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0198833083, 9780198833086

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Kathleen Gutman
Janek Tomasz Nowak

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OXFORD EU LAW LIBRARY General Editors:

ROBERT SCHÜTZE Professor of European and Global Law, Durham Law School and Co-Director, Global Policy Institute, Durham Law School

PIET EECKHOUT Professor of EU Law, University College London and Academic Director of the European Institute

EU Procedural Law

OX F O R D E U L AW L I B R A RY The aim of the series is to publish important and original studies of the various branches of EU law. Each work provides a clear, concise, and critical exposition of the law in its social, economic, and political context, at a level which will interest the advanced student, the practitioner, the academic, and government officials. OTHER TITLES IN THE LIBRARY Directives in EC Law Second Edition Sacha Prechal

EC Agricultural Law Second Edition John A. Usher

EC Company Law Vanessa Edwards

EC Tax Law Paul Farmer, Richard Lyal EU Anti-Discrimination Law Second Edition Evelyn Ellis, Philippa Watson EU Constitutional Law Koen Lenaerts, Piet Van Nuffel, Tim Corthaut EU Customs Law Third Edition Timothy Lyons Principles and Practice in EU Sports Law Stephen Weatherill EU Justice and Home Affairs Law Fourth Edition Steve Peers EU Procedural Law Koen Lenaerts, Ignace Maselis, Kathleen Gutman, Janek Tomasz Nowak

EU Procedural Law Second Edition KO E N L E NA E RT S KAT H L E E N G U T M A N JA N E K T OM A S Z N OWA K

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak 2023 The moral rights of the authors have been asserted First Edition published in 2014 Second Edition published in 2023 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer Public sector information reproduced under Open Government Licence v3.0 (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/open-government-licence.htm) Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Control Number: 2023932454 ISBN 978–0–19–883308–6 DOI: 10.1093/law/9780198833086.001.0001 Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work.

Preface This book explains how to enforce Union law in court. It sets out the remedies available to enforce Union law rights and the mechanisms affording judicial protection against unlawful action on the part of Union institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies. It is directly oriented towards legal practice. Accordingly, competition law, State aid, and anti-dumping law are dealt with in separate sections wherever it was felt appropriate to provide guidance as to how the available remedies work concretely in those fields. Considerable attention is given to the central role played by the national courts in the European Union legal order, both in deciding cases alone and in dialogue with the Court of Justice through the preliminary ruling procedure. Additionally, the various actions which can be brought before the Court of Justice and the General Court are analysed. This book reflects the state of the law on 1 May 2023. Two remarks should be made in that respect. First, the Court of Justice has recently submitted a request to amend the Treaties, with a view to establishing the preliminary ruling jurisdiction of the General Court in specific areas and to extending the scope of the preliminary admission mechanism for appeals brought against decisions of the General Court. As this book takes account of such developments, we have decided to proceed with its publication without waiting for the formal adoption of the relevant rules on these matters. Second, since 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union has used a citation method for its case-law based on the ECLI (European Case-Law Identifier). This book relies on that method in referring to such case-law in the Table of Cases. Nevertheless, this book employs an abbreviated citation method in the chapter footnotes to save space and enhance readability. Finally, all views expressed in this book are our own. Koen Lenaerts Kathleen Gutman Janek Tomasz Nowak

Summary Contents Contents Table of Cases List of Abbreviations

1. General Introduction

ix xix cxli 1

PA RT I : T H E J U D IC IA L O R G A N I Z AT IO N O F T H E E U R O P E A N U N IO N 2. The Union Judicial System

13

3. Cooperation between National Courts and the Court of Justice: The Reference for a Preliminary Ruling

49

4. Union Law and National Procedures and Remedies

117

PA RT I I : E N F O R C E M E N T O F U N IO N L AW 5. The Action for Infringement of Union Law by a Member State

175

6. Preliminary Rulings on the Interpretation of Union Law

235

PA RT I I I : P R O T E C T IO N AG A I N ST U N IO N AC T S 7. The Action for Annulment

275

8. The Action for Failure to Act

411

9. The Objection of Illegality

433

10. Preliminary Rulings on the Validity of Union Acts

447

11. The Action for Damages

473

12. Application for an Opinion on the Compatibility with the Treaties of an International Agreement to Be Concluded by the Union

521

PA RT I V: SP E C IA L F O R M S O F P R O C E D U R E 13. Proceedings for Interim Measures Before the Union Courts

535

14. Proceedings for Authorization to Serve a Garnishee Order on the Union

565

15. Jurisdiction of the Union Courts to Give Judgment pursuant to an Arbitration Clause or a Special Agreement

569

viii Summary Contents

16. Proceedings Brought by Officials and Other Servants of the Union (Staff Cases)

589

17. Jurisdiction of the Union Courts over Disputes Relating to Intellectual Property Rights

615

18. Unlimited Jurisdiction of the Union Courts in Respect of Actions Relating to Sanctions

633

19. Appeals

643

20. The Review Procedure

671

21. Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice under Conventions Concluded by the Member States

679

PA RT V: P R O C E DU R E B E F O R E T H E U N IO N C O U RT S 22. Start of the Procedure

691

23. Incidental Elements of the Procedure

733

24. Main Elements of the Procedure

769

25. Conclusion of the Procedure

805

Index

829

Contents Table of Cases List of Abbreviations

1. General Introduction

I. EU Procedural Law II. The System of Judicial Protection in Context

III. Challenges to the System of Judicial Protection

IV. Structure of the Book V. Texts Governing the Procedure before the Union Courts

A. The complete and coherent system of judicial protection B. Union based on the rule of law C. Role of the national courts D. Two-fold task of the Union Courts A. The former Treaty framework B. The present Treaty framework post-Lisbon

xix cxli

1.01 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10

PA RT I : T H E J U D IC IA L O R G A N I Z AT IO N O F T H E E U R O P E A N U N IO N 2. The Union Judicial System

I. The National Courts

A. General B. Primary role C. Essential requirements which national courts must fulfil

II. The Court of Justice of the European Union III. The Court of Justice

IV. The General Court

V. Specialized Courts

A. Composition B. Internal organization C. Basic functions A. Composition B. Internal organization C. Basic function

A. General overview B. The European Union Civil Service Tribunal

VI. Allocation of Jurisdiction among the Union Courts

A. Historical evolution B. The present allocation of jurisdiction

2.01 2.01 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.05 2.11 2.22 2.24 2.24 2.30 2.36 2.38 2.38 2.39 2.40 2.40 2.50

x Contents

3. Cooperation between National Courts and the Court of Justice: The Reference for a Preliminary Ruling

I. General Overview

A. Introduction B. Objectives of the preliminary ruling procedure C. Sole power of the Court of Justice to declare a Union act invalid D. Topics to be discussed

II. The Initiative for Requesting a Preliminary Ruling

A. What is a ‘court or tribunal of a Member State’? B. Types of proceedings in which a preliminary ruling may be requested C. Power to request a preliminary ruling D. Content of a request for a preliminary ruling E. Timing of a request for a preliminary ruling F. Annulment of a request for a preliminary ruling

III. Determination of the Relevance of the Request for a Preliminary Ruling

IV. The Duty to Request a Preliminary Ruling

A. Task of the national court B. The limits set by Union law

A. General B. What national courts and tribunals are involved? C. Decisions against which there is no judicial remedy under national law D. Limits placed on the duty to request a preliminary ruling E. Enforcement of the obligation to request a preliminary ruling F. Obligation to request a preliminary ruling praeter legem

V. Requests for a Preliminary Ruling in the Context of Composite Administrative Procedures

4. Union Law and National Procedures and Remedies

I. General Overview

A. Introduction B. Importance of national procedural rules and remedies C. Europeanization and `national procedural autonomy’ D. Topics to be discussed

II. The Union Law Framework Governing National Procedures and Remedies

A. The principles of equivalence, effectiveness, and sincere cooperation sensu stricto B. The rule of law and Art. 19(1) TEU C. The principle of effective judicial protection and Art. 47 of the Charter D. Full effectiveness and practical effect of Union law E. Union legislation F. Relationship between different expressions of Art. 4(3) TEU

A. General overview B. Constraints upon the freedom of the Member States to provide remedies C. Union remedies

A. Before going to court B. Access to court C. Conduct of proceedings

III. The Obligation to Provide Effective Remedies

IV. Requirements Imposed upon National Procedural Rules

3.01 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.04 3.05 3.05 3.13 3.16 3.19 3.24 3.26 3.28 3.28 3.31 3.39 3.39 3.40 3.44 3.46 3.52 3.56 3.59 4.01 4.01 4.02 4.03 4.04 4.05 4.06 4.10 4.11 4.12 4.13 4.14 4.15 4.15 4.16 4.17 4.22 4.22 4.23 4.31

Contents xi

D. End of proceedings E. After proceedings have ended

V. Some Fields of Application

A. Recovery of unlawful charges B. Recovery of unlawful State aid C. Claims based on a directive not implemented in time D. Damages action against a Member State for breach of Union law E. Damages actions against private parties for breach of Union (competition) law F. Legal protection in proceedings for interim relief

4.48 4.50 4.53 4.54 4.63 4.64 4.65 4.72 4.75

PA RT I I : E N F O R C E M E N T O F U N IO N L AW 5. The Action for Infringement of Union Law by a Member State

I. Subject-Matter

A. General overview B. Failure of a Member State to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties C. Relationship with special legal procedures to obtain a declaration that a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations under Union law

II. Identity of the Parties

III. Special Characteristics

IV. Consequences

A. Applicants B. Defendants C. Intervening parties D. Brexit

A. The pre-litigation stage of the procedure B. The stage of the procedure before the Court of Justice

A. Result of the action B. Legal force of the judgment declaring that a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations C. Sanctions for failure to comply with the judgment D. Sanctions under Art. 260(3) TFEU E. Enforcement of the Court’s judgment imposing pecuniary sanctions F. New failure to comply with the judgment

6. Preliminary Rulings on the Interpretation of Union Law

I. Subject-Matter

A. General overview B. Rules of which an interpretation can be sought

II. Special Characteristics

A. Content of a preliminary ruling on interpretation B. Limits placed on the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice C. Reference back to the national court D. Jurisdiction of the national court

III. Consequences

A. As regards the national court deciding the case at issue in the main proceedings B. As regards national courts generally C. Temporal effects

5.01 5.01 5.05 5.22 5.32 5.32 5.38 5.42 5.43 5.44 5.44 5.55 5.75 5.75 5.76 5.81 5.86 5.88 5.89 6.01 6.01 6.03 6.19 6.19 6.21 6.30 6.31 6.32 6.32 6.35 6.38

xii Contents

PA RT I I I : P R O T E C T IO N AG A I N ST U N IO N AC T S 7. The Action for Annulment

I. Subject-Matter

A. General overview B. The reviewable act C. The reviewable act: some fields of application

II. Identity of the Parties

III. Special Characteristics

A. Defendants B. Applicants

A. Other admissibility requirements B. Grounds for annulment C. Conduct during the administrative procedure and admissibility of pleas in judicial proceedings D. Standard of review in competition cases

A. Result of an application for annulment B. Authority of the declaration of nullity

IV. Consequences

8. The Action for Failure to Act

I. Subject-Matter

A. General overview B. Subject-matter of the action for failure to act C. Relationship between the actions for failure to act and for annulment

II. Identity of the Parties

III. Special Characteristics

IV. Consequences

A. Applicants B. Defendants

A. Pre-litigation procedure B. Procedure before the Union Courts

9. The Objection of Illegality

I. Subject-Matter

A. General overview B. Acts against which an objection of illegality may be raised

II. Identity of the Parties

III. Special Characteristics

IV. Consequences

A. Natural and legal persons B. Member States and Union institutions C. Union bodies, offices, and agencies D. Objection raised by the parties and exceptionally by the Union Courts A. Special requirements for admissibility B. Actions in which an objection of illegality may be raised C. Pleas in law

10. Preliminary Rulings on the Validity of Union Acts

I. Subject-Matter

A. General overview B. Acts of which the legality can be reviewed

7.01 7.01 7.05 7.26 7.70 7.70 7.77 7.146 7.146 7.161 7.195 7.199 7.216 7.216 7.220 8.01 8.01 8.04 8.09 8.11 8.11 8.15 8.17 8.17 8.23 8.26 9.01 9.01 9.05 9.10 9.11 9.12 9.13 9.14 9.15 9.15 9.17 9.19 9.20 10.01 10.01 10.03

Contents xiii

II. Special Characteristics

A. Review of legality of Union acts reserved to the Court of Justice under Foto-Frost B. Differences compared with an action for annulment C. Grounds on which validity may be contested D. Assessment of validity normally based on the situation existing when Union act was adopted E. Finding of facts necessary to assess the legality of a given Union act

III. Consequences

A. Ruling of the Court of Justice B. Definitive effect of a declaration of invalidity C. Consequences of the declaration of invalidity in the national legal order D. Declaration of invalidity comparable to declaration of nullity E. Temporal effects F. Exceptional limitation of temporal effects

11. The Action for Damages

I. Subject-Matter

A. General overview B. Notion of Union non-contractual liability C. Role in the system of judicial protection

II. Identity of the Parties

III. Special Characteristics

IV. Consequences

A. Applicants B. Defendants

A. General overview B. Substantive requirements C. Limitation period

A. Judgment holding the Union liable B. Judgment dismissing the action for damages

12. Application for an Opinion on the Compatibility with the Treaties of an International Agreement to Be Concluded by the Union

I. Subject-Matter

A. General overview B. The expression ‘agreement envisaged’

II. Identity of the Parties

III. Special Characteristics

IV. Consequences

A. Applicants B. No obligation

A. Extent of the jurisdiction to give opinions B. The request for an opinion C. Procedure before the Court

A. Adverse opinion B. Favourable opinion C. Declaratory opinion

10.13 10.13 10.14 10.15 10.16 10.17 10.18 10.18 10.19 10.20 10.21 10.22 10.23 11.01 11.01 11.06 11.12 11.17 11.17 11.22 11.35 11.35 11.38 11.62 11.71 11.71 11.73

12.01 12.01 12.06 12.09 12.09 12.10 12.11 12.11 12.14 12.17 12.19 12.19 12.20 12.21

xiv Contents

PA RT I V: SP E C IA L F O R M S O F P R O C E D U R E 13. Proceedings for Interim Measures Before the Union Courts

I. Subject-Matter

A. Objective B. Types of interim measures C. The ancillary nature of proceedings for interim measures D. The provisional nature of interim measures

II. Identity of the Parties

III. Special Characteristics

IV. Consequences

A. Applicants B. Defendants

A. Competent Judge B. Procedure before the Union Courts C. Admissibility Requirements D. Substantive requirements

A. Provisional nature B. Compliance C. Costs D. Appeal

14. Proceedings for Authorization to Serve a Garnishee Order on the Union

I. Subject-Matter

A. Principle and purpose B. Competent Union Court

II. Identity of the Parties

III. Special Characteristics

A. Applicants B. Defendants

A. Automatic immunity B. Limited jurisdiction C. Applications

15. Jurisdiction of the Union Courts to Give Judgment pursuant to an Arbitration Clause or a Special Agreement

I. Art. 272 TFEU

II. Art. 273 TFEU

A. Subject-matter B. Identity of the parties C. Special characteristics D. Consequences A. Subject-matter B. Identity of the parties C. Special characteristics D. Consequences

16. Proceedings Brought by Officials and Other Servants of the Union (Staff Cases)

I. Subject-Matter

13.01 13.01 13.02 13.05 13.12 13.15 13.15 13.18 13.21 13.21 13.22 13.23 13.28 13.39 13.39 13.40 13.41 13.42

14.01 14.01 14.02 14.03 14.03 14.04 14.05 14.05 14.06 14.07

15.01 15.01 15.14 15.16 15.22 15.23 15.23 15.26 15.30 15.33

16.01

Contents xv

A. General overview B. Against what measures will an action lie?

II. Identity of the Parties

III. Special Characteristics

IV. Consequences

A. Applicants B. Defendants

A. The requirement for a pre-litigation procedure B. Priority of an action brought under Art. 270 TFEU

A. Decision of the General Court B. Appeal

17. Jurisdiction of the Union Courts over Disputes Relating to Intellectual Property Rights

I. Subject-Matter

A. General overview B. System of Legal Protection

II. Identity of the Parties

III. Special Characteristics

IV. Consequences

A. Defendants B. Applicants

A. Pleas in law B. Time-limits C. Content of the application

A. Successful action B. Action dismissed C. Appeal

18. Unlimited Jurisdiction of the Union Courts in Respect of Actions Relating to Sanctions

I. Subject-Matter

A. Legal basis B. Objective C. Extent of unlimited jurisdiction

II. Identity of the Parties III. Special Characteristics

IV. Consequences

A. Review of the sanction B. Reasonableness of the sanction C. Criteria D. Role of the Court of Justice on appeal

19. Appeals

I. Subject-Matter

A. General overview B. Appeals are confined to points of law C. Decisions of the General Court against which an appeal will lie

II. Identity of the Parties A. Appellants B. Interveners

16.01 16.03 16.08 16.08 16.11 16.13 16.13 16.28 16.29 16.29 16.30

17.01 17.01 17.02 17.09 17.09 17.11 17.12 17.12 17.19 17.20 17.21 17.21 17.22 17.23

18.01 18.01 18.02 18.03 18.04 18.05 18.05 18.06 18.07 18.08 18.09 19.01 19.01 19.02 19.12 19.14 19.14 19.15

xvi Contents

C. Member States and Union institutions D. Respondents

A. Procedure B. Appeal must be sufficiently detailed C. Pleas D. Injury suffered as a result of the bringing of the appeal E. Measures of inquiry F. Time-limits

A. No suspensory effect B. Dismissal of the appeal C. Successful appeal D. Consequences of a successful appeal

III. Special Characteristics

IV. Consequences

20. The Review Procedure

I. Subject-Matter II. Special Characteristics

A. Determination whether there is a serious risk of the unity or consistency of Union law being affected B. Procedure

III. Consequences

21. Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice under Conventions Concluded by the Member States

I. Subject-Matter

A. General overview B. What conventions are involved?

II. Special Characteristics

A. Jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings B. Direct actions

III. Procedure before the Court of Justice IV. Consequences A. Preliminary references B. Direct actions

19.16 19.17 19.18 19.18 19.21 19.22 19.26 19.27 19.28 19.29 19.29 19.30 19.32 19.33 20.01 20.02 20.02 20.04 20.09

21.01 21.01 21.02 21.06 21.06 21.09 21.12 21.13 21.13 21.14

PA RT V: P R O C E DU R E B E F O R E T H E U N IO N C O U RT S 22. Start of the Procedure

I. Act Initiating the Procedure

A. The order for reference B. The application in direct actions C. The appeal

II. Methods of Service

A. Service of procedural documents B. Service of the order for reference C. Service of the application D. Service of the appeal E. Service by e-Curia

22.01 22.01 22.05 22.31 22.32 22.32 22.33 22.36 22.37 22.38

Contents xvii

III. Language Arrangements

IV. Representation

A. Language of a case B. Internal language arrangements at the Court of Justice of the European Union A. General B. Rights and obligations

V. Time-Limits

A. Distinction between procedural time-limits and limitation periods B. Preliminary objection C. Main steps in the calculation of procedural time-limits D. Dies a quo E. Starting point in case of publication F. Duration of the period G. Extension of ten days on account of distance H. Dies ad quem I. The Court of Justice of the European Union is never closed J. Lodgement at the Registry K. Lodgement by telefax, e-Curia, or any other means of communication L. Excusable error, unforeseeable circumstances, or force majeure

VI. Legal Aid

A. Legal aid in preliminary ruling proceedings B. Legal aid in direct actions C. Legal aid in appeals

23. Incidental Elements of the Procedure

I. Intervention

A. Aim of intervention B. Substantive requirements C. Formal requirements D. No intervention in preliminary ruling proceedings

II. Expedited and Urgent Procedures

A. Expedited and urgent preliminary ruling procedures B. The expedited procedure in direct actions

III. Confidentiality

A. General B. Materials that are the outcome of a measure of inquiry C. Intervening parties D. Joinder of cases E. Actions in which a request for access to documents is at issue F. Exceptional regime relating to the security of the Union or its Member States, or the conduct of their international relations G. Confidentiality in appeals

A. Preliminary issues B. Discontinuance C. Withdrawal of the reference for a preliminary ruling D. No need to proceed to judgment

IV. Preliminary Issues, Discontinuance, Withdrawal of Reference, and No Need to Proceed to Judgment

22.39 22.39 22.50 22.53 22.53 22.59 22.63 22.63 22.64 22.65 22.66 22.67 22.68 22.69 22.70 22.71 22.72 22.73 22.74 22.74 22.75 22.76 22.81 23.01 23.01 23.04 23.14 23.23 23.24 23.24 23.42 23.45 23.45 23.46 23.47 23.48 23.49 23.50 23.51 23.52 23.52 23.59 23.61 23.62

xviii Contents

24. Main Elements of the Procedure

I. Procedures for Dealing with Cases

A. General B. Joinder of cases C. Stay of proceedings D. Deferment of the determination of a case

II. Written Part of the Procedure

A. Lodging of procedural documents B. Particularities regarding preliminary ruling proceedings C. Particularities regarding direct actions D. Particularities regarding appeal

III. The Preliminary Report and Assignment of Cases

IV. Measures of Organization of Procedure and Measures of Inquiry

A. General B. Preliminary ruling proceedings

A. Burden of proof on the parties and role played by the Union Courts in fact-finding B. Measures of organization of procedure C. Measures of inquiry

V. Oral Part of the Procedure

A. Opening of the oral part of the procedure B. Participation C. Course of the oral procedure D. Reopening of the oral procedure

25. Conclusion of the Procedure

I. Judgments and Orders

A. The judgment or order B. Content and formal requirements C. Legal force

II. Judgments by Default and Applications to Set Them Aside A. Default judgment B. Application to set aside a default judgment C. Consequences

III. Procedure When Case Is Referred Back to the General Court IV. Costs

V. Exceptional Procedures Relating to Judgments and Orders

Index

A. Costs in preliminary ruling proceedings B. Costs in direct actions A. General B. Preliminary ruling proceedings C. Direct actions

24.01 24.01 24.05 24.08 24.10 24.11 24.11 24.22 24.25 24.41 24.44 24.44 24.45 24.46 24.46 24.53 24.55 24.64 24.64 24.68 24.69 24.75 25.01 25.01 25.04 25.09 25.11 25.11 25.12 25.13 25.14 25.15 25.15 25.16 25.27 25.27 25.28 25.32

829

Table of Cases

COURT OF JUSTICE 1/54, France v High Authority, EU:C:1954:7�� 7.162, 7.173 2/54, Italy v High Authority, EU:C:1954:8�� 7.173, 22.17 6/54, Netherlands v High Authority, EU:C:1955:5�� 4.46, 7.162, 7.172 7/54 and 9/54, Groupement des industries sidérurgiques Luxembourgeoises v High Authority, EU:C:1956:2��24.07 5/55, Assider v High Authority, EU:C:1955:8�� 25.51, 25.53 9/55, Société des charbonnages de Beeringen v High Authority, EU:C:1956:12��22.15 10/55, Mirossevich v High Authority, EU:C:1956:14��24.47 1/56, Bourgaux v Common Assembly, EU:C:1956:15��15.08 2/56, Geitling Ruhrkohlen-Verkaufsgesellschaft and Others v High Authority, EU:C:1957:4��7.180 7/56 and 3/57 to 7/57, Algera and Others v Common Assembly, EU:C:1957:7 ��7.10 8/56, Alma v High Authority, EU:C:1957:12��18.08 9/56, Meroni v High Authority, EU:C:1958:7�� 7.168, 10.06 1/57 and 14/57, Usines à tubes de la Sarre v High Authority, EU:C:1957:13��7.10, 7.11 2/57, Compagnie des hauts fourneaux de Chasse v High Authority, EU:C:1958:5�� 7.191, 7.192 13/57, Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen-und Stahlindustrie v High Authority, EU:C:1958:10 ��22.07 15/57, Compagnie des hauts fourneaux de Chasse v High Authority, EU:C:1958:6��7.191 18/57, Nold v High Authority, EU:C:1959:6��7.162 3/58 to 18/58, 25/58 and 26/58, Erzbergbau v High Authority, EU:C:1960:18��13.24 20/58, Phoenix-Rheinrohr v High Authority, EU:C:1959:14 ��7.21 21/58, Felten & Guilleaume v High Authority, EU:C:1959:15��22.07 24/58 and 34/58, Chambre syndicale de la sidérurgie de l’est de la France v High Authority, EU:C:1960:32��23.52 32/58 and 33/58, Snupat v High Authority, EU:C:1959:18 ��9.17 14/59, Société des fonderies de Pont-à-Mousson v High Authority, EU:C:1959:31�� 7.162, 24.63 30/59, De gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v High Authority, EU:C:1961:2��23.03 36/59 to 38/59 and 40/59, Präsident Ruhrkohlen-Verkaufsgesellschaft and Others v High Authority, EU:C:1960:36��24.06 42/59 and 49/59, Snupat v High Authority, EU:C:1961:5 �� 7.19, 7.75, 23.03, 24.63 42/59-TO and 49/59-TO, Breedband v Société des Aciéries du Temple and Others, EU:C:1962:24��25.33 43/59, 45/59 and 48/59, Von Lachmüller and Others v Commission, EU:C:1960:37 ��13.31 44/59, Fiddelaar v Commission, EU:C:1960:47 ��13.31 46/59 and 47/59, Meroni and Others v High Authority, EU:C:1962:44��22.19 1/60 REVI, Acciaieria Ferriera di Roma v High Authority, EU:C:1960:22 ��25.43 9/60-TO and 12/60-TO, Vloeberghs v High Authority, EU:C:1962:25�� 25.33, 25.35 14/60, 16/60, 17/60, 20/60, 24/60, 26/60 and 27/60, Meroni and Others v High Authority, EU:C:1961:16��9.20 19/60, 21/60, 2/61 and 3/61, Société Fives Lille Cail and Others v High Authority, EU:C:1962:1��22.15 13/61, De Geus, EU:C:1962:11�� 3.20, 3.27, 6.19 21/61 to 26/61, Meroni and Others v High Authority, EU:C:1962:12 ��8.10 4/62 SA, Hübner v High Authority, EU:C:1962:9��14.04 18/62, Barge v High Authority, EU:C:1963:56��7.189

xx Table of Cases 19/62, Fédération nationale de la boucherie en gros and Others v Council, EU:C:1962:48 ��5.88 25/62, Plaumann v Commission, EU:C:1963:17�� 7.86, 7.99, 7.118 26/62, van Gend & Loos, EU:C:1963:1�� 2.02, 3.41, 4.02, 4.14, 24.68 28/62 to 30/62, Da Costa en Schaake and Others, EU:C:1963:6��3.41, 3.48 31/62 and 33/62, Wöhrmann v Commission, EU:C:1962:49 �� 3.16, 7.158 15/63, Lasalle v Parliament, EU:C:1964:9��23.04 18/63, Schmitz v EEC, EU:C:1964:15�� 16.11, 22.11 26/63, Pistoj v Commission, EU:C:1964:53��16.04 64/63 SA, Potvin v Commission, EU:C:1963:13��14.04 73/63 and 74/63, Internationale Crediet-en Handelsvereniging Rotterdam and Others, EU:C:1964:8��10.15 78/63, Huber v Commission, EU:C:1964:54��16.05 83/63, Krawczynski v Commission, EU:C:1965:70 ��22.19 90/63 and 91/63, Commission v Luxembourg and Belgium, EU:C:1964:80��7.20 101/63, Wagner, EU:C:1964:28��3.20 106/63 and 107/63, Toepfer v Commission , EU:C:1965:65 �� 7.97, 7.100 108/63, Officine Ellettromeccaniche Merlini v High Authority, EU:C:1965:4��24.13 111/63, Lemmerz Werke v High Authority, EU:C:1965:76��23.08 6/64, Costa, EU:C:1964:34��6.19, 6.23 12/64 and 29/64, Ley v Commission, EU:C:1965:28 ��24.38 20/64, Albatros, EU:C:1965:8��6.19 21/64, Macchiorlati Dalmas e Figli v High Authority, EU:C:1965:30��7.172 23/64, Vandevyvere v Parliament, EU:C:1965:31��16.08 26/64, Rosenstiel-Schwarz v High Authority, EU:C:1964:62 ��3.41 45/64, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1969:58��24.47 55/64, Lens v Court of Justice, EU:C:1965:113��22.19 8/65, Acciaierie e Ferriere Pugliese v High Authority, EU:C:1966:5��7.181 16/65, Schwarze, EU:C:1965:117 ��3.02, 3.20, 6.19, 7.180, 10.15 18/65 R, Gutmann v Commission, EU:C:1965:41�� 13.05, 13.13 25/65 and 26/65, Simet and Others v High Authority, EU:C:1967:13 ��7.07 28/65, Fonzi v Commission, EU:C:1966:57��23.52 32/65, Italy v Council and Commission, EU:C:1966:42��9.09, 9.12 44/65, Singer, EU:C:1965:122��10.14 48/65, Lütticke v Commission, EU:C:1966:8 ��5.36, 5.37 59/65, Schreckenberg v Commission, EU:C:1966:60��11.14 61/65, Vaassen-Goebbels, EU:C:1966:39��3.05 62/65, Serio v Commission, EU:C:1966:61��22.15 3/66, Alfieri v Parliament, EU:C:1966:55��4.41 5/66, 7/66 and 13/66 to 24/66, Kampffmeyer and Others v Commission, EU:C:1967:31�� 11.34, 11.42, 11.70 24/66 bis, Getreidehandel v Commission, EU:C:1973:163��25.51 29/66 R, Gutmann v Commission, EU:C:1966:52��13.32 30/66, Becher v Commission, EU:C:1967:44 ��11.34 4/67, Collignon v Commission, EU:C:1967:51��11.14 5/67, Beus, EU:C:1968:13 ��10.17 13/67, Becher, EU:C:1968:26�� 6.33, 25.28 5/68, Sayag and Zurich, EU:C:1968:42��11.28 7/68, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1968:51�� 5.01, 5.66, 5.71 10/68 and 18/68, Eridania and Others v Commission, EU:C:1969:66�� 7.97, 8.06, 8.10 13/68, Salgoil, EU:C:1968:54��3.28, 6.19 29/68, Milch-, Fett-und Eierkontor, EU:C:1969:27��6.32, 6.33 30/68, Lacroix v Commission, EU:C:1970:46�� 7.07, 22.13 31/68, Chanel v Cepeha, EU:C:1970:52��3.27 4/69, Lütticke v Commission, EU:C:1971:40 �� 11.13, 11.40, 22.15

Table of Cases xxi 6/69 and 11/69, Commission v France, EU:C:1969:68��5.72 7/69, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1970:15��5.60 9/69, Sayag and Zurich, EU:C:1969:37�� 11.07, 11.26 28/69, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1970:26��5.18 29/69, Stauder, EU:C:1969:57��3.14 31/69, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1970:10��5.14, 5.35 33/69, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1970:14��5.74 41/69, Chemiefarma v Commission, EU:C:1970:71 �� 7.30, 7.174 48/69, ICI v Commission, EU:C:1972:70�� 7.157, 7.171, 7.185 50/69 R, Germany v Commission, EU:C:1969:42 ��13.03 56/69, Hoechst v Commission, EU:C:1972:77 ��7.180 69/69, Alcan v Commission, EU:C:1970:53 ��7.97 8/70, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1970:94��5.10, 5.40 15/70, Chevalley v Commission, EU:C:1970:95��8.09 18/70, Duraffour v Council, EU:C:1971:515��16.08 22/70, Commission v Council, EU:C:1971:32��7.11, 7.14, 7.17, 7.172, 7.218, 10.05 25/70, Köster, EU:C:1970:115��7.168 40/70, Sirena, EU:C:1979:236��6.33 48/70, Bernardi v Parliament, EU:C:1971:28 ��7.171 56/70-REVI, Mandelli v Commission, EU:C:1971:4��25.43 59/70, Netherlands v Commission, EU:C:1971:77��8.19 62/70, Bock v Commission, EU:C:1971:108�� 7.97, 7.100 1/71 SA, X v Commission, EU:C:1971:48��14.01, 14.03, 14.04, 14.05 2/71 SA, X v Commission, EU:C:1971:54��14.04 7/71, Commission v France, EU:C:1971:121��5.66 8/71, Deutscher Komponistenverband v Commission, EU:C:1971:82��6.22 9/71 and 11/71, Compagnie d’approvisionnement, de transport et de crédit and Others v Commission, EU:C:1972:52��11.32 15/71, Mackprang v Commission, EU:C:1971:98��11.40 24/71, Meinhardt v Commission, EU:C:1972:37��16.08 35/71, Schleswig-Holsteinische Landwirtschaftliche Hauptgenossenschaft, EU:C:1971:126 ��11.44 37/71, Jamet v Commission, EU:C:1972:57��7.217 40/71, Richez-Parise v Commission, EU:C:1972:9��25.45 42/71, Nordgetreide v Commission, EU:C:1972:16�� 7.15, 7.103 43/71, Politi, EU:C:1971:122��3.24 44/71, Marcato v Commission, EU:C:1972:53 ��16.15 48/71, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1972:65��5.76 96/71, Haegemann v Commission, EU:C:1972:88�� 3.29, 11.31 6/72, Europemballage and Continental Can v Commission, EU:C:1975:50��7.155 11/72, Giordano v Commission, EU:C:1973:39��11.70 13/72, Netherlands v Commission, EU:C:1973:4��7.180 21/72 to 24/72, International Fruit Company and Others, EU:C:1972:115�� 7.188, 10.14 39/72, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1973:13�� 5.02, 5.20, 5.63, 5.79 41/72, Getreide-Import-Gesellschaft, EU:C:1973:2��10.15 43/72, Merkur v Commission, EU:C:1973:108��11.32 48/72, Brasserie de Haecht, EU:C:1973:11��7.30 58/72 and 75/72, Perinciolo v Council, EU:C:1973:52��7.171 63/72 to 69/72, Werhahn Hansamuehle and Others v Council, EU:C:1973:121 �� 11.22, 11.45 70/72, Commission v Germany, EU:C:1973:87 ��5.24, 5.75 6/73 and 7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial Solvents v Commission, EU:C:1974:18��18.06 9/73, Schlüter, EU:C:1973:110��6.10 15/73 to 33/73, 52/73, 53/73, 57/73 to 109/73, 116/73, 117/73, 123/73, 132/73 and 135/73 to 137/73, Kortner and Others v Council and Others, EU:C:1974:16��9.20

xxii Table of Cases 34/73, Fratelli Variola, EU:C:1973:101��5.20 36/73, Nederlandse Spoorwegen, EU:C:1973:130 ��3.07 41/73‑ITRP, 43/73‑ITRP and 44/73‑ITRP, Générale sucrière and Béghin-Say v Commission and Others, EU:C:1977:41��25.57 112/73, 144/73 and 145/73, Campogrande v Commission, EU:C:1974:97��24.05 120/73, Lorenz, EU:C:1973:152 ��5.25 130/73, Vandeweghe and Others, EU:C:1973:131��6.18 146/73, Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf, EU:C:1974:12��3.27 153/73, Holz & Willemsen v Council and Commission, EU:C:1974:70 ��11.32 166/73, Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf, EU:C:1974:3�� 3.01, 3.04, 3.16 167/73, Commission v France, EU:C:1974:35��5.18 169/73, Compagnie Continentale France v Council, EU:C:1975:13 �� 11.22, 11.61 173/73, Italy v Commission, EU:C:1974:71��5.24 175/73, Union Syndicale and Others v Council, EU:C:1974:95�� 7.84, 16.10 181/73, Haegemann, EU:C:1974:41�� 6.15, 7.188 188/73, Grassi v Council, EU:C:1974:112��22.19 17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Association v Commission, EU:C:1974:106��7.175 18/74, Syndicat général du personnel des organismes européens v Commission, EU:C:1974:96�� 7.84, 16.10 19/74 and 20/74, Kali und Salz and Kali-Chemie v Commission, EU:C:1975:58��24.05 20/74 R, Kali-Chemie v Commission, EU:C:1974:33 ��13.13 26/74, Roquette Frères v Commission, EU:C:1976:69�� 11.31, 11.33, 11.57 32/74, Haaga, EU:C:1974:116��3.14 56/74 to 60/74, Kampffmeyer and Others v EEC, EU:C:1976:78�� 11.54, 11.65 68/74, Alaimo, EU:C:1975:11��6.35 71/74, Fruit-en Groentenimporthandel and Frubo v Commission, EU:C:1975:61��13.04 72/74, Union syndicale and Others v Council, EU:C:1975:43 ��11.19 73/74, Papiers Peints v Commission, EU:C:1975:160 ��7.180 74/74, CNTA v Commission, EU:C:1976:84��22.17 79/74, Küster v Parliament, EU:C:1975:85 ��16.05 90/74, Deboeck v Commission, EU:C:1975:128�� 16.07, 16.08 99/74, Société des grands moulins des Antilles v Commission, EU:C:1975:161 ��11.32 100/74, CAM v Commission, EU:C:1975:152 ��7.102 9/75, Meyer-Burckhardt v Commission, EU:C:1975:131 ��16.28 23/75, Rey Soda, EU:C:1975:142 �� 3.14, 10.20 43/75, Defrenne, EU:C:1976:56 ��6.39 52/75, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1976:29��5.71 58/75, Sergy v Commission, EU:C:1976:102�� 11.61, 16.22 59/75, Manghera and Others, EU:C:1976:14��10.09 109/75 R, National Carbonising Company v Commission, EU:C:1975:133��13.03 110/75, Mills v EIB, EU:C:1976:152��16.09 113/75, Frecassetti, EU:C:1976:89 ��6.10 1/76, Wack v Commission, EU:C:1976:91��7.168 5/76, Jänsch v Commission, EU:C:1977:163��7.155 15/76 and 16/76, France v Commission, EU:C:1979:29�� 5.01, 7.55, 7.197 23/76, Pellegrini and Others v Commission and Others, EU:C:1976:174�� 7.193, 15.16 26/76, Metro v Commission, EU:C:1977:167��7.39, 7.88 27/76, United Brands v Commission, EU:C:1978:22�� 7.201, 7.217 33/76, Rewe, EU:C:1976:188�� 4.03, 4.06, 4.55 44/76, Eier-Kontor v Council and Commission, EU:C:1977:37��22.09 45/76, Comet, EU:C:1976:191�� 4.03, 4.06, 4.55 50/76, Amsterdam Bulb, EU:C:1977:13��5.20 52/76, Benedetti, EU:C:1977:16��3.23, 6.32 62/76, Strehl, EU:C:1977:18 ��10.15

Table of Cases xxiii 64/76, 113/76, 167/78, 239/78, 27/79, 28/79 and 45/79, Dumortier and Others v Council, EU:C:1982:185 �� 11.45, 11.56, 11.59 83/76, 94/76, 4/77, 5/77 and 40/77, Bayerische HNL Vermehrungsbetriebe and Others v Council and Commission, EU:C:1978:113 ��11.45 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, EU:C:1979:36��7.175 88/76, Exportation des Sucres v Commission, EU:C:1977:61��7.143 101/76, Koniklijke Scholten Honig v Council and Commission, EU:C:1977:70 ��7.86 107/76, Hoffmann-Laroche, EU:C:1977:89�� 3.14, 3.41, 3.42 112/76, Manzoni, EU:C:1977:152��3.58, 6.37 5/77, Tedeschi, EU:C:1977:144�� 3.28, 7.168 25/77, De Roubaix v Commission, EU:C:1978:100��16.05 34/77, Oslizlok v Commission, EU:C:1978:101��7.07 54/77, Herpels v Commission, EU:C:1978:45��16.21 61/77 R, Commission v Ireland, EU:C:1977:88 ��13.37 65/77, Razanatsimba, EU:C:1977:193 ��3.07 70/77, Simmenthal, EU:C:1978:139��3.14 90/77, Stimming v Commission, EU:C:1978:91��22.09 103/77 and 145/77, Royal Scholten-Honig and Tunnel Refineries, EU:C:1978:186��10.15 104/77, Öhlschläger, EU:C:1978:69�� 6.22, 24.51 106/77, Simmenthal, EU:C:1978:49�� 2.01, 3.17, 3.26 113/77, NTN Toyo Bearing v Council, EU:C:1979:91��7.135 116/77 and 124/77, Amylum and Tunnel Refineries v Council and Commission, EU:C:1979:273��11.33 118/77, ISO v Council, EU:C:1979:92 ��7.135 121/77, Nachi Fujikoshi v Council, EU:C:1979:95��7.86 123/77, UNICME v Council, EU:C:1978:73�� 7.95, 7.97, 7.101 132/77, Société pour l’exportation des sucres v Commission, EU:C:1978:99��11.60 135/77, Bosch, EU:C:1978:75��6.32 148/77, Hansen & Balle, EU:C:1978:173��6.22 156/77, Commission v Belgium, EU:C:1978:180��5.72, 9.08 8/78, Milac, EU:C:1978:157��10.18 17/78, Deshormes v Commission, EU:C:1979:24��16.07 30/78, Distillers Company v Commission, EU:C:1980:186�� 7.32, 23.20 83/78, Redmond, EU:C:1978:214��3.28 92/78, Simmenthal v Commission, EU:C:1979:53��7.144, 7.194, 7.220, 9.03 92/78 R, Simmenthal v Commission, EU:C:1978:106��13.38 98/78, Racke, EU:C:1979:14 ��7.150 125/78, GEMA v Commission, EU:C:1979:237�� 8.22, 22.19 141/78, France v United Kingdom, EU:C:1979:225��5.34, 5.75 166/78, Italy v Council, EU:C:1979:195��7.77 166/78 R, Italy v Council, EU:C:1978:161��13.36 168/78, Commission v France, EU:C:1980:51��22.14 170/78, Commission v United Kingdom, EU:C:1983:202��5.75 177/78, McCarren, EU:C:1979:164 ��5.26 209/78 to 215/78 and 218/78, Van Landewyck and Others v Commission, EU:C:1980:248�� 7.172, 7.177, 16.29 220/78 and 221/78, ALA and ALFER v Commission, EU:C:1979:114�� 7.156, 24.13 222/78, ICAP, EU:C:1979:90��3.23, 6.32 232/78, Commission v France, EU:C:1979:215 �� 22.14, 22.19 238/78, Ireks-Arkady v EEC, EU:C:1981:155��11.20, 11.32, 11.45, 11.56 241/78, 242/78 and 246/78 to 249/78, DGV and Others v EEC, EU:C:1981:157��11.32 243/78, Simmenthal v Commission, EU:C:1980:65��7.145 244/78, Union laitière normande, EU:C:1979:198��3.21, 6.20 250/78, DEKA Getreideprodukte v EEC, EU:C:1983:49�� 11.20, 11.32, 24.31

xxiv Table of Cases 261/78 and 262/78, Interquell Stärke-Chemie and Diamalt v Council and Commission, EU:C:1979:228��11.32 4/79, Providence agricole de la Champagne, EU:C:1980:232��10.23 12/79, Wagner v Commission, EU:C:1979:286��11.32 26/79 and 86/79, Forges de Thy-Marcinelle et Monceau v Commission, EU:C:1980:82��24.07 40/79, P. v Commission, EU:C:1981:32��23.08 51/79, Buttner v Commission, EU:C:1980:96��7.75 61/79, Denkavit italiana, EU:C:1980:100�� 4.51, 4.54, 4.59, 6.38, 6.39 65/79, Chatain, EU:C:1980:108��3.14 68/79, Just, EU:C:1980:57 ��4.54, 4.59 72/79, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1980:109��5.24, 5.26 73/79, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1980:129��5.24 76/79, Könecke v Commission, EU:C:1980:68��7.144 102/79, Commission v Belgium, EU:C:1980:120��5.71 104/79, Foglia v Novello, EU:C:1980:73��3.38 109/79, Maiseries de Beauce, EU:C:1980:233��10.23 114/79 to 117/79, Fournier v Commission, EU:C:1980:124��16.28 130/79, Express Dairy Foods, EU:C:1980:155�� 4.02, 4.59, 10.22 133/79, Sucrimex v Commission, EU:C:1980:104��11.29 136/79, National Panasonic v Commission, EU:C:1980:169��7.28 138/79, Roquette v Council, EU:C:1980:249��7.102, 7.172, 7.173, 7.174, 23.05 139/79, Maizena v Council, EU:C:1980:250��7.102, 7.172, 7.173, 7.174, 23.05 145/79, Roquette Frères, EU:C:1980:234��10.23 155/79, AM & S v Commission, EU:C:1982:157��7.33 730/79, Philip Morris v Commission, EU:C:1980:209��7.124 792/79 R, Camera Care v Commission, EU:C:1980:18��7.35 806/79, Gerin v Commission, EU:C:1980:264 ��16.15 817/79, Buyl and Others v Commission, EU:C:1982:36 ��7.174 1253/79, Battaglia v Commission, EU:C:1982:38��7.173 1/80, Salmon, EU:C:1980:157��6.31 24/80 R and 97/80 R, Commission v France, EU:C:1980:107��5.76 36/80 and 71/80, Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Association and Others, EU:C:1981:62��3.21, 3.25 46/80, Vianl, EU:C:1981:4��3.38 66/80, International Chemical Corporation, EU:C:1981:102�� 3.03, 4.59, 10.18, 10.19 126/80, Salonia, EU:C:1981:136��3.16, 3.32 138/80, Borker, EU:C:1980:162��3.07 142/80 and 143/80, Essevi and Salengo, EU:C:1981:121��5.32, 5.36 158/80, Rewe, EU:C:1981:163��4.07 179/80, Roquette Frères v Council, EU:C:1982:357��7.145 182/80, Gauff v Commission, EU:C:1982:78��7.11 184/80, Van Zaanen v Court of Auditors, EU:C:1981:173��16.26 197/80 to 200/80, 243/80, 245/80 and 247/80, Ludwigshafener Walzmühle and Others v Council and Commission, EU:C:1981:311��24.49 244/80, Foglia v Novello, EU:C:1981:302�� 3.29, 3.30, 3.35, 3.37 246/80, Broekmeulen, EU:C:1981:218��3.06 256/80, 257/80, 265/80, 267/80, 5/81, 51/81 and 282/82, Birra Wührer and Others v Council and Commission, EU:C:1987:87�� 11.20, 11.56, 11.66 267/80 TO, Birra Dreher v Riseria Modenese and Others, EU:C:1986:472��25.35 10/81, Farrall v Commission, EU:C:1981:60��13.23 11/81, Dürbeck v Commission, EU:C:1982:120��22.16 14/81, Alpha Steel v Commission, EU:C:1982:76�� 7.09, 22.20 17/81, Pabst & Richarz, EU:C:1982:129��24.51 26/81, Oleifici Mediterranei v EEC, EU:C:1982:318��11.61

Table of Cases xxv 28/81, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1981:257��5.54 29/81, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1981:258��5.54 51/81, De Franceschi v Council and Commission, EU:C:1982:20�� 11.20, 11.56 60/81, IBM v Commission, EU:C:1981:264 ��7.13, 7.23, 7.24, 7.25, 7.30, 7.53, 13.14, 13.32 60/81 R and 190/81 R, IBM v Commission, EU:C:1981:165, �� 13.14, 13.32 65/81, Reina, EU:C:1982:6��3.26 94/81, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1982:74��5.10, 5.40 96/81, Commission v Netherlands, EU:C:1982:192��5.67, 5.70 102/81, Nordsee, EU:C:1982:107��3.09 104/81, Kupferberg, EU:C:1982:362��5.05, 6.16 106/81, Kind v EEC, EU:C:1982:291 �� 11.42, 11.45 109/81, Porta v Commission, EU:C:1982:253��15.09 114/81, Tunnel Refineries v Council, EU:C:1982:324 ��7.174 132/81, Vlaeminck, EU:C:1982:294��3.32 135/81, Groupement des agences des voyages v Commission, EU:C:1982:371�� 7.84, 7.138 141/81 to 143/81, Holdijk and Others, EU:C:1982:122��6.36 207/81, Ditterich v Commission, EU:C:1983:123��7.172 210/81, Demo-Studio Schmidt, EU:C:1983:277��7.39, 7.88 211/81, Commission v Denmark, EU:C:1982:437��5.45 213/81 to 215/81, Norddeutsches Vieh-und Fleischkontor and Others, EU:C:1982:351��7.168 217/81, Interagra v Commission, EU:C:1982:222 ��11.29 230/81, Luxembourg v Parliament, EU:C:1983:32��7.77 232/81, Agricola Commerciale Olio v Commission, EU:C:1984:358 ��7.138 249/81, Commission v Ireland, EU:C:1982:402��5.19, 5.41 261/81, Rau, EU:C:1982:382��24.68 267/81, SPI and SAMI, EU:C:1983:78��6.18 282/81, Ragusa v Commission, EU:C:1983:105��7.172 283/81, CILFIT and Others, EU:C:1982:335��3.16, 3.46, 3.47, 3.48, 3.49, 3.50, 3.51 301/81, Commission v Belgium, EU:C:1983:51��5.71 306/81, Verros v Parliament, EU:C:1983:143 ��22.17 307/81, Alusuisse v Council and Commission, EU:C:1982:337��7.135 314/81, Waterkeyn, EU:C:1982:430�� 3.49, 3.52, 5.76, 5.78, 6.13 318/81, Commission v CO.DE.MI., EU:C:1985:467 ��15.17 1/82, D. v État luxembourgeois, EU:C:1982:367��5.35 2/82 to 4/82, Delhaize and Others, EU:C:1983:268 ��3.27 11/82, Piraiki-Patraiki v Commission, EU:C:1985:18�� 7.97, 7.100, 7.102 35/82 and 36/82, Morson and Jhanjan, EU:C:1982:368��3.42 41/82, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1982:418��5.10, 5.40 42/82, Commission v France, EU:C:1983:88��5.59 42/82 R, Commission v France, EU:C:1982:83��13.31 43/82, VBVB and VBBB v Commission, EU:C:1984:9 ��7.171 43/82 R, VBVB and VBBB v Commission, EU:C:1982:119��13.04 62/82, Italy v Commission, EU:C:1983:74��7.223 74/82, Commission v Ireland, EU:C:1984:34 ��5.54 75/82 and 117/82, Razzouk and Others v Commission, EU:C:1984:116�� 9.20, 16.26 85/82, Schloh v Council, EU:C:1983:179�� 7.143, 16.07 92/82, Gutmann v Commission, EU:C:1983:286��22.07 107/82, AEG v Commission, EU:C:1983:293��7.32 133/82, Commission v Luxembourg, EU:C:1983:136��11.29 191/82, FEDIOL v Commission, EU:C:1983:209�� 7.106, 7.134 199/82, San Giorgio, EU:C:1983:318�� 4.08, 4.17, 4.20, 4.43, 4.59, 4.60 205/82 to 215/82, Deutsche Milchkontor and Others, EU:C:1983:233��3.23, 4.63 225/82, Verzyck v Commission, EU:C:1983:165 ��16.29 228/82 and 229/82, Ford v Commission, EU:C:1984:80��7.35

xxvi Table of Cases 235/82 REV, Ferriere San Carlo v Commission, EU:C:1986:237 ��25.45 239/82and 275/82, Allied Corporation and Others v Commission, EU:C:1984:68��7.86, 7.102, 7.133, 7.135, 10.11 264/82, Timex v Council and Commission, EU:C:1985:119�� 7.134, 10.20 266/82, Turner v Commission, EU:C:1984:3 ��7.221 267/82, Développement and Clemessy v Commission, EU:C:1986:253��11.29 281/82, Unifrex v Council and Commission, EU:C:1984:165�� 11.29, 11.32, 22.13 296/82 and 318/82, Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek v Commission, EU:C:1985:113��7.124 323/82, Intermills v Commission, EU:C:1984:345�� 7.119, 7.124 324/82, Commission v Belgium, EU:C:1984:152��5.66 325/82, Commission v Germany, EU:C:1984:60 ��5.49 13/83, Parliament v Council, EU:C:1985:220�� 8.06, 8.07, 8.08, 8.11, 8.21, 8.25 14/83, Von Colson and Kamann, EU:C:1984:153��4.16 28/83, Forcheri v Commission, EU:C:1984:111��5.03 29/83 and 30/83, Compagnie Royale Asturienne des Mines and Rheinzink v Commission, EU:C:1984:130�� 7.200, 7.201 41/83, Italy v Commission, EU:C:1985:120�� 7.77, 7.180 51/83, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1984:261��5.46, 5.52 52/83, Commission v France, EU:C:1983:328��5.72 59/83, Biovilac v EEC, EU:C:1984:380��11.45 62/83, Eximo v Commission, EU:C:1984:197��11.32 80/83, Habourdin International and Others, EU:C:1983:321��21.07 108/83, Luxembourg v Parliament, EU:C:1984:156��7.20 112/83, Société des produits de maïs, EU:C:1985:86�� 10.04, 10.22, 10.23 114/83, Société d’initiatives et de coopération agricoles v Commission, EU:C:1984:246��11.19 118/83, CMC v Commission, EU:C:1985:308�� 7.98, 11.17, 11.29 126/83, STS v Commission, EU:C:1984:257��7.98 130/83, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1984:263��5.24 145/83, Adams v Commission, EU:C:1985:445 �� 11.61, 11.68 152/83, Demouche, EU:C:1987:421��6.12 172/83 and 226/83, Hoogovens Groep v Commission, EU:C:1985:355 ��7.158 178/83, P., EU:C:1984:272��21.07 224/83, Ferriera Vittoria v Commission, EU:C:1984:208��7.156 274/83, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1985:148��5.45, 5.70 289/83, GAARM v Commission, EU:C:1984:398 ��11.19 290/83, Commission v France, EU:C:1985:37��5.24 293/83, Gravier v Ville de Liège, EU:C:1985:69 ��24.68 294/83, Les Verts v Parliament, EU:C:1986:166��1.03, 3.03, 3.52, 4.14, 6.04, 7.70, 7.84, 7.92, 7.104, 7.165, 10.04, 10.10, 22.07 298/83, CICCE v Commission, EU:C:1985:150�� 7.39, 25.21 21/84, Commission v France, EU:C:1985:184��5.10 29/84, Commission v Germany, EU:C:1985:229 ��5.15 35/84, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1986:59��5.10 41/84, Pinna, EU:C:1986:1�� 10.21, 10.23 42/84, Remia v Commission, EU:C:1985:327�� 7.199, 7.202 50/84, Bensider and Others v Commission, EU:C:1984:365�� 7.84, 7.160 50/84 R, Bensider and Others v Commission, EU:C:1984:190��13.23 56/84, Von Gallera, EU:C:1984:136��21.07 75/84, Metro v Commission, EU:C:1986:399��7.113 121/84, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1986:4��5.67 142/84 and 156/84, British American Tobacco and Reynolds Industries v Commission, EU:C:1987:490�� 7.39, 7.202 150/84, Bernardi v Parliament, EU:C:1986:167 ��7.172

Table of Cases xxvii 159/84, 267/84, 12/85 and 264/85, Ainsworth and Others v Commission, EU:C:1987:172��7.223 166/84, Thomasdünger, EU:C:1985:373 ��6.29 169/84, Cofaz and Others v Commission, EU:C:1990:301�� 7.118, 7.122, 7.125 175/84, Krohn v Commission, EU:C:1987:8��11.13, 11.14, 11.29, 11.32 179/84, Bozzetti, EU:C:1985:306 ��3.15 190/84, Les Verts v Parliament, EU:C:1988:94��7.21 191/84, Barcella v Commission, EU:C:1986:197 ��22.19 222/84, Johnston, EU:C:1986:206��4.14 234/84, Belgium v Commission, EU:C:1986:302�� 7.176, 7.197, 7.213 240/84, Toyo v Council, EU:C:1987:202 �� 7.86, 7.133, 7.214 258/84, Nippon Seiko v Council, EU:C:1987:205��7.133 279/84, 280/84, 285/84 and 286/84, Rau and Others v Commission, EU:C:1987:119��22.16 297/84, Sahinler v Commission, EU:C:1986:45��22.08 309/84, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1986:73�� 5.10, 5.40, 5.57 5/85, AKZO Chemie v Commission, EU:C:1986:328 ��7.170 15/85, Consorzio Cooperative d’Abruzzo v Commission, EU:C:1987:111��7.10 20/85, Roviello, EU:C:1988:283 �� 10.13, 22.34 42/85, Cockerill-Sambre v Commission, EU:C:1985:471��7.157 53/85, AKZO Chemie v Commission, EU:C:1986:256��7.08, 7.33, 7.144, 7.177, 7.221 67/85, 68/85 and 70/85, Kwekerij van der Kooy and Others v Commission, EU:C:1988:38��7.106, 7.121, 7.123, 7.130 69/85, Wünsche, EU:C:1986:104 �� 6.13, 6.33, 6.36, 10.03 85/85, Commission v Belgium, EU:C:1986:129��5.35 89/85, 104/85, 114/85, 116/85, 117/85 and 125/85 to 129/85, Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and Others v Commission, EU:C:1988:447 �� 7.167, 7.188 C-89/85, C-104/85, C-114/85, C-116/85, C-117/85 and C-125/85 to C-129/85, Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and Others v Commission, EU:C:1993:120�� 7.30, 7.32, 7.200, 24.59 98/85, 162/85 and 258/85, Bertini, EU:C:1986:246 ��3.30 103/85, Stahlwerke Peine-Salzgitter v Commission, EU:C:1988:398��22.20 133/85 to 136/85, Rau, EU:C:1987:244 ��10.10 146/85 and 431/85, Maindiaux and Others v ESC, EU:C:1988:189��23.57 150/85, Drake, EU:C:1986:257��3.06 152/85, Misset v Council, EU:C:1987:10��22.70 154/85, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1987:292��5.14 154/85 R, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1985:249��13.37 220/85, Fadex v Commission, EU:C:1986:427��15.17 265/85, Van den Bergh en Jurgens v Commission, EU:C:1987:121��11.45 281/85, 283/85 to 285/85 and 287/85, Germany and Others v Commission, EU:C:1987:351 ��22.70 282/85, DEFI v Commission, EU:C:1986:316�� 7.129, 7.143 293/85, Commission v Belgium, EU:C:1988:40��5.48, 5.54 293/85 R, Commission v Belgium, EU:C:1985:446 ��13.37 309/85, Barra, EU:C:1988:42��4.56, 6.39 310/85, Deufil v Commission, EU:C:1987:96��7.211 311/85, VVR, EU:C:1987:418��6.20 314/85, Foto-Frost, EU:C:1987:452��3.03, 3.56, 3.57, 10.01, 10.04, 10.13, 10.17, 10.19, 11.31 318/85, Greis Unterweger, EU:C:1986:106 ��3.07 331/85, Bianco and Girard, EU:C:1988:97��4.60 338/85, Pardini, EU:C:1988:194��3.13 358/85, France v Parliament, EU:C:1988:431��23.57 391/85, Commission v Belgium, EU:C:1988:58��5.60 403/85 REV, F. v Commission, EU:C:1991:119��25.44 12/86, Demirel, EU:C:1987:400 ��6.16 14/86, Pretore di Salò v X, EU:C:1987:275�� 3.14, 3.23, 3.24, 6.33 22/86, Rindone, EU:C:1987:130��4.17

xxviii Table of Cases 23/86 R, United Kingdom v Parliament, EU:C:1986:125�� 13.13, 13.19 24/86, Blaizot, EU:C:1988:43��6.39 31/86 and 35/86, LAISA v Council, EU:C:1988:211�� 7.76, 11.22 33/86, 44/86, 110/86, 226/86 and 285/86, Stahlwerke Peine-Salzgitter and Others v Commission, EU:C:1988:402�� 7.191, 7.194, 7.217 34/86, Council v Parliament, EU:C:1986:291��7.70, 7.75 45/86, Commission v Council, EU:C:1987:163 �� 7.77, 7.219 68/86, United Kingdom v Council, EU:C:1988:85��7.178 69/86, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1987:85��5.80 70/86, Commission v Greece, EU:C:1987:374 ��5.74 81/86, De Boer Buizen v Council and Commission, EU:C:1987:393��11.29 85/86, Commission v EIB, EU:C:1988:110��22.09 89/86 and 91/86, Étoile commerciale and CNTA v Commission, EU:C:1987:337��11.29 97/86, 193/86, 99/86 and 215/86, Asteris and Others v Commission, EU:C:1988:199��7.103, 7.218, 7.221, 19.33 113/86, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1988:59��5.59 119/86, Spain v Council and Commission, EU:C:1987:446 ��7.181 128/86, Spain v Commission, EU:C:1987:447��7.174 131/86, United Kingdom v Council, EU:C:1988:86��24.49 147/86 TO1, Panhellinia Omospondia Idioktiton Frontistirion Xenon Glosson and Others v Greece and Commission, EU:C:1989:610��25.34 147/86 TO2, Panhellinios Syndesmos Idioktiton Frontistirion Xenon Glosson and Trechas v Greece and Commission, EU:C:1989:611��25.34 147/86 TO3, Panhellinios Syndesmos Idioktiton Idiotikon Technikon Epangelmatikon ke Naftikon Scholikon Monadon v Greece and Commission, EU:C:1989:612��25.34 166/86, Irish Cement v Commission, EU:C:1988:549��7.19 199/86, Raiffeisen, EU:C:1988:99��10.20 207/86, Apesco v Commission, EU:C:1988:200��7.144 222/86, Heylens, EU:C:1987:442 ��4.22, 4.42 229/86, Brother Industries v Commission, EU:C:1987:403 ��7.16 231/86 R, Breda-Geomineraria v Commission, EU:C:1986:338 ��13.05 236/86, Dillinger Hüttenwerke v Commission, EU:C:1988:367��7.158 240/86, Commission v Greece, EU:C:1988:173 ��5.62 247/86, Alsatel, EU:C:1988:469��3.19 267/86, Van Eycke, EU:C:1988:427��3.37 272/86, Commission v Greece, EU:C:1988:433 ��5.67 279/86, Sermes v Commission, EU:C:1987:343��7.135 295/86, Garelly v Commission, EU:C:1987:344��7.133 300/86, Van Landschoot, EU:C:1988:342 ��10.20 301/86, Frimodt Pedersen v Commission, EU:C:1987:345��7.135 305/86, Neotype Techmashexport v Commission and Council, EU:C:1990:295�� 7.135, 23.03, 24.05 314/86, de Szy-Tarisse and Feyaerts v Commission, EU:C:1988:471��6.13 1/87 SA, Universe Tankship v Commission, EU:C:1987:298 �� 14.04, 14.05 33/87, Christianos v Court of Justice, EU:C:1988:300��9.20 46/87 and 227/88, Hoechst v Commission, EU:C:1989:337��7.27, 7.28 46/87 R, Hoechst v Commission, EU:C:1987:167 �� 7.28, 13.32 76/87, 86/87 to 89/87 and 149/87, Seguela and Others, EU:C:1988:220 ��6.37 85/87, Dow Benelux v Commission, EU:C:1989:379��7.28 85/87 R, Dow Chemical Nederland v Commission, EU:C:1987:472��7.28 91/87, Gutshof-Ei, EU:C:1988:235��14.05 94/87, Commission v Germany, EU:C:1989:46 ��4.63 97/87, Dow Chemical Ibérica and Others v Commission, EU:C:1989:380��7.170 106/87 to 120/87, Asteris and Others v Greece and EEC, EU:C:1988:457��11.33

Table of Cases xxix 125/87, Brown v Court of Justice, EU:C:1989:399 ��16.04 126/87, Del Plato v Commission, EU:C:1989:115 �� 16.07, 16.26 133/87 and 150/87, Nashua Corporation and Others v Commission and Council, EU:C:1990:115�� 7.62, 7.135, 7.136 133/87 R, Nashua Corporation v Commission, EU:C:1987:315��13.18 141/87, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1989:165��5.67 142/87, Belgium v Commission, EU:C:1990:125��5.24 156/87, Gestetner Holdings v Council and Commission, EU:C:1990:116 �� 7.62, 7.133, 7.135, 7.136, 7.214 162/87 and 351/87, Tagaras v Court of Justice, EU:C:1989:448 ��7.219 165/87, Commission v Council, EU:C:1988:458 ��7.173 193/87 and 194/87, Maurissen and Union syndicale v Court of Auditors, EU:C:1990:18�� 7.19, 7.70, 16.10 205/87, Nuova Ceam v Commission, EU:C:1987:485��7.135 224/87, Koutchoumoff v Commission, EU:C:1989:38��16.26 226/87, Commission v Greece, EU:C:1988:354 �� 5.28, 5.72, 9.08 229/87, Commission v Greece, EU:C:1988:501 ��5.45 241/87, Maclaine Watson v Council and Commission, EU:C:1990:189��5.14 247/87, Star Fruit v Commission, EU:C:1989:58 ��7.07, 8.06 301/87, France v Commission, EU:C:1990:67��5.24, 7.54 302/87, Parliament v Council, EU:C:1988:461��8.09, 8.21 308/87, Grifoni v EAEC, EU:C:1994:38��11.61 346/87, Bossi v Commission, EU:C:1989:59��11.14 359/87, Pinna, EU:C:1989:107 ��10.20 374/87, Orkem v Commission, EU:C:1989:387��7.27 376/87 R, Distrivet v Council, EU:C:1988:37��13.23 377/87, Parliament v Council, EU:C:1988:387�� 8.01, 8.05, 8.08, 8.21 383/87, Commission v Council, EU:C:1988:388 ��8.01, 8.05 1/88 SA, Générale de Banque v Commission, EU:C:1989:142�� 14.04, 14.07 20/88, Roquette frères v Commission, EU:C:1989:221�� 11.31, 11.69 22/88, Vreugdenhil and Others, EU:C:1989:277��7.169 30/88, Greece v Commission, EU:C:1989:422 �� 6.17, 7.188 35/88, Commission v Greece, EU:C:1990:302 ��5.24 62/88, Greece v Council, EU:C:1990:153��7.187 70/88, Parliament v Council, EU:C:1991:373��7.80 109/88, Handels-og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund i Danmark (Danfoss), EU:C:1989:383��3.09, 4.46 111/88 R, Greece v Commission, EU:C:1988:240��13.37 112/88 R, Crete Citron Producers Association v Commission, EU:C:1988:241��13.37 119/88, AERPO and Others v Commission, EU:C:1990:231 ��11.32 133/88, Del Amo Martinez v Parliament, EU:C:1989:124�� 16.22, 16.26 C-143/88 and C-92/89, Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen and Zuckerfabrik Soest, EU:C:1991:65�� 4.19, 4.77, 4.79 C-150/88, Eau de Cologne & Parfümerie-Fabrik 4711, EU:C:1989:594 ��3.35 C-152/88, Sofrimport v Commission, EU:C:1992:21 ��7.100, 7.102, 11.56, 25.01 C-177/88, Dekker, EU:C:1990:383��4.16 C-202/88, France v Commission, EU:C:1991:120��5.27 C-213/88 and C-39/89, Luxembourg v Parliament, EU:C:1991:449 ��7.20 C-221/88, Busseni, EU:C:1990:84�� 3.02, 6.03, 10.01 C-229/88, Cargill v Commission, EU:C:1990:138��7.101 C-244/88, Usines coopératives de déshydratation du Vexin and Others v Commission, EU:C:1989:588��7.101 C-262/88, Barber, EU:C:1990:209 ��6.39 C-286/88, Falciola, EU:C:1990:33��3.32

xxx Table of Cases C-297/88 and C-197/89, Dzodzi, EU:C:1990:360��6.29 C-322/88, Grimaldi, EU:C:1989:646�� 6.10, 10.09 C-330/88, Grifoni v EAEC, EU:C:1991:95��15.09 C-350/88, Delacre and Others v Commission, EU:C:1990:71 ��7.180 C-353/88, Briantex and Di Domenico v EEC and Commission, EU:C:1989:415��11.22 C-366/88, France v Commission, EU:C:1990:348��7.21 C-10/89, CNL-SUCAL, EU:C:1990:359 ��6.37 C-69/89, Nakajima All Precision v Council, EU:C:1991:186 ��7.179 C-73/89, Fournier, EU:C:1992:431��6.29 C-96/89, Commission v Netherlands, EU:C:1991:213 ��5.66 C-100/89 and C-101/89, Kaefer and Procacci, EU:C:1990:456��3.10 C-104/89 and C-37/90, Mulder and Others v Council and Commission, EU:C:1992:217�� 11.29, 11.45, 11.52, 11.56, 11.58, 11.61, 25.19 C-104/89 and C-37/90, Mulder and Others v Council and Commission, EU:C:2000:38��11.56 C-152/89, Commission v Luxembourg, EU:C:1991:272��5.49 C-170/89, BEUC v Commission, EU:C:1991:450��7.63 C-192/89, Sevince, EU:C:1990:322�� 6.17, 10.08 C-200/89, FUNOC v Commission, EU:C:1990:356��7.171 C-201/89, Le Pen, EU:C:1990:133 ��7.74 C-213/89, Factortame and Others, EU:C:1990:257�� 4.02, 4.12, 4.17, 4.76 C-231/89, Gmurzynska-Bscher, EU:C:1990:386 ��3.36 C-243/89, Commission v Denmark, EU:C:1993:257��5.47, 5.64 C-260/89, ERT, EU:C:1991:254��5.06 C-291/89, Interhotel v Commission, EU:C:1991:189��10.15 C-298/89, Gibraltar v Council, EU:C:1993:267 ��7.96 C-304/89, Oliveira v Commission, EU:C:1991:191�� 10.15, 11.56, 11.58 C-309/89, Codorníu v Council, EU:C:1994:197�� 7.86, 7.102 C-313/89, Commission v Spain, EU:C:1991:415 ��7.76 C-348/89, Mecanarte-Metalurgica da Lagoa, EU:C:1991:278 ��3.17 C-358/89, Extramet Industrie v Council, EU:C:1992:257�� 7.86, 7.132, 7.135 C-370/89, SGEEM and Etroy v EIB, EU:C:1993:202 �� 11.24, 11.29 C-377/89, Cotter and Others, EU:C:1991:116 ��6.13 C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich and Bonifaci, EU:C:1991:428�� 4.17, 4.65, 4.70, 5.02, 11.16 C-16/90, Nölle, EU:C:1991:402��10.17 C-33/90, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1991:476��5.70 C-48/90 and C-66/90, Netherlands and PTT Nederland v Commission, EU:C:1992:63 ��5.27, 5.28 C-61/90, Commission v Greece, EU:C:1992:162��5.26 C-65/90, Parliament v Council, EU:C:1992:325��7.174 C-106/90, C‑317/90 and C‑129/91, Emerald Meats v Commission, EU:C:1993:19��5.35 C-126/90 P, Bocos Viciano v Commission, EU:C:1991:83 ��16.14 C-132/90 P, Schwedler v Parliament, EU:C:1991:452 ��19.02 C-159/90, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland, EU:C:1991:378��5.06 C-163/90, Legros and Others, EU:C:1992:326��6.39 C-205/90, Les assurances du crédit, EU:C:1997:67 ��3.27 C-208/90, Emmott, EU:C:1991:333��4.29 C-209/90, Commission v Feilhauer, EU:C:1992:172�� 15.14, 15.16, 15.17 C-237/90, Commission v Germany, EU:C:1992:452��5.56 C-260/90, Leplat, EU:C:1992:66��3.10 C-269/90, Technische Universität München, EU:C:1991:438��7.180 C-282/90, Vreugdenhil v Commission, EU:C:1992:124 ��11.42 C-286/90, Poulsen and Diva Navigation, EU:C:1992:453��7.167 C-294/90, British Aerospace and Rover v Commission, EU:C:1992:55�� 5.23, 5.24, 25.19 C-312/90, Spain v Commission, EU:C:1992:282 ��7.53 C-313/90, CIRFS and Others v Commission, EU:C:1993:111 ��7.57, 7.106, 7.130, 7.140, 23.03

Table of Cases xxxi C-315/90, Gimelec and Others v Commission, EU:C:1991:447��7.63 C-320/90 to C-322/90, Telemarsicabruzzo and Others, EU:C:1993:26��3.23 C-343/90, Lourenço Dias, EU:C:1992:327 ��6.22 C-354/90, Fédération nationale du commerce extérieur des produits alimentaires and Others, EU:C:1991:440 ��5.25 C-362/90, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1992:158 ��5.62 C-15/91 and C-108/91, Buckl and Others v Commission, EU:C:1992:454�� 7.103, 8.05 C-47/91, Italy v Commission, EU:C:1994:358 ��7.53 C-59/91, France v Commission, EU:C:1992:57 ��7.156 C-65/91, Commission v Greece, EU:C:1992:388��5.70 C-67/91, Asociación Española de Banca Privada and Others, EU:C:1992:330��3.08 C-83/91, Meilicke, EU:C:1992:332��3.25 C-88/91, Federconsorzi, EU:C:1992:276��6.29 C-94/91, Wagner, EU:C:1992:181��10.09 C-101/91, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1993:16��5.76 C-109/91, Ten Oever, EU:C:1993:833 ��6.39 C-110/91, Moroni, EU:C:1993:926��6.39 C-146/91, KYDEP v Council and Commission, EU:C:1994:329��11.41 C-181/91 and C-248/91, Parliament v Council and Commission, EU:C:1993:271��7.74 C-182/91, Forafrique Burkinabe v Commission, EU:C:1993:165 ��14.05 C-188/91, Deutsche Shell, EU:C:1993:24 ��6.17 C-198/91, Cook v Commission, EU:C:1993:197 ��7.119 C-199/91, Foyer culturel du Sart-Tilman v Commission, EU:C:1993:205 ��7.221 C-225/91, Matra v Commission, EU:C:1993:239�� 7.119, 7.211, 23.03 C-267/91 and C-268/91, Keck and Mithouard, EU:C:1993:905��6.37 C-271/91, Marshall, EU:C:1993:335��4.14, 4.71 C-306/91, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1993:161 ��5.47 C-325/91, France v Commission, EU:C:1993:245�� 7.16, 7.182 C-327/91, France v Commission, EU:C:1994:305�� 10.05, 12.03 C-338/91, Steenhorst-Neerings, EU:C:1993:857 ��4.29, 4.64 C-6/92, Federmineraria v Commission, EU:C:1993:913�� 7.123, 7.129 C-24/92, Corbiau, EU:C:1993:118��3.06 C-25/92, Miethke v Parliament, EU:C:1993:32��7.15 C-32/92 P, Moat v Commission, EU:C:1992:496 ��19.30 C-35/92 P, Parliament v Frederiksen, EU:C:1993:104��19.26 C-36/92 P, SEP v Commission, EU:C:1994:205 ��7.177 C-41/92, The Liberal Democrats v Parliament, EU:C:1993:234��8.08 C-49/92 P, Commission v Anic Partecipazioni, EU:C:1999:356��19.02 C-51/92 P, Hercules Chemicals v Commission, EU:C:1999:357��7.32 C-53/92 P, Hilti v Commission, EU:C:1994:77��19.07 C-80/92, Commission v Belgium, EU:C:1994:118��5.14 C-91/92, Faccini Dori, EU:C:1994:292 ��4.66, 5.79 C-102/92, Ferriere Acciaierie Sarde v Commission, EU:C:1993:86��7.158 C-115/92 P, Parliament v Volger, EU:C:1993:922��16.25 C-128/92, Banks, EU:C:1994:130��4.72 C-130/92, OTO, EU:C:1994:288��6.23 C-136/92 P, Commission v Brazzelli Lualdi and Others, EU:C:1994:211�� 19.02, 19.23 C-137/92 P, Commission v BASF and Others, EU:C:1994:247�� 7.10, 7.170, 7.178 C-188/92, TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf, EU:C:1994:90�� 7.123, 10.11 C-199/92 P, Hüls v Commission, EU:C:1999:358�� 7.10, 7.201, 24.76 C-200/92 P, ICI v Commission, EU:C:1999:359��7.10, 23.19, 24.55, 24.76 C-228/92, Roquette Frères, EU:C:1994:168�� 10.22, 10.23 C-234/92 P, Shell v Commission, EU:C:1999:361��19.27 C-235/92 P, Montecatini v Commission, EU:C:1999:362�� 7.10, 7.162, 7.201

xxxii Table of Cases C-245/92 P, Chemie Linz v Commission, EU:C:1999:363��7.10 C-269/92, Bosman, EU:C:1993:918��3.27 C-278/92 and C-280/92, Spain v Commission, EU:C:1994:325��7.213 C-354/92 P, Eppe v Commission, EU:C:1993:952 �� 19.21, 19.23 C-382/92, Commission v United Kingdom, EU:C:1994:233 ��5.67 C-393/92, Gemeente Almelo and Others, EU:C:1994:171 ��3.09 C-398/92, Mund & Fester, EU:C:1994:52 �� 5.08, 21.02 C-410/92, Johnson, EU:C:1994:401��4.64 C-422/92, Commission v Germany, EU:C:1995:125��5.32 C-432/92, Anastasiou and Others, EU:C:1994:277 ��6.15 C-5/93 P, DSM v Commission, EU:C:1999:364 �� 18.02, 19.07, 25.48 C-18/93, Corsica Ferries, EU:C:1994:195��3.14 C-19/93 P, Rendo and Others v Commission, EU:C:1996:158�� 7.39, 19.14 C-30/93, AC-ATEL Electronics, EU:C:1994:224 ��3.25 C-39/93 P, SFEI and Others v Commission, EU:C:1994:253��7.39, 8.22 C-41/93, France v Commission, EU:C:1994:196 ��7.180 C-44/93, Namur-Les assurances du crédit, EU:C:1994:311 ��7.49, 7.50 C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, EU:C:1996:79�� 4.08, 4.17, 4.18, 4.65, 4.66, 4.67, 4.70, 4.71, 5.79, 6.31, 11.16 C-107/93, AEFMA v Commission, EU:C:1993:301��13.23 C-135/93, Spain v Commission, EU:C:1995:201 ��9.08, 9.12 C-156/93, Parliament v Commission, EU:C:1995:238�� 7.80, 23.03 C-274/93, Commission v Luxembourg, EU:C:1996:160��5.56 C-280/93, Germany v Council, EU:C:1994:367��7.174 C-280/93 R, Germany v Council, EU:C:1993:270 �� 13.27, 13.31 C-298/93 P, Klinke v Court of Justice, EU:C:1994:273��19.30 C-299/93, Bauer v Commission, EU:C:1995:100��15.16 C-312/93, Peterbroeck, EU:C:1995:437�� 3.04, 4.08, 4.38 C-316/93, Vaneetveld, EU:C:1994:82��3.23 C-346/93, Kleinwort Benson, EU:C:1995:85��6.29 C-360/93, Parliament v Council, EU:C:1996:84�� 7.80, 7.219 C-363/93 and C-407/93 to C-411/93, Lancry and Others, EU:C:1994:315�� 6.13, 6.39, 10.22 C-365/93, Commission v Greece, EU:C:1995:76��5.15 C-378/93, La Pyramide, EU:C:1994:316��3.23 C-388/93, PIA HiFi v Commission, EU:C:1994:151 ��22.19 C-392/93, British Telecommunications, EU:C:1996:131��4.68, 6.31 C-396/93 P, Henrichs v Commission, EU:C:1995:280��19.03 C-422/93 to C-424/93, Zabala Erasun and Others, EU:C:1995:183��3.26 C-428/93, Monin Automobiles, EU:C:1994:192��3.32 C-430/93 and C-431/93, van Schijndel and van Veen, EU:C:1995:441�� 4.08, 4.09, 4.37 C-433/93, Commission v Germany, EU:C:1995:263��5.71 C-445/93, Parliament v Commission, EU:C:1996:283��8.08 C-465/93, Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft and Others, EU:C:1995:369��4.19, 4.77 C-473/93, Commission v Luxembourg, EU:C:1996:263��5.75, 5.80 C-480/93 P, Zunis Holding and Others v Commission, EU:C:1996:1�� 7.19, 19.30 C-485/93 and C-486/93, Simitzi, EU:C:1995:281��6.39 C-1/94 SA, Dupret v Commission, EU:C:1995:2��14.05 C-5/94, Hedley Lomas, EU:C:1996:205��4.67 C-7/94, Gaal, EU:C:1995:118 ��2.11 C-21/94, Parliament v Council, EU:C:1995:220��7.173 C-25/94, Commission v Council, EU:C:1996:114��7.73 C-39/94, SFEI and Others, EU:C:1996:285��3.26, 7.54 C-54/94 and C-74/94, Cacchiarelli and Stanghellini, EU:C:1995:56��3.06

Table of Cases xxxiii C-57/94, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1995:150��5.61 C-61/94, Commission v Germany, EU:C:1996:313��5.05 C-68/94 and C-30/95, France and Others v Commission, EU:C:1998:148�� 7.47, 7.114, 7.144, 7.206, 7.217 C-84/94, United Kingdom v Council, EU:C:1996:431��7.161 C-90/94, Haahr Petroleum, EU:C:1997:368��4.64 C-111/94, Job Centre, EU:C:1995:340��3.14 C-114/94, IDE v Commission, EU:C:1997:68��15.09 C-118/94, Associazione Italiana per il WWF and Others, EU:C:1996:86��3.37 C-120/94, Commission v Greece, EU:C:1996:116��5.29 C-126/94, Cadi Surgelés and Others, EU:C:1996:423 ��6.39 C-127/94, Ecroyd , EU:C:1996:222��10.20 C-129/94, Ruiz Bernáldez, EU:C:1996:143��3.37 C-132/94, Commission v Ireland, EU:C:1995:447��5.56 C-158/94, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1997:500 ��5.44 C-159/94, Commission v France, EU:C:1997:501 ��5.44 C-178/94, Dillenkofer and Others, EU:C:1996:375�� 4.65, 4.67, 5.79 C-192/94, El Corte Inglés, EU:C:1996:88 ��4.66 C-197/94 and C-252/94, Bautiaa and Société française maritime, EU:C:1996:47 ��6.39 C-199/94 P, Inpesca v Commission, EU:C:1998:82��7.216 C-206/94, Brennet, EU:C:1996:182 ��6.13 C-212/94, FMC and Others, EU:C:1996:40��4.61, 4.64 C-266/94, Commission v Spain, EU:C:1995:235 ��5.52, 5.55 C-280/94, Posthuma-van Damme and Oztürk, EU:C:1996:27��6.13 C-283/94, C-291/94 and C-292/94, Denkavit Internationaal and Others, EU:C:1996:387��4.68, 6.31 C-310/94, Garage Ardon, EU:C:1996:8��3.27 C-24/95, Alcan Deutschland, EU:C:1997:163��4.63 C-28/95, Leur-Bloem, EU:C:1997:369��3.37, 6.29 C-51/95 P, Unifruit Hellas v Commission, EU:C:1997:53��19.21 C-57/95, France v Commission, EU:C:1997:164 ��7.16 C-66/95, Sutton, EU:C:1997:207��4.70 C-68/95, T. Port, EU:C:1996:452�� 4.79, 8.09, 8.13, 8.14, 10.12 C-74/95 and C-129/95, X, EU:C:1996:491��3.06 C-85/95, Reisdorf, EU:C:1996:466��3.37 C-91/95 P, Tremblay and Others v Commission, EU:C:1996:407 ��22.31 C-94/95 and C-95/95, Bonifaci and Others and Berto and Others, EU:C:1997:348 ��4.71 C-107/95 P, Bundesverband der Bilanzbuchhalter v Commission, EU:C:1997:71��5.36, 7.40 C-114/95 and C-115/95, Texaco and Others, EU:C:1997:371��4.64 C-122/95, Germany v Council, EU:C:1998:94�� 7.150, 12.03, 12.08 C-127/95, Norbrook Laboratories, EU:C:1998:151��4.67 C-130/95, Giloy, EU:C:1997:372��6.29 C-134/95, USSL nº 47 di Biella, EU:C:1997:16��6.24 C-143/95 P, Commission v Socurte and Others, EU:C:1997:3�� 7.156, 19.04 C-147/95, Evrenopoulos, EU:C:1997:201��6.04 C-149/95 P(R), Commission v Atlantic Container Line and Others, EU:C:1995:257�� 19.02, 22.31 C-178/95, Wiljo, EU:C:1997:46�� 3.20, 10.11 C-185/95 P, Baustahlgewebe v Commission, EU:C:1998:608�� 7.199, 24.37, 24.48 C-188/95, Fantask and Others, EU:C:1997:580 ��4.64 C-191/95, Commission v Germany, EU:C:1998:441�� 5.32, 5.49, 5.51 C-192/95 to C-218/95, Comateb and Others, EU:C:1997:12 ��4.55, 4.59 C-235/95, Dumon and Froment, EU:C:1998:365��3.25 C-241/95, Accrington Beef, EU:C:1996:496�� 7.123, 10.11 C-245/95 P, Commission v NTN and Koyo Seiko, EU:C:1998:46 �� 22.69, 23.02, 23.11 C-245/95 P-INT, Commission v NTN and Koyo Seiko, EU:C:1999:4�� 25.51, 25.56

xxxiv Table of Cases C-246/95, Coen, EU:C:1997:33��16.28 C-253/95, Commission v Germany, EU:C:1996:188��5.71 C-261/95, Palmisani, EU:C:1997:351�� 3.16, 4.29, 4.71 C-263/95, Germany v Commission, EU:C:1998:47��7.178 C-265/95, Commission v France, EU:C:1997:595 ��5.14 C-279/95 P, Langnese-Iglo v Commission, EU:C:1998:447 ��7.144 C-282/95 P, Guérin automobiles v Commission, EU:C:1997:159 ��7.39, 8.22 C-286/95 P, Commission v ICI, EU:C:2000:188�� 7.178, 25.20 C-300/95, Commission v United Kingdom, EU:C:1997:255 ��5.10, 5.67 C-307/95, Max Mara, EU:C:1995:465 ��3.20 C-309/95, Commission v Council, EU:C:1998:66�� 7.150, 7.158 C-326/95, Banco de Fomento e Exterior, EU:C:1996:99��3.23 C-334/95, Krüger, EU:C:1997:378�� 3.20, 4.77, 4.78 C-337/95, Parfums Christian Dior, EU:C:1997:517�� 3.11, 3.43, 3.48 C-338/95, Wiener, EU:C:1997:552��3.46 C-352/95, Phytheron International, EU:C:1997:170��3.25 C-355/95 P, TWD v Commission, EU:C:1997:241��7.18, 9.08 C-362/95 P, Blackspur and Others v Council and Commission, EU:C:1997:401��11.57 C-367/95 P, Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France, EU:C:1998:154 �� 7.51, 7.57, 7.58, 7.118, 7.176, 7.181 C-373/95, Maso and Others, EU:C:1997:353 ��4.71 C-388/95, Belgium v Spain, EU:C:2000:244��5.34 C-390/95 P, Antillean Rice Mills and Others, EU:C:1999:66��7.102 C-392/95, Parliament v Council, EU:C:1997:289��7.80 C-395/95 P, Geotronics v Commission, EU:C:1997:210��7.98 C-408/95, Eurotunnel and Others, EU:C:1997:532�� 3.38, 10.11, 22.34 C-30/96 P, Abello and Others v Commission, EU:C:1998:42��19.21 C-46/96, Germany v Commission, EU:C:1997:103��7.144 C-49/96 P, Progoulis v Commission, EU:C:1996:505��19.23 C-50/96, Schröder, EU:C:2000:72��4.51 C-53/96, Hermès International, EU:C:1998:292��6.16 C-54/96, Dorsch Consult, EU:C:1997:413��3.05, 3.06 C-55/96, Job Centre, EU:C:1997:603��3.14 C-61/96, C-132/97, C-45/98, C-27/99, C-81/00 and C-22/01, Spain v Council, EU:C:2002:230��7.160 C-69/96 to 79/96, Garofalo and Others, EU:C:1997:492��3.07 C-116/96 REV, Reisebüro Binder, EU:C:1998:169�� 25.28, 25.30 C-140/96 P, Dimitriadis v Court of Auditors, EU:C:1997:493 ��19.04 C-147/96, Netherlands v Commission, EU:C:2000:335 ��7.24 C-148/96 P(R), Goldstein v Commission, EU:C:1996:307��19.02 C-149/96, Portugal v Council, EU:C:1999:574��7.188 C-159/96, Portugal v Commission, EU:C:1998:550��7.13 C-162/96, Racke, EU:C:1998:293��10.14 C-170/96, Commission v Council, EU:C:1998:219��1.07 C-176/96, Lehtonen and Castors Braine, EU:C:2000:201�� 3.14, 3.23, 3.24 C-231/96, Edis, EU:C:1998:401 �� 4.54, 4.56, 4.57, 4.64 C-239/96 R and 240/96 R, United Kingdom v Commission, EU:C:1996:347��13.37 C-246/96, Magorrian and Cunningham, EU:C:1997:605��4.64 C-252/96 P, Parliament v Gutiérrez de Quijano y Lloréns, EU:C:1998:551��22.17 C-259/96 P, Council v De Nil and Impens, EU:C:1998:224��24.54 C-260/96, Spac, EU:C:1998:402�� 4.56, 4.57, 4.64 C-262/96, Sürül, EU:C:1999:228��6.39 C-279/96 to C-281/96, Ansaldo Energia and Others, EU:C:1998:403�� 4.57, 4.62, 4.64 C-288/96, Germany v Commission, EU:C:2000:537��7.55

Table of Cases xxxv C-298/96, Oelmühle Hamburg and Schmidt Söhne, EU:C:1998:372 ��4.63 C-314/96, Djabali, EU:C:1998:104��3.26 C-319/96, Brinkmann Tabakfabriken, EU:C:1998:429��4.67, 6.31 C-326/96, Levez, EU:C:1998:577��4.29, 4.64 C-328/96, Commission v Austria, EU:C:1999:526��5.53 C-343/96, Dilexport, EU:C:1999:59�� 3.26, 4.56, 4.57, 4.59, 4.60 C-353/96, Commission v Ireland, EU:C:1998:611��5.41 C-386/96 P, Dreyfus v Commission, EU:C:1998:193��7.98 C-391/96 P, Compagnie Continentale v Commission, EU:C:1998:194��7.98 C-393/96 P(R), Antonissen v Council and Commission, EU:C:1997:42��13.10 C-403/96 P, Glencore Grain v Commission, EU:C:1998:195 ��7.98 C-404/96 P, Glencore Grain v Commission, EU:C:1998:196 ��7.98 C-409/96 P, Sveriges Betodlares Centralförening and Henrikson v Commission, EU:C:1997:635��7.101 C-415/96, Spain v Commission, EU:C:1998:533 ��7.221 C-2/97, IP, EU:C:1998:613��6.29 C-5/97, Ballast Nedam Groep, EU:C:1997:636��6.13 C-9/97 and C-118/97, Jokela and Pitkäranta, EU:C:1998:497��3.05, 3.06 C-10/97 to C-22/97, IN.CO.GE.’90 and Others, EU:C:1998:498 ��4.56 C-35/97, Commission v France, EU:C:1998:431 ��5.77 C-61/97, FDV, EU:C:1998:422 ��3.23 C-69/97, Commission v SNUA, EU:C:1999:204��15.09 C-70/97 P, Kruidvat v Commission, EU:C:1998:545�� 7.113, 10.10 C-73/97 P, France v Comafrica and Others, EU:C:1999:13��19.12 C-95/97, Région wallonne v Commission, EU:C:1997:184�� 5.39, 7.126 C-103/97, Köllensperger and Atzwanger, EU:C:1999:52��3.06 C-104/97 P, Atlanta v European Community, EU:C:1999:498�� 19.23, 22.16 C-119/97 P, Ufex and Others v Commission, EU:C:1999:116�� 19.27, 24.48 C-120/97, Upjohn, EU:C:1999:14��4.42 C-124/97, Läärä and Others, EU:C:1999:435��3.20 C-126/97, Eco Swiss, EU:C:1999:269��3.09, 4.38 C-131/97, Carbonari and Others, EU:C:1999:98��3.20, 4.71 C-134/97, Victoria Film, EU:C:1998:535��3.07, 3.08 C-140/97, Rechberger and Others, EU:C:1999:306��4.68, 6.31 C-161/97 P, Kernkraftwerke Lippe-Ems v Commission, EU:C:1999:193��22.31 C-180/97, Regione Toscana v Commission, EU:C:1997:451��7.126 C-181/97, van der Kooy, EU:C:1999:32��3.23 C-198/97, Commission v Germany, EU:C:1999:283��5.32 C-200/97, Ecotrade, EU:C:1998:579 ��3.20 C-207/97, Commission v Belgium, EU:C:1999:17��5.60 C-221/97 P, Schröder and Thamann v Commission, EU:C:1998:597 ��19.04 C-233/97, KappAhl, EU:C:1998:585 ��6.04 C-239/97, Ireland v Commission, EU:C:1998:213��22.74 C-272/97, Commission v Germany, EU:C:1999:195��5.32 C-274/97, Commission v Coal Products, EU:C:2000:245��15.08 C-295/97, Piaggio, EU:C:1999:313��3.20, 7.50 C-302/97, Konle, EU:C:1999:271��4.71, 6.31 C-310/97 P, Commission v AssiDomän Kraft Products and Others, EU:C:1999:407�� 7.221, 7.222 C-312/97 P, Fichtner v Commission, EU:C:1998:326 ��16.25 C-319/97, Kortas, EU:C:1999:272 ��13.09 C-321/97, Andersson and Wåkerås-Andersson, EU:C:1999:307��6.16 C-334/97, Commission v Comune di Montorio al Vomano, EU:C:1999:290�� 5.02, 11.51, 25.10 C-336/97, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1999:314 ��5.15 C-341/97, Commission v Netherlands, EU:C:2000:434 ��5.45

xxxvi Table of Cases C-371/97, Gozza and Others, EU:C:2000:526��3.26 C-372/97, Italy v Commission, EU:C:2004:234 �� 7.211, 7.220 C-387/97, Commission v Greece, EU:C:2000:356��5.82, 5.84 C-404/97, Commission v Portugal, EU:C:2000:345��5.72 C-408/97, Commission v Netherlands, EU:C:2000:427 ��5.70 C-412/97, ED, EU:C:1999:324 ��4.02 C-414/97, Commission v Spain, EU:C:1999:417 ��5.74 C-421/97, Tarantik, EU:C:1999:309��3.32 C-422/97 P, Sateba v Commission, EU:C:1998:395��5.41, 7.39 C-424/97, Haim, EU:C:2000:357 �� 4.66, 4.70, 4.71 C-429/97, Commission v France, EU:C:2001:54 ��5.56 C-437/97, EKW and Wein & Co., EU:C:2000:110��6.39 C-443/97, Spain v Commission, EU:C:2000:190 ��7.21 C-2/98 P, de Compte v Parliament, EU:C:1999:158�� 19.07, 25.44 C-15/98, Italy and Sardegna Lines v Commission, EU:C:2000:570�� 7.121, 7.123 C-17/98, Emesa Sugar, EU:C:2000:70 �� 2.16, 4.77, 24.74 C-28/98 and C-29/98, Charreire and Hirtsmann, EU:C:1999:188��3.23 C-61/98, De Haan, EU:C:1999:393��3.20 C-64/98 P-REV, Petrides v Commission, EU:C:2010:279�� 22.42, 25.47 C-78/98, Preston and Others, EU:C:2000:247 ��4.07 C-83/98 P, France v Ladbroke Racing and Commission, EU:C:2000:248��7.210 C-95/98 P, Dubois v Council and Commission, EU:C:1999:373 ��11.22 C-97/98, Jägerskiöld, EU:C:1999:515��6.24 C-106/98 P, Comité d’entreprise de la Société française de production and Others v Commission, EU:C:2000:277��7.106, 7.124, 7.125, 7.130, 7.131 C-108/98, RI.SAN., EU:C:1999:400��6.24 C-110/98 to C-147/98, Gabalfrisa and Others, EU:C:2000:145 ��3.06, 3.07 C-152/98, Commission v Netherlands, EU:C:2001:255 ��5.32 C-153/98 P, Guérin automobiles v Commission, EU:C:1999:123 ��7.11 C-154/98 P, Guérin automobiles v Commission, EU:C:1999:124 ��7.11 C-162/98, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft and Others, EU:C:1998:539 ��6.18 C-164/98 P, DIR International Film and Others v Commission, EU:C:2000:48�� 7.161, 19.05 C-165/98, Mazzoleni and ISA, EU:C:2001:162��3.29 C-175/98 to C-177/98, Lirussi and Bizzaro, EU:C:1999:486��3.25 C-180/98 to C-184/98, Pavlov and Others, EU:C:2000:428 ��3.23 C-195/98, Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, EU:C:2000:655��3.05, 3.08 C-200/98, X and Y, EU:C:1999:566��3.07 C-205/98, Commission v Austria, EU:C:2000:493��5.05 C-210/98 P, Salzgitter v Commission, EU:C:2000:397�� 7.162, 10.15 C-219/98, Anastasiou and Others, EU:C:2000:360 ��6.13 C-237/98 P, Dorsch Consult v Council and Commission, EU:C:2000:321�� 11.10, 19.04 C-240/98 to C-244/98, Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores, EU:C:2000:346 ��4.41, 6.31 C-256/98, Commission v France, EU:C:2000:192 ��5.56 C-286/98 P, Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags v Commission, EU:C:2000:630��18.07 C-297/98 P, SCA Holding v Commission, EU:C:2000:633��7.195 C-300/98 and C-392/98, Dior and Others, EU:C:2000:688��6.16 C-325/98, Anssens, EU:C:1999:244��3.30 C-343/98, Collino and Chiappero, EU:C:2000:441 ��3.29 C-344/98, Masterfoods and HB, EU:C:2000:689 ��3.57 C-352/98 P, Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission, EU:C:2000:361�� 4.65, 11.16, 11.40 C-364/98 P(R), Emesa Sugar v Commission and Others, EU:C:1998:629 ��13.29 C-372/98, Cooke, EU:C:2000:558��6.39 C-376/98, Germany v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2000:544 �� 7.166, 24.39 C-377/98, Netherlands v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2001:523��23.02

Table of Cases xxxvii C-383/98, Polo/Lauren, EU:C:2000:193 ��3.20 C-390/98, Banks, EU:C:2001:456��10.11 C-393/98, Gomes Valente, EU:C:2001:109��3.49 C-397/98 and C-410/98, Metallgesellschaft and Others, EU:C:2001:134��4.62, 4.71 C-399/98, Ordine degli Architetti and Others, EU:C:2001:401 ��3.23 C-405/98, Gourmet International Products, EU:C:2001:135��3.27 C-407/98, Abrahamsson and Anderson, EU:C:2000:367 ��3.05 C-426/98, Commission v Greece, EU:C:2002:180��5.77 C-432/98 P and C-433/98 P, Council v Chvatal and Others, EU:C:2000:545��9.09 C-434/98 P, Council v Busacca and Others, EU:C:2000:546�� 9.20, 19.16 C-440/98, RAI, EU:C:1999:590��3.07 C-441/98 and C-442/98, Michaïlidis, EU:C:2000:479��4.60 C-448/98, Guimont, EU:C:2000:663 ��6.28 C-451/98, Antillean Rice Mills v Council, EU:C:2001:622��7.102 C-452/98, Nederlandse Antillen v Council, EU:C:2001:623�� 7.86, 7.102 C-458/98 P, Industrie des poudres sphériques v Council, EU:C:2000:531 ��19.33 C-462/98 P, Mediocurso v Commission, EU:C:2000:480 �� 7.175, 19.04 C-1/99, Kofisa Italia, EU:C:2001:10��6.29 C-6/99, Greenpeace France and Others, EU:C:2000:148��3.56 C-7/99 P, Campoli v Commission, EU:C:1999:227 ��19.28 C-17/99, France v Commission, EU:C:2001:178 ��5.72 C-29/99, Commission v Council, EU:C:2002:734��12.05 C-36/99, Idéal tourisme, EU:C:2000:405��3.37 C-59/99, Commission v Manuel Pereira Roldão & Filhos and Others, EU:C:2001:604��24.25 C-70/99, Commission v Portugal, EU:C:2001:355��5.27 C-80/99 to C-82/99, Flemmer and Others, EU:C:2001:525 �� 15.17, 15.18 C-83/99, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2001:31 ��5.71 C-88/99, Roquette Frères, EU:C:2000:652�� 3.20, 4.57, 4.64, 6.38 C-89/99, Schieving-Nijstad and Others, EU:C:2001:438��6.16 C-109/99, ABBOI, EU:C:2000:483��3.23 C-110/99, Emsland-Stärke, EU:C:2000:695 ��4.60 C-120/99, Italy v Council, EU:C:2001:567��7.180 C-127/99, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2001:597 ��5.82 C-145/99, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2002:142 ��5.18 C-150/99, Stockholm Lindöpark, EU:C:2001:34��4.67, 4.68 C-154/99 P, Politi, EU:C:2000:354 ��16.22 C-159/99, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2001:278 ��5.52 C-163/99, Portugal v Commission, EU:C:2001:189��5.27, 7.40 C-176/99 P, ARBED v Commission, EU:C:2003:524��7.175 C-177/99 and C-181/99, Ampafrance and Sanofi, EU:C:2000:470��10.22 C-178/99, Salzmann, EU:C:2001:331��3.07 C-184/99, Grzelczyk, EU:C:2001:458��6.39 C-194/99 P, Thyssen Stahl v Commission, EU:C:2003:527��7.176 C-197/99 P, Belgium v Commission, EU:C:2003:444 ��19.05 C-198/99 P, Ensidesa v Commission, EU:C:2003:530��24.52 C-199/99 P, Corus UK v Commission, EU:C:2003:531��24.50 C-202/99, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2001:646 ��5.67 C-208/99, Portugal v Commission, EU:C:2001:638��7.17 C-212/99, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2001:357 ��5.18 C-216/99 and C-222/99, Prisco and CASER, EU:C:2002:472��4.57, 4.62 C-226/99, Siples, EU:C:2001:14 ��4.76 C-228/99, Silos, EU:C:2001:599��10.22 C-236/99, Commission v Belgium, EU:C:2000:374��5.71, 5.74

xxxviii Table of Cases C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission, EU:C:2002:582��7.27, 7.28, 7.32, 7.188, 7.199, 7.221, 18.02, 18.06, 19.21, 22.16 C-239/99, Nachi Europe, EU:C:2001:101 ��3.20, 7.133, 7.135, 7.221, 9.01, 10.11 C-249/99 P, Pescados Congelados Jogamar v Commission, EU:C:1999:571 ��8.17 C-261/99, Commission v France, EU:C:2001:179 ��5.72 C-263/99, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2001:293 ��5.67 C-267/99, Adam, EU:C:2001:534��6.29 C-294/99, Athinaïki Zythopoiia, EU:C:2001:505��6.39 C-302/99 P and C-308/99 P, Commission and France v TF1, EU:C:2001:408 �� 19.24, 23.62 C-306/99, BIAO, EU:C:2003:3 ��6.29 C-315/99 P, Ismeri Europa v Court of Auditors, EU:C:2001:391��19.27 C-321/99 P, ARAP and Others v Commission, EU:C:2002:292��7.57, 7.58 C-329/99 P(R), Pfizer Animal Health v Council, EU:C:1999:572 �� 13.23, 23.03 C-333/99, Commission v France, EU:C:2001:73 ��5.66 C-340/99, TNT Traco, EU:C:2001:281��3.50 C-349/99 P, ADT Projekt Gesellschaft v Commission, EU:C:1999:475��19.12 C-356/99, Commission v Hitesys, EU:C:2000:615��15.06 C-363/99, Koninklijke KPN Nederland, EU:C:2004:86��3.43 C-366/99, Griesmar, EU:C:2001:648��6.39 C-382/99, Netherlands v Commission, EU:C:2002:363 ��7.213 C-384/99, Commission v Belgium, EU:C:2000:660��5.62 C-390/99, Canal Satélite Digital, EU:C:2002:34��3.29 C-393/99 and C-394/99, Hervein and Others, EU:C:2002:182��10.03 C-400/99, Italy v Commission, EU:C:2005:275 �� 7.49, 7.50, 7.53, 7.54, 7.191 C-403/99, Italy v Commission, EU:C:2001:507 ��23.33 C-404/99, Commission v France, EU:C:2001:192 ��5.71 C-439/99, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2002:14��5.62 C-451/99, Cura Anlagen, EU:C:2002:195��3.38 C-453/99, Courage and Crehan, EU:C:2001:465�� 4.17, 4.72, 4.73 C-478/99, Commission v Sweden, EU:C:2002:281 ��5.15 C-480/99 P, Plant and Others v Commission and South Wales Small Mines, EU:C:2002:8�� 19.06, 24.07 C-496/99 P, Commission v CAS Succhi di Frutta, EU:C:2004:236�� 7.138, 7.144 C-514/99, France v Commission, EU:C:2000:334��7.19 C-516/99, Schmid, EU:C:2002:313��3.06 C-1/00, Commission v France, EU:C:2001:687 ��5.48, 5.74 C-1/00 SA, Cotecna Inspection v Commission, EU:C:2001:296 ��14.03, 14.04, 14.06, 14.07 C-11/00, Commission v ECB, EU:C:2003:395 �� 5.72, 9.01, 9.08, 9.12, 10.11 C-13/00, Commission v Ireland, EU:C:2002:184�� 5.07, 23.03 C-17/00, De Coster, EU:C:2001:651��3.06 C-23/00 P, Council v Boehringer, EU:C:2002:118 �� 7.91, 19.12 C-41/00 P, Interporc v Commission, EU:C:2003:125��19.33 C-44/00 P, Sodima v Commission, EU:C:2000:686��8.05, 8.21 C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council, EU:C:2002:462�� 2.17, 7.107 C-52/00, Commission v France, EU:C:2002:252 ��5.71 C-62/00, Marks & Spencer, EU:C:2002:435��4.58 C-92/00, HI, EU:C:2002:379��3.05 C-94/00, Roquette Frères, EU:C:2002:603��7.28 C-97/00, Commission v France, EU:C:2001:149 ��5.15 C-99/00, Lyckeskog, EU:C:2002:329 ��3.45, 3.52 C-116/00, Laguillaumie, EU:C:2000:350��3.30 C-118/00, Larsy, EU:C:2001:368��4.67 C-119/00, Commission v Luxembourg, EU:C:2001:351��5.62

Table of Cases xxxix C-129/00, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2003:656 �� 3.52, 4.60, 5.10, 5.12, 5.40 C-139/00, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2002:438 ��5.56 C-142/00 P, Commission v Nederlandse Antillen, EU:C:2003:217��7.102 C-147/00, Commission v France, EU:C:2001:175 ��5.62 C-150/00, Commission v Austria, EU:C:2004:237��5.10 C-153/00, der Weduwe, EU:C:2002:735 �� 3.25, 3.32, 3.35 C-171/00 P, Libéros v Commission, EU:C:2002:17 ��2.30 C-182/00, Lutz and Others, EU:C:2002:19 ��3.07 C-185/00, Commission v Finland, EU:C:2003:639 �� 5.56, 23.03 C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P, Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission, EU:C:2004:6 ��7.31, 7.32, 7.172, 7.199, 7.201, 7.202, 19.04, 19.05, 19.20, 19.21, 24.67 C-255/00, Grundig Italiana, EU:C:2002:525��4.29, 4.58 C-265/00, Campina Melkunie, EU:C:2004:87��3.43 C-274/00 P, Simon v Commission, EU:C:2002:401��24.15 C-275/00, First and Franex, EU:C:2002:711��11.07 C-298/00 P, Italy v Commission, EU:C:2004:240�� 7.121, 7.123, 23.64 C-312/00 P, Commission v Camar and Tico, EU:C:2002:736�� 7.101, 11.54 C-318/00, Bacardi-Martini and Cellier des Dauphins, EU:C:2003:41��3.25, 3.35 C-325/00, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2002:633��5.41 C-347/00, Barreira Pérez, EU:C:2002:560��6.39 C-378/00, Commission v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2003:42��7.217 C-404/00, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2003:373 ��5.24 C-409/00, Spain v Commission, EU:C:2003:92 ��7.211 C-411/00, Felix Swoboda, EU:C:2002:660��3.05 C-418/00 and C-419/00, Commission v France, EU:C:2002:263��5.14 C-445/00, Austria v Council, EU:C:2003:445�� 7.25, 24.49 C-447/00, Holto, EU:C:2002:38 ��3.14 C-453/00, Kühne & Heitz, EU:C:2004:17 ��4.51, 4.52 C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-139/01, Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others, EU:C:2003:294��3.14 C-466/00, Kaba, EU:C:2003:127��6.13 C-472/00 P, Commission v Fresh Marine, EU:C:2003:399�� 11.40, 11.59, 11.61 C-473/00, Cofidis, EU:C:2002:705��4.29 C-2/01 P and C-3/01 P, BAI and Commission v Bayer, EU:C:2004:2��19.04 C-6/01, Anomar and Others, EU:C:2003:446��6.28 C-20/01 and C-28/01, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2003:220��5.09 C-24/01 P and C-25/01 P, Glencore and Compagnie Continentale v Commission, EU:C:2002:642��19.04 C-29/01, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2002:155 ��5.62 C-42/01, Portugal v Commission, EU:C:2004:379��7.42 C-62/01 P, Campogrande v Commission, EU:C:2002:248 ��19.10 C-63/01, Evans, EU:C:2003:650��4.65, 4.66 C-76/01 P, Eurocoton and Others v Council, EU:C:2003:511�� 7.12, 7.63, 11.42 C-82/01 P, Aéroports de Paris v Commission, EU:C:2002:617�� 19.04, 19.07, 22.31 C-129/01, Condominio Facchinei Orsini, EU:C:2002:278��3.32 C-135/01, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2003:171��5.49 C-136/01 P, Autosalone Ispra dei Fratelli Rossi v EAEC, EU:C:2002:458�� 2.25, 11.68 C-145/01, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2003:324 ��5.46, 5.51 C-147/01, Weber’s Wine World and Others, EU:C:2003:533�� 4.56, 4.59, 4.60 C-165/01, Betriebsrat der Vertretung der Europäischen Kommission in Österreich, EU:C:2003:401��16.08 C-167/01, Inspire Art, EU:C:2003:512��3.29 C-172/01 P, C-175/01 P, C-176/01 P and C-180/01 P, International Power and Others v NALOO, EU:C:2003:534��19.05

xl Table of Cases C-189/01, Jippes and Others, EU:C:2001:420��23.27 C-199/01 P and C-200/01 P, IPK-München v Commission, EU:C:2004:249��7.221 C-207/01, Altair Chimica, EU:C:2003:451 ��6.10 C-224/01, Köbler, EU:C:2003:513 �� 3.52, 3.53, 4.50, 4.66, 4.69, 4.70, 5.79, 6.13, 11.16 C-226/01, Commission v Denmark, EU:C:2003:60��5.71 C-241/01, National Farmers’ Union, EU:C:2002:604�� 3.20, 9.12, 10.11 C-261/01 and C-262/01, van Calster and Cleeren, EU:C:2003:571��5.25 C-278/01, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2003:635 ��5.84 C-296/01, Commission v France, EU:C:2003:626 ��5.15 C-300/01, Salzmann, EU:C:2003:283��6.28 C-314/01, Siemens and ARGE Telekom, EU:C:2004:159 ��3.33 C-315/01, GAT, EU:C:2003:360��3.29 C-341/01, Plato Plastik Robert Frank, EU:C:2004:254 ��3.38 C-362/01, Commission v Ireland, EU:C:2002:739��5.52, 5.55 C-380/01, Schneider, EU:C:2004:73�� 3.24, 3.33, 24.73 C-387/01, Weigel, EU:C:2004:256 ��3.20 C-406/01, Germany v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2002:304 ��16.13 C-429/01, Commission v France, EU:C:2003:643 ��5.15 C-430/01, Herbstrith, EU:C:2002:215��3.23 C-439/01, Cipra and Kvasnicka, EU:C:2003:31 ��6.16 C-440/01 P(R), Commission v Artegodan, EU:C:2002:95 ��13.39 C-447/01, DLD Trading Company Import-Export, EU:C:2002:216��3.23 C-463/01, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2004:797��5.52 C-465/01, Commission v Austria, EU:C:2004:530��5.07 C-475/01, Commission v Greece, EU:C:2004:585�� 5.21, 5.73, 7.10, 9.08, 9.12 C-486/01 P, Front national v Parliament, EU:C:2004:394�� 7.94, 19.30, 23.63 C-491/01, British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco, EU:C:2002:741�� 3.13, 10.09, 10.18 C-494/01, Commission v Ireland, EU:C:2005:250�� 5.11, 5.14, 5.70 C-1/02 SA, Antippas v Commission, EU:C:2003:187 �� 14.04, 14.06, 14.07 C-9/02, de Lasteyrie du Saillant, EU:C:2004:138 ��3.25 C-24/02, Marseille Fret, EU:C:2002:220 ��21.07 C-30/02, Recheio –Cash & Carry, EU:C:2004:373�� 3.20, 4.02, 4.29, 4.54, 4.58, 6.23 C-32/02, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2003:555��25.11 C-34/02, Pasquini, EU:C:2003:366��4.07 C-41/02, Commission v Netherlands, EU:C:2004:762 ��5.10 C-60/02, X, EU:C:2004:10��3.14, 3.24 C-66/02, Italy v Commission, EU:C:2005:768 ��22.17 C-69/02, Reichling, EU:C:2002:221��21.07 C-71/02, Karner, EU:C:2004:181 ��3.32 C-87/02, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2004:363��5.35, 5.39 C-93/02 P, Biret International v Council, EU:C:2003:517��11.46 C-99/02, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2004:207�� 4.63, 5.24, 5.71 C-103/02, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2004:591 ��5.71 C-104/02, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2005:219��5.75 C-105/02, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2006:637��5.74 C-110/02, Commission v Council, EU:C:2004:395��5.23, 7.51 C-111/02 P, Parliament v Reynolds, EU:C:2004:265 ��16.03 C-116/02, Gasser, EU:C:2003:657��3.23 C-117/02, Commission v Portugal, EU:C:2004:266��5.56 C-141/02 P, Commission v max.mobil, EU:C:2005:98 �� 5.36, 7.40, 19.12 C-153/02, Neri, EU:C:2003:614 ��3.32 C-164/02, Netherlands v Commission, EU:C:2004:54 ��7.18 C-167/02 P, Rothley and Others v Parliament, EU:C:2004:193��7.102

Table of Cases xli C-170/02 P, Schlüsselverlag J.S. Moser and Others v Commission, EU:C:2003:501�� 8.06, 8.19, 19.30 C-174/02, Streekgewest, EU:C:2005:10��4.27 C-184/02 and C-223/02, Spain and Finland v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2004:497��22.09 C-186/02 P, Ramondín and Others v Commission, EU:C:2004:702 ��23.11 C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P, Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission, EU:C:2005:408��9.09 C-222/02, Paul and Others, EU:C:2004:606 ��4.66 C-225/02, García Blanco, EU:C:2005:34��3.26 C-233/02, France v Commission, EU:C:2004:173��7.16, 7.21 C-234/02 P, Ombudsman v Lamberts, EU:C:2004:174�� 5.37, 11.13, 11.22, 11.24, 11.49, 19.12, 23.63 C-235/02, Saetti and Frediani, EU:C:2004:26��3.14, 3.29 C-236/02, Slob, EU:C:2004:94��3.19 C-237/02, Freiburger Kommunalbauten, EU:C:2004:209��6.31 C-238/02, Viluckas and Jonusas, EU:C:2004:126��6.28 C-245/02, Anheuser-Busch, EU:C:2004:717��6.16 C-248/02, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2004:531 ��5.67 C-249/02, Portugal v Commission, EU:C:2004:704��7.171 C-250/02 to C-253/02 and C-256/02, Telecom Italia Mobile, EU:C:2004:335 ��24.67 C-258/02 P, Bactria v Commission, EU:C:2003:675�� 7.99, 7.107 C-263/02 P, Commission v Jégo-Quéré, EU:C:2004:210��7.101, 7.102, 7.107, 7.111 C-276/02, Spain v Commission, EU:C:2004:521 ��7.197 C-286/02, Bellio F.lli, EU:C:2004:212��3.32 C-289/02, AMOK, EU:C:2003:669��5.12 C-294/02, Commission v AMI Semiconductor Belgium and Others, EU:C:2005:172�� 15.01, 15.15, 15.16 C-304/02, Commission v France, EU:C:2005:444 �� 5.83, 5.84, 5.85 C-309/02, Radlberger Getränkegesellschaft and S. Spitz, EU:C:2004:799��3.26 C-315/02, Lenz, EU:C:2004:446��3.32 C-350/02, Commission v Netherlands, EU:C:2004:389 ��5.52 C-394/02, Commission v Greece, EU:C:2005:336��5.53 C-434/02, Arnold André, EU:C:2004:800��10.18 C-441/02, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2006:253��5.06, 5.10 C-445/02 P, Glaverbel v OHIM, EU:C:2004:393�� 23.14, 23.20 C-470/02 P, UER v M6 and Others, EU:C:2004:565��19.06 C-1/03 SA, Icon Institute v Commission, EU:C:2004:165��14.04 C-12/03 P, Commission v Tetra Laval, EU:C:2005:87 �� 7.202, 7.205, 7.206 C-38/03, Commission v Belgium, EU:C:2005:13��23.02 C-42/03, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2004:764 ��5.66 C-44/03, Horn, EU:C:2003:419��3.32 C-45/03, Dem’Yanenko, EU:C:2004:166��3.07 C-46/03, United Kingdom v Commission, EU:C:2005:725 ��7.19 C-53/03, Syfait and Others, EU:C:2005:333 ��3.08 C-54/03, Austroplant-Arzneimittel, EU:C:2004:148��6.30 C-61/03, Commission v United Kingdom, EU:C:2005:210 ��5.03 C-72/03, Carbonati Apuani, EU:C:2004:506��6.39 C-78/03 P, Commission v Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum, EU:C:2005:761�� 7.119, 7.125, 7.130 C-82/03, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2004:433��5.14, 5.70 C-86/03, Greece v Commission, EU:C:2005:769��9.12 C-91/03, Spain v Council, EU:C:2005:174��7.187 C-105/03, Pupino, EU:C:2005:386��3.06 C-106/03 P, Vedial v OHIM, EU:C:2004:611��17.10 C-118/03, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2004:458��5.71, 5.72

xlii Table of Cases C-123/03 P, Commission v Greencore, EU:C:2004:783�� 7.12, 7.222, 8.09, 19.02 C-131/03 P, Reynolds Tobacco and Others v Commission, EU:C:2006:541��5.32, 7.15, 7.21, 11.12, 11.38 C-134/03, Viacom Outdoor, EU:C:2005:94��3.22, 3.23 C-138/03, C-324/03 and C-431/03, Italy v Commission, EU:C:2005:714��7.19 C-147/03, Commission v Austria, EU:C:2005:427��5.13 C-152/03, Ritter-Coulais, EU:C:2006:123��3.31 C-157/03, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2005:225 ��5.09 C-160/03, Spain v Eurojust, EU:C:2005:168��7.03, 7.71 C-161/03, Cafom and Samsung, EU:C:2003:413 ��3.05 C-168/03, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2004:525 ��5.63 C-173/03, Traghetti del Mediterraneo, EU:C:2006:391�� 3.53, 4.66, 4.69, 4.70 C-176/03, Commission v Council, EU:C:2005:542�� 1.07, 7.03, 23.05, 23.07 C-177/03, Commission v France, EU:C:2004:784 ��5.58, 5.66 C-182/03 and C-217/03, Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission, EU:C:2006:416��7.100, 7.123, 7.127, 7.188 C-182/03 R and C-217/03 R, Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission, EU:C:2003:385��7.53 C-197/03, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2006:306 ��4.56 C-198/03 P, Commission v CEVA and Pfizer, EU:C:2005:445 ��11.49 C-203/03, Commission v Austria, EU:C:2005:76��5.58 C-208/03 P, Le Pen v Parliament, EU:C:2005:429��13.29 C-208/03 P-R, Le Pen v Parliament, EU:C:2003:424 ��13.02 C-209/03, Bidar, EU:C:2005:169��6.39 C-210/03, Swedish Match, EU:C:2004:802��10.18 C-213/03, Pêcheurs de l’étang de Berre, EU:C:2004:464 ��6.16 C-220/03, ECB v Germany, EU:C:2005:748 �� 15.04, 15.15 C-224/03, Italy v Commission, EU:C:2003:658 �� 7.216, 23.54 C-229/03, Herbstrith, EU:C:2004:222��3.23 C-239/03, Commission v France, EU:C:2004:598 ��5.07, 6.16 C-244/03, France v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2005:299��7.217 C-250/03, Mauri, EU:C:2005:96��6.28 C-266/03, Commission v Luxembourg, EU:C:2005:341��5.13 C-267/03, Lindberg, EU:C:2005:246��3.25 C-278/03, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2005:281 ��5.18 C-279/03, Commission v Implants, EU:C:2005:109 �� 24.26, 25.11 C-280/03, Commission v Lior and Others, EU:C:2004:343 ��15.06 C-287/03, Commission v Belgium, EU:C:2005:282��5.10, 5.68 C-301/03, Italy v Commission, EU:C:2005:727 ��7.18 C-320/03, Commission v Austria, EU:C:2005:684��5.54 C-320/03 R, Commission v Austria, EU:C:2004:231��13.13 C-321/03, Dyson, EU:C:2007:51��3.20 C-346/03 and C-529/03, Atzeni and Others, EU:C:2006:130�� 7.123, 10.11 C-358/03, Commission v Austria, EU:C:2004:824��5.71 C-366/03 P to C-368/03 P, C-390/03 P, C-391/03 P and C-394/03 P, Associazione bancaria italiana v Commission, EU:C:2003:638��19.12 C-377/03, Commission v Belgium, EU:C:2006:638��5.74 C-379/03 P, Pérez Escolar v Commission, EU:C:2004:580 ��8.09, 8.13 C-380/03, Germany v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2006:772 ��7.166 C-396/03 P, Killinger v Germany and Others, EU:C:2005:355�� 4.70, 5.12, 5.40, 19.02 C-397/03 P, Archer Daniels Midland and Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients v Commission, EU:C:2006:328��7.203 C-410/03, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2005:258 ��5.15 C-413/03, Commission v Ireland, EU:C:2004:58��7.206 C-432/03, Commission v Portugal, EU:C:2005:669��5.14

Table of Cases xliii C-433/03, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2005:462��5.13 C-438/03, C-439/03, C-509/03 and C-2/04, Cannito and Others, EU:C:2004:85 ��3.21 C-442/03 P and C-471/03 P, P&O European Ferries (Vizcaya) v Commission, EU:C:2006:356�� 7.223, 19.07, 19.25 C-451/03, Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti, EU:C:2006:208 ��6.20 C-453/03, C-11/04, C-12/04 and C-194/04, ABNA and Others, EU:C:2005:741��3.31, 4.77, 10.18, 10.21 C-456/03, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2005:388 ��5.16, 5.70, 22.17, 22.19, 25.23 C-459/03, Commission v Ireland, EU:C:2006:345�� 5.03, 5.13, 5.14, 5.17, 15.32 C-461/03, Gaston Schul Douane-expediteur, EU:C:2005:742 ��3.51 C-470/03, AGM-COS.MET, EU:C:2007:213 �� 4.65, 4.66, 4.67, 4.71 C-485/03, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2006:777 ��5.23 C-495/03, Intermodal Transports, EU:C:2005:552 ��3.51, 3.53 C-508/03, Commission v United Kingdom, EU:C:2006:287 ��5.56, 5.66 C-511/03, Ten Kate Holding Musselkanaal and Others, EU:C:2005:625�� 4.79, 8.14, 10.12 C-515/03, Eichsfelder Schlachtbetrieb, EU:C:2005:491��4.60 C-517/03, Commission v IAMA Consulting, EU:C:2004:326 ��15.09 C-519/03, Commission v Luxembourg, EU:C:2005:234��5.74 C-521/03 P, Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission, EU:C:2004:778��7.11 C-525/03, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2005:648 ��5.62 C-540/03, Parliament v Council, EU:C:2006:429�� 7.77, 23.44 C-1/04 SA, Tertir-Terminais de Portugal v Commission, EU:C:2004:803 �� 14.04, 14.05, 14.07 C-3/04, Poseidon Chartering, EU:C:2006:176��6.29 C-23/04 to C-25/04, Sfakianakis, EU:C:2006:92��6.15 C-27/04, Commission v Council, EU:C:2004:436��7.12, 7.14 C-36/04, Spain v Council, EU:C:2006:209�� 7.217, 23.52, 24.49 C-70/04, Switzerland v Commission, EU:C:2005:468��2.55 C-95/04 P, British Airways v Commission, EU:C:2007:166 ��19.07 C-96/04, Standesamt Stadt Niebüll, EU:C:2006:254 ��3.07 C-119/04, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2006:489 ��5.82, 5.84 C-125/04, Denuit and Cordenier, EU:C:2005:69��3.09 C-144/04, Mangold, EU:C:2005:709 ��3.38 C-145/04, Spain v United Kingdom, EU:C:2006:543��5.34 C-156/04, Commission v Greece, EU:C:2007:316��5.10 C-177/04, Commission v France, EU:C:2006:173 ��5.82 C-184/04, Uudenkaupungin kaupunki, EU:C:2006:214��6.39 C-192/04, Lagardère Active Broadcast, EU:C:2005:475 ��4.77 C-199/04, Commission v United Kingdom, EU:C:2007:72 ��5.56 C-208/04, Inter-Environnement Wallonie, EU:C:2005:71 ��19.30 C-210/04, FCE Bank, EU:C:2006:196 ��3.20 C-212/04, Adeneler and Others, EU:C:2006:443��3.32 C-213/04, Burtscher, EU:C:2005:731��3.26 C-214/04, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2005:440 ��5.18 C-221/04, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2006:329 ��5.59, 5.62 C-222/04, Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others, EU:C:2006:8 ��10.11 C-234/04, Kapferer, EU:C:2006:178��4.50, 4.52 C-237/04, Enirisorse, EU:C:2006:197 ��3.20 C-255/04, Commission v France, EU:C:2006:401 ��5.56 C-258/04, Ioannidis, EU:C:2005:559��8.23 C-259/04, Emanuel, EU:C:2006:215 ��3.06 C-289/04 P, Showa Denko v Commission, EU:C:2006:431��7.195 C-292/04, Meilicke and Others, EU:C:2007:132��6.39 C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi and Others, EU:C:2006:461��3.28, 4.74 C-300/04, Eman and Sevinger, EU:C:2006:545��23.26

xliv Table of Cases C-301/04 P, Commission v SGL Carbon, EU:C:2006:432�� 7.195, 18.04 C-308/04 P, SGL Carbon v Commission, EU:C:2006:433�� 7.195, 18.04 C-310/04, Spain v Council, EU:C:2006:521��2.13 C-317/04, Parliament v Council, EU:C:2005:189��23.07 C-317/04 and C-318/04, Parliament v Commission, EU:C:2006:346 ��12.16 C-344/04, IATA and ELFAA, EU:C:2006:10��3.56, 3.57, 10.01, 10.08, 10.17 C-351/04, Ikea Wholesale, EU:C:2007:547�� 7.214, 10.08 C-354/04 P, Gestoras Pro Amnistía and Others v Council, EU:C:2007:115�� 7.03, 11.03 C-355/04 P, Segi and Others v Council, EU:C:2007:116 �� 7.03, 11.03 C-368/04, Transalpine Ölleitung in Österreich, EU:C:2006:644 ��5.25 C-380/04 P(R), Bactria v Commission, EU:C:2004:795 ��13.05 C-392/04 and C-422/04, i-21 Germany and Arcor, EU:C:2006:586��4.52 C-403/04 P and C-405/04 P, Sumitomo Metal Industries and Nippon Steel v Commission, EU:C:2007:52�� 7.199, 25.03 C-404/04 P, Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau v Commission, EU:C:2007:6��13.11 C-404/04 P-R, Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau v Commission, EU:C:2005:267 ��13.02 C-413/04, Parliament v Council, EU:C:2006:741��7.187 C-414/04, Parliament v Council, EU:C:2006:742��7.187 C-417/04 P, Regione Siciliana v Commission, EU:C:2006:282��7.159 C-423/04, Richards, EU:C:2006:256��6.39 C-432/04, Commission v Cresson, EU:C:2006:455�� 2.11, 24.49 C-442/04, Spain v Council, EU:C:2008:276��9.12, 9.16 C-446/04, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, EU:C:2006:774��6.39 C-466/04, Acereda Herrera, EU:C:2006:405��3.32 C-470/04, N, EU:C:2006:525��3.23, 4.62 C-479/04, Laserdisken, EU:C:2006:549��10.15 C-487/04, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2006:435 ��5.18 C-499/04, Werhof, EU:C:2006:168��3.20 C-503/04, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2007:432�� 5.65, 5.75, 5.84, 23.60 C-506/04, Wilson, EU:C:2006:587��3.06, 4.42 C-523/04, Commission v Netherlands, EU:C:2007:244 ��5.66 C-524/04, Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation, EU:C:2007:161 ��4.44, 6.39 C-525/04 P, Spain v Lenzing, EU:C:2007:698�� 7.125, 7.210 C-526/04, Laboratoires Boiron, EU:C:2006:528��4.44, 4.60 C-1/05 SA, Intek v Commission, EU:C:2005:610�� 14.04, 14.06 C-2/05 SA, Names v Commission, EU:C:2005:611 �� 14.04, 14.06 C-3/05 SA, Statistical Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan v Commission, EU:C:2005:612�� 14.04, 14.06 C-4/05 SA, Alt Ylmy v Commission, EU:C:2005:613�� 14.04, 14.06 C-5/05 SA, Gil do Nascimento and Others v Commission, EU:C:2005:723�� 14.04, 14.05, 14.06 C-6/05, Medipac –Kazantzidis, EU:C:2007:337��6.22 C-11/05, Friesland Coberco Dairy Foods, EU:C:2006:312��10.06 C-15/05, Kawasaki Motors Europe, EU:C:2006:259 ��10.01 C-17/05, Cadman, EU:C:2006:633��6.13, 6.39 C-18/05 and C-155/05, Salus and Villa Maria Beatrice Hospital, EU:C:2006:447��6.23 C-24/05 P, Storck v OHIM, EU:C:2006:421��17.15 C-25/05 P, Storck v OHIM, EU:C:2006:422��17.17 C-29/05 P, OHIM v Kaul, EU:C:2007:162�� 17.03, 17.12 C-32/05, Commission v Luxembourg, EU:C:2006:749��5.56 C-35/05, Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken, EU:C:2007:167��4.56, 4.59 C-45/05, Maatschap Schonewille-Prins, EU:C:2007:296 ��10.01 C-51/05 P, Commission v Cantina sociale di Dolianova and Others, EU:C:2008:409��8.23, 11.29, 11.32, 11.45, 11.63, 11.66, 11.67, 11.68, 11.70 C-53/05, Commission v Portugal, EU:C:2006:448��5.72

Table of Cases xlv C-76/05, Schwarz and Gootjes-Schwarz, EU:C:2007:492��24.05 C-91/05, Commission v Council, EU:C:2008:288�� 1.07, 5.72, 7.03, 9.06 C-97/05, Gattoussi, EU:C:2006:780��6.16 C-110/05, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2009:66��5.67 C-113/05 P, EFfCI v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2006:222��23.54 C-119/05, Lucchini, EU:C:2007:434��3.56, 4.12, 4.50, 4.63, 6.03, 10.01, 10.11 C-132/05, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2008:117��5.14 C-135/05, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2007:250 ��5.11 C-168/05, Mostaza Claro, EU:C:2006:675��4.38 C-178/05, Commission v Greece, EU:C:2007:317��5.77 C-201/05, Test Claimants in the CFC and Dividend Group Litigation, EU:C:2008:239�� 4.54, 4.66, 4.67, 4.71 C-210/05 P, Campailla v Commission, EU:C:2005:759�� 2.25, 7.156 C-217/05, Confederación Española de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio, EU:C:2006:784��6.29 C-222/05 to C-225/05, van der Weerd and Others, EU:C:2007:318�� 3.22, 4.38, 4.39 C-228/05, Stradasfalti, EU:C:2006:578 ��6.39 C-229/05 P, PKK and KNK v Council, EU:C:2007:32 �� 7.84, 19.05 C-232/05, Commission v France, EU:C:2006:651 ��4.63 C-238/05, ASNEF-EQUIFAX and Administración del Estado, EU:C:2006:734 ��3.26 C-239/05, BVBA Management, Training en Consultancy, EU:C:2007:99��4.42 C-243/05 P, Agraz and Others v Commission, EU:C:2006:708 �� 11.51, 11.57 C-246/05, Häupl, EU:C:2007:340��3.05, 3.06 C-248/05, Commission v Ireland, EU:C:2007:629��5.11 C-260/05 P, Sniace v Commission, EU:C:2007:700�� 7.125, 19.27 C-278/05, Robins and Others, EU:C:2007:56��4.66, 4.68 C-279/05, Vonk Dairy Products, EU:C:2007:18��4.60 C-282/05 P, Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission, EU:C:2007:226��11.38, 11.40, 11.49, 11.63, 11.64, 11.66, 11.70 C-283/05, ASML, EU:C:2006:787��4.22 C-284/05, Commission v Finland, EU:C:2009:778 ��5.77 C-290/05 and C-333/05, Nádasdi and Németh, EU:C:2006:652 ��6.39 C-292/05, Lechouritou and Others, EU:C:2007:102 ��2.11 C-299/05, Commission v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2007:608 ��7.19 C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld, EU:C:2007:261 ��10.17 C-305/05, Ordre des barreaux francophones and germanophone and Others, EU:C:2007:383��3.19 C-311/05 P, Naipes Heraclio Fournier v OHIM, EU:C:2007:572��17.03 C-318/05, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2007:495��24.05 C-326/05 P, Industrias Químicas del Vallés v Commission, EU:C:2007:443 ��19.05 C-330/05, Granberg, EU:C:2007:679��23.26 C-331/05 P, Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission, EU:C:2007:390�� 11.59, 11.60, 25.19 C-337/05, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2008:203 ��5.45, 5.82 C-342/05, Commission v Finland, EU:C:2007:341 ��5.10 C-362/05 P, Wunenburger v Commission, EU:C:2007:322�� 7.141, 7.144, 7.145, 19.12, 19.30, 23.63 C-368/05 P, Polyelectrolyte Producers Group v Commission and Council, EU:C:2006:771 ��7.106 C-372/05, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2009:780��5.29 C-376/05 and C-377/05, Brünsteiner and Autohaus Hilgert, EU:C:2006:753 ��10.14 C-380/05, Centro Europa 7, EU:C:2008:59�� 3.21, 3.23, 3.30, 6.24, 6.28 C-387/05, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2009:781 ��5.77 C-392/05, Alevizos, EU:C:2007:251��3.20 C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, EU:C:2008:461��7.188, 7.219, 10.05, 22.20 C-403/05, Parliament v Commission, EU:C:2007:624��7.158

xlvi Table of Cases C-412/05 P, Alcon v OHIM, EU:C:2007:252�� 17.13, 17.15, 22.17 C-417/05 P, Commission v Fernández Gómez, EU:C:2006:582��16.04 C-421/05, City Motors Groep, EU:C:2007:38��4.74 C-429/05, Rampion and Godard, EU:C:2007:575 ��4.41 C-431/05, Merck Genéricos Produtos Farmacêuticos, EU:C:2007:496��6.16 C-432/05, Unibet, EU:C:2007:163�� 4.11, 4.17, 4.21, 4.75, 4.76 C-440/05, Commission v Council, EU:C:2007:625��1.07, 7.03 C-441/05, Roquette Frères, EU:C:2007:150�� 9.18, 10.11 C-443/05 P, Common Market Fertilizers v Commission, EU:C:2007:511 ��7.169 C-456/05, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2007:755��5.09, 5.62 C-462/05, Commission v Portugal, EU:C:2008:337��5.82 C-2/06, Kempter, EU:C:2008:78��4.51, 4.52 C-3/06 P, Groupe Danone v Commission, EU:C:2007:88�� 18.04, 18.06, 18.09 C-6/06 P, Cofradía de pescadores “San Pedro” de Bermeo and Others v Council, EU:C:2007:702�� 11.46, 19.27 C-14/06 and C-295/06, Parliament and Denmark v Commission, EU:C:2008:176�� 7.169, 7.219 C-15/06 P, Regione Siciliana v Commission, EU:C:2007:183��7.98 C-16/06 P, Éditions Albert René v OHIM, EU:C:2008:739��17.03 C-55/06, Arcor, EU:C:2008:244 ��6.10 C-56/06, Euro Tex, EU:C:2007:347��6.15 C-70/06, Commission v Portugal, EU:C:2008:3��5.84 C-80/06, Carp, EU:C:2007:327��6.10 C-102/06, Commission v Austria, EU:C:2006:691��5.39 C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P, FIAMM and Others v Council and Commission, EU:C:2008:476�� 11.10, 11.71, 25.03 C-125/06 P, Commission v Infront WM, EU:C:2008:159�� 7.94, 7.95, 7.100 C-135/06 P, Weißenfels v Parliament, EU:C:2007:812��18.02 C-150/06 P, Arizona Chemical and Others v Commission, EU:C:2007:164��7.15 C-161/06, Skoma-Lux, EU:C:2007:773�� 6.19, 7.185 C-162/06, International Mail Spain, EU:C:2007:681��6.20 C-167/06 P, Komninou and Others v Commission, EU:C:2007:633�� 11.47, 19.02 C-175/06, Tedesco, EU:C:2007:552 ��3.42 C-176/06 P, Stadtwerke Schwäbisch Hall and Others v Commission, EU:C:2007:730 ��19.25 C-186/06, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2007:813 ��5.56 C-195/06, Österreichischer Rundfunk, EU:C:2007:613 ��3.07 C-199/06, CELF and ministre de la Culture et de la Communication, EU:C:2008:79��7.218 C-202/06 P, Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission, EU:C:2007:814��7.206 C-205/06, Commission v Austria, EU:C:2009:118��5.13 C-210/06, Cartesio, EU:C:2008:723��3.04, 3.05, 3.07, 3.14, 3.27, 3.31, 3.45 C-212/06, Gouvernement de la Communauté française and Gouvernement wallon, EU:C:2008:178 �� 5.71, 6.24, 6.28 C-231/06 to C-233/06, Jonkman and Others, EU:C:2007:373 ��6.34 C-234/06 P, Il Ponte Finanziaria v OHIM, EU:C:2007:514��24.42 C-237/06 P, Strack v Commission, EU:C:2007:156 ��11.14 C-239/06, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2009:784 ��5.77 C-249/06, Commission v Sweden, EU:C:2009:119 ��5.13 C-255/06 P-REV, Yedaş Tarim ve Otomotiv Sanayi ve Ticaret v Council and Commission, EU:C:2009:212��25.43 C-266/06 P, Evonik Degussa v Commission and Council, EU:C:2008:295��18.08 C-267/06, Maruko, EU:C:2008:179 ��6.39 C-268/06, Impact, EU:C:2008:223�� 2.01, 4.26, 4.70, 6.11 C-269/06, Commission v CdT, EU:C:2007:774 ��2.55 C-279/06, CEPSA, EU:C:2008:485��6.20 C-280/06, ETI and Others, EU:C:2007:775��6.29

Table of Cases xlvii C-296/06, Telecom Italia, EU:C:2008:106��6.23 C-308/06, Intertanko and Others, EU:C:2008:312�� 6.18, 10.08 C-309/06, Marks & Spencer, EU:C:2008:211 ��4.59 C-334/06 to C-336/06, Zerche and Others, EU:C:2008:367��6.22 C-341/06 P and C-342/06 P, Chronopost and La Poste v UFEX and Others, EU:C:2008:375�� 7.190, 19.25, 19.33 C-348/06 P, Commission v Girardot, EU:C:2008:107��19.09 C-353/06, Grunkin and Paul, EU:C:2008:559��3.07 C-362/06 P, Sahlstedt and Others v Commission, EU:C:2009:243��7.101 C‑373/06 P, C‑379/06 P and C‑382/06 P, Flaherty and Others v Commission, EU:C:2008:230��7.141 C-383/06 to C-385/06, Vereniging Nationaal Overlegorgaan Sociale Werkvoorziening and Others, EU:C:2008:165 ��4.63 C-390/06, Nuova Agricast, EU:C:2008:224��3.19 C-393/06, Ing. Aigner, EU:C:2008:213 ��3.05 C-399/06 P and C-403/06 P, Hassan and Ayadi v Council and Commission, EU:C:2009:748��19.15 C-401/06, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2007:759��5.02 C-406/06, Landtag Schleswig-Holstein v Commission, EU:C:2007:90��2.55, 3.33 C-409/06, Winner Wetten, EU:C:2010:503��10.20 C-413/06 P, Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v Impala, EU:C:2008:392�� 7.180, 7.181, 7.206, 19.03, 19.04, 19.07, 19.09 C-418/06 P, Belgium v Commission, EU:C:2008:247 �� 2.55, 18.01 C-419/06, Commission v Greece, EU:C:2008:89��5.72 C-421/06, Fratelli Martini and Cargill, EU:C:2007:662��10.21 C-428/06 to C-434/06, UGT-Rioja and Others, EU:C:2008:488��3.20 C-442/06, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2008:216 ��5.45 C-445/06, Danske Slagterier, EU:C:2009:178�� 4.64, 4.65, 4.66, 4.71, 4.74, 5.79 C-449/06, Gysen, EU:C:2008:90��3.20 C-450/06, Varec, EU:C:2008:91 ��4.33 C-452/06, Synthon, EU:C:2008:565�� 4.66, 4.67, 6.31, 11.49 C-454/06, pressetext Nachrichtenagentur, EU:C:2008:351��3.05 C-455/06, Heemskerk and Schaap, EU:C:2008:650��4.40 C-468/06, Sot. Lélos kai Sia, EU:C:2008:504��3.08 C-484/06, Koninklijke Ahold, EU:C:2008:394��5.56 C-487/06 P, British Aggregates v Commission, EU:C:2008:757��7.50, 7.106, 7.119, 7.121, 7.122, 7.125, 7.161, 7.210 C-489/06, Commission v Greece, EU:C:2009:165�� 5.10, 5.11, 5.18, 5.67 C-497/06 P, CAS Succhi di Frutta v Commission, EU:C:2009:273��11.60 C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v Commission and Others, EU:C:2009:610�� 7.210, 19.19, 24.42 C-502/06 P-INT, Correia de Matos v Parliament, EU:C:2008:519��25.50 C-516/06 P, Commission v Ferriere Nord, EU:C:2007:763��7.38 C-521/06 P, Athinaïki Techniki v Commission, EU:C:2008:422 ��7.13, 7.51, 7.57, 7.147, 7.158 C-525/06, Nationale Loterij, EU:C:2009:179��3.27 C-531/06, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2009:315 ��25.21 C-33/07, Jipa, EU:C:2008:396��23.26 C-45/07, Commission v Greece, EU:C:2009:81��5.19 C-47/07 P, Masdar (UK) v Commission, EU:C:2008:726 ��11.11, 11.45, 19.05, 19.27 C-48/07, Les Vergers du Vieux Tauves, EU:C:2008:758��6.29 C-71/07 P, Campoli v Commission, EU:C:2008:424 ��23.03 C-73/07, Satakunnan Markkinapörssi and Satamedia, EU:C:2008:727��23.23 C-88/07, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2009:123 ��5.10, 5.14 C-100/07 P, É.R. and Others v Council and Commission, EU:C:2007:585��11.38 C-109/07, Pilato, EU:C:2008:274 ��3.06

xlviii Table of Cases C-121/07, Commission v France, EU:C:2008:695 ��5.84 C-122/07 P, Eurostrategies v Commission, EU:C:2007:743 ��19.13 C-125/07 P, Erste Group Bank and Others v Commission, EU:C:2009:576��7.27 C-127/07, Arcelor Atlantique and Lorraine and Others, EU:C:2008:728��6.09 C-138/07, Cobelfret, EU:C:2009:82��6.39 C-156/07, Aiello and Others, EU:C:2008:398��6.23 C-157/07, Krankenheim Ruhesitz am Wannsee-Seniorenheimstatt, EU:C:2008:588��6.16 C-166/07, Parliament v Council, EU:C:2009:499��7.219 C-185/07, Allianz, EU:C:2009:69��6.23 C-188/07, Commune de Mesquer, EU:C:2008:359 ��6.18 C-193/07 R, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2007:464 ��13.08 C-193/07 RII, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2008:45��13.08 C-198/07 P, Gordon v Commission, EU:C:2008:761��16.07 C-200/07 and C-201/07, Marra, EU:C:2008:579 ��6.12 C-202/07 P, France Télécom v Commission, EU:C:2009:214�� 19.01, 19.21 C-203/07 P, Greece v Commission, EU:C:2008:606��19.22 C-204/07 P, CAS v Commission, EU:C:2008:446��25.19 C-213/07, Michaniki, EU:C:2008:731��6.24 C-237/07, Janecek, EU:C:2008:447��4.29 C-239/07, Sabatauskas and Others, EU:C:2008:551��3.14 C-246/07, Commission v Sweden, EU:C:2010:203 �� 5.05, 5.13, 5.19 C-260/07, Pedro IV Servicios, EU:C:2009:215��3.49 C-265/07, Caffaro, EU:C:2008:496��3.14 C-277/07 P(R), Makhteshim-Agan Holding and Others v Commission, EU:C:2008:430�� 13.05, 13.18 C-290/07 P, Commission v Scott, EU:C:2010:480 ��7.210 C-295/07 P, Commission v Département du Loiret, EU:C:2008:707�� 7.217, 19.02, 19.23 C-300/07, Hans & Christophorus Oymanns, EU:C:2009:358��10.15 C-309/07 INT, Baumann, EU:C:2011:152��25.29 C-319/07 P, 3F v Commission, EU:C:2009:435��7.56, 7.119, 7.129, 7.130, 7.131 C-331/07, Commission v Greece, EU:C:2009:247��5.11 C-333/07, Regie Networks, EU:C:2008:764�� 10.20, 10.23 C-343/07, Bavaria and Bavaria Italia, EU:C:2009:415�� 9.18, 10.11 C-349/07, Sopropé, EU:C:2008:746��7.175 C-350/07, Kattner Stahlbau, EU:C:2009:127��3.20, 3.28 C-369/07, Commission v Greece, EU:C:2009:428�� 5.65, 5.82, 5.84 C-370/07, Commission v Council, EU:C:2009:590�� 7.08, 7.182 C-393/07 and C-9/08, Italy and Donnici v Parliament, EU:C:2009:275 ��7.188 C-402/07 and C-432/07, Sturgeon and Others, EU:C:2009:716��6.13 C-416/07, Commission v Greece, EU:C:2009:528��5.11 C-423/07, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2010:211 ��5.35, 6.13 C-426/07, Krawczyński, EU:C:2008:434��6.39 C-427/07, Commission v Ireland, EU:C:2009:457��5.15, 5.70 C-439/07 and C-499/07, KBC-bank, EU:C:2009:339 ��6.29 C-440/07 P, Commission v Schneider Electric, EU:C:2010:324��11.40, 11.45, 11.48, 11.49, 11.58, 11.59, 11.60, 19.03, 19.04, 19.07, 19.11, 25.01 C-445/07 P and C-455/07 P, Commission v Ente per le Ville vesuviane and Ente per le Ville Vesuviane v Commission, EU:C:2009:529�� 7.97, 7.98, 19.12 C-454/07, Raulin v France, EU:C:2008:285��5.35 C-457/07, Commission v Portugal, EU:C:2009:531��5.02, 5.82 C-459/07, Elshani, EU:C:2009:224��3.32 C-479/07 R, France v Council, EU:C:2008:137��13.36 C-481/07 P, SELEX Sistemi Integrati v Commission, EU:C:2009:461�� 11.57, 11.58

Table of Cases xlix C-483/07 P, Galileo Lebensmittel v Commission, EU:C:2009:95�� 7.87, 7.102 C-500/07 P, TEA v Commission, EU:C:2008:651��7.152 C-503/07 P, Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland v Commission, EU:C:2008:207 ��7.144 C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P and C-532/07 P, Sweden and Others v API and Commission, EU:C:2010:541�� 5.44, 24.47 C-519/07 P, Commission v Koninklijke FrieslandCampina, EU:C:2009:556�� 7.121, 7.123, 7.141 C-522/07 and C-65/08, Dinter and Europol Frost-Food, EU:C:2009:663��10.18 C-526/07 P, Combescot v Commission, EU:C:2008:665��19.12 C-534/07 P, Prym and Prym Consumer v Commission, EU:C:2009:505 ��18.06 C-546/07, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2010:25��5.10 C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission, EU:C:2010:512��11.45, 23.08, 23.09, 23.14 C-555/07, Kücükdeveci, EU:C:2010:21��3.17 C-558/07, S.P.C.M. and Others, EU:C:2009:430�� 10.01, 10.15 C-567/07, Woningstichting Sint Servatius, EU:C:2009:593 ��3.23, 3.32 C-568/07, Commission v Greece, EU:C:2009:342��5.84 C-570/07 and C-571/07, Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez, EU:C:2010:300��6.24, 6.28 C-2/08, Fallimento Olimpiclub, EU:C:2009:506��4.50 C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands and Others, EU:C:2009:343��4.46 C-14/08, Roda Golf & Beach Resort, EU:C:2009:395�� 3.05, 3.07, 3.44 C-22/08 and C-23/08, Vatsouras and Koupatantze, EU:C:2009:344 ��10.01 C-28/08 P, Commission v Bavarian Lager, EU:C:2010:378��5.44 C-36/08, Commission v Greece, EU:C:2008:536��5.75 C-40/08, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones, EU:C:2009:615 ��4.38, 4.41 C-49/08, Raulin v France, EU:C:2008:286��5.35 C-58/08, Vodafone and Others, EU:C:2010:321�� 6.09, 10.17 C-60/08 P(R), Cheminova and Others v Commission, EU:C:2009:181 ��13.23 C-63/08, Pontin, EU:C:2009:666 ��4.29, 4.64 C-69/08, Visciano, EU:C:2009:468�� 4.55, 4.56, 4.64 C-73/08, Bressol and Others, EU:C:2010:181��6.39 C-75/08, Mellor, EU:C:2009:279��4.22, 4.42 C-76/08 R, Commission v Malta, EU:C:2008:252 ��13.08, 13.15, 13.31, 13.37, 13.38 C-78/08 to C-80/08, Paint Graphos and Others, EU:C:2011:550��6.21 C-89/08 P, Commission v Ireland and Others, EU:C:2009:742 �� 4.33, 7.162, 24.50 C-109/08, Commission v Greece, EU:C:2009:346��5.84 C-115/08, ČEZ, EU:C:2009:660��3.20, 6.09 C-118/08, Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales, EU:C:2010:39�� 4.54, 4.65, 4.67, 4.70, 5.79 C-120/08, Bavaria, EU:C:2010:798��10.18 C-124/08 and C-125/08, Snauwaert and Others, EU:C:2009:469��3.23 C-127/08, Metock and Others, EU:C:2008:449 �� 6.37, 23.26 C-128/08, Damseaux, EU:C:2009:471��6.18 C-129/08, Cloet, EU:C:2009:347 ��3.27 C-133/08, ICF, EU:C:2009:617��21.03 C-135/08, Rottmann, EU:C:2010:104 ��6.04 C-137/08, VB Pénzügyi Lízing, EU:C:2010:659�� 4.41, 6.10, 24.23 C-146/08 P, Efkon v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2009:201��7.102 C-147/08, Römer, EU:C:2011:286 ��3.20 C-154/08, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2009:695 ��5.12, 5.40 C-160/08, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2010:230��5.11, 5.56 C-169/08, Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri, EU:C:2009:709 ��3.14 C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/08, Salahadin Abdulla and Others, EU:C:2010:105��6.29 C-188/08, Commission v Ireland, EU:C:2009:670��23.60 C-195/08 PPU, Rinau, EU:C:2008:406��23.28

l Table of Cases C-205/08, Umweltanwalt von Kärnten, EU:C:2009:767 ��3.07 C-211/08, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2010:340 ��5.45 C-214/08 P, Guigard v Commission, EU:C:2009:330�� 11.08, 15.10 C-216/08 RX, Review Combescot v Commission, EU:C:2008:228��20.01 C-221/08, Commission v Ireland, EU:C:2010:113��5.14 C-225/08 P, Nuova Agricast v Commission, EU:C:2009:406 ��7.68 C-227/08, Martín Martín, EU:C:2009:792��3.20, 4.41 C-229/08, Wolf, EU:C:2010:3��3.20 C-241/08, Commission v France, EU:C:2010:114 ��5.58 C-243/08, Pannon GSM, EU:C:2009:350 ��4.41, 6.31 C-247/08, Gaz de France –Berliner Investissement, EU:C:2009:600 ��10.16 C-251/08 P, Ayyanarsamy v Commission and Germany, EU:C:2009:161��7.15 C-275/08, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2009:632��5.09 C-279/08 P, Commission v Netherlands, EU:C:2011:551��7.51 C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, EU:C:2010:603�� 19.07, 19.23 C-295/08 P, Cofra v Commission, EU:C:2009:407��7.68 C-296/08 PPU, Santesteban Goicoechea, EU:C:2008:457�� 3.07, 23.33 C-297/08, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2010:115 ��5.71, 5.74 C-301/08, Bogiatzi, EU:C:2009:649��6.18 C-304/08, Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft, EU:C:2010:12��6.24 C-306/08, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2011:347 ��5.71 C-308/08, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2010:281 ��6.09 C-314/08, Filipiak, EU:C:2009:719��3.17 C-317/08 to C-320/08, Alassini and Others, EU:C:2010:146 �� 3.20, 4.25, 6.10 C-334/08, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2010:414 ��5.74 C-335/08 P, Transports Schiocchet –Excursions v Commission, EU:C:2009:372��11.66 C-343/08, Commission v Czech Republic, EU:C:2010:14��5.56 C-350/08, Commission v Lithuania, EU:C:2010:642��5.62, 5.66 C-355/08 P, WWF-UK v Council, EU:C:2009:286��7.102 C-362/08 P, Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission, EU:C:2010:40��7.68 C-372/08 P, Atlantic Dawn and Others v Commission, EU:C:2009:287��7.95 C-373/08, Hoesch Metals and Alloys, EU:C:2010:68�� 3.19, 10.15 C-375/08, Pontini and Others, EU:C:2010:365��6.22, 23.26, 23.29, 23.41 C-378/08, ERG and Others, EU:C:2010:126��6.21, 6.22 C-379/08 and C-380/08, ERG and Others, EU:C:2010:127�� 3.16, 3.17, 3.22, 6.22 C-382/08, Neukirchinger, EU:C:2011:27��3.20 C-384/08, Attanasio Group, EU:C:2010:133��3.23, 6.24 C-386/08, Brita, EU:C:2010:91��6.15 C-391/08 P(R), Dow AgroSciences and Others v Commission, EU:C:2009:785��7.140 C-395/08 and C-396/08, Bruno and Others, EU:C:2010:329��3.22 C-399/08 P, Commission v Deutsche Post, EU:C:2010:481 ��7.210 C-400/08, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2011:172 ��5.67 C-403/08 and C-429/08, Football Association Premier League and Others, EU:C:2011:631��23.23 C-407/08 P, Knauf Gips v Commission, EU:C:2010:389�� 7.31, 7.32, 7.195 C-413/08 P, Lafarge v Commission, EU:C:2010:346 ��7.200 C-414/08 P, Sviluppo Italia Basilicata v Commission, EU:C:2010:165��11.10 C-419/08 P, Trubowest Handel and Makarov v Council and Commission, EU:C:2010:147��11.31, 11.38, 11.59, 11.60, 11.61 C-436/08 and C-437/08, Haribo Lakritzen Hans Riegel, EU:C:2011:61��3.26, 6.30 C-439/08, VEBIC, EU:C:2010:739�� 3.08, 3.25, 6.24, 23.26 C-444/08 P, Região autónoma dos Açores v Council, EU:C:2009:733��7.78, 7.91 C-455/08, Commission v Ireland, EU:C:2009:809��4.51 C-456/08, Commission v Ireland, EU:C:2010:46��5.09

Table of Cases li C-457/08, Commission v United Kingdom, EU:C:2009:514 ��5.39 C-458/08, Commission v Portugal, EU:C:2010:692��5.56 C-475/08, Commission v Belgium, EU:C:2009:751��5.56 C-483/08, Régie communale autonome du stade Luc Varenne, EU:C:2009:446 ��4.55 C-486/08, Zentralbetriebsrat der Landeskrankenhäuser Tirols, EU:C:2010:215��6.11 C-487/08, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2010:310 ��5.62 C-495/08, Commission v United Kingdom, EU:C:2009:699 ��5.39 C-497/08, Amiraike Berlin, EU:C:2010:5 ��3.07, 3.14 C-507/08, Commission v Slovakia, EU:C:2010:802��4.63, 5.67 C-508/08, Commission v Malta, EU:C:2010:643��5.62 C-526/08, Commission v Luxembourg, EU:C:2010:379��5.74, 5.82 C-533/08, TNT Express Nederland, EU:C:2010:243��6.18 C-535/08, Pignataro, EU:C:2009:204��6.24 C-542/08, Barth, EU:C:2010:193 ��4.64 C-561/08 P and C-4/09 P, Commission v Potamianos and Potamianos v Commission, EU:C:2009:656��16.04 C-565/08, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2011:188 ��5.67 C-568/08, Combinatie Spijker Infrabouw-De Jonge Konstruktie and Others, EU:C:2010:751��3.20, 3.32 C-573/08 R, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2009:775��13.37 C-577/08, Brouwer, EU:C:2010:449��6.39 C-582/08, Commission v United Kingdom, EU:C:2010:429 ��5.23, 5.73 C-583/08 P, Gogos v Commission, EU:C:2010:287�� 16.29, 18.02, 19.02 C-585/08 and C-144/09, Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof, EU:C:2010:740��3.58 C-14/09, Genc, EU:C:2010:57��6.19 C-20/09, Commission v Portugal, EU:C:2011:214��5.51, 5.62 C-21/09 RX, Review Belgium v Commission, EU:C:2009:57��20.01 C-27/09 P, France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, EU:C:2011:853�� 7.175, 19.16 C-28/09, Commission v Austria, EU:C:2011:854��5.67 C-32/09 P(R), Artisjus v Commission, EU:C:2010:473��13.29 C-36/09 P, Transportes Evaristo Molina v Commission, EU:C:2010:670��23.11 C-41/09, Commission v Netherlands, EU:C:2011:108 ��5.02 C-52/09, TeliaSonera Sverige, EU:C:2011:83 ��3.25 C-57/09 and C-101/09, B and D, EU:C:2010:661��6.18, 6.29 C-59/09 P, Hasbro, EU:C:2009:452��19.12 C-69/09 P, Makhteshim-Agan Holding and Others v Commission, EU:C:2010:37�� 7.15, 23.44 C-70/09, Hengartner and Gasser, EU:C:2010:430 ��6.16 C-71/09 P, C-73/09 P and C-76/09 P, Comitato “Venezia vuole vivere” and Others v Commission, EU:C:2011:368�� 7.123, 7.141, 23.57 C-77/09, Gowan Comércio Internacional e Serviços, EU:C:2010:803�� 10.01, 10.15 C-79/09, Commission v Netherlands, EU:C:2010:171 ��5.52 C-83/09 P, Commission v Kronoply and Kronotex, EU:C:2011:341�� 7.56, 7.119 C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert, EU:C:2010:662��3.32, 6.07, 10.15, 10.18, 10.23, 23.23 C-98/09, Sorge, EU:C:2010:369 ��6.11 C-113/09 P(R), Ziegler v Commission, EU:C:2010:242 �� 13.27, 13.32 C-115/09, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, Landesverband Nordrhein-Westfalen, EU:C:2011:289 ��4.29 C-118/09, Koller, EU:C:2010:805��3.07 C-128/09 to C-131/09, C-134/09 and C-135/09, Boxus and Others, EU:C:2011:667 ��3.21, 3.33 C-132/09, Commission v Belgium, EU:C:2010:562��5.08 C-140/09, Fallimento Traghetti del Mediterraneo, EU:C:2010:335��3.20 C-142/09, Lahousse and Lavichy, EU:C:2010:694 ��3.20, 6.30 C-154/09, Commission v Portugal, EU:C:2010:591��5.15

lii Table of Cases C-168/09, Flos, EU:C:2011:29��6.30 C-173/09, Elchinov, EU:C:2010:581�� 3.04, 3.16, 3.18, 6.32 C-180/09 RX, Review Sanchez Ferriz and Others v Commission, EU:C:2009:355 ��20.01 C-186/09, Commission v United Kingdom, EU:C:2010:60 ��5.39 C-189/09, Commission v Austria, EU:C:2010:455��5.14 C-191/09 P and C-200/09 P, Council and Commission v Interpipe Niko Tube and Interpipe NTRP, EU:C:2012:78�� 7.176, 19.04, 19.05 C-196/09, Miles and Others, EU:C:2011:388 �� 2.02, 3.10, 3.11 C-197/09 RX, Review M v EMEA, EU:C:2009:391 �� 7.162, 18.02, 20.01, 20.02, 20.05, 20.09 C-201/09 P and C-216/09 P, ArcelorMittal Luxembourg v Commission and Commission v ArcelorMittal Luxembourg and Others, EU:C:2011:190 �� 7.222, 19.14 C-210/09, Scott and Kimberly Clark, EU:C:2010:294��4.63 C-221/09, AJD Tuna, EU:C:2011:153��10.18 C-225/09, Jakubowska, EU:C:2010:729��3.33 C-232/09, Danosa, EU:C:2010:674��6.22 C-236/09, Association belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats and Others, EU:C:2011:100�� 3.17, 10.23 C-239/09, Seydaland Vereinigte Agrarbetriebe, EU:C:2010:778��3.20 C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, EU:C:2011:125�� 4.27, 4.28, 6.16 C-241/09, Fluxys, EU:C:2010:753��3.26, 3.33 C-242/09, Albron Catering, EU:C:2010:625��6.39 C-245/09, Omalet, EU:C:2010:808�� 3.34, 6.24, 6.28 C-246/09, Bulicke, EU:C:2010:418��3.20, 4.07 C-251/09, Commission v Cyprus, EU:C:2011:84��5.51, 5.56 C-260/09 P, Activision Blizzard Germany v Commission, EU:C:2011:62��19.05 C-261/09, Mantello, EU:C:2010:683 ��23.30 C-263/09 P, Edwin v OHIM, EU:C:2011:452 �� 17.03, 17.05, 19.08, 19.13, 19.17, 24.41 C-272/09 P, KME Germany and Others v Commission, EU:C:2011:810 ��7.200 C-279/09, DEB, EU:C:2010:811��3.20, 4.30 C-283/09, Weryński, EU:C:2011:85��3.07 C-285/09, R., EU:C:2010:742 ��3.30 C-294/09, Commission v Ireland, EU:C:2010:200��5.16, 5.64 C-304/09, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2010:812 �� 4.63, 4.77, 5.40 C-307/09 to C-309/09, Vicoplus and Others, EU:C:2011:64��3.20 C-310/09, Accor, EU:C:2011:581��6.22 C-316/09, MSD Sharp & Dohme, EU:C:2011:275��10.14 C-317/09 P, ArchiMEDES v Commission, EU:C:2010:700��7.141 C-319/09 P, ACEA v Commission, EU:C:2011:857��7.141 C-320/09 P, A2A v Commission, EU:C:2011:858�� 7.123, 7.141, 7.145 C-322/09 P, NDSHT v Commission, EU:C:2010:701�� 7.13, 7.51, 7.57, 7.119 C-335/09 P, Poland v Commission, EU:C:2012:385��7.153 C-337/09 P, Council v Zhejiang Xinan Chemical Industrial Group, EU:C:2012:471�� 7.144, 23.62 C-338/09, Yellow Cab Verkehrsbetrieb, EU:C:2010:814��3.20 C-340/09, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2010:758 ��5.70 C-343/09, Afton Chemical, EU:C:2010:419 �� 10.09, 10.11 C-344/09, Bengtsson, EU:C:2011:174��3.07 C-345/09 INT, van Delft and Others, EU:C:2011:57 ��25.29 C-359/09, Ebert, EU:C:2011:44 ��22.53 C-360/09, Pfleiderer, EU:C:2011:389��4.74 C-362/09 P, Athinaïki Techniki v Commission, EU:C:2010:783 ��7.57 C-374/09 P, Hârsulescu v Romania, EU:C:2010:123 ��8.16 C-376/09, Commission v Malta, EU:C:2011:320��5.02 C-377/09, Hanssens-Ensch, EU:C:2010:459�� 11.01, 11.07, 15.10 C-383/09, Commission v France, EU:C:2011:369 ��5.67

Table of Cases liii C-385/09, Nidera Handelscompagnie, EU:C:2010:627��6.23 C-393/09, Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace, EU:C:2010:816��3.32 C-396/09, Interedil, EU:C:2011:671��3.18 C-398/09, Lady & Kid and Others, EU:C:2011:540��4.59, 4.60 C-400/09 and C-207/10, Orifarm and Others, EU:C:2011:519 ��6.13 C-401/09 P, Evropaïki Dynamiki v ECB, EU:C:2011:370 �� 23.53, 24.42 C-403/09 PPU, Detiček, EU:C:2009:810��6.07 C-429/09, Fuß, EU:C:2010:717�� 4.67, 4.71, 6.31 C-430/09, Euro Tyre Holding, EU:C:2010:786��6.13 C-434/09, McCarthy, EU:C:2011:277��3.20, 6.24 C-437/09, AG2R Prévoyance, EU:C:2011:112 ��3.20 C-443/09, Grillo Star Fallimento, EU:C:2012:213 ��3.07 C-444/09 and C-456/09, Gavieiro Gavieiro and Iglesias Torres, EU:C:2010:819��5.15, 6.11 C-448/09 P, Royal Appliance International v OHIM, EU:C:2010:384�� 17.03, 17.04 C-450/09, Schröder, EU:C:2011:198 ��3.21 C-451/09 P, Pigasos Alieftiki Naftiki Etaireia v Council and Commission, EU:C:2010:268��11.61 C-452/09, Iaia and Others, EU:C:2011:323��4.64 C-457/09, Chartry, EU:C:2011:101 �� 3.34, 6.20, 6.24 C-458/09 P, Italy v Commission, EU:C:2011:769��23.52 C-460/09 P, Inalca and Cremonini v Commission, EU:C:2013:111�� 11.62, 11.66 C-461/09 P, The Wellcome Foundation v OHIM, EU:C:2010:421��17.03 C-465/09 P to C-470/09 P, Diputación Foral de Vizcaya and Others v Commission, EU:C:2011:372��19.27 C-492/09, Agricola Esposito, EU:C:2010:766��3.22 C-493/09, Commission v Portugal, EU:C:2011:635��23.06 C-496/09, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2011:740 ��5.24, 5.84 C-503/09, Stewart, EU:C:2011:500��3.20 C-504/09 P, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2012:178��22.17 C-505/09 P, Commission v Estonia, EU:C:2012:179 ��22.15 C-506/09 P, Portugal v Transnáutica, EU:C:2012:156 ��25.37 C-512/09, Commission v Greece, EU:C:2010:442��5.14 C-517/09, RTL Belgium, EU:C:2010:821��3.05, 3.06 C-521/09 P, Elf Aquitaine v Commission, EU:C:2011:620 ��7.180 C-522/09, Commission v Romania, EU:C:2011:251��5.52 C-529/09, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2013:31 ��5.82 C-532/09 P, Ivanov v Commission, EU:C:2010:577��11.14 C-537/09, Bartlett and Others, EU:C:2011:278��10.15 C-539/09, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2011:733��5.14, 5.33 C-542/09, Commission v Netherlands, EU:C:2012:346 ��23.06 C-550/09, E and F, EU:C:2010:382�� 10.11, 23.26 C-2/10, Azienda Agro-Zootecnica Franchini and Eolica di Altamura, EU:C:2011:502 ��6.23 C-3/10, Affatato, EU:C:2010:574 ��23.26 C-5/10 P-R, Torresan v OHIM, EU:C:2010:269��13.11 C-15/10, Etimine, EU:C:2011:504 ��6.09 C-25/10, Missionswerk Werner Heukelbach, EU:C:2011:65 ��3.20 C-29/10, Koelzsch, EU:C:2011:151 ��21.03 C-30/10, Andersson, EU:C:2011:66��3.20 C-32/10, Semerdzhiev, EU:C:2011:288��3.32 C-40/10, Commission v Council, EU:C:2010:713�� 23.09, 23.44 C-47/10 P, Austria v Scheucher-Fleisch and Others, EU:C:2011:698��7.119 C-58/10 to C-68/10, Monsanto and Others, EU:C:2011:553��3.20 C-69/10, Samba Diouf, EU:C:2011:524��4.21 C-76/10, Pohotovosť, EU:C:2010:685 ��3.25 C-82/10, Commission v Ireland, EU:C:2011:621��5.77

liv Table of Cases C-89/10 and C-96/10, Q-Beef and Bosschaert, EU:C:2011:555��4.57, 4.64 C-94/10, Danfoss and Sauer-Danfoss, EU:C:2011:674 ��4.54, 4.59 C-101/10, Pavlov and Famira, EU:C:2011:462��6.15 C-104/10, Kelly, EU:C:2011:506��3.19 C-106/10, Lidl & Companhia, EU:C:2011:526��3.31 C-109/10 P, Solvay v Commission, EU:C:2011:686�� 19.05, 19.07 C-110/10 P, Solvay v Commission, EU:C:2011:687��7.32, 7.176, 19.05, 19.07, 24.38 C-115/10, Bábolna, EU:C:2011:376��3.20 C-128/10 and C-129/10, Naftiliaki Etaireia Thasou and Amaltheia I Naftiki Etaireia, EU:C:2011:163��6.22 C-132/10, Halley, EU:C:2011:586��3.20 C-134/10, Commission v Belgium, EU:C:2011:117��5.56 C-135/10, SCF, EU:C:2012:140��3.25 C-145/10, Painer, EU:C:2011:798��3.32 C-148/10, DHL International, EU:C:2011:654��3.26 C-149/10, Chatzi, EU:C:2010:534��6.11 C-155/10, Williams and Others, EU:C:2011:588��6.11 C-183/10 RX, Review Bianchi v ETF, EU:C:2010:246��20.01 C-188/10 and C-189/10, Melki and Abdeli, EU:C:2010:363��3.04, 3.17, 3.25, 6.22, 10.14, 23.26, 23.27, 23.41 C-197/10, Unió de Pagesos de Catalunya, EU:C:2011:590 ��3.33 C-200/10 P, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, EU:C:2011:281�� 19.02, 19.09 C-211/10 PPU, Povse, EU:C:2010:400��23.33 C-212/10, Logstor ROR Polska, EU:C:2011:404��6.22 C-215/10, Pacific World and FDD International, EU:C:2011:528��10.18 C-221/10 P, Artegodan v Commission, EU:C:2012:216 �� 11.15, 11.42 C-228/10, UEFA and British Sky Broadcasting, EU:C:2012:6��23.26 C-264/10, Kita, EU:C:2010:618��23.26 C-266/10 P, Seacid v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2010:629��7.146 C-267/10 and C-268/10, Rossius and Collard, EU:C:2011:332��6.24 C-275/10, Residex Capital IV, EU:C:2011:814 ��7.50 C-281/10 P, PepsiCo v Grupo Promer Mon Graphic, EU:C:2011:679��17.03 C-283/10, Circul Globus Bucureşti, EU:C:2011:772 ��3.32 C-296/10, Purrucker, EU:C:2010:665 ��23.41 C-308/10 P, Union Investment Privatfonds v OHIM, EU:C:2011:327��17.12 C-309/10, Agrana Zucker, EU:C:2011:531 �� 10.01, 10.15, 10.16 C-310/10, Agafiţei and Others, EU:C:2011:467 ��3.32, 6.29 C-316/10, Danske Svineproducenter, EU:C:2011:863��3.21 C-338/10, GLS, EU:C:2012:158 ��10.15, 10.17, 10.18, 24.51 C-339/10, Asparuhov Estov and Others, EU:C:2010:680��3.34, 6.24 C-342/10, Commission v Finland, EU:C:2012:688 ��22.14 C-349/10 P, Claro v OHIM, EU:C:2011:105��17.12 C-351/10, Laki, EU:C:2011:406 ��19.34 C-354/10, Commission v Greece, EU:C:2012:109��22.44 C-355/10, Parliament v Council, EU:C:2012:516�� 7.77, 7.169 C-364/10, Hungary v Slovakia, EU:C:2012:630 ��5.34, 5.53 C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and Others, EU:C:2011:864�� 6.18, 7.167, 7.188, 10.08, 10.13, 10.14 C-367/10 P, EMC Development v Commission, EU:C:2011:203��8.22 C-377/10, Băilă, EU:C:2010:737��3.32 C-379/10, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2011:775 ��4.69 C-384/10, Voogsgeerd, EU:C:2011:842��21.03 C-386/10 P, Chalkor v Commission, EU:C:2011:815��7.22, 7.202, 7.203, 18.02, 18.03 C-389/10 P, KME Germany and Others v Commission, EU:C:2011:816 �� 7.200, 7.204

Table of Cases lv C-399/10 P and C-401/10 P, Bouygues and Others v Commission and Others, EU:C:2013:175��7.23, 7.24 C-400/10 PPU, McB., EU:C:2010:582 �� 6.07, 23.33 C-403/10 P, Mediaset v Commission, EU:C:2011:533��19.21 C-404/10 P, Commission v Éditions Odile Jacob, EU:C:2012:393�� 13.29, 19.32, 23.63 C-411/10, N. S. and Others, EU:C:2011:865��23.26 C-416/10, Križan and Others, EU:C:2013:8 �� 3.16, 3.18, 3.45 C-426/10 P, Bell & Ross v OHIM, EU:C:2011:612 �� 22.74, 24.13 C-427/10, Banca Antoniana Popolare Veneta, EU:C:2011:844��4.57 C-431/10, Commission v Ireland, EU:C:2011:227��5.77 C-433/10 P, Mauerhofer v Commission, EU:C:2011:204 �� 11.59, 11.60 C-446/10 P(R), Alcoa Trasformazioni v Commission, EU:C:2011:829�� 13.33, 13.36 C-462/10 P, Evropaïki Dynamiki v AEE, EU:C:2012:14 ��19.27 C-463/10 P and C-475/10 P, Deutsche Post and Germany v Commission, EU:C:2011:656��7.13, 7.17, 7.24, 7.27, 7.55, 19.30 C-478/10 RX, Review Marcuccio v Commission, EU:C:2010:641��20.01 C-482/10, Cicala, EU:C:2011:868��6.29 C-491/10 PPU, Aguirre Zarraga, EU:C:2010:828��23.31 C-500/10, Belvedere Costruzioni, EU:C:2012:186��4.48 C-534/10 P, Brookfield New Zealand and Elaris v CPVO and Schniga, EU:C:2012:813��17.15 C-551/10 P, Éditions Odile Jacob v Commission, EU:C:2012:681��7.180 C-566/10 P, Italy v Commission, EU:C:2012:752��7.185 C-571/10, Kamberaj, EU:C:2012:233��3.32, 3.33 C-581/10 and C-629/10, Nelson and Others, EU:C:2012:657��6.13, 6.39 C-583/10, Nolan, EU:C:2012:638��6.29 C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P, Commission and Others v Kadi, EU:C:2013:518��7.175, 7.176, 24.50, 24.57, 24.74 C-591/10, Littlewoods Retail and Others, EU:C:2012:478 ��4.62 C-596/10, Commission v France, EU:C:2012:130 ��5.56 C-605/10 P(R), Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2011:710��13.24 C-613/10, Debiasi, EU:C:2011:266��3.30 C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, EU:C:2013:105�� 3.34, 6.07, 6.24 C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito, EU:C:2012:349��4.22, 4.41 C-626/10 P, Agapiou Joséphidès v Commision and EACEA, EU:C:2011:726 ��7.158 C-628/10 P and C-14/11 P, Alliance One International and Standard Commercial Tobacco v Commission and Commission v Alliance One International and Others, EU:C:2012:479�� 7.183, 7.201 C-1/11 SA, Marcuccio v Commission, EU:C:2012:729��14.02, 14.03, 14.04, 14.05 C-17/11 RX, Review Commission v Petrilli, EU:C:2011:55 �� 20.01, 20.03 C-25/11, Varzim Sol, EU:C:2012:94��3.20, 3.21 C-27/11, Vinkov, EU:C:2012:326��3.32 C-32/11, Allianz Hungária Biztosító and Others, EU:C:2013:160��6.20 C-34/11, Commission v Portugal, EU:C:2012:712��5.56, 5.62 C-35/11, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, EU:C:2012:707�� 6.13, 6.33, 25.28, 25.29 C-37/11, Commission v Czech Republic, EU:C:2012:640�� 5.72, 9.07, 9.12 C-41/11, Inter-Environnement Wallonie and Terre wallonne, EU:C:2012:103��6.39 C-52/11 P, Victoria Sánchez v Parliament and Commission, EU:C:2011:693��8.07, 8.26 C-59/11, Association Kokopelli, EU:C:2012:447��10.11 C-61/11 PPU, El Dridi, EU:C:2011:268��23.33 C-73/11 P, Frucona Košice v Commission, EU:C:2013:32 ��7.210 C-76/11 P, Tresplain Investments v OHIM, EU:C:2011:790��19.08 C-88/11 P, LG Electronics v OHIM, EU:C:2011:727��17.17 C-89/11 P, E.ON Energie v Commission, EU:C:2012:738�� 7.29, 7.200

lvi Table of Cases C-92/11, RWE Vertrieb, EU:C:2013:180��4.37 C-97/11, Amia, EU:C:2012:306 ��3.15 C-100/11 P, Helena Rubinstein and L’Oréal v OHIM, EU:C:2012:285��17.12 C-103/11 P, Commission v Systran and Systran Luxembourg, EU:C:2013:245�� 11.08, 15.10 C-111/11 P, Ruipérez Aguirre and ATC Petition v Commission, EU:C:2011:491��7.15 C-118/11, Eon Aset Menidjmunt, EU:C:2012:97��3.32 C-122/11, Commission v Belgium, EU:C:2013:63��5.66 C-135/11 P, IFAW Internationaler Tierschutz-Fonds v Commission, EU:C:2012:376��24.50 C-154/11, Mahamdia, EU:C:2012:491��14.01 C-155/11 PPU, Mohammad Imran, EU:C:2011:387��23.34 C-157/11, Sibilio, EU:C:2012:148��3.33 C-161/11, Vino, EU:C:2011:420��3.32 C-172/11, Erny, EU:C:2014:157��6.23 C-184/11, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2014:316 ��5.39 C-197/11 and C-203/11, Libert and Others, EU:C:2013:288 ��6.27 C-199/11, Otis and Others, EU:C:2012:684 ��4.42, 4.74 C-208/11 P, Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission, EU:C:2012:76��7.68 C-237/11 and C-238/11, France v Parliament, EU:C:2012:796��7.20 C-239/11 P, C-489/11 P and C-498/11 P, Siemens v Commission, EU:C:2013:866�� 7.201, 23.06 C-246/11 P, Portugal v Commission, EU:C:2013:118 �� 7.161, 7.216 C-251/11, Huet, EU:C:2012:133��3.16 C-256/11, Dereci and Others, EU:C:2011:734 ��6.24 C-262/11, Kremikovtzi, EU:C:2012:760 ��7.49 C-272/11 P, Noko Ngele v Commission, EU:C:2011:632��11.60 C-274/11 and C-295/11, Spain and Italy v Council, EU:C:2013:240��7.191 C-279/11, Commission v Ireland, EU:C:2012:834��5.84 C-286/11 P, Commission v Tomkins, EU:C:2013:29�� 7.222, 18.09 C-287/11 P, Commission v Aalberts Industries and Others, EU:C:2013:445�� 24.44, 24.53 C-292/11 P, Commission v Portugal, EU:C:2014:3��5.88 C-300/11, ZZ, EU:C:2013:363�� 4.33, 24.50 C-329/11, Achughbabian, EU:C:2011:807 ��23.41 C-335/11 and C-337/11, HK Danmark, EU:C:2013:222��6.15 C-338/11 to C-347/11, Santander Asset Management SGIIC and Others, EU:C:2012:286 ��6.39 C-348/11, Thomson Sales Europe, EU:C:2012:169 ��3.23, 3.30 C-363/11, Epitropos tou Elegktikou Synedriou, EU:C:2012:825��3.07 C-364/11, Abed El Karem El Kott and Others, EU:C:2012:826 ��24.23 C-371/11, Punch Graphix Prepress Belgium, EU:C:2012:647 ��6.29 C-387/11, Commission v Belgium, EU:C:2012:670��5.77 C-394/11, Belov, EU:C:2013:48��3.06 C-396/11, Radu, EU:C:2013:39��3.33 C-399/11, Melloni, EU:C:2013:107 �� 3.14, 3.29, 3.34, 6.07, 6.24 C-413/11, Germanwings, EU:C:2013:246��6.13 C-414/11, Daiichi Sankyo and Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland, EU:C:2013:520��6.16 C-415/11, Aziz, EU:C:2013:164 ��4.41, 6.31 C-417/11 P, Council v Bamba, EU:C:2012:718��7.181 C-439/11 P, Ziegler v Commission, EU:C:2013:513�� 23.03, 23.56 C-441/11 P, Commission v Verhuizingen Coppens, EU:C:2012:778��7.217 C-448/11 P, SNIA v Commission, EU:C:2013:801��7.30 C-452/11 P, Heineken Nederland and Heineken v Commission, EU:C:2012:829��7.188 C-462/11, Cozman, EU:C:2011:831��3.34, 6.24 C-466/11, Currà and Others, EU:C:2012:465��3.34 C-469/11 P, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, EU:C:2012:705��11.62, 11.63, 11.69, 22.63, 22.69 C-470/11, Garkalns, EU:C:2012:505 ��6.26 C-472/11, Banif Plus Bank, EU:C:2013:88��4.32, 4.33

Table of Cases lvii C-477/11 P, Sepracor Pharmaceuticals v Commission, EU:C:2012:292��11.12 C-492/11, Di Donna, EU:C:2013:428��3.33 C-512/11 and C-513/11, TSN and YTN, EU:C:2014:73 ��3.20 C-514/11 P and C-605/11 P, LPN and Finland v Commission, EU:C:2013:738��5.44 C-530/11, Commission v United Kingdom, EU:C:2014:67 ��5.51, 5.52 C-533/11, Commission v Belgium, EU:C:2013:659��5.39 C-536/11, Donau Chemie and Others, EU:C:2013:366��4.74 C-537/11, Manzi and Compagnia Naviera Orchestra, EU:C:2014:19��10.08 C-565/11, Irimie, EU:C:2013:250��4.62, 4.71 C-570/11 P(R), Gollnisch v Parliament, EU:C:2012:200��13.02 C-578/11 P, Deltafina v Commission, EU:C:2014:1742��11.45 C-581/11 P, Mugraby v Council and Commission, EU:C:2012:466�� 8.16, 11.22 C-583/11 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2013:625��1.03, 7.107, 7.108, 7.111, 9.04 C-587/11 P-R, Omnicare v OHIM, EU:C:2012:506��13.11 C-588/11 P, Omnicare v OHIM, EU:C:2012:576 ��13.11 C-593/11 P, Alliance One International v Commission, EU:C:2012:804��19.02 C-601/11 P, France v Commission, EU:C:2013:465��19.09 C-623/11, Geodis Calberson GE, EU:C:2013:22 �� 15.02, 15.04 C-625/11 P, PPG and SNF v ECHA, EU:C:2013:594 �� 7.150, 22.67 C-626/11 P, PPG and SNF v ECHA, EU:C:2013:595 ��22.67 C-644/11 P(R), Qualitest FZE v Council, EU:C:2012:354�� 13.15, 13.38 C-656/11 R, United Kingdom v Council, EU:C:2012:211��13.36 C-658/11, Parliament v Council, EU:C:2014:2025�� 7.173, 12.04 C-6/12, P, EU:C:2013:525 ��7.49 C-16/12, Hermes Hitel és Faktor, EU:C:2012:426��3.34 C-23/12, Zakaria, EU:C:2013:24��6.22 C-28/12, Commission v Council, EU:C:2015:282��7.178 C-32/12, Duarte Hueros, EU:C:2013:637 ��4.41 C-34/12 P, Idromacchine and Others v Commission, EU:C:2013:552�� 11.55, 19.09 C-40/12 P, Gascogne Sack Deutschland v Commission, EU:C:2013:768 �� 11.23, 11.45, 25.03 C-49/12, Sunico and Others, EU:C:2013:545��21.02 C-50/12 P, Kendrion v Commission, EU:C:2013:771 �� 11.23, 11.45, 25.03 C-58/12 P, Groupe Gascogne v Commission, EU:C:2013:770 ��11.23, 11.45, 18.08, 19.11, 25.03 C-63/12, Commission v Council, EU:C:2013:752�� 7.12, 8.09, 8.10, 8.21 C-66/12, Council v Commission, EU:C:2013:751�� 8.09, 8.10, 8.21, 23.62 C-69/12 P, Noscira v OHIM, EU:C:2012:589 �� 22.30, 24.15 C-77/12 P, Deutsche Post v Commission, EU:C:2013:695��7.53 C-93/12, Agrokonsulting-04, EU:C:2013:432��4.26 C-95/12, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2013:676��5.82 C-97/12 P, Louis Vuitton Malletier v OHIM, EU:C:2014:324��17.10 C-110/12 P(R), Akhras v Council, EU:C:2012:507�� 13.22, 13.28, 13.32 C-122/12 P, Rintisch v OHIM, EU:C:2013:628��17.12 C-127/12, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2014:2130��5.46, 5.52 C-132/12 P, Stichting Woonpunt and Others v Commission, EU:C:2014:100�� 7.100, 7.123 C-136/12, Consiglio Nazionale dei Geologi, EU:C:2013:489�� 3.04, 3.16, 3.17, 3.19, 3.33, 3.46 C-152/12, Commission v Bulgaria, EU:C:2014:82��5.45 C-159/12 to C-161/12, Venturini, EU:C:2013:791��6.26 C-180/12, Stoilov i Ko, EU:C:2013:693 ��3.33 C-183/12 P, Ayadi v Commission, EU:C:2013:369��7.144 C-185/12, Ciampaglia, EU:C:2012:273��3.22 C-192/12 PPU, West, EU:C:2012:404��23.30 C-196/12, Commission v Council, EU:C:2013:753�� 8.01, 8.05, 8.09, 8.10, 8.11, 8.21 C-234/12, Sky Italia, EU:C:2013:496 ��3.21

lviii Table of Cases C-235/12 P, H-Holding v Commission, EU:C:2013:132��8.06, 8.13 C-237/12, Commission v France, EU:C:2014:2152�� 5.56, 5.67, 5.71 C-238/12 P, FLSmidth v Commission, EU:C:2014:284��11.45 C-239/12 P, Abdulrahim v Council and Commission, EU:C:2013:331�� 7.08, 7.141, 7.144 C-240/12, EBS Le Relais Nord-Pas-de-Calais, EU:C:2013:173��3.23 C-248/12 P, Northern Ireland Department of Agriculture and Rural Development v Commission, EU:C:2014:137��7.97, 7.98 C-270/12, United Kingdom v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2014:18�� 7.168, 8.16 C-272/12 P, Commission v Ireland and Others, EU:C:2013:812 ��7.162, 7.184, 22.17, 23.03 C-274/12 P, Telefónica v Commission, EU:C:2013:852�� 7.110, 7.121, 7.123 C-278/12 PPU, Adil, EU:C:2012:508��23.33 C-284/12, Deutsche Lufthansa, EU:C:2013:755�� 5.25, 7.50, 7.53 C-287/12 P, Ryanair v Commission, EU:C:2013:395��7.119 C-288/12, Commission v Hungary, EU:C:2014:237��5.42, 5.77 C-295/12 P, Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission, EU:C:2014:2062�� 7.202, 7.204 C-300/12, Ibero Tours, EU:C:2014:8��6.13 C-313/12, Romeo, EU:C:2013:718��6.29 C-334/12 RX, Review Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB, EU:C:2012:468�� 20.01, 20.05 C-334/12 RX-II, Review Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB, EU:C:2013:134�� 16.18, 20.01, 20.02, 20.09 C-348/12 P, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, EU:C:2013:776�� 6.05, 7.03, 10.04 C-350/12 P, Council v In ‘t Veld, EU:C:2014:2039 ��12.03 C-368/12, Adiamix, EU:C:2013:257��3.23 C-370/12, Pringle, EU:C:2012:756��2.11, 6.10, 6.12, 7.70, 7.76, 10.03, 15.25, 15.26, 15.30, 23.26 C-374/12, Valimar, EU:C:2014:2231 �� 7.133, 10.11 C-382/12 P, MasterCard and Others v Commission, EU:C:2014:2201��19.21 C-385/12, Hervis Sport-és Divatkereskedelmi, EU:C:2014:47��6.30 C-399/12, Germany v Council, EU:C:2014:2258��12.08 C-404/12 P and C-405/12 P, Council and Commission v Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Pesticide Action Network Europe, EU:C:2015:5 ��7.188 C-414/12 P, Bolloré v Commission, EU:C:2014:301 ��18.05 C-421/12, Commission v Belgium, EU:C:2014:2064��5.10, 5.15 C-422/12 P, Industrias Alen v The Clorox Company, EU:C:2014:57��19.19 C-466/12, Svensson and Others, EU:C:2014:76��13.29 C-470/12, Pohotovosť, EU:C:2014:101 ��4.27 C-497/12, Gullotta and Farmacia di Gullotta Davide & C., EU:C:2015:436��3.21 C-501/12 to C-506/12, C-540/12 and C-541/12 , Specht and Others, EU:C:2014:2005�� 4.66, 11.16 C-525/12, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2014:2202��5.02 C-527/12, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2014:2193��4.63, 4.77 C-531/12 P, Commune de Millau and SEMEA v Commission, EU:C:2014:2008��15.14 C-533/12 P and C-536/12 P, SNCM and France v Corsica Ferries France, EU:C:2014:2142��7.210 C-549/12 P and C-54/13 P, Germany v Commission, EU:C:2015:412��7.162 C-551/12 P(R), EDF v Commission, EU:C:2013:157��2.19, 13.29, 13.33, 13.34 C-557/12, Kone and Others, EU:C:2014:1317 ��4.74 C-579/12 RX, Review Commission v Strack, EU:C:2012:785��20.01 C-579/12 RX-II, Review Commission v Strack, EU:C:2013:570 �� 20.01, 20.02, 20.09 C-611/12 P, Giordano v Commission, EU:C:2014:2282 �� 11.38, 11.51, 19.11 C-12/13 P and C-13/13 P, Buono and Others v Commission, EU:C:2014:2284�� 11.10, 11.20 C-27/13, Flughafen Lübeck, EU:C:2014:240��7.53 C-34/13, Kušionová, EU:C:2014:2189��4.41 C-58/13 and C-59/13, Torresi, EU:C:2014:2088��3.05 C-60/13, Commission v United Kingdom, EU:C:2014:219 ��5.17

Table of Cases lix C-64/13 P, H-Holding v Parliament, EU:C:2013:557��8.13 C-76/13, Commission v Portugal, EU:C:2014:2029��5.80, 5.84 C-100/13, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2014:2293��5.68 C-112/13, A, EU:C:2014:2195��3.17 C-115/13, Commission v Hungary, EU:C:2014:253��5.71 C-127/13 P, Strack v Commission, EU:C:2014:2250 �� 7.13, 7.68, 19.13 C-134/13, Raytek and Fluke Europe, EU:C:2015:82��2.13 C-166/13, Mukarubega, EU:C:2014:2336��4.22 C-168/13 PPU, F., EU:C:2013:358��23.33 C-196/13, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2014:2407 ��5.82, 5.84 C-200/13 P, Council v Bank Saderat Iran, EU:C:2016:284��19.19 C-213/13, Impresa Pizzarotti, EU:C:2014:2067 ��4.50 C-220/13 P, Nikolaou v Court of Auditors, EU:C:2014:2057 ��11.07 C-243/13, Commission v Sweden, EU:C:2014:2413 ��5.81 C-244/13, Ogieriakhi, EU:C:2014:2068��4.66 C-252/13, Commission v Netherlands, EU:C:2014:2312 ��5.56 C-261/13 P, Schönberger v Parliament, EU:C:2014:2423 ��7.14 C-263/13 P, Spain v Commission, EU:C:2015:415��7.162 C-278/13 P(R), Commission v Pilkington Group, EU:C:2013:558 ��13.31 C-282/13, T-Mobile Austria, EU:C:2015:24 ��23.26 C-293/13 P, Fresh Del Monte Produce v Commission and Commission v Fresh Del Monte Produce, EU:C:2015:416 �� 7.201, 19.14 C-318/13, X, EU:C:2014:2133��4.66 C-325/13 P and C-326/13 P, Peek & Cloppenburg v OHIM, EU:C:2014:2059��17.13 C-329/13, Stefan, EU:C:2014:815��4.32 C-336/13 P, Commission v IPK International, EU:C:2015:83��11.56 C-351/13, Commission v Greece, EU:C:2014:2150��5.71 C-369/13, Gielen and Others, EU:C:2015:85 ��23.26 C-374/13 P, Metropolis Inmobiliarias y Restauraciones v OHIM, EU:C:2014:270 ��17.13 C-376/13, Commission v Bulgaria, EU:C:2015:266��5.53 C-377/13, Ascendi Beiras Litoral e Alta, Auto Estradas das Beiras Litoral e Alta, EU:C:2014:1754��3.09 C-378/13, Commission v Greece, EU:C:2014:2405��5.45, 5.84 C-395/13, Commission v Belgium, EU:C:2014:2347��5.32, 5.39 C-410/13, Baltlanta, EU:C:2014:2134 ��6.10 C-433/13, Commission v Slovakia, EU:C:2015:602�� 5.44, 5.51, 5.52, 5.55, 5.67 C-434/13 P, Commission v Parker Hannifin Manufacturing and Parker-Hannifin, EU:C:2014:2456�� 18.07, 18.08 C-439/13 P, Elitaliana v Eulex Kosovo, EU:C:2015:753�� 6.12, 7.03, 7.73, 7.74, 11.24, 15.03, 22.09, 22.10 C-447/13 P, Nencini v Parliament, EU:C:2014:2372 ��19.13 C-456/13 P, T & L Sugars and Sidul Açúcares v Commission, EU:C:2015:284��7.110 C-468/13, MOL v OHIM, EU:C:2014:2116�� 17.15, 17.17 C-481/13, Qurbani, EU:C:2014:2101��6.18 C-497/13, Faber, EU:C:2015:357 ��4.41 C-502/13, Commission v Luxembourg, EU:C:2015:143��5.72 C-506/13 P, Lito Maieftiko Gynaikologiko kai Cheirourgiko Kentro v Commission, EU:C:2015:562�� 13.33, 15.12, 19.04 C-506/13 P-R, Lito Maieftiko Gynaikologiko kai Cheirourgiko Kentro v Commission, EU:C:2013:882��13.32 C-559/13, Grünewald, EU:C:2015:109 ��6.31 C-564/13 P, Planet v Commission, EU:C:2015:124 ��7.144, 15.08, 15.09, 15.16 C-581/13 P and C-582/13 P, Intra-Presse v OHIM, EU:C:2014:2387 ��17.21 C-583/13 P, Deutsche Bahn and Others v Commission, EU:C:2015:404 ��7.28

lx Table of Cases C-587/13 P and C-588/13 P, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria and Telefónica v Commission, EU:C:2015:18��7.123 C-591/13, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2015:230��5.56, 5.66 C-603/13 P, Galp Energia España and Others v Commission, EU:C:2016:38�� 18.02, 18.07 C-608/13 P, CEPSA v Commission, EU:C:2016:414 ��18.05 C-609/13 P, Duravit and Others v Commission, EU:C:2017:46�� 7.200, 7.204 C-613/13 P, Commission v Keramag Keramische Werke and Others and Sanitec Europe, EU:C:2017:49�� 19.04, 19.09 C-616/13 P, PROAS v Commission, EU:C:2016:415��18.05 C-636/13 P, Roca Sanitario v Commission, EU:C:2017:56��19.01 C-640/13, Commission v United Kingdom, EU:C:2014:2457 ��5.63 C-644/13 P, Villeroy and Boch v Commission, EU:C:2017:59 �� 18.03, 18.05 C-659/13 and C-34/14, C & J Clark International and Puma, EU:C:2016:74�� 7.136, 7.221, 10.11 C-660/13, Council v Commission, EU:C:2016:616��7.219 C-664/13, Nīmanis, EU:C:2015:417��4.45 C-667/13, Banco Privado Português and Massa Insolvente do Banco Privado Português, EU:C:2015:151 ��10.11 C-671/13, Indėlių ir investicijų draudimas and Nemaniūnas, EU:C:2015:418��4.68 C-678/13, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2015:358��5.69 C-682/13 P, Andechser Molkerei Scheitz v Commission, EU:C:2015:356 ��7.143 C-689/13, PFE, EU:C:2016:199��2.13, 3.17 C-5/14, Kernkraftwerke Lippe-Ems, EU:C:2015:354��3.17, 3.24 C-12/14, Commission v Malta, EU:C:2016:135��5.32, 5.66 C-21/14 P, Commission v Rusal Armenal, EU:C:2015:494��7.188, 13.04, 13.24, 13.29, 13.33 C-21/14 P-R, Commission v Rusal Armenal, EU:C:2014:1749 ��13.37 C-29/14, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2015:379��5.70 C-32/14, ERSTE Bank Hungary, EU:C:2015:637��4.41 C-33/14 P, Mory and Others v Commission, EU:C:2015:609��7.119, 7.122, 7.124, 7.125, 7.141, 7.144 C-35/14 P, Enercon v Gamesa Eólica, EU:C:2015:158��17.11 C-49/14, Finanmadrid EFC, EU:C:2016:98��4.41 C-62/14, Gauweiler and Others, EU:C:2015:400�� 3.13, 3.14, 3.26, 6.32 C-63/14, Commission v France, EU:C:2015:458 ��5.23, 5.74 C-69/14, Târșia, EU:C:2015:662��3.53 C-71/14, East Sussex County Council, EU:C:2015:656��4.42 C-72/14 and C-197/14, X and van Dijk, EU:C:2015:564��3.51 C-76/14, Manea, EU:C:2015:216 ��6.39 C-78/14 P, Commission v ANKO, EU:C:2015:732�� 13.05, 15.06, 19.05 C-87/14, Commission v Ireland, EU:C:2015:449��5.68 C-98/14, Berlington Hungary and Others, EU:C:2015:386��4.66 C-102/14 P, Investigación y Desarrollo en Soluciones y Servicios IT v Commission, EU:C:2016:737�� 11.08, 11.14 C-105/14, Taricco and Others, EU:C:2015:555�� 6.33, 7.188 C-107/14, 3D I, EU:C:2014:2117 ��3.21 C-113/14, Germany v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2016:635 ��7.217 C-138/14 P, Faktor B. i W. Gęsina v Commission, EU:C:2014:2256�� 22.73, 22.74 C-155/14 P, Evonik Degussa and AlzChem v Commission, EU:C:2016:446 ��19.04 C-158/14, A and Others, EU:C:2017:202��10.11 C-160/14, Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others, EU:C:2015:565�� 3.51, 3.53, 3.54, 4.18, 4.50 C-165/14, Rendón Marín, EU:C:2016:675 ��3.13 C-169/14, Sánchez Morcillo and Abril García, EU:C:2014:2099 ��4.21 C-203/14, Consorci Sanitari del Maresme, EU:C:2015:664�� 2.13, 3.05, 3.06 C-233/14, Commission v Netherlands, EU:C:2016:396 ��5.56 C-258/14, Florescu and Others, EU:C:2017:448��6.10, 6.11

Table of Cases lxi C-274/14, Banco de Santander, EU:C:2020:17��2.03, 3.06 C-276/14, Gmina Wrocław, EU:C:2015:635��6.39 C-281/14 P, SACBO v Commission and INEA, EU:C:2016:46��11.13 C-283/14 and C-284/14, CM Eurologistik and GLS, EU:C:2016:57��7.221 C-301/14, Pfotenhilfe-Ungarn, EU:C:2015:793��5.72 C-312/14, Banif Plus Bank, EU:C:2015:794 ��6.20 C-346/14, Commission v Austria, EU:C:2016:322��5.45 C-351/14, Rodríguez Sánchez, EU:C:2016:447��3.26 C-361/14 P, Commission v McBride and Others, EU:C:2016:434�� 7.219, 7.221, 19.33 C-362/14, Schrems, EU:C:2015:650��8.14, 10.13, 10.15, 10.16, 10.18 C-363/14, Parliament v Council, EU:C:2015:579��7.173 C-367/14, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2015:611 ��5.82 C-373/14 P, Toshiba Corporation v Commission, EU:C:2016:26��19.04 C-377/14, Radlinger and Radlingerová, EU:C:2016:283��4.41 C-396/14, MT Højgaard and Züblin, EU:C:2016:347 ��3.06 C-413/14 P, Intel v Commission, EU:C:2017:632��19.35 C-414/14 P, Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian v OHIM, EU:C:2015:157��17.17 C-415/14 P, Quimitécnica.com and de Mello v Commission, EU:C:2016:58��7.141 C-417/14 RX, Review Missir Mamachi di Lusignano v Commission, EU:C:2014:2219��20.01 C-417/14 RX-II, Review Missir Mamachi di Lusignano v Commission, EU:C:2015 :588��11.09, 16.14, 16.28, 18.02 C-419/14, WebMindLicenses, EU:C:2015:832��3.20, 4.35 C-431/14 P, Greece v Commission, EU:C:2016:145�� 7.212, 13.11 C-431/14 P-R, Greece v Commission, EU:C:2014:2418 ��13.02 C-440/14 P, National Iranian Oil Company v Council, EU:C:2016:128 ��9.20 C-441/14, DI, EU:C:2016:278��6.09 C-443/14 and C-444/14, Alo and Osso, EU:C:2016:127 ��6.18 C-449/14 P, DTS Distribuidora de Televisión Digital v Commission, EU:C:2016:848 �� 19.19, 23.02 C-454/14, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2016:117 ��5.38 C-455/14 P, H v Council and Commission, EU:C:2016:569��7.03, 7.74, 11.03, 11.22, 11.24, 15.03 C-461/14, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2016:895 ��5.45, 5.56 C-477/14, Pillbox 38, EU:C:2016:324��3.30 C-482/14, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2017:499��5.58 C-504/14, Commission v Greece, EU:C:2016:847��5.09, 5.67 C-505/14, Klausner Holz Niedersachsen, EU:C:2015:742��4.50 C-511/14, Pebros Servizi, EU:C:2016:448��3.05 C-524/14 P, Commission v Hansestadt Lübeck, EU:C:2016:971 �� 7.53, 7.126, 7.141 C-525/14, Commission v Czech Republic, EU:C:2016:714��5.10, 5.56 C-526/14, Kotnik and Others, EU:C:2016:570��10.09 C-541/14 P, Royal Scandinavian Casino Århus v Commission, EU:C:2016:302 ��7.121 C-543/14, Ordre des barreaux francophones and germanophone and Others, EU:C:2016:605��4.32 C-547/14, Philip Morris Brands and Others, EU:C:2016:325�� 3.21, 10.15 C-556/14 P, Holcim (Romania) v Commission, EU:C:2016:207 ��11.10 C-560/14, M, EU:C:2017:101 ��7.175 C-562/14 P, Sweden v Commission, EU:C:2017:356��7.163 C-563/14 P, Dansk Automat Brancheforening v Commission, EU:C:2016:303��7.121 C-566/14 P, Marchiani v Parliament, EU:C:2016:437 ��19.04 C-576/14 P, Mirelta Ingatlanhasznosító v Commission and Ombudsman, EU:C:2015:370��5.36 C-584/14, Commission v Greece, EU:C:2016:636��5.81, 5.84 C-590/14 P, DEI and Commission v Alouminion tis Ellados, EU:C:2016:797��7.48 C-591/14, Commission v Belgium, EU:C:2017:670��5.23, 5.72 C-595/14, Parliament v Council, EU:C:2015:847�� 7.08, 7.173 C-597/14 P, EUIPO v Grau Ferrer, EU:C:2016:579 ��17.12 C-598/14 P, EUIPO v Szajner, EU:C:2017:265 ��17.03, 17.06, 19.08, 19.15

lxii Table of Cases C-601/14, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2016:759 �� 5.56, 9.07, 9.12 C-602/14 P, Bharat Heavy Electricals v Commission, EU:C:2015:376��5.36, 5.37 C-611/14, Canal Digital Danmark, EU:C:2016:800��2.01 C-613/14, James Elliott Construction, EU:C:2016:821��6.11, 6.12 C-614/14, Ognyanov, EU:C:2016:514 ��3.01, 3.16 C-1/15 SA, Shotef v Commission, EU:C:2015:632��14.01, 14.03, 14.04, 14.07 C-2/15 SA, ANKO v Commission, EU:C:2015:670��14.01, 14.03, 14.04, 14.05, 14.06 C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB, EU:C:2016:701��7.73, 11.25, 11.45, 11.46 C-15/15, New Valmar, EU:C:2016:464��3.20 C-35/15 P(R), Commission v Vanbreda Risk & Benefits, EU:C:2015:275��13.29 C-45/15 P, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council, EU:C:2017:402�� 11.03, 11.40, 11.53, 19.05, 19.19, 19.23 C-46/15, Ambisig, EU:C:2016:530��4.45 C-53/15 P to C-56/15 P, Moreda-Riviere Trefilerías and Others v Commission, EU:C:2015:839��7.141 C-57/15, United Video Properties, EU:C:2016:611��4.30 C-72/15, Rosneft, EU:C:2017:236�� 3.33, 6.05, 7.03, 9.06, 10.04, 10.10, 11.03, 12.04 C-90/15 P, Hansen & Rosenthal and H&R Wax Company Vertrieb v Commission, EU:C:2017:123��7.201 C-104/15, Commission v Romania, EU:C:2016:581��5.45, 5.52 C-105/15 P to C-109/15 P, Mallis and Others v Commission and ECB, EU:C:2016:702�� 7.73, 19.09, 19.21 C-119/15, Biuro podróży Partner, EU:C:2016:987��3.45 C-131/15 P, Club Hotel Loutraki and Others v Commission, EU:C:2016:989��7.180 C-162/15 P, Evonik Degussa v Commission, EU:C:2017:205�� 13.31, 13.38 C-162/15 P-R, Evonik Degussa v Commission, EU:C:2016:142��13.31 C-168/15, Tomášová, EU:C:2016:602 �� 4.41, 4.69, 4.70 C-169/15, Montis Design, EU:C:2016:790 ��3.11 C-190/15 P, Fetim v OHIM, EU:C:2015:778��17.13 C-206/15 P, Sun Mark and Bulldog Energy Drink v Red Bull, EU:C:2015:773��17.11 C-224/15 P, Rose Vision v Commission, EU:C:2016:358 ��19.09 C-225/15, Politanò, EU:C:2016:645��3.21 C-226/15 P, Apple and Pear Australia and Star Fruits Diffusion v EUIPO, EU:C:2016:582 ��17.21 C-243/15, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK, EU:C:2016:838��6.20 C-264/15 P and C-265/15 P, Makro autoservicio mayorista and Vestel Iberia v Commission, EU:C:2016:301��7.95 C-268/15, Ullens de Schooten, EU:C:2016:874��3.21, 3.34, 6.21, 6.25, 6.26, 6.27, 6.28, 6.29 C-274/15, Commission v Luxembourg, EU:C:2017:333��5.10, 5.66 C-296/15, Medisanus, EU:C:2017:431��3.05 C-312/15 P, SolarWorld v Commission, EU:C:2016:162��7.141 C-320/15, Commission v Greece, EU:C:2017:678��5.64 C-321/15, ArcelorMittal Rodange and Schifflange, EU:C:2017:179 ��3.14 C-327/15, TDC, EU:C:2016:974��4.64 C-330/15 P, Tomana and Others v Council and Commission, EU:C:2016:601 ��19.23 C-331/15 P, France v Schlyter, EU:C:2017:639��19.23 C-337/15, Ombudsman v Staelen, EU:C:2017:256�� 11.24, 11.38, 11.40, 11.45, 11.47, 11.49, 11.53, 11.59, 16.28, 19.11, 19.19, 19.20, 19.30 C-351/15, Commission v Total and Elf Aquitaine, EU:C:2017:27��7.38 C-356/15, Commission v Belgium, EU:C:2018:555��5.56, 5.69 C-373/15 P, France v Commission, EU:C:2017:55��19.23 C-376/15 P and C-377/15 P, Changshu City Standard Parts Factory and Ningbo Jinding Fastener v Council, EU:C:2017:269��7.83 C-379/15, Association France Nature Environnement, EU:C:2016:603��3.51 C-385/15 P(I), Etairia Larymnis Larko v Larko, EU:C:2015:681��23.08

Table of Cases lxiii C-386/15 P(R), Alcogroup and Alcodis v Commission, EU:C:2015:623��13.02 C-396/15 P, Shoe Branding Europe v OHIM, EU:C:2016:95��17.03 C-399/15 P, Vichy Catalán v EUIPO, EU:C:2016:546 ��7.148 C-406/15, Milkova, EU:C:2017:198��3.21 C-408/15 P and C-409/15 P, Ackermann Saatzucht and Others v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2016:893�� 7.99, 7.101 C-410/15 P(I), Comité d’entreprise de la SNCM v Commission, EU:C:2015:669 ��23.11 C-414/15 P, Stichting Woonlinie and Others v Commission, EU:C:2017:215 �� 3.59, 7.210 C-415/15 P, Stichting Woonpunt and Others v Commission, EU:C:2017:216�� 3.59, 7.49, 7.59, 7.210 C-418/15 P(I), Cap Actions SNCM v Commission, EU:C:2015:671��23.08 C-433/15, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2018:31��5.67 C-434/15, Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi, EU:C:2017:981��3.21 C-440/15 P, AgriCapital v OHIM, EU:C:2016:144��17.13 C-442/15 P, Pensa Pharma v EUIPO, EU:C:2016:720 ��7.181, 17.03, 17.12, 17.15 C-452/15 P, Best-Lock, EU:C:2016:270��17.20 C-458/15, K.P., EU:C:2019:522�� 3.57, 10.11, 10.15 C-482/15 P, Westermann Lernspielverlag v EUIPO, EU:C:2016:805��17.12 C-484/15, Zulfikarpašić, EU:C:2017:199��3.05 C-486/15 P, Commission v France and Orange, EU:C:2016:912 ��7.210 C-488/15, Commission v Bulgaria, EU:C:2017:267��5.58 C-490/15 P, Ori Martin v Commission, EU:C:2016:678��19.21 C-502/15, Commission v United Kingdom, EU:C:2017:334 ��5.68 C-503/15, Margarit Panicello, EU:C:2017:126��3.05, 3.06 C-517/15 P, AGC Glass Europe and Others v Commission, EU:C:2017:598 ��7.177 C-517/15 P-R, AGC Glass Europe and Others v Commission, EU:C:2016:21��13.33 C-521/15, Spain v Council, EU:C:2017:982�� 2.51, 22.17 C-523/15 P, Westfälische Drahtindustrie and Others v Commission, EU:C:2016:541 ��18.02 C-524/15, Menci, EU:C:2018:197��24.75 C-532/15 and C-538/15, Eurosaneamientos and Others, EU:C:2016:932��3.34, 6.25 C-551/15, Pula Parking, EU:C:2017:193��3.05 C-552/15, Commission v Ireland, EU:C:2017:698�� 5.32, 5.44, 5.45, 5.55, 5.66 C-577/15 P, SV Capital v EBA, EU:C:2016:947�� 7.162, 19.21 C-586/15 P, Lotte v Nestlé Unternehmungen Deutschland, EU:C:2016:642 �� 8.05, 8.08, 8.17 C-587/15, Lietuvos Respublikos transporto priemonių draudikų biuras, EU:C:2017:463�� 6.11, 6.12, 6.20 C-588/15 P, LG Electronics v Commission, EU:C:2017:679��7.30 C-589/15 P, Anagnostakis v Commission, EU:C:2017:663��19.23 C-591/15, The Gibraltar Betting and Gaming Association, EU:C:2017:449��6.26 C-593/15 P and C-594/15 P, Slovakia v Commission, EU:C:2017:800��7.13, 7.14 C-596/15 P and C-597/15 P, Bionorica and Diapharm v Commission, EU:C:2017:886��7.144, 8.10, 8.13, 8.20, 8.21, 19.07 C-599/15 P, Romania v Commission, EU:C:2017:801��7.13 C-601/15 PPU, N., EU:C:2016:84��23.36 C-612/15, Kolev and Others, EU:C:2018:392�� 3.13, 3.17, 6.13 C-616/15, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2017:721��5.67 C-621/15, W and Others, EU:C:2017:484��4.45, 4.46 C-623/15 P, Toshiba v Commission, EU:C:2017:21�� 19.04, 19.05, 19.07 C-625/15 P, Schniga v CPVO, EU:C:2017:435 ��17.12 C-626/15, Commission v Council, EU:C:2018:925��7.73 C-628/15, The Trustees of the BT Pension Scheme, EU:C:2017:687 ��4.54 C-643/15 and C-647/15, Slovakia and Hungary v Council, EU:C:2017:631�� 7.173, 7.188 C-648/15, Austria v Germany, EU:C:2017:664��3.12, 5.08, 15.23, 15.24, 15.25, 15.29, 15.30, 15.31, 21.01 C-664/15, Protect Natur-, Arten-und Landschaftschutz Umweltorganisation, EU:C:2017:987��4.22

lxiv Table of Cases C-668/15, Jyske Finans, EU:C:2017:278 ��5.14 C-670/15, Šalplachta, EU:C:2017:594 ��4.30 C-677/15 P, EUIPO v European Dynamics Luxembourg and Others, EU:C:2017:998�� 11.24, 11.52 C-682/15, Berlioz Investment Fund, EU:C:2017:373��4.02, 4.35 C-691/15 P, Commission v Bilbaína de Alquitranes and Others, EU:C:2017:882 ��13.29 C-696/15 P, Czech Republic v Commission, EU:C:2017:595 ��7.169 C-3/16, Aquino, EU:C:2017:209��3.45 C-16/16 P, Belgium v Commission, EU:C:2018:79�� 7.05, 7.11, 7.13 C-19/16 P, Al-Faqih and Others v Commission, EU:C:2017:466�� 7.84, 19.05 C-24/16 and C-25/16, Nintendo, EU:C:2017:724��3.21 C-38/16, Compass Contract Services, EU:C:2017:454 ��4.58 C-44/16 P, Dyson v Commission, EU:C:2017:357�� 19.02, 19.05 C-52/16 and C-113/16, SEGRO and Horváth, EU:C:2018:157��3.16, 3.24 C-57/16 P, ClientEarth v Commission, EU:C:2018:660��7.141 C-61/16 P, EBMA v Giant, EU:C:2017:968��25.19 C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, EU:C:2018:117�� 1.03, 2.03, 3.06, 4.05, 4.10, 6.24 C-70/16 P, Comunidad Autónoma de Galicia and Retegal v Commission, EU:C:2017:1002��19.05 C-71/16 P, Comercializadora Eloro v EUIPO, EU:C:2017:345�� 25.18, 25.20 C-73/16, Puškár, EU:C:2017:725 ��4.24, 4.47 C-74/16, Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania, EU:C:2017:496��3.21 C-75/16, Menini and Rampanelli, EU:C:2017:457��4.25 C-84/16 P, Continental Reifen Deutschland v Compagnie générale des établissements Michelin and EUIPO, EU:C:2017:596��19.05 C-104/16 P, Council v Front Polisario, EU:C:2016:973�� 19.16, 23.44 C-106/16, Polbud -Wykonawstwo, EU:C:2017:804��3.19 C-115/16, C-118/16, C-119/16 and C-299/16, N Luxembourg 1 and Others, EU:C:2019:134��3.20 C-116/16 and C-117/16, T Danmark and Y Denmark, EU:C:2019:135 ��3.20 C-122/16 P, British Airways v Commission, EU:C:2017:861 ��7.204, 7.217, 18.03, 19.18, 19.26, 22.31 C-123/16 P, Orange Polska v Commission, EU:C:2018:590 ��18.02, 18.06, 18.08, 19.11 C-125/16, Malta Dental Technologists Association and Reynaud, EU:C:2017:707��6.27 C-128/16, Commission v Spain and Others, EU:C:2018:591��19.05 C-130/16 P, Gaki v Commission, EU:C:2016:731��5.37, 8.13 C-135/16, Georgsmarienhütte and Others, EU:C:2018:582��2.56, 3.20, 3.57, 7.118, 7.123, 10.11 C-137/16 P, Petraitis v Commission, EU:C:2016:904�� 7.15, 8.06, 8.13, 8.26 C-147/16, Karel de Grote –Hogeschool Katholieke Hogeschool Antwerpen, EU:C:2018:320 ��4.41 C-152/16, Commission v Luxembourg, EU:C:2016:919��5.32, 5.64 C-157/16 P(I), Bundesverband der Pharmazeutischen Industrie v Commission, EU:C:2016:476��23.09 C-163/16, Louboutin and Christian Louboutin, EU:C:2018:423��24.75 C-170/16 P(R), ICA Laboratories and Others v Commission, EU:C:2016:462 ��13.35 C-176/16 P, Proforec v Commission, EU:C:2017:290 �� 7.141, 7.144 C-180/16 P, Toshiba v Commission, EU:C:2017:520�� 7.221, 19.23 C-181/16, Gnandi, EU:C:2018:465�� 3.13, 24.75 C-183/16 P, Tilly-Sabco v Commission, EU:C:2017:704�� 7.172, 7.178 C-198/16 P, Agriconsulting Europe v Commission, EU:C:2017:784��11.59 C-203/16 P, Andres, EU:C:2018:505�� 7.121, 19.09 C-207/16, Ministerio Fiscal, EU:C:2018:788��3.22 C-228/16 P, DEI v Commission, EU:C:2017:409 ��7.19, 7.57 C-233/16, ANGED, EU:C:2018:280��6.27, 7.49 C-244/16 P, Industrias Químicas del Vallés v Commission, EU:C:2018:177 �� 7.102, 7.110 C-247/16, Schottelius, EU:C:2017:638��6.20 C-256/16, Deichmann, EU:C:2018:187��7.221

Table of Cases lxv C-266/16, Western Sahara Campaign UK, EU:C:2018:118�� 7.188, 10.05 C-267/16, Buhagiar and Others, EU:C:2018:26��3.10, 6.04 C-268/16 P, Binca Seafoods v Commission, EU:C:2017:1001��7.141 C-271/16 P, Panalpina World Transport, EU:C:2018:59 ��19.21 C-284/16, Achmea, EU:C:2018:158�� 2.02, 3.01, 3.09, 3.11, 4.02 C-295/16, Europamur Alimentación, EU:C:2017:782��6.29 C-298/16, Ispas, EU:C:2017:843��4.33 C-300/16 P, Commission v Frucona Košice, EU:C:2017:706 �� 7.210, 7.213 C-303/16, Solar Electric Martinique, EU:C:2017:773 ��3.21 C-304/16, American Express, EU:C:2018:66 ��3.13 C-312/16 RX, Review Andres and Others v ECB, EU:C:2016:520��20.01 C-322/16, Global Starnet, EU:C:2017:985��3.17 C-323/16 P, Eurallumina v Commission, EU:C:2017:952��19.19 C-326/16 P, LL v Parliament, EU:C:2018:83��16.15 C-327/16, Jacob, EU:C:2018:210��6.29 C-336/16, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2018:94��5.58, 5.74 C-337/16 P, Portugal v Commission, EU:C:2017:381 �� 7.155, 7.156 C-350/16 P, Pappalardo and Others v Commission, EU:C:2017:672�� 11.15, 11.43 C-353/16, MP, EU:C:2018:276 ��24.75 C-358/16, UBS Europe and Others, EU:C:2018:715 ��4.33 C-363/16, Commission v Greece, EU:C:2018:12��5.23, 5.62 C-364/16 P, Trioplast Industrier /Commission, EU:C:2017:1008 ��7.19, 7.38 C-368/16, Assens Havn, EU:C:2017:546��21.02 C-372/16, Sahyouni, EU:C:2017:988��6.29 C-376/16 P, EUIPO v European Dynamics Luxembourg and Others, EU:C:2018:299�� 11.24, 11.52, 11.59 C-377/16, Spain v Parliament, EU:C:2019:249�� 7.19, 7.188 C-378/16 P, Inclusion Alliance for Europe v Commission, EU:C:2020:575 �� 13.27, 15.12, 15.13, 15.20, 19.03, 19.14, 22.19 C-378/16 P-R, Inclusion Alliance for Europe v Commission, EU:C:2016:668��13.11 C-381/16, Benjumea Bravo de Laguna, EU:C:2017:889 ��3.14, 3.26 C-384/16 P, European Union Copper Task Force v Commission, EU:C:2018:176�� 7.101, 7.102, 7.110, 9.04, 10.10 C-391/16, C-77/17 and C-78/17, M and Others, EU:C:2019:403��6.18, 10.05, 10.08, 10.18 C-406/16 P(R), EMA v Pari Pharma, EU:C:2016:775 ��13.39 C-414/16, Egenberger, EU:C:2018:257 �� 4.11, 4.15, 6.07 C-418/16 P, mobile.de v EUIPO, EU:C:2018:128��17.12, 19.04, 19.14, 19.15, 19.21 C-423/16 P, HX v Council, EU:C:2017:848��22.20 C-430/16 P, Bank Mellat v Council, EU:C:2018:668�� 7.141, 7.144, 7.145 C-454/16 P, Global Steel Wire v Commission, EU:C:2017:818��7.38 C-465/16 P, Council v Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association, EU:C:2019:155��7.102, 7.106, 7.133, 19.07, 19.33 C-466/16 P, Council v Marquis Energy, EU:C:2019:156 ��7.133 C-469/16, Infante v Italy, EU:C:2016:953 ��5.35 C-470/16, North East Pylon Pressure Campaing and Sheehy, EU:C:2018:185��6.16 C-476/16, Air Serbia and Kondić, EU:C:2017:874��3.06 C-477/16 PPU, Kovalkovas, EU:C:2016:861��23.36 C-488/16 P, Bundesverband Souvenir –Geschenke –Ehrenpreise v EUIPO, EU:C:2018:673��17.13 C-496/16, Aranyosi, EU:C:2017:866 ��3.33 C-500/16, Caterpillar Financial Services, EU:C:2017:996��4.02, 4.29 C-505/16, Yanukovych v Council, EU:C:2017:525��7.160 C-512/16 P(R), EMA v MSD Animal Health Innovation and Intervert Internation, EU:C:2017:149��13.31, 13.33, 13.38, 19.02 C-516/16, Erzeugerorganisation Tiefkühlgemüse, EU:C:2017:1011��4.63

lxvi Table of Cases C-524/16, Faggiano, EU:C:2019:399 ��3.13 C-537/16, Garlsson Real Estate and Others, EU:C:2018:193 ��6.09 C-546/16, Montte, EU:C:2018:752��3.05 C-557/16, Astellas Pharma, EU:C:2018:181��4.27 C-564/16 P, EUIPO v Puma, EU:C:2018:509 ��17.13 C-569/16 and C-570/16, Bauer and Willmeroth, EU:C:2018:871 ��3.29 C-571/16, Kantarev, EU:C:2018:807 �� 4.18, 4.66, 4.67, 4.68, 4.70, 4.71 C-574/16, Grupo Norte Facility, EU:C:2018:390 ��6.22 C-579/16 P, Commission v FIH Holding and FIH Erhversbank, EU:C:2018:159 ��19.33 C-585/16, Alheto, EU:C:2018:584 ��4.42 C-586/16 P, Sun Pharmaceutical Industries and Ranbaxy, EU:C:2021:241��7.195 C-588/16 P, Generics, EU:C:2021:242��18.02 C-591/16 P, Lundbeck v Commission, EU:C:2021:243�� 18.08, 19.11 C-595/16, Emmea and Commercial Hub, EU:C:2017:320��3.34 C-601/16 P, Arrow Group and Arrow Generics v Commission, EU:C:2021:244��19.08 C-611/16 P, Xellia Pharmaceuticals and Alpharma v Commission, EU:C:2021:245��19.30 C-612/16, C & J Clark International, EU:C:2019:508�� 10.20, 10.21 C-620/16, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2019:256��5.01, 5.13, 5.17, 5.62, 5.72, 8.26, 9.12 C-621/16 P, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2019:251�� 7.19, 7.21, 7.185, 7.188 C-622/16 P to C-624/16 P, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission, Commission v Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori and Commission v Ferracci, EU:C:2018:873��7.87, 7.93, 7.107, 7.118, 7.121, 7.217, 19.05, 19.30, 19.32, 19.34 C-626/16, Commission v Slovakia, EU:C:2018:525��5.82 C-634/16 P, EUIPO v European Food, EU:C:2018:30��17.12 C-640/16 P, Greenpeace Energy v Commission, EU:C:2017:752�� 7.124, 7.125 C-669/16, Commission v United Kingdom, EU:C:2018:844 ��5.56 C-675/16 P, Guccio Gucci v EUIPO, EU:C:2018:470��25.25 C-1/17, Petronas Lubricants Italy, EU:C:2018:478��12.07 C-4/17 P, Czech Republic v Commission, EU:C:2018:678 ��19.23 C-15/17, Bosphorus Queen Shipping, EU:C:2018:557 ��6.18 C-21/17, Catlin Europe, EU:C:2018:675��4.22, 4.32 C-32/17 P, Apcoa Parking Holdings v EUIPO, EU:C:2018:396 ��17.13 C-33/17, Čepelnik, EU:C:2018:896 ��3.28 C-42/17, M.A.S. and M.B., EU:C:2017:936��6.13, 6.33 C-43/17 P, Jenkinson v Council and Others, EU:C:2018:531��15.03, 15.05, 15.08, 15.09 C-73/17, France v Parliament, EU:C:2018:787��7.16 C-76/17, Petrotel-Lukoil and Georgescu, EU:C:2018:139��4.59 C-84/17 P, C-85/17 P and C-95/17 P, Société des produits Nestlé and Others v Mondelez UK Holdings & Services, EU:C:2018:596��19.01 C-87/17 P, CBA Spielapparate-und Restaurantbetrieb v Court of Justice, EU:C:2017:512��3.16 C-93/17, Commission v Greece, EU:C:2018:903�� 5.24, 5.83, 5.84 C-97/17, Commission v Bulgaria, EU:C:2018:285�� 5.45, 5.47, 5.51, 5.52, 5.67 C-98/17 P, Philips and Philips France v Commission, EU:C:2018:774 ��18.02 C-99/17 P, Infineon Technologies v Commission, EU:C:2018:773 ��18.02, 18.03, 18.08, 19.05, 19.23 C-100/17 P, Gul Ahmed Textile Mills v Council, EU:C:2018:842��7.141, 7.159, 7.214, 25.18, 25.19, 25.20 C-114/17 P, Spain v Commission, EU:C:2018:753��22.20 C-122/17, Smith, EU:C:2018:631��2.01, 3.20 C-127/17, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2019:236��5.56 C-136/17, GC and Others, EU:C:2019:773��3.20 C-138/17 P and C-146/17 P, European Union v Gascogne Sack Deutschland and Gascogne, EU:C:2018:1013�� 4.48, 7.222, 11.23, 11.53, 11.60, 19.10 C-145/17 P, Internacional de Productos Metálicos v Commission, EU:C:2018:839 �� 7.110, 7.132, 7.135, 7.216

Table of Cases lxvii C-150/17 P, European Union v Kendrion, EU:C:2018:1014��2.18, 7.222, 11.07, 11.22, 11.23, 11.51, 11.53, 11.56, 11.57, 11.59, 11.60, 19.32 C-162/17 P, Poland v Stock Polska and EUIPO, EU:C:2019:27�� 17.13, 19.05 C-163/17, Jawo, EU:C:2019:218��6.07 C-174/17 P and C-222/17 P, European Union v ASPLA and Armando Álvarez, EU:C:2018:1015��11.23, 11.60, 11.63, 11.68 C-176/17, Profi Credit Polska, EU:C:2018:711��4.41 C-183/17 P, International Management Group v Commission, EU:C:2019:78 ��7.15, 7.98 C-193/17, Cresco Investigation, EU:C:2019:43 ��6.04 C-204/17 P(R), Hungary v Commission, EU:C:2017:751��13.24 C-205/17, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2018:606 ��5.83 C-207/17, Blaas, EU:C:2018:840��7.132, 7.133, 7.135, 10.11 C-208/17 P to C-210/17 P, NF and Others v European Council, EU:C:2018:705��7.74 C-219/17, Berlusconi and Fininvest, EU:C:2018:1023��3.59, 7.25 C-225/17 P, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Others v Council, EU:C:2019:82�� 7.144, 7.180, 7.223 C-233/17 P, GX v Commission, EU:C:2018:102��19.27 C-234/17, XC and Others, EU:C:2018:853 �� 3.01, 3.31, 4.06 C-235/17, Commission v Hungary, EU:C:2019:432�� 5.06, 11.45 C-236/17 P, Canadian Solar Emea and Others v Council, EU:C:2019:258��7.141, 7.144, 7.214, 19.19 C-237/17 P, Canadian Solar Emea and Others v Council, EU:C:2019:259�� 7.141, 7.144 C-238/17, Renerga, EU:C:2018:905��3.33 C-244/17, Commission v Council, EU:C:2018:662�� 7.219, 12.04 C-248/17 P, Bank Tejarat v Council, EU:C:2018:967��11.15 C-251/17, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2018:358 ��5.82 C-257/17, C and A, EU:C:2018:876��6.29 C-265/17, Commission v United Parcel Service, EU:C:2019:23�� 7.31, 7.205, 25.20 C-298/17, France Télévisions, EU:C:2018:1017��6.25 C-301/17, Commission v Romania, EU:C:2018:846��5.42 C-310/17, Levola Hengelo, EU:C:2018:899��3.28, 3.29 C-313/17 P, Haswani v Council, EU:C:2019:57�� 22.20, 22.30 C-328/17, Amt Azienda Trasporti e Mobilità and others, EU:C:2018:958 ��3.38 C-330/17, Verbraucherzentrale Baden-Württemberg, EU:C:2018:916��6.20 C-331/17, Sciotto, EU:C:2018:859��19.05 C-340/17 P, Alcohol Countermeasure Systems, EU:C:2018:965 �� 13.26, 17.13 C-342/17, Memoria and Dall’Antonia, EU:C:2018:906��6.28 C-343/17, Fremoluc, EU:C:2018:754�� 3.34, 6.25, 6.26 C-346/17 P, Klein v Commission, EU:C:2018:679��11.15, 11.38, 11.57, 11.59, 19.05 C-347/17, A and Others, EU:C:2019:720��3.20 C-349/17, Eesti Pagar, EU:C:2019:172�� 3.18, 4.63, 5.25 C-363/17, Equipolymers and Others v Council, EU:C:2018:402�� 11.59, 19.11 C-370/17 and C-37/18, CRPNPAC and Vueling Airlines, EU:C:2020:260��4.12, 4.50 C-373/17 P, Agria Polska and Others v Commission, EU:C:2018:756��19.21 C-378/17, Minister for Justice and Equality and Commissioner of the Garda Síochána, EU:C:2018:979 �� 3.17, 3.21, 4.26 C-380/17, K and B, EU:C:2018:877 ��6.29 C-391/17, Commission v United Kingdom, EU:C:2019:919 �� 5.17, 5.39, 5.67, 5.75 C-393/17, Kirschstein, EU:C:2019:563 ��3.32, 6.24 C-395/17, Commission v Netherlands, EU:C:2019:918 �� 5.17, 5.39, 5.56, 5.75 C-395/17 INT, Commission v Netherlands, EU:C:2022:335��25.50 C-399/17, Commission v Czech Republic, EU:C:2019:200��5.67 C-411/17, Inter-Environnement Wallonie and Bond Beter Leefmilieu Vlaanderen, EU:C:2019:622��6.16, 6.39

lxviii Table of Cases C-412/17 and C-474/11, Touring Tours und Travel and Sociedad de Transportes, EU:C:2018:1005��3.20 C-416/17, Commission v France, EU:C:2018:811 �� 3.51, 3.52, 5.12, 5.39, 5.40 C-419/17 P, Deza v ECHA, EU:C:2019:52�� 19.05, 19.21 C-427/17, Commission v Ireland, EU:C:2019:269�� 5.56, 5.64, 5.67, 5.68, 5.71 C-428/17 P, Meta Group v Commission, EU:C:2019:201��15.06 C-441/17, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2018:255�� 5.44, 5.55, 5.56 C-441/17 R, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2017:877 �� 2.13, 5.76, 13.01, 13.03, 13.04, 13.08, 13.14, 13.21, 13.22, 13.31, 13.32, 13.36, 13.37, 13.38, 13.40 C-447/17 P and C-479/17 P, European Union v Guardian Europe, EU:C:2019:672�� 7.222, 11.13, 11.14, 11.16, 11.23, 11.38, 11.52, 11.56, 11.59, 11.60, 11.63, 19.04, 19.34 C-453/17 P, Camerin v Parliament, EU:C:2017:922��16.04 C-463/17 P, Ori Martin v Court of Justice, EU:C:2018:411��11.23 C-469/17, Funke Medien NRW, EU:C:2019:623��6.30 C-472/17, Di Girolamo, EU:C:2018:684 ��3.15 C-482/17, Czech Republic v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2019:1035�� 7.166, 7.188, 13.41 C-482/17 R, Czech Republic v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2018:119 �� 2.19, 13.37 C-493/17, Weiss and Others, EU:C:2018:1000��3.13, 3.14, 6.13, 6.32, 10.06, 10.18, 23.26 C-504/17, Commission v Ireland, EU:C:2018:832��5.10 C-507/17, Google, EU:C:2019:772��7.167 C-508/17 P, CBA Spielapparate-und Restaurantbetrieb v Commission, EU:C:2018:72��8.05, 8.21 C-511/17, Lintner, EU:C:2020:188��4.41 C-515/17 P and C-561/17 P, Uniwersytet Wrocławski v REA, EU:C:2020:73�� 19.03, 19.05, 19.07, 22.53, 22.56, 23.09 C-536/17 P, Josel v EUIPO, EU:C:2018:14��17.13 C-543/17, Commission v Belgium, EU:C:2019:573�� 5.16, 5.70, 5.84, 5.86, 5.87 C-544/17 P, BPC Lux 2 and Others v Commission, EU:C:2018:880�� 7.141, 7.144, 19.07 C-554/17, Jonsson, EU:C:2019:124 �� 7.141, 7.144 C-556/17, Torubarov, EU:C:2019:626��4.17, 4.49 C-558/17 P, OZ v EIB, EU:C:2019:289��16.06, 16.29, 25.18, 25.19, 25.20 C-563/17, Associação Peço a Palavra and Others, EU:C:2019:144��3.32 C-565/17 P(R), BASF Grenzach v ECHA, EU:C:2018:340 �� 13.16, 13.29, 13.41 C-571/17 PPU, Ardic, EU:C:2017:1026��23.33 C-576/17 P(R), Wall Street Systems UK v ECB, EU:C:2018:208��13.29 C-579/17, Gradbeništvo Korana, EU:C:2019:162 ��3.05 C-584/17 P, ADR Center v Commission, EU:C:2020:576��15.11, 15.12, 15.13, 15.20, 22.19 C-585/17, Dilly’s Wellnesshotel, EU:C:2019:969 ��3.20 C-590/17, Pouvin and Dijoux, EU:C:2019:232��4.41 C-591/17, Austria v Germany, EU:C:2019:504��5.34 C-597/17, Belgisch Syndicaat van Chiropraxie and Others, EU:C:2019:544 ��6.39 C-598/17, A-Fonds, EU:C:2019:352��5.23 C-604/17, PM, EU:C:2018:10��6.20 C-611/17, Italy v Council, EU:C:2019:332�� 7.180, 7.190 C-616/17, Blaise and Others, EU:C:2019:800��6.09 C-617/17, Powszechny Zakład Ubezpieczeń na Życie, EU:C:2019:283��6.09 C-620/17, Hochtief Solutions Magyarországi Fióktelepe, EU:C:2019:630�� 3.32, 4.09, 4.18, 4.50, 4.69, 4.70, 4.71 C-630/17, Milivojević, EU:C:2019:123 ��3.24 C-635/17, E., EU:C:2019:192��3.32 C-637/17, Cogeco Communications, EU:C:2019:263��4.73, 4.74 C-639/17, KPMG Baltics, EU:C:2019:31��3.32 C-644/17, Eurobolt, EU:C:2019:555�� 3.57, 7.178, 10.18 C-653/17 P, VM Vermögens-Management v EUIPO, EU:C:2019:406��19.03

Table of Cases lxix C-654/17 P, Bayerische Motoren Werke v Commission and Freistaat Sachsen, EU:C:2019:634��7.212, 19.12, 19.25, 23.03 C-656/17 P, Berliner Stadtwerke v EUIPO, EU:C:2018:374 ��17.13 C-660/17 P, RF v Commission, EU:C:2019:509 ��7.146, 7.148, 19.03, 22.74 C-663/17 P, C-665/17 P and C-669/17 P, ECB and Others v Trasta Komercbanka and Others, EU:C:2019:923�� 7.66, 7.94, 7.95, 7.137, 19.14, 19.33, 22.23, 22.57 C-676/17, Călin, EU:C:2019:700 �� 3.53, 4.09, 4.51 C-677/17, Çoban, EU:C:2019:408 ��6.17 C-682/17, ExxonMobil Production Deutschland, EU:C:2019:518 ��6.39 C-687/17 P, Aanbestedingskalender and Others v Commission, EU:C:2019:932��8.10 C-696/17 P, Alex v Commission, EU:C:2018:848�� 7.125, 19.21 C-701/17 P, Valkov v European Court of Human Rights and Supreme Court of Cassation of the Republic of Bulgaria, EU:C:2018:106 ��7.73 C-703/17, Krah, EU:C:2019:850��3.20 C-708/17 and C-725/17, EVN Bulgaria Toplofikatsia and Toplofikatsia Sofia, EU:C:2019:1049��6.30 C-714/17, Karp v Parliament, EU:C:2018:471 ��16.06 C-715/17, C-718/17 and C-719/17, Commission v Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic, EU:C:2020:257��5.01, 5.02, 5.09, 5.32, 5.38, 5.44, 5.48, 5.49, 5.55, 5.56, 5.58, 5.62, 5.63, 5.70, 5.72, 5.74, 5.75, 5.79, 9.07, 22.14, 22.19 C-717/17 P(I), Minority SafePack –one million signatures for diversity in Europe v Romania and Commission, EU:C:2018:691��23.08 C-724/17, Skanska Industrial Solutions and Others, EU:C:2019:204 ��4.12, 4.74 C-727/17, ECO-WIND Construction, EU:C:2020:393��6.31 C-729/17, Commission v Greece, EU:C:2019:534�� 5.10, 5.58, 5.71 C-10/18 P, Marine Harvest v Commission, EU:C:2020:149�� 9.16, 19.23 C-12/18 P(I), United States of America v Apple Sales International and Others, EU:C:2018:330��23.06 C-13/18 and C-126/18, Sole-Mizo and Dalmandi Mezőgazdasági, EU:C:2020:292 ��4.07, 4.57, 4.62, 4.74 C-14/18 P, Alfamicro v Commission, EU:C:2019:159�� 15.13, 15.20 C-16/18, Dobersberger, EU:C:2019:1110 ��3.28 C-19/18 P, VG v Commission, EU:C:2019:578�� 11.08, 15.10, 19.23 C-23/18 P, Ccc Event Management v Court of Justice, EU:C:2018:761�� 11.29, 19.20 C-24/18, Bán, EU:C:2018:376��6.26 C-33/18, V, EU:C:2019:470��3.38 C-39/18 P, Commission v Icap Management Services and Icap New Zealand, EU:C:2019:584��7.22, 7.180, 7.202, 7.203 C-49/18, Escribano Vindel, EU:C:2019:106 ��2.03 C-53/18, Mastromartino, EU:C:2019:380��3.32, 6.26 C-55/18, CCOO, EU:C:2019:402��4.45 C-56/18 P, Commission v Gmina Miasto Gdynia and Port Lotniczy Gdynia Kosakowo, EU:C:2020:192�� 7.172, 7.176, 19.33 C-59/18 and C-182/18, Italy and Comune di Milano v Council, EU:C:2022:567��1.03, 7.11, 7.74, 10.03, 11.24 C-64/18, C-140/18, C-146/18 and C-148/18, Maksimovic and Others, EU:C:2019:723��3.20 C-65/18 P(R), Nexans France and Nexans v Commission �� 13.29, 13.32 C-66/18, Commission v Hungary, EU:C:2020:792��5.01, 5.05, 5.06, 5.32, 5.44, 5.48, 5.54, 5.55 C-70/18, A and Others, EU:C:2019:823��6.17 C-74/18, A, EU:C:2019:33��3.20 C-75/18, Vodafone Magyarország, EU:C:2020:139��3.32 C-78/18, Commission v Hungary, EU:C:2020:476�� 5.06, 5.42, 5.67 C-91/18, Commission v Greece, EU:C:2019:600��25.50

lxx Table of Cases C-99/18 P, FTI Touristik v EUIPO, EU:C:2019:565��19.09 C-104/18 P, Koton Mağazacilik Tekstil Sanayi ve Ticaret v EUIPO, EU:C:2019:724��17.05 C-117/18 P, PGNiG Supply & Trading v Commission, EU:C:2019:1042��7.95 C-118/18 P, Hochmann Marketing v EUIPO, EU:C:2018:522��17.13 C-118/18 P-INT, Hochmann Marketing v EUIPO, EU:C:2018:1007��25.50 C-118/18 P-TO, Hochmann Marketing v EUIPO, EU:C:2018:827 ��25.34 C-118/18 P-REV, Hochmann Marketing v EUIPO, EU:C:2019:396 �� 25.34, 25.42, 25.43 C-118/18 P-REVIII, Hochmann Marketing v EUIPO, EU:C:2020:440��25.44 C-122/18, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2020:41�� 5.02, 5.09, 5.14, 5.39, 5.49, 5.71 C-123/18 P, HTTS v Council, EU:C:2019:694�� 10.21, 11.03, 11.13, 11.15, 11.38, 11.40, 11.42, 11.47, 11.49, 11.62, 19.35 C-125/18, Gómez del Moral Guasch, EU:C:2020:138��3.20 C-139/18 P, CJ v ECDC, EU:C:2019:281��16.29 C-141/18 RX, Review FV v Council, EU:C:2018:218��20.01 C-144/18 P, River Kwai International Food Industry v AETMD, EU:C:2019:266 ��7.159 C-150/18 P, El Corte Inglés v EUIPO, EU:C:2018:689��17.12 C-152/18 P, Crédit mutuel Arkéa v ECB, EU:C:2019:810 ��19.17 C-155/18 P, Tulliallan Burlington v EUIPO, EU:C:2020:151 ��7.175 C-170/18 P, CJ v ECDC, EU:C:2019:410��16.29 C-171/18, Safeway, EU:C:2019:839 ��3.19, 6.39 C-175/18 P, PTC Therapeutics International v EMA, EU:C:2020:23��19.01 C-176/18, Club de Variedades Vegetales Protegidas, EU:C:2019:1131��6.22 C-177/18, Baldonedo Martín, EU:C:2020:26��3.32 C-182/18 R, Comune di Milano v Council, EU:C:2018:524�� 13.01, 13.36 C-186/18, José Cánovas Pardo, EU:C:2021:849 ��14.01 C-187/18 P(I), Müller and Others v Parliament, EU:C:2018:543�� 2.19, 22.74, 23.14 C-189/18, Glencore Agriculture Hungary, EU:C:2019:861�� 4.35, 6.23, 7.175 C-192/18, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2019:924��2.03, 5.05 C-202/18 and C-238/18, Rimšēvičs and ECB v Latvia, EU:C:2019:139�� 3.59, 5.05, 5.75, 6.06, 7.73 C-203/18 and C-374/18, Deutsche Post and Leymann, EU:C:2019:999�� 6.29, 7.123 C-210/18, WESTbahn Management, EU:C:2019:586��6.39 C-216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality, EU:C:2018:586��2.03, 4.10 C-228/18, Budapest Bank and Others, EU:C:2020:265��6.20 C-238/18 R, ECB v Latvia, EU:C:2018:581 �� 2.19, 13.01, 13.29 C-242/18, UniCredit Leasing, EU:C:2019:558��3.32 C-243/18 P, Fusion for Energy Joint Undertaking v Galocha, EU:C:2019:378�� 16.03, 16.29 C-244/18, Larko v Commission, EU:C:2020:238��7.210 C-248/18 P, Krasnyiy oktyabr v EUIPO, EU:C:2018:699��17.15 C-250/18, Commission v Croatia, EU:C:2019:343��5.68, 5.71 C-251/18, Trace Sport, EU:C:2019:766 �� 7.132, 7.135, 10.11 C-258/18, Solak, EU:C:2020:98��3.49 C-259/18, Asendia Spain, EU:C:2019:346��6.22 C-260/18, Dziubak, EU:C:2019:819��4.16, 4.38 C-261/18, Commission v Ireland, EU:C:2019:955�� 5.39, 5.71, 5.80, 5.83, 5.84 C-262/18 P and C-271/18 P, Commission and Slovak Republic v Dôvera zdravotná poistʼovňa, EU:C:2020:450�� 19.01, 19.19, 19.34 C-263/18, Nederlands Uitgeversverbond and Groep Algemene Uitgevers, EU:C:2019:1111��3.20 C-264/18, P.M. and Others, EU:C:2019:472�� 3.57, 10.18 C-274/18, Schuch-Ghannadan, EU:C:2019:828��3.20 C-281/18 P, Repower v EUIPO, EU:C:2019:916��19.21 C-300/18 P, UF v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2018:828��16.12 C-304/18, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2019:601 ��5.75 C-307/18, Generics (UK) and Others, EU:C:2020:52 ��6.29 C-308/18 P, Schniga v CPVO, EU:C:2018:886 ��17.15

Table of Cases lxxi C-311/18, Facebook Ireland and Schrems, EU:C:2020:559�� 3.31, 10.15 C-312/18 P, Eco-Bat Technologies and Others v Commission, EU:C:2019:235�� 7.155, 7.156 C-314/18, SF, EU:C:2020:191 ��2.03 C-315/18 P(R), Valencia Club de Fútbol v Commission, EU:C:2018:951��13.21 C-320/18 P, Crocs v EUIPO, EU:C:2020:702��17.11 C-323/18, Tesco-Global Áruházak, EU:C:2020:140��3.32, 7.50 C-327/18 PPU, RO, EU:C:2018:733��3.12 C-330/18 P, Gollnisch v Parliament, EU:C:2019:240�� 19.05, 19.24 C-331/18, Pohotovosť, EU:C:2019:665 ��6.38 C-332/18 P, Mytilinaios Anonymos Etairia –Omilos Epicheiriseon, EU:C:2019:1065��19.04 C-334/18 P(R), Hércules Club de Fútbol v Commission, EU:C:2018:952�� 13.21, 13.22, 13.26 C-342/18 P, Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo v Commission, EU:C:2019:1043 ��7.95 C-345/18 P, Caviro Distillerie and Others v Commission, EU:C:2019:589��7.214 C-346/18 P, Rose Vision v Commission, EU:C:2019:939 �� 11.08, 15.09, 22.19 C-347/18, Salvoni, EU:C:2019:661��3.05 C-360/18, Cargill Deutschland, EU:C:2019:1124��4.55 C-362/18, Hochtief, EU:C:2019:1100��3.33 C-363/18, Organisation juive européenne and Vignoble Psagot, EU:C:2019:954��6.15 C-376/18, Slovenské elektrárne, EU:C:2019:1068 ��3.21 C-379/18, Deutsche Lufthansa, EU:C:2019:1000�� 4.17, 4.21, 4.27 C-381/18 and C-382/18, G.S. and V.G., EU:C:2019:1072 ��6.29 C-384/18, Commission v Belgium, EU:C:2020:124��5.58, 5.67 C-390/18, Airbnb Ireland, EU:C:2019:1112��3.31 C-394/18, I.G.I., EU:C:2020:56��6.29 C-398/18 and C-428/18, Bocero Torrico and Bode, EU:C:2019:1050��3.28 C-401/18, Herst, EU:C:2020:295 ��6.38 C-403/18 P, Alcogroup and Alcodis v Commission, EU:C:2019:870��7.28, 7.33, 7.141, 7.163, 19.05 C-406/18, PG, EU:C:2020:216 �� 4.12, 4.17, 4.49 C-407/18, Addiko Bank, EU:C:2019:537��3.24 C-410/18, Aubriet, EU:C:2019:582��3.20 C-412/18 P, King v Commission, EU:C:2018:947�� 5.36, 5.37, 8.06, 8.13 C-413/18 P, H v Council, EU:C:2019:1044 ��19.06 C-414/18, Iccrea Banca, EU:C:2019:1036�� 3.57, 3.59, 7.02, 7.25, 7.137 C-426/18 P, Iordăchescu v Parliament and Others, EU:C:2019:89��7.158 C-433/18, Aktiva Finants, EU:C:2019:1074 ��6.31 C-434/18, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2019:603 ��5.03 C-435/18, Otis and Others, EU:C:2019:1069 ��4.74 C-440/18 P, Verein Deutsche Sprache v Commission, EU:C:2019:77��19.27 C-443/18, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2019:676 �� 5.09, 5.10, 5.11, 5.75 C-449/18 P and C-474/18 P, EUIPO v Messi Cuccittini, EU:C:2020:722�� 17.15, 17.17 C-450/18, Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social, EU:C:2019:1075��3.20 C-455/18 P, Spieker v EUIPO, EU:C:2020:1005��19.20 C-456/18 P, Hungary v Commission, EU:C:2020:421�� 7.210, 7.216, 19.34 C-457/18, Slovenia v Croatia, EU:C:2020:65�� 5.09, 5.34, 15.25, 15.32 C-460/18 P, HK v Commission, EU:C:2019:1119�� 9.17, 16.14, 19.09 C-461/18 P, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Distillerie Bonollo and Others, EU:C:2020:979��7.61, 7.95, 7.133, 19.15, 19.30 C-465/18, Comune di Bernareggio, EU:C:2019:1125 ��6.26, 6.29 C-469/18 and C-470/18, Belgische Staat, EU:C:2019:895��6.29 C-471/18 P, Germany v Esso Raffinage, EU:C:2021:48 �� 7.13, 7.16, 7.159, 23.09 C-480/18, PrivatBank, EU:C:2020:274 ��4.06 C-482/18, Google Ireland, EU:C:2020:141��3.20 C-486/18, Praxair MRC, EU:C:2019:379��6.10 C-488/18, Golfclub Schloss Igling, EU:C:2020:1013 ��5.11

lxxii Table of Cases C-496/18 and C-497/18, HUNGEOD and Others, EU:C:2020:240��3.20 C-499/18 P, Bayer CropScience and Bayer v Commission, EU:C:2021:367��7.08, 19.14, 19.30, 23.09 C-500/18, Reliantco Investment and Reliantco Investment Limassol Sucursala Bucureşti, EU:C:2020:264��3.22 C-501/18, Balgarska Narodna Banka, EU:C:2021:249��4.18, 4.36, 4.66, 4.71, 10.09, 11.16, 11.54 C-508/18 and C-82/19 PPU, OG and PI, EU:C:2019:456 ��3.05 C-511/18, C-512/18 and C-520/18, La Quadrature du Net and Others, EU:C:2020:791�� 4.03, 4.47, 6.39 C-514/18 P, Landeskammer für Land-und Forstwirtschaft in Steiermark v Schmid, EU:C:2019:878�� 25.18, 25.20 C-517/18, Fédération des fabricants de cigares, EU:C:2019:780��9.17 C-518/18, RD, EU:C:2019:546 ��9.17 C-519/18, Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal, EU:C:2019:1070 ��6.22 C-521/18, Pegaso and Sistemi di Sicurezza, EU:C:2020:867��3.15 C-522/18, Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych, EU:C:2020:42��3.33, 6.24 C-524/18, Dr. Willmar Schwabe, EU:C:2020:60��3.31 C-528/18 P, Outsource Professional Services v EUIPO, EU:C:2019:961��19.05 C-529/18 P and C-531/18 P, PJ and PC v EUIPO, EU:C:2022:218��19.07, 19.30, 22.55, 22.56 C-532/18, Niki Luftfahrt, EU:C:2019:1127��6.15 C-535/18, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, EU:C:2020:391��4.17 C-542/18 RX, Review Simpson v Council, EU:C:2018:763��20.01 C-542/18 RX-II and C-543/18 RX-II, Review Simpson v Council and HG v Commission, EU:C:2020:232�� 2.03, 2.05, 4.10, 4.34, 7.162, 7.172, 9.05, 19.25, 20.01, 20.02, 20.05, 20.09 C-543/18 RX, Review HG v Commission, EU:C:2018:764��20.01 C-549/18, Commission v Romania, EU:C:2020:563�� 5.15, 5.16, 5.32, 5.48, 5.87 C-550/18, Commission v Ireland, EU:C:2020:564��5.15, 5.16, 5.45, 5.62, 5.81, 5.83, 5.86, 5.87 C-556/18, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2019:785 ��5.71 C-558/18 and C-563/18, Miasto Łowicz and and Prokurator Generalny, EU:C:2020:234�� 2.03, 3.01, 3.33, 6.20, 6.24 C-560/18 P, Izba Gospodarcza Producentów i Operatorów Urządzeń Rozrywkowych v Commission, EU:C:2020:330�� 7.141, 7.144, 19.23 C-561/18, Solvay Chemicals, EU:C:2019:101��10.18 C-567/18, Coty Germany, EU:C:2020:267 ��3.19 C-568/18 P, Rogesa v Commission, EU:C:2019:1092��7.141 C-570/18 P, HF v Parliament, EU:C:2020:490��16.29, 19.12, 19.19, 19.33 C-572/18 P, thyssenkrupp Electrical Steel and thyssenkrupp Electrical Steel Ugo v Commission, EU:C:2021:317 �� 2.19, 7.15, 7.24, 7.25, 23.13 C-575/18 P, Czech Republic v Commission, EU:C:2020:530 �� 7.05, 7.15, 11.11, 11.21 C-576/18, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2020:202 �� 5.24, 5.71, 5.83, 5.84 C-577/18 P, Kerstens v Commission, EU:C:2019:129 ��16.04 C-579/18, Comida paralela 12, EU:C:2019:875 ��3.22 C-581/18, TÜV Rheinland LGA Products and Allianz IARD, EU:C:2020:453 ��3.20 C-584/18, D.Z. –Airline Management Solutions, EU:C:2020:324��3.14, 3.26 C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, A.K. and Others, EU:C:2019:982�� 2.03, 3.15, 3.16, 3.33, 3.39, 4.34, 6.20, 6.21, 6.24 C-592/18, Darie, EU:C:2019:1140 ��3.31 C-593/18 P, ABB v Commission, EU:C:2019:1027�� 7.199, 19.04, 22.16 C-594/18 P, Austria v Commission, EU:C:2020:742 �� 7.77, 7.119, 19.21, 19.22, 19.23, 19.30 C-597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P and C‑604/18 P, Council v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others, EU:C:2020:1028�� 11.24, 11.25, 11.29, 11.38, 19.04, 19.09, 19.21, 19.33, 19.34, 23.08, 23.10 C-599/18 P, Silec Cable and General Cable v Commission, EU:C:2019:966�� 19.04, 19.05 C-602/18 P, Star Television Productions v EUIPO, EU:C:2018:849��22.42

Table of Cases lxxiii C-606/18 P, Nexans France and Nexans v Commission, EU:C:2020:571 �� 7.28, 18.02, 18.03, 18.08, 19.01 C-607/18 P, NKT Verwaltung and NKT v Commission, EU:C:2020:385�� 7.30, 7.32, 19.32, 22.16 C-607/18 P-OST, NKT Verwaltung and NKT v Commission, EU:C:2021:537 ��25.50 C-608/18 P, Cyprus v EUIPO, EU:C:2020:347 ��17.11 C-610/18, AFMB and Others, EU:C:2020:565��3.20 C-611/18 P, Pirelli & C. v Commission, EU:C:2020:868 ��18.02 C-615/18, Staatsanwaltschaft Offenburg, EU:C:2020:376��4.32 C-618/18, Di Girolamo, EU:C:2019:1090��3.15, 3.38 C-619/18, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2019:531�� 2.03, 3.01, 4.10, 5.05, 5.71 C-619/18 R, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2018:852 �� 5.76, 13.22 C-619/18 R, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2018:1021��13.38 C-619/18, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2019:575�� 13.22, 13.31 C-620/18, Hungary v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2020:1001��7.191 C-621/18, Wightman and Others, EU:C:2018:999�� 2.11, 3.26, 12.03, 23.26 C-623/18, Prokuratura Rejonowa w Słubicach, EU:C:2020:800��6.24 C-626/18, Poland v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2020:1000��7.217 C-627/18, Nelson Antunes da Cunha, EU:C:2020:321 ��4.63 C-628/18, Commission v Slovenia, EU:C:2021:1�� 5.16, 5.66, 5.83, 5.87 C-631/18, Commission v Slovenia, EU:C:2021:2��5.84 C-634/18, Prokuratura Rejonowa w Słupsku, EU:C:2020:455�� 6.23, 6.28, 6.29 C-635/18, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2021:437��5.56, 5.59 C-636/18, Commission v France, EU:C:2019:900 ��5.71, 5.74 C-637/18, Commission v Hungary, EU:C:2021:92��5.01, 5.59 C-638/18, Commission v Romania, EU:C:2020:334��5.55, 5.56 C-641/18, Rina, EU:C:2020:349�� 3.15, 6.15, 14.01 C-642/18, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2019:1051��5.45, 5.47 C-644/18, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2020:895 �� 5.11, 5.56, 5.59, 5.71, 5.74 C-649/18, A, EU:C:2020:764��6.10 C-650/18, Hungary v Parliament, EU:C:2021:426��7.05, 7.11, 7.20, 7.70, 7.77, 7.141 C-657/18, Hrvatska radiotelevizija, EU:C:2019:304��6.28 C-658/18, Governo della Repubblica italiana, EU:C:2020:572�� 3.05, 3.06, 3.15 C-661/18, CTT –Correios de Portugal, EU:C:2020:335��6.23 C-663/18, Ministère public and Conseil national de l’ordre des pharmaciens, EU:C:2020:938 ��3.20 C-664/18, Commission v United Kingdom, EU:C:2021:171 �� 5.01, 5.11, 5.35, 5.45, 5.49, 5.59, 5.62, 5.63 C-665/18, Pólus Vegas, EU:C:2019:477��6.26 C-667/18, Orde van Vlaamse Balies and Ordre des barreaux francophones and germanophone, EU:C:2020:372��3.14 C-668/18, Uniparst, EU:C:2019:1093��23.26 C-670/18, Comune di Gesturi, EU:C:2020:272��6.31 C-674/18 and C-675/18, TMD Friction, EU:C:2020:682��3.20 C-677/18, Amoena, EU:C:2019:1142��10.18 C-678/18, Procureur-Generaal bij de Hoge Raad der Nederlanden, EU:C:2019:998 ��3.05 C-681/18, KG, EU:C:2020:823 ��3.31 C-682/18 and C-683/18, YouTube and Cyando, EU:C:2021:503 ��3.20 C-686/18, Adusbef and Others, EU:C:2020:567�� 3.17, 3.18, 3.21, 3.32, 3.39, 3.45, 6.07, 10.15, 23.26 C-690/18 to C-692/18, CLCV and Others, EU:C:2021:363��3.29 C-693/18, CLCV and Others, EU:C:2020:1040 ��3.14, 6.22 C-698/18 and C-699/18, Raiffeisen Bank and BRD Groupe Societé Générale, EU:C:2020:537��3.32 C-700/18 P, Hungary Restaurant Company and Evolution Gaming Advisory v Commission, EU:C:2019:215�� 7.146, 7.150, 7.151 C-702/18 P, Primart v EUIPO, EU:C:2020:489��17.15

lxxiv Table of Cases C-704/18, Kolev and Others, EU:C:2020:92��3.17, 6.13 C-710/18, Land Niedersachsen, EU:C:2020:299��3.20 C-718/18, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2021:662��5.56 C-719/18, Vivendi, EU:C:2020:627 ��3.22 C-728/18 P, EM Research Organization v EUIPO, EU:C:2019:781�� 17.03, 17.12 C-730/18 P, SC v Eulex Kosovo, EU:C:2020:505��15.03 C-740/18 RX, Review FN and Others v CEPOL, EU:C:2018:1049��20.01 C-742/18 P, Czech Republic v Commission, EU:C:2020:628 ��19.05 C-743/18, Elme Messer Metalurgs, EU:C:2020:767��3.23 C-744/18 P, Volkswagen v EUIPO, EU:C:2019:437��17.13 C-746/18, Prokuratuur, EU:C:2021:152�� 4.03, 4.47, 6.39 C-749/18, B and Others, EU:C:2020:370��6.22 C-752/18, Deutsche Umwelthilfe, EU:C:2019:1114��4.11, 4.17 C-755/18 P, Shindler and Others v Council, EU:C:2019:221 ��7.77 C-756/18, easyJet Airline, EU:C:2019:902��6.20 C-757/18 P, M-Sansz v Commission, EU:C:2019:1107��19.07 C-760/18, M.V. and Others, EU:C:2021:113��23.26 C-761/18 P, Leino-Sandberg v Parliament, EU:C:2021:52�� 7.141, 19.23 C-763/18 P-INT, WALLAPOP v EUIPO, EU:C:2021:109��25.50 C-768/18 P, Michal Harvilik –HYDRA v Czech Republic and European Court of Human Rights, EU:C:2019:225 ��2.02 C-778/18, Association française des usagers de banques, EU:C:2020:831 ��3.25, 3.33 C-785/18, GAEC Jeanningros, EU:C:2020:46��3.59, 4.05 C-787/18, Sögård Fastigheter, EU:C:2020:964��3.29 C-794/18 P, Pracsis and Conceptexpo Project v Commission and EACEA, EU:C:2019:305 ��19.20 C-795/18 P, FCA US v EUIPO, EU:C:2019:525��17.12 C-798/18 and C-799/18, Federazione nazionale delle imprese elettrotecniche ed elettroniche (Anie) and Others, EU:C:2021:280 ��6.16 C-808/18, Commission v Hungary, EU:C:2020:1029 �� 5.10, 5.15, 5.67, 5.68, 5.74 C-817/18 P, Vereniging tot Behoud van Natuurmonumenten in Nederland and Others, EU:C:2020:637 ��7.50, 7.119, 7.129, 7.212, 19.19 C-818/18 P and C-6/19 P, Yokohama Rubber and EUIPO v Pirelli Tyre, EU:C:2021:431�� 19.05, 23.14 C-823/18 P, Commission v GEA Group, EU:C:2020:955 ��7.141, 11.45, 19.16, 19.35 C-824/18, A.B. and Others, EU:C:2021:153 ��2.03, 3.01, 3.13, 3.16, 3.19, 3.41, 4.11, 6.24, 6.32 C-826/18, Stichting Varkens in Nood and Others, EU:C:2021:7 ��4.22, 4.29 C-831/18 P, Commission v RQ, EU:C:2020:481��16.07 C-2/19, A. P., EU:C:2020:237��3.19 C-3/19, Asmel, EU:C:2020:423��2.18, 6.22 C-8/19 PPU, RH, EU:C:2019:110��3.16 C-13/19, Ibercaja Banco, EU:C:2021:158 ��3.21 C-14/19 P, SatCen v KF, EU:C:2020:492�� 1.02, 1.03, 7.175, 11.03, 11.06, 11.08, 11.24 C-16/19, Szpital Kliniczny im. dra J. Babińskiego Samodzielny Publiczny Zakład Opieki Zdrowotnej w Krakowie, EU:C:2021:64��6.31 C-17/19, Bouygues travaux publics and Others, EU:C:2020:379��6.30 C-18/19, Stadt Frankfurt am Main, EU:C:2020:511��6.06 C-24/19, A and Others, EU:C:2020:503��6.22, 6.39 C-30/19, Braathens Regional Aviation, EU:C:2021:269��4.16, 6.23 C-35/19, État belge, EU:C:2019:894��3.31 C-36/19 P, Daico International v EUIPO, EU:C:2019:568��7.157 C-46/19 P, Council v PKK, EU:C:2021:316��7.181 C-50/19 P, Sigma Alimentos Exterior v Commission, EU:C:2021:792 �� 7.161, 7.216, 19.05 C-51/19 P and C-64/19, World Duty Free Group and Spain v Commission, EU:C:2021:793�� 7.161, 19.05, 19.07, 19.09, 19.23, 19.24

Table of Cases lxxv C-52/19 P, Banco Santander v Commission, EU:C:2021:794��19.05 C-53/19 P and C-65/19, Banco Santander and Others v Commission, EU:C:2021:795 ��19.05 C-54/19 P, Axa Mediterranean v Commission, EU:C:2021:796��19.05 C-55/19 P, Prosegur Compañía de Seguridad v Commission, EU:C:2021:797��19.05 C-56/19 P, RFA International v Commission, EU:C:2021:102�� 19.09, 19.22, 19.30 C-57/19 P, Commission v Tempus Energy and Tempus Energy Technology, EU:C:2021:663�� 7.22, 7.57, 7.212, 19.34 C-58/19 P, Azarov v Council, EU:C:2019:890��19.20 C-59/19, Wikingerhof, EU:C:2020:950��6.31 C-61/19, Orange Romania, EU:C:2020:901 ��6.30 C-63/19, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2021:18��5.67 C-69/19 P, Credito Fondiario v SRB, EU:C:2020:178��9.15, 19.05, 19.07, 19.13 C-70/19 P, Commission v HM, EU:C:2020:544 ��16.07 C-71/19 P, Barata v Parliament, EU:C:2019:793��16.15 C-74/19, Transportes Aéreos Portugueses, EU:C:2020:460 ��6.30 C-81/19, Banca Transilvania, EU:C:2020:532��4.37 C-83/19, C‑127/19, C‑195/19, C‑291/19, C‑355/19 and C‑397/19, Asociaţia “Forumul Judecătorilor din România” and Others, EU:C:2021:393 �� 1.03, 2.03, 3.13, 3.18, 3.20, 3.28, 3.31, 6.07, 6.12, 6.24 C-84/19, C-222/19 and C-252/19, Profi Credit Polska and Others, EU:C:2020:631 ��6.31 C-86/19, Vueling Airlines, EU:C:2020:538��3.29, 4.44 C-87/19, TV Play Baltic, EU:C:2019:1063��19.21 C-89/19, Rieco, EU:C:2020:87 ��4.02 C-95/19, Silcompa, EU:C:2021:128��6.22, 6.30 C-98/19 P, Comprojecto-Projectos e Construções and Others v Portugal, EU:C:2019:712��7.73 C-103/19, SUSH and CGT Sanidad de Madrid, EU:C:2021:460 ��3.29 C-104/19, Donex Shipping and Forwarding, EU:C:2020:539��3.18 C-106/19 and C-232/19, Italy and Comune di Milano v Council and Parliament, EU:C:2022:568�� 7.78, 7.94, 7.95, 7.100, 7.105, 7.108, 7.141, 11.24 C-113/19, Luxaviation, EU:C:2020:228��3.20, 3.49 C-119/19 P and C-126/19 P, Commission and Council v Carreras Sequeros and Others, EU:C:2020:676�� 9.03, 9.09, 9.17, 16.05, 16.29, 19.24, 19.34, 23.07 C-120/19, X, EU:C:2021:398��3.33 C-128/19, Azienda Sanitaria Provinciale di Catania, EU:C:2021:401��5.23 C-129/19, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, EU:C:2020:566��3.33, 4.66 C-130/19, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, EU:C:2021:782�� 2.11, 22.19, 24.49 C-132/19 P, Groupe Canal +v Commission, EU:C:2020:1007��7.31, 7.36, 7.113, 7.188, 7.191, 19.21, 19.23 C-134/19 P, Bank Refah Kargaran v Council, EU:C:2020:793 ��7.03, 9.06, 11.03, 11.12, 11.42, 11.45, 19.25 C-148/19 P, BTB Holding Investments and Duferco Participations Holding v Commission, EU:C:2020:354��7.210 C-152/19 P, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, EU:C:2021:238�� 19.07, 19.24 C-153/19, DER Touristik, EU:C:2020:412��19.24 C-160/19 P, Comune di Milano v Commission, EU:C:2020:1012�� 7.210, 19.05 C-163/19 P(R), Trifolio-M and Others v EFSA, EU:C:2019:453 �� 13.27, 13.42 C-165/19 P, Slovak Telekom v Commission, EU:C:2021:239�� 7.30, 19.04, 19.23 C-166/19 P, Unichem Laboratories v Commission, pending�� 7.167, 7.172 C-167/19 P and C-171/19 P, Commission v Freistaat Bayern and Others, EU:C:2022:176��19.05, 19.09, 19.21, 19.23, 19.24 C-168/19 and C-169/19, Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale, EU:C:2020:338��6.22 C-172/19 P, Euracoal v Commission, EU:C:2020:66��7.102 C-174/19 P and C-175/19 P, Scandlines Danmark and Scandlines Deutschland v Commission, EU:C:2021:801�� 7.119, 19.01, 19.03, 19.05, 19.19, 19.23

lxxvi Table of Cases C-176/19, Commission v Servier and Others, pending��7.18, 7.170, 7.202, 7.222 C-177/19 P to C-179/19 P, Germany –Ville de Paris and Others v Commission, EU:C:2022:10��7.78, 7.94, 11.53, 19.16, 19.33, 19.34 C-184/19, Hecta Viticol, EU:C:2020:337��3.20, 6.09 C-193/19, Migrationsverket, EU:C:2021:168��3.28 C-194/19, État belge, EU:C:2021:270�� 3.02, 3.13, 4.11 C-201/19 P, Servier and Others v Commission, pending ��7.18, 7.170, 7.202, 7.222 C-207/19 P, Biogaran v Commission, pending��7.201 C-212/19, Compagnie des pêches de Saint-Malo, EU:C:2020:726��3.20, 7.123, 10.11, 10.18 C-213/19, Commission v United Kingdom, EU:C:2022:167 �� 5.01, 5.14, 5.17, 5.43, 5.49, 5.66, 5.69, 5.71, 5.75, 22.15, 22.19, 24.47 C-217/19, Commission v Finland, EU:C:2020:291 ��5.59 C-224/19 and C-259/19, Caixabank and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, EU:C:2020:578�� 3.19, 3.23, 4.30 C-225/19, Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, EU:C:2020:951 ��19.03 C-230/19 P, Fryč v Commission, EU:C:2019:685�� 7.146, 7.150, 7.159 C-233/19, CPAS de Liège, EU:C:2020:757�� 3.18, 3.26, 6.22 C-234/19, EOS Matrix, EU:C:2019:986��6.28 C-236/19 P, Szécsi and Somossy v Commission, EU:C:2019:804��11.29 C-239/19, Eli Lilly and Company, EU:C:2019:687��3.12 C-241/19 P, Haswani v Council, EU:C:2020:545 �� 19.01, 19.22 C-245/19 and C-246/19, État luxembourgeois, EU:C:2020:795��6.07 C-248/19, Commission v Cyprus, EU:C:2020:171��5.67 C-255/19, Secretary of State for the Home Department, EU:C:2021:36 ��3.19 C-256/19, S.A.D. Maler und Anstreicher, EU:C:2020:523��6.24 C-258/19, EUROVIA, EU:C:2020:345��3.32 C-269/19, Banca B., EU:C:2020:954��3.20 C-270/19 P, WB v Commission, EU:C:2019:1038 ��8.21 C-272/19, Land Hessen, EU:C:2020:535�� 2.03, 3.06, 4.32, 6.24 C-276/19, Commission v United Kingdom, EU:C:2020:368 ��5.43, 5.66 C-280/19, ERCEA v Aristoteleio Panepistimio Thessalonikis, EU:C:2021:23 ��19.05 C-284/19 P, Clarke v Commission, EU:C:2019:799��5.32, 5.35, 5.36, 5.37, 7.15, 7.216, 8.06, 8.13 C-287/19, DenizBank, EU:C:2020:897 ��6.39 C-298/19, Commission v Greece, EU:C:2020:133�� 5.81, 5.83, 5.84 C-301/19 P, Commission v Printeos, EU:C:2021:39��7.221, 7.222, 9.17, 11.49, 11.56, 19.30, 19.34, 24.47 C-307/19, Obala i lučice, EU:C:2021:236�� 3.21, 3.22, 3.32 C-308/19, Whiteland Import Export, EU:C:2021:47��6.10 C-310/19 P, Schokker v EASA, EU:C:2020:435�� 16.14, 16.28 C-311/19, BONVER WIN, EU:C:2020:981��6.26 C-316/19, Commission v Slovenia, EU:C:2020:1030��5.17, 5.67 C-321/19, Bundesrepublik Deutschland, EU:C:2020:866��6.39 C-322/19 and C-385/19, The International Protection Appeals Tribunal and Others, EU:C:2021:11��3.33 C-324/19, eurocylinder systems, EU:C:2021:94�� 10.11, 10.18 C-326/19, Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca –MIUR and Others, EU:C:2021:438��3.21 C-332/19 P, Hércules Club de Fútbol v Commission, EU:C:2019:948��19.20 C-336/19, Centraal Israëlitisch Consistorie van België and Others, EU:C:2020:1031��6.07 C-337/19 P, Commission v Belgium and Magnetrol International, EU:C:2021:741��19.01, 19.05, 19.32, 19.34 C-339/19, Romenergo and Aris Capital, EU:C:2020:709 ��6.39 C-342/19 P, De Masi and Varoufakis v ECB, EU:C:2020:1035 �� 9.16, 19.23 C-344/19, Radiotelevizija Slovenija, EU:C:2021:182��6.19, 6.31

Table of Cases lxxvii C-347/19, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2020:1017��5.71 C-352/19 P, Région de Bruxelles-Capitale v Commission, EU:C:2020:978�� 2.54, 7.78, 7.94, 7.110, 7.111, 23.08, 23.13 C-357/19, C-379/19, C-547/19, C-811/19 and C-840/19, Euro Box Promotion and Others, EU:C:2021:1034 ��1.03, 2.03, 3.16, 3.17, 3.18, 4.10, 23.26 C-361/19, De Ruiter, EU:C:2021:71��3.20 C-362/19 P, Commission v Fútbol Club Barcelona, EU:C:2021:169 ��19.02, 19.19, 19.23, 19.32, 19.34, 24.42 C-367/19, Tax-Fin-Lex, EU:C:2020:685 ��6.29 C-371/19, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2020:936�� 5.10, 5.32, 5.56, 5.67 C-372/19, SABAM, EU:C:2020:959��3.20 C-376/19, МАК ТURS, EU:C:2020:99��3.32 C-378/19, Prezident Slovenskej republiky, EU:C:2020:462��3.20 C-383/19, Ubezpieczeniowy Fundusz Gwarancyjny, EU:C:2021:337��3.29 C-384/19, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2020:271 ��5.71 C-389/19 P, Commission v Sweden, EU:C:2021:131��7.219, 13.37, 13.38, 19.33 C-389/19 P-R, Commission v Sweden, EU:C:2019:1007��13.31 C-393/19, Okrazhna prokuratura –Haskovo and Apelativna prokuratura – Plovdiv, EU:C:2021:8��6.07 C-394/19, CPAS d’Anderlecht, EU:C:2020:820��6.29 C-396/19 P, ECB v Estate of Espírito Santo Financial Group, EU:C:2020:845 �� 7.68, 19.21, 19.34 C-398/19, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Berlin, EU:C:2020:1032��3.20 C-401/19, Poland v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2022:297��7.217 C-402/19, CPAS de Seraing, EU:C:2020:759��6.23 C-404/19 P, France v Commission, EU:C:2020:1041��19.32 C-407/19 and C-471/19, Katoen Natie Bulk Terminals and General Services Antwerp, EU:C:2021:107�� 3.21, 3.34, 6.27 C-424/19, UR, EU:C:2020:581 ��4.50 C-425/19 P, Commission v Italy and Others, EU:C:2021:154�� 19.04, 19.07, 19.08 C-428/19, Rapidsped, EU:C:2021:548��3.21, 3.30 C-430/19, C.F., EU:C:2020:429��6.29 C-434/19 and C-435/19, Poste Italiane and Agenzia delle entrate –Riscossione, EU:C:2021:162��3.28 C-436/19 P, Abaco Energy and Others v Commission, EU:C:2020:606 �� 7.162, 7.184, 22.16 C-439/19, Latvijas Republikas Saeima, EU:C:2021:504��6.39 C-440/19 P, Pometon v Commission, EU:C:2021:214�� 7.188, 18.02, 18.07, 18.08, 19.04, 19.21, 19.23, 19.33, 19.34 C-448/19, Subdelegación del Gobierno en Guadalajara, EU:C:2020:467��6.23 C-453/19, Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission, EU:C:2021:608��7.109, 7.118, 7.119, 7.124, 7.125, 19.21, 19.24 C-454/19, ZW, EU:C:2020:947��3.20, 3.21 C-458/19 P, ClientEarth v Commission, EU:C:2021:802��19.05 C-461/19 P, All Star v EUIPO, EU:C:2019:797�� 17.15, 17.17, 19.20 C-462/19, Anesco and Others, EU:C:2020:715��3.05, 3.08 C-463/19, Syndicat CFTC, EU:C:2020:932�� 3.21, 3.22, 6.23 C-466/19 P, Qualcomm and Qualcomm Europe v Commission, EU:C:2021:76�� 7.27, 7.28, 7.30, 7.188, 19.07, 19.21 C-472/19, Vert Marine, EU:C:2020:468��6.23 C-473/19 and C-474/19, Föreningen Skydda Skogen, EU:C:2021:166 ��3.20 C-477/19, Magistrat der Stadt Wien, EU:C:2020:517��6.20 C-481/19, Consob, EU:C:2021:84��7.27 C-485/19, Profi Credit Slovakia, EU:C:2021:313 �� 3.14, 4.03, 4.08, 6.07 C-487/19, W. Ż., EU:C:2021:798�� 2.03, 3.06, 4.76 C-498/19 P, Romania v Commission, EU:C:2020:686��7.146, 7.155, 7.156, 19.07

lxxviii Table of Cases C-499/19 P, Lupu v EUIPO, EU:C:2019:683��19.20 C-502/19, Junqueras Vies, EU:C:2019:1115��3.28 C-503/19 and C-592/19, Subdelegación del Gobierno en Barcelona, EU:C:2020:629��6.22 C-504/19, Banco de Portugal and Others, EU:C:2021:335 ��3.19, 3.20 C-505/19, Bundesrepublik Deutschland, EU:C:2021:376�� 3.21, 3.24, 6.09 C-508/19, Prokurator Generalny, EU:C:2022:201�� 3.15, 3.29, 6.24, 23.26 C-510/19, Openbaar Ministerie, EU:C:2020:953�� 3.05, 3.13, 3.28, 6.38, 6.39 C-519/19, DelayFix, EU:C:2020:1023 ��3.13 C-520/19, Armostav Místek, EU:C:2019:978��3.21 C-528/19, Mitteldeutsche Hartstein-Industrie, EU:C:2020:712��6.22 C-531/19, Subdelegación del Gobierno en Ciudad Real, EU:C:2020:619��3.26 C-536/19 P(I), EDP España v Commission, EU:C:2019:965 ��23.11 C-537/19, Commission v Austria, EU:C:2021:319�� 5.02, 5.32, 5.67, 5.68, 5.70 C-546/19, Westerwaldkreis, EU:C:2021:432��6.22 C-550/19, Obras y Servicios Públicos and Acciona Agua, EU:C:2021:514�� 3.20, 3.22, 3.31, 6.22, 6.24 C-551/19 P and C-552/19 P, ABLV Bank and Others v ECB, EU:C:2021:369�� 7.13, 7.23, 7.65, 19.24 C-554/19, Staatsanwaltschaft Offenburg, EU:C:2020:439��6.20 C-556/19, Eco TLC, EU:C:2020:844��3.20 C-559/19, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2021:512 ��5.56 C-561/19, Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi, EU:C:2021:799�� 1.04, 3.16, 3.19, 3.41, 3.46, 3.48, 3.49, 3.50, 3.51, 6.13, 6.33 C-562/19 P, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2021:201��7.210 C-564/19, IS, EU:C:2021:949 �� 3.16, 3.17, 3.27, 3.28, 3.34, 6.24 C-565/19 P, Carvalho and Others v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2021:252��7.106, 11.13, 11.14, 19.07 C-571/19 P, EMB Consulting and Others v ECB, EU:C:2020:208 �� 11.38, 11.46 C-572/19 P, Ertico –ITS Europe v Commission, EU:C:2021:188��19.05 C-573/19, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2022:380 �� 5.56, 5.59, 5.67, 5.71, 5.74 C-575/19 P, GMPO v Commission, EU:C:2020:448 �� 7.148, 22.74 C-578/19, Kuoni Travel, EU:C:2021:213��24.75 C-579/19, Food Standards Agency, EU:C:2021:665��4.42 C-580/19, Stadt Offenbach am Main, EU:C:2021:183��6.31 C-581/19, Frenetikexito, EU:C:2021:167��3.22 C-585/19, Academia de Studii Economice din Bucureşti, EU:C:2021:210��3.30, 6.39 C-587/19 P, L’Oréal v EUIPO, EU:C:2019:844��19.20 C-594/19 P, Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission, EU:C:2022:40�� 7.119, 7.121, 7.125 C-597/19, M.I.C.M., EU:C:2021:492��3.20 C-600/19, Ibercaja Banco, EU:C:2022:394 ��4.41, 4.50 C-601/19 P, BP v FRA, EU:C:2020:1048 ��2.31, 9.08, 9.09, 9.14, 16.04, 16.26 C-603/19, Úrad špeciálnej prokuratúry, EU:C:2020:774��3.21 C-605/19 P(R), Highgate Capital Management v Commission, EU:C:2020:12��13.17 C-607/19, Husqvarna, EU:C:2020:1044��25.31 C-609/19, BNP Paribas Personal Finance, EU:C:2021:469��6.20, 6.31 C-612/19 P, CC v Parliament, EU:C:2020:776��19.09 C-613/19 P, Porsche v EUIPO, EU:C:2019:905��19.20 C-615/19 P, Dalli v Commission, EU:C:2021:133�� 11.24, 11.38, 11.40, 11.42, 11.43, 11.45, 19.05 C-617/19, Granarolo, EU:C:2021:338 ��3.20 C-620/19, J & S Service, EU:C:2020:1011 ��6.29 C-624/19, Tesco Stores, EU:C:2021:429��3.12 C-631/19 P, Dickmanns v EUIPO, EU:C:2020:75��16.20 C-632/19 and C-633/19, Federale Overheidsdienst Financiën and Openbaar Ministerie, EU:C:2020:560��3.20 C-634/19 P, CJ v Court of Justice, EU:C:2020:474 ��8.05, 8.21

Table of Cases lxxix C-638/19 P, Commission v European Food and Others, EU:C:2022:50 �� 19.05, 19.07, 19.21, 19.23, 19.32, 19.33 C-640/19, Azienda Agricola Ambrosi Nicola Giuseppe and Others, EU:C:2021:97��10.18 C-643/19, Resopre, EU:C:2020:388��3.23, 6.20 C-644/19, Universitatea “Lucian Blaga” Sibiu and Others, EU:C:2020:810��3.31 C-645/19, Facebook Ireland and Others, EU:C:2021:483��6.07 C-646/19 P(R), Puigdemont i Casamajó and Comín i Oliveres v Parliament, EU:C:2019:1149�� 13.31, 13.42 C-647/19 P, Ja zum Nürburgring v Commission, EU:C:2021:666 ��7.119, 7.125, 7.130, 7.213, 19.05, 19.09, 19.25, 19.34 C-649/19, Spetsializirana prokuratura, EU:C:2021:75�� 3.05, 3.08, 3.13 C-650/19 P, Vialto Consulting v Commission, EU:C:2021:879 ��11.38, 11.40, 11.45, 11.49, 19.33 C-651/19, Commissaire général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides, EU:C:2020:681��4.29 C-652/19, Consulmarketing, EU:C:2021:208��6.07, 6.23 C-656/19, BAKATI PLUS, EU:C:2020:1045��3.19, 3.21 C-658/19, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2021:138 ��5.15, 5.16, 5.45, 5.62, 5.63, 5.84, 5.86, 5.87 C-662/19 P, NRW. Bank v SRB, EU:C:2021:846 �� 7.19, 7.65, 19.21, 19.35 C-665/19 P, NeXovation v Commission, EU:C:2021:667 ��7.119, 7.125, 19.02, 19.34 C-666/19 P, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Commission, EU:C:2022:323�� 19.03, 19.05, 19.07, 19.21, 19.23, 19.27 C-668/19, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2021:815 ��5.62, 5.67 C-669/19 P, BP v FRA, EU:C:2020:713��22.16 C-673/19, M and Others, EU:C:2021:127��2.18 C-675/19 SA, Ramon v Commission, EU:C:2020:683�� 14.01, 14.04, 14.06 C-677/19, Valoris, EU:C:2020:825��4.55 C-678/19 P, Retail Royalty v Fashion Energy, EU:C:2019:994�� 17.05, 17.21 C-689/19 P, VodafoneZiggo Group v Commission, EU:C:2021:142�� 2.03, 7.11, 7.13, 7.17, 7.23, 23.02, 23.13 C-693/19 and C-831/19, SPV Project 1503 and Others, EU:C:2022:395��4.41, 4.50 C-698/19 P, Sony Optiarc and Sony Optiarc America v Commission, EU:C:2022:480��7.180 C-699/19 P, Quanta Storage v Commission, EU:C:2022:483 ��7.30, 7.201, 18.02, 18.04 C-701/19 P, Pilatus Bank v ECB, EU:C:2021:99 ��7.66, 7.141, 7.144, 19.25 C-702/19 P, Silver Plastics and Johannes Reifenhäuser v Commission, EU:C:2020:857��19.27 C-704/19, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2021:342 ��5.23, 5.72 C-708/19, Von Aschenbach & Voss, EU:C:2021:190�� 7.132, 7.135, 10.11 C-709/19, Vereniging van Effectenbezitters, EU:C:2021:377��3.33 C-710/19, G. M. A., EU:C:2020:1037��3.20 C-716/19, Repsol Comercial de Productos Petrolíferos, EU:C:2020:870 ��3.21, 3.23 C-730/19, Commission v Bulgaria, EU:C:2022:382��5.71, 5.74 C-735/19, Euromin Holdings, EU:C:2020:1014��4.71 C-741/19, Republic of Moldova, EU:C:2021:655��3.09, 6.16 C-742/19, Ministrstvo za obrambo, EU:C:2021:597 �� 3.20, 3.32, 6.31 C-743/19, Parliament v Council, EU:C:2022:569�� 1.03, 7.11, 7.74 C-744/19, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2021:21��5.03 C-747/19 P, Rosellò v Italy, EU:C:2020:313��19.24 C-748/19 and C-754/19, Prokuratura Rejonowa w Mińsku Mazowieckim and Others, EU:C:2021:931��2.03, 3.06, 3.15, 3.26, 6.24, 6.31, 23.26 C-758/19, OH, EU:C:2021:603�� 11.07, 11.09, 11.26 C-760/19, JCM Europe, EU:C:2021:96 ��10.18 C-762/19, CV-Online Latvia, EU:C:2021:434��3.20 C-767/19, Commission v Belgium, EU:C:2020:984��5.15 C-769/19, Spetsializirana prokuratura, EU:C:2021:28��6.07 C-771/19, NAMA and Others, EU:C:2021:232��3.21 C-776/19 to C-782/19, BNP Paribas Personal Finance, EU:C:2021:470�� 4.03, 4.06, 6.20, 6.31

lxxx Table of Cases C-787/19, Commission v Austria, EU:C:2021:72�� 5.44, 5.56, 5.62, 5.63 C-791/19, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2021:596��1.03, 2.03, 2.16, 3.01, 4.10, 5.05, 24.74, 24.75 C-791/19 R, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2020:147 �� 13.21, 13.40 C-791/19 R, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2020:277 �� 13.08, 13.21, 13.24, 13.31, 13.37, 13.38, 13.40 C-793/19, SpaceNet, EU:C:2022:702��6.13 C-798/19 P, Paix and justice pour les juifs séfarades en Israël v Commission and Council of Europe, EU:C:2020:389 ��7.73 C-799/19, Sociálna poist’ovňa, EU:C:2020:960��3.21, 6.22 C-801/19, Franck, EU:C:2020:1049��3.32 C-802/19, Firma Z, EU:C:2021:195��3.19, 6.22 C-806/19 P, Commission v HSBC Holdings and Others, EU:C:2021:703��19.32 C-817/19, Ligue des droits humains, EU:C:2022:491�� 4.47, 6.23, 6.39 C-818/19 and C-878/19, Marvik–Pastrogor and Rodes –08, EU:C:2020:314 ��6.09 C-819/19, Stichting Cartel Compensation and Equilib Netherlands, EU:C:2021:904��4.73 C-822/19, Flavourstream, EU:C:2021:444��3.20, 6.31 C-826/19, Austrian Airlines, EU:C:2021:318��6.31 C-833/19 P, Council v Hamas, EU:C:2021:950�� 7.180, 19.01, 19.19, 19.21, 19.23, 19.34, 22.31, 24.38, 24.42 C-841/19, Fogasa, EU:C:2021:159 ��3.20 C-842/19, Commission v Belgium, EU:C:2020:915�� 5.09, 5.80, 5.81, 5.83, 5.84 C-846/19, Administration de l’Enregistrement, des Domaines and de la TVA, EU:C:2021:277 ��6.31 C-847/19 P, Achemos Grupė and Achema v Commission, EU:C:2021:343 �� 7.213, 19.32 C-850/19 P, FVE Holýšov I and Others v Commission, EU:C:2021:740�� 19.32, 25.26 C-851/19 P, DK v EEAS, EU:C:2021:607�� 16.28, 19.23 C-856/19, Commission v Hungary, EU:C:2021:253�� 5.09, 5.32, 5.71, 5.74 C-857/19, Slovak Telekom, EU:C:2021:139��6.09, 7.30 C-859/19, FX and Others, EU:C:2022:878��2.03 C-860/19 P, Magnan v Commission, EU:C:2020:227��19.24 C-869/19, Unicaja Banco, EU:C:2022:397��4.41 C-872/19 P, Venezuela v Council, EU:C:2021:507��2.54, 7.78, 7.83, 7.84, 7.93, 7.94, 7.95, 7.108, 7.110, 7.141, 7.159, 19.33 C-873/19, Deutsche Umwelthilfe, EU:C:2022:857��4.28, 6.16 C-874/19 P, Aeris Invest v SRB, EU:C:2021:1040�� 7.65, 19.21 C-875/19 P, FV v Council, EU:C:2021:283 ��16.27 C-876/19 P, PlasticsEurope v ECHA, EU:C:2021:1047 ��19.05 C-882/19, Sumal, EU:C:2021:800�� 3.21, 4.74, 7.30, 24.74 C-883/19 P, HSBC Holdings and Others v Commission, EU:C:2023:11�� 18.06, 23.03 C-884/19 P and C-888/19 P, Commission and GMB Glasmanufaktur Brandenburg v Xinyi PV Products (Anhui) Holdings, EU:C:2021:973�� 7.214, 19.34 C-885/19 P and C-898/19 P, Fiat Chrysler Finance Europe v Commission, EU:C:2022:859��22.13 C-890/19 P, Fortischem v Commission, EU:C:2021:345��19.05 C-891/19 P, Commission v Hubei Xinyegang Special Tube, EU:C:2022:38 �� 7.180, 7.214, 7.215, 19.33 C-896/19, Repubblika, EU:C:2021:311 �� 2.03, 4.10, 6.24 C-897/19 PPU, Ruska Federacija, EU:C:2020:262 ��3.20 C-907/19, Q-GmbH, EU:C:2021:237��6.30 C-908/19 P, European Food v EUIPO, EU:C:2020:212��17.12 C-910/19, Bankia, EU:C:2021:433�� 3.16, 3.19, 3.21, 4.03, 4.06 C-911/19, FBF, EU:C:2021:599�� 7.11, 7.21, 7.66, 9.04, 10.09 C-914/19, Ministero della Giustizia, EU:C:2021:430��6.31 C-920/19, Fluctus and Others, EU:C:2021:395��3.18 C-922/19, Stichting Waternet, EU:C:2021:91��6.30 C-923/19, Van Ameyde España, EU:C:2021:475 ��6.22

Table of Cases lxxxi C-924/19 PPU and C-925/19 PPU, Országos Idegenrendeszeti Főigazgatóság Dél-alföldi Regionális Igazgatóság, EU:C:2020:367�� 3.02, 3.21, 4.02, 4.11, 4.15, 4.76 C-927/19, Klaipėdos regiono atliekų tvarkymo centras, EU:C:2021:700 ��7.177 C-928/19 P, EPSU v Commission, EU:C:2021:656�� 7.180, 7.190 C-930/19, État belge, EU:C:2021:657��6.37 C-931/19, Titanium, EU:C:2021:446��3.28 C-932/19, OTP Jelzálogbank and Others, EU:C:2021:673 ��23.26 C-933/19 P, Autostrada Wielkopolska v Commission and Poland, EU:C:2021:905�� 7.210, 7.213, 19.01, 19.03, 19.04, 19.05, 19.30 C-934/19 P, Algebris (UK) and Anchorage Capital Group v SRB, EU:C:2021:1042�� 7.17, 19.23 C-935/19, Grupa Warzywna, EU:C:2021:287��6.23 C-937/19, Staatsanwaltschaft Köln and Bundesamt für Güterverkehr, EU:C:2021:555�� 3.20, 3.31, 3.32 C-938/19, Energieversorgungscenter Dresden-Wilschdorf, EU:C:2021:908��23.26 C-941/19, Samohýl group, EU:C:2021:192��6.31 C-942/19, Servicio Aragonés de Salud, EU:C:2021:440��3.32 C-949/19, Konsul Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w N., EU:C:2021:186 ��6.04 C-3/20, LR Ģenerālprokuratūra, EU:C:2021:969��6.04 C-9/20, Grundstücksgemeinschaft Kollaustraße 136, EU:C:2022:88 ��6.04 C-11/20, Commission v Greece, EU:C:2021:380�� 4.63, 5.23, 5.62, 5.74 C-19/20, Bank BPH, EU:C:2021:341��4.41, 6.22 C-22/20, Commission v Sweden, EU:C:2021:669��5.14, 5.70 C-23/20, Simonsen & Weel, EU:C:2021:490��3.20 C-24/20, Commission v Council, EU:C:2022:911��7.217 C-27/20, CAF, EU:C:2021:383 ��3.20 C-36/20 PPU, Ministerio Fiscal, EU:C:2020:495 ��3.13, 3.38 C-37/20 and C-601/20, Luxembourg Business Registers, EU:C:2022:912 �� 6.07, 10.18 C-40/20, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri and Others, EU:C:2022:985��4.02 C-51/20, Commission v Greece, EU:C:2022:36�� 4.63, 5.24, 5.63, 5.83, 5.84 C-54/20 P, Commission v Missir Mamachi di Lusignano and Others, EU:C:2022:349�� 11.09, 16.28 C-55/20, Minister Sprawiedliwości, EU:C:2022:6 ��3.06, 3.07 C-57/20, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2022:229��25.25 C-61/20 P, Billa v EUIPO, EU:C:2020:408��19.20 C-62/20, Vogel Import Export, EU:C:2021:288 ��6.31 C-63/20 P, Dickmanns v EUIPO, EU:C:2021:406��16.04, 16.13, 16.14, 16.17, 16.20 C-64/20, An tAire Talmhaíochta Bia agus Mara, Éire agus an tArd-Aighne, EU:C:2021:207��3.31 C-66/20, XK, EU:C:2021:670 ��3.05 C-70/20, Altenrhein Luftfahrt, EU:C:2021:379 ��3.29, 3.41 C-74/20 P, Hästens Sängar v EUIPO, EU:C:2020:407 ��17.01 C-76/20, BalevBio, EU:C:2021:441��3.28, 3.32 C-79/20 P, Yieh United Steel v Commission, EU:C:2022:305�� 19.04, 19.21, 19.22 C-80/20, Wilo Salmson France, EU:C:2021:870��6.32 C-81/20, Mitliv Exim, EU:C:2021:510��3.21 C-83/20, BPC Lux 2 and Others, EU:C:2022:346��6.07 C-88/20, ENR Grenelle Habitat and Others, EU:C:2021:407��3.23 C-89/20, GR and Others, EU:C:2020:771��3.21 C-94/20, Land Oberösterreich, EU:C:2021:477��6.24, 6.31 C-100/20, Hauptzollamt B, EU:C:2021:716��4.17, 4.62 C-105/20, UNMLibres, EU:C:2021:62��3.21 C-109/20, PL Holdings, EU:C:2021:875 �� 2.03, 6.22, 6.38, 6.39 C-110/20, Regione Puglia, EU:C:2022:5 ��3.15, 3.20 C-112/20, État belge, EU:C:2021:197��3.20 C-113/20, Slovenský plynárenský priemysel, EU:C:2020:772��3.32

lxxxii Table of Cases C-114/20 P(R), Anglo Austrian AAB and Belegging-Maatschappij “Far-East” v ECB, EU:C:2020:1059 ��10.21, 13.01, 13.29, 13.36, 13.42 C-117/20, bpost, EU:C:2022:202 ��6.09 C-120/20, Koleje Mazowieckie, EU:C:2021:553��4.18 C-122/20 P, Gollnisch v Parliament, EU:C:2021:370�� 9.04, 19.21 C-125/20, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2022:1025��5.59, 5.71 C-130/20, INSS, EU:C:2021:381��3.20 C-132/20, Getin Noble Bank, EU:C:2022:235��2.03, 3.01, 3.05, 3.06, 6.24, 23.26 C-134/20, Volkswagen, EU:C:2022:571��3.20, 6.22 C-139/20, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2022:240�� 22.13, 22.15 C-140/20, Commissioner of An Garda Síochána and Others, EU:C:2022:258��6.38, 6.39 C-142/20, Analisi G. Caracciolo, EU:C:2021:368�� 4.77, 10.18 C-143/20 and C-213/20, A and Others, EU:C:2022:118 ��24.51 C-151/20, Nordzucker and Others, EU:C:2022:203��6.09 C-152/20 and C-218/20, SC Gruber Logistics, EU:C:2021:600 ��3.20 C-159/20, Commission v Denmark, EU:C:2022:561��5.02, 5.17 C-160/20, Stichting Rookpreventie Jeugd and Others, EU:C:2022:101��7.185 C-161/20, Commission v Council, EU:C:2022:260�� 7.73, 7.167, 7.188 C-162/20 P, WV v EEAS, EU:C:2022:153 �� 18.02, 22.15 C-166/20, Lietuvos Respublikos sveikatos apsaugos ministerija, EU:C:2021:554��3.20 C-167/20 P, WD v EFSA, EU:C:2021:516 ��16.20 C-170/20, Novart Engineering, EU:C:2020:908��3.34 C-171/20 P, WV v EEAS, EU:C:2022:154 ��16.17 C-172/20 P, WV v EEAS, EU:C:2022:155 ��16.13, 16.14, 16.19, 22.31 C-176/20, Avio Lucos, EU:C:2022:274��3.20 C-177/20, Grossmania, EU:C:2022:175��3.49, 4.51, 4.66, 4.67, 5.76, 6.22, 6.34, 6.36 C-180/20, Commission v Council, EU:C:2021:658��12.04 C-181/20, VYSOČINA WIND, EU:C:2022:51��3.20, 4.66 C-184/20, Vyriausioji tarnybinės etikos komisija, EU:C:2022:601�� 3.02, 3.20, 3.31 C-185/20 P, Hungary v Commission, EU:C:2022:54�� 22.17, 23.03 C-190/20, DocMorris, EU:C:2021:609��3.20 C-192/20, Prima banka Slovensko, EU:C:2021:480��3.21 C-193/20 P, Dekoback v EUIPO, EU:C:2020:553��2.19 C-195/20 PPU, Generalbundesanwalt beim Bundesgerichtshof, EU:C:2020:749��23.33 C-198/20, X Bank, EU:C:2021:481��3.29 C-201/20 P(R), Junqueras i Vies v Parliament, EU:C:2020:818 ��13.31 C-202/20 P, Necci v Commission, EU:C:2021:385��16.04 C-206/20, Prosecutor of the regional prosecutor’s office in Ruse, Bulgaria, EU:C:2021:509��3.29 C-207/20 P(R), Anglo Austrian AAB and Belegging-Maatschappij “Far-East” v ECB, EU:C:2020:1057 �� 13.22, 13.29 C-210/20, Rad Service and Others, EU:C:2021:445��3.20 C-219/20, Bezirkshauptmannschaft Hartberg-Fürstenfeld, EU:C:2022:89 ��6.18 C-228/20, I, EU:C:2022:275��3.19 C-232/20, Daimler, EU:C:2022:196��3.20 C-236/20, Ministero della Giustizia and Others, EU:C:2022:263��3.21 C-238/20, Sātiņi-S, EU:C:2022:57 ��6.24 C-245/20, Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens, EU:C:2022:216��2.03 C-247/20, Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, EU:C:2022:177�� 3.12, 3.30, 23.26 C-248/20, Skellefteå Industrihus, EU:C:2021:394 ��3.29 C-259/20 P, Barata v Parliament, EU:C:2020:994��16.06 C-260/20 P, Commission v Hansol Paper, EU:C:2022:370 ��19.30 C-261/20, Thelen Technopark Berlin, EU:C:2022:33��4.65, 4.67, 4.70, 5.76, 5.78, 11.16 C-265/20, Universiteit Antwerpen and Others, EU:C:2022:361��3.21, 3.22

Table of Cases lxxxiii C-266/20 P, ZU v EEAS, EU:C:2021:42�� 2.16, 16.06 C-267/20, Volvo and DAF Trucks, EU:C:2022:494 ��3.20, 4.73 C-274/20, Prefettura di Massa Carrara, EU:C:2021:1022 ��3.20 C-275/20, Commission v Council, EU:C:2022:142��7.219 C-278/20, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2022:503 �� 4.18, 4.65, 4.66, 4.70, 4.71, 5.56 C-279/20, Bundesrepublik Deutschland, EU:C:2022:618��3.26, 6.22 C-283/20, Eulex Kosovo, EU:C:2022:126 ��7.73, 11.24, 13.20, 15.05, 15.14 C-289/20, IB, EU:C:2021:955 �� 6.31, 23.26 C-295/20, Sanresa, EU:C:2021:556��3.33 C-296/20, Commerzbank, EU:C:2021:784��21.02 C-298/20 P, Price v Council, EU:C:2020:1006�� 13.22, 13.23, 13.27 C-303/20, Ultimo Portfolio Investment, EU:C:2021:479�� 3.22, 3.28, 6.22 C-306/20, Visma Enterprise, EU:C:2021:935��6.29 C-318/20, Colt Technology Services and Others, EU:C:2020:969��3.21 C-320/20 P, Vasilev v Bulgaria, EU:C:2021:6��11.22 C-321/20, CDT, EU:C:2021:98��6.35 C-322/20 P, Wonder Line v EUIPO, EU:C:2020:706 ��2.19 C-328/20, Commission v Austria, EU:C:2022:468��5.42 C-329/20, Raiffeisen Bank International, EU:C:2021:111��3.21 C-331/20 P and C-343/20 P, Volotea and easyJet v Commission, EU:C:2022:886��7.123, 7.210, 7.211, 7.213 C-332/20, Roma Multiservizi and Rekeep, EU:C:2022:610�� 3.23, 3.30, 3.31 C-339/20 and C-397/20, VD and SR, EU:C:2022:703 ��3.31, 6.39 C-348/20 P, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2022:548�� 7.11, 7.13, 7.17, 7.93, 7.94, 7.95, 7.96, 7.99, 7.100, 7.101, 7.102, 7.108, 7.109, 7.110, 19.33, 24.49 C-349/20, Secretary of State for the Home Department, EU:C:2022:151�� 3.12, 24.51 C-350/20, INPS, EU:C:2021:659��23.26 C-351/20 P, Dragnea v Commission, EU:C:2022:8 �� 7.15, 7.68, 19.07, 19.21 C-352/20, HOLD Alapkezelő, EU:C:2022:606��3.20 C-354/20 PPU and C-412/20 PPU, Openbaar Ministerie, EU:C:2020:1033�� 2.03, 3.05, 6.31, 23.32, 23.33 C-356/20 P, AL v Commission, EU:C:2020:1021��19.04 C-364/20 P, Bernis and Others v SRB, EU:C:2022:115�� 7.93, 19.14, 19.21 C-368/20 and C-369/20, Landespolizeidirektion Steiermark, EU:C:2022:298��3.20 C-375/20, Liberty Seguros, EU:C:2021:861��3.20 C-376/20 P, Commission v CK Telecoms UK Investments, pending��7.22, 7.205, 7.206, 7.208 C-377/20, Servizio Elettrico Nazionale and Others, EU:C:2022:379��3.29 C-378/20, Stadtapotheke E, EU:C:2021:130��3.21 C-379/20, Udlændingenævnet, EU:C:2021:660��6.17 C-385/20, Caixabank, EU:C:2022:278��3.19 C-387/20, OKR, EU:C:2021:751��3.05 C-389/20, TGSS, EU:C:2022:120 ��3.15 C-391/20, Boriss Cilevičs and Others, EU:C:2022:638 ��6.27 C-399/20 P, XH v Commission, EU:C:2021:205��2.16, 16.13, 16.20, 16.29, 19.09 C-400/20 P, Dermavita v EUIPO, EU:C:2020:997 ��19.20 C-402/20 P, Lípidos Santiga v Commission, EU:C:2021:872 ��7.92, 7.114, 7.118, 7.133 C-403/20 P, CF and Others v Commission, EU:C:2021:156�� 11.38, 11.59 C-409/20, Subdelegación del Gobierno en Pontevedra, EU:C:2022:148��3.26 C-411/20, Familienkasse Niedersachsen-Bremen, EU:C:2022:602��6.31 C-413/20, État belge, EU:C:2021:938�� 4.65, 6.38, 6.39 C-415/20, C-419/20 and C-427/20, Gräfendorfer Geflügel-und Tiefkühlfeinkost Produktions and Others, EU:C:2022:306�� 1.03, 4.08, 4.17, 4.62 C-423/20 P(R), Council v Sharpston, EU:C:2020:700��2.19, 13.22, 13.23, 13.31

lxxxiv Table of Cases C-424/20 P(R), Council v Sharpston, EU:C:2020:705��2.19, 13.22, 13.23, 13.31 C-429/20 P, Solar Ileias Bompaina v Commission, EU:C:2022:282�� 7.56, 7.119 C-436/20, ASADE, EU:C:2022:559 �� 3.30, 3.32, 6.26 C-439/20 P and C-441/20 P, Commission v Jiangsu Seraphim Solar System and Council v Jiangsu Seraphim Solar System, EU:C:2023:211��7.132, 7.133, 7.141, 9.08, 22.21 C-447/20 and C-448/20, IFAP, EU:C:2022:265��4.29, 6.22 C-450/20 P, Comprojecto-Projectos e Construções and Others v ECB and Banco de Portugal, EU:C:2021:356 �� 2.16, 19.12, 19.28 C-452/20, Agenzia delle dogane e dei monopoli and Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, EU:C:2022:111�� 3.20, 7.188 C-453/20, CityRail, EU:C:2022:341��3.07, 3.08 C-460/20, Google, EU:C:2022:962��6.07 C-470/20, Veejaam and Espo, EU:C:2022:981 ��2.19, 6.22 C-471/20, Centre d’Enseignement Secondaire Saint-Vincent de Soignies, EU:C:2021:331�� 3.13, 3.21, 3.23 C-472/20, Lombard Lízing, EU:C:2022:242 ��2.19 C-475/20 and C-482/20, Admiral Gaming Network and Others, EU:C:2022:714��3.23 C-485/20, HR Rail, EU:C:2022:85 ��6.31 C-490/20, Stolichna obshtina, rayon “Pancharevo”, EU:C:2021:1008 �� 23.26, 23.27 C-497/20, Randstad Italia, EU:C:2021:1037��3.55, 4.11, 4.21, 23.26, 24.03 C-500/20, ÖBB-Infrastruktur Aktiengesellschaft, EU:C:2022:563 ��6.15, 6.16 C-501/20, MPA, EU:C:2022:619��6.31 C-503/20, Banco Santander, EU:C:2021:254��6.26 C-504/20 P, Wagenknecht v European Council, EU:C:2021:305�� 2.16, 8.21, 13.26 C-510/20, Commission v Bulgaria, EU:C:2022:324��5.56 C-519/20, Landkreis Gifhorn, EU:C:2022:178��6.20 C-521/20, J.P., EU:C:2022:293�� 3.16, 3.19, 3.31, 3.32, 10.03 C-524/20, Vítkovice Steel, EU:C:2021:1048 ��10.11 C-530/20, EUROAPTIEKA, EU:C:2022:1014 ��6.20 C-539/20 P-REV, Hochmann Marketing v Commission, EU:C:2022:110 ��25.42 C-541/20 R, Lithuania v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2021:264 ��13.01, 13.28, 13.29, 13.32, 13.33, 13.36, 13.37 C-557/20, DS, EU:C:2021:204��3.34 C-559/20, Koch Media, EU:C:2022:317��3.20 C-561/20, United Airlines, EU:C:2022:266�� 7.167, 7.188, 10.08 C-567/20, Zagrebačka banka, EU:C:2022:352 ��3.32 C-569/20, Spetsializirana prokuratura, EU:C:2022:401��3.32 C-570/20, Direction départementale des finances publiques de la Haute-Savoie, EU:C:2022:348��6.07 C-571/20, Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca and Others, EU:C:2021:364��6.20, 6.26 C-572/20, ACC Silicones, EU:C:2022:469��3.32 C-573/20, Casa di Cura Città di Parma, EU:C:2021:307��3.33 C-574/20, Finanzamt Österreich, EU:C:2023:27 ��3.20 C-576/20, Pensionsversicherungsanstalt, EU:C:2022:525��3.20 C-580/20, XXX and YYY, EU:C:2021:375��3.35 C-581/20, TOTO, EU:C:2021:808 �� 23.26, 23.44 C-584/20 P and C-621/20 P, Commission v Landesbank Baden-Württemberg and SRB, EU:C:2021:601��7.162, 7.177, 7.178, 7.180, 7.219, 9.09, 23.12, 23.47 C-586/20 P, P. Krücken Organic v Commission, EU:C:2021:1046��19.23 C-588/20, Daimler, EU:C:2022:607�� 3.13, 3.28, 3.31 C-589/20, Austrian Airlines, EU:C:2022:424��6.16 C-590/20, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri and Others, EU:C:2022:150��23.26 C-592/20, British Airways, EU:C:2021:312��3.20

Table of Cases lxxxv C-593/20 SA, Moro and Others v Commission, EU:C:2021:535��14.01, 14.03, 14.04, 14.05, 14.07 C-596/20, DuoDecad, EU:C:2022:474��6.20, 6.22 C-603/20 PPU, MCP, EU:C:2021:231�� 2.18, 23.33 C-617/20, T.N. and N.N., EU:C:2022:426��6.22 C-619/20 P and C-620/20 P, IMG v Commission, EU:C:2022:722�� 11.45, 11.55, 11.73 C-622/20 P, Validity and Center for Independent Living v Commission, EU:C:2021:310�� 7.17, 7.111, 8.10 C-625/20, INSS, EU:C:2022:508��6.31 C-630/20, Deutsche Lufthansa, EU:C:2021:584��3.26, 6.37 C-632/20 P, Spain v Commission, EU:C:2023:28��7.219 C-633/20, TC Medical Air Ambulance Agency, EU:C:2022:733 ��2.18 C-634/20, Sosiaali-ja terveysalan lupa-ja valvontavirasto, EU:C:2022:149��3.13 C-636/20, Totalnext, EU:C:2021:538��3.21 C-640/20 P, PV v Commission, EU:C:2023:232��7.10 C-641/20, CPAS de Liège, EU:C:2021:374��3.29 C-642/20, Caruter, EU:C:2022:308��23.26 C-644/20, W. J., EU:C:2022:371 �� 2.03, 3.05, 3.06 C-652/20, Allianz Elementar Versicherung, EU:C:2022:514 ��6.22, 6.30 C-655/20, Gómez del Moral Guasch II, EU:C:2021:943 ��6.33 C-661/20, Commission v Slovakia, EU:C:2022:496�� 5.11, 5.56, 5.58, 5.59, 5.63 C-663/20 P, SRB v Hypo Vorarlberg Bank, EU:C:2022:162��19.20 C-664/20 P, SRB v Portigon and Commission, EU:C:2022:161 ��19.20 C-665/20 PPU, X, EU:C:2021:339�� 2.18, 23.33 C-666/20 P, GVN v Commission, EU:C:2022:225��7.91, 19.14, 19.21, 19.23, 22.31 C-673/20, Préfet du Gers and Institut National de la Statistique and des Études Économiques, EU:C:2022:449��3.21, 3.31, 7.188, 10.05, 24.74 C-674/20, Airbnb Ireland, EU:C:2022:303 �� 3.21, 25.15 C-679/20, Administración General del Estado, EU:C:2021:362��6.15, 6.24 C-682/20 P, Les Mousquetaires and ITM Entreprises v Commission, EU:C:2023:170��7.33 C-684/20 P, Sharpston v Council and Conference of the Representatives of the Member States, EU:C:2021:486�� 2.05, 6.11, 7.74 C-685/20 P, Sharpston v Council and Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, EU:C:2021:485�� 2.05, 6.11, 7.74, 10.03 C-690/20 P, Casino, Guichard-Perrachon and Achats Marchandises Casino v Commission, EU:C:2023:171�� 7.28, 7.33, 7.163, 9.09 C-693/20 P, Intermarché Casino Achats v Commission, EU:C:2023:172��7.199 C-694/20, Orde van Vlaamse Balies and Others, EU:C:2022:963��6.07 C-695/20, Fenix International, EU:C:2023:127 �� 3.12, 7.169, 10.18 C-696/20, Dyrektor Izby Skarbowej w W., EU:C:2022:528��6.22 C-698/20, Gmina Wieliszew, EU:C:2022:787��3.05 C-699/20, Centraal Justitieel Incassobureau, EU:C:2021:465��3.13, 3.33 C-700/20, London Steam-Ship Owners’ Mutual Insurance Association, EU:C:2022:488��21.02 C-702/20 and C-17/21, DOBELES HES, EU:C:2023:1 �� 3.21, 6.20, 6.22, 6.23 C-703/20, PONS HOLDING, EU:C:2021:365 ��3.34 C-704/20, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid, EU:C:2022:858�� 3.32, 4.11, 4.41 C-705/20, Fossil, EU:C:2022:680 ��4.63 C-706/20, Amoena II, EU:C:2021:698��6.33 C-707/20, Gallaher, EU:C:2023:101��3.12 C-709/20, The Department for Communities in Northern Ireland, EU:C:2021:602��3.12, 3.20, 3.28, 3.31, 6.24, 23.26 C-710/20, AM, EU:C:2022:551��6.24 C-712/20, Ryanair, EU:C:2021:580��3.26

lxxxvi Table of Cases C-718/20 P, Zhejiang Jiuli Hi-Tech Metals v Commission, EU:C:2022:362��7.176, 7.188, 19.03, 19.04 C-719/20, Comune di Lerici, EU:C:2022:372��3.21 C-722/20 P, Ultrasun v EUIPO, EU:C:2021:255��19.20 C-725/20 P, Coppo Gavazzi and Others v Parliament, pending��7.10 C-3/21, Chief Appeals Officer and Others, EU:C:2022:737��4.64 C-7/21, LKW WALTER, EU:C:2022:527��4.12 C-14/21 and C-15/21, Sea Watch, EU:C:2022:604��4.76, 6.18, 10.05, 23.26, 24.03 C-19/21, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid, EU:C:2022:605�� 3.32, 24.03 C-24/21, PH, EU:C:2022:526 ��3.20, 6.10 C-26/21 P, Dermavita v EUIPO, EU:C:2021:355 ��19.20 C-31/21, Eurocostruzioni, EU:C:2023:136��3.31 C-36/21, Sense Visuele Communicatie en Handel, EU:C:2022:556��3.28, 6.31 C-42/21 P, Lietuvos geležinkeliai v Commission, EU:C:2023:12 �� 18.02, 18.06, 18.08 C-44/21, Phoenix Contact, EU:C:2022:309��23.26 C-45/21, Banka Slovenije, EU:C:2022:670�� 6.04, 23.26 C-46/21 P, ACER v Aquind, EU:C:2023:182��13.36 C-54/21, ANTEA POLSKA and Others, EU:C:2022:888 ��4.22 C-55/21, Imperial Tobacco Bulgaria, EU:C:2022:459 ��3.30 C-56/21, ARVI ir ko, EU:C:2022:509��4.06 C-57/21, RegioJet, EU:C:2023:6��4.44 C-58/21, Rechtsanwaltskammer Wien, EU:C:2022:691 ��3.20 C-60/21, Commission v Belgium, EU:C:2022:172��5.75 C-61/21, Ministre de la Transition écologique and Premier ministre, EU:C:2022:1015�� 4.18, 4.66, 11.16, 11.42 C-64/21, Rigall Arteria Management, EU:C:2022:783��6.29 C-65/21 P and C-73/21 P to C-75/21 P, SGL Carbon and Others v Commission, EU:C:2022:470��11.45 C-69/21, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid, EU:C:2022:913��3.24, 6.07 C-72/21, PRODEX, EU:C:2022:312��6.31 C-78/21, PrivatBank and Others, EU:C:2023:137 ��3.20, 6.31 C-80/21 to C-82/21, D.B.P. and Others, EU:C:2022:646��4.29 C-83/21, Airbnb Ireland and Airbnb Payments UK, EU:C:2022:1018 �� 3.16, 3.19, 3.41, 3.46 C-85/21, Steiermärkische Landesregierung, EU:C:2022:192��3.32 C-96/21, CTS Eventim, EU:C:2022:238��6.31 C-98/21, Finanzamt R, EU:C:2022:645��24.74 C-99/21 P, Danske Slagtermestre v Commission, EU:C:2022:510��7.118, 7.130, 7.131, 19.33 C-104/21, RegioJet, EU:C:2022:851��3.07 C-105/21, Spetsializirana prokuratura, EU:C:2022:511��3.33 C-110/21 P, Universität Bremen v REA, EU:C:2022:555��22.56 C-114/21 P, Cinkciarz.pl v EUIPO, EU:C:2021:508��19.20 C-116/21 to C-118/21 P, C-138/21 P and C-139/21 P, Commission v VW and Others, EU:C:2022:557�� 22.13, 22.31 C-120/21, LB, EU:C:2022:718��4.64 C-121/21, Czech Republic v Poland, EU:C:2022:82��5.34 C-121/21 R, Czech Republic v Poland, EU:C:2021:752�� 5.76, 13.08, 13.15, 13.21, 13.22, 13.32, 13.37, 13.38, 13.39, 13.40, 13.42 C-123/21 P, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Commission, pending�� 7.188, 7.214, 7.215 C-126/21, Commission v Ireland, EU:C:2022:214��5.62, 5.66 C-130/21, Wagenknecht v Commission, EU:C:2022:226�� 8.21, 19.13 C-131/21, KI, EU:C:2021:695��3.34 C-132/21, Budapesti Elektromos Művek, EU:C:2023:2�� 4.02, 4.03, 4.11 C-137/21, Parliament v Commission, pending��8.06 C-144/21, Parliament v Commission, EU:C:2023:302�� 23.07, 23.08

Table of Cases lxxxvii C-154/21, Österreichische Post, EU:C:2023:3��2.19, 6.30 C-156/21, Hungary v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2022:97��1.03, 4.10, 7.166, 7.217, 23.44, 23.52, 24.49 C-157/21, Poland v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2022:98��1.03, 4.10, 7.166, 23.44, 24.49 C-158/21, Puig Gordi and Others, EU:C:2023:57��2.16, 3.28, 3.31, 6.22, 23.26, 24.74, 24.75 C-159/21, Országos Idegenrendeszeti Főigazgatóság and Others, EU:C:2022:708��4.33 C-160/21 and C-217/21, Nikopolis AD Istrum 2010 and Agro –EKO 2013, EU:C:2022:315 ��7.12 C-161/21, Comune di Camerota, EU:C:2021:833 ��3.07 C-164/21 and C-318/21, Baltijas Starptautiskā Akadēmija and Stockholm School of Economics in Riga, EU:C:2022:785��6.29 C-166/21, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2022:922��5.67 C-170/21, Profi Credit Bulgaria, EU:C:2022:518�� 3.28, 3.29, 4.41 C-175/21, Harman International Industries, EU:C:2022:895��4.11, 4.35 C-186/21 PPU, Republika Slovenija, EU:C:2021:447��23.33 C-188/21, Megatherm-Csillaghegy, EU:C:2022:444 ��6.21 C-192/21, Comunidad de Castilla y León, EU:C:2022:513��6.22 C-195/21, Smetna palata na Republika Bulgaria, EU:C:2022:239 ��6.29 C-198/21 P, Santini and Others v Parliament, pending��7.216 C-201/21 P, Foundation for the Protection of the Traditional Cheese of Cyprus named Halloumi v EUIPO, EU:C:2021:419�� 2.19, 19.20 C-201/21 P-OST, Foundation for the Protection of the Traditional Cheese of Cyprus named Halloumi v EUIPO, EU:C:2021:965��25.61 C-203/21, DELTA STROY 2003, EU:C:2022:865��3.20 C-204/21 R, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2021:593 �� 5.76, 13.08, 13.21, 13.22, 13.29, 13.31, 13.37, 13.38 C-204/21 R, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2021:834 �� 13.21, 13.39 C-204/21 R, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2021:878 �� 13.21, 13.39, 13.40 C-204/21 R-RAP, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2023:334��13.40 C-205/21, Ministerstvo na vatreshnite raboti, EU:C:2023:49�� 3.20, 3.21, 4.11 C-208/21, Towarzystwo Ubezpieczeń Ż, EU:C:2023:64 ��3.13, 3.29 C-213/21 and C-214/21, Italy Emergenza, EU:C:2022:532��6.31 C-215/21, Servicios prescriptor y medios de pagos EFC SAU, EU:C:2022:723��4.15, 4.30 C-220/21 P(I), ratiopharm and Others v Orion and Commission, EU:C:2021:521��23.08 C-221/21 and C-222/21, Správa železnic, EU:C:2022:342��3.21, 3.23 C-225/21 P, Segura del Oro Pulido v Commission, EU:C:2021:787��8.06 C-229/21, Port de Bruxelles and Région de Bruxelles-Capitale, EU:C:2022:471��23.26 C-232/21, Volkswagen Bank and Audi Bank, pending ��13.33 C-237/21, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft München, EU:C:2022:1017��6.13 C-239/21 P, Fryč v Commission, EU:C:2022:144�� 22.19, 22.31 C-244/21, Ministerul Public, EU:C:2021:539��3.34 C-257/21 and C-258/21, Coca-Cola European Partners Deutschland, EU:C:2022:529��3.28, 3.32 C-259/21, Parliament v Council, EU:C:2022:917��7.08 C-260/21, Corporate Commercial Bank, EU:C:2022:881��2.03 C-261/21, F. Hoffmann-La Roche and Others, EU:C:2022:534 �� 4.03, 4.10, 4.11, 4.21 C-262/21 PPU, A, EU:C:2021:640 �� 3.26, 23.33 C-264/21, Keskinäinen Vakuutusyhtiö Fennia, EU:C:2022:536��3.19 C-266/21, HV, EU:C:2022:754 ��3.13 C-267/21, Uniqa Asigurări, EU:C:2022:614��3.20 C-274/21 and C-275/21, EPIC Financial Consulting, EU:C:2022:565�� 3.20, 3.33, 4.03, 4.06, 4.07, 4.11, 4.12, 4.30 C-279/21, Udlændingenævnet, EU:C:2022:1019��2.18 C-282/21 P(R), Symrise v ECHA, EU:C:2021:631��13.20, 13.29, 13.36, 13.37 C-284/21 P, Commission v Braesch and Others, EU:C:2023:58��7.56, 7.91, 7.99, 7.118, 7.119, 7.124, 7.125

lxxxviii Table of Cases C-286/21, Commission v France, EU:C:2022:319 ��5.58, 5.71 C-289/21, Varhoven administrativen sad, EU:C:2022:920��4.17, 4.27 C-294/21, Navitours, EU:C:2022:608��15.25 C-299/21 P, EM v Parliament, EU:C:2022:429 ��16.17 C-302/21, Banco Cetelem, EU:C:2022:919��3.13, 3.26 C-305/21 P, Barata v Parliament, EU:C:2022:253��19.20 C-312/21, Tráficos Manuel Ferrer, EU:C:2023:99��3.20, 4.30 C-313/21 P and C-314/21 P, Council v FI, EU:C:2022:1045��16.05 C-316/21, Monument Vandekerckhove, EU:C:2021:837 ��6.29 C-322/21 P, Macías Chávez and Others v Parliament and Spain, EU:C:2022:80 ��22.31 C-335/21, Vicente, EU:C:2022:720��4.06, 4.41 C-341/21 P and C-35721 P, Commission v KM and Council v Commission, EU:C:2022:1042��16.05 C-342/21, Commission v Slovakia, EU:C:2023:87��5.49, 5.59 C-349/21, HYA and Others, EU:C:2023:102��4.22 C-350/21, Spetsializirana prokuratura, EU:C:2022:896��4.17 C-352/21, A1 and A2, EU:C:2023:344��21.02 C-355/21, Perfumesco.pl, EU:C:2022:791��2.03 C-366/21 P, Picard v Commission, EU:C:2022:984�� 16.04, 16.06 C-371/21 P, SGI Studio Galli Ingegneria v Commission, EU:C:2022:566��15.13 C-376/21, Obshtina Razlog, EU:C:2022:472��3.20 C-381/21 P, Lee v EUIPO, EU:C:2021:970��19.20 C-382/21 P, EUIPO v The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann, EU:C:2021:1050��19.20 C-382/21 P, EUIPO v The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann, pending�� 17.03, 17.06 C-385/21, Zenith Media Communications, EU:C:2022:866��4.05 C-389/21 P, ECB v Crédit lyonnais, pending��7.221 C-394/21, Bursa Română de Mărfuri, EU:C:2023:146�� 3.20, 3.34, 6.25 C-397/21, HUMDA, EU:C:2022:790��4.62 C-403/21, NV Construct, EU:C:2023:47��3.05, 3.06 C-409/21, DELID, EU:C:2022:946��3.33 C-413/21 P, Council v El-Qaddafi, EU:C:2023:306 ��22.67 C-428/21 PPU and C-429/21 PPU, Openbaar Ministerie, EU:C:2021:876��23.33 C-430/21, RS, EU:C:2022:99��2.03, 3.16, 3.18, 3.56, 6.38, 23.26 C-432/21, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2023:139��5.56, 5.66 C-438/21 P to C-440/21 P, Commission and Others v Pharmaceutical Works Polpharma and EMA, EU:C:2023:213��7.110, 9.01, 9.03, 9.05, 9.08, 9.09, 9.20 C-441/21 P, Ryanair v Commission, pending��9.09 C-444/21, Commission v Ireland, pending��5.11 C-447/21, Kerstens v Commission, EU:C:2022:612��16.25 C-450/21, Ministero dell’istruzione, EU:C:2022:411��3.29 C-451/21 P, Luxembourg v Commission, pending��7.180 C-457/21 P, Commission v Amazon.com and Others, pending��7.210 C-459/21, The Navigator Company and Navigator Pulp Figueira, EU:C:2022:979��4.02, 4.56 C-460/21, Vapo Atlantic, EU:C:2022:83 ��4.59, 4.60 C-466/21 P, Land Rheinland-Pfalz v Deutsche Lufthansa, pending�� 7.50, 7.119, 7.124 C-466/21 P-R, Land Rheinland-Pfalz v Deutsche Lufthansa, EU:C:2021:972 �� 13.29, 13.32, 13.33 C-468/21 P, Electrodomésticos Taurus v EUIPO, EU:C:2021:839��19.20 C-471/21 P(R), Inivos and Inivos v Commission, EU:C:2021:984�� 13.22, 13.29, 13.32 C-475/21 P, Franz Schröder v EUIPO, EU:C:2021:1000��19.20 C-478/21 P, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and Others v Commission, pending��7.99, 7.106, 7.133, 7.141, 7.214 C-479/21 PPU, Governor of Cloverhill Prison and Others, EU:C:2021:929�� 23.32, 23.33 C-480/21, Minister for Justice and Equality, EU:C:2022:592 �� 3.49, 23.26, 24.67

Table of Cases lxxxix C-492/21 P, Casa Regina Apostolorum della Pia Società delle Figlie di San Paolo v Commission, EU:C:2023:354��7.118, 7.121, 7.161, 7.216 C-493/21, K. M., EU:C:2022:191 ��24.67 C-494/21, Eircom, EU:C:2022:867��3.20 C-499/21 P, Silver and Others v Council, pending��7.101, 7.102, 7.104, 7.108 C-500/21 P, HIM v Commission, EU:C:2022:741 �� 15.13, 22.19 C-508/21 P, Commission v Dansk Erhverv, pending��7.129 C-511/21 P, Commission v Calhau Correia de Paiva, EU:C:2023:208�� 9.03, 9.09, 9.17, 16.05 C-513/21 P, DI v ECB, pending��16.29 C-524/21 and C-525/21, Agenţia Judeţeană de Ocupare a Forţei de Muncă Ilfov, EU:C:2023:100��4.03 C-527/21 P, XC v Commission, pending��16.29 C-537/21, PL v Commission, EU:C:2023:363��16.04 C-538/21 P, Cyprus v EUIPO, EU:C:2021:1053 ��19.20 C-547/21 P(R), Portugal v Commission, EU:C:2021:1007�� 13.22, 13.36 C-551/21, Commission v Council, pending��23.07 C-562/21 PPU and C-563/21 PPU, Openbaar Ministerie, EU:C:2022:100�� 2.03, 2.11, 23.32, 23.33 C-564/21, Bundesrepublik Deutschland, EU:C:2022:951��4.22 C-587/21 P, DD v FRA, pending�� 16.06, 16.14, 16.29 C-591/21 P, Ryanair and Laudamotion v Commission, pending��7.188 C-597/21, Centro Petroli Roma, EU:C:2022:1010�� 3.41, 3.50, 3.51 C-599/21 P, AM.VI. and Quinam v EUIPO, EU:C:2022:32��19.20 C-600/21, Caisse régionale de Crédit mutuel de Loire-Atlantique and du Centre Ouest, EU:C:2022:970��3.13 C-609/21, IP and Others, EU:C:2022:232��3.16, 3.22 C-610/21 P, Svenska Metallkompaniet v EUIPO, EU:C:2022:107 ��19.20 C-611/21 P, Bese v EUIPO, EU:C:2022:108��19.20 C-613/21 P, Parliament v Carbajo Ferrero, EU:C:2023:51��16.29 C-629/21 P(R), Puigdemont i Casamajó and Others v Parliament and Spain, EU:C:2022:413�� 13.36, 13.38 C-633/21, Commission v Greece, EU:C:2023:112��5.01, 5.59 C-635/21, LB, EU:C:2023:85��6.31 C-638/21, Rozhlas a televízia Slovenska, EU:C:2022:339 ��3.21 C-649/21 P(I), Fastweb v Iliad Italia, EU:C:2022:171�� 23.08, 23.11 C-665/21 P, MKB Multifunds v Commission, pending�� 7.57, 7.119 C-666/21, Åklagarmyndigheten, EU:C:2023:149��3.20 C-675/21, Strong Charon, EU:C:2023:108 ��3.02 C-678/21 P, Sony Interactive Entertainment Europe v EUIPO, EU:C:2022:141��19.20 C-688/21, Confédération paysanne and Others, EU:C:2023:75��23.26 C-691/21, Cafpi and Aviva assurances, EU:C:2022:926��6.29 C-701/21 P, Mytilinaios v DEI and Commission, pending��7.57, 7.119, 7.125, 7.141 C-703/21 P(R), Girardi v EUIPO, EU:C:2022:250�� 13.17, 13.36, 13.37 C-706/21, Petróleos de Portugal –Petrogal, EU:C:2022:418��3.21, 3.22 C-722/21, Frontera Capital, EU:C:2022:412��3.05 C-724/21, Staatsanwaltschaft Köln, EU:C:2022:393��6.23 C-728/21, IFAP, EU:C:2022:519�� 3.29, 24.67 C-730/21 P, Collibra v EUIPO, EU:C:2022:208��19.20 C-731/21, Caisse nationale d’assurance pension, EU:C:2022:969 ��3.20 C-739/21 P, Commission v DEI, pending��7.57, 7.119, 7.125, 7.141 C-742/21 P, CAPA and Others v Commission, pending�� 7.119, 7.125, 7.141 C-743/21 P, Marina Yachting Brand Management v EUIPO, EU:C:2022:257��19.20 C-744/21 P, Henry Cotton’s Brand Management v EUIPO, EU:C:2022:256��19.20 C-745/21, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid, EU:C:2023:113��3.20 C-746/21 P, Altice Group Lux v Commission, pending�� 9.09, 18.02, 18.06

xc Table of Cases C-750/21 P, Pilatus Bank v ECB, pending��7.66 C-755/21 P, Kočner v Europol, pending�� 11.24, 11.60 C-757/21 P, Nichicon Corporation v Commission, pending �� 7.32, 18.06 C-758/21 P, Ryanair and Airport Marketing Services, pending�� 7.210, 7.213 C-759/21 P, Nippon Chemi-Con Corporation v Commission, pending��7.32, 7.167, 7.199, 7.201, 18.02 C-762/21 P, St. Hippolyt Holding v EUIPO, EU:C:2022:255��19.20 C-766/21 P, Parliament v Axa Assurances Luxembourg and Others, pending�� 15.18, 22.41 C-767/21 P, Rivière and Others v Parliament, pending��7.15, 7.21 C-778/21 P, Commission v Front Polisario, pending�� 7.84, 7.108, 7.188 C-779/21 P, Commission v Front Polisario, pending�� 7.84, 7.108, 7.188 C-782/21 P, Aeris Invest v ECB, EU:C:2023:345�� 7.68, 7.141 C-783/21, M.M., EU:C:2022:438 ��3.13, 3.14 C-784/21 P, Kappes v Sedus Stoll and EUIPO, EU:C:2022:292��22.31 C-794/21 P, Germany v Infineon Technologies Dresden and Others, pending ��7.150 C-798/21 P, Council v Front Polisario, pending�� 7.84, 7.108, 7.188 C-799/21 P, Council v Front Polisario, pending�� 7.84, 7.108, 7.188 C-800/21 P, Infineon Technologies and Infineon Technologies Dresden v Commission, pending��7.150 C-801/21 P, EUIPO v Indo European Foods, EU:C:2022:295��19.20 C-803/21 P, Versobank v ECB and Ukrselhosprom PCF, pending��7.141, 7.144, 7.191, 9.16 C-804/21 PPU, C and CD, EU:C:2022:307 �� 23.30, 23.33 C-815/21 P, Amazon.com and Others v Commission, EU:C:2023:308��7.30 C-816/21 P, Novais v Portugal, EU:C:2022:189��19.20 C-1/22 P, Castillejo Oriol v Commission, EU:C:2022:343��7.15 C-19/22, Sanford v EUIPO, EU:C:2022:262��19.20 C-29/22 P and C-49/22 P, KS and KD v Council and Others, pending �� 11.03, 11.24 C-31/22 P(I), Atlas Copco Airpower and Atlas Copco v Magnetrol International and Commission, EU:C:2022:620 ��19.12, 19.15, 23.13, 23.19 C-32/22 P(I), Anheuser-Busch Inbev and Ampar v Magnetrol International and Commission, EU:C:2022:621 ��19.12, 19.15, 23.13, 23.19 C-46/22 P, Jenkinson v Council and Others, pending��11.03, 11.08, 15.03, 15.17, 15.18 C-48/22 P, Google and Alphabet v Commission, pending �� 7.199, 7.200, 7.202, 18.02, 18.06, 23.03 C-53/22, VZ, EU:C:2023:88��3.29 C-54/22 P, Romania v Commission, pending��7.14, 7.17 C-72/22 PPU, Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnyba, EU:C:2022:505 �� 3.20, 3.33, 23.33 C-73/22 P, Grupa Azoty and Others v Commission, pending �� 7.93, 7.94, 7.109, 7.118 C-74/22 P(I), Soudal and Esko-Graphics v Magnetrol and Commission, EU:C:2022:632�� 19.12, 19.15, 19.28, 22.74, 23.13, 23.19 C-77/22 P, Advansa Manufacturing and Others v Commission and Dralon, pending��7.118 C-102/22 P, HC v Commission, EU:C:2023:351�� 16.25, 16.29 C-111/22 P, Hamers v Cedefop, pending��16.14 C-122/22 P, Dyson and Others v Commission, pending�� 11.40, 11.49 C-124/22 P, Apostolopoulou and Apostolopoulou-Chrysanthaki v European Union, pending��11.22, 11.36, 11.38, 11.45, 11.73 C-135/22 P, Breyer v REA, pending��7.74 C-136/22 P, D & A Pharma v EMA, pending��7.144 C-144/22, Società Eredi Raimondo Bufarini, EU:C:2022:1013 �� 3.41, 3.50, 3.51 C-150/22 P, HG v Commission, EU:C:2022:523��20.09 C-152/22 P, Legero Schuhfabrik v EUIPO, EU:C:2022:500��24.65 C-160/22 P and C-161/22 P, Commission v HB, pending��11.08 C-163/22 P, Gmina Miasto Gdynia and Port Lotniczy Gdynia-Kosakowo v Commission, pending��23.03 C-173/22 P, MG v EIB, pending ��16.04

Table of Cases xci C-181/22 P, Nemea Bank v ECB and Others, pending�� 11.23, 11.36 C-187/22 P, Laboratorios Ern v EUIPO, EU:C:2022:547��24.47 C-212/22 P(I), SES Astra v Spain and Commission, EU:C:2022:460��23.08 C-221/22 P, Commission v Deutsche Telekom, pending��7.221, 7.222, 11.45, 11.49, 11.56 C-237/22 P, Mylan IRE Healthcare v Commission, pending ��23.02 C-240/22 P, Commission v Intel Corporation, pending ��18.06 C-242/22 PPU, TL, EU:C:2022:611 �� 2.18, 3.20, 4.06, 4.07, 6.22, 6.31 C-251/22 P, Scania and Others v Commission, pending��7.32, 7.199, 7.200, 7.201, 18.06 C-255/22 P, Polski Koncern Naftowy Orlen v Commission, pending��23.03 C-256/22 P, Pilatus Bank v ECB, pending��7.66 C-297/22 P, United Parcel Service v Commission, pending ��7.222, 11.36, 11.38, 11.40, 11.42, 11.45, 11.47, 11.48, 11.49, 11.58, 11.59, 11.60 C-337/22 P, EUIPO v Nowhere, EU:C:2022:908��19.20 C-337/22 P, EUIPO v Nowhere, pending��17.21 C-351/22, Neves 77 Solutions, pending��6.05 C-376/22, Google Ireland and Others, pending��18.02 C-378/22 P, British Airways v Commission, pending �� 7.162, 7.180 C-379/22 P, Singapore Airlines and Singapore Airlines Cargo v Commission, pending��18.02 C-401/22 P, Cargolux Airlines v Commission, pending �� 18.02, 18.05 C-403/22 P, SAS Cargo Group and Others v Commission, pending�� 7.188, 7.221, 18.02, 18.03, 18.05 C-423/22 P, EESC v Correia, pending �� 16.17, 16.18, 16.29 C-435/22 PPU, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft München, EU:C:2022:852 �� 6.09, 6.22, 23.32, 23.33 C-448/22 P and C-551/22 P, SFL and Commission v SRB��7.65 C-457/22, Commission v Slovenia, pending��23.03 C-467/22 P, Airoldi Metalli v Commission, pending��7.110 C-483/22, KI, EU:C:2023:124��3.21 C-484/22, Bundesrepublik Deutschland, EU:C:2023:122��3.49 C-492/22 PPU, CJ, EU:C:2022:964��2.19 C-494/22 P, Commission v Czech Republic, pending�� 11.11, 11.21 C-506/22, SNI, EU:C:2023:46��3.21 C-515/22, Tirrenia di navigazione v Commission, pending��7.176 C-539/22 P, Del Valle Ruíz and Others v Commission and SRB, pending��22.17 C-580/22 P, bonnanwalt v EUIPO, EU:C:2023:126 ��19.20 C-595/22 P, Colombani v EEAS, pending��16.13 C-611/22 P, Illumina v Commission, pending��23.09 C-625/22 P, Grail v Commission and Illumina, pending��23.09 C-638/22 PPU, Rzecznik Praw Dziecka and Others, EU:C:2023:103�� 3.15, 3.28, 4.11 C-742/22 SA, Ramon v Commission, pending��14.04 C-786/22 P, MV v Commission, pending ��16.29 C-5/23 P, EUIPO v KD, pending��16.15 C-32/23 P, QI v Commission, pending ��16.29 C-64/23 P, Neoperl v EUIPO, pending��17.12 C-93/23 P, EUIPO v Neoperl, pending��17.12 C-96/23 P, TL v Commission, pending �� 16.03, 16.15, 16.27 C-98/23 P, OM v Commission, pending ��16.28 C-106/23 P, Vanhoudt v EIB, pending�� 16.07, 16.26

GENERAL COURT T-1/89, Rhône-Poulenc v Commission, EU:T:1991:56�� 2.25, 7.189 T-2/89, Petrofina v Commission, EU:T:1991:57��2.25 T-3/89, Atochem v Commission, EU:T:1991:58��2.25

xcii Table of Cases T-4/89, BASF v Commission, EU:T:1991:73�� 2.25, 7.189 T-4/89 REV, BASF v Commission, EU:T:1992:46��25.44 T-6/89, Enichem Anic v Commission, EU:T:1991:74 ��2.25 T-7/89, Hercules Chemicals v Commission, EU:T:1991:75 ��2.25, 7.32 T-8/89, DSM v Commission, EU:T:1991:76��2.25 T-9/89, Hüls v Commission, EU:T:1992:31�� 2.25, 7.189, 24.76 T-10/89, Hoechst v Commission, EU:T:1992:32 �� 2.25, 24.76 T-11/89, Shell v Commission, EU:T:1992:33 �� 2.25, 24.76 T-12/89, Solvay v Commission, EU:T:1992:34�� 2.25, 24.76 T-13/89, ICI v Commission, EU:T:1992:35�� 2.25, 18.06, 24.76 T-14/89, Montedipe v Commission, EU:T:1992:36�� 2.25, 24.76 T-15/89, Chemie Linz v Commission, EU:T:1992:37 �� 2.25, 24.76 T-33/89 and T-74/89, Blackman v Parliament, EU:T:1993:21��25.18 T-35/89 TO1, Ascasibar Zubizarreta and Others v Albani and Others , EU:T:1992:47��25.34 T-37/89, Hanning v Parliament, EU:T:1990:49��16.29 T-42/89 OPPO, Yorck von Wartenburg v Parliament, EU:T:1990:40��25.13 T-51/89, Tetra Pak v Commission, EU:T:1990:41��2.25, 2.30 T-57/89, Alexandrakis v Commission, EU:T:1990:25�� 16.13, 16.22, 16.26 T-59/89, Yorck von Wartenburg v Parliament, EU:T:1990:8��24.56 T-64/89, Automec v Commission, EU:T:1990:42�� 7.39, 8.22, 22.20 T-65/89, BPB Industries and British Gypsum v Commission, EU:T:1993:31��18.09 T-73/89, Barbi v Commission, EU:T:1990:65��16.29 T-79/89, T-84/89, T-85/89, T-86/89, T-89/89, T-91/89, T-92/89, T-94/89, T-96/89, T-98/89, T-102/89 and T-104/89, BASF and Others v Commission, EU:T:1992:26 ��24.44 T-113/89, Nefarma and Others v Commission, EU:T:1990:82��7.16, 7.75 T-119/89, Teissonnière v Commission, EU:T:1989:7��16.07 T-120/89, Stahlwerke Peine-Salzgitter v Commission, EU:T:1991:32��2.25 T-134/89, Hettrich and Others v Commission, EU:T:1990:61��16.26 T-135/89, Pfloeschner v Commission, EU:T:1990:26 ��16.05 T-138/89, NBV and NVB v Commission, EU:T:1992:95�� 7.18, 7.142 T-139/89, Virgili-Schettini v Parliament, EU:T:1990:54��16.26 T-163/89, Sebastiani v Parliament, EU:T:1991:49 ��16.07 T-2/90, Ferreira de Freitas v Commission, EU:T:1991:11��16.26 T-24/90, Automec v Commission, EU:T:1992:97��2.25, 2.30 T-26/90, Finsider v Commission, EU:T:1992:68 �� 7.217, 7.221 T-27/90, Latham v Commission, EU:T:1991:5��16.14 T-28/90, Asia Motor France and Others v Commission, EU:T:1992:98 �� 2.25, 2.30, 8.22, 22.19 T-47/90, Herremans v Commission, EU:T:1991:34��16.05 T-52/90, Volger v Parliament, EU:T:1992:12��16.25 T-16/91, Rendo and Others v Commission, EU:T:1992:109�� 7.39, 7.180 T-19/91 R, Vichy v Commission, EU:T:1991:29��13.02 T-22/91 INT, Raiola-Denti and Others v Council, EU:T:1993:64��25.53 T-30/91, Solvay v Commission, EU:T:1995:115��7.32 T-32/91, Solvay v Commission, EU:T:1995:117��22.16 T-35/91, Eurosport v Commission, EU:T:1993:49��23.11 T-64/91, Marcato v Commission, EU:T:1992:22 ��16.14 T-78/91, Moat and TAO/AFI v Commission, EU:T:1991:67��16.10 T-84/91, Meskens v Parliament, EU:T:1993:57�� 16.10, 25.20 T-4/92, Vardakas v Commission, EU:T:1993:29��16.26 T-7/92, Asia Motor France and Others v Commission, EU:T:1993:52 ��8.22 T-10/92, T-11/92, T-12/92 and T-15/92, Cimenteries CBR and Others v Commission, EU:T:1992:123 ��7.32 T-13/92, Moat v Commission, EU:T:1993:22��25.21 T-19/92, Leclerc v Commission, EU:T:1996:190 ��7.113

Table of Cases xciii T-37/92, BEUC and NCC v Commission, EU:T:1994:54 ��7.39 T-46/92, Scottish Football v Commission, EU:T:1994:267��7.141 T-47/92, Lenz v Commission, EU:T:1993:58 ��23.52 T-55/92, Knijff v Court of Auditors, EU:T:1993:65 ��16.16 T-56/92, Koelman v Commission, EU:T:1993:105�� 8.22, 24.13 T-60/92, Noonan v Commission, EU:T:1996:44��16.04 T-65/92, Arauxo-Dumay v Commission, EU:T:1993:47��16.08 T-74/92, Ladbroke Racing v Commission, EU:T:1995:10�� 8.22, 23.11 T-88/92, Leclerc v Commission, EU:T:1996:192 ��7.113 T-96/92, CCE de la Société générale des grandes sources and Others v Commission, EU:T:1995:77 ��7.115 T-2/93, Air France v Commission, EU:T:1994:55 �� 7.114, 7.209 T-3/93, Air France v Commission, EU:T:1994:36 ��7.13 T-12/93, CCE Vittel v Commission, EU:T:1995:78 �� 7.106, 7.115 T-13/93, Cordier v Commission, EU:T:1993:101��5.04 T-17/93, Matra Hachette v Commission, EU:T:1994:89�� 7.39, 7.181 T-24/93, Compagnie maritime belge transports and Others v Commission, EU:T:1996:139 ��23.47 T-44/93, Saby v Commission, EU:T:1995:135��16.26 T-244/93 and T-486/93, TWD v Commission, EU:T:1995:160 ��9.08 T-246/93, Bühring v Council and Commission, EU:T:1998:21 ��11.22 T-432/93 to T-434/93, Socurte and Others v Commission, EU:T:1995:43��7.158 T-435/93, ASPEC and Others v Commission, EU:T:1995:79�� 7.118, 7.125, 7.145 T-443/93, Casillo Grani v Commission, EU:T:1995:81��7.145 T-447/93 to T-449/93, AITEC and Others v Commission, EU:T:1995:130�� 7.129, 23.03 T-450/93, Lisrestal and Others v Commission, EU:T:1994:290��7.171 T-452/93 and T-453/93, Pevasa and Inpesca v Commission, EU:T:1994:45��7.158 T-459/93, Siemens v Commission, EU:T:1995:100 �� 4.63, 23.03 T-462/93, T-464/93 and T-470/93, Lenz v Commission, EU:T:1995:105 ��16.28 T-478/93, Wafer Zoo v Commission, EU:T:1995:92 ��11.37 T-480/93 and T-483/93, Antillean Rice Mills and Others v Commission, EU:T:1995:162��7.144 T-481/93 and T-484/93, Exporteurs in Levende Varkens and Others v Commission, EU:T:1995:209 �� 7.144, 11.45 T-482/93, Weber v Commission, EU:T:1996:97��22.07 T-485/93, T-491/93, T-494/93 and T-61/98, Dreyfus and Others v Commission, EU:T:2000:255 ��7.158 T-497/93, Hogan v Court of Justice, EU:T:1995:58 ��22.11 T-514/93, Cobrecaf and Others v Commission, EU:T:1995:49��11.14 T-528/93, T-542/93, T-543/93 and T-546/93, Métropole Télévision and Others v Commission, EU:T:1996:99��7.113 T-575/93, Koelman v Commission, EU:T:1996:1��8.22 T-584/93, Roujansky v Council, EU:T:1994:87��7.70 T-588/93, G v Commission, EU:T:1994:281�� 16.26, 16.29 T-20/94, Hartmann v Council and Commission, EU:T:1998:272 ��22.13 T-85/94 OPPO, Branco v Commission, EU:T:1995:210 ��25.13 T-115/94, Opel Austria v Council, EU:T:1997:3�� 7.150, 7.188 T-154/94, CSF and CSME v Commission, EU:T:1996:152��7.58 T-155/94, Climax Paper Converters v Council, EU:T:1996:118��7.214 T-161/94, Sinochem Heilongjiang v Council, EU:T:1996:101 �� 7.84, 7.133 T-167/94, Nölle v Council and Commission, EU:T:1995:169��11.33, 11.45, 11.70, 25.15 T-170/94, Shanghai Bicycle v Council, EU:T:1997:134�� 7.84, 7.133 T-177/94, Altmann and Others v Commission, EU:T:1996:193��16.11 T-179/94, Bonnamy v Council, EU:T:1994:88 ��7.70 T-186/94, Guérin automobiles v Commission, EU:T:1995:114��8.22

xciv Table of Cases T-235/94, Galtieri v Parliament, EU:T:1996:22��24.77 T-243/94, British Steel v Commission, EU:T:1997:159��23.03 T-261/94, Schulte v Council and Commission, EU:T:2002:27��11.29 T-266/94, Skibsvaerftsforeningen and Others v Commission, EU:T:1996:153 ��7.118 T-277/94, AITEC v Commission, EU:T:1996:66 ��5.37 T-290/94, Kaysersberg v Commission, EU:T:1997:186�� 7.159, 25.20 T-305/94, T-306/94, T-307/94, T-313/94 to T-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T-329/94 and T-335/94, LVM and Others v Commission, EU:T:1999:80 ��7.27, 7.28, 7.32, 7.199, 7.221 T-330/94, Salt Union v Commission, EU:T:1996:154 �� 7.53, 7.59, 23.17 T-331/94, IPK-München v Commission, EU:T:2001:70�� 7.19, 7.163, 7.180 T-358/94, Air France v Commission, EU:T:1996:194 ��7.124 T-361/94, Weir v Commission, EU:T:1996:37 ��16.26 T-371/94 and T-394/94, British Airways and Others v Commission, EU:T:1998:140 �� 7.55, 7.197, 7.211 T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 and T-388/94, European Night Services and Others v Commission, EU:T:1998:198��7.156 T-380/94, AIUFASS and AKT v Commission, EU:T:1996:195�� 7.106, 7.130 T-390/94, Schröder and Thamann v Commission, EU:T:1997:51��11.40 T-391/94, Baiwir v Commission, EU:T:1996:77��16.14 T-395/94 R, Atlantic Container Line and Others v Commission, EU:T:1995:48��13.02 T-398/94, Kahn Scheepvaart v Commission, EU:T:1996:73��7.122 T-11/95, BP Chemicals v Commission, EU:T:1998:199 ��7.50, 7.125, 7.158, 22.44 T-19/95, Adia interim v Commission, EU:T:1996:59��22.16 T-25/95, T-26/95, T-30/95 to T-32/95, T-34/95 to T-39/95, T-42/95 to T-46/95, T-48/95, T-50/95 to T-65/95, T-68/95 to T-71/95, T-87/95, T-88/95, T-103/95 and T-104/95, Cimenteries CBR and Others v Commission, EU:T:2000:77 �� 7.32, 7.172, 7.201 T-28/95, IECC v Commission, EU:T:1998:213��8.22 T-73/95, Oliveira v Commission, EU:T:1997:39��7.221 T-75/95, Günzler Aluminium v Commission, EU:T:1996:74��7.221 T-93/95, Laga v Commission, EU:T:1998:22��11.29 T-94/95, Landuyt v Commission, EU:T:1998:23 ��11.29 T-101/95, Zedelmaier v Council and Commission, EU:T:1995:112 ��22.30 T-113/95, Mancini v Commission, EU:T:1996:53 ��16.14 T-117/95, Corman v Commission, EU:T:1997:9 ��7.143 T-126/95, Dumez v Commission, EU:T:1995:189��5.37 T-134/95, Dysan Magnetics and Review Magnetics v Commission, EU:T:1996:38��7.62 T-149/95, Ducros v Commission, EU:T:1997:165��7.211 T-174/95, Svenska Journalistförbundet v Council, EU:T:1998:127�� 1.07, 7.84, 7.141, 24.39 T-180/95, Nutria v Commission, EU:T:1997:121��15.01 T-188/95, Waterleiding Maatschappij “Noord-West Brabant” v Commission, EU:T:1998:217 ��7.119 T-195/95, Guérin automobiles v Commission, EU:T:1997:66 ��8.23 T-198/95, T-171/96, T-230/97, T-174/98 and T-225/99, Comafrica and Dole Fresh Fruit Europe v Commission, EU:T:2001:184��11.49 T-203/95 R, Connolly v Commission, EU:T:1995:208��13.04 T-208/95, Miwon v Commission, EU:T:1996:98 ��7.62 T-213/95 and T-18/96, SCK and FNK v Commission, EU:T:1997:157��7.18 T-214/95, Vlaamse Gewest v Commission, EU:T:1998:77 �� 7.78, 7.126, 7.143 T-228/95 R, Lehrfreund v Council and Commission, EU:T:1996:16��13.03 T-14/96, BAI v Commission, EU:T:1999:12��7.158 T-16/96, Cityflyer Express v Commission, EU:T:1998:78�� 7.144, 7.197 T-17/96, TF1 v Commission, EU:T:1999:119�� 7.57, 8.06, 8.20, 8.22, 8.24 T-22/96, Langdon v Commission, EU:T:1996:121��7.144

Table of Cases xcv T-25/96, Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Luftfahrt-Unternehmen and Hapag-Lloyd v Commission, EU:T:1997:34��7.144 T-30/96, Gomes de Sá Pereira v Council, EU:T:1996:107��16.28 T-36/96, Gaspari v Parliament, EU:T:1999:143 ��19.33 T-38/96, Guérin automobiles v Commission, EU:T:1997:110 ��8.22 T-44/96, Oleifici Italiani v Commission, EU:T:1997:122��15.11 T-48/96, Acme v Council, EU:T:1999:251��7.215 T-52/96 R, Sogecable v Commission, EU:T:1996:108��13.06 T-53/96, Syndicat des producteurs de viandes bovines and Others v Commission, EU:T:1996:170 ��24.48 T-54/96, Oleifici Italiani and Fratelli Rubino Industrie Olearie v Commission, EU:T:1998:204 ��11.29 T-64/96, de Jorio v Council, EU:T:1997:15��8.20 T-65/96, Kish Glass v Commission, EU:T:2000:93��7.39 T-66/96, Mellett v Court of Justice, EU:T:1998:187��16.04 T-69/96, Hamburger Hafen-und Lagerhaus and Others v Commission, EU:T:2001:100��7.130 T-75/96, Söktaş v Commission, EU:T:1996:183��7.62 T-79/96, T-260/97 and T-117/98, Camar and Tico v Commission and Council, EU:T:2000:147 �� 8.24, 8.26, 11.54 T-87/96, Assicurazioni Generali and Unicredito v Commission, EU:T:1999:37��7.42 T-89/96, British Steel v Commission, EU:T:1999:136 ��23.47 T-95/96, Gestevisión Telecinco v Commission, EU:T:1998:206�� 8.06, 8.13, 8.22 T-102/96, Gencor v Commission, EU:T:1999:65�� 7.141, 7.167 T-105/96, Pharos v Commission, EU:T:1998:35��8.10 T-107/96 R, Pantochim v Commission, EU:T:1996:151��13.06 T-121/96 and T-151/96, Mutual Aid Administration Services v Commission, EU:T:1997:132 ��7.19 T-122/96, Federolio v Commission, EU:T:1997:142 ��7.106 T-132/96 and T-143/96, Freistaat Sachsen and Others v Commission, EU:T:1999:326 �� 7.126, 7.127, 7.143 T-135/96, UEAPME v Council, EU:T:1998:128��7.96 T-149/96, Coldiretti and Others v Council and Commission, EU:T:1998:228��11.19 T-158/96, Acciaierie di Bolzano v Commission, EU:T:1999:335��23.11 T-178/96, Eridania and Others v Council, EU:T:2001:135��22.19 T-186/96, Mutual Aid Administration Services v Commission, EU:T:1997:149��15.11 T-191/96 and T-106/97, CAS Succhi di Frutta v Commission, EU:T:1999:256 �� 7.144, 23.11 T-9/97, Elf Atochem v Commission, EU:T:1997:83��7.28 T-22/97, Kesko v Commission, EU:T:1999:327 �� 7.08, 7.141 T-46/97, SIC v Commission, EU:T:2000:123 ��7.50 T-74/97 and T-75/97, Büchel v Council and Commission, EU:T:2000:215 ��7.135 T-83/97, Sateba v Commission, EU:T:1997:140��5.41 T-85/97, Horeca-Wallonie v Commission, EU:T:1997:180��22.69 T-125/97 and T-127/97, Coca-Cola v Commission, EU:T:2000:84�� 7.18, 7.45, 7.142 T-148/97, Keeling v OHIM, EU:T:1998:114��7.71 T-184/97, BP Chemicals v Commission, EU:T:2000:217 ��7.18 T-189/97, Comité d’entreprise de la Société française de production and Others v Commission, EU:T:1998:38��7.124 T-194/97 and T-83/98, Branco v Commission, EU:T:2000:20 ��8.23 T-213/97 R, Eurocoton and Others v Council, EU:T:1997:147��13.04 T-220/97, H. & R. Ecroyd v Commission, EU:T:1999:106��10.21 T-238/97, Comunidad Autónoma de Cantabria v Council, EU:T:1998:126��7.127 T-256/97, BEUC v Commission, EU:T:2000:21�� 7.143, 7.144 T-267/97, Broome & Wellington v Commission, EU:T:1998:108 ��7.62 T-286/97, Goldstein v Commission, EU:T:1998:150��8.06

xcvi Table of Cases T-288/97, Regione autonoma Friuli-Venezia Giulia v Commission, EU:T:2001:115 ��7.126 T-296/97, Alitalia v Commission, EU:T:2000:289��7.124 T-311/97, Pescados Congelados Jogamar v Commission, EU:T:1999:89 ��8.20 T-596/97, Dalmine v Commission, EU:T:1998:138��7.27 T-597/97, Euromin v Council, EU:T:2000:157��7.133 T-598/97, BSC Footwear Supplies and Others v Council, EU:T:2002:52�� 7.133, 7.135 T-613/97, Ufex and Others v Commission, EU:T:2006:150 ��7.57 T-614/97, Aduanas Pujol Rubio and Others v Council and Commission, EU:T:2000:152��11.22 T-7/98, T-208/98 and T-109/99, De Nicola v EIB, EU:T:2001:69��25.20 T-9/98, Mitteldeutsche Erdöl-Raffinerie v Commission, EU:T:2001:271�� 7.122, 7.123, 7.141 T-10/98, E-Quattro v Commission, EU:T:1999:123��15.06 T-12/98, Argon and Others v Council and Commission, EU:T:2000:161��11.22 T-14/98, Hautala v Council, EU:T:1999:157��1.07 T-32/98 and T-41/98, Nederlandse Antillen v Commission, EU:T:2000:36��7.143 T-37/98, FTA and Others v Council, EU:T:2000:52��22.56 T-42/98 R, Sabbatucci v Parliament, EU:T:1998:189��23.59 T-43/98, Emesa Sugar v Council, EU:T:2001:279�� 6.35, 7.102, 11.45 T-44/98 R, Emesa Sugar v Commission, EU:T:1998:191��13.13 T-65/98 R, Van den Bergh Foods v Commission, EU:T:1998:155��23.47 T-73/98 R, Prayon-Rupel v Commission, EU:T:1998:170��23.47 T-78/98, Unione provinciale degli agricoltori di Firenze and Others v Commission, EU:T:1999:87 ��7.143 T-81/98, Boyes v Commission, EU:T:1999:305 ��23.62 T-94/98, Alferink and Others v Commission, EU:T:2008:226��9.16 T-112/98, Mannesmannröhren-Werke v Commission, EU:T:2001:61��7.27 T-120/98, Alce v Commission, EU:T:1999:88��7.101 T-145/98, ADT Projekt v Commission, EU:T:2000:54 ��22.72 T-166/98, Cantina sociale di Dolianova and Others v Commission, EU:T:2004:337 ��8.23, 11.30, 11.32, 11.45 T-172/98 and T-175/98 to T-177/98, Salamander and Others v Parliament and Council, EU:T:2000:168��7.96 T-178/98, Fresh Marine v Commission, EU:T:2000:240�� 11.48, 11.61 T-186/98, Inpesca v Commission, EU:T:2001:42��7.19 T-191/98 and T-212/98 to T-214/98, Atlantic Container Line and Others v Commission, EU:T:2003:245��24.16 T-191/98 R, DSR-Senator Lines v Commission, EU:T:1999:161 ��13.29 T-2/99, T. Port v Council, EU:T:2001:186��11.46 T-3/99, Banatrading v Council, EU:T:2001:187��11.46 T-7/99, Medici Grimm v Council, EU:T:2000:175��7.135 T-9/99, HFB and Others v Commission, EU:T:2002:70 �� 24.57, 24.58 T-11/99 R, Van Parys and Others v Commission, EU:T:1999:86��13.23 T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health v Council, EU:T:2002:209 ��7.102 T-18/99, Cordis v Commission, EU:T:2001:95�� 11.46, 11.48 T-30/99, Bocchi Food Trade International v Commission, EU:T:2001:96 �� 11.45, 11.46 T-35/99, Keller and Keller Meccanica v Commission, EU:T:2002:19 ��7.212 T-52/99, T. Port v Commission, EU:T:2001:97��11.45 T-54/99, max.mobil v Commission, EU:T:2002:20 ��5.36 T-55/99, CETM v Commission, EU:T:2000:223��7.130 T-59/99, Ventouris v Commission, EU:T:2003:334��7.28 T-62/99, Sodima v Commission, EU:T:2001:53��23.52 T-66/99, Minoan Lines v Commission, EU:T:2003:337��7.28 T-69/99, DSTV v Commission, EU:T:2000:302��7.97 T-78/99, Elder v Commission, EU:T:1999:255��25.19 T-79/99, Euro-Lex v OHIM, EU:T:1999:312��17.22

Table of Cases xcvii T-103/99, Associazione delle Cantine Sociali Venete v Ombudsman and Parliament, EU:T:2000:135 �� 8.16, 23.62 T-107/99 R, García Retortillo v Council, EU:T:1999:129 ��16.14 T-115/99, SEP v Commission, EU:T:2001:54��7.201 T-120/99, Kik v OHIM, EU:T:2001:189��17.18 T-122/99, Procter & Gamble v OHIM, EU:T:2000:39��17.12 T-131/99, Shaw and Falla v Commission, EU:T:2002:83��7.113 T-152/99, HAMSA v Commission, EU:T:2002:188��7.210 T-155/99, Dieckmann & Hansen v Commission, EU:T:2001:256��11.48 T-171/99, Corus UK v Commission, EU:T:2001:249��7.222 T-191/99, Petrie and Others v Commission, EU:T:2001:284 ��5.44 T-192/99, Dunnett and Others v EIB, EU:T:2001:72�� 16.09, 24.57 T-196/99, Area Cova and Others v Commission and Council, EU:T:2001:281�� 11.45, 11.46 T-206/99, Métropole télévision v Commission, EU:T:2001:101��7.180 T-212/99, Intervet International v Commission, EU:T:2002:63��8.13, 8.21 T-219/99, British Airways v Commission, EU:T:2003:343��7.170 T-228/99 and T-233/99, Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale and Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Commission, EU:T:2003:57��7.175 T-269/99, T-271/99 and T-272/99, Diputación Foral de Guipúzcoa and Others v Commission, EU:T:2002:258 �� 7.53, 7.126 T-307/99, Oliecentrum Strijbos v Commission, EU:T:2004:141 ��7.28 T-333/99, X v ECB, EU:T:2001:251 �� 2.54, 16.09 T-337/99, Henkel v OHIM, EU:T:2001:221��17.05 T-342/99, Airtours v Commission, EU:T:2002:146��7.206 T-346/99 to T-348/99, Diputación Foral de Álava and Others v Commission, EU:T:2002:259��7.53 T-359/99, DKV v OHIM, EU:T:2001:151��17.21 T-361/99, Meyer v Commission and EIB, EU:T:2000:107��5.33 T-3/00 and T-337/04, Pitsiorlas v Council and ECB, EU:T:2007:357�� 9.09, 11.60 T-5/00 R, Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied v Commission, EU:T:2000:309��23.12 T-11/00, Hautem v EIB, EU:T:2000:295��7.221 T-26/00, Lecureur v Commission, EU:T:2001:222��15.11 T-30/00, Henkel v OHIM, EU:T:2001:223��17.05 T-41/00, British American Tobacco International (Holdings) v Commission, EU:T:2001:125 ��7.139 T-44/00, Mannesmannröhren-Werke v Commission, EU:T:2004:218��7.162 T-47/00, Rica Foods v Commission, EU:T:2002:7��7.102 T-50/00, Dalmine v Commission, EU:T:2004:220��7.18 T-52/00, Coe Clerici Logistics v Commission, EU:T:2003:168��7.39 T-56/00, Dole Fresh Fruit International v Commission and Council, EU:T:2003:58 ��11.45 T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00, JFE Engineering v Commission, EU:T:2004:221 �� 7.201, 18.03, 18.09 T-69/00, FIAMM and FIAMM Technologies v Council and Commission, EU:T:2005:449��2.30 T-106/00, Streamserve v OHIM, EU:T:2002:43��17.21 T-129/00, Procter & Gamble v OHIM, EU:T:2001:231��17.11 T-148/00, Panhellenic Union of Cotton Ginners and Exporters v Commission, EU:T:2003:271 ��5.35 T-149/00 R, Innova v Commission, EU:T:2000:197��15.09 T-151/00, Laboratoire du Bain v Council and Commission, EU:T:2005:450��2.30 T-153/00, Spain Pharma v Commission, EU:T:2001:3 ��7.143 T-158/00, ARD v Commission, EU:T:2003:246��23.14 T-177/00, Philips v Council, EU:T:2005:106��7.61 T-178/00 and T-341/00, Pflugradt v ECB, EU:T:2002:253��22.19 T-190/00, Regione Siciliana v Commission, EU:T:2003:316��7.53

xcviii Table of Cases T-198/00, Hershey Foods v OHIM, EU:T:2002:140��17.12 T-209/00, Lamberts v Ombudsman, EU:T:2002:94�� 5.37, 11.22 T-210/00, Biret & Cie v Council, EU:T:2002:3 ��11.29 T-212/00, Nuove Industrie Molisane v Commission, EU:T:2002:21��7.142 T-213/00, CMA CGM and Others v Commission, EU:T:2003:76��7.18 T-214/00, X v Commission, EU:T:2001:172��25.18 T-224/00, Archer Daniels Midland and Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients v Commission, EU:T:2003:195��7.195 T-228/00, T-229/00, T-242/00, T-243/00, T-245/00 to T-248/00, T-250/00, T-252/00, T-256/00 to T-259/00, T-265/00, T-267/00, T-268/00, T-271/00, T-274/00 to T-276/00, T-281/00, T-287/00 and T-296/00, Gruppo ormeggiatori del porto di Venezia and Others v Commission, EU:T:2005:90 �� 7.123, 23.64 T-237/00, Reynolds v Parliament, EU:T:2005:437��25.18 T-251/00, Lagardère and Canal+v Commission, EU:T:2002:278 ��7.44 T-301/00, Groupe Fremaux and Palais Royal v Council and Commission, EU:T:2005:451��2.30 T-302/00 R, Goldstein v Commission, EU:T:2001:108��22.62 T-310/00, MCI v Commission, EU:T:2004:275 ��7.141 T-320/00, CD Cartondruck v Council and Commission, EU:T:2005:452��2.30 T-323/00, SAT.1 v OHIM, EU:T:2002:172��17.05 T-334/00, Goldstein v Court of Justice, EU:T:2001:39��25.05 T-339/00, Bactria v Commission, EU:T:2002:107 ��23.08 T-340/00, Comunità montana della Valnerina v Commission, EU:T:2003:71��8.21 T-344/00, CEVA and Pharmacia entreprises v Commission, EU:T:2003:40��8.21 T-365/00, AICS v Parliament, EU:T:2002:151��7.19 T-374/00, Verband der freien Rohrwerke and Others v Commission, EU:T:2003:188��7.209 T-377/00, T-379/00, T-380/00, T-260/01 and T-272/01, Philip Morris International and Others v Commission, EU:T:2003:6 ��5.32 T-383/00, Beamglow v Parliament and Others, EU:T:2005:453��2.30 T-386/00, Gonçalves v Parliament, EU:T:2002:12��16.15 T-387/00, Comitato organizzatore del convegno internazionale v Commission, EU:T:2002:186 ��24.25 T-18/01 R, Goldstein v Commission, EU:T:2001:110 ��13.32 T-19/01, Chiquita Brands and Others v Commission, EU:T:2005:31 ��22.21 T-26/01, Fiocchi Munizioni v Commission, EU:T:2003:248��5.29 T-45/01, Sanders and Others v Commission, EU:T:2007:221�� 16.18, 16.28, 25.23 T-63/01, Procter & Gamble v OHIM, EU:T:2002:317��17.09 T-64/01 and T-65/01, Afrikanische Frucht-Compagnie v Council, EU:T:2004:37 ��11.10 T-84/01, Association contre l’heure d’été v Parliament and Council, EU:T:2002:5 ��7.106 T-85/01, IAMA Consulting v Commission, EU:T:2003:309�� 2.55, 15.09 T-109/01, Fleuren Compost v Commission, EU:T:2004:4 ��7.213 T-110/01, Vedial v OHIM –France Distribution, EU:T:2002:318��17.10 T-111/01 and T-133/01, Saxonia Edelmetalle v Commission, EU:T:2005:166��7.197 T-135/01, Fedon & Figli and Others v Council and Commission, EU:T:2005:454 ��2.30 T-139/01, Comafrica and Dole Fresh Fruit Europe v Commission, EU:T:2005:32 �� 7.102, 23.10 T-141/01, Entorn v Commission, EU:T:2005:10 �� 24.46, 24.49, 24.55 T-142/01 and T-283/01, OPTUC v Commission, EU:T:2004:25�� 7.146, 23.20, 23.64 T-146/01, D.L.D. Trading v Council, EU:T:2003:344�� 11.29, 11.60 T-172/01, M v Court of Justice, EU:T:2004:108 ��24.58 T-177/01, Jégo-Quéré v Commission, EU:T:2002:112�� 7.107, 7.111 T-184/01, IMS Health v Commission, EU:T:2005:95��7.35 T-194/01, Unilever v OHIM, EU:T:2003:53 ��17.15 T-195/01 and T-207/01, Government of Gibraltar v Commission, EU:T:2002:111��7.53 T-198/01, Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau v Commission, EU:T:2004:222�� 7.57, 7.176 T-208/01, Volkswagen v Commission, EU:T:2003:326��24.35

Table of Cases xcix T-210/01, General Electric v Commission, EU:T:2005:456 �� 7.176, 23.08 T-213/01 and T-214/01, Österreichische Postsparkasse v Commission, EU:T:2006:151 �� 7.34, 7.221 T-215/01, T-220/01 and T-221/01, Calberson GE v Commission, EU:T:2004:38 ��15.11 T-216/01 R, Reisebank v Commission, EU:T:2001:277��13.06 T-219/01 R, Commerzbank v Commission, EU:T:2001:278��13.06 T-227/01 to T‑229/01, T‑265/01, T‑266/01 and T‑270/01, Diputación Foral de Álava and Others v Commission, EU:T:2009:315��7.105 T-236/01, T‑244/01 to T‑246/01, T‑251/01 and T‑252/01, Tokai Carbon and Others v Commission, EU:T:2004:118 �� 7.195, 18.04 T-243/01, Sony Computer Entertainment Europe v Commission, EU:T:2003:251�� 7.86, 7.102 T-247/01, eCopy v OHIM, EU:T:2002:319��17.05, 17.13, 17.21, 22.13 T-297/01 and T-298/01, SIC v Commission, EU:T:2004:48 ��8.10, 8.22 T-301/01, Alitalia v Commission, EU:T:2008:262�� 7.141, 7.221 T-304/01, Abad Pérez and Others v Council and Commission, EU:T:2006:389 ��11.19 T-308/01, Henkel v OHIM –LHS, EU:T:2003:241�� 17.12, 17.15 T-313/01, R v Commission, EU:T:2004:109��24.59 T-322/01, Roquette Frères v Commission, EU:T:2006:267��18.02 T-334/01, MFE Marienfelde v OHIM –Vétoquinol, EU:T:2004:223��17.05 T-5/02, Tetra Laval v Commission, EU:T:2002:264��25.20 T-10/02, Girardot v Commission, EU:T:2006:148�� 16.02, 18.03 T-15/02, BASF v Commission, EU:T:2006:74��18.06 T-16/02, Audi v OHIM, EU:T:2003:327��17.12 T-17/02, Olsen v Commission, EU:T:2005:218�� 7.154, 7.158 T-29/02, GEF v Commission, EU:T:2005:99��23.64 T-38/02, Groupe Danone v Commission, EU:T:2005:367��7.201 T-47/02, Danzer v Council, EU:T:2006:167 ��3.57 T-55/02, Finch v Commission, EU:T:2004:351��16.25 T-80/02, Tetra Laval v Commission, EU:T:2002:265��25.20 T-94/02, Boss v OHIM –Delta Biomichania Pagatou, EU:T:2004:344��17.11 T-107/02, GE Betz v OHIM –Atofina Chemicals, EU:T:2004:196��17.10 T-114/02, BaByliss v Commission, EU:T:2003:100 ��7.114, 7.208, 22.17, 23.03 T-119/02, Royal Philips Electronics v Commission, EU:T:2003:101�� 7.46, 7.118 T-144/02, Eagle and Others v Commission, EU:T:2007:222�� 16.14, 16.18, 16.28 T-164/02, Kaul v OHIM –Bayer, EU:T:2004:328��17.12 T-171/02, Regione autonoma della Sardegna v Commission, EU:T:2005:219��23.02 T-178/02, WONUC and Others v Commission, EU:T:2002:183��7.13 T-185/02, Ruiz-Picasso and Others v OHIM –DaimlerChrysler, EU:T:2004:189�� 17.15, 22.07 T-189/02, Ente per le Ville Vesuviane v Commission, EU:T:2007:233��7.98 T-191/02, Lebedef v Commission, EU:T:2005:123��16.05 T-193/02, Piau v Commission, EU:T:2005:22��7.39 T-200/02, Tsarnavas v Commission, EU:T:2004:224��16.13 T-202/02, Makedoniko Metro and Michaniki v Commission, EU:T:2004:5��18.03 T-212/02, Commune de Champagne and Others v Commission, EU:T:2007:194 �� 7.83, 7.101, 11.29 T-216/02, Fieldturf v OHIM, EU:T:2004:96��17.21 T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council, EU:T:2006:384 �� 7.09, 7.144 T-235/02, Strongline v OHIM –Scala, EU:T:2003:304 ��17.22 T-236/02, Marcuccio v Commission, EU:T:2011:465 ��16.29 T-238/02, Barbosa Gonçalves v Commission, EU:T:2004:92�� 16.14, 16.26 T-242/02, Sunrider v OHIM, EU:T:2005:284��17.12 T-259/02 to T‑264/02 and T‑271/02, Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich and Others v Commission, EU:T:2006:396 �� 7.27, 18.03, 24.05 T-267/02, Rewe Zentral v OHIM –Fritidsresor, EU:T:2004:184��7.53

c Table of Cases T-282/02, Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission, EU:T:2006:64��7.47 T-289/02, Telepharmacy Solutions v OHIM, EU:T:2004:227��17.12 T-291/02, González y Díez v Commission, EU:T:2004:252��25.25 T-292/02, Confservizi v Commission, EU:T:2009:188 ��7.127 T-296/02, Lidl Stiftung v OHIM –REWE-Zentral, EU:T:2005:49��17.17 T-308/02, SGL Carbon v Commission, EU:T:2004:119��7.19, 7.38 T-309/02, Acegas v Commission, EU:T:2009:192 ��7.121 T-312/02, Gussetti v Commission, EU:T:2004:102 ��16.26 T-320/02, Esch-Leonhardt and Others v ECB, EU:T:2004:45��16.03 T-334/02, Viomichania Syskevasias Typopoiisis Kai Syntirisis Agrotikon Proïonton v Commission, EU:T:2003:323��8.23, 8.24 T-341/02, Regione Siciliana v Commission, EU:T:2004:228��7.97, 7.98 T-342/02, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Lion v OHIM –Moser Grupo Media, EU:T:2004:268��17.11 T-343/02, Schintgen v Commission, EU:T:2004:111��9.08 T-346/02 and T-347/02, Cableuropa and Others v Commission, EU:T:2003:256�� 7.46, 7.118 T-351/02, Deutsche Bahn v Commission, EU:T:2006:104 ��7.51 T-358/02, Deutsche Post and DHL v Commission, EU:T:2004:159��7.125 T-360/02, Graf Yorck von Wartenburg v Commission, EU:T:2004:237��22.07 T-370/02, Alpenhain-Camembert-Werk and Others v Commission, EU:T:2004:209 ��7.101 T-391/02, Bundesverband der Nahrungsmittel-und Speiseresteverwertung and Kloh v Parliament, EU:T:2004:138��7.106 T-392/02 R, Solvay Pharmaceuticals v Council, EU:T:2003:116 ��23.44 T-396/02, Storck v OHIM, EU:T:2004:329 ��17.15 T-2/03, Verein für Konsumenteninformation v Commission, EU:T:2005:125��23.03 T-9/03, Coldiretti –Federazione regionale della Sardegna and CIA v Commission, EU:T:2004:200 �� 11.19, 11.20 T-14/03, Di Marzio v Commission, EU:T:2004:59��16.25 T-28/03, Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission, EU:T:2005:139��7.221, 7.222, 11.49, 11.60, 11.64 T-29/03, Comunidad Autónoma de Andalucía v Commission, EU:T:2004:235 ��7.103 T-30/03, SID v Commission, EU:T:2007:111 ��7.211 T-45/03, Riva Acciaio v Commission, EU:T:2007:318��7.164 T-47/03, Sison v Council, EU:T:2007:207�� 11.38, 11.44, 11.45 T-48/03, Schneider Electric v Commission, EU:T:2006:34��7.43 T-57/03, SPAG v OHIM –Dann and Backer, EU:T:2005:29�� 17.15, 17.17 T-60/03, Regione Siciliana v Commission, EU:T:2005:360��7.98 T-66/03, “Drie Mollen sinds 1818” v OHIM –Nabeiro Silveria, EU:T:2004:190��17.15 T-86/03, Holcim (France) v Commission, EU:T:2005:157�� 7.222, 8.09 T-90/03, Fédération des industries condimentaires de France and Others v Commission, EU:T:2007:208 ��11.46 T-110/03, T-150/03 and T-405/03, Sison v Council, EU:T:2005:143��7.68 T-115/03, Samar v OHIM –Grotto, EU:T:2004:236��17.15 T-125/03 and T-253/03, Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission, EU:T:2007:287 ��7.28, 7.33 T-133/03, Schering-Plough v Commission and EMEA, EU:T:2007:365��22.10 T-138/03, É.R. and Others v Council and Commission, EU:T:2006:390��11.30, 11.34, 11.60, 11.68 T-141/03, Sniace v Commission, EU:T:2005:129�� 7.124, 7.142, 7.144 T-144/03, Schmit v Commission, EU:T:2005:158 ��16.26 T-151/03, Nuova Agricast v Commission, EU:T:2005:204��22.54 T-212/03, MyTravel v Commission, EU:T:2008:315 �� 11.38, 11.45, 11.47 T-217/03 and T-245/03, FNCBV and Others v Commission, EU:T:2006:391 ��9.09 T-217/03 R, FNCBV v Commission, EU:T:2004:15��13.33 T-241/03 REV, Marcuccio v Commission, EU:T:2012:414��25.44 T-252/03, FNICGV v Commission, EU:T:2004:326 ��18.03 T-259/03, Nikolaou v Commission, EU:T:2007:254 �� 11.26, 11.40, 11.43, 11.44, 11.45, 11.53

Table of Cases ci T-261/03, Euro Style v OHIM –RCN-Companhia de Importaçao e Exportaçao de Texteis, EU:T:2004:356 ��17.22 T-264/03, Schmoldt and Others v Commission, EU:T:2004:157�� 7.106, 7.158, 22.67 T-265/03, Helm Düngemittel v Commission, EU:T:2005:213��15.11 T-266/03, CB v Commission, EU:T:2007:223��24.57 T-269/03, Socratec v Commission, EU:T:2009:211��7.145 T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, EU:T:2008:101 ��7.202 T-277/03, Vlachaki v Commission, EU:T:2005:83��16.28 T-278/03, Van Mannekus v Council, EU:T:2006:31��7.135 T-279/03, Galileo International Technology and Others v Commission, EU:T:2006:121 ��11.41, 11.54, 11.55, 11.59, 11.60 T-289/03, BUPA and Others v Commission, EU:T:2008:29��7.135 T-294/03, Gibault v Commission, EU:T:2005:190��16.06 T-301/03, Canali Ireland v OHIM –Canal Jean, EU:T:2005:254��17.11 T-303/03, Lidl Stiftung v OHIM –REWE-Zentral, EU:T:2005:200��17.14 T-309/03, Camós Grau v Commission, EU:T:2006:110��7.159, 11.09, 11.24, 11.53, 16.06 T-314/03 and T-378/03, Musée Grévin v Commission, EU:T:2004:139��15.11 T-327/03, Al-Aqsa v Council, EU:T:2007:211��7.144 T-346/03, Krikorian and Others v Parliament and Others, EU:T:2003:348 ��11.23 T-349/03, Corsica Ferries France v Commission, EU:T:2005:221�� 7.162, 7.211 T-350/03, Wirtschaftskammer Kärnten and best connect Ampere Strompool v Commission, EU:T:2006:257��7.114 T-351/03, Schneider Electric v Commission, EU:T:2007:212��11.48 T-354/03, Reggimenti v Parliament, EU:T:2005:54��16.22 T-357/03, Gollnisch and Others v Parliament, EU:T:2005:1��7.104 T-360/03, Frischpack v OHIM, EU:T:2004:340 ��17.05 T-363/03, Regione Siciliana v Commission, EU:T:2008:403��7.98 T-364/03, Medici Grimm v Council, EU:T:2006:28�� 11.22, 11.49 T-366/03 and T-235/04, Land Oberösterreich v Commission, EU:T:2005:347 ��7.105 T-392/03, T‑408/03, T‑414/03 and T‑435/03, Regione Siciliana v Commission, EU:T:2008:404 ��7.07 T-396/03, Vanhellemont v Commission, EU:T:2005:406��16.07 T-410/03, Hoechst v Commission, EU:T:2008:211 ��23.11 T-413/03, Shandong Reipu Biochemicals v Council, EU:T:2006:211 ��7.215 T-415/03, Cofradía de pescadores “San Pedro” de Bermeo and Others v Council, EU:T:2005:365 �� 11.42, 11.44, 11.46 T-440/03, T‑121/04, T‑171/04, T‑208/04, T‑365/04 and T‑484/04, Arizmendi and Others v Council and Commission, EU:T:2009:530�� 5.37, 11.29 T-443/03, Retecal and Others v Commission, EU:T:2005:178��7.46 T-2/04, Korkmaz and Others v Commission, EU:T:2006:97��8.09 T-16/04, Arcelor v Parliament and Council, EU:T:2010:54�� 7.96, 7.101, 7.102 T-20/04, Aguar Fernandez and Others v Commission, EU:T:2005:35 ��24.48 T-30/04, Sena v EASA, EU:T:2005:161 ��16.09 T-36/04, API v Commission, EU:T:2007:258��2.30 T-37/04, Região autónoma dos Açores v Council, EU:T:2008:236��7.105 T-37/04 R, Região autónoma dos Açores v Council, EU:T:2004:215�� 7.105, 23.09 T-40/04, Bonino and Others v Parliament and Council, EU:T:2005:279��7.104 T-48/04, Qualcomm v Commission, EU:T:2009:212��7.47 T-69/04, Schunk and Schunk Kohlenstoff-Technik v Commission, EU:T:2008:415 �� 7.195, 18.04, 18.05 T-73/04, Carbone-Lorraine v Commission, EU:T:2008:416��18.05 T-75/04 and T‑77/04 to T‑79/04, Arch Chemicals and Others v Commission��7.102 T-78/04 R, Sumitomo Chemical v Commission, EU:T:2004:204��13.05 T-100/04, Giannini v Commission, EU:T:2008:68�� 16.13, 16.26

cii Table of Cases T-113/04, Atlantic Container Line and Others v Commission, EU:T:2007:377�� 7.221, 7.222, 11.59, 11.60, 11.61 T-117/04, Werkgroep Commerciële Jachthavens Zuidelijke Randmeren and Others v Commission, EU:T:2006:276 ��7.127 T-123/04, Cargo Partner v OHIM, EU:T:2005:340 �� 17.21, 22.19 T-124/04, Ouariachi v Commission, EU:T:2005:378�� 11.07, 11.26 T-132/04, Bonnet v Court of Justice, EU:T:2004:232��16.15 T-161/04, Valero Jordana v Commission, EU:T:2011:337��7.180 T-163/04, Schäfer v OHIM –KoKa, EU:T:2005:282 ��22.09 T-167/04, Asklepios Kliniken v Commission, EU:T:2007:215�� 8.06, 8.07, 8.13, 8.22 T-177/04, easyJet v Commission, EU:T:2006:187�� 7.114, 7.141 T-184/04, Sulvida v Commission, EU:T:2005:7��22.56 T-188/04, Freixenet v OHIM, EU:T:2006:290��17.06 T-190/04, Freixenet v OHIM, EU:T:2006:291��17.06 T-191/04, MIP Metro v OHIM –Tesco Stores, EU:T:2006:254 ��17.10 T-193/04, Tillack v Commission, EU:T:2006:292��11.45 T-201/04, Microsoft v Commission, EU:T:2007:289��2.30, 7.199, 7.202, 22.13, 23.20 T-209/04, Spain v Commission, EU:T:2005:2��8.06, 8.24 T-234/04, Netherlands v Commission, EU:T:2007:335��7.15 T-238/04, Raab and Others v Parliament and Council, EU:T:2004:250��7.158 T-239/04 and T-323/04, Italy v Commission, EU:T:2007:260��7.141 T-245/04, Commission v Lior and Others, EU:T:2008:4��15.14 T-247/04, Aseprofar and Edifa v Commission, EU:T:2005:327��5.35 T-257/04, Poland v Commission, EU:T:2009:182 ��2.56 T-271/04, Citymo v Commission, EU:T:2007:128��9.17, 11.08, 11.52, 15.06, 15.16 T-274/04, Rounis v Commission, EU:T:2005:442 ��16.07 T-279/04, Éditions Odile Jacob v Commission, EU:T:2010:384�� 7.43, 7.209 T-288/04, Van Neyghem v Committee of Regions, EU:T:2007:1�� 16.04, 16.17 T-291/04, Enviro Tech Europe and Enviro Tech International v Commission, EU:T:2011:760 �� 7.101, 7.102, 7.141, 7.144, 11.15, 11.48, 23.56 T-302/04, Maison de l’Europe Avignon Méditérranée v Commission, EU:T:2008:118��15.09 T-309/04, T‑317/04, T‑329/04 and T‑336/04, TV2/Danmark and Others v Commission, EU:T:2008:457 ��7.142 T-311/04, Buendía Sierra v Commission, EU:T:2006:329�� 9.01, 16.04, 16.06 T-312/04, Di Bucci v Commission, EU:T:2008:423�� 16.04, 16.06 T-325/04, Citigroup v OHIM –Link Interchange Network, EU:T:2008:51 ��17.16 T-339/04, France Télécom v Commission, EU:T:2007:80��7.28 T-340/04, France Télécom v Commission, EU:T:2007:81��7.28 T-343/04, Tsarnavas v Commission, EU:T:2007:123��16.07 T-360/04, FG Marine v Commission, EU:T:2007:235��11.61 T-362/04, Minin v Commission, EU:T:2007:25��7.181 T-363/04, Koipe v OHIM –Aceites del Sur, EU:T:2007:264��17.06 T-376/04, Polyelectrolyte Producers Group v Council and Commission, EU:T:2005:297��7.73 T-394/04, Strack v Commission, EU:T:2008:20��16.04 T-395/04, Air One v Commission, EU:T:2006:123�� 8.06, 8.13, 8.22, 8.26 T-400/04 and T‑402/04 to T‑404/04, Arch Chemicals and Arch Timber Protection v Commission, EU:T:2011:490�� 7.103, 8.06, 8.10 T-406/04, Bonnet v Court of Justice, EU:T:2006:322��16.04 T-417/04, Regione Autonoma Friuli-Venezia Giulia v Commission, EU:T:2007:82��7.105 T-422/04, Lavagnoli v Commission, EU:T:2006:362��16.07 T-423/04, Bunker & BKR v OHIM –Marine Stock, EU:T:2005:348 �� 17.15, 25.21 T-424/04, Angelidis v Parliament, EU:T:2006:376��16.04 T-431/04 R, Italy v Commission, EU:T:2007:183��13.17 T-435/04, Simões Dos Santos v OHIM, EU:T:2007:50��16.06

Table of Cases ciii T-437/04 and T-441/04, Standertskjöld-Nordenstam and Heyraud v Commission, EU:T:2006:62 ��16.06 T-445/04, ET v OHIM –Aparellaje eléctrico, EU:T:2005:70��22.56 T-449/04, Commission v Trends, EU:T:2007:266��15.14 T-451/04, Mediocurso v Commission, EU:T:2006:95��8.26 T-452/04, Éditions Odile Jacob v Commission, EU:T:2010:385��7.42 T-455/04, Beyatli and Candan v Commission, EU:T:2007:74��16.15 T-457/04, Camar v Commission, EU:T:2008:439�� 7.221, 11.70 T-458/04, Au lys de France v Commission, EU:T:2007:195 ��7.84 T-466/04 and T-467/04, Dami v OHIM –Stilton Cheese Makers, EU:T:2006:40��17.10 T-474/04, Pergan Hilfsstoffe für industrielle Prozesse v Commission, EU:T:2007:306��7.141 T-485/04, COBB v Commission, EU:T:2005:186��7.158 T-486/04, Michail v Commission, EU:T:2008:111��16.04 T-500/04, Commission v IIC, EU:T:2007:146��15.22 T-6/05, DEF-TEC Defense Technology v OHIM –Defense Technology, EU:T:2006:241 �� 17.12, 17.15 T-27/05, Lo Giudice v Commission, EU:T:2007:321��16.06 T-33/05, Cetarsa v Commission, EU:T:2011:24��18.04 T-35/05, T‑61/05, T‑107/05, T‑108/05 and T‑139/05, Agne-Dapper and Others v Commission and Others, EU:T:2006:365��16.05 T-41/05, Alliance One International v Commission, EU:T:2011:586 ��18.05 T-48/05, Franchet and Byk v Commission, EU:T:2008:257 �� 11.37, 11.45 T-50/05, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, EU:T:2010:101��7.84 T-66/05, Sack v Commission, EU:T:2007:370�� 16.05, 16.17, 16.25 T-70/05, Evropaïki Dynamiki v EMSA, EU:T:2010:55 ��7.71 T-87/05, EDP v Commission, EU:T:2005:333�� 7.196, 7.205, 7.206 T-91/05, Sinara Handel v Council and Commission, EU:T:2007:31�� 10.11, 11.31 T-101/05, BASF and UCB v Commission, EU:T:2007:380��18.04 T-115/05, Jiménez Martínez v Commission, EU:T:2006:346��16.06 T-122/05, Benkö and Others v Commission, EU:T:2006:262��7.105 T-128/05, SPM v Council and Commission, EU:T:2008:494�� 11.22, 11.46 T-135/05, Campoli v Commission, EU:T:2006:366�� 16.05, 16.07 T-137/05, La Perla v OHIM –Worldgem Brands, EU:T:2007:142��17.06 T-141/05, Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission, EU:T:2008:179��23.62 T-150/05, Sahlstedt and Others v Commission, EU:T:2006:172 ��7.95 T-151/05, NVV and Others v Commission, EU:T:2009:144�� 7.140, 7.196, 7.207 T-154/05, Lo Giudice v Commission, EU:T:2007:322��16.04 T-181/05, Citigroup and Citibank v OHIM –Citi, EU:T:2008:112 ��17.10 T-185/05, Italy v Commission, EU:T:2008:519�� 7.21, 7.148, 7.158 T-189/05, Usinor v OHIM –Corus UK, EU:T:2008:39��17.15 T-198/05, Mebrom v Commission, EU:T:2007:147��11.52 T-295/05, Document Security Systems v ECB, EU:T:2007:243 ��11.08 T-299/05, Shanghai Excell M&E Enterprise and Shanghai Adeptech Precision v Council, EU:T:2009:72 ��7.144 T-306/05, Scippacercola and Terezakis v Commission, EU:T:2008:9 ��7.39, 7.88 T-315/05, Adomex v Commission, EU:T:2008:300��7.122 T-324/05, Estonia v Commission, EU:T:2009:381��7.170 T-329/05, Movimondo Onlus v Commission, EU:T:2012:199��15.16 T-345/05 R, V v Parliament, EU:T:2007:89��13.23 T-376/05 R, TEA-CEGOS and STG v Commission, EU:T:2005:356��13.29 T-411/05, Annemans v Commission, EU:T:2007:227��7.39 T-412/05, M v Ombudsman, EU:T:2008:397 ��11.24, 11.36, 11.45, 11.49 T-415/05, T-416/05 and T-423/05, Greece v Commission, EU:T:2010:386 ��7.17 T-420/05, Vischim v Commission, EU:T:2009:391 �� 7.09, 7.96, 7.144

civ Table of Cases T-420/05 R, Vischim v Commission, EU:T:2006:102 �� 13.33, 13.37 T-429/05, Artegodan v Commission, EU:T:2010:60��11.40, 11.47, 11.48, 11.49 T-437/05, Brink’s Security Luxembourg v Commission, EU:T:2009:318 �� 7.15, 7.18, 7.68 T-441/05, IVG Immobilien v OHIM, EU:T:2007:178 ��17.06 T-443/05, El Corte Inglés v OHIM –Bolaños Sabri, EU:T:2007:219��17.10 T-445/05, Associazione italiana del risparmio gestito and Fineco Asset Management v Commission, EU:T:2009:50��7.197 T-447/05, SPM v Commission, EU:T:2007:3 ��7.221 T-449/05, Dikigorikos Syllogos Ioanninon v Parliament and Council, EU:T:2007:55 ��7.96 T-455/05, Componenta v Commission, EU:T:2008:597��25.19 T-458/05, Tegometall International v OHIM –Wuppermann, EU:T:2007:349��17.16 T-6/06, wheyco v Commission, EU:T:2007:202��7.52 T-11/06 R, Romana Tabacchi v Commission, EU:T:2006:217 �� 18.03, 18.05 T-39/06, Transcatab v Commission, EU:T:2011:562�� 7.30, 7.195 T-40/06, Trioplast Industrier v Commission, EU:T:2010:388��25.20 T-42/06, Gollnisch v Parliament, EU:T:2010:102�� 7.141, 7.145, 11.45 T-44/06, Commission v Hellenic Ventures and Others, EU:T:2010:284�� 15.14, 15.16 T-45/06, Reliance Industries v Council and Commission, EU:T:2008:398�� 7.63, 7.133, 9.16 T-60/06 RENV II, Italy v Commission, EU:T:2016:233��7.213 T-62/06 RENV-R, Eurallumina v Commission, EU:T:2011:261 ��13.11 T-80/06 and T-182/09, Budapesti Erőmű v Commission, EU:T:2012:65 ��7.53 T-82/06, Apple Computer International v Commission, EU:T:2008:46��7.101 T-91/06, Theofilopoulos v Commission, EU:T:2007:18��18.03 T-92/06, Lademporiki and Parousis & Sia v Commission, EU:T:2006:248��11.29 T-94/06, Gargani v Parliament, EU:T:2007:351��7.75 T-95/06, Federación de Cooperativas Agrarias de la Comunidad Valenciana v CPVO, EU:T:2008:25 ��25.20 T-99/06, Phildar v OHIM –Comercial Jacinto Parera, EU:T:2009:346��17.06 T-109/06, Vodafone España and Vodafone Group v Commission, EU:T:2007:384��7.18 T-114/06 R, Globe v Commission, EU:T:2006:221 ��13.38 T-125/06, Centro Studi Manieri v Council, EU:T:2009:19 �� 7.67, 7.148 T-139/06, France v Commission, EU:T:2011:605�� 5.88, 18.02 T-143/06, MTZ Polyfilms v Council, EU:T:2009:441��7.133 T-144/06, O’Loughlin v Ombudsman and Ireland, EU:T:2006:237��8.16 T-150/06, Smanor and Others v Commission, EU:T:2006:402��13.02 T-156/06, Regione Siciliana v Commission, EU:T:2007:372��7.98 T-179/06, Commission v Burie Onderzoek en Advies, EU:T:2009:171��15.14 T-191/06, FMC Foret v Commission, EU:T:2011:277��7.32 T-193/06, TF1 v Commission, EU:T:2010:389��7.121 T-212/06, Bowland Dairy Products v Commission, EU:T:2009:419��11.29 T-217/06, Arkema France and Others v Commission, EU:T:2011:251�� 18.02, 18.09 T-236/06, Landtag Schleswig-Holstein v Commission, EU:T:2008:91 ��7.84 T-258/06, Germany v Commission, EU:T:2010:214 ��5.32 T-263/06, Greece v Commission, EU:T:2008:529 ��18.01 T-269/06, Rautaruukki v OHIM, EU:T:2008:512��17.17 T-270/06, Lego Juris v OHIM –Mega Brands, EU:T:2008:483��17.17 T-272/06, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Court of Justice, EU:T:2008:334�� 7.70, 7.180 T-274/06, Estaser El Mareny v Commission, EU:T:2007:323��7.10 T-282/06, Sun Chemical Group and Others v Commission, EU:T:2007:203�� 7.114, 7.140, 7.208 T-291/06, Operator ARP v Commission, EU:T:2009:235��7.141 T-301/06, Lemaître Sécurité v Commission, EU:T:2008:495�� 7.63, 7.134 T-303/06 and T-337/06, UniCredito Italiano v OHIM –Union Investment Privatfonds, EU:T:2010:160 ��17.17 T-310/06, Hungary v Commission, EU:T:2007:343��7.217

Table of Cases cv T-314/06, Whirlpool Europe v Council, EU:T:2010:390��24.75 T-324/06, Município de Gondomar v Commission, EU:T:2008:337��7.98 T-324/06 R, Município de Gondomar v Commission, EU:T:2007:165��13.36 T-332/06, Alcoa Trasformazioni v Commission, EU:T:2009:79�� 7.53, 7.159 T-343/06, Shell Petroleum and Others v Commission, EU:T:2012:478��18.04 T-346/06 R, IMS v Commission, EU:T:2007:164�� 13.24, 13.31, 13.36 T-369/06, Holland Malt v Commission, EU:T:2009:319��22.17 T-375/06, Viega v Commission, EU:T:2011:106��7.195 T-378/06, IMI and Others v Commission, EU:T:2011:109��23.57 T-380/06, Vischim v Commission, EU:T:2009:392 ��7.96 T-382/06, Tomkins v Commission, EU:T:2011:112��18.09 T-385/06, Aalberts Industries and Others v Commission, EU:T:2011:114��18.02 T-386/06, Pegler v Commission, EU:T:2011:115��18.09 T-387/06 to T-390/06, Inter-Ikea v OHIM, EU:T:2008:427��17.16 T-393/06, Makhteshim-Agan Holding and Others v Commission, EU:T:2008:531 ��8.10, 8.17 T-411/06, Sogelma v EAR, EU:T:2008:419�� 7.67, 7.71, 7.85, 7.158 T-412/06, Vitro Corporativo v OHIM –VKR Holding, EU:T:2008:560��17.06 T-414/06 P, Combescot v Commission, EU:T:2008:58 �� 11.14, 20.01 T-9/07, Grupo Promer Mon Graphic v OHIM –PepsiCo, EU:T:2010:96��17.17 T-12/07 R, Polimeri Europa v Commission, EU:T:2007:124�� 13.06, 13.17 T-18/07 R, Kronberger v Parliament, EU:T:2007:144 ��13.23 T-25/07, Iride and Iride Energia v Commission, EU:T:2009:33��7.124 T-31/07, Du Pont de Nemours, EU:T:2013:167 ��7.217 T-31/07 R, Du Pont de Nemours, EU:T:2007:236��13.04 T-35/07, Leche Celta v OHIM –Celia, EU:T:2008:125 ��25.20 T-42/07, Dow Chemical and Others v Commission, EU:T:2011:357 ��18.06 T-43/07 P, Neophytou v Commission, EU:T:2008:432�� 16.13, 16.26 T-49/07, Fahas v Council, EU:T:2010:499��11.45 T-52/07, Movimondo Onlus v Commission, EU:T:2012:200��7.145 T-56/07 P, Commission v Economidis, EU:T:2008:260��16.26 T-57/07, E.ON Ruhrgas and E.ON Földgáz Trade v Commission, EU:T:2009:297��7.47 T-90/07 P and T-99/07 P, Belgium and Commission v Genette, EU:T:2008:605 �� 16.04, 20.01 T-104/07, BVGD v Commission, EU:T:2013:366��7.39 T-108/07 and T‑354/08, Spira v Commission, EU:T:2013:367��23.52 T-119/07, Italy v Commission, EU:T:2019:613��7.197 T-120/07 R, MB Immobilien Verwaltungs v Commission, EU:T:2007:305 �� 13.28, 13.33 T-127/07 P, Bligny v Commission, EU:T:2008:187��16.19 T-129/07, Ireland v Commission, EU:T:2019:610 ��7.212 T-132/07, Fuji Electric v Commission, EU:T:2011:344��7.163, 7.199, 7.200, 7.201, 18.07 T-133/07, Mitsubishi Electric v Commission, EU:T:2011:345��24.30 T-137/07, Portela v Commission, EU:T:2008:589 �� 11.17, 11.60 T-152/07, Lange Uhren v OHIM, EU:T:2009:324 ��17.06 T-160/07, Lancôme v OHIM –CMS Hasche Sigle, EU:T:2008:261��8.16 T-214/07, Greece v Commission, EU:T:2011:130 ��7.221 T-215/07, Donnici v Parliament, EU:T:2007:393��2.56 T-234/07, Koninklijke Grolsch v Commission, EU:T:2011:476��7.195 T-236/07, Germany v Commission, EU:T:2010:451 ��24.38 T-238/07, Ristic and Others v Commission, EU:T:2009:263 ��11.43 T-240/07, Heineken Nederland and Heineken v Commission, EU:T:2011:284��7.32 T-256/07, People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v Council, EU:T:2008:461��7.144 T-257/07 R, France v Commission, EU:T:2007:300�� 13.31, 13.36 T-262/07, Lithuania v Commission, EU:T:2012:171��7.187 T-284/07 P, OHIM v López Turuel, EU:T:2008:533��16.04 T-295/07, Vitro Corporativo v OHIM –VKR Holding, EU:T:2008:563��17.06

cvi Table of Cases T-312/07, Dimos Peramatos v Commission, EU:T:2011:587��13.37 T-320/07, Jones and Others v Commission, EU:T:2011:686��22.23 T-320/07 AJ, Jones and Others v Commission, EU:T:2009:123��22.80 T-326/07 R, Cheminova and Others v Commission, EU:T:2007:364 ��13.23 T-335/07, Mergel and Others v OHIM, EU:T:2008:580��17.17 T-338/07 P, Bianchi v ETF, EU:T:2010:103 �� 16.30, 20.01 T-341/07, Sison v Council, EU:T:2011:687��7.144, 11.03, 11.40, 11.42, 11.45, 11.47, 11.49, 11.73 T-342/07, Ryanair v Commission, EU:T:2010:280��7.205, 7.206, 7.207, 22.17 T-344/07, O2, EU:T:2010:35��17.17 T-348/07, Al-Aqsa v Council, EU:T:2010:373��22.20 T-369/07, Latvia v Commission, EU:T:2011:103��7.10, 7.77 T-375/07, Pellegrini v Commission, EU:T:2008:465��11.46 T-375/07 R, Pellegrini v Commission, EU:T:2008:3��13.10 T-380/07, Kaloudis v OHIM –FTT, EU:T:2008:412 ��17.05 T-387/07, Portugal v Commission, EU:T:2011:71��15.09 T-391/07, Alber v OHIM, EU:T:2009:336��17.17 T-398/07, Spain v Commission, EU:T:2012:173��7.88 T-401/07, Caixa Geral de Depósitos v Commission, EU:T:2011:72��15.09 T-407/07, CMB and Christof v Commission, EU:T:2011:477�� 7.19, 7.148 T-409/07, Cohausz v OHIM –Izquierdo Faces, EU:T:2009:354��17.17 T-410/07 R, Jurado Hermanos v OHIM, EU:T:2008:45��13.05 T-411/07, Aer Lingus Group v Commission, EU:T:2010:281��13.16 T-411/07 R, Aer Lingus Group v Commission, EU:T:2008:80�� 13.13, 13.19 T-413/07, Bayern Innovativ v OHIM –Life Sciences Partners Perstock, EU:T:2009:34��17.06 T-419/07, Okalux v OHIM –Messe Düsseldorf, EU:T:2009:238��17.05 T-423/07, Ryanair v Commission, EU:T:2011:226�� 8.05, 8.06, 8.22, 8.26 T-428/07 and T-455/07, CEVA v Commission, EU:T:2010:240��15.13 T-439/07, Coats Holdings v Commission, EU:T:2012:320��7.201 T-440/07 R, Huta Buczek v Commission, EU:T:2008:77��13.36 T-442/07, Ryanair v Commission, EU:T:2011:547�� 8.06, 8.18, 8.20, 8.22, 8.24 T-444/07, CPEM v Commission, EU:T:2009:227��11.19 T-456/07, Commission v CdT, EU:T:2010:39��7.13, 7.19 T-457/07, Evropaïki Dynamiki v EFSA, EU:T:2012:671�� 7.144, 7.190, 22.15 T-460/07, Nokia v OHIM, EU:T:2010:18��17.20 T-461/07, Visa Europe and Visa International Service v Commission, EU:T:2011:181 ��22.13 T-464/07, Korsch v OHIM, EU:T:2009:207��17.16 T-466/07, Osram v Council, EU:T:2008:311��25.25 T-475/07, Dow AgroSciences and Others v Commission, EU:T:2011:445��7.144 T-487/07, Imperial Chemical Industries v OHIM, EU:T:2008:453��22.56 T-492/07 P, Sanchez Ferriz and Others v Commission, EU:T:2009:116 ��20.01 T-496/07, Repsol Lubricantes y Especialidades and Others v Commission, EU:T:2013:464 ��7.141 T-502/07, IIC v OHIM –McKenzie, EU:T:2011:223��17.17 T-12/08 P, M v EMEA, EU:T:2009:143�� 20.01, 20.05 T-38/08, Correia de Matos v Commission, EU:T:2008:100��7.76 T-41/08 R, Vakakis v Commission, EU:T:2008:128��13.27 T-54/08 R, T‑87/08 R, T‑88/08 R and T‑91/08 R to T‑93/08 R, Cyprus v Commission, EU:T:2008:96 �� 13.34, 13.36 T-65/08 R, Spain v Commission, EU:T:2008:136��13.38 T-68/08, FIFA v Commission, EU:T:2011:44 ��23.05 T-70/08, Axis v OHIM –Etra Investigación y Desarrollo, EU:T:2010:375��17.05 T-83/08, Denki Kagaku Kogyo and Denka Chemicals v Commission, EU:T:2012:48��7.32 T-85/08, Exalation v OHIM, EU:T:2010:303��17.20 T-97/08, KUKA Roboter v OHIM, EU:T:2010:396 ��17.15

Table of Cases cvii T-107/08, Transnational Company “Kazchrome” and ENRC Marketing v Council and Commission, EU:T:2011:704�� 11.59, 11.60 T-111/08, MasterCard and Others v Commission, EU:T:2012:260��23.08 T-114/08 P, Marcuccio v Commission, EU:T:2009:221��16.17 T-117/08, Italy v EESC, EU:T:2011:131��7.185 T-118/08, Actega Terra v OHIM, EU:T:2010:234��17.07 T-120/08, Arch Chemicals and Others v Commission, EU:T:2011:492 ��7.102 T-123/08, Spitzer v OHIM –Homeland Housewares, EU:T:2010:341��22.23 T-141/08, E.ON Energie v Commission, EU:T:2010:516 ��7.29 T-148/08, Beifa Group v OHIM –Schwan-Stabilo Schwanhäußer, EU:T:2010:190 ��17.06 T-156/08 P, R v Commission, EU:T:2009:69��16.06 T-165/08, Química Atlântica and Martins de Freitas Moura v Commission, EU:T:2008:298 ��8.21, 8.23 T-167/08, Microsoft v Commission, EU:T:2012:323�� 7.37, 23.08 T-169/08 RENV, DEI v Commission, EU:T:2016:733��7.37 T-180/08 P, Tiralongo v Commission, EU:T:2009:429��16.18 T-185/08, VDH Projektentwicklung and Edeka Rhein-Ruhr v Commission, EU:T:2008:225��8.13 T-186/08, LPN v Commission, EU:T:2009:309��5.35 T-187/08, Rodd & Gunn Australia v OHIM, EU:T:2010:150��17.17 T-189/08, Forum 187 v Commission, EU:T:2010:99��7.127 T-192/08, Transnational Company “Kazchrome” and ENRC Marketing v Council, EU:T:2011:619 ��23.09 T-195/08, Antwerpse Bouwwerken v Commission, EU:T:2009:491��7.67 T-195/08 R, Antwerpse Bouwwerken v Commission, EU:T:2008:292 ��13.35 T-196/08, Srinivasan v Ombudsman, EU:T:2008:470��7.71, 8.16 T-207/08, Habanos v OHIM –Tabacos de Centroamérica, EU:T:2011:224��17.15 T-213/08 REV, Marinova v Commission and Université Libre de Bruxelles, EU:T:2009:290 �� 2.31, 25.07, 25.27 T-219/08, Işçi Partisi v Commission, EU:T:2008:538��11.18 T-221/08, Strack v Commission, EU:T:2016:242��7.68 T-228/08, Szomborg v Commission, EU:T:2009:463��8.08, 8.21 T-242/08, Faur v Council of Europe, EU:T:2008:283��11.22 T-246/08, Melli Bank v Council, EU:T:2009:266 ��9.16 T-247/08, C-Content v Commission, EU:T:2010:409��11.67 T-254/08, Associazione “Giùlemanidallajuve” v Commission, EU:T:2009:537��8.22 T-266/08 P, Kerstens v Commission, EU:T:2010:273��25.20 T-271/08 P, Boudova and Others v Commission, EU:T:2009:339 �� 16.19, 16.20 T-284/08 INTP, People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v Council, EU:T:2008:593��25.53 T-284/08 TO, People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v Council, EU:T:2009:340 �� 25.34, 25.35 T-303/08, Tresplain Investments v OHIM –Hoo Hing, EU:T:2010:505��17.20 T-306/08 P, Braun-Neumann v Parliament, EU:T:2009:6�� 16.04, 16.23 T-312/08 R, Ellinikos Niognomon v Commission, EU:T:2008:407��13.04 T-338/08, Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Pesticide Action Network Europe v Commission, EU:T:2012:300��22.18 T-348/08, Aragonesas Industrias y Energía v Commission, EU:T:2011:621��18.06 T-352/08 R, Pannon Hőerőmű v Commission, EU:T:2009:15��13.33 T-353/08, vwd Vereinigte Wirtschaftsdienste v Commission, EU:T:2009 :402 ��23.17 T-361/08, Peek & Cloppenburg and van Graaf v OHIM –Queen Sirikit Institute of Sericulture, EU:T:2010:152��17.11 T-365/08, Hidalgo v OHIM –Bodegas Hidalgo –La Gitana, EU:T:2010:407��23.62 T-367/08, Abouchar v Commission, EU:T:2009:292��11.66 T-369/08, EWRIA and Others v Commission, EU:T:2010:549�� 7.62, 7.63, 7.198 T-370/08, Alpiq Csepel v Commission, EU:T:2011:116 ��23.08 T-381/08, DAI v Commission, EU:T:2012:396�� 22.16, 24.38

cviii Table of Cases T-386/08, Trautwein v OHIM, EU:T:2010:296��17.16 T-394/08, T-408/08, T-453/08 and T-454/08, Regione autonoma della Sardegna and Others v Commission, EU:T:2011:493 ��7.53, 9.09 T-404/08, Fluorsid and Minmet v Commission, EU:T:2013:321�� 7.141, 22.74 T-405/08, Spar Österreichische Warenhandels v Commission, EU:T:2013:306��7.208 T-412/08, Trubion Pharmaceuticals v OHIM –Merck, EU:T:2009:507 ��17.16 T-424/08, Nexus Europe, EU:T:2010:211 ��15.10 T-427/08, CEAHR v Commission, EU:T:2010:517 �� 7.39, 7.201 T-429/08 DEP, Grain Millers v OHIM –Grain Millers, EU:T:2011:35 �� 25.18, 25.20 T-439/08, Agapiou Joséphidès v Commission and EACEA, EU:T:2010:442 �� 7.68, 7.74, 22.10 T-442/08, CISAC v Commission, EU:T:2013:188 ��7.88 T-443/08 and T-455/08, Freistaat Sachsen and Others v Commission, EU:T:2011:117 �� 7.124, 7.126, 7.142 T-460/08, Commission v Acentro Turismo, EU:T:2010:551��15.16 T-461/08, Evropaïki Dynamiki v EIB, EU:T:2011:494�� 7.71, 11.24 T-468/08, Tisza Erőmű v Commission, EU:T:2014:235��7.188 T-481/08, Alisei v Commission, EU:T:2010:32�� 15.13, 23.52 T-491/08 P, Bui Van v Commission, EU:T:2010:191 ��18.03 T-494/08 to T-500/08 and T-509/08, Ryanair v Commission, EU:T:2010:511�� 2.56, 7.145, 24.05 T-526/08 P, Commission v Strack, EU:T:2010:506��16.07 T-532/08, Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta and Umicore v Commission, EU:T:2010:353��2.30 T-536/08, Huvis v Council, EU:T:2013:432��10.11 T-537/08, Cixi Jiangnan Chemical Fiber and Others v Council, EU:T:2013:428��23.08 T-539/08, Etimine and Etiproducts v Commission, EU:T:2010:354 �� 2.30, 7.03, 7.135 T-551/08, H&R ChemPharm v Commission, EU:T:2014:1081��18.03 T-554/08, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, EU:T:2012:194��7.138 T-556/08, Slovenská pošta v Commission, EU:T:2015:189�� 7.37, 7.202 T-560/08 P, Commission v Meierhofer, EU:T:2010:192��24.46 T-561/08, Gutknecht v Commission, EU:T:2011:599 ��23.56 T-565/08, Corsica Ferries France v Commission, EU:T:2012:415��7.180 T-570/08 RENV, Deutsche Post v Commission, EU:T:2013:589 ��7.144 T-574/08, Syndicat des thoniers méditerranéens and Others v Commission, EU:T:2012:583 �� 11.19, 22.16 T-576/08, Germany v Commission, EU:T:2011:166 ��24.49 T-587/08, Fresh Del Monte Produce v Commission, EU:T:2013:129 �� 23.08, 23.11 T-8/09, Dredging International and Ondernemingen Jan de Nul v EMSA, EU:T:2011:461��7.159 T-15/09, Euro-Information v OHIM, EU:T:2010:80��17.06 T-17/09, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, EU:T:2012:243��23.53 T-33/09, Portugal v Commission, EU:T:2011:127��5.88 T-52/09 R, Nycomed Danmark v EMEA, EU:T:2009:117��13.35 T-57/09, Alfastar Benelux v Council, EU:T:2011:609 ��11.37 T-58/09, Schemaventotto v Commission, EU:T:2010:342��7.42 T-80/09 P, Commission v Q, EU:T:2011:347�� 11.09, 16.07 T-82/09, Dennekamp v Parliament, EU:T:2011:688 ��23.07 T-83/09, Chalk v OHIM –Reformed Spirits Company Holdings, EU:T:2011:450 ��17.06 T-87/09, Andersen v Commission, EU:T:2009:468��7.53, 7.57 T-88/09, Idromacchine and Others v Commission, EU:T:2011:641 ��11.56 T-89/09, Pollmeier Massivholz v Commission, EU:T:2015:153, ��7.51, 7.57 T-95/09 R, United Phosphorus v Commission, EU:T:2009:124�� 13.04, 13.13, 13.34 T-108/09, Ravensburger v OHIM –Educa Borras, EU:T:2010:213��22.13 T-115/09 and T-116/09, Electrolux and Whirlpool v Commission, EU:T:2012:76��7.211 T-119/09, Protégé International v Commission, EU:T:2012:421��23.11 T-121/09 DEP, Al Shanfari v Council and Commission, EU:T:2012:607 ��25.20 T-123/09, Ryanair v Commission, EU:T:2012:164�� 7.119, 7.211

Table of Cases cix T-134/09, Basile and I Marchi Italiani v OHIM –Osra, EU:T:2012:328 ��17.15 T-135/09, Nexans France and Nexans v Commission, EU:T:2012:596�� 7.28, 24.39 T-136/09, Commission v Gal-Or, EU:T:2010:429 �� 15.09, 15.20 T-137/09, Nike International v OHIM –Muñoz Molina, EU:T:2010:478��17.14 T-139/09, France v Commission, EU:T:2012:496��7.180 T-140/09, Prysmian and Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi Energia v Commission, EU:T:2012:597��7.28 T-143/09 P, Commission v Petrilli, EU:T:2010:531 �� 16.28, 20.01, 20.03 T-145/09, Bredenkamp and Others v Commission, EU:T:2012:407��7.143 T-146/09, Parker ITR and Parker-Hannifin v Commission, EU:T:2013:258 �� 18.04, 18.05 T-149/09, Dover v Parliament, EU:T:2011:119��24.49 T-152/09, Rintisch v OHIM –Valfleuri Pâtes alimentaires, EU:T:2011:763��22.15 T-157/09 P, Marcuccio v Commission, EU:T:2010:403��20.01 T-158/09, Greece v Commission, EU:T:2012:530 ��18.01 T-162/09, Würth and Fasteners (Shenyang) v Council, EU:T:2012:187 �� 7.133, 7.135, 7.136 T-164/09, Kitou v CEPD, EU:T:2010:533 ��23.62 T-170/09, Shanghai Biaowu High-Tensile Fastener and Shanghai Prime Machinery v Council, EU:T:2012:531 ��7.133 T-172/09, Gem-Year and Jinn-Well Auto-Parts, EU:T:2012:532 ��23.53 T-176/09, Government of Gibraltar v Commission, EU:T:2011:239��7.217 T-196/09 R, TerreStar Europe v Commission, EU:T:2009:270��13.35 T-197/09, Slovenia v Commission, EU:T:2011:348��20.02 T-198/09, UOP v Commission, EU:T:2013:105�� 24.37, 24.38 T-207/09, El Jirari Bouzekri v OHIM –Nike International, EU:T:2011:537��17.07 T-219/09 and T-326/09, Albertini and Others and Donnelly v Parliament, EU:T:2010:519��7.102 T-223/09, İŞÇİ Partisi v Commission, EU:T:2009:524�� 11.18, 11.19, 11.20 T-233/09, Access Info Europe v Council, EU:T:2011:105�� 7.141, 7.156 T-237/09, Région wallonne v Commission, EU:T:2012:38��7.18 T-259/09, Commission v Arci Nuova associazione comitato di Cagliari and Gessa, EU:T:2010:536 ��15.14 T-260/09 P, OHIM v Simões Dos Santos, EU:T:2010:461��18.03 T-261/09 P, Commission v Violetti and Others, EU:T:2010:215��16.06 T-264/09, Tecnoprocess v Commission and Delegation of the European Union to Morocco, EU:T:2011:319��8.16, 8.20, 8.23, 11.24, 11.60 T-274/09, Deutsche Bahn v OHIM –DSB, EU:T:2011:451��17.06 T-279/09, Aiello v OHIM –Cantoni ITC, EU:T:2012:367��17.06 T-284/09 P, Meister v OHIM, EU:T:2010:246��16.25 T-285/09, CEVA v Commission, EU:T:2011:479��15.13 T-286/09, Intel v Commission, EU:T:2014:547��7.195, 7.200, 18.06, 22.14 T-291/09, Carrols v OHIM –Gambettola, EU:T:2012:39��17.17 T-292/09, Mugraby v Council and Commission, EU:T:2011:418�� 8.06, 8.08, 8.16, 8.21, 11.22, 11.46 T-296/09, EFIM v Commission, EU:T:2011:693 ��7.39 T-297/09, Evropaïki Dynamiki v EASA, EU:T:2015:184��7.144 T-322/09, Al-Faqih and MIRA v Council and Commission, EU:T:2013:244��7.21 T-327/09, Connefroy and Others v Commission, EU:T:2012:155��7.123 T-332/09, Electrabel v Commission, EU:T:2012:672�� 7.42, 7.201 T-335/09, Groupement Adriano, Jaime Ribeiro, Conduril v Commission, EU:T:2011:614��25.22 T-336/09, Häfele v OHIM –Topcom Europe, EU:T:2011:10 ��24.14 T-346/09, Winzer Pharma v OHIM –Alcon, EU:T:2012:368��17.12 T-352/09, Novácke chemické závody v Commission, EU:T:2012:673��18.09 T-358/09, Sociedad Agricola Requingua v OHIM –Consejo Regulador de la Denominación de Origen Toro, EU:T:2011:174��17.17 T-367/09, Tecnoprocess v Commission, EU:T:2011:320�� 8.16, 8.20, 8.23, 11.60 T-368/09 P, Sevenier v Commission, EU:T:2010:300��16.17

cx Table of Cases T-372/09, Visti Beheer v OHIM –Meister, EU:T:2011:97��17.06 T-377/09, Mövenpick v OHIM, EU:T:2011:753��17.07 T-385/09, Annco v OHIM –Freche and fils, EU:T:2011:49 ��17.04 T-392/09 R, 1. garantovaná v Commission, EU:T:2011:63��13.13 T-396/09 R, Vereniging Milieudefensie and Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht v Commission, EU:T:2009:526��13.05 T-407/09, Neubrandenburger Wohnungsgesellschaft v Commission, EU:T:2012:1 �� 7.57, 8.22, 8.23 T-409/09, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, EU:T:2011:299�� 11.66, 11.67, 11.70 T-411/09, Terezakis v Commission, EU:T:2011:4�� 7.141, 7.145, 23.62 T-419/09, Cybergun v OHIM –Umarex Sportwaffen, EU:T:2011:121��17.12 T-430/09, İŞÇİ Partisi v Council and Commission, EU:T:2009:527 ��11.18 T-435/09 R, GL2006 Europe v Commission and OLAF, EU:T:2010:88�� 11.24, 13.20 T-436/09, Dufour v ECB, EU:T:2011:634 �� 11.23, 11.37, 11.51 T-446/09 R, Escola Superior Agrária de Coimbra v Commission, EU:T:2010:5 ��13.37 T-455/09, Jiménez Sarmiento v OHIM –Oxygène sport international, EU:T:2011:93��17.07 T-458/09 and T-171/10, Slovak Telekom v Commission, EU:T:2012:145��7.27 T-461/09, CheapFlights International v OHIM –Cheapflights, EU:T:2011:199 ��17.04 T-464/09, Commission v New Acoustic Music and Hildibrandsdottir, EU:T:2011:210�� 15.15, 22.80 T-504/09, Völkl v OHIM –Marker Völkl, EU:T:2011:739��17.05 T-508/09, Cañas v Commission, EU:T:2012:152��22.56 T-511/09, Niki Luftfahrt v Commission, EU:T:2015:284 �� 7.197, 7.211 T-512/09, Rusal Armenal v Council, EU:T:2013:571��7.215 T-528/09, Hubei Xinyegang Steel v Council, EU:T:2014:35 ��7.214 T-6/10, Sviluppo Globale v Commission, EU:T:2012:245��7.19 T-15/10 R, Noko Ngele v Commission, EU:T:2010:218��13.10 T-15/10 RII, Noko Ngele v Commission, EU:T:2010:363�� 13.02, 13.10, 13.39 T-18/10, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, EU:T:2011:419��7.03 T-18/10 R, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, EU:T:2010:172 �� 13.23, 13.31, 24.49 T-18/10 RII, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, EU:T:2010:448 �� 13.33, 13.34, 13.37 T-25/10, BASF Schweiz and BASF Lampertheim v Commission, EU:T:2011:642��25.20 T-28/10, Euro-Information v OHIM, EU:T:2011:158��17.06 T-37/10 P, De Nicola v EIB, EU:T:2012:205��16.01 T-53/10, Reisenthel v OHIM –Dynamic Promotion, EU:T:2011:601��17.15 T-58/10, Phoenix-Reisen and DRV v Commission, EU:T:2012:3 ��7.118 T-63/10, Jurašinović v Council, EU:T:2012:516��24.57 T-77/10 and T-78/10, Certmedica International v OHIM –Lehning entreprise, EU:T:2012:95 ��17.07 T-84/10, Regione Puglia v Commission, EU:T:2011:468��7.98 T-86/10, British Sugar v Commission, EU:T:2013:154 ��7.145 T-91/10, Lucchini v Commission, EU:T:2014:1033��9.08 T-94/10, Rütgers Germany and Others v ECHA, EU:T:2013:107�� 7.23, 7.24, 7.108 T-102/10, Südzucker and Others v Commission, EU:T:2013:155 ��7.144 T-110/10, Insula v Commission, EU:T:2012:289��15.19 T-119/10, Netherlands v Commission, EU:T:2017:622��7.172 T-120/10, ClientEarth and Others v Commission, EU:T:2011:646��7.68 T-134/10, FESI v Council, EU:T:2014:143�� 7.132, 7.133, 7.135 T-136/10, M v EMA, EU:T:2011:12��11.09 T-137/10, CBI v Commission, EU:T:2012:584��7.211 T-154/10, France v Commission, EU:T:2012:452�� 7.17, 7.77, 22.16 T-156/10, Confederación de Cooperativas Agrarias de España and CEPES v Commission, EU:T:2014:41��7.130

Table of Cases cxi T-162/10, Niki Luftfahrt v Commission, EU:T:2015:283 �� 7.206, 7.207 T-164/10, Pioneer Hi-Bred International v Commission, EU:T:2013:503 ��8.10, 8.21 T-170/10 and T-340/10, CTG Luxembourg PSF v Court of Justice, EU:T:2011:660 ��7.70 T-172/10, Colas v OHIM –García-Teresa Gárate and Bouffard Vicente, EU:T:2012:119 �� 17.12, 17.17 T-175/10, Milux v OHIM, EU:T:2011:99��22.56 T-177/10 R, Alcoa Trasformazioni v Commission, EU:T:2010:306��13.36 T-190/10, Egan and Hackett v Parliament, EU:T:2012:165��7.68 T-207/10, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, EU:T:2018:786 ��7.141 T-219/10, Autogrill España v Commission, EU:T:2014:939��7.53 T-219/10 RENV, World Duty Free Group v Commission, EU:T:2018:784��7.53 T-221/10, Iberdrola v Commission, EU:T:2012:112 �� 7.121, 7.123 T-224/10, Association belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats v Commission, EU:T:2011:588 �� 7.46, 7.116 T-236/10, Asociación Española de Banca v Commission, EU:T:2012:176��7.130 T-252/10, Cross Czech v Commission, EU:T:2011:324��15.13 T-257/10, Italy v Commission, EU:T:2012:504��7.176 T-262/10, Microban International and Microban (Europe) v Commission, EU:T:2011:623��7.107 T-271/10, H v Council, EU:T:2014:702��7.73 T-271/10 R, H v Council, EU:T:2010:315 �� 7.73, 13.20 T-271/10 RENV II, H v Council, EU:T:2020:548��7.191, 7.194, 11.09, 11.40, 11.53, 11.58, 22.16, 22.17, 22.19 T-273/10, Olive Line International v OHIM –Umbria Olii International, EU:T:2012:246��17.07 T-291/10, Martin v Commission, EU:T:2011:148 ��23.62 T-298/10, Arrieta D. Gross v OHIM –International Biocentric Foundation and Others, EU:T:2012:113 �� 17.11, 25.18 T-299/10 R, Babcock Noell v Fusion for Energy Joint Undertaking, EU:T:2010:334��13.29 T-300/10, Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission, EU:T:2012:247�� 7.68, 7.221 T-301/10, In ‘t Veld v Commission, EU:T:2013:135�� 24.50, 24.57 T-306/10, Yusef v Commission, EU:T:2014:141�� 8.06, 8.10, 25.20 T-308/10 P, Commission v Nanopoulos, EU:T:2012:370��16.14 T-332/10, Viaguara v OHIM –Pfizer, EU:T:2012:26��17.15 T-333/10, ATC and Others v Commission, EU:T:2014:842 �� 11.45, 25.01 T-341/10, F91 Diddeléng and Others v Commission, EU:T:2012:183��7.39 T-344/10, UPS Europe and United Parcel Service Deutschland v Commission, EU:T:2012:216 �� 8.09, 8.13, 8.22 T-346/10, Borax Europe v ECHA, EU:T:2011:510��23.52 T-353/10, Lito Maieftiko Gynaikologiko kai Cheirourgiko Kentro v Commission, EU:T:2011:589 ��15.13 T-357/10, Kraft Foods Schweiz v OHIM –Compañía Nacional de Chocolates, EU:T:2012:312 ��17.17 T-363/10, Abbott Laboratories v OHIM, EU:T:2011:662 ��17.12 T-386/10, Dornbracht v Commission, EU:T:2013:450 ��9.09 T-389/10 and T-419/10, SLM and Ori Martin v Commission, EU:T:2015:513��7.195 T-393/10 R, Westfälische Drahtindustrie and Others v Commission, EU:T:2011:178��13.04 T-398/10 R, Fapricela v Commission, EU:T:2011:395��13.32 T-400/10, Hamas v Council, EU:T:2014:1095��22.20 T-415/10, Nexans France v Fusion for Energy Joint Undertaking, EU:T:2013:141��11.24 T-416/10, Yoshida Metal Industry v OHIM –Pi-Design and Others, EU:T:2012:222��17.07 T-433/10 P, Allen and Others v Commission, EU:T:2011:744 ��16.18 T-434/10, Hrbek v OHIM –Outdoor Group, EU:T:2011:663��17.06 T-437/10, Gap granen & producten v Commission, EU:T:2013:248��11.61 T-453/10, Northern Ireland Department of Agriculture and Rural Development v Commission, EU:T:2012:106��7.98

cxii Table of Cases T-468/10, Doherty v Commission, EU:T:2011:133�� 22.73, 22.74 T-469/10, Conneely v Commission, EU:T:2011:134�� 22.73, 22.74 T-470/10, Oglesby v Commission, EU:T:2011:135�� 22.73, 22.74 T-486/10 R, Iberdrola v Commission, EU:T:2011:54��13.31 T-490/10 R, Endesa and Endesa Generación v Commission, EU:T:2011:162 �� 13.02, 13.16 T-500/10, Dorma v OHIM –Puertas Doorsa, EU:T:2011:679��17.07 T-501/10, TI Media Broadcasting and TI Media v Commission, EU:T:2012:460 ��7.18, 7.45 T-502/10, Département du Gers v Commission, EU:T:2011:156��7.105 T-511/10, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, EU:T:2014:307��7.141 T-520/10 R, Comunidad Autónoma de Galicia v Commission, EU:T:2011:56 �� 13.16, 13.37 T-533/10 R, DTS Distribuidora de Televisión Digital v Commission, EU:T:2011:263��23.12 T-539/10, Acino v Commission, EU:T:2013:110 ��7.144 T-554/10, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Frontex, EU:T:2015:224 ��7.172 T-564/10 RENV, Quimitécnica.com and de Mello v Commission, EU:T:2017:666��7.38 T-594/10 P, Marcuccio v Commission, EU:T:2012:336��16.04 T-15/11, Sina Bank v Council, EU:T:2012:661��9.08, 9.19 T-37/11, Hungary v Commission, EU:T:2012:310��7.19 T-46/11, Deutsche Lufthansa and Others v Commission, EU:T:2015:987��7.162 T-87/11, GRP Security v Court of Auditors, EU:T:2013:161��7.70 T-91/11, InnoLux v Commission, EU:T:2014:92�� 7.27, 18.04 T-105/11, Noko Ngele v Commission, EU:T:2011:332 ��7.14 T-116/11, EMA v Commission, EU:T:2013:634��11.24 T-116/11 R, EMA v Commission, EU:T:2011:681��13.33 T-128/11, LG Display and LG Display Taiwan v Commission, EU:T:2014:88 ��25.19 T-133/11, Fundația Pro Fondbis –1946 Semper v European Court of Human Rights, EU:T:2011:141 ��8.16 T-134/11, Al-Faqih and Others v Commission, EU:T:2015:812��7.84 T-149/11, GS v Parliament and Council, EU:T:2011:590��7.94, 7.95 T-156/11, Since Hardware, EU:T:2012:431�� 7.214, 7.215 T-157/11, Adămuţ and Others v Romania, EU:T:2011:201��24.13 T-176/11 R, Carbunión v Council, EU:T:2011:710 ��13.38 T-186/11, Schönberger v Parliament, EU:T:2013:111��16.28 T-187/11 R, Trabelsi and Others v Council, EU:T:2011:384��13.10 T-195/11, Cahier and Others v Council and Commission, EU:T:2015:161 �� 13.10, 13.36 T-217/11 REV, Staelen v Ombudsman, EU:T:2017:861�� 25.43, 25.45 T-218/11, Dagher v Council, EU:T:2012:82 ��7.145 T-228/11 P, Barbin v Parliament, EU:T:2012:701��22.07 T-234/11 P, Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB, EU:T:2012:311�� 20.01, 20.02, 20.05 T-243/11, Glaxo Group v OHIM –Farmodiética, EU:T:2011:649��22.56 T-245/11, ClientEarth and International Chemical Secretariat v ECHA, EU:T:2015:675��23.09 T-264/11 P, De Nicola v EIB, EU:T:2013:461��16.18 T-268/11 P, Commission v Strack, EU:T:2012:588�� 20.01, 20.02 T-269/11 R, Xeda International v Commission, EU:T:2011:665 �� 13.34, 13.35 T-278/11, ClientEarth and Others v Commission, EU:T:2012:593��7.12, 7.68 T-279/11, T & L Sugars and Sidul Açúcares v Commission, EU:T:2016:683�� 11.42, 11.45 T-289/11, T-290/11 and T-521/11, Deutsche Bahn and Others v Commission, EU:T:2013:404 �� 7.28, 23.06, 23.17 T-292/11 R, Cemex and Others v Commission, EU:T:2011:402 ��13.22 T-301/11, Ben Ali v Council, EU:T:2012:4 ��18.02 T-319/11, ABN Amro Group v Commission, EU:T:2014:186 ��7.180 T-330/11, MasterCard and Others v Commission, EU:T:2012:27��7.10 T-331/11, Besselink v Council, EU:T:2013:419�� 23.52, 24.49 T-333/11, Wessang v OHIM –Greinwald, EU:T:2012:536��17.06 T-347/11 R, Gollnisch v Parliament, EU:T:2011:554��13.04

Table of Cases cxiii T-352/11, N’Guessan v Council, EU:T:2011:375 ��7.151 T-366/11, Bial-Portela v OHIM –Isdin, EU:T:2012:527��17.06 T-369/11, Diadikasia Symvouloi Epicheiriseon v Commission and Others, EU:T:2012:425 ��11.22, 11.24, 11.29, 22.15 T-370/11, Poland v Commission, EU:T:2013:113 ��22.15 T-387/11, Nitrogénművek Vegyipari v Commission, EU:T:2013:98��7.210 T-388/11, Deutsche Post v Commission, EU:T:2019:237�� 7.53, 7.141 T-395/11, Elti v Delegation of the European Union to Montenegro, EU:T:2012:274�� 7.73, 11.24 T-400/11, Altadis v Commission, EU:T:2013:490 ��7.121 T-401/11 P, Missir Mamachi di Lusignano v Commission, EU:T:2014:625 �� 16.28, 20.01, 20.02 T-402/11 R, Preparados Alimenticios del Sur v Commission, EU:T:2011:728�� 13.19, 13.36 T-418/11 P, De Nicola v EIB, EU:T:2013:478�� 16.01, 16.18 T-421/11, Qualitest v Council, EU:T:2012:646��22.20 T-422/11, Computer Resources International, EU:T:2014:927��22.10 T-441/11, Peftiev v Council, EU:T:2014:1041��22.20 T-442/11, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, EU:T:2012:566�� 7.19, 23.58 T-443/11, Gold East Paper and Gold Huasheng Paper v Council, EU:T:2014:774��7.214 T-451/11, Gigabyte Technology v OHIM –Haskins, EU:T:2013:13 ��17.17 T-471/11, Éditions Odile Jacob v Commission, EU:T:2014:739�� 7.141, 7.206, 23.03 T-471/11 R, Éditions Jacob v Commission, EU:T:2011:695 ��13.38 T-479/11 and T-157/12, France v Commission, EU:T:2016:320�� 7.188, 7.210 T-488/11, Sarc v Commission, EU:T:2014:497��7.122 T-489/11 R, Rousse Industry v Commission, EU:T:2011:597��7.197 T-497/11, Euro-Information v OHIM, EU:T:2012:402��17.06 T-531/11, Hamas v Council, EU:T:2012:317��23.57 T-534/11, Schenker v Commission, EU:T:2014:854 ��7.177 T-546/11, Technion and Technion Research & Development Foundation v Commission, EU:T:2012:303��15.13 T-551/11, BSI v Council, EU:T:2013:60��7.132 T-559/11, BytyOKD v Commission, EU:T:2013:255��7.127 T-572/11 R, Hassan v Council, EU:T:2012:83��13.33 T-589/11, Phonebook of the World v OHIM –Seat Pagine Gialle, EU:T:2012:609��17.08 T-601/11, Dansk Automat Brancheforening v Commission, EU:T:2014:839��7.127 T-601/11 R, Dansk Automat Brancheforening v Commission, EU:T:2012:66��13.37 T-607/11 R, Henkel and Henkel France v Commission, EU:T:2012:22��13.02, 13.05, 13.11, 13.28 T-643/11, Crown Equipment (Suzhou) and Crown Gabelstapler v Council, EU:T:2014:1076��7.133 T-644/11 P, Kimman v Commission, EU:T:2014:613 ��16.26 T-1/12, France v Commission, EU:T:2015:17��7.210 T-12/12, Laboratoires CTRS v Commission, EU:T:2012:343��8.17, 8.20 T-15/12 and T-16/12, Provincie Groningen and Others v Commission, EU:T:2013:74��7.119 T-17/12, Hagenmeyer and Hahn v Commission, EU:T:2014:234 ��7.180 T-43/12, Hamcho and Hamcho International v Council, EU:T:2014:946��7.15 T-50/12, AMC-Representações Têxteis v OHIM –MIP Metro, EU:T:2013:68��17.08 T-52/12, Greece v Commission, EU:T:2014:677��9.09 T-52/12 R, Greece v Commission, EU:T:2012:447��13.31 T-53/12, CF Sharp Shipping Agencies v Council, EU:T:2012:578�� 7.149, 22.20 T-62/12, ClientEarth v Council, EU:T:2012:525�� 7.68, 23.58 T-67/12, Sina Bank v Council, EU:T:2014:348�� 7.03, 10.04 T-79/12, Cisco Systems and Messagenet v Commission, EU:T:2013:635��7.141 T-91/12, Flying Holding and Others v Commission, EU:T:2014:832 ��7.176 T-103/12, T & L Sugars and Sidul Açúcares v Commission, EU:T:2016:682�� 11.42, 11.45 T-107/12, LTTE v Council, EU:T:2012:543��22.23 T-140/12, Teva Pharma and Teva Pharmaceuticals Europe v EMA, EU:T:2015:41�� 9.03, 9.09, 22.16

cxiv Table of Cases T-143/12, Germany v Commission, EU:T:2016:406 ��7.192 T-146/12 AJ, CS v Court of Justice and Ombudsman, EU:T:2012:393��5.35 T-168/12, Georgias and Others v Council and Commission, EU:T:2014:781 ��9.17 T-175/12, Deutsche Börse v Commission, EU:T:2015:148�� 7.205, 7.206, 7.207 T-177/12, Spraylat v ECHA, EU:T:2014:849��9.09 T-190/12, Tomana and Others v Council and Commission, EU:T:2015:222��7.180 T-193/12, MIP Metro v OHIM –Holsten-Brauerei, EU:T:2015:44��13.04 T-198/12, Germany v Commission, EU:T:2014:251 ��7.17 T-198/12 R, Germany v Commission, EU:T:2013:245��13.02 T-227/12, Saobraćajni institut CIP v Commission, EU:T:2012:569��25.18 T-234/12, Amitié v Commission, EU:T:2015:601��15.17 T-242/12, SNCF v Commission, EU:T:2015:1003 ��7.188 T-250/12, Corporación Empresarial de Materiales de Construcción v Commission, EU:T:2015:749 ��7.141 T-264/12, UTi Worldwide and Others v Commission, EU:T:2016:112��7.199 T-275/12, FC Dynamo-Minsk v Council, EU:T:2015:747��7.149 T-276/12, Chyzh and Others v Council, EU:T:2015:748��22.20 T-293/12, Syria International Islamic Bank v Council, EU:T:2014:439��7.144 T-296/12, Health Food Manufacturers’ Association and Others v Commission, EU:T:2015:375 �� 7.108, 7.110, 9.09 T-317/12, Holcim (Romania) v Commission, EU:T:2014:782��11.34 T-318/12, Communicaid Group v Commission, EU:T:2012:508��23.54 T-367/12, MOL v OHIM –Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, EU:T:2013:336��17.15 T-400/12, Hârsulescu v Romania, EU:T:2012:595��22.23 T-427/12, Austria v Commission, EU:T:2016:41��7.51 T-432/12, VTZ and Others v Council, EU:T:2015:248 ��7.179 T-461/12, Hansestadt Lübeck v Commission, EU:T:2014:758�� 7.210, 7.126 T-462/12 R, Pilkington Group v Commission, EU:T:2013:119 ��23.12 T-507/12, Slovenia v Commission, EU:T:2016:35 ��7.180 T-517/12, Alro v Commission, EU:T:2014:890��7.53 T-530/12 P, Bermejo Garde v EESC, EU:T:2014:860��16.04 T-532/12, Morea v Commission, EU:T:2012:703��23.54 T-539/12 and T-150/13, Ziegler and Ziegler Relocation v Commission, EU:T:2015:15 ��11.13, 11.15, 11.27, 11.60, 11.61 T-543/12, Grau Ferrer v OHIM –Rubio Ferrer, EU:T:2014:911��17.12 T-2/13, CFE-CGC France Télécom-Orange v Commission, EU:T:2014:226��7.130 T-7/13, ADEAS v Commission, EU:T:2014:221��7.106 T-79/13, Accorinti and Others v ECB, EU:T:2015:756��11.11, 11.13, 11.14, 11.23 T-82/13, Panasonic Corp. and MT Picture Display v Commission, EU:T:2015:612�� 7.30, 7.203 T-84/13, Samsung SDI and Others v Commission, EU:T:2015:611�� 7.199, 7.201 T-102/13, Heli-Flight v EASA, EU:T:2014:1064�� 8.16, 8.17, 11.24 T-104/13, Toshiba v Commission, EU:T:2015:610��7.201 T-106/13, Synergy Hellas v Commission, EU:T:2015:860��11.08, 11.18, 15.10, 15.20 T-118/13, Whirlpool Europe v Commission, EU:T:2016:365�� 7.124, 7.125 T-120/13, Codacons v Commission, EU:T:2013:287��22.56 T-126/13, Direct Way and Directway Worldwide v Parliament, EU:T:2015:819�� 7.141, 7.159 T-129/13, Alpiq RomIndustries and Alpiq RomEnergie v Commission, EU:T:2014:895��7.160 T-155/13, Zanjani v Council, EU:T:2014:605��7.162 T-167/13, Comune di Milano v Commission, EU:T:2018:940�� 7.126, 7.144 T-194/13, United Parcel Service v Commission, EU:T:2017:144��25.20 T-208/13, Portugal Telecom v Commission, EU:T:2016:368 ��18.03 T-209/13, Olive Line International v OHIM, EU:T:2014:216��7.204 T-214/13, Typke v Commission, EU:T:2015:448 ��7.09 T-216/13, Telefónica v Commission, EU:T:2016:369�� 7.199, 7.200

List of Abbreviations AG A.J.C.L. Cambridge J.I.C.L. C.D.E. CFSP Charter CJ Practice Directions

Advocate General American Journal of Comparative Law Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law Cahiers de droit européen Common Foreign and Security Policy Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union Practice directions to parties concerning cases brought before the Court of Justice CJ Rules of Procedure Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice CJ Supplementary Rules Supplementary Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice C.M.L.Rev. Common Market Law Review Col. J. Eur. L. Columbia Journal of European Law CPVO Community Plant Variety Office C.Y.E.L.S. Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies EAEC European Atomic Energy Community E.B.L. Rev. European Business Law Review EC European Community ECB European Central Bank ECHR European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms E. Const. L. Rev. European Constitutional Law Review ECR European Court Reports ECSC European Coal and Steel Community EEA European Economic Area EEC European Economic Community E.F.A. Rev. European Foreign Affairs Review EFTA European Free Trade Association EIB European Investment Bank E.J.I.L European Journal of International Law E.J.L.S. European Journal of Legal Studies E.L.J. European Law Journal E.L.Rep. European Law Reporter E.L.Rev. European Law Review E.P.L. European Public Law EPSO European Personnel Selection Office E. Rev. Priv. L. European Review of Private Law E.R.P.L./R.E.D.P. European Review of Public Law/Revue européenne de droit public EU European Union EuGRZ Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift EUIPO European Union Intellectual Property Office Fordham I.L.J. Fordham International Law Journal

cxlii List of Abbreviations GATS GATT GC Practice Rules GC Rules of Procedure G.L.J. I.C.L.Q. I.O.L.Rev. J.D.E. J.D.I. J.E.C.L. & Pract. J.T. J.W.T. MEP M.J.E.C.L. Mod.L.Rev. OJ OLAF PJCCM R.A.E. REALaw R.G.D.I.P. R.M.U.E. R.T.D.E. S.E.W. SRB SRF SRM SSM Statute TBP TEU TFEU VAT WTO Y.E.L. Z.ö.R

General Agreement on Trade in Services General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Practice Rules for the implementation of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court Rules of Procedure of the General Court German Law Journal International and Comparative Law Quarterly International Organizations Law Review Journal de droit européen Journal de droit international Journal of European Competition Law & Practice Journal des tribunaux Journal of World Trade Member of the European Parliament Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law Modern Law Review Official Journal European Anti-Fraud Office Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters Revue des affaires européennes Review of European Administrative Law Revue générale de droit international public Revue du Marché Unique européen Revue trimestrielle de droit européen SEW–Tijdschrift voor Europees en economisch recht Single Resolution Board Single Resolution Fund Single Resolution Mechanism Single Supervisory Mechanism Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union Tijdschrift voor bestuurswetenschappen en publiekrecht Treaty on European Union Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Value Added Tax World Trade Organization Yearbook of European Law Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht

Table of Cases cxv T-244/13, Industrie Cartarie Tronchetti Ibérica v Commission, EU:T:2014:644��7.96 T-276/13, Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association v Council, EU:T:2016:340 �� 7.08, 23.03 T-276/13 RENV, Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association v Council, EU:T:2019:811 �� 7.08, 7.141 T-294/13, Fialtor v Commission and ECB, EU:T:2014:980��11.60 T-305/13, SACE and Sace BT v Commission, EU:T:2015:435 ��7.210 T-316/13, Pappalardo and Others v Commission, EU:T:2016:247 ��11.60 T-323/13, Pure Fishing v EUIPO –Łabowicz, EU:T:2017:175��7.193 T-336/13, Borghezio v Parliament, EU:T:2014:763��7.74 T-351/13, Crown Equipment (Suzhou) and Crown Gabelstapler v Council, EU:T:2016:616 �� 7.133, 7.135, 7.159 T-355/13, easyJet Airline v Commission, EU:T:2015:36��8.22 T-392/13, La Ferla v Commission and ECHA, EU:T:2016:478��9.01, 9.19 T-393/13, SolarWorld and Solsonica v Commission, EU:T:2015:211��11.18 T-403/13, APRAM v Commission, EU:T:2015:317��7.98 T-410/13, Bitiqi and Others v Commission and Others, EU:T:2014:871 ��15.03 T-413/13, City Cycle Industries v Council, EU:T:2015:164��23.03 T-422/13, CPME and Others v Council, EU:T:2017:251��7.214, 7.215, 11.38, 11.54 T-425/13, Giant, EU:T:2015:896��25.20 T-429/13, Bayer CropScience v Commission, EU:T:2018:280��7.110 T-462/13, Comunidad Autónoma del País Vasco and Itelazpi v Commission, EU:T:2015:902 �� 7.126, 7.140 T-483/13, Oikonomopoulos v Commission, EU:T:2016:421�� 11.37, 11.71 T-483/13 R, Oikonomopoulos v Commission, EU:T:2013:614 ��11.55 T-484/13, Lumene v OHIM, EU:T:2014:963��7.162 T-507/13, SolarWorld and Others v Commission, EU:T:2015:23 �� 7.132, 7.135 T-516/13, CW v Council , EU:T:2016:377��11.61 T-544/13 RENV, Dyson v Commission, EU:T:2018:761��7.217 T-546/13, T-108/14 and T-109/14, Šumelj and Others v Commission, EU:T:2016:107 �� 11.41, 11.45 T-552/13, Oil Turbo Compressor v Council, EU:T:2015:805��7.11, 8.06 T-570/13, Agriconsulting Europe v Commission, EU:T:2016:40�� 11.52, 11.57 T-599/13, Cosmowell v OHIM –Haw Par, EU:T:2015:262��25.24 T-641/13, Gemeente Bergen op Zoom v Commission, EU:T:2014:670��25.19 T-690/13, In vivo v Commission, EU:T:2015:519�� 8.09, 8.13, 8.16 T-38/14, Kafetzakis and Others v Parliament and Others, EU:T:2015:785��8.17 T-67/14, Viraj Profiles v Council, EU:T:2017:481��7.215 T-75/14, USFSPEI v Parliament and Council, EU:T:2017:813��11.13, 11.15, 22.68, 22.69 T-76/14, Morningstar v Commission, EU:T:2016:481��7.113 T-79/14, Secop v Commission, EU:T:2016:118 ��7.212 T-103/14, Frucona Košice v Commission, EU:T:2016:152�� 7.57, 7.162 T-104/14 P, Commission v Verile and Gjergji, EU:T:2015:776�� 16.04, 22.19 T-104/14 P-INT, Commission v Verile and Gjergji, EU:T:2017:37�� 25.53, 25.56 T-112/14 to T-116/14 and T-119/14, Molinos Río de la Plata and Others v Council, EU:T:2016:509 ��7.106, 7.133, 7.136, 10.11 T-128/14, Daimler v Commission, EU:T:2018:643 ��7.32, 7.69 T-129/14 P, Andres and Others v ECB, EU:T:2016:267��20.01 T-138/14, Chart v EEAS, EU:T:2015:981�� 11.24, 11.45, 11.60, 11.63, 11.64, 11.66, 11.68 T-141/14, SolarWorld and Others v Council, EU:T:2016:67��7.217 T-157/14, JingAo Solar and Others v Council, EU:T:2017:127��7.141 T-164/14, Calberson GE v Commission, EU:T:2016:85 ��15.17 T-168/14, Pérez Gutiérrez v Commission, EU:T:2015:607��11.53 T-172/14 R, Stahlwerk Bous v Commission, EU:T:2014:558 ��13.31 T-189/14, Deza v ECHA, EU:T:2017:4��7.177

cxvi Table of Cases T-199/14, Vanbreda Risk & Benefits v Commission, EU:T:2016:532�� 11.45, 11.58 T-217/14 R, Gmina Kosakowo v Commission, EU:T:2014:734��13.36 T-219/14, Regione autonoma della Sardegna v Commission, EU:T:2017:266�� 7.77, 7.78, 7.126, 7.141, 9.09 T-220/14, Saremar v Commission, EU:T:2017:267 ��7.141 T-231/14 P, EMA v Drakeford, EU:T:2015:639��18.03 T-234/14, Mammoet Salvage v Commission, EU:T:2015:166��8.20 T-238/14, EGBA and RGA v Commission, EU:T:2016:259 �� 7.127, 7.130 T-284/14, Dyckerhoff Polska v Commission, EU:T:2015:264��7.158 T-299/14, AETP v Commission, EU:T:2014:612��8.17 T-312/14, Federcoopesca and Others v Commission, EU:T:2015:472��7.107 T-328/14, Jannatian v Council, EU:T:2016:86��7.144 T-346/14, Yanukovych v Council, EU:T:2016:497��9.06 T-347/14, Yanukovych v Council, EU:T:2016:433�� 7.144, 22.20 T-347/14 INTP, Yanukovych v Council, EU:T:2017:580�� 25.56, 25.57 T-348/14, Yanukovych v Council, EU:T:2016:508��9.06 T-350/14, Arvanitis and Others v Parliament and Others, EU:T:2015:790��8.17 T-374/14, Bharat Heavy Electricals v Commission, EU:T:2014:931 ��5.49 T-386/14, Fih Holding and Fih Erhversbank v Commission, EU:T:2016:474 �� 7.210, 7.212 T-386/14 RENV, FIH Holding and FIH v Commission, EU:T:2019:623��7.142 T-409/14, Marcuccio v European Union, EU:T:2015:18��11.22 T-412/14, Larko v Commission, EU:T:2018:55 ��7.142 T-413/14, Grigoriadis and Others v Parliament and Others, EU:T:2015:786��8.17 T-419/14, The Goldman Sachs Group v Commission, EU:T:2018:445��7.201 T-436/14, Neka Novin v Council, EU:T:2017:142 ��22.70 T-448/14, Hitachi Metals v Commission, EU:T:2018:442��7.203 T-449/14, Nexans France and Nexans v Commission, EU:T:2018:456��7.203 T-452/14, Laboratoires CTRS v Commission, EU:T:2015:373��7.17 T-468/14, Holistic Innovation Institute v Commission, EU:T:2016:296�� 11.14, 11.59 T-479/14, Kendrion v European Union, EU:T:2015:2��11.22 T-481/14, European Dynamics Luxembourg and Evropaïki Dynamiki v EIT, EU:T:2016:498 ��7.67, 7.68 T-493/14, Mayer v EFSA, EU:T:2017:100 ��22.18 T-512/14, Green Source Poland v Commission, EU:T:2017:299 ��7.97, 7.98 T-521/14, Sweden v Commission, EU:T:2015:976�� 8.01, 8.06, 8.21, 8.25 T-531/14, Sotiropoulou and Others v Council, EU:T:2017:297�� 11.29, 11.42 T-554/14, Messi Cuccittini v EUIPO –J-M.-E.V. e hijos, EU:T:2018:230��17.15 T-561/14, One of Us and Others v Commission, EU:T:2018:210��7.159, 7.172, 23.09, 25.23 T-567/14, Group v EUIPO –Iliev, EU:T:2016:371��17.12 T-574/14, EAEPC v Commission, EU:T:2018:605��7.39, 7.201, 7.217, 7.223 T-575/14, Larymnis Larko v Commission, EU:T:2016:168��7.143 T-576/14, Larymnis Larko v Commission, EU:T:2016:169��7.143 T-577/14, Gascogne Sack Deutschland and Gascogne v European Union, EU:T:2017:1��11.22 T-578/14, VSM Geneesmiddelen v Commission, EU:T:2015:715��8.23 T-632/14, Intercon v Commission, EU:T:2016:526��15.16 T-639/14, DEI v Commission, EU:T:2016:77�� 7.57, 7.119, 7.125 T-639/14 RENV, T‑352/15 and T‑740/17, DEI v Commission, EU:T:2021:604 ��7.57, 7.119, 7.125, 7.141 T-664/14, Belgium v Commission, EU:T:2018:890��7.141 T-670/14, Milchindustrie-Verband and Deutscher Raiffeisenverband v Commission, EU:T:2015:906 ��7.127 T-673/14, Italy v Commission, EU:T:2015:969��7.53 T-677/14, Biogaran v Commission, EU:T:2018:910��7.201 T-691/14, Servier and Others v Commission, EU:T:2018:922��7.18, 7.170, 7.202, 7.223, 24.47

Table of Cases cxvii T-693/14, Hamr –Sport v Commission, EU:T:2016:292��7.119 T-694/14, EREF v Commission, EU:T:2015:915��7.97 T-705/14, Unichem Laboratories v Commission, EU:T:2018:915�� 7.167, 7.172 T-708/14, Marpefa v OHIM –Sony Computer Entertainment, EU:T:2015:93��24.13 T-711/14, Arcofin and Others v Commission, EU:T:2018:80�� 7.141, 7.143 T-713/14, IPSO v ECB, EU:T:2016:727��7.158 T-715/14, Rosneft and Others v Council, EU:T:2018:544��7.190 T-725/14, Aalberts Industries v European Union, EU:T:2017:47��11.22 T-726/14, Novar v EUIPO, EU:T:2017:99�� 11.24, 11.38, 11.60 T-735/14, Gazprom Neft v Council, EU:T:2018:548 �� 7.03, 9.06, 10.04 T-737/14 R, Vnesheconombank v Council, EU:T:2017:681�� 13.24, 13.27 T-744/14, Meta Group v Commission, EU:T:2017:304��15.20 T-758/14, Infineon Technologies v Commission, EU:T:2016:737�� 7.188, 18.05 T-771/14, ANKO v Commission, EU:T:2017:27 ��15.19 T-787/14 P, ECB v Cerafogli, EU:T:2016:633 ��9.01, 9.03, 9.09, 9.18, 9.20, 16.26 T-798/14, DenizBank v Council, EU:T:2018:546�� 7.94, 7.188, 9.06 T-808/14, Spain v Commission, EU:T:2016:734�� 7.172, 22.16 T-812/14, BPC Lux 2 and Others v Commission, EU:T:2017:560 ��7.118 T-812/14 RENV, BPC Lux 2 and Others v Commission, EU:T:2019:885 �� 7.109, 7.118, 7.119 T-814/14, Banco Espírito Santo v Commission, EU:T:2015:936 ��7.217 T-817/14, Zoofachhandel Züpke and Others v Commission, EU:T:2016:157�� 11.47, 11.48 T-826/14 R, Spain v Commission, EU:T:2015:126��13.29 T-827/14, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, EU:T:2018:930 ��22.15 T-828/14, Antrax It v EUIPO –Vasco Group, EU:T:2017:87 ��9.02 T-831/14, Alfamicro v Commission, EU:T:2017:804�� 15.13, 15.20 T-832/14, Nutria v Commission, EU:T:2016:428��8.18, 8.21, 8.23, 8.24, 11.14, 11.42, 11.70 T-851/14, Slovak Telekom v Commission, EU:T:2018:929�� 7.176, 7.204 T-9/15, Ball Europe v EUIPO –Crown Hellas Can, EU:T:2017:386 ��25.19 T-40/15, ASPLA and Armando Álvarez v European Union, EU:T:2017:105�� 11.63, 11.68, 25.03 T-55/15, Certified Angus Beef v EUIPO –Certified Australian Angus Beef, EU:T:2017:499��22.13 T-61/15, 1&1 Internet v OHIM –Unoe Bank, EU:T:2016:115��11.29 T-65/15, Talanton v Commission, EU:T:2017:491��15.20 T-66/15, Alsharghawi v Council, EU:T:2015:716��8.23 T-68/15, HH Ferries and Others v Commission, EU:T:2018:563�� 7.48, 7.53, 7.57, 7.59, 7.159, 7.210, 7.211, 7.212 T-74/15, European Dynamics Luxembourg and Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, EU:T:2017:55 ��22.15 T-76/15, Kenup Foundation and Others v EIT, EU:T:2018:9 ��7.141 T-95/15, Printeos and Others v Commission, EU:T:2016:722��7.202 T-103/15, Flabeg Deutschland v Commission, EU:T:2019:470 ��25.20 T-104/15, KV v Commission, EU:T:2018:360��7.162 T-112/15, Greece v Commission, EU:T:2017:239 ��22.13 T-113/15, RFA International v Commission, EU:T:2018:783��7.214 T-117/15, Estonia v Commission, EU:T:2017:217��7.11, 7.19 T-120/15, Proforec v Commission, EU:T:2016:50��7.143 T-121/15, Fortischem v Commission, EU:T:2019:684��7.210 T-149/15, Ben Ali v Council, EU:T:2017:693 �� 22.16, 22.20, 24.38 T-161/15, Brinkmann (Steel Trading) and Others v Commission and ECB, EU:T:2021:132��11.29 T-161/15, Brinkmann (Steel Trading) and Others v Commission and ECB, EU:T:2022:96��11.25 T-165/15, Ryanair and Airport Marketing Services v Commission, EU:T:2018:953��7.210 T-175/15, Mabrouk v Council, EU:T:2017:694��22.20 T-184/15, Trivisio Prototyping v Commission, EU:T:2016:652��15.13 T-185/15, Buonotourist v Commission, EU:T:2018:430��7.53 T-187/15, Compagnia Trasporti Pubblici and Others v Commission, EU:T:2015:846�� 7.123, 7.129

cxviii Table of Cases T-207/15 R, National Iranian Tanker Company v Council, EU:T:2015:535��13.38 T-231/15, Haswani v Council, EU:T:2017:200��22.20 T-235/15 R, Pari Pharma v EMA, EU:T:2016:309 ��13.14 T-238/15, Novartis v EUIPO –Meda, EU:T:2017:636��17.05 T-241/15 R, Buga v Parliament and Others, EU:T:2015:391�� 13.05, 13.19, 13.23 T-242/15, ACDA and Others v Commission, EU:T:2017:6�� 7.121, 7.127 T-245/15, Klymenko v Council, EU:T:2017:792��22.13 T-246/15, Ivanyushchenko v Council, EU:T:2017:789 �� 7.08, 7.144 T-260/15 R, Iberdrola v Commission, EU:T:2018:87��13.35 T-263/15, Gmina Miasto Gdynia and Port Lotniczy Gdynia Kosakowo v Commission, EU:T:2017:820 �� 22.17, 23.03 T-274/15, Alcogroup and Alcodis v Commission, EU:T:2018:179 �� 11.12, 23.09 T-284/15, AlzChem v Commission, EU:T:2018:950�� 7.98, 7.125, 7.210 T-286/15, KF v SatCen, EU:T:2018:718��7.160, 9.09, 9.18, 11.37, 16.29 T-288/15, Ezz and Others v Council, EU:T:2018:619��9.16 T-289/15, Hamas v Council, EU:T:2019:138��7.188 T-292/15, Vakakis kai Synergates v Commission, EU:T:2019:84��11.13, 11.14, 11.45, 11.49, 11.51, 11.52, 11.56, 11.58, 11.59, 11.60, 11.71 T-299/15, Nova v Commission, EU:T:2018:713��15.13 T-306/15 and T-484/15, KV v EACEA, EU:T:2018:359��15.13 T-332/15, Ocean Capital Administration and Others v Council, EU:T:2020:308 ��9.01 T-351/15, Papapanagiotou v Parliament, EU:T:2017:45��7.144 T-354/15, Allergopharma v Commission, EU:T:2018:201 ��7.121 T-356/15, Austria v Commission, EU:T:2018:439��7.210 T-364/15, ADR Center v Commission, EU:T:2021:593�� 22.16, 22.19 T-368/15, Alcimos Consulting v ECB, EU:T:2016:438 ��7.141 T-376/15, KK v EASME, EU:T:2017:330��11.24 T-381/15, IMG v Commission, EU:T:2017:57 ��11.55 T-392/15, European Dynamics Luxembourg and Others v European Union Agency for Railways, EU:T:2017:462��7.141 T-403/15, JYSK v Commission, EU:T:2017:300��7.98 T-405/15, Fulmen v Council, EU:T:2019:469�� 11.53, 11.58 T-406/15, Mahmoudian v Council, EU:T:2019:468�� 11.53, 11.58 T-433/15, Bank Saderat v Council, EU:T:2019:374 �� 11.40, 11.49 T-434/15, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Others v Council, EU:T:2019:307 �� 11.42, 11.49 T-436/15 R, Consorzio Vivaisti viticoli pugliesi and Negro v Commission, EU:T:2015:665 ��13.37 T-477/15, European Dynamics Luxembourg and Others v ECHA, EU:T:2018:52 ��11.24 T-480/15, Agria Polska and Others v Commission, EU:T:2017:339 �� 7.39, 7.88, 8.22 T-492/15, Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission, EU:T:2019:252 ��7.93 T-515/15, Almaz-Antey v Council, EU:T:2018:545��22.20 T-522/15 R, CCPL and Others v Commission, EU:T:2015:1012 ��13.32 T-530/15, Huhtamäki and Huhtamaki Flexible Packaging Germany v Commission, EU:T:2019:498 ��18.03 T-540/15, De Capitani v Parliament, EU:T:2018:167��7.141 T-542/15, Hungary v Commission, EU:T:2017:699��7.141 T-544/15, Terna v Commission, EU:T:2016:513��7.23 T-554/15, Hungary v Commission, EU:T:2018:220��7.53 T-556/15, Portugal v Commission, EU:T:2016:239��22.67 T-558/15, Iran Insurance v Council, EU:T:2018:945��11.03, 11.40, 11.45, 11.53, 11.59 T-559/15, Post Bank Iran v Council, EU:T:2018:948��11.03, 11.40, 11.45, 11.53 T-584/15 R, POA v Commission, EU:T:2015:946 ��13.37 T-590/15, Onix Asigurări v EIOPA, EU:T:2016:374�� 8.16, 8.23, 22.13

Table of Cases cxix T-595/15, Europäischer Tier-und Naturschutz and Giesen v Commission, EU:T:2016:362��8.20 T-596/15, Batmore Capital v EUIPO –Univers Poche, EU:T:2017:103��22.23 T-598/15, Stichting Accolade v Commission, EU:T:2016:686 �� 7.122, 7.125 T-601/15, CEVA v Commission, EU:T:2016:316��15.13 T-602/15, Jenkinson v Council and Others, EU:T:2016:660��11.03, 11.08, 15.17, 15.18 T-607/15, Yieh United Steel v Commission, EU:T:2019:831�� 7.190, 7.215 T-611/15, Edeka-Handelsgesellschaft Hessenring v Commission, EU:T:2018:63�� 7.139, 8.17, 8.20 T-615/15, LL v Parliament, EU:T:2016:432��16.18 T-616/15, Transtec, EU:T:2018:399�� 11.11, 11.53 T-618/15, Voigt v Parliament, EU:T:2017:821�� 7.143, 7.193, 24.39 T-630/15, Scandlines Danmark and Scandlines Deutschland v Commission, EU:T:2018:942 ��7.211 T-673/15, Guardian Europe v European Union, EU:T:2017:377�� 11.22, 11.63, 25.03 T-692/15, HTTS v Council, EU:T:2017:890 ��11.38 T-712/15, Crédit mutuel Arkéa v ECB, EU:T:2017:900�� 7.137, 7.141, 7.192 T-725/15, Arysta LifeScience Netherlands v EFSA, EU:T:2018:977��22.13 T-727/15, Justice & Environment v Commission, EU:T:2017:18��7.68 T-729/15 R, MSD Animal Health Innovation and Intervet international v EMA, EU:T:2016:426 ��13.14 T-732/15 R, ICA Laboratories and Others v Commission, EU:T:2016:129��13.39 T-746/15, Biofa v Commission, EU:T:2016:658��7.94 T-749/15, Nausicaa Anadyomène and Banque d’escompte v ECB, EU:T:2017:21�� 11.23, 11.45 T-750/15, Mitteldeutsche Braunkohlengesellschaft and Others v Commission, EU:T:2016:534 ��7.142 T-755/15 and T-759/15, Luxembourg and Fiat Chrysler Finance Europe v Commission, EU:T:2019:670 ��22.13 T-760/15, Netherlands v Commission, EU:T:2019:669��7.210 T-771/15, Hochmann Marketing v EUIPO –BitTorrent, EU:T:2017:887��17.13 T-772/15, Quanta Storage v Commission, EU:T:2019:519�� 7.201, 18.02, 18.04 T-1/16, Hitachi-LG Data Storage and Hitachi-LG Data Storage Korea v Commission, EU:T:2019:514 �� 7.203, 18.03, 18.06 T-10/16, GABO:mi v Commission, EU:T:2018:600�� 15.12, 15.20, 22.20 T-10/16 R, GABO:mi v Commission, EU:T:2016:197�� 13.23, 13.33, 13.36 T-11/16, De Masi v Commission, EU:T:2017:385 ��7.68, 7.69 T-22/16, Comprojecto-Projectos e Construções and Others v ECB, EU:T:2017:172 ��8.23 T-41/16, Cyprus Turkish Chamber of Industry and Others v Commission, EU:T:2016:613��7.23 T-43/16, 1&1 Telecom v Commission, EU:T:2018:660��7.47 T-47/16, Sigma Orionis v REA, EU:T:2018:247��13.36 T-47/16 R, Sigma Orionis v REA, EU:T:2017:584 �� 13.07, 13.10, 13.29 T-48/16, Sigma Orionis v Commission, EU:T:2018:245��7.141, 11.08, 15.08, 15.10, 15.20 T-48/16 R, Sigma Orionis v Commission, EU:T:2017:585 �� 13.07, 13.10 T-52/16, Crédit mutuel Arkéa v ECB, EU:T:2017:902�� 7.137, 7.141 T-69/16, Ateknea Solutions Catalonia v Commission, EU:T:2019:121��15.20 T-79/16, Vereniging Gelijkberechtiging Grondbezitters and Others v Commission, EU:T:2018:680 ��7.119 T-84/16, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena and Banca Widiba v EUIPO –ING-DIBa, EU:T:2017:661 ��17.15 T-97/16, Kasztantowicz v EUIPO –Gbb Group, EU:T:2017:298��17.05 T-99/16, De Nicola v Court of Justice, EU:T:2017:790��22.14 T-101/16, Klausner Holz Niedersachsen v Commission, EU:T:2017:269��8.21, 8.22 T-108/16, Naviera Armas v Commission, EU:T:2018:145 ��7.56 T-116/16, Port autonome du Centre and de l’Ouest and Others v Commission, EU:T:2016:656 ��7.49 T-125/16, Léon Van Parys v Commission, EU:T:2017:884��7.221

cxx Table of Cases T-131/16 R, Belgium v Commission, EU:T:2016:427 �� 13.29, 13.32, 13.37 T-137/16, Uniwersytet Wrocławski v REA, EU:T:2017:407 ��19.16 T-140/16, Le Pen v Parliament, EU:T:2018:122 ��7.23 T-142/16, Dröge and Others v Commission, EU:T:2017:72�� 7.06, 7.18, 7.69 T-149/16, Spliethoff ’s Bevrachtingskantoor v Commission, EU:T:2019:40��7.159 T-152/16, Megasol Energie v Commission, EU:T:2017:446��7.143 T-168/16, Grizzly Tools v Commission, EU:T:2018:246�� 7.09, 22.20 T-170/16, Guardian Glass España, Central Vidriera v Commission, EU:T:2017:722��7.13, 7.60 T-172/16, Centro Clinico e Diagnostico G.B. Morgagni v Commission, EU:T:2018:34��7.123 T-191/16, Lito Maieftiko Gynaikologiko kai Cheirourgiko Kentro v Commission, EU:T:2021:707 ��22.13 T-211/16, Caviro Distillerie and Others v Commission, EU:T:2018:148 ��7.215 T-215/16, Cop v EUIPO –Conexa, EU:T:2017:241��17.17 T-236/16, Biogena Naturprodukte v EUIPO, EU:T:2017:416��22.21 T-238/16, Clean Sky 2 Joint Undertaking v Scouring Environment, EU:T:2017:260��15.05 T-247/16 RENV, Fursin and Others v ECB, EU:T:2021:809��7.141 T-257/16, NM v European Council, EU:T:2017:130 ��7.70 T-269/16, Salama and Others v Council, EU:T:2016:607 ��22.20 T-270/16 P, Kerstens v Commission, EU:T:2017:74��25.19 T-271/16, Pempe v EUIPO –Marshall Amplification, EU:T:2017:787��22.15 T-281/16 R, Solelec and Others v Parliament, EU:T:2016:659��13.21 T-290/16, Fruits de Ponent v Commission, EU:T:2018:934 �� 11.42, 11.45, 11.48 T-298/16, East West Consulting v Commission, EU:T:2018:967��11.13, 11.29, 11.38, 11.42, 11.43, 11.45, 11.47, 11.51, 11.52, 11.57, 11.59 T-301/16, Jindal Saw and Jindal Saw Italia v Commission, EU:T:2019:234�� 7.190, 7.214 T-303/16, Mylan IRE Healthcare v Commission, EU:T:2022:25 ��23.02 T-310/16, Foshan Lihua Ceramic v Commission, EU:T:2019:170��7.215 T-314/16 and T-435/16, VG v Commission, EU:T:2018:841 �� 7.141, 11.38, 22.07 T-323/16, Banco Cooperativo Español v SRB, EU:T:2019:822��7.137 T-334/16 P, FN and Others v CEPOL, EU:T:2018:723��20.01 T-338/16 P, Zink v Commission, EU:T:2018:98��16.18 T-339/16, T-352/16 and T-391/16, Ville de Paris, Ville de Bruxelles and Ayuntamiento de Madrid v Commission, EU:T:2018:927�� 5.35, 11.53, 19.16 T-341/16, De Masi v Commission, EU:T:2017:301 ��7.69 T-346/16, CSL Behring v EUIPO –Vivatrex, EU:T:2017:422��7.144 T-347/16, Inox Mare v Commission, EU:T:2017:415��7.97 T-348/16 OP, Aristoteleio Panepistimio Thessalonikis v ERCEA, EU:T:2019:14��25.13 T-348/16 OP-R, Aristoteleio Panepistimio Thessalonikis v ERCEA, EU:T:2017:497 ��25.11 T-364/16, ArcelorMittal Tubular Products Ostrava and Others v Commission, EU:T:2018:696 ��7.63, 7.94, 7.133, 7.218, 7.221 T-365/16, Portigon v SRB, EU:T:2019:824�� 7.17, 7.95, 7.110, 7.137 T-377/16, T‑645/16 and T‑809/16, Hypo Vorarlberg Bank v SRB, EU:T:2019:823 �� 7.95, 7.99, 7.137, 7.172, 7.178, 7.179, 7.218, 10.23 T-380/16, Popescu v Romania, EU:T:2017:159��2.02 T-399/16, CK Telecoms UK Investments v Commission, EU:T:2020:217��7.22, 7.205, 7.206, 7.208 T-419/16, Carrera Brands v EUIPO –Autec, EU:T:2017:812��22.15 T-433/16, Pometon v Commission, EU:T:2019:201��24.47 T-436/16, AEIM and Kazenas v Commission, EU:T:2018:78�� 11.51, 11.63, 11.67 T-437/16, Italy v Commission, EU:T:2020:410��22.19 T-458/16, Acquafarm v Commission, EU:T:2017:810�� 11.01, 11.40, 11.41 T-466/16, NRW. Bank v SRB, EU:T:2019:445�� 7.148, 7.158 T-477/16, Epsilon International v Commission, EU:T:2018:714�� 7.21, 15.18, 15.20, 22.16, 22.19, 22.21

Table of Cases cxxi T-478/16, Frank v Commission, EU:T:2019:399 ��2.56 T-478/16 AJ, OP v Commission��2.55 T-500/16, BZ v ECB, EU:T:2021:863 �� 16.14, 18.03 T-516/16 and T-536/16, Alvarez y Bejarano and Others v Commission, EU:T:2019:267��16.05 T-517/16, Janoha and Others v Commission, EU:T:2018:874 ��9.09 T-529/16, Feral v Committee of Regions, EU:T:2019:851�� 9.01, 9.12, 9.17 T-538/16, Schaffrin v Commission, EU:T:2022:365��16.29 T-546/16, Tataram v Commission, EU:T:2018:644 ��9.15 T-554/16, BZ v ECB, EU:T:2021:387 ��16.01 T-560/16, Schneider v EUIPO, EU:T:2018:872��16.22 T-561/16, Galocha v Fusion for Energy Joint Undertaking, EU:T:2018:29��16.29 T-568/16 and T-599/16, Spagnolli and Others v Commission, EU:T:2018:347��16.15 T-570/16, HF v Parliament, EU:T:2017:283 ��16.14 T-573/16, PT v EIB, EU:T:2019:481��2.47, 22.19, 22.20, 22.21 T-583/16, PG v Frontex, EU:T:2017:344��16.29 T-584/16, HF v Parliament, EU:T:2017:282 �� 16.13, 16.15 T-598/16, Pipiliagkas v Commission, EU:T:2017:111��16.04 T-609/16, PB v Commission, EU:T:2017:910��16.05 T-621/16, České dráhy v Commission, EU:T:2018:367��7.28 T-624/16 TO, L’Huillier v Gollnisch and Parliament, EU:T:2019:47�� 25.32, 25.33, 25.34 T-631/16, Remag Metallhandel and Jaschinsky v Commission, EU:T:2019:352�� 11.12, 11.13, 11.51, 11.59, 11.60 T-639/16 P, FV v Council, EU:T:2018:22��20.01 T-640/16, GEA Group v Commission, EU:T:2018:700��7.141 T-645/16 R, Vorarlberger Landes-und Hypothekenbank v SRB, EU:T:2017:62 ��13.02 T-646/16 P, Simpson v Council, EU:T:2018:493�� 20.01, 20.02 T-653/16, Malta v Commission, EU:T:2018:241�� 1.03, 7.68, 7.77, 7.180 T-670/16, Digital Rights Ireland v Commission, EU:T:2017:838��7.90 T-671/16, Villeneuve v Commission, EU:T:2018:519 ��16.06 T-679/16, Athletic Club v Commission, EU:T:2019:112��7.141 T-690/16, Enrico Colombo and Corinti Giacomo v Commission, EU:T:2019:303�� 7.67, 11.22 T-693/16 P, HG v Commission, EU:T:2018:492�� 16.13, 16.26, 16.29, 18.03, 20.01, 20.02 T-716/16, Pfizer and Pfizer santé familiale v Commission, EU:T:2017:526 ��7.101 T-732/16, Valencia Club de Fútbol v Commission, EU:T:2020:98��7.210 T-732/16 R, Valencia Club de Fútbol v Commission, EU:T:2018:171�� 13.16, 23.12 T-738/16, La Quadrature du Net and Others v Commission, EU:T:2020:638 ��22.41 T-741/16, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Commission, EU:T:2019:454 ��7.214 T-742/16 RENV, CW v Parliament, EU:T:2017:338��16.15 T-759/16, Campailla v European Union, EU:T:2018:26 ��11.23 T-763/16, PY v EUCAP Sahel Niger, EU:T:2018:181�� 15.03, 15.05, 15.18 T-764/16, Paulini v ECB, EU:T:2018:101��16.05 T-766/16 R, Hércules Club de Fútbol v Commission, EU:T:2019:178��13.41 T-773/16, Salehi v Commission, EU:T:2017:739 ��8.13 T-781/16, Puma and Others v Commission, EU:T:2021:328 ��7.100, 7.135, 7.159, 7.191 T-786/16 REV, PV v Commission, EU:T:2022:52�� 25.42, 25.48 T-786/16 and T-224/18, PV v Commission, EU:T:2020:17��7.10 T-788/16, De Geoffroy and Others v Parliament, EU:T:2018:534 ��9.18, 9.20 T-796/16, CEDC International v EUIPO –Underberg, EU:T:2020:439�� 7.221, 17.21 T-818/16, Netflix International and Netflix v Commission, EU:T:2018:274�� 7.101, 7.110, 9.04 T-829/16, Mouvement pour une Europe des nations and des libertés v Parliament, EU:T:2018:840 ��9.16 T-834/16, QC v European Council, EU:T:2018:984��8.07 T-835/16, Louvers Belgium v Commission, EU:T:2017:593��7.141 T-838/16, BP v FRA, EU:T:2019:494 ��7.55

cxxii Table of Cases T-841/16, Alex v Commission, EU:T:2017:724��7.51, 7.57 T-853/16, Techniplan v Commission, EU:T:2017:928��8.26 T-859/16, Damm v EUIPO –Schlossbrauerei Au, Willibald Beck Freiherr von Peccoz, EU:T:2018:352 ��25.20 T-868/16, QI and Others v Commission and ECB, EU:T:2022:58��11.13, 11.23, 11.24, 11.25, 11.38, 11.42, 11.43, 11.45, 11.46 T-873/16, Groupe Canal +v Commission, EU:T:2018:904��7.113 T-875/16, Falcon Technologies International v Commission, EU:T:2018:877��7.141 T-880/16, RF v Commission, EU:T:2017:647��22.74 T-881/16, HJ v EMA, EU:T:2019:5��11.09 T-883/16, Poland v Commission, EU:T:2019:567 ��7.146, 7.150, 13.22, 22.18, 22.67 T-884/16, Multiconnect v Commission, EU:T:2018:665�� 7.47, 7.154 T-885/16, Mass Response Service v Commission, EU:T:2018:666��7.47 T-890/16, Scandlines Danmark and Scandlines Deutschland v Commission, EU:T:2018:1004��7.51, 7.57 T-891/16, Scandlines Danmark and Scandlines Deutschland v Commission, EU:T:2018:1003��8.22 T-894/16, Air France v Commission, EU:T:2019:508 ��7.108, 7.118, 7.119, 7.124, 7.125 T-901/16 R, Elche Club de Fútbol v Commission, EU:T:2018:268�� 13.36, 13.38 T-902/16, HeidelbergCement v Commission, EU:T:2017:846��7.43 T-903/16, RE v Commission, EU:T:2019:96��7.19 T-907/16, Schwenk Zement v Commission, EU:T:2017:858��7.43 T-917/16 REV, BP v FRA, EU:T:2019:548��25.45 T-919/16, Collins v Parliament, EU:T:2018:58��11.14 T-5/17, Sharif v Council, EU:T:2019:216��9.01 T-10/17, Proof IT v EIGE, EU:T:2018:682�� 11.15, 11.24 T-12/17, Mellifera v Commission, EU:T:2018:616��7.188 T-17/17, Constantinescu v Parliament, EU:T:2018:645��16.11 T-20/17 R, Hungary v Commission, EU:T:2017:203��13.01 T-42/17, VR-Bank Rhein-Sieg v SRB, EU:T:2018:813��7.158 T-71/17, France.com v EUIPO –France, EU:T:2018:381 ��7.74 T-73/17, RS v Commission, EU:T:2018:532��9.01, 9.18 T-79/17, Schoonjans v Commission, EU:T:2018:531��9.18 T-82/17, PepsiCo v EUIPO –Intersnack Group, EU:T:2018:814��7.83 T-100/17, BTB Holding Investments and Duferco Participations Holding v Commission, EU:T:2018:900�� 7.161, 7.216 T-105/17, HSBC Holdings and Others v Commission, EU:T:2019:675 ��18.06 T-107/17, Steinhoff and Others v ECB, EU:T:2019:353�� 11.13, 11.23, 11.29, 11.40, 11.42, 11.43, 11.45, 11.46, 11.59, 11.62 T-110/17, Jiangsu Seraphim Solar System v Commission, EU:T:2020:315�� 7.132, 7.133, 7.141, 9.08, 22.21 T-117/17, Proximus v Council, EU:T:2019:19 ��7.138 T-118/17 R, Institute for Direct Democracy in Europe v Parliament, EU:T:2017:465��13.32 T-119/17, Alba Aguilera and Others v EEAS, EU:T:2018:183��16.05 T-124/17, Estamede v ECB, EU:T:2018:152 ��11.19 T-129/17 RENV, DI v EASO, EU:T:2018:722 ��16.26 T-131/17 R, Argus Security Projects v EEAS, EU:T:2017:543��13.35 T-135/17, Scor v Commission, EU:T:2019:287�� 7.119, 7.125 T-153/17, FV v Council, EU:T:2019:622��16.07 T-197/17, Abel and Others v Commission, EU:T:2018:258 ��11.55 T-201/17, Printeos v Commission, EU:T:2019:81 ��9.17 T-202/17, Calhau Correia de Paiva v Commission, EU:T:2021:323��16.29 T-206/17, Argus Security Projects v Commission, EU:T:2018:288��7.55 T-217/17, FVE Holýšov I and Others v Commission, EU:T:2019:633�� 7.51, 7.188

Table of Cases cxxiii T-224/17, Adapta Color v EUIPO –Coatings Foreign IP, EU:T:2019:242��17.17 T-228/17, Zhejiang Jndia Pipeline Industry v Commission, EU:T:2019:619 �� 7.188, 7.215 T-236/17 and T-596/17, Balti Gaas v Commission and INEA, EU:T:2020:612 �� 7.163, 7.180, 22.19 T-239/17, Germany v Commission, EU:T:2019:289 ��7.188 T-240/17, Campine and Campine Recycling v Commission, EU:T:2019:778 �� 7.32, 7.204, 18.03, 18.05, 18.07 T-242/17 RENV, SC v Eulex Kosovo, EU:T:2022:637��15.09 T-244/17 R, António Conde & Companhia v Commission, EU:T:2017:545 ��13.39 T-245/17, ViaSat v Commission, EU:T:2021:128��7.05, 7.11, 7.108, 8.18, 8.20, 8.21 T-249/17, Casino, Guichard-Perrachon and AMC v Commission, EU:T:2020:458 ��7.28, 7.33, 7.163, 9.09 T-254/17, Intermarché Casino Achats v Commission, EU:T:2020:459��7.199 T-255/17, Les Mousquetaires and ITM Entreprises v Commission, EU:T:2020:460��7.33 T-257/17, RE v Commission, EU:T:2018:549�� 22.13, 22.20 T-262/17, Metrans v Commission and INEA, EU:T:2019:341�� 7.147, 7.150, 7.158 T-275/17, Curto v Parliament, EU:T:2018:479��16.04 T-282/17, UI v Council, EU:T:2018:768 ��8.01 T-290/17, Stavytskyi v Council, EU:T:2019:37��7.180 T-293/17, Fakro v Commission, EU:T:2018:733 ��8.23 T-312/17, Campbell v Commission, EU:T:2018:876��5.44 T-318/17, Clean Sky 2 Joint Undertaking v Revoind Industriale di Pindaru Gelu, EU:T:2021:741 �� 22.41, 25.11 T-319/17, Aldridge and Others v Commission, EU:T:2019:231�� 16.04, 16.05, 16.16 T-321/17, Niemelä and Others v ECB, EU:T:2021:942 �� 7.141, 11.23, 11.36 T-324/17, SAS Cargo Group and Others v Commission, EU:T:2022:175��7.188, 7.221, 18.03, 18.05 T-325/17, Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij v Commission, EU:T:2022:176 ��22.15 T-326/17, Air Canada v Commission, EU:T:2022:177�� 18.02, 22.15 T-332/17, E-Control v ACER, EU:T:2019:761 ��7.141 T-334/17, Cargolux Airlines v Commission, EU:T:2022:178�� 18.03, 18.05 T-341/17, British Airways v Commission, EU:T:2022:182�� 7.162, 7.180, 10.21 T-344/17, Latam Airlines Group and Lan Cargo v Commission, EU:T:2022:185 ��24.38 T-350/17, Singapore Airlines and Singapore Airlines Cargo v Commission, EU:T:2022:186 ��18.03 T-370/17, KPN v Commission, EU:T:2019:354 �� 7.205, 7.206 T-376/17, Poland v Commission, EU:T:2020:373 ��7.145 T-380/17, HeidelbergCement and Schwenk Zement v Commission, EU:T:2020:471��23.03 T-383/17, Hansol Paper v Commission, EU:T:2020:139�� 7.214, 7.217 T-392/17, TE v Commission, EU:T:2018:459��13.24 T-399/17, Dalli v Commission, EU:T:2019:384 �� 11.38, 11.40, 11.45, 11.47, 11.57, 11.59, 11.73 T-423/17 R, Nexans France and Nexans v Commission, EU:T:2017:835 ��13.05 T-435/17, Grendene v EUIPO –Hipanema, EU:T:2018:596��17.20 T-440/17, Arca Capital Bohemia v Commission, EU:T:2018:898 ��7.68 T-441/17, Arca Capital Bohemia v Commission, EU:T:2018:899 ��7.68 T-454/17, “Pro NGO!” v Commission, EU:T:2018:755��7.175 T-462/17, TO v EEA, EU:T:2019:397��22.16 T-475/17, Rogesa v Commission, EU:T:2017:919 ��7.141 T-476/17 R, Arysta LifeScience Netherlands v Commission, EU:T:2018:407 �� 13.29, 13.38 T-481/17, Fundación Tatiana Pérez de Guzmán el Bueno and SFL v SRB, EU:T:2022:311��7.65 T-491/17, Opere Pie d’Onigo v Commission, EU:T:2019:692��7.118 T-494/17, Iccrea Banca v Commission and Others, EU:T:2018:804 �� 7.158, 9.01 T-510/17, Del Valle Ruiz and Others v Commission and SRB, EU:T:2022:312 �� 7.168, 7.175, 9.03, 9.09, 22.17 T-523/17, Eleveté Invest Group and Others v Commission and SRB, EU:T:2022:313�� 11.15, 11.38 T-550/17, Troszczynski v Parliament, EU:T:2018:754��9.09 T-553/17, Cambra Abaurrea v Parliament and SRB, EU:T:2018:371��7.74

cxxiv Table of Cases T-557/17, Liaño Reig v SRB, EU:T:2019:771�� 7.217, 11.24 T-559/17, Abdulkarim v Council, EU:T:2019:44��7.219 T-560/17, Fortischem v Parliament and Council, EU:T:2018:764��7.101 T-570/17, Algebris (UK) and Anchorage Capital Group v Commission, EU:T:2022:314 ��7.168, 7.175, 7.180, 7.210 T-577/17, thyssenkrupp Electrical Steel and thyssenkrupp Electrical Steel Ugo v Commission, EU:T:2018:411 ��7.16 T-578/17, a&o hostel and hotel Berlin v Commission, EU:T:2019:437�� 7.119, 7.124, 7.141 T-591/17, EIB v Syrie, EU:T:2019:391�� 15.04, 15.14, 25.11 T-598/17, Italy v Commission, EU:T:2019:482��7.188 T-607/17, Volotea v Commission, EU:T:2020:180��22.13 T-612/17, Google and Alphabet v Commission, EU:T:2021:763��7.199, 7.200, 7.202, 18.02, 18.06, 23.03 T-618/17, Activa Minoristas del Popular v ECB and SRB, EU:T:2018:608 ��7.137 T-626/17, Slovenia v Commission, EU:T:2020:402��7.187 T-649/17, ViaSat v Commission, EU:T:2020:235��22.20 T-650/17, Jinan Meide Casting v Commission, EU:T:2019:644��7.215 T-658/17, Stichting Against Child Trafficking v Commission, EU:T:2018:799 ��8.16 T-674/17, Le Port de Bruxelles and Région de Bruxelles-Capitale v Commission, EU:T:2019:651 ��7.140 T-699/17, Poland v Commission, EU:T:2021:44�� 7.178, 7.218, 7.219 T-711/17, Spinoit v Commission and Others, EU:T:2018:803��7.73, 11.24, 11.60, 11.61 T-713/17, Motex v Commission, EU:T:2018:631��7.119 T-716/17, Germanwings v Commission, EU:T:2020:181��22.13 T-719/17, FMC v Commission, EU:T:2021:143��7.175 T-725/17, Clestra Hauserman v Parliament, EU:T:2019:190 ��9.08 T-726/17, Commune de Fessenheim and Others v Commission, EU:T:2018:291�� 7.12, 7.68, 22.66 T-728/17, Marinvest and Porting v Commission, EU:T:2019:325�� 7.22, 7.212 T-733/17 R, GMPO v Commission, EU:T:2018:839 �� 13.33, 13.34, 13.35 T-734/17, ViaSat v Commission, EU:T:2020:123��22.20 T-737/17, Wattiau v Parliament, EU:T:2019:273 ��9.09, 9.18 T-741/17, Trasys International and Axianseu –Digital Solutions v EASA, EU:T:2019:572��7.141 T-745/17, Kerkosand v Commission, EU:T:2020:400��7.212, 9.09, 25.19, 25.20 T-747/17, UPF v Commission, EU:T:2019:271�� 7.18, 7.100, 7.106, 7.121, 7.123, 7.128, 7.129 T-750/17, Izba Gospodarcza Producentów i Operatorów Urządzeń Rozrywkowych v Commission, EU:T:2018:506��7.141 T-754/17, Chambre de commerce and d’industrie métropolitaine Bretagne-Ouest (port de Brest) v Commission, EU:T:2019:270��7.123 T-755/17, Germany v ECHA, EU:T:2019:647�� 7.17, 7.168 T-768/17, Comprojecto-Projectos e Construções and Others v ECB, EU:T:2019:104 ��7.12, 8.06, 8.07, 8.17, 8.18, 8.20, 8.24 T-775/17, Estampaciones Rubí v Commission, EU:T:2018:607�� 7.13, 8.08, 8.21 T-783/17 R, GE Healthcare v Commission, EU:T:2018:503��13.34 T-784/17, Strabag Belgium v Parliament, EU:T:2019:162��7.141 T-784/17 R, Strabag Belgium v Parliament, EU:T:2018:17��13.17 T-793/17, Bruel v Commission and Others, EU:T:2018:801��7.73, 11.24, 11.60, 11.61 T-799/17, Scania and Others v Commission, EU:T:2022:48��7.32, 7.199, 7.200, 7.201, 18.06 T-806/17, BASF and REACH & colours v ECHA, EU:T:2019:724��7.87 T-814/17, Lietuvos geležinkeliai v Commission, EU:T:2020:545��7.181, 7.188, 18.06, 18.07 T-816/17 and T-318/18, Luxembourg and Amazon v Commission, EU:T:2021:252�� 7.210, 23.03 T-827/17, Aeris Invest v ECB, EU:T:2021:660�� 7.68, 7.141 T-834/17, United Parcel Service v Commission, EU:T:2022:84��7.222, 11.36, 11.38, 11.40, 11.42, 11.45, 11.47, 11.48, 11.49, 11.58, 11.59, 11.60, 25.23

Table of Cases cxxv T-8/18, easyJet Airline v Commission, EU:T:2020:182�� 7.123, 7.210, 7.211 T-15/18, OCU v ECB, EU:T:2021:661�� 7.141, 22.19 T-27/18 RENV, FV v Council, EU:T:2019:621 ��16.07 T-36/18, Asahi Intecc v EUIPO –Celesio, EU:T:2018:808 ��22.74 T-39/18, VF v ECB, EU:T:2019:683��9.18 T-41/18, Autoridad Portuaria de Vigo v Commission, EU:T:2018:398��8.23 T-50/18, BO v Court of Justice, EU:T:2019:573 ��7.70 T-51/18, BP v Court of Justice, EU:T:2019:570��7.70 T-53/18, Germany v Commission, EU:T:2019:490 ��2.52 T-66/18, BQ v Court of Justice, EU:T:2019:566 ��7.70 T-67/18, Probelte v Commission, EU:T:2019:873 �� 7.93, 7.110, 7.175 T-69/18, Verband Deutscher Alten und Behindertenhilfe and CarePool Hannover v Commission, EU:T:2021:189��7.118, 7.119, 7.121, 7.140 T-77/18 and T-567/18, VE v ESMA, EU:T:2020:420 ��9.18, 9.20 T-81/18, Barata v Parliament, EU:T:2020:137��9.18 T-83/18, CH v Parliament, EU:T:2018:935��16.15 T-100/18, Wehrheim v ECB, EU:T:2019:882��11.14 T-106/18, Laverana v EUIPO –Agroecopark, EU:T:2019:143��7.50 T-108/18, Universität Koblenz-Landau v EACEA, EU:T:2021:104�� 7.74, 15.13 T-125/18, Associazione GranoSalus v Commission, EU:T:2019:92�� 7.87, 7.110 T-132/18, Roland v Commission, EU:T:2021:329 �� 7.100, 7.132, 7.135 T-138/18, De Esteban Alonso v Commission, EU:T:2019:398��25.19 T-151/18, Ben Ali v Council, EU:T:2020:514 ��7.218, 22.21, 22.67, 22.77 T-156/18, Legutko and Poręba v Parliament, EU:T:2019:150��8.21, 8.26 T-158/18, Scaloni and Figini v Commission, EU:T:2019:491�� 11.29, 11.36 T-170/18, Kande Mupompa v Council, EU:T:2020:60��22.20 T-175/18, Ruhorimbere v Council, EU:T:2020:62��9.09 T-178/18, Région de Bruxelles-Capitale v Commission, EU:T:2019:130 ��7.94 T-185/18, Lucchini v Commission, EU:T:2019:298��7.10, 7.221, 11.63, 11.66 T-186/18, Abaco Energy and Others v Commission, EU:T:2019:206�� 7.119, 7.142 T-190/18, Solwindet las Lomas v Commission, EU:T:2019:205��7.142 T-195/18, Talanton v Commission, EU:T:2020:194�� 15.09, 15.19, 15.20 T-201/18, Diusa Rendering and Assograssi v Commission, EU:T:2021:751��8.01 T-203/18, VQ v ECB, EU:T:2020:313��22.17 T-212/18, Romańska v Frontex, EU:T:2019:581�� 25.19, 25.20 T-218/18, Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission, EU:T:2021:282 �� 7.50, 7.119, 7.124 T-223/18, Casa Regina Apostolorum della Pia Società delle Figlie di San Paolo v Commission, EU:T:2021:315��7.118, 7.121, 7.161, 7.216 T-235/18, Qualcomm v Commission, EU:T:2022:358��7.176 T-240/18, Polskie Linie Lotnicze “LOT” v Commission, EU:T:2021:723�� 7.205, 7.206 T-250/18 R, RATP v Commission, EU:T:2018:458 ��13.31 T-251/18, IFSUA v Council, EU:T:2020:89��7.94, 7.106, 7.110, 7.166 T-251/18 R, IFSUA v Council, EU:T:2018:516��13.37 T-254/18, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and Others v Commission, EU:T:2021:278 ��7.99, 7.106, 7.133, 7.141, 7.214 T-257/18, Iberpotash v Commission, EU:T:2020:1�� 7.210, 7.213 T-258/18, Brunke v Commission, EU:T:2019:108��8.21, 8.23 T-278/18, Nemius Group v EUIPO, EU:T:2019:86��22.15 T-280/18, ABLV Bank v SRB, EU:T:2022:429�� 7.65, 7.175, 7.176, 7.180, 7.191, 22.13 T-282/18, Bernis and Others v SRB, EU:T:2020:209 ��7.95 T-293/18, Latvia v Commission, EU:T:2020:29�� 7.15, 8.10, 8.21 T-296/18, Polskie Linie Lotnicze “LOT” v Commission, EU:T:2021:724�� 7.91, 7.209 T-299/18, Strabag Belgium v Parliament, EU:T:2019:411��7.67 T-302/18, Sógor v Council and Others, EU:T:2018:621�� 15.03, 15.08

cxxvi Table of Cases T-304/18, MLPS v Commission, EU:T:2019:34��8.06, 8.13 T-305/18 R, Klyuyev v Council, EU:T:2018:849��13.29 T-310/18, EPSU and Goudriaan v Commission, EU:T:2019:757��7.15, 8.10 T-330/18, Carvalho and Others v Parliament and Council, EU:T:2019:324��7.108 T-337/18 and T-347/18, Laboratoire Pareva and Biotech 3D v Commission, EU:T:2021:594��7.140 T-337/18 R and T-347/18 R, Laboratoire Pareva and Biotech 3D v Commission, EU:T:2018:587 �� 13.22, 13.29, 13.39 T-342/18, Nichicon Corporation v Commission, EU:T:2021:635�� 7.32, 18.06 T-343/18, Tokin Corporation v Commission, EU:T:2021:636�� 7.30, 7.203 T-344/18, Rubycon and Rubycon Holdings v Commission, EU:T:2021:637 �� 7.22, 7.203 T-351/18 and T-584/18, Ukrselhosprom PCF and Versobank v ECB, EU:T:2021:669 ��7.141, 7.144, 7.191, 9.16 T-352/18, Germann Avocats v Commission, EU:T:2021:64�� 7.216, 11.15 T-362/18, Robert v Conseil national de l’ordre des pharmaciens, EU:T:2018:550��13.24 T-363/18, Nippon Chemi-Con Corporation v Commission, EU:T:2021:638�� 7.32, 7.167, 7.199, 7.201, 18.03 T-379/18, WI v Commission, EU:T:2019:617��22.15 T-391/18, Riesco García v Parliament, EU:T:2018:864 ��8.06 T-401/18, SFIE-PE v Parliament, EU:T:2019:132��22.20 T-402/18, Aquino and Others v Parliament, EU:T:2020:13��22.20 T-408/18, Aristoteleio Panepistimio Thessalonikis v EACEA, EU:T:2020:431�� 15.16, 15.20 T-410/18, Silgan Closures and Silgan Holdings v Commission, EU:T:2019:166 ��7.30 T-417/18, CdT v EUIPO, EU:T:2019:766 ��7.79 T-417/18 R, CdT v EUIPO, EU:T:2018:502��13.36 T-419/18 R, Crédit agricole and Crédit agricole Corporate and Investment Bank v Commission, EU:T:2018:726��13.31 T-420/18 R, JPMorgan Chase and Others v Commission, EU:T:2018:724��13.31 T-421/18, Bauer Radio v EUIPO –Weinstein, EU:T:2020:433��17.03, 17.11, 17.141 T-425/18, Altice Europe v Commission, EU:T:2021:607�� 9.09, 18.02, 18.06 T-429/18, BRF and SHB Comercio e Industria de Alimentos v Commission, EU:T:2020:322 ��7.110 T-429/18 R, BRF and SHB Comercio e Industria de Alimentos v Commission, EU:T:2019:98 �� 13.34, 13.36 T-437/18, Tilly-Sabco v Commission, EU:T:2020:159��11.42 T-448/18, Ryanair and Others v Commission, EU:T:2021:626�� 7.210, 7.213 T-451/18, Triantafyllopoulos and Others v ECB, EU:T:2019:715�� 11.60, 11.63, 11.71 T-475/18 R, Boyer v Wallis-et-Futuna, EU:T:2018:518��13.23 T-478/18, Bezouaoui and HB Consultant v Commission, EU:T:2021:2��7.125 T-486/18, Danske Slagtermestre v Commission, EU:T:2020:576��7.130 T-488/18, XC v Commission, EU:T:2021:76�� 16.28, 16.29 T-493/18, Comprojecto-Projectos e Construções and Others v Portugal, EU:T:2018:992��8.16 T-504/18, XG v Commission, EU:T:2019:883��7.171 T-504/18 R, XG v Commission, EU:T:2018:526��13.17 T-511/18, XH v Commission, EU:T:2020:291 �� 16.07, 16.26 T-516/18 and T-525/18, Luxembourg and Others v Commission, EU:T:2021:251��7.180 T-535/18, Peek & Cloppenburg v EUIPO –Peek & Cloppenburg, EU:T:2020:189��17.20 T-540/18, ASL Aviation Holdings and ASL Airlines, EU:T:2022:85 �� 11.36, 11.38, 11.43, 11.47, 22.15 T-541/18, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Commission, EU:T:2020:605 �� 7.188, 7.214, 7.215 T-544/18, ArcelorMittal Bremen v Commission, EU:T:2019:541 ��8.05, 8.23 T-558/18, Lupu v EUIPO –Et Djili Soy Dzhihangir Ibryam, EU:T:2019:268��11.57 T-559/18, Atos Medical v EUIPO –Andreas Fahl Medizintechnik-Vertrieb, EU:T:2019:758��11.57 T-560/18, Atos Medical v EUIPO –Andreas Fahl Medizintechnik-Vertrieb, EU:T:2019:767��7.100

Table of Cases cxxvii T-561/18, ITD and Danske Fragtmænd v Commission, EU:T:2021:240��7.217 T-565/18, P. Krücken Organic v Commission, EU:T:2020:395�� 11.36, 11.38 T-573/18, Hickies v EUIPO, EU:T:2020:32��17.17 T-574/18, Agrochem-Maks v Commission, EU:T:2020:226��7.180 T-574/18 R, Agrochem-Maks v Commission, EU:T:2019:25��13.29, 13.32, 13.33, 13.34, 13.38 T-576/18, Crédit agricole v ECB, EU:T:2020:304��7.183 T-578/18, CA Consumer Finance v ECB, EU:T:2020:30��7.176 T-581/18, ND and OE v Commission, EU:T:2019:133 ��7.39 T-585/18, Şanli v Council, EU:T:2021:73��7.07 T-605/18, ZF v Commission, EU:T:2020:51�� 16.15, 16.20 T-606/18, Universität Koblenz-Landau v EACEA, EU:T:2021:105��15.13 T-610/18, ZR v EUIPO, EU:T:2021:5��16.06 T-611/18, Pharmaceutical Works Polpharma v EMA, EU:T:2021:241 �� 7.87, 7.110, 7.144, 9.01, 9.03, 9.05, 9.08, 9.09, 9.20 T-615/18, Diesel v EUIPO –Sprinter megacentros del deporte, EU:T:2020:223��17.05 T-616/18, Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo v Commission, EU:T:2022:43 �� 23.03, 24.48 T-635/18, Industrial Química del Nalón v Commission, EU:T:2020:624��11.42 T-638/18, Deza v Commission, EU:T:2020:627��11.42 T-639/18, SGL Carbon v Commission, EU:T:2020:628��11.42 T-640/18, Intercontact Budapest v CdT, EU:T:2020:167��22.13 T-645/18, Bilbaína de Alquitranes v Commission, EU:T:2020:629�� 11.42, 11.48, 11.49 T-654/18, Armani v EUIPO –Asunción, EU:T:2020:122��17.06 T-655/18, Aupicon and Others v EEAS, EU:T:2021:693��22.13 T-671/18, ZU v Commission, EU:T:2021:715��16.06 T-674/18, Vattenfall Europe Nuclear Energy v Commission, EU:T:2019:501 ��7.60 T-677/18, Galletas Gullón v EUIPO –Intercontinental Great Brands, EU:T:2020:229��17.17 T-687/18, Pilatus Bank v ECB, EU:T:2019:542��7.66 T-702/18, Durand and Others v Parliament, EU:T:2019:408��8.10, 8.21 T-703/18, Poland v Commission, EU:T:2019:628 ��7.23 T-707/18, Tilly-Sabco v Council and Commission, EU:T:2020:160 ��11.15 T-712/18, Umweltinstitut München v Commission, EU:T:2021:29��7.141 T-721/18 and T-81/19, Apostolopoulou and Apostolopoulou-Chrysanthaki v Commission, EU:T:2021:933��11.22, 11.36, 11.38, 11.45, 11.73 T-723/18, Barata v Parliament, EU:T:2021:113�� 9.01, 16.25 T-727/18, ZW v EIB, EU:T:2019:809��22.20 T-728/18, Brand IP Licensing v EUIPO –Facebook, EU:T:2021:134 ��22.74 T-734/18 R, Sumitomo Chemical and Tenka Best v Commission, EU:T:2019:314��13.35 T-737/18, Siberia Oriental v CPVO, EU:T:2020:289 �� 17.06, 17.20, 22.13 T-739/18, Darment v Commission, EU:T:2020:218��13.24 T-740/18 R, Taminco and Arysta LifeScience Great Britain v Commission, EU:T:2019:717 �� 13.35, 13.37 T-748/18, Glimarpol v EUIPO –Metar, EU:T:2020:321��17.11 T-754/18, Hochmann Marketing v Parliament, EU:T:2019:364��8.26 T-757/18, Koinopraxia Touristiki Loutrakiou v Commission, EU:T:2022:13��7.53 T-758/18, ABLV Bank v SRB, EU:T:2021:28�� 7.05, 7.13, 7.14 T-762/18, Athanasiadou and Soulantikas v Commission, EU:T:2019:574��13.05 T-763/18, Lazarus Szolgáltató és Kereskedelmi v Commission, EU:T:2019:886 �� 7.60, 7.158 T-1/19, CJ v Court of Justice, EU:T:2019:465��8.15, 8.21 T-2/19, Algebris (UK) and Anchorage Capital Group v SRB, EU:T:2019:741 �� 7.93, 7.137 T-6/19, Irish Wind Farmers’ Association and Others v Commission, EU:T:2020:30 ��7.51, 7.57 T-7/19, Scandlines Danmark and Scandlines Deutschland v Commission, EU:T:2002:337 ��24.47 T-17/19, Moi v Parliament, EU:T:2021:51��7.01 T-20/19, Pablosky v EUIPO –docPrice, EU:T:2020:309��17.04 T-21/19, Pablosky v EUIPO –docPrice, EU:T:2020:310��17.04

cxxviii Table of Cases T-22/19, Noguer Enríquez and Others v Commission, EU:T:2020:295 �� 11.29, 11.46 T-24/19, INC and Consorzio Stabile Sis v Commission, EU:T:2021:586�� 7.141, 7.144 T-27/19, Pilatus Bank and Pilatus Holding v ECB, EU:T:2022:46 ��7.66 T-30/19, CRIA and CCCMC v Commission, EU:T:2022:266�� 7.107, 7.110, 7.176 T-36/19, PE Digital v EUIPO –Spark Networks Services, EU:T:2020:425��17.13 T-37/19, Cimpress Schweiz v EUIPO –Impress, EU:T:2020:164��17.11 T-42/19, Volkswagen v EUIPO, EU:T:2020:15��17.13 T-45/19, Acron and Others v Commission, EU:T:2021:238��7.188 T-47/19, Dansk Erhverv v Commission, EU:T:2021:331��7.128 T-48/19, smart things solutions v EUIPO –Samsung Electronics, EU:T:2020:483��17.15 T-52/19, AH v Eurofound, EU:T:2021:537��16.07, 16.29, 22.14, 22.16 T-65/19, AI v ECDC, EU:T:2021:454�� 16.04, 16.07, 16.15 T-66/19, Vlaamse Gemeenschap and Vlaams Gewest v Parliament, EU:T:2019:848��7.105 T-71/19, BMC v Clean Sky 2 Joint Undertaking, EU:T:2020:567��7.74 T-99/19, Magnan v Commission, EU:T:2019:693 �� 8.01, 8.05, 8.08, 8.13, 8.21 T-100/19, L. Oliva Torras v EUIPO –Mecánica del Frío, EU:T:2020:255��17.07 T-105/19, Louis Vuitton Malletier v EUIPO –Wisniewski, EU:T:2020:258��17.17 T-106/19, Abarca v EUIPO –Abanca Corporación Bancaria, EU:T:2020:158��7.87 T-107/19, ACRE v Parliament, EU:T:2020:560��7.188 T-109/19, Kerry Luxembourg v EUIPO –Döhler, EU:T:2020:162��17.17 T-127/19, Dyson and Others v Commission, EU:T:2021:870�� 11.40, 11.49 T-128/19, Hemp Foods Australia v EUIPO –Cabrejos, EU:T:2020:3��7.160 T-131/19, Oosterbosch v Parliament, EU:T:2020:250��9.09 T-134/19, AM v EIB, EU:T:2021:119�� 16.04, 16.13 T-139/19, Pilatus Bank v ECB, EU:T:2021:623��7.66 T-141/19, Sabo and Others v Parliament and Council, EU:T:2020:179�� 7.96, 7.108 T-143/19, Solar Ileias Bompaina v Commission, EU:T:2020:301�� 7.56, 7.57, 7.58, 7.119 T-144/19, Kludi v EUIPO –Adlon Brand, EU:T:2020:404��17.17 T-146/19, García Ruiz v Parliament, EU:T:2019:653��8.23 T-153/19, European Union Copper Task Force v Commission, EU:T:2021:688 �� 7.84, 7.108, 7.110 T-158/19, Breyer v REA, EU:T:2021:902�� 7.74, 7.141 T-160/19, LTTE v Council, EU:T:2021:817��7.143 T-162/19, Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Parliament and Council, EU:T:2020:7��7.108 T-164/19, AQ v eu-LISA, EU:T:2021:456 ��16.28 T-167/19, Tempus Energy Germany and T Energy Sweden v Commission, EU:T:2021:645 �� 7.22, 7.56, 7.119, 7.159, 7.212, 7.213, 23.03 T-169/19, Style & Taste v EUIPO –The Polo/Lauren Company, EU:T:2021:318�� 17.06, 17.11 T-176/19 R, 3V Sigma v ECHA, EU:T:2019:547��13.36 T-177/19, Exxonmobil Petroleum & Chemical v ECHA, EU:T:2021:336��7.184 T-185/19, Public.Resource.Org and Right to Know v Commission, EU:T:2021:445�� 7.141, 7.144 T-188/19, United Kingdom v Commission, EU:T:2019:772��15.14 T-190/19, BF v Commission, EU:T:2020:368��8.23 T-193/19, Achema and Achema Gas Trade v Commission, EU:T:2021:558��7.211 T-195/19, GEA Group v Commission, EU:T:2022:65�� 7.05, 7.19, 7.218 T-233/19 and T-234/19, Infineon Technologies Dresden and Infineon Technologies v Commission, EU:T:2021:647��7.150 T-235/19, HIM v Commission, EU:T:2021:343�� 22.19, 22.20, 24.47 T-236/19, Comité de Douzelage de Houffalize v Commission, EU:T:2020:112��7.84 T-245/19, Uzina Metalurgica Moldoveneasca v Commission, EU:T:2022:295 ��7.93, 7.100, 7.110, 7.141 T-246/19, Cambodge and CRF v Commission, EU:T:2022:694�� 7.83, 7.100, 7.106 T-250/19, Tradición CZ v EUIPO –Rivero Argudo, EU:T:2022:838��17.03 T-251/19, Wieland-Werke v Commission, EU:T:2022:296��8.13 T-253/19, BG v Parliament, EU:T:2021:459 �� 16.15, 16.29

Table of Cases cxxix T-261/19, Stada Arzneimittel v EUIPO –Optima Naturals, EU:T:2021:24 ��17.15 T-272/19, TO v EEAS, EU:T:2020:361��16.25 T-277/19, BK v EASO, EU:T:2021:161�� 16.15, 22.20 T-279/19, Front Polisario v Council, EU:T:2021:639��7.84, 7.108, 7.188, 23.03 T-280/19, Highgate Capital Management v Commission, EU:T:2020:117��7.13 T-280/19 R, Highgate Capital Management v Commission, EU:T:2019:545�� 13.04, 13.06, 13.17 T-285/19, SGI Studio Galli Ingegneria v Commission, EU:T:2021:190��15.20 T-288/19, Divaro v EUIPO –Grendene, EU:T:2020:201��17.04 T-296/19, Sumol +Compal Marcas v EUIPO –Heretat Mont-Rubi, EU:T:2020:93 ��17.04 T-297/19, Dragomir v Commission, EU:T:2019:902��11.46 T-300/19, Achema and Lifosa v Commission, EU:T:2021:191�� 7.56, 7.141, 7.213 T-305/19, Welmax +v EUIPO –Valmex Medical Imaging, EU:T:2020:327��7.156 T-306/19, Graanhandel P. van Schelven v Commission, EU:T:2021:166�� 7.141, 7.143 T-316/19, Lucaccioni v Commission, EU:T:2021:367��16.13, 16.21, 16.26, 16.29, 22.20 T-321/19, Maternus v EUIPO –adp Gauselmann, EU:T:2020:101 ��25.19 T-322/19, El-Qaddafi v Council, EU:T:2021:206�� 7.180, 22.67 T-325/19 DEP, Cipriani v EUIPO –Hotel Cipriani, EU:T:2022:98 ��25.25 T-326/19 R, Gerber v Parliament and Council, EU:T:2020:64�� 13.05, 13.23 T-328/19, Scorify v EUIPO –Scor, EU:T:2020:311 ��17.20 T-344/19 and T-356/19, Front Polisario v Council, EU:T:2021:640��7.84, 7.108, 7.188, 22.23 T-345/19, T-346/19, T-364/19 to T-366/19, T-372/19 to T-375/19 and T-385/19, Santini and Others v Parliament, EU:T:2021:78��7.216 T-349/19, Decathlon v EUIPO –Athlon Custom Sportswear, EU:T:2020:488��17.13 T-353/19, Gamma-A v EUIPO –Zivju pārstrādes uzņēmumu serviss, EU:T:2020:95 ��17.07 T-355/19, CE v Committee of Regions, EU:T:2021:369��16.07 T-355/19 INTP, CE v Committee of Regions, EU:T:2021:860��25.50 T-358/19, Groupe Canal +v Commission, EU:T:2021:273��7.145 T-360/19, Jalkh v Parliament, EU:T:2019:899��7.23 T-368/19, Datenlotsen Informationssysteme v Commission, EU:T:2020:87�� 8.05, 8.22, 8.23 T-371/19, Itinerant Show Room v EUIPO –Save the Duck, EU:T:2020:339 ��17.06 T-378/19, Topcart v EUIPO –Carl International, EU:T:2020:544��16.15 T-382/19, Turk Hava Yollari v EUIPO –Sky, EU:T:2021:45 ��17.08 T-383/19 R, Walker and Others v Parliament and Council, EU:T:2019:754��13.23 T-384/19, Parliament v Axa Assurances Luxembourg and Others, EU:T:2021:630�� 15.18, 22.41 T-384/19 OP, Parliament v Axa Assurances Luxembourg and Others, pending��22.41 T-387/19, DF and DG v EIB, EU:T:2021:258�� 16.04, 16.29 T-388/19, Puigdemont i Casamajó and Comín i Oliveres v Parliament, EU:T:2022:421��7.11, 7.13 T-389/19 to T-394/19, T-397/19, T-398/19, T-403/19, T-404/19, T-406/19, T-407/19, T-409/19 to T-414/19, T-416/19 to T-418/19, T-420/19 to T-422/19, T-425/19 to T-427/19, T-429/19 to T-432/19, T-435/19, T-436/19, T-438/19 to T-442/19, T-444/19 to T-446/19, T-448/19, T-450/19 to T-454/19, T-463/19 and T-465/19, Coppo Gavazzi and Others v Parliament, EU:T:2020:494��7.10, 9.18 T-495/19, Romania v Commission, EU:T:2021:781��7.14, 7.18 T-496/19, CV and Others v Commission, EU:T:2020:163 ��16.05 T-504/19, Crédit lyonnais v ECB, EU:T:2021:185��7.221 T-508/19, Mead Johnson Nutrition, EU:T:2022:217 ��7.217 T-510/19, Puma v EUIPO –Gemma Group, EU:T:2021:281��17.15 T-514/19, DI v ECB, EU:T:2021:332��16.29 T-515/19, Lego v EUIPO –Delta Sport Handelskontor, EU:T:2021:155��17.17 T-518/19, Sipcam Oxon v Commission, EU:T:2021:662��7.175 T-521/19, Haswani v Council, EU:T:2020:608�� 7.152, 7.221, 9.04 T-525/19, Intering and Others v Commission, EU:T:2021:202 �� 22.05, 22.19 T-535/19, H.R. Participations v EUIPO –Hottinger Investment Management, EU:T:2020:614 �� 17.03, 22.15, 22.41

cxxx Table of Cases T-536/19, Militos Symvouleftiki v Commission, EU:T:2020:588�� 7.141, 7.218 T-540/19, Sharif v Council, EU:T:2021:220��22.20 T-541/19, Shindler and Others v Council, EU:T:2020:28 ��8.09, 8.13 T-543/19, Romania v Commission, EU:T:2021:193��7.180 T-552/19, Malacalza Investimenti v ECB, EU:T:2020:294�� 7.139, 25.11 T-552/19 OP, Malacalza Investimenti v ECB, EU:T:2020:362��25.11 T-562/19, Klein v Commission, EU:T:2020:300��22.63 T-564/19, Lozano Arana and Others v EUIPO –Coltejer, EU:T:2020:228��17.19 T-565/19, Oltchim v Commission, EU:T:2021:904 �� 7.141, 7.151 T-568/19, Micreos Food Safety v Commission, EU:T:2020:647�� 7.19, 13.41 T-569/19, AlzChem Group v Commission, EU:T:2021:628�� 7.68, 7.181 T-575/19, Hill Mansilla v Commission, EU:T:2021:324 ��16.04, 16.26, 16.27, 18.03 T-578/19 R, Sophia Group v Parliament, EU:T:2019:583 ��13.29 T-579/19, The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann v EUIPO, EU:T:2021:186�� 17.03, 17.06 T-580/19, Borborudi v Council, EU:T:2021:330��7.221 T-583/19, Electrolux Home Products v EUIPO –D. Consult, EU:T:2020:511��17.13 T-584/19, thyssenkrupp v Commission, EU:T:2022:386�� 7.180, 24.71 T-585/19, EJ v EIB, EU:T:2021:142�� 16.01, 16.13 T-586/19, PL v Commission, EU:T:2021:370��16.04 T-588/19, Novomatic v EUIPO –adp Gauselmann, EU:T:2021:157��7.175 T-589/19, Gothe and Kunz v EUIPO –Aldi Einkauf, EU:T:2020:397��17.11 T-599/19, EM v Parliament, EU:T:2021:111��16.17 T-601/19, Osório & Gonçalves v EUIPO –Miguel Torres, EU:T:2020:422��17.15 T-607/19, Itinerant Show Room v EUIPO, EU:T:2020:491��17.07 T-609/19, Canon v Commission, EU:T:2022:299��7.176 T-610/19, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, EU:T:2022:15��7.221, 7.222, 11.45, 11.49, 11.56 T-612/19 R, UPL Europe and Aceto Agricultural Chemicals v Commission, EU:T:2020:102 �� 13.32, 13.33 T-613/19, ENIL Brussels Office and Others v Commission, EU:T:2020:382 ��7.15 T-615/19, Point Tec Products Electronic v EUIPO –Compagnie des Montres Longines, Francillon, EU:T:2021:224 ��17.20 T-616/19 REV, Katjes Fassin v EUIPO –Haribo The Netherlands & Belgium, EU:T:2021:213 �� 20.01, 25.44, 25.48 T-620/19, Ace of spades v EUIPO –Krupp and Borrmann, EU:T:2020:593��8.23 T-624/19, Welter’s v EUIPO, EU:T:2021:393�� 17.06, 17.20 T-627/19 R, Shindler and Others v Commission, EU:T:2020:23��13.02, 13.04, 13.05, 13.09 T-630/19, AH v Eurofound, EU:T:2021:538�� 16.26, 22.41 T-632/19, DD v FRA, EU:T:2021:434�� 16.06, 16.14, 16.29 T-634/19, FC v EUAA, EU:T:2022:222 �� 16.15, 16.28 T-639/19, Sánchez Romero Carvajal Jabugo v EUIPO –Embutidos Monells, EU:T:2020:581 ��17.17 T-640/19, Sasol Germany and Others v ECHA, EU:T:2020:336��7.19 T-641/19, FD v Fusion for Energy Joint Undertaking, EU:T:2021:388 ��16.14, 16.15, 16.17, 16.26 T-644/19, Linde Material Handling v EUIPO –Verti Aseguradora, EU:T:2021:222��17.03 T-645/19, IMG v Commission, EU:T:2020:388 �� 7.23, 11.73 T-648/19, Nike European Operations Netherlands and Converse Netherlands v Commission, EU:T:2021:428��7.53, 7.55 T-651/19, Brands Up v EUIPO, EU:T:2020:288��17.06 T-652/19 R, Elevolution –Engenharia v Commission, EU:T:2020:263��13.24 T-654/19 R, FF v Commission, EU:T:2019:860 ��13.03, 13.04, 13.05, 13.09 T-658/19 R, Vizzone v Commission, EU:T:2020:71�� 13.12, 13.14, 13.27 T-659/19, FF Group Romania v EUIPO –KiK Textilien und Non-Food, EU:T:2020:328 ��17.21 T-663/19, Hasbro v EUIPO –Kreativni Događaji, EU:T:2021:211 ��17.08 T-670/19, Carbajo Ferrero v Parliament, EU:T:2021:435 �� 16.05, 16.27, 16.28

Table of Cases cxxxi T-677/19, Polfarmex v EUIPO –Kaminski, EU:T:2020:42�� 17.05, 17.21 T-678/19, Health Product Group v EUIPO –Bioline Pharmaceutical, EU:T:2021:364�� 17.17, 22.15 T-680/19, Irish Wind Farmers’ Association and Others v Commission, EU:T:2021:412 ��7.56 T-684/19 and T-704/19, MEKH and FGSZ v ACER, EU:T:2022:138�� 7.165, 9.01, 9.08, 9.09 T-688/19, VeriGraft v Eismea, EU:T:2022:112��22.16 T-689/19, ZU v EEAS, EU:T:2021:796��16.11 T-693/19, Kerry Luxembourg v EUIPO –Ornua, EU:T:2021:124��17.17 T-700/19, Ghaoud v Council, EU:T:2021:576�� 1.03, 7.190 T-709/19, GW v Court of Auditors, EU:T:2021:389��16.04 T-729/19, Dinamo v EUIPO, EU:T:2020:314�� 17.20, 22.15 T-734/19, Junqueras i Vies v Parliament, EU:T:2021:15 ��7.15 T-738/19, Clouds Sky v EUIPO –The Cloud Networks, EU:T:2020:441��17.17 T-746/19, GY v ECB, EU:T:2021:390�� 9.16, 16.05 T-753/19, Ungureanu v Commission, EU:T:2021:90��11.36 T-777/19, CAPA and Others v Commission, EU:T:2021:588�� 7.119, 7.125, 7.141 T-777/19 R, CAPA and Others v Commission, EU:T:2021:407�� 13.32, 13.36 T-789/19, Moerenhout and Others v Commission, EU:T:2021:260 ��7.180 T-791/19, Sped-Pro v Commission, EU:T:2022:67 �� 7.39, 7.188 T-795/19, HB v Commission, EU:T:2021:917��11.08 T-795/19 R, HB v Commission, EU:T:2020:88�� 13.29, 13.33 T-796/19, HB v Commission, EU:T:2021:918�� 11.08, 25.23 T-804/19, HC v Commission, EU:T:2021:849 �� 16.25, 16.29 T-807/19, Hochmann Marketing v Commission, EU:T:2020:10��7.15 T-809/19, Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional v EUIPO, EU:T:2021:100 ��17.13 T-815/19, Constantinescu and Horga v Romania and Others, EU:T:2020:149 ��2.02 T-819/19, Man and Machine v EUIPO –Bim Freelance, EU:T:2020:596��17.16 T-821/19, Herlyn and Beck v EUIPO –Brillux, EU:T:2021:80��17.05 T-822/19, Asoliva and Anierac v Commission, EU:T:2021:246�� 7.100, 7.110 T-824/19, RY v Commission, EU:T:2021:6��16.29 T-838/19, Koopman International v EUIPO –Tinnus Enterprises and Mystic Products, EU:T:2020:343 ��7.23 T-842/19, Koopman International v EUIPO –Tinnus Enterprises and Mystic Products, EU:T:2020:345 ��7.13, 7.23 T-843/19, Correia v EESC, EU:T:2021:221�� 16.07, 16.29 T-849/19, Leonardo v Frontex, EU:T:2022:28�� 7.141, 11.51, 11.57 T-849/19 R, Leonardo v Frontex, EU:T:2020:154�� 13.20, 13.39 T-851/19, Body Attack Sports Nutrition v EUIPO –Sakkari, EU:T:2020:485 ��17.13 T-854/19, Franz Schröder v EUIPO –RDS Design, EU:T:2021:309 ��7.172 T-856/19, Franz Schröder v EUIPO –RDS Design, EU:T:2021:311 ��17.15 T-858/19, easyCosmetic Swiss v EUIPO –UWI Unternehmensberatungs-und Wirtschaftsinformations, EU:T:2020:598��2.30 T-864/19, AI and Others v ECDC, EU:T:2022:452��22.13 T-866/19, Ryanair and Laudamotion v Commission, EU:T:2021:480�� 7.101, 7.110 T-868/19 R, Nouryon Industrial Chemicals and Others v Commission, EU:T:2020:171��13.37 T-878/19, Bende v EUIPO –Julius-K9, EU:T:2021:146��17.17 T-880/19, Lianopoulou v Commission, EU:T:2021:325 �� 16.15, 16.26, 16.29 T-881/19, GABO:mi v Commission, EU:T:2021:564��22.15 T-882/19, Kerangus v EUIPO, EU:T:2020:558�� 17.06, 17.13 T-884/19, Folschette and Others v Commission, EU:T:2021:27��11.24, 11.34, 11.62, 11.63, 11.64 T-885/19, Aquind and Others v Commission, EU:T:2021:118��7.13 T-4/20, Sieć Badawcza Łukasiewicz –Port Polski Ośrodek Rozwoju Technologii v Commission, EU:T:2022:242�� 15.12, 15.19 T-6/20, Dr. Spiller v EUIPO –Rausch, EU:T:2021:920 �� 22.23, 22.58 T-15/20, Skyliners v EUIPO –Sky, EU:T:2021:401�� 17.12, 17.20, 22.13

cxxxii Table of Cases T-17/20, adp Gauselmann v EUIPO –Gameloft, EU:T:2021:313��17.16 T-24/20, Junqueras i Vies v Parliament, EU:T:2020:601 �� 7.06, 7.12, 7.15 T-24/20 R, Junqueras i Vies v Parliament, EU:T:2020:78��13.05, 13.17, 13.19, 13.23, 13.31 T-26/20, Forex Bank v EUIPO –Coino UK, EU:T:2020:583��17.20 T-30/20, Promed v EUIPO –Centrumelektroniki, EU:T:2020:599�� 17.05, 25.24 T-31/20, West End Drinks v EUIPO –Pernod Ricard, EU:T:2021:217��17.11 T-34/20, Datenlotsen Informationssysteme v Commission, EU:T:2021:13��7.124 T-35/20, Monster Energy v EUIPO –Nanjing aisiyou Clothing, EU:T:2020:579��17.03 T-37/20, United Kingdom v Commission, EU:T:2020:637�� 7.148, 7.154 T-41/20, Di Bernardo v Commission, EU:T:2021:778��16.27 T-42/20, JT v Secrétaire général des écoles européennes and Chambre de recours des écoles européennes, EU:T:2020:278��7.73 T-43/20, AV and AW v Parliament, EU:T:2021:666��22.23 T-44/20, Chanel v EUIPO –Huawei Technologies, EU:T:2021:207��17.08 T-50/20, PNB Banka v ECB, EU:T:2021:141��7.16 T-60/20, Enosi Mastichoparagogon Chiou v EUIPO, EU:T:2021:629��22.15 T-71/20, Puma v EUIPO –CAMäleon, EU:T:2021:121��17.10 T-75/20, Abitron Germany v EUIPO –Hetronic International, EU:T:2021:431��17.17 T-77/20 R, Ascenza Agro and Industrias Afrasa v Commission, EU:T:2020:246��13.34 T-79/20, AI v ECDC, EU:T:2021:478�� 16.14, 16.15 T-83/20, bonnanwalt v EUIPO –Bayerischer Rundfunk and Others, EU:T:2022:369 ��22.56 T-88/20, Rivière and Others v Parliament, EU:T:2021:664��7.14, 7.21 T-92/20, Fryč v Commission, EU:T:2021:82��11.70 T-93/20, Albert Darboven Holding v EUIPO, EU:T:2021:164��17.05 T-113/20, BSEF v Commission, EU:T:2022:142�� 7.188, 22.13 T-119/20, IN v Eismea, EU:T:2021:427�� 16.15, 16.27, 16.29 T-124/20, M/S. Indeutsch International v EUIPO –135 Kirkstall, EU:T:2021:668�� 17.03, 17.06 T-127/20, France v ECHA, EU:T:2021:572��2.52 T-131/20, IR v Commission, EU:T:2020:381 ��7.159 T-134/20, Huhtamaki v Commission, EU:T:2022:100�� 7.180, 7.216 T-148/20, FC v EASO, EU:T:2022:30�� 16.04, 16.14, 16.15 T-150/20 R, Tartu Agro v Commission, EU:T:2020:299��13.37 T-151/20, Czech Republic v Commission, EU:T:2022:281�� 11.11, 11.20 T-159/20, Hamers v Cedefop, EU:T:2021:913�� 16.14, 22.20 T-160/20, 3M Belgium v ECHA, EU:T:2021:149��7.148, 7.150, 22.67, 22.74, 23.53 T-161/20, Ighoga Region 10 v Commission, EU:T:2020:652 ��8.23 T-162/20 R, UPL Europe and Indofil Industries, EU:T:2020:366�� 13.29, 13.31 T-163/20, Isopix v Parliament, EU:T:2020:527�� 13.23, 13.29 T-163/20 R and T-163/20 R II, Isopix v Parliament, EU:T:2020:215 ��13.23 T-164/20, BG v Parliament, EU:T:2023:35 �� 16.15, 16.29 T-165/20, JC v EUCAP Somalia, EU:T:2022:453��15.06, 15.13, 15.17, 15.20, 22.19 T-173/20, Henry Cotton’s Brand Management v EUIPO –Industries Sportswear, EU:T:2021:610 ��17.06 T-177/20, Himmel v EUIPO –Ramirez Monfort, EU:T:2021:312��17.05 T-179/20, JP v Commission, EU:T:2022:423��16.14 T-194/20, JF v EUCAP Somalia, EU:T:2022:454 ��15.06, 15.10, 15.12, 15.13, 15.20 T-195/20, Sociedade da Água de Monchique v EUIPO –Ventura Vendrell, EU:T:2021:601 ��17.10 T-197/20, JT v EUIPO –Carrasco Pirard, EU:T:2021:429��17.21 T-201/20, Berebene v EUIPO –Consorzio vino Chianti Classico, EU:T:2021:192��17.03 T-203/20, Al-Imam v Council, EU:T:2021:605��7.175, 7.188, 9.16, 11.15 T-205/20, Frommer v EUIPO –Minerva, EU:T:2021:414��17.20 T-208/20, JH v Europol, EU:T:2021:726 ��16.14 T-210/20, Square v EUIPO, EU:T:2021:711 ��17.13

Table of Cases cxxxiii T-215/20, Fidia farmaceutici v EUIPO –Ioulia and Irene Tseti Pharmaceutical Laboratories, EU:T:2021:371 ��17.12 T-216/20, Vysoka v Commission and Others, EU:T:2020:386��11.29 T-219/20, JK v Commission, EU:T:2021:690 ��16.17 T-220/20, Kerstens v Commission, EU:T:2021:716��16.29 T-232/20, Biovene Cosmetics v EUIPO –Eugène Perma France, EU:T:2021:396��17.15 T-247/20, JP v Commission, EU:T:2021:871�� 7.180, 11.36 T-249/20, Sabra v Council, EU:T:2022:140��7.218 T-251/20, KG v Parliament, EU:T:2021:130 ��16.04 T-252/20, Silver and Others v Council, EU:T:2021:347��2.56, 7.91, 7.101, 7.102, 7.104, 7.108 T-254/20, Kondyterska korporatsiia “Roshen” v EUIPO –Krasnyj Octyabr, EU:T:2021:650 �� 17.15, 22.16 T-265/20, JR v Commission, EU:T:2021:850��7.141 T-266/20, Global Chartered Controller Institute v EUIPO –CFA Institute, EU:T:2021:342��17.05 T-271/20, JS v SRB, EU:T:2022:652 ��16.16 T-277/20, MKB Multifunds v Commission, EU:T:2021:560�� 7.57, 7.119 T-292/20, Yanukovych v Council, EU:T:2022:188��7.190 T-296/20, Foz v Council, EU:T:2022:298�� 7.176, 10.21 T-298/20, KD v EUIPO, EU:T:2022:671 ��16.15 T-299/20, KF v EIB, EU:T:2022:171��16.01, 16.14, 16.17, 16.29 T-300/20, Nosio v EUIPO –Tros del Beto, EU:T:2021:223��25.22 T-323/20, Hell Energy Magyarország v EUIPO, EU:T:2021:205 ��17.06 T-325/20, Unger Marketing International v EUIPO –Orben Wasseraufbereitung, EU:T:2022:23 �� 17.11, 24.77 T-326/20, Bibita Group v EUIPO –Benkomers, EU:T:2021:208�� 7.221, 17.06 T-337/20, Hochmann Marketing v EUIPO, EU:T:2022:406��7.175 T-338/20, KI v eu-LISA, EU:T:2022:130 �� 9.15, 16.04 T-341/20, EAB v EUIPO, EU:T:2021:72 ��17.16 T-358/20 R, Net Technologies Finland v REA, EU:T:2020:369��13.36 T-359/20, Team Beverage v EUIPO –Zurich Deutscher Herold Lebensversicherung, EU:T:2021:841 ��17.16 T-370/20, KL v EIB, EU:T:2021:822�� 16.29, 18.03 T-377/20, KN v EESC, EU:T:2021:528��7.14 T-377/20 R, KN v EESC, EU:T:2020:353��13.39 T-380/20, Tubes Radiatori v EUIPO –Antrax It, EU:T:2022:359��17.15 T-381/20 R, Datax v REA, EU:T:2020:414�� 13.20, 13.33 T-388/20, Ryanair v Commission, EU:T:2021:196��22.20 T-389/20, KO v Commission, EU:T:2021:436��16.15 T-392/20, Flašker v Commission, EU:T:2022:245 ��7.217 T-404/20, Global Translation Solutions v Commission, EU:T:2021:654��22.19 T-415/20, KT v EIB, EU:T:2021:368��16.18 T-433/20, KY v Court of Justice, EU:T:2021:840 ��22.17 T-436/20, Sedus Stoll v EUIPO –Kappes, EU:T:2021:699��17.05 T-440/20, Jindal Saw and Jindal Saw Italia v Commission, EU:T:2022:318��9.08 T-451/20, Meta Platforms Ireland v Commission, pending ��7.27 T-452/20, Meta Platforms Ireland v Commission, pending ��7.27 T-452/20 R, Facebook Ireland v Commission, EU:T:2020:516��13.04, 13.13, 13.34, 13.37, 13.38 T-454/20, Garment Manufacturers Association in Cambodia v Commission, EU:T:2021:833 ��7.106 T-457/20, VeriGraft v Eismea, EU:T:2022:457�� 15.12, 15.13 T-462/20, ZU v Commission, EU:T:2021:197�� 16.04, 16.21 T-464/20, Eggy Food v EUIPO, EU:T:2021:421��17.06 T-465/20, Ryanair v Commission, EU:T:2021:284��10.23 T-466/20, LF v Commission, EU:T:2021:574 ��16.12

cxxxiv Table of Cases T-467/20, Inditex v EUIPO –Ffauf Italia, EU:T:2021:842��22.65 T-468/20, Kühne v Parliament, EU:T:2022:137 �� 16.26, 22.16, 22.17 T-479/20, Eurobolt and Others v Commission, EU:T:2022:304�� 7.91, 7.172, 7.221 T-481/20, Magnetec v EUIPO, EU:T:2021:373��17.16 T-482/20, LG and Others v Commission, EU:T:2021:290��7.11, 7.23 T-484/20, SATSE v Commission, EU:T:2021:172��7.110 T-489/20, Eos Products v EUIPO, EU:T:2021:547��17.16 T-492/20, S. Tous v EUIPO –Zhejiang China-Best Import & Export, EU:T:2021:413��17.15 T-504/20, Soapland v EUIPO –Norma, EU:T:2021:789��22.15 T-511/20, Zardini v Commission, EU:T:2022:122��16.06 T-516/20, Mandelay v EUIPO –Qx World, EU:T:2022:227��17.12 T-528/20, Kočner v Europol, EU:T:2021:631 �� 11.24, 11.60 T-529/20, LR v EIB, EU:T:2022:523��16.01 T-531/20, Wolf Oil v EUIPO –Rolf Lubricants, EU:T:2021:406��2.30 T-533/20, Green Power Technologies v Key Digital Technologies Joint Undertaking, EU:T:2022:805 ��7.74 T-533/20 R, Green Power Technologies v Commission and ECSEL Joint Undertaking, EU:T:2021:38 ��13.23 T-535/20, Müller v EUIPO, EU:T:2021:283�� 17.11, 17.20 T-536/20, LU v EIB, EU:T:2022:40�� 16.03, 16.06 T-562/20, Upper Echelon Products v EUIPO, EU:T:2021:464�� 17.13, 17.17, 17.21 T-566/20, Residencial Palladium v EUIPO –Fiesta Hotels & Resorts, EU:T:2021:525��17.11 T-568/20, MF v eu-LISA, EU:T:2022:223 ��16.04 T-571/20, Luna Italia v EUIPO –Luna, EU:T:2021:956��17.03 T-573/20, MG v EIB, EU:T:2021:915��16.04 T-577/20, Ryanair v Commission, EU:T:2022:301��7.50 T-579/20, Genekam Biotechnology v Commission, EU:T:2022:114��22.16 T-581/20, YP v Commission, EU:T:2021:823��22.19 T-598/20, Skechers USA v EUIPO, EU:T:2021:922��17.13 T-601/20, Tirrenia di navigazione v Commission, EU:T:2022:302 ��7.176 T-603/20, Likvidacijska masa iza Mesoprodukt and Čuljak v Commission, EU:T:2021:66��13.24 T-604/20, Guangdong Haomei New Materials and Guangdong King Metal Light Alloy Technology v Commission, EU:T:2021:952��7.141 T-609/20, LA International Cooperation v Commission, EU:T:2022:407 ��7.175 T-610/20, Egis Bâtiments International and InCA v Parliament, EU:T:2021:735 ��15.19 T-611/20, Airoldi Metalli v Commission, EU:T:2021:641�� 7.141, 7.144 T-619/20, FJ and Others v EEAS, EU:T:2021:901��16.05 T-620/20, Alessio and Others v ECB, EU:T:2021:877 ��7.158 T-622/20, Aldi v EUIPO, EU:T:2021:446��17.21 T-624/20, MV v Commission, EU:T:2022:653��16.29 T-628/20, Ryanair v Commission, EU:T:2021:285��9.09 T-643/20, Ryanair v Commission, EU:T:2021:286��7.56 T-645/20, Dual Star Logistic and Others v Parliament and Council, EU:T:2021:507 ��7.101, 7.102, 7.106, 7.108 T-646/20 R, NG and Others v Parliament and Council, EU:T:2020:540��13.14 T-647/20, Verelst v Council, EU:T:2022:5��7.181 T-648/20, NB v Court of Justice, EU:T:2021:676 ��16.13 T-652/20, TO v EEA, EU:T:2021:8��22.74 T-656/20 R, Symrise v ECHA, EU:T:2021:99 �� 13.36, 13.37 T-657/20, Ryanair v Commission, EU:T:2022:390��7.180 T-661/20, NV v eu-LISA, EU:T:2022:154 ��16.05 T-663/20, One Voice v ECHA, EU:T:2021:345��7.150 T-665/20, Ryanair v Commission, EU:T:2021:344��7.180, 7.210, 7.218, 7.219 T-665/20, Ryanair v Commission, EU:T:2021:344��7.119

Table of Cases cxxxv T-669/20, Pluscard Service v EUIPO, EU:T:2022:106��17.06 T-670/20, Sam McKnight v EUIPO –Carolina Herrera, EU:T:2021:494 ��17.11 T-671/20, OA v EESC, EU:T:2022:82�� 24.46, 24.49 T-672/20, Kerstens v Commission, EU:T:2021:289��16.13 T-674/20, TLP v Parliament and Council, EU:T:2021:139 ��7.146, 7.159, 22.08, 22.70 T-677/20, Ryanair and Laudamotion v Commission, EU:T:2021:465�� 7.188, 23.44 T-678/20, Solar Electric and Others v Commission, EU:T:2021:780��7.57 T-681/20, OC v EEAS, EU:T:2022:422�� 16.14, 16.28 T-684/20, Legero Schuhfabrik v EUIPO –Rieker Schuh, EU:T:2021:912��24.65 T-686/20, Asian Gear v EUIPO –Multimox, EU:T:2021:615��17.04 T-689/20, HB v EIB, EU:T:2021:891��16.27 T-691/20, Kühne v Parliament, EU:T:2021:600 ��16.04 T-698/20, Forum Justicia Europa v Spain and Fiscalía Especial contra la Corrupción y la Criminalidad Organizada, EU:T:2020:657��7.73 T-699/20, Fashion Energy v EUIPO –Retail Royalty, EU:T:2021:928�� 17.21, 22.44 T-701/20, Segura del Oro Pulido v Commission, EU:T:2021:67 ��5.37 T-709/20, OJ v Commission, EU:T:2022:81 ��16.29 T-712/20, Škoda Investment v EUIPO –Škoda Auto, EU:T:2021:700�� 7.217, 17.15 T-713/20, OQ v Commission, EU:T:2022:513 ��16.12 T-714/20 R, Ovsyannikov v Council, EU:T:2021:243 ��13.27 T-718/20, Wizz Air Hungary v Commission, EU:T:2022:276��24.71 T-719/20, Macías Chávez and Others v Spain and Parliament, EU:T:2021:216��2.02 T-722/20, Far Polymers and Others v Commission, EU:T:2021:598�� 7.132, 7.135 T-723/20, Prigozhin v Council, EU:T:2022:317��7.180 T-725/20, Guangdong Haomei New Materials and Guangdong King Metal Light Alloy Technology v Commission, EU:T:2021:957��7.141 T-726/20, Grupa Azoty and Others v Commission, EU:T:2021:884�� 7.93, 7.109, 7.118 T-727/20, Kirimova v EUIPO, EU:T:2022:136��22.56 T-728/20, OM v Commission, EU:T:2021:409��16.15 T-738/20, Deutschtec v EUIPO –Group A, EU:T:2022:343�� 17.15, 17.20, 22.15 T-739/20, Unite the Union v EUIPO –WWRD Ireland, EU:T:2022:381 ��17.15 T-741/20, Advansa Manufacturing and Others v Commission, EU:T:2021:885 ��7.118 T-742/20 R, UPL Europe and Indofil Industries, EU:T:2021:152��13.32, 13.33, 13.34, 13.35 T-744/20, Airoldi Metalli v Commission, EU:T:2021:853�� 7.13, 7.61, 7.62 T-749/20, Veronese v EUIPO –Veronese Design Company, EU:T:2021:430��17.21 T-750/20, Correia v EESC, EU:T:2022:246��16.17, 16.18, 16.29, 25.23 T-753/20, Green Power Technologies v Commission, EU:T:2022:806 ��15.13 T-757/20, OT v Parliament, EU:T:2022:156 ��16.26 T-760/20, Jakeliūnas v ESMA, EU:T:2021:512��8.13, 8.16 T-765/20 R, The Floow v Commission, EU:T:2021:167�� 13.33, 13.36 T-768/20, Standard International Management v EUIPO –Asia Standard Management Services, EU:T:2022:458��17.05 T-1/21, Fabryki Mebli “Forte” v EUIPO –Bog-Fran, EU:T:2022:108 ��7.223 T-5/21, Stichting Comité N 65 Ondergronds Helvoirt v EEA, EU:T:2021:813��7.15 T-18/21, Be Smart v Commission, EU:T:2021:531��8.23 T-19/21, Amazon.com and Others v Commission, EU:T:2021:730��7.30 T-20/21, VI v Commission, EU:T:2022:427 �� 16.06, 16.29 T-38/21 R, Inivos and Inivos v Commission, EU:T:2021:287�� 13.29, 13.32 T-45/21 R, Ciano Trading & Services CT & S and Others v Commission, EU:T:2021:131��13.23 T-54/21 R, OHB System v Commission, EU:T:2021:292�� 13.29, 13.31, 13.38 T-76/21, Masterbuilders, Heiermann, Schmidtmann v EUIPO –Cirillo, EU:T:2022:16 ��22.13 T-86/21, Distintiva Solutions v EUIPO –Makeblock, EU:T:2022:107�� 17.07, 22.15 T-88/21, Paesen v EEAS, EU:T:2022:631��16.04 T-92/21 R, Darment v Commission, EU:T:2021:293��13.28, 13.29, 13.32, 13.33

cxxxvi Table of Cases T-95/21 R, Portugal v Commission, EU:T:2021:383 �� 13.36, 13.37 T-117/21, Deichmann v EUIPO –Munich, EU:T:2022:271��17.03 T-122/21, QI v Commission, EU:T:2022:361��16.29 T-128/21, Bese v EUIPO –Mixtec, EU:T:2021:479 ��22.56 T-129/21, Colombani v EEAS, EU:T:2022:424��16.13 T-130/21 R, CCPL and Others v Commission, EU:T:2021:488 ��13.31 T-148/21 R, Paccor Packaging and Others v Commission, EU:T:2021:687 �� 13.29, 13.34 T-152/21, Union syndicale Solidaires des SDIS de France and DOM/TOM v Commission, EU:T:2021:847��11.45 T-154/21, Saure v Commission, EU:T:2022:231�� 7.68, 22.20 T-157/21, RG v Council, EU:T:2021:829�� 7.107, 7.108 T-159/21, Bustos v EUIPO –Bicicletas Monty, EU:T:2021:924 �� 17.06, 17.14 T-161/21, McCord v Commission, EU:T:2021:910��8.06 T-164/21, QM v Europol, EU:T:2022:695��16.27 T-165/21, Amort and Others v Commission, EU:T:2021:805��9.04 T-176/21, CCTY Bearing Company v EUIPO –CCVI International, EU:T:2022:449 ��17.01 T-187/21 R, Firearms United Network and Others v Commission, EU:T:2021:595 �� 13.36, 13.37 T-189/21 R, Aloe Vera of Europe v Commission, EU:T:2021:487 �� 13.33, 13.35, 13.37 T-191/21, Svenska Metallkompaniet v EUIPO –Otlav, EU:T:2021:470 ��22.56 T-197/21, Lea Nature Services v EUIPO –Debonair Trading Internacional, EU:T:2022:118 ��17.13 T-207/21 R, Polynt v ECHA, EU:T:2021:382�� 13.27, 13.29, 13.36 T-227/21, Illumina v Commission, EU:T:2021:672��7.11 T-227/21, Illumina v Commission, EU:T:2022:447��7.17, 7.46, 7.175, 7.188, 23.09, 23.44 T-231/21, Praesidiad v EUIPO –Zaun, EU:T:2022:649��17.04 T-237/21, Fidelity National Information Services v EUIPO –IFIS, EU:T:2022:267 ��17.15 T-246/21, FJ and Others v EEAS, EU:T:2022:370��16.05 T-249/21 R, SN v Parliament, EU:T:2021:496�� 13.27, 13.36 T-250/21, Zdút v EUIPO –Nehera and Others, EU:T:2022:430��17.17 T-251/21, Tigercat International v EUIPO –Caterpillar, EU:T:2022:437��24.47 T-266/21, Casanova v EIB, EU:T:2022:566��16.29 T-272/21, Puigdemont i Casamajó and Others v Parliament, pending��7.70 T-272/21 R, Puigdemont i Casamajó and Others v Parliament, EU:T:2021:497�� 13.21, 13.39 T-273/21, The Bazooka Companies v EUIPO –Bilkiewicz, EU:T:2022:675��17.11 T-281/21, Nowhere v EUIPO –Ye, EU:T:2022:139 ��17.21 T-285/21 R, Alliance française de Bruxelles-Europe and Others v Commission, EU:T:2021:495 �� 13.01, 13.29 T-287/21, Pejovič v EUIPO –ETA živilska industrija, EU:T:2022:441 �� 17.01, 17.04, 17.05 T-293/21, Muschaweck v EUIPO –Conze, EU:T:2022:345 ��22.57 T-296/21, SU v EIOPA, EU:T:2022:808�� 16.15, 16.28 T-297/21 R, Troy Chemical Company and Troy v Commission, EU:T:2021:733��13.35 T-311/21, SV v EIB, EU:T:2022:600�� 16.13, 16.26 T-312/21, SY v Commission, EU:T:2022:814��16.06 T-315/21, Laboratorios Ern v EUIPO –Nordesta, EU:T:2022:141��17.17 T-328/21, Airoldi Metalli v Commission, EU:T:2022:277��7.110 T-334/21, Mendes de Almeida v Council, EU:T:2022:375 �� 16.01, 16.08 T-338/21, F I S I v EUIPO –Verband der Deutschen Daunen-und Federnindustrie, EU:T:2022:360 ��17.08 T-341/21, Rauff-Nisthar v Commission, EU:T:2022:516��16.27 T-353/21, KTM Fahrrad v EUIPO –KTM, EU:T:2022:527 ��17.14 T-355/21, Polo Club Düsseldorf v EUIPO –Company Bridge and Life, EU:T:2022:348��17.04 T-356/21, Future Motion v EUIPO –El Corte Inglés, EU:T:2022:380��7.188 T-356/21, Future Motion v EUIPO –El Corte Inglés, EU:T:2022:380�� 7.84, 7.108 T-357/21, Jose A. Alfonso Arpon v EUIPO –Puma, EU:T:2022:405��17.13

Table of Cases cxxxvii T-365/21, TJ v EEAS, EU:T:2023:25�� 16.14, 16.29 T-381/21, D & A Pharma v EMA, EU:T:2021:960 ��7.144 T-418/21, Alauzun and Others v Commission and EMA, EU:T:2022:39�� 7.23, 7.74, 7.141 T-422/21, Daimler v EUIPO –Volkswagen, EU:T:2021:888��22.56 T-431/21, UNIS v Commission, EU:T:2022:126��7.14 T-433/21, Vitronic v EUIPO, EU:T:2022:344��17.13 T-434/21, TO v EEA, EU:T:2022:72��16.04 T-437/21, Greenwich Polo Club v EUIPO –Lifestyle Equities, EU:T:2022:643�� 17.06, 17.21 T-438/21, TL v Commission, EU:T:2022:455��16.27 T-440/21, TM v ECB, EU:T:2022:800��16.01 T-443/21, YAplus DBA Yoga Alliance v EUIPO –Vidyanand, EU:T:2023:7�� 17.08, 17.17 T-465/21, Ionfarma v EUIPO –LG Electronics, EU:T:2022:153 ��17.05 T-468/21, Avenir de la langue française v Commission, EU:T:2021:806�� 7.14, 7.103 T-469/21, Natale v Italy, EU:T:2021:705 ��13.02 T-478/21, Les Éditions P. Amaury v EUIPO –Golden Balls, EU:T:2022:419��17.21 T-487/21, Neoperl v EUIPO, EU:T:2022:780 ��17.12 T-490/21, Vanhoudt v EIB, EU:T:2022:801�� 16.07, 16.26 T-497/21, Girardi v EUIPO, EU:T:2022:293��7.23 T-497/21 R, Girardi v EUIPO, EU:T:2021:725�� 13.34, 13.36, 13.37 T-517/21, Grieger v Commission, EU:T:2022:588��16.15 T-527/21, Abenante and Others v Parliament and Council, EU:T:2022:278��7.94 T-527/21 R, Abenante and Others v Parliament and Council, EU:T:2021:750��13.32 T-528/21, Neratax v EUIPO –Intrum Hellas and Others, EU:T:2023:4��17.07 T-534/21, VP v Cedefop, EU:T:2022:327��7.10 T-538/21, PBL and WA v Commission, EU:T:2023:53 ��13.37 T-544/21, Cheers Interactive (India) v EUIPO –Furrion Property, EU:T:2022:202 ��7.148, 7.154, 22.74, 24.77 T-552/21, Worldwide Brands v EUIPO –Wan, EU:T:2023:98��17.17 T-569/21, Harbaoui v EUIPO –Google, EU:T:2023:38��2.30 T-573/21, Brand Energy Holdings v EUIPO, EU:T:2022:450��17.15 T-585/21, Zásilkovna v Commission, EU:T:2022:338��7.58 T-594/21, Stadtgemeinde Zell am See and Others v Commission, EU:T:2022:51��7.14 T-603/21 R, WO v EPPO, EU:T:2022:92��13.27 T-623/21, Puma v EUIPO –Vaillant, EU:T:2022:776 ��17.13 T-626/21, Intersagunto Terminales v Spain and Commission, EU:T:2021:908 �� 11.41, 11.46 T-628/21, Tequila Revolución v EUIPO –Horizons Group, EU:T:2022:384 �� 17.05, 17.21 T-640/21, bet-at-home.com Entertainment v EUIPO, EU:T:2022:408��17.04 T-645/21, Bloom v Parliament and Council, EU:T:2022:230 �� 7.94, 7.95, 7.106 T-654/21, Eurecna v Commission, EU:T:2022:332 ��7.14, 7.22 T-657/21, Chesini and Others v Parliament and Council, EU:T:2021:879��7.146 T-663/21, Zegers v Commission, EU:T:2022:589��16.26 T-664/21, YF v EFCA, EU:T:2022:425��16.06 T-665/21 R, Civitta Eesti v Commission, EU:T:2021:937��13.29 T-669/21, Courtois and Others v Commission, EU:T:2021:810�� 7.68, 7.146 T-677/21, TL v Commission, EU:T:2022:456�� 16.03, 16.15, 16.27 T-679/21, ANIEF v Parliament and Council, EU:T:2021:883��13.05 T-680/21, Funline International v EUIPO, EU:T:2022:216�� 17.20, 22.15 T-691/21, Alcogroup and Alcodis v Commission, EU:T:2022:206 ��7.23 T-717/21 R, ICA Traffic v Commission, EU:T:2022:18�� 13.29, 13.32 T-719/21, Correia de Matos v Commission, EU:T:2021:943��22.56 T-724/21 R, IL and Others v Parliament, EU:T:2021:873 ��13.22 T-726/21, Rolex v EUIPO –PWT, EU:T:2023:6��17.15 T-738/21, Bora Creations v EUIPO, EU:T:2022:779 ��2.30 T-747/21, Borussia VfL 1900 Mönchengladbach v EUIPO –Neng, EU:T:2022:773�� 17.11, 17.20

cxxxviii Table of Cases T-758/21, Dorsum v EUIPO –id Quantique, EU:T:2023:3��17.05 T-764/21 R, Atesos medical and Others v Commission, EU:T:2022:91��13.32, 13.34, 13.36, 13.37 T-766/21, Daw v EUIPO –Sapa Building Systems, EU:T:2022:238��25.26 T-768/21, Castellanos Triviño and Others v Commission, EU:T:2021:961��13.05 T-777/21, Trend Glass v EUIPO, EU:T:2022:846��17.13 T-795/21, Protectoplus v EUIPO, EU:T:2022:550 ��17.16 T-805/21, NS v Parliament, EU:T:2023:22�� 16.04, 16.29 T-6/22, Martínez Arzoz and Others v Commission, EU:T:2022:129��8.06 T-8/22, Topcart v EUIPO –Carl International, EU:T:2023:70��17.13 T-38/22, Romedor Pharma v EUIPO –Perfect Care Distribution, EU:T:2023:96��17.17 T-43/22, Sanrio v EUIPO –Miroglio Fashion, EU:T:2022:844��17.17 T-46/22 R, Esedra v Parliament, EU:T:2022:115��13.29 T-54/22, Rivière v Parliament and ID, EU:T:2022:472��7.74 T-54/22 R, Rivière v Parliament and ID, EU:T:2022:74�� 7.74, 13.27 T-64/22, Vtesse Harlow v Commission, EU:T:2022:376��7.15 T-66/22, Novais v Portugal, EU:T:2022:134 ��8.16 T-118/22, OM v Commission, EU:T:2022:849��16.27 T-124/22, Falcó Capilla v Commission, EU:T:2022:289 ��7.15 T-125/22, RT France v Council, EU:T:2022:483��2.30 T-125/22 R, RT France v Council, EU:T:2022:199�� 2.30, 13.01, 13.29, 13.32, 13.36, 13.37, 13.38, 23.42, 23.44 T-141/22, Sport1 v EUIPO –SFR, EU:T:2023:55��17.20 T-217/22, Lifestyle Equities v EUIPO –Greenwich Polo Club, EU:T:2023:92��17.01 T-260/22, Freixas Montplet and Others v Committee of the Regions, EU:T:2023:71 ��16.06 T-341/22, Deutsche Bank v EUIPO –Operación y Auditoria, EU:T:2023:73�� 17.07, 17.13, 17.15 T-349/22, Hacker-Pschorr Bräu v EUIPO –Vandělíková, EU:T:2023:31��17.13 T-352/22, De Dietrich Process Systems v EUIPO –Koch-Glitsch, EU:T:2023:17��17.21 T-357/22, Das Neves v Commission, EU:T:2023:72�� 16.14, 16.26, 16.29

CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL F-5/05 and F-7/05, Violetti and Others v Commission, EU:F:2009:39 ��16.06 F-34/05, Lebedef and Others v Commission, EU:F:2006:45��16.07 F-46/05, Falcione v Commission, EU:F:2006:25��2.39 F-71/05, Milella and Campanella v Commission, EU:F:2007:184��16.07 F-51/06, Tesoka v Eurofound, EU:F:2007:108��16.07 F-57/06, Hinderyckx v Council, EU:F:2007:188��16.29 F-104/06, Arpaillange and Others v Commission, EU:F:2009:23 ��16.01 F-110/06, Carpi Badía v Commission, EU:F:2007:207 ��16.04 F-113/06, Bouis and Others v Commission, EU:F:2008:166��16.06 F-138/06 and F-37/08, Meister v OHIM, EU:F:2009:48�� 16.15, 16.21 F-141/06, Hartwig v Commission, EU:F:2007:145�� 16.21, 16.22 F-146/06, Speiser v Parliament, EU:F:2007:153��16.02 F-21/07, Marcuccio v Commission, EU:F:2007:235��16.18 F-23/07, M v EMEA, EU:F:2007:181��16.04 F-70/07, Marcuccio v Commission, EU:F:2009:15��16.28 F-130/07, Vinci v ECB, EU:F:2009:114 ��16.02 F-141/07, Maniscalso v Commission, EU:F:2008:99��16.02 F-15/08, Wiame v Commission, EU:F:2010:7��16.06 F-30/08, Nanopoulos v Commission, EU:F:2010:43��16.18 F-42/08, Marcuccio v Commission, EU:F:2009:16��16.18 F-45/07, Mandt v Parliament, EU:F:2010:72��16.26 F-60/07, Martin Bermejo v Commission, EU:F:2007:216��16.26 F-30/08, Nanopoulos v Commission, EU:F:2010:43��16.28

Table of Cases cxxxix F-46/08, Thoss v Court of Auditors, EU:F:2008:164��16.08 F-53/08, Bouillez and Others v Commission, EU:F:2010:37��16.04 F-55/08, De Nicola v EIB, EU:F:2009:159��16.01 F-64/08, Nijs v Court of Auditors, EU:F:2008:179��16.06 F-80/08, Wenig v Commission, EU:F:2009:160��16.07 F-82/08, Clarke and Others v OHIM, EU:F:2011:45 ��16.04 F-16/09, de Britto Patricio-Dias v Commission, EU:F:2009:164 ��16.04 F-20/09, Juvyns v Commission, EU:F:2011:181��16.26 F-29/09, Lebedef and Jones v Commission, EU:F:2010:120��9.17 F-50/09, Missir Mamachi di Lusignano v Commission, EU:F:2011:55�� 11.10, 16.14 F-65/09, Marcuccio v Commission, EU:F:2010:149��16.06 F-96/09, Cuallado Martorell v Commission, EU:F:2012:129 ��16.15 F-98/09, Whitehead v ECB, EU:F:2011:156��9.05, 9.16 F-102/09, Bennet and Others v OHIM, EU:F:2011:138��16.04 F-6/10, Munch v OHIM, EU:F:2011:139��16.04 F-7/10, Galan Girodit v OHIM, EU:F:2011:140��16.04 F-49/10, De Nicola v EIB, EU:F:2011:93 ��16.01 F-59/10, Barthel and Others v Court of Justice, EU:F:2011:51��16.17 F-71/10, Cantisani v Commission, EU:F:2012:71��16.02 F-114/10, Bowles and Others v ECB, EU:F:2011:173��16.03 F-29/11, BA v Commission, EU:F:2012:172��16.04 F-31/11, BI v Cedefop, EU:F:2012:28��16.25 F-61/11, Possanzini v Frontex, EU:F:2012:146��16.06 F-83/11, Cristina v Commission, EU:F:2012:90�� 16.06, 16.15 F-107/11, Ntouvas v ECDC, EU:F:2012:182�� 16.06, 16.07, 16.15 F-144/11, Mateo Pérez v Commission, EU:F:2013:86��16.04 F-148/12, Solberg v EMCDDA, EU:F:2013:154��16.07 F-74/13, Mommer v Commission, EU:F:2016:196��2.39 F-102/13, Urena de Poznanski v Commission, EU:F:2016:197��2.39 F-116/14, Murariu v EIOPA, EU:F:2015:89��16.29 F-143/14, Gervais Singou v Council, EU:F:2015:27��16.13 F-67/15, Opreana v Commission, EU:F:2016:153 ��16.04 F-100/15, De Nicola v EIB, EU:F:2016:167��11.09 F-103/15, Trampuz v Commission, EU:F:2016:184��16.21

1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION I. EU Procedural Law This book concerns EU procedural law, which denotes the study of the system of ju- 1.01 dicial protection in the European Union. It relates to three main aspects. First, that system concerns the functioning of the judicial system at the Union level and the roles and competences of the institution of the Court of Justice of the European Union— which is currently composed of the Court of Justice (often known as the European Court of Justice or ECJ) and the General Court, and which is referred to in this book as the Union Courts—along with the various types of proceedings which may be brought before it by natural and legal persons, the Member States, and the Union institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies. Second, that system takes account of the relationship between the Union Courts and the Member State courts (referred to in this book as the national courts), which is largely predicated on the preliminary ruling procedure by which the national courts refer to the Court of Justice questions about the interpretation and validity of Union law. Third, that system involves the interaction between Union law and the national procedural and remedial frameworks more generally. By way of general introduction, this chapter highlights several themes underlying the system of judicial protection in the European Union (II), along with certain challenges bearing on that system (III), which run through the chapters of this book. This is followed by discussion of the structure of this book, taking account of changes from the previous edition (IV) and the texts governing the procedure before the Union Courts (V).

II. The System of Judicial Protection in Context A. The complete and coherent system of judicial protection It should be recognized from the outset that the European Union is unique in the sense that it has a highly developed complete and coherent system of judicial protection, with the result that the rights derived from Union law can be enforced in court. This is as opposed to international organizations, whereby enforceability is often far less certain. The complete system of judicial protection means that sufficient legal remedies and procedures exist before the Union Courts and the national courts to allow for the enforcement of Union law rights and to ensure the judicial review of Union acts, while

EU Procedural Law. Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak, Oxford University Press. © Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833086.003.0001

1.02

2 GENERAL INTRODUCTION the coherent system of judicial protection means that there exist both direct and indirect routes by which to enforce rights based on Union law and to review the legality of Union acts. Each of these implicates important, albeit differing, roles for the Union Courts and the national courts as laid down by the Treaties.1

B. Union based on the rule of law 1.03

At the heart of the system of judicial protection in the European Union is the core principle of upholding the rule of law upon which the Union is founded.2 The substance of the rule of law is concretized in Art. 47 of the Charter, which guarantees the fundamental right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, along with Art. 19 TEU.3 As declared by the Court of Justice starting in its seminal Les Verts judgment,4 the Union is ‘based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the question whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic constitutional charter’, the Treaties. As further underscored in that judgment, the Treaties set out to establish a complete system of legal remedies, whereby any Union institution or Member State’s act or failure to act contrary to Union law can be subject to review by the Union Courts,5 which must ensure that, in the interpretation and application of the Treaties, the law is observed.6 Consequently, it should be recognized that the stakes are enormous, in the sense that the system of judicial protection in the European Union must live up to its promise that individuals, Member States, and Union institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies

1 See K. Lenaerts, ‘The Rule of Law and the Coherence of the Judicial System of the European Union’ (2007) C.M.L.Rev. 162. See also, in that regard, C-14/19 P, Satcen v KF, 2020, para. 80. 2 See Arts 2 and 21 TEU; Preamble to the TEU, second and fourth recitals; Preamble to the Charter, second recital. See, in that regard, C-156/21, Hungary v Parliament and Council, 2022, paras 124–127, 156–157; C-157/21, Poland v Parliament and Council, 2022, paras 142–145, 192–193. For a brief selection of literature relating to the rule of law in the Union legal order, see C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union (CUP, 2016); A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Ensuring Member States’ Compliance (OUP, 2017); M. Elósegui, A. Miron, and I. Motoc (eds), The Rule of Law in Europe: Recent Challenges and Judicial Responses (Springer, 2021); L. Pech, ‘The Rule of Law’ in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (3rd ed., OUP, 2021) 307; K. Lenaerts, ‘On Checks and Balances: The Rule of Law within the EU’ (2023) Col. J. Eur. L. 25. 3 See, e.g. C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, 2018, paras 30–32; C-83/19, C-127/19, C-195/19, C-291/19, C-355/19, and C-397/19, Asociaţia ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’, 2021, paras 188–190; C-791/19, Commission v Poland, 2021, paras 50–52; C-357/19, C-379/19, C-547/19, C-811/19, and C-840/19, Euro Box Promotion and Others, 2021, paras 160–162; C-156/21, Hungary v Parliament and Council, 2022, paras 160–162; C-157/21, Poland v Parliament and Council, 2022, paras 196–198. As laid down in the second subparagraph of Art. 19(1) TEU, ‘Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law’. 4 See 294/83, Les Verts v Parliament, 1986, para. 23; see also, e.g. C-583/11 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, 2013, paras 92–93; C-565/19, Carvalho and Others v Parliament and Council, 2021, paras 67–68; C-59/18 and C-182/18, Italy and Comune di Milano v Council, 2022, para. 59; C-743/19, Parliament v Council, 2022, para. 35; T-653/16, Malta v Commission, 2018, para. 33; T-700/19, Ghaoud v Council, 2021, para. 79. 5 See K. Lenaerts, ‘Case 294/83 Parti écologiste “Les Verts” v European Parliament. The Basic Constitutional Charter of a Community Based on the Rule of Law’ in M. Poiares Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds), The Past and Future of EU Law: The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart, 2010) 295. 6 See the first subparagraph of Art. 19(1) TEU, which provides that the Court of Justice of the European Union ‘shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed’.

The System of Judicial Protection in Context 3 are all guaranteed a route by which to enforce Union law. This is, above all, guided by the Treaties, which constitute the Union legal order as a whole and set down the framework for judicial protection combining the judicial routes before the Union Courts and before the national courts. As courts of general jurisdiction in matters governed by Union law, the national courts play a crucial role in the system of judicial protection in the European Union. That system indeed hinges on the interlocking jurisdiction of the Union Courts and the national courts.7

C. Role of the national courts The national courts are in effect the lynchpin of the European Union’s judicial system. They must be seen as ‘functional’ Union courts because it is before the national courts that parties may bring cases involving issues of Union law.8 By contrast, the ‘organic’ Union Courts—the Court of Justice and the General Court—are bound by the principle of conferral, whereby they exercise only the jurisdiction conferred upon them under the Treaties.9 In other words, the Union Courts do not have inherent jurisdiction just because matters of Union law are involved in a particular case. Instead, there must be a specific legal basis set down in the Treaties, which delineates the extent of the Union Courts’ power to hear and determine the case. Consequently, everything falling outside of what the Treaties confer upon the Union Courts falls within the residual jurisdiction of the national courts.10 That is to say, cases between natural and legal persons, on the one hand, and cases between natural and legal persons and national authorities, on the other, are brought before the national courts. The only cases in which a natural or legal person may bring an action directly before the Union Courts are those lodged against a ‘Union defendant’, namely, a Union institution, body, office, or agency. This serves to underline the importance of the preliminary ruling procedure by which the Court of Justice and the national courts work together so as to enable the national courts to carry out their function in deciding the various cases before them involving Union law and, at the same time, allow the Court of Justice to ensure the uniform interpretation of Union law such that the same rules are applied in the Member States.11

7 See K. Lenaerts, ‘La systématique des voies de recours dans l’ordre juridique de l’Union européenne’ in A. De Walsche (ed.), Mélanges en hommage à Georges Vandersanden: promenades au sein du droit européen (Bruylant, 2008) 257. See also, in that regard, Opinion 1/09, Draft Agreement Creating a Unified Patent Litigation System (European and Community Patents Court), 2011, paras 66, 69; C-14/19 P, Satcen v KF, 2020, para. 59; C-357/19, C-379/19, C-547/19, C-811/19, and C-840/19, Euro Box Promotion and Others, 2021, para. 217; C-415/20, C-419/20, and C-427/20, Gräfendorfer Geflügel-und Tiefkühlfeinkost Produktions and Others, 2022, para. 67. 8 See, in that regard, Opinion 1/09, Draft Agreement Creating a Unified Patent Litigation System (European and Community Patents Court), 2011, para. 80. See further para. 2.02. 9 See Arts 5(2) and 13(2) TEU. See also, in that regard, Opinion 1/19, Istanbul Convention, 2021, para. 233. 10 See Art. 274 TFEU. 11 See, e.g. C-561/19, Consorzio Italian Management e Catania Multiservizi and Catania Multiservizi, 2021, paras 27–31. See further para. 3.02.

1.04

4 GENERAL INTRODUCTION

D. Two-fold task of the Union Courts 1.05

In complement to the important role played by the national courts, the Union Courts have a two-fold task in connection with the system of legal remedies laid down by the Treaties. In the first place, the Union Courts are responsible for enforcing all the rules of Union law. As a result, they afford protection against any act or failure to act on the part of the Member States which offends against such rules. In this respect, Union law acts as a ‘sword’ for safeguarding the rights deriving from that law, and hence this involves certain types of actions and procedures which ensure that the Member States comply with their obligations under the Treaties (see Part II of this book). In the second place, the Union Courts afford protection against acts, omissions, and conduct of Union institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies which are found to be in breach of Union law. In this respect, Union law acts as a ‘shield’ for affording protection against Union acts (see Part III of this book).

III. Challenges to the System of Judicial Protection 1.06

Notwithstanding the Court of Justice’s seminal proclamation in Les Verts mentioned above (see para. 1.03), there are certain aspects of the constitutional framework of the European Union that present challenges to the system of judicial protection in terms of ensuring that it is both complete and coherent. This encompasses examination of the apparent gaps in the former Treaty framework comprising the EU and EC Treaties, which provides the setting for the evaluation of the extent to which such gaps have been addressed through the changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty, along with developments in the case-law.

A. The former Treaty framework 1.07

It is important to recall that, under the former Treaty framework based on the EU and EC Treaties, the Union was divided into three pillars, whereby the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, as it was then called, differed in respect of the first Community pillar, as compared to the second pillar of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the third pillar of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM). The original version of Art. L of the EU Treaty (brought about by way of the Maastricht Treaty) limited the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court of Justice to the EC Treaty, the (now defunct) ECSC Treaty, the EAEC Treaty, the former third paragraph of Art. K.3(2)(c) of the EU Treaty, and former Arts L to S of the EU Treaty. Accordingly, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice covered what was then Community law, certain agreements

Challenges to the System of Judicial Protection 5 concluded by the Member States outside that law (see Ch. 21), and the final provisions of the EU Treaty. The Amsterdam Treaty introduced former Art. 46 of the EU Treaty, which was further amended by the Nice Treaty. That provision replaced the former Art. L and considerably extended the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in the field of PJCCM, expressly empowering the Court of Justice to review acts of the institutions in the light of fundamental rights protected by Art. 6(2) EU insofar as the Court of Justice had jurisdiction under the Community Treaties or the EU Treaty.12 Former Art. 46 EU did not prevent the Court of Justice itself from delimiting the scope of its jurisdiction. For instance, in the event of a dispute, it was the task of the Court of Justice or the General Court to define the pillars of the Union in relation to each other. That task could not be undertaken by any other institution, since it was a matter of interpreting and applying the Community Treaties and hence within the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice and the General Court within the Community legal order, which, by virtue of the judicially enforceable former Art. 47 EU, was not affected by any other provision of that treaty.13 Nevertheless, both in relation to the former second and third pillars of the Union and the Community pillar, the jurisdiction of the Union Courts was curtailed to varying degrees.14 As regards the second pillar of CFSP, the Union Courts were generally not conferred jurisdiction in this field aside from certain exceptions, such as the adjudication of so-called inter-pillar disputes pursuant to former Art. 47 EU, as previously mentioned. As regards the third pillar of PJCCM, the Union Courts were given some jurisdiction, although it was greatly restricted under former Art. 35 EU. Furthermore, even within the Community pillar, where the Union Courts’ jurisdiction was in principle the strongest, there were still significant difficulties for natural and legal persons to challenge certain types of Community acts due to the strict standing requirements of former Art. 230 EC. In addition, for matters falling within former Title IV of the EC Treaty on visas, asylum, immigration, and other policies concerning the free movement of persons, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice was subject to special rules pursuant to former Art. 68 EC, which also curtailed that jurisdiction. As Title IV of the EC Treaty and the third pillar of PJCCM comprised the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, this had the result that acts adopted by the Union institutions in those areas often presented significant issues of judicial protection for individuals, particularly with a view to the protection of fundamental rights. Altogether, the limitations placed

12 See K. Lenaerts, ‘Le respect des droits fondamentaux en tant que principe constitutionnel de l’Union européenne’ in M. Dony and A. De Walsche (eds), Mélanges en hommage à Michel Waelbroeck (Vol. I, Bruylant, 1999) 423. 13 See C-170/96, Commission v Council, 1998, paras 12–18; C-176/03, Commission v Council, 2005, paras 38– 40; C-440/05, Commission v Council, 2007, paras 52–53; C-91/05 Commission v Council, 2008, paras 31–33; see also, in connection with access to documents, T-174/95, Svenska Journalistförbundet v Council, 1998, paras 81–87; T-14/98, Hautala v Council, 1999, paras 40–42. 14 For a summary of the relevant case-law, see K. Lenaerts, ‘The Rule of Law and the Coherence of the Judicial System of the European Union’ (2007) C.M.L.Rev. 1625, 1626–33.

6 GENERAL INTRODUCTION on the Court’s jurisdiction in the three pillars of the Union highlighted apparent gaps in the system of judicial protection under the former EU and EC Treaties.

B. The present Treaty framework post-Lisbon 1.08

The Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, brought about significant changes to the system of judicial protection of the European Union,15 which are discussed in detail in the chapters of this book. With the elimination of the pillar structure, the same level of judicial protection would in principle apply for all matters falling within the scope of the Treaties.16 However, this is not the case wholly across the board, and the present Treaty framework based on the TEU (that is, the EU Treaty, as amended) and the TFEU contain limitations in respect of the jurisdiction of the Union Courts. As regards the former Community pillar, certain changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty attempted to remedy the apparent gap in the standing for natural and legal persons in connection with actions for annulment under the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU, although certain issues regarding the breadth of those changes remain.17 In any event, with the consolidation of the various provisions concerning the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in Title V of the TFEU, the constraints of former Art. 68 EC have been eliminated.18 As regards the former second pillar of CFSP, the Union Courts as a general matter have not been conferred jurisdiction under the Treaties to hear and determine actions in that field, although changes have been made by the Lisbon Treaty in respect of the situations allowing for such jurisdiction in certain types of proceedings, and these jurisdictional issues have also been subject to case-law developments.19 As regards the former third pillar of PJCCM, in principle, the limitations of former Art. 35 EU have been deleted, and the Union Courts’ jurisdiction in this field has essentially been ‘mainstreamed’. However, certain exceptions do remain, especially in relation to acts adopted within this field before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.20 15 See further, e.g. K. Lenaerts, ‘Le traité de Lisbonne et la protection juridictionnelle des particuliers en droit de l’Union’ (2009) C.D.E. 711; R. Barents, ‘The Court of Justice after the Treaty of Lisbon’ (2010) C.M.L.Rev. 709; F.G. Jacobs, ‘The Lisbon Treaty and the Court of Justice’ in A. Biondi, P. Eeckhout, and S. Ripley (eds), EU Law after Lisbon (OUP, 2012) 197; V. Skouris, ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union: A Judiciary in a Constant State of Transformation’ in P. Cardonnel, A. Rosas, and N. Wahl (eds), Constitutionalising the EU Judicial System. Essays in Honour of Pernilla Lindh (Hart, 2012) 3; P. Craig, The Lisbon Treaty, Revised Edition: Law, Politics, and Reform (OUP, 2013) 122; see also more generally K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel (T. Corthaut (ed.)), EU Constitutional Law (OUP, 2021) ch. 2. 16 See Art. 1, third para. TEU. 17 See paras 7.106–7.110. 18 See para. 6.06. 19 See Art. 24(1), second subpara. TEU; Art. 275 TFEU. See, in particular, as regards actions for annulment (para. 7.03), preliminary rulings on the interpretation (para. 6.05) and validity (para. 10.04) of Union law, and actions for damages (para. 11.03). 20 See Protocol (No. 36), annexed to the TEU, the TFEU, and the EAEC Treaty, on transitional provisions (OJ 2016 C202/321).

Structure of the Book 7

IV. Structure of the Book Both the two-fold task of the Union Courts and the interlocking relationship between the Union Courts and the national courts in large part determine the structure of this book, which is divided into five main parts. Part I concerns the judicial organization of the European Union. Chapter 2 delves into the roles of the national courts and the Union Courts in the Union judicial system, with a focus on the Union Courts and matters relating to their organization, composition, and allocation of jurisdiction. Chapter 3 examines the system of cooperation between the national courts and the Court of Justice through the reference for a preliminary ruling, involving general features of the preliminary ruling procedure, such as the framing of the questions, the obligation to refer, and the division of tasks between the Court of Justice and the national courts. Chapter 4 analyses the interaction between Union law and national procedures and remedies. Part II concerns the enforcement of Union law and therefore encompasses two procedures falling within the ‘sword’ function. Chapter 5 examines the action brought against a Member State for its failure to fulfil its obligations under the Treaties, commonly referred to as the infringement action, under Arts 258–260 TFEU. Chapter 6 addresses preliminary rulings on the interpretation of Union law under Art. 267 TFEU, which, albeit indirectly, implicates matters concerning the compatibility of national law with Union law. Part III concerns the forms of actions constituting protection against unlawful acts, omissions, and conduct of the Union institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies falling within the ‘shield’ function. These actions comprise the following: the action for annulment under Art. 263 TFEU (Chapter 7); the action for failure to act under Art. 265 TFEU (Chapter 8); the objection of illegality under Art. 277 TFEU (Chapter 9); preliminary rulings on the validity of Union law under Art. 267 TFEU (Chapter 10); the action for damages under Art 268 and the second and third paras of Art. 340 TFEU (Chapter 11); and the application for an opinion on the compatibility of an international agreement to be concluded by the Union with the Treaties under Art. 218(11) TFEU (Chapter 12). Part IV concerns special forms of procedure before the Union Courts. These relate to: interim measures before the Union Courts (Chapter 13); proceedings for authorization to serve a garnishee order on the Union (Chapter 14); proceedings pursuant to an arbitration clause or a special agreement (Chapter 15); staff cases (Chapter 16); disputes relating to intellectual property rights (Chapter 17); unlimited jurisdiction in actions relating to sanctions (Chapter 18); appeals (Chapter 19); the review procedure (Chapter 20); and conventions concluded by the Member States (Chapter 21). Part V deals with the procedure before the Union Courts proper, and is organized into four chapters in accordance with the way in which cases are generally dealt with by

1.09

8 GENERAL INTRODUCTION the Union Courts. Chapter 22 discusses matters relating to the start of the procedure, namely, the act initiating the procedure, service, languages, representation, time-limits, and legal aid. Chapter 23 addresses incidental elements of the procedure, which include intervention, expedited and urgent procedures, confidentiality, preliminary issues, discontinuance, and cases in which it is found that there is no need to proceed to judgment. Chapter 24 examines the main elements of the procedure, comprising the procedures for dealing with cases, the written and oral parts of the procedure, the preliminary report and assignment of cases, measures of organization of procedure, and measures of inquiry. Chapter 25 treats aspects relating to the conclusion of the procedure in respect of judgments and orders, costs, and exceptional procedures relating to judgments and orders. As in the previous edition, this book’s linkage to the double role—that is, the ‘sword’ and ‘shield’ functions—of the system of judicial protection which underpins Parts I, II, and III, along with the choice to divide up the discussion of the preliminary ruling procedure across the different parts of the book, have been maintained. In the view of the present authors, the separation of the discussion of the preliminary ruling procedure may be considered to facilitate understanding of this procedure and the salient and distinct aspects regarding admissibility, interpretation, and validity. However, as compared to the previous edition, Part IV has been reshuffled in the light of relevant institutional and jurisprudential developments. The chapter on the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice has been removed, and Part V has been reconfigured in order to centralize the key procedural themes.

V. Texts Governing the Procedure before the Union Courts 1.10

The procedure before the Union Courts is governed by a set of rules, which are contained in the Treaties, the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the respective Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice and of the General Court, along with various other procedural texts relative to each of the Union Courts. They can be found—in addition to the case-law—on the website of the Court of Justice of the European Union (https://curia.europa.eu).21 First, there are the relevant Treaty provisions conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Justice of the European Union as an institution, which are basically enshrined in Art. 19 TEU and Arts 218, 251–281, and 340 TFEU.

21 The relevant procedural texts can be found by clicking on the file ‘procedure’ on the drop-down menu for the Court of Justice and the General Court, which also includes a file on ‘other useful information’ for practitioners. The case-law of the Union Courts is accessible on that website by clicking on the file ‘case-law’. It is also worth noting that, under the file ‘Judicial Network of the EU’, case-law of the national courts and research notes on, inter alia, comparative procedural issues prepared by the Court’s Research and Documentation Service are made available.

Texts Governing the Procedure before the Union Courts 9 Second, there is the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union (the Statute), whose provisions have the same legal force as the Treaty provisions, and which is annexed in a Protocol to the Treaties.22 The Statute is divided into five titles, and generally sets down the rules governing the various types of proceedings before the Court of Justice and the General Court, as well as provisions concerning their composition and organization. The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure (meaning by way of qualified majority voting in the Council and the co-decision procedure involving the European Parliament), may amend the provisions of the Statute, except for Title 1 and Art. 64 thereof concerning the language arrangements applicable at the Court of Justice of the European Union, acting either at the request of the Court of Justice and after consultation of the European Commission or on a proposal from the European Commission and after consultation of the Court of Justice.23 Third, the rules set out in the Statute are expanded upon in the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice (CJ Rules of Procedure)24 and the Rules of Procedure of the General Court (GC Rules of Procedure).25 Those rules are adopted by the respective Court in agreement with the Court of Justice as regards the latter, and require the approval of the Council.26 Finally, there are various other procedural texts applicable to the procedure before the Union Courts. For the Court of Justice, these include, inter alia, the Supplementary Rules of Procedure (CJ Supplementary Rules),27 Recommendations to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings,28 and Practice Directions to parties (CJ Practice Directions).29 For the General Court, these include, inter alia, Practice Rules for the implementation of its Rules of Procedure (GC Practice Rules).30

22 Protocol (No. 3), annexed to the TEU, the TFEU, and the EAEC Treaty, on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union (OJ 2016 C202/210), as last amended by Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2019/629 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 (OJ 2019 L111/1). 23 See Art. 281, second para. TFEU. 24 Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of 25 September 2012 (OJ 2012 L265/1), as last amended on 26 November 2019 (OJ 2019 L316/103). 25 Rules of Procedure of the General Court of 4 March 2015 (OJ 2015 L105/1), as last amended on 30 November 2022 (OJ 2023 L44/8). 26 As regards the Court of Justice, see Art. 253, sixth para. TFEU. As regards the General Court, see Art. 254, fifth para. TFEU. Pursuant to Art. 16(3) TEU, the Council acts by a qualified majority. 27 Supplementary Rules of the Court of Justice (OJ 2014 L32/37). 28 Recommendations to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings (OJ 2019 C380/1). 29 Practice directions to parties concerning cases brought before the Court (OJ 2020 L42 I/1). 30 Practice Rules for the implementation of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court of 20 May 2015 (OJ 2015 L152/1), as last amended on 1 February 2023 (2023 L73/58).

PART I

THE JU DIC IA L ORG A NI Z AT ION OF T HE E U ROPE A N U NION

2 THE UNION JUDICIAL SYSTEM I. The National Courts A. General National courts are under an obligation to apply Union law in all cases between national authorities and natural or legal persons, or between such persons, and to safeguard the rights conferred on them by Union law.1

2.01

B. Primary role The primary role played by national courts in applying Union law is connected with the particular nature of that law. As long recognized in the case-law of the Court of Justice, the Treaties created a new legal order directed at the Member States and their nationals. The relationship between the Union legal order and the national legal systems is characterized by the primacy of Union law and the direct effect of a whole series of provisions of Union law.2 The question arises as to how individuals may assert the rights that they derive from those provisions. The system of legal protection formulated in the Treaties does not provide for the creation of local ‘Union courts’ in the different Member States. It starts from the premise that the national courts are the bodies to which individuals may turn whenever action or failure to act on the part of national authorities or other individuals infringes rights conferred on them by Union law.3 The national court is therefore the ordinary Union court to hear and to determine all cases that do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Union Courts, which do not have jurisdiction just because an issue of Union law

1 See 106/77, Simmenthal, 1978, para. 21; C-268/06, Impact, 2008, para. 42; C-611/14, Canal Digital Danmark, 2016, para. 31; C-122/17, Smith, 2018, para. 37. 2 See Opinion 1/91, Draft Agreement between the Community, on the one hand, and the countries of the European Free Trade Association, on the other, relating to the creation of the European Economic Area, 1991, para. 21; Opinion 1/09, Draft Agreement Creating a Unified Patent Litigation System, 2011, para. 65. See also K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel (T. Corthaut (ed.)), EU Constitutional Law (OUP, 2021) paras 23.008–23.035. 3 See 26/62, Van Gend & Loos, 1963 ECR 1, 12. Art. 19(1), second para. TEU provides: ‘Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law.’ The Court further underlined the importance of national courts in the Union legal order in Opinion 1/09, Draft Agreement Creating a Unified Patent Litigation System, 2011, para. 66, stating that ‘[a]‌s is evident from Art. 19(1) TEU, the guardians of that legal order and the judicial system of the European Union are the Court of Justice and the courts and tribunals of the Member States’.

EU Procedural Law. Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak, Oxford University Press. © Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833086.003.0002

2.02

14 THE UNION JUDICIAL SYSTEM is involved in a particular case.4 Within the legal system of the individual’s Member State, the national courts are the bridgehead of the Union legal order and secure the enforcement of Union law through dialogue with the Court of Justice by way of the preliminary reference procedure.5 The Court of Justice has defined the task of national courts in its case-law on the operation of the preliminary ruling procedure6 and on the application of the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Art. 4(3) TEU to national courts.7

C. Essential requirements which national courts must fulfil 2.03

National courts do not merely secure the application of Union law in the legal system of their own Member State. They are also entrusted with the task of judicial review, in cooperation with the Court of Justice, of acts of the Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies.8 Moreover, on account of Union law, in particular the principle of mutual trust, their decisions can circulate throughout the Union and be enforced in other Member States.9 The Union nature of a national court is therefore not solely derived from the fact that the national court applies Union law in its own Member State, but equally from the fact that it participates in a judicial system that has been created by the Treaties and which encompasses both the Union Courts and the judicial systems of the Member States.10 Therefore, a Member State must ensure that the bodies which, as courts or tribunals within the meaning of Union law, are part of its judicial system 4 See Art. 274 TFEU, which provides: ‘Save where jurisdiction is conferred on the Court of Justice of the European Union by the Treaties, disputes to which the Union is a party shall not on that ground be excluded from the jurisdiction of the courts or tribunals of the Member States.’ See C-196/09, Miles and Others, 2011, paras 43–45. As such, the only time that a private party may bring a case before the Union Courts is when such party is bringing an action stipulated in the Treaties against a Union defendant (i.e. an institution, body, office, or agency of the Union). Conversely, cases between private parties, on the one hand, and cases between private parties and national authorities, on the other, fall within the jurisdiction of the national courts, not the Union Courts. See C-768/18 P, Harvilik—Hydra v Czech Republic and European Court of Human Rights (order), 2019, para. 10; T-380/16, Popescu v Romania (order), 2017, para. 7; T-815/19, Constantinescu and Horga v Romania (order), 2020, para. 6; T-719/20, Macías Chávez and Others v Spain and Parliament (order), 2021, para. 43. 5 See Opinion 1/09, Draft Agreement Creating a Unified Patent Litigation System, 2011, paras 66–69; C-284/16, Achmea, 2018, paras 35–37. See further T. Corthaut, EU Ordre Public (Kluwer Law International, 2012) 436–439; K. Lenaerts, ‘The Court of Justice and National Courts: A Transparent Dialogue’ in P. Šamal et al. (eds), Binding Effect of Judicial Decisions: National and International Perspectives (Kluwer, 2018) 204; K. Lenaerts, ‘Upholding the Rule of Law through Judicial Dialogue’ (2019) Y.E.L. 1; C. Lacchi, Preliminary References to the Court of Justice of the European Union and Effective Judicial Protection (Larcier, 2020) 147. 6 See Ch. 3. 7 See Ch. 4. 8 See C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, 2018, para. 32; C-689/19 P, VodafoneZiggo Group v Commission, 2021, para. 141; C‑357/19, C‑379/19, C‑547/19, C‑811/19, and C‑840/19, Euro Box Promotion and Others, 2021, para. 217; C-859/19, FX and Others (order), 2022, para. 108. 9 See C-216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality, 2018, para. 58; C-314/18, SF, 2020, paras 35–36; C-354/20 PPU and C-412/20 PPU, Openbaar Ministerie, 2020, para. 40; C‑562/21 PPU and C‑563/21 PPU, Openbaar Ministerie, 2022, paras 40–49. See further K. Lenaerts, ‘New Horizons for the Rule of Law within the EU’ (2020) G.L.J. 32. 10 See M. Bonelli and M. Claes, ‘Judicial Serendipity: How Portuguese Judges Came to the Rescue of the Polish Judiciary’ (2018) E. Const. L. Rev. 622, 643; D. Adamski, ‘The Social Contract of Democratic Backsliding in the “New EU” Countries’ (2019) C.M.L.Rev. 623, 651; A. Torres Pérez, ‘From Portugal to Poland: The Court of Justice of the European Union as Watchdog of Judicial Independence’ (2020) M.J.E.C.L. 105, 115; J. T. Nowak, Ambtshalve toepassing van EU-recht door de Belgische burgerlijke rechter (diss. Leuven, 2021) 52–56.

The National Courts 15 in the fields covered by Union law meet the requirements of effective judicial protection,11 as laid down in Art. 19(1), second subpara. TEU and Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter).12 This is because a body that operates in the national judicial system as a court or a tribunal within the meaning of Union law is automatically part of the judicial system created by the Treaties, which is based, in accordance with Art. 2 TEU, on the value of respect for the rule of law. Structural compliance with rule of law requirements is a precondition to take part in the judicial system created by the Treaties, inter alia, through the preliminary reference procedure.13 It follows that a body that qualifies to take part in the judicial system created by the Treaties may rely on Union law to have its independence protected.14 In order to meet the requirements stemming from the rule of law and the principle of effective judicial protection, such a body must be established by law, independent, and impartial.15 In general, this means that judicial functions are exercised wholly autonomously, without the courts being subject to any hierarchical constraint or subordinate relationship, and without taking orders or instructions from any source whatsoever.16 To this extent, the guarantees of independence and impartiality presuppose rules in order to dispel any reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to the imperviousness of that body to external factors and its neutrality with respect to the interests before it.17 In its case-law, the Court has referred to rules regarding the composition of the body;18 rules regarding the appointment,19 length of 11 See C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, 2018, para. 37; C-619/18, Commission v Poland, 2019, paras 42–59; C-192/18, Commission v Poland, 2019, paras 98–107; C‑585/18, C‑624/18, and C‑625/18, A.K. and Others, 2019, para. 82; C-558/18 and C-563/18, Miasto Łowicz, 2020, paras 31–37; C-824/18, A.B. and Others, 2021, paras 111–112; C-896/19, Repubblika, 2021, para. 50; C‑83/19, C‑127/19, C‑195/19, C‑291/19, C‑355/19, and C‑397/19, Asociaţia ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’, 2021, paras 190–193; C-791/19, Commission v Poland, 2021, paras 53–54; C-487/19, W.Ż., 2021, paras 103–104; C‑748/19 to C‑754/19, Prokuratura Rejonowa w Mińsku Mazowieckim, 2021, paras 62–63; C‑357/19, C‑379/19, C‑547/19, C‑811/19, and C‑840/19, Euro Box Promotion and Others, 2021, paras 219–220; C-430/21, RS, 2022, para. 40; C-132/20, Getin Noble Bank, 2022, paras 90–91; C-859/19, FX and Others (order), 2022, paras 109–110. 12 Art. 19(1), second subpara. TEU requires Member States to set up a system of judicial remedies in the fields covered by Union law: see C-109/20, PL Holdings, 2021, para. 45; C‑748/19 to C‑754/19, Prokuratura Rejonowa w Mińsku Mazowieckim, 2021, para. 60. 13 See C-644/20, W.J., 2022, para. 46; C-355/21, Perfumesco.pl, 2022, para. 29. See further para. 3.06. 14 K. Lenaerts, ‘On Judicial Independence and the Quest for National, Supranational and Transnational Justice’ in G. Selvik, M.-J. Clifton, T. Haas, L. Lourenço, and K. Schwiesow (eds), The Art of Judicial Reasoning: Festschrift in Honour of Carl Baudenbacher (Springer, 2019) 164. 15 See C‑542/18 RX-II and C‑543/18 RX-II, Simpson v Council and HG v Commission, 2020, para. 57; C-791/19, Commission v Poland, 2021, paras 166–177; C-487/19, W.Ż., 2021, paras 126–131; C‑357/19, C‑379/19, C‑547/19, C‑811/19, and C‑840/19, Euro Box Promotion and Others, 2021, para. 205; C-132/20, Getin Noble Bank, 2022, para. 115. 16 See C-245/20, X and Z, 2022, para. 33; C-859/19, FX and Others (order), 2022, para. 115. 17 See C‑216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality, 2018, para. 66; C-619/18, Commission v Poland, 2019, para. 74; C-192/18, Commission v Poland, 2019, para. 111; C‑585/18, C‑624/18, and C‑625/18, A.K. and Others, 2019, para. 123; C-272/19, Land Hessen, 2020, para. 52; C-824/18, A.B. and Others, 2021, para. 117; C-896/19, Repubblika, 2021, para. 53; C‑83/19, C‑127/19, C‑195/19, C‑291/19, C‑355/19, and C‑397/19, Asociaţia ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’, 2021, paras 196, 212–213, 231–233; C-791/19, Commission v Poland, 2021, paras 59, 139; C-487/19, W.Ż., 2021, para. 109; C‑748/19 to C‑754/19, Prokuratura Rejonowa w Mińsku Mazowieckim, 2021, para. 67; C‑357/19, C‑379/19, C‑547/19, C‑811/19, and C‑840/19, Euro Box Promotion and Others, 2021, para. 225; C-132/20, Getin Noble Bank, 2022, para. 95; C-355/21, Perfumesco.pl, 2022, para. 30. 18 See C-619/18, Commission v Poland, 2019, para. 86; C-272/19, Land Hessen, 2020, paras 54–56. 19 See C‑585/18, C‑624/18, and C‑625/18, A.K. and Others, 2019, paras 133–135; C-896/19, Repubblika, 2021, paras 64–73; C-487/19, W.Ż., 2021, paras 128–154.

16 THE UNION JUDICIAL SYSTEM service,20 and grounds for abstention, rejection, and dismissal of its members,21 including rules on disciplinary proceedings22 and rules on the involuntary transfer23 or secondment24 of Judges; rules regarding appraisal and promotion;25 and rules on remuneration.26 Such rules must, in particular, guarantee the independence of the judiciary in relation to the legislature and the executive.27

II. The Court of Justice of the European Union 2.04

The institution known as the Court of Justice of the European Union currently consists of the Court of Justice and the General Court, which, within their respective spheres of jurisdiction, ensure that, in the interpretation and application of the Treaties, the law is observed.28 Art. 19(1), first subpara. TEU also refers to specialized courts.29 Thus far, only one specialized court has been created, namely, the European Union Civil Service Tribunal.30 However, during the judicial reforms of 2015–201931 that Tribunal was abolished, and jurisdiction over staff cases was transferred to the General Court.32 In light of the doubling of the number of Judges at the General Court and the internal

20 See C-619/18, Commission v Poland, 2019, paras 78–96; C-192/18, Commission v Poland, 2019, paras 116–135. 21 See C‑216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality, 2018, para. 64; C-619/18, Commission v Poland, 2019, paras 75–76; C-896/19, Repubblika, 2021, para. 53; C-791/19, Commission v Poland, 2021, para. 59. 22 See C-216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality, 2018, para. 67; C-619/18, Commission v Poland, 2019, para. 77; C‑83/19, C‑127/19, C‑195/19, C‑291/19, C‑355/19, and C‑397/19, Asociaţia ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’, 2021, paras 198–200; C-791/19, Commission v Poland, 2021, paras 61, 80, 136–140, 187, 193; C‑357/19, C‑379/19, C‑547/19, C‑811/19, and C‑840/19, Euro Box Promotion and Others, 2021, paras 227–243; C-430/21, RS, 2022, paras 83–87; C-859/19, FX and Others (order), 2022, paras 120–125. 23 See C-487/19, W.Ż., 2021, paras 113–120. 24 See C‑748/19 to C‑754/19, Prokuratura Rejonowa w Mińsku Mazowieckim, 2021, paras 71–73, 83. 25 See C-272/19, Land Hessen, 2020, para. 59. 26 See C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, 2018, para. 45; C-216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality, 2018, para. 64; C-49/18, Escribano Vindel, 2019, paras 61–74. 27 See C‑585/18, C‑624/18, and C‑625/18, A.K. and Others, 2019, para. 124; C-274/14, Banco de Santander, 2020; C-824/18, A.B. and Others, 2021, paras 108–139; C-896/19, Repubblika, 2021, para. 54; C‑83/19, C‑127/19, C‑195/19, C‑291/19, C‑355/19, and C‑397/19, Asociaţia ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’, 2021, para. 195; C- 791/19, Commission v Poland, 2021, para. 96; C-487/19, W.Ż., 2021, para. 127; C‑748/19 to C‑754/19, Prokuratura Rejonowa w Mińsku Mazowieckim, 2021, para. 68; C‑357/19, C‑379/19, C‑547/19, C‑811/19, and C‑840/19, Euro Box Promotion and Others, 2021, para. 228; C-430/21, RS, 2022, para. 44; C-859/19, FX and Others (order), 2022, para. 117; C-260/21, Corporate Commercial Bank (order), 2022, para. 38. 28 Art. 19(1), first para. TEU. As the Court held in Opinion 1/09, Draft Agreement Creating a Unified Patent Litigation System, 2011, para. 69: ‘The national court, in collaboration with the Court of Justice, fulfils a duty entrusted to them both of ensuring that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed.’ 29 See S. Soldevila Fragoso, ‘La création de juridictions spécialisées: la réponse des traités au traitement des contentieux de masse’ (2011) Europe 4. 30 Council Decision 2004/752/EC, Euratom of 2 November 2004 establishing the European Union Civil Service Tribunal (OJ 2004 L333/7). See W. Hakenberg, ‘The Civil Service Tribunal of the European Union: A Model to Follow as a Specialised Court?’ in E. Guinchard and M.-P. Granger (eds), The New EU Judiciary. An Analysis of Current Judicial Reforms (Wolters Kluwer, 2017) 161; K. Bradley, ‘Création et suppression du Tribunal de la fonction publique’ in A. Cartier Bresson and D. Dero-Bugny (eds), Les réformes de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne (Bruylant, 2020) 103. 31 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2015/2422 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 amending Protocol (No. 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union (OJ 2015 L341/14). 32 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2016/1192 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 on the transfer to the General Court of jurisdiction at first instance in disputes between the European Union and its servants (OJ 2016 L200/137).

The Court of Justice 17 specialization within that Court,33 it remains to be seen whether new specialized courts may be created in the future.34 As summarized by Art. 19(3) TEU, the Court of Justice of the European Union rules on actions brought by a Member State, a Union institution, or a natural or legal person; gives preliminary rulings on the interpretation and validity of Union law; and adjudicates other cases provided for in the Treaties.35

III. The Court of Justice A. Composition (1) Judges and Advocates General The Court of Justice consists of one Judge per Member State36 and is ‘assisted’ by a number of Advocates General,37 of which there are currently eleven.38 33 See Notice 2022/C 398/09 concerning the Criteria for the assignment of cases to Chambers (OJ 2022 C398/8). On the issue of specialization within the Union Courts, see further F. Clausen, ‘Quelle place pour la spécialisation au sein des juridictions de l’Union européenne’ in A. Cartier Bresson and D. Dero-Bugny (eds), Les réformes de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne (Bruylant, 2020) 131. 34 See further G. Butler, ‘An Interim Post-mortem. Specialised Courts in the EU Judicial Architecture after the Civil Service Tribunal’ (2020) I.O.L.Rev. 586. 35 Art. 19(3) TEU. 36 Art. 19(2), first para. TEU. 37 Art. 252, first para. TFEU. 38 Art. 252 TFEU states: ‘Should the Court of Justice so request, the Council, acting unanimously, may increase the number of Advocates General.’ When new Member States joined the Community in 1973, the original number of Advocates General was increased from two to four (Art. 1 of the Decision of 1 January 1973, OJ 1973 L2/29), which were to be shared among the four ‘large’ Member States. After the accession of Greece, a fifth was added (Council Decision of 30 March 1981, OJ 1981 L100/21) for a smaller Member State and, following the accession of Spain and Portugal, a sixth (Art. 18 of the 1985 Act of Accession, OJ 1985 L302/26). The accession of further Member States increased the number of Advocates General to eight, and temporarily to nine (Art. 11 of the Council Decision of 1 January 1995 amending Art. 20 of the 1994 Act of Accession, OJ 1995 L1/1). It was also stated in the Joint Declaration on Art. 31 of the Decision adjusting the instruments concerning the accession of the new Member States to the European Union (OJ 1995 L1/221) that the five ‘large’ Member States each put forward one person for appointment as Advocate General, while the other Member States shared in turn the remaining three posts. In the 2004 and 2007 accessions, the number of Advocates General was kept at eight. The Joint Declaration on the Court of Justice of the European Communities annexed to the Acts of Accession stated that ‘[s]‌hould the Court of Justice so request, the Council, acting unanimously, may increase the number of Advocates General’ and added: ‘[o]therwise, the new Member States will be integrated into the existing system for their appointment’ (OJ 2003 L236/971). Similarly, in Declaration (No. 38), annexed to the Lisbon Treaty, on Art. 252 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union regarding the number of Advocates General in the Court of Justice (OJ 2012 C326/352), it was stated that in case of a request by the Court of Justice to increase the number of Advocates General by three, the Council would, acting unanimously, agree on such an increase. In that case, Poland would have a permanent Advocate General. Pursuant to Art. 252 TFEU, the Court of Justice made a request to increase the number of Advocates General to eleven on 16 January 2013. Following Declaration (No. 38), the Council adopted Council Decision 2013/336/EU of 25 June 2013 increasing the number of Advocates General of the Court of Justice of the European Union (OJ 2013 L179/92), by which the number of Advocates General was increased to nine on 1 July 2013 and to eleven on 7 October 2015. This number has not been affected by the departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union. The permanent post of Advocate General which was assigned to the United Kingdom was integrated into the rotation system for the appointment of Advocates General upon the date of the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union (Declaration by the Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of 29 January 2020 on the consequences of the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union for the Advocates General of the Court of Justice of the European Union, XT 21018/20). The action for annulment against that declaration by the then incumbent United Kingdom Advocate General was dismissed by the Court of Justice: see

2.05

18 THE UNION JUDICIAL SYSTEM Judges and Advocates General are chosen from persons whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the qualifications required for appointment to the highest judicial offices in their respective countries or who are jurisconsults of recognized competence.39 They are appointed for a term of six years by common accord of the governments of the Member States.40 Before the national governments take their decision, a panel has to give an opinion on candidates’ suitability to perform the duties of Judge or Advocate General.41 Every three years there is a partial replacement of Judges and Advocates General.42 Retiring Judges and Advocates General may be reappointed.43 The Treaties do not require that Judges and Advocates General be nationals of Member States.

2.06

(2) Uneven number of Judges The Court must always consist of an uneven number of Judges when it takes its decisions.44 Were the Court to have an even number of Judges, as it had in the period between the accession of Croatia and the departure of the United Kingdom, this poses no

C-684/20 P, Sharpston v Council and Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (order), 2021; C-685/20 P, Sharpston v Council of the European Union and Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (order), 2021. 39 Art. 19(2), third para. TEU; Art. 253, first para. TFEU. 40 Art. 253, first para. TFEU. The decision appointing a Judge or an Advocate General to the Court of Justice or the General Court is an act of the representatives of the governments of the Member States, and not an act adopted by an institution, body, office, or agency of the European Union. Therefore, the legality of such an appointment decision cannot be reviewed by the Union Courts: see C-684/20 P, Sharpston v Council and Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (order), 2021, paras 39–45; C-685/20 P, Sharpston v Council and Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (order), 2021, paras 46–51. This was different for appointment decisions of Judges to the former Civil Service Tribunal, which were acts of the Council. See, in that regard, C‑542/18 RX-II and C‑543/18 RX-II, Simpson v Council and HG v Commission, 2020. 41 Art. 253, first para. TFEU; Art. 255 TFEU. The panel comprises seven persons chosen from among former members of the Union Courts, members of national supreme courts, and lawyers of recognized competence, one of whom is to be proposed by the European Parliament. The Council, acting on the initiative of the President of the Court of Justice, establishes the panel’s operating rules and appoints its members. The operating rules of this panel were laid down by Council Decision 2010/124/EU of 25 February 2010 (OJ 2010 L50/18). Each year, the panel issues an activity report, which can be consulted through . For further discussion, see J.-M. Sauvé, ‘Selecting the European Union’s Judges: On the Practice of the Art. 255 Panel’ in M. Bobek (ed.), Selecting Europe’s Judges: A Critical Review of the Appointment Procedures to the European Courts (OUP, 2015) 78– 85; L. Clément-Wilz, La Cour de justice de l’Union européenne (LGDJ, 2020) 62–71. 42 Art. 253, second para. TFEU. Art. 9 of the Statute further stipulates the modalities and the numbers of the partial replacement. In principle, one half of the Judges and one half of the Advocates General are replaced every three years. In case of an uneven number, the number of Judges or Advocates General who shall be replaced alternates between the number which is next above one half of the number of Judges or Advocates General and the number which is next below one half. 43 Art. 253, fourth para. TFEU. 44 Art. 17, first para. of the Statute. The need to have an uneven number of Judges stemmed from the rule that in principle the Court of Justice met in plenary session. Accordingly, the accession of new Member States in 1973 was to have increased the original number of Judges from seven to eleven (Art. 17 of the 1972 Act of Accession, OJ 1972 Spec. Ed. 14), but their number was reduced to nine on account of Norway’s decision not to join the Community (Art. 4 of the Council Decision of 1 January 1973, OJ 1973 L2/1). Following the accession of Greece, the Court had only ten Judges (Art. 16 of the 1979 Act of Accession, OJ 1979 L291/20, and Council Decision of 22 December 1980 (OJ 1980 L380/6), after which the Council increased the number to eleven by Decision of 30 March 1981 (OJ 1981 L100/20). The number was increased to fifteen by Art. 10 of the Council Decision of 1 January 1995, adjusting the instruments concerning the accession of the new Member States to the European Union (OJ 1995 L1/1), which amended Art. 17 of the 1985 Act of Accession (OJ 1985 L302/26). The accession of ten Member States on 1 May 2004 brought the number to twenty-five Judges (Art. 13 of the 2003 Act of Accession, OJ 2003 L236/33). With the accession of Bulgaria and Romania on 1 January 2007, the number was increased to twenty-seven Judges (Art. 11 of the 2005 Act of Accession, OJ 2005 L157/203), and further to twenty-eight Judges with the accession of

The Court of Justice 19 problems in practice, as the Grand Chamber is de facto the biggest bench, consisting of fifteen Judges. When, exceptionally, the Full Court will hear a case, the most junior Judge will not sit. As far as Advocates General are concerned, at present there is a permanent post for France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and Spain; the six remaining Advocates General come from the other Member States on a rotating basis.45 If the office of a Judge or Advocate General falls vacant before the expiry of the term, a successor is appointed for the remainder of the normal term of office.46 (3) Oath and immunity Before taking up their duties, Judges and Advocates General take an oath, in open court, to perform their duties impartially and conscientiously and to preserve the secrecy of the deliberations of the Court.47 Judges and Advocates General are immune from legal proceedings. They continue to enjoy immunity after they have ceased to hold office in respect of acts performed by them in their official capacity, including words spoken or written. Their immunity may be waived only by the Court sitting in plenary session. Where immunity has been waived and criminal proceedings are instituted against a Judge or an Advocate General, the member concerned may be tried only by the court competent to judge the members of the highest national judiciary.48

2.07

Judges and Advocates General may not hold any political or administrative office or engage in any occupation unless exemption is granted by the Council. After their term of office, they must act with integrity and discretion as regards the acceptance of certain appointments or benefits.49 A Judge or Advocate General may be deprived of his or her office or of his or her right to a pension or other benefits only if, in the unanimous opinion of the other Judges and Advocates General, they no longer fulfil the requisite conditions or meet the obligations arising from their office.50 (4) President Immediately after their partial replacement, the Judges elect one of their number as President of the Court for a term of three years, who may be re-elected.51 The rule

Croatia on 1 July 2013 (Art. 9(1) of the 2012 Act of Accession, OJ 2012 L112/21). After the departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union, the Court consists of twenty-seven Judges. 45 See para. 2.05, n. 38. 46 Statute, Arts 7–8. 47 Statute, Art. 2. By virtue of Art. 8 of the Statute, the provisions of the Statute relating to the status of Judges (Arts 2–7) also apply to Advocates General. As from 2007, the Court of Justice of the European Union adopted a Code of Conduct clarifying certain obligations under the relevant provisions of the Statute and Rules of Procedure for members and former members of the Court of Justice of the European Union (latest version: OJ 2021 C397/1). 48 Statute, Art. 3. 49 Statute, Art. 4. 50 Statute, Art. 6. 51 Art. 253, third para. TFEU; Art. 9a of the Statute; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 8(1). The elections are conducted by secret ballot. The Judge obtaining the votes of more than half the Judges of the Court shall be elected; if no Judge obtains that majority, further ballots are held until that majority is attained: CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 8(3).

2.08

20 THE UNION JUDICIAL SYSTEM whereby if an office falls vacant before the normal expiry date of its term, a successor is to be elected for the remainder of the term, also applies to the President.52

2.09

2.10

(5) Vice-President Following the election of the President, the Judges elect from among their number a Vice-President of the Court for a term of three years. He or she may be re-elected.53 The rule whereby if an office falls vacant before the normal expiry date of its term, a successor is to be elected for the remainder of the term, likewise applies to the Vice-President.54 (6) Registrar An election procedure is also used to appoint the Court Registrar for a term of six years.55 He or she may be reappointed.56 If the office of Registrar falls vacant before the normal expiry date, a new Registrar is to be appointed for a term of six years.57 The Registrar takes the same oath before the Court as the Judges and Advocates General.58 The Court may, in accordance with the procedure laid down in respect of the Registrar, elect a Deputy Registrar to assist the Registrar and to take his or her place if he or she is prevented from acting.59

B. Internal organization 2.11

(1) Chambers In principle, the Court of Justice sits in Chambers consisting of five (the most frequent case)60 or three Judges, or as the Grand Chamber when a Member State or an institution of the Union that is party to the proceedings so requests61 or when the Court 52 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 8(2). When prevented from acting, the President is replaced by the Vice- President. As regards circumstances in which the President and the Vice-President of the Court are prevented from acting, Art. 13 of the CJ Rules of Procedure provides that the functions of President are to be exercised by one of the Presidents of Chambers of five Judges, or failing that, by one of the Presidents of Chambers of three Judges, or failing that, by one of the other Judges according to the order of seniority laid down in Art. 7 of the Statute. 53 Statute, Art. 9a; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 8(4). Once elected, the names of the President and Vice-President are published in the Official Journal: CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 8(5). 54 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 8(4). 55 Art. 253, fifth para. TFEU; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 18. The name of the Registrar elected in accordance with that procedure is published in the Official Journal: CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 18(8). 56 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 18(4). As provided therein, the Court may decide to renew the term of office of the incumbent Registrar without availing itself of the procedure laid down in Art. 18(2) of the CJ Rules of Procedure. 57 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 18(7). 58 Statute, Art. 10; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 18(5). 59 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 19. 60 As regards the urgent preliminary ruling procedure applicable to measures concerning the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, the Court designates two Chambers of five Judges for a period of one year to handle such cases: CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 11(2) (referring to the cases of the kind referred to in Art. 107 of the CJ Rules of Procedure). The composition and designation of such Chambers are published in the Official Journal: CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 11(5). See Notice 2022/C 472/02 concerning the Designation of the Chambers responsible for cases of the kind referred to in Art. 107 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court (OJ 2022 C472/2). This procedure is discussed further in Ch. 23. 61 Art. 251, first para. TFEU; Statute, Art. 16, first, second, and third paras. See C-292/05, Lechouritou, 2007, paras 19–20, 23, underlining that the third para. of Art. 16 of the Statute only mentions requests made by a Member State or an institution that is a party to the proceedings for the Court to sit in a Grand Chamber; individuals do not have standing to make such requests.

The Court of Justice 21 considers that a case before it has an important value as a precedent.62 For specific cases listed in the Statute or where the Court considers that a case before it is of exceptional importance, the Court may sit as a Full Court.63 The Court forms Chambers consisting of three or five Judges.64 At present, the Court has five Chambers of five Judges and five Chambers of three Judges. The Judges elect the Presidents of Chambers from among their number. The Presidents of the Chambers of five Judges are elected for three years and may be re-elected once.65 The Presidents of the Chambers of three Judges are elected for a term of one year.66 The Grand Chamber consists of fifteen Judges and is presided over by the President of the Court.67 In order to avoid the important cases assigned to that chamber being heard always by the same Judges, its composition varies. For each case, the Grand Chamber is composed of the President and the Vice-President of the Court, three Presidents of Chambers of five Judges, the Judge-Rapporteur, and the number of Judges necessary to reach fifteen. The last-mentioned Judges and three Presidents of Chambers of five Judges are designated from lists drawn up for the purpose of determining the composition of the Grand Chamber.68 Only the President and the Vice-President of the Court are thus permanent members of the Grand Chamber, while the other Judges sit in approximately one in two Grand Chamber cases. For each case, the Chambers of five Judges and three Judges are composed of the President of the Chamber, the Judge-Rapporteur, and the number of Judges required to attain the number of five and three Judges, respectively. The lists of Judges assigned to the Chambers of five and three Judges,69 the order used to determine the composition of the Grand Chamber and the Chambers of five and three Judges, and the appointments of Presidents of Chambers are published in the Official Journal of the European Union.70 62 See CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 60(1), which provides: ‘The Court shall assign to the Chambers of five and three Judges any case brought before it insofar as the difficulty or importance of the case or particular circumstances are not such as to require that it should be assigned to the Grand Chamber.’ A Chamber may also decide to remit a case to the Court for it to be assigned to the Grand Chamber: see C-562/21 PPU and C-563/21 PPU, Openbaar Ministerie, 2022, para. 37. See further M. Bobek, ‘What are Grand Chambers for?’ (2021) C.Y.E.L.S. 1. 63 Art. 251, second para. TFEU; Statute, Art. 16, fourth and fifth paras; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 60(2). For some examples, see C-432/04, Commission v Cresson, 2006; C-370/12, Pringle, 2012; Opinion 2/15, Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore, 2017; C-621/18, Wightman, 2018; Opinion 1/17, CETA, 2019; C-130/19, European Court of Auditors v Pinxten, 2021. 64 Statute, Art. 16, first para.; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 28. 65 Statute, Art. 16, first para.; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 12(1). 66 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 12(2). Since, in practice, a rotation system is applied, they are generally not re-elected. 67 Statute, Art. 16, second para. 68 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 27. 69 At present, five Judges are assigned to each of the five Chambers of five Judges and four Judges are assigned to each of the five Chambers of three Judges. It falls within the Court’s power of internal organization to assign the Judges from a Chamber which are to adjudicate a particular case (see C-7/94, Gaal, 1995, para. 13, in which the German Government argued that the criteria determining the composition of the Chamber adjudicating a case consisting of five Judges from a Chamber to which six Judges had been appointed had not been published in the Official Journal). As far as the General Court is concerned, Art. 26(3) of the GC Rules of Procedure provides that if, in a Chamber of three or five Judges, the number of Judges assigned to that Chamber is higher than three or five, respectively, the President of the Chamber is to decide which of the Judges will be called upon to take part in the judgment of the case. 70 CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 12(4), 27(5), and 28(4).

22 THE UNION JUDICIAL SYSTEM 2.12

2.13

2.14

(2) Quorum When the Court sits in Chambers, there is a quorum of three Judges in the case of three-or five-Judge Chambers and of eleven Judges in the case of the Grand Chamber. Decisions of the Full Court are valid if seventeen Judges are sitting.71 (3) Assignment of a case to a Chamber At the end of the written procedure, the Court may assign any case to a Chamber of five or three Judges or to the Grand Chamber at an administrative meeting, upon consideration of the Judge-Rapporteur’s preliminary report and after the Advocate General has been heard. In principle, the Court must comply with a request from a Member State or an institution of the Union that is a party to the proceedings for a case to be assigned to the Grand Chamber.72 The Court meets as the Full Court in very exceptional cases exhaustively listed in the Treaties and where the Court considers that the case before it is of exceptional importance.73 A Chamber may, however, refer a case back to the Court at any stage in the proceedings so that it may be reassigned to a formation composed of a greater number of Judges.74 Parties are not entitled to require that a Judge of a particular nationality sit or not sit.75 The Court therefore constitutes a genuinely ‘supranational’ court vis-à-vis the Member States and specifically national procedural interests. (4) Deliberations The deliberations of the Court are secret.76 The Judges are not assisted by interpreters (as French is the working language of the Court and is used in the deliberations: see para. 22.50) or by other members of staff. The deliberations take place on the basis of a draft judgment drawn up by the Judge-Rapporteur. The conclusions reached by a majority of Judges after final discussion determine the decision of the Court.77 It is for this 71 Statute, Art. 17, fourth and fifth paras. 72 Art. 251, second para. TFEU; Statute, Art. 16, third para.; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 60(1). See C-441/17 R, Commission v Poland (order), 2021, paras 11–12. However, the Court rejected a request of the Council, made pursuant to Art. 16, third para. of the Statute, to have a case reassigned to the Grand Chamber where it was made at a very advanced stage of the proceedings—after the close of the oral procedure and thus at the deliberation stage— on the grounds that such request was ‘liable to cause considerable delay to the progress of the proceedings and therefore to have effects clearly contrary to the requirement of the proper administration of justice which means that the Court must be able in any case brought before it to ensure that a decision is taken following a procedure that is efficient and completed within a proper time’: C-310/04, Spain v Council, 2006, para. 23. 73 Statute, Art. 16, fourth and fifth paras; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 60(2). See para. 2.11. 74 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 60(3). See C-134/13, Raytek, 2015, paras 26–27; C-203/14, Consorci Sanitari del Maresme (order), 2015, para. 5; C-689/13, Puligienica Facility Esco (order), 2015, para. 8. A referral back under Art. 60(3) of the CJ Rules of Procedure constitutes a measure which the formation to which the case has been assigned decides on freely and of its own motion, as opposed to Art. 16, third para. of the Statute, which requires the Court to sit as a Grand Chamber if a request is made to that effect, inter alia, by an institution of the Union that is party to the proceedings (see C-310/04, Spain v Council, 2006, paras 21–22). As regards the composition of Chambers where cases are referred back, see CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 29(2). 75 The fourth para. of Art. 18 of the Statute provides: ‘A party may not apply for a change in the composition of the Court or of one of its chambers on the grounds of either the nationality of a Judge or the absence from the Court or from the chamber of a Judge of the nationality of that party.’ 76 Statute, Art. 35; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 32(1). When a hearing has taken place, only those Judges who participated in that hearing and, where relevant, the Assistant Rapporteur responsible for the consideration of the case, take part in the deliberations: CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 32(2). Every Judge taking part in the deliberations must state his or her opinion and the reasons for it: CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 32(3). 77 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 32(4).

The Court of Justice 23 reason that an uneven number of Judges always take part in the deliberations: it prevents a tied vote. Where, by reason of a Judge being absent or prevented from attending, there is an even number of Judges, the most junior Judge (where there is equal seniority in office, the younger) is to abstain from taking part in the deliberations unless he or she is the Judge-Rapporteur. In that case, the Judge immediately senior to him or her is to abstain from taking part in the deliberations.78 (5) Collegiate decision of the Court For each case, there is one single judgment or order issued by the Court representing the collective decision of all the Judges participating in the case concerned. There are no dissenting or concurring opinions issued by individual Judges, as there are, for instance, in the European Court of Human Rights or the International Court of Justice.79

2.15

(6) Roles of the Judge-Rapporteur and the Advocate General The primary responsibility for decision-making within the Court lies with the Judge- 2.16 Rapporteur, who is designated for each case by the President immediately after proceedings have been brought.80 At the same time, the First Advocate General81 assigns an Advocate General to the case.82 The Judge-Rapporteur and the Advocate General follow the procedural progress of the case and may be requested to give their opinion on procedural matters for decision by the President of the Court or the Chamber President, as the case may be. The Judge-Rapporteur is responsible for drawing up the preliminary report (see para. 24.44). Finally, it falls to the Judge-Rapporteur to draw up the draft judgment and subsequently to revise it so that it reflects the consensus of (the majority of) the bench (see para. 2.14). The Advocate General, acting with complete impartiality and independence, makes, in open court, reasoned submissions (the Advocate General’s Opinion) on each case assigned to him or her in order to assist the Court in the performance of its task.83 Unlike the Procureur-Général in some national legal systems, the Advocates General are not entrusted with the defence of the general interest and do not form a hierarchy. 78 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 33. 79 A debate on the introduction of a practice of separate opinions in the Court of Justice regularly resurfaces in the European Parliament. See European Parliament, Report of the Committee of Legal Affairs of 6 December 2018 on the draft regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on amending Protocol (No. 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, A8-0439/2018, 10–12; see also, in that regard, V. Skouris, ‘Judging at the Court of Justice of the European Union: Is there a Need for Dissenting Opinions?’ in K. Lenaerts, J.-C. Bonichot, H. Kanninen, C. Naômé, and P. Pohjankoski (eds), An Ever-Changing Union? Perspectives on the Future of EU Law in Honour of Allan Rosas (Hart, 2019) 99. 80 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 15(1). On this practice, see C. Kern, ‘A Sense of Common Purpose. On the Role of Case Assignment and the Judge-Rapporteur at the European Court of Justice’ in M.R. Madsen, F. Nicola, and A. Vauchez (eds), Researching the European Court of Justice. Methodological Shifts and Law’s Embeddedness (CUP, 2022) 187. 81 The First Advocate General is elected for three years by the Advocates General and has the rank of a President of Chamber. He or she is primus inter pares among the Advocates General (CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 14(1)). For the role of the First Advocate General in the context of the review procedure, see Statute, Art. 62, and Ch. 20. 82 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 16(1). 83 Art. 252, second para. TFEU. See further M. Bobek, ‘A Fourth in the Court: Why Are there Advocates General in the Court of Justice?’ (2012) C.Y.E.L.S. 529; L. Clément- Wilz, La fonction de l’avocat général près de la Cour de Justice (Bruylant, 2021).

24 THE UNION JUDICIAL SYSTEM As members of the Court of Justice, the Advocates General take part in the process by which the Court reaches its judgment and in carrying out the judicial function entrusted to it.84 Where it considers that the case raises no new point of law, the Court may decide, after hearing the Advocate General, that the case shall be determined without an Opinion from the Advocate General.85 Further to this, in cases where an appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or unfounded, the Advocate General may write a position that will form the basis of the reasoned order given by the formation rejecting the appeal.86

2.17

(7) Authority of the Advocate General’s Opinion The Advocate General’s Opinion is not binding on the Court of Justice. It is merely advisory, and essentially constitutes how the Advocate General submits that the Court of Justice should decide the particular case before it. Thus, while the Advocate General’s Opinion is a helpful aid, there is no obligation on the Court of Justice to follow it.87 The Court of Justice has complete discretion in this regard, and it may, for instance, wholly disregard the Advocate General’s Opinion, take up some or all of the arguments raised, or even refer explicitly to the reasoning of the Advocate General’s Opinion in the judgment itself. Even if it is not binding on the Court of Justice, the Advocate General’s Opinion nonetheless plays an important role in the case-law. This is illustrated by the fact that it is published on the Court’s website alongside the Court’s judgment. It should also be mentioned that the Advocate General’s Opinion may have significant merit for advocating necessary change or providing critical insight on matters concerning the future development of the Union legal order.88

84 See C-17/98, Emesa Sugar (order), 2000, paras 10. According to the case-law, neither the Statute nor the CJ Rules of Procedure make provision for the parties, including the Member States, to submit observations in response to the Advocate General’s Opinion. Moreover, in the light of the Advocate General’s role and function under the second paragraph of Art. 252 TFEU, the Court is not bound either by the Advocate General’s conclusion or by the reasoning which led to that conclusion. Consequently, a party’s disagreement with the Advocate General’s Opinion, irrespective of the questions that he or she examines in his or her Opinion, cannot in itself constitute grounds justifying the reopening of the oral part of the procedure. Therefore, applications to that effect are rejected. See C-791/19, Commission v Poland, 2021, paras 41–42; C-158/21, Puig Gordi and Others, 2023, paras 37–38. 85 Statute, Art. 20, fifth para. See, in this regard, E. Sharpston, ‘The Changing Role of the Advocate General’ in A. Arnull, P. Eeckhout, and T. Tridimas (eds), Continuity and Change in EU Law—Essays in Honour of Sir Francis Jacobs (OUP, 2008) 20. 86 See C-266/20 P, ZU v EEAS (order), 2021; C-399/20 P, XH v Commission (order), 2021. It should be noted, however, that reasoned orders in application of Art. 181 CJ Rules of Procedure are not always based on a position written by an Advocate General. See C-504/20 P, Wagenknecht v European Council (order), 2021; C-450/20 P, Comprojecto-Projectos e Construções Lda and Others v ECB and Banco de Portugal (order), 2021. 87 Commentators have attempted to analyse the influence of Opinions of the Advocates General on the Court of Justice. See, for example, C. Arrebola, A. Júlia Maurício, and H. Jiménez Portilla, ‘An Econometric Analysis of the Influence of the Advocate General on the Court of Justice of the European Union’ (2016) Cambridge J.I.C.L. 82; U. Šadl and S. Sankari, ‘The Elusive Influence of the Advocate General on the Court of Justice of the European Union: The Case of European Citizenship’ (2017) Y.E.L. 421.Yet, generally speaking, it is difficult to determine how much influence the particular Opinion had on the deliberations of the Court, even if the Court did not follow it; conversely, the Court may come to the same conclusions as the Advocate General in a particular case, but on the basis of very different legal reasoning. 88 For a classic example as regards effective judicial protection for individuals in respect of the standing requirements for actions for annulment, see C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council, AG Jacobs Opinion, 2002; see further para. 7.107.

The Court of Justice 25 (8) Role of the President The President represents the Court and directs the judicial business and the administration of the Court.89 He or she presides at general meetings of the Members of the Court and at hearings before and deliberations of the Full Court and the Grand Chamber.90 The President does not sit in the five-and three-Judge Chambers, but may replace a Judge that is prevented from sitting in a Chamber of three or five Judges in application of Art. 31(2) and (3) of the CJ Rules of Procedure.91 (9) Role of the Vice-President The Vice-President assists the President of the Court in the performance of his or her duties.92 He or she takes the place of the President when the latter is prevented from acting or when the office of President is vacant.93 He or she may also take the President’s place, at the latter’s request, in performing the duties specified in Art. 9(1) and (3) of the CJ Rules of Procedure, namely, in representing the Court and ensuring the proper functioning of the services of the Court.94 He or she may also take the President’s place in performing some of the latter’s judicial duties. The Court must, however, by decision to be published in the Official Journal, specify the conditions under which the Vice-President will take the place of the President in the performance of his or her judicial duties.95 Currently, the Vice-President hears applications for suspension of acts against which an action is brought96 or applications for interim measures,97 as well as appeals against decisions of the General Court regarding applications for suspension or for interim measures.98 The Vice-President also hears

89 See C-150/17 P, EU v Kendrion, 2018, para. 38. 90 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 9. Under Art. 39 of the Statute, the President of the Court of Justice adjudicates on applications, by way of summary procedure, to suspend execution or enforcement of acts of the Union institutions and to prescribe interim measures as provided for in the relevant provisions of the Treaties specified therein: see further Ch. 13. These functions are now performed by the Vice-President of the Court: see para. 2.19. 91 In practice, the President only sits as an acting judge in Chambers of five Judges: see C-673/19, M and Others, 2021; C-603/20 PPU, MCP, 2021; C-665/20 PPU, X, 2021; C-242/22 PPU, TL, 2022; C-633/20, TC Medical Air Ambulance Agency, 2022; C-279/21, Udlændingenævnet, 2022. In that capacity, the President may act as a Judge- Rapporteur: see C-3/19, Asmel, 2020. 92 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No. 741/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council amending the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Annex I thereto (OJ 2012 L228/1), third recital. 93 Statute, Art. 9a, second para.; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 10(1). See also Statute, Art. 39, second para., in which it is provided that the powers of the President under that provision may, under the conditions laid down in the Rules of Procedure, be exercised by the Vice-President of the Court. 94 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 10(2). 95 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 10(3). On this basis, on 23 October 2012 the CJ adopted Decision 2012/671/EU concerning the judicial functions of the Vice-President of the Court (OJ 2012 L 300/47). According to this decision, ‘[t]‌he Vice-President of the Court shall take the place of the President of the Court in the performance of the judicial duties referred to in the first paragraph of Art. 39 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and in Art. 57 thereof and in Art. 160–166 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice’. For a first application, see C-551/12 P(R), EDF v Commission (order of the Vice-President), 2013. See further K. Lenaerts, ‘Les nouvelles fonctions de vice-président de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne’ (2012) Rec. Dalloz 2880. 96 For a recent example, see C-482/17 R, Czech Republic v Parliament (order of the Vice-President), 2018. 97 For a recent example, see C-238/18 R, ECB v Latvia (order of the Vice-President), 2018. 98 For recent examples, see C-423/20 P(R), Council v Sharpston (order of the Vice-President), 2020; C-424/20 P(R), Representatives of the Governments of the Member States v Sharpston (order of the Vice-President), 2020.

2.18

2.19

26 THE UNION JUDICIAL SYSTEM appeals against decisions of the General Court in relation to intervention.99 In addition, in accordance with Art. 170a of the CJ Rules of Procedure, the Vice-President decides on the inadmissibility of appeals for which no request that the appeal be allowed to proceed was made100 or for which the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed does not comply with the requirements set out in Art. 170a(2) of the CJ Rules of Procedure.101 The Vice-President does not sit in the five-and three-Judge Chambers, except when a case in which the Vice-President is the Judge-Rapporteur is assigned to such a Chamber. He or she may also replace a Judge that is prevented from sitting in a Chamber of three or five Judges in application of Art. 31(2) and (3) of the CJ Rules of Procedure.102

2.20

2.21

(10) Role of the Registrar The Registrar is responsible, under the authority of the President of the Court, for the acceptance, transmission, and custody of all documents and for effecting service as provided for by the CJ Rules of Procedure. The Registrar has additional responsibilities, including assisting the Members of the Court in all their official functions; being in charge of the publications of the Court, in particular the European Court Reports; and directing the services of the Court under the authority of the President.103 Importantly, the Registrar is responsible for the keeping of the Registry, in which all procedural documents and supporting items and documents lodged are entered in the order in which they are submitted.104 (11) Staff In performing its duties, the Court of Justice has a variety of departments at its disposal. There is an interpreting service; a translation service; a research and documentation department; a library department; a communications department; and an internal administrative machinery (including personnel, finance, and technical services departments). The Registry staff assist the Registrar in the performance of his or her judicial duties. As far as his or her administrative tasks are concerned, the Registrar can have recourse to the various departments of the Court. The Judges and Advocates General are generally served by four law clerks, known as référendaires, who carry out the

99 For a recent example, see C-187/18 P(I), Müller and Others (order of the Vice-President), 2018. Note that the President continues to hear applications to intervene in proceedings before the Court of Justice: see C-572/18 P, thyssenkrupp Electrical Steel and thyssenkrupp Electrical Steel Ugo (order of the President), 2019. 100 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 170(a)(1). See C-322/20 P, Wonderline v EUIPO (order of the Vice- President), 2020; C-201/21 P, Foundation for the Protection of the Traditional Cheese of Cyprus named Halloumi v EUIPO (order of the Vice-President), 2021. 101 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 170(a)(3). See C-193/20 P, Dekoback v EUIPO (order of the Vice-President), 2020. 102 See C-472/20, Lombard Lízing, 2022; C-492/22 PPU, CJ, 2022; C-470/20, Veejaam and Espo, 2022; C-154/21, Österreichische Post, 2023. 103 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 20; see also CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 39: The Registrar must, at the request of any Judge, Advocate General, or party, arrange for anything said or written in the course of the proceedings before the Court to be translated into the languages chosen from those referred to in Art. 36 of the CJ Rules of Procedure. 104 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 21.

The Court of Justice 27 preparatory work for the Judges and Advocates General, and by two secretarial staff members.105

C. Basic functions (1) Constitutional and Supreme Court The Court of Justice plays the role of the Union’s constitutional court, that is to say, the guardian of the values, principles, and rules laid down in the Treaties and the Charter. The Court rules in cases in which constitutional issues come to the fore, such as the legality of secondary Union law, the preservation of institutional balance, the demarcation of Union and national spheres of competence, the protection of fundamental rights, and the rule of law.106 Alongside this, the Court plays the role of a supreme court, where—on a request from a national court for a preliminary ruling—it ensures the uniform interpretation of Union law.107 In a certain sense, there is also a constitutional aspect to that function performed by the Court inasmuch as disparate interpretation of Union law in the Member States would run counter to achievement of the objectives laid down in the Treaties. (2) Court of last resort for constitutional issues It is self-evident that constitutional issues of Union law may also arise in cases brought before national courts or the General Court. Consequently, the Court of Justice is not the sole guardian of the Union legal order. Yet, national courts may (and, in some cases, must) still bring the constitutional issue before the Court by requesting a preliminary ruling (see Ch. 3). Likewise, an appeal may be brought against decisions of the General Court, which means that here, again, the Court of Justice can have the last word in determining legal questions with constitutional implications108 (see paras 2.50–2.54, concerning the distribution of heads of jurisdiction as between the judicial bodies belonging to the Court of Justice of the European Union).

105 See further K. McAuliffe, ‘Behind the Scenes at the Court of Justice’ in F. Nicola and B. Davies (eds), EU Law Stories: Contextual and Critical Histories of European Jurisprudence (CUP, 2017) 35; I. Streho, ‘The Référendaires, the Chambers, Staffing and Recruitement Matters’ in E. Guinchard and M.-P. Granger (eds), The New EU Judiciary. An Analysis of Current Judicial Reforms (Wolters Kluwer, 2017) 213. 106 See K. Lenaerts, Le juge et la constitution aux Etats-Unis d’Amérique et dans l’ordre juridique européen (Bruylant, 1988); V. Skouris, ‘Der Europäische Gerichtshof als Verfassungsgericht?’ in D. Merten (ed.), Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Deutschland und Österreich (Duncker and Humblot, 2008) 43; E. Sharpston and G. De Baere, ‘The Court of Justice as a Constitutional Adjudicator’ in A. Arnull, C. Barnard, M. Dougan, and E. Spaventa (eds), A Constitutional Order of States? Essays in EU Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood (Hart, 2011) 123; P.-E. Pignarre, La Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, juridiction constitutionnelle (Bruylant, 2021) 914p. 107 The Court’s sui generis role as both constitutional and supreme court has been emphasized. See V. Skouris, ‘The Position of the European Court of Justice in the EU Legal Order and Its Relationship with National Constitutional Courts’ (2005) Z.ö.R 326–327; B. Vesterdorf, ‘A Constitutional Court for the EU?’ (2006) I.J. Const. L. 607–617; K. Lenaerts, ‘Upholding the Rule of Law through Judicial Dialogue’ (2019) Y.E.L. 1. 108 See Chs 16 and 17.

2.22

2.23

28 THE UNION JUDICIAL SYSTEM

IV. The General Court A. Composition 2.24

2.25

(1) Judges The General Court consists of at least one Judge per Member State109 and, in its present composition, has fifty-four Judges.110 They are appointed for a term of six years by common accord of the governments of the Member States, after consultation of the panel provided for in Art. 255 TFEU.111 They are chosen from persons whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the ability required for appointment to high judicial office. Membership of the Court is partially renewed every three years, although retiring Judges are eligible for reappointment.112 As in the case of the Court of Justice, there is no nationality requirement, but, in practice, there are two Judges from each Member State. If a vacancy occurs during the term of office, the new Judge is appointed for the remainder of his or her predecessor’s normal term.113 (2) Advocates General At present, no separate Advocates General are attached to the General Court, on the ground that cases brought before it normally do not require the assistance of an Advocate General. However, a Judge may be called upon to perform the task of Advocate General in a given case.114 In such case, he or she performs the same function as an Advocate General in the Court of Justice and may not take part in the judgment of the case.115 The decision to designate an Advocate General in a particular case is taken by the plenum of the General Court at the request of the Chamber dealing with the case

109 Art. 19(2), second para. TEU. The number of Judges is laid down in the Statute: Art. 254, first para. TFEU. 110 Statute, Art. 48. In order to combat the judicial backlog at the General Court, the Statute of the Court of Justice was amended by Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2015/2422 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 amending Protocol (No. 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union (OJ 2015 L341/14) to allow for the doubling of the number of Judges at the General Court. Between 25 December 2015 and 1 September 2019, the number of Judges gradually increased from one Judge per Member State to two Judges per Member State, as laid down in Art. 48 of the Statute. The doubling of the number of Judges at the General Court has been subject to criticism in the literature: see A. Alemanno and L. Pech, ‘Thinking Justice Outside the Docket: A Critical Assessment of the Reform of the EU’s Court System’ (2017) C.M.L.Rev. 129. But see S. Gervasoni, ‘Le doublement du nombre de juges du Tribunal de l’Union européenne: Simple élargissement ou réforme structurelle?’ in A. Cartier Bresson and D. Dero-Bugny (eds), Les réformes de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne (Bruylant, 2020) 89. 111 Art. 19(2), third para. TEU; Art. 254, second para. TFEU. As regards the panel set forth in Art. 255 TFEU, see n. 41. 112 Art. 254, second para. TFEU. 113 Statute, Art. 7. 114 Statute, Art. 49. This rule is a ‘compromise’ between the view that the Advocate General’s role principally consists of assisting the Court of Justice in its task of ensuring uniform interpretation of Union law and that therefore there is no need for an Advocate General in the General Court, and the view that the Advocate General’s role is an essential safeguard for the legal protection of individuals and that therefore it is important for there to be an Advocate General in the General Court. However, Art. 254, first para. TFEU states that the Statute may provide that the General Court be assisted by Advocates General, which leaves the possibility open to appoint permanent Advocates General, and not just Judges as ad hoc Advocates General. 115 See the second para. of Art. 252 TFEU in conjunction with the second and fourth paras of Art. 49 of the Statute.

The General Court 29 or to which the case is assigned.116 The General Court is under no obligation to have itself assisted by an Advocate General,117 but may decide to appoint an Advocate General when it considers that the legal difficulty or the factual complexity of the case requires such appointment.118 The President of the General Court then designates the Judge called upon to perform the function of an Advocate General.119 The consequence is that references to the Advocate General in the GC Rules of Procedure apply only where a Judge has been designated so to act.120 (3) Oath and immunity Before taking up his or her duties, each Judge takes an oath before the Court of Justice 2.26 (see para. 2.07).121 Judges of the General Court have the same status as Judges and Advocates General of the Court of Justice (see para. 2.07)122 and are subject to the same constraints and obligations as regards taking up political or administrative offices and engaging in other occupations. A Judge may be removed from office only by the Court of Justice, after seeking the opinion of the General Court.123 Before that opinion— which must be reasoned124—is given, the Judge concerned may make representations to the General Court.125

116 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 31(1). The third para. of Art. 49 of the Statute provides that the criteria for selecting such cases, as well as the procedures for designating the Advocates General, are to be laid down in the GC Rules of Procedure. 117 See C-136/01 P, Autosalone Ispra dei Fratelli Rossi v Commission (order), 2002, paras 17–18; C-210/05 P, Campailla v Commission (order), 2005, paras 13–14. Note that an obligation existed for the General Court to appoint an Advocate General when it sat as a Full Court (1991 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 17). For example, see Opinion of Judge D.A.O. Edward performing the function of Advocate General in T-24/90, Automec, 1992 and T- 28/90, Asia Motor France, 1992; and Opinion of Judge H. Kirschner performing the function of Advocate General in T-51/89, Tetra Pak, 1990. However, this obligation no longer exists, as the General Court no longer sits as a full court. This may change again, however, following the request of the Court of Justice to transfer jurisdiction to the General Court to hear and determine questions referred for a preliminary ruling in specific areas. The request proposes to make the designation of an Advocate General mandatory in every preliminary ruling case. See Request submitted by the Court of Justice pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 281 [TFEU], with a view to amending Protocol (No. 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, available on the Court’s website (under ‘Institution’, ‘Various documents’). 118 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 30. For example, see Opinion of Judge J. Biancarelli performing the function of Advocate General in T-120/89, Stahlwerke Peine-Salzgitter v Commission, 1992; Opinion of Judge B. Vesterdorf performing the function of Advocate General in T-1/89, Rhône-Poulenc v Commission, 1991; T-2/89, Petrofina v Commission, 1991; T-3/89, Atochem v Commission, 1991; T-4/89, BASF v Commission, 1991; T-6/89, Enichem Anic v Commission, 1991; T-7/89, Hercules Chemicals v Commission, 1991; T-8/89, DSM v Commission, 1991; T-9/89, Hüls v Commission, 1992; T-10/89, Hoechst v Commission, 1992; T-11/89, Shell v Commission, 1992; T-12/89, Solvay v Commission, 1992; T-13/89, ICI v Commission, 1992; T-14/89, Montedipe v Commission, 1992; T-15/89, Chemie Linz v Commission, 1992. For further discussion of Judge B. Vesterdorf ’s role in the latter cases, see K. Lenaerts, ‘Réflexions sur la preuve et sur la procédure en droit communautaire de la concurrence’ in C. Baudenbacher, C. Gulmann, K. Lenaerts, E. Coulon, and E. Barbier de La Serre (eds), Liber Amicorum en l’honneur de Bo Vesterdorf (Bruylant, 2007) 475 (published in English in Symposium on Developments in European Union Law Dedicated to CFI President Bo Vesterdorf; K. Lenaerts, ‘Some Thoughts on Evidence and Procedure in European Community Competition Law’ (2007) Fordham I.L.J. 1463). 119 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 31(2). 120 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 3(4). 121 Statute, Art. 2; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 5. 122 Art. 254, sixth para. TFEU; Statute, Arts 2–8. 123 Statute, Art. 6, first para.; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 7(1). 124 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 7(2). 125 For further particulars, see GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 7.

30 THE UNION JUDICIAL SYSTEM 2.27

(4) President Immediately after their partial replacement, the Judges elect a President from among their number for a term of three years.126 He or she may be re-elected.127 If the President gives up his or her office before the expiry of its term, a successor is to be elected only for the outstanding portion of the term.128

2.28

(5) Vice-President In addition to the election of the President, the Judges elect one of their number as Vice- President of the General Court for a term of three years. He or she may be re-elected.129

2.29

(6) Registrar The Court appoints its Registrar.130 The provisions relating to the status of the Registrar of the Court of Justice apply, mutatis mutandis, to the Registrar of the General Court.131

B. Internal organization 2.30

(1) Chambers The General Court has ten Chambers that sit either as a Chamber of three Judges or in extended composition as a Chamber of five Judges.132 Unlike in the case of the Court of Justice, the most common formation is the three-Judge Chamber133, although the practice of a five-Judge Chamber is increasing since the doubling of the number of Judges at the General Court.134 The General Court may also sit as a single Judge135 or as the 126 Art. 254, third para. TFEU; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 9(1). 127 Art. 254, third para. TFEU. 128 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 9(2). As with the Court of Justice, the elections are conducted by secret ballot. The Judge obtaining the votes of more than half the Judges composing the General Court shall be elected; if no Judge obtains that majority, further ballots are held until that majority is attained: GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 9(3). 129 Statute, Art. 9a. 130 Art. 254, fourth para. TFEU; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 32(1). 131 Statute, Art. 47, second para. See further E. Coulon, ‘Le greffier du Tribunal de première instance des Communautés européennes’ (2007–2008) R.A.E. 549. 132 Statute, Art. 50, first para.; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 13(1); Notice 2022/C 398/06 concerning the Formation of Chambers and assignment of Judges to Chambers (OJ 2022 C398/3). 133 A three-Judge Chamber has six or ten formations. See Notice 2022/C 398/06 concerning the Formation of Chambers and assignment of Judges to Chambers (OJ 2022 C398/3). 134 See Council conclusions of 13 July 2021 on the report of the Court of Justice on the functioning of the General Court of the European Union, 10790/21, point 8. 135 Statute, Art. 50, second para.; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 14(3). Under Art. 29(3), first para. of the GC Rules of Procedure, the Judge-Rapporteur of a Chamber of three Judges may hear and determine the sort of cases described in that Article as a single Judge (Council Decision 1999/291/EC, ECSC, Euratom, OJ 1999 L114/5) if, having regard to the lack of difficulty of the questions of law or fact raised, to the limited importance of those cases, and to the absence of other special circumstances, they are suitable for being so heard and determined and have been delegated under the conditions laid down in Art. 29(3), fourth para. of the GC Rules of Procedure. However, as a result of Art. 29(3), second para. of the GC Rules of Procedure, it is not possible to delegate to a single Judge cases raising issues as to the legality of an act of general application (unless in staff cases, in which a plea of illegality is raised, the Union Courts have already given a ruling on the issues raised by that plea) or cases relating to the implementation of the rules on competition and on control of concentrations, State aid, measures to protect trade, or the common organization of the agricultural markets, with the exception of cases that form part of a series of cases in which the same relief is sought and of which one has already been finally decided. See C-171/00 P, Libéros v Commission, 2002, paras 25–39, where the judgment of the then Court of First Instance sitting as a single Judge was set aside on the ground that the case raised an issue of the legality of an act of general application and therefore could not be decided by a single Judge. Under the former 1991 GC Rules of Procedure, a single Judge could not sit

The General Court 31 Grand Chamber,136 which consists of fifteen Judges.137 Contrary to the Court of Justice, the General Court does not sit very frequently as the Grand Chamber.138 It should also be pointed out that the General Court no longer sits as a Full Court.139 Each Chamber has a President of Chamber. The Presidents of the Chambers of five Judges are elected for three years and may be reappointed once.140 The President of the General Court presides over the Grand Chamber and the plenum, which is the administrative meeting of the General Court. A President of a Chamber of five Judges is also a President of a Chamber of three Judges. The composition of the Chambers and appointments of Presidents of Chambers are published in the Official Journal.141 (2) Assignment of a case to a Chamber Under the second paragraph of Art. 50 of the Statute, the General Court is to lay down criteria by which cases are to be allocated among the Chambers.142 As soon as the application initiating proceedings has been lodged, the President of the General Court assigns the case to one of the Chambers,143 which is a Chamber of three Judges.144 Cases concerning the Union’s civil service are allocated to the four three-Judge Chambers in proceedings brought against the EU Intellectual Property Office or against the Community Plant Variety Office concerning the application of the rules relating to an intellectual property regime. However, this is no longer the case: GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 29(3), first para. a). See T-858/19, easyCosmetic Swiss v EUIPO, 2020; T-531/20, Wolf Oil Corporation v EUIPO, 2021; T-738/21, Bora Creations v EUIPO, 2022; T-569/21, Zoubier Harbaoui v EUIPO, 2023. In practice, the use of the single Judge at the General Court is rather limited: see M. Fortunova-Michel, ‘Le juge unique’ in A. Cartier Bresson and D. Dero-Bugny (eds), Les réformes de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne (Bruylant, 2020) 114. 136 Statute, Art. 50, third para.; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 14(2). 137 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 15(1). 138 See T-69/00, FIAMM and FIAMM Technologies v Council and Commission, 2005; T-151/00, Laboratoire du Bain v Council and Commission, 2005; T-301/00, Groupe Fremaux and Palais Royal v Council and Commission, 2005; T-320/00, CD Cartondruck v Council and Commission, 2005; T-383/00, Beamglow v European Parliament and Others, 2005; T-135/01, Fedon & Figli and Others v Council and Commission, 2005; T-36/04, API v Commission, 2007; T-201/04, Microsoft v Commission, 2007; T-532/08, Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta and Umicore v Commission, 2010; T-539/08, Etimine and Etiproducts v Commission, 2010; T-125/22, RT France v Council, 2022. 139 The formation of a Full Court no longer figures among the possible formations of the General Court. See Statute, Art. 50; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 14 (compare previous version of Art. 50, second para. of the Statute and Art. 11(1), second para. of the 1991 GC Rules of Procedure). In the past, it sat as a Full Court on only three occasions: T-51/89, Tetra Pak v Commission, 1990; T-2 8/90, Asia Motor France and Others v Commission, 1992; and T-24/90, Automec v Commission, 1992. The plenary session of the General Court, which is called the plenum, has a function comparable to the administrative meeting of the Court. See para. 2.13. 140 Statute, Art. 50, first para.; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 18(2). The President of the General Court is not subject to this limitation. By comparison, the Presidents of Chambers of three Judges shall be elected for a defined term: GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 18(3). 141 GC Rules of Procedure, Arts 13(3), 15(2), and 18(6). 142 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 25(1). 143 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 26(1). See also GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 26(2), whereby the President of the Chamber proposes to the President of the Court, in respect of each case assigned to that Chamber, the designation of a Judge-Rapporteur; see CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 15(1) and Arts 25, 59–60 (designation of a Judge- Rapporteur by the President of the Court; at the general meeting, the Court assigns the case to a Chamber, at the proposal of the Judge-Rapporteur). The decision to assign a case to a Chamber, which is a matter for the President of the General Court, is adopted in the context of measures of administration of justice in accordance with the relevant provisions of the GC Rules of Procedure; subject to the provisions of Art. 18 of the Statute, the parties are not entitled to formulate pleadings in that respect. Consequently, an applicant’s claim to assign the application to ‘an appropriate Chamber’ is inadmissible: see T-213/08 REV, Marinova v Université Libre de Bruxelles and Commission (order), 2009. 144 See Notice 2022/C 398/09 concerning the Criteria for the assignment of cases to Chambers (OJ 2022 C398/8).

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32 THE UNION JUDICIAL SYSTEM specifically designated for that purpose.145 Likewise, cases related to intellectual property rights are allocated to the six three-Judge Chambers specifically designated for that purpose.146 Whenever the legal difficulty or the importance of the case, or special circumstances, so justify, a case may be referred to the Grand Chamber, or to a Chamber consisting of a different number of Judges.147 At any stage of the proceedings, the Chamber hearing the case may, on its own initiative or at the request of a main party, make a proposal to this effect to the plenum of the Court.148 Until the close of the oral part of the procedure, or before the Chamber seized of the case decides to rule without an oral part of the procedure where Art. 106(3) GC Rules of Procedure applies, the President or the Vice President may also make such a proposal.149 The plenum then decides whether or not to refer the case.150 Where a Member State or an institution of the Union which is a party to the proceedings so requests, a case will be decided by a Chamber composed of at least five Judges.151 The decision to delegate a case to a single Judge is taken by the plenum, after the parties have been heard. Where a Member State or a Union institution that is a party to the proceedings objects to the case being heard by a single Judge, the case shall be maintained before or referred to the Chamber to which the Judge-R apporteur belongs.152

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(3) Quorum A bench of the General Court can decide validly only when an uneven number of Judges is sitting in the deliberations.153 A quorum consists of three Judges in the case of three-or five-Judge Chambers,154 and eleven Judges in the case of the Grand Chamber.155

145 These are the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Chambers. See Notice 2022/C 398/06 concerning the Formation of Chambers and assignment of Judges to Chambers (OJ 2022 C398/3). Before the abolition of the Civil Service Tribunal, appeals against decisions of the Civil Service Tribunal were heard by a special Appeal Chamber of three Judges composed of the President of the General Court and, in rotation, two Presidents of Chambers. 146 These are the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Chambers. See Notice 2022/C 398/06 concerning Formation of Chambers and assignment of Judges to Chambers (OJ 2022 C398/3). 147 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 28(1). This is an option, and not an obligation: see C-601/19 P, BP v FRA, 2020, para. 95. 148 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 28(2). 149 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 28(3). 150 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 28(4) and (5). 151 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 28(6). 152 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 29(3). 153 Statute, Art. 17, first para., applicable to the General Court by virtue of Art. 47, first para. of the Statute. 154 Statute, Art. 17, second para., applicable to the General Court by virtue of Art. 47, first para. of the Statute, and GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 24(1). 155 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 23(1). Art. 47, first para. of the Statute excludes the application of Art. 17, third para. of the Statute to the General Court. This is because under the former 1991 GC Rules of Procedure the quorum applicable to the Grand Chamber of the General Court was not the same quorum as that applicable to the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice (providing for nine Judges instead of eleven at the Court of Justice). At present, however, the quorum for both Grand Chambers is the same.

The General Court 33 (4) Procedure The procedure before the General Court largely parallels that before the Court of Justice in relation to direct actions (see Part V). (5) President, Vice-President, and Registrar The tasks of the President,156 the Vice-President,157 and the Registrar158 of the General Court are, to the extent of their powers, similar159 to those of their counterparts in the Court of Justice. (6) Staff As far as the personnel of the General Court is concerned, the Statute provides as follows:

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2.34

2.35

The President of the Court of Justice and the President of the General Court shall determine, by common accord, the conditions under which officials and other servants attached to the Court of Justice shall render their services to the General Court to enable it to function. Certain officials or other servants shall be responsible to the Registrar of the General Court under the authority of the President of the General Court.160

The last sentence of that passage applies, of course, to the staff of the Registrar and the cabinets of the Judges of the General Court (Judges are assisted by, among others, two to three référendaires, who perform the same duties as those of the Judges and Advocates General of the Court of Justice, and by secretarial staff members). The aim is to bring the staff of the General Court directly and exclusively concerned with the performance of its judicial function under the President and the Registrar, which constitutes a guarantee of independence from the Court of Justice.

C. Basic function (1) Purpose The purpose of establishing the Court of First Instance (as it was then called), in 1989, which was ‘attached’161 to the Court of Justice, was to maintain and improve the quality and effectiveness of judicial protection in the Union legal order. In 1988, a steadily rising

156 See GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 9. 157 See GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 10. 158 See GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 20. 159 They are not completely the same, however. For example, at the General Court, it is the President who hears applications for interim measures, while it is the Vice-President at the Court of Justice. See para. 2.19. 160 Statute, Art. 52. 161 This term was employed in the pre-Nice version of Art. 225(1) EC: ‘A Court of First Instance shall be attached to the Court of Justice . . .’

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34 THE UNION JUDICIAL SYSTEM tide of cases had caused proceedings before the Court of Justice to become unacceptably protracted.162 Furthermore, in cases requiring an appraisal of complex facts,163 the Court could no longer provide the high quality of judicial protection that it was called upon to offer.164 The transfer in stages to the Court of First Instance of jurisdiction in all cases brought by natural or legal persons against any unlawful act or failure to act on the part of the Union institutions helped to allay those shortcomings.165 At the same time, a two-tier court system was created for such cases, which could only improve the quality of legal protection.166

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(2) Treaty of Nice and subsequent institutional developments As a result of the Nice Treaty, which entered into force on 1 February 2003, and the amendment of Art. 51 of the Statute on 26 April 2004,167 the jurisdiction of the then Court of First Instance was extended to a considerable degree. It became the administrative court of general jurisdiction of the European Union (see paras 2.50–2.54, concerning the distribution of heads of jurisdiction among the various judicial bodies belonging to the Court of Justice of the European Union).168 This was further consolidated by the Lisbon Treaty and subsequent amendments to the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

162 The average duration of a direct action increased from 8.5 months in 1970 to 24 months. The average time taken to complete proceedings in a reference for a preliminary ruling was 17.5 months. See B. Vesterdorf, ‘The European Legal Order and the Court of First Instance’ (2006) E.R.P.L./R.E.D.P. 919. 163 Principally, competition and anti-dumping cases. 164 See K. Lenaerts, ‘Le Tribunal de première instance des Communautés européennes: genèse et premiers pas’ (1990) J.T. 409; M. Van der Woude, ‘Le Tribunal de première instance “Les trois premières années” ’ (1992) R.M.U.E. 113; D. Edward, ‘The Court of First Instance—The Beginnings’ in C. Baudenbacher, C. Gulmann, K. Lenaerts, E. Coulon, and E. Barbier de la Serre (eds), Liber Amicorum en l’honneur de Bo Vesterdorf (Bruylant, 2007) 1. For a broader perspective on the creation of the General Court, see L. Avril, ‘The Genesis of the Institution within the Institution. Studying the Mobilization for the Creation of the Court of First Instance’ in M.R. Madsen, F. Nicola, and A. Vauchez (eds), Researching the European Court of Justice. Methodological Shifts and Law’s Embeddedness (CUP, 2022) 237. 165 See Council Decision 88/591/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 24 October 1988 establishing a Court of First Instance of the European Communities (OJ 1988 L319/1; corrigendum in OJ 1989 L241/4), as amended by Council Decision 93/350/Euratom, ECSC, EEC of 8 June 1993 (OJ 1993 L144/21) and Council Decision 94/149/ECSC, EC of 7 March 1994 (OJ 1994 L66/29). Art. 10 of the Nice Treaty abrogated this Decision. As regards the transfer of direct actions to the then Court of First Instance, see A. Tizzano, ‘Le transfert des recours directs’ in G. Vandersanden (ed.), La réforme du système juridictionnel communautaire (ULB, 1994) 67. 166 K. Lenaerts, ‘Le Tribunal de première instance des Communautés européennes: regards sur une décennie d’activités et sur l’apport du double degré d’instance au droit communautaire’ (2000) C.D.E. 323. 167 Council Decision 2004/407/EC, Euratom of 26 April 2004 amending Arts 51 and 54 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice (OJ 2004 L132/5; corrigendum in OJ 2004 L194/3). 168 For the effects of the Nice Treaty on the judicial organization of the European Union, see E. Coulon, ‘L’indispensable réforme du Tribunal de première instance des Communautés européennes’ (2000) R.A.E. 254; K. Lenaerts, ‘La réorganisation de l’architecture juridictionnelle de l’Union européenne: quel angle d’approche adopter?’ in M. Dony and E. Bribosia (eds), L’avenir du système juridictionnel de l’Union européenne (Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2002) 49; A. Tizzano, ‘La Cour de Justice après Nice: le transfert des compétences au Tribunal de première instance’ in A. De Walsche and G. Vandersanden (eds), Mélanges en hommage à Jean- Victor Louis (ULB, 2003) 499; P. Mengozzi, ‘The Judicial System of the European Community and Its Recent Evolution’ in A. Del Vecchio (ed.), New International Tribunals and New International Proceedings (Giuffrè, 2006) 81.

Specialized Courts 35

V. Specialized Courts A. General overview Under Art. 257 TFEU, the European Parliament and the Council may create specialized courts (previously referred to as judicial panels169) to be attached to the General Court, which will hear and determine at first instance certain classes of action or proceeding brought in specific areas.170 Decisions given by specialized courts may be subject to a right of appeal before the General Court on points of law only, or, when provided for in the regulation establishing the specialized court, a right of appeal also on matters of fact.171

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B. The European Union Civil Service Tribunal Declaration No. 16 annexed to the Nice Treaty called upon the Court of Justice and the Commission ‘to prepare as swiftly as possible a draft decision establishing a judicial panel which has jurisdiction to deliver judgments at first instance on disputes between the [Union] and its servants’.172 On 2 November 2004 the Council adopted Decision 2004/752/EC, Euratom, establishing the European Union Civil Service Tribunal.173 This decision inserted a new Art. 62a (now Art. 62c) in the Statute which provided that the provisions relating to the jurisdiction, composition, organization, and procedure of the judicial panels are set out in an annex to the Statute.174 Council Decision 2004/752 added a new Annex I to the Statute entitled ‘The European Union Civil Service Tribunal’ (Civil Service Tribunal).175

169 See para. 2.43. 170 Art. 257, first para. TFEU. The European Parliament and the Council shall act, in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, by means of regulations either on a proposal from the Commission after consultation of the Court of Justice or at the request of the Court of Justice after consultation of the Commission. Originally, from the entry into force of the Nice Treaty, the Council was to establish judicial panels, deciding unanimously on a proposal of the Commission after consulting the European Parliament and the Court of Justice, or at the request of the Court of Justice after consulting the European Parliament and the Commission, under former Arts 220 and 225a EC. 171 Art. 257, third para. TFEU. 172 Declaration (No. 16), annexed to the Nice Treaty, on Art. 225a of the Treaty establishing the European Community (OJ 2001 C80/80). 173 OJ 2004 L333/7. On 18 January 2005, the Council adopted Decision 2005/150/EC, Euratom, concerning the conditions and arrangements governing the submission and processing of applications for appointment as a Judge of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal (OJ 2005 L50/7). On 22 July 2005, the Council adopted Decision 2005/577/EC, Euratom, appointing Judges of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal (OJ 2005 L197/28). 174 Statute, Art. 62c, first para. 175 For the workings of the EU Civil Service Tribunal generally, see H. Kanninen, ‘Le Tribunal de la fonction publique de l’UE—la première juridiction spécialisée dans le système juridictionnel de l’Union européenne’ in M. Johansson, N. Wahl, and U. Bernitz (eds), Liber Amicorum in honour of Sven Norberg (Bruylant, 2006) 287; W. Hakenberg, ‘The Civil Service Tribunal of the European Union: A Model to Follow as a Specialised Court?’ in E. Guinchard and M.-P. Granger (eds), The New EU Judiciary. An Analysis of Current Judicial Reforms (Wolters Kluwer, 2017) 161.

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36 THE UNION JUDICIAL SYSTEM On 12 December 2005,176 the European Union Civil Service Tribunal took over the staff cases previously falling within the jurisdiction of the then Court of First Instance. It was operational until 1 September 2016, when the jurisdiction at first instance in disputes between the European Union and its servants was transferred back to the General Court as part of a wider reform of the Union Courts.177 Council Decision 2004/752 was repealed and the Civil Service Tribunal ceased to exist.178 It remains the only specialized court set up so far.

VI. Allocation of Jurisdiction among the Union Courts A. Historical evolution

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(1) The position before the Treaty of Nice (a) Court of First Instance Before the Nice Treaty, the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, as it was then called, was limited as follows. That Court had jurisdiction179 to hear and determine actions for annulment,180 actions for failure to act,181 and actions for compensation for non-contractual damage182 brought by natural or legal persons against institutions and bodies of the Union, and disputes between those institutions and bodies and their servants.183 It also had jurisdiction to entertain actions brought by natural and legal persons pursuant to an arbitration clause.184 Finally, that Court had jurisdiction in cases brought against the EU Intellectual Property Office relating to trade marks185 and designs,186 as well as cases brought against the Community Plant Variety Office relating to Community plant variety rights.187 176 Art. 4 Council Decision 2004/752/EC, Euratom of 2 November 2004 establishing the European Union Civil Service Tribunal (OJ 2004 L333/7); Decision of the President of the Court of Justice recording that the European Union Civil Service Tribunal has been constituted in accordance with law (OJ 2005 L325/1). On 25 July 2007, the Rules of Procedure of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal were adopted (OJ 2007 L225/1). 177 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2016/1192 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 on the transfer to the General Court of jurisdiction at first instance in disputes between the European Union and its servants (OJ 2016 L 200/137). 178 In the period 2005–2016, the Civil Service Tribunal dealt with 1696 cases and issued 719 judgments and 1394 orders. It gave its first judgment on 26 April 2006 (F-46/05, Falcione v Commission, 2006) and rendered its last substantive decisions on 2 August 2016 (F-74/13, Mommer v Commission (order), 2016; F-102/13, Urena de Poznanski v Commission (order), 2016). 179 See Council Decision 88/591/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 24 October 1988 establishing a Court of First Instance of the European Communities (OJ 1988 L319/1; corrigendum in OJ 1989 L241/4), as amended by Council Decision 93/350/Euratom, ECSC, EEC of 8 June 1993 (OJ 1993 L144/21) and Council Decision 94/149/ECSC, EC of 7 March 1994 (OJ 1994 L66/29). 180 Ex. Art. 230 EC. 181 Ex. Art. 232 EC. 182 Ex. Arts 235 and 288, second para. EC. 183 Ex. Art. 236 EC. 184 Ex. Art. 238 EC. 185 Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154/1). 186 Council Regulation (EC) No. 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community designs (OJ 2002 L3/1), as amended. 187 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2100/94 of 27 July 1994 on Community plant variety rights (OJ 1994 L227/1), as amended.

Allocation of Jurisdiction among the Union Courts 37 (b) Court of Justice The former EC Treaty (pre-Nice) had explicitly excluded preliminary references from the potential jurisdiction of the then Court of First Instance.188 They thus came within the reserved jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. The Court of Justice also had jurisdiction to decide actions for annulment or for failure to act and actions pursuant to an arbitration clause where those actions were lodged by a Member State, a Union institution,189 or, under certain circumstances, the European Central Bank (ECB). The Court of Justice was likewise competent to hear actions brought by the Commission or a Member State relating to the infringement of then Community law by a Member State (infringement actions)190 and actions relating to compensation for non-contractual damage brought by a Member State against the then Community.191 Finally, as regards the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, mention should be made of appeals that could be lodged on points of law only against rulings of the Court of First Instance.192 (2) The Treaty of Nice: a fundamental reallocation of jurisdiction in embryo (a) Role of the Court of Justice The Nice Treaty contained a fundamental reallocation of jurisdiction in embryo as between the Union Courts.193 It appeared from the Nice Treaty that the Court of Justice’s role should be confined to the examination of questions that were of essential importance for the Union legal order. In order to achieve this objective, the former EC Treaty provided that the Court of Justice was to be the competent court for infringement actions,194 for (the great majority of) preliminary references, for appeals against rulings of the Court of First Instance,195 and, exceptionally, for the review of preliminary rulings

188 The last sentence of the pre-Nice version of Art. 225(1) EC provided: ‘The Court of First Instance shall not be competent to hear and determine questions referred for a preliminary ruling under Art. 234.’ 189 Former Art. 7 EC listed five institutions comprising the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the Court of Justice, and the Court of Auditors. 190 Ex Arts 226–228 EC. 191 However, such actions have been generally lodged by natural and legal persons, and not by Member States. For the sake of completeness, the following actions falling within the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice should also be mentioned: actions based on former Art. 237 EC concerning the fulfilment by Member States of obligations under the Statute of the European Investment Bank (EIB), the legality of measures adopted by the Board of Governors and of the Board of Directors of the EIB, and the fulfilment by national central banks of obligations within the framework of the monetary union; and actions based on former Art. 239 EC concerning any dispute between Member States relating to the subject-matter of the EC Treaty, submitted to the Court under a special agreement between the parties. 192 Ex Art. 225(1) EC. 193 See, in that regard, A. Tizzano, ‘La Cour de Justice après Nice: le transfert de compétences au Tribunal de première instance’ (2002) R.D.U.E 665. 194 According to former Art. 225(1), first para., second sent. EC: ‘[t]‌he Statute may provide for the Court of First Instance to have jurisdiction for other classes of action or proceeding.’ This meant that granting the Court of First Instance jurisdiction in infringement actions (based on former Arts 226–228 EC) would not have required a Treaty amendment; an amendment of the Statute would have sufficed. The same holds true with the reframing of this provision in the Lisbon Treaty: see Art. 256(1), first para., second sent. TFEU. 195 Former Art. 225 EC allowed for the introduction of a filter system for appeals insofar as former Art. 225(1), second para. EC provided: ‘Decisions given by the Court of First Instance [ . . . ] may be subject to a right of appeal to the Court of Justice on points of law only, under the conditions and within the limits laid down by the Statute’ (emphasis added).

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38 THE UNION JUDICIAL SYSTEM of the Court of First Instance or of decisions taken by the Court of First Instance upon appeal in cases for which a judicial panel, as it was then called, had jurisdiction at first instance.

2.43

(b) Transfer of jurisdiction to the Court of First Instance The Nice Treaty introduced into the former EC Treaty a legal basis for the potential transfer of jurisdiction to the Court of First Instance with regard to preliminary references in specific areas, which have yet to be determined.196 It was the intention of the Nice Treaty197 that the Court of First Instance, regardless of the status of the applicant, should have jurisdiction to hear at first instance actions for annulment198 and for failure to act,199 actions relating to compensation for non- contractual damage,200 actions pursuant to an arbitration clause,201 and disputes between the then Community and its staff.202 There were two exceptions. First, judicial panels could be created, which were to hear and determine at first instance certain classes of action or proceeding brought in specific areas.203 Second, the Statute could reserve certain actions at first and last instance to the Court of Justice.204 However, the Statute attached to the Nice Treaty confirmed the pre- Nice status quo and, as far as the direct actions mentioned above were concerned, maintained—until a later amendment of the Statute205—t he pre-Nice division of jurisdiction ratione personae between the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance.

196 Ex Art. 225(3) EC. In the request of the Court of Justice of December 2022 to transfer jurisdiction for preliminary rulings to the General Court, the following areas are proposed: the common system of value added tax, excise duties, the Customs Code and the tariff classification of goods under the Combined Nomenclature, compensation and assistance to passengers, and the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading. See Request submitted by the Court of Justice pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 281 [TFEU], with a view to amending Protocol (No. 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, available on the Court’s website (under ‘Institution’, ‘Various documents’). 197 Ex Art. 225(1) EC. 198 Ex Art. 230 EC. 199 Ex Art. 232 EC. 200 Ex Arts 235 and 288, second para. EC. 201 Ex Art. 238 EC. 202 Ex Art. 236 EC. 203 Ex Art. 225(1), first para. EC; ex Art. 225a, first para. EC. 204 Ex Art. 225(1), first para. EC. 205 The Nice Treaty introduced a simplified procedure for amending the Statute. While, until the entry into force of the Nice Treaty, the provisions relating to Treaty amendments generally applied, the post-Nice version of Art. 245 EC provided: ‘The Council, acting unanimously at the request of the Court of Justice and after consulting the European Parliament and the Commission, or at the request of the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament and the Court of Justice, may amend the provisions of the Statute, with the exception of Title I.’ The Lisbon Treaty further modified this provision. Under Art. 281, second para. TFEU, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, may amend the Statute, with the exception of Title I and Art. 64; either the Court of Justice or the Commission may take the initiative, and the other institution will be consulted. As a result, amendments to the Statute no longer require unanimity in the Council; qualified majority voting suffices. Furthermore, the European Parliament is not merely consulted on amendments to the Statute, but is a co-legislator alongside the Council in this regard.

Allocation of Jurisdiction among the Union Courts 39 (3) Implementation of the principles of the Nice Treaty (a) Jurisdiction for direct actions Council Decision 2004/407/EC, Euratom of 26 April 2004, which amended Art. 51 of the Statute,206 (partly) implemented the principles of the Nice Treaty by transferring from the Court of Justice to the then Court of First Instance jurisdiction over direct actions, other than actions for infringement. (b) Jurisdiction for staff cases The jurisdiction for staff cases was transferred to the Civil Service Tribunal by way of Council Decision 2004/752/EC, Euratom, establishing the European Union Civil Service Tribunal.207 An appeal on points of law against decisions of the Civil Service Tribunal could be lodged before the then Court of First Instance.208 Decisions given on appeal by the Court of First Instance could exceptionally be reviewed by the Court of Justice, under the conditions and within the limits laid down in Art. 62 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, where there was a serious risk of the unity or consistency of Union law being affected.209 (4) Subsequent developments (a) Lisbon Treaty The changes to the Statute, which aimed at leaving the Court of Justice with jurisdiction at first and last instance only in respect of basic legislative activity and in respect of the determination of inter-institutional disputes, were left relatively undisturbed by the Lisbon Treaty.210 The Lisbon Treaty did, however, enlarge the number of Union institutions211 and make changes to certain Treaty provisions governing the types of actions that may be brought before the Union Courts, which introduced further nuances.212 (b) Jurisdiction for staff cases As part of a package of wider judicial reforms, the Civil Service Tribunal ceased operations on 1 September 2016 and jurisdiction at first instance in disputes between the Union and its servants was transferred to the General Court.213 An appeal on points of 206 Council Decision 2004/407/EC, Euratom of 26 April 2004 amending Arts 51 and 54 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice (OJ 2004 L132/5; corrigendum in OJ 2004 L194/3). 207 OJ 2004 L333/7. See n. 173. 208 Art. 256(2), first subpara. TFEU. 209 Art. 256(2), second subpara. TFEU. 210 Furthermore, the general scheme of the jurisdiction allocated to the Court of First Instance, save for what was given to a judicial panel or reserved to the Court of Justice, set down in former Art. 225(1), first para. EC was retained in virtually identical terms (save for the renaming of certain of the Union Courts) in Art. 256(1), first para. TFEU. 211 Art. 13(1), second para. TEU added the European Council and the ECB to the five institutions (i.e. the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the Court of Justice, and the Court of Auditors) that had already been listed in former Art. 7 EC (n. 189). 212 See Art. 263(4) TFEU. 213 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2016/1192 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 on the transfer to the General Court of jurisdiction at first instance in disputes between the European Union and its servants (OJ 2016 L200/137). On 1 September 2016, cases pending before the Civil Service Tribunal were transferred to the General Court and were, from then on, dealt with under the GC Rules of Procedure: see T-573/16, PT v EIB, 2019, paras 187–189.

2.44

2.45

2.46

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40 THE UNION JUDICIAL SYSTEM law against decisions of the General Court in staff cases may be lodged before the Court of Justice.214 As a consequence, the review procedure has thereafter been extinguished (for now).215

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2.49

(c) Disputes relating to the execution of a judgment of the Court imposing financial sanctions upon a Member State When adjudicating on an action for annulment brought by a Member State against an act of the Commission relating to a failure to comply with a judgment delivered by the Court of Justice under Art. 260(2) or (3) TFEU, the General Court could risk encroaching upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to rule on the compatibility of national measures with Union law in the context of an infringement action where the Commission and the Member State concerned disagreed on the adequacy of the measures adopted by that Member State to comply with the judgment of the Court of Justice.216 In order to overcome this issue, and the problems deriving from it for the effectiveness of the infringement procedure, the Statute was amended and jurisdiction at first instance for actions for annulment against such Commission acts was transferred to the Court of Justice.217 Consequently, all disputes related to the failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligations under the Treaties are decided by the Court of Justice. (d) Preliminary admission mechanism for appeals In order to deal with the increasing number of incoming cases in the Court of Justice, a preliminary admission mechanism for appeals was introduced, which allows the Court of Justice to decide whether an appeal brought against a decision of the General Court in an annulment action against a decision of an independent board of appeal should be allowed to proceed.218 An appeal is allowed to proceed ‘where it raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of Union law’.219 Since such circumstances are only present in exceptional cases, the reform has effectively

214 Statute, Art. 56. 215 See Ch. 20. 216 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2019/629 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 amending Protocol (No. 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union (OJ 2019 L111/1), third recital. See further para. 5.88. 217 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2019/629 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 amending Protocol (No. 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union (OJ 2019 L111/1), Art. 1(1). 218 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2019/629 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 amending Protocol (No. 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union (OJ 2019 L111/1), Art. 1(2) and fifth recital. Note that there is a request to amend Art. 58a of the Statute which would extend the preliminary admission mechanism for appeals to decisions of the General Court concerning independent boards of appeal of other Union offices and agencies existing on 1 May 2019, as well as to decisions of the General Court relating to the performance of a contract containing an arbitration clause within the meaning of Art. 272 TFEU. See Request submitted by the Court of Justice pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 281 [TFEU], with a view to amending Protocol (No. 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, available on the Court’s website (under ‘Institution’, ‘Various documents’). 219 Statute, Art. 58a, third para. See further para. 19.20.

Allocation of Jurisdiction among the Union Courts 41 buttressed the position of the General Court as the supreme administrative court of the Union legal order.

B. The present allocation of jurisdiction (1) Present system The present allocation of jurisdiction among the Union Courts may be summarized as follows:

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First, all actions brought by natural or legal persons that already fell within the jurisdiction of the General Court, previously the Court of First Instance, continue to be heard and determined by that Court.220 Second, inter-institutional disputes (including those involving the European Council and the European Central Bank221) are to be heard and determined at first and last instance by the Court of Justice. Third, as regards actions brought by Member States, the Statute favours the status of the defendant as the factor determining jurisdiction. The Court of Justice has jurisdiction to hear and determine actions for annulment brought by Member States against legislative acts, acts of the European Parliament, of the European Council, or of the Council, or against a failure to act by one or more of those institutions. In principle, therefore, actions brought by Member States against the Commission or the European Central Bank fall within the jurisdiction of the General Court, since such cases do not normally involve review of the basic legislative activity of the Union institutions. (2) Exceptions Art. 51 of the Statute contains three exceptions.222 The first is based on the fact that the Council sometimes adopts acts that do not concern the basic legislative activity of the

220 This means that it cannot be ruled out that some cases involving basic legislative activity will be heard and determined at first instance by the General Court. 221 The European Council and the European Central Bank are now listed as Union institutions: see n. 202. 222 Art. 51 of the Statute provides By way of derogation from the rule laid down in Article 256(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, jurisdiction shall be reserved to the Court of Justice: (a) in actions referred to in Articles 263 and 265 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union which are brought by a Member State against: (i) a legislative act, an act of the European Parliament, of the European Council or of the Council, or against a failure to act by one or more of those institutions, except for: - decisions taken by the Council under the third subparagraph of Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; - acts of the Council adopted pursuant to a Council regulation concerning measures to protect trade within the meaning of Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; - acts of the Council by which the Council exercises implementing powers in accordance with Article 291(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. (ii) an act of, or a failure to act by, the Commission under Article 331(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;

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42 THE UNION JUDICIAL SYSTEM Union. Reserving actions in relation to such acts to the Court of Justice would not be in conformity with the aim pursued by the changes made to the Statute. Art. 51 of the Statute therefore provides that the General Court is to have jurisdiction to hear and determine at first instance actions brought by a Member State concerning acts or failures to act of the Council in the field of State aid (Art. 108(2), third subpara. TFEU), with respect to implementing measures to protect trade (within the meaning of Art. 207 TFEU), as well as with respect to acts by which the Council exercises implementing powers in accordance with Art. 291(2) TFEU.223 Second, action by the Commission may constitute basic legislative activity. The review of the legality of such acts or of a failure on the part of the Commission to adopt such an act would therefore logically fall within the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice at first and last instance. Accordingly, Art. 51 of the Statute provides that the Court of Justice is to have jurisdiction to hear and determine actions brought by Member States against an act of or failure to act by the Commission under the first paragraph of Art. 331 TFEU relating to enhanced cooperation. Third, the Court of Justice hears actions for annulment brought by a Member State against an act of the Commission relating to the execution of a judgment of the Court delivered under Art. 260(2) or Art. 260(3) TFEU.224

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(3) Position of the Committee of the Regions Under Art. 51 of the Statute, jurisdiction has not been reserved to the Court of Justice for actions brought by an institution of the Union or a Member State against an act or failure to act by a Union body, office, or agency.225 Moreover, as the Committee of the Regions is not ‘an institution of the Union’, the action for annulment that it brings should be decided at first instance by the General Court. When the Committee of the Regions brings an action against a legislative act of the European Parliament and of the Council on the basis of the second paragraph of Art. 8 of Protocol (No. 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, it can be questioned

(b) in actions referred to in Articles 263 and 265 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union which are brought by an institution of the Union against a legislative act, an act of the European Parliament, of the European Council, of the Council, of the Commission or of the European Central Bank, or against a failure to act by one or more of those institutions; (c) in actions referred to in Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union which are brought by a Member State against an act of the Commission relating to a failure to comply with a judgment delivered by the Court under the second subparagraph of Article 260(2), or the second subparagraph of Article 260(3), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

223 For an implementing decision of the Council not falling into this category, see C-521/15, Spain v Council, 2017, paras 39–54 (involving an action for annulment of fines imposed on a Member State for having manipulated statistics within the meaning of Art. 8 of Regulation (EU) No. 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area (OJ 2011 L306/1)). 224 Statute, Art. 51(c). 225 See T-53/18, Germany v ECHA, 2019; T-127/20, France v ECHA, 2021.

Allocation of Jurisdiction among the Union Courts 43 whether such a matter is not of constitutional importance to the European Union and should not be decided by the Court of Justice. (4) Infringement actions and preliminary references Since the changes to the Statute did not bear on infringement actions226 or preliminary references227, the Court of Justice presently continues to hold exclusive jurisdiction in this respect (at first and last instance). (5) Overview On the basis of the Treaties, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, and Art. 51 of the Statute, the current allocation of jurisdiction between the Court of Justice and the General Court is as follows: The Court of Justice has jurisdiction with regard to: – infringement actions (Arts 258–260 TFEU); – preliminary references (Art. 267 TFEU); – actions for annulment (Art. 263 TFEU) lodged by o an institution of the Union against a legislative act, an act of the European Parliament, of the European Council, of the Council, of the Commission, or of the European Central Bank; o a Member State against a legislative act, an act of the European Parliament, of the European Council, or of the Council, with the exception of actions relating to decisions taken by the Council in the field of State aid under Art. 108(2), third subpara. TFEU; acts of the Council adopted pursuant to a Council regulation concerning measures to protect trade within the meaning of Art. 207 TFEU, and acts of the Council by which the Council exercises implementing powers in accordance with Art. 291(2) TFEU; o a Member State against the Commission under Art. 331(1) TFEU relating to enhanced cooperation; o a Member State against acts of the Commission relating to a failure to comply with a judgment of the Court delivered under Art. 260(2) or Art. 260(3) TFEU; – actions for failure to act (Art. 265 TFEU) lodged by o an institution of the Union against a failure to act by one or more of the following institutions: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the Commission, or the European Central Bank; o a Member State against a failure to act by one or more of the following institutions: the European Parliament, the European Council, or the Council, 226 A proposal by the Court of Justice relating to the partial transfer to the General Court of infringement proceedings was not accepted by the Union legislature. See Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2019/629 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 amending Protocol (No. 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, fifth recital. 227 See, however, Request submitted by the Court of Justice pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 281 [TFEU], with a view to amending Protocol (No. 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, available on the Court’s website (under ‘Institution’, ‘Various documents’).

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44 THE UNION JUDICIAL SYSTEM with the exception of actions relating to the Council’s failure to adopt a decision in the field of State aid under Art. 108(2), third subpara. TFEU, the Council’s failure to adopt an act pursuant to a Council regulation concerning measures to protect trade within the meaning of Art. 207 TFEU, and the Council’s failure to exercise its implementing powers in accordance with Art. 291(2) TFEU; o a Member State against a failure to act by the Commission under Art. 331(1) TFEU relating to enhanced cooperation; – actions based on Art. 271 (a)–(d) TFEU which concern disputes regarding the fulfilment by Member States of obligations under the Statute of the European Investment Bank (EIB), measures adopted by the Board of Governors and of the Board of Directors of the EIB, and the fulfilment by national central banks of obligations within the framework of the monetary Union; – actions based on Art. 273 TFEU concerning any dispute between Member States which relates to the subject-matter of the Treaties, submitted to the Court under a special agreement between the parties; – actions based on Art. 269 TFEU relating to the legality of acts adopted by the European Council or by the Council pursuant to Art. 7 TEU; – appeals against decisions of the General Court (Art. 256(1), second subpara. TFEU); – review of decisions which the General Court took on appeal against decisions of specialized courts (Art. 256(2), second subpara. TFEU).228 The General Court has jurisdiction with regard to: – actions for annulment (Art. 263 TFEU) lodged by o natural or legal persons;229 o the Committee of the Regions;230 o a Member State against the Commission (unless the action concerns an act by the Commission under Art. 331(1) TFEU relating to enhanced cooperation); o a Member State against the Council relating to decisions in the field of State aid under Art. 108(2), third subpara. TFEU; o a Member State against acts of the Council adopted pursuant to a Council regulation concerning measures to protect trade within the meaning of Art. 207 TFEU;

228 The review procedure has ceased to be operational for the time being. 229 Regional and local entities of Member States and third States fall within this category. As regards regional and local entities, see C-352/19 P, Région de Bruxelles-Capitale v Commission, 2020. As regards third States, see C- 872/19 P, Venezuela v Council, 2021, paras 45–53, stating that the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, as a State with international legal personality, must be regarded as a ‘legal person’ within the meaning of Art. 263, fourth para. TFEU. See further para. 7.84. 230 The Committee of the Regions may bring an action for annulment under Art. 263 TFEU for the purpose of protecting its prerogatives. See Art. 263, third para. TFEU. See paras 7.80–7.81.

Allocation of Jurisdiction among the Union Courts 45

o a Member State against acts of the Council by which the latter exercises implementing powers in accordance with Art. 291(2) TFEU; o a Member State against the European Central Bank, or a Union body, office, or agency; o an institution of the Union against acts of a Union body, office, or agency; – actions for failure to act (Art. 265 TFEU) lodged by o natural or legal persons;231 o a Member State against the Commission (unless the action concerns a failure to act by the Commission under Art. 331(1) TFEU); o a Member State against the Council relating to a failure to adopt a decision in the field of State aid under Art. 108(2), third subpara. TFEU; o a Member State against the Council relating to a failure to adopt an act pursuant to a Council regulation concerning measures to protect trade within the meaning of Art. 207 TFEU; o a Member State against the Council relating to a failure to exercise its implementing powers in accordance with Art. 291(2) TFEU; o a Member State against the European Central Bank, or a Union body, office, or agency; – actions relating to compensation for non-contractual liability brought against the Union and the European Central Bank (Arts 268 and 340, second and third paras TFEU); – actions pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in a contract concluded by or on behalf of the Union, whether that contract be governed by public or private law (Art. 272 TFEU); – cases brought against the EU Intellectual Property Office relating to EU trade marks232 and designs233 and cases brought against the Community Plant Variety Office relating to Community plant variety rights;234 – appeals against decisions of specialized courts (Art. 256(2), first subpara. TFEU); – staff cases (Art. 270 TFEU).235

231 Regional and devolved authorities of Member States and third States fall within this category: see, by way of analogy, n. 229. 232 Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154/1). 233 Council Regulation (EC) No. 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community designs (OJ 2002 L3/1), as amended. 234 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2100/94 of 27 July 1994 on Community plant variety rights (OJ 1994 L227/1), as amended. 235 Where the protocol establishing a Union institution or body provides that the Court of Justice should be the competent court to hear and determine disputes between that institution or body and its servants, the expression ‘Court of Justice’ is to ‘be interpreted as referring to the [Union] judicature as a whole within the meaning of Art. 7 EC and thus as including the [General Court]’. If such a provision was interpreted ‘as precluding actions by certain servants against certain institutions or organs . . . from the improved system of legal remedies introduced by Decision 88/591 [which is characterized by a two-tier approach] for the same type of dispute, that departure from the general system of legal remedies, for which there is no objective justification, would be in breach of the principle of equal treatment and therefore of a fundamental principle of [Union] law’ (see T-333/99, X v ECB, 2001, paras 40–41).

46 THE UNION JUDICIAL SYSTEM 2.55

2.56

(6) Formal and substantive mistake In addition, mention should be made of Art. 54 of the Statute, which deals with three complications regarding the allocation of jurisdiction as between the Court of Justice and the General Court. First, there is formal mistake: if an application or other procedural document addressed to the General Court is lodged by mistake with the Registrar of the Court of Justice, or vice versa, it is to be transmitted immediately from one Registrar to the other.236 Second, there is substantive mistake: if the General Court finds that it does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine an action in respect of which the Court of Justice has jurisdiction, it is to refer the action to the Court of Justice;237 likewise, where the Court of Justice finds that an action falls within the jurisdiction of the General Court, it is to refer it to the General Court, whereupon that Court may not decline jurisdiction.238 As will be appreciated, the allocation of jurisdiction as between the Court of Justice and the General Court is based on objective grounds insofar as the Court wrongly seized of a case falling within the jurisdiction of the other Court is under an obligation to refer it to that other Court. In case of doubt, the Court of Justice has the last word, since after it has referred a case to the General Court in that way, that Court cannot decline jurisdiction. This system does not detract from the right of the General Court to decline jurisdiction where a case falls outside the sphere of action of the Union judiciary regarded as a whole. (7) Identical cases pending before different courts Third, there is the case where the Court of Justice and the General Court are validly seized of cases in which the object is identical.239 Identity of object will occur where the same relief is sought, the same issue of interpretation is raised, or the validity of the same act is called into question. An example is where a natural or legal person or a Member State brings an action before the General Court against a Union institution for annulment of an act or for failure to act, and another Union institution brings an action against the same act or failure to act before the Court of Justice. Another example is where a natural or legal person or a Member State brings an action for annulment of an act—for example, of a Commission decision approving State aid—before the General Court, while a national court makes a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice relating to the validity of the same act.240 Likewise, the same question of interpretation may be raised before both the General Court and the Court of Justice. 236 Statute, Art. 54, first para. 237 Statute, Art. 54, second para. See T-85/01, IAMA Consulting v Commission (order), 2003, para. 62; T-478/16 AJ II, Frank v Commission (order), 2018, para. 18. 238 Statute, Art. 54, second para. See C-70/04, Swiss Confederation v Commission (order), 2005, paras 23–24; C-406/06, Landtag Schleswig-Holstein v Commission (order), 2007, para. 10; C-269/06, Commission v Translation Centre for the Bodies of the EU (order), 2007, para. 6; C-418/06 P, Belgium v Commission, 2008, para. 22. 239 For some examples, see T-215/07 Donnici v Parliament (order), 2007, para. 12; T-257/04, Poland v Commission, 2009, para. 8; T‑494/08 to T‑500/08 and T‑509/08, Ryanair v Commission, 2010, para. 18. 240 See C-135/16, Georgsmarienhütte and Others, 2018, para. 25. In T-252/20, Silver v Council (order), 2021, paras 23–26, the General Court appears to have adopted a stricter reading of the third paragraph of Art. 54 of the Statute. It stated in para. 24 of that judgment that ‘[i]‌t follows from that provision that the General Court may decline jurisdiction in a case only if both the Court of Justice and the General Court are seised of actions for annulment’.

Allocation of Jurisdiction among the Union Courts 47 The third and fourth paragraphs of Art. 54 of the Statute241 resolve the matter as follows: Where the Court of Justice and the General Court are seised of cases in which the same relief is sought, the same issue of interpretation is raised or the validity of the same act is called in question, the General Court may, after hearing the parties, stay the proceedings before it until such time as the Court of Justice has delivered judgment or, where the action is one brought pursuant to Art. 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, may decline jurisdiction so as to allow the Court of Justice to rule on such actions. In the same circumstances, the Court of Justice may also decide to stay the proceedings before it; in that event, the proceedings before the General Court shall continue. Where a Member State and an institution of the Union are challenging the same act, the General Court shall decline jurisdiction so that the Court of Justice may rule on those applications.

This solution calls for a number of observations. The General Court is obliged to decline jurisdiction only in one instance, namely, where a Member State (before the General Court) and an institution (before the Court of Justice) contest the same act. For the rest, the General Court cannot be compelled to decline jurisdiction (se dessaisir) or to stay proceedings.242 This is a reflection of the judicial independence of the two Courts, expressed by the words ‘the General Court may’. However, if the General Court decides to make use of that possibility, the Court of Justice can prevent it from doing so by staying proceedings on its part, thereby causing the procedure to have to go through the General Court. In the event that the General Court has already declined jurisdiction, the Court of Justice can refer the case back to it by staying the parallel proceedings.

241 Council Decision 2004/407/EC, Euratom of 26 April 2004 amending Arts 51 and 54 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice (OJ 2004 L132/5; corrigendum in OJ 2004 L194/3). In line with the changes made by the Lisbon Treaty regarding the names of the Union Courts, further modifications were made to the Statute thereafter. 242 The expression ‘decline jurisdiction’ (‘se dessaisir’ in the French language version) in the third para. of Art. 54 of the Statute does not have the same meaning as it has in the second para. of Art. 54 (where the French language version reads ‘décliner sa compétence’). Where the General Court stays proceedings, an appeal will not lie against that decision (see C-366/03, C-368/03, C-390/03, C-391/03, and C-394/03 P, Associazione Bancaria Italiana and Others v Commission (order), 2003).

3 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE: THE REFERENCE FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING I. General Overview A. Introduction The primary responsibility of national courts for the correct application of Union law is rounded off by the preliminary ruling procedure, which, in the words of the Court of Justice, is ‘the keystone of the judicial system established by the Treaties [ . . . ], which, by setting up a dialogue between one court and another, specifically between the Court of Justice and the courts and tribunals of the Member States, has the object of securing uniformity in the interpretation of EU law, thereby serving to ensure its consistency, its full effect and its autonomy as well as, ultimately, the particular nature of the law established by the Treaties’.1 Art. 267 TFEU empowers the Court of Justice to ‘give preliminary rulings’ on the interpretation of Union law2 and on the validity of acts of the Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies.3 Any court or tribunal of a Member State is entitled to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice.4 However, if a question regarding the validity or the interpretation of Union law is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal is obliged to bring the matter before the Court of Justice.5

1 C‑558/18 and C‑563/18, Miasto Łowicz, 2020, para. 55; C-824/18, A.B. and Others, 2021, para. 90; C-791/19, Commission v Poland, 2021, para. 222. See also Opinion 2/13, Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 2014, para. 176; C-614/14, Ognyanov, 2016, para. 15; C-284/16, Achmea, 2018, para. 37; C-234/17, XC, 2018, para. 41; C-619/18, Commission v Poland, 2019, para. 45; C-132/20, BN and Others, 2022, para. 71. This description of the preliminary reference procedure has evolved over time since it was used by the Court for the first time in 166/73, Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf (‘Rheinmühlen I’), 1974, para. 2. 2 Ch. 6. 3 Ch. 10. But see Art. 19(3) TEU, which refers in more abbreviated fashion to ‘acts adopted by the institutions’. 4 While Art. 256(3), first subpara. TFEU provides that the General Court may be conferred jurisdiction to deliver preliminary rulings in ‘specific areas’ as laid down by the Statute. See para. 2.53. 5 See paras 3.39–3.45.

EU Procedural Law. Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak, Oxford University Press. © Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833086.003.0003

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50 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE

B. Objectives of the preliminary ruling procedure 3.02

Under established case-law, the preliminary ruling procedure enshrined in Art. 267 TFEU embodies a two-fold need: to ensure the utmost uniformity in the application of Union law and to establish for that purpose effective cooperation between the Court of Justice and national courts.6 That cooperation requires ‘the national court and the Court of Justice, both keeping within their respective jurisdiction, and with the aim of ensuring that [Union] law is applied in a uniform manner, to make direct and complementary contributions to the working out of a decision’.7 In other words, there are twin aims of the preliminary ruling procedure. First, this procedure underlies the strong relationship of judicial cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts. The preliminary ruling procedure constitutes an important ‘judicial dialogue’8 between the Court of Justice and the national courts that encompasses all levels of the judicial hierarchy in the various Member States, thereby ensuring ‘ground level access’ for citizens’ assertion of Union law rights at their first point of contact with the judicial system of a particular Member State.9 Second, the preliminary ruling procedure contributes to the uniform application of Union law, since it ensures that Union law is applied the same way throughout the Union legal order.

C. Sole power of the Court of Justice to declare a Union act invalid 3.03

The twin aims of the preliminary ruling procedure hold good no matter whether the ruling is sought on the interpretation of Union law and/or on the validity of a Union 6 See C-221/88, Busseni, 1990, para. 13 (referring to the relevant provisions of the E(E)C Treaty and the EAEC Treaty). 7 16/65, Schwarze, 1965 ECR 877, 886 (then referring to the E(E)C Treaty). As the Court has consistently held, the preliminary ruling procedure enshrined in Art. 267 TFEU is an ‘instrument of cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts, by means of which the Court provides the national courts with the points of interpretation of EU law which they need in order to decide the disputes before them’: see C‑924/19 PPU and C‑925/19 PPU, FMS, 2020, para. 167; C-194/19, H.A., 2021, para. 21; C-184/20, OT, 2022, para. 47; C-675/21, Strong Charon, 2023, para. 27. It does not install a hierarchy between the Court of Justice and the national courts: see, in that regard, V. Skouris, ‘Stellung und Bedeutung des Vorabentscheidungsverfahrens im europäischen Rechtsschutzsystem’ (2008) EuGRZ 344. 8 See further N. Jääskinen, ‘Judicial Dialogue between National Supreme Administrative Courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union’ in K. Lenaerts, J.-C. Bonichot, H. Kanninen, C. Naômé, and P. Pohjankoski (eds), An Ever Changing Union? Perspective on the Future of EU Law in Honour of Allan Rosas (Bloomsbury, 2019) 129; K. Lenaerts, ‘Upholding the Rule of Law through Judicial Dialogue’ (2019) Y.E.L. 1; K. Lenaerts, ‘Curtea de Justiţie şi instanţele judecătoreşti naţionale: un dialog întemeiat pe încredere reciprocă şi pe independenţa sistemului judiciar/The Court of Justice and National Courts: A Dialogue based on Mutual Trust and Judicial Independence’ (2020) Revista Romana de Drept European 11. For a critical appraisal of the preliminary reference procedure as a dialogue between judges, see R. van Gestel and J. de Poorter, In the Court We Trust. Cooperation, Coordination and Collaboration between the ECJ and Supreme Administrative Courts (CUP, 2019) 200–203. 9 Note that the judicial dialogue works both ways and that the interpretation of Union law is also influenced by national courts and national law: see, in that regard, V. Skouris, ‘L’influence du droit national et la jurisprudence des juridictions des États membres sur l’interprétation du droit communautaire’ (2008) Il diritto dell’Unione europea 239; J.-C. Bonichot, ‘L’influence des droits nationaux à l’élaboration de la norme jurisprudentielle communautaire’ (2009) Justice & Cassation 233; T. von Danwitz, ‘Sur les conditions de fonctionnement du processus jurisprudentiel à la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne’ (2010) Il diritto dell’Unione europea 775.

General Overview 51 act.10 This was the principal reason that prompted the Court in the landmark case of Foto-Frost11 to declare, with regard to the application of what is now Art. 267 TFEU, that it has the sole power to declare an act of a Union institution invalid. This is because the uniform application of Union law is particularly necessary when the validity of a Union act is at stake. Divergences of view between courts in the Member States as to the validity of acts of Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies would be liable to place in jeopardy the very unity of the Union legal order and detract from the fundamental requirement of legal certainty.12 Naturally, this does not alter the fact that reviewing the validity of acts of the Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies is essentially a control of the legality of such acts, which is primarily designed to protect the rights of individuals.13

D. Topics to be discussed A request for a preliminary ruling takes the form of a question put to the Court of Justice, which is subject to a number of rules. First, the initiative of referring the question must emanate from ‘a court or tribunal of a Member State’, either of its own motion or acting on a request made by one of the parties in proceedings pending before it, and national (procedural) law may not put impediments in the way of the right to seek a preliminary ruling, which every national court or tribunal has by virtue of Union law.14 Second, as a consequence, the relevance of the question falls to be determined by the national court, albeit only within certain limits which the Court of Justice has placed upon its competence to answer questions referred for a preliminary ruling. Third, there are issues relating to which national courts must, as opposed to may, refer questions for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice. Under the third paragraph of Art. 267 TFEU, a ‘court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law’ is in principle obliged to refer questions for a preliminary ruling which are raised in a case pending before it, save in certain circumstances as set forth in the case-law of the Court of Justice. Finally, issues relating to requests for a preliminary ruling in the context of composite administrative procedures are addressed. These four issues will be considered in turn in the main parts of this chapter.

10 See 66/80, International Chemical Corporation, 1981, para. 11. As regards CFSP acts, see paras 6.05, 10.04. 11 See 314/85, Foto-Frost, 1987, para. 17. 12 See 314/85, Foto-Frost, 1987, para. 15. This case is discussed further at paras 3.56–3.58. 13 See 294/83, Les Verts v Parliament, 1986, para. 23. 14 See 166/73, Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf (‘Rheinmühlen I’), 1974, para. 2; C-312/93, Peterbroeck, 1995, para. 13; C-210/06, Cartesio, 2008, para. 94; C-188/10 and C-189/10, Melki and Abdeli, 2010, para. 42; C-173/09, Elchinov, 2010, paras 25–28; C-136/12, Consiglio nazionale dei geologi, 2013, para. 36.

3.04

52 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE

II. The Initiative for Requesting a Preliminary Ruling A. What is a ‘court or tribunal of a Member State’? 3.05

(1) Vaassen criteria Generally, the expression ‘court or tribunal of a Member State’ set out in Art. 267 TFEU does not raise any difficulties. Where a Member State regards a public body as a ‘court or tribunal’, Union law normally accepts it as such.15 This is because in that case the body manifestly fulfils the criteria which the Court of Justice has formulated—which are known as the Vaassen criteria, after the case in which they were first formulated16— in order to confer on a body which is not considered a court or tribunal under national law that capacity under Union law with a view to the application of the preliminary ruling procedure.17 A ‘court or tribunal’ under Art. 267 TFEU is: (1) a body (2) which is established by law, (3) permanent and independent,18 (4) charged with the settlement of disputes defined in general terms, (5) bound by rules governing inter partes proceedings similar to those used by the ordinary courts of law,19 (6) acts as the ‘proper judicial body’ for the 15 But see paras 2.03, 3.06. 16 See 61/65, Vaassen (née Göbbels), 1966 ECR 261, 273. Given the Court’s standard formula (i.e. ‘The Court takes into account a number of factors, such as . . .’), these criteria may not be exhaustive, and some criteria may weigh more than others depending on the circumstances of the case. This line of case-law should be distinguished from the case-law dealing with the question whether, under certain regulations regarding cross-border cooperation in judicial matters, a body other than a court or tribunal can be regarded as a court for the purposes of that specific regulation, as the term ‘court’ defined in those regulations has a broader meaning than the term ‘court’ in Art. 267 TFEU (see C-387/20, OKR (order), 2021, para. 31). See C-484/15, Ibrica Zulfikarpašić, 2017 (whether a Croatian notary qualifies as a court under Regulation No. 805/2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims); C-551/15, Pula Parking, 2017 (whether a Croatian notary qualifies as a court under Regulation No. 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters). 17 This presumption only applies for the purposes of assessing the admissibility of an order for reference under Art. 267 TFEU. It does not necessarily imply that the conditions for the appointment of the judges making up the referring court comply with Art. 19(1), second subpara. TEU and Art. 47 of the Charter. Moreover, this presumption may be rebutted where a final judicial decision of a national or international court or tribunal has concluded that the referring court is not an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law within the meaning of Art. 19(1), second subpara. TEU and Art. 47 of the Charter. See C-132/20, Getin Noble Bank, 2022, paras 66–75; C-644/20, W.J., 2022, paras 45–51; C-698/20, Gmina Wieliszew, 2022, paras 56–62. 18 See C-54/96, Dorsch Consult, 1997, para. 23; C-517/09, RTL Belgium, 2010. As regards the ‘independence’ requirement, see further para. 3.06. A similar requirement applies to ‘issuing judicial authorities’ within the meaning of Art. 6(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ 2002 L190/1). See C‑508/18 and C‑82/19 PPU, OG, 2019, para. 74. Where an issuing judicial authority is not a public prosecutor but a court or a tribunal of a Member State, the Court has made an explicit link between its case-law regarding an ‘issuing judicial authority’ within the meaning of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA and the notion of ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU: see C‑354/20 PPU and C‑412/20 PPU, Openbaar Ministerie, 2020, para. 44. Similar requirements apply to ‘executing judicial authorities’ within the meaning of Framework Decision 2002/584: see C-510/19, AZ, 2020, paras 54–56. 19 In the case of Dorsch Consult (C-54/96, Dorsch Consult, 1997, paras 22–38), the Court held that ‘the requirement that the procedure before the hearing body concerned must be inter partes is not an absolute requirement’, after which it found that the adjudicating body, the Federal German Vergabeüberwachungsausschuss des Bundes (the Federal Public Procurement Awards Supervisory Board)—a statutory administrative body supervising the award of procurement contracts—had to hear the parties before making any determination (see para. 31). The Court of Justice held on this basis that the board in question was a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU; compare AG Tesauro Opinion in that case, expressing doubts as to that body’s compliance with the Vaassen criteria. The relativity of the inter partes requirement has been confirmed throughout the years (see C-210/06,

The Initiative for Requesting a Preliminary Ruling 53 disputes in question, which means that parties must be required to apply to the court or tribunal for the settlement of their dispute and its determination must be binding,20 and (7) is bound to apply rules of law.21 (2) Importance of the independence requirement In the context of Art. 267 TFEU, the Court’s case-law on the independence requirement focused initially on verifying whether the referring body was an authority acting as a third party in relation to the authority which adopted the contested decision.22 This required the absence of any organizational or functional links between the referring adjudicating body and the authority against whose decision an appeal was brought before that body. This was, for example, clearly not so with respect to the Directeur des Contributions Directes et des Accises (Director of Direct Taxation and Excise Duties) of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, which was in charge of the revenue departments that had made the contested tax assessment, while being at the same time the authority before which complaints against such assessments could be submitted.23 Furthermore, if the matter were to come before the Luxembourg Conseil d’Etat (Council of State) on

Cartesio, 2008, para. 56; C-14/08, Roda Golf & Beach Resort, 2009, para. 33; C-678/18, Procureur-Generaal bij de Hoge Raad der Nederlanden, 2019, paras 21–27; C-658/18, UX, 2020, paras 63–64; C-66/20, XK, 2021, para. 37). Following Dorsch Consult, the Court has regarded other types of public procurement bodies as satisfying the Vaassen criteria: see C-411/00, Felix Swoboda, 2002, paras 25–28 (the Austrian Bundesvergabeamt, Federal Procurement Office, held to be a court or tribunal within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU; upheld in later cases: see citations in C-454/06, pressetext Nachrichtenagentur, AG Kokott Opinion, 2008, points 30–31); C-92/00, HI, 2002, paras 24–28 (the Austrian Vergabekontrollsenat des Landes Wien, Public Procurement Review Chamber of the Vienna Region, held to be a court or tribunal within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU; see also C-393/06, Ing. Aigner, 2008); C-296/15, Medisanus, 2017, paras 32–38 (the Slovenian State Public Procurement Tribunal held to be a court or tribunal within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU). 20 See C-54/96, Dorsch Consult, 1997, paras 27–29; C-195/98, Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, 2000, paras 21–32. The requirement is at times worded differently as ‘proceedings intended to lead to a decision of a judicial nature’ (see C-649/19, IR, 2021, para. 34; C-722/21, Frontera Capital (order), 2022, para. 13). This requirement should be interpreted broadly and encompasses the whole procedure leading to the referring court’s judgment (see C-347/18, Salvoni, 2019, para. 27). See C-511/14, Servizi, 2016, para. 29: procedure for the certification of a court decision as a European Enforcement Order considered to be a part of the whole procedure culminating in a decision of a judicial nature. Similarly, in regard of a certificate of enforceability under Regulation No. 1215/2012: C-579/17, Gradbeništvo Korana, 2019, paras 33–42. However, an authority recognizing and executing a European Investigation Order does not render a decision of a judicial nature within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU (see C-66/20, XK, 2021, paras 36–46). Regarding bodies that act both in judicial and non-judicial capacities, a request for a preliminary ruling will only be admissible if made in the context of a judicial procedure: see C‑58/13 and C‑59/13, Torresi, 2014, paras 26–29. Moreover, the requirement that parties must be required to apply to the body does not require that no alternatives exist, but rather that the jurisdiction of that body does not depend on the agreement of the parties and that its decision is binding upon the parties: see C-203/14, Consorci Sanitari del Maresme, 2015, paras 22–25; C-503/15, Panicello, 2017, paras 31–32; C-546/16, Montte, 2018, paras 23–24; C-403/21, NV Construct, 2023, paras 41–43. 21 See 61/65, Vaassen (née Göbbels), 1966 ECR 261, 273; C-9/97 and C-118/97, Jokela and Pitkäranta, 1998, para. 18; C-462/19, Asociación Nacional de Empresas Estibadoras y Consignatarios de Buques, 2020, para. 36; see also C-407/98, Abrahamsson and Anderson, 2000, paras 28–38 (the Swedish Överklagandenämnden för Högskolan, which undertakes an independent examination of appeals lodged against decisions on appointments taken in universities and higher educational institutions, held to be a court or tribunal within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU); C-246/05, Häupl, 2007 (The Oberster Patent-und Markensenat, Supreme Patent and Trade Mark Adjudication Body of Vienna, Austria held to be a court or tribunal within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU); compare C-161/03, CAFOM and Samsung Electronics France (order), 2003, paras 10–17 (the French Commission de conciliation et d’expertise douanière held not to be a court or tribunal within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU). 22 See C-516/99, Schmid, 2002, para. 36; C-506/04, Wilson, 2006, para. 49. 23 See C-24/92, Corbiau, 1993, para. 16.

3.06

54 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE appeal, the Directeur des Contributions would be the defendant, which was regarded as confirming the status of a party to proceedings and not an authority separate from the parties to the proceedings as a neutral outsider.24 Consequently, the Court, of its own motion,25 refused to answer a question referred for a preliminary ruling by the Directeur des Contributions on the grounds of not constituting a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU.26 Further to this, in Schmid,27 the Court rejected questions submitted to it by the Berufungssenat V der Finanzlandesdirektion (Fifth Appeal Chamber of the Regional Finance Authority) for Vienna, Niederösterreich, and Burgenland because of organizational and functional links between the Appeal Chamber and the regional tax authority which adopts the decisions that can be contested before the Appeal Chamber, inter alia, because officials of that tax authority were sitting in the Appeal Chamber. In this line of case-law, the analysis focused essentially on the question whether the authority which had taken the contested decision in the concrete case could, in one way or another, influence or exert pressure on the authority deciding the appeal against the decision.28 The Court appeared to be less concerned with more abstract aspects of the requirement of independence, such as sufficient guarantees against removal. This is illustrated by the judgment in Gabalfrisa,29 in which the Court answered questions from a Spanish Tribunal Económico-Administrativo Regional ((TEAR) Regional Tax Tribunal), after having assessed whether those TEARs complied with the Vaassen criteria. In relation to the independence requirement, the Court stated that the applicable rules ensured a separation of functions between the departments of the tax authorities responsible for management, clearance, and recovery, and the TEARs, before which complaints against the decisions of those departments could be brought and which did not receive any instruction from the tax authority.30 The Court found these safeguards sufficient to guarantee the independence of the TEARs in relation to the tax

24 See C-24/92, Corbiau, 1993, para. 16; see also C-394/11 Belov, 2013, para. 49. 25 The Commission and the Luxembourg Government, which alone submitted observations to the Court pursuant to Art. 23 of the Statute, did not take issue with the competence of the body requesting the preliminary ruling in this case. Indeed, there have been cases in which, as noted by the Advocates General, no reservations, let alone formal pleas, are put forward as regards whether the particular body can be regarded as a court or tribunal of a Member State under Art. 267 TFEU and thus the Court assesses the admissibility of such body of its own motion. See C-259/04, Emanuel, AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer Opinion, 2006, point 24; C-246/05, Häupl, AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer Opinion, 2007, point 21. 26 See C-24/92, Corbiau, 1993, para. 17; see also 150/85, Drake, 1986; C-74/95 and C-129/95, X, 1996, paras 17–20, in which the Court held that the Italian Procura della Repubblica (Office of the Prosecutor of the Republic) could not be regarded as being a court or tribunal within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU on the grounds that its role in the main proceedings in the case in question was not to rule on an issue in complete independence but, acting as prosecutor in the proceedings, to submit that issue, if appropriate, for consideration by the competent judicial body. By contrast, a national judge in charge of preliminary inquiries in criminal proceedings acts in a judicial capacity, so that they must be regarded as a ‘court or tribunal of a Member State’: see C-54/94 and C-74/94, Cacchiarelli and Stanghellini, 1995; C-105/03, Pupino, 2005, para. 22. 27 See C-516/99, Schmid, 2002, paras 34–44. 28 Cases often concerned the situation in which multiple bodies within the same authority were involved in the decision-making process, and the Court focused on whether these bodies were sufficiently independent from each other. 29 See C-110/98 to C-147/98, Gabalfrisa and Others, 2000. But see further n. 46 and accompanying text. 30 See C-110/98 to C-147/98, Gabalfrisa and Others, 2000, para. 39.

The Initiative for Requesting a Preliminary Ruling 55 authorities.31 It is noteworthy that the Court did not consider the fact that, according to the applicable rules at the time, both the president and the members of the TEARs could be removed from office by a decision of the Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance.32 Gradually, the Court took a broader approach and put more emphasis on the rules regarding appointment and removal.33 Thus, in Dorsch Consult,34 the Court considered that the members of the referring body enjoyed the same guarantees against removal from office as judges. In Köllensperger,35 the Court took into account that the law applicable to the referring body contained very specific provisions on the circumstances in which members of that body must withdraw. In Pilato,36 the Court elaborated further on this criterion, ruling that the independence of the body making a reference ‘presumes that the body is protected against external intervention or pressure liable to jeopardise the independent judgment of its members as regards proceedings before them’ and that ‘the case-law requires, inter alia, that dismissals of members of that body should be determined by express legislative provisions’. This culminated in the well-known formula that the requirement of independence has both an external and an internal aspect,37 and ‘that those guarantees of independence and impartiality require rules, particularly as regards the composition of the body and the appointment, length of service and the grounds for abstention, rejection and dismissal of its members, in order to dismiss any reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to the imperviousness of that body to external factors and its neutrality with respect to the interests before it’.38 31 See C-110/98 to C-147/98, Gabalfrisa and Others, 2000, para. 40. 32 See C-110/98 to C-147/98, Gabalfrisa and Others, 2000, para. 23. 33 See C-109/07, Pilato (order), 2008, para. 23. 34 See C-54/96, Dorsch Consult, 1997, para. 36; C-9/97 and C-118/97, Jokela, 1998, para. 20. 35 See C-103/97, Köllensperger, 1999, para. 22; see also C-17/00, De Coster, 2001, para. 20, in which the Court of Justice considered that the Rechtsprekend College van het Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest/Collège juridictionnel de la Région de Bruxelles-Capitale (Judicial Board of the Brussels-Capital region), which adjudicates disputes relating to the legality of municipal taxes, constituted a court or tribunal for the purposes of Art. 267 TFEU; compare C-17/00, De Coster, AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer Opinion, 2001, points 102–119 (reaching the opposite conclusion). 36 See C-109/07, Pilato (order), 2008, paras 23–24. 37 See C-506/04, Wilson, 2006, paras 49–53, in which the Court determined that the appeal procedure provided for under Luxembourg law against decisions regarding the registration of foreign lawyers did not provide a remedy before a court or tribunal as required by Art. 9 of Directive 98/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 to facilitate practice of the profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State other than that in which the qualification was obtained (OJ 1998 L77/36) for lack of independence. 38 See C-109/07, Pilato (order), 2008, para. 24, in reference to C-506/04, Wilson, 2006, para. 53, in which this formula was used for the first time. For an example, see the Belgian Collège d’autorisation et de contrôle du Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel (the Licensing and Control Authority of the Broadcasting Authority) which could not be considered to be a tribunal or a court within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU, since neither the structural organization of the Broadcasting Authority nor the tasks assigned to its various bodies guaranteed both external and internal independence. It appeared that the investigating body of the Broadcasting Authority, which brought the case against a broadcaster before the Licensing and Control Authority, was overseen by the Bureau of the Broadcasting Authority. The members of that Bureau were also sitting in the Licensing and Control Authority. Furthermore, the Bureau represented the Licensing and Control Authority in appeal proceedings against its decisions before national courts. In view of these elements, the Court decided, contrary to what the Licensing and Control Authority had stated in its order for reference, that the Licensing and Control Authority was not acting as a third party and did thus not qualify as a tribunal or court for the purposes of Art. 267 TFEU (see C-517/09, RTL Belgium, 2010, paras 36–49); see further C-748/19 to C-754/19, WB, 2021, paras 67, 71; C-644/20, W.J., 2022, para. 47; C-403/21, NV Construct, 2023, para. 46.

56 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE The gradual stepping up of the requirement of independence did not mean that the Court no longer accepted references from bodies that are not considered courts or tribunals under national law, as it is exactly the objective of its case-law under Art. 267 TFEU to allow bodies that are not considered to be courts or tribunals under national law to refer questions to the Court, especially where no other Member State bodies can seize the Court by way of a reference for a preliminary ruling.39 Thus, the Court accepted questions from the Spanish Tribunal Català de Contractes del Sector Públic (Catalan Public Sector Contracts Tribunal), which was considered to be an administrative body under national law, as the Tribunal complied with the requirement of independence, inter alia, because its members were appointed on a permanent basis and only ceased to hold office in circumstances expressly provided for by law.40 Similarly, the Court held that the Danish Klagenævnet for Udbud (the Public Procurement Complaints Board) met the requirement of independence because, while that body was composed of judges and lay members, the judges sitting on that board held in any circumstances the majority of the votes and were protected against removal on account of being members of the judiciary.41 The fact that the lay members did not enjoy the same level of protection could not call into question the independence of the referring body.42 Recently, the Court has brought its case-law regarding the independence requirement for the purposes of deciding whether a body is a court or a tribunal within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU in line with its case-law regarding the independence of national courts and tribunals that might be called upon to decide disputes with a Union law element.43 While this is a logical step, as part of the justification for the Court’s rule of law case-law, it means that only a body which strictly meets the requirements of independence can activate the preliminary ruling mechanism.44 Evidence of this can 39 See 246/80, Broekmeulen, 1981, paras 16–17. 40 See C-203/14, Consorci Sanitari del Maresme, 2015, paras 19–20. Note that this was only after serious doubts had arisen during the procedure before the Court regarding the mandatory nature of its jurisdiction as well as the judicial nature of its decisions, which appears from the order to reassign the case to the Grand Chamber, and the decision to hold a hearing: see C-203/14, Consorci Sanitari del Maresme (order), 2015. 41 See C-396/14, MT Højgaard and Züblin, 2016, paras 29–31. 42 See C-396/14, MT Højgaard and Züblin, 2016, para. 31. 43 See C-274/14, Banco de Santander, 2020, para. 50. This does not mean, however, that the Court will undertake an abstract assessment of the independence of the referring body for the purposes of determining the admissibility of a request for a preliminary ruling. In the context of a preliminary reference procedure, the question of the independence of the referring body should be answered in relation to referring court actually deciding the dispute in the main proceedings. Thus, issues relating to the procedures for the appointment of temporary judges are not relevant where such temporary judges are not members of the formation of the referring court (see C-272/19, VQ, 2020, paras 46–50). That being said, issues relating to the personal situation of individuals that sit in the court that made the request will, in principle, not be relevant for the purposes of assessing the admissibility of a request for a preliminary ruling under Art. 267 TFEU. Only in exceptional circumstances will the Court take the position of an individual member of a referring body into account, namely, ‘where a final judicial decision, handed down by a national or international court or tribunal, leads to the conclusion that the judge constituting the referring court is not an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law’ (see C-132/20, BN and Others, 2022, paras 68–74). Nevertheless, it may be necessary for the Court to undertake a different assessment where other factors in addition to the personal situation of the individual judges submitting a request for a preliminary ruling impact on the functioning of the referring court and contribute to undermining its independence and impartiality (see C-132/20, BN and Others, 2022, para. 75); see also, in that regard, C-487/19, W.Ż., 2021, paras 152–154; C- 132/20, BN and Others, AG Bobek Opinion, 2021, points 44–79. 44 See C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, 2018, para. 43. See para. 2.03.

The Initiative for Requesting a Preliminary Ruling 57 be found in Banco de Santander,45 in which the Court declared a reference from the Central Spanish tax tribunal (Tribunal Económico-Administrativo Central (TEAC)) inadmissible because it could not be considered to be a court or a tribunal within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU, whereas, as mentioned above, the Court had previously decided in Gabalfrisa46 that a similar body—a Regional Spanish Tax Tribunal (Tribunal Económico-Administrativo Regional (TEAR)), against whose decisions an appeal lies before the TEAC—did meet the Vaassen criteria and was a court or a tribunal within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU. It should be recalled that, in Gabalfrisa, the Court accepted to answer questions referred to it by a TEAR and expressly stated that the TEARs comply with the independence requirement,47 even though, according to the applicable rules at the time, both the president and the members of the TEARs could be removed from office by a decision of the Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance.48 Almost twenty years later, those same rules, as well as the comparable rules for the TEAC, led the Court to conclude that both the TEAC and the TEARs are not courts or tribunals within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU, since the requirement of independence was not met. First, the Court held that ‘the removal of the President and the other members of the TEAC and of the members of the other TEAs is not limited, as required by the principle of irremovability . . ., to certain exceptional cases reflecting legitimate and compelling grounds that warrant the adoption of such a measure, subject to the principle of proportionality and to the appropriate procedures being followed, such as cases of incapacity or of a serious breach of obligations rendering the individuals concerned unfit for the purposes of carrying out their duties’.49 Second, the Court took issue with an extraordinary appeal procedure before the TEAC, from which it appeared that organizational and functional links existed between the TEAC and the Ministry of the Economy and Finance, making it impossible to regard the TEAC as a third party vis-à-vis the administration.50 Thus, while the Court continues to assess whether the referring adjudicating body and the body that took the contested decision are sufficiently separated from each other— which is akin to the internal aspect of the requirement of independence and linked to impartiality51—concerns regarding the appointment and removal of the members of the referring body, deriving from the external aspect of the requirement of independence, especially the principle of irremovability, have become much more important in the Court’s analysis throughout the years.52 45 See C-274/14, Banco de Santander, 2020. 46 See C-110/98 to C-147/98, Gabalfrisa and Others, 2000. 47 See C-110/98 to C-147/98, Gabalfrisa and Others, 2000, paras 39–40. 48 See C-110/98 to C-147/98, Gabalfrisa, 2000, para. 23. 49 C-274/14, Banco de Santander, 2020, para. 67. 50 See C-274/14, Banco de Santander, 2020, paras 73–76. 51 The fact that a referring court submits questions to the Court regarding its own status, inter alia, its remuneration, does not cast doubt on the independence of the referring court: see C-658/18, UX, 2020, para. 56. 52 See C-476/16, Air Serbia and Kondić (order), 2017, paras 22–26; C-503/15, Panicello, 2017, paras 40–41; C- 272/19, VQ, 2020, paras 51–60; C-658/18, UX, 2020, paras 47–49; C-55/20, Minister Sprawiedliwości, 2022, paras 62–79; C-403/21, NV Construct, 2023, paras 49–51.

58 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE 3.07

(3) Administrative bodies Bodies that act in an administrative capacity but not as a judicial authority, or that only submit opinions to the public authorities with a view to their taking a decision, are not entitled to refer questions for a preliminary ruling.53 Examples are bodies of professional organizations deciding on admission to a profession54 or a consultative committee whose duty is to submit reasoned—but not binding—opinions to the Treasury Minister on the sanctions to be imposed by that minister on persons infringing national legislation relating to transfers of foreign exchange.55 In both cases, there is the possibility of an appeal after the final administrative decision to a judicial body that could, if necessary, make a reference for a preliminary ruling. In addition, none of the bodies concerned could be regarded as a ‘third party’, either because they took the first—ex hypothesi subsequently contested—decision themselves, or because they were directly

53 See C-453/20, CityRail, 2022, paras 44–71. Importantly, the fact that national law may deem certain functions as administrative is not decisive. For example, an indictment division of an appellate court which is charged with giving opinions on requests for extradition that are deemed to constitute the exercise of administrative powers under national law constitutes a court within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU provided the requisite criteria are satisfied: see C-296/08 PPU, Santesteban Goicoechea, 2008, paras 39–42. For that matter, the Court has admitted references from quasi-judicial bodies situated, strictly speaking, outside the judicial system of a Member State, as in the case of Austrian independent administrative tribunals (Senate): see C-205/08, Umweltanwalt voor Kärnten, 2009, paras 34–39 (deeming the Austrian Unweltsenat (Environment Tribunal) to fall within the definition of court or tribunal of a Member State); C-195/06, Österreichischer Rundfunk, 2007, paras 10–13, 20–22 (deeming the Austrian Bundeskommunikationssenat, a body of last administrative instance set up by the Federal Chancellery to monitor the decisions of certain telecommunications and broadcasting authorities, to fall within the definition of court or tribunal of a Member State); compare C-195/06, Österreichischer Rundfunk, AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer Opinion, 2007, points 24–41. For an analysis, see J.T. Nowak, case note (2013) S.E.W. 557–564. 54 See 65/77, Razanatsimba, 1977, para. 5; 138/80, Borker (order), 1980, para. 4; see also C-178/99, Salzmann, 2001, paras 11–22, in which it was held that the Austrian Bezirksgericht (District Court) does not constitute a court or tribunal where, acting as an administrative body, it considers an application for registration of a contract of sale of land in the land register. This is because, in that capacity, it does not decide a dispute but merely checks that applications for registration of titles to property in the land register comply with the conditions laid down by law; C-182/00, Lutz and Others, 2002, paras 11–15: when ruling on obligations to disclose annual accounts and the annual report, the Austrian Landesgericht (Regional Court), does not decide any dispute and therefore does not constitute a court or tribunal within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU when acting in that capacity (see also AG Geelhoed Opinion to the same effect). However, not all bodies deciding on the admission to a profession are considered to be administrative bodies. For example, the Oberste Berufungs-und Disziplinarkommission (Appeals and Disciplinary Board) of the Austrian Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional Court), ruling on appeal of a decision of the Rechtsanwaltsprüfungskommission (Lawyers’ Examination Board of the same Oberlandesgericht) refusing admission of an Austrian national to the aptitude test for the profession of lawyer in Austria because that national had studied and practised law in another Member State, constituted a court or tribunal within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU, since its jurisdiction was compulsory and it also exhibited all necessary features in order to be regarded as such (see C-118/09, Koller, 2010, paras 21–24); see also C-55/20, Minister Sprawiedliwości, 2022, para. 61. 55 See 318/85, Greis Unterweger (order), 1986, para. 4; but see 36/73, Nederlandse Spoorwegen, 1973, together with C-69/96 to C-79/96, Garofalo and Others, 1997, paras 17–27, in which the Court held that, where the Italian Consiglio di Stato (Council of State) issues an opinion in relation to an extraordinary petition made to the President of the Republic for annulment of an administrative act, it constitutes a court or tribunal within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU. The Swedish Skatterättsnämnden (Revenue Board), which may give a preliminary decision on matters of taxation upon application by a taxable person, is not a court or tribunal within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU. The Court held that such board essentially performs an administrative function on the grounds that it does not have as its task to review the legality of the decisions of the tax authorities, but rather to adopt a view on how a specific transaction is to be assessed to tax. It therefore acts in an administrative capacity and is not called upon to decide a dispute (see C-134/97, Victoria Film, 1998, paras 15–19); see also C-453/20, CityRail, 2022, para. 51. In contrast, the Regeringsrätten (Swedish Supreme Administrative Court) does constitute a court or tribunal within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU when seized of an appeal against a ruling of the Skatterättsnämnden (see C-200/98, X and Y, 1999, paras 13–17); C-440/98, RAI (order), 1999, paras 14–15 (the Italian Corte dei Conti (Court of Auditors) does not perform a judicial function when it plays an administrative role consisting in the evaluation and verification of the results of administrative actions); see also C-161/21, Comune di Camerota (order), 2021, paras 39–40; C-104/21, RegioJet (order), 2022, paras 31–71.

The Initiative for Requesting a Preliminary Ruling 59 involved in taking that decision.56 Judicial bodies that also perform non-judicial functions are likewise not entitled to make a reference for a preliminary ruling in connection with that administrative activity.57 (4) National competition authorities The question arises as to whether national authorities responsible for settling disputes relating to the application of competition law (domestic as well as Union) are entitled to refer questions for a preliminary ruling. Do the authorities in question give a ruling in like manner to a court in proceedings brought by the prosecuting party (the public department responsible for ensuring that competition law is complied with) against a defendant undertaking or do they instead take an administrative decision after a procedure in which the other party is entitled to give its views, which they must subsequently defend before a court or tribunal to which the undertaking concerned has appealed? The answer to this question depends on a prior analysis of the legal position of the authorities concerned in each Member State and hence is liable to differ from one Member State to another.58 The Court gave a ruling, without any reservation, on the questions referred for a preliminary ruling by the Spanish Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia (Tribunal for the Protection of Competition), after Advocate General Jacobs had pointed out that while, administratively, the ‘Tribunal’ formed part of the Ministry of Trade, it nevertheless fulfilled the Vaassen criteria (see para. 3.05).59 In addition, the applicant in the proceedings was the Dirección General de Defensa de la Competencia (Directorate General for the Protection of Competition), suing a number of banks, with the result that the ‘Tribunal’ did in fact come across as a third party.

56 See also C-344/09, Dan Bengtsson (order), 2011, paras 23–25; C-363/11, Epitropos Tou Elegktikou Synedriou, 2012, paras 24–28. 57 See C-110/98 to C-147/98, Gabalfrisa and Others, 2000, para. 33; C-178/99, Salzmann, 2001, paras 15–17; C-45/03, Dem’ Yanenko (order), 2004, paras 26–283; C-96/04, Standesamt Stadt Niebüll, 2006, paras 13–20; compare C-353/06, Grunkin and Paul, 2008, paras 9–13 (with further elaboration in AG Sharpston Opinion, points 34–36). As emphasized in the case-law, while a court responsible for maintaining a register or dealing with an application for the service of judicial or extra-judicial documents under Union law makes an administrative decision without being required to resolve a legal dispute and hence cannot be regarded as exercising a judicial function, a court hearing an appeal which has been brought against that administrative decision, rejecting such an application, and which seeks the setting aside of that decision which allegedly affects the rights of the applicant is called upon to give judgment in a dispute and is considered to exercise a judicial function: see C-210/06, Cartesio, 2008, paras 57–62; C-14/08, Roda Golf & Beach Resort, 2009, paras 35–42; C-497/08, Amiraike Berlin (order), 2010, paras 17–22. Furthermore, while the cooperation on the taking of evidence between courts of the Member States in the context of Regulation No. 1206/2001 (OJ 2001 L174/1) does not necessarily lead to a judicial decision, the examining of a witness is an act clearly undertaken in the context of judicial proceedings ‘intended to lead to a decision of a judicial nature’, and therefore under those circumstances, a national court submitting questions to the Court concerning the functioning of Regulation No. 1206/2001 is acting in its judicial capacity: see C-283/09, Weryński, 2011, paras 43–46. Furthermore, an insolvency judge determining, on application by the creditors, which debts are to be included in the liabilities acts in a judicial capacity where its decisions can be challenged by the administrator and other interested parties and where, in the absence of a challenge, its refusal to include a debt in the liabilities has binding legal effects: see C-443/09, Grillo Star Fallimento, 2012, para. 23. 58 Note that some national competition authorities may have a dual nature, exercising both administrative and judicial functions: see C-439/08, VEBIC, AG Mengozzi Opinion, 2010, point 82. 59 See C-67/91, Asociación Española de Banca Privada and Others, AG Jacobs Opinion, 1992 ECR 4806, 4809.

3.08

60 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE In Syfait and Others,60 a case concerning a reference for a preliminary ruling made by the Greek competition authority— the Epitropi Antagonismou (Competition Commission)—the Court of Justice adopted a more restrictive approach. According to the Court, insofar as there is an operational link between the Epitropi Antagonismou (a decision-making body) and its secretariat (a fact-finding body) on the basis of whose proposal it adopts decisions, the Epitropi Antagonismou is not a clearly distinct third party in relation to the State body which, by virtue of its role, may be akin to a party in the course of competition proceedings.61 Moreover, the Court emphasized the fact that a competition authority such as the Epitropi Antagonismou may, pursuant to Art. 11(6) of Regulation No. 1/2003,62 be relieved of its competence by a decision of the Commission initiating its own proceedings. After having recalled its case-law according to which a body may refer a question to the Court only if that body is called upon to give judgment in proceedings intended to lead to a decision of a judicial nature,63 the Court of Justice concluded that the Epitropi Antagonismou is not a court or tribunal within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU, since whenever the Commission relieves a national competition authority such as the Epitropi Antagonismou of its competence, the proceedings initiated before that authority will not lead to a decision of a judicial nature.64 The question was thus declared inadmissible65 on grounds that make the admissibility of future references of national competition authorities very doubtful. This seems to find confirmation in a recent judgment in which the Court declared inadmissible questions referred to it by the Spanish Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC, National Markets and Competition Commission).66 It should be pointed out that the CNMC is the successor to the Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia, which did meet the Vaassen criteria, as the Court gave a ruling on the questions referred to it by that body.67 However, while the Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia was, according to the Court, sufficiently separate from the investigation body in competition matters at the time—that is, the Dirección General de Defensa de la Competencia—this is apparently not the case for the CNMC, which combines both functions under the Law establishing the CNMC.68 In light of this, the Court found that the Competition Division of the Board of the CNMC, which takes the decisions of the CNMC, maintained an organizational and operational link with the Competition Directorate of the CNMC, which is the investigation body of the CNMC and which makes proposals for decisions which the Board is called upon 60 See C-53/03, Syfait and Others, 2005. 61 See C-53/03, Syfait, and Others, 2005, para. 33. 62 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules laid down in Arts 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ 2003 L1/1). 63 See C-134/97, Victoria Film, 1998, para. 14; C-195/98, Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, 2000, para. 25; C-53/03, Syfait and Others, 2005, para. 35; C-649/19, IR, 2021, para. 34. 64 See C-53/03, Syfait and Others, 2005, paras 35–37. 65 Yet, eventually the preliminary questions at issue in Syfait did come before the Court: see C-468/06, Sot. Lélos kai Sia, 2008. 66 See C-462/19, Asociación Nacional de Empresas Estibadoras y Consignatarios de Buques, 2020. 67 See C-67/91, Asociación Española de Banca Privada, 1992. 68 See C-462/19, Asociación Nacional de Empresas Estibadoras y Consignatarios de Buques, 2020, paras 38–50.

The Initiative for Requesting a Preliminary Ruling 61 to adjudicate, since the President of the CNMC, who presides over the Board of the CNMC, exercises management, coordination, evaluation, and supervision powers in relation to the Competition Directorate. For that reason, the CNMC was considered not to be a third party in relation to the decision it is called upon to take. Further to this, the Court found that the latter decision was of an administrative nature. The Court based this finding on the fact that proceedings were initiated ex officio; that the CNMC might be denied jurisdiction in favour of the Commission; that the CNMC could withdraw its own decision under certain circumstances, meaning that such decisions lack the quality of a proper judicial decision, in particular the force of res judicata; and that the CNMC acts as a defendant in court proceedings brought against its decisions.69 (5) Arbitrators An arbitrator that does not fulfil all the Vaassen criteria cannot be regarded as a ‘court or tribunal of a Member State’ within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU, despite the fact that ‘there are certain similarities between the activities of the arbitration tribunal in question and those of an ordinary court or tribunal in as much as the arbitration is provided for within the framework of the law, the arbitrator must decide according to law and his award has, as between the parties, the force of res judicata, and may be enforceable if leave to issue execution is obtained’.70 Those characteristics were not sufficient to give the arbitrator the status of a ‘court or tribunal of a Member State’ because the parties to the contract were ‘free to leave their disputes to be resolved by the ordinary courts or to opt for arbitration by inserting a clause to that effect in the contract’.71 Consequently, the arbitrator did not act as the ‘proper judicial body’ designated by law, with the result that at least that Vaassen criterion was not fulfilled. The parties were indeed under ‘no obligation, whether in law or in fact, to refer their disputes to arbitration’.72 Moreover, the Member State in which the arbitrator operated was not involved in the decision to opt for arbitration and was not called upon to intervene of its own motion in the proceedings before the arbitrator.73 If questions of Union law arise in an arbitration resorted to by agreement, the Court counts on the ‘ordinary courts’ examining the issues and, where necessary, requesting a preliminary ruling. The ordinary courts will have an opportunity to do so ‘in the context of their collaboration’ with arbitration tribunals, ‘in particular in order to assist them in certain procedural matters or to interpret the law applicable’, or when they are called upon to conduct a ‘review of an arbitration award’ in 69 See also C-453/20, CityRail, 2022, para. 67, in which the Court held that a power to initiate the proceedings giving rise to a request for a preliminary ruling of its own motion is a particularly relevant indication that a body exercises administrative functions, and paras 68–69 of that same judgment, where the Court considered that the participation of a body as a defendant in court proceedings brought against its decisions is evidence that such a body is not a third party in relation to the interests involved. 70 102/81, Nordsee, 1982, para. 10. 71 102/81, Nordsee, 1982, para. 11. 72 102/81, Nordsee, 1982, para. 11. See also C-125/04, Denuit and Cordenier, 2005, para. 13. 73 This consideration was perhaps intended to distinguish the Broekmeulen situation (C-125/04, Denuit and Cordenier, para. 12); see n. 39 and accompanying text. See also 102/81, Nordsee, 1982, para. 11; C-125/04, Denuit and Cordenier, 2005, para. 13.

3.09

62 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE the case of ‘an appeal or objection, in proceedings for leave to issue execution or by any other method of recourse available under the relevant national legislation’.74 In this context, it makes no difference that, in reviewing the arbitration award, the ordinary court has, pursuant to the arbitration agreement concluded between the parties, to rule ex aequo et bono: ‘It follows from the principles of the primacy of [Union] law and of its uniform application, in conjunction with [Art. 4(3) TEU], that a court of a Member State to which an appeal against an arbitration award is made pursuant to national law must, even where it gives judgment having regard to fairness, observe the rules of [Union] law . . .’.75 The Court of Justice likewise recognizes that the review of arbitration awards is limited in scope and that annulment of or refusal to recognize an award is possible only in exceptional circumstances. However, the limited nature of that review may not preclude reviewing the award in the light of ‘fundamental provisions’ of Union law, such as Art. 101 TFEU, which prohibits agreements and concerted practices in restraint of competition.76 By declining jurisdiction to answer questions referred for a preliminary ruling by arbitrators, the Court sought to prevent contracting parties from creating ‘courts and tribunals’ of their own and subsequently inducing (or obliging) them to seek preliminary rulings. Indeed, Art. 267 TFEU is intended to bring about a dialogue between courts in the Member States and the Court of Justice. National courts, having the monopoly right to seek preliminary rulings, submit to the Court only questions that are genuinely necessary in order to deliver a judgment with the authority of res judicata. In the Court’s view, the preliminary ruling mechanism would be endangered if parties to a contract could circumvent it by setting up an arbitration board whose organization is in no way based on action on the part of the public authorities and which is not regarded as the obligatory legal authority for dealing with a particular class of disputes. Following from Achmea,77 it appears that the same logic applies to Member States. In that case, the Court held that the arbitral tribunal provided for by the Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and what was then the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic could not make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice.78 The Court considered that the arbitral tribunal was not a court of those Member States because it was not part of the judicial system of the Member States which had concluded the investment agreement. The Court pointed to the exceptional nature of the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal compared to that of the courts of the Member States. The jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal removed disputes involving issues of Union law from the ordinary courts of these Member States, which was precisely the reason for including an

74 102/81, Nordsee, 1982, para. 14. 75

C-393/92, Almelo, 1994, para. 23. See C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time, 1999, paras 33–40. See further para. 4.38. 77 C-284/16, Achmea, 2018. 78 See C-284/16, Achmea, 2018, para. 49. 76

The Initiative for Requesting a Preliminary Ruling 63 arbitration clause in the agreement.79 The arbitral tribunal could not be considered to be a court common to those Member States either.80 However, this does not mean that arbitral tribunals can never satisfy the Vaassen criteria. Where there is a ‘sufficiently close connection’ between the arbitration and the general system of legal protection in the Member State concerned, the ‘arbitrator’ is deemed to be ‘a court or tribunal of a Member State’ within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU (as in the case of the ‘arbitration tribunal’ in the Vaassen case itself).81 (6) Courts of a Member State The court or tribunal must be ‘of a Member State’.82 Although this is generally obvious, it should be noted that the following qualify as such: courts and tribunals established in the Member States;83 courts and tribunals established in several French overseas departments and territories, as well as the Azores, Madeira, and the Canary Islands;84 courts and tribunals established in the ‘overseas countries and territories’ listed in Annex II to the Treaties to which the special association arrangements set out in Part Four of the TFEU apply;85 courts and tribunals established in the ‘European territories for whose external relations a Member State is responsible’;86 and courts and tribunals established in the Åland Islands.87 (7) International courts International courts, such as the International Court of Justice or the European Court of Human Rights, are not entitled to refer questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. The position is different in the case of the Benelux Court of Justice. That court has the task of ensuring that the legal rules common to the three Benelux States are applied uniformly. The procedure before it is a step in the proceedings before the national courts leading to definitive interpretations of common Benelux legal rules. For those reasons, the Benelux Court of Justice is entitled—and, as a court against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, may be under a duty (see para.

79 See C-284/16, Achmea, 2018, paras 44–46; see also C-741/19, Republic of Moldova, 2021, paras 51–63. 80 See C-284/16, Achmea, 2018, paras 47–48; see further para. 3.11. 81 See 109/88, Danfoss, 1989, paras 7–9 (holding that the Faglige Voldgiftsret, the Danish Industrial Arbitration Board responsible for disputes concerning collective agreements, satisfied the Vaassen criteria, since its jurisdiction and composition was required by national law and did not depend on the parties’ agreement, among other things); C-377/13, Ascendi Beiras Litoral e Alta, 2014, paras 22–35 (holding that the Tribunal Arbitral Tributário, the Portuguese Arbitration tribunal dealing with taxation, satisfied the Vaassen criteria, inter alia, because their jurisdiction was compulsory and not dependent on a prior expression of the will of the parties). 82 See C-196/09, Miles and Others, 2011, paras 37–43: the Chambre de recours des écoles européennes (the Complaints Board of the European Schools) was held not to constitute a court or tribunal of a Member State. 83 Art. 52 TEU. 84 Art. 355(1) TFEU; as regards the French overseas departments, Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Martinique, Réunion, Saint-Barthélemy, and Saint-Martin are listed. 85 Art. 355(2) TFEU; for some examples, see C-100/89 and C-101/89, Kaefer and Procacci, 1990; C-260/90 Leplat, 1992, in which the Tribunal Administratif (Administrative Court) and the Tribunal de Paix (Justice of the Peace) respectively, of Papeete in French Polynesia, were held to be courts or tribunals ‘of a Member State’. 86 Art. 355(3) TFEU; in practice, this was only Gibraltar. See C-267/16, Buhagiar and Others, 2018. 87 Art. 355(4) TFEU. The Treaties apply in accordance with the provisions set out in Protocol (No. 2) to the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland, and the Kingdom of Sweden (OJ 1994 C241/352).

3.10

3.11

64 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE 3.43)—to refer questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling where it is faced with the task of interpreting Union rules in the performance of its function.88 The same holds true for the newly created Unified Patent Court. The initial Draft Agreement creating a Unified Patent Litigation System was considered to be incompatible with the Treaties by the Court of Justice.89 The Court took issue with the fact that exclusive jurisdiction in patent litigation was transferred from the Member States’ courts to a newly designed court structure that was not common to the legal systems of the Member States since, apart from the Member States of the European Union, a number of third countries were also party to the Draft Agreement.90 This was problematic, as the uniform and effective application of Union law through the preliminary rulings mechanism could no longer be guaranteed for the matters of Union law falling in the scope of application of the Draft Agreement. The Court of Justice based its argument on the absence of means to enforce compliance with the obligations flowing from Art. 267 TFEU. Contrary to a court that is common to the Member States, it would not be possible to have recourse to Member State liability or infringement proceedings should the Patent Court, a court standing outside of the legal systems of the Member States, breach Union law.91 In the aftermath of Opinion 1/09, the Member States adapted the Draft Agreement and created a court system common to the legal systems of the Member States. In doing so, the Member States almost literally copied the relevant paragraphs of the Parfums Christian Dior judgment92 concerning the Benelux Court. Art. 1 of the Draft Agreement states: ‘The Unified Patent Court shall be a court common to the Contracting Member States and subject to the same obligations under Union law as any national court of the Contracting Member States.’93 Third countries that were parties to the initial Draft Agreement were left out of the amended Draft Agreement. The judgment in Parfums Christian Dior and Opinion 1/09 should be contrasted with the judgment in Miles.94 In Miles, the Court held that the Complaints Board of the European Schools was not competent to refer questions for a preliminary ruling. The judgment emphasizes that being a court common to a number of Member States alone is not sufficient to qualify as a national court within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU. The common court should also have the necessary links to the judicial systems of the Member States concerned, meaning that it is responsible for the uniform

88 See C-337/95, Parfums Christian Dior, 1997, paras 19–23. For a recent reference for a preliminary ruling, see C-169/15, Montis Design, 2016. In contrast, it would be hard to argue that proceedings brought against a Member State in the European Court of Human Rights constitute ‘a step in the proceedings’ before a national court. Proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights do not fall within any national proceedings and hence the reasoning employed by the Court of Justice in the Parfums Christian Dior case in order to hold that the Benelux Court of Justice constitutes a court or tribunal within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU cannot be used so as to allow the European Court of Human Rights to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice. See also C-284/16, Achmea, 2018, paras 43–49. 89 See Opinion 1/09, Draft Agreement on the European and Community Patents Court, 2011. 90 See Opinion 1/09, Draft Agreement on the European and Community Patents Court, 2011, paras 69, 82. 91 See Opinion 1/09, Draft Agreement on the European and Community Patents Court, 2011, paras 86–88. 92 C-337/95, Parfums Christian Dior, 1997. 93 Agreement of 19 February 2013 on a Unified Patent Court (OJ 2013 C175/1), Art. 1. 94 C-196/09, Miles and Others, 2011.

The Initiative for Requesting a Preliminary Ruling 65 application of legal rules common to those Member States. This was not the case for the Complaints Board of the European Schools. While it was set up by the Member States of the European Union, it was not entrusted with the task of applying uniformly legal rules common to the Member States. Rather, it applied the rules governing the system of European Schools, which is a sui generis system of international cooperation different from the judicial systems of the Member States. The fact that the system of European Schools has functional ties with the EU and applies Union law cannot alter that conclusion.95 (8) Third countries’ courts Courts and tribunals established in non-Member States do not fall within Art. 267 TFEU.96 In the event that it is nevertheless intended to confer on such courts and tribunals to a certain extent the right to refer questions for a preliminary ruling, that right must be enshrined in an international agreement concluded between the Union and the third countries concerned.97 An example is the EEA Agreement, which authorizes courts and tribunals of EFTA States to refer questions to the Court of Justice on the interpretation of EEA rules.98 Likewise, courts and tribunals of the United Kingdom may continue to refer questions to the Court of Justice after the United Kingdom’s formal withdrawal from the European Union under the conditions set out in the Withdrawal Agreement.99

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B. Types of proceedings in which a preliminary ruling may be requested (1) Dispute must be pending before national court The Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a request for a preliminary ruling when, at the time when it is made, the procedure before the court making it has already been

95 See C-196/09, Miles and Others, 2011, paras 39–42; see also C-284/16, Achmea, 2018, paras 43–46. 96 See C-247/20, VI, 2022, para. 34. 97 See J.T. Nowak, ‘Dispute Resolution among Member States at the Court of Justice on the Basis of Article 273 TFEU: A Comment on C-648/15 Austria v Germany’, Yearbook on Procedural Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural Law, 2020) 105, 115–116. 98 EEA Agreement, Art. 107 (OJ 1994 L1/26) and Protocol (No. 34) annexed to the EEA Agreement on the possibility for courts and tribunals of EFTA States to request the Court of Justice of the European Communities to decide on the interpretation of EEA rules corresponding to EC rules (OJ 1994 L1/204). 99 United Kingdom courts will have the power to refer questions for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice regarding certain parts of the Withdrawal Agreement in cases which commenced at first instance within 8 years from the end of the transition period provided for in the Withdrawal Agreement or, regarding applications for residence status, from the date from which Art. 19 of the Withdrawal Agreement applies (Withdrawal Agreement, Art. 158). Further to this, the Court of Justice also continued to have jurisdiction for references made by United Kingdom courts during the transition period, which ran from 1 February 2020 until 31 December 2020 (Withdrawal Agreement, Art. 86(2)). See C-624/19, K and Others, 2021, para. 17; C-709/20, CG, 2021, paras 47–51; C-349/20, NB and Others, 2022, paras 29–31; C-247/20, VI, 2022, para. 38; C-707/20, Gallaher, 2023, para. 53; C-695/20, Fenix International, 2023, paras 32–34. Further to this, the Court has held that a court of a Member State that has notified the European Council of its intention to withdraw from the European Union is able to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice (at least) until the date of that withdrawal: see C-239/19, Eli Lilly and Company (order), 2019, para. 25; see also C-327/18 PPU, RO, 2018, para. 45.

3.13

66 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE terminated.100 Art. 267 TFEU in fact restricts the right to make a reference to a court or tribunal which considers that the preliminary ruling requested is necessary to enable it to give judgment.101 A national court is empowered to bring a matter before the Court by way of reference for a preliminary ruling only if a dispute is pending before it in the context of which it is called upon to give a decision capable of taking into account the preliminary ruling.102 The preliminary ruling must actually be intended to make a contribution to the decision that the referring court is to take. Regarding requests for a preliminary ruling concerning the validity of an act of secondary Union law, the Court has held that it is sufficient for the reference to be admissible that the national court is seized of a genuine dispute in which the legality of such an act is contested on indirect grounds.103 The Court of Justice remains seized of a request for a preliminary ruling for as long as it is not withdrawn by the court or tribunal which made that request.104 However, since this is a question of securing the very essence of the preliminary ruling procedure, the Court is required to verify of its own motion the continued existence of a dispute,105 and does not shirk from going back to seek further information about the course of the procedure before the referring court with a view to ascertaining whether the proceedings are still pending before that court.106 In Pardini,107 the Court held—contrary to its first impressions—that, in view of the explanations which it had obtained, it had to be assumed that ‘the interlocutory proceedings which gave rise to the reference to the Court must be regarded as still pending before the Pretore [Magistrate], who may 100 See 338/85, Pardini, 1988, para. 11; C-649/19, IR, 2021, para. 34; C-699/20, Centraal Justitieel Incassobureau (order), 2021, paras 18–20. 101 See 338/85, Pardini, 1988, para. 10; C-510/19, AZ, 2020, para. 27; C-471/20, Centre d’Enseignement Secondaire Saint-Vincent de Soignies (order), 2021, para. 40; C-83/19, C‑127/19, C‑195/19, C‑291/19, C‑355/19, and C‑397/19, Asociaţia ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’, 2021, para. 117; C-266/21, Sofiyska gradska prokuratura, 2022, para. 22. 102 See 338/85, Pardini, 1988, para. 11; C- 612/15, Kolev, 2018, para. 46; C- 699/20, Centraal Justitieel Incassobureau (order), 2021, para. 69; C-783/21, M.M. (order), 2022, para. 19; C-588/20, Landkreis Northeim, 2022, para. 32; C-208/21, Towarzystwo Ubezpieczeń Ż, 2023, para. 41. 103 See C-62/14, Gauweiler, 2015, para. 29; C-493/17, Weiss, 2018, para. 21. This is so, even where the action before the national court is brought with the sole aim of contesting the validity of the act of secondary Union law. See C-304/16, American Express Company, 2018, para. 33, referring, inter alia, to C-491/01, British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco, 2002, paras 36–38; compare C-304/16, American Express Company, AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona Opinion, 2017, points 32–48 (providing critical review of this line of case-law). 104 See C-824/18, A.B. and Others, 2021, para. 75. See also CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 100; para. 3.26. 105 See C-165/14, Rendón Marín, 2016, para. 24; C-181/16, Gnandi, 2018, para. 31. 106 See C-519/19, Ryanair, 2020, paras 29–34; C-194/19, H.A., 2021, paras 19–20; C-634/20, A, 2022, paras 24–30; C-302/21, Banco Cetelem, 2022, paras 26–34. Where the Court, in application of Art. 101(1) CJ Rules of Procedure, receives clarification from the referring court that an answer to the questions referred remains necessary, the Court considers itself bound by such statement of the referring court, especially where it does not appear from the facts that the preliminary reference procedure has been misused or where it is not obvious that Union law does not apply to the case: see C-36/20 PPU, VL, 2020, para. 50; C-208/21, Towarzystwo Ubezpieczeń Ż, 2023, para. 45. However, where the referring court expresses its wish to maintain the reference without specifying how the questions referred remain relevant to the solution of the case, the Court will declare that there is no need to give an answer to the reference for a preliminary ruling: see C-524/16, Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale (order), 2019, paras 22–25. Further to this, the Court may also request information from the parties to the main proceedings to this end: see C-600/21, Caisse régionale de Crédit mutuel de Loire-Atlantique et du Centre Ouest, 2022, paras 19–25. 107 See 338/85 Pardini, 1988, para. 14; see also C-519/19, Ryanair, 2020, paras 29–34: while the dispute giving rise to the reference had become devoid of purpose, it appeared that the dispute in the main proceedings had been joined to two other cases involving the parties to the main proceedings regarding similar issues, leading the Court to conclude that the main proceedings were still pending before the referring court.

The Initiative for Requesting a Preliminary Ruling 67 take account of the preliminary ruling for the purposes of his own decision confirming, varying or discharging his original order’. (2) Types of proceedings All sorts of proceedings may give rise to a preliminary ruling: matters of civil law, criminal law,108 commercial and economic law, social law, revenue law, constitutional109 and administrative law, and so on. Neither the substantive law at issue nor the type of proceedings has any bearing. Questions may be referred by an examining magistrate110 and in interlocutory proceedings.111 Even ex parte proceedings, at which the other party is not represented, may result in a reference for a preliminary ruling if the body making the reference is exercising the functions of a court or tribunal.112 The fact that an order for reference has been made without prior adversarial debate also does not preclude the Court from being seized.113 Furthermore, it does not matter if the body making the reference performs other functions in addition to its functions as a court or tribunal. Accordingly, the Court held that ‘the Pretori [Italian magistrates] are judges who, in proceedings such as those in which the questions referred . . . were raised, combine the functions of a public prosecutor and an examining magistrate’. Nevertheless, the Court declared that it had jurisdiction to reply to the questions referred, since the request emanated from ‘a court or tribunal which has acted in the general framework of its task of judging, independently and in accordance with the law, cases coming within the jurisdiction conferred on it by law, even though certain functions of that court or tribunal in the proceedings which gave rise to the reference for a preliminary ruling are not, strictly speaking, of a judicial

108 A request for a preliminary ruling arising in the context of an inquiry in criminal proceedings which could result in an order that no further action be taken, a summons to appear, or an acquittal is admissible: see 14/86, Pretore di Salò v X, 1987, paras 10–11; C-60/02, X, 2004, para. 25. 109 For instance, as regards the Belgian Constitutional Court, see C-667/18, Orde van Vlaamse Balies, 2020; as regards the Austrian Constitutional Court, see C-456/00, C-138/01, and C-139/01, Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others, 2003; as regards the Lithuanian Constitutional Court, see C-239/07, Sabatauskas and Others, 2008; as regards the Italian Constitutional Court, see C-169/08, Presidente del Consiglio dei Minisitri, 2009; as regards the Spanish Constitutional Court, see C-399/11, Melloni, 2013; as regards the German Constitutional Court, see C-62/14, Gauweiler, 2015; C-493/17, Weiss, 2018; and as regards the Luxembourgish Constitutional Court, see C-321/15, ArcelorMittal Rodange and Schifflange, 2017. Regarding the relationship between the role played by constitutional courts in connection with the mechanism for ordinary courts to refer to them questions on the compatibility of national law with the national constitution, and the preliminary ruling procedure initiated by these latter courts, see para. 3.17. 110 See 65/79, Chatain, 1980, para. 1. 111 See 29/69, Stauder, 1969 ECR 419, 424; 107/76, Hoffmann-La Roche, 1977, para. 4; C-176/96, Lehtonen and Castors Braine, 2000; C-60/02, X, 2004, para. 26 (a preliminary question raised in proceedings concerning interim measures is admissible notwithstanding the fact that the measures may be confirmed, varied, or revoked). 112 See, e.g. the Italian summary proceedings for a court order in 70/77, Simmenthal, 1978, paras 4–11; C-18/93, Corsica Ferries, 1994, para. 12 (with further citations in C-265/07 Caffaro, AG Trstenjak Opinion, 2008, point 25); and the proceedings for the protective sequestration of assets in 23/75, Rey Soda, 1975. See further C-783/21, M.M. (order), 2022, para. 20. 113 See C-584/18, Blue Air—Airline Management Solutions, 2020, paras 39–40; C-693/18, X, 2020, para. 57; C-485/19, LH, 2021, para. 33. It makes no difference whether the absence of a prior adversarial debate was in violation of national procedural rules. In assessing the admissibility of an order for reference, it is not for the Court to verify whether the order was made in accordance with national procedural law: see C-381/16, Benjumea Bravo de Laguna, 2017, para. 26.

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68 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE nature’.114 However, if in the proceedings the national court simply acts as an administrative authority and performs a non-judicial function, the Court of Justice considers that it has no jurisdiction to rule on questions referred for a preliminary ruling in the proceedings in question.115

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(3) Issues concerning jurisdiction Questions of jurisdiction that are apt to arise before national courts in connection with the classification of legal situations based on Union law cannot be determined by the Court of Justice.116 This is because it is for the legal system of each Member State to determine which court has jurisdiction to hear disputes involving rights which individuals derive from Union law.117 In such circumstances, a national court may make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice with a view to obtaining an explanation of points of Union law which may help to solve the problem of jurisdiction.118

C. Power to request a preliminary ruling 3.16

(1) Initiative with the national court From the text of Art. 267 TFEU it follows that only the national court is entitled to apply to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.119 Parties to the main proceedings, including the public prosecutor, cannot compel the national court to make a reference.120 This is because the preliminary reference procedure is an instrument of direct cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts, which is completely independent of any initiative by the parties.121 Accordingly, the national court 114 14/86, Pretore di Salò v X, 1987, para. 7. See further C-235/02, Saetti (order), 2004, para. 23 (a national judge investigating a criminal matter or an investigating magistrate may make a reference for a preliminary ruling). 115 See C-111/94, Job Centre, 1995, paras 8–11; C-447/00, Holto, 2002, paras 17–22; C-497/08, Amiraike Berlin (order), 2010. In contrast, a preliminary question raised by a national court in proceedings brought for judicial review of a decision made in such non-contentious proceedings will be admissible: see C-111/94, Job Centre, 1995, para. 11; C-55/96, Job Centre, 1997; see also 32/74, Haaga, 1974, para. 2; C-210/06, Cartesio, 2008, paras 57–59. See further para. 3.07. 116 See C-641/18, LG and Others, 2020, paras 37–38. 117 It is not for the Court to determine whether the decision whereby a matter is brought before it was taken in conformity with the rules of domestic law governing the organization of the courts and their procedure. As long as the questions referred to it are relevant and necessary to resolve the case before the national court, the Court of Justice will accept jurisdiction. See C-97/11, Amia, 2012, paras 20–22; C-658/18, UX, 2020, paras 60–62; C‑748/19 to C‑754/19, WB and Others, 2021, para. 44; C-389/20, CJ, 2022, para. 28. This is only different where the referring court has clearly indicated in its order for reference that it lacks jurisdiction to rule on the dispute pending before it: see C-472/17, Di Girolamo (order), 2018, paras 30–32; C-618/18, Di Girolamo (order), 2019, paras 30–32; see also C-508/19, M.F. and Others, 2022, paras 67–69. Similarly, the question whether a party to the main proceedings has an interest in bringing proceedings before the referring court is irrelevant for the purposes of the admissibility of an order for reference: see C-110/20, Regione Puglia, 2022, para. 28. 118 See 179/84, Bozzetti v Invernizzi, 1985, para. 17; C‑585/18, C‑624/18, and C‑625/18, A.K. and Others, 2019, paras 99–100; C-521/18, Pegaso and Sistemi di Sicurezza, 2020, paras 30–31; C‑748/19 to C‑754/19, WB and Others, 2022, paras 47–50. The term ‘give judgment’ must thus be interpreted broadly and encompasses the entire procedure leading to the referring court’s decision, including procedural questions that arise in the course of proceedings before the referring court: see C-638/22 PPU, Rzecznik Praw Dziecka and Others, 2023, para. 49. 119 See 31/62 and 33/62, Wöhrmann and Others v Commission, 1962; C-910/19, Bankia, 2021, para. 22. 120 See C-87/17 P, CBA Spielapparate-und Restaurantbetriebs (order), 2017, paras 16–17. 121 See C-136/12, Consiglio nazionale dei geologi, 2013, para. 28; C-521/20, OM (order), 2021, para. 12; C- 561/19, Consorzio Italian Management, 2021, para. 53; C-83/21, Airbnb Ireland and Airbnb Payments UK, 2022, para. 83.

The Initiative for Requesting a Preliminary Ruling 69 has the right to refer questions of its own motion,122 a right which Union law confers on every ‘court or tribunal of a Member State’ within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU. National (procedural) law cannot detract from this.123 Thus, the Court has held that ‘the existence of a rule of domestic law whereby a court is bound on points of law by the rulings of the court superior to it cannot of itself take away the power provided for by [Art. 267 TFEU] of referring cases to the Court’,124 especially ‘if it considers that the ruling on law made by the superior court could lead it to give a judgment contrary to [Union] law’.125 Similarly, national rules that have as their effect to discourage judges to refer questions to the Court are incompatible with Art. 267 TFEU.126 Thus, the Court held that Art. 267 TFEU precludes a national rule which is interpreted in such a way that a referring court would be obliged to disqualify itself from a pending case because, by having set out the factual and legal context of that case in the order for reference, it has expressed a provisional opinion on questions of fact and law before deliberations had begun, which is a ground for recusal under national procedural law.127 Likewise, rules that would lead to the exposure of judges to financial penalties or other sanctions for having referred questions to the Court are incompatible with Art. 267 TFEU.128 Further to this, a Member State is not allowed to amend its national legislation with the specific aim of preventing requests for a preliminary ruling addressed to the Court from being maintained after they have been made.129 (2) Interplay between the national court’s right to refer under Art. 267 TFEU and national procedural mechanisms according priority to references on the compatibility of national law with the national constitution A particularly important issue relating to the national court’s initiative to refer is that concerning the interplay between its right to refer questions on the interpretation and/ or validity of Union law, on the one hand, and national procedural mechanisms requiring references to the national constitutional court or other bodies for deciding

122 See 166/73, Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf (‘Rheinmühlen I’), 1974, para. 3; 126/80, Salonia, 1981, para. 7; 283/81, CILFIT, 1982, para. 9; C-261/95, Palmisani, 1997, para. 20; C-251/11, Huet, 2012, paras 22–26. 123 See C-136/12, Consiglio nazionale dei geologi, 2013, para. 32; C-824/18, A.B., 2021, para. 93. The concern to give judgment on the legality of pre-trial detention within a reasonable time cannot justify national legislation having the effect of precluding a court from making a request for a preliminary ruling, especially since the urgent preliminary reference procedure allows for an expedient treatment of the case before the Court: see C‑8/19 PPU, RH (order), 2019, paras 30–48. 124 166/73, Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf (‘Rheinmühlen I’), 1974, para. 5. See also C-173/09, Elchinov, 2010, paras 25–32; C‑52/16 and C‑113/16, SEGRO, 2018, para. 48. 125 166/73, Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf (‘Rheinmühlen I’), 1974, para. 4. See also C-379/08 and C-380/08, ERG and Others, 2010, para. 26; C-416/10, Križan and Others, 2013, para. 68. 126 See C-824/18, A.B. and Others, 2021, para. 94; C-564/19, IS, 2021, para. 73. 127 See C-614/14, Ognyanov, 2016, paras 24–26. See also C-609/21, IP and Others (order), 2022, paras 18–36. 128 See C-614/14, Ognyanov, 2016, paras 24–26; C‑8/19 PPU, RH (order), 2019, paras 30–48; C-564/19, IS, 2021, para. 90; C‑357/19, C‑379/19, C‑547/19, C‑811/19, and C‑840/19, PM and Others, 2021, para. 260; see also C-430/21, RS, 2022, paras 81–93. 129 See C-824/18, A.B. and Others, 2021, para. 95; see also C‑585/18, C‑624/18, and C‑625/18, A.K. and Others, 2019, paras 102–104.

3.17

70 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE questions relating to the compatibility of national law with the national constitution, on the other.130 In the landmark case of Simmenthal,131 the Court of Justice was confronted with issues relating to the conflict between national law and Union law in a situation in which the national court was first required to refer to the Italian Constitutional Court the question of the incompatibility with the Italian Constitution of the national law concerned.132 In response, the Court of Justice held that the effectiveness of the preliminary ruling procedure would be impaired if the national court was prevented from applying Union law in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice, and therefore a national court which is called upon, within the limits of its jurisdiction, to apply provisions of Union law is under a duty to give full effect to those provisions, it not being necessary for that court to request or to await the prior setting aside of such provision by legislative or other constitutional means.133 Thereafter, Mecanarte134 presented the Court of Justice with a similar scenario involving Portuguese procedural law, whereby it ruled that a national court which in a case concerning Union law takes the view that a provision of national law is unconstitutional does not lose the right or escape the obligation under Art. 267 TFEU to refer to the Court of Justice questions concerning the interpretation or validity of Union law by reason of the fact that such a declaration of unconstitutionality is subject to a mandatory reference to the constitutional court. Subsequent cases reiterated such points in brief fashion.135 Then, in Kücükdeveci,136 situated within the context of German proceedings, the Court firmly underlined: ‘The possibility thus given to the national court by the second paragraph of Art. 267 TFEU of asking the Court for a preliminary ruling before disapplying the national provision that is contrary to European Union law cannot, however, be transformed into an obligation because national law does not allow that court to disapply a provision it considers to be contrary to the constitution unless the provision has first been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court.’ In

130 See further P. Van Nuffel, ‘Samenloop van prejudiciële procedures en de rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie van de Europese Gemeenschappen’ in D. Arts, I. Verougstraete, R. Andersen et al. (eds), De verhouding tussen het Arbitragehof, de rechterlijke macht en de Raad van State—verslagboek van het symposium van 21 oktober 2005 (Die Keure, 2006) 343–352; J. Dutheil de La Rochère, ‘La question prioritaire de constitutionnalité et le droit européen’ (2010) R.T.D.E. 577; T. Larrouthurou, Question prioritaire de constitutionnalité et contrôle de conventionnalité (LGDJ, 2021); see also, in that regard, Corte Constituzionale (Constitutional Court, Italy), 7 November 2017, decision n. 269/17, para. 5.2; Corte Constituzionale (Constitutional Court, Italy), 30 July 2020, order n. 182/20, paras 3.1–3.2; C. Amalfitano, ‘Il dialogo tra giudice comune, Corte di giustizia e Corte costituzionale dopo l’obiter dictum della sentenza n. 269/2017’ Osservatorio sulle fonti 2019/2, 1–29; A. Tizzano, ‘Les relations entre juridictions en Europe’ in K. Lenaerts, N. Piçarra, C. Farinhas, A. Marciano, and F. Rolin (eds), Building the European Union: The Jurist’s View of the Union’s Evolution (Hart, 2021) 223. 131 106/77, Simmenthal, 1978. 132 See 106/77, Simmenthal, 1978, paras 6–7. 133 See 106/77, Simmenthal, 1978, paras 19–24; see also C-378/17, Minister for Justice and Equality and Commissioner of the Garda Síochána, 2018, paras 35–36; C-564/19, IS, 2021, para. 80; C-14/20, G.D., 2022, para. 118. 134 See C-348/89, Mecanarte-Metalurgica da Lagoa, 1991, paras 38–46. 135 See C-314/08, Filipiak, 2009, para. 81; C-348/89, Mecanarte, 1991, para. 4; C-379/08 and C-380/08, ERG and Others, 2010, para. 26. 136 See C-555/07, Kücükdeveci, 2010, paras 52–56.

The Initiative for Requesting a Preliminary Ruling 71 other words, ‘[t]‌he optional nature of such a reference is not affected by the conditions of national law under which a court may disapply a national provision which it considers to be contrary to the constitution.’ Matters came to a head in Melki and Abdeli,137 involving a reference for a preliminary ruling from the French Cour de Cassation (Court of Cassation) as to whether a provision of French constitutional law, requiring national courts to rule, as a matter of priority, on the submission to the French Conseil constitutionnel (Constitutional Council) of questions of constitutionality put before them, was compatible with Art. 267 TFEU. While it could be questioned whether the priority mechanism did effectively prevent the French Court of Cassation from making a reference for a preliminary ruling in the main proceedings, the Court of Justice considered that ‘it is for the referring court to determine, in the cases before it, what the correct interpretation of national law is’.138 After reiterating its traditional case-law on national procedural rules limiting the possibility of national courts to make use of Art. 267 TFEU, the Court of Justice provided a balanced answer, taking into account the particularities of the French constitutional system. On the one hand, as a general rule, national courts cannot be prevented from referring questions to the Court, and therefore, if an interlocutory procedure giving priority to the review of constitutionality of national law effectively prevents these courts from referring questions to the Court, such a procedure would be precluded by Art. 267 TFEU. On the other hand, such a procedure is not precluded by Art. 267 TFEU if three conditions are fulfilled. First, national courts should remain free to submit a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice, at whatever stage of the proceedings they consider appropriate, even at the end of the interlocutory procedure for the review of constitutionality, on any question which they consider necessary. Second, national courts should remain free to adopt any measure necessary to ensure provisional judicial protection of the rights conferred under Union law. Third, national courts must have the possibility to disapply, at the end of such an interlocutory procedure, the national legislative provision at issue if they consider it to be contrary to Union law.139 Consequently, on the basis of Melki and Abdeli, national courts may be required to await the outcome of an interlocutory procedure assessing the constitutionality of the national provisions at issue, provided that the three abovementioned conditions are met.140 That being said, Melki and Abdeli does not restrict the freedom of national 137 C-188/10 and C-189/10, Melki and Abdeli, 2010. 138 C-188/10 and C-189/10, Melki and Abdeli, 2010, para. 49. 139 See C-188/10 and C-189/10, Melki and Abdeli, 2010, paras 52–53, 57. See also C-112/13, A and B, 2014, paras 39–40; C-5/14, Kernkraftwerke Lippe-Ems, 2015, para. 37. Moreover, the existence of such interlocutory proceedings has no bearing on a last instance court’s duty to refer under Art. 267 TFEU: see C-322/16, Global Starnet, 2017, paras 25–26. 140 Another example in which the Court allowed for a nuanced application of the Simmenthal case-law can be found in the Kolev II judgment (C-704/18, Kolev, 2020). That judgment dealt with the implementation of the Court’s judgment in the first Kolev case (C‑612/15, Kolev, 2018), in which the Court had interpreted, inter alia, Directive 2012/13/EU on the right to information in criminal proceedings. Upon receiving the answer, the referring court concluded that the proceedings before it were deficient in light of the requirements imposed by that directive and, instead of terminating the trial phase and sending the case back to the prosecutor in order to remedy these procedural defects as required under national law, the referring court remedied the deficiencies itself. On

72 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE courts to refer questions to the Court whenever they consider it necessary, even when national provisions oblige them to do otherwise.141 In all, what is essential is that in case of a conflict between a provision of Union law and a provision of national law, the power to set aside the conflicting provision of national law lies exclusively with the court called upon to apply Union law in the dispute pending before it, at the exclusion of any other authority with a discretion of its own.142 Moreover, in its ruling in Melki and Abdeli, the Court of Justice added that questions concerning the validity of a Union directive take priority over questions concerning the constitutionality of national implementing measures transposing the mandatory provisions of the directive when both are challenged on the same grounds. In such a situation, the national constitutional court, being a court against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy, is obliged to refer the matter first to the Court in accordance with the third paragraph of Art. 267 TFEU.143 The obligation to refer ceases to exist when the ordinary court itself has referred a question concerning the validity of the directive to the Court before or simultaneously with initiating the interlocutory procedure. Nevertheless, in both situations, the national constitutional court is under an obligation to await the outcome of the proceedings before the Court of Justice before ruling on the question of constitutionality.144

3.18

(3) Binding rulings of higher courts The freedom of national courts to refer questions to the Court of Justice has an impact on the hierarchical structure of the court systems in the Member States. Since any court should be free to make use of Art. 267 TFEU, a lower court cannot be bound on points of Union law by a ruling of a higher court.145 Accordingly, lower courts remain free to

appeal, that decision was annulled and the appeal court remitted the case back to the referring court, requesting it to terminate the trial phase and to send the case back to the prosecutor. The Court ruled that, in these circumstances, such an injunction of a higher court was not incompatible with Art. 267 TFEU, on the condition that the provisions of Union law as interpreted by the Court in the first Kolev case were complied with (see C-704/18, Kolev, 2020, paras 48–57). Compare C-378/17, Minister for Justice and Equality and Commissioner of the Garda Síochána, 2018, para. 36. 141 See C-136/12, Consiglio nazionale dei geologi, 2013, paras 32–33; C-112/13, A and B, 2014, para. 38; C-5/14, Kernkraftwerke Lippe-Ems, 2015, paras 34–37; C-686/18, OC and Others, 2020, paras 30–33. 142 See C-378/17, Minister for Justice and Equality and Commissioner of the Garda Síochána, 2018, paras 36–37; C‑357/19, C‑379/19, C‑547/19, C‑811/19 and C‑840/19, PM and Others, 2021, paras 255–259. See also C-689/13, Puligienica Facility Esco, 2016, paras 21–30, in which the Court held that Art. 267 TFEU precluded a rule that required the Council of Administrative Justice for the Region of Sicily, which under the specific status of Sicily is considered to be a chamber of the Italian Council of State and therefore a court of last instance, to refer a case to the plenary session of the Council of State if it does not concur with the position adopted by a decision of that court sitting in plenary session. In doing so, the Court adopted a functional approach to the notion of a court or tribunal as opposed to an organizational approach, by which that notion would only apply to the court or tribunal as a whole, regardless of the chamber seized (see C-689/13, Puligienica Facility Esco (order), 2015, para. 7). 143 For an example, see C-236/09, Association belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats and Others, 2011. 144 See C-188/10 and C-189/10, Melki and Abdeli, 2010, paras 54–56; see also C-112/13, A and B, 2014, paras 41–43. 145 See C-173/09, Elchinov, 2010, paras 24–32; C-396/09, Interedil, 2011, paras 34–40; C-416/10, Križan and Others, 2013, para. 68; C-233/19, B., 2020, para. 37; C-83/19, C‑83/19, C‑127/19, C‑195/19, C‑291/19, C‑355/19, and C‑397/19, Asociaţia ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’, 2021, para. 133; C-920/19, Fluctus (order), 2021, paras 57–58; C-104/19, XR, 2021, paras 44–49; C‑357/19, C‑379/19, C‑547/19, C‑811/19, and C‑840/19, PM and

The Initiative for Requesting a Preliminary Ruling 73 question the higher court’s assessment of the point of Union law at issue and, if necessary, to submit a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court.146 This line of case-law of the Court of Justice has been challenged in view of the hierarchy of the national legal systems and the powers of the highest national courts. In particular, a number of arguments have been advanced to limit the possibility of lower national courts to refer questions to the Court of Justice. For example, it has been asserted that while uniformity is important, not all questions of Union law need be answered by the Court of Justice. The often trivial matters that are brought before the Court through references by lower national courts could first be solved within the national legal system, and if difficulties still remain, the higher national courts can then submit a reference to the Court. Moreover, it has been contended that limiting the number of references coming from lower courts would significantly lighten the workload of the Court; alternatively, a ‘European certiorari’ or other mechanism of case selection could shorten the length of proceedings and provide the Court with more time to decide the cases before it and allow it to substantiate its judgments with elaborate reasoning.147 Arguably, while the reference for a preliminary ruling procedure has its imperfections, the amendments proposed in the literature are often the result of a misunderstanding of the functioning of the procedure and the internal functioning of the Court in particular. The possibility for a lower court to review the application of Union law by a higher court is an exceptional means to guarantee the uniform and effective application of Union law by the highest courts. If Union law is applied correctly by the higher courts, there will be no valid reason for lower courts to put that application into doubt. It has also been pointed out that some commentators may question the preliminary reference procedure and its implications for the national legal system merely to safeguard the position of the highest courts, rather than with the aim of contributing to a more workable system of judicial protection in the European Union.148 As such, criticism motivated by such reasons has not been considered constructive from the perspective of the system of cooperation between the European Union and the national legal orders which lies at the heart of the preliminary ruling procedure (see para. 3.02).149 Others, 2021, paras 255–259; C-430/21, RS, 2022, paras 64–67. Similarly, a national supreme court cannot be bound by rulings of a national constitutional court, especially since that supreme court, under Art. 267, third para. TFEU, has an obligation to refer questions concerning the interpretation and validity of Union law to the Court of Justice: see C-686/18, OC and Others, 2020, paras 32–33. 146 See C-349/17, Eesti Pagar, 2019, para. 52. 147 See J. Komarek, ‘In the Court(s) We Trust? On the Need for Hierarchy and Differentiation in the Preliminary Ruling Procedure’ (2007) E.L.Rev. 467. 148 P. Van Nuffel, ‘Technieken van doorwerking van EU-recht in het Belgische privaatrecht’ in I. Samoy, V. Sagaert, and E. Terryn (eds), Invloed van het Europese recht op het Belgische privaatrecht (Intersentia, 2012) 1, 10–11. 149 M. Bossuyt and W. Verrijdt, ‘The Full Effect of EU Law and of Constitutional Review in Belgium and France after the Melki Judgment’ (2011) E. Const. L. Rev. 389, argue, inspired by AG Cruz Villalon, against the possibility for lower courts to review the application of Union law by higher courts and suggest that other measures such as an action for State liability or an action for infringement can effectively guarantee that higher courts act in conformity with Union law. For a critical reflection on this proposal, see M. Wathelet, ‘Adieu, Monsieur le Professeur: de la liberté des juges nationaux de poser des questions préjudicielles à la Cour de justice de

74 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE Furthermore, it should be recalled that a number of important cases have been decided based upon references submitted by lower courts.150 It would thus be wrong to state that their references are not important enough and that the power to refer should be limited to higher courts.151

D. Content of a request for a preliminary ruling 3.19

(1) Content determined by the national court It is for the national court to determine the content of the questions referred for a preliminary ruling.152 Certainly, the parties to the main proceedings are at liberty to make proposals, but it is the national court alone which determines whether to accept them, in all or in part, or deviate from them.153 In other words, the preliminary ruling procedure is completely independent of any initiative of the parties.154 The Court of Justice does not allow parties to the main proceedings to seek to extend the request for a preliminary ruling to cover questions that they suggested to the national court, but that it did not wish to ask.155 It is immaterial in this respect that the Commission or one or more Member States support parties in their attempt to alter the subject-matter of the preliminary ruling procedure. The Court will not go against the referring court’s (express or implicit) refusal to refer a particular question because that court ‘alone is competent under the system established by [Art. 267 TFEU] to assess the relevance of questions concerning the interpretation of [Union] law in order to resolve the dispute

l’Union européenne’ (2010) Revue de la Faculté de droit de l’Université de Liège 449–455. See also M. Broberg and N. Fenger, Broberg and Fenger on preliminary references to the European Court of Justice (3rd edn, OUP, 2021) 26–27. 150 See A. Arena, ‘From an Unpaid Electricity Bill to the Primacy of EU Law: Gian Galeazzo Stendardi and the Making of Costa v. ENEL’ (2019) E.J.I.L. 1017. 151 See C. Barnard and E. Sharpston, ‘The Changing Face of Article 177 References’ (1997) C.M.L.Rev. 1113, 1163–1164. 152 The questions referred for a preliminary ruling are considered within the factual and legal context as set out by the referring court. The Court of Justice does not take account of observations from interested parties within the meaning of Art. 23 of the Statute which take issue with that context. See C-2/19, A.P., 2020, para. 27; C-567/18, Coty Germany, 2020, paras 21–22; C‑224/19 and C‑259/19, Caixabank, 2020, paras 39–40; C-504/19, Banco de Portugal, 2021, paras 26–29; C-228/20, I, 2022, paras 27–30; C-385/20, EL and Others, 2022, para. 38; C-264/21, Keskinäinen Vakuutusyhtiö Fennia, 2022, para. 18 (see further para. 3.22). For example, in C-171/18, Safeway, 2019, paras 19–32, a case in which both the parties to the main proceedings and the Commission disputed the (legal) hypothesis on which the referring court had relied for the purposes of formulating its questions, the Court gave, on its own motion, an interpretation of Union law in order to confirm the hypothesis on which the referring judge had relied. However, occasionally, the Court may suggest to the national court to review the factual context on which it relied in its order for reference: see C-106/16, Polbud—Wykonawstwo, 2017, para. 28; C-255/19, Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2021, paras 30–32. 153 See C-136/12, Consiglio nazionale dei geologi, 2013, paras 29–31; C-910/19, Bankia, 2021, para. 22; C-561/19, Consorzio Italian Management, 2021, para. 55. 154 See C-104/10, Kelly, 2011, paras 60–66; C-521/20, OM (order), 2021, para. 12; C-561/19, Consorzio Italian Management, 2021, paras 53–54; C-83/21, Airbnb Ireland and Airbnb Payments UK, 2022, paras 83–84. 155 See C-236/02, Slob, 2004, paras 29–30; C-373/08, Hoesch Metals and Alloys, 2010, paras 57–60; C-656/19, BAKATI PLUS Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató, 2020, paras 29–32. The Court has made clear that this includes the grounds put forward to challenge the validity of a Union measure: see C-305/05, Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone and Others, 2007, paras 17–19; C-390/06, Nuova Agricast, 2008, paras 42–44; C-802/19, Firma Z, 2021, para. 37.

The Initiative for Requesting a Preliminary Ruling 75 before it’.156 Conversely, the Court will allow an order for reference from the referring court supplementing its initial request for a preliminary ruling.157 (2) Court of Justice may reformulate questions This does not mean that the Court of Justice will refrain from giving a more precise definition of the subject-matter of the reference for a preliminary ruling or even from altering it where this appears necessary in order to obtain a helpful answer, namely, an answer which the national court can use.158 It will do this where the questions referred are too vague, for instance, where they do not refer specifically to any provision or principle of Union law,159 or are deficient in other respects.160 In such cases, the Court will specify and flesh out the questions in the light of the particulars set out in the order for reference and in the national case-file.161 However, the adjustment of the questions referred must always be consonant with the actual objective of the referring court, which precludes any change running contrary to that court’s intention. Thus, if the referring court has explicitly stated in its order for reference that there was no necessity to ask a particular question or if the referring court has implicitly refused to submit a question to the Court that was raised by one of the parties, the Court is precluded from answering that question or from taking it into account in the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling.162 Conversely, in a case in which the national court had not formulated any question, but had simply referred the parties to the Court, the Court itself defined the question of interpretation of Union law, which had in fact arisen on the basis of the order for reference and the case-file directed to the Court through the Registry.163 This is because the Court has jurisdiction to extract from all the factors provided by the referring court, and in particular the statement of reasons for the order of

156 247/86, Alsatel, 1988, para. 8. 157 See C-824/18, A.B. and Others, 2021, paras 54–59. 158 See C‑674/18 and C‑675/18, EM, 2020, paras 44–45; C-556/19, Eco TLC, 2020, paras 18–22; C-663/18, B.S., 2020, paras 44–45; C-269/19, Banca B., 2020, paras 24–26; C-398/19, BY, 2020, para 35–38; C-617/19, Granarolo, 2021, paras 32–36; C-937/19, KA, 2021, para. 23; C-742/19, B.K., 2021, para. 31; C-190/20, DocMorris, 2021, para. 23; C-592/20, NT (order), 2021, paras 18–19; C-682/18 and C-683/18, Peterson, 2021, paras 119–124; C-709/20, CG, 2021, para. 61; C-368/20 and C-369/20, NW, 2022, para. 50; C-559/20, Koch Media, 2022, para. 46; C-267/20, Volvo and DAF Trucks, 2022, paras 28–30; C-745/21, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid, 2023, para. 43. 159 See C-410/18, Aubriet, 2019, paras 20–23; C-454/19, ZW, 2020, para. 28; C-494/21, Eircom, 2022, para. 32. 160 For example, this can involve considering additional points or issues (see C-142/09, Lahousse and Lavichy, 2010, paras 35–48; C-307/09 to C-309/09, Vicoplus and Others, 2011, paras 22–25); ‘tightening up’ the question(s) referred (see C-210/04, FCE Bank, 2006, paras 21–24; C-227/08, Martín Martín, 2009, paras 17–18); ‘knocking out’ certain points of Union law (see C-338/09, Yellow Cab Verkehrbetrieb, 2010, paras 24–27; C-58/10 to C-68/10, Monsanto and Others, 2011, paras 57–58); reframing as a matter of the principles of equivalence and of effectiveness (see C-246/09, Bulicke, 2010, paras 21–23); reframing the principle of effectiveness as the principle of effective judicial protection (see C-279/09, DEB, 2010, paras 27–33); or identifying specific provisions of the Union act concerned (see C-130/20, YJ, 2021, paras 15–18; C-176/20, SC Avio Lucos, 2022, paras 25–29). 161 See C-125/18, del Moral Guasch, 2020, paras 27–37; C-83/19, C‑127/19, C‑195/19, C‑291/19, C‑355/19, and C‑397/19, Asociaţia ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’, 2021, paras 131–132; C-762/19, ‘CV-Online Latvia’, 2021, paras 16–20. 162 C‑412/17 and C‑474/17, Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2018, para. 41; C-274/18, Schuch-Ghannadan, 2019, para. 31. 163 See 101/63, Wagner, 1964 ECR 195, 199–200.

3.20

76 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE reference, the elements of Union law which require an interpretation in the light of the subject-matter of the dispute in the main proceedings.164 Sometimes, too, a great many questions are referred, and the Court prunes them back somewhat;165 or the questions are put in a very complicated way (for example, divided into propositions and sub-propositions), and the Court has first to identify the core issue(s) raised.166 This exercise often makes it unnecessary to answer some of the questions referred.167 Furthermore, under established case-law the Court of Justice has a duty to interpret all provisions of Union law which the national court needs in order to decide the case pending before it, even if those provisions are not expressly indicated in the questions.168 The Court of Justice can therefore take account of provisions of Union law not mentioned by the national court in formulating its questions,169 even where the referring court has formally limited its question to the interpretation of a specific provision.170 This arises on the Court’s own motion, sometimes on the basis of the written

164 See C-263/18, Nederlands Uitgeversverbond, 2019, paras 31–32; C-184/19, Hecta Viticol, 2020, para. 30; C-597/19, Mircom International Content Management & Consulting, 2021, para. 39; C-550/19, EV, 2021, para. 37; C-937/19, KA, 2021, para. 23; C-152/20 and C-218/20, DG, 2021, para. 33; C-72/22 PPU, M.A., 2022, para. 51; C-576/20, CC, 2022, para. 36; C-134/20, IR, 2022, para. 33; C-312/21, Tráficos Manuel Ferrer, 2023, para. 32; C-666/21, Åklagarmyndigheten, 2023, para. 22. In particular, where a preliminary question merely refers to ‘Union law’ without stating which provisions are at issue, the Court finds it necessary to extract from all the factors provided by the referring court, particularly from the statement of grounds contained in the order for reference, the provisions requiring interpretation: see C-350/07, Kattner Stahlbau, 2009, paras 26–27; see also C‑83/19, C‑127/19, C‑195/19, C‑291/19, C‑355/19, and C‑397/19, Asociaţia ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’, 2021, paras 139–143, in which the questions referred in broad terms to Arts 2 and 4(3) TEU. Furthermore, it is possible that the Court of Justice will examine of its own motion a question of interpretation (not raised by the national court) ‘in the context of the close cooperation which it is required to establish with national courts’ (see C-295/97, Piaggio, 1999, para. 25). The Court may sometimes also make supplementary ‘observations’ with regard to questions of Union law not raised by the national court in its preliminary question to which parties have drawn attention in their observations (see C-131/97, Carbonari and Others, 1999, paras 52 et seq.). Furthermore, the Court may, on the basis of an assessment of the factual and legal context in the order for reference, come to the conclusion that the provision of Union law of which an interpretation is sought is not applicable to the facts of the case and subsequently substitute that provision with a provision of Union law that is applicable (see C-710/18, WN, 2020, paras 18–22). But see C-307/95, Max Mara (order), 1995, paras 5–10, in which the Court found that the order for reference did not contain specific questions addressed to the Court and that it did not allow the questions on which the national court wished the Court to give a preliminary ruling to be discerned. The national court’s order for reference also did not contain enough information to permit the Court to give a useful interpretation. Accordingly, the Court held that the national court’s request was manifestly inadmissible. 165 See C-115/10, Bábolna, 2011, para. 32; C-419/14, WebMindLicenses, 2015, para. 33; C-74/18, A, 2019, para. 24; C-274/21 and C-275/21, EPIC Financial Consulting, 2022. 166 See C‑115/16, C‑118/16, C‑119/16, and C‑299/16, N Luxembourg 1, 2019, para. 82; C‑116/16 and C‑117/16, Skatteministeriet, 2019, para. 67; C-482/18, Google Ireland, 2020, paras 19–23; C-113/19, Luxaviation (order), 2020, paras 28, 35, 43, 50, 54. This may also involve the Court having to reshuffle the order of the questions: see C-347/17, A and Others, 2019, paras 32–33; C-496/18 and C‑497/18, Hungeod and Others, 2020, para. 67. The Court does so in cases where the answer given to a further question has an impact on the jurisdiction of the Court or the rules applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings: see C-585/17, Finanzamt Linz, 2019, para. 64. 167 See C-229/08, Wolf, 2010, para. 47; C-147/08, Römer, 2011, para. 65. 168 See C-15/15, New Valmar, 2016, para. 28; C-897/19 PPU, I.N., 2020, para. 43; C-597/19, Mircom International Content Management & Consulting, 2021, para. 38; C-23/20, Simonsen & Weel, 2021, para. 81; C-937/19, KA, 2021, para. 22; C-376/21, Obshtina Razlog, 2022, para. 51; C-24/21, PH, 2022, paras 36–37. 169 See C-387/01, Weigel, 2004, para. 44; C-122/17, Smith, 2018, para. 34; C-110/20, Regione Puglia, 2022, para. 51; C-78/21, PrivatBank and Others, 2023, para. 35; C-394/21, Bursa Română de Mărfuri, 2023, para. 40. 170 See C‑512/11 and C‑513/11, 2014, TSN, 2014, para. 33; C-450/18, WA, 2019, para. 26; C-378/19, Prezident Slovenskej republiky, 2020, para. 29; C-452/20, PJ, 2022, para. 19; C-232/20, NP, 2022, para. 49; C-242/22 PPU, TL, 2022, para. 37; C-58/21, Rechtsanwaltskammer Wien, 2022, para. 41.

The Initiative for Requesting a Preliminary Ruling 77 or oral submissions of the interested parties within the meaning of Art. 23 of the Statute.171 Such a situation typically involves the interpretation of additional172 or different173 provisions of the Union act concerned.174 By the same token, the Court may limit,175 supplement,176 or even replace the provisions indicated by the national court in its question altogether by those provisions of either secondary or primary Union law (including general principles of Union law) which are actually relevant.177 In one case before the expiry of the ECSC Treaty, the Court even referred to the relevant provisions of the ECSC Treaty when it found that such Treaty was applicable in the main proceedings, and not the EC Treaty to which the national court referred in its question.178 It bears emphasis in this regard that the Court of Justice’s inclusion of provisions of Union law not mentioned by the national court does not alter the terms of the order for reference, but is intended to be of help to the national court in deciding the case before it. A classic scenario arising in the case-law is where the referring court has framed its question in relation to certain Treaty provisions (usually in connection with free movement and/or Union citizenship), and the Court of Justice hones in on the particular provision(s) applicable in the main proceedings.179 It may be the case that the Court ‘knocks out’ Art. 18 TFEU, which lays down a general prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality, since it only applies independently in the absence of specific provisions on non-discrimination, so once the applicable free movement provision is identified which contains specific rules on discrimination, that provision does not

171 See C-88/99, Roquette Frères, 2000, paras 18–19, where the Court of Justice reformulated the question referred to it because it appeared from the observations submitted to the Court that the interpretation given by the referring judge to the rule of national law at issue in the proceedings did not accord with the case-law of the highest court in the Member State concerned. See also C-392/05, Alevizos, 2007, paras 63–65; C-30/10, Andersson, 2011, paras 20–21; C-375/20, Liberty Seguros, 2021, para. 52. This is so, despite protestations by such parties that the Court may not of its own motion raise a question which was not touched on by the referring court: see C-321/03, Dyson, 2007, paras 21–26. 172 See C-841/19, JL (order), 2021, para. 34; C-504/19, Banco de Portugal, 2021, paras 30–31; C-762/19, ‘CV- Online Latvia’, 2021, paras 16–20; C-210/20, Rad Service, 2021, para. 29; C-597/19, Mircom International Content Management & Consulting, 2021, para. 40. 173 See C-152/20 and C-218/20, DG, 2021, paras 34–35; C-550/19, EV, 2021, para. 44. 174 This can also involve consideration of additional provisions of national law at issue in the main proceedings: see C-239/09, Seydaland Vereingte Agrarbetriebe, 2010, para. 29. 175 See C-372/19, Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers, 2020, paras 20–24; C-473/19 and C-474/19, Föreningen Skydda Skogen, 2021, para. 48; C-27/20, PF, 2021, para. 26; C-242/22 PPU, TL, 2022, paras 42–43; C-205/21, Ministerstvo na vatreshnite raboti, 2023, para. 77. Where provisions of the Charter reiterate the content of provisions of Union free movement law, the Court will limit its answer to an interpretation of those free movement law provisions: see C-166/20, BB, 2021, paras 30–34. 176 See C-503/09, Stewart, 2011, paras 79–81; C-434/09, McCarthy, 2011, paras 24–26; C-437/09, AG2R Prévoyance, 2011, paras 23–27; C-710/19, G.M.A., 2020, paras 21–23. 177 See C-115/08, ĈEZ, 2009, paras 84–86; C-25/10, Missionswerk Werner Heukelbach, 2011, paras 13–17; C-23/20, Simonsen & Weel, 2021, paras 81–83; C-203/21, DELTA STROY 2003, 2022, paras 28–50. But see C-124/97, Läuarä and Others, 1999, para. 23: in its questions, the national court referred not only to specific Treaty provisions, but also to ‘any other article of the EC Treaty’ without providing any further details in that regard, either in the reasoning or in the operative part of its order. The Court was unable to rule on the question whether any Treaty provisions other than those specifically named precluded national legislation of the type at issue in the main proceedings. 178 See C-200/97, Ecotrade, 1998, paras 29–30; see also C-115/08, ČEZ, 2009, paras 82–86, in which the Court examined relevant principles and provisions of the EAEC Treaty, while the national court had referred in its order for reference only to provisions of the EC Treaty. 179 See C-132/10, Halley, 2011, paras 16–21; C-27/20, PF, 2021, paras 21–22.

78 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE apply.180 Another classic scenario is when the Union law provision or act whose interpretation is sought has been replaced by another provision or act, or a previous Union act is found to be applicable instead, so that the relevant act is substituted or added, depending on the relevant time-frame.181 In this way, as a practical matter, the Court’s reformulation of the questions is sometimes linked to its assessment of the substance of the case, even if it is precluded from assessing facts and interpreting points of national law. For example, this can occur when the facts of the case demonstrate that certain Union rules are inapplicable to the main proceedings,182 or that the hypothesis upon which the questions are posed does not apply in the main proceedings,183 which then necessitates the reformulation of the questions referred. This may also relate to the temporal application of the Union rules to be interpreted, since, in the Court’s evaluation of the question, it may find that the events at issue in the main proceedings somehow rule out the interpretation of certain provisions of Union law—for instance, that the interpretation of a particular directive is not necessary in view of the fact that the period of transposition had not yet expired on the date of the events at issue in the main proceedings.184 Additionally, the Court sometimes reworks the wording of the questions referred on account of the limits placed by the Treaties on its jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings. It has to do so because the Treaties do not expressly or by implication prescribe a particular form in which a national court must present its request for a preliminary ruling, and therefore it falls to the Court of Justice itself to decide ‘on that request only insofar as it has jurisdiction to do so, that is to say, only insofar as the decision relates to the interpretation’ of Union law.185 Further to this, the Court has not drawn the demarcation line strictly between the interpretation of Union law and the assessment of the validity of acts of the Union institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies.186 Questions that ostensibly relate to the interpretation of Union law but, having regard to the whole content of the order

180 See C-703/17, Krah, 2019, para. 19; C-581/18, RB, 2020, para. 31; C-709/20, CG, 2021, paras 65–66; C-274/20, GN and Others, 2021, para. 18; C-731/21, Caisse nationale d’assurance pension, 2022, para. 28. Conversely, despite the reference to the free movement provisions in the question, the Court may find such provisions inapplicable and that Art. 18 TFEU applies instead, even if not mentioned explicitly in the reference: see C-382/08, Neukirchinger, 2011, para. 30. 181 See C-136/17, GC, 2019, paras 32–33; C-610/18, AFMB and Others, 2020, paras 32–37; C-822/19, Direcţia Generală Regională a Finanţelor Publice Braşov, 2021, para. 32; C-682/18 and C-683/18, Peterson, 2021, para. 59; C-184/20, OT, 2022, paras 55–59; C-267/21, Uniqa Asigurări, 2022, paras 21–24. 182 See C-317/08 to C-320/08, Alassini and Others, 2010, paras 31–37; C-190/20, DocMorris, 2021, paras 19–28; C-352/20, HOLD Alapkezelő Befektetési Alapkezelő, 2022, paras 35–37. 183 See C-568/08, Combinatie Spijker Infrabouw-De Jonge Konstruktie and Others, 2010, paras 73–74. 184 See C-499/04, Werhof, 2006, paras 14–16; C‑64/18, C‑140/18, C‑146/18 and C‑148/18, Maksimovic, 2019, para. 27. 185 13/61, Bosch and Others, 1962. See also C-237/04, Enirisorse, 2006, paras 23–24; C-428/06 to C-434/06, UGT-Rioja and Others, 2008, paras 77–78; C-140/09, Fallimento Traghetti del Mediterraneo, 2010, paras 22–24. 186 See C-25/11, Varzim Sol—Turismo, Jogo e Animação, 2012, para. 28. For a critical appraisal, see C-30/02 Recheio, AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer Opinion, 2004, points 23–36; see also C-449/06, Gysen, AG Mengozzi Opinion, 2008, particularly points 40–45.

The Initiative for Requesting a Preliminary Ruling 79 for reference, rather probe the validity of a Union act, are also answered as such.187 Accordingly, the Court has gone so far as to expand a question of interpretation to cover the validity of a Commission decision that was not mentioned in the national court’s order for reference and of which the national court was probably unaware. The Court nevertheless held that the requirement for a ‘useful’ answer warranted its raising and answering the question of the validity of the decision in question. The Court also invoked reasons of procedural economy insofar as the question of the validity of the Commission decision in question had already been raised in an action for annulment brought by the Netherlands in relation to which proceedings had been suspended pending the Court’s judgment in the preliminary ruling proceedings.188 The opposite situation may also arise, that is to say, the Court may consider whether the question of validity is based on a correct interpretation of the Union act at issue.189 It may then find—after interpreting the act in question—that it is no longer necessary to inquire into its validity inasmuch as the argument that primary Union law has been breached is founded upon a different interpretation of the relevant Union act. If it so finds, the Court will also not go into the consequences that would have ensued from a finding that the act was invalid.190 However, in the event that the questions referred for a preliminary ruling are concerned with the validity of an act of individual application against which no action for annulment has been brought within the time-limits prescribed in the sixth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU, the Court of Justice will refuse to alter the substance of the questions referred insofar as the validity of the contested act can no longer be called in question (see para. 10.11).191 In those circumstances, to alter the substance of the questions referred would be incompatible with the Court’s function under Art. 267 TFEU and with its duty to ensure that the governments of the Member States and parties concerned are given the opportunity to submit observations under Art. 23 of the Statute, bearing in mind that only the order for reference is notified to the interested parties.192 In the light of the order for reference, they may therefore confine their observations to the validity of the contested act by arguing solely that the questions raised no longer require an answer. To amend the scope of the order for reference would infringe the right conferred on them by Art. 23 of the Statute.193 187 See 16/65, Schwarze, 1965 ECR 877, 886–887; C-212/19, Ministre de l’Agriculture et de l’Alimentation, 2020, paras 26–30; C-181/20, VYSOČINA WIND, 2022, paras 34–37. 188 See C-61/98, De Haan Beheer, 1999; see also C-383/98, Polo/Lauren, 2000, para. 23, in which the Court held that the question of interpretation also called the validity of the act of the institution into question and therefore ruled on its validity as well as on the question of interpretation. 189 See C-361/19, De Ruiter, 2021, paras 22–28, in which the Court reformulated a question regarding the validity of a regulation into a question regarding the interpretation of a regulation because the referring court based its question regarding the validity of the regulation on an incorrect premise about the interpretation of that regulation. See also C-574/20, Finanzamt Österreich (order), 2023, para. 37. 190 See C-334/95, Krüger, 1997, paras 21, 35. 191 See C-135/16, Georgsmarienhütte and Others, 2018, para. 37; C-212/19, Ministre de l’Agriculture et de l’Alimentation, 2020, para. 31. 192 See C-178/95, Wiljo, 1997, para. 30; C-239/99, Nachi Europe, 2001, paras 28–40; C-241/01, National Farmers’ Union, 2002, para. 34; C‑632/19 and C‑633/19, Federale Overheidsdienst Financiën (order), 2020, para. 27. 193 See C-112/20, M.A., 2021, para. 21.

80 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE 3.21

(3) Requirements for an order for reference In Union Laitière Normande,194 the Court held in the first place that ‘the need to afford a helpful interpretation of [Union] law makes it essential to define the legal context in which the interpretation requested should be placed’. Although in that case the national court had not stated why it sought an interpretation of Union law, the reasons for the questions referred were sufficiently clear from the case-file submitted to the Court and it consequently appeared that a ‘helpful interpretation of [Union] law’ was possible and that the Court could give a ruling. Thereafter, in Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Association,195 the Court enlarged upon that basic requirement: ‘From that aspect it might be convenient, in certain circumstances, for the facts in the case to be established and for questions of purely national law to be settled at the time the reference is made to the Court of Justice so as to enable the latter to take cognizance of all the features of fact and of law which may be relevant to the interpretation of [Union] law which it is called upon to give.’ This sounded like encouragement to formulate the order for reference in concrete terms, yet without taking away the national court’s discretion to determine at what stage in the main proceedings it needed a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice. Plainly, this is a compromise: the national court was given good advice in quite strong terms, but, at the same time, failure to follow it did not make the request for a preliminary ruling inadmissible. Where the Court of Justice could fill the gaps in the order for reference by using information gleaned from the national court’s case-file or adduced in the proceedings before the Court, it was still generally prepared to answer the questions referred on that basis. Nonetheless, the Court intimated that it was not entirely happy about this on account of the risk that the quality of judicial debate will suffer if it is based on insufficiently informative orders for reference. Indeed, the information provided in orders for reference not only enables the Court to give useful answers but also serves to ensure that the governments of the Member States and other interested persons are given an opportunity to submit observations in accordance with Article 23 of the Statute [ . . . ]. It is for the Court to ensure that that opportunity is safeguarded, given that, under Article 23, only the orders for reference are notified to the interested parties [ . . . ].196

194 See 244/78, Union Laitière Normande, 1979, para. 5. 195 See 36/80 and 71/80, Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Association, 1981, paras 7–9. 196 C-434/15, Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi, 2017, para. 25; C-656/19, BAKATI PLUS Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató, 2020, para. 33; C-505/19, WS, 2021, para. 53; C-326/19, EB, 2021, para. 37; C-471/20, Centre d’Enseignement Secondaire Saint-Vincent de Soignies (order), 2021, para. 48; C-882/19, Suma, 2021, para. 25; C- 265/20, FN, 2022, para. 26. Therefore, the fact that the parties to the main proceedings know the subject-matter of the dispute and its factual and legal context does not make up for the non-compliance of an order for reference with the requirements laid down in Art. 94 of the CJ Rules of Procedure: see C-716/19, ZA (order), 2020, para. 23. For the same reason, a question will be declared inadmissible if it merely refers, as regards the factual context, to a judgment of another national court or a decision of a national competition authority (see C-438/03, C-439/03, C- 509/03, and C-2/04, Cannito and Others (order), 2004, paras 8–12), or to the case-file, even where this file has been submitted to the Court (see C-471/20, Centre d’Enseignement Secondaire Saint-Vincent de Soignies (order), 2021, para. 49). For similar reasons, the Court will not accede to a request made by a party in its observations to reformulate the content of the questions referred (see C-316/10, Danske Svineproducenter, 2011, para. 33). Conversely, the fact that parties were in a position to state their views on the questions referred effectively in their observations submitted to the Court is an indication that the factual and legal context was sufficiently described in the order for

The Initiative for Requesting a Preliminary Ruling 81 Art. 94 of the CJ Rules of Procedure now clearly indicates what is expected of national courts when submitting preliminary questions to the Court. This provision stipulates that, apart from the questions referred, an order for reference must contain: (a) a summary of the subject-matter of the dispute and the relevant findings of fact as determined by the referring court or tribunal, or at least an account of the facts on which the questions are based; (b) the tenor of any national provisions applicable in the case and, where appropriate, the relevant national case-law; and (c) a statement of the reasons which prompted the referring court or tribunal to inquire about the interpretation or validity of certain provisions of Union law, and the relationship between those provisions and the national legislation applicable to the main proceedings.197 These minimum requirements emanate from the Court’s case-law and are further reflected in the Recommendations to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings, particularly point 15 of those recommendations (see para. 22.01).198 National courts ought to be aware of these requirements and are bound to observe them ‘scrupulously’.199 The Court will not refrain from declaring an order for reference inadmissible when drawn up in disregard of the requirements laid down in Art. 94 of the

reference (see C-450/09, Schröder, 2011, paras 19–21; C-128/09 to C-131/09, C-134/09, and C-135/09 Boxus and Others, 2011, para. 27; C-25/11, Varzim Sol—Turismo, Jogo e Animação, 2012, paras 30–34). 197 See C-686/18, OC and Others, 2020, paras 58–61; C-105/20, UF (order), 2021, para. 30: While the order for reference established a certain link between the rule of Union law of which an interpretation was sought and the national legislation applicable to the dispute, the Court nevertheless declared the reference manifestly inadmissible because the link appeared largely insufficient and was only described in an excessively brief manner. 198 See C-378/20, Stadtapotheke E (order), 2021, para. 22; C-307/19, Obala i lučice, 2021, para. 50. See Recommendations to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings (OJ 2019 C380/1). 199 See C-406/15, Milkova, 2017, para. 72; C-13/19, Ibercaja Banco (order), 2021, para. 78; C-81/20, SC Mitliv Exim (order), 2021, para. 30; C-265/20, FN, 2022, para. 25; C-706/21, Petróleos de Portugal—Petrogal (order), 2022, para. 24; C-483/22, KI (order), 2023, para. 18. In specific areas of Union law, such as competition law, which is of a very factual nature, an even stricter obligation seems to exist (see C-380/05, Centro Europa 7, 2008, para. 58; C-74/16, Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania, 2017, para. 26; C-702/20 and C-17/21, DOBELES HES, 2023, para. 86). Thus, an order for reference regarding the interpretation of the notion ‘abuse of dominant position’ must contain a minimum of factual, economic, or legal details concerning the premise or assumption that a position of individual or collective dominance exists (see C-329/20, Raiffeisen Bank lnternational (order), 2021, para. 21). It should at least include information regarding the definition of the relevant markets and the calculation of market shares (see C-234/12, Sky Italia, 2013, para. 32; C-318/20, Colt Technology Services (order), 2020, para. 22). Also, in other areas of law, the Court has specifically indicated which facts should be included in the order for reference. Thus, a reference order asking the Court about the application of Art. 54 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, which deals with the ne bis in idem principle, should set out with sufficient detail the factual circumstances underlying the criminal proceedings brought in the two Member States concerned, and the reasons why the referring court might be led to consider that those circumstances are inextricably linked: see C-89/20, GR (order), 2020, paras 29–30. This line of case-law might indicate that the Court takes a stricter view in assessing the admissibility of references for a preliminary ruling generally. For example, in relation to references for a preliminary ruling on validity see C-547/14, Philip Morris, 2016, para. 50. This would be coherent with the Court’s approach regarding jurisdiction, which has become more stringent in the past years: see C-268/15, Ullens de Schooten, 2016, paras 54–55; see also, in that regard, C-497/12, Gullotta, AG Wahl Opinion, 2015, points 37–44; C-303/16, Solar Electric Martinique, AG Mengozzi Opinion, 2017, points 33–34. Conversely, the obligation seems less demanding where the context of the case is already largely familiar to the Court because of a preceding reference for a preliminary ruling: see C-107/14, 3D I (order), 2014, para. 12; C-225/15, Politanò, 2019, para. 24; C-706/21, Petróleos de Portugal—Petrogal (order), 2022, para. 28; see also, with respect to cases that are joined, C‑407/19 and C‑471/19, Katoen Natie Bulk Terminals, 2021, para. 52.

82 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE CJ Rules of Procedure.200 From recent practice, it appears that the Court pays particular attention to compliance with Art. 94(c) of the CJ Rules of Procedure.201 It is thus important for a national court to explain clearly its reasons for referring a question to the Court of Justice.202

3.22

(4) Clear description of the factual and legal context It follows from the abovementioned overview that it is essential203 for the national court, in order to enable the Court to give a useful interpretation of Union law, to provide a sufficiently clear description in its order for reference of the factual and legal context of the main proceedings.204 In order to ascertain whether the information supplied in the order for reference satisfies such conditions, the nature and the scope of the questions referred are taken into consideration.205 Where the Court does not have the necessary factual and legal information to enable it to give a useful answer to the question referred, it will declare the question inadmissible.206 This does not mean, however, that the referring court must make all the findings of fact and of law required by its judicial function before it may bring the matter before the Court. It is sufficient that both the subject-matter of the dispute in the main proceedings and the main issues raised for the Union legal order may be understood from the reference for a preliminary ruling.207 200 See C-910/19, Bankia, 2021, para. 24; C-221/21 and C-222/21, Správa železnic, státní organizace (order), 2022, para. 40; C-673/20, EP, 2022, para. 87. 201 See C-74/16, Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania, 2017, para. 27; C‑24/16 and C‑25/16, Nintendo, 2017, para. 110; C-378/17, Minister for Justice and Equality and Commissioner of the Garda Síochána, 2018, para. 28; C-520/19, Armostav Místek (order), 2019, paras 15 20; C‑924/19 PPU and C‑925/19 PPU, FMS, 2020, paras 172–174; C-603/19, TG, 2020, paras 26–42; C-771/19, NAMA and Others, 2021, paras 25–26; C-307/19, Obala i lučice, 2021, paras 51–53; C-81/20, SC Mitliv Exim (order), 2021, para. 35; C-636/20, Tolnatext (order), 2021, paras 18–24; C-428/19, OL, 2021, paras 66–68; C-236/20, PG and Others, 2022, paras 18–25; C-674/20, Airbnb Ireland, 2022, paras 35–37; C-638/21, Rozhlas a televízia Slovenska (order), 2022, paras 28–29; C-706/21, Petróleos de Portugal—Petrogal (order), 2022, paras 30–31; C-506/22, SNI (order), 2023, paras 23–29. 202 For examples in which the Court has explicitly recognized that the referring court has met the requirements laid down in Art. 94 of the CJ Rules of Procedure, see C-376/18, Slovenské elektrárne, 2019, paras 26–28; C-454/19, ZW, 2020, paras 23–24; C-799/19, NI, 2020, para. 46; C-505/19, WS, 2021, para. 52; C-192/20, Prima banka Slovensko, 2021, paras 19–25; C-719/20, Comune di Lerici, 2022, paras 26–29; C-205/21, Ministerstvo na vatreshnite raboti, 2023, paras 55–59. In a case in which a referring court merely repeated the arguments of the parties to the main proceedings regarding the compatibility of national law with Union law, the Court nevertheless declared the order for reference admissible because it considered that the referring court had implicitly adopted the doubts regarding the compatibility of national law with Union law as its own: see C-463/19, Syndicat CFTC du personnel de la Caisse primaire d’assurance maladie de la Moselle, 2020, para. 41. 203 This is also stressed in the Recommendations to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings (n. 198), in particular point 9. 204 See C-307/19, Obala i lučice, 2021, para. 49; C-303/20, Ultimo Portfolio Investment, 2021, para. 23; C-550/19, EV, 2021, para. 31. 205 See C-134/03, Viacom Outdoor, 2005, paras 23–25. In that case, the Court distinguished the legislative context, for which the order for reference contained a sufficiently clear and full description of the relevant provisions of national law concerned, from the factual context, regarding which the order for reference was insufficient. While the Court can make use of the written and oral procedure in order to remedy deficiencies, provided that the rights of interested parties are safeguarded under Art. 23 of the Statute, this may not suffice (see C-379/08, ERG and Others, 2010, paras 75–78). 206 See C-222/05 to C-225/05, van der Weerd and Others, 2007, para. 22; C-492/09, Agricola Esposito (order), 2010, paras 20–26; C-185/12, Ciampaglia (order), 2012, paras 8–9; C-265/20, FN, 2022, paras 27–32; C-706/21, Petróleos de Portugal—Petrogal (order), 2022, paras 26–29. 207 See C-579/18, Ministère public, 2019, para. 21; C-500/18, AU, 2020, para. 42; C-463/19, Syndicat CFTC du personnel de la Caisse primaire d’assurance maladie de la Moselle, 2020, para. 39; C-581/19, Frenetikexito— Unipessoal Lda, 2021, para. 18; C-609/21, IP and Others (order), 2022, para. 24. Thus, where the order for reference lacks certain information relevant to the outcome of the case, the Court has deemed it admissible where it still allows the scope of the questions referred and the context in which they are asked to be determined: see C-395/08 and C-396/08, Bruno and Pettini, 2010, para. 20; C-207/16, Ministerio Fiscal, 2018, para. 46; C-719/18, Vivendi,

The Initiative for Requesting a Preliminary Ruling 83 (5) Inadmissibility of a reference Already in Telemarsicabruzzo,208 the Court converted the good advice to national courts into a genuine requirement which, if not complied with, will cause the preliminary reference to be inadmissible. The Court held that the need to provide an interpretation of Union law that would be of use to the national court made it necessary that the national court define the factual and legislative context of the questions it was asking or, at the very least, explain the factual circumstances on which those questions were based. In fact, to a limited extent the Court had previously refused to consider particular parts of preliminary references where they were insufficiently precise, but this had never resulted in the whole of the request for a preliminary ruling being declared inadmissible.209 The reason for this change was that the Court considered it unrealistic—particularly in the light of the complex factual and legal situations arising in competition law, which was the subject of the main proceedings in Telemarsicabruzzo—to expect it to fill the lacunae in the order for reference (which was virtually unreasoned) with sufficient certainty from the information in the file provided by the national court and the observations submitted to the Court by the parties to the main proceedings, the Italian Government, and the Commission pursuant to what is now Art. 23 of the Statute.210 The risk that the Court’s judgment would be of no assistance to the national court was too great and hence cooperation with the referring court could not serve its purpose. The Court declined to give potentially ineffective rulings which would merely serve as an ‘opinion’ for a hypothetical case and not contribute towards the determination of the main proceedings. In 2020, para. 35; C-743/18, LSEZ SIA ‘Elme Messer Metalurgs’, 2020, paras 42–43; C-475/20 to C-482/20, Admiral Gaming Network, 2022, paras 29–30. 208 C-320/90 to C-322/90, Telemarsicabruzzo and Others, 1993, para. 5. See also C-378/93, La Pyramide, 1994, para. 17; C-124/08 and C-125/08, Snauwaert and Others and Deschaumes, 2009, para. 15; C-332/20, Roma Multiservizi, 2022, para. 43. It is, however, sufficient if the order for reference ‘contains the essential circumstances of the dispute in the main proceedings’ (see C-181/97, Van der Kooy, 1999, para. 29); compare C-447/01, DLD Trading Company Import-Export (order), 2002, paras 8–20; C-430/01, Herbstrith (order), 2002, paras 7–19, in which the Court declared the question inadmissible on the grounds that the national court had not given details of the legislative context of the main proceedings, had merely summarized arguments of the parties to the main proceedings which described the dispute in contradictory ways, and had failed to specify the necessity for the preliminary ruling and its relevance. Moreover, the questions were formulated in general terms and did not refer to a specific provision of Union law on which an interpretation was requested. A subsequent new reference for a preliminary ruling from the national court was also declared inadmissible (see C-229/03, Herbstrith (order), 2004). See also C-28/98 and C-29/98, Charreire and Hirtsmann (order), 1999, paras 12–14, in which the Court held that the order for reference contained contradictory information and that it was therefore impossible to form a clear picture of the legal situation. Compare C-116/02, Gasser, 2003, paras 21–27, in which the Court held that a question was admissible even though it was based on the submissions of a party to the main proceedings, the merits of which the national court had not yet assessed. 209 See 52/76, Benedetti, 1977, paras 20–22; 205/82 to 215/82, Deutsche Milchkontor, 1983, para. 36; see also 222/78, ICAP, 1979, paras 19–20; 14/86, Pretore di Salò v X, 1987, para. 16; C-348/11, Thomson Sales Europe (order), 2012, paras 40–58. 210 See C-320/90 to C-322/90, Telemarsicabruzzo and Others, 1993, paras 6–8. See also C-134/03, Viacom Outdoor, 2005, paras 23–29; C-384/08, Attanasio Group, 2010, paras 32–34; see also C-180/98 to C-184/98, Pavlov and Others, 2000, paras 54–55, in which the Court found that the information provided in the order for reference was amplified by the case-file forwarded by the national court, by the written observations, and by the answers given to the questions asked by the Court, which were summarized in the Report for the Hearing and had been made available to the Member States and the other interested parties for the purposes of the hearing, at which they had an opportunity to amplify their observations. For those reasons, the Court rejected the argument that the question was inadmissible. See further C-176/96, Lehtonen and Castors Braine, 2000, para. 26; C-109/99, ABBOI, 2000, para. 43; C‑224/19 and C‑259/19, Caixabank, 2020, paras 44–45.

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84 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE subsequent cases, the Court has even gone so far as to decide that the preliminary reference was manifestly inadmissible for the same reasons (in orders given pursuant to Art. 53(2) of the CJ Rules of Procedure).211 The Court has recognized, however, that the requirement for the national court to define the factual and legislative context of the questions referred is less pressing where they relate to specific technical points and enable the Court to give a useful reply even where the national court has not given an exhaustive description of the legal and factual situation.212 The Court of Justice may also hold that a preliminary question is admissible in part. For example, in FDV,213 the Court accepted the admissibility of a preliminary question relating to the interpretation of Arts 34 and 36 TFEU, but observed that the national court had given no explanation of the reasons for which it raised the question of the interpretation of Arts 101 and 102 TFEU in connection with the matters of fact and law in the main proceedings. In the absence of such information the national court had failed to put the Court in a position to give an interpretation of those articles that could be of use to it. That question was therefore declared inadmissible.

E. Timing of a request for a preliminary ruling 3.24

(1) Discretion of the national court According to the case-law, national courts have the widest discretion in referring matters to the Court of Justice and they are free to exercise this discretion at every stage of the proceedings.214 The decision at which stage a reference should be made for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Art. 267 TFEU is thus dictated by considerations of procedural economy and utility to be weighed by the national court alone, and not the Court of Justice.215 The national court is ‘in the best position to appreciate at which stage of the proceedings it requires a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice’.216 211 See C-240/12, EBS (order), 2013, paras 10–23; C-368/12, Adiamix (order), 2013, para. 35; C-88/20, ENR Grenelle Habitat (order), 2021, para. 39. Where the necessary factual and legal context is insufficient, the Court may invite a national court to make a new order for reference: C-643/19, Resopre—Sociedade Revendedora de Aparelhos de Precisão (order), 2020, para. 31; C-716/19, AZ (order), 2020, para. 30; C-471/20, Centre d’Enseignement Secondaire Saint-Vincent de Soignies (order), 2021, para. 50; C-88/20, ENR Grenelle Habitat (order), 2021, para. 38; C-221/21 and C-222/21, Správa železnic, státní organizace (order), 2022, para. 41. 212 See C-316/93, Vaneetveld, 1994, para. 13; C-326/95, Banco de Fomento e Exterior (order), 1996, para. 8. 213 C-61/97, FDV, 1998, paras 9–10; see also C-399/98, Ordine degli Architetti and Others, 2001, paras 105–107; C-380/05, Centro Europa 7, 2008, paras 57–71; C-567/07, Woningstichting Sint Servatius, 2009, paras 54–56; C- 384/08, Attanasio Group, 2010, paras 32–35. This also applies to additional questions that are apparent from the order for reference even though they may not have appeared, strictly speaking, in the operative part of the reference: see C-470/04, N, 2006, paras 68–72. 214 See C‑52/16 and C‑113/16, ‘SEGRO’, 2018, para. 48; C-630/17, Milivojević, 2019, para. 46; C-407/18, Addiko Bank, 2019, para. 35; C-505/19, WS, 2021, para. 49; C-69/21, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid, 2022, para. 37. 215 See 14/86, Pretore di Salò v X, 1987, para. 11. That being said, the Court has indicated in its case-law that it might be convenient, depending on the circumstances of the case, for the facts to be established and the questions of purely national law to be settled at the time of the reference: see C-5/14, Kernkraftwerke Lippe-Ems, 2015, para. 31. 216 See 14/86, Pretore di Salò v X, 1987, para.11; see also 43/71, Politi, 1971, para. 5; C-176/96, Lehtonen and Castors Braine, 2000, paras 19–20. Accordingly, the choice of the most appropriate time to refer a question to the Court for a preliminary ruling lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national court (see C-60/02 X, 2004, para. 28).

The Initiative for Requesting a Preliminary Ruling 85 Nevertheless, the national court does not have unlimited latitude in this respect. In principle, the Court of Justice goes along with its assessment, unless it is manifestly premature. This will be clear from the content of the order for reference. If the national court has not yet sufficiently ascertained the factual and legal context of the case and therefore does not say anything about it in the order for reference, the Court is left uncertain about the way in which the preliminary ruling sought is intended to help resolve the main action pending before the national court. In those circumstances, there is a great risk that the Court will not reach a ‘helpful’ determination. The upshot would be that the preliminary ruling would be ignored as a purely hypothetical ‘opinion’ and the collaboration between the national court and the Court of Justice would not achieve its aim.217 In order to avoid this, the Court has gradually stepped up its requirements with regard to the content of the order for reference.218 The national court should make a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court only if it has determined the facts and non- Union law aspects of the case to such an extent that it can indicate precisely how the preliminary ruling sought is to be applied in the case before it. This inevitably restricts the national court’s latitude to choose the stage at which the request for a preliminary ruling is made. (2) Limits The Telemarsicabruzzo requirement (see para. 3.23) as to the precision of the order for reference in terms of its content does not negate the national court’s discretion in determining at what stage in the proceedings pending before it a reference should be made to the Court of Justice. It is sufficient for the national court to set out in the order for reference the factual and national legal premises or hypotheses underlying the questions referred, so as to enable the Court of Justice to arrive at a helpful answer. In contrast, the national court is not in principle required to have chosen between the premises or hypotheses at the time when it seeks the preliminary ruling. It may still be influenced by ‘considerations of procedural organization and efficiency’219 and await the Court’s answer to a preliminary question before making a definitive ruling on the factual and national legal aspects of the case.220 The only condition is that the order for reference should provide an interpretation of the various premises or hypotheses and explain the reasons why the national court is seeking a preliminary ruling, so as to make it clear in what way Union law is relevant in the case of each of those premises or hypotheses. It goes without saying that the national court must have fully examined the case in order to fulfil this condition. This is at the heart of the

217 See C-380/01, Schneider, 2004, paras 20–31; compare C-630/17, Milivojević, 2019, para. 47. 218 See para. 3.21. 219 36/80 and 71/80, Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Association, 1981, para. 8. 220 See C-439/08, VEBIC, 2010, 12471, paras 45–47; C-188/10 and C-189/10, Melki and Abdeli, 2010, para. 41; C-76/10, Pohotovost´ (order), 2010, para. 33; C-52/09, TeliaSonera Sverige, 2011, para. 17. This is also the case where an answer of the Court is necessary to discard a hypothesis regarding the interpretation of national law: see C-778/18, Association française des usagers de banques, 2020, paras 45–48.

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86 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE Telemarsicabruzzo requirement, which is designed to give rise to a genuine dialogue between courts. In one situation, the order for reference has to contain more than an exposition of the various factual and national legal premises or hypotheses underlying the case, together with the reasons for seeking the preliminary ruling. This is where it appears that Union law is not relevant in every eventuality to the decision in the main proceedings. In such a case, it is the national court’s task first to narrow down the legal debate to only those premises or hypotheses in which Union law is relevant in any event. In order to do so, it will perhaps have to make a full or partial determination of the facts and national legal aspects of the case before it makes a reference to the Court, which certainly restricts its discretion to determine at what stage the reference is made. The intention behind this restriction is to avoid a fruitless judgment from the Court in the event that the national court should subsequently find that Union law has no part to play at all, having regard to the facts or the relevant national law. Meilicke221 illustrates this. A German court had referred a long series of involved questions concerning the interpretation of the Second Company Law Directive222 in order to be able to rule on the compatibility with the directive of a principle of German company law enshrined in case-law. However, the parties to the main proceedings did not agree on whether that principle was applicable to the facts of the case. The national court had elected not to rule on that issue and first to submit the question of compatibility to the Court. Its rationale was that if it should become clear from the Court’s interpretation of the Second Company Law Directive that the principle of German company law conflicted therewith, the question as to the applicability of that principle to the facts of the case would be of no account, given that the principle would in any event have to yield to Union law, which took precedence. The Court of Justice was unable to accept the sequence of the national court’s decision-making on the grounds that if, conversely, it were to appear from the preliminary ruling that the principle of German company law was compatible with the Second Company Law Directive, the judgment of the Court of Justice would have no practical effect as a contribution to the resolution of the main proceedings, if at that stage the national court were to decide that under national law the principle laid down by case-law was not applicable to the facts of the case. The only way of eliminating the risk of a hypothetical ruling from the Court was to oblige the German court to determine the facts and to rule on the applicability of the principle of national law at issue before considering making a reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling.

221 C-83/91, Meilicke, 1992; see also C-153/00, der Weduwe, 2002; C-318/00, Bacardi-Martini and Cellier des Dauphins, 2003. 222 Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976 on coordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent (OJ 1977 L26/1).

The Initiative for Requesting a Preliminary Ruling 87 It should be borne in mind that, in preliminary ruling proceedings, any assessment of the facts in the case is a matter for the national court.223 The Court of Justice is empowered to rule on the interpretation or validity of Union law provisions only on the basis of the facts which the national court places before it.224

F. Annulment of a request for a preliminary ruling (1) General The Court considers that a request for a preliminary ruling made pursuant to Art. 267 TFEU continues ‘so long as the request of the national court has not been withdrawn by the court from which it emanates or has not been quashed on appeal by a superior court’.225 Consequently, the Court refuses to go into objections to its jurisdiction raised in observations submitted pursuant to Art. 23 of the Statute, claiming that the questions are no longer relevant, for example, on the ground that the national legislative provisions whose compatibility with Union law the preliminary reference seeks to assess have in the meantime been declared unconstitutional,226 or that the request for a preliminary ruling was the outcome of a decision which was not taken in accordance with the applicable national (procedural) law.227 As explained by the Court, ‘in view of the distribution of functions between itself and the national court, it is not for the Court to determine whether the decision whereby a matter is brought before it was taken in accordance with the rules of national law governing the organization of the courts and their procedure. The Court is therefore bound by a decision of a court or tribunal of a Member State referring a matter to it, insofar as that decision has not been rescinded on the basis of a means of redress provided for by national law.’228 However, the Court may find that the main proceedings are to no purpose and that for it to reply to the questions

223 See C-135/10, Società Consortile Fonografici, 2012, para. 66. See para. 6.22. 224 See C-30/93, AC-ATEL Electronics, 1994, paras 16–17; C-352/95, Phytheron International, 1997, paras 11–14; C-235/95, AGS Assedic Pas-de-Calais, 1998, para. 25; C-175/98 and C-177/98, Lirussi and Bizzaro, 1999, paras 36–39; C-9/02, De Lasteyrie du Saillant, 2004, para. 41; C-267/03, Lindberg, 2005, paras 41–42. 225 106/77, Simmenthal, 1978, para. 10; for some examples, see C-148/10, DHL International, 2011, para. 31; C-712/20, GJ (order), 2021; C-630/20, Deutsche Lufthansa (order), 2021. It should be mentioned that, according to Art. 100(1) of the CJ Rules of Procedure, the withdrawal of a request will, in principle, no longer be taken into account when notice of the date of delivery of the judgment has been served on the interested parties referred to in Art. 23 of the Statute. Art. 100(2) of those Rules adds, however, that the Court may at any time declare that the conditions of its jurisdiction are no longer fulfilled. See C-302/21, Banco Cetelem, 2022. 226 See 106/77, Simmenthal, 1978, paras 8–12. However, the Court can request a clarification from the national court (Art. 101 of the CJ Rules of Procedure): see C-436/08 and C-437/08, Haribo and Österreichische Salinen, 2011, para. 19; C-262/21 PPU, A, 2021, para. 31. A party cannot request such clarifications: see C-351/14, Rodríguez Sánchez, 2016, para. 50. 227 See 65/81, Reina, 1982, para. 7; C-62/14, Gauweiler, 2015, para. 26; C-381/16, Benjumea Bravo de Laguna, 2017, para. 26; C-621/18, Wightman, 2018, para. 30; C-584/18, Blue Air—Airline Management Solutions, 2020, para. 41; C-233/19, B., 2020, para. 36. 228 65/81, Reina, 1982, para. 7; see also C-39/94, SFEI and Others, 1996, para. 24; C-371/97, Gozza and Others, 2000, para. 30; C-309/02, Radlberger Getränkegesellschaft and S. Spitz, 2004, para. 26; C-213/04, Burtscher, 2005, paras 30–32; C-238/05, Asnef-Equifax and Others, 2006, para. 14; C‑748/19 to C‑754/19, WB and Others, 2021, para. 44. If, however, the Court of Justice finds that, after making a reference for a preliminary ruling, the national court considers that it cannot terminate the main proceedings even though the defendant has acceded to the applicant’s claims, on the ground that Union law precludes it from doing so, it considers itself entitled to inquire into the reasons given by the national court. If it appears that Union law does not preclude the national court from

3.26

88 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE referred would therefore be of no avail to the national court. In those circumstances, it will hold that the reference is to no purpose and that there is no need to reply to the questions referred.229

3.27

(2) Appeal brought against the order for reference In order for a request for a preliminary ruling to be admissible, it is not necessary that the order for reference should have the force of res judicata under national law.230 Union law does not in principle restrict the remedies available under national law against the order for reference.231 However, in Cartesio,232 the Court of Justice made clear that the jurisdiction of the national court to submit a preliminary reference cannot be called into question by the application of national rules that allow for the order for reference alone being subject to a limited appeal, where such rules permit the appellate court to vary the order for reference, to set aside the reference, and to order the referring court to resume the domestic law proceedings. At the national level, this is further illustrated by the judgment of 11 February 2010 of the Danish Supreme Court in Case no. 344/2009 Danish Ministry of Taxation v Lady & Kid A/S and Others.233 In this case, the Danish Supreme Court held that an appeal brought against an order for reference of a lower court was inadmissible. The Court came to that conclusion in order to avoid an incompatibility with the Danish system of judicial hierarchy. Indeed, if an appeal were to be admissible, the lower court, as a result of the Cartesio judgment, would not be bound by the judgment of the higher court setting aside a decision to refer a question to the Court of Justice. Likewise, the Belgian Supreme Court declared inadmissible an appeal brought against an order for reference.234

terminating the main proceedings under national law, the Court considers that it has no jurisdiction to answer the questions referred for a preliminary ruling as long as the national court has not found that in national law the acts of the parties have not terminated the main proceedings: see C-422/93 to C-424/93, Zabala Erasun and Others, 1995, paras 28–30; C-343/96, Dilexport, 1999, para. 19. 229 See C-314/96, Djabali, 1998, paras 17–23; C-225/02, Garciá Blanco, 2005, paras 28–32; C-241/09, Fluxys, 2010, paras 33–34. Where, after the national court has made a reference, the Court gives a preliminary ruling in another case involving the same question of interpretation, the national court should consider whether it should maintain its reference (see C-409/20, UN, 2022, paras 32–33; C-279/20, Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2022, paras 24–25). If that court subsequently makes it known that it withdraws its request, the case will be removed from the register of the Court (see C-531/19, PO (order), 2020; C-630/20, Deutsche Lufthansa (order), 2021). See also Art. 99 of the CJ Rules of Procedure, which allows the Court at any time to rule by reasoned order, where a question referred to it is identical to a question on which the Court has already ruled, where the reply to such a question may be clearly deduced from existing case-law, or where the answer to the question referred admits of no reasonable doubt. 230 See 13/61, Bosch and Others, 1962 ECR 45, 49–50; 2/82 to 4/82, Delhaize Frères and Others, 1983, paras 8–9. 231 See 146/73, Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf (‘Rheinmühlen II’), 1974, para. 3; C-210/06, Cartesio, 2008, para. 89; C-525/06, De Nationale Loterij (order), 2009, para. 6. Such a restriction may, however, ensue from national law itself. 232 C-210/06, Cartesio, 2008, paras 92–98; see also C-564/19, IS, 2021, paras 71–72. 233 Available at . See further Reflets—Informations rapides sur les développements juridiques présentant un intérêt communautaire, n. 2/2010, published by the Court of Justice’s Research and Documentation Directorate, 10–11, available at the website of the Court of Justice, . 234 See Cour de cassation, 30 March 2010, P.09.1592.N, available at . See further Reflets— Informations rapides sur les développements juridiques présentant un intérêt communautaire, No. 3/2010, published by the Court of Justice’s Research and Documentation Directorate, 10–11, available at the website of the Court of Justice, .

The Initiative for Requesting a Preliminary Ruling 89 The circumstances at issue in Cartesio should be compared with the order issued by the Court of Justice in De Nationale Loterij.235 There, a preliminary reference was made by the Rechtbank van koophandel te Hasselt (Commercial Court, Hasselt) in Belgium regarding the compatibility with Union law of the Belgian rules on gambling that it was required to apply in the proceedings before it. Subsequent to the reference to the Court of Justice, one of the parties brought an appeal against the order for reference before the Hof van beroep te Antwerpen (Court of Appeal, Antwerp), which reversed the order for reference and delivered judgment against the other party to the dispute on grounds of non-compliance with the national rules. Under such circumstances, the Court of Justice underlined that the interpretation of Art. 267 TFEU given in Cartesio was not relevant to this case: in Cartesio, the Court had to consider rules of national law, relating to the right of appeal against a decision making a reference for a preliminary ruling, ‘under which the main proceedings remain pending before the referring court in their entirety, the order for reference alone being the subject of a limited appeal’, while in the present proceedings, the dispute is no longer pending before the referring court. In fact, the Antwerp Court of Appeal itself adjudicated the dispute between the parties to the main proceedings, thereby assuming responsibility for ensuring compliance with Union law. Accordingly, there was no longer any dispute before the referring court, and therefore, even though such court has responsibility to draw the proper inferences from a judgment delivered on appeal against its decision to refer, and in particular to come to the conclusion whether it is appropriate to maintain the reference, to amend it, or to withdraw it, it must be held that there is no need to reply to that reference.236 Where an appeal brought against the order for reference under national law has suspensory effect and the Court is officially notified of this by the national courts concerned, it will defer its ruling until it has received notification that the appeal has been decided.237 If the appeal results in the annulment of the order for reference, the Court will order the case to be removed from the register.238 In this way, the Court avoids giving a ruling that is no longer of any assistance for the purposes of making a determination in the main proceedings.239

235 See C-525/06, De Nationale Loterij (order), 2009; see also C-129/08, Cloet and Cloet (order), 2009. 236 See C-129/08, Cloet and Cloet (order), 2009, paras 7–11. 237 See, by way of example, C-269/92, Bosman (order), 1993; see also C-405/98, Gourmet International Products, 2001, para. 12, in which the Court noted the fact that an appeal against the order for reference had been rejected. 238 See 31/68, Chanel (order), 1969, 1970 ECR 404, and subsequently 31/68, Chanel (order), 1970 ECR 404; C-310/94, Garage Ardon (order), 1996, paras 2–3. By an order, the President of the Court instructed a case to be struck out where an appeal against the order for reference had been blocked for seven years because one of the parties to the main proceedings had been declared insolvent. The President took the view that in the circumstances it was no longer necessary to reply to the questions set out in the order for reference: see C-205/90, Les Assurances du Crédit Namur (order of the President), 1997. 239 See 31/68 Chanel, AG Roemer Opinion, 1969, 1970 ECR 406, 408–409.

90 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE

III. Determination of the Relevance of the Request for a Preliminary Ruling A. Task of the national court 3.28

(1) National court’s responsibility for assessing relevance In the context of the cooperation between the Court and the national courts provided for in Article 267 TFEU, ‘it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court’.240 Consequently, the national court’s responsibility for assessing the relevance of the questions referred for a preliminary ruling has a dual basis. In the first place, that assessment falls to it as part of its jurisdiction to hear and determine the main proceedings, which is left intact by Art. 267 TFEU. This aspect of the national court’s task was stressed above all during the first twenty years of preliminary rulings from the Court, when it repeatedly stated that, under what is now Art. 267 TFEU, which enshrines the principle of the mutual independence of the national courts and the Union Courts, the Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to pronounce on the considerations which prompted the request for an interpretation or for the assessment of the validity of a Union act.241 When the questions referred by the national court relate to the interpretation of a provision of Union law or to the validity of a Union act, the Court is, in principle, bound to give a ruling.242 In the second place, it is for the national court to determine the relevance of the request for a preliminary ruling on account of its particular ability to make the relevant assessment. This signifies that the national court’s competence to determine the relevance of the preliminary questions constitutes the starting point, but is not absolute or subject to no possible correction in any circumstances (the Court is only obliged ‘in principle’ to reply). In exceptional circumstances, the Court must examine the conditions

240 C-310/17, Levola Hengelo, 2018, para. 27; C-502/19, Junqueras Vies, 2019, para. 55; C-510/19, AZ, 2020, para. 25; C-83/19, C‑83/19, C‑127/19, C‑195/19, C‑291/19, C‑355/19, and C‑397/19, Asociaţia ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’, 2021, para. 115; C-931/19, Titanium, 2021, para. 36; C-709/20, CG, 2021, para. 54; C-564/19, IS, 2021, para. 60; C-257/21 and C-258/21, Coca-Cola European Partners Deutschland, 2022, para. 34; C-588/20, Landkreis Northeim, 2022, para. 30. Originally, the formula was cast in slightly different terms, which put more emphasis on the national court’s direct knowledge of the facts of the case and the arguments of the parties: see 83/78, Pigs Marketing Board v Redmond, 1978, para. 25. 241 See 13/68, Salgoil, 1968 ECR 453, 459–460; 5/77, Tedeschi, 1977, paras 17–19. 242 See C-33/17, Čepelnik, 2018, para. 20; C-16/18, Dobersberger, 2019, para. 18; C-510/19, AZ, 2020, para. 25; C-193/19, A, 2021, para. 25; C-76/20, ‘BalevBio’, 2021, para. 46; C-303/20, Ultimo Portfolio Investment, 2021, para. 22; C-170/21, Profi Credit Bulgaria, 2022, para. 25; C-36/21, Sense Visuele Communicatie en Handel, 2022, para. 21; C-158/21, Puig Gordi and Others, 2023, para. 50; C-638/22 PPU, Rzecznik Praw Dziecka and Others, 2023, para. 47. If the request for a preliminary ruling has nothing to do with the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity or interpretation of a Union act, the Court of Justice may then declare the request inadmissible by an order given pursuant to Art. 53(2) of the CJ Rules of Procedure.

RELEVANCE OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING 91 in which the case was referred to it by the national court in order to assess that it has jurisdiction.243 The Court accordingly points out that, in the event of questions having been improperly formulated or going beyond the scope of the powers conferred on the Court of Justice by Art. 267 TFEU, it is free to extract from all the factors provided by the national court, and in particular from the statement of grounds contained in the reference, the elements of Union law requiring an interpretation—or, as the case may be, an assessment of validity—having regard to the subject-matter of the dispute.244 (2) The ruling must contribute to resolving the dispute before the national court The national court’s jurisdiction to adjudge the relevance of the questions referred for a preliminary ruling and, in that light, to determine their content is not exclusive, however. The Court of Justice itself must ensure the questions do not go beyond the scope of its powers, and where necessary adapt the questions, ‘having regard to the subject-matter of the dispute’, so that the preliminary ruling achieves its aim of making an effective contribution towards resolving the dispute before the national court.245 Consequently, the Court has emphasized that the national court’s power to determine the relevance of questions referred for a preliminary ruling is constrained by its aim: ‘[I]‌n the use which it makes of the facilities provided by [Art. 267 TFEU] [the national court] should have regard to the proper function of the Court of the Justice in this field’,246 which is not that of ‘delivering advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions but of assisting in the administration of justice in the Member States’.247 The Court of Justice must always examine whether the questions raised are connected with its own task in order—just as in the case of any other court—not to exceed the limits of its jurisdiction. That limit would be exceeded if it appears impossible for the ruling requested to contribute towards the resolution of the dispute pending before the national court because of a manifest error in assessing the relevance of the questions of Union law referred to the Court.248 However, the fact that the answer to the preliminary 243 See C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi and Others, 2006, para. 27; C-350/07, Kattner Stahlbau, 2009, para. 29. 244 See 83/78, Pigs Marketing Board v Redmond, 1978, para. 26; C‑398/18 and C‑428/18, Bocero Torrico, 2019, para. 21; C-434/19 and C-435/19, Poste Italiane, 2021, para. 29. 245 On those grounds, the Court may, in exceptional circumstances, examine the conditions in which the case was referred to it by the national court (see C-390/99, Canal Satélite Digital, 2002, paras 18–20). In Mazzoleni (C-165/98, Mazzoleni and ISA, 2001, paras 16–17), the Court held that it was ‘not necessary’ to give an interpretation of Directive 96/71/EC (OJ 1997 L18/1) on the grounds that the period prescribed for the implementation of the directive had not expired and it had not been transposed into national law at the time of the facts of the main proceedings. Similar issues concerning the scope ratione temporis of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA (OJ 2002 L190/1), however, did not stop the Court from giving judgment in C-399/11, Melloni, 2013, paras 27–34. In C-508/19, M.F. and Others, 2022, paras 59–71, the Court declared a reference for a preliminary ruling inadmissible because the action brought in the main proceedings sought essentially to resolve a legal issue arising in legal proceedings different from those initiated in the main proceedings. Answering the questions would have obliged the Court to go beyond the dispute in the main proceedings and to take into account relevant factors characterizing the other dispute, thereby going beyond the powers conferred upon it by Art. 267 TFEU. 246 244/80, Foglia v Novello ( ‘Foglia v Novello II’), 1981, para. 20; see also C-167/01, Inspire Art, 2003, para. 45; C-787/18, Skatteverket, 2020, para. 76. 247 244/80, ‘Foglia v Novello (‘Foglia v Novello II’)’, 1981, para. 18; see also C-167/01 Inspire Art, 2003, para. 45; C-787/18, Skatteverket, 2020, paras 76–82. 248 In C-315/01, GAT, 2003, paras 38–39, the Court declared inadmissible a preliminary question relating to the award of compensation for infringement of Union law, or the conditions related thereto, on the ground that the question had been referred by a court which, under national law, had no power to award damages. Compare

3.29

92 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE question can be alleged to be clearly deduced from the case-law or admits of no reasonable doubt does not render the order for reference inadmissible,249 although the Court may deliver its ruling by way of reasoned order under Art. 99 of the CJ Rules of Procedure.250

3.30

(3) The relevance of questions must appear from the order for reference In order to enable the Court to ascertain whether it has jurisdiction, ‘it is essential for national courts to explain, when the reasons do not emerge beyond any doubt from the documents, why they consider that a reply to their questions is necessary to enable them to give judgment’.251 It is thus well settled that the order for reference must set out the precise reasons why the national court was unsure as to the interpretation of Union law and why it considered it necessary to refer the questions concerned. 252 At the very least, it is essential that the national court provides some explanation of the reasons for the choice of the provisions of Union law which it requests to be interpreted and of the link it establishes between those provisions and the facts and the national legislation applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings.253 It is important to underline that those reasons should be the national court’s own reasons; merely taking over the arguments of the parties is not sufficient.254 Failure to fulfil that duty to state reasons does not automatically mean that the request for a preliminary ruling is inadmissible,255 but

C-343/98, Collino and Chiappero, 2000, paras 19–24, in which the Court did not question the admissibility of a question, even though it was not certain whether the provisions of the directive at issue could be invoked against one of the parties to the main proceedings; see also C-235/02, Saetti (order), 2004, paras 24–30. 249 C-569/16 and C-570/16, Stadt Wuppertal, 2018, paras 21–22; C-86/19, SL, 2020, para. 22; C-383/19, Ostrowski, 2021, para. 33; C-70/20, YL, 2021, para. 27; C-377/20, Servizio Elettrico Nazionale SpA, 2022, para. 37; C-170/21, Profi Credit Bulgaria, 2022, para. 25; C-208/21, Towarzystwo Ubezpieczeń Ż, 2023, para. 40; C-53/22, VZ, 2023, para. 25. Additionally, the fact that a lower court held that it was in a position to rule on a dispute without deciding upon a preliminary issue has no bearing on the admissibility of the reference for a preliminary ruling of a higher court, before which an appeal against the decision of that lower court is pending, seeking clarifications of the Court regarding that preliminary issue: see C-310/17, Levola Hengelo, 2018, para. 29. 250 See C-641/20, VT (order), 2021, para. 20; C‑690/18 to C‑692/18, X (order), 2021, para. 58; C-248/20, Skatteverket (order), 2021, para. 32; C-103/19, Sindicato Único de Sanidad e Higiene (SUSH) de la Comunidad de Madrid (order), 2021, para. 24; C-198/20, MN (order), 2021, para. 20; C-206/20, VA (order), 2021, para. 36; C-450/21, UC (order), 2022, para. 26; C-728/21, OF (order), 2022, para. 13. See further para. 3.49. 251 244/80, ‘Foglia v Novello (‘Foglia v Novello II’)’, 1981, para. 17; C-428/19, OL, 2021, para. 67; see also C-325/98, Anssens, 1999, para. 14, in which the Court declared a question inadmissible, in particular, because the referring court had not given reasons justifying the need for the preliminary reference, even though one of the parties to the main proceedings had drawn the national court’s attention to a judgment of the Court giving a preliminary ruling on an identical question. 252 See C-247/20, VI, 2022, para. 75; C-436/20, ASADE, 2022, para. 35; C-332/20, Roma Multiservizi, 2022, para. 43; but see C-285/09, R, 2010, paras 25–34, where the German Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) stated in the order for reference that it had no doubts as to the interpretation of the Sixth VAT Directive, but nevertheless felt the need to make an order for reference for a preliminary ruling, since an order of a German Finanzgericht (Finance Court) in another case had raised doubts concerning the interpretation by the Bundesgerichtshof of the Sixth VAT Directive. The Court declared the reference admissible. 253 See C-585/19, Academia de Studii Economice din Bucureops ti, 2021, paras 27–30; C-55/21, Direktor na Agentsia ‘Mitnitsi’, 2022, para. 34. 254 See C-348/11, Thomson Sales Europe (order), 2012, paras 40–58; C-477/14, Pillbox 38, 2016, paras 27–29. 255 See 98/85, 162/85 and 258/85, Bertini, 1986, paras 6–7. There is, however, a serious risk that the question will be declared inadmissible: see C-116/00, Laguillaumie (order), 2000, paras 16–17; C-380/05, Centro Europe 7, 2008, paras 54–56. This risk may be even greater if the factual and legal context is not described sufficiently either: see C-613/10, Debiasi (order), 2011, paras 19–32.

RELEVANCE OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING 93 it does cause the Court to adopt a more critical attitude when it makes its substantive review of the assessment of relevance that the national court is implicitly deemed to have carried out.256

B. The limits set by Union law (1) Presumption of relevance Through the development of the case-law, the Court of Justice has honed a well-known 3.31 formula, declaring that questions on Union law referred by a national court enjoy a ‘presumption of relevance’ and that the Court may refuse to rule on such questions only: (1) where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Union law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose; (2) where the problem is hypothetical; or (3) where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it.257 The presumption of relevance cannot be rebutted by the simple fact that one of the parties to the main proceedings contests certain facts, the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine and on which the delimitation of the subject-matter of those proceedings depends.258 In addition, the fact that the applicant might ultimately be unsuccessful in the proceedings before the referring court does not rebut the presumption of relevance.259 The Court will thus generally examine the questions put before it where they are not ‘manifestly’, ‘obviously’, or ‘prima facie’ irrelevant.260 Of the three categories elaborated by the Court, some are intertwined to some extent with the earlier discussion in connection with the timing and content of the order for reference, such as the need for a clear description of the factual and legal context in the order for reference.261 Further to this, while the Court continues to refer to these three categories,262 the case- law contains applications that do not necessarily fall within one of these categories or that are so specific that they merit a category of their own. This is reflected in the following overview.

256 When it does not appear clearly from the order for reference and the submissions of the parties why it would be necessary to answer the questions referred, the Court will, in the absence of reasons provided by the national court to the contrary, declare the order for reference manifestly inadmissible (see C-348/11, Thomson Sales Europe (order), 2012, paras 40–58). 257 See C‑234/17, XC, 2018, para. 16; C-592/18, Darie, 2019, para. 25; C-311/18, Data Protection Commissioner, 2020, para. 73; C-83/19, C‑127/19, C‑195/19, C‑291/19, C‑355/19, and C‑397/19, Asociaţia ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’, 2021, para. 116; C-709/20, CG, 2021, para. 55; C-521/20, J.P. (order), 2022, paras 17–18; C-673/20, EP, 2022, para. 87; C-332/20, Roma Multiservizi, 2022, para. 42; C-588/20, Landkreis Northeim, 2022, para. 31; C‑339/20 and C‑397/20, VD, 2022, para. 57; C-158/21, Puig Gordi and Others, 2023, para. 51; C-31/21, Eurocostruzioni, 2023, para. 28. 258 See C-35/19, BU, 2019, para. 29; C-524/18, Dr. Willmar Schwabe, 2020, para. 29; C-184/20, OT, 2022, para. 48. 259 See C-64/20, UH, 2021, para. 28. 260 See C-152/03, Ritter-Coulais, 2006, para. 15; C-210/06, Cartesio, 2008, paras 72–73; see also C-453/03, C-11/04, C-12/04 and C-194/04, ABNA and Others, 2005, para. 50; C-106/10, Lidl & Companhia, 2011, para. 26; C-390/18, X, 2019, para. 31; C-550/19, EV, 2021, para. 34; C-937/19, KA, 2021, para. 20. 261 See para. 3.22. 262 See C-644/19, FT, 2020, para. 22; C-681/18, JH, 2020, paras 34–35.

94 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE 3.32

(2) The reference bears no relation to the dispute before the national court The Court will not follow the national court’s assessment of relevance where ‘it is quite obvious that the interpretation of [Union] law or the examination of the validity of a rule of [Union] law sought by that court bears no relation to the actual nature of the case or to the subject-matter of the main action’.263 The request for a preliminary ruling is then inadmissible and will be dismissed, wholly264 or in part,265 on that account. In the words of the Court, it must be ‘obvious’ that the preliminary questions are irrelevant.266 The question arises, however, as to how far the Court will take its examination of the facts and national legal aspects of the main action in order to ascertain whether the preliminary ruling sought has some chance of making an actual contribution towards the decision in the case. Is it not the case that the Court must exercise a degree of restraint, given that determining the facts and the national law comes under the national court’s jurisdiction? The answer to that question is in the affirmative insofar as the Court may not pronounce upon facts or aspects of national law that are in issue between the parties and on which the national court has not yet made any determination.267 In contrast, where the facts and national legal aspects of the case have been determined in the order for reference or are clear from the case-file submitted to the Court, there is nothing to prevent the Court from having regard to them in testing the national court’s assessment of the relevance of the preliminary questions against the requirements which arise out

263 126/80, Salonia, 1981, para. 6; see also C-620/17, Hochtief Solutions, 2019, paras 29–33; C-686/18, OC and Others, 2020, para. 39; C-569/20, IR, 2022, para. 20. 264 See C-428/93, Monin Automobiles (order), 1994, paras 13–16; C-129/01, Condominio Facchinei Orsini (order), 2002, paras 17–23; C-44/03, Horn (order), 2003, paras 12–16; C-521/20, J.P. (order), 2022, paras 21–27. 265 See C-421/97, Tarantik, 1999, paras 33–37; C-315/02, Lenz, 2004, paras 52–54; C-466/04, Acereda Herrera, 2006, paras 47–49; C-459/07, Elshani, 2009, paras 45–47; C-742/19, B.K., 2021, para. 30; C-572/20, ACC Silicones, 2022, paras 23–29. 266 See C-76/20, ‘BalevBio’, 2021, para. 47; C-937/19, KA, 2021, para. 20. A question will be regarded as relevant where the Court’s answer may be of use to the national court in finding whether a provision of national law is compatible with Union law (see C-286/02, Bellio Fratelli, 2004). That is also the case where clarification is sought regarding the date on which courts in the Member States are obliged to interpret national law in conformity with a non-transposed directive and, in particular, whether such an obligation exists from the directive’s entry into force or, at the very least, from expiry of the period which the Member States are allowed for transposing it, provided, of course, that the facts of the dispute before the national court are covered by those periods: see C-212/04, Adeneler and Others, 2006, paras 43–53. Conversely, the Court will declare a question inadmissible where it is obvious that the interpretation of Union law requested is not necessary for resolving the dispute before the national court (see C-71/02, Herbert Karner Industrie-Auktionen, 2004, para. 21; C-19/21, I, 2022, paras 56–59), which is the case, inter alia, where the provision of which an interpretation is sought is manifestly not relevant for the solution of the case (see C-376/19, МАK ТURS (order), 2020, para. 20). However, where it is not obvious that the interpretation of a provision of Union law is irrelevant in light of the facts of the action in the main proceedings or its purpose, the objection that the provision of Union law is not applicable to the case in the main proceedings relates to the substance of the questions and does not concern their admissibility: see C-393/17, Kirschstein, 2019, para. 28; C-436/20, ASADE, 2022, para. 41. Moreover, it is possible that the admissibility of questions referred depends on an interpretation of the Union rules which form the subject-matter of those questions. Thus, the Court declared inadmissible questions in relation to Arts 107 and 108 TFEU concerning State aid, after having concluded that the party in the main proceedings could not rely on these provisions in order to contest a national tax measure with a view of avoiding payment or obtaining repayment of the tax paid: see C-75/18, Vodafone Magyarország Mobil Távközlési, 2020, paras 18–32; C-323/18, Tesco-Global Áruházak, 2020, paras 30–44. Further to this, the determination whether Union law is applicable to the facts of the case in the main proceedings may also be the subject- matter of a preliminary ruling: see C-639/17, SIA ‘KPMG Baltics’, 2019, paras 10–11; C-635/17, E, 2019, para. 32; C-53/18, Mastromartino, 2019; C-257/21 and C-258/21, Coca-Cola European Partners Deutschland, 2022. In case of a negative answer, the Court may indicate, in light of the information provided to it by the referring court, which rule of Union law might be relevant instead: see C-563/17, Associação Peço a Palavra, 2019, para. 32. 267 See C-153/02, Neri, 2003, para. 34.

RELEVANCE OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING 95 of the aims of the Court’s jurisdiction under Art. 267 TFEU.268 A number of examples serve to clarify the Court’s approach. Notably, the distinction the Court makes between various cases is subtle, and the determination of the line concerning hypothetical questions is not always easy to draw.269 The Court will declare an order for reference for a preliminary ruling inadmissible if the facts in the main proceedings do not warrant an answer to the questions referred.270 Thus, in a case dealing with the Sixth VAT Directive,271 the Court found that questions regarding the deductibility of VAT for goods not used for an economic activity were inadmissible, since it was not established in the order for reference that the goods in question were ever used for anything else but an economic activity.272 Similarly, preliminary questions will be declared inadmissible if the facts of the case do not fall within the scope of the provisions of Union law of which an interpretation is sought,273 or within the scope of Union law at all.274 In the same vein, the Court has declared inadmissible preliminary questions concerning facts that had occurred before the accession of the Member State of the referring court.275 The Court will also declare preliminary questions inadmissible when it is unclear how a national rule related to the interpretation of Union law being sought is applicable to the facts in the main proceedings.276 For this reason, the Court held that questions referred in connection with an Italian law laying down residence and linguistic conditions for Union citizens in order to be entitled to housing benefits were inadmissible, since the national court had not explained why an interpretation of Union law could bear any relation to the main proceedings, in which a third-country national challenged the fact that his application for housing benefits was rejected on the ground that the housing benefit budget for third-country nationals was exhausted.277 Moreover, questions will 268 See C-177/18, Baldonedo Martín, 2020, paras 66–74. 269 See C-145/10, Painer (order), 2013, paras 60, 70; C-571/10, Kamberaj, 2012, paras 44–46. 270 132/81, Vlaeminck, 1982, paras 13–14; C-567/07, Woningstichting Sint Servatius, 2009, para. 43; C-571/10, Kamberaj, 2012, paras 51–54. 271 Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes—Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L145/1). 272 See C-118/11, Eon Aset Menidjmunt, 2012, paras 75–79. 273 See C-377/10, Băilă (order), 2010, paras 8–14; C-571/10, Kamberaj, 2012, paras 47–50; C-27/11, Vinkov, 2012, paras 40–45; C-942/19, Servicio Aragonés de Salud, 2021, paras 37–38. 274 See C-27/11, Vinkov, 2012, paras 53–54; C-161/11, Vino (order), 2011, para. 38. See further para. 3.34. Note that, in such cases, the Court relies interchangeably on the inadmissibility of the reference and a lack of jurisdiction. While this may not be without criticism, the practical relevance of the distinction should not be overemphasized: see, in that regard, N. Wahl and L. Prete, ‘The Gatekeepers of Article 267 TFEU: On Jurisdiction and Admissibility of References for a Preliminary Ruling’ (2018) C.M.L.Rev. 511, 513–516, pointing out that Art. 53(2) of the CJ Rules of Procedure makes a distinction between those two situations. 275 See C-32/10, Semerdzhiev (order), 2011, para. 29; C-258/19, EUROVIA, 2020, para. 42; C-307/19, Obala i lučice, 2021, para. 58; C-85/21, WY (order), 2022, para. 33; see also C-283/10, Circul Globus Bucureşti, 2011, paras 27–29; C‑698/18 and C‑699/18, SC Raiffeisen Bank, 2020, paras 41–44, 48; C-801/19, FRANCK d.d. Zagreb, 2020, paras 15–17. This is different, however, where the question referred by the national court specifically concerns the application ratione temporis of Union law in relation to facts that have occurred before accession: see C-113/20, Slovenský plynárenský priemysel (order), 2020. Moreover, in case of facts continuing to produce legal effects after accession, the Court has jurisdiction to answer questions in relation to those facts from the date of accession: see C-242/18, ‘Unicredit Leasing’, 2019, paras 30–35; C-567/20, A.H., 2022, paras 31–41. 276 See C-393/09, Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace, 2010, para. 26. 277 See C-571/10, Kamberaj, 2012, paras 55–58; see also C-153/00, der Weduwe, 2002, in which the Court considered that the referring court had not provided the Court with all the necessary information to determine

96 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE be declared inadmissible if the Court’s answer is not necessary to enable the referring court to give judgment. This will be the case, for instance, when the national court refers questions concerning side-issues that are considered to have no impact on the outcome of the main proceedings,278 or when the questions referred have a purpose other than solving the case in the main action.279 Additionally, when it is clear that the questions referred are based on a false premise, the Court will declare them inadmissible,280 even when this verges on the determination that the national court has erroneously interpreted national law.281

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(3) General or hypothetical questions Hypothetical questions are questions referred to the Court that will result in the Court delivering an advisory opinion on certain points of Union law, rather than providing an interpretation of Union law that is useful to solve the dispute pending before the referring national court. While advisory opinions might under certain circumstances be useful, the Court has consistently held that the aim of the preliminary ruling procedure provided for in Art. 267 TFEU is to assist national courts in giving judgment by providing them with a ruling on the interpretation of the rules of Union law applicable to the disputes pending before them.282 Art. 267 TFEU does not give the Court jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions on questions of a general or hypothetical nature.283 Questions leading the Court to answer by way of an advisory opinion will therefore be declared inadmissible.284 This means that the Court will have to assess the relevance and the necessity of the order for reference, in particular, the reasons that motivated the national court to make an order for reference.285 At first sight, this seems to imply that the Court will have to whether an interpretation of Union law would serve a useful purpose in the main proceedings. It therefore declared the request for a preliminary ruling inadmissible. In fact, the relevance of the preliminary question depended upon the interpretation of the national law at issue in the proceedings. The Court did not rule on the relevance of the question, but found that it did not have sufficient information to be certain about its relevance. 278 See C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker und Schecke and Eifert, 2010, paras 38–42. 279 See C-286/88, Falciola (order), 1990. It is particular in the context of such cases that the line with hypothetical questions may be difficult to draw. See also C-704/20 and C-39/21, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid, 2022, paras 68–69, where the Court held that a question was inadmissible because it was intended to supplement a request for a preliminary ruling made by another court and did not concern the dispute before the referring court. 280 See C-310/10, Agafiţei and Others, 2011, para. 48. 281 See C-568/08, Combinatie Spijker Infrabouw-De Jonge Konstruktie and Others, 2010, paras 42–49. 282 See C-72/15, Rosneft, 2017, para. 194; C-558/18 and C-563/18, Miasto Łowicz, 2020, para. 44; C‑322/19 and C‑385/19, K.S., 2021, para. 53; C-573/20, Casa di Cura Città di Parma (order), 2021, para. 34; C-120/19, X, 2021, para. 62. 283 See C-406/06, Winner Wetten, 2010, para. 38; C-571/10, Kamberaj, 2012, paras 44–46. 284 See C-571/10, Kamberaj, 2012, paras 44–46; C-396/11, Radu, 2013, para. 24; C-136/12, Consiglio nazionale dei geologi, 2013, para. 35; C-362/18, Hochtief (order), 2019, paras 32–34; C-709/19, Vereniging van Effectenbezitters, 2021, para. 39; C-105/21, IR, 2022, paras 71–72; C-274/21 and C-275/21, EPIC Financial Consulting, 2022, paras 105–110; C-409/21, DELID, 2022, paras 37–39. 285 Where an order for reference does not contain a minimum of explanations that make it possible to establish a link between a question and the main proceedings, the Court will declare the question inadmissible because of its hypothetical nature: see C-295/20, Sanresa, 2021, para. 69. Thus, in certain cases, rather than the general or abstract nature of the question concerned, it is the lack of sufficient reasons in the order for reference explaining why an answer to the question is necessary that makes a question hypothetical and thus inadmissible. But see C-238/17, UAB ‘Renerga’, 2018, paras 24–29, in which the Court established the hypothetical nature of the question because

RELEVANCE OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING 97 trespass over the borderline between interpreting Union law and interpreting national law. Yet, this approach is in line with the division of tasks in the preliminary ruling procedure, since the Court does not pronounce upon any factual or national legal aspect of the main proceedings which is in issue between the parties (see para. 6.22). The Court regards itself as being obliged simply to supply the lacunae which the national court has left in its order, namely, its omission to give reasons why it considered it needed an answer to the preliminary questions so as to decide the main action, in order not to exceed its jurisdiction.286 In addition, it should be borne in mind in this connection that a preliminary ruling has binding effects on national courts generally (see para. 6.35), which makes the Court—in common with all courts—careful only to decide on what is necessary in order to bring a case to a conclusion, and thereby to allow the whole mosaic of case-law to build itself up incrementally. General or hypothetical questions might be referred unknowingly or deliberately. In the latter case, a ruling of the Court may be sought by the national court in order to serve other purposes than resolving the case that gave rise to the reference for a preliminary ruling. For instance, a national court might seek an abstract ruling in order to prevent more cases of a similar nature from being brought before it287 or because an answer to the question referred may be useful in other procedures.288 Furthermore, questions might also become hypothetical in the course of proceedings before the Court due to the fact that the context of the case pending before the national court has changed.289 The Court’s case-law on hypothetical questions does not necessarily imply, however, that national courts should already have chosen between various hypotheses present in the main proceedings before submitting questions to the Court.290 There are also cases in which the Court has expressly ruled that the questions are not of a hypothetical nature. For instance, in Boxus,291 the Court held that a national law taking away jurisdiction from the referring court to rule on the administrative acts it appeared from the answer of the referring court to its request for clarification that the national legislation in connection to which a reference was made to the Court was clearly not applicable to the situation in the main proceedings. 286 See C-380/01, Schneider, 2004, paras 20–31. 287 See C-197/10, Unió de Pagesos de Catalunya, 2011, para. 19–25. 288 See C-699/20, Centraal Justitieel Incassobureau (order), 2021, para. 19. 289 See C-314/01, Siemens and ARGE Telecom & Partner, 2004, para. 37; C-241/09, Fluxys, 2010, paras 33–34; C- 492/11, Di Donna, 2013, paras 30–32; C-180/12, Stoilov i Ko, 2013, paras 45–47; C-496/16, Aranyosi (order), 2017, paras 25–28; C‑585/18, C‑624/18 and C‑625/18, A.K. and Others, 2019, paras 66–71; C-72/22 PPU, M.A., 2022, para. 48. However, the fact that a Member State, after the commencement of an action for State liability, has transposed, belatedly, a directive providing for a compensation scheme and has paid out the compensation provided for in the implementing law to the party in the main proceedings, does not mean that the action for State liability for non-transposition of that directive has become devoid of purpose and that the questions referred in relation to the application of the directive have become hypothetical, since the beneficiaries of that scheme may establish that they suffered complementary losses due to the fact that they were unable to benefit at the appropriate time from the financial advantages guaranteed by the directive: see C-129/19, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, 2020, paras 25–32; compare C-522/18, DŚ (order), 2020. 290 See C-157/11, Sibilio, 2012, paras 30–34; C-778/18, Association française des usagers de banques, 2020, paras 46–48. See also para. 3.25. 291 See C-128/09 to C-131/09, C-134/09 and C-135/09, Boxus and Others, 2011, para. 28; see also C-225/09, Jakubowska, 2010, paras 31–32.

98 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE pending in the main proceedings did not render the questions referred hypothetical, since the questions were precisely intended to determine whether, in the light of Union law, such law was capable at all of taking away jurisdiction from the referring court.

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(4) The order for reference does not contain elements demonstrating a connection between the dispute and Union law In order for the Court to have jurisdiction to answer preliminary questions, the dispute in which the questions have arisen must fall within the scope of Union law.292 This is of particular importance for questions relating to the Treaty provisions on the fundamental freedoms293 and questions relating to the Charter.294 A reference for a preliminary ruling may be declared inadmissible where the order for reference does not contain sufficient elements allowing the Court to establish that the dispute in the main proceedings falls within the scope of Union law.295 In relation to a reference for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the Treaty provisions on the fundamental freedoms, this will be the case where an order for reference does not contain any elements showing the existence of a cross-border element, or, alternatively, in the exceptional case that an interpretation of these Treaty provisions might be necessary in purely domestic situations,296 where the order for reference lacks specific factors indicating why an interpretation is necessary other than that the national legislation in question applies without distinction to nationals of the Member State concerned and those of other Member States.297 For a reference for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the Charter, this will be the case where an order for reference does not contain any specific information showing that the national measure at issue constitutes a measure implementing Union law.298

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(5) The dispute concerns the legislation of another Member State The Court will be particularly attentive where a question is referred to it in connection with proceedings between individuals that is intended to assess whether the legislation of another Member State is in conformity with Union law.299 In those circumstances, 292 See C-268/15, Ullens de Schooten, 2016, paras 55–56. See further para. 6.25 et seq. 293 See C-245/09, Omalet, 2010, paras 9–19; C-16/12, Hermes Hitel és Faktor (order), 2012, paras 12–21; C-131/21, KI (order), 2021, paras 22–24. See also C-170/20, SC Novart Engineering (order), 2020, paras 33–38 (in relation to public procurement law); C-557/20, DS, 2021, paras 27–29 (in relation to competition law). 294 C-457/09, Chartry (order), 2011, paras 25–26; C-462/11, Cozman (order), 2011, paras 14–16; C-466/11, Currà and Others (order), 2012, paras 25–26. See further para. 624. 295 See C-564/19, IS, 2021, para. 143. 296 See C-268/15, Ullens de Schooten, 2016, paras 50–53. 297 See C-268/15, Ullens de Schooten, 2016, paras 54–55; C-532/15 and C-538/15, Eurosaneamientos, 2016, paras 43–50; C-595/16, Emmea (order), 2017, paras 18–22; C-343/17, Fremoluc, 2018, paras 20–32; C-407/19 and C-471/19, Katoen Natie Bulk Terminals, 2021, para. 52; C-394/21, Bursa Română de Mărfuri, 2023, paras 46–56. 298 See C-339/10, Asparuhov Estov and Others (order), 2010, paras 11–15; C-703/20, PONS HOLDING (order), 2021, para. 17; C-244/21, C.I.I (order), 2021, paras 30–32. When this latter requirement is fulfilled, the Court does, of course, interpret the Charter: see, in that regard, C-399/11, Melloni, 2013, paras 55–64 and C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, 2013, paras 16–31. 299 See 244/80, Foglia v Novello (‘Foglia v Novello II’), 1981, para. 31 (legality of French legislation raised by an Italian court); C-150/88, Eau de Cologne & Parfumerie-Fabrik 4711, 1989, para. 21 (legality of Italian legislation raised by German court); C-153/00, der Weduwe, 2002 (legality of Luxembourg legislation raised by a Belgian

RELEVANCE OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING 99 the national court must take particular pains to explain why it considers that an answer to its questions is necessary in order to determine the dispute.300 If it fails to do so, the preliminary question will be inadmissible. (6) Spurious disputes (a) General The idea that the preliminary ruling should contribute towards bringing a dispute to a conclusion also underlies the Court’s refusal to answer questions raised by means of spurious main proceedings. This means that the Court will refuse to give a preliminary ruling ‘where it appears that the procedure of [Art. 267 TFEU] has been misused and been resorted to, in fact, in order to elicit a ruling from the Court by means of a spurious dispute’.301 (b) Assessment It is not, however, an easy matter for the Court to decide that it ‘appears’ that the main proceedings are spurious, without in so doing exceeding the limits of its jurisdiction. It is a slippery slope from finding that preliminary questions have been raised ‘within the framework of procedural devices arranged by the parties in order to induce the Court to give its views on certain problems of [Union] law which do not correspond to an objective requirement inherent in the resolution of a dispute’302 to assessing facts and aspects of national law on which no definitive finding has yet been made by the national court—a task which falls outside the limits of the Court’s jurisdiction. In order to avoid this difficulty, the Court will decide that the preliminary reference is inadmissible only where it is manifestly apparent from the facts set out in the order for reference that the dispute is in fact fictitious.303 In this way, the Court confines its review to a species of ‘marginal review’ of facts plainly set out in the order for reference, even without having regard to further particulars contained in the case-file from the national court or in observations submitted pursuant to Art. 23 of the Statute.304 (c) Foglia v Novello I The only case to date in which the Court has declined jurisdiction on account of the spurious nature of the main proceedings is Foglia v Novello I,305 in which the parties

court); C-318/00, Bacardi-Martini and Cellier des Dauphins, 2003 (legality of French legislation raised by a United Kingdom court). 300 See C-318/00, Bacardi-Martini and Cellier des Dauphins, 2003, paras 45–46; C-153/00, der Weduwe, 2002, paras 31–40; C-580/20, XXX (order), 2021, para. 30. 301 C-231/89, Gmurzynska-Bscher, 1990, para. 23; see also C-118/94, Associazione Italiana per il WWF and Others, 1996, para. 15; C-85/95, Reisdorf, 1996, para. 16; C-28/95 Leur-Bloem, 1997, para. 26. 302 244/80, Foglia v Novello (‘Foglia v Novello II’), 1981, para. 18. 303 See 267/86, Van Eycke, 1988, para. 12; C-118/94, Associazione Italiana per il WWF and Others, 1996, para. 15; C-129/94, Bernáldez, 1996, para. 7; C-36/99, Idéal Tourisme, 2000, para. 22 (the documents in the case contained nothing to show that the parties to the main proceedings had colluded). 304 See 267/86, Van Eycke, Report for the Hearing, 1988 ECR 4769, 4774, second column. 305 See 104/79, Foglia v Novello ( ‘Foglia v Novello I’), 1980, para. 10. Where a court in one Member State makes a reference for a preliminary ruling relating to the legality of another Member State’s legislation, the hurdle for admissibility will invariably be set high: see para. 3.35.

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100 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE were concerned to obtain a ruling that a tax system in one Member State was invalid by the expedient of proceedings before a court in another Member State between two private individuals who were in agreement as to the result to be obtained and had inserted a clause in their contract in order to induce a court in another Member State to give a ruling on the point. The Court held that the artificial nature of this expedient was underlined by the fact that the remedies available under the law of the first Member State to contest the tax in question had not been used. This judgment has been severely criticized by commentators on the ground that the Court exceeded its powers by going too deeply into the facts of the main proceedings, specifically with the intention of making the national court respect the limits of the Court’s jurisdiction insofar as it is to give only preliminary rulings which actually contribute towards resolving the main dispute. It has been argued that this puts at risk the whole relationship of trust between the Court of Justice and the national courts on which the cooperation mechanism set in place by what is now Art. 267 TFEU is founded.306 It is therefore not surprising that subsequently the Court has done everything to reduce the scope of this case-law to a hard core of exceptional cases:307 only where it is clear from the factual data set out in the order for reference that the main proceedings are manifestly spurious will the Court decline jurisdiction on the grounds that answering the national court’s preliminary questions will not assist it in giving judgment (which is unnecessary if there is no ‘dispute’). Clearly, such a situation will arise only exceptionally.308

IV. The Duty to Request a Preliminary Ruling A. General 3.39

The third paragraph of Art. 267 TFEU provides that where a question concerning the interpretation of Union law or the validity of acts of Union institutions, bodies, offices,

306 K. Lenaerts, ‘Toegewezen bevoegdheden en prejudiciële evenwichtsoefeningen in de rechtsorde van de Europese Gemeenschap. Een perspectiefbeeld’ (1983–84) R.W. 143; A. Tizzano, ‘Litiges fictifs et compétence préjudicielle de la Cour de justice européenne’ (1981) R.G.D.I.P. 524. 307 See 46/80, Vinal, 1981, paras 5–7; see also AG Reischl’s Opinion in that case, which refers to the exceptional nature of Foglia v Novello I. 308 But the principle that spurious proceedings are inadmissible remains: see C-328/17, Amt Azienda Trasporti e Mobilità, 2018, para. 34; C-33/18, V, 2019, para. 27; C-618/18, Di Girolamo (order) 2019, para. 27; C-36/20 PPU, VL, 2020, para. 49. The Court may thus assess whether questions submitted to it relate to a genuine dispute. See C-408/95, Eurotunnel and Others, 1997, para. 22 (the reality of the dispute may be inferred from the fact that all the arguments raised by the applicant in the main proceedings have been contested by the defendant in those proceedings); C-451/99, Cura Anlagen, 2002, para. 27 (the question was admissible because the main proceedings related to a genuine contract, the performance or annulment of which depended on a question of Union law, even if some of the information on the file might give rise to a suspicion that the situation underlying the main proceedings was contrived with a view to obtaining a decision from the Court on a question of Union law of general interest); C-341/01, Plato Plastik Robert Frank, 2004, para. 30 (the fact that the parties to the main proceedings were in agreement as to the interpretation of the Union provisions in question did not affect the reality of the dispute); see further C-144/04, Mangold, AG Tizzano Opinion, 2005, points 22–35.

The Duty to Request a Preliminary Ruling 101 or agencies is raised in a national court and it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, it is bound to bring the matter before the Court of Justice where ‘there is no judicial remedy under national law’ against the national court’s decisions.309

B. What national courts and tribunals are involved? (1) Highest courts In the first place, the highest courts in the hierarchy are under a duty to make a preliminary reference, irrespective as to whether they have general or specialized jurisdiction. 310 The idea behind this is that in the national legal systems, decisions of the highest courts bind lower courts in one way or another, with the result that the most efficient way of securing the uniformity of Union law in all the Member States is to oblige courts of last resort to refer questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. 311 If that obligation were to be extended to all courts and tribunals, the Court of Justice would be overloaded and there would be no real additional gain in terms of the uniformity of Union law, since the lower courts have to follow decisions of courts of last resort which are the outcome of collaboration with the Court of Justice. Naturally, this does not detract from the right of any court to decide to refer a question to the Court of Justice of its own motion. (2) No remedy available against the decision of a lower court In the second place, courts other than those of last resort may in certain circumstances take decisions against which there is no remedy. Are those courts then under a duty to make a reference for a preliminary ruling under the third paragraph of Art. 267 TFEU? The Court of Justice appears to have answered this question in the affirmative in Costa v ENEL,312 in which it stated with regard to a request for a preliminary ruling from an Italian Giudice Conciliatore (magistrate): ‘By the terms of [Art. 267 TFEU] national courts against whose decisions, as in the present case, there is no judicial remedy, must refer the matter to the Court of Justice so that a preliminary ruling may be given.’ Accordingly, where a lower court has the power to prevent an appeal from it, it must make a reference if it is minded to exercise its power not to allow an appeal.

309 See C-686/18, OC and Others, 2020, para. 32; C‑585/18, C‑624/18, and C‑625/18, A.K. and Others, 2019, para. 103; C-824/18, A.B. and others, 2021, para. 92; C-70/20, YL, 2021, para. 28. 310 For example, the Tariefcommissie voor Belastingzaken, a revenue court in the Netherlands. See 26/62, Van Gend & Loos, 1963; 28/62 to 30/62, Da Costa en Schaake and Others, 1963 ECR 31, 38. 311 See, in that regard, 107/76, Hoffmann-La Roche, 1977, para. 5. 312 6/64, Costa v ENEL, 1964 ECR 585, 592; see also C-561/19, Consorzio Italian Management, 2021, para. 32; C-597/21, Centro Petroli Roma (order), 2022, para. 39; C-144/22, Società Eredi Raimondo Bufarini (order), 2022, para. 34; C-83/21, Airbnb Ireland and Airbnb Payments UK, 2022, para. 79.

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102 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE 3.42

(3) Interim proceedings A judge hearing an application for interim relief, where no judicial remedy is available against the judge’s order, is in a special position. In response to a preliminary question relating specifically to that situation, the Court of Justice ruled that a national court or tribunal is not required to refer to the Court a question of interpretation or of validity mentioned in [Art. 267 TFEU] when the question is raised in interlocutory proceedings for [interim relief], even where no judicial remedy is available against the decision to be taken in the context of those proceedings provided that each of the parties is entitled to institute proceedings or to require proceedings to be instituted on the substance of the case and that during such proceedings the question provisionally decided in the summary proceedings may be re-examined and may be the subject of a reference to the Court under [Art. 267 TFEU].313

Subsequently, the Court refined this by stating that the requirements of the third paragraph of Art. 267 TFEU are observed, even if only the unsuccessful party may bring proceedings as to the substance and the action is tried ‘before courts or tribunals belonging to a jurisdictional system different from that under which the interlocutory proceedings are conducted, provided that it is still possible to refer to the Court under [Art. 267 TFEU] any questions of [Union] law which are raised’.314

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(4) Benelux Court of Justice The Benelux Court of Justice (see para. 3.11), which gives definitive rulings on questions of interpretation of uniform Benelux law, may be obliged to make a reference to the Court of Justice under the third paragraph of Art. 267 TFEU.315 The Court of Justice has held, however, that if, before making a reference to the Benelux Court, a national court has submitted a question of (Union) law to the Court of Justice, the Benelux Court is released from its obligation to submit the question if it would be couched in ‘substantially the same terms’ (see para. 3.48).

C. Decisions against which there is no judicial remedy under national law 3.44

(1) Existence of a judicial remedy The question against what decisions a ‘judicial remedy’ exists is a matter of national law, as is clear from the actual wording of the third paragraph of Art. 267 TFEU (‘against 313 107/76, Hoffmann-La Roche, 1977, para. 6. 314 35/82 and 36/82, Morson and Jhanjan, 1982, paras 8–9; see also, in that regard, C-175/06, Tedesco, AG Kokott Opinion, 2007, in particular points 26–28; the Court of Justice did not have the opportunity to rule on such matters, as the questions became devoid of purpose and the case was therefore removed from the register: see C-175/06, Tedesco (order), 2007. 315 See C-337/95, Parfums Christian Dior, 1997, para. 26. The first reference to be submitted by the Benelux Court of Justice was in C-265/00, Campina Melkunie, 2004. The Court of Justice’s ruling in that case was delivered on the same day as its ruling in C-363/99, Koninklijke KPN Nederland, 2004, which involved the submission of similar questions from the Gerechtshof te ‘s-Gravenhage (Regional Court of Appeal, The Hague, Netherlands).

The Duty to Request a Preliminary Ruling 103 whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law’).316 All the same, Union law does play a role, more specifically, in ascertaining what type of possible ‘judicial remedy’ precludes the obligation to make a reference for a preliminary ruling. The starting point for any inquiry should be the aim of the third paragraph of Art. 267 TFEU, which is to avoid the most authoritative case-law in any given Member State developing contrary to Union law, thus putting all courts in that Member State at risk of going off in the same—wrong—direction. Consequently, the obligation to make a preliminary reference arises whenever the national court finds that there is no judicial remedy available against its decisions that can normally be deployed against judicial decisions, no matter how the remedy is described. Whether the remedy is termed ‘ordinary’ or ‘exceptional’ has no bearing in this regard. The decisive test is whether the legal issues that the lower court has decided may, as a matter of course, be subjected to a fresh judicial assessment. This is clearly the case with an appeal on a point of law or in cassation proceedings, which must accordingly be deemed to be a ‘judicial remedy’ within the meaning of the third paragraph of Art. 267 TFEU.317 Questions of Union law are in fact legal issues that are definitively settled in the highest courts. (2) Wholly exceptional judicial remedies In contrast, the existence of wholly exceptional judicial remedies—even where they may be available against decisions of the highest courts—may not be invoked in order to avoid the obligation to seek a preliminary ruling.318 Examples are applications for the revision of a judgment or tierce-opposition proceedings. The Verfassungsbeschwerde (constitutional appeal) which may be brought before the Federal Constitutional Court against a judgment of a court of last resort (for example, the Bundesgerichtshof or the Bundesfinanzhof) is an example from Germany. The existence of such an exceptional remedy—which, moreover, does not enable all the legal issues decided by the court of last resort to be reviewed, but relates only to the compatibility of the contested judgment with the German Basic Law—does not detract from the obligation of the ordinary German courts of last resort to request a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice.319 316 See C-14/08, Roda Golf & Beach Resort, 2009, paras 28–29: while there had been conflicting case-law and academic disagreement with respect to whether it was possible to appeal against a decision like the one that the referring court (Juzgado de Primera Instancia e Instrucción No. 5, San Javier in Spain) would deliver in the main proceedings, the Court found that it was not for it to give a ruling on that issue; it was sufficient that the referring court had indicated in its reference for a preliminary ruling that the decision it will deliver in the main proceedings will be final. The determination involved in this case was in relation to the admissibility of references from last instance courts for the purposes of former Art. 68 EC: see para. 21.02. 317 See C-119/15, Biuro podróży ‘Partner’, 2016, para. 52; C-3/16, Aquino, 2017, para. 36. The fact that, as in Sweden, leave is required from the highest court in order to lodge an appeal does not have the effect of depriving the parties of a judicial remedy, with the result that this must be regarded as an ‘exceptional remedy’. Where appropriate, the question of Union law raised in a dispute may place the highest court under a duty to grant leave to appeal and, at a later stage, refer a question for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice (see C-99/00, Lyckeskog, 2002, paras 10–19); see further C-210/06, Cartesio, 2008, paras 75–79. Moreover, the fact that an appeal on a point of law against a decision of a referring court has not been examined by a last instance court because proceedings before that last instance court were discontinued by the appellant does not have as a consequence that that referring court has to be regarded as a last instance court (see C-3/16, Aquino, 2017, paras 36–38). 318 See C-416/10, Križan and Others, 2013, para. 72. 319 See BVerfG of 9 January 2001 (1 BvR 1036/99), the German Federal Constitutional Court pointing out that it is not an additional appeal jurisdiction. See also C-686/18, OC and Others, 2020, paras 32–33.

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104 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE

D. Limits placed on the duty to request a preliminary ruling 3.46

3.47

3.48

(1) Irrelevant questions First and foremost, courts coming within the scope of the third paragraph of Art. 267 TFEU have discretion to assess the relevance of a request for a preliminary ruling (see paras 3.28–3.30). The Court of Justice enlarged upon this in the leading case of CILFIT.320 The mere fact that a party contends that the dispute gives rise to a question concerning the interpretation of Union law or the validity of an act of a Union institution, body, office, or agency does not mean that the court concerned is compelled to request a preliminary ruling.321 The Court takes the view that ‘it follows from the relationship between the second and third paragraphs of [Art. 267 TFEU] that the courts or tribunals referred to in the third paragraph have the same discretion as any other national court or tribunal to ascertain whether a decision on a question of [Union] law is necessary to enable them to give judgment. Accordingly, those courts or tribunals are not obliged to refer to the Court of Justice a question concerning the interpretation of [Union] law [or the validity of an act of a Union institution, body, office or agency] raised before them if that question is not relevant, that is to say, if the answer to that question, regardless of what it may be, can in no way affect the outcome of the case.’322 In such a case the Court of Justice would, moreover, dismiss the request for a preliminary ruling in any event on account of the irrelevance of the question referred (see paras 3.31–3.32). (2) Limits to the duty to refer with respect to relevant questions Next, it falls to consider the actual exceptions to the obligation to request a preliminary ruling where the question is manifestly relevant for the purposes of reaching a decision in the main proceedings. There are three instances in which the Court of Justice has tempered the obligation to seek a preliminary ruling in the interests of more efficiently achieving the aim of the third paragraph of Art. 267 TFEU, namely, ‘to prevent the occurrence within the [Union] of divergences in judicial decisions on questions of [Union] law’.323 (a) Identical or similar question Starting with Da Costa en Schaake,324 the Court has ruled that ‘the authority of an interpretation under [Art. 267 TFEU] already given by the Court may deprive the obligation 320 283/81, CILFIT, 1982. 321 See 283/81, CILFIT, 1982, para. 9; C-561/19, Consorzio Italian Management, 2021, para. 54; C-83/21, Airbnb Ireland and Airbnb Payments UK, 2022, para. 81. As is well-known, AG Jacobs expressed the view in C-338/95 Wiener, AG Jacobs Opinion, 1997, points 12–20, that national courts should show self-restraint in making references where there is no question of general importance or the ruling is not likely to promote the uniform application of Union law. 322 283/81, CILFIT, 1982, para. 10. See also C-136/12, Consiglio nazionale dei geologi, 2013, para. 26; C-561/19, Consorzio Italian Management, 2021, para. 34. 323 283/81, CILFIT, 1982, para. 7. 324 28/62 to 30/62, Da Costa en Schaake and Others, 1963 ECR 31, 38, confirmed by 283/81, CILFIT, 1982, para. 13; C-337/95, Parfums Christian Dior, 1997, paras 29–30 (where it was held that the question had to be in ‘substantially the same terms’); C-561/19, Consorzio Italian Management, 2021, para. 36.

The Duty to Request a Preliminary Ruling 105 [to seek a preliminary ruling] of its purpose and thus empty it of its substance. Such is the case especially when the question raised is materially identical with a question which has already been the subject of a preliminary ruling in a similar case’. The national court which is obliged in principle under the third paragraph of Art. 267 TFEU to make a reference to the Court of Justice is released from its obligation provided that it follows the existing preliminary ruling. It is only the obligation to make a reference that ceases to apply, not the possibility of seeking a ruling.325 More specifically, where the national court would like the Court of Justice to amend, qualify, or limit its earlier preliminary ruling—for instance, in the light of the particular facts of the main action—the only solution is for the national court to make use of that possibility.326 (b) The answer can be clearly deduced from the case-law (acte éclairé) Second, the Court held: ‘The same effect, as regards the limits set to the obligation laid 3.49 down by the third paragraph of [Art. 267 TFEU], may be produced where previous decisions of the Court have already dealt with the point of law in question, irrespective of the nature of the proceedings which led to those decisions, even though the questions at issue are not strictly identical.’327 This is known as the acte éclairé doctrine and is an extension of the first exception. There is no longer a requirement for the earlier judgment of the Court to have ruled on a virtually identical preliminary question. In contrast, it is sufficient that the earlier decision should provide an answer to the question of Union law which has arisen in the main proceedings, regardless of the procedural context in which it came about. This also provides an explanation as to why the questions at issue need not be completely identical, which would appear to be out of the question where the earlier judgment was not given in answer to a request for a preliminary ruling. The only critical point is whether the decision is capable of being regarded as ‘settled case- law’ or one of a number of ‘previous decisions’, as the English translation has it; or, in other words, whether it can be definitely regarded as constituting the Court of Justice’s answer to the question of Union law that has arisen. Thus, a judgment given pursuant to Arts 258–260 TFEU in which the Court declared that a Member State had failed to fulfil its obligations under Union law will generally contain an interpretation of provisions and principles of that law.328 Insofar as that is so, national courts subject to the third paragraph of Art. 267 TFEU can extract from the judgment what they need in order to answer the questions concerning the interpretation of Union law that are determinative of the main proceedings pending before them. In common with any court, they are 325 See C-561/19, Consorzio Italian Management, 2021, para. 37. 326 See 283/81, CILFIT, 1982, para. 15. 327 283/81, CILFIT, 1982, para. 14. Affirmed in C-260/07, Pedro IV Servicios, 2009, para. 36; C-561/19, Consorzio Italian Management, 2021, para. 36. 328 The fact that the Commission discontinues infringement proceedings under Art. 258 TFEU against a Member State concerning national legislation has no effect on the obligation upon a court of last instance of that Member State to refer to the Court of Justice a question on the interpretation of Union law so as to be able to assess the compatibility with Union law of that national legislation. This is because the Commission is not empowered to determine conclusively, by opinions formulated pursuant to Art. 258 TFEU or by other statements issued in that procedure, the rights and duties of a Member State, which may be determined only by a judgment of the Court of Justice: see C-393/98, Gomes Valente, 2001, paras 17–19.

106 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE even obliged to do this,329 unless they opt to exercise their right to bring the matter before the Court of Justice anew, perhaps with a view to an adjustment of the case-law.330

3.50

(c) Acte clair Third, the Court considered that ‘[T]‌he correct application of [Union] law may be so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the question raised is to be resolved. Before it comes to the conclusion that such is the case, the national court or tribunal must be convinced that the matter is equally obvious to the courts of the other Member States and to the Court of Justice.’331 If that condition is satisfied, the national court may ‘refrain from submitting the question to the Court of Justice and take upon itself the responsibility for resolving it’.332 This exception is known as the acte clair doctrine. The strict conditions to which application of the acte clair doctrine is subject are designed to prevent national courts from abusing the doctrine in order to evade their obligation to seek a preliminary ruling where they are disinclined to adhere to the Court’s case-law. Both the French Conseil d’Etat (Council of State) and the German Bundesfinanzhof (Federal Finance Court) were at one time considered to have abused the acte clair doctrine in this way.333 According to those courts, the wording of the third paragraph of now Art. 288 TFEU was so clear that it was unnecessary to seek a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice on the effect within a Member State’s national legal system of a directive that had failed to be implemented within the prescribed period. They therefore decided, completely contrary to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice,334 that in the circumstances in question a directive could never have direct effect on account of its legal nature. The CILFIT formulation of the acte clair doctrine is the expression of a particularly subtle compromise.335 On the one hand, the Court seeks to reinforce spontaneous collaboration on the part of the highest national courts by allowing them to take the responsibility upon themselves to decide questions of Union law where it is not

329 See 314/81 to 316/81 and 83/82, Waterkeyn, 1982, paras 13–16; C-177/20, ‘Grossmania’, 2022, para. 36. 330 See 283/81, CILFIT, 1982, para. 15. In such a case, however, the Court might give its ruling by reasoned order, pursuant to Art. 99 of the CJ Rules of Procedure. See C-258/18, Solak (order), 2020, regarding questions referred by the Dutch Centrale Raad van Beroep (Central Board of Appel); C-113/19, Luxaviation (order), 2020, regarding questions referred by the Luxembourgish Cour administrative (Administrative Court); C–415/19 to C–417/19, Blumar (order), 2020, regarding a question referred by the Italian Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation); C-480/21, W O (order), 2022, regarding a question referred by the Irish Supreme Court; C-484/22, Bundesrepublik Deutschland (order), 2023, regarding a question referred by the German Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court). 331 283/81, CILFIT, 1982, para. 16; confirmed in C-561/19, Consorzio Italian Management, 2021, paras 39–40; C-597/21, Centro Petroli Roma (order), 2022, paras 40–41; C-144/22, Società Eredi Raimondo Bufarini (order), 2022, paras 35–36. 332 283/81, CILFIT, 1982, para. 16; see also C-340/99, TNT Traco, 2001, para. 35. 333 France: Conseil d’Etat, 22 December 1978, Ministre de l’Intérieur v Cohn-Bendit (1979) R.T.D.E. 168–189; Germany: Bundesfinanzhof, 16 July 1981, (1981) EuR. 442–444. 334 For further discussion of the direct effect of directives, see K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel (T. Corthaut (ed.)), EU Constitutional Law (OUP, 2021), paras 27.022–27.027. 335 But see 283/81, CILFIT, AG Capotorti Opinion, 1982.

The Duty to Request a Preliminary Ruling 107 reasonably conceivable that anyone would come to a different answer. On the other hand, the Court seeks to constrain the judgment of the highest national courts as to the obvious nature of the—apparently only conceivable—answer to a question of Union law to the greatest degree possible in order to preclude bona fide inadvertence. To this end, the Court has listed three factors that the highest national courts have to take into account before they are entitled to consider that they may release themselves from their obligation to seek a preliminary ruling. Those factors have to do with the ‘characteristic features of [Union] law and the particular difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise’.336 These factors are as follows: (1) the interpretation of a provision of Union law involves a comparison of the various language versions,337 all of which are authentic; (2) given that Union law uses terminology peculiar to it, legal concepts do not necessarily have the same meaning as they do in the different national legal systems; and (3) every provision of Union law must be placed in its context and interpreted ‘in the light of the provisions of [Union] law as a whole, regard being had to the objectives thereof and to its state of evolution at the date on which the provision in question is to be applied’.338 It is self-evident that if these three factors were scrupulously taken into account, the number of cases in which ‘the correct application of [Union] law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt’339 would be reduced to an absolute minimum.340 (3) Post-CILFIT case-law While the Court in CILFIT gave guidance on the factors that national courts of last instance have to take into account to evaluate whether the correct application of Union law is so obvious that it leaves no scope for any reasonable doubt, it gave no indication regarding the second limb of the test, namely, that the matter is equally obvious to the courts of the other Member States and to the Court of Justice. A first indication can be found in Intermodal Transports,341 in which the Court clarified that the second limb of the acte clair test was limited to courts. Thus, while underscoring that a national court, before coming to the conclusion that the correct application of a provision of Union law is ‘so obvious that there is no scope as to the manner in which the question raised is to be resolved’, must be convinced that the matter is equally obvious to the courts of the other Member States and to the Court of Justice in accordance with CILFIT, the Court

336 283/81, CILFIT, 1982, para. 17. 337 While it was uncertain whether this required a last instance court to examine each of the language versions of a provision, it appears clearly from C-561/19, Consorzio Italian Management, 2021, paras 42–44 that a last instance court is not required to examine all language versions. That being said, a last instance court should take into account the divergences between various language versions of which it is aware. 338 283/81, CILFIT, 1982, paras 18–20; see also C-561/19, Consorzio Italian Management, 2021, paras 41–46; C- 597/21, Centro Petroli Roma (order), 2022, paras 42–47; C-144/22, Società Eredi Raimondo Bufarini (order), 2022, paras 37–42. 339 283/81, CILFIT, 1982, para. 21. 340 CILFIT may, however, also be abused: see A. Arnull, ‘The Use and Abuse of Article 177 EEC’ (1989) Mod.L.Rev. 622–639. 341 C-495/03, Intermodal Transports, 2005.

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108 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE recognized that such court cannot be required to ensure that, in addition, the matter is equally obvious to bodies of a non-judicial nature such as administrative authorities.342 It was only in Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others343 and Consorzio Italian Management344 that the Court provided last instance courts with a number of factors to take into account for the purposes of determining whether a matter is equally obvious to the last instance courts345 of the other Member States and the Court of Justice. A court seeking to apply the acte clair doctrine must first evaluate whether uncertainty exists in the area of law under consideration, and in particular regarding the provisions or concepts at issue. Relevant factors to take into account are the number of references to the Court of Justice by courts and tribunals of other Member States,346 as well as the existence of conflicting decisions of lower courts.347 While, depending on the circumstances, the existence of diverging lines of case-law among the courts of a Member State or between the courts of different Member States does not automatically lead to an obligation to make a reference,348 it nevertheless requires a last instance court to be particularly vigilant in its assessment of whether any reasonable doubt exists requiring a reference to the Court of Justice.349 In such a situation, the last instance court should have regard to the objective pursued by the preliminary ruling procedure, namely, securing the uniform interpretation of Union law.350 This is because, regardless of the individual position of the national court of last instance—or even the application of the rule in its own legal order—such uncertainty entails a risk of divergences in judicial decisions within the European Union.351 In this way, the Court obliges the last instance courts of the 342 See C-495/03, Intermodal Transports, 2005, para. 39. 343 C-160/14, Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others, 2015. 344 C-561/19, Consorzio Italian Management, 2021. 345 While in CILFIT (283/81, CILFIT, 1982, para. 16) and subsequent case-law (see C-495/03, Intermodal Transports, 2005, para. 39; C-379/15, Association France Nature Environnement, 2016, para. 48), the Court referred to ‘the courts of the other Member States’, the Court refers in Consorzio Italian Management to ‘the other courts or tribunals of last instance of the Member States’ (C-561/19, Consorzio Italian Management, 2021, para. 40). The Court thus appears to have limited the scope of the comparative exercise a court or tribunal of last instance is required to undertake to the other courts or tribunals of last instance of the Member States, and to the Court of Justice (see also C-597/21, Centro Petroli Roma (order), 2022, para. 54; C-144/22, Società Eredi Raimondo Bufarini (order), 2022, para. 48). That being said, where the national court or tribunal of last instance is made aware of the existence of diverging lines of case law ‘among the courts of a Member State or between the courts of different Member States’, that is a relevant factor in determining whether any reasonable doubt exists with regard to the correct interpretation of a provision of Union law (C-561/19, Consorzio Italian Management, 2021, para. 49). 346 See C-160/14, Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others, 2015, para. 43. 347 See C-160/14, Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others, 2015, para. 44. In C-379/15, Association France Nature Environnement, 2016, para. 51, the Court added a number of other criteria, namely, whether the case-law of the Court is new or relates to a very exceptional situation that is heavily dependent on the circumstances of the individual case (compare C-597/21, Centro Petroli Roma (order), 2022, paras 55–57; C-144/22, Società Eredi Raimondo Bufarini (order), 2022, paras 50–52). However, the fact that a lower court has made a reference to the Court in a case similar to the case before a last instance court does not impose a duty on that last instance court to make a reference to the Court as well. It is for that last instance court to determine independently whether a duty to refer exists or whether the conditions for acte clair have been met. Moreover, that last instance court, when it comes to the conclusion that it has no duty to refer, is not obliged to await the answer of the Court to the preliminary reference of the lower national court. See C-72/14 and C-197/14, X, 2015, paras 52–63. 348 See, however, C-160/14, Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others, 2015, para. 44. 349 See C-561/19, Consorzio Italian Management, 2021, para. 49 350 See C-561/19, Consorzio Italian Management, 2021, para. 49. 351 See C-160/14, Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others, 2015, para. 43. For a criticism regarding the use of this criterion in assessing the existence of a duty to refer under Art. 267 TFEU, see C-72/14 and C-197/14, X, AG Wahl Opinion, 2015, point 68.

The Duty to Request a Preliminary Ruling 109 Member States to look beyond the confines of their own legal order and to assume fully their role as Union courts within the judicial organization of the European Union.352 Another question post-CILFIT was whether the exceptions could be extended to preliminary references on the validity of Union acts. In Gaston Schul,353 the Court made it clear that this is not the case. There, the Court of Justice was confronted with a preliminary reference concerning the question whether a last instance court could refrain from applying provisions of a Union regulation without referring a question on the validity of those provisions under circumstances where the Court of Justice had already ruled that analogous provisions of another regulation were invalid. In response, the Court held that last instance courts are obliged to refer questions on the validity of a Union act in accordance with the third paragraph of Art. 267 TFEU, and that the CILFIT judgment, pertaining to questions of interpretation, could not be extended to questions relating to the validity of Union acts. The uniform application of Union law is indeed ‘vital’ where the validity of a Union act is in question and the Court of Justice is in the ‘best position’ to rule on the validity of such act in view of the participation of interested parties through Arts 23 and 24 of the Statute.

E. Enforcement of the obligation to request a preliminary ruling (1) Infringement action There is no remedy available from the Court of Justice to parties to the main proceedings against a refusal of a last instance court to make a preliminary reference. The Commission or a Member State may, however, seek a declaration from the Court of Justice pursuant to Arts 258 or 259 TFEU that, through its national court’s refusal to seek a ruling, the Member State in question has infringed the third paragraph of Art. 267 TFEU. Courts and tribunals are in fact ‘institutions of the Member State concerned’.354 The Commission has acknowledged a duty to oversee the way in which national courts subject to the obligation to seek preliminary rulings make use of the acte clair doctrine enshrined in the judgment in CILFIT.355 The institution of proceedings for

352 See also C-416/17, Commission v France, AG Wathelet Opinion, 2018, point 100. It has been argued in the literature that the Court has relaxed its acte clair doctrine by way of its judgments in Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others and X, inter alia, by not mentioning the three CILFIT factors that courts of last instance should take into account to determine whether a situation of acte clair exists (see A. Kornezov, ‘The New Format of the Acte Clair Doctrine and Its Consequences’ (2016) C.M.L.Rev. 1317). On the basis of subsequent case-law, especially C-561/19, Consorzio Italian Management, 2021, it is clear that this is not the case. Although the Court has further clarified the scope of the factors courts of last instance should take into account, CILFIT remains good law, and it is difficult to consider Consorzio Italian Management as a true relaxation of the acte clair doctrine (see, in that regard, N. Cariat and J.T. Nowak, ‘ “Passez par la case Luxembourg!”: l’obligation de renvoi préjudiciel à la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne’ (2022) J.T. 165). This is so, especially since the Court has recently held for the first time that a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations under the Treaties because a last instance court of that Member State failed to fulfil its duty under Art. 267 TFEU (see C-416/17, Commission v France, 2018). See para. 3.52. 353 See C-461/03, Gaston Schul Douane-expediteur, 2005, paras 19–24. 354 314/81 to 316/81 and 83/82, Waterkeyn, 1982, para. 14. See also C-224/01, Köbler, 2003; C-129/00, Commission v Italy, 2003. 355 Answer given by President G. Thorn on behalf of the Commission on 25 July 1983 to a written question from A. Tyrrell MEP (OJ 1983 C268/25).

3.52

110 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE infringement of Union law on account of the failure of a national court to comply with its obligation under the third paragraph of Art. 267 TFEU is, however, not the most efficient way of enforcing that obligation. In the first place, the parties to the main proceedings are not directly assisted thereby. Second, while, in such proceedings, it is no defence for a Member State to plead the independence under its Constitution of the State institution responsible for the infringement of Union law,356 in a Union based on the rule of law357 the essential principle of the constitutional independence of the judiciary from the executive and the legislature nevertheless implies that a national government which is unsuccessful in an action brought against it under Art. 258 TFEU can count on comprehension where it is not in a position to compel the offending court to change its position. Unlike other ‘independent’ institutions of the State (for example, legislative bodies, autonomous entities forming part of a federation, etc.), in respect of which it is considered that the Member State should, where necessary, adjust its internal structure in such a way that it is always in a position to ensure that those institutions effectively comply with Union law, even if this is at the expense of their independence, a certain reluctance is—properly—felt in advocating that idea as far as the highest national courts are concerned. Commentators have also taken the view that it would be inappropriate to enforce the obligation laid down in the third paragraph of Art. 267 TFEU by means of proceedings under Arts 258 and 259 TFEU.358 That being said, in 2018, the Court was called upon for the first time to rule in the context of an infringement procedure on the failure of a court of last resort to comply with its duty to refer preliminary questions to the Court under Art. 267 TFEU.359 In Commission v France,360 the Court of Justice declared that the French Conseil d’État (Council of State) had failed to refer questions to the Court regarding the application of Arts 49 and 63 TFEU. The Court, after having established that the Member State had failed to fulfill its obligations under Arts 46 and 63 TFEU, found a separate infringement of Art. 267 TFEU, as the failure of the Member State to apply Arts 49 and 63 TFEU correctly was the consequence of two judgments of the Conseil d’État in which it had not referred preliminary questions to the Court of Justice. The Court considered that the Conseil d’État could not have been certain that its reasoning would be equally obvious to the Court since it departed from a relevant judgment of the Court.361 The fact 356 See para. 5.71. 357 See 294/83, Les Verts v Parliament, 1986, para. 23. 358 See further, in that regard, C-99/00, Lyckeskog, AG Tizzano Opinion, 2002, point 65; M. Wathelet, ‘Adieu, Monsieur le Professeur: de la liberté des juges nationaux de poser des questions préjudicielles à la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne’ (2010) Revue de la Faculté de droit de l’Université de Liège 449. For an overview of further objections, see A. Kornezov, ‘The New Format of the Acte Clair Doctrine and Its Consequences’ (2016) C.M.L.Rev. 1317, 1332–1333. That being said, where a failure to refer questions to the Court of Justice has, as its consequence, that certain rules are consistently applied at variance with Union law, the Commission can take aim at the Member State for failure to amend rules that are wrongly constructed by its judiciary. See C-129/00, Commission v Italy, 2003. 359 On previous occasions, an infringement procedure was terminated in the course of the pre-litigation procedure. See the reasoned opinion of the Commission concerning the failure of the Swedish Supreme Court to comply with the duty to refer under Art. 267 TFEU (2003/2161, C(2004) 3899, 13 October 2004). 360 C-416/17, Commission v France, 2018. 361 See C-416/17, Commission v France, 2018, para. 111.

The Duty to Request a Preliminary Ruling 111 that the Court came to a different conclusion than the Conseil d’État in its findings regarding the proper application of Arts 49 and 63 TFEU implied that the Conseil d’État could not have ruled out the existence of reasonable doubt when delivering the contested judgments.362 Consequently, in the light of its previous case-law, the Court held that the Conseil d’État had breached its duty under Art. 267 TFEU because the interpretation of the provisions of Union law in the contested decisions ‘was not so obvious as to leave no scope for doubt’.363 (2) Claim in damages As confirmed in Köbler, Union law requires Member States to recognize the possibility of a claim in damages against the public authorities where an infringement by a court of last resort of its obligation to make a reference for a preliminary ruling demonstrably thwarts a right conferred on individuals by Union law.364 Especially in cases where the acte clair doctrine is abused and the last instance court shirks its obligation to seek a preliminary ruling in order to ignore the settled case-law of the Court of Justice on the interpretation of a particular provision on the purported ground that it is obvious, it may well be imagined that the interested individual may identify an individual right which is denied to them (loss or damage) as a result (causal link) of the national court’s refusal to comply with the third paragraph of Art. 267 TFEU (breach of Union law).365 Such action may not be made subject to the condition that the decision of the last instance court causing the loss or damage must be set aside, when such setting aside is impossible in practice.366 (3) Outside of Union law (a) European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms The European Court of Human Rights considers that a failure to comply with the duty under Art. 267 TFEU to refer preliminary questions to the Court of Justice may in certain circumstances entail a breach of Art. 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), inter alia, where: (1) the refusal 362 See C-416/17, Commission v France, 2018, para. 112. 363 See C-416/17, Commission v France, 2018, para. 114. 364 See C-224/01, Köbler, 2003, paras 30–50; see also C-495/03, Intermodal Transports, 2005, para. 37; C-173/03, Traghetti del Mediterraneo, 2006, paras 30–46; C-69/14, Târșia, 2015, para. 40; C-676/17, Călin, 2019, para. 56. It is for the internal legal order of each Member State to designate the competent court to deal with such claims. According to the Court of Justice, the independence of the judiciary and the principle of res judicata do not preclude recognition of the principle of State liability stemming from a decision of a court adjudicating at last instance (C-224/01, Köbler, 2003, paras 42, 43, 46). See Z. Varga, The Effectiveness of the Köbler Liability in National Courts (Hart, 2020). For a particularly critical view, see P.J. Wattel, ‘Köbler, CILFIT and Welthgrove: We Can’t Go On Meeting Like This’ (2004) C.M.L.Rev. 177–190: the author argues that the Court of Justice also ought to be able to be held liable for manifest breaches of Union law; the author, however, overlooks the fact that the Court of Justice, unlike courts of last resort in the Member States, is the highest court for the interpretation of Union law, whose decisions are final, as the law of the land, until they are reconsidered in appropriate proceedings brought before the Court, possibly by a new reference for a preliminary ruling. 365 See C-160/14, Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others, 2015. The Member State concerned may incur liability under Union law all the more readily inasmuch as the highest national court has no discretion in applying the third para. of Art. 267 TFEU: see para. 4.69. 366 See C-160/14, Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others, 2015, paras 46–60.

3.53

3.54

112 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE is arbitrary, in the sense that the applicable rules do not allow for an exception to the obligation to refer; (2) the refusal is based on other reasons than those provided for by the applicable rules (in casu, the CILFIT case-law); and (3) the refusal has not been duly reasoned in light of the applicable rules (in casu, the CILFIT case-law).367

3.55

(b) National law In various Member States, the failure of a court of last instance to comply with its duty under Art. 267 TFEU to refer questions to the Court of Justice constitutes a separate violation of national law. For example, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) considers the failure of a last instance court to refer a preliminary question to the Court of Justice as a breach of Art. 101(1)(2) of the Basic Law.368

F. Obligation to request a preliminary ruling praeter legem 3.56

(1) Foto-Frost Under the landmark Foto-Frost case,369 where a court or tribunal not subject to the third paragraph of Art. 267 TFEU considers that an act of a Union institution, body, office, or agency is invalid, it may not make such a finding itself, but must seek a preliminary ruling thereon from the Court of Justice. At first sight, this obligation detracts from the national court’s freedom under the second paragraph of Art. 267 TFEU to decide whether or not to make a reference to the Court of Justice. However, the Court has held that ‘[i]‌n enabling national courts, against whose decisions there is a judicial remedy under national law, to refer to the Court for a preliminary ruling questions on interpretation or validity, [Art. 267 TFEU] did not settle the question whether those courts themselves may declare that acts of [Union] institutions are invalid.’370 Consequently, Art. 267 TFEU had a lacuna that the Court filled by answering that question in the negative. In

367 See ECtHR, Ullens de Schooten and Rezabek v Belgium, 2011, paras 59, 62. The European Court of Human Rights has found a violation of Art. 6(1) of the ECHR for failure to duly reason a refusal to refer preliminary questions to the Court of Justice in the following cases: ECtHR, Dhahbi v Italy, 2014, para. 34 (regarding the Corte Suprema di Cassazione—Supreme Court of Cassation); ECtHR, Schipani and Others v Italy, 2015, para. 73 (regarding the Corte Suprema di Cassazione—Supreme Court of Cassation); ECtHR, Baltic Master v Lithuania, 2019, para. 44 (regarding the Lietuvos vyriausiasis administracinis teismas—Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania) ECtHR, Sanofi Pasteur v France, 2020, para. 81 (regarding the Cour de Cassation—Court of Cassation); ECtHR, Bio Farmland Betriebs v Romania, 2021, para. 57 (regarding the Court of Appeal of Timișoara, sitting in last instance); ECtHR, Georgiou v Greece, 2023, para. 26 (regarding the Areios Pagos - Supreme Civil and Criminal Court). 368 See BverfG, 9 January 2001, 1 BvR 1036/99 (regarding the Bundesverwaltungsgericht—Federal Administrative Court); BverfG, 31 May 2016, 1 BvR 1585/13 (regarding the Bundesgerichtshof—Federal Supreme Court). See further C-497/20, Randstad Italia, 2021, paras 82–85. See also A. Wallerman Ghavanini and C. Rauchegger, ‘Effective Judicial Protection before National Courts: Article 47 of the Charter, National Constitutional Remedies and the Preliminary Reference Procedure’ in M. Bonelli, M. Eliantonio and G. Gentile (eds), Article 47 of the EU Charter and Effective Judicial Protection, Volume 1: The Court of Justice’s Perspective (Hart, 2022) 45, 50–54. 369 314/85, Foto-Frost, 1987. Bebr identifies the autonomous nature of Union law as an additional reason for the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to declare a Union measure invalid: see G. Bebr, ‘The Reinforcement of the Constitutional Review of Community Acts under Art. 177 EEC Treaty (Cases 314/85 and 133 to 136/85)’ (1988) C.M.L.Rev. 678. See also C-6/99, Greenpeace France and Others, 2000, para. 55; C-344/04, IATA and ELFAA, 2006, para. 27; C-119/05 Lucchini, 2007, para. 53; C-430/21, RS, 2022, para. 71. 370 314/85, Foto-Frost, 1987, para. 13.

The Duty to Request a Preliminary Ruling 113 the Court’s view, this was necessary for three reasons: first, divergences between courts in the Member States as to the validity of Union acts would be liable to place in jeopardy the unity of Union law; second, since the Court has exclusive jurisdiction to declare void an act of a Union institution, body, office, or agency (under what is now Art. 263 TFEU), the coherence of the system of judicial protection established by the Treaties requires that, where the validity of a Union act is challenged before a national court, the power to declare the act invalid must also be reserved to the Court of Justice, since both proceedings are ‘designed to permit the Court of Justice to review the legality of measures adopted by the institutions’;371 and third, the Court of Justice is in the best position to decide on the validity of Union acts, since Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies whose acts are challenged ‘are entitled [under Art. 23 of the Statute] to participate in the proceedings in order to defend the validity of the acts in question’.372 (2) Limits to Foto-Frost National courts not subject to the third paragraph of Art. 267 TFEU may of course consider the validity of a Union act and reject the grounds put forward before them by the parties in support of invalidity as unfounded, concluding that the measure is completely valid. In doing so they are not calling into question the existence of the Union act.373 In the context of that assessment, national courts have the possibility to approach the Union institutions that have participated in the decision-making process culminating in the adoption of the act at issue in order to obtain specific information and evidence which they consider essential for taking away any doubts regarding the validity of the Union act at issue.374 However, where the national court is convinced of the fact that the Union act is invalid on the basis of the grounds put forward by the parties in the main proceedings, it should refer that validity question to the Court without investigating further.375 It is only where the validity of a Union act is contested before a court subject to the third paragraph of Art. 267 TFEU that the court must seek a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice, even if it itself does not share the view that the act is invalid,376 provided, of course, that the validity question is relevant for the outcome of the case.377 371 314/85, Foto-Frost, 1987, paras 16–17. 372 314/85, Foto-Frost, 1987, para. 18; in addition, under the second para. of Art. 24 of the Statute, the Court may require the Member States and Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies not being party to the case to supply all information which the Court considers necessary for the proceedings. 373 See 314/85, Foto-Frost, 1987, para. 14; C-644/17, Eurobolt, 2019, para. 28. 374 See C-644/17, Eurobolt, 2019, paras 30–32. 375 See C-644/17, Eurobolt, 2019, para. 29. 376 See C-344/04, IATA and ELFAA, 2006, paras 28–30; T-47/02, Danzer v Council, 2006, para. 37. When the addressee of a Commission decision has, within the period prescribed in the sixth para. of Art. 263 TFEU, brought an action for annulment of that decision pursuant to that article, it is for the national court to decide whether to stay proceedings until a definitive decision has been given in the action for annulment or in order to refer a question to the Court for a preliminary ruling. However, when the outcome of the dispute before the national court depends on the validity of the Commission decision, it follows from the duty of sincere cooperation that the national court should, in order to avoid reaching a decision that runs counter to that of the Commission, stay its proceedings pending final judgment in the action for annulment by the Union Courts, unless it considers that, in the circumstances of the case, a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on the validity of the Commission decision is warranted (see C-344/98, Masterfoods and HB Ice Cream, 2000, paras 55, 57; C-135/16, Georgsmarienhütte, 2018, para. 24). See also C-414/18, Iccrea Banca, 2019, para. 61. 377 See C-264/18, P.M., 2019, para. 14; C-458/15, K.P., 2019, para. 29.

3.57

114 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE 3.58

(3) Divergence from the case-law of the Court of Justice According to some commentators,378 the authority of the Court’s case-law causes a second obligation to request a preliminary ruling praeter legem to arise: where national courts against whose decisions a judicial remedy exists under national law are minded to diverge from the interpretation which the Court of Justice has given to a provision or a principle of Union law, they must first attempt to obtain a change in the Court’s case-law by making a request for a preliminary ruling. It is only by so doing that such courts, as institutions of a Member State, can act in accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Art. 4(3) TEU. It would indeed be illogical if national courts of last instance were bound by the ‘settled case- law’ of the Court of Justice, subject to the possibility of their raising the content of the case-law afresh with the Court (see paras 3.48–3.49), yet lower courts were completely at liberty to diverge from that case-law without having to request a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice.379 The different treatment of lower and highest courts in Art. 267 TFEU only comes into its own, therefore, where there is not yet any case-law of the Court of Justice on a question of interpretation of Union law. In such a case, the lower court will be at liberty to answer the question itself,380 while the last instance courts will be under an obligation to make a reference to the Court of Justice.

V. Requests for a Preliminary Ruling in the Context of Composite Administrative Procedures 3.59

In principle, a national court may refer questions to the Court of Justice regarding the interpretation of Union law or the validity of acts of the Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies where the answer to that question is relevant for the outcome of the dispute pending before it. In this context, a national court may refer questions regarding the interpretation of Union law in order to determine the validity of national measures at issue in the dispute pending before it. Further to this, in accordance with the division of jurisdiction between the Union Courts and the national courts, only the latter can, in principle, review the legality of acts of the Member States.

378 See M. Broberg and N. Fenger, Broberg and Fenger on Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice (3rd edn, OUP, 2021) 233. 379 See, to this effect, 112/76, Manzoni, AG Warner Opinion, 1977. 380 See the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Liège, Belgium (Tribunal de première instance de Liège), 1 October 2008, R.D.C. 2009, 610), where the national court, while acknowledging that the provision of Union law at issue had not yet been interpreted by the Court, interpreted the provision of Union law itself without referring to the Court. The same provision gave later rise to the preliminary ruling in C-585/08 and C-144/09, Pammer and Alpenhof, 2010.

COMPOSITE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 115 However, a notable exception exists in relation to acts of Member States which constitute a stage of a composite administrative procedure in which a Union institution exercises the final decision-making power, without being bound by the acts of the Member States. In such a procedure, the Court has held, ‘there must necessarily be a single judicial review, which is conducted, by the [Union] Courts alone, only once the decision of the [Union] institution bringing the administrative procedure to an end has been adopted, a decision which is, alone, capable of producing binding legal effects such as to affect the applicant’s interests by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position.’381 The Union Courts will thus examine any defects vitiating the acts or proposals of the Member States that are capable of affecting the validity of the final decision taken by the Union institution in the context of an action for annulment brought against the decision of the Union institution on the basis of Art. 263 TFEU.382 This is because, if there were remedies available at national level against acts or proposals of the Member States alongside an action for annulment against the final decision of a Union institution, a risk of divergent assessments in regard of the same procedure would exist, ultimately affecting the exclusive jurisdiction of the Union Courts to review the legality of the acts of the Union institutions.383 Consequently, for example, in the context of the prudential supervision of the European Central Bank (ECB) regarding the acquisition of qualifying holdings in credit institutions, an adverse opinion on the reputation of the acquirers submitted by a national central bank to the ECB in the exercise of its duty of assistance, and which will be part of the materials on which the ECB will base its final decision, cannot be challenged before the national courts. 384 Preliminary questions on the interpretation of Union law with the aim of assessing the legality of that opinion will thus be declared inadmissible.385 The same goes for acts of national banks adopted in preparation of decisions of the Single Resolution Board on the calculation of the ex ante contributions to the Single Resolution Fund.386 Conversely, where acts adopted by national authorities are a necessary stage of a procedure for adopting a Union act and Union institutions have only a limited or no discretion so that they are bound by the act of the national authorities, it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national courts to verify whether such a national act is tainted by an irregularity, and, in case of necessity, to refer questions for a preliminary

381 C-219/17, Berlusconi and Fininvest, 2018, para. 49; C-414/18, Iccrea Banca 2019, para. 42. 382 See C-219/17, Berlusconi and Fininvest, 2018, para. 44; C-414/18, Iccrea Banca, 2019, para. 39. 383 See C-219/17, Berlusconi and Fininvest, 2018, para. 50; C-414/18, Iccrea Banca, 2019, para. 53. 384 See C-219/17, Berlusconi, 2018, paras 53–59. 385 See C-414/18, Iccrea Banca, 2019, para. 33. 386 See C-414/18, Iccrea Banca, 2019, paras 47–48, 73–74. See further M. Simoncini, ‘Challenges of Justice in the European Banking Union: Administrative Integration and Mismatches in Jurisdiction’ (2021) Y.E.L. 310.

116 COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE ruling to the Court of Justice.387 This is the case, for example, with the procedure to register a name as a protected designation of origin,388 or to alter such a registration.389 In such procedure, the Commission can only take a registration decision after a Member State has submitted to it an application in this regard, and which that Member State is only capable of doing after having verified whether the conditions for registration have been met.390 Nevertheless, it will be for the Union Courts to rule on the legality of the actual registration decision taken by the Commission.391 Lastly, it should be pointed out that the situation above must be distinguished from the situation that has arisen in Rimšēvičs v Latvia.392 In that case, the Court ruled directly on the legality of a decision taken by a Member State to relieve the governor of its central bank from office. The Court has been given such exceptional power on the basis of Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB, by which the authors of the Treaties departed from the division of jurisdiction between the Union Courts and the national courts.393 Yet, although the reasons for that departure are similar to the situation in which Member State authorities play a role in the preparation of decisions of Union institutions—namely, the existence of a highly integrated system394—it is important to underscore that the nature of the acts is different in both situations. Whereas the acts at issue in Berlusconi and Fininvest and Iccrea Banca qualify as preparatory acts of final decisions of a Union institution, body, office, or agency, and, therefore, the exclusive jurisdiction of Union Courts in regard of these acts can be considered to be in line with settled case-law of the Court that the legality of preparatory acts can only be challenged in the context of an annulment action against the final decision,395 the decision at issue in Rimšēvičs v Latvia is genuinely a final decision, which produces legal effects and is capable of adversely affecting individuals. That being said, in both instances, exclusive jurisdiction for reviewing the legality of these acts lies with the Union Courts. National courts are precluded from reviewing the legality of such acts, and preliminary references that would contribute to such legality review will be declared inadmissible.

387 See C-219/17, Berlusconi, 2018, paras 45–46; C-785/18, GAEC Jeanningros, 2020, paras 25–26. 388 See C-785/18, GAEC Jeanningros, 2020, para. 26. 389 See C-785/18, GAEC Jeanningros, 2020, para. 28. 390 See C-785/18, GAEC Jeanningros, 2020, para. 24. 391 See C-785/18, GAEC Jeanningros, 2020, para. 25. 392 C‑202/18 and C‑238/18, Rimšēvičs v Latvia, 2019. 393 See C‑202/18 and C‑238/18, Rimšēvičs v Latvia, 2019, para. 69. 394 See C‑202/18 and C‑238/18, Rimšēvičs v Latvia, 2019, para. 70. 395 See C-414/15 P, Stichting Woonlinie, 2017, para. 46; C-415/15 P, Stichting Woonpunt, 2017, para. 46. See further para. 7.25.

4 UNION LAW AND NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES I. General Overview A. Introduction The national court is the ordinary Union court to hear and to determine all cases that do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union. When deciding cases with a Union law element, national courts rely primarily on their national system of procedural and remedial rules. While each Member State has in principle the freedom to organize its judicial system, including the procedural rules for dealing with cases and the remedies that can be obtained, Member States must ensure that their rules guarantee effective judicial protection of the rights conferred by Union law and do not compromise the effective application of Union law. Member States are thus constrained in their freedom to organize their systems of judicial protection and have to respect various requirements set by Union law. These requirements and their applications will be discussed in this chapter.

4.01

B. Importance of national procedural rules and remedies The full effectiveness (pleine efficacité) and practical effect (effet utile) of Union law are achieved only if individuals can assert before their national courts the rights that they derive from Union law.1 Since the Union does not, as yet, have a comprehensive set of procedural rules or remedies for dealing with cases brought before national courts,2 it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural 1 See, on this distinction, J. T. Nowak, Ambtshalve toepassing van EU-recht door de Belgische burgerlijke rechter (Ex officio application of EU law by Belgian civil courts) (PhD Thesis KU Leuven, 2021) 15, 20–22. Compare J. Blockx, ‘Effet Utile reasoning by the Court of Justice of the European Union is mostly indirect: evidence and consequences’ (2022) E.J.L.S. 141. 2 What is meant is all those rules of law which come into play in order to apply Union law in the Member States’ legal systems. They may have to do with the conduct of judicial proceedings, such as rules on admissibility, procedural time limits, and rules of evidence, or with the execution of judgments. However, concepts of civil law or other substantive law (e.g. the concept of unjust enrichment) may sometimes be relevant. On the distinction between procedural and substantive rules, see C-459/21, The Navigator Company et Navigator Pulp Figueira (order), 2022, paras 25–27; C-40/20, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri and Others, 2022, para. 38.

EU Procedural Law. Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak, Oxford University Press. © Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833086.003.0004

4.02

118 UNION LAW AND NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from Union law.3 Accordingly, Arts 4(3) and 19(1) TEU impose an obligation upon Member States to designate the competent court or tribunal to which individuals may apply with a view to protecting the rights which they derive from Union law; to provide for remedies that allow for adequate and effective protection of these rights; and to ensure that procedural rules do not bar individuals from obtaining the redress to which they are entitled. As far as the application of national rules relating to procedure and remedies by national courts and tribunals is concerned, three difficulties arise. First, these national rules may impede the effective application of Union law and thereby affect its primacy and direct effect.4 Second, the uniform application of Union law may be jeopardized as a result of diverging national laws.5 Third, individuals may not be able to assert the rights conferred upon them by Union law.6 In order to deal with these difficulties, Arts 4(3) and 19(1) TEU place national courts and tribunals under a duty to ensure both the full effectiveness and the practical effect of Union law, and to provide effective judicial protection.7 The Court of Justice has defined this duty by means of a number of Union requirements with which national law relating to procedure and remedies must comply.8 On the one hand, these requirements are a practical expression of the principles of the primacy and direct effect of Union law9 and seek to ensure the effective application and enforcement of Union law in the legal orders of the Member States. On the other hand, they embody the rule of law principle and the fundamental right to effective judicial protection, enabling individuals to claim before national courts the

3 See C‑924/19 PPU and C‑925/19 PPU, FMS, 2020, para. 142; C-89/19, SL, 2020, para. 39. This does not, however, preclude testing the national procedural rule against Treaty provisions relating to the four freedoms: see C- 412/97, ED, 1999. 4 For example, the national law may apply very short limitation periods or deal with the burden of proof or admissible evidence in such a way that the party relying on Union law is unable or has extreme difficulty in proving his or her claims. 5 For examples of judgments in which the Court of Justice has expressed regret at the lack of Union provisions harmonizing procedures and time limits, see 130/79, Express Dairy Foods, 1980, para. 12; 54/81, Fromme, 1982, para. 4. 6 See C-682/15, Berlioz Investment Fund, 2017, para. 53; C-500/16, Caterpillar Financial Services, 2017, para. 44. 7 See C-213/89, Factortame and Others, 1990, para. 21; C-284/16, Achmea, 2018, para. 36; C-132/21, Budapesti Elektromos Művek, 2023, para. 49. 8 The relevant case-law is remarkable in that the Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction to rule directly on questions of national procedural law (indeed, it systematically refuses to answer preliminary questions relating to the interpretation or the validity of national law), yet will nevertheless seize upon the basis in Union law of national courts’ obligation to achieve a particular result in order to provide very concrete guidance as to how that obligation must be complied with. For a critical appraisal, see C-30/02, Recheio, AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer Opinion, 2003, points 23–36. In fact, the need to provide concrete guidance to the national court transcends the topic of national procedural autonomy and concerns aspects of the preliminary ruling procedure generally: see K. Lenaerts, ‘The Unity of European Law and the Overload of the ECJ—The System of Preliminary Rulings Revisited’ in G. Ziccardi Capaldo (ed.), The Global Community—Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence (Vol. 1, Oceana Publications, 2006) 173. 9 See S. Prechal, ‘Community Law in National Courts: The Lessons from Van Schijndel’ (1998) C.M.L.Rev. 686– 687, who emphasizes that Union law is part of the national legal order and that the primacy of Union law only applies within the realm of substantive law. For detailed discussion on the principles of primacy and direct effect in the Union legal order, see K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel (T. Corthaut (ed.)), EU Constitutional Law (OUP, 2021) paras 23.008–23.024.

General Overview 119 full enforcement and protection of the rights which they derive from Union law.10 The case-law of the Court of Justice oscillates between these two tendencies, which overlap in the vast majority of cases, since allowing for the effective application of Union law reinforces the judicial protection of individuals and vice versa. The Court made this clear as early as in Van Gend & Loos,11 in which it held that ‘[t]‌he vigilance of individuals concerned to protect their rights amounts to an effective supervision in addition to the supervision entrusted by Arts [258 to 260 TFEU] to the diligence of the Commission and of the Member States’.

C. Europeanization and ‘national procedural autonomy’ ‘[I]‌n the absence of [Union] rules on the matter, it is for the national legal order of each Member State to establish, in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy, procedural rules for actions intended to safeguard the rights that individuals derive from [Union] law, provided, however, that those rules are no less favourable than the rules governing similar domestic actions (the principle of equivalence) and do not render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by [Union] law (the principle of effectiveness).’12 This passage is the traditional expression of the relationship between national procedural law and Union law, formulated originally by the Court of Justice in its Rewe and Comet judgments.13 It is often referred to as the principle of ‘national procedural autonomy’,14 whereby, in the absence of Union rules on the subject, the Member States have in principle autonomy to organize their respective judicial frameworks and procedures, with the result that the European Union essentially ‘piggybacks’ on what is provided for in the national legal systems. The use of the notion of national procedural autonomy has been contested in legal doctrine15 because it gives the misleading impression that Member States have a reserved 10 See A. Van Duin, Effective Judicial Protection in Consumer Litigation. Article 47 of the EU Charter in Practice (Intersentia, 2022); M. Bonelli, M. Eliantonio, and G. Gentile (eds), Article 47 of the EU Charter and Effective Judicial Protection, Volume 1: The Court of Justice’s Perspective (Hart, 2022). 11 26/62, Van Gend & Loos, 1963 ECR 1, 13. 12 See C‑511/18, C‑512/18, and C‑520/18, La Quadrature du Net and Others, 2020, para. 223; C-746/18, H.K., 2021, para. 42; C-485/19, LH, 2021, para. 52; C-261/21, F. Hoffmann-La Roche, 2022, para. 44; C‑274/21 and C‑275/21, EPIC Financial Consulting, 2022, para. 73; C-524/21 and C-525/21, Agenţia Judeţeană de Ocupare a Forţei de Muncă Ilfov, 2023, para. 54. See also K. Lenaerts, ‘National Remedies for Private Parties in the Light of the EU Law Principles of Equivalence and Effectiveness’ (2011) Irish Jurist 13. 13 See 33/76, Rewe, 1976, para. 5; 45/76, Comet, 1976, para. 13. 14 See C-485/19, LH, 2021, para. 52; C-910/19, Bankia, 2021, para. 46; C‑776/19 to C‑782/19, VB, 2021, para. 27; C-132/21, Budapesti Elektromos Művek, 2023, para. 45. 15 See C.N. Kakouris, ‘Do the Member States Possess Judicial Procedural “Autonomy”?’ (1997) C.M.L.Rev. 1389; A. Ward, Judicial Review and the Rights of Private Parties in EU Law (2nd edn, OUP, 2007) 193; M. Bobek, ‘Why There Is No Principle of “Procedural Autonomy” of the Member States’ in H. Micklitz and B. De Witte (eds), The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States (Intersentia, 2012) 305; J.T. Nowak, ‘Considerations on the Impact of EU Law on National Civil Procedure’ in V. Lazić and S. Stuij (eds), International Dispute Resolution (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2018) 1; D. Halberstam, ‘Understanding National Remedies and the Principle of National Procedural Autonomy: A Constitutional Approach’ (2021) C.Y.E.L.S. 128; M. Bonelli, ‘Article 47 of the Charter, Effective Judicial Protection and the (Procedural) Autonomy of the Member States’ in M. Bonelli, M. Eliantonio, and G. Gentile (eds), Article 47 of the EU Charter and Effective Judicial Protection, Volume 1: The Court of Justice’s Perspective (Hart, 2022) 81.

4.03

120 UNION LAW AND NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES area of competence for procedures and remedies that cannot be affected by Union law. That is indeed not the case. Importance should rather be attached to the phrase ‘in the absence of Union rules’. It is only when no specific Union rules exist that Member States are free to organize their national judicial systems, provided they comply with the requirements set by Union law, in particular, the case-law of the Court of Justice. The autonomy of the Member States is thus largely conditional, and the notion of national procedural autonomy should be understood in that way. Moreover, the regulatory space of the Member States is diminishing as the Union legislature is rapidly increasing its activity in the area of procedural rules and remedies.16 Various important pieces of legislation have been adopted in recent years, such as the directive on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of competition law17 and the directive on representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers.18 While an attempt by the European Parliament to go beyond sectoral rules and to enact general minimum standards for civil procedure has been unsuccessful,19 it is clear in which direction the Union legislature is heading. In addition to this, with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter) becoming binding, the right to effective judicial protection as laid down in Art. 47 of the Charter has become more prominent in the case-law of the Court of Justice.20 It now serves as the primary benchmark to assess national procedural rules and remedies and the Court, by defining the contours of Art. 47 of the Charter, is gradually laying down basic requirements to which the procedural and remedial rules of the Member States must adhere. Add to this the imposition of additional procedural requirements on the basis of the effet utile of substantive Union law—of which the obligation of national courts to apply Union consumer law of their own motion (ex officio) serves as a prime example21—as well as the recent case-law on the second subparagraph of Art. 19(1) TEU regarding the independence of national courts, and it is safe to say that Union law is now in a different era as compared to the time in which the Rewe and Comet judgments were given.22 It might therefore be preferable to speak about the Europeanization of national procedural rules and remedies, rather than about national procedural autonomy.23 That being said, the 16 See F. Wilman, Private Enforcement of EU Law before National Courts. The EU Legislative Framework (Edward Elgar, 2016). 17 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States (OJ 2014 L349/1). 18 Directive (EU) 2020/1828 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2020 on representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers and repealing Directive 2009/22/EC (OJ 2020 L409/1). 19 Resolution of the European Parliament of 4 July 2017 with recommendations to the Commission on common minimum standards of civil procedure in the European Union, SP(2017)539. 20 See S. Prechal, ‘The Court of Justice and Effective Judicial Protection: What Has the Charter Changed?’ in C. Paulussen, T. Takacs, V. Lazić, and B. Van Rompuy (eds), Fundamental Rights in International and European Law (T.M.C. Asser, 2015) 156. 21 See para. 4.41. 22 See A. Arnull, ‘Article 47 CFR and national procedural autonomy’ (2020) E.L.Rev. 681, 692. 23 For other suggestions, see W. Van Gerven, ‘Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures’ (2000) C.M.L.Rev. 502, who suggests ‘procedural competence of the Member States’; D. Halberstam, ‘Understanding National Remedies and

FRAMEWORK GOVERNING NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES 121 Court has fully incorporated the notion of national procedural autonomy into its case- law,24 and what ultimately matters is how the different requirements imposed upon national rules on procedure and remedies play out in concrete cases.

D. Topics to be discussed This chapter will focus on a number of key aspects of the Court’s abundant case-law on national procedures and remedies, and it is by no means exhaustive. First, the major principles and rules structuring the case-law of the Court will be explored (Part II). This will be followed by a section on the obligation to provide remedies (Part III) and a section concerning the actual requirements imposed upon national procedural rules (Part IV). A final part will delve into some fields of application relating to the recovery of unlawful charges, the recovery of unlawful State aid, claims based on a directive not implemented in time, damages actions against a Member State for breach of Union law, damages actions against private parties for breach of Union law, and interim relief (Part V).

4.04

II. The Union Law Framework Governing National Procedures and Remedies In the case-law of the Court of Justice, one can find several provisions, principles, and concepts informing Union law requirements imposed upon national procedures and remedies. Depending on the particular context, the Court has based its judgments on the following foundations: the principle of equivalence; the principle of effectiveness; the principle of sincere cooperation sensu stricto;25 the principle of the rule of law; Art. 19(1) TEU; the principle of effective judicial protection; Art. 47 of the Charter; the full effectiveness of Union law (pleine efficacité); the practical effect of Union law (effet utile); as well as Union legislation providing rules and standards on procedures and remedies. In one way or another, these are all expressions of the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Art. 4(3) TEU, which requires the Member States to take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the Union institutions.26 This is so, especially for the principle of equivalence, the principle of effectiveness, the principle of sincere

the Principle of National Procedural Autonomy: A Constitutional Approach’ (2021) C.Y.E.L.S. 128, who suggests ‘national procedural authority’.

24

See C-746/18, H.K., 2021, para. 42; C-485/19, LH, 2021, para. 52. See para. 4.09. 26 See C-385/21, Zenith Media Communications, 2022, para. 34. 25

4.05

122 UNION LAW AND NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES cooperation, the full effectiveness of Union law, and the practical effect of Union law. Moreover, while the principle of the rule of law, Art. 19(1) TEU, the principle of effective judicial protection, and Art. 47 of the Charter all have an existence of their own, they can ultimately be traced back to the basic obligation of the Member States laid down in Art. 4(3) TEU. In this regard, the Court of Justice has consistently held that Art. 4(3) TEU requires national courts to ensure that individuals enjoy judicial protection under Union law.27 More recently, the Court has also linked the requirement imposed upon Member States to provide for effective judicial review by independent courts directly to Art. 4(3) TEU.28 The various expressions of Art. 4(3) TEU have different consequences for the autonomy of the Member States to regulate procedural rules and to provide for remedies. A brief account of these expressions will be given hereafter, as well as some comments on their relationship.

A. The principles of equivalence, effectiveness, and sincere cooperation sensu stricto 4.06

4.07

(1) General The principles of equivalence and effectiveness have been developed by the Court of Justice specifically to evaluate whether national procedures ensure the effective application of Union law. They apply to all types of national procedures, such as administrative and judicial proceedings,29 and are the most direct expression of Art. 4(3) TEU in matters of procedure.30 As mentioned above, the Court of Justice laid down the principles of equivalence and effectiveness at the same time when it held that, in principle, national procedural rules and rules on remedies are to apply, but (1) that those rules may not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence),31 and (2) that they may not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Union law (principle of effectiveness).32 (2) The principle of equivalence The principle of equivalence embodies a requirement for ‘procedural equal treatment’ of claims based on Union law and claims based on national law, for example, as regards the effects of the expiry of a time-limit for bringing proceedings or of an error in drawing up the document originating proceedings. In addition, it must be possible for every type of action provided for by national law to be available for the purpose

27 See C-785/18, GAEC Jeanningros, 2020, para. 32. 28 See C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, 2018, paras 34–37. 29 See C-480/18, ‘PrivatBank’ AS, 2020, para. 73; C-56/21, UAB ‘ARVI’ ir ko, 2022, para. 31; C‑274/21 and C‑275/21, EPIC Financial Consulting, 2022, para. 73. 30 See C-234/17, XC and Others, 2018, para. 22; C-335/21, Vincente, 2022, para. 54. 31 See 33/76, Rewe, 1976, para. 5; 45/76, Comet, 1976, para. 13; C-910/19, Bankia, 2021, para. 46; C‑776/19 to C‑782/19, VB, 2021, para. 27; C-242/22 PPU, TL, 2022, para. 75. 32 See 33/76, Rewe, 1976, para. 5; 45/76, Comet, 1976, para. 16; C-910/19, Bankia, 2021, para. 46; C‑776/19 to C‑782/19, VB, 2021, para. 27; C-242/22 PPU, TL, 2022, para. 75.

FRAMEWORK GOVERNING NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES 123 of ensuring observance of Union provisions having direct effect.33 In order to decide whether procedural rules relating to a claim based on national law and those relating to claims based on Union law are equivalent, the national court must verify objectively, in the abstract, whether the rules at issue are similar, taking into account the role played by those rules in the procedure as a whole, as well as the operation of that procedure and any special features of those rules.34 Member States are not required, however, to extend their most favourable procedural rules to actions involving an element of Union law.35 (3) The principle of effectiveness National procedural rules and remedies must comply with the principle of effectiveness. Those rules, albeit complying with the principle of equivalence, may not be framed in such a way as to make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by Union law.36 This question must be analysed by reference to the role of that provision in the procedure, its progress, and its special features, viewed as a whole, before the various national instances. In the light of that analysis, the basic principles of the national judicial system, such as protection of the rights of the defence, the principle of legal certainty, and the proper conduct of procedure, must, where appropriate, be taken into consideration.37 (4) The principle of sincere cooperation sensu stricto The Court of Justice further developed a third principle which is directly relevant for national procedures, in particular, court procedures. This principle requires that a national court must exercise its discretion to ensure the legal protection which individuals derive from the direct effect of provisions of Union law.38 In short, where a national court has a discretionary power under national law to take a certain action, it is under an obligation to exercise that discretionary power where this contributes to the application of Union law. This obligation has been referred to in the literature as an expression of the principle of sincere cooperation or the principle of loyalty.39 Contrary to what is the case for the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, the Court of Justice has not

33 See 158/80, Rewe, 1981, para. 44. The Court of Justice specified in Pasquini that the principle of equivalence ‘must be applied not only with regard to provisions of national law on limitation of actions and recovery of sums paid though not due, but also to all procedural rules governing the treatment of comparable situations, whether administrative or judicial’: C-34/02, Pasquini, 2003, para. 62. 34 See C-78/98, Preston and Others, 2000, para. 63; C-246/09, Bulicke, 2010, para. 29; C‑13/18 and C‑126/18, Sole-Mizo and Others, 2020, para. 40. 35 See C‑274/21 and C‑275/21, EPIC Financial Consulting, 2022, para. 77; C-242/22 PPU, TL, 2022, para. 75. 36 See 199/82, San Giorgio, 1983, para. 12 (this phrase has tended to be rendered in English as ‘framed in such a way as in practice to make it impossible’: see C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, 1996, para. 74); see 2/94, Denkavit International, AG Jacobs Opinion, 1996, point 75, suggesting ‘unduly difficult’. 37 See C-430/93 and C-431/93, van Schijndel, 1995, para. 19; C-312/93, Peterbroeck, 1995, para. 14; C-485/19, LH, 2021, para. 53; C‑415/20, C‑419/20, and C‑427/20, Gräfendorfer Geflügel-und Tiefkühlfeinkost Produktions and Others, 2022, para. 80. 38 See C-430/93 and C-431/93, van Schijndel, 1995, para. 14; C-620/17, Hochtief Solutions Magyarországi Fióktelepe, 2019, paras 54–60; C-676/17, Călin, 2019, paras 27–28. 39 See A. Wallerman, ‘Towards an EU Law Doctrine on the Exercise of Discretion in National Courts? The Member States’ Self-imposed Limits on National Procedural Autonomy’ (2016) C.M.L.Rev. 339.

4.08

4.09

124 UNION LAW AND NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES (yet) adopted a specific notion for this obligation and refers to Art. 4(3) TEU in general or even connects it to the principle of equivalence. The use in this book of the notion of the principle of sincere cooperation sensu stricto is thus for reasons of clarity only.

B. The rule of law and Art. 19(1) TEU 4.10

The rule of law is one of the values on which the Union is founded.40 In a Union based on the rule of law, individuals have a right to challenge before the courts the legality of any decision or other national measure relating to the application to them of a Union act.41 Indeed, the existence of judicial review ensuring compliance with Union law is of the essence of the rule of law.42 In accordance with Art. 19(1) TEU, judicial review in the Union legal order has been entrusted to both the Court of Justice of the European Union and the national courts and tribunals.43 National courts and tribunals, together with the Union Courts, have a duty to ensure that, in the interpretation and application of the Treaties, the law is observed. It follows from this that Art. 19(1) TEU, which gives concrete expression to the principle of the rule of law,44 imposes upon Member States an obligation to provide remedies that are sufficient to ensure effective judicial protection for individuals in the fields covered by Union law.45 This includes a right to an effective remedy before an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law.46 The central role of national courts and tribunals in upholding the rule of law in the European Union is thus not without consequences. It means that national legal systems must be organized in such a way that they comply with the rule of law requirements expressed in the second subparagraph of Art. 19(1) TEU.47 This requires that courts and tribunals which are part of a Member State’s judicial system are independent, impartial, and previously established by law.48 In particular, this requires rules that dispel any reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to the imperviousness of courts and tribunals to external factors and their neutrality with respect to the interests before them. Following this, Union law impacts upon national laws governing the organization of the judiciary; for example, the rules regarding the composition of a court, the

40 Art. 2 TEU. 41 See C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, 2018, para. 31; C-216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality, 2018, para. 49; C-619/18, Commission v Poland, 2019, para. 46. 42 See C‑357/19, C‑379/19, C‑547/19, C‑811/19, and C‑840/19, PM and Others, 2021, para. 219; C-156/21, Hungary v Parliament and Council, 2022, para. 132; C-157/21, Poland v Parliament and Council, 2022, para. 150. 43 See Opinion 1/09, Draft agreement on the European and Community Patents Court, 2011, paras 66–70. 44 See C‑64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, 2018, para. 32. 45 See C-261/21, F. Hoffmann-La Roche, 2022, para. 43. 46 See C-542/18 RX-II and C-543/18 RX-II, Review Simpson v Council and HG v Commission, 2020, para. 55. 47 See C‑64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, 2018, para. 34. See further S. Prechal, ‘Article 19 TEU and National Courts: A New Role for the Principle of Effective Judicial Protection? in M. Bonelli, M. Eliantonio, and G. Gentile (eds), Article 47 of the EU Charter and Effective Judicial Protection, Volume 1: The Court of Justice’s Perspective (Hart, 2022) 11. 48 See C-542/18 RX-II and C-543/18 RX-II, Review Simpson v Council and HG v Commission, 2020, para. 55.

FRAMEWORK GOVERNING NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES 125 appointment of judges, the termination of a judge’s mandate, the length of a mandate, recusal, disciplinary proceedings, and the remuneration of judges.49

C. The principle of effective judicial protection and Art. 47 of the Charter The principle of effective judicial protection is a general principle of Union law. It corresponds to Arts 6 and 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and imposes an obligation upon the Member States to provide for effective judicial protection of the rights conferred upon individuals by Union law.50 With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the principle of effective judicial protection was codified in Art. 47 of the Charter, which constitutes a reaffirmation of that principle.51 Art. 47 of the Charter serves primarily as a benchmark to test the effectiveness of the remedies provided for in national law and the rules which govern the procedures and conditions under which a remedy may be obtained. In addition, Art. 47 of the Charter functions as a legal basis for filling gaps in the judicial protection provided for by the Member States. Although the latter function of Art. 47 of the Charter was already quite clear from the case-law of the Court,52 the Court of Justice recently dispelled any doubts in this regard by stating in Egenberger53 that Art. 47 of the Charter ‘is sufficient in itself and does not need to be made more specific by provisions of [Union] or national law to confer on individuals a right which they may rely on as such’. This creates an obligation for national courts to provide judicial protection where national law does not provide for a remedy in case of a breach of Union law.54 Further to this, Art. 47 of the Charter also imposes conditions on the organization of national judiciaries through Art. 19(1) TEU.55 The different ways in which Art. 47 of the Charter is being used also translate into different intensities of review. On the one hand, there are cases where Art. 47 of the Charter imposes rigid conditions on national law, leaving no room for Member State discretion. This is the case where the essence of Art. 47 of the Charter is affected,56 for example, 49 See C-896/19, Repubblika, 2021, para. 53; C-791/19, Commission v Poland, 2021, para. 59. See para. 2.03. 50 C-205/21, Ministerstvo na vatreshnite raboti, 2023, para. 87 51 See C‑924/19 PPU and C‑925/19 PPU, FMS, 2020, para. 141; C-824/18, A.B. and Others, 2021, para. 87; C- 194/19, H.A., 2021, para. 43; C-132/21, Budapesti Elektromos Művek, 2023, para. 50. 52 See C-432/05, Unibet, 2007, para. 64. See also C-432/05, Unibet, AG Sharpston Opinion, 2006, point 56. 53 See C-414/16, Egenberger, 2018, para. 78; C‑274/21 and C‑275/21, EPIC Financial Consulting, 2022, para. 83; C-175/21, Harman International Industries, 2022, para. 32. 54 See C-497/20, Randstad Italia, 2021, para. 62; C-261/21, F. Hoffmann-La Roche, 2022, para. 47. 55 See S. Prechal, ‘Article 19 TEU and National Courts: A New Role for the Principle of Effective Judicial Protection?’ in M. Bonelli, M. Eliantonio, and G. Gentile (eds), Article 47 of the EU Charter and Effective Judicial Protection, Volume 1: The Court of Justice’s Perspective (Hart, 2022) 11. 56 See, on this notion, M. Brkan, ‘The Concept of Essence of Fundamental Rights in the EU Legal Order: Peeling the Onion to its Core’ (2018) E. Const. L. Rev. 332; K. Gutman, ‘The Essence of the Fundamental Right to an Effective Remedy and to a Fair Trial in the Case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union: The Best Is Yet to Come?’ (2019) G.L.J. 884. For a critical approach of the notion essence of rights, see G. Gentile and T. Tridimas, ‘The Essence of Rights: An Unreliable Boundary’ (2019) G.L.J. 794.

4.11

126 UNION LAW AND NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES where no remedies are available to ensure compliance with Union law,57 where the administration ignores judicial decisions,58 or where the independence of the judiciary is undermined.59 On the other hand, Art. 47 of the Charter leaves a margin for Member States to make procedural choices. However, these procedural choices must meet the standard imposed by Art. 47 of the Charter, which may imply that additional procedural obligations are imposed upon the Member States, particularly in areas where Union rules providing for the (minimum) harmonization of national procedural rules exist.60

D. Full effectiveness and practical effect of Union law 4.12

The notion of ‘full effectiveness’ is used by the Court of Justice in situations where the national legal framework does not give sufficient effect to a provision of Union law or where it creates obstacles to the intended functioning of a provision of Union law.61 It obliges the national authority concerned to do everything possible within its powers to ensure the functioning of the provision of Union law in question. For example, Member State rules on the principle of res judicata should not be applied where they undermine the exclusive competence of the Commission for the approval of State aid.62 In this sense, the full effectiveness of Union law is closely linked to the primacy of Union law: national rules that obstruct the full effectiveness of a provision of Union law must be disapplied. The notion of ‘effectiveness’ or ‘practical effect’ is closely related to the concept of ‘full effectiveness’, but should nevertheless be distinguished from it. In essence, the case-law on the effet utile of Union law does not concern the correction of imperfections in the national system of enforcement of Union law, but is about the imposition of additional requirements which are necessary for a provision of Union law to fully deploy its intended effect in the national legal orders.63 In this way, the case-law on effet utile may be regarded as a direct application of Art. 4(3) TEU: the Member State is required to do more than what is strictly required by the provision of Union law in question. For 57 See C-414/16, Egenberger, 2018, para. 79. 58 See C-752/18, Deutsche Umwelthilfe, 2019, para. 35. For similar reasons, national legislation providing for a two-month suspension of a decision ordering the return of a child that has become definitive at the simple request of a national authority was held to be incompatible with Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility (OJ 2003 L 338/1), as interpreted in the light of Art. 47 of the Charter: C-638/22 PPU, Rzecznik Praw Dziecka and Others, 2023, paras 83–85. 59 See S. Prechal, ‘Effective Judicial Protection: Some Recent Developments—Moving to the Essence’ (2020) REALaw 175, 189. 60 See C-704/20 and C-39/21, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid, 2022, paras 86–94. See further M. Bonelli, ‘Article 47 of the Charter, Effective Judicial Protection and the (Procedural) Autonomy of the Member States’ in M. Bonelli, M. Eliantonio, and G. Gentile (eds), Article 47 of the EU Charter and Effective Judicial Protection, Volume 1: The Court of Justice’s Perspective (Hart, 2022) 81. 61 See C-370/17 and C-37/18, CRPNPAC, 2020, para. 74. 62 See C-119/05, Lucchini, 2007, para. 61. 63 See C-724/17, Vantaan kaupunki, 2019, para. 25; C-406/18, PG, 2020, para. 20; C-7/21, LKW Walter, 2022, paras 45–49; C‑274/21 and C‑275/21, EPIC Financial Consulting, 2022, para. 94.

FRAMEWORK GOVERNING NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES 127 example, the effet utile of Art. 267 TFEU presupposes, inter alia, that a national court may take interim measures pending a preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice.64

E. Union legislation As mentioned above, Union law also imposes requirements on the procedural and remedial rules of the Member States by way of Union legislation.65 In fact, Union legislation on national procedural and remedial rules can be seen as the detailed working out of the principles and requirements discussed above. The impact of Union legislation on national procedural rules and remedies is important as it narrows down further the regulatory space of the Member States in areas of procedure and remedies. Moreover, requirements imposed by Union legislation will give rise to further questions of interpretation and may trigger the application of additional requirements stemming from the obligation to ensure the practical effect of Union law or compliance with Art. 47 of the Charter.

4.13

F. Relationship between different expressions of Art. 4(3) TEU The use of different principles and requirements to structure the relationship between Union law and national procedural rules and remedies has provoked discussion in the literature about their usefulness and relationship.66 This is so particularly for the various expressions of effectiveness in the case-law, which are largely intertwined.67 Overall, the case-law relating to national procedural law and remedies has been influenced by a concern both for the effective application of Union law and for the effective judicial protection of private parties, as expressed through various principles and requirements.68 Often, these concerns coincide, in the sense that effective judicial protection also usually leads to the effective application of Union law, and vice versa.69 Moreover, in the

64 See C-213/89, Factortame and Others, 1990, para. 22. 65 See para. 4.03. 66 See S. Prechal and R. Widdershoven, ‘Redefining the Relationship between ‘Rewe Effectiveness’ and Effective Judicial Protection’ (2011) REALaw 31, 38, 44; P. Van Cleynenbreugel, ‘The Confusing Constitutional Status of Positive Procedural Obligations in EU Law’ (2012) REALaw 100; J. Krommendijk, ‘Is There Light on the Horizon? The Distinction between “Rewe Effectiveness” and the Principle of Effective Judicial Protection in Article 47 of the Charter after Orizzonte’ (2016) C.M.L.Rev. 1395, 1415–1416; A. Lenaerts, ‘Invloed van de rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie van de Europese Unie op de autonomie van het nationaal procesrecht: over de verhouding tussen de beginselen van doeltreffendheid van het Unierecht en effectieve rechtsbescherming van de burger’ in J. de Codt, B. De Coninck, A. Henkes, D. Thijs, and J.-F. van Drooghenbroeck (eds), Le Code judiciaire à 50 ans. Et après? Hommage Ernest Krings & Marcel Storme (Larcier, 2018) 203; B. Krans and A. Nylund, ‘Aspects of Procedural Autonomy’ in B. Krans and A. Nylund (eds), Procedural Autonomy across Europe (Intersentia, 2020) 4. 67 J.L. da Cruz Vilaça, ‘Le principe de l’effet utile de droit de l’Union dans la jurisprudence de la Cour’ in A. Rosas, E. Levits, and Y. Bot (eds), The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe: Analysis and Perspectives on Sixty Years of Case-Law (Springer and Asser Press, 2012) 279. 68 A. Ward, Judicial Review and the Rights of Private Parties in EU Law (2nd edn, OUP, 2007) 413. 69 D. Curtin, ‘Case C-271/91, Marshall v. Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health Authority, [“Marshall II”], Judgment of 2 August 1993, nyr’ (1994) C.M.L.Rev. 641.

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128 UNION LAW AND NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES early years of European integration the focus was mainly on the effective application of Union law, and the Court sought to establish the authority of Union law and its application in the legal orders of the Member States. In this particular context, judicial protection of private parties was rather an instrument to realize the effective application of Union law, as follows from the Van Gend & Loos judgment.70 There is no clear point in the case-law where effective judicial protection comes to the fore as the prime concern. Reference is often made to the Johnston judgment,71 in which the Court of Justice, for the first time, referred to the principle of effective judicial protection.72 Starting around the same time, the Court of Justice also defined the then European Economic Community as a Community based on the rule of law and recognized the principle of the completeness of judicial protection.73 Therefore, the turning point could indeed be situated in the mid-1980s. At the beginning of the 2020s, it is safe to say that the principle of effective judicial protection has gained the upper hand and is now the primary basis for the Court of Justice’s case-law relating to national procedural law and remedies.74 That being said, effective judicial protection and the effective application of Union law still go hand in hand.75 Moreover, at times the requirement of effective application may even prevail, namely, in those cases where the effective application of Union law requires stronger intervention in national procedural law than the principle of effective judicial protection.

III. The Obligation to Provide Effective Remedies A. General Overview 4.15

The Member States are obliged to provide remedies to ensure effective judicial protection in the fields covered by Union law.76 Where a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations in a particular case, Art. 47 of the Charter gives individuals the right to apply to national courts for an effective remedy77 and, where appropriate, the national courts are obliged to accept jurisdiction.78 Ultimately, it is thus for the national courts to ensure effective judicial protection of rights derived from Union law.

70 See 26/62, Van Gend & Loos, 1963 ECR 1, 13. 71 See 222/84, Johnston, 1986, paras 18–21, referring at the time to ‘judicial control’. 72 S. Prechal, ‘The Court of Justice and Effective Judicial Protection: What Has the Charter Changed?’ in C. Paulussen, T. Takacs, V. Lazić, and B. Van Rompuy (eds), Fundamental Rights in International and European Law (T.M.C. Asser, 2015) 143. 73 See 294/83, Les Verts v Parliament, 1986, para. 23. 74 See R. Widdershoven, ‘National Procedural Autonomy and General EU Law Limits’ (2019) REALaw 5. 75 See C-215/21, Servicios Prescriptor y Medios de Pagos EFC, 2022, paras 35–36. 76 Art. 19(1), second para. TEU. 77 See C-414/16, Egenberger, 2018, para. 78. 78 See C-924/19 PPU and C-925/19 PPU, FMS, 2020, para. 144.

The Obligation to Provide Effective Remedies 129

B. Constraints upon the freedom of the Member States to provide remedies The Member States are, in principle, free to choose how they ensure effective judicial protection in the fields covered by Union law. They may determine which remedies exist in national law and under which conditions such remedies may be obtained. However, remedies must comply with the general requirement of effective judicial protection. On the one hand, this means that the substantive conditions under which the remedy may be obtained shall not be insurmountable. For example, proving fault on the part of the employer should not be a requirement for being able to claim damages for sex discrimination.79 On the other hand, this means that a remedy must provide adequate protection of rights derived from Union law. For example, symbolic damages in the form of the reimbursement of application fees are not sufficient to compensate for sex discrimination in the recruitment process.80 In some instances, it is required that the remedy also has a deterrent effect. For example, it is not enough for the national court to reduce the amount of an unfair penalty clause in a consumer contract; Union law requires either that such a clause is null and void, or some other remedy which would result in the clause not being binding upon the consumer.81

4.16

C. Union remedies (1) Existence The Court of Justice has specified the obligation to provide remedies in certain judgments, thereby creating genuine Union remedies.82 In particular, it concerns the following remedies: Member State liability;83 interim judicial protection;84 damages for breach of competition law;85 injunctions to comply with Union law obligations;86 an 79 See C-177/88, Dekker, 1990, para. 24. See further K. Gutman, ‘The Role of Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Field of Non-Discrimination: Onwards and Upwards’ in M. Bonelli, M. Eliantonio, and G. Gentile (eds), Article 47 of the EU Charter and Effective Judicial Protection, Volume 1: The Court of Justice’s Perspective (Hart, 2022) 121. 80 See 14/83, Von Colson, 1984, para. 24. In discrimination cases, it is also important that a national court has the power to recognize the existence of discrimination. Union law thus precludes national legislation that prevents a national court from examining the existence of discrimination where the defendant agrees to pay the compensation claimed without recognizing the existence of that discrimination: C-30/19, Braathens Regional Aviation, 2021, paras 43–45. 81 See C-260/18, Dziubak, 2019, para. 59. 82 Increasingly, Union legislation provides for the creation of new remedies in the legal orders of the Member States. See, e.g. Art. 54 of Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection, or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA (OJ 2016 L119/89), which obliges Member States to provide for an effective judicial remedy against a controller or processor in case of the processing of personal data in non-compliance with this directive. The remedy and the procedure for obtaining such remedy must, of course, comply with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness: C-350/21, Spetsializirana prokuratura, 2022, paras 74–76. 83 See C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich and Others, 1991; C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, 1996. 84 See C-213/89, Factortame and Others, 1990. 85 See C-453/99, Courage and Crehan, 2001. 86 See C-535/18, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2020, paras 122–123.

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130 UNION LAW AND NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES appeal against negative administrative decisions;87 and reform of administrative decisions where the competent authorities have failed to take appropriate action following a previously annulled decision.88 In addition, the Court of Justice has implicitly recognized the existence of a number of remedies without, however, imposing an obligation to do so in the specific case, since a remedy was already present in national law. This concerns the reimbursement of sums paid in breach of Union law,89 as well as a freestanding legal remedy to assess the compatibility of provisions of national law with Union law if this cannot be done indirectly.90

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(2) Conditions under which a remedy can be obtained (a) Member State liability Compensation from a Member State for breach of Union law can be obtained under three conditions: the breach of a rule intended to confer rights on individuals; a sufficiently serious breach of Union law; and a direct causal link between the breach of Union law by the Member State and the damage.91 These conditions are uniformly defined at Union level and constitute a ‘cause of action’ leading to the award of damages. Member States are not allowed to impose additional substantive conditions, for instance, that the damage was intentionally caused,92 or the setting aside of a decision of a supreme court in breach of Union law as a precondition for an action for Member State liability.93 They may, however, lay down less stringent conditions.94 Further to this, it is for the Member States to determine the procedural rules under which a claim for Member State liability may be brought, provided that these rules comply with, inter alia, the requirements of equivalence and effectiveness.95 (b) Interim relief The Court of Justice has also set out the substantive conditions under which interim relief may be obtained against Union acts whose validity is disputed before a national court. In such instances, the national court may suspend the application of a Union act if: (1) the national court has serious doubts about the validity of the Union act in question and, where such a question has not yet been referred to the Court, refers a question

87 See 22/86, Unectef, 1987. 88 C-556/17, Torubarov, 2019, para. 77; C-752/18, Deutsche Umwelthilfe, 2019, paras 34–37; C-406/18, PG, 2020, paras 21–22. 89 See 199/82, San Giorgio, 1983, para. 12; C-100/20, XY, 2021, para. 26. This right constitutes the expression of a general principle of recovery of sums paid but not due. It applies regardless of the nature of the sums paid or the nature of the breach of Union law: see C‑415/20, C‑419/20, and C‑427/20, Gräfendorfer Geflügel-und Tiefkühlfeinkost Produktions and Others, 2022, paras 53, 60–65. 90 See C-432/05, Unibet, 2007, para. 65; C-379/18, Deutsche Lufthansa, 2019, para. 61; C-289/21, Varhoven administrativen sad, 2022, para. 34; see also C-432/05, Unibet, AG Sharpston Opinion, 2006, point 56. 91 See C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, 1996, para. 51; C-278/20, Commission v Spain, 2022, para. 31. See further paras 4.65–4.67. 92 See C-571/16, Kantarev, 2018, para. 128; C-501/18, BT, 2021, para. 121. 93 See C-160/14, Ferreira da Silva e Brito, 2015, paras 46–60. 94 See C-620/17, Hochtief Solutions Magyarországi Fióktelepe, 2019, para. 37; C-120/20, Koleje Mazowieckie, 2021, para. 62; C-61/21, Ministre de la Transition écologique et Premier ministre, 2022, para. 63. 95 See para. 4.70.

Requirements Imposed upon National Procedural Rules 131 to the Court for a preliminary ruling on the validity of that Union act; (2) the matter is urgent and a threat of serious and irreparable damage to the applicant exists; and (3) the national court takes due account of the interests of the European Union.96 In subsequent case-law, the Court further specified how these conditions should be assessed. In particular, it is important for the national court to take into account the judgments of the Union Courts on the legality of the Union act in question or any interlocutory order at Union level granting similar interim measures.97 Under the same conditions, a national court has the power to prescribe interim measures pending the outcome of a preliminary question of validity.98 (c) Other remedies For other Union remedies, the Court of Justice has not defined the substantive conditions in such an explicit manner. However, it can be deduced from the case-law whether a substantive condition meets the requirement of effective judicial protection. For example, the Court of Justice held that Union law does not preclude a rule of national law that excludes the reimbursement of levies paid in breach of Union law where the claimant has passed on the amounts to a third party.99 (3) Limits In its case-law, the Court of Justice has also set some limits on the availability of remedies. For example, Art. 47 of the Charter does not imply a right to a second instance judicial review,100 except where the exclusion of an appeal would result in the unequal treatment of the parties to the proceedings.101 Additionally, in light of the complete and coherent system of judicial protection, it is not necessary for Member States to provide for an independent right of appeal in order to verify the conformity of national measures with Union law where there is an incidental possibility of doing so in the context of a procedure to obtain a different remedy.102

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IV. Requirements Imposed upon National Procedural Rules A. Before going to court The requirements of Art. 47 of the Charter have an impact on national procedural law even before the judicial phase. This is particularly true for administrative procedures, as a preceding administrative procedure often has an impact on participation in 96 See C-143/88 and C-92/89, Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen, 1991, para. 33. 97 See C-465/93, Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft, 1995, para. 51. 98 See C-465/93, Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft, 1995, para. 30. 99 See 199/82, San Giorgio, 1983, para. 13. 100 See C-69/10, Samba Diouf, 2011, para. 69; see also C-497/20, Randstad Italia, 2021, para. 69; C-261/21, F. Hoffmann-La Roche, 2022, paras 49–51. 101 See C-169/14, Sánchez Morcillo, 2014, para. 51. 102 See C-432/05, Unibet, 2007, para. 65; C-379/18, Deutsche Lufthansa, 2019, para. 61.

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132 UNION LAW AND NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES subsequent judicial proceedings and may thus affect the right to judicial review. In certain cases, participation in a preliminary decision-making procedure is a precondition for being able to appeal against the measure which is the result of it. The right of access to court requires that parties with a direct interest are not excluded from participating in that decision-making procedure.103 Individuals must also be able to defend their rights in the best possible circumstances and be in a position to decide, with full knowledge of the facts, whether they will benefit from going to court.104 The competent authority is therefore under a duty to inform them of the grounds for its decision, either in the decision itself or in a subsequent communication made at their request. The possibility of bringing legal proceedings and the duty to state reasons are designed, among other things, effectively to protect the rights conferred on individuals by Union law. These Union law requirements apply only to final decisions of national authorities, not to opinions or to measures taken at the preparatory or investigative stage.105 Also in the context of civil proceedings, Art. 47 of the Charter imposes requirements on the communication between parties prior to action. For example, a party may refuse service of a document if it is not in a language that he or she understands or in an official language of the place of service.106 The Court of Justice further held that a party in default must be able to acquaint him-or herself with the grounds of a default judgment in order to be able to challenge them in an effective manner.107 For similar reasons, the limited content of an application for an order for payment could dissuade consumers from appealing against an order for payment and thus not ensure the effective protection of their rights under Union law.108

B. Access to court 4.23

(1) General Access to court is understood here as the possibility to turn to a court. It does not concern the question of whether a right of action (a form of remedy) exists, but rather whether one can actually enforce a right of action before a court or a tribunal. In other words: can a party request an existing form of remedy from the court?

103 See C-664/15, Protect Natur-, Arten-und Landschaftschutz Umweltorganisation, 2017, para. 81. Moreover, such a precondition is precluded altogether in regard of non-governmental organizations which are part of the ‘public concerned’ for proceedings that come within the scope of Art. 9(2) of the Aarhus Convention: see C-826/18, LB, 2021, paras 58–59. 104 See C-166/13, Mukarubega, 2014, para. 48; C-349/21, HYA and Others, 2023, para. 46. Regarding the form in which such information should be made available, see C-564/21, Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2022, para. 56. In the context of tendering procedures, the contracting authority must communicate to the unsuccessful tenderer the essential content of data considered to be confidential, in particular, the content of data concerning decisive aspects of its decision and of the successful tender. To this end, the contracting authority may request the successful tenderer to provide it with a non-confidential version of the documents containing confidential information: see C-54/21, ANTEA POLSKA and Others, 2022, paras 66–67. 105 See 222/86, Heylens and Others, 1987, para. 16; C-75/08, Mellor, 2009, para. 59. 106 See C-21/17, Caitlin Europe, 2018, paras 32–34. 107 See C-283/05, ASML, 2006, para. 35. 108 See C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito, 2012, para. 54.

Requirements Imposed upon National Procedural Rules 133 (2) Prior exhaustion of administrative remedies In Puškár,109 the Court of Justice held that Art. 47 of the Charter does not preclude, in principle, an obligation laid down in national law to have exhausted the available administrative remedies prior to the exercise of a judicial remedy. This is on the condition that the practical arrangements for the exercise of such an administrative remedy do not impact in a disproportionate way on the right to an effective remedy before a court. Factors to be taken into account are, inter alia, whether such proceedings result in a binding decision, whether time-limits are suspended, the availability of interim relief, and the costs of such a procedure as well as the time for conducting it. (3) Mandatory ADR procedures Under similar conditions, the Court of Justice has accepted that the right to apply to a court for a remedy may be made conditional upon having attempted alternative dispute resolution (ADR), such as out-of-court conciliation110 or a mediation procedure.111 (4) Rules on jurisdiction and competence In Impact,112 the Court had to decide on the compatibility with Union law of an Irish procedural rule which had the effect of requiring actions relating to the Framework Agreement on fixed-term work to be brought in specialized labour courts for the period after the entry into force of the Irish transposition law and in the ordinary courts for the period between the end of the transposition period of the directive and the entry into force of the Irish transposition law. The Court ruled that the specialized labour courts had to be able to hear both actions if the obligation for litigants to simultaneously bring another action before an ordinary court would create procedural inconveniences making it extremely difficult for them to exercise the rights conferred upon them by Union law. Similarly, in Agrokonsulting-04,113 the Court held that a Bulgarian rule of jurisdiction that centralized all disputes concerning agricultural subsidies in the administrative court of Sofia was not problematic per se as long as it did not entail procedural inconveniences that would prevent a party from exercising its rights under Union law. To this end, the referring court had to consider, inter alia, whether the distance between the place of residence of a party and the seat of the court would prevent that party from bringing a claim.

109 See C-73/16, Puškár, 2017, paras 62–64, 69–71. 110 See C‑317/08 to C‑320/08, Alassini and Others, 2010, para. 67. 111 See C-75/16, Menini, 2017, para. 61. 112 See C-268/06, Impact, 2008, para. 51. See also, in that regard, C-378/17, Minister for Justice and Equality and Commissioner of the Garda Síochána, 2018, paras 31–52, which concerned the ‘jurisdiction’ of a specialized court in Ireland to set aside national law conflicting with Union law. Irish law reserved that ‘jurisdiction’ to ordinary courts. The Court held this to be contrary to Union law because the specialized court dealt with cases concerning Union law and thus needed to have that ‘jurisdiction’ in order to enable the principles of direct effect and primacy to work in practice. 113 See C-93/12, Agrokonsulting-04, 2013, paras 50–58.

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134 UNION LAW AND NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES

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(5) Standing and interest (a) General The Court of Justice has consistently held that national rules on standing and the interest in bringing proceedings cannot prejudice the right to effective judicial protection.114 The Court appears to favour a broad interpretation of the capacity to bring proceedings, in particular, with respect to market participants seeking to challenge decisions by regulatory authorities115 and environmental associations.116 This approach is also exemplified, inter alia, by the fact that an undertaking which is not a competitor of the beneficiary of unlawful State aid may have an interest in relying before the national court on the direct effect of the prohibition on implementation referred to in the last sentence of Art. 108(3) TFEU. This will be the case where the undertaking concerned is subject to a tax that forms an integral part of a measure implemented in breach of the prohibition referred to in that provision.117 However, this does not mean that the Court will consider national rules limiting standing to be contrary to Union law per se. For example, in Pohotovosť,118 the Court held that a national rule which did not allow a consumer rights association to intervene on behalf of a consumer was not contrary to Art. 47 of the Charter, since the court hearing the case had an obligation under Union law to raise, of its own motion, the unfairness of contractual terms. (b) Application in the field of environmental law Traditionally, the locus standi of non-governmental organizations having as their object the protection of the environment is interpreted narrowly in a number of Member States. Prompted by the Aarhus Convention119 and Art. 47 of the Charter, the Court of Justice has developed a line of case-law providing for more relaxed standing conditions for such organizations when acting within the scope of Union law. Therefore, national courts are under an obligation to interpret national procedural rules relating to the conditions to be met in order to bring administrative or judicial proceedings in such a way as to enable an environmental protection organization to challenge before a court a decision taken following administrative proceedings liable to be contrary to Union environmental law.120 In addition, concerning the application of

114 See C-379/18, Deutsche Lufthansa, 2019, para. 60; this also concerns rules regarding the interest in continuing proceedings: see C-289/21, Varhoven administrativen sad, 2022, paras 52–56. 115 See C-557/16, Astelles Pharma, 2018, para. 36. 116 See C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, 2011, para. 51. 117 See C-174/02, Streekgewest Westelijk Noord-Brabant, 2005, para. 19. 118 See C-470/12, Pohotovost’, 2014, para. 57. 119 Council Decision 2005/370/EC of 17 February 2005 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Community, of the Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making, and access to justice in environmental matters (OJ 2005 L124/1). 120 See C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, 2011, paras 47–52; C-873/19, Deutsche Umwelthilfe, 2022, paras. 63–75. This approach has been contrasted with a more limited approach to the standing of environmental associations before the Union Courts: see I. Hadjiyianni, ‘Judicial Protection and the Environment in the EU Legal order: Missing Pieces for a Complete Puzzle of Legal Remedies’ (2021) C.M.L.Rev. 777. But see para. 7.111. Further to this, natural and legal persons which are directly concerned should, in the context of the application of Council Directive 96/62/EC of 27 September 1996 on ambient air quality assessment and management (OJ 1996 L296/55), as amended by Regulation (EC) No. 1882/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 September 2003 (OJ 2003 L284/1), have the possibility of requiring the competent authorities to draw up an action plan if

Requirements Imposed upon National Procedural Rules 135 Directive 85/337/EEC,121 where national law only allows an applicant to bring an action conditional upon demonstrating that the contested administrative decision impairs an individual right, such condition would be at odds with the principle of effectiveness if environmental protection organizations were not allowed to rely before national courts on the impairment of rules of Union environmental law solely on the grounds that those rules protect the public interest, since it largely deprives those organizations of the possibility of having a court verify compliance with the rules of Union environmental law which, for the most part, address the public interest, and not merely the protection of the interests of individuals as such.122 (6) Time-limits and limitation periods It is settled case-law that reasonable time-limits and limitation periods are compatible with Union law insofar as they implement the fundamental principle of legal certainty.123 Time-limits should, in any event, be proportionate to the interest of the parties concerned by the decision to be taken, the complexity of the applicable procedures and legislation, the number of persons likely to be affected by the decision, and any other public or private interests that must be taken into account.124 They must also be sufficiently precise, clear, and predictable to allow individuals to know their rights and obligations. Finally, time-limits must be materially adequate and allow sufficient time for preparation in order to bring an effective action. Within these guidelines, Member States are free to set longer or shorter time-limits. The reasonableness of a time-limit or limitation period is assessed according to the circumstances of the case. The assessment of a time-limit may be influenced, inter alia, by the objectives of the substantive Union law in respect of which the time-limit is applied. For example, in view of the objective of diligence underlying Directive 89/665/EEC, 125 short time-limits for appeal periods against decisions of a contracting authority are in principle not problematic. Sometimes, the behaviour of the other party to the proceedings may play a role in the assessment of a time-limit. For example, the Court held that a rule limiting an employee’s entitlement to arrears of remuneration to two years prior to bringing an action without the possibility of an extension was contrary to the principle of effectiveness because she had been deliberately misinformed by her employer about the higher pay of her male colleagues.126 However, Member States may rely on limit values or alert thresholds contained in that directive are exceeded, where necessary by bringing an action before the national courts: see C-237/07, Janecek, 2008, para. 39 121 Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (OJ 1985 L175/40). 122 See C-115/09, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, 2011, paras 36–50. This case-law does not mean, however, that the right of non-governmental organizations to bring proceedings is completely unrestricted. See C-826/18, LB, 2021, paras 61–67. 123 See C-261/95, Palmisani, 1997, para. 28; C‑447/20 and C‑448/20, IFAP, 2022, para. 55. 124 See C-63/08, Pontin, 2009, para. 48; C‑447/20 and C‑448/20, IFAP, 2022, para. 56. 125 Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts (OJ 1989 L395/33). 126 See C-326/96, Levez, 1998, para. 34.

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136 UNION LAW AND NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES limitation periods against private parties in the context of actions for the recovery of amounts levied in breach of Union law, even where the illegal nature of those levies only appeared from a preliminary ruling given after the expiry of that limitation period.127 The same applies to limitation periods for claims based on rights which individuals derive from a directive that was transposed belatedly by the Member State.128 Although the Court initially seemed to have decided that the limitation period for bringing an action against the Member State in such a situation could only start to run from the moment when the directive in question had been transposed into national law,129 it is now settled case-law that Member States may invoke reasonable limitation periods for actions based on national provisions transposing a directive belatedly.130 It is within the competence of the Member States to determine the length of time-limits and limitation periods. Apart from a rare exception,131 which was heavily criticized by Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in a subsequent Opinion,132 the Court does not explicitly determine in its judgments what constitutes a reasonable time-limit where it holds that a particular time-limit does not meet the effectiveness requirement. On the basis of that case-law, it can be generally assumed that time-limits in years are in principle reasonable,133 although the specific circumstances of a case may sometimes lead to a different outcome. The Court thus held that a two-year period for calling into question the unfairness of a contractual term in a consumer contract was contrary to Union law because, after two years, the other party to the contract, the trader, could still rely on the term before the courts against the consumer.134 Conversely, this does not mean that time-limits in months135 or even days are problematic per se. For example, the Court decided in Commissaire général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides136 that a ten-day time-limit is not in itself insufficient to allow an effective appeal against a decision of inadmissibility of a subsequent application for international protection.

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(7) Costs and legal aid Although costs and legal aid are fundamental to guaranteeing the right of access to justice, these aspects have not yet been the subject of extensive case-law. However, the limited number of cases shows that these aspects of national procedural law do not escape Union law requirements either. The Court has held, inter alia, that the exclusion of

127 See C-500/16, Caterpillar Financial Services, 2017, para. 51. 128 See further para. 4.64. 129 See C-208/90, Emmott, 1991, para. 23. 130 See C-338/91, Steenhorst-Neerings, 1993, para. 24. 131 See C-255/00, Grundig Italiana, 2002, para. 40. 132 See C-30/02, Recheio, AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer Opinion, 2003, point 35, in which the Advocate General criticized the Court for having transgressed the division of jurisdiction between the Court of Justice and the national courts, stating, inter alia, that ‘[t]‌he judgment in Grundig Italiana is thus shown to be the result of arbitrariness and a misunderstanding of the preliminary ruling procedure’. 133 See C-500/16, Caterpillar Financial Services, 2017, para. 43. 134 See C-473/00, Cofidis, 2002, paras 35–36. See also C-80/21 and C-82/21, D.B.P., 2022, paras 93–100, in which the Court held that a limitation period of ten years was contrary to the principle of effectiveness. 135 See C‑447/20 and C‑448/20, IFAP, 2022, paras 57–58. 136 See C-651/19, Commissaire général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides, 2020, para. 64.

Requirements Imposed upon National Procedural Rules 137 translation costs from legal aid in a cross-border dispute prevents access to justice for a person of limited means;137 that Union law, in the context of Directive 2004/48/EC,138 precludes fixed rates for the reimbursement of lawyers’ fees where a disproportionate part of the costs of the winner of an intellectual property rights dispute is not reimbursed to it;139 that legal persons cannot be excluded in principle from a right to legal aid;140 that the amount of flat-rate court fees payable upon introduction of an action should be foreseeable;141 and that Union law, in the context of actions for compensation for harm caused by infringements of competition law, does not preclude a rule that each party bears its own costs and half of the common costs in the event that the claim is upheld in part, except in case of wrongful conduct.142

C. Conduct of proceedings (1) General All rules concerning the handling of a case can, in appropriate circumstances, raise questions of Union law. The following overview provides the main lines of the case-law of the Court of Justice regarding the handling of disputes: requirements deriving from the right to a fair trial, powers of the court, and rules of evidence. (2) Fair trial guarantees The handling of a case must meet the requirements of a fair trial.143 These include the right to be heard144 by an independent and impartial court or tribunal,145 the right to equal treatment of the parties,146 and the rights of the defence.147 Where Member States have failed to ensure the right to a fair trial, Art. 47 of the Charter grants parties a directly effective right to a fair trial which the courts must safeguard.148 In certain circumstances, this may even lead to the setting aside of the force of res judicata of a judgment in the area of criminal law.149

137 See C-670/15, Šalplachta, 2017, para. 45. 138 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (OJ 2004 L157/45). 139 C-57/15, United Video Properties, 2016, para. 32. See, regarding the effects of this judgment on Belgian procedural law, J.T. Nowak, ‘Considerations on the Impact of EU Law on National Civil Procedure: Recent Examples from Belgium’ in V. Lazic and S. Stuij (eds), International Dispute Resolution: Select Issues in International Litigation and Arbitration (Springer, 2018) 1. 140 See C-279/09, DEB, 2010, para. 59. 141 See C‑274/21 and C‑275/21, EPIC Financial Consulting, 2022, paras 103–104. 142 C-312/21, Tráficos Manuel Ferrer, 2023, para. 49. Compare C‑224/19 and C‑259/19, Caixabank, 2020, paras 93–99, in which the Court held that Union law precludes a system whereby the consumer may be made to bear part of the costs of proceedings depending on the level of the unduly paid sums which are refunded to him or her following a finding that a contractual term is void for being unfair. See also C-215/21, Servicios Prescriptor y Medios de Pagos EFC, 2022. 143 See C-329/13, Stefan (order), 2014, para. 33. 144 See C-472/11, Banif Plus Bank, 2013, para. 29. 145 See C-272/19, Land Hessen, 2020, para. 45. 146 See C-543/14, Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone, 2016, paras 40–41. 147 See C-21/17, Catlin Europe, 2018, para. 33. 148 See C-615/18, UY, 2020, para. 72. 149 See C-615/18, UY, 2020, paras 74–77.

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138 UNION LAW AND NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES 4.33

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(a) Right to be heard A court decision must be based on facts and documents which the parties themselves have had the opportunity to examine and to comment on.150 Thus, a court must give the parties an opportunity to comment on a plea raised of its own motion.151 However, the right to be heard is not absolute. For example, in an appeal against an expulsion decision on grounds of public security, State security interests may prevent the person challenging the expulsion decision from being informed of all the facts and evidence on which the decision was based. In that case, the court must be able to examine whether the interests of State security justify the non-disclosure of facts and evidence.152 If that were the case, at least the essence of the reasons on which the decision is based should be communicated to the party concerned.153 While there is at the same time no obligation to communicate a minimum amount of evidence in such a case, the national court must assess to what extent the non-communication of evidence affects its probative value.154 Similar restrictions can be found in cases involving professional secrecy155 and the protection of business secrets.156 (b) Independent and impartial court The independence, the impartiality, and the legality of a court are the cornerstones of the right to a fair trial.157 A party must be able to complain about a violation of this right and to rely on an irregularity in a judicial appointment procedure.158 Furthermore, in cases of serious doubt, a court must verify, of its own motion, whether it fulfils the conditions of independence, impartiality, and legality.159 Such verification is an essential procedural requirement which affects public policy; an appeal court must verify of its own motion whether a lower court has carried out this verification.160 Where a court with exclusive jurisdiction does not fulfil the conditions of independence and impartiality, another court is obliged to accept jurisdiction and to set aside the national rules on jurisdiction.161 (c) Equality of the parties Equal treatment of the parties means that each party must be given a reasonable opportunity to present its case under such conditions that it is not substantially disadvantaged vis-à-vis the other party.162 With regard to the use by the tax administration of evidence 150 See C-89/08 P, Commission v Ireland, 2009, para. 52. 151 See C-472/11, Banif Plus Bank, 2013, para. 31. 152 See C-300/11, ZZ, 2013, para. 58. 153 See C-300/11, ZZ, 2013, para. 65; C-159/21, Országos Idegenrendézeti Főigazgatóság and Others, 2022, para. 51. 154 See C-300/11, ZZ, 2013, paras 66–67. 155 See C-298/16, Ispas, 2017, para. 36; C-358/16, UBS Europe, 2018, para. 69. 156 See C-450/06, Varec, 2008, paras 51–52. 157 See C-542/18 RX-II and C-543/18 RX-II, Review Simpson v Council and HG v Commission, 2020, para. 57. 158 See C-542/18 RX-II and C-543/18 RX-II, Review Simpson v Council and HG v Commission, 2020, para. 55. 159 See C-542/18 RX-II and C-543/18 RX-II, Review Simpson v Council and HG v Commission, 2020, para. 57. 160 See C-542/18 RX-II and C-543/18 RX-II, Review Simpson v Council and HG v Commission, 2020, para. 57. 161 See C-585/18, C-624/18, and C-625/18, A.K., 2019, para. 166. 162 See C-682/15, Berlioz Investment Fund, 2017, para. 96; C-175/21, Harman International Industries, 2022, para. 62.

Requirements Imposed upon National Procedural Rules 139 obtained without the knowledge of the taxable person in the context of a criminal procedure which has not yet been concluded, the Court has ruled that the tax administration may use such evidence for the purposes of recovering VAT, provided that the court in the appeal proceedings against the recovery decision has the power to review whether the evidence on which the decision is based was obtained lawfully.163 The same requirement applies to evidence obtained in the course of a related administrative procedure to which the taxable person was not a party, including evidence which has served as a basis for decisions in respect of other taxable persons and which have already become definitive.164 (3) Powers of national courts (a) Raising pleas of Union law ex officio (i) Principle Union law does not require national courts to raise pleas of Union law of their own motion at all times. For an effective application of Union law, it is generally sufficient that national courts can raise pleas based on Union law in regard of the (factual) grounds relied upon by the parties.165 (ii) Ordinary procedures In accordance with the principle of equivalence, a national court must give mandatory or binding Union rules the same treatment as national mandatory or binding rules.166 Thus, where a national court has an obligation to apply a mandatory or binding rule of national law of its own motion, it must also do so for mandatory or binding rules of Union law. In addition to this, where a national court is empowered to apply mandatory or binding rules of national law of its own motion, without being obliged to do so, it follows from the principle of sincere cooperation sensu stricto that it must exercise that power in respect of mandatory or binding rules of Union law.167 Furthermore, a court is not obliged to apply mandatory or binding rules of Union law of its own motion if, in order to do so, it would have to go beyond the ambit of the dispute as defined by national law.168 The Court of Justice thus accepts restrictions on the power of national courts to raise points of Union law of their own motion where those restrictions are dictated by principles of national procedural law, such as the autonomy of the parties, the dispositive principle, or the passive role of the court, although it left room for exceptional cases 163 See C-419/14, WebMindLicenses, 2015, paras 87–88. 164 See C-189/18, Glencore Agriculture Hungary, 2019, para. 65. 165 See C-501/18, BT, 2021, paras 134–136. See further J.T. Nowak, Ambtshalve toepassing van EU-recht door de Belgische rechter (PhD Thesis KU Leuven, 2021) 233. 166 See C-430/93 and C-431/93, van Schijndel, 1995, para. 13. It should be pointed out that the notion of ‘mandatory rules’ or ‘binding rules’ must be interpreted in light of the distinction between binding and non-binding rules of Union law, for example, within the meaning of Art. 288 TFEU, and is not comparable to notions such as public policy or mandatory law as used in certain Member States. See C-92/11, RWE Vertrieb, 2013, para. 26, in which the Court stated that the notion of mandatory statutory and regulatory provisions in Art. 1(2) of Directive 93/13/EEC includes ‘provisions of national law that apply between the parties to the contract independently of their choice or provisions that apply by default in the absence of other arrangements established by the parties’. See also C-81/19, NG, 2020, para. 34. See further J.T. Nowak, Ambtshalve toepassing van EU-recht door de Belgische burgerlijke rechter (PhD Thesis KU Leuven, 2021) 172–186. 167 See C-430/93 and C-431/93, van Schijndel, 1995, para. 14. 168 See C-430/93 and C-431/93, van Schijndel, 1995, para. 22.

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140 UNION LAW AND NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES in which the public interest might require a more extensive intervention by the court.169 That being said, a rule prohibiting a national court to raise pleas based of Union law of its own motion within the ambit of the dispute as defined by national law is not compatible with the principle of effectiveness, in particular, where no other court would be able to apply the rules of Union law that are applicable to the dispute.170 4.38

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(iii) Procedures in relation to arbitral awards In Eco Swiss,171 the Court ruled that the referring court had to examine rules of Union competition law of its own motion in an annulment procedure against an arbitral award because the national court was obliged to examine national rules of public policy in such a procedure.172 According to the Court, within this context, Union rules of competition law were to be considered as equivalent to national public policy rules.173 Subsequently, in Mostaza Claro,174 the Court similarly held that a national court, which was obliged to examine national rules of public policy of its own motion in the context of an appeal against an arbitral award, had an obligation to examine of its own motion the fairness of an arbitration clause in the general terms and conditions of a consumer contract.175 Although the Court did not state that the Union rules on unfair contract terms were of public policy, it relied explicitly on the Eco Swiss judgment and at least implied the public policy nature of Art. 6 of Directive 93/13/EEC.176 Then, in Asturcom,177 the Court appeared to confirm the equivalence of Art. 6 of Directive 93/13/EEC and national rules of public policy,178 and derived from that directive an obligation for the referring court to assess of its own motion the unfairness of contractual terms in consumer contracts in the context of an action for enforcement of a final arbitral award.179 (iv) van der Weerd Interestingly, in van der Weerd,180 the Court of Justice played down the importance of the public policy nature of a rule for the purposes of its case-law on the application of Union law by national courts of their own motion. First, the Court found in relation to the principle of equivalence that, while the national court could raise of its own motion pleas relating to the infringement of rules of public policy under national law, the Union rules at 169 See C-430/93 and C-431/93, van Schijndel, 1995, paras 20–21. 170 See C-312/93, Peterbroeck, 1995, paras 15–21. 171 See C-126/97, Eco Swiss, 1999. 172 See C-126/97, Eco Swiss, 1999, para. 41. 173 See C-126/97, Eco Swiss, 1999, paras 36–39. 174 See C-168/05, Mostaza Claro, 2006. 175 See C-168/05, Mostaza Claro, 2006, para. 39. 176 See C-168/05, Mostaza Claro, 2006, paras 35–38. 177 See C-40/08, Asturcom, 2009. 178 See C-40/08, Asturcom, 2009, para. 52. But see C-260/18, Dziubak, 2019, paras 54–55, in which the Court held that the system of protection of Directive 93/13/EEC is not mandatory and that a consumer may prefer not to rely on it. The existence of a possibility for a consumer to resist the application of the rule that unfair contract terms do not bind consumers goes against the classic conception of rules of public policy (‘ordre public’) in the Member States, namely, that those rules are absolute and that parties cannot resist their application. See J.T. Nowak, Ambtshalve toepassing van EU-recht door de Belgische burgerlijke rechter (PhD Thesis, KU Leuven, 2021) 182– 187. See further, as regards the distinction between ‘public policy’ and ‘public order’, G. Kodek, ‘Public Interest in Private Law. Some Thoughts from a Civil Law Perspective’ in L. Tichý and M. Potacs (eds), Public Interest in Law (Intersentia, 2021) 181, 186–187. 179 See C-40/08, Asturcom, 2009, paras 53–54. 180 See C-222/05 to C-225/05, van der Weerd, 2007.

Requirements Imposed upon National Procedural Rules 141 issue were not equivalent to the public policy rules which the referring court could raise of its own motion.181 Second, in relation to the principle of effectiveness, the Court held that Union law does not impose a duty on national courts to raise pleas based on Union law of their own motion, ‘irrespective of the importance of that provision to the [Union] legal order’, where parties have a genuine opportunity to raise a plea based on Union law before a national court.182 In other words, where parties are not precluded from alleging facts or grounds to which Union law is applicable, Union law does not require a national court to expand the ambit of the dispute with a view to applying rules of Union law. (v) No reformatio in pejus The status of Union law for the purposes of activating the ex officio powers of national courts was further qualified in Heemskerk and Schaap.183 In that case, the Court of Justice made clear that Union law cannot oblige a national court to apply Union legislation of its own motion where this would have the effect of breaching the principle, enshrined in its national procedural law, of the prohibition of reformatio in pejus (that is to say, that an individual bringing an action must not be placed in a less favourable position than if he or she had not brought the action).184 In the Court’s view, such an obligation would be contrary not only to the principles of respect for the rights of the defence, legal certainty, and protection of legitimate expectations which underlie that prohibition, but also would expose an individual who brought an action against an act adversely affecting her or him to the risk that such an action would place her or him in a less favourable position than he or she would have been in, had he or she not brought that action.185 (vi) Consumer law The case-law of the Court of Justice on the ex officio application of Union law by national courts in the field of consumer law takes a somewhat different approach.186 Rather than analysing national rules on ex officio application wholly from the standpoint of national procedural autonomy and testing their compliance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, the Court appears to frame this particular line of case-law primarily from the perspective of the effet utile of Union law.187 The case-law has centred on Arts 6 and 7 of Council Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts,188 and is based on the premise that the consumer is the weaker party to a consumer contract and should be protected.189 Therefore, in order to restore the equality of the parties

181 See C-222/05 to C-225/05, van der Weerd, 2007, paras 29–32. 182 See C-222/05 to C-225/05, van der Weerd, 2007, para. 41. 183 See C-455/06, Heemskerk and Schaap, 2008. 184 See C-455/06, Heemskerk and Schaap, 2008, paras 44–46, 48. 185 See C-455/06, Heemskerk and Schaap, 2008, para. 47. 186 See V. Trstenjak and E. Beysen, ‘European Consumer Protection Law: Curia semper dabit remedium?’ (2011) C.M.L.Rev. 95; J.T. Nowak, Ambtshalve toepassing van EU-recht door de Belgische burgerlijke rechter (PhD Thesis KU Leuven, 2021) 233. See also C-704/20 and C-39/21, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid, 2022, paras 81–93. 187 See para. 4.12. 188 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L95/29). This Directive has been amended by Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights (OJ 2011 L304/64) (the Consumer Rights Directive). 189 See C-415/11, Aziz, 2013, paras 44–45; C-590/17, Pouvin, 2019, paras 25–28.

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142 UNION LAW AND NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES to such contract, national courts should be able to determine of their own motion whether a contractual term is unfair.190 This case-law has been extended to other provisions of Union consumer law, including Art. 11(2) of now repealed Council Directive 87/102/EEC on consumer credit,191 Art. 4 of now repealed Council Directive 85/577/ EEC to protect the consumer in respect of contracts negotiated away from business premises,192 and now repealed Directive 1999/44/EC on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees.193 In respect of Art. 6 of Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts, the Court of Justice has clarified in subsequent case-law that national courts, by virtue of Union law, have not only the possibility, but also the obligation to determine ex officio the unfairness of consumer contracts.194 Furthermore, in VB Pénzügyi Lízing,195 the Court ruled that Directive 93/13/EEC also included an obligation for national courts to take measures of instruction ex officio. This contrasts with the classic line of case-law on the ex officio application of Union law by national courts as developed in van Schijndel, where the Court held that national courts should not be obliged to go beyond the ambit of the dispute as defined by the parties and to rely on facts and circumstances not relied upon by the parties in their application.196 In Lintner,197 the Court clarified the scope of the obligation to take measures of instruction. Such obligation only applies where ‘the elements of law and fact in the file before the national court give rise to serious doubts as to the unfair nature of certain clauses which were not invoked by the consumer but which are related to the subject matter of the dispute, without it being possible to make definitive assessments in that regard’.198 First, it follows from this that the boundary of the dispute in consumer cases is set by the case-file before the national court, and which determines the scope of the obligation 190 See C-240/98 to C-244/98, Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores, 2000, paras 25–26; C-19/20, I.W., 2021, para. 83. See A. Van Duin, Effective Judicial Protection in Consumer Litigation. Article 47 of the EU Charter in Practice (Intersentia, 2022). 191 Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 December 1986 for the approximation of the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit (OJ 1987 L42/48) (this Directive has been replaced by Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC (OJ 2008 L133/66)); C-429/05, Rampion and Godard, 2007, paras 63–69. 192 Council Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 December 1985 to protect the consumer in respect of contracts negotiated away from business premises (OJ 1985 L372/31) (This Directive has since been repealed by the Consumer Rights Directive, cited in n. 188); C-227/08, Martín Martín, 2009, paras 27–29. 193 Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees (OJ 1999 L171/12) (this Directive has since been amended by the Consumer Rights Directive, cited in n. 188); C-32/12, Duarte Hueros, 2013; C-497/13, Faber, 2015. See, however, J.T. Nowak, Ambtshalve toepassing van EU-recht door de Belgische burgerlijke rechter (PhD Thesis KU Leuven, 2021) 226–232, in which it is argued that the Court dealt in these cases with particular problems of the national systems in question and did not lay down a general obligation of ex officio application in respect of the rules regarding the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees. See further S. Law and J.T. Nowak, ‘Procedural Harmonisation by the European Court of Justice. Procedural Autonomy and the Member States’ Perspective’ in F. Gascón Inchausti and B. Hess (eds), The Future of the European Law of Civil Procedure. Coordination or Harmonisation? (Intersentia, 2020) 17, 51–58. 194 See C-243/08, Pannon, 2009, para. 32; C-168/15, Tomášová, 2016, paras 29–30. 195 See C-137/08, VB Pénzügyi Lízing, 2010, para. 56; see also C-497/13, Faber, 2015, paras 39–40. 196 See para. 4.37. 197 See C-511/17, Lintner, 2020. 198 See C-511/17, Lintner, 2020, para. 37.

Requirements Imposed upon National Procedural Rules 143 to apply Union consumer law ex officio, as opposed to the ambit of the dispute as defined by the parties in other areas of Union law, subject to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. Second, the obligation to take measures of instruction does not imply that the national court has to search for or collect facts itself. The Court refers to typical measures of instruction, such as asking the parties for clarification or the production of documents.199 A national court may, of course, make use of more far-reaching investigative measures where permitted by national law.200 While the Court has formulated a clear obligation for national courts to apply a number of rules of Union consumer law ex officio, Member States are to decide on the way in which they implement that obligation into national procedural law. Given the variety of national procedures in which a question on the unfairness of a contract term might be relevant (payment order procedures,201 execution procedures,202 default proceedings203), and which may at times encompass various stages—for example, in payment order procedures204—the Court has not imposed a general obligation that each judge at every stage of the proceedings should check whether a term in a consumer contract is potentially unfair.205 The standard that the Court has defined entails that a consumer must have access to a court that can assess the fairness of the terms in a consumer contract with full powers.206 Such access must be possible under reasonable procedural conditions,207 which implies that a consumer may at times have to take an initiative in order to appear before a judge with full powers, inter alia, by bringing an action against an enforceable authentic instrument concerning a contract208 or by lodging an objection against a payment order given in the first stage of a two-stage payment order procedure.209 A consumer who remains completely passive will thus not be protected at all times under the case-law of the Court of Justice.210 (b) Intensity of review For a national court to decide a dispute concerning rights derived from Union law in accordance with Art. 47 of the Charter, it must have jurisdiction to examine all matters of fact and law relevant to the dispute before it.211 For example, the Court held that an appeal against a refusal to register a lawyer at the Luxembourg Bar did not meet the

199 See C-511/17, Lintner, 2020, para. 37. 200 See C-511/17, Lintner, 2020, para. 41. 201 See C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito, 2012. 202 See C-49/14, Finanmadrid, 2016. 203 See C-147/16, Karel de Grote, 2018. 204 See C-176/17, Profi Credit Polska, 2018. 205 See also C-335/21, Vincente, 2022, para. 70. 206 See J.T. Nowak, Ambtshalve toepassing van EU-recht door de Belgische burgerlijke rechter (PhD Thesis, KU Leuven, 2021) 223–224. 207 See C-377/14, Radlinger, 2016, para. 46; C-176/17, Profi Credit Polska, 2018, para. 63; C-335/21, Vincente, 2022, para. 56. 208 See C-32/14, ERSTE Bank Hungary, 2015, para. 59. 209 See C-176/17, Profi Credit Polska, 2018, para. 71; C-170/21, Profi Credit Bulgaria, 2022, para. 48. 210 See C-40/08, Asturcom, 2009, para. 47; C-34/13, Kušionová, 2014, para. 56; C-600/19, Ibercaja Banco, 2022, para. 44; C‑693/19 and C‑831/19, SPV Project 1503, 2022, para. 60; C-869/19, Unicaja Banco, 2022, para. 28. 211 See C-199/11, Otis, 2012, para. 49.

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144 UNION LAW AND NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES requirement of effective judicial protection because the bodies before which an appeal would lie could not be considered courts or tribunals due to a lack of independence. The possibility of bringing a further appeal in cassation could not remedy this situation because the Luxembourg Court of Cassation did not have full jurisdiction as the appeal was limited to points of law.212 However, this does not mean that Member States cannot impose any restrictions on the review power of national courts. For example, Union law does not preclude a rule which prevents a court hearing an appeal against a trade mark registration from taking into account facts and circumstances that have occurred after the registration decision when assessing the legality of that decision.213 Nor does Union law require that, in appeals against decisions of a public authority, a national court should be able to conduct a full review in law and in fact, where a national authority has to make complex assessments and enjoys a wide margin of appreciation.214 The principle of marginal review is compatible with Union law in such a case, provided that the court can apply the relevant principles and rules of Union law effectively.215 By contrast, a court adjudicating at first instance on an appeal against the rejection of a decision on an application for international protection is obliged, in its examination, to consider both the factors which the national authority that made the decision took into account or could have taken into account as well as the factors which have arisen after the decision was taken.216 Moreover, effective judicial review must be able to cover the legality of the reasons for a contested decision. Therefore, a court before which an action for judicial review is brought should generally be empowered to require the competent authority to notify to it the reasons for any national decision which is contested on the basis of Union law.217

4.43

4.44

(4) Evidence In general, Union law precludes all rules of evidence that make it excessively difficult or virtually impossible for parties to enforce their rights under Union law.218 Therefore, the Court’s case-law covers various aspects of the taking of evidence: measures of inquiry, means of proof, and burden of proof. (a) Measures of inquiry It should be possible for parties to adduce evidence without undue constraints.219 This is not the case where the person who is to provide the evidence does not have, or is unable to obtain, the necessary information.220 In such case, the national court may be

212 See C-506/04, Wilson, 2006, paras 59–61. 213 See C-239/05, BVBA Management, Training en Consultancy, 2007, para. 60. 214 See C-120/97, Upjohn, 1999, paras 34–36. 215 See C-71/14, East Sussex County Council, 2015, para. 58. See also C-579/19, Food Standards Agency, 2021, para. 93. 216 See C-585/16, Serin Alheto, 2018, para. 118. 217 See 222/86, Heylens and Others, 1987, paras 14–16; C-75/08, Mellor, 2009, para. 59. 218 See 199/82, San Giorgio, 1983, para. 14. 219 See C-524/04, Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation, 2007, para. 82. 220 See C-86/19, SL, 2020, para. 43.

Requirements Imposed upon National Procedural Rules 145 required to use all procedural means available to it under national law, including the ordering of the necessary measures of inquiry, such as the production of a document by one of the parties or even a third party.221 (b) Means of proof The case-law on evidence covers both the availability and the use of evidence in national law. For example, in an employment law context, Member States are required to provide for a system that objectively and reliably registers an employee’s working time, and witness evidence in a dispute between an employee and an employer cannot compensate for the absence of such a registration system because there is a risk that employees would not want to testify against their employer for fear of a negative impact on the employment relationship.222 In the context of a dispute about the liability of a vaccine manufacturer, the Court considered that proof of a causal link between a defective vaccine and the occurrence of a disease must be possible by means of an evidence-based method and cannot be limited to a means of proof that constitutes irrefutable proof of a causal link based on a medical examination.223 More generally, the exclusion of certain types of evidence is problematic, particularly if the parties are in need of proof as a result of such exclusion.224 The same applies, for that matter, to the taking of evidence in administrative proceedings.225 (c) Burden of proof Generally speaking, Union law follows the principle that it is for a party to prove the facts which he or she alleges. In light of this, Directive 85/374/EEC226 precludes a rule following which the causal link between a defect attributed to a vaccine and alleged damage is proven where certain pre-identified facts are established, since such rule amounts to proof by presumption and thus changes the burden of proof under that directive.227 Yet, the Court of Justice has held that the obligation to provide for effective means of ensuring compliance with the principle of equal pay for men and women laid down in Directive 75/117/EEC228 implies that national rules on the burden of proof must be amended where the traditional allocation of the burden of proof would mean that the principle of equal pay could not be effectively ensured.229 In the context of

221 See C-526/04, Laboratoires Boirin, 2006, para. 55. But see, in the context of actions for compensation for harm caused by infringements of competition law, C-57/21, RegioJet, 2023, paras 62–78, in which the Court had to balance the effectiveness of actions for compensation by private parties and actions pursued by the competition authorities. 222 See C-55/18, CCOO, 2019, paras 53–56. 223 See C-621/15, Sanofi Pasteur, 2017, paras 30–32. 224 See C-46/15, Ambisig, 2016, para. 44. 225 See C-664/13, Nīmanis, 2015, para. 51. 226 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products (OJ 1985 L210/29). 227 See C-621/15, N.W., 2017, paras 51–55. 228 Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and women (OJ 1975 L45/19), replaced by Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (OJ 2006 L204/23). 229 See 109/88, Danfoss, 1989, para. 14.

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146 UNION LAW AND NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES Union competition law, the Court has ruled that Art. 101 TFEU creates a rebuttable presumption that undertakings which have participated in a concerted practice take account of information exchanged with their competitors in determining their conduct on that market when they remain active on that market.230

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(d) Unlawful evidence If it is being disputed that evidence has been obtained lawfully, the national court cannot simply exclude it from the debate. It must first examine whether the law actually prescribes the exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence, whether the exclusion of the evidence does not undermine the right to an effective remedy, and whether it is necessary and corresponds to objectives of general interest recognized by the Union or to the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.231 However, in the context of criminal proceedings, if a court takes the view that a party who is suspected of having committed criminal offences is not in a position to comment effectively on evidence pertaining to a field of which the judges have no knowledge and that is likely to have a preponderant influence on the findings of fact, it must find an infringement of the right to a fair trial and exclude that evidence in order to avoid such an infringement.232

D. End of proceedings 4.48

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(1) Reasonable time The second paragraph of Art. 47 of the Charter requires that proceedings are concluded within a reasonable time, a requirement Member States must respect when implementing Union law.233 For that reason, Union law does not preclude, in certain circumstances, a national provision which leads to the automatic termination of a tax dispute pending at third instance where the appeal against the decision of the tax administration was lodged more than ten years before the entry into force of that provision, even though it extinguishes the claim of the tax administration.234 Further to this, a failure on the part of national courts to render their decision within a reasonable time may expose the Member State concerned to liability claims for breach of Union law.235 (2) Execution of judgments In the context of Art. 46(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU,236 the Court of Justice has held that, while that provision does not oblige the Member States to confer a power to alter 230 See C-8/08, T-Mobile, 2009, paras 51–52. 231 See C-73/16, Puškár, 2017, paras 89–91. 232 C‑511/18, C‑512/18, and C‑520/18, La Quadrature du Net and Others, 2020, para. 227; C- 746/18, Prokuratuur, 2021, para. 44; C-817/19, Ligue des droits humains, 2022, para. 297. 233 See C-500/10, Belvedere Construzioni, 2012, para. 23. 234 See C-500/10, Belvedere Construzioni, 2012, para. 28. 235 See C-138/17 P and C-146/17 P, EU v Gascogne Sack Deutschland and Gascogne, 2018. 236 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (OJ 2013 L180/60).

Requirements Imposed upon National Procedural Rules 147 decisions on the courts with jurisdiction to hear and determine actions under that provision, it follows from Art. 47 of the Charter that, where a subsequent decision of a competent authority contradicts a judicial decision in which a court has held that international protection must be granted following a full and ex nunc examination of the international protection needs of the person concerned, that court must amend the subsequent decision and substitute its own decision for it as to the application for international protection where national law does not provide it with any means to secure compliance with its judgment.237 Where a rule of national law precludes a court from amending the decision of the competent authorities in those circumstances, that court must set aside that rule.238

E. After proceedings have ended (1) Res judicata The principle of res judicata has particular importance in Union law. National courts are not obliged, in principle, to go back on decisions that have become res judicata, not even to correct a misapplication of Union law239 or to take into account the subsequent interpretation by the Court of Justice of a relevant provision of Union law.240 However, Union law requires that, where it has the possibility under national law to go back on decisions that have become res judicata, a national court exercises this power in order to correct misapplications of Union law.241 Moreover, Union law precludes a broad application of the principle of res judicata if such application has the consequence that an erroneous application of Union law continues to be repeated in the national legal order without any possibility of rectification.242 For example, where, in a dispute about an agreement between a private party and a national authority, the validity of that agreement is confirmed by a national court without verification of the agreement's conformity with State aid rules, the res judicata effect of that decision cannot subsequently be invoked to resist proceedings challenging the validity of the agreement under Union State aid rules.243 Union law thus respects the essence of the force of res judicata, that is, the identity of the parties, the subject-matter, and the cause of action,244 but resists additional preclusive effects if this would lead to a situation in which a misapplication of Union law is being perpetuated.245 For this reason, the Court has also repeatedly held that a claim for Member State liability is not problematic from the point of view of the

237 See C-556/17, Torubarov, 2019, paras 69, 74; C-406/18, PG, 2020, paras 20–22. 238 See C-556/17, Torubarov, 2019, para. 74; C-406/18, PG, 2020, para. 22. 239 See C-234/04, Kapferer, 2006, para. 24; C-2/08, Fallimento Olimpiclub, 2009, para. 23. 240 See C-213/13, Impresa Pizzarotti, 2014, para. 60. 241 See C-213/13, Impresa Pizzarotti, 2014, para. 62. 242 See C-424/19, UR, 2020, para. 32. 243 See C-119/05, Lucchini, 2007, paras 59–63; C-505/14, Klausner Holz Niedersachsen, 2015, paras 42–45. 244 See A. Kornezov, ‘Res Judicata of National Judgments Incompatible with EU Law: Time for a Major Rethink?’ (2014) C.M.L.Rev. 809. 245 See also C‑370/17 and C‑37/18, CRPNPAC, 2020, paras 94–96. See further, in relation to unfair contract terms, C-600/19, Ibercaja Banco, 2022, para. 50; C‑693/19 and C‑831/19, SPV Project 1503, 2022, para. 65.

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148 UNION LAW AND NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES principle of res judicata because of the lack of identity of, at least, the subject-matter of such proceedings.246

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(2) Withdrawal of a decision of a national administrative body that has become final (a) Kühne & Heitz It may appear from a judgment of the Court of Justice that earlier decisions taken by national administrative bodies are based on a wrong interpretation of Union law. In Kühne & Heitz,247 the Court ruled that the interpretation which it gives to a rule of Union law in a preliminary ruling clarifies and defines where necessary the meaning and scope of that rule as it must be or ought to have been understood and applied from the time of its coming into force.248 It follows that a rule of Union law interpreted in this way must be applied by an administrative body within the sphere of its competence even to legal relationships which arose or were formed before the Court gave its ruling on the question on interpretation.249 However, it does not follow automatically that an administrative body has to reopen an administrative decision which has become final. On the contrary, the Court, referring to the principle of legal certainty, considers that, in principle, such a body is not required to reopen an administrative decision which has become final.250 That being said, in very specific circumstances, there may be an obligation for a national administrative body to reopen a decision.251 This will be the case, in particular, where such a body is obliged, in accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation arising from Art. 4(3) TEU, to reopen a final administrative decision where an application for such review is made to it, in order to take account of the interpretation of the relevant provision of Union law given in the meantime by the Court of Justice where the following four conditions are satisfied: – first, under national law, the administrative body concerned has the power to reopen the decision;252 – second, the administrative decision in question has become final as a result of a judgment of a national court ruling at final instance; – third, that judgment, in the light of a decision given by the Court of Justice subsequent to it, was based on a misinterpretation of Union law which was adopted without a question being referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling under the third paragraph of Art. 267 TFEU;253 and

246 See C-224/01, Köbler, 2003, para. 39; C-160/14, Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others, 2015, para. 55; C-620/17, Hochtief Solutions Magyarországi Fióktelepe, 2019, para. 39; C-676/17, Călin, 2019, para. 56. 247 See C-453/00, Kühne & Heitz, 2004. 248 See C-453/00, Kühne & Heitz, 2004, para. 21. See also 61/79, Denkavit Italiana, 1980, para. 16; C-50/96, Deutsche Telekom, 2000, para. 43; C-455/08, Commission v Ireland, 2009, para. 39. 249 See C-453/00, Kühne & Heitz, 2004, para. 22. 250 See C-453/00, Kühne & Heitz, 2004, para. 24. 251 For an example of such very specific circumstances, see C-177/20, ‘Grossmania’, 2022, paras 31–68. 252 See, by analogy, the issue of raising pleas derived from Union law of the court’s own motion, para. 4.36. 253 It is, however, not necessary that the person applying for the reopening of the decision raised the point of Union law in question before the national court: see C-2/06 Kempter, 2006, paras 44, 46.

Some Fields of Application 149 – fourth, the person concerned complained to the administrative body immediately after becoming aware of the decision of the Court of Justice from which it appears that the national decision is contrary to Union law.254 (b) i-21 Germany and Arcor In i-21 Germany and Arcor,255 the Court of Justice reiterated, in line with Kühne & Heitz, that an administrative body responsible for the adoption of an administrative decision is under an obligation to review and possibly to reopen that decision if the four conditions mentioned earlier are fulfilled.256 However, the case giving rise to the judgment in Kühne & Heitz was different from those proceedings: while the undertaking in the former case had exhausted all legal remedies available to it, i-21 Germany and Arcor had not availed themselves of their right to appeal against the fee assessments issued to them, and therefore the judgment in Kühne & Heitz was not relevant.257 That being said, the Court proceeded to analyse the relevant national procedural rules in accordance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, finding that Art. 4(3) TEU, read in conjunction with the directive concerned, requires the national court to ascertain whether national legislation which is clearly incompatible with Union law, such as that on which the fee assessments at issue in the main proceedings were based, constitutes manifest unlawfulness within the meaning of the national law concerned. If that is the case, it is for the national court to draw the necessary conclusions under its national law with regard to the withdrawal of those assessments.258 The Court added that where, pursuant to rules of national law, the authorities are required to withdraw an administrative decision which has become final if that decision is manifestly incompatible with domestic law, that same obligation must exist if the decision is manifestly incompatible with Union law.259

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V. Some Fields of Application In this part, the principles and case-law set out in the preceding parts will be illustrated in some fields of application in relation to a number of specific actions brought before the national courts which are based on Union law. These are: the recovery of

254 C-453/00, Kühne & Heitz, 2004, paras 26–28. This condition can, however, not be interpreted as an obligation to make such an application within a certain specific period after the applicant has become aware of the decision of the Court on which the application is based, and thus, the Member States remain free to set reasonable time-limits for seeking remedies in a manner consistent with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness: C-2/06 Kempter, 2006, paras 56–60. See also C-234/04, Kapferer, 2006, paras 19–24, whereby the Court rejected the transposition of the principles laid down in Kühne & Heitz to the reopening of final judicial decisions and ruled that the principle of sincere cooperation under Art. 4(3) TEU does not require a national court to disapply its internal rules of procedure in order to review and set aside such a decision if it should be contrary to Union law. 255 See C-392/04 and C-422/04, i-21Germany and Arcor, 2006. 256 See C-392/04 and C-422/04, i-21Germany and Arcor, 2006, paras 51–52. 257 See C-392/04 and C-422/04, i-21Germany and Arcor, 2006, paras 53–54. 258 See C-392/04 and C-422/04, i-21Germany and Arcor, 2006, paras 56–72. 259 See C-392/04 and C-422/04, i-21Germany and Arcor, 2006, para. 69.

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150 UNION LAW AND NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES unlawful charges; the recovery of unlawful State aid; claims based on a directive not implemented in time; damages actions against a Member State for a breach of Union law; damages actions against private parties for a breach of Union law; and interim relief. A number of additional procedural and remedial issues in relation to these actions will also be addressed.

A. Recovery of unlawful charges 4.54

(1) Diversity of national systems The question of challenging charges unlawfully claimed or the recovery of charges unduly paid in breach of Union law is dealt with in divergent ways in the Member States, and even within a given Member State, depending on the kind of tax or charge concerned.260 In some cases, national law requires both complaints addressed to the tax authorities and appeals to comply with fairly strict requirements as to the form in which and the time-limits within which such legal claims or applications may be submitted. In others, actions for the recovery of unduly paid charges must be brought before the ordinary courts, for instance, in the form of an action based on an undue payment; such actions are subject to varying time-limits which, in some cases, correspond to the normal limitation period laid down by the ordinary law.261 The diversity of the national systems is a consequence, in particular, of the lack of Union rules on the recovery of unlawfully imposed national charges in the relevant areas.262 As has already been observed, this is because, in such a situation, it is for the national law of each Member State to designate the competent court and lay down the procedural rules governing legal claims for protecting the rights which individuals derive from Union law, provided that those rules are not less favourable than those that apply to similar national claims (principle of equivalence) and do not render the exercise of rights conferred by Union law virtually impossible or excessively difficult (principle of effectiveness).263

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(2) Limitation periods It clearly appears from the case-law of the Court of Justice on the recovery of charges unduly levied under national law in breach of Union law264 that the setting of ‘reasonable 260 It is for the national legal orders to classify the actions which can be used to obtain reimbursement of charges paid but not due: see C-201/05, Test Claimants in the CFC and Dividend Group Litigation (order), 2008, para. 111; C-628/15, The Trustees of the BT Pension Scheme, 2017, para. 57. For instance, a claim for reimbursement can be made through an action for annulment of the decision imposing the charge (see C-30/02, Recheio, 2004, para. 7), an action for damages (see C-118/08, Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales, 2010, para. 11), or appeal proceedings brought against an administrative decision rejecting a claim for reimbursement (see C-94/10, Danfoss, 2011, para. 18). 261 See 61/79, Denkavit Italiana, 1980, paras 23–24; 68/79, Just, 1980, paras 22–23; C-231/96, Edis, 1998, para. 36. 262 See M. Wathelet, ‘La répétition des montants payés en violation du droit communautaire’ in Scritti in onore di Giuseppe Federico Mancini (Vol. II, Giuffrè, 1998) 1033. 263 See C-201/05, Test Claimants in the CFC and Dividend Group Litigation (order), 2008, para. 113. 264 A clear exposition of all these aspects of this doctrine is set out in C-192/95 to C-218/95, Comateb and Others, 1997, paras 19–34.

Some Fields of Application 151 periods of limitation of actions’ satisfies in principle the test of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.265 (a) Principle of equivalence A Member State may not lay down provisions for the repayment of a charge levied in breach of Union law which set conditions specifically relating to the charge in question that are less favourable than those otherwise laid down for repayment of charges.266 In contrast, Union law does not prohibit a Member State from resisting actions for repayment of charges levied in breach of Union law by relying on a time-limit under national law of three years, by way of derogation from the ordinary rules governing actions between individuals for the recovery of sums paid but not due, for which the period allowed is more favourable, provided that this time-limit applies in the same way to actions based on Union law for repayment of such charges as to those based on national law.267 Consequently, observance of the principle of equivalence hinges on correctly identifying what claims—based on Union law or based on national law—are of the same kind.268 It seems appropriate to use the most precise comparative criterion, namely, the recovery of charges paid but undue (undue either under Union law or under national law).269 Furthermore, Union law does not preclude the legislation of a Member State from laying down, alongside a limitation period applicable under the ordinary law to actions between individuals for the recovery of sums paid but not due, special detailed rules, which are less favourable, governing claims and legal proceedings to challenge the imposition of charges and other levies. The position would be different only if those detailed rules applied solely to actions based on Union law for the repayment of such charges or levies. The same test is applied where a Member State adopts rules which retroactively restrict the right to repayment of a sum levied but not due, in order to forestall the possible effects of a judgment of the Court of Justice.270

265 See 33/76, Rewe, 1976, para. 5; 45/76, Comet, 1976, paras 17–18; C-360/18, Cargill Deutschland, 2019, para. 52; C-677/19, SC Valoris, 2020, para. 25. Note that the case-law on the setting of limitation periods also concerns the point of departure of limitation periods. See C-483/08, Régie communale autonome du stade Luc Varenne (order), 2009, paras 35–42; C-69/08, Visciano, 2009, paras 46–50. See also para. 4.29. 266 See 309/85, Barra, 1988, paras 18–19, in which the Court of Justice held that a Belgian law restricting the right to repayment of an enrolment fee imposed on students from other Member States contrary to Union law made it impossible to exercise the rights guaranteed by Art. 18 TFEU. See also C-343/96, Dilexport, 1999, paras 37–43; C-197/03, Commission v Italy, 2006, paras 43–46; C-459/21, The Navigator Company and Navigator Pulp Figueira (order), 2022, para. 21. 267 It is a matter of national law whether, in the case of a claim for repayment of a charge which is contrary to Union law and therefore undue, the legal relationship between the national tax authorities and companies in a Member State is regarded as a fiscal relationship or whether the rules of the ordinary law govern that legal relationship. The primacy of Union law that caused the imposition of the charge to be undue has no bearing on the classification in national law of the claim to repayment: see C-10/97 to C-22/97, IN. CO.GE.’90, 1998, paras 28–29. 268 For instance, the Court of Justice has held on the issue of the availability under national law of possible actions for reimbursement of sums paid but not due that the system of direct taxation cannot be considered similar to the system of VAT: see C-35/05, Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken, 2007, paras 43–45; see also C-69/08, Visciano, 2009, para. 41. 269 See C-231/96, Edis, 1998, paras 36–37; C-260/96, Spac, 1998, paras 20–21. 270 See C-343/96, Dilexport, 1999, para. 43; C-147/01, Weber’s Wine World and Others, 2003, para. 92.

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152 UNION LAW AND NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES 4.57

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(b) Principle of effectiveness The Court of Justice has regarded a national limitation period of three years from the date of the contested payment as reasonable.271 Of course, national limitation periods are assessed on a case-by-case basis. For instance, the Court of Justice has held that a Member State is not precluded from laying down, alongside a limitation period applicable under the ordinary law to actions between individuals for the recovery of sums paid but not due, special detailed rules governing claims and legal proceedings for the recovery of sums paid but not due against the Member State, which are less favourable. If a Member State were then to lay down a shorter limitation period of five years, compared to a ten-year limitation period under ordinary law, this would not in itself be precluded by the principle of effectiveness. However, that five-year limitation period would infringe the principle of effectiveness if it would result in a situation in which an intermediary who paid taxes to the Member State on behalf of another private party as a result of the interplay between the different limitation periods would not be able to have the payments made to the Member State reimbursed, so that the charges paid but not due to the Member State were solely paid by that intermediary.272 The same logic applies when a recipient of services is not time-barred from bringing an action for reimbursement against a supplier, whereas the latter’s action for reimbursement against the Member State would be time-barred as a consequence of different rules on limitation periods.273 (c) Reduction of a limitation period If a Member State decides to reduce a limitation period, the new reduced period should itself be reasonable. Reducing a limitation period will infringe the principle of effectiveness where the legislation which effected the reduction does not include transitional arrangements allowing an adequate period after its enactment for lodging the claims for repayment which persons were entitled to submit under the original legislation.274 As far as the duration of the requisite transitional period is concerned, the Court of Justice has further specified that it must be sufficient to allow taxpayers who initially thought that the old period for bringing proceedings was available to them a reasonable period of time to assert their right of recovery.

271 See C-231/96, Edis, 1998, para. 35; C-260/96, Spac, 1998, para. 19; C-279/96, C-280/96, and C-281/96, Ansaldo Energia and Others, 1998, paras 17–18; C-343/96, Dilexport, 1999, para. 70; see also C-216/99 and C-222/99, Prisco and CASER, 2002, para. 70; C‑13/18 and C‑126/18, Sole-Mizo and Others, 2020, paras 56–58. In Roquette Frères (C-88/99, Roquette Frères, 2000), the Court of Justice considered that a national limitation period for a claim for the recovery of undue payment of up to a minimum of four years and a maximum of five years preceding the year of the judicial decision finding the rule of national law establishing the tax to be incompatible with a superior rule of law was reasonable. 272 See C-89/10 and C-96/10, Q-Beef and Bosschaert, 2011, paras 39–45. 273 See C-427/10, Banca Antoniana Popolare Veneta, 2011, paras 20–42. 274 See C-62/00, Marks & Spencer, 2002, paras 34–42, where the Court of Justice held that a three-year limitation period was reasonable, but that the principle of effectiveness had been infringed because the new legislation did not provide for a transitional limitation period and was applicable immediately with retroactive effect. See also C-38/16, Compass Contract Services Limited, 2017, paras 42–44.

Some Fields of Application 153 For example, in Grundig Italia,275 the Court considered that a transitional period of ninety days prior to the retroactive application of a period of three years for initiating proceedings in place of a five-year period was clearly insufficient. If an initial period of five years was taken as a reference, ninety days left taxpayers whose rights accrued approximately three years earlier in a position of having to act within three months when they had thought that almost another two years were still available. Consequently, the Court of Justice considered that where a period of five or ten years for initiating proceedings is reduced to three years, the minimum transitional period required to ensure that rights conferred by Union law can be effectively exercised and that normally diligent taxpayers can familiarize themselves with the new regime and prepare and commence proceedings in circumstances which do not compromise their chances of success can be reasonably assessed at six months.276 In contrast, in Recheio,277 a limitation period of ninety days was held to be compatible with the principle of effectiveness.278 In that case, however, there was not a longer limitation period that was subsequently reduced to ninety days. (3) Charge passed on to third parties In principle, a trader that has paid a charge that was unduly levied is entitled to recover the sum in question. The tax authorities may refuse to repay such a charge only where repayment would result in the trader being unjustly enriched.279 Therefore, from the point of view of Union law, there is nothing to prevent national courts from taking into account, in accordance with their national law, the fact that it has been possible for charges unduly levied to be incorporated in the prices of the undertaking liable for the charge and to be passed on to the purchasers.280 The direct passing on to the purchasers of the tax wrongly levied constitutes the sole exception to the right to reimbursement of tax levied in breach of Union law.281 Furthermore, it is necessary that there is a direct link between the reimbursement of the unlawful tax and the enrichment of the taxable person. Thus, the situation in which an unlawful tax is offset by the abolition of a lawful levy of an equivalent amount cannot amount to the unjust enrichment of the taxable person.282 Conversely,

275 C-255/00, Grundig Italiana, 2002. 276 C-255/00, Grundig Italiana, 2002, paras 36–42. 277 C-30/02, Recheio, 2004. 278 C-30/02 Recheio, 2004, para. 21. 279 C-192/95 to C-218/95, Comateb and Others, 1997, paras 20–22; C-147/01, Weber’s Wine World and Others, 2003, para. 109; C-76/17, SC Petrotel-Lukoil, 2018, para. 33; C-460/21, Vapo Atlantic (order), 2022, para. 39. With particular regard to charges unduly levied in connection with VAT, see C-309/06, Marks & Spencer, 2008. 280 See 61/79, Denkavit Italiana, 1980, para. 26; 68/79, Just, 1980, para. 26; 130/79, Express Dairy Foods, 1980, para. 12; 199/82, San Giorgio, 1983, para. 13; C-192/95 to C-218/95, Comateb and Others, 1997, para. 12; C-343/96, Dilexport, 1999, para. 47. The same principle is applied in respect of a claim for repayment of an invalid Union charge: see 66/80, International Chemical Corporation, 1981, paras 22–26. 281 C-398/09, Lady & Kid and Others, 2011, para. 20. Thus, where it appears that an undertaking has not passed on a tax unduly levied to its customers, even though such an obligation existed under national law, the failure to comply with the obligation to pass on the tax in question cannot be relied upon by the Member State to resist reimbursement of the tax unduly levied: see C-76/17, SC Petrotel-Lukoil, 2018, paras 35–37. 282 See C-398/09, Lady & Kid and Others, 2011, paras 21–27.

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154 UNION LAW AND NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES Member States are allowed to require a direct relationship between the tax authorities and the persons claiming reimbursement of a sum unduly paid. Accordingly, they may resist a claim made by a purchaser to whom a duty was passed on by a taxable person on the grounds that it is not the purchaser who has paid the duty to the tax authorities. However, this is subject to two conditions: first, it should be possible for the purchaser to bring a civil action against the taxable person for recovery of the sum unduly paid; and, second, reimbursement by that taxable person of the duty unduly paid should not be virtually impossible or excessively difficult.283 In the case that reimbursement would not be possible—in particular, in the case of the insolvency of the taxable person—the Member State has to provide the instruments necessary to enable that purchaser to recover the sum unduly paid in order to respect the principle of effectiveness.284

4.60

4.61

(4) Burden of proof A national provision which imposes on the taxpayer the—negative—burden of proving that the charge was not passed on to third parties or embodies a presumption that the charge was passed on does not satisfy the requirements of Union law.285 Accordingly, a national tax authority (or a national court) cannot merely state that a charge was passed on in the selling price to consumers, that the economic burden which the charge represented for the taxable person is neutralized and that, consequently, repayment would automatically entail unjust enrichment of the trader.286 (5) Payment under protest A Member State may not make the recovery of a sum which was paid to a public authority under a mistake of law and which was not due under Union law dependent upon the payment having been made under protest, since such a condition is liable to

283 See C-94/10, Danfoss, 2011, paras 24–29. 284 See C-35/05, Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken, 2007, para. 41. 285 See 199/82, San Giorgio, 1983, para. 14; 331/85, 376/85, 378/85, Bianco and Girard, 1988, paras 12–13; C- 343/96, Dilexport, 1999, para. 48; C-441/98 and C-442/98, Michaïlidis, 2000, paras 40–41; C-460/21, Vapo Atlantic (order), 2022, para. 46. See also C-129/00, Commission v Italy, 2003, in which the Court held that Italy had infringed Union law insofar as the case-law of the Corte suprema di cassazione (Italian Supreme Court of Cassation) was in breach of the principles enshrined in the judgments in San Giorgio and Dilexport. See, with regard to the proof of the abuse of law, C-110/99, Emsland-Stärke, 2000, para. 54, in which the Court held that it was necessary to prove the existence of two elements, namely, a combination of objective circumstances in which, despite formal observance of the conditions laid down by the Union rules, the purpose of those rules had not been achieved, and a subjective element consisting in the intention to obtain an advantage from the Union rules by artificially creating the conditions laid down for obtaining it. It is for the national court to establish the existence of those two elements, evidence of which must be adduced in accordance with the rules of national law, provided that the effectiveness of Union law is not thereby undermined; see also C-515/03, Eichsfelder Schlachtbetrieb, 2005, para. 39; C-279/05, Vonk Dairy Products, 2007, paras 32–34. See, with respect to national rules of evidence requiring it to be shown by the economic operator alleging an overcompensation of a company discharging public service obligations that at least one of the four so-called Altmark conditions is not met in order to obtain reimbursement of the charge at issue, C-526/04, Laboratoires Boiron, 2008, paras 50–57. 286 See 199/82, San Giorgio, 1983, para. 14; C-343/96 Dilexport, 1999, paras 48, 52, 54; C-441/98 and C-442/98, Michaïlidis, 2000, paras 36–37; C-147/01, Weber’s Wine World and Others, 2003, paras 110–111; C-398/09, Lady & Kid and Others, 2011, para. 21; C-460/21, Vapo Atlantic (order), 2022, para. 47. For an older, but still valuable analysis, see C-129/00, Commission v Italy, AG Geelhoed Opinion, 2003, points 68–100.

Some Fields of Application 155 prejudice effective protection of the rights conferred by Union law on the individuals involved.287 (6) Interest As for the question whether interest is payable on wrongly levied charges, case-law initially held that it is ‘for national law to settle all ancillary questions relating to the reimbursement of charges improperly levied, such as the payment of interest, including the rate of interest and the date from which it must be calculated’.288 Starting in Littlewoods Retail,289 the Court of Justice, however, ruled that there is an obligation under Union law for Member States to repay with interest amounts of tax levied in breach of Union law.290 The rate of interest, the date from which it must be calculated, and the question whether simple interest, compound interest, or another type of interest must be paid are left to the Member States, provided that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness are respected.291 This means that national rules relating to the calculation of interest may not deprive the taxable person from adequate compensation for the undue unavailability of funds.292 Thus, Union law does not preclude, in the event of the repayment of charges levied in breach thereof, payment of interest calculated by methods less favourable than those applicable under the ordinary rules governing actions for the recovery of sums paid but not due between private parties, provided that those methods apply in the same way to such actions brought under Union law as to those brought under national law.293 However, the Court of Justice has ruled that a national rule limiting the interest to that accruing from the day following the date of the claim for repayment of the sums unduly paid breached the principle of effectiveness.294

287 See C-212/94, FMC and Others, 1996, para. 72. 288 See C-397/98 and C-410/98, Metallgesellschaft and Others, 2001, para. 86; C-470/04, N, 2006, para. 60. The same applies for payment of interest on arrears designed to compensate for constitution of guarantees given similarities between a restitution of taxes unduly levied and a release of guarantees demanded in breach of Union law (see C-470/04, N, 2006, para. 61). 289 See C-591/10, Littlewoods Retail and Others, 2012, para. 26; C-100/20, XY, 2021, para. 27; C‑415/20, C‑419/20, and C‑427/20, Gräfendorfer Geflügel-und Tiefkühlfeinkost Produktions and Others, 2022, paras 52–53; C-397/21, HUMDA, 2022, para. 32. 290 This case law is also applicable to situations where export funds have been paid late to a trader in breach of Union law or where financial penalties have been wrongfully imposed by a Member State when implementing Union law: see C‑415/20, C‑419/20, and C‑427/20, Gräfendorfer Geflügel-und Tiefkühlfeinkost Produktions and Others, 2022, paras 54–59. 291 See C-591/10, Littlewoods Retail Ltd and Others, 2012, paras 22–34; C‑13/18 and C‑126/18, Sole-Mizo and Others, 2020, para. 37; C‑415/20, C‑419/20, and C‑427/20, Gräfendorfer Geflügel-und Tiefkühlfeinkost Produktions and Others, 2022, para. 74. 292 C-397/21, HUMDA, 2022, para. 40. 293 See C-279/96, C-280/96, and C-281/96, Ansaldo Energia and Others, 1998, paras 24–36; compare C-216/99 and C-222/99, Prisco and CASER, 2002, paras 76–79. 294 See C-565/11, Irimie, 2013, paras 26–29; C‑415/20, C‑419/20, and C‑427/20, Gräfendorfer Geflügel-und Tiefkühlfeinkost Produktions and Others, 2022, paras 75–77. However, this does not preclude national legislation providing that payment of interest may benefit only persons that have brought legal proceedings seeking the repayment of the sums unduly paid: see C‑415/20, C‑419/20, and C‑427/20, Gräfendorfer Geflügel-und Tiefkühlfeinkost Produktions and Others, 2022, paras 78–84.

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156 UNION LAW AND NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES

B. Recovery of unlawful State aid 4.63

Where the Commission orders the recovery of State aid paid unlawfully under Union law, applicable provisions of national law may not affect the scope and effectiveness of Union law.295 The decision declaring the aid incompatible with the internal market will generally require the authority that granted the aid to recover it in accordance with the rules of national law.296 However, the application of those rules must not make it impossible in practice to recover the sums irregularly granted or be discriminatory in relation to comparable cases that are governed solely by national legislation.297 Accordingly, national courts should leave unapplied a procedural rule attaching automatic suspensory effect to actions brought against demands for reimbursement of unlawful State aid.298 Even when national courts consider a Commission decision declaring State aid unlawful to be invalid, they cannot suspend national implementing measures unless they comply with the conditions for interim relief, as laid down in the case-law (see para. 4.77).299

C. Claims based on a directive not implemented in time 4.64

It may happen that individuals base their claim to a certain social advantage on the provisions having direct effect of a directive that the Member State concerned failed to implement in time. In such a case, the national court is entitled to apply the limitation period provided for in its national procedural law, unless it appears that, as a result of the application of a limitation period, an individual has no possibility at all of asserting the rights conferred upon him or her by a directive.300 A national rule which restricts the retroactive effect of a claim to an unpaid social security benefit is compatible with

295 See C-507/08, Commission v Slovak Republic, 2010, para. 51; C-119/05, Lucchini, 2007, para. 63. The same basic rules also apply to the recovery by national authorities of Union aid which has been unduly paid: see C-298/96, Oelmühle Hamburg and Schmidt Söhne, 1998, paras 23–38; C-516/16, Erzeugerorganisation Tiefkühlgemüse eGen, 2017, paras 84–102 (specification of the requirements of Union law for the application of the principle of unjust enrichment on which the recipient of undue Union aid may possibly rely in order to avoid having to make repayment to the national authorities). Regarding the role and duties of national courts and administrations regarding the reimbursement of unlawful aid, see C-349/17, Eesti Pagar, 2019, paras 88–91; see further Commission Notice on the enforcement of State aid rules by national courts (OJ 2021 C305/1). 296 C-11/20, Commission v Greece, 2021, para. 34; C-51/20, Commission v Greece, 2022, para. 56; C-705/20, Fossil (Gibraltar), 2022, para. 40. 297 205/82 to 215/82, Deutsche Milchkontor, 1983, paras 17–24; 94/87, Commission v Germany, 1989, para. 12; C-383/06 to C-385/06, Vereniging Nationaal Overlegorgaan Sociale Werkvoorziening and Others, 2008, paras 48– 50; C-210/09 Scott and Kimberly Clark, 2010, paras 20–21; C-627/18, Nelson Antunes da Cunha, 2020, para. 41; T-459/93 Siemens v Commission, 1995, para. 82. For an example in which various principles of national law were set aside, see C-24/95 AlcanDeutschland, 1997. Nevertheless, it cannot be precluded that a recipient of illegally granted aid may rely on exceptional circumstances on the basis of which it had legitimately assumed the aid to be lawful and thus declined to refund the aid (see C-99/02 Commission v Italy, 2004, para. 20). 298 See C-232/05, Commission v France, 2006, para. 53. 299 See C-304/09, Commission v Italy, 2010, para. 45; C-527/12, Commission v Germany, 2014, para. 57. 300 See C-90/94, Haahr Petroleum, 1997, para. 52; C-114/95 and C-115/95, Texaco and Olieselskabet Danmark, 1997, para. 48; C-188/95, Fantask and Others, 1997, para. 51; C-88/99, Roquette Frères, 2000, para. 34; C-445/06, Danske Slagterier, 2009, paras 53–55; C-63/08, Pontin, 2009, paras 60–67; C-89/10 and C-96/10, Q-Beef NV, 2011, para. 50; C-327/15, TDC, 2016, para. 40.

Some Fields of Application 157 Union law, even where the claim is based on a provision with direct effect of a directive which has not been properly transposed into national law. This is because such a rule does not affect the individual’s actual right to the relevant benefit. Furthermore, Union law does not preclude the application of a provision of national law, whereby benefits for incapacity for work are payable not earlier than one year before the date of claim, in the case where an individual seeks to rely on rights conferred by a provision with direct effect of a directive which was not transposed into national law on time.301 In contrast, a national provision that is such as to render any action by individuals relying on Union law impossible in practice is incompatible with Union law. Thus, the Court of Justice held in Magorrian and Cunningham302 that Union law precludes the application, to a claim based on Art. 157 TFEU for recognition of the claimants’ entitlement to join an occupational pension scheme, of a national rule under which such entitlement is limited to a period which starts to run from a point in time two years prior to commencement of proceedings in connection with the claim. Unlike rules which, in the interests of legal certainty, merely limit the retroactive scope of a claim for certain benefits and do not therefore strike at the very essence of the rights conferred by the Union legal order,303 a rule such as the one at issue in Magorrian and Cunningham was such as to render any action by individuals relying on Art. 157 TFEU impossible in practice. In fact, the rule at issue meant that a large number of years of service were not taken into account in calculating the pensions to which those concerned would have been entitled in the future.304 Finally, the principle of effectiveness precludes the application of a national limitation period which is per se reasonable where the claim was brought out of time owing to the deceit of the other party. Accordingly, Union law precludes the application of a rule of national law which limits an employee’s entitlement to arrears of remuneration or damages for breach of the principle of equal pay to a period of two years prior to the date on which the proceedings were instituted, there being no possibility of extending that

301 C-338/91, Steenhorst-Neerings, 1993, para. 24; C-410/92, Johnson, 1994, para. 36. For the application of these principles to the recovery of unlawful charges, see C-231/96, Edis, 1998, paras 40–49; C-260/96, Spac, 1998, paras 24–32; C-279/96, C-280/96, and C-281/96, Ansaldo Energia and Others, 1998, paras 13–23. In each of those judgments, the Court of Justice held that, having regard to the documents before the Court and the arguments presented at the hearing, it did not appear that the conduct of the Italian authorities, in conjunction with the existence of the contested time-limit, had the effect, as it did in Emmott (n. 129), of depriving the claimants of any opportunity of enforcing their rights before the national courts. Further to this, Union law does not preclude the application of a period of limitation or prescription laid down by a rule of national law which restricts the period prior to the bringing of the claim in the national court in respect of which reimbursement of undue payments may be obtained: see C-212/94, FMC and Others, 1996, paras 63–64; C-114/95 and C-115/95, Texaco and Olieselskabet Danmark, 1997, paras 44–49; C-188/95, Fantask and Others, 1997, para. 52. 302 See C-246/96, Magorrian and Cunningham, 1997, para. 47. 303 See also C-3/21, Chief Appeals Officer and Others, 2022, paras 45–47. 304 See C-246/96, Magorrian and Cunningham, 1997, paras 43–45. For other examples, see C-63/08, Pontin, 2009, paras 55–69 (finding national rules relating to specific types of action and fifteen-day limitation period in respect of the dismissal of pregnant workers and workers having recently given birth or breastfeeding adopted pursuant to certain directives problematic on grounds of both principles of equivalence and effectiveness); C-69/08, Visciano, 2009, paras 47–49 (finding that one-year limitation period for bringing claims pursuant to directive providing fund in event of employer insolvency without specifying when it starts to run may constitute violation of the principle of effectiveness due to the legal uncertainty caused).

158 UNION LAW AND NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES period, where the delay in bringing a claim is attributable to the fact that the employer deliberately misrepresented to the employee the level of remuneration received by persons of the opposite sex performing like work.305

D. Damages action against a Member State for breach of Union law 4.65

(1) Principle of State liability Union law obliges Member States to provide for the specific ‘sanction’ of a right to reparation where, by their action or failure to act, national authorities breach Union law and this results in damage to individuals deriving rights from Union law.306 The Court of Justice takes the view that the principle whereby a Member State must be liable for loss and damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of Union law for which that State can be held responsible is inherent in the system of the Treaties.307 The obligation of Member States to make good such loss and damage is further grounded in the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Art. 4(3) TEU.308 The basic conditions under which that liability gives rise to a right to reparation depend on the nature of the breach of Union law giving rise to the loss and damage.309 This means that those conditions invariably have to be assessed in the light of the particular situation.310 In determining those conditions, the Court of Justice has regard to its case-law on the non-contractual liability of the Union. First, this is because the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU refers to the general principles common to the legal systems of the Member States, from which, in the absence of written rules, the Court also draws inspiration in other areas of Union law; and, second, it is because the conditions under which the Member State may incur liability for damage caused to individuals by a breach of Union law cannot differ from those governing the liability of the Union in like circumstances.311 Since the Bergaderm 305 See C-326/96, Levez, 1998, para. 34; compare C-542/08, Barth, 2010, para. 36. Similar concerns are at the basis of the Court’s judgment in Emmott (discussed in para. 4.29): see C-452/09, Iaia and Others, 2011, paras 19– 20. See also C-120/21, LB, 2022, paras 43–57, in which the Court held that an employer cannot rely on a three-year limitation period in respect of claims based on the right to paid annual leave acquired by a worker in respect of a given reference period where the employer had not put the worker in a position to exercise that right. 306 See C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich and Others, 1991. 307 See C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich and Others, 1991, para. 35; C-63/01, Evans, 2003, para. 83; C-445/06, Danske Slagterier, 2009, para. 19; C-118/08 Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales, 2010, para. 29; C-413/20, État belge, 2021, para. 60; C-261/20, Thelen Technopark Berlin, 2022, para. 42; C-278/20, Commission v Spain, 2022, para. 29. For further discussion of the Court’s grounding of the principle of State liability, see K. Lenaerts and K. Gutman, ‘ “Federal Common Law” in the European Union: Comparative Reflections from the United States’ (2006) A.J.C.L. 1, 78–96. 308 See C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich and Others, 1991, para. 36. 309 See C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich and Others, 1991, para. 38. 310 See C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94, C-189/94, and C-190/94, Dillenkofer and Others, 1996, para. 24; see also C-470/03, AGM.-COS.MET, 2007, para. 78. 311 C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, 1996, paras 39–42. Some commentators would have preferred it if the conditions for liability on the part of the Community, as it then was, had been equated with those for liability on the part of the Member States, and not the other way around, while arguing for ‘clarification’ of the interpretation of then Art. 288 EC (now Art. 340 TFEU) in the light of the judgment in Francovich: see R. Caranta, ‘Judicial Protection Against Member States: A New Jus Commune Takes Shape’ (1995) C.M.L.Rev. 703. See further C. Vajda, ‘Liability for Breach of Community Law: A Survey of the ECJ Cases Post Factortame’ (2006) E.B.L. Rev. 257.

Some Fields of Application 159 judgment,312 the conditions for the Union to incur liability have been aligned with the criteria identified by the Court of Justice for Member States to incur liability. (2) Conditions According to the established case-law of the Court of Justice, a Member State must make good loss or damage sustained by individuals as a result of breaches of Union law attributable to it where the following three conditions are met:313 first, the rule of Union law breached must be intended to confer rights on individuals; second, the breach of Union law must be sufficiently serious; and, third, there must be a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation resting on the Member State and the loss or damage sustained by the injured party.314 Regarding the first condition, namely, whether the rule of Union law infringed intended to confer rights upon individuals, the Court has held that this condition does not require a provision of Union law to have direct effect.315 Whereas the intention to confer rights is assessed on a case-by-case basis,316 the Court has held, for example, that the provisions of the TFEU relating to fundamental freedoms give rise to rights for individuals which the national courts must protect.317 As far as the second condition is concerned, namely, whether the breach of Union law is sufficiently serious, all the factors which characterize the situation must be taken into account by the national court.318 As identified by the Court of Justice, those guiding factors include, in particular, the clarity and precision of the rule infringed, the measure of discretion left to the national or Union authorities by that rule, whether the infringement or the damage caused was intentional or involuntary, whether any error of law was excusable or inexcusable, the fact that the position taken by a Union institution may have contributed towards the omission, and the adoption or retention of national measures or practices contrary to Union law.319 312 See C-352/98 P, Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission, 2000. See further para. 11.16. 313 These three conditions are necessary and sufficient to found a right in individuals to obtain redress, but this does not mean that the Member State concerned cannot incur liability under less strict conditions on the basis of national law: see C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, 1996, para. 66; C-173/03, Traghetti del Mediterraneo, 2006, paras 44–45; C-470/03, AGM-COS.MET, 2007, para. 85. Moreover, this does not in principle preclude specific conditions being laid down by the domestic law of a Member State in connection with State liability, provided that such rules comply with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness: see para. 4.70. 314 See C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, 1996, para. 51; C-424/97, Haim, 2000, para. 26; C-224/01, Köbler, 2003, para. 51; C-63/01, Evans, 2003, para. 83; C-452/06, Synthon, 2008, para. 35; C-445/06, Danske Slagterier, 2009, para. 20; C-177/20, ‘Grossmania’, 2022, para. 69; C-278/20, Commission v Spain, 2022, para. 31; C-61/21, Ministre de la Transition écologique et Premier ministre, 2022, para. 44. For the question as to whether a directive without direct effect confers ‘rights’ on individuals breach of which may give rise to an obligation to make reparation, see C-91/92, Faccini Dori, 1994, para. 27; and C-192/94, El Corte Inglés, 1996, para. 22. The third condition (causal link) refers to a fourth condition, namely, that there has been loss or damage sustained: see further (in the context of the action for damages against the Union) para. 11.63. 315 See C-571/16, Kantarev, 2018, para. 97. 316 See C-501/18, BT, 2021, para. 115 (Art. 1(3)(i) of Directive 94/19/EC); C-177/20, ‘Grossmania’, 2022, para. 70 (Art. 17 of the Charter); compare C-222/02, Paul and Others, 2004, para. 50 (Directives 94/19/EC, 77/80/EEC, 89/299/EEC, and 89/646/EEC); C-61/21, Ministre de la Transition écologique et Premier ministre, 2022, paras 45– 57 (Arts 3 and 7 of Directive 80/779/EEC, Arts 3 and 7 of Directive 85/203/EEC, Arts 7 and 8 of Directive 96/62/EC, Arts 4(1) and 5(1) of Directive 1999/30/EC, and Arts 13(1) and 23(1) of Directive 2008/50/EC). 317 See C-98/14, Berlington Hungary and Others, 2015, para. 105. 318 See C-181/20, VYSOČINA WIND, 2022, para. 71. 319 See C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, 1996, para. 56; C-424/97, Haim, 2000, para. 26; C-63/01, Evans, 2003, para. 86; C-278/05, Robins and Others, 2007, para. 77; C-201/05, Test Claimants in the

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160 UNION LAW AND NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES With respect to the third condition, namely, the existence of a direct causal link, so far the Court has generally left it to the national courts to establish whether such a causal link exists.320 In general, it is for the national courts, and not the Court, to establish liability of the Member State based on these conditions. While the Court cannot substitute its assessment for that of the national courts, it does provide guidance in the application of these conditions.321

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(3) Margin of discretion The decisive test for finding that a breach of Union law is sufficiently serious is whether the Member State concerned manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits on its discretion.322 Where a Member State authority acts in a matter in which it had only considerably reduced discretion, or no discretion at all, at the time when it committed the infringement, the mere infringement of Union law may be sufficient to establish the existence of a sufficiently serious breach.323 Accordingly, failure to take any measure to transpose a directive into national law within the prescribed period in order to achieve the result sought by the directive constitutes a sufficiently serious breach of Union law.324 Where conduct has persisted in spite of a preliminary ruling, a judgment of the Court of Justice finding a failure to fulfil obligations or settled case-law of the Court on the matter from which it appears that that conduct constitutes a breach of Union law, this will also amount to a sufficiently serious breach.325

CFC and Dividend Group Litigation (order), 2008, para. 122. However, the fact that a national court found it necessary to make a reference for a preliminary ruling concerning a provision of Union law cannot be considered a decisive factor in determining whether a sufficiently serious breach has occurred: see C-244/13, Ewaen Fred Ogieriakhi, 2014, paras 51–55. 320 See C-501/12, C‑501/12 to C‑506/12, C‑540/12, and C‑541/12, Specht and Others, 2014, para. 106; C-501/18, BT, 2021, para. 115; C-177/20, ‘Grossmania’, 2022, para. 72. See K. Gutman, ‘Liability for Breach of EU Law by the Union, Member States and Individuals: Damages, Enforcement and Effective Judicial Protection’ in A Lazowski and S. Blockmans (eds), Research Handbook on EU Institutional Law (Edward Elgar, 2016) 441, 463–464; . 321 See C-318/13, X, 2014, para. 44; C-129/19, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, 2020, para. 35; C-181/20, VYSOČINA WIND, 2022, para. 70. 322 C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, 1996, para. 55; C-571/16, Kantarev, 2018, para. 105. Member States are precluded from making the finding of an infringement conditional on a concept of fault, or any other concept, which goes beyond that of a sufficiently serious breach as defined in the case-law of the Court of Justice: see C-429/09 Fuß, 2010, paras 64–70. 323 For an example, see C-5/94, Hedley Lomas, 1996, para. 28, where the Court of Justice held that the mere infringement of Art. 31 TFEU by the United Kingdom in refusing to grant an export licence constituted a sufficiently serious breach of Union law on the grounds that at the time of the infringement the United Kingdom had considerably reduced discretion, if any; see also C-127/95, Norbrook Laboratories, 1998, para. 109; C-150/99, Stockholm Lindöpark, 2001, paras 40–42; C-470/03, AGM.-COS.MET, 2007, paras 81–82; C-452/06, Synthon, 2008, paras 41–45. 324 See C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94, C-189/94, and C-190/94, Dillenkofer and Others, 1996. See, also C-319/96, Brinkmann, 1998, para. 29. 325 See C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, 1996, para. 57; C-118/00, Larsy, 2001, para. 44; C-201/05, Test Claimants in the CFC and Dividend Group Litigation (order), 2008, para. 123; C-261/20, Thelen Technopark Berlin, 2022, para. 47; C-177/20, ‘Grossmania’, 2022, para. 71. However, reparation of the damage caused by a breach of Union law by a Member State is not conditional on the requirement that the existence of such a breach must be clear from a preliminary ruling or another judgment delivered by the Court of Justice (see C-118/08, Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales, 2010, para. 38).

Some Fields of Application 161 (4) Transposition of directives As far as the actual transposition of the provisions of a directive is concerned, a Member State’s margin of discretion may be broader, depending on the directive’s content. In this way, improper transposition of a directive may not automatically constitute a sufficiently serious breach and give rise to liability on the part of the Member State. For example, in the British Telecommunications case,326 the Court of Justice held that the improper transposition of a particular directive into national law did not constitute a sufficiently serious breach of Union law on the grounds that the directive at issue was imprecisely worded and was reasonably capable of bearing the interpretation given to it by the Member State concerned in good faith and on the basis of arguments which were not entirely devoid of substance and not manifestly contrary to the wording of the directive or its objectives. Likewise, in Robins,327 the Court found that the United Kingdom’s liability by reason of improper transposition of a certain provision of a directive (incidentally, the very same directive at issue in the Francovich case328), by failing to ensure that the national legislation put in place adequate protection for pension schemes, was conditional on a finding of the Member State’s manifest and grave disregard for the limits set on its discretion. In that respect, the Court found that the clarity and the precision of the directive’s provision with respect to the level of protection required was lacking, and that as far as the position of the Union institutions was concerned, a report had been issued by the Commission indicating that the United Kingdom appeared to be in compliance with the requirements of the directive, which could have served to reinforce that then Member State’s belief that it had transposed the directive correctly.329 Conversely, whenever the provisions of a directive are unconditional and sufficiently precise, they may be relied upon before the national courts by individuals against the Member State where the latter has failed to transpose the directive correctly.330 (5) Decisions of national courts adjudicating at last instance In Köbler,331 the Court of Justice ruled that a Member State may be held liable for a breach of Union law as a result of a decision of a national court adjudicating at last

326 See C-392/93, British Telecommunications, 1996, para. 43. In C-283/94, C-291/94, and C-292/94, Denkavit and Others, 1996, paras 51–54, the Court of Justice held that its case-law did not provide Germany with any interpretation as to how a provision of a particular directive had to be interpreted. Consequently, the erroneous interpretation which Germany had given to it, which had been adopted by almost all the other Member States following discussions within the Council, could not be regarded as a sufficiently serious breach of Union law. In contrast, in Rechberger, the Court of Justice held that a national implementing provision which limited the time from which a right conferred by a directive entered into effect where the directive conferred no discretion on the Member States in this respect constituted a sufficiently serious breach of Union law (C-140/97, Rechberger and Others, 1999, para. 51). See also C-150/99, Stockholm Lindöpark, 2001, paras 40–42. 327 See C-278/05, Robins and Others, 2007. 328 See n. 306. 329 C-278/05, Robins and Others, 2007, paras 77–82. 330 See C-671/13, Indėlių ir investicijų draudimas and Nemaniūnas, 2015, para. 57; C-571/16, Kantarev, 2018, para. 98. 331 See C-224/01, Köbler, 2003, paras 51–53. Member States can thus neither exclude State liability nor supplement the conditions for State liability for breaches of Union law by courts of last instance on account of the specific nature of such courts: see C-173/03, Traghetti del Mediterraneo, 2006; C-379/10, Commission v Italy, 2011.

4.68

4.69

162 UNION LAW AND NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES instance on the basis of the same three conditions mentioned332 (see para. 4.66), though it recognized that with respect to the second condition of a sufficiently serious breach, ‘regard must be had to the specific nature of the judicial function and to the legitimate requirements of legal certainty’. Thus, State liability ‘can be incurred only in the exceptional case where the court has manifestly infringed the applicable law’.333 In order to determine whether that condition is satisfied, the national court hearing a claim for reparation must take account of all the factors which characterize the situation put before it. As set forth in the case-law of the Court of Justice, those guiding factors include, in particular, the degree of clarity and precision of the rule infringed; whether the infringement was intentional; whether the error of law was excusable or inexcusable; the position taken, where applicable, by a Union institution; and non-compliance by the court in question with its obligation to make a reference for a preliminary ruling under the third paragraph of Art. 267 TFEU.334 In any event, an infringement of Union law will be sufficiently serious where the judicial decision concerned was taken in manifest breach of the case-law of the Court of Justice in the relevant matter.335

4.70

(6) Principles of equivalence and effectiveness In the absence of Union rules, the procedural organization of the legal proceedings concerning State liability is left to national law, but the provisions of national law must comply with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness; that is to say, they must not be less favourable for actions for damages for breach of Union law than they are for other actions for damages, or be framed so as to make it ‘virtually impossible or excessively difficult to obtain reparation’.336 Moreover, traditional concepts applying in some Member States must, where appropriate, yield to State liability under Union law. Accordingly, the principle that the State cannot be held liable for an unlawful act or omission on the part of the legislature, which applies in some Member States’ legal systems, cannot restrict the principle of State liability for breaches of Union law. The reason for this is that State liability holds good for any case in which a Member State breaches Union law, whatever be the organ of the State whose act or omission was responsible for the breach.337 This applies not only to breaches of Union law by organs of the legislature

332 See C-168/15, Tomášová, 2016, para. 23; C-620/17, Hochtief Solutions Magyarországi Fióktelepe, 2019, para. 36. 333 See C-224/01, Köbler, 2003, para. 53; C-168/15, Tomášová, 2016, para. 24; C-620/17, Hochtief Solutions Magyarországi Fióktelepe, 2019, para. 41. 334 See C-224/01, Köbler, 2003, para. 55; C-168/15, Tomášová, 2016, para. 25; C-620/17, Hochtief Solutions Magyarországi Fióktelepe, 2019, para. 42. 335 See C-224/01, Köbler, 2003, para. 56; C-620/17, Hochtief Solutions Magyarországi Fióktelepe, 2019, para. 43. 336 See C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich and Others, 1991, para. 43; C-66/95, Sutton, 1997, para. 33; C-224/01, Köbler, 2003, paras 46–50; C-268/06, Impact, 2008, paras 44–47; C-118/08, Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales, 2010, para. 31; C-571/16, Kantarev, 2018, para. 123. 337 See C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, 1996, paras 32–36; C-571/16, Kantarev, 2018, para. 93; C-261/20, Thelen Technopark Berlin, 2022, para. 43. In Commission v Spain, the Court deemed contrary to Union law a requirement imposed by Spanish law that an individual could only be compensated for loss or harm caused to them by an infringement of Union law attributable to the national legislature where a previous judgment of the Court of Justice had established that infringement (see C-278/20, Commission v Spain, 2022, paras 101–106).

Some Fields of Application 163 or the executive, but also to judicial bodies adjudicating at last instance.338 In addition, the acts of a federated State or a territorial authority with a degree of autonomy and likewise public-law bodies339 may cause the Member State itself, as well as such authorities or bodies, to incur liability. In Member States with a federal structure, reparation for damage caused to individuals does not necessarily have to be provided by the federal State (federal authority). It is sufficient that a party’s right to reparation for loss or damage flowing from an infringement of Union law by a federated entity is effectively protected. If, however, there is no effective protection, a Member State (federal authority) cannot plead the distribution of powers and responsibilities between the bodies which exist in its national legal order in order to excuse itself from liability on that basis.340 That is also true for those Member States in which certain legislative or administrative tasks are devolved to regional or local entities with a certain degree of autonomy or to any other public-law body legally distinct from the State.341 (7) Compensation The amount of the damages must be commensurate with the loss or damage sustained so as to ensure the effective protection of the rights of the injured parties.342 In the case of late implementation of a directive, retroactive and proper application in full of the measures implementing the directive will suffice in principle, unless the beneficiaries establish the existence of complementary loss sustained on account of the fact that they were unable to benefit at the appropriate time from the financial advantages guaranteed by the directive, with the result that such loss must also be made good.343 Limiting compensation to an upper limit, or a prohibition on the national court’s granting interest on that basic amount, are contrary to Union law, insofar as they make it impossible to make reparation in full for the damage sustained.344 The national rules may require 338 See C-224/01, Köbler, 2003, paras 30–50: the principles of res judicata and judicial independence do not preclude State liability for breaches of Union law committed by courts adjudicating at last instance. See also C-396/03 P, Killinger v Germany and Others (order), 2005, para. 28; C-173/03, Traghetti del Mediterraneo, 2006. 339 See C-424/97, Haim, 2000, para. 32. 340 See C-302/97, Konle, 1999, paras 61–64. 341 See C-424/97, Haim, 2000, paras 30–31. 342 See C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, 1996, para. 82; C-620/17, Hochtief Solutions Magyarországi Fióktelepe, 2019, para. 46; C-278/20, Commission v Spain, 2022, para. 164. See C-429/09, Fuß, 2010, paras 91–98: it is for the national court to decide, taking into account the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, whether, in order to compensate an employee for breaches of the Working Time Directive (Council Directive 93/104/EC of 23 November 1993 concerning certain aspects of the organization of working time (OJ 1993 L307/18), as amended), compensation should take the form of time off in lieu or financial compensation. 343 See C-94/95 and C-95/95, Bonifaci and Others and Berto and Others, 1997, para. 54; C-373/95, Maso and Others, 1997, para. 41; C-131/97, Carbonari and Others, 1999, para. 53. 344 See C-271/91, Marshall, 1993, paras 22–32. To limit compensation to an upper limit may, where the loss or damage exceeds that upper limit, conflict with the requirement for an effective, deterrent sanction. This is also true of the prohibition on adding interest to the basic amount. If account cannot be taken of the effluxion of time, reparation will not be made for the whole of the damage. Consequently, the grant of interest under the applicable national law is essential in order to satisfy the requirement of the full effectiveness of Union law. See, to the same effect, C-397/98 and C-410/98, Metallgesellschaft and Others, 2001, para. 94; C-470/03, AGM.-COS.MET, 2007, paras 90–95; C-565/11, Irimie, 2013, paras 26–29. Further to this, it is not possible, as a rule, to limit compensation to loss or harm during a specific time-period (see C-278/20, Commission v Spain, 2022, paras 162–167), to cap the amount of compensation at a certain percentage of the amount of the damage (see C-735/19, Euromin Holdings (Cyprus) Limited, 2020, paras 98–99), or to exclude from the compensation of the damage caused by an infringement of Union law by a last instance court the legal costs of legal proceedings leading to the infringing last instance court decision (see C-620/17, Hochtief Solutions Magyarországi Fióktelepe, 2019, para. 47).

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164 UNION LAW AND NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES the injured party to show reasonable diligence in order to avoid the loss or damage or limit its extent.345 The setting of reasonable limitation periods for bringing an action for damages against a Member State is compatible with these requirements, provided that it does not make it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to obtain reparation.346

E. Damages actions against private parties for breach of Union (competition) law 4.72

4.73

Private parties that have infringed a Union provision with direct effect may be obliged to make reparation for the loss or damage caused thereby.347 While such an obligation may exist in regard of any provision of Union law having direct effect,348 the Court of Justice has developed its case law on this point mainly in relation to Union competition law. (1) Courage and Crehan In Courage and Crehan,349 the Court of Justice held that Union law, in particular Art. 101 TFEU, precludes a rule of national law under which a party to a contract liable to restrict or distort competition is barred from claiming damages under national law for loss caused by performance of that contract on the sole ground that the claimant is a party to that contract. This is because the practical effect of Art. 101 TFEU would be put at risk ‘if it were not open to any individual to claim damages for loss caused to him by a contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort competition’.350 Yet, national law can deny that right to a party which bears significant responsibility for the distortion of competition, provided that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness have been complied with.351 Thus, while the full effectiveness and the practical effect of Art. 101 TFEU require the availability of a damages action to individuals for harm suffered where there is a causal link between that harm and a violation of Art. 101 TFEU,352 the conditions under which such a claim for damages is available are left to the competence 345 See C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, 1996, paras 84–85; C-571/16, Kantarev, 2018, paras 140–141; C-278/20, Commission v Spain, 2022, para. 123. However, this rule must be applied having regard to the specific circumstances of the case. In the judgment in Metallgesellschaft (C-397/98 and C-410/98, Metallgesellschaft and Others, 2001, paras 101–107), the Court of Justice considered that rejecting or reducing reparation for a financial disadvantage sustained because the claimants had not applied for a tax advantage which national law denied them, with a view to challenging the refusal of the tax authorities by means of the legal remedies provided for that purpose, would render the exercise of rights conferred on private persons by directly applicable provisions of Union law (in that case Art. 49 TFEU) impossible or excessively difficult. See further C-201/05, Test Claimants in the CFC and Dividend Group Litigation (order), 2008, paras 127–130. Similarly, while a duty to seek prior annulment of the measure causing harm is not, in principle, contrary to the principle of effectiveness, it may make obtaining compensation excessively difficult where annulment is precluded in practice or only possible in a very limited number of instances: see C-571/16, Kantarev, 2018, para. 143; C-501/18, BT, 2021, paras 119–120. 346 See C-261/95, Palmisani, 1997, para. 28. See further C-445/06, Danske Slagterier, 2009, para. 48. 347 See C-453/99, Courage and Crehan, 2001. 348 See C-128/92, Banks, AG van Gerven Opinion, 1994, points 36–54. 349 See C-453/99, Courage and Crehan, 2001. 350 See C-453/99, Courage and Crehan, 2001, para. 26. 351 See C-453/99, Courage and Crehan, 2001, paras 24–36. 352 See C-819/19, Stichting Cartel Compensation, 2021, para. 49.

Some Fields of Application 165 of the Member States, subject to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, and provided that Union legislation does not apply.353 (2) Subsequent case-law In subsequent case-law, the Court of Justice further developed the conditions under which such a claim for damages was available. Thus, in Manfredi,354 it held that, where there is a causal relationship between an invalid agreement or practice prohibited under Art. 101 TFEU and the harm suffered by an individual, the latter can claim compensation for that harm.355 In the absence of Union rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to prescribe the detailed rules governing the exercise of that right, including those on the application of the concept of ‘causal relationship’, provided that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness are observed.356 As such, national rules on the jurisdiction of courts hearing such claims, limitation periods, and damages awards (such as the prospect of punitive damages) are to be assessed in line with these principles, underscoring that injured persons must be able to seek compensation not only for actual loss (damnum emergens), but also for loss of profit (lucrum cessans), plus interest.357 That being said, in more recent judgments, the Court of Justice has developed a body of case-law governing private damages actions for violations of Union competition law, including Art. 102 TFEU,358 limiting the Member States in the exercise of their competence for the enactment of procedural rules. First, the Court has rejected national concepts of causation which make the right of an individual to claim compensation subject to the existence of a direct causal link.359 Thus, it found that national rules precluding victims of umbrella pricing to request damages360 or limiting the possibility of requesting damages to suppliers and customers of the market affected by the cartel to be contrary to Art. 101 TFEU.361 Similarly, the Court of Justice held that the victim of anti-competitive behaviour may bring an action for damages against either the infringing parent company or its subsidiary, provided that they constitute a single economic unit, thereby precluding national rules providing for the possibility of imputing liability for one company’s conduct to another company only in circumstances where the second company controls the first company.362 Further to this, the Court has clarified that a claim in damages also 353 See C-637/17, Cogeco Communications, 2019, para. 42; C-267/20, Volvo and DAF Trucks, 2022, para. 50. 354 See C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi and Others, 2006. 355 See C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi and Others, 2006, paras 56–61, 63, 90–91; see also C-421/05, City Motors Groep, 2007, para. 33. 356 See C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi and Others, 2006, paras 62, 64. The Court’s findings in this case as regards the compliance of the limitation period at issue in the national proceedings with the principle of effectiveness was subsequently distinguished in a later case: see C-445/06, Danske Slagterier, 2009, paras 50–52. 357 See C-445/06, Danske Slagterier, 2009, paras 70–72, 77–82, 92–100. 358 See C-360/09, Pfleiderer, 2011, para. 24; C-536/11, Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde, 2013, para. 28; C-637/17, Cogeco Communications, 2019, para. 40. 359 See C-557/12, Kone, 2014, para. 33. 360 See C-557/12, Kone, 2014, para. 37. 361 See C-435/18, Otis, 2019, para. 34. See further G. Bacharis, ‘National Law Cannot Exclude Damages Claims of Public Lenders, Otis v. Land Oberösterrech (Otis II)’ (2020) C.M.L.Rev. 1609. 362 See C-882/19, Sumal, 2021, paras 67, 75.

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166 UNION LAW AND NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES lies against successor companies of undertakings responsible for damage caused by infringing Union competition law.363 Second, taking into account the context of competition law,364 the Court appears to favour limitation periods that are on balance longer than those in other areas of its case-law. For example, while the Court usually considers a three-year limitation period reasonable from the point of view of Union law,365 it ruled in Cogeco Communications366 that a limitation period of three years for an action for damages is contrary to Art. 102 TFEU, where it starts to run from the date on which the injured party is aware of this right to compensation, even though the injured party is unaware of the identity of the perpetrator at that time, and no possibility exists to suspend or interrupt the three-year limitation period during the proceedings before the national competition authority. More generally, the Court has held that a right to claim compensation would be rendered practically impossible or excessively difficult where limitation periods applicable to actions for damages for infringements of competition law begin to run before the infringement has ceased and before the injured party knows, or can reasonably be expected to know, the elements of information needed for bringing their action.367 Further to this, in Otis,368 the Court of Justice confirmed that the Commission can also bring an action before a national court, on behalf of the European Union, for damages in respect of loss sustained by the European Union as a result of an agreement or practice contrary to Art. 101 TFEU. The fact that national courts are bound by the Commission decision finding the infringement does not mean that the undertakings concerned do not enjoy effective judicial protection within the meaning of Art. 47 of the Charter. The Court pointed out in that regard that Union law provides for a system of judicial review of Commission competition decisions that affords all the safeguards required by Art. 47 of the Charter.369

F. Legal protection in proceedings for interim relief 4.75

(1) Two situations The protracted nature of judicial proceedings may pose a threat to the actual enforcement of the rights conferred upon an individual by Union law. This explains the interest for the full effectiveness of Union law of a system of provisional legal protection which enables those rights to be safeguarded by suspending a provision which is allegedly in

363

See C-724/17, Vantaan kaupunk, 2019, paras 46–51. See C-267/70, Volvo and DAF Trucks, 2022, para. 53. 365 See C‑13/18 and C‑126/18, Sole-Mizo and Others, 2020, para. 56. 366 See C-637/17, Cogeco Communications, 2019, para. 55. 367 See C-267/70, Volvo and DAF Trucks, 2022, paras 56–57. 368 See C-199/11, Otis and Others, 2012, paras 43–44. 369 See C-199/11, Otis and Others, 2012, paras 45–67. 364

Some Fields of Application 167 conflict with Union law or by granting interim relief to settle or regulate disputed legal positions or relationships pending a judicial ruling in the main proceedings.370 Two situations need to be distinguished as far as interim relief involving Union law before the national court is concerned.371 First, there is the situation where the national court grants interim relief in order to suspend the effect of a national provision that is allegedly in breach of Union law. Second, the national court may grant interim relief in order to suspend the implementation of a Union act which is allegedly in breach of higher-ranking Union law (and therefore unlawful) or provisionally to settle or regulate disputed legal positions or relationships with reference to a national measure based on a Union act whose validity is under consideration in proceedings for a preliminary ruling. (2) Allegedly illegal national measure As far as the first situation is concerned, the Court of Justice held in the seminal Factortame judgment372 that Union law must be interpreted as meaning that ‘a national court which, in a case before it concerning [Union] law, considers that the sole obstacle which precludes it from granting interim relief is a rule of national law must set aside that rule’. It is only in this way that the full effectiveness of Union law can be secured by the judgment to be given on the existence of the rights claimed under Union law.373 In other words, by virtue of this judgment, if the national court would grant interim relief to ensure the full effectiveness of rights claimed under Union law but for national law, then the national court is obliged to set aside that national rule and grant interim relief in order to ensure enforcement of Union law rights. As such, while it was left to the national court to specify the conditions under which interim relief would be granted, the Court of Justice confirmed that a national rule prohibiting absolutely the granting of interim relief in this setting would contravene the principle of effectiveness. This means that, where necessary, the national court can derive directly from Union law the power to suspend a provision of national law in interlocutory proceedings. The nature of the measure whose suspension is sought is immaterial. Furthermore, Union law embodies no special requirements for the suspension of provisions of national law, although here, too, the principle applies that there must be equal treatment of suspension on grounds of domestic law and suspension on Union law grounds (principle of equivalence), together with the principle that the applicable domestic law must not subject the suspension to conditions such as to make it impossible in practice to obtain it (principle of effectiveness).

370 E. Sharpston, ‘Interim Relief in the National Courts’ in J. Lonbay and A. Biondi (eds), Remedies for Breach of EC Law (Wiley, 1997) 47–54. 371 See C-432/05, Unibet, 2007, paras 79–82. For interim relief before the Union Courts, see Ch. 13. 372 See C-213/89, Factortame and Others, 1990, operative part. 373 See C-213/89, Factortame and Others, 1990, para. 21. See also C-226/99, Siples, 2001, paras 17–20; C‑924/19 PPU and C‑925/19 PPU, FMS and Others, 2020, paras 297–298; C-14/21, Seawatch (order of the President), 2021, para. 32; C-487/19, W.Ż., 2021, para. 142.

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168 UNION LAW AND NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES In Unibet,374 the applicant had submitted two applications for the granting of interim relief protection: the first was in connection with its first application seeking declaratory- type relief, thereby seeking by way of interim relief an order immediately disapplying the prohibition against its promotion of betting activities in Sweden; and the second was in connection with the applicant’s second application concerning the action for damages, whereby it made a fresh application for interim relief, claiming that the national court should immediately issue an order allowing it to take specific marketing measures related to its promotion of betting activities. As a result, in its reference, the Swedish Supreme Court submitted a question as to whether the principle of effective judicial protection required it to provide interim relief in these circumstances. In its judgment, the Court of Justice ruled that on the one hand, the principle of effective judicial protection does not require it to be possible in the national legal order concerned to obtain interim relief in the context of an application that is inadmissible, as in the case of a declaratory-type action that is not provided for in Sweden. On the other hand, by way of the other legal remedies or avenues that must be provided in the Member States which permit the issue of the compatibility of national law with Union law to be determined as a preliminary issue—for example, in the case of Sweden, by way of judicial review of the administrative decision concerning the promotion of the applicant’s betting activities or the action for damages—it must be possible to grant interim relief protection until the competent national court has given a ruling as to whether the contested national provisions are compatible with Union law, where the grant of such interim relief is necessary to ensure the full effectiveness of the judgment to be given on the existence of such Union law rights.375

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(3) Allegedly illegal Union act As far as the second situation is concerned, the Court of Justice has held as follows: In cases where national authorities are responsible for the administrative application of [Union] regulations, the legal protection guaranteed by [Union] law includes the right of individuals to challenge, as a preliminary issue, the legality of such regulations before national courts and to induce those courts to refer questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. That right would be compromised if, pending delivery of a judgment of the Court, which alone has jurisdiction to declare that a [Union] regulation is invalid . . . , individuals were not in a position, where certain conditions are satisfied, to obtain a decision granting suspension of enforcement which would make it possible for the effects of the disputed regulation to be rendered for the time being inoperative as regards them.376

374 See C-432/05, Unibet, 2007, paras 18–30. 375 See C-432/05, Unibet, 2007, paras 71–77; compare C-432/05 Unibet, AG Sharpston Opinion, 2007, points 77–86 (expressing concerns about unduly stretching the action for damages in connection with the interim relief protection sought by the applicant). 376 See C-143/88 and C-92/89, Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen and Zuckerfabrik Soest, 1991, paras 16–17; C- 465/93, Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft and Others, 1995, paras 20–21; C-142/20, Analisi G. Caracciolo, 2021, para. 142.

Some Fields of Application 169 For this reason, Art. 288 TFEU does not preclude national courts from ‘granting interim relief to settle or regulate the disputed legal positions or relationships with reference to a national administrative measure based on a [Union] regulation which is the subject of a reference for a preliminary ruling on its validity’.377 The question arises as to what is meant by ‘where certain conditions are satisfied’. The Court of Justice has held that ‘the rules of procedure of the courts are determined by national law and . . . those conditions differ according to the national law governing them, which may jeopardise the uniform application of [Union] law’.378 In order to reduce this danger, the Court of Justice has held that suspension of enforcement of national administrative measures based on a Union regulation or the grant of other interim measures ‘must in all the Member States be subject to conditions which are uniform’.379 The Court identifies those ‘uniform conditions’ with ‘the conditions which must be satisfied for the Court of Justice [itself] to allow an application to it for interim measures’.380 The parallel between the conditions for the grant of interim relief applicable before the national court and the Court of Justice (along with the General Court) is due to the fact that an assessment of validity via a request for a preliminary ruling and an action for annulment constitute two aspects of a single system of judicial review of legality. The coherence of the system of judicial protection demands uniformity in the procedural rules for provisional suspension or limitation of enforcement of contested Union acts until such time as the Union Courts have carried out their review of legality, whether by way of a preliminary ruling or by a judgment on an application for annulment. As a result, the national court must base itself, as far as the substantive conditions for suspension or limitation of enforcement of national administrative measures based on a Union act are concerned, on the case-law of the Court of Justice concerning interim measures, and no longer on national law.381 National law governs only ‘the making and examination of the application’.382 As elaborated in the Zuckerfabrik and Atlanta judgments, interim measures may be granted by a national court only if the following four conditions are satisfied: 1. the national court entertains serious doubts as to the validity of the Union act and, if the validity of the contested act is not already in issue before the Court of Justice, itself refers that question to the Court;383 2. there is urgency, in that interim relief is necessary to avoid serious and irreparable damage to the party seeking the relief;

377 C-465/93, Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft and Others, 1995, para. 30. 378 C-143/88 and C-92/89, Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen and Zuckerfabrik Soest, 1991, para. 25. 379 C-465/93 Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft and Others, 1995, paras 29, 33. 380 C-143/88 and C-92/89, Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen and Zuckerfabrik Soest, 1991, paras 26–27. 381 See C-527/12, Commission v Germany, 2014, para. 57. See Ch. 13. 382 See C-143/88 and C-92/89, Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen and Zuckerfabrik Soest, 1991, para. 26. 383 See C-143/88 and C-92/89, Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen and Zuckerfabrik Soest, 1991, para. 33; see also C-334/95, Krüger, 1997, para. 47. These conditions also apply where the interim measures are directed against an authority of an overseas country or territory: see C-17/98, Emesa Sugar, 2000, paras 69–73.

170 UNION LAW AND NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES 3. the national court takes due account of the Union interest; and 4. in its assessment of all those conditions, the national court respects any decisions of the Union Courts ruling on the lawfulness of the Union act concerned or on an application for interim measures seeking similar interim relief at Union level.384 As far as the first requirement is concerned, the Court of Justice has held that ‘the national court cannot restrict itself to referring the question of the validity of the [Union act] to the Court for a preliminary ruling, but must set out, when making the interim order, the reasons for which it considers that the Court should find the [Union act] to be invalid. The national court must take into account here the extent of the discretion which, having regard to the Court’s case-law, the [Union] institutions must be allowed in the sectors concerned.’385 Further to this, it has to be stated that the fact that an action for annulment against a decision ordering recovery of aid has been brought before the General Court does not justify a stay of proceedings, since such an action does not have suspensory effect on the obligation to implement the decision. The same holds true for appeal proceedings brought before the Court of Justice against the judgment of the General Court in such an action.386 The Court has clarified the second requirement as follows: With regard to the question of urgency, . . . damage invoked by the applicant must be liable to materialise before the Court of Justice has been able to rule on the validity of the contested [Union] measure. With regard to the nature of that damage, purely financial damage cannot, as the Court has held on numerous occasions, be regarded in principle as irreparable. However, it is for the national court hearing the application for interim relief to examine the circumstances particular to the case before it. It must in this connection consider whether immediate enforcement of the measure which is the subject of the application for interim relief would be likely to result in irreversible damage to the applicant which could not be made good if the [Union] act were to be declared invalid.387

As far as the third requirement is concerned, the Court of Justice has observed that the national court ‘must first examine whether the [Union] measure in question would be deprived of all effectiveness if not immediately implemented’388 and, ‘if suspension of enforcement is liable to involve a financial risk for the [Union], the national court must also be in a position to require the applicant to provide adequate guarantees, such as the deposit of money or other security’.389 In assessing the Union interest, the national court is free to decide, in accordance with its own rules of procedure, which is the most appropriate way of obtaining all relevant information on the Union act in question.390 384 See C-465/93, Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft and Others, 1995, para. 51. 385 C-465/93, Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft and Others, 1995, paras 36–37; see also C-304/09, Commission v Italy, 2010, para. 51. 386 See C-304/09, Commission v Italy, 2010, para. 52. 387 C-143/88 and C-92/89, Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen and Zuckerfabrik Soest, 1991, I-415, para. 29. 388 C-143/88 and C-92/89, Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen and Zuckerfabrik Soest, 1991, para. 31. 389 C-143/88 and C-92/89, Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen and Zuckerfabrik Soest, 1991, para. 32. 390 See C-334/95, Krüger, 1997, para. 46.

Some Fields of Application 171 The fourth requirement signifies that if the Court of Justice has dismissed an action for annulment of the act in question or has held, in the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling on validity, that the reference disclosed nothing to affect the validity of that act, the national court can no longer order interim measures or must revoke any existing measures, unless the grounds of illegality put forward before it differ from the pleas in law or grounds of illegality rejected by the Court in its judgment. The same applies if the General Court, in a judgment which has become final and binding, has dismissed on the merits an action for annulment of the act or an objection of illegality.391 Following the Zuckerfabrik and Atlanta cases, the question arose in ABNA392 as to whether, provided that the requisite conditions entitling the national court of one Member State to suspend implementation of a Union act are satisfied, the national authorities of other Member States were themselves entitled to suspend application of that same Union act as well, until such time as the Court of Justice has given its ruling on validity of that act. In response, the Court of Justice ruled that national authorities are not in a position to grant interim relief under such circumstances because they are not in the same position as national courts and that it is the national courts alone that are entitled to verify whether the requisite conditions governing interim relief have been satisfied and to grant interim relief on that basis.393 (4) Appeal against a national decision National procedural rules allowing an appeal to be brought against a decision granting interim measures in the form of suspension of enforcement of a national administrative measure are compatible with Union law, provided that they do not affect the national court’s obligation in such a case to make a reference for a preliminary ruling on the validity of the Union act on which the suspended national implementing measure is based, and that they do not restrict the right conferred by Art. 267 TFEU on every court or tribunal to make a reference to the Court of Justice.394 (5) Counterpart of interim relief granted by the Union Courts National courts’ power to grant interim relief under Union law in the two situations described above (see paras 4.76–4.77) is also based on the consideration that the judicial review which the Court of Justice carries out in the preliminary ruling procedure needs to retain its full effectiveness.395 In both situations, the national court has the power, or even a duty, to make a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. In the first situation, it may, by referring a question on the interpretation of the applicable provision of Union law, indirectly determine whether the national provision at issue is, as alleged, contrary to Union law. In the second, it is under a duty, if the question

391

See C-465/93, Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft and Others, 1995, para. 46. See C-453/03, C-11/04, C-12/04, and C-192/04, ABNA and Others, 2005. See C-453/03, C-11/04, C-12/04, and C-192/04, ABNA and Others, 2005, paras 108–111. 394 See C-334/95, Krüger, 1997, paras 49–54. 395 See C-143/88 and C-92/89, Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen and Zuckerfabrik Soest, 1991, para. 19. 392 393

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172 UNION LAW AND NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES concerning the validity of the disputed Union act has not yet been submitted to the Court, to raise that question with the Court itself. Consequently, the interim relief granted by national courts in those two situations is the precise counterpart of the interim relief which the Court of Justice or the General Court grants under Arts 278–279 TFEU in order to ensure the effectiveness of the judicial supervision which it carries out in direct actions.396 The Court of Justice has held, in full accord with its concern to guarantee the coherence of the system of judicial protection set out in the Treaties, that the national courts are not empowered to grant interim relief in situations in which, by virtue of a Union act, the existence and scope of traders’ rights must be established by a Commission measure which that institution has not yet adopted. This is because the Treaties make no provision for a reference for a preliminary ruling by which the national court asks the Court of Justice to rule that an institution has failed to act.397 The Court of Justice and the General Court may only make such a ruling in a direct action brought pursuant to Art. 265 TFEU.

396 For further particulars, see K. Lenaerts, ‘The Legal Protection of Private Parties under the EC Treaty: A Coherent and Complete System of Judicial Review’ in Scritti in onore di Giuseppe Federico Mancini (Vol. II, Giuffrè, 1998) 591. 397 See C-68/95, T. Port v Commission, 1996, paras 52–53; but see C-511/03, Ten Kate Holding Musselkanaal and Others, 2005, discussed further in para. 8.14.

PART II

EN F ORC E ME N T OF U NION L AW

5 THE ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF UNION LAW BY A MEMBER STATE I. Subject-Matter A. General overview (1) Nature of the action The action for failure to fulfil obligations (or infringement proceedings)1 is for the purpose of obtaining a declaration from the Court of Justice that the conduct of a Member State infringes Union law and of terminating that conduct.2 It therefore constitutes a direct action brought before the Court of Justice by which to ensure the enforcement of Union law as part of the system of judicial protection enshrined in the Treaties. The action is objective in nature, and the only question raised is whether or not the defendant Member State has breached Union law.3 The objective nature of the action for failure to fulfil obligations does not mean, however, that the Court of Justice does not subject the relevant conduct of the Member State concerned to thorough examination, from the point of view of both the law and the facts. Save for certain exceptions, any infringement of Union law may be ‘found’ pursuant to Arts 258–260 TFEU.4 (2) Purpose The ‘finding’ of an infringement serves principally to enforce the actual application of Union law by the Member State in breach. In the first place, since Francovich,5 a Member State may incur liability under Union law for a breach of that law. The judgment finding the infringement may ground such liability.6 In addition, Art. 260 TFEU 1 Arts 258–260 TFEU, applicable to the EAEC Treaty. See para. 5.03. See further K. Lenaerts, ‘Préface’ in T. Materne, La procédure en manquement d’État. Guide à la lumière de la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne (Larcier, 2012) 13. 2 See 15/76 and 16/76, France v Commission, 1976, para. 27; see also C-620/16, Commission v Germany, 2019, para. 40; C‑715/17, C‑718/17, and C‑719/17, Commission v Poland and Others, 2020, para. 52; C-66/18, Commission v Hungary, 2020, para. 56; C-213/19, Commission v United Kingdom, 2022, para. 180. 3 See 7/68, Commission v Italy, 1968 ECR 423, 428; C-664/18, Commission v United Kingdom, 2021, para. 53; C-637/18, Commission v Hungary, 2021, para. 64; C-633/21, Commission v Greece, 2023, para. 54. See further para. 5.71. 4 As regards these exceptions, see para. 5.05. 5 C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich and Others, 1991. See para. 4.65. 6 See 39/72 Commission v Italy, 1973, para. 11; C‑715/17, C‑718/17, and C‑719/17, Commission v Poland and Others, 2020, para. 66. See also para. 4.67.

EU Procedural Law. Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak, Oxford University Press. © Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833086.003.0005

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176 THE ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF UNION LAW BY A MEMBER STATE provides for options for enforcing such a judgment.7 The action may also be used as a means of determining the exact nature of the obligations of a Member State in the event of differences of interpretation of Union law.8 After the Court of Justice has given judgment, the Member State concerned may no longer contest the extent of its Union obligations. If the Member State continues to be in breach of its obligations, this will constitute a sufficiently serious breach of Union law to possibly cause it to incur liability vis-à-vis injured individuals.9

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(3) Procedure The procedure is set forth in Arts 258, 259, and 260 TFEU. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, these provisions replaced Arts 226, 227, and 228 EC, respectively, and exacted certain changes that will be discussed throughout the chapter. Former Arts 226– 228 EC were identical in substance to Arts 141–143 EAEC.10 Upon entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, these provisions of the EAEC Treaty have been repealed, and Arts 258–260 TFEU are applicable since then.11 Art. 88 of the now-expired ECSC Treaty had set forth a somewhat different procedure for failure to fulfil obligations under that Treaty.12 (4) Direct review of Member State conduct against Union law The action for failure to fulfil obligations is the only procedure—apart from some special procedures (see paras 5.22–5.31)—which allows the Court of Justice to assess the conduct of a Member State directly against Union law.13

7 The procedure provided for in Art. 260(2) TFEU may be applied only where the Court has first determined pursuant to Arts 258 or 259 TFEU that the Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under Union law: see C-334/97 R-EX, Comune di Montorio al Vomano v Commission (order), 2001, para. 19; C-457/07, Commission v Portugal, 2009, para. 47. That being said, Art. 260(3) TFEU is also relevant in connection with pecuniary sanctions that may be imposed in proceedings brought under Art. 258 TFEU as far as a Member State’s alleged failure to fulfil its obligation to notify measures transposing a legislative directive is concerned: see para. 5.86. 8 See C-525/12, Commission v Germany, 2014, para. 24. For some examples, see C-41/09, Commission v Netherlands, 2011 (dealing with different language versions of a Union text); C-122/18, Commission v Italy, 2020 (whether Member States are obliged to ensure that their public authorities effectively comply with the periods for payment prescribed in Directive 2011/7/EU on combating late payment in commercial transactions); C-537/19, Commission v Austria, 2021 (whether a specific transaction constituted a public works contract in order to assess whether Austria had violated Union public procurement rules); C-159/20, Commission v Denmark, 2022 (whether the scope of Regulation No. 1151/2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs extends to products exported to third countries for the purposes of determining whether Denmark had failed to fulfil its obligation under Art. 13 of that regulation to prevent or stop Danish dairy producers using the designation ‘Feta’ for cheese produced in Denmark from cow’s milk when exporting the cheese to third countries); see also, in that regard, C-159/20, Commission v Denmark, AG Ćapeta, 2022, points 83–88. A difference of interpretation between the Commission and a Member State can come out in favour of the Member State concerned and hence the action, or certain heads of claim, brought under Art. 258 TFEU are dismissed: see C-401/06, Commission v Germany, 2007; C-376/09, Commission v Malta, 2011. 9 See para. 4.67. 10 See C-61/03, Commission v United Kingdom, 2005. 11 See Art. 106a EAEC; Art. 3 of Protocol (No. 2) amending the EAEC Treaty, annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon (OJ 2007 C306/199). For some recent applications, see C-434/18, Commission v Italy, 2019; C-744/19, Commission v Italy, 2021. Nonetheless, before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, recourse to the two sets of Treaty provisions was not mutually exclusive, that is, an action for failure to fulfil obligations could be brought on the basis of both: see C-459/03, Commission v Ireland, 2006. 12 See further K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel (T. Corthaut (ed.)), EU Constitutional Law (OUP, 2021) para. 1.009. 13 See 28/83, Forcheri v Commission, 1984, para. 12; T-13/93 Cordier v Commission, 1993, para. 52. That being said, on the basis of Art. 14.2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, the Court exceptionally has jurisdiction to directly review the legality of a Member State

Subject-Matter 177

B. Failure of a Member State to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties (1) What rules are covered by the expression ‘an obligation under the Treaties’? (a) All rules of Union law The expression ‘an obligation under the Treaties’ in principle covers all rules of Union law that are binding on the Member States. These generally comprise all the Treaty provisions;14 binding acts of Union institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies;15 international agreements concluded by the Union;16 the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter);17 and the general principles of Union law recognized by the Court of Justice (see para. 5.06). A finding that those rules have been infringed may be made as a result of an action brought pursuant to Arts 258–260 TFEU.18 However, there are exceptions as far as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)19 and the economic policy of the Union are concerned. As regards the CFSP, the Treaties provide that the Court of Justice of the European Union has not generally been conferred jurisdiction with respect to the relevant Treaty provisions on the CFSP and the acts adopted pursuant thereto, save for monitoring compliance with Art.

decision relieving a Governor of a national central bank from office. See C‑202/18 and C‑238/18, Rimšēvičs, 2019. See also para. 3.59. 14 A violation of Art. 4(3) TEU by itself can constitute the basis of infringement proceedings against a Member State, even if no other provision of Union law has been breached: see C-246/07, Commission v Sweden, 2010; see also para. 5.17. Likewise, a violation of Art. 19(1), second subpara. TEU can form the subject-matter of infringement proceedings against a Member State: see C-192/18, Commission v Poland, 2019, paras 98–107; C-619/18, Commission v Poland, 2019, paras 47–59; C-791/19, Commission v Poland, 2021, paras 50–62. On the use of infringement proceedings to address rule of law issues in a Member State, see, e.g. K.L. Scheppele, D.V. Kochenov, and B. Grabowska-Moroz, ‘EU Values Are Law, after All: Enforcing EU Values through Systemic Infringement Actions by the European Commission and the Member States of the European Union’ (2020) Y.E.L. 3. 15 C-205/98, Commission v Austria, 2000, para. 43. The infringement of a directive which has been annulled, but whose effects the Court of Justice preserved in the judgment until such time as it had been replaced by a new directive in compliance with the Court’s judgment, may form the subject of an action for failure to fulfil obligations. It made no difference in the aforementioned judgment that the Council and the European Parliament did not adopt the new directive until four years had elapsed. 16 Art. 216(2) TFEU; 104/81 Kupferberg, 1982, para. 11; C-61/94 Commission v Germany, 1996, para. 15. See recently C-66/18, Commission v Hungary, 2020, whereby the Court declared that Hungary had failed to fulfil its obligations under Art. XVII of the General Agreement on Trade in Services, in Annex 1B to the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization. As regards mixed agreements, see para. 5.07. As regards a Member State’s conclusion of an international agreement, see also para. 5.13. 17 See C-2357/17, Commission v Hungary, 2019, paras 123–129; C-66/18, Commission v Hungary, 2020, paras 212–215. 18 For detailed discussion of the sources of Union law, see K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel (T. Corthaut (ed.)), EU Constitutional Law (OUP, 2021) paras 23.001–28.020. 19 With regard to acts adopted in the field of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM) prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, Art. 10(1) of the Protocol (No. 36) on Transitional Provisions provided for reduced powers of the Court of Justice of the European Union and of the Commission for a period of five years: the Commission could not enforce the application of such acts by bringing infringement actions under Art. 258 TFEU, and the Court of Justice only had the powers that were attributed to it by Title VI of the EU Treaty before 1 December 2009, that is to say, the powers attributed to the Court of Justice under former Art. 35 EU, which excluded infringement actions. Yet, where such PJCCM acts were amended, the reduction in powers of both the Commission and the Court no longer applied with respect to the amended act and for those Member States to which that amended act applied. Accordingly, with regard to the provisions of the amended act, the Commission and the Court enjoyed the full scope of powers they had under the Treaties with regard to acts adopted in the field of PJCCM, which included their respective powers in relation to infringement actions. The reduction of powers of these institutions ceased to apply on 1 December 2014.

5.05

178 THE ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF UNION LAW BY A MEMBER STATE 40 TEU and reviewing the legality of certain decisions as provided for by Art. 24(1) TEU and the second paragraph of Art. 275 TFEU.20 As a result, as things stand now, there is no provision under the Treaties for infringement actions to be brought against a Member State for its failure to fulfil obligations in connection with CFSP Union law. Furthermore, as regards economic policy, Art. 126(10) TFEU rules out the possibility of bringing an action against a Member State under Arts 258 and 259 TFEU for failing to fulfil its obligations under Art. 126(1)–(9) TFEU to avoid an excessive government deficit.21

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5.07

(b) General principles of Union law and the Charter A finding that a Member State has infringed general principles of Union law or the Charter may be made only insofar as the national conduct falls within the scope of Union law. This will be so in particular where the Member State justifies its conduct on one of the grounds provided for in the Treaties.22 (c) Mixed agreements With respect to actions brought against a Member State pursuant to Art. 258 TFEU for failure to fulfil obligations under an international agreement, by and large, much of the case-law centres on mixed agreements.23 For example, in Commission v Ireland,24 the Court held that Ireland’s failure to accede to the Berne Convention as required by Art. 5 of Protocol (No. 28) to the EEA Agreement (a mixed agreement concluded by the Union, its Member States, and non-member countries and related to an area covered in large measure by the Treaties) came within the Union framework. This therefore constituted a failure to fulfil obligations within the meaning of Art. 258 TFEU. Moreover, in Commission v France,25 the Court ruled that provisions of a mixed agreement come within the scope of Union law if they—even in the absence of specific Union legislation regarding the issue covered by these provisions (for example, discharges of fresh water and alluvia into saltwater marsh)—concern a field (for example,

20 See Art. 24(1), second subpara. TEU; Art. 275 TFEU. The Court of Justice’s jurisdiction to review the legality of decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural and legal persons in actions brought in accordance with the conditions laid down in Art. 263, fourth para. TFEU is discussed in Ch. 7. 21 A sanction mechanism similar to Arts 258–260 TFEU has been included in Art. 8 of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG), however. Member States may apply to the Court of Justice for a declaration that a Member state has failed to comply with its obligations under Art. 3(2) of the TSCG. If the Member State concerned has not taken the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court, another Member State may bring the case before the Court of Justice again and request the imposition of financial sanctions. 22 See C-260/89, ERT, 1991, para. 42; C-159/90, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland, 1991, para. 31; C-441/02, Commission v Germany, 2006, paras 107–108. For an application in relation to the Charter, see C-235/17, Commission v Hungary, 2019, paras 64–66; C-66/18, Commission v Hungary, 2020, para. 214; C-78/18, Commission v Hungary, 2020, para. 101. 23 See, in that regard, P.-J. Kuijper, J. Wouters, F. Hoffmeister, G. De Baere, and T. Ramopoulos, The Law of EU External Relations: Cases, Materials and Commentary on the EU as an International Legal Actor (3rd edn, OUP, 2021) ch. 4. 24 C-13/00, Commission v Ireland, 2002, para. 20. See also C-465/01, Commission v Austria, 2004 (action upheld against Austria for failure to fulfil obligations under provisions of Union law, the EEA Agreement, and certain association agreements concluded by the Union). 25 C-239/03, Commission v France, 2004, paras 22–31; C-465/01, Commission v Austria, 2004.

Subject-Matter 179 environmental protection) ‘in large measure’ covered by Union law; if this is the case, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to assess a Member State’s compliance with the provisions concerned of the mixed agreement in proceedings brought before it under Art. 258 TFEU. (d) Conventions between Member States, including those concluded pursuant to former Art. 293 EC It remains an open question whether a Member State may be brought before the Court of Justice for infringing a convention concluded pursuant to former Art. 293 EC. Some commentators argued that this was possible on the grounds that Art. 293 EC put the Member States under a duty to enter into negotiations with each other in order to achieve clearly defined Community objectives.26 Others contended that a distinction should be made between the obligation to conclude the convention under Art. 293 EC and the obligations ensuing out of such a convention for Member States. They maintained that the latter obligations were not part of Community law as it then was.27 The Court of Justice has not yet had to rule on the question.28 Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, however, the Treaties no longer mention conventions between Member States as a policy instrument of the Union, and Art. 293 EC has been repealed. Yet, this does not prevent existing conventions from keeping their legal force, and thus this question may eventually arise. In any event, in accordance with the case-law, compliance with conventions concluded by the Member States outside of what used to be Art. 293 EC cannot be enforced by proceedings under Arts 258 and 259 TFEU, even if they do contribute to the attainment of the objectives of the Treaties.29

26 See A. Dashwood and R. White, ‘Enforcement Actions Under Art. 169 and 170 EEC’ (1989) E.L.Rev. 390. 27 See J. Schwartz, ‘Voies d’uniformisation du droit dans la CEE: règlements de la Communauté ou conventions entre les États membres’ (1978) J.D.I. 781. 28 However, the Court has held in its case-law on the Brussels Convention—which has since been replaced (except as far as Denmark is concerned) by Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2012 L351/1), which manifestly forms part of Union law—that the provisions of that Convention were ‘linked to the E[E]‌C Treaty’, and that this allowed the Court of Justice to assess the compatibility of those provisions with then Art. 12 EC (now Art. 18 TFEU) (prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality): C-398/92, Mund & Fester, 1994, paras 11–12. Admittedly, the Court has not provided any answer to the question whether infringements on the part of Member States of the Brussels Convention can be the subject of proceedings brought under Arts 258 and 259 TFEU. It may be considered, however, that the answer must be in the negative, given that the Court of Justice mentioned in the aforementioned judgment the Brussels Convention and the national provisions, to which it refers on an equal footing when it stated that they were linked to the then EC Treaty and therefore ‘within the scope of application of this Treaty’ within the meaning of Art. 12 EC (now Art. 18 TFEU). As a result, the Brussels Convention came across as a joint measure of the Member States, which, in common with unilateral national measures, must be compatible with Union law, but does not form part of it. 29 See C-132/09, Commission v Belgium, 2010, paras 42–53. Yet, an international agreement may include a clause granting jurisdiction to the Court of Justice pursuant to Art. 273 TFEU. See J. T. Nowak, ‘Dispute Resolution among Member States at the Court of Justice on the Basis of Art. 273 TFEU: A Comment on C-648/15 Austria v Germany’, Yearbook on Procedural Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural Law, 2020) 105; G. Butler, ‘The Court of Justice as an Inter-state Court’ (2017) Y.E.L. 179. See further para. 15.23 et seq.

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5.09

5.10

(2) What is meant by ‘failed to fulfil’? (a) Any shortcoming Since the action for failure to fulfil obligations is objective in nature (see para. 5.01), any shortcoming by a Member State in respect of its obligations under Union law will ground a claim for a declaration that it is in breach. The frequency or scale of the shortcoming is irrelevant, as is the fact that the failure had no adverse effects.30 A minimum, isolated, and negligible infringement of Union law is sufficient for the action to be declared well-founded.31 However, where the infringements of Union law complained of are ancillary to the alleged failure of a Member State to comply with obligations arising from an international agreement to which the European Union is not a party and whose subject-matter does not fall within the areas of Union competence, they cannot form the subject-matter of an action for failure to fulfil obligations.32 It lies with the Commission or the applicant Member State (see paras 5.32 and 5.34) to assess whether it is appropriate to bring an action.33 Once the action is pending, the Court of Justice has to consider whether or not the alleged infringement was committed.34 (b) Administrative practice Not only the exercise by a Member State of its regulatory powers can constitute a failure to fulfil an obligation of the Treaties;35 an administrative practice can also be the subject-matter of an action for failure to fulfil obligations when it is, to some degree, of a consistent and general nature.36 The idea underlying the notion of ‘administrative

30 See C-456/05, Commission v Germany, 2007, para. 22 (underlining ‘no degree of gravity’ in infringement actions); C-122/18, Commission v Italy, 2020, para. 64. The seriousness of an infringement is relevant, however, when it comes to determining the amount of financial sanctions per Art. 260(2) TFEU. See, e.g. C-842/19, Commission v Belgium, 2020, para. 51. See further para. 5.84. 31 Thus, the Commission may ask the Court of Justice to find that in not having achieved, in a specific case, the result intended by the directive, a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations: see C-20/01 and C-28/01, Commission v Germany, 2003, para. 30; C-157/03, Commission v Spain, 2005, para. 44; C-275/08, Commission v Germany, 2009, para. 27; C-456/08, Commission v Ireland, 2010, paras 39–41. That being said, the isolated nature of an infringement may be relevant in cases where the Commission alleges a certain wrongful practice: see C-504/14, Commission v Greece, 2016, para. 81. Moreover, in relation to directives setting certain targets in relation to the protection of health or the environment, the circumstance that a factual situation is not in compliance with the result prescribed by a directive cannot directly lead to the conclusion that a Member State has necessarily failed to comply with its obligation to take all necessary measures to obtain the result achieved by the directive: see C-443/18, Commission v Italy, 2019, para. 79. 32 See C-457/18, Slovenia v Croatia, 2020, paras 92–104. 33 See C-715/17, C-718/17, and C-719/17, Commission v Poland and Others, 2020, para. 75. 34 See C-856/19, Commission v Hungary, 2021, para. 57. 35 See 8/70, Commission v Italy, 1970, paras 8–9; 94/81, Commission v Italy, 1982, para. 4; 41/82, Commission v Italy, 1982, para.15; 309/84, Commission v Italy, 1986, para. 9. 36 See 21/84, Commission v France, 1985, paras 13, 15; C-504/17, Commission v Ireland, 2019, para. 29; C-443/18, Commission v Italy, 2019, para. 74; C-808/18, Commission v Hungary, 2020, para. 111. The Commission does not prove the existence of an administrative practice—which must be, to some degree, of a consistent and general nature—by making reference to a single complaint: see C-287/03, Commission v Belgium, 2005, paras 29–30; see also C-156/04, Commission v Greece, 2007, para. 51: given the large pool of EU and Greek nationals involved, the Court ruled that eight individual cases, even if established, constituted a ‘substantially inadequate percentage’ to prove the existence of a consistent administrative practice. In some cases, the existence of an administrative practice in the Member State concerned is assumed without dispute: see C-546/07, Commission v Germany, 2010; C-274/15, Commission v Luxembourg, 2017, para. 73. This is the case, for example, where an administrative practice restricts the free movement of goods, but the Member State seeks to justify this restriction on account of public interest grounds set out in Art. 36 TFEU or other imperative requirements: see C-525/14, Commission v Czech Republic, 2016.

Subject-Matter 181 practice’ in this regard is that while the applicable national legislation itself complies with Union law, it is the application of the relevant Union law rules by the national administrative (or other37) authorities that constitutes the basis for the Member State’s failure to fulfil obligations.38 It will be easier to make a finding that there has been a failure to fulfil an obligation where it ensues from the existence of a provision of national law which infringes Union law39 than where it ensues out of a so-called administrative practice of a Member State, which assumes that a particular pattern of behaviour can be discerned on the part of the authorities of the defendant Member State.40 (c) General and persistent infringements Starting with Commission v Ireland,41 the Court of Justice has allowed infringement proceedings to be brought against a Member State based on the conduct of a Member

37 Depending on the case, inquiry into the existence of an administrative practice may encompass the actions or conduct of administrative as well as judicial authorities and/or other authorities of the Member State concerned: see C-129/00, Commission v Italy, 2003, paras 28–29; C-88/07, Commission v Spain, 2009, para. 62. For further case-law bearing on the substantiation of an infringement due to case-law of national courts, see para. 5.40. 38 See C-489/06, Commission v Germany, 2009, paras 46–47. Note that in addition to the notion of administrative practice as the basis for an alleged infringement, it can also be used in a different sense as a defence to an infringement action in terms of arguments put forward by the Member State concerned that it has remedied the alleged infringement by means of administrative practice, although such arguments usually fail. See C-729/17, Commission v Greece, 2019, para. 102. Regarding judicial practice as a defence, see C-421/12, Commission v Belgium, 2014, para. 46. 39 However, the scope of national laws, regulations, or administrative provisions must be assessed in the light of the interpretation given to them by national courts: see C-300/95, Commission v United Kingdom, 1997, para. 37; C-129/03, Commission v Italy, 2003, para. 30. 40 See 21/84, Commission v France, 1985; 35/84, Commission v Italy, 1986; C-150/00, Commission v Austria, 2004; C-41/02, Commission v Netherlands, 2004. Indeed, the requisite standard of proof in relation to an administrative and/or judicial practice is high. See C-808/18, Commission v Hungary, 2020, para. 113: with regard to a complaint concerning the implementation of a national provision, proof of a Member State’s failure to fulfil its obligations requires production of evidence different from that usually taken into account in an action for failure to fulfil obligations concerning solely the terms of a national provision, and, in those circumstances, the failure to fulfil obligations can be established only by means of sufficiently documented and detailed proof of the alleged practice of the ‘national administration and/or courts’ for which the Member State concerned is answerable. See also C-156/04, Commission v Greece, 2007, paras 50, 52–53, where the Court underscored that if the Commission intended to prove a Member State’s failure to fulfil obligations on account of ‘judicial practice’, the criteria established in the case-law apply with particular stringency; in those proceedings, the Commission failed to make out such a case. For some recent examples demonstrating the Court’s assessment in relation to finding the existence of an administrative practice, see C-504/17, Commission v Ireland, 2019, paras 27–35; C-808/18, Commission v Hungary, 2020, paras 111–118. For examples in which an administrative practice was not proven, see C-441/02, Commission v Germany, 2006, paras 50–56, 78–80, 98–102, 110–113, 122–125; C-342/05, Commission v Finland, 2007, paras 32–39; C-156/04 Commission v Greece, 2007, paras 50–53; C-443/18, Commission v Italy, 2019, paras 82–89. Conversely, where the Commission has adduced sufficient evidence of the existence of an administrative practice, it is not sufficient for the Member State to simply state that it has changed its practice in line with the reasoned opinion of the Commission; the Member State must adduce concrete elements proving such change: see C-371/19, Commission v Germany, 2020, para. 69. 41 C-494/01, Commission v Ireland, 2005. Another important feature of this case concerned the question whether the Commission could, at the litigation stage of the procedure, submit new evidence about infringements not mentioned in the reasoned opinion but which became available at a later stage in order to further support the persistent nature of the breach at issue. The Court ruled in this regard that the submission of fresh evidence is admissible because it does not change the subject-matter of the dispute: see C-494/01, Commission v Ireland, 2005, paras 37–39. Such evidence may encompass events that have occurred after the reasoned opinion provided that they are of the same kind and constitute the same conduct: see C-664/18, Commission v United Kingdom, 2021, para. 78; C-661/20, Commission v Slovakia, 2022, paras 93–97. For a detailed discussion of the Commission v Ireland case and its implications, see P. Wennerås, ‘A New Dawn for Commission Enforcement under Articles 226 and 228 EC: General and Persistent (GAP) Infringements, Lump Sums and Penalty Payments’ (2006) C.M.L.Rev. 31; K. Lenaerts and J. Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘The General Enforcement Obligation of EU Environmental Law’ (2011) Y.E.L. 1.

5.11

182 THE ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF UNION LAW BY A MEMBER STATE State’s authorities not with regard to particular specifically defined situations, but instead where the relevant provisions of Union law have not been complied with because its authorities have adopted a general practice thereto, which the particular situations illustrate where appropriate.42 In holding such approach admissible in subsequent cases, the Court explained that the Treaties do not contain any rule that precludes the overall treatment of a significant number of situations on the basis of which the Commission considers that a Member State has, repeatedly and over a long period, failed to fulfil its obligations under Union law.43 To some extent, this line of case-law is interrelated with the conditions under the Court’s case-law in relation to an administrative practice in the sense that specific instances of breaches of Union law are being used to substantiate the extent to which the practice of the national authorities is of a ‘general’ nature.44 However, they are not the same. In the case-law that has emerged so far, an allegation of a ‘general and persistent’ infringement (also referred to as a ‘structural and general’,45 a ‘systematic and consistent’,46 or a ‘systematic and persistent’47 infringement) is aimed at a generalized or sustained systemic failure on the part of the Member State concerned to fulfil its obligations in relation to the subject addressed by the particular Union rules. This has crucial implications for a Member State found in breach, since that Member State’s obligations to take the ‘necessary measures’ to comply with the Court’s judgment under Art. 260(1) TFEU go beyond the specific instances identified.48 In addition, where the case-law regarding an administrative practice generally targets positive actions on the part of the authorities of a Member State, the case-law regarding a general and persistent failure usually takes aim at a failure to act and/or to meet the objectives set out in a directive.

5.12

(d) Judicial decisions A rule established by case-law in a Member State can also constitute a failure to fulfil obligations.49 Moreover, the failure to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the 42 See C-494/01, Commission v Ireland, 2005, para. 27; see further C-248/05, Commission v Ireland, 2007, paras 63–64; C-331/07, Commission v Greece, 2009, para. 32; C-160/08, Commission v Germany, 2010, para. 106. 43 See C-135/05, Commission v Italy, 2007, paras 20–22; C-416/07, Commission v Greece, 2009, paras 23–25. 44 See C-416/07, Commission v Greece, 2009, paras 46–50; compare C-489/06, Commission v Greece, 2009, paras 46–53, where the Court focused its relevant ruling on whether the conditions for finding an administrative practice were satisfied, with AG Mazák Opinion in the same case, points 42–76, which examined the case from the perspective of a ‘general and persistent’ infringement of Union law by the Member State concerned. 45 See C-494/01, Commission v Ireland, paras 127, 136, 139, 151, 170, 171, 174, 184, 193. The Court seems to use the two phrasings interchangeably, or at the very least, has not yet ruled as to whether there is a distinction between the two: compare C-135/05, Commission v Italy, 2007, paras 22, 45. 46 See C-488/18, Commission v Bulgaria, 2017, para. 42. 47 See C-644/18, Commission v Italy, 2020, para. 77. 48 See C-443/18, Commission v Italy, 2019, para. 75; see also C-494/01, Commission v Ireland, AG Geelhoed Opinion, 2005, points 43–48, particularly point 48: ‘a general and structural infringement may be deemed to exist where the remedy for this situation lies not merely in taking action to resolve a number of individual cases which do not comply with the [Union] obligation at issue, but where this situation of non-compliance can only be redressed by a revision of the general policy and administrative practice of the Member State in respect of the subject governed by the [Union] measure involved.’ See further C-444/21, Commission v Ireland, AG Ćapeta Opinion, 2023, points 103–107. 49 See C-129/00, Commission v Italy, 2003, para. 32: while ‘isolated or numerically insignificant judicial decisions in the context of case-law taking a different direction, or still more a construction disowned by the national supreme court, cannot be taken into account’, this was ‘not true of a widely-held judicial construction which has

Subject-Matter 183 Court of Justice by a national last instance court, even isolated, may constitute a failure to fulfil obligations on the part of the Member State when the existence of a reasonable doubt concerning the interpretation of Union law could not be ruled out at the time the national last instance court delivered its judgment.50 (e) International agreements The conclusion by a Member State of an agreement with a third State constitutes a violation of the Treaties if such conclusion infringes Union law, for example, where it infringes the exclusive external competence of the Union.51 Even the negotiation of a bilateral agreement may constitute such infringement,52 or the recourse to dispute settlement procedures provided in the international agreement to the detriment of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice under Art. 344 TFEU.53 Similarly, a Member State may not invoke as a justification for an infringement of Union law the existence of an international agreement with other Member States to which it was a party prior to its accession to the Union. Indeed, Art. 351 TFEU does not authorize Member States to exercise rights under international agreements which conflict with Union law in intra-Union relations.54 More broadly, in particular when it comes to mixed agreements, the requirement of unity in the international representation of the Union imposes an obligation of close cooperation between the Member States and the Union’s institutions in the process of negotiation and conclusion of such agreements, and in the fulfilment of the commitments entered into.55 This implies, inter alia, a requirement to cooperate in good faith with the Union in decision-making bodies established by international agreements. In case a decision was adopted within the Council

not been disowned by the supreme court, but rather confirmed by it’. Following that reasoning, the Court of Justice thereafter declared, for the first time, that a Member State had failed to fulfil its obligations solely as a result of a decision of a national supreme court: see C-154/08, Commission v Spain, 2009, paras 124–127; see also C-289/02, AMOK Verlags, 2003, para. 41; C-396/03 P, Killinger v Germany and Others (order), 2005, para. 28. See further para. 5.40. 50 See C-416/17, Commission v France, 2018, paras 105–114. 51 See C-266/03, Commission v Luxembourg, 2005, paras 34–52. 52 See C-266/03, Commission v Luxembourg, 2005, paras 57–67: the adoption by the Council of a decision authorizing the Commission to negotiate a multilateral agreement on behalf of the Union marks the start of a concerted Union action at international level and requires, for that purpose, if not a duty of abstention on the part of the Member States, at the very least a duty of close cooperation between the latter and the Union institutions in order to facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and to ensure the coherence of its international representation. Therefore, if a Member State negotiates and/or concludes and ratifies a bilateral agreement in the field concerned without cooperating or consulting with the Commission, that Member State compromises the achievement of the Union’s task and the attainment of the objectives of the Treaties and violates Art. 4(3) TEU. Even the willingness of the Member State concerned to denounce the contested bilateral agreement on the entry into force of a multilateral agreement binding the Union does not demonstrate compliance with the obligation of genuine cooperation laid down in Art. 4(3) TEU. See also C-433/03, Commission v Germany, 2005, paras 60–74. 53 See C-459/03, Commission v Ireland, 2006, paras 123–139. 54 See C-147/03, Commission v Austria, 2005, paras 71–75. Non-compliance with Art. 351 TFEU may, of course, result in a failure to fulfil obligations: see C-205/06, Commission v Austria, 2009; C-249/06, Commission v Sweden, 2009. 55 See C-246/07, Commission v Sweden, 2010, para 73.

5.13

184 THE ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF UNION LAW BY A MEMBER STATE defining a ‘recommended coordinated position’ on the basis of Art. 218(9) TFEU, a Member State expressing a separate point of view from the position adopted by the Union as defined in such decision may constitute a breach of that decision as well as a separate breach of Art. 4(3) TEU, as it calls into question the unity and consistency of the external action of the Union.56

5.14

(f) Act or failure to act The failure to fulfil obligations can arise both out of an act and out of a failure to act on the part of the Member State.57 The classic example of the latter is failure by a Member State to implement a directive in national law.58 Failure to respond to a request from the Commission for information will also constitute a failure to fulfil obligations, namely, the obligations ensuing for Member States from Art. 4(3) TEU.59 In addition, a failure by public authorities to pay their commercial debts in time constitutes an infringement of Union law when it violates the obligations arising from Directive 2011/7/ EU on combating late payments in commercial transactions.60 Equally, the failure of a Member State to penalize a private company for violating Union law may constitute the subject-matter of an infringement action.61 An example of conduct contrary to Union law is the imposition of administrative formalities restricting the import of goods and therefore infringing Art. 34 TFEU.62

56 See C-620/16, Commission v Germany, 2019, in particular paras 92–100. 57 See 31/69, Commission v Italy, 1970, para. 9 (when the application of Union regulations requires a modification of certain public services or of the rules governing them, the failure of the authorities concerned to take the necessary measures constitutes a failure to fulfil obligations within the meaning of Art. 258 TFEU). In the so-called Spanish strawberries case, the French authorities’ failure to adopt all necessary measures to prevent the free movement of fruit and vegetables from being obstructed by actions by private individuals constituted a failure to fulfil obligations under Art. 34 TFEU, in conjunction with Art. 4(3) TEU, and under the common organization of the markets in agricultural products (C-265/95, Commission v France, 1997). The failure of the French authorities to take penal or administrative action pursuant to Regulation No. 2241/87 against those responsible in cases of infringement of Union rules on the conservation and control of fishery resources constituted a failure to fulfil obligations (C-418/00 and C-419/00, Commission v France, 2002, paras 60–64). Compare C-132/05, Commission v Germany, 2008. The failure of the German authorities to submit to an audit of the Court of Auditors constituted a failure of the Member State concerned to comply with its obligations under Art. 287 TFEU: see C-539/09, Commission v Germany, 2011. 58 See C-512/09, Commission v Greece, 2010; C-189/09, Commission v Austria, 2010. See further para. 5.15. 59 See C-82/03, Commission v Italy, 2004; C-494/01, Commission v Ireland, 2005, paras 195–200; C-221/08, Commission v Ireland, 2010, paras 60–62; C-22/20, Commission v Sweden, 2021, para. 149; C-213/19, Commission v United Kingdom, 2022, para. 598. Likewise, the failure to cooperate with the Commission in terms of the duty placed on a Member State to engage in prior information and consultation within the framework of international agreements can result in a breach of Art. 4(3) TEU: see C-459/03, Commission v Ireland, 2006, paras 174–182. In C-539/09, Commission v Germany, 2011, the Court found that Germany’s failure to permit the Court of Auditors to review cross-border administrative cooperation in the field of VAT infringed Art. 287(1)–(3) TFEU. See further para. 5.17. 60 See C-122/18, Commission v Italy, 2020, para. 57. 61 See C-668/15, Commission v Germany, 2018, para. 89: Germany had failed to take the measures necessary to impose penalties upon Daimler for breaches of Directive 2006/40/EC relating to emissions from air- conditioning systems in motor vehicles and Directive 2007/46/EC establishing a framework for the approval of motor vehicles and their trailers, and of systems, components and separate technical units intended for such vehicles whereas the latter directive contained an obligation for Member States to determine the penalties applicable for infringement of the provisions of these directives and to take all measures necessary for their implementation. 62 See 154/85 Commission v Italy, 1987, para. 12; C-80/92, Commission v Belgium, 1994, para. 18; C-88/07, Commission v Spain, 2009, para. 83; C-432/03, Commission v Portugal, 2005, para. 41.

Subject-Matter 185 (g) Failure to transpose a directive Each of the Member States to which a directive is addressed is obliged to adopt, within the framework of its national legal system, all the measures necessary to ensure that the directive is fully effective, in accordance with the objective it pursues.63 A provision of a directive that concerns only relations between a Member State and the Commission or with the other Member States need not, in principle, be transposed. However, given that the Member States are obliged to ensure that Union law is fully complied with, it is open to the Commission to demonstrate that compliance with a provision of a directive governing those relations requires the adoption of specific transposition measures in national law.64 For the purposes of the implementation of a directive conferring rights on individuals in a Member State, it is essential for national law to guarantee that the directive is effectively applied in full, that the legal position under national law should be sufficiently clear and precise in order to satisfy the requirement of legal certainty, and that individuals are made fully aware of their rights and obligations.65 Invariably, it is not necessary formally to incorporate the provisions of a directive in an express, specific legislative provision. Depending on the content of the directive, a general legal framework may suffice.66 In particular, the existence of general principles of national constitutional or administrative law may render implementation by specific legislation superfluous, provided, however, that those principles guarantee that the national authorities will in fact apply the directive fully and that, where the directive is intended to create rights for individuals, the legal position arising from those principles is sufficiently clear and precise and the persons concerned are made fully aware of their rights and, where appropriate, afforded the possibility of relying on them before the national courts.67 Nevertheless, the obligation to transpose directives into national law requires a ‘positive act of transposition’ if the directive in question expressly requires the Member States to refer to it in adopting provisions or when officially notifying the provisions adopted.68

63 See C-336/97, Commission v Italy, 1999, para. 19; C-97/00, Commission v France, 2001, para. 9; C-478/99, Commission v Sweden, 2002, para. 15. 64 See C-296/01, Commission v France, 2003, para. 92; C-429/01, Commission v France, 2003, para. 68; C-410/03, Commission v Italy, 2005, paras 38–39, 52–58. 65 See C-365/93, Commission v Greece, 1995, para. 9; C-154/09, Commission v Portugal, 2010, para. 47; C-808/18, Commission v Hungary, 2020, para. 288. 66 See C-427/07, Commission v Ireland, 2009, paras 55–60. 67 See C-29/84, Commission v Germany, 1985, paras 22–23; C-296/01, Commission v France, para. 55; C-410/03, Commission v Italy, 2005, para. 60. A mere administrative practice does not suffice, however, as such practice, by its nature, can be changed at the discretion of the administration: see C-767/19, Commission v Belgium, 2020, para. 57. Also, the fact that it is settled case-law of national courts to interpret national law in conformity with the directive is not sufficient to meet the requirement of legal certainty. This is so, especially in the area of consumer protection: see C-421/12, Commission v Belgium, 2014, para. 46. 68 See C-549/18, Commission v Romania, 2020, para. 20; C-550/18, Commission v Ireland, 2020, para. 31; C-658/19, Commission v Spain, 2021, para. 16; but see C-444/09 and C-456/09, Gaviero Gaviero and Iglesias Torres, 2010, paras 62–67: although under these circumstances, a Member State could be found to have failed to fulfil its obligations in the context of infringement proceedings, it does not follow that a national measure which fails to refer to the directive concerned cannot be regarded as a valid measure transposing the directive.

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186 THE ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF UNION LAW BY A MEMBER STATE

5.16

(h) Failure to notify measures transposing a legislative directive within the meaning of Art. 260(3) TFEU As mentioned earlier, a classic subject of infringement proceedings is a Member State’s failure to implement a directive into national law within the time-frame provided therein. As part of the changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty to render the infringement procedure more efficient, Art. 260(3) TFEU provides that, where a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligation ‘to notify measures transposing a directive adopted under a legislative procedure’, the Commission may bring a case before the Court of Justice asking the latter to find an infringement and to impose a pecuniary sanction at the same time.69 While the Commission provided clarification on how it sought to apply the provision by way of a communication,70 it was only starting with Commission v Belgium71 that the Court had an opportunity to clarify the extent of the obligation to communicate transposition measures. The Court held that the notion ‘obligation to notify measures transposing a directive’ requires the communication of all measures transposing a directive in full. A Member State may thus be found in breach of Art. 260(3) TFEU if it has only communicated part of the transposition measures required by a directive. Both non-communication and non-transposition, even partially, are caught by Art. 260(3) TFEU.72 Conversely, the incorrect transposition of a directive cannot be equated with a situation of non-communication. Art. 260(3) TFEU cannot be used by the Commission to fast-track cases of incorrect transposition.73 Stating otherwise would distort the system put in place by Arts 258 and 260(2) TFEU, in particular because it would deprive the Member States from the possibility to challenge the Commission’s assessment of their transposition measures without risking the immediate imposition of financial penalties.74 By limiting the application of Art. 260(3) TFEU to instances of (partial) non-communication, the Court thus sought to strike a balance between, on the one hand, the role of the Commission in ensuring

69 Art. 260(3), first para. TFEU. This change had already appeared in the Draft Constitutional Treaty (Art. III- 362(3)), having been proposed by the Commission at the European Convention: see CONV 734/03, p. 16. 70 See Commission Communication—Implementation of Art. 260(3) TFEU (OJ 2011 C12/1), which explains how the Commission will make use of this new provision (para. 8). In particular, the Commission points out that Art. 260(3) TFEU covers both the total failure to notify any measures transposing a legislative directive and only partial notification of transposition measures, which may occur either where the transposition measures notified do not cover the whole territory of the Member State or where the notification is incomplete with respect to the transposition measures corresponding to a part of the directive (point 19). In line with the discretionary powers conferred on the Commission under this provision, however, there could be special cases in which the Commission would not deem it appropriate to seek financial penalties in this context (points 16–17). The amount of the penalty payment and, where appropriate, the lump sum will be calculated by the same method used for referrals under Art. 260(2) TFEU (see para. 5.84), the sole proviso being that in cases where the Commission seeks a lump sum, the dies a quo should be the day after the time-limit for transposition set out in the directive expires (points 23–28). 71 See C-543/17, Commission v Belgium, 2019. This interpretation has been confirmed in subsequent case- law: see C-549/18, Commission v Romania, 2020, para. 46; C-550/18, Commission v Ireland, 2020, para. 56; C-628/18, Commission v Slovenia, 2021, para. 45; C-658/19, Commission v Spain, 2021, para. 30. 72 See C-543/17, Commission v Belgium, 2019, paras 53–54. 73 See C-543/17, Commission v Belgium, 2019, paras 55–56. 74 See C-543/17, Commission v Belgium, 2019, para. 57.

Subject-Matter 187 the effective application of Union law and, on the other hand, the rights of the defence of the Member States.75 Complexities may arise in cases in which the boundary line between a Member State’s failure to implement a legislative directive and a Member State’s implementing it incorrectly or incompletely is difficult to find, for example, where the Commission brings an infringement action under Art. 258 TFEU before the Court of Justice alleging a Member State’s failure to notify any measures transposing a legislative directive and seeking financial penalties pursuant to Art. 260(3) TFEU, but through the course of the procedure, the dispute revolves around the extent of the Member State’s alleged failure to transpose it properly within the prescribed time-period.76 (i) Failure to eliminate unlawful consequences of a breach of Union law Art. 4(3) TEU imposes upon Member States a requirement to eliminate the unlawful consequences of a breach of Union law.77 Such failure may constitute a separate infringement of Union law if that obligation can be separated from the initial breach of Union law.78 This is the case where the failure to fulfil the general duty of sincere cooperation covers conduct distinct from the failure to fulfil the specific obligations in which that general obligation manifests itself.79 Thus, for example, where the issuing of export certificates by a Member State’s customs’ authorities in breach of Union law leads to a loss of own resources of the Union, the failure of a Member State to compensate the Union for the loss of own resources constitutes a separate infringement of Art. 4(3) TEU.80 The Court also found a separate infringement of Art. 4(3) TEU in Commission v Slovenia.81 While the seizure of documents of the archives of the European Central Bank (ECB) constituted a violation of the principle of inviolability of the archives of the ECB and the applicable rules on the privileges and immunities of the Union, and thus a violation of a specific obligation in which the general obligation of sincere cooperation manifested itself, the subsequent failure of the Member State to cooperate with the ECB to identify the documents concerned and to return the documents constituted a separate failure to fulfil the obligation of sincere cooperation. 75 See C-543/17, Commission v Belgium, 2019, para. 58. 76 See C-456/03, Commission v Italy, 2005; C-294/09, Commission v Ireland, 2010. 77 See C-316/19, Commission v Slovenia, 2020, para. 124. 78 See C-60/13, Commission v United Kingdom, 2014, para. 61. 79 See C-316/19, Commission v Slovenia, 2020, para. 121; C-159/20, Commission v Denmark, 2022, para. 75; see also C-620/16, Commission v Germany, 2019, paras 92–100: the Court found that Germany, during a session of the Intergovernmental Organisation for International Carriage by Rail Revision Committee, by having voted against the position laid down in Council Decision 2014/699/EU establishing a common position as well as having publicly declared its opposition to that position and the voting arrangements provided for in that position, had not only acted in breach of Council Decision 2014/699/EU, but also committed a separate infringement of the requirement of unity in representation of the Union, which arises from the obligation of sincere cooperation. Conversely, the Court will not find a separate infringement if the infringement complained of is ancillary or linked to another head of complaint in which such breach is subsumed: see C-459/03, Commission v Ireland, 2006, paras 171–173. For further discussion of Art. 4(3) TEU, see paras 5.13, 5.14, 5.19, 5.70. 80 See C-395/17, Commission v Netherlands, 2019, paras 98–112; C-391/17, Commission v United Kingdom, 2019, paras 96– 127; C-213/19, Commission v United Kingdom, 2022, paras 192– 194; compare C-391/17, Commission v United Kingdom, AG Bobek Opinion, 2019, points 65–73. 81 See C-316/19, Commission v Slovenia, 2020, paras 123–130.

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188 THE ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF UNION LAW BY A MEMBER STATE 5.18

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(j) Legal provision that is no longer applied The existence of a legal provision conflicting with Union law may also be categorized as a ‘failure’, even if it is not or no longer being applied by the national authorities. The fact that such a provision exists is liable to create uncertainty with respect to those subject to the law about the possibility of relying on Union law. That uncertainty impedes the operation of Union law and is regarded as a ‘failure to fulfil’ an obligation.82 Only where such a provision conflicting with Union law can have no effect at all will its mere existence be insufficient to constitute an infringement of Union law.83 Conversely, a failure to fulfil obligations may arise owing to the existence of an administrative practice that infringes Union law, even if the applicable national legislation itself complies with that law.84 (k) Non-binding acts Even acts of a Member State that are not binding under the domestic legal system may result in a failure to fulfil obligations under Union law insofar as their potential effects are comparable with those resulting from binding measures. A classic example is the ‘Buy Irish’ case, where a large-scale campaign launched by the Irish Government to promote the sale of Irish goods on the home market was held to be a measure of equivalent effect contrary to Art. 34 TFEU.85 Non-binding acts in the international arena, such as proposals submitted in the context of an international convention, may also result in a finding that a Member State has breached its Union law obligations, for example, in relation to Art. 4(3) TEU.86 (l) Acts affecting the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union Acts of a Member State that affect the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union will invariably contravene Union law. For instance, a Member State is prohibited from transposing a regulation which has direct effect into national law, thereby concealing its Union origin, which would be liable to jeopardize the making of preliminary references on the interpretation or validity of the regulation.87

82 See 167/73, Commission v France, 1974, paras 41–48; C-145/99, Commission v Italy, 2002, paras 30, 37; C-214/04, Commission v Italy, 2005, para. 13; C-487/04, Commission v Italy, 2006, para. 13. 83 See 28/69, Commission v Italy, 1970, paras 14–17. In that judgment, the excise duty that Italy imposed on cocoa shells and husks differed depending on whether they were imported or produced by the Italian processing industry. Nevertheless, they were exempt from the duty if they were used for certain specified purposes. The high level of duty made it impossible in practice to use the products for purposes other than those to which the exemption applied. The existence of differential taxation was therefore insufficient to constitute an infringement of Art. 110 TFEU. 84 See C-212/99, Commission v Italy, 2001, para. 31; C-278/03, Commission v Italy, 2005, para. 13; C-489/06, Commission v Germany, 2009, paras 46–47. See para. 5.10. 85 See 249/81, Commission v Ireland, 1982, para. 27. 86 See C-45/07, Commission v Greece, 2009; C-246/07, Commission v Sweden, 2010. 87 See 39/72, Commission v Italy, 1973, paras 16–17; 34/73, Fratelli Variola, 1973, para. 11; 50/76, Amsterdam Bulb, 1977, paras 4–7.

Subject-Matter 189 (m) National rules allegedly violating the Treaties but complying with secondary Union law A failure to fulfil obligations under Union law will not be found under circumstances where a national rule, which at first sight conflicts with a provision of the Treaties, expressly complies with a provision of secondary Union law. A classic example is Commission v Greece,88 in which the Court dismissed an infringement action brought against Greece with respect to the reduced rate of excise duty applicable in this Member State for ouzo. The Commission considered that this reduced rate was incompatible with Art. 110 TFEU, prohibiting discriminatory internal taxes. The Court, however, found that a provision of Directive 92/83/EEC explicitly allowed Greece to apply a lower rate of excise duty for ouzo. Since that provision had not been declared invalid or annulled by the Union Courts and since it could also not be considered to be non-existent, its legal effects were presumed to be lawful. Greece therefore did not fail to fulfil its obligations under Union law by maintaining in force a national measure complying with that provision of a directive.89

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C. Relationship with special legal procedures to obtain a declaration that a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations under Union law (1) Overview There are several categories of Treaty provisions that provide for special procedures derogating from the infringement procedure of Arts 258–260 TFEU by which the Commission (or in certain cases a Member State) can obtain a declaration that a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations under Union law. For the most part, the focus is placed on the following four categories of special procedures relating to: State aid (Art. 108(2) TFEU); competition rules regarding public undertakings (Art. 106(3) TFEU); misuse of derogating provisions in certain policy fields, namely, that relating to internal market approximation (Art. 114(9) TFEU) and national security measures (Art. 348 TFEU); and public procurement contracts (under relevant provisions of secondary Union law). These are discussed respectively in the sections that follow. (2) Art. 108(2) TFEU concerning State aid (a) Procedure under Art. 108(2) TFEU Under Art. 108 TFEU, the Commission is empowered to rule on the compatibility of State aid with the internal market. Both existing aid and the introduction or alteration of aid are subject to supervision by the Commission.90 Any plans to grant or alter aid

88 C-475/01, Commission v Greece, 2004, paras 16–24. 89 See also C-582/08, Commission v United Kingdom, 2010, paras 47–48. 90 For the distinction between ‘existing’ and ‘new’ aid and an explanation of the respective powers of the Commission and the national courts in supervising aid for compatibility with the internal market, see C-598/17, A-Fonds, 2019, paras 45–48; C-128/19, Azienda Sanitaria Provinciale di Catania, 2021, paras 26–33. See also Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Art. 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ 2015 L248/9).

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190 THE ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF UNION LAW BY A MEMBER STATE must be notified to the Commission pursuant to Art. 108(3) TFEU.91The Commission may take action against aid that it considers, on the basis of Art. 107 TFEU, to be incompatible with the internal market in accordance with the procedure laid down in Art. 108(2) TFEU. It makes a finding that the aid is incompatible and orders the Member State concerned to abolish or alter the aid within a specified period.92 If the Member State fails to comply with the decision within the prescribed period, the Commission or any other interested party may, by way of derogation from Arts 258 and 259 TFEU, refer the matter directly to the Court of Justice.93 In these circumstances, as a general matter, the only defence available to a Member State opposing an application by the Commission under Art. 108(2) TFEU for a declaration that it has failed to fulfil its obligations is to plead that it was ‘absolutely impossible’ for it to properly implement the decision.94 Art. 108(2) TFEU secures all interested parties the right to submit observations.95 In addition, on application by a Member State, the Council may, acting unanimously and by way of derogation from Art. 107 TFEU, decide that the aid must be considered to be compatible with the internal market if such a decision is justified by exceptional circumstances.96

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(b) Relationship with Art. 258 TFEU The question arises as to whether, despite the existence of the special procedure provided for in Art. 108(2) TFEU, the general procedure set out in Art. 258 TFEU may still be used by the Commission to find infringements of Art. 107 TFEU. In the first place, the procedure provided for in Art. 108(2) TFEU affords all interested parties guarantees commensurate with the specific problems raised by State aid for competition in the 91 The applicable procedural requirements are laid down in Council Regulation No. 2015/1589 (n. 90). 92 See C-485/03 to C-490/03, Commission v Spain, 2006, para. 53: since the second subpara. of Art. 108(2) TFEU does not provide for a pre-litigation phase in contrast to Art. 258 TFEU and hence the Commission does not issue a reasoned opinion allowing a Member State a certain time-period within which to comply with its decision, the reference period can only be that provided for in the decision failure to implement which is at issue or, where appropriate, that subsequently fixed by the Commission. See also C-11/20, Commission v Greece, 2021, para. 36. 93 Art. 108(2), second para. TFEU. Under settled case-law, the Member State to which the decision requiring recovery of unlawful aid is addressed is obliged under Art. 288 TFEU to take all measures necessary to ensure implementation of that decision; the Member State must actually recover the sums owed, and recovery out of time, after the deadlines set, cannot satisfy the requirements of the Treaties: see C-363/16, Commission v Greece, 2018, para. 48. 94 See C-591/14, Commission v Belgium, 2017, para. 38; C-704/19, Commission v Spain, 2021, para. 61; C-11/20, Commission v Greece, 2021, para. 40. The condition that it be absolutely impossible to implement a decision is not fulfilled where the defendant government merely informs the Commission of the legal, political, or practical difficulties involved in implementing the decision, without taking any real step to recover the aid from the undertakings concerned, and without proposing to the Commission any alternative arrangements for implementing the decision which could have enabled the difficulties to be overcome: see C-63/14, Commission v France, 2015, para. 49. In compliance with the duty of sincere cooperation imposed by Art. 4(3) TEU, the Member State must inform the Commission of the difficulties arising in applying a Union provision with a view to seeking a solution together; if a Member State does not do so, its defence will fail: see C-363/16, Commission v Greece, 2018, para. 46; C-704/19, Commission v Spain, 2021, para. 63. Further to this, there is another defence, albeit exceptional, relating to situations in which the decision would contain such serious and manifest defects that it would be deemed non- existent: see C-591/14, Commission v Belgium, 2017, para. 38. 95 See C-294/90, British Aerospace and Rover v Commission, 1992, para. 13. 96 Art. 108(2), third para. TFEU. For the powers of the Council under this provision, see C-110/02 Commission v Council, 2004, paras 28–51.

Subject-Matter 191 internal market; those guarantees are much more extensive than those afforded by the pre-litigation procedure under Art. 258 TFEU, in which only the Commission and the Member State concerned take part. Accordingly, if the Commission wishes to make a finding that a State aid is incompatible with the internal market, it is obliged to follow the procedure set out in Art. 108(2) TFEU.97 However, the existence of the procedure laid down in Art. 108(2) TFEU does not preclude an aid measure being found incompatible with rules of Union law other than Art. 107 TFEU by means of the Art. 258 TFEU procedure.98 Second, in the event of an infringement of a decision made pursuant to the first subparagraph of Art. 108(2) TFEU, the Commission may elect either to bring the matter directly before the Court of Justice under the second subparagraph of Art. 108(2) TFEU or to initiate the Art. 258 TFEU procedure.99 (c) Violation of the obligation to notify aid The Commission also often has a choice between the Art. 108(2) TFEU procedure and that provided for in Art. 258 TFEU where a Member State fails to inform the Commission in time, contrary to Art. 108(3) TFEU, of a plan to grant new aid or alter aid.100 The fact that the duty to notify the Commission has been infringed, however, does not make the aid incompatible with the internal market. Accordingly, the Commission must initiate an examination of the compatibility of the non-notified aid with the internal market under Art. 108(2) TFEU. In that event, it may require the aid to be suspended pending the outcome of its examination and order the Member State to provide information under a procedure pursuant to Art. 108(2) TFEU.101 If the Member State refuses to suspend the aid, the Commission may bring the matter directly before the Court of Justice pursuant to the second subparagraph of Art. 108(2)102 or bring an action against the Member State under Art. 258 TFEU.103 A finding by the Commission, after carrying out an examination, that the non-notified aid measure is compatible with the internal market does not retroactively remedy the

97 See 290/83, Commission v France, 1985, para. 17. 98 See 72/79, Commission v Italy, 1980, para. 12; 73/79, Commission v Italy, 1980, para. 9; 290/83, Commission v France, 1985, para. 17; C-35/88, Commission v Greece, 1990, para. 11. 99 See 70/72, Commission v Germany, paras 8–13 (action based on the second subpara. of Art. 108(2) TFEU); 130/83, Commission v Italy, 1984 (action based on Art. 258 TFEU). The Court now considers that an application on the basis of the second subpara. of Art. 108(2) TFEU is also an application pursuant to Art. 258 TFEU: see C-99/02, Commission v Italy, 2004, para. 1; C-496/09, Commission v Italy, 2011, para. 3; see also C-294/90, British Aerospace and Rover v Commission, 1992, para. 12 (the Commission may also take the approach that the infringement of its decision constitutes new aid within the meaning of Art. 108(3) TFEU; if so, it must start up the special procedure under the first subpara. of Art. 108(2) TFEU afresh and if necessary, take a fresh decision, after having put interested parties on notice to submit observations: see C-294/90, British Aerospace and Rover v Commission, para. 13); C-404/00, Commission v Spain, 2003, para. 25. Regardless of the choice, where the Member State concerned fails to comply with a judgment given either under Art. 108(2) or Art. 258 TFEU, the Commission may bring an action on the basis of Art. 260(2) TFEU to have the judgment enforced: see C-93/17, Commission v Greece, 2018; C-576/18, Commission v Italy, 2020; C-51/20, Commission v Greece, 2022. 100 See 173/73, Italy v Commission, 1974, para. 9. 101 See C-301/87, France v Commission, 1990, paras 18–23; C-142/87, Belgium v Commission, 1990, paras 15–19. 102 See C-301/87, France v Commission, 1990, para. 23. 103 See C-301/87, France v Commission, 1990, para. 23. See also Arts 13 and 14 of Regulation No. 2015/1589 (n. 90).

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192 THE ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF UNION LAW BY A MEMBER STATE infringement of the Treaties caused by the failure to notify. Since Art. 108(3) TFEU has direct effect, national courts are obliged to regard as unlawful any acts performed to implement the non-notified aid before the Commission made its finding that the aid was compatible with the internal market, and impose the appropriate sanctions.104

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(d) Aid to agriculture Since ‘the Council is entitled to lay down, within the context of the regulations establishing the common organisation of the markets in agricultural products, provisions prohibiting wholly or partially certain forms of national aids for the production or marketing of the products in question and . . . an infringement of such a prohibition may be dealt with within the specific framework of such an organisation’, the procedure laid down by Art. 258 TFEU is to be used in order to determine the infringement.105 Under Art. 42 TFEU, all the provisions of Arts 101–109 TFEU are applicable to production of and trade in agricultural products only to the extent determined by the European Parliament and the Council within the framework of measures adopted for the organization of agricultural markets. This explains why recourse by a Member State to Arts 107–109 TFEU on State aid cannot receive priority over the provisions of a regulation on the organization of a sector of the agricultural market.106 Consequently, the fact that there is a special procedure in Art. 108 TFEU for appraising the compatibility of State aid with the internal market cannot preclude recourse to the Art. 258 TFEU procedure in the event that the Commission considers that an aid measure of a Member State infringes the provisions of a regulation organizing a sector of the agricultural market, even though the aid measure is also open to criticism under Art. 107 TFEU. (3) Art. 106(3) TFEU concerning public undertakings (a) Procedure under Art. 106(3) TFEU Art. 106(3) TFEU charges the Commission with supervising Member States’ compliance with their obligations with regard to public undertakings and undertakings to which they have granted special or exclusive rights, and expressly confers on it the power to use two legal instruments to this end, namely, directives and decisions. The Commission is empowered to use directives to specify in general terms the obligations arising under Art. 106(1) TFEU. It exercises that power where, without taking into consideration the particular situation existing in the various Member States, it defines in concrete terms the obligations imposed on them under that provision of the Treaty. In view of its very nature, such a power cannot be used to make a finding that a Member State has failed to fulfil a particular obligation under the Treaties.107 104 See 120/73, Lorenz, 1973; C-354/90, Fédération Nationale du Commerce Extérieur des Produits Alimentaires and Others, 1991; C-261/01 and C-262/01, Van Calster and Cleeren, 2003, para. 53; C-368/04, Transalpine Ölleitung in Österreich, 2006, paras 39–41; C-284/12, Deutsche Lufthansa, 2013, paras 29–32; C-349/17, Eesti Pagar, 2019, paras 88–89. 105 72/79, Commission v Italy, 1980, para. 12; see also C-61/90, Commission v Greece, 1992. 106 See 177/78, McCarren, 1979, paras 11, 21. 107 See C-202/88, France v Commission, 1991, para. 17; C-163/99, Portugal v Commission, 2001, para. 26. In Portugal v Commission, the Portuguese Government argued that the Commission was wrong to commence an

Subject-Matter 193 The powers exercised by the Commission under Art. 106(3) TFEU by decision are different from those that it exercises by directive. Decisions are adopted in respect of a specific situation in one or more Member States and necessarily involve an appreciation of the situation in the light of Union law. They specify the consequences arising for the Member State concerned, regard being had to the requirements which the performance of the particular tasks assigned to an undertaking imposes on it where it is entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest (Art. 106(1) and (2) TFEU).108 If the power to adopt decisions conferred on the Commission by Art. 106(3) TFEU is not to be deprived of all practical effect, the Commission must be empowered to determine that a given State measure is incompatible with the rules of the Treaties and to indicate what measures the Member State to which the decision is addressed must take in order to comply with its obligations under Union law.109 Even though there is no express provision to this effect in Art. 106(3) TFEU—unlike in Art. 258 TFEU and Art. 108(2) TFEU—the general principle of respect for the rights of the defence requires that the Member State concerned must receive an exact and complete statement of the objections that the Commission intends to raise against it. It must also be placed in a position in which it may effectively make known its views on the observations submitted by interested third parties.110 (b) The Commission’s discretion The Commission’s power to appraise, in a decision adopted pursuant to Art. 106(3) TFEU, the conformity with the Treaties of measures adopted or applied by Member States with regard to undertakings referred to in Art. 106(1) TFEU does not run counter to the powers conferred on the Court of Justice by Art. 258 TFEU. If the Member State does not comply with the decision, this may form the basis for infringement proceedings under Art. 258 TFEU.111 Whether the Commission may bring an action for failure to fulfil obligations before it has adopted a decision pursuant to Art. 106(3) TFEU depends in all likelihood on the requirements of the rights of the defence. The procedure that affords the strongest action for failure to fulfil obligations under Art. 258 TFEU and that it ought to have followed the procedure provided for in Art. 106(3) TFEU and adopted a harmonization directive. The Court rejected this argument, holding that, notwithstanding its other powers under the Treaties to ensure that Member States comply with Union law, the Commission enjoyed a discretion in deciding whether or not to commence an action for failure to fulfil obligations. It was not required to justify its decision, nor would the admissibility of the action be dependent upon the circumstances dictating its choice (see C-70/99, Commission v Portugal, 2001, para. 17). 108 See C-48/90 and C-66/90, Netherlands and Others v Commission, 1992, para. 27; C-163/99, Portugal v Commission, 2001, para. 27. 109 See C-48/90 and C-66/90, Netherlands and Others v Commission, 1992, para. 28. The fact that allegedly other Member States also infringe the Treaties by granting similar exclusive rights does not oblige the Commission to bring proceedings under Art. 258 TFEU and exercise its power to address a decision to those Member States under Art. 106(3) TFEU: see C-163/99, Commission v Portugal, 2001, paras 31–35. 110 See C-48/90 and C-66/90, Netherlands and Others v Commission, 1992, paras 45–46. 111 See 226/87, Commission v Greece, 1988. It appears from this judgment that if the Member State to which the Commission’s decision is addressed contests its legality, it must bring an action for annulment within the time- limit laid down by Art. 263 TFEU (ex Art. 230 EC); thereafter, the Member State may not plead the unlawfulness of the decision as a defence in proceedings for failure to fulfil obligations. See para. 5.72.

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194 THE ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF UNION LAW BY A MEMBER STATE guarantees for the Member State concerned should take precedence at the stage of the initial examination of the compatibility of a national measure with Art. 106(1) and (2) TFEU by analogy with the aforementioned case-law on Art. 108(2) TFEU (see para. 5.24).112 In any event, it is certain that Member States may invariably bring an action under Art. 259 TFEU against a Member State for failure to fulfil its obligations under Art. 106(1) and (2) TFEU, even if the Commission has not yet exercised its powers under Art. 106(3) TFEU to address a decision to the Member State concerned.

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(4) Special procedures relating to the misuse of derogating provisions concerning the internal market and national security measures Apart from Art. 108(2) TFEU, the Treaties provide for other cases in which, by way of derogation from the procedure laid down in Arts 258 and 259 TFEU, the Commission or a Member State may bring a Member State directly before the Court of Justice, namely, where the derogating provisions provided for in the Treaties are misused (Art. 114(4)–(8) TFEU and Arts 346–348 TFEU).The opportunity afforded to the Commission by Art. 114(9) TFEU in order to bring a matter directly before the Court of Justice without incurring the delay of a pre-litigation procedure is intended to serve the Union interest of protecting in full the establishment of the internal market. However, this does not preclude the Commission from opting to bring proceedings under Art. 258 TFEU in the interests of the defendant Member State.113 The action that the Commission or any Member State may bring against a Member State pursuant to the second paragraph of Art. 348 TFEU if it considers that that Member State is making improper use of the powers provided for in Arts 346 and 347 TFEU does not involve a pre-litigation stage (which is precisely the difference compared with proceedings under Arts 258 and 259 TFEU), but does afford the guarantee that the Court of Justice is to give its ruling in camera, this being essential in the case of a politically charged dispute.114 (5) Special procedures relating to public procurement contracts (a) Special procedures relating to public procurement contracts On the basis of Art. 3 of Council Directive 89/665/EEC115 and Art. 8 of Council Directive 92/13/EEC,116 the Commission has the power to request a Member State to 112 Moreover, the Court of Justice itself has strongly emphasized the parallel between Art. 106(3) TFEU and Art. 108 TFEU: see C-48/90 and C-66/90, Netherlands and Others v Commission, 1992, paras 31–33. 113 Proceedings should be brought under Art. 258 TFEU against a failure of a Member State to notify the Commission of the application of a national measure conflicting with a harmonizing measure adopted pursuant to Art. 114(1) TFEU. For the Commission’s handling of a complaint on account of the grant of State aid to a manufacturer of military goods and the application of Arts 346 and 348 TFEU, see T-26/01, Fiocchi Munizioni v Commission, 2003. 114 See C-120/94, Commission v Greece (order), 1996. A case brought under Arts 258 or 259 TFEU is heard in principle in public, although the Court of Justice may decide otherwise of its own motion or on application by the parties for serious reasons (Art. 31 Statute). See also C-372/05, Commission v Germany, 2009, paras 28–30: Art. 348 TFEU is only applicable where the Commission alleges improper use of the powers provided for in Arts 346 and 347 TFEU, not to other alleged breaches of Union law. 115 Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts (OJ 1989 L395/33), as amended most recently by Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts (OJ 2014 L94/1). 116 Council Directive 92/13/EEC of 25 February 1992 coordinating the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions relating to the application of Community rules on the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport, and telecommunications sectors (OJ 1992 L76/14), as amended most recently by

Identity of the Parties 195 adopt appropriate correction measures when, prior to a contract being concluded, it considers that a clear and manifest infringement of Union rules in the field of public procurement has occurred during a contract award procedure. (b) The Commission’s discretion Even if it were preferable that the Commission should use the procedure for direct intervention established by that directive, such a procedure is a preventive measure which can neither derogate from nor replace the powers of the Commission under Art. 258 TFEU.117 The fact that the Commission used or did not use that procedure is therefore irrelevant where it is a matter of deciding on the admissibility of infringement proceedings. The Commission alone is competent to decide whether it is appropriate to bring proceedings under Art. 258 TFEU for failure to fulfil obligations. Thus, the choice between the two procedures is within its discretion.118

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II. Identity of the Parties A. Applicants (1) Commission Under Art. 258 TFEU, only the Commission may bring an action against a Member State. That power is consistent with its task of ensuring that Union law is applied.119 The Commission exercises its supervisory task of its own motion in the general interest of the Union120 and does not have to show the existence of a specific interest in bringing proceedings.121 It assesses itself whether it is appropriate to bring proceedings under Art. 258 TFEU and has therefore no obligation to do so in the event of an alleged infringement of the Treaties.122 In view of the objective nature of the action (see para. 5.01), the Court must Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts (OJ 2014 L94/1). 117 See, in the context of Directive 89/665/EEC, C-359/93, Commission v Netherlands, 1995, para. 13; C-79/94, Commission v Greece, 1995, para. 11; C-353/96, Commission v Ireland, 1998, para. 22; C-328/96, Commission v Austria, 1999, para. 57; and, in the context of Directive 92/13/EEC, C-394/02, Commission v Greece, 2005, paras 25–29. For a case in relation to a directive falling outside the public procurement sector, see C-424/07, Commission v Germany, 2009, para. 36 (concerning directives in the telecommunications sector). 118 See C-394/02, Commission v Greece, 2005, paras 25–29. 119 Art. 17(1) TEU. See C-537/19, Commission v Austria, 2021, para. 56. 120 See C-856/19, Commission v Hungary, 2021, para. 59. See also generally K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel (T. Corthaut (ed.)), EU Constitutional Law (OUP, 2021) paras 12.058–12.059. 121 See C-12/14, Commission v Malta, 2016, para. 26; C-715/17, C-718/17, and C-719/17, Commission v Poland and Others, 2020, para. 67; C-371/19, Commission v Germany, 2020, para. 45. 122 See C-284/19 P, Clarke v Commission (order), 2019, para. 25; C-715/17, C-718/17, and C-719/17, Commission v Poland and Others, 2020, para. 75. The discretion allotted to the Commission allows for it to adopt a policy regarding the bringing of infringement proceedings. Thus, in relation to urban waste water collection in agglomerations, while Directive 91/271/EEC concerning urban waste water treatment requires a collection rate of 100%, the Commission will only bring infringement proceedings if the collection rate is below 98% or where the uncollected 2% residue represents a population equivalent greater than or equal to 2000: see C-395/13, Commission v Belgium, 2014, para. 33. See also the second para. of Art. 258 TFEU, which provides that the Commission ‘may’ bring the matter before the Court of Justice if the Member State concerned fails to comply with the reasoned opinion within the period laid down; see, in that regard, C-152/98, Commission v Netherlands, 2001, para. 20.

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196 THE ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF UNION LAW BY A MEMBER STATE consider whether or not there has been a failure to fulfil obligations as alleged, without it being part of its role to take a view on the Commission’s exercise of its discretion.123 The decision to apply to the Court of Justice for a declaration that a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations cannot be described as a measure of administration or management and hence may not be delegated; it must be taken by the college of Commissioners, who should bear collective responsibility for it.124 The formal requirements for effective compliance with that principle of collegiate responsibility are less strict in this case than in the case of the adoption of decisions affecting the legal position of individuals. The reason for this is that, while the decision to commence proceedings for failure to fulfil obligations before the Court constitutes an indispensable step for the purpose of enabling the Court to give judgment by way of a binding decision on the alleged failure to fulfil obligations, it does not per se alter the legal position of the Member State in question. Consequently, it is sufficient that the decision to bring an action was the subject of collective deliberation by the college of Commissioners and that the information on which the decision was based was available to the members of the college. However, it is not necessary for the college itself formally to decide on the wording of the acts that give effect to the decision and put them in final form.125 The involvement of the Court is not always necessary or appropriate in order to ensure that the Member States effectively apply Union law. The Commission is therefore also free to determine the time when it brings any proceedings126 and whether to discontinue proceedings.127 In contrast, the Commission is not empowered to determine conclusively whether a given conduct of a Member State is compatible with the Treaties. The rights and duties of Member States may be determined, and their conduct appraised, only by a judgment of the Court of Justice.128 Consequently, a decision by the

123 See C-552/15, Commission v Ireland, 2017, para. 34; C-549/18, Commission v Romania, 2020, para. 49; C-66/18, Commission v Hungary, 2020, para. 56. 124 See C-191/95, Commission v Germany, 1998, paras 35–37; and C-272/97, Commission v Germany, 1999, paras 13–22, in which the Court justified this position in terms, inter alia, of ‘the discretionary power of the institution’, which ‘[i]‌n its role as guardian of the Treaty. . . is competent to decide whether it is appropriate to bring proceedings against a Member State for failure to fulfil its obligations’. 125 See C-191/95, Commission v Germany, 1998, paras 47–48; see also C-272/97, Commission v Germany, 1999, paras 13–22; C-198/97, Commission v Germany, 1999, paras 19–21. The decision to bring an action is therefore not a challengeable act within the meaning of Art. 263 TFEU: see T-377/00, T-379/00, T-380/00, T-260/01, and T-272/01, Philip Morris International and Others v Commission, 2003, para. 79 (upheld in C-131/03 P, Reynolds Tobacco and Others v Commission, 2006). 126 See C-552/15, Commission v Ireland, 2017, para. 36; C-715/17, C-718/17, and C-719/17, Commission v Poland and Others, 2020, paras 75, 93–97; see also C-422/92, Commission v Germany, 1995, paras 17–18: although the Court was surprised at the Commission having brought an action more than six years after the national legislation at issue had entered into force, it held that the Commission was not obliged to act within a specified period. See further para. 5.62. 127 See C-152/16, Commission v Luxembourg, 2016, para. 16. 128 See 142/80 and 143/80, Essevi and Salengo 1981, para. 16; see also T-258/06, Germany v Commission, 2010, para. 153. For further case-law bearing on this point in connection with the role of the Commission vis-à-vis the Court of Justice in the context of the enforcement of financial sanctions imposed on a Member State under Art. 260(2) TFEU, see para. 5.88.

Identity of the Parties 197 Commission not to bring proceedings against a Member State does not mean that that Member State is not in breach of Union law.129 (2) Other Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies Generally, other Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies cannot bring an action for failure to fulfil obligations.130 However, by way of exception, it follows from Art. 271 TFEU that both the Governing Council of the European Central Bank and the Board of Directors of the European Investment Bank can bring an action for failure to fulfil obligations. Thus, pursuant to Art. 271(d) TFEU, the Governing Council of the European Central Bank has the same powers as the Commission has under Art. 258 TFEU. It may thus bring an action against a national central bank for failure to fulfil obligations under the Treaties and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. Similarly, under Art. 271(a) TFEU, the Board of Directors of the European Investment Bank enjoys the powers conferred upon the Commission by Art. 258 TFEU131 and may bring an action in the Court of Justice against a Member State in relation to the fulfilment of its obligations under the Bank’s Statute. (3) Member State Under Art. 259 TFEU, a Member State may also bring a matter before the Court of Justice if it considers that another Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under Union law. The Member State must first submit a complaint to the Commission. The Commission delivers a reasoned opinion, after giving each of the States concerned the opportunity to submit its own case and its observations on the other party’s case, both orally and in writing. The opinion sets out the Commission’s view as to whether or not the alleged infringement of Union obligations under the Treaties is made out. If the Commission has not delivered an opinion within three months of the date of receipt of the complaint, the matter may be brought before the Court of Justice. The Commission may also bring the matter before the Court itself pursuant to Art. 258 TFEU. If it does so, this does not prevent the Member State from also bringing an action.132 In the event that the Commission’s reasoned opinion falls short of the Member State’s expectations,

129 Where it subsequently appears that the Member State is indeed infringing Union law, the fact that the Commission did not bring an action for failure to fulfil obligations may, in certain circumstances, constitute a reason for limiting the temporal effects of a judgment of the Court on a reference for a preliminary ruling which brings the infringement to light (see para. 6.39). This may also be relevant in assessing whether the breach of Union law was sufficiently serious as to cause the Member State to incur liability vis-à-vis individuals who suffered loss or damage as a result of it (see para. 4.66). 130 Prerogatives of other institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies may be safeguarded by the Commission or the other Member States. For example, the Commission or a Member State may bring an action for failure to fulfil obligations where a Member State fails to submit to an audit of the Court of Auditors: see C-539/09, Commission v Germany, 2011. 131 See T-361/99, Meyer v Commission and EIB (order), 2000, para. 12. 132 See L. Prete and B. Smulders, ‘The Coming of Age of Infringement Proceedings’ (2010) C.M.L.Rev. 27, finding that 141/78, France v United Kingdom, 1979, appears to confirm this reading of Art. 259 TFEU since in that case, France had lodged its action against the United Kingdom three months after the Commission had issued a reasoned opinion and the Commission did not raise any plea of inadmissibility in that regard.

5.33

5.34

198 THE ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF UNION LAW BY A MEMBER STATE it may add to it in its application. To date, few actions have been brought under Art. 259 TFEU that have resulted in a judgment.133

5.35

5.36

(4) No standing for individuals Individuals may not bring actions for failure to fulfil obligations before the Union Courts.134 If the need arises, they must contest the conduct of the Member State in a national court.135 The latter may (or must) request a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice in order indirectly to have the conduct complained of reviewed in the light of the requirements of Union law (see Chs 3 and 6).136 Furthermore, persons considering that a Member State is infringing Union law may lodge a complaint with the Commission.137 The Commission, however, is under no obligation to act on the complaint.138 (5) Rejection of a complaint The Commission’s decision rejecting a complaint cannot be challenged by an action for annulment,139 since the Commission does not adopt any binding legal act in the 133 See 141/78, France v United Kingdom, 1979; C-388/95, Belgium v Spain, 2000; C-145/04, Spain v United Kingdom, 2006; C-364/10, Hungary v Slovakia, 2012; C-591/17, Austria v Germany, 2019; C-457/18, Slovenia v Croatia, 2020. The recent action brought by the Czech Republic against Poland was terminated by way of an amicable agreement: see C-121/21, Czech Republic v Poland (order), 2022, paras 1–2. It is often considered that the lack of such actions is due to political sensitivities and/or to the availability of intervention by which a Member State can submit its observations during infringement proceedings brought by the Commission. That being said, it appears that Member States have become less reticent in recent years. See further, in that regard, K. Lane Scheppele, D. V. Kochenov, and B. Grabowska-Moroz, ‘EU Values Are Law, after All: Enforcing EU Values through Systemic Infringement Actions by the European Commission and the Member States of the European Union’ (2020) Y.E.L. 3. 134 See C-49/08 Raulin v France (order), 2008; C-454/07, Raulin v France (order), 2008; T-339/16 AJ, FX v United Kingdom and Others, 2013; T-146/12 AJ, CS v Court of Justice and Others, 2012; C-469/16, Infante v Italy (order), 2016. Individuals may also not have the General Court review the legality of national measures through an action for annulment brought against the Commission (see T-148/00, Panhellenic Union of Cotton Ginners and Exporters v Commission, 2003, para. 66). 135 The fact that individuals have brought proceedings before a national court cannot prevent the bringing of an action by the Commission under Art. 258 TFEU, since the two procedures have different objectives and effects: see 31/69, Commission v Italy, 1970, para. 9; 85/85, Commission v Belgium, 1986, para. 24; C-87/02, Commission v Italy, 2004, para. 39; C-423/07, Commission v Spain, 2010, paras 78–80. Consequently, neither the Court nor the Commission can be bound by the findings of a national court: see C-664/18, Commission v United Kingdom, 2021, paras 141–142. 136 See 1/82, De Dapper v Luxembourg, 1982, para. 8; see also C-106/90, C-317/90, and C-129/91, Emerald Meats v Commission, 1993, para. 40. 137 See the Commission’s website, which provides general information on the submission of complaints and a system for the submission of complaints via the internet (available at http://ec.europa.eu). 138 See C-284/19 P, Clarke v Commission, 2019, paras 33–39. Consequently, the position of an individual who makes a complaint against an undertaking for infringement of Art. 101 TFEU and/or Art. 102 TFEU (see paras 7.39, 8.06) differs fundamentally from that of an individual who brings a complaint against a Member State for infringement of Union law: see T-247/04, Aseprofar and Edifa v Commission (order), 2005, paras 40–61; T-186/08, LPN v Commission, 2009, para. 56. That being said, individuals may possibly take up the matter with the European Ombudsman relating to instances of maladministration in connection with the Commission’s handling of such complaints. The number of complaints received led the European Ombudsman to open a strategic inquiry into the Commission’s handling of complaints, which resulted in 2017 in a decision encompassing suggestions for improvement: see Decision of the European Ombudsman setting out suggestions following her strategic inquiry OI/5/2016/AB on timeliness and transparency in the European Commission’s handling of infringement complaints, 14 September 2017 (available at https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu). 139 See C-602/14 P, Bharat Heavy Electricals v Commission, 2015, para. 18; C-284/19 P, Clarke v Commission, 2019, paras 22–32. Similarly, the Commission cannot be ordered by the Union Courts to bring infringement proceedings: see C-412/18 P, King v Commission, 2018, para. 27. In relation to Art. 106 TFEU, see C-107/95 P, Bundesverband der Bilanzbuchhalter v Commission, 1997, paras 26–30 (compare AG La Pergola Opinion, points 14–21, taking a different view); C-141/02 P, Commission v T-Mobile Austria, 2005, para. 70 (setting aside T-54/99,

Identity of the Parties 199 course of the pre-litigation stage:140 it does not determine the rights and duties of the Member State nor afford any guarantee that a given line of conduct is compatible with the Treaties. An opinion of the Commission cannot release a Member State from its Treaty obligations and certainly does not give it a licence to restrict rights that individuals derive from the Treaties.141 Consequently, the Commission’s decision rejecting a complaint from individuals does not affect their legal position, since the Commission is simply refusing to take measures that in no event would have legal effects for them. (6) Failure of the Commission to bring an infringement action If the Commission leaves a complaint unanswered, an action for failure to act under Art. 265 TFEU will not lie, since the Commission has not infringed any duty to act.142 The same is true where the Commission fails to bring proceedings before the Court in the event of a Member State’s infringing a decision adopted pursuant to Art. 108(2) TFEU relating to State aid.143 In addition, natural or legal persons may bring such an action against the Commission only if it failed to adopt an act addressed to them, other than a recommendation or an opinion.144 Since in a procedure pursuant to Art. 258 TFEU the Commission addresses to the Member State concerned only a reasoned ‘opinion’, natural or legal persons are precluded from bringing an action for failure to deliver such an opinion.145 A failure on the part of the Commission to bring an action for failure to fulfil obligations will not ground an action for damages either.146 The reason for this is that the Commission’s inaction does not infringe Art. 258 TFEU and therefore cannot be regarded as constituting conduct amounting to a sufficiently serious breach of Union law.147 In such a case, the source of any damage lies in the Member State’s infringement of the Treaties and not in any shortcoming of the Commission. max. mobil Telekommunication Service v Commission, 2002, in which the General Court had found that the rejection of an Art. 106 TFEU complaint constituted a challengeable act). 140 See 48/65, Lütticke v Commission, 1966 ECR 19, 27: the Court held that ‘[n]‌ o measure taken by the Commission during [the pre-litigation] stage has any binding force’. See further C-576/14 P, Mirelta Ingatlanhasznosító kft v Commission and Others, 2015, para. 23. 141 See 142/80 and 143/80, Essevi and Salengo, 1981, paras 16–18. 142 See C-284/19 P, Clarke v Commission (order), 2019, para. 34; T-701/20, Luis Gonzalo Segura del Oro Pulido v Commission, 2021, paras 6–8. The same goes for an action for non-contractual liability: see para. 11.29. 143 See T-277/94, AITEC v Commission, 1996, paras 65–72. 144 See C-130/16 P, Anastasia-Soultana Gaki v Commission, 2016, para. 17; C-412/18 P, King v Commission (order), 2018, para. 20; C-284/19 P, Clarke v Commission (order), 2019, para. 35. 145 See 48/65, Lütticke and Others v Commission, 1966 ECR 19, 39; T-126/95, Dumez v Commission (order), 1995, paras 34–37; C-602/14 P, Bharat Heavy Electricals v Commission, 2015, paras 22–23. 146 See T-209/00, Lamberts v Ombudsman, 2002, para. 53 (upheld in C-234/02 P, European Ombudsman v Lamberts, 2004); C-130/16 P, Anastasia-Soultana Gaki v Commission, 2016, para. 24. 147 However, the Commission’s conduct may possibly infringe other Treaty provisions and hence potentially make it liable in damages if all the necessary conditions are fulfilled (see Ch. 11). For example, in T-440/03, T-121/04, T-171/04, T-208/04, T-365/04, and T-484/04, Arizmendi and Others v Council and Commission, 2009, the General Court ruled as admissible an action seeking compensation for damage allegedly suffered as a result of the Commission’s sending of a reasoned opinion to a Member State. On the one hand, the Commission’s reasoned opinion cannot result in a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals. On the other hand, however, if the assessment set out in the reasoned opinion goes beyond the determination as to whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations or if other conduct on the part of the Commission in an infringement procedure exceeds the powers conferred upon it, then those assessments or that conduct may constitute such a breach as to render the Union liable. See further K. Gutman, ‘The Evolution of the Action for Damages Against the European Union and Its Place in the System of Judicial Protection’ (2011) C.M.L.Rev. 695, 707–708.

5.37

200 THE ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF UNION LAW BY A MEMBER STATE

B. Defendants 5.38

5.39

(1) Member State An action under Arts 258–259 TFEU may be brought before the Court of Justice only against a Member State. Each action is directed at an individual Member State. There is no provision for such an action to be brought against more than one Member State at the same time. Depending upon the circumstances, however, the Commission may lodge proceedings against several Member States in parallel or successive actions for similar or identical alleged violations of Union law, which may be joined for the purposes of giving judgment.148 Conversely, the Commission may join two separate pre-litigation procedures against the same Member State into one action.149 (2) Notion of Member State Under Art. 258 TFEU, it is the Member State alone that is responsible vis-à-vis the Union for compliance with Union law obligations.150 By ‘Member State’ is meant the entity under international law that acceded to the Treaties governing the European Union.151 Any act or failure to act by any authority of the Member State or constitutionally independent bodies or institutions that are to be regarded as public bodies may thus potentially cause that Member State to become liable under Union law.152 This is because the domestic organization of a Member State may not detract from the full effect of Union law. Consequently, it may be that a Member State is found to have infringed Union law even though the infringement was committed by a federated entity and the national government, which represents the ‘Member State’ before the Court of Justice, was not in a position under domestic law to avoid this.153 The rationale of the Court’s case-law is that the Member State is under a Union law duty to organize its constitutional structure in such a way as to avoid that evil. 148 For a recent example, as regards various Member States’ failure to comply with their obligation to indicate an appropriate number of applicants for international protection who could be relocated swiftly to their territory, see C‑715/17, C‑718/17, and C‑719/17, Commission v Poland and Others, 2020. 149 See C-454/14, Commission v Spain, 2016, para. 27. 150 See C-395/17, Commission v Netherlands, 2019, para. 73; C-391/17, Commission v United Kingdom, 2019, para. 71. The same goes for financial penalties imposed upon a Member State under Art. 206(2) TFEU: see C-184/11, Commission v Spain, 2014, paras 43–44. 151 Thus excluding the EFTA/EEA States, although there is provision for similar infringement proceedings brought before the EFTA Court by the EFTA Surveillance Authority against an EFTA State for infringement of the EEA Rules. 152 See C-416/17, Commission v France, 2018, para. 107; C-122/18, Commission v Italy, 2020, para. 55; C-261/18, Commission v Ireland, 2020, para. 90. See also the definition of the expression ‘Member State’ in C-95/97, Région Wallonne v Commission (order), 1997, paras 6–7. The fact that a directive has been transposed in a timely manner in some, but not all, of the relevant authorities in the territories of a Member State has resulted in a finding of a failure to fulfil obligations against it: see C-457/08, Commission v United Kingdom, 2009 (failure by Gibraltar to transpose directive in time); C-495/08 Commission v United Kingdom, 2009 (failure by Wales to transpose directive in time); C-186/09, Commission v United Kingdom, 2010 (failure by Gibraltar to transpose directive in time). 153 See C-395/13, Commission v Belgium, 2014, paras 50–51. See also C-87/02, Commission v Italy, 2004, para. 38; C-102/06, Commission v Austria, 2006, paras 7–9. For examples of actions on the part of local authorities which resulted in the finding of a failure to fulfil obligations, see C-533/11, Commission v Belgium, 2013, para. 57; C-261/18, Commission v Ireland, 2019; C-122/18, Commission v Italy, 2020. See also para. 5.71.

Identity of the Parties 201 (3) Legislative, executive, and judicial authorities An act or omission of the legislative authority of a Member State can certainly give rise to an action for failure to fulfil obligations.154 The same is true for shortcomings of the executive branch or of administrative authorities of the Member State. Shortcomings in the way in which national courts apply Union law may also be imputed to the Member State.155 In all likelihood, an ordinary judicial error is not sufficient.156 If a national last instance court deliberately ignored or disregarded Union law, this could certainly bring the Union liability of the relevant Member State into play.157 The same goes if a national last instance court fails to make a reference for a preliminary ruling where that court could not be certain that its reasoning would be equally obvious to the Court of Justice.158 (4) Private companies controlled by public authorities Finally, acts of legal persons governed by private law that are controlled by the public authorities may result in an infringement of Union law on the part of the Member State concerned.159

5.40

5.41

C. Intervening parties Member States and Union institutions may intervene in actions for infringement and do not have to show an interest.160 Union bodies, offices, and agencies may intervene on the condition that they can establish an interest in the result of the case.161 The same goes for the European Data Protection Supervisor, which has the power to intervene in actions before the Court of Justice.162 Where an infringement action concerns one of 154 See 8/70, Commission v Italy, 1970, paras 8–9; 94/81, Commission v Italy, 1982, para. 4; 41/82, Commission v Italy, 1982, para. 15; 309/84, Commission v Italy, 1986, para. 9. 155 See C-129/00, Commission v Italy, 2003, paras 29–41: an Italian law, which in itself was not contrary to Union law, was interpreted by a large part of the Italian judiciary, including the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation), in a way which was incompatible with Union law. In the context of proceedings under Art. 108(2) TFEU, see C-304/09, Commission v Italy, 2010, paras 55–56. 156 See C-129/00, Commission v Italy, 2003, para. 33: where national legislation has been the subject of different relevant judicial constructions, some leading to the application of that legislation in compliance with Union law, others leading to the opposite application, it must be held that, at the very least, such legislation is not sufficiently clear to ensure its application in compliance with Union law. See also C-396/03 P, Killinger v Germany and Others (order), 2005, para. 28. 157 See C-154/08, Commission v Spain, 2009, paras 125–127. See also paras 5.38–5.39 for the possibility of bringing proceedings under Arts 258–259 TFEU against a Member State where one of its courts infringes the obligation to seek a preliminary ruling under the third para. of Art. 267 TFEU. 158 See C-416/17, Commission v France, 2018, para. 111. 159 See 249/81, Commission v Ireland, 1982, para. 15; C-325/00, Commission v Germany, 2002, paras 14–21; see also C-353/96, Commission v Ireland, 1998, para. 23: the Member State is liable for acts of an individual undertaking that is State-owned and acts as a contracting authority within the meaning of the directives on public contract awards; T-83/97, Sateba v Commission (order), 1997, para. 36 (upheld on appeal: C-422/97 P, Sateba v Commission (order), 1998). 160 Art. 40, first para. Statute; C-78/18, Commission v Hungary (order), 2013, paras 8–9. 161 Art. 40, second para. Statute. 162 Art. 58(4) Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 45/2001 and Decision No. 1247/2002/EC (OJ 2018 L295/39); C-288/12, Commission v Hungary (order), 2013.

5.42

202 THE ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF UNION LAW BY A MEMBER STATE the fields of application of the EEA Agreement, third States that are a party to the EEA Agreement as well as the EFTA Surveillance Authority are allowed to intervene in that case without the need to demonstrate a particular interest.163 Natural and legal persons, however, cannot intervene in infringement actions.164

D. Brexit 5.43

For the purposes of dealing in an orderly fashion with the consequences of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union and any disputes stemming therefrom, the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (Withdrawal Agreement)165 provides for the continued jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to hear infringement actions against the United Kingdom in a number of instances as specified by that agreement. Apart from the fact that the Court continues to have jurisdiction for pending cases,166 the Commission may bring any failure of the United Kingdom to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties or under Part Four of the Withdrawal Agreement before the end of the transition period before the Court of Justice within four years after the end of the transition period in accordance with the requirements laid down in Art. 258 TFEU or Art. 108(2), second subpara. TFEU.167 Similarly, the Court has jurisdiction to hear actions brought by the Commission in relation to a failure by the United Kingdom to comply with or to give effect to decisions rendered as a result of ongoing administrative procedures that were initiated before the end of the transition period,168 to decisions of the Commission that conclude State aid proceedings started up to four years after the end of the transition period for aid granted before the end of the transition period,169 and to decisions that are the outcome of investigations initiated by OLAF up to four years after the end of the transition period.170 The Commission can bring the action up to four years after the decision concerned was taken. Furthermore, the Commission may bring an infringement action against the United Kingdom in relation to the application of parts of the financial settlement.171 Lastly, the Court has jurisdiction to hear infringement actions brought in relation to the Northern Ireland Protocol172 and the Sovereign Base Area Protocol173 under the conditions specified therein. 163 See C-328/20, Commission v Austria (order), 2020, paras 7–10. 164 Statute, Art. 40, para. 2; C-301/17, Commission v Romania (order), 2018, para. 4. 165 OJ 2020 L 29/7. 166 Art. 86(1) Withdrawal Agreement. See C-276/19, Commission v United Kingdom, 2020, para. 28; C-213/19, Commission v United Kingdom, 2022, para. 120. 167 Art. 87(1) Withdrawal Agreement. 168 Arts 87(2), 92, and 95(1) Withdrawal Agreement. 169 Arts 87(2), 93(1), and 95(1) Withdrawal Agreement. 170 Arts 87(2), 93(2), and 95(1) Withdrawal Agreement. 171 Art. 160 Withdrawal Agreement. 172 Art. 12(4) Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland (OJ 2020 L29/7). 173 Art. 12(1) Protocol relating to the Sovereign Base Areas of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Cyprus (OJ 2020 L29/7).

Special Characteristics 203

III. Special Characteristics A. The pre-litigation stage of the procedure (1) Objective The aim of the pre-litigation stage of the procedure is to give the Member State an opportunity: (a) of remedying the infringement before the matter is brought before the Court of Justice; and (b) of putting forward its defence to the Commission’s complaints.174 Moreover, during the pre-litigation stage, the Commission and the Member State may come to an accommodation, thus rendering a court proceeding unnecessary.175 Finally, the proper conduct of the pre-litigation procedure constitutes an essential guarantee in order not only to protect the rights of the Member State concerned, but also to ensure that any contentious procedure will have a clearly defined dispute as its subject-matter.176 The scope of the dispute is defined in the pre-litigation procedure. As a result, in the contentious proceedings, the Court may only judge the merits of the pleas in law put forward by the Commission in the pre-litigation procedure.177 (2) Letter of formal notice (a) Content and purpose The Art. 258 TFEU procedure formally commences with receipt of a letter of formal notice—also referred to as the letter before action—from the Commission giving the Member State formal notice. As a rule, the letter will have been preceded by informal contacts between the Commission and the Member State by which the former starts its investigation into the possible infringements of Union law.178 Such prior contacts are necessary to verify whether a possible failure to fulfil obligations actually exists, as a letter of formal notice can only be issued by the Commission if it is capable of legitimately alleging

174 See C-715/17, C-718/17, and C-719/17, Commission v Poland and Others, 2020, para. 92; C-66/18, Commission v Hungary, 2020, para. 45; C-787/19, Commission v Austria, 2021, para. 19. 175 Consequently, the Commission is justified to refuse to disclose a letter of formal notice and a reasoned opinion requested under the right of access to documents by an individual who lodged a complaint. This is because the Member States are entitled to expect the Commission to guarantee confidentiality during investigations that might lead to an infringement procedure and also after proceedings are brought in the Court. This enables discussions to continue between the parties even after proceedings have been brought, with a view to reaching a speedy resolution (see T-191/99, Petrie and Others v Commission, 2001, paras 67–69). As regards disclosure of the letter of formal notice and the reasoned opinion, see also C-514/11 P and C-605/11 P, LPN and Finland v Commission, 2013, paras 64–66; T-312/17, Campbell v Commission, 2018. For a related case on access to documents concerning a meeting held in the context of a procedure for failure to fulfil obligations, see C-28/08 P, Commission v Bavarian Lager, 2010; compare C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P, and C-532/07 P, Sweden and Others v Commission, 2010, paras 118–127: access to written pleadings lodged in infringement actions for which the Court has already delivered judgment may be granted under the relevant rules regarding access to documents. See further K. Lenaerts, ‘The Principle of Democracy in the Case Law of the CJEU’ (2013) I.C.L.Q. 271. 176 See C-433/13, Commission v Slovakia, 2015, para. 40; C-552/15, Commission v Ireland, 2017, para. 29; C-441/17, Commission v Poland, 2018, para. 64; C-66/18, Commission v Hungary, 2020, para. 45. 177 See C-158/94, Commission v Italy, 1997, paras 59–60; C-159/94, Commission v France, 1997, paras 106–107. 178 In this context, the Commission may, for example, send a letter to a Member State requesting information by a certain deadline, but this is purely informal and does not constitute a letter of formal notice: see C-211/08, Commission v Spain, 2010, paras 21–22; C-152/12, Commission v Bulgaria, 2014, paras 15–18. The Commission can also obtain information of the Member State through the EU pilot mechanism. The use of this mechanism cannot modify the conduct of the pre-litigation procedure: see C-104/15, Commission v Romania, 2016, para. 39.

5.44

5.45

204 THE ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF UNION LAW BY A MEMBER STATE a prior failure to fulfil obligations by the Member State concerned.179 The infringement complained of must thus exist prior to the issuing of the letter of formal notice.180 The purpose of the letter of formal notice is to delimit the subject-matter of the dispute and to provide the Member State, which is asked to submit observations, with the information necessary in order for it to prepare its defence.181 Alternatively, it may enable the Member State to comply with its Union law obligations before proceedings are brought.182 Bearing in mind its purpose, the letter of formal notice must precisely specify the obligation that the Commission maintains the Member State has failed to fulfil and the grounds on which the Commission takes this view. Any vagueness in the letter of formal notice depriving the Member State of the opportunity of submitting observations to good effect may be remedied by the Commission’s sending a new or supplementary letter of formal notice, setting out in time additional particulars or information.183 However, a letter of formal notice cannot be subject to the same strict requirements of precision as a reasoned opinion, since such letter cannot, at that point in the pre-litigation stage, necessarily contain anything more than an initial brief summary of the complaints.184 Thus, the Commission may always clarify its initial complaints during a later stage in the proceedings,185 even in its application.186 What is important at this stage is that the Member State was placed in possession of all the relevant information needed for its defence through the letter of formal notice.187

5.46

(b) Formal notice must be complete The Member State must be put on notice of the whole of the alleged infringement of Union law. The complaints may not be subsequently extended in the reasoned

179 See C-642/18, Commission v Spain, 2019, para. 17; C-550/18, Commission v Ireland, 2020, para. 92; C-658/19, Commission v Spain, 2021, para. 36. 180 See C-642/18, Commission v Spain, 2019, para. 17; C-658/19, Commission v Spain, 2021, para. 36. Thus, the Commission cannot issue a letter of formal notice alleging a failure to transpose a directive before the expiry of the deadline of transposition (see C-104/15, Commission v Romania, 2016, para. 35). However, this is different where the failure complained of concerns an infringement of the duty to refrain from actions which seriously compromise the attainment of the objectives prescribed by a directive, as this constitutes a violation of Art. 4(3) TEU, read in conjunction with Art. 288 TFEU (C-346/14, Commission v Austria, 2016, para. 42). See also C-341/97 Commission v Netherlands (order), 2000: a detailed opinion within the meaning of Art. 9(1) of Directive 83/189/EEC (now replaced by Directive (EU) 2015/1535) (a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations) informing a Member State that a national measure notified to the Commission did not comply with Union law cannot be regarded as a letter of formal notice within the meaning of Art. 258 TFEU. At the time when such a detailed opinion is delivered, the Member State to which it is addressed cannot have infringed Union law, since the measure exists only in draft form. 181 See 274/83 Commission v Italy, 1985, para. 19; 229/87, Commission v Greece, 1988, para. 12; C-97/17, Commission v Bulgaria, 2018, para. 18. 182 See C-552/15, Commission v Ireland, 2017, para. 29. 183 See 211/81, Commission v Denmark, 1982, paras 10–11. The Commission may also send out a supplementary letter of formal notice, which adds new complaints and provides for a new time-limit, which then forms the basis for the complaints alleged in the reasoned opinion: see C-442/06, Commission v Italy, 2008, paras 23–24; see also C-378/13, Commission v Greece, 2014, para. 28. 184 See C-337/05, Commission v Italy, 2008, para. 23; C-97/17, Commission v Bulgaria, 2018, para. 19. 185 See C-461/14, Commission v Spain, 2016, para. 27. 186 See C-664/18, Commission v United Kingdom, 2021, para. 81. 187 See 229/87, Commission v Greece, 1998, para. 13.

Special Characteristics 205 opinion,188 since that would be in breach of the Commission’s duty to give the Member State concerned a fair hearing.189 The illegality cannot be regarded as cured even by the fact that the Member State put forward a defence in its observations on the reasoned opinion to the new complaints enlarging the scope of the dispute.190 (c) Essential procedural requirement Because it gives the Member State concerned the opportunity to submit prior observations, the letter of formal notice constitutes an essential procedural requirement for the legality of the procedure for a declaration that a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations.191 Even if the Member State does not wish to make any observations, the Commission must comply with that requirement.192 Failure to give formal notice in compliance with Art. 258 TFEU is an absolute bar to proceedings that may be raised by the Court of its own motion.193 (d) Sufficient time for lodging observations The Member State must have a reasonable time in which to make its observations. The reasonableness of the period prescribed by the Commission has to be assessed in the light of the particular circumstances.194 Thus, the urgent nature of the case or the fact that the Member State was fully apprised of the Commission’s position even before the letter of formal notice may warrant setting a short period.195 However, the urgency of the case may not be brought about by the Commission itself, for instance, because it was tardy in bringing proceedings for failure to fulfil obligations.196 Moreover, a Member State cannot be regarded as having been fully apprised of the Commission’s position before the letter of formal notice where the Commission did not make any clear view known to it.197 (3) Reasoned opinion (a) Content and purpose If the Commission is of the view that the Member State failed to remedy the failure to fulfil obligations under Union law, it may issue a reasoned opinion. That

188 See C-127/12, Commission v Spain, 2014, para. 24. 189 See 51/83 Commission v Italy, 1984, para. 6. For an example, see C-145/01, Commission v Italy, 2003, paras 17–18 (the reasoned opinion and the application made to the Court pursuant to the second para. of Art. 258 TFEU were flawed with regard to the rights of the defence since: (1) they referred to rules of Union law other than those cited in the letter of formal notice; and (2) a change in the legal situation was likely to have affected the assessment of the compatibility of the national legislation in question with Union law). 190 See 51/83, Commission v Italy, 1984, para. 7. 191 See C-306/91, Commission v Italy, 1993, paras 22–24; C-243/89, Commission v Denmark, 1993, para. 13. 192 See C-97/17, Commission v Bulgaria, 2018, para. 18. 193 See C-642/18, Commission v Spain, 2019, para. 19. 194 See C-66/18, Commission v Hungary, 2020, para. 46. 195 See C‑715/17, C‑718/17, and C‑719/17, Commission v Poland and Others, 2020, para. 92; C-549/18, Commission v Romania, 2020, para. 70. For example, in one case involving a time-limit of fifteen days in relation to the letter of formal notice and five working days in relation to the reasoned opinion, with extensions granted for both, the application was held admissible: see C-1/00, Commission v France, 2001, paras 65–69, 76. 196 For an example, see C-66/18, Commission v Hungary, 2020, paras 50–51 (rejecting Hungary’s arguments that the short time-limits given to it were the result of inertia of the Commission). 197 See 293/85, Commission v Belgium, 1988, paras 10–20.

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5.48

5.49

206 THE ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF UNION LAW BY A MEMBER STATE document describes the infringement of Union law in detail and prescribes the time within which the Member State must put an end to it.198 As in the case of the letter of formal notice, delivery of a reasoned opinion is an essential procedural requirement for the purposes of the legality of the proceedings and the admissibility of any proceedings brought against the Member State before the Court of Justice.199 The issuance of a reasoned opinion constitutes a preliminary procedure, which does not have any binding legal effect for the addressee. It is merely a pre-litigation stage of a procedure that may lead to an action before the Court.200 The purpose of that pre-litigation procedure provided for by Art. 258 TFEU is to enable the Member State concerned to comply of its own accord with the requirements of the Treaties or, if appropriate, to justify its position.201 If that attempt at settlement is unsuccessful, the function of the reasoned opinion is to define the subject-matter of the dispute.202 However, the Commission is not empowered to determine conclusively, by reasoned opinions formulated pursuant to Art. 258 TFEU, the rights and duties of a Member State, or to afford that State guarantees concerning the compatibility of a given line of conduct with the Treaties.203 According to the system embodied in Arts 258–260 TFEU, the rights and duties of Member States may be determined and their conduct appraised only by a judgment of the Court.204 The reasoned opinion therefore has legal effect only in relation to the commencement of proceedings before the Court so that where a Member State does not comply with that opinion within the period allowed, the Commission has the right, but not the duty, to commence proceedings before the Court.205

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(b) Collegiate responsibility of the Commission A decision to issue a reasoned opinion is subject to the principle of collegiate responsibility, since it is not a measure of administration or management and therefore may not be delegated. Yet, here too (see para. 5.32), a less stringent approach to effective compliance with the principle of collegiate responsibility applies, having regard to the legal consequences attaching to reasoned opinions in that it is not necessary for the college itself formally to decide on the wording of the act which gives effect to the decision to issue a reasoned opinion and put it in final form. It is sufficient that the decision was the subject of collective deliberation by the college of Commissioners and

198 See C-122/18, Commission v Italy, 2020, para. 58; C-664/18, Commission v United Kingdom, 2021, para. 50. 199 See 325/82, Commission v Germany, 1984, para. 8; C-152/89, Commission v Luxembourg, 1991, para. 9. 200 See T-374/14, Bharat Heavy Electricals v Commission (order), 2014, para. 12. 201 See C-213/19, Commission v United Kingdom, 2022, para. 131. 202 See C‑715/17, C‑718/17, and C‑719/17, Commission v Poland and Others, 2020, para. 122; C-342/21, Commission v Slovakia, 2023, para. 105. 203 See C-135/01, Commission v Germany, 2003, para. 24; C-213/19, Commission v United Kingdom, 2022, para. 165. 204 See C-191/95, Commission v Germany, 1998, para. 45. 205 See C-191/95, Commission v Germany, 1998, para. 46.

Special Characteristics 207 that the information on which the decision was based was available to the members of the college.206 (c) Reasoned opinion must be coherent and detailed The reasoned opinion is sufficiently reasoned if it contains a coherent and detailed statement of the reasons that led the Commission to believe that the Member State in question has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties.207 The opinion may only relate to shortcomings of the Member State that were mentioned in the letter of formal notice.208 (d) Relationship with the letter of formal notice The reasoned opinion must be clear in itself.209 A general reference to the letter of formal notice is not sufficient.210 While the letter of formal notice, which comprises an initial succinct résumé of the alleged infringement, may be useful in construing the reasoned opinion, the Commission is nonetheless obliged to specify precisely in that opinion the grounds of complaint which it already raised more generally in the letter of formal notice and alleges against the Member State concerned, after taking cognizance of any observations submitted by it under the first paragraph of Art. 258 TFEU. That requirement is essential in order to delimit the subject-matter of the dispute prior to any initiation of the contentious procedure provided for in the second paragraph of Art. 258 TFEU and in order to ensure that the Member State in question is accurately apprised of the grounds of complaint maintained against it by the Commission and can thus bring an end to the alleged infringement or put forward its arguments in defence prior to any application to the Court by the Commission.211 In the reasoned opinion, however, the Commission may set out the complaints contained in the letter of formal notice in more detail and refine them.212 The Commission takes account in the reasoned opinion of the observations submitted by the Member State in response to the letter of formal notice.213 Nevertheless, if the reasoned opinion contains new complaints, the Court of Justice will have regard in the subsequent judicial proceedings 206 See C-191/95, Commission v Germany, 1998, paras 34–36, 48; see also C-251/09, Commission v Cyprus, 2011, para. 17. 207 See C-20/09, Commission v Portugal, 2011, para. 20; C-530/11, Commission v United Kingdom, 2014, para. 40; C-97/17, Commission v Bulgaria, 2018, para. 19. 208 See C-145/01, Commission v Italy, 2003, para. 18; C-433/13, Commission v Slovakia, 2015, paras 48–51. 209 In case of doubt as to the clarity of a reasoned opinion, the reply of the Member State government concerned to the opinion can be taken into account in order to assess whether the grounds of complaint raised by the Commission were comprehensible (see C-463/01, Commission v Germany, 2004, para. 31). 210 See C-350/02, Commission v Netherlands, 2004, para. 27. 211 See C-350/02, Commission v Netherlands, 2004, para. 21. 212 See C-530/11, Commission v United Kingdom, 2014, para. 40; C-104/15, Commission v Romania, 2016, para. 33; C-97/17, Commission v Bulgaria, 2018, para. 19. The Commission may include new examples in an additional reasoned opinion where these examples are mere illustrations of the initial complaint as formulated in the letter of formal notice: see C-127/12, Commission v Spain, 2014, para. 26. See further para. 5.56. 213 If the Commission takes no account in the reasoned opinion of the observations submitted by the Member State concerned in response to the letter of formal notice, this may mean that the nature and scope of the dispute are not precisely defined at the time when the case is brought before the Court. If so, the Court will hold that the pre-litigation procedure was not properly conducted and declare the application manifestly inadmissible: see C-266/94, Commission v Spain (order), 1995, paras 16–26. Although, in principle, the Commission is required to state in its reasoned opinion how it assesses the Member State’s observations, even if they are received late, a

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208 THE ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF UNION LAW BY A MEMBER STATE only to those contained both in the letter of formal notice and in the reasoned opinion,214 or will dismiss the action altogether.215 This is because the Member State was in a position to submit observations only on those complaints in accordance with the first paragraph of Art. 258 TFEU before the Commission delivered its reasoned opinion.

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(e) Reasoned opinion may propose measures to be taken The Commission also may—but is not obliged to216—set forth the measures which need to be taken in order to bring the infringement to an end. To this extent, the Member State’s freedom to determine the manner in which it terminates the relevant infringement of Union law is restricted. The fact that the Court of Justice is confined to making a ‘finding’ that there has been a failure to fulfil an obligation does not affect this power of the Commission. This is because the aim of Art. 258 TFEU proceedings is to achieve the practical elimination of infringements.217 Where the Commission indicates in its reasoned opinion the measures required to this end and the Member State does not act on it, the ‘finding’ made by the Court of Justice refers both to the actual infringement of Union law and to the measures which could have been taken in order to bring the infringement to an end. As a result, the Member State then knows— from the reasoning of the Court’s judgment finding the infringement—what measures indicated in the reasoned opinion are capable of bringing the failure to fulfil obligations to an end. (f) Prescribed period The Commission must prescribe in the reasoned opinion the time within which the Member State must comply with it. The period must be reasonable, having regard to the circumstances of the case.218 The Court of Justice has no power to alter the period prescribed by the Commission.219 An action for failure to fulfil obligations brought after the expiry of a period that was too short to enable the Member State to take the

failure to do so will not result directly in the inadmissibility of the application if it did not make it impossible for the Member State to put an end to the alleged infringement, did not compromise its rights of defence, and had no effect on the definition of the subject-matter of the dispute (see C-362/01, Commission v Ireland, 2002, paras 14–22). See also C-79/09, Commission v Netherlands, 2010, paras 20–25: in response to the Netherlands’ objection that the Commission’s failure to take account of the arguments put forward in its response to the reasoned opinion went against the fundamental objectives of the pre-litigation stage of the procedure, the Court underlined that this had no effect on the rights of defence of the Member State concerned or on the scope of the dispute, especially as the Netherlands’ arguments essentially reiterated those set forth in its response to the letter of formal notice. 214 See 51/83, Commission v Italy, 1984, paras 6–8; C-159/99, Commission v Italy, 2001, para. 54; C-433/13, Commission v Slovakia, 2015, paras 48–51. 215 See C-522/09, Commission v Romania, 2011, paras 15–20. 216 See C-376/13, Commission v Bulgaria, 2015, para. 53. It is only where the Commission intends to make the failure to adopt measures to enable the infringement complained of to be remedied the subject-matter of its action for failure to fulfil obligations that it has to specify those measures in the reasoned opinion: see C-328/96, Commission v Austria, 1999, para. 39; C-394/02, Commission v Greece, 2005, para. 23. 217 See C-364/10, Hungary v Slovakia, 2012, paras 67–68. 218 See C-66/18, Commission v Hungary, 2020, para. 46. See C-320/03, Commission v Austria, 2005, paras 33–34 (one week was deemed to be sufficient). See also para. 5.48, in relation to the time prescribed for submitting observations on the letter of formal notice. 219 See 28/81, Commission v Italy, 1981, para. 6; 29/81, Commission v Italy, 1981, para. 6.

Special Characteristics 209 necessary measures or, as the case may be, to prepare its defence, will be declared inadmissible.220 The application may be declared admissible, however, if in the actual case the aims of the pre-litigation procedure were nevertheless achieved, in spite of the unreasonably short period of time allowed to the Member State.221

B. The stage of the procedure before the Court of Justice (1) Conditions of admissibility (a) The requirement for the pre-litigation stage of the procedure to be properly conducted The proper conduct of the pre-litigation stage of the procedure is, as already noted, 5.55 an essential guarantee required by the Treaties in order not only to protect the rights of the Member State concerned, but also to ensure that any contentious procedure will have a clearly defined dispute as its subject-matter.222 For those reasons, the Commission must take account in the reasoned opinion of the observations submitted by the Member State concerned in response to the letter of formal notice.223 If the Commission fails to satisfy this requirement, this may mean that the subject- matter of the dispute is not precisely defined. Such an irregularity in the conduct of the pre-litigation stage of the procedure may result in the application being declared manifestly inadmissible.224 (b) Concordance between the letter of formal notice, the reasoned opinion, and the application (i) Concordance between the pre-litigation stage and the application Since the subject-matter of the proceedings is defined in the pre-litigation stage, the application by which the action for failure to fulfil obligations is brought before the Court of Justice must accord both with the reasoned opinion and with the letter of formal notice.225 Where necessary, the Court will take up this point of its own 220 See 293/85, Commission v Belgium, 1988, para. 20. 221 For an example, see 74/82, Commission v Ireland, 1984, para. 13. 222 See C-552/15, Commission v Ireland, 2017, para. 29; C-441/17, Commission v Poland, 2018, para. 64; C‑715/17, C‑718/17, and C‑719/17, Commission v Poland and Others, 2020, para. 91; C-66/18, Commission v Hungary, 2020, para. 45; C-638/18, Commission v Romania, 2020, paras 48–49. 223 See C-433/13, Commission v Slovakia, 2015, para. 41. 224 See C-266/94, Commission v Spain (order), 1995; compare C-362/01, Commission v Ireland, 2002, paras 19–22. 225 See C-669/16, Commission v United Kingdom, 2018, para. 39; C-441/17, Commission v Poland, 2018, para. 65; C-427/17, Commission v Ireland, 2019, para. 83; C-787/19, Commission v Austria, 2021, para. 20; C-661/20, Commission v Slovakia, 2022, para. 44; C-278/20, Commission v Spain, 2022, para. 24. For some examples, see C-186/06, Commission v Spain, 2007, paras 16–17 (complaint in application not mentioned in either the letter of formal notice or reasoned opinion held inadmissible); C-237/12, Commission v France, 2014, paras 102–103 (complaint raised in statement of reply not mentioned in application or reasoned opinion held inadmissible). Compare C-475/08, Commission v Belgium, 2009, paras 20–23 (rights of defence of Member State not undermined by Commission changing relevant provision of directive constituting basis for complaint); C-251/09, Commission v Cyprus, 2011, paras 19–24 (clerical error by Commission in specifying provision of Union law allegedly infringed by the Member State concerned in its reasoned opinion does not suffice where Member State itself referred to correct provision in its response to the reasoned opinion); C-371/19, Commission v Germany, 2020, paras 47–48 (arguments relied upon by the Commission in application to refute declarations made by Member State in reply to reasoned opinion do not enlarge subject-matter); C-432/21, Commission v Poland, 2023, paras 31–36 (clerical errors in operative part of the application specifying provisions of Union law allegedly infringed not affecting rights of the defence of Member State). It should be noted that the application must accord with the general requirements

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210 THE ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF UNION LAW BY A MEMBER STATE motion.226 This means that the alleged infringement of Union law must be defined in both the application and in the reasoned opinion in consistent, sufficiently precise terms,227 and that the application must be based on the same pleas and arguments as the reasoned opinion.228 For example, in principle the Commission cannot extend an action brought against a Member State for failing to transpose a directive in national law to cover the infringement of failing in practice to comply with provisions of the directive where that complaint was not raised during the pre-litigation stage.229 However, the statement of the subject-matter of the proceedings in the reasoned opinion does not of Art. 21 of the Statute and Art. 120 of the CJ Rules of Procedure: see C-356/15, Commission v Belgium, 2018, para. 32; C-395/17, Commission v Netherlands, 2019, para. 52; C‑715/17, C‑718/17, and C‑719/17, Commission v Poland and Others, 2020, para. 114. In particular, where the Commission does not include a complaint in its heads of claim, but only in the grounds of the application, the complaint has been ruled inadmissible by the Court: see C-255/04, Commission v France, 2006, paras 24–26. This is because an action must be considered having regard only to the form of order sought in the application: see C‑715/17, C‑718/17, and C‑719/17, Commission v Poland and Others, 2020, para. 113; see also C-508/03 Commission v United Kingdom, 2006, paras 60–64 (where the Commission failed to include a complaint in its application, even if it was mentioned in the letter of formal notice, reasoned opinion, and its reply, the complaint was held inadmissible). However, the fact that the precise date at which the Member State had failed to fulfil its obligations was not mentioned in the form of order sought, but only in certain grounds of the application, as well as in the letter of formal notice and in the reasoned opinion, does not lead to the inadmissibility of the application, as the Member State could not have any reasonable doubt regarding the precise date and was thus able to exercise its rights of defence effectively: see C‑715/17, C‑718/17, and C‑719/17, Commission v Poland and Others, 2020, paras 117–120. On the general requirements relating to applications in direct actions, as applied in the context of infringement proceedings, see C-510/20, Commission v Bulgaria, 2022, para. 17; C-432/21, Commission v Poland, 2023, paras 155–156. See further paras 22.13, 22.15. 226 See C-233/14, Commission v Netherlands, 2016, para. 43. See C-160/08 Commission v Germany, 2010, paras 40–52 (ruling not only complaints alleged for the first time in application as compared to pre-litigation procedure inadmissible, but also those alleged for the first time in reply). More generally, the Court may examine of its own motion whether the various conditions laid down by Art. 258 TFEU for bringing an action for failure to fulfil obligations are satisfied: see C-525/14, Commission v Czech Republic, 2016, para. 14. Thus, the Court can examine of its own motion whether the reasoned opinion and the action set out the complaints coherently and precisely: see C-34/11, Commission v Portugal, 2012, para. 43. 227 See C-199/04, Commission v United Kingdom, 2006, paras 17–23 (action based on contradictory arguments inadmissible); C-252/13, Commission v Netherlands, 2014, paras 38–43 (action inadmissible because Commission fails to identify any rule of Dutch law whose content or application is contrary to the provisions of Union law mentioned in application). See also C-34/11, Commission v Portugal, 2012, paras 43, 46–51: the absence of an indispensable element from the content of the application initiating proceedings, such as the period during which the Member State concerned, according to the Commission’s assertions, has infringed Union law, does not satisfy the requirements of coherence, clarity, and precision. Since it was, however, apparent from the documents submitted by the Member State concerned to the Commission on which the letter of formal notice had been based that the infringement related to the period 2005–2007, the application was declared admissible within these limits. 228 See C-441/17, Commission v Poland, 2018, para. 65; C-371/19, Commission v Germany, 2020, para. 47. See C-127/17, Commission v Poland, 2019, para. 120 (new pleas in law raised for the first time at the stage of the reply inadmissible); C-559/19, Commission v Spain, 2021, para. 160. The fact that the Commission changes the grounds supporting a particular plea in the application as compared to the pre-litigation procedure will render that plea inadmissible: C-186/06, Commission v Spain, 2007, paras 18–23. This will not be the case, however, where the Commission has added additional grounds supporting a particular plea. In such case, only the additional grounds will be inadmissible and the plea will be examined on the basis of the other grounds: see C-237/12, Commission v France, 2014, paras 125–126. Further to this, an argument, albeit new, merely supporting the pleas and grounds initially complained of does not constitute an extension of the subject-matter of a dispute: see C-371/19, Commission v Germany, 2020, para. 48. Similarly, references to particular facts not mentioned in the reasoned opinion do not constitute an extension of the subject-matter of a dispute if they are merely added for reasons of completeness: see C-669/16, Commission v United Kingdom, 2018, para. 43. Also, where the Commission has relied in its reasoned opinion on a number of examples to illustrate the consequences of an infringement of Union law rules, such illustrations cannot be considered as limiting the subject-matter of the dispute: see C-601/14, Commission v Italy, 2016, paras 29–32. 229 See C-237/90, Commission v Germany, 1992, paras 20–22; but see C-32/05, Commission v Luxembourg, 2006, paras 54–56: under circumstances in which the Member State concerned failed to mention any measure transposing the directive in question in the course of the pre-litigation procedure and it was not until after the Commission brought proceedings before the Court of Justice that that Member State submitted, in its defence, that

Special Characteristics 211 have to be exactly the same as the form of order sought in the application if the subject- matter of the proceedings has not been extended or altered,230 but simply clarified231 or restated in greater detail,232 or if the subject-matter—compared to the pre-litigation proceedings—has been limited.233 Moreover, an application will be admissible only insofar as the Commission adduces matters of fact and law which support the conclusions set out in general terms in the reasoned opinion and the application.234 (ii) Infringement relates to a cluster of acts Where an action for failure to fulfil obligations relates, not to a single act, but to a cluster of acts, each involving a separate infringement, the Member State must have been given a law transposing the directive in question had been adopted, the Court held that if the pre-litigation procedure attained its objective of protecting the rights of the Member State concerned, the latter could not complain that the Commission had extended or altered the subject-matter of the action as defined in the pre-litigation procedure on the grounds that the Commission, after alleging a failure to transpose a directive, has specified in its reply that the implementation pleaded for the first time by the Member State concerned in its defence is incorrect or incomplete so far as certain provisions of the directive are concerned. Where the Commission has given a Member State formal notice of a failure to transpose a directive and the Member State adopts some implementing measures after the pre-litigation stage but not all those necessary in order to transpose the directive, the Commission may restrict the form of order sought in the application made to the Court to those provisions not yet implemented at that time: see C-132/94, Commission v Ireland, 1995, paras 7–9; but see C-274/93, Commission v Luxembourg, 1996, paras 12–13. In a case where the Commission specified that a Member State had breached ‘in particular’ certain provisions of a Union act, the Court rejected the form of order sought to the extent of provisions other than those mentioned expressly therein: see C-343/08, Commission v Czech Republic, 2010, paras 24–28. Similarly, the Commission cannot extend the subject-matter beyond the national provisions indicated in the pre-litigation procedure: see C-569/10, Commission v Poland, 2013, para. 30. 230 See C-441/17, Commission v Poland, 2018, para. 66; C-638/18, Commission v Romania, 2020, para. 49; C-787/19, Commission v Austria, 2021, para. 21. 231 See C-591/13, Commission v Germany, 2015, para. 19; C-461/14, Commission v Spain, 2016, para. 27. 232 See C-644/18, Commission v Italy, 2020, para. 67; C-635/18, Commission v Germany, 2021, para. 47. See C-185/00, Commission v Finland, 2003, para. 87 (the fact that in the application the Commission sets out in detail the complaints it had already made in a more general way in the letter of formal notice and the reasoned opinion has no effect on the scope of the proceedings); C-139/00, Commission v Spain, 2002, para. 19 (the Commission can reword the complaints in the application to take account of additional evidence produced after notification of the reasoned opinion); C-484/06, Commission v United Kingdom, 2006, paras 25–27 (the fact that the Commission confined itself to criticism of certain national guidelines to substantiate a complaint of failure to implement correctly certain provisions of a directive, whereas the application was directed more generally at the lack of adequate national measures to ensure full and effective implementation of the directive, was held admissible because the subject-matter defined in the reasoned opinion had not been changed); C-458/08, Commission v Portugal, 2010, paras 45–48 (the fact that in its application the Commission set out in detail arguments which had already been put forward in general terms in the letter of formal notice and the reasoned opinion did not alter the subject of the infringement, and in those circumstances, ‘there is no requirement that the Commission’s arguments should, at the application stage, specifically relate to the details of responses given by the [Member State concerned] during the pre-litigation procedure, which the Commission has, moreover, largely reproduced in its application’); C-661/20, Commission v Slovakia, 2022, para. 54 (arguments developed by the Commission in its reply in order to respond to arguments put forward by the Member State in its defence do not alter the subject-matter of the dispute where the complaint has already been put forward in general terms in the application). See also C-573/19, Commission v Italy, 2022, para. 72. Compare C-256/98, Commission v France, 2000, paras 29–33, where, in its reply, the Commission amends its grounds of complaint so as to go beyond a mere restatement, albeit in greater detail, of the initial complaints, or thereby raises submissions before the Court which were not put forward during the pre-litigation procedure or in the application initiating the proceedings, the Court will hold that the Commission must be deemed to have withdrawn its original complaints and declare the application inadmissible. In general, a party cannot alter the subject-matter of the case during the proceedings before the Court: see C-718/18, Commission v Germany, 2021, para. 98. 233 See C-134/10, Commission v Belgium, 2011, para. 24; C-638/18, Commission v Romania, 2020, para. 49; C-661/20, Commission v Slovakia, 2022, paras 123–124; see also C-117/02, Commission v Portugal, 2004, paras 52–55: the Commission can base its application on a complaint which was raised only in the alternative in the pre- litigation procedure insofar as the complaint was set out in the reasoned opinion. 234 See C-429/97, Commission v France, 2001, para. 56; C-34/11, Commission v Portugal, 2012, para. 49.

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212 THE ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF UNION LAW BY A MEMBER STATE an opportunity in the pre-litigation stage to set forth its defence to each breach of which it stands accused. If the letter of formal notice referred only to certain isolated cases, the action cannot extend to the whole collection of acts categorized as infringements. In this event, the application will be admissible only to the extent to which the acts complained of in the application were also dealt with in the pre-litigation stage.235 5.58

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(iii) Modification of national and Union legislation If, in both the pre-litigation stage (the letter of formal notice and the reasoned opinion) and in its application, the Commission complains of a specific shortcoming on the part of the Member State, the latter cannot claim that the application is irregular on the grounds that the same shortcoming was due in the pre-litigation stage to a different national provision than the one to which it was attributable at the time when the action was brought. This is because the shortcoming with which the Member State is charged is not the existence of a specific provision incompatible with Union law, but the specific shortcoming arising as a result of such provision. As a result, a change in the national provision in the course of or after the pre-litigation procedure does not jeopardize the admissibility of the action for failure to fulfil obligations, provided that the two versions of national legislation are identical in content.236 Conversely, where the obligations arising under the new provision do not correspond to those arising under the original version of the measure concerned, including them in the application would, however, amount to changing the subject-matter of the dispute.237 Further to this, the Commission may bring an admissible application for a declaration of failure to fulfil obligations under a directive for facts that occurred before a Member State was required to bring into force the measures implementing that directive where the obligations in question find their origin in the original version of that directive, which was applicable at the time of the facts complained of, and were subsequently retained.238 (iv) Infringements committed after the notification of the reasoned opinion The requirement that the reasoned opinion and the application must accord with each other does not preclude infringements committed by the Member State after notification of the reasoned opinion from nevertheless being covered by the application, provided that the conduct at issue is of the same kind as that complained of in that 235 See 309/84, Commission v Italy, 1986, paras 15–16. 236 See C-203/03, Commission v Austria, 2005, para. 29; C-241/08 Commission v France, 2010, paras 12–13; C-384/18, Commission v Belgium, 2020, para. 19. 237 See C-729/17, Commission v Greece, 2019, paras 36–42; C-661/20, Commission v Slovakia, 2022, paras 45–54; compare C-177/03 Commission v France, 2004, para. 21, in which the Court ruled that where the relevant national provisions have fundamentally changed between the expiry of the period laid down for compliance with the reasoned opinion and the lodging of the application, that change in circumstances may render the judgment to be given by the Court otiose. According to the Court, in such situations, it may be preferable for the Commission not to bring an action but to issue a new reasoned opinion precisely identifying the complaints that it intends pursuing, having regard to the changed circumstances. 238 See C-488/15, Commission v Bulgaria, 2017, para. 52; C-482/14, Commission v Germany, 2017, para. 50; C-336/16, Commission v Poland, 2018, para. 44; C-286/21, Commission v France, 2022, para. 38. As a related point, even if the Union act constituting the basis for the infringement has been repealed by a subsequent measure or has expired, if it was in force by the expiry of the date specified in the reasoned opinion, the action is not devoid of purpose and hence admissible: see C‑715/17, C‑718/17, and C‑719/17, Commission v Poland and Others, 2020, paras 60–62.

Special Characteristics 213 opinion.239 This case-law finds application where the Commission alleges a general and persistent infringement, as facts occurring after the expiry of the deadline given in the reasoned opinion further establish the general and persistent nature of the infringement alleged.240 Accordingly, the Court of Justice is entitled to take account of administrative practices that were applied after the reasoned opinion was given, but were substantively the same as those referred to in the reasoned opinion.241 Factual circumstances referred to in the reasoned opinion that continued after it was given may unquestionably be reviewed by the Court of Justice for the whole of their duration.242 (v) Measures taken in order to comply with the reasoned opinion An infringement arising where a Member State takes measures in order to eliminate 5.60 an infringement complained of by the Commission may be the subject of an action for failure to fulfil obligations only if a new pre-litigation stage is held. This is because the infringement resulting from the measures in question is not the same as the breach originally complained of. It is therefore impossible to bring a new action on the basis of the original pre-litigation procedure without infringing the requirement that the subject- matter of the reasoned opinion and the application must be the same.243 (vi) New application may remedy defects If the Court declares an application inadmissible on the grounds that the application 5.61 does not square with the reasoned opinion, the Commission may remedy the defects by submitting a new application based on the same complaints, pleas in law, and arguments as the reasoned opinion. If it does this, it is not under a duty to start the pre- litigation stage afresh or to issue a supplementary reasoned opinion.244 (c) Existence of a failure to fulfil obligations (i) Infringement no longer exists on the expiry of the period prescribed in the reasoned opinion An action for failure to fulfil obligations is admissible only if the infringement complained of exists on the expiry of the period prescribed by the reasoned 239 See C-644/18, Commission v Italy, 2020, para. 66; C-637/18, Commission v Hungary, 2021, para. 60; C-664/18, Commission v United Kingdom, 2021, paras 50–51, 78; C-661/20, Commission v Slovakia, 2022, para. 95. 240 See C-635/18, Commission v Germany, 2021, paras 45–55. A typical example is the Court’s case-law regarding the exceedance of the limit values for nitrogen dioxide or micro parts in breach of Directive 2008/50/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008, on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe (OJ 2008 L152/1). See C-664/18, Commission v United Kingdom, 2021, paras 77–78; C-573/19, Commission v Italy, 2022, para. 71; C-125/20, Commission v Spain, 2022, para. 62; C-342/21, Commission v Slovakia, 2023, para. 51; C-633/21, Commission v Greece, 2023, para. 31. See also C-217/19, Commission v Finland, 2020, para. 58 regarding the practice of the Finnish authorities to issue authorizations for spring hunting of male specimens of the ‘common eider’ bird species in the province of Åland in breach of Directive 2009/147/EC. While Finland was notified of the reasoned opinion of the Commission on 9 December 2016, the Court decided that Finland failed to comply with its Union law obligations for the period 2011–2019, since the practice of issuing authorizations had continued after the expiry of the time-limit laid down in the reasoned opinion. See para. 5.11 241 See 42/82, Commission v France, 1983, para. 20; 113/86, Commission v Italy, 1988, para. 11; C-221/04 Commission v Spain, 2006, paras 27–29. 242 See 42/82, Commission v France, 1983, para. 20. 243 See 7/69, Commission v Italy, 1970, paras 4–5; 391/85, Commission v Belgium, 1988; C-207/97, Commission v Belgium, 1999, para. 25. 244 See C-57/94, Commission v Italy, 1995, para. 14.

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214 THE ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF UNION LAW BY A MEMBER STATE opinion.245 The action indeed is to no purpose if the Member State has taken all the necessary measures in time so as to eliminate the infringement at issue.246 The same applies where all the effects of the national conduct at issue have been exhausted on the expiry of the period prescribed by the reasoned opinion.247 The Court is, however, very strict before concluding that this is the case.248 That strictness is motivated by the fact that otherwise Member States could evade infringement proceedings by short-lived infringements, however detrimental to the Union.249 The Commission must be able to play its role as guardian of the Treaties for such infringements.250 In addition, upholding the inadmissibility of an infringement action in cases where it is not clear how the defendant Member State can concretely comply with a judgment finding the infringement would be detrimental to both the binding nature of Union acts as well as the values on which the Union is founded, in particular the rule of law.251 Lastly, the finding of an infringement is not devoid of purpose, as it can serve as a basis for Member State liability.252 The expiry of the period for compliance with Union law laid down in the reasoned opinion is the point in time to assess whether a Member State has infringed that law.253 It serves as an incentive for Member States to comply as early as possible with Union law, thereby avoiding Court proceedings.

245 See C-384/99, Commission v Belgium, 2000, para. 16; C-147/00, Commission v France, 2001, para. 26; C-119/00, Commission v Luxembourg, 2001, para. 14; C-29/01, Commission v Spain, 2002, para. 11; C-525/03, Commission v Italy, 2005, paras 8–17; C-221/04, Commission v Spain, 2006, paras 23–26; C-487/08, Commission v Spain, 2010, para. 34. As regards matters relating to the obligations placed on Member States prior to the date of accession, compare C-350/08, Commission v Lithuania, 2010, with C-508/08, Commission v Malta, 2010. Where the Commission brings an action under Art. 108(2) TFEU on the grounds that the Member State concerned has not complied with a decision requiring unlawful State aid to be repaid, the reference date for determining the failure to fulfil obligations is that provided for in the decision or, where appropriate, that subsequently fixed by the Commission: see C-363/16, Commission v Greece, 2018, paras 40, 43, 50; C-11/20, Commission v Greece, 2021, para. 36. 246 See 240/86, Commission v Greece, 1988, para. 16; C-439/99, Commission v Italy, 2002, paras 16–17; C-126/21, Commission v Ireland, 2022, para. 20. 247 See C-362/90, Commission v Italy, 1992, paras 11–13; C-525/03, Commission v Italy, 2005, paras 15–17. Compare C-456/05, Commission v Germany, 2007, paras 16–20; C-20/09, Commission v Portugal, 2011, paras 31–38: finding action admissible because disputed national provisions continued to produce effects; C-34/11, Commission v Portugal, 2012, para. 48: finding action in relation to a past situation admissible. See also C-221/04, Commission v Spain, 2006, paras 24–26: finding action inadmissible in relation to a permit that expired before deadline specified in reasoned opinion. 248 See C-620/16, Commission v Germany, 2019 (the systemic effect of Germany’s taking a position in an international organization contrary to a Council decision based on Article 218(9) TFEU on the unity and consistency of the Union’s external action extended well beyond the time set for compliance in the reasoned opinion); compare C‑715/17, C‑718/17, and C‑719/17, Commission v Poland and Others, 2020 (the Union acts allegedly infringed ceased to be applicable after the expiry of the time-limit set for compliance in the reasoned opinion). 249 See C-620/16, Commission v Germany, 2019, para. 48; C‑715/17, C‑718/17, and C‑719/17, Commission v Poland and Others, 2020, para. 63. 250 See C-620/16, Commission v Germany, 2019, para. 49; C‑715/17, C‑718/17, and C‑719/17, Commission v Poland and Others, 2020, para. 64. 251 See C-620/16, Commission v Germany, 2019, para. 50; C‑715/17, C‑718/17, and C‑719/17, Commission v Poland and Others, 2020, para. 65. 252 See C‑715/17, C‑718/17, and C‑719/17, Commission v Poland and Others, 2020, para. 66. 253 See C-550/18, Commission v Ireland, 2020, para. 30; C-664/18, Commission v United Kingdom, 2021, para. 77; C-658/19, Commission v Spain, 2021, para. 15; C-787/19, Commission v Austria, 2021, para. 34. See C-668/19, Commission v Italy, 2021, paras 29–31 regarding the relevant period in case of a supplementary reasoned opinion.

Special Characteristics 215 (ii) Infringement ceases after the prescribed period in the reasoned opinion If the Member State has not taken measures in time, the application will be admissible. Even if the Member State remedies the infringement after the prescribed period has expired, but before the action is brought, the application will still be admissible. Under settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation in that Member State at the time of the deadline set down in the reasoned opinion and thus the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes.254 In the light of the potential liability on the part of the Member State, there remains an interest for the Union, other Member States, and individuals in the Court’s making a finding that there has been an infringement. The finding may then serve as the basis for claims for damages.255 (iii) Acknowledgement of the infringement by the Member State The fact that the Member State acknowledges that it has failed to fulfil its obligations and its resultant liability during the pre-litigation stage of the procedure or after the action has been brought before the Court of Justice does not mean that the application is to no purpose. Otherwise, the Member State would be at liberty, at any time during the proceedings, to have them brought to an end without any judicial determination of the breach of obligations and of the basis of its liability, and the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to make a determination—after an action has been brought—as to whether or not Union law has been infringed would be impaired.256

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(d) Time-limits (i) Calculation of the expiry of the time-limit laid down in the reasoned opinion 5.65 While there does not seem to have been much litigation on this issue to date, it appears that the expiry of the time-limit laid down in the reasoned opinion is calculated from the date of receipt or notification of the Member State, not the date specified in the reasoned opinion itself.257 (ii) Commission’s discretion In exercising its powers in connection with an action for failure to fulfil obligations, the Commission does not have to comply with any specific time-limits. Consequently, as established by the case-law, it has discretion in the sense that it is free to judge when it starts the pre-litigation stage and at what time after the expiry of the period prescribed by the 254 See C-787/19, Commission v Austria, 2021, para. 34; C-658/19, Commission v Spain, 2021, para. 15; C-664/18, Commission v United Kingdom, 2021, para. 77; C-51/20, Commission v Bulgaria, 2022, para. 39; C-661/20, Commission v Slovakia, 2022, para. 44. This applies all the more for forthcoming amendments of the legislation concerned: see C-640/13, Commission v United Kingdom, 2014, para. 44. 255 See 39/72, Commission v Italy, 1973, para. 11; C-168/03, Commission v Spain, 2004, para. 24; C‑715/17, C‑718/17, and C‑719/17, Commission v Poland and Others, 2020, para. 66. 256 See C-243/89, Commission v Denmark, 1993, para. 30; C-320/15, Commission v Greece, 2017, para. 21; C-427/17, Commission v Ireland, 2019, paras 43, 50. An application from a Member State for the proceedings to be stayed in order to allow it to put an end to the infringement and hence in the expectation of a hypothetical withdrawal of the action by the Commission cannot be granted, since a failure to fulfil obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period prescribed in the reasoned opinion: see C-294/09, Commission v Ireland, 2010, para. 20; C-152/16, Commission v Luxembourg, 2016, para. 16. 257 See C-503/04, Commission v Germany, 2007, paras 19–20; C-369/07, Commission v Greece, 2009, paras 10, 44. For general discussion of the calculation of time-limits, see paras 22.65–22.70.

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216 THE ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF UNION LAW BY A MEMBER STATE reasoned opinion it brings an action before the Court of Justice.258 Yet, the Commission may not abuse its discretion.259 For instance, if the pre-litigation procedure is excessively long, the Member State may find it more difficult to refute the Commission’s arguments, and this may constitute an infringement of the rights of the defence.260 The Member State has to prove that the unusual length of the pre-litigation procedure had adverse effects on the way in which it conducted its defence.261 Only if it succeeds in proving this will the application be declared inadmissible. However, the burden of proof is difficult for the Member State to discharge, since there will generally be factors justifying the unusually long lapse of time between the ‘infringement’ and the commencement of the procedure or the unusual duration of the pre-litigation stage, causing them not to be regarded as excessive.262 A good illustration is Commission v Netherlands (‘Open skies’),263 in which, despite the Netherlands’ arguments that six years had elapsed before the Commission’s initiation of the pre-litigation procedure and four years had elapsed between its issuance of the reasoned opinion and bringing the action before the Court of Justice, the Court found that the Netherlands failed to prove that the unusual duration of the proceedings had any effect on the way in which it organized its defence and rejected its attempt to invoke the principle of protection of legitimate expectations in this regard.264

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(2) Aspects of the treatment given to the substantive claim (a) Burden of proof (i) Commission bears the burden of proof The burden of proof as regards each head of claim constituting the failure to fulfil obligations has to be discharged by the Commission.265 This means that it is for 258 See 7/68, Commission v Italy, 1968 ECR. 423, 428; C-552/15, Commission v Ireland, 2017, para. 36; C-628/18, Commission v Slovenia, 2021, para. 73; C-213/19, Commission v United Kingdom, 2022, para. 164; C-126/21, Commission v Ireland, 2022, para. 23. See C-333/99, Commission v France, 2001, para. 25 (in that case the Commission brought an action seven years after it had received the observations of the Member State concerned on the reasoned opinion). Arguments concerning the purported violation of the principle of legal certainty, the protection of legitimate expectations, and the principle of sound administration have been rejected, though the Court of Justice has based its rulings on the specific situations at issue, as opposed to excluding their potential applicability for rendering the action inadmissible altogether: see C-508/03, Commission v United Kingdom, 2006, paras 66–69; C-350/08, Commission v Lithuania, 2010, paras 36–39; C-552/15, Commission v Ireland, 2017, para. 34; compare C-122/11, Commission v Belgium, 2013, para. 50, where the Court criticizes the Commission for waiting too long to bring an action before the Court. See further C-432/21, Commission v Poland, 2023, para. 162. 259 See C-177/03, Commission v France, 2004, para. 17. The bar for a finding of misuse of powers is, however, high. See C-12/14, Commission v Malta, 2016, para. 26. 260 See C-126/21, Commission v Ireland, 2022, para. 24. 261 See C-591/13, Commission v Germany, 2015, para. 14; C-274/15, Commission v Luxembourg, 2017, para. 39; C-276/19, Commission v Romania, 2020, para. 60. 262 In 7/71, Commission v France, 1971, the Commission applied to the Court of Justice in 1971 to find an infringement which had existed since 1965. The infringement did not come to light until 1968, and the Commission formally started the procedure in April 1970 following informal contacts with the Member State. In 324/82, Commission v Belgium, 1984, the Commission waited until the directive concerned had been implemented in all the Member States before investigating the contested Belgian measures. In C-96/89, Commission v Netherlands, 1991, the Commission waited for the Court of Justice to give judgment in another case and for the reaction of the Netherlands Government. 263 See C-523/04, Commission v Netherlands, 2007. 264 See C-523/04, Commission v Netherlands, 2007, paras 27–30. See also C-42/03 Commission v Spain, 2004, paras 21–25, in which the Court held that the Member State did not establish that its rights of defence were violated because a period of ten years had elapsed between the letter of formal notice and the application to the Court. 265 96/81, Commission v Netherlands, 1982, para. 6; C-78/18, Commission v Hungary, 2020, para. 36; C-808/18, Commission v Hungary, 2020, para. 112. However, it is not sufficient for the Commission, in order to claim that

Special Characteristics 217 the Commission to prove the alleged failure to fulfil obligations by placing before the Court of Justice all the information needed to enable the Court to establish that the obligation has not been fulfilled.266 It has to adduce sufficient evidence to the Court of Justice that the infringement existed at the time when the period prescribed by the reasoned opinion expired.267 The Commission may not rely on any presumptions (of law) in this connection.268 It is settled case-law that the scope of national laws, regulations, or administrative provisions must be assessed in the light of the interpretation given to them by national courts. Therefore, if a national provision can be interpreted in two ways—one consistent with and another one inconsistent with Union law—the Commission will have to prove that the national courts interpret the domestic provision at issue inconsistently with Union law.269 An application from the Commission for an expert’s report to be commissioned by the Court will be refused, since if it were granted the Commission itself would not be providing evidence of the alleged failure to fulfil obligations.270

the defendant Member State has not complied with a provision of Union law, merely to cite that provision in the section of the reasoned opinion or of the application which covers the legal context and which is purely descriptive and lacking of any explanatory character (C-202/99, Commission v Italy, 2001, para. 21). For recent examples in which the Commission failed to carry its burden of proof, see C-399/17, Commission v Czech Republic, 2019; C-427/17, Commission v Ireland, 2019, paras 96–103; C-63/19, Commission v Italy, 2021; C-166/21, Commission v Poland, 2022. Furthermore, while the Commission may fail to carry its burden of proof as regards one of the grounds alleged to substantiate the alleged infringement, it may nonetheless carry its burden with respect to others, with the result that its action is partially well-founded: see C-263/99, Commission v Italy, 2001, paras 27–28; C-383/09, Commission v France, 2011, paras 38–39. 266 See C-433/15, Commission v Italy, 2018, para. 43; C-427/17, Commission v Ireland, 2019, paras 38, 57; C-391/17, Commission v United Kingdom, 2019, para. 111; C-537/19, Commission v Austria, 2021, para. 55. 267 See 121/84 Commission v Italy, 1986, paras 10–12. Thus, in C-248/02 Commission v Italy, 2004, para. 28, the Court, in assessing whether or not there has been an infringement, took no account of information provided to the Commission by the Member State after the expiry of the period prescribed in the reasoned opinion. Likewise, in C-504/14, Commission v Greece, 2016, paras 18–26, the Court decided that new evidence produced during the proceedings could only be taken into account in so far as it concerned the factual and legal situation that existed at the time of expiry of the time-limit laid down in the reasoned opinion. 268 See C- 237/12, Commission v France, 2014, para. 32; C-808/18, Commission v Hungary, 2020, para. 112; C-537/19, Commission v Austria, 2021, para. 55; C-573/19, Commission v Italy, 2022, para. 101; but see C-316/19, Commission v Slovenia, 2020, paras 93–97: while the Commission acknowledged that it did not have specific information regarding the nature of the documents seized by the Slovenian authorities at the premises of the Central Bank of Slovenia, the Court nevertheless concluded that the documents seized must have included documents which were part of the archives of the ECB because of, first, the considerable number of documents seized and, second, the duties that the governor of a national central bank is called upon to carry out within the framework of the Governing Council of the ECB. 269 See C-382/92, Commission v United Kingdom, 1994, para. 36; C-300/95, Commission v United Kingdom, 1997, para. 37; C-433/13, Commission v Slovakia, 2015, para. 81. Note, however, that the burden of proof imposed upon the Commission in the context of infringement actions only concerns questions of fact. It cannot be required to prove how a rule of Union law should be interpreted: see C-616/15, Commission v Germany, 2017, para. 70. 270 See 141/87, Commission v Italy, 1989, para. 17. The Commission can, however, rely on any type of evidence that is available to it, including information made available to it by the Member State concerned (see C-427/17, Commission v Ireland, 2019, para. 58; C-668/19, Commission v Italy, 2021, paras 75–76); official documents issued by the authorities of the Member State concerned (see C-97/17, Commission v Bulgaria, 2018, para. 70); and reports compiled by the Council of Europe or the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees regarding the situation in the Member State concerned (see C-808/18, Commission v Hungary, 2020, paras 115–116). This flexible approach is justified by the fact that the Commission has no investigative powers and is largely reliant on information provided by complainants, by private or public bodies active in the territory of the Member State concerned as well as by the Member State concerned itself: see C-97/17, Commission v Bulgaria, 2018, para. 70; C-668/19, Commission v Italy, 2021, para. 75.

218 THE ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF UNION LAW BY A MEMBER STATE It is only when the Commission has produced sufficient evidence of the failure to fulfil obligations that the defendant Member State has to adduce its counter-arguments. In this regard, it is incumbent on the Member State to challenge in substance and in detail the information produced and the consequences flowing therefrom.271 5.68

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(ii) Differentiation of burden of proof The burden of proof imposed upon the Commission differs in light of the type of infringement that is being alleged. Where the Commission seeks to establish the incompatibility of a provision of national law with Union law, it is sufficient to demonstrate that the interpretation adopted under national law of the national provision concerned is incompatible with Union law. However, where the Commission seeks to establish that the application of a national provision is incompatible with Union law, an infringement can only be established by means of sufficiently documented and detailed proof of the alleged practice.272 The same applies where the Commission alleges the existence of a general and persistent infringement.273 That being said, where it comes to verifying whether national provisions intended to ensure effective implementation of a directive are applied correctly in practice, the Court takes into account that the Commission has no investigative powers. Thus, where the Commission has adduced sufficient evidence that national implementing measures are not being applied correctly in practice, it falls upon the Member State concerned to challenge in substance and detail the information produced by the Commission as well as the inferences drawn from it.274 (iii) Question of substance Whether the Commission has met the burden of proof is a question of substance.275 An action cannot be declared inadmissible for failure of the Commission to provide the Court with the required evidence. (iv) Duty of sincere cooperation imposed on the Member States Member States are under a duty, by virtue of the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Art. 4(3) TEU, to facilitate the achievement of the Commission’s tasks, which 271 See 272/86, Commission v Greece, 1988, para. 21; C-427/17, Commission v Ireland, 2019, para. 39; C-248/19, Commission v Cyprus, 2020, para. 21; C-371/19, Commission v Germany, 2020, para. 68. Where the Member State fails to do so, then the facts alleged by the Commission can be regarded as proven (see C-489/06, Commission v Greece, 2009, paras 40–42) and the infringement sustained (see C-507/08, Commission v Slovak Republic, 2010, paras 61–65). In the context of infringement cases concerning the fundamental freedoms, while the Commission bears the burden of proof as regards a sufficient showing that a particular act or conduct of a Member State constitutes a restriction to free movement or else the action fails (see C-565/08, Commission v Italy, 2011, paras 52–53), a Member State carries the burden of proof in a situation where that Member State invokes an imperative requirement as justification for derogating from the free movement rules (see C-110/05, Commission v Italy, 2009, para. 66; C-384/18, Commission v Belgium, 2020, para. 55: underscoring that such burden cannot be so extensive as to require the Member State to prove, positively, that no other conceivable measures could enable the objective to be attained under the same conditions). Once the Member State has substantiated a particular justification, the burden falls to the Commission to put forward sufficient proof opposing such justifications: see C-400/08, Commission v Spain, 2011, paras 100–103; see also C-28/09, Commission v Austria, 2011, paras 118–151. 272 See C-287/03, Commission v Belgium, 2005, paras 28–30; C-87/14, Commission v Ireland, 2015, para. 23; C-808/18, Commission v Hungary, 2020, para. 113. 273 See C-100/13, Commission v Germany, 2014, paras 37–42. See also para. 5.11. 274 See C-502/15, Commission v United Kingdom, 2017, paras 23–24; C-427/17, Commission v Ireland, 2019, para. 39; C-250/18, Commission v Croatia, 2019, para. 35; C-537/19, Commission v Austria, 2021, para. 56. 275 See C-678/13, Commission v Poland, 2015, para. 18; C-356/15, Commission v Belgium, 2018, para. 26; C-213/19, Commission v United Kingdom, 2022, para. 152.

Special Characteristics 219 consist in particular, in accordance with Art. 17(1) TEU, in ensuring that the measures taken by the institutions pursuant to the Treaties are applied.276 It follows that the Member States are required to cooperate in good faith with the inquiries of the Commission pursuant to Arts 258–260 TFEU and to provide the Commission with all the information requested for that purpose.277 A failure to comply with this obligation may result in a finding of a failure to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties.278 Many directives incorporate that duty to cooperate in good faith and to provide information in a specific provision. Such a provision will require Member States to provide clear, accurate information about the legal and administrative provisions adopted in order to implement the directive in question, which enables the Commission to ascertain whether the Member State has effectively and completely implemented it.279 When a directive imposes upon the Member States an obligation to provide information, the information that the Member States are thus obliged to supply to the Commission must be clear and precise. It must indicate unequivocally the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions by means of which the Member State considers that it has satisfied the various requirements imposed on it by the directive. In the absence of such information, the Commission is not in a position to ascertain whether the Member State has genuinely implemented the directive completely. The failure of a Member State to fulfil that obligation, whether by providing no information at all or by providing insufficiently clear and precise information, may of itself justify recourse to the procedure under Art. 258 TFEU in order to establish the failure to fulfil the obligation.280 (b) Substantive defence of the Member State (i) Objective nature of the action The chances of success of defence pleas that a Member State wishes to raise are determined first by the objective nature of the action for failure to fulfil obligations. As stated in para. 5.01, the action is objective in nature and the only question raised is whether or not the defendant Member State has breached Union law.281 In determining whether

276 See C-33/90, Commission v Italy, 1991, para. 18; C-494/01, Commission v Ireland, 2005, para. 197; C-340/09, Commission v Spain, 2010, para. 37; C‑715/17, C‑718/17, and C‑719/17, Commission v Poland and Others, 2020, para. 55; C-22/20, Commission v Sweden, 2021, para. 144. 277 See C-65/91, Commission v Greece, 1992, para. 14; C-537/19, Commission v Austria, 2021, para. 56. A Member State cannot therefore claim that the Commission’s application is inadmissible because the details of the national law and practice are not specific enough (C-408/97, Commission v Netherlands, 2000, para. 17). 278 See C-82/03, Commission v Italy, 2004, para. 15; C-494/01, Commission v Ireland, 2005, paras 195–200; C-22/20, Commission v Sweden, 2021, paras 145–150; see further C-456/03, Commission v Italy, 2005, para. 27: ‘the failure of a Member State to fulfil that obligation, whether by providing no information at all or by providing insufficiently clear and precise information, may of itself justify recourse to the procedure under [Art. 258 TFEU] in order to establish the failure to fulfil the obligation.’ 279 See 274/83, Commission v Italy, 1985, para. 42. 280 See 96/81, Commission v Netherlands, 1982, para. 8; C-427/07, Commission v Ireland, 2009, para. 107; C-543/17, Commission v Belgium, 2019, para. 51. Note in that regard that a failure to provide information on transposition measures is a separate infringement which should be distinguished from a failure to transpose a directive: see C-29/14, Commission v Poland, 2015, para. 34. 281 See 7/68, Commission v Italy, 1968 ECR 423, 428; C-237/12; Commission v France, 2014, para. 56; C-351/13, Commission v Greece, 2014, para. 23; C-573/19, Commission v Italy, 2022, para. 99; C-730/19, Commission v Bulgaria, 2022, paras 63–64.

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220 THE ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF UNION LAW BY A MEMBER STATE the alleged infringement took place, the Court of Justice takes no account of subjective factors invoked to justify the Member State’s conduct or omission, the frequency or the scale of the circumstances complained of,282 or of the fact that there is no evidence that the infringement of Union law was intentional.283 No reasonableness test may be applied. The Court of Justice pays no regard to the underlying reasons for the breach, to circumstances that limited the adverse effects of the breach or explain the breach, or to the fact that the situation has improved.284 It is virtually certain that a defence based on such pleas will fail. Accordingly, a Member State may not plead provisions, practices, or situations existing in its internal legal system (such as those resulting from its constitutional organization)285 in order to justify a failure to comply with its Union obligations.286 Moreover, the fact that the failure to fulfil obligations had no adverse effects is irrelevant.287 Neither does the fact that a directive with direct effect produces the same result in practice as if the directive had been implemented properly and in time justify a failure to fulfil the obligation to implement it.288 What is more, a Member State cannot rely on the principle of protection of legitimate expectations—insofar as that principle can be invoked by a 282 See C-404/99, Commission v France, 2001, para. 51; C-226/01, Commission v Denmark, 2003, para. 32; C-730/19, Commission v Bulgaria, 2022, paras 70–72. 283 See C-636/18, Commission v France, 2019, para. 42; C-644/18, Commission v Italy, 2020, para. 87. 284 See C-122/18, Commission v Italy, 2020, para. 77; C-286/21, Commission v France, 2022, para. 46; C-573/19, Commission v Italy, 2022, para. 93; C-730/19, Commission v Bulgaria, 2022, para. 69; C-125/20, Commission v Spain, 2022, para. 75. 285 See C-236/99, Commission v Belgium, 2000, para. 23; C-358/03, Commission v Austria, 2004, paras 12–13: the fact that Austrian constitutional law precludes the Federal State from adopting transposition measures in the place of a Land and that only censure by the Court of Justice confers the power on the Federal State to undertake the transposition cannot justify an infringement for which the Federal State bears responsibility under Union law. Although each Member State may freely allocate areas of internal legal competence as it sees fit, the fact remains that it alone is responsible to the Union under Art. 258 TFEU for compliance with obligations arising under Union law. See further C-212/06, Gouvernement de la Communauté française and Gouvernement wallon, 2008, para. 58; C-306/08, Commission v Spain, 2011, para. 84 (noting that infringement related solely to laws adopted by the Autonomous Community of Valencia on the basis of its regional powers in area concerned). 286 See 52/75, Commission v Italy, 1976, para. 14; C-576/18, Commission v Italy, 2020, para. 105; C-384/19, Commission v Spain, 2020, para. 12. See the case-law rejecting the following pleas: difficulties in the domestic decision-making process (C-347/19, Commission v Spain, 2020, para. 31); the rule of Union law infringed is incompatible with national public policy (C-52/00, Commission v France, 2002, para. 33); the presence of organized crime (C-297/08, Commission v Italy, 2010, paras 81–82, 84); shortness of the transitional period laid down in a directive (C-856/19, Commission v Hungary, 2021, para. 55); exercise of judicial remedies (C-250/18, Commission v Croatia, 2019, para. 61); need to comply with Union free movement law (C-636/18, Commission v France, 2019, para. 46); failure to comply concerned is the consequence of another failure to comply (C-556/18, Commission v Spain, 2019, para. 33); national authorities do not apply the rules that are in breach of Union law (C-729/17, Commission v Greece, 2019, para. 102); financial difficulties (C-427/17, Commission v Ireland, 2019, para. 122); national traditions (C-115/13, Commission v Hungary, 2014, para. 44); and geographical characteristics of the territory of the Member State (C-573/19, Commission v Italy, 2022, para. 100). 287 See para. 5.09. 288 See 102/79, Commission v Belgium, 1980, para. 12; 301/81, Commission v Belgium, 1983, para. 13; C-433/93, Commission v Germany, 1995, para. 24; C-253/95, Commission v Germany, 1996, para. 13. The obligation to ensure the full effectiveness of a directive, in accordance with its objective, cannot be interpreted as meaning that the Member States are released from adopting transposition measures where they consider that their national provisions are better than the Union provisions concerned and that the national provisions are therefore more likely to ensure that the objective pursued by the directive is achieved. According to the Court’s case-law, the existence of national rules may render transposition by specific legislative or regulatory measures superfluous only if those rules actually ensure the full application of the directive by the national authorities (see C-103/02, Commission v Italy, 2004, para. 33).

Special Characteristics 221 Member State at all—because that defence is incompatible with the objective nature of these proceedings.289 Furthermore, the special nature of Union law prevents a Member State from relying on a number of common defences in international law. For instance, a Member State cannot justify its failure to perform its obligations by reference to the shortcomings of other Member States, since the Treaties do not merely create reciprocal obligations between the Member States, but also establish a new legal order governing the procedures necessary for the purposes of having any infringement of Union law ‘declared and punished’.290 (ii) Illegality of the Union act Under the former Treaty framework, it appeared from the case-law that a Member State could plead the illegality of a regulation on the basis of former Art. 241 EC in proceedings for failure to fulfil obligations.291 In contrast, a Member State was not entitled to raise the claim that a directive or a decision addressed to it was unlawful where it was accused of breaching such a measure and the time-limit for applying for its annulment had expired, or even where it had brought an action for annulment and not at the same time a (successful) application for interim measures to suspend the contested act pending the judgment in the main proceedings.292 The Court of Justice took the view that to allow this defence would jeopardize the stability of the system of legal remedies established by the Treaty and the principle of legal certainty on which it is based.293 Yet, in the exceptional case where the directive or decision infringed contained such serious and manifest defects that it could be deemed non-existent, the Court of Justice could be asked to declare it non-existent, thereby making the claim of an infringement to no purpose.294 289 See C-83/99, Commission v Spain¸2001, paras 22–27; C-213/19, Commission v United Kingdom, 2022, para. 163. See C-99/02, Commission v Italy, 2004, paras 20–21, in which the Court held that a Member State whose authorities have granted aid contrary to the procedural rules laid down in Art. 108 TFEU may not plead the legitimate expectations of recipients in order to justify a failure to comply with the obligation to take the steps necessary to implement a Commission decision instructing it to recover the aid. If it could do so, Arts 107 and 108 TFEU would be deprived of all practical force, since national authorities would thus be able to rely on their own unlawful conduct in order to render decisions taken by the Commission under those Treaty provisions ineffectual. See also C-261/18, Commission v Ireland, 2019, para. 93, in which the Court rejected Ireland’s defence relying on the legitimate expectations of the operator which had been issued with a consent to operate a wind farm in order to justify the failure to revoke authorisations issued in breach of Union law. 290 See 52/75, Commission v Italy, 1976, para. 11; C-118/03, Commission v Germany, 2003, para. 8; C-619/18, Commission v Poland, 2019, para. 120; C-213/19, Commission v United Kingdom, 2022, para. 141. 291 See C-11/00, Commission v ECB, 2003, paras 74–78. Former Art. 241 EC had provided, without exception, that an objection of illegality may be raised ‘in proceedings in which a regulation . . . is at issue’. See further C-91/05, Commission v Council, AG Mengozzi Opinion, 2008, points 36–54. 292 See further para. 9.12. In C-261/99, Commission v France, 2001, the Court held in connection with an action brought under Art. 108(2) TFEU that France had failed to fulfil its obligations by not implementing a Commission decision requiring it to recover unlawful State aid. That decision was deemed to be lawful despite the action for annulment already brought by France (see C-17/99, France v Commission, 2001). Similarly, see C-620/16, Commission v Germany, 2019, para. 86; C‑715/17, C‑718/17, and C‑719/17, Commission v Poland and Others, 2020, paras 139–141. 293 See 156/77 Commission v Belgium, 1978, paras 15–25; 52/83, Commission v France, 1983, para. 10; C-118/03, Commission v Germany, 2004, para. 7; C-53/05, Commission v Portugal, 2006, para. 30. This also applies to an action brought on the basis of Art. 108(2) TFEU: see C-404/97, Commission v Portugal, 2000, para. 34; C-419/06, Commission v Greece, 2008, para. 52. 294 See 226/87, Commission v Greece, 1988, paras 15–16; C-404/97, Commission v Portugal, 2000, para. 35. The beginnings of this case-law can be found in 6/69 and 11/69, Commission v France, 1969, paras 11–13.

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222 THE ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF UNION LAW BY A MEMBER STATE With the changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty, the status of this case-law was no longer certain. As compared with the approach taken by the Union Courts to the interpretation of former Art. 241 EC, in which a Member State or Union institution could only invoke an objection of illegality against acts of general application in the form of a regulation and not against those in the form of a directive or a decision in line with the wording of that provision, the explicit reference to an act of general application in Art. 277 TFEU means that such an approach might merit some refinement in future case- law. Thus far, however, when the objection of illegality has been raised against acts of general application in the form of directives or decisions as a defence by a Member State in infringement proceedings, the Court of Justice has confirmed its traditional approach holding the objection inadmissible.295 5.73

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(iii) Violation of the Treaties but compliance with Union legislation Where the Commission deems that a national rule violates a Treaty provision, the Member State concerned can justify its national legislation by referring to the fact that it expressly complies with a provision of secondary Union law. Provisions of secondary Union law are indeed presumed to be lawful (as long as they are not annulled or declared unlawful by the Union Courts).296 (iv) Pleas refuting the breach in an objective manner The Member State’s defence is not restricted to a limited number of pleas. Any plea, of law or fact, which refutes the alleged breach in an objective manner is admissible. In addition, the Member State may raise defences not relied upon in the pre-litigation procedure.297 The pleas must, however, be raised timeously in the defence.298 Furthermore, a Member State may claim the existence of a situation constituting force majeure.299 In such a case, a Member State would have to prove that there were abnormal and unforeseeable circumstances outside of its control, the consequences of which, in spite of the exercise of all due care, could not have been avoided.300 As demonstrated by the case-law, it is difficult for a 295 See C-37/11, Commission v Czech Republic, 2012, para. 46; C-502/13, Commission v Luxembourg, 2015, para. 56; C-301/14, Commission v Italy, 2016, para. 33; C-591/14, Commission v Belgium, 2017, para. 39; C-620/16, Commission v Germany, 2019, paras 84–91; C-704/19, Commission v Spain, 2021, para. 69. 296 C-475/01, Commission v Greece, 2004, paras 18–26; C-582/08, Commission v United Kingdom, 2010, paras 47–48. See para. 5.21. 297 See C-414/97, Commission v Spain, 1999, paras 18–19. 298 See C-519/03, Commission v Luxembourg, 2005, para. 23: plea raised for the first time in the rejoinder was inadmissible. See also C-526/08, Commission v Luxembourg, 2010, paras 48–51: pleas in defence raised for the first time in rejoinder were inadmissible, even if they had been previously submitted in substance in reply to reasoned opinion. 299 In the case of special procedures concerning State aid under Art. 108(2) TFEU, a Member State may put forward the plea of ‘absolute impossibility’ (see para. 5.23). Though similarly strict, the notion of force majeure does not presuppose absolute impossibility: see 70/86, Commission v Greece, para. 8; C-297/08, Commission v Italy, 2010, para. 85. Further to this, in relation to a failure to implement the air quality directive (Directive 2008/50/EC), the Court allows Member States to adduce proof of the existence of exceptional circumstances whose consequences could not have been avoided despite all the steps taken to justify exceedance of the daily and annual limit of the values laid down by that directive: see C-644/18, Commission v Italy, 2020, para. 87; C-573/19, Commission v Italy, 2022, para. 105. Structural difficulties arising from socio-economic or financial challenges of major investments do not constitute such exceptional circumstances (see C-336/16, Commission v Poland, 2018, para. 101; C-636/18, Commission v France, 2019, para. 85; C-730/19, Commission v Bulgaria, 2022, para. 77). The same goes for Union policies relating to transport or agriculture (see C-573/19, Commission v Italy, 2022, paras 106–108). 300 See C-334/08, Commission v Italy, 2010, para. 46.

Consequences 223 Member State to satisfy these requirements.301 Moreover, a Member State may plead this defence only for the period necessary in order to resolve the difficulties.302 Similar conditions apply to the public order defence on the basis of Art. 72 TFEU.303

IV. Consequences A. Result of the action The Court of Justice either finds the infringement has been made out or dismisses the application in all or in part.304 The judgment finding the failure to fulfil obligations is purely declaratory.305 The infringement existed before the Court made its finding. It does not have the power to require specific measures to be taken in order to give effect to the judgment,306 as it is for the Member States to take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with the Court’s judgment.307 At most, it may indicate such measures as it considers necessary in order to eliminate the infringement found.308 In addition, the Court may not set a period of time for compliance with its judgment, since Art. 260

301 For a selection of examples, see 33/69, Commission v Italy, 1970, para. 9; C-70/86, Commission v Greece, 1987, paras 8–11; C-236/99, Commission v Belgium, 2000, paras 21–22; C-105/02, Commission v Germany, 2006, para. 89; C-377/03, Commission v Belgium, 2006, para. 95; C-297/08, Commission v Italy, 2010, paras 85–86; C-334/08, Commission v Italy, 2010, paras 47–49. 302 See C-1/00, Commission v France, 2001, para. 131. 303 A Member State may exceptionally rely on a public order defence on the basis of Art. 72 TFEU to justify a failure to comply with Union law. In order to do so, it must demonstrate that the implementation of Union law would have consequences for public order with which it could not cope by using the means at its disposal (see C-63/14, Commission v France, 2015, para. 52). The Member State must adduce concrete proof of possible disturbances and cannot rely on mere assumptions (see C-808/18, Commission v Hungary, 2020, paras 217–220; C-11/20, Commission v Greece, 2021, para. 50). Moreover, it is only possible to raise the public order defence in relation to particular situations, and it cannot be used as a justification for a general failure to implement Union law (see C‑715/17, C‑718/17, and C‑719/17, Commission v Poland and Others, 2020, para. 160; C-856/19, Commission v Hungary, 2021, paras 53–54). 304 If the Court does not have sufficient information to find that the act of the Member State constitutes a failure to fulfil obligations, it may ask the parties to resume examination of the question at issue and report to it, after which the Court will give final judgment: see 170/78, Commission v United Kingdom, 1980, para. 24. 305 C-443/18, Commission v Italy, 2019, para. 77; C-715/17, C-718/17, and C-719/17, Commission v Poland and Others, 2020, para. 57. 306 See C-304/18, Commission v Italy, 2019, para. 75; C-715/17, C-718/17, and C-719/17, Commission v Poland and Others, 2020, para. 56. If the Commission (or a Member State) attempts to request such specific measures, this will be deemed inadmissible by the Court: see C-104/02, Commission v Germany, 2005, paras 48–51; C-36/08, Commission v Greece, 2008, paras 8–10; C-213/19, Commission v United Kingdom, 2022, paras 180–181. However, the declaratory nature of a judgment finding a failure to fulfil obligations does not prevent the Commission from seeking a declaration that a Member State has failed to make a specific amount of own resources available to the Union’s budget: see C-213/19, Commission v United Kingdom, 2022, paras 184–195. 307 See C-304/18, Commission v Italy, 2019, para. 75. 308 But see C-60/21, Commission v Belgium, 2022, para. 38. For further discussion, see C-503/04, Commission v Germany, AG Trstenjak Opinion, 2007, point 41. In the reasoned opinion, the Commission may prescribe the measures that it deems necessary in order to eliminate the infringement. In addition, in a procedure under Art. 108(2) TFEU, the Commission may adopt a decision finding that a measure constitutes State aid incompatible with the internal market and requiring the unlawfully granted aid to be repaid. If the Member State concerned fails to comply with that decision, the Commission may bring an action in the Court for failure to fulfil the specific obligation to obtain repayment of the aid (see 70/72, Commission v Germany, 1973, para. 13). Also, the Commission may apply for a declaration for failure to compensate for the loss of own resources of the Union resulting from breaches of Union law caused by the public authorities of a Member State (see C-391/17, Commission v United Kingdom, 2019; C-395/17, Commission v Netherlands, 2019).

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224 THE ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF UNION LAW BY A MEMBER STATE TFEU does not confer a power on it to do so.309 Equally, the Court may not declare acts (or failures to act) on the part of a Member State unlawful, void, or not applicable. Only the national courts have the power to do so under national law.310 The Court of Justice may find only that the act (or failure to act) was or was not contrary to Union law.

B. Legal force of the judgment declaring that a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations 5.76

(1) Duty for the Member State to take the necessary measures Art. 260(1) TFEU puts the Member State that has been found by the Court of Justice to have failed to fulfil its Treaty obligations under a duty to take the necessary measures to comply with the Court’s judgment. That duty, which also arises because the judgment has the force of res judicata, entails a prohibition having the full force of law against applying a national rule held to be incompatible with Union law and an obligation to take every measure to enable Union law to be fully applied.311 The duty to give effect to the Court’s judgment is borne by all institutions of the Member State concerned within the fields covered by their respective powers. The legislative and executive authorities have to bring the offending provisions of domestic law into conformity with the requirements of Union law. The courts of the Member State concerned have to disregard those provisions in determining cases.312 Because the judgment has the force of res judicata, the Commission may not make an application for interim measures pursuant to Art. 279 TFEU in order to require the Member State to desist from an infringement of Union law which has already been found by judgment of the Court of Justice. This is because the Member State is required to take the necessary measures under Art. 260(1) TFEU. No further decision of the Court, in interlocutory or other proceedings, is required. Where the Commission sought such interim measures in this connection, the Court held that they were not necessary within the meaning of Art. 279 TFEU.313 309 See C-473/93, Commission v Luxembourg, 1996, para. 52. 310 See 141/78, France v United Kingdom, AG Reischl Opinion, 1979 ECR 2944, 2946; compare C-202/18 and C-238/18, Rimšēvičs, 2019. 311 See 48/71, Commission v Italy, 1972, para. 7; 24/80 and 97/80 R, Commission v France (order), 1980, para. 16; C-101/91, Commission v Italy, 1993, para. 24. For further discussion of the res judicata effects of the first judgment rendered under Art. 258 TFEU in relation to Art. 260(2) TFEU, see para. 5.82. 312 See 314/81 to 316/81 and 83/82, Waterkeyn, 1982, para. 14; C-177/20, “Grossmania”, 2022, para. 36. However, since a judgment of the Court delivered under Arts 258–260 TFEU does not have the purpose of conferring rights upon individuals, such a judgment alone does not oblige national courts and authorities to disapply national legislation which is contrary to a directive in a dispute between private parties: see C-261/20, Thelen Technopark Berlin, 2022, para. 40. 313 See 24/80 and 97/80 R, Commission v France (order), 1980, para. 19. Importantly, while interim relief is deemed inadmissible in the context of ensuring compliance with a judgment already given, this is to be distinguished from the provision of interim relief pending the outcome of the Court’s judgment finding the infringement pursuant to Arts 258–259 TFEU: see C-441/17 R, Commission v Poland (order of the Vice-President), 2017; C-619/18 R, Commission v Poland (order of the Vice-President), 2018; C-204/21 R, Commission v Poland (order of the Vice-President), 2021; C-121/21 R, Czech Republic v Poland (order of the Vice-President), 2021. See further para. 13.08; L. Prete, Infringement Proceedings in EU law (Wolters Kluwer, 2017) 232–238. That said, the Court has made clear that the finding of a failure to fulfil obligations in itself precludes granting a Member State’s

Consequences 225 (2) Court may limit the temporal effects Exceptionally, by virtue of the general principle of legal certainty inherent in the Union legal order, the Court may limit the effects in time of a judgment given on the basis of Art. 258 TFEU.314 The declaratory nature of the judgment does not preclude the Court from deciding, in application of that general principle, to restrict the right to rely upon a provision it has interpreted with a view to calling into question legal relations established in good faith. The Court will only take such a step in certain specific circumstances, where there is a risk of serious economic repercussions, owing in particular to the large number of relationships entered into in good faith on the basis of rules considered to be validly in force, and where it appears that both individuals and national authorities have been led into adopting practices which did not comply with Union law by reason of objective, significant uncertainty regarding the implications of Union provisions, to which the conduct of other Member States or the Commission may even have contributed.315 The fact that a finding of failure to fulfil obligations (which is invariably coupled, explicitly or implicitly, with an interpretation of the applicable provision of Union law) will have serious financial consequences for the Member State concerned is not sufficient in itself to justify limiting the scope of the judgment.316 In this regard, the Court has drawn on its case-law in the context of limiting the temporal effects of preliminary rulings,317 but questions remain open as regards the linkage between the two.318 (3) Position of individuals The judgment finding the infringement of Union law does not as such confer any rights on individuals. Individuals may not rely directly on such a judgment before the national courts, but only on the ‘provision’ of Union law having direct effect that the judgment finds has been infringed by the Member State.319 In the event that an individual pleads a provision of Union law in his or her defence which does not have direct effect but which has been found by the Court of Justice to have been infringed by the Member State concerned, the national court, as an institution of that Member State, must ensure in the exercise of its functions that it is complied with by applying national law in such a way that it is compatible with the obligations that—according to the judgment of the Court—ensue from Union law for that Member State. application to suspend the proceedings pending possible withdrawal of the action by the Commission: see C-431/10, Commission v Ireland, 2011, para. 14. 314 See C-35/97, Commission v France, 1998, paras 49–52; C-284/05, Commission v Finland, 2009, paras 56–59; C-387/05, Commission v Italy, 2009, paras 57–60; C-239/06, Commission v Italy, 2009, paras 57–60; C-288/12, Commission v Hungary, 2014, para. 64. 315 See C-387/05, Commission v Italy, 2009, para. 58; C-288/12, Commission v Hungary, 2014, para. 64. 316 See C-35/97, Commission v France, 1998, paras 49–52; C-426/98, Commission v Greece, 2002, paras 42–44. 317 See paras 6.39, 10.23. 318 See C-178/05, Commission v Greece, 2007, para. 67, and C-387/05, Commission v Italy, 2009, para. 59; C-82/10, Commission v Ireland, 2011, para. 63; C-387/11, Commission v Belgium, 2012, para. 90; C-288/12, Commission v Hungary, 2014, para. 64. 319 See 314/81 to 316/81 and 83/82, Waterkeyn, 1982, paras 15–16; C-261/20, Thelen Technopark Berlin, 2022, para. 40.

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226 THE ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF UNION LAW BY A MEMBER STATE 5.79

(4) Judgment may constitute the basis for State liability The finding of a failure to fulfil obligations may potentially form the basis for liability on the part of the Member State concerned.320 However, in accordance with the case-law, a Member State may incur liability only in the case of a sufficiently serious breach of Union law.321 A judgment finding a failure to fulfil obligations is in itself not enough, certainly not for loss or damage that arose before judgment was given.322 The requirement for a ‘sufficiently serious breach’ of Union law does not square completely with the objective nature of an action for failure to fulfil obligations, since the Court of Justice also takes other factors into account, such as whether or not the breach was intentional and whether any mistake of law was excusable. It is self- evident that, if the failure to fulfil obligations continues after delivery of the judgment declaring the Member State concerned to be in breach of its obligations, that itself will constitute a sufficiently serious breach of Union law to cause the Member State to incur liability to make good any loss or damage which occurred in that period (see para. 4.65 et seq.). In addition, it must be noted that the Union provision infringed must confer a right on individuals in order for the issue of State liability to arise.323 It follows that a finding of an infringement in proceedings under Arts 258–259 TFEU does not automatically result in the Member State concerned incurring liability under Union law. Yet, it may well be that the Member State will incur liability in damages under national law for loss or damage caused by an infringement of a Union provision, even though that provision does not directly confer any right on individuals.

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(5) Period within which the Member State must comply with the judgment The Treaties themselves do not specify the period within which the judgment must be complied with, but the Court of Justice has held that the process must be initiated at once and completed as soon as possible.324

320 See 39/72, Commission v Italy, 1973, para. 11; C‑715/17, C‑718/17, and C‑719/17, Commission v Poland and Others, 2020, para. 66. For a concrete example, see C-118/08, Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales, 2010. 321 See para. 4.66. 322 See C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, 1996, paras 93–96; C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94, C-189/94, and C-190/94, Dillenkofer and Others, 1994, para. 29; C-445/06, Danske Slagterier, 2009, para. 37. Moreover, there is no need for the Court of Justice to have made a finding that the Member State is in breach in order for the Member State to incur liability. Indeed, the Court has consistently repeated that it is the role of the national courts to find that the Member State has infringed Union law. This is the reason for the guiding factors set down in the Court’s case-law in that regard, even if in particular cases the Court may go far in ‘helping’ the national courts with the application of such factors, as demonstrated by Köbler (C-224/01, Köbler, 2003). If difficulties arise in this connection, they may always enlist the help of the Court of Justice by making a reference for a preliminary ruling. This power of the national courts is important. Since the Commission has a discretion whether to bring proceedings under Art. 258 TFEU, individuals may play a major, complementary role in enforcing Union law by invoking Francovich liability in national courts (see further C-91/92, Faccini Dori, 1994, paras 27–29). 323 See para. 4.66. 324 See 69/86 Commission v Italy, 1987, para. 8; C-76/13, Commission v Portugal, 2014, para. 57; C-261/18, Commission v Ireland, 2019, para. 123; C-842/19, Commission v Belgium, 2020, para. 57. See also C-473/93, Commission v Luxembourg, 1996, paras 51–52: Art. 260(1) TFEU does not confer on the Court any power to grant a Member State a period of time for compliance with its judgments.

Consequences 227

C. Sanctions for failure to comply with the judgment (1) Art. 260(2) TFEU The Commission is responsible for ensuring that the judgment finding a breach of Union law is complied with.325 If the Member State fails to take the necessary measures, Art. 260(2) TFEU provides for a procedure whereby the Commission may bring a case before the Court of Justice with a view to a finding that the Member State concerned has failed to comply with the original judgment (or to give effect to it in time or correctly), and in doing so, ‘shall specify the amount of the lump sum or penalty payment to be paid by the Member State concerned which it considers appropriate under the circumstances’.326 The procedure of Art. 260(2) TFEU modifies the rather inefficient procedure that was set down in the former Art. 228(2) EC. Under the latter provision, it was only when a Member State failed to comply with a judgment of the Court of Justice finding an infringement that the Commission could initiate new proceedings before the Court—after having completed another two-stage pre-litigation procedure (involving both a letter of formal notice and a reasoned opinion)—in which it would ask the Court to impose a pecuniary sanction upon the Member State concerned. As a result, it often took years before a pecuniary sanction was imposed on a non- compliant Member State. The current Art. 260(2) TFEU renders the second action somewhat less onerous by doing away with the requirement of a reasoned opinion in the pre-litigation stage. The Commission is thus able to bring an action before the Court under this provision after only having invited the Member State concerned to submit its observations.327 This invariably means that the Commission will still need to send to the Member State a letter of formal notice which will serve to delineate the scope of the alleged non-compliance and lay down the time-limit by which that Member State must take the necessary measures to comply with the first judgment or be brought before the Court of Justice. Furthermore, the Commission must also specify the nature and the amount of financial sanctions it will apply for in case of continued non-compliance.328 The procedure of Art. 260(2) TFEU must be distinguished from that of Art. 260(3) TFEU. Whereas Art. 260(2) TFEU concerns a second action before the Court concerning a Member State’s alleged non-compliance with the first judgment finding an infringement, Art. 260(3) TFEU is situated in the context of the first action brought under Art. 258 TFEU concerning a Member State’s failure to notify measures transposing a

325 See C-584/14, Commission v Greece, 2016, para. 23. 326 The imposition of financial penalties has had particular salience in relation to the field of EU environmental law: see Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘The General Enforcement Obligation of EU Environmental Law’ (n. 41). 327 Art. 260(2), first para. TFEU. 328 See C-243/13, Commission v Sweden, 2014, para. 24; C-298/19, Commission v Greece, 2020, para. 22; C-842/19, Commission v Belgium, 2020, para. 11.

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228 THE ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF UNION LAW BY A MEMBER STATE legislative directive, whereby the Commission may ask the Court to find an infringement and to impose a pecuniary sanction at the same time.329

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(2) Relationship between Art. 260(2) TFEU and Art. 258 TFEU In proceedings under Art. 260(2) TFEU, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to assess the suitability and effectiveness of any measures that the Member State has taken in compliance with the original judgment.330 Save for what has been said as regards the shortening of the pre-litigation stage (see para. 5.81), the procedure under Art. 260(2) TFEU largely resembles that of Art. 258 TFEU. It too, is based on the objective finding that a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations.331 The Commission must provide the Court with the information necessary to determine the extent to which a Member State has complied, or not, with a judgment declaring it to be in breach of its obligations.332 As that judgment has the force of res judicata, the dispute as to the original failure to fulfil obligations may not be reopened in proceedings under Art. 260(2) TFEU.333 The only matter in issue is the alleged failure to give effect to the original judgment. Thus, matters falling outside the original judgment cannot be dealt with in Art. 260(2) TFEU proceedings and are inadmissible,334 just as matters that did not comprise the subject-matter delineated in the pre-litigation procedure.335

329 On the different objectives on both provisions, see C-550/18, Commission v Ireland, 2020, para. 91. See further para. 5.86. 330 See C-196/13, Commission v Italy, 2014, para. 32; C-251/17, Commission v Italy, 2018, para. 20. 331 See C-177/04, Commission v France, 2006, para. 43. 332 See C-387/97, Commission v Greece, 2000, para. 73; C-369/07, Commission v Greece, 2009, para. 74; C-367/14, Commission v Italy, 2015, para. 36. Consequently, where the Commission does not do so, the complaint is inadmissible: see C-457/07, Commission v Portugal, 2009, paras 97–101. Conversely, where the Commission does adduce sufficient evidence to show that the breach of obligations has persisted, then it is for the Member State concerned to challenge in substance and in detail the information produced and its consequences: see C-119/04, Commission v Italy, 2006, para. 41. In essence, this greatly resembles the case-law discussed earlier in relation to the burden of proof and submission of evidence in the context of the Art. 258 TFEU procedure (see para. 5.67). 333 See C-462/05, Commission v Portugal, 2008, paras 23–28. In C-526/08, Commission v Luxembourg, 2010, paras 25–35, the Court ruled that the principle of res judicata is applicable to infringement proceedings, with the result that complaints identical in fact and in law to those already settled by a judgment delivered under Art. 258 TFEU must be brought pursuant to the Art. 260 TFEU procedure and cannot be brought afresh under Art. 258 TFEU. For an application of the principle of res judicata in relation to Art. 108(2) TFEU, see also C-529/09, Commission v Spain, 2013, paras 64–79. Furthermore, as regards the applicability of the ne bis in idem principle (also referred to as the principle of ‘no double jeopardy’ in C-337/05, Commission v Italy, 2008, paras 16, 25), the Court found that ‘even if that principle could be relied on in the present case, its application is in any event precluded because the matters of fact and law involved in this case and the case which gave rise to the [previous] judgment in Commission v Luxembourg are not identical’: C-526/08, Commission v Luxembourg, 2010, para. 36. See already C-127/99, Commission v Italy, 2001, paras 27–29 (where the Court held that the ne bis in idem principle had not been violated as regards the question whether the Member State concerned had implemented the directive within the prescribed period, since the earlier judgment of the Court related to provisions other than those at issue in the new proceedings). 334 See C-95/12, Commission v Germany, 2013, paras 23–26. This is different, however, for cases where the Court found a general and persistent breach: see C-196/13, Commission v Italy, 2014, paras 32–33. 335 See C-457/07, Commission v Portugal, 2009, paras 66–68. However, the Commission cannot be criticized for failing to specify in the letter of formal notice the points in relation to which the Member State has not complied with the previous judgment where the Member State had only provided the Commission the information necessary to assess compliance after the letter of formal notice was sent whereas the Commission had requested such information at the initial stage of the pre-litigation procedure, before the sending of the letter of formal notice: see C-626/16, Commission v Slovakia, 2018, paras 30–35.

Consequences 229 (3) Lump sum and/or penalty payment The Court may impose a lump sum and/or a penalty payment pursuant to the second subparagraph of Art. 260(2) TFEU in the event that it finds that the original judgment rendered under Art. 258 TFEU has not been complied with.336 In the Court’s view, while the imposition of a penalty payment seems particularly suited to inducing a Member State to put an end as soon as possible to a breach of obligations which, in the absence of such a measure, would be likely to persist, the imposition of a lump sum is prompted more by the assessment of the consequences for private and public interests of the failure by the Member State concerned to comply with its obligations, in particular where the breach has persisted for a long period since the judgment which initially established it was delivered. The imposition of both types of penalty provided for in Art. 260(2) TFEU is appropriate, particularly where the breach of obligations has continued for a long period and tends to persist.337 (4) Court’s discretion In proceedings under Art. 260(2) TFEU, it is for the Court to assess, in light of the circumstances of each case, the financial penalties to be imposed on a Member State.338 Thus, the Commission’s suggestions cannot bind the Court, but merely constitute a useful point of reference.339 Likewise, guidelines such as those laid down in Commission communications are not binding on the Court, but contribute to ensuring that the action is transparent, foreseeable, and consistent with legal certainty.340 Indeed, 336 As for the use of ‘and/or’ instead of ‘or’ appearing in the text of the Treaties, see C-304/02, Commission v France, 2005, paras 83–86. As the Court held in para. 83 of the foregoing judgment, the conjunction ‘or’ in Art. 260(2) TFEU to link the financial penalties capable of being imposed may, linguistically, have an alternative or a cumulative sense and must therefore be read in the context in which it is used. In the light of the objective pursued by Art. 260 TFEU, the conjunction ‘or’ in Art. 260(2) TFEU must be understood as being used in a cumulative sense. For some examples in which both a penalty payment and a lump sum have been imposed by the Court, see C-205/17, Commission v Spain, 2018; C-93/17, Commission v Greece, 2018; C-261/18, Commission v Ireland, 2019; C-576/18, Commission v Italy, 2020; C-842/19, Commission v Belgium, 2020; C-51/20, Commission v Greece, 2022. 337 See C-304/02, Commission v France, 2005, paras 81–82; C-298/19, Commission v Greece, 2020, para. 39. Note that, while the objectives of both provisions are different, the same considerations apply in relation to Art. 260(3) TFEU in this regard: see C-550/18, Commission v Ireland, 2020, para. 76; C-628/18, Commission v Slovenia, 2021, para. 69; C-658/19, Commission v Spain, 2021, para. 54. 338 See C-51/20, Commission v Greece, 2022, para. 86. 339 See C-51/20, Commission v Greece, 2022, para. 95. 340 See C-369/07, Commission v Greece, 2009, paras 111–112; C-76/13, Commission v Portugal, 2014, para. 50; C-93/17, Commission v Greece, 2018, para. 119. In early cases, only a penalty payment was sought by the Commission and imposed by the Court: see C-387/97, Commission v Greece, 2000; C-278/01, Commission v Spain, 2003. However, in the aftermath of C-304/02, Commission v France, 2005, discussed in n. 336, the Commission issued a Communication on the ‘Application of Art. 228 of the EC Treaty’ (SEC (2005) 1658, amended by SEC (2010) 923/3), replacing the previous 1996 and 1997 communications, which stated that as from 1 January 2006, the Commission would generally include in its applications under Art. 260 TFEU the specification of both a lump sum and penalty payment and set down a predetermined and objective approach for the calculation of both types of pecuniary sanctions. In 2019, the Commission issued a communication modifying its calculation method in reaction to the judgment C-93/17, Commission v Greece, 2018, para. 139, in which the Court held that the new double majority system for voting in the Council, which replaced the old system after the phasing out phase of Protocol (No. 36) on transitional provisions had expired, is not directly transposable to the mechanism for calculating pecuniary sanctions. Until then, the Commission had used, next to a number of other parameters, the so-called n-factor for the calculation of fines and which took into account the capacity to pay of the Member State concerned (GDP) as well as its institutional weight (number of votes within the Council). Following the Court’s judgment, the Commission modified the n-factor but, contrary to the Court (see C-93/17, Commission v Greece, 2018, paras 140–142), it decided that the n-factor should continue to reflect both GDP and institutional weight and adapted the n-factor to this extent. The modified calculation method can be found in the Communication from

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230 THE ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF UNION LAW BY A MEMBER STATE by providing in the second subparagraph of Art. 260(2) TFEU that the Court ‘may’ impose a lump sum or penalty payment on the defaulting Member State, that provision is deemed to confer a wide discretion upon the Court in deciding whether it is necessary to impose such sanctions.341 As a result, the fact that the Commission may take the view, at a certain stage of the procedure before the Court, that the imposition of a particular penalty is no longer necessary does not render the action inadmissible, as the Court has jurisdiction to impose a pecuniary sanction not suggested by the Commission.342 If the Court decides to impose a penalty payment and/or lump sum payment, it must do so, in exercising its discretion, in a manner that is appropriate to the circumstances and proportionate both to the breach that has been established and the ability to pay of the Member State concerned.343 The Court has made clear that an order imposing a periodic penalty payment is intended to place the defaulting Member State under economic pressure, which induces it to put an end to the infringement established.344 Thus, as far as the imposition of a penalty payment is concerned, it is justified only insofar as the failure to comply with an earlier judgment of the Court continues up to the time of the Court’s examination of the facts.345 Where the Court imposes a penalty payment, its amount (which must ensure that penalty payments have coercive force and that Union law is applied uniformly and effectively) must be determined having regard to the duration of the infringement, its degree of seriousness, and the ability of the Member State to pay. Regard should also be had to the effects of failure to comply on private and public interests and to the urgency of getting the Member State concerned to fulfil its obligations.346 Where a Member State has taken certain measures—but not all that are needed—to comply with the Court’s judgment finding that it has failed to the Commission—Modification of the calculation method for lump sum payments and daily penalty payments proposed by the Commission in infringements proceedings before the Court of Justice of the European Union (OJ 2019 C70/1). In subsequent case-law, the Court has maintained that it is necessary to rely on the GDP of a Member State as the predominant factor for assessing its ability to pay, without taking into account institutional weight: see C-51/20, Commission v Greece, 2022, paras 111–116. 341 See C-121/07, Commission v France, 2009, para. 63; C-196/13, Commission v Italy, 2014, para. 95; C-576/18, Commission v Italy, 2020, para. 135. Compare Art. 260(3) TFEU, which explicitly limits the Court’s imposition of a lump sum or penalty payment on the Member State concerned ‘not exceeding the amount specified by the Commission’. See C-543/17, Commission v Belgium, 2019, para. 89; C-631/18, Commission v Slovenia, 2021, para. 86. 342 See C-503/04, Commission v Germany, 2007, para. 22. 343 See C-109/08, Commission v Greece, 2009, para. 52; C-93/17, Commission v Greece, 2018, para. 118; C-261/18, Commission v Ireland, 2019, para. 114; C-576/18, Commission v Italy, 2020, para. 135; C-51/20, Commission v Greece, 2022, para. 94. 344 See C-109/08, Commission v Greece, 2009, para. 28; C-584/14, Commission v Greece, 2016, para. 88; C-658/19, Commission v Spain, 2021, para. 56. 345 See C-369/07, Commission v Greece, para. 59; C-261/18, Commission v Ireland, 2019, para. 127; C-51/20, Commission v Greece, 2022, para. 87. The imposition of a periodic penalty payment can also be deemed not justified under circumstances where the Court does not have sufficient information to permit it to find that, on the date of the Court’s examination of the facts, the breach persisted: see C-119/04, Commission v Italy, 2006, paras 45–46. This is interrelated to some extent with the burden of proof placed on the Commission in Art. 260 TFEU proceedings. 346 See C-369/07, Commission v Greece, 2009, para. 115; C-842/19, Commission v Belgium, 2020, para. 65; C-51/20, Commission v Greece, 2022, para. 96.

Consequences 231 fulfil its obligations, the amount of the penalty payment will take account of the progress that it has made in complying with its obligations.347 As regards the imposition of a lump sum payment, the decision depends, in each individual case, on all the relevant factors pertaining to both the specific nature of the infringement established and the individual conduct of the Member State involved in the procedure instigated pursuant to Art. 260 TFEU.348 These relevant factors include, in particular, how long the breach of obligations has persisted since the judgment that initially established it was delivered and the public and private interests involved.349 Notably, in its Communication on the application of Art. 260 TFEU, 350 the Commission considers the possibility of recourse only to the lump sum payment in specific cases. In cases where a Member State has remedied the infringement after the referral of the case to the Court of Justice, but before the judgment has been delivered, it will no longer withdraw its action for that reason alone, since the Court of Justice can still impose a lump sum payment penalizing the duration of the infringement up to the time that the situation was rectified. As mentioned earlier, however, such guidelines are not binding on the Court, and by the terms of Art. 260(2) TFEU, that provision confers a wide discretion on the Court in deciding whether it is necessary to impose such a sanction.351 (5) Retroactive pecuniary sanctions The Treaty framers did not consider it necessary to grant jurisdiction to the Court of Justice to impose pecuniary sanctions retroactively (as from the first day of the infringement), as Art. 260(2) TFEU allows the Court to impose not only a penalty payment to

347 See C-278/01, Commission v Spain, 2003, para. 50; C-584/14, Commission v Greece, 2016, para. 83; C-51/20, Commission v Greece, 2022, para. 88. When a Member State has failed to adopt all the measures necessary to comply with a judgment of the Court of Justice finding an infringement for non-recovery of aid which had been found by Commission decision to be unlawful and incompatible with the internal market, the Court acknowledges that—when a general aid scheme is concerned—the Member State concerned will normally not manage to implement the Commission decision fully in the short term. If the amount of the penalty payment were invariable, it would continue to be due in its entirety for as long as the Member State concerned had not achieved complete implementation of the decision. In those circumstances, a penalty payment which takes account of the progress that the Member State may have made in complying with its obligations appears appropriate and proportionate to the infringement that has been found (see C-496/09, Commission v Italy, 2011, para. 49). Conversely, where it appears that the Member State will arrive shortly at full compliance with the Court’s judgment, the Commission’s application for a periodic penalty payment will be rejected (see C-576/18, Commission v Italy, 2020, paras 159–160). See also C-369/07, Commission v Greece, 2009, para. 125: the Court considered it appropriate to defer the point at which the penalty payment took effect until one month after the judgment was delivered in the present case, so as to enable the Member State concerned to demonstrate that it had brought the infringement to an end. To be clear, this is to be distinguished from a request from the defendant Member State to suspend the application of a penalty payment until after the entry into force of a legislative enactment that would render it in compliance, which the Court will not do: see C-70/06, Commission v Portugal, 2008, paras 29, 53. 348 See C-51/20, Commission v Greece, 2022, para. 129. 349 See C-121/07, Commission v France, 2008, paras 62, 64; C-378/13, Commission v Greece, 2014, para. 72; C-93/17, Commission v Greece, 2018, para. 157; C-261/18, Commission v Ireland, 2019, paras 113–114. 350 See Communication from the Commission—Application of Art. 228 of the EC Treaty (n. 340), points 10.5 and 11. For examples, see C-121/07, Commission v France, 2008; C-568/07, Commission v Greece, 2009; C-298/19, Commission v Greece, 2020. Note that a similar evolution has taken place in relation to Art. 260(3) TFEU: see Communication from the Commission—EU law: Better results through better application (OJ 2017 C18/10), point 3. 351 See C-121/07, Commission v France, 2009, paras 61, 63; C-279/11, Commission v Ireland, 2012, paras 65–81.

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232 THE ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF UNION LAW BY A MEMBER STATE be paid per day of infringement as from the day the judgment is given, but also a lump sum, which can be determined having regard to the gravity and the duration of the infringement in the period preceding the judgment.352

D. Sanctions under Art. 260(3) TFEU 5.86

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(1) Objective Art. 260(3) TFEU provides that where a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligation ‘to notify measures transposing a directive adopted under a legislative procedure’,353 the Commission may bring a case before the Court of Justice asking the latter to find an infringement and to impose a pecuniary sanction at the same time. The objective of this provision is to increase the timely transposition of legislative directives,354 which is traditionally a problematic area of compliance with Union obligations for Member States. To this extent, the objective of Art. 260(3) TFEU differs from that of Art. 260(2) TFEU, which has as its objective the enforcement of a judgment of the Court finding an infringement of Union law.355 More generally, the possibility to impose pecuniary sanctions in proceedings based on Arts 258 and 260(3) TFEU reflects a desire to simplify and speed up the procedure for imposing pecuniary sanctions for the failure to comply with notification obligations.356 (2) Limited discretion of the Court An important difference between Arts 260(2) and 260(3) TFEU is the amount of discretion allotted to the Court in determining the nature and the amount of the pecuniary sanction. While the Court has a wide discretion to determine the type and the amount of the pecuniary sanction under Art. 260(2) TFEU, under Art. 260(3) TFEU it may not award a pecuniary sanction exceeding the amount specified by the Commission.357 While Art. 260(3) TFEU only states that the Court may not award a pecuniary sanction exceeding the amount specified by the Commission, the Court considers itself bound by the proposal of the Commission regarding the nature of the sanction too, given the intrinsic link between the nature and the amount of the sanction proposed.358 The authors of the TFEU indeed have under Art. 260(3) TFEU established a direct correlation between the pecuniary sanction sought by the Commission and the pecuniary sanction

352 CONV 734/03 (n. 69); see also C-304/02, Commission v France, AG Geelhoed Opinion, 2005, points 81–108. 353 The failure to notify measures transposing a legislative directive entails both instances of non-communication and non-transposition. See para. 5.16. 354 See C-543/17, Commission v Belgium, 2019, para. 52; C-658/19, Commission v Spain, 2021, para. 52. 355 See C-550/18, Commission v Ireland, 2020, para. 91. The different objective of both provisions does not stand in the way of the fact that the Court uses the same parameters for calculating the amount of the pecuniary sanctions imposed: see C-658/19, Commission v Spain, 2021, para. 56. 356 See C-543/17, Commission v Belgium, 2019, para. 52; C-658/19, Commission v Spain, 2021, para. 52. 357 Art. 260(3), second subpara. TFEU. See C-543/17, Commission v Belgium, 2019, para. 83; C-658/19, Commission v Spain, 2021, paras 62, 73. 358 See C-549/18, Commission v Romania, 2020, para. 52; C-550/18, Commission v Ireland, 2020, para. 62; C-628/18, Commission v Slovenia, 2021, para. 51; C-658/19, Commission v Spain, 2021, para. 34.

Consequences 233 that may be imposed by the Court.359 However, the Court is not obliged to impose a pecuniary sanction where the Commission has applied for it, nor a sanction that reaches the amount proposed. In relation to Art. 260(3) TFEU, the Court held that, for the calculation of the lump sum, contrary to the calculation of the penalty payment, the relevant date for evaluating the duration of the infringement is not the expiry of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion, but the date of the expiry of the transposition deadline of the directive concerned.360 It is not disproportionate to impose a lump sum upon a Member State where that Member State has complied with its duty to notify the transposition measures of the directive concerned at the moment of assessment of the facts by the Court.361 The fact that the Court has only a limited power to assess the proposals made by the Commission in regard of the nature and the amount of financial sanctions brings about a duty for the Commission to state reasons for the nature and the amount of the financial sanction sought.362 While this requirement does not imply an obligation for the Commission to state reasons each time it applies for a pecuniary sanction on the basis of Art. 260(3) TFEU, it nevertheless entails an obligation to adopt guidelines, as this would ensure that the action brought by the Commission is transparent, foreseeable, and consistent with legal certainty. In this regard, the Court made an explicit reference to the Commission’s communications regarding the application of Art. 260 TFEU.363

E. Enforcement of the Court’s judgment imposing pecuniary sanctions The Treaties do not lay down detailed rules for the enforcement of the judgment delivered by the Court of Justice at the conclusion of the Art. 260 TFEU procedure imposing pecuniary sanctions on a Member State. In Portugal v Commission,364 the General Court made clear that where a judgment delivered pursuant to Art. 260(2) TFEU orders a Member State to pay a penalty to the Commission into the Union’s ‘own resources’ account, and since under Art. 317 TFEU the Commission implements the budget, the latter is responsible for recovering the amounts that would be due to the budget pursuant to the judgment in accordance with the provisions of the regulations made under Art. 322 TFEU. Consequently, the decision by which the Commission

359 See C-549/18, Commission v Romania, 2020, para. 53; C-550/18, Commission v Ireland, 2020, para. 63; C-628/18, Commission v Slovenia, 2021, para. 52; C-658/19, Commission v Spain, 2021, para. 35. 360 See C-658/19, Commission v Spain, 2021, para. 81. 361 See C-550/18, Commission v Ireland, 2020, para. 77. 362 See C-549/18, Commission v Romania, 2020, para. 52; C-550/18, Commission v Ireland, 2020, para. 62; C-628/18, Commission v Slovenia, 2021, para. 51; C-658/19, Commission v Spain, 2021, para. 34. 363 See C-549/18, Commission v Romania, 2020, para. 51; C-550/18, Commission v Ireland, 2020, para. 61; C-628/18, Commission v Slovenia, 2021, para. 50; C-658/19, Commission v Spain, 2021, para. 33. See further Communication from the Commission—Implementation of Art. 260(3) of the Treaty (n. 70). 364 T-33/09, Portugal v Commission, 2011, paras 50–91 (upheld in C-292/11 P, Commission v Portugal, 2014). See also T-139/06, France v Commission, 2011).

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234 THE ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF UNION LAW BY A MEMBER STATE determines the amount due from the Member State can be the subject of an action for annulment under Art. 263 TFEU. However, in exercising its jurisdiction to adjudicate annulment actions, the General Court considered that it could not impinge on the exclusive jurisdiction reserved to the Court of Justice under Arts 258 and 260 TFEU and therefore could not rule, in the context of annulment proceedings, on a question relating to an infringement by the Member State that had not been previously decided by the Court of Justice. Thus, the General Court considered itself without jurisdiction to assess whether the measures adopted by the Member State were compatible with the Court of Justice’s judgment and Union law. While this was in line with the allocation of jurisdiction between the General Court and the Court of Justice, as provided for in Art. 256(1) TFEU and the version of Art. 51 of the Statute applicable at the time, the outcome was considered to be problematic as it risked undermining the effectiveness of Art. 260(2) TFEU: in case of a dispute between the Commission and the Member State regarding whether the adoption of new measures by that Member State had brought the infringement which had continued after the delivery of the Art. 260(2) TFEU judgment to an end, the only means available to settle this dispute would be the bringing of fresh infringement proceedings on the basis of Art. 258 TFEU, since only the Court had jurisdiction to assess the compatibility of these new measures with Union law.365 To overcome this problem, Art. 51 of the Statute was amended,366 and the Court of Justice now has jurisdiction for actions for annulment brought by a Member State against an act of the Commission relating to a failure to comply with a judgment delivered under Art. 260(2) or Art. 260(3) TFEU.367

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Failure to comply with a judgment constitutes an infringement of Art. 260 TFEU and may therefore give rise in itself to a finding of liability on the part of the Member State concerned.

365 See also, implicitly, C-292/11 P, Commission v Portugal, 2014, paras 54–56. 366 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2019/629 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 amending Protocol (No. 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union (OJ 2019 L111/1). 367 Statute, Art. 51(c).

6 PRELIMINARY RULINGS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF UNION LAW I. Subject-Matter A. General overview (1) Purpose Under Art. 267 TFEU, the Court of Justice has been conferred jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of Union law, as well as on the validity of acts adopted by the Union institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies.1 In the system of judicial protection in the European Union, preliminary rulings on the interpretation of Union law constitute an indirect route for ensuring the compatibility of acts of the Member States with Union law, alongside the direct route of infringement actions under Arts 258–260 TFEU (see Ch. 5).2 (2) Topics to be discussed The request for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Union law generally raises three main issues. The first relates to the subject-matter of the preliminary ruling on interpretation, namely, what provisions and principles may be interpreted by the Court of Justice (Part I, B). The second relates to special characteristics of the preliminary ruling on interpretation, namely, its content and the related limits placed on the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice (Part II). The third relates to the consequences of a preliminary ruling on interpretation (Part III). These three issues will be considered in turn in the main parts of this chapter.

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B. Rules of which an interpretation can be sought (1) Overview According to Art. 267 TFEU, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to give preliminary rulings on interpretation extends to ‘the Treaties’ and ‘acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or 1 See also Art. 19(3)(b) TEU. At present, the Court of Justice has exclusive jurisdiction to deliver preliminary rulings. However, it is envisaged in the first subpara. of Art. 256(3) TFEU that the General Court may be conferred jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings in specific areas laid down by the Statute. See Request submitted by the Court of Justice pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 281 [TFEU], with a view to amending Protocol (No. 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, available on the Court’s website (under ‘Institution’, ‘Various documents’). See further para. 2.43. 2 See generally K. Lenaerts, ‘The Rule of Law and the Coherence of the Judicial System of the European Union’ (2007) C.M.L.Rev. 1625. See further para. 6.23.

EU Procedural Law. Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak, Oxford University Press. © Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833086.003.0006

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236 PRELIMINARY RULINGS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF UNION LAW agencies of the Union’. Under Art. 1 of the TEU and Art. 1 of the TFEU, the TEU and the TFEU are referred to as ‘the Treaties’.3 Art. 267 TFEU also applies to preliminary rulings in connection with the EAEC Treaty, as Art. 150 EAEC, the counterpart to the former Art. 234 EC, has been repealed and references to, inter alia, the ‘Treaties’ are taken as references to the EAEC Treaty in this regard.4 The upshot is that, as far as the subject-matter of a reference for a preliminary ruling is concerned, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on interpretation under the three Treaties (the TEU, the TFEU, and the EAEC Treaty).5 This generally covers the following three main categories: (1) the Treaties themselves and other Union instruments and principles having the status of primary Union law; (2) acts of the Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies; and (3) international agreements concluded by the Union and acts of bodies set up by such agreements.

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(2) The Treaties (a) Notion of the Treaties As successor to the former EC Treaty, the TFEU, together with the TEU, and the EAEC Treaty constitute the ‘basic constitutional charter’ of the Union.6 They are the written constitution at the apex of the hierarchy of Union norms, that is, primary Union law, and consequently are the first instruments whose interpretation may form the subject-matter of preliminary rulings by the Court of Justice. The notion of the Treaties generally encompasses the TEU, the TFEU, and the EAEC Treaty and all amendments thereto; the Treaties and Acts relating to the accession of new Member States;7 ‘complementary’ Treaties, such as the former (1957) Convention on certain institutions common to the European Communities8 and the former (1965) Treaty establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities (the Merger Treaty);9 and all of the Annexes and Protocols to those Treaties and Acts of Accession, which are deemed to have the

3 Art. 1, third para. TEU; Art. 1(2) TFEU. 4 Art. 106a(1)–(2) EAEC. 5 Moreover, the Court of Justice continues to have jurisdiction to answer questions referred for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the ECSC Treaty and of acts adopted under that Treaty even though such questions are referred to it after the expiry of the ECSC Treaty. The Court indeed considers that it would be contrary to the objectives and coherence of the Treaties and irreconcilable with the continuity of the Union legal order if the Court did not have jurisdiction to ensure the uniform interpretation of the rules deriving from the ECSC Treaty that continue to produce effects after the expiry of that Treaty: see C-221/88, Busseni, 1990, para. 16; C-119/05, Lucchini, 2007, para. 41. 6 294/83, Les Verts v Parliament, 1986, para. 23. See Art. 1, third para. TEU; Art. 1(2) TFEU, specifying that the TEU and the TFEU constitute the Treaties upon which the Union is founded. 7 See C-267/16, Buhagiar and Others, 2018. 8 OJ 1967 152/5. 9 OJ 1967 152/2. This Treaty and the Convention cited in n. 8 have been repealed by Art. 9(1) of the Treaty of Amsterdam (OJ 1997 C340/76-77). Most of their provisions had been incorporated into the former Community Treaties. As for the remainder, Art. 9(2) to (7) of the Amsterdam Treaty set out to retain their essential elements. See further K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel (T. Corthaut (ed.)), EU Constitutional Law (OUP, 2021) para. 1.017.

Subject-Matter 237 same legal force as the Treaties themselves.10 In contrast, the Declarations of intergovernmental conferences accompanying the Treaties do not have Treaty status, although their content may be taken into account in interpreting the Treaty provisions to which they relate.11 (b) Common Foreign and Security Policy Under Art. 275 TFEU, the Court of Justice of the European Union does not have jurisdiction with respect to the provisions relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) nor with respect to the acts adopted on the basis of those provisions, subject to two exceptions: (1) it has jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Art. 40 TEU; and (2) it has jurisdiction to rule on proceedings brought under the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU reviewing the legality of decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons adopted by the Council on the basis of Chapter 2 of Title V of the TEU (concerning specific provisions on the CFSP).12 As regards the first exception, the Court has held that the Treaties do not prescribe any particular means by which the Court should carry out such judicial monitoring.13 However, that monitoring falls undoubtedly within the general jurisdiction of the Court of Justice on the basis of Art. 19 TEU.14 Therefore, since Art. 19(3)(b) TEU states that the Court is to give preliminary rulings, inter alia, on the interpretation of Union law, it follows from this that the Court has jurisdiction for answering preliminary questions regarding the application of Art. 40 TEU.15 The Court’s assessment pursuant to Art. 40 TEU as to whether the implementation of the CFSP affects the application of

10 Art. 51 TEU; Art. 207 EAEC. The principal Protocols annexed to the TEU, the TFEU, and/or the EAEC Treaty can be found at OJ 2012 C326/201, and the Annexes at OJ 2016 C202/1. See C-147/95, Evrenopoulos, 1997 (interpretation of the Protocol on what is now Art. 134 TFEU); C-45/21, Banka Slovenije, 2022 (Protocol (No. 4) on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (OJ 2016 C202/230); C-3/20, AB and Others, 2021 (Protocol (No. 7), annexed to the TEU, TFEU, and EAEC Treaty, on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union (OJ 2012 C326/266). Similarly, conventions concluded between the Member States may become part of Union law by an explicit reference to it in primary or secondary Union law. In such instance, the Court has jurisdiction to interpret the instrument referred to. See C-949/19, Konsul Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 2021, paras 22–25 (interpretation of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders (OJ 2000 L239/19), which is part of Union law by virtue of Protocol (No. 19) on the Schengen acquis integrated into the framework of the European Union, annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon (OJ 2010 C83/290)). 11 See C-135/08, Rottmann, 2010, para. 40; C-193/17, Cresco Investigation, 2019, para. 32. This applies at least insofar as such declarations do not conflict with those provisions: see C-233/97, KappAhl, 1998, paras 22–23; see further K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel (T. Corthaut (ed.)), EU Constitutional Law (OUP, 2021) para. 24.008. The set of Declarations annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Lisbon Treaty, Declarations concerning Protocols annexed to the Treaties, and Declarations by Member States can be found starting at OJ 2016 C202/335. Conversely, a declaration in the minutes of the Council or the Commission on a provision of secondary legislation cannot be used to interpret that provision where no reference is made to that declaration in the provision in question: see C-9/20, Grundstücksgemeinschaft Kollaustraße 136, 2022, para. 38. 12 See also Art. 24(1), second subpara. TEU. 13 See C-72/15, Rosneft, 2017, para. 62. 14 See C-72/15, Rosneft, 2017, para. 62. 15 See C-72/15, Rosneft, 2017, para. 62.

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238 PRELIMINARY RULINGS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF UNION LAW the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions in the other policy fields of the Treaties, or vice versa, could arguably arise within the context of a preliminary ruling on interpretation, for instance, with respect to questions on the interpretation of the provisions of the Treaties concerning the CFSP or Treaty provisions falling outside the sphere of the CFSP but which raise issues relating thereto. The second exception pertains, in view of the reference to the requirements of the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU, to actions for annulment. Therefore, the reasoning in relation to Art. 40 TEU cannot be applied unreservedly to this exception, as the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the Court has been expressly limited to questions of validity.16 However, it could be argued that, since the Court has jurisdiction to answer preliminary questions regarding the validity of restrictive measures, it would not be logical to exclude jurisdiction for interpreting such measures, at least where a preliminary question regarding the interpretation of a restrictive measure is closely linked to the validity of such a measure. For example, a restrictive measure might be valid under one interpretation, but not under another. In addition, a preliminary question regarding the validity of a restrictive measure might be the consequence of a mistaken interpretation by the referring court, which the Court of Justice would need to correct when answering the question of the referring court. In any event, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of international agreements concluded by the Union even where such agreements encompass CFSP matters.17 The Court of Justice’s preliminary ruling jurisdiction on interpretation vis-à-vis the CFSP thus remains limited, but not wholly excluded, and issues regarding the extent of such jurisdiction await further clarification in the case-law.

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(c) Area of Freedom, Security and Justice The restrictions placed on the Court’s preliminary ruling jurisdiction in certain areas of the former EC and EU Treaties comprising the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) by virtue of former Art. 68 EC (concerning former Title IV of the EC Treaty on visas, asylum, immigration, and other policies related to the free movement of persons) and former Art. 35 EU (concerning the former third pillar of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM) under Title VI of the EU Treaty), respectively, have been formally eliminated by the Lisbon Treaty.18 That being said, one 16 See C-72/15, Rosneft, 2017, para. 76. However, as indicated in that judgment, the Court has no jurisdiction to deliver preliminary rulings in respect of provisions of CFSP acts which do not constitute restrictive measures against natural or legal persons within the meaning of the second paragraph of Art. 275 TFEU, but rather are measures of general application. See C-72/15, Rosneft, 2017, paras 76, 81, 98, 99, 102, 103, 107; see also, in that regard, C-348/12 P, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, 2013, para. 99; C-351/22, Neves 77 Solutions, pending. 17 See P. Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (OUP, 2011) 498. For the Court of Justice’s jurisdiction over CFSP agreements in the context of Opinions delivered pursuant to Art. 218(11) TFEU, see para. 12.04. 18 This was subject to a transitional period as stipulated in Art. 10 of Protocol (No. 36), annexed to the Lisbon Treaty, on Transitional Provisions (OJ 2016 C202/321). According to this Protocol, the regime of the former third pillar of PJCCM under Art. 35 EU remained in force for a five-year period from the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, subject to certain exceptions.

Subject-Matter 239 exception to the Court’s jurisdiction in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice continues to exist to date. Art. 276 TFEU provides that [i]‌n exercising its powers regarding the provisions of Chapters 4 and 5 of Title V of Part Three relating to the area of freedom, security and justice, the Court of Justice of the European Union shall have no jurisdiction to review the validity or proportionality of operations carried out by the police or other law-enforcement services of a Member State or the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security.

The provision has not yet given rise to any preliminary references and thus its scope remains unclear.19 (d) Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the rights, freedoms, and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter) of 7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg on 12 December 2007 and published alongside the TEU and TFEU,20 have ‘the same legal value as the Treaties’.21 Yet, while the Court of Justice’s preliminary ruling jurisdiction covers the interpretation of the provisions of the Charter,22 certain limits are placed on such jurisdiction in relation to action taken by the Member States that must fall within the scope of Union law.23 (e) Other Union instruments having Treaty status Treaty status also has to be given to such provisions, adopted by the Council by means of a special procedure, which enter into force after their approval by the Member States ‘in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements’ (i.e. by act of parliament and/or after a referendum, depending upon the ‘constitutional requirements’ of 19 Compare C-202/18 and C-238/18, Rimšēvičs and ECB v Latvia, 2019, para. 59, in which the Court held a decision by a Member State to relieve the governor of a national central bank from office did not fall within the scope of Art. 276 TFEU. See further C-18/19, Stadt Frankfurt am Main, 2020, paras 28–29. 20 OJ 2012 C326/391. 21 Art. 6(1) and (3) TEU. Although the Charter was given legally binding force with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, it constituted an important instrument, alongside other sources, in connection with the protection of fundamental rights in the EU prior to this date, particularly where the Union act concerned contained express reference to it. See further K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel (T. Corthaut (ed.), EU Constitutional Law (OUP, 2021) para. 25.007. 22 See C-414/16, Egenberger, 2018, paras 76–82; C-769/19, Spetsializirana prokuratura (order), 2021, paras 57–58; C-55/19, Fussl Modestraße Mayr, 2021, paras 80–94; C-652/19, Consulmarketing, 2021, para. 36; C-83/19, C‑127/19, C‑195/19, C‑291/19, C‑355/19, and C‑397/19, Asociaţia ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’, 2021, para. 110; C-645/19, Facebook Ireland and Others, 2021, paras 43–75; C-69/21, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid, 2022, paras 46–47; C-460/20, Google, 2022. For preliminary rulings dealing with the assessment of the validity of Union acts vis-à-vis the Charter, implying the interpretation of its provisions, see C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert, 2010, paras 44–46; C-336/19, Centraal Israëlitisch Consistorie van België and Others, 2020, paras 82–95; C-37/20, Luxembourg Business Registers, 2022, paras 34–88; C-694/20, Orde van Vlaamse Balies, 2022. 23 See C-399/11, Melloni, 2013, paras 55–64 and C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, 2013, paras 16–31; C-163/17, Jawo, 2019, 76–79; C-686/18, Adusbef and Others, 2020, paras 51–55; C‑245/19 and C‑246/19, État luxembourgeois, 2020, paras 44–46; C-393/19, Okrazhna prokuratura—Haskovo en Apelativna prokuratura—Plovdiv, 2021, paras 28–42; C-485/19, Profi Credit Slovakia, 2021, para. 37; C-83/20, BPC Lux 2 and Others, 2022, paras 25–32; C-570/20, Direction départementale des finances publiques de la Haute-Savoie, 2022, para. 26. See further para. 6.24. For acts adopted by the Union institutions, see C-403/09 PPU, Detiček, 2009; C-400/10 PPU, McB., 2010.

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240 PRELIMINARY RULINGS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF UNION LAW the Member State concerned).24 Once they have been so adopted, they obtain the status of primary Union law.25

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(f) General principles of Union law The unwritten general principles of Union law, including fundamental rights, may also be the subject of a reference for a preliminary ruling on interpretation. Those principles form part of the ‘law’ which the Court of Justice of the European Union has to ensure is observed in the interpretation and application of the Treaties.26 Examples include the principles of equal treatment, proportionality, ne bis in idem,27 and the rights of the defence prior to the adoption of an individual act having adverse effect.28 Naturally, a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of those principles may be sought only in connection with the application of substantive Union law, that is to say, in connection with main proceedings relating (at least to some extent) to Union law.29 (3) Acts of Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies (a) All acts of Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies Art. 267 TFEU explicitly envisages preliminary rulings to be sought on the interpretation of acts of Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies.30 Subject to the limitations placed on the Court of Justice’s preliminary ruling jurisdiction in the CFSP and AFSJ (see paras 6.05–6.06), all acts of Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies

24 See Art. 223 TFEU (determining a uniform procedure for elections to the European Parliament); see the ‘1976 Act’ concerning the election of the representatives of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage, annexed to the Council Decision of 20 September 1976 (OJ 1976 L278/1), as amended by Council Decision of 1 February 1993 (OJ 1993 L33/15) and by Council Decision of 25 June 2002 and 23 September 2002 (OJ 2002 L283/1); and Art. 311 TFEU (determining the system of the Union’s own resources). 25 This should be distinguished from those Treaty provisions authorizing the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure, to adopt provisions that enter into force only after their approval by the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements: see, e.g. Art. 25 TFEU (rights related to Union citizenship); Art. 262 TFEU (jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union in disputes relating to the application of acts creating European intellectual property rights). See further K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel (T. Corthaut (ed.)), EU Constitutional Law (OUP, 2021) paras 3.007, 24.009. 26 See Art. 19(1), first subpara. TEU (applicable to the EAEC Treaty with repeal of Art. 136 EAEC). See C-115/08, ĈEZ, 2009, paras 88–91 (extending the principle of prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality under Art. 18 TFEU to the EAEC Treaty). Under Art. 6(3) TEU, fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the ECHR and as they result from the ‘constitutional traditions common to the Member States’, constitute general principles of Union law. 27 See C-537/16, Garlsson Real Estate, 2018, para. 64; C-617/17, Powszechny Zakład Ubezpieczeń na Życie, 2019; C-857/19, Slovak Telekom, 2021, paras 39–48; C-505/19, Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2021; C-117/20, bpost, 2022; C-151/20, Nordzucker and Others, 2022; C-435/22 PPU, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft München, 2022. 28 For a general survey, see K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel (T. Corthaut (ed.)), EU Constitutional Law (OUP, 2021) paras 25.023–25.026. The ‘interpretation’ of the principle concerned is often concealed behind the appraisal of the ‘validity’ of a provision of secondary Union law: see C-308/08, Intertanko and Others, 2008, paras 69–71 (principles of legal certainty and of legality of criminal offences and penalties); C-127/07, Arcelor Atlantique and Lorraine and Others, 2008, paras 23, 25–26 (principle of equal treatment); C-58/08, Vodafone and Others, 2010, paras 51–71 (principle of proportionality); C-15/10, Etimine, 2011, paras 124–125 (principle of proportionality). 29 See C-441/14, Dansk Industri, 2016, paras 21–27 (principle prohibiting discrimination on grounds of age); C-616/17, Blaise, 2019, paras 41–51 (precautionary principle); C-184/19, Hecta Viticol 2020, paras 32–33 (principle of legal certainty and principle of protection of legitimate expectations); C‑818/19 and C‑878/19, Marvik- Pastrogor (order), 2020, para. 54 (principle of non-discrimination, principle of legal certainty, and principle of protection of legitimate expectations). See further para. 6.24. 30 Art. 267, first para., indent (b), TFEU. Art. 19(3)(b) TEU merely refers to preliminary rulings on the interpretation and validity of acts adopted by ‘the institutions’ in more abbreviated fashion.

Subject-Matter 241 may be the subject of a request for a preliminary ruling on their interpretation,31 irrespective of whether the act is specifically mentioned in the Treaties32 or not,33 whether it is binding or non-binding,34 or whether or not it has direct effect.35 (i) Act must be attributable to Union institution, body, office, or agency The key criterion is whether the act may be ascribed to a Union institution, body, office, 6.11 or agency.36 The test that a Union institution, body, office, or agency must have ‘taken part’ in the conclusion of the act in order for it to be amenable to interpretation by the Court of Justice in preliminary ruling proceedings is, in all likelihood, open to flexible application. There are many ways in which a Union institution, body, office, or agency might conceivably ‘take part’ in the conclusion of an act. Thus, the test is satisfied in the case of international agreements concluded by the Union and of (binding and non- binding) acts adopted by bodies set up by such agreements (since the Union participates in the operation of such bodies). Moreover, while acts of the governments of the Member States that do or do not have their legal basis in the Treaties—for example, acts adopted by the conference of the representatives of the governments of the Member States— probably would not fall within the Court of Justice’s preliminary ruling jurisdiction,37 31 See C-137/08, VB Pénzügyi Lízing, 2010, para. 38; C-258/14, Florescu, 2017, para. 30. 32 In Arts 288–292 TFEU or elsewhere in the Treaties, such as the Rules of Procedure of the Union institutions (e.g. Arts 232, first para., 235(3), 240(3), 249(1), and 287(4), fifth subpara. TFEU), the Financial Regulation (Art. 322 TFEU), or the acts provided for in Art. 291(3) TFEU, i.e. the so-called ‘Comitology Regulation’ (Regulation No. 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and the general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (OJ 2011 L55/13)). Yet, to be clear, the conclusions of the ‘comitology’ committees arguably would not by themselves—that is to say, apart from the resulting act adopted through this process—be subject to a preliminary ruling on interpretation: see further para. 6.14. 33 For example, a Council resolution: see 9/73, Schlüter, 1973, para. 40; see also C-80/06, Carp, 2007 (a Commission decision of general, as opposed to individual, scope of application which, before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, was not explicitly mentioned in what was then Art. 249 EC). For a list of ‘atypical’ Union instruments, see K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel (T. Corthaut (ed)), EU Constitutional Law (OUP, 2021) para. 27.044. 34 For example, a recommendation (or opinion) within the meaning of Art. 288 TFEU: see 113/75, Frecassetti, 1976, paras 8–9; C-322/88, Grimaldi, 1989, paras 7–9; C-207/01, Altair Chimica, 2003, paras 41–43; C-24/21, PH, 2022, paras 31–32. Under established case-law, national courts are bound to take recommendations into consideration in order to decide disputes referred to them, in particular where they cast light on the interpretation of national measures adopted in order to implement them or where they are designed to supplement binding Union provisions: see C-55/06, Arcor, 2008, para. 94; C-317/08 to C-320/08, Alassini and Others, 2010, para. 40; C-410/13, ‘Baltlanta’, 2014, para. 64; C-24/21, PH, 2022, para. 51. 35 See C-370/12, Pringle, 2012, para. 89; C-486/18, Praxair MRC, 2019, para. 35. Irrespective of whether the Union act has direct effect, its interpretation will be useful to the national court, which, as a public body, is required under Art. 4(3) TEU to apply its domestic legislation in conformity with the requirements of Union law: see C-649/18, A, 2020, paras 38–40; C-308/19, Consiliul Concurenţei, 2021, para. 30. For detailed discussion, see K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel (T. Corthaut (ed)), EU Constitutional Law (OUP, 2021) paras 23.031–23.035. 36 See C-587/15, Lietuvos Respublikos transporto priemonių draudikų biurasn, 2017, paras 37–40; C-258/14, Florescu, 2017, paras 31–36 (a Memorandum of Understanding between the then European Community and Romania, regarding the grant of mutual assistance to a Member State whose currency is not the euro, considered to be an act of a Union institution, inter alia, because it had its legal basis in provisions of Union law and the Commission took part in the conclusion of the Memorandum); C-613/14, James Elliott Construction, 2016, paras 32–47 (the Court accepted jurisdiction to interpret a European harmonized standard drawn up by the European Committee for Standardization, a standardization body established by the national standardization bodies of the EU and EFTA Member States, because the harmonized standard was drawn up in accordance with a mandate given to it in accordance with Directive 83/189, along with the involvement of the Commission in the process which initiates, manages, and monitors the development process, and the fact that the legal effects of the standard are subject to prior publication in the ‘C’ series of the Official Journal of the European Union). 37 See, in relation to Art. 263 TFEU, C-684/20 P, Sharpston v Council and Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (order), 2021, paras 39–45; C-685/20 P, Sharpston v Council and Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (order), 2021, paras 45–51. See further para. 7.74.

242 PRELIMINARY RULINGS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF UNION LAW since they are acts of the Member States and not of the Council as a Union institution, arguably there could be exceptions to the extent that such acts are taken by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States jointly when the matter concerned falls partly within the Union’s jurisdiction and partly within the Member States’ jurisdiction.38 New forms of regulatory activity within the Union have made it necessary to take a creative approach to this test. A prominent example can be found in the Title of the TFEU concerning social policy (Title X of Part Three). Under Art. 155 TFEU, management and labour may conclude agreements at Union level. The question is whether, in certain circumstances, such agreements may also be the subject of a reference for a preliminary ruling. Such agreements are intended to be an alternative to the Union legislation contemplated by Art. 153 TFEU. Before submitting proposals for legislation, the Commission has indeed to consult management and labour and, if they express a wish to that effect, must give them the opportunity to conclude an agreement on the content of the proposal (Art. 154 TFEU). Furthermore, ‘[a]‌greements concluded at Union level shall be implemented . . . in matters covered by Art. 153, at the joint request of the signatory parties, by a Council decision on a proposal from the Commission’ (Art. 155(2) TFEU). Although, strictly speaking, Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies do not play any part in drawing up the agreements to be concluded by management and labour at Union level, it must be considered that they ‘take part’ to a sufficient extent in the conferral of legal force on the agreements, as a result of the Council decisions implementing them, as to make them qualify for preliminary rulings by the Court of Justice.39 The position will be different where the agreements are implemented not by Council decision, but ‘in accordance with the procedures and practices specific to management and labour and the Member States’ (the other alternative set out in Art. 155(2) TFEU). The main reason for this is that it is stated in Declaration No. 27 annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam that ‘the content of [such] agreements’ is to be developed ‘by collective bargaining according to the rules of each Member State’ and that there is therefore ‘no obligation on the Member States to apply the agreements directly or to work out rules for their transposition, nor any obligation to amend national legislation in force to facilitate their implementation’.40 Precisely the opposite situation obtains where the agreements are implemented by Council decision, which means that the aim of the procedure of preliminary rulings on interpretation may be achieved in full in that case.

38 For further discussion of such acts, see K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel (T. Corthaut (ed)), EU Constitutional Law (OUP, 2021) para. 28.003; see also para. 12.08 regarding the power of the Court to deliver opinions pursuant to Art. 218(11) TFEU in relation to mixed agreements. 39 See C-149/10, Chatzi, 2010, paras 25–26. On similar grounds, the Court has applied its case-law on the assessment of the direct effect of provisions of a directive to framework agreements: see C-98/09, Sorge, 2010, para. 51; C-444/09 and C-456/09, Gavieiro Gavieiro and Iglesias Torres, 2010, para. 77; C-486/08, Tirols, 2010, para. 23; C-268/06, Impact, 2008, para. 58; C-155/10, Williams and Others, 2011, para. 16. See further K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel (T. Corthaut (ed.)), EU Constitutional Law (OUP, 2021) paras 17.044, 28.005. 40 Declaration (No. 27), annexed by the Amsterdam Treaty, on Art. 118b (later Art. 139(2) EC, now Art. 155 TFEU) (OJ 1997 C340/136).

Subject-Matter 243 (ii) Notion of Union institution, body, office, or agency First, as regards the notion of Union ‘institution’, Art. 13 TEU lists the seven institutions of the Union, namely, the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank, and the Court of Auditors.41 Since Art. 267 TFEU confers jurisdiction upon the Court to give preliminary rulings on all acts of the Union institutions without exception,42 save where the Treaties have explicitly excluded jurisdiction of the Court,43 this means that all acts adopted by the European Council,44 the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament,45 the European Central Bank, or the European Parliament and the Council jointly may be the subject of a reference for a preliminary ruling on their interpretation. In the overwhelming majority of cases, Union decision-making results in such an act in one form or another (see Arts 288–292 TFEU). Certainly, acts of the Court of Auditors also come under the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to give preliminary rulings on interpretation, albeit it is more exceptional for the interpretation of such acts to be relevant to the determination of main proceedings before a national court. Second, as regards the notion of Union bodies, offices, or agencies, this language essentially covers any entity of the Union that is not an institution mentioned in Art. 13 TEU.46 As was pointed out above (see para. 6.11), the Court of Justice requires a Union institution, body, office, or agency to have taken part in the adoption of an act for it to be capable of being the subject of an Art. 267 TFEU reference on its interpretation.47 That requirement can certainly be fulfilled in the case of offices, agencies, foundations, centres, and other ‘bodies’ established by Union institutions.48 Accordingly, subject to the limitations placed on the Court’s preliminary ruling jurisdiction under the CFSP,49 acts of bodies, offices, or agencies established by Union institutions in the exercise of their powers and given specific executive tasks (and the associated power to take decisions) can constitute the subject of a request for a preliminary ruling. 41 Art. 13(1), second subpara. TEU. 42 See C‑83/19, C‑127/19, C‑195/19, C‑291/19, C‑355/19, and C‑397/19, Asociaţia ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’, 2021, para. 148. 43 See para 6.05 regarding the CFSP. 44 See C-370/12, Pringle, 2012, paras 34–36. See para. 10.03. 45 For example, with respect to the interpretation of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, see C-200/07 and C-201/07, Marra, 2008. 46 See also C-613/14, James Elliott Construction, 2016, paras 32–47. 47 See 152/83, Demouche and Others, 1987, para. 19; C-587/15, Lietuvos Respublikos transporto priemonių draudikų biurasn, 2017, paras 37–40. 48 Nowhere in the Treaties is the distinction between Union ‘bodies’, ‘offices’, and ‘agencies’ explained. It does not appear that the words ‘Union bodies, offices, and agencies’ are exhaustive; they can in principle cover acts of Union ‘bodies’ in the general sense of centres, foundations, supervisory authorities, and the like. In the European Convention documents and the subsequent provisions of the Draft Constitutional Treaty on the Court of Justice, reference was made to Union ‘bodies and agencies’ despite the widespread recognition of various kinds of bodies, offices, agencies, monitoring centres, foundations, etc. 49 For example, a Union body, office, or agency created pursuant to the Treaty provisions on the CFSP, for which the Court of Justice’s preliminary ruling jurisdiction is generally excluded save for certain exceptions (see para. 6.05), as illustrated by the European Defence Agency (see Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1835 of 12 October 2015 defining the statute, seat, and operational rules of the European Defence Agency (recast) (OJ 2015 L266/55)). See further, in relation to the status of the Eulex Mission in Kosovo, C-439/13 P, Elitaliana v Eulex Kosovo, 2015, paras 54–59.

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244 PRELIMINARY RULINGS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF UNION LAW 6.13

(b) Judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union Preliminary rulings may also be sought on the interpretation of judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union. For instance, an interpretation of a previous judgment may be sought in the event that the national court (including the same or other courts dealing with the case50) has difficulty in understanding or applying it.51 Where a national court is not in agreement with a judgment given by the Court, it may invite the Court to reconsider the interpretation given in its previous judgment.52 The judgment to be interpreted does not have to be a preliminary ruling; it may have been given in any sort of proceedings before the Union Courts.53Where national courts refer questions on the interpretation of previous judgments of the Court, in answering them the Court of Justice inevitably falls back on the provisions and principles of Union law underlying those judgments.54 This is also true where national courts apply to the Court of Justice for an interpretation of a judgment of the General Court. The possibility of making such a reference is of great practical importance for national courts where they query whether a judgment of the General Court against which no appeal has been brought before the Court of Justice correctly interprets the principles and provisions of Union law with which it deals. Further to this, judgments of the Court may also form indirectly the subject-matter of a reference for a preliminary ruling. For example, in the Kolev II case,55 the Court was required to clarify the scope of the Kolev judgment56 before answering the question of the referring court regarding the compatibility with Union law of the procedure by which the Kolev judgment was implemented in the national legal order.57 50 See C-206/94, Brennet, 1996; C-35/11, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, 2012; C-561/19, Consorzio Italian Management, 2021. 51 See 69/85, Wünsche (order), 1986, para. 15 (albeit making clear that it would not be permissible to contest the validity of a previous judgment: see further para. 6.33); 14/86, Pretore di Salò v X, 1987, para. 12. For examples, see C-377/89, Cotter and Others, 1991; C-363/93 and C-407/93 to C-411/93, Lancry and Others, 1994; C-280/94, Posthuma-van Damme and Oztürk, 1996, para. 13; C-5/97, Ballast Nedam Groep, 1997, para. 1; C-219/98, Anastasiou and Others, 2000, paras 13–14; C-466/00, Kaba, 2003; C-224/01, Köbler, 2003; C-17/05, Cadman, 2006; 2/06, Kempter, 2008; C-430/09, Euro Tyre Holding, 2010, para. 21; C-237/21, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft München, 2022, para. 27. This does not necessarily mean only one judgment; a reference can be made in relation to a line of case-law related to the interpretation of a Union act: see C-400/09 and C-207/10, Orifarm and Others, 2011, para. 1. It is also possible that a referring court whose request for a preliminary ruling was suspended pending the delivery of a judgment in another case justifies its decision to maintain its request for a preliminary ruling by seeking a clarification of that judgment in connection to the questions it had referred: see C-793/19, SpaceNet, 2022, para. 46. 52 See C-581/10 and C-629/10, Nelson and Others, 2012, para. 20; C-42/17, M.A.S., 2017, paras 27–28; C-493/17, Weiss, 2018, para. 19. 53 See 314/81 to 316/81 and 83/82, Waterkeyn, 1982 (concerning the interpretation of the scope and legal effects of a judgment given pursuant to what is now Art. 258 TFEU). It should, however, be stressed that according to Art. 104(1) of the CJ Rules of Procedure: ‘Article 158 of these Rules relating to the interpretation of judgments and orders shall not apply to decisions given in reply to a request for a preliminary ruling.’ Art. 104(2) of those Rules adds: ‘It shall be for the national courts or tribunals to assess whether they consider that sufficient guidance is given by a preliminary ruling, or whether it appears to them that a further reference to the Court is required.’ See also para. 6.33. 54 See C-300/12, Finanzamt Düsseldorf-Mitte, 2014, paras 23–33. However, albeit drafted as a question of interpretation of provisions and principles of Union law, the reference in C-413/11, Germanwings (order), 2013, directly challenged the Court’s judgment in C-402/07 and C-423/07, Sturgeon and Others, 2009. 55 C-704/18, Kolev (‘Kolev II’), 2020. 56 C‑612/15, Kolev, 2018. 57 See C-704/18, Kolev II, 2020, paras 38–50. See para. 3.17.

Subject-Matter 245 (c) Acts of committees established under Union law The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, which assist the European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission in an advisory capacity (Art. 13(4) TEU), are not, formally speaking, Union institutions or bodies, offices, or agencies whose acts are amenable to interpretation by the Court of Justice pursuant to Art. 267 TFEU. The Opinions which they deliver as envisaged by the various Treaty provisions or on their own initiative form part of the decision-making process carried out between the Commission, the Council, and (generally) the European Parliament. They have no independent existence and could, at most, be used to help interpret Union acts where they contributed to the process of their adoption.58 Similar remarks could be made for other committees established under Union law, for example, the various scientific, consultative, and advisory committees in the relevant field.59 (4) International agreements concluded by the Union and acts of bodies established by such agreements (a) Agreements concluded by the Union Not only acts adopted by Union institutions autonomously but also ‘contractual’ acts are covered by indent (b) of the first paragraph of Art. 267 TFEU. Thus, the Court of Justice has held that it has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of international agreements concluded by the Union with third countries or international organizations (see Arts 216–219 TFEU).60 Under established case-law, international agreements concluded by the Union form an integral part of the Union legal order and can therefore be the subject of a request for a preliminary ruling on their interpretation.61 (b) Agreements concluded by the Union and the Member States In a number of preliminary rulings, the Court of Justice determined that an international agreement fell within its jurisdiction without explaining the impact of the fact that the international agreement at issue was concluded by the Union and the Member States jointly with third countries, commonly referred to as a mixed agreement.62 Yet, a 58 K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel (T. Corthaut (ed)), EU Constitutional Law (OUP, 2021) paras 13.030–13.035. 59 For a survey, see K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel (T. Corthaut (ed)), EU Constitutional Law (OUP, 2021) para. 13.036. 60 See 181/73, Haegeman, 1974, paras 1–6; C-335/11 and C-337/11, HK Danmark, 2013; C-532/18, GN, 2019, para. 30; C-641/18, Rina, 2020, para. 46; C-679/20, Administración General del Estado (order), 2021, para. 19; C-500/20, ÖBB-Infrastruktur Aktiengesellschaft, 2022, paras 38–39. Sometimes, the Court of Justice’s interpretation of international agreements concluded by the Union can implicate sensitive political issues in international relations: for example, as regards the Israel–Palestinian conflict, see C-386/08, Brita, 2010; C-363/18, Organisation juive européenne and Vignoble Psagot, 2019. Questions concerning the interpretation of such agreements have sometimes involved third countries which since acceded to the European Union: in addition to 181/73, Haegeman 1974, see C-432/92, Anastasiou and Others, 1994; C-23/04 to C-25/04, Sfakianakis, 2006; C-56/06, Euro Tex, 2007; C-101/10, Pavlov and Famira, 2011. 61 See C-741/19, Republic of Moldova, 2021, para. 23. 62 For example, as regards the EEA Agreement, see C-321/97, Andersson and Wåkerås-Andersson, 1999, paras 23–33. It is clear from this judgment that the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to interpret the EEA Agreement; however, the interpretation is binding only on the Union, and not on the EFTA States. The EFTA Court is empowered to give rulings on the interpretation of the EEA Agreement which are applicable in the EFTA States. See, more recently, C-157/07, Krankenheim Ruhesitz am Wannsee-Seniorenheimstatt, 2008; C-589/20, JR, 2022. For

6.14

6.15

6.16

246 PRELIMINARY RULINGS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF UNION LAW key question has arisen in the case-law as to whether, in the case of a mixed agreement concluded by the Union and the Member States jointly with a third country, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice extends to rulings interpreting provisions of the agreement by which the Member States enter into commitments vis-à-vis that country by virtue of their own competences.63 The Court of Justice first left this question expressly open.64 It was able to do so because it took the view that the provisions whose interpretation was sought fell partly within the Union’s competence to guarantee commitments towards the non-member country concerned. The fact that the Member States had to carry out the commitments was irrelevant because in doing so they were simply fulfilling an obligation towards the Union and did not assume, vis-à-vis the non-member country, the Union’s responsibility for the due performance of the agreement.65 In Parfums Christian Dior,66 the Court held, however, that it had jurisdiction to interpret Art. 50 of TRIPs67 (a procedural provision conferring on the judicial authorities of the Contracting Parties the authority to order prompt and effective provisional measures to prevent a threatened or suspected infringement of any intellectual property right from occurring) both in situations falling within the scope of the national law and in those coming under Union law. The Court inferred its interpretative jurisdiction from the finding that Art. 50 of TRIPs constitutes a procedural provision which should be applied in the same way in every situation falling within its scope (both situations covered by national law and situations covered by Union law) and that this obligation requires the judicial bodies of the Member States and the Union, to give it a uniform interpretation, for practical and legal reasons.68 Further to this, the Court of Justice seems to consider itself competent to interpret provisions of a mixed agreement if the agreement concerns a field in large measure covered

examples concerning other agreements, see C-213/03, Syndicat professionnel coordination des pêcheurs de l’étang de Berre et de la région, 2004 (see in the context of an infringement action concerning the same agreement: C-239/03, Commission v France, 2004, paras 22–31); C-97/05, Gattoussi, 2006; C-70/09, Hengartner and Gasser, 2010, paras 35–43. See further A. Rosas, ‘Mixity Past, Present and Future: Some Observations’ in M. Chamon and I. Govaere (eds), EU External Relations Post-Lisbon. The Law and Practice of Facultative Mixity (Brill, 2020) 8. 63 See P. Koutrakos, ‘Interpretation of Mixed Agreements’ in C. Hillion and P. Koutrakos (eds), Mixed Agreements Revisited (Hart, 2010) 116; C. Timmermans, ‘The Court of Justice and Mixed Agreements’ in A. Rosas, E. Levits, and Y. Bot (eds), The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe: Analyses and Perspectives on Sixty Years of Case-law (Asser Press/Springer, 2013) 666. 64 See 12/86, Demirel, 1987, para. 9; C-53/9,6 Hermès International, 1998, paras 24–33. 65 Art. 4(3) TEU; 104/81, Kupferberg, 1982; see also C-439/01, Cipra and Kvasnicka, 2003, paras 23–24 (with respect to the AETR Agreement (European Agreement concerning the Work of Crews of Vehicles engaged in International Road Transport): the Court held, after having recalled that in ratifying or acceding to that agreement the Member States had acted in the interest and on behalf of the Union (then Community), that it forms part of Union law and hence that it has jurisdiction to interpret it. 66 C-300/98 and C-392/98, Parfums Christian Dior and Others, 2000, paras 32–40; see also C-89/99, Schieving- Nijstad and Others, 2001, para. 30; C-245/02, Anheuser-Busch, 2004, paras 40–46. 67 On the WTO and the competence of the Union and the Member States for matters falling within the scope of the WTO, see generally K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel (T. Corthaut (ed.)), EU Constitutional Law (OUP, 2021) paras 10.010–10.011. 68 See also C-470/16, North East Pylon Pressure Campaign and Sheehy, 2018, para. 50; C-741/19, Republic of Moldova, 2021, paras 28–29.

Subject-Matter 247 by Union legislation.69 In Merck Genéricos,70 concerning questions on the interpretation of Art. 33 of TRIPs (a provision on the term of protection for patents), the Court of Justice held that it has jurisdiction under Art. 267 TFEU to interpret the provisions of the TRIPs Agreement in order to define the obligations that the Union has thereby assumed and to determine whether the relevant sphere covering the provision of the TRIPs Agreement at issue in the main proceedings is one in which the Union has or has not legislated.71 This is because the answer to that question ‘calls for a uniform reply at [Union] level that the Court alone is capable of supplying’.72 In the case at hand, the sphere concerned (patent law) was not covered sufficiently by Union legislation to lead to the conclusion that it fell within the scope of Union law.73 It should be pointed out that while the Union’s exclusive competence, following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, now explicitly covers the common commercial policy—including ‘the commercial aspects of intellectual property’,74 which refers to TRIPs75—it is not sufficient that an agreement is liable to have implications for trade with one or more third States for it to fall within the common commercial policy and thus the exclusive competence of the Union.76 Consequently, only the components of agreements that display a specific link with trade between the European Union and the third State(s) concerned will fall within the field of the common commercial policy.77 The aforementioned pre-Lisbon case-law regarding mixed agreements therefore remains valid for the components of agreements that do not fall within the common commercial policy.78 Moreover, the approach taken by the Court of Justice is relevant in assessing its jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of mixed agreements in other fields of Union law.79 For 69 See C-741/19, Republic of Moldova, 2021, paras 28–29; C-500/20, ÖBB-Infrastruktur Aktiengesellschaft, 2022, para. 41. 70 C-431/05, Merck Genéricos, 2007, paras 31–37; compare C-431/05, Merck Genéricos, AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer Opinion, 2007, particularly points 54–61 (advocating that the Court of Justice should have unlimited jurisdiction to interpret the TRIPs Agreement, irrespective of whether the Union has legislated in the field concerned). 71 See C-431/05, Merck Genéricos, 2007, paras 33–36. 72 See C-431/05, Merck Genéricos, 2007, para. 37; see also C-500/20, ÖBB-Infrastruktur Aktiengesellschaft, 2022, para. 43. 73 See C-431/05, Merck Genéricos, 2007, para. 46. 74 Arts 3(1)(e) and 207(1) TFEU. 75 See C-414/11, Daiichi Sankyo, 2013, paras 45–48. 76 See Opinion 2/15, Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore, 2017, para. 36; Opinion 3/15, Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons who are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled, 2017, para. 61. In C-414/11, Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland, 2013, paras 53–32, the Court held that the rules in the TRIPs agreement have a specific link to international trade and fall within the concept of ‘commercial aspects of intellectual property’. Conversely, the Court held that this is not the case for the rules of the Marrakesh Treaty, for which a link with international trade could only be indirect: see Opinion 3/15, Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons who are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled, 2017, paras 81–101. 77 See Opinion 2/15, Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore, 2017, para. 37; Opinion 3/15, Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons who are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled, 2017, para. 61. 78 See Opinion 2/15, Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore, 2017, para. 305. 79 See C-470/16, North East Pylon Pressure Campaign and Sheehy, 2018, para. 50; C-500/20, ÖBB-Infrastruktur Aktiengesellschaft, 2022, paras 42– 43; C-873/19, Deutsche Umwelthilfe, 2022, para. 48; see also C-411/17,

248 PRELIMINARY RULINGS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF UNION LAW example, in Lesoochranárske zoskupenie,80 the Court declared that it has ‘jurisdiction to define the obligations which the [Union] has assumed and those which remain the sole responsibility of the Member States in order to interpret the Aarhus Convention’. Specifically, the Court ruled that it has jurisdiction to interpret Art. 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention (concerning the right of access to procedures to challenge acts contravening national law provisions relating to the environment), emphasizing that where a provision can apply both to situations falling within the scope of national and of Union law, it is in the interests of Union law that the provision is interpreted uniformly, whatever the circumstances in which it is to apply.81

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(c) Acts of bodies established by international agreements Since the function of Art. 267 TFEU is to ensure the uniform application throughout the Union of all provisions forming part of the Union legal system and to ensure that their effects do not vary according to the interpretation accorded to them in the various Member States, the Court of Justice held that it is to have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on the interpretation not only of the agreement itself, but also of decisions of the body established by the agreement and entrusted with responsibility for its implementation.82 This is so regardless of the binding nature of such decisions. 83 Thus, within the context of the EEC–Turkey Association Agreement, the Court has held that decisions of the Association Council form an integral part of Union law on account of their direct connection with the agreement itself.84 Consequently, the Court has jurisdiction to interpret the decisions of the Association Council.85 (d) Agreements to which the Union is not a party The Court of Justice does not, in principle, have jurisdiction to interpret in preliminary ruling proceedings international agreements concluded between Member States and

Inter-Environnement Wallonie, AG Kokott Opinion, 2018, points 69–74. Note that the Court does not always explicitly consider whether it has competence to interpret provisions of a mixed agreement. For example, it may dispose of that question where it finds that the provision of the mixed agreement of which an interpretation is sought is not applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings. See C-798/18 and C-799/18, Federazione nazionale delle imprese elettrotecniche ed elettroniche (Anie) and Others, 2021, paras 67–70 (in relation to Art. 10 of the Energy Charter); compare to C-741/19, Republic of Moldova, 2021, paras 22–27. 80 C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, 2011, paras 30–34; see also C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, AG Sharpston Opinion, 2010, points 43–62 (providing a neat summary of the case-law regarding the Court’s jurisdiction for interpreting mixed agreements). 81 See C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, 2011, paras 40–43. Regarding the converse situation, it has been submitted that the Court does not have jurisdiction to interpret provisions of a mixed agreement that are not covered by the Union’s competence and that are not indivisible from the parts of the agreement for which the Court has jurisdiction: see M. Broberg and N. Fenger, Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice (3rd edn, OUP, 2021) 110–111. 82 See 30/88, Greece v Commission, 1989, paras 12–13; C-192/89, Sevince, 1990, paras 9–11; C-188/91, Deutsche Shell, 1993, para. 17. 83 See C-188/91, Deutsche Shell, 1993, paras 16–19. 84 See 30/88, Greece v Commission, 1989, paras 12–13. 85 See C-677/17, Çoban, 2019; C-70/18, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid, 2019; C-379/20, Udlændingenævnet, 2021.

Subject-Matter 249 non-member countries outside the scope of Union law.86 A number of exceptions exist, however. First, international agreements by which the Union is bound by way of substitution for the Member States are treated in the same way as international agreements concluded by the Union.87 Second, where provisions of international agreements have been taken over by Union law and by national law, the Court has jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of that international agreement in order to forestall future differences of interpretation, irrespective of the circumstances in which they apply.88 Third, the Court may interpret provisions of an international agreement to which Union law has made a reference (renvoi).89 Fourth, on the basis of the customary international law principle of good faith and of the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Art. 4(3) TEU, the Court is required to take an international agreement binding all the Member States into account even though it does not bind the European Union, either because the Union is not a party to it or is not bound by it by way of substitution, where that international agreement is likely to have consequences for the interpretation of an international agreement by which the European Union is bound, as well as for rules of secondary Union law that come within the scope of that international agreement.90 The same goes for an international agreement to which not all Member States are a party, but which is relevant for the interpretation of an international agreement to which the Union is a party.91

86 See 130/73, Vandeweghe and Others, 1973, para. 2; 44/84, Hurd, 1986, para. 20; C-481/13, Ferooz Qurbani, 2014, para. 22; C-219/20, Bezirkshauptmannschaft Hartberg-Fürstenfeld, 2022, para. 14. For example, as regards bilateral tax conventions, see C-128/08, Damseaux, 2009, paras 20–22. Likewise, the Court considers that it has no jurisdiction under Art. 267 TFEU to interpret a provision of an agreement concluded between a number of Member States, even if the agreement was concluded pursuant to a Union directive: C-162/98, Hartmann (order), 1998, paras 8–10. 87 See C-533/08, TNT Express Nederland, 2010, paras 59–62; see also C-188/07, Commune de Mesquer, 2008, para. 85; C-301/08, Bogiatzi, 2009, paras 24–34, and C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and Others, 2011, para. 62. As illustrated by the foregoing cases, the Court of Justice takes a strict approach with respect to the evaluation of the Union’s functional succession to obligations entered into by the Member States. Yet, as noted by the Court (C-308/06, Intertanko and Others, 2008, para. 48), functional succession has been found in the context of the GATT. See also 267/81 to 269/81, SPI and SAMI, 1983, paras 14–19: the Court of Justice took quite an expansive approach, holding that it had jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of the 1947 GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) on the grounds that, since the Common Customs Tariff entered into effect, the then Community had been substituted for the Member States as regards the fulfilment of the commitments laid down in the GATT, thereby assuming jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings simply by referring to the aim of that jurisdiction, namely, ‘to ensure the uniform interpretation of [Union] law’. This case is relied upon for establishing the rationale for requiring uniform application of international law that is an integral part of Union law in other contexts. 88 See C‑57/09 and C‑101/09, B and D, 2010, para. 71; C-481/13, Ferooz Qurbani, 2014, para. 26. 89 See C-481/13, Ferooz Qurbani, 2014, para. 28; C‑443/14 and C‑444/14, Warendorf, 2016, paras 28–29 (interpretation in conformity with the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees); C-14/21 and C-15/21, Sea Watch, 2022, paras 89–92 (interpretation in conformity with the SOLAS Convention). Where a Treaty provision refers to an international agreement to which the Union is not a contracting party, that international agreement may be taken into account to assess the validity of acts adopted on the basis of that Treaty provision: see C‑391/16, C‑77/17, and C‑78/17, M, 2019, para. 74. 90 See C-308/06, Intertanko and Others, 2008, para. 52; C-15/17, Bosphorus Queen Shipping, 2018, paras 44–45; C-14/21 and C-15/21, Sea Watch, 2022, para. 90. 91 See C-15/17, Bosphorus Queen Shipping, 2018, paras 46–47.

250 PRELIMINARY RULINGS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF UNION LAW

II. Special Characteristics A. Content of a preliminary ruling on interpretation 6.19

6.20

(1) Interpretation versus application The Treaties do not define precisely what is meant by ‘interpretation’ of Union law in the context of the preliminary ruling procedure.92 Initially, the Court of Justice strongly emphasized the distinction between interpretation and application, which was also to demarcate the respective functions of the Court of Justice and the national courts.93 At the same time, however, the Court referred to ‘the special field of judicial cooperation’ under what is now Art. 267 TFEU, which requires that the national court and the Court of Justice, both keeping within their respective jurisdiction and with the aim of ensuring that Union law is applied in a unified manner, ‘make direct and complementary contributions to the working out of a decision’.94 (2) Judicial cooperation As the case-law has evolved, the idea of ‘judicial cooperation’ has gained the upper hand over the distinction between interpretation and application,95 the aim being to ensure that the main proceedings are determined in a way which secures the uniform ‘application’ of Union law. This is not to discount the Court of Justice’s repeated admonition that the application of Union law falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national court.96 Nonetheless, the idea is that this does not preclude the Court from ensuring

92 See 13/61, Bosch and Others, 1962 ECR 45, 50, where the Court of Justice held that since the question as to what is meant in what is now Art. 267 TFEU by ‘the interpretation of Union law’ may itself be a matter of interpretation, it is permissible for the national court to formulate its questions in a simple and direct way. See for a case in which the Court received such a question, holding that the enforceability against an individual of a Union regulation which is not published in the language of a Member State is a question of the interpretation, not validity, of Union law: see C-161/06, Skoma-Lux, 2007, paras 57–61. See further B. de Witte, ‘The Preliminary Ruling Dialogue: Three Types of Questions Posed by National Courts’ in B. de Witte, J.A. Mayoral, U. Jaremba, M. Wind, and K. Podstawa (eds), National Courts and EU Law. New Issues, Theories and Methods (Edward Elgar, 2018) 150. 93 See 6/64, Costa v ENEL (order), 1964 ECR 614, 614–615; 20/64, Albatros, 1965 ECR 29, 34; 13/68, Salgoil, 1968 ECR 453, 459–460. 94 See 16/65, Schwarze, 1965 ECR 878, 886; C-14/09, Genc, 2010, para. 30; C-344/19, Radiotelevizija Slovenija, 2021, para. 23. 95 In C-162/06, International Mail Spain, 2007, para. 24, the Court held: ‘It is one of the essential characteristics of the system of judicial cooperation established under Article 267 TFEU, that the Court replies in rather abstract and general terms to a question on the interpretation of Union law referred to it, while it is for the referring court to give a ruling in the dispute before it, taking into account the Court’s reply.’ Despite the sensitivities that this distinction continues to engender, there seems to be widespread recognition of the inherent tensions placed on the Court in terms of ensuring that the answer given by the Court is sufficiently concrete to be of service to the national court, on the one hand, and providing a general answer as part of ensuring the uniform interpretation of Union law in the various national legal systems, on the other. 96 See C-451/03, Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti, 2006, para. 69; C-32/11, Allianz Hungária Biztosító, 2013, para. 29; C-228/18, Gazdasági Versenyhivatal, 2020, para. 47; C-554/19, Staatsanwaltschaft Offenburg (order), 2020, para. 28; C-596/20, DuoDecad, 2022, paras 37–39. But see C-243/15, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, 2016, para. 64, in which the Court held that there is nothing ‘preventing a national court from asking the Court of Justice to rule on the application of those provisions in the case in point, provided, however, that the national court carries out the finding and assessment of the facts necessary for that purpose in the light of all the material in the file before it’. See also C-312/14, Banif Plus Bank, 2015, para. 52, regarding the legal classification by the Court of facts established by the national court. See further C-247/16, Schottelius, 2017, paras 44–45; C-330/17, Verbraucherzentrale Baden-Württember, 2018, paras 20, 39–40; C-604/17, PM (order), 2018, paras 29–34.

Special Characteristics 251 that it can give an answer that will be of use to the national court to enable it to determine the case before it,97 inter alia, by providing the referring court with ‘the interpretative criteria needed to enable it to decide the case before it’.98 Further to this, the Court of Justice regularly refers to ‘the need to afford a helpful interpretation of [Union] law’.99 Such an interpretation can be confined specifically to the facts and points of national law underlying the national proceedings as they emerge from the ‘documents before the Court’.100 The idea of judicial cooperation is also reflected in the practice of the Court to provide a national court with some explanations when the questions referred to it are manifestly inadmissible, either for lack of jurisdiction, absence of a connecting factor to Union law, or deficiency of the reference order. For example, where a national court inquired about the validity of Art. 45(4) TFEU in the light of Art. 45(1) to (3) TFEU, the Court, while declaring the question manifestly inadmissible for lack of jurisdiction, nevertheless provided the national court with an explanation regarding the relationship between Art. 45(4) TFEU and Art. 45(1)–(3) TFEU, as well as the application of Art. 45(4) TFEU.101

B. Limits placed on the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice As developed in the case-law, certain limits are placed on the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to deliver preliminary rulings on the interpretation of Union law.102 These limits are primarily aimed at precluding the Court from ruling on facts and points of national law and on the compatibility of national rules with Union law. Where the referring court’s questions are framed in such a manner, however, there is the possibility for the Court of Justice to reformulate such questions. Consequently, attempts by interested parties within the meaning of Art. 23 of the Statute to challenge the admissibility

97 See C-279/06, CEPSA, 2008, para. 31; C-756/18, easyJet Airline (order), 2019, paras 16–21; C‑585/18, C‑624/18 and C‑625/18, A.K., 2019, para. 132; C-519/20, Landkreis Gifhorn, 2022, para. 47; C-530/20, EUROAPTIEKA, 2022, paras 52–54. 98 C-228/18, Gazdasági Versenyhivatal, 2020, para. 48. Regarding the determination whether a particular contractual term is unfair within the context of Directive 93/13/EEC, see C-609/19, BNP Paribas Personal Finance, 2021, para. 60; C-776/19 to C-782/19, BNP Paribas Personal Finance, 2021, para. 92. 99 244/78, Union Laitière Normande, 1979, para. 5. 100 311/85, VVR, 1987, para. 11. The documents in the case from which the Court derives the relevant facts and points of national law include not only the order for reference and the file submitted by the national court, but also the written and oral observations of the parties to the main proceedings, the Member States, the Commission, and the Union institution, body, office, or agency which adopted the act at issue in the proceedings under Art. 23 of the Statute: see C‑702/20 and C‑17/21, DOBELES HES, 2023, paras 40–42. 101 See C-571/20, Ministero dell'Istruzione, dell'Università e della Ricerca and Others (order), 2021, paras 13–17. See further C-457/09, Chartry (order), 2011, paras 19–20; C-587/15, Lietuvos Respublikos transporto priemonių draudikų biurasn, 2017, para. 45; C-558/18 and C-563/18, Miasto Łowicz, 2020, paras 54–59; C-477/19, Magistrat der Stadt Wien, 2020, paras 37–45; C-643/19, Resopre—Sociedade Revendedora de Aparelhos de Precisão (order), 2020, paras 32–33. 102 See C-268/15, Ullens de Schooten, 2016, para. 40; C‑585/18, C‑624/18, and C‑625/18, A.K. and Others, 2019, para. 77: the Court of Justice may interpret Union law only within the limits and the powers conferred upon it. Note that such limits are in addition to those placed on the preliminary ruling jurisdiction of the Court of Justice generally in relation to the assessment of questions which implicate the material, personal, territorial, and temporal scope of Union law.

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252 PRELIMINARY RULINGS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF UNION LAW of the questions submitted by the referring court on these grounds alone routinely fail.103 Moreover, the Court of Justice in principle does not have jurisdiction to deliver preliminary rulings involving situations in the main proceedings which have no factor linking them to Union law, as illustrated by case-law concerning the free movement provisions and fundamental rights—although some exceptions have been carved out in the case-law, as discussed in the sections that follow.

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(1) The Court of Justice does not rule on facts and points of national law In the context of preliminary ruling proceedings, the Court of Justice is not entitled to rule on facts or points of national law, or to verify whether they are correct.104 Likewise, it is not for the Court to identify the provisions of national law relevant to the dispute, to give a ruling on their interpretation, or to decide whether the referring court’s interpretation is correct.105 These matters fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national court.106 That said, there is nothing to prevent the Court from spelling out its understanding of the facts and points of national law as its starting point for its ‘useful’ (i.e. specific) interpretation of the applicable provisions and principles of Union law.107 The Court

103 See C-378/08, ERG and Others, 2010, paras 30–33; C-78/08 to C-80/08, Paint Graphos and Others, 2011, para. 36; C-188/21, Megatherm-Csillaghegy (order), 2022, paras 28–32. 104 See 104/77, Oehlschläger, 1978, para. 4; C-799/19, NI, 2020, para. 45; C-693/18, X, 2020, para. 55; C-802/19, Firma Z, 2021, para. 37; C-19/20, Bank BPH, 2021, paras 37–38; C-596/20, DuoDecad, 2022, paras 37–39; C-652/20, Allianz Elementar Versicherung, 2022, para. 27; C‑702/20 and C‑17/21, DOBELES HES, 2023, para. 56; C-158/21, Puig Gordi and Others, 2023, para. 61. In particular, it is for the national court, and not for the Court of Justice, to ascertain the facts that have given rise to the dispute and to establish the consequences which they have for the judgment which it is required to deliver: see C-232/09, Danosa, 2010, paras 31–36; C-310/09, Accor, 2011, para. 37; C-23/12, Zakaria, 2013, para. 29; but see C-109/20, PL Holdings, 2021, paras 39–43. 105 See C-574/16, Grupo Norte Facility, 2018, para. 32; C-3/19, Asmel, 2020, para. 39; C‑503/19 and C‑592/19, Subdelegación del Gobierno en Barcelona, 2020, para. 37; C-528/19, Mitteldeutsche Hartstein-Industrie, 2020, para. 56; C-233/19, CPAS de Liège, 2020, para. 23; C-303/20, Ultimo Portfolio Investment, 2021, para. 25; C-550/19, Obras y Servicios Públicos en Acciona Agua, 2021, para. 24; C-447/20 and C-448/20, IFAP, 2022, para. 100. But see C-24/19, A and Others, 2020, paras 59–60; C-470/20, Veejaam and Espo, 2022, para. 25. 106 For this reason, the Court bases its consideration on the description given in the order for reference and disregards observations of interested parties within the meaning of Art. 23 of the Statute (including the ‘defendant’ government) which contradict information in the order for reference: see C-128/10 and C-129/10, Thasou and Etairia, 2011, paras 37–41; C-212/10, Logstor ROR Polska, 2011, paras 27–31; C-519/18, Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal, 2019, para. 26. 107 For a very explicit example, see C-188/10 and C-189/10, Melki and Abdeli, 2010, paras 46–50, involving a delicate situation in which the provisions of national law concerned could be considered to yield more than one interpretation, whereby the Court of Justice took as its starting point the alternative readings of the national provisions concerned, while adhering to the presentation of national law in the order for reference. In C-978/19, FORMAT Urządzenia i Montaże Przemysłowe, 2021, paras 22–25, 28, the Court first, based on the file submitted to it, made the factual determination that a person performed nearly all of their paid employment activity in the territory of a single Member State, and subsequently held that ‘it cannot be accepted that a person who is employed under conditions such as those at issue in the main proceedings [ . . . ] is covered by the concept of ‘a person normally employed in the territory of two or more Member States’ for the purposes of Article 14(2) of Regulation No 1408/71’. In C‑168/19 and C‑169/19, HB, 2020, para. 11, although the referring court had not specified whether the applicants in the main proceedings had transferred their residence from Italy to Portugal after having ceased all occupational activity, the Court found this was the case as the referring court considered that their situation was governed by Art. 21 TFEU. See further C-176/18, Club de Variedades Vegetales Protegidas, 2019, paras 20–21; C-749/18, B and Others, 2020, paras 16–19; C-923/19, Van Ameyde España, 2021, para. 33; C-617/20, T.N. and N.N., 2022, paras 31–34; C-192/21, Mr Clemente, 2022, paras 35–39; C-696/20, Dyrektor Izby Skarbowej w W., 2022, paras 21–26; C-134/20, Volkswagen, 2022, paras 33–37; C-177/20, ‘Grossmania’, 2022, paras 48–49; C-242/22 PPU, TL, 2022, para. 45; C-435/22 PPU, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft München, 2022, paras 128–136.

Special Characteristics 253 of Justice may also ask the national court or the government concerned to clarify certain facts and/or points of national law and take account of them in the preliminary ruling.108 A request to the national court will be based on Art. 101 of the CJ Rules of Procedure.109 Generally, a request to the national government will be informal, in the form of a letter from the Registrar, but it may, if necessary, be made in the form of an order of the Court prescribing measures of inquiry within the meaning of Art. 64(2) of the CJ Rules of Procedure (request for information and production of documents).110 Other measures of inquiry, such as taking oral testimony, commissioning an expert’s report, and inspections of a place or thing, are not formally precluded in proceedings for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Union law, but probably go too far in practice because they are intrinsically intended to determine or verify contested facts and points of national law, and the Court of Justice has indeed no jurisdiction to do this.111 (2) No jurisdiction to rule on the compatibility of national rules with Union law It occurs frequently that a national court asks the Court of Justice to rule on the compatibility of national law with relevant provisions of Union law. The Court has consistently held, however, that in the context of the preliminary ruling procedure, it has no jurisdiction to rule on the conformity of provisions of national law with Union law.112 That being said, it is settled case-law that the Court may nevertheless provide the national court with an interpretation of Union law on all such points so as to enable that court to determine whether those national rules are compatible with Union law for the purposes of the case before it.113 In view of this, the Court may reformulate the national court’s questions in a concrete manner (see generally para. 3.20), such as whether the

108 See C-343/90, Lourenço Dias, 1992, para. 52. 109 See C-95/19, Agenzia delle Dogane, 2021, paras 38–39; C-546/19, Westerwaldkreis, 2021, paras 38–40. 110 See 148/77, Hansen, 1978 ECR 1788, 1790, from which it appears that the Court decided ‘to open the procedure without any preparatory inquiry’, but requested the German and French Governments and the Commission ‘to provide written answers to a certain number of questions before the opening of the oral procedure’. Germany had submitted observations to the Court pursuant to Art. 23 of the Statute but France had not, so that the questions were intended to involve the latter Member State in the proceedings, which is what happened: see 148/77, Hansen, 1978 ECR 1788, 1798–1799. See also C-6/05, Medi-pac Kazantzidis, 2007, para. 31 (on account of procedural reasons, the national court could not respond to the Court of Justice’s request for clarification, so the Court decided to hold a hearing at which the ‘defendant’ government provided the requisite information which was taken up as part of the ruling); C-334/06 to C-336/06, Zerche and Others, 2008, paras 40–41 (submission of a series of written questions to the Member State government concerned); C-279/20, Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2022, para. 26 (same). 111 When ruling on the interpretation of Union law provisions, the Court of Justice is empowered to do so only on the basis of the facts which the national court puts before it: see C-378/08, ERG and Others, 2010, para. 42; C-379/08 and C-380/08, ERA and Others, 2010, para. 35; C-375/08, Pontini and Others, 2010, para. 48; C-259/18, Sociedad Estatal Correos y Telégrafos, 2019, para. 17. 112 For the first of those cases, see 6/64 Costa v ENEL, 1964 ECR 585, 592–593. More recently, see C-172/11, Erny, 2012, para. 30; C-935/19, Grupa Warzywna, 2021, para. 20; C-724/21, Staatsanwaltschaft Köln (order), 2022, paras 17–19. 113 See C-189/18, Glencore Agriculture Hungary, 2019, para. 31; C-634/18, Prokuratura Rejonowa w Słupsku, 2020, paras 16–20; C-661/18, CTT—Correios de Portugal, 2020, paras 28–29; C‑448/19, Subdelegación del Gobierno en Guadalajara, 2020, para. 17; C-472/19, Vert Marine, 2020, para. 32; C-402/19, CPAS de Seraing, 2020, para. 25; C-463/19, Syndicat CFTC du personnel de la Caisse primaire d’assurance maladie de la Moselle, 2020, paras 29–30; C-652/19, Consulmarketing, 2021, paras 32–33; C-817/19, Ligue des droits humains, 2022, para. 240; C‑702/20 and C‑17/21, DOBELES HES, 2023, para. 58.

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254 PRELIMINARY RULINGS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF UNION LAW relevant rules or principles of Union law preclude national measures of the kind concerned,114 or words to similar effect.115 As a result, although the questions are primarily based on the interpretation of provisions or principles of Union law, the answers given will nevertheless at the same time be determinative of the outcome of the question of compatibility.116

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(3) The issues raised must fall within the scope of Union law (a) No jurisdiction for issues falling outside the scope of Union law Where the question of interpretation referred by the national court is intended to test the compatibility of a national measure with provisions of secondary or primary Union law (including general principles of Union law, such as fundamental rights), the Court must verify whether the issues raised in the main proceedings are linked to a situation falling within the scope of Union law. This is because, as a general matter, the Court of Justice has no jurisdiction with regard to national provisions falling outside the scope of Union law and when the subject-matter of the dispute is not connected in any way with any of the situations contemplated by the Treaties.117 This finds specific expression in relation to questions concerning the interpretation of Union law in connection with free movement and fundamental rights.118 In particular, where the question referred by the national court concerns the interpretation of the Treaty provisions on the free movement of persons, goods, services, and capital,119 the Court ascertains that the issues raised in the main proceedings have some link to one of the situations envisaged by the Treaties in relation to the fundamental freedom concerned.120 This is because if the issues raised in the main proceedings relate to activities which are confined in all respects within a single Member State (a so-called purely 114 See C-385/09, Nidera Handelscompagnie, 2010, paras 32–33; C-2/10, Azienda Agro-ZootechnicaFranchini and Eolica di Altamura, 2011, paras 35–36; C-652/19, Consulmarketing, 2021, para. 36; C-935/19, Grupa Warzywna, 2021, para. 24. Sometimes, the Court does not explicitly reformulate the questions referred, but will do so implicitly in its answer to those questions: see C-30/19, Braathens Regional Aviation, 2021. 115 See C-296/06, Telecom Italia, 2008, paras 16–17, 20; C-155/05, Villa Maria Beatrice Hospital (order), 2006, paras 22–25; C-156/07, Aiello and Others (order), 2008, paras 41–43. 116 In the past, it sometimes occurred that the Court did not formulate the operative part neutrally and referred expressly to the provisions of national law as being compatible or incompatible with Union law: see C-130/92, OTO, 1994, para. 21; for a critical appraisal, see C-30/02, Recheio, AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer Opinion, 2004, points 23–36. Yet, this is more exceptional nowadays (see C-185/07, Allianz, 2009, para. 34). 117 See C-462/11, Cozman (order), 2011, para. 12; C-550/19, Obras y Servicios Públicos and Acciona Agua, 2021, para. 26. See para. 3.34. 118 As highlighted by C-439/08, VEBIC, AG Mengozzi Opinion, 2010, point 36, n. 5 (although not dealt with by the Court of Justice in its judgment), there are several lines of case-law that overlap or co-exist in this regard. 119 While perhaps obvious, this should be distinguished from preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of acts of secondary Union law, which need not have an actual link to free movement: for a few examples, see C-213/07, Michaniki, 2008, paras 28–29; C-304/08, Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft, 2010, paras 27–28. 120 Under the case-law, national legislation which applies without distinction to nationals of that Member State and to those of other Member States alike is generally capable of falling within the scope of the provisions on the fundamental freedoms only to the extent that it applies to situations related to intra-EU trade. Nevertheless, this appears to be fulfilled if it is possible (or not inconceivable) that entities from other Member States have been or would be interested in taking up the transactions at issue in the main proceedings: see C-380/05, Centro Europa 7, 2008, paras 65–67 (further noting that the finding of a link to intra-EU trade will be presumed if the market in question has a certain cross-border element); C-384/08, Attanasio Group, 2010, paras 23–24; C-570/07 and C-571/07, Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez, 2010, paras 40–41; C-709/20, The Department for Communities in Northern Ireland, 2021, paras 56–59.

Special Characteristics 255 internal situation), the Treaty provisions on free movement are not applicable to the main proceedings,121 and the Court will in principle leave the preliminary question without a substantive answer,122 or rule that it has no jurisdiction to answer the questions referred.123 Similarly, where the question concerns the interpretation of provisions of the Charter or other sources relating to the Union regime for the protection of fundamental rights (see Art. 6(3) TEU), the Court of Justice examines whether the subject-matter of the main proceedings is situated within the field of application of Union law. Specifically, with respect to the Charter, Art. 51 thereof states that the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States ‘only when they are implementing Union law’,124 that is to say, only when they are acting within the scope of Union law.125 Therefore, the Court has ruled—often by way of reasoned order under Art. 53(2) of the CJ Rules of Procedure—that it has no jurisdiction to answer questions referred by the national court relating to situations that fall outside the scope of Union law.126 The scope of application of Art. 47 of the Charter has led to some discussion in the context of the Court’s case-law relating to the rule of law.127 Apart from the question when a Member State is implementing Union law for the purposes of Art. 51(1) of the Charter, other issues are also involved, such as the scope of application of the second subparagraph of Art. 19(1) TEU, as well as the necessity requirement following from Art. 267 TFEU.128 The Court has held that it has jurisdiction to answer questions on the interpretation of Art. 47 of the Charter in connection to rules concerning the 121 As emphasized by the Court of Justice, it is not possible to raise against this conclusion the Treaty provisions on Union citizenship (Arts 20–21 TFEU) because Union citizenship is not intended to expand the material scope of the Treaties to internal situations which have no link to Union law: see C-212/06, Gouvernement de la Communauté française and Gouvernement wallon, 2008, para. 39; see also C-535/08, Pignataro (order), 2009, paras 15–16. For the purposes of interpreting the Union citizenship provisions, the Treaty rules governing free movement of persons and the measures adopted to implement them cannot be applied to situations which have no factor linking them to any of the situations governed by Union law and are confined in all relevant respects within a single Member State, provided, however, that the situation of the Union citizen concerned does not include national measures which have the effect of depriving Union citizens of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of those rights: see C-434/09, McCarthy, 2011, paras 44–57. It should be pointed out, however, that not all Union law requires a cross-border element to be applicable to a dispute before a national court: see C-304/08, Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft, 2010, paras 27–28; C-393/17, Kirschstein, 2019, para. 24. 122 See C-134/95, USSL No. 47 di Biella, 1997, paras 19–23; C-108/98, RI.SAN., 1999, paras 21–23; C-97/98, Jägerskiöld, 1999, paras 42–44. In relation to the Charter, see C-94/20, Land Oberösterreich, 2021, paras 60–64. 123 See C-245/09, Omalet, 2010, paras 9–18. While such issues have been dealt with by the Court of Justice as part of the substance of the ruling on the question referred, the Court has emphasized that where a reference is sought on the interpretation of the free movement provisions in a situation where all the relevant facts of the dispute in the main proceedings are confined within a single Member State, the Court must assess whether it has jurisdiction to rule on the interpretation of those provisions: see C-380/05, Centro Europa 7, 2008, para. 64; C-384/08, Attanasio Group, 2010, para. 22; C-245/09, Omalet, 2010, paras 9–10. 124 Charter, Art. 51(1). See also Art. 6(1), second para. TEU: ‘The provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties.’ 125 See C-256/11, Dereci, 2011, paras 71–72; C-399/11, Melloni, 2013, paras 55–64; C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, 2013, paras 16–31; C-679/20, Administración General del Estado (order), 2021, paras 27–28; C-238/20, ‘Sātiņi-S’ SIA, 2022, paras 21–29. For detailed discussion, see K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel (T. Corthaut (ed.)), EU Constitutional Law (OUP, 2021) para. 25.009. 126 See C-339/10, Estov and Others (order), 2010; C-457/09, Chartry (order), 2011; C-267/10 and C-268/10, Rossius and Collard (order), 2011; C-710/20, AM, 2022 (order), paras 35–36. 127 See para. 2.03. 128 See para. 3.29.

256 PRELIMINARY RULINGS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF UNION LAW organization of a national justice system,129 in particular in relation to the requirements of judicial independence and impartiality, where such questions are referred to it by a national court before which a dispute is pending that concerns a situation falling within the scope of Union law, that is, where a Member State is implementing Union law.130 The Court’s case-law regarding the rule of law is based not only on Art. 47 of the Charter, but also, perhaps even more prominently, on the second subparagraph of Art. 19(1) TEU.131 Both provisions lay down an obligation for the Member States to provide effective judicial protection, including access to courts that are independent, impartial, and established by law. However, the scope of application of the second subparagraph of Art. 19(1) TEU is broader and extends to ‘fields covered by Union law’.132 In relation to national courts, this means that every national court that may be called upon to apply or interpret Union law must comply with the requirements flowing from the second subparagraph of Art. 19(1) TEU. Only in this way do the Member States comply with their obligation to guarantee effective judicial protection in the fields covered by Union law.133 Consequently, while both Art. 47 of the Charter and the second subparagraph of Art. 19(1) TEU establish an obligation for the Member States to provide effective judicial protection, their scope of application is different. This is aptly illustrated by the judgment in Repubblika,134 in which the Court of Justice gave a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the second subparagraph of Art. 19(1) TEU, but held that Art. 47 of the Charter was not applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings because the Member State concerned was not implementing Union law within the meaning of Art. 51(1) of the Charter. In that case, the national court sought a ruling on the conformity with Union law, in particular Art. 47 of the Charter and the second subparagraph of Art. 19(1) TEU, of national provisions governing the procedure for the appointment of members of the judiciary. The Court considered that it did not appear from the order for reference that the person invoking Art. 47 of the Charter was relying on a right conferred upon it by a provision of Union law. Therefore, as the case did not appear to involve a situation in which the Member State was implementing Union law for the purposes of Art. 51(1) of the Charter, Art. 47 of the Charter was not applicable, and 129 C‑585/18, C‑624/18, and C‑625/18, A.K. and Others, 2019, paras 76–86; C-83/19, C‑127/19, C‑195/19, C‑291/19, C‑355/19, and C‑397/19, Asociaţia ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’, 2021, para. 111; C‑748/19 to C‑754/19, Prokuratura Rejonowa Warszawa Wola w Warszawie, 2021, paras 36–38; C-132/20, Getin Noble Bank, 2022, para. 88. Further to this, the question whether the Member States’ competence for the organization of the justice system can be made subject to requirements flowing from Art. 47 of the Charter is a question about the interpretation of that provision and can thus be the subject-matter of a reference for a preliminary ruling: see C-824/18, A.B. and Others, 2021, para. 80; C-896/19, Repubblika, 2021, para. 33. Similar considerations apply in relation to Art. 19(1), second subpara. TEU: see C-508/19, Prokurator Generalny, 2022, paras 54–58. 130 See C-522/18, Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych (order), 2020, para. 32; C-272/19, Land Hessen, 2020, paras 46–50. 131 See C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, 2018, paras 29–37. See further paras 2.03, 4.10. 132 See C-558/18 and C-563/18, Miasto Łowicz, AG Tanchev Opinion, 2019, points 91–92, in which the Advocate General underscored that the Court’s line of case-law on internal situations, in particular, its judgment in Ullens de Schooten, does not apply in relation to Art. 19(1), second subpara. TEU. 133 See paras 2.03, 4.10. 134 See C-896/19, Repubblika, 2021, paras 35–46.

Special Characteristics 257 the Court could not interpret that provision. That being said, since the case concerned the conformity of national provisions governing the appointment of judges which could be called upon to apply Union law, the case fell within the scope of the second subparagraph of Art. 19(1) TEU, as that provision is ‘intended to apply in the context of an action the purpose of which is thus to challenge the conformity with EU law of provisions of national law which it is alleged are liable to affect judicial independence’.135 The judgment in Repubblika does not mean, however, that a question referred on the interpretation of the second subparagraph of Art. 19(1) TEU will always be admissible. It is important to underscore that the dispute before the referring court in Repubblika concerned the compatibility of national rules governing the appointment of judges with Union law. The answer given the Court was necessary to enable the referring court to decide the case before it.136 By contrast, the necessity criterion flowing from Art. 267 TFEU is not fulfilled where there is no connecting factor between the dispute before the referring court and the provisions of Union law whose interpretation is sought. In other words, an interpretation must be objectively required for the decision to be taken by the referring court.137 Further to this, the Court will not answer questions regarding the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, where it is not apparent how the Court’s answer may help the referring court in deciding the dispute pending before it.138 (b) Exceptions In four situations, the Court of Justice accepts jurisdiction to interpret provisions of Union law, even though the issues raised in the main proceedings are not directly linked to a situation falling within the scope of Union law.139 (i) Potential effect of national rule on cross-border activities The Court has referred to the potential effect the national rule at issue might have on cross-border activities to substantiate its jurisdiction to provide an interpretation of 135 C-896/19, Repubblika, 2021, para. 39. 136 See para. 3.29. 137 See C-558/18 and C-563/18, Miasto Łowicz, 2020, paras 47–48; C-564/19, IS, 2021, para. 142. See further C-256/19, S.A.D. Maler und Anstreicher (order), 2020, paras 46–48; C-623/18, Prokuratura Rejonowa w Słubicach, 2020. 138 C-564/19, IS, 2021, para. 144. See also C-564/19, IS, AG Pikamäe Opinion, 2021, points 88–92. 139 See C-268/15, Ullens de Schooten, 2016, paras 47–55. In this judgment, the Court systematized its case-law on this point and provided an overview of the four situations in which the Court will accept jurisdiction despite all elements of the case pending before the referring court being internal to a single Member State; see also C-343/17, Fremoluc, 2018, paras 20–21; C-298/17, France Télévisions, 2018, para. 32; C-394/21, Bursa Română de Mărfuri, 2023, para. 49. While that case-law had been criticized for being too willing to accept preliminary questions relating to issues that fall outside of the scope of Union law (see J. Krommendijk, ‘Wide Open and Unguarded Stand Our Gates: The CJEU and References for a Preliminary Ruling in Purely Internal Situations’ (2007) G.L.J. 1392), it appears that the Court has recently turned to a stricter approach (S. Prechal, ‘Interne situatie en prejudiciële vragen’ (2015) S.E.W. 494), of which the Ullens de Schooten judgment is said to be its culmination, in particular, by specifying the necessary information an order for reference should contain when all elements of the case pending before the referring court are situated in a single Member State (see M. Fierstra, ‘Fundamentele vrijheden en zuiver nationale situaties: de navigatie tussen Scylla en Charybdis’ (2017) S.E.W. 220, 223–224; N. Wahl and L. Prete, ‘The Gatekeepers of Article 267 TFEU: On Jurisdiction and Admissibility of References for Preliminary Rulings’ (2018) C.M.L.Rev. 511, 534; S. Iglesias Sanchez, ‘Purely Internal Situations and the Limits of EU Law: A Consolidated Case Law or a Notion to Be Abandoned’ (2018) E. Const. L. Rev. 7, 19–22). See C-532/15 and C-532/15, Eurosaneamientos, 2016, paras 43–50; C-343/17, Fremoluc, 2018, paras 18–33.

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258 PRELIMINARY RULINGS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF UNION LAW provisions of the Treaties relating to the fundamental freedoms, despite the absence of a cross-border element in the main action. This is the case where nationals of other Member States have been or are interested in making use of those freedoms for carrying on activities in the territory of the Member State that has enacted the national legislation in question where that legislation applies without distinction to nationals of that State and those of other Member States.140 6.27

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(ii) Reference made in the context of annulment proceedings Where the referring court makes a request for a preliminary ruling in proceedings for the annulment of provisions which apply not only to its own nationals, but also to those of other Member States, the decision of the referring court that will be adopted following the Court’s preliminary ruling will also have effects on the nationals of other Member States. The objective nature of the national proceedings therefore justifies the Court giving an answer to the questions put to it in relation to the provisions of the Treaties on the fundamental freedoms, even though the dispute in the main proceedings is confined in all respects within a single Member State.141 (iii) National law prohibiting reverse discrimination The Court considers that a reply might be useful to the national court if its national law were to require that a citizen of the Member State concerned must be allowed to enjoy the same rights as those that a citizen of another Member State would derive from Union law in the same situation; in short, if the national law concerned were to prohibit reverse discrimination.142 Consequently, if these circumstances are applicable, the Court finds that it has jurisdiction to answer the questions referred.143 140 C-268/15, Ullens de Schooten, 2016, para. 50. See C-470/11, Garkalns, 2012, para. 21; C‑159/12 to C‑161/12, Venturini, 2013, paras 24–29; C-465/18, Comune di Bernareggio, 2019, paras 33–36. Such an effect cannot be inferred from the mere fact that Union citizens from other Member States could make use of the services offered in the Member State concerned: see C-665/18, Pólus Vegas (order), 2019, para. 24; C-311/19, BONVER WIN, 2020, para. 24. For further cases in which the application of this exception was rejected, see C-591/15, The Gibraltar Betting and Gaming Association Limited, 2017, para. 55; C-343/17, Fremoluc, 2018, paras 27–32; C-53/18, Pasquale Mastromartino, 2019, paras 36–37; C-24/18, Bán (order), 2018, para. 21; C-503/20, Banco Santander (order), 2021, paras 41–45; C-571/20, Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell'Università e della Ricerca and Others (order), 2021, paras 23– 26; C-436/20, ASADE, 2022, paras 46–51. 141 C-268/15, Ullens de Schooten, 2016, para. 51. See C‑197/11 and C‑203/11, Libert, 2013, paras 34–35; C-125/16, Malta Dental Technologists Association and Reynaud, 2017, para. 30; C-233/16, Europamur Alimentación, 2018, para. 22; C-407/19 and C-471/19, Katoen Natie Bulk Terminals, 2021, para. 53; C-391/20, Cilevičs and Others, 2022, paras 32–33. 142 C-268/15, Ullens de Schooten, 2016, para. 52. See C-448/98, Guimont, 2000, para. 23; C-570/07 and C-571/07, Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez, 2010, para. 36; C-245/09, Omalet, 2010, para. 15; C-342/17, Memoria, 2018, para. 23; C-234/19, EOS Matrix (order), 2019, para. 25; C-634/18, Prokuratura Rejonowa w Słupsku, 2020, para. 25. However, the Court is not competent to answer questions regarding a situation of alleged reverse discrimination where national law does not have such a specific aim and the alleged discrimination is the mere result of the interplay between Union law and national law: see C-657/18, Hrvatska radiotelevizija, 2019, paras 26–27. 143 See C-300/01, Salzmann, 2003, paras 32–35; C-6/01, Anomar and Others, 2003, paras 39, 41; C-250/03, Mauri (order), 2005, para. 21; C-380/05, Centro Europa 7, 2008, paras 69–70. For cases in which this exception has been held not to apply, see C-245/09, Omalet, 2010, paras 15–17. There are other cases in which, as a matter of substance, the Court has stressed that its interpretation of the relevant Union law rules may be helpful to the national court under these conditions (i.e. whether national law requires nationals of that Member State to be accorded the same rights as nationals of other Member States in comparable situations), without providing a basis for the Court’s preliminary rulings jurisdiction as such: see C-238/02, Douwe Egberts, 2004, para. 58; C-212/06, Gouvernement de la Communauté française and Gouvernement wallon, 2008, para. 40. As noted by commentators, there is some connection between this exception and the Dzodzi line of case-law: see C. Ritter, ‘Purely Internal Situations, Reverse Discrimination, Guimont, Dzodzi and Article 234’ (2006) E.L.Rev. 690. Indeed, the rationale

Special Characteristics 259 (iv) National law refers to Union law Where provisions of Union law have been made applicable by national law, the Court will accept jurisdiction even though the facts of the main proceedings are outside the direct scope of Union law.144 On the basis of what has been referred to as the Dzodzi line of case-law,145 the Court considers that it is ‘manifestly in the interest of the [Union] legal order that, in order to forestall future differences of interpretation, every Union provision should be given a uniform interpretation irrespective of the circumstances in which it is to be applied’.146 By recognizing its interpretative jurisdiction, the Court avoids the provisions of Union law in issue taking on a life of their own. Moreover, if the Court of Justice refused—in a case such as Dzodzi—to accede to a request from the national court to provide the correct interpretation of the provisions in question, a national court could, in a future case in which—by contrast to Dzodzi—Union law is applicable in its own right, be more easily inclined to come to the (possibly wrong) conclusion that the answer to the question of interpretation is obvious (or already in existence) and that it is therefore not necessary to seek a preliminary ruling. This would in turn put the uniform interpretation of Union law at risk.147 The Court of Justice also accepts jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on interpretation on the same terms where provisions of Union law are applicable for the resolution of a dispute by virtue of a contractual relationship between the parties.148 Further to this, the fact that the Union for this exception, as with the Dzodzi case-law, goes back to the emphasis placed on the system of judicial cooperation in the preliminary ruling procedure, in the sense that the preliminary ruling given by the Court of Justice can be of help to the national court in adjudicating the case before it under circumstances where it may be confronted with questions concerning the rights derived from Union law afforded to nationals of other Member States in order to grant the same rights to nationals of the Member State concerned, thereby justifying the approach in the case-law to extend the Court of Justice’s preliminary ruling jurisdiction. 144 C-268/15, Ullens de Schooten, 2016, para. 53; C-372/16, Sayyouni, 2017, para. 28; C-327/16 and C-421/16, Jacob, 2018, para. 33; C-380/17, K and B, 2018, para. 34; C-316/21, Monument Vandekerckhove (order), 2021, paras 28, 34; C-164/21 and C-318/21, BALTIJAS STARPTAUTISKĀ AKADĒMIJA, 2022, para. 35; C-691/21, Cafpi and Aviva assurances, 2022, paras 30–34. 145 C-297/88 and C-197/89, Dzodzi, 1990. Although the Court of Justice has drawn attention to some earlier case-law in which it took a similar approach (namely, 166/84, Thomasdünger, 1985, paras 11–12), it has given the label ‘Dzodzi line of cases’ to the established line of judgments in which the Court has held that it has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on questions concerning Union law provisions in situations where the facts of the cases being considered by the national courts are outside the scope of Union law, but where those provisions have been rendered applicable by domestic law: see C-28/95, Leur-Bloem, 1997, para. 27; C-130/95, Giloy, 1997, para. 23; C-48/07, Les Vergers du Vieux Tauves, 2008, para. 21. 146 See C-297/88 and C-197/89, Dzodzi, 1990, para. 37; C-295/16, Europamur Alimentación, 2017, paras 29, 32; C-30/18, Generics, 2020, para. 27; C-394/18, I.G.I., 2020, para. 46; C-430/19, C.F., 2020, para. 25; C-620/19, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2020, para. 34; C-306/20, Visma Enterprise, 2021, para. 45; C-195/21, Smetna palata na Republika Bulgaria, 2022, para. 43; C-64/21, Rigall Arteria Management, 2022, para. 25. See also C-267/99, Adam, 2001, paras 27–28 (stressing that this reasoning applies all the more when the national legislation which uses a concept of a provision of Union law has been adopted with a view to the transposition into internal law of a directive of which the said provision forms part); C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08, and C-179/08, Abdulla and Others, 2010, para. 48 (involving a situation where national law refers to the provisions of a directive in order to determine the rules applicable to a situation which is governed by that law). Reasoning by analogy with the latter judgment, the Court of Justice held that this also applies to the specific case where national law refers to the content of provisions of an international agreement which have been re-stated in a directive in order to determine the rules applicable to a situation that is governed by that law: see C-57/09 and C-101/09, B and D, 2010, para. 71. 147 See K. Lenaerts, ‘The Unity of European Law and the Overload of the ECJ: The System of Preliminary Rulings Revisited’ in I. Pernice, J. Kokott, and C. Saunders (eds), The Future of the European Judicial System in a Comparative Perspective (Nomos, 2005) 212. 148 See C-88/91, Federconsorzi, 1992, paras 6–9. Yet, in doing so, the Court emphasized that its jurisdiction concerned only the interpretation of Union law, not matters relating to the contract or provisions of national law

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260 PRELIMINARY RULINGS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF UNION LAW legislature specifically limited the scope of application of a Union directive cannot call into question the jurisdiction of the Court to accept references for a preliminary ruling regarding provisions of that directive that have been made applicable by national law to situations which have been expressly excluded from the scope of that directive by the Union legislature.149 For the Dzodzi line of case-law to apply, the Court requires that identical treatment of national law and Union law is ensured. This means that the reference made by national law to Union law is direct and unconditional,150 and that provisions of national law do not allow the interpretation of those rules by the Court to be departed from.151 Thus, to take a well-known example, in Kleinwort Benson152 the Court held that it had no jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling on a provision of the Brussels Convention on the grounds that the dispute in the main proceedings was not concerned with the interpretation of this provision as such but with that of a provision of domestic law modelled on the Convention and partially reproducing its terms, and, moreover, that the domestic law provided for the national authorities to adopt modifications designed to produce divergence between the provisions of that law and the corresponding provisions of the Convention. The Court properly inferred from this that the provisions of the Convention could not be regarded as having been rendered applicable as such in cases outside the scope of the Convention by the law of the Contracting State concerned. The Court also emphasized that, in applying the provisions of national law modelled on the Brussels Convention, the national courts were not bound by its case-law, but were required only to have regard to it. In subsequent cases, the Court of Justice has taken pains to distinguish, albeit loosely, the factors identified in Kleinwort Benson from those situations in which the Dzodzi line of case-law applies. For example, in Les Vergers du Vieux Tauves,153

which may determine the scope of the contractual obligations: see C-88/91, Federconsorzi, 1992, para. 10; see also C-73/89, Fournier, 1992, paras 22–24. 149 See C-257/17, C and A, 2018, paras 36–40; C‑381/18 and C‑382/18, G.S., 2019, paras 46–47. 150 See C-394/18, I.G.I., 2020, para. 46; C‑469/18 and C‑470/18, Belgische Staat, 2019, para. 23; C-634/18, Prokuratura Rejonowa w Słupsku, 2020, para. 26; C-367/19, Tax-Fin-Lex, 2020, para. 21; C-394/19, CPAS d’Anderlecht (order), 2020, para. 29; C-430/19, C.F., 2020, para. 26. Such a reference is, in the words of the Court, ‘hard to conceive’ if Union law does not make provision for the rules to which national law would allegedly refer: see C‑469/18 and C‑470/18, Belgische Staat, 2019, para. 25. See also, in that regard, C‑203/18 and C‑374/18, Deutsche Post, AG Pikamae Opinion, 2019, points 43–62; C‑620/19, J & S Service, AG Bobek Opinion, 2020, points 27–96; C‑164/21 and C‑318/21, Baltijas Starptautiskā akadēmija, AG Ćapeta Opinion, 2022, points 57–64. 151 See C-313/12, Romeo, 2013, para. 33; C‑203/18 and C‑374/18, Deutsche Post, 2019, paras 35–44. 152 C-346/93, Kleinwort Benson, 1995. Prior to this case, a somewhat laxer approach seemed to prevail: see C-73/89, Fournier, 1992, paras 22–23. 153 C-48/07, Les Vergers du Vieux Tauves, 2008, paras 22–25. In C-371/11, Punch Graphic Prepress Belgium, 2012, para. 27, the Court held that ‘where domestic legislation adopts for purely internal situations the same solutions as those adopted by European Union law, it is for the national court alone, in the context of the division of judicial functions between national courts and the Court of Justice under Art. 267 TFEU, to assess the precise scope of that reference to European Union law, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice being confined to the examination of provisions of that law’. For some earlier examples, see C-28/95, Leur-Bloem, 1997, paras 28–31; C-130/95, Giloy, 1997, paras 24–28; C-1/99, Kofisa Italia, 2001, paras 29–32; C-306/99, BIAO, 2003, paras 91–93.

Special Characteristics 261 the Court pointed out that the national legislation was expressly intended, as was clear from its title, to transpose a Union directive and, even though it was not stated explicitly, the fact that the referring court had referred a question for a preliminary ruling and that it established a connection between the national legislation and the directive concerned led to the conclusion that the judgment was binding on the national court. In another case, involving Union competition law, the Court ruled that, although the national legislation expressly referred to the Union regulation concerned only in order to determine the rules in domestic situations, the national legislature nonetheless decided to apply the same treatment to domestic and to Union law situations, which justified its providing a preliminary ruling in the instant case.154 Conversely, the Court of Justice has not shied away from deeming inadmissible questions for a preliminary ruling when the provisions of Union law of which interpretation is sought clearly cannot be applied, either directly or indirectly, to the circumstances of the main proceedings and thus fall outside the scope of the Dzodzi line of case-law altogether.155 Furthermore, as made clear starting in Dzodzi, the Court has jurisdiction only to interpret Union law; it cannot ‘take account of the general scheme of the provisions of domestic law which, while referring to [Union] law, define the extent of that reference’.156 The Court has therefore drawn the boundary between its own jurisdiction and that of the national court in the following terms: ‘[C]‌onsideration of the limits which the national legislature may have placed on the application of [Union] law to purely internal situations is a matter for domestic law and consequently falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the Member States.’157 Lastly, national law should refer to a rule of Union law. It is, for example, not sufficient that national law should be applied in conformity with the principle of effectiveness to render the Dzodzi line of case-law applicable.158

154 See C-217/05, Confederación Española de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio, 2006, paras 21–22. For other examples which do not identify Kleinwort Benson explicitly, see C-3/04, Poseidon Chartering, 2006, paras 16–19; C-280/06, ETI and Others, 2007, paras 23–26. 155 See C-2/97, IP, 1998, paras 59–62; C-310/10, Agafiţei and Others, 2011, paras 38–48; C-583/10, Nolan, 2012, paras 47–52; C-482/10, Cicala, 2011, paras 17–30; C-313/12, Romeo, 2013, paras 32–35; C-620/19, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2020, paras 39–52. Further to this, it must be apparent from the order for reference that the Court has jurisdiction on the basis of the Dzodzi line of case-law. A referring court must thus indicate the specific factors from which it can be inferred that provisions of Union law have been made directly and unconditionally applicable by national law. It is not sufficient to merely indicate that provisions of Union law apply outside of the direct scope of Union law on the basis of national law: see C-268/15, Ullens de Schooten, 2016, paras 54–55; C-465/18, Comune di Bernareggio, 2019, para. 34; C-430/19, C.F., 2020, paras 47–49. 156 C-297/88 and C-197/89, Dzodzi, 1990, para. 42. 157 C-48/07, Les Vergers du Vieux Tauves, 2008, para. 27; see also C-439/07 and C-499/07, KBC Bank and Others (order), 2009, paras 58–60; C-620/19, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2020, para. 35. In Leur-Bloem and Giloy the Court held, however, that in every case where it had held that it had jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on questions concerning Union provisions in situations where the facts of the cases being considered by the national courts were outside the scope of Union law, the application of the provisions of Union law was manifestly not limited by provisions of domestic law or contractual provisions incorporating those Union provisions (C-28/95, Leur-Bloem, 1997, para. 27, and C-130/95, Giloy, 1997, para. 23). 158 See C-469/18 and C-470/18, Belgische Staat, 2019, para. 25.

262 PRELIMINARY RULINGS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF UNION LAW

C. Reference back to the national court 6.30

When the Court of Justice interprets Union law in a case where certain relevant facts or points of national law have not yet been established in the main proceedings, it will indicate precisely what findings the national court has to make in order to resolve the case in accordance with its interpretation.159 However, the Court of Justice may not abuse this sort of reference back to the national court by evading its responsibility for making the necessary appraisals in interpreting Union law. The Court is under a duty to give the national court an answer which, in principle, will lead directly to the resolution of the case (at least as far as Union law is concerned). Only where, in the concrete context of the main proceedings, some specific facts or points of national law require clarification in order to make a ‘useful interpretation’ of Union law work will that clarification have to be made by the national court, after the Court of Justice has clearly identified which facts and points of national law must be elucidated.160 Where, by contrast, the Court of Justice is itself apprised of the uncontested facts and points of national law which are necessary in order to reach a decision in the main proceedings, then it has to have regard to those facts and points of law as such in making the ‘useful interpretation’ of Union law expected by the national court.161

D. Jurisdiction of the national court 6.31

Naturally, it falls in any event to the national court to dispose of the case. In that sense, the judgment giving a ruling on interpretation, no matter to what extent it determines the outcome of the main proceedings, is always ‘preliminary’, that is to say, given before the national court gives final judgment in the main proceedings.162 However, the Court of Justice does not shirk giving guidance based on the case-file and the written and oral observations which have been submitted to it, with a view to enabling the national court to give judgment on the application of Union law in the specific case which it has to adjudicate.163 More cautiously, the Court may indicate a number of circumstances 159 See C-142/09, Lahousse and Lavichy, 2010, para. 47; C-168/09, Flos, 2011, para. 31; C-385/12, Hervis Sport- és Divatkereskedelm, 2014, para. 45; C-469/17, Funke Medien NRW, 2019, paras 22–26; C‑708/17 and C‑725/17, ‘EVN Bulgaria Toplofikatsia’, 2019, paras 60–61; C-17/19, Bouygues travaux publics, 2020, paras 51–53; C-74/19, Transportes Aéreos Portugueses, 2020, para. 33; C-61/19, Orange România, 2020, para. 48; C-922/19, Stichting Waternet, 2021, para. 52; C-907/19, Q-GmbH, 2021, paras 24–27; C-652/20, Allianz Elementar Versicherung, 2022, paras 29–30; C-154/21, Österreichische Post, 2023, para. 50. 160 However, the Court may, after hearing the Advocate General, request clarification from the national court (CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 101). For an illustration, see C-54/03, Austroplant-Arzneimittel (order), 2004, para. 14; C-436/08 and C-437/08, Haribo Lakritzen Hans Riegel, 2011, para. 19; C-95/19, Agenzia delle Dogane, 2021, paras 38–39. 161 See also K. Lenaerts, ‘Form and Substance of the Preliminary Rulings Procedure’ in D. Curtin and T. Heukels (eds), Institutional Dynamics of European Integration. Essays in Honour of H.G. Schermers (Vol. II, Martinus Nijhoff, 1994) 364. 162 See 1/80, Salmon, 1980, para. 6. 163 See C-559/13, Finanzamt Dortmund-Unna, 2015, para. 32; C-16/19, Szpital Kliniczny im. dra J. Babińskiego Samodzielny Publiczny Zakład Opieki Zdrowotnej w Krakowie, 2021, para. 38; C-580/19, Stadt Offenbach am Main, 2021, para. 25; C‑344/19, Radiotelevizija Slovenija, 2021, paras 23–24; C-96/21, CTS Eventim, 2022, para. 20. See, for concrete examples, C-433/18, Aktiva Finants, 2019, paras 30–31; C-727/17, Syndyk Masy Upadłości

Special Characteristics 263 which the national courts might or should take into account for the purposes of rendering their decision.164 In some cases, the Court of Justice has trodden a fine line with respect to leaving the case in the hands of the national court.165 For example, in cases concerning free movement law or anti-discrimination law, the Court of Justice often indicates whether the national law at issue fails the proportionality test, but then adds that it is for the referring court to verify this.166 In particular,167 the Court has gone a step further when dealing with requests for preliminary rulings in certain cases on the principle of State liability for an alleged breach of Union law by a Member State.168 While recognizing that it is in principle for the national courts to verify whether or not the conditions governing State liability for a breach of Union law are fulfilled, the Court has held that, in the case in question, it had all the necessary information to assess the conduct of the Member State concerned itself.169 Given that these cases largely concern factually complex scenarios or particularly flagrant examples of violations of Union law by the Member State concerned, they appear to represent exceptional circumstances in which the Court seeks to ensure, as much as possible, judicial protection for individuals. Therefore, notwithstanding the division of tasks between the Court of Justice and the national courts in the preliminary ruling procedure, these cases illustrate that the Court is mindful to

ECO-WIND Construction, 2020, paras 80–82; C‑84/19, C‑222/19 and C‑252/19, Profi Credit Polska, 2020, paras 81–86; C-59/19, Winkingerhof, 2020, paras 36–37; C‑354/20 PPU and C‑412/20 PPU, Openbaar Ministerie, 2020, para. 61; C-846/19, Administration de l'Enregistrement, des Domaines and de la TVA, 2021, paras 50–54; C-609/19, BNP Paribas Personal Finance, 2021, paras 45–57; C‑776/19 to C‑782/19, BNP Paribas Personal Finance, 2021, para. 66–78; C‑748/19 to C‑754/19, Prokuratura Rejonowa w Mińsku Mazowieckim, 2021, paras 75–87; C-485/20, HR Rail, 2022, paras 46–48; C-625/20, INSS, 2022, paras 58–66; C-36/21, Sense Visuele Communicatie en Handel, 2022, paras 41–43; C-242/22 PPU, TL, 2022, paras 81–88. 164 See C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, 1996, para. 58; C-670/18, Comune di Gesturi, 2020, paras 48–51; C-826/19, Austrian Airlines, 2021, para. 56; C-344/19, Radiotelevizija Slovenija, 2021, para. 24; C-580/19, Stadt Offenbach am Main, 2021, para. 55; C-94/20, Land Oberösterreich, 2021, para. 43; C-742/19, Ministrstvo za obrambo, 2021, para. 85. In relation to tariff classification cases, the Court has held that ‘its task is to provide the national court with guidance on the criteria which will enable the latter to classify the goods at issue correctly in the CN, rather than to effect that classification itself, a fortiori since the Court does not necessarily have available to it all the information which is essential in that regard’: see C-941/19, Samohýl group, 2021, para. 28; C-62/20, Vogel Import Export, 2021, para. 28; C-822/19, Direcţia Generală Regională a Finanţelor Publice Braşov, 2021, para. 33; C-72/21, PRODEX, 2022, para. 27; C-635/21, LB, 2023, para. 31. 165 Regarding the concept of ‘habitual residence’, compare C-411/20, Familienkasse Niedersachsen-Bremen, 2022, para. 72, with C-289/20, IB, 2021, paras 57–61; C-501/20, MPA, 2022, para. 56. See further C-213/21 and C-214/21, Italy Emergenza Cooperativa Sociale, 2022, para. 39. 166 See C-914/19, Ministero della Giustizia, 2021, para. 46; C-78/21, PrivatBank and Others, 2023, para 98. 167 Conceivably, one could also contemplate as another example some previous case-law of the Court of Justice on the interpretation of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L95/29, as amended by Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights (OJ 2011 L304/64)), in which the Court ruled that it had all the criteria before it to determine that a particular contract term was unfair (see in C-240/98 to C-244/98, Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores, 2000, paras 21–23), although it has essentially ‘backed away’ from this approach in subsequent case- law: see C-237/02, Freiburger Kommunalbauten, 2004, paras 22–24; C-243/08, Pannon GSM, 2009, paras 40–43; C-415/11, Aziz, 2013, para. 72. 168 See C-319/96, Brinkmann, 1998, para. 29 (finding no causal link in those proceedings). 169 See C-392/93, British Telecommunications, 1996, para. 41; C-283/94, C-291/94, and C-292/94, Denkavit and Others, 1996, para. 49; C-302/97, Konle, 1999, para. 59; C-140/97, Rechberger and Others, 1999, paras 72–73; C-452/06, Synthon, 2008, paras 36–46; C-429/09, Fuß, 2010, paras 53–58.

264 PRELIMINARY RULINGS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF UNION LAW ensure that the rights derived from Union law are upheld as the cases proceed to adjudication before the national court.170

III. Consequences A. As regards the national court deciding the case at issue in the main proceedings 6.32

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(1) Binding effect A judgment given by the Court under Art. 267 TFEU is binding on the national court hearing the case in which the decision is given.171 This is to be understood as meaning that all courts dealing with the case—also at a later stage of the proceedings, on appeal or upon an appeal on a point of law—are obliged to comply with the substance of the judgment giving the preliminary ruling.172 The binding effect attaches to the whole of the operative part and main body of the judgment, since the operative part has to be understood in the light of the reasoning on which it is based.173 Naturally, the fact that the judgment given by way of preliminary ruling is binding does not mean that the national court has invariably to apply the provisions or principles of Union law elucidated thereby in reaching its decision in the main proceedings. It may be that this judgment specifically indicates why those provisions or principles are not applicable.174 (2) New reference possible The fact that a judgment given by way of a preliminary ruling is binding does not preclude the national court to which the judgment is addressed, or another court involved in deciding the case, from making a further reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice if it considers such a step to be necessary in order to give judgment in the main proceedings.175 Such a request will be justified ‘when the national court encounters difficulties in understanding or applying the judgment, when it refers a fresh 170 See also C-242/22 PPU, TL, 2022, paras 68–70. 171 For example, 29/68, Milch-, Fett-, und Eierkontor, 1969, para. 2; C-173/09, Elchinov, 2010, para. 29; C-62/14, Gauweiler, 2015, para. 16; C-493/17, Weiss, 2018, para. 19; C-824/18, A.B. and Others, 2021, para. 81. Conversely, the Court will declare itself without jurisdiction to give a ruling where a referring court is not bound by the Court’s interpretation: see C-62/14, Gauweiler, 2015, para. 12. 172 See 52/76, Benedetti, 1977, para. 26. 173 See 135/77, Bosch, 1978, para. 4. Commentators have noted that issues concerning the binding effect of a preliminary ruling particularly arise with respect to rulings that have, in the referring court’s view, gone beyond the questions submitted in the order for reference or have diverged from the facts presented therein: see M. Broberg and N. Fenger, Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice (3rd edn, OUP, 2021) 434–438 (highlighting issues arising in national legal orders on account of the Court’s different reading of the facts, which then makes binding effect problematic on account of national procedural rules). 174 See 222/78, ICAP, 1979, paras 7–12. Further to this, the referring court is not precluded from amending the factual and legal context set out in the order for reference after the Court of Justice has given its preliminary ruling in the case, provided that the referring court gives full effect to the interpretation provided for in the Court’s judgment: see C-80/20, Wilo Salmson France, 2021, para. 53. 175 See 29/68, Milch-, Fett-, und Eierkontor, 1969, para. 3; C-35/11, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, 2012, para. 2; C-706/20, Amoena, 2021, paras 21–24; C-561/19, Consorzio Italian Management, 2021, para. 38; C-655/20, Marc Gómez del Moral Guasch (order), 2021, paras 23–25. See further para. 6.13.

Consequences 265 question of law to the Court, or again when it submits new considerations which might lead the Court to give a different answer to a question submitted earlier’.176 The validity of the judgment delivered previously cannot be contested by means of a further reference for a preliminary ruling ‘as this would call in question the allocation of jurisdiction as between national courts and the Court of Justice’ under Art. 267 TFEU.177 Furthermore, the initiative for making a fresh request for a preliminary ruling lies with the national court dealing with the main proceedings alone. The parties to those proceedings are not entitled to ask the Court of Justice to interpret an earlier preliminary ruling.178 Moreover, the Court has held that Arts 41–44 of the Statute ‘list exhaustively the exceptional review procedures available for challenging the authority of the Court’s judgments; however, since there are no parties to such proceedings in which the Court gives judgment by way of a preliminary ruling, the aforementioned articles do not apply to such a judgment’.179 (3) Sanctions for non-compliance In the event that the national court fails to comply with its obligation to follow the judgment giving the preliminary ruling, that court, as an institution of its Member State, will be in breach of Union law. This means that, in principle, infringement proceedings may be brought against that Member State under Arts 258–260 TFEU.180 This may also result in domestic remedies being taken with a view to reversing the infringement of Union law, or at least its consequences (including potential recourse to State liability).181

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B. As regards national courts generally (1) Binding on all national courts The binding effect of a judgment by way of preliminary ruling extends further than to merely what is necessary to determine the main proceedings. It also applies outside the specific dispute in respect of which it was given to all national courts and tribunals,182 subject, of course, to their right to make a further reference on interpretation to the

176 14/86, Pretore di Salò v X, 1987, para. 12. See, e.g. C-42/17, M.A.S. and M.B., 2017, in relation to C-105/14, Taricco and Others, 2015. For an analysis of this case, see A. Marciano, ‘The Dialogue between Courts in the so- called Tarrico Saga’ in K. Lenaerts, C. Farinhas, A. Marciano, and F. Rolin (eds), Building the European Union: The Jurist’s View of the European Union (Hart, 2021) 237. A further reference cannot be made, however, solely for the purposes of verifying whether the national court has correctly applied to the case in the main proceedings the interpretation provided by the Court of Justice in a preliminary ruling made in the same case: see C-262/21, F. Hoffmann-La Roche, 2022, para. 55. 177 69/85, Wünsche (order), 1986, para. 15. See para. 6.13. 178 See 13/67, Becher (order), 1968; 40/70, Sirena (order), 1979 ECR 3169, 3170–3171. See also Art. 104 of the CJ Rules of Procedure. 179 69/85, Wünsche (order), 1986, para. 14. 180 See para. 5.38. 181 As regards the obligations on a Member State stemming from a judgment given on an order for reference from which it is apparent that national legislation is incompatible with Union law, see C-231/06 to C-233/06, Jonkman and Others, 2007, paras 36–41; C-177/20, ‘Grossmania’, 2022, paras 63–69. See further para. 4.71. 182 See C-321/20, CDT (order), 2021, para. 26.

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266 PRELIMINARY RULINGS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF UNION LAW Court of Justice.183 In other words, the preliminary ruling on interpretation (as well as on validity: see para. 10.18) is considered to have erga omnes, as opposed to merely inter partes, effect.184 There are at least two main arguments in favour of the generalization of the binding effect of the interpretation of Union law given by way of preliminary ruling: the first relates to the declaratory nature of the interpretation, and the second concerns the aim of ensuring uniformity in the application of Union law.

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(2) Declaratory nature of the interpretation First, there is the fact that the interpretation is declaratory; it does not lay down any new rule, but is incorporated into the body of provisions and principles of Union law on which it is based. Consequently, the binding effect of the interpretation coincides with the binding effect of the provisions and principles on which it is based and which all national courts must respect.185 It is, moreover, precisely because the interpretation has, by its very nature, such erga omnes effect that there are no ‘parties to proceedings’,186 but rather there is a system in which, alongside the parties to the main proceedings, all the Member States, the Commission, and the Union institution, body, office, or agency which adopted the contested act are entitled to submit observations pursuant to Art. 23 of the Statute (and to take part in the oral procedure before the Court). The compass of the legal discussion which takes place before the Court accordingly corresponds with the scope of the ruling to be given.187 It would therefore be wrong to consider that a preliminary ruling has only inter partes effects on the ground that it is designed primarily to help the national court reach its decision in the main proceedings in which the question referred for a preliminary ruling arose. The inter partes aspect attaches only to the judicial decision in the main proceedings, including the way in which that decision deals with the preliminary ruling, but it does not extend to that ruling itself. (3) Uniformity in the application of Union law Second, the purpose for which the preliminary ruling procedure exists—which is to secure uniformity in the interpretation of Union law throughout the Member States— would be defeated if it were to be considered that a preliminary ruling under Art. 267

183 For an example, see 68/74, Alaimo, 1975. The General Court is bound by a preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice, unless it appears that the latter court ‘based its assessment on inaccurate or incomplete information’ (T-43/98, Emesa Sugar v Council, 2001, para. 73). 184 That being said, this is an area that has been the subject of a long-running academic debate, which has been complicated by the fact that some of the terms used, such as erga omnes, have varying connotations in the national legal orders: D. Anderson and M. Demetriou, References to the European Court (Sweet & Maxwell, 2002) 331–332. Moreover, the erga omnes effect may in certain instances only extend to cases in which the circumstances are similar or the same: S. Law and J. Nowak, ‘Procedural Harmonisation by the European Court of Justice: Procedural Autonomy and the Member States’ Perspective’ in F. Gascón Inchausti and B. Hess (eds), The Future of the European Law of Civil Procedure (Intersentia, 2020) 17, 51–58. 185 See C-177/20, ‘Grossmania’, 2022, paras 41–42. 186 69/85, Wünsche (order), 1986, para. 14. 187 See, in that regard, 141/81 to 143/81, Holdijk and Others, 1982, para. 6.

Consequences 267 TFEU had ‘no binding effect at all except in the case in which it was given’.188 The Court of Justice assumes that, with the exception of any new feature necessitating a refinement or even a reversal of the existing case-law, the preliminary ruling provides all national courts and tribunals with an answer to the question of Union law which gave rise to the interpretation given.189 This is underscored by Art. 99 of the CJ Rules of Procedure, which states: ‘Where a question referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling is identical to a question on which the Court has already ruled . . . the Court may at any time, on a proposal from the Judge Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate General, decide to rule by reasoned order.’ That provision combines with the long-standing practice by which the Court informs the national court by letter from the Registrar that an earlier ruling appears to answer its question and requests that the national court inform the Court whether it still wishes to maintain its request for a preliminary ruling (often the national court will then withdraw its request).190 Moreover, the erga omnes effect of the judgment given by way of preliminary rulings on interpretation is reinforced by the approach taken in the case-law concerning the temporal effects of such preliminary rulings, namely, with respect to limiting such temporal effects as seen in the remainder of the chapter (see para. 6.39).

C. Temporal effects (1) Ex tunc effect In principle, the interpretation given in the preliminary ruling simply expresses what was contained ab initio in the provisions and principles of Union law to which it relates. Consequently, its temporal effects are the same as the effects of those provisions and principles; in other words, it is effective as from their entry into force (ex tunc). According to the case-law, the interpretation given by the Court to a rule of Union law, in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by Art. 267 TFEU, clarifies and defines where necessary the meaning and scope of that rule as it must be or ought to have been understood and applied from the time of its entry into force. Consequently, the rule as thus interpreted is to be applied by the courts even to legal relationships arising and established before the judgment ruling on the request for interpretation, provided that in other respects the conditions are satisfied which enable an action relating to the application of that rule to be brought before the courts having jurisdiction.191 188 112/76, Manzoni, AG Warner Opinion, 1977 ECR 1657, 1662–1663, where he went on to say as follows: ‘This, it seems to me, is where the doctrine of stare decisis must come into play [ . . . ] It means that all Courts throughout the Community [now Union], with the exception of the Court itself, are bound by the ratio decidendi of a Judgment of this Court.’ He then referred, inter alia, to German legislation, which confirm this binding effect. 189 See 76/87, 86/87 to 89/87 and 149/87, Seguela and Others, 1988, paras 11–14. For some examples of an express reversal of the case-law prompted by a new reference for a preliminary ruling, see C-10/89, CNL-SUCAL, 1990, para. 10; C-267/91 and C-268/91, Keck and Mithouard, 1993, para. 14; C-127/08, Metock and Others, 2008, para. 58; C-930/19, Belgian State, 2021, para. 43. 190 See C-630/20, Deutsche Lufthansa (order), 2021. 191 See 61/79, Denkavit Italiana, 1980, para. 16; C-331/18, Pohotovosť, 2019, para. 53; C-401/18, Herst, 2020, para. 54; C-510/19, Openbaar Ministerie, 2020, para. 73; C-109/20, PL Holdings, 2021, para. 58; C-413/20, État belge, 2021, para. 53; C-430/21, RS, 2022, para. 77; C-140/20, Commissioner of An Garda Síochána, 2022, para. 125.

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268 PRELIMINARY RULINGS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF UNION LAW The proviso set out in the last sentence refers to the national procedural rules which continue to govern the conditions in which such a dispute may be brought before the courts (for example, time-limits and other procedural requirements). Admittedly, these procedural rules must accord with Union law (see para. 4.02), but their relevance—and hence the fact that they may prevent the dispute from being brought back before the courts—is not necessarily defeated by the ex tunc effect of the preliminary ruling on interpretation.192

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(2) Exceptional limitation of temporal effects It is only exceptionally193 that the Court may, in application of the general principle of legal certainty which is inherent in the Union legal order, be moved to restrict for any person concerned the opportunity of relying on a provision which it has interpreted with a view to calling into question legal relationships established in good faith; however, two essential criteria must be fulfilled before such a limitation can be imposed, namely, that those concerned should have acted in good faith, and that there should be a risk of serious difficulties.194 More specifically, the Court has taken that step only in quite specific circumstances: first, where there was a risk of serious economic consequences owing in particular to the large number of legal relationships entered into in good faith on the basis of the rules considered to be validly in force; and second, where it appeared that individuals and national authorities had been led to adopt practices which did not comply with Union legislation, to which the conduct of other Member States or the Commission may even have contributed.195 In other words, taking into account the serious difficulties which the Court’s judgment may create as regards events in the past, the Court limits the effects of its preliminary rulings in time, subject to compliance with strict requirements.196 Accordingly, on the basis of these two main components or ‘factors’,197 the Court determines whether limiting the temporal effects of its preliminary ruling is justified on a case-by-case basis. It is settled case-law that the financial consequences which might ensue for a Member State from a preliminary ruling do not in themselves justify limiting the temporal

192 The fact that the Court has given a preliminary ruling interpreting a provision of Union law without limiting the temporal effects of its judgment does not affect the right of a Member State to impose a time-limit under national law within which, on penalty of being barred, proceedings for repayment of charges levied in breach of that provision must be commenced (C-88/99, Roquette Frères, 2000, para. 36). 193 See, in that regard, D. Düsterhaus, ‘Eppur si muove! The Past, Present, and (Possible) Future of Temporal Limitations in the Preliminary Ruling Procedure’ (2017) Y.E.L.238. 194 See C-339/19, SC Romenergo, 2020, para. 48; C-287/19, DenziBank, 2020, para. 108; C-510/19, Openbaar Ministerie, 2020, para. 74; C-585/19, Academia de Studii Economice din Bucureops ti, 2021, para. 79; C-439/19, Latvijas Republikas Saeima, 2021, para. 132; C-109/20, PL Holdings, 2021, para. 59; C-413/20, État belge, 2021, para. 54. 195 See C-73/08, Bressol and Others, 2010, paras 91, 93; C-242/09, Albron Catering, 2010, paras 36–37; C-338/11 to C-347/11, Santander Asset Management SGIIC, 2012, paras 59–60; C-321/19, BY, 2020, para. 56; C-585/19, Academia de Studii Economice din Bucureops ti, 2021, para. 80; C-109/20, PL Holdings, 2021, para. 60. Compare the approach taken with respect to limiting the temporal effects of preliminary rulings on validity: see para. 10.23. 196 See, in that regard, C-267/06, Maruko, 2008, para. 77. See further F. Rosenkranz, ‘Temporal Effects of CJEU Judgments’ in K. Riesenhuber (ed.), European Legal Methodology (2nd edn, Intersentia, 2021) 435. 197 See C-577/08, Brouwer, 2010, para. 36.

Consequences 269 effects of the ruling.198 The Court reasons that, if it were otherwise, the most serious infringements would receive more lenient treatment insofar as it is those infringements that are likely to have the most significant financial implications for Member States.199 Furthermore, as the Court has consistently held, such a limitation of the temporal effects of a preliminary ruling may be allowed only in the actual judgment ruling upon the interpretation sought.200 In Meilicke,201 the Court of Justice refused to grant a Member State’s request to limit the temporal effects of its ruling on these grounds, emphasizing that there must necessarily be a single occasion when a decision is made on the temporal effects of the requested interpretation. The principle that a limitation of the temporal effects of a preliminary ruling containing an interpretation of Union law may be allowed only in the first ruling giving that interpretation guarantees the equal treatment of the Member States and other persons subject to Union law, while fulfilling at the same time the requirements arising from the principle of legal certainty. In those proceedings, as there were prior rulings which had clarified the Union provisions at issue for which no temporal limitation had been granted, the Court held that it was therefore not appropriate to limit the temporal effects of the preliminary ruling. In this way, the Court’s approach taken to the temporal effects of preliminary rulings further underscores the erga omnes effect of preliminary rulings in terms of constituting an important ‘precedential’ value for courts in other Member States. Notably, only the Court of Justice can limit the temporal effects of its preliminary rulings; the national legislature or the domestic courts have no power to restrict the effects ratione temporis of a preliminary ruling if the Court of Justice itself has not done so.202 198 See C-184/99, Grzelczyk, 2001, paras 52–53; C-209/03, Bidar, 2005, paras 68–69; C-73/08, Bressol and Others, 2010, para. 92; C-577/08, Brouwer, 2010, paras 34–35; C-338/11 to C-347/11, Santander Asset Management SGIIC, 2012, para. 62. The fact that the interpretative judgment could result in the re-examination of numerous files and give rise to administrative and practical difficulties did not suffice in order to limit the temporal effect of the interpretative judgment: see C-372/98, Cooke, 2000, para. 43. 199 See C-294/99, Athinaïki Zythoppoïia, 2001, para. 39. 200 See C-292/04, Meilicke and Others, 2007, para. 36; C-267/06, Maruko, 2008, para. 77; C-581/10 and C-629/10, Nelson and Others, 2012, paras 92–94; C‑511/18, C‑512/18, and C‑520/18, La Quadrature du Net, 2020, para. 216; C-109/20, PL Holdings, 2021, para. 61; C-140/20, Commissioner of An Garda Síochána, 2022, para. 119; C-339/20, VD, 2022, para. 98. 201 C-292/04, Meilicke and Others, 2007, paras 37–41; see also C-426/07, Krawcyński, 2008, paras 43–47; C-140/20, Commissioner of An Garda Síochána, 2022, para. 126. 202 See 309/85, Barra, 1988, para. 13: ‘The fundamental need for a general and uniform application of Union law implies that it is for the Court of Justice alone to decide upon the temporal restrictions to be placed on the interpretation which it lays down.’ See also C-439/19, Latvijas Republikas Saeima, 2021, para. 134, in which the Court stated that the temporal effects of a preliminary ruling cannot depend on the date of delivery of the judgment by the referring court in the main action; C-41/11, Inter-Environnement Wallonie and Terre wallonne, 2012, para. 63, in which the Court allowed, under certain conditions, a national court to make use of a national provision empowering it to maintain certain effects of a national measure adopted in breach of a procedural obligation laid down in a Union environmental directive where that national measure constituted the correct substantive transposition of another Union environmental directive. See also C-411/17, Inter-Environnement Wallonie, 2019, paras 177–182. That case-law is thus limited to rather exceptional situations, in which a Member State has failed to comply with procedural obligations imposed by Union law when correctly transposing a substantive Union law obligation: see C-597/17, Belgisch Syndicaat van Chiropraxie and Bart Vandendries, 2019, paras 61–62; C‑511/18, C‑512/18, and C‑520/18, La Quadrature du Net, 2020, paras 218–220; C-24/19, A and Others, 2020, paras 90–94; C-140/20, Commissioner of An Garda Síochána, 2022, paras 120–123; C-817/19, Ligue des droits humains, 2022, para. 295; C-339/20, VD, 2022, paras 99–100. That being said, in particular instances, for example, where evidence in criminal proceedings has been obtained on the basis of national rules of which the Court has decided by way of a preliminary ruling that they are contrary to Union law, the temporal effect of that judgment might indirectly be

270 PRELIMINARY RULINGS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF UNION LAW The burden of proof is on the party requesting the limitation of the temporal effects of the Court’s ruling to demonstrate with specific evidence that all of the requirements have been fulfilled; otherwise, the request is rejected.203 As mentioned earlier, the Court takes account of the conduct of the Commission204 and the other Member States in the period prior to the judgment, as well as the Court’s earlier case-law;205 any acts of other Union institutions, offices, bodies, or agencies;206 and the acts or conduct of the Member State concerned.207 Notwithstanding these considerations, the Court may be apt to reject a request where it is clear that the party concerned has not put forward sufficient evidence that all of the requirements have been satisfied.208 In practice, the Court of Justice weighs on a case-by-case basis the principle of legal certainty—which is applied to obviate the serious effects which its judgment might have, as regards the past, on legal relationships entered into in good faith—against the principle of the uniform application of Union law. Where the scales tip in favour of the

limited as it will be for the national courts to decide, on the basis of national procedural law, whether such evidence can still be relied upon in criminal proceedings, subject to the requirements of equivalence and effectiveness: see C‑511/18, C‑512/18, and C‑520/18, La Quadrature du Net, 2020, paras 221–227; C-339/20, VD, 2022, para. 104. See also C-746/18, Prokuratuur, 2021, paras 41–44. 203 See C-339/19, SC Romenergo, 2020, para. 50. For examples in which the standard of proof was not met, see C-76/14, Manea, 2015, paras 56–57; C-276/14, Wrocław, 2015, para. 46; C-287/19, DenziBank, 2020, para. 109; C-585/19, Academia de Studii Economice din Bucureops ti, 2021, para. 81. While typically it is the Member State whose national legislation is at issue in the main proceedings which requests the limitation of the temporal effects of the Court’s preliminary ruling, such a request can also be made by other interested parties within the meaning of Art. 23 of the Statute, such as the Commission (see C-262/88, Barber, 1990, para. 40), other Member States submitting observations in the preliminary ruling proceedings (see C-209/03, Bidar, 2005, para. 65; C-290/05 and C-333/05, Nádasdi, 2006, para. 61), or a party to the main proceedings (see C-682/17, ExxonMobil Production Deutschland, 2019, para. 127; C-287/19, DenziBank, 2020, para. 107; C-585/19, Academia de Studii Economice din Bucureops ti, 2021, par. 75). In certain cases, the Court of Justice has entertained a request put forward by the ‘defendant’ Member State for the first time at the oral hearing, although it ultimately rejected the request concerned: see C-366/99, Griesmar, 2001, paras 70–78; C-446/04, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, 2006, paras 221–225; C-524/04, Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Litigation, 2007, paras 129–133. 204 See 43/75, Defrenne, 1976, paras 72–73; 24/86, Blaizot, 1988, paras 32–33; C-163/90, Legros and Others, 1992, paras 32–33; C-437/97, EKW and Wein & Co., 2000, para. 58. Compare the following cases, in which the Court did not accept the argument that the Commission’s conduct justified a limitation of temporal effects: see C-228/05, Stradasfalti, 2006, paras 71–77 (the fact that the Commission supported the national authorities during the years at issue in the main proceedings is not sufficient); C-577/08, Brouwer, 2010, para. 39 (the fact that the Commission had not initiated infringement proceedings against the Member State concerned cannot be interpreted as the Commission’s tacit consent to the national rules concerned); C-321/19, Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2020, para. 58 (Commission opinions allegedly contributing to uncertainty regarding Union rules was adopted subsequent to the period in which the national legislation at issue applied). 205 Cited in favour of restricting the temporal effects of the preliminary ruling, see 24/86, Blaizot, 1988, para. 31, and C-262/96, Sürül, 1999, paras 106–113; against, see 61/79, Denkavit Italiana, 1980, paras 19–21; C-366/99, Griesmar, 2001, paras 70–78. The Court has not foreclosed the possibility of granting a request for limiting the temporal effects of a preliminary ruling under circumstances where the Court would depart from established case- law, albeit in those proceedings, the Court dismissed the request on the grounds that the judgment contained a clarification of the case-law in the field: see C-17/05, Cadman, 2006, paras 42–43. 206 See C-262/88, Barber, 1990, para. 42; C-163/90, Legros and Others, 1992, para. 32; C-197/94 and C-252/94, Société Bautiaa and Société Française Maritime, 1996, paras 44–56; C-347/00, Barreira Pérez, 2002, paras 43–47. 207 See C-184/04, Uudenkaupungin kaupunki, 2006, para. 57 (emphasizing that the very fact that the Member State seeking the limitation of temporal effects invoked a derogation in the measure concerned which was predicated on the adjustments being ‘insignificant’ casts doubt on the claim that the judgment would have any significant economic repercussions); C-423/04, Richards, 2006, para. 43 (placing emphasis on the adoption of legislation and the Member State’s withdrawal of its request to limit the temporal effects of the Court’s preliminary ruling). 208 See C-138/07, Cobelfret, 2009, paras 67–70; C-210/18, WESTbahn Management, 2019, para. 47; C-321/19, BY, 2020, paras 57–60.

Consequences 271 principle of legal certainty, the Court declares that no reliance may be placed on the provision of Union law as interpreted in order to support claims concerning periods prior to the date of its judgment, except in the case of persons who have before that date initiated legal proceedings or raised an equivalent claim under national law.209 Finally, it should be noted that the precise scope of the temporal limitation of the effects of a preliminary ruling may be the subject of a further request for an interpretation by way of preliminary ruling (see para. 6.13).210

209 See 43/75, Defrenne, 1976, paras 69–75; 24/86, Blaizot, 1988, para. 35; C-262/88, Barber, 1990, paras 44–45; C-163/90, Legros and Others, 1992, paras 34–35; C-485/93 and C-486/93, Simitzi, 1995, para. 34; C-126/94, Société Cadi Surgelés and Others, 1996, paras 32–34; C-72/03, Carbonati Apuani, 2004, paras 37–42. 210 See C-109/91, Ten Oever, 1993; C-110/91, Moroni, 1993; C-171/18, Safeway, 2019 (these judgments interpret the limitation of the temporal effects of the judgment in Barber (C-262/88, Barber, 1990), which the Court of Justice associated with its interpretation of Art. 157 TFEU); see also C-363/93 and C-407/93 to C-411/93, Lancry and Others, 1994, paras 42–43.

PART III

PROT E C T ION AGA INST U NION AC T S

7 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT I. Subject-Matter A. General overview (1) Purpose The purpose of the action for annulment set forth in Art. 263 TFEU is to enable all 7.01 types of parties (such as Union institutions, Member States, and natural and legal persons) to protect themselves against unlawful binding acts of Union institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies, provided that the specific conditions as to admissibility are fulfilled.1 By this procedure, the Court of Justice or the General Court2 reviews the contested act in the light of higher-ranking rules of—written and unwritten— Union law. In the event that an infringement of such rules is found, the action will result in the annulment of the contested act (i.e. a declaration that the act is void pursuant to Art. 264 TFEU). (2) Role in the system of judicial protection The action for annulment is at the core of the system of judicial protection by allowing direct review of the legality of binding Union acts before the Union Courts. Under Art. 263 TFEU, the Union Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to declare Union acts void.3 Moreover, the action for annulment is linked with other procedures which may be brought before the Union Courts and the national courts as part of the complete and coherent system of EU judicial protection, which provides for both direct and indirect routes for the review of the legality of Union acts, for example, as regards the relationship between the direct route of annulment and the indirect route of preliminary rulings on the validity of Union acts under Art. 267 TFEU (see para. 10.11), as well as complementary means by which to compensate parties for damage caused by unlawful acts and conduct of Union institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies through the action for damages against the Union (see para. 11.13).

1 Arts 263, 264, and 266 TFEU are applicable to the EAEC Treaty. 2 As regards the allocation of jurisdiction between the Court of Justice and the General Court regarding actions for annulment, see para. 2.54. With particular regard to the distinction between actions for annulment based on Art. 263 TFEU and contractual actions based on Art. 272 TFEU, see paras 15.11–15.13. See also T-17/19, Moi v Parliament, 2021, paras 84–90 (concordance rule in staff cases brought on the basis of Art. 270 TFEU held to be not applicable to actions for annulment under Art. 263 TFEU). 3 See, e.g. C-414/18, Iccrea Banca, 2019, para. 37.

EU Procedural Law. Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak, Oxford University Press. © Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833086.003.0007

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276 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT 7.03

(3) Present Treaty framework With the elimination of the pillar structure and the replacement of the European Community with the Union upon the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty,4 certain restrictions placed on the Union Courts’ jurisdiction were removed. With respect to the field of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM), the Union Courts’ jurisdiction is no longer precluded for actions for annulment challenging acts adopted in this field,5 as had been the case under former Art. 230 EC. 6 By contrast, with respect to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the Union Courts still have not been conferred jurisdiction in this field as a general matter,7 although there are exceptions laid down in the Treaties which provide for the Union Courts’ jurisdiction over actions for annulment in relation to, first, monitoring compliance with Art. 40 TEU and, second, reviewing the legality of restrictive measures against natural and legal persons in proceedings brought in accordance with the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU.8 Furthermore, there is a developing body of case-law on jurisdictional issues relating to the CFSP which indicates that the fact that the CFSP is involved in the circumstances of a particular case does not necessarily mean that the Union Courts’ jurisdiction to hear an action for annulment is precluded.9 It should also be noted at the outset that the changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty have impacted the action for annulment in other respects, namely, as regards the parties to such an action (see paras 7.70–7.71) and the relaxation of the standing requirements for natural and legal persons under the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU (see para. 7.107).10

4 See Art. 1(3) TEU. 5 Where such an action is brought against a PJCCM act adopted before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Union Courts’ jurisdiction is subject to the five-year provisional period set forth in Art. 10 of Protocol (No. 36), annexed to the TEU, the TFEU, and the EAEC Treaty, on transitional provisions (OJ 2016 C202/321). On account of the two-month time-limit prescribed by Art. 263, sixth para. TFEU, this provision is no longer relevant for annulment actions. See also Declaration No. 50, annexed to the Lisbon Treaty, concerning Art. 10 of the Protocol on transitional provisions. 6 See C-160/03, Spain v Eurojust, 2005, paras 35–44. Former Art. 35(6) EU had provided for a comparable procedure to former Art. 230 EC brought by a Member State or the Commission: see C-354/04 P, Gestoras Pro Amnistia and Others and Council, 2007, para. 55; C-355/04 P, Segi and Others v Council, 2007, para. 55. 7 Under the former Treaty framework, the Union Courts had jurisdiction to annul acts adopted in the PJCCM (see C-176/03, Commission v Council, 2005, paras 38–40; C-440/05, Commission v Council, 2007, paras 52–54), as well as in the CFSP (see C-91/05, Commission v Council, 2005, paras 29–34), which were found to encroach on the competences of the then Community. 8 Art. 24(1), second subpara. TEU; Art. 275 TFEU. See, in that regard, C-72/15, Rosneft, 2017, paras 65, 85; C-134/19 P, Bank Refah Kargaran v Council, 2020, paras 26–27. However, the Union Courts have no jurisdiction to rule on the legality of provisions of CFSP acts which do not constitute restrictive measures against natural or legal persons within the meaning of the second paragraph of Art. 275 TFEU, but rather are measures of general application. See C-348/12 P, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, 2013, para. 99; T-67/12, Sina Bank, 2014, paras 38–43, 46–50; T-735/14, Gazprom Neft v Council, 2018, paras 52–62; see also, in that regard, C-72/15, Rosneft, 2017, paras 76, 81, 98, 99, 102, 103, 107; C-351/22, Neves 77 Solutions, pending. 9 See, in that regard, C-439/13 P, Elitaliana v Eulex Kosovo, 2015, paras 41–50; C-455/14 P, H v Council and Others, 2016, paras 39–61. 10 As regards the temporal application of the rules determining the conditions of admissibility of an action for annulment brought by natural or legal persons, on the basis of settled case-law, this issue is to be determined at the time of the lodging of the application. Thus, the admissibility of an action for annulment lodged after the date of entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (1 December 2009) is adjudicated on the basis of Art. 263 TFEU, while an action lodged before that date is adjudicated on the basis of former Art. 230 EC even though the Union Courts delivered their judgment after that date. See T-539/08, Etimine and Etiproducts v Commission (order), 2010, paras 73–81; T-18/10, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council (order), 2011, paras 32–35.

Subject-Matter 277 (4) Topics to be discussed The action for annulment has several components and characteristics for which all six paragraphs of Art. 263 TFEU, along with Arts 264 and 266 TFEU, come into play. First, the subject-matter of the action for annulment pertains to the type of Union act being challenged and requires there to be a reviewable act within the meaning of the case-law (Part I, section B). Second, the standing of the parties in annulment proceedings must be evaluated, as regards both the potential applicants and defendants. In this, certain admissibility requirements placed on applications brought by natural and legal persons arise (Part II). Additional admissibility requirements (compliance with time-limits and other procedural aspects) and the grounds on which the action for annulment may be based comprise special characteristics of the action for annulment (Part III). Finally, the consequences of an action for annulment are addressed (Part IV). Particular attention is given to certain fields of Union law, namely, Arts 101 and 102 TFEU, merger control, State aid, anti-dumping, banking union, public procurement, and access to documents.

7.04

B. The reviewable act The issue of the reviewable act11 is one of the central admissibility requirements for actions for annulment under Art. 263 TFEU. Following from the case-law, this generally turns on two central aspects, namely, that there must be (1) a contested act and (2) a binding act. (1) The requirement for there to be a contested act (a) Existing act An application for annulment is admissible only if it is directed against an existing act.12 A non-existent act may not be declared void. (b) Identification of the act Consequently, the applicant must identify precisely the act which it is seeking to have annulled. If the applicant fails to do so, the application will be inadmissible on the grounds that its subject-matter is unknown.13 However, it may be that an application 11 Also referred to in the case-law as, e.g., an actionable measure (see C-575/18 P, Czech Republic v Commission, 2020, para. 49; T-245/17, ViaSat v Commission, 2021, para. 180) or a challengeable act (see C-16/16 P, Belgium v Commission, 2018, paras 37, 52; C-650/18, Hungary v Parliament, 2021, para. 49; T-758/18, ABLV Bank v SRB, 2021, para. 27; T-195/19, GEA Group v Commission, 2022, para. 44). 12 See, in that regard, T-24/20, Junqueras i Vies v Parliament (order), 2020, paras 101–106. The Court of Justice (under Art. 150 CJ Rules of Procedure) and the General Court (under Art. 129 GC Rules of Procedure) may declare of its own motion that an act is non-existent. Thus, a hypothetical act cannot be the subject of an action for annulment: see, e.g. T-142/16, Dröge and Others v Commission (order), 2017, para. 26. 13 See 30/68, Lacroix v Commission, 1970, paras 20–27; 247/87, Star Fruit v Commission, 1989, para. 9; see also T-392/03, T-408/03, and T-435/03, Regione Siciliana v Commission, 2008, para. 48 (subject-matter of applications for annulment of all ‘preceding and subsequent acts’ insufficiently specific and thus dismissed); compare T-585/18, Şanli v Council, 2021, paras 31–36 (application not inadmissible on the grounds that the acts were not formally identified in the application because they could be so identified taking account of their context).

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7.07

278 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT for annulment which is formally directed against a particular act is in fact directed against other acts which are linked with the contested act in such a way that they constitute a single whole.14

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7.09

7.10

(c) Act no longer in force An application for annulment of an act which is no longer in force is not necessarily devoid of purpose. If the applicant has an interest in the annulment of an act which is no longer in force and the application has been brought within the time-limit prescribed by the sixth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU, it will be admissible (at least from this point of view).15 This also applies where the contested act has already been implemented at the time when the action is brought.16 (d) Act replacing a withdrawn act In the interests of the due administration of justice and the requirements of procedural economy, an action for annulment of an act which is withdrawn in the course of the proceedings may also be redirected against a new, closely related act which replaces or simply revokes the contested act.17 In such case, the new act is regarded as a new matter which has arisen in the course of the proceedings and the applicant may put forward new pleas in law.18 Naturally, it is also possible to bring a new action for annulment. The new act is regarded as being of the same kind as the act that was withdrawn. (e) Non-existent act The requirement that the contested act must exist is applied in the special case of the doctrine of the non-existent act. Such an act exhibits such particularly serious and manifest defects that it must be regarded as non-existent. If an act is found to be non- existent, it loses the benefit of the normal presumption that it is valid insofar as it has not been annulled, or the institution which adopted it has not properly repealed or withdrawn it.19 Moreover, the non-existent act cannot produce any legal effects at all. Consequently, an application for annulment of a non-existent act will invariably be 14 See, in that regard, 25/65 and 26/65 SIMET and FERAM v High Authority, 1967 ECR 33, 43–44; 34/77 Oslizlok v Commission, 1978, paras 5–6. 15 See, e.g. C-239/12 P, Abdulrahim v Council and Commission, 2013, paras 62–85; C-595/14, Parliament v Council, 2015, paras 16–30; C-499/18 P, Bayer CropScience and Bayer v Commission, 2021, para. 40; T-246/15, Ivanyushchenko v Council, 2017, paras 46–50; T-276/13 RENV, Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association v Council (order), 2019, paras 23–28. 16 See 53/85 AKZO Chemie v Commission, 1986, para. 21; C-370/07, Commission v Council, 2009, paras 14–18; T-22/97 Kesko v Commission, 1999, para. 59; see also C-259/21, Parliament v Council, 2022, paras 45–49. 17 See 14/81, Alpha Steel v Commission, 1982, para. 8; T-228/02, PMOI v Council, 2006, paras 27–35; T-214/13, Typke v Commission, 2015, paras 27–28; T-168/16, Grizzly Tools v Commission, 2018, para. 24; compare T-420/05, Vischim v Commission, 2009, paras 53–55 (this does not cover the situation where the applicant puts forward a new claim, not directed at the later act, but rather seeks from another angel the partial or entire annulment of the original act already the subject of the claim set out in the application). 18 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 127(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 84(1). 19 See 15/85, Consorzio Cooperative d’Abruzzo v Commission, 1987, para. 10. The purpose of this exception to the principle that acts are presumed to be lawful is to maintain a balance between two fundamental, but sometimes conflicting, requirements with which a legal order must comply, namely, stability of legal relations and respect for legality: see, e.g. C-199/92 P, Hüls v Commission, 1999, para. 85; C-200/92 P, ICI v Commission, 1999, para. 70; C-235/92 P, Montecatini v Commission, 1999, para. 97; C-475/01, Commission v Greece, 2004, para. 19.

Subject-Matter 279 declared inadmissible.20 Furthermore, an act may be declared non-existent after the period prescribed for bringing an action for annulment has run out. To date, the case- law—which shows every sign of reluctance to do this21—affords exceptional instances in which an act has actually been declared non-existent.22 (2) The requirement for a binding act (a) Definition Under well-established case-law, the action for annulment laid down in Article 263 TFEU is available in respect of all acts adopted by the Union institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies, whatever their nature or form, which are intended to have binding legal effects.23 Conversely, any Union act which does not produce binding legal effects falls outside the scope of the judicial review provided for in Article 263 TFEU.24 It follows from the wording of the first paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU, which precludes the annulment of opinions and recommendations, that acts whose annulment is sought must be binding.25 Binding acts are the outcome of the exercise, upon the conclusion of an internal procedure laid down by law, of a power provided for by law which is intended to produce legal effects.26 They must therefore have a legitimate legal basis; reflect the

20 See 1/57 and 14/57, Société des Usines à Tubes de la Sarre v High Authority, 1957–1958 ECR 105, 112–113. In view of the non-existence of the contested act, the Court of Justice and the General Court may make an order for costs against the defendant and in favour of the applicant while declaring that the application is inadmissible (see CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 139; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 135). 21 See 7/56 and 3/57 to 7/57, Algera and Others v Common Assembly, 1957–1958 ECR 39, 60–61; 15/85, Consorzio v Commission, 1987, para. 10; C-137/92 P, Commission v BASF and Others, 1994, paras 49–50; C-245/92 P, Chemie Linz v Commission, 1999, paras 92–97; T-274/06, Estaser El Mareny v Commission (order), 2007, para. 41; T-369/07 Latvia v Commission, 2011, para. 61; T-330/11, MasterCard and Others v Commission (order), 2012, para 31; T-185/18, Lucchini v Commission, 2019, paras 44–50; T-389/19 to T-394/19, T-397/19, T-398/19, T-403/19, T-404/19, T-406/19, T-407/19, T-409/19 to T-414/19, T-416/19 to T-418/19, T-420/19 to T-422/19, T-425/19 to T-427/19, T-429/19 to T-432/19, T-435/19, T-436/19, T-438/19 to T-442/19, T-444/19 to T-446/19, T-448/19, T-450/19 to T-454/19, T-463/19, and T-465/19, Coppo Gavazzi and Others v Parliament, 2020, paras 72–77 (appeal pending in C-725/20 P); see also C-475/01, Commission v Greece, 2004, paras 20–21; T-786/16 and T-224/18, PV v Commission, 2020, paras 109–115 (upheld in C-640/20 P, PV v Commission, 2023, paras 112-119); T-534/21, VP v Cedefop (order), 2022, paras 27–37. 22 See 1/57 and 14/57, Société des Usines à Tubes de la Sarre v High Authority, 1957–1958 ECR 105, 112–113; compare C-137/92 P, Commission v BASF and Others, 1994, paras 48–54. 23 See, e.g. 22/70, Commission v Council, 1971, para. 39; C-16/16 P, Belgium v Commission, 2018, para. 31; C-650/18, Hungary v Parliament, 2021, para. 37; C-348/20 P, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, 2022, para. 62; C‑59/18 and C‑182/18, Italy and Comune di Milano v Council, 2022, para. 60; C-743/19, Parliament v Council, 2022, para. 36; T-117/15, Estonia v Commission, 2017, para. 44; T-245/17, ViaSat v Commission, 2021, para. 110; T-227/21, Illumina v Commission, 2022, para. 63. 24 See, e.g. C-16/16 P, Belgium v Commission, 2018, para. 27; C-911/19, FBF, 2021, para. 37; T-245/17, ViaSat v Commission, 2021, para. 111; T-388/19, Puigdemont i Casamajó and Comín i Oliveres v Parliament, 2022, para. 75. Arguments based on the right to effective judicial protection are to no avail in respect of acts which do not meet the case-law requirements: see, e.g. C-689/19 P, VodafoneZiggo Group v Commission, 2021, para. 138; T-482/20, LG v Commission (order), 2021, para. 64. 25 See, in that regard, 1/57 and 14/57, Usines à tubes de la Sarre v High Authority, 1957–1958 ECR 105, 114; C-16/16 P, Belgium v Commission, 2018, paras 25–45. 26 See 182/80 Gauff v Commission, 1982, para. 18. Under Union law, there is no general obligation on the administrative or judicial authorities to inform the addressees of measures of the judicial remedies available or of the conditions for availing themselves thereof (see C-153/98 P, Guérin Automobiles v Commission (order), 1999, para. 15; C-154/98 P Guérin Automobiles v Commission (order), 1999, para. 15; see also C-521/03 P, Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission (order), 2004, para. 44; T-552/13, Oil Turbo Compressor v Council, 2015, para. 68) and thus a Union institution, body, office, or agency is not obliged to indicate whether one of its acts is binding.

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280 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT definitive position of a Union institution, body, office, or agency; and be intended to have legal effects.

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7.13

(b) Silence on the part of a Union institution, body, office, or agency When a party makes a request to a Union institution, body, office, or agency, mere silence on the part of that institution, body, office, or agency cannot be placed on the same footing as an implied refusal, except where that result is expressly provided for by a provision of Union law.27 Thus, for example, where in a legislative procedure the Council does not act upon a proposal from the Commission, that failure cannot be regarded as giving rise to a reviewable act within the meaning of Art. 263 TFEU.28 The position would be different if, under Union law, the Council were deemed, after the expiry of a specific period of time, to have taken an implied decision whose content is determined by Union law29 or if the Council adopted a decision rejecting explicitly the Commission’s proposal.30 (3) Substance, not form, is determinative (a) Content The binding legal effects of the contested act are inferred from its substance.31 In that regard, the Union Courts assess those effects on the basis of objective criteria, such as the content of the act, taking into account, where appropriate, the context in which it was adopted and the powers of the Union institution, body, office, or agency which adopted it.32 In addition, while it is possible to take into consideration a subjective criterion relating to the intention that led the Union institution, body, office, or agency which drafted the contested act to adopt it, that subjective criterion can play only a complementary role as compared with the objective criteria and therefore cannot be given greater weight than those objective

27 See C-123/03 P, Commission v Greencore, 2004, para. 45; see also C‑160/21 and C‑217/21, NIKOPOLIS AD ISTRUM 2010, 2022, para. 32; T-768/17, Comprojecto-Projectos e Construções and Others v ECB (order), 2019, para. 53; T-24/20, Junqueras i Vies v Parliament (order), 2020, para. 104. For example, as regards the rules concerning access to documents, failure to abide by the requisite time-limits may render the contested act an implied decision to refuse access within the meaning of Art. 8(3) of Regulation No. 1049/2001; see, e.g. T-278/11, ClientEarth and Others v Commission (order), 2012, paras 32–33; T-726/17, Commune de Fessenheim and Others v Commission (order), 2018, paras 21–22. 28 See C-27/04, Commission v Council, 2004, para. 34. In the event of an unlawful failure to act, an action for failure to act may be brought under Art. 265 TFEU: see Ch. 8. 29 See C-27/04 Commission v Council, 2004, para. 32; see also C-76/01 P Eurocoton and Others v Council, 2003, paras 54–65. 30 See C-63/12, Commission v Council, 2013, paras 28–34. 31 See, e.g. 60/81, IBM v Commission, 1981, para. 9; C-322/09 P, NDSHT v Commission, 2010, para. 46; C-127/13 P, Strack v Commission, 2014, para. 90; C‑551/19 P and C‑552/19 P, ABLV Bank v ECB, 2021, para. 40; T-170/16, Guardian Glass España, Central Vidriera v Commission (order), 2017, para. 68; T-775/17, Estampaciones Rubí v Commission (order), 2018, para. 58. 32 See, e.g. C-599/15 P, Romania v Commission, 2017, para. 48; C-16/16 P, Belgium v Commission, 2018, para. 32; C-348/20 P, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, 2022, para. 63; T-758/18, ABVL v SRB, 2021, para. 29; T-388/19, Puigdemont i Casamajó and Comín i Oliveres v Parliament, 2022, para. 76. The Union Courts must carry out an analysis of the content of the contested act in light of those requirements, and not merely examine the powers of the Union institution, body, office, or agency which adopted that act: see, in that regard, C-593/15 P and C-594/15 P, Slovak Republic v Commission, 2017, paras 53–54.

Subject-Matter 281 criteria, nor can it affect the assessment of the effects of the resulting contested act.33 Where an act is cast in one of the forms of binding acts of Art. 288 TFEU, its binding nature will not in principle be called into question.34 However, with respect to other acts, the form in which they are cast is irrelevant as regards the right to bring an action for annulment of such acts.35 To take a well-known example, the General Court has held that an action will lie against an act made simply orally—by means of a statement by the spokesman for the Commissioner responsible for competition matters, also reported by the press agency Agence Europe—on the grounds that its contents were not contested by the parties and had subsequently been confirmed by the Commission itself, and that hence the General Court was in a position to investigate whether it had produced legal effects.36 However, an action for annulment will not lie against a ‘practice’ of the Commission.37 (b) Acts not listed in Art. 288 TFEU The category of acts against which an action for annulment will lie is not confined to the binding acts mentioned in Art. 288 TFEU. The Court of Justice has held that to confine that class of acts in that way would conflict with the obligation under what is now the first subparagraph of Art. 19(1) TEU to ensure that, in the interpretation and application of the Treaties, the law is observed and that an action for annulment, as a means of fulfilling that obligation, must therefore be available in the case of all acts adopted by the Union institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies, whatever their nature or form, which are intended to have legal effects.38 33 See C-471/18 P, Germany v Esso Raffinage, 2021, para. 65; C-551/19 P and C-552/19 P, ABLV Bank v ECB, 2021, para. 42. 34 See C-463/10 P and C-475/10 P, Deutsche Post and Germany v Commission, 2011, paras 43–45; compare T-885/19, Aquind and Others v Commission (order), 2021, paras 23–37 (Commission delegated regulation not a reviewable act when the application was lodged because the stage during which the Parliament or the Council could object to the contested regulation had not been completed). 35 See, e.g. 60/81, IBM v Commission, 1981, para. 9; C-521/06 P, Athinaïki Techniki v Commission, 2008, paras 43–45; C-322/09 P NDSHT v Commission, 2010, para. 47; C-689/19 P, VodafoneZiggo Group v Commission, 2021, para. 97; T-842/19, Koopman International v EUIPO -Tinnus Enterprises and Mystic Products (order), 2020, para. 20; T-744/20, Airoldi Metalli v Commission (order), 2021, para. 21. The form of the act may nonetheless be relevant in identifying the nature of the act: see, e.g. T-456/07, Commission v Cdt, (order), 2010, para. 62. 36 See T-3/93, Air France v Commission, 1994, paras 55–60; see also C-208/03 Le Pen v Parliament, 2005, para. 47; compare, e.g. T-178/02 WONUC and Others v Commission (order), 2003, para. 7; T-280/19, Highgate Capital Management v Commission (order), 2020, paras 45–56. 37 See C-159/96, Portugal v Commission, 1998, paras 23–24. 38 See, in that regard, 22/70, Commission v Council, 1971, paras 40–42; 60/81, IBM v Commission, 1981, para. 8. For some examples of binding acts under Art. 263 TFEU, see 22/70, Commission v Council, 1971 (Council decision establishing common negotiating position on the part of the Member States with a view to the conclusion of an international agreement); C-27/04, Commission v Council, 2004, paras 44–51 (Council conclusions holding excessive deficit procedure in abeyance as regards certain Member States); C-261/13 P, Schönberger v Parliament, 2014, paras 12–26 (decision by which the Parliament considers that a petition addressed to it does not meet the conditions laid down in Art. 227 TFEU, or by which the Parliament refuses to consider, or refrains from considering, a petition addressed to it, is amenable to judicial review, yet a decision, taken after a petition has been declared admissible, on how that petition should be dealt with is not amenable to judicial review); T-758/18, ABLV Bank v SRB, 2021, paras 30–36 (SRB letter); T-495/19, Romania v Commission, 2021, paras 36–53 (appeal pending in C-54/22 P) (Commission decision registering proposal for European citizens’ initiative). For some examples of non-binding acts under Art. 263 TFEU, see C-593/15 P and C-594/15 P, Slovak Republic v Commission, 2017, paras 48–67 (Commission letters expressing opinion as to the legal consequences of the losses of Union own

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282 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT 7.15

(c) Refusal An act of a Union institution, body, office, or agency amounting to a rejection must be appraised in the light of the nature of the request to which it constitutes a reply.39 The refusal by a Union institution to withdraw or amend an act may constitute an act whose legality may be reviewed under Art. 263 TFEU only if the act which the Union institution refuses to withdraw or amend could itself have been contested under that provision.40 Accordingly, the fact that a document is sent by a Union institution to its addressee in response to a request from the addressee is not sufficient to make it a reviewable act within the meaning of Art. 263 TFEU.41 In addition, a Commission decision to shelve a complaint from an individual in the course of a procedure brought pursuant to Art. 258 TFEU does not have any legal effects as regards the complainant. This is because the act sought by the complainant, a decision to commence infringement proceedings against a Member State before the Court of Justice, is not per se a reviewable act.42 Similarly, the refusal of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to

resources); C-183/17 P, IMG v Commission, 2019, paras 52–70 (Commission financing decisions); C-572/18 P, thyssenkrupp Electrical Steel and thyssenkrupp Electrical Steel Ugo v Commission, 2021, paras 51–73 (Commission conclusion contained in the minutes of a meeting of the Customs Expert Group); C-575/18 P, Czech Republic v Commission, 2020 (Commission letter relating to the system of the Union’s own resources); T-105/11, Noko Ngele v Commission (order), 2011, paras 5–7 (Commission response to Parliamentary questions); T-88/20, Rivière and Others v Parliament, 2021, paras 31–52 (appeal pending in C-767/21 P) (President of the European Parliament act forbidding national flags being placed on the desks of MEPs); T-377/20, KN v EESC, 2021, paras 60–87 (EESC invitation to resign and withdraw a candidacy for presidency of EESC and decision to join proceedings before a national court as a civil party, while decision to discharge an EESC member from their duties involving the management and administration of staff deemed binding act); T-431/21, UNIS v Commission (order), 2022, paras 22–32 (Commission letter declaring that it was not competent to review the questions raised by the applicant in its complaint); T-594/21, Stadtgemeinde Zell am See and Others v Commission (order), 2022, paras 5–15 (Commission summary published in the Official Journal concerning aid scheme); T-654/21, Eurecna v Commission (order), 2022, paras 26–50 (Commission decision registering applicant in the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) database); T-468/21, Avenir de la langue française v Commission (order), 2021, paras 5–12 (Commission letter recalling the state of existing law and expressing opinion on importance of multilingualism). 39 See, e.g. C-150/06 P, Arizona Chemical and Others v Commission (order), 2007, para. 22; C-351/20 P, Dragnea v Commission, 2022, para. 42; T-613/19, ENIL Brussels Office and Others v Commission (order), 2020, para. 27; T-64/22, Vtesse Harlow v Commission (order), 2022, para. 7. 40 See, e.g. 42/71, Nordgetreide v Commission, 1972, para. 5; C-60/09 P, Makhteshim-Agan Holding and Others v Commission (order), 2010, para. 46; T-293/18, Latvia v Commission (order), 2020, para. 25; T-24/20, Junqueras i Vies v Parliament (order), 2020, para. 52. 41 See, e.g. C-25/92 P, Miethke v Parliament (order), 1993, paras 10–17; C-150/06 P, Arizona Chemical and Others v Commission, 2007, paras 21–25; C-251/08 P, Ayyanarsamy v Commission and Germany (order), 2009, paras 15–20; C-69/09 P, Makhteshim-Agan Holding and Others v Commission (order), 2010, paras 40–47; T-234/04, Netherlands v Commission, 2007, paras 48–71; T-437/05, Brink’s Security Luxembourg v Commission, 2009, paras 63–66; T-43/12, Hamcho and Hamcho International v Council, 2014, paras 77–81; T-5/21, Stichting Comité N 65 Ondergronds Helvoirt v AEE (order), 2021, paras 23–43. 42 See, e.g. C-111/11 P, Ruipérez Aguirre and ATC Petition v Commission (order), 2011, paras 11–12; C-602/14, Bharat Heavy Electricals v Commission (order), 2015, paras 21–25; C-284/19 P, Clarke v Commission (order), 2019, in particular paras 27–31, 38; T-431/21, UNIS v Commission (order), 2022, paras 28–29; T-64/22, Vtesse Harlow v Commission (order), 2022, paras 9–13 (in the context of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU); T-124/22, Falcó Capilla v Commission (order), 2022, paras 12–16; see also, in that regard, C-131/03 P, Reynolds Tobacco and Others v Commission, 2006, paras 54–68. In any event, the complainant has no entitlement to a Commission decision, since the idea underlying the case-law is also that the Commission has a discretion whether or not to bring proceedings for a particular Member State’s failure to fulfil obligations under the Treaties: see, e.g. C-137/16 P, Petraitis v Commission (order), 2007, para. 22; C-1/22 P, Castillejo Oriol v Commission (order), 2022, para. 23; T-807/19, Hochmann Marketing v Commission (order), 2020, para. 8. See further para. 5.32. This has been transposed to other fields: see, e.g. T-734/19, Junqueras i Vies v Parliament (order), 2021, para. 51; but see T-310/18, EPSU and Goudriaan v Commission, 2019, paras 30–36.

Subject-Matter 283 initiate an investigation into the conduct of its previous investigations has been held not to be a reviewable act, especially given that no provision of Union law confers on natural and legal persons, whether or not persons concerned, the right to request OLAF to do so.43 (d) Legitimate legal basis Finally, a Union institution, body, office, or agency may adopt a binding act only insofar as it has a legitimate legal basis which empowers the institution, body, office, or agency to adopt a binding act.44 No such power may be presumed to exist in the absence of a specific Union provision.45 Consequently, the consideration of the admissibility of the action for annulment is linked with the substance, as the question whether the contested act has a legitimate legal basis coincides with the question whether the institution, body, office, or agency was empowered to adopt it.46 (4) The act is intended to produce legal effects (a) Legal effects and privileged versus non-privileged applicants Acts of a Union institution, body, office, or agency are binding insofar as they produce legal effects.47 Under the case-law, privileged applicants (the Member States and certain Union institutions: see para. 7.77) only have to prove that the contested act produces binding legal effects for the purposes of Art. 263 TFEU, while in the case of non-privileged applicants (natural and legal persons) the action for annulment lies only if the binding legal effects of the contested act are capable of affecting the interests of the applicant by bringing about a distinct change in its legal position.48 The Union Courts have, moreover, emphasized that, contrary to a non-privileged applicant, a privileged applicant is not required to prove a legal interest to bring the action

43 See C-351/20 P, Dragnea v Commission, 2022, paras 42–52. 44 See T-113/89, Nefarma v Commission, 1990, para. 68 (no legal basis: see paras 70–83, in particular para. 75); T-577/17, thyssenkrupp Electrical Steel and thyssenkrupp Electrical Steel Ugo v Commission (order), 2018, para. 47 (no legal basis: see paras 48–56, in particular para. 55). 45 See 229/86, Brother Industries v Commission (order), 1987 ECR 3757, 3763; T-113/89, Nefarma v Commission, 1990, para. 69; T-577/17, thyssenkrupp Electrical Steel and thyssenkrupp Electrical Steel Ugo v Commission (order), 2018, para. 46. 46 For a recent example, see C-471/18 P, Germany v Esso Raffinage, 2020. This may have the result that admissibility is treated together with the substance (see, e.g. C‑325/91, France v Commission, 1993, para. 11; C‑57/95, France v Commission, 2007, paras 9–10). The Union Courts also take other approaches depending on the circumstances, and have held, for example, that the question whether an act has binding legal effects should not be considered in the context of admissibility, but rather on the merits (see C-73/17, France v Parliament, 2018, para. 15). Alternatively, the Union Courts may proceed to the substance of the action without consideration of its admissibility (see, e.g. C-233/02, France v Commission, 2004, para. 26; T-50/20, PNB Banka v ECB (order), 2021, para. 24). 47 See 22/70, Commission v Council, 1971, para. 39; C-348/20 P, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, 2022, para. 62; T-227/21, Illumina v Commission, 2022, para. 63. 48 See C-463/10 P and C-475/10 P, Deutsche Post and Germany v Commission, 2011, paras 36–38; C-689/19 P, VodafoneZiggo Group v Commission, 2021, paras 46, 48; C-622/20 P, Validity and Center for Independent Living v Commission (order), 2021, paras 37–38. Thus, where an action for annulment is brought by a non-privileged applicant against an act not addressed to it, the requirement that the binding legal effects of the act must be capable of affecting the interests of the party by bringing about a distinct change in its legal position overlaps with the conditions laid down in the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU: see, e.g. C-463/10 P and C-475/10 P, Deutsche Post and Germany v Commission, 2011, para. 38; C-934/19 P, Algebris (UK) and Anchorage Capital Group v SRB, 2021, para. 87; T-365/16, Portigon v SRB, 2019, para. 65.

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284 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT (see para. 7.77) and thus a Member State is not required to show that the contested act produces legal effects with regard to it.49

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(b) Operative part and recitals Whether an act is capable of having binding (and adverse) effects as far as non- privileged applicants are concerned must be determined in the first place from its operative part.50 The explanations and recitals contained in the act in support of the operative part,51 as well as the context in which the act is adopted,52 may also predicate whether the act has such effects and is amenable to review.53 Where an act against which an action for annulment has been brought comprises essentially distinct parts, only those parts of that act which produce binding legal effects capable of bringing about a significant change in the (non-privileged) applicant’s legal situation can be challenged.54 (5) Confirmatory acts An application for annulment of an act which merely confirms an irrevocable act which was previously adopted is inadmissible.55 The confirmatory act does not produce any new legal effects. If the Court of Justice or the General Court were to hold that an application for annulment of a confirmatory act was admissible despite the fact that the time-limit for bringing an action against the original act had run out, this would make it possible to circumvent that time-limit. An applicant who was out of time would then

49 See C-208/99, Portugal v Commission, 2001, paras 22–24; T-415/05, T-416/05, and T-423/05, Greece and Others v Commission, 2010, paras 57–60; T-154/10, France v Commission, 2012, para. 37; T-198/12, Germany v Commission, 2014, para. 37; T-755/17, Germany v ECHA, 2019, para. 37; T-495/19, Romania v Commission, 2021, para. 34 (appeal pending in C-54/22 P). 50 See T-138/89, NBV and NVB v Commission, 1992, para. 31; T-125/97 and T-127/97, Coca-Cola v Commission, 2000, paras 77–92; T-109/06, Vodafone España and Vodafone Group v Commission (order), 2007, para. 147; T-501/10, TI Media Broadcasting and TI Media v Commission (order), 2012, para. 55. 51 This is because the operative part of an act is indissociably linked to the statement of reasons for it, so that when it has to be interpreted, account must be taken of the reasons which led to its adoption: see C-355/95 P, TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf v Commission, 1997, para. 21; T-213/95 and T-18/96, SCK and FNK v Commission, 1997, para. 104; T-747/17, UPF v Commission, 2019, para. 50. Whether the operative part has adverse effect consequently extends to the recitals, which constitute the necessary support for the operative part. The assessments made in the recitals to an act are not in themselves capable of forming the subject of an action for annulment and can be subject to judicial review by the Union Courts to the extent that, as grounds of an act adversely affecting the applicant’s interests, they constitute the essential basis for the operative part of that act: see C-164/02, Netherlands v Commission (order), 2004, para. 21; T-213/00, CMA CGM and Others v Commission, 2003, para. 186; T-452/14, Laboratoires CTRS v Commission, 2015, para. 51; T-691/14, Servier and Others v Commission, 2018, para. 188 (appeal pending in C-176/19 P and C-201/19 P). Thus, an action for annulment cannot be validly brought exclusively against a recital in the preamble to a Union act: see, e.g. C-657/21, Chesini and Others v Parliament and Council (order), 2021, paras 20–21. 52 See C-301/03, Italy v Commission, 2005, paras 21–24; T-142/16, Dröge and Others v Commission (order), 2017, para. 25. 53 See T-237/09, Walloon Region v Commission, 2012, paras 44–48. 54 See T-184/97, BP Chemicals v Commission, 2000, para. 34; T-50/00, Dalmine v Commission, 2004, paras 134– 135; T-437/05, Brink’s Security Luxembourg v Commission, 2009, paras 67, 76–77. 55 See, e.g. C-480/93 P, Zunis Holding and Others v Commission, 1996, para. 14; C-364/16 P, Trioplast Industries v Commission, 2017, para. 42; T-37/11, Hungary v Commission (order), 2012, paras 35–43; T-117/15, Estonia v Commission, 2017; T-568/19, Micreos Food Safety v Commission (order), 2021, paras 41–92. In contrast, where a provision in a Union act is amended, a fresh right of action arises not only with respect to that provision alone, but also against all provisions which, even if not amended, form a whole with it, and thus the time-limits are calculated from the date of the amended act: see C-299/05, Commission v Council and Parliament, 2007, paras 29–34.

Subject-Matter 285 be able to reactivate the possibility of bringing proceedings by provoking the adoption of a confirmatory act, thereby jeopardizing legal certainty.56 Consequently, as long as the time-limit for bringing an action against the original act has not expired, an action for annulment may be brought against the original act, the confirmatory act, or both concurrently.57 An action for annulment of a confirmatory act will be inadmissible only insofar as it is a genuinely confirmatory act.58 Thus, an act will be regarded as confirmatory of an earlier act only if the latter is or was amenable to appeal.59 Furthermore, a new fact which is of such a character as to alter the essential circumstances and conditions which governed the adoption of the original act causes the new act no longer to be confirmatory, even though it has the same content as the original act. An action brought against such an ostensibly confirmatory act will be admissible.60 On those grounds, an act by which a Union institution, body, office, or agency refuses to amend an earlier act—in spite of the new facts presented by the applicant—may be the subject of an action for annulment.61 (6) Resolutions Resolutions often express a political declaration of intent which embodies no binding commitments and therefore produces no legal effects. Accordingly, an action will not lie against a resolution,62 unless it appears from its content that it produces binding legal effects.63 For example, the European Parliament resolution on a proposal calling on the Council to determine the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values on which the European Union is founded on the basis of Art. 7 TEU was held to have binding legal effects from the time of its adoption until the Council takes a decision on the action to be taken on it. 64

56 See 166/86 and 220/86, Irish Cement v Commission, 1988, para. 16; T-121/96 and T-151/96, Mutual Aid Administration Services v Commission, 1997, para. 50; T-456/07, Commission v Cdt (order), 2010, paras 54, 67; compare T-407/07, CMB and Christof v Commission, 2011, paras 90–105. 57 See 193/87 and 194/87, Maurissen and European Public Service Union v Court of Auditors, 1989, para. 26; T-442/11, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission (order), 2012, para. 66. 58 See C-521/03, Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission (order), 2004, para. 47; T-6/10, Sviluppo Globale v Commission, 2012, paras 22–23; T-640/19, Sasol Germany and Others v ECHA (order), 2020, paras 44–52; see also, in that regard. C-228/16 P, DEI v Commission, 2017, paras 33–43; compare, e.g. C-377/16, Spain v Parliament, 2016, and C-621/16 P, Italy v Parliament, 2019 (contested acts not merely confirmatory, but had new binding legal effects); T-195/19, GEA Group v Commission, 2022, paras 44–51 (content of contested act not the same as earlier act). 59 See 193/87 and 194/87, Maurissen and European Public Service Union v Court of Auditors, 1989, para. 23. 60 See 42/59 and 49/59, SNUPAT v High Authority, 1961; C-662/19 P, NRW. Bank v SRB, 2021, paras 41–54; T-331/94, IPK v Commission, 1997, para. 26 (not disturbed on appeal: see T-331/94, IPK v Commission, 2001, paras 30–32); T-365/00, AICS v Parliament, 2002, paras 28–40; T-903/16, RE v Commission, 2019, paras 45–63. 61 See C-514/99, France v Commission, 2000, para. 45; C-138/03, C-324/03, and C-431/03, Italy v Commission, 2005, paras 36–37; C-46/03, United Kingdom v Commission, 2005, paras 23–26; T-186/98, Inpesca v Commission, 2001, paras 45–51; T-308/02, SGL Carbon v Commission, 2004, paras 51–53. 62 See 90/63 and 91/63, Commission v Luxembourg and Belgium, 1964 ECR 625, 631. 63 See 108/83, Luxembourg v Parliament, 1984, paras 19–23; C-213/88 and C-39/89, Luxembourg v Parliament, 1991, paras 24–28; C-237/11 and C-238/11, France v Parliament, 2012, paras 19–20. 64 See C-650/18, Hungary v Parliament, 2021, paras 39–49.

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7.21

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(7) Internal instructions and guidelines (a) No legal effects vis-à-vis third parties Internal instructions are usually simply guidelines for the adoption of acts of institutions. Generally, such internal instructions and guidelines do not produce legal effects.65 Even where internal instructions do have legal effects, they must create rights or obligations outside the institution concerned before third parties may bring an admissible application for their annulment.66 (b) Binding on the institution concerned Where the Commission notifies guidelines for the exercise of its discretion (for example, for the assessment of State aid under Art. 107(3) TFEU or the determination of a fine on account of infringement of Art. 101 and/or Art. 102 TFEU), this entails a self-imposed limitation of that discretion insofar as it must comply with the indicative rules which it has itself laid down.67 Such guidelines may be relied upon as against the Commission. In an action for annulment (brought, for instance, against a decision relating to State aid or a decision based on Art. 101 and/or Art. 102 TFEU), parties may therefore argue before the Union Courts that the Commission has wrongly failed to apply the guidelines.68 (8) Preparatory acts and acts laying down a definitive position (a) Definitive statement of position An action for annulment will lie against an act only if it definitively lays down the position of the Union institution, body, office, or agency that adopted it.69 Thus, it is in principle those acts which definitively determine the position of an institution, body,

65 See C-233/02, France v Commission, 2004, paras 24–26; see also, e.g. C-443/97, Spain v Commission, 2000, para. 34 (internal instruction of the Commission); C-911/19, FBF, 2021, paras 39–50 (European Banking Authority guidelines). As regards the Parliament, see T-88/20, Rivière and Others v Parliament, 2021, paras 31–52, in particular paras 33–34 (appeal pending in C-767/21 P) (measure adopted by the President of the European Parliament forbidding national flags being placed on the desks of MEPs). 66 For examples of cases in which the internal instruction produced only internal effects, see 20/58, Phoenix- Rheinrohr v High Authority, 1959; 190/84, Les Verts v Parliament, 1988, para. 8; compare C-366/88, France v Commission, 1990, paras 9–12, 25; T-322/09, Planet v Commission (order), 2011, paras 38–54; T-477/16, Epsilon International v Commission, 2018, paras 153–168; T-654/21, Eurecna v Commission (order), 2022, paras 26–50. According to the case-law, the category of acts not producing binding legal effects which are capable of affecting the interests of the individual concerned includes ‘purely implementing measures’, which are designed merely to put into practical effect an earlier measure or adopted in order to implement earlier decisions which produce only internal legal effects within the administration: see T-185/05, Italy v Commission, 2008, paras 51–57; see also, in that regard, C-131/03 P, Reynolds Tobacco and Others v Commission, 2006, para. 55; C-621/16 P, Commission v Italy, 2019, para. 45. 67 For guidelines in connection with State aid, see, e.g. C-57/19 P, Commission v Tempus Energy and Tempus Energy Technology, 2021, para. 143; T-167/19, Tempus Energy Germany and T Energy Sweden v Commission, 2021, para. 76; see further para. 7.212. For guidelines with regard to the amount of fines which may be imposed on account of infringement of Arts 101 and 102 TFEU, see, e.g. C-39/18 P, Commission v Icap and Others, 2019, para. 29; T-344/18, Rubycon and Rubycon Holdings v Commission, 2021, para. 58; see further para. 7.203. For guidelines in the area of the control of concentrations, see, e.g. T-399/16, CK Telecoms UK Investments v Commission, 2020, para. 99 (appeal pending in C-376/20 P); see further para. 7.208. 68 See, e.g. C-386/10 P, Chalkor v Commission, 2011, para. 62; T-728/17, Marinvest and Porting v Commission, 2019, para. 108. 69 See 60/81, IBM v Commission, 1981, para. 10; T-94/10, Rütgers Germany and Others v ECHA, 2013, para. 29; T-140/16, Le Pen v Parliament (order), 2016, paras 36–37; T-482/20, LG v Commission (order), 2021, para. 48.

Subject-Matter 287 office, or agency upon the conclusion of an administrative procedure, and which are intended to have legal effects capable of affecting the interests of the complainant, which constitute acts open to challenge, and not preparatory or intermediate acts whose purpose is to prepare for the final decision, which do not have those effects. Consequently, preparatory or intermediate acts setting out an assessment by the institution, body, office, or agency and whose aim is to prepare the final decision do not in principle constitute acts which may form the subject-matter of an action for annulment. 70 (b) Act concluding an internal procedure Some acts of institutions are adopted by means of a procedure comprising different stages. Only the act which concludes the procedure expresses the definitive position of the institution, and not acts paving the way for the final act. Consequently, the latter acts may not be the subject of an action for annulment.71 This is because an action brought against such an act would make it necessary for the Court of Justice or the General Court to arrive at a decision on questions on which the Union institution, body, office, or agency has not yet had an opportunity to state its position and would as a result anticipate the arguments on the substance of the case, confusing different procedural stages, both administrative and judicial.72 (c) Irregularities in preparatory acts Where an action for annulment is brought against the act concluding the procedure, any irregularities in the preparatory acts may be raised in challenging the final act.73

70 See C-551/19 P and C-552/19 P, ABVL Bank v ECB, 2021, para. 39; T-41/16, Cyprus Turkish Chamber of Industry and Others v Commission (order), 2016. For some examples of preparatory acts, see C-401/10 P, Bouygues and Others v Commission, 2013, paras 76–78; C-551/19 P and C-552/19 P, ABVL Bank v ECB, 2021; C-689/19 P, VodafoneZiggo Group v Commission, 2021; T-544/15, Terna v Commission (order), 2016; T-703/18, Poland v Commission (order), 2019, paras 39–63; T-360/19, Jalkh v Parlement (order), 2019, paras 22–24; T-645/19, IMG v Commission (order), 2020, paras 51–76 (upheld in C-619/20 P and C-620/20 P, IMG v Commission, 2022, paras 98-117); T-838/19 to T-842/19, Koopman International v EUIPO—Tinnus Enterprises et Mystic Products (order), 2020; T-482/20, LG v Commission (order), 2021, paras 53–62; T-497/21, Girardi v EUIPO (order), 2022, paras 23–34; T-691/21, Alcogroup and Alcodis v Commission (order), 2022, paras 26–44; T-418/21, Alauzun and Others v Commission and EMA (order), 2022, paras 23–25. 71 See 60/81, IBM v Commission, 1981, para. 10; C-147/96, Netherlands v Commission, 2000, para. 35; T-94/10, Rütgers Germany and Others v ECHA, 2013, para. 29. It would be otherwise only if acts adopted in the course of the preparatory proceedings were themselves the culmination of a special procedure distinct from that intended to permit the institution concerned to take a decision on the substance of the case: see 60/81, IBM v Commission, 1981, para. 11; C-572/18 P, thyssenkrupp Electrical Steel and thyssenkrupp Electrical Steel Ugo v Commission, 2021, para. 49. 72 See 60/81, IBM v Commission, 1981, para. 20; C-401/10 P, Bouygues and Others v Commission, 2013, para. 78; compare C-463/10 P and C-475/10 P Deutsche Post and Germany v Commission, 2011, paras 49–60. 73 See 60/81, IBM v Commission, 1981, para. 12; C-572/18 P, thyssenkrupp Electrical Steel and thyssenkrupp Electrical Steel Ugo v Commission, 2021, para. 50. The unlawful act in the preparatory phase may even affect an institution other than the one against which the action for annulment is brought (see C-445/00 Austria v Council, 2003, paras 31–35: in an action for annulment of a Council regulation, it was argued that the Commission proposal was unlawful). See also, in that regard, C-219/17, Berlusconi and Fininvest, 2018, paras 43–57; and C-414/18, Iccrea Banca, 2019, paras 38–54: illegalities in national preparatory acts should be reviewed by the Union Courts in the action brought against the Union final decision. See further para. 3.59.

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C. The reviewable act: some fields of application

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(1) Enforcement of Arts 101 and 102 TFEU (a) Regulatory framework The processing of complaints relating to, inquiries into, and the prosecution of infringements of Arts 101 and 102 TFEU is governed by Regulation No. 1/200374 and Regulation No. 773/2004,75 which determine an administrative procedure in which the Commission and/or the national competition authorities adopt various acts.76 The acts adopted by the national authorities may be challenged only before the courts of the Member State concerned, which may—and in some cases must—refer a question for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice. Acts adopted by the Commission on the basis of Regulations Nos 1/2003 and 773/2004 can be challenged at first instance before the General Court,77 provided that they produce binding legal effects. (b) Requests for information Whenever the Commission becomes aware that an infringement of Art. 101 and/or Art. 102 TFEU may have been committed, it may decide to address a request for information to the undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned in order to obtain ‘all necessary information’.78 A distinction has to be drawn between ‘simple requests’ for information on the basis of Art. 18(2) of Regulation No. 1/2003 and requests ‘by decision’ on the basis of Art. 18(3) of that Regulation. The addressees of a simple request are free to reply or not to reply to the questions put to them. Such requests for information do not bring about a distinct change in the legal position of the undertakings and associations concerned and cannot be challenged before the General Court.79 By contrast, the addressees of a Commission decision based on Art. 18(3) of Regulation No. 1/2003 requiring them to supply information are obliged, on pain of penalties, to comply with such a request.80 Such a decision is a reviewable act.81 If the party to 74 Council Regulation No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Arts 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (now Arts 101 and 102 TFEU) of the Treaty (OJ 2003 L1/1), as amended. 75 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Arts 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (now Arts 101 and 102 TFEU) (OJ 2004 L123/18), as amended. 76 It may be assumed that the case-law which has been built up with regard to acts adopted by the Commission on the basis of the previous regulations in force—namely, Regulation No. 17: First Regulation implementing Arts 85 and 86 of the Treaty (now Arts 101 and 102 TFEU) (OJ English Special Edition 1959–1962 87), along with Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2842/98 of 22 December 1998 on the hearing of parties in certain proceedings under Arts 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty (now Arts 101 and 102 TFEU) (OJ 1998 L354/18), which replaced Regulation No. 99/63 (OJ English Special Edition 1963–1964 47)—will apply, mutatis mutandis, to similar acts adopted on the basis of Regulations Nos 1/2003 and 773/2004. 77 In the event that a Union institution challenges such act, proceedings would be brought before the Court of Justice (see para. 2.54). 78 Regulation No. 1/2003, Art. 18(1). 79 Regulation No. 1/2003, Arts 18(2) and 23(1)(a). A penalty may only be imposed where, having agreed to reply, the undertaking or association concerned provides incorrect or misleading information. 80 Regulation No. 1/2003, Arts 18(3) and 23(1)(b). The Commission may not, however, compel an undertaking or an association to provide answers which might involve an admission on its part of the existence of an infringement which it is incumbent on the Commission to prove: see 374/87 Orkem v Commission, 1989, para. 35; T-259/02, Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich v Commission, 2006, para. 539. 81 See C-463/10 P and C-475/10 P, Deutsche Post and Germany v Commission, 2011, para. 46. For some recent examples, see C-466/19 P, Qualcomm and Qualcomm Europe v Commission, 2021; T-451/20 and T-452/20,

Subject-Matter 289 which such a decision is addressed wishes to challenge its legality, it will have to bring its action within the two-month time-limit imposed by the sixth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU. Indeed, an undertaking or association concerned which has not sought the annulment of such a decision within this two-month time-limit will be foreclosed from pleading the illegality of the decision requiring information in an action for annulment brought against the Commission decision finding an infringement.82 The decision by which, in a first stage, the Commission, acting on the basis of Art. 24(1) of Regulation No. 1/2003, fixes a deadline by which an undertaking which has provided what the Commission considers to be an incomplete response to a decision requesting information83 is required to give a full response and at the same time imposes a penalty payment is, however, not a reviewable act as regards the imposition of the penalty payment. This is because such a decision does not produce binding legal effects insofar as it only fixes a periodical penalty in terms of a specific amount for each day by which the deadline is exceeded. It is not enforceable because it does not fix the total amount of the penalty payable. The total amount is fixed in a second stage by a new decision, adopted on the basis of Article 24(2) of Regulation No. 1/2003, when it is found that the undertaking has not provided the information in good time.84 (c) Inspections Art. 20 of Regulation No. 1/2003 draws a distinction between two forms of inspections, namely, inspections carried out upon production of an authorization in writing85 (‘inspections under authorization’) and inspections formally ordered by a decision of the Commission.86 The former type of inspection may be carried out only on the premises, land, and means of transport of the undertakings and associations concerned and only if the undertakings and associations concerned are prepared to cooperate. No fine may be imposed where an undertaking or association of undertakings refuses to submit to an inspection under authorization. Where the Commission wishes to search other premises, land, and means of transport, including the homes of directors, managers, and other members of staff of the undertakings and associations concerned, or where it expects the parties concerned not to adopt a cooperative attitude, it will order an

Meta Platforms Ireland v Commission, pending. Under Art. 18(3) of Regulation No. 1/2003, the Commission is even obliged to indicate in a request by decision the right of the parties concerned to have the decision reviewed by the Union Courts. See also 374/87, Orkem v Commission, 1989, para. 34; C-125/07 P, Erste Group Bank and Others v Commission, 2009, para. 271; C-481/19, Consob, 2021, paras 46–47; T-112/98, Mannesmannröhren-Werke v Commission, 2001, para. 65; T-458/09 and T-171/10, Slovak Telekom v Commission, 2012, para. 41; T-91/11, Innolux v Commission, 2014, para. 167. 82 See T-305/94, T-306/94, T-307/94, T-313/94 to T-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T-329/94, and T-335/94, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission, 1999, paras 441–442 (set aside in part on other grounds in C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P, and C-254/99 P). 83 Regulation No. 1/2003, Art. 18(3). 84 See 46/87 and 227/88, Hoechst v Commission, 1989, para. 55; C-466/19 P, Qualcomm and Qualcomm Europe v Commission, 2021, paras 121–124; T-596/97, Dalmine v Commission (order), 1998, paras 27–34. 85 Regulation No. 1/2003, Art. 20(3). 86 Regulation No. 1/2003 Arts 20(4) and 21(1).

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290 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT inspection by a formal decision.87 It should be emphasized that the Commission may carry out such an inspection without first attempting an inspection by authorization.88 There is a legal obligation to submit to an inspection ordered by a decision. Given its binding character, a decision ordering an inspection can be the subject of an action for annulment brought under Art. 263 TFEU.89 However, all persons subject to Union law are under an obligation to acknowledge that measures adopted by the Union institutions are fully effective as long as they have not been declared invalid by the Union Courts and to recognize their enforceability unless one of those Courts has decided to suspend the legal effects of the said measures.90 Practically speaking, this means that an undertaking or association of undertakings will not be in a position to prevent an inspection ordered by a decision of the Commission from taking place. The party concerned will only be able to seek judicial redress before the Union Courts after the event by lodging an action for annulment against the decision ordering an inspection.91 If such action were to be lodged within the two-month time-limit laid down by the sixth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU and the General Court were to find that the inspection had been unlawful, the evidence obtained in the course of such inspection would also be unlawful. The Commission could then no longer find an infringement on the basis of that evidence.92 When the Union Courts examine the lawfulness of an inspection decision, they will do so in the light of the matters of law and fact existing at the time when the decision was adopted. The way the Commission implements the inspection decision therefore has no effect on the lawfulness of that decision.93 However, issues relating to the way in 87 Regulation No. 1/2003, Arts 20(4) and 21(1). 88 See, in that regard, 136/79, National Panasonic v Commission, 1980, paras 11–12; see also T-339/04, France Télécom v Commission, 2011, para. 48; T-340/04, France Télécom v Commission, 2011, para. 120. 89 See, e.g. T-135/09, Nexans France and Nexans, 2012, paras 38–43; T-140/09, Prysmian and Prysmian Cavi e Systemi Energia v Commission, 2012, paras 33–38; T-289/11, T-290/11 and T-521/11, Deutsche Bahn and Others v Commission, 2013, paras 97, 111, 112; T-249/17, Casino, Guichard-Perrachon and AMC v Commission, 2020, para. 59 (set aside on other grounds in C-690/20 P). Art. 20(4) of Regulation No. 1/2003 requires the Commission to specify in such a decision that the right exists to have it reviewed by the Union Courts. It should be noted, however, that reports drawn up by the Commission’s officials during an investigation into an undertaking and containing a summary of what was said by that undertaking’s representatives in the course of the investigation are not reviewable acts: see T-9/97, Elf Atochem v Commission (order), 1997, paras 18–27. Similarly, the copying of documents and the asking of questions during an inspection constitute intermediate measures designed to pave the way for the adoption of a final decision under Article 101 TFEU; they are, therefore, not to be regarded as acts separable from the decision under which the inspection was ordered, but rather as measures implementing that decision: see T-135/09, Nexans France and Nexans, 2012, paras 119–125; T-140/09, Prysmian and Prysmian Cavi e Systemi Energia v Commission, 2012, paras 97–102. Additionally, a Commission decision penalizing an obstruction of the inspection on the basis of Article 23(1)(c) to (e) of Regulation No. 1/2003 is distinct from the inspection decision and the final decision adopted under Article 101 TFEU and thus may be the subject of an action for annulment: see, e.g. T-135/09, Nexans France and Nexans, 2012, para. 126. 90 See 46/87 and 227/88, Hoechst v Commission, 1989, para. 64. 91 There remains the possibility of bringing an application for interim relief. See, in that regard, T-249/17, Casino, Guichard-Perrachon and AMC v Commission, 2020, paras 64–65 (set aside on other grounds in C-690/20 P). 92 See, in that regard, 46/87 R, Hoechst v Commission, 1987, para. 34; 85/87 R, Dow Chemical Nederland v Commission, 1987, para. 17; C-94/00, Roquette Frères, 2002, para. 49; C-583/13 P, Deutsche Bahn and Others v Commission, 2015, para. 45; C-403/18 P, Alcogroup and Alcodis v Commission, 2019, para. 26; T-59/99, Ventouris v Commission, 2003, para. 126; T-66/99, Minoan Lines v Commission, 2003, para. 56; compare T-621/16, České dráhy v Commission, 2018, paras 40–52. 93 See 85/87, Dow Benelux v Commission, 1989, para. 49; C-403/18 P, Alcogroup and Alcodis v Commission, 2019, para. 45; C-466/19 P, Qualcomm and Qualcomm Europe v Commission, 2021, para. 82; T-305/94 to T-307/94,

Subject-Matter 291 which the inspection was conducted may be raised in the action for annulment brought against the final decision of the Commission finding the infringement.94 An addressee of a decision ordering an inspection who does not seek the annulment of that decision within the two-month time-limit laid down by the sixth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU will be foreclosed from pleading the illegality of the decision (as well as of the evidence obtained in the course of such inspection) in any subsequent action for annulment of the Commission decision finding an infringement of Art. 101(1) and/or Art. 102 TFEU.95 Before an inspection takes place, a national judicial authority will generally be asked to carry out a limited review of the Commission decision ordering the inspection.96 This will be the case where the Commission requests the assistance of the police in order to compel the undertaking or association concerned to submit to an inspection, or where the Commission seeks to conduct an inspection in the homes of members of staff of the undertaking or association concerned. The national judicial authority will check whether the Commission decision is authentic. It will verify that the coercive measures envisaged are neither arbitrary nor excessive having regard to the subject-matter of the inspection. In reviewing the proportionality of the coercive measures, the national judicial authority may ask the Commission, directly or through the Member State competition authority, for detailed explanations, in particular, of the grounds the Commission has for suspecting an infringement of Arts 101 and 102 TFEU, as well as of the seriousness of the suspected infringement and the nature of the involvement of the undertaking concerned. However, the national judicial authority may not call into question the necessity for the inspection or demand that it be provided with the information in the Commission’s file. Only the General Court and the Court of Justice on appeal can review the legality of the Commission’s decision.97

T-313/94 to T-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T-329/94, and T-335/94, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission, 1999, para. 413 (set aside in part on other grounds in C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P, and C-254/99 P); T-339/04, France Télécom v Commission, 2007, para. 54; T-125/03 and T-253/03, Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission, 2007, paras 55–56; T-249/17, Casino, Guichard-Perrachon and AMC v Commission, 2020, para. 101 (set aside on other grounds in C-690/20 P). 94 See 85/87, Dow Benelux v Commission, 1989, para. 49; T-305/94, T-306/94, T-307/94, T-313/94, T-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T-329/94, and T-335/94, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij v Commission, 1999, para. 413 (set aside in part on other grounds in C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P, and C-254/99 P); T-135/09, Nexans France and Nexans, 2012, para. 132; T-249/17, Casino, Guichard-Perrachon and AMC v Commission, 2020, para. 58 (set aside on other grounds in C-690/20 P). For a recent example, see C-606/18 P, Nexans France and Nexans v Commission, 2020. 95 See T-305/94, T-306/94, T-307/94, T-313/94, T-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T-329/94, and T-335/94 Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij v Commission, 1999, paras 408–410 (set aside in part on other grounds in C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P, and C-254/99 P); T-249/17, Casino, Guichard-Perrachon and AMC v Commission, 2020, para. 58 (set aside on other grounds in C-690/20 P). 96 Regulation No. 1/2003, Art. 20(7) and (8) and Art. 21(3). 97 Regulation No. 1/2003, Art. 20(7) and (8) and Art. 21(3). See, in that regard, C-94/00, Roquette Frères, 2002, para. 51.

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(d) Decision imposing a fine for breaking of seals Under Art. 23(1)(e) of Regulation No. 1/2003, the Commission may by decision impose on undertakings and associations of undertakings fines not exceeding 1 per cent of the total turnover in the preceding business year where, intentionally or negligently, seals affixed during the investigation by officials or other accompanying persons authorized by the Commission have been broken. Such a decision is a reviewable act.98 (e) Initiation of formal procedure and statement of objections If the Commission considers, on the basis of the information obtained during its investigation, that certain undertakings and/or associations of undertakings have infringed the competition rules, it may open a formal procedure against the parties concerned pursuant to Art. 2 of Regulation No. 773/2004. Shortly after the initiation of proceedings, it will send a statement of objections to these parties pursuant to Art. 10 of Regulation No. 773/2004. The initiation of an administrative procedure99 and the communication of a statement of objections100 are not acts against which an application for annulment may be brought. This is because they are preparatory acts. Any irregularities in such acts may be raised in an action brought against the decision concluding the procedure.101 Thus, if the final decision alleges that the undertakings concerned have committed infringements other than those referred to in the statement of objections or takes into consideration different facts, there will be an infringement of the rights of the defence.102 98 See T-141/08, E.ON Energie v Commission, 2010 (appeal dismissed in C-89/11 P, E.ON Energie v Commission, 2012). 99 Regulation No. 773/2004, Art. 2. The initiation of the administrative procedure requires an authoritative act of the Commission, evidencing its intention of taking a decision on the matter: see, in that regard, 48/72, Brasserie de Haecht, 1973, para. 16; C-857/19, Slovak Telecom, 2021, para. 26. The undertaking addressed is aware of the fact that an administrative procedure is underway against it and knows its procedural position. Such notification does not constitute a definitive adoption of a position: see, in that regard, 60/81, IBM v Commission, 1981, para. 21; T-410/18, Silgan Closures and Silgan Holdings v Commission (order), 2019; see also T-19/21, Amazon.com and Others v Commission (order), 2021, paras 17–51 (holding that the decision, adopted under Art. 2(1) of Regulation No. 773/204, by which the Commission excludes a Member State from the geographical scope of the investigation not reviewable act for the purposes of Art. 263 TFEU). 100 Regulation No. 773/2004, Art. 10. See, in that regard, 60/81, IBM v Commission, 1981, para. 21; C-165/19 P, Slovak Telecom v Commission, 2021, paras 81–82; C-466/19 P, Qualcomm and Qualcomm Europe v Commission, 2021, para. 66. The Commission is obliged to apprise the undertaking charged with an infringement of Art. 101 or Art. 102 TFEU of the facts and arguments underlying its charges. 101 See e.g. C-448/11 P, SNIA v Commission, 2013, paras 41–50; C-165/19 P, Slovak Telecom v Commission, 2021, paras 83–92; T-39/06, Transcatab v Commission, 2011, paras 115–118. 102 See, e.g. 41/69, ACF Chemiefarma v Commission, 1970, para. 94; C-699/19 P, Quanta Storage v Commission, 2022, para. 66; T-82/13, Panasonic Corp. and MT Picture Display v Commission, 2015, para. 50. The Commission must be permitted to clarify that classification in its final decision, taking into account the factors emerging from the administrative procedure, in order either to abandon such objections as have been shown to be unfounded or to amend and supplement its arguments, both in fact and in law, in support of the objections which it raises, provided however that it relies only on facts on which those concerned have had an opportunity to make known their views and provided that, in the course of the administrative procedure, it has made available the evidence necessary for the defence of their interests: see C-448/11 P, SNIA v Commission, 2013, para. 44; C-165/19 P, Slovak Telecom v Commission, 2021, para. 83; T-343/18, Tokin Corporation v Commission, 2021, para. 83. For some examples, see C-89/85, C-104/85, C-114/85, C-116/85, C-117/85, and C-125/85 to C-129/85, Ahlström and Others v Commission, 1993, paras 52, 154, or, more recently, C-607/18 P, NKT Verwaltungs and NKT v Commission, 2020, paras 48–59. The sending of a statement of objections to a given undertaking seeks to ensure that the rights of defence of that company are respected rather than those of a third party, even though that latter party may well be affected by the same administrative proceedings: see, in that regard, C-588/15 P, LG Electronics v Commission, 2017, para. 46; C-882/19, Sumar, 2021, para. 56.

Subject-Matter 293 (f) Notice pursuant to Art. 27(4) of Regulation No. 1/2003 It may be assumed that a Commission notice pursuant to Art. 27(4) of Regulation No. 1/2003 in which the Commission informs interested third parties either of its intention to adopt a decision making the commitments offered by the undertakings concerned binding on them or of its intention to adopt a decision finding the inapplicability of Art. 101 TFEU to an agreement, a decision of an association of undertakings, or a concerted practice, and invites third parties to submit their observations within a fixed time-limit, does not constitute a reviewable act.103 The reason is that such notice is a preparatory act in a procedure which will normally result in the adoption of a reviewable act based on Art. 9 or Art. 10 of Regulation No. 1/2003. (g) The Commission’s refusal to give access to its file to the parties under investigation In the course of the administrative procedure, the Commission has to give the parties under investigation access to its file. The right of access to the Commission’s file is a corollary of the principle of respect for the rights of the defence.104 The Commission’s obligation extends to all the documents in its investigation file,105 which may be relevant for the defence of the undertaking(s) concerned. Those documents include both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, save where the business secrets of other undertakings, the internal documents of the Commission, or other confidential information are involved.106 A refusal on the part of the Commission to accede to a request of a party under investigation to disclose some documents in its file does not constitute a reviewable act.107 The possible illegality of such refusal may be raised in an application brought against the final decision of the Commission finding an infringement (and possibly imposing fines).108 103 Compare, e.g. C-132/19 P, Groupe Canal +v Commission, 2020, paras 103–119: an interested third party successfully challenged a decision making commitments binding. 104 See C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P, and C-219/00 P, Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission, 2004, para. 68; C-407/08 P, Knauf Gips v Commission, 2010, para. 22; C-265/17 P, Commission v United Parcel Service, 2019, para. 30. 105 Access has to be given only to documents which are part of the investigation file. Replies given by the other undertakings concerned to the statement of objections are not part of the investigation file proper. Accordingly, since they are documents which are not part of the file compiled at the time of notification of the statement of objections, the Commission is required to disclose those replies to the other undertakings concerned only if it transpires that they contain new inculpatory or exculpatory evidence: see T-191/06, FMC Foret v Commission, 2011, paras 266–267; T-240/07, Heineken Nederland and Heineken v Commission, 2011, paras 241–242; T-240/17, Campine and Campine Recyling v Commission, 2019, para. 210; T-342/18, Nichicon Corporation v Commission, 2021, para. 243 (appeal pending in C-757/21 P). 106 See C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P, and C-219/00 P, Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission, 2004, para. 68; C-407/08 P, Knauf Gips v Commission, 2010, para. 22; C-607/18 P, NKT Verwaultung and NKT v Commission, 2020, para. 262; T-7/89, Hercules Chemicals v Commission, 1991, para. 54; T-363/18, Nippon Chemi-Con Corporation v Commission, 2021, para. 89 (appeal pending in C-759/21 P). This rule, which was first developed in the case-law, is incorporated into Art. 15 of Regulation No. 773/2004, which adds that the right of access does not also extend to internal documents of the national competition authorities, to correspondence between the Commission and such authorities, and to correspondence between national competition authorities where that correspondence is contained in the Commission’s file. 107 See T-10/92 to T-12/92 and T-15/92, CBR Cementbedrijven and Others v Commission, 1992, para. 42; T-128/14, Daimler v Commission, 2018, para. 68. 108 Infringement of the right of access to the Commission’s file during the procedure prior to adoption of a decision can in principle cause the decision to be annulled if the rights of defence of the undertaking concerned have been infringed: see C-110/10 P, Solvay v Commission, 2011, para. 50; C-609/13, Duravit and Others v Commission, 2017, para. 99.

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294 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT If a party demonstrates in the context of an action for annulment brought against the final Commission decision that it was not in a position to express its views with regard to one or more inculpatory documents in the course of the administrative procedure, the General Court will find that there has been a violation of the rights of the defence, and the inculpatory documents will be excluded as evidence. However, far from leading inevitably to the annulment of the decision in its entirety, the exclusion of such documents will lead to the annulment in whole or in part of the decision only insofar as the corresponding objection raised by the Commission can only be proved by reference to them.109 In other words, if the General Court considers that the infringement has been sufficiently made out on the basis of other inculpatory evidence which was made available to the applicant in the course of the administrative procedure and in respect of which the applicant was able to express its views, the violation of the rights of the defence will not affect the legality of the decision.110 If a party claims, in the context of an action for annulment brought against the final Commission decision, that a document in the Commission’s file which might contain exculpatory evidence was not available to it during the administrative procedure, the Union Courts will find a violation of that party’s rights of defence and annul the contested decision in whole or in part if the party concerned can show that there is even a small chance that the outcome of the administrative procedure might have been different if it had been able to rely on that document during that procedure.111 It is thus sufficient for the undertaking to show that it would have been able to use the exculpatory documents for its defence, in the sense that, had it been able to rely on them during the administrative procedure, it would have been able to invoke evidence which was not consistent with the inferences made at that stage by the Commission and therefore could have had an influence, in any way at all, on the assessments made by the Commission in its decision, as regards the conduct in which the undertaking was found to have engaged.112 109 See 107/82, AEG v Commission, 1983, paras 24–30; C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P, and C-219/00 P, Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission, 2004, paras 71–73; C-407/08 P, Knauf Gips v Commission, 2010, para. 13; T-30/91, Solvay v Commission, 1995, para. 58; T-240/07, Heineken Nederland and Heineken v Commission, 2011, para. 237; T-342/18, Nichicon Corporation v Commission, 2021, para. 240 (appeal pending in C-757/21 P). 110 It is therefore only exceptionally that the non-communication of inculpatory documents during the administrative procedure will lead to the partial or total annulment of the decision finding the infringement. For an example, see C-89/85, C-104/85, C-114/85, C-116/85, C-117/85, and C-125/85 to C-129/85, Ahlström and Others v Commission, 1993, para. 138. 111 See T-7/89, Hercules Chemicals v Commission, 1991, para. 56; T-30/91, Solvay v Commission, 1995, para. 68; T-83/08, Denki Kagaku Kogyo and Denka Chemicals v Commission, 2012, para. 84. The test applied by the General Court with respect to the non-disclosure of potentially exculpatory documents is fully in line with the case-law which the Court of Justice developed starting in Distillers (30/78 Distillers v Commission, 1980, para. 26) with respect to procedural defects, according to which an alleged procedural defect cannot be relied upon to annul a decision where that defect could not in any event have affected the content of the decision. The applicant does not have to show that, if it had had access to certain documents in the administrative proceedings, the Commission decision would have been different in content, but rather that it would have been able to use those documents in its defence: see C-51/92 P, Hercules Chemicals v Commission, 1999, para. 81. 112 See C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P, and C-219/00 P, Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission, 2004, paras 74–75; C-407/08 P, Knauf Gips v Commission, 2010, para. 23; C-110/10 P, Solvay v Commission, 2011, para. 52; T-240/07, Heineken Nederland and Heineken v Commission, 2011, para. 238; T-799/17, Scania and Others v Commission, 2022, para. 177 (appeal pending in C-251/22 P).

Subject-Matter 295 Consequently, when, in the context of an action seeking annulment of the Commission’s final decision, an applicant challenges the Commission’s refusal to disclose one or more documents during the administrative procedure, the General Court will order their disclosure in the proceedings before it.113 The applicant will then be invited to inspect the documents and to substantiate its plea alleging infringement of its rights of defence.114 In that regard, applicants who have raised a plea alleging infringement of their rights of defence cannot be required to set out in the application detailed arguments or a consistent body of evidence to show that the outcome of the administrative procedure might have been different if they had had access to certain documents which were in fact never disclosed to them. Such an approach would in effect amount to requiring a probatio diabolica.115 It is nevertheless for the applicant to adduce prima facie evidence that the undisclosed documents would be useful for its defence.116 (h) The Commission’s rejection of a request for protection under the legal professional privilege Where an undertaking relies on the legal professional privilege (LPP) for the purpose of opposing the seizure of documents or other information in the course of an inspection pursuant to Art. 20 of Regulation No. 1/2003, the decision whereby the Commission rejects that request produces legal effects for that undertaking by bringing about a distinct change in its legal position. That decision in effect withholds from the undertaking the protection provided by Union law and is definitive in nature and independent of any final decision making a finding of an infringement of the competition rules. Indeed, the opportunity which the undertaking has to bring an action against a final decision establishing that the competition rules have been infringed does not provide it with an adequate degree of protection of its rights. First, it is possible that

113 By way of a measure of organization of procedure or a measure of inquiry in accordance with Arts 88–104 of the GC Rules of Procedure. 114 See T-305/94, T-306/94, T-307/94, T-313/94, T-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T-329/94, and T-335/94, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission, 1999, para. 1023 (set aside in part on other grounds in C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P, and C-254/99 P); T-25/95, T-26/95, T-30/95, T-31/95, T-32/95, T-34/95, T-35/95, T-36/95, T-37/95, T-38/95, T-39/95, T-42/95, T-43/95, T-44/95, T-45/95, T-46/95, T-48/95, T-50/95, T-51/95, T-52/95, T-53/95, T-54/95, T-55/95, T-56/95, T-57/95, T-58/95, T-59/95, T-60/95, T-61/95, T-62/95, T-63/95, T-64/95, T-65/95, T-68/95, T-69/95, T-70/95, T-71/95, T-87/95, T-88/95, T-103/95, and T-104/95, Cimenteries CBR and Others v Commission, 2000, paras 158–162, 241 (set aside in part on other grounds in C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P, and C-219/00 P). 115 See T-25/95, T-26/95, T-30/95, T-31/95, T-32/95, T-34/95, T-35/95, T-36/95, T-37/95, T-38/95, T-39/95, T-42/95, T-43/95, T-44/95, T-45/95, T-46/95, T-48/95, T-50/95, T-51/95, T-52/95, T-53/95, T-54/95, T-55/95, T-56/95, T-57/95, T-58/95, T-59/95, T-60/95, T-61/95, T-62/95, T-63/95, T-64/95, T-65/95, T-68/95, T-69/95, T-70/95, T-71/95, T-87/95, T-88/95, T-103/95, and T-104/95, Cimenteries CBR and Others v Commission, 2000, para. 161 (set aside in part on other grounds in C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P, and C-219/00 P); T-240/17, Campine and Campine Recycling v Commission, 2019, para. 94. 116 See T-25/95, T-26/95, T-30/95, T-31/95, T-32/95, T-34/95, T-35/95, T-36/95, T-37/95, T-38/95, T-39/95, T-42/95, T-43/95, T-44/95, T-45/95, T-46/95, T-48/95, T-50/95, T-51/95, T-52/95, T-53/95, T-54/95, T-55/95, T-56/95, T-57/95, T-58/95, T-59/95, T-60/95, T-61/95, T-62/95, T-63/95, T-64/95, T-65/95, T-68/95, T-69/95, T-70/95, T-71/95, T-87/95, T-88/95, T-103/95, and T-104/95, Cimenteries CBR and Others v Commission, 2000, paras 409, 415, 421 (set aside in part on other grounds in C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P, and C-219/00 P); T-240/17, Campine and Campine Recycling v Commission, 2019, para. 95; compare C-110/10 P, Solvay v Commission, 2011, paras 59–62, 72: the loss of part of the Commission’s file to which the applicant had not had access during the administrative proceedings led inevitably to the annulment of the contested decision.

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296 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT the administrative procedure will not result in a decision finding that an infringement has been committed. Second, if an action is brought against that decision, it will not in any event provide the undertaking with the means of preventing the irreversible consequences which would result from improper disclosure of documents protected under legal professional privilege. It follows that the Commission’s decision rejecting a request for protection of a specific document under LPP—and ordering, where appropriate, the production of the document in question—brings to an end a special procedure distinct from that enabling the Commission to rule on the existence of an infringement of the competition rules and thus constitutes an act capable of being challenged by an action for annulment.117 Similarly, where the Commission, during an inspection, seizes a document in respect of which LPP is claimed and places it on the administrative file without putting it in a sealed envelope and without having taken a formal rejection decision, that physical act necessarily entails a tacit decision by the Commission to reject the protection claimed by the undertaking and allows the Commission to examine the document in question immediately. That tacit decision is also open to challenge by an action for annulment.118

7.34

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(i) The Commission’s disclosure of documents to third parties For the same reasons as those indicated in para. 7.33, a decision by the Commission not to treat certain documents or other information as confidential during the administrative procedure and to disclose them to third parties may form the subject-matter of an action for annulment.119 Such a decision is independent of the final decision bringing the administrative procedure to an end. Moreover, the possibility of bringing an action for annulment of the final decision does not afford adequate protection. (j) Interim measures The Commission has the power to impose interim measures120 in the course of the administrative procedure in order to avoid serious and irreparable damage to competition which could not be remedied by its final decision. The decision imposing interim measures must be ‘made in such a form that an action may be brought upon them . . . by any party who considers it has been injured’.121 However, it will have to be assessed

117 See 155/79, AM & S Europe v Commission, 1982; T-125/03 and T-253/03, Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission, 2007, paras 46–48; T-249/17, Casino, Guichard-Perrachon and AMC v Commission, 2020, para. 61 (set aside on other grounds in C-690/20 P). 118 See T-125/03 and T-253/03, Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission, 2007, para. 49; see also by analogy, 53/85, AKZO Chemie v Commission, 1986, para. 17; compare C-403/18 P, Alcogroup and Alcodis v Commission, 2019, paras 67–69; T-255/17, Les Mousquetaires and ITM Entreprises v Commission, 2020, paras 40–44 (set aside on other grounds in C-682/20 P). 119 A decision to transmit a non-confidential version of the statement of objections to the complainant is prima facie a reviewable act: see T-213/01 and T-214/01, Österreichische Postsparkasse and Bank für Arbeit und Wirtschaft v Commission, 2006, paras 64–73. 120 The Commission will adopt interim measures only on its own initiative and not at the request of a party. Indeed, Art. 8(1) of Regulation No. 1/2003 provides: ‘In cases of urgency due to the risk of serious and irreparable damage to competition, the Commission, acting on its own initiative may by decision, on the basis of a prima facie finding of infringement, order interim measures.’ 121 792/79 R, Camera Care v Commission, 1980, para. 19; 228/82 and 229/82, Ford v Commission, 1984, para. 10.

Subject-Matter 297 whether an applicant still retains an interest in having the decision imposing interim measures annulled where the Commission has adopted a final decision withdrawing the decision imposing interim measures.122 (k) Commitments Where the Commission intends to adopt a decision requiring that an infringement be brought to an end and the undertakings concerned offer commitments to meet the concerns expressed to them by the Commission in its preliminary assessment, the Commission may by decision make those commitments binding on the undertakings.123 Such a decision is a reviewable act within the meaning of Art. 263 TFEU.124 (l) Finding of infringement and imposition of fines The decision by which the Commission finds an infringement of Art. 101 and/or Art. 102 TFEU and possibly imposes a fine produces binding legal effects and is a reviewable act.125 The same applies to a decision finding an infringement of Art. 106(1) TFEU read in combination with Art. 102 TFEU.126 (m) Acts relating to the execution of a decision imposing a fine An action for annulment will not lie against the Commission’s refusal to accede to a request from one of the addressees of the decision to agree to their paying the fine in a particular way.127 This is because such an act must be regarded as confirming the initial decision. The obligatory legal effects therefore arise out of the initial decision and not out of the refusal.128 Similarly, an action for annulment will not lie against an act by which the Commission demands the payment of the outstanding balance of a fine to its debtor and threatens to take steps to enforce the bank guarantee provided for by the latter.129 Indeed, such acts must be regarded as giving notice of enforcement of a decision taken previously. They cannot be regarded as producing legal effects binding

122 See T-184/01, IMS Health v Commission (order), 2005, paras 34–49. 123 Regulation No. 1/2003, Art. 9(1). 124 See C-132/19 P, Groupe Canal +v Commission, 2020, paras 103–119: an interested third party successfully challenged a decision making commitments binding. 125 A decision of the Commission fixing, pursuant to Art. 24 of Regulation No. 1/2003, the definitive amount of the periodic penalty payment imposed on an undertaking on the ground that it has not complied with the obligations imposed upon it by the decision finding an infringement, is also a reviewable act: see T-167/08, Microsoft v Commission, 2012. 126 See T-556/08, Slovenská pošta v Commission, 2015; T-169/08 RENV, DEI v Commission, 2016. 127 See T-308/02, SGL Carbon v Commission (order), 2004, paras 39–73; see also, in that connection, C-454/16 P, Global Steel Wire v Comission, 2017, paras 30–40 (upholding inadmissibility of action for annulment brought in respect of the Commission’s response to applicant’s request to reconsider the position which it previously adopted on its ability to pay the fine); compare T-564/10 RENV, Quimitécnica.com and de Mello v Commission, 2017, paras 45–49 (Commission decision requiring the provision of a bank guarantee from a bank with a long-term ‘AA’ credit rating regarded as a reviewable act under Art. 263 TFEU). 128 There is a possibility of securing the suspension of the decision finding the infringement and imposing a fine, provided that the conditions for the grant of interim measures are satisfied (see Ch. 13). 129 See C-516/06 P, Commission v Ferriere Nord, 2007, para. 29. As regards default interest, see also C-364/16 P, Trioplast Industrier v Commission, 2017, paras 40–41; compare C-351/15 P, Commission v Total and Elf Aquitaine, 2017, para. 48.

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298 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT on, and capable of affecting the interests of, their addressee, since they constitute acts preparatory to enforcement.

7.39

(n) Position of complainant According to settled case-law, it is in the interests of a satisfactory administration of justice and of the proper application of Arts 101 and 102 TFEU that natural or legal persons who are entitled, pursuant to Art. 7(2) of Regulation No. 1/2003, to request the Commission to find an infringement of Arts 101 and 102 TFEU should be able, if their request is not complied with either wholly or in part, to institute proceedings in order to protect their legitimate interests.130 However, acts adopted by the Commission during the administrative procedure vis-à-vis persons who have lodged complaints alleging breaches of Art. 101 and/or Art. 102 TFEU are not all capable of forming the subject-matter of an action for annulment. Acts containing a provisional assessment of the complaint cannot be challenged under Art. 263 TFEU. Accordingly, an action will not lie against the notification to be served on the complainants under Art. 7 of Regulation No. 773/2004 informing them that the Commission is not going to take up the complaint and fixing a time-limit for them to submit any further comments, following which it will take its final decision.131 The notification must make it clear that the complainant is entitled to submit comments on the proposed rejection of its complaint. If the letter addressed to the complainant does not contain such an invitation to submit comments, the rejection of the complaint is final and may be the subject of judicial proceedings.132 If the complainant makes known its views within the time-limit set by the Commission and the written submissions made by the complainant do not lead to a different assessment of the complaint, the Commission is to reject the complaint by decision. An action for annulment will lie against that act.133 If the complainant fails to make known its views within the time- limit set by the Commission, the complaint is deemed to have been withdrawn.134 An action will also lie against a decision of the Commission suspending an administrative procedure under Regulation No. 1/2003 pending delivery of judgment in proceedings pursuant to Art. 258 TFEU.135 This is because such a decision affects the procedural 130 See 26/76, Metro v Commission, 1977, para. 13; 210/81, Schmidt v Commission, 1983, para. 14; T-37/92, BEUC and NCC v Commission, 1994, para. 36; T-193/02, Piau v Commission, 2005, para. 38; T-306/05, Scippacercola and Terezakis v Commission, 2008, para. 66; T-480/15, Agro Polska and Others v Commission, 2017, para. 93. 131 See C-282/95 P, Guérin automobiles v Commission, 1997, para. 34; T-64/89, Automec v Commission, 1990, para. 46; T-411/05, Annemans v Commission, 2007, paras 31–45. 132 See 210/81, Demo-Studio Schmidt v Commission, 1983, paras 10–16; 298/83, CICCE v Commission, 1985, paras 15–20; 142/84 and 156/84, BAT and Reynolds v Commission, 1987, paras 11–13; C-39/93 P, SFEI and Others v Commission, 1994, paras 24–33. 133 See, e.g. T-427/08, CEAHR v Commission, 2010; T-296/09 EFIM v Commission, 2011. As regards a Commission decision determining the competition authority best placed to examine a complaint regarding an infringement of Arts 101 and 102 TFEU in the context of respect for the principle of the rule of law in Poland, see T-791/19, Sped-Pro v Commission, 2022, paras 76–106. 134 Regulation No. 773/2004, Art. 7. 135 However, the initiation of Art. 258 TFEU proceedings does not automatically imply that the complaint regarding a violation of Arts 101 or 102 TFEU has been suspended or dismissed: see C-422/97 P, Sateba v Commission (order), 1998, paras 36–37; T-341/10, F91 Diddeléng and Others v Commission (order), 2012, para. 43.

Subject-Matter 299 rights of persons who have submitted a complaint pursuant to Art. 7 of Regulation No. 1/2003, in particular, the right to be informed beforehand of the Commission’s intention not to uphold their complaint and to submit observations in that connection and the right to bring an action for annulment against the rejection of the complaint. In the case of proceedings under Art. 258 TFEU, persons who have lodged a complaint do not have those rights. If some of the questions raised in the complaint pursuant to Regulation No. 1/2003 are going to form the subject of infringement proceedings and the Commission therefore suspends judgment on the complaint as far as those questions are concerned, this deprives the complainant of its procedural rights. An action may consequently be brought against the decision suspending the administrative procedure.136 As far as access to the file is concerned, the principle that there must be full disclosure applies only to undertakings and associations on which a penalty may be imposed by a Commission decision finding an infringement of Art. 101(1) or Art. 102 TFEU.137 Such access ensures that those parties can effectively exercise their rights of defence. Thus, complainants cannot claim to have a right of access to the file on the same basis as the parties under investigation.138 In any event, the Commission’s refusal to grant (partial) access to its file to a complainant cannot be held to be a reviewable act. However, when the Commission rejects the complaint, the complainant may challenge the Commission’s final decision on the grounds that it had insufficient access to the Commission’s file during the administrative procedure. In this connection, it must be borne in mind that Art. 8(1) of Regulation No. 773/2004 provides that the complainant may request access to the documents on which the Commission bases its provisional assessment that the complaint should be rejected. (o) Complaint relating to an infringement of Art. 106(3) TFEU Art. 106(3) TFEU requires the Commission to ensure that the Member States comply with the obligations imposed on them with regard to the undertakings mentioned in Art. 106(1) TFEU, and expressly confers on it the power to take action for that purpose by way of directives and decisions. The Commission is empowered to determine that a given measure is incompatible with the rules of the Treaties and to indicate what measures the Member State to which a decision is addressed must adopt in order to comply with its obligations under Union law.139 This constitutes a reviewable act.140 If

136 See T-16/91, Rendo and Others v Commission, 1992, paras 51–55 (dismissed on other grounds in C-19/93 P); T-581/18, ND and OE v Commission, 2019, para. 22. 137 Regulation No. 1/2003, Art. 27(2). See T-17/93, Matra Hachette v Commission, 1994, para. 34; T-65/96, Kish Glass v Commission, 2000, para. 34; T-104/07 and T-339/08, BVGD v Commission, 2013, para. 89; T-574/14, EAEPC v Commission, 2018, para. 93. 138 See T-17/93, Matra Hachette v Commission, 1994, para. 34; T-65/96, Kish Glass v Commission, 2000, para. 34; T-104/07 and T-339/08, BVGD v Commission, 2013, para. 89; T-574/14, EAEPC v Commission, 2018, para. 93. 139 See C-107/95 P, Bundesverband der Bilanzbuchhalter v Commission, 1997, para. 23; T-52/00, Coe Clerici Logistics v Commission, 2003, para. 85. 140 See C-163/99, Portugal v Commission, 2001.

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300 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT an undertaking requests the Commission to find that a Member State has infringed the combined provisions of Arts 102 and 106(1) TFEU, an action will not lie against the Commission’s rejection of that request. The Union Courts consider that a letter to that effect cannot be regarded as producing binding legal effects.141 As a result, complaints based on Arts 102 and 106(1) TFEU are treated in the same way as complaints that a Member State has infringed other provisions of Union law.142

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(2) Merger control (a) Regulatory framework The Commission’s supervisory competence with regard to mergers (or concentrations) and the administrative procedure which it has to follow in this area are laid down in Council Regulation No. 139/2004143 and Commission Regulation No. 802/2004.144 (b) Final decisions on notification An action will lie against a decision by which the Commission declares a merger compatible or incompatible with the internal market145 or by which the Commission imposes a fine for not notifying or putting into effect without prior authorization a merger falling within the scope of Regulation No. 139/2004.146 An action will also lie against a Commission decision finding that a joint venture does not constitute a concentration within the meaning of Regulation No. 139/2004 and therefore does not fall within the scope of that regulation.147 (c) Initiation of the procedure The initiation of the formal investigation procedure provided for in Art. 6(1)(c) of Regulation No. 139/2004 is a preparatory measure and cannot be challenged before the Union Courts.148

141 See C-141/02 P, Commission v max.mobil, 2005, para. 70. 142 See para. 7.15. 143 Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the Merger Regulation) (OJ 2004 L24/1). 144 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 802/2004 of 7 April 2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ 2004 L133/1), as amended. 145 Regulation No. 139/2004, Art. 8(1)–(3). A decision pursuant to Art. 21(4) of Regulation No. 139/2004 also constitutes a reviewable act. See C-42/01, Commission v Portugal, 2004, paras 50–60. However, where the proposed merger has been abandoned, the Commission is no longer competent to terminate the procedure initiated pursuant to Art. 21(4) of Regulation No. 139/2004 by a decision relating to the recognition of a public interest protected by the national measures at issue. The Commission’s decision to discontinue the procedure under such circumstances does not constitute a reviewable act: see T-58/09, Schemaventotto v Commission (order), 2010, paras 117–120. 146 See T-332/09, Electrabel v Commission, 2012. The Commission decision approving the sale of assets resulting from the decision declaring a merger compatible with the internal market is also a reviewable act: see T-452/04, Éditions Odile Jacob and Others v Commission, 2010. 147 See T-87/96, Assicurazioni Generali and Unicredito v Commission, 1999, paras 37–44. 148 See T-48/03, Schneider Electric v Commission (order), 2006, para. 79; T-279/04, Éditions Jacob v Commission, 2010, paras 89–93; T-902/16, Heidelberg Cement v Commission (order), 2017, paras 18–26; T-907/16, Schwenk Zement v Commission (order), 2017, paras 18–26.

Subject-Matter 301 (d) Ancillary restrictions The assessment made by the Commission which is contained in the grounds of a concentration decision on whether ancillary restrictions mentioned by the notifying undertakings are permitted or not permitted is likewise a reviewable act.149 This is because a decision declaring a concentration compatible with the internal market is to be deemed to cover restrictions directly related and necessary to the implementation of the concentration.150 (e) Finding of a dominant position The mere finding in a concentration decision that an undertaking occupies a dominant position cannot be challenged. The reason for this is that such a finding does not produce binding legal effects.151 (f) Referral to national authorities An action will lie against the referral of a merger falling within the scope of Regulation No. 139/2004 to the competition authorities of a Member State pursuant to Art. 9 of that regulation.152 (g) Commitments Commitments submitted by the undertakings concerned in the administrative procedure are as such not reviewable acts.153 However, the conditions which the Commission imposes in its decision with a view to ensuring that the undertakings concerned comply with the commitments they have entered into vis-à-vis the Commission produce binding legal effects and may be reviewed by the Union Courts.154 149 See T-251/00, Lagardère and Canal +v Commission, 2002, paras 63–118. 150 Regulation No. 139/2004, Art. 8(1) and (2). 151 See T-125/97 and T-127/97, Coca-Cola v Commission, 2000, para. 92; T-501/10, Ti Media Broadcasting and Ti Media v Commission (order), 2012, paras 55–56. 152 See T-119/02, Royal Philips Electronics v Commission, 2003, paras 267–300; T-346/02 and T-347/02, Cableuropa and Others v Commission, 2003, paras 47–82. A decision taken by such national authorities following a referral may be contested only before the national courts, although they may refer a question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Regulation No. 139/2004. A complaint made to the Commission about the handling of the case after referral is a complaint under Art. 258 TFEU and the rejection of such a complaint is not a reviewable act: see T-443/03, Retecal and Others v Commission (order), 2005, paras 34–46. An action brought by a third party against a decision of the Commission rejecting a request from a national competition authority for partial referral of the case under Art. 9(3) of Regulation No. 139/2004 will be declared inadmissible, not because of the fact that such decision would not constitute a reviewable act, but because a third party is considered not to be directly and individually concerned by such decision: see T-224/10, Association belge des consommateurs test-achats v Commission, 2011, paras 70–85. But see, as regards a decision of the Commission adopted in accordance with the first subparagraph of Art. 22(3) of Regulation No. 139/2004, T-227/21, Illumina v Commission, 2022, paras 67–82. 153 See Regulation No. 139/2004, Arts 6(2) and 8(2); Regulation No. 802/2004, Art. 20. See C-68/94 and C-30/95, France and Others v Commission, 1998 paras 64–67; T-57/07, E.ON Ruhrgas and E.ON Földgáz v Commission (order), 2009, paras 30–52. 154 See T-125/97 and T-127/97, Coca-Cola v Commission 2000, paras 94–106; T-282/02, Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission, 2006, paras 294, 307–311; T-48/04, Qualcomm v Commission, 2009, paras 89–90, 112: see also, in that regard, T-43/16, Telecom v Commission, 2018, paras 36–62; T-884/16, Multiconnect v Commission, 2018, paras 27–58; T-885/16, Mass Response Service v Commission, 2018, paras 31–56: letter of the Commission addressed to an applicant interpreting the commitments given by another undertaking and concluding there was no cause to take measures against that undertaking or to adopt a decision relating to its compliance with those commitments held not to be a reviewable act under Art. 263 TFEU.

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302 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT

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(3) State aid (a) Regulatory framework The Commission’s supervisory competence and the administrative procedure with which it must comply in relation to State aid are laid down in Arts 107 and 108 TFEU and in Regulation 2015/1589155 and Regulation No. 794/2004.156 This legal framework makes provision for separate procedures depending on whether the aid concerned is existing aid or new aid. 157 (b) Existing aid As far as existing aid158 is concerned, Art. 108(1) TFEU and Arts 21–23 of Regulation 2015/1589 empower the Commission, in cooperation with the Member States, to keep aid under constant review. Where the Commission considers that existing aid is not, or is no longer, compatible with the internal market, it informs the Member State concerned of its preliminary view and gives that Member State the opportunity to submit its comments. Where the Commission, in the light of the information submitted by the Member State concerned, concludes that the existing aid scheme is not, or is no longer, compatible with the internal market, it will propose to that Member State any appropriate measures required by the progressive development or by the functioning of the internal market. Where the Member State concerned does not accept the proposed measures and the Commission, having taken into account the arguments of the Member State concerned, still considers that those measures are necessary, it will initiate the procedure provided for in Art. 108(2) TFEU. Therefore, as far as existing aid is concerned, the initiative lies with the Commission.159 If the Commission considers that there is existing aid whose compatibility with the internal market it wishes to re-examine, it cannot require the Member State concerned to suspend that aid before it has taken a final decision holding it incompatible with the internal market. For its part, the Member State concerned is not under any obligation to suspend existing aid before such final decision where it has not accepted the measures proposed by the Commission.160

155 Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 [TFEU] (codification) (OJ 2015 L248/9). That regulation repealed Council Regulation (EC) No. 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of [Art. 108 TFEU] (OJ 1999 L83/1). 156 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 794/2004 of 21 April 2004 implementing Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 [TFEU] (OJ 2004 L140/1), as amended. 157 See, e.g. C-590/14 P, DEI and Commission v Alouminion tis Ellados, 2016, para. 45; T-68/15, HH Ferries and Others v Commission, 2018, para. 45. 158 See Regulation 2015/1589, Art. 1(b). 159 See, e.g. C-44/93, Namur-Les assurances du crédit, 1994, para. 11; C-6/12, P, 2013, paras 40–41; C-233/16, ANGED, 2018, para. 72. 160 See, e.g. C-400/99, Italy v Commission, 2001, para. 48; C-262/11, Kremikovtzi, 2012, para. 49; C-6/12, P, 2013, paras 40–41; T-116/16, Port autonome du Centre et de l’Ouest and Others v Commission (order), 2016, paras 16–22; see also, in that regard, C-415/15 P, Stichting Woonput and Others v Commission, 2017, paras 33–52.

Subject-Matter 303 (c) New aid As far as new aid is concerned,161 Art. 108(3) TFEU and Art. 2(1) of Regulation 2015/1589 provide that the Commission is to be informed, in sufficient time, of any plans to grant or alter aid. The Commission then proceeds to an initial examination of the planned aid. If, at the end of that examination, it considers that the notified measure does not constitute aid, it will make such finding in a decision pursuant to Art. 4(2) of Regulation 2015/1589. Where the Commission, after a preliminary examination, finds that no doubts are raised as to the compatibility with the internal market of a notified measure, it will decide that the measure is compatible with the internal market in a ‘decision not to raise objections’ pursuant to Art. 4(3) of Regulation 2015/1589. If the Commission has doubts as to the compatibility with the internal market of the measure concerned, it will adopt a decision pursuant to Art. 4(4) of Regulation 2015/1589 to initiate the formal investigation procedure provided for in Art. 108(2) TFEU.162 Such a decision is to call upon the Member State concerned and upon other interested parties to submit comments within a prescribed period, which must not, as a rule, exceed one month.163 This formal investigation procedure will be closed by one of the decisions mentioned in Art. 9 of Regulation 2015/1589, namely: (a) a decision pursuant to Art. 9(2) of Regulation 2015/1589 by which the Commission finds that no aid within the meaning of Art. 107(1) TFEU is being granted; (b) a decision pursuant to Art. 9(3) or (4) of Regulation 2015/1589 (to which conditions may be attached) by which the Commission finds that the aid is compatible with the internal market; or (c) a decision pursuant to Art. 9(5) of Regulation 2015/1589 in which the Commission finds that the aid is incompatible with the internal market. The last sentence of Art. 108(3) TFEU prohibits the Member State concerned from putting the proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision.164 New aid is therefore subject to preventive review by the Commission, and in principle cannot be put into effect as long as that institution has not declared it compatible with the Treaties.165 161 See C-295/97, Piaggio, 1995, paras 47–48: the answer to the question whether aid is new cannot depend on a subjective assessment by the Commission. According to Art. 1(c) of Regulation 2015/1589, new aid is all aid, that is to say, aid schemes and individual aid, which is not existing, including alterations to existing aid. Art. 1(b) of Regulation 2015/1589 provides a list of all aid which must be regarded as existing aid. 162 See Regulation 2015/1589, Art. 4(4). Proceedings must also be initiated where the Commission has doubts whether the measure should be categorized as aid unless, in the course of the initial examination, the Commission is able to satisfy itself that the measure at issue is in any event compatible with the internal market, even if it is aid: see C-400/99, Italy v Commission, 2005, para. 47; C-487/06 P, British Aggregates v Commission, 2008, para. 113; C-817/18 P, Vereniging tot Behoud van Natuurmonumenten in Nederland and Others v Commission, 2020, para. 77; T-11/95, BP Chemicals v Commission, 1998, para. 166; T-46/97, SIC v Commission, 2000, para. 72; T-218/18, Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission, 2021, para. 100 (appeal pending in C-466/21 P); T-577/20, Ryanair v Commission, 2022, para. 25. The fact that the time spent on an initial examination under Art. 108(3) TFEU considerably exceeds the time usually taken may, in addition to other factors, justify the conclusion that the Commission encountered serious difficulties of assessment necessitating initiation of the procedure under Art. 108(2) TFEU: see, e.g. T-46/97 SIC v Commission, 2000, para. 102; T-106/18, Naviera Armas v Commission, 2018, para. 64. 163 Regulation 2015/1589, Art. 6(1). 164 See also Regulation 2015/1589, Art. 3. 165 See, e.g. C-44/93, Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit, 1994, para. 12; C-284/12, Deutsche Lufthansa, 2013, paras 25–26; C-323/18, Tesco-Global Áruházak, 2020, para. 31. While assessment of the compatibility of aid measures with the internal market falls within the exclusive competence of the Commission, subject to review by the Union

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(d) Final decisions Irrespective of whether existing aid or new aid is involved, Commission decisions by which national measures are held to be aid and compatible or incompatible with the internal market produce binding legal effects and constitute reviewable acts.166 The same is true of decisions by which the Commission determines that a measure of a Member State does not constitute aid within the meaning of Art. 107(1) TFEU.167 It is irrelevant for the classification of an act as a reviewable act whether or not it satisfies certain formal requirements, in particular that it is duly identified by its author and that it mentions the provisions providing the legal basis for it. It is therefore irrelevant that the act may not be described as a ‘decision’ or that it does not refer to Art. 4 or Art. 9 of Regulation 2015/1589. It is also of no importance that the Member State concerned was not notified of the act at issue by the Commission, infringing Art. 31 of that regulation, as such an error is not capable of altering the substance of that act.168 (e) Undertakings by the Member State concerned An undertaking entered into by a Member State during the course of the administrative proceedings and mentioned only in the recitals of the Commission decision has to be considered to be a voluntary modification of the notification and is not as such a reviewable act.169 Indeed, regardless of the grounds on which such a decision is based, only the operative part thereof is capable of producing legal effects and, as a consequence, of adversely affecting the interests of the applicant.170 (f) Initiation of the procedure Another question is whether the initiation of the formal investigation procedure provided for in Art. 108(2) TFEU and Art. 6(1) of Regulation 2015/1589171 constitutes a reviewable act in itself. Under these provisions, the Commission has to give notice

Courts, it is for the national courts to ensure that the rights of individuals are safeguarded where the obligation to give prior notification of State aid to the Commission pursuant to Art. 108(3) TFEU has been infringed: see C-275/10, Residex Capital, 2011, para. 27. 166 See, in that regard, C-279/08 P, Netherlands v Commission, 2011, paras 35–42; T-427/12, Austria v Commission, 2016, paras 31–37. A Council decision pursuant to the third paragraph of Art. 108(2) TFEU by which aid is considered to be compatible with the internal market by way of derogation from the provisions of Art. 107 TFEU or from the regulations provided for in Art. 109 TFEU is also a reviewable act: see C-110/02, Commission v Council, 2004. By contrast, a letter confirming the content of an earlier decision does not constitute a reviewable act: see, e.g. T-890/16, Scandlines Denmark and Scandlines Deutschland v Commission, 2018, para. 35. 167 See C-367/95 P, Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France, 1998, paras 45–48; T-351/02, Deutsche Bahn v Commission, 2006, paras 34–62; T-89/09, Pollmeier Massivholz v Commission, 2015, para. 34. 168 See, e.g. Case C-521/06 P, Athinaïki Techniki v Commission, 2008, paras 43–44; C-322/09 P, NDSHT v Commission, 2010, para. 47; T-841/16, Alex v Commission (order), 2017, para. 32; T-217/17, FVE Holýšov I and Others v Commission, 2019, para. 48; T-6/19, Irish Wind Farmers’ Association and Others v Commission (order), 2020, para. 35. 169 See T-6/06, Wheyco v Commission (order), 2007, paras 95–96. 170 See T-6/06, Wheyco v Commission (order), 2007, para. 94: the assessments made in the recitals to a decision are not in themselves capable of forming the subject of an application for annulment. They can be subject to judicial review by the Union Courts only to the extent that, as grounds of an act adversely affecting a person’s interests, they constitute the essential basis for the operative part of that act. 171 Such decision will be based on Art. 4(4) of Regulation 2015/1589.

Subject-Matter 305 to the ‘interested parties’ to submit their comments before it decides whether aid is compatible with the internal market. It is settled case-law that the initiation of that procedure produces no legal effects and therefore cannot be challenged before the Union Courts where it relates to existing aid,172 since the Member State concerned may maintain the aid at that stage of the procedure.173 Where, in contrast, the procedure initiated relates to a measure which the Commission considers to constitute new aid, the decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure, which will be based on Art. 4(4) of Regulation 2015/1589, will constitute a reviewable act.174 Such a decision entails independent legal effects,175 particularly in relation to the suspension of the measure under consideration, since, according to Art. 108(3) TFEU, a proposed aid measure must not be put into effect until the investigation procedure has resulted in a final decision.176 The initiation decision will be challengeable, not only where a measure in the course of implementation is regarded by the authorities of the Member State concerned as existing aid, but also where these authorities take the view that the measure to be formally investigated does not fall within the scope of Art. 107(1) TFEU.177 Indeed, a decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure pursuant to Art. 4(4) of Regulation 2015/1589 in relation to a measure in the course of implementation and classified by the Commission as new aid necessarily alters the legal implications of the measure under consideration and the legal position of the recipient firms, particularly as regards the continued implementation of the measure. Until the adoption of such a decision, the Member State, the recipient firms, and other economic operators may think that the measure is being lawfully implemented as a general measure not falling within the scope of Art. 107(1) TFEU or as existing aid. After the adoption of the decision to initiate the procedure, there is at the very least a significant element of doubt

172 See C-182/03 R and C-217/03 R, Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission (order), 2007, para. 119; T-267/02 Forum 187 v Commission (order), 2003. 173 As far as existing aid is concerned, the Commission’s proposal of appropriate measures under Art. 108(1) TFEU is also not a reviewable act: see T-330/94, Salt Union v Commission, 1996, paras 31–38; compare T-68/15, HH Ferries and Others v Commission, 2018, paras 50–51. 174 See C-312/90, Spain v Commission, 1992, paras 11–26; C-47/91, Italy v Commission, 1992, paras 19– 32; C-400/99, Italy v Commission, 2001, paras 45–70; T-269/99, T-271/99 and T-272/99, Diputación Foral de Guipúzcoa and Others v Commission, 2002, paras 37–40; T-332/06, Alcoa Transformazioni v Commission, 2009, paras 35–36; T-394/08, T-408/08, T-453/08, and T-454/08, Regione Autonoma della Sardegna v Commission, 2011, para. 77. 175 As a result, an action to annul the decision to initiate the formal procedure does not become devoid of purpose where the Commission adopts a final decision and that decision is not contested by the party which challenged the decision initiating the procedure: see C-400/99, Italy v Commission, 2005, paras 15–18. However, a decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure in respect of a measure which is no longer in the course of implementation does not entail independent legal effects and thus is not a reviewable act for the purposes of Art. 263 TFEU: see T-517/12, Alro v Commission, 2014, paras 34–44; T-673/14, Italy v Commission (order), 2015, paras 32–34. 176 See C-400/99, Italy v Commission, 2001, para. 62; T-346/99 to T-348/99, Diputación Foral de Álava and Others v Commission, 2002, para. 33; T-332/06, Alcoa Transformazioni v Commission, 2009, para. 35; T-517/12, Alro v Commission, 2014, para. 27. 177 See C-400/99, Italy v Commission, 2001, paras 59–60, 69; C-77/12 P, Deutsche Post v Commission, 2013, para. 53; T-346/99 to T-348/99, Diputación Foral de Álava and Others v Commission, 2002, para. 33; T-332/06, Alcoa Transformazioni v Commission, 2009 para. 35; T-80/06 and T-182/09, Budapesti Erőmű Zrt v Commission, 2012, para. 37; T-517/12, Alro v Commission, 2014, para. 27.

306 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT as to the legality of the measure which, without prejudice to the possibility of seeking interim relief from the Court, must lead the Member State to suspend its application, since the initiation of the formal investigation procedure excludes the possibility of an immediate decision that the measure is compatible with the internal market, which would enable it to continue to be lawfully implemented. Such a decision might also be invoked before a national court called upon to draw all the consequences arising from infringement of the last sentence of Art. 108(3) TFEU. Finally, it is capable of leading the firms which are beneficiaries of the measure to refuse in any event new payments or new advantages or to hold the necessary sums as provision for possible subsequent financial compensations. Businesses will also take account, in their relations with those beneficiaries, of the uncertainty cast on the legal and financial situation of the latter.178 An action for annulment will therefore lie against a decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure pursuant to Art. 4(4) of Regulation 2015/1589, where the action is brought by a Member State or by a beneficiary of the measure.179 Such a decision is, however, considered not to alter the legal position of a competitor of the beneficiary of the measure. Accordingly, an action for annulment of a decision adopted pursuant to Art. 4(4) of Regulation 2015/1589 brought by a competitor will be declared inadmissible.180 It should be emphasized that classification of a measure as State aid in a decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure is provisional.181 The very aim of initiating the procedure is to enable the Commission to obtain all the views it needs in order to be able to adopt a definitive decision on that point (as well as—if the measure constitutes aid—on the compatibility of the measure with the internal market).182 In order to avoid confusion between the administrative and judicial proceedings and to preserve the division of powers between the Commission and the Union Courts, any review by the General Court of the legality of a decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure must necessarily be limited. The Union Courts must in fact avoid giving a 178 See, e.g. C-400/99, Italy v Commission, 2001, paras 59–6, 69; C-77/12 P, Deutsche Post v Commission, 2013, para. 52; T-195/01 and T-207/01, Government of Gibraltar v Commission, 2002, para. 85; T-346/99 to T-348/99, Diputación Foral de Álava and Others v Commission, 2002, para. 34; T-332/06, Alcoa Transformazioni v Commission, 2009, para. 36; T-80/06 and T-182/09, Budapesti Erőmű v Commission, 2012, paras 38–40; T-517/12, Alro v Commission, 2014, para. 28; T-388/11, Deutsche Post v Commission, 2019, para. 42. With respect to the binding character of a decision to initiate proceedings before a national court, see C-284/12, Deutsche Lufthansa, 2011, paras 36–44; C-27/13, Flughafen Lübeck (order), 2014, para. 27; C-524/14 P, Hansestadt Lübeck v Commission, 2016, para. 29; T-185/15, Buonotourist v Commission, 2018, para. 186; T-554/15, Hungary v Commission, 2018, para. 68; T-219/10 RENV, World Duty Free Group v Commission, 2018, para. 290. 179 See, e.g. C-77/12 P, Deutsche Post v Commission, 2013, para. 55 (see further paras 57–64, distinguished in T-757/18, Koinopraxia Touristiki Loutrakiou v Commission, 2022, paras 44–53); T-80/06 and T-182/09 Budapesti Erőmű v Commission, 2012, paras 41–42; T-388/11, Deutsche Post v Commission, 2019, paras 43–46. 180 See T-87/09, Andersen v Commission (order), 2009, paras 49–63. 181 For this reason, the right to contest a decision to initiate the procedure provided for in Art. 108(2) TFEU does not affect the procedural rights of interested parties to challenge the final decision. The latter decision can indeed not be held to be confirmatory of the decision to initiate the procedure: see, in that regard, T-190/00, Regione Siciliana v Commission, 2003, paras 42–53; T-394/08, T-408/08, T-453/08, and T-454/08, Regione Autonoma della Sardegna v Commission, 2011, para. 78. 182 See, e.g. T-346/99 to T-348/99, Diputación Foral de Álava and Others v Commission, 2002, para. 43; T-332/06, Alcoa Transformazioni v Commission, 2009, para. 60; T-648/19, Nike European Operations Netherlands and Converse Netherlands v Commission, 2021, para. 152.

Subject-Matter 307 final ruling on questions on which the Commission has merely formed a provisional view.183 Thus, where in an action against a decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure the applicants challenge the Commission’s assessment of a measure as constituting State aid, review by the Union Courts is limited to ascertaining whether or not the Commission has made a manifest error of assessment in forming the view that it was unable to resolve all the difficulties on that point during its initial examination of the measure concerned.184 (g) Suspension and recovery injunctions An action will also lie against an injunction to suspend or recover aid that the Commission may address to a Member State by separate decision (before taking a final decision with regard to the compatibility of the aid with the internal market) under Art. 13(1) and (2) of Regulation 2015/1589.185 (h) Information injunction In the course of the administrative procedure, the Commission may address a request for information to the Member State concerned.186 Where, despite a reminder, the Member State does not provide the information requested within the period prescribed by the Commission, or where it provides incomplete information, the Commission may by decision require the information to be provided. Such ‘information injunction’ is a reviewable act.187 In the event of non-compliance with an information injunction, the Commission will decide on the basis of the information available.188 (i) Right to file a complaint As regards the position of complainants, Art. 24(2) of Regulation 2015/1589 provides that any interested party may submit a complaint to inform the Commission of any

183 See, e.g. 60/81, IBM v Commission, 1981, para. 20; T-346/99 to T-348/99, Diputación Foral de Álava and Others v Commission, 2002, para. 44; T-332/06, Alcoa Transformazioni v Commission, 2009, para. 61; T-648/19, Nike European Operations Netherlands and Converse Netherlands v Commission, 2021, para. 99. 184 See, e.g. T-346/99 to T-348/99, Diputación Foral de Álava and Others v Commission, 2002, para. 45; T-332/06, Alcoa Transformazioni v Commission, 2009, para. 62; T-838/16, Poland v Commission, 2019, para. 106; T-648/19, Nike European Operations Netherlands and Converse Netherlands v Commission, 2021, para. 100. By contrast, the Union Courts’ review of the question whether the measure is ‘new’ as opposed to ‘existing’ is complete. The Commission is indeed not entitled to open the formal investigation procedure of Art. 108(2) TFEU with respect to existing aid if it did not first propose appropriate measures under Art. 108(1) TFEU: see, in that regard, T-195/01 and T-207/01, Government of Gibraltar v Commission, 2002, paras 105–116. 185 The Commission’s power to issue such injunctions was already recognized by case-law: see C-301/87, France v Commission, 1990, paras 19, 22; C-39/94, SFEI and Others, 1996, para. 43; C-400/99, Italy v Commission, 2001, para. 51. 186 Regulation 2015/1589, Art. 12(2). 187 Regulation 2015/1589, Art. 12(3). See C-463/10 P and C-475/10 P, Deutsche Post and Germany v Commission, 2011, para. 45. 188 In the context of an action for annulment under Art. 263 TFEU, the legality of a Union act must be assessed on the basis of the elements of fact and of law existing at the time when the act was adopted. In particular, the complex assessments made by the Commission must be examined solely on the basis of the information available to the Commission at the time when those assessments were made: see, e.g. 15/76 and 16/76, France v Commission, 1979, para. 7; C-288/96, Germany v Commission, 2000, para. 34; T-371/94 and T-394/94, British Airways and Others and British Midland Airways v Commission, 1998, para. 81; T-206/17, Argus Security Projects v Commission (order), 2018, para. 26. See further para. 7.197.

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308 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT alleged unlawful aid and any alleged misuse of aid.189 It follows from Art. 24(1) and (2) of Regulation 2015/1589 that the interested parties entitled to file a complaint are those which may submit comments following a Commission decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure. They include, according to Art. 1(h) of Regulation 2015/1589, ‘any Member State or any person, undertaking or association of undertakings whose interests might be affected by the granting of aid, in particular, the beneficiary of the aid, competing undertakings, and trade associations’.190

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(j) Decisions pursuant to a complaint Insofar as the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to assess the compatibility of a grant of State aid with the internal market, in the interests of the sound administration of the fundamental rules of the Treaties relating to State aid, it is required to conduct a diligent and impartial examination of complaints alleging the grant of aid which is incompatible with the internal market.191 After examining the complaint, the Commission takes one of the following decisions—unless it considers on the basis of the information in its possession that there are insufficient grounds for taking a view on the case192—all of which will be addressed to the Member State concerned:193 (1) a decision pursuant to Art. 4(2) of Regulation 2015/1589 by which the Commission finds that no aid within the meaning of Art. 107(1) TFEU is being granted; (2) a decision

189 For the form to be used for filing a complaint, see Regulation No. 794/2004, as amended, Annex IV. 190 Art. 1(h) of Regulation 2015/1589 does not rule out the possibility that an undertaking which is not a direct competitor of the beneficiary of the aid can be categorized as an interested party, provided that undertaking demonstrates that its interests could be adversely affected by the grant of the aid. For that purpose, it is necessary for that undertaking to establish, to the requisite legal standard, that the aid is likely to have a specific effect on its situation: see C-319/07 P, 3F v Commission, 2009, para. 33; C-83/09 P, Commission v Kronoply and Kronotex, 2011, paras 64–65; C-284/21 P, Commission v Braesch and Others, 2023, para. 60; T-143/19, Solar Ileias Bompaina v Commission (order), 2020, paras 42–43 (upheld in C-429/20 P, Solar Ileias Bompaina v Commission, 2022, para. 35); T-167/19, Tempus Energy Germany and T Energy Sweden v Commission, 2021, paras 39–40. See further para. 7.119. 191 See T-108/16, Naviera Armas v Commission, 2018, para. 60; T-300/19, Achmema and Lifosa v Commission, 2021, para. 57. See also Regulation 2015/1589, Art. 12(1), first subpara., which indicates that the Commission may on its own initiative examine information regarding alleged unlawful aid from whatever source. Diligent and impartial examination of the complaint may make it necessary for the Commission to examine matters not expressly raised by the complainant. The Commission may therefore be obliged to extend its investigation beyond a mere examination of the facts and the points of law brought to its notice by the complainant. See C-367/95 P, Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France, 1998, para. 62; T-643/20, Ryanair v Commission, 2021, para. 195; T-680/19, Irish Wind Farmers’ Association and Others v Commission, 2021, para. 41. That being said, it cannot be inferred from that case-law that it is for the Commission, on its own initiative and in the absence of any evidence to that effect, to seek all information which might be connected with the case before it, even where such information is in the public domain: see, e.g. C-57/19 P, Commission v Tempus Energy and Tempus Energy Technology, 2021, para. 45. 192 See Regulation 2015/1589, Art. 24(2). It follows from Art. 12(1), second subpara. of Regulation 2015/1589, according to which the Commission must examine ‘without undue delay’ any complaint submitted by any interested party concerning alleged unlawful aid, read in conjunction with Art. 15(1) of that regulation, according to which the examination of possible unlawful aid must result in a decision pursuant to Art. 4(2), (3), or (4) thereof, that is to say, a decision finding that the measure does not constitute aid, a decision finding that no doubts are raised as to the compatibility with the internal market, or a decision initiating proceedings pursuant to Art. 108(2) TFEU, that the Commission is not allowed to perpetuate a state of inaction during the preliminary examination stage and is bound, in due course, either to initiate the next stage of the procedure or to adopt a definitive decision rejecting the complaint: see, e.g. C-521/06 P, Athinaïki Techniki v Commission, 2008, para. 40; T-6/19, Irish Wind Farmers’ Association and Others v Commission (order), 2020, para. 38. 193 Regulation 2015/1589, Art. 31. See, e.g. C-367/95 P, Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France, 1998, para. 45; T-89/09, Pollmeier Massivholz v Commission, 2015, para. 34.

Subject-Matter 309 pursuant to Art. 4(3) of Regulation 2015/1589 by which the Commission finds that the aid is compatible with the internal market; or (3) if it has doubts as to the compatibility with the internal market of a notified measure, a decision pursuant to Art. 4(4) of Regulation 2015/1589 to initiate proceedings pursuant to Art. 108(2) TFEU and Art. 6(1) of Regulation 2015/1589, in which case all interested parties, in particular the complainant and the Member States, may submit comments.194 The first two decisions, which are to be addressed to the Member State concerned,195 may be contested by the complainant, if it demonstrates that they are of direct and individual concern to it within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU.196 The complainant will have no interest in challenging the initiation of proceedings under Art. 108(2) TFEU and Art. 6(1) of Regulation 2015/1589.197 This is because the complaint will normally aim to have the aid declared incompatible with the internal market and this can only happen after the Commission has gone through the procedure prescribed by Art. 108(2) TFEU and Art. 6(1) of Regulation 2015/1589.198 If the Commission considers, after having received a complaint, that on the basis of the information in its possession there are insufficient grounds for taking a view on the case, it will inform the complainant thereof.199 Such act based on Art. 24(2) of Regulation 2015/1589 also constitutes a reviewable act within the meaning of Art. 263 TFEU.200 Indeed, by such act, the Commission states that the review it initiated has not enabled it to establish the existence of State aid within the meaning of Art. 107(1) TFEU and it implicitly refuses to initiate the formal investigation procedure provided for in Art. 108(2) TFEU and Art. 6(1) of Regulation 2015/1589. In such a situation, the persons to whom the procedural guarantees under the latter provision apply may ensure that they are observed only if they are able to challenge that decision before the Union Courts. Furthermore, a dismissal of a complaint on the ground of Art. 24(2) of Regulation 2015/1589 cannot be classified as a preliminary or a preparatory act, since it

194 Regulation 2015/1589, Art. 4. See T-17/96, TF1 v Commission, 1999, para. 78; T-678/20, Solar Electric and Others v Commission, 2021, para. 33. 195 Regulation 2015/1589, Art. 31. 196 See, e.g. C-322/09 P, NDSHT v Commission, 2010, paras 51, 53, 54; T-143/19, Solar Ileias Bompaina v Commission (order), 2020, para. 30; T-277/20, MKB Multifunds v Commission (order), 2021, para. 25 (appeal pending in C-665/21 P). As regards the classification of a decision as adopted under Art. 4(2) of Regulation 2015/1589, see T-841/16, Alex v Commission (order), 2017, paras 29–42. However, preparatory acts before reaching such a decision are not reviewable: see, e.g. T-407/09, Neubrandenburger Wohnungsgesellschaft v Commission (order), 2012, paras 28–35; T-890/16, Scandlines Denmark and Scandlines Deutschland v Commission, 2018, paras 50–58; T-6/19, Irish Wind Farmers’ Association and Others v Commission (order), 2020, paras 50–52. 197 See T-87/09, Andersen v Commission (order), 2009, paras 49–63. 198 The formal investigation procedure does not lead to an inter partes debate involving the complainant, or even the recipient, of the aid. The comments received in the course of the formal investigation will only be submitted to the Member State concerned (Regulation 2015/1589, Art. 6(2)): see, e.g. T-613/97, Ufex v Commission, 2000, paras 85–90; T-198/01, Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau v Commission, 2004, paras 193–198; T-103/14, Frucona Košice v Commission, 2016, para. 70. 199 See Regulation 2015/1589, Art. 24(2). 200 See C-521/06 P, Athinaïki Techniki v Commission, 2008, paras 52–62; C-322/09 P, NDSHT v Commission, 2010, paras 51–60; C-362/09 P, Athinaïki Techniki v Commission, 2010, paras 65–66; C-228/16 P, DEI v Commission, 2017, paras 30–31; T‑639/14 RENV, T‑352/15 and T‑740/17, DEI v Commission, 2021, paras 75–76 (appeal pending in C-701/21 P and C-739/21 P).

310 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT cannot be followed, in the context of the administrative procedure which has been initiated, by any other decision amenable to annulment proceedings. A decision pursuant to Art. 24(2) of Regulation 2015/1589 may be challenged independently of whether or not the Commission finds in this decision that the aid complained of constitutes new or existing aid. Indeed, where it receives a complaint relating to allegedly unlawful aid, the Commission, in classifying the measure as existing aid, subjects it to the procedure provided for by Art. 108(1) TFEU and thus refuses by implication to initiate the procedure provided for by Art. 108(2) TFEU.201

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(k) Mere correspondence with complainants Any letters which the Commission may address to complainants are not acts amenable to judicial review. In principle,202 only the formal decision addressed to the Member State concerned can be challenged.203 Thus, an action for annulment lodged by a complainant against a letter from the Commission informing the complainant that a specific aid measure is covered by an approved general aid scheme will be inadmissible.204 By contrast, a similar action brought against a decision addressed to a Member State in which the Commission raises no objections to an aid measure on the grounds that it falls within the scope of an approved aid scheme will be admissible insofar as the complainant demonstrates that the contested act is of direct and individual concern to it within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU.205 (l) Refusal to take appropriate measures Finally, as regards existing aid, an action will not lie against the Commission’s refusal to take appropriate measures within the meaning of Art. 108(1) TFEU.206 It should be borne in mind that when the Union Courts are considering whether an action for the annulment of a negative decision of an institution is admissible, the decision must be appraised in the light of the nature of the request to which it constitutes a reply. Since, according to the wording of Art. 108(1) TFEU, appropriate measures are merely proposals, which the Member State concerned is not bound to respect,207 the Commission’s refusal to take such measures does not constitute an act producing binding legal effects.

201 See C-313/90, CIRFS and Others v Commission, 1993, paras 25–27; C-321/99 P, ARAP and Others v Commission, 2002, paras 61–62; C-322/09 P, NDSHT v Commission, 2010, paras 52–54; T-68/15, HH Ferries and Others v Commission, 2018, paras 42–53. 202 However, the decision based on Art. 24(2) of Regulation 2015/1589 is addressed to the complainant. See para. 7.57. 203 See C-367/95 P, Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France, 1998, para. 45; T-143/19, Solar Ileias Bompaina v Commission (order), 2020, para. 26. 204 See T-154/94, CSF and CSME v Commission, 1996, paras 37–54: see also, e.g. T-585/21, Zásilkovna v Commission (order), 2022, paras 33–55. 205 See C-321/99 P, ARAP and Others v Commission, 2002, paras 60–61. 206 See T-330/94, Salt Union v Commission, 1996, paras 31–38; compare T-68/15, HH Ferries and Others v Commission, 2018, paras 50–51. 207 However, where the Member State concerned accepts the proposed measures and informs the Commission thereof, it will be bound by its acceptance to implement the appropriate measures: see, in that regard, Regulation 2015/1859, Art. 23(1); see also, e.g. C-415/15 P, Stichting Woonput and Others v Commission, 2017, paras 62–63.

Subject-Matter 311 (m) Miscellaneous A letter from the Commission addressed to a national court limited to informing it of the progress made in the investigation of a State aid complaint is not a reviewable act under Art. 263 TFEU. 208 Similar considerations apply to a letter from the Commission representing informal, bilateral pre-notification contacts with the relevant national authorities,209 along with a letter from the Commission sent to the national authorities in the course of exchanges made to ensure the immediate and effective implementation of a Commission decision on State aid.210 (4) Anti-dumping (a) Regulatory framework Under the present regulatory framework governed by Regulation 2016/1036,211 the final decision in an anti-dumping procedure normally lies with the Commission. It imposes definitive anti-dumping duties or decides to terminate the anti-dumping procedure without imposing such duties. Such regulations and decisions produce legal effects and constitute reviewable acts.212

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(b) Preparatory measures Regulation 2016/1036 confers extensive duties on the Commission in connection 7.62 with the investigation of dumping and the provisional control thereof. It receives complaints, initiates investigations, and decides whether or not protective measures are needed. Various acts adopted by the Commission pursuant to that regulation are preparatory and thus cannot be the subject of an application for annulment, the reason being that sufficient protection is afforded by bringing an action for annulment against the final decision. Examples of acts against which an action will not lie are: a decision to initiate an anti-dumping procedure;213 the initiation of an interim review of anti- dumping measures;214 a Commission decision rejecting an undertaking offered by the

208 See T-763/18, Lazarus Szolgáltató és Kereskedelmi v Commission (order), 2019, para. 39. 209 See T-674/18, Vattenfall Europe Nuclear Energy v Commission (order), 2019, paras 35–43. 210 See, e.g. T-170/16, Guardian Glass España, Central Vidriera v Commission (order), 2017, paras 63–119. 211 Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union (codification) (OJ 2016 L176/21), as amended. That regulation repealed Council Regulation (EC) No. 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community (OJ 2009 L343/51). Since the entry into force in 2016 of that regulation, the Commission has adopted the entirety of the acts forming the anti-dumping proceeding, from the notice of initiation to the imposition of definitive duties, while previously definitive duties were imposed by the Council: see, in that regard, C-461/18 P, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Distillerie Bonollo and Others, 2020, paras 95–98; T-744/20, Airoldi Metalli v Commission (order), 2021, para. 26. 212 See, e.g. C-76/01, Eurocoton and Others v Council, 2003, para. 72. In that case, the Court held that the tacit rejection by the Council of the Commission’s proposal for a regulation imposing definitive anti-dumping duties constituted a reviewable act, on the grounds that it became definitive after the expiry of the time-period laid down in the applicable EU regulation then in force and affected the interests of the applicants who had instigated the anti‑dumping investigation: see C-76/01, Eurocoton and Others v Council, 2003, paras 54–75; T-177/00, Koninklijke Philips Electronics v Council, 2005, paras 29–33. 213 See T-134/95, Dysan Magnetics and Review Magnetics v Commission (order), 1996, para. 23; T-75/96, Söktas v Commission (order), 1996, paras 26–43; T-744/20, Airoldi Metalli v Commission (order), 2021, para. 23. 214 See T-267/97, Broome & Wellington v Commission, 1998, para. 29; T-369/08, EWRIA and Others v Commission, 2010, para. 37. By contrast, a Commission decision rejecting a request for initiation of a partial

312 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT company concerned in return for the termination of the anti-dumping investigation;215 and a Commission decision terminating an undertaking breached by an exporter.216 As far as Commission regulations imposing provisional anti-dumping duties under Art. 7 of Regulation 2016/1036 are concerned, they constitute an intermediate stage between the notice of initiation governed by Art. 5 of that regulation, which marks the initiation of the anti-dumping proceeding, and the termination of that proceeding, which results either in the fixing of definitive duties or in the non-fixing of duties pursuant to Art. 9 thereof. Consequently, a regulation imposing provisional anti-dumping duties has been regarded as preparatory for those acts terminating the anti-dumping proceeding, which are themselves open to challenge, and thus is not a reviewable act for the purposes of Art. 263 TFEU. 217

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(c) Definitive measures Some acts adopted by the Commission in anti-dumping procedures have definitive legal effects and may be challenged by means of an action for annulment. Examples of such acts include:218 a Commission decision rejecting a request for initiation of a partial interim review of anti-dumping measures;219 a Commission decision to terminate the anti-dumping procedure without imposing anti-dumping duties;220 and a Commission decision to modify the TARIC (integrated tariff of the European Union) additional code for a company which did not require the collection of anti-dumping duties with respect to imports of the goods concerned.221 Similarly, a Commission notice of initiation of an expiry review of anti-dumping or countervailing measures applicable to imports of certain goods is a reviewable act, since such notice has the effect that the measures concerned by the review remain in force until the conclusion of that review, whereas they would have expired if the review had not taken place.222 (5) Banking union (a) Regulatory framework The regulatory framework of the banking union, which is part of the EU’s economic and monetary union, comprises an extensive set of Union secondary legislation relating to, inter alia, the regulation and prudential supervision of banks and the management

interim review of anti-dumping measures is a reviewable act, since it cannot be followed by any other measure amenable to annulment proceedings: see T-369/08, EWRIA and Others v Commission, 2010, para. 37. 215 See C-133/87 and C-150/87, Nashua Corporation and Others v Commission and Council, 1990, paras 8–11; C-156/87, Gestetner Holdings v Council and Commission, 1990, para. 8. 216 See T-208/95, Miwon v Commission (order), 1996, para. 31. 217 See T-744/20, Airoldi Metalli v Commission (order), 2021, paras 24–39 (contrasting the previous regulatory framework). 218 Note that an action for annulment will also lie against a Commission decision denying a third party access to the non-confidential file: see C-170/89, BEUC v Commission, 1991, para. 11. 219 See T-369/08, EWRIA and Others v Commission, 2010, paras 30–43. 220 See C-315/90, Gimelec and Others v Commission, 1991; C-76/01 P, Eurocoton and Others v Council, 2003, para. 72; T-301/06, Lemaître Sécurité v Commission (order), 2008, para. 19. 221 See T-364/16, ArcelorMittal Tubular Products Ostrava v Commission, 2018, paras 23–35. 222 See T-45/06, Reliance Industries v Council and Commission, 2008, para. 37.

Subject-Matter 313 of failing banks.223 In particular, the single supervisory mechanism (SSM) gives the European Central Bank (ECB), in collaboration with the competent Member State authorities, supervisory tasks over banks, as set out primarily in Regulations (EU) Nos 1022/2013224 and 1024/2013.225 Additionally, in the context of the single resolution mechanism (SRM), Regulation No. 806/2014226 establishes the framework for the restructuring of banks which are failing or likely to fail, which is managed by the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and a Single Resolution Fund (SRF) that is financed by the banking sector. (b) Measures in the context of the SRM On the basis of the applicable provisions of Regulation No. 806/2014, decisions of the SRB fixing the ex ante contributions to the SRF and adjusting such contributions have been regarded as reviewable acts. For example, in NRW.Bank v SRB,227 involving the annulment of the SRB’s decisions on the 2016 ex ante contributions to the SRF and the adjustment of those contributions, the Court of Justice held that, by requiring the applicant to pay an ex ante contribution to the SRF in an amount different from that established in the first decision, the second decision altered its legal position in such a way that annulment of that decision is not the same thing as annulment of the first decision and therefore the General Court had erred in law in holding that the second decision was merely confirmatory. By contrast, a decision of the SRB not to proceed with an ex post definitive valuation in the context of Art. 20 of Regulation No. 806/2014 is not a reviewable act for the purposes of Art. 263 TFEU.228 Pursuant to Article 18 of Regulation No. 806/2014, it is for the SRB to adopt a resolution scheme, which must then be endorsed by the Commission or, as the case may be, the Council, and such a scheme may enter into force only if those institutions do not object.229 In addition, a resolution scheme may be adopted, according to points (a) to

223 See further M. P. Chiti, ‘The European Banking Union in the Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union’ in M. P. Chiti and V. Santoro (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of European Banking Law (Palgrave MacMillan, 2019) 105; M. López Escudero, ‘Le contrôle juridictionnel de la Cour de justice dans le domaine de l’union bancaire’ (2020) C.D.E. 549; A. Rosas, ‘EMU in the Case Law of the Union Courts: A General Overview and Some Observations’ (2021) European Papers 1397; L. Wissink, Effective Legal Protection in Banking Supervision (Europa, 2021); C. Zilioli and K.-P. Wojcik (eds), Judicial Review in the European Banking Union (Edward Elgar, 2021). 224 Regulation (EU) No. 1022/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) as regards the conferral of specific tasks on the European Central Bank pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013 (OJ 2013 L287/5). 225 Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ 2013 L287/63). 226 Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 (OJ 2014 L L225/1), as amended. 227 See C-662/19 P, NRW.Bank v SRB, 2021, paras 42–57. 228 See C-874/19 P, Aeris Invest v SRB, 2021, paras 76–85. 229 See, in that regard, T-481/17, Fundación Tatiana Pérez de Guzmán el Bueno and SFL v SRB, 2022, paras 114– 150 (once approved by the Commission, the resolution scheme adopted by the SRB produces legal effects and constitutes a reviewable act capable of being the subject of an independent action for annulment) (appeal pending in C-448/22 P and C-551/22 P).

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314 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of that regulation, only if three conditions are met, namely: that the bank is failing or is likely to fail; that there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative measures would prevent its failure within a reasonable timeframe; and that a resolution action is necessary in the public interest pursuant to Article 18(5) of that regulation. As regards the first condition, the second subparagraph of Article 18(1) of Regulation No. 806/2014 gives the ECB a primary—albeit not exclusive—role, since it is the ECB which, as a general rule, is required to carry out the assessment that a bank is failing or likely to fail (FOLTF assessment). Consequently, the ECB’s FOLTF assessment has been held not to be a reviewable act, as the resolution procedure is to be regarded as a complex administrative procedure involving a number of authorities, only the outcome of which, resulting from the SRB’s exercise of its powers, may be subject to judicial review.230

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(c) Measures involving the SSM and the prudential supervision of banks In the context of administrative proceedings concerning the withdrawal of a bank’s licence, ECB correspondence specifying the forms of communication addressed to the ECB has solely the purpose and effect of expressing the ECB’s view on a particular aspect of the course of the preparatory proceedings concerning the adoption of a potential licence withdrawal decision. Therefore, it does not produce legal effects distinct from the licence withdrawal decision231 but has only limited effects, characteristic of an intermediate measure forming part of a preliminary administrative procedure, and is not a reviewable act under Art. 263 TFEU.232 However, ECB correspondence asking the applicant bank to ‘direct its comments and future communications with the ECB’ via the competent person appointed under the applicable national law or with the competent person’s approval has been found to be a reviewable act on the grounds that it produced legal effects as regards the representation of a party which is independent of the decision to withdraw a banking institution’s licence; the question of the representation of a party during licence withdrawal proceedings does not in principle have any effect on the decision whether or not to withdraw the licence adopted at the end of such proceedings, and does not constitute a stage in those proceedings.233 Additionally, it should be mentioned that guidelines of the European Banking Authority on product oversight and governance arrangements for retail banking products have been held not to be a reviewable act, as they have no binding legal effects in relation to competent national authorities or financial institutions. 234 230 See C-551/19 P and C-552/19 P, ABLV Bank and Others v ECB, 2021, paras 55–56, 61–75; see also, in that regard, T-280/18, ABLV Bank v SRB, 2022, paras 31–36. 231 See, e.g. T-27/19, Pilatus Bank and Pilatus Holding v ECB, 2022 (action against ECB decision on the withdrawal of licence) (appeal pending in C-256/22 P). Note that in cases concerning the annulment of a ECB decision addressed to the applicant bank that it was no longer competent to ensure its direct prudential supervision and to take measures concerning it, the General Court proceeded to the merits of the action, without addressing its admissibility: see, e.g. T-139/19, Pilatus Bank v ECB (order), 2021 (appeal pending in C-750/21 P). 232 See T-687/18, Pilatus Bank v ECB (order), 2019. 233 See C-701/19 P, Pilatus Bank v ECB (order), 2021, paras 3139; see also, in that regard, C-663/17 P, C-665/17 P, and C-669/17 P, ECB and Others v Trasta Komercbanka and Others, 2019, paras 54–78. 234 See C-911/19, FBF, 2021, paras 39–50.

Subject-Matter 315 (6) Public procurement In the context of public procurement, provisional measures intended to pave the way for the decision awarding a public contract, which is a decision drawn up under an internal procedure involving several stages, cannot themselves be contested in an action for annulment; such an action can only be brought against measures which definitively lay down the position of the Union institution concerned upon the conclusion of that internal procedure.235 Moreover, as a general rule, a decision to organize a tender procedure has no adverse effects, since it does no more than give to interested parties the possibility of taking part in the procedure and submitting a tender.236 Correspondence involving further information following the tender decision does not constitute reviewable acts for the purposes of Art. 263 TFEU. 237 (7) Access to documents Regulation No. 1049/2001238 defines the principles, conditions, and limits governing the right of access by the public to European Parliament, Council, and Commission documents laid down by what is now Art. 15 TFEU.239 A two-stage administrative procedure applies.240 If an initial application for access to documents is refused,241 the person concerned may make a confirmatory application asking the Union institution to reconsider its position. In principle, therefore, only the Union institution’s decision to reject a confirmatory application is a reviewable act

235 See, e.g. T-195/08, Antwerpse Bouwwerken v Commission, 2009, paras 26–30; T-T-690/16, Enrico Colombo and Corinti Giacomo v Commission, 2019, para. 66; T-299/18, Strabag Belgium v Parliament, 2019, paras 35–37. 236 See, e.g. T-411/06, Sogelma v EAR, 2008, paras 86–90; see also T-125/06 Centro Studi Antonio Manieri v Council, 2009, paras 92–94 (as an internal act unconnected with the tendering procedure, the Council’s favourable evaluation of the proposal of the Office for Infrastructure and Logistics which preceded the decision to entrust the services in question to that office was held not to constitute an act against which an action for annulment can be brought). 237 See, e.g. T-481/14, European Dynamics Luxembourg and Evropaïki Dynamiki v EIT, 2016, para. 456. 238 Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L145/43). See further K. Lenaerts, ‘Quelques réflexions sur le droit d’accès aux documents’, in Liber Amicorum Antonio Tizzano: de la Cour CECA à la Cour de l'Union: le long parcours de la justice européenne (G. Giappichelli Editore, 2018) 495; L. Rossi and P. Vinagre e Silva, Public Access to Documents in the EU (Hart, 2017). Access to documents of other Union institutions and bodies is regulated by other Union secondary law. For example, as regards the ECB, see, e.g. C-396/19 P, ECB v Insolvent Estate of Espírito Santo Financial Group, 2020; T-827/17, Aeris Invest v ECB, 2021 (appeal pending in C-782/21 P), concerning access to documents under Decision 2004/258/EC (OJ 2004 L80/42); see further, in that regard, D. Sarmiento, ‘Confidentiality and Access to Documents in the Banking Union’ in Judicial Review in the European Banking Union (n 223) 165. 239 With respect to the interplay between Regulation No. 1049/2001 on access to documents and the specific regulations in the field of competition law, see K. Lenaerts, ‘Due Process in Competition Cases’ (2013) Neue Zeitschrift für Kartellrecht 175; O. Davidson and M. Van Huffel, ‘Le contentieux européen de l’accès aux documents: problématiques générales et problématiques spécifiques au droit de la concurrence’ in V. Giacobbo Peyronnel and C. Verdure (eds), Contentieux du droit de la concurrence de l'Union européenne: questions d'actualité et perspectives (Bruylant, 2017) 501. 240 See, e.g. C-351/20 P, Dragnea v Commission, 2022, para. 63; T-120/11, ClientEarth and Others v Commission (order), 2011, para. 35; T-11/16, De Masi v Commission (order), 2017, para. 33; T-669/21, Courtois and Others v Commission (order), 2021, para. 10. Thus, an action brought before the administrative procedure for access to the documents requested in two successive stages has been completed, is inadmissible on account of the absence of a reviewable act: see T-154/21, Saure v Commission (order), 2022, paras 24–38. 241 A decision to grant access to certain documents also constitutes a reviewable act: see, e.g. T-653/16, Malta v Commission, 2018.

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316 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT for the purposes of Art. 263 TFEU.242 The general rules on confirmatory acts (see para. 7.19) do not apply to the confirmatory refusal decision taken at the end of the two-stage administrative procedure. However, those rules do in principle apply to any further refusal decisions taken with respect to the same request for access to the same documents.243 That being said, exceptionally, where the Union institution adopts a definitive position with the response to an initial application, it may be subject to an action for annulment.244 Starting with Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission,245 the Court of Justice has held, in essence, that a derogation could be made under certain circumstances. In those proceedings, the applicant had submitted both an initial application and a confirmatory application in response to the Commission’s refusal to grant it access to certain documents. Following the applicant’s submission of a complaint to the European Ombudsman, the Commission reconsidered the applicant’s request, disclosing some, but still not all, documents to which it had been previously refused access. Thereafter, the applicant submitted an application to the Commission for full access to the documents to which access had to date been refused. By virtue of the contested act, the Commission responded to the applicant’s request, deciding not to grant access to the documents requested save for what had already been disclosed. On appeal, the Court of Justice considered that the contested act constituted a definitive refusal by the Commission to disclose all of the documents requested, which brought to an end a long series of successive steps taken by the applicant to gain access to such documents.

242 See, e.g. C-362/08 P, Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission, 2010, paras 53–54; C-208/11 P, Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission (order), 2012, paras 30–31; C-127/13 P, Strack v Commission, 2014, para. 36; T-11/16, De Masi v Commission (order), 2017, paras 33–48; T-727/15, Justice & Environment v Commission, 2017, paras 14–16; T-440/17, Arca Capital Bohemia v Commission, 2018, paras 19–21; T-669/21, Courtois and Others v Commission (order), 2021, para. 11–13. However, an action for annulment directed against the initial application for access to documents is admissible where the institution fails to inform the applicant of the right to make a confirmatory application in accordance with Art. 7(2) of Regulation No. 1049/2001, and subsequently, the applicant had not made a confirmatory application: see, e.g. C-351/20 P, Dragnea v Commission, 2022, paras 63–64, 66–77; T-437/05, Brink’s Security Luxembourg v Commission, 2009, paras 74–75; T-190/10 Egan and Hackett v Parliament, 2012, paras 42–46; T-727/15, Justice & Environment v Commission, 2017, para. 14; T-440/17, Arca Capital Bohemia v Commission, 2008, para. 20; T-441/17, Arca Capital Bohemia v Commission, 2018, para. 19; compare T-481/14, European Dynamics Luxembourg and Evropaïki Dynamiki v EIT, 2016, paras 454–455. Procedural time-limits should also be respected when bringing an action against an implied confirmatory decision: see T-278/11, ClientEarth and Others v Commission (order), 2012, paras 33–47; T-726/17, Commune de Fessenheim and Others v Commission (order), 2018, paras 26–31. See also, as regards the situation in which the institution adopts an express refusal decision which is deemed to implicitly withdraw the implied decision refusing access, T-569/19, AlzChem Group v Commission, 2019, paras 25–31. 243 An action for annulment against a decision of an institution refusing access which is merely confirmatory of one or more previous decisions refusing access will therefore generally be deemed inadmissible: see, e.g. C-225/08 P, Nuova Agricast v Commission (order), 2009, paras 35–48; C-295/08 P, Cofra v Commission (order), 2009, paras 32–44; T-110/03, T-150/03, and T-405/03, Sison v Council, 2005, para. 26; T-62/12, ClientEarth v Commission (order), 2012. 244 See C-362/08 P, Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission, 2010, paras 58–62; C-127/13 P, Strack v Commission, 2014, para. 36; T-727/15, Justice & Environment v Commission, 2007, para. 14; T-440/17, Arca Capital Bohemia v Commission, 2018, para. 19. 245 See C-362/08 P, Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission, 2010, paras 58–62; T-300/10, Internationaler Hilsfonds v Commission, 2012, para. 80; see also, e.g. T-439/08, Joséphidès v Commission and EACEA, 2010, para. 78; T-221/08, Strack v Commission, 2016, para. 82.

Identity of the Parties 317 It is worth noting that various acts relating to access to documents outside the procedure established by Regulation No. 1049/2001 have been recognized in the case-law as not constituting reviewable acts for the purposes of Art. 263 TFEU. Examples include: refusal of access to the file, in the context of Directive 2007/46,246 requested by the applicant on the basis of Article 41(2)(b) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter);247 acts concerning arrangements for access to negotiating documents of an international agreement in respect of national parliamentarians;248 and administrative correspondence in the context of the interinstitutional dialogue developed between the Parliament and the Commission on access to documents.249

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II. Identity of the Parties A. Defendants (1) Union institutions The first paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU enables actions for annulment to be brought against legislative acts,250 acts of the Council, acts of the Commission, and acts of the European Central Bank. Acts of the European Parliament may also be reviewed if they are intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.251 In addition, in contrast to the previous Treaty framework,252 the first paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU provides that the Union Courts can review the legality of acts of the European Council intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.253 Since, under the Treaties, the European Council is regarded as one of the Union institutions,254 which adopts acts intended to produce legal effects,255 it is only logical to include its acts among those against which an action for annulment will lie in that regard. Although

246 Directive 2007/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 September 2007 establishing a framework for the approval of motor vehicles and their trailers, and of systems, components and separate technical units intended for such vehicles (OJ 2007 L263/1), which has been repealed by Regulation (EU) 2018/858 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 on the approval and market surveillance of motor vehicles and their trailers, and of systems, components and separate technical units intended for such vehicles (OJ 2018 L151/1). 247 See T-128/14, Daimler v Commission, 2018, paras 65–74. 248 See T-142/16, Dröge and Others v Commission (order), 2017. 249 See T-341/16, De Masi v Commission (order), 2017; T-11/16, De Masi v Commission (order), 2017, paras 49–66. 250 See Art. 289 TFEU. Thus, such actions are brought against the Parliament and the Council or the Council alone depending on the (ordinary/special) legislative procedure. See further K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel (T. Corthaut (ed.)), EU Constitutional Law (OUP, 2021) ch. 17. 251 For some examples, see C-650/18, Hungary v Parliament, 2021; T-272/21, Puigdemont i Casamajó and Others v Parliament, pending. This wording essentially codifies the Court’s previous case-law: see 294/83, Les Verts v Parliament, 1986, paras 20–26; 34/86, Council v Parliament, 1986, para. 5. 252 See T-179/94, Bonnamy v Council (order), 1994, para. 10; T-584/93, Roujansky v Council (order), 1994, para. 12. 253 See C-370/12, Pringle, 2012, paras 34–36; T-257/16, NM v European Council (order), 2017, para. 42. 254 Art. 13(1), second subpara. TEU. 255 See, e.g. Art. 22(1) TEU; Art. 24(1), second subpara. TEU; Art. 26(1) TEU.

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318 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Court of Auditors are also Union institutions listed in Art. 13(1) TEU, acts adopted by them are not expressly mentioned in the first paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU. Nevertheless, actions for annulment have been brought against acts of the Court of Justice of the European Union256 and of the Court of Auditors257 having effects on third parties, which have not been declared inadmissible on these grounds.

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(2) Union bodies, offices, or agencies (a) Express provision Following the changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty, the first paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU expressly provides that the Union Courts may review the legality of acts of Union bodies, offices, or agencies intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. The inclusion of such acts of Union bodies, offices, and agencies among those that may be challenged in an action for annulment under Art. 263 TFEU was anticipated to some extent by the approach taken in certain case-law under former Art. 230 EC.258 Nevertheless, matters were not fully settled,259 and former Art. 230 EC was confined to Community bodies, as opposed to those in the PJCCM and the CFSP.260 Consequently, the first paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU may be interpreted as ensuring that acts of Union bodies, offices, or agencies producing effects in relation to third parties can be reviewed by the Union Courts, subject to the limits placed on the Union Courts’ jurisdiction under the Treaties, such as with regard to the CFSP (see para. 7.03). (b) Specific arrangements in secondary Union law As had already been the case under the former Treaty framework,261 acts of secondary Union law establishing the Union body, office, or agency concerned may have specific arrangements concerning the review of the legality of the acts of that body, office, or agency. Therefore, the fifth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU provides that acts setting up Union bodies, offices, or agencies may lay down specific conditions and arrangements concerning actions brought by natural and legal persons against acts of these bodies, offices, or agencies intended to produce legal effects in relation to them. However, such arrangements do not permit such bodies, offices, or agencies to shield disputes involving the interpretation or application of Union

256 See T-272/06, Evropaiki Dynamiki v Court of Justice, 2008; T-170/10 and T-340/10, Computer Task Group Luxembourg PSF v Court of Justice, 2011; T-50/18, BO v Court of Justice, 2019, T-51/18, BP v Court of Justice; T-66/18, BQ v Court of Justice, 2019. 257 See 193/87 and 194/87, Maurissen and European Public Service Union v Court of Auditors, 1989, paras 29–49; T-87/11, GRP Security v Court of Auditors, 2013, paras 40–85. 258 See, e.g. T-411/06 Sogelma v EAR, 2008, paras 33–57; T-70/05 Evropaiki Dynamiki v EMSA, 2010, paras 61– 75; T-461/08, Evropaiki Dynamiki v EIB, 2011, paras 44–52. Compare, e.g. T-148/97 Keeling v OHIM, 1998, paras 31–34 (relevant Union act provided routes for effective judicial review). 259 See, e.g. T-196/08 Srinivasan v Ombudsman, 2008, para. 13. 260 See, in that regard, C-160/03, Spain v Eurojust, 2005, paras 35–40. 261 See, e.g. C-29/05, Kaul v OHIM, 2007, paras 51–54.

Identity of the Parties 319 law from the jurisdiction of both the courts of the Member States and the Union Courts.262 (c) Other entities Acts of entities that are not regarded as Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies in principle fall outside the scope of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice and the General Court under Art. 263 TFEU.263 For example, this includes entities established on the basis of provisions of the EEA Agreement, such as the EEA Joint Committee,264 the European Court of Human Rights,265 the European Schools,266 and the European Stability Mechanism, which is an international organization created by the Eurozone Member States involving the Union institutions but situated outside the Union legal order,267 and the Eurogroup.268 This also includes Member State authorities.269 Similarly, under the case-law270 Coreper is not a Union institution but an auxiliary body of the Council which carries out the preparatory work and tasks assigned to it by the Council,271 and does not have the power to take decisions, which belongs, under the Treaties, to the Council. As such, acts adopted by Coreper cannot in principle be regarded as binding acts of the Council that are reviewable in annulment proceedings under Art. 263 TFEU. In addition, an EU Delegation does not have the legal capacity required to act as a defendant.272

262 See C-14/19, KF v Satcen, 2020, paras 58–65. 263 As the Treaties do not define the notion of Union body, office, or agency, this issue is in the process of being clarified in the case-law on Art. 263 TFEU. The fact that a particular entity is referred to as a body, office, or agency does not in itself appear to be determinative, so long as it is acting in the sphere of Union law and carrying out objectives in furtherance of that law. For example, as regards EU international missions which are set up by the Council pursuant to Arts 42 and 43 TEU in the field of the Common Defence and Security Policy, the Union Courts have regarded an action for annulment as inadmissible in respect of acts taken by the mission in question on the ground that it did not have legal personality and there was no provision affording it the capacity to be a party to legal proceedings, with the result that it could not be regarded as a body, office, or agency for the purposes of Art. 263 TFEU: see C-439/13 P, Elitaliana v Eulex Kosovo, 2015, paras 58–59, 66; T-271/10 R, H v Council and Others, 2010, para. 19. However, this may be distinguished from a situation in which the mission in question has been granted such explicit legal capacity under the relevant Council act: see, in that regard, C-283/20, Eulex Kosovo, 2022. 264 See T-376/04, Polyelectrolyte Producers Group v Council and Commission (order), 2005, para. 31. 265 See C-701/17 P, Valkov v European Court of Human Rights and Supreme Court of Cassation of the Republic of Bulgaria (order), 2018; C-798/19 P, Paix and justice pour les juifs séfarades en Israël v Commission and Council of Europe (order), 2020. 266 See T-42/20, JT v Secrétaire général des écoles européennes and Chambre de recours des écoles européennes (order), 2020, paras 14–15. 267 See C-8/15 P to 10/15 P, Ledra Advertising v Commission and ECB, 2016, paras 54–55. 268 See C-105/15 P to C-109/15 P, Mallis and Malli v Commission and ECB, 2016, para. 61. 269 See, e.g. C-98/19 P, Comprojecto-Projectos e Construções and others v Portugal (order), 2019; T-698/20, Forum Justicia Europa v Spain and Fiscalía Especial contra la Corrupción y la Criminalidad Organizada (order), 2020; compare C-202/18 and C-238/18, Rimšēvičs and ECB v Latvia, 2019, paras 64–77. This issue also intersects with the case-law on composite procedures involving acts of national authorities: see para. 3.59. 270 See C-25/94, Commission v Council, 1996, paras 21–28; compare C-626/15, Commission v Council, 2018, paras 59–67 (Council decision contained in the conclusion of the Coreper Chairman held to be a reviewable act); C-161/20, Commission v Council, 2022, para. 29 (Council decision contained in Coreper act held to be revieweable act). 271 See Art. 240(1) TFEU. 272 See T-395/11, Elti v Delegation of the European Union to Montenegro (order), 2012, paras 25–75; T-711/17, Spinoit v Commission and Others (order), 2018, paras 28–29; T-793/17, Bruel v Commission and Others (order), 2018, paras 27–28.

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(3) What acts may be imputed to a Union institution, body, office, or agency? (a) Outcome of the institution, body, office, or agency’s decision-making power An action for annulment will lie only against acts which may be imputed to a Union institution, body, office, or agency. 273 For example, acts of a political group of the European Parliament cannot be imputed to the Parliament qua institution.274 Moreover, acts adopted by the representatives of the Member States’ governments cannot be imputed to the Council. 275 Under the case-law, a Union act is generally imputable to the institution, body, office, or agency which is the author of the act concerned.276 However, depending on the case, the Union Courts may find that the acts adopted under delegated powers are attributable to the delegating Union institution, which is responsible for defending the act in question.277 (b) Act of a Member or staff member of a Union institution An act of a Member or of a staff member of a Union institution is not necessarily to be imputed to that institution.278 It will be so imputable only if the person who adopts the act makes it clear that he or she does so pursuant to his or her power to act in the name of the institution.279 Furthermore, it must transpire from the content of the act that the person in question intended to express the position or the decision of the institution.280 (c) Treaty amendments Treaty amendments adopted pursuant to the ordinary revision procedure laid down in Art. 48(1) to (5) TEU and Acts relating to the accession of new Member States (adopted pursuant to Art. 49 TEU) are not acts of Union institutions.281 They are provisions of primary Union law which are not subject to the system of judicial review provided for in the Treaties. Even if modifications of acts of the Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies ensue out of those provisions, they still do not constitute acts of the institutions

273 As regards a Union body, office, or agency, see T-439/08, Joséphidès v Commission and EACEA, 2010, paras 34–38; T-71/19, BMC v Commission and Clean Sky 2 Joint Undertaking (order), 2019, paras 23–42. 274 See C-201/89, Le Pen and Front National, 1990, para. 14; T-336/13, Borghezio v Parliament, 2014, para. 42; T-54/22, Rivière v Parliament and ID (order), 2022, paras 12–16. 275 See C-181/91 and C-248/91, Parliament v Council and Commission, 1993; C-208/17 P to C-210/17 P, NF and Others v Council (order), 2018; C-684/20 P, Sharpston v Council and Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (order), 2021; C-685/20 P, Sharpston v Council and Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (order), 2021; C-59/18 and C-182/18, Italy and Comune di Milano v Council, 2022, paras 61–113; C-743/19, Parliament v Council, 2022, paras 37–91. 276 See T-553/17, Cambra Abaurrea v Parliament and Others (order), 2018, para. 12; T-533/20, Green Power Technologies v Commission and Joint Enterprise ECSEL (order), 2021, para. 49; T-418/21, Alauzun and Others v Commission and EMA (order), 2022, para. 28; see also, in that regard, T-158/19, Breyer v Commission (order), 2019 (appeal pending in C-135/22 P). 277 See C-439/13 P, Elitaliana v Eulex Kosovo, 2015; C-455/14 P, H v Council and Others, 2016; T-71/17, BMC v Commission and Joint Enterprise Clean Sky 2 (order), 2019, para. 23; T-108/18, Universität Koblenz-Landau v Commission and EACEA (order), 2019, para. 20. 278 See 42/59 and 49/59, SNUPAT v High Authority, 1961; T-94/06, Gargani v Parliament, 2007. 279 See 34/86, Council v Parliament, 1986, paras 7–8. A report commissioned by a Union institution from a private consultancy firm cannot be imputed to the institution, since such a report does not contain any act adopted by the institution itself: see 51/79, Buttner v Commission, 1980. 280 See T-113/89, Nefarma v Commission, 1990, para. 81. 281 See C-313/89, Commission v Spain, 1991, para. 10.

Identity of the Parties 321 and are therefore not amenable to judicial review.282 However, under the simplified revision procedures prescribed in Art. 48(6) TEU, the European Council may adopt a decision amending all or part of the provisions of Part Three of the TFEU, which does not enter into force until it is approved by the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The European Council decision constitutes a reviewable act, since it is an act of a Union institution.283

B. Applicants (1) The European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, and the Member States (a) Privileged applicants The European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, and the Member States derive from the second paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU the right to bring actions for annulment. They are privileged applicants.284 They may, without proving that they have an interest in bringing proceedings,285 bring an action for annulment of any binding act of a Union institution, body, office, or agency, whether general or individual, and may also rely on any plea in law permitted under Art. 263 TFEU.286 The right to bring an action for annulment is not dependent upon the position which they took up when the act at issue was adopted. Thus, the fact that an act was voted for in the Council by the representative of a Member State does not preclude that Member State from bringing an application for its annulment.287 Any Member State has a right to bring an action for annulment, and that right is not dependent upon other Member States, the Council, or the Commission participating in the proceedings before the Union Courts.288 (b) Regional and local entities Regional and local entities are not equated to a Member State and are therefore not privileged applicants.289 Thus, while an action brought by such authorities cannot be treated in the same way as the action brought by a Member State referred to in the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, such entity, to the extent that it has legal personality, may

282 See 31/86 and 35/86, LAISA and Others v Council, 1988, paras 1–18; T-38/08, Correia de Matos v Commission, 2008, para. 13. 283 See C-370/12, Pringle, 2012, paras 30–37. 284 For the first case brought by the European Parliament as a privileged applicant, see C-540/03, Parliament v Council, 2006. 285 See 45/86, Commission v Council, 1987, para. 3; C-355/10, Parliament v Council, 2012, para. 37; C-650/18, Hungary v Parliament, 2021, para. 50; T-369/07, Latvia v Commission, 2011, para. 33; T-154/10, France v Commission, 2012, paras 36–38; T-219/14, Regione autonoma della Sardegna v Commission, 2017, para. 43. They also need not demonstrate the requirements relating to direct and/or individual concern: see, in that regard, C-755/18 P, Shindler and Others v Council (order), 2019, paras 38–39. 286 See 41/83, Italy v Commission, 1985, para. 30; T-653/16, Malta v Commission, 2018, para. 35. 287 See 166/78, Italy v Council, 1979, paras 5–6; C-355/10, Parliament v Council, 2012, para. 38. 288 See 230/81, Luxembourg v Parliament, 1983, paras 22–26; C-594/18 P, Austria v Commission, 2020. 289 See C-352/19 P, Région de Bruxelles-Capitale v Commission, 2020, para. 18; C-106/19 and C-232/19, Italy and Comune di Milano v Council and Parliament, 2022, para. 53.

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322 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT in principle bring an action for annulment under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.290

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(c) Union bodies, offices, or agencies Given the express wording of the second and fourth paragraphs of Art. 263 TFEU, which refers to actions brought by Member States, certain Union institutions, and natural and legal persons, the question arises whether actions for annulment brought by a Union body, office, or agency are precluded. Although so far such an action has not been ruled out on such grounds,291 the definitive answer to this question awaits further development in the case-law. (2) The European Central Bank, the Court of Auditors, and the Committee of the Regions (a) Semi-privileged applicants According to the third paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU, the European Central Bank, the Court of Auditors, and the Committee of the Regions may bring an action for annulment ‘for the purpose of protecting their prerogatives’.292 Consequently, they must clearly show which of their prerogatives should have been respected and in what way the prerogative in question has been infringed. (b) Infringement of the principle of subsidiarity However, in one specific situation, namely, where the Committee of the Regions considers that a legislative act infringes the principle of subsidiarity, it will be entitled to bring an action for annulment even if the action is not brought for the purpose of protecting the Committee’s prerogatives. Under Protocol (No. 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality,293 the Union Courts have jurisdiction in actions for annulment brought by the Committee of the Regions on grounds of infringement of the principle of subsidiarity by a legislative act for the adoption of which

290 See C-352/19 P, Région de Bruxelles-Capitale v Commission, 2020, para. 18; C-872/19 P, Venezuela v Council, 2021, para. 45; C-177/19 P to C-179/19 P, Germany—Ville de Paris and Others v Commission, 2022, para. 69. For some examples, see C-444/08 P, Região autónoma dos Açores v Council, 2009, paras 30–33; C-106/19 and C-232/19, Italy and Comune di Milano v Council and Parliament, 2022, paras 54–78; T-214/95 Vlaams Gewest v Commission, 1998, para. 28; T-219/14, Regione autonoma della Sardegna v Commission, 2017, paras 46–66. See further P. Van Nuffel, ‘What’s in a Member State? Central and Decentralised Authorities before the Community Courts’ (2001) C.M.L.Rev. 871; K. Lenaerts and N. Cambien, ‘Regions and the European Courts: Giving Shape to the Regional Dimension of Member States’ (2010) E.L.Rev. 609; M. Finck, Subnational Authorities in EU Law (OUP, 2017). For discussion of the standing requirements in the context of actions brought by regional and local entities, see paras 7.78, 7.105; and in the context of State aid, para. 7.126. 291 See, e.g. T-417/18, CdT v EUIPO, 2019. 292 As compared to former Art. 230 EC, which only listed the European Central Bank and the Court of Auditors, the Committee of Regions has been added to this category. Moreover, as the European Parliament initially fell into this category by virtue of the Court’s Chernobyl judgment (C-70/88, Parliament v Council, 1990), the previous case-law has potential relevance for the assessment of the admissibility of actions brought by these semi-privileged applicants: see, e.g. C-156/93, Parliament v Commission, 1995, para. 11; C-360/93, Parliament v Council, 1996, para. 18; C-392/95, Parliament v Council, 1997, paras 14–15. 293 Protocol (No. 2), annexed to the TEU and the TFEU, on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (OJ 2016 C202/206), Art. 8, second para.

Identity of the Parties 323 the TFEU provides that it be consulted.294 In those circumstances, the action for annulment will be admissible regardless of whether the Committee of the Regions was actually consulted.295 (3) Natural and legal persons Under the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU, natural and legal persons (also referred to as private parties or individuals) have the right to institute annulment proceedings against an act addressed to those persons or which is of direct and individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures. For the sake of discussion, the admissibility requirements in respect of actions for annulment brought by natural or legal persons are divided into four parts concerning: (1) those relating to the person; (2) those relating to the type of act, which include a general survey of the requirements of direct and individual concern and the category of regulatory acts not entailing implementing measures; (3) some fields of application in connection with the requirements of direct and individual concern; and (4) the interest requirement.

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(4) Admissibility requirements relating to the person (a) Nationality of natural or legal person is irrelevant Any natural or legal person may bring an action for annulment under the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU.296 The applicant’s nationality is irrelevant as far as the admissibility of the application is concerned.297

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(b) Notion of legal personality In principle, national law determines whether the applicant has legal personality.298 Entities without legal personality may nevertheless bring an action for annulment.299

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294 So far, no such action has arisen in the case-law. See, in that regard, S. F. Nicolosi and L. Mustert, ‘The European Committee of the Regions as a Watchdog of the Principle of Subsidiarity’ (2020) M.J.E.C.L. 284, 295– 297. If, in the context of one and the same action, the Committee of the Regions raises a plea relating to the infringement of the principle of subsidiarity as well as other pleas, it may be argued that the latter pleas will be admissible only if it can be shown that they are raised for the purpose of protecting the Committee’s prerogatives. 295 An action on the same grounds may also be brought by a Member State or notified by them in accordance with their legal order on behalf of their national Parliament or a chamber of it. See Protocol (No. 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, Art. 8, first para. 296 This includes non-EU Member States: see C-872/19 P, Venezuela v Council, 2021, paras 41–53; T-246/19, Cambodia and CRF v Commission (order), 2020, paras 36–43. Actions brought by sub-national entities of non-EU Member States also fall within Art. 263, fourth para. TFEU: see T-212/02, Commune de Champagne and Others v Council and Commission, 2007, paras 178–179. 297 For some examples of successful actions for annulment brought by natural and legal persons from non-EU Member States, see C-376/15 P and C-377/15 P, Changshu City Standard Parts Factory and Ningbo Jinding Fastener v Council, 2015; T-82/17, PepsiCo v EUIPO—Intersnack Group, 2018. 298 See 50/84, Bensider v Commission, 1984, para. 7; 294/83 Les Verts v Parliament, 1986, paras 13–18; T-174/95, Svenska Journalistförbundet v Council, 1998, para. 43; T-458/04, Au Lys de France v Commission, 2007 paras 34–39; as regards sub-national territorial bodies, see T-236/06 Landtag Schleswig-Holstein v Commission, 2008, para. 22. 299 See, in that regard, C-229/05 P, PKK and KNK v Council, 2007, para. 112; C-872/19 P, Venezuela v Council, 2021, para. 47; T-279/19, Front Polisario v Council, 2021, paras 83–114 (appeal pending in C-779/21 P and C-799/21 P); T-344/19 and T-356/21, Front Polisario v Council, 2021, paras 136–159 (appeal pending in C-778/21 P and C-798/21 P); see also, in the context of public procurement, T-50/05 Evropaiki Dynamiki—Proigmena Systimata v Commission, 2010, para. 40.

324 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT In order for them to bring an action, they must be in a position to act as a responsible body in legal matters and thus be a party to legal proceedings.300 As the Court of Justice held in Venezuela v Council,301 the expression ‘legal person’ used in the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU represents an autonomous concept of Union law and cannot be interpreted restrictively. In addition, the fact that the applicant was recognized by the defendant as a negotiating partner before the proceedings arose302 and the fact that an ad hoc association was allowed to take part in a tendering procedure organized by the Commission303 have helped certain applicants to be recognized as legal persons for the purposes of the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU.

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(c) Capacity to bring action on behalf of another Natural or legal persons are entitled to demonstrate by sufficient evidence that they are bringing annulment proceedings acting on behalf of another party.304 (5) Admissibility requirements based on the type of act (a) Context Under the fourth paragraph of former Art. 230 EC, the only Community acts that could in principle be challenged by natural or legal persons in an action for annulment were decisions addressed to them, addressed to another person, or adopted in the form of a regulation. In the last two cases, an action for annulment of the ‘decision’ would lie only if it was of direct and individual concern to the applicant. The expression ‘decision addressed to another person’ also covered decisions addressed to a Member State.305 Consequently, the fourth paragraph of former Art. 230 EC seemed to preclude individuals from bringing an action for annulment against measures of general application. The reason was that, in accordance with a literal reading of this provision, an individual could bring an action for annulment only against ‘genuine’ decisions and ‘disguised’ decisions, that is to say, decisions adopted in the form of regulations.306 However, the case-law evolved so that the only question to be determined in relation to the admissibility of proceedings brought by a natural or legal person against an act not addressed to that person was whether the act was of direct and individual concern to that person.307

300 See 175/73, Union Syndicale and Others v Council, 1974, paras 7–17; 18/74, Syndicat Général du Personnel des Organismes Européens v Commission, 1974, paras 3–11; T-236/19, Comité de Douzelage de Houffalize v Commission and EACEA (order), 2020, paras 27–36; T-279/19, Front Polisario v Council, 2021, paras 83–114 (appeal pending in C-779/21 P and C-799/21 P); T-344/19 and T-356/21, Front Polisario v Council, 2021, paras 136–159 (appeal pending in C-778/21 P and C-798/21 P); compare T-134/11, Al-Faqih and Others v Commission, 2015, paras 41–42 (finding that the applicant no longer had any existence in law and thus no longer had capacity to bring legal proceedings before the General Court) (upheld in C-19/16 P, Al-Faqih and Others v Commission, 2017, paras 30–42). 301 See C-872/19 P, Venezuela v Council, 2021, paras 42–49. 302 See 175/73, Union Syndicale and Others v Council, 1974, para. 12; 18/74, Syndicat Général du Personnel des Organismes Européens v Commission, para. 9; T-161/94, Sinochem Heilongjiang v Council, 1996, para. 34; T-170/94, Shanghai Bicycle v Council, 1997, para. 26; T-153/19, European Union Copper Task Force v Commission, 2021, paras 35–41. 303 See 135/81, Groupement des Agences de Voyage v Commission, 1982, paras 10–11. 304 Compare T-411/06, Sogelma v EAR, 2008, paras 95–105. 305 See 25/62, Plaumann v Commission, 1963 ECR 95, 106–107. 306 See 101/76, Koninklijke Scholten Honig, 1977 ECR 797, 805. 307 See C-309/89, Codorníu v Council, 1994, para. 19; C-452/98, Nederlandse Antillen v Council, 2001, para. 55.

Identity of the Parties 325 If so, the action was admissible even if the annulment of an act of general application was sought.308 (b) Threshold determination: what type of act? The fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU codifies this development in the case-law. That provision states: ‘Any natural or legal person may . . . institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures.’ Therefore, despite the change in wording, the case-law on the former fourth paragraph of Art. 230 EC remains relevant as regards the type of act involved. Although no longer framed in terms of decisions and regulations, the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU still centres on the threshold question as to the type of act involved and whether such act is or is not addressed to the applicant.309 The answer to that question determines the standing requirements that must be fulfilled by the natural or legal person bringing the action for annulment on the basis of the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU. There are, in essence, four possible scenarios: – If the act is addressed to the applicant, in principle such applicant has standing (i.e. that applicant does not have to satisfy the conditions of direct and individual concern or demonstrate the existence of a regulatory act not entailing implementing measures). – If the act is one of individual application not addressed to the applicant but addressed to a third party, the applicant must satisfy the conditions of direct and individual concern. – If the act is an act of general application,310 other than a regulatory act not entailing implementing measures, the applicant must here too satisfy the conditions of direct and individual concern.

308 See C-309/89, Codorníu v Council, 1994; T-243/01, Sony Computer Entertainment Europe v Commission, 2003 paras 58–76. Anti-dumping cases afforded striking illustrations. Undertakings which could prove that their identity was apparent from the contested regulation or that the investigation which resulted in the imposition of anti-dumping duties related to them may bring an action for annulment of the regulation or of the provisions of the regulation which imposed anti-dumping duties on them: see, e.g. C-121/77, Nachi Fujikoshi v Council, 1979, paras 7–13; 239/82 and 275/82, Allied Corporation v Commission, 1984, paras 10–16; 240/84, NTN Toyo Bearing v Council, 1987, paras 4–7; C-358/89, Extramet Industrie v Council, 1991, paras 13–15. 309 See, in that regard, C-483/07 P, Galileo Lebensmittel v Commission (order), 2009, para. 29 (‘The essential distinguishing factor lies in whether or not the applicant for annulment is the addressee of the [act] being challenged’). The notion of an addressee of an act is construed in a formal sense, as referring to the person designated by that act as being its addressee: see T-125/18, Associazione GranoSalus v Commission (order), 2019, para. 49; T-806/17, BASF and REACH & colours v ECHA, 2019, paras 52–54. In the restrictive measures context, a subdivision of the entity to which fund-freezing measures are addressed is also regarded as an addressee and thus directly and individually concerned by those measures (see T-106/19, LTTE v Council, 2021, paras 79–85), while members of that entity that were not themselves included on the list of those whose funds were to be frozen are not obviously directly and individually concerned by such measures (see C-144/18, A and Others, 2017, paras 59–75). 310 An act is of general application if it applies to objectively determined situations and produces legal effects with respect to categories of persons envisaged in a general and abstract manner: see C-622/16 P to C-624/16 P, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission, 2018, para. 29; T-866/19, Ryanair and Laudamotion v Commission (order), 2021, para. 34..

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326 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT – If the act is an act of general application falling within the category of regulatory acts not entailing implementing measures, the applicant only needs to satisfy the condition of direct concern (and not individual concern).

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(6) Contested act is addressed to the applicant (a) Decisions finding a violation of Art. 101 and/or Art. 102 TFEU or rejecting a complaint Where the Commission finds that certain undertakings or associations of undertakings have infringed Art. 101 and/or Art. 102 TFEU and possibly imposes fines on them, the undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned may bring an action for the annulment of the decision in question. As addressees of the decision, they derive that right from the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU.311 Similarly, when a natural or legal person showing a legitimate interest lodges a complaint with the Commission on account of an alleged infringement of Art. 101 and/or Art. 102 TFEU,312 such persons will be entitled—as addressees of the Commission decision—to bring an action for annulment against the full or partial rejection of their complaint.313 (b) Addressees of merger decision Where the Commission finds that a concentration is incompatible with the internal market, the addressees of the relevant decision have standing, pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU, to bring an action for annulment of that decision. (7) Contested (non-regulatory) act is not addressed to the applicant (a) General overview (i) Avoiding the risk of an actio popularis Under the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU, an application brought by natural or legal persons against acts not addressed to them will be admissible only insofar as such acts are of direct and individual concern to them, save for those acts falling within the concept of regulatory acts not entailing implementing measures. The justification for the restriction lies in the far-reaching consequences of the annulment of a Union act. Annulment applies erga omnes and is retroactive. To make the action for annulment generally available might mean permanent litigation on Union acts of general application and open the way to an actio popularis.314 (ii) Cumulative requirements Following from the wording of the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU, under circumstances in which the applicant is challenging an act not addressed to it, which 311 A Member State, as a privileged applicant under the second paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU, can also bring an action seeking the annulment of a decision finding an infringement of Arts 101 and/or 102 TFEU: see T-398/07, Spain v Commission, 2012. A third party may also bring an action if they are directly and individually concerned by the challenged decision: see T-442/08, CISAC v Commission, 2013, paras 63–79. 312 Regulation No. 1/2003, Art. 7; Regulation No. 773/2004, Art. 5. 313 See 26/76, Metro v Commission, 1977, para. 13; 210/81, Demo-Studio Schmidt v Commission, 1983, paras 10–16; T-306/05, Scippacercola and Terezakis v Commission, 2008, para. 66; T-480/15, Agria Polska and Others v Commission, 2017, para. 93. 314 See, in that regard, T-670/16, Digital Rights Ireland v Commission (order), 2017, para. 50.

Identity of the Parties 327 falls outside the scope of a regulatory act not entailing implementing measures (see paras 7.107–7.111), that applicant must fulfil the requirements of direct concern and individual concern within the meaning of the case-law. These two requirements are cumulative, meaning that both must be satisfied or the application for annulment is inadmissible.315 Accordingly, the Union Courts may find it appropriate to examine either the requirement of direct concern or that of individual concern first, and then, if necessary, proceed to examine the other. Depending on the circumstances of the case, the Union Courts may proceed to the substantive merits of the application for annulment without first deciding on the pleas raised by the defendant Union institution, body, office, or agency as regards the alleged inadmissibility of the action based upon the individual applicant’s lack of locus standi, in particular where it finds that the application must in any event be dismissed.316 (b) Direct concern (i) Definition The requirement that the contested act not addressed to the applicant must be of direct concern to it expresses the rule that an applicant may bring an action for annulment only against acts of Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies which, as such, have legal effects on it.317 By contrast, Union acts which are to be implemented by national authorities and in respect of which the latter have a discretion do not obtain their precise scope until they have been implemented. Interested individuals are entitled to challenge the implementing measures before the national courts when they have been adopted. If it is argued that the implementing measures are unlawful on the ground that the Union act to be implemented is invalid, the national court may (or must) make a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling (see Ch. 10). In this way, the system of judicial protection reflects the structure of Union law-making. (ii) Criteria According to the case-law, in order for a natural or legal person to be regarded as directly concerned by a Union act for the purposes of Art. 263 TFEU, first, that act must directly affect the legal situation of the person concerned and, second, there must be no discretion left to the persons to whom that measure is addressed and who are responsible for its implementation, such implementation being purely automatic and resulting

315 See C-284/21 P, Commission v Braesch and Others, 2023, para. 124; T-252/20, Silver and Others v Council (order), 2021, para. 36; see also, in that regard, C-444/08 P, Azores v Council, 2009, para. 75. 316 See, e.g. C-23/00 P, Council v Boehringer, 2002, paras 51–52; C-666/20 P, GVN and Others v Commission, 2022, paras 24–25; T-296/18, Polskie Linie Lotnicze ‘LOT’ v Commission, 2021, para. 31; T-479/20, Eurobolt and Others v Commission, 2022, paras 30–31. 317 See, in that regard, 294/83, Les Verts v Parliament, 1986, para. 31 (the contested acts are of direct concern to the applicant because they ‘constitute a complete set of rules which are sufficient in themselves and . . . require no implementing provisions’). The mere fact that an act may exercise an influence on an applicant’s substantive situation is not sufficient for that applicant to be regarded as directly concerned: see C-402/20 P, Lípidos Santiga v Commission, 2021, para. 20.

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328 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT from Union rules without the application of other intermediate rules.318 These two criteria are cumulative,319 meaning that both must be satisfied or the application for annulment brought by the individual applicant is inadmissible. 7.94

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(iii) Contested act must directly affect the applicant’s legal situation As regards the first criterion, the requirement that the contested act must be of direct concern will be satisfied only if that measure is capable of directly producing effects on the applicant’s legal situation.320 In particular, a Union act that prevents a public legal person, such as a regional or local authority, from exercising its own powers as it sees fit has a direct effect on the legal position of that person, with the result that the act in question is regarded as being of direct concern to it.321 (iv) Contested act must leave no discretion to addressees entrusted with implementation As regards the second criterion, in order for it to be found that a Union act is of direct concern to the applicant, the question whether the contested act confers a discretion on the national authorities or on its addressee with regard to its implementation must be answered in the negative.322 The idea is that there are no further national or Union 318 See C‑622/16 P to C‑624/16 P, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission, para. 42; C-872/19 P, Venezuela v Council, 2019, para. 61; C-348/20 P, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, 2022, para. 43; T-67/18, Probelte v Commission, 2019, para. 50; T-2/19, Algebris (UK) and Anchorage Capital Group v SRB (order), 2019, para 39; T-245/19, Uzina Metalurgica Moldoveneasca v Commission, 2022, para. 38. According to the case-law, the same applies where the possibility for addressees not to give effect to the contested act is purely theoretical and their intention to act in conformity with it is not in doubt: see C-348/20 P, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, 2022, para. 44; T-726/20, Grupa Azoty and Others v Commission (order), 2021, para. 30 (appeal pending in C-73/22 P). 319 See C-348/20 P, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, 2022, para. 43; C-364/20 P, Bernis and Others v SRB, 2022, paras 58, 84; T-492/15, Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission, 2019, para. 197; T-245/19, Uzina Metalurgica Moldoveneasca v Commission, 2022, para. 38. 320 For examples in which the first criterion was met, see C-125/06 P Commission v Infront, 2008, paras 48–58; C-106/19 and C-232/19, Italy and Comune di Milano v Council and Parliament, 2022, paras 65–67; C-872/19 P, Venezuela v Council, 2021, paras 67–74; C-348/20 P, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, 2022, paras 75–81; T-798/14, DenizBank v Council, 2018, paras 50–55; T-364/16, ArcelorMittal Tubular Products Ostrava and Others v Commission, 2018, paras 39–43; T-251/18, IFSUA v Council, 2020, paras 38–53. For examples where the first criterion was not met, see C-486/01 P, Front National v Parliament, 2004, paras 34–43; C-663/17 P, C-665/17 P, and C-669/17 P, ECB v Trasta Komercbanka and Others, 2019, paras 106–111 (no criterion based on the ‘intensity’ of the effects of the contested act); T-746/15, Biofa v Commission (order), 2016, paras 30–39; T-726/20, Grupa Azoty and Others v Commission (order), 2021, paras 31–48 (appeal pending in C-73/22 P); T-527/21 Abenante and Others v Parliament and Council (order), 2022, paras 44–51. The fact that a regulation is directly applicable in the Member States does not automatically mean that all legal or natural persons are directly concerned by that regulation: see T-149/11, GS v Parliament and Council (order), 2011, para. 24. 321 See C-177/19 P to C-179/19 P, Germany—Ville de Paris and Others v Commission, 2022, para. 73 (not satisfied in those proceedings: see paras 74–102); T-178/18, Région de Bruxelles-Capitale v Commission (order), 2019, paras 66–67 (not satisfied in those proceedings: see paras 68–77); see also, in that regard, C-352/19 P, Région de Bruxelles-Capitale v Commission, 2020, AG Bobek Opinion, points 46–107, 126–158 (reaching different view that the applicants were directly concerned); and C-177/19 P to C-179/19 P, Germany—Ville de Paris and Others v Commission, AG Bobek Opinion, 2021, points 74–110 (reaching different view that the applicants were directly (and individually) concerned). 322 For examples where the second criterion was met, see C-125/06 P, Commission v Infront, 2008 paras 59– 63; C-461/18 P, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Distillerie Bonollo and Others, 2020, paras 60–77; C-106/19 and C-232/19, Italy and Comune di Milano v Council and Parliament, 2022, paras 63–64; C-872/19 P, Venezuela v Council, 2021, paras 90–92; C-348/20 P, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, 2022, paras 100–114; T-67/18, Probelte v Commission, 2019, paras 54–60; T-377/16, T‑645/16, and T‑809/16, Hypo Vorarlberg Bank v SRB, 2019, paras 64–66, 75–78; T-245/19, Uzina Metalurgica Moldoveneasca v Commission, 2022, paras 45–46. For examples where the second criterion was not met, see C-117/18 P, PGNiG Supply & Trading v Commission, 2019, paras 31–52; C-342/18 P, Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo, 2019, paras 40–64; C-663/17 P, C-665/17 P, and C-669/17 P, ECB v Trasta Komercbanka and Others, 2019, paras 114–115; T-282/18, Bernis and Others v SRB (order), 2020, paras 44–45; T-645/21, Bloom v Parliament and Council (order), 2022, paras 61, 64–74.

Identity of the Parties 329 acts required, the implementation of the contested act being ‘purely automatic’ without the application of other intermediate rules, and hence the effects on the applicant’s legal position are the direct consequence of the contested act itself.323 Conversely, the contested act will not be of direct concern to the applicant where, in implementing the act, the authorities entrusted with the task of implementation have a genuine discretion.324 (v) Directives Although an application brought by a natural or legal person for annulment of a dir- 7.96 ective is not inadmissible per se, a directive may present difficulties for natural and legal persons in fulfilling the requirement of direct concern. This is because, at least in principle, in transposing the directive, the Member States remain free to choose the form and method of implementing it in national law and achieving the result to be attained. In that context, a directive cannot, in itself, impose obligations on individuals. For those reasons, it was considered in some past case-law that a directive was not capable, independently of the adoption of implementing measures, of affecting the legal position of market participants.325 That being said, there were already circumstances in the case- law where a directive could be found to be of direct (and individual) concern to an individual applicant.326 Recently, in Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council,327 the Court of Justice made clear that any act may in principle directly affect the legal situation of an individual, irrespective of whether the act entails implementing measures, including, in the case of a directive, transposing measures. Accordingly, in a case where the contested directive has such effects, the fact that measures transposing that directive have been adopted or have yet to be adopted is not, in itself, relevant, since they do not call into question the direct nature of the connection between that directive and its effects, provided that that directive does not leave any discretion to the Member States as to the imposition of those effects on that individual. In addition, according to the Court, the mere fact that the act being challenged must be the subject of implementing measures—including, as regards a directive, transposing measures—does not necessarily mean that there is a discretion as regards the addressees of that act and that it is necessary to examine the specific legal effects produced by that act’s provisions, as referred to in the action, on the legal situation of the applicant. 323 See T-150/05, Sahlstedt and Others v Commission (order), 2006, para. 53; T-365/16, Portigon v SRB, 2019, paras 67–69. The failure to exercise discretion is not therefore a relevant criterion for determining whether a natural or legal person is directly concerned by the contested act under the fourth para. of Art. 263 TFEU: see C-264/15 P and C-265/15 P, Makro autoservicio mayorista v Commission (order), 2016, para. 62. 324 See 123/77 UNICME v Council, 1978, para. 11; C-372/08 P Atlantic Dawn and Others v Commission (order), 2009, paras 35–41; T-149/11, GS v Parliament and Council (order), 2011, paras 20–23; T-645/21, Bloom v Parliament and Council (order), 2022, paras 61, 64–74. 325 See T-172/98 and T-175/98 to T-177/98, Salamander and Others v Parliament and Council, 2000, para. 54; T-244/13, Industrie Cartarie Tronchetti Ibérica v Commission (order), 2014, para. 30; see also, in that regard, C-298/89, Gibraltar v Council, 1993, paras 14–24; T-449/05, Dikigorikos Syllogos Ioanninon v Parliament and Council, 2007, paras 60–78; T-16/04, Arcelor v Parliament and Council, 2010, paras 94–122. The Union Courts may, alternatively, decide that the contested directive is not of individual concern to the applicant: see, e.g. T-449/05, Dikigorikos Syllogos Ioanninon v Parliament and Council, 2007, paras 79–86; T-141/19, Sabo and Others v Parliament and Council (order), 2020, paras 25–46. 326 See T-135/96, UEAPME v Council, 1998, para. 90; T-420/05, Vischim v Commission, 2009, paras 69–79; T-380/06, Vischim v Commission, 2009, paras 57–59. 327 C-348/20 P, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, 2022, paras 64–74, 95–99 (finding that both direct and individual concern were met as regards the contested directive: see paras 75–81, 100–115, 156–163).

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(vi) Authorization by the Commission of an act of a Member State A decision by which the Commission authorizes Member States in some areas of Union law to diverge from the applicable general provisions may be of direct concern to individuals depending on the circumstances. This will be so where, before they were given authorization, the national authorities limited their discretion themselves. The Court of Justice has therefore held that where the Member State concerned makes it known beforehand that it will implement an authorizing decision, that act will be of direct concern to individuals.328 The Member State’s position does not have to be express; it may be inferred from all relevant factors.329 If a Member State does not make its position known beforehand with regard to an authorizing decision, it reserves its power of discretion and the act is not of direct concern to individuals.330 If an application from a Member State for authorization is refused and this adversely affects an individual’s interests, the requirement that the contested act must be of direct concern to the applicant is assessed just as if the authorization had been granted.331 Authorization from the Commission of a protective measure already adopted by a Member State is of direct concern to individuals.332 (vii) Aid programmes financed by the Commission In the context of aid programmes financed by the Union or the grant of Union loans to non-EU Member States, one and the same division of powers is generally instituted between the authorities of the beneficiary State and the Union institutions. The authorities of the beneficiary State have the power to select a contractual partner to carry out a particular project, to negotiate the contractual conditions, and to conclude the agreement. The Commission is given the task only of examining whether the conditions for Union financing are met. Entities competing for the grant of a particular project are in a legal relationship only with the authorities of the beneficiary State. For its part, the Commission has legal relations only with the authorities of the beneficiary State. This pattern of legal relations means that the decision by which the Commission approves the financing of a contract concluded by the beneficiary State is not of direct concern to natural and legal persons to which the contract is not granted.333 This is because the Commission’s decision to finance the project does not take the place of the decision of the beneficiary State granting the contract in question.334 However, it is possible for 328 See 62/70, Bock v Commission, 1971, paras 6–8; compare 10/68 and 18/68, ‘Eridania’ Zuccherifici Nationali and Others v Commission, 1969, para. 11; T-69/99, DSTV v Commission, 2000, paras 24–32, in particular para. 29; T-694/14, EREF v Commission (order), 2015, paras 20–35, 38; T-512/14, Green Source Poland v Commission, 2017, paras 76, 79; T-347/16, Inox Mare v Commission (order), 2017, paras 51–52. 329 See 11/82, Piraiki-Patraiki v Commission, 1985, paras 7–10; compare C‑445/07 P and C‑455/07 P, Ente per le Ville Vesuviane, 2009, paras 58–60; C-248/12 P, Northern Ireland Department of Agriculture and Rural Development v Commission (order), 2014, paras 22–26; T-341/02, Regione Siciliana v Commission (order), 2004, para. 79; T-694/14, EREF v Commission (order), 2015, paras 20–35, 38; T-512/14, Green Source Poland v Commission, 2017, paras 76, 79. 330 See also 123/77, UNICME and Others v Council, 1978, paras 8–20 (where derogating rules were provided for a Member State in a Council regulation). 331 See 69/69, Alcan v Commission, 1970, para. 15. 332 See 106/63 and 107/63, Toepfer and Getreide-Import v Commission, 1965 ECR 405, 411. 333 See 126/83, STS v Commission, 1984, para. 18; 118/83, CMC v Commission, 1985, para. 28. 334 However, a Commission act which, by reason of its context, may be isolated from the procedure for the conclusion of a contract between the beneficiary State and an undertaking inasmuch as the Commission adopted it in

Identity of the Parties 331 the natural or legal person, including regional or local entities to which the beneficiary State awarded a contract, to be directly concerned by the Commission decision refusing financing. This depends on the circumstances in which the Commission decision was adopted.335 If it appears that the Commission decision refusing Union financing deprived the applicant of any real possibility of performing the transaction entered into with the beneficiary State or of obtaining payment of the goods supplied on the agreed terms, the applicant’s ‘legal situation’ will be directly concerned. This will be the case where the contract with the beneficiary State was concluded on account of the commitments which the Commission would enter into in its capacity as ‘financing authority’ once it found that the contract was in conformity with the Union rules.336 (c) Individual concern (i) Definition According to the case-law, a Union act not addressed to natural or legal persons will be of individual concern to them if it affects them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the person addressed by the act.337 This means that natural and legal persons must prove that the contested act, which, in terms of form, is not addressed to them, affects them substantively as if the act were addressed to them.338 This is a particularly strict requirement, and it curtails the ability of natural or legal persons to bring actions for annulment. the exercise of its own powers and specifically directed it to an individual undertaking, which loses any chance of actually being awarded the contract simply because that act is adopted, does give rise to binding legal effects as regards the undertaking in question and may therefore be regarded as an act adversely affecting it against which the undertaking concerned may bring an action for annulment: see C-395/95 P, Geotronics v Commission, 1997, paras 12–15; see also, in that regard, C-183/17 P, IMG v Commission, 2019, para. 62. 335 Compare, in particular, T-341/02, Regione Siciliana v Commission (order), 2004, paras 47–80 (no direct concern), with T-60/03, Regione Siciliana v Commission (order), 2005, paras 44–68 (direct concern) (set aside in C-15/06 P); and T-189/02, Ente per le Ville Vesuviane v Commission, 2007, paras 37–53 (direct concern) (set aside in C-445/07 P and C-455/07 P). See also e.g. T-156/06 Regione Siciliana v Commission (order), 2007, paras 39–55 (no direct concern); T-324/06, Municipio de Gondomar v Commission, 2008, paras 37–44 (no direct concern); T-363/03, Regione Siciliana v Commission, 2008, paras 19–26 (no direct concern); T-84/10, Regione Puglia v Commission, 2011, paras 42–44 (no direct concern); T-453/10, Northern Ireland Department of Agriculture and Rural Development v Commission (order), 2012, paras 42–66 (no direct concern); T-403/13, APRAM v Commission (order), 2015, paras 35–71 (no direct concern); T-403/15 JYSK v Commission, 2017, paras 23–67 (no direct concern); T-512/14, Green Source Poland v Commission, 2017, paras 32–83 (no direct concern). 336 See C-386/96 P, Dreyfus v Commission, 1998, paras 40– 56; C-391/96 P, Compagnie Continentale v Commission, 1998, paras 38–54; C-403/96 P, Glencore Grain v Commission, 1998, paras 40–56; C-404/96 P Glencore Grain v Commission, 1998, paras 38–54; compare C‑445/07 P and C‑455/07 P, Ente per le Ville Vesuviane, 2009, para. 58; C-248/12 P, Northern Ireland Department of Agriculture and Rural Development v Commission (order), 2014, paras 22–26; T-403/15 JYSK v Commission, 2017, paras 57–59 (no direct concern); T-512/14, Green Source Poland v Commission, 2017, paras 75–78. 337 See 25/62, Plaumann v Commission, 1963 ECR 95, 107; C-348/20 P, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, 2022, para. 156; C-284/21 P, Commission v Braesch and Others, 2023, para. 51; T-284/15, AlzChem v Commission, 2018, para. 36; T-377/16, T‑645/16, and T‑809/16, Hypo Vorarlberg Bank v SRB, 2019, para. 63. T-254/18, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and Others v Commission, 2021, para. 49 (appeal pending in C-478/21 P). 338 See, in that regard, C-258/02 P, Bactria Industriehygiene-Service v Commission, 2003, paras 34, 36, 50 (the time for assessing whether the natural or legal person is individually concerned is the date of adoption of the contested act); C-408/15 P and C-409/15 P, Ackermann Saatzucht and Others v Parliament and Council, 2016, paras 37–38.

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(ii) Act of individual application Where the contested act is one of individual application, it is sufficient for the applicant to show that, at the time when that act was adopted, they were part of a closed class of persons concerned by that act.339 In other words, where the contested act affects a group of persons who were identified or identifiable when that act was adopted by reason of criteria specific to the members of the group, those persons may be individually concerned by that act inasmuch as they form part of a limited class of economic operators, and this may be the case in particular where the act modifies rights acquired by the natural and legal persons prior to its adoption.340 It makes no difference whether the class is large or small or whether its members are known by name. Various sets of circumstances may bring about a closed class. Accordingly, a closed class is involved where the contested act affects only persons who satisfied certain conditions before it was adopted.341 This is a situation in which the contested act has completely retroactive effect. Because the number of persons who satisfied the conditions laid down for the application of the act in the past can no longer change, the act is applicable to a closed class. For example, a Commission decision approving a national decision refusing to grant import licences concerns the closed class of importers that were refused an import licence before the Commission decision was taken. That group was known (or at least ascertainable) when the decision was adopted.342 (iii) Act of general application Where, in contrast, the contested act is one of general application, it is not enough for the applicant to show that it belongs to a closed class in order to show that it is individually concerned by it.343 The fact that the persons to whom such an act is applicable are identifiable (meaning the possibility of determining more or less precisely the number, or

339 In addition to ‘closed class’ (see, e.g. C-106/19 and C-232/19, Italy and Comune di Milano v Council and Parliament, 2022, para. 70; T-246/19 Cambodia and CRF v Commission (order), 2020, para. 91), other expressions, such as ‘closed circle’ (see, e.g. C-132/12 P, Stichting Woonpunt and Others v Commission, 2014, para. 62) or ‘closed group’ (see, e.g. T-245/19 Uzina Metalurgica Moldoveneasca v Commission, 2022, para. 68), may also be found in the case-law. 340 See 11/82, Piraiki-Patraiki and Others v Commission, 1985, para. 31; C-152/88, Sofrimport v Commission, 1990, para. 11; C-182/03 P and C-217/03 P, Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission, 2006, para. 60; C-125/06 P, Commission v Infront, 2008, paras 71–72; C-132/12 P, Stichting Woonpunt and Others v Commission, 2014, paras 59–62; C-348/20 P, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, 2022, para. 158; T-560/18, Fortischem v Parliament and Council (order), 2018, paras 55–56; T-781/16, Puma and Others v Commission, 2021, para. 51; T-132/18, Roland v Commission, 2021, para. 50; T-246/19, Cambodia and CRF v Commission (order), 2020, para. 91. 341 See, e.g. C-182/03 P and C-217/03 P, Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission, 2006, paras 60–64; C-125/06 P, Commission v Infront, 2008 paras 71–78; C-132/12 P, Stichting Woonpunt and Others v Commission, 2014, paras 60– 62; C-106/19 and C-232/19, Italy and Comune di Milano v Council and Parliament, 2022, paras 70–76; T-747/17, UPF v Commission, 2019, paras 37–43; T-781/16, Puma and Others v Commission, 2021, para. 57; T-132/18, Roland v Commission, 2021, para. 55; T-245/19, Uzina Metalurgica Moldoveneasca v Commission, 2022, paras 66–70. 342 See 106/63 and 107/63, Toepfer and Getreide-Import v Commission, 1965 ECR 405, 411–12; see also, in that regard, 62/70, Bock v Commission, 1971, paras 2–5; T-822/19, Asoliva and Anierac v Commission (order), 2021, para. 58. 343 See, e.g. T-16/04, Arcelor v Parliament and Council, 2010, paras 106–110; T-291/04, Enviro Tech Europe and Enviro Tech International v Commission, 2011, paras 104–113; T-818/16, Netflix International and Netflix v Commission, 2018, paras 60–64; T-560/17, Fortischem v Parliament and Council (order), 2018, paras 81–84; T-645/20, Dual Star Logistic and Others v Parliament and Council (order), 2021, paras 41–52; T-252/20, Silver and Others v Council (order), 2021, paras 38–59 (appeal pending in C-499/21 P).

Identity of the Parties 333 even the identity, of the persons to whom an act applies) is not determinative in itself.344 Additionally, the fact that an act of general application is applicable only to a small number of individuals,345 that certain market participants are affected more harshly in economic terms than their competitors,346 or that different specific consequences may ensue for the various persons to whom the contested act applies347 is not sufficient to show that the persons in question are individually concerned by the act. If the situation to be regulated is such that, in order to attain its aim, the contested act must be held to be applicable without distinction to facts which existed at the time when it entered into effect and to similar facts which arose thereafter, an applicant cannot rely on its partial retroactive effect in order to claim that it is individually concerned by that act.348 (iv) Exceptional circumstances in which the applicant is individually concerned by an act of general application The case-law recognizes exceptional circumstances under which the applicant can show in only limited ways that it is individually concerned by an act of general application depending on the case.349 First, an applicant will be individually concerned where the act adversely affected specific rights of the applicant or its members.350 In Codorníu,351 the Court of Justice held that a provision of a Council regulation which reserved the use of the term ‘crémant’ to sparkling wine produced in France and Luxembourg prevented the Spanish undertaking concerned from continuing to sell its wine under the trade mark ‘Gran Cremant de Codorníu’. It had registered this trade mark in Spain as long ago as 1924, and was therefore regarded as being in a position which differentiated it, from the point of view of the provision concerned, from all other market participants. 344 See 123/77, UNICME v Council, 1978, para. 16; C-362/06 P, Sahlstedt and Others v Commission, 2009, para. 31; C-456/13, T & L Sugars and Sidul Açúcares v Commission, 2015, para. 64; C-384/16 P, European Union Copper Task Force v Commission, 2018, para. 94; C-348/20 P, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, 2022, para. 157; T-818/16, Netflix International and Netflix v Commission, 2018, para. 60; T-866/19, Ryanair and Laudamotion v Commission (order), 2021, para. 88; T-645/20, Dual Star Logistic and Others v Parliament and Council (order), 2021, para. 41. 345 See C-263/02 P, Commission v Jégo-Quéré, 2004, para. 46. 346 See C-312/00 P, Commission v Camar and Tico, 2002, paras 69–83; T-16/04, Arcelor v Parliament and Council, 2010, para. 106; T-645/20, Dual Star Logistic and Others v Parliament and Council (order), 2021, para. 46. The fact that the applicant may lose a major source of revenue as a result of new legislation is not sufficient to establish individual concern (see T-291/04, Enviro Tech Europe and Enviro Tech International v Commission, 2011, para. 110). Nor is the fact that the applicant is the largest undertaking in the sector in question (see T-120/98, Alce v Commission (order), 1999, paras 21–23). 347 See C-409/96 P, Sveriges Betodlares Centralförening and Henrikson v Commission (order), 1997, para. 37; T-370/02, Alpenhain-Camembert-Werk and Others v Commission (order), 2004, para. 62. 348 See C-244/88, Usines Coopératives de Déshydratation du Vexin and Others v Commission, 1989, paras 11–14; C-229/88, Cargill and Others v Commission, 1990, paras 13–18; see also, in that regard, C-408/15 P and C-409/15 P, Ackermann Saatzucht and Others v Parliament and Council, 2016, paras 39–40. 349 For a recent example in the context of energy law, see C-348/20 P, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, 2022, paras 159–163. Another notable example in the context of tariff classification regulations is T-243/01, Sony Computer Entertainment Europe v Commission, 2003, paras 58–78; compare T-82/06, Apple Computer International v Commission, 2008, paras 44–60; T-716/16, Pfizer and Pfizer Santé familiale v Commission, 2017, paras 58–81. 350 See C-309/89, Codorníu v Council, 1994, paras 19–22; compare, inter alia, C-483/07 P, Galileo Lebensmittel v Commission, 2009, para. 45; C-146/08 P, Efkon v Parliament and Council, 2009, paras 39–42: T-212/02, Commune de Champagne and Others v Council and Commission (order), 2007, paras 186–189; T-291/04, Enviro Tech Europe and Enviro Tech International v Commission, 2011, para. 116; T-252/20, Silver and Others v Council (order), 2021, paras 60–61 (appeal pending in C-499/21 P). 351 See C-309/89, Codorníu v Council, 1994, paras 19–22.

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334 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT Second, the applicant may argue that, in adopting the contested act of general application, the Union institution, body, office, or agency was under a duty to take account of its specific circumstances. Such specific protection distinguishes it sufficiently from other market participants to which the act applies. In addition, there is the fact that such a market participant must be able to assert that specific protection and therefore to bring an action.352 However, the fact that a natural or legal person intervenes in some way in the procedure leading to the adoption of a Union act can only cause that person to be individually concerned with regard to that act within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU if the applicable Union rules confer on that person specific procedural guarantees,353 such as the right to be heard.354 Even then, a natural or legal person enjoying a procedural right will not, as a rule, have standing to bring proceedings contesting the legality of a Union act in terms of its substantive content; the precise scope of a natural or legal person’s right of action against a Union act depends on their legal position as defined by Union law with a view to protecting the legitimate interests thus afforded to them.355 Third, an applicant will be individually concerned when the contested act mentions the applicant by name (although the applicant is not the addressee of the act), and a situation specific to the applicant is directly governed by the act.356 What is involved, therefore, is a situation in which the Union authority adopts an act with the aim of obtaining a specific result in favour of,357 or to the disadvantage of,358 specific persons. 7.103

(v) Refusal of a Union institution An action for annulment may be brought by a natural or legal person against a Union institution’s refusal to adopt an act only if an application brought against the act refused would have been admissible.359

352 See 11/82, Piraiki-Patraiki v Commission, 1985, paras 17–32; C-152/88, Sofrimport v Commission, 1990, paras 8–13; C-390/95 P, Antillean Rice Mills v Council, 1999, paras 25–30; C-167/02 P, Rothley and Others v Parliament, 2004, paras 32–38. For some examples in which those exceptional circumstances were not met, see, e.g. C-451/98, Antillean Rice Mills v Council, 2001, paras 56–68; C-452/98, Nederlandse Antillen v Council, 2001, paras 54–77; C-142/00 P, Commission v Nederlandse Antillen, 2003, paras 64–81; C-244/16 P, Industrias Químicas del Vallés v Commission, 2018, paras 89–92; C-384/16 P, European Union Copper Task Force v Commission, 2018, paras 90–92; T-43/98, Emesa Sugar v Council, 2001, paras 54–56; T-219/09 and T-326/09, Albertini and Donnelly v Parliament (order), 2010, paras 47–51; T-645/20, Dual Star Logistic and Others v Parliament and Council (order), 2021, paras 49–52. 353 See T-47/00, Rica Foods v Commission, 2002, para. 55; T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health v Council, 2002, paras 81–106; T-16/04, Arcelor v Parliament and Council, 2010, paras 119–120; T-291/04, Enviro Tech Europe and Enviro Tech International v Commission, 2011, para. 106; T-120/08, Arch Chemicals and Others v Commission, 2011, paras 48–53. 354 See C-263/02 P, Commission v Jégo-Quéré, 2004, para. 47. 355 See C-355/08 P, WWF-UK v Council (order), 2009, para. 44; C-465/16 P, Council v Windth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association, 2019, para. 107; C-172/19 P, Euracoal v Commission (order), 2020, para. 27. 356 See 138/79, Roquette Frères v Council, 1980, paras 13–16; 139/79, Maizena v Council, 1980, paras 13–16; 239/82 and 275/82, Allied Corporation v Commission, 1984, paras 4, 12; compare T-75/04 and T-77/04 to T-79/04, Arch Chemicals and Others v Commission, 2011, para. 60. 357 See T-139/01, Comafrica and Dole Fresh Fruit Europe v Commission, 2005, para. 110. 358 See 100/74, CAM v Commission, 1975, para. 16. 359 See, e.g. 42/71, Nordgetreide v Commission, 1972, para. 5; 97/86, 193/86, 99/86, and 215/86, Asteris and Others v Commission, 1988, paras 17–18; C-15/91 and C-108/91, Buckl and Others v Commission, 1992, para. 22; T-29/03, Comunidad Autónoma de Andalucía v Commission (order), 2004, para. 30; T-400/04 and T-402/04 to T-404/04, Arch Chemicals and Others v Commission, 2011, paras 79–87; T-468/21, Avenir de la langue française v Commission (order), 2021, paras 14–22. See para. 7.15.

Identity of the Parties 335 (vi) Les Verts judgment Once again, in exceptional circumstances, the requirement that the contested act must be of individual concern to the applicant has been found to discriminate against persons who find themselves in a similar position. In such a case, the Court of Justice, applying the principle of equal treatment, will, if necessary, lower the hurdle of admissibility. The Les Verts judgment360 provides the only illustration to date. The decision of the Bureau of the European Parliament determining the allocation of financial assistance to political parties with a view to preparing for the European elections applied both to political parties which were represented in the Parliament at the time when the decision was adopted, which were therefore identifiable, and to parties which were not so represented at that time and therefore were not identifiable, but which would be taking part in the elections. According to the wording of the judgment, there was no doubt that parties represented in the Parliament, which were identifiable, were individually concerned. The question arose whether this was also true of parties not represented in the Parliament, who were therefore not identifiable. The Court of Justice held that the fact that the decision applied to all parties taking part in the elections placed the second class of parties in a similar position to the first, with the result that both classes had to be regarded as individually concerned by the decision in the same way. (vii) Regional and local entities Where the contested act is not addressed to a particular regional or local entity of a Member State, such entity must demonstrate that it is individually concerned by such measure within the meaning of the case-law.361 It should be borne in mind that the general interest that a regional or local entity may have, as the body competent for economic, social, or environmental matters in its territory, in obtaining an outcome conducive to the prosperity of that territory cannot, of itself, be sufficient for it to be regarded as individually concerned within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU.362 That being said, the Union Courts have recognized that where the contested act affects a measure of which the entity concerned is the author and prevents it from exercising, as it sees fit, its own powers conferred on it under the particular national constitutional system, that entity is individually concerned for the purposes of the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU.363

360 See 294/83, Les Verts v Parliament, 1986, paras 35–37; compare T-357/03, Gollnisch and Others v Parliament (order), 2005, paras 69–70; T-40/04, Bonino and Others v Parliament and Council (order), 2005, paras 73–74; T-252/20, Silver and Others v Council (order), 2021, para. 65 (appeal pending in C-499/21 P). 361 See para. 7.78. In the context of State aid, see para. 7.126. 362 See, e.g. T-37/04, Região autónoma dos Açores v Council, 2008, para. 53; T-502/10, Department du Gers v Commission (order), 2011, paras 25–26; compare C-106/19 and C-232/19, Italy and Comune di Milano v Council and Parliament, 2022, paras 75–76. 363 See, e.g. T-366/03 and T-235/04, Land Oberösterreich and Austria v Commission, 2005, para. 28; T-227/01 to T-229/01, T-265/01, T-266/01, and T-270/01, Territorio Histórico de Álava and Others v Commission, 2009, para. 76; T-122/05, Benkö and Others v Commission, 2006, paras 58–64; T-417/04, Regione autonoma Friuli-Venezia Giulia v Commission (order), 2007, paras 61–66; T-66/19, Vlaamse Gemeenschap and Vlaams Gewest v Parliament and Council (order), 2019, paras 39–45. There is a similar approach taken in the case-law as regards the assessment of direct concern in this context: see para. 7.126.

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(viii) Associations Under the case-law, trade associations may be deemed to be individually concerned in at least three types of situation.364 First, the association will be individually concerned if it can show that a provision of Union law expressly grants it a series of procedural rights.365 Second, this will be so where the association represents the interests of natural or legal persons who would be entitled to bring proceedings in their own right.366 Third, the association will be individually concerned where it is differentiated because its own interests as an association are affected by the contested act, especially where its position as negotiator of the act in question is affected.367 In those three situations, the Union Courts take account of the participation of the association in question in the decision-making procedure. (d) Regulatory acts not entailing implementing measures (i) Context In the years leading up to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Court of Justice was not prepared to relax the criteria developed in its case-law for individual concern depending on the legal protection enjoyed by natural and legal persons before their national courts.368 In some cases, it happened that a natural or legal person had no apparent remedy to challenge the legality of a provision of what was then Community law before a national court, in particular where the contested act did not require the Member States to adopt any implementing measures. As is well known, in Jégo-Quéré v Commission,369 the General Court held that the strict interpretation of the notion of individual concern had to be reconsidered in order to ensure effective judicial protection for individuals, setting forth a more relaxed test to the effect that the contested 364 See T-122/96, Federolio v Commission, 1997, paras 60–81; T-7/13, ADEAS v Commission (order), 2014, paras 32–43; T-747/17, UPF v Commission, 2019, para. 20; T-645/20, Dual Star Logistic and Others v Parliament and Council (order), 2021, paras 59–68; T-645/21, Bloom v Parliament and Council (order), 2022, para. 42. In the context of State aid, see para. 7.127. 365 See 191/82, Fediol v Commission, 1983, paras 28–29; C-565/19 P, Carvalho and Others v Parliament and Council, 2021, para. 90; T-12/93, CCE de Vittel and Others v Commission, 1995, paras 40–41; T-254/18, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and Others v Commission, 2021, paras 52–60 (appeal pending in C-478/21 P). The mere fact that the internal rules of an association entrust it with the task of defending the common interests of its members and representing them before the Union Courts is not sufficient in this respect: see T-747/17, UPF v Commission, 2019, para. 21. 366 See C-487/06 P, British Aggregates Association v Commission, 2008, para. 39; T-380/94, AIUFASS and AKT v Commission, 1996, para. 50; T‑112/14 to T‑116/14 and T‑119/14, Molinos Río de la Plata and Others v Commission, 2016, paras 33–64; T-747/17, UPF v Commission, 2019, paras 24–44; T-251/18, IFSUA v Council, 2020, paras 52–53; T-254/18, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and Others v Commission (order), 2021, paras 83–123 (appeal pending in C-478/21 P); T-246/19, Cambodia and CRF v Commission (order), 2020, paras 95–122; T-454/20, Garment Manufacturers Association in Cambodia v Commission (order), 2021, paras 17–67 (also finding requirement of direct concern relevant for the purposes of the third limb of the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU: see paras 68–90). The absence of a right to vote or any other means for undertakings to defend their interests within an association does not preclude the association from bringing an action on behalf of its members: see C-465/16 P, Council v Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association, 2019, paras 120–125; T-254/18, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and Others v Commission (order), 2021, paras 99–101 (appeal pending in C-478/21 P). 367 See 67/85, 68/85, and 70/85, Van der Kooy and Others v Commission, 1988, para. 21; C-313/90, CIRFS and Others v Commission, 1993, paras 29–30; C‑106/98 P, Comité d’entreprise de la Société française de production and Others v Commission, 2000, paras 42–45; C-368/05 P, Polyelectrolyte Producers Group v Council and Commission, 2006, paras 59–61; T-84/01, ACHE v Parliament and Council (order), 2002, para. 25; T-391/02, Bundesverband der Nahrungsmittel-und Speiseresteverwertung and Kloh v Parliament, 2004, para. 48; T-264/03, Schmoldt and Others v Commission, 2004, paras 131–143; T-645/21, Bloom v Parliament and Council (order), 2022, paras 42–54. 368 See, in that regard, C-258/02 P, Bactria Industriehygiene-Service v Commission, 2003, paras 57–60. 369 See T-177/01, Jégo-Quéré v Commission, 2002, paras 41, 50–51 (set aside in C-263/02 P).

Identity of the Parties 337 act—which did not require the Member States to adopt any implementing measures— affects those persons’ legal position, in a manner which is both definite and immediate, by restricting their rights or by imposing obligations on them. However, thereafter, in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council,370 the Court of Justice did not follow the General Court’s approach,371 finding that only a Treaty amendment could make the admissibility requirements more flexible in that regard. It is in this context that the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU should be understood.372 The fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU relaxes the standing requirements for natural and legal persons by removing the requirement of individual concern for regulatory acts which do not require implementing measures (‘against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures’). In order for natural and legal persons to avail themselves of this limb of the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU, they must therefore meet the three main requirements relating to: (1) concept of regulatory act; (2) direct concern; and (3) not entailing implementing measures.373 (ii) Concept of regulatory act The concept of a regulatory act is not defined among the legal instruments referred to in Art. 288 TFEU. In the case-law, the Union Courts have held that, while its scope is more restricted than that of the concept of ‘acts’ used in the first and second limbs of the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU, the concept of regulatory act extends to all acts of general application other than legislative acts.374 In other words, the concept of regulatory act covers in principle any act of general application375 which has not been adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure or a special legislative procedure within the meaning of Art. 289 TFEU.376 By contrast, a legislative act may form the 370 See C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council, 2002, paras 35, 44–45. 371 See also C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council, AG Jacobs Opinion, 2002 (proposing a similar test to that of the General Court in Jégo-Quéré). 372 See C-583/11 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, 2013, paras 55, 57; C‑622/16 P to C‑624/16 P, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission, 2018, para. 22; T-262/10, Microban International and Microban (Europe) v Commission, 2011, para. 32; T-312/14, Federcoopesca and Others v Commission, 2015, paras 25–26. Such an opening had already appeared as Art. III-365(4) of the Draft Constitutional Treaty, which also forms the background to what is now the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU: see, in that regard, C‑622/16 P to C‑624/16 P, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission, 2018, para. 26. 373 See T-157/21, RG v Council (order), 2021, para. 33; T-30/19, CRIA and CCCMC v Commission, 2022, para. 55. 374 See C-583/11 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, 2013, paras 58–61; C-622/16 to C-624/16 P, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission, 2018, paras 23–28; C-872/19 P, Venezuela v Council, 2021, para. 92; T-262/10 Microban International and Microban (Europe) v Commission, 2011, paras 22–25; T-296/12, The Heath Food Manufacturers’ Association and Others v Commission, 2015, para. 34; T-245/17, ViaSat v Commission, 2021, para. 168; T-153/19, European Union Copper Task Force v Commission, 2021, para. 47; T-30/19, CRIA and CCCMC v Commission, 2022, para. 56. 375 Acts of individual application therefore do not fall within the scope of regulatory act: see, e.g. T-894/16, Air France v Commission, 2019, para. 25; see para. 7.87. As regards the field of State aid, the fact that a part of the contested act is of individual concern to the restricted class of beneficiaries of the aid scheme concerned (who did not have any interest in challenging that part of the act since it considered the aid scheme to be compatible with the internal market) does not preclude that part of the contested act from being regarded as a regulatory act of general application where it applies to objectively determined situations and produces legal effects for categories of persons envisaged in a general and abstract manner (that is, including competitors of the beneficiaries opposed to the aid scheme): see C-622/16 to C-624/16 P, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission, 2018, paras 31–39. 376 See T-94/10, Rütgers Germany and Others v ECHA, 2013, para. 58; T-645/20, Dual Star Logistic and Others v Parliament and Council (order), 2021, para. 22; T-30/19, CRIA and CCCMC v Commission, 2022, para. 56. The General Court has regarded the concept of regulatory acts as excluding decisions approving the conclusion of an international agreement, and in particular decisions approving the conclusion of an agreement setting out the

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(iii) Requirement of direct concern With respect to the requirement of direct concern introduced in the third limb of the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU in connection with a regulatory act, the Union Courts have held that this requirement cannot be subject to a more restrictive interpretation than that already developed in the case-law and thus it is interpreted the same way in respect to both limbs of that provision.378 Consequently, the case-law regarding direct concern in respect of the second limb of that provision is relevant (see paras 7.92–7.98). (iv) Requirement that the contested act must not entail implementing measures According to the case-law, the expression ‘does not entail implementing measures’ within the meaning of the third limb of the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU is to be interpreted in the light of the objective of that provision, which, as is apparent from its drafting history, is to ensure that individuals do not have to break the law in order to have access to a court. Where a regulatory act directly affects the legal situation of natural or legal persons without requiring implementing measures, these persons could be denied effective judicial protection if they did not have a legal remedy before the Union Courts for the purpose of challenging the lawfulness of the regulatory act. In the absence of implementing measures, natural or legal persons, although directly concerned by the act in question, would be able to obtain judicial review of the act only after having infringed its provisions, by pleading that those provisions are unlawful in proceedings initiated against them before the national court.379 The Union Courts have established a number of guidelines in respect of assessment of whether a regulatory act entails implementing measures.380 In particular, that issue arrangements for the withdrawal of a Member State from the Union: see, e.g. T-252/20, Silver and Others v Council (order), 2021, paras 68–97 (appeal pending in C-499/21 P); T-157/21, RG v Council (order), 2021, paras 35–43; T-279/19, Front Polisario v Council, 2021, paras 137–140 (appeal pending in C-779/21 P and C-799/21 P); T-344/19 and T-356/21, Front Polisario v Council, 2021, paras 173–174 (appeal pending in C-778/21 P and C-798/21 P). 377 See C-106/19 and C-232/19, Italy and Comune di Milano v Council and Parliament, 2022, para. 60; C-348/20 P, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, 2022, para. 42; T-330/18, Carvalho and Others v Parliament and Council (order), 2019, paras 38–43; T-162/19, Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Parliament and Council (order), 2020, paras 16–20; T-141/19, Sabo and Others v Parliament and Council (order), 2020, para. 24; see also, in that regard, C-583/11 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, 2013, para. 70. 378 See C-453/19 P, Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission, 2021, paras 82–84; C-348/20 P, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, 2022, para. 73; T-812/14 RENV, BP Lux 2 and Others v Commission, 2019, para. 73; T-726/20, Grupa Azoty and Others v Commission (order), 2021, para. 28 (appeal pending in C-73/22 P). 379 See C-274/12 P, Telefónica v Commission, 2013, para. 27; C-384/16 P, European Union Copper Task Force v Commission, 2018, para. 35; C-622/16 to C-624/16 P, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission, 2018, para. 58; T-866/19, Ryanair and Laudamotion v Commission (order), 2021, para. 39. 380 For examples of regulatory acts not entailing implementing measures, see C-872/19 P, Venezuela v Council, 2021, paras 90–94; T-296/12, The Health Food Manufacturers’ Association and Others v Commission, 2015, paras 49–50; T-251/18, IFSUA v Council, 2020, para. 37; T-429/18, BRF and SHB Comercio e Industria de Alimentos v Commission, 2020, paras 44–49; T-153/19, European Union Copper Task Force v Commission, 2021, paras 48– 53. For examples of regulatory acts entailing implementing measures, see C-274/12 P, Telefónica v Commission, 2013; C-456/13 P, T & L Sugars et Sidul Açúcares v Commission, 2015; C-244/16 P, Industrias Químicas del Vallés v Commission, 2018, paras 48–76; C-384/16 P, European Union Copper Task Force v Commission, 2018, paras 41–70: T-818/16, Netflix International and Netflix v Commission, 2018, paras 31–44; T-125/18, Associazione GranoSalus v Commission (order), 2019, paras 74–96; T-866/19, Ryanair and Laudamotion v Commission (order),

Identity of the Parties 339 should be assessed by reference to the position of the person pleading the right to bring proceedings under the third limb of the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU. It is therefore irrelevant whether the contested act entails implementing measures with regard to other persons.381 Furthermore, in the context of that assessment, it is necessary to refer exclusively to the subject-matter of the action and, where an applicant seeks only the partial annulment of an act, it is solely any implementing measures which that part of the act may entail that must, where appropriate, be taken into consideration. 382 It is also entirely irrelevant, in that regard, whether those measures are of a mechanical nature.383 The fact that a regulatory act entails implementing measures, so that certain legal effects of the act only materialize through those measures, does not exclude the possibility of that act producing on the legal situation of a natural or legal person other legal effects, which do not depend on the adoption of implementing measures.384 As recognized in the case-law,385 the Court of Justice takes a broad view of the concept of implementing measures. For example, the Court has held, in the event that the contested act is a Commission decision declaring that a national measure constituting State aid is incompatible with the internal market, that for the beneficiaries of such a measure, the specific consequences of that declaration will materialize in implementing measures such as a tax notice—while the contested act had the effect, by itself, of prohibiting the implementation of the national measure, the existence of the enforcement measures at issue depended on the submission by the person concerned, subsequent to that prohibition, of a request to benefit from the advantage provided by the national measure.386 Moreover, the Court of Justice has considered that the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU does not require, in order for a measure to be classified as a measure 2021, paras 36–63; T-822/19, Asoliva and Anierac v Commission (order), 2021, paras 37–49; T-328/21, Airoldi Metalli v Commission (order), 2022, paras 19–35 (appeal pending in C-467/22 P). The General Court has considered that a directive is not regarded as a regulatory act not entailing implementing measures: see T-484/20, SATSE v Commission (order), 2021, paras 38–50; but see, in that regard, C-348/20 P, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, 2022, in particular paras 71–74, 98. 381 See C-244/16 P, Industrias Químicas del Vallés v Commission, 2018, para. 45; C-622/16 to C-624/16 P, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission, 2018, para. 61; C-313/19, Associazione GranoSalus v Commission, 2020, para. 38; T-296/12, The Health Food Manufacturers’ Association and Others v Commission, 2015, para. 47; T-866/19, Ryanair and Laudamtion v Commission (order), 2021, para. 42; T-30/19, CRIA and CCCMC v Commission, 2022, paras 65–70 (in the context of anti-dumping, although there are implementing measures in respect of the importers, there are no implementing measures in respect of the exporting producers). 382 See C-244/16 P, Industrias Químicas del Vallés v Commission, 2018, para. 46; C-622/16 to C-624/16 P, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission, 2018, para. 61; T-296/12, The Health Food Manufacturers’ Association and Others v Commission, 2015, para. 48; T-818/16, Netflix International and Netflix v Commission, 2018, para. 30. Thus, a certain provision of the contested regulatory act can be regarded as entailing implementing measures, while another provision of the same act does not: see, e.g. T-67/18, Probelte v Commission, 2019, paras 61, 65. 383 See C-456/13 P, T& L Sugars and Sidul Açúcares v Commission, 2015, paras 41–42, C-145/17 P, Internacional de Productos Metálicos v Commission, 2018, para. 54; T-429/13, Bayer CropScience v Commission, 2018, para. 90; T-818/16, Netflix International and Netflix v Commission, 2018, para. 35; T-611/18, Pharmaceutical Works Polpharma v EMA, 2021, para. 131 (set aside on other grounds in C-438/21 P to C-440/21 P). 384 See C-384/16 P, European Union Copper Task Force v Commission, 2018, para. 45; C-145/17 P, Internacional de Productos Metálicos v Commission, 2018, para. 56. 385 See T-822/19, Asoliva and Anierac v Commission (order), 2021, paras 31–35. 386 See C-274/12 P, Telefónica v Commission, 2013, para. 35.

340 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT implementing a regulatory act, that that act should constitute the legal basis for that measure. The same measure may be a measure implementing both the act whose provisions constitute its legal basis and a separate act (i.e. the regulatory act), where all or some of the legal effects of the latter act will materialize, in relation to the applicant, only through that measure.387 The Court of Justice has also held, in a case in which the contested act repealed an earlier act imposing anti-dumping duties and provided that it could not serve as a basis for the reimbursement of duties levied before its date of entry into force, that the measures taken by the national authorities with a view to collecting those duties constituted measures implementing the contested act, which was, however, subsequent to these measures.388 Accordingly, as indicated by the case-law, the concept of implementing measures should not be confused with that of direct concern for the purposes of the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU.389 In contrast with direct concern, the existence of implementing measures of the Union act is sufficient in itself to conclude that the condition under the third limb of the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU is not satisfied.390 (v) Extent of the opening for regulatory acts 7.111

It appears that the opening established by the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU as regards regulatory acts not entailing implementing measures is not as large as the one envisaged by the General Court in Jégo-Quéré v Commission391 (see para. 7.107). This is because it covers only non-legislative acts of general application,392 while the relaxation of the admissibility requirements in that judgment would have covered both legislative and non-legislative acts of general application. Nevertheless, as indicated in the case-law, there would not appear to be a gap in the system of judicial protection inasmuch as the second subparagraph of Art. 19(1) TEU—which provides that ‘Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law’—ensures the complementary role of national courts in this system. That provision, read in conjunction with the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU, may therefore lead to a balanced outcome in terms of ensuring effective judicial protection for natural and legal persons.393

387 See C-244/16 P, Industrias Químicas del Vallés v Commission, 2018, para. 72. 388 See C-145/17 P, Internacional de Productos Metálicos v Commission, 2018, paras 12–14, 57 to 61. 389 See, e.g. C-841/14 P, Forgital Italy v Council, 2015, para. 43; C-348/20 P, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, 2022, paras 71–72; T-245/19, Uzina Metalurgica Moldoveneasca v Commission, 2022, para. 45. 390 See C-352/19 P, Région de Bruxelles-Capitale v Commission, 2020, AG Bobek Opinion, points 159–177, in particular points 169–170; see also, in that regard, T-365/16, Portigon v SRB, 2019, paras 67–69. 391 See T-177/01, Jégo-Quéré v Commission, 2002, paras 49–53 (set aside in C-263/02 P). 392 As the Union Courts have held, the admissibility requirements laid down in the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU must be interpreted in the light of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection, as enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter, but such an interpretation cannot have the effect of setting aside those requirements, which are expressly laid down in the FEU Treaty (see, e.g. C-622/20 P, Validity and Center for Independent Living v Commission (order), 2021, paras 58–59; C-99/21, Danske Slagtermestre v Commission, 2022, para. 42). Nor does the Aarhus Convention (see C-352/19 P, Région de Bruxelles-Capitale v Commission, 2020, para. 26). 393 See C-583/11 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, 2013, paras 89–107.

Identity of the Parties 341 (8) Direct and individual concern: some fields of application As has been mentioned in paras 7.82 and 7.87, the addressee of a reviewable Union act 7.112 derives a right under the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU to bring an action for the annulment of the act concerned. Natural or legal persons that are not the addressee of the Union act will only have standing if they can demonstrate that they are directly and individually concerned by such act or that they are directly concerned by that act and it constitutes a regulatory act not entailing implementing measures. The following sections will examine the conditions of direct and individual concern in some fields of application. These include Arts 101 and 102 TFEU, merger control, State aid, anti- dumping, banking union, public procurement, and access to documents. (a) Arts 101 and 102 TFEU In respect of a Commission decision granting an exemption under Art. 101(3) TFEU, persons who had submitted objections to the Commission during the investigation in respect of a proposed declaration that Art. 101(1) TEU was not applicable to the practices of a competitor or supplier, or persons who had participated in the hearing organized by the Commission, are directly and individually concerned by such a decision.394 The Union Courts have essentially considered that such persons have been sufficiently involved in the procedure in order to constitute a closed class in respect of the decision for the purposes of individual concern.395 A similar reasoning is followed when third parties bring an action for annulment against a decision making commitments binding on undertakings or finding that there are no longer grounds for action by the Commission (Regulation No. 1/2003, Art. 9).396 This case-law is also likely to be relevant for the purpose of assessing the admissibility of actions for annulment brought by third parties against decisions in which the Commission finds that Art. 101 and/or Art. 102 TFEU are inapplicable to a certain practice or agreement (Regulation No. 1/2003, Art. 10). (b) Merger control (i) Competitors In respect of direct concern, the fact that the Commission declares a concentration notified to it pursuant to Regulation No. 139/2004 compatible with the internal market on condition that the notifying parties implement commitments set forth in 394 See 75/84, Metro v Commission, 1986, paras 19–23; T-19/92, Leclerc v Commission, 1996, paras 53–63; T-88/92, Leclerc v Commission, 1996, paras 49–50. 395 See, in that regard, T-528/93, T-542/93, T-543/93, and T-546/93, Métropole Télévision and Others v Commission, 1996, paras 60–65 (holding it is sufficient for the applicant to be an interested third party within the meaning of what was then Art. 19(3) of Regulation No. 17, and it was irrelevant that the applicant had actually taken part in the administrative procedure before the Commission); compare C-70/97 P, Kruidvat v Commission, 1998, paras 22–23 (a trade organization’s participation in the administrative procedure before the Commission was not sufficient to individualize one of its members which had not participated that procedure). An undertaking which participated in the administrative procedure before the Commission and which started proceedings in the national courts for compensation for having had obligations contrary to Art. 101 TFEU imposed on it under an agreement to which Art. 101(1) TFEU was declared inapplicable was held to be individually concerned: see T-131/99, Shaw and Falla v Commission, 2002, paras 25–27. 396 See T-76/14, Morningstar v Commission, 2016, paras 31–36; T-873/16, Groupe Canal +v Commission, 2018, paras 23–25 (set aside on other grounds in C-132/19 P).

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342 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT the notification does not prevent a third undertaking, which is affected by the implementation of those commitments, from being directly concerned by the Commission’s decision. This is because there is no doubt that parties to the concentration have undertaken to implement those commitments, given that the Commission declared it compatible with the internal market in return for compliance with those commitments and the Commission may revoke its decision if the undertakings concerned commit a breach of an obligation attached thereto.397Additionally, a Commission decision, in permitting the merger to be put into effect immediately, is capable of bringing about an immediate change in the state of the relevant markets. Thus, the undertakings engaged in the relevant markets can be certain of an immediate or imminent change in the state of the market and have been considered to be directly concerned by that decision.398 In respect of individual concern, a competitor of undertakings involved in the concentration which has actively participated in the administrative procedure (by submitting observations and criticisms, clarifying, among other things, the effects of the concentration on its competitive position) is considered to be individually concerned by a Commission decision declaring the concentration compatible with the internal market, at least where the decision has an appreciable effect on the applicant’s position on the market.399 It would appear to be sufficient that the applicant is a potential competitor on most of the markets affected.400 7.115

(ii) Representatives of employees The General Court has held, in connection with what is now Regulation No. 139/2004, that recognized employees’ representatives of an undertaking involved in a concentration were individually concerned by a Commission decision adopted pursuant to that regulation on the ground that that regulation mentioned them expressly and specifically among the third persons showing a ‘sufficient interest’ to submit observations to the Commission during the administrative investigation of the concentration’s compatibility with the internal market.401 The General Court regarded it as irrelevant whether the employees’ representatives of the undertaking had actually taken part in the administrative procedure.402 397 See, e.g. C-68/94 and C-30/95, France and Others and EMC v Commission, 1998, para. 51. 398 See, e.g. C-402/20 P, Lípidos Santiga v Commission, 2021, para. 23; T-177/04, easyJet v Commission, 2006, para. 32. 399 See C-68/94 and C-30/95, France and Others v Commission, 1998, paras 54–58; T-2/93, Air France v Commission, 1994, paras 40– 48; T-114/02, BaByliss v Commission, 2003, paras 87– 117; T-350/03, Wirtschaftskammer Kärnten and best connect Ampere Strompool v Commission, 2006, para. 43. It follows from T-282/06, Sun Chemical Group and Others v Commission, 2007, para. 49 that an active participation in the administrative procedure is sufficient for a third party to be individually concerned by the contested decision. Compare T-177/04, easyJet v Commission, 2006, para. 35, in which the General Court held that active participation in the administrative procedure is a factor taken into account to establish, in conjunction with other specific circumstances, the admissibility of the action. 400 See T-114/02, BaByliss v Commission, 2003, paras 99–100. 401 Representatives of employees and representatives of management enjoy the same right under Art. 18(4) of Regulation No. 139/2004. 402 See T-96/92, CCE de la Société générale des Grandes Sources and Others v Commission, 1995, para. 37; T-12/93, CCE de Vittel and Others v Commission, 1995, para. 48. In those cases, the General Court held that the applicants were directly concerned by the contested decision only insofar as their procedural rights during the administrative procedure had been affected. Consequently, it considered only the plea alleging that those rights had

Identity of the Parties 343 (iii) Consumer associations Under the second indent of Art. 11(c) of Regulation No. 802/2004, consumer associations are entitled to the right to be heard, pursuant to Art. 18 of Regulation No. 139/2004, subject to compliance with two conditions: first, that the merger concerns products or services used by final consumers; and, second, that an application to be heard by the Commission during the investigation procedure is made in writing. Provided that those two conditions are fulfilled, a consumer organization is entitled to challenge the clearance decision on the grounds of infringement of its procedural right to be heard.403 The action will be declared admissible only to the extent to which its purpose is to ensure protection of procedural rights.404 (iv) Referral to national authorities An undertaking is directly concerned by a Commission decision to refer the matter to the national competition authorities pursuant to Art. 9 of Regulation No. 139/2004, since the immediate effect of the decision is to deprive it of a review of the concentration by the Commission on the basis of Union law and of the procedural rights under it for third parties, as well as the judicial protection provided for by the Treaties.405 An undertaking is individually concerned by such a decision if it would have been individually concerned by the Commission’s final decision had the referral not been made.406 (c) State aid (i) Position of beneficiaries of State aid and their competitors Decisions addressed to Member States—State aid decisions are addressed to the Member State concerned.407 Consequently, an action for annulment brought against such decisions by persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed will be admissible under the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU only if, first, the applicant is directly and individually concerned by the contested decision, or second, the applicant is directly concerned by the contested decision and that decision constitutes a regulatory act which does not entail implementing measures.408 been breached: see T-96/92, CCE de la Société générale des Grandes Sources and Others v Commission, 1995, paras 38–47; T-12/93, CCE de Vittel and Others v Commission, 1995, paras 49–60. 403 See T-224/10, Association belge des consommateurs test-achats v Commission, 2011, paras 36–38. In this case, the action was declared inadmissible since, following the notification of the merger to the Commision, the consumer organization in question had not submitted an application to be heard (see paras 46–64). 404 See T-224/10, Association belge des consommateurs test-achats v Commission, 2011, paras 27–31. 405 See T-119/02, Royal Philips Electronics v Commission, 2003, paras 272–290; T-346/02 and T-347/02, Cableuropa and Others v Commission, 2003, paras 49–68. 406 See T-119/02, Royal Philips Electronics v Commission, 2003, paras 291–298; T-346/02 and T-347/02, Cableuropa and Others v Commission, 2003, paras 69–80. By contrast, a third party will not be directly and individually concerned by a Commission decision rejecting a request from a national competition authority for partial referral of the case under Art. 9(3) of Regulation No. 139/2004. See T-224/10, Association belge des consommateurs test-achats v Commission, 2011, paras 70–85 (the admissibility of an action against the non-referral decision cannot result from the fact that the national law in question may confer on the applicant more extensive procedural rights and/or judicial protection than provided for under Union law). 407 Regulation 2015/1589, Art. 31(2). See also C-367/95 P, Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France, 1998, para. 45; T-58/10, Phoenix-Reisen and DRV v Commission (order), 2012, para. 25. 408 See C-453/19, Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission, 2021, para. 31; T-223/18, Casa Regina Apostolorum della Pia Società delle Figlie di San Paolo v Commission, 2021, para. 71 (appeal pending in C-492/21 P). The requirement of direct concern is identical in the second and the third limb in the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU (see para.

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344 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT As regards direct concern, it is settled case-law that there are two cumulative criteria to be met, namely, first, the contested act must directly affect the legal situation of the applicant and, second, it must leave no discretion to its addressees who are entrusted with the task of implementing it, such implementation being purely automatic and resulting from the Union rules alone without the application of other intermediate rules.409 With particular regard to the rules on State aid, their objective is to preserve competition, so, in that field, the fact that a Commission decision leaves intact all the effects of the national measures which the applicant, in a complaint addressed to that institution, claimed were not compatible with that objective and placed it in an unfavourable competitive position makes it possible to conclude that the decision directly affects its legal situation, in particular its right under the Treaty provisions on State aid not to be subject to competition distorted by the national measures concerned.410 Consequently, with regard to the first criterion for direct concern, the Court of Justice has held that a direct effect on an applicant’s legal situation cannot be deduced from the mere potential existence of a competitive relationship. Given that the condition of direct concern requires the contested act to produce effects directly on an applicant’s legal situation, the applicant must adequately explain the reasons why the Commission decision is liable to place it in an unfavourable competitive position and thus to produce effects on its legal situation.411 Additionally, with regard to the second criterion for direct concern, the Commission decision must be found to produce legal effects purely automatically on the basis of the Union rules alone without the application of other intermediate rules.412 7.109). Thus, the Union Courts may infer from the finding that an applicant does not fulfil that requirement for the purposes of the second limb that it does not fulfil it either for the purposes of the third limb: see C-453/19, Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission, 2021, para. 84. 409 See C-622/16 P to C-624/16 P, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission, 2018, para. 42; T-69/18, Verband Deutscher Alten und Behindertenhilfe and CarePool Hannover v Commission, 2021, para. 153. See para. 7.93. 410 See 169/84, Cofaz and Others v Commission, 1986, para. 30; C-622/16 P to C-624/16 P, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission, 2018, para. 43; C-402/20 P, Lípidos Santiga v Commission, 2021, para. 22; C-99/21, Danske Slagtermestre v Commission, 2022, para. 47; T-435/93, ASPEC and Others v Commission, 1995, para. 60; T-266/94, Skibsværftsforeningen and Others v Commission, 1996, para. 49; T-491/17, Opere Pie d’Onigo v Commission (order), 2019, para. 23; T-69/18, Verband Deutscher Alten und Behindertenhilfe and CarePool Hannover v Commission, 2021, para. 154; T-223/18, Casa Regina Apostolorum della Pia Società delle Figlie di San Paolo v Commission, 2021, para. 90 (appeal pending in C-492/21 P). 411 See C-622/16 P to C-624/16 P, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission, 2018, paras 44–53; see also C-99/21 P, Danske Slagtermestre v Commission, 2022, paras 48–49, 70–72 (finding that the General Court had erred in law by requiring the applicant to ‘demonstrate’ what anti-competitive effects would be ‘concretely’ produced by the national measure in question and thus by the contested decision which allows the Member State concerned to apply the measure, thereby going beyond the Court’s interpretation of direct concern in the Montessori judgment: see paras 50–55); T-69/18, Verband Deutscher Alten und Behindertenhilfe and CarePool Hannover v Commission, 2021, paras 155–158; T-223/18, Casa Regina Apostolorum della Pia Società delle Figlie di San Paolo v Commission, 2021, paras 91–99 (appeal pending in C-492/21 P); for an example where this has not been shown, see T-491/17, Opere Pie d’Onigo v Commission (order), 2019, paras 25–35. The mere fact that a Union act may exercise an influence on an applicant’s substantive position cannot suffice to allow it to be regarded as directly concerned by the act: see, e.g. T-812/14 RENV, BP Lux 2 v Commission, 2019, paras 70–72; see also, in that regard, T-726/20 Grupa Azoty and Others v Commission (order), 2021, paras 32–48 (appeal pending in C-73/22 P); and T-741/20, Advansa Manufacturing and Others v Commission (order), 2021, paras 32–48 (applicant not directly concerned by Commission guidelines on State aid matters) (appeal pending in C-77/22 P). 412 For some examples, see C-135/16, Georgsmarienhütte and Others, 2018, paras 29–30 (decision instructing the Member State concerned to recover the incompatible aid); C-622/16 P to C-624/16 P, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission, 2018, para. 54 (decision allowing the Member State concerned not to recover the

Identity of the Parties 345 As regards individual concern, it is well established that persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed may claim to be individually concerned only if the decision affects them by reason of certain attributes peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons and if, by virtue of those factors, it distinguishes them individually in the same way as the person addressed (the Plaumann test).413 Decisions taken on the basis of the preliminary stage of the procedure provided for in Art. 108(3) TFEU—As far as new aid414 is concerned, the Commission is empowered to take decisions at two stages of its investigation into its compatibility with the internal market. First, there is the preliminary stage for reviewing aid pursuant to Art. 108(3) TFEU, which allows the Commission to form a prima facie opinion on the conformity of the aid in question. Second, there is the formal investigation procedure provided for in Art. 108(2) TFEU, which allows the Commission to be fully informed of the facts of the case. It is only at that latter stage that the TFEU imposes an obligation on the Commission to give the parties concerned notice to submit their comments.415 Where, at the conclusion of its investigation, the Commission decides to initiate the formal investigation procedure under Art. 108(2) TFEU, that decision is of individual concern to undertakings which are the envisaged beneficiaries of the proposed aid.416 Where, in contrast, the Commission considers at the end of the preliminary stage that the proposed aid is compatible with the internal market and therefore decides not to initiate the formal investigation procedure pursuant to Art. 108(2) TFEU and Art. 6(1) of Regulation 2015/1589,417 the lawfulness of such decision not to raise objections based on Art. 4(3) of that regulation will depend on whether there are doubts as to the compatibility of the aid with the internal market. Since such doubts must trigger the initiation of a formal investigation procedure in which the interested parties referred to in Art. 1(h) of Regulation 2015/1589418 can participate, any interested party within the unlawful aid and to apply tax regime containing no element of aid); C-99/21 P, Danske Slagtermestre v Commission, 2022, para. 69 (decision finding no State aid); T-69/18, Verband Deutscher Alten und Behindertenhilfe and CarePool Hannover v Commission, 2021, para. 160 (decision concerning existing aid). 413 See 25/62, Plaumann v Commission, 1963 ECR 95, 107; C-453/19, Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission, 2021, para. 33; C-284/21 P, Commission v Braesch and Others, 2023, para. 51; T-894/16, Air France v Commission, 2019, para. 26. See para. 7.99. 414 According to Regulation 2015/1589, Art. 1(c), ‘new aid’ means all aid, that is to say, aid schemes and individual aid, which is not existing aid, including alterations to existing aid. 415 See C-284/21 P, Commission v Braesch and Others, 2023, para. 52; T-665/20, Ryanair v Commission, 2021, para. 26. 416 The Member State concerned may not put the measure into effect before the procedure has resulted in a final decision in accordance with Art. 108(3) TFEU. 417 Where the Commission adopts a decision not to raise objections, it not only declares that the measure is compatible with the internal market, but also implicitly refuses to initiate the formal investigation procedure laid down under Art. 108(2) TFEU and Art. 6(1) of Regulation 2015/1589: see C-83/09 P, Commission v Kronoply and Kronotex, 2011, para. 45; C-174/19 P and C-175/19 P, Scandlines Danmark et Scandlines Deutschland v Commission, 2021, para. 64; T-693/14, Hamr—Sport v Commission, 2016, para. 34; T-578/17, a&o hostel and hotel Berlin v Commission, 2019, para. 39. 418 According to Art. 1(h) of Regulation 2015/1589, an ‘interested party’ means any Member State and any person, undertaking or association of undertakings whose interests might be affected by the granting of aid, in particular the beneficiary of the aid, competing undertakings and trade associations. That provision reproduces

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346 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT meaning of that provision is directly and individually concerned by such a decision.419 If the beneficiaries of the procedural guarantees provided for in Art. 108(2) TFEU and Art. 6(1) of Regulation 2015/1589 are to be able to ensure that those guarantees are respected, it must indeed be possible for them to challenge before the Union Courts the decision not to raise objections.420 Accordingly, the specific status of ‘interested party’ within the meaning of Art. 1(h) of Regulation 2015/1589, in conjunction with the specific subject-matter of the action— that is, an action seeking to safeguard the applicant’s procedural rights421—is sufficient to distinguish individually, for the purposes of the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU, an applicant contesting a decision not to raise objections.422 ‘Interested parties’ within the meaning of Art. 1(h) of Regulation 2015/1589 comprise not only the undertaking or undertakings in receipt of aid,423 but also such persons, undertakings, or associations whose interests might be affected by the grant of the aid, for instance, competing undertakings and trade associations.424 In the light of that provision, an undertaking the definition of ‘parties concerned’ within the meaning of Article 108(2) TFEU, as established by the Court’s case-law: see C-647/19 P, Ja zum Nürburgring v Commission, 2021, para. 56; C-284/21 P, Commission v Braesch and Others, 2023, para. 58. 419 See C-198/91, Cook v Commission, 1993, paras 13–26; C-225/91, Matra v Commission, 1993, paras 15– 20; C-47/10 P, Austria v Scheucher-Fleisch and Others, 2011, paras 40–43; C-647/19 P, Ja zum Nürburgring v Commission, 2021, paras 113–114; C-665/19 P, NeXovation v Commission, 2021, para. 62; T-693/14, Hamr—Sport v Commission, 2016, para. 35; T-578/17, a&o hostel and hotel Berlin v Commission, 2019, para. 41; T-777/19, CAPA and Others v Commission, 2021, para. 62 (appeal pending in C-742/21 P). The same applies whether the ground for the Commission decision is that the aid is compatible with the internal market, that the measures concerned do not constitute aid, or that there is existing aid: see, in that regard, C-322/09 P, NDSHT v Commission, 2010, paras 51–56; T‑639/14 RENV, T‑352/15, and T‑740/17, DEI v Commission, 2021, para. 95 (appeal pending in C-701/21 P and C-739/21 P); T-69/18, Verband Deutscher Alten und Behindertenhilfe and CarePool Hannover v Commission, 2021, paras 57–59. 420 See C-78/03 P, Commission v Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum, 2005, para. 35; C-33/14 P, Mory and Others v Commission, 2015, para. 95; C-594/19 P, Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission, 2022, para. 34; T-123/09, Ryanair v Commission, 2012, para. 63 (appeal rejected in C-287/12 P); T-578/17, a&o hostel and hotel Berlin v Commission, 2019, para. 41; T‑639/14 RENV, T‑352/15, and T‑740/17, DEI v Commission, 2021, para. 95 (appeal pending in C-701/21 P and C-739/21 P). 421 It matters little whether the application initiating proceedings states that it is seeking the annulment of ‘a decision not to raise objections’ (the term used in Art. 4(3) of Regulation 2015/1589) or of a decision not to initiate the formal investigation procedure, since the Commission takes a position on both aspects of the question by means of a single decision (C-83/09 P, Commission v Kronoply and Kronotex, 2011, para. 52). However, where the applicant challenges the correctness of the decision to assess the aid as such, the fact that the applicant is an interested party does not render it individually concerned; that applicant must meet the Plaumann test: see, e.g. C-594/19 P, Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission, 2022, para. 35; T-894/16, Air France v Commission, 2019, para. 28. See further para. 7.99. 422 See C-83/09 P, Commission v Kronoply and Kronotex, 2011, para. 48; C-47/10 P, Austria v Scheucher-Fleisch and Others, 2011, para. 44; T-693/14, Hamr—Sport v Commission, 2016, para. 36; T-135/17, Scor v Commission, 2019, para. 41; T-578/17, a&o hostel and hotel Berlin v Commission, 2019, paras 41–43; T‑639/14 RENV, T‑352/15, and T‑740/17, DEI v Commission, 2021, para. 95 (appeal pending in C-701/21 P and C-739/21 P). 423 In that event, such undertakings may be found to have no interest in bringing an action for annulment. See T-15/12 and T-16/12, Provincie Groningen and Others v Commission (order), 2013, paras 39–59; T-186/18, Abaco Energy and Others v Commission (order), 2019. See further para. 7.141. 424 See 323/82, Intermills v Commission, 1984, para. 16; C-78/03 P, Commission v Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum, 2005, para. 36; C-487/06 P, British Aggregates v Commission, 2008, para. 29; C-319/07 P, 3F v Commission, 2009, para. 32; C-33/14 P, Mory and Others v Commission, 2015, para. 96; C-453/19 P, Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission, 2021, para. 36; C-594/19 P, Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission, 2022, para. 34; C-284/21 P, Commission v Braesch and Others, 2023, para. 53; T-79/16, Vereniging Gelijkberechtiging Grondbezitters v Commission, 2018, para. 52; T-167/19, Tempus Energy Germany and T Energy Sweden v Commission, 2021, para. 38; T-777/19, CAPA and Others v Commission, 2021, para. 63 (appeal pending in C-742/21 P).

Identity of the Parties 347 in competition with the beneficiary of an aid measure is undoubtedly an interested party within the meaning of Art. 108(2) TFEU.425 Additionally, Art. 1(h) of Regulation 2015/1589 does not rule out the possibility that an undertaking which is not a direct competitor of the beneficiary of the aid can be categorized as an interested party, provided that undertaking demonstrates that its interests could be adversely affected by the grant of the aid. For that purpose, it is necessary for the applicant to establish, to the requisite legal standard, that the aid is likely to have a specific effect on its situation.426 In Commission v Braesch and Others,427 the Court of Justice clarified that, in order to meet this criterion, the applicant must take issue with the State aid itself or the modalities for its grant. In that case, the applicants did not claim to be affected by the aid at issue, nor did they dispute that the aid constituted State aid or that it was compatible with the internal market. Rather, they claimed to be adversely affected by certain burden-sharing measures, which were purely national measures notified by the Member State concerned under its own responsibility and which were not imposed by the Commission in the decision at issue. In those circumstances, the fact that a third party considers itself to be affected by such measures does not confer on it the status of ‘interested party’. In particular, the Court distinguished other case-law, such as its judgment of 22 September 2020, Austria v Commission (C‑594/18 P, EU:C:2020:742), involving situations where the modalities of an aid measure were indissolubly linked to the object of the aid and thus their effect on the compatibility or incompatibility of the aid viewed as a whole had to be determined in the course of the procedure prescribed in Article 108 TFEU. The Court further emphasized that the applicants were in no way deprived of the right to an effective remedy guaranteed in the first paragraph of Art. 47 of the Charter. If a third party considers that, as a result of the adoption of such measures, the Member State concerned has infringed Union law, it must challenge the legality of those measures before the national court which has sole jurisdiction in that regard and

425 See C-322/09 P, NDSHT v Commission, 2010, para. 59; C‑817/18 P, Vereniging tot Behoud van Natuurmonumenten in Nederland and Others v Commission, 2020, para. 50; T-693/14, Hamr—Sport v Commission, 2016, para. 41; T-665/20, Ryanair v Commission, 2021, para. 28. However, unsupported assertions that the applicant is a competitor in that regard do not suffice: see, e.g. T-713/17, Motex v Commission (order), 2018, paras 24–30. 426 See C-83/09 P, Commission v Kronoply and Kronotex, 2011, paras 64–65; C-647/19 P, Ja zum Nürburgring v Commission, 2021, para. 57; C-284/21 P, Commission v Braesch and Others, 2023, para. 60; T-79/16, Vereniging Gelijkberechtiging Grondbezitters v Commission, 2018, para. 53; T‑639/14 RENV, T‑352/15, and T‑740/17, DEI v Commission, 2021, paras 80–84 (appeal pending in C-701/21 P and C-739/21 P); see also, e.g. C-319/07 P, 3F v Commission, 2009, paras 33, 98–108 (trade union); C-647/19 P, Ja zum Nürburgring v Commission, 2021, paras 57–67 (association); T-218/18, Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission, 2021, paras 45–56 (indirect competitor) (appeal pending in C-466/21 P); compare, e.g. T-188/95, Waterleiding Maatschappij ‘Noord-West Brabant’ v Commission, 1998, paras 60–86, in particular para. 68 (taxpayer per se is not an interested party); T-812/14 RENV, BPC Lux 2 v Commission, 2019, paras 56–67 (contested decision affected the applicants’ interests only indirectly so could not benefit from the status of interested party); T-277/20, MKB Multifunds v Commission (order), 2021, paras 30–52, in particular paras 31–32 (the fact that the applicant lodged a complaint and communicated with the Commission is not sufficient in itself to be regarded as interested party) (appeal pending in C-665/21 P). For some examples in which an applicant failed to show to the requisite legal standard that the aid was capable of having specific effect on its situation, see T-143/19, Solar Ileias Bompaina v Commission (order), 2020, paras 36–48 (upheld in C-429/20 P, Solar Ileias Bompaina v Commission, 2022, paras 35–44); T-777/19, CAPA and Others v Commission, 2021 (appeal pending in C-742/21 P). 427 See C-284/21 P, Commission v Braesch and Others, 2023, paras 57–110, in particular paras 66–81, 96–109.

348 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT which has the power or the obligation, as the case may be, to submit a reference to the Court of Justice on the interpretation of the relevant provisions of Union law. Where an ‘interested party’ seeks the annulment of a decision not to raise objections, the applicant may invoke any plea to show that the assessment of the information and evidence which the Commission had at its disposal during the preliminary investigation examination phase of the measure notified should have raised doubts as to the compatibility of that measure with the internal market.428 7.120

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Decisions taken upon completion of the formal investigation procedure provided for in Art. 108(2) TFEU—The Commission may also take a decision after the formal investigation procedure provided for in Art. 108(2) TFEU and Art. 6(1) of Regulation 2015/1589 has been completed. Such a decision is likewise addressed to the Member State concerned. As regards the position of beneficiaries of State aid and their competitors, a distinction has to be drawn between decisions relating to general aid regimes and decisions relating to individual aid measures. (ii) Decisions relating to general aid regimes Acts of general application—Commission decisions which declare general aid regimes429 compatible or incompatible with the internal market upon completion of the formal investigation procedure provided for in Art. 108(2) TFEU and Art. 6(1) of Regulation 2015/1589 are considered to be acts of general application. Thus, they may generally be assumed to constitute regulatory acts430 within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU. Under the case-law, such decisions do entail implementing measures (by the Member States),431 so that the requirement of individual concern still applies 428 The use of arguments relating to the incompatibility of the aid measure with the internal market does nothing to bring about a change in the subject-matter of the action (seeking to safeguard the procedural rights of an interested party) or in the conditions for its admissibility. On the contrary, the existence of doubts concerning that compatibility is precisely the evidence which must be adduced in order to show that the Commission was required to initiate the formal investigation procedure under Art. 108(2) TFEU and Art. 6(1) of Regulation 2015/1589. See C-83/09 P, Commission v Kronoply and Kronotex, 2011, para. 59; C-47/10 P, Austria v Scheucher-Fleisch and Others, 2011, para. 50; C-647/19 P, Ja zum Nürburgring v Commission, 2021, para. 115; T-578/17, a&o hostel and hotel Berlin v Commission, 2019, paras 45–49; T‑639/14 RENV, T‑352/15, and T‑740/17, DEI v Commission, 2021, paras 97–102 (appeal pending in C-701/21 P and C-739/21 P); T-218/18, Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission, 2021, paras 61–63 (appeal pending in C-466/21 P); T-665/20, Ryanair v Commission, 2021, paras 31–32; T-777/19, CAPA and Others v Commission, 2021, para. 66 (appeal pending in C-742/21 P). 429 Regulation 2015/1589, Article 1(d) defines ‘aid scheme’ as ‘any act on the basis of which, without further implementing measures being required, individual aid awards may be made to undertakings defined within the act in a general and abstract manner and any act on the basis of which aid which is not linked to a specific project may be awarded to one or several undertakings for an indefinite period of time and/or for an indefinite amount’. 430 See C‑622/16 P to C‑624/16 P, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission, 2018, paras 22–39, in particular paras 31–32; C-594/19 P, Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission, 2022, paras 49–50; C-99/21, Danske Slagtermestre v Commission, 2022, para. 66; T-747/17, UPF v Commission, 2019, para. 29; T-69/18, Verband Deutscher Alten und Behindertenhilfe and CarePool Hannover v Commission, 2021, paras 143–152; T-223/18, Casa Regina Apostolorum della Pia Società delle Figlie di San Paolo v Commission, 2021, paras 73–77 (appeal pending in C-492/21 P). Such acts may be of direct concern to the applicant within the meaning of Art. 263, fourth para. TFEU, as the requirement of an act which does not entail implementing measures laid down in that provision constitutes a different condition than that of direct concern. See para. 7.110. For an example, see T-747/17, UPF v Commission, 2019, paras 32–33 (contested decision found to entail implementing measures, while being of direct concern to the applicant’s members). 431 See C-274/12 P, Telefónica v Commission, 2013, paras 27–39; C-622/16 P to C‑624/16 P, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission, 2018, paras 63–64; see also C-541/14 P, Royal Scandinavian Casino Århus v Commission (order), 2016, paras 40–49; C-563/14 P, Dansk Automat Brancheforening v Commission (order), 2016,

Identity of the Parties 349 under the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU. However, in certain situations, such as that of the competitors of beneficiaries of a national measure that has been found not to constitute State aid within the meaning of Art. 107(1) TFEU, such decisions have been held not to entail implementing measures for the purposes of the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU.432 By and large, actions brought by undertakings against such acts will be inadmissible, since they will generally fail to satisfy the condition of individual concern laid down in the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU.433 By contrast, the general nature of the aid measure does not prevent an interested party within the meaning of Art. 1(h) of Regulation 2015/1589 from being individually concerned by the decision not to raise objections.434 Competitors of potential beneficiaries of the aid—An undertaking which is a competitor of a potential beneficiary of aid authorized under a general aid scheme will only exceptionally have standing to challenge a Commission decision authorizing that scheme.435 This is because the contested decision generally affects such an undertaking only by virtue of its objective capacity in the same manner as any other undertaking which is, or might be in the future, in the same situation.436 The fact that the applicant is a competitor of the beneficiaries of the aid437 and/or made a complaint to the Commission (and in that connection corresponded and even had meetings with the Commission) does not constitute sufficient circumstances peculiar to the applicant by which it can be distinguished individually from all other persons, thus conferring on it standing to bring proceedings against a decision of the Commission relating to a general aid scheme.438

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Beneficiaries of the aid—Similarly, potential beneficiaries of a general aid scheme are not individually concerned by a Commission decision relating to that scheme. The Union Courts have consistently held that an undertaking cannot in principle contest a Commission decision prohibiting a sectoral aid scheme if it is concerned

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paras 52–62; T-242/15, ACDA and Others v Commission (order), 2017, paras 37–48; T-354/15, Allergopharma v Commission (order), 2018, paras 62–72; T-747/17, UPF v Commission, 2019, paras 30–32. 432 See C-622/16 P to C‑624/16 P, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission, 2018, paras 62, 65–67; see also, in that regard, C-99/21, Danske Slagtermestre v Commission, 2022, paras 59–60, 67; T-69/18, Verband Deutscher Alten und Behindertenhilfe and CarePool Hannover v Commission 2021, paras 162–168; T-223/18, Casa Regina Apostolorum della Pia Società delle Figlie di San Paolo v Commission, 2021, paras 78–88 (appeal pending in C-492/21 P). 433 See 67/85 to 68/85 and 70/85, Van der Kooy v Commission, 1988, paras 13–16; C-15/98 and C-105/99, Italy and Sardegna Lines v Commission, 2000, para. 33; C-298/00 P, Italy v Commission, 2004, para 37; C-519/07 P, Commission v Koninklijke FrieslandCampina, 2009, para. 53; C-203/16 P, Andres (liquidation Heitkamp BauHolding) v Commission, 2018, para. 43; T-309/02, Acegas v Commission, 2009, para. 47; T-221/10, Iberdrola v Commission, 2012, para. 25; T-400/11, Altadis v Commission (order), 2013, para. 25. 434 See C-487/06 P, British Aggregates v Commission, 2008, para. 31; T-193/06, TF1 v Commission, 2010, para. 73. 435 See 169/84, Cofaz and Others v Commission, 1986, paras 22–25. 436 See, in that regard, T-9/98, Mitteldeutsche Erdöl-Raffinerie v Commission, 2001, paras 78–85; T-221/10, Iberdrola v Commission, 2012, para. 37. 437 See C-487/06 P, British Aggregates v Commission, 2008, para. 48; C-33/14 P, Mory and Others v Commission, 2015, para. 100; T-488/11, Sarc v Commission, 2014, para. 35; T-598/15, Stichting Accolade v Commission (order), 2016, para. 55. 438 See T-398/94, Kahn Scheepvaart v Commission, 1996, para. 42; T-315/05, Adomex v Commission (order), 2008, para. 30.

350 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT by that decision solely by virtue of belonging to the sector in question and being a potential beneficiary of the scheme. Such a decision is, vis-à-vis that undertaking, a measure of general application covering situations which are determined objectively and entails legal effects for a class of persons envisaged in a general and abstract manner.439 Where, however, the applicant undertaking is concerned by the contested decision not only by virtue of its being potential beneficiary of the aid scheme in question, but also by virtue of its being an actual recipient of individual aid granted under that scheme, the recovery of which has been ordered by the Commission, the Union Courts will find that the Plaumann test is satisfied.440 Therefore, an actual beneficiary of individual aid granted under a general scheme is individually concerned by the Commission decision declaring the aid incompatible with the internal market in the case of a decision ordering the recovery of the aid.441 The Commission’s (lack of) knowledge of the situation of such undertakings has no bearing on the fact that those undertakings may be individually concerned by the contested decision.442 It should further be recalled that, as a result of the Deggendorf line of case-law (see para. 10.11), a natural or legal person who undoubtedly has the right under Art. 263 TFEU to seek the annulment of a Union act may not plead the illegality of that act in subsequent proceedings before the national courts.443 That case-law, however, only applies where there is no doubt that the action

439 See 67/85, 68/85, and 70/85, Van der Kooy and Others v Commission, 1988, para. 15; C-6/92, Federmineraria and Others v Commission, 1993, para. 14; C-15/98 and C-105/99, Italy and Sardegna Lines v Commission, 2000, para. 33; C-519/07 P, Commission v Koninklijke FrieslandCampina, 2009, para. 53; C-274/12 P, Telefónica v Commission, 2013, paras 47–50; C‑587/13 P et C-588/13 P, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria and Telefónica v Commission (order), 2015, paras 42–44; C-203/18 P, Andres (liquidation Heitkamp BauHolding) v Commission, 2018, paras 42–43; T-187/15, Compagnia Trasporti Pubblici and Others v Commission (order), 2015, para. 21; T-8/18, easyJet Airline v Commission, 2020, para. 61 (set aside in part on other grounds in C-331/20 P and C-343/20 P). 440 See para. 7.99. In absence of such recovery order, the Plaumann test can also exceptionally be satisfied where the contested decision takes into account particular features of the applicant’s situation. See, e.g. T-9/98, Mitteldeutsche Erdöl-Raffinerie v Commission, 2001, paras 78–85; T-221/10, Iberdrola v Commission, 2012, para. 37. 441 See C-15/98 and C-105/99, Italy and Sardegna Lines v Commission, 2000, para. 34; C-298/00 P, Italy v Commission, 2004, paras 37–39; C-71/09 P, C-73/09 P, and C-76/09 P, Comitato ‘Venezia vuole vivere’ v Commission, 2011, para. 53; C-320/09 P, A2A v Commission, 2011, paras 57–60; C-135/16, Georgsmarienhütte and Others, 2018, paras 33–36; C-203/18 P, Andres (liquidation Heitkamp BauHolding) v Commission, 2018, para. 45; T-221/10, Iberdrola v Commission, 2012, para. 26; T-327/09, Connefroy and Others v Commission (order), 2012, para. 22 (the applicant has to provide sufficient proof that it was effectively granted State aid under the general aid scheme: paras 24–33); T-8/18, easyJet Airline v Commission, 2020, para. 63 (set aside in part on other grounds in C-331/20 P and C-343/20 P). The requirement of individual concern may also be satisfied where the contested act affects a group of persons who were identified or identifiable when that measure was adopted by reason of criteria (other than being the actual beneficiaries of the aid) specific to the members of the group and thus form part of a closed circle (see para. 7.100). See C-182/03 and C-217/03, Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission, 2006, paras 60–64; C-519/07 P, Commission v Koninklijke FrieslandCampina, 2009, paras 53–58; C-132/12 P, Stichting Woonpunt and Others v Commission, 2014, paras 58–62; C-203/18 P, Andres (liquidation Heitkamp BauHolding) v Commission, 2018, paras 44, 54–58 (whether the applicant is an actual or potential recipient of aid granted under the scheme is not in itself decisive: see paras 46–48); T-747/17, UPF v Commission, 2019, paras 37–43; T-754/17, Chambre de commerce and d'industrie métropolitaine Bretagne-Ouest (port de Brest) v Commission, 2019, paras 28–34; T-172/16, Centro Clinico e Diagnostico G.B. Morgagni v Commission, 2018, paras 65, 68–79. 442 See C-519/07 P, Commission v Koninklijke Friesland Campina, 2009, para. 59. 443 See C-188/92, TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf, 1994, paras 24–26; C-241/95, Accrington Beef, 1996, paras 15–16; C-71/09 P, C-73/09 P, and C-76/09 P, Comitato ‘Venezia vuole vivere’ v Commission, 2011, paras 58–59; C-135/16, Georgsmarienhütte and Others, 2018, paras 14–44.

Identity of the Parties 351 for annulment brought against the contested act by the undertaking concerned would have been admissible.444 (iii) Decisions relating to individual aid measures Recipient of the aid—With regard to decisions relating to individual aid measures,445 if the Commission declares the aid incompatible with the internal market, the undertaking for which the aid was intended will be individually concerned.446 Furthermore, a recipient of aid will be individually concerned by a Commission decision declaring aid compatible with the internal market subject to the express condition that the recipient of the aid fulfils a number of obligations.447 In contrast, it will generally have no interest such as to claim annulment of a decision which simply declares a specific aid measure compatible with the internal market. Accordingly, it cannot contest the classification of a measure as aid where the aid is declared unconditionally compatible with the internal market.448 Competitors of recipient—As regards an undertaking which is not the beneficiary of the aid measure, the Union Courts have consistently held that a decision closing a procedure under Art. 108(2) TFEU is of individual concern to those competitors of the beneficiary which have played a significant role in the investigation procedure, provided that their position on the market is substantially affected by the aid which is the subject of the decision at issue.449 The Court of Justice has therefore held that the fact 444 See C-346/03 and C-529/03, Atzeni and Others, 2006, paras 31–34; C-212/19, Compagnie des pêches de Saint- Malo, 2020, paras 29–36. When the national authorities consider that the recovery order does not apply to the undertaking having brought an action for annulment before the General Court, that court will declare the action inadmissible and the Deggendorf line of case-law will not apply. See T-228/00, T-229/00, T-242/00, T-243/00, T-245/00 to T-248/00, T-250/00, T-252/00, T-256/00 to T-259/00, T-265/00, T-267/00, T-268/00, T-271/00, T-274/00 to T-276/00, T-281/00, and T-287/00 to T-296/00, Gruppo ormeggiatori del porto di Venezia and Others v Commission (order), 2005, paras 24, 30–32; T-266/00, Confartigianato Venezia and Others v Commission (order), 2005, paras 21–23; T-273/00, Unindustria and Others v Commission (order), 2005, paras 21–23. 445 Regulation 2015/1589, Article 1(e) defines ‘individual aid’ as ‘aid that is not awarded on the basis of an aid scheme and notifiable awards of aid on the basis of an aid scheme’. As the Union Courts have held, where the contested decision concerns individual aid measures, it does not constitute a regulatory act. See C-33/14 P, Mory and Others v Commission, 2015, paras 12, 92; C-640/16 P, Greenpeace Energy v Commission (order), 2017, paras 23– 28; C-453/19 P, Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission, 2021, para. 32; C-284/21 P, Commission v Braesch and Others, 2023, para. 115; T-118/13, Whirlpool Europe v Commission, 2016, para. 41; T-894/16, Air France v Commission, 2019, para. 25; T-578/17, a&o hostel and hotel Berlin v Commission, 2019, para. 38; T-218/18, Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission, 2021, para. 33 (appeal pending in C-466/21 P); T-34/20, Datenlotsen Informationssysteme v Commission (order), 2021, paras 55–72. 446 See 730/79, Philip Morris v Commission, 1980, para. 5; 323/82, Intermills v Commission, 1984, para. 5; 296/82 and 318/82, Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek v Commission, 1985, para. 13; T-358/94, Air France v Commission, 1996, para. 31. Works councils and trade unions of undertakings in receipt of aid, however, are not held to be individually concerned by a Commission decision declaring the aid incompatible with the internal market; they are interested parties within the meaning of Art. 1(h) of Regulation 2015/1589, but that is not sufficient to render them individually concerned: see T-189/97, Comité d’entreprise de la Société française de production and Others v Commission (order), 1998. paras 42–44 (upheld in C-106/98 P Comité d’entreprise de la Société française de production and Others v Commission, 2000, paras 47–55). 447 See, in that regard, T-296/97, Alitalia v Commission, 2000; T-25/07, Iride and Iride Energia v Commission, 2009. 448 See T-141/03, Sniace v Commission, 2005, paras 20–41; T-443/08 and T-455/08, Freistaat Sachsen and Others v Commission, 2011, paras 46–69. 449 See 169/84, Cofaz v Commission, 1986, paras 22–25; C-260/05 P, Sniace v Commission, 2007, para. 55; C-33/14 P, Mory and Others v Commission, 2015, para. 98; C-453/19 P, Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission, 2021, para. 38 (the requirement of a substantial adverse effect on market position is applicable both where the measure at issue is classified as aid and where it is not: para. 52); C-665/19 P, NeXovation v Commission, 2021, paras 26– 32 (that requirement not met where the applicant is not present on the relevant markets); C-594/19 P, Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission, 2022, para. 36; T-118/13, Whirlpool Europe v Commission, 2016, para. 45; T-894/16, Air France v Commission, 2019, para. 29; T-34/20, Datenlotsen Informationssysteme v Commission (order), 2021, para.

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352 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT that an undertaking was at the origin of the complaint which led to the opening of the formal investigation procedure, the fact that its views were heard, and the fact that the conduct of that procedure was largely determined by its observations are factors which are relevant to the assessment of the standing of that undertaking.450 However, that does not preclude the possibility that an undertaking may be in a position to demonstrate by other means—by reference to specific circumstances distinguishing it individually, as in the case of the person addressed—that it is individually concerned.451 Indeed, the case-law indicates that participation in the administrative procedure is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition to be individually concerned by the Commission decision within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU. The determining factor is whether the market position of the applicant is substantially affected by the measure.452 Unlike in the case of an action for annulment of a decision taken on the basis of the preliminary procedure provided for in Art. 108(3) TFEU, an undertaking cannot simply rely on its status as ‘interested party’ within the meaning of Art. 1(h) of Regulation 2015/1589 in order to demonstrate that it is individually concerned by the Commission’s decision.453 The applicant must prove that it is in a distinct competitive position which differentiates it, as regards the State aid in question, from any other trader.454 Accordingly, the General Court has accepted that undertakings which had

33. Under the case-law, the showing of a substantial effect on its market position requires the applicant adduce pertinent reasons to show that the Commission’s decision may harm its legitimate interests by substantially affecting its position on the market in question. See, in that regard, C-453/19 P, Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission, 2021, paras 57–71 (finding that the General Court went beyond the requirements resulting from the case-law in holding that the size, structure, and competitors were necessary in order to define the market or markets in the light of which the condition regarding a substantial adverse effect on the competitive position had to be assessed, but that such error of law was ineffective); see also C-594/19 P, Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission, 2022, paras 74–86. The fact that an applicant has made investments in specific infrastructure does not mean that it is active in any market related to the operation of that infrastructure, especially where the investments are intended to promote the operation of that infrastructure by different operators on terms that serve the public interest, and thus is insufficient to demonstrate individual concern: see C-647/19 P, Ja zum Nürburgring v Commission, 2021, paras 34–35. 450 See 169/84, Cofaz v Commission, 1986, paras 24–25; C-260/05 P, Sniace v Commission, 2007, para. 56; T-284/15, AlzChem v Commission, 2018, para. 44; T-135/17, Scor v Commission, 2019, para. 67. 451 See C-260/05 P, Sniace v Commission, 2007, para. 57; T-435/93, ASPEC and Others v Commission, 1995, para. 64; T-11/95, BP Chemicals v Commission, 1998, para. 72; T-358/02, Deutsche Post and DHL v Commission (order), 2004, para. 36. 452 See C-260/05 P, Sniace v Commission, 2007, para. 54; C-33/14 P, Mory and Others v Commission, 2015, para. 97; C-640/16 P, Greenpeace Energy v Commission (order), 2017, para. 38; C-453/19 P, Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission, 2021, paras 37, 39–43; C-284/21 P, Commission v Braesch and Others, 2023, para. 54. The mere fact that a measure may exercise an influence on the competitive relationships existing on the relevant market and that the applicant was in a competitive relationship with the addressee of that measure cannot, in any event, suffice for the applicant to be regarded as being individually concerned by that measure. See C-525/04 P, Spain v Lenzing, 2007, para. 32; C-33/14 P, Mory and Others v Commission, 2015, para. 99; C-640/16 P, Greenpeace Energy v Commission (order), 2017, para. 39; C-696/17 P, Alex v Commission (order), 2018, para. 50; T-118/13, Whirlpool Europe v Commission, 2016, para. 46; T-894/16, Air France v Commission, 2019, para. 29; T-478/18, Bezouaoui and HB Consultant v Commission, 2021, para. 65. 453 See C-106/98 P, Comité d’entreprise de la Société française de production and Others v Commission, 2000, para. 41; C-78/03 P, Commission v Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum, 2005, para. 37; C-33/14 P, Mory and Others v Commission, 2015, paras 97, 101–111; C-696/17 P, Alex v Commission (order), 2018, paras 48–49; C-594/19 P, Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission, 2022, para. 35; T‑639/14 RENV, T‑352/15, and T‑740/17, DEI v Commission, 2021, para. 96 (appeal pending in C-701/21 P and C-739/21 P); T-777/19, CAPA and Others v Commission, 2021, para. 65 (appeal pending in C-742/21 P). 454 See C-525/04 P, Spain v Lenzing, 2007, para. 33; C-487/06 P, British Aggregates v Commission, 2008, para. 48; C-33/14 P, Mory and Others v Commission, 2015, para. 100; T-435/93, ASPEC and Others v Commission, 1995,

Identity of the Parties 353 not taken part in the formal investigation pursuant to Art. 108(2) TFEU could be individually concerned on the ground that the market in which the aid was granted was characterized by a limited number of producers (the applicants had a market share of 95 per cent) and by the significant increase in production capacity involved in the investments planned by the company in receipt of the aid in question. That special situation distinguished them from every other market participant as far as the aid in issue was concerned.455 (iv) Regional and local entities It should be recalled that regional and local entities are not entitled to bring proceedings pursuant to the second paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU (see para. 7.78). Where such entities have legal personality under national law, they are to be treated as legal persons within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU.456 According to the case-law, a regional or local entity will be deemed to be directly concerned when the contested decision is liable to have a direct impact on the measures by which the aid was granted adopted by it and on its aid recovery obligations, without the national authorities to whom the contested decision was notified having any discretion in the matter.457 Furthermore, it will be deemed to be individually concerned by a Commission decision declaring a general aid scheme458 or an individual aid measure459 adopted by the regional or local entity incompatible with the internal market. Under such circumstances, the contested decision directly prevents the entity from exercising its own powers as it sees fit.460 However, where para. 70; T-11/95, BP Chemicals v Commission, 1998, para. 77; T-598/15, Stichting Accolade v Commission (order), 2016, para. 55. 455 See T-435/93, ASPEC and Others v Commission, 1995, para. 70. Under the case-law, showing a substantial adverse effect on a competitor’s position on the market cannot simply be a matter of the existence of certain factors indicating a decline in its commercial or financial performance: see C-525/04 P, Spain v Lenzing, 2004, paras 34–35; C-487/06 P, British Aggregates v Commission, 2008, para. 53; C-453/19 P, Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission, 2021, para. 61; T-598/15, Stichting Accolade v Commission (order), 2016, paras 56–57; T-284/15, AlzChem v Commission, 2018, paras 41–42. 456 See C-95/97, Région Wallonne v Commission (order), 1997, para. 11; C-180/97, Regione Toscana v Commission (order), 1997, para. 11; T-214/95, Vlaams Gewest v Commission, 1998, para. 28; T-288/97, Regione autonoma Friuli-Venezia Giulia v Commission, 1999, para. 28; T-219/14, Regione autonoma della Sardegna v Commission, 2017, para. 46. 457 See T-132/96 and T-143/96, Freistaat Sachsen and Others v Commission, 1999, paras 89–90; T-288/97, Regione autonoma Friuli-Venezia Giulia v Commission, 1999, para. 32; T-219/14, Regione autonoma della Sardegna v Commission, 2017, paras 47–48. 458 See T-288/97, Regione autonoma Friuli-Venezia Giulia v Commission, 1999, para. 31; T-269/99, T-271/99, and T-272/99, Diputación Foral de Guipúzcoa and Others v Commission, 2002, para. 41. 459 See T-214/95, Vlaams Gewest v Commission, 1998, para. 29; T-132/96 and T-143/96, Freistaat Sachsen and Others v Commission, 1999, para. 84; T-461/12, Hansestadt Lübeck v Commission, 2014, para. 34 (upheld in C-524/14 P, Commission v Hansestadt Lübeck, 2016, paras 15–26); T-219/14, Regione autonoma della Sardegna v Commission, 2017, paras 47–48. 460 See T-214/95, Vlaams Gewest v Commission, 1998, para. 29; T-132/96 and T-143/96, Freistaat Sachsen and Others v Commission, 1999, para. 84; T-288/97, Regione autonoma Friuli-Venezia Giulia v Commission, 1999, para. 31; T-269/99, T-271/99, and T-272/99, Diputación Foral de Guipúzcoa and Others v Commission, 2002 para. 41; T-461/12, Hansestadt Lübeck v Commission, 2014, para. 34 (upheld in C-524/14 P, Commission v Hansestadt Lübeck, 2016, paras 15–26); T-462/13, Comunidad Autónoma del País Vasco and Itelazpi v Commission, 2015, para. 34; T-219/14, Regione autonoma della Sardegna v Commission, 2017, paras 47–48; T-167/13, Comune di Milano v Commission, 2018, paras 34, 43. Thus, as regards the interest requirement, a regional or local entity may be found to derive an advantage from the annulment of the contested decision, insofar as it would put an end to the legal consequences of that decision on the validity of its acts by which it granted the disputed aid and its ensuing obligations: see T-219/14, Regione autonoma della Sardegna v Commission, 2017, paras 50–66 (finding continuing

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354 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT the applicant is not the author of the aid scheme, reliance by a regional or local entity on the fact that the application or implementation of the contested Union act is capable generally of affecting socio-economic conditions within its territorial jurisdiction is not sufficient to render an action brought by that entity admissible.461 7.127

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(v) Associations General—Under the case-law (see para. 7.106), an action for annulment brought by an association against a Commission decision relating to State aid will be admissible in three situations where: (1) a legal provision expressly grants a series of procedural rights to the association; (2) the association, by bringing the action, has substituted itself for one or more of the members whom it represents, on condition that those members are themselves in a position to bring an admissible action; and (3) the association is differentiated because its own interests as an association are affected, in particular because its position as a negotiator is affected by the decision.462 Association has been granted procedural rights—An association will be considered to be individually concerned by a Commission decision relating to State aid where that decision violates rights of a procedural nature expressly conferred on such association by a legal provision.463 As regards the procedural rights conferred by Art. 108(2) TFEU and Art. 6(1) of Regulation 2015/1589, it should be recalled that ‘interested parties’ within the meaning of Art. 1(h) of Regulation 2015/1589 include, in particular, associations whose interests might be affected by the grant of the aid, such as trade associations (see para. 7.119) insofar as the action brought seeks to safeguard such rights. The association which brings the action for annulment will generally represent the interests of undertakings which are ‘interested parties’ within the meaning of those provisions, as a result of which the association will not have to prove an interest of its own to bring the action.464 interest despite undertaking which was the subject of the aid being placed under liquidation). As the General Court has ruled, there is nothing to indicate that such entity must not only satisfy the requirements set out in the case-law, but also prove that its interest is ‘specific and autonomous’: see T-167/13, Comune di Milano v Commission, 2018, paras 45–49. When the aid scheme is declared compatible with the internal market, the action will in principle be inadmissible: see T-443/08 and T-455/08, Freistaat Sachsen and Others v Commission, 2011, paras 46–69. 461 See T-238/97, Comunidad Autónoma de Cantabria v Council (order), 1998, para. 50; compare T-132/96 and T-143/96, Freistaat Sachsen and Others v Commission, 1999, paras 84–88, in particular para. 87. 462 See T-292/02, Confservizi v Commission, 2009, para. 52; T-189/08, Forum 187 v Commission, 2010, para. 58; T-559/11, BytyOKD v Commission (order), 2013, para. 29; T-670/14, Milchindustrie-Verband and Deutscher Raiffeisenverband v Commission (order), 2015, para. 14; T-238/14, EGBA and RGA v Commission (order), 2016, para. 50; T-747/17, UPF v Commission, 2019, para. 20. In the case-law within the context of State aid, those three situations may be parsed down to two, i.e., that an association is entitled to bring an action for annulment against a Commission decision in matters of State aid only if the undertakings which it represents or some of those undertakings themselves have standing or if it can prove an interest of its own: see, e.g. C-182/03 and C-217/03, Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission, 2006, para. 56; T-601/11, Dansk Automat Brancheforening v Commission, 2014, para. 37; T-242/15, ACDA and Others v Commission (order), 2017, para. 22. This may be explained by the fact that, depending on the way they are framed, the first situation (procedural rights affected) and the third situation (own interests affected) could be subsumed into one general category: see, e.g. T-117/04, Vereniging Werkgroep Commerciële Jachthavens Zuidelijke Randmeren v Commission, 2006, para. 65. 463 See, e.g. T-747/17, UPF v Commission, 2019, para. 20 (the fact that its internal rules entrust the association with the task of defending the common interests of its members and representing them before the Union Courts is not sufficient in that regard: see para. 21). 464 As recognized in the case-law, an association which represents the interests of competitors of the beneficiaries of an aid measure is an interested party within the meaning of Art. 108(2) TFEU. Such a party is entitled

Identity of the Parties 355 Association represents the interests of undertakings which are directly and individually concerned—The defence of common interests is not enough to establish the admissibility of an action for annulment brought by an association. An association will, however, be able to bring an action for annulment where it defends the individual interests of certain of its members before the Union Courts in accordance with the powers conferred on it by its statutes if it can be demonstrated that those members are directly and individually concerned by the contested decision. Such collective action brought by the association presents procedural advantages, since it obviates the bringing of numerous separate actions against the same decision, while avoiding any risk of Art. 263 TFEU being circumvented by means of such a collective action.465

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Association can prove an interest of its own—An association will be considered to be individually concerned by a Commission decision relating to State aid if it is capable of showing that its own interests are affected, especially where its position as negotiator is affected by that decision.466 In that regard, a trade association which was closely involved in the development of Union policy on aid in a particular sector will be individually concerned by a Commission decision which is allegedly at odds with the policy outlined. This is because such a decision affects the trade association in its capacity as a negotiator of the policy concerned.467

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A classic example is CIRFS and Others v Commission,468 in which the Court of Justice held that the Comité International de la Rayonne et des Fibres Synthétiques (an association governed by French law whose membership consisted of the main international manufacturers of synthetic fibres) was individually concerned by a Commission decision which allegedly infringed the Commission’s ‘discipline’ with respect to aid to the synthetic fibre industry, after noting that the association concerned had been the Commission’s interlocutor with regard to the adoption of this ‘discipline’ and to its later

to challenge a decision by which the Commission finds, in the context of the preliminary stage of the procedure for reviewing aid under Article 108(3) TFEU, that a measure is not aid, provided that that party seeks, by bringing its action, to safeguard the procedural rights available to it if the Commission decided to initiate the formal investigation procedure under Art. 108(2) TFEU: see C-817/18 P, Vereniging tot Behoud van Natuurmonumenten in Nederland v Commission, 2020, paras 41–53; T-47/19, Dansk Erhverv v Commission, 2021, para. 44 (appeal pending in C-508/21 P). 465 See 282/85, DEFI v Commission, 1986, para. 16; C-6/92, Federmineraria and Others v Commission, 1993, para. 17; C-319/07 P, 3F v Commission, 2009, paras 87–94; T-447/93, T-448/93, and T-449/93, AITEC and Others v Commission, 1995, paras 60, 62; T-55/99, CETM v Commission, 2000, para. 23; T-747/17, UPF v Commission, 2019, paras 20, 24, 44. Thus, an association may not rely on the fact that it represents the interests of members which have brought their own actions, since they are representing their own interests: see T-187/15, Compagnia Trasporti Pubblici and Others v Commission (order), 2015, para. 27; T-747/17, UPF v Commission, 2019, paras 26–27. 466 See 67/85, 68/85, and 70/85, Van der Kooy and Others v Commission, 1988, paras 19–25; C-313/90, CIRFS and Others v Commission, 1993, paras 29–30; C-319/07 P, 3F v Commission, 2009, paras 87–94; T-2/13, CFE-CGC France Télécom-Orange v Commission (order), 2014, para. 32; T-486/18, Danske Slagtermestre v Commission (order), 2020, para. 23 (set aside on other grounds in C-99/21 P). To recall (see para. 7.125), where an association calls into question a decision appraising the aid taken at the conclusion of the formal investigation procedure, it cannot be inferred from the mere participation of the association in the administrative procedure that it has standing: see T-238/14, EGBA and RGA v Commission (order), 2016, paras 74–75. 467 See C-313/90, CIRFS and Others v Commission, 1993, paras 28–31; T-380/94, AIUFASS and AKT v Commission, 1996, para. 51. 468 See C-313/90, CIRFS and Others v Commission, 1993, paras 24–31.

356 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT extension and adaptation and had actively pursued negotiations with the Commission during the pre-litigation procedure, in particular by submitting written observations to it and by keeping in close contact with the responsible departments. Similarly, in Van der Kooy v Commission,469 the Landbouwschap (a body established under Netherlands law to protect the common interests of agricultural undertakings) had negotiated with a public undertaking a preferential gas tariff which was considered by the Commission to constitute State aid. It was also one of the signatories of the agreement establishing that tariff. The Court of Justice held that the Landbouwschap was individually concerned by the Commission decision declaring the preferential gas tariff incompatible with the internal market on the grounds that its position as negotiator of gas tariffs in the interests of the growers concerned was affected by the decision and that in this capacity it had taken an active part in the procedure under Art. 108(2) TFEU by submitting written comments to the Commission and by keeping in close contact with the responsible officials throughout the procedure. Accordingly, the case-law concerns particular situations in which the association occupies a clearly circumscribed position as negotiator which is closely linked to the actual subject-matter of the Commission decision on State aid, thus placing it in a factual situation which distinguishes it from any other persons.470 7.131

(vi) Trade unions A trade union will not normally be individually concerned by a decision of the Commission declaring an aid measure incompatible with the internal market. The status of negotiator with regard to the social aspects in principle constitutes only a tenuous link with the actual subject-matter of the decision. Whereas, when determining whether or not State aid is compatible with the internal market, social aspects are liable to be taken into account by the Commission, this will be done only as part of an overall assessment which includes a large number of considerations of various kinds linked in particular to the protection of competition, regional development, the promotion of culture or environmental protection.471 By contrast, where the Commission decides that an aid measure is compatible with the internal market without opening the formal investigation procedure provided for in Art. 108(2) TFEU and Art. 6(1) of Regulation 2015/1589, a trade union may be regarded as an ‘interested party’ within the meaning of Art. 1(h) of Regulation 2015/1589 and thus individually concerned by

469 See 67/85 to 68/85, and 70/85, Van der Kooy v Commission, 1988, paras 20–24. 470 See, e.g. C-106/98 P, Comité d’entreprise de la Société française de production and Others v Commission, 2000, para. 45, C-319/07 P, 3F v Commission, 2009, para. 87; T-236/10, Asociación Española de Banca v Commission, 2012, para. 43; T-2/13, CFE-CGC France Télécom-Orange v Commission (order), 2014, para. 35; compare, e.g. C-78/03 P, Commission v Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum, 2005, paras 55–59; C-647/19 P, Ja zum Nürburgring v Commission, 2021, paras 44–48; T-69/96, Hamburger Hafen-und Lagerhaux and Others v Commission, 2001, para. 50; T-236/10, Asociación Española de Banca v Commission, 2012, paras 44–46; T-156/10, Confederación de Cooperativas Agrarias de España and CEPES v Commission (order), 2014, paras 34–38; T-2/13, CFE-CGC France Télécom-Orange v Commission (order), 2014, paras 36–42; T-486/18, Danske Slagtermestre v Commission (order), 2020, paras 24–26 (set aside on other grounds in C-99/21 P). 471 See C-106/98 P, Comité d’entreprise de la Société française de production and Others v Commission, 2000, paras 52–53.

Identity of the Parties 357 such a decision if it shows that its interests or those of its members might be affected by the granting of aid.472 (d) Anti-dumping (i) Measures of general application Provisional and definitive anti-dumping duties are imposed by regulation pursuant 7.132 to Art. 14(1) of Regulation 2016/1036. What is involved is essentially a provision of general application which applies to all economic entities concerned. As indicated by the case-law, anti-dumping regulations constitute regulatory acts473 which do entail implementing measures (by the Member States), so that the requirement of individual concern still applies under the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU.474 It is apparent that some parts of such an anti-dumping regulation or the extension of existing anti- dumping duties to like products or parts thereof are of individual concern to some natural and legal persons.475 (ii) Producers and exporters Generally, under the case-law, producers or exporters of the product at issue will be 7.133 directly concerned by a regulation imposing anti-dumping duties, on the grounds that, first, the regulation directly affects their legal situation since it determines the anti- dumping duty which they must pay and, second, the Member States have no discretion as regards the rate of anti-dumping duty and the imposition of that duty.476 However, as the Court of Justice has held,477 the determination whether producers and exporters of the product at issue are directly concerned by a regulation imposing anti-dumping duties is connected, in particular, with the fact that they are alleged to be involved in dumping practices. A producer that does not export its product to the EU market, but simply sells it on its national market, cannot be alleged to be involved in dumping. Consequently, producers which did not directly export their product to the EU market during the investigation period and thus were not identified in the contested regulation as being exporters will not be directly concerned by that regulation, since their product was not directly made subject to the anti-dumping duties imposed; the fact that the

472 See C-319/07 P, 3F v Commission, 2009, paras 33, 98–108. 473 See T-134/10, FESI v Council (order), 2014, paras 23–25; T-722/20, Far Polymers and Others v Commission (order), 2021, paras 54–56; compare, e.g.T-507/13, Solar World and Others v Commission, 2015, para. 64 (Commission decision accepting a specific undertaking not considered to be a regulatory act). 474 See C-145/17 P, Internacional de Productos Metálicos v Commission, 2018, paras 55–62; C-207/17, Rotho Blaas, 2018, paras 38–39; T-551/11, Brugola Service International v Council (order), 2013, paras 42–66; T-134/10, FESI v Council (order), 2014, paras 27–37; T-722/20, Far Polymers and Others v Commission (order), 2021, paras 58–71. 475 See, e.g. C‑358/89, Extramet Industrie v Council, 1991, para. 14; T-110/17, Jiangsu Seraphim Solar System Co v Commission, 2020, para. 35 (set aside on other grounds in C-439/20 P and C-441/20 P); T-132/18, Roland v Commission, 2021, para. 48. For a summary of certain classes of traders recognized in the case-law, see, e.g. C-207/17, Rotho Blaas, 2018, paras 31–35; C-251/18, Trace Sport, 2019, paras 33–36; C-708/19, Von Aschenbach & Voss, 2021, paras 40–41. 476 See T-170/94, Shanghai Bicycle Corporation v Council, 1997, para. 41; T-643/11, Crown Equipment (Suzhou) Co. and Crown Gabelstapler, 2014, para. 28; T-351/13, Crown Equipment (Suzhou) and Crown Gabelstapler v Council, 2016, para. 24. 477 See C-465/16 P, Council v Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association, 2019, paras 69–82; C-466/16 P, Council v Marquis Energy, 2019, paras 44–57.

358 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT producers had initially been selected by the Commission in the sample of exporting producers is considered insufficient in that regard. Furthermore, producers or exporters of products on which anti-dumping duties are imposed are considered to be directly as well as individually concerned where information about their business activities is used with a view to determining the duties. Generally speaking, this will be the case where manufacturing and exporting undertakings can establish that they were identified in measures adopted by the Commission or were concerned by the preliminary investigation.478 Such a factor should have in some way prompted the intervention of the institutions or have formed part of the raison d’être of the regulation itself.479 An action for annulment is often the only legal remedy available to them against the imposition of such duties.480 Where a regulation which introduces an anti-dumping duty imposes different duties on a series of undertakings, an undertaking is individually concerned only by those provisions which impose on it a specific anti-dumping duty and determine the amount thereof, and not by those provisions which impose anti-dumping duties on other undertakings. Manufacturing and exporting undertakings are thus not individually concerned by an anti-dumping duty which is imposed on other undertakings by the same regulation. Consequently, an action brought by such undertakings will be admissible only insofar as they seek the annulment of those provisions of the regulation that exclusively concern them.481 As regards companies which offer undertakings, the case-law has recognized that the provisions of a Commission regulation relating to the withdrawal of the acceptance of an undertaking offered by an exporter in connection with anti-dumping proceedings are of direct and individual concern to that exporter.482 Similarly, a Commission 478 See 239/82 and 275/82, Allied Corporation v Commission, 1984, para. 12; C-156/87, Gestetner Holdings v Council and Commission, 1990, para. 17; C-239/99, Nachi Europe, 2001, para. 21; C-374/12, ‘Valimar’, 2014, para. 30; C-207/17, Rotho Blaas, 2018, para. 33; C-465/16 P, Council v Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association, 2019, para. 73; C-466/16 P, Council v Marquis Energy, 2019, para. 48; C-461/18 P, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Distillerie Bonollo and Others, 2020, para. 64; T-598/97, BSC Footwear Supplies and Others v Council, 2002, para. 45; T-162/09, Würth and Fasteners (Shenyang) v Council, 2012, para. 23; T-134/10, FESI v Commission (order), 2014, para. 44; T-351/13, Crown Equipment (Suzhou) and Crown Gabelstapler v Council, 2016, paras 27– 38 (it is sufficient that an applicant is clearly identified and need not be expressly named in the contested regulation: see paras 28–33). As regards an example of Union producers fulfilling the criterion of direct concern, see C-461/18 P, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Distillerie Bonollo and Others, 2020, paras 60–88; C-402/20 P, Lípidos Santiga v Commission, 2021, paras 24–25; see also T-161/94, Sinochem Heilongjiang v Council, 1996, paras 45–48 (finding that the applicant was concerned by the preliminary investigation, which was not affected by the fact that the Commission had decided not to make use of the information which it had provided); as regards a Commission review notice, see T-45/06, Reliance Industries v Council and Commission, 2008, para. 47; and a Commission decision prescribing that anti-dumping duties were no longer to be collected with respect to goods produced by a specific company and therefore on imports which compete with goods marketed within the EU was found to be of direct and individual concern to the applicants which included Union producers who were sampled and at whose premises verification visits were carried out in the course of the procedure, see T-364/16, ArcelorMittal Tubular Products Ostrava and Others v Commission, 2018, paras 38–53. 479 See T-597/97, Euromin v Council, 2000, para. 45. 480 See, in that regard, 239/82 and 275/82, Allied Corporation v Commission, 1984, para. 13. 481 See 240/84, Toyo v Council, 1987, paras 5–7; 258/84 Nippon Seiko v Council, 1987, para. 7; C-156/87, Gestetner Holdings v Council and Commission, 1990, para. 12; C-239/99, Nachi Europe, 2001 para. 22; T-143/06, MTZ Polyfilms v Council and Commission, 2009, para. 27; T-170/09, Shanghai Biaowu High-Tensile Fasteners and Shanghai Prime Machinery v Council, 2012, paras 38–43. 482 See T-110/17, Jiangsu Seraphim Solar System v Commission, 2020, paras 41–45 (confirmed on appeal, but set aside on other grounds in C-439/20 P and C-441/20 P, Commission v Jiangsu Seraphim Solar System, 2023, paras 54–64).

Identity of the Parties 359 regulation accepting an undertaking offered by an exporter in anti-dumping proceedings are of direct and individual concern to that exporter. However, an importer, even if it is the sole importer of the product in question, is necessarily not party to the undertaking given and thus has been held not to be directly and individually concerned by such a regulation.483 Additionally, the General Court has found that Union producers are not directly concerned by a Commission regulation accepting an undertaking offered in connection with the anti‑dumping proceeding.484 In the light of the case-law concerning the admissibility of actions brought by associations (see para. 7.106), an association whose members include exporting producers of the product concerned will be individually concerned by a regulation imposing definitive anti-dumping duties, as far as the action for annulment is brought in its own name to protect its own procedural rights, under circumstances where that association was recognized by the Commission in the contested regulation as having a particular status as an interested party to which the procedural rights provided for in Regulation 2016/1036 should be granted.485 It is also apparent from the case-law that an association has standing to bring annulment proceedings where it represents the interests of producers and exporters of the product concerned which would be entitled to bring such proceedings in their own right.486 (iii) Complainants Natural or legal persons or associations which lodge a complaint leading to a preliminary administrative procedure487 are entitled to bring an action for annulment against a refusal by the Commission to initiate the actual anti-dumping procedure on the grounds that there is insufficient evidence.488 Their particular legal position founded upon the procedural guarantees conferred by Regulation 2016/1036 must be protected by the Union Courts. A decision refusing to initiate a procedure may not undermine those procedural safeguards. An action brought against a regulation imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty is available only to a complainant whose involvement in the adoption of the regulation extends further than simply lodging the complaint which initiated the anti-dumping procedure. Only where the complainant’s observations were determinative of the course of the investigation or where its specific position on the market was taken into account will the complainant be individually concerned by the regulation imposing a definitive 483 See 295/86, Garelly v Commission (order), 1987, para. 14. 484 See T-507/13, SolarWorld and Others v Commission (order), 2015, paras 41–62. 485 See T-254/18, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and Others v Commission, 2021, paras 49–70 (appeal pending in C-478/21 P). In that case, the General Court also held, in particular, that that association was directly concerned by the contested regulation, since it can ensure that its procedural rights are respected only if it is able to challenge that regulation (para. 74). 486 See T‑112/14 to T‑116/14 and T‑119/14, Molinos Río de la Plata and Others v Council, 2016, paras 33–64; T-254/18, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and Others v Commission, 2021, paras 81–123 (appeal pending in C-478/21 P); see also, in that regard, C-465/16 P, Council v Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association, 2019, paras 122–125 (an association representing non-exporting producers and traders/blenders is not required to show that the members whose interests it intended to defend were able to enforce their individual interests within that association). 487 See Articles 5 and 6 of Regulation 2016/1036. 488 See 191/82 Fediol v Commission, 1983, paras 15–33. The simple fact that an EU producer was entitled to file a complaint but did not do so is not sufficient to consider that this producer is individually concerned, even if the undertaking concerned is considerably affected by the refusal to adopt anti-dumping measures: see T-301/06, Lemaître Sécurité v Commission (order), 2008, paras 23–30.

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360 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT anti-dumping duty.489 The fact that the complaint was lodged by a trade association of which the applicant is a member does not detract from the undertaking’s right to bring an action.490 If the aforementioned conditions are fulfilled by both the trade association and the undertaking, both of them can bring an action for annulment. 7.135

(iv) Importers Under the case-law, importers are directly concerned by anti-dumping regulations, since those regulations determine the anti-dumping duties which they have to pay and oblige the national customs authorities to collect such duties without leaving them any margin of discretion.491 Importers associated with an exporter are individually concerned by a regulation imposing an anti-dumping duty where the resale prices, and not the export prices, of the product in question are considered in order to determine whether dumping is taking place492 or the level of the anti- dumping duty.493 Where an importer brings an action for annulment against a regulation which, following circumvention, was extended to cover like products or parts thereof, an ‘importer’ which is affected by the extension of the anti-dumping duty will be individually concerned only if the Commission took account of the undertaking’s commercial activities in its investigation carried out following circumvention of the original anti-dumping duty or if the undertaking concerned participated in good time in the investigation.494 Generally speaking, importers not associated with an exporter are not individually concerned by a regulation imposing an anti-dumping duty.495 The reason for this is that the imposition of the duty affects them in their objective capacity as importers of

489 See 264/82, Timex v Council and Commission, 1985, paras 8–17. 490 See 264/82, Timex v Council and Commission, 1985, paras 8–17. 491 See T-134/10, FESI v Council, 2014, para. 26; T-351/13, Crown Equipment (Suzhou) and Crown Gabelstapler v Council, 2016, para. 24; T-781/16, Puma v Commission, 2021, para. 47; T-132/18, Roland v Commission, 2021, para. 46; T-722/20, Far Polymers and Others v Commission (order), 2021, para. 23. By contrast, users of the product have been found not to be directly concerned by a regulation imposing anti-dumping duties, since the potential effects of such duties on them would result from any price increase decided on by the importers from whom they obtain their supplies, and does not stem directly from the regulation: see T-722/20, Far Polymers and Others v Commission (order), 2021, paras 79–80. 492 See 118/77, ISO v Council, 1977, paras 10–16; 239/82 and 275/82, Allied Corporation v Commission, 1984, para. 15; C-156/87, Gestetner Holdings v Council and Commission, 1990, para. 18; C-239/99, Nachi Europe, 2001, para. 21; C-207/17, Rotho Blaas, 2018, para. 34 (drawing from case-law in respect of related and non-related importers); T-598/97, BSC Footwear Supplies and Others v Council, 2002, para. 45; T-162/09, Würth and Fasteners (Shenyang) v Council, 2012, para. 25. 493 See 113/77, NTN Toyo Bearing and Others v Council, 1979, para. 9; 205/87, Nuova Ceam v Commission (order), 1987, para. 13; C-305/86 and C-160/87, Neotype Techmashexport v Commission and Council, 1990, paras 19–21; C-207/17, Rotho Blaas, 2018, para. 35; T-278/03, Van Mannekus v Council (order), 2006, para. 119; T-162/09, Würth and Fasteners (Shenyang) v Council, 2012, para. 25. The status of importer, even if associated with exporters of the product in question, cannot, on its own, be sufficient to support the view that an importer is individually concerned by a regulation imposing an anti-dumping duty, but rather requires proof that information relating to its commercial activity has been taken into account for the purpose of establishing dumping or, failing that, proof of other attributes which are peculiar to it and which differentiate it from all other persons: see C-251/18, Trace Sport, 2019, paras 37–44; C-708/19, Von Aschenbach & Voss, 2021, paras 42–47; T-722/20, Far Polymers and Others v Commission (order), 2021, para. 33. 494 See T-74/97 and T-75/97, Büchel v Council and Commission, 2000, paras 50–68. 495 See 307/81, Alusuisse v Council and Commission, 1982, paras 7–14; 279/86, Sermes v Commission (order), 1987, paras 14–22; C-145/17 P, Internacional de Productos Metálicos v Commission, 2018, paras 37–41; T-722/20, Far Polymers and Others v Commission (order), 2021, paras 30–49.

Identity of the Parties 361 the product subjected to an anti-dumping duty. Consequently, the regulation remains a regulation, even if independent importers were involved in the procedure which led to its adoption496 or if their identity emerges from the regulation.497 The existence of dumping is not normally determined by reference to importers’ resale prices, but by reference to the actual prices paid or payable on export.498 The restrictive scope of the case-law relating to independent importers is mitigated by the fact that they can challenge the imposition of an anti-dumping duty in the national courts, which, in turn, may or must make a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on the validity of the regulation (see Ch. 10).499 In exceptional circumstances, the Court of Justice has recognized the particular economic situation of an independent importer as a specific circumstance causing the importer to be individually concerned by a regulation imposing an anti-dumping duty.500 The Court pointed out that the applicant was the largest importer of the product and that its business activities depended to a very large extent on imports, given that there was only one producer within the Union of the product, which, moreover, was its direct competitor and had strengthened its position considerably vis-à-vis the applicant as a result of the restriction of imports. It made no difference that its resale price was not taken into account in adopting the regulation.501 (v) Original equipment manufacturers An original equipment manufacturer (OEM)—an undertaking selling goods produced by other manufacturers under its own brand name502—will be individually concerned by a regulation imposing an anti-dumping duty where, in calculating the dumping margin, account was taken of the particular features of its business dealings with the manufacturers in respect of which anti-dumping duties are imposed by the regulation. An application by an OEM will be admissible only insofar as it seeks annulment of the specific anti-dumping duty imposed by the regulation on the producer from which the OEM obtains the goods which it sells.503

496 See 307/81, Alusuisse v Council and Commission, 1982, para. 13. 497 See 301/86, Frimodt Pedersen v Commission (order), 1987, para. 3. 498 See 301/86, Frimodt Pedersen v Commission (order), 1987, para. 17. However, non-related importers will have standing to bring an action for annulment against a regulation imposing anti-dumping duties where their resale prices were used in order to construct export prices: see C-133/87 and C-150/87, Nashua Corporation and Others v Commission and Council, 1990, paras 12, 15; T-7/99, Medici Grimm v Council, 2000, para. 65; T-162/09, Würth and Fasteners (Shenyang) v Council, 2012, para. 24. 499 See C-145/17 P, Internacional de Productos Metálicos v Commission, 2018, para. 61. 500 See C-358/89, Extramet v Council, 1991, para. 17; see also, in that regard, T-598/97, BSC Footwear Supplies and Others v Council, 2002, para. 50; T-162/09, Würth and Fasteners (Shenyang) v Council, 2012, para. 28; T-722/20, Far Polymers and Others v Commission (order), 2021, para. 34; T-781/16, Puma v Commission, 2021, paras 50–60; T-132/18, Roland v Commission, 2021, paras 49–58. 501 This case-law was applied by analogy in the field of State aid: see T-289/03, BUPA and Others v Commission, 2008, para. 79; T-539/08, Etimine and Etiproducts v Commission (order), 2010, para. 90. 502 Consequently, an OEM falls somewhere between a producer/exporter and an importer. 503 See C-133/87 and C-150/87, Nashua Corporation and Others v Commission and Council, 1990, paras 16–21; C-156/87, Gestetner Holdings v Council and Commission, 1990, paras 19–24; C‑659/13 and C‑34/14, C & J Clark International, 2016, paras 63–66; T-162/09, Würth and Fasteners (Shenyang) v Council, 2012, para. 26; T‑112/14 to T‑116/14 and T‑119/14, Molinos Río de la Plata and Others v Council, 2016, para. 45.

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(e) Banking union In the context of the SRM for credit institutions and certain investment firms established by Regulation No. 806/2014, the Union Courts have held that, although the decisions of the SRB on the calculation of the ex ante contributions to the SRF are addressed to the national resolution authorities, the institutions which are debtors in respect of those contributions are directly and individually concerned by those decisions.504 Moreover, the General Court has held that a decision of the SRB not to proceed with an ex post definitive valuation of a bank in connection with the implementation of a resolution scheme was not of direct concern to applicants holding Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments of that bank, since they cannot obtain any compensation on the basis of Article 20(12) of Regulation No. 806/2014. The bank’s previous shareholders are no longer shareholders in that entity following the adoption of the resolution decision, with the result that the applicants no longer hold capital instruments of the bank that can be the subject of compensation under that provision.505 In the context of the SSM, the Court of Justice has ruled that the shareholders of the company whose authorization has been withdrawn by an ECB decision on the basis of Regulation No. 1024/2013 are not directly concerned by that decision. The right of shareholders to receive dividends and to participate in the management of the company has not been affected by the decision at issue, and the liquidation of that bank is taken on the basis of national law, thereby constituting other intermediate rules for the purposes of the Court’s case-law.506 Additionally, the General Court has found that an ECB decision concerning prudential supervision of a banking group on a consolidated basis, although drafted as a single decision, is to be regarded as a group of individual decisions imposing prudential requirements on each of the entities listed therein. Where the applicant forms part of the banking group over which the ECB has decided to exercise prudential supervision, the provisions of that decision are therefore of direct and individual concern to the applicant insofar as those provisions confer responsibility on that group for the prudential supervision of the applicant vis-à-vis the ECB.507

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(f) Public procurement Natural or legal persons who participate in a public tender procedure organized by the Union belong to a closed class. Each of them is individually concerned by a decision awarding the contract to one of their number.508 The withdrawal or modification of a 504 See C-414/18, Iccrea Banca, 2019, paras 65–69; T-323/16, Banco Cooperativo Español v SRB, 2019, paras 58– 64; T-365/16, Portigon v SRB, 2019, paras 76–82; T‑377/16, T‑645/16, and T‑809/16, Hypo Vorarlberg Bank v SRB, 2019, paras 73–79. 505 See T-2/19, Algebris (UK) and Anchorage Capital Group v SRB (order), 2019, paras 37–64; see also T-618/17, Activa Minoristas del Popular v SRB (order), 2018, paras 25–26: an association which lodged an action for annulment against a SRB decision adopting a resolution scheme in respect of a bank, and which was set up to defend the interests of the investors concerned after the decision was adopted was not directly concerned by that decision. 506 See C‑663/17 P, C‑665/17 P, and C‑669/17 P, ECB v Trasta Komercbanka, 2019, paras 104–115, 119. 507 See T-712/15, Crédit Mutuel Arkéa v ECB, 2017, paras 34–37; T-52/16, Crédit Mutuel Arkéa v ECB, 2017, paras 34–37. 508 See 135/81, Groupement des Agences de Voyages v Commission, 1982, paras 11–13; C-496/99 P, Commission v CAS Succhi di Frutta, 2004, paras 58–59. A member of a consortium which is the addressee of the contested decision, has standing to challenge that decision in accordance with the conditions laid down by Art. 263

Identity of the Parties 363 definitive decision awarding the contract is also of individual concern to the persons who participated in the public tender procedure.509 (g) Access to documents In the context of access to documents pursuant to Regulation No. 1049/2001, a person seeking the annulment of a decision addressed to another person refusing that person access to documents does not have standing before the Union Courts. In such a case, the applicant cannot be considered to have an interest in seeking the annulment of such a decision, since it does not affect its own rights.510 As the addressee of the decision which rejects a confirmatory application, the applicant has standing to bring an action to annul that decision.511 (9) Assessment of admissibility where different individual applicants Where more than one applicant has brought one and the same action, a finding of admissibility in relation to one applicant means that there is no need to consider whether the other applicants are entitled to bring proceedings.512 (10) The interest requirement (a) Concept In contrast to privileged applicants (see para. 7.77),513 natural or legal persons may bring an action for annulment514 only insofar as they can establish that they have an TFEU: see, e.g. T-554/08, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, 2012, paras 30–34; T-117/17, Proximus v Council, 2019, paras 30–42. 509 See 232/81, Agricola Commerciale Olio and Others v Commission, 1984, para. 11; C-496/99 P, Commission v CAS Succhi di Frutta, 2004, paras 58–61. 510 See T-41/00, British American Tobacco International v Commission, 2001, paras 18–24. This differs from a situation in which a person makes the application for access on behalf of the applicant and solely in the applicant’s interest: see T-611/15, Edeka-Handelsgesellschaft Hessenring v Commission (order), 2016, para. 59. 511 See, in that regard, T-552/19, Malacalza Investimenti v ECB, 2020, paras 46–47 (concerning Decision 2004/258 on public access to ECB documents). 512 See, e.g. C-313/90, CIRFS and Others v Commission, 1993, paras 30–31; T-462/13, Comunidad Autónoma del País Vasco and Itelazpi, 2015, para. 34; T-674/17, Le Port de Bruxelles and Région de Bruxelles-Capitale v Commission, 2019, paras 35–37; T-337/18 and T-347/18, Laboratoire Pareva v Commission, 2021, paras 55–57; see also, with particular regard to direct concern, T-69/18, Verband Deutscher Alten und Behindertenhilfe and CarePool Hannover v Commission, 2021, para. 159. For discussion of the rationale underlying this case-law, see, e.g. T-282/06, Sun Chemical Group and Others v Commission, 2007, paras 50–53; T-151/05, NVV and Others v Commission, 2009, paras 45–48. This differs from assessing urgency in proceedings for interim measures: see C-391/08 P(R), Dow AgroSciences and Others v Commission (order), 2009, paras 40–43. 513 See C-650/18, Hungary v Parliament, 2021, para. 50; T-219/14, Regione autonoma della Sardegna v Commission, 2017, paras 43, 45. That being said, an action for annulment brought by a Member State may still be found to be devoid of purpose: see, e.g. T-542/15 (order), Hungary v Commission, 2017, para. 16; T-664/14, Belgium v Commission, 2018, para. 57. An interest in bringing proceedings and locus standi are distinct conditions for admissibility which must be satisfied by a natural or legal person cumulatively in order to be admissible to bring an action for annulment under Art. 263, fourth para. TFEU: see C-33/14 P, Mory and Others v Commission, 2015, para. 62; T-219/14, Regione autonoma della Sardegna v Commission, 2017, paras 42, 45; T-777/19, CAPA v Commission, 2021, para. 112 (appeal pending in C-742/21 P). Thus, if the Union Court finds that the interest requirement is not fulfilled, it need not examine whether the other conditions for the admissibility of such an action set out in Art. 263, fourth para. TFEU are met: see C-176/16 P, Proforec v Commission (order), 2017, paras 45–46. While an interest in bringing proceedings constitutes a procedural condition independent of the substantive law applicable to the substance of the case, it is to be assessed in the light of the substantive claim that has been made in the application: see C-761/18 P, Leino-Sandberg v Parliament, 2021, para. 35. 514 As the Union Courts have held, an interest in bringing proceedings is an essential and fundamental prerequisite for any legal proceedings: see, e.g. C-236/17 P, Canadian Solar Emea and Others v Council, 2019, para. 91; C-560/18 P, Izba Gospodarcza Producentów i Operatorów Urządzeń Rozrywkowych v Commission, 2020, para.

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364 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT interest.515 This means that such persons must benefit from the annulment of the contested act.516 In other words, the action for annulment must be liable, if successful, to procure an advantage to the party bringing it.517 If an interest cannot be shown at the stage of lodging the action, the action (or certain pleas thereof) is held inadmissible.518 The applicant’s interest must continue until the final decision, failing which there will be no need to adjudicate.519 Where necessary, the Union Courts will consider of their own motion (ex officio) whether the requirement to have an interest in bringing proceedings is satisfied and whether that interest has ceased to exist in the course of the proceedings.520 The Union Courts may have regard to the effect of the law of a Member State when they consider the applicant’s legal position in assessing the applicant’s interest in bringing annulment proceedings.521 An interest will have to be shown by the individual applicant whether that applicant brings an action for annulment against

72; C-106/19 and C-232/19, Italy and Commune di Milano v Parliament and Council, 2022, para. 55; T-388/11, Deutsche Post v Commission, 2019, para. 47; T-418/21, Alauzun and Others v Commission and EMA (order), 2022, para. 33; see also, as regards the issue of interest in the context of contractual actions under Art. 272 TFEU, para. 15.14; actions for damages under Art 268 TFEU and the second and third paras of Art. 340 TFEU, para. 11.18; and appeals, para. 19.14. 515 Under the case-law, the applicant must justify its interest in a sufficiently relevant manner: see, in that regard, C-176/16 P, Proforec v Commission (order), 2017, paras 33–34; C-554/17 P, BPC Lux 2 v Commission, 2018, paras 34–38; C-701/19 P, Pilatus Bank v ECB (order), 2021, paras 25–38; T-332/17, E-Control v ACER, 2019, paras 32–35; T-276/13 RENV, Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association v Council (order), 2019, paras 27, 2938; T-306/19, Graanhandel P. van Schelven v Commission (order), 2021, paras 31–39. Arguments dependent on the alleged illegality of the contested act or provisions thereof do not suffice: see T-711/14, Arcofin and Others v Commission (order), 2018, para. 174. Interest may be retained despite death of the applicant: see T-314/16 and T-435/16, VG v Commission, 2018, paras 32–36. 516 See, e.g. C-701/19 P, Pilatus Bank v ECB (order), 2021, para. 25; T-245/19, Uzina Metalurgica Moldoveneasca v Commission, 2022, para. 32. 517 See C-362/05 P, Wunenburger v Commission, 2007, para. 42; C-373/06, C-379/06, and C-382/06 P, Flaherty and Others, 2008, para. 25; C-33/14 P, Mory and Others v Commission, 2015, para. 55; C-268/16 P, Binca Seafoods v Commission, 2017, para. 44; C-872/19 P, Venezuela v Council, 2021, para. 82; C-106/19 and C-232/19, Italy and Commune di Milano v Parliament and Council, 2022, para. 55; T-565/19, Oltchim v Commission, 2021, para. 72; T-849/19, Leonardo v Frontex, 2022, para. 23. The question whether an applicant retains an interest in bringing proceedings is assessed in the light of the specific circumstances, taking account, in particular, of the consequences of the alleged unlawfulness and of the nature of the damage claimed to have been sustained: see C-544/17 P, BPC Lux 2 and Others v Commission, 2018, para. 45; T-388/11, Deutsche Post v Commission, 2019, para. 49. 518 See C-430/16 P, Bank Mellat v Council, 2018, para. 50; C-236/17 P, Canadian Solar Emea and Others v Council, 2019, paras 91, 96; C-237/17 P, Canadian Solar Emea and Others v Council, 2019, paras 75, 80; T-76/15, Kenup Foundation and Others v EIT, 2018, para. 28; T-565/19, Oltchim v Commission, 2021, para. 72; T-321/17, Niemelä and Others v ECB (order), 2021, para. 35. 519 See C-239/12 P, Abdulrahim v Council and Commission, 2013, para. 15; C-57/16 P, Client Earth v Commission, 2018, para. 43; C-761/18 P, Leino-Sandberg v Parliament, 2021, para. 32; T-388/11, Deutsche Post v Commission, 2019, para. 48; T-351/18, Ukrselhosprom PCF and Versobank v ECB, 2021, para. 71; T-565/19, Oltchim v Commission, 2021, para. 72. 520 See C-430/16 P, Bank Mellat v Council, 2018, para. 49; C-100/17 P, Gul Ahmed Textile Mills v Council, 2018, paras 38–40; C-236/17 P, Canadian Solar Emea and Others v Council, 2019, para. 92; C-237/17 P, Canadian Solar Emea and Others v Council, 2019, para. 76; T-48/16, Sigma Orionis v Commission, 2018, para. 48; T-351/18 and T-584/18, Ukrselhosprom PCF and Versobank v ECB, 2021, para. 72 (appeal pending in C-803/21 P). See para. 7.159. While it has been held that interveners may not raise a plea of inadmissibility based on lack of interest where the party in support of whose form of order sought has not done so, the Union Courts may still examine such a plea of their own motion: see, in that regard, T-471/11, Éditions Odile Jacob v Commission, 2014, paras 35–38; T-827/17, Aeris Invest v ECB, 2021, paras 71–72 (appeal pending in C-782/21 P). 521 See C-317/09 P, ArchiMEDES v Commission, 2010, paras 102, 107–112; T-42/06, Gollnisch v Parliament, 2010, paras 63–66; T-291/04, Enviro Tech Europe and Enviro Tech International v Commission, 2011, paras 86– 91; with respect to the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU, see, e.g. T-421/18, Bauer Radio v EUIPO— Weinstein, 2020, para. 37.

Identity of the Parties 365 a decision finding an infringement of Arts 101 or 102 TFEU,522 a decision on State aid, an anti-dumping regulation,524 a decision relating to public procurement,525 or any other reviewable Union act. 523

As regards merger control, an applicant has an interest in challenging a contested act authorizing a concentration between its competitors, since that may affect its commercial situation.526 The fact that the addressees have complied with the Commission decision does not affect their interest in bringing proceedings. Where the Commission declares a concentration incompatible with the internal market and orders it to be reversed, the undertakings involved in the concentration do not 522 See T-474/04, Pergan Hilfsstoffe v Commission, 2007, paras 37–42; T-404/08, Fluorsid and assocMinmet v Commission, 2013, para. 48; see also, in this context, for examples where the interest requirement has been met in respect of actions for annulment brought against: amending decisions, T-250/12, Corporación Empresarial de Materiales de Construcción v Commission, 2015, paras 41–49; T-640/16, GEA Group v Commission, 2018, paras 53–77 (set aside on other grounds in C-823/18 P); inspection decisions, C-403/18 P, Alcogroup and Alcodis v Commission, 2019, paras 24–27; decisions relating to bank guarantees, C-415/14 P, Quimitécnica.com and de Mello v Commission, 2016, paras 36–43. For examples where the interest requirement has not been met, see C‑53/15 P to C-56/15 P, Moreda-Riviere Trefilerías and Others v Commission (order), 2015, paras 24–37 (in the case of a Commission decision adjusting the amount of the fines imposed on certain undertakings and fixing a new period for the payment of those fines, other undertakings whose fines remained unchanged do not have an interest in bringing proceedings); T-496/07, Repsol Lubricantes y Especialidades and Others v Commission, 2013, para. 336 (plea based on reasoning of the Commission regarding immunity to one party without consequence for the applicant). 523 See, e.g. C-33/14 P, Mory and Others v Commission, 2015, paras 69–85; T-207/10, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, 2018, paras 22–32; T-565/19, Oltchim v Commission, 2019, paras 72–76; T‑639/14 RENV, T‑352/15, and T‑740/17, DEI v Commission, 2021, paras 86–92 (appeal pending in C-701/21 P and C-739/21 P). As regards specific pleas in law, see, e.g. T-300/19, Achema and Lifosa v Commission, 2021, para. 200: see also, in this context, as regards: a decision not to initiate the formal investigation procedure, T-578/17, a&o hostel and hotel Berlin v Commission, 2019, paras 51–53; a decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure, C-524/14 P, Commission v Hansestadt Lübeck, 2016, paras 26–31; a decision to extend the formal investigation procedure, T-388/11, Deutsche Post v Commission, 2019, paras 47–63; a decision on individual aid in respect of an undertaking having been placed under liquidation, T-220/14, Saremar v Commission, 2017, paras 49–63. 524 See, e.g. T-254/18, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and Others v Commission, 2021, paras 77–80 (appeal pending in C-478/21 P); compare, e.g. C-236/17 P, Canadian Solar Emea and Others v Council and Commission, 2019, paras 91–98. As regards specific pleas in law, see, e.g. T-157/14, JingAo Solar v Council, 2017, paras 48, 69–75. Given the fact that the amounts lodged by way of provisional duties imposed are to be definitively collected pursuant to a definitive regulation, the applicant in principle no longer has an interest in contesting the regulation imposing such provisional duties: see, e.g. C-312/15 P, SolarWorld v Commission (order), 2016, paras 25–33; T-725/20, Guangdong Haomei New Materials and Guangdong King Metal Light Alloy Technology v Commission (order), 2021, paras 38–51. See also, in this context, for examples in the case of: a regulation on registration of imports, T-604/20, Guangdong Haomei New Materials and Guangdong King Metal Light Alloy Technology v Commission (order), 2021; T-611/20, Airoldi Metalli v Commission (order), 2021; a regulation withdrawing acceptance of undertakings for exporting producers, T-110/17, Jiangsu Seraphim Solar System v Commission, 2020, paras 46–49 (confirmed on appeal, but set aside on other grounds in C-439/20 P and C-441/20 P, Commission v Jiangsu Seraphim Solar System, 2023, paras 65–72); a regulation imposing definitive duties which has been repealed, T-276/13 RENV, Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association v Council (order), 2019. 525 See, e.g. T-126/13, Direct Way and Directway Worldwide v Parliament, 2015, paras 42–45; T-392/15, European Dynamics Luxembourg and Others v European Union Agency for Railways, 2017, paras 34–43; T-741/17, Trasys International and Axianseu v EASA, 2019, paras 31–33. For examples where the interest requirement has not been met, see T-835/16, Louvers Belgium v Commission (order), 2017, para. 17; T-784/17, Strabag Belgium v Parliament (order), 2019, para. 36; T-536/19, Militos Symvouleftiki v Commission, 2020; T-849/19, Leonardo v Frontex, 2022, paras 23–39. According to the case-law, in a situation where the applicant asserts that it did not participate in the tender procedure because the requirements of the specifications prevented it from submitting a tender, the applicant must establish that it was prevented from submitting a tender and thus justify an interest in requesting the annulment of the contested contract notice: see T-849/19, Leonardo v Frontex, 2022, paras 24–29 (finding these requirements were not met in those proceedings: see paras 30–39). 526 See T-177/04 easyJet v Commission, 2006, para. 41; T-79/12, Cisco Systems and Messagenet v Commission, 2013, para. 36; T- T-471/11, Éditions Odile Jacob v Commission, 2014, paras 40–45, in particular para. 43.

366 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT lose their interest in the annulment of the decision if they have complied with it and thereby brought the concentration irreversibly to an end.527 Where a concentration has not been effectuated before the Commission takes its decision declaring it to be incompatible with the internal market, an undertaking party to the intended concentration retains an interest in the annulment of the Commission decision also where the concentration can no longer take place, even in the event that the judgment of the General Court is in the applicant’s favour, as a result of the disappearance of its contractual basis. The General Court takes account in particular of the existing and future legal consequences of annulment of such a decision by virtue of Art. 266 TFEU and of the requirements of judicial review of the legality of Commission acts under the concentration regulation.528 As far as State aid is concerned, the conduct of the Member State to which the Commission decision is addressed does not have any bearing on the applicant’s interest in the annulment of the Commission decision declaring the aid granted to the applicant unlawful and requiring the Member State to recover the aid, even though the Member State has fully complied with the contested decision and does not intend to reintroduce the aid scheme in question if the decision is annulled. The rationale is that the applicant may be able to put forward certain claims before the national authorities if the contested decision is found to be unlawful.529 In the context of the banking union, an applicant has an interest in challenging a decision of the ECB setting out the prudential requirements in respect to financial institutions of which it forms part, 530 and the fact that that decision has been repealed by a subsequent decision does not deprive the applicant of such interest.531 However, in the legal framework of the administrative review of decisions taken by the ECB in the exercise of the powers conferred on it by Regulation No. 1024/2013, which give rise to the adoption of acts intended to replace, with retroactive effect, the acts which were the

527 See T-22/97, Kesko v Commission, 1999, paras 55–65. 528 See T-102/96, Gencor v Commission, 1999, paras 41–45. The same applies where the parties concerned withdraw from the merger before the Commission takes its decision, but the Commission nonetheless adopts a decision: see T-310/00, MCI v Commission, 2004, paras 49–61. 529 See, e.g. C-519/07 P, Commission v Koninklijke FrieslandCampina, 2009, paras 64–68; C-71/09 P, C-73/09 P, and C-76/09 P, Comitato ‘Venezia vuole vivere’ v Commission, 2011, paras 76–77; C-319/09 P, ACEA v Commission, 2011, paras 67–70; C-320/09 P, A2A v Commission, 2011, paras 68–71; T-9/98, Mitteldeutsche Erdoel-Raffinerie v Commission, 2001, paras 32–38; T-239/04 and T-323/04, Italy and Brandt v Commission, 2007, para. 43; T-301/01, Alitalia v Commission, 2008, paras 38–47; T-291/06, Operator ARP v Commission, 2009, para. 27; T-220/14, Saremar v Commission, 2017, paras 55–63. However, an applicant does not have an interest in bringing proceedings insofar as the national authorities decided, on the basis of the contested decision and, where appropriate, the information relating to its implementation provided by the Commission, not to recover the alleged aid from the applicant undertakings: see, e.g. T-679/16, Athletic Club v Commission, 2019, paras 18–23. Additionally, while competitors of the aid beneficiary have an interest in seeking the annulment of a decision under which, without initiating the formal investigation procedure, the Commission declares it compatible with the internal market, the fact that the Member State definitively abandoned the plan which was the subject of the Commission’s decision not to raise objections may affect the existence of a continuing interest in bringing proceedings: see T-24/19, INC and Consorzio Stabile Sis v Commission, 2021, para. 45. 530 See T-52/16, Crédit mutuel Arkéa v ECB, 2017, paras 40–43. 531 See T-712/15, Crédit mutuel Arkéa v ECB, 2017, paras 40–45; see also, in that regard, T-368/15, Alcimos Consulting v ECB (order), 2016, paras 22–25.

Identity of the Parties 367 subject of that review, the applicant has been found to have no interest in obtaining the annulment of acts which have been withdrawn.532 In litigation concerning access to documents of Union institutions, a natural or legal person who has been refused access to all or part of a document requested has an interest in the annulment of the (confirmatory) decision of refusal.533 In Leino-Sandberg v Parliament,534 the Court of Justice made clear that an applicant retains an interest in the annulment of the decision refusing such access where the requested document has been disclosed by a third party and the applicant obtained knowledge of it. (b) No interest in challenging the act the adoption of which was sought by the applicant Where a natural or legal person receives from the Commission an act which that person sought, the person in question has no interest in applying for the annulment of that act (or of certain grounds of that act), even if the grounds of the act contain a number of unfavourable passages. Accordingly, an undertaking which has notified a concentration has no interest in having the decision declaring it compatible with the internal market annulled, even if the decision finds that the undertaking concerned has a dominant position on a particular market.535 Likewise, a recipient of State aid generally has no interest in obtaining the annulment of a decision declaring this aid compatible with the internal market.536

532 See T-351/18 and T-584/18, Ukrselhosprom PCF and Versobank v ECB, 2021, paras 70–94 (appeal pending in C-803/21 P); T-247/16 RENV, Trasta Komercbanka v ECB (order), 2021, paras 41–61; T-321/17, Niemelä and Others v ECB (order), 2021, paras 34–54. 533 See, e.g. T-875/16, Falcon Technologies International v Commission, 2018, para. 29; T-185/19, Public.Resource. Org and Right to Know v Commission, 2021, para. 80. Where the defendant institution subsequently withdraws and replaces the contested act refusing access with an act granting access, the action may become devoid of purpose: see T-411/09, Terezakis v Commission, 2011, paras 14–21; T-511/10, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, 2014; see also, as regards the situation in which, without formally withdrawing the contested act, the defendant institution adopts a new decision granting access, T-750/17, Izba Gospodarcza Producentów i Operatorów Urządzeń Rozrywkowych v Commission (order), 2018. Additionally, an applicant is deemed not to have an interest in respect of the documents to which it had been granted access by the defendant institution: see, e.g. T-265/20, JR v Commission, 2021, paras 34–45. However, an applicant may retain an interest where the decision of the defendant institution has not been withdrawn and in order to induce it to make suitable amendments in the future, thus avoiding the risk that the alleged unlawfulness will be repeated: see C-57/16 P, ClientEarth v Commission, 2018, paras 43–56; compare, e.g. C-568/18 P, Rogesa v Commission (order), 2019, paras 25–34; C-560/18 P, Izba Gospodarcza Producentów i Operatorów Urządzeń Rozrywkowych v Commission, 2020, paras 38–59; T-712/18, Umweltinstitut München v Commission, 2021, paras 15–31. When the defendant institution adopts an explicit confirmatory decision, the applicant does not in principle have an interest in bringing proceedings against an earlier implied decision and those proceedings are devoid of purpose: see, e.g. T-475/17, Rogesa v Commission (order), 2017, paras 16–19. 534 See C-761/18 P, Leino-Sandberg v Parliament, 2021, paras 32–50; see also, in that regard, T-46/92, Scottish Football Association v Commission, 1994, paras 13–14; T-174/95, Svensak Journalistenförbundet v Council, 1998, paras 66–69; T-233/09 Access Info Europe v Council, 2011, paras 34–37; T-540/15, De Capitani v Parliament, 2018, paras 29–33; T-158/19, Breyer v REA, 2021, para. 158; T-827/17, Aeris Invest v ECB, 2021, paras 73–79 (appeal pending in C-782/19 P); T-15/18, OCU v ECB, 2021, paras 76–82. 535 See T-125/97 and T-127/97, Coca-Cola v Commission, 2000, paras 77–92; see also, in that regard, T-138/89, NBV and NVB v Commission, 1992, paras 32–34. 536 See T-212/00, Nuove Industrie Molisane v Commission, 2002; T-141/03 Sniace v Commission, 2005, paras 25–41; T‑443/08 and T‑455/08, Freistaat Sachsen and Land Sachsen-Anhalt v Commission, 2011, paras 46–69; T-412/14, Larko v Commission, 2018; T-750/15, Mitteldeutsche Braunkohlengesellschaft and Others v Commission (order), 2016; T-186/18, Abaco Energy v Commission (order), 2019; T-190/18, Solwindet las Lomas v Commission (order), 2019; compare, e.g. T-309/04, T-317/04, T-329/04, and T-336/04, TV2/Danmark and Others v Commission, 2008, paras 67–83; T-386/14 RENV, FIH Holding and FIH v Commission, 2019, paras 55–58.

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368 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT 7.143

7.144

(c) Personal interest The interest must be personal to the applicant.537 An applicant to which the contested act is not applicable cannot claim that it has an interest.538 Accordingly, a company was held to have no interest in bringing proceedings for the annulment of an act which did not concern the product which it manufactured.539 Additionally, the applicant may adduce only pleas in law against the contested act which raise breaches of the law adversely affecting it. Pleas solely raised in the interests of the law or of the institutions are inadmissible.540 As far as federal Member States are concerned, the regional or local entities often have autonomous policy- making powers which are not subject to the control of the Member State as such. Consequently, such entities have an interest of their own, distinct from the interest of the federal or central authorities, in challenging a Union act which restricts their policy-making powers.541 (d) Vested and present interest The interest must be vested and present, and is to be assessed on the date when the action is brought.542 A hypothetical interest is therefore insufficient to ground an action for annulment.543 Moreover, if the interest pleaded by the applicant concerns 537 See 282/85, DEFI v Commission, 1986, para. 18; T-256/97, BEUC v Commission, 2000, para. 33; T-153/00, Schneider España de Informática v Commission, 2012, para. 40; T-711/14, Arcofin and Others v Commission (order), 2018, paras 172–173; T-160/19, European Political Subdivision of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam v Council, 2021, paras 66–75. A Commission regulation protecting a geographical indication which the applicant did not use was held not to affect its legal sphere, with the result that it had no legal interest in obtaining its annulment: see T-78/98, Unione provinciale degli agricoltori di Firenze and Others v Commission, 1999, paras 30–34; T-120/15, Proforec v Commission (order), 2016, paras 22–35, in particular para. 27. As the General Court has held, an interest presupposes that the annulment of this act is likely, by itself, to have legal consequences for the applicant and thus must be direct: see, in that regard, T-575/14, Elliniki Metalleftiki kai Metallourgiki Larymnis Larko v Commission (order), 2016; T-576/14, Elliniki Metalleftiki kai Metallourgiki Larymnis Larko v Commission (order), 2016, paras 22–27. 538 See, e.g. 88/76, Société pour l’Exportation des Sucres v Commission, 1977, paras 18–19; T-152/16, Megasol Energie v Commission (order), 2017, paras 23–24. 539 See T-117/95, Corman v Commission, 1997, paras 82–84; see also, in that regard, C-682/13 P, Andechser Molkerei Scheitz v Commission, 2015, paras 25–37. 540 See, e.g. 85/82, Schloh v Council, 1983, paras 13–14; T-145/09, Bredenkamp and Others v Commission (order), 2012, para. 24; T-618/15, Voigt v Parliament, 2017, para. 71; T-306/19, Graanhandel P. van Schelven v Commission (order), 2021, para. 38. 541 See T-214/95, Vlaams Gewest v Commission, 1998, para. 30; T-132/96 and T-143/96 Freistaat Sachsen and Others v Commission, 1999, para. 92; T-32/98 and T-41/98, Nederlandse Antillen v Commission, 2000, para. 58. 542 See C-544/17 P, BPC Lux v Commission, 2018, para. 29; C-701/19, Pilatus Bank v ECB (order), 2021, para. 25; T-185/19, Public.Resource.Org and Right to Know v Commission, 2021, para. 17. 543 See, e.g. C‑33/14 P, Mory v Commission, 2015, para. 56; C-236/17 P, Canadian Solar Emea and Others v Council, 2019, para. 92; C-237/17 P, Canadian Solar Emea and Others v Council, 2019, para. 76; T-30/19, CRIA and CCCMC v Commission, 2022, para. 77; T-24/19, INC and Consorzio Stabile Sis v Commission, 2021, para. 37. For some examples, see C-564/13 P, Planet v Commission, 2015, paras 32–34; C-176/16 P, Proforec v Commission (order), 2017, paras 32–41; T-611/20, Airoldi Metalli v Commission (order), 2021, para. 61; T-381/21, D & A Pharma v EMA (order), 2021, paras 27–41 (appeal pending in C-136/22 P). The possibility of an action for damages suffices to justify such an interest in bringing proceedings insofar as that interest is not hypothetical: see, e.g. C-560/18 P, Izba Gospodarcza Producentów i Operatorów Urządzeń Rozrywkowych v Commission, 2020, paras 73–74; T-611/20, Airoldi Metalli v Commission (order), 2021, paras 67–69. Moreover, an interest in bringing proceedings could arise from any action before the national courts in the context of which the possible annulment of the contested act before the Union Courts is capable of benefiting the applicant: see C-33/14 P, Mory v Commission, 2015, paras 76–85; C-554/17 P, BPC Lux 2 v Commission, 2018, paras 42–58: T-167/13, Comune di Milano v Commission, 2018, paras 45–49.

Identity of the Parties 369 a future legal situation, that applicant must demonstrate that the prejudice to that situation is already certain; in other words, an applicant cannot plead future uncertain circumstances to establish an interest in seeking annulment of the contested act.544 An applicant may have an interest in the annulment of an act which has expired.545 The annulment of such an act has the effect of preventing its author from adopting a similar act in the future.546 An applicant may also have an interest in bringing an action for annulment against an act which has been implemented in full, the intention being for the defendant institution to do justice to the applicant, possibly by way of the payment of damages,547 or for it to make the necessary amendments for the future to the legal system in the context of which the act was adopted.548 Furthermore, an applicant may have an interest in the annulment of an act which has been replaced549 or repealed.550 The reason for this is that the repeal of an act cannot invariably be equated with annulment by the Union Courts, since, by definition, it does not amount to recognition of its

544 See, e.g. C‑596/15 P and C‑597/15 P, Bionorica and Diapharm v Commission, 2017, paras 114–115; T-611/18, Pharmaceutical Works Polpharma v EMA, 2021, paras 147–148 (set aside on other grounds in C-438/21 P to C-440/21 P); T-16/96, Cityflyer Express v Commission, 1998, para. 30; T-141/03, Sniace v Commission, 2005, para. 26; T-24/19, INC and Consorzio Stabile Sis v Commission, 2021, para. 37. 545 See 53/85, AKZO Chemie v Commission, 1986, para. 21; 207/86, APESCO v Commission, 1988, para. 16; C-279/95 P, Langnese-Iglo v Commission, 1998, para. 71; C-362/05 P, Wunenburger v Commission, 2007, para. 47; T-191/96 and T-106/97, CAS Succhi di Frutta v Commission, 1999, paras 62–63; T-299/05, Shanghai Excell M&E Enterprise and Others v Council, 2009, para. 46 (emphasizing that to accept the Council’s argument would be tantamount to admitting that acts adopted by the institutions whose temporal effects are limited and which will expire after an action for annulment has been brought but before the Union Court is able to give judgment would be excluded from review and that such a situation is incompatible with the spirit of Art. 263 TFEU: see paras 56–57); T-291/04, Enviro Tech Europe and Enviro Tech International v Commission, 2011, para. 86; T-346/16, CSL Behring v EUIPO—Vivatrex (order), 2017, para. 26. 546 See C-362/05 P, Wunenburger v Commission, 2007, paras 50–60; C-239/12 P, Abdulrahim v Council and Commission, 2013, para. 63; T-299/05, Shanghai Excell M&E Enterprise and Others v Council, 2009, paras 48–52; T-291/04, Enviro Tech Europe and Enviro Tech International v Commission, 2011, paras 87–91. 547 See 76/79, Könecke v Commission, 1980, paras 8–9; C‑68/94 and C‑ 30/95, France and Others v Commission, 1998, para. 74; C-496/99 P, Commission v CAS Succhi di Frutta, 2004, para. 83; C-149/12 P, Xeda International and Pace International v Commission, 2013, paras 32, 33; T-539/10, Acino v Commission, 2013, paras 41–46; T-570/08 RENV, Deutsche Post v Commission, 2013, para. 47. 548 See 92/78, Simmenthal v Commission, 1979, para. 32; 53/85, AKZO Chemie and AKZO Chemie UK v Commission, 1986, para. 21; C-239/12 P, Abdulrahim v Council and Commission, 2013, para. 63; C-183/12 P, Ayadi v Commission, 2013, para. 61; T-480/93 and T-483/93, Antillean Rice Mills v Commission, 1995, para. 60; T-256/97, BEUC v Commission (order), 1999, para. 18; T-457/07, Evropaïki Dynamiki v EFSA, 2012, para. 27; T-297/09, Evropaïki Dynamiki v EASA, 2015, para. 43. 549 See C-503/07 P, Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland and Others v Commission, 2008, paras 48–52; T-420/05, Vischim v Commission, 2009, paras 58–63; see also, in that regard, C-337/09 P, Council v Zhejiang Xinan Chemical Industrial Group, 2012, paras 46–49. 550 In the restrictive measures context, the applicant has been found to retain an interest in securing the annulment of an act imposing restrictive measures which has been repealed and replaced: see, e.g. T-228/02, PMOI v Council, 2006, paras 34–35; T-327/03, Al-Aqsa v Council, 2007, paras 38–39; T-256/07, PMOI v Council, 2008, para. 48; T-341/07, Sison v Council, 2009, paras 47–48. The same applies where the applicant’s name is removed from the list of persons whose funds had been frozen by the challenged act or the freezing of assets has been suspended: see, e.g. C-239/12 P, Abdulrahim v Council and Commission, 2013, paras 61–84; C-183/12 P, Ayadi v Commission, 2013, paras 59–81; C-225/17 P, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Others v Council, 2019, paras 31–33; T-347/14, Yanukovych v Council (order), 2016, paras 67–71; T-246/15, Ivanyushchenko v Council, 2017, paras 43–50; compare C-430/16 P, Bank Mellat v Council, 2018, paras 50–68; T-328/14, Jannatian v Council, 2016, para. 25.

370 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT illegality.551 Moreover, repeal generally takes effect ex nunc, whereas annulment within the meaning of Art. 264 TFEU takes effect ex tunc. Accordingly, the judgment annulling an act which has been withdrawn may put the author of the act under an obligation to remove the effects of the illegal conduct found in the judgment by taking adequate steps to restore the applicant to the original position or to avoid the adoption of an identical act.552

7.145

(e) Interest may disappear In order to obtain judgment on the substance, it is not enough that the applicant had an interest at the time when it brought the action for annulment. The applicant’s interest must continue until final judgment.553 Consequently, the interest may disappear in the course of the proceedings, with the result that there is no longer any need to adjudicate on the claim for annulment, since a decision on the merits cannot bring the applicant any benefit.554 For instance, an undertaking which was declared bankrupt after bringing an action for annulment of a Commission decision authorizing aid to a competitor ceased to have any interest in bringing the proceedings, since the competitive situation no longer existed as a result of the applicant’s having been declared bankrupt and that situation could not have been affected by the aid because the applicant had been declared bankrupt before the aid was paid.555 If the interest for bringing an action disappears in the course of the proceedings (for example, if the defendant institution revokes the contested act in all its aspects and with effect ex tunc), it is for the applicant to discontinue the proceedings. If it fails to do so, it may be ordered to pay the costs.556

551 If the contested act has been declared invalid by the Court of Justice in the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling, the action for annulment will become devoid of purpose: see T-102/10, Südzucker AG Mannheim v Commission, 2013, paras 26–32. 552 See T-481/93 and T-484/93, Exporteurs in Levende Varkens and Others v Commission, 1995, paras 46– 48; T-475/07, Dow AgroSciences v Commission, 2011, paras 68–69; T-293/12, Syria International Islamic Bank v Council, 2014, para. 36. However, the withdrawal of the contested act may take effect ex tunc and also have the same consequences as a declaration of nullity. In such case, the Union Court may decide that the action for annulment is devoid of purpose and that there is no need to proceed to judgment: see C-46/96, Germany v Commission (order), 1997, paras 3–6; T-22/96, Langdon v Commission, 1996, paras 12–14; T-25/96, Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Luftfahrt-Unternehmen and Hapag Lloyd v Commission (order), 1997, paras 16–20; T-411/09, Terezakis v Commission, 2011, paras 14–21; T-351/15, Papapanagiotou v Parliament (order), 2017, paras 28–51; T-351/18, Ukrselhosprom PCF and Versobank v ECB, 2021, paras 70–95 (appeal pending in C-803/21 P). 553 See C-320/09 P, A2A v Commission, 2011, para. 68; C-430/16 P, Bank Mellat v Council, 2018, para. 50; C-725/15, Arysta LifeScience Netherlands v EFSA, 2018, paras 64–74. 554 See C-362/05 P, Wunenburger v Commission, 2007, paras 42–43; T-42/06, Gollnisch v Parliament, 2010, paras 60–61; T-86/10, British Sugar v Commission (order), 2013, paras 27–33; T-376/17, Poland v Commission (order), 2020, paras 27–31. 555 See T-435/93, ASPEC and Others v Commission, 1995, para. 29; T-443/93, Casillo Grani v Commission, 1995, paras 5–9; see also, in that regard, T-269/03, Socratec v Commission, 2009, paras 40–49; T-52/07, Movimondo Onlus v Commission (order), 2012, paras 21–29. 556 See 243/78, Simmenthal v Commission, 1980, para. 9; 179/80, Roquette Frères v Commission, 1982, paras 8– 12. However, where the defendant institution repeals the contested act and replaces it with a subsequent act after the action has been brought, which leads the Union Courts to find that the applicant’s interest in challenging the repealed act has disappeared, the institution may expose itself to an order requiring it to pay the costs of the applicant: see, e.g. T-494/08 to T-500/08 and T-509/08, Ryanair v Commission, 2010, para. 106; T-218/11, Dagher v Council (order), 2012, para. 51; T-358/19, Group Canal +v Commission (order), 2021, para. 20.

Special Characteristics 371

III. Special Characteristics A. Other admissibility requirements (1) Time-limits (a) General overview Under the sixth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU, annulment proceedings ‘shall be instituted within two months of the publication of the measure, or its notification to the plaintiff, or, in the absence thereof, of the day on which it came to the knowledge of the latter, as the case may be’.557 It is settled case-law that the time-limit prescribed for bringing an action for annulment under Art. 263 TFEU is a matter of public policy and not subject to the discretion of the parties or the Union Courts, since it was established in order to ensure that legal positions are clear and certain and to avoid any discrimination or arbitrary treatment in the administration of justice.558 The Union Courts will therefore consider of their own motion whether the time-limit for bringing an action for annulment has been respected.559 (i) Burden of proof The party alleging that the time-limit for bringing proceedings has run out has to prove the date on which time started running.560 (ii) Unforseeable circumstances, force majeure, or excusable error When the time-limit for instituting proceedings is exceeded, the applicant will bear the burden of proving the existence of unforeseeable circumstances, force majeure, or excusable error.561 The concepts of unforeseeable circumstances and force majeure contain the same elements and have the same legal consequences. They contain an objective element relating to abnormal circumstances unconnected with the applicant and a subjective element involving the obligation, on its part, to guard against the consequences of the abnormal event by taking appropriate steps without making unreasonable sacrifices.562 Those concepts do not apply to a situation in which, objectively, a diligent and prudent person would have been able to take the necessary steps before 557 For the method of calculating time-limits in general, see paras 22.65–22.70. For some recent examples, see T-657/21, Chesini and Others v Parliament and Council (order), 2021, para. 11 (publication); T-669/21, Courtois and Others v Commission (order), 2021, para. 14 (notification). 558 See C-230/19 P, Fryč v Commission (order), 2019, para. 14; T-883/16, Poland v Commission, 2019, para. 41; T-674/20, TLP v Parliament and Council (order), 2021, para. 8. Under the case-law, the rules on time-limits do not permit derogations based on the fact that fundamental rights or other general principles of Union law are at stake. Likewise, the right to effective judicial protection is in no way undermined by the strict application of Union rules concerning time-limits in annulment proceedings: see C-660/17 P, RF v Commission, 2019, paras 57–58. As regards Art. 47 of the Charter, see also C-700/18 P, Hungary Restaurant Company and Evolution Gaming Advisory v Commission (order), 2019, para. 26; C-498/19 P, Romania v Commission, 2020, para. 53. 559 See C-266/10 P, Seacid v Parliament and Council (order), 2010, para. 21; T-142/01 and T-283/01, OPTUC v Commission, 2004, para. 30. See also para. 7.159. 560 See T-262/17, Metrans v Commission and INEA (order), 2019, para. 37. This holds generally, whether the time-limit is calculated from the date of publication of the act in the Official Journal, the date of notification, or the date on which the applicant had knowledge of the contested act: see C-521/06 P Athinaiki Techniki v Commission, 2008, paras 70–78; T-185/05, Italy v Commission, 2008, paras 70–82. 561 See T-466/16, NRW Bank v SRB, 2019, para. 60. 562 See C-660/17 P, RF v Commission, 2019, para. 37.

7.146

7.147

7.148

372 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT the expiry of the period prescribed for instituting proceedings.563 Similarly, the concept of excusable error in this context concerns exceptional circumstances in which, in particular, the conduct of the institution has been, either alone or to a decisive extent, such as to give rise to a pardonable confusion in the mind of the party acting in good faith and displaying all the diligence required of a normally well-informed person.564 In the light of the requirements of legal certainty and the avoidance of discrimination in the administration of justice, those exceptions are strictly interpreted.565 7.149

7.150

(iii) Subsequent acts repealing earlier contested act Especially in the case of restrictive measures against natural and legal persons, there are situations in which subsequent acts repeal and replace the contested act during the proceedings and thus applications for the annulment against those subsequent acts are allowed (see further para. 7.144). In principle, the time-limit laid down in the sixth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU applies both where an action for annulment of an act is brought by means of an application and where it is brought in the course of the proceedings by means of a request to adapt a claim for annulment of an earlier act that has been repealed and replaced by the act in question. However, by way of exception to that rule, that time- limit is not applicable in proceedings in which, first, the act in question and the act which that act repeals and replaces have, with respect to the person concerned, the same subject-matter, are essentially based on the same grounds, and have essentially the same content, and therefore differ only by reason of their respective scopes of application ratione temporis; and, second, the request to adapt a claim is not based on any new plea, fact, or evidence apart from the actual adoption of the act in question repealing and replacing the earlier act. Since the subject-matter and context of the dispute as established by the original action have not undergone any alteration except as for its temporal dimension, legal certainty is not affected. This exception is also justified in the light of the measures that a Union institution, body, office, or agency is obliged to take under Art. 266 TFEU.566 (b) Publication (i) Effects of publication Under the third subparagraph of Art. 297(1) TFEU and the second subparagraph of Art. 297(2) TFEU, legislative acts and non-legislative acts adopted in the form of regulations and directives addressed to all Member States, as well as decisions which do not specify to whom they are addressed, must be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. Time for bringing proceedings against such acts starts to run from the end of the fourteenth day after their publication in the Official 563 See C-660/17 P, RF v Commission, 2019, para. 38. 564 See T-37/20, United Kingdom v Commission (order), 2020, para. 18. 565 See C‑575/19 P, GMP Orphan (GMPO) v Commission, 2020, para. 38; T-160/20, 3M Belgium v Commission (order), 2021, para. 63. For some examples, see C-399/15 P, Vichy Catalán v EUIPO (order), 2016; C-660/17 P, RF v Commission, 2019, paras 39–45; T-544/21, Cheers Interactive (India) v EUIPO—Furrion Property (order), 2022, paras 17–44. Occasionally, there are situations in which such exceptional circumstances are found: see, e.g. T-125/06, Centro Studi Antonio Manieri v Council, 2009, paras 23–30; T-407/07, CMB and Christof v Commission, 2011, paras 99–105; see also T-37/20, United Kingdom v Commission (order), 2020, para. 17. 566 See T-53/12, CF Sharp Shipping Agencies v Council, 2012, paras 26–30; T-275/12, FC Dynamo-Minsk v Council, 2015, paras 64–66.

Special Characteristics 373 Journal.567 There is a rebuttable presumption that the date of publication is the date borne by the issue of the Official Journal containing the contested act.568 Since publication is necessary in order for such acts to enter into effect, time for bringing proceedings cannot start to run until they have been published in the Official Journal.569 It makes no difference if the applicant became aware of the content of such acts also in some other way. 570 The same is true of acts which do not have to be published in order to enter into force where there is a consistent practice of publishing them.571 In those circumstances, the applicant is entitled to see such an act published in the Official Journal and the starting point of the period for instituting proceedings is the date of publication, regardless of whether the applicant had earlier or later notice by some other means of the existence and content of the act in question.572 (ii) Date of publication decisive Where the applicant is not the addressee of the contested act which, pursuant to the third subparagraph of Art. 297(2) TFEU, should receive formal notification of such act, the date of publication, if there is one, is the decisive criterion for determining the starting point of the period prescribed for initiating annulment proceedings under the sixth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU.573 Consequently, an applicant cannot invoke the date on which it gained knowledge of the contested act subsequent to its publication in order to extend this starting point.574 567 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 50; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 59. The sixth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU does not give any indication as to the method of publication envisaged by that provision and does not restrict the publication within the meaning of that provision to specified methods of publication. Publication within the meaning of that provision cannot therefore consist of a publication in the Official Journal only. If an act is published by other means, such as on the website of a Union body, office, or agency, the fourteen-day extension of the period for bringing the action also applies; see C-625/11 P, PPG and SNF v ECHA, 2013, paras 30–37. However, that foregoing case has since been distinguished in the light of Art. 59 of the GC Rules of Procedure, which refers exclusively to publication in the Official Journal. In other situations, the calculation of the time-limit starts from the date of publication of that act, and not from the end of the fourteenth day following that date: see T-160/20, 3M Belgium v ECHA (order), 2021, paras 49–59; T-663/20, One Voice v ECHA (order), 2021, paras 22–39. 568 See 98/78 Racke, 1979, paras 15–17; T-115/94 Opel Austria v Council, 1997, para. 127. 569 See C-700/18 P, Hungary Restaurant Company and Evolution Gaming Advisory v Commission (order), 2019, para. 22; C-230/19 P, Fryč v Commission (order), 2019, para. 15. 570 See C-230/19 P, Fryč v Commission (order), 2019, para. 18. The date of publication of a press release announcing the adoption of an act cannot be held to cause the period for bringing an action to start to run; since such a press release contains only a short summary of the act in question, it cannot be assumed that reading it amounts to ‘knowledge’ of the contested act within the meaning of the sixth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU: see T-883/16, Poland v Commission, 2019, para. 42. 571 See, in that regard, T-262/17, Metrans v Commission and INEA (order), 2019, para. 39 (for publication to be the starting point, it must either be required by Union law or result from consistent practice which the applicant could legitimately expect). 572 See, e.g. C-122/95, Germany v Council, 1998, paras 34–39 (consistent practice for Council decisions embodying the conclusion of international agreements binding the Union to be published in the Official Journal); compare C-309/95, Commission v Council, 1998; for acts which are not published; see also T‑233/19 and T‑234/19, Infineon Technologies Dresden and Infineon Technologies v Commission, 2021, para. 39 (appeal pending in C-794/21 P and C-800/21 P) (consistent practice for Commission decisions closing a State aid investigation procedure under Article 108(2) TFEU). 573 See C-700/18 P, Hungary Restaurant Company and Evolution Gaming Advisory v Commission (order), 2019, para. 21; T-565/19, Oltchim v Commission, 2021, paras 37–69 (the starting point for the period prescribed for bringing an action for annulment against a Commission decision taken under Art. 9 of Regulation 2015/1589, in relation to an applicant who is not the addressee of that decision, is the date of publication of that decision in the Official Journal); T-753/21, Aaron Jetcharter and Others v Commission (order), 2022, paras 9–15 (rejecting argument that applicant had legal standing only from the date on which the Member State decided to apply the contested act to change the starting point of the period for bringing proceedings). 574 See C-500/07 P, Territorio Energia Ambiente v Commission, 2008, para. 23; T-352/11, N’Guessan v Council, 2011, para. 16.

7.151

374 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT 7.152

7.153

7.154

7.155

(iii) Restrictive measures However, under circumstances where the contested act which is published imposes restrictive measures against the applicant, the Union institutions are under an obligation to communicate as soon as possible after the publication of the act in the Official Journal the grounds on which that measure is based. Time-limits do not start to run in respect of the affected natural or legal person as long as the act has not been notified or otherwise communicated to them (which can be done by way of publication of a notice in the C series of the Official Journal).575 (iv) New Member States As regards new Member States, they must enjoy, in relation to all acts which are adopted on the basis of the Accession Treaty and which affect them in their capacity as Member States, a right of action as applicants pursuant to the second paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU. Independently of the date of publication of such act, the two-month period laid down in the sixth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU begins to run on the day of accession of the Member State concerned to the European Union.576 (v) Summary publication and Internet link According to the case-law, the fact that the Commission gave third parties full access to the text of a decision on its Internet site, combined with the publication of a succinct notice in the Official Journal which enabled interested parties to identify the decision in question and brought their attention to the possibility of accessing it over the Internet, is regarded as constituting publication within the meaning of the sixth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU.577 Such publication constitutes the starting point of the period for instituting proceedings. (c) Notification (i) Effects of notification Under the third subparagraph of Art. 297(2) TFEU, all other directives and decisions which specify to whom they are addressed must be notified to those to whom they are addressed and take effect upon such notification.578 Therefore, the period of time for commencing proceedings against such acts runs from the day following the receipt by the person concerned of due notification,579 where any delay in notification is not

575 See C-478/11 to C-482/11, GMPO , 2013, paras 53–64; T-521/19, Haswani v Council (order), 2020, para. 92. 576 See C-335/09 P, Poland v Commission, 2012, paras 48–51. 577 See T-17/02, Olsen v Commission, 2005, para. 80; T-884/16, Multiconnect v Commission, 2018, para. 65. 578 Note that under Art. 72(5) of Regulation 2017/1001 on the European Union trade mark, an action for annulment is to be brought before the General Court within two months of the date of notification of the decision of the Board of Appeal: see, e.g. T-544/21, Cheers Interactive (India) v EUIPO—Furrion Property (order), 2022, para. 14. 579 See C-337/16 P, Portugal v Commission, 2017, paras 34–40; T-37/20, United Kingdom v Commission (order), 2020, paras 11–15. In that regard, a purely formal error in the notification (e.g. a mistake in the name of the addressee) does not prevent the time-limits from applying, provided that the act in question actually reached the addressee and the latter realized that they actually were the addressee: see C-498/19 P, Romania v Commission, 2020, para. 31; see also C-312/18 P, Eco-Bat Technologies and Others v Commission, 2019, paras 27–28 (error or omission, even if it is not purely formal in nature, which does not prevent the addressee of the act notified from understanding the reasons of the act, cannot prevent the application of Art. 263, sixth para. TFEU).

Special Characteristics 375 attributable to that person.580 The person to whom the act is addressed cannot prevent time from starting to run by refusing to take cognizance of a properly notified act.581 Publication in the Official Journal of an act which takes effect upon notification to the addressee or the fact that the addressee has knowledge of its existence before or after notification has no effect on when time starts running.582 (ii) Due notification of the act Due notification requires that the act be communicated to the person to whom it is addressed and should put that person in a position to take cognizance of its content and of the grounds on which it is based.583 Registered mail with an acknowledgement slip is accepted as an appropriate means of notification, provided that the rules applicable to the delivery of mail are complied with,584 since it enables the Union Courts to determine with certainty when time started to run.585 In such cases, only unforeseen circumstances, force majeure, or excusable error which prevented the applicant from actually taking cognizance of the act notified may justify exceeding the time-limit for instituting proceedings (see para. 7.148).586 (iii) Notification to a legal person If the act is addressed to a legal person, notification to the registered office suffices. In particular, companies have no right to require the Commission to give notice at a place other than the registered office or to a particular person.587 In addition, acts addressed to the parent company may not be validly notified to subsidiaries.588 (d) Knowledge By virtue of the wording of the sixth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU (‘or in the absence thereof, of the day on which [the act] came to the knowledge’ of the applicant), the criterion of the day on which an act came to the knowledge of an applicant is subsidiary to the criteria of publication or notification of the act.589 In other words, it is only relevant where the contested act is neither published in the Official Journal nor notified to the 580 See 5/76, Jänsch v Commission, 1976, para. 9. 581 See 6/72, Europemballage and Continental Can v Commission, 1973, para. 10. 582 See C-337/16 P, Portugal v Commission, 2017, paras 37–40. 583 See C-337/16 P, Portugal v Commission, 2017, para. 47; C-312/18 P, Eco-Bat Technologies and Others v Commission, 2019, paras 25–26; C-498/19 P, Romania v Commission, 2020, para. 27; T-305/19, Welmax +v EUIPO—Valmex Medical Imaging, 2020, para. 42. To send only a brief summary of the contents of the act is not sufficient and will not start time running for the purposes of bringing proceedings: see C-143/95 P, Commission v Socurte and Others, 1997, para. 32. 584 See, in that regard, T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94, and T-388/94, European Night Services and Others v Commission, 1998, paras 75–79. 585 See, in that regard, 224/83, Ferriera Vittoria v Commission, 1984, para. 9; T-233/09, Access Info Europe v Council, 2011, para. 27. Where the exact date of notification is not known, the date on which the applicant responded to the act has been considered to constitute the day which starts the time running: see C-210/05 P, Campailla v Commission (order), 2005, paras 30–31. 586 See 220/78 and 221/78, ALA and ALFER v Commission, 1979, para. 9; C-59/91, France v Commission (order), 1992, para. 8. 587 See 42/85, Cockerill-Sambre v Commission, 1985, paras 10–11; C-36/19 P, Daico International v EUIPO (order), 2019, para. 5 (AG Tanchev position, point 12). 588 See 48/69, ICI v Commission, 1972, paras 34–38. 589 See C‑426/18 P, Iordăchescu v Parliament (order), 2019, para. 22; T-466/16, NRW Bank v SRB, 2019, paras 45–46.

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376 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT applicant.590 This means that an individual who already has knowledge of the content of an act before it is published in the Official Journal is not obliged to bring proceedings within two months of the date when it came to their knowledge, but may wait until it is published.591 The same applies where an act comes to the addressee’s knowledge before it is officially notified to it.592 The period for commencing proceedings in the case of interested third parties seeking annulment of an act addressed to another person begins—except in the case of publication in the Official Journal—on the day on which that person acquired knowledge of the existence and the precise contents of the act and of the reasons on which it is based in such a way as to enable them profitably to exercise their right of action.593 If the act is published in an official publication of a Member State594 or if it is brought to the notice of interested third parties, this will constitute sufficient notice, with the result that time will start running.595 However, whether an action for annulment brought by an interested third party against an act directed to another person is admissible does not depend on the fact of publication or notification. An application lodged before publication or notification will be admissible.596 A third party who acquires precise knowledge of the content of an act (not published in the Official Journal) must bring proceedings within two months of the moment at which it acquired that precise knowledge.597 The expression ‘precise knowledge of the content of an act’ does not mean knowledge of every aspect of the act, but of its essential contents and the reasons on which it was based.598 It has been held that where the applicant had knowledge of the contested act from a letter of which the date of receipt could not be definitely established, the period for commencing proceedings began

590 See C-403/05, Parliament v Commission, 2007, paras 28–29; C-521/06 P, Athinaiki Techniki v Commission, 2008, para. 69; T-264/03, Schmoldt and Others v Commission, 2004, paras 51–61; T-713/14, IPSO v ECB, 2016, para. 71; T-494/17, Iccrea Banca v Commission and Others (order), 2018, paras 32–33; T-262/17, Metrans v Commission and INEA (order), 2019, paras 38, 54; T-620/20, Alessio and Others v ECB (order), 2021, para. 41. 591 See T-14/96, BAI v Commission, 1999, paras 33–37. 592 See T-11/95, B.P. v Commission, 1998, paras 38, 52. 593 See 236/86, Dillinger Hüttenwerke v Commission, 1988, para. 14; C-403/05, Parliament v Commission, 2007, paras 29–38; C-626/10 P, Joséphidès v Commission and EACEA (order), 2011, para. 127; T-466/16, NRW Bank v SRB, 2019, para. 46; T-763/18, Lazarus Szolgáltató és Kereskedelmi v Commission (order), 2019, para. 22; T-620/20, Alessio and Others v ECB (order), 2021, paras 43–49; compare T-713/14, IPSO v ECB, 2016, paras 72–77. 594 See 31/62 and 33/62, Wöhrmann and Others v Commission, 1962 ECR 501, 508; T-620/20, Alessio and Others v ECB (order), 2021, para. 48. 595 See T-238/04, Raab and Others v Parliament and Council (order), 2004, paras 9–10. Since the date of publication, if there is one, is the decisive element for determining the starting point for the time-limit prescribed by the sixth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU, an applicant is not able to invoke the date on which they gained knowledge of the contested act subsequent to its publication in order to extend this starting point: see C-428/16 P, Iordăchescu v Parliament, 2019, para. 24; T-284/14, Dyckerhoff Polska v Commission (order), 2015, para. 16. 596 See 172/83 and 226/83, Hoogovens Groep v Commission, 1985, para. 8; T-17/02, Olsen v Commission, 2005, para. 83. 597 See C-309/95, Commission v Council, 1998, paras 18–22; T-494/17, Iccrea Banca v Commission and Others (order), 2018, para. 34 (distinguishing the reasonable period available to the applicant to request the communication of the full text of the act in order to have precise knowledge of it). 598 See T-485/93, T-491/93, T-494/93, and T-61/98, Dreyfus and Others v Commission, 2000, para. 49.

Special Characteristics 377 on the date on which the applicant itself referred to the act in a letter.599 However, a third party may not remain idle indefinitely until it acquires precise knowledge of the content of an act. Indeed, if interested parties are put on notice of the existence of an act, they are under an obligation to request the complete text of the act within a reasonable period.600 Thus, where the applicant fails to ask for the full text of the act after it had had knowledge of its existence, its application will be held to be inadmissible if, at the time when it had cognizance of the content of the act, the reasonable time had expired.601 (2) Ex officio examination of the admissibility requirements As the requirements governing the admissibility of an action for annulment are a 7.159 matter of public policy, the Union Courts examine of their own motion (ex officio) absolute bars to proceedings,602 relating, for example,603 to the expiry of the time- limit for bringing an action,604 whether the contested act is of a reviewable nature,605 the applicant’s interest in obtaining the annulment of the contested act,606 and the applicant’s standing to bring proceedings.607 The lis pendens objection, when more than one action is brought between the same parties seeking the annulment of the same act on the basis of the same submissions, may also be raised by the Union Courts of their own motion.608

599 See T-452/93 and T-453/93, Pevasa and Inpesca v Commission (order), 1994, paras 33–36; see also T-411/06, Sogelma v EAR, 2008, paras 75–76; T-185/05, Italy v Commission, 2008, paras 70–82. 600 See T-466/16, NRW Bank v SRB, 2019, paras 46–47. As indicated by the foregoing case, the ‘reasonable period’ for requesting the communication of the act after becoming aware of its existence depends on the circumstances of the case: see, e.g. T-466/16, NRW Bank v SRB, 2019, para. 54 (nearly four months unreasonable: see paras 55–59); T-42/17, VR-Bank Rhein-Sieg v SRB (order), 2018, para. 44 (more than four months unreasonable: see paras 44–49); see also, e.g. C-102/92, Ferriere Acciaierie Sarde v Commission (order), 1993, paras 18–19 (two months unreasonable); C-626/10 P, Joséphidès v Commission and EACEA (order), 2011, paras 130–132 (more than four months unreasonable); T-432/93, T-433/93, and T-434/93, Socurte and Others v Commission, 1995, para. 49 (two weeks reasonable); T-763/18, Lazarus Szolgáltató és Kereskedelmi v Commission (order), 2019, paras 28–30 (more than ten months unreasonable). 601 See C-626/10 P, Joséphidès v Commission and EACEA (order), 2011, paras 130–132; T-485/04, COBB v Commission (order), 2005, paras 17–22. 602 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 150; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 129. See C-872/19 P, Venezuela v Council, 2021, para. 22; T-781/16, Puma and Others v Commission, 2021, para. 44. Sometimes, different bars to proceedings are examined by the Union Court ex officio in the same judgment: see T-332/06, Alcoa Transformazioni v Commission, 2009, paras 33–44. 603 See, e.g. T-8/09, Dredging International and Ondernemingen Jan de Nul v EMSA, 2011, para. 129 (the lack of a right of action constitutes an absolute bar to proceedings, which a Union Court may raise of its own motion). 604 See C-230/19 P, Fryč v Commission (order), 2019, para. 14; T-674/20, TLP v Parliament and Council (order), 2021, para. 8. See also para. 7.146. 605 See T-126/13, Direct Way and Directway Worldwide v Parliament, 2015, para. 25. 606 See C-100/17 P, Gul Ahmed Textile Mills v Council, 2018, para. 39; C-471/18 P, Germany v Esso Raffinage, 2021, para. 101; T-131/20, IR v Commission, 2020, para. 122. See also para. 7.141. 607 See C-417/04 P, Regione Siciliana, 2006, para. 36; T-561/14, One of Us and Others v Commission, 2018, para. 53. While the Union Courts are not required to consider pleas of inadmissibility based on the lack of standing raised by an intervener where the main party has not done so (see C-144/18 P, River Kwai International Food Industry v AETMD and Others, 2019, paras 23–27; T-290/94, Kaysersberg v Commission, 1997, paras 75–77), the Union Courts may still examine such a plea of their own motion (see T-351/13, Crown Equipment (Suzhou) and Crown Gabelstapler v Council, 2016, paras 19–21; T-68/15, HH Ferries and Others v Commission, 2018, para. 227; T-167/19, Tempus Energy Germany and T Energy Sweden v Commission, 2021, para. 36). 608 See 75/72, Perinciolo v Council, 1973, para. 5; T-309/03, Camos Grau v Commission, 2006, para. 41; T-149/16, Spliethoff 's Bevrachtingskantoor v Commission (order), 2016, paras 27–33.

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(3) Time-frame The admissibility of an action for annulment is judged by reference to the situation prevailing when the application was lodged.609

B. Grounds for annulment 7.161

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(1) Pleas which may be raised by the applicant Under the second paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU, an act of a Union institution, body, office, or agency may be annulled on grounds of: (1) lack of competence; (2) infringement of an essential procedural requirement; (3) infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application; or (4) misuse of powers. Consequently, the review exercised under this provision must be limited to the legality of the contested act and the Union Courts will not consider its expediency610 or substitute their own reasoning for that of the author of the contested act.611 (2) Pleas which may be raised by the Union Courts ex officio It appears from the case-law that the first three grounds for annulment may be subsumed under the heading of breach of higher-ranking Union law, since the rules on competence and essential procedural requirements form part of the Treaties or of general rules adopted pursuant thereto. This blurs the distinction between the different grounds for annulment, yet the distinction is not without importance.612 The Union Courts are bound to raise of their own motion (ex officio) pleas alleging (1) lack of competence613 and (2) infringement of an essential procedural requirement614 in relation to the adoption of the act (la légalité externe) in the light of the facts adduced.615 In 609 See 50/84, Bensider and Others v Commission, 1984, para. 8; C-61/96, C-45/98, C-27/99, C-81/00, and C-22/01, Spain v Council, 2002, para. 23; C-505/16 P, Yanukovych v Council (order), 2017, para. 53; T-129/13, Alpiq RomIndustries and Alpiq RomEnergie v Commission, 2014, para. 44; T-286/15, KF v Satcen, 2018, para. 164; T-128/19, Hemp Foods Australia v EUIPO—Cabrejos (Sativa) (order), 2020, para. 20. 610 See C-84/94, United Kingdom v Council, 1996, para. 23. 611 See C-246/11 P, Portugal v Commission, 2013, para. 85; C-50/19 P, Sigma Alimentos Exterior v Commission, 2021, para. 63; T-100/17, BTB Holding Investments and Duferco Participations Holding v Commission, 2018, para. 59; T-223/18, Casa Regina Apostolorum della Pia Società delle Figlie di San Paolo v Commission, 2021, paras 104– 105 (appeal pending in C-492/21 P). Nonetheless, except where there is no material factor to justify that course of action, the Union Courts may be led, in proceedings for annulment, to interpret the reasoning of the contested act in a manner which differs from that of its author, and even, in certain circumstances, to reject the latter’s formal statement of reasons: see e.g. C-164/98 P, DIR International Film and Others v Commission, 2000, para. 42; C-487/06 P, British Aggregates v Commission, 2008, para. 142; C‑51/19 P and C‑64/19 P, World Duty Free Group v Commission, 2021, para. 71. 612 See, in that regard, C-210/98 P, Salzgitter v Commission and Germany, AG Jacobs Opinion, 2000, points 125–150. 613 See 14/59, Société des fonderies de Pont-à-Mousson v High Authority, 1959; C-210/98 P, Salzgitter v Commission, 2000, para. 56; C-577/15 P, SV Capital v ABE, 2016, paras 31–32; T-484/13, Lumene v OHIM, 2014, para. 17; T-104/15, KV v Commission, 2018, para. 38. 614 See 1/54, France v High Authority, 1954–1956; 6/54, Netherlands v High Authority, 1954–1956; 18/57, Nold v High Authority, 1959; C-542/18 RX-II and C-543/18 RX-II, Review Simpson v Council and HG v Commission, 2020, para. 57; T-44/00, Mannesmannröhren-Werke v Commission, 2004, paras 126, 210; T-46/11, Deutsche Lufthansa and Others v Commission, 2015, para. 26. See also para. 7.172. 615 See C-235/92 P, Montecatini v Commission, 1999, para. 107; see further K. Lenaerts, ‘Rechter en partijen in de rechtspleging voor Hof en Gerecht’ (2002) S.E.W. 231; F. Clausen, Les moyens d’ordre public devant la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne (Larcier, 2018).

Special Characteristics 379 contrast, pleas alleging (3) infringement of the Treaties or of any rules of law relating to their application and (4) misuse of powers, which relate to the content of the contested act (la légalité interne), may only be considered by the Union Courts if they are raised by the applicant.616 Furthermore, a Union Court cannot in principle base its decision on a plea raised of its own motion without having first invited the parties to the case to submit observations.617 (3) Time-frame The legality of the contested act is reviewed in the light of the facts and the state of the law at the time it was adopted.618 Addenda and improvements subsequently effected by the Union institution, body, office, or agency are not taken into account.619 Acts adopted after the adoption of the contested act cannot affect the validity of the contested act.620

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(4) Grounds (a) Lack of competence As a ground for annulment, lack of competence on the part of the defendant Union institution, body, office, or agency has several aspects, namely, substantive, territorial, and personal aspects.621

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(i) Substantive competence Concept—The Union is empowered only to act in policy areas assigned to it by the Treaties. A Union act which falls outside those areas may be annulled.622

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Division of competences—Where an application for annulment is based on an alleged lack of competence of a Union institution, body, office, or agency which has acted, the case will generally consist of a dispute about the legal basis of the contested act.623 If the provision of higher-ranking Union law which is stated as being the legal basis for 616 See C-272/12 P, Commission v Ireland and Others, 2013, para. 28; C-436/19 P, Abaco Energy and Others v Commission (order), 2020, para. 68; T-349/03, Corsica Ferries France v Commission, 2005, para. 52; T-103/14, Frucona Košice v Commission, 2016, para. 85. 617 See C-89/08 P, Commission v Ireland and Others, 2009, paras 57–62; C-197/09 RX-II, Review M v EMEA, 2009, para. 57; C‑584/20 P and C‑621/20 P, Commission v Landesbank Baden-Württemberg and SRB, 2021, paras 61–77; T-155/13, Zanjani v Council, 2014, para. 48; T-341/17, British Airways v Commission, 2022, paras 177–178 (appeal pending in C-378/22 P); compare C-263/13 P, Spain v Commission, 2015, paras 56–64; C-549/12 P and C-54/13 P, Germany v Commission, 2015, paras 92–100. 618 See C-562/14 P, Sweden v Commission, 2017, para. 63; T-236/17, Balti Gaas v Commission and INEA, 2020, para.152. 619 See T-331/94, IPK-München v Commission, 2001, para. 91; T-132/07, Fuji Electric v Commission, 2011, paras 167–168. 620 See C-403/18 P, Alcogroup and Alcodis v Commission, 2019, para. 45; T-249/17, Casino, Guichard-Perrachon and Others v Commission, 2020, para. 101 (set aside on other grounds in C-690/20 P). 621 There may also be temporal aspects: see, e.g. T-45/03, Riva Acciaio v Commission, 2007, para. 96 (annulment of Commission decision on grounds taken after the expiry of the ECSC Treaty). 622 See, e.g. 294/83, Les Verts v Parliament, 1986, paras 51–55; T-684/19 and T-704/19, MEKH v ACER, 2022, paras 140–141. 623 See, e.g. C-376/98, Germany v Parliament and Council, 2000, paras 76–116; C-380/03, Germany v Parliament and Council, 2006, paras 36–88; C-482/17, Czech Republic v Parliament and Council, 2019, paras 31–62; C-156/21, Hungary v Parliament and Council, 2022, paras 98–153; C-157/21, Poland v Parliament and Council, 2022, paras 111–189; T-251/18, IFSUA v Council, 2020, paras 59–84.

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380 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT the act is substantively insufficient to support its content, at the same time the mode of decision-making laid down in that provision (including the powers provided for therein for the Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies concerned), together with the permitted legal instruments (regulations, directives, decisions or still other— albeit unspecified—instruments), will clearly have been used unlawfully. In that sense, the Union institution, body, office, or agency which adopted the contested act will have exceeded its powers (even if it could have adopted the same measure on the basis of some other provision of higher-ranking Union law). Thus, it would seem that in such cases the ground of nullity for lack of competence fuses almost entirely with the ground of infringement of the Treaties or of any rules of law relating to their application. From the procedural viewpoint, however, it is more a question of the correct application of the rules invoked as the legal basis for adopting a given act than a question purely of competence (or lack of it).624 7.167

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(ii) Territorial competence A Union act may apply to natural or legal persons established in areas outside the territorial scope of the Treaties.625 It must, however, be applied in conformity with international law.626 For example, as far as EU competition law is concerned, it is enough that agreements concluded outside the Union are implemented in the territory of the Union.627 (iii) Delegation of powers Concept—In the Union legal order, an institution may, subject to certain conditions, delegate powers to itself or to other institutions,628 to Member States,629 to international organizations,630 or to agencies governed by public or private law not mentioned in the Treaties.631 Delegation and implementation in Union decision-making—Since the Lisbon Treaty, the terms ‘delegation’ and ‘implementation’ are associated with certain types of acts 624 As regards the concept of legal basis, see K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel (T. Corthaut (ed.)), EU Constitutional Law (OUP, 2021) paras 5.010-5.021. 625 See Art. 355 TFEU. 626 See C-286/90, Poulsen and Diva Navigation and Others, 1992, paras 21–29; see also, in that regard, C-161/20, Commission v Council, 2022, para. 33: the Court must take account, in the context of its jurisdiction under, in particular, Art. 263 TFEU, of the relevant rules of international law to the full extent necessary in order to dispose of the case before it. 627 See 89/85, 104/85, 114/85, 116/85 to 117/85, and 125/85 to 129/85, Ahlström and Others v Commission, 1988, paras 11–18; T-102/96, Gencor v Commission, 1999, paras 78–111 (as regards merger control); T-705/14, Unichem Laboratories v Commission, 2018, paras 99–102 (appeal pending in C-166/19 P); T-363/18, Nippon Chemi-Con v Commission, 2021, para. 75 (appeal pending in C-759/21 P); see also, in that regard, C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and Others, 2011; C-507/17, Google (Territorial scope of de-referencing), 2019; C-561/20, United Airlines, 2022, paras 46–61. 628 See 25/70, Köster, 1970, para. 9. 629 As a result of the principle of sincere cooperation now enshrined in Art. 4(3) TEU, it is implicit in every Union act that the Member States are under a duty to implement it, although the extent of the obligation and the detailed rules relating to it may also be expressly defined in the act itself (see 5/77, Tedeschi, 1977, para. 49; 213/81 to 215/81, Norddeutsches Vieh-und Fleischkontor and Others, 1982, para. 10). 630 See Opinion 1/76, Draft Agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels, 1977, para. 5. 631 See 9/56, Meroni v High Authority, 1957–1958 ECR 133, 151; see also, in that regard, C-270/12, United Kingdom v Parliament and Council, 2014, paras 41–54; T-755/17, Germany v ECHA, 2019, paras 138–147; T-510/17, Del Valle Ruíz v Commission and SRB, 2022, paras 207–234; T-570/17, Algebris (UK) and Anchorage Capital Group v Commission, 2022, paras 112–140.

Special Characteristics 381 as provided for in Arts 290–291 TFEU.632 Under Art. 290 TFEU, a legislative act may delegate to the Commission the power to adopt non-legislative acts of general application to supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of the legislative act, which are referred to as ‘delegated acts’. This is subject to the explicit conditions set down in the legislative act to which the delegation is subject.633 Moreover, pursuant to Art. 291(2) TFEU, where uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union acts are needed, such acts will confer implementing powers on the Commission, or in ‘duly justified specific cases’ (as well as in the cases provided for in Arts 24 and 26 TEU) on the Council.634 For this purpose, the European Parliament and the Council have adopted a regulation laying down in advance the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (comitology). This is generally subject to the requirement that specific committees must be involved.635 Yet, as with the pre-Lisbon Treaty framework, in the ‘implementing acts’, the Commission must remain within the limits of the implementing powers conferred upon it. If it does not respect those limits, its decisions may be annulled for want of competence.636 Delegation to a Member of the Commission—The Commission may, provided that it does not detract from the principle of collegiate responsibility,637 empower one or more of its Members to take, on its behalf and under its responsibility, clearly defined management or administrative measures.638 Measures adopted pursuant to such a delegation of authority are still ascribed to the Commission, which, as a collegiate body, has the last word.639 Members of the Commission who voluntarily resign retain their full powers until they are replaced.640

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Delegation to members of staff—Insofar as it is compatible with the intention behind the provision conferring a power on the Commission,641 that institution may also delegate powers to its officials. In exceptional cases, a delegation of powers properly so-called is involved where officials take decisions in the name of the Commission.642 Usually, however, what is involved is a delegation of signature, which, as a matter of the internal

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632 See K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel (T. Corthaut (ed.)), EU Constitutional Law (OUP, 2021) ch. 18. 633 See Art. 290(2) TFEU. 634 See Art. 291(2) TFEU. See, in that regard, C-695/20, Fenix International, 2023. 635 See, in that regard, C-443/05 P, Common Market Fertilizers v Commission, 2007, paras 111–139. 636 See 22/88, Vreugdenhil and Others, 1989, paras 17–25; C-14/06 and C-295/06, Parliament and Denmark v Commission, 2008, paras 50–78; C-355/10, Parliament v Council, 2012, paras 64–84; see also, in that regard, C-540/14, DK Recycling und Roheisen v Commission, 2016, paras 47–58; C-696/15 P, Czech Republic v Commission, 2017, paras 75–87. 637 See, e.g. C-137/92 P, Commission v BASF and Others, 1994, paras 62–64; T-324/05, Estonia v Commission, 2009, paras 65–68; T-691/14, Servier v Commission, 2018, para. 127 (appeal pending in C-176/19 P and C-201/19 P). 638 See Article 13 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission (OJ 2000 L308/26), as amended. 639 See 5/85, AKZO Chemie v Commission, 1986, paras 28–40; 97/87 to 99/87, Dow Chemical Ibérica and Others v Commission, 1989, paras 58–59. 640 This is also the case when all the Members of the Commission voluntarily resign. The Commission retains its full powers until the new Members take office (see T-219/99, British Airways v Commission, 2003, paras 46–58). 641 See C-249/02, Portugal v Commission, 2004, paras 44–47. 642 See 48/70, Bernardi v Parliament, 1971, paras 30–36.

382 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT organization of the institution, authorizes an official to notify a decision taken by the Commission;643 sometimes both aspects arise in the same case.644 Where a delegation of powers properly so-called is involved, the limits imposed on the Commission’s ability to delegate powers to its Members apply a fortiori (see para. 7.170).

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(b) Infringement of an essential procedural requirement (i) Concept An essential procedural requirement is a procedural rule intended to ensure that the measures concerned are formulated with due care, compliance with which may influence the content of the act.645 Essential procedural requirements enable the legality of a Union act to be reviewed, or may express a fundamental institutional rule. The fact that an essential procedural requirement has been breached in the preparation or adoption of a Union act will constitute a ground for its annulment only if the Union Court finds that, in the absence of the irregularity in question, the contested act might have been substantively different;646 that the irregularity makes judicial review impossible;647 or that, on account of the irregularity which it contains, the act in question breaches a fundamental institutional rule.648 If a procedural provision is infringed, but this does not prevent the aims of the provision from being achieved, no ‘substantial procedural defect’ will be involved.649 An express obligation to comply with certain procedural requirements when carrying out a particular act may not be extended to other acts by way of interpretation.650 As has already been mentioned, the Union Courts will raise the issue of an infringement of an essential procedural requirement of their own motion (see para. 7.162). 651 The ground of infringement of an essential procedural 643 See 48/69, ICI v Commission, 1972, paras 11–15; 8/72, Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren v Commission, 1972, paras 10–14; 43/82 and 63/82, VBVB and VBBB v Commission, 1984, para. 14; T-450/93, Lisrestal v Commission, 1994, para. 34; T-504/18, XG v Commission, 2019, paras 87–96. 644 See C-200/89, FUNOC v Commission, 1990, paras 13–14. 645 See 6/54, Netherlands v High Authority, 1954–1956 ECR 103, 111–112; T-554/10, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Frontex, 2015, para. 80; T-479/20, Eurobolt and Others v Commission, 2022, para. 73. 646 See 209/78 to 215/78, and 218/78, Van Landewyck v Commission, 1980, para. 47; 150/84, Bernardi v Parliament, 1986, para. 28; C-56/18 P, Commission v Gmina Miasto Gdynia et Port Lotniczy Gdynia Kosakowo, 2020, para. 80; T-854/19, Franz Schröder v EUIPO—RDS Design, 2021, para. 29. 647 This is why the obligation to give a statement of reasons is strictly enforced: see paras 7.180–7.184. 648 See 138/79, Roquette Frères v Council, 1980, para. 33; 139/79, Maizena v Council, 1980, para. 34. 649 See 282/81, Ragusa v Commission, 1983, para. 22; 207/81, Ditterich v Commission, 1983, para. 19; T-561/14, One of Us and Others v Commission, 2018, para. 131. 650 See 21/64, Macchiorlati Dalmas v Commission, 1965; 22/70, Commission v Council, 1971, para. 98. 651 See C-183/16 P, Tilly-Sabco v Commission, 2017, para. 116; C-542/18 RX-II and C-543/18 RX-II, Review Simpson v Council and HG v Commission, 2020, para. 57; T-119/10, Netherlands v Commission (order), 2017, para. 64; T‑377/16, T‑645/16, and T‑809/16, Hypo Vorarlberg Bank v SRB, 2019, para. 156; compare, e.g. C-373/15, France v Commission, 2017, paras 46–48; T-705/14, Unichem Laboratories v Commission, 2018, paras 110–111 (appeal pending in C-166/19 P). Under the case-law, any obligation to raise matters of public policy of its own motion exists only where the evidence in the file allows the Union Court to detect and identify an infringement of an essential procedural requirement: see C-199/92, Hüls v Commission, 1999, para. 134; T-705/14, Unichem Laboratories v Commission, 2018, para. 114 (appeal pending in C-166/19 P); see also, in that regard, T-808/14, Spain v Commission, 2016, para. 46. Consequently, as regards the requirement to hear the addressee, the applicant must present the relevant facts and thus somehow complain that they have not been heard, or did not get access to the file. The applicant cannot remain fully passive in this respect. This is borne out, for example, by T-25/95, T-26/95, T-30/95, T-31/95, T-32/95, T-34/95, T-35/95, T-36/95, T-37/95, T-38/95, T-39/95, T-42/95, T-43/95, T-44/95, T-45/95, T-46/95, T-48/95, T-50/95, T-51/95, T-52/95, T-53/95, T-54/95, T-55/95, T-56/95, T-57/95, T-58/95, T-59/95, T-60/95, T-61/95, T-62/95, T-63/95, T-64/95, T-65/95, T-68/95, T-69/95, T-70/95, T-71/95,

Special Characteristics 383 requirement encompasses five main aspects: (1) the duty to consult; (2) the requirement to hear the addressee (the right to be heard and infringement of the rights of the defence); (3) the duty of confidentiality; (4) compliance with internal procedural rules; and (5) the requirement to provide a statement of reasons. (ii) The duty to consult Duty to seek an opinion—In the Union decision-making process, the institution, body, office, or agency adopting or implementing an act is sometimes under a duty (imposed by higher-ranking Union law) to seek the opinion of another institution or committee before acting. The requirement to consult constitutes an essential procedural requirement.652 This is because consultation may affect the substance of the act adopted.653 Furthermore, the Court of Justice has held that the consultation of the European Parliament required by the Treaties in certain cases constitutes a fundamental rule designed to guarantee the institutional balance intended by the Treaties, which reflects the fundamental democratic principle that the people should take part in the exercise of power through a representative assembly.654 Time-frame and scope—It is not sufficient merely to ask the Union institution or committee having to be consulted for its opinion; that institution or committee must have made its views known before the act was adopted,655 unless a derogating provision provides otherwise656 or the institution, body, office, or agency requesting the advice exhausted all possibilities of obtaining a preliminary opinion.657 In addition, the draft instrument submitted to the consultative institution or committee must basically correspond to the instrument ultimately adopted, unless the amendments made to the draft are specifically intended to comply with the wishes expressed by the consultative institution or committee in its opinion.658 It is sufficient, however, that the opinion be delivered before the act is adopted. The institution, body, office, or agency seeking the opinion is not obliged to allow a certain period of time to elapse between receipt of

T-87/95, T-88/95, T-103/95, and T-104/95, Cimenteries CBR and Others v Commission, 2000, paras 85–435 (set aside in part on other grounds in C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P, and C-219/00 P), in which the General Court only examined the sufficiency of the access to the file in relation to those applicants that had invoked that plea and considered some evidence in that regard. The same applies more generally to the rights of the defence: unless the applicant provides some evidence of the alleged infringement, the General Court has nothing in the file to go on, and it must not of its own motion start an inquiry, gather evidence, and ask the applicant what they think. 652 See 1/54, France v High Authority, 1954–1956 ECR 1, 15; 2/54 Italy v High Authority, 1954–1956 ECR 37, 52. 653 See 165/87, Commission v Council, 1988, para. 20; compare C-363/14, Parliament v Council, 2015, para. 96. 654 See 138/79, Roquette Frères v Council, 1980, para. 33; 139/79, Maizena v Council, 1980, para. 34; 1253/79, Battaglia v Commission, 1982, para. 17; C-21/94, Parliament v Council, 1995, para. 17; C-643/15, Slovakia v Council, 2017, para. 160; see also, in that regard, C-363/14, Parliament v Council, 2015, para. 82; C-595/14, Parliament v Council, 2015, para. 35. With regard to Art. 218(10) TFEU, which provides that the Parliament ‘shall be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure’ for negotiating and concluding international agreements envisaged in that article, see also C-658/11, Parliament v Council, 2014, paras 80–81. 655 See 138/79, Roquette Frères v Council, 1980, para. 34; 139/79, Maizena v Council, 1980, para. 35. 656 See 128/86, Spain v Commission, 1987, paras 22–26. 657 See 138/79, Roquette Frères v Council, 1980, para. 36; 139/79, Maizena v Council, 1980, para. 37. 658 See 41/69, ACF Chemiefarma v Commission, 1970, paras 68–69; 817/79, Buyl v Commission, 1982, paras 14– 24; C-65/90, Parliament v Council, 1992, paras 16–21; C-280/93, Germany v Council, 1994, para. 38.

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384 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT the opinion and adoption of the act in order to be able better to consider the opinion. Consequently, an act adopted only a matter of days after the European Parliament delivered its opinion was held to have been validly adopted.659 7.175

(iii) The requirement to hear the addressee The right to be heard—Before a Union act adversely affecting a person is adopted, the addressee of the act or interested third parties must be heard by the Union institution, body, office, or agency concerned.660 That obligation is prescribed either by the Treaties661 or by secondary Union law,662 or arises out of the general legal principle to the effect that a person whose interests are perceptibly affected by a decision taken by a public authority must be given the opportunity to make their point of view known.663 This obligation is an essential procedural requirement.664 The persons concerned must be informed in time,665 effectively,666 and personally667 of all the information in the file which might be useful for their defence and of the grounds of the proposed act, so that they are in a position to challenge it with full knowledge of the facts.668

659 See 114/81, Tunnel Refineries v Council, 1982, para. 18. 660 See 17/74, Transocean Marine Paint v Commission, 1974, para. 15; C-14/19 P, Satcen v KF, 2020, para. 117; T-454/17, ‘PRO-NGO!’ v Commission, 2017, para. 56; T-510/17, Del Valle Ruíz v Commission and SRB, 2022, paras 120–123; T-280/18, ABLV Bank v SRB, 2022, paras 157–158. 661 See, e.g. Art. 108(2) TFEU. The right to be heard is affirmed not only in Arts 47 and 48 of the Charter, which ensure respect for both the rights of the defence and the right to fair legal process in all judicial proceedings, but also in Art. 41(2) thereof, which provides that the right to good administration includes, inter alia, the right of every person to be heard before any individual measure which would affect them adversely is taken. See, in that regard, C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P, and C-595/10 P, Commission and Others v Kadi, 2013, para. 99; T-609/20, LA International Corporation v Commission, 2022, para. 74. The right to be heard in an administrative procedure taken against a specific person is a corollary of the rights of the defence, which must be observed even in the absence of any rules governing the procedure in question: see, e.g. T-719/17, FMC v Commission, 2021, para. 183. 662 See, e.g. Art. 27 of Regulation No. 1/2003 (Arts 101 and 102 TFEU); Art. 18 of Regulation No. 139/2004 (merger control); Art. 6(7) of Regulation No. 1225/2009 (anti-dumping). With regard to the procedure before EUIPO, see, e.g. C-155/18 P, Tulliallan Burlington v EUIPO, 2020, paras 93–94; T-337/20, Hochmann Marketing v EUIPO, 2022, para. 82. 663 See, e.g. 17/74, Transocean Marine Paint v Commission, 1974, para. 15; 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, 1979, para. 9; C-462/98 P, Mediocurso v Commission, 2000, para. 36; T-67/18, Probelte v Commission, 2019, para. 86; T-588/19, Novomatic v EUIPO—adp Gauselmann, 2021, para. 104. The purpose of the rule that the addressees of an adverse decision must be placed in a position to submit their observations before that decision is taken is to put the competent authority in a position effectively to take all relevant information into account. In order to ensure that the persons concerned are in fact protected, the purpose of that rule is, inter alia, to enable these persons to correct an error or submit such information relating to their personal circumstances as will tell in favour of the decision being adopted or not, or of its having a specific content: see, e.g. C-349/07, Sopropé, 2008, para. 49; C-27/09 P, France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran and Others, 2011, para. 65; C-189/18, Glencore Agriculture Hungary, 2019, para. 41; T-510/17, Del Valle Ruíz v Commission and SRB, 2022, para. 120; T-280/18, ABLV Bank v SRB, 2022, para. 157. 664 See T-228/99 and T-233/99, 2000, Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale and Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Commission, 2003, para. 141. 665 See, in that regard, T-518/19, Sipcam Oxon v Commission, 2021, paras 90–93; T-203/20, Al-Imam v Council, 2021, paras 89–95; T-227/21, Illumina v Commission, 2022, para. 245. 666 See, e.g. C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P, and C-595/10 P, Commission and Others v Kadi, 2013, para. 112; C-14/19 P, Satcen v KF, 2020, para. 117; T-280/18, ABLV Bank v SRB, 2022, para. 157; T-609/20, LA International Corporation v Commission, 2022, paras 75–78. 667 See, in that regard, C-176/99 P, ARBED v Commission, 2003, paras 19–25 (a decision addressed to the parent company finding that it had committed an infringement of the competition rules of the ECSC Treaty was annulled on the ground that the statement of objections was addressed only to a subsidiary). 668 See, e.g. C-560/14, M, 2017, para. 32; T-570/17, Algebris (UK) and Anchorage Capital Group v Commission, 2022, para. 325; T-280/18, ABLV Bank v SRB, 2022, para. 157.

Special Characteristics 385 Infringement of the rights of the defence—The rights of the defence are infringed where it is possible that the outcome of the administrative procedure conducted by the Union authority might have been different if these rights had been respected. An applicant undertaking establishes that there has been such an infringement where it adequately demonstrates not that the Commission’s decision would have been different in content, but rather that it would have been better able to ensure its defence.669 The question whether there is an infringement of the rights of the defence must be examined in relation to the specific circumstances of each particular case, inter alia, the nature of the act at issue, the context of its adoption, and the legal rules governing the matter in question.670 (iv) The duty of confidentiality Art. 339 TFEU imposes an obligation not to disclose information of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy, in particular, information about undertakings, their business relations, or their cost components.671 The issue often arises in the Commission’s administrative procedure for investigating infringements of competition law672 or for determining dumping practices.673 It is the institution to which the purportedly confidential information is made available itself which has to judge whether or not the duty of confidentiality is applicable, after giving the party concerned the opportunity to state its views. In addition, before implementing its decision, the institution must give that party the opportunity of bringing an action before the Union Courts with a view to having its assessments reviewed and to preventing disclosure.674 In particular, unlawful disclosure of confidential information in the course 669 See, e.g. as regards Arts 101 and 102 TFEU, C-194/99 P, Thyssen Stahl v Commission, 2003, para. 31; T-851/14, Slovak Telekcom v Commission, 2018, para. 184; T-235/18, Qualcomm v Commission, 2022, para. 160; as regards merger control, T-210/01, General Electric v Commission, 2005, para. 632; T-609/19, Canon v Commission, 2022, para. 471; as regards anti-dumping, C‑191/09 P and C‑200/09 P, Council and Commission v Interpipe Niko Tube and Interpipe NTRP, 2012, paras 78–79; C-718/20 P, Zhejiang Jiuli Hi-Tech Metals v Commission (order), 2022, para. 49; T-30/19, CRIA and CCCMC v Commission, 2022, paras 242–243; as regards banking union, see T-578/18, CA Consumer Finance v ECB, 2020, paras 97–98; as regards public procurement, T-91/12, Flying Holding and Others v Commission, 2014, para. 72. With respect to State aid, although interested parties are invited to submit observations in the course of the formal investigation procedure, this procedure does not lead to an inter partes debate with the complainant, or even with the recipient of the aid: see C-367/95 P, Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France, 1998, paras 58–59; C-56/18 P, Commission v Gmina Miasto Gdynia et Port Lotniczy Gdynia Kosakow, 2020, paras 70–75. Only the Member State concerned can successfully raise a plea relating to infringement of the rights of the defence in annulment proceedings before the Union Courts: see, e.g. 234/84, Belgium v Commission, 1986, para. 30; C-56/18 P, Commission v Gmina Miasto Gdynia et Port Lotniczy Gdynia Kosakow, 2020, para. 62; T-601/20, Tirrenia di navigazione v Commission, 2022, paras 64–65 (appeal pending in C-515/22 P). In order for such an infringement to result in annulment, it must be established that, had it not been for such an irregularity, the outcome of the procedure might have been different: see, e.g. T-198/01, Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau v Commission, 2004, paras 201, 203; T-257/10, Italy v Commission, 2012, paras 66–67. 670 See, e.g. C-110/10 P, Solvay v Commission, 2011, para. 63; C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P, and C-595/10 P, Commission and Others v Kadi, 2013, para. 102; T-280/18, ABLV v SRB, 2022, para. 169; T-296/20, Foz v Council, 2022, para. 58. 671 There are specific applications of this duty of confidentiality in secondary Union law. See, e.g., as regards the protection of confidential information and business secrets in the context of public procurement, C-927/19, Klaipėdos regiono atliekų tvarkymo centras, 2021, paras 112–137. The protection of business secrets is also recognized as a general principle of Union law: see, e.g. C‑584/20 P and C‑621/20 P, Landesbank Baden-Württemberg and SRB, 2021, para. 109; T-189/14, Deza v ECHA, 2017, para. 147. 672 See Arts 27 and 28 of Regulation No. 1/2003. See also, in that regard, C-517/15 P, AGC Glass Europe and Others v Commission, 2017, paras 44–45. 673 See Art. 19 of Regulation 2016/1036. 674 See 53/85, AKZO Chemie v Commission, 1986, para. 29; C-36/92 P, SEP v Commission, 1994, para. 38; T-534/11, Schenker v Commission, 2014, para. 128.

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386 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT of the administrative procedure which leads to the adoption of a decision finding an infringement of Art. 101 and/or Art. 102 TFEU will be regarded as an infringement of an essential procedural requirement only if it were shown that in the absence of such irregularity the contested decision might have been different. Consequently, it does not inevitably result in the act being declared void.675 7.178

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(v) Compliance with internal procedural rules Concept and scope—The institutions adopt internal procedural rules in their Rules of Procedure676 and thereafter are obliged to comply with them. Such rules may be categorized as essential procedural requirements. Therefore, Union acts adopted in breach of such procedural rules may be annulled.677 For instance, the authentication of a Union act, which is intended to guarantee legal certainty, is an essential procedural requirement, breach of which may give rise to the annulment of the relevant act.678 In addition, failure to comply with voting arrangements constitutes an infringement of an essential procedural requirement within the meaning of Art. 263 TFEU, which results in annulment of the Union act.679 Protection for individuals—Natural or legal persons may plead infringement of internal procedural rules which guarantee legal certainty.680 This qualifies the view that internal procedural rules are intended to guarantee the sound functioning of internal decision- making while respecting the prerogatives of each of the Members of the Union institution, and that they are therefore not intended to ensure protection for individuals.681 (vi) The requirement to provide a statement of reasons Concept and scope—The statement of reasons required by Art. 296 TFEU682 must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the Union institution, body, office, or agency which adopted the act in question in such a way as to make the persons concerned aware of the reasons for the act and thus enable them to defend their rights and the Union Courts to exercise their supervisory jurisdiction.683 675 See 209/78 to 215/78 and 218/78, Van Landewyck v Commission, 1980, para. 47. 676 See Art. 232 TFEU (European Parliament); Art. 240(3) TFEU (Council); Art. 249(1) TFEU (Commission). 677 See, e.g. C-263/95, Germany v Commission, 1998, paras 26–33; see also, in that regard, C-183/16 P, Tilly- Sabco v Commission, 2017, paras 114–117, 121; C-644/17, Eurobolt, 2019, paras 51–52. 678 See C-137/92 P, Commission v BASF and Others, 1994, paras 75–78; C-286/95 P, Commission v ICI, 2000, paras 40–53, 59–63; C‑584/20 P and C‑621/20 P, Commission v Landesbank Baden-Württemberg and SRB, 2021, paras 61–76, 152–163; C-833/19, Hamas v Council, 2021, paras 56–76, 83–84; T-377/16, T‑645/16, and T‑809/16, Hypo Vorarlberg Bank v SRB, 2019, paras 112–158. 679 See 68/86, United Kingdom v Council, 1988, paras 40–49; C-28/12, Commission v Council, 2015, paras 55–57; T-699/17, Poland v Commission, 2021, paras 58–60. 680 See T-432/12, VTZ and Others v Council, 2015, para. 181; T-377/16, T‑645/16, and T‑809/16, Hypo Vorarlberg Bank v SRB, 2019, para. 153. 681 See C-69/89, Nakajima v Council, 1991, paras 48–51. 682 The second paragraph of Art. 296 TFEU provides: ‘Legal acts shall state the reasons on which they are based and shall refer to any proposals, initiatives, recommendations, requests or opinions required by the Treaties.’ The case-law requirements have been held to apply to Art. 41(2)(c) of the Charter, according to which the right to sound administration includes the obligation of the administration to give reasons for its decisions: see, e.g. C-131/15 P, Club Hotel Loutraki and Others v Commission, 2015, para. 46; C-584/20 P and C-621/20 P, Commission v Landesbank Baden-Württemberg and CRU, 2021, para. 102; T-247/20, JP v Commission, 2021, para. 41; T-341/17, British Airways v Commission, 2022, para. 241 (appeal pending in C-378/22 P). 683 See C-833/19 P, Council v Hamas, 2021, para. 74; C-891/19 P, Commission v Hubei Xinyegang Special Tube, 2022, para. 87; T-516/18 and T-525/18, Luxembourg v Commission, 2021, para. 168 (appeal pending in C-451/21 P); T-280/18, ABLV Bank v SRB, 2022, para. 174. As regards the decisions imposing fines on undertakings for

Special Characteristics 387 The reasoning must be logically compatible with the content of the act.684 A minimal, merely formal statement of reasons is not enough because it does not effectively enable interested parties685 and the Union Courts to verify the legality of the Union act.686 However, the Union institution, body, office, or agency is not under a duty to go into all the arguments raised by interested parties during the administrative procedure which led to the adoption of the act; it is sufficient if it sets out the facts and legal considerations having decisive importance in the context of the decision so as to enable its reasoning to be clearly understood.687 In principle, the various relevant factual and legal aspects should be set out in the statement of reasons. There is a consistent line of cases, however, to the effect that this is not always necessary on the grounds that, in considering whether the statement of reasons of an act satisfies the requirements of Art. 296 TFEU, regard must be had not only to its wording, but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question.688 For example, as the Court of Justice held in Commission v Landesbank Baden- Württemberg and SRB,689 it cannot be inferred from the case-law that the statement of reasons for any decision of a Union institution, body, office, or agency imposing the payment of a sum of money on a private operator must necessarily include all the evidence enabling the addressee to verify the accuracy of the calculation of the amount of that sum of money. The reasons for an enforceable decision relating to the collection of a quasi-fiscal charge are required to comprise an exact and detailed statement of account of the elements of the claim at issue, as only an account of that kind could make the infringement of the competition rules, the obligation to state reasons is of particular importance. It is for the Commission to state the reasons for its decisions and, in particular, to explain the weighting and assessment of the factors taken into account: see, e.g. C-39/18 P, Commission v Icap and Others, 2019, para. 24. 684 See 2/56, Geitling v High Authority, 1958 ECR 3, 16; T-272/06, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Court of Justice, 2009, para. 42. With respect to the balancing between the obligation to state reasons and the obligation not to disclose information covered by professional secrecy (Art. 339 TFEU), see C‑584/20 P and C‑621/20 P, Landesbank Baden-Württemberg and SRB, 2021, paras 110–148, 166–172; T-565/08 Corsica Ferries France v Commission, 2012, para. 43. 685 Interested parties include not only the addressee of an act, but also persons to whom the act is of direct and individual concern. The interest of the latter in obtaining an explanation of the act should therefore be taken into account in determining the extent of the obligation to provide a statement of reasons: see 41/83, Italy v Commission, 1985, para. 46; C-928/19 P, EPSU v Commission, 2021, para. 109; T-657/20, Ryanair v Commission, 2022, para. 160. 686 See, in that regard, C-269/90, Technische Universität München, 1991, paras 26–27; C-41/93, France v Commission, 1994, paras 34–37; C-698/19 P, Sony Optiarc and Sony Optiarc America v Commission, 2022, paras 84–85; T-789/19, Moerenhout and Others v Commission, 2021, paras 45–49; T-134/20, Huhtamaki v Commission, 2022, paras 62–79; see also, in the restrictive measures context, T-322/19, Al-Qaddafi v Council, 2021, para. 82 (the statement of reasons for an act of the Council imposing restrictive measures cannot in principle consist merely of a general, stereotypical formulation). The statement of reasons for a Union act is particularly important, insofar as it allows the persons concerned to decide in full knowledge of the circumstances whether it is worthwhile to bring an action against the act and the court with jurisdiction to review it, and thus is a requirement for ensuring that the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter is effective: see C-584/20 P and C-621/20 P, Commission v Landesbank Baden-Württemberg and SRB, 2021, para. 103. 687 See 56/69, Hoechst v Commission, 1972, para. 22; C-413/06 P, Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v Impala and Others, 2008, para. 169; T-17/12, Hagenmeyer and Hahn v Commission, 2014, para. 173; T-665/20, Ryanair v Commission, 2021, para. 40. 688 See C-350/88, Delacre and Others v Commission, 1990, para. 16; C-39/18 P, Commission v Icap and Others, 2019, para. 23; T-570/17, Algebris (UK) and Anchorage Capital Group v Commission, 2022, para. 146; T-657/20, Ryanair v Commission, 2022, para. 160. 689 C‑584/20 P and C‑621/20 P, Commission v Landesbank Baden-Württemberg and SRB, 2021, paras 104–108.

388 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT possible the judicial review of such a decision. However, in the context of the banking union, a decision on the ex ante contributions to the SRF is not akin to such claims, since such a decision merely sets out the contributions of each of the institutions concerned according to the calculation rules laid down in Union law. The nature of the contested act is one aspect, along with its context, which determines the extent of the obligation to provide a statement of reasons.690 In the case of an act of general application, the statement of reasons may be confined to indicating the general situation which led to its adoption, on the one hand, and the general objectives which it is intended to achieve, on the other. If the contested act clearly discloses the essential objective pursued by the institution, it would be excessive to require a specific statement of reasons for the various technical choices made.691 The degree of precision of the statement of reasons of an act of individual application depends on the practical realities and the time and technical facilities available for drawing it up.692 Furthermore, an act of individual application which fits into a well-established line of decisions may be reasoned in a summary manner, for instance, by reference to the practice in question. If, in contrast, the act deviates from previous practice, for example, by going appreciably further than previous decisions, the Union authority which adopted the act must expressly explain why this is so.693 Finally, the degree to which the addressee was involved in the process by which an act was drawn up has a bearing on the extent of the duty to provide a statement of reasons.694 In addition, persons concerned by an act may be expected to make a certain effort to interpret the reasons if the meaning of the text is not immediately clear. The duty to give a statement of reasons is not infringed if it is possible to resolve ambiguities in the statement of reasons by means of such interpretation.695

690 See C-225/17 P, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Others v Council, 2019, para. 69; T-236/17 and T-596/17, Balti Gaas v Commission and INEA, 2020, para. 199. Consequently, the reasons given for an act adversely affecting a person are sufficient if the act was adopted in a context which was known to that person and which enables them to understand the scope of the act concerning them: see C‑584/20 P and C‑621/20 P, Commission v Landesbank Baden-Württemberg and SRB, 2021, para. 104; T-723/20, Prigozhin v Council, 2022, para. 26. 691 See C-611/17, Italy v Council, 2019, para. 42; T-574/18, Agrochem-Maks v Commission, 2020, para. 59. 692 See 16/65 Schwarze, 1965 ECR 877, 888; C-551/10 P, Éditions Odile Jacob v Commission, 2012, para. 48; T-290/17, Stavytskyi v Council, 2019, para. 46; T-570/17, Algebris (UK) and Anchorage Capital Group v Commission, 2022, paras 147, 155; T-584/19, thyssenkrupp v Commission, 2022, para. 939. 693 See 73/74, Papiers peints v Commission, 1975, para. 31; C‑521/09 P, Elf Aquitaine v Commission, 2011, para. 155; C-39/18, Commission v Icap and Others, 2019, para. 28; T-139/09, France v Commission, 2012, para. 39; T-653/16, Malta v Commission, 2018, para. 54; compare, e.g. T-319/11, ABN Arno Group v Commission, 2014, para. 139; T-507/12, Slovenia v Commission, 2016, para. 133. A substantial change as compared with a previously adopted position of the Union authority concerned must be justified in the statement of reasons of the new decision containing the change (see T-206/99 Métropole télévision v Commission, 2001, para. 53). The same stricter requirement to state reasons applies where an act derogates from a more general rule (see C-120/99, Italy v Council, 2001, para. 53). 694 See 13/72, Netherlands v Commission, 1973, paras 11–13; 14/88, Italy v Commission, 1988, para. 11; C-611/17, Italy v Council, 2019, para. 41; T-543/19, Romania v Commission, 2021, para. 86. 695 See T-16/91 RV, Rendo and Others v Commission, 1996, para. 46; compare T-331/94, IPK-München v Commission, 2001, para. 90; T-161/04, Valero Jordana v Commission, 2011, para. 107; T-190/12, Tomana and Others v Council and Commission, 2015, para. 151.

Special Characteristics 389 Material inaccuracy—A shortcoming in the material accuracy of the statement of reasons, such as a factual inaccuracy or a wrong legal categorization, is considered an infringement of the Treaties or of a rule relating to its application.696 Importantly, the duty to state reasons, which concerns an essential procedural requirement, must be distinguished from the assessment of the correctness of those reasons, which goes to the substantive legality of the act and thus concerns a different plea for the purposes of Art. 263 TFEU.697

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Failure to specify legal basis of contested act—The obligation to indicate the legal basis of a Union act is related to the requirement under Art. 296 TFEU to state reasons.698 The failure to refer to a precise provision of the Treaties does not necessarily constitute an infringement of an essential procedural requirement if the legal basis for an act may be determined from other parts of the act; however, such an explicit reference is indispensable where, in its absence, the parties concerned and the Union Courts are left uncertain as to the precise legal basis.699

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Time-frame—A sufficient statement of reasons must in principle be notified at the same time as the person concerned has notice of the act. The absence of such a statement of reasons cannot be regularized after proceedings have been brought.700

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Plea raised by the Union Courts of their own motion—The Union Courts must raise of their own motion (ex officio) the question as to whether the requirement for a statement of reasons has been fulfilled (see para. 7.172).701

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(vii) Publication and notification of the contested act Irregularities in the publication or notification of the contested act are not regarded as infringements of an essential procedural requirement because they do not affect the act itself.702 Such irregularities may at most prevent time from beginning to run for

696 See 8/65, Acciaierie e Ferriere Pugliesi v High Authority, 1966 ECR 1, 7–8; T-17/93, Matra Hachette v Commission, 1994, para. 57; compare, e.g. C-119/86, Spain v Council and Commission, 1987, para. 51; T-362/04, Minin v Commission, 2007, para. 79: even if one recital of a contested act contains a factually incorrect statement, that procedural defect cannot lead to the annulment of the act if the other recitals in themselves supply a sufficient statement of reasons. 697 See C-367/95 P, Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France, 1998, para 67; C-413/06 P, Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v Impala and Others, 2008, para. 181; C-442/15 P, Pensa Pharma v EUIPO, 2016, paras 35– 38; T-814/17, Lietuvos geležinkeliai v Commission, 2020, para. 290; T-569/19, AlzChem Group v Commission, 2021, para. 140; T-647/20, Verelst v Council, 2022, para. 102. Indeed, there have been cases in which the Court of Justice has annulled a ruling of the General Court because the latter had annulled an administrative decision, thereby setting the standard of statement of reasons too high; this mostly goes together with confusing the statement of reasons with the substantive correctness of those reasons, a problem first solved in C-367/95 P, Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France, 1998, paras 65–78; see also C-417/11 P, Council v Bamba, 2012, paras 57–64; C-46/19 P, Council v PKK, 2021, paras 55–67. 698 This should be distinguished from the ground of lack of competence involving disputes about the legal basis for a contested act: see para. 7.166. 699 See C-370/07, Commission v Council, 2009, paras 60–62. Failure to indicate the legal basis also infringes the principle of legal certainty: see C-325/91 France v Commission, 1993, para. 30. 700 See C-628/10 P and C-14/11 P, Alliance One and Others v Commission, 2012, paras 73–74; T-576/18, Crédit agricole v ECB, 2020, para. 131. 701 See C-272/12 P, Commission v Ireland and Others, 2013, para. 28; C-436/19 P, Abaco Energy and Others v Commission (order), 2020, para. 68; T-177/19, Exxonmobil Petroleum & Chemical v ECHA, 2021, para. 228. 702 This is apart from substantive issues regarding how the contested act was published, e.g. cases on publication of vacancy notices in only specific languages: see C-566/10 P, Italy v Commission, 2012, paras 61–100; T-117/08, Italy v EESC, 2011, paras 69–88; see also, in that regard, C-621/16 P, Commission v Italy, 2019, paras 117–125.

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390 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT the purposes of bringing proceedings as provided in the sixth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU.703

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(c) Infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application This ground for annulment encompasses any infringement of any provision of higher- ranking Union law. (i) Treaties The reference to ‘Treaties’ in the second paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU denotes the TEU and the TFEU,704 the Protocols annexed thereto,705 the Charter, and the Accession Treaties and Acts.706 The pleas raised by the applicant do not necessarily have to be confined to infringements of the Treaties on the basis of which the action is brought. An action for annulment based on Art. 263 TFEU may embody admissible pleas referring to infringements of provisions of the EAEC Treaty.707 (ii) Rule of law relating to the application of the Treaties The wording ‘any rule of law relating to [the Treaties’] application’ covers all other binding provisions or principles of the Union legal order. These include the category made up of general principles of Union law,708 such as the principle of proportionality,709 the principle of protection of legitimate expectations,710 the principle of equal treatment,711 and the principle of reasonable time in administrative procedures.712 These also include provisions or principles of international law, in particular, provisions 703 See 48/69, ICI v Commission, 1972, para. 40; C-161/06, Skoma-Lux, 2007, paras 57–61; see also, in that regard, C-160/20, Stichting Rookpreventie Jeugd and Others, 2022, paras 37–53. 704 Art. 1, third para. TEU; Art. 1(2) TFEU. 705 Art. 51 TEU; Art. 207 EAEC. 706 See C-91/03, Spain v Council, 2005, paras 19–31 (rejected); C-413/04, Parliament v Council, 2006, paras 30–78 (upheld in part); C-414/04, Parliament v Council, 2006, paras 28–54 (upheld); T-262/07, Lithuania v Commission, 2007, paras 24–80 (upheld); T-626/17, Slovenia v Commission, 2017, paras 214–217 (rejected). 707 See C-62/88, Greece v Council, 1990, para. 8. 708 See generally K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel (T. Corthaut (ed.)), EU Constitutional Law (OUP, 2021) ch. 25. 709 See, e.g. C‑643/15 and C‑647/15, Slovakia and Hungary v Council, 2017, paras 206–310 (rejected); C-132/19 P, Groupe Canal +v Commission, 2020, paras 104–119 (upheld); T-479/11 RENV and T-157/12 RENV, France v Commission, 2020, paras 196–212 (upheld in part); T-758/14 RENV, Infineon Technologies v Commission, 2020, paras 166–193 (upheld); T-113/20, BSEF v Commission, 2022, paras 124–145 (rejected). 710 See, e.g. C-182/03 P and C-217/03, Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission, 2006, paras 147–167 (upheld); C-482/17, Czech Republic v Parliament and Council, 2019, paras 153–157 (rejected); T-217/17, FVE Holýšov I and Others v Commission, 2019, paras 66–85 (rejected); T-227/21, Illumina v Commission, 2022, paras 254–266 (rejected). 711 See C-182/03 P and C-217/03, Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission, 2006, paras 170–173 (upheld); C-440/19 P, Pometon v Commission, 2021, paras 151–153 (upheld ground of appeal based on breach of the principle of equal treatment and the obligation to state reasons); T-107/19, ACRE v Parliament, 2020, paras 77–82 (rejected); T-677/20, Ryanair and Laudamotion v Commission, 2021, paras 48–69 (rejected) (appeal pending in C-591/21 P). 712 Observation of a reasonable time in conducting administrative proceedings relating to competition policy is a general principle of Union law which the Union Courts ensure is respected: see, in that regard, C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P, C-252/99 P, and C-254/99 P, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission, 2002, paras 167–171; C-452/11 P, Heineken Nederland and Heineken v Commission, 2012, para. 97. That principle is reaffirmed in Art. 41(1) of the Charter, according to which every person has the right to have their affairs handled impartially, fairly, and within a reasonable time by the Union institutions, offices, bodies, and agencies: see, e.g. T-814/17, Lietuvos geležinkeliai v Commission, 2020, paras 354–355. However, an infringement of the reasonable time principle justifies the annulment of a decision adopted at the end of the administrative procedure only when it also entails an infringement of the rights of defence of the undertaking concerned: see, in that regard, C-105/14 P, Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied v Commission, 2006, paras 35–61; C-466/19 P, Qualcomm and Qualcomm Europe v Commission, 2021, para. 32; T-242/12, SNCF v Commission, 2015,

Special Characteristics 391 originating in conventions concluded by Member States before the former E(E)C Treaty was concluded where the Union succeeded to the Member States,713 agreements concluded by the Union itself,714 and customary international law.715 Finally, there are all valid, binding acts of Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies, including but not limited to the acts listed in Art. 288 TFEU.716 (iii) Infringement The ‘infringement’ of Union law for which annulment is imposed under this ground may consist equally of a misapplication of the law (including an erroneous legal categorization of the facts in question or a misinterpretation of the applicable rule) or of an error in determining the factual basis on which the application of Union law is founded.717 (iv) Margin of discretion It is only in areas in which the Union institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies have a broad discretion that the Union Courts show reluctance in reviewing the assessment of economic facts and circumstances which played a determinative role in the adoption of the contested act. In such a case, there will have to be a manifestly wrong assessment or para. 393; T-814/17, Lietuvos geležinkeliai v Commission, 2020, paras 356–361; T-791/19, Sped-Pro v Commission, 2022, paras 20–35; T-227/21, Illumina v Commission, 2022, para. 223; see also, e.g. in the restrictive measures context, T-203/20, Al-Imam v Council, 2021, para. 92; in the context of Union agricultural funds, T-239/17, Germany v Commission, 2019, paras 90–102; T-598/17, Italy v Commission, 2019, paras 56–62. 713 See 21/72 to 24/72, International Fruit Company, 1972, paras 6–7; see also, in that regard, Opinion 1/15, EU- Singapore Free Trade Agreement, 2017, para. 248. 714 See Art. 216(2) TFEU; 181/73, Haegeman, 1974, para. 5; C-266/16, Western Sahara Campaign UK, 2018, paras 45–48; C-452/20, Agenzia delle dogane e dei monopoli et Ministero dell'Economia e delle Finanze, 2022, para. 30; C-673/20, Préfet du Gers and Institut National de la Statistique and des Études Économiques, 2022, para. 84; for examples in connection with an action for annulment, 30/88, Greece v Commission, 1989, para. 12; T-798/14, DenizBank v Council, 2018, para. 150; see also, in that regard, C-161/20, Commission v Council, 2022, paras 30–33. The Union Courts will review the legality of a Union act under Art. 263 TFEU in the light of the WTO rules only where the EU intended by means of that act to implement a particular obligation assumed in the context of the WTO or where the act refers expressly to the precise provisions of the WTO agreements: see, e.g. C-149/96, Portugal v Council, 1999, paras 47–49; C-21/14 P, Commission v Rusal Armenal, 2015, paras 38–41; C-718/20 P, Zhejiang Jiuli Hi-Tech Metals v Commission, 2022, paras 83–91; T-228/17, Zhejiang Jndia Pipeline Industry v Commission, 2019, paras 98–108; T-541/18, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Commission, 2020, paras 56–79 (appeal pending in C-123/21 P); T-45/19, Acron and Others v Commission, 2021, paras 110–117. With regard to the Aarhus Convention, see C-404/12 P and C-405/12 P Council and Commission v Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Pesticide Action Network Europe, 2015, paras 44–53, 60–62; T-12/17, Mellifera v Commission, 2018, para. 85. See also para. 10.08. 715 See 89/85, 104/85, 114/85, 116/85 to 117/85, and 125/85, to 129/85, Åhlström Osakeyhtiö v Commission, 1988, paras 11–23; C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and Others, 2011, paras 101–111, 121–130; C-561/20, United Airlines, 2022, paras 46–61; T-115/94 Opel Austria v Council, 1997, paras 87–95; T-468/08, Tisza Erőmű v Commission, 2014, para. 321; T-279/19, Front Polisario v Council, 2021, paras 267–297 (annulling Council decision on the conclusion of international agreement on grounds of infringing obligation to comply with case-law of the Court of Justice interpreting principles of international law: see paras 298–392) (appeal pending in C-779/21 P and C-799/21 P); T-344/19 and T-356/21, Front Polisario v Council, 2021, paras 287–294 (annulling Council decision on the conclusion of international agreement on grounds of infringing obligation to comply with case-law of the Court of Justice interpreting principles of international law: see paras 295–365) (appeal pending in C-778/21 P and C-798/21 P); T-324/17, SAS Cargo Group and Others v Commission, 2022, paras 499–503 (appeal pending in C-403/22 P); compare C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, 2008, paras 280–330, in particular para. 287; T-289/15, Hamas v Council, 2019, paras 172–175. 716 For example, this includes provisions of the Staff Regulations: see, e.g. C-377/16 P, Spain v Parliament, 2019, paras 40–52, 63–80 (upheld); C-621/16 P, Commission v Italy, 2019, para. 125 (upheld). This also includes provisions of the 1976 Act concerning the election of the representatives to the European Parliament by direct, universal suffrage: see, e.g. C-393/07 and C-9/08, Italy and Donnici v Parliament, 2009, paras 39–76 (upheld). As regards guidelines and notices issued by the Commission, see para. 7.22. 717 See 18/62, Barge v High Authority, 1963 ECR 259, 279–281; for an analytical breakdown of these two aspects, see T-1/89, Rhône-Poulenc v Commission, 1991, paras 31–128; T-4/89, BASF v Commission, 1991, paras 54–258; T-9/89, Hüls v Commission, 1992, paras 90–328.

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392 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT a misuse of power if the act is to be annulled (apart, of course, from any misapplication of Union law in some other respect).718

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(d) Misuse of powers (i) Concept A Union institution, body, office, or agency is regarded as misusing its powers when it uses them for a purpose other than that for which they were conferred (détournement de pouvoir).719 As the Union Courts have recognized, a Union act is vitiated by misuse of powers only if it appears, on the basis of objective, relevant, and consistent evidence, to have been taken with the exclusive or main purpose of achieving an end other than that stated or of evading a procedure specifically prescribed by the Treaties for dealing with the circumstances of the case.720 Therefore, the case-law follows an objective approach in respect of the concept of misuse of powers. It is not necessary to know the actual grounds which motivated the institution (subjective approach). When the outcome of the contested act diverges from the objectives for which the power was conferred, this can afford a sufficient basis for annulling the contested act for misuse of powers (objective approach). 721 An unlawful choice of a decision-making procedure in order to evade other procedures which would normally be applicable also constitutes a misuse of powers.722 (ii) Act pursuing authorized and unauthorized aims An act which pursues both unauthorized and authorized aims may be annulled only if this detracts from the main aim for which the power was conferred723 or if the unauthorized aim constitutes the main reason for exercising the power.724 (iii) Proof The Union Courts subject claims alleging misuse of powers to strict requirements as to proof. Only if the applicant adduces evidence of a sufficiently objective, relevant, and consistent nature that the act was adopted for unauthorized purposes, will the Union Courts entertain a claim of misuse of powers.725 A misuse of powers cannot be presumed.726 718 See C-341/06 P and C-342/06 P, Chronopost and La Poste v UFEX and Others, 2008, para. 143; C-611/17, Italy v Council, 2019, para. 57; C-928/19 P, EPSU v Commission, 2021, para. 96; see also, as regards anti-dumping, T-607/15, Yieh United Steel v Commission, 2019, para. 68; T-301/16, Jindal Saw and Jindal Saw Italia v Commission, 2019, para. 110; as regards public contracts, T-457/07, Evropaïki Dynamiki v EFSA, 2012, para. 40; as regards restrictive measures, see, e.g. T-715/14, NK Rosneft and Others v Council, 2018, para. 155; T-700/19, Ghaoud v Council, 2021, para. 77; compare T-292/20, Yanukovych v Council, 2022, para. 72. With respect to the standard of review in competition cases, see paras 7.199–7.215. 719 See 15/57, Compagnie des hauts fourneaux de Chasse v High Authority, 1957–1958 ECR 211, 230–231; C-400/99, Italy v Commission, 2005, para. 38; T-271/10 RENV II, H v Council, 2020, para. 48; T-351/18, Ukrselhosprom PCF and Versobank v ECB, 2021, para. 209 (appeal pending in C-803/21 P). 720 See C-620/18, Hungary v Parliament and Council, 2018, para. 82; C-132/19 P, Groupe Canal +v Commission, 2020, para. 31; T-781/16, Puma and Others v Council, 2021, para. 121; T-280/18, ABLV Bank v SRB, 2022, para. 204. 721 See T-271/10 RENV II, H v Council, 2020, para. 77. 722 See 2/57, Compagnie des Hauts Fourneaux de Chasse v High Authority, 1957–1958 ECR 199, 207; 33/86, 44/86, 110/86, 226/86, and 285/86, Stahlwerke Peine-Salzgitter and Others v Commission, 1988, paras 27–28; compare, e.g. C-274/11 and C-295/11, Spain and Italy v Council, 2013, paras 33–41. 723 See T-143/12, Germany v Commission, 2016, para. 84; T-712/15, Arkéa v ECB, 2017, para. 210. 724 See 2/57, Compagnie des Hauts Fourneaux de Chasse v High Authority, 1957–1958 ECR 199, 232. 725 See para. 7.191. See also T-323/13 P, da Silva Tenreiro v Commission (order), 2013, paras 31–33; T-618/15, Voigt v Parliament, 2017, para. 102. 726 See 23/76, Pellegrini and Others v Commission, 1976, para. 30; and AG Mayras Opinion, 1976 ECR 1823, 1829–1830.

Special Characteristics 393 (iv) Exceptional ground It is exceptional that the Union Courts will declare a Union act void for misuse of powers.727

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C. Conduct during the administrative procedure and admissibility of pleas in judicial proceedings (1) Acknowledgement of the facts in Arts 101 and 102 TFEU proceedings An undertaking involved in an alleged infringement of Arts 101 and 102 TFEU may raise in its application any ground for annulment mentioned in Art. 263 TFEU. Where the undertaking does not expressly acknowledge the facts, the Commission must prove the facts in its decision, and the undertaking is free to put forward in the proceedings before the Union Courts any plea in its defence which it deems appropriate, even if such plea has not been raised during the administrative procedure.728 However, where the undertaking explicitly admits during the administrative procedure the substantive truth of the Commission’s allegations made against it in the statement of objections, those facts must thereafter be regarded as established and the undertaking will be in principle precluded from disputing them during the proceedings before the Union Courts.729 (2) Merger control The assessments made by the Commission will be examined by the Union Courts on the basis of the information available to the Commission at the time when those assessments were made. The applicant should therefore not alter, during the proceedings before the Union Courts, the legal and factual framework previously submitted to the Commission for the purposes of the adoption of the contested decision.730

727 See, e.g. 92/78, Simmenthal v Commission, 1979, para. 106; 33/86, 44/86, 110/86, 226/86, and 285/86, Stahlwerke Peine-Salzitter and Others v Commission, 1988, para. 28; T-271/10 RENV II, H v Council, 2020, paras 54–82. 728 See C-407/08 P, Knauf Gips v Commission, 2010, paras 89–92; C-586/16 P, Sun Pharmaceutical Industries and Ranbaxy (UK) v Commission, 2021, para. 111; T-234/07, Koninklijke Grolsch v Commission, 2011, paras 37–41; T-389/10 and T-419/10, SLM and Ori Martin v Commission, 2015, paras 392–393; T-286/09 RENV, Intel v Commission, 2022, paras 300–302. 729 See, in that regard, C-297/98 P, SCA Holding v Commission, 2000, para. 37; T-224/00, Archer Daniels Midland and Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients v Commission, 2003, para. 227; T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01, T-246/01, T-251/01, and T-252/01, Tokai Carbon and Others v Commission, 2004, para. 108 (appeal dismissed in C-289/04 P and C-308/04 P and set aside in part on other grounds in C-301/04 P); T-69/04, Schunkand Schunk Kohlenstoff- Technik v Commission, 2008, para. 84. Only where the acknowledgement of the facts leaves no room for doubt will the applicant be barred from contesting such facts before the General Court: see, in that regard, T-39/06 Transcatab v Commission, 2011, paras 400–404; T-375/06, Viega v Commission, 2011, para. 40. Moreover, inferences made by the Commission on the basis of declarations made during the administrative procedure may still be challenged before the General Court: see T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01, T-246/01, T-251/01, and T-252/01, Tokai Carbon and Others v Commission, 2004, para. 109 (appeal dismissed in C-289/04 P and C-308/04 P and set aside in part on other grounds in C-301/04 P). 730 See T-87/05, EDP v Commission, 2005, para. 158; T-151/05, NVV and Others v Commission, 2009, paras 58, 63.

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394 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT 7.197

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(3) State aid The legality of a Union act is assessed on the basis of the elements of fact and of law existing at the time when the act was adopted. In particular, the assessments made by the Commission are examined by the Union Courts solely on the basis of the information available to the Commission at the time when those assessments were made.731 It follows that an applicant which took part in the investigation procedure provided for in Art. 108(2) TFEU cannot rely on factual arguments which were not known to the Commission and of which it did not inform the Commission during the investigation procedure.732 However, there is nothing to prevent a recipient of State aid or any other interested party from raising against the final decision a plea in law not raised at the stage of the administrative procedure.733 (4) Anti-dumping In principle, nothing prevents an applicant from raising in its application any ground for annulment mentioned in Art. 263 TFEU, including a plea which was not raised during the administrative proceedings.734

D. Standard of review in competition cases

7.199

(1) Enforcement of Arts 101 and 102 TFEU (a) Comprehensive review as a general rule The burden of proof of the existence of the circumstances which constitute an infringement of Arts 101 or 102 TFEU is borne by the Commission.735 The General Court will therefore consider whether the evidence and other information relied on by the Commission in its decision is sufficient to prove the existence of the alleged

731 See 15/76 and 16/76, France v Commission, 1979, para. 7; 234/84, Belgium v Commission, 1986, para. 16; C-276/02, Spain v Commission, 2004, para. 31; T-371/94 and T-394/94, British Airways and Others v Commission, 1998, para. 81; T-489/11, Rousse Industry v Commission, 2013, para. 33; T-511/09, Niki Luftfahrt v Commission, 2015, para. 127; T-119/07, Italy v Commission, 2019, para. 157. 732 See T-111/01 and T-133/01, Saxonia Edelmetalle and Zemag v Commission, 2005, para. 68; T-445/05, Associazione italiana del risparmio gestito and Fineco Asset Management v Commission, 2009, para. 177. 733 See T-16/96, Cityflyer Express v Commission, 1998, para. 39; T-111/01 and T-133/01, Saxonia Edelmetalle and Zemag v Commission, 2005, para. 68; T-445/05, Associazione italiana del risparmio gestito and Fineco Asset Management v Commission, 2009, para. 177. 734 Compare, in that regard, T-369/08 EWRIA and Others v Commission, 2010, paras 105–109. 735 Art. 2 of Regulation 1/2003. See also C-185/95 P, Baustahlgewebe v Commission, 1998, para. 58; C-593/18 P, ABB v Commission, 2019, para. 38; T-216/13, Telefónica v Commission, 2016, para. 124; T-799/17, Scania and Others v Commission, 2022, para. 197 (appeal pending in C-251/22 P). Although the burden of proof of the existence of the circumstances that constitute an infringement of Art. 102 TFEU is borne by the Commission, it is for the dominant undertaking concerned, and not for the Commission, before the end of the administrative procedure, to raise any plea of objective justification and to support it with arguments and evidence. It then falls to the Commission, where it proposes to make a finding of an abuse of a dominant position, to show that the arguments and evidence relied on by the undertaking cannot prevail and, accordingly, that the justification put forward cannot be accepted: see T-201/04, Microsoft v Commission, 2007, paras 688, 1144; T-612/17, Google and Alphabet v Commission, 2021, para. 554 (appeal pending in C-48/22 P). See further K. Lenaerts, ‘Some Thoughts on Evidence and Procedure in European Competition Law’ (2006) Fordham I.L.J. 1463–1495; N. Wahl, ‘Standard of Review: Comprehensive or Limited?’ in D. Ehlermann and M. Marquis (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2009 (Hart, 2011) 285; A. Kornezov, ‘Judicial Review of Commission Decisions and Judicial Protection’ in E. Rousseva (ed.), EU Antitrust Procedure (OUP, 2020) paras 18.94–18.180.

Special Characteristics 395 infringement.736 As a general rule, the Union Courts undertake a comprehensive review of the question as to whether or not the conditions for the application of the competition rules are met.737 (b) Role of the applicant It is for the applicant to raise pleas in law against the Commission decision and to adduce evidence in support of those pleas. That requirement, which is procedural in nature, does not conflict with the rule that, with regard to infringements of the competition rules, it is for the Commission to prove the infringement found by it and to adduce evidence capable of demonstrating to the requisite legal standard the existence of the circumstances constituting an infringement. What the applicant is required to do in the context of a legal challenge is to identify the impugned elements of the contested decision, to formulate grounds of challenge in that regard, and to adduce evidence, direct or circumstantial, to demonstrate that its objections are well-founded.738 Accordingly, when the Commission found an infringement of Arts 101 or 102 TFEU on the basis of the mere conduct of the undertakings concerned, the Union Courts will annul such finding if the applicants prove circumstances which cast the facts established by the Commission in a different light and which thus allow another explanation of the facts to be substituted for the one adopted by the contested decision.739 However, if the Commission relies on documentary evidence in support of its finding of the existence of an infringement of Arts 101 or 102 TFEU, the General Court will only annul such finding when the applicant demonstrates that the evidence relied on in the contested decision to establish the existence of the infringement is insufficient.740

736 See T-305/94, T-306/94, T-307/94, T-313/94 to T-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T-329/94, and T-335/94, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission, 1999, para. 891 (set aside in part on other grounds in C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P, and C-254/99 P); T-132/07, Fuji Electric v Commission, 2011, para. 89; T-84/13, Samsung SDI and Others v Commission, 2015, para. 115. 737 See 42/84, Remia v Commission, 1985, para. 34; T-264/12, UTi Worldwide and Others, 2016, para. 45. However, in their review, the Union Courts take account of the fact that anti-competitive activities take place clandestinely, and accordingly, in most cases, the existence of an anti-competitive practice or agreement must be inferred from a number of coincidences and indicia which, taken together, may, in the absence of another plausible explanation, constitute evidence of an infringement of the competition rules: see C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P, and C-219/00 P, Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission, 2004, paras 55–57; C-403/04 P and C-405/04 P, Sumitomo Metal Industries and Nippon Steel v Commission, 2007, para. 51; T-254/17, Intermarché Casino Achats v Commission, 2020, para. 238 (appeal pending in C-693/20 P); T-363/18, Nippon Chemi-Con v Commission, 2021, paras 150–152 (set aside on other grounds in C-759/21 P). 738 See C-272/09 P, KME Germany and Others v Commission, 2011, paras 104–105; C-389/10 P, KME Germany and Others v Commission, 2011, paras 131–132; C-609/13 P, Duravit and Others v Commission, 2017, para. 58. 739 See 29/83 and 30/83, CRAM and Rheinzink v Commission, 1984, para. 16; C-89/85, C-104/85, C-114/85, C-116/85, C-117/85, and C-125/85 to C-129/85, Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and Others v Commission, 1993, paras 126– 127; C-89/11 P, E.ON Energie v Commission, 2017, para. 74; T-286/09 RENV, Intel v Commission, 2022, para. 165; see also, with respect to the burden of proof, C-413/08 P, Lafarge v Commission, 2010, paras 29–30; C-89/11 P, E.ON Energie v Commission, 2017, para. 76; C-609/13 P, Duravit and Others v Commission, 2017, paras 56–57; T-132/07, Fuji Electric v Commission, 2011, paras 84–85; T-612/17, Google and Alphabet v Commission, 2021, paras 133–134 (appeal pending in C-48/22 P). 740 In such case, it is not sufficient for the applicant to put forward a plausible alternative to the Commission’s view: see T-216/13, Telefónica v Commission, 2016, para. 125; T-799/17, Scania and Others v Commission, 2022, para. 199 (appeal pending in C-251/22 P).

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396 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT 7.201

(c) Benefit of the doubt to the applicant In the proceedings before the General Court, the Commission may not adduce new inculpatory evidence in support of the contested decision which is not contained in that decision.741 The existence of an infringement must be assessed by reference solely to the evidence gathered by the Commission in the decision finding that infringement, and the only relevant question is therefore to ascertain, on the merits, whether or not the infringement has been proved by that evidence.742 The Commission must thus in its decision produce sufficiently precise and consistent evidence to support the firm conviction that the alleged infringement took place.743 Where there is doubt as regards the existence of the infringement, the General Court must give the benefit of that doubt to the applicant.744 As a result, the General Court will conclude that the Commission has not established the existence of the infringement at issue to the requisite legal standard if it still entertains doubts on that point.745 This is because, given the nature of the infringements in question and the nature and degree of severity of the ensuing penalties, the principle of the presumption of innocence (resulting in particular from Art. 48 of the Charter) applies to competition procedures.746 741 See C-628/10 P and C-14/11 P, Alliance One and Others v Commission, 2012, para. 79; T-677/14, Biogaran v Commission, 2018, para. 57 (appeal pending in C-207/19 P). Insofar as the applicants seek to establish, on the basis of ‘new documents’ produced to the General Court, that the Commission’s position is based on inaccurate facts, the Commission is entitled to respond to their arguments by referring to the documents in question: see T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00, and T-78/00, JFE Engineering and Others v Commission, 2004, paras 175–176; T-772/15, Quanta Storage v Commission, 2019, para. 140 (confirmed on appeal, but set aside on other grounds in C-699/19 P, Quanta Storage v Commission, 2022, in particular para. 159). 742 See T-25/95, T-26/95, T-30/95, T-31/95, T-32/95, T-34/95, T-35/95, T-36/95, T-37/95, T-38/95, T-39/95, T-42/95, T-43/95, T-44/95, T-45/95, T-46/95, T-48/95, T-50/95, T-51/95, T-52/95, T-53/95, T-54/95, T-55/95, T-56/95, T-57/95, T-58/95, T-59/95, T-60/95, T-61/95, T-62/95, T-63/95, T-64/95, T-65/95, T-68/95, T-69/95, T-70/95, T-71/95, T-87/95, T-88/95, T-103/95, and T-104/95, Cimenteries CBR and Others v Commission, 2000, para. 726 (set aside in part on other grounds in C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P, and C-219/00 P); T-132/07, Fuji Electric v Commission, 2011, paras 90, 185; T-104/13, Toshiba v Commission, 2015, para. 98; T-419/14, The Goldman Sachs Group v Commission, 2018, para. 85. 743 See 29/83, CRAM v Commission, 1986, para. 20; C-293/13 P, Fresh Del Monte Produce v Commission, 2015, para. 143; T-132/07, Fuji Electric v Commission, 2011, para. 87; T-363/18, Nippon Chem-Con v Commission, 2021, para. 147 (appeal pending in C-759/21 P). However, it is not necessary for every item of evidence produced by the Commission to satisfy those criteria in relation to every aspect of the infringement. It is sufficient if the body of evidence relied on by the institution, viewed as a whole, meets that requirement: see C‑239/11 P, C‑489/11 P, and C‑498/11 P, Siemens v Commission, 2013, para. 217; T-132/07, Fuji Electric v Commission, 2011, para. 87; T-363/18, Nippon Chem-Con v Commission, 2021, para. 148 (appeal pending in C-759/21 P). With respect to the probative value which should be attached to freely adduced evidence (such as statements of other incriminated undertakings), see T-132/07, Fuji Electric v Commission, 2011, para. 88; T-439/07, Coats Holdings v Commission, 2012, paras 45–50. 744 See 27/76, United Brands v Commission, 1978, para. 265; C-199/92 P, Hüls v Commission, 1999, paras 149– 150; C-90/15 P, Hansen & Rosenthal and H&R Wax Company Vertrieb v Commission, 2017, para. 18; T-332/09, Electrabel v Commission, 2012, para. 106; T-799/17, Scania and Others v Commission, 2022, para. 200 (appeal pending in C-251/22 P). 745 See T-38/02, Groupe Danone v Commission, 2005, para. 215; T-132/07, Fuji Electric v Commission, 2011, para. 89; T-84/13, Samsung SDI and Others v Commission, 2015, para. 115. 746 See C-199/92 P, Hüls v Commission, 1999, paras 149–150; C-235/92 P, Montecatini v Commission, 1999, paras 175–176; C-90/15 P, Hansen & Rosenthal and H&R Wax Company Vertrieb v Commission, 2017, para. 18; T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00, and T-78/00, JFE Engineering and Others v Commission, 2004, paras 177–178; T-799/17, Scania and Others v Commission, 2022, para. 200 (appeal pending in C-251/22 P). The review of the Commission’s assessment of the Union interest of a complaint in a decision rejecting the complaint is also limited. Review by the Union Courts of the Commission’s exercise of the discretion conferred on it in this regard must not lead them to substitute their own assessment of the Union interest for that of the Commission, but rather focuses on whether the contested decision is based on materially incorrect facts or is vitiated by an error of law, manifest error of appraisal, or misuse of powers: see T-115/99, SEP v Commission, 2001, para. 34; T-427/08, CEAHR v Commission, 2010, para. 65; T-574/14, EAEPC v Commission, 2018, para. 78.

Special Characteristics 397 (d) Review takes into account the complex nature of economic and technical appraisals Although, as a general rule, the Union Courts undertake a comprehensive review of the question as to whether or not the conditions for the application of the competition rules are met, their review of complex economic appraisals made by the Commission is limited to checking whether the relevant rules on procedure and on stating reasons have been complied with, whether the facts have been accurately stated, and whether there has been any manifest error of assessment or a misuse of powers.747 Likewise, insofar as the Commission’s decision is the result of complex technical appraisals, those appraisals are in principle subject to only limited review by the Union Courts, which means that they cannot substitute their own assessment of matters of fact for that of the Commission.748 However, while the Union Courts recognize that the Commission has a margin of discretion in economic or technical matters, that does not mean that they must decline to review the Commission’s interpretation of economic or technical data. The Union Courts must not only establish whether the evidence put forward is factually accurate, reliable, and consistent, but also determine whether that evidence contains all the information which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation, and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it.749 The Union Courts must also establish of their own motion that the Commission has stated reasons for its decision and, among other things, that it has explained the weighting and assessment of the factors taken into account.750 (e) Review of compliance with the Commission Guidelines In its Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Art. 23(2)(a) of Regulation No. 1/2003,751 the Commission indicates the basis on which it will take account of one or other aspect of the infringement and what this will imply as regards the amount of the fine. The Union Courts will examine whether the Commission decision complies with the Guidelines. Indeed, the Guidelines form rules of practice from which the administration may not depart in an individual case without giving reasons

747 See 42/84, Remia v Commission, 1985, para. 34; 142/84 and 156/84, BAT and Reynolds v Commission, 1987, para. 62; C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P, and C-219/00 P, Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission, 2004, para. 279; T-201/04, Microsoft v Commission, 2007, para. 87; T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, 2008, para. 185; T-691/14, Servier and Others v Commission, 2018, para. 1374 (appeal pending in C-176/19 P and C-201/19 P). See further M. Jaeger, ‘The Standard of Review in Competition Cases Involving Complex Economic Assessments’ (2011) J.E.C.L. & Pract. 295; R. Wesseling and M. van der Woude, ‘Over de rechtmatigheid en aanvaardbaarheid van de handhaving van het Europese kartelrecht’ (2012) S.E.W. 174; A. Kalintiri, ‘What’s in a name? The marginal standard of review of “complex economic assessments” in EU competition enforcement’ (2016) C.M.L.Rev. 1283; M. Prek and S. Lefèvre, ‘Competition Litigation Before the General Court: Quality If Not Quantity?’ (2016) C.M.L.Rev. 65, 68–74; F. Castillo de la Torre and E. Gippini Fournier, Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in EU Competition Law (Edward Elgar, 2017) paras 6.024–6.095. 748 See T-201/04, Microsoft v Commission, 2007, paras 88, 379; T-556/08, Slovenská pošta v Commission, 2015, para. 105. 749 See C-12/03 P, Commission v Tetra Laval, 2005, para. 39; C-295/12 P, Telefónica and Telefónica de España, 2014, para. 54; T-201/04, Microsoft v Commission, 2007, para. 89; T-612/17, Google and Alphabet v Commission, 2021, para. 131 (appeal pending in C-48/22 P). 750 See C-386/10 P, Chalkor v Commission, 2011, para. 61; C-39/18 P, Commission v Icap and Others, 2019, para. 24; T-95/15, Printeos v Commission, 2016, para. 47. See also para. 7.184. 751 OJ 2006 C210/2.

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398 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT compatible with, inter alia, the principle of equal treatment.752 The Union Courts carry out the review of legality of the Commission decision on the basis of the evidence adduced by the applicant in support of the pleas in law put forward. In carrying out such a review, the Union Courts cannot use the Commission’s margin of discretion—either as regards the choice of factors taken into account in the application of the criteria mentioned in the Guidelines or as regards the assessment of those factors—as a basis for dispensing with the conduct of an in-depth review of the law and of the facts.753

7.204

7.205

(f) Review of legality supplemented by unlimited jurisdiction as regards the fines satisfies the requirements of effective judicial protection The review of legality is supplemented by the unlimited jurisdiction which the Union Courts enjoy pursuant to Art. 31 of Regulation No. 1/2003 in accordance with Art. 261 TFEU (see Ch. 18). That jurisdiction empowers the Union Courts, in addition to carrying out a mere review of the lawfulness of the penalty, to substitute their own appraisal for the Commission’s and, consequently, to cancel, reduce, or increase the fine or penalty payment imposed.754 The review provided by the Treaties thus involves review by the Union Courts of both the law and the facts, and means that they have the power to assess the evidence, to annul the contested decision, and to alter the amount of a fine.755 The review of legality provided for under Art. 263 TFEU, supplemented by the unlimited jurisdiction in respect of the amount of the fine, is considered to satisfy the requirements of the principle of effective judicial protection laid down in Art. 47 of the Charter.756 (2) Merger control (a) Decision based on prospective analysis In contrast to the adoption of a decision finding an infringement of Arts 101 and/or 102 TFEU, which entails the examination of past events for which different items of evidence

752 See C-397/03 P, Archer Daniels Midland and Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients v Commission, 2006, para. 91; C-386/10 P, Chalkor v Commission, 2011, para. 60; C-39/18 P, Commission v Icap and Others, 2019, para. 29; T-1/16, Hitachi-LG Data Storage and Hitachi-LG Data Storage Korea v Commission, 2019, para. 80; T-344/18, Rubycon and Rubycon Holdings v Commission, 2021, paras 58, 160; T-343/18, Tokin v Commission, 2021, para. 62. In the absence of any binding indication in those guidelines regarding the mitigating circumstances that may be taken into account, the Commission retains a degree of latitude in making an overall assessment of the extent to which a reduction of fines may be made in respect of mitigating circumstances: see T-82/13, Panasonic and MT Picture Display v Commission, 2015, para. 176; T-448/14, Hitachi Metals v Commission, 2018, para. 181. 753 See C-386/10 P, Chalkor v Commission, 2011, para. 62; T-449/14, Nexans France and Nexans v Commission, 2018, para. 144. 754 See C-389/10 P, Chalkor v Commission, 2011, para. 63; C-295/12 P, Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission, 2014, para. 44; C-609/13 P, Duravit and Others v Commission, 2017, para. 31; T-851/14, Slovak Republic v Commission, 2018, para. 474; T-240/17, Campine and Campine Recycling v Commission, 2019, para. 381. The exercise of unlimited jurisdiction does not amount to a review of the Court’s own motion. The proceedings before the Union Courts are indeed inter partes: see C-609/13 P, Duravit and Others v Commission, 2017, para. 32; T-851/14, Slovak Republic v Commission, 2018, para. 475. 755 See C-389/10 P, Chalkor v Commission, 2011, para. 67; C-122/16 P, British Airways v Commission, 2017, para. 104; T-209/13, Portugal v Commission, 2016, para. 276; T-851/14, Slovak Republic v Commission, 2018, para. 473. 756 See C-389/10 P, Chalkor v Commission, 2011, para. 67; C-295/12 P, Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission, 2014, para. 42; T-209/13, Portugal v Commission, 2016, para. 276; T-240/17, Campine and Campine Recycling v Commission, 2019, para. 381.

Special Characteristics 399 may be available, the adoption of a decision pursuant to Regulation No. 139/2004 concerning a concentration requires a prospective analysis of future events.757 That prospective analysis involves an examination of how the notified concentration might alter the factors determining the state of competition on a given market in order to establish whether it would give rise to a serious impediment to effective competition.758 (b) Review takes account of margin of discretion of Commission The Commission has a margin of discretion with respect to assessments of an economic nature. The review by the Union Courts of decisions in the field of merger control must take account of that margin of discretion.759 It follows that the review by the Union Courts of a Commission decision relating to concentrations is confined, in particular, to ascertaining that the facts have been accurately stated and that there has been no manifest error of assessment.760 That does not mean, however, that the Union Courts must refrain from reviewing the Commission’s interpretation of information of an economic nature. The Union Courts must verify, in particular, not only whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable, and consistent, but also whether that evidence contains all the information which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it.761 The evidence relied upon by the Commission to find that a concentration is (in)compatible with the internal market must indeed be convincing.762

757 See C-12/03 P, Commission v Tetra Laval, 2005, para. 42; C-265/17 P, Commission v United Parcel Service, 2019, para. 32; T-342/07, Ryanair v Commission, 2010, para. 27; T-399/16, CK Telecoms UK Investments v Commission, 2020, para. 112 (appeal pending in C-376/20 P). 758 See C-12/03 P, Commission v Tetra Laval, 2005, para. 43; C-265/17 P, Commission v United Parcel Service, 2019, para. 32; T-342/07 Ryanair v Commission, 2010, para. 27; T-370/17, KPN v Commission, 2019, para. 109; T-240/18, Polskie Linie Lotnicze ‘LOT’ v Commission, 2021, para. 105. Where commitments have been validly proposed by the parties to the concentration during the administrative procedure in order to obtain a decision that the concentration is compatible with the internal market, the Commission is required to examine the concentration as modified by those commitments. It is then for the Commission to demonstrate that those commitments do not render the concentration, as modified by the commitments, compatible with the internal market: see T-87/05, EDP v Commission, 2005, paras 63–65; T-342/07, Ryanair v Commission, 2010, para. 28; T-175/12, Deutsche Börse v Commission, 2015, para. 64. 759 See C-68/94 and C-30/95, France and Others v Commission, 1998, paras 223–224; C-12/03 P, Commission v Tetra Laval, 2005, para. 38; C-202/06 P, Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission, 2007, para. 53; T-342/07, Ryanair v Commission, 2010, para. 29; T-162/10, Niki Luftfahrt v Commission, 2015, para. 85; T-370/17, KPN v Commission, 2019, para. 106; T-240/18, Polskie Linie Lotnicze ‘LOT’ v Commission, 2021, para. 68. 760 See C-68/94 and C-30/95, France and Others v Commission, 1998, paras 223–224; C-413/06 P, Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v Impala, 2008, para. 144; C-12/03 P, Commission v Tetra Laval, 2005, para. 38; T-87/05, EDP v Commission, 2005, para. 151; T-471/11, Éditions Odile Jacob v Commission, 2014, para. 137; T-240/18, Polskie Linie Lotnicze ‘LOT’ v Commission, 2021, para. 68. 761 See C-12/03 P, Commission v Tetra Laval, 2005, para. 39; C-413/03 P, Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v Impala, 2008, para. 69; T-342/07, Ryanair v Commission, 2010, para. 30; T-162/10, Niki Luftfahrt v Commission, 2015, para. 86; T-370/17, KPN v Commission, 2019, para. 108; T-240/18, Polskie Linie Lotnicze ‘LOT’ v Commission, 2021, para. 69; T-399/16, CK Telecoms UK Investments v Commission, 2020, para. 76 (appeal pending in C-376/20 P). 762 See T-342/99, Airtours v Commission, 2002, paras 63, 294–295; T-175/12, Deutsche Börse v Commission, 2015, para. 63; see also, as regards the burden of proof and standard of proof in relation to concentrations, T-399/16, CK Telecoms UK Investments v Commission, 2020, paras 107–118 (appeal pending in C-376/20 P).

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(c) Observance of procedural guarantees In addition, according to settled case-law, where the institutions have a power of appraisal, respect for the rights guaranteed by the Union legal order in administrative procedures is of even more fundamental importance. Those guarantees include, in particular, the duty of the Commission to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case, the right of the person concerned to make their views known, and also their right to have an adequately reasoned decision.763 (d) Review of compliance with Commission Guidelines and Notices The Commission is bound by guidelines and notices which it issues in the area of supervision of concentrations, provided they do not depart from the rules in the Treaties and from Regulation No. 139/2004.764 The Union Courts will examine whether the Commission decision complies with such guidelines and notices. (e) Lawfulness assessed on the basis of facts and law existing at time of notification The appraisal by the Commission of the compatibility of a concentration with the internal market must be carried out solely on the basis of matters of fact and law existing at the time of notification of that transaction, and not on the basis of hypothetical factors, the economic implications of which cannot be assessed at the time at which the decision is adopted.765 (3) State aid (a) Legal characterization of the measure as aid State aid, as defined in the Treaties, is a legal concept which must be interpreted on the basis of objective factors. For that reason, the Union Courts must in principle, having regard both to the specific features of the case before them and to the technical or complex nature of the Commission’s assessments, carry out a comprehensive review as to whether a measure falls within the scope of Art. 107(1) TFEU.766 The General Court will thus comprehensively review whether the alleged aid measure is selective or whether it is financed through State resources, since those issues generally do not

763 See T-151/05, NVV and Others v Commission, 2009, para. 163; T-342/07, Ryanair v Commission, 2010, para. 31; T-162/10, Niki Luftfahrt v Commission, 2015, para. 87; T-175/12, Deutsche Börse v Commission, 2015, para. 67. 764 See T-114/02, BaByliss v Commission, 2003, para. 143; T-282/06 Sun Chemical Group and Others v Commission, 2007, para. 55; T-405/08, Spar Österreichische Warenhandels v Commission, 2013, para. 58; T-399/16, CK Telecoms UK Investments v Commission, 2020, para. 99 (appeal pending in C-376/20 P). 765 See T-2/93, Air France v Commission, 1994, para. 70; T-374/00, Verband der freien Rohrwerke and Others v Commission, 2003, para. 170; T-279/04, Éditions Odile Jacob v Commission, 2010, paras 327, 338; T-296/18, Polskie Linie Lotnicze ‘LOT’ v Commission, 2021, para. 55. 766 See C-83/98 P, France v Ladbroke Racing and Commission, 2000, para. 25; C-487/06 P, British Aggregates v Commission, 2008, paras 111–112; C-533/12 P and C-536/12 P, SNCM and France v Corsica Ferries France and Commission, 2014, paras 15, 19; C-485/15 P, Commission v France and Orange, 2016, para. 87; T-760/15, Netherlands v Commission, 2019, para. 198; T‑816/17 and T‑318/18, Luxembourg v Commission, 2021, para. 128 (appeal pending in C-457/21 P); T-448/18, Ryanair and Others v Commission, 2021, para. 171 (appeal pending in C-758/21 P). See further V. Kreuschitz and H. P. Nehl, ‘Direct Actions and Judicial Review before the Union Courts’ in H .C. H. Hofmann and C. Micheau (eds), State Aid Law of the European Union (OUP, 2016) 406.

Special Characteristics 401 involve complex economic assessments. By contrast, the question whether the measure confers an advantage on its recipient may involve complex economic assessments. For instance, this will be the case when the Commission examines whether a particular measure satisfies the ‘private investor test’ or, in other words, whether a public authority acted in the same way as a private investor would have done.767 The General Court’s review of such assessments is limited and confined to verifying whether the rules on procedure and on the statement of reasons have been complied with, whether the facts have been accurately stated, and whether there has been any manifest error of assessment or misuse of powers.768 However, that does not mean that the Union Courts will refrain from reviewing the Commission’s interpretation of information of an economic nature.769 According to the case-law, the Union Courts must verify not only whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable, and consistent, but also whether that evidence contains all the information which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it.770 When conducting such a review, the Union Courts must not substitute their own economic assessment for that of the Commission.771 The case-law thus draws a distinction

767 See C-525/04 P, Spain v Lenzing, 2007, para. 59; C-73/11 P, Frucona Košice v Commission, 2013, para. 74; C‑486/15 P, Commission v France and Orange, 2016, paras 88–89; C-300/16 P, Commission v Frucona Košice, 2017, para. 62; C-160/19 P, Comune di Milano v Commission, 2020, para. 100; C-933/19 P, Autostrada Wielkopolska v Commission and Poland, 2022, para. 116; T-1/12, France v Commission, 2015, para. 35; T-165/15, Ryanair and Airport Marketing Services, 2018, paras 129–130; T-448/18, Ryanair and Others v Commission, 2021, paras 172– 173 (appeal pending in C-758/21 P). 768 See C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P, and C-519/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v Commission and Others, 2009, para. 163; C-290/07 P, Commission v Scott, 2010, para. 66; C-414/15 P, Stichting Woonlinie and Others v Commission, 2017, para 53; C-415/15 P, Stichting Woonpunt and Others v Commission, 2017, para. 53; C-148/19 P, BTB Holding Investments and Duferco Participations Holdings v Commission, 2020, para. 56; T-152/99, HAMSA v Commission, 2002, para. 127; T-386/14 RENV, FIH Holding and FIH v Commission, 2019, para. 68; T-8/18, easyJet v Commission, 2020, para. 243 (set aside in part on other grounds in C-331/20 P and C-343/20 P). Under the case-law, judicial review of the legality of a decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure, where the applicant challenges the Commission’s assessment of the measure concerned as State aid, within the meaning of Art. 107(1) TFEU, is limited to ascertaining whether or not the Commission, at the stage of the preliminary examination provided for in Art. 4 of Regulation 2015/1589, has made a manifest error of assessment: see C-562/19 P, Commission v Poland, 2021, para. 52. For some examples in which a manifest error of assessment was found, see C-486/15 P, Commission v France and Orange, 2016, paras 90–93; T-461/12, Hansestadt Lübeck v Commission, 2014, paras 42–60; T-732/16, Valencia Club de Fútbol v Commission, 2020, paras 124–138. 769 See C-525/04 P, Spain v Lenzing, 2007, para. 56; C-290/07 P, Commission v Scott, para. 64; C-486/15 P, Commission v France and Orange, 2016, para. 91; T-479/11 RENV, France v Commission, 2020, para. 80. In order to establish that the Commission made a manifest error in assessing the facts such as to justify the annulment of the contested decision, the evidence adduced by the applicant must be sufficient to make the factual assessments used in the decision implausible: see C-148/19 P, BTB Holding Investments and Duferco Participations Holding v Commission, 2020, para. 72; T-387/11, Nitrogénmüvek Vegyipari v Commission, 2013, para. 25; T-356/15, Austria v Commission, 2018, para. 170. This approach has been transposed to the banking union context: see, in that regard, T-570/17, Algebris (UK) and Anchorage Capital Group v Commission, 2022, paras 102–109. 770 See C-525/04 P, Spain v Lenzing, 2007, para. 57; C-290/07 P, Commission v Scott, para. 65; C-73/11 P, Frucona Košice v Commission, 2013, para. 76; C-486/15 P, Commission v France and Orange, 2016, para. 91; C-300/16 P, Commission v Frucona Košice, 2017, para. 64; C-933/19 P, Autostrada Wielkopolska v Commission and Poland, 2022, para. 117; T-121/15, Fortischem v Commission, 2019, para. 63; T-479/11 RENV, France v Commission, 2020, para. 80; T-448/18, Ryanair and Others v Commission, 2021, para. 174 (appeal pending in C-758/21 P). 771 See C-525/04 P, Spain v Lenzing, 2007, para. 57; C-290/07 P, Commission v Scott, para. 66; C-300/16 P, Commission v Frucona Košice, 2017, para. 75; C-244/18 P, Larko v Commission, 2020, para. 39; T-152/99 HAMSA v Commission, 2002, para. 127; T-121/15, Fortischem v Commission, 2019, para. 63; T-257/18, Iberpotash v Commission, 2020, para. 96.

402 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT between what the Union Courts are prohibited from doing, namely, substituting their own economic assessment for that of the institutions, and what they are allowed to do, that is to say, checking the legal classification that the institutions have placed on economic factors.772 As in all cases in which the Union institution has a wide discretion, the review of observance of certain procedural guarantees is of fundamental importance. Those guarantees include the obligation for the competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant elements of the individual case and to give an adequate statement of the reasons for its decision.773

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(b) Assessment of compatibility of aid measure It is settled case-law that, in the application of Art. 107(3) TFEU, the Commission has a wide discretion, the exercise of which involves complex economic and social assessments which must be made in a Union context. Judicial review of the manner in which that discretion is exercised is restricted.774 It is indeed confined to establishing that the rules of procedure and the rules relating to the duty to give reasons have been complied with and to verifying the accuracy of the facts relied on and that there has been no error of law, manifest error of assessment with regard to the facts, or misuse of powers.775 In particular, it is not for the Union Courts to substitute their own economic assessment for that of the author of the decision.776 However, when the Commission,

772 See C-525/04 P, Spain v Lenzing, 2007, paras 60–61; C-399/08 P, Commission v Deutsche Post, 2010, paras 96–98; compare C-73/11 P, Frucona Košice v Commission, 2013, paras 89–91 (finding General Court erred in law by filling a gap in the reasoning in the Commission decision by means of its own reasoning); C-456/18 P, Hungary v Commission, 2020, paras 70–73 (finding that General Court erred in law by adding grounds to those set out by the Commission and thus exceeded the limits of its powers). 773 See C-525/04 P, Spain v Lenzing, 2007, para. 58; T-68/15, HH Ferries and Others v Commission, 2018, para. 88; T-356/15, Austria v Commission, 2018, para. 161. For some examples in which an infringement of the duty to state reasons was found, see C-487/06 P, British Aggregates v Commission, 2008, paras 172–179; T-305/13, SACE and Sace BT v Commission, 2015, paras 150–161, 201; T-284/15, AlzChem v Commission, 2018, paras 58–249; see also, in respect of: a decision imposing a suspension injunction, C-456/18 P, Hungary v Commission, 2020, paras 57–67; a decision adopted at the end of the preliminary stage of the procedure for reviewing aid under Art. 108(3) TFEU, T-665/20, Ryanair v Commission, 2021, paras 39–67. 774 See 310/85, Deufil v Commission, 1987, para. 18; C-225/91, Matra v Commission, 1993, paras 24–25; C-372/97, Italy v Commission, 2004, para. 83; T-115/09 and T-116/09, Electrolux and Whirlpool v Commission, 2012, paras 37, 40; T-68/15, HH Ferries and Others v Commission, 2018, para. 87; T-8/18, easyJet Airline v Commission, 2020, para. 243 (set aside in part on other grounds in C-331/20 P and C-331/20 P). However, if, after the preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified measure raises doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market, it is required to adopt, on the basis of Art. 4(4) of Regulation 2015/1589, a decision to open the formal investigation procedure provided for under Art. 108(2) TFEU and Art. 6(1) of that regulation. Although it has no discretion in relation to the decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure, where it finds that such doubts exist, the Commission nevertheless enjoys a certain margin of discretion in identifying and evaluating the circumstances of the case in order to determine whether or not they present doubts. The applicant bears the burden of proving the existence of doubts and may discharge that burden of proof by reference to a body of consistent evidence, concerning, first, the circumstances and the length of the preliminary examination procedure and, second, the content of the contested decision. See T-123/09, Ryanair v Commission, 2012, paras 77–78; T-630/15, Scandlines Denmark and Scandlines Deutschland v Commission, 2018, paras 138–140. 775 See C-409/00, Spain v Commission, 2003, para. 93; C-372/97, Italy v Commission, 2004, para. 83; T-149/95, Ducros v Commission, 1997, para. 63; T-68/15, HH Ferries and Others v Commission, 2018, para. 87; T-8/18, easyJet Airline v Commission, 2020, para. 243 (set aside in part on other grounds in C-331/20 P and C-343/20 P). 776 See T-371/94 and T-394/94, British Airways and Others v Commission, 1998, para. 79; T-349/03, Corsica Ferries v Commission, 2005, para. 138; T-68/15, HH Ferries and Others v Commission, 2018, para. 87. It is thus not for the Union Courts to replace the Commission by carrying out in its stead an examination it never carried out and drawing the conclusions which it would have drawn: see T-115/09 and T-116/09, Electrolux and Whirlpool v Commission, 2012, para. 42; T-511/09, Niki Luftfahrt v Commission, 2015, para. 149.

Special Characteristics 403 after a preliminary examination, finds that no doubts are raised as to the compatibility with the internal market of a notified measure and decides that the measure is compatible with the internal market in a decision not to raise objections pursuant to Art. 4(3) of Regulation No. 2015/1589, the review by the Union Courts of the assessment of the nonexistence of doubts will not be restricted to the examination whether the Commission made a manifest error in that regard.777 (c) Review of compliance with Commission Guidelines The Commission has a wide discretion to assess the compatibility of an aid measure with the internal market under Art. 107(3) TFEU. In order to exercise that discretion, it may adopt rules of conduct, such as guidelines, so long as those rules do not depart from the provisions of the Treaties. Where such guidelines have been adopted, the Commission is bound by them.778 The General Court will therefore verify whether the Commission has observed such guidelines in the contested decision.779 (d) Lawfulness assessed in light of information available when the decision was adopted The lawfulness of a decision concerning State aid is to be assessed in the light of the information available to the Commission at the time when the decision was adopted, which includes that which appeared to be relevant for the assessment to be carried out and which could have been obtained, upon request by the Commission, during the preliminary examination stage.780 An applicant cannot therefore rely before the Union Courts on matters of fact which were not put forward in the course of the pre-litigation procedure laid down in Art. 108 TFEU.781

777 See T-30/03 RENV, 3F v Commission, 2011, para. 55; T-137/10, CBI v Commission, 2012, paras 76–77; T-193/19, Achema and Achema Gas Trade v Commission, 2021, para. 44. 778 See C-431/14 P, Greece v Commission, 2016, paras 68–70; C-654/17 P, Bayerische Motoren Werke v Commission and Freistaat Sachsen, 2019, paras 81–82; C-817/18 P, Vereniging tot Behoud van Natuurmonumenten in Nederland and Others v Commission, 2020, paras 99–101; C-57/19 P, Commission v Tempus Energy and Tempus Energy Technology, 2021, para. 143; T-68/15, HH Ferries and Others v Commission, 2018, para. 94; T-386/14 RENV, FIH and FIH Holding v Commission, 2019, para. 93; T-745/17, Kerkosand v Commission, 2020, para. 71 (finding that similar considerations apply to the provisions of a block exemption regulation: see para. 72); T-167/19, Tempus Energy Germany and T Energy Sweden v Commission, 2021, para. 76. 779 See T-35/99, Keller and Keller Meccanica v Commission, 2002, para. 77; T-79/14, Secop v Commission, 2016, para. 29; T-129/07, Ireland v Commission, 2019, para. 107; T-728/17, Marinvest and Porting v Commission, 2019, para. 108. 780 See 234/84, Belgium v Commission, 1986, para. 16; C-300/16 P, Commission v Frucona Košice, 2017, paras 70–71; C-847/19 P, Achemos Grupė and Achema v Commission, 2021, paras 41–42; C-933/19 P, Autostrada Wielkopolska v Commission and Poland, 2021, para. 118; C-331/20 P and C-343/20 P, Volotea and easyJet Airline v Commission, 2022, para. 112; T-257/18, Iberpotash v Commission, 2020, para. 93; T-167/19, Tempus Energy Germany and T Energy Sweden v Commission, 2021, para. 50; T-448/18, Ryanair and Others v Commission, 2021, paras 273–274 (appeal pending in C-758/21 P); T-300/19, Achema and Lifosa v Commission, 2021, paras 42, 194. 781 See C-278/92 to C-280/92, Spain v Commission, 1994, para. 31; C-382/99, Netherlands v Commission, 2002, paras 49, 76; T-109/01, Fleuren Compost v Commission, 2004, para. 51; T-60/06 RENV II, Italy v Commission, 2016, para. 132; compare, e.g. C-647/19 P, Ja zum Nürburgring v Commission, 2021, para. 98 (finding that it is possible that new and relevant facts of which the Commission was previously unaware could emerge after the end of the tender process, but before the adoption of the relevant Commission decision).

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(4) Anti-dumping (a) Limited review of complex economic situations In the sphere of measures to protect trade, the Union institutions enjoy a wide discretion by reason of the complexity of the economic, political, and legal situations which they have to examine.782 The determination of normal value, the choice between the different methods of calculating the dumping margin, and the existence of harm to the Union industry require an appraisal of complex economic situations. The judicial review of such appraisals must therefore be limited to verifying whether the relevant procedural rules have been complied with, whether the facts on which the contested choice is based have been accurately stated, and whether there has been a manifest error of assessment of the facts or a misuse of power.783 The same applies to factual situations of a legal and political nature in the country concerned which the Union institutions must assess in order to determine whether an exporter operates in market conditions without significant State interference and can, accordingly, be granted market economy status.784 In addition, according to the case-law, the General Court’s review of the evidence on which the Union institutions based their findings does not constitute a new assessment of the facts replacing that made by the institutions. That review does not encroach on the broad discretion of those institutions in the field of commercial policy, but is restricted to showing whether that evidence was able to support the conclusions reached by the institutions. The General Court must therefore not only establish whether the evidence put forward is factually accurate, reliable, and consistent, but also ascertain whether that evidence contained all the relevant information which had to be taken

782 See C-351/04, Ikea Wholesale, 2007, para. 40; C-100/17 P, Gul Ahmed Textile Mills v Council, 2018, para. 63; C-236/17 P, Canadian Solar Emea and Others v Council, 2018, para. 175; C-884/19 P and C-888/19 P, Commission v Xinyi PV Products (Anhui) Holdings and GMB Glasmanufaktur Brandenburg, 2021, para. 117; C-891/19 P, Commission v Hubei Xinyegang Special Tube, 2022, para. 35; T-113/15, RFA International v Commission, 2018, para. 40; T-301/16, Jindal Saw and Jindal Saw Italia v Commission, 2019, para. 110; T-541/18, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Commission, 2020, para. 93 (appeal pending in C-123/21 P). See further A. Willems, B. Natens, and A. Moroni, ‘Hurdles to Litigating Trade Defence Measures Before the EU Courts’ (2020) J.W.T. 919. 783 See 240/84, NTN Toyo Bearing v Council, 1987, para. 19; C-156/87, Gestetner Holdings v Council and Commission, 1990, para. 63; C-351/04, Ikea Wholesale, 2007, para. 41; C-100/17 P, Gul Ahmed Textile Mills v Council, 2018, para. 63; C-884/19 P and C-888/19 P, Commission v Xinyi PV Products (Anhui) Holdings and GMB Glasmanufaktur Brandenburg, 2021, para. 117; C-891/19 P, Commission v Hubei Xinyegang Special Tube, 2022, para. 36; T-422/13, CPME and Others v Council, 2017, para. 55; T-113/15, RFA International v Commission, 2018, para. 40; T-301/16, Jindal Saw and Jindal Saw Italia v Commission, 2019, para. 110; T-383/17, Hansol Paper v Commission, 2020, para. 77; T-254/18, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and Others v Commission, 2021, para. 149 (appeal pending in C-478/21 P). That is the case, in particular, with regard to: the determination of the factors causing injury to the Union industry in an anti-dumping investigation (see C-891/19 P, Commission v Hubei Xinyegang Special Tube, 2022, para. 36 (finding that the General Court exceeded the limits of judicial review by reason of the broad discretion afforded to the Commission in respect of the analysis of price undercutting: see paras 102–115, 167–172)); the assessment of the reliability of export prices reported by an exporter (see T-301/16, Jindal Saw and Jindal Saw Italia v Commission, 2019, para. 110); and the choice between the different methods of calculating the dumping margin and the assessment of the normal value of a product (see T-741/16, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Commission, 2019, para. 29). For some examples in which a manifest error of assessment was found, see T-528/09, Hubei Xinyegang Steel v Council, 2014; T-422/13, CPME and Others v Council, 2017. 784 See T-155/94, Climax Paper v Council, 1996, para. 98; T-156/11, Since Hardware (Guangzhou) v Council, 2012, para. 183; T-443/11, Gold East Paper and Gold Huasheng Paper v Council, 2014, para. 163.

Consequences 405 into account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it was capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it.785 Moreover, in reviewing the legality of acts under Article 263 TFEU, the Union Courts cannot, under any circumstances, substitute their own reasoning for that of the author of the contested act. 786 (b) Obligation to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the case and to state reasons While in the sphere of measures to protect trade, and anti-dumping measures in particular, the Union Courts cannot intervene in the assessment reserved for the Union institutions, it is nevertheless for them to satisfy themselves that the institution concerned took account of all the relevant circumstances and appraised the facts of the matter with all due care, so that the institution’s findings, for example with respect to normal value and injury, may be regarded as having been determined in a reasonable manner.787 Indeed, given the wide discretion the Union institutions enjoy in the sphere of trade defence measures, respect of the rights guaranteed by the Union legal order in administrative procedures is of fundamental importance. Those guarantees include, in particular, the duty of the competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case and the right of the persons concerned to make their views known and to have an adequately reasoned decision.788

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IV. Consequences A. Result of an application for annulment (1) Power of the Union Courts limited to annulment Under the first paragraph of Art. 264 TFEU, if the action for annulment is well-founded, the Court of Justice or the General Court will declare the contested act void (declaration of nullity). The power of the Union Courts under Art. 263 TEU is limited to the

785 See C-100/17 P, Gul Ahmed Textile Mills v Council, 2018, para. 64; C-345/18 P, Caviro Distillerie and Others v Commission, 2019 para. 16; C-891/19 P, Commission v Hubei Xinyegang Special Tube, 2022, para. 37; T-422/13, CPME and Others v Council, 2017, para. 56; T-541/18, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Commission, 2020, para. 95 (appeal pending in C-123/21 P); T-254/18, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and Others v Commission, 2021, para. 150 (appeal pending in C-478/21 P). 786 C‑345/18 P, Caviro Distillerie and Others v Commission, 2019, para. 17; T-541/18, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Commission, 2020, para. 96 (appeal pending in C-123/21 P). 787 See T-48/96, Acme v Council, 1999, para. 39; T-156/11, Since Hardware (Guangzhou) v Council, 2012, para. 184; T-211/16, Caviro Distillerie and Others v Commission, 2018, para. 37; T-607/15, Yieh United Steel v Commission, 2019, para. 108; T-650/17, Jinan Meide Casting v Commission, 2019, para. 53. 788 See T-413/03, Shandong Reipu Biochemicals v Council, 2006, para. 63; T-67/14, Viraj Profiles v Council, 2017, para. 114; T-310/16, Foshan Lihua Ceramic v Commission, 2019, para. 103. With particular regard to the requirements which must be met in the case of statement of reasons for regulations imposing anti-dumping duties, see, e.g. C-891/19 P, Commission v Hubei Xinyegang Special Tube, 2022, paras 87–89; T-512/09 RENV, Rusal Armenal v Council, 2017, paras 139–141; T-228/17, Zhejiang Jndia Pipeline Industry v Commission, 2019, para. 140; T-541/18, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Commission, 2020, paras 183–185 (appeal pending in C-123/21 P). For some examples in which an infringement of the duty to state reasons was found, see T-67/14, Viraj Profiles v Council, 2017, paras 125–155; T-422/13, CPME and Others v Council, 2017, paras 142, 154.

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406 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT annulment of the contested act.789 Accordingly, applications seeking, for example, the Court of Justice or the General Court to make declarations or statements of law,790 or to issue orders, directions, or injunctions to Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies791 are inadmissible. If the application for annulment is not well-founded, it will be dismissed.

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(2) Partial annulment The Court of Justice and the General Court may also declare part of the contested act void, either by annulling some of its provisions or by confining the declaration of nullity to some substantive or personal aspect.792 The applicant may have sought partial annulment793 or the Court of Justice or the General Court may itself take the view that only some provisions of the contested act must be annulled.794 However, partial annulment of a Union act is possible only if the elements to be annulled may be severed from the remainder of the act.795 The requirement of severability is not satisfied where partial 789 Art. 264, first para. TFEU. The Union Courts cannot substitute their own reasoning for that of the author of the contested act: see, e.g. C-246/11 P, Portugal v Commission, 2013, para. 85; C-50/19 P, Sigma Alimentos Exterior v Commission, 2021, para. 63; T-100/17, BTB Holding Investments and Duferco Participations Holding v Commission, 2018, para. 59; T-223/18, Casa Regina Apostolorum della Pia Società delle Figlie di San Paolo v Commission, 2021, paras 104–105 (appeal pending in C-492/21 P). This leads to an error of law when the General Court does do so: see, e.g. C-246/11 P, Portugal v Commission, 2013, paras 90–91; C-456/18 P, Hungary v Commission 2020, paras 70–75; C-50/19 P, Sigma Alimentos Exterior v Commission, 2021, para. 69 (ultimately rejecting relevant ground of appeal: see paras 70–75). 790 See C-224/03, Italy v Commission (order), 2003, paras 20–22; C-145/17 P, Internacional de Productos Metálicos v Commission, 2018, para. 67; T-345/19, T-346/19, T-364/19 to T-366/19, T-372/19 to T-375/19, and T-385/19, Santini and Others v Parliament, 2021, para. 225 (appeal pending in C-198/21 P); T-223/18, Casa Regina Apostolorum della Pia Società delle Figlie di San Paolo v Commission, 2021, para. 106 (appeal pending in C-492/21 P). 791 See, e.g. C‑199/94 P and C‑200/94 P, Pevasa and Impesca v Commission, 1995, para. 24; C-284/19 P, Clarke v Commission (order), 2019, para. 41; T-352/18, Germann Avocats v Commission (order), 2021, para. 50; T-134/20, Huhtamaki v Commission, 2022, para. 18. 792 See, e.g. 33/86, 44/86, 110/86, 226/86, and 285/86, Stahlwerke Peine-Salzgitter and Others v Commission, 1988, point 1 of the operative part; C‑622/16 P to C‑624/16 P, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission, 2018, paras 11, 115–116; T-26/90, Finsider v Commission, 1992, paras 52–57; T-392/20, Flašker v Commission, 2022, paras 17, 57. 793 If the applicant seeks only partial annulment of an act and the Court of Justice or the General Court considers that the contested provisions are not severable, it may not rule ultra petita (see, in that regard, 37/71, Jamet v Commissio 1972, para. 12), but will have to declare the application inadmissible (see, e.g. C-36/04, Spain v Council, 2006, para. 21; T-176/09, Government of Gibraltar v Commission, 2011, paras 38–52; T-814/14, Banco Espírito Santo v Commission (order), 2015, para. 24; T-557/17, Liaño Reig (order), 2019, para. 26; see also C-122/16 P, British Airways v Commission, 2017, paras 81–92 (where applicant sought partial annulment, the General Court did not err in law in finding that it could annul the decision at issue only within the limits defined by the form of order sought in the application or, therefore, in annulling that decision only in part in accordance with those limits); T-712/20, Škoda Investment v EUIPO—Škoda Auto, 2021, paras 20–27 (case-law principles apply to actions brought before the Boards of Appeal in proceedings relating to relative grounds for refusal of registration of a trade mark)). 794 See 27/76, United Brands v Commission, 1978, para. 268. The mere fact that the General Court finds that a plea relied on in support of an action for annulment is well-founded does not automatically enable it to annul the contested act in its entirety. Annulment of the act in its entirety is not acceptable where it is obvious that, being directed only at a specific part of the contested act, that plea can provide a basis only for partial annulment: see C-295/07 P, Commission v Département du Loiret, 2008, para. 104; C-441/11 P, Commission v Verhuizingen Coppens, 2012, para. 37; T-544/13 RENV, Dyson v Commission, 2018, para. 78; T-561/18, ITD and Danske Fragtmænd v Commission, 2021, para. 378; T-508/19, Mead Johnson Nutrition (Asia Pacific) and Others v Commission, 2022, para. 43. 795 See, e.g. C-68/94 and C-30/95, France and Others v Commission, 1998, para. 256 (non-severable: see paras 257–259); C-378/00, Commission v Parliament and Council, 2003, para. 29 (severable); C-113/14, Germany v Parliament and Council, 2016, para. 27 (severable: see paras 28–32); C-401/19, Poland v Parliament and Council, 2022, para. 17 (certain provisions of specific article not severable from the remainder of the article, but that article itself severable from the remainder of the contested act: see paras 20–22); C-156/21, Hungary v Parliament and

Consequences 407 annulment of an act would have the effect of altering its substance.796 This is because the Court of Justice and the General Court cannot ‘revise’ the contested act in annulment proceedings. (3) Ex tunc effect The annulment of a Union act causes it to disappear from the Union legal order from the date on which that act entered into force (ex tunc), so that the parties to the proceedings are restored to the situation they were in before it entered into force.797 (4) Maintenance of effects The retroactive force of a declaration of nullity may be attenuated, pursuant to the second paragraph of Art. 264 TFEU, in the light of the aim behind the action or on grounds of legal certainty,798 as well as on grounds seeking to prevent a lack of continuity or a decline in the implementation of policies conducted or supported by the Union, such as in the fields of environmental protection or public health.799 Thus, the Court of Justice or the General Court may,800 either on request of a party or of its own motion,801 maintain the effects of the annulled act as definitive802 or for a certain period of time until the competent Union institution, body, office, or agency has taken the necessary measures to give effect to the decision annulling the act. 803 Council, 2022, para. 293 (non-severable: see paras 294–295); C-24/20, Commission v Council (Accession to the Geneva Act), 2022, para. 47 (severable: see paras 49–57); T-310/06, Hungary v Commission, 2007, para. 39 (severable: see paras 40–45); T-383/17, Hansol Paper v Commission, 2020, para. 44 (non-severable: see paras 45–47). 796 See, e.g. C-244/03, France v Parliament and Council, 2005, para. 13 (non-severable: see paras 15–21); C-626/18, Poland v Parliament and Council, 2020, para. 28 (holding specific provision of contested act severable, but not others: see paras 31–35); C-156/21, Hungary v Parliament and Council, 2022, para. 293 (non-severable: see paras 294–295): T-141/14, SolarWorld and Others v Council (order), 2016, para. 49 (non-severable: see paras 52– 61); T-557/17, Liaño Reig v SRB (order), 2019, para. 25 (non-severable: see paras 27–52). Whether the partial annulment of an act causes the substance of that act to be altered is a point to be determined on the basis of objective, and not subjective, criteria: see, e.g. C-441/11 P Commission v Verhuizingen Coppens, 2012, para. 38; C-156/21, Hungary v Parliament and Council, 2022, para. 293; C-24/20, Commission v Council (Accession to the Geneva Act), 2022, para. 48; T-31/07, Du Pont de Nemours (France) v Commission, 2013, para. 83; T-574/14, EAEPC v Commission, 2018, para. 51. 797 See 22/70, Commission v Council, 1971, paras 59–60; 97/86, 193/86, 99/86, and 215/86, Asteris and Others v Commission, 1988, para. 30; C-199/06, CELF et ministre de la Culture et de la Communication, 2008, para. 61; T-364/16, ArcelorMittal Tubular Products Ostrava v Commission, 2018, para. 61; T-536/19, Militos Symvouleftiki v Commission, 2020, para. 30; T-195/19, GEA Group v Commission, 2022, para. 75. 798 See C-389/19 P, Commission v Sweden, 2021, para. 72; T-665/20, Ryanair v Commission, 2021, para. 68. 799 See T-699/17, Poland v Commission, 2021, para. 61. 800 The Union Courts may reject such a request: see, e.g. T-377/16, T‑645/16, and T‑809/16, Hypo Vorarlberg Bank v SRB, 2019, paras 220–223; T-151/18, Ben Ali v Council, 2020, paras 164–169; T-249/20, Sabra v Council, 2022, paras 228–232. 801 See C-14/06 and C-295/06, Parliament and Denmark v Commission, 2008, para. 85; T-665/20, Ryanair v Commission, 2021, para. 69. 802 See, e.g. 45/86, Commission v Council, 1987, para. 23; 51/87, Commission v Council, 1988, para. 22; C-360/93, Parliament v Council, 1996, paras 32–36; C-360/93, Parliament v Council, 1998, para. 42; C-166/07, Parliament v Council, 2009, paras 73–75; C-244/17, Commission v Council, 2018, paras 50–52. 803 See, e.g. C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, 2008, paras 373–376; C-361/14 P, Parliament v Council, 2016, paras 86–89; C-660/13, Council v Commission, 2016, paras 50–54; C-389/19 P, Commission v Sweden, 2021, paras 73–74; C-584/20 P, Commission v Landesbank Baden-Württemberg and SRB, 2021, paras 174–178; C-275/20, Commission v Council, 2022, paras 53–56; C-632/20 P, Spain v Commission, 2023, paras 133–137; T-559/17, Abdulkarim v Council, 2019, paras 65–69; T-699/17, Poland v Commission, 2021, paras 62–65; T-665/20, Ryanair v Commission, 2021, paras 71–73.

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B. Authority of the declaration of nullity 7.220

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(1) Erga omnes effect The declaration of nullity applies erga omnes, meaning that it extends beyond the parties involved in the particular case (inter partes) and has general effect throughout the Union legal order. Consequently, an action for annulment of a Union act which has already been declared void is to no purpose.804 In exceptional cases, the Court of Justice or the General Court may be prompted to curtail the general effect of the declaration of nullity on grounds of legal certainty.805 (2) Obligation under Art. 266 TFEU The Union institution, body, office, or agency whose act has been declared void is required by the first paragraph of Art. 266 TFEU806 to take the necessary measures to comply with the Union Courts’ ruling.807 The Court of Justice and the General Court have no power to indicate what measures should be taken.808 The extent of the obligation to comply with the ruling is determined both by the operative part and by the grounds underlying the operative part.809 However, the Union institution, body, office, or agency concerned is not required to consider whether, in the light of the reasoning of the decision annulling the contested act, it needs to take measures in relation to persons for whom the partly annulled act remains in place.810 In addition, a Union institution, 804 See C-372/97, Italy v Commission, 2004, paras 33–38. 805 See 92/78, Simmenthal v Commission, 1979, para. 107. 806 Art. 266 TFEU mentions only ‘[t]‌he institution whose act has been declared void’, but obviously similar obligations are placed on a Union body, office, or agency whose act has been annulled by the Union Courts. 807 See C-361/14 P, McBride and Others v Commission, 2016, para. 35; T-504/19, Crédit lyonnais v ECB, 2021, para. 35 (set aside in part on other grounds in C-389/21 P). Art. 266 TFEU requires the Union institution, body, office, or agency to ensure that any act intended to replace the annulled act is not vitiated by the same irregularities as those identified in the annulling judgment: see, e.g. C‑199/01 P et C‑200/01 P, IPK-München v Commission, 2004, para. 83; T-364/16, ArcelorMittal Tubular Products Ostrava and Others v Commission, 2018, para. 66; T-324/17, SAS Cargo Group and Others v Commission, 2022, para. 733 (appeal pending in C-403/22 P). The obligation to act which follows from Art. 266 TFEU is not a source of competence for a particular Union institution (in casu, the Commission), nor does it permit it to rely on a legal basis which has in the meantime been repealed: see C-361/14 P, McBride and Others v Commission, 2016, paras 36–53. As regards the distinction between the declaration of nullity and the measures taken under Art. 266 TFEU, see T-213/01 and T-214/01 Österreichische Postsparkasse and Bank fur Arbeit und Wirtschaft v Commission, 2006, para. 54; T-447/05, SPM v Commission (order), 2007, para. 57. 808 See 53/85, AKZO Chemie v Commission, 1986, para. 23; C-199/91, Foyer Culturel du Sart-Tilman v Commission, 1993, para. 7; T-26/90, Finsider v Commission, 1992, para. 65; T-75/95, Günzler Aluminium v Commission, 1996, para. 18; T-326/20, Bibita Group v EUIPO—Benkomers, 2021, para. 19. The Union Courts also have no power to substitute another act for the annulled act or to amend that act in annulment proceedings: see T-214/07, Greece v Commission, 2011, para. 136. In the restrictive measures context, it is not for the Union Courts to indicate to the Council whether, as a result of the annulment of such acts, the name of the person or entity concerned should be reinstated or, on the contrary, withdrawn from the lists at issue: see T-521/19, Haswani v Council, 2020, para. 56. That being said, the Union Courts may provide additional guidance so as to enable the Union institution, body, office, or agency to draw all useful consequences from their ruling: see, e.g. T-300/10 Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission, 2012, para. 151. 809 See 97/86, 193/86, 99/86, and 215/86, Asteris and Others v Commission, 1988, para. 27; C-361/14 P, McBride and Others v Commission, 2016, para. 35; T-796/16, CEDC International v EUIPO—Underberg, 2020, para. 73; T-504/19, Crédit lyonnais v ECB, 2021, para. 36 (set aside in part on other grounds in C-389/21 P); see also, in that regard, T-580/19, Borborudi v Council, 2021, paras 93–99 (in the restrictive measures context, such obligation gives rise to consequences in respect of subsequent fund-freezing measures, along with measures already adopted where the grounds are substantiated by the same evidence as that examined by the General Court in its decision). 810 See C-310/97 P, Commission v AssiDomän Kraft Products and Others, 1999, paras 53–71; C-239/99, Nachi Europe, 2001, paras 24–26; C-659/13 and C-34/14, C & J Clark International, 2016, paras 180–185; T-185/18, Lucchini v Commission, 2019, paras 34–35.

Consequences 409 body, office, or agency which wishes to replace an annulled act may take up the decision-making procedure at the precise point where the illegality arose. This is because the annulment of the final decision does not necessarily affect the validity of the preparatory acts. The grounds of the judgment annulling the act set out the reasons for the annulment pronounced in the operative part, and the Union institution, body, office, or agency concerned must take account of them in replacing the annulled act.811 The Union institution, body, office, or agency has a reasonable time in which to comply with the Union Court’s decision.812 What constitutes a reasonable time depends on the nature of the measures having to be taken in order to carry out the decision declaring the contested act void and on the relevant circumstances of the case.813 Failure to comply with the decision constitutes an infringement of Art. 266 TFEU, which may cause the Union to incur liability.814 (3) Reimbursement of fines If the Court of Justice or the General Court annuls a decision finding an infringement of Art. 101 and/or Art. 102 TFEU and the undertakings concerned have already paid the fines imposed by the decision, the Commission is obliged, pursuant to Art. 266 TFEU, to repay the fines plus interest to the undertakings which successfully brought the action for annulment.815 If the Commission does not comply with this obligation, the undertaking concerned has the choice to introduce either an action for failure to act under Art. 265 TFEU or an action for damages under Art. 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU.816 An explicit refusal on the part of the Commission to pay interest on the principal sum is itself a reviewable act.817 The undertaking concerned may decide not to introduce an action for annulment of the Commission’s refusal to

811 See C-415/96, Spain v Commission, 1998, paras 30–32; C-417/06, Italy v Commission, 2007, para. 52; C-180/16 P, Toshiba v Commission, 2017, para. 24; C‑283/14 and C‑284/14, CM Eurologistik and GLS, 2016, paras 50–52; C-256/16, Deichmann, 2018, paras 73–74; T-305/94, T-306/94, T-307/94, T-313/94 to T-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T-329/94, and T-335/94, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission, 1999, paras 183–193 (confirmed on appeal, but set aside in part on other grounds in C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P, and C-254/99 P, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission, 2002, paras 71–76); T-301/01, Alitalia v Commission, 2008, paras 99–100; T-504/19, Crédit lyonnais v ECB, 2021, para. 38 (set aside in part on other grounds in C-389/21 P); T-479/20, Eurobolt and Others v Commission, 2022, paras 69–77. 812 See 266/82, Turner v Commission, 1984, para. 5; T-73/95, Oliveira v Commission, 1997, para. 41; T-125/16, Léon Van Parys v Commission, 2017, para. 51. 813 See T-73/95, Oliveira v Commission, 1997, para. 41 (finding period of about thirty-eight months not unreasonable in the context of financial assistance for vocational training: see paras 44–46); T-301/01 Alitalia v Commission, 2008, paras 155–156 (finding period of a little over seven months not unreasonable in the context of State aid); T-125/16, Léon Van Parys v Commission, 2017, para. 51 (finding period of thirty-four months unreasonable in the customs context: see paras 72–79). 814 See C-301/19 P, Printeos v Commission, 2021, paras 67–68, 104–105; T-11/00 Hautem v EIB, 2000, para. 43; T-457/04 and T-223/05, Camar v Commission, 2008, paras 34–43; T-610/19, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, 2022, paras 73, 113 (appeal pending in C-221/22 P). Art. 266 TFEU does not, however, constitute an autonomous remedy: see T-28/03, Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission, 2005, paras 27–40; T-113/04, Atlantic Container Line and Others v Commission, 2007, para. 23. 815 See C-301/19 P, Printeos v Commission, 2021, paras 66–68, 94; T-171/99, Corus UK v Commission, 2001, paras 54–58; T-610/19, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, 2022, paras 72–76, 103 (appeal pending in C-221/22 P). 816 See T-86/03, Holcim (France) v Commission (order), 2005, paras 33–34. 817 See C-123/03 P, Commission v Greencore, 2004, paras 39–47; T-86/03, Holcim (France) v Commission, 2005, para. 44; T-610/19, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, 2022, paras 147–148 (appeal pending in C-221/22 P).

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410 THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT pay interest, but to bring a damages claim instead.818 Where, in contrast, the undertakings concerned have not paid the fine, but furnished a bank guarantee, they are not entitled to claim the costs of that guarantee from the Commission on account of the absence of a causal link between those costs and the unlawful act.819 Furthermore, where the Court of Justice or the General Court annuls a decision finding an infringement of Art. 101 and/or Art. 102 TFEU, the Commission is not obliged to repay fines imposed by that decision to undertakings which did not bring an action for annulment.820

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(4) Dismissal of an application for annulment After a judgment has been given dismissing an application for annulment (in all or in part), the applicant may not raise the same pleas in another action brought against the same act and the same defendant.821 An action for annulment which is brought after a judgment dismissing an action brought between the same parties, which has the same purpose, and which is based on the same submissions as the application that led to the first judgment, will be inadmissible on the grounds that the first judgment has the authority of res judicata.822 However, the principle of res judicata extends only to matters of fact and law actually or necessarily settled in the judicial decision in question.823

818 See C-301/19 P, Printeos v Commission, 2021, paras 103–105, 122–126; T-86/03, Holcim (France) v Commission (order, 2005, paras 32–33; T-610/19, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, 2022, paras 71–113, 117–137 (appeal pending in C-221/22 P). 819 See T-28/03, Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission (order), 2005, paras 119–132; T-113/04, Atlantic Container Line and Others v Commission, 2007, paras 38–51, 61–63; see also, in that regard, C-138/17 P and C-146/17 P, EU v Gascogne Sack Deutschland and Gascogne, 2018, paras 29–32; and AG Wahl Opinion, points 27–59; C-150/17 P, EU v Kendrion, 2018, paras 59–62; and AG Wahl Opinion, points 47–81; C‑447/17 P and C‑479/17 P, 2019, paras 37–42; T-834/17, United Parcel Service v Commission, 2022, paras 348–349 (appeal pending in C-297/22 P). 820 See C-310/97 P, Commission v AssiDomän Kraft Products and Others, 1999, paras 53–71; C-201/09 P and C-216/09 P, ArcelorMittal Luxembourg v Commission and Commission v ArcelorMittal Luxembourg, 2011, para. 142; see also C-286/11 P Commission v Tomkins, 2013, paras 32–51; T-691/14, Servier v Commission, 2018, paras 92–99 (appeal pending in C-176/19 P and C-201/19 P). 821 See 62/82, Italy v Commission, 1983, paras 17–18. 822 See 159/84 and 267/84, 12/85, and 264/85, Ainsworth v Commission (order), 1987, paras 3–4; C-442/03 P and C-471/03 P, P & O European Ferries (Vizcaya) v Commission, 2006, paras 39–52; T-1/21, Fabryki Mebli ‘Forte’ v EUIPO—Bog-Fran, 2022, paras 27–38. 823 See, e.g. C-225/17 P, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Others v Council, 2019, para. 47; T-574/14, EAEPC v Commission, 2018, para. 50.

8 THE ACTION FOR FAILURE TO ACT I. Subject-Matter A. General overview (1) Judicial protection covers both unlawful action and inaction The action for failure to act is enshrined in Art. 265 TFEU.1 The purpose of this action is a declaration on the part of the Court of Justice or the General Court2 that a Union institution, body, office, or agency acted unlawfully by failing to take a decision or other sort of action requested in the particular case.3 The action for failure to act forms part of the complete and coherent system of judicial protection in the European Union, which covers both unlawful action and inaction of Union institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies.4 Moreover, the action for failure to act does not stand alone. It may be brought alongside other types of actions before the Union Courts, such as actions for annulment or damages, within that system. Conceivably, the action for failure to act may not attract as much attention as other actions brought before the Union Courts, but it should not be considered any less important in the system of remedies set down in the Treaties. As illustrated by the case-law, the action for failure to act may be relied upon by parties in a variety of contexts, ranging from competition and State aid law to regulatory matters (for example, involving procedures laid down for the marketing of products under Union law), to combat instances of unlawful inaction on the part of Union institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies, thereby helping to ensure judicial protection for natural and legal persons. (2) Present Treaty framework As the Lisbon Treaty did not modify the substance of the action for failure to act under Art. 265 TFEU, the case-law regarding former Art. 232 EC generally remains relevant.

1 Art. 265 TFEU applies to actions for failure to act under the EAEC Treaty: see Art. 106a(1) EAEC. There was a similar provision relating to failures to act by the High Authority in Art. 33 of the now-expired ECSC Treaty. Additionally, claims based on alleged failures to act under Art. 90(2) of the Staff Regulations may be brought in the context of staff disputes under Art. 270 TFEU, of which there are some similarities with Art. 265 TFEU: see, e.g. T-282/17, UI v Council (order), 2018, in particular paras 28, 36. 2 As regards the allocation of jurisdiction between the Union Courts relating to actions for failure to act with particular regard to those brought by Member States, see paras 2.50–2.52, 2.54. 3 See 377/87, Parliament v Council, 1988, para. 9; 383/87, Commission v Council, 1988, para. 9; C-196/12, Commission v Council, 2013, para. 22; T-521/14, Sweden v Commission, 2015, para. 33; T-201/18, Diusa Rendering and Assograssi v Commission (order), 2021, para. 15. 4 See T-99/19, Magnan v Commission (order), 2019, para. 40.

EU Procedural Law. Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak, Oxford University Press. © Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833086.003.0008

8.01

8.02

412 THE ACTION FOR FAILURE TO ACT The changes made by the Lisbon Treaty to the wording of Art. 265 TFEU mainly concern the parties against which an action for failure to act may be brought.5 The first paragraph of Art. 265 TFEU provides that an action for failure to act may be brought against the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the European Council, the European Central Bank (ECB), and Union bodies, offices, and agencies. The Treaties’ recognition of the ECB as a Union institution6 may be considered to account for the consolidation of Art. 265 TFEU into three paragraphs and the deletion of the specific paragraph devoted to it in former Art. 232 EC.7

8.03

(3) Basic elements of the action for failure to act Taking account of the three paragraphs of Art. 265 TFEU, the basic elements of an action for failure to act are: (1) the Union institution, body, office, or agency must have failed to act; (2) the Union institution, body, office, or agency was under an obligation to act; (3) the Union institution, body, office, or agency was first called upon to act by the applicant; (4) within two months of being called upon to act, the Union institution, body, office, or agency does not define its position or otherwise fails to act; (5) an action for failure to act may be brought by the applicant within a further period of two months before the Union Courts, seeking a declaration that the Union institution, body, office, or agency acted unlawfully by failing to act and thereby putting that institution, body, office, or agency under the obligation to act.

It should be noted that certain elements of an action for failure to act just mentioned are inextricably intertwined. For example, the type of act which may be the subject of an action for failure to act is linked to the status of the party bringing such an action. This, in turn, implicates issues concerning the relationship between the action for failure to act and the action for annulment. Thus, while some overlap in the discussion is unavoidable, this chapter is structured in order to elucidate the key features of the action for failure to act.

B. Subject-matter of the action for failure to act 8.04

The subject-matter of the action for failure to act is confined to an inquiry into whether the omission on the part of the Union institution, body, office, or agency to take a given decision or other sort of action was unlawful.

5 Regarding the impact on Art. 265, third para. TFEU of the changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty relating to the standing for natural and legal persons under Art. 263, fourth para. TFEU, see para. 8.13. 6 See Art. 13(1) TEU. 7 See former Art. 232, fourth para. EC. Compare the regime of Union non-contractual liability in which Art. 340, third para. TFEU specifically concerns the ECB on account of its separate legal personality: see para. 11.23.

Subject-Matter 413 (1) Omission to take a decision or other sort of action In the first place, the Union institution, body, office, or agency against which the proceedings are brought must have failed to act, meaning that that institution, body, office, or agency must have failed to take a decision or other sort of action which defines its position.8 Under the express terms of the second paragraph of Art. 265 TFEU, an action for failure to act will be admissible only if the Union institution, body, office, or agency concerned has first been called upon to act. If, within two months of being so called upon, the Union institution, body, office, or agency concerned has not defined its position, the action may be brought within a further period of two months.9 The admissibility conditions of an action for failure to act are not satisfied where the Union institution, body, office, or agency invited to act has taken a position on that invitation before the action is brought.10 The subject-matter of the action for failure to act becomes devoid of purpose when the act to which it relates is adopted after the action was brought but before judgment, since in those circumstances a declaration by the Union Courts that the initial failure to act was unlawful can no longer bring about the consequences prescribed by Art. 266 TFEU.11 (2) Obligation to act Furthermore, a failure to take a decision or other sort of action requested is unlawful only if the Union institution, body, office, or agency is under an obligation to act.12 The obligation to act must derive from Union law.13 The reference in the first paragraph of Art. 265 TFEU to ‘infringement of the Treaties’14 does not mean that only an obligation

8 See C-196/12, Commission v Council, 2013, para. 22. Regarding the definition of position, see para. 8.21. 9 See C-586/15 P and C-597/15 P, Bionorica and Diapharm v Commission, 2017, para. 51. 10 See C-508/17 P, CBA Spielapparate-und Restaurantbetrieb v Commission, 2018 (order), para. 15. In that regard, the Union Courts have held that Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union cannot lead to a change in the admissibility conditions of an action for failure to act: see, e.g. C-508/17 P, CBA Spielapparate-und Restaurantbetrieb v Commission, 2018 (order), para. 20; T-99/19, Magnan v Commission (order), 2019, para. 41. 11 See 377/87, Parliament v Council, 1988, para. 10; 383/87, Commission v Council, 1988, para. 10; C-15/91 and C-108/91, Buckl and Others v Commission, 1992, para. 15; C-44/00 P, Sodima v Commission (order), 2000, para. 83; C-634/19 P, CJ v Court of Justice, 2020, paras 27–28; T-423/07, Ryanair v Commission, 2011, para. 26; T-544/18, ArcelorMittal Bremen v Commission (order), 2019, para. 25; T-368/19, Datenlotsen Informationssysteme v Commission (order), 2020, para. 22. In those circumstances, however, the Union institution, body, office, or agency may be subject to an order of costs made against it: see para. 8.23. 12 See 13/83, Parliament v Council, 1985, para. 48; T-306/10, Yusef v Commission, 2014, para. 76; T-521/14, Sweden v Commission, 2015, para. 50; T-391/18, Riesco García v Parliament (order), 2018, para. 23; T-161/21, McCord v Commission (order), 2021, para. 38. According to certain General Court case-law, the question whether the Union institution, body, office, or agency is under an obligation to act is not a condition for the admissibility of the action for failure to act, but rather a question which must be examined on the merits: see, e.g. T-442/07, Ryanair v Commission, 2011, para. 27; T-306/10, Yusef v Commission, 2014, para. 76; T-161/21, McCord v Commission (order), 2021, para. 39. The action may be unfounded where the Union institution, body, office, or agency is under no obligation or is not even competent to act as requested by the applicant: see, e.g. T-768/17, Comprojecto- Projectos e Construções and Others v ECB (order), 2019, paras 57–67. That being said, where the Union institution, body, office, or agency has a discretion under Union law, this does not entail any obligation which may be relied on in an action for failure to act, rendering the action inadmissible: see, e.g. T-292/09, Mugraby v Council and Commission, 2011, paras 44–45. As noted by R. Barents, Remedies and Procedures before the EU Courts (2nd edn, Kluwer, 2020) para. 8.09, the distinction between admissibility and substance in this context is not always clear. 13 Such an obligation can arise, for example, from Art. 266 TFEU. An action for failure to act is the appropriate means for obtaining a declaration that the failure by an institution to take the necessary measures to comply with a judgment of the Union Courts is unlawful: see T-552/13, Oil Tube Compressor v Council, 2015, para. 81. 14 See also Art. 266, first para. TFEU (‘contrary to the Treaties’). See, in that regard, 10/68 and 18/68, ‘Eridania’ Zuccherifici Nationali and Others v Commission, 1969, para. 16; T-521/14, Sweden v Commission, 2015, para. 50.

8.05

8.06

414 THE ACTION FOR FAILURE TO ACT to act set out in a Treaty provision may be enforced by means of an action for failure to act. Such an action will lie on the basis of any provision of Union law which is as such binding on the Union institution, body, office, or agency, and contains an obligation to act.15 In particular, the Commission has no obligation to institute infringement proceedings under Art. 258 TFEU against a Member State. Therefore, an action for failure to act brought by natural or legal persons is deemed inadmissible on the grounds that the Commission has discretion as to whether to initiate such proceedings, and that such persons are seeking the adoption of acts of which they are neither the addressees nor directly or individually concerned in accordance with the third paragraph of Art. 265 TFEU (see para. 8.13).16 By comparison, the Commission is under an obligation to act upon a complaint regarding an infringement of the competition rules.17 Yet, the earliest moment at which the Commission may be under an obligation to take a decision on a complaint is when it has been able to examine all the considerations of fact and law brought to its notice by the complainant.18 The Commission is also under an obligation to act on a complaint regarding an infringement of the State aid rules in similar circumstances. For example, in Ryanair v Commission,19 the General Court evaluated five separate pleas in law regarding a failure to act on the part of the Commission in relation to the applicant’s complaint

15 See T-400/04 and T-402/04 to T-404/04, Arch Chemicals and Others v Commission, 2011, para. 57 (referring to a provision or general principle of Union law). In that judgment, the General Court held that Art. 17(1) TEU does not form the basis of an obligation on the Commission to withdraw or amend an act of general application, such as a regulation, for the purposes of an action for failure to act, and that the principles of sound administration, legitimate expectations, and legal certainty constitute standards against which a failure to act is examined, but they do not constitute the basis of an obligation to amend such an act (see paras 60, 65–67). For an example of a successful action for failure to act based on secondary Union law, see T-521/14, Sweden v Commission, 2015. See also C-137/21, Parliament v Commission, pending (alleged failure to act on the part of the Commission by not adopting a delegated act pursuant to Article 7(f) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement (OJ 2018 L303/39)). 16 See, inter alia, 247/87, Star Fruit v Commission, 1989, paras 10–14; C-235/12 P, H-Holding v Commission (order), 2013, paras 12–13; C-137/16, Petraitis v Commission (order), 2016, paras 20–26; C-412/18 P, King v Commission (order), 2018, paras 20–22; C-284/19 P, Clarke v Commission (order), 2019, paras 34–35; C-225/21 P, Segura del Oro Pulido v Commission (order), 2021, paras 15–18; T-6/22, Martínez Arzoz and Others v Commission (order), 2022; see also, with regard to the Commission’s failure to refer to the European Council or the Council a proposal to implement a procedure based on Art. 7 TEU, T-304/18, MLPS v Commission (order), 2019, paras 24–26. 17 For complaints alleging violation of Arts 101 and/or 102 TFEU, see para. 8.22. The Commission is likewise under an obligation to act where an undertaking lodges a complaint to the effect that a competitor is involved in a non-notified concentration falling within the scope of Regulation No. 139/2004: see C-170/02 P, Schlüsselverlag J.S. Moser and Others v Commission, 2003, paras 27–30. 18 See T-286/97, Goldstein v Commission (order), 1998, paras 26–28; see also, in that regard, T-209/04 Spain v Commission (order), 2005, paras 41–44. 19 See T-442/07, Ryanair v Commission, 2011, paras 28–39, 49–53, 65–69, 78. In that judgment, the General Court found that the Commission was under no obligation to act in relation to certain pleas for which no complaint existed (see paras 44–48, 58–64, 74–77); compare T-423/07, Ryanair v Commission, 2011, paras 27–33 (no need to rule on whether the Commission was under an obligation to act in relation to applicant’s complaint, since the Commission initiated the formal investigation procedure under Art. 108(2) TFEU) and paras 34–41 (the Commission had no obligation to act in relation to plea for which no complaint existed).

Subject-Matter 415 alleging unlawful State aid, finding that the Commission was under a duty to act under the applicable Union rules by setting in motion the preliminary stage and examining information without delay which should have led the Commission either to inform the applicant that there were sufficient grounds for taking a view on the case or to adopt a decision. The Commission is under a duty to conduct a diligent and impartial examination of the applicant’s complaint alleging the existence of non-notified State aid within a reasonable period, which is determined in relation to the particular circumstances of each case and especially its context, the various procedural stages to be followed by the Commission, and the complexity of the case.20 (3) Identification of the act to be taken The applicant must identify what act the Union institution, body, office, or agency has allegedly failed to take, or the action will be inadmissible.21 The applicant must describe the act sufficiently precisely so that the Union Courts may give a judgment which will enable the Union institution, body, office, or agency to take the necessary measures to comply with it in accordance with Art. 266 TFEU.22 (4) The act must be capable of having legal effects The obligation to take a decision or other sort of action requested must give rise to an act which is capable of having legal effects. The nature of the legal effects required, however, is not always the same. It depends on the status of the party bringing the action.23 If the action for failure to act is brought by a natural or legal person, the Union institution, body, office, or agency must have failed to ‘address to that person any act other than a recommendation or an opinion’ under the third paragraph of Art. 265 TFEU. It follows that an action for failure to act brought by a natural or legal person must generally involve binding acts. That is, an action for failure to act may be brought against a failure to adopt an act which is legally binding on, and capable of affecting the interests of, the applicant by bringing about a distinct change in its legal position. In addition, the case-law recognizes the possibility that such an action may be brought against

20 See, e.g. T-95/96 Gestevisión Telecinco v Commission, 1998, para. 75; T-167/04, Asklepios Kliniken v Commission, 2007, para. 81. Provided that the other conditions for the action are satisfied, where such period is held unreasonable and no exceptional circumstances can be shown, an action for failure to act against the Commission is made out: see, e.g. T-95/96 Gestevisión Telecinco v Commission, 1998, paras 71–86, 90 (forty-seven months for first complaint and twenty-six months for second complaint); T-17/96, TF1 v Commission, 1999, paras 72–81 (thirty-one months). For examples in which the duration of the Commission’s investigation deemed reasonable, see T-395/04, Air One v Commission, 2006, paras 60–67 (less than six months); T-167/04, Asklepios Kliniken v Commission, 2007, paras 80–91 (twelve months). 21 This is linked to the requirements of the letter of formal notice (see para 8.20), along with the requirements of clarity and precision of applications more generally: see, e.g. C-52/11 P, Victoria Sánchez v Parliament and Commission (order), 2011, paras 20–23; T-167/04, Asklepios Kliniken v Commission, 2007, paras 41, 44; T-834/16, QC v Council (order), 2018, para. 41; T-768/17, Comprojecto-Projectos e Construções and Others v ECB (order), 2019, paras 25–27. 22 See 13/83, Parliament v Council, 1985, paras 35–37. 23 See, in that regard, C-41/92, Liberal Democrats v Parliament, AG Darmon Opinion, 1993, in particular points 29–81.

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416 THE ACTION FOR FAILURE TO ACT a failure to adopt a preparatory act if it is a necessary preliminary act in a procedure leading to an act which has binding legal effects.24 In contrast, if the action for failure to act is brought by a Member State or a Union institution,25 the act which was not taken does not necessarily have to be binding in order to have legal effects, and thus such an action may be brought in this case, too. It follows that an action for failure to act brought by a Member State or Union institution can generally involve binding as well as non-binding acts. As a classic example, an action for failure to act may be brought against the Commission if it fails to submit a proposal to the Union legislature relating to a matter on which the Union is under an obligation to legislate.26 The rationale is that the Commission proposal is necessary in order to enable the Council and the European Parliament to play their respective roles in the legislative process.27

C. Relationship between the actions for failure to act and for annulment 8.09

(1) No necessary link between the two forms of action Under established case-law, the action for failure to act and the action for annulment are considered to prescribe one and the same method of recourse.28 Indeed, the possibility for parties to assert their rights should not depend upon whether the Union institution, body, office, or agency concerned has acted or failed to act.29 Accordingly, the action for failure to act and the action for annulment are meant to be ‘two sides of the same coin’ for the most part, in the sense that the two actions often follow each other: when the Union institution, body, office, or agency has not acted, the action for failure to act urges it to do so; and when the Union institution, body, office, or agency acts and the act taken is not what the party wanted, the action for annulment comes to the fore 24 See, e.g. C-586/15 P and C-597/15 P, Bionorica and Diapharm v Commission, 2017, para. 53; T-99/19, Magnan v Commission (order), 2019, paras 25–26 (finding that those conditions were not fulfilled: see paras 30–35); see also, to that effect, e.g. T-228/08, Szomborg v Commission (order), 2009, para. 19; T-292/09, Mugraby v Council and Commission (order), 2011, paras 36–39; T-775/17, Estampaciones Rubí v Commission (order), 2018, paras 112– 113. See further A. H. Türk, Judicial Review in Union Law (Edward Elgar, 2009) 173–181. 25 Regarding the question whether Union bodies, offices, or agencies can bring an action for failure to act, see para. 8.12. 26 See C-445/93, Parliament v Commission (order), 1996 (failure of the Commission to submit the necessary proposals pursuant to what is now Art. 17(1) TEU and Art. 26 TFEU for the liberalization of the movement of persons; on an application from the European Parliament, an order was given declaring that there was no need to proceed to judgment following the submission of the relevant proposal by the Commission). For a case in which the Council was under a duty to legislate, see 13/83, Parliament v Council, 1985, paras 64–68. 27 The same reasoning applies to a failure to act in the context of the decision-making process relating to the Union budget: see 377/87, Parliament v Council, 1988. 28 See e.g. C‑68/95, T. Port v Commission, 1996, para. 59; C-379/03 P, Pérez Escolar v Commission (order), 2004, para. 15; T-344/10, UPS Europe and United Parcel Deutschland v Commission (order), 2012, para. 34; T-690/13, In vivo v Commission (order), 2015, para. 20; T-541/19, Shindler v Council (order), 2020, para. 25; but see, in this regard, C-63/12, C-66/12, and C-196/12, Commission v Council, AG Bot Opinion, 2013, points 76–77. 29 The approach taken in early case-law that the concept of an act as used in Art. 265, third para. TFEU is the same as that used in Art. 263, first para. TFEU (see, e.g. 15/70, Chevalley v Commission, 1970, para. 6; T-2/04, Korkmaz and Others v Commission (order), 2006, para. 62) has been tempered by later case-law allowing actions for failure to act related to non-binding acts: see para. 8.08.

Subject-Matter 417 as a means to challenge such act. However, there is no necessary link between the action for failure to act and the action for annulment,30 since the action for failure to act does not always enable the applicant to induce the adoption of an act which can be the subject of an action for annulment. In other words, while these two forms of action are related, they are not exact counterparts. In particular, an applicant may request the Union institution, body, office, or agency to adopt an act by means of an action for failure to act, even though no action for annulment would be available against the act in question. To take a classic example, the European Parliament is entitled to a declaration from the Court of Justice that the Council’s failure to lay before it a draft budget is unlawful, but once the draft budget has been adopted no action for annulment will lie against it, since it is a preparatory act.31 Moreover, even if the applicant seeks the adoption of a binding act, the Union institution, body, office, or agency may, under certain circumstances, put an end to its failure to act by adopting a non-binding act against which an action for annulment will not lie. Since the failure to act has been terminated, an action for failure to act will no longer be admissible, unless at a later stage a further failure to act on the part of that institution, body, office, or agency can be established in the light of new circumstances (see paras 8.21–8.22). (2) Action for annulment will lie only against a binding act Once the Union institution, body, office, or agency adopts a binding act, an action for annulment will in principle lie against it. The act in question may be a refusal to adopt the act sought32 or the adoption of an act different from the one requested.33 If, however, the failure to act is terminated by a definition of a position not constituting a binding act (see paras 8.21–8.22), no action for annulment may be brought against it.34 That being said, an act which is not open to an action for annulment may constitute a definition of position terminating the failure to act if it is the prerequisite for the next 30 See 302/87, Parliament v Council, 1988, para. 16; C-123/03 P, Commission v Greencore, 2004, para. 46 (holding that the fact that the applicant had not used the procedure provided for in Art. 265 TFEU had no bearing on the admissibility of the action for annulment subsequently brought in connection with the Commission’s refusal to pay default interest on the sum refunded to the undertaking concerned); see also, to that effect, T-86/03, Holcim (France) v Commission (order), 2005, para. 45. 31 See 302/87, Parliament v Council, 1988, para. 16. 32 See, e.g. C-196/12, Commission v Council, 2013, in particular paras 23–26; T-293/18, Latvia v Commission (order), 2020, para. 21; see also C-63/12, C-66/12, and C-196/12, Commission v Council, AG Bot Opinion, points 94–111 (emphasizing refusal to adopt an act must be challenged by means of an action for annulment, and not an action for failure to act). 33 As the Union Courts have consistently held, a failure to act for the purposes of Art. 265 TFEU means a failure to take a decision or to define a position, ‘and not the adoption of a measure different from that sought or considered necessary by the applicant’: see, e.g. C-596/15 P and C-597/15 P, Bionorica and Diapharm v Commission, 2017, para. 22. For recent examples, see C-687/17 P, Aanbestedingskalender, 2019, paras 1–2; T-702/18, Durand v Parliament (order), 2019, paras 21–24. 34 For an example, see C-622/20 P, Validity and Center for Independent Living Association v Commission (order), 2021; T-293/18, Latvia v Commission (order), 2020. As noted in para. 25 of that latter order, under the case-law, an act amounting to a rejection must be appraised in the light of the nature of the request to which it constituted a reply; it follows that an action for annulment directed against a proposal to amend a Union act or a refusal to advance a proposal is in principle inadmissible; see also, e.g. T-310/18, EPSU and Goudriaan v Commission, 2019, paras 25–26.

8.10

418 THE ACTION FOR FAILURE TO ACT step in a procedure which is to culminate in a legal act which itself will be challengeable by an action for annulment.35 The Union Courts will not tolerate improper use of the action for failure to act.36 In the event that a Union institution, body, office, or agency has adopted a binding act, only an action for annulment will be available to challenge it. If the applicant has allowed the period for bringing an action for annulment to expire, it cannot provoke a failure to act by addressing a request to the Union institution, body, office, or agency concerned to revoke the act adversely affecting it.37

II. Identity of the Parties A. Applicants 8.11

8.12

(1) Member States and Union institutions The first paragraph of Art. 265 TFEU authorizes ‘the Member States and the other institutions of the Union’ to bring an action for failure to act. It confers that right of action on all the Union institutions.38 This includes the European Council and the ECB— now recognized as Union institutions under Art. 13(1) TEU—as well as the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union,39 and the Court of Auditors, which had already been mentioned in former Art. 7(1) EC. Accordingly, under Art. 265 TFEU, the ECB is no longer limited to bringing an action for failure to act ‘in the areas falling within the latter’s field of competence’, as was the case under the fourth paragraph of former Art. 232 EC. (2) Union bodies, offices, and agencies While Art. 265 TFEU indicates that an action for failure to act may be brought against Union bodies, offices, and agencies as defendants (see para. 8.16), that provision does not address the question whether Union bodies, offices, and agencies can bring such an action as applicants. Although a right of action for Union bodies, offices, and agencies would not appear to be precluded on such grounds, having regard in particular to the

35 See, e.g. T-105/96, Pharos v Commission, 1998, para. 43; T-297/01 and T-298/01, SIC v Commission, 2004, para. 53; T-393/06, Makteshim-Agan Holding and Others v Commission (order), 2008, para. 52; T-164/10, Pioneer Hi-Bred International v Commission, 2013, para. 26; T-702/18, Durand v Parliament (order), 2019, para. 28. 36 See, e.g. T-400/04 and T-402/04 to T-404/04, Arch Chemicals and Others v Commission, 2011, para. 63 (applicants’ argument exceeds scope of action for failure to act and in reality seeks annulment). 37 See 21/61 to 26/61, Meroni and Others v High Authority, 1962 ECR 73, 78 (concerning the relevant provisions of the ECSC Treaty); 10/68 and 18/68, ‘Eridania’ Zurcherifici Nationali and Others v Commission, 1969, para. 17; compare T-306/10, Yusef v Commission, 2014, in particular paras 55–67. 38 See 13/83, Parliament v Council, 1985 paras 17–18; see also C-196/12, Commission v Council, 2013, para. 21 (referring to ‘a European Union institution’ without reservation). 39 In the literature, commentators have expressed a negative view regarding the right of the Court of Justice of the European Union to bring an action for failure to act: see, e.g. S. Cazet, Le recours en carence en droit de l’Union européenne (Larcier, 2012) 124. That institution’s right of action indeed appears minimal since ‘it is responsible for legal protection and does not itself seek it’ (13/83, Parliament v Council, AG Lenz Opinion, 1985, point 2.1.2.1).

Identity of the Parties 419 parallelism with the action for annulment, a definitive answer to that question awaits clarification in the case-law. (3) Natural and legal persons Under the third paragraph of Art. 265 TFEU, a natural or legal person may complain to the Union Courts that ‘an institution, body, office, or agency of the Union has failed to address to that person any act other than a recommendation or an opinion’. As mentioned in para. 8.08, an action for failure to act brought by a natural or legal person must involve an act which is legally binding on, and capable of affecting the interests of, the applicant by bringing about a distinct change in its legal position; such an action can also be brought in connection with a failure to adopt a preparatory act if it is a necessary preliminary act in a procedure leading to an act which has binding legal effects.40 Consequently, an action for failure to act is available to a natural or legal person in three situations: (1) that person is the addressee of the act which the Union institution, body, office, or agency has failed to adopt; (2) the act has binding legal effects on the applicant’s legal position; or (3) the act constitutes the necessary precondition for proceedings likely to result in an act producing binding legal effects in relation to the applicant.41 As had been the case before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, although a literal reading of the wording of Art. 265 TFEU could appear to indicate that an action for failure to act can be brought by a natural or legal person only in relation to acts addressed ‘to that person’, under the case-law it has been regarded as sufficient for such person to be directly and individually concerned by the act which the Union institution, body, office, or agency failed to adopt and which was addressed to another person. This is because what are now Arts 263 and 265 TFEU prescribe one and the same method of recourse, and therefore, just as the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU allows natural and legal persons to bring an action for annulment against a measure not addressed to them, provided that the act is of direct and individual concern—or direct concern, as the case may be—to them, the third paragraph of Art. 265 TFEU must be interpreted as also entitling those persons to bring an action for failure to act against a Union institution, body, office, or agency which they claim has failed to adopt a measure which concerns them in the same way.42 The idea behind this is to underscore the parallelism between the action for failure to act and the action for annulment as far as the act at issue is concerned,43 on the grounds that the possibility for natural or legal 40 See, e.g. C-596/15 P and C-597/15 P, Bionorica and Diapharm v Commission, 2017, para. 53. 41 See T-99/19, Magnan v Commission (order), 2019, paras 25–26. 42 See, e.g. C-68/95, T. Port v Commission, 1996, para. 59; T-395/04, Air One v Commission, 2006, para. 25; T-185/08, VDH Projektentwicklung v Commission, 2008, para. 9; T-690/13, In vivo v Commission (order), 2015, para. 21. 43 With particular regard to the State aid context, see, e.g. C-379/03 P, Pérez Escolar v Commission (order), 2004, paras 15–26. If, pursuant to the filing of the complaint, the Commission has not taken any decision, the fact that the complainant is an ‘interested party’ within the meaning of Art. 1(h) of Regulation 2015/1589 will be sufficient to satisfy the requirement of individual concern in order to challenge a failure to act on the part of the Commission to take a decision on State aid addressed to a Member State: see T-95/96, Gestevisión Telecinco v Commission, 1988, paras 64–69; T-395/04, Air One v Commission, 2006, paras 25–42; T-167/04 Asklepios Kliniken v Commission,

8.13

420 THE ACTION FOR FAILURE TO ACT persons to assert their rights should not depend upon whether the Union institution, body, office, or agency concerned has acted or failed to act (see para. 8.09). As such, the case-law on the standing requirements for natural and legal persons under the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU has been brought to bear on the admissibility of actions brought by such persons under the third paragraph of Art. 265 TFEU.44 Moreover, with the Lisbon Treaty’s introduction of the category of regulatory acts which do not entail implementing measures and for which national and legal persons must demonstrate only direct concern under the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU (see paras 7.107– 7.111), it appears that the Union Courts have read a similar development into the third paragraph of Art. 265 TFEU in the light of the parallelism between the two provisions as far as the standing of natural and legal persons is concerned.45 Natural and legal person must also prove an interest in bringing proceedings, as with other direct actions brought before the Union Courts, such as the action for annulment (see paras 7.141–7.145). According to the case-law, this means that the applicant has a present and vested interest in the action for failure to act, and its outcome is liable to procure an advantage for the applicant.46 In contrast, where the favourable outcome of the action for failure to act could not give the applicant satisfaction or concerns a future and hypothetical situation, interest is found to be lacking, and the action is inadmissible.47

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(4) The action for failure to act and the routes of legality control The parallelism of the standing requirements for natural and legal persons under the third paragraph of Art. 265 TFEU and the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU brings into play related aspects in the case-law concerning the interplay between direct and indirect routes of legality control when it comes to failures to act on the part of Union 2007, paras 45–57. If the action concerns the Commission’s failure to adopt a final decision, the applicant will in principle have to demonstrate that its market position is substantially affected by the aid concerned: see, e.g. T-344/10, UPS Europe and United Parcel Service Deutschland v Commission (order), 2012, paras 43–64. See further paras 7.119, 7.125. 44 See, e.g. C-130/16 P, Gaki v Commission (order), 2016, para. 17; C-137/16 P, Petraitis v Commission (order), 2016, para. 20; C-284/19 P, Clarke v Commission (order), 2019, para. 35; T-304/18, MLPS v Commission (order), 2019, para. 23; T-251/19, Shindler v Council (order), 2020, para. 25; T-760/20, Jakeliūnas v ESMA (order), 2021, para. 37. 45 While this issue has yet to be explicitly confirmed in the Court of Justice’s case-law, it has been implied in certain cases: see, e.g. C-235/12 P, H-Holding v Commission (order), 2013, para. 12; C-64/13 P, H-Holding v Parliament (order), 2013, para. 15; C-412/18 P, King v Commission (order), 2018, para. 20; see also, in that regard, C-596/15 P and C-597/15 P, Bionorica and Diapharm v Commission, AG Bobek Opinion, 2017, points 106–117; the Court did not reach that point in its judgment: see C-596/15 P and C-597/15 P, Bionorica and Dipharm v Commission, 2017, paras 106–107. In the General Court’s case-law, this issue has been expressly addressed: see, e.g. T-773/16, Salehi v Commission (order), 2017, para. 25; T-541/19, Shindler v Council (order), 2020, paras 25–26. 46 See, e.g. T-212/99, Intervet International v Commission, 2002, paras 53–57. 47 See, e.g. C-596/15 P and C-597/15, Bionorica and Diapharm v Commission, 2017, paras 83–85, 92–104, 112– 116. Even so, in paras 92–96 of that judgment, the Court rejected the approach taken by the General Court that an applicant’s interest in bringing an action for failure to act in connection with the authorization of health claims was lacking where the transitional regime could be more advantageous than the permanent regime on the grounds that such an approach would mean accepting that an applicant would only have an interest if the worst possible outcome of the action would be better than the status quo, and even the rejection of a health claim could procure a benefit in terms of legal certainty for an economic operator planning to enter the market concerned.

Identity of the Parties 421 institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies (see para. 1.02). As discussed in para. 10.12, in T. Port v Commission,48 the Court of Justice ruled that the Treaties make no provision for a reference for a preliminary ruling in which the national court asks the Court to rule that a Union institution, body, office, or agency has failed to act. At the same time, the Court emphasized several routes to ensure judicial protection for the persons concerned, including the fact that the German undertaking or the Member State concerned could bring an action for failure to act before the Union Courts under Art. 265 TFEU, thereby making clear that the direct route of an action for failure to act is available when the indirect route of a reference for a preliminary ruling is not. Thereafter, in Ten Kate Musselkanaal and Others,49 the Court of Justice was presented with a reference for a preliminary ruling from a national court about the possibility of State liability arising out of the fact that the Member State concerned had refrained from bringing an action for failure to act (or an action for annulment) against the Commission in circumstances where the natural and legal persons involved in the main proceedings could not bring such an action themselves and thus that direct route was unavailable. The Court ruled that, while Union law did not impose any obligation on a Member State to bring an action for failure to act (or an action for annulment), just as natural and legal persons should be able to challenge before a national court the legality of any decision or other national measure relating to the application to them of a Union act of general application by pleading the invalidity of that act, ‘the same holds true where a natural or legal person invokes a failure to take a decision, within the meaning of Article [265 TFEU], which it considers to be contrary to [Union] law’.50 Accordingly, the approach taken by the Court of Justice in that judgment may be seen as ensuring that the indirect route of a preliminary ruling on the validity of a failure to act remains open in circumstances where the direct route of an action for failure to act is not available.

B. Defendants (1) Union institutions As regards the Union institutions, the first paragraph of Art. 265 TFEU provides that an action for failure to act may be brought against the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the Commission, or the ECB. Noticeably, of the seven Union institutions enumerated in Art. 13(1) TEU, the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Court of Auditors are not mentioned among the list of potential defendant institutions in the first paragraph of Art. 265 TFEU. Nevertheless, in the case-law so far,

48 C-68/95, T. Port v Commission, 1996, para. 53. 49 See C-511/03, Ten Kate Musselkanaal and Others, 2005, para. 17 (also indicating that an action for damages would not have sufficed). 50 C-511/03, Ten Kate Musselkanaal and Others, 2005, para. 29. See, in that regard, C-362/14, Schrems, AG Bot Opinion, 2015, point 236 n. 96.

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422 THE ACTION FOR FAILURE TO ACT that wording has not been interpreted as precluding an action for failure to act being brought against the Court of Justice of the European Union.51

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(2) Union bodies, offices, and agencies Pursuant to the changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty (see para. 8.02), the first paragraph of Art. 265 TFEU provides: ‘This Article shall apply, under the same conditions, to bodies, offices and agencies of the Union which fail to act.’52 Since the action for failure to act and the action for annulment are envisaged to provide for one and the same method of recourse (see para. 8.09), the wording of Art. 265 TFEU has been brought in line with that of Art. 263 TFEU.53 Consequently, case-law decided under former Art. 232 EC, in which only ‘institutions of the Community’ were mentioned, may merit some refinement. For example, that provision was deemed inapplicable to the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) on the grounds that it concerned omissions of only those institutions listed in the EC Treaty, which did not include the OHIM.54 In addition, an action for failure to act brought against the European Ombudsman was held inadmissible before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty because it was not considered a Community institution within the meaning of former Art. 232 EC.55 However, as part of its reasoning, the General Court considered that the only act which the applicant could have obtained in the proceedings concerned was the report issued by the European Ombudsman to the European Parliament finding a case of maladministration of the Commission, which was not capable of having legal effects for the purposes of the action for failure to act.56 Consequently, such an approach may not necessarily be disturbed by the changes brought by the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. 51 See T-1/19, CJ v Court of Justice (order), 2019. 52 It is worth noting that, even before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, certain bodies, offices, and agencies already provided for recourse to an action for failure to act: see, e.g. as regards the European Chemicals Agency, Art. 94(2) of Regulation (EC) No. 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency, amending Directive 1999/45/EC and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No. 793/93 and Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 76/769/EEC and Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC, and 2000/21/EC (OJ 2006 L396/1); and as regards European Union Aviation Safety Agency, Art. 114(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2018 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and amending Regulations (EC) No. 2111/2005, (EC) No. 1008/2008, (EU) No. 996/2010, (EU) No. 376/2014 and Directives 2014/30/EU and 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Regulations (EC) No. 552/2004 and (EC) No. 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3922/91 (OJ 2018 L212/1) (ex Art. 50(1) of Regulation (EC) No. 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing Council Directive 91/670/EEC, Regulation (EC) No. 1592/2002 and Directive 2004/36/EC (OJ 2008 L79/1)). 53 See, in that regard, C-270/12, United Kingdom v Parliament and Council, 2014, paras 80–81. Art. 265 TFEU does not specify that the acts of Union bodies, offices, and agencies must be ‘intended to produce legal effects vis- à-vis third parties’, as is the case in Art. 263, first para. TFEU. Art. 265 TFEU has been interpreted as pertaining to acts capable of having legal effects in any event: see para. 8.08. 54 See T-160/07, Lancôme v OHIM, 2008, para. 31. 55 See T-103/99, Associazione delle Cantine Sociali Venete v Ombudsman and Parliament (order), 2000, para. 46; see also T-144/06, O’Loughlin v Ombudsman and Ireland (order), 2006, para. 15; T-196/08, Srinivasan v Ombudsman (order), 2008, para. 13. 56 See T-103/99, Associazione delle Cantine Sociali Venete v Ombudsman and Parliament (order), 2000, paras 47–55.

Special Characteristics 423 In any event, an action for failure to act can only be brought against Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies.57 Since the Union (former Community) itself is not referred to in Art. 265 TFEU, an action for failure to act brought against it would be inadmissible.58 Moreover, an action for failure to act under Art. 265 TFEU cannot be brought against a Member State59 or the European Court of Human Rights.60 Moreover, it may be the case that the alleged failure to act is committed by a Union organ which has no legal personality and thus the Union institution to whom that organ is attached is the proper defendant against whom an action for failure to act should be brought. For example, under the case-law, the Commission is the defendant in actions for failure to act in connection with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF).61 Additionally, an action for failure to act brought against an EU Delegation within the meaning of Art. 221 TFEU has been held inadmissible, and the Commission was deemed the sole defendant in the circumstances.62

III. Special Characteristics A. Pre-litigation procedure (1) The Union institution, body, office, or agency must first have been called upon to act Under the second paragraph of Art. 265 TFEU, an action for failure to act is admissible only if, before proceedings are brought, the Union institution, body, office, or agency has first been called upon to act by the applicant.63 This means that the applicant is obliged first to raise the matter with the Union institution, body, office, or agency by

57 For examples of a failure to act brought against a Union body, office, or agency, see T-102/13, Heli-Flight v EASA, 2014, paras 108–113 (dismissed as inadmissible); T-590/15, Onix Asigurări v EIOPA (order), 2016, paras 30–38 (dismissed as inadmissible); T-760/20, Jakeliūnas v ESMA (order), 2021, paras 36–39 (dismissed as inadmissible). 58 See T-292/09, Mugraby v Council and Commission (order), 2011, para. 23 (upheld in C-581/11 P, Mugraby v Council and Commission (order), 2012, paras 15, 48–51). 59 See, e.g. C-374/09 P, Hârsulescu v Romania (order), 2010, para. 12; T-493/18, Comprojecto-Projectos e Construções and Others v Portugal (order), 2018, paras 10–12; T-66/22, Novais v Portugal (order), 2022, paras 5–6. 60 See T-133/11, Fundaţia Pro Fondbis—1946 Semper v European Court of Human Rights (order), 2011. 61 See, e.g. T-690/13, In vivo v Commission (order), 2015, paras 14–16; T-658/17, Stichting Against Child Trafficking v Commission (order), 2018, paras 17, 18, 33. 62 See T-264/09, Tecnoprocess v Commission and Delegation of the EU in Morocco (order), 2011, paras 70–71. In T-367/09, Tecnoprocess v Commission (order), 2011, paras 35–36, the applicant renounced the action for failure to act brought against the EU Delegation concerned, leaving the Commission the sole defendant. 63 See, e.g. C-586/15 P and C-597/15 P, Bionorica and Diapharm v Commission, 2017, para. 51; T-12/12, LTRS v Commission, 2012, para. 38; T-299/14, AETP v Commission (order), 2014, para. 12; T-611/15, Edeka- Handelsgesellschaft Hessenring v Commission (order), 2016, para. 70; T-768/17, Comprojecto-Projectos e Construções and Others v ECB (order), 2019, para. 43. Art. 265 TFEU does not provide any derogation from the requirement of formal notice: see T-393/06 Makhteshim-Agan Holding and Others v Commission, 2008, para. 49. For some examples in which the action was held inadmissible on the grounds that the applicant failed to call upon the Union institution, body, office, or agency concerned to act, see T-102/13, Heli-flight v AESA (order), 2014, paras 111, 113; T-38/14, Kafetzakis v Parliament and Others (order), 2015, paras 26–28; T-350/14, Arvanitis v Parliament and Others (order), 2015, paras 12–14; T-413/14, Grigoriadis and Others v Parliament and Others (order), 2015, paras 26–28.

8.17

424 THE ACTION FOR FAILURE TO ACT means of some sort of communication, which is often referred to as a letter before action or letter of formal notice. The idea behind raising the matter with the Union institution, body, office, or agency in this way is to prompt it to adopt the act requested within two months, or at least to define its position with regard to the alleged failure to act.64

8.18

8.19

8.20

(2) Letter of formal notice is an essential procedural requirement The letter of formal notice calling upon the Union institution, body, office, or agency to act is an essential procedural requirement, the effects of which are, first, to cause the two-month period within which that institution, body, office, or agency is required to define its position to begin to run; and, second, to delimit any action that might be brought, should that institution, body, office, or agency fail to define its position.65 (3) The Union institution, body, office, or agency must be called upon to act within a reasonable time There is no specific time-limit laid down in Art. 265 TFEU for calling upon the Union institution, body, office, or agency to act.66 Conceivably, this is because the precise moment when a failure to act becomes reproachable is difficult to establish. Yet, this does not mean that the applicant can wait for an indefinite period of time after finding that there has been a failure to act on the part of a Union institution, body, office, or agency. Under the case-law, the Union institution, body, office, or agency must be called upon to act within a reasonable time after the applicant initially finds that there has been a failure to act. What constitutes a reasonable time is determined by the Union Courts on a case-by-case basis.67 (4) Content of the letter of formal notice There is no particular requirement as to form, but the letter of formal notice must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the Union institution, body, office, or agency to ascertain in specific terms the content of the act which it is being asked to adopt, and must also show what matters are understood to require that institution, body, office, or agency to define its position.68 As indicated by the case-law, the letter of formal notice must essentially include four main elements. First, it must call upon the Union

64 See, in that regard, C-249/99 P, Pescados Congelados Jogamar v Commission (order), 1999, para. 18. 65 See, e.g. T-442/07, Ryanair v Commission, 2011, para. 22; T-832/14, Nutria v Commission, 2016, para. 43; T-768/17, Comprojecto-Projectos e Construções and Others v ECB (order), 2019, para. 43; T-245/17, ViaSat v Commission, 2021, para. 38. 66 This is distinguished from the explicit time-limits set down in Art. 265, second para. TFEU once the letter of formal notice has been sent to the Union institution, body, office, or agency as discussed in para. 8.23. 67 See 59/70, Netherlands v Commission, 1971, paras 12–24 (concerning the ECSC Treaty) (eighteen-month period unreasonable); C-170/02 P, Schlüsselverlag J.S. Moser and Others v Commission, 2003, paras 36–38 (four- month period unreasonable). 68 See, e.g. C-596/15 P and C-597/15 P, Bionorica and Diapharm v Commission, 2017, para. 54; T-768/17, Comprojecto-Projectos e Construções and Others v ECB (order), 2019, para. 44; T-245/17, ViaSat v Commission, 2021, paras 38–39.

Special Characteristics 425 institution, body, office, or agency to act.69 Second, it must make it clear that it is made pursuant to Art. 265 TFEU.70 Third, it must indicate precisely what Union act(s) the applicant expects the Union institution, body, office, or agency to take.71 Fourth, it must make clear the identity of the person making the request, since only that person calling upon the Union institution, body, office, or agency to act is entitled to bring an action for failure to act before the Union Courts.72 (5) Definition of position of the Union institution, body, office, or agency In order to have the failure to act in question brought to an end, the Union institution, body, office, or agency must have ‘defined its position’ within two months of its having been called upon to act under the second paragraph of Art. 265 TFEU. Once the Union institution, body, office, or agency has defined its position in that period, an action for failure to act will be inadmissible.73 The reaction of the Union institution, body, office, or agency which has been called upon to act will be deemed to be a definition of a position within the meaning of the second paragraph of Art. 265 TFEU only insofar as it explains the stance of the Union institution, body, office, or agency with regard to the act requested.74 It is the content, and not the form, of the definition of a position which determines whether this condition has been met. Accordingly, the Union institution, body, office, or agency called upon to act may reject a request to adopt a particular act explicitly (for example, by letter75 or email76), or implicitly by adopting an act other than the one requested.77 Importantly, however, a communication from the Union institution, body, office, or agency indicating that examination of the questions raised

69 See, e.g. T-311/97, Pescados Congelados Jogamar v Commission, 1999, para. 37; T-264/09, Technoprocess v Commission and Delegation of the EU to Morocco (order), 2011, paras 85–90; T-367/09, Technoprocess v Commission (order), 2011, paras 49–50; T-611/15, Edeka-Handelsgesellschaft Hessenring v Commission (order), 2016, paras 69– 70. The letter of formal notice must be addressed to the Union institution, body, office, or agency concerned; the fact that it is copied (put in cc) on the letter is not sufficient for it to be regarded as the institution, body, office, or agency invited to act in response to the requests contained therein: see T-234/14, Mammoet Salvage v Commission (order), 2015, paras 31–34. 70 This should transpire from the content of the letter. An express reference to Art. 265 TFEU is helpful, but not necessary: see T-12/12, Laboratoires CTRS v Commission, 2012, para. 40. 71 See, e.g. T-442/07, Ryanair v Commission, 2011, paras 23–25, 41, 71; T-768/17, Comprojecto-Projectos e Construções and Others v ECB (order), 2019, paras 45–46. The action may be declared admissible only in part: see, e.g. T-17/96, TF1 v Commission, 1999, paras 41–44; T-245/17, ViaSat v Commission, 2021, paras 40–53. 72 See, e.g. T-64/96, de Jorio v Council (order), 1997, para. 40; T-595/15, Europäischer Tier-und Naturschutz v Commission (order), 2016, para. 13. 73 See, e.g. C-270/19 P, WB v Commission (order), 2019, para. 13; C-504/20 P, Wagenknecht v European Council (order), 2021, paras 20–24; C-130/21, Wagenknecht v Commission (order), 2022, paras 31–34; T-702/18, Durand v Parliament (order), 2019, para. 21; T-245/17, ViaSat v Commission, 2021, para. 57. 74 Under the case-law, a Union institution, body, office, or agency has not failed to act not only when it adopts an act which satisfies the applicant, but also when it refuses to adopt such an act but responds to the request made to it by stating the reasons why it considers that it is not appropriate to adopt that act: see, e.g. T-156/18, Legutko and Poręba v Parliament (order), 2019, para. 24; T-245/17, ViaSat v Commission, 2021, para. 59. The question whether a letter sent by a Union institution, body, office, or agency brings to an end, or not, the failure to act is a question of law capable of being examined on appeal: see, e.g. C-596/15 P and C-597/15 P, Bionorica and Diapharm v Commission, 2017, para. 55; C-634/19 P, CJ v Court of Justice, 2020, para. 29. 75 See, e.g. C-508/17 P, CBA Spielapparate-und Restaurantbetrieb v Commission (order), 2018, paras 15–17; T-258/18, Brunke v Commission (order), 2019, paras 31–41; T-293/18, Latvia v Commission (order), 2020, paras 20–21. 76 See, e.g. T-1/19, CJ v Court of Justice (order), 2019, in particular paras 12–14. 77 See e.g. C-196/12, Commission v Council, 2013, paras 22–31.

8.21

426 THE ACTION FOR FAILURE TO ACT in the letter of formal notice is in progress does not constitute a definition of position which brings the failure to act to an end.78 Under settled case-law, if the definition of position of the Union institution, body, office, or agency concerned does not meet the expectations of the person who requested it to act, that person may no longer challenge that position by means of an action for failure to act. This is because Art. 265 TFEU refers to the failure to take a decision or to define a position, and not to the adoption of an act different from that desired or considered necessary by the person concerned.79 Although a definition of position brings the failure to act to an end, thereby precluding the possibility of bringing an action for failure to act in those circumstances, it is not always in the nature of a binding act against which an action for annulment will lie (see para. 8.10). In particular, this will be the case where the invitation to act is made by an applicant with a view to the adoption of a preparatory act needed for the purpose of the EU decision-making process to proceed (see paras 7.23 and 8.08). The way in which the Union Courts can secure legal protection for the applicant in such a situation is to be relatively exacting in judging whether the content of the definition of a position is such as to bring the failure to act to an end. The reason is that since an action for annulment is ruled out, in any event, as a potential means of recourse, the only avenue remaining is an action for failure to act if the Union institution, body, office, or agency is not fulfilling its obligations and so blocking the EU decision-making process.80 Even where the invitation to act comes from a natural or legal person who in principle has in mind the adoption of a binding act against which an action for annulment will lie, it is possible for the failure to act to be brought to an end by a non-binding definition of a position. This will be the case when the Union institution, body, office, or agency adopts a preparatory act which is a prerequisite in the procedure leading to a definitive and legally binding act.81

78 See, e.g. C-596/15 P and C-597/15 P, Bionorica and Diapharm v Commission, 2017, paras 56–59; T-212/99, Intervet International v Commission, 2002, para. 61; T-344/00 and T-340/00, CEVA et Pharmacia v Commission, 2003, para. 80; T-165/08, Química Atlântica et Martins de Freitas Moura v Commission (order), 2008, para. 11; T-521/14, Sweden v Commission, 2015, para. 42; see also 377/87, Parliament v Council, 1988, AG Mischo Opinion, point 12. 79 See, e.g. C-44/00 P, Sodima v Commission (order), 2000, para. 83; C-196/12, Commission v Council, 2013, para. 22; T-832/14, Nutria v Commission, 2016, para. 46; T-101/16, Klausner Holz Niedersachsen v Commission (order), 2017, para. 24; T-156/18, Legutko and Poręba v Parliament (order), 2019, para. 30. 80 See 13/83, Parliament v Council, 1985, para. 25; T-164/10, Pioneer Hi-Bred v Commission, 2013, para. 35. Moreover, it was in an inter-institutional context that the Court of Justice held—in all likelihood for these reasons— that an express refusal to act does not put an end to a failure to act: see 302/87, Parliament v Council, 1988, para. 17; see further, in that regard, C-63/12, C-66/12, and C-196/12, Commission v Council, AG Bot Opinion, 2013, point 97; T-521/14, Sweden v Commission, 2015, para. 44. 81 See, e.g. C‑596/15 P and C‑597/15 P, Bionorica and Diapharrm v Commission, 2017, para. 53; T-228/08 Szomborg v Commission, 2009, para. 19; T-292/09, Mugraby v Council and Commission (order), 2011, para. 36; T-775/17, Estampaciones Rubí v Commission (order), 2018, para. 112; T-99/19, Magnan v Commission (order), 2019, paras 25–26.

Special Characteristics 427 (6) Complaint regarding infringement of Art. 101 or Art. 102 TFEU The procedure for the investigation of complaints relating to infringements of Art. 101 or Art. 102 TFEU affords an illustration.82 A complaint is lodged in the hope that the Commission will find that there has been an infringement of Art. 101 or Art. 102 TFEU.83 The complainant is not entitled to a definitive decision from the Commission on the existence of the alleged infringement.84 However, the complainant does have the right to a decision on the outcome which the Commission is to give to its complaint, so that, in the event that the complaint is rejected, the complainant can be assured of being able to bring an action for annulment of the decision rejecting the complaint and thus of securing judicial review by the General Court (and the Court of Justice on appeal).85 Before the complaint is rejected the Commission should send a letter to the complainant pursuant to Art. 7 of Regulation No. 773/2004,86 informing it of the reasons why it considers that, on the basis of the information in its possession, there are insufficient grounds for upholding the complaint, and fixing a time-limit within which the complainant may make its views known in writing. Such a letter constitutes a definition of a position within the meaning of the second paragraph of Art. 265 TFEU, 87 even though it is not a binding act against which an action for annulment will lie.88 If the complainant wishes to avail itself of the procedure provided for in Art. 265 TFEU in order to induce the Commission to take a decision on the outcome of its complaint, it will call on the Commission to take that decision (which, moreover, the complainant hopes will be favourable to it).89 Only if the Commission is planning to reject its complaint will the complainant receive (under the normal procedure in such a case) a letter pursuant to Art. 7 of Regulation No. 773/2004, that is, a definition of a position that is not

82 For the Commission’s handling of complaints relating to State aid, see, e.g. T-95/96, Gestevisión Telecinco v Commission, 1998; T-17/96, TF1 v Commission, 1999; T-297/01 and T-298/01, SIC v Commission, 2004; T-395/04, Air One v Commission, 2006; T-167/04, Asklepios Kliniken v Commission, 2007; T-423/07, Ryanair v Commission, 2011; T-442/07, Ryanair v Commission, 2011; T-344/10, UPS Europe and United Parcel Service Deutschland v Commission (order), 2012. For cases involving the Commission’s definition of its position, see, e.g. T-407/09, Neubrandenburger Wohnungsgesellschaft v Commission (order), 2012, para. 40; T-101/16, Klausner Holz Niedersachsen (order), 2017, paras 23–25; T-891/16, Scandlines Danmark and Scandlines Deutschland v Commission (order), 2018, paras 34–55; T-368/19, Datenlotsen Informationssysteme v Commission (order), 2020. 83 Where the complaint fails to provide sufficient information to be classified as a complaint, the Commission cannot be held to be under a duty to act in relation to the alleged violations of the competition rules: see T-423/07, Ryanair v Commission, 2011, paras 52–63 (rejecting the complainant’s action seeking a declaration that the Commission failed to act in relation to a complaint alleging abuse of a dominant position on such grounds). 84 See, e.g. 125/78, GEMA v Commission, 1979, paras 17–18; C-367/10 P, EMC Development v Commission (order), 2011, para. 73; T-355/13, easyJet Airline v Commission, 2015, para. 69; T-480/15, Agria Polska and Others v Commission, 2017, para. 94. 85 See, e.g. T-7/92, Asia Motor France and Others v Commission, 1993; compare, e.g. T-56/92, Koelman v Commission (order), 1993, paras 26–28 (action for failure to act held to be devoid of purpose, since the Commission definitively rejected the complaint); T-575/93, Koelman v Commission, 1996 (applicant sought annulment of the definitive rejection of its complaint). 86 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Arts 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (now Arts 101 and 102 TFEU) (OJ 2004 L123/18), as last amended by Commission Regulation (EU) No. 2015/1348 of 3 August 2015 (OJ 2015 L208/3). 87 See, e.g. 125/78, GEMA v Commission, 1979, para. 21; C-282/95 P, Guérin Automobiles v Commission, 1997, para. 30; T-186/94, Guérin Automobiles v Commission, 1995, para. 26. 88 See, e.g. T-64/89, Automec v Commission, 1990, para. 46; T-186/94, Guérin Automobiles v Commission, 1995, para. 41; T-38/96, Guérin Automobiles v Commission, 1997, para. 31. 89 See, e.g. T-28/90, Asia Motor France v Commission, 1992, para. 28.

8.22

428 THE ACTION FOR FAILURE TO ACT a binding act.90 This provisionally exhausts the complainant’s possibilities of recourse, but not necessarily for long. This is because the initiative reverts to the complainant. If it submits written observations within the prescribed period, the Commission must take, within a reasonable time,91 a final decision on the outcome of the complaint in the light of those observations.92 If necessary, the complainant can call on the Commission, pursuant to Art. 265 TFEU, to take the decision. If the Commission rejects the complaint, the complainant may bring an action for annulment; if the Commission does nothing at all, an action for failure to act will lie.93

B. Procedure before the Union Courts 8.23

(1) Time-limits The applicant must bring its action within the applicable time-limits prescribed in the second paragraph of Art. 265 TFEU. The letter of formal notice marks the starting point of the two-month period which the Union institution, body, office, or agency has in order to bring the failure to act to an end.94 As a consequence, an action brought during this period of two months will be deemed premature and hence inadmissible.95 The case-law indicates that the Union Courts generally look at the day on which the letter before action has been sent to the Union institution, body, office, or agency to mark the starting point of this two-month period.96 Moreover, the failure to act comes to an end not on the day on which the Union institution, body, office, or agency actually defines its position, but rather on the day on which the party which called on it to act

90 See, e.g. T-254/08, Associazione Giùlemanidallajuve v Commission (order), 2008, paras 24–25. The fact that a complainant which requests that a decision be taken has to be satisfied in the first instance with a definition of a position which is not a decision, has to do with the Commission’s obligation to take the intermediate step— designed to protect the complainant’s interests—of notifying the draft decision, following which the complainant is entitled to submit observations. Sometimes, however, the decision is taken directly, whereupon an action for annulment will lie against it: see C-39/93 P, SFEI and Others v Commission, 1994, paras 24–33. 91 See, e.g. C-282/95 P, Guérin Automobiles v Commission, 1997, para. 37. The Commission must be given a reasonable period within which to examine the complainant's observations before being required to define its final position on the complaint: see T-28/95, IECC v Commission, 1998, para. 15; see also para. 8.06. 92 See, in that regard, Regulation No. 773/2004, Arts 7(2) and (3). 93 An action for failure to act will not have lost its purpose merely because the restriction of competition referred to in the complaint has been terminated following the Commission’s intervention, since that did not dispense the Commission from defining its position on the applicant’s complaint: see T-74/92, Ladbroke Racing v Commission, 1995, paras 66–67. 94 See, e.g. T-832/14, Nutria v Commission, 2016, para. 43; T-258/18, Brunke v Commission (order), 2019, para. 22. In order to facilitate the calculation of time-limits regarding actions for failure to act, Art. 21, second para. of the Statute provides that for actions based on Art. 265 TFEU, the application must be accompanied by documentary evidence of the date on which the Union institution was requested to act: see, in that regard, T-22/16, Comprojecto-Projectos e Construções and Others v ECB (order), 2017, paras 22–26. 95 See, e.g. T-367/09, Tecnoprocess v Commission (order), 2011, paras 51–55; T-578/14, VSM Geneesmiddelen v Commission (order), 2015, paras 28, 35; T-146/19, García Ruiz v Parliament (order), 2019, para. 22. 96 See, e.g. T-195/95, Guérin Automobiles v Commission (order), 1996, para. 18; T-334/02, Viomichania Syskevasias Typopoiisis Kai Syntirisis Agrotikon Proïonton v Commission (order), 2003, para. 33; T-578/14, VSM Geneesmiddelen v Commission (order), 2015, paras 9, 35; T-590/15, Onix Asigurări v EIOPA (order), 2016, paras 15, 34–36; T-41/18, Autoridad Portuaria de Vigo v Commission (order), 2018, paras 10–11; T-258/18, Brunke v Parliament (order), 2019, para. 25. Conceivably, the Union Courts look at the date when the invitation to act reached the institution, body, office, or agency concerned where applicable: see T-166/98, Cantina sociale di Dolianova and Others v Commission, 2004, para. 81 (set aside on other grounds in C-51/05 P).

Special Characteristics 429 receives the document by which the Union institution, body, office, or agency defined its position.97 If, during the two-month period after being called upon to act, the Union institution, body, office, or agency persists in its failure to act, then the person who called upon it to act may bring an action for failure to act before the Union Courts ‘within a further period of two months’, as prescribed in the second paragraph of Art. 265 TFEU (plus ten days for distance).98 Actions brought out of time are inadmissible.99 In the event that the Union institution, body, office, or agency concerned defines its position before the action is brought before the Union Courts, the action for failure to act will be inadmissible, whereas if the act is adopted after the action for failure to act has been lodged at the Union Courts but before judgment is given, the action becomes devoid of purpose (see para. 8.05).100 However, in the latter case, the Union institution, body, office, or agency exposes itself to having an order for costs made against it, depending on the circumstances.101 (2) Letter of formal notice delimits action The letter of formal notice determines the subject-matter of the action for failure to act.102 The action can relate only to a failure to act which has been previously so raised with the Union institution, body, office, or agency.103 In effect, no ‘new’ failures to act can be brought before the Union Courts. 97 See T-194/97 and T-83/98 Branco v Commission, 2000, paras 23, 55–56; see also, in that regard, C-258/04 P(R), Makhteshim-Agan Holding and Others v Commission (order), 2005, para. 14; T-407/09, Neubrandenburger Wohnungsgesellschaft v Commission (order), 2012, para. 42. 98 See, e.g. T-590/15, Onix Asigurări v EIOPA (order), 2016, para. 33; T-258/18, Brunke v Commission (order), 2019, para. 23. As indicated in para. 23 of that latter order, the sending of a second invitation to act which has the same subject-matter as the first and is based on the same factual or legal situation as the first does not allow the applicant to benefit from a new time-limit for bringing an action based on Art. 265 TFEU. See also, in that regard, T-590/15, Onix Asigurări v EIOPOA (order), 2016, para. 42; T-41/18, Autoridad Portuaria de Vigo v Commission (order), 2018, paras 10–14; T-190/19, BF v Commission (order), 2020, paras 31–38. 99 For some examples, see T-165/08, Química Atlântica et Martins de Freitas Moura v Commission (order), 2008, paras 11–12; T-264/09, Tecnoprocess v Commission and Delegation of the EU in Morocco (order), 2011, paras 91–94; T-590/15, Onix Asigurări v EIOPOA (order), 2016, para. 36; T-258/18, Brunke v Commission (order), 2019, paras 25–26. While the case-law indicates that it is possible in principle for an applicant to show the existence of a case of force majeure or excusable error permitting derogation from the applicable time-limits under the second paragraph of Art. 45 of the Statute, in practice this often fails: see, in that regard, T-334/02, Viomichania Syskevasias Typopoiisis Kai Syntirisis Agrotikon Proïonton v Commission (order), 2003, paras 34–40; T-258/18, Brunke v Commission (order), 2019, para. 25. 100 For a critical view in that regard, see, e.g. J.T. Lang and C. Raftery, ‘Remedies for the Commission’s Failure to Act in “Comitology” Cases’ (2011) 36 E.L.Rev. 265–275, 274; Türk (n. 24) 189–193. 101 See, e.g. T-66/15, Alsharghawi v Council (order), 2015, para. 35; T-544/18, ArceclorMittal Bremen v Commission (order), 2019, paras 40–41; T-368/19, Datenlotsen Informationssysteme v Commission (order), 2020, para. 27; T-161/20, Ighoga Region 10 v Commission (order), 2020, paras 32–34; T-18/21, Be Smart v Commission (order), 2021, paras 29–32. Depending on the circumstances, the Union Courts may, for example, order the parties to pay their own costs (see, e.g. T-620/19, ArcelorMittal Bremen v Commission (order), 2020, paras 20, 29), or for the applicant to pay the costs (see, e.g. T-293/17, Fakro v Commission (order), 2018, paras 49–52, 54, 64). As for what costs can be recovered, see paras 25.17–25.20. 102 See, e.g. T-442/07, Ryanair v Commission, 2011, para. 22; T-832/14, Nutria v Commission, 2016, para. 43; T-768/17, Comprojecto-Projectos e Construções and Others v ECB (order), 2019, paras 43, 45. 103 See, e.g. T-17/96, TFI v Commission, 1996, para. 44; T-334/02 Viomichania Syskevasias Typopoiisis Kai Syntirisis Agrotikon Proïonton v Commission, 2003, para. 46; compare, e.g. T-79/96, T-260/97, and T-117/98, Camar and Tico v Commission and Council, 2000, paras 64–68; T-209/04, Spain v Commission (order), 2005, paras 32, 36–37.

8.24

430 THE ACTION FOR FAILURE TO ACT 8.25

(3) Pleas in law Under the first paragraph of Art. 265 TFEU, the only plea open to the applicant is that the failure to act constitutes an ‘infringement of the Treaties’.104 As has already been mentioned, the expression ‘infringement of the Treaties’ covers any provision of Union law under which an obligation to act arises for the Union institution, body, office, or agency (see para. 8.06). No account is taken of how difficult it may be for the Union institution, body, office, or agency to comply with that obligation.105 Moreover, the assessment of the merits of an action for failure to act depends solely on whether the Union institution, body, office, or agency on which an obligation to act is imposed has unlawfully failed to act; the fact that such a failure to act would have no practical consequences has no bearing on that assessment.106

IV. Consequences 8.26

If the Union Courts find pursuant to Art. 265 TFEU that a Union institution, body, office, or agency has infringed the Treaties by failing to act, that institution, body, office, or agency is required under Art. 266 TFEU to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment.107 The scope of the judgment of the Union Courts is limited. It merely declares that the Union institution, body, office, or agency’s failure to act is illegal,108 and reinforces the duty on that institution, body, office, or agency to act, but it does not take the place of the act which the institution, body, office, or agency failed to adopt.109 The Union Courts cannot issue directions or tell the Union institution, body, office, or agency concerned what act to take in an action based on Art. 265 TFEU, and thus, requests for them to do so are inadmissible.110 The actual discretion as to the type, content, and form of the act required lies with the Union institution, body, office, or agency concerned. Still, as a practical matter, sometimes in circumstances where a Union institution, body, office, or agency has an obligation to take a specific act, it may in fact have very little discretion following the judgment of the Court of Justice or the

104 See also Art. 266, first para., TFEU (‘contrary to the Treaties’). Regarding the difference with the pleas involved in actions for annulment, see, e.g. Barents (n. 12) para. 8.29. 105 See 13/83, Parliament v Council, 1985, para. 48. 106 See T-521/14, Sweden v Commission, 2015, para. 75. 107 See, e.g. T-395/04, Air One v Commission, 2006, para. 24; T-754/18, Hochmann Marketing v Parliament (order), 2019, para. 10. 108 See Art. 265, first para. TFEU (‘may bring an action before the Court of Justice of the European Union to have the infringement established’) (emphasis added). The action for failure to act has been distinguished from infringement proceedings (Arts 258–260 TFEU). See T-451/04, Mediocurso—Estabelecimento de Ensino Particular v Commission (order), 2006, para. 25; see also, in that regard, C-620/16, Commission v Germany, 2019, para. 89; T-423/07, Ryanair v Commission, 2011, para. 26. 109 See, in that regard, T-79/96, T-260/97, and T-117/98, Camar and Tico v Commission and Council, 2000, para. 67. 110 See, e.g. C-52/11 P, Victoria Sánchez v Parliament and Commission (order), 2011, para. 38; C-137/16 P, Petraitis v Commission (order), 2016, paras 31–32; T-853/16, Techniplan v Commission (order), 2017, point 40; T-156/18, Legutko et Poręba v Parliament (order), 2019, para. 47.

Consequences 431 General Court. Therefore, unlike the action for annulment in which the judgment of the Union Courts brings about a legal change—namely, the act is retroactively annulled and ceases to exist in the Union legal order—no such similar change in legal status occurs in the context of the action for failure to act, in the sense that the Union Courts cannot adopt the act that should have been taken.

9 THE OBJECTION OF ILLEGALITY I. Subject-Matter A. General overview (1) Not an independent right of action The objection of illegality enshrined in Art. 277 TFEU1 is an indirect form of legality control set out in the Treaties. It does not constitute an independent right of action. 2 Rather, it is an incidental plea in law,3 which is intended to avoid the application of unlawful Union acts of general application to the detriment of parties who are not—or who are no longer4—entitled to challenge them.5 In other words, the objection of illegality does not stand alone, but may only be raised in the context of one or more direct actions lodged before the Union Courts (see para. 9.17).6 This may explain why it is often called a plea of illegality, since it is not a separate cause of action in and of itself, as, for example, the action for annulment under Art. 263 TFEU or the action for failure to act under Art. 265 TFEU.7 (2) Present Treaty framework It is important to point out that, with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, former Art. 241 EC was reframed as Art. 277 TFEU, which provides: Notwithstanding the expiry of the period laid down in Article 263, sixth paragraph, any party may, in proceedings in which an act of general application adopted by an 1 With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, Art. 277 TFEU applies to objections of illegality in connection with the EAEC Treaty, as Art. 156 EAEC has been repealed: see Art. 106a(1)–(2) EAEC. 2 See, e.g. C-239/99, Nachi Europe, 2001, para. 33; T-529/16, Feral v Committee of Regions, 2019, para. 54. 3 See, e.g. T-392/13, La Ferla v Commission and ECHA, 2016, para. 40; T-494/17, Iccrea Banca v Commission and Others (order), 2018, para. 21; T-611/18, Pharmaceutical Works Polpharma v EMA, 2021, para. 73 (set aside on other grounds in C-438/21 P to C-440/21 P). 4 For the parties entitled to raise an objection of illegality, see paras 9.10–9.13. 5 For a summary of key aspects of the objection of illegality, see T-787/14 P, Commission v Cerafogli, 2016, para. 46. For some examples in which an objection of illegality has been upheld, see T-73/17, RS v Commission, 2018, para 56; T 684/19 and T-704/19, MEKH v ACER, 2022, para. 142. 6 The Union Courts alone are entitled under Art. 277 TFEU to rule that an act of general application is unlawful, so that a party cannot be criticized for not raising an objection of illegality before the relevant Union institution, body, office, or agency: see T‑684/19 and T‑704/19, MEKH v ACER, 2022, paras 47–51. 7 The objection of illegality may be raised as a subsidiary plea (see, e.g. C-11/00, Commission v ECB, 2003, para. 57; T-5/17, Sharif v Council, 2019, para. 37), and an applicant may raise a number of objections of illegality in the same case (see, e.g. T-311/04, Sierra v Commission, 2006, para. 125). Nevertheless, the applicant must comply with the relevant procedural rules. See, in that regard, T-332/15, Ocean Capital Administration v Council, 2020, paras 60–67 (solely the pleas in law raised in the application, and not documents concerning other cases annexed thereto); T-723/18, Barata v Parliament, 2021, paras 57–62 (application held inadmissible for not satisfying the conditions laid down in GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 76(d)). EU Procedural Law. Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak, Oxford University Press. © Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833086.003.0009

9.01

9.02

434 THE OBJECTION OF ILLEGALITY institution, body, office or agency of the Union is at issue, plead the grounds specified in Article 263, second paragraph, in order to invoke before the Court of Justice of the European Union the inapplicability of that act.

Art. 277 TFEU refers to ‘an act of general application’ and no longer to ‘a regulation adopted jointly by the European Parliament and the Council, or a regulation of the Council, of the Commission, or of the ECB [European Central Bank]’, as former Art. 241 EC had done. Art. 277 TFEU also mentions acts of general application adopted not only by a Union institution, but also by a Union body, office, or agency,8 which is in line with adjustments made to the provisions of the Treaties concerning other actions that may be brought before the Union Courts (for example, the action for annulment under Art. 263 TFEU and the action for failure to act under Art. 265 TFEU).9 Accordingly, the Lisbon Treaty introduced important changes regarding the scope of the objection of illegality. In addition, its application may intersect with jurisdictional issues in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (see para. 9.06).

9.03

(3) Essential function The purpose of the objection of illegality is twofold. First, the right to bring an action for annulment is limited, since it must be brought within a short period of time, as prescribed by the sixth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU, and the illegality of acts of general application may not yet become apparent. Thus, there needed to be an indirect possibility so as to allow for a declaration of inapplicability of such acts, as provided by Art. 277 TFEU. Second, with particular regard to natural and legal persons, the idea underlying the Treaty framework is that, in situations where such persons are bringing proceedings to obtain the annulment of acts addressed to them or acts which were not addressed to them but were of direct and individual concern (or now regulatory acts not entailing implementing measures of direct concern to them: see para. 7.87), such acts may be based on illegal Union acts which such persons had no standing to challenge directly in view of the standing requirements under the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU. The objection of illegality therefore provides those persons with an indirect means by which the illegality of such acts can be raised incidentally in such proceedings. Under settled case-law, the objection of illegality set out in Art. 277 TFEU gives expression to a general principle conferring upon any party the right to challenge, for the purpose of obtaining the annulment of an act against which that party may bring an action, the validity of an act of general application adopted by an institution which forms the legal basis of the act which is being attacked, if that party was not entitled to bring a direct

8 See, in that regard, T-828/14, Antrax It v EUIPO, 2017, para. 31: the fact that the measure relative to the particular Union body, office, or agency does not expressly mention the objection of illegality as a collateral legal remedy does not preclude parties from raising such an objection in actions brought before the Union Courts, given that that remedy flows from a general principle affording parties with such a right (see further para. 9.03). 9 See para. 7.71 (action for annulment); and para. 8.16 (action for failure to act). But there are exceptions: see para. 11.24 (action for damages).

Subject-Matter 435 action challenging such an act by which it was thus affected without having been in a position to ask that it be declared void.10 Consequently, the field of application of the objection of illegality extends to acts of general application which are not in the form of a regulation but produce similar effects, and on those grounds could not be challenged in an action for annulment brought by natural or legal persons.11 In so deciding, the Court of Justice intimated that the essential function of the objection of illegality is to enable natural and legal persons to render inapplicable in relation to them an act against which they cannot bring an action for annulment under the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU in a case where they are seeking the annulment of an act adopted by the Union on the basis of that act. (4) Part of the complete and coherent system of judicial protection The objection of illegality under Art. 277 TFEU provides an indirect means of challenging the legality of Union acts and thus ensures protection for natural and legal persons against unlawful acts of Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies. As recognized by the Court of Justice, the objection of illegality is part of the complete and coherent system of legal remedies and procedures set out in the Treaties, alongside the action for annulment and the preliminary ruling procedure on the validity of Union acts, designed to permit the Union Courts to review the legality of such acts.12 Even so, natural and legal persons are not the only parties to have recourse to the objection of illegality. According to Art. 277 TFEU, the objection of illegality can be raised by ‘any party’, thus including Member States and Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies.

9.04

B. Acts against which an objection of illegality may be raised (1) An act of general application Art. 277 TFEU provides that an objection of illegality may be brought against ‘an act of general application’.13 This undoubtedly covers the category of regulations (as former

10 See, e.g. 92/78, Simmenthal v Commission, 1979, para. 39; C-119/19 P and C-126/19 P, Commission v Carreras Sequeros and Others, 2020, para. 67; C-511/21 P, Commission v Calhau Correia de Paiva, 2023, para. 44; T-787/14 P, ECB v Cerafogli, 2016, para. 42; T-611/18, Pharmaceutical Works Polpharma v EMA, 2021, para. 71 (appeal pending in C-438/21 P to C-440/21 P); T-510/17, Del Valle Ruiz and Others v Commission and SRB, 2022, para. 114. 11 See, e.g. 92/78, Simmenthal v Commission, 1979, paras 40– 41; T-140/12, Teva Pharma and Teva Pharmaceuticals v EMA, 2015, para. 50; T-611/18, Pharmaceutical Works Polpharma v EMA, 2021, para. 91 (set aside on other grounds in C-438/21 P to C-440/21 P). 12 See, e.g. 294/03, Les Verts v Parliament, 1986, para. 23; C-583/11 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, 2013, para. 92; C-384/16 P, European Copper Task Force v Commission, 2018, para. 37; C-911/19, FBF, 2021, para. 60; T-818/16, Netflix International and Netflix v Commission, 2018, para. 39; T-521/19, Haswani v Council, 2020, para. 52; T-165/21, Amort and Others v Commission (order), 2021, para. 64; see also C-122/20 P, Gollnisch v Parliament, 2021, paras 60–63. 13 See, e.g. T-611/18, Pharmaceutical Works Polpharma v EMA, 2021, paras 85–96 (set aside on other grounds in C-438/21 P to C-440/21 P) (Commission implementing decision deemed act of general application); compare, e.g. C-542/18 RX-II and C-543/18 RX-II, Review Simpson v Council and HG Commission, 2020, para. 54 (Council decision appointing three judges to the now-defunct EU Civil Service Tribunal does not constitute act of general application). See further para. 7.87.

9.05

436 THE OBJECTION OF ILLEGALITY Art. 241 EC had done), along with directives and decisions to the extent that they are found to be acts of general application.14 With the reform of the system of Union legal instruments brought about by the Lisbon Treaty, regulations, directives, and decisions may be legislative or non-legislative (delegated or implementing) acts.15 The fact that the act of general application invoked in an objection of illegality may be classified as a legislative as opposed to a non-legislative act does not render the objection of illegality inadmissible.16

9.06

(2) CFSP acts As recognized by the Court of Justice,17 while, pursuant to Art. 24(1) TEU and the first paragraph of Art. 275 TFEU, the Union Courts do not generally have jurisdiction with respect to the provisions relating to the CFSP and the acts adopted on the basis of those provisions, the Treaties explicitly establish two exceptions to that rule. First, the second subparagraph of Art. 24(1) TEU and the second paragraph of Art. 275 TFEU provide that the Union Courts have jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Art. 40 TEU.18 Second, the second subparagraph of Art. 24(1) TEU confers on the Union Courts jurisdiction to review the legality of certain decisions referred to in the second paragraph of Art. 275 TFEU. That latter provision confers on the Union Courts jurisdiction to give rulings on actions—brought subject to the conditions laid down in the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU—concerning the review of the legality of Council decisions, adopted on the basis of provisions relating to the CFSP, which provide for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons. In that regard, restrictive measures may resemble measures of general application, in that they impose on a category of addressees determined in a general and abstract manner a prohibition on making available funds and economic resources to entities listed in their annexes, as well as individual decisions affecting those entities. Moreover, with regard to measures adopted on the basis of provisions relating to the CFSP, it is the individual nature of those measures which, in accordance with the second paragraph of Art. 275 TFEU, permits access to the Union Courts.19 Consequently, as the second paragraph of Art. 275 TFEU is directed at all such Council decisions relating to restrictive measures against natural or legal persons, no distinction being made between

14 See, in that regard, Art. 288 TFEU, recognizing decisions with and without addressees; and Art. 297(2) TFEU, providing that regulations, directives addressed to all Member States, and decisions which do not specify to whom they are addressed are to be published in the same way in the Official Journal of the European Union. 15 See Arts 289–291 TFEU. See further K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel (T. Corthaut (ed.)), EU Constitutional Law (OUP, 2021) ch. 27. 16 See F-98/09, Whitehead v ECB, 2011, paras 71, 73. 17 See, e.g. C-72/15, Rosneft, 2017, in particular para. 60; C-134/19 P, Bank Refah Kargaran v Council, 2020, paras 26–27. 18 See, in that regard, C-91/05, Commission v Council, 2008, paras 29–34, in which the Court of Justice ruled that it had jurisdiction to consider an objection of illegality raised in relation to an act of general application falling within the CFSP (in casu, a CFSP joint action under the former Treaty framework) in the context of an action for annulment brought against a decision implementing that joint action insofar as such objection alleged an infringement of what is now Art. 40 TEU (ex Art. 47 EU). 19 See, e.g. C-72/15, Rosneft, 2017, paras 102–103; T-735/14, Gazprom Neft v Council, 2018, paras 52–53.

Subject-Matter 437 decisions of general application or individual decisions, that provision has been found not to preclude the possibility of challenging, by way of an objection of illegality, a provision of general application in support of an action for annulment brought against an individual restrictive measure.20 (3) Linkage between the type of act and the status of the invoking party As mentioned earlier (see para. 9.03), it had already been the case for the purposes of the application of former Art. 241 EC, now Art. 277 TFEU, that any act having similar effects to a regulation would be treated as if it were a regulation, provided that natural or legal persons could not bring an action for annulment against it pursuant to the fourth paragraph of former Art. 230 EC, now Art. 263 TFEU. This meant that acts of general application were covered under the case-law concerning former Art. 241 EC as far as natural and legal persons were concerned. By contrast, Member States and Union institutions, unlike natural and legal persons, are privileged applicants and thus may bring an action for annulment against all sorts of binding acts, whether general or individual in nature (see para. 7.77). Thus, a distinction was made in the case-law concerning former Art. 241 EC with regard to the type of acts which could be the subject of an objection of illegality as far as Member States and Union institutions were concerned. In large part this issue is intertwined with the status of the party invoking the objection of illegality, which is addressed in part II of this chapter.

9.07

As compared with the approach taken by the Union Courts to the interpretation of former Art. 241 EC, in which a Member State or a Union institution could only invoke an objection of illegality against acts of general application in the form of a regulation and not against those in the form of a directive or a decision in line with the wording of that provision, the explicit reference to an act of general application in Art. 277 TFEU means that such an approach might merit some refinement in future case-law.21 Thus far, however, where the objection of illegality has been raised against acts of general application in the form of directives or decisions as a defence by a Member State in infringement proceedings, the Court of Justice has confirmed its traditional approach, holding the objection inadmissible.22 (4) Exclusion of acts of individual application As had been the case under the former Treaty framework, a party may not rely on Art. 277 TFEU in order to challenge the legality of an act of individual application. This follows from the wording of Art. 277 TFEU itself. In the case-law, it is further explained that the party concerned could have applied under Art. 263 TFEU for that act to be

20 See, e.g. T-346/14, Yanukovych v Council, 2016, para. 57; T-348/14, Yanukovych v Council, 2016, para. 58; T-798/14, DenizBank v Council, 2018, para. 162. 21 See, in that regard, C-715/17, C-718/17, and C-719/17, Commission v Poland and Others, AG Sharpston Opinion, 2019, points 178–180. 22 See, e.g. C-37/11, Commission v Czech Republic, 2012, para. 46; C-601/14, Commission v Italy, 2016, para. 33; see further para. 9.12.

9.08

438 THE OBJECTION OF ILLEGALITY annulled, so that legal certainty would be affected if that party were still allowed to challenge such an act by means of an objection of illegality after the time-limit for bringing an action for annulment of the act had expired.23 Exceptions recognized in the case-law are where the party concerned is entitled to entertain reasonable doubt as to the admissibility of an action for annulment of an act whose general or individual scope of application was not clear,24 or where the contested act contains such particularly serious and manifest defects that it could be deemed non-existent.25 Consequently, this case-law, as with the Deggendorf line of case-law concerning the interplay between annulment and preliminary rulings on validity (see para. 10.11), gives expression to the interaction between the direct (annulment) and indirect (objection of illegality) routes of legality control in the Treaties.26 Moreover, it is not sufficient that the act invoked in an objection of illegality has the ‘label’ of a general act. According to the Court of Justice, the general principle, to which Art. 277 TFEU gives expression and which has the effect of ensuring that every person has, or will have had, the opportunity to challenge a Union act which forms the basis of an act adversely affecting him or her, does not in any way preclude a regulation from becoming definitive as against an individual in regard to whom it must be considered to be an act of individual application. In that connection the Court of Justice has referred, in particular, to regulations imposing anti-dumping duties by virtue of their dual nature as acts of a legislative nature and acts liable to be of direct and individual concern to certain traders.27

9.09

(5) The act of general application must be ‘at issue’ Art. 277 TFEU requires the act of general application in respect of which the objection of illegality is raised to be ‘at issue’. This alludes to the fact that an objection of illegality raised under Art. 277 TFEU, when challenging in the main proceedings the legality of another act, is admissible only if there is a link between the contested act and the

23 See, e.g. 156/77, Commission v Belgium, 1978, paras 20–21; C-135/93, Spain v Commission, 1995, para. 17; C-601/19 P, BP v FRA, 2020, paras 27, 34–39; T-15/11, Sina Bank v Council, 2012, para. 43; T-725/17, Hauserman v Parliament, 2019, para. 35; T-110/17, Jiangsu Seraphim Solar System v Commission, 2020, paras 56–64 (appeal pending in C-439/20 P and C-441/20 P); T-611/18, Pharmaceutical Works Polpharma v EMA, 2021, paras 108–149 (set aside on other grounds in C-438/21 P to C-440/21 P). 24 See, e.g. T-343/02, Schintgen v Commission, 2004, para. 26; T‑684/19 and T‑704/19, MEKH v ACER, 2022, para. 54. 25 See, e.g. 226/87 Commission v Greece, 1988, para. 16; C-475/01, Commission v Greece, 2004, paras 18–20; T-91/10, Lucchini v Commission, 2014, paras 70–72. 26 See, in that regard, T-244/93 and T-486/93, TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf v Commission, 1995, para. 103 (though this point was not considered by the Court of Justice on appeal in C-355/95 P); T-15/11, Sina Bank v Council, 2012, para. 43; T-110/17, Jiangsu Seraphim Solar System v Commission, 2020, para. 56 (appeal pending in C-439/20 P and C-441/20 P). It should, however, be noted that there is no strict requirement that no action for annulment of an act of general application could have been brought for the objection of illegality to be admissible. That is so under vested case-law for acts of general application (regulations under the former Treaty text) which Member States could have challenged under Art. 263 TFEU, and yet they may invoke an objection of illegality against such acts, at the very least against regulations. 27 See, e.g. C-11/00, Commission v ECB, 2003, para. 75; T-110/17, Jiangsu Seraphim Solar System v Commission, 2020, in particular para. 63 (appeal pending in C-439/20 P and C-441/20 P); T-440/20, Jindal Saw and Jindal Saw Italia v Commission, 2022, paras 143–152.

Subject-Matter 439 provision forming the subject-matter of that objection.28 As the Union Courts have consistently held, since the purpose of Art. 277 TFEU is not to allow a party to contest the applicability of any general act in support of any action whatsoever, the objection of illegality must be limited to what is necessary for the outcome of the proceedings.29 The general act in respect of which the objection of illegality is raised must be applicable, directly or indirectly, to the issue with which the action is concerned.30 Consequently, in the light of the essential function of the objection of illegality (see para. 9.03), 31 the scope of Art. 277 TFEU extends to provisions of general acts which are relevant for the adoption of the individual act which is the subject of the action insofar as the individual act is essentially based on them, even if they do not formally constitute the legal basis of that individual act.32 The upshot is that in principle an objection of illegality may be raised only against provisions of a general act which constitute the basis of the individual act or which have a direct legal connection with that act.33 By contrast, an objection of illegality covering a general act in respect of which the individual act being challenged does not constitute an implementing measure is inadmissible.34 With the same concern to guarantee the essential function of the objection of illegality, the case-law accepts that Art. 277 TFEU may be raised against acts of general application which cannot be contested for one reason or another, but whose content is nonetheless determinative in the adoption of the individual act which may be directly challenged. For example,35 an objection of illegality may be raised against Commission 28 See, e.g. T-296/12, Health Food Manufacturers’ Association and Others v Commission, 2015, para. 170; T-517/16, Janoha and Others v Commission, 2018, para. 40; T-737/17, Wattiau v Parliament, 2019, para 56; T-249/17, Casino, Guichard-Perrachon and AMC v Commission, 2020, para. 33 (set aside on other grounds in C-690/20 P). 29 See, e.g. T-787/14, ECB v Cerafogli, 2016, para. 44; T-611/18, Pharmaceutical Works Polpharma v EMA, 2021, para. 98 (set aside on other grounds in C-438/21 P to C-440/21 P). The objection of illegality may be limited to certain provisions of the general act whose illegality is claimed: see, e.g. T-296/12, Health Food Manufacturers’ Association and Others v Commission, 2015, para. 174. 30 See, e.g. 32/65, Italy v Council and Commission, 1966 ECR 389, 409; C-119/19 P and C-126/19 P, Commission v Carreras Sequeros and Others, 2020, para. 68; C-601/19 P, BP v FRA, 2020, para. 28; C-511/21 P, Commission v Calhau Correia de Paiva, 2023, para. 45; T-787/14 P, ECB v Cerafogli, 2016, para. 44; T-286/15, KF v SatCen, 2018, para. 156; T-611/18, Pharmaceutical Works Polpharma v EMA, 2021, para. 98 (set aside on other grounds in C-438/21 P to C-440/21 P); T-510/17, Del Valle Ruiz and Others v Commission and SRB, 2022, para. 115. 31 Under the case-law, Art. 277 TFEU must be interpreted sufficiently broadly to enable effective judicial review of the legality of acts of the institutions of a general nature in favour of persons excluded from direct actions against such acts: see, e.g. T-737/17, Wattiau v Parliament, 2019, para. 57. 32 See, e.g. T-787/14 P, ECB v Cerafogli, 2016, para. 44; T-517/16, Janoha and Others v Commission, 2018, para. 41; T-131/19, Oosterbosch v Parliament, 2020, para. 55. 33 See, e.g. C-119/19 P and C-126/19 P, Commission v Carreras Sequeros and Others, 2020, para. 69 (satisfied: see paras 71–77); C-601/19 P, BP v FRA, 2020, para. 29 (not satisfied: see para. 40); C-511/21 P, Commission v Calhau Correia de Paiva, 2023, para. 46 (satisfied: see paras 54–66); T-517/16, Janoha and Others v Commission, 2018, para. 40 (satisfied: see paras 42–47); T‑684/19 and T‑704/19, MEKH v ACER, 2022, para. 58 (satisfied: see para. 59). This may apply in respect of provisions of one general act, as opposed to another act (see T-175/18, Ruhorimbere v Council, 2020, para. 154), but not to preparatory measures for the general act (see T-140/12, Teva Pharma and Teva Pharmaceuticals v Commission, 2015, para. 53; compare T-611/18, Pharmaceutical Works Polpharma v EMA, 2021, paras 100–106 (set aside on other grounds in C-438/21 P to C-440/21 P)). 34 See C‑432/98 P and C‑433/98 P, Council v Chvatal and Others, 2000, para. 33; C-119/19 P and C-126/19 P, Commission v Carreras Sequeros and Others, 2020, para. 70; C-601/19 P, BP v FRA, 2020, para. 30; C-511/21 P, Commission v Calhau Correia de Paiva, 2023, para. 47. In that latter judgment, the Court considered that, similar to the case-law concerning competition notices in the staff context (see para. 9.17), such a direct legal connection presupposes that the individual act constitutes an implementing measure of the general act whose illegality is invoked (see para. 51). 35 See also, e.g. C-584/20 P, Commission v Landesbank Baden-Württemberg and SRB, 2021, paras 126–142 (Commission delegated regulation in the context of the banking union); T-3/00 and T-337/04, Pitsiorlas v Council

440 THE OBJECTION OF ILLEGALITY guidelines in the context of the competition36 and State aid37 rules, since although such guidelines do not constitute the legal basis of the contested measure, they nonetheless determine the criteria which the Commission has bound itself to apply when making the relevant assessment.

II. Identity of the Parties 9.10

Under Art. 277 TFEU, ‘any party’ may raise an objection of illegality.

A. Natural and legal persons 9.11

‘Any party’ within the meaning of Art. 277 TFEU covers, first, natural and legal persons who normally are unable to challenge before the Union Courts the act against which the objection of illegality is raised (see para. 9.08). Natural or legal persons may therefore raise an objection against acts of general application, provided that the act concerned applies to the issue with which the application is concerned.38

B. Member States and Union institutions 9.12

In order to ascertain the types of acts of general application which may be raised by Member States and Union institutions under Art. 277 TFEU, the approach taken by the Union Courts to this issue under the former Treaty framework is relevant. By way of background, there was considerable debate in the commentary concerning former Art. 241 EC and the kinds of acts in relation to which an objection of illegality may be

and ECB, 2007, paras 178–257 (ECB Rules of Procedure); T-177/12, Spraylat v ECHA, 2014, paras 25–29 (ECHA Management Board decision on the classification of services for which charges are levied); T-550/17, Troszczynski v Parliament, 2018 (European Parliament Rules of Procedure). For examples in the context of staff cases, see para. 9.17. 36 With regard to the competition rules, see, e.g. C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P, and C-213/02 P, Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission, 2005, paras 212–213; T-217/03 and T-245/03, FNCBV and Others v Commission, 2006, para. 250; T-386/10, Aloys F. Dornbracht v Commission, 2013, in particular paras 68–79; see also, e.g. as regards: Regulation No. 1/2003, T-249/17, Casino, Guichard-Perrachon and AMC v Commission, 2020, paras 27–44 (set aside on other grounds in C-690/20 P); Regulation No. 139/2004, T-425/18, Altice Europe v Commission, 2021, para. 67 (appeal pending in C-746/21 P). 37 With regard to State aid, see, e.g. T-394/08, T-408/08, T-453/08, and T-454/08, Regione autonoma della Sardegna and Others v Commission, 2011, paras 206–211; T-52/12, Greece v Commission, 2014, paras 152–155; see also, e.g. as regards: the Union framework applicable to State aid in the form of public service compensation, T-219/14, Regione autonoma della Sardegna v Commission, 2017, paras 188–203; a block exemption regulation, T-745/17, Kerkosand v Commission, 2020, para. 63; the Temporary Framework for State aid, T-628/20, Ryanair v Commission, 2021, para. 70 (appeal pending in C-441/21 P). 38 As already mentioned, an objection of illegality cannot be raised by a natural or legal person against an act of a dual nature, such that it should be considered to constitute an individual act as regards the natural or legal person concerned, with the result that such person could undoubtedly have sought its annulment under the fourth paragraph of Art 263 TFEU: see para. 9.08.

Identity of the Parties 441 raised by the Member States and Union institutions. Their status as privileged applicants in annulment proceedings, according to one school of thought, precluded them from raising an objection of illegality in respect of acts whose annulment they could have asked for, so as not to undermine the principle of legal certainty.39 Other commentators, including a number of Advocates General,40 took a different view, based, in particular, on the explicit reference to ‘any party’ in that provision and the function of the objection of illegality.41 Consequently, with regard to the interpretation of former Art. 241 EC, the Union Courts took the following approach. On the one hand, as expressly confirmed in the Court of Justice’s judgment in Commission v ECB,42 a Member State or Union institution could raise an objection of illegality against a regulation which it could have challenged directly via an action for annulment, but did not.43 In that judgment, the Court held that the objection of illegality invoked by the ECB was admissible based on the wording of former Art. 241 EC—referring to ‘any party’, thus including privileged applicants—and the fact that the regulation at issue was of a general or legislative character. That judgment has been confirmed in later case-law.44 On the other hand, privileged applicants were not entitled to raise an objection of illegality against directives or decisions, since that possibility was not provided for in any Treaty provision.45 In particular, it is settled case-law that, in the context of infringement proceedings, a Member State is precluded, in the absence of a Treaty provision expressly permitting it to do so, from challenging the legality of a directive or decision addressed to it as a defence to such an action that it failed to fulfil its obligations in relation to that directive or decision. That case-law has been confirmed under Art. 277 TFEU.46

39 See, inter alia, G. Bebr, ‘Judicial Remedy of Private Parties Against Normative Acts of the European Communities: The Role of the Exception of Illegality’ (1966) C.M.L.Rev. 7; J. Usher, ‘The Interrelationship of Articles 173, 177 and 184 [now Arts 263, 267 and 277 TFEU]’ (1979) E.L.Rev. 37; D. Sinaniotis, ‘The Plea of Illegality in EC Law’ (2001) E.P.L. 103. 40 See, e.g. C-11/00, Commission v ECB, AG Jacobs Opinion, 2002, points 190–194; C-442/04, Spain v Council, AG Bot Opinion, 2008, points 50–67. 41 See, inter alia, R. H. Lauwaars, Lawfulness and Legal Force of Community Decisions (Sitjthoff, 1973) 277– 279; A. Barav, ‘The Exception of Illegality in Community Law: A Critical Analysis’ (1974) C.M.L.Rev. 366; P. Dubois, ‘L’exception d’illégalité devant la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes’ (1978) C.D.E. 407; H. G. Schermers and D. F. Waelbroeck, Judicial Protection in the European Union (6th edn, Kluwer, 2001) 491; M. Vogt, ‘Indirect Judicial Protection in EC Law—The Case of the Plea of Illegality’ (2006) E.L.Rev. 364. 42 See C-11/00, Commission v ECB, 2003, paras 74–78. 43 It is worth noting that, as long ago as 1966, the Court of Justice implicitly accepted that Member States could raise an objection of illegality against provisions of a Council regulation and a Commission regulation in an action for the annulment of another Council regulation. Although it did not consider whether Member States were entitled to invoke what is now Art. 277 TFEU, it did reject the objection on the ground that it was directed against provisions of a regulation which were not applicable to the issue with which the application was concerned. See 32/65, Italy v Council and Commission, 1966. 44 See C-442/04, Spain v Council, 2008, para. 22; T-529/16, Feral v Committee of Regions, 2019, para. 53. 45 See, e.g. C-135/93, Spain v Commission, 1995, para. 17; C-86/03, Greece v Commission, 2005, para. 86; see also C-241/01, National Farmers’ Union, 2002, paras 34–39 (involving action before a national court). 46 See, e.g. C-37/11, Commission v Czech Republic, 2012, para. 46; C-601/14, Commission v Italy, 2016, para. 33; C-620/16, Commission v Germany, 2019, para. 89. As indicated in the foregoing case-law, the position could be different only if the directive or decision would be considered a non-existent act. Likewise, the Commission cannot, in infringement proceedings, claim that a directive, the provisions of which were complied with by the Member State concerned, is unlawful with a view to demonstrating the existence of an infringement by that Member State of a Treaty provision: see C-475/01, Commission v Greece, 2004, paras 17, 18, 24–25. Such an issue arose in other

442 THE OBJECTION OF ILLEGALITY The general approach as to the possibility for Member States and Union institutions to raise an objection of illegality against acts of general application in the form of directives or decisions might nevertheless have to be refined—in particular, outside the context of infringement proceedings47 —in view of the fact that Art. 277 TFEU expressly refers to acts of general application and no longer solely to regulations, as former Art. 241 EC had done. Development in the case-law is awaited as to how the Union Courts will reconcile Art. 277 TFEU with the requirement of legal certainty.

C. Union bodies, offices, and agencies 9.13

Although there is no case-law so far, the reference to ‘any party’ in Art. 277 TFEU presumably includes an objection of illegality invoked by a Union body, office, or agency within the meaning of that provision.

D. Objection raised by the parties and exceptionally by the Union Courts 9.14

In principle, an objection of illegality must be raised by one of the parties in any direct action before the Union Courts (see para. 9.17).48 Nevertheless, the Union Courts may consider of their own motion whether an act of general application constituting the basis for the act contested in the proceedings is unlawful.49 The Union Courts may do so, in particular, where the act of general application may potentially be unlawful for lack of competence or infringement of an essential procedural requirement (see para. 7.162).

contexts, such as in an action for annulment (see, e.g. C-86/03 Greece v Commission, 2005, para. 86) and a preliminary ruling on validity (see, e.g. C-241/01, National Farmers’ Union, 2002, paras 34–39). 47 See, in that regard, C-620/16, Commission v Germany, 2019, paras 69–71, 89–91: while the Member State concerned withdrew the objection of illegality based on Art. 277 TFEU, the Court nevertheless underlined, in the light of the distinction between actions for infringement and actions for annulment and failure to act in the system of remedies established by the Treaties, that the case-law generally precluding a Member State, in the absence of a Treaty provision expressly permitting it to do so, from pleading, as a defence in an infringement action, the unlawfulness of a directive or decision addressed to it applies, mutatis mutandis, to a decision of a general nature not formally addressed to that Member State. 48 There do not seem to be clear indications in the case-law so far regarding whether an intervener may raise an objection of illegality, although it should be noted that an intervener cannot raise new pleas: see paras 23.02–23.03. See also CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 125; and GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 82 (indicating that where the European Parliament, the Council, or the Commission is not a party to a case, the Court of Justice or the General Court, respectively, will send to them copies of the application and defence, without the annexes thereto, to enable them to assess whether the inapplicability of one of their acts is being invoked under Art. 277 TFEU); with respect to other Union institutions, such as the ECB, see, e.g. C. Zilioli and G. Buono, ‘A New Kid on the Block: The European Central Bank Before the Union Courts’, Yearbook on Procedural Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural Law, 2020) , 41, 64–67. 49 See C-601/19 P, BP v FRA, 2020, para. 47.

Special Characteristics 443

III. Special Characteristics A. Special requirements for admissibility (1) Direct action must be admissible An objection of illegality is admissible only insofar as the direct action in connection with which it is raised is admissible.50 The applicant’s interest in successfully raising an objection of illegality against the general act on which the contested individual act is based coincides with its interest in succeeding with its application for the annulment of that individual act. If the general act is declared inapplicable, the individual act loses its legal basis and the action for annulment of that act will succeed. If the objection is raised by the defendant, its interest in obtaining a declaration that a Union act which it has allegedly infringed is inapplicable is likewise self-evident. (2) Other conditions As already noted, an objection of illegality may be raised only in respect of an act of general application which is applicable to the issue with which the application is concerned (see para. 9.09). An objection of illegality must be raised in time, in principle in the application or the defence.51 To be clear, however, the possibility of raising an objection of illegality in relation to an act of general application is not restricted to a period of time.52 According to Art. 277 TFEU (‘Notwithstanding the expiry of the period laid down in Article 263, sixth paragraph’ TFEU), an objection of illegality may be raised against an act of general application outside the time-limit for bringing an action for annulment against it. This is also in line with the essential function of the objection (see para. 9.03). Moreover, an objection of illegality may be held inadmissible if it infringes the principle of res judicata, but as illustrated by the case-law so far, several requirements must be fulfilled for that to be the case.53

50 See C-69/19 P, Credito Fondario v SRB, 2020, para. 64; T-546/16, Tataram v Commission, 2018, para. 33; T-338/20, KI v eu-LISA (order), 2021, para. 60. 51 As the General Court has recognized, there is no requirement for an objection of illegality to be raised formally, and such an objection can be raised implicitly where it is relatively clear from the application. See, e.g. T-829/16, Mouvement pour une Europe des nations and des libertés v Parliament, 2018, para. 66; T-746/19, GY v ECB, 2021, para. 21; T-203/20, Al-Imam v Council, 2021, para. 39. An objection of illegality expressly raised for the first time in the reply is admissible if it constitutes the amplification of a plea raised by implication in the application: see, e.g. C-442/04, Spain v Council, 2008, paras 23–24; T-45/06 Reliance Industries v Council and Commission, 2008, paras 62–66. Otherwise, it is inadmissible according to the general bar against new pleas: see, e.g. T-94/98, Alferink, 2008, paras 38–39; T‑351/18 and T‑584/18, Ukrselhosprom PCF and Versobank v ECB, 2021, para. 375 (appeal pending in C-803/21 P). An objection of illegality raised for the first time on appeal is inadmissible: see, e.g. C-10/18 P, Mowi v Commission, 2020, paras 125–127; C-342/19 P, De Masi and Varoufakis v ECB, 2020, paras 37–41. 52 See, in that regard, F-98/09, Whitehead v ECB, 2011, para. 74. 53 See C-442/04, Spain v Council, 2008, para. 25; T-288/15, Ezz and Others v Council, 2018, paras 45–54; see, also, with regard to a challenge to the admissibility of an objection of illegality on the basis of lis pendens: T-246/08 and T-322/08, Melli Bank v Council, 2009, paras 31–37.

9.15

9.16

444 THE OBJECTION OF ILLEGALITY

B. Actions in which an objection of illegality may be raised 9.17

(1) Any direct action An objection of illegality may be raised in any direct action which may be brought before the Union Courts. Objections of illegality are raised most often in the context of an action for annulment under Art. 263 TFEU. Such an objection may also be raised in an action for failure to act under Art. 265 TFEU, either by the defendant Union institution, body, office, or agency, where it asserts that the act of general application which, the applicant claims, gives rise to an obligation for it to act is unlawful, or by the applicant, where it argues that an act of general application which the defendant Union institution, body, office, or agency invokes in order to deny the existence of any obligation to act is unlawful.54 That being said, it is not as easy to raise an objection of illegality in the context of an action for failure to act. Where the Union institution, body, office, or agency concerned has failed to act, the applicant can sometimes only presume on what general act the failure to act is based. Once the Union institution, body, office, or agency indicates the general act on which its failure to act is based, it has defined its position and the action for failure to act becomes inadmissible. In addition, it should be possible for a Member State to defend itself against an action for infringement under Arts 258–260 TFEU by raising an objection of illegality against an act of general application pursuant to Art. 277 TFEU, but as mentioned above (see para. 9.12), under the present case-law that possibility is restricted to regulations. In principle, it is also possible to raise an objection of illegality in the context of an action for damages against the Union under Art. 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Art 340 TFEU.55 In practice, however, recourse to such an objection in this connection may be of little utility. The illegality of the general act against which the objection is raised admittedly results in the act being declared inapplicable, but it does not as such result in a determination that the Union has incurred non-contractual liability, irrespective of whether the general act allegedly caused damage directly or because that act served as the legal basis for the individual act which caused the damage incurred by the applicant. There are also other requirements that must be satisfied. Moreover, an objection of illegality has considerable importance in staff cases under Art. 270 TFEU.56 Indeed, in this context an objection of illegality may be invoked against provisions of various types of acts of general application, such as the Staff

54 See 32/58 and 33/58, SNUPAT v High Authority, 1959 ECR 127, 139 (in that case under the now-expired ECSC Treaty, the action for failure to act was in fact an action to annul a tacit refusal). 55 See, e.g. T-271/04, Citymo v Commission, 2007, para. 118 (objection of illegality dismissed); T-168/12, Georgias and Others v Council and Commission, 2014, paras 35, 125 (objection of illegality found admissible, but dismissed on the merits); T-201/17, Printeos v Commission, 2019, paras 37, 40, 69 (no need to rule on objection of illegality) (set aside on other grounds in C-301/19 P). 56 Art. 277 TFEU is applicable to acts based on Art. 270 TFEU: see, e.g. F-29/09, Lebedef and Jones v Commission, 2010, para. 29; T-529/16, Feral v Committee of the Regions, 2019, para. 53. Art. 270 TFEU applies to staff cases in connection with the EAEC Treaty, as Art. 152 EAEC has been repealed: see Art. 106a(1)–(2) EAEC.

Special Characteristics 445 Regulations;57 the Conditions of Employment;58 an agreement between the Union institutions, Luxembourg, and an association representing the hospitals of that Member State on the basis of the Staff Regulations;59 a competition notice;60 and internal guidelines for the annual review of salaries and bonuses.61 Importantly, though, an objection of illegality is subject to certain admissibility requirements according to the applicable rules governing staff disputes (see Ch. 16).62 (2) Not in proceedings for a preliminary ruling An objection of illegality cannot be raised before the Court of Justice in proceedings for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation or validity of Union law under Art. 267 TFEU, since such proceedings are not direct actions brought before the Union Courts. Nevertheless, under settled case-law, Art. 277 TFEU expresses a general principle of law under which the applicant must, in proceedings brought under national law against the rejection of its application, be able to plead the illegality of a Union act on which the national decision adopted in its regard is based, and the question of the validity of that Union act may thus be referred to the Court in proceedings for a preliminary ruling.63 In this way, similar results are achieved in the sense that, through the preliminary ruling on validity, a party is able to challenge the legality of Union acts of general application.

9.18

C. Pleas in law By virtue of Art. 277 TFEU, any party may plead the grounds specified in the second paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU in order to claim that an allegedly unlawful act of general

57 See, e.g. C-460/18 P, HK v Parliament, 2019; C-119/19 P and C-126/19 P, Commission v Carreras Sequeros and Others, 2020; C-517/18 P and C-518/18 P, Alvarez y Bejarano and Others v Commission, 2021; T-73/17, RS v Commission, 2018, para. 56; T-81/18, Barata v Parliament, 2020, para. 108. With regard to the staff regulations of Union bodies, see, e.g. T-286/15, KF v SatCen, 2018, paras 154–161. 58 See, e.g. T-79/17, Schoonjans v Commission, 2018, paras 39–51; T-39/18, VF v ECB, 2019, paras 71–79. 59 See, e.g. T-737/17, Wattiau v Parliament, 2019, paras 58–59. 60 See, e.g. C-511/21 P, Commission v Calhau Correia de Paiva, 2023, paras 48–66, in which the Court clarified that the concept of ‘close link’ presupposes that the provisions of the competition notice whose illegality is invoked have been applied in support of the individual decision which is the subject of the action. In that respect, account must be taken of the substantive, and not merely formal, reasons of the contested decision, and the existence of such a close link must therefore be rejected where the provisions of the competition notice have no connection with the reasons underlying the contested decision. In those proceedings, the Court confirmed the existence of such a close link between the statement of reasons for the contested decision and the provisions of the competition notice at issue. 61 See, e.g. T-39/18, VF v ECB, 2019, paras 142–145 (ECB guidelines for the annual review of salaries and bonuses); see also T-788/16, De Geoffroy v Parliament, 2018, para. 82 (European Parliament internal guidelines on leave management); T‑77/18 and T‑567/18, VE v ESMA, 2020, paras 55–83 (ESMA appraisal manual); T-389/19 to T-394/19, T-397/19, T-398/19, T-403/19, T-404/19, T-406/19, T-407/19, T-409/19 to T-414/19, T-416/19 to T-418/19, T-420/19 to T-422/19, T-425/19 to T-427/19, T-429/19 to T-432/19, T-435/19, T-436/19, T-438/19 to T-442/19, T-444/19 to T-446/19, T-448/19, T-450/19 to T-454/19, T-463/19, and T-465/19, Coppo Gavazzi and Others v Parliament, 2020, paras 188–192 (rules governing the payment of expenses and allowances to Members of the European Parliament). 62 See, in particular, T-787/14 P, ECB v Cerafogli, 2016, paras 47–79 (holding that an objection of illegality should be declared admissible where it is raised for the first time before the Union Courts by derogation from the rule of correspondence between the application and the complaint). 63 See, e.g. C-441/05, Roquette Frères, 2007, para. 39; C-343/07, Bavaria and Bavaria Italia, 2009, para. 38.

9.19

446 THE OBJECTION OF ILLEGALITY application is inapplicable. The pleas of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers (see paras 7.161–7.194) are therefore potentially available in support of an objection of illegality.64

IV. Consequences 9.20

If an objection of illegality is successfully raised, the act of general application to which it relates is declared inapplicable for the purposes of the proceedings in which the objection was raised.65 It is inapplicable only in relation to the parties involved in those proceedings; that is, in principle it has inter partes and not erga omnes effects.66 The act of general application subsists as far as third parties are concerned.67 Nevertheless, the Union institution, body, office, or agency which adopted the act declared inapplicable may be under a duty to withdraw or adjust the effects in order to eliminate the illegality found from the Union legal order.68 Additionally, the case-law recognizes the possibility for the partial inapplicability of such act under Article 277 TFEU where the provisions are severable.69

64 See, e.g. T-15/11, Sina Bank v Council, 2012, para. 46; T-392/13, La Ferla v Commission and ECHA, 2016, para. 42. 65 See, in that regard, C-440/14 P, NIOC v Council, AG Cruz Villalón Opinion, 2015, points 66, 69 (emphasizing inapplicability, and not a declaration of invalidity, of the act concerned in the case of Art. 277 TFEU). 66 See, e.g. 15/73 to 33/73, 52/73 to 53/73, 57/73 to 109/73, 116/73 to 117/73, 123/73, 132/73, and 135/73 to 137/73, Schots (née Kortner) and Others v Council and Others, 1974, paras 36–38; C-434/98 P, Council v Busacca and Others, 2000, para. 26; T-787/14 P, Commission v Cerafogli, 2016, paras 45, 46, 53; T-77/18 and T 567/18, VE v ESMA, 2020, para. 56; T-611/18, Pharmaceutical Works Polpharma v EMA, 2021, para. 72 (set aside on other grounds in C-438/21 P to C-440/21 P). 67 Nevertheless, the declaration that the act is inapplicable may have indirect effects on third parties. For instance, if the implementation of the general act was determined by an individual act which was addressed to a number of persons, the annulment of the implementing measure on account of the non-applicability of the general act might also alter the legal position of persons to whom the implementing measure was addressed, but who did not bring proceedings against it. In such a situation, the Court of Justice or the General Court may restrict the effects of the declaration of nullity if such a step is necessary to protect the interests of third parties: see para. 7.220. 68 See, in that regard, 75/82 and 117/82, Razzouk and Beydoun v Commission, 1984, para. 19; 14/60, 16/60, 17/60, 20/60, 24/60, 26/60, 27/60, and 1/61, Meroni and Others v High Authority, AG Lagrange Opinion, 1961 ECR 161, 174; 9/60 and 12/60, Vloeberghs v High Authority, AG Roemer Opinion, 1961 ECR 197, 227; 33/87, Christianos v Court of Justice, AG Cruz Vilaça Opinion, 1988, points 31–34. See further C. M. Capdevila, ‘The Action for Annulment, the Preliminary Reference on Validity and the Plea of Illegality: Complementary or Alternative Means?’ (2006) Y.E.L. 451, 472; L. Coutron, La contestation incidente des actes de l’Union européenne (Bruylant, 2007) 557–714; M. T. Karayigit, ‘The Plea of Illegality as a Pillar of the Incidental Review’ (2019) E.P.L. 689, 704– 705; J.-L. Sauron and A. Grasso, Droit processual européen: Procédures devant la Cour de justice, le Tribunal et la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme (Legitech, 2021) 206. 69 See, e.g. T-788/16, De Geoffroy v Parliament, 2018, para. 81.

10 PRELIMINARY RULINGS ON THE VALIDITY OF UNION ACTS I. Subject-Matter A. General overview (1) Purpose Art. 267 TFEU confers jurisdiction on the Court of Justice of the European Union1 to give preliminary rulings on the validity of ‘acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union’.2 What this involves is a review of the validity of a given Union act as a step in proceedings before a national court in which the validity of that act is at issue, but the national court does not resolve that question itself, referring it instead to the Court of Justice for its assessment. Preliminary rulings on the validity of Union law are, like those concerning the interpretation of Union law (see Ch. 6), subject to the requirements placed on orders for reference3 (see Ch. 3), and the Court of Justice may be presented with questions concerning both the validity and the interpretation of Union law in orders for reference submitted by national courts.4 1 At present, the preliminary ruling jurisdiction is vested with the Court of Justice. However, it is envisaged in the first subpara of Art. 256(3) TFEU that the General Court may be conferred jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings in specific areas laid down by the Statute. See Request submitted by the Court of Justice pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 281 [TFEU], with a view to amending Protocol (No. 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, available on the Court’s website (under ‘Institution’, ‘Various documents’). See further para. 2.43. 2 Art. 267, first para., indent (b), TFEU. See also Art. 19(3)(b) TEU, which refers in more succinct language to ‘acts adopted by the institutions’. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, Art. 267 TFEU applies to preliminary rulings in connection with the EAEC Treaty, as Art. 150 EAEC has been repealed: see Art. 106a (1)–(2) EAEC. Moreover, ex Art. 41 ECSC provided: ‘The Court shall have sole jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on the validity of acts of the High Authority [Commission] and of the Council where such validity is in issue in proceedings brought before a national court or tribunal.’ In case a question regarding the validity of such acts would be at issue before a national court, the Court considers itself competent to rule on that question: see C-221/88, Busseni, 1990, para. 16; C-119/05, Lucchini, 2007, para. 41. 3 See C-77/09, Gowan Comércio Internacional e Serviços, 2010, paras 24–27. 4 See C-15/05, Kawasaki Motors Europe, 2006; C-45/05, Maatschap Schonewille-Prins, 2007; C-558/07, S.P.C.M. and Others, 2009; C-22/08 and C-23/08, Vatsouras and Koupatantze, 2009; C-309/10, Agrana Zucker, 2011. See further C-344/04, IATA and ELFAA, 2006, para. 25: in the main proceedings, the claimants contested the validity of a regulation. This led the referring court to submit a question on the interpretation of Art. 267 TFEU in connection with the obligation placed on national courts to refer questions on the validity of Union acts. In response to a challenge to the admissibility of that reference, the Court of Justice ruled that the fact that the referring court has at the same time referred questions on the validity of that regulation and that the answers provided to it may dispose of the main proceedings ‘cannot call into question the relevance which the question on the interpretation of Art. 267 TFEU possesses in itself ’.

EU Procedural Law. Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak, Oxford University Press. © Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833086.003.0010

10.01

448 PRELIMINARY RULINGS ON THE VALIDITY OF UNION ACTS Importantly, Art. 267 TFEU contains no obligation for national courts and tribunals to make a reference for a preliminary ruling in the case of courts and tribunals against whose decisions there is a ‘judicial remedy under national law’ (see paras 3.44–3.45) but, as already mentioned, the Court of Justice has decided that even these courts and tribunals have no jurisdiction themselves to declare that Union acts are invalid (see paras 3.56–3.57). Consequently, they, too, are under an obligation to submit the question of validity to the Court of Justice whenever they regard a Union act as invalid.5

10.02

(2) Topics to be discussed Similar to the treatment of preliminary rulings on the interpretation of Union law (see Ch. 6), the request for a preliminary ruling on the validity of Union law raises generally three main issues. The first relates to the subject-matter of the preliminary ruling on validity (what acts may be subject to such a ruling and what acts—for example, international agreements—can be used to assess the validity of Union acts), as well as broader issues relating to the interplay between the indirect route of a preliminary ruling on validity and the direct route provided in the Treaties for challenging the legality of Union acts, namely, the action for annulment (Part I, section B). The second relates to special characteristics of the review of validity of a Union act in preliminary ruling proceedings, which invites discussion of the differences between a preliminary ruling on validity and the action for annulment (Part II). The third relates to the consequences of a preliminary ruling on validity, examining the erga omnes and ex tunc effects of a declaration of invalidity and comparing them with the declaration of nullity in the context of an action for annulment (Part III). In this way, a common theme running through the topics discussed in this chapter is the place of preliminary rulings on validity in the context of a complete and coherent system of judicial protection in the European Union, especially when it comes to its relationship with the action for annulment.6

B. Acts of which the legality can be reviewed 10.03

(1) Acts excluded from review The Treaties themselves and all Union rules of constitutional rank generally fall outside the ambit of preliminary rulings on the validity of Union acts.7 Those rules constitute in fact the yardstick against which the validity of such acts is reviewed.8 In addition, the 5 See 314/85, Foto-Frost, 1987, paras 12–20. 6 See K. Lenaerts, ‘The Rule of Law and the Coherence of the Judicial System of the European Union’ (2007) C.M.L.Rev. 1625–1659. 7 See C-521/20, OM (order), 2021, para. 14. 8 As provided by the Treaties, some acts of the European Council and the Council can be regarded as ‘constitutional’ acts having the status of primary Union law because their entry into force depends upon their being adopted by the Member States in accordance with their constitutional requirements. See further K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel (T. Corthaut (ed.)), EU Constitutional Law (OUP, 2021) para. 24.009. However, to the extent that these acts are acts of a Union institution, they may be the subject of references for preliminary rulings on their validity. See C-370/12, Pringle, 2012, paras 34–36, relating to a decision adopted by the European Council pursuant to Art. 48(6) TEU. See further, with regard to acts adopted by Representatives of the Governments of the Member States,

Subject-Matter 449 Court of Justice has held that ‘a preliminary ruling of the Court does not rank among the acts of the [Union] institutions whose validity is open to review in proceedings under [Art. 267 TFEU]’.9 Undoubtedly, that ruling must be extended to cover any judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which, as a result, remains outside the scope of review by way of preliminary rulings on validity. However, the fact that the Court of Justice has already given a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of a Union act does not preclude the Court from ruling on the validity of the same act in a later judgment.10 (2) Union acts regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy With respect to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the Court of Justice has generally not been conferred jurisdiction, subject to two exceptions provided for in Art. 24(1) TEU and Art. 275 TFEU: it has jurisdiction, first, to monitor compliance with Art. 40 TEU and, second, to rule on proceedings brought under the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU reviewing the legality of decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural and legal persons adopted by the Council on the basis of Chapter Two of Title V of the TEU (concerning specific provisions on the CFSP).11 In Rosneft,12 the Court held that these provisions, interpreted in conjunction with Art. 19 TEU and Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter), also mean that the Court has jurisdiction under Art. 267 TFEU to give preliminary rulings on the validity of acts adopted in relation to the CFSP falling within the scope ratione materiae of Art. 40 TEU or Art. 275 TFEU. While this was less controversial in relation to Art. 40 TEU, as the Court’s jurisdiction to monitor compliance with that provision was not limited to a particular procedure,13 Art. 24(1) and Art. 275 TFEU appeared to limit the Court’s jurisdiction to review the legality of restrictive measures to actions for annulment based on Art. 263 TFEU. Nonetheless, the Court established its jurisdiction to rule on the legality of restrictive measures under Art. 267 TFEU in that judgment on two principal grounds. First, the Court relied on the fact that an essential characteristic of the complete system of legal remedies is that natural and legal persons have a right to challenge the legality of Union acts, either directly via an action for annulment or indirectly before the national courts, which may or must

C-685/20 P, Sharpston v Council and Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (order), 2021, para. 46; C‑59/18 and C‑182/18, Italy v Council, 2022, para. 61. 9 69/85, Wünsche (order), 1986, para. 16. 10 See C-393/99 and C-394/99, Hervein and Others, 2002, para. 27. Consequently, a judgment giving a preliminary ruling on interpretation does not therefore implicitly rule on the validity of the act interpreted. 11 See Art. 24(1), second subpara. TEU; Art. 275 TFEU. 12 See C-72/15, Rosneft, 2017, para. 81. However, as indicated in that judgment (see paras 76, 81, 98, 99, 102, 103, 107), the Court has no jurisdiction to deliver preliminary rulings in respect of provisions of CFSP acts which do not constitute restrictive measures against natural or legal persons within the meaning of the second paragraph of Art. 275 TFEU, but rather are measures of general application. See also, in that regard, C-348/12 P, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, 2013, para. 99; C-351/22, Neves 77 Solutions, pending; T-67/12, Sina Bank, 2014, paras 38–43, 46–50; T-735/14, Gazprom Neft v Council, 2018, paras 52–62. 13 See C-72/15, Rosneft, 2017, paras 62–63.

10.04

450 PRELIMINARY RULINGS ON THE VALIDITY OF UNION ACTS submit the validity question to the Court of Justice via the preliminary reference procedure.14 In light of this, taking into account the value of the rule of law, which also underpins the Union’s external action; the purpose of Art. 267 TFEU; and the requirements flowing from the principle of effective judicial protection, as reaffirmed by Art. 47 of the Charter, the Court held that its jurisdiction on the basis of Art. 24(1) TEU and Art. 275 TFEU should not be interpreted strictly and, since those provisions did not expressly exclude the Court’s jurisdiction under Art. 267 TFEU, concluded that it had jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on the validity of restrictive measures adopted in the context of the CFSP.15 Second, the Court highlighted the coherence of the system of judicial protection in the European Union and the need for a uniform application of Union law. The concurrent jurisdiction of the Union Courts and the national courts to review the legality of restrictive measures would entail a risk of conflicting decisions, which would be liable to jeopardize the unity of the Union legal order and to undermine the principle of legal certainty.16

10.05

(3) Review of the validity of international agreements concluded by the Union The question whether the validity of international agreements concluded by the Union may be reviewed in preliminary ruling proceedings has long been the subject of debate.17 Commentators have long voiced great reservations,18 chiefly on the grounds that, in the event that it failed to give effect to such agreements, the Union might stand to incur liability at international level. Moreover, it was for that reason that the Treaties introduced a procedure, whereby the Court of Justice gives a prior opinion on the compatibility of proposed international agreements with the provisions of the Treaties (which means in practice primary Union law as a whole) (see Ch. 12). However, already in Opinion 1/75 regarding the Draft Understanding on a Local Cost Standard drawn up under the auspices of the OECD, the Court stated the following: ‘The question whether the conclusion of a given agreement is within the power of the [Union] and whether, in a given case, such power has been exercised in conformity with the provisions of the [Treaties] is, in principle, a question which may be submitted to the Court of Justice . . . in accordance with the preliminary procedure.’19 Moreover, in France v Commission,20 the Court of Justice declared void the act whereby the Commission sought to conclude the Agreement with the United States regarding 14 See C-72/15, Rosneft, 2017, paras 66–69. See further, in that regard, 112/83, Société des Produits de Maïs, 1985, para. 17; 294/83, Les Verts v Parliament, 1986, para. 23; 314/85, Foto-Frost, 1987, para. 16. 15 See C-72/15, Rosneft, 2017, paras 70–75. 16 See C-72/15, Rosneft, 2017, paras 77–80. See further M. Kuisma, ‘Jurisdiction, Rule of Law, and Unity of EU law in Rosneft’ (2018) Y.E.L. 3. 17 To be distinguished from this is the assessment of the validity of Union acts in the light of international agreements (see para. 10.08). 18 See R. Joliet, Le droit institutionnel des Communautés européennes—Le contentieux (Faculté de Droit, d’Économie et de Sciences sociales de Liège, 1981) 198; J.-V. Louis, G. Vandersanden, D. Waelbroeck, and M. Waelbroeck, Commentaire Mégret—La Cour de Justice. Les actes des institutions (2nd edn, Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1993) 214–215. 19 See Opinion 1/75, Draft Understanding on a Local Cost Standard drawn up under the auspices of the OECD, 1975 ECR 1355, 1361. 20 See C-327/91, France v Commission, 1994.

Subject-Matter 451 the application of the competition laws of the European Union and the United States, which was signed and entered into force on 23 September 1991(essentially on the grounds that the Commission had disregarded the Council’s powers under what is now Art. 218 TFEU). Although ‘[i]‌n the event of non-performance of the Agreement by the Commission . . . the [Union] could incur liability at international level’,21 the Court of Justice held that the action for annulment of the act whereby the Commission sought to conclude the agreement was admissible, on the grounds that, ‘as is apparent from its actual wording, the Agreement [on which that act was based was] intended to produce legal effects’22 within the meaning of the AETR case-law.23 In addition, it held that ‘[e]xercise of the powers delegated to the [Union] institutions in international matters cannot escape judicial review, under [Art. 263 TFEU], of the legality of the acts adopted’.24 Nevertheless, it was not until Western Sahara Campaign25 that the Court expressly confirmed that the validity of an international agreement concluded by the Union may form the subject-matter of a preliminary ruling. Recalling its case-law that the Court has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on the interpretation and the validity of acts adopted by the Union institutions, without exception, and pointing out that international agreements concluded by the Union constitute acts of the Union institutions, which should comply with the Treaties and the constitutional principles stemming therefrom—as well as with the principles of general and customary international law and the provisions of international agreements that are binding upon the European Union under the Treaties—the Court rejected the objection raised by the Council that the Court has no jurisdiction to examine the validity of international agreements in the context of the preliminary reference procedure.26 However, since international agreements concluded by the Union are also binding upon third States that are parties to those agreements, such request for a preliminary ruling must be interpreted as requesting the Court to review the validity of the Union act approving the conclusion of that international agreement.27 (4) Acts of Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies Art. 267 TFEU explicitly envisages preliminary rulings to be sought on the validity of acts of Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies.28 In the first place, this means that the validity of acts of the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council,

21 C-327/91, France v Commission, 1994, para. 25. 22 C-327/91, France v Commission, 1994, paras 14–15. 23 See 22/70, Commission v Council, 1971. 24 C-327/91, France v Commission, 1994, para. 16. 25 C-266/16, Western Sahara Campaign, 2018. 26 See C-266/16, Western Sahara Campaign, 2018, paras 42–48; see also C‑391/16, C‑77/17, and C‑78/17, M, 2019, para. 71; C-673/20, EP, 2022, para. 84; see further C-14/21 and C-15/21, Sea Watch, 2022, para. 92. 27 See C-266/16, Western Sahara Campaign, 2018, paras 49–50; C-673/20, EP, 2022, para. 85; see also C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, 2008, para. 286. 28 Art. 267, first para., indent (b), TFEU. Compare Art. 19(3)(b) TEU, which merely refers to preliminary rulings on the validity (and interpretation) of ‘acts adopted by the institutions’ in more succinct way.

10.06

452 PRELIMINARY RULINGS ON THE VALIDITY OF UNION ACTS the Commission, the European Central Bank,29 and the Court of Auditors, all institutions of the Union within the meaning of the second subparagraph of Art. 13(1) TEU, may be reviewed under the preliminary ruling procedure.30 This also applies to acts adopted jointly by the European Parliament and the Council under the ordinary legislative procedure provided for in Art. 294 TFEU. In the second place, acts of Union ‘bodies, offices or agencies’ also come within the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to give preliminary rulings on validity,31 again subject to the limitations placed on the preliminary ruling jurisdiction of the Court of Justice discussed earlier.

10.07

10.08

(5) Acts of bodies established by international agreements concluded by the Union The question whether acts of a body established by an international agreement concluded by the Union may be subjected to a review of their validity under the preliminary ruling procedure is difficult to answer. In this context, the Court of Justice has emphasized the need for a system of judicial supervision which provides effective legal protection for all individuals,32 but so far has left it undecided whether the Court of Justice itself ought to provide the judicial protection insofar as the international agreement in question provides for no (or an insufficient) system of judicial supervision of the bodies which it establishes. Here, too, the possibility of the Union incurring liability at international level counsels caution, but even so, the requirement for a complete system of judicial protection is an argument in favour of allowing validity to be tested by references for a preliminary ruling, especially since the Union institutions contributed, within the framework of the bodies concerned, towards the adoption of the acts in question.33 (6) Review of the validity of Union acts in the light of international agreements Apart from the issue of whether the validity of international agreements concluded by the Union can be reviewed in the context of preliminary ruling proceedings (see para. 10.05), the question arises to what extent the Court of Justice may review the validity of Union acts in the light of international agreements. Under the case-law, the validity of a Union act may be affected by the fact that it is incompatible with rules of international law. Where such invalidity is pleaded before a national court making a reference for a preliminary ruling on the matter, the Court of Justice first ascertains whether certain conditions are satisfied in the case before the referring court so that, pursuant to Art.

29 See C-493/17, Weiss, 2018, paras 22–24. 30 As regards the Court of Justice of the European Union, see para. 10.03. See also C-11/05, Friesland Coberco Dairy Foods, 2006, paras 34–41, in which the Court ruled that the validity of conclusions of the Customs Code Committee cannot be examined within the framework of what is now Art. 267 TFEU on the grounds that the Committee’s conclusions cannot be regarded as constituting an act of the Union institutions and, like the opinions of a similar kind issued by other Committees in the field, are not binding on national customs authorities in taking final decisions which are subject to judicial review before the national courts. 31 See 9/56, Meroni v High Authority, 1957–1958 ECR 11. See further K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel (T. Corthaut (ed.)), EU Constitutional Law (OUP, 2021) paras 13.042–13.048. 32 See Opinion 1/76, Draft Agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels, 1977, para. 21. 33 See C-192/89, Sevince, 1990, para. 3.

Subject-Matter 453 267 TFEU, the validity of the Union act concerned may be assessed in the light of the rules of international law relied upon to this effect: first, the Union must be bound by those rules; second, the Court can examine the validity of a Union act in view of an international agreement only where the nature and the broad logic of the latter do not preclude this; third, where the nature and the broad logic of the international agreement in question permit the validity of the Union act to be reviewed in the light of the provisions of that agreement, it is also necessary that the provision of that agreement which is relied upon for the purpose of examining the validity of the Union act appears, as regards its content, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise. The latter condition will be fulfilled where the provision relied upon contains a clear and precise obligation that is not subject, in its implementation or its effects, to the adoption of any subsequent measure.34 Moreover, when the Union adopts an act, it is bound to observe international law in its entirety, including customary international law, and to the extent that the invalidity of a Union act is alleged to violate customary international law within the context of a preliminary ruling on validity, the Court proceeds by first verifying whether the principles to which the referring court makes reference are recognized as forming part of customary international law and if so, second, determining whether and to what extent they may be relied upon by individuals to call into question the validity of a Union act.35 Consequently, the Court of Justice proceeds on a case-by-case basis in determining whether these conditions are fulfilled. For example, in Air Transport Association of America and Others,36 the Court was confronted with questions concerning the validity of a Union act in the light of several international agreements (the Chicago Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and the so-called Open Skies Agreement between the United States, of the one part, and the then European Community and its Member States, of the other) and certain principles of customary international law. Since the Union is not bound by the Chicago Convention, and the relevant provisions of the Kyoto Protocol cannot be considered unconditional and sufficiently precise so as to confer on individuals the right to rely on them in legal proceedings to contest the validity of a Union act, these international agreements could not be used as a yardstick for assessing the validity of the Union act concerned.37 In contrast, the relevant provisions of the Open Skies Agreement fulfilled the abovementioned conditions and could be relied upon for the purposes of assessing the validity of the Union act concerned,38 although, ultimately, the Court found that the Union act at issue was not invalid in the light of those provisions.39 Moreover, the three principles of customary international law identified by the referring court were regarded as embodying customary international law and could be relied upon by an 34 See C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and Others, 2011, paras 51–55. 35 See C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and Others, 2011, paras 101–102; C-537/11, Manzi, 2014, para. 39; C-561/20, Q and Others, 2022, paras 47–48. 36 C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and Others, 2011. 37 C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and Others, 2011, paras 57–78. 38 See C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and Others, 2011, paras 79–100. 39 See C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and Others, 2011, paras 135, 147, 156.

454 PRELIMINARY RULINGS ON THE VALIDITY OF UNION ACTS individual for the purpose of the Court’s examination of the validity of a Union act insofar as, first, those principles are capable of calling into question the Union’s competence to adopt that act and, second, that act is liable to affect rights which the individual derives from Union law or to create obligations under Union law in his or her regard, both of which conditions were satisfied in the proceedings at issue.40 However, in the Court’s view, since a principle of customary international law does not have the same degree of precision as a provision of an international agreement, judicial review must necessarily be limited to the question whether, in adopting the Union act in question, the Union institutions made ‘manifest errors of assessment concerning the conditions for applying those principles’.41 On that basis, the Court determined that the Union act in question was not invalid in the light of the principles of customary international law concerned.42 As illustrated by further case-law, there are difficulties in satisfying all of the conditions elaborated here. In Ikea Wholesale,43 the Court held that the validity of a Union anti-dumping regulation could not be reviewed in the light of the Agreement on Implementation of Art. IV of the GATT as part of the WTO agreements (the so-called Anti-Dumping Agreement), as subsequently interpreted by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)’s recommendations, since it was clear from the subsequent regulations that the Union did not in any way intend to give effect to a specific obligation assumed in the context of the WTO. Thereafter, in Intertanko and Others,44 the Court ruled that the validity of certain provisions of a Union directive on ship-source pollution could not be assessed in the light of either the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) or the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (Marpol 73/78). As regards the former, UNCLOS does not establish rules intended to apply directly and immediately to individuals and to confer upon them rights or freedoms capable of being relied upon, and, as regards the latter, the EU is not bound by Marpol 73/78, and the relevant provisions could not be regarded as the expression of principles of customary international law. The Court’s approach has come in for criticism.45 Yet, again, it depends upon the particular international rule or agreement concerned. For instance, in IATA and ELFAA,46 the Court held that certain provisions of the Montreal Convention were among the rules in the light of which the Court reviews the legality of Union acts in accordance with the conditions elaborated in the case-law. Likewise, the Court has held that it could review the legality of Directive 2011/95 in the light of the rules of the Geneva

40 See C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and Others, 2011, paras 103–109. 41 See C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and Others, 2011, para. 110. 42 See C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and Others, 2011, para. 130. 43 See C-351/04, Ikea Wholesale, 2007, para. 35. 44 See C-308/06, Intertanko and Others, 2008, paras 47–66. 45 See M. Mendez, ‘The Legal Effect of Community Agreements: Maximalist Treaty Enforcement and Judicial Avoidance Techniques’ (2010) E.J.I.L. 83. 46 See C-344/04, IATA and ELFAA, 2006, paras 36, 39.

Subject-Matter 455 Convention relating to the status of refugees, as both the legal basis of that directive and Art. 18 of the Charter require the Union to observe the rules of that convention.47 (7) Binding and non-binding Union acts The validity of acts of Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies may be reviewed 10.09 in the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling irrespective as to what they are called48 and whether or not they have direct effect.49 The Union acts may be non- binding.50 Reviewing the validity of non-binding Union acts in preliminary rulings can be of considerable interest: in the Court’s words, such acts ‘cannot . . . be regarded as having no legal effect. The national courts are bound to take recommendations51 into consideration in order to decide disputes submitted to them, in particular where they cast light on the interpretation of national measures adopted in order to implement them or where they are designed to supplement binding [Union] provisions.’52 Sometimes, it will be sufficient for the Court to interpret a non-binding act (for example, a communication), thereby appraising its compatibility with the Union provisions that it is intended to elucidate.53 (8) Acts of general application Since the review of validity effected by means of a reference for a preliminary ruling is a species of review incidental to the main proceedings, some commentators in the past argued—by analogy with the objection of illegality (enshrined in what is now Art. 277 TFEU)—that only acts of general application could be so reviewed.54 The Court of Justice also gave the impression of acceding to that view by referring to the ‘complete system’ of judicial protection of acts of the institutions early on in its landmark judgment in Les Verts in the framework of the former EC Treaty, in which it declared that natural and legal persons are protected against the application against them of general measures which they could not contest directly before the Union Courts by reason of the admissibility requirements for actions for annulment: ‘Where the Community [now Union] institutions are responsible for the administrative implementation of . . . 47 See C‑391/16, C‑77/17, and C‑78/17, M, 2019, para. 74. 48 For the indirect review in a preliminary ruling of the validity of a Council resolution, see 59/75, Manghera and Others, 1976, paras 19–22. 49 The Court has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning the validity of a directive, regardless of whether it is directly applicable, even though the period for its implementation has not yet expired, provided that the question referred for a preliminary ruling is connected with a real dispute: see C-491/01, British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco, 2002, paras 32–38; C-343/09, Afton Chemical, 2010, paras 15–17. 50 C-322/88, Grimaldi, 1989, para. 8, where the Court of Justice compared the wording of what is now Arts 263 and 267 TFEU, reaching the conclusion that the Court has jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling on the validity and interpretation of all acts of the institutions ‘without exception’. See also C-526/14, Kotnik and Others, 2016 (reviewing the legality of the Commission’s Communication on the application, from 1 August 2013, of State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis); C-501/18, BT, 2021, paras 82–83 (review of the legality of a recommendation of the European Banking Authority); C-911/19, FBF, 2021, paras 52–57 (review of the legality of Guidelines issued by the European Banking Authority). 51 Recommendations are not binding pursuant to Art. 288 TFEU. 52 C-322/88, Grimaldi, 1989, para. 18. This is so, even though, in the cited case, the Court of Justice was confronted with a preliminary ruling on the interpretation (not validity) of Union law. 53 See C-94/91, Wagner, 1992, paras 16–17. 54 As regards the distinction between acts of general and individual application, see paras 7.100–7.101.

10.10

456 PRELIMINARY RULINGS ON THE VALIDITY OF UNION ACTS measures [of general application], natural or legal persons may bring a direct action before the Court against administrative measures which are addressed to them or which are of direct and individual concern to them and, in support of such an action, plead the illegality of the general measure on which they are based. Where implementation is a matter for the national authorities, such persons may plead the invalidity of general measures before the national courts and cause the latter to request the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.’55 It is clear, however, that while that passage correctly reproduces the rationale of judicial review of validity by means of the preliminary ruling procedure, it does not necessarily mean that such a review may in no circumstances be carried out in respect of an act of individual application.56

10.11

(9) Acts of individual application and the Deggendorf line of case-law What is typically behind the question whether it is possible to review by way of preliminary ruling the validity of an act of individual application of a Union institution, office, body, or agency concerns a different aspect relating to the coherent system of judicial protection, namely, whether it is still possible for a party to the main proceedings to have recourse to the indirect route of a preliminary ruling on the validity of a Union act which that party could have challenged via the direct route of an action for annulment, but neglected to do so within the prescribed time-limit under the sixth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU.57 Under what is often been referred to as the Deggendorf line of case- law, the Court of Justice has answered this question in the negative: a natural or legal person that undoubtedly58 has the right under Art. 263 TFEU to seek the annulment of a Union act may not plead the illegality of that act in subsequent proceedings before the national courts leading to a preliminary ruling on validity of the act in question under Art. 267 TFEU.59 55 See 294/83, Les Verts v Parliament, 1986, para. 23; see also C-72/15, Rosneft, 2017, paras 66–68; C-384/16 P, European Union Copper Task Force v Commission, 2018, paras 112–114. 56 See 133/85 to 136/85, Rau and Others, 1987, point 1 of the operative part: ‘The possibility of bringing a direct action under the [fourth] para. of [Art. 263 TFEU] against a decision adopted by a [Union] institution does not preclude the possibility of bringing an action in a national court against a measure adopted by a national authority for the implementation of that decision on the ground that the latter decision is unlawful.’ That case was concerned with a Commission decision addressed to Germany within the meaning of the fourth para. of Art. 189 EC (now Art. 288 TFEU), that is, an individual act which a German authority had implemented with respect to the applicants in the main proceedings, whereupon they brought an action for annulment of the Commission decision before the Court of Justice and an action for annulment of the German implementing decision before the national court referring the question of the validity of that decision to the Court. It was in this context that the Court of Justice held that it had jurisdiction to conduct judicial review of an individual act of a Union institution in a preliminary ruling procedure on the basis of the rationale of that jurisdiction set out earlier. See, to the same effect, C-70/97 P, Kruidvat v Commission, 1998, paras 47–49 (relating to a Commission decision declaring Art. 101(1) TFEU inapplicable to a selective distribution system pursuant to Art. 101(3) TFEU). 57 See K. Lenaerts, ‘The Rule of Law and the Coherence of the Judicial System of the European Union’ (2007) C.M.L.Rev. 1625–1659. 58 The case-law uses a variety of terms ‘beyond doubt’, ‘indisputably’ (see C-550/09, E and F, 2010, paras 48, 50, 52), or ‘unquestionably’ (see C-158/14, A, 2017, para. 67). This involves a situation where a Union act is addressed to a natural or legal person or a Union act is not addressed to that person, but such person is manifestly deemed to satisfy the standing requirements for an action for annulment under the fourth para. of Art. 263 TFEU. 59 See C-135/16, Georgsmarienhütte and Others, 2018, para. 14; C-251/18, Trace Sports, 2019, paras 29–30; C-324/19, eurocylinder systems, 2021, paras 31–35; C-708/19, Von Aschenbach & Voss, 2021, para. 32; C-524/20, Vítkovice Steel, 2021, paras 58–67. The Deggendorf line of case-law also applies where the party to the main proceedings has raised the validity of the decision addressed to them before the expiry of the time-limit laid down in Art. 263 TFEU: see C-135/16, Georgsmarienhütte and Others, 2018, para. 16. However, the fact that a party failed

Subject-Matter 457 In TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf,60 the Court held that the applicant, a beneficiary of an individual aid measure, who could ‘without any doubt’ have brought an action for annulment against the Commission decision addressed to the Member State concerned and declaring the aid incompatible with the internal market, and who allowed the mandatory time-limit set down in the Treaties to expire was precluded from calling into question the lawfulness of that decision before the national courts in an action brought against measures taken by the national authorities in implementation of that decision. In subsequent cases, the Court ruled that the same principle applies for other kinds of Union acts.61 The Court also ruled that the same principle applies with regard to Member States and decisions addressed to them.62 To have decided otherwise would have detracted excessively from the legal certainty which the time-limit prescribed by what is now the sixth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU is intended to secure. In a case where a party who undoubtedly fulfils the standing requirements of the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU to bring an action for annulment of a Union act before the Union Courts and who allows that time-limit set down in the sixth paragraph of that Article to expire, the national courts must regard the act in question as valid vis-à-vis such party and therefore apply it in any event. As a result, there is no point in making a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on the validity of that act with a view to protecting a party to the main proceedings who is no longer entitled to plead that the act is unlawful, as this would amount to circumventing the finality of the act in regard of that party.63 However, where such a party has brought an action for annulment before the Union Courts, that party is allowed to plead the invalidity of the decision in question in to challenge the legality, by way of an action for annulment, of a Union decision at issue in the main proceedings, has no bearing on the admissibility of a reference for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of that decision: see C-212/19, Compagnie des pêches de Saint-Malo, 2020, para. 25. 60 See C-188/92, TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf, 1994, paras 17–26: the Commission’s decision addressed to the Member State concerned made explicit reference to the recipient of the individual aid in question and that State had communicated the decision to the recipient, stating that it could bring an action for annulment thereof. For further examples in which the Court has precluded the indirect route of preliminary rulings on validity in relation to acts of individual application, see C-178/95, Wiljo, 1997, paras 19–24; C-119/05, Lucchini, 2007, paras 54–56; compare C-390/98, Banks, 2001, paras 111–113 (proceedings distinguished from Deggendorf line of case-law); C-346/03 and C-529/03, Atzeni and Others, 2006, paras 30–34 (in contrast to Deggendorf line of case-law, proceedings involved Commission decision addressed to a Member State concerning a general aid scheme and which was not communicated by the Member State concerned to the applicants or any other aid recipient). 61 See C-239/99, Nachi Europe, 2001, para. 37 (regulations imposing an anti-dumping duty); compare C-241/95, Accrington Beef, 1996, para. 15 (involving regulation of general scope of application); and for a similar ruling relating to a directive, see C-408/95, Eurotunnel and Others, 1997, paras 29–30; C-59/11, Association Kokopelli, 2012, paras 34–36; see also T-91/05, Sinara Handel v Council and Commission (order), 2007, paras 61–63 (distinguishing circumstances from those of Nachi Europe). 62 See C-241/01, National Farmers’ Union, 2002, paras 34–39, in which the Court held that a Member State which was an addressee of the contested Commission decisions and which had not challenged the legality of those decisions within the time-limit laid down in what is now the sixth para. of Art. 263 TFEU did not have standing subsequently before a national court to invoke its unlawfulness in order to dispute the merits of an action brought against it. This judgment has been confirmed in subsequent case-law: see C-11/00, Commission v ECB, 2003. See further para. 5.72. 63 See C-158/14, A, 2017, para. 70.

458 PRELIMINARY RULINGS ON THE VALIDITY OF UNION ACTS proceedings before the national courts. In Estado português,64 the Court accepted to rule on questions concerning the validity of a Commission decision declaring unlawful the aid which had been given to the defending party in the proceedings. In that case, the Court held that the Deggendorf line of case-law did not apply because the recipient of the aid had brought an action for annulment against the decision in the General Court and, moreover, had not brought the proceedings in the national court, but only pleaded the invalidity of the Commission decision by way of a defence to resist the claim of the opposing party. In Georgsmarienhütte,65 the Court confirmed this judgment and added that a recipient of State aid could also plead the invalidity of such a Commission decision in national proceedings as an applicant, provided, of course, that they had brought, first or concurrently, an action for annulment of the Commission decision before the General Court. Further to this, the Court stressed the importance of bringing an action in the General Court, deeming it not sufficient that the recipient of the aid had brought the proceedings in the national court before the expiry of the time- limit provided for in Art. 263 TFEU.66 This is because the action for annulment brought in the General Court ‘provides a particularly appropriate procedural framework for the thorough examination, both parties being duly heard, of legal and factual questions, particularly in technical and complex fields such as State aid’.67 Apart from State aid, the Deggendorf line of case-law is also of importance in the area of anti-dumping,68 in particular as regards the question which traders are individually concerned by an anti-dumping regulation and can thus not rely on the invalidity of the anti-dumping regulation in proceedings before national courts where they have not brought an action for annulment in the General Court. In the case-law, the Union Courts have identified three categories of traders that may be individually concerned by such regulations:69

64 See C-667/13, Estado português, 2015, paras 29–30. 65 C-135/16, Georgsmarienhütte and Others, 2018, paras 23–25: the bringing of a subsequent or concurrent action in the national court may be necessary to resist national implementing measures of the Commission decision. Where a recipient of State aid has brought an action for annulment in the General Court and relies in the proceedings before the national court on the invalidity of the decision at issue, the national court should, on the basis of the obligation of sincere cooperation, stay proceedings and await the outcome of the action for annulment before the Union Courts, unless the national court is of the opinion that a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice is necessary. In that case, the Court, on the basis of Art. 54 of the Statute, may stay proceedings before it in order to give preference to the action for annulment before the General Court. See further para. 2.56. 66 See C-135/16, Georgsmarienhütte and Others, 2018, para. 16. 67 C-135/16, Georgsmarienhütte and Others, 2018, para. 19. 68 See C-239/99, Nachi Europe, 2001, paras 28–40: the Court held that the applicant was precluded from challenging the validity of a regulation imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty against which it could undoubtedly have brought an annulment action in the General Court, but failed to do so, even where the regulation has been declared null vis-à-vis other undertakings which did bring actions for annulment, underscoring the ‘dual nature’ of such regulations as acts of a legislative nature (applying to objectively defined situations and of general scope of application), on the one hand, and acts liable to be of direct and individual concern to certain traders, on the other. 69 See C-374/12, Valimar, 2014, paras 30–32; C‑659/13 and C‑34/14, C & J Clark International, 2016, para. 59; C-207/17, Rotho Blaas, 2018, para. 32; C-251/18, Trace Sport, 2019, para. 35; C-708/19, Von Aschenbach & Voss, 2021, para. 40; T‑112/14 to T‑116/14, and T‑119/14, Molinos Río de la Plata, 2016, paras 43–45.

Subject-Matter 459 – producers and exporters of the product concerned which have been charged with practicing dumping on the basis of information relating to their business activities;70 – importers of the product concerned whose resale prices were taken into account for the construction of export prices and which are consequently affected by the findings relating to the existence of dumping; – importers associated with exporters of the product concerned, particularly where the export price has been calculated on the basis of those importers’ resale prices on the EU market and where the anti-dumping duty itself has been calculated on the basis of those resale prices.71 The Court has underscored, however, that these categories are not exclusive.72 For example, an original equipment manufacturer was held to be individually concerned by the provisions of an anti-dumping regulation in relation to dumping practices of the producer of which it bought products.73 Moreover, it is in itself not sufficient that a party is an importer of the product concerned to be individually concerned by an anti-dumping regulation.74 Thus, while the Court held in Von Aschenbach & Voss75 that an importer was precluded from raising the invalidity of an anti-dumping regulation in national court proceedings and thus held the reference for a preliminary ruling to be inadmissible, it concluded in Trace Sport76 that an importer would not undoubtedly have had standing to bring an action for annulment in the Union Courts and thus could raise the invalidity of an anti- dumping regulation in national court proceedings, leading to the admissibility of the reference for a preliminary ruling. The crucial difference between these two cases is that, in Von Aschenbach & Voss, the importer participated in the investigation that resulted in the adoption of the anti-dumping regulation, while this was not the case in Trace Sport.77 If there remains doubt on the admissibility of the action for annulment, then access to the indirect route of a preliminary ruling on validity is not foreclosed. This

70 This is the case for producers and exporters that were identified in the regulation imposing an anti-dumping duty or were concerned by the preliminary investigations: see C-239/82, Allied Corporation, 1984, paras 11–12; T‑536/08, Huvis v Council, 2013, para. 25. 71 See C‑659/13 and C‑34/14, C & J Clark International, 2016, paras 60–62; C-207/17, Rotho Blaas, 2018, paras 33–35; C-251/18, Trace Sport, 2019, para. 36; C-708/19, Von Aschenbach & Voss, 2021, para. 41; T‑112/14 to T‑116/14, and T‑119/14, Molinos Río de la Plata, 2016, paras 43–45. 72 See C-374/12, Valimar, 2014, para. 33; C‑659/13 and C‑34/14, C & J Clark International, 2016, para. 59; C-207/17, Rotho Blaas, 2018, para. 32; C-251/18, Trace Sport, 2019, para. 35; C-708/19, Von Aschenbach & Voss, 2021, para. 40. 73 See C-156/83, Gestetner Holdings, 1990, para. 23. 74 See C-251/18, Trace Sport, 2019, para. 37; C-708/19, Von Aschenbach & Voss, 2021, para. 42: for an importer to be individually concerned, it is necessary that information relating to its commercial activity has been taken into account for the purpose of establishing dumping or, failing that, the existence of other attributes which are peculiar to it and which differentiate it from all other persons. As regards the requirement of individual concern, see para. 7.99, and with respect to anti-dumping, paras 7.132–7.136. 75 See C-708/19, Von Aschenbach & Voss, 2021, paras 44–50. 76 See C-251/18, Trace Sport, 2019, paras 42–45. 77 Compare C-708/19, Von Aschenbach & Voss, 2021, paras 44–45, with C-251/18, Trace Sport, 2019, para. 42.

460 PRELIMINARY RULINGS ON THE VALIDITY OF UNION ACTS typically involves the situation where the applicant cannot be deemed to be manifestly directly and individually concerned by the contested act of which it is not the addressee78 or where the applicant is found to have no interest in challenging the act at the time.79 Another party to the main proceedings that was not entitled to challenge the act in question pursuant to Art. 263 TFEU may persuade the national court to make a reference for a preliminary ruling on the validity of the act. There is nothing to prevent the national court from inquiring into this question or from raising it with the Court of Justice of its own motion.80 If the Court of Justice then finds that the act is invalid, it will be for it to determine what consequences that finding should have for the party to the main proceedings for whom the act has become definitive because of its failure to bring an action for annulment.

10.12

(10) Failure to act In proceedings for a preliminary ruling, the Court of Justice has no power to rule that a Union institution, body, office, or agency has failed to act,81 when an action brought on the basis of Art. 265 TFEU (see Ch. 8) would be admissible to challenge an unlawful failure to act on the part of such institution, body, office, or agency. That being said, in Ten Kate Musselkanaal and Others,82 the Court emphasized that just as natural and legal persons should be able to challenge before a national court the legality of any decision or other national measure relative to the application to them of a Union act of general application by pleading the invalidity of that act, ‘the same holds true where a natural [or] legal person invokes a failure to take a [Union act of general application], within the meaning of Article [265 TFEU], which it considers to be contrary to [Union] law’. The Court’s approach thus ensures that recourse to a preliminary ruling on the validity of a failure to act remains open to such persons under circumstances where, as in those proceedings, an action for failure to act is not available.

78 See C-441/05, Roquette Frères, 2007, paras 35–48 (applicant held not directly concerned by contested regulation); C-343/07, Bavaria and Bavaria Italia, 2009, paras 40–46 (applicant held not directly and individually concerned by contested regulation); C-343/09, Afton Chemical, 2010, paras 19–26 (applicant held not individually concerned by contested provisions of directive); C-550/09, E and F, 2010, paras 48–52 (applicants held no indisputably directly and individually concerned by listing for the purposes of restrictive measures); C-458/15, K.P., 2019, paras 32–34 (applicants held not directly and individually concerned by contested decisions). 79 See C-212/19, Compagnie des pêches de Saint-Malo, 2020, paras 32–35. 80 Where such a question is referred by a national court of its own motion, it cannot be declared inadmissible by virtue of the Deggendorf line of case-law: see C-222/04, Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze, 2006, paras 72–74. However, the Court of Justice itself cannot raise the validity question of its own motion in such circumstances: see C-135/16, Georgsmarienhütte and Others, 2018, para. 37; C-212/19, Compagnie des pêches de Saint- Malo, 2020, para. 31. 81 See C-68/95, T. Port v Commission, 1996, para. 53. 82 See C-511/03, Ten Kate Musselkanaal and Others, 2005, para. 29.

Special Characteristics 461

II. Special Characteristics A. Review of legality of Union acts reserved to the Court of Justice under Foto-Frost Following from Foto-Frost,83 the review of the validity of a Union act by preliminary ruling, in common with the action for annulment, is a form of judicial review of the legality of acts of Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies: since Art. 263 TFEU gives the Court of Justice of the European Union exclusive jurisdiction to declare void an act of a Union institution, body, office, or agency, the coherence of the system of judicial protection requires that, where the validity of a Union act is challenged before a national court, the power to declare the act invalid must also be reserved to the Court of Justice.84 Moreover, the Court is ‘in the best position’ to decide on the validity of Union acts, since under Art. 23 of the Statute, Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies whose acts are challenged are entitled to participate in the proceedings in order to defend the validity of the acts in question.85

10.13

B. Differences compared with an action for annulment The most important differences between the action for annulment and the preliminary ruling on the validity of Union law are that the latter is not subject to any time-limit and is not limited to the grounds specified for the action for annulment (Art. 263, second para. TFEU),86 and that the initiative for seeking a preliminary ruling on validity comes from the national court and not from interested parties.87 In the main proceedings, the parties may try to move the national court to make a reference to the Court of Justice, but they cannot compel the Court to rule on the validity of a Union act if the national court has not put a question to that effect.88 Under settled case-law, Art. 267 TFEU does

83 See 314/85, Foto-Frost, 1987, para. 16. 84 See 314/85, Foto-Frost, 1987, para. 17; C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and Others, 2011, paras 47–48; C-362/14, Schrems, 2015, paras 61–62. 85 See 314/85, Foto-Frost, 1987, para. 18. The wording of this passage of the judgment is more consonant with the procedure in the case of a direct action than with the formally non-contentious procedure of a reference for a preliminary ruling. The Court of Justice added that, under the second para. of Art. 24 of the Statute, the Court may require the Member States and ‘institutions which are not participating in the proceedings’ to supply all information which it considers necessary for the purposes of the case before it. It did so on one occasion in order to enable the European Parliament, which was (then) formerly not entitled to submit observations to the Court under Art. 23 of the Statute, to defend its prerogatives in proceedings for a preliminary ruling on validity: see 20/85, Roviello, 1988. 86 See 21/72 to 24/72, International Fruit and Others, 1972, para. 5; C-162/96, Racke, 1998, para. 26 (where the Court reviewed the validity of a Union act in the light of customary international law). For another example in which the Court reviewed the validity of a Union act in the light of customary international law, see C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and Others, 2011. See also para. 10.08. 87 As such, a party to the national proceedings cannot compel the national court to submit a question on the validity (or interpretation) of the Union act concerned, as it is solely for the national court before which the dispute is brought to determine the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions it submits to the Court of Justice: see further para. 3.16. 88 See 44/65, Singer, 1965 ECR 965, 970.

10.14

462 PRELIMINARY RULINGS ON THE VALIDITY OF UNION ACTS not make available a means of redress to the parties in a case pending before a national court, such that the Court cannot be compelled to evaluate the validity of a Union act on the sole ground that the question has been put before it by one of the parties in its written observations in situations where the referring court has not put such a question to the Court.89

C. Grounds on which validity may be contested 10.15

The parties to the main proceedings; the Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies whose act is at issue; and the Member States submitting observations pursuant to Art. 23 of the Statute cannot oblige the Court of Justice to appraise the validity of a Union act in the light of ‘submissions’ or ‘grounds’ of illegality not raised in the order for reference.90 This does not mean, however, that the Court has no latitude at all in the matter.91 First, the national court may request the Court of Justice merely to interpret a Union act, but the Court, having regard to the whole of the content of the order for reference, may consider the reference to be concerned with the validity of the act with a view to promoting the efficiency of judicial cooperation.92 It is important in such a case that the order for reference may be construed as a request for a ruling on validity, even though it is couched as a request for a ruling on interpretation. The reason for this is that only in such a case may the interested parties within the meaning of Art. 23 of the Statute correctly assess what the Court’s ruling may cover and formulate their views thereon.93 Second, the Court of Justice may supplement the ‘submissions’ or ‘grounds’ of illegality of the Union act at issue, as set forth in the order for reference, in the light of matters that come to light in the course of legal argument before the Court itself. One situation occurs where the national court raises the question of the validity of an act in general terms only. In such a case, the Court of Justice will answer that question in the light of an assessment of the submissions which are set out by the claimant or other interested parties in their observations before the Court concerning the validity

89 See C-276/05 and C-377/05, A. Brünsteinder and Autohaus Hilgert, 2006, paras 25–28; C-188/10 and C-189/10, Melki and Abdeli, 2010, para. 63; C-316/09, MSD Sharp & Dohme, 2011, paras 20–24. 90 See C-373/08, Hoesch Metals and Alloys, 2010, paras 57–60; C-547/14, Philip Morris, 2016, para. 50; C-458/15, K.P., 2019, paras 37–38; C-686/18, OC and Others, 2020, para. 64. Likewise, the Court cannot extend the review of validity to acts to which the order for reference does not refer: C-458/15, K.P., 2019, paras 45–46. 91 It should be pointed out that the latitude of the Court is subject to the condition that the referring court has set out in the order for reference the precise reasons which led the court to question the validity of an act or a provision of Union law. Failure to do so will lead to the inadmissibility of the question: see C-547/14, Philip Morris, 2016, para. 50. 92 See 16/65, Schwarze, 1965 ECR 877, 886; C-300/07, Hans & Christophorus Oymanns, 2009, paras 40–47. For recent examples, see C-362/14, Schrems, 2015, paras 67–106; C-311/18, Data Protection Commissioner, 2020, paras 150–201. For matters relating to the Court of Justice’s reformulation of questions in connection with references for preliminary rulings on interpretation and validity generally, see para. 3.20. 93 See 62/76, Strehl, 1977 ECR 211, 217, where the Court of Justice held of its own motion that a provision of a regulation, of which only the interpretation had been sought, was invalid having regard to a decided case. See also C-338/10, GLS, 2012, paras 14, 17.

Special Characteristics 463 of the act94 or which emerge from the statement of reasons of the order for reference.95 Similarly, the national court may refer a question on the validity of a Union act in relation to only certain pleas, but the Court may find it necessary in the light of the order for reference and the observations lodged before it to examine the validity of such an act in relation to additional pleas in order to give a useful answer to the referring court.96 Another situation occurs by virtue of the fact that the Court of Justice has held that it is empowered to find of its own motion infringements of essential procedural requirements by which an act is vitiated, thereby, if necessary, supplementing the submissions set out in the order for reference alleging that the act is invalid.97 The case-law to this effect is related to the rule applicable to actions for annulment that Union Courts will find infringements of essential procedural requirements of their own motion.98 Lack of competence on the part of the Union institution, body, office, or agency which adopted the contested act is also (at least insofar as the parallelism with the action for annulment is concerned) regarded as a peremptory plea, with the result that, as in the case of an infringement of an essential procedural requirement, it may be raised by the Court of Justice of its own motion in conducting judicial review of a contested act in preliminary ruling proceedings.99

D. Assessment of validity normally based on the situation existing when Union act was adopted Under the case-law, the assessment of the validity of a Union act which the Court of Justice is called upon to undertake on a reference for a preliminary ruling must normally be based on the facts and law as they stood at the time when the act was adopted, and cannot in particular depend on retrospective considerations relating to its efficacy.100 However, in certain cases, the validity of a Union act can be assessed by

94 See 103/77 and 145/77, Royal Scholten Honig, 1978, paras 16–17; see also C-338/10, GLS, 2012, in which the assessment of the validity of the contested measure prompted the Court to adopt a measure of inquiry. 95 See 41/72, Getreide-Import, 1973, para. 2. For some examples, see C-479/04, Laserdisken, 2006; C-537/09, Bartlett and Others, 2011, paras 34–36. 96 See C-309/10, Agrana Zucker, 2011, para. 23; C-77/09, Gowan Comércio Internacional e Serviços, 2010, paras 29–30. In the light of its latitude for the reformulation of questions submitted by national courts in orders for reference generally (see para. 3.20), the Court may adjust certain questions presented to it: see C-558/07, S.P.C.M. and Others, 2009, paras 17, 39–40 (finding that the complaint concerning the irrationality of a certain provision of a Union act must be regarded as relating to the infringement of the principle of proportionality); C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert, 2010, paras 44–46 (application of the Charter, while the referring court had only referred to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms). 97 See 73/63 and 74/63, Internationale Crediet-en Handelsvereniging Rotterdam and Others, 1964 ECR 1, 14. 98 See C-291/89, Interhotel v Commission, 1991, para. 14; C-304/89, Oliveira v Commission, 1991, para. 18. 99 Taking account of the parallelism with the action for annulment, see C-210/98 P, Salzgitter v Commission and Germany, AG Jacobs Opinion, 2000. See further para. 7.162. 100 See C-309/10, Agrana Zucker, 2011, para. 31 (adding in para. 45 that where the Union legislature is obliged to assess the future effects of rules to be adopted and those effects cannot be accurately foreseen, its assessment is open to criticism only if it appears manifestly incorrect in the light of the information available to it at the time when the rules in question were adopted).

10.16

464 PRELIMINARY RULINGS ON THE VALIDITY OF UNION ACTS reference to new factors arising after the act was adopted, depending on the determination of the Court.101

E. Finding of facts necessary to assess the legality of a given Union act 10.17

In arriving at its preliminary ruling on the validity of a given Union act, the Court of Justice may go no deeper into the facts of the main proceedings than it may in the case of a preliminary ruling on interpretation (see para. 6.21). There is a slight difference, however, in that the Court may make all the findings of fact necessary to assess the legality of the contested act.102 In this respect, the Court’s powers are no different if it reviews the legality of an act under Art. 263 TFEU or Art. 267 TFEU.103 In this connection, it would be perfectly possible for measures of inquiry to be ordered pursuant to Art. 64(2) of the CJ Rules of Procedure.104

III. Consequences A. Ruling of the Court of Justice 10.18

Where the Court of Justice comes to the conclusion that the contested Union act or certain provisions thereof should not be declared invalid, the answer which it generally gives to the national court is not that the act is valid, but that the examination of the question raised has disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of that act.105 That answer does not preclude the national court to which the preliminary ruling is addressed, or other national courts, from referring other questions to the Court of Justice which might call into question the validity of the same act.106 101 See C-247/08, Gaz de France—Berliner Investissement, 2009, paras 49–50 (ruling that the assessment of the validity of the Union act concerned by reference to new factors arising after its adoption did not need to be made in the present proceedings); C-362/14, Schrems, 2015, paras 76–77 (Commission failed to check periodically whether circumstances have changed after adequacy decision was adopted). 102 See C-344/04, IATA and ELFAA, 2006; C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld, 2007; C-58/08, Vodafone and Others, 2010; C-338/10, GLS, 2012. 103 The parallel between the two procedures as adverted to by the Court in 314/85, Foto-Frost, 1987, emerges clearly here. For an example, see C-16/90, Nölle, 1991, paras 17, 23, 24. 104 See 5/67, Beus, 1968 ECR 83, 86; C-338/10, GLS, 2012, para. 15. 105 See C-677/18, C-677/18, Amoena, para. 62; C-640/19, Azienda Agricola Ambrosi Nicola Giuseppe, 2021, para. 79; C-760/19, JCM Europe, 2021, para. 61; C-142/20, Analisi G. Caracciolo, 2021, para. 63; C-695/20, Fenix International, 2023, para. 91. Depending on the circumstances, the Court may declare that the examination of certain grounds did not disclose factors of such a kind as to affect the validity of a Union act (see C-264/18, P.M., 2019, para. 42), whereas for others it may declare such act partially invalid: see C-221/09, AJD Tuna, 2011. The Court may also exceptionally diverge from its usual framing of its response and declare that the Union act is valid, though only insofar as the question presented to it is concerned: see C-215/10, Pacific World and FDD International, 2011, para. 52. Further to this, the Court may decide that the act is not invalid provided that it is being interpreted in the way set out by the Court in its judgment: see C‑391/16, C‑77/17 and C‑78/17, M, 2019, paras 110–111. 106 See 8/78, Milac, 1978, paras 4–9. For example, as regards references for preliminary rulings on the validity of different provisions of the same Union act, see C-491/01, British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco, 2002; C-434/02, Arnold André, 2004; C-210/03, Swedish Match, 2004. That being said, if faced with a

Consequences 465 Where, in contrast, the Court of Justice declares the Union act in question or certain provisions thereof107 invalid (declaration of invalidity),108 its answer is binding on the national court to which it is made.109 The national court may no longer apply the act. The same applies to ‘any other national court’, since the declaration of invalidity constitutes ‘sufficient reason [for it] to regard that act as void for the purposes of a judgment which it has to give’.110 The erga omnes effect of the preliminary ruling on validity is justified as being the inevitable corollary of ‘particularly imperative requirements concerning legal certainty in addition to those concerning the uniform application of Union law. It follows from the very nature of such a declaration that a national court may not apply the act declared to be void without once more creating serious uncertainty as to the Union law applicable.’111

B. Definitive effect of a declaration of invalidity The declaration that an act is invalid is definitive, as in the case of a declaration of nullity in relation to an action for annulment (hence the Court of Justice’s exclusive jurisdiction to declare an act void results in it also having exclusive jurisdiction to declare an act invalid112). Nevertheless, the Court of Justice endeavours to reconcile the absolute effect of the declaration that a given act is invalid with the requirements of the preliminary ruling procedure as laid down by Art. 267 TFEU. Consequently, it acknowledges that the declaration of invalidity ‘does not mean . . . that national courts are deprived of the power given to them by [Art. 267 TFEU] and it rests with those courts to decide whether there is a need to raise once again a question which has already been settled by the Court where the Court has previously declared an act of a [Union] institution [invalid]’.113 The Court does not mean that the declaration of invalidity may be reversed, but that any national court (including the one which obtained the ruling that the act in question was invalid) may possibly have an interest in referring further questions for a

subsequent reference in which the question regarding the validity of a Union act is the same as that decided by the Court in a previous case, the Court may find it unnecessary to answer such question: see C-120/08, Bavaria, 2010, paras 32–34. 107 For example, the Court may find certain provisions of a Union act invalid in relation to the question raised, but not others: see C-453/03, C-11/04, C-12/04, and C-194/04, ABNA and Others, 2005, para. 85. 108 Depending on the case, the Court’s declaration of invalidity may be framed in relation to the question raised by the national court, namely, that the Union act concerned is invalid ‘in so far as’ or ‘to the extent’ as the circumstances provided for in the question submitted apply: see C-522/07 and C-65/08, Dinter, 2009, para. 42; C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert, 2010, para. 92; C-561/18, Solvay Chemicals (order), 2019, para. 36; C-644/17, Eurobolt, 2019, para. 52; C-212/19, Compagnie des pêches de Saint-Malo, 2020, para. 51; C-37/20 and C-601/20, Luxembourg Business Registers, 2022, para. 88. The declaration of invalidity may also be framed in general terms: see C-338/10, GLS, 2012, para. 31; C-362/14, Schrems, 2015, para. 106; C-324/19, eurocylinder systems, 2021, para. 82. 109 See C-493/17, Weiss, 2018, para. 19. 110 66/80, International Chemical Corporation, 1981, point 1 of the operative part. 111 66/80, International Chemical Corporation, 1981, para. 12. 112 See 314/85, Foto-Frost, 1987, para. 16. 113 66/80, International Chemical Corporation, 1981, para. 14.

10.19

466 PRELIMINARY RULINGS ON THE VALIDITY OF UNION ACTS preliminary ruling ‘if questions arise as to the grounds, the scope and possibly the consequences of the invalidity established earlier’.114

C. Consequences of the declaration of invalidity in the national legal order 10.20

It is for the national court to decide disputes concerning the consequences of the declaration by the Court of Justice that a Union act is invalid in accordance with its national law insofar as Union law does not provide otherwise. For instance, national law in principle governs the formal and substantive requirements for the refund of amounts collected on behalf of the Union—on the basis of a regulation subsequently declared invalid—unless a rule of Union law specifically deals with such refunds.115 More generally, all national authorities have to draw the necessary conclusions from the Court’s declaration that a Union act is invalid. Action by the national authorities may no longer be based on that act and any action previously taken on the basis of that act must be withdrawn (and, where necessary, its consequences rectified).116 However, the consequences which may be drawn in the national legal systems from such a ruling of invalidity depend directly on Union law as it stands in the light of that ruling.117 Sometimes, the Court of Justice spells out the consequences of the declaration that an act is invalid in the national legal system, either in the judgment ruling that it is invalid or in a subsequent judgment following a request for an interpretation of the consequences of the declaration of invalidity. The first scenario presented itself in Van Landschoot,118 when an agricultural regulation which denied the benefit of exemption from a levy to a particular group of traders, thereby discriminating against them, was declared invalid. As far as the ‘scope of the preliminary ruling’ was concerned, the Court of Justice inferred from that declaration that the Union legislature had to act upon the judgment by adopting such measures as might be appropriate in order to establish equal treatment for the traders concerned as regards the rules governing exemption from the levy. In so doing, the Court implicitly applied what is now Art. 266 TFEU119 (governing the consequences of a declaration of nullity in the context of an action for annulment) by analogy to a declaration of invalidity. Next, the Court noted that, in the particular circumstances of the case, in which the discrimination did not arise from what the offending provision provided but from what it did not provide, a straightforward declaration that it was invalid would have had the result that, pending

114 66/80, International Chemical Corporation, 1981, para. 14. 115 See 199/86, Raiffeisen, 1988, paras 12–19. 116 See 23/75, Rey Soda, 1975, paras 50–51. 117 See C-127/94, H. & R. Ecroyd and Rupert Ecroyd, 1996, para. 58. 118 See 300/86, Van Landschoot, 1988, paras 22–23. 119 The first para. of Art. 266 TFEU provides: ‘The institution whose act has been declared void or whose failure to act has been declared contrary to the Treaties shall be required to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union.’

Consequences 467 the adoption of new provisions, all exemptions would be precluded. In order to avoid such a situation, the Court expressly held that the second paragraph of what is now Art. 264 TFEU120 had to be applied ‘by analogy’ for the same reasons of legal certainty which underlay that provision. Specifically, this meant that, pending such new provisions, ‘the competent authorities must continue to apply the exemption provided for in the provision declared invalid but they must also grant it to the operators affected by the discrimination found to exist’.121 In Société Regie Networks,122 involving a declaration of invalidity of a Commission decision in the field of State aid in which the Commission had asked the Court to preserve the effects of the invalid decision, the Court underlined that where it is justified by overriding considerations of legal certainty, the second paragraph of Art. 264 TFEU, applicable by analogy to a reference for a preliminary ruling on the validity of a Union act under Art. 267 TFEU, confers on the Court a discretion to decide in each particular case which specific effects of such act must be regarded as definitive. Where the Court rules in proceedings under Art. 267 TFEU that such an act is invalid, its decision has the legal effect of requiring the competent Union institutions to take the necessary measures to remedy that illegality, as the obligation laid down in Art. 266 TFEU in the case of a judgment annulling a Union act applies in such a situation by analogy.123 On this basis, the Court ruled that the effects of the declaration that the contested decision is invalid must be suspended until a new decision is adopted by the Commission to remedy the illegality established in the judgment, laying down a period of no more than two months from the date of delivery of its judgment if the Commission decides to adopt a new decision under Art. 108(3) TFEU and for a reasonable further period if the Commission decides to initiate the procedure under Art. 108(2) TFEU.124 The second scenario concerns the case where the national court comes back to the Court of Justice with a new request for a preliminary ruling for guidance on how it should react to the declaration of invalidity in deciding the case before it in the main proceedings.125 Such a request gives the Court of Justice an opportunity to give a precise indication of the consequences of its declaration of invalidity.126 120 The second para. of Art. 264 TFEU provides: ‘However, the Court shall, if it considers this necessary, state which of the effects of the act which it has declared void shall be considered as definitive’. 121 See 300/86, Van Landschoot, 1988, para. 24; see also 264/82, Timex v Council and Commission, 1985, para. 32. 122 C-333/07, Société Regie Networks, 2007. This case also presented issues relating to the limitation of the temporal effects of the Court’s declaration of invalidity: see para. 10.23. 123 See also C-612/16, C & J Clark International, 2019, paras 37–38. 124 See C-333/07, Société Regie Networks, 2007, paras 119–121, 124, 126. Compare C-409/06, Winner Wetten, 2010, paras 63–67, where the Court ruled that although under the second para. of Art. 264 TFEU, applicable by analogy to preliminary rulings on validity, the Court has a discretion to indicate in each case which effects of a Union measure which it annuls or declares invalid must be regarded as definitive (using the aforementioned case as an example), such reasoning could not be extended to the national context as regards the recognition of a principle authorizing, in exceptional circumstances, the provisional maintenance of the effects of a national rule held contrary to a directly applicable rule of Union law. See para. 6.39. 125 Alternatively, the referring court may be seized of a new dispute in which the implementation by the Commission of an earlier judgment of the Court declaring a Commission act invalid is at issue: see C-612/16, C & J Clark International, 2019. 126 See 359/87, Pinna, 1989, para. 13, where the Court explained the consequences of its declaration that Art. 73(2) of Regulation No. 1408/71 was invalid for ‘those authorities, which were obliged, to draw the inferences in

468 PRELIMINARY RULINGS ON THE VALIDITY OF UNION ACTS

D. Declaration of invalidity comparable to declaration of nullity 10.21

The Union Courts attach similar consequences to the declaration of invalidity and the declaration of nullity,127 especially as far as the application of the second paragraph of Art. 264 TFEU and Art. 266 TFEU128 is concerned. The act which has been declared invalid may no longer be applied by a national court or a national authority, the institution, body, office, or agency which adopted the invalidated act must take appropriate steps to cure the illegality and, if necessary, adopt a new measure, and the Court of Justice is prepared in certain circumstances to maintain certain aspects of the act which has been declared invalid in force until another measure is adopted. That being said, although both the preliminary ruling on the validity of Union acts and the action for annulment of such acts constitute two forms of the same type of judicial review of the legality of these acts, there is a distinction between a declaration of invalidity and a declaration of nullity. The action for annulment constitutes a direct attack on a Union act (i.e. it is aimed at its total elimination), and therefore, a declaration of nullity means that the Union act concerned never existed in the Union legal order. In contrast, as regards a preliminary ruling on the validity of a Union act, a declaration of invalidity does not formally result in nullity, but only prevents the invalid Union act from being applied. In other words, the Court’s declaration of invalidity means that the national court which requested the preliminary ruling must treat the act as inoperative in that case. However, as discussed earlier, the declaration of invalidity has not just inter partes, but also erga omnes effects. It is therefore binding in relation to the national court which made the reference, as well as to other national courts outside the specific dispute in the various Member States, subject to the right to make further references.

E. Temporal effects 10.22

As far as temporal effects are concerned, the declaration of invalidity and the declaration of nullity also run on parallel lines. The Court of Justice has held that a preliminary ruling declaring a Union act invalid in principle has retroactive effect, just like a judgment annulling a Union act, meaning that in principle it has ex tunc effect going their legal system from a declaration of invalidity’ given in the context of what is now Art. 267 TFEU, ‘so long as the Council has failed, following the judgment of the Court, to lay down new rules’; the earlier judgment containing the declaration of invalidity was 41/84 Pinna, 1986. For a more recent example, see C-421/06, Fratelli Martini and Cargill (order), 2007, concerning the consequences of the Court’s declaration of invalidity in C-453/03, C-11/04, C-12/04, and C-194/04, ABNA and Others, 2005 (which also led the Court to respond to questions concerning the obligations of the Union institutions under Art. 266 TFEU following the declaration of invalidity delivered in ABNA and Others: see C-421/06, Fratelli Martini and Cargill (order), 2007, paras 52–63. 127 See C-123/18 P, HTTS Hanseatic Trade Trust & Shipping v Council and Commission, 2019, para. 100; C-114/20 P(R), Anglo Austrian AAB and Others v ECB (order of the Vice-President), 2020, para. 53; T-341/17, British Airways v Commission, 2022, para. 232; T-296/20, Foz v Council, 2022, para. 116. 128 See C-612/16, C & J Clark International, 2019, paras 37–38; T-220/97, H & R Ecroyd v Commission, 1999, para. 49.

Consequences 469 back to the date on which the act took effect.129 However, a problem may arise as a result of the fact that there is no temporal restriction on a national court’s requesting the Court of Justice to declare a Union act invalid, in contrast to an action for annulment, which has to be brought within the time-limit laid down in the sixth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU. Consequently, the idea that the legal uncertainty resulting from the ex tunc effect of a declaration of nullity (i.e. from the date on which the measure declared void took effect) is mitigated by the relatively short period within which an action for annulment must be brought has no relevance to a declaration of invalidity. This may explain why, under the case-law, the Court of Justice has inferred from Art. 267 TFEU the power to modulate the temporal effects of preliminary rulings declaring Union acts invalid on a case-by-case basis.130 In order to justify that power, the Court reasons that the declaration of nullity and the declaration of invalidity are ‘two mechanisms’ provided under the Treaties for reviewing the legality of Union acts and that the ‘necessary consistency’ between the two mechanisms warrants interpreting the second paragraph of Art. 264 TFEU as enabling the Court to impose temporal limits on the invalidity of a Union act, whether under Art. 263 TFEU or Art. 267 TFEU in the interests of ensuring the uniform application of Union law.131

F. Exceptional limitation of temporal effects Under the case-law, the Court has limited the temporal effect of a declaration that a Union act is invalid where overriding considerations of legal certainty involving all the interests, public as well as private, at stake in the cases concerned precluded calling into question the charging or payment of sums of money effected on the basis of that measure in respect of the period prior to the date of the judgment.132 For example, in Société Regie Networks,133 concerning the declaration that a Commission decision in the field of State aid is invalid, as mentioned earlier (see para. 10.20), the Court granted the French Government’s request to limit the temporal effects of its judgment, excluding only those undertakings which prior to the date of delivery of the judgment concerned had brought legal proceedings or made an equivalent complaint regarding

129 See C-228/92, Roquette Frères, 1994, paras 17–18, from which it follows that the national authorities must ensure the repayment of sums unduly charged on the basis of Union regulations which are subsequently declared invalid by the Court; see also 130/79, Express Dairy Foods, 1980, para. 14; C-14/20, G.D., 2022, para. 124. 130 See 112/83, Société des Produits de Maïs, 1985; for a case in which the Court of Justice refused to restrict the ex tunc effect of a declaration of invalidity, see C-363/93 and C-407/93 to C-411/93, Lancry and Others, 1994, paras 40–45; see also C-177/99 and C-181/99, Ampafrance and Sanofi Synthelabo, 2000, para. 67 (in this case, a Member State invoked for the first time the principle of protection of legitimate expectations with a view to limiting the temporal effects of a judgment declaring a decision invalid. The Court of Justice held that this was not possible on the grounds that to allow a Member State to do so would jeopardize the possibility for individuals to be protected against conduct of the public authorities based on unlawful rules); C-228/99, Silos e Mangimi Martini, 2001, paras 35–38. 131 See 112/83, Société des Produits de Maïs, 1985, para. 17. 132 See C-333/07, Société Regie Networks, 2007, para. 122; T-465/20, Ryanair v Commission, 2021, para. 58; compare T‑377/16, T‑645/16, and T‑809/16, Hypo Vorarlberg Bank v SRB, 2019, para. 221. 133 See C-333/07, Société Regie Networks, 2007, paras 123, 127.

10.23

470 PRELIMINARY RULINGS ON THE VALIDITY OF UNION ACTS the levying of the charge on advertising companies which was related to the aid scheme at issue. The Court justified the imposition of a limitation on the temporal effects of the declaration that the contested decision is invalid, first, on the ground that the aid scheme in question was applicable for a period of five years and a great deal of aid was paid under that scheme, affecting a large number of operators; and, second, given the overriding considerations of legal certainty invoked by the French Government and the Commission and in particular the fact that the aid scheme at issue was not challenged before the Union Courts. As illustrated by this case, the Court’s approach diverges somewhat from the strict conditions applied by the Court for limiting the temporal effects of preliminary rulings on interpretation (see para. 6.39). While future case-law aligning these two sets of conditions cannot be ruled out, the approach taken so far in the case-law may be explained in part by the particular consequences of the retroactive application of a declaration of invalidity on account of the lack of time-limits placed on the submission of references by national courts for preliminary rulings on validity. As far as limiting the temporal effects of its judgments declaring a Union act invalid is concerned, the Court of Justice will decide in each particular case whether an exception to that temporal limitation may be granted in favour of the party that brought the action before the national court or of any other party that took similar steps before the declaration of invalidity, or conversely, whether a declaration of invalidity applicable only to the future constitutes an adequate remedy for the party concerned.134 In earlier case-law, the Court had in fact considered that the parties that took the initiative of challenging in the national courts the act ultimately declared invalid are sufficiently rewarded for their efforts by seeing the act eliminated from the legal system for the future.135 That approach has been criticized on the grounds that it effectively deprives the party that successfully pleaded the invalidity of the Union act of the benefit of its success, since that party only shares in the general benefit which anyone may have in an invalid Union act which is detrimental to his or her interests being no longer applied.136 The Court of Justice recognized this when it was faced with this question on a subsequent occasion and had to consider whether ‘an importer who, like the plaintiff in the main proceedings, has brought an administrative complaint followed by judicial proceedings, challenging a notice to pay MCAs [monetary compensatory amounts] on the ground that the [Union] regulation on the basis of which the notice was adopted was invalid, is entitled to rely for the purposes of those proceedings on the invalidity of a regulation declared by the Court of Justice in the same proceedings’.137 If the Court

134 See 112/83, Société des Produits de Maïs, 1985, para. 18. 135 See 4/79, Providence Agricole de la Champagne, 1980, paras 42–46; 109/79, Maïseries de Beauce, 1980, paras 42–46; 145/79, Roquette Frères, 1980, paras 50–53. 136 See H. Labayle, ‘La Cour de justice des Communautés et les effets d’une déclaration d’invalidité’ (1982) R.T.D.E. 484; D. Waelbroeck, ‘Le principe de la non-rétroactivité en droit communautaire à la lumière des arrêts “isoglucose” ’(1983) R.T.D.E. 363. 137 C-228/92, Roquette Frères, 1994, para. 24.

Consequences 471 were to have held that ‘a declaration of invalidity applicable only to the future is an adequate remedy even for that party’, this would have meant that ‘the national court would dismiss the action brought against the notice in question, even though the regulation on the basis of which that notice was adopted had been declared invalid by the Court in the same proceedings’.138 The Court found that this outcome would be unacceptable: ‘An economic agent such as the plaintiff in the main proceedings would thereby be deprived of its right to effective judicial protection in the event of a breach of [Union] law by the institutions, and the practical effect of [Art. 267 TFEU] would thereby be jeopardised.’139 Consequently, the Court concluded that ‘a trader who before the date of the present judgment has brought an action in a national court challenging a notice to pay MCAs adopted on the basis of a [Union] regulation declared invalid by the present judgment is entitled to rely on that invalidity in the national proceedings’.140 This covered not only the applicant in the main proceedings which had resulted in the reference to the Court of Justice, but also anyone who had brought judicial proceedings or ‘submitted an administrative complaint’ before the date of the declaration of invalidity.141 That being said, since, as already mentioned, the Court determines on a case-by-case basis whether a limitation on the temporal effects of a declaration that a particular Union act is invalid is justified, there may be circumstances that may lead the Court to hold that a declaration of invalidity is only applicable for the future. For example, in Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert,142 the Court ruled that, in view of the large number of publications which had taken place in the Member States on the basis of provisions of Union regulations in connection with the publication of personal data relating to natural persons who are beneficiaries of agricultural aid, the declaration of invalidity of these provisions did not allow any action to be brought to challenge the effects of the publication of the lists of beneficiaries of such aid carried out by the national authorities on the basis of those provisions during the period prior to the date on which the judgment was delivered. Moreover, in Association belge de Consommateurs Test-Achats and Others,143 the Court declared invalid a certain provision of a directive relating to the treatment of sex-specific risk assessments in insurance contracts upon the expiry of an appropriate transitional period in the future (i.e. with effect from 21 December 2012), which, in contrast to the Advocate General’s Opinion, did not carve out as an exception to that temporal limitation those persons who had initiated legal proceedings or equivalent claims under the applicable national law prior to the date of delivery of the Court’s judgment.

138 C-228/92, Roquette Frères, 1994, paras 25–26. 139 C-228/92, Roquette Frères, 1994, para. 27. 140 C-228/92, Roquette Frères, 1994, para. 30. 141 See C-228/92, Roquette Frères, 1994; see also 41/84, Pinna, 1986, paras 29–30. 142 See C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert, 2010, para. 94. 143 See C-236/09, Association belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats and Others, 2011, paras 33–34. The transitional period declared by the Court coincided with a five-year period provided under the provision of Union law in question for review of the option afforded to the Member States to permit sex-specific risk assessments of insurance contracts (see para. 26). Compare C-236/09, Association belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats and Others, AG Kokott Opinion, 2010, points 73–82.

11 THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES I. Subject-Matter A. General overview (1) Objective and functions The action for damages against the Union brought on the basis of Art. 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU seeks to have the Union held non-contractually liable to make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties. Since the founding of the European Union, the Treaties have provided for such an action.1 It distinguishes the Union legal order from international organizations whose rules traditionally confer extensive immunity from suit.2 According to the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU, the rules governing the Union’s non-contractual liability are to be determined by the Union Courts ‘in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States’.3 The action for damages therefore represents the first expression in the Treaties of the comparative law method by which the Union Courts take account of general principles applicable in the national legal systems in deciding the cases brought before them.4 (2) Present Treaty framework The Lisbon Treaty did not change the substantive content of Art. 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU, as compared to former Art. 235 EC and the second paragraph of Art. 288 EC, respectively, which had governed the action for damages against the former Community. However, taking account of the broader framework 1 Art. 340, third para. TFEU specifically concerns the ECB: see para. 11.23. There are comparable provisions in respect of actions for damages against the EAEC (Art. 188, second para. EAEC and Art. 268 TFEU, which replaced former Art. 151 EAEC). There was a different non-contractual liability regime governing the now-expired ECSC Treaty (Arts 34 and 40 ECSC), which has featured in the development of Union non-contractual liability. See further T. Heukels and A. McDonnell (eds), The Action for Damages in Community Law (Kluwer, 1997); J. Wakefield, Judicial Protection through the Use of Article 288(2) EC (Kluwer, 2002). 2 See K. Gutman, ‘Action for Damages: Court of Justice of the European Union’ in H. Ruiz Fabri (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Procedural Law (OUP, 2019) para. 4. For a broader discussion, see, e.g. M. Evans and P. Koutrakos (eds), The International Responsibility of the European Union: European and International Perspectives (Hart, 2013); M. Fink, Frontex and Human Rights: Responsibility in ‘Multi-Actor Situations’ under the ECHR and EU Public Liability Law (OUP, 2018). 3 See C-377/09, Hanssens-Ensch, 2010, para. 21; T-458/16, Acquafarm v Commission, 2017, para. 61. 4 See further K. Lenaerts, ‘The European Court of Justice and the Comparative Law Method’ (2017) E. Rev. Priv. L. 297; K. Lenaerts and K. Gutman, ‘The Comparative Law Method and the Court of Justice of the European Union: Interlocking Legal Orders Revisited’ in M. Andenas and D. Fairgrieve (eds), Courts and Comparative Law (OUP, 2015) 141.

EU Procedural Law. Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak, Oxford University Press. © Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833086.003.0011

11.01

11.02

474 THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES of Union law, there are certain key changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty which have an impact on the action for damages against the Union. In particular, this includes aspects relating to limitations placed on the Union Courts’ jurisdiction in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the defending parties whose action and conduct may form the basis of such an action, and the potential relevance of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter), as detailed below.

11.03

(a) Jurisdictional limitations and the CFSP As a result of the elimination of the former pillar structure and the replacement of the European Community with the Union,5 certain limitations placed on the jurisdiction of the Union Courts concerning the action for damages have been removed. With respect to the former third pillar of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM), which is now enshrined in Title V, Chapters 4 and 5 of the TFEU, an action for damages against the Union is not precluded for acts adopted in this field, as had been the case under the former Treaty framework.6 Of note, there was a five-year provisional period, subject to certain exceptions, in respect of actions for damages based on PJCCM acts adopted before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, but this expired on 1 December 2014.7 By contrast, with respect to the former second pillar of the CFSP, the Union Courts’ jurisdiction in this field remains limited. However, certain exceptions laid down in Art. 24(1) TEU and the second paragraph of Art. 275 TFEU confer jurisdiction on the Union Courts in respect of, first, monitoring compliance with Art. 40 TEU and, second, reviewing the legality of decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural and legal persons adopted by the Council on the basis of Title V, Chapter 2 TEU (concerning specific provisions on the CFSP) in proceedings brought in accordance with the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU (concerning actions for annulment). Consequently, the Union Courts have not been expressly conferred jurisdiction to rule on actions for damages involving CFSP acts and conduct of the Union institutions, along with Union bodies, offices, and agencies, taken on the basis of the Treaty provisions concerning the CFSP.8 5 See Art. 1, third para. TEU. 6 See C-354/04 P, Gestoras Pro Amnistía and Others v Council, 2007; C-355/04 P, Segi and Others v Council, 2007: see also, in that regard, post-Lisbon Treaty, albeit in relation to the CFSP: C-134/19 P, Bank Refah Kargaran v Council, 2020, paras 45–48. 7 See Art. 10 of Protocol (No. 36), annexed to the TEU, the TFEU, and the EAEC Treaty, on transitional provisions (OJ 2016 C202/321); see also Declaration No. 50, annexed to the Lisbon Treaty, concerning Art. 10 of the Protocol on transitional provisions (OJ 2016 C202/354). 8 See, in that regard, Opinion 2/13, Accession to the ECHR, 2014, paras 249–257; Opinion 2/13, AG Kokott Opinion, 2014, points 86–103; C-72/15, Rosneft, AG Wathelet Opinion, 2016, point 65 n. 36; see also C-29/22 P and C-44/22 P, KS and KD v Council and Others, pending. See further C. Eckes, ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Consequences of the Court’s Extended Jurisdiction’ (2016) E.L.J. 492; M. Cremona, ‘ “Effective Judicial Review Is of the Essence of the Rule of Law”: Challenging Common Foreign and Security Policy Measures Before the Court of Justice’ (2017) European Papers 671; C. Hillion and R. A. Wessel, ‘ “The Good, the Bad and the Ugly”: Three Levels of Judicial Control over the CFSP’ in S. Blockmans and P. Koutrakos (eds), Research Handbook on the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (Edward Elgar, 2018) 65; P. Koutrakos, ‘Judicial Review in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (2018) I.C.L.Q. 1; G. Butler, Constitutional Law of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy: Competence and Institutions in External Relations (Hart, 2019) 185–191.

Subject-Matter 475 Nevertheless, to the extent that Union action in the CFSP is implemented by Union acts adopted under Treaty provisions that fall within the jurisdiction of the Union Courts, an action for damages is available.9 Moreover, the Court of Justice has held that, since the Union Courts have jurisdiction to rule on an action for damages insofar as it concerns restrictive measures provided for by Union regulations based on Art. 215 TFEU, they must also have jurisdiction to rule on actions for damages in respect of restrictive measures provided for in CFSP decisions in order to avoid a lacuna in the judicial protection of the natural and legal persons concerned.10 Recent developments in the case- law further indicate that the fact that acts and conduct of the Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies in the CFSP are involved does not necessarily mean that the restrictions placed on the Union Courts’ jurisdiction in the CFSP apply, with the result that an action for damages may not be foreclosed.11 (b) The defending parties As far as the Union institutions whose acts or conduct may constitute the basis for an action for damages are concerned, the Lisbon Treaty’s recognition of the European Council as a Union institution in Art. 13(1) TEU has widened the scope of potential defendants against which such an action may be directed (see para. 11.23). It should be noted, however, that the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU contains no express reference to Union bodies, offices, or agencies, even though the principle that the Union is responsible for acts committed by such bodies, offices, or agencies is clearly established in the case-law (see para. 11.24). (c) The potential relevance of the Charter With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter has the same legal value as the Treaties, meaning that it has the status of primary Union law.12 This makes the fact that the action for damages is the only procedure mentioned in the text of the Charter stand out. More specifically, it has been given concrete expression in Art. 41(3) of the Charter concerning the right to good administration in Title V on Citizens’ Rights. Art.

9 See C-134/19 P, Bank Refah Kargaran v Council, 2020, paras 29–30; T-558/15, Iran Insurance v Council, 2018, para. 55; T-559/15, Post Bank Iran v Council, 2018, para. 55. For some examples, see C-45/15 P, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council, 2017; C-123/18 P, HTTS v Council, 2019; T-341/07, Sison v Council, 2011. 10 See C-134/19 P, Bank Refah Kargaran v Council, 2020, paras 31–44. See further A. Carrozzini and L. Lonardo, ‘Non-Contractual Liability for EU Sanctions: Towards the Normalization of CFSP’ (2021) E.F.A. Rev. 459; L. Coutron, ‘La consécration de la possibilité de demander réparation du préjudice causé par des mesures restrictives prévues par des décisions PESC: un gain de protection juridictionnelle en trompe-l’oeil?’ (2021) R.T.D.E. 627; G. Butler and R. A. Wessel, ‘Jurisdiction of the Court for Non-Contractual Liability and Actions for Damages Claims within the CFSP: Bank Refah Kargaran’ in G. Butler and R. A. Wessel (eds), EU External Relations Law: The Cases in Context (Hart, 2022) 991; S. Poli, ‘The Right to Effective Judicial Protection with Respect to Acts Imposing Restrictive Measures and Its Transformative Force for the Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (2022) C.M.L.Rev. 1045, 1050–1057. 11 See C-455/14 P, H v Council and Commission, 2016, paras 42–60 (involving acts of staff management in connection with seconded staff member of CFSP mission); C-14/19 P, Satcen v KF, 2020, paras 84–86 (involving acts of staff management in connection with contract staff member of CFSP body); T-602/15 RENV, Jenkinson v Council and Others, 2021, paras 68–69 (involving acts of staff management in connection with contract staff member of CFSP mission) (appeal pending in C-46/22 P). 12 Art. 6(1), first subpara. TEU.

11.04

11.05

476 THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES 41(3) of the Charter states: ‘Every person has the right to have the Union make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties, in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States.’ This provision reiterates the wording of the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU and therefore does not modify the requirements that must be satisfied under the case- law in order for the action for damages to succeed. In other words, Art. 41(3) of the Charter is not the legal basis for the Union Courts’ jurisdiction over an action for damages, which remains grounded in Art. 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU. Nevertheless, the reference to the action for damages in Art. 41(3) of the Charter gives expression to the role of that action in the context of guaranteeing the right to good administration on the part of the Union through its institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies.13

B. Notion of Union non-contractual liability 11.06

11.07

Although the term ‘non-contractual liability’ appears in the text of the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU, other terminology may be found in the literature to refer to the action for damages, for example, in connection with Union tort law14 and the liability of public authorities.15 Nonetheless, as indicated in the case-law, the notion of Union non- contractual liability is important for delineating the jurisdiction of the Union Courts and the scope of the action for damages.16 (1) Jurisdiction of the Union Courts (a) Exclusive jurisdiction Though not mentioned expressly in the Treaties, Art. 268 TFEU has been interpreted as conferring on the Court of Justice of the European Union exclusive jurisdiction to find the Union non-contractually liable.17 This jurisdiction is vested in the General Court

13 As regards Art. 41 of the Charter, see para. 11.45. See further, in respect of the action for damages in the context of the Charter, M. Fink, ‘The Action for Damages as a Fundamental Rights Remedy: Holding Frontex Liable’ (2020) G.L.J. 532 14 See further, in that regard, G. Bruggemeier, Tort Law in the European Union (Kluwer, 2015); P. Giliker (ed.), Research Handbook on EU Tort Law (Edward Elgar, 2017); E. de Jong, ‘EU Agency Tort Law and Its Limited Role in Controlling Agencies’ in M. Scholten and A. Brenninkmeijer (eds), Controlling EU Agencies: The Rule of Law in a Multi-jurisdictional Legal Order (Edward Elgar, 2020) 117. 15 See further, in that regard, P. Aalto, Public Liability in EU Law: Brasserie, Bergaderm and Beyond (Hart, 2011); M. Gautier-Melleray and J. F. Delile, ‘La responsibilité extracontractuelle en droit de l’Union européenne’ in A. Antoine and T. Olson (eds), La responsibilité de la puissance publique en droit comparé (Société de législation comparée, 2016) 149. 16 As the Court of Justice has held, the notion of Union ‘non-contractual liability’, which is of an autonomous character, must in principle be interpreted in the light of its purpose, namely, that of allowing an allocation of jurisdiction between the Union Courts and the national courts: see C-14/19 P, Satcen v KF, 2020, para. 82. 17 See C-220/13 P, Nikolaou v Court of Auditors, 2014, para. 52; C-758/19, OH, 2021, para. 22; see also C-275/00, First and Franex, 2002, paras 43–50 (exclusive jurisdiction of Union Courts means no competence for national court to order expert report as interlocutory measure); C-377/09, Hanssens-Ensch, 2010, paras 17, 23–26 (no jurisdiction of the national courts, even if an action is brought under national legislation establishing special statutory rules in the Member State concerned).

Subject-Matter 477 by virtue of Art. 256(1) TFEU.18 The exclusive jurisdiction of the General Court at first instance—and of the Court of Justice on appeal—to find the Union non-contractually liable guarantees the Union’s independence insofar as its acts are not reviewed in the light of national law by national courts. It also has the advantage of ensuring that there are uniform rules governing the Union’s non-contractual liability.19 (b) Non-contractual liability versus contractual liability of the Union The action for damages brought pursuant to Art. 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU only pertains to the ‘non-contractual liability’ of the Union, which generally concerns unlawful acts or conduct on the part of the Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies that have allegedly caused damage to the applicant.20 This should be distinguished from an action for damages on account of the contractual liability of the Union, meaning liability arising out of a contract entered into on behalf of the Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies and the applicant, which is governed by Art. 272 TFEU and the first paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU (see Ch. 15).21 The jurisdiction of the Union Courts to hear and to determine an action for damages differs according to the contractual or non-contractual nature of the liability involved. On the one hand, with respect to Union contractual liability, it is only in the presence of an arbitration clause within the meaning of Art. 272 TFEU that the Union Courts have jurisdiction. Thus, in the absence of such a clause, the Union Courts cannot on the basis of Art. 268 TFEU adjudicate on what is in reality an action for contractual damages, since to do so would extend its jurisdiction beyond the limits of Art. 274 TFEU, which specifically gives national courts general jurisdiction over disputes to which the Union is a party. On the other hand, as regards Union non-contractual liability, the Union Courts have jurisdiction without there being any need for the parties to the dispute to express their consent; the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice and the General Court flows directly from Art. 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU.22

18 See C-150/17 P, EU v Kendrion, 2018, paras 29–30. There are no exceptions carved out for the Court of Justice to rule on actions for damages at first instance: see Statute, Art. 51. For a broader perspective, see G. Gentile, ‘The ECJ as the EU Court of Appeal: Some Evidence from the Appeal Case-law on the Non-contractual Liability of the EU’ (2020) REALaw 73. 19 See, in that regard, 9/69, Sayag and Others v Leduc and Others, 1969, paras 5–6 (in the context of the EAEC Treaty); T-124/04, Ouariachi v Commission (order), 2005, para. 18. The same approach was not taken with regard to jurisdiction over Union contractual liability under Art. 272 TFEU: see Ch. 15; see further K. Gutman, ‘The Non-contractual Liability of the European Union: Principle, Practice and Promise’ in P. Giliker (ed.), Research Handbook on EU Tort Law (Edward Elgar, 2017) 26, 31–32. 20 See T-295/05, Document Security Systems v ECB, 2007, paras 61–62, 71 (action for patent infringement falls within jurisdiction of national courts, and not within the action based on Union non-contractual liability). 21 As the General Court has held, the breach of a contractual provision by an institution cannot in itself give rise to non-contractual liability on the part of that institution towards one of the parties with whom it has concluded the contract containing that provision. In such a case, the breach attributable to that institution has a purely contractual origin and emanates from its liability by reason of its status as a contracting party, and not by reason of any other status, such as that of administrative authority: see T-48/16, Sigma Orionis v Commission, 2018, para. 162; T-T-795/19, HB v Commission, 2021, para. 99 (appeal pending in C-160/22 P); T-796/19 P, HB v Commission, 2021, para. 95 (appeal pending in C-161/22 P). 22 See C-103/11 P, Commission v Systran and Systran Luxembourg, 2013, paras 56–60; C-19/18 P, VG v Commission, 2019, paras 26–27; T-106/13, Synergy Hellas v Commission, 2015, paras 143–144.

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478 THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES Consequently, to determine their jurisdiction under Art. 268 TFEU, the Union Courts must assess whether the claim for compensation is contractual or non- contractual in nature.23 Specifically, the Union Courts must examine, on an analysis of the various matters in the file—such as, for example, the rule of law allegedly infringed, the nature of the damage claimed, the conduct complained of, and the legal relations between the parties in question—w hether there exists between them a genuine contractual context, linked to the subject-matter of the dispute, the in-depth examination of which proves to be indispensable for the resolution of the said action. If a preliminary analysis of those matters shows that it is necessary to interpret one or more contracts concluded between the parties in question in order to establish whether the applicant’s claims are well-founded, the Union Courts are required at that point to halt their examination of the dispute and declare that they have no jurisdiction to rule thereon in the absence of an arbitration clause in the contracts within the meaning of Art. 272 TFEU.24 The mere reference to legal rules or principles which do not stem from the contract between the parties but which are binding on them cannot have the effect of changing the contractual nature of the dispute, since otherwise the nature of the dispute, and hence the jurisdiction of the Union Courts, would depend on the types of rules invoked by the parties.25

11.09

(c) Staff disputes A dispute between an official and the Union institution to which he or she is or was employed concerning compensation for damage where it originates in the relationship of employment between that person and the institution falls under Art. 270 TFEU and Arts 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations, and lies outside the sphere of application of Arts 268 and 340 TFEU.26 The same is true of an action for damages brought by anyone who, although not an official, is covered by the Staff Regulations as a result of family ties he or

23 For some examples, see C-103/11 P, Commission v Systran and Systran Luxembourg, 2013, paras 75–86 (finding dispute contractual in nature); C-19/18 P, VG v Commission, 2019, paras 28, 32–43 (finding dispute contractual in nature). Depending on the case, claims based on contractual and non-contractual liability may co- exist: see T-106/13, Synergy Hellas v Commission, 2015, para 150; T-48/16, Sigma Orionis v Commission, 2018, paras 163–164; for some examples, see C-346/18 P, Rose Vision v Commission, 2019; T-602/15 RENV, Jenkinson v Council and Others, 2021 (appeal pending in C-46/22 P). Such claims may also be brought in the alternative: see T-271/04, Citymo v Commission, 2007, para. 66. 24 See C-103/11 P, Commission v Systran and Systran Luxembourg, 2013, paras 66–67; C-19/18 P, VG v Commission, 2019, para. 30; T-106/13, Synergy Hellas v Commission, 2015, para. 145. 25 See C-214/08 P, Guigard v Commission, 2009, para. 43; C-103/11 P, Commission v Systran and Systran Luxembourg, 2013, paras 64–65; C-102/14 P, Investigación y Desarrollo en Soluciones y Servicios IT v Commission (order), 2016, para. 98; C -19/18 P, VG v Commission, 2019, paras 29, 42; C-14/19 P, Satcen v KF, 2020, para. 81; T-106/13, Synergy Hellas v Commission, 2015, para. 146. In its case-law, the General Court has held that where it is seized of an action relating to non-contractual liability when the dispute is in fact contractual in nature, it may reclassify the action if certain conditions are fulfilled: see, e.g. T-106/13, Synergy Hellas v Commission, 2015, paras 147–148. The Court of Justice has not yet ruled on the matter; but see C-730/18, SC v Eulex Kosovo, AG Tanchev Opinion, 2020, points 121–136. 26 See, in that regard, C-417/14 RX-II, Review Missir Mamachi di Lusignano v Commission, 2015, para. 38; C-54/20 P, Commission v Missir Mamachi di Lusignano and Others, 2022, paras 38–43; C-758/19, OH, 2021, para. 24; T-80/09 P, Commission v Q, 2011, para. 40.

Subject-Matter 479 she has with an official, since the dispute has its origin in the employment relationship between that official and the institution concerned.27 Therefore, in order to determine its jurisdiction, the General Court28 will assess whether the claim for compensation brought before it may be classified as litigation concerning Union non-contractual liability under Art. 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU, or as litigation concerning relations between the Union and its servants, commonly referred to as staff disputes, under Art. 270 TFEU (which used to fall within the jurisdiction of the EU Civil Service Tribunal).29 (2) Union non-contractual liability in the absence of unlawful action or conduct (a) The FIAMM case-law In considering the action for damages, the unlawfulness of the action or conduct on 11.10 the part of the particular institution, body, office, or agency has been a central feature of the Union’s non-contractual liability regime under Art. 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU. However, the question arises as to the potential non- contractual liability of the Union for lawful action or conduct of a Union institution, body, office, or agency (which has been referred to as a regime of ‘no-fault’ or ‘strict’ liability). In past case-law, the Court of Justice and the General Court left matters open, taking the approach that, in the event of the principle of Union liability for a lawful act being recognized in Union law, a precondition for such liability would in any event be the existence of unusual and special damage.30 In FIAMM and Others v Council and Commission,31 the Court of Justice held that, although comparative examination of the Member States’ legal systems had enabled the Court to make at a very early stage the finding of a principle of liability in the case of an unlawful act or omission, that was in no way the position as regards the possible existence of a principle of liability in the case of a lawful act or omission of the public authorities, in particular, where it is of a legislative nature. The Court of Justice concluded that Union law, as it currently stands, does not provide for a regime under which the Union can incur liability by reason of a lawful act or conduct. Therefore, on the basis of that

27 See C-417/14 RX-II, Review Missir Mamachi di Lusignano v Commission, 2015, para. 42 (concerning claims for compensation brought by an official’s father and children); C-54/20 P, Commission v Missir Mamachi di Lusignano and Others, 2022, paras 55–56 (concerning claims for compensation brought by an official’s brother and sister). 28 Following the dissolution of the EU Civil Service Tribunal, staff cases fall under the first instance jurisdiction of the General Court: see para. 2.39. 29 See T-309/03, Camós Grau v Commission, 2006, paras 65–74; T-136/10, M v EMA (order), 2011, paras 1–15; F-100/15, De Nicola v EIB (order), 2016, paras 16–23. In cases based on Art. 270 TFEU, the non-contractual liability of Union institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies may be incurred by reason of the illegality of an act adversely affecting an individual without there being any need to consider whether there has been a sufficiently serious infringement of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals, as is required in the case of actions for damages based on Arts 268 and 340, second and third paras TFEU: see T-881/16, HJ v EMA, 2019, paras 49–50; T‑271/10 RENV II, H v Council, 2020, para. 105. 30 See, inter alia, C-237/98 P, Dorsch Consult v Council and Commission, 2000, para. 18; T-64/01 and T-65/01, Afrikanische Frucht Compagnie and Others v Council and Commission, 2004, para. 150. 31 See C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P, FIAMM and Others v Council and Commission, 2008, paras 167–188.

480 THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES judgment, such liability is precluded.32 However, by virtue of its reference to Union law ‘as it currently stands’, the Court has leeway to refine its approach in future case-law.

11.11

(b) Recognition of a claim for unjust enrichment Nevertheless, the Court of Justice has not ruled out completely the possibility for the Union to incur non-contractual liability in the absence of unlawful conduct. In the case-law starting with Masdar (UK) v Commission,33 the Court has held that, according to the principles common to the laws of the Member States, a person who has suffered a loss which increases the wealth of another person without there being any legal basis for that enrichment has the right, as a general rule, to restitution from the person enriched, up to the amount of the loss. While the Treaties do not make express provision for a means of pursuing that type of action, if Art. 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU were to be construed as excluding that possibility, the result would be contrary to the principle of effective judicial protection. Actions for unjust enrichment of the Union, brought under those articles, require proof of enrichment on the part of the defendant for which there is no valid legal basis and proof of impoverishment on the part of the applicant which is linked to that enrichment.

C. Role in the system of judicial protection 11.12

By virtue of its role in ensuring judicial protection for parties against any act or omission of the Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies in breach of Union law, the action for damages has a complementary relationship to other actions brought before the Union Courts in the system of judicial protection. In the case-law, the Union Courts have referred to the availability of the action for damages where the applicant failed to satisfy the standing requirements for natural and legal persons under what is now the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU. The action for damages thus guarantees that such applicant is not deprived of effective judicial protection.34 This highlights its relationship to other actions brought before the Union Courts and to the principle of State liability, as detailed below. 32 See C-414/08 P, Sviluppo Italia Basilicata v Commission, 2010, para. 141; C-556/14 P, Holcim (Romania) v Commission, 2016, para. 105; C‑12/13 P and C‑13/13 P, Buono and Others v Commission, para. 43; T-79/13, Accoriniti v ECB, 2015, para. 119; see also F-50/09, Missir Mamachi di Lusignano v Commission, 2011, paras 209– 217 (rejecting such a regime in the context of staff disputes brought on the basis of Art. 270 TFEU). 33 See C-47/07 P, Masdar (UK) v Commission, 2008, paras 44–50; C-575/18 P, Czech Republic v Commission, 2020, paras 81–83; T-616/15, Transtec, 2018, para. 157; T-151/20, Czech Republic v Commission, 2022, paras 40– 43 (appeal pending in C-494/22 P). See further M. van de Moosdijk, Unjust Enrichment in European Union Law (Kluwer, 2018); N. Bačić Selanec, ‘A (More) Complete System of Remedies: Effective Judicial Protection of EU Member States in Czech Republic v. Commission’ (2022) 59 C.M.L.Rev. 171. In the abovementioned Masdar case, the applicant sought to bring a claim for damages under Arts 268 and 340, second para. TFEU based on the principle of negotiorum gestio. The Court of Justice found it unnecessary to rule on this issue (see C-47/07 P, Masdar (UK) v Commission, 2008, paras 66–69), which therefore awaits clarification in the case-law. 34 See C-131/03 P, Reynolds Tobacco and Others v Commission, 2006, paras 82–83; C-477/11 P, Sepracore Pharmaceuticals v Commission (order), 2012, para. 66; T-274/15, Alcogroup and Alcodis v Commission, 2018, para. 92; T-631/16, Remag Metalhandel and Jaschinsky v Commission, 2019, para. 26; see also C-134/19 P, Bank Refah Kargaran v Council, 2020, para. 34.

Subject-Matter 481 (1) Autonomous form of action vis-à-vis other actions before Union Courts According to the case-law, the action for damages is an autonomous form of action, 11.13 with a particular purpose to fulfil within the system of legal remedies and subject to conditions of use dictated by its specific purpose.35 Whereas an action for annulment under Art. 263 TFEU and an action for failure to act under Art. 265 TFEU seek a declaration that a binding Union act is unlawful or that such an act has not been taken, an action for damages under the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU seeks compensation for damage resulting from a Union act or from unlawful conduct attributable to a Union institution, body, office, or agency.36 Consequently, an action for damages will be admissible even if no action for annulment or for failure to act has been brought and if no preliminary ruling declaring the offending act invalid has been obtained. 37 What is more, the requirements in order for liability to be incurred are substantively different from the criteria for reviewing the legality of an action or an alleged failure to act on the part of the Union. Therefore, a finding that an act is unlawful or that the Union has failed to act does not suffice to establish the requisite conditions for the Union’s non- contractual liability.38 (2) Improper use of an action for damages However, an action for damages will be inadmissible where an applicant seeks to use the action for damages in order to obtain the specific outcome sought by an action for annulment or an action for failure to act. Accordingly, an action for damages may not be brought in order to avoid the consequences of time having run out for bringing an action for annulment against an act against which the applicant could have brought such an action. The improper use of the action for damages will be inferred from the fact that the reparation sought coincides with the benefit which the applicant would have obtained as a result of the annulment of the contested Union act39 or from the 35 See, inter alia, 4/69, Lütticke v Commission, 1971 ECR 325, 336; C-234/02 P, Ombudsman v Lamberts, 2004, para. 59; C-281/14 P, SACBO v Commission and INEA, 2016, para. 47; C-447/17 P and C-479/17 P, EU v Guardian Europe, 2019, para. 49; C-565/19 P, Carvalho and Others v Parliament and Council, 2021, para. 101. In its case-law, the General Court has referred to the principle of the autonomy of actions for damages: see T‑539/12 and T‑150/13, Zeigler and Zeigler Relocation v Commission, 2015, para. 41; T-292/15, Vakakis kai Synergates v Commission, 2018, para. 29. 36 See C-234/02 P, Ombudsman v Lamberts, 2004, para. 59; T-631/16, Remag Metalhandel and Jaschinsky v Commission, 2019, para. 26; T-107/17, Steinhoff v ECB, 2019, para. 51; see also C-123/18 P, HTTS v Council, 2019, paras 38–40: the autonomy of the action for damages is without prejudice to the fact that, in order to assess the merits of such an action, the Union Courts must assess the legality of the act or conduct of the Union institution, body, office, or agency on the basis of the facts and the law as they stood at the time when the act or conduct was adopted, as with an action for annulment. 37 In particular, the fact that an application for annulment is inadmissible does not in itself render a claim for damages inadmissible: see 175/84, Krohn v Commission, 1986, para. 32; C-447/17 P and C-479/17 P, EU v Guardian Europe, 2019, para. 49; C-565/19 P, Carvalho and Others v Parliament and Council, 2021, para. 101; T-79/13, Accorinti v ECB, 2015, para. 61; T-75/14, USFSPEI v Parliament and Council, 2017, para. 67. There is also no requirement for the act that gave rise to the damage to be binding: see T-107/17, Steinhoff v ECB, 2019, paras 55–56; T-631/16, Remag Metalhandel and Jaschinsky v Commission, 2019, paras 26–27; T-868/16, QI and Others v Commission and ECB, 2022, paras 71, 83. 38 See T-298/16, East West Consulting v Commission, 2018, para. 122. See further para. 11.47. 39 See 59/65, Schreckenberg v Commission, 1966 ECR 543, 550; Case 175/84, Krohn v Commission, para. 33; C-199/94 and C-200/94 P, Pevasa and Inpesca v Commission, 1995, para. 28; C-447/17 P and C-479/17 P, EU v Guardian Europe, 2019, paras 50–51; C-565/19 P, Carvalho and Others v Parliament and Council, 2021, paras 102– 103; T-514/93, Cobrecaf and Others v Commission, 1995, paras 59–60; T-468/14, Holistic Innovation Institute v

11.14

482 THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES close connection between the damage which arose and the applicant’s own failure to have recourse to another form of action.40 The Union Courts take a strict approach to the application of this case-law so as to preserve as much as possible the autonomy of the action for damages.41 In that regard, it is only where an action for damages is actually aimed at securing withdrawal of an individual decision addressed to the applicant which has become definitive—so that it has the same purpose and the same effect as an action for annulment—that the action for damages could be considered to be an abuse of process.42

11.15

(3) Potential relevance of annulment action for an action for damages Notwithstanding the autonomous nature of the action for damages in terms of its admissibility vis-à-vis the action for annulment, there is some linkage between these two actions in practice. For example, where an applicant brings an action for annulment against an allegedly unlawful Union act at the same time as an action for damages for the damage allegedly suffered on account of such act which are based on the same grounds, the General Court may utilize its reasoning relative to the annulment action to find that the applicant has failed to prove one or more of the requisite conditions for the action for damages, typically the unlawfulness of the act or conduct on the part of the institution, body, office, or agency concerned, at least insofar as the applicant puts forth no further arguments in the context of the latter action.43 Likewise, where there has been a previous judgment of a Union Court in which the legality of a Union act is examined and confirmed, that previous judgment may be deemed to have res judicata effects precluding a Union Court from re-examining, in an action for damages, the same matters of fact and law previously raised by the same parties.44

Commission, 2016, para. 47; T-292/15, Vakakis kai Synergates v Commission, 2018, para. 30; T-100/18, Wehrheim v ECB, 2019, para. 53. 40 See 4/67, Muller (née Collignon) v Commission, 1967 ECR 365, 373; 346/87, Bossi v Commission, 1989, paras 31–35; C-237/06 P, Strack v Commission (order), 2007, para. 98; C-532/09 P, Ivanov v Commission (order), 2010, paras 23–25; T-414/06 P, Combescot v Commission, 2008, para. 49; T-468/14, Holistic Innovation Institute v Commission, 2016, para. 48. 41 See T-79/13, Accorinti v ECB, 2015, para. 62; T-292/15, Vakakis kai Synergates v Commission, 2018, para. 29. 42 See C-102/14 P, Investigación y Desarrollo en Soluciones y Servicios v Commission, 2016, para. 80; T-292/15, Vakakis kai Synergates v Commission, 2018, para. 31 (finding action admissible: see paras 34–43). The burden of proving such an abuse of process lies on the party pleading it: see T-919/16, Collins v Parliament (order), 2018, para. 36; see also C-447/17 P and C-479/17 P, EU v Guardian Europe, 2019, paras 53–65 (upholding dismissal of plea of inadmissibility alleging that the compensation for the loss of profit would nullify the legal effects of a decision that has become final); T-832/14, Nutria v Commission, 2016, paras 40–50 (rejecting plea of inadmissibility alleging circumvention of the time-limit for bringing an action for failure to act). 43 See T-10/17, ProofIt v EIGE, 2018, paras 205–208; T-707/18, Tilly-Sabco v Council and Commission 2020, para. 115; T-352/18, Germann Avocats v Commission (order), 2021, paras 110–111; T-203/20, Al-Imam v Council, 2021, para. 281; T-523/17, Eleveté Invest Group and Others v Commission and SRB, 2022, paras 590–591; see also, in that regard, T-75/14, USFSPEI v Parliament and Council, 2017, paras 63–65. 44 See C-346/17 P, Klein v Commission, 2018, paras 50–56; T-291/04, Enviro Tech Europe and Enviro Tech International v Commission, 2011, paras 137–138; T‑539/12 and T‑150/13, Zeigler and Zeigler Relocation v Commission, 2015, paras 45–47; compare C-221/10 P, Artegodan v Commission, 2012, paras 83–94; C-350/16 P, Pappalardo and Others v Commission, 2017, paras 32–38; C-248/17 P, Bank Tejarat v Council, 2018, paras 70– 77; see also C-123/18 P, HTTS v Council, 2019, para. 41 (unlawfulness condition satisfied in view of previous judgment).

Subject-Matter 483 Additionally, in HTTS v Council,45 the Court of Justice held that the coherence underlying the system of remedies in the Treaties means that the methodology for examining the legality of acts or conduct of a Union institution cannot differ according to the type of action. Thus, as with an action for annulment, in an action for damages, too, the illegality of an act or conduct giving rise to Union non-contractual liability must be assessed on the basis of the facts and law as they stood at the time when the act or conduct was taken. (4) Linkage to the principle of State liability The action for damages against a Member State for breach of Union law, referred to 11.16 as the principle of State liability, which was established by the Court of Justice in the landmark judgments Francovich and Others,46 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame,47 and Köbler,48 relates to parties’ right of compensation based on Union law in respect of harm or loss suffered as a consequence of national law or conduct allegedly in breach of Union law. Such actions are decided by the national courts in accordance with the relevant domestic-law rules, with a role for the Court of Justice to play in the context of references for preliminary rulings submitted by national courts in those proceedings (see paras 4.65–4.71).49 By contrast, the action for damages against the Union concerns a situation in which the legality of an act or conduct of a Union institution, body, office, or agency is at issue, and whose assessment is undertaken exclusively by the Union Courts pursuant to Union substantive and procedural rules. However, viewed in a broader perspective, these regimes are essentially ‘two sides of the same coin’ because they ensure protection for individuals against unlawful acts and conduct on the part of Union and Member State authorities in breach of Union law.50 This helps to explain why these regimes are intertwined in the case-law. The Court of Justice drew from the Union non- contractual liability regime in its formulation of the main conditions for State liability in Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame,51 and then came full circle in Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission,52 declaring that those conditions govern Union non-contractual liability, the rationale being that individuals should be afforded equivalent protection no matter whether it is a Union or Member State authority which is responsible for the damage caused. Therefore, the main substantive conditions for Union and Member

45 See C-123/18 P, HTTS v Council, 2019, in particular paras 37–40. 46 C‑6/90 and C‑9/90, Francovich and Others, 1991. 47 C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, 1996. 48 C-224/01, Köbler, 2003. 49 See C‑501/12 to C‑506/12, C‑540/12 and C‑541/12, Specht and Others, 2014, paras 98–100; C-261/20, Thelen Technopark Berlin, 2022, para. 45. 50 P. Eeckhout, ‘Liability of Member States in Damages and the Community’s System of Remedies’ in J. Beatson and T. Tridimas (eds), New Directions in European Public Law (Hart, 1998) 63, 64. See further Aalto (n. 15); C. H. Sieburgh, ‘EU Law and Non-Contractual Liability of the Union, Member States and Individuals’ in A. S. Hartkamp, C.H. Sieburgh, and L.A.D. Keus (eds), The Influence of EU Law on National Private Law (Kluwer, 2014) 465; A. Biondi and M. Farley, ‘Damages in EU Law’ in R. Schütze and T. Tridimas (eds), Oxford Principles of European Union Law: The European Union Legal Order (Vol. I, OUP, 2018) 1040. 51 See C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, 1996, paras 48–53. 52 C-352/98 P, Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission, 2000, paras 41–42, 62.

484 THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES State liability are in principle the same,53 and these regimes have largely developed in tandem, with cross-fertilization between the two.54

II. Identity of the Parties A. Applicants 11.17

11.18

11.19

(1) Natural and legal persons Any natural or legal person who claims to have been injured by acts or conduct of a Union institution, body, office, or agency, or of its officials or servants, may bring an action for damages in the General Court, with appeal to the Court of Justice.55 There is no requirement as to the applicant’s nationality in the case of such an action. (a) Interest must be shown Under settled case-law, a natural or legal person has the right to bring an action for damages against the Union only where that person is able to assert in law either a particular interest of his or her own or a right to compensation which has been assigned to him or her by others. Otherwise, the applicant has not established that he or she has any interest in bringing proceedings, and the action for damages fails.56 (b) Injury must be personal The injury for which the applicant seeks reparation must affect his or her own personal assets.57 In particular, legal persons, including trade associations, must show that the damage sustained affected their own separate assets, and not (exclusively) the personal assets of their members.58 53 See for State liability, paras 4.65–4.66; and for Union liability, para. 11.38. As the Court of Justice has held, there is nothing to preclude State liability being incurred under less restrictive conditions: see C-501/18, Balgarska Narodna Bank, 2021, para. 114; C-61/21, Ministre de la Transition écologique et Premier ministre, 2022, para. 63. 54 This is illustrated, for example, by the cross-references in the case-law on Union and State liability in connection with the factors to be taken into account in the assessment of the sufficiently serious breach requirement: see C-261/20, Thelen Technopark Berlin, 2022, para. 47; see further para. 11.40. See also C-447/17 P and C-479/17 P, EU v Guardian Europe, 2019, paras 74–87, in which the Court of Justice held that the regime governing State liability with regard to national last instance courts was transferable to the Union non-contractual liability regime, with the result that a breach of Union law arising from a decision of the General Court cannot give rise to Union liability. 55 See 118/83, CMC v Commission, 1984, para. 31; T-137/07, Portela v Commission (order), 2008, para. 50. 56 See T-219/08, Turkish Labour Party v Commission (order), 2008, para. 7; T-223/09, Turkish Labour Party v Commission (order), 2009, para. 11; T-430/09, Turkish Labour Party (order), 2009, para. 11; T-393/13, Solarworld and Solonica v Commission (order), 2015, paras 34–69; see also T-106/13, Synergy Hellas v Commission, 2015, para. 132 (the fact that an applicant withdrew from an action for non-contractual liability is not sufficient to show that it has no interest in bringing a new action). 57 See T-223/09, Turkish Labour Party v Commission, 2009, para. 12 (underscoring that an interest in seeing that the person who suffered damage—not being the applicant—obtains compensation is not sufficient to establish an interest within the meaning of the case-law). 58 See 72/74, Union Syndicale and Others v Council, 1975, para. 21; 114/83, Société d’Initiatives et de Coopération Agricoles v Commission, 1984, paras 3–5; 289/83, GAARM v Commission, 1984, paras 4–5; T-149/96, Coldiretti and Others v Council and Commission, 1998, paras 57–60; T-9/03, Coldiretti and Others v Commission (order), 2004, para. 47; T-304/01, Abad Pérez and Others v Council and Commission, 2006, paras 52–55; T-444/07, CPEM v Commission, 2009, paras 39–40; T-574/08, Syndicat des thoniers méditerranéens and Others v Commission, 2012,

Identity of the Parties 485 (c) Assignment Nevertheless, a person who suffers injury may assign his or her right which was infringed, together with his or her claim to damages, to another person who will consequently be entitled to bring an action by subrogation.59 Once the injured party has assigned his or her claim, that party ceases to have the right to bring an action.60 If the assignment is of a fraudulent nature—if the assignor and/or the assignee does not act in good faith—it may not be relied upon as against the defendant.61 (2) Member States Art. 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU do not preclude Member States from bringing an action for damages. Recently, such an action has been brought before the Union Courts.62

11.20

11.21

B. Defendants (1) General overview The Union may incur non-contractual liability under the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU as a result of damage caused by its institutions (see paras 11.23 and 11.25); by its bodies, offices, and agencies (see paras 11.24–11.25); or by its servants in the performance of their duties (see paras 11.26–11.28). Union non-contractual liability may also arise concurrently with that of the Member States (see paras 11.29–11.34). However, the Union cannot incur non-contractual liability for an act of primary Union law (such as amendments to the Treaties), since such an act cannot be imputed to a Union institution.63 In addition, acts or conduct of the Member States,64 of third (non-EU) States,65 of institutions outside the Union (such as the Council of Europe66 or the European Court of Human Rights67), or of natural and legal persons68 cannot cause the Union to incur non-contractual liability.

paras 20–30 (standing of the association concerned not addressed on appeal: see C-12/13 P and C-13/13 P, Buono and Others v Commission, 2014, para. 39); T-124/17, Estamede v ECB (order), 2018, paras 14–16. 59 See 238/78, Ireks-Arkady v Council and Commission, 1979, para. 5; 256/80, 257/80, 265/80, 267/80, 5/81, 51/81, and 282/82, Birra Wührer and Others v Council and Commission, 1984, para. 12; T-9/03, Coldiretti and Others v Commission (order), 2004, para. 47; T-223/09, Turkish Labour Party v Commission (order), 2009, para. 13. 60 See 256/80, 257/80, 265/80, 267/80, 5/81, 51/81, and 282/82, Birra Wührer and Others v Council and Commission, 1984, para. 7. 61 See 250/78, DEKA v EEC, 1983. 62 See C-575/18 P, Czech Republic v Commission, 2020, para. 81; T-151/20, Czech Republic v Commission, 2022, in particular paras 188–195 (appeal pending in C-494/22 P). See further para. 11.11. 63 See 169/73, Compagnie Continentale v Council, 1975, para. 16; 31/86 and 35/86, LAISA and Others v Council, 1988, paras 19–22; C-95/98 P, Edouard Dubois and Fils v Council and Commission (order), 1999; T-614/97, Aduanas Pujol Rubio and Others v Council and Commission (order), 2000; T-12/98 and T-13/98, Argon and Others v Council and Commission (order), 2000. 64 See C-747/19, Rosellò v Italy (order), 2020; C-320/20 P, Vasilev v Bulgaria (order), 2021. 65 See T-369/11, Diadikasia Symbouloi Epicheiriseon v Commission and Others (order), 2012, paras 48–49. 66 See T-242/08, Faur v Council of Europe (order), 2008. 67 See T-768/18 P, Harvilik—HYDRA v Czech Republic and European Court of Human Rights (order), 2019. 68 See T-690/16, Enrico Colombo and Giacomo Corinti v Commission (order), 2016.

11.22

486 THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES Substantively, the action for damages is directed against the Union.69 However, it is the particular Union institution, body, office, or agency to which the allegedly unlawful act or conduct is attributable which has to be summoned before the General Court at first instance, or the Court of Justice on appeal, as representing the Union.70 The Commission has no general right to represent the Union.71 It is for the applicant to specify the institution, body, office, or agency against which its action is brought in its application.72 If the damage was allegedly caused by more than one institution, body, office, or agency, they must all be brought into the proceedings.73

11.23

(2) Union institutions The Union institutions which may cause the Union to incur non-contractual liability under the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU are those listed in Art. 13(1) TEU, namely, the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank (ECB), and the Court of Auditors. The European Council had been excluded under the former Treaty framework on the ground that only acts and conduct of a Community institution under former Art. 7(1) EC74 could give rise to non-contractual liability of the then European Community.75 With the Lisbon Treaty (see para. 11.02), an action for damages may now be brought in relation to acts and conduct on the part of the European Council.76

69 See, in that regard, C-150/17 P, EU v Kendrion, para. 33; T-577/14, Gascogne Sack Deutschland and Gascogne v EU (order), 2015, paras 15–16; T-721/18 and T-81/19, Apostolopoulou and Apostolopoulou-Chrysanthaki v Commission, 2021, para. 81 (appeal pending in C-124/22 P). 70 See 63/72 to 69/72, Werhahn Hansamühle and Others v Council, 1973, para. 7; 353/88, Briantex and Di Domenico v Commission, 1989, para. 7; C-234/02 P, Ombudsman v Lamberts, 2004, para. 67; C-150/17 P, EU v Kendrion, 2018, para. 33; T-292/09, Mugraby v Council and Commission (order), 2011, para. 24 (upheld in C-581/11 P, Mugraby v Council and Commission (order), 2012, paras 49–-51); T-577/14, Gascogne Sack Deutschland and Gascogne v EU (order), 2015, para. 23; T-721/18 and T-81/19, Apostolopoulou and Apostolopoulou-Chrysanthaki v Commission, 2021, para. 82 (appeal pending in C-124/22 P). The question of the identification of the institution responsible for representing the Union in an action for damages is part of the assessment of the admissibility of that action: see, e.g. T-409/14, Marcuccio v EU (order), 2015, para. 26; T-725/14, Aalberts Industries v EU (order), 2015, para. 14. 71 Art. 335 TFEU is concerned with the Union’s power to act and its representation in the various Member States. Thus, as the Union Courts have made clear, in an action for damages based on a failure of a Union Court to adjudicate within a reasonable time under the second paragraph of Art. 47 of the Charter, the Union is represented by the Court of Justice of the European Union, and not by the Commission: see, inter alia, C-150/17 P, EU v Kendrion, 2018, paras 27–47 (dismissing objection to the admissibility of the appeal based on alleged conflict of interest ensuing from the Court of Justice of the European Union as defendant and as the court before which the action is heard); T-479/14, Kendrion v EU (order), 2015; T-673/15, Guardian Europe v EU, 2017, paras 18–19. 72 The Union Courts have dismissed objections to the admissibility of an action for damages on the grounds that the application was brought directly against a Union institution, body, office, or agency, and not specifically against the Union; such an action is deemed to be directed against the Union represented by that institution, body, office, or agency: see 353/88, Briantex and Di Domenico v Commission, 1989, para. 7; T-209/00, Lamberts v Ombudsman, 2002, para. 48; T-364/03, Medici Grimm v Council, 2006, para. 47. This is so where the rights of the defence are not affected: see 63/72 to 69/72, Werhahn Hansamühle and Others v Council, 1973, para. 8; T-246/93, Bühring v Council and Commission, 1998, para. 26. 73 Where an applicant directs its action for damages against several institutions, but the act or conduct forming the basis for the action cannot be attributed to one of those institutions, the Union Courts will find the action inadmissible insofar as it is directed at that institution: see, e.g. C-455/14 P, H v Council and Others, 2016, paras 65–68; T-209/00, Lamberts v Ombudsman (order), 2001, paras 17–19; T-128/05, SPM v Council, 2008, paras 61, 69. 74 Former Art. 7(1) EC mentioned the following five institutions: the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the Court of Justice, and the Court of Auditors. 75 See T-346/03, Krikorian and Others v Parliament and Others (order), 2003, para. 17. 76 See T-868/16, QI and Others v Commission and ECB, 2022, in particular paras 78, 83.

Identity of the Parties 487 To the extent that it is a primary actor (alongside the Council) in the field of the CFSP, its acts or conduct in this field are subject to the limits placed on the Union Courts’ jurisdiction under the Treaties (see para. 11.03). The ECB is also included in the list of Union institutions under Art. 13(1) TEU. However, in view of its legal personality,77 there is a separate provision concerning its non-contractual liability laid down in the third paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU, which is virtually identical to the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU. As compared to former Art. 288 EC,78 Art. 340 TFEU clarifies that it is the ECB which is responsible for making good the alleged damage, and Art. 268 TFEU reflects the Union Courts’ jurisdiction over actions for damages brought on the basis of both paragraphs. The conditions governing Union non-contractual liability apply, mutatis mutandis, to the ECB.79 With respect to the Court of Justice of the European Union, the Court of Justice held that the sanction for a breach by a Union Court of its obligation to adjudicate a case within a reasonable time, as guaranteed by the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, is an action for damages against the Union, as opposed to the remedy of reducing the amount of the fine in the context of the competition rules.80 The possibility of bringing an action for damages against the Union Courts on grounds other than those relating to excessively long proceedings was sidestepped in certain cases and thus awaits clarification in the case-law.81 (3) Union bodies, offices, and agencies As far as Union bodies, offices, and agencies are concerned, an action for damages may also be brought on account of acts and conduct committed by them, despite the lack of explicit language to this effect in Art. 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU.82 In comparison to other Treaty provisions in which language was added by the Lisbon Treaty to encompass action taken by Union bodies, offices, and agencies in the context of the procedures before the Union Courts (for example, Arts 263, 265, 267, and 277 TFEU), this was not done in respect of Art. 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU. Nevertheless, this omission does not change the system already worked out for actions for damages against such bodies, offices, or agencies in the case-law83 (subject to the limits placed on the Union Courts’ jurisdiction under 77 See, e.g. Art. 282(3) TFEU. 78 See T-436/09, Dufour v ECB, 2011, para. 188. 79 See T-79/13, Accorinti and Others v ECB, 2015, para. 65; T-749/15, Nausicaa Anadyomène and Banque d’escompte v ECB, 2017, para. 68; T-107/17, Steinhoff and Others v ECB, 2019, para. 52; T-321/17, Niemelä and Others v ECB, 2021, para. 59 (appeal pending in C-181/22 P); T-868/16, QI and Others v Commission and ECB, 2022, paras 45–46. 80 See C-40/12 P, Gascogne Sack Deutschland v Commission, 2013, paras 89–96; C-50/12 P, Kendrion v Commission, 2013, paras 94–101; C-58/12 P, Groupe Gascogne v Commission, 2013, paras 83–90. See, inter alia, C-138/17 P and C-146/17 P, EU v Gascogne Sack Deutschland and Gascogne, 2018; C-150/17 P, EU v Kendrion, 2018; C-174/17 P and C-222/17 P, EU v ASPLA and Armando Alvarez, 2018; C-447/17 P and C-479/17 P, EU v Guardian Europe, 2019. 81 See C-463/17 P, Ori Martin v Court of Justice, 2018, paras 31–34; T-759/16, Campailla v EU (order), 2018, para. 33. See also n. 54 of this chapter. 82 See, in that regard, M. Chamon, ‘Les agences décentralisées et le droit procédural de l’UE’ (2016) C.D.E. 541. 83 As the Court of Justice has held, the term ‘institution’ within the meaning of Art. 340, second para. TFEU encompasses not only the Union institutions listed in Art. 13(1) TEU, but also all the Union bodies, offices,

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488 THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES the Treaties, for example, the CFSP84), such as the European Investment Bank (EIB)85 and the European Ombudsman.86 This broad interpretation is designed to prevent the Union from escaping possible liability where it acts through bodies, offices, or agencies that are not institutions within the meaning of Art. 13(1) TEU, since national courts have no jurisdiction to find the Union non-contractually liable (see para. 11.07). Moreover, many Union bodies, offices, or agencies have legal personality. Thus, the Court of Justice or the General Court may hold that these bodies, offices, or agencies have incurred non-contractual liability pursuant to a specific provision in the measures establishing them.87 It might also be the case that the disputed acts and conduct of a particular entity are taken pursuant to delegated powers and therefore attributable to a Union institution which is the proper defendant in the action for damages. For example, under the case-law, an action for damages concerning allegedly unlawful acts and conduct committed by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) is directed at the Commission.88 EU Delegations have not been recognized as Union bodies, offices, or agencies having legal capacity to act in court proceedings, so their acts and conduct forming the basis of an action for damages have been directed at the Commission and the European External Action Service.89 Additionally, actions for damages brought on the basis of allegedly unlawful acts and conduct committed by EU Missions active in the field of the Common Defence and Security Policy have so

and agencies that have been established by or under the Treaties and are intended to contribute to the achievement of the European Union’s objectives: see C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P, and C‑604/18 P, Council v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others, 2020, para. 80; see also, in that regard, C-59/18 and C-182/18, Italy and Comune di Milano v Council, 2022, paras 74–75; C-106/19 and C-232/19, Italy and Comune di Milano v Council and Parliament, 2022, paras 118–119; T-528/20, Kočner v Europol, 2021, para. 60 (appeal pending in C-755/21 P); T-868/16, QI and Others v Commission and ECB, 2022, para. 49. 84 But see C-455/14 P, H v Council and Commission, 2016, paras 42–60 (jurisdiction to rule on actions for annulment and for damages brought by seconded staff member of CFSP mission); C-14/19 P, Satcen v KF, 2020, paras 84–86 (jurisdiction to rule on actions for annulment and for damages brought by contract staff member of CFSP body). See further para. 11.03. 85 See C-370/89, SGEEM and Etroy v EIB, 1992, paras 12–16; see also T-461/08, Evropaïki Dynamiki v EIB, 2011; T-868/16, QI and Others v Commission and ECB, 2022, para. 83 (referring, inter alia, to the Eurosystem and the EIB). 86 See C-234/02 P, Ombudsman v Lamberts, 2004, in particular paras 43–52, 59–65; see also C-337/15 P, Ombudsman v Staelen, 2017; T-412/05, M v Ombudsman, 2008. See further para. 11.49. 87 See C-376/16 P, EUIPO v European Dynamics Luxembourg and Others, 2018, para. 6; T-116/11, EMA v Commission, 2013, paras 292–297; T-102/13, Heli-Flight v EASA, 2014, para. 115; T-376/15, KK v EASME, 2017, para. 13; T-726/14, Novar v EUIPO, 2017, para. 25; T-10/17, Proof IT v EIGE, 2018, para. 203; T-557/17, Liaño Reig v SRB (order), 2019, paras 58–62. However, depending on the circumstances, there may be no explicit reference to the relevant Union measures: see T-477/15, European Dynamics Luxembourg and Others v ECHA, 2018, paras 135–140. The conditions for Union non-contractual liability apply, mutatis mutandis, to one of its bodies, offices, or agencies: see, e.g. C-677/15 P, EUIPO v European Dynamics Luxembourg and Others, 2017, para. 99; T-10/17, Proof IT v EIGE, 2018, para. 203. As regards joint undertakings, see T-415/10, Nexans France v European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy, 2013, para. 179. 88 See T-309/03, Camós Grau v Commission, 2006, para. 66; T‑435/09 R, GL2006 Europe v Commission and OLAF (order), 2010, paras 14–16. For some recent examples, see C-615/19 P, Dalli v Commission, 2021; T-884/19, Folschette and Others v Commission, 2021. 89 See T-264/09, Tecnoprocess v Commission and EU Delegation to Morocco (order), 2011, paras 70–71; T-369/11, Diadikasia Symbouloi Epicheiriseon v Commission and Others (order), 2012, paras 39–45; T-395/11, Elti v EU Delegation to Montenegro (order), 2012; T-138/14, Chart v EEAS, 2015; T-711/17, Spinoit v Commission and Others (order), 2018, paras 28–29; T-793/17, Bruel v Commission and Others (order), 2018, paras 27–28.

Identity of the Parties 489 far been attributed to the Council90 or the Commission91 in circumstances in which the particular mission had not been conferred legal capacity to act under the Union measures at the relevant time.92 (4) Scope of Union law It is generally assumed that the acts and conduct attributed to a particular Union institution, body, office, or agency fall within the scope of Union law. Due to developments arising out of the global financial crisis, this has become a controversial subject in the case-law and in particular raises questions in the context of actions for damages against the Union.93 Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB94 involved actions for annulment and for damages brought by depositors of two Cypriot banks in connection with the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) concerned with Cyprus under the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The ESM Treaty is an international-law treaty concluded by the Member States whose currency is the euro in order to establish an institution with legal personality, with a view to providing financial assistance, subject to strict conditionality requirements, to Member States experiencing or threatened by severe financial problems. In its judgment, the Court of Justice held that the General Court had erred in law by holding that it did not have jurisdiction to decide an action for damages based on the alleged illegality of certain provisions of the MOU. Although the MOU did not constitute an act that could be imputed to the Commission and the ECB, the Court considered that such a finding was liable to have an effect in relation to the conditions governing the admissibility of an action for annulment, but could not prevent unlawful conduct of the Commission or the ECB linked to the adoption of an MOU on behalf of the ESM from being raised against these institutions in an action for damages. Furthermore, in Council v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others,95 the Court of Justice upheld the dismissal of actions for damages brought by individuals on account of the

90 See C-455/14 P, H v Council and Commission, 2016, paras 65–68 (concerning the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which according to the Union acts at issue was not conferred legal capacity to act). 91 See C-439/13 P, Elitaliana v Eulex Kosovo, 2015, paras 63–66 (concerning the EU civilian mission Eulex Kosovo before it was conferred legal capacity under the relevant Union acts). 92 See, in that regard, C-283/20, Eulex Kosovo, 2022; C-29/22 P and C-44/22 P, KS and KD v Council and Others, pending. 93 See further M. Markakis, Accountability in the Economic and Monetary Union (OUP, 2020) 228–232; D. Sarmiento and M. Hartman, ‘European Monetary Union and the Courts’ in F. Amtenbrink, C. Herrmann, and R. Repasi (eds), The EU Law of Economic and Monetary Union (OUP, 2020) 526, 543–551; P. Nicolaides, ‘The Euro Group and Judicial Protection: Has the Court of Justice Created a Loophole?’ (2021) M.J.E.C.L. 919; E. Spaventa, ‘Constitutional Creativity or Constitutional Deception? Acts of the Member States Acting Collectively and Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice’ (2021) C.M.L.Rev. 1697, 1720–1724. 94 See C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB, 2016, paras 52–61. 95 See C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P, and C‑604/18 P, Council v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others, 2020, in particular paras 78–97; see also, in that regard, T-161/15, Brinkmann (Steel Trading) and Others v Commission and ECB (order), 2022, paras 78–80; T-868/16, QI and Others v Commission and ECB, 2022, in particular paras 71–86 (also finding no jurisdiction to rule on claims for damages raised in respect of statements of the Heads of State or Government of the euro area).

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490 THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES MOU, along with other acts and conduct of the Council, the Commission, the ECB, and the Euro Group in connection with the restructuring of the Cyprus banking sector. Crucially, with regard to the naming of the Euro Group as a defending party, the Court of Justice held, contrary to the General Court, that the Euro Group (which is composed of the finance ministers of the Member States whose currency is the euro who meet informally to discuss matters related to their shared responsibilities concerning the euro, and the Commission and the ECB are invited to attend)96 is not an EU entity established by the Treaties whose acts or conduct might form the subject-matter of an action to establish Union non-contractual liability under the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU. The Court pointed out that the term ‘institution’ within the meaning of that provision encompasses not only the Union institutions listed in Art. 13(1) TEU, but also all the Union bodies, offices, and agencies which, first, have been established by or under the Treaties and, second, are intended to contribute to the achievement of the Union’s objectives. However, according to the Court, the Euro Group failed to satisfy the first of those criteria. While Art. 137 TFEU and Protocol (No. 14) on the Euro Group formalized the existence of the Euro Group, those provisions did not alter its intergovernmental nature and, moreover, it does not have any competence of its own in the Union legal order. Nonetheless, the Court emphasized that individuals may bring an action for damages against the Council, the Commission, and the ECB in respect of the acts or conduct that those institutions adopt following the political agreements concluded within it.

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(5) Servants in the performance of their duties (a) Acts carried out in performance of the servant’s duties The Union Courts have regarded only a limited class of acts of servants (officials) of the Union institutions as acts carried out ‘in the performance of their duties’ which are potentially capable of causing the Union to incur liability for the purposes of the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU. The Union may be held liable only for damage caused by acts that are the ‘necessary extension’ of the tasks entrusted to the institution to which the staff member belongs.97 As a classic example under the case-law, where a servant drives his or her own car pursuant to a travel order, this does not satisfy that test, except in the case of force majeure or in exceptional circumstances of such overriding importance that the Union would otherwise have been unable to carry out the tasks entrusted to it. A servant who causes a road accident with his or her own car pursuant to a travel order issued by the institution therefore does not cause that institution to incur liability for the ensuing damage in the absence of force majeure or exceptional circumstances.98

96 See Art. 137 TFEU; Protocol (No. 14), annexed to the TEU and the TFEU, on the Euro Group (OJ 2016 C202/283). 97 See 9/69, Sayag and Others, 1969, para. 7 (concerning the EAEC Treaty); C-758/19, OH, 2021, para. 23; T-124/04, Ouariachi v Commission (order), 2005, paras 18–23; T-259/03, Nikolaou v Commission, 2007, paras 193–199. The staff members concerned are the servants of a Union institution, body, office, or agency within the meaning of Art. 340, second para. TFEU. 98 See 9/69, Sayag and Others, 1969, paras 8–13 (concerning the EAEC Treaty).

Identity of the Parties 491 (b) Other acts The second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU excludes Union non-contractual liability for damage caused by its servants outside the performance of their duties.99 Thus, servants are liable for acts not performed in pursuance of their duties. They are not immune from legal proceedings in respect of such acts under Art. 11(a) of Protocol (No. 7) on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union, since such immunity is limited to ‘acts performed by them in their official capacity, including their words spoken or written’.100 (c) Immunity of the staff member and Union non-contractual liability There is no parallel between the possible liability of the Union and the staff member’s immunity from legal proceedings.101 If the staff member’s immunity is waived, this does not prevent the unlawful act from causing the Union to incur liability. Consequently, an act which cannot be regarded as having been performed by the staff member in an ‘official capacity’ within the meaning of Art. 11(a) of Protocol (No. 7) on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union may nevertheless be deemed an act carried out in the performance of his or her duties and imputed to the Union. The idea behind this case-law is to avoid the Union getting out of a claim all too easily by simply waiving the immunity of the staff member concerned, which would ultimately result in the injured party’s risking coming up against an insolvent debtor—the staff member as opposed to the Union. As a result, concurrent claims against the Union (before the General Court) and against the staff member himself or herself (before the national courts) are not ruled out either. (6) Union non-contractual liability concurrent with that of Member States (a) Principle The Member States make an extensive contribution to the implementation of Union law. If they act unlawfully in this connection, this may affect the assets of individuals. First, sometimes, the damage is exclusively attributable to the Member State’s infringing Union law in performing its executive task. Second, the damage may also arise because of the illegality of a Union act which was still regarded as valid at the time when it was implemented by the Member State. Finally, the damage may be the result of unlawful joint action on the part of the Union and a Member State. In principle, the damage must be made good by the authority that caused it through its unlawful action. Accordingly, the Union must make good the damage caused by its institutions, bodies, offices, agencies, or servants in the performance of their duties, while the Member State will be liable for the financial loss caused by its national authorities.102 99 See T-539/12, Zeigler and Zeigler Relocation v Commission, 2015, paras 73–76. 100 Art. 11(a) of Protocol (No. 7), annexed to the TEU, the TFEU, and the EAEC Treaty, on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union (OJ 2016 C202/266). 101 See 5/68, Sayag and Others, 1968 ECR 395, 402 (concerning the EAEC Treaty). 102 See 175/84, Krohn v Commission, 1986, para. 18; 89/86 and 91/86, Étoile Commerciale and CNTA v Commission, 1987, paras 16–21; C-597/18 P, C-598/18 P, C-603/18 P, and C-604/18 P, Council v K. Chrysostomides

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492 THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES That being said, the central issue remains as to the grounds on which an unlawful act may be attributed to a Union or national authority.103 In that regard, the decisive criterion appears to be the respective margin of discretion of the Union and the Member States. According to the case-law, where the national authority has in fact a genuine discretion in carrying out an obligation imposed by Union law and thus could have taken a different decision, the damage incurred is attributed to the Member State.104 In contrast, where a Member State does not have such decision-making power in carrying out the act in question, the ensuing damage cannot be attributed to it, but rather to the Union.105 Consequently, an infringement of Union law committed by a Member State which has a genuine discretion in implementing Union law must be distinguished from a merely instrumental application by a Member State of an unlawful Union act where the Member State has no real discretion. Of note, a Member State that follows an opinion given by the Commission at its request remains liable for any damage that may nevertheless ensue from an infringement of Union law. This is because opinions are not binding and hence do not restrict the Member State’s discretion. Such cooperation cannot make the Union liable.106 The position will be different where, acting on the basis of a power conferred on it by Union law, the Commission imposes a requirement or a prohibition on a Member State, which has no choice other than to comply. Although, on the face of it, the financial loss results from the national decision, it is really the outcome of the Commission’s binding direction. The illegality on which the action for damages is based regards that direction alone and must be attributed to the Commission and thus to the Union.107 As indicated in the case-law,108 the verification of the imputability of allegedly unlawful acts and conduct to the Union can be relevant, first, in the context of the examination

& Co. and Others, 2020, para. 106; T-22/19, Noguer Enríquez and Others v Commission (order), 2020, para. 22; T-161/15, Brinkmann (Steel Trading) and Others v Commission and ECB (order), 2021, paras 66–68. The same principle applies in the event of damage arising where a non-member country and the Union act jointly; the non- member country is liable for the damage attributable to its acts and the Union for the damage attributable to its acts: see 118/83, CMC v Commission, 1985, para. 31; 33/82, Murri Frères v Commission, 1985, paras 34–39; 267/82, Développement and Clemessy v Commission, 1986, paras 16–17; C-370/89, SGEEM and Etroy v EIB, 1993, paras 27–42; T-212/02, Commune de Champagne and Others v Council and Commission (order), 2007, paras 207–213; T-369/11, Diadikasia Symbouloi Epicheiriseon v Commission and Others (order), 2012, paras 53–62; T-298/16, East West Consulting v Commission, 2018, paras 83–91. 103 See further A. Biondi and M. Farley, The Right to Damages in European Law (Kluwer, 2009) 163–199; M. Fink, ‘EU Liability for Contributions to Member States’ Breaches of EU Law’ (2019) 56 C.M.L.Rev. 1227. 104 See 89/86 and 91/86, Étoile Commerciale and CNTA v Commission, 1987, paras 16–21; C-597/18 P, C-598/18 P, C-603/18 P, and C-604/18 P, Council v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others, 2020, paras 108–118, 214; T-93/95, Laga v Commission, 1998, para. 47; T-94/95, Landuyt v Commission, 1998, para. 47; T-261/94 Schulte v Council and Commission, 2002, para. 5. 105 See C-104/89 and C-37/90, Mulder and Others v Council and Commission, 1992, para. 9; T-210/00, Biret & Cie v Council, 2002, para. 36. 106 See 133/79, Sucrimex v Commission, 1980, para. 22; 217/81, Interagra v Commission, 1982, paras 8–9; T-54/96, Oleifici Italiani and Fratelli Rubino Industrie Olearie v Commission, 1998, paras 66–67; T-92/06, Lademporiki and Apostolos Parousis & Sia v Commission (order), 2006, paras 26–27; T-212/06, Bowland Dairy Products v Commission, 2009, paras 41–43. 107 See 175/84, Krohn v Commission, 1986, paras 19–23. 108 See T-531/14, Sotiropoulou and Others v Council, 2017, paras 57–61.

Identity of the Parties 493 of the admissibility of an action for damages, insofar as the Union Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine actions for damages aiming at compensation for damage attributable not to the institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies of the Union or to their agents but to a Member State,109 and, second, in the context of the examination of the merits of an action for damages, since it forms part of the elements making it possible to determine whether one of the three conditions for the Union’s liability to be incurred, namely, the existence of a causal link between the conduct of which an institution, body, office, or agency is accused and the alleged damage, is satisfied.110 With regard to the principle of State liability, a Member State will be liable for damage caused to individuals as a result of a breach of Union law for which that State can be held responsible (see para. 11.16). Obviously, the Union cannot incur liability for damage resulting from breaches of Union law that are attributable exclusively to a Member State.111 The Commission’s failure to bring an action under Art. 258 TFEU against a Member State for failure to fulfil obligations under Union law cannot cause the Union to incur liability; liability attaches only to the Member State concerned.112 (b) Loss resulting from the unlawfulness of the Union measure implemented (i) Claim before the national court secures full compensation Where a Member State carries out an allegedly unlawful Union act,113 an action for damages brought pursuant to Art. 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU will be inadmissible where the alleged damage can be made good by bringing a claim before the national courts. The Court of Justice has described the circumstances in which this is most likely to occur as follows: ‘Where an individual considers that he has been injured by the application of a [Union] legislative measure that he considers illegal, he may, when the implementation of the measure is left to the national authorities, contest the validity of the measure, when it is implemented, before a national court in an action against the national authorities. That court may, or even must, as provided for in [Art. 267 TFEU], refer the question of the validity of the [Union] measure in dispute to

109 See C-597/18 P, C-598/18 P, C-603/18 P, and C-604/18 P, Council v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others, 2020, para. 107; T-158/18, Scaloni and Figini v Commission (order), 2019, paras 20–24; T-22/19, Noguer Enríquez and Others v Commission (order), 2020, paras 23–26; T-61/15, Brinkmann (Steel Trading) and Others v Commission and ECB (order), 2022, para. 69. 110 See T-146/01, DLD Trading v Council, 2003, paras 80–97; T-107/17, Steinhoff and Others v ECB, 2019, paras 43–47. 111 See, in that regard, C-23/18 P, Ccc Event Management v Court of Justice (order), 2018, paras 37–38 (the failure of a national court to submit a question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling is not attributable to the latter, but an action based on State liability may be available). 112 See, inter alia, C-236/19 P, Szécsi and Somossy v Commission (order), 2019; T-216/20, Vysoka v Commission (order), 2020, para. 13. However, it cannot be inferred from the absence of liability for the Commission’s failure to initiate infringement proceedings that the Union cannot be held non-contractually liable for acts or conduct of the Commission in the context of infringement proceedings against a Member State under Art. 258 TFEU: see T-440/03, T-121/04, T-171/04, T-208/04, T-365/04, and T-484/04, Arizmendi and Others v Council and Commission, 2009, in particular paras 61–71; T-107/17, Steinhoff and Others v ECB, 2019, para. 55. 113 If the Union act has already been annulled or declared invalid at the time when it is implemented by the Member State, the latter will be in breach of Union law and the question of compensation for any pecuniary loss will be dealt with in accordance with para. 11.29.

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494 THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES the Court of Justice.’114 This means that, in order to decide on the admissibility of an action for damages brought before it, the General Court has to consider whether bringing a claim before the national courts would be capable of securing full compensation for the alleged damage. This will depend on the type of pecuniary loss that purportedly constitutes the damage, together with the possibility that the declaration of the invalidity of the Union act in question by preliminary ruling will constitute a direct basis for the national courts to remedy the pecuniary loss suffered. This has to be considered in the light of the particular circumstances of the case concerned. Only if, on account of the type of the alleged damage or of the limited extent of the consequences of any declaration of invalidity by way of preliminary ruling, compensation cannot be obtained from the national courts, will an action for damages lie against the Union institution from which the act implemented by the Member State originated.115 11.31

(ii) Undue payment to a national authority First, it may be that the pecuniary loss simply stems from a payment that the individual concerned made to a national authority pursuant to what he or she considers to be an unlawful Union act. In order to recover the undue amount paid over, together with the applicable interest at the legal rate, the individual concerned must apply to the national courts.116 Union law obliges Member States to provide for legal proceedings enabling undue amounts paid to be recovered.117 The national courts have no jurisdiction themselves to declare that the Union act on the basis of which payment was made is invalid, but if they consider that there are grounds for doubting whether the act is lawful, they must make a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on its validity.118 If the Court of Justice declares the Union act at issue invalid, it provides the national court in principle with a sufficient basis for ordering restitution of the undue amount. Thus, it is not possible to bring an action for damages under Art. 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU in respect of this kind of pecuniary loss.119 An action for damages under those provisions will lie only in the exceptional case where the Court of Justice limits the effects as regards the past of a preliminary ruling declaring an act invalid. In such case, the national court cannot order restitution of the undue payment. Since compensation for the alleged damage can then not be secured by bringing proceedings in the national

114 281/82, Unifrex v Commission and Council, 1984, para. 11; see also 175/84, Krohn v Commission, 1986 para. 27; 81/86, De Boer Buizen v Council and Commission, 1987, para. 9. 115 See T-166/98, Cantina sociale di Dolianova and Others v Commission, 2004, paras 115–116 (set aside on other grounds in C-51/05 P); T-138/03, É.R. and Others v Council and Commission, 2006, paras 38, 40–41. 116 See 26/74, Roquette Frères v Commission, 1976, paras 11–12; 96/71, Haegeman v Commission, 1972, paras 15– 16. As regards a claim for the repayment of anti-dumping duties which an applicant alleges to have wrongfully paid to the national authorities, it, too, falls within the jurisdiction of the national courts: see C-419/08 P, Trubowest and Makarov v Council and Commission, 2010, paras 20–26; T-91/05, Sinara Handle v Council and Commission (order), 2007, para. 64. 117 See para. 4.62. 118 See 314/85, Foto-Frost, 1987; see also para. 3.56. 119 This does not mean that the Union will not have to bear the financial burden of repayment vis-à-vis the Member State concerned, since repayment occurs as a result of a preliminary ruling by the Court of Justice declaring the Union act in question invalid, which is binding on all Union institutions.

Identity of the Parties 495 courts, an action for damages may unquestionably be brought in the General Court against the institution in which the act in question originated.120 (iii) National authority’s unlawful refusal to effect a payment or to perform an act Second, the pecuniary loss may possibly be caused by a national authority’s refusal to effect a payment or to perform some other act, whereby the individual concerned takes the view that the refusal is based on an unlawful Union act. Insofar as individuals seek only reparation for the pecuniary loss resulting from the refusal, namely, payment of what they maintain they are owed, or adoption of the act to which they consider they are entitled (i.e. compensation in kind), the only question arising in principle is whether the declaration by preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice that the Union act on which the refusal is based is invalid affords in itself the legal basis needed by the national court for ordering the payment requested or, as the case may be, the adoption of the act requested. If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, an action for damages brought in the General Court against the institution from which the act originated will be inadmissible.121 If, in contrast, the answer to that question is in the negative, such an action for damages will be admissible.122 It should not come as a surprise in the light of the above that the admissibility of an action for damages should turn on a close analysis of the individual case. A degree of unpredictability of the outcome is therefore inevitable. For example, the importance of the time factor should not be underestimated. Even if a declaration of invalidity in preliminary ruling proceedings results in the national court’s annulling the refusal to adopt the act requested (for example, the grant of import licences), the loss of a number of years can no longer be made good. Consequently, an action for damages brought against the Union institution from which the act declared invalid originated will be admissible.123 (iv) Actual injury Third, the pecuniary loss may take the form of actual ‘injury’, possibly alongside the financial loss resulting from an undue payment or from the fact that a payment or an act was unlawfully withheld. Examples include an undertaking becoming the subject of insolvency proceedings, a weakening of the undertaking’s competitive position, or

120 See 20/88, Roquette Frères v Commission, 1989, paras 18–20. 121 See 99/74, Société des Grands Moulins des Antilles v Commission, 1975; 12/79, Hans-Otto Wagner v Commission, 1979, paras 11–14; C-119/88, AERPO and Others v Commission, 1990, paras 12–14. 122 The examples in the case-law are generally concerned with cases in which the Union act was unlawful because it exhibited a lacuna which could be filled only by the necessary decisions; on the basis of the mere finding that the act is invalid, the national court cannot order compensation to be paid for the alleged damage, and thus the injured party will be entitled to bring proceedings in the Union Courts: see 9/71 and 11/71, Compagnie d’Approvisionnement, de Transport et de Crédit and Others v Commission, 1972; 43/72, Merkur Aussenhandels v Commission, 1973; 153/73, Holtz & Willemsen v Council and Commission, 1974; 281/82, Unifrex v Council and Commission, 1984, para. 12; 81/86, De Boer Buizen v Council and Commission, 1987, para. 10; T-166/98, Cantina sociale di Dolianova and Others v Commission, 2004, paras 112–113, 115–116 (set aside on other grounds in C-51/05 P). More exceptionally, the Court itself will limit the effects of the declaration of invalidity by way of preliminary ruling, with the result that this ruling no longer constitutes a legal basis justifying the national court ordering reparation of the financial loss: see 238/78, Ireks-Arkady v Council and Commission, 1979, para. 6; 241/78, 242/78, and 245/78 to 250/78, DGV v Council and Commission, 1979, para. 6; 262/78, Interquell Stärke-Chemie and Diamalt v Council and Commission, 1979, para. 6. 123 See 62/83, Eximo v Commission, 1984, paras 15–17; 175/84, Krohn v Commission, 1986, paras 27–28.

11.32

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496 THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES the price of having to obtain credit at short notice. Compensation for such injury may be obtained only by bringing an action for damages in the Union Courts.124 The Union Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to find the Union liable to make good actual injury pursuant to an action brought under Art. 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU. If the Union Courts find that the illegality of the Union act at issue does not cause the Union to incur liability because the relevant requirements are not satisfied, that finding makes it impossible to bring a claim before the national courts for a declaration that the Member State which implemented that provision is liable on account of the same illegality.125 The judgment of the Union Courts does not preclude an action on grounds other than the unlawfulness of the Union act at issue in that judgment brought against the competent national authorities for damage caused to individuals by the national authorities, even where they were acting within the framework of Union law.126

11.34

(c) Loss resulting from unlawful joint action of the Union and a Member State The Union and a Member State act jointly where they both contribute to the adoption of a measure through the exercise of their own discretion. A classic example is where Member States adopt protective measures with the agreement of the Union. If such action is unlawful, here, again, a distinction has to be drawn between the three types of pecuniary loss mentioned above (see paras 11.31–11.33). As far as the first two types of pecuniary loss are concerned (that is to say, recovery of an undue payment or a claim for a payment or for an act which was wrongfully refused), proceedings must in principle be brought before the national courts.127 In contrast, where actual injury is involved, although an action brought against the Union will be admissible before national remedies have been exhausted, the extent of the Union’s liability will not be determined until the national courts have determined the proportion of the liability to be borne by the Member State under national law. The Court of Justice has held that it is necessary to avoid the applicants’ being insufficiently or excessively compensated for the same damage by the different assessment of two different courts applying different rules of law.128 Thus, in such a case, the Union Courts must wait until the national court has given judgment before ruling on the existence and extent of the damage, as well as the causal link between the conduct alleged against the Union and the damage invoked, but they may determine whether the alleged acts and conduct are capable of giving rise to non-contractual liability on the part of the Union.129

124 See 26/74, Roquette Frères v Commission, 1976, paras 15–25; 116/77 and 124/77, Amylum and Others v Council and Commission, 1979, para. 9; T-167/94, Nölle v Council and Commission, 1995, paras 41–42. 125 See 106/87 to 120/87, Asteris and Others v Greece and EEC, 1988, paras 17–18. 126 See 106/87 to 120/87, Asteris and Others v Greece and EEC, 1988, para. 19. 127 See 5/66, 7/66, and 13/66 to 24/66, Kampffmeyer and Others v Commission, 1967 ECR 245, 263–264. 128 See 5/66, 7/66, and 13/66 to 24/66, Kampffmeyer and Others v Commission, 1967 ECR 245, 266; 30/66, Becher v Commission, 1967 ECR 285, 300; T-138/03, É.R. and Others v Council and Commission, 2006, para. 42; T-317/12, Holcim (Romania) v Commission, 2014, para. 79. 129 See T-317/12, Holcim (Romania) v Commission, 2014, paras 80–83; T-884/19, Folschette and Others v Commission, 2021, paras 32–35.

Special Characteristics 497

III. Special Characteristics A. General overview (1) Requirements Under the current case-law, the incurring of the Union’s non-contractual liability on the basis of the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU depends on the fulfilment of three main substantive requirements relating to: first, the unlawfulness of the act or conduct on the part of the Union institution, body, office, or agency; second, the reality of damage; and, third, a (direct) causal link between such acts or conduct and the damage alleged (see section B). There are some additional requirements which generally bear on the admissibility of an action for damages against the Union, including the specificity and content of the application (see para. 11.36), the premature character of the claim (see para. 11.37), and compliance with the limitation period (see section C). (2) Application must be sufficiently detailed Under the first paragraph of Art. 21 of the Statute130 and Art. 76(d) of the GC Rules of Procedure, every application must state the subject-matter of the proceedings, the pleas in law and arguments relied on, and a summary of those pleas in law. Those particulars must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the General Court to rule on the application, if necessary, without any further information.131 In order to satisfy those requirements, an application seeking compensation for damages pursuant to Art. 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU must state, first, the evidence from which the unlawful act or conduct alleged against the institution, body, office, or agency can be identified; second, the reasons for which the applicant considers there to be a causal link between that act or conduct and the damage which it claims to have suffered; and, third, the nature and the extent of that damage,132 failing which the application for damages133 (or certain heads of claim therein134) will be declared inadmissible.

130 Applicable to the General Court by virtue of Art. 53, first para. of the Statute. 131 See, e.g. T-753/19, Ungureanu v Commission (order), 2021, para. 13. General reference by the applicant to pleadings of third parties in other cases is therefore not permitted. See, in that regard, T-540/18, Aviation Holdings and ASL Airlines (Ireland) v Commission, 2022, paras 54–62. 132 See T-565/18, P. Krücken Organic v Commission, 2020, para. 16 (finding those requirements satisfied: see paras 17–19). For some further examples, see T-721/18 and T-81/19, Apostolopoulou and Apostolopoulou- Chrysanthaki v Commission, 2021, paras 62–73 (appeal pending in C-124/22 P); T-834/17, United Parcel Service v Commission, 2022, paras 26–29, 31–62 (finding requirements satisfied and rejecting plea of inadmissibility based on the confused nature of the action) (appeal pending in C-297/22 P). For further particulars on sufficient proof of the alleged damage, see para. 11.57. 133 See T-158/18, Scaloni and Figini v Commission (order), 2019, para 29–48; T-247/20, JP v Commission, 2021, paras 139–146; T-321/17, Niemelä and Others v ECB, 2021, paras 60–63 (appeal pending in C-181/22 P). 134 See T-412/05, M v Ombudsman, 2008, paras 44–50.

11.35

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498 THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES 11.37

(3) Premature claim Under the case-law, the General Court may reject as premature a claim for damages where it is unable to determine at the time that such claim is brought before it whether the conditions to incur Union non-contractual liability have been made out.135

B. Substantive requirements 11.38

(1) Summary The classic conditions relating to the unlawfulness of the act or conduct alleged against the Union institution, body, office, or agency;136 the existence of damage; and the causal link between that act or conduct and the damage complained of must be fulfilled if the Union is to be held non-contractually liable.137 Those three conditions have been refined through the course of the case-law, taking account of the alignment of the conditions governing the non-contractual liability of the Union with those governing the principle of State liability in the Bergaderm judgment (see para. 11.16). Consequently, the following three main substantive requirements must be satisfied for an action for damages against the Union to succeed: (1) a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of Union law which is intended to confer rights on individuals (paras 11.39–11.49); (2) actual damage is shown to have occurred (see paras 11.50–11.58); and (3) a direct causal link between the unlawful act or conduct on the part of the Union institution, body, office, or agency concerned and the damage sustained by the injured party (see paras 11.59–11.61).138 The unlawfulness requirement encompasses the components relating to a sufficiently serious breach and a rule of Union law intended to confer rights on individuals.139

135 See T-478/93, Wafer Zoo v Commission, 1995, paras 49–50; T-57/09, Alfastar Benelux v Council, 2011, paras 51–52; T-436/09, Dufour v ECB, 2011, paras 197–199; T-286/15, KF v Satcen, 2018, paras 250–254; compare T-48/05, Franchet and Byk v Commission, 2008, paras 90–92; T-483/13, Oikonomopoulos v Commission, 2016, paras 37–39. 136 There are certain claims within the scope of Union non-contractual liability in which no unlawful act or conduct need be shown, such as an action based on unjust enrichment. See further para. 11.11. 137 See C-597/18 P, C-598/18 P, C-603/18 P, and C-604/18 P, Council v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others, 2020, para. 79; C-650/19 P, Vialto Consulting v Commission, 2021, para. 138; T-314/16, VG v Commission, 2018, para. 115; T-868/16, QI and Others v Commission and ECB, 2022, para. 46. 138 See C-123/18 P, HTTS v Council, 2019, para. 32; T-540/18, ASL Avaiation Holdings and ASL Airlines (Ireland) v Commission, 2022, para. 28. Depending on the particular formulation chosen by the Union Courts, sometimes, for example, the requirements concerning a sufficiently serious breach and the rule of Union law intended to confer rights on individuals may be presented separately and the damage requirement not mentioned expressly: see C-337/15 P, Staelen v Ombudsman, 2017, para. 31. Under the case-law, the fact that the applicant may be unable to establish those requirements does not mean that it has been denied effective judicial protection: see C-131/03 P, Reynolds Tobacco and Others v Commission, 2006, para. 84; T-834/17, United Parcel Service v Commission, 2022, para. 369 (appeal pending in C-297/22 P). 139 See C-611/12 P, Giordano v Commission, 2014, para. 44; C-123/18 P, HTTS v Council, 2019, para. 36; C-615/19 P, Dalli v Commission, 2021, paras 55, 127; T-212/03, MyTravel v Commission, 2008, para. 29; T-834/17, United Parcel Service v Commission, 2022, para. 82 (appeal pending in C-297/22 P). Where an applicant invokes an infringement not of a rule of Union law conferring rights on individuals, but rather of national law, the claim will be rejected: see T-721/18 and T-81/19, Apostolopoulou and Apostolopoulou-Chrysanthaki v Commission, 2021, paras 157–164 (appeal pending in C-124/22 P).

Special Characteristics 499 These three substantive requirements relating to unlawfulness, damage, and causation are cumulative, meaning that they must all be fulfilled or the action for damages fails.140 If one of the requirements is not satisfied, the action for damages may be dismissed in its entirety, without it being necessary for the Union Courts to undertake assessment of the others.141 Nor are the Union Courts required to examine those requirements in any particular order.142 The applicant bears the burden of proof that all of the requirements for incurring Union non-contractual liability are fulfilled.143 (2) The unlawful act or conduct The first main substantive requirement governing Union non-contractual liability relates to the unlawful act or conduct of the Union institution, body, office, or agency. (a) Framework for assessment (i) The post-Bergaderm case-law As has been mentioned (para. 11.01), the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU puts the Union Courts under a duty to determine any non-contractual liability incurred by the Union in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States. In principle, that provision provides an opportunity for formulating a system of objective liability, in which a generally applicable criterion of unlawfulness is determined in advance, without having regard to the particular circumstances surrounding the Union act or conduct at issue. In practice, however, this is not what was worked out in the case-law. Indeed, a finding of the unlawfulness of a legal measure is not enough, however regrettable that unlawfulness may be, for it to be held that the condition for the incurring of the Union’s non-contractual liability relating to the unlawfulness of the institutions’ alleged conduct has been satisfied.144

140 See C-571/19 P, EMB Consulting and Others v ECB (order), 2020, para. 29; C-403/20 P, CF and Others v Commission (order), 2021, para. 40; T-692/15 RENV, HTTS v Council, 2021, para 52; T-834/17, United Parcel Service v Commission, 2022, para. 82 (appeal pending in C-297/22 P). For perspectives on the development of the case-law, see, e.g. J. Wakefield, ‘Retrench and Reform: The Action for Damages’ (2010) Y.E.L. 390; D. Hanf, ‘EU Liability Actions’ and A. Biondi and M. Farley, ‘Damages in EU Law’ in R. Schütze and T. Tridimas (eds), Oxford Principles of European Union Law: The European Union Legal Order (Vol. I, OUP, 2018) 910; K. Gutman, ‘New Strategies Concerning Actions for Damages Against the Union’, Yearbook on Procedural Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural Law, 2021) , 7. 141 See C-282/05 P, Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission, 2007, para. 57; C-447/17 P and C-479/17 P, EU v Guardian Europe, 2019, para. 148; T-726/14, Novar v EUIPO, 2017, para. 34; T-868/16, QI and Others v Commission and ECB, 2022, para. 191. However, depending on the circumstances, even where one of the conditions is found lacking, the Union Courts may assess the others: see, e.g. T-399/17, Dalli v Commission, 2019, paras 217–218; T-523/17, Eleveté Invest Group and Others v Commission and SRB, 2022, paras 651–652. As regards the distinction between these requirements, see C-346/17 P, Klein v Commission, 2018, para. 135 (finding that in those proceedings the question of the alleged definiteness of the Commission decision at issue should have been examined in the context of the damage requirement, and not that of the causal link); C-123/18 P, HTTS v Council, 2019, para. 55 (distinguishing the sufficiently serious breach requirement which is static, from the damages requirement which is dynamic). 142 See C-419/08 P, Trubowest Handel and Makarov v Council and Commission, 2010, para. 42; C-447/17 P and C-479/17 P, EU v Guardian Europe, 2019, para. 148; T-422/13, CPME and Others v Council, 2017, para. 171; T-565/18, P. Krücken Organic v Commission, 2020, para. 29. 143 See C-100/07 P, É.R. and Others v Council and Commission (order), 2007, paras 27, 37; T-47/03, Sison v Council, 2007, para. 244; T-298/16, East West Consulting v Commission, 2018, para. 113. 144 See T-341/07, Sison v Council, 2011, para. 31; T-271/10 RENV II, H v Council, 2020, para. 101.

11.39

11.40

500 THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES By virtue of the Bergaderm judgment in which the Court of Justice aligned the conditions that must be met for Union non-contractual liability with those for State liability (see para. 11.16), the case-law requires there to have been a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of Union law intended to confer rights on individuals.145 Where the Union institution, body, office, or agency concerned has a discretion, a sufficiently serious breach will be involved where that institution or body manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits on its discretion, whereas if the Union institution, body, office, or agency has only considerably reduced, or even no, discretion, the mere infringement of Union law may be sufficient to establish the existence of a sufficiently serious breach.146 As regards the determination of a sufficiently serious breach, the general or individual nature of the Union act taken by the institution, body, office, or agency is not a decisive criterion. As made clear starting with the Bergaderm judgment,147 it is the extent of the discretion enjoyed by the institution concerned which is a decisive criterion, and not the nature of the act at issue (general or individual), as had been the case under the previous case-law generally emanating from the Lütticke and Schöppenstedt judgments.148 Furthermore, the Union Courts may consider certain factors elaborated in the case- law,149 including, inter alia, the complexity of the situations to be regulated, difficulties in the application or interpretation of the legislation, and the margin of discretion available to the author of the act in question, along with others inspired from the case- law on State liability, such as the degree of clarity and precision of the rule of Union law infringed and the inexcusable or intentional character of the error.150 As indicated by the case-law following the Bergaderm judgment, those factors may be taken into

145 See C-352/98 P, Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission, paras 41–42, 62; C-440/07 P, Commission v Schneider Electric, 2009, para. 160; C-123/18 P, HTTS v Council, 2019, para. 32; C-615/19 P, Dalli v Commission, 2021, paras 55, 127; T-217/10 RENV II, H v Council, 2020, para. 96; T-834/17, United Parcel Service v Commission, 2022, para. 82 (appeal pending in C-297/22 P). 146 See C-352/98 P, Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission, 2000, paras 43–44; C-472/00 P, Commission v Fresh Marine, 2003, para. 27; C-282/05 P, Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission, 2007, para. 47; C-337/15 P, Staelen v Ombudsman, 2017, paras 31, 37; C-650/19 P, Vialto Consulting v Commission, 2021, para. 142; T-107/17, Steinhoff and Others v ECB, 2019, para. 53; T-399/17, Dalli v Commission, 2019, para. 49. 147 See C-352/98 P, Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission, para. 46; C-472/00 P, Commission v Fresh Marine, 2003, para. 27; C-282/05 P, Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission, 2007, paras 48–49; T-259/03, Nikolaou v Commission, 2007, paras 40–42; T-429/05, Artegodan v Commission, 2010, paras 53–54; T-458/16, Acquafarm v Commission, 2017, paras 43–44. 148 See 4/69, Lütticke v Commission, 1971; 5/71, Zuckerfabrik Schöppenstedt v Council, 1971; see also T-390/94, Schröder and Thamann v Commission, 1997, paras 50–51. 149 In the light of those factors, the Court of Justice has recognized that the existence of a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of Union law must necessarily be assessed on the basis of the circumstances in which the institution, body, office, or agency acted on that particular date: see C-123/18 P, HTTS v Council, 2019, paras 44–46; T-834/17, United Parcel Service v Commission, 2022, para. 107 (appeal pending in C-297/22 P). 150 See C-352/98 P, Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission, 2000, para. 40; C-282/05 P, Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission, 2007, para. 50; C-45/15 P, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council, 2017, para. 30; C-123/18 P, HTTS v Council and Commission, 2019, paras 33, 42; T-558/15, Iran Insurance v Council, 2018, para. 110; T-559/15, Post Bank Iran v Council, 2018, para. 101; T-271/10 RENV II, H v Council, 2020, para. 101; T-834/17, United Parcel Service v Commission, 2022, para. 83 (appeal pending in C-297/22 P). In particular, it follows from the case-law that a breach of Union law will, in any event, clearly be sufficiently serious if it has persisted despite a judgment finding the breach in question to be established, or despite a preliminary ruling or settled case-law of the Court on the matter from which it is clear that the conduct in question constituted a breach: see C-45/15 P, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council, 2017, para. 31; for some examples, see T-558/15, Iran Insurance v Council, 2018, paras 113–115; T-559/15, Post Bank Iran v Council, 2018, paras 104–106.

Special Characteristics 501 account whether the institution, body, office, or agency is found to have a discretion or not.151 Consequently, it appears that the test for liability applied by the Union Courts will contain a subjective element which is related to the discretion available to the institution, body, office, or agency, along with the consideration of the abovementioned factors, as the case may be. That test thereby requires a finding to be made that the rule of Union law which has been breached is intended to confer rights on individuals and that the infringement in question constitutes a sufficiently serious breach of Union law, whereby the discretion of the institution, body, office, or agency must first be identified and then the factors set out in the case-law may be considered. (ii) Non-contractual liability on account of an omission Union non-contractual liability on account of an alleged unlawful omission is determined on the basis of the same criteria as those for unlawful acts or conduct. However, such an omission can give rise to liability on the part of the Union only when the institution, body, office, or agency has infringed a legal obligation to act under a provision of Union law.152 (b) The rule of Union law must be intended to confer rights on individuals (i) Notion As already mentioned, one of the elements of unlawfulness is the requirement that the rule of Union law infringed must be intended to confer rights on individuals.153 According to the case-law, that requirement is met where the rule of Union law: (1) gives rise to rights for individuals which the national courts must protect, so that it has direct effect; (2) creates an advantage which could be defined as a vested right; (3) is designed for the protection of the interests of individuals; (4) entails the grant of rights to individuals and the content of those rights is sufficiently identifiable; or (5) while referring essentially to interests of a general nature, the rule also ensures the protection of the individual interests of the persons concerned.154 Therefore, while this requirement

151 See T-341/07, Sison v Council, 2011, paras 36–38, 40; T-433/15, Bank Sederat v Council, 2019, paras 54, 56; T-127/19, Dyson and Others v Commission, 2021, paras 20, 22 (appeal pending in C-122/22 P). 152 See C-146/91, KYDEP v Council and Commission, 1994, para. 58; T-279/03, Galileo International Technology and Others v Commission, 2006, para. 137; T‑546/13, T‑108/14, and T‑109/14, Šumelj and Others v Commission, 2016, para. 42; T-458/16, Acquafarm v Commission, 2017, para. 47; T-626/21, Intersagunto Terminales v Spain and Commission (order), 2021, para. 14. 153 See, in that regard, C-615/19 P, Dalli v Commission, 2021, para. 128, in which the Court held: ‘The purpose of that restriction is, without prejudice to the rules applicable to the assessment of the legality of a Union act, to limit liability to situations where the unlawful conduct of Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies has caused damage to an individual by prejudicing his or her interests specifically protected by Union law.’ 154 See T-415/03, Cofradía de pescadores de ‘San Pedro’ de Bermeo v Council, 2005, para. 86; T-279/11, T&L Sugars and Sidul Açúcares v Commission, 2016, para. 39; T-103/12, T&L Sugars and Sidul Açúcares v Commission, 2016, para. 44; T-107/17, Steinhoff and Others v ECB, 2019, para. 140; T-437/18, Tilly-Sabco v Commission, 2020, para. 46; T-868/16, QI and Others v Commission and ECB, 2022, para. 90; see also, in that regard, C-61/21, Ministre de la Transition écologique et Premier ministre, 2022, paras 46–47. In its case-law, the General Court has considered the possibility that the Union may incur non-contractual liability as a result of the infringement of a rule of law which is not intended sensu stricto to confer rights on individuals, but rather is likely to lead to the imposition or strengthening of obligations on individuals pursuant to other rules of Union law: see, inter alia, T-635/18, Industrial Química del Nalón v Commission, 2020, para. 70; T-638/18, Deza v Commission, 2020, para. 67; T-639/18, SGL Carbon v Commission, 2020, para. 69; T-T-645/18, Bilbaína de Alquitranes v Commission, 2020, para. 70.

11.41

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502 THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES includes situations in which a provision of Union law has direct effect, such direct effect is not required. While other formulations were used in older case-law, these are, in the view of the General Court, simply variations on the concept expressed by the formula ‘intended to confer rights on individuals’.155 The upshot is that it is sufficient if the rule of Union law is deemed to protect individual as well as general interests,156 but it is problematic where that rule is not found to protect any individual interests. For example, this is the case with the principle of institutional balance pertaining to the horizontal division of powers between the Union institutions.157 In Artegodan v Commission,158 the Court of Justice affirmed that, although not all rules on the division of powers are intended to protect individuals, the position is different where those rules are accompanied by an infringement of a substantive provision of Union law that is intended to confer rights, as was the case in those proceedings. Moreover, as the Union Courts have confirmed, the requirement for a statement of reasons is intended only to enable those Courts to review the legality of acts and does not serve any individual interest, with the result that an infringement of that requirement cannot in itself make the Union non-contractually liable.159 That requirement must be distinguished from the question whether the reasoning is well- founded, which is concerned with the substantive legality of the measure at issue and which may engage the Union’s non-contractual liability.160 11.43

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(ii) Applicant must be within scope of protection In order to ensure the practical effect of the condition relating to the breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals, the Union Courts have held that it is necessary for the protection offered by the rule invoked to be effective in relation to the person who invokes it, and therefore that person must be among those upon whom the rule concerned confers rights; conversely, a rule not protecting the person against the unlawfulness he or she invokes but protecting another person cannot be accepted as the source of the obligation to provide compensation on the part of the Union.161 (iii) Any rule of Union law According to the case-law following the Bergaderm judgment, it is not important whether or not the rule of Union law breached constitutes a superior or higher-ranking 155 See T-341/07, Sison v Council, 2011, para. 33. 156 See 5/66, 7/66, and 13/66 to 24/66, Kampffmeyer and Others v Commission, ECR 1967 245, 262–3; T-341/07, Sison v Council, 2011, paras 47–52. 157 See C-282/90, Vreugdenhil v Commission, 1992, paras 20–25; T-415/03, Cofradía de pescadores de ‘San Pedro’ de Bermeo v Council, 2005, paras 84–97; T-832/14, Nutria v Commission, 2016, paras 71–72. 158 See C-221/10 P, Artegodan v Commission, 2012, paras 81–82, 96. See also T-298/16, East West Consulting v Commission, 2018, para. 144; compare T-531/14, Sotiropoulou and Others v Council, 2017, paras 70–74. 159 See 106/81, Kind v EEC, 1982, para. 14; C-76/01 P, Eurocoton and Others v Council, 2003, para. 98; C-123/18 P, HTTS v Council and Commission, 2019, para. 103; C-134/19 P, Bank Refah Kargaran v Council, 2020, paras 61– 63; T-290/16, Fruits de Ponent v Commission, 2018, paras 44–45; T-434/15, ISSL and Others v Council, 2019, paras 76–77; T-834/17, United Parcel Service v Commission, 2022, para. 189 (appeal pending in C-297/22 P). 160 See C-134/19 P, Bank Refah Kargaran v Council, 2020, paras 64–65. 161 See C-350/16 P, Pappalardo and Others v Commission, 2017, paras 52–55; C-615/19 P, Dalli v Commission, 2021, paras 127–130; T-259/03, Nikolaou v Commission, 2007, paras 43–44; T-238/07, Ristic and Others v Commission, 2009, para. 60; T-298/16, East West Consulting v Commission, 2018, para. 142; T-107/17, Steinhoff and Others v ECB, 2019, paras 77, 140; T-540/18, Aviation Holdings and ASL Airlines (Ireland) v Commission, 2022, paras 43–44; T-868/16, QI and Others v Commission and ECB, 2022, para. 90.

Special Characteristics 503 rule of Union law,162 as had been the case under the previous case-law stemming from the Schöppenstedt judgment.163 The rule of Union law infringed that may constitute the basis for Union non-contractual liability may include provisions of the Treaties and the Charter, general principles of Union law, and all other Union rules irrespective of their rank in the Union system of hierarchy of norms. In other words, such a rule may constitute a provision of primary or secondary Union law (legislative as well as non-legislative acts).164 (iv) Examples of rules of Union law which confer rights on individuals The Union Courts have recognized various fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter as conferring rights on individuals, including Art. 1 concerning the right to human dignity;165 Art. 7 on respect for private and family life;166 Art. 11 on the right of expression;167 Art. 15 on the freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work;168 Art. 17(1) on the right to property;169 the second paragraph of Art. 47 on the right to a fair trial,170 including the right to have a case adjudicated within a reasonable time171 and the rights of the defence;172 and Art. 48(1) on the presumption of innocence.173 In particular, according to the case-law, while the principle of sound administration does not in itself confer rights on individuals,174 this is different where it constitutes the expression of specific rights, such as the right to have one’s affairs handled impartially, fairly, and within a reasonable time;175 the right to be heard;176 the right to have access 162 See T-415/03, Cofradía de pescadores ‘San Pedro’ de Bermeo and Others v Council, 2005, para. 85; T-259/03 Nikolaou v Commission, 2007, para. 41; T-47/03 Sison v Council, 2007, para. 234. Nonetheless, the case-law prior to the Bergaderm judgment remains relevant insofar as the particular rule was considered to constitute a rule of law protecting individuals. 163 5/71, Zuckerfabrik Schöppenstedt v Council, 1971. 164 See further K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel (T. Corthaut (ed.)), EU Constitutional Law (OUP, 2021) pt V. 165 See T-721/18 and T-81/19, Apostolopoulou and Apostolopoulou-Chrysanthaki v Commission, 2021, para. 150 (appeal pending in C-124/22 P). 166 See T-193/04, Tillack v Commission, 2006, para. 121; T-412/05, M v Ombudsman, 2007, para. 125; T-341/07, Sison v Council, 2011, paras 41, 75. 167 See T-193/04, Tillack v Commission, 2006, para. 121. 168 See T-30/99, Bocchi Food Trade International v Commission, 2001, paras 79–83; T-52/99, T. Port v Commission, 2001, para. 81. 169 See 59/83, Biovilac v EEC, 1984, paras 21–22; C‑8/15 P to C‑10/15 P, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB, 2016, para. 66; C-235/17, Commission v Hungary, 2019, para. 68; T-52/99, T. Port v Commission, 2001, para. 99; T-341/07, Sison v Council, 2011, paras 41, 75; T-107/17, Steinhoff and Others v ECB, 2019, para. 96; T-868/16, QI and Others v Commission and ECB, 2022, para. 115. 170 See T-193/04, Tillack v Commission, 2006, para. 121. As regards the first paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter on the right to an effective remedy, the Union Courts have not (yet) expressly recognized that provision as conferring rights on individuals in the context of Union non-contractual liability, but see C-134/19 P, Bank Refah Kargaran v Council, 2020, para. 77. 171 See C-40/12 P, Gascogne Sack Deutschland v Commission, 2013, para. 102; C-50/12 P, Kendrion v Commission, 2013, para. 106; C-58/12 P, Group Gascogne v Commission, 2013, para. 96; C-578/11 P, Deltafina v Commission, 2014, para. 88; C-238/12 P, FLSmidth v Commission, 2014, para. 133. 172 See T-47/03 Sison v Council, 2007, para. 239; T-298/16, East West Consulting v Commission, 2018, para. 143; see also, in the context of the competition rules, C-440/07 P, Schneider Electric v Commission, 2009, para. 162; T-834/17, United Parcel Service v Commission, 2022, paras 95, 97 (appeal pending in C-297/22 P). 173 See T-193/04, Tillack v Commission, 2006, para. 121; T-48/05, Franchet and Byk v Commission, 2008, para. 209; T-49/07, Fahas v Council, 2010, para. 63; T-298/16, East West Consulting v Commission, 2018, para. 143. 174 See T-196/99, Area Cova and Others v Council and Commission, 2001, para. 43. 175 See, with regard to the right to have one’s affairs handled impartially and fairly, T-292/15, Vakakis kai Synergates v Commission, 2018, para. 85; and the reasonable time requirement, T-138/14, Chart v EEAS, 2015, para. 113; T-152/21, Union syndicale Solidaires des SDIS de France and DOM/TOM v Commission, 2021, paras 36–41. 176 See, in that regard, C-650/19 P, Vialto Consulting v Commission, 2021, paras 120–136, 140.

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504 THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES to files; and the obligation to give reasons for decisions, as provided for in Art. 41 of the Charter on the right to good administration.177 Furthermore, the Union Courts have recognized, inter alia, the following general principles of Union law as being rules of law conferring rights on individuals: the principle of equal treatment (also referred to as the principle of equality or the principle of the prohibition of discrimination and which is now enshrined in Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter178 );179 the principle of proportionality;180 the principle of protection of legitimate expectations;181 the principle of unjust enrichment;182 the principle of the prohibition of misuse of powers;183 and the right to be heard.184 In addition, the Union Courts have found, inter alia, provisions of the Treaties,185 the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the Union,186 and certain rules laid down in secondary Union law in connection with, for example, the conduct of investigations by OLAF,187 the control of concentrations,188 and restrictive measures in the CFSP189 to confer rights on individuals.

177 See T-193/04, Tillack v Commisison, 2006, para. 127; T-279/11, T&L Sugars and Sidul Açúcares v Commission, 2016, para. 60; T-103/12, T&L Sugars and Sidul Açúcares v Commission, 2016, para. 65; T-399/17, Dalli v Commission, 2019, para. 200; T-152/21, Union syndicale Solidaires des SDIS de France and DOM/TOM v Commission, 2021, para. 23; see also, as regards the duty of diligence, see C-47/07 P, Masdar (UK) v Commission, 2008, paras 90–95; C-337/15 P, Ombudsman v Staelen, 2017, para. 34; C-65/21 P and C-73/21 P to C-75/21 P, SGL Carbon and Others v Commission, 2022, para. 30 (noting that pleas alleging breach of the duty of diligence may overlap with pleas alleging manifest error of assessment: see paras 31–36); C-619/20 P and C-620/20 P, IMG v Commission, 2022, paras 168–169; T-167/94, Nölle v Council and Commission, 1995, para. 76; T-212/03, MyTravel v Commission, 2008, paras 49–50; T-333/10, ATC v Commission, 2013, para. 93; T-290/16, Fruits de Ponent v Commission, 2018, paras 47–49; T-152/21, Union syndicale Solidaires des SDIS de France and DOM/TOM v Commission, 2021, paras 24–35. 178 See C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akros v Commission, 2010, para. 54; C-823/18 P, Commission v GEA Group, 2020, para. 58. 179 See 83/76, 94/76, 4/77, 15/77, and 40/77, HNL and Others v Council and Commission, 1978, para. 5; 64/76, 113/76, 167/78, 238/78, 29/79, 28/79, and 45/79, Dumortier Frères v Council, 1979, para. 11; 106/81, Kind v EEC, 1982, paras 22–25; T-481/93 and T-484/93, Exporteurs in Levende Varkens and Others v Commission, 1995, para. 102; T-56/00, Dole Fresh Fruit International v Council and Commission, 2003, para. 73; T-199/14, Vanbreda Risk & Benefts v Commission, 2015, para. 180; T-749/15, Nausicaa Anadyomène and Banque d'escompte v ECB, 2017, para. 110; T-292/15, Vakakis kai Synergates v Commission, 2018, para. 80. 180 See 63/72 to 69/72, Werhahn Hansamuhle and Others v Council, 1973, paras 18–20; 265/85, Van Den Bergh and Jurgens v Commission, 1987, paras 30–34; T-481/93 and T-484/93, Exporteurs in Levende Varkens and Others v Commission, 1995, para. 102; T-43/98, Emesa Sugar v Council, 2001, para. 64; T-412/05, M v Ombudsman, 2008, para. 125. 181 See C-104/89 and C-37/90, Mulder and Others v Council and Commission, 1992, para. 15; T-481/93 and T-484/93, Exporteurs in Levende Varkens and Others v Commission, 1995, para. 102; T-43/98, Emesa Sugar v Council, 2001, para. 64; T-546/13, T‑108/14, and T‑109/14, Šumelj and Others v Commission, 2016, para. 72; T-292/15, Vakakis kai Synergates v Commission, 2018, para. 79. 182 See T-166/98, Cantina sociale di Dolianova and Others v Commission, 2004, paras 160–162 (set aside on other grounds in C-51/05 P). 183 See T-481/93 and T-484/93, Exporteurs in Levende Varkens and Others v Commission, 1995, para. 102. 184 See T-481/93 and T-484/93, Exporteurs in Levende Varkens and Others v Commission, 1995, para. 102. 185 See, as regards Art. 266, first para. TFEU, T-610/19, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, 2022, para. 71 (appeal pending in C-221/22 P). 186 See T-42/06, Gollnisch v Parliament, 2010, paras 94, 108. 187 See T-259/03, Nikolaou v Commission, 2007, para. 210; T-48/05, Franchet and Byk v Commission, 2008, paras 152–153, 166–169. But not others: see C-615/19 P, Dalli v Commission, 2021, paras 55–63. 188 See T-212/03, My Travel Group v Commission, 2008, paras 44–48. 189 See T-558/15, Iran Insurance v Council, 2018, paras 107–109; T-559/15, Post Bank Iran v Council, 2018, paras 98–100.

Special Characteristics 505 (v) Examples of rules of Union law which do not confer rights on individuals By contrast, the Union Courts have recognized, for example, the principles of relative stability and respect for traditional fishing rights190 and the duty to state reasons191 as not conferring rights on individuals. The same applies to Art. 124 TFEU within the context of economic policy;192Art. 207 TFEU193 on the common commercial policy; and Art. 351 TFEU194 concerning agreements concluded between Member States and third countries before 1 January 1958 or their date of accession, along with various other Treaty provisions.195 Moreover, in principle, the WTO agreements do not constitute rules of Union law which confer rights on individuals.196 Likewise, to the extent that an applicant seeks to rely on provisions of other international agreements concluded by the Union (and the Member States, as the case may be) with third countries in order to establish unlawful conduct on the part of Union institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies for the purposes of an action for damages, those provisions are deemed not to confer rights on individuals where they cannot be held to be directly applicable.197

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As regards the competences of the Commission enshrined in Art. 17(1) TEU,198 the General Court has found that that provision is institutional in nature and thus does not in itself constitute a rule of law whose purpose is to confer rights on individuals. That being said, as developed in recent case-law in the context of economic and monetary policy, the Commission199 (as well as other Union institutions such as the ECB200) may be considered to engage the Union’s non-contractual liability where it is under a specific obligation to ensure compliance with fundamental rights as guaranteed by the Charter. (c) The requirement of a sufficiently serious breach of Union law (i) Notion Following from the case-law, only a sufficiently serious breach, and not merely any breach, of a rule of Union law conferring rights on individuals is capable of giving rise 190 See T-196/99, Area Cova and Others v Council and Commission, 2001, para. 152; T-415/03, Cofradía de pescadores de ‘San Pedro’ and Others v Council, 2005, paras 86–93 (upheld in C-6/06 P, Cofradía de pescadores de ‘San Pedro’ and Others v Council, 2007, paras 48–62). 191 See para. 11.42. 192 See T-107/17, Steinhoff and Others v ECB, 2019, paras 139–141 (upheld in C-571/19 P, EMB Consulting and Others v ECB (order), 2020, para. 55). 193 See Case T-90/03, FICF and Others v Commission, 2007, para. 61. 194 See T-2/99, T. Port v Council, 2001, para. 83; T-3/99, Banatrading v Council, 2001, para. 78. 195 See also T-626/21, Intersagunto Terminales v Spain and Commission (order), 2021, para. 16 (in reference to Arts 3, 4, 14, 32, 170, and 171 TFEU); T-868/16, QI and Others v Commission and ECB, 2022, paras 91–105 (in reference to Arts 120 to 127, 282(2), and 352(1) TFEU). 196 See C-93/02 P, Biret International v Council, 2003, para. 52; C-120/06 and C-121/06 P, FIAMM and Others v Council and Commission, 2008, paras 125–129; T-2/99, T. Port v Commission, 2001, para. 51; T-18/99, Cordis v Commission, 2001, para. 46; T-30/99, Bocchi Food Trade International v Commission, 2001, para. 56. 197 See T-128/05, SPM v Commission, 2008, paras 96–106, 119, 131; T-292/09, Mugraby v Council and Commission (order), 2011, paras 61–69. 198 See T-90/03, FICF and Others v Commission, 2007, paras 61–62; T-375/07, Pellegrini v Commission (order), 2008, para. 19; T-297/19, Dragomir v Commission (order), 2019, para. 60; T-22/19, Noguer Enríquez and Others v Commission (order), 2020, para. 80. 199 See C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P, Ledra Advertising and Others v Council and Commission, 2016, paras 67–76; compare T-22/19, Noguer Enríquez and Others v Commission (order), 2020, paras 86–92; T-868/16, QI and Others v Commission and ECB, 2022, paras 79–81. 200 See T-107/17, Steinhoff and Others v ECB, 2019, para. 98.

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506 THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES to Union non-contractual liability.201 The requirement that there be a sufficiently serious breach stems from the need to strike a balance between the protection of individuals against unlawful conduct of the institutions, on the one hand, and the leeway that must be accorded to the institutions in order not to paralyze action by them, on the other.202 It is intended, whatever the nature of the unlawful act at issue, to avoid the risk of having to bear the losses claimed by the persons concerned obstructing the ability of the institution concerned to exercise to the full its powers in the general interest, whether that be in its legislative activity or in that involving choices of economic policy or in the sphere of its administrative competence, without, however, thereby leaving individuals to bear the consequences of flagrant and inexcusable conduct.203 Where the alleged infringements of Union law relied on by the applicant are not of such a kind to establish a sufficiently serious breach, the action is dismissed.204 This cannot be remedied by arguments that the cumulative effects of the alleged errors committed by the institution, body, office, or agency concerned taken together constitute a sufficiently serious breach.205 11.48

(ii) The discretion of the Union institution, body, office, or agency As mentioned above (see para. 11.40), under the case- law following from the Bergaderm judgment,206 the test for finding a breach of Union law to be sufficiently serious is whether the Union institution, body, office, or agency has manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits on its discretion, and under circumstances where that institution, body, office, or agency has considerably reduced or no discretion, the mere infringement of Union law may in itself establish the existence of a sufficiently serious breach. Accordingly, the General Court at first instance and the Court of Justice on appeal have to determine the extent of the discretion of the particular Union institution, body, office, or agency in the light of the legal context of the Union act or conduct at issue. The fact that such act or conduct is taken in a policy area that frequently involves policy choices does not automatically lead to a finding that a discretion exists. The Union Courts assess the margin of discretion on a case-by-case basis.207 It is therefore critical whether the Union institution, body, office, or agency had a discretion when it 201 See C-337/15 P, Ombudsman v Staelen, 2017, para. 37. The fact that Union non-contractual liability is made subject to the finding of a sufficiently serious breach is considered to be compliant with fundamental rights as guaranteed, in particular, by the Charter: see T-341/07, Sison v Council, 2011, para. 81. 202 See C-123/18 P, HTTS v Council, 2019, para. 34; T-834/17, United Parcel Service v Commission, 2022, para. 84 (appeal pending in C-297/22 P); T-540/18, ASL Aviation Holdings and ASL Airlines (Ireland), 2022, para. 36. 203 See T-298/16, East West Consulting v Commission, 2018, para. 124; T-399/17, Dalli v Commission, 2019, para. 48; T-834/17, United Parcel Service v Commission, 2022, paras 85–87 (appeal pending in C-297/22 P); T-540/18, ASL Aviation Holdings and ASL Airlines (Ireland), 2022, paras 37–39. 204 See T-817/14, Zoofachhandel Züpke and Others v Commission, 2016, para. 140; T-540/18, ASL Holdings and ASL Airlines (Ireland) v Commission, 2022, para 73. 205 See C-167/06 P, Komninou and Others v Commission, 2007, para. 73; T-212/03, MyTravel v Commission, 2008, paras 94–95; T-429/05, Artegodan v Commission, 2010, paras 140–143. 206 It is worth noting that previous case-law took account of the specific situation of a clearly defined group of individuals and required that the damage went beyond the normal economic risk inherent in the sector concerned, but those elements are not mentioned as requirements for Union non-contractual liability in the Bergaderm judgment: see, in that regard, T-429/05, Artegodan v Commission, 2010, para. 56. 207 To take some examples, in the context of anti-dumping measures, see T-178/98, Fresh Marine v Commission, 2000 para. 57; and in the context of the control of concentrations, see T-351/03, Schneider Electric v Commission,

Special Characteristics 507 adopted the act or conduct at issue. As ventilated from the case-law, there will be a discretion where the provision of Union law on which the act or conduct is based requires the institution, body, office, or agency to make a policy choice.208 In addition, the fact that the institution has to reconcile divergent interests and thus select options within the context of the policy choices which are its own responsibility obviously points to the existence of a discretion.209 (iii) Consideration of the factors As indicated by the case-law (see para. 11.40), discretion is a key criterion, but it is not the only one. Once the Union Courts determine the margin of discretion, if any, of the Union institution, body, office, or agency, they may consider certain factors elaborated in the case-law in both situations, that is, where the Union institution, body, office, or agency has a discretion within the context of the manifest and grave disregard prong,210 or where the Union institution, body, office, or agency has little to no discretion within the context of the mere infringement prong,211 in the determination whether the requirement of a sufficiently serious breach has been satisfied. Given that such factors may be taken into account irrespective of the level of discretion of the Union institution, body, office, or agency, the mere infringement of Union law may suffice, but not necessarily so, to establish the existence of a sufficiently serious breach.212 For example, this was highlighted in Ombudsman v Staelen,213 in which the Court of Justice held that the General Court had erred by ruling in general terms that a mere breach by the

2007, in particular paras 122, 155–156 (upheld in C-440/07 P, Commission v Schneider Electric, 2009, para. 166); T-834/17, United Parcel Service v Commission, 2022, in particular paras 104, 201–202 (indicating in para. 203 that, in the light of the Commision’s discretion, any departure from the accepted rules of economic discipline is not in itself sufficient for it to be concluded that there was a sufficiently serious breach) (appeal pending in C-297/22 P). As regards the specific legal nature of the duty of diligence, see T-290/16, Fruits de Ponent v Commission, 2018, paras 64–71. 208 See T-155/99, Dieckmann & Hansen v Commission, 2001, paras 48–56; T-18/99, Cordis v Commission, 2001, para. 75; T-645/18, Bilbaína de Alquitranes v Commission, 2020, paras 95–96. 209 See T-291/04, Enviro Tech Europe and Enviro Tech International v Commission, 2011, para. 125; T-817/14, Zoofachhandel Züpke and Others v Commission, 2016, para. 42. 210 See C-198/03 P, Commission v CEVA Santé Animale and Others; 2005, paras 74–93; T-645/18, Bilbaína de Alquitranes v Commission, 2020, paras 96–115. 211 See C-440/07 P, Commission v Schneider Electric, 2009, paras 166–170; T-28/03, Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission, 2005, paras 98–118 (upheld in C-282/05 P, Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission, 2007, paras 41, 50–51); T-364/03, Medici Grimm v Council, 2006, paras 82–98; T-429/05, Artegodan v Commission, 2010, paras 104–112; T-341/07, Sison v Council, 2011, paras 57–74; T-127/19, Dyson and Others v Commission, 2021, paras 36–38 (appeal pending in C-122/22 P); T-834/17, United Parcel Service v Commission, 2022, paras 104–123 (appeal pending in C-297/22 P). 212 That being said, depending on the circumstances, where the Union institution, body, office, or agency has no discretion, the mere infringement of Union law may suffice for finding a sufficiently serious breach without consideration of the factors. See C-301/19 P, Printeos v Commission, 2021, paras 103–105; C-650/19 P, Vialto Consulting v Commission, 2022, paras 142–143; T-610/19, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, 2022, paras 111–113 (appeal pending in C-221/22 P). See also, in the context of State liability, C-452/06, Synthon, 2008, paras 38–43. 213 See C-337/15 P, Ombudsman v Staelen, 2017, paras 31–45. In the case-law, the Court of Justice has indicated that, in order to determine whether there has been a sufficiently serious breach on account of the conduct of the European Ombudsman, regard must be had to the specific nature of the latter’s functions and that, in that context, he or she is merely under the obligation to use best endeavours and enjoys wide discretion: see C-234/02 P, Ombudsman v Lamberts, 2004, para. 50; T-412/05, M v Ombudsman, 2008, para. 123; see also, in that regard, N. Vogiatzis, ‘The EU’s Liability Owing to the Conduct of the European Ombudsman Revisited: European Ombudsman v. Staelen’ (2018) C.M.L.Rev. 1251.

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508 THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES European Ombudsman of the duty to act diligently amounted to a sufficiently serious breach. Since the European Ombudsman enjoys a wide discretion, manifest and grave disregard of that discretion must be shown, taking account of various factors set down in the case-law. In the context of the test for finding a sufficiently serious breach, the Union Courts have also mentioned that only the finding of an irregularity that an administrative authority, exercising ordinary care and diligence, would not have committed in similar circumstances can render the Union non-contractually liable.214 The case-law so far seems to indicate that such language may be considered to elucidate the assessment of a sufficiently serious breach, in the sense of fleshing out the circumstances in which a Union institution, body, office, or agency has been found,215 or not,216 to have committed such a breach, without modifying the test to be carried out on the basis of the discretion of the Union institution, body, office, or agency, along with the factors set out in the case-law where relevant.

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11.51

(3) The damage The second main substantive requirement governing Union non-contractual liability relates to the reality of the damage. This requirement is satisfied when the existence and the extent of the damage have been proved. In practice, the determination as to the existence and the extent of the damage that the applicant claims to have suffered is merged with that concerning the proof of such damage put forward by the applicant. For the purposes of the following survey, these aspects will be considered separately. (a) Existence and extent of the damage (i) Damage must be actual and certain The condition relating to the damage requires that the damage for which compensation is sought be actual and certain.217 By contrast, damage that is purely hypothetical and indeterminate does not confer an entitlement to compensation.218 As the Court of Justice has held, the fact that there is uncertainty about the exact extent of the damage claimed does not mean that the application should be rejected if the existence of the damage has been shown.219 As detailed in the sections that follow, there are various types of damage which may be claimed by the applicant, including material damage, non-material damage, and future damage. Compensation in kind may also be available,

214 See C-123/18 P, HTTS v Council, 2019, para. 43; T-198/95, T-171/96, T-230/97, T-174/98, and T-225/99, Comafrica and Dole Fresh Fruit Europe v Commission, 2001, para. 144; T-364/03, Medici Grimm v Council, 2006, para. 79; T-341/07, Sison v Council, 2011, para. 39; T-433/15, Bank Sedarat v Council, 2019, para. 55; T-434/15, ISSL and Others v Council, 2018, para. 57; T-834/17, United Parcel Service v Commission, 2022, para. 88 (appeal pending in C-297/22 P). 215 See T-292/15, Vakakis kai Synergates v Commission, 2018, para. 148. 216 See T-433/15, Bank Sedarat v Council, 2019, para. 73; T-434/15, ISSL and Others v Council, 2018, para. 75; T-645/18, Bilbaína de Alquitranes v Commission, 2020, para. 110. 217 See C-243/05 P, Agraz and Others v Commission, 2006, para. 27; C-150/17 P, EU v Kendrion, 2018, para. 86; T-298/16, East West Consulting v Commission, 2018, para. 163; T-849/19, Leonardo v Frontex, 2022, para. 47. 218 See T-436/09, Dufour v ECB, 2011, para. 192; T-292/15, Vakakis kai Synergates v Commission, 2018, para. 166. 219 See C-243/05 P, Agraz and Others v Commission, 2006, in particular paras 30–42; C-611/12 P, Giordano v Commission, 2014, paras 37–40.

Special Characteristics 509 along with interest on the damages awarded. However, costs incurred by the parties for the purposes of the judicial proceedings before the Union Courts are not regarded as constituting damage distinct from the burden of costs.220 (ii) Material damage An applicant may claim to have suffered material or pecuniary damage in the form of a reduction in its assets. Such material damage may include loss of profit.221 To that effect, the applicant must show that it was legitimately entitled in all the circumstances to make the profit and was only frustrated by the unlawful act of the Union institution, body, office, or agency,222 or the claim fails.223 Moreover, compensation for loss of an opportunity may be awarded under certain circumstances.224

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(iii) Non-material damage Non-material or non-pecuniary damage is not an actual reduction in assets, but es- 11.53 sentially covers various kinds of physical and psychological damage.225 For example, it may result from the unreasonable inconvenience caused to the applicant on account of the unlawful act or conduct on the part of a Union institution, body, office, or agency.226 It may also consist of impairment of the applicant’s honour and professional reputation.227 In particular, non-material damage can, in principle, be compensated with regard to legal persons, and such damage can take the form of damage to the image or to the reputation of that person.228 However, as the Court of Justice has held, the loss of confidence in the institution of the European Ombudsman does not constitute non- material damage which may be compensated.229

220 See C‑334/97, Commission v Montorio, 1999, para. 54; T-436/16, AEIM and Kazenas v Commission (order), 2018, para. 48; T-631/16, Remag Metalhandel and Jaschinsky v Commission, 2019, para. 63. 221 See C-104/89 and C-37/90, Mulder and Others v Council and Commission, 1992, para. 26; T-198/05, Mebrom v Commission, 2007, para. 51. 222 For an example, see T-298/16, East West Consulting v Commission, 2018, paras 175–176. 223 See C-447/17 P and C-479/17 P, EU v Guardian Europe, 2019, paras 102–118; T-570/13, Agriconsulting v Commission, 2016, paras 90–96. 224 See T-271/04, Citymo v Commission, 2007, para. 176 (granted in those proceedings: see paras 180–181). As regards the loss of an opportunity to be awarded a contract in a tendering procedure, see T-292/15, Vakakis kai Synergates v Commission, 2018, paras 188–191 (distinguishing damages resulting from a loss of profit and those resulting from the loss of an opportunity) and paras 196–197 (concerning the costs and expenses relating to the participation in the tendering procedure); compare C-677/15 P, EUIPO v European Dynamics Luuxembourg and Others, 2017, paras 101–103; C-376/16 P, EUIPO v European Dynamics Luxembourg and Others, 2018, in particular paras 94–97. As regards the loss of an opportunity to obtain other public contracts, see T-292/15, Vakakis kai Synergates v Commission, 2018, para. 179; T-298/16, East West Consulting v Commission, 2018, para. 188. 225 See C-150/17 P, EU v Kendrion, AG Wahl Opinion, points 103–110. 226 See T-168/14, Chart v EEAS, 2015, paras 151–155. 227 See T-309/03, Camós Grau v Commission, 2006, para. 162; T-405/15, Fulmen v Council, 2019, paras 184– 187; T-406/15, Mahmoudian v Council, 2019, paras 178–181, as well as paras 216–218 (non-material damage also awarded on account of impact of restrictive measures on the applicant’s social and family life); T-271/10 RENV II, H v Council, 2020, para. 108. 228 See T-558/15, Iran Insurance v Council, 2018, para. 129; T-559/15, Post Bank Iran v Council, 2018, para. 116; T-406/15, Mahmoudian v Council, 2019, paras 173–177. With respect to the awarding of non-material damages to a legal person in the case of the prolonged uncertainty caused by the General Court’s failure to adjudicate within a reasonable time, see C-138/17 P and C-146/17 P, EU v Gascogne Sack Deutschland and Gascogne, 2018, in particular paras 61–62; C-150/17 P, EU v Kendrion, 2018, paras 111–112; and AG Wahl Opinion, points 111–116. 229 See C-337/15 P, Ombudsman v Staelen, 2017, paras 92–95, 128. That being said, in that judgment, the Court awarded non-material damages for the psychological harm suffered by the applicant (see paras 129–131).

510 THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES Where non-material damage is found, equitable damages (rendered ex aequo et bono)230 or sometimes symbolic damages231 may be awarded. Under the case-law, while annulment of the unlawful measures may be capable of constituting a form of reparation for non-material damage suffered,232 it does not follow from this that that form of reparation is necessarily sufficient in every case to ensure full reparation for such damage.233 11.54

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(iv) Future damage Future damage denotes damage not yet sustained at the time that it is being appraised. Starting early on, the Court of Justice has held that a claim for compensation for damage that was to materialize only in the future, yet was foreseeable with sufficient certainty, was admissible, given that it might prove necessary to prevent even greater damage to bring the matter before the Union Courts as soon as the cause of damage is certain.234 (v) Compensation in kind Under the case-law, it had generally been considered that the Union Courts were empowered only to make an award of money. However, starting with the General Court’s judgment in Galileo International Technology v Commission,235 the Union Courts have recognized that, on the basis of Art. 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU, the Union Courts have the power to grant any form of reparation that accords with the general principles of non-contractual liability common to the laws of the Member States, including, if it accords with those principles, compensation in kind, if necessary in the form of an injunction to do or not to do something. (vi) Default and compensatory interest There are two kinds of interest which arise in the context of an action for damages: default interest and compensatory interest. They are different, and one may be awarded without the other.236 Default interest is designed to compensate at a standard rate for 230 See T-405/15, Fulmen v Council, 2019, para. 207; T-406/15, Mahmoudian v Council, 2019, paras 201, 220; T-271/10 RENV II, H v Council, 2020, para. 109. 231 See T-259/03, Nikolaou v Commission, 2007, para. 333; compare T‑339/16, T‑352/16, and T‑391/16, Ville de Paris and Others v Commission, 2018, para. 167 (set aside on other grounds in C-177/19 P to C-179/19 P). 232 The annulment of an unlawful measure may constitute in itself adequate and, in principle, sufficient compensation for all non-material damage which that measure may have caused, unless the applicant can show that he or she has suffered non-material damage which is separable from the unlawfulness giving rise to the annulment and which is incapable of being entirely repaired by that annulment: see T-616/15, Transtec v Commission, 2018, para. 165. 233 See C-45/15 P, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council, 2017, paras 47–54; T‑339/16, T‑352/16, and T‑391/16, Ville de Paris and Others v Commission, 2018, para. 168 (set aside on other grounds in C-177/19 P to C-179/19 P); T-405/15, Fulmen v Council, 2019, para. 189; T-406/15, Mahmoudian v Council, 2019, para. 183. 234 See 56/74 to 60/74, Kampffmeyer and Others v Commission and Council, 1976, paras 6–8; T-79/96, T-260/97, and T-117/98, Camar and Tico v Commission and Council, 2000, paras 192, 207 (set aside in part on other grounds in C-312/00 P); T-279/03, Galileo International Technology and Others v Commission, 2006, para. 123; T-422/13, CPME and Others v Council, 2017, para. 159. See also, in the context of State liability, C-501/18, Balgarska Narodna Banka, 2021, para. 126. 235 See T-279/03, Galileo International Technology v Commission, 2006, in particular para. 63 (claim ultimately rejected for failure to satisfy the main substantive requirements for Union non-contractual liability: see paras 141–142); see also C-34/12 P, Idromacchine and Others v Commission (order), 2013, para. 29; T-483/13 R, Oikonomopoulos v Commission, 2013, paras 23–28; T-197/17, Abel v Commission (order), 2018, paras 38–40; T-381/15 RENV, IMG v Commission, 2020, paras 55–59 (set aside in part on other grounds in C-619/20 P and C-620/20 P, IMG v Commission, 2022, in particular para. 186). 236 See C-304/89 and C-37/90, Mulder and Others v Council and Commission, 2000, para. 55.

Special Characteristics 511 the loss of enjoyment of the monies owed and to encourage the debtor to pay monies owed as soon as possible, while compensatory interest is designed to compensate for the time that passes before the judicial assessment of the amount of the loss sustained, irrespective of any delay attributable to the debtor.237 Default interest calculated at the normal legal rate as from the date of judgment until full payment may be awarded.238 Interest is not due until the date of judgment, since the extent of the damage is also determined at that date, which means that any increase in the damage from the time at which it arose until the date of judgment is therefore taken into account.239 Compensatory interest may also be awarded for the period prior to the date of judgment.240 The conditions for non-contractual liability must be satisfied for an applicant to be eligible to receive that form of interest.241 (b) Proof of damage (i) Applicant bears the burden of proof As with the other requirements, the burden of proof is discharged by the applicant.242 This means that it is for the applicant to adduce conclusive proof as to the existence of the damage and its extent.243 More specifically, any claim for compensation for damage must state the nature of the alleged damage by reference to the act or conduct complained of and, even in an approximate fashion, quantify the total damage.244 Thus, for material damage, it is incumbent on the applicant to put forward evidence of the existence of the damage and of the data on which the assessment of the damage is based, given that such an assessment cannot be performed merely on an equitable basis.245

237 See C-336/13 P, Commission v IPK International, 2015, paras 30, 37; C-301/19 P, Printeos v Commission, 2021, paras 55–56; T-292/15, Vakakis kai Synergates v Commission, 2018, para. 200; T-610/19, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, 2022, para. 106 (appeal pending in C-221/22 P). 238 See 64/76, 113/76, 167/78, 239/78, 27/79 to 28/79, and 45/79, Dumortier Frères v Council, 1979, para. 25; 238/78, Ireks-Arkady v Council and Commission, 1979, para. 20; T-88/09, Idromacchine and Others v Commission, 2011, paras 79–80; T-292/15, Vakakis kai Synergates v Commission, 2018, paras 222–224. 239 See 64/76, 113/76, 167/78, 239/78, 27/79 to 28/79, and 45/79, Dumortier Frères v Council, 1982, para. 11; 256/80, 257/80, 265/80, 267/80, 51/81, and 282/82, Birra Wührer and Others v Council and Commission, 1984 para. 37; C-152/88, Sofrimport v Commission, 1990, para. 32; C-104/89 and C-37/90, Mulder and Others v Council and Commission, 1992, para. 35; see also C-301/19 P, Printeos v Commission, 2021, paras 122–126 (circumstances of the case justified default interest being compounded); compare C-150/17 P, EU v Kendrion, 2018, paras 87–92 (upholding General Court’s finding that there was no actual and certain damage in respect of the payment of default interest in the proceedings); C-447/17 P and C-479/17 P, EU v Guardian Europe, 2018, paras 57–66 (distinguishing compensation from default interest). 240 See T-88/09, Idromacchine and Others v Commission, 2011, paras 77–78; T-292/15, Vakakis kai Synergates v Commission, 2018, paras 201, 217. 241 See C‑104/89 and C‑37/90, Mulder and Others v Council and Commission, 2000, para. 51; T-292/15, Vakakis kai Synergates v Commission, 2018, para. 199. 242 See 26/74, Roquette Frères v Commission, 1976, paras 22–24; C-243/05 P, Agraz and Others v Commission, 2006, para. 27; C-6111/12 P, Giordano v Commission, 2014, para. 36; C-346/17 P, Klein v Commission, 2018, para. 147; T-570/13, Agriconsulting Europe v Commission, 2016, para. 39; T-399/17, Dalli v Commission, 2019, para. 222. 243 See C-362/95 P, Blackspur DIY and Others v Council and Commission, 1997, para. 31; C-346/17 P, Klein v Commission, 2018, para. 147; C-150/17 P, EU v Kendrion, 2018, para. 89; T-558/18, Iran Insurance v Council, 2018, para. 119; T-559/18, Post Bank Iran v Council, 2018, para. 112; T-298/16, East West Consulting v Commission, 2018, para. 163; T-849/19, Leonardo v Frontex, 2022, para. 47. 244 See T-298/16, East West Consulting v Commission, 2018, para. 164; T-558/18, Iran Insurance v Council, 2018, para. 120; T-559/18, Post Bank Iran v Council, 2018, para. 113. 245 See C-481/07 P, SELEX Sistemi Integrati v Commission, 2009, para. 37; C-346/17 P, Klein v Commission, 2018, para. 152.

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512 THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES In addition, as regards non-material damage, the Union Courts have recognized that, while the submission of evidence is not necessarily regarded as a requirement for the recognition of such damage, it is for the applicant to at least establish that the conduct alleged against the institution, body, office, or agency concerned was capable of causing it such damage.246 11.58

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(ii) Determination of the quantum The award of damages is intended to restore the injured party’s financial situation to what it would have been in the absence of the unlawful act or as close as possible thereto.247 The question of the determination of the amount of the damages may be reserved in the event that the necessary information is not available at the time when the finding of liability is made.248 In that event, the Union Courts will indicate as far as possible a number of criteria to be taken into account, and invite the parties to reach agreement on the amount of the damages within a specified period and to submit the result to it. If the parties fail to reach agreement, the Union Courts will themselves determine the amount of the damages.249 (4) The causal link (a) The causal link must be direct The third main substantive requirement governing Union non-contractual liability is that there must be a direct causal link between the unlawful act or conduct on the part of the institution, body, office, or agency concerned and the damage alleged.250 There is not one standard formulation of this requirement in the case-law. Instead, it is articulated by the Union Courts in various ways (sometimes in the very same case), for example, that there must be a sufficiently direct causal nexus251 or that the alleged damage must be a sufficiently direct consequence of the conduct complained of,252 and therefore such conduct is the determining253 or immediate254 cause of the damage sustained. Nevertheless, the main idea underlying the case-law is that the Union is liable only for damage which is the direct consequence of the wrongful acts or conduct of 246 See C-481/07 P, SELEX Sistemi Integrati v Commission, 2009, para. 38; T-405/15, Fulmen v Council, 2019, para. 188; T-406/15, Mahmoudian v Council, 2019, para. 182; T-271/10 RENV II, H v Council, 2020, para. 106. 247 See C-304/89 and C-37/90, Mulder and Others v Council and Commission, 2000, para. 216; compare T-834/17, United Parcel Service v Commission, 2022, paras 15–18 (in which the General Court rejected the Commission’s request for a measure of organization of procedure in that regard) (appeal pending in C-297/22 P). 248 See C-104/89 and C-37/90, Mulder and Others v Council and Commission, 1992, paras 37–38; C-440/07 P, Commission v Schneider Electric, 2009, paras 214–217; T-199/14, Vanbreda Risk & Benefits v Commission, 2015, para. 217; T-292/15, Vakakis kai Synergates v Commission, 2018, paras 213–221. 249 For an example, see T-292/15, Vakakis kai Synergates v Commission, 2019. 250 See C-337/15 P, Staelen v Ombudsman, 2017, para. 31; T-107/17, Steinhoff and Others v ECB, 2019, para. 52. 251 See C-45/15, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council, 2017, para. 62; C-403/20 P, CF and Others v Commission (order), 2021, para. 41; T-399/17, Dalli v Commission, 2019, para. 223; T-834/17, United Parcel Service v Commission, 2022, para. 341 (appeal pending in C-297/22 P). 252 See C-472/00 P, Fresh Marine v Commission, 2003, para. 118; C-419/08 P, Trubowest Handel and Makarov v Council and Commission, 2010, para. 57; T-483/18, Oikonomopoulos v Commission, 2016, para. 246. 253 See C-433/10 P, Mauerhofer v Commission (order), 2011, para. 127; C-447/17 P and C‑479/17 P, EU v Guardian Europe, 2019, paras 32–33; C‑150/17 P, EU v Kendrion, 2018, paras 52–53; T-468/14, Holistic Innovation Institute v Commission, 2016, para. 43; T-558/15, Iran Insurance v Council, 2018, para. 121. 254 See T-113/04, Atlantic Container Line and Others v Commission, 2007, para. 31; T-631/16, Remag Metalhandel and Jaschinsky v Commission, 2019, para. 41.

Special Characteristics 513 its institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies.255 By contrast, if the damage alleged does not flow directly from such acts or conduct and is too indirect and remote, this is not sufficient because there is no obligation on the part of the Union to make good every harmful consequence, even a remote one, of the unlawful act or conduct alleged.256 This requirement of a direct causal link is reflected in the Treaties,257 and is grounded in the general principles common to the laws of the Member States.258 As with the other requirements, the burden of proof is on the applicant.259 If the applicant fails to adduce conclusive proof as to the existence of a direct causal link, the claim for damages fails.260 Whether or not there is found to be a direct causal link between the damage alleged and the act or conduct complained of on the part of the Union institution, body, office, or agency is assessed by the Union Courts on a case-by-case basis and thus depends on the particular circumstances of the case.261 The question as to whether there is a causal link between the wrongful act and the damage is a question of law which is subject to review by the Court of Justice on appeal.262 The directness of the causal link requirement is interpreted strictly by the Union Courts. The General Court has held that the mere fact that the allegedly unlawful conduct of the defendant institution, body, office, or agency constituted a necessary condition—albeit not a sufficient one—for the damage, in the sense that it would not have occurred without that conduct, does not suffice to establish a sufficiently direct causal link under the case-law.263 (b) Damage must be attributable to a Union institution, body, office, or agency For a direct causal link to be established, it is necessary that the damage alleged is actually caused by the act or conduct of the institution, body, office, or agency.264 Therefore, even 255 See 64/76, 113/76, 167/78, 239/78, 27/79 to 28/79, and 45/79, Dumortier Frères v Council, 1979, para. 21; C-331/05 P, Internationaler Hilsfonds v Commission, 2007, para. 23; T-631/16, Remag Metalhandel and Jaschinsky v Commission, 2019, para. 41. 256 See 64/76, 113/76, 167/78, 239/78, 27/79 to 28/79, and 45/79, Dumortier Frères v Council, 1979, para. 21; C-433/10 P, Mauerhofer v Commission (order), 2011, para. 127; T-279/03, Galileo and Others v Commission, 2006, para. 130; T-298/16, East West Consulting v Commission, 2018, para. 159. 257 See Art. 340, second and third paras TFEU, which provide respectively that the Union and the ECB are liable to make good any damage ‘caused’ by the Union institutions and by the ECB or by their servants in the performance of their duties. 258 See C-433/10 P, Mauerhofer v Commission, 2011, para. 127. 259 See C-447/17 P and C-479/17 P, EU v Guardian Europe, 2019, para. 32; T-631/16, Remag Metalshandel and Jaschinsky v Commission, 2019, para. 40; T-834/17, United Parcel Service v Commission, 2022, para. 341 (appeal pending in C-297/22 P). 260 See C-376/16 P, EUIPO v European Dynamics Luxembourg, 2018, paras 92, 95–96; C-363/17, Equipolymers and Others v Council, 2018, paras 37–43; T-483/18, Oikonomopoulos v Commission, 2016, paras 246–248. 261 It may be the case that the requirement of a direct causal link will be assessed separately with respect to the types of damage alleged by the applicant, finding it satisfied for certain claims, but not for others: see, e.g. C-138/14, Chart v EEAS, 2015, paras 125–155. 262 See C-440/07 P, Commission v Schneider Electric, 2009, para. 192; C-363/17 P, Equipolymers and Others v Council, 2018, para. 22. By contrast, the General Court’s factual assessment of the causal link does not consistute a question of law subject to review by the Court of Justice (see, e.g. C-198/16 P, Agriconsulting Europe v Commission, 2017, paras 21–22), except where the evidence has been distorted (see, e.g. C-346/17 P, Klein v Commission, 2018, paras 124–133). 263 See T-113/04, Atlantic Container Line AB and Others v Commission (order), 2007, paras 39–40; T-107/08, Transnational Company ‘Kazchrome’ and ENRC Marketing v Council and Commission, 2011, para. 80; T-631/16, Remag Metalshandel and Jaschinsky v Commission, 2019, para. 52. 264 See C-419/08 P, Trubowest Handel and Makarov v Council and Commission, 2010, para. 59; C-433/10 P, Mauerhofer v Commission (order), 2011, paras 131–132.

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514 THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES in the case of a possible contribution by the institution, body, office, or agency concerned to the damage for which compensation is sought, that contribution might be too remote because of some responsibility resting on others. Accordingly, the Union will not be liable for damage which is attributable exclusively to action by a Member State (including various kinds of national authorities),265 by the applicant itself,266 or by a third party.267 Furthermore, the requisite causal link will not be found under circumstances where the alleged damage is the direct consequence of the applicant’s own decision or free choice.268 For example, in the case-law on actions for damages based on the General Court’s breach of its obligation to adjudicate a case within a reasonable time under the second paragraph of Art. 47 of the Charter, the Court of Justice held that that breach was not the determining cause of the damage sustained by the applicant as a result of paying bank guarantee costs during the period when that time was exceeded, but was the consequence of the applicant’s own decision to maintain the bank guarantee throughout the proceedings, despite the financial consequences which that entailed, with the result that a sufficiently direct causal link between the breach of Union law and the loss sustained by the applicant was lacking.269 In cases where the conduct of a Union institution, body, office, or agency which allegedly caused the damage pleaded consists in refraining from taking action, the Union Courts have held that it is particularly necessary to be certain that that damage was actually caused by the inaction complained of and could not have been caused by conduct separate from that alleged against the defendant institution, body, office, or agency.270 265 See 132/77, Société pour l’Exportation des Sucres v Commission, 1978, para. 27; T-146/01, DLD Trading v Council, 2003, paras 80–97; T-316/13, CW v Council, 2016, paras 265–266; T-631/16, Remag Metalshandel and Jaschinsky v Commission, 2019, paras 43–65; T-528/20, Kočner v Europol, 2021, paras 62–96, 102–110 (appeal pending in C-755/21 P). See further para. 11.29. 266 See C-272/11 P, Noko Ngele v Commission and Others (order), 2011, paras 17–19; T-3/00 and T-337/04 Pitsiorlas v Council and ECB, 2007 paras 315–322. 267 See C-497/06 P, CAS Succhi di Frutta v Commission, 2009, paras 61–67; Case C-433/10 P, Mauerhofer v Commission (order), 2011, paras 129–131; T-279/03, Galileo and Others v Commission, 2006, paras 131–135; T-711/17, Spinoit v Commission and Others (order), 2018, para. 66; T-793/17, Bruel v Commission and Others (order), 2018, para. 65. 268 See C-440/07 P, Commission v Schneider Electric, 2009, paras 197–208, 221–223; T-107/08, Transnational Company ‘Kazchrome’ and ENRC Marketing v Council and Commission, 2011, para. 80; T-834/17, United Parcel Service v Commission, 2022, paras 342–371 (appeal pending in C-297/22 P); see also C-331/05 P, Internationaler Hilsfonds v Commission, 2007, paras 22–32 (concerning costs related to proceedings before the European Ombudsman); T-726/14, Novar v EUIPO, 2017, paras 31–32 (concerning costs related to proceedings before EUIPO); T-292/15, Vakakis kai Synergates v Commission, 2018, para. 173 (concerning costs related to proceedings before the European Ombudsman). 269 See, inter alia, C-138/17 P and C-146/17 P, EU v Gascogne Sack Deutschland and Gascogne, 2018, paras 22– 32; C-150/17 P, EU v Kendrion, 2018, paras 52–62; C-174/17 P and C-222/17 P, EU v ASPLA and Armando Álvarez, 2018, paras 23–33; C-447/17 P and C-479/17 P, EU v Guardian Europe, 2019, paras 32–42; see also T-28/03, Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission, 2005, paras 119–131; T-113/04, Atlantic Container Line and Others v Commission (order), 2007, paras 35–51; T-834/17, United Parcel Service v Commission, 2022, para. 348 (appeal pending in C-297/22 P). See further P. Verbruggen and K. Kryla-Cudna, ‘The Union’s Liability for Failure to Adjudicate within a Reasonable Time: EU Tort Law after Gascogne, Kendrion and ASPLA’ (2020) C.M.L.Rev. 191; K. Havu and S. Kurki-Suonio, ‘Damages Liability of the EU for Harm Caused by Excessive Duration of Court Proceedings’ (2021) E.P.L. 1. 270 See T-138/03, É.R. and Others v Council and Commission, 2006, paras 134–140; T-137/07, Portela v Commission, 2008, paras 80–101; T-264/09, Tecnoprocess v Commission (order), 2011, paras 121–135; T-367/09, Tecnoprocess v Commission (order), 2011, paras 77–85; T-294/13, Fialtor v Commission and ECB (order), 2014, paras 53–54; T-138/14, Chart v EEAS, 2015, paras 132–133; T-539/12, Zeigler and Zeigler Relocation v Commission, 2015, para. 90; T-451/18, Triantafyllopoulos and Others v ECB (order), 2019, paras 38–44.

Special Characteristics 515 (c) Reasonable diligence of the applicant Under established case-law, the Court of Justice held that, in the light of the general principles common to the laws of the Member States, the injured party must show reasonable diligence in avoiding or limiting the extent of damage or else risk having to bear that damage itself.271 Thus, even if the conduct alleged against the Union institution, body, office, or agency contributed to bringing about the damage, that causal link may be broken by negligence on the part of the person adversely affected where that negligence proves to be the immediate or determinant cause of the damage.272 If the applicant does not show reasonable diligence, the Union will either not be liable273 or be liable only for part of the damage suffered.274 This attests to the fact that the applicant’s reasonable diligence bears on the causal link requirement as regards the determination of the extent to which the damage is a sufficiently direct consequence of the unlawful act or conduct of the institution, as well as the extent of the damage for which the Union is liable in the context of the damage requirement.275

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C. Limitation period (1) Commencement and duration (a) Period of five years Under Art. 46 of the Statute,276 a claim against the Union for non-contractual liability pursuant to Art. 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU becomes time-barred after a period of five years from the occurrence of the event giving rise

271 See C-104/89 and C-37/90, Mulder and Others v Council and Commission, 1992, para. 33; C-419/08 P, Trubowest Handel and Makarov v Council and Commission, 2010, para. 61; C-451/09 P, Pigasos Alieftiki Naftiki Etaireia v Council and Commission, 2010, para. 39; T-360/04, FG Marine v Commission, 2007, para. 51; T-113/04, Atlantic Container Line and Others v Commission (order), 2007, para. 32; T-539/12, Zeigler and Zeigler Relocation v Commission, 2015, para. 66; T-516/13, CW v Council, 2016, para. 243. 272 See C-419/08 P, Trubowest Handel and Makarov v Council and Commission, 2010, para. 61; T-360/04, FG Marine v Commission, 2007, para. 52; T-113/04, Atlantic Container Line and Others v Commission (order), 2007, para. 33; T-437/10, Gap granen & producten, 2013, para. 81. As the General Court has held, such negligent conduct may, in particular, consist in the fact that the injured party did not use the legal remedies available to him to avoid the damage: see T-360/04, FG Marine v Commission, 2007, para. 53; T-539/12, Zeigler and Zeigler Relocation v Commission, 2015, para. 66; T-711/17, Spinoit v Commission and Others (order), 2018, paras 67–68; T-793/17, Bruel v Commission and Others (order), 2018, paras 66–67. However, it would be contrary to Union law to require injured parties systematically to have recourse to all the legal remedies available to them, even if that would give rise to excessive difficulties or could not reasonably be required of them, in reference to the case-law on State liability: see T-516/13, CW v Council, 2016, paras 243, 263. 273 See 169/73, Compagnie Continentale v Council, 1975, paras 22–32; 58/75, Sergy v Commission, 1976, paras 46–47; 26/81, Oleifici Mediterranei v EEC, 1982, para. 24; C-104/89 and C-37/90, Mulder and Others v Council and Commission, 1992, para. 33; C-419/08 P, Trubowest Handel and Makarov v Council and Commission, 2010, para. 61; T-360/04, FG Marine v Commission, 2007, paras 75–77. 274 See 145/83, Adams v Commission, 1985, paras 53–55; C-308/87, Grifoni v Commission, 1990, paras 16–17; T-178/98 Fresh Marine v Commission, 2000, paras 84–92 (upheld in C-472/00 P, Fresh Marine v Commission, 2003, paras 65–69). 275 See further K. Gutman, ‘The Evolution of the Action for Damages Against the European Union and Its Place in the System of Judicial Protection’ (2011) C.M.L.Rev. 695, 730–731. 276 Applicable to the General Court by virtue of Art. 53, first para. of the Statute. Art. 46 of the Statute states that that article also applies to actions for damages brought against the ECB. See T-107/17, Steinhoff and Others v ECB, 2019, para. 30.

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516 THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES thereto.277 This five-year period is not extended by ten days for distance, since such a limitation period is not the same thing as a procedural time-limit.278 According to the case-law, the function of the limitation period set out in Art. 46 of the Statute is to reconcile protection of the rights of the aggrieved person and the principle of legal certainty. The length of the limitation period was determined by taking into account, in particular, the time that the party which has allegedly suffered harm needs to gather the appropriate information for the purpose of a possible action and to verify the facts likely to provide the basis of that action.279

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(b) Materialization of the damage causes time to start running The five-year limitation period referred to in Art. 46 of the Statute does not begin to run until all of the requirements governing the obligation to provide compensation for damage are satisfied, and in particular, until the damage to be made good has materialized.280 It is then that time starts running. For example, in Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission,281 involving bank guarantee charges incurred to avoid paying a fine imposed by a Commission decision for infringement of the competition rules, the Court of Justice held that, while the claim for damages could have been brought as soon as the bank guarantees were provided, since at that time the damage caused by the contested decision was certain as to its grounds and could be determined as to its scope, the period of limitation could not begin until the financial loss had in fact materialized, that is, until the bank guarantee charges had begun to run. (c) Continuous damage If the full extent of the damage does not materialize immediately but only over a period of time, the damages claim will be admissible only for compensation for the damage which arose during the period starting five years before the date on which the action was brought.282

277 See C-460/09 P, Inalca and Cremonini v Commission, 2013, para. 45; T-884/19, Folschette and Others v Commission, 2021, para. 23. The regularization of an application does not in principle affect the assessment that the application was lodged within the period set out in Art. 46 of the Statute: see T-107/17, Steinhoff and Others v ECB, 2019, para. 33. 278 See C-469/11 P, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, 2012, paras 49–59. 279 See C-469/11 P, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, 2012, paras 33, 53; C-123/18 P, HTTS v Council, 2019, para. 49; T-436/16, AEIM and Kazenas v Commission (order), 2018, para. 24. 280 See C-51/05 P, Commission v Cantina sociale di Dolianova and Others, 2008, para. 54; C-469/11 P, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, 2012, para. 34; T-436/16, AEIM and Kwzenas v Commission (order), 2018, para. 25; T-884/19, Folschette and Others v Commission, 2021, para. 24. For some applications, see T-138/14, Chart v EEAS, 2015, paras 74–97; T-884/19, Folschette and Others v Commission, 2021, paras 26–30; T-451/18, Triantafyllopoulos and Others v ECB (order), 2019, paras 26–29. As regards an action for damages based on the failure to adjudicate in a reasonable time, see T-40/15, ASPLA and Armando Álvarez v EU, 2017, paras 48–51 (set aside on other grounds in C-174/17 P and C-222/17 P). 281 See C-282/05 P, Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission, 2007, paras 29–33; see also T-673/15, Guardian Europe v EU, 2017, paras 33–35 (set aside on other grounds in C-447/17 P and C-479/17 P); T-185/18, Lucchini v Commission, 2019, paras 58–59. 282 See T-28/03, Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission, 2005, paras 69–70 (upheld in C-282/05 P, Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission, 2007, para. 35); T-138/14, Chart v EEAS, 2015, para. 58; T-884/19, Folschette and Others v Commission, 2021, para. 25.

Special Characteristics 517 (d) Future damage The possibility of bringing a claim for compensation for future damage or damage which has not yet been assessed does not influence when time starts to run. Time under the limitation period always starts to run when the damage materializes, and not from the time when it became possible to bring an action for damages. If that were not the case, the claim for damages could be time-barred before the damage had actually materialized.283 (e) Legislative and individual acts In cases where the non-contractual liability of the Union has its origin in a legislative or normative act, the limitation period does not begin to run until the resulting damage materializes, that is to say, the limitation period does not begin to run until the damaging effects of that act have arisen and hence until the time at which the persons concerned were bound to have suffered certain damage.284 This solution is also applied to disputes arising from individual acts, such that the limitation period begins to run as soon as the decision has produced its effects vis-à-vis the persons concerned by it.285 Neither notification of the act concerned nor its entry into force as such causes the limitation period to begin running.286 Consequently, for the purposes of calculating the limitation period, the case-law does not take a different approach according to the nature of the act. (f) Objective, not subjective, inquiry Under the case-law, the rules on limitation periods which govern actions for damages must be based only on strictly objective criteria, since if it were otherwise, there would be a risk of undermining the principle of legal certainty on which such rules specifically rely and the point in time in which such actions become time-barred would vary according to the individual perception that each party may have as to the reality of the damage. Accordingly, the start of the limitation period for actions for damages is linked to the objective loss actually caused to the assets of the party that claims to have suffered harm.287

283 See 56/74 to 60/74, Kampffmeyer and Others v Commission and Council, 1976. 284 See 256/80 to 257/80, 265/80, 267/80, and 5/81, Birra Wührer and Others v Council and Commission, 1982, paras 9–12; C-51/05 P, Commission v Cantina sociale di Dolianova, 2008, para. 54; C-460/09 P, Inalca and Cremonini v Commission, 2013, paras 54–58. 285 See C-282/05 P, Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission, 2007, paras 29–30; C-335/08 P, Transports Schiocchet— Excursions v Commission, 2009, para. 33; C-460/09 P, Inalca and Cremonini v Commission, 2013, paras 54–58; T-367/08, Abouchar v Commission (order), 2009, para. 23; T-138/14, Chart v EEAS, 2015, para. 56; T-185/18, Lucchini v Commission, 2019, para. 56. 286 See T-409/09, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission (order), 2011, paras 69–70. 287 See C-51/05 P, Commission v Cantina sociale di Dolianova v Commission, 2008, in particular paras 59–63; T-247/08, C-Content v Commission, 2010, paras 55–58; T-409/09, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission (order), 2011, para. 50; T-436/16, AEIM and Kazenas v Commission (order), 2018, para. 40.

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(g) Unawareness of the event giving rise to the damage Nevertheless, expiry of the limitation period cannot be pleaded against an applicant who was not aware in time of the event which gave rise to the damage and therefore did not have a reasonable time before the limitation period ran out in order to bring a claim.288 (h) Expiry of the limitation period must be raised by the defendant The expiry of the limitation period set down in Art. 46 of the Statute must be raised by the defendant. It cannot be raised by the Union Courts of their own motion, since it is not the same thing as a procedural time-limit.289 (2) Interruption of the limitation period Art. 46 of the Statute provides that the period of limitation is to be interrupted if proceedings are instituted before the General Court,290 or if prior to such proceedings an application is made by the aggrieved party to the relevant Union institution. In the latter event, proceedings must be instituted within the two-month period provided for in Art. 263 TFEU; the provisions of the second paragraph of Art. 265 TFEU apply where appropriate. Reference to Arts 263 and 265 TFEU is made solely in connection with the possibility of interrupting the five-year limitation period prescribed by the first sentence of Art. 46 of the Statute. This reference is not intended to shorten the five-year limitation period, but simply to protect interested parties by preventing certain periods from being taken into account in calculating that limitation period. Its aim is merely to postpone the expiration of the period of five years when proceedings instituted or a prior application made within this period start time to run in respect of the periods provided for in Art. 263 TFEU or Art. 265 TFEU.291 If a prior application is addressed by the aggrieved party to the institution concerned, interruption will occur only if that application is

288 See 145/83, Adams v Commission, 1985, para. 50; T-138/03, É.R. and Others v Council and Commission, 2006, para. 49; T-138/14, Chart v EEAS, 2015, para. 57; T-40/15, ASPLA and Armando Álvarez v EU, 2017, para. 46 (set aside on other grounds in C-174/17 P and C-222/17 P). This case-law is not considered to conflict with the objective approach in the case-law: see C-136/01 P, Autosalone Ispra dei Fratelli Rossi v Commission (order), 2002, paras 31–32; C-51/05 P, Commission v Cantina sociale di Dolianova, 2008, paras 61, 67. 289 See C-469/11 P, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, 2012, paras 49–59; T-136/16, AIEM and Kazenas v Commission (order), 2018, para. 23. This is similar to the Member State legal systems: see 20/88, Roquette Frères v Commission, 1989, para. 12. 290 The institution of proceedings before the national courts does not constitute an act interrupting the limitation period under Art. 46 of the Statute: see C-51/05 P, Commission v Cantina sociale di Dolianova and Others, 2008, para. 69. As regards the interruption of the limitation period in connection with the lodging of an action for damages, see T-457/04 and T-223/05, Camar v Commission, 2008, paras 73–81. 291 See 5/66, 7/66, and 13/66 to 24/66, Kampffmeyer and Others v Commission, 1967 ECR 245, 260; C-282/05 P, Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission, 2007, para. 36; T-92/20, Fryč v Commission (order), 2021, para. 22.

Consequences 519 followed by an application to the General Court within the time-limits determined by reference to Arts 263 and 265 TFEU.292 If the aggrieved party does not bring proceedings within those time-limits, the initial five-year limitation period continues to run in spite of the application made to the defendant institution. The limitation period is not reduced as a result.293

IV. Consequences A. Judgment holding the Union liable (1) Obligation to pay compensation If the Court of Justice or the General Court finds the Union non-contractually liable, the Union will be obliged under the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU to pay the damages awarded to the person concerned.294 In contrast to an action for annulment, in which the finding that an act is unlawful has ex tunc effect, in the context of an action for damages the finding that an act is unlawful, justifying the non-contractual liability of the Union, has ex nunc effect and does not in principle have the effect of retroactively eliminating the legal basis for that act.295 (2) Judgment is enforceable By virtue of Arts 280 and 299 TFEU, judgments of the Court of Justice and the General Court are enforceable.296 Enforcement is carried out in accordance with the law of the Member State on whose territory it takes place. However, the property and assets of the Union shall not be the subject of any administrative or legal measure of constraint without the authorization of the Court of Justice.297

292 See 11/72, Giordano v Commission, 1973, para. 6; T-409/09, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission (order), 2011, paras 57–58; T-92/20, Fryč v Commission (order), 2021, para. 24. 293 See 11/72, Giordano v Commission, 1973, para. 7; T-167/94, Nölle v Council and Commission, 1995, para. 30; T-832/14, Nutria v Commission, 2016, paras 35–39. 294 Of note, an application for a declaration of invalidity goes beyond an action for damages and is inadmissible: see T-483/13, Oikonomopoulos v Commission, 2016, paras 27–28. The Union Courts also have no jurisdiction to give a declaratory judgment in respect of the responsibility of a Union institution, body, office, or agency under Art. 340 TFEU: see T-451/18, Triantafyllopoulos and Others v ECB (order), 2019, para. 15. 295 See T-292/15, Vakakis kai Synergates v Commission, 2018, para. 37; see also C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P, FIAMM and Others v Council and Commission, 2008, para. 124 (any determination by the Union Courts that a measure is unlawful, even when made in an action for damages, has the force of res judicata and compels the Union institution, body, office, or agency concerned to take the necessary measures to remedy that illegality). 296 Judgments of the General Court are enforceable even if an appeal has been brought before the Court of Justice. Appeals do not have suspensory effect (Statute, Art. 60, first para.). However, the Court of Justice may order application of the judgment of the General Court to be suspended for the duration of the appeal proceedings pursuant to Arts 278 and 279 TFEU. 297 See Ch. 14.

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A judgment dismissing an application for damages does not have erga omnes effects. Its force as res judicata extends only to the parties to the proceedings: they are no longer entitled to bring the same claim before the Union Courts on the basis of the same facts.298 Other parties wishing to bring an action for damages on the basis of the same facts may do so.

298 See T-341/07, Sison v Council, 2011, paras 17–25; compare T-399/17, Dalli v Commission, 2019, paras 26–42. In addition, an action which brings the same parties together and seeks the same ends, on the basis of the same pleas in law, as an action brought previously is dismissed as inadmissible on grounds of lis pendens: see T-645/19, IMG v Commission (order), 2020, paras 82–85 (upheld in C-619/20 P and C-620/20 P, IMG v Commission, 2022, paras 123–124); compare T-721/18 and T-81/19, Apostolopoulou and Apostolopoulou-Chrysanthaki v Commission, 2021, paras 98–105 (appeal pending in C-124/22 P).

12 APPLICATION FOR AN OPINION ON THE COMPATIBILITY WITH THE TREATIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT TO BE CONCLUDED BY THE UNION I. Subject-Matter A. General overview (1) Objective By virtue of Art. 218(11) TFEU, a Member State, the European Parliament, the Council, or the Commission may obtain the opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether an agreement envisaged is compatible with the Treaties. Where the opinion of the Court is adverse, the agreement envisaged may not enter into force unless it is amended, or the Treaties are revised. The purpose of Art. 218(11) TFEU is dual. First, it is to forestall complications which would result from legal disputes concerning the compatibility with the Treaties of international agreements binding on the Union.1 Second, it is to avoid the legal complications stemming from situations in which the Member States enter into international commitments without the requisite authorization when, under Union law, they no longer have the necessary competence to give effect to those commitments.2 This is because were the Court to find, after the conclusion of an international agreement binding upon the Union, that such an agreement is, by reason either of its content or the procedure adopted for its conclusion, incompatible with the provisions of the Treaties, inter alia, the division of competences between the EU and the Member States, such finding would be liable to provoke serious difficulties not only in the internal Union context, but also in the context of international relations, and might give rise to adverse consequences for all interested parties, including third countries.3 To

1 See Opinion 1/75, Draft Understanding on a Local Cost Standard drawn up under the auspices of the OECD, 1975 ECR 1355, 1360; Opinion 1/19, Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention), 2021, para. 193; Opinion 1/20, Draft modernized Energy Charter Treaty, 2022, para. 35. 2 See Opinion 1/13, Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction, 2014, para. 47. 3 See Opinion 1/75, Draft Understanding on a Local Cost Standard drawn up under the auspices of the OECD, 1975 ECR 1355, 1360–1361; Opinion 1/15, Draft agreement between Canada and the European Union on the transfer

EU Procedural Law. Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak, Oxford University Press. © Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833086.003.0012

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522 Opinion Procedure avoid such complications, the Treaties provide for the possibility to obtain a prior opinion from the Court of Justice based on Art. 218(11) TFEU. Such an opinion aims to elucidate, before the conclusion of an agreement, whether that agreement is compatible with the Treaties.4 To date, the Court has given a limited number of opinions (twenty-three).5

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(2) Ex ante judicial control Opinions delivered by the Court of Justice pursuant to Art. 218(11) TFEU perform an ex ante function.6 According to the case-law, Art. 218(11) TFEU embodies ‘a special procedure of collaboration between the Court of Justice on the one hand and the other [Union] institutions and the Member States on the other whereby, at a stage prior to conclusion of an agreement which is capable of giving rise to a dispute concerning the legality of a [Union] act which concludes, implements or applies it, the Court is called upon to ensure, in accordance with [Art. 19(1), first para. TEU], that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed’.7

and processing of Passenger Name Record data, 2017, para. 69; Opinion 1/19, Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention), 2021, paras 193–194. 4 See Opinion 1/75, Draft Understanding on a Local Cost Standard drawn up under the auspices of the OECD, 1975; Opinion 3/94, GATT–WTO–Framework Agreement on Bananas, 1995, para. 18; Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Communities to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1996, para. 5. See also Opinion 1/08, Competence of the European Community to conclude agreements modifying the Schedules of Specific Commitments of the Community and its Member States under the General Agreement on Trade in Services, 2009, para. 107. The mere risk of invalidation of an act concluding an international agreement suffices for requesting the Court for an opinion: see Opinion 1/15, Draft agreement between Canada and the European Union on the transfer and processing of Passenger Name Record data, 2017, para. 74. 5 See Opinion 1/75, Draft Understanding on a Local Cost Standard drawn up under the auspices of the OECD, 1975; Opinion 1/76, Draft Agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels, 1977; Opinion 1/78, International Agreement on Natural Rubber, 1979; Opinion 1/91, Draft Agreement between the Community, on the one hand, and the countries of the European Free Trade Association, on the other, relating to the creation of the European Economic Area, 1991; Opinion 1/92, Draft Agreement between the Community, on the one hand, and the countries of the European Free Trade Association, on the other, relating to the creation of the European Economic Area, 1992; Opinion 2/91, Convention No. 170 of the International Labour Organization concerning safety in the use of chemicals at work, 1993; Opinion 1/94, Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, 1994; Opinion 2/92, Competence of the Community or one of its institutions to participate in the Third Revised Decision of the OECD on national treatment, 1995; Opinion 3/94, GATT-WTO-Framework Agreement on Bananas, 1995; Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Communities to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1996; Opinion 2/00, Cartagena Protocol, 2001; Opinion 1/00, Proposed Agreement between the European Community and non-Member States on the establishment of a European Common Aviation Area, 2002; Opinion 1/03, New Lugano Convention, 2006; Opinion 1/08, Competence of the European Community to conclude agreements modifying the Schedules of Specific Commitments of the Community and its Member States under the General Agreement on Trade in Services, 2009; Opinion 1/09, Draft Agreement creating a Unified Patent Litigation System (European and Community Patents Court), 2011; Opinion 1/13, Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction, 2014; Opinion 2/13, Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 2014; Opinion 1/15, Agreement between Canada and the European Union on the transfer and processing of Passenger Name Record data, 2017; Opinion 2/15, Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore, 2017; Opinion 3/15, Marrakesh Treaty to facilitate access to published works for persons who are blind, visually impaired, or otherwise print disabled, 2017; Opinion 1/17, CETA, 2019; Opinion 1/19, Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention), 2021; Opinion 1/20, Draft modernized Energy Charter Treaty, 2022. 6 See Opinion 1/19, Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention), 2021, paras 215–220. 7 See Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Communities to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1996, para. 6.

Subject-Matter 523 (3) Relationship with other procedures in the Treaties The existence of the procedure under Art. 218(11) TFEU, however, does not mean that the Court of Justice will not conduct judicial review ex post of the act by which a Union institution intended to conclude an international agreement.8 In other words, while the procedure for obtaining the opinion of the Court of Justice is intended to obviate the adoption of unlawful acts, if it does not succeed in this, the usual channels for judicial review of the acts in question remain open.9 Moreover, the fact that certain questions may be dealt with by means of other remedies in the Treaties, in particular by bringing an action for annulment under Art. 263 TFEU, does not constitute an argument which precludes the Court from being asked for an opinion on those questions under Art. 218(11) TFEU.10 (4) International agreements concerning the Common Foreign and Security Policy As explicitly provided in the Treaties, the Court of Justice of the European Union does not have jurisdiction with respect to the provisions relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) or acts adopted on the basis of those provisions save for certain exceptions with respect to monitoring compliance with Art. 40 TEU and ruling on proceedings brought under the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU reviewing the legality of decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural and legal persons adopted by the Council on the basis of Chapter 2 of Title V of the TEU.11 That being said, there is no express reference in the Treaties to any limitations placed on the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to deliver opinions under Art. 218(11) TFEU

8 See C-327/91, France v Commission, 1994, paras 15–17; Opinion 3/94, GATT-WTO-Framework Agreement on Bananas, 1995, para. 22; C-122/95 Germany v Council, 1998, paras 41–42; C-350/12 P, Council v in ‘t Veld, 2014, para. 58. 9 For the action for annulment, see Ch. 7; for preliminary rulings on validity, see Ch. 10. 10 See Opinion 2/00, Cartagena Protocol, 2001, para. 12. See also Opinion 1/13, Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction, 2014, paras 52–55, where the Council and a number of Member States put forward the argument that the Commission had misused the opinion procedure as a substitute for infringement proceedings under Art. 258 TFEU. The Court rejected the argument, however, pointing out that no specific and objective evidence had been put forward that could lead to the conclusion that the Commission had exclusively or primarily requested an opinion with the aim of circumventing the procedure laid down in Art. 258 TFEU. The Court added that the fact that a number of questions raised in the context of the opinion procedure could also form the subject- matter of an infringement action did not preclude the Commission from requesting the Court for an opinion on those questions under Art. 218(1) TFEU. But see Opinion 1/19, Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention), 2021, paras 201–213: while the Court held that the failure to bring an action for annulment against a decision authorizing the signing of an agreement did not preclude the admissibility of a request for an opinion on the compatibility of that agreement with the Treaties, as a measure authorizing the signing of an agreement and a measure concluding an agreement are two distinct legal acts giving rise to distinct legal obligations, the Court held that a question pertaining to the decisions authorizing the signature of the Istanbul Convention was inadmissible because the signature of that convention was performed more than two years before the request for an Opinion, which meant that the preventive intent of an opinion could no longer be achieved in regard of such decisions. The Court added that the applicant requesting the opinion, here the European Parliament, could have challenged the signature decisions by way of an action for annulment. Regarding the distinction between the signature and the conclusion of an international agreement, see K. Lenaerts and S. Adams, ‘The Relationship between the Common Commercial Policy and Other External Competences of the EU: Opinion 2/00 (Cartagena Protocol)’ in G. Butler and R. Wessel (eds), EU External Relations Law: The Cases in Context (Bloomsbury, 2022) 407, 413–414. See further C-621/18, Wightman, 2018, paras 23–24, 35. 11 See Art. 24(1), second para. TEU; Art. 275 TFEU. See, however, C-72/15, Rosneft, 2017. See further para. 6.05 and para. 10.04.

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524 Opinion Procedure with respect to international agreements concerning CFSP matters. In fact, several other paragraphs of Art. 218 TFEU make provision for the conclusion of an envisaged agreement relating to the CFSP and the role to be played in that regard by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.12 As such, although further case-law is awaited to address this point, it appears that a request for an opinion of the Court of Justice under Art. 218(11) TFEU may encompass an envisaged agreement concerning the CFSP (provided that the other requisite conditions for the admissibility of such a request are satisfied) and is thus not limited by the restriction placed on the Union Courts’ jurisdiction relating to the CFSP.13

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(5) Comparable provisions of the EAEC Treaty The Court of Justice also has the power to give opinions under Art. 103 of the EAEC Treaty.14 As highlighted in the case-law, this provision is comparable to Art. 218(11) TFEU,15 but it is not exactly the same, since it concerns an application for an opinion of the Court submitted by a Member State in relation to the compatibility with the provisions of the EAEC Treaty of proposed clauses of draft agreements or contracts between that Member State and third parties in the context of communications about such agreements or contracts with the Commission.16 Moreover, Arts 104 and 105 of the EAEC Treaty allow the Court of Justice to give opinions on an application of the Commission, generally relating to agreements or contracts between a person or undertaking and third parties.17

B. The expression ‘agreement envisaged’ 12.06

(1) Agreement The term ‘agreement’ in Art. 218(11) TFEU has been interpreted by the Court of Justice as referring to any undertaking entered into by entities subject to international law which has binding force, whatever its formal designation.18 Provided that it is a

12 See Art. 218(3), (6), and (9) TFEU. 13 See C-658/11, Parliament v Council, 2014, para. 52; C-244/17, Commission v Council, 2018, para. 21; C-180/20, Commission v Council, 2021, para. 27. See further P. Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (2nd edn, OUP, 2011) 274. 14 See Ruling 1/78, Draft Convention of the International Energy Agency on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Facilities and Transports, 1978, particularly paras 1–4. 15 See Opinion 1/78, International Agreement on Natural Rubber, 1979, para. 30; Opinion 2/91, Convention No. 170 of the International Labour Organization concerning safety in the use of chemicals at work, 1993, para. 3. 16 See C-29/99, Commission v Council, 2002, paras 52–55: in an action for annulment brought by the Commission against a Council decision approving the accession of the EAEC to the Nuclear Safety Convention, the Court noted that ‘the Euratom Treaty does not provide that the Court may rule by way of an opinion on the compatibility with that Treaty of international agreements which the Community is planning to conclude’ in the course of rejecting the Council’s argument that the action was inadmissible on the grounds that the Commission was not really seeking the annulment of the act concerned but instead was seeking to obtain from the Court an opinion on the extent of the EAEC’s competence in the context of its accession to this Convention which was not provided for under the EAEC Treaty as compared to what is now Art. 218(11) TFEU (then Art. 300(6) EC). 17 See CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 202-203. 18 See Opinion 1/75, Draft Understanding on a Local Cost Standard drawn up under the auspices of the OECD, 1975 ECR 1355, 1359–1360. See also Opinion 1/13, Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction, 2014, paras 37–42 (a declaration of acceptance of accession to an international agreement constitutes an agreement within the meaning of Art. 218(11) TFEU).

Subject-Matter 525 ‘ “standard”, that is to say a rule of conduct, covering a specific field, determined by precise provisions, which is binding upon the participants’, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to give an opinion on its compatibility with the Treaties.19 (2) Union must not yet be bound by the agreement A request may be made to the Court only insofar as the Union is not yet bound by the agreement. Failing this, the opinion would not play its preventive role.20 It makes no difference in this connection at what stage in the process of concluding the international agreement the opinion is sought, provided that the Union is not yet bound by it. Accordingly, an opinion may be obtained from the Court before the Commission (or the High Representative, as the case may be) has made any recommendations to the Council pursuant to Art. 218(1) TFEU with a view to opening negotiations and before the Council has given it the necessary authorization. The Court’s opinion may also be sought after the negotiations have closed, but before the Council concludes the agreement pursuant to Art. 218(2) TFEU.21 If, however, the envisaged agreement is concluded after the request for an opinion was submitted, but before the Court has given its opinion, the request becomes devoid of purpose.22 The ex ante nature of the procedure provided for in Art. 218(11) TFEU requires the ‘envisaged’ agreement to be still only envisaged at the time when the Court gives its opinion. Moreover, if the Court were to give an adverse opinion on the compatibility with the Treaties of an agreement which had already been concluded, that opinion would not be capable of having the legal effect prescribed by the second sentence of Art. 218(11) TFEU, namely, that, if the Court has given an adverse opinion, the agreement may not enter into force unless it is amended, or the Treaties are revised (see para. 12.19). In those circumstances, the Court will not respond to the request for an opinion.23

19 See Opinion 1/75, Draft Understanding on a Local Cost Standard drawn up under the auspices of the OECD, 1975 ECR 1355, 1360. In Opinion 1/08, the Court found for the purposes of assessing the subject-matter of an ‘envisaged agreement’, here involving agreements modifying the schedules of specific commitments of the then Community and its Member States under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) that even though the modification and withdrawal of commitments annexed to the GATS could be implemented unilaterally by the then Community and its Member States, they constituted an ‘indissociable whole’ with the compensatory adjustments, all of which were binding on the parties to the agreements at issue and on the other WTO members as well, and thus formed the content of the agreements at issue: see Opinion 1/08, Competence of the European Community to conclude agreements modifying the Schedules of Specific Commitments of the Community and its Member States under the General Agreement on Trade in Services, 2009, paras 96–105. 20 An opinion dealing with the compatibility with the Treaties of an international agreement which has already entered into force may be given where the Union is not yet bound by it, but is considering acceding to it. In addition, where the Union is already provisionally bound by parts of the agreement concerned, but not by the part on which an opinion has been requested, the request is admissible: see C-1/17, CETA, 2019, paras 3–4, 105. 21 See Opinion 1/94, Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, 1994, para. 12. The Commission requested Opinion 2/00 (Opinion 2/00, Cartagena Protocol, 2001) after the Protocol had been signed by the Council, but before the Commission had submitted a proposal to the Council for the conclusion of the Protocol. Similarly, the Parliament requested Opinion 1/19 (Opinion 1/19, Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention), 2021) after the Convention had been signed by the Council, but before the Council had adopted a decision concluding the Convention. 22 See Opinion 1/13, Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction, 2014, para. 51. 23 See Opinion 3/94, GATT–WTO–Framework Agreement on Bananas, 1995. As a consequence, the Member State which had requested an opinion (Germany) in that case brought an action for annulment against the Council

12.07

526 Opinion Procedure 12.08

(3) Participation of the Union Since the Court’s jurisdiction to give opinions is provided for in Art. 218 TFEU, which lays down in general the decision-making procedure to be followed with regard to the conclusion of international agreements, that jurisdiction extends only to agreements in which the Union (as opposed to just the Member States) seeks to participate.24 For the purposes of requesting an opinion, it is, however, sufficient that a single institution envisages the conclusion of an international agreement, even where other institutions have not yet made clear an intention to conclude the agreement concerned, for example, because of disagreement on the extent of the respective competences of the Union and the Member States in relation to the agreement envisaged.25 The settlement of such disputes relates exactly to the aims of the procedure set forth in Art. 218(11) TFEU.26 By the same token, the Court of Justice is entitled to give opinions on the compatibility with the Treaties of mixed agreements to which both the Union and some or all Member States are parties.27 That being said, in case of a mixed agreement, the expression ‘envisaged agreement’ within the meaning of Art. 218(11) TFEU only covers the part of the agreement that falls within the competences of the European Union.28

II. Identity of the Parties A. Applicants 12.09

Under Art. 218(11) TFEU, only a Member State, the European Parliament, the Council, or the Commission may request the Court of Justice to deliver an opinion. Accordingly, this does not include all the Union institutions as listed in Art. 13(1) TEU. Further to this, the right to request an opinion is an individual right specifically attributed to the particular institution or Member State, and which can be exercised without coordinated action between the institutions.29 decision approving the international agreement concerned on behalf of the Community, resulting in the annulment of a certain provision of that decision: see C-122/95, Germany v Council, 1998. 24 See C‑399/12, Commission v Germany, 2014, para. 54. But see Opinion 2/91, Convention No. 170 of the International Labour Organization concerning safety in the use of chemicals at work, 1993, paras 4–6 regarding the situation in which the Member States act jointly to exercise the Union’s (then Community’s) external competence because it cannot become a party to the envisaged international agreement. See further A. Rosas, ‘Recent Case Law of the European Court of Justice Relating to Article 218 TFEU’ in J. Czuczai and F. Naert (eds), The EU as a Global Actor—Bridging Legal Theory and Practice (Brill, 2017) 365, 370–371; J. Heliskoski, ‘The Procedural Law of International Agreements: A Thematic Journey through Article 218 TFEU’ (2020) C.M.L.Rev. 79, 84–90. 25 See Opinion 1/13, Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction, 2014, para. 46. 26 See Opinion 1/13, Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction, 2014, para. 47. See further para. 12.01. 27 See Opinion 1/76, Draft Agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels, 1977; Opinion 1/09, Draft Agreement creating a Unified Patent Litigation System (European and Community Patents Court), 2011. 28 See Opinion 1/19, Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention), 2021, para. 294. 29 See Opinion 1/19, Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention), 2021, para. 204.

Special Characteristics 527

B. No obligation It is optional whether a request for an opinion is made. The Union can validly conclude an international agreement without seeking the opinion of the Court.

12.10

III. Special Characteristics A. Extent of the jurisdiction to give opinions (1) Scope of review The Court of Justice has interpreted its jurisdiction to review ‘whether an agreement envisaged is compatible with the Treaties’ within the meaning of Art. 218(11) TFEU in the sense that its judgment may depend not only on provisions of substantive law, but also on those concerning the powers, procedure, or organization of the institutions of the Union.30 This approach is also expressed in Art. 196(2) of the CJ Rules of Procedure.31 In particular, the Court’s opinion may be obtained on questions concerning the division of competence between the Union and the Member States to conclude a given agreement with non-member countries.32 This includes questions concerning the choice of the proper legal basis for the envisaged agreement.33 Further to this, the Court may also review an envisaged agreement in light of the guarantees laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.34

30 See Opinion 1/75, Draft Understanding on a Local Cost Standard drawn up under the auspices of the OECD, 1975; Opinion 1/19, Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention), 2021, para. 197. 31 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 196(2) provides as follows: ‘A request for an opinion may relate both to whether the envisaged agreement is compatible with the provisions of the Treaties and to whether the European Union or any institution of the European Union has the power to enter into that agreement.’ See Opinion 2/15, Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore, 2017, para. 28. 32 See Opinion 2/00, Cartagena Protocol, 2001, para. 3; Opinion 1/03, New Lugano Convention, 2006, para. 112; Opinion 1/08, Competence of the European Community to conclude agreements modifying the Schedules of Specific Commitments of the Community and its Member States under the General Agreement on Trade in Services, 2009, para. 109. 33 See Opinion 2/00, Cartagena Protocol, 2001, paras 1, 5–6, 9. For other examples, see Opinion 1/94, Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, 1994; Opinion 2/92, Competence of the Community or one of its institutions to participate in the Third Revised Decision of the OECD on national treatment, 1995; Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Communities to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1996; Opinion 1/08, Competence of the European Community to conclude agreements modifying the Schedules of Specific Commitments of the Community and its Member States under the General Agreement on Trade in Services, 2009. As acknowledged by the Court in the latter Opinion (paras 111–113), the question concerning the character, exclusive or not, of Union competence to conclude the agreements in issue and the question of what is the proper legal basis for that purpose are closely linked and it was thus found appropriate to consider the two together. See further Opinion 1/15, Draft agreement between Canada and the European Union on the transfer and processing of Passenger Name Record data, 2017, paras 71–72; Opinion 1/19, Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention), 2021, paras 199–200. 34 See Opinion 1/15, Draft agreement between Canada and the European Union on the transfer and processing of Passenger Name Record data, 2017, para. 70.

12.11

528 Opinion Procedure 12.12

12.13

(2) Review limited to the compatibility of the agreement with the Treaties The Court’s review is limited, however, to the envisaged agreement’s compatibility with the Treaties. The requirements imposed upon the Union by international law are not covered.35 Thus, in Opinion 2/91, the Court did not inquire into the provisions establishing the International Labour Organization to see whether the then Community was entitled to join that organization.36 The procedure under Art. 218(11) TFEU is also not intended to solve difficulties associated with the implementation of an envisaged agreement which falls within shared Union and Member State competence.37 In addition, the review as to compatibility covers only the legal aspects of the envisaged agreement. Judicial review does not extend to political expediency. As a result of the broad compass of the Court’s review, conflicting powers often form the basis of requests for opinions. (3) Review may be limited to parts of the agreement As illustrated by the case-l aw, the Court may examine the whole agreement, or, as the case may be, only part of it. 38 In Opinion 1/91, the Court, at the Commission’s request, considered only the provisions of the envisaged EEA Agreement which related to the system of judicial supervision provided for therein.39 In Opinion 1/92, the Court confined its review to those provisions of the EEA Agreement which had been amended following Opinion 1/91 finding the Agreement incompatible with the former EC Treaty, despite the request made by the European Parliament in its observations submitted to the Court that it should consider the influence of the EEA Agreement on the role and powers of the Parliament. 40 In Opinion 1/00, the Court assessed the compatibility with the former EC Treaty of the system of judicial supervision established by an agreement on a European Common Aviation Area. In determining the scope of the assessment requested, the Court considered all the language versions in which the request had been made.41 In Opinion 1/17, the request for an opinion of the Court was limited by the requesting Member State to Section F of Chapter Eight of the agreement, which related to the compatibility of the dispute settlement mechanism with the Treaties.42

35 See Opinion 1/19, Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention), 2021, para. 272. 36 See Opinion 2/91, Convention No. 170 of the International Labour Organization concerning safety in the use of chemicals at work, 1993, para. 4. 37 See Opinion 2/00, Cartagena Protocol, 2001, para. 17. 38 See para. 12.08 regarding mixed agreements. 39 See Opinion 1/91, Draft Agreement between the Community, on the one hand, and the countries of the European Free Trade Association, on the other, relating to the creation of the European Economic Area, 1991, para. 1. 40 See Opinion 1/92, Draft Agreement between the Community, on the one hand, and the countries of the European Free Trade Association, on the other, relating to the creation of the European Economic Area, 1992, para. 1. 41 See Opinion 1/00, Proposed Agreement between the European Community and non-Member States on the establishment of a European Common Aviation Area, 2002, para. 1. 42 See Opinion 1/17, CETA, 2019, para. 105.

Special Characteristics 529

B. The request for an opinion (1) Ex ante nature Art. 218(11) TFEU sets no time-limit. Nevertheless, the ex ante nature of the procedure and the extent of the Court’s jurisdiction to give opinions place restrictions on the time within which a request may be made to the Court. (2) Subject-matter of the envisaged agreement must be known A request for an opinion may be made to the Court only as from the time when the subject-matter of the envisaged agreement is known.43 It is hard to conceive that the Court would be requested to give an opinion at a time when the subject-matter of the envisaged agreement was still uncertain. However, as soon as the subject-matter is known, the Court’s opinion may be sought, even before the negotiations have started.44 From that time, the Court is in a position to adjudge whether the Union is competent to conclude the agreement in question.45 Indeed, in the event of any conflicts of jurisdiction, it is of essential importance for the Union, the Member States, and third countries or international organizations concerned to be certain about the precise powers of the parties at the beginning of the negotiations. As a result, it is not a prerequisite condition of being able to submit a request for an opinion pursuant to Art. 218(11) TFEU that the institutions concerned have reached final agreement; the right afforded to the Council, the Parliament, the Commission, and the Member States to request such an opinion can be exercised individually, without any coordinated action and without waiting for the final outcome of any related legislative procedure. The fact that the adoption of the agreement concerned cannot occur until after consulting or obtaining the approval of an institution and that the adoption of related legislative measures will be subject to a legislative procedure involving that institution has no effect on another institution’s power to request an opinion from the Court.46 That being said, the Court will not be in a position to give its opinion on the compatibility of an envisaged agreement so long as it does not have sufficient information about the content and institutional machinery of the agreement.47 Consequently, a request 43 See Opinion 1/78, International Agreement on Natural Rubber, 1979, paras 32–34; Opinion 1/20, Draft modernized Energy Charter Treaty, 2022, para. 37. 44 See Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Communities to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1996, paras 11–17; Opinion 1/09, Draft Agreement creating a Unified Patent Litigation System (European and Community Patents Court), 2011, paras 53–54 (underscoring that the fact that draft agreement or related legislative measures linked to it do not currently enjoy unanimous support in the Council cannot by itself affect the admissibility of a request for an opinion under Art. 218(11) TFEU). 45 See Opinion 1/20, Draft modernized Energy Charter Treaty, 2022, paras 37–38. 46 See Opinion 1/09, Draft Agreement creating a Unified Patent Litigation System (European and Community Patents Court), 2011, paras 55–56 (rejecting the Parliament’s arguments concerning the admissibility of the request for an opinion submitted by the Council on the grounds that the principle of institutional balance had been compromised); Opinion 1/19, Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention), 2021, para. 205. 47 See Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Communities to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1996, paras 20–22; Opinion 2/13, Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 2014, paras 147–148 (draft accession instruments on which the negotiators have reached agreement in principle are sufficiently comprehensive and precise for assessing compatibility with the Treaties); Opinion 1/20, Draft modernized Energy Charter

12.14

12.15

530 Opinion Procedure for an opinion raising the question of the compatibility of an envisaged agreement with the Treaties will be admissible only insofar as the Court can have access to such information.48

12.16

(3) No suspensory effect of the request A request for an opinion under Art. 218(11) TFEU does not suspend the procedure for adopting the international agreement in question. This is illustrated, for example, by the saga concerning the proposed agreement between what was then the European Community and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of Passenger Name Record data, in which the European Parliament lodged a request for an opinion concerning this envisaged agreement, but before the Court delivered its opinion the Council adopted a decision on the conclusion of the agreement, with the result that the Parliament withdrew its request and subsequently brought a successful action for annulment against this decision and a related measure.49

C. Procedure before the Court 12.17

(1) Non-contentious nature of the procedure Since a request for an opinion pursuant to Art. 218(11) TFEU does not introduce normal contentious proceedings, the decision is reached in the Court of Justice in accordance with a special procedure. It is further elaborated in Arts 196–200 of the CJ Rules of Procedure. The request for an opinion has to be lodged with the Registry. It is served on the Member States, the European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission.50 The President of the Court of Justice prescribes a period within which the Member States and the institutions which have been served with the request may submit written observations.51 On account of the special or non-contentious nature of the procedure, it is not possible to apply the expedited procedure (applicable to direct actions before the Union Courts) in the case of a request for an opinion made pursuant to Art. 218(11) TFEU.52 Treaty, 2022, paras 39–48 (inadmissibility of request for an opinion since the Court did not have sufficient information on the actual content of the envisaged agreement). This requirement does not relate, however, to the internal rules required to make the international agreement operational within the Union legal order: see Opinion 2/13, Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 2014, paras 149–151. 48 For examples, see Opinion 1/03, New Lugano Convention, 2006, para. 111; Opinion 1/09, Draft Agreement creating a Unified Patent Litigation System (European and Community Patents Court), 2011, paras 49–52. In Opinion 1/08, the Court of Justice delivered an opinion on the compatibility of seventeen agreements, even though only one of those agreements had been produced to the Court on the grounds that they were confirmed by the requesting institution (the Commission) as well as the Council to be substantially the same: see Opinion 1/08, Competence of the European Community to conclude agreements modifying the Schedules of Specific Commitments of the Community and its Member States under the General Agreement on Trade in Services, 2009, paras 21, 29. 49 See C-317/04 and C-318/04, Parliament v Council, 2006. 50 Art. 196(3) CJ Rules of Procedure. 51 Art. 196(3) CJ Rules of Procedure. 52 See Opinion 1/04, Proposed Agreement between the European Community and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of Passenger Name Record data (order of the President), 2004. For the expedited

Consequences 531 (2) Opinion The Court delivers its opinion in open court as soon as possible after hearing the appointed Advocate General.53 The Court may decide that the procedure before it shall also include a hearing.54 The opinion is signed by the President, by the Judges who took part in the deliberations,55 and by the Registrar, following which it is served on the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, and the Member States.56

12.18

IV. Consequences A. Adverse opinion Under Art. 218(11) TFEU, an agreement on which the Court of Justice has given an adverse opinion may not enter into force unless it is amended or the Treaties are revised. This means that the Treaties may be revised in accordance with the applicable procedure (see Art. 48 TEU)57 or that the envisaged agreement may be amended by the Union institutions in consultation with the third countries and international organizations concerned in order to meet the objections raised by the Court.58 Accordingly, this provision implicitly confirms the binding effects of the Court’s opinion under Art. 218(11) TFEU. For the purposes of Art. 218(11) TFEU, an adverse opinion is an opinion declaring either that the envisaged agreement is incompatible with Union law or that the envisaged agreement is compatible with Union law subject to conditions.59

procedure, see paras 23.42. Likewise, Art. 151 of the CJ Rules of Procedure cannot be relied upon for raising a preliminary objection to the admissibility of a request for an opinion under Art. 218(11) TFEU: see Opinion 2/92, Competence of the Community or one of its institutions to participate in the Third Revised Decision of the OECD on national treatment, 1995, para. 11. 53 CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 197, 199, and 200. Under the former CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 108(2), all the Advocates General were heard. 54 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 198. See Opinion 1/08, Competence of the European Community to conclude agreements modifying the Schedules of Specific Commitments of the Community and its Member States under the General Agreement on Trade in Services, 2009. 55 Note that the Court does not automatically sit as a full court in the opinion procedure. It will only do so where it considers that the request relates to a matter which is of exceptional importance: Statute, Art. 16 juncto CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 60. Where this is not the case, the request will be assigned to the Grand Chamber. See Opinion 1/15, Draft agreement between Canada and the European Union on the transfer and processing of Passenger Name Record data, 2016; Opinion 3/15, Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons who are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled, 2017; Opinion 1/19, Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention), 2021. 56 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 200. 57 For further discussion of the ordinary and special revision procedures laid down in Art. 48 TEU, see K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel (T. Corthaut (ed.)), EU Constitutional Law (OUP, 2021) paras 3.002–3.008. 58 See the EEA Agreement: the proposed system of judicial supervision was amended following Opinion 1/91: see Opinions 1/91 and 1/92 (see para. 12.13); the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court: the proposed court system was altered following Opinion 1/09 (see para. 3.11); the ECHR Accession Agreement: accession negotiations were reopened in order to take Opinion 2/13 into account. 59 See Opinion 1/15, Draft agreement between Canada and the European Union on the transfer and processing of Passenger Name Record data, 2017, para. 232.

12.19

532 Opinion Procedure

B. Favourable opinion 12.20

A favourable opinion leaves the way free for the Union to enter into the agreement, but does not compel it to do so. However, the opinion does not prevent the legality of the act by which the Union concludes the agreement from being raised in other judicial proceedings, especially where the Court’s review was limited to only certain provisions of the agreement (see para. 12.13).

C. Declaratory opinion 12.21

Where the request relates to the division of competences between the Union and the Member States, in particular to the nature of the Union’s external competence, the Court will not give a decision on the compatibility of the envisaged agreement with the Treaties, but will only state the nature of the Union’s competence.60 It is difficult to characterize such an opinion as either positive or negative within the meaning of Art. 218(11) TFEU.

60 See Opinion 2/15, Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore, 2017, para. 30.

PART IV

SPEC IA L F OR MS OF PRO C E DU R E

13 PROCEEDINGS FOR INTERIM MEASURES BEFORE THE UNION COURTS I. Subject-Matter A. Objective As provided for in Arts 278 and 279 TFEU,1 proceedings for interim measures before the Union Courts essentially constitute provisional legal protection granted in favour of a party before the main action is decided.2 Art. 278 TFEU lays down the principle that actions brought before the Court of Justice and the General Court do not have suspensory effect.3 As a result of the time which elapses between the bringing of proceedings and judgment, this principle may detract from the effectiveness of legal protection. Consequently, the purpose of interim proceedings is to guarantee the full effectiveness of the future final decision of the Union Courts, in order to avoid a gap in the system of judicial protection.4 In other words, the provision of interim relief in proceedings before the Union Courts pursuant to Arts 278 and 279 TFEU enables a claimant to safeguard its rights under Union law because the passage of time would undo the benefits of the judgment to be given on the merits. The principle just mentioned, that actions brought before the Union Courts do not have suspensory effect, can be explained by the fact that acts adopted by Union institutions, along with Union bodies, offices, and agencies, are presumed to be lawful. Therefore, under the case-law, it is only exceptionally that the interim relief Judge may order suspension of the operation of such acts or other interim measures pursuant to Arts 278 and 279 TFEU.5

1 In respect of the EAEC Treaty, a comparable provision to Art. 278 TFEU is laid down in Art. 157 EAEC and Art. 279 TFEU is also applicable. 2 Where, pursuant to Art. 54, third para. of the Statute, the General Court declines jurisdiction so that the Court of Justice can rule on the case, this has implications for the Court’s jurisdiction over the application for interim measures: see C-182/18 R, Comune di Milano v Council (order), 2018, paras 6–7; see also C-238/18 R, ECB v Latvia (order), 2018, paras 28–30 (the Court of Justice’s jurisdiction to order interim measures is not precluded by Art. 276 TFEU). 3 Art. 278 TFEU, first sent. 4 See C-441/17 R, Commission v Poland (order), 2017, para. 43; C-541/20 R, Lithuania v Parliament and Council (order), 2021, para. 18; T-20/17 R, Hungary v Commission (order), 2017, para. 13; T-285/21 R, Alliance française de Bruxelles-Europe v Commission (order), 2021, para. 21. 5 See C-114/20 P(R), Anglo Austrian AAB and Belegging-Maatschappij ‘Far-East’ v ECB (order), 2020, para. 53; T-125/22 R, RT France v Council (order), 2022, para. 19.

EU Procedural Law. Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak, Oxford University Press. © Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833086.003.0013

13.01

536 PROCEEDINGS FOR INTERIM MEASURES BEFORE THE UNION COURTS

B. Types of interim measures 13.02

13.03

(1) Suspension of the operation of the contested act According to Art. 278 TFEU, the Union Courts may, if they consider that circumstances so require, order that application of the contested act be suspended.6 Only the operation of ‘enforceable’ measures may be suspended.7 On that basis, according to settled case-law, an application for suspension of operation cannot be envisaged against a negative decision save in exceptional circumstances, since the grant of suspension could not have the effect of changing the applicant’s legal position.8 Moreover, the Treaties do not provide for any means of recourse allowing private parties to demand the suspension of the execution of measures adopted by national authorities, including decisions of national courts and tribunals, before the Union Courts, and thus applications to this effect are inadmissible.9 That being said, this does not prevent interim measures being directed at national authorities (see para. 13.19), nor the suspension of national measures in the context of infringement proceedings brought by the Commission or a Member State (see para. 13.08). (2) Other interim measures In some cases, suspension of the operation of the contested act does not suffice in order to prevent irreparable damage from occurring. Consequently, under Art. 279 TFEU, the Union Courts may, in any cases before them, prescribe ‘any necessary interim measures’. By virtue of this broad wording, interim measures may even be directed at third parties not party to the proceedings (see para. 13.19). Nevertheless, such interim measures must be compatible with Union law, including the specific nature of interim proceedings and the system of remedies set out in the Treaties.10 The range of possible 6 The chapter devoted to interim proceedings in the Rules of Procedure of the Union Courts applies to applications to suspend the enforcement of a decision of the respective Court or of any measure adopted by the Council, the Commission, or the European Central Bank pursuant to Arts 280 and 299 TFEU or Art. 164 EAEC (see CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 165; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 161), as well as applications regarding compulsory inspections pursuant to Art. 81 EAEC before the Court of Justice (see CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 166). Moreover, in the context of third-party proceedings, the Union Courts may, on application of the third party, order a stay of execution of the contested judgment and in that case, the respective chapter on interim relief is to apply (see CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 157(4); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 167(3)). 7 See T-19/91 R, Vichy v Commission (order), 1991, para. 20; T-395/94 R II, Atlantic Container Line and Others v Commission (order), 1995, para. 20; see also T-15/10 R II, Ngele v Commission (order), 2010, para. 8 (request that the interim relief Judge ‘declare illegal and irregular’ an act of the Commission held inadmissible as beyond the scope of Art. 278 TFEU). 8 See C‑570/11 P(R), Gollnisch v Parliament (order), 2012, para. 13; C-386/15 P(R), Alcogroup and Alcodis v Commission (order), 2015, para. 38; T-607/11 R, Henkel and Henkel France v Commission (order), 2012, para. 21; T-627/19 R, Shindler and Others v Commission (order), 2020, para. 21; but see, in that regard, C-208/03 P-R, Le Pen v Parliament (order), 2003, paras 78–88; C-404/04 P-R, Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau v Commission (order), 2005, paras 13–14; C-431/14 P-R, Greece v Commission (order), 2014, para. 17; T-198/12 R, Germany v Commission (order), 2013, paras 28–29. 9 See T-150/06, Smanor and Others v Commission (order), 2006, paras 17–18. As the Treaties do not provide means by which natural and legal persons can lodge an action against a Member State in the Union Courts, interim measures brought pursuant to such an action will fail because the main action is inadmissible: see, e.g. T-469/21 R, Natale v Italy (order), 2021. The Union Courts have also made clear that interim measures ordered by them are not dependent on decisions taken by national judges or national measures producing similar effect: see T-490/10 R, Endesa and Endesa Generacion v Commission (order), 2011, paras 21–24, 30–31; T-645/16 R, Vorarlberger Landes- und Hypothekenbank v SRB (order), 2017, para. 41. 10 See, in that regard, T-228/95 R, S. Lehrfreund v Council (order), 1996, paras 60–61 (holding request for a declaration as to the interpretation of the contested measure inadmissible); T-654/19 R, FF v Commission (order),

Subject-Matter 537 interim measures is not predetermined.11 However, the interim relief Judge may not exercise a power that is vested in another Union institution, as this would jeopardize the division of powers among the Union institutions.12 Nor can such measures prejudice the decision to be given in the main proceedings.13 (3) Interim relief is tailored to the case The interim relief imposed by the Union Courts is tailored to the case. Consequently, suspension of operation may be ordered of only part of the contested act or other such relief granted may be made subject to specific conditions.14 Sometimes, security may be required to be lodged.15 The interim relief Judge may also remind a party to comply with existing provisions where this may provisionally ensure appropriate protection of the applicant’s rights.16

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C. The ancillary nature of proceedings for interim measures (1) Ancillary to the main proceedings The ancillary nature of proceedings for interim measures clearly emerges from Art. 278 TFEU, which merely permits application of the contested act to be suspended, and from Art. 279 TFEU, which provides for interim measures only in cases before the Court of Justice and the General Court.17 Accordingly, the Rules of Procedure of the Union Courts provide that an application to suspend the operation of a Union act shall be admissible only if the applicant is challenging that act in main proceedings,18 and that an application for any other interim measures must be made by a party to a pending case 2019, para. 23 (holding request for the adoption of measures which form part of the measures of organization of procedure or measures of inquiry inadmissible). 11 This may even include the issuance on a provisional basis of appropriate injunctions to a Union institution, body, office, or agency (see T-31/07 R Du Pont de Nemours (France) and Others v Commission (order), 2007, para. 126; T-193/12 R, Germany v Commission (order), 2013), or to a Member State (see C-441/17 R, Commission v Poland (order), 2017, para. 96). Compare the approach taken in the case-law in connection with direct actions, namely, the action for annulment: see para. 7.216. 12 See 50/69 R, Germany v Commission (order), 1969 ECR 449, 451; 109/75 R, National Carbonising v Commission (order), 1975, para. 8; T-213/97 R, Eurocoton and Others v Council (order), 1997, para. 40; T-312/08 R, Ellinikos Niognomon v Commission (order), 2008, paras 28–29; T-347/11 R, Gollnisch v Parliament (order), 2011, para. 19; T-280/19 R, Highgate Capital Management v Commission (order), 2019, para. 85; T-627/19 R, Shindler v Commission (order), 2020, para. 24. 13 See T-654/19 R, FF v Commission (order), 2019, paras 25–26. 14 See 71/74 R and RR, Fruiten Groentenimporthandel and Frubo v Commission (order), 1974, para. 8; 43/82 R and 63/82 R, VBVB and VBBB v Commission (order), 1982, paras 9–11; T-393/10 R, Westfälische Drahtindustrie and Others v Commission (order), 2011, para. 69; T-452/20 R, Facebook Ireland v Commission (order), 2020, para. 121; see also C-441/17 R, Commission v Poland (order), 2017, paras 81–84 (permitting certain derogations from the interim measures granted under specific conditions). 15 See CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 162(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 158(2). See, in that regard, C-21/14 P (R), Commission v Rusal Armenal (order), 2014, para. 17; see also C-441/17 R, Commission v Poland (order), 2017, paras 86–87 (no grounds for lodging security in respect of the EU). 16 See T-203/95 R, Connolly v Commission (order), 1995, para. 25; T-95/09 R, United Phosphorus v Commission (order), 2009, paras 91–92. 17 See also CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 160(1)–(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 156(1)–(2). 18 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 160(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 156(1). For an example of an application which failed that requirement, see T-326/19 R, Gerber v Parliament and Council (order), 2020, paras 40–45. This also applies in the case where certain provisions of the contested act are being challenged: see T-78/04 R, Sumitomo Chemical v Commission (order), 2004, paras 43–48. These requirements are not necessarily interpreted in a strictly

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538 PROCEEDINGS FOR INTERIM MEASURES BEFORE THE UNION COURTS and must relate to that case.19 Where an applicant seeks, pursuant to Art. 279 TFEU, an interim measure that essentially seeks the same result as an application for suspension of operation under Art. 278 TFEU, the application will be declared admissible only if the applicant is challenging the same act in the main proceedings.20 Moreover, in the light of the ancillary nature of interim measures, where the main action falls, so does the application for interim relief. 21 In principle, an application for interim measures may be made after any direct action has been brought. However, the interim relief sought may not make the claim in the main proceedings nugatory.22

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(2) Judge may not assume the role of the defendant Union institution, body, office, or agency If the application aims at the adoption of a measure that would be contrary to Union law, the application will be dismissed.23 Consequently, an application for a measure amounting to the Judge’s assuming the role of the defendant Union institution, body, office, or agency, and not merely reviewing its activity, may not be granted unless the application contains evidence from which the Judge hearing the interim application can find that there are exceptional circumstances justifying the adoption of the measure requested.24 (3) Interim relief possible in relation to all direct actions In principle, interim relief is possible in relation to all types of direct actions that may be brought before the Union Courts.25 In the case-law to date, one of the

formalistic manner. For instance, the applicant may seek suspension of the operation of an act which is the consequence of the act challenged in those proceedings, but the subject-matter of the main action and that of the application for interim relief must still be linked: see 18/65 R, Gutmann v Commission (order), 1966; C-277/07 P(R), Makhteshim-Agan Holding and Others v Commission (order), 2008, paras 28–31; T-410/07 R, Jurado Hermanos v OHIM (order), 2008, paras 37–39; T-396/09 R, Vereniging Milieudefensie and Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht v Commission (order), 2009, paras 39–41; T-423/17 R, Nexans France and Nexans v Commission v Commission (order), 2017, paras 72–78; compare T-762/18 R, Athanasiadou et Soulantikas v Commission (order), 2019, paras 30–36 (finding admissible application based on Art. 299 TFEU for the suspension of the enforcement of a decision so as to enable a national court to exercise its powers under that provision, even though no action for annulment of the contested decision had been brought). 19 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 160(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 156(2) (specifying ‘a main party’ to a case before the General Court: see further para. 13.15). See, e.g. T-24/20 R, Junqueras i Vies v Parliament (order), 2020, para. 24. For an example of application held not to be related to the main action, see T-241/15 R, Buga v Parliament (order), 2015, paras 18–19. It follows that the applicant cannot, as a general rule, seek a form of order in the interlocutory proceedings that is broader than that sought in the main action: see, e.g. T-627/19 R, Shindler v Commission (order), 2020, para. 25. 20 See C-380/04 P(R), Bactria v Commission (order), 2004, paras 13–18. 21 See, e.g. T-679/21 R, ANIEF v Parliament and Council (order), 2021, paras 3–4; T-768/21 R, Castellanos Triviño and Others v Commission (order), 2021, paras 3–4; see further para. 13.23. 22 See 231/86 R, Breda-Geomineraria v Commission (order), 1986, para. 18; T-607/11 R, Henkel and Henkel France v Commission (order), 2012, paras 23–25; T-654/19 R, FF v Commission (order), 2019, para. 25. 23 See T-107/96 R, Pantochim v Commission (order), 1996, paras 37–42; T-12/07 R, Polimeri Europa v Commission (order), 2007, paras 50–55. 24 See T-52/96 R, Sogecable v Commission (order), 1996, paras 38–41; T-216/01 R, Reisebank v Commission (order), 2001, para. 52; T-219/01 R, Commerzbank v Commission (order), 2001, para. 42; T-280/19 R, Highgate Capital Management v Commission (order), 2019, para. 83. 25 This includes all of the actions discussed hereafter, as well as others, such as an action based on an arbitration clause within the meaning of Art. 272 TFEU: see, e.g. C-78/14 P(R), Commission v ANKO (order), 2014; T-47/16 R, Sigma Orionis v REA (order), 2017; T-48/16 R, Sigma Orionis v Commission (order), 2017.

Subject-Matter 539 most common contexts in which interim relief is sought is in connection with the action for annulment under Art. 263 TFEU. However, in practice, there are particular aspects related to the provision of interim relief in relation to certain other types of direct actions. As regards the preliminary ruling procedure (which does not constitute a direct action), the Court of Justice takes the view that it is not empowered to order interim measures, but it has provided indications as to the interim relief which the national courts are under a duty to provide following the bringing of proceedings relating to the application of Union law (see paras 4.74–4.76). (4) Interim relief in the context of an action for infringement The Court of Justice may order the adoption of interim measures under Arts 278 and 13.08 279 TFEU in the context of an action for infringement under Arts 258–260 TFEU.26 The interim relief often sought is—full or partial, conditional or unconditional— suspension of the operation of a contested national measure.27 The fact that the judgment finding the failure to fulfil obligations is declaratory in nature does not preclude the imposition of interim measures. The Court’s interlocutory order does not derive its binding force from the Court’s power to give judgment in the main proceedings. Therefore, if a contested national measure threatens to cause serious and irreparable damage to one of the parties, the interim relief Judge must be able to order the necessary measures to secure the full effectiveness of the action in the main proceedings.28 (5) Interim relief in the context of an action for failure to act As already alluded to, while in principle the grant of interim relief in the context of an action for failure to act under Art. 265 TFEU is possible,29 in practice it is more exceptional. This is because there would seem to be little chance of successfully applying for suspension of operation in connection with an action for failure to act under Art. 265 TFEU, since the very object of that action is to produce the adoption of an act. An application for other interim measures would normally

26 See, e.g. C-791/19 R, Commission v Poland (order), 2020; C-121/21 R, Czech Republic v Poland (order of 21 May), 2021; C-204/21 R, Commission v Poland (order of 14 July), 2021. Other more informal arrangements may also be made in this regard: see C-76/08 R, Commission v Malta (order), 2008, para. 7. Depending on the assurances given by the Member State concerned, such arrangements may even cause the Commission to withdraw its application: see C-193/07 R, Commission v Poland (order), 2007; C-193/07 R-II, Commission v Poland (order), 2008. As regards the possible imposition of a financial penalty for non-compliance with the Court of Justice’s order of interim measures, see para. 13.40. 27 See, e.g. C-441/17 R, Commission v Poland (order), 2017 (order for interim measures granted, subject to strictly confined exceptions). In the context of the case-law generally related to the rule of law in the Union legal order, the Court of Justice has affirmed its jurisdiction in respect of interim measures suspending national measures concerning the organization of justice which have been alleged to infringe, in particular, the second subparagraph of Art. 19(1) TEU: see, in that regard, C-791/19 R, Commission v Poland (order), 2020, paras 29–49; C-204/21 R, Commission v Poland (order of 14 July), 2021, paras 50–55, 65–75. 28 See, e.g. C-76/08 R, Commission v Malta (order), 2008, paras 16–20; C-441/17 R, Commission v Poland (order), 2017, paras 43–44; C-121/21 R, Czech Republic v Poland (order of 21 May), 2021, paras 27–30. 29 See C-319/97, Kortas, 1999, para. 37.

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540 PROCEEDINGS FOR INTERIM MEASURES BEFORE THE UNION COURTS make the action in the main proceedings devoid of purpose and would therefore be inadmissible.30

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(6) Interim relief in the context of an action for damages In the context of an action for damages against the Union and the European Central Bank on the basis of Art. 268 TFEU and the second and third paragraphs of Art. 340 TFEU, an application for suspension of the operation of the act that allegedly caused the damage generally falls foul of the admissibility requirements related to, inter alia,31 the concordance between the interim relief sought and the main action. This is because, as far as Art. 278 TFEU is concerned, by virtue of the fact that the main action is an action for damages, and not an action for annulment, it does not satisfy the requirement that, in order to be admissible, the applicant has challenged that act in proceedings before the General Court pursuant to Art. 156(1) GC Rules of Procedure and, as far as Art. 279 TFEU is concerned, there must be a sufficient link between the contested measure and damage invoked by the applicant in its main action (see para. 13.05).32 In any event, under the case-law, it is not possible to rule out in advance, in a general and abstract manner, that payment by way of advance, even of an amount corresponding to that sought in the main application, may be necessary in order to ensure the practical effect of the judgment in the main action and may, in certain cases, appear justified with regard to the interests involved, and, while exceptional, must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of each case.33 (7) Interim relief in the context of appeals A party who has brought an appeal may apply for interim measures in the form of suspension of the operation of the decision of the General Court or other interim relief. The application is made to the Court of Justice under Art. 60 of the Statute.34 When the General Court has dismissed an application to annul an act of a Union institution, body, office, or agency, an order to suspend the judgment of the General Court would be to no avail to the applicant.35 In order to grant effective judicial protection to such an applicant, the 30 Certainly, an application may be dismissed on other grounds, for example, on grounds of its inadmissibility since the action for failure to act in the main proceedings is inadmissible (see T-627/19 R, Shindler v Commission (order), 2020, para. 20: the main action bound to be dismissed by reason of the Commission's definition of its position) or where the damage which the application for interim measures seeks to prevent has already occurred (see T-654/19 R, FF v Commission (order), 2019, para. 24). 31 An application submitted in this context may be regarded as inadmissible for other reasons, for example, by virtue of the fact that it is directed against entities other than Union institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies: see T-375/07 R, Pellegrini v Commission (order), 2008, para. 19; T-15/10 R, Ngele v Commission (order), 2010, paras 10–12. 32 See T-15/10 R II, Ngele v Commission (order), 2010, paras 9–13; T-195/11 R, Cahier v Council and Commission (order), 2011, para. 13. 33 See C-393/96 P(R), Antonissen v Council and Commission, 1997, paras 37–41; T-187/11 R, Trabelsi v Commission (order), 2011, para. 50; T-47/16 R, Sigma Orionis v REA (order), 2017, para. 30; T-48/16 R, Sigma Orionis v Commission (order), 2017, para. 36. 34 See C-378/16 P-R, Inclusion Alliance for Europe v Commission (order), 2016, para. 15. Moreover, it is possible that where on appeal the Court of Justice sets aside the General Court’s decision and refers the case back to the General Court, a party may submit an application for interim measures before the General Court: see, e.g. T-62/06 RENV-R, Eurallumnia v Commission (order), 2011. 35 Nevertheless, in the case-law, there are examples in which the interim relief Judge still assesses whether the requisite conditions are fulfilled: see C-5/10 P-R, Torresan v OHIM (order), 2010; see also C-587/11 P-R and C-588/11 P(R), Omnicare v OHIM (order), 2012, para. 29.

Subject-Matter 541 interim relief Judge may, in the context of an appeal, suspend the application of the act that had been challenged before the General Court.36

D. The provisional nature of interim measures Interim measures are only provisional. There are two aspects to this: first, the interim measures are valid only for a limited period of time and, second, they may not prejudice the judgment in the main proceedings. 37 (1) Interim measures apply for a limited period of time As regards the first aspect, the period of time for which the interim measures are to apply may be expressly specified in the order.38 Otherwise, the order will expire when judgment is given in the main proceedings.39 At the request of one of the parties40 or by order given by the Court of its own motion,41 interim measures may at any time be varied, extended,42 or cancelled on account of a change in circumstances.43 (2) Interim measures may not prejudge the decision to be given in the main proceedings As regards the second aspect, the order giving interim relief may not prejudge the decision to be given in the main proceedings.44 In that regard, the interim relief Judge may not decide disputed points of law or fact, or neutralize in advance the consequences of

36 See C-404/04 P(R), Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau v Commission, 2005, paras 13–14; C-431/14 P(R), Greece v Commission (order), 2014, paras 17–18. 37 Statute, Art. 39, fourth para.; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 162(4); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 158(4). See T-607/11 R, Henkel and Henkel France v Commission (order), 2012, para. 23; T-658/19 R, Vizzone v Commission (order), 2020, para. 18. 38 See 18/65 R, Gutmann v Commission (order), 1966; Case 23/86 R, United Kingdom v Parliament (order), 1986; T-95/09 R, United Phosphorus v Commission (order), 2009, para. 88; T-392/09 R, 1. garantovaná v Commission (order), 2011, para. 120; see also T-452/20 R, Facebook Ireland v Commission (order), 2020, para. 121 (specifying until special procedure agreed between parties put in place). 39 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 162(3); GC Rules of Procedure Art. 158(3). Consequently, the applicant’s request cannot extend beyond the date when judgment is given in the main action: see T-411/07 R, Aer Lingus Group v Commission (order), 2008, para. 45. 40 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 163; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 159. 41 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 160(7); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 157(2). These provisions, however, deal expressly only with applications for interim relief granted before observations of other party are submitted (ex parte orders). 42 See, e.g. 20/74 R II, Kali-Chemie v Commission (order), 1974; C-320/03 R, Commission v Austria (order of 2 October), 2003; C-320/03 R, Commission v Austria (order), 2004; T-44/98 R II, Emesa Sugar v Commission (order), 1999; T-95/09 R II, United Phosphorus v Commission (order of 15 January), 2010; T-95/09 R III, United Phosphorus v Commission (order of 25 November), 2010. As illustrated by the latter case, in the process of examining whether the interim relief granted may be extended, the interim relief Judge may find it necessary to revise his or her findings providing the basis for such extension (see T-95/09 R III, United Phosphorus v Commission (order of 25 November), 2010, para. 19). 43 See further para. 13.39. 44 See 60/81 and 190/81 R, (order), 1981, para. 4; C-441/17 R, Commission v Poland (order), 2017, para. 95; T-235/15 R, Pari Pharma v EMA (order), 2015, paras 65–66; T-729/15 R, MSD Animal Health Innovation and Intervet International v EMA (order), 2016, para. 75; T-646/20 R, NG and Others v Parliament and Council (order), 2020, para. 18.

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542 PROCEEDINGS FOR INTERIM MEASURES BEFORE THE UNION COURTS the decision to be taken subsequently on the substance.45 Indeed, by their nature, proceedings for interim relief do not lend themselves to an in-depth investigation of the facts and the parties’ pleas. 46

II. Identity of the Parties A. Applicants 13.15

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(1) General overview The ancillary nature of interim measures also determines the identity of the parties that may apply to the Union Courts for interim relief. An application for suspension of the operation of an act may be made only by the party that is challenging that act in proceedings before the respective Court.47 As regards other interim measures, the CJ Rules of Procedure provide that they may be sought by any party to the main proceedings (‘a party to a case before the Court’), whereas the GC Rules of Procedure specify that such measures must be made by ‘a main party to a case before the General Court’.48 (2) Interveners Consequently, as regards the General Court, that latter wording in the GC Rules of Procedure has been considered to exclude an intervener in the main proceedings from being entitled to apply for interim measures, whereas the Court of Justice has yet to directly address the issue in respect of the broader language used in the CJ Rules of Procedure.49 In the latter regard, it is arguably preferable not to grant interveners a right of their own to apply for interim measures, since if they were given such a right they might obtain the initiative in the litigation, something which Art. 40 of the Statute sought specifically to avoid by allowing them only to intervene in support of the submissions of one of the parties.50 However, interveners may join in proceedings for interim measures, provided that they show a sufficient interest.51 If they satisfy that

45 See C-76/08 R, Commission v Malta (order), 2008, para. 17; C-644/11 P(R), Qualitest FZE v Council (order), 2012, para. 77; T-235/15 R, Pari Pharma v EMA (order), 2015, para. 106; T-658/19 R, Vizzone v Commission (order), 2020, para. 18. 46 See C-76/08 R, Commission v Malta (order), 2008, para. 36; C-121/21 R, Czech Republic v Poland (order of 21 May), 2021, para. 59; T-235/15 R, Pari Pharma v Commission (order) 2015, para. 39; T-729/15 R, EMA v MSD Animal Health Innovation and Intervet International (order), 2016, para. 58. 47 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 160(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 156(1). 48 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 160(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 156(2). 49 See, in that regard, V. Terrien, ‘Interim Measures’ in V. Luszcz (ed.), European Court Procedure: A Practical Guide (Hart, 2020) 571, 576 (considering that, since no rule exists in the CJ Rules of Procedure similar to that in the GC Rules of Procedure, the right of an intervener may extend to requesting other interim measures referred to in Art. 279 TFEU before the Court of Justice). 50 On intervention generally, see paras 23.01–23.23. 51 See, e.g. C-565/17 P(R), BASF Grenzach v ECHA (order), 2018, paras 32–39 (rejected); T-732/16 R, Valencia Club de Fútbol v Commission (order), 2017 (rejected). For some examples where granted, see T-490/10 R, Endesa and Endesa Generacion v Commission (order), 2011, paras 32–42; T-520/10 R, Comunidad Autonoma de Galicia v Commission (order), 2011, paras 27–37.

Identity of the Parties 543 requirement, it appears even to be unnecessary for them to have already intervened in the main proceedings.52 In such a case, the view of the interim relief Judge as to whether leave should be granted to intervene in the proceedings for interim relief would not be binding on the Judges hearing the main application. (3) Interest In order to obtain interim measures, an applicant must establish an interest in obtaining the measures sought.53 An application for interim measures is dismissed where the relief sought could not have the effect of changing the applicant’s position and thus could not be of any practical use to the applicant.54 As compared to the interest that must be shown by natural and legal persons for the admissibility of an action for annulment (see para. 7.141), the interest requirement for the purposes of the admissibility of proceedings for interim relief appears to apply to all types of applicants, including, in particular, Member States and Union institutions.55

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B. Defendants (1) Opponent in the main proceedings The defendant in proceedings for interim measures is the opponent in the main proceedings of the party that lodged the application for interim relief. By virtue of the ancillary nature of proceedings for interim measures, the jurisdiction of the Judge hearing an application for interim measures may not in principle be exercised unless the acts at issue in the main action and interim proceedings emanate from the same Union institution, body, office, or agency, and it is a party to the proceedings.56 Consequently, if the relief sought by the applicant relates to an act of a Union institution, body, office, or agency which is not a named defendant in the interim proceedings, the application for such relief is generally inadmissible.57

52 See T-520/10 R, Comunidad Autónoma de Galicia v Commission (order), 2011, para. 26 (noting that the party already granted leave to intervene in the main action automatically becomes intervening party for the purposes of proceedings for interim measures). However, the opposite does not hold, in that a party granted leave to intervene in the proceedings for interim measures has to apply separately to intervene in the main action (see, e.g. T-411/07, Aer Lingus Group v Commission (order), 2011, para. 36). See further M. F. Orzan, ‘The Procedural Features of Interim Relief Before the Court of Justice of the European Union’ in F. M. Palombino, R. Virzo, and G. Zara (eds), Provisional Measures Issued by International Courts and Tribunals (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2021) 199, 206–207. 53 See T-280/19 R, Highgate Capital Management v Commission (order), 2019, para. 58; T-24/20 R, Junqueras i Vies v Parliament (order), 2020, para. 25. 54 See C-703/21 P(R), Girardi v EUIPO (order), 2022, paras 23–28 (compare paras 29–32); T-12/07 R, Polimeri Europa v Commission (order), 2007, paras 59–63; T-504/18 R, XG v Commission (order), 2018, paras 38–49; T-280/19 R, Highgate Capital Management v Commission (order), 2019, paras 62–76 (upheld in C-605/19 P(R), Highgate Capital Management v Commission (order), 2020, paras 50–65); T-24/20 R, Junqueras i Vies v Parliament (order), 2020, para. 25. 55 See, in that regard, T-431/04 R, Italy v Commission (order), 2007, paras 25–35; T-784/17 R II, Strabag Belgium v Parliament (order), 2018, in particular paras 18–19, 43. 56 See 133/87 R, Nashua Corporation v Commission (order), 1987, para. 7; C-277/07 P(R), Makteshim-Agan Holding and Others v Commission (order), 2008, para. 28. 57 See 133/87 R, Nashua Corporation v Commission (order), 1987, para. 8; C-277/07 P(R), Makteshim-Agan Holding and Others v Commission (order), 2008, paras 29–31.

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544 PROCEEDINGS FOR INTERIM MEASURES BEFORE THE UNION COURTS 13.19

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(2) Third parties That being said, the case-law does allow for the application of interim measures to third parties. There appears to be one exceptional case so far with respect to the Union institutions in which the Commission was obliged to comply with an interim measure addressed to it in the context of proceedings concerning the Union budget that were brought by the United Kingdom against the European Parliament.58 Moreover, interim measures addressed to an intervener have been held admissible.59 Interim measures directed at national authorities have also been held admissible under certain circumstances,60 even though the Union Courts do not have jurisdiction to hear actions brought by natural and legal persons against national authorities. (3) Union bodies, offices, and agencies A Union body, office, or agency may be a defendant in proceedings for interim relief,61 provided that it has sufficient legal capacity under Union law.62

III. Special Characteristics A. Competent Judge 13.21

As from 1 November 2012, the Vice-President of the Court of Justice is empowered to rule on applications for interim measures brought before that Court, along with appeals brought against orders on applications for interim relief before the General Court.63 The Vice-President of the Court of Justice may refer the application to the Court for decision.64 Such a reference will generally be made on the grounds of the difficulty 58 See 23/86 R, United Kingdom v Parliament (order), 1986, paras 22–24. 59 See T-411/07 R, Aer Lingus v Commission (order), 2008, paras 55–59. 60 See T-402/11 R, Preparados Alimenticios del Sur v Commission (order), 2011, paras 14–15; T-241/15 R, Buga v Parliament and Others (order), 2015, para. 20; T-24/20 R, Junqueras i Vies v Parliament (order), 2020, para. 37. 61 For some recent examples, see C-282/21 P(R), Symrise v ECHA (order), 2021; T-849/19 R II, Leonardo v Frontex (order), 2020; T-381/20 R, Datax v REA (order), 2020. In that regard, it may be the case that the main action, along with the proceedings for interim relief, must be brought instead against the particular Union institution which represents it, as, for example, in the case of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), such actions must be directed against the Commission alone: see T-435/09 R, GL2006 Europe v Commission (order), 2010, paras 13–17. 62 See e.g. T-271/10 R, H v Council and Commission (order), 2010, paras 18–21 (the application for suspension could not be brought against an EU international mission based on the fact that under the relevant Union measure, it did not have legal personality and there was no provision for it to be a party to legal proceedings); but see, in that regard, C-283/20, Eulex Kosovo, 2022. 63 See Statute, Art. 39, second para.; Decision 2012/671/EU concerning the judicial functions of the Vice- President of the Court (OJ 2012 L300/47). Before that date, the President of the Court of Justice carried out that function. As indicated in Art. 1, second para. of Decision 2012/671, if the Vice-President is prevented from acting, such functions are to be exercised by one of the Presidents of the Chambers of five Judges or, failing that, by one of the Presidents of the Chambers of three Judges or, failing that, by one of the other Judges, according to the order of seniority: see, e.g. C-315/18 P(R), Valencia Club de Fútbol v Commission (order), 2018, para. 20; C-334/18 P(R), Hércules Club de Fútbol v Commission (order), 2018, para. 18. 64 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 161(1). See, e.g. C-441/17 R, Commission v Poland (order of 20 November), 2017, para. 12; C-791/19 R, Commission v Poland (order), 2020, para. 4. Under the case-law, it is for the Vice-President of the Court alone to assess, on a case-by-case basis, whether or not the applications for interim measures before him or her require referral to the Court for the purpose of their assignment to a formation of the Court. See, in that regard, C-121/21 R, Czech Republic v Poland (order of 20 September), 2021, paras 9–12, 29–30; C-204/21 R-RAP,

Special Characteristics 545 or importance of the case. If the application is so referred, the Court of Justice has to give a decision immediately, after hearing the Advocate General.65 Whether it is the Vice-President of the Court of Justice or another formation of the Court which rules on the application for interim measures, it is general procedural practice that the First Advocate General—or the Advocate General who is assigned to the case, depending on the circumstances—is heard before the order concerning the application for interim measures is rendered.66 By contrast, at the General Court, it is the President of that Court who is empowered to rule on applications for interim measures.67 However, when the latter is prevented from dealing with such applications, the Judge specifically designated for this purpose will carry out that function.68

B. Procedure before the Union Courts An application for interim relief is adjudicated upon by way of summary procedure before the respective Union Court.69 The application is served on the opposing party, and the respective Court—in principle, the Vice-President of the Court of Justice or the President of the General Court, as the case may be—prescribes a short period within which that party may submit written or oral observations.70 The application may be granted even before the observations of the opposing party have been submitted, which has been referred to as an ex parte order.71 Depending on the circumstances of the Commission v Poland (order), 2021, paras 5–8; C-204/21 R, Commission v Poland (order of 27 October), 2021, paras 8–15. 65 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 161(3). 66 For example, where the case involves the same Member State as that of the First Advocate General, the Advocate General assigned to the case will be heard instead: see, e.g. C-204/21 R, Commission v Poland (order of 14 July), 2021. 67 GC Rules of Procedure, Arts 157 and 158. 68 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 157(4), referring to Arts 11 and 12 thereof. For some examples, see T-281/16 R, Solelec and Others v Parliament (order), 2016; T-272/21 R II, Puigdemont i Casamajó and Others v Parliament (order), 2021. 69 Statute, Art. 39, first para. See also, in that regard, GC Practice Rules, point 226. Proceedings for interim measures may be joined: see T-337/18 R and T-347/18 R, Laboratoire Pareva v Commission (order), 2018, paras 26–27. 70 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 160(5); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 157(1). The applicant does not have the right to submit a reply; if the President of the General Court refuses to give the applicant the possibility to submit a reply or to take measures of inquiry as requested, no infringement of Union law ensues: see C-298/20 P(R), Price v Council (order), 2020, paras 24–34. In the light of the speed which, by its nature, characterizes interlocutory proceedings, the interim relief Judge is not required to hear systematically the party making the application on all the information provided by the other party which that Judge intends to take into consideration in order to rule on the application for interim measures: see C-471/21 P(R), Inivos and Inivos v Commission (order), 2021, para. 47. 71 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 160(7); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 157(2); under those provisions, this decision may be varied or cancelled even without any application being made by any party. See, in that regard, C-619/18 R, Commission v Poland (order of 19 October), 2018, paras 13–14; C-204/21 R, Commission v Poland (order of 14 July), 2021, paras 41–42. For some examples, see C-441/17 R, Commission v Poland (order of 27 July), 2017; C-334/18 P(R)-R, Hércules Club de Fútbol v Commission (order of 5 July), 2018; C-619/18 R, Commission v Poland (order), 2018; T-883/16 R, Poland v Commission (order of 19 October), 2016; T-724/21 R, IL and Others v Parliament (order of 15 November), 2021. For an example in which an ex parte order has not been granted, see C-204/21 R, Commission v Poland (order of 14 July), 2021, paras 43–44; for an example in which the Vice- President of the Court annulled, by ex parte order, an ex parte order of the General Court and dismissed the application for interim measures altogether, see C-423/20 P(R), Council v Sharpston (order), 2020; and C-424/20 P(R), Representatives of the Governments of the Member States v Sharpston (order), 2020.

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546 PROCEEDINGS FOR INTERIM MEASURES BEFORE THE UNION COURTS case, a hearing may be held.72 According to Art. 160(6) of the CJ Rules of Procedure, a preparatory inquiry may be ordered, while Art. 157(3) of the GC Rules of Procedure provides that the President of the General Court may prescribe, where appropriate, measures of organization of procedure and measures of inquiry.

C. Admissibility Requirements 13.23

(1) Admissibility of the application in the main proceedings On account of the ancillary nature of proceedings for interim relief, whether an application for interim measures is admissible is contingent upon the admissibility of the application in the main proceedings.73 Proceedings for interim relief would acquire an impermissible degree of autonomy if interim measures could be ordered in connection with an inadmissible application in the main proceedings. This requirement confronts the interim relief Judge with a dilemma: because of the provisional nature of such relief, he or she may not prejudge in any way the final judgment, but in order to determine the admissibility of the application for interim relief, he or she must make a reasonably accurate determination of whether the main application will be declared admissible. Consequently, the interim relief Judge takes a cautious approach to this question. It has been consistently held that the issue of the admissibility of the main application should not as a rule be examined in proceedings relating to an application for interim measures so as not to prejudice the substantive proceedings.74 Yet, where the opposing party contends that the main application is manifestly inadmissible,75 it may76 nevertheless be necessary for the interim relief Judge to establish whether there are any grounds for concluding prima facie that the main application is admissible.77 In doing so, he or she 72 If the interim relief Judge considers that the case-file contains all the information which is required to make a pronouncement, he or she may lawfully dispense with oral argument from the parties. Consequently, a request by a party for a hearing may be rejected: see C-121/21 R, Czech Republic v Poland (order of 20 September), 2021, paras 13–14, 31–32; T-292/11 R, Cemex and Others v Commission (order), 2011, para. 19. The decision as to whether to hold a hearing is considered to fall within the broad discretion of the interim relief Judge. Thus, except for situations in which there would be evidence in the file to support the conclusion that he or she exceeded the limits of that discretion, pleas challenging the decision of the interim relief Judge not to hold a hearing fail on appeal: see, e.g. C-110/12 P(R), Akhras v Council (order), 2012, paras 54–64; see also, as regards the hearing of witnesses, C-547/21 P(R), Portugal v Commission (order), 2021, paras 83–84; and the submission of evidence, C-207/20 P(R), Anglo Austrian AAB and Belegging-Maatschappij ‘Far-East’ v ECB (order), 2020, paras 41–46. 73 See C-107/93 R, AEFMA v Commission (order), 1993, para. 4; C-423/20 P(R), Council v Sharpston (order), 2020, paras 21–30; C-424/20 P(R), Representatives of the Governments of the Member States v Sharpston (order), 2020, paras 21–30. 74 See T-24/20 R, Junqueras i Vies v Parliament (order), 2020, para. 23; T-45/21 R, Ciano Trading & Services v Commission (order), 2021, para. 13. 75 The fact that the opposing party does not plead the manifest inadmissibility of the main action in proceedings for interim relief does not preclude the interim relief Judge from undertaking this assessment, since the inadmissibility of an action involves a question of public policy which may, and even must, be raised by the Union Courts of their own motion: see C-60/08 P(R), Cheminova and Others v Commission (order), 2009, para. 31; T-475/18 R, Boyer v Wallis-et-Futuna (order), 2018, para. 16. 76 The interim relief Judge may base the order on other grounds and find it unnecessary to consider the question of the possible inadmissibility of the main proceedings (see, e.g. T-533/20 R, Green Power Technologies v Commission and ECSEL (order), 2021, para. 19), or certain heads of claim thereof (see, e.g. T-24/20 R, Junqueras i Vies v Parliament (order), 2020, para. 39). 77 See C-298/20 P(R), Price v Council (order), 2020, paras 51–53; T-383/19 R, Walker and Others v Parliament and Council (order), paras 20–21.

Special Characteristics 547 will take care that the Judges hearing the main case retain their latitude. The assessment made by the interim relief Judge does not preclude interim measures being granted following the bringing of an action which is subsequently declared inadmissible, but it does avoid an application which is manifestly inadmissible giving rise to proceedings for interim relief which enable the application or effects of a Union act to be temporarily averted. 78 The interim relief Judge takes the view that the application is admissible where he or she finds that the application in the main proceedings discloses prima facie grounds for concluding that the admissibility of the main application cannot be excluded.79 Such grounds will be lacking where, in the light of settled case-law, the main application is manifestly inadmissible. For example, as an application for annulment of the Commission’s refusal to initiate infringement proceedings is manifestly inadmissible, an application for interim measures brought in connection with such an action will also be inadmissible.80 Likewise, where the main action falls outside the scope of the Union Courts’ competences, as for example in a case where an action for annulment is brought against a national measure, an application for interim measures in respect of such measure will be inadmissible.81 Other examples of manifest inadmissibility of the main application include where the applicant has failed to comply with certain formal requirements82 or to lodge the application within the prescribed time-limit83 and where natural or legal persons have brought an action for annulment against an act for which they fail to satisfy the standing requirements under the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU84 or against an act which is not reviewable within the meaning of that provision.85 In particular, the case-law in the context of the action for annulment—to the effect that where one and the same application is involved and one of the applicants satisfies the standing requirements, there is no need to consider whether the other applicants are entitled to bring proceedings (see para. 7.140)—has been held not to apply in the context of proceedings for interim relief as far as the issue of assessing urgency is concerned, with the result that those applicants that fail to satisfy the requirements of direct and/or individual concern under the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU are not

78 See 376/87 R, Distrivet v Council (order), 1988, para. 22; C-329/99 P(R), Pfizer Animal Health v Council (order), 1999, para. 89; T-11/99 R, Van Parijs and Others v Commission (order), 1999, para. 51; T-345/05 R, V v Parliament (order), 2007, para. 42. This also applies to the requirement for a prima facie case (see para. 13.30). 79 See T-18/10 R, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council (order), 2010, para. 40; T-10/16 R, GABO:mi v Commission (order), 2016, para. 32; T-163/20 R et T-163/20 R II, Isopix v Parliament (order), 2020, paras 23–24. 80 See C-97/94 P(R), Schulz v Commission (order), 1994, paras 12–15. 81 See T-475/18 R, Boyer v Wallis-et-Futuna (order), 2018. 82 See 10/81, Farrall v Commission (order), 1981 (application not lodged by a lawyer). 83 See 50/84 R, Bensider v Commission (order), 1984, para. 24; T-18/07 R, Kronberger v Parliament (order), 2007, paras 33–34. 84 See C-298/20, P(R), Price v Council (order), 2020, paras 53–82; T-241/15 R, Buga v Parliament and Others (order), 2015, paras 9–16; T-383/19 R, Walker and Others v Parliament and Council (order), 2019, paras 26–32; T-326/19 R, Gerber v Parliament and Council (order), 2020, paras 20–38, 47. 85 See C-423/20 P(R), Council v Sharpston (order), 2020, paras 21–30; C-424/20 P(R), Representatives of the Governments of the Member States v Sharpston (order), 2020, paras 21–30; T-163/20 R and T-163/20 R II, Isopix v Parliament (order), 2020, paras 35–36.

548 PROCEEDINGS FOR INTERIM MEASURES BEFORE THE UNION COURTS entitled to bring an application for interim measures or to put forward their own individual situation in order to establish urgency.86

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(2) Time-limits (a) General overview An application for interim measures will be admissible only as from the time when the application in the main proceedings has been brought.87 As long as the main action is pending, an application for interim measures can in principle be made.88 An application for interim relief is to no purpose once the Court of Justice or the General Court has given judgment in the main proceedings,89 or in other circumstances, such as where the contested act which is the subject of the application for interim measures has been implemented.90 In addition, the applicant should take care that its decision as to the time when it submits an application for interim measures does not prejudice its chance of the measures being granted. If the applicant delays too long, there is a danger that the interim relief Judge will draw inferences detracting from the urgency of the measures sought.91 (b) Staff cases Generally speaking, the case-law regarding proceedings for interim measures in the context of staff cases brought under Art. 270 TFEU is comparable, though given the nature of such cases, some nuances in approach may be detected, for example, as regards the fact that measures possibly leading to the amicable settlement of disputes apply to interim measures.92 Moreover, an action in the General Court accompanied by an application for interim measures may be made from the time when the applicant lodges his or her complaint with the appointing authority.93 The proceedings in the main action are then suspended until such time as an express or implied decision on the complaint is taken.94

86 See T-326/07 R, Cheminova and Others v Commission (order), 2007, 48–64; T-45/21 R, Ciano Trading & Services and Others v Commission (order), 2021, paras 18–24. 87 This may be implied from CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 160(1)–(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Arts 156(1)–(2). 88 The interim relief Judge will not hold an application for interim measures admissible if it is lodged after the written and oral procedure in the main case have been concluded and only a matter of weeks before final judgment is given: see 3/58 to 16/58, 18/58, and 25/58 to 26/58 R, Barbara Erzbergbau and Others v High Authority (order), 1960. 89 See C-605/10 P(R), Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami v Parliament and Council (order), 2011; T-392/17 R, TE v Commission (order), 2018; T-362/18 R, Robert v Conseil national de l’ordre des pharmaciens (order), 2018 ; T-739/18 R, Darment v Commission (order), 2020; T-603/20 R, Likvidacijska masa iza Mesoprodukt et Čuljak v Commission (order), 2021. 90 See C-204/17 P(R), Hungary v Commission (order), 2017. 91 See C-21/14 P(R), Commission v Rusal Armenal (order), 2014, in particular paras 42, 48, 53; T-737/14 R, Vnesheconombank v Council (order), 2017, para. 28; T-652/19 R, Elevolution—Engenhari v Commission (order), 2020, para. 53; compare C-791/19 R, Commission v Poland (order), 2020, paras 94–98 (see also paras 99–102: no correlation between expedited procedure and urgency requirement); T-346/06 R, IMS v Commission, 2007, paras 155–158. 92 See GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 125a(4). 93 See GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 156(3). 94 Staff Regulations, Art. 91(4).

Special Characteristics 549 (3) Sufficiency of separate application (a) Separate document Under Art. 160(4) of the CJ Rules of Procedure and Art. 156(5) of the GC Rules of Procedure, an application for interim measures must be made by a separate document. If it is not, the application will be inadmissible.95 (b) Sufficiency of the application As further provided under Art. 160(4) of the CJ Rules of Procedure and Art. 156(5) of the GC Rules of Procedure, an application for interim measures must be in accordance with the formal requirements applying to procedural documents in general and applications in particular.96 Moreover, under Art. 160(3) of the CJ Rules of Procedure and Art. 156(4) of the GC Rules of Procedure, applications for interim measures must state the subject-matter of the proceedings, the circumstances giving rise to urgency, and the pleas of fact and law establishing a prima facie case for the interim measures applied for.97 Art. 156(4) of the GC Rules of Procedure further specifies that the application must ‘contain all the evidence and offers of evidence available to justify the grant of interim measures’. On the basis of those provisions, an application for interim measures must be sufficient in itself to enable the opposing party to prepare its observations and the interim relief Judge to rule on it, where appropriate, without other supporting information, the essential elements of fact and law on which it is founded having to be set out in a coherent and comprehensible fashion in the application for interim measures itself.98 An application for interim measures that fails to satisfy these requirements will be deemed inadmissible.99 This means that it is not sufficient for the application for interim measures merely to refer to the pleas and arguments set out in the pleadings in the main proceedings, and where some of the grounds contained in the application for interim measures 95 See C-340/17 P, Alcohol Countermeasure Systems (International) v EUIPO, 2018, paras 27–28; C-334/18 P(R), Hércules Club de Fútbol v Commission (order), 2018, paras 22–23. This also applies to appeals against interim orders: see C-504/20 P, Wagenknecht v European Council (order), 2021, paras 49–50. 96 See CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 120–122; GC Rules of Procedure, Arts 76 and 78. See also GC Practice Rules, points 223–227. 97 Since failure to comply with these provisions of the Rules of Procedure constitutes an absolute bar to proceedings, the interim relief Judge may consider of his or her own motion whether they have been complied with: see T-603/21 R, WO v EPPO (order), 2022, para. 12. 98 See C-378/16 P(R), Inclusion Alliance for Europe v Commission (order), 2016, paras 17–20; C-163/19 P(R), Trifolio-M and Others v Commission (order), 2019, paras 55–56; T-714/20 R, Ovsyannikov v Council, 2021, paras 33–35; T-603/21 R, WO v EPPO (order), 2022, paras 10–11 (also referring to point 223 of the GC Practice Rules). It follows that it is not for the interim relief Judge to seek, in place of the party concerned, those matters contained in, inter alia, the annexes or the main application which would support the application for interim measures: see T-737/14 R, Vnesheconombank v Council (order), 2017, para. 27; T-603/21 R, WO v EPPO (order), 2022, para. 17. It also follows that an application for interim measures may not validly be supplemented by a document lodged subsequently by the party seeking interim relief to remedy any deficiencies: see C-113/09 P(R), Zeigler v Commission (order), 2010, paras 14–21; C-163/19 P(R), Trifolio-M and Others v Commission (order), 2019, paras 60–62; C-298/20 P(R), Price v Council (order), 2020, paras 24–34. The application may be ‘varied’ in the course of the oral procedure if it falls within the framework of the measures requested and has less of an effect on the defendant: see C-280/93 R, Germany v Council (order), 1993, paras 15–16. 99 See, e.g. T-378/16 P(R), Inclusion Alliance for Europe v Commission (order), 2016, para. 22; T-249/21 R, SN v Parliament (order), 2021, paras 15–25; T-603/21 R, WO v EPPO (order), 2022, paras 13–18; T-54/22 R, Rivière v Parliament and ID (order), 2022, paras 16–20.

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550 PROCEEDINGS FOR INTERIM MEASURES BEFORE THE UNION COURTS (as well as the observations submitted in response to the application by the defendant) are not set out in a manner consistent with these requirements, they will not be taken into consideration in order to establish the points of fact and law to which they relate.100 It should also be pointed out that a head of claim in an application for interim measures inviting the interim relief Judge to adopt any other measures considered appropriate without providing further details has generally been held vague and imprecise in character and therefore inadmissible.101

D. Substantive requirements

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(1) General overview (a) Three substantive requirements In general, the following three substantive requirements have to be met if the application for interim measures is to be granted: (1) the application must establish a prima facie case, which means that the application in the main proceedings with which it is associated must, at first sight, have a reasonable chance of succeeding (fumus boni juris); (2) the application must be urgent; and (3) the applicant’s interest in the imposition of interim measures must outweigh the other interests at stake in the proceedings. The first two requirements are set out in Art. 160(3) of the CJ Rules of Procedure and Art. 156(4) of the GC Rules of Procedure, while the third emerged from the case-law.102 Accordingly, there is often language found in the case-law to the effect that the interim relief Judge must, where appropriate, balance the interests concerned.103 In some cases, no explicit reference is made to the balance of interests as part of the recitation of the main requirements that must be satisfied for the grant of interim relief.104 Yet, even where it is not mentioned in this regard, the interim relief Judge may proceed to examine whether it is satisfied.105 (b) Overall assessment In the context of the overall assessment of these three substantive requirements, the interim relief Judge enjoys a broad discretion and is free to determine, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, the manner and the order in which the

100 See T-41/08 R, Vakakis International v Commission (order), 2008, paras 40, 45–46; see also C-163/19 P(R), Trifolio-M and Others v Commission (order), 2019, paras 57–62 (also rejecting argument that the President of the General Court ought to have allowed applicant to lodge a new and supplemented version of the application for interim relief). 101 See T-658/19 R, Vizzone v Commission (order), 2020, para. 19; T-207/21 R, Polynt v ECHA (order), 2021, para. 39. 102 The balance of interests requirement may essentially be regarded as an application of the principle of proportionality in interim proceedings: see, in that regard, G. Le Floch, ‘Requirements for the Issuance of Provisional Measures’ in Provisional Measures Issued by International Courts and Tribunals (n. 52) 19, 48. 103 See C-541/20 R, Lithuania v Parliament and Council (order), 2021, para. 12; T-92/21 R, Darment v Commission (order), 2021, para. 27. 104 See C-110/12 P(R), Akhras v Council (order), 2012, para. 21; T-607/11 R, Henkel and Henkel France v Commission (order), 2012, para. 14. 105 See T-120/07 R, MB Immobilien Verwaltungs v Commission, 2007, paras 20, 23, 44–49.

Special Characteristics 551 requirements are to be examined, there being no rule of Union law imposing a pre- established scheme of analysis within which the need to order interim measures must be assessed.106 These three substantive requirements are cumulative,107 with the result that if one of them is not satisfied, the application for interim measures is dismissed.108 In practice, the determination of the urgency of the interim measures sought is often decisive and the other requirements do not have to be considered109 or are merely considered on a subsidiary basis.110 As recognized in the case-law, there is some connection between the three substantive requirements,111 for instance, as regards the effect of the relative strength or weakness of the prima facie case on the assessment of urgency,112 or the fact that one of the criteria for establishing urgency also constitutes the first element in the comparison carried out in assessing the balance of interests.113 The fact remains that in principle each requirement is distinct and must be sufficiently demonstrated by the applicant.114 That being said, under the case-law, the relaxation of the conditions relating to urgency where there is the existence of a particularly serious prima facie case is permitted in certain areas of litigation where it is excessively difficult, if not impossible, for systemic reasons, to

106 See C-466/21 P-R, Land Rheinland-Pfalz v Deutsche Lufthansa and Commission (order), 2021, para. 21; T-125/22 R, RT France v Council (order), 2022, para. 22. Thus, no error of law is found on appeal where the interim relief Judge dismissed the application for lack of urgency, without examining the other requirements: see C-114/20 P(R), Anglo Austrian AAB and Belegging-Maatschappij ‘Far-East’ v ECB (order), 2020, paras 66–70; C-207/20 P(R), Anglo Austrian AAB and Belegging-Maatschappij ‘Far-East’ v ECB (order), 2020, paras 101–104. This has implications for certain claims based on a general interest which are taken into consideration at the stage of the balancing of interests and thus may not be assessed if the application for interim measures fails on urgency grounds: see, e.g. as regards the protection of animal welfare, C-565/17 P(R), BASF Grenzach v ECHA (order), 2018, paras 67–68; C-282/21 P(R), Symrise v ECHA (order), 2021, paras 29–32; T-207/21 R, Polynt v ECHA (order), 2021, 107 See C-204/21 R, Commission v Poland (order of 14 July), 2021, para. 77; T-125/22 R, RT France v Council (order), 2022, para. 21. 108 See T-162/20 R, Indofil Industries (Netherlands) v Commission (order), 2020 (no prima facie case); T-207/21 R, Polynt v Commission (order), 2021 (no urgency); T-54/21 R, OHB System v Commission (order), 2021 (the balance of interests involved favoured not granting the interim measures requested). 109 See C-541/20 R, Lithuania v Parliament and Council (order), 2021, paras 45–46. 110 See T-574/18 R, Agrochem Maks v Commission (order), 2019, paras 81–82. 111 It is sometimes found that the dismissal of the application for interim measures by reason of the failure to satisfy one of the requirements (typically urgency) is corroborated or supported by analysis of another (typically balance of interests): see, e.g. T-476/17 R, Arysta LifeScience Netherlands v Commission (order), 2018; T-125/22 R, RT France v Council (order), 2022, paras 57–58. Or the requirements relating to urgency and the balance of interests may be taken together. See C-238/18 R, ECB v Latvia (order), 2018; T-47/16 R, Sigma Orionis v REA (order), 2017, para. 25. 112 See C-404/10 P(R), Commission v Editions Odile Jacob (order), 2011, para. 27; C-551/12 P(R), EDF v Commission (order), 2013, paras 23–24; C-691/15 P(R), Commission v Bilbaína de Alquitranes and Others (order), 2016, para. 20; C-466/12 P-R, Land Rheinland-Pfalz v Deutsche Lufthansa and Commission (order), 2021, para. 35; T-826/14 R, Spain v Commission (order), 2015, para. 22; T-795/19 R, HB v Commission (order), 2020, para. 75; T-148/21 R, Paccor Packaging and Others v Commission (order), 2021, para. 22. As regards the connection between the prima facie and urgency requirements in respect of interim measures to prevent the disclosure of allegedly confidential information, see C-65/18 P(R), Nexans France and Nexans v Commission (order), 2018, paras 15–22. 113 See C-208/03 P(R), Le Pen v Parliament (order), 2003, para. 106. Findings as regards urgency have an impact on the scope of assessment of the balance of interests: see T-299/10 R, Babcock Noell v The European joint undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy (order), 2010, para. 66; T-337/18 R and T-347/18 R, Laboratoire Pareva v Commission (order), 2018, paras 102–103. 114 See C‑21/14 P(R), Commission v Rusal Armenal (order), 2014, para. 41; C-691/15 P-R, Commission v Bilbaína de Alquitranes and Others (order), 2016, para. 21; T-92/21 R, Darment v Commission (order), 2021, para. 47; T-717/21 R, ICI Traffic v Commission (order), 2022, para. 44.

552 PROCEEDINGS FOR INTERIM MEASURES BEFORE THE UNION COURTS satisfy those conditions, and which have been held to include the areas of public procurement,115 restrictive measures,116 and confidential information.117 The interim relief Judge must proceed with the necessary care, in particular, where the Union institution, body, office, or agency concerned has a discretion. According to the Court of Justice, the mere fact that a discretionary power is vested in the institution which adopted the contested act cannot in itself, in the absence of any consideration whether there is a prima facie case and of any balancing of the interests involved, determine requirements relating to the condition of urgency. To take a different approach would mean excluding, or at least restricting, legal protection in proceedings for interim relief where the act at issue was adopted pursuant to a broad discretionary power. The result could, in particular, be that provisional measures necessary to secure the effectiveness of the judgment in the main proceedings would be refused on the sole ground that the urgency was not indisputable in cases where there was a particularly strong prima facie case and the balance of interests was in favour of the party applying for the interim measures.118 It may be noted in this connection that the interim relief Judge is not required to reply explicitly to all the points of law and fact raised in the course of the interlocutory proceedings. It is sufficient that the reasons given validly justify the order given in the light of the circumstances of the case.119 115 Under the case-law, when an unsuccessful tenderer is able to show that there is a particularly strong prima facie case, it cannot be required to establish that the rejection of its application for interim measures also risks causing it irreparable damage; given the extreme difficulty of establishing the latter, imposing such a requirement on a tenderer would limit, excessively and unjustifiably, the tenderer’s right to an effective judicial remedy under Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. However, that relaxation of the requirement relating to urgency applies only during the pre-contractual phase, provided that the standstill period under Art. 175 of the Financial Regulation (Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No. 1296/2013, (EU) No. 1301/2013, (EU) No. 1303/2013, (EU) No. 1304/2013, (EU) No. 1309/2013, (EU) No. 1316/2013, (EU) No. 223/2014, (EU) No. 283/2014, and Decision No. 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No. 966/2012 (OJ 2018 L193/1)) is respected; where the contracting authority concluded the contract with the successful tenderer after that period had elapsed and before the application for interim measures was lodged, that relaxation is no longer justified (see C-35/15 P(R), Commission v Vanbreda Risk & Benefits, 2015, paras 23–58, in particular paras 38–42, 57), and in no way relieves the applicant from establishing the seriousness of the damage that would be caused by the rejection of its application for interim measures (see C-576/17 P(R), Wall Street Systems UK v ECB (order), 2018, para. 26; T-665/21 R, Civitta Eesti v Commission (order), 2021, paras 20–34). For some examples in which the relaxation of the requirements for urgency in public procurement matters was found to apply, see T‑163/20 R and T‑163/20 R II, Isopix v Parliament (order), 2020, paras 46–65; T-54/21 R, OHB System v Commission (order), 2021, paras 87–94. For some examples in which the relaxation of such requirements did not apply, see T-578/19 R, Sophia Group v Parliament (order), 2019, paras 23–34; T-795/19 R, HB v Commission (order), 2019, paras 76–78; T-38/21 R, Inivos and Inivos v Commission (order), 2021, paras 29–33 (upheld in C-471/21 P(R), Inivos and Inivos v Commission (order), 2021, paras 65–82); T-285/21 R, Alliance française de Bruxelles‑Europe v Commission (order), 2021, paras 29–43; T-46/22 R, Esedra v Parliament (order), 2022, paras 20–31. The Court of Justice has made it clear that that solution cannot be extended to the field of State aid: see C-466/21 P-R, Land Rheinland-Pfalz v Deutsche Lufthansa and Commission (order), 2021, paras 36–37. 116 Compare, in that regard, T-305/18 R, Klyuyev v Council (order), 2018, paras 95–115. 117 See T-131/16 R, Belgium v Commission (order), 2016, paras 37–42. See further K. Lenaerts and M. Radley, ‘Recent Case-Law of the European Court of Justice in Interim Measures Cases’ (2016) E.L.Rep. 2; N. Korogiannakis, ‘Recent Case Law of the CJEU on Interim Measures and Award of Damages in EU Public Procurement Law’ (2017) ERA Forum 95; E. Barbier de la Serre and C. Lavin, ‘Le droit du référé européen depuis 2007: entre prudence et coups d’audace’ (2019) C.D.E. 613. 118 See C-364/98 P(R), Emesa Sugar v Commission (order), 1998, paras 50–51. 119 See C-32/09 P(R), Artisjus Magyar v Commission (order), 2010, para. 17. In exceptional circumstances, the interim relief Judge may order the suspension of the contested act or part of it pending additional information, which will enable him or her to assess the basic requirements for the grant of interim measures. Such suspension by way of ‘intermediate order’ is valid until such time as a decision is given terminating the proceedings for interim

Special Characteristics 553 (2) Prima facie case (a) Objective The requirement for a prima facie case to be made out (also referred to as fumus boni juris) is designed—just as in the case of the determination that the main application is not manifestly inadmissible—to prevent improper use being made of applications for interim relief (see para. 13.23). (b) Evolution towards fumus non mali juris The main case must have a reasonable chance of succeeding. According to the case-law, this requirement is met where at least one of the pleas in law relied on by the applicant for interim measures in support of the main action appears prima facie not unfounded. That is the case, inter alia, where one of the pleas relied on reveals the existence of difficult legal issues, the solution to which is not immediately obvious and therefore calls for a detailed examination that cannot be carried out by the Judge hearing the application for interim relief, but must be the subject of the main proceedings, or where the discussion of issues by the parties reveals that there is a major legal disagreement whose resolution is not immediately obvious.120 Since the interim relief Judge may not prejudge the decision to be given in the main proceedings, his or her assessment in this regard will essentially be confined to whether the arguments put forward by the applicant in the main proceedings are prima facie basically sound or are clearly doomed to fail.121 With the development of the case-law, which was influenced greatly by the particular circumstances of the cases concerned, there were in practice subtle differences in the interpretation of this requirement. In contrast to certain past cases,122 in the more relief. See T-191/98 R II, Cho Yang Shipping v Commission (order), 1999; T-376/05 R, TEA CEGOS and STG v Commission (order), 2005, paras 1–3. 120 See C-C-441/17 R, Commission v Poland (order), 2017, para. 31; C-204/21 R, Commission v Poland (order of 14 July), 2021, para. 79; T-54/21 R, OHB System v Commission (order), 2021, para. 32; T-130/21 R, CCPL and Others v Commission (order), 2021, para. 24. It follows that the applicant is not required to show that the condition of fumus boni juris is satisfied in respect of all the complaints alleged: see C-791/19 R, Commission v Poland (order), 2020, paras 79–80; see also, e.g. C-389/19 P-R, Commission v Sweden (order), 2019, paras 49–61; T-54/21 R, OHB System v Commission (order), 2021, paras 33–84. With regard to interim measures to prevent disclosure of allegedly confidential information, the Court of Justice has held that the interim relief Judge—if he or she is not to disregard the intrinsically ancillary and provisional nature of proceedings for interim measures—may, as a rule, conclude that there is no prima facie case only where the information in question is obviously not confidential. See C-278/13 P(R), Commission v Pilkington Group (order), 2003, para. 68; C-162/15 P-R, Evonik Degussa v Commission (order), 2016, para. 29; C-512/16 P(R), EMA v MSD Animal Health Innovation and Intervet International (order), 2017, para. 60; T-250/18 R, RATP v Commission (order), 2018, paras 46–47; T-162/20 R, UPL Europe and Indofil Industries (Netherlands) v EFSA (order), 2020, paras 31–34; see also, in that regard, T-419/18 R, Crédit agricole and Crédit agricole Corporate and Investment Bank v Commission (order), 2018, paras 26–30; T-420/18 R, JPMorgan Chase and Others v Commission (order), 2018, paras 26–31. 121 In the context of an appeal brought in the Court of Justice against a judgment of the General Court dismissing as unfounded an action for annulment of the contested decision, the application for interim relief seeking the suspension of the enforcement of the latter decision should rest on a ‘particularly solid’ prima facie case: see, e.g. C-162/15 P(R), Commission v Degussa and Others (order), 2016, para. 25. See also, in that regard, C-423/20 P(R), Council v Sharpston (order), 2020, para. 22; and C-424/20 P(R), Representatives of the Governments of the Member States v Sharpston (order), 2020, para. 22 (‘It follows that it is not possible for the condition concerning a prima facie case to be fulfilled and, consequently, for the application for interim relief to be granted, even on a provisional basis, where it is apparent, prima facie, that the main action has no prospect of success.’) 122 See, inter alia, 43/59, 44/59, and 45/59 R, Von Lachmüller and Others v Commission (order), 1960; 42/82 R, Commission v France (order), 1982, paras 13–14; T-346/06 R, IMS v Commission (order), 2007, para. 93.

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554 PROCEEDINGS FOR INTERIM MEASURES BEFORE THE UNION COURTS recent case-law the interim relief Judge takes a less demanding approach and finds that there are no grounds for holding that the substantive application is manifestly without foundation or words to similar effect.123 That formula expresses the view of the interim relief Judge that the arguments put forward by the party seeking the interim measures cannot be rejected at that stage of the proceedings in the absence of an in-depth consideration of the case.124 Consequently, fumus boni juris (i.e. the applicant must demonstrate that the allegations in the main action are prima facie well-founded) has evolved into fumus non mali juris (i.e. the applicant must demonstrate that the allegations in the main action are not obviously or manifestly unfounded). It would therefore seem that the interim relief Judge need not be of the opinion that the main action will succeed in order to grant the measures requested, but merely has to be persuaded that the main application is reasonable.125

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(3) Urgency (a) Serious and irreparable damage An application for interim relief is urgent where the absence of the judgment in the main proceedings threatens to cause the person seeking the relief serious and irreparable damage. Under settled case-law, the urgency of an application for interim measures must be assessed in relation to the necessity for an interlocutory order to avoid serious and irreparable damage being caused to the party applying for those measures.126 The urgent nature of the interim application is therefore determined by the nature of the damage that is liable to arise as a result of the duration of the main proceedings.127

123 See C-76/08 R, Commission v Malta (order), 2008, para. 30; C-619/18 R, Commission v Poland (order), 2018, para. 51; T-486/10 R, Iberdrola v Commission (order), 2011, paras 63–64; T-172/14 R, Stahlwerk Bous v Commission (order), 2014, para. 42. 124 See C-280/93 R, Germany v Council (order), 1993, para. 21; C-149/95 P-R, Commission v Atlantic Container Line and Others (order), 1995, para. 26; T-257/07 R, France v Commission (order), 2007, para. 116; T-18/10 R, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami v Parliament and Council (order), 2010, para. 95; T-52/12 R, Greece v Commission (order), 2012, para. 35. 125 For some examples, see C-441/17 R, Commission v Poland (order), 2017, paras 38–42; C-646/19 P(R), Puigdemont i Casamajó and Comín i Oliveres v Parliament (order), 2019, paras 53–78. Contrast examples where this requirement was not satisfied: see C-423/20 P(R), Council v Sharpston (order), 2020, paras 21–36; C-424/20 P(R), Representatives of the Governments of the Member States v Sharpston (order), 2020, paras 21–36; T-24/20 R, Junqueras i Vies v Parliament (order), 2020, paras 47–76 (upheld in C-201/20 P(R), Junqueras i Vies v Parliament (order), 2020, paras 124–126); T-162/20 R, Indofil Industries (Netherlands) v EFSA (order), 2020, paras 33–76, T-130/21 R, CCPL and Others v Commission (order), 2021, paras 25–46. 126 See C-441/17 R, Commission v Poland (order), 2017, para. 43; C-541/20 R, Lithuania v Parliament and Council (order), 2021, para. 18; T-131/16 R, Belgium v Commission (order), 2016, para. 22; T-764/21 R, Atesos medical and Others v Commission (order), 2022, para. 24. The case-law has referred to the possibility of adopting interim measures on the basis of the manifest illegality of the contested act where it lacks even the appearance of legality, without the applicant having to demonstrate the existence of serious and irreparable damage in the event of its continued operation (see 60/81 and 190/81 R, IBM v Commission, 1981, paras 7–8; 46/87 R, Hoechst v Commission, 1987, paras 31–32), but claims based on that case-law have been unsuccessful (see T-18/01 R, Goldstein v Commission (order), 2001, paras 40–43; T-38/21 R, Inivos and Inivos v Commission (order), 2021, paras 34–35 (upheld in C-471/21 P(R), Inivos and Inivos v Commission (order), 2021, para. 55); T-92/21 R, Darment v Commission (order), 2021, paras 46–47; T-527/21 R, Abenante and Others v Parliament and Council (order), 2021, paras 23–24; T-717/21 R, ICA Traffic v Commission (order), 2022, paras 42–44. 127 It is not sufficient to allege, in the abstract, infringement of a fundamental freedom (see C-541/20 R, Lithuania v Parliament and Council (order), 2021, para. 25) or of a fundamental right (see C-65/18 P(R), Nexans France and Nexans v Commission (order), 2018, para. 36; T-125/22 R, RT France v Council (order), 2022, para. 52).

Special Characteristics 555 Accordingly, it was not by chance that the serious and irreparable nature of the damage emerged in the case-law as the yardstick for determining the urgency of an application for interim measures. This twofold criterion of serious and irreparable damage is intended to restrict the grant of interim measures to cases in which the judgment in the main proceedings would not afford any legal redress in the absence of the interim relief sought.128 In the case-law, the seriousness and the irreparable nature of the alleged damage are often,129 but not always,130 considered separately. Although the damage must be both serious and irreparable, where one of the two criteria is found lacking, the interim relief Judge may consider that it is not necessary to examine the other.131 The burden of proof is on the applicant to establish the existence of serious and irreparable damage and adduce the facts that are considered to found the prospect of such damage.132 (b) Criterion of irreparable damage The damage is irreparable where it will not be eliminated by a judgment in the main proceedings in favour of the applicant. Save for exceptional circumstances, damage that is purely financial cannot be regarded as irreparable, since normally it may be the subject of subsequent financial compensation.133 Such exceptional circumstances may exist, for instance, where the alleged damage imperils the existence of

Moreover, in the context of the competition rules, an application for an exemption from the obligation to provide a bank guarantee as a condition for not immediately collecting the fine imposed against the applicant is granted only in exceptional circumstances where the applicant adduces evidence that it is objectively impossible for it to provide such guarantee or that such provision would imperil its existence. See C-113/09 P(R), Zeigler v Commission (order), 2010, para. 48; T-398/10 R Fapricela v Commission (order), 2011, paras 22–23; T-522/15 R, CCPL and Others v Commission (order), 2015, paras 49–51. This case-law has been held to apply to other contexts involving the provision of bank guarantees: see T-118/17 R, Institute for Direct Democracy in Europe v Parliament (order), 2017, para. 34. 128 29/66 R, Gutmann v Commission (order), 1967 ECR 241, 242; C-121/21 R, Czech Republic v Poland (order of 21 May), 2021, para. 60. 129 See C-121/21 R, Czech Republic v Poland (order of 21 May), 2021, paras 65–72; T-574/18 R, Agrochem-Maks v Commission (order), 2019; T-742/20 R, Indofil Industries (Netherlands) v Commission (order), 2021. 130 See C-121/21 R, Czech Republic v Poland (order of 21 May), 2021, paras 65–72; T-612/19 R, UPL Europe and Aceto Agricultural Chemicals v Commission (order), 2020, paras 30–57. 131 See C-506/13 P-R, Lito Maieftiko Gynaikologiko kai Cheirourgiko Kentro v Commission (order), 2013, para. 24. 132 See C-110/12 P(R), Akhras v Council (order), 2012, para. 42; C-541/20 R, Lithuania v Parliament and Council (order), 2021, para. 19; T-131/16 R, Belgium v Commission (order), 2016, para. 22; T-777/19 R, Bourel v Commission (order), 2021, para. 28. The applicant must submit specific and precise information, supported by detailed and certified documentary evidence, which shows the situation in which the party seeking the interim measures finds itself and enables the probable consequences, should the measures sought not be granted, to be assessed. That party, in particular when it relies on the occurrence of financial damage, must produce, with supporting documentation, an accurate overall picture of its financial situation: see C-110/12 P(R), Akhras v Council (order), 2012, para. 43; C-466/21 P-R, Land Rheinland-Pfalz v Deutsche Lufthansa and Commission (order), 2021, para. 43; T-131/16 R, Belgium v Commission (order), 2016, para. 23; T-125/22 R, RT France v Council (order), 2022, para. 35. See further para. 13.27. 133 See C-541/20 R, Lithuania v Parliament and Council (order), 2021, para. 29; C-232/21 P(R), Symrise v ECHA (order), 2021, para. 42; T-381/20 R, Datax v REA (order), 2020, para. 37; T-765/20 R, The Floow v Commission (order), 2021, para. 28.

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556 PROCEEDINGS FOR INTERIM MEASURES BEFORE THE UNION COURTS the undertaking concerned,134 or where the damage, even when it occurs, cannot be quantified.135 When assessing the risk of serious as well as irreparable damage to the applicants, account may be taken of the group to which the applicant belongs, since the objective interests of the undertaking concerned cannot be regarded in isolation from the interests of the persons who control the undertaking.136 This applies not only to legal persons, but also to natural persons who control the undertaking and shareholders of the undertaking concerned.137 As such, by taking account of the group to which the applicant belongs, it follows that the fact that an undertaking may become insolvent does not necessarily mean that the condition as to urgency is fulfilled.138

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(c) Criterion of serious damage The damage must also be serious, which gives a relative aspect to the urgency of an application for interim relief. In particular, under the case-law, the interim measure sought will be justified only if it appears that, without such a measure, the party seeking it would be in a position that could imperil its existence before the final decision in the main action.139 In the case of financial damage alleged by an applicant having the status of natural person, an interim measure is justified if it appears that in the absence of that measure, the applicant would find himself or herself in a position which is likely to jeopardize his or her financial viability, since he or she would not have an amount of money which under normal circumstances should enable him or her to meet all the expenditure

134 See C-506/13 P(R), Lito Maieftiko Gynaikologiko kai Cheirourgiko Kentro v Commission (order), 2013, para. 20; C‑21/14 P(R), Rural Armenal v Commission (order), 2014, point 46; T-381/20 R, Datax v REA (order), 2020, para. 38; T-92/21 R, Darment v Commission (order), 2021, para. 38. The claim that the applicant’s market share would be irremediably affected has been placed on the same footing as that of the risk of disappearance from the market, provided that the irremediable effect on market share is also of a serious nature. It is therefore not sufficient that a market share, however minimal, may be irremediably lost; it is necessary for that market share to be sufficiently large and that regaining a significant proportion of that market share is impossible by reason of obstacles of a structural or legal nature. See T-742/20 R, Indofil Industries (Netherlands) v Commission (order), 2021, para. 52. 135 See C-517/15 P-R, AGC Glass Europe v Commission (order), 2016, para. 54; C-512/16 P(R), EMA v MSD Animal Health Innovation and Intervet International (order), 2017, para. 117; T-733/17 R, GMPO v Commission (order), 2019, para. 97; T-574/18 R, Agrochem-Maks v Commission (order), 2019, para. 75. 136 See C-446/10 P(R), Alcoa Trasformazioni v Commission (order), 2011, paras 17–18; C-551/12 P(R), EDF v Commission (order), 2012, paras 54–58; T-420/05 R, Vischim v Commission (order), 2006, paras 81–82; T-10/16 R, GABO:mi v Commission (order), 2016, paras 52, 56–65; T-612/19 R, Aceto Agricultural Chemicals v Commission (order), 2020, paras 38, 46–48. As regards associations, account is taken of the financial situation of the members: see, e.g. T-217/03 R, FNCBV v Commission (order), 2004, para. 77; T-733/17 R, GMPO v Commission (order), 2018, para. 33. However, the fact that an association is non-profit-making cuts against arguments as to the seriousness of the damage to its operation: see T-18/10 R II, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami v Parliament and Council (order), 2010, para. 70; T-116/11 R, EMA v Commission (order), 2011, para. 20. 137 See C-466/21 P-R, Land Rheinland-Pfalz v Deutsche Lufthansa and Commission (order), 2021, paras 44, 55; T-120/07 R, MB Immobilien Verwaltungs v Commission (order), 2007, para. 38; T-572/11 R, Hassan v Council (order), 2012, para. 36; T-10/16 R, GABO:mi v Commission (order), 2016, para. 56. 138 See T-352/08 R, Pannon v Commission (order), 2009, para. 42; T-10/16 R, GABO:mi v Commission (order), 2016, para. 52; T-795/19 R, HB v Commission (order), 2020, para. 61; T-189/21 R, Aloe Vera of Europe v Commission (order), 2021, para. 31. 139 See T-574/18 R, Agrochem-Maks v Commission (order), 2019, para. 33; T-742/20 R, Indofil Industries (Netherlands) v Commission (order), 2021, para. 31.

Special Characteristics 557 necessary for satisfying his or her own basic needs and those of the family until judgment is given in the main action.140 In the case of financial damage alleged by a legal person, the seriousness of the damage may be assessed in the light, in particular, of its size and turnover and, where relevant, the characteristics of the group to which it belongs.141 Thus, except where account is taken of the group to which it belongs, a small undertaking has less of an ability to bear financial or economic burdens than a multinational or a Member State.142 However, although the assessment of the concept of seriousness is generally comparative, meaning that the amount of any financial harm is compared with the size of the undertaking which would sustain the harm in the absence of the adoption of the interim measures sought, this is not the case with regard to an application for interim measures which is based not on the applicant undertaking’s financial situation, but on the obligation to make a commercial choice within a period alleged to be disadvantageous, with the result that it cannot be excluded that financial harm to a legal person which is objectively significant and which allegedly results from the obligation to make a final commercial choice of some magnitude within a disadvantageous time-scale may be considered serious, even in the absence of information concerning the size of the undertaking concerned.143 In the evaluation of the seriousness of the damage, the interim relief Judge is not confined to having recourse in a mechanical and rigid manner solely to the relevant turnover of the applicant, but must also examine the particular circumstances of each case.144 The requirement for the damage to be serious prevents interim measures being imposed in order to avert irreparable but negligible damage.145 The impending damage does not have to be financial.146 For example, in Commission v Poland,147 the Court of Justice ordered interim measures to cease active forest management operations which were considered to have serious and irreversible damaging effects on the protected habitats of Natura 2000 sites.

140 See T-18/10 R II, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami v Parliament and Council (order), 2010, para. 59; T-497/21 R, Girardi v EUIPO (order), 2021, para. 26. 141 See T-574/18 R, Agrochem-Maks v Commission (order), 2019, para. 34; T-742/20 R, Indofil Industries (Netherlands) v Commission (order), 2021, para. 32; T-764/21 R, Atesos medical and Others v Commission (order), 2022, para. 36. See further T-733/17 R, GMPO v Commission (order), 2018, paras 30–36 (taking account of various situations under the case-law). 142 See T-429/18 R, BRF and SHB Comercio e Industria de Alimentos v Commission (order), 2019, paras 38–39. 143 See C-551/12 P(R), EDF v Commission (order), 2012, paras 31–33; T-783/17 R, GE Healthcare v Commission (order), 2018, para. 56; T-742/20 R, Indofil Industries (Netherlands) v Commission (order), 2021, para. 33. 144 See T-95/09 R, United Phosphorus v Commission (order), 2009, paras 69–71; T-742/20 R, Indofil Industries (Netherlands) v Commission (order), 2021, para. 36; T-574/18 R, Agrochem-Maks v Commission (order), 2019, paras 39–40; compare T-269/11 R, Xeda International v Commission (order), 2011, paras 22–53, in particular para. 27; T-77/20 R, Ascenza Agro v Commission (order), 2020, paras 43–49 (rejecting arguments based on a number of circumstances including the Covid-19 pandemic); T-148/21 R, Paccor Packing v Commission (order), 2021, paras 37–40 (rejecting arguments based on the Covid-19 pandemic). 145 See T-54/08 R, T-87/08 R, T-88/08 R, and T-91/08 R to T-93/08 R, Cyprus v Commission, 2008, paras 64–76. 146 As regards serious and irreparable harm resulting from the breach of individuals’ right to privacy, see T-452/20 R, Facebook Ireland v Commission (order), 2020, paras 83–94, 114. 147 See C-447/17 R, Commission v Poland (order), 2017, in particular paras 54–61.

558 PROCEEDINGS FOR INTERIM MEASURES BEFORE THE UNION COURTS 13.35

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(d) Reasonable diligence of the applicant In assessing the seriousness of the damage and the related urgency of the measures requested, the interim relief Judge takes account of reasonable diligence on the part of the applicant in causing or limiting the extent of the damage alleged.148 Accordingly, for example, the situation giving rise to the application for interim measures was found to have resulted from a free choice on the part of the applicant in the implementation of its commercial strategy and thus the damage alleged could not establish the urgency of the interim relief sought.149 (e) Imminence of the damage alleged As already mentioned, the purpose of interim proceedings is not to secure reparation of damage, but to guarantee the full effectiveness of the judgment on the substance.150 Thus, as far as urgency is concerned, interim measures serve only to avoid the serious and irreparable damage pleaded by the applicant from arising. This requirement relating to the imminence of the damage alleged is considered separately.151 If the interim relief Judge finds that the contested act has been completely implemented and produced all its effects, damage can no longer be averted by imposing interim measures. If that is so, the application for interim measures is to no purpose.152 However, it may happen that a measure which had already produced damage before the application for interim measures was brought is continuing to cause damage, in which case interim measures may be imposed to prevent any increase in the damage.153 Furthermore, the threat of damage must be a real one, which means that it does not have to be established with absolute certainty that damage is imminent; it is sufficient that

148 See, e.g. T-195/08 R, Antwerpse Bouwwerken v Commission (order), 2008, paras 47–48; T-196/09 R, TerreStar Europe v Commission (order), 2009, paras 85–88; T-131/17 R, Argus Security Projects v EEAS (order), 2017, paras 36–41; T-260/15 R, Iberdrola v Commission (order), 2018, para. 36; T-733/17 R, GMPO v Commission (order), 2018, para. 49; T-742/20 R, Indofil Industries (Netherlands) v Commission (order), 2021, para. 46. Under the case-law, it has been found that, with regard to a loss corresponding to less than 10% of turnover of undertakings active in highly regulated markets, the financial difficulties which those undertakings risked suffering did not appear to be such as to threaten their very existence (see T-269/11 R, Xeda International v Commission, 2011, para. 21), and regarding a loss representing almost two-thirds of the turnover of those undertakings, while acknowledging that the financial difficulties they underwent could have been such as to threaten their very existence, in a highly regulated sector where major investment is often required and the competent authorities may be led to intervene when public health risks become apparent, for reasons which cannot always be foreseen by the undertakings concerned, it was for those undertakings, if they were not to bear themselves the loss resulting from such intervention, to protect themselves against its consequences by adopting an appropriate policy (see C-170/16 P(R), ICA Laboratories and Others v Commission, 2016, para. 29). See T-297/21 R, Troy Chemical Company and Troy v Commission (order), 2021, para. 36; for some applications, see also T-740/18 R, Taminco and Arysta LifeScience Great Britain v Commission (order), 2019, paras 41–44; T-189/21 R, Aloe Vera of Europe v Commission (order), 2021, paras 40–52. 149 See T-52/09 R, Nycomed Denmark v Commission (order), 2009, paras 83–93; T-734/18 R, Sumitomo Chemical and Tenka Best v Commission (order), 2019, in particular para. 67. 150 See para. 13.01. For an example of an application for interim measures which was found to be premature, see T-249/21 R, SN v Parliament (order), 2021, para. 38. 151 See 166/78 R, Italy v Council (order), 1978, para. 14; T-324/06 R, Municipio de Gondomar v Commission, 2007, para. 55; T-54/08 R, T-87/08 R, T-88/08 R, and T-91/08 R to T-93/08 R, Cyprus v Commission (order), 2008, para. 61; T-176/19 R, 3V Sigma v ECHA (order), 2019, para. 36; T-187/21 R, Firearms United Network and Others v Commission (order), 2021, para. 24. 152 See C-656/11 R, United Kingdom v Council (order), 2012, paras 23–26; T-10/16 R, GABO:mi v Commission (order), 2016, paras 22, 48; T-47/16 P, Sigma Orionis v REA (order), 2017, paras 37–39. 153 See T-257/07 R, France v Commission (order), 2007, para. 131.

Special Characteristics 559 the damage, particularly when it depends on a number of factors, is foreseeable with a sufficient degree of probability.154 Hypothetical or indefinite potential damage does not suffice.155 Likewise, where it is determined that the decisive cause of the damage alleged is not the contested measure at issue, the interim relief sought cannot be granted on the basis of the claims put forward by the applicant or the damage alleged is deemed irrelevant to the assessment of urgency.156 The interim relief Judge may have regard, in assessing the seriousness and irreparability of the damage, whether or not effective relief is available from the national courts or other authorities of the Member States.157 Generally, the annulment of the contested decision on conclusion of the main proceedings is considered to provide sufficient reparation for alleged non-material damage in respect of the applicant’s reputation.158 (f) Serious and irreparable damage must affect the applicant personally For the condition of urgency to be met, the applicant must demonstrate that the serious and irreparable damage alleged affects it personally.159 In particular, damage to the applicant’s employees, third parties, or general interests is in principle not taken into consideration.160

154 See C-441/17 R, Commission v Poland (order), 2017, para. 44; C-541/20 R, Lithuania v Parliament and Council (order), 2021, para. 18; C-629/21 P(R), Puigdemont i Casamajó and Others v Parliament and Spain (order), 2022, paras 127–135, 218–245. 155 See C-46/21 P(R), ACER v Aquind (order), 2021, para. 28; T-429/18 R, BRF and SHB Comercio e Industria de Alimentos v Commission (order), 2019, para. 43; T-417/18 R, CdT v EUIPO (order), 2018, para. 52; T-358/20 R, Datax v REA (order), 2020, paras 28, 35; T-207/21 R, Polynt v ECHA (order), 2021, para. 25; T-497/21 R, Girardi v EUIPO (order), 2021, para. 29 (upheld in C-703/21 P(R), Girardi v EUIPO (order), 2022, para. 57). 156 See C-182/18 R, Commune di Milano v Council (order), 2018, paras 33–36; C-114/20 P(R), Anglo Austrian AAB and Belegging-Maatschappij ‘Far-East’ (order), 2020, paras 54–56; T-777/19 R, Bourel v Commission (order), 2021, paras 20–21; T-95/21 R, Portugal v Commission (order), 2021, para. 43 (upheld in C-547/21 P(R), Portugal v Commission (order), 2021, para. 133); T-125/22 R, RT France v Council (order), 2022, paras 49–51. 157 See C-479/07 R, France v Council (order), 2008, para. 29; T-195/11 R, Cahier v Council and Commission (order), 2011, para. 21. With particular regard to the field of State aid, it is for the applicant to show that domestic remedies under national law to oppose recovery of State aid do not enable the avoidance of serious and irreparable damage. See T-177/10 R, Alcoa Trasformazioni v Commission (order), 2011, para. 57 (upheld in C-446/10 P(R), Alcoa Trasformazioni v Commission (order), 2011, paras 46–51); T-440/07 R, Slovenia v Commission (order), 2013, para. 22; T-217/14 R, Gmina Miasto Gdynia and Port Lotniczy Gdynia Kosakowo v Commission (order), 2014, para. 46; compare T-901/16 R, Elche Club de Fútbol v Commission (order), 2018, paras 100–104. This line of case-law has been applied in other contexts: see T-402/11 R, Preparados Alimenticios del Sur v Commission (order), 2011, paras 23–24 (customs duties). 158 See, e.g. T-656/20 R, Symrise v ECHA (order), 2020, para. 31 (upheld in C-282/21 P(R), Symrise v ECHA (order), 2021, para. 45); T-765/20 R, The Floow v Commission (order), 2021, para. 34; T-764/21 R, Atesos medical and Others v Commission (order), 2022, para. 45; but for an example of serious and irreparable damage to the applicant’s commercial reputation, see T-346/06 R, IMS v Commission (order), 2007, paras 133–160. 159 See 111/88 R, Greece v Commission (order), 1988, para. 15; 112/88 R, Crete Citron Producers Association v Commission (order), 1988, para. 20; C-21/14 P-R, Commission v Rusal Armenal (order), 2014, para. 51; T-584/15 R, POA v Commission (order), 2015, para. 21; T-740/18 R, Taminco v Commission (order), 2019, para. 52; T-868/19 R, Nouryon Industrial Chemicals and Others v Commission (order), 2020, para. 24; T-125/22 R, RT France v Council (order), 2022, paras 54–56. The damage caused to a general interest or to the rights of third parties may be taken into account, if appropriate, in the context of the balance of interests requirement: see T-420/05 R, Vischim v Commission (order), 2005, para. 73; T-150/20 R, Tartu Agro v Commission (order), 2020, paras 41–42; T-868/19 R, Nouryon Industrial Chemicals and Others v Commission (order), 2020, para. 26; T-656/20 R, Symrise v ECHA (order), 2020, para. 24 (upheld in C-282/21 P(R), Symrise v ECHA (order), 2021, para. 32). 160 See, e.g. T-656/20 R, Symrise v ECHA (order), 2020, paras 22–23 (upheld in C-282/21 P(R), Symrise v ECHA (order), 2021, paras 29–31, 47); T-187/21 R, Firearms United Network and Others v Commission (order), 2021, paras 19–21; T-189/21 R, Aloe Vera of Europe v Commission (order), 2021, paras 53–56; T-497/21 R, Girardi v EUIPO (order), 2021, para. 32 (upheld in C-703/21 P(R), Girardi v EUIPO (order), 2022, para. 59); T-538/21

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560 PROCEEDINGS FOR INTERIM MEASURES BEFORE THE UNION COURTS A Member State may rely on interests considered to be general at national level and defend them in interim proceedings.161 For instance, a Member State can rely on damage relating to public safety162 or to the environment and human health.163 In addition, Member States may claim harm to a sector of their economy, in particular, where the contested measure is likely to have an adverse effect on the level of employment and the cost of living.164 Furthermore, by virtue of its participation in the exercise of legislative and budgetary powers and contribution to the Union budget, a Member State may rely on the damage which would arise from expenditure being incurred contrary to the rules governing the powers of the Union and its institutions.165 All the same, it is not sufficient for a Member State to rely on the harm suffered by a limited number of undertakings where those undertakings, taken individually, do not represent an entire sector of the national economy.166 The Union institutions, too, may rely on general interests, such as the protection of human health.167 In the context of infringement proceedings, the Commission is entitled to adduce evidence of damage to the Union as the guardian of its general interest,168 or to the interests of nationals of other Member States,169 or even of the Member State concerned.170

13.38

(4) Balance of interests According to settled case-law, with regard to interim measures seeking suspension of the operation of the contested act, the balance of interests requires the interim relief Judge to determine, in particular, whether or not the interest of the applicant in obtaining the interim measures sought outweighs the interest in the immediate application of the contested act by examining specifically whether the possible annulment of

R, PBL and WA v Commission (order), 2021, paras 23–24; T-764/21 R, Atesos medical and Others v Commission (order), 2022, paras 30–32. Compare T-452/20 R, Facebook Ireland v Commission (order), 2020, paras 89–94. 161 See C-482/17 R, Czech Republic v Parliament and Council (order), 2018, para. 24; C-541/20 R, Lithuania v Parliament and Council (order), 2021, para. 21. 162 See C-482/17 R, Czech Republic v Parliament and Council (order), 2018, paras 57–63 (rejected). 163 See C-121/21 R, Czech Republic v Poland (order of 21 May), 2021, paras 62, 65–72 (satisfied). 164 See T-131/16 R, Belgium v Commission (order), 2016, para. 24; T-95/21 R, Portugal v Commission (order), 2021, para. 25. This applies to other entities of public law responsible for protecting the economic, social, and cultural interests at national, regional, or local level: see T-312/07, Dimos Peramatos v Commission (order), 2007, paras 36–44; T-446/09 R, Escola Superior Agrária de Coimbra v Commission (order) 2010, paras 25–33; T-18/10 R II, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami v Parliament and Council (order), 2010, paras 52–54; T-520/10 R, Comunidad Autonoma de Galicia v Commission (order), 2011, paras 62–78; compare T-601/11 R, Dansk Automat Brancheforening v Commission (order), 2012, paras 25–27; T-436/15 R, Consorzio Vivaisti viticoli pugliesi and Negro v Commission (order), 2015, para. 20; T-251/18 R, IFSUA v Council (order), 2018, paras 24, 28. 165 See C-239 and C-240/96 R, United Kingdom v Commission (order), 1996, para. 66. 166 See T-131/16 R, Belgium v Commission (order), 2016, para. 24; T-95/21 R, Portugal v Commission (order), 2021, para. 25. 167 See C-389/19 P(R), Commission v Sweden (order), 2019, paras 73–81. 168 See C-76/08 R, Commission v Malta (order), 2008, paras 33–43; Case C-573/08 R, Commission v Italy (order), 2009, paras 19–26; C-441/17 R, Commission v Poland (order), 2017, paras 72–80; C-791/19 R, Commission v Poland (order), 2020; C-204/21 R, Commission v Poland (order), 2021. 169 See 61/77 R II, Commission v Ireland (order), 1977, para. 14; 293/85 R, Commission v Belgium (order), 1985. 170 See 154/85 R, Commission v Italy (order), 1985, para. 19.

Consequences 561 that act by the Union Court giving judgment in the main action would make it possible to reverse the situation that would be brought about by its immediate implementation and, conversely, whether the suspension of operation of that act would be such as to prevent its being fully effective in the event of the main application being dismissed.171 Consequently, even where the interim relief Judge has found that the application in the main proceedings is prima facie not unreasonable and that the interim measures sought are urgent,172 he or she is not obliged to give an order imposing those measures if the applicant’s interest does not outweigh the possible effects of the interim measures on the interests of the opposing party,173 third parties,174 the public (Union)175 interest, or all of them taken together.176

IV. Consequences A. Provisional nature The decision on the application for interim measures takes the form of a reasoned order, which is served on the parties177 and is enforceable.178 The interim measure 171 See, e.g. C-162/15 P(R), Degussa v Commission (order), 2016, para. 103; C-791/19 R, Commission v Poland (order), 2020, para. 104; T-452/20 R, Facebook Ireland v Commission (order), 2020, para. 115; T-125/22 R, RT France v Council (order), 2022, para. 59. As regards the suspension of national legislation, see, e.g. C-204/21 R, Commission v Poland (order of 14 July), 2021, para. 142. 172 See, e.g. T-54/21 R, OHB System v Commission (order), 2021, paras 84, 101, 116 (although the prima facie case and urgency requirements were satisfied, the balance of interests was found to be in favour of not granting the interim measures sought). 173 See C-512/16 P(R), EMA v MSD Animal Health Innovation and Intervet International (order), 2017, paras 127–133. 174 See 92/78 R, Simmenthal v Commission (order), 1978, para. 18; T-65/08 R, Spain v Commission (order), 2008, para. 86; T-471/11 R, Editions Odile Jacob v Commission (order), 2011, paras 76–77. In principle, the interest of protection of public health takes precedence over economic interests: see T-574/18 R, Agrochem Maks v Commission (order), 2019, para. 91. The precautionary principle is also emphasized in this context: see T-476/17 R, Arysta LifeScience Netherlands v Commission (order), 2018, para. 111. 175 The range of potential public (Union) interests is broad. For a brief selection, as regards, e.g.: the functioning of the Union legal order, see C-619/18 R, Commission v Poland (order), 2019, paras 115–117; C-791/19 R, Commission v Poland (order), 2020; C-204/21 R, Commission v Poland (order), 2021; the proper functioning of representative democracy, C-629/21 P(R), Puigdemont i Casamajó and Others v Parliament and Spain (order), 2022, paras 249–263; protection against disinformation campaigns, T-125/22 R, RT France v Council (order), 2022, paras 60– 66; the fight against terrorism, see C-644/11 P(R), Qualitest v Council, 2012, paras 72–79; T-207/15 R, National Iranian Tanker Company v Council (order), 2015, paras 51–59; the protection of public health, see C-389/19 P(R), Commission v Sweden (order), 2019, paras 89–95; T-574/18 R, Agrochem-Maks v Commission (order), 2019, paras 87–100; the protection of the environment and the ecological heritage of the Union, see C-76/08 R, Commission v Malta (order), 2008, para. 48; C-441/17 R, Commission v Poland (order), 2017; C-121/21 R, Czech Republic v Poland (order of 21 May), 2021, paras 88–95 (also involving the protection of public health); the Union space program, T-54/21 R, OHB System v Commission (order), 2021, paras 111–116. In particular, in the context of State aid, it is often difficult for the applicant to demonstrate that its interest outweighs the public interest or other interests involved in seeing the particular State aid decision implemented (see T-176/11 R, Carbunion v Council (order), 2011, paras 36–43), but not impossible (see T-901/16 R, Elche Club de Fútbol v Commission (order), 2018, paras 122–125). 176 See T-114/06 R, Globe v Commission (order), 2006, para. 148. 177 See CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 162(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 158(1). 178 Enforcement of the order may be made conditional on the lodging by the applicant of security, of an amount and nature to be fixed in the light of the circumstances. See CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 162(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 158(2).

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562 PROCEEDINGS FOR INTERIM MEASURES BEFORE THE UNION COURTS lapses when final judgment is delivered or on the date fixed by the order.179 On application by a party, the order may at any time be varied or cancelled on account of a change in circumstances.180 Rejection of an application for an interim measure does not bar the party that made it from making a fresh application on the basis of new facts.181 The interim relief Judge will then consider whether the new facts justify the grant of the measures sought.182

B. Compliance 13.40

Starting in Commission v Poland,183 the Court of Justice has held that, if the interim relief Judge considers that the circumstances of the case require additional measures to be taken in order to ensure the effectiveness of the measures requested, he or she has the power under Article 279 TFEU, inter alia, to provide for a periodic penalty payment to be imposed on a party in the event that that party fails to comply with the interim measures ordered. As regards the amount of the penalty imposed, the Court has held, in the light of the case-law in the context of Art. 260(2) TFEU (see para. 5.84) that the interim relief Judge remains free to set the periodic penalty

179 See CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 162(3); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 158(3). 180 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 163; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 159. As regards the concept of ‘change in circumstances’, see C-440/01 P(R), Commission v Artegodan (order), 2002, in particular paras 61–65; C-121/21 R, Czech Republic v Poland (order of 20 September), 2021, para. 22; C-204/21 R-RAP, Commission v Poland (order), 2023, para. 11; T-244/17 R II, Conde and Companhia v Commission (order), 2017, paras 7–9. Simple repetition or development of arguments put forward by the party on the application for interim measures does not constitute a ‘change in circumstances’ in that regard. See C-121/21 R, Czech Republic v Poland (order of 20 September), 2021, para. 24. For an example where change of circumstances was found and an order for interim measures cancelled, see C-406/16 P(R), EMA v Pari Pharma (order), 2016. 181 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 164; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 160. The term ‘new facts’ for the purposes of those provisions means facts which appear after the order dismissing the first application for interim measures was made or which the applicant was not capable of invoking in the first application or during the proceedings leading to the first order and which are relevant to the assessment of the case in question. See T-849/19 R II, Leonardo v Frontex (order), 2020, para. 20. In contrast, where a further application seeks the grant of interim measures other than those sought in the previous application, it is examined on the basis of the general provisions of Arts 278 and 279 TFEU. See T-15/10 R II, Ngele v Commission (order), 2010, para. 7. Arguments challenging the findings made by the President of the General Court in the first order for interim measures fall outside the scope of Art. 160 of the GC Rules of Procedure and should instead be raised in an appeal against that order: see T-732/15 R II, ICA Laboratories and Others v Commission (order), 2016, para. 26. 182 For some examples resulting in dismissal of the application, see T-849/19 R II, Leonardo v Frontex (order) 2020; T-377/20 R II, KN v CESE (order), 2020; T-272/21 R II, Puigdemont i Casamajó and Others v Parliament (order), 2021. The relevant date for assessing the existence of new facts is the time of adoption of the interim order: see T-337/18 R II, Laboratoire Pareva v Commission (order), 2018, para. 12. 183 See C-441/17 R, Commission v Poland (order), 2017, paras 94–108; C-121/21 R, Czech Republic v Poland (order of 20 September), 2021, paras 34–37; C-204/21 R, Commission v Poland (order of 27 October), 2021, paras 18–20; see also C-791/19 R, Commission v Poland (order of 3 March), 2020, para. 3, and (order of 8 April) 2020, para. 2. See further L. Coutron, ‘La Cour de justice au secours de la forêt de Bialowieska : Coup de tonnerre dans le recours en manquement !’ (2018) R.T.D.E. 321; T. Martin, ‘Le large pouvoir d’appréciation du juge des référés au service de l’efficacité du droit de l’Union européenne’ (2018) C.D.E. 495; L. Prete, ‘Can’t See the Forest for the Trees? Penalties under Article 279 TFEU’, Yearbook on Procedural Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Max Planck Luxembourg for Procedural Law, 2019), 157; P. Wennerås, ‘Saving a Forest and the Rule of Law: Commission v. Poland’ (2019) C.M.L.Rev. 541.

Consequences 563 payment imposed at an amount and in a form which he or she considers adequate, since the periodic penalty payment fixed must be both appropriate to the circumstances and proportionate to the infringement established and the ability to pay of that Member State. 184 In Commission v Poland,185 the Court of Justice reserved its decision on the application of such measures, specifying the procedure to be carried out and indicating that if there was found to be an infringement, it would impose a periodic penalty payment of at least EUR 100,000 per day. Thereafter, in Czech Republic v Poland,186 the Vice-President of the Court of Justice ordered the Member State concerned to pay a periodic penalty payment of EUR 500,000 per day, having regard to the circumstances of the case and, in particular, the fact that the order related to interim measures with which compliance was necessary in order to avoid serious and irreparable harm to the environment and human health. Furthermore, in Commission v Poland,187 the Vice-President of the Court of Justice ordered the Member State concerned to pay a periodic penalty payment of EUR 1 million per day, taking into account the circumstances of the case and its ability to pay, in order to deter that Member State from delaying bringing its conduct in line with the interim order.

C. Costs While there are no provisions on costs in the CJ Rules of Procedure, Article 158(5) of the GC Rules of Procedure provides that the costs in proceedings for interim measures are reserved for the decision of the General Court on the substance of the case.188 Usually, costs follow the event in the main proceedings. Unless one of the parties raises the issue of the distribution of costs as between the proceedings for interim relief and the main proceedings (in which case, the Court of Justice or the General Court, as the case may be, will have to rule thereon), the order to pay the costs covers both the costs of the proceedings for interim measures and of the main proceedings.189

184 See C-204/21 R, Commission v Poland (order of 27 October), 2021, para. 22. 185 See C-441/17 R, Commission v Poland (order), 2017, paras 109–119. 186 See C-121/21 R, Czech Republic v Poland (order of 20 September), 2021, paras 47–51. 187 See C-204/21 R, Commission v Poland (order of 27 October), 2021, paras 42–64 (rejecting certain ‘mitigating circumstances’ put forward by the Member State concerned). See also C-204/21 R-RAP, Commission v Poland (order), 2023, paras 110–113 (rejecting request to cancel order of 27 October 2021, but reducing the amount of the penalty payment to EUR 500,000 per day). 188 However, if it appears justified in the light of the circumstances of the case, the decision on such costs may be given in the order in accordance with the general rules on the allocation of costs: see, e.g. T-766/16 R-RENV, Hércules Club de Fútbol v Commission (order), 2019, paras 10–11; in the context of an appeal before the Vice- President of the Court of Justice, see, e.g. C-565/17 P(R), BASF Grenzach v ECHA (order), 2018, para. 71. 189 See, e.g. C-482/17, Czech Republic v Parliament and Council, 2019, para. 172; T-568/19, Micreos Food Safety v Commission, 2020, para. 178.

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564 PROCEEDINGS FOR INTERIM MEASURES BEFORE THE UNION COURTS

D. Appeal 13.42

An appeal will lie to the Court of Justice against interim orders of the General Court within two months of their notification.190 Appeals are dealt with by way of summary procedure.191 Where the appeal is unfounded, according to Art. 184(2) of the CJ Rules of Procedure, the Court of Justice decides on the costs.192 There is no appeal against the decision on the application for interim measures before the Court of Justice.193

190 Statute, Art. 57, second para. Parties may bring an appeal against the interim order of the General Court, along with a separate application for interim measures for the suspension of that order and of the contested act and which can be the subject of an ex parte order under Art. 160(7) of the CJ Rules of Procedure. See, e.g. C-163/19 P(R)-R, Trifolio-M and Others v EFSA (order), 2019. 191 Statute, Art. 57, third para. Art. 61 of the Statute, providing that if the Court of Justice quashes the decision of the General Court, it may itself give judgment in the matter, where the state of the proceedings so permits, or refer the case back to the General Court for judgment, applies also to appeals brought in the context of proceedings for interim relief. Thus, in circumstances where the General Court erred in law in respect of one of the substantive requirements, without examining the others, the Court of Justice does not dispose of the necessary elements to decide the case and thus will refer it back to the General Court. See, e.g. C-646/19 P(R), Puigdemont i Casamajó and Comín i Oliveres v Parliament (order), 2019, paras 80–83. 192 See C-114/20 P(R), Anglo Austrian AAB and Belegging-Maatschappij ‘Far-East’ (order), 2020, para. 92. 193 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 162(1). See, e.g. C-121/21 R, Czech Republic v Poland (order of 20 September), 2021, para. 21.

14 PROCEEDINGS FOR AUTHORIZATION TO SERVE A GARNISHEE ORDER ON THE UNION I. Subject-Matter A. Principle and purpose Where a debtor fails to pay the sums owed, the creditor may seek to claim the funds owed by a third party to its debtor. However, where that third party is the Union,1 account should be taken of Art. 1 of the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union (the Protocol),2 which provides in relevant part: ‘The property and assets of the Union shall not be the subject of any administrative or legal measure of constraint without the authorisation of the Court of Justice.’3 The purpose of that provision is to ensure that there is no interference with the functioning and independence of the Union.4 Therefore, a garnishee order can be served on the Union only after prior authorization of the Court of Justice.5

1 Under the former Treaty framework, proceedings for authorization to serve a garnishee order concerned the European Communities. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, such proceedings are generally effected against the Union. As the EAEC Treaty still stands, proceedings may equally be brought against the European Atomic Energy Community. 2 As recognized in the case-law, a distinction is drawn between, on the one hand, immunity from jurisdiction, which constitutes an obstacle preventing national courts from deciding on the responsibility of another State or international organization (see C-641/18, Rina, 2020, para. 56; C-186/18, Supreme Site Services and Others, AG Saugmandsgaard Øe Opinion, 2020, points 59–64), and, on the other hand, immunity from execution, which, as expressed in Art. 1 of the Protocol, prohibits the authorities of a State from carrying out any forced execution on the property and assets of another State or international organization without its consent. The purpose of immunity from execution is precisely to relieve the State or international organization concerned of any administrative or jurisdictional constraint resulting from the application of a judgment (see C-154/11, Mahamdi, AG Mengozzi Opinion, 2012, point 28). It is worth noting that issues pertaining to the interaction between such proceedings and the scope of the Court of Justice’s jurisdiction in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) have not yet arisen in its case-law. 3 Protocol (No. 7) on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union, annexed to the TEU, the TFEU, and the EAEC Treaty (OJ 2016 C202/266), Art. 1. 4 See, e.g. C-1/15 SA, Shotef v Commission (order), 2015, para. 12; C-2/15 SA, ANKO v Commission (order), 2015, para. 12; C-675/19 SA, Ramon v Commission, 2020, para. 24; C-593/20 SA, Moro and Others v Commission (order), 2021, para. 14. 5 In certain older judgments, the Court has referred to ‘attachment order’ instead of ‘garnishee order’, though no difference in meaning appears to be intended: see, e.g. C-1/71 SA, X v Commission (order), 1971.

EU Procedural Law. Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak, Oxford University Press. © Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833086.003.0014

14.01

566 PROCEEDINGS FOR AUTHORIZATION TO SERVE A GARNISHEE ORDER

B. Competent Union Court 14.02

The Court of Justice has exclusive jurisdiction over these proceedings, since Art. 256(1) TFEU and the Statute do not confer jurisdiction on the General Court with respect to actions brought under Art. 1 of the Protocol. The Court adopts an order, after hearing the Advocate General. According to its normal procedure, the Court frequently decides the case in a chamber of five Judges.6

II. Identity of the Parties A. Applicants 14.03

Proceedings for authorization to serve a garnishee order on a Union institution have been brought by natural or legal persons in relation to the amounts owed by the institution to the party’s debtor. Nothing precludes a Member State from bringing an application for authorization to serve a garnishee order on the Union. To date, however, no Member State has done so. So far, there is no case-law regarding proceedings for a garnishee order lodged against a Union body, office, or agency.7 Nevertheless, in all likelihood, a Union body, office, or agency may be a defendant to proceedings for authorization to serve a garnishee order on the Union.

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It is the Union institution or body, office, or agency, as the case may be, which owes sums to the applicant’s debtor that will be summoned before the Court of Justice. To date, all applications have been brought against the Commission (along with the former High Authority of the ECSC8).9

6 See para. 2.11. For cases decided by three-Judge chambers, see, e.g. C-1/11 SA, Marcuccio v Commission (order), 2012; C-1/15 SA, Shotef v Commission (order), 2015; C-593/20 SA, Moro and Others v Commission (order), 2021. Older cases were decided by larger formations: see, e.g. C-1/71 SA, X v Commission (order), 1971; C-1/00 SA, Cotecna Inspection v Commission (order), 2001. 7 Recent case-law generally refers to a Union institution: see, e.g. C-1/11 SA, Marcuccio v Commission (order), 2012, para. 22; C-2/15 SA, ANKO v Commission (order), 2015, para. 12. 8 See 4/62 SA, Hübner v High Authority, 1962. 9 See 64/63 SA, Potvin v Commission (order), 1963; 1/71 SA, X v Commission (order), 1971; 2/71 SA, X v Commission (order), 1971; 1/87 SA, Universe Tankship v Commission (order), 1987; 1/88 SA, Générale de Banque v Commission (order), 1989; C-1/00 SA, Cotecna Inspection v Commission (order), 2001; C-1/02 SA, Antippas v Commission (order), 2003; C-1/03 SA, Icon Institute v Commission (order removing from register), 2004; C-1/04 SA, Tertir-Terminais de Portugal v Commission (order), 2004; C-1/05 SA, Intek v Commission (order), 2005; C-2/05 SA, Names v Commission (order), 2005; C-3/05 SA, Statistical Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan v Commission (order), 2005; C-4/05 SA, Alt Ylmy v Commission (order), 2005; C-5/05 SA, Fil do Nascimento and Others v Commission (order), 2005; C-1/11 SA, Marcuccio v Commission (order), 2012; C-1/15 SA, Shotef v Commission (order), 2015; C-2/15 SA, ANKO v Commission (order), 2015; C-675/19 SA, Ramon v Commission (order), 2020; C-593/20 SA, Moro and Others v Commission (order), 2021; C-742/22 SA, Ramon v Commission, pending.

Special Characteristics 567

III. Special Characteristics A. Automatic immunity The immunity provided for in Art. 1 of the Protocol is automatic, and precludes, in the absence of authorization by the Court, the execution of any measure of constraint against the Union, without the institution concerned having to expressly invoke the benefit of the provisions of Art. 1 of the Protocol, in particular, by giving notice to the person who caused the national court’s order to be issued. Under those circumstances it is for the latter person to seek authorization from the Court to waive the immunity.10 However, if the institution concerned states that it has no objection to the measure of constraint, the application for authorization is devoid of purpose and need not be examined by the Court.11 It follows that the possibility of garnishing a debt under national law is suspended until the immunity of the Union is lifted, either by waiver on the part of the institution concerned or by authorization of the Court, irrespective of any time-limit laid down by national law.12

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It also follows from the interpretation of Art. 1 of the Protocol that the Union’s immunity is not absolute and that a measure of constraint such as a garnishee order may be authorized if it is not liable to interfere with the Union’s functioning.13 The Court of Justice has held that a decision refusing to authorize a measure of constraint and adopted in accordance with that interpretation cannot be regarded as an unlawful or disproportionate interference with the exercise of fundamental rights in the Union legal order and, in particular, the right to property and the right of access to a court which forms an integral part of the right to a fair trial.14

B. Limited jurisdiction It is neither the object nor the effect of Art. 1 of the Protocol to substitute review by the Court of Justice for that exercised by the national court having jurisdiction to determine whether all the conditions for a garnishee order are actually satisfied. Thus, the determination of the question of the garnishee’s indebtedness to the debtor does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, but within that of the competent national

10 See, e.g. C-182/91, Forafrique Burkinabe v Commission, 1993, para. 12; C-1/11 SA, Marcuccio v Commission (2012), para. 22; C-2/15 SA, ANKO v Commission (order), 2015, para. 12. 11 See, e.g. 1/71 SA, X v Commission (order), 1971, paras 7, 9; 1/87 SA, Universe Tankship v Commission (order), 1987, paras 4–7; C-1/94 SA, Dupret v Commission (order), 1995, paras 3–5; C-5/05 SA, Fil do Nascimento and Others v Commission (order), 2005, paras 15–17; see also C-1/11 SA, Marcuccio v Commission (order), 2012, paras 23–31: where there is a decision of a Union Court having the force of res judicata, there is no need to authorize a garnishee in execution of a judgment of a national court ruling on an application having the same subject-matter. 12 See C-182/91, Forafrique Burkinabe v Commission, 1993, para. 14. 13 See C-593/20 SA, Moro and Others v Commission (order), 2021, para. 15. 14 See C-1/04 SA, Tertir-Terminais de Portugal v Commission (order), 2004, paras 11–13.

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568 PROCEEDINGS FOR AUTHORIZATION TO SERVE A GARNISHEE ORDER court.15 The Court of Justice’s competence with respect to garnishee orders is confined to considering whether such measures are likely, in view of the effects which they have under the applicable national law, to interfere with the proper functioning and the independence of the Union.16 However, the Court can make such an assessment only if the indebtedness is not contested by the Union institution concerned, or has been found in a prior judgment of a national court.17

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The Court of Justice has consistently held that the functioning of the Union may be impeded by measures of constraint which affect the financing of common policies or the implementation of action programmes established by the Union.18 Since applications for authorization to serve a garnishee order on the Union normally concern funds that the Union decided to allocate to the financing of a common policy19 or the implementation of an action programme,20 such applications will rarely be successful.21

15 See, e.g. C-1/02 SA, Antippas v Commission (order), 2003, para. 13; C-1/05 SA, Intek v Commission (order), 2005, para. 15; C-5/05 SA Fil do Nascimento and Others v Commission, 2005, para. 13; C-675/19 SA, Ramon v Commission, 2020, para. 25. 16 See, e.g. C-1/00 SA, Cotecna Inspection v Commission (order), 2001, para. 10; C-1/02 SA, Antippas v Commission (order), 2003, para. 14; C-1/05 SA, Intek v Commission (order), 2005, para. 14; C-5/05 SA, Fil do Nascimento and Others v Commission (order), 2005, para. 12; C-675/19 SA, Ramon v Commission, 2020, para. 26. 17 See C-1/05 SA, Intek v Commission (order), 2005, paras 16–22; C-2/05 SA, Names v Commission (order), 2005, paras 16–22; C-3/05 SA, Statistical Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan v Commission (order), 2005, paras 16–22; C-4/05 SA, Alt Ylmy v Commission (order), 2005, paras 16–22; C-5/05 SA, Fil do Nascimento and Others v Commission (order), 2005, paras 18–21; C-2/15 SA, ANKO v Commission (order), 2015, paras 13–17. In certain cases, the Court has examined a garnishment application despite the fact that the existence of a specific debt was contested: see, in particular, C-1/02 SA, Antippas v Commission (order), 2003, paras 6, 10, 15–20. However, such an approach seems to have been superseded by more recent case-law: see, e.g. C-675/19 SA, Ramon v Commission, 2020, paras 30–32. 18 See, e.g. C-593/20 SA, Moro and Others v Commission (order), 2021, para. 16. 19 See C-1/04 SA, Tertir-Terminais de Portugal v Commission (order), 2004, paras 15–24 (common fisheries policy). 20 See C-1/00 SA, Cotecna Inspection v Commission (order), 2001, paras 13–17; C-1/02 SA, Antippas v Commission (order), 2003, paras 16–20; C-1/15 SA, Shotef v Commission (order), 2015, paras 15–16; C-593/20 SA, Moro and Others v Commission (order), 2021, paras 17–19. These cases involved action programmes in the field of EU development aid. 21 For a successful application, see 1/88 SA, Générale de Banque v Commission (order), 1989, paras 13–16 (involving sums owed by the Union to Belgium in respect of rent).

15 JURISDICTION OF THE UNION COURTS TO GIVE JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO AN ARBITRATION CLAUSE OR A SPECIAL AGREEMENT I. Art. 272 TFEU A. Subject-Matter (1) General overview (a) Arbitration clause Under Art. 335 TFEU, the Union, which has legal personality,1 enjoys in each of the Member States the most extensive legal capacity accorded to legal persons under national law. The Union’s participation in legal transactions may give rise to contractual disputes having to be decided judicially. Art. 272 TFEU authorizes the Union and parties contracting with it to confer jurisdiction over such disputes on the Court of Justice of the European Union pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in a contract governed by private or public law concluded by or on behalf of the Union.2 As the Treaties do not contain any rules regarding the wording or the form of an arbitration clause, any wording that reveals the parties’ intention to remove any dispute between them relating to the contract concerned from the jurisdiction of the national courts in favour of the Union Courts must be regarded as an arbitration clause within the meaning of Art. 272 TFEU.3 In the absence of such a clause, the

1 Art. 47 TEU. 2 Art. 272 TFEU states: ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction to give judgment pursuant to any arbitration clause contained in a contract concluded by or on behalf of the Union, whether that contract be governed by public or private law.’ Comparable provisions concerning the Union Courts’ jurisdiction to give judgment pursuant to an arbitration clause in relation to the European Atomic Energy Community’s contractual liability used to be found in Art. 153 EAEC and the first paragraph of Art. 188 EAEC. In tandem with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, however, there is a new consolidated version of the EAEC Treaty, whereby the first paragraph of Art. 188 EAEC remains applicable, but Art. 153 EAEC has been repealed and Art. 272 TFEU is now applicable. There was also a provision comparable to Art. 272 TFEU in the now-expired ECSC Treaty as regards the Court of Justice’s jurisdiction to give judgment pursuant to an arbitration clause set forth in Art. 42 ECSC. 3 See C‑294/02, Commission v AMI Semiconductor Belgium and Others, 2005, para. 50. See further para. 15.16.

EU Procedural Law. Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak, Oxford University Press. © Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833086.003.0015

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570 ARBITRATION CLAUSE OR SPECIAL AGREEMENT national courts have jurisdiction under national law to settle any such disputes under Art. 274 TFEU.4

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(b) Objective There are a number of grounds which may prompt the conclusion of an arbitration clause that confers jurisdiction on the Union Courts within the meaning of Art. 272 TFEU. The Court of Justice of the European Union constitutes the meeting place of a number of legal cultures, as a result of which it may be regarded as a suitable forum for deciding a dispute relating to an international contract. Moreover, an arbitration clause is a means of avoiding a national court’s adjudicating a contractual dispute in which important Union interests are at stake. The Union through its institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies may also want to bring any contractual disputes before a natural court under a procedure with which it is familiar. In addition, it is essential for the proper administration of justice not to have multiple courts having jurisdiction in respect of one single contract and to prevent conflicting decisions.5 (c) Contracts relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy In H v Council and Commission,6 the Court of Justice decided that the Union Courts have jurisdiction to review acts of staff management in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), even when they concern the performance of activities undertaken at theatre level. Building on this judgment, the General Court has accepted jurisdiction for disputes related to employment contracts in the context of the CFSP, provided that an arbitration clause is included in the employment contract concerned.7 While the Court of Justice has not pronounced itself directly on the question, it has not disputed the jurisdiction of the Union Courts of its own motion in the context of appeals against judgments of the General Court in which the latter had accepted jurisdiction to hear a contractual dispute on the basis of an arbitration clause included in employment contracts concluded by an EU mission.8 Thus, while jurisdiction of the Union Courts on the basis of Art. 272 TFEU in CFSP matters is not absolutely excluded, it remains to be seen whether this case-law also

4 Art. 274 TFEU provides: ‘Save where jurisdiction is conferred on the Court of Justice of the European Union by the Treaties, disputes to which the Union is a party shall not on that ground be excluded from the jurisdiction of the courts or tribunals of the Member States.’ In the absence of an arbitration clause within the meaning of Art. 272 TFEU, the Court of Justice or the General Court lacks jurisdiction to rule on any liability in contract. In that event, the fact that the parties have brought their dispute before the Union Courts cannot be regarded as an expression of their intention to confer on the Union Courts jurisdiction over disputes arising out of an agreement: see T-180/95, Nutria v Commission (order), 1997, paras 37–40. As regards the Union Courts’ jurisdiction in relation to contractual versus non-contractual liability claims, see further para. 15.10. 5 See C-623/11, Geodis Calberson GE, 2013, para. 32. 6 See C-455/14 P, H v Council and Commission, 2016, paras 54–60. 7 See T-763/16, PY v EUCAP Sahel Niger, 2018, paras 51–53. Compare T-410/13, Bitiqi and Others v Commission and Others (order), 2014; T-302/18, Sógor v Council and Others (order), 2018. 8 See C-43/17 P, Jenkinson v Eulex Kosovo, 2018; C-730/18 P, SC v Eulex Kosovo, 2020; T‑602/15 RENV, Jenkinson v Council and Others, 2021, para. 68 (appeal pending in C-46/22 P). For a discussion on the jurisdiction of the Union Courts on the basis of arbitration clauses in CFSP matters, see C-730/18 P, SC v Eulex Kosovo, AG Tanchev Opinion, 2020, points 46–64.

Art. 272 TFEU 571 extends to agreements other than employment contracts.9 One could take the view that the Union’s contractual liability is rooted in a (public or private) contract between the parties concerned, as opposed to an act adopted under the Treaties pursuant to the provisions concerning the CFSP and hence the Union Courts’ jurisdiction pursuant to an arbitration clause within the meaning of Art. 272 TFEU may not be precluded by rules restricting the Union Courts’ jurisdiction in these fields, as provided in Art. 24(1), second subpara. TEU and Art. 275 TFEU. (2) What contracts are concerned? (a) Contract concluded by or on behalf of the Union As has already been noted, under Art. 272 TFEU, the Union Courts may have jurisdiction to give judgment pursuant to an arbitration clause ‘contained in a contract concluded by or on behalf of the Union, whether that contract be governed by public or private law’. The case-law so far has not yet made it clear what is meant by a public-law contract in this context. What may be meant is agreements concluded by the Union (or its Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies) with Member States, third countries, or international organizations (whether or not in the form of a convention) and administrative agreements concluded with individuals.10 Private-law contracts presumably denote all contracts into which the Union enters as a party to normal legal transactions. However, an arbitration clause is not always contained in a contract. A Union regulation can refer a whole class of pre-defined contractual disputes to the Union Courts.11 (b) Union institutions, bodies, offices, agencies, or other entities The stipulation that the contract may be concluded ‘on behalf of the Union’ undoubtedly indicates that entities which are not institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies may nevertheless include an arbitration clause in a contract concluded by them on behalf of the Union. This is, for example, the case for joint undertakings12 or EU missions.13 (3) Nature and extent of the Union Courts’ jurisdiction pursuant to an arbitration clause (a) Allocation of jurisdiction between the Court of Justice and the General Court The General Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine at first instance actions based on Art. 272 TFEU.14 Before 1 June 2004, the situation was that, in the case 9 In relation to public procurement contracts, see C-439/13 P, Elitaliana v Eulex Kosovo, 2015, paras 41–50. 10 See C-220/03, ECB v Germany, 2005, paras 22–27, in which the Court upheld its jurisdiction involving an arbitration clause contained in the Agreement of 18 September 1998 concluded between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the European Central Bank (ECB) on the seat of that institution. See also T-591/17, EIB v Syrian Arab Republic, 2019, paras 14–15, in which the General Court accepted jurisdiction on the basis of an arbitration clause included in a loan agreement between the Union and the Syrian Arab Republic regarding a water supply project. 11 See C-623/11, Geodis Calberson GE, 2013, paras 29–33. 12 See T-238/16, Clean Sky 2 Joint Undertaking v Scouring Environment, 2017, para. 19. 13 See T-763/16, PY v EUCAP Sahel Niger, 2018, paras 50–52. See also C-283/20, CO and Others, 2022, paras 43–47. 14 See C-43/17 P, Jenkinson v Eulex Kosovo, 2018, para. 37; T-165/20, JC v EUCAP Somalia, 2022, para. 30; T-194/20, JF v EUCAP Somalia, 2022, para. 49. There is a request to amend Art. 58a of the Statute which

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572 ARBITRATION CLAUSE OR SPECIAL AGREEMENT of a contract concluded between what was then the Community (now the Union) and a natural or legal person, disputes could be brought before either the Court of Justice or the former Court of First Instance (now General Court), depending on whether the applicant was the Community or an individual. The Court of Justice had jurisdiction if the Community initiated the proceedings,15 whereas the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction if they were brought by a natural or legal person.16 This split jurisdiction had the result that a private party which was a defendant in proceedings brought before the Court of Justice by the Community pursuant to an arbitration clause had only one chance of putting over its defence, whereas if the Community was the defendant in proceedings brought by a natural or legal person it might have a second chance, if it lost, by appealing the decision of the Court of First Instance to the Court of Justice. This lack of symmetry in the contracting parties’ position as litigants was brought to an end by the entry into force of Council Decision 2004/407/EC, Euratom of 26 April 2004, which amended Art. 51 of the Statute.17 Consequently, as from 1 June 2004, all claims under Art. 272 TFEU are to be brought before the General Court at first instance and on appeal to the Court of Justice.18 An appeal to the Court of Justice is limited to questions of law (see Ch. 19). Since the interpretation of a term of contract by the General Court concerns a question of fact, it cannot be reviewed by the Court of Justice in the context of an appeal, save where the clear meaning of a contractual term has been distorted.19

would, inter alia, extend the scope of the preliminary admission mechanism for appeals to appeals brought against decisions of the General Court relating to the performance of a contract containing an arbitration clause within the meaning of Art. 272 TFEU. See Request submitted by the Court of Justice pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 281 [TFEU], with a view to amending Protocol (No. 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, available on the Court’s website (under ‘Institution’, ‘Various documents’). 15 See C-356/99, Commission v Hitesys, 2000. 16 An application brought before the Court of Justice by an individual pursuant to an arbitration clause was referred by that Court to the former Court of First Instance (now the General Court): see T-10/98, E-Quattro v Commission, 1999, paras 8–9. Where, with regard to the same contract, the Community (now Union) brought proceedings in the Court of Justice and the individual concerned brought proceedings in the then Court of First Instance, the Court of Justice referred the case before it to the Court of First Instance as a counterclaim. Compare C-280/03, Commission v Lior and Others (order), 2003, para. 9, in which the Court of Justice did not regard the Commission’s claim as a counterclaim, on the grounds that it had been lodged two years after the proceedings had been initiated in the then Court of First Instance and that the claim brought before the Court of Justice was directed not only against the applicant in the proceedings before the Court of First Instance, but also against other undertakings. 17 Council Decision 2004/407/EC, Euratom of 26 April 2004 amending Arts 51 and 54 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice (OJ 2004 L132/5); corrigendum in OJ 2004 L194/3. See para. 2.44. 18 Art. 256(1), first para. TFEU; Statute, Art. 51. This is so even if a Member State may be a party to the dispute; under the aforementioned Arts, there is no provision for the Court of Justice to have jurisdiction at first instance in claims brought under Art. 272 TFEU. In cases where an arbitration clause stipulates the jurisdiction of the ‘Court of Justice’, these words have been interpreted as designating the institution of the Court of Justice of the European Union referred to in Art. 272 TFEU, which comprises the General Court as the competent court at first instance: see T-271/04, Citymo v Commission, 2007, para. 57. 19 See C-78/14 P, Commission v ANKO, 2015, paras 21–24; C-428/17 P, Meta Group v Commission, 2019, paras 23–24.

Art. 272 TFEU 573 (b) Expression ‘arbitration clause’ is misleading The expression ‘arbitration clause’ employed in Art. 272 TFEU is misleading. Where the General Court gives judgment pursuant to an ‘arbitration clause’, it acts not as an arbitrator, but as a court giving judgments which may be directly enforced. (c) Jurisdiction of national courts The arbitration clause may or may not give the Court of Justice of the European Union exclusive jurisdiction. If the clause confers an exclusive right on the Court of Justice of the European Union (namely, the General Court at first instance and the Court of Justice on appeal) to hear and determine disputes concerning a contract, courts in Member States must decline jurisdiction by reason of the primacy of Union law (i.e. compliance with the arbitration clause concluded pursuant to Art. 272 TFEU). If a number of courts, including the General Court, are entitled to determine disputes under the arbitration clause, a problem of lis alibi pendens may arise. No specific rules are set forth in the Treaties (or the procedural texts of the Union Courts) for resolving this problem.

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In case the jurisdiction of the Union Courts on the basis of Art. 272 TFEU is disputed, it falls on the General Court to determine the question of jurisdiction solely with regard to Art. 272 TFEU and the terms of the arbitration clause.20 National provisions cannot exclude the jurisdiction of the Union Courts.21 The same goes for the opposite situation. The General Court is not bound by the decision of a national court declining jurisdiction in favour of the Union Courts.22 In case a national court doubts whether it has jurisdiction to hear a dispute regarding a contract to which the Union is a party, a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling thus seems warranted. (d) Extent of jurisdiction of the General Court The extent of the General Court’s jurisdiction emerges from the arbitration clause itself.23 Because that jurisdiction is conferred by derogation from the ordinary rules of law, it must be given a restrictive interpretation, so that only claims and pleas arising from the contract containing the arbitration clause or directly connected therewith may be entertained.24

20 See C-43/17 P, Jenkinson v Eulex Kosovo and Others, 2018, para. 39. 21 See C-564/13 P, Planet v Commission, 2015, para. 21. 22 See T-302/18, Sógor v Council and others (order), 2018, paras 19–20. Likewise, decisions of national courts cannot affect the exclusive jurisdiction of the Union Courts on the basis of Art. 272 TFEU: see T-48/16, Sigma Orionis v Commission, 2018, para. 70. 23 See 1/56, Bourgaux v Common Assembly, 1954–1956 ECR 361, 367; T-401/07, Caixa Geral de Depósitos v Commission, 2011, para. 99. The Union Courts may inquire into whether the contract incorporating the arbitration clause has been rescinded under the law applicable to the contract (C-274/97, Commission v Coal Products, 2000, paras 17–18). 24 See C-43/17 P, Jenkinson v Eulex and Others, 2018, paras 38, 40. See also para. 15.10. The Union Courts may adjudicate under an arbitration clause on a claim for damages for non-performance of the contract based on the law applicable to the contract that provides for such compensation (C-69/97, Commission v SNUA, 1999, paras 35–36).

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574 ARBITRATION CLAUSE OR SPECIAL AGREEMENT That being said, it is possible that the Union Courts take cognizance of a cluster of contracts concluded by the parties on the basis of an arbitration clause contained in only one (or some) of the contracts.25 Thus, the Court of Justice has held in Jenkinson v Eulex Kosovo and Others26 that, in case of successive fixed-term employment contracts, of which only the last contract contains an arbitration clause in favour of the Court of Justice of the European Union whereas the preceding contracts contain arbitration clauses in favour of national courts, the jurisdiction of the General Court may extend to the preceding employment contracts, provided that the application by the party concerned contains claims arising under the final contract or claims which are directly connected with the obligations arising from that contract. Furthermore, if the arbitration clause does not limit the scope of the General Court’s jurisdiction, it may entertain any claim arising from a contract or directly connected to it and is not restricted to claims of a particular nature.27 Thus, provided that the arbitration clause does not exclude it, the General Court may hear an action for declaratory relief in the context of Art. 272 TFEU.28 Counterclaims made by the defendant which are directly based on the contract are likewise admissible.29 Conversely, claims falling outside the scope of the arbitration clause will be dismissed.30 Further to this, even when an agreement contains an arbitration clause without limitations, the claim brought on the basis of Art. 272 TFEU should always be of a contractual nature.31 Consequently, for example, a claim based on the other party’s having been unjustly enriched inevitably falls outside the scope of the contractual relations between the parties because it is not of a contractual nature.32

25 See 109/81, Porta v Commission, 1982, para. 10. 26 See C-43/17 P, Jenkinson v Eulex Kosovo and Others, 2018, para. 45; T-242/17 RENV, SC v Eulex Kosovo, 2022, para. 38. 27 See C-346/18 P, Rose Vision v Commission, 2019, para. 100; see also T-242/17 RENV, SC v Eulex Kosovo, 2022, paras 40–44. 28 See C-564/13 P, Planet v Commission, 2015, paras 25–26. 29 See C-114/94, IDE v Commission, 1997, paras 82–83; T-195/18, Talanton Anonymi Emporiki v Commission, 2020, para. 42. In T-85/01, IAMA Consulting v Commission (order), 2003, para. 62, the then Court of First Instance (which at that time could only hear actions brought by natural and legal persons) referred a counterclaim brought by the Commission to the Court of Justice after it had determined that the applicant’s main claim was inadmissible. However, the Court of Justice referred the case back to the Court of First Instance (C-517/03, IAMA Consulting v Commission (order), 2004). It did this on the grounds that it is implicit in the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to entertain the main claim, with the result that it also has jurisdiction to entertain a counterclaim. 30 See T-302/04, MEAM v Commission (order), 2008, paras 27–29; T-387/07, Portugal v Commission, 2011, para. 115; T-401/07, Caixa Geral de Depósitos v Commission, 2011, para. 101. In T-149/00 R, Innova v Commission (order), 2000, the President of the General Court held that that Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate proceedings relating to the termination by the Commission of a contract concluded with an organization that included a term conferring jurisdiction over disputes relating to the performance of the contract on the Brussels courts. The applicant argued that the jurisdiction of the Brussels courts concerned only disputes relating to the performance of the contract, not the Commission’s decision to terminate the contract itself. The President of the General Court dismissed this argument on the grounds that there was a direct connection between the contract and the dispute: see Innova v Commission (order), para. 21. 31 See T-136/09, Commission v Gal-Or, 2010, paras 34–35. 32 See C-330/88, Grifoni v EAEC, 1991, para. 20.

Art. 272 TFEU 575 (4) Relationship between claims of a contractual nature and other type of claims (a) Contractual versus non-contractual liability claims The Union Courts’ jurisdiction to hear and determine an action for damages differs according to the contractual or non-contractual nature of the liability involved. For the purposes of the Union’s contractual liability under the first paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU, the Union Courts have jurisdiction only if there is an arbitration clause within the meaning of Art. 272 TFEU; otherwise, pursuant to Art. 274 TFEU, jurisdiction to adjudicate an action based on the Union’s contractual liability falls within the jurisdiction of the national courts. In contrast, the Union Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate actions concerning the Union’s non-contractual liability under Art. 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU, without the need for the parties concerned to express their consent (see para. 11.07).33 Consequently, the Union Courts may have to determine the nature (contractual or non-contractual) of the dispute in order to assess their jurisdiction.34 In that regard, they must examine—by reference to the various relevant matters in the file, such as, for example, the rule of law allegedly infringed, the nature of the damage claimed, the conduct complained of, and the legal relations between the parties in question—whether there exists between them a genuine contractual context, linked to the subject-matter of the dispute, the in-depth examination of which proves to be indispensable for the resolution of the said action; if a preliminary analysis of those matters shows that it is necessary to interpret one or more contracts concluded between the parties in question in order to establish whether the applicant’s claims are well-founded, the Union Courts are required at that point to halt their examination of the dispute and declare that they have no jurisdiction to rule thereon in the absence of an arbitration clause in the said contracts within the meaning of Art. 272 TFEU.35 This is because such an examination would imply the assessment of rights and obligations of a contractual nature, which can only be removed from the jurisdiction of the national courts by way of an arbitration clause.36 Further to this, the Court of Justice has held that the mere reliance on legal rules which did not follow from the contract in question but which were binding on

33 See C-103/11 P, Commission v Systran and Systran Luxembourg, 2013, paras 56–60. 34 See C-19/18 P, VG v Commission, 2019, para. 28; T-106/13, Synergy Hellas Anonymi Emporiki Etaireia Parochis Ypiresion Pliroforikis v Commission, 2015, para. 145. For example, in one case, although the application was brought pursuant to the second para. of Art. 340 TFEU governing the Union’s non-contractual liability, the General Court determined that the dispute was contractual in nature, but that this finding did not have the effect of excluding its jurisdiction, since the contracts in question contained an arbitration clause within the meaning of Art. 272 TFEU: see T-424/08, Nexus Europe (Ireland) v Commission, 2010, paras 59–61. See also C-377/09, Hanssens-Ensch v European Community, 2010, paras 16–20, rejecting the assertion that, in addition to contractual liability and non-contractual liability within the meaning of the second para. of Art. 340 TFEU, there is a third category of liability which, pursuant to Art. 274 TFEU, falls within the jurisdiction of the national courts (paras 22–25). 35 See C-103/11 P, Commission v Systran and Systran Luxembourg, 2013, paras 66–67. In this case, the Court of Justice held that the General Court had erred in classifying the dispute as non-contractual in nature and that the Union Courts did not have jurisdiction to hear the action for compensation brought by the applicants: see C-103/11 P, Commission v Systran and Systran Luxembourg, 2013, paras 75–86. See also T-194/20, JF v EUCAP Somalia, 2022, paras 42–47. 36 See C-103/11 P, Commission v Systran and Systran Luxembourg, 2013, para. 67.

15.10

576 ARBITRATION CLAUSE OR SPECIAL AGREEMENT the parties cannot have the consequence of altering the contractual nature of the dispute and removing it from the court with jurisdiction to determine it, since otherwise this would make the nature of the dispute and the court with jurisdiction susceptible to change depending on the norms invoked by the parties.37 That being said, it cannot be excluded that the contractual liability and the non- contractual liability of the Union may coexist in respect to a party with which it has concluded a contract. However, this would only be possible if the unlawful conduct attributed to the Union does not only constitute a breach of a contractual obligation, but also of a general obligation and, furthermore, that the breach of the general obligation resting with the Union has caused damage which is different from the damage resulting from the breach of the contractual obligation.38

15.11

15.12

(b) Contractual liability versus annulment claims (i) General Contractual acts of a Union institution, body, office, or agency are not regarded as acts exercising prerogatives of a public authority and hence cannot be the subject of an action for annulment under Art. 263 TFEU.39 Instead, claims related to such acts may be brought before the Union Courts pursuant to an arbitration clause within the meaning of Art. 272 TFEU, failing which the national courts have jurisdiction under Art. 274 TFEU. Moreover, a party cannot unilaterally circumvent the division of jurisdiction between the Union Courts and the national courts by causing the Union institution concerned to reject its request for compensation relating to a contract for the purposes of Art. 272 TFEU and then describing that rejection as a decision within the meaning of Art. 263 TFEU.40 (ii) Acts of public authority separable from the contractual relationship Union institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies remain public authorities while being engaged in a contractual relationship. It may not always be easy for a contracting partner to distinguish between acts of a purely contractual nature and acts adopted in the exercise of public authority. For example, the Commission may adopt an enforceable decision ordering the recovery of sums due by the contract partner under the contract. The distinction is important as it demarcates the jurisdictional boundary 37 See C-214/08 P, Guigard v Commission, 2009, para. 43; C-19/18 P, VG v Commission, 2019, para. 29; T-194/20, JF v EUCAP Somalia, 2022, para. 43. 38 See T-48/16, Sigma Orionis v Commission, 2018, paras 163–164. 39 See C-584/17 P, ADR Center v Commission, 2020, paras 62–65. 40 See T-44/96, Oleifici Italiani v Commission (order), 1997, para. 44; T-186/96, Mutual Aid Administration Services v Commission (order), 1997, para. 44; T-314/03 and T-378/03, Musée Grévin v Commission (order), 2004, paras 79–89. Compare T-26/00, Lecureur v Commission, 2001, paras 37–39, in which the General Court held that Art. 24 of Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2519/97 of 16 December 1997 laying down general rules for the mobilization of products to be supplied under Council Regulation (EC) No. 1292/96 as Community food aid (OJ 1997 L346/23), which provides that the Court of Justice is to be competent to resolve any dispute resulting from the implementation or the non-implementation or from the interpretation of the rules governing supply operations carried out in accordance with that Regulation, formed an integral part of the supply contract concluded on the basis of that Regulation and therefore had to be regarded as an arbitration clause. See, to the same effect, T-215/01, T-220/01, and T-221/01, Calberson GE v Commission, 2004, paras 11, 81–88; T-265/03, Helm Düngemittel v Commission (order), 2005, para. 46.

Art. 272 TFEU 577 between Art. 263 TFEU and Art. 272 TFEU, which also affects the division of jurisdiction between the Union Courts and the national courts. If it would be possible to bring an action for annulment against decisions of a purely contractual nature, this would not only risk rendering Art. 272 TFEU meaningless but, when the contract concerned does not contain an arbitration clause, would also encroach upon the jurisdiction of the national courts in breach of Art. 274 TFEU.41 Therefore, when a contract exists between an applicant and a Union institution, body, office, or agency, an action based on Art. 263 TFEU may only be brought where the contested act aims to produce binding legal effects falling outside the contractual relationship between the parties and which involve the exercise of the prerogatives of a public authority conferred on the contracting institution acting in its capacity as an administrative authority.42 In this regard, the Court of Justice has held that debit notes issued by the Commission constitute formal demands for payment that cannot be equated with enforceable orders and, consequently, fall within the scope of the contractual relationship and cannot be the subject of an action for annulment.43 Conversely, an act by which the Commission performs an out-of-court set-off between debts and claims arising from different legal relationships with the same person constitutes a reviewable act for the purposes of Art. 263 TFEU.44 The same goes for an enforceable recovery order within the meaning of Art. 299 TFEU unilaterally adopted by the Commission.45 A problem may arise if the Commission establishes contractual claims by way of enforceable decisions whereas the contractual agreement concerned does not contain an arbitration clause in favour of the Union Courts. Such enforceable decisions are acts of public authority that are not of a purely contractual nature, which means that the Union Courts would be competent to rule on the legality of such decisions on the basis of Art. 263 TFEU. However, this would amount to restricting the jurisdiction of the national courts and give the Commission the possibility of circumventing systematically the division of competences between the Union Courts and the national courts as laid down in Art. 274 TFEU. Therefore, the Court of Justice has held that the Commission’s power to adopt enforceable decisions in the framework of contractual relationships should be limited to contracts that contain an arbitration clause conferring jurisdiction on the Union Courts.46

41 See C-378/16 P, Inclusion Alliance for Europe v Commission, 2020, para. 73; C-584/17 P, ADR Center v Commission, 2020, para. 64. 42 See C-378/16 P, Inclusion Alliance for Europe v Commission, 2020, para. 74; C-584/17 P, ADR Center v Commission, 2020, para. 65; T-194/20, JF v EUCAP Somalia, 2022, para. 29. 43 See C-506/13 P, Lito Maieftiko Gynaikologiko kai Cheirourgiko Kentro v Commission, 2015, paras 23–25; T-4/20, Sieć Badawcza Łukasiewicz—Port Polski Ośrodek Rozwoju Technologii v Commission, 2022, paras 152–160. 44 See T-10/16, GABO:mi v Commission, 2018, para. 44. 45 See C-584/17 P, ADR Center v Commission, 2020, para. 69; T-4/20, Sieć Badawcza Łukasiewicz –Port Polski Ośrodek Rozwoju Technologii v Commission, 2022, para. 154; T-457/20, VeriGraft v Eismea, 2022, para. 55. 46 See C-378/16 P, Inclusion Alliance for Europe v Commission, 2020, para. 75; C-584/17 P, ADR Center v Commission, 2020, para. 73.

578 ARBITRATION CLAUSE OR SPECIAL AGREEMENT 15.13

(iii) Pleas relied upon in an action for annulment against an enforceable decision Traditionally, the case-law of the Union Courts has maintained a strict separation between actions based on Art. 263 TFEU and those based on Art. 272 TFEU. Thus, as an annulment action only concerns the legality of the contested act, pleas relating to the performance of the contract were held to be irrelevant or inadmissible. Likewise, an applicant could only rely on pleas of a contractual nature in an action based on an arbitration agreement pursuant to Art. 272 TFEU. Save for a few exceptions, pleas based on a violation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter) or general principles of Union law could not be invoked within the context of Art. 272 TFEU.47 In case parties would have relied on pleas not falling within the scope of the legal basis on which they had brought their action, the General Court has consented to the reclassification of the action for annulment as an action brought pursuant to Art. 272 TFEU (or vice versa), provided that the conditions for such reclassification are satisfied. In this regard, the General Court considered itself unable to reclassify an action for annulment where the applicant’s express intention is not to base its application on Art. 272 TFEU or where the action is not based on any plea alleging infringement of the rules governing the contractual relationship in question, whether they are contractual clauses or provisions of the national law designated in the contract.48 In ADR Center v Commission,49 the Court of Justice refined this case-law. The case concerned an action for annulment against an enforceable recovery decision issued by the Commission seeking the recovery of amounts unduly paid to ADR Center under a grant agreement. The applicant contested the legality of the recovery decision on grounds other than those listed in Art. 263 TFEU, namely, grounds related to the performance of the contract. While the General Court held that these pleas were inadmissible in the context of an action for annulment, the Court of Justice considered that maintaining such a strict separation between the two actions cannot guarantee that all questions of fact and law relevant to the resolution of the dispute will be examined in

47 See C-14/18 P, Alfamicro v Commission, 2019, paras 74–76; T-299/15, Nova Onlus Consorzio nazionale di cooperative sociali v Commission, 2018, para. 185. 48 For some examples in which reclassification was granted, see T-428/07 and T-455/07, CEVA v Commission, 2010, paras 57–64; T-184/15, Trivisio Prototyping v Commission, 2016, paras 61–65; T-306/15 and T-484/15, KV v EACEA, 2018, paras 47–53; T-108/18, Universität Koblenz-Landau v EACEA, 2021, paras 60–65. For some examples in which the actions for annulment could not be reclassified as applications based on Art. 272 TFEU, see T-252/10, Cross Czech v Commission (order), 2011, paras 62–64; T-353/10, Lito Maieftiko Gynaikologiko kai Cheirourgiko Kentro v Commission (order), 2011, paras 33–39; T-285/09, CEVA v Commission, 2011, paras 29– 35. Reclassification will also not be granted where there is no arbitration clause within the meaning of Art. 272 TFEU: see T-481/08, Alisei v Commission (order), 2010, paras 56–59; T-546/11, Technion and Technion Research & Development Foundation v Commission (order), 2012, paras 56–67. The case-law certainly does not preclude the reclassification of an action founded on Art. 272 TFEU as one brought under Art. 263 TFEU, but the General Court may find that even supposing such reclassification could be effected, the action is inadmissible as being brought out of time (T-601/15, CEVA v Commission (order), 2016, para. 28) or in the absence of a challengeable act (T-831/14, Alfamicro v Commission, 2017, para. 41). 49 See C-584/17 P, ADR Center v Commission, 2020, paras 87–88.

Art. 272 TFEU 579 order to ensure effective judicial protection under Art. 47 of the Charter. Consequently, the Court decided that in an action for annulment against an enforceable decision formally establishing a contractual claim, the Union Courts have jurisdiction to examine pleas of annulment based on matters of fact and law arising from the contractual relations between the Commission and the applicant. The same goes for counterclaims based on the performance of the contract in question.50 In addition to this, the Court of Justice decided that it is possible to rely on pleas based on an infringement of the Charter or the general principles of Union law in the context of an action based on Art. 272 TFEU. This is so because the Union institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies remain subject to their obligations under the Charter and general principles of Union law when performing a contract.51

B. Identity of the parties (1) Any party to the contract Any party bound by the contract embodying the arbitration clause has the right to bring a dispute before the General Court.52 However, if a person bringing or defending against a claim brought on the basis of Art. 272 TFEU is not a party to the contract containing the arbitration clause, the claim in relation to that person will be rejected.53 That being said, it is not excluded that a clause conferring jurisdiction may be the subject of a stipulation for the benefit of a third party.54 Moreover, a party lawfully subrogated in the rights of a party to the contract may bring an admissible action on the basis of the arbitration clause as well.55

50 See C-584/17 P, ADR Center v Commission, 2020, para. 88; T-165/20, JC v EUCAP Somalia, 2022, para. 32. 51 See C-378/16 P, Inclusion Alliance for Europe v Commission, 2020, paras 81–82; C-584/17 P, ADR Center v Commission, 2020, para. 86; C-371/21 P, SGI Studio Galli Ingegneria v Commission, 2022, para. 79; C-500/21 P, HIM v Commission, 2022, para. 41; T-606/18, Universität Koblenz-Landau v EACEA, 2021, para. 31; T-457/20, VeriGraft v Eismea, 2022, paras 51–54; T-194/20, JF v EUCAP Somalia, 2022, para 70; T-753/20, Green Power Technologies v Commission, 2022, paras 196–197. 52 A party must, however, show a vested and current interest in bringing proceedings under Art. 272 TFEU, even where that party to a contract is a Member State: see T-188/19, United Kingdom v Commission (order), 2019, paras 37–52. 53 See, T-245/04, Commission v Lior and Others (order), 2008; T-213/08 and T-213/08 AJ, Marinova v Université Libre de Bruxelles and Commission (order), 2008, paras 14–17; T-179/06, Commission v Burie Onderzoek en Advies, 2009, paras 60–69. In particular, where a natural person signs the contract merely on behalf of the entity concerned and not in his or her own name, that person is not deemed to be party to the contract: see T-449/04, Commission v Trends and Others (order), 2006; T-44/06, Commission v Hellenic Ventures and Others, 2010, paras 48–55. See, e.g. T-259/09, Commission v Arci Nuova associazione comitato di Cagliari and Gessa, 2010, paras 40–45, where the General Court ruled that since the natural person concerned signed the contract in the name of the association as president and the contract referred solely to the Commission and the association as parties to the contract, that natural person was not a party to the contract and the action brought against that person was to be dismissed. The General Court emphasized that its holding was not affected by the fact that the association concerned was not recognized under the applicable national law and that such law provided that persons who act in the name of such an association are personally responsible for its obligations, since that provision of national law cannot serve to circumvent the rules on jurisdiction of the Union Courts under Art. 272 TFEU. 54 See C-531/12 P, Commune de Millau v Commission, 2014, paras 50–51. 55 See T-591/17, EIB v Syrian Arab Republic, 2019, paras 21–23. See also C-283/20, CO and Others, 2022, para. 46. Moreover, there is nothing to prevent a party to a contract from assigning its rights to a successor. For an example, see C-209/90, Commission v Feilhauer, 1992, para. 5.

15.14

580 ARBITRATION CLAUSE OR SPECIAL AGREEMENT 15.15

(2) Legal capacity of the parties An action against a legal person, such as a company or partnership, is inadmissible if, when the action was brought, that entity had neither the legal capacity nor the standing to be a party to legal proceedings.56 An action brought against a dissolved company will thus be inadmissible. Similarly, an action brought against a party against which insolvency proceedings have been instituted will also be inadmissible.57 As mentioned earlier, the reference in Art. 272 TFEU to ‘a contract concluded by or on behalf of the Union’ encompasses contracts concluded by Union institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies, as well as other entities acting on behalf of the Union (see para. 15.05). With particular regard to the European Central Bank, although it is now listed as a Union institution in the second paragraph of Art. 13(1) TEU, it has separate legal personality, and as such there can be found a provision comparable to Art. 272 TFEU in Art. 35.4 of Protocol (No. 4) on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.58

C. Special characteristics 15.16

(1) Requirements relating to validity of arbitration clause As the Treaties do not contain any rules regarding the wording or the form of an arbitration clause, any wording that reveals the parties’ intention to remove any dispute between them relating to the contract concerned from the jurisdiction of the national courts in favour of the Union Courts must be regarded as an arbitration clause within the meaning of Art. 272 TFEU.59 Moreover, while it can be inferred from Art. 78(3) of the GC Rules of Procedure, under which the application must be accompanied by a copy of the contract containing that clause, that an arbitration clause should in

56 See T-464/09, Commission v New Acoustic Music Association and Hildibrandsdottir, 2011, paras 43–53, in which the General Court, looking to the applicable national law in which the partnership concerned was established, found that legal proceedings could be instituted against the partners only, in the name of the partnership, and not against the partnership as such, and thus declared the action inadmissible insofar as it was brought against the partnership concerned. 57 See C-294/02, Commission v AMI Semiconductor Belgium and Others, 2005, paras 60, 66–72. 58 Art. 35.4 of the Protocol (No. 4), annexed to the TEU and the TFEU, on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (OJ 2012 C326/230) states: ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction to give judgment pursuant to any arbitration clause contained in a contract concluded by or on behalf of the ECB, whether that contract be governed by public or private law.’ For an example of an action brought by the ECB on the basis of Art. 272 TFEU, see C-220/03, ECB v Germany, 2005 (involving an arbitration clause contained in the Agreement of 18 September 1998 concluded between Germany and the ECB on the seat of that institution). 59 See C-294/02, Commission v AMI Semiconductor Belgium and Others, 2005, para. 50; T-408/18, Aristoteleio Panepistimio Thessalonikis v EACEA, 2020, para. 35. As highlighted in the case-law, the parties may stipulate means by which to reach amicable settlement before bringing the dispute before the General Court. However, where such means fail and the parties do not elaborate more detailed provisions as to how to proceed in such circumstances, the General Court has held that it has jurisdiction to adjudicate the contractual dispute before it. See T-44/06, Commission v Hellenic Ventures and Others, 2010, paras 68–71; T-329/05, Movimondo Onlus v Commission, 2012, paras 17–18.

Art. 272 TFEU 581 principle be in writing, this formal condition is for evidential purposes only.60 The lack of an explicit written arbitration clause does not prevent the Union Courts from accepting jurisdiction if sufficient documentary evidence exists that the parties were in agreement to submit their dispute to the Union Courts.61 The validity of the arbitration clause is determined exclusively on the basis of Art. 272 TFEU.62 The Union Court pays no regard to special requirements laid down by the national law applicable to the contract.63 For the same reason, a court or an administrative authority in a Member State cannot refuse to give effect to the judgment of the General Court on the ground that that Court’s jurisdiction is based on an arbitration clause which is invalid under national law. (2) Applicable law (a) Choice of the parties In the absence of applicable Union law, the Union Courts must identify the applicable law of their own authority.64 They respect the parties’ choice of applicable law, whether express or implied,65 provided that this does not detract from the scope and effectiveness of Union law.66 In the absence of such a choice, the Union Courts will be guided by the principles that are generally accepted in the Member States and use rules of private international law as a source of inspiration, in particular those found in the Rome I Regulation.67 (b) Formulation of rules of contract law based on general principles common to the Member States In a case in which neither the contracts in question nor the applicable Union law specified the applicable law, the Court of Justice held that the first paragraph of Art. 340

60 See T-271/04, Citymo v Commission, 2007, para. 56. See, e.g. T-632/14, Intercon v Commission, 2016, paras 46–51, in which the General Court decided that an exception of inadmissibility for failure to annex the contract concerned to the application should be rejected because the purpose of the formal requirement had been achieved as the defendant himself had annexed the contract to his exception of inadmissibility. 61 See T-271/04, Citymo v Commission, 2007, paras 54–65 (ruling that since the applicant failed to demonstrate the existence of an arbitration clause validly concluded by the parties and to comply with the provisions of Art. 78(3) of the GC Rules of Procedure (former Art. 44(5bis)), its action based on Art. 272 TFEU was inadmissible). 62 See C-564/13 P, Planet AE v Commission, 2015, para. 21. 63 See 23/76, Pellegrini and Others v Commission, 1976, paras 8–10; C-209/90, Commission v Feilhauer, 1992, paras 12–14; C-299/93, Bauer v Commission, 1995, para. 11 (Art. 153 EAEC applied in the same way); T-460/08, Commission v Acentro Turismo, 2010, paras 33–38 (ruling that this case-law applies in circumstances where the contract stipulates specific approval in writing). 64 See T‑602/15 RENV, Jenkinson v Council and Others, 2021, paras 84–139 (appeal pending in C-46/22 P). 65 See 318/81, Commission v CO.DE.MI., 1985, paras 18–22; 220/85, Fadex v Commission, 1986, para. 10; C-209/90, Commission v Feilhauer, 1992, paras 3, 16; T-234/12, Amitié v Commission, 2015, para. 74. 66 See C-80/99 to C-82/99, Flemmer and Others, 2001, para. 57. 67 See T-164/14, Calberson GE v Commission, 2016, para. 25; T-165/20, JC v EUCAP Somalia, 2022, paras 40–43; Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) (OJ 2008 L177/6). The Rome I Regulation does not apply to all Member States, namely, not to Denmark. See para. 21.03.

15.17

15.18

582 ARBITRATION CLAUSE OR SPECIAL AGREEMENT TFEU ‘refers, as regards the law applicable to a contract, to the Member States’ own laws and not to the general principles common to the legal systems of the Member States’.68 Consequently, the Union Courts have so far generally declined to formulate Union law on contractual liability.69

15.19

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(c) Distinction between substantive law and rules of procedure Under an arbitration clause within the meaning of Art. 272 TFEU, a Union Court is called upon to resolve a dispute in accordance with the applicable law governing the contract.70 However, in accordance with the principle that each court applies its own procedural rules, the Union Courts assess their jurisdiction and the admissibility of claims put forward by the applicant or defendant solely under Union law.71 (d) Determination based primarily on contractual provisions According to the case-law, disputes arising from the performance of a contract must be resolved in principle on the basis of the contractual provisions.72 However, recourse may be had to the law applicable to the contract when doubts exist regarding the validity or the interpretation of the contractual provisions73 or where the contract alone does not enable all aspects of the dispute to be resolved.74 In the absence of Union rules, the contractual liability of the Union will usually be determined by the national law applicable to the contract.75 Moreover, the principle that disputes arising from the performance of a contract must be decided on the basis of the contractual terms cannot lead to the application of contractual terms contrary to overriding mandatory provisions of the applicable national law.76 Until recently, the Union Courts inferred from the principle that disputes arising from the performance of a contract must be resolved on the basis of the contractual 68 See C-80/99 to C-82/99, Flemmer and Others, 2001, para. 54. 69 Normally, the Union Courts refer to the rules of contractual liability of the law of the Member State applicable to the contract. See T-477/16, Epsilon International v Commission, 2018, paras 135–138; T‑602/15 RENV, Jenkinson v Council and Others, 2021, para. 99 (appeal pending in C-46/22 P). However, in T-763/16, PY v EUCAP Sahel Niger, 2018, paras 61–66, the General Court held that the examination of the action should occur in the light of ‘the general principles of European Union law concerning the establishment of contractual liability’ and went on to define the conditions which must be satisfied if an action for contractual liability is to be successful. See also T-384/19, Parliament v Axa Assurances Luxembourg and Others, 2021, para. 127 (appeal pending in C-766/21 P). 70 See T-195/18, Talanton Anonymi Emporiki v Commission, 2020, para. 52. 71 See T-110/10, Insula v Commission, 2012, paras 29–30; T-610/20, Egis Bâtiments International v Parliament, 2021, para. 26. Regarding rules on evidence, the General Court has held that such rules are not of a procedural nature and are determined by the law applicable to the contract concerned: see T-771/14, ANKO v Commission, 2017, para. 47; T-4/20, Sieć Badawcza Łukasiewicz—Port Polski Ośrodek Rozwoju Technologii v Commission, 2022, para. 112. 72 See T-408/18, Aristoteleio Panepistimio Thessalonikis v EACEA, 2020, para. 80; T-194/20, JF v EUCAP Somalia, 2022, para. 52. 73 See T-106/13, Synergy Hellas Anonymi Emporiki Etaireia Parochis Ypiresion Pliroforikis v Commission, 2015, para. 37. 74 See T-136/09, Commission v Benjamin Gal-Or, 2010, para. 46; T-65/15, Talanton v Commission, 2017, para. 43; T-165/20, JC v EUCAP Somalia, 2022, para. 37. Where an applicant relies exclusively on pleas in law alleging an infringement of Union law, it is not necessary for the Union Courts to determine the national law applicable to the contract, even though the contract does not regulate all aspects of the contractual relationship: see T-194/20, JF v EUCAP Somalia, 2022, para. 57. 75 See T-744/14, Meta Group v Commission, 2017, para. 266 (Belgian law); T-477/16, Epsilon International v Commission, 2018, paras 134–136 (Belgian and Luxembourgish law). The applicable national law will also determine the nature of the remedy that can be applied for: see T-165/20, JC v EUCAP Somalia, 2022, para. 149. 76 See T-194/20, JF v EUCAP Somalia, 2022, para. 53. For an application, see T-165/20, JC v EUCAP Somalia, 2022, paras 125–130, where the General Court declared a contractual clause null and void because it was contrary to mandatory rules of Belgian law.

Art. 273 TFEU 583 provisions, and, in subsidiary order, the law applicable to the contract, that parties could not rely on pleas based on violations of the Charter or general principles of Union law in actions based on Art. 272 TFEU (see para. 15.13).77 Exceptions were the principle of proportionality78 and the principle of reasonable time in the context of the recovery of debts,79 which applied regardless of the contractual nature of the dispute. However, in Inclusion Alliance for Europe v Commission,80 the Court of Justice changed the case-law on this point and held that the Union Courts will have jurisdiction to examine any infringement of the Charter or of the general principles of Union law independently of the law applicable to the contract concerned. This is because the Union institutions remain bound by their obligations under the Charter and the general principles of Union law when performing a contract; the fact that the law applicable to the contract does not provide the same guarantees does not detract from that.81 (3) Procedure before Union Courts The procedure ordinarily applied to direct actions before the Union Courts is used for the determination of disputes under an arbitration clause pursuant to Art. 272 TFEU.

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D. Consequences A judgment given by the General Court pursuant to Art. 272 TFEU is enforceable under Arts 280 and 299 TFEU in the same way as any other judgment.82 As already mentioned, an appeal may be brought before the Court of Justice (see Ch. 19).

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II. Art. 273 TFEU A. Subject-matter (1) Disputes between Member States Art. 273 TFEU83 provides that the Court of Justice has ‘jurisdiction in any dispute between Member States that relates to the subject-matter of the Treaties if the 77 See C-14/18 P, Alfamicro v Commission, 2019, paras 75–76; T-69/16, Ateknea Solutions Catalonia v Commission, 2019, para. 125; T-831/14, Alfamicro v Commission, 2017, paras 175–177. 78 See T-10/16, GABO:mi v Commission, 2018, paras 107–108; T-48/16, Sigma Orionis v Commission, para. 128. 79 See T-195/18, Talanton Anonymi Emporiki v Commission, 2020, para. 73. 80 See C-378/16 P, Inclusion Alliance for Europe v Commission, 2020, para. 81. See also C-584/17 P, ADR Center v Commission, 2020, paras 84–89; T-285/19, SGI Studio Galli Ingegneria v Commission, 2021, para. 73. 81 See C-378/16 P, Inclusion Alliance for Europe v Commission, 2020, para. 82; C-584/17 P, ADR Center v Commission, 2020, para. 86. 82 See, in this regard, T-500/04, Commission v IIC Informations-Industrie Consulting, 2007, paras 187–191. 83 A comparable provision concerning the Court of Justice’s jurisdiction to give judgment pursuant to a special agreement in relation to the European Atomic Energy Community used to be found in Art. 154 EAEC. In tandem with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, however, there is a new consolidated version of the EAEC Treaty, whereby Art. 154 EAEC has been repealed and Art. 273 TFEU is now applicable. There was also a provision similar to Art. 273 TFEU in Art. 89 of the now-expired ECSC Treaty.

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584 ARBITRATION CLAUSE OR SPECIAL AGREEMENT dispute is submitted to it under a special agreement between the parties’.84 This provision thereby allows Member States to conclude a special agreement to refer any dispute between them relating to the subject-matter of the Treaties to the Court of Justice. To date, the Court of Justice has decided only one case on the basis of Art. 273 TFEU.85

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(2) The requirement that a dispute exists The procedure under Art. 273 TFEU requires the existence of a dispute between the Member States that are party to the proceedings. The existence of a dispute is a separate condition for the Court of Justice to have jurisdiction on the basis of Art. 273 TFEU. A dispute exists, for example, where two Member States have concurrent claims that are mutually exclusive.86 In the absence of a dispute, the Court of Justice cannot accept jurisdiction on the basis of Art. 273 TFEU. (3) Dispute related to the subject-matter of the Treaties Only disputes related to the subject-matter of the Treaties can be submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice pursuant to Art. 273 TFEU. This means that the dispute must have an objectively identifiable link with the subject-matter of the Treaties. The notion ‘related to’ cannot be understood as a requirement for the subject-matter to be the same, as disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the Treaties between Member States should be brought on the basis of Art. 259 TFEU.87 In Austria v Germany,88 the Court of Justice considered that a dispute regarding mutually exclusive claims on the right to taxation was related to the Treaties because of the beneficial effect of the mitigation of double taxation on the functioning of the internal market. A slightly different criterion was used in Pringle.89 In that case, the Court of Justice decided that a dispute linked to the interpretation or application of the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism related to the Union Treaties, since the conditions to be attached to the grant of support to a Member State under that Treaty are, at least in part, determined by Union law. Moreover, in Slovenia v Croatia,90 the Court suggested that a dispute between two Member States regarding the geographical 84 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 205(7) provides that the same procedure as that laid down for the settlement of disputes between Member States or between Member States and the Commission as referred to in Art. 35(7) EU as maintained in force by Protocol (No. 36) on Transitional Provisions (which is laid down in CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 205(1)–(6)) applies where an agreement concluded between Member States confers jurisdiction on the Court of Justice to rule on a dispute between Member States or between Member States and an institution. 85 See C-648/15, Austria v Germany, 2017. See further J. T. Nowak, ‘Dispute Resolution among Member States at the Court of Justice on the Basis of Article 273 TFEU: A Comment on C-648/15 Austria v Germany’, Yearbook on Procedural Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural Law, 2020) 105. 86 See C-648/15, Austria v Germany, 2017, para. 21 (both Member States claimed an exclusive right to tax income relating to financial years in which those two States were members of the European Union). 87 See C-648/15, Austria v Germany, 2017, paras 23–25. 88 See C-648/15, Austria v Germany, 2017, para. 26. 89 See C-370/12, Pringle, 2012, para. 174. 90 See C-457/18, Slovenia v Croatia, 2020, para. 109.

Art. 273 TFEU 585 demarcation of their borders may be related to the application of the Treaties, as a definite solution to such dispute contributes to the effective and unhindered application of Union law in the areas concerned.91

B. Identity of the parties (1) Only between Member States The jurisdiction of the Court of Justice under Art. 273 TFEU is subject to the condition that only Member States are parties to the dispute submitted to it.92 (2) Common institutions The notion ‘Member States’ includes common institutions set up by the Member States outside the framework of the Treaties. This is the case, for example, for the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), as it solely consists of Member States. A dispute between the ESM and one of the Member States would amount to a dispute between a Member State and a group of Member States, which is in line with the requirements laid down in Art. 273 TFEU.93 This is different, however, from the situation in which the Commission would be tasked by the Member States by way of an international agreement concluded between Member States to perform duties that fall outside the Treaty framework.94 Since it is an essential characteristic of the Commission that it is completely independent from the Member States,95 it is not possible for the Commission to be equated to a group of Member States, also not when it performs tasks that lay outside the framework of the Treaties. (3) Third States The special agreement conferring jurisdiction upon the Court should be concluded between Member States. Where an international agreement concluded between the Union or its Member States and a third State confers jurisdiction upon the Court of Justice to settle any disputes that may arise from the application of that international agreement, the legal basis for the Court’s jurisdiction follows directly from that agreement and is not a special agreement within the meaning of Art. 273 TFEU.

91 See also C-294/21, Navitours, AG Szpunar Opinion, 2022, point 70. 92 See C-370/12, Pringle, 2012, para. 175, in which the Court stated that since the membership of the European Stability Mechanism consists solely of Member States, a dispute to which that Mechanism is a party may be considered to be a dispute between Member States within the meaning of Art. 273 TFEU. 93 See C-370/12, Pringle, 2012, paras 175–176. 94 See Art. 10 of the Monetary Agreement between the European Union and the Principality of Andorra (OJ 2011 C369/1); Art. 12 of the Monetary Agreement between the European Union and the Principality of Monaco (OJ 2013 C310/1); Art 10 of the Monetary Agreement between the European Union and the Vatican City State (OJ 2010 C28/13); Art 10 of the Monetary Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of San Marino (OJ 2012 C121/5). 95 Art. 17(3), third subpara. TEU.

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586 ARBITRATION CLAUSE OR SPECIAL AGREEMENT 15.29

(4) Departing Member States Where a Member State leaves the Union during a procedure based on a special agreement conferring jurisdiction upon the Court on the basis of Art. 273 TFEU, this raises the question whether the Court of Justice should declare itself without jurisdiction. While, on the one hand, it may be argued that the conditions for the Court’s jurisdiction are no longer fulfilled at that moment and thus should declare itself without jurisdiction,96 the judgment in Austria v Germany suggests, on the other hand, that the requirement to be a Member State must be fulfilled for the period to which the dispute submitted to the Court following the special agreement relates.97

C. Special characteristics 15.30

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(1) Special agreement While it is true that the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice under Art. 273 TFEU is subject to the existence of a special agreement, there is no reason, given the objective pursued by that provision, why such agreement should not be given in advance, with reference to a whole class of pre-defined disputes.98 Additionally, the Court has accepted jurisdiction where the submission of a dispute to the Court resulted from a mechanism included in an agreement between two Member States providing for the mandatory seizure of the Court upon request by a private party.99 (2) Extent of jurisdiction of the Court of Justice Art. 273 TFEU does not determine the nature of the relief that can be sought by way of a special agreement. In line with the case-law of the Court under Art. 272 TFEU, it may be argued that any type of relief is possible when not explicitly excluded in the special agreement. Thus, while the Court in Austria v Germany did not rule on the matter specifically, it did not declare itself without jurisdiction in regard of a claim for injunctive relief.100 (3) Existence of an obligation to make use of Art. 273 TFEU A controversial point is whether Member States can be obliged to submit a dispute to the Court of Justice pursuant to a special agreement within the meaning of Art. 273 TFEU. It has been suggested that in case of a so-called hybrid dispute, where issues related to the ‘interpretation or application of the Treaties’ and issues related to the ‘subject-matter of the Treaties’ cannot be separated, it might be preferable that Member States make use of Art. 273 TFEU to bring the whole dispute before the Court of Justice.101 Further to this, it can be deduced from the case-law that the failure to submit

96 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 100(2). 97 See C-648/15, Austria v Germany, 2017, para. 21. 98 See C-370/12, Pringle, 2012, para. 172. 99 C-648/15, Austria v Germany, 2017. 100 See C-648/15, Austria v Germany, 2017, para. 55. 101 In the Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in C-459/03, Commission v Ireland, 2006, point 14, n. 9, he surmised: ‘This does not necessarily mean that Member States should always carefully isolate the [Union]

Art. 273 TFEU 587 such a dispute as a whole to the Court may amount to a breach of the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Art. 4(3) TEU where the submission of (parts of) such a dispute to another dispute settlement body would involve the risk that a judicial forum other than the Court would rule on the scope of obligations imposed upon the Member States under Union law.102 Similarly, the Court has suggested that Art. 4(3) TEU entails an obligation for Member States to bring their border dispute to an end by using one or more means of dispute settlement, which may include submitting their dispute to the Court pursuant to Art. 273 TFEU.103

D. Consequences Judgments of the Court of Justice are binding upon the Member States.104 Member States are thus under an obligation to give effect to a judgment of the Court issued on the basis of Art. 273 TFEU. The question remains open whether failure to comply with an Art. 273 TFEU judgment might give rise to infringement proceedings being brought pursuant to Arts 258–259 TFEU.

elements from a dispute between them in order to bring only those elements before the Court of Justice, while submitting the rest of the dispute to another method of settlement. In theory, such a solution would be in line with [Art. 344 TFEU]. Yet, in practice it may be preferable to bring “hybrid disputes” between Member States— concerning both matters falling within and matters falling outside the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction—in their entirety before the Court under [Art. 273 TFEU].’

102

See C-459/03, Commission v Ireland, 2006, para. 177. See C-457/18, Slovenia v Croatia, 2020, para. 109. 104 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 91. 103

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16 PROCEEDINGS BROUGHT BY OFFICIALS AND OTHER SERVANTS OF THE UNION (STAFF CASES) I. Subject-Matter A. General overview (1) Disputes between the Union and its staff The relationship between the Union and its personnel is governed by the Staff Regulations of officials of the European Union (Staff Regulations) and the Conditions of Employment of other servants of the European Union (Conditions of Employment).1 Every Union act regarding staff policy must comply with the provisions of the Staff Regulations or Conditions of Employment. Disputes between the Union and its staff within the limits of and under the conditions set down in the Staff Regulations or Conditions of Employment are brought before the General Court at first instance, with appeal to the Court of Justice. Between 12 December 2005 and 1 September 2016, this first instance jurisdiction was exercised by the European Union Civil Service Tribunal, which has now been dissolved.2 It should be pointed out, however, that the Staff Regulations and Conditions of Employment do not apply to all officials employed by the Union. For instance, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Investment Bank (EIB) have

1 Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No. 259/68 of the Council of 29 February 1968 laying down the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Communities and instituting special measures temporarily applicable to officials of the Commission (OJ 1968 Spec. Ed. I, 30), as reformed by Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No. 723/2004 of 22 March 2004 amending the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Communities (OJ 2004 L124/1); corrigendum in OJ 2005 L51/28. The latest substantial amendment to the Staff Regulations concerned a general update of various aspects of the Staff Regulations: Regulation (EU, Euratom) No. 1023/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 amending the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union (OJ 2013 L287/15). The Conditions of Employment indicate the provisions of the Staff Regulations which apply to categories of Union staff other than officials (temporary staff, auxiliary staff, contract staff, local staff, and special advisers). These staff members are engaged by contract. The fact that different provisions apply to different categories of staff does not breach the principle of equality. The Union legislature is free to create different categories of officials corresponding to the legitimate needs of the Union’s civil service and to the nature of the tasks that need to be performed (F-104/06, Arpaillange and Others v Commission, 2009, paras 60–61). 2 See para. 2.39.

EU Procedural Law. Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak, Oxford University Press. © Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833086.003.0016

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590 STAFF CASES their own set of staff regulations.3 These regulations contain provisions regulating disputes between these entities and members of their staff similar to the Staff Regulations and Conditions of Employment. The Union Courts apply their case-law concerning the Staff Regulations and Conditions of Employment by way of analogy.4

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(2) Art. 91(1) of the Staff Regulations The jurisdiction of the Union Courts is delineated in Art. 91(1) of the Staff Regulations.5 They have jurisdiction in any dispute between the Union and any person to whom the Staff Regulations apply regarding the legality of an act adversely affecting such a person, either because the appointing authority has taken a decision or because it has not adopted a measure which it was under a duty to adopt under the Staff Regulations. In the case of disputes of a financial nature, the Union Courts have unlimited jurisdiction.6

B. Against what measures will an action lie? 16.03

An action will lie only against an act adversely affecting the person concerned.7 The expression ‘act having adverse effect’ has two aspects: (1) the act must have legal effects as far as the applicant is concerned; and (2) those legal effects must be unfavourable to the staff member, with the result that they can establish a personal interest in a judgment granting his or her claims.8

3 Conditions for Employment for Staff of the European Central Bank of 9 June 1988, as amended (latest amendments entered into force on 1 June 2021, available at ); Staff Regulations of the European Investment Bank of 20 April 1960, as amended (latest version is of 1 September 2020, available at ). Regarding the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, see T-334/21, Mendes de Almeida v Council (order), 2022, paras 35–36. 4 See T-585/19, EJ v EIB, 2021, paras 22–25; T-554/16, BZ v ECB, 2021, paras 70–71; T-299/20, KF v EIB, 2022, para. 144; T-440/21, TM v ECB, 2022, para. 24; F-130/07, Vinci v ECB, 2009, para. 52. This will, however, not be the case when the staff regulations of those entities clearly deviate from the provisions of the Staff Regulations or Conditions for Employment: see T-37/10 P, De Nicola v EIB, 2012, paras 74–81 (rejecting an application by analogy in F-55/08, De Nicola v EIB, 2009, paras 80–90); see also T-418/11 P, De Nicola v EIB, 2013 (overturning F-49/10, De Nicola v EIB, 2011, para. 64 on similar grounds). See further T-529/20, LR v EIB, 2022, paras 41–46. 5 Note that Art. 91(1) of the Staff Regulations is applied by analogy to temporary staff (Conditions of Employment, Art. 46), auxiliary staff (Conditions of Employment, Art. 73), contract staff (Conditions of Employment, Art. 117), and special advisers (Conditions of Employment, Art. 124). See F-146/06, Speiser v Parliament (order), 2007, paras 21–23; F-141/07, Maniscalso v Commission (order), 2008; F-71/10, Cantisani v Commission, 2012, paras 58–62. 6 Accordingly, the General Court can award damages to the applicant of its own motion where the applicant seeks the annulment of a particular decision yet protecting the interests of third parties precludes the annulment of the decision (T-10/02, Girardot v Commission, 2004, para. 89). See also C-243/18 P, European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy v Galocha, 2019, paras 70–74, where the Court of Justice held that the General Court did not err in law in deciding that the annulment of the outcome of the selection procedure was required and that is was not necessary to award damages. 7 See T-677/21, TL v Commission, 2022, para. 16 (appeal pending in C-96/23 P). This also applies to proceedings brought against the ECB: see T-320/02, Esch-Leonhardt and Others v ECB, 2004, paras 36–37; T-536/20, LU v EIB, para. 37; F-114/10, Bowles and Others v ECB, 2011, paras 48–51. 8 The fact that a decision adversely affects an official and he or she can bring an action against it does not automatically mean that the appointing authority was under an obligation to give him or her a proper hearing before adopting the decision at issue (C-111/02 P, Parliament v Reynolds, 2004, para. 57).

Subject-Matter 591 (1) What measures constitute acts having adverse effect? (a) Binding act An act having adverse effect is one which directly affects the applicant’s legal position.9 No strict conditions exist as to the form in which a binding act should be adopted. The Union Courts will take into account the substance of the act to determine its binding nature.10 A mere letter or email replying to a request made by an official might thus constitute a binding act.11 On that same account, it is not required that a binding act contains an express decision. Implicit decisions can also have an adverse effect which directly affects an applicant’s legal position.12 What is important is that the act is issued by the competent authority and that it contains a definitive position adopted by that authority regarding the individual situation of the applicant.13 The concept is therefore very similar to the expression ‘binding act’, which has been discussed in connection with actions for annulment on the basis of Art. 263 TFEU (see para. 7.11).14 In the context of staff litigation, the Union Courts have held that the following acts constitute binding acts within the meaning of Art. 91(1) of the Staff Regulations: career development reports;15 a decision refusing to convoke the invalidity committee;16 a decision refusing assistance to an official pursuant to Art. 24 of the Staff Regulations;17 a letter communicating to an official the response given to his or her request for assistance pursuant to Art. 24 of the Staff Regulations;18 a decision fixing the total number of points awarded to a staff member in the context of a promotion exercise;19 a decision adopting the list of promoted officials;20 a decision not to promote an official;21 salary statements;22 a vacancy note containing conditions that exclude the applicant from 9 See 26/63, Pistoj v Commission, 1964 ECR 341, 352; C-366/21 P, Picard v Commission, 2022, para. 95; T-65/19, AI v ECDC, 2021, para. 74; T-434/21, TO v EEA (order), 2022, para. 27. 10 See C-366/21 P, Picard v Commission, 2022, para. 96; T-306/08 P, Braun-Neumann v Parliament (order), 2009, para. 39; T-251/20, KG v Parliament (order), 2021, para. 36. 11 See T-306/08 P, Braun-Neumann v Parliament (order), 2009, paras 31–32. However, a letter in reply to a request that, by its subject and content, is assimilated to a mere request for information does not constitute a reviewable act: see T-462/20, ZU v Commission, 2021, paras 36–37; see also, in that regard, T-691/20, Kühne v Parliament (order), 2021, para. 27. 12 See T-154/05, Lo Giudice v Commission, 2007, paras 41–44; T-486/04, Michail v Commission, 2008, para. 49; T-594/10 P, Marcuccio v Commission, 2012, paras 19–25. 13 See T-66/96 and T-221/97, Mellett v Court of Justice, 1998, para. 83; T-319/17, Aldridge v Commission, 2019, para. 42; T-251/20, KG v Parliament, 2021, para. 36. 14 See C-63/20 P, Dickmanns v EUIPO, 2021, para. 29: the notion of reviewable act under Art. 90 of the Staff Regulations cannot have a broader scope than under Art. 263 TFEU. 15 See C-601/19 P, BP v FRA, 2020, para. 35; F-16/09, de Britto Patricio-Dias v Commission, 2009. 16 See T-709/19, GW v Court of Auditors, 2021; F-23/07, M v EMEA (order), 2007, para. 41. 17 See T-154/05, Lo Giudice v Commission, 2007, paras 41–44; T-486/04, Michail v Commission, 2008, para. 49. Only in exceptional circumstances is an institution required to act without a request made by one of its officials: see T-90/07 P and T-99/07 P, Belgium and Commission v Genette, 2008, paras 98–103. 18 See T-65/19, AI v ECDC, 2021, para. 76. 19 See T-311/04, Buendía Sierra v Commission, 2006, paras 87–94; T-312/04, Di Bucci v Commission, 2008, para. 64–66; F-110/06, Carpi Badía v Commission, 2007, paras 31–34. 20 See T-311/04, Buendía Sierra v Commission, 2006, paras 87–94; T-312/04, Di Bucci v Commission, 2008, para. 64–66; T-575/19, Hill Mansilla v Commission, 2021, para. 22; F-110/06, Carpi Badía v Commission, 2007, paras 31–34. 21 See T-394/04, Strack v Commission, 2008, para. 28. 22 See T-288/04, Van Neyghem v Committee of the Regions, 2007, paras 39–41. The General Court seems to limit this possibility to salary statements clearly reflecting a decision of a pecuniary nature: see T-134/19, AM v EIB, 2021, paras 40–41. See also para. 16.05.

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592 STAFF CASES taking part in the recruitment procedure;23 a contractual clause providing for the termination of a contract upon the occurrence of a determined but uncertain future event at the moment the determined event occurs;24 a modification of contractual clauses;25 a decision not to renew a contract;26 and the failure to give effect to an annulment judgment in breach of Art. 266 TFEU.27 Conversely, an action for annulment brought against an act not directly affecting an applicant’s legal position will be declared inadmissible. Examples of such acts are a delay in the establishment of a staff report;28 the rejection of a spontaneous application for the position of legal secretary at the Court of Justice of the European Union;29 the decision of a hierarchical superior not to pass on information notified to him by a lower-ranking official to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF);30 a proposal concerning additional pensionable years;31 the letter of the secretary-general of a political group of the European Parliament informing an official of the decision that he or she will propose to the director of the human resources department of the European Parliament to end the official’s detachment to the secretariat of the political group;32 a final assessment report of a trial period;33 a notice informing an official that disciplinary proceedings will be resumed ab initio following annulment of the sanction by the General Court;34 or, generally, a measure relating purely to the internal organization of a service, such as a reassignment decision.35 Likewise, acts of a purely confirmatory36 or declaratory nature do not constitute binding acts within the meaning of Art. 91(1) of the Staff Regulations, since they do not alter the legal position of the applicant. On that account, an action for annulment

23 See T-60/92, Noonan v Commission, 1993, para. 21; F-82/08, Clarke and Others v OHIM, 2011, para. 79; F-29/11, BA v Commission, 2012, para. 42; F-144/11, Mateo Pérez v Commission (order), 2013, para. 46. 24 See F-6/10, Munch v OHIM, 2011, paras 32–38; F-7/10, Galan Girodit v OHIM, 2011, paras 41–47. 25 See F-102/09, Bennet and Others v OHIM, 2011, para. 58; F-6/10, Munch v OHIM, 2011, para. 52. 26 See F-67/15, Opreana v Commission, 2016, para. 25. 27 See T-598/16, Pipiliagkas v Commission (order), 2017, para. 46; T-434/21, TO v EEA (order), 2022, para. 21. 28 See T-424/04, Angelidis v Parliament, 2006, para. 145. That being said, in exceptional circumstances, where the delay in establishing the report has an impact on the content of the report, annulment is possible. Moreover, the unavailability of an action for annulment does not exclude a right to compensation: see T-586/19, PL v Commission, 2021, para. 96 (appeal pending in C-537/21 P). See further T-275/17, Curto v Parliament, 2018, para. 104. 29 See T-406/04, Bonnet v Court of Justice, 2006, para. 33. 30 See T-530/12, P, Bermejo Garde v EESC, 2014, para. 67. 31 See T-104/14, P, Commission v Verile and Gjergji, 2015, para. 62. 32 See C-453/17 P, Camerin v Parliament (order), 2017, para. 5. 33 See T-88/21, Paesen v EEAS, 2022, paras 38–57. 34 See C-577/18 P, Kerstens v Commission, 2018, paras 27–28. 35 This, however, subject to the conditions that act does not affect the non-material interests or future prospects of the applicant and that no particular circumstances exist, such as the fact that the internal measure is a covert penalty: see T-338/20, KI v eu-LISA (order), 2022, paras 36–39; T-805/21, NS v Parliament, 2023, paras 31–33. 36 See C-417/05 P, Commission v Fernández Gómez, 2006, paras 42–46; T-154/05, Lo Giudice v Commission, 2007, paras 52–53; T-284/07 P, OHIM v López Teruel, 2008, para. 40; T-306/08 P, Braun-Neumann v Parliament (order), 2009, para. 40; C-63/20 P, Dickmanns v EUIPO, 2021, para. 30; T-573/20, MG v EIB, 2021, para. 34 (appeal pending in C-173/22 P); T-148/20, FC v EASO (order), 2022, paras 49–50. However, where the alleged confirmatory decision contains new elements compared to the previous decision and/or has been preceded by a new examination of the situation of the addressee of the previous decision, such decision is not purely confirmatory and constitutes a binding act that is open to challenge: see C-202/20 P, Necci v Commission, 2021, para. 21; C-63/20 P, Dickmanns v EUIPO, 2021, para. 34; T-387/19, DF and DG v EIB, 2021, para. 24.

Subject-Matter 593 brought against a decision not to renew the contract of a contractual agent was held to be inadmissible, as the date of expiry was stated in the contract of employment.37 (b) Measures of a general nature Where an applicant challenges a ‘measure of a general nature’ (Staff Regulations, Art. 90(2), first indent), the application will be admissible only insofar as he or she shows that the act adversely affects him or her.38 This means that the measure of a general nature must directly affect his or her legal position.39 If this is not the case, no action will lie against the measure in question, but subsequently an objection of illegality may be raised against it if that measure is used as the basis for an act adversely affecting the applicant.40 For instance, an official was allowed to challenge new pension rules through his or her individual pension statements, since they constituted a first concretization of the new pension scheme as regards that official.41 The same goes for salary statements when refusing for the first time a financial advantage to an official on account of new general measures affecting the remuneration of officials.42 Subsequent statements,

37 See C-417/05 P, Commission v Fernández Gómez, 2006, paras 42–46. However, under certain particular circumstances, for instance, when the decision not to renew a contract somehow alters the provisions of the initial contract, such a decision can constitute a binding act within the meaning of Art. 91(1) of the Staff Regulations: see C-561/08 P and C-4/09 P, Commission v Potamianos (order), 2009, paras 43–49; F-102/09, Bennet and Others v OHIM, 2011, para. 58; F-6/10, Munch v OHIM, 2011, para. 52; T-568/20, MF v eu-LISA, 2022, para. 24. 38 See 125/87, Brown v Court of Justice, 1988, para. 17; T-191/02, Lebedef v Commission, 2005, paras 49– 54, 90–95. 39 See, e.g. 78/63, Huber v Commission, 1964 ECR 367, 375; T-135/89, Pfloeschner v Commission, 1990, para. 11; T-47/90, Herremans v Commission (order), 1991, para. 22; T-319/17, Aldrigde and Others v Commission, 2019, paras 41–51. Insofar as the conditions set out in a notice of vacancy exclude a person from applying for the post in question, that person will be adversely affected by the notice. See, by way of example, 79/74, Küster v Parliament, 1975, para. 6; 25/77, De Roubaix v Commission, 1978, para. 8. However, a candidate cannot be precluded from challenging by way of an objection of illegality the vacancy notice where the plea alleging irregularities in the notice of competition, which has not been challenged in good time directly by the candidate, concerns the statement of reasons for the contested individual decision: see T-609/16, PB v Commission, 2017, paras 26–29. In C-511/21 P, Commission v Calhau Correia de Paiva, 2023, paras 48–66, the Court clarified that the concept of ‘close link’ presupposes that the provisions of the competition notice whose illegality is invoked have been applied in support of the individual decision which is the subject of the action. In that respect, account must be taken of the substantive, and not merely formal, reasons of the contested decision, and the existence of such a close link must therefore be rejected where the provisions of the competition notice have no connection with the reasons underlying the contested decision. In those proceedings, the Court confirmed the existence of such a close link between the statement of reasons for the contested decision and the provisions of the competition notice at issue. 40 See C-119/19 P and C-126/19 P, Commission v Carreras Sequeros and Others, 2020, paras 66–77; C-341/21 P and C-357/21 P, Council and Commission v KM (order), 2022, paras 71–107; C-313/21 P and C-314/21 P, Council and Commission v FI (order), paras 75–116; T-746/19, GY v ECB, 2021, paras 20–24; T-670/19, Carbajo Ferrero v Parliament, 2021, paras 52–57; T-661/20, NV v eu-LISA, 2022, paras 41–46. Where guidelines, such as bonus policies or policies regarding the allowance for special living conditions, determine the application of general rules in particular situations, an objection of illegality may also lie against these guidelines even though they do not constitute the legal basis of the contested decision: see T-764/16, Paulini v ECB, 2018, para. 31; T-119/17 RENV, Alba Aguilera v EEAS, 2021, para. 73. See further para. 9.17. 41 See T-135/05, Campoli v Commission, 2006, paras 39–40; T-35/05, T-61/05, T-107/05, T-108/05, and T-139/05, Agne-Dapper and Others v Commission, 2006, para. 32. 42 See T-35/05, T-61/05, T-107/05, T-108/05, and T-139/05, Agne-Dapper and Others v Commission, 2006, para. 32; T-66/05 P, Sack v Commission, 2007, para. 31; T-496/19, CV and Others v Commission, 2020, para. 60; T-619/20, FJ and Others v EEAS, 2021, paras 39–40; T-246/21, FJ and Others v EEAS (order), 2022, paras 25–27; see also T‑516/16 and T‑536/16, Alvarez y Bejarano v Commission, 2019, in which a number of staff members brought an action for annulment against a regulation amending the Staff Regulations and suppressing various benefits they enjoyed. However, the action was dismissed on substantive grounds and the General Court did not consider the pleas of inadmissibility raised by the Commission and the European Parliament based on the lack of a reviewable act.

16.05

594 STAFF CASES however, cannot be challenged, since they constitute purely confirmatory acts.43 The objection of illegality can thus only be raised in the context of proceedings against the binding act of individual application which is the first concretization of the contested general measure.

16.06

(c) Preparatory measures Frequently, decisions of the appointing authority are prepared by a lower-ranking official or in an advisory body. Such preparatory measures are not acts having adverse effect because they do not affect the applicant’s legal position.44 For instance, the Union Courts have held that an end of probationary period report does not constitute a binding act, since it is only a preparatory measure in the lead–up to a final decision, namely, the decision to appoint the probationer as an established official or not.45 The same goes for interim probationary reports, re-affectation measures during the probationary period, or decisions to extend the probationary period, as they allow the appointing authority to appreciate the capacities of the probationer before taking a final decision.46 Further to this, the Union Courts have, inter alia, held the following acts to be preparatory measures: an offer of employment;47 a decision of an invalidity committee finding that an official is not suffering from invalidity;48 intermediary evaluations in preparation of a career development report;49 a decision to award priority points;50 a decision not to include an official on the merit list;51 an initial staff appraisal report;52 the nomination of a reporting officer;53 the opinion of an institution’s medical officer;54 a note of the Commission’s medical officer establishing an official’s non-appearance at a medical examination;55 and the report of an investigation panel.56 The legality of a preparatory act can nevertheless be challenged by bringing an action for annulment against the decision adopted at the end of the decision-making procedure in the context of which the preparatory act was taken.57 In some cases, moreover, 43 See T-66/05 P, Sack v Commission, 2007, para. 32. 44 See C-266/20 P, ZU v EEAS (order), 2021, para. 12; T-536/20, LU v EIB, paras 38–39; F-61/11, Possanzini v Frontex (order), 2012, paras 42–43. This does not exclude, however, that such acts may cause the Union to incur liability, since an action for damages is an independent legal remedy with a different purpose than an action for annulment: see T-632/19, DD v FRA, 2021, para. 112 (appeal pending in C-587/21 P). 45 See T-156/08 P, R v Commission, 2009, para. 50. 46 See T-156/08 P, R v Commission, 2009, para. 50. 47 See C-714/17 P, Karp v Parliament (order), 2018, para. 4. 48 See T-115/05, Jiménez Martínez v Commission (order), 2006, paras 28–30. 49 See T-27/05, Lo Giudice v Commission, 2007, paras 27–30. 50 See T-311/04, Buendía Sierra v Commission, 2006, paras 96–98; T-312/04, Di Bucci v Commission, 2008, paras 67–68. 51 See T-311/04, Buendía Sierra v Commission, 2006, paras 96–98; T-312/04, Di Bucci v Commission, 2008, para. 67–68. 52 See F-107/11, Ntouvas v ECDC, 2012, para. 44. 53 See F-64/08, Nijs v Court of Auditors (order), 2008, para. 17. 54 See F-65/09, Marcuccio v Commission, 2010, para. 44. 55 See C-266/20 P, ZU v EEAS (order), 2021, paras 9–13. The note was considered to be a preparatory act for the decision of the appointing authority regarding the classification of the absence of the official as annual leave or sick leave. 56 See C-558/17 P, OZ v EIB, 2019, para. 79; T-536/20, LU v EIB, para. 40. 57 See C-259/20 P, Barata v Parliament (order), 2020, para. 4; T-435/04, Dos Santos v OHIM, 2007, para. 51. But see T-664/21, YF v EFCA, 2022, para. 58: it is not possible to challenge evaluation reports which have

Subject-Matter 595 preparatory acts actually do have adverse effect. A recurring example in the case-law is a jury’s decision, taken in the course of a recruitment competition, to eliminate the applicant from the further stages of the competition after rejecting his or her request for re-examination.58 It should also be pointed out that the appointing authority itself can perform preparatory acts. The Union Courts will declare an action for annulment against such acts inadmissible, since they do not directly affect the applicant’s legal position. Exceptionally, a preparatory act performed by an appointing authority can constitute a binding act.59 For instance, the decision to exclude an applicant from the list of most deserving officials in the context of a second stage promotion was considered to constitute a binding act, since the non-inclusion effectively precluded the applicant from obtaining a possible promotion.60 Finally, the notion of preparatory acts is not confined to acts taken in the course of a decision-making process within a single Union institution, body, office, or agency. For instance, the final report by OLAF concluding an investigation conducted in respect of an official is considered to be a preparatory act in the lead-up to a final decision either taken by the institution concerned or by the national judicial authorities.61 Such act cannot be challenged independently, even though it constitutes the end of a decision- making process within OLAF. Similarly, a decision by OLAF to pass on information concerning an official to the competent national authorities is not considered to be a binding act.62

become definite incidentally in the context of an action for annulment against a decision to terminate an employment contract, even though these reports played a preparatory role in the decision to terminate the employment contract. This is because it would have been possible to bring an action against these evaluation reports within the time-limits laid down in Arts 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations. 58 See T-294/03, Gibault v Commission, 2005, para. 22; F-15/08, Wiame v Commission, 2010, para. 20; F-83/11, Cristina v Commission, 2012, para. 25. Note that it is the decision of the jury taken after re-examination that constitutes the reviewable act within the meaning of Arts 90(2) or 91(1) of the Staff Regulations: see T-671/16, Villeneuve v Commission, 2018, para. 24; T-610/18, ZR v EUIPO, 2021, para. 23; T-511/20, Zardini v Commission, 2022, para. 16; T-20/21, VI v Commission, 2022, para. 15; T-312/21, SY v Commission, 2022, para. 33. 59 See C-366/21 P, Picard v Commission, 2022, paras 108–114. 60 See T-437/04 and T-441/04, Standertskjöld-Nordenstam and Heyraud v Commission, 2006, paras 31–34. Note that this situation is no longer possible since the 2004 amendments to the Staff Regulations. While second-stage promotions allowed officials to be promoted without changing their position, Art. 4 of the current Staff Regulations provides that no appointment or promotion shall be made for any purpose other than that of filling a vacant post. In principle, the decision to exclude an applicant from the list of most deserving officials is thus considered to constitute a preparatory act not amenable to judicial review. See T-671/18 and, T-140/19, ZU v Commission, 2021, paras 403–412; F-113/06, Bouis and Others v Commission, 2008, paras 31–33. Compare T-260/22, Freixas Montplet and Others v Committee of the Regions, 2023, paras 17–25. 61 See T-309/03, Camós Grau v Commission, 2006, paras 46–58. 62 See T-261/09 P, Commission v Violetti and Others, 2010, para. 73 (setting aside F-5/05 and F-7/05, Violetti and Others v Commission, 2009, paras 71–83, in which the EU Civil Service Tribunal had held that a decision by OLAF to pass on information concerning an official to the competent national authorities did constitute a binding act within the meaning of Art. 90(2) of the Staff Regulations). The fact that the information has been passed on in breach of the rights of defence has no influence on the binding nature of the act: see T-261/09 P, Commission v Violetti and Others, 2010, para. 48.

596 STAFF CASES 16.07

(2) The requirement of an interest Applicants are entitled to challenge a decision which has implications for their legal position only insofar as that decision adversely affects that legal position.63 In other words, there must be an advantage for the applicant personally in a judgment granting his or her claims.64 Accordingly, no interest is present when the annulment of the contested decision will lead to the adoption of the same decision in respect of the applicant.65 Equally, an applicant has no interest in the annulment of an appointment to a post to which he or she personally is ineligible for appointment.66 Conversely, officials eligible for promotion to a particular grade in principle have a personal interest in challenging the decisions promoting other officials to that grade.67 An official may also establish an interest when an act, while not affecting the grade or the material situation of the official, causes prejudice to his or her morale and future prospects.68 The same goes for measures affecting an official’s reputation.69 Therefore, an official will be allowed to bring an action for annulment against a staff appraisal report,70 even where that official is no longer in service of the institution that has drawn up the staff appraisal report, either because he or she has resigned, has been dismissed, or has reached the age of retirement.71 This is because every official has a right to have his or her work recognized by means of an appraisal carried out in a just and equitable manner, regardless of the future usefulness of the report.72 This is all the more the case for an official who has been automatically retired on the grounds of total permanent invalidity. As long as it cannot be ruled out that the official will be reinstated in the institutions at some point in the future, he or she retains an interest in the annulment of a career development report, since the official might need the report at that point to further his or her career.73 63 See T-65/19, AI v ECDC, 2021, para. 74. It is sufficient that an official’s legal position is affected by the contested decision. It is not necessary that the contested decision also changes or affects a right that has been conferred upon the official. Thus, an official has an interest in challenging a decision to lift her or his immunity from jurisdiction: see C-831/18 P, Commission v RQ, 2020, paras 41–54. 64 T-526/08 P, Commission v Strack, 2010, para. 43; T-355/19, EC v Committee of the Regions, 2021, para. 49; T-65/19, AI v ECDC, 2021, para. 75; T-52/19, AH v Eurofound, 2021, para. 44. 65 See C-70/19 P, Commission v HM, 2020, para. 119. 66 See 126/87, Plato v Commission, 1989, paras 18–20; T-490/21, Vanhoudt v EIB, 2022, paras 19–21 (appeal pending in C-106/23 P). 67 See F-53/08, Bouillez and Others v Commission, 2010, para. 80. 68 See F-51/06, Tesoka v FEACVT (order), 2007, para. 40. 69 See F-80/08, Wenig v Commission, 2009, paras 33–36. 70 See C-198/07 P, Gordon v Commission, 2008, paras 44–45; T-511/18, XH v Commission, 2020, para. 80. 71 See T-80/09 P, Commission v Q, 2011, para. 157; T-27/18 RENV, FV v Council, 2019, para. 43; T-153/17, FV v Council, 2019, paras 30–40; F-107/11, Ntouvas v ECDC, 2012, paras 33–37. Before the judgment in C-198/07 P, Gordon v Commission, 2008, it was established case-law of the General Court that an official had no interest in challenging an appraisal report if he or she was no longer working for the institution that had drawn up the report. For an overview and critique of that case-law, see C‑198/07 P, Gordon v Commission, AG Bot Opinion, 2008, points 42–53. For an application of the old case-law, see T-274/04, Rounis v Commission, 2005, paras 17–31, in which the General Court held that, save for exceptional circumstances, an official who has definitely terminated his or her duties no longer has an interest in challenging a staff appraisal report; see also T-343/04, Tsarnavas v Commission, 2007, para. 56. 72 See C-198/07 P, Gordon v Commission, 2008, paras 44–45; T-80/09 P, Commission v Q, 2011, para. 157. However, it appears that the use of the criterion of ‘future usefulness’ of the report concerned to assess the interest of an applicant seeking to challenge an appraisal report has continued after the judgment in Gordon v Commission: see F-148/12, Solberg v OEDT, 2013, paras 14–22. 73 See C-198/07 P, Gordon v Commission, 2008, paras 41–53. See also T-526/08 P, Commission v Strack, 2010, paras 69–75.

Identity of the Parties 597 Such an official also retains an interest in seeking, in the context of a selection procedure in which he or she was admitted to participate, the annulment of the decision rejecting his or her candidature and the decision to appoint another candidate, in order to be able to continue to aspire to the post in question should that official return to work.74 Consequently, the applicant is entitled only to adduce grievances which affect him or her personally. He or she may not bring an action in the interests of the law or of the institutions.75 That being said, in the context of staff representation elections, officials entitled to vote establish an interest in the annulment of binding acts adopted in connection with such elections solely on the basis of their objective capacity as voter.76 Furthermore, the applicant’s interest must be legitimate, present, and vested.77 In addition, the applicant may only make submissions which genuinely serve his or her interest.78 A plea criticizing a defect in the contested act will therefore be inadmissible if the defect was incapable of disadvantaging the applicant.79

II. Identity of the Parties A. Applicants (1) Any member of staff Any person whose relationship with the Union is determined by the Staff Regulations or the Conditions of Employment may bring a dispute concerning the application of the Staff Regulations or the Conditions of Employment before the General Court.80 Only ‘local staff ’—staff engaged in places outside the European Union according to local practice for manual or service duties—must, under Art. 122 of the Conditions of Employment, bring any dispute between them and the institution concerned before the arbitration board indicated in their contract for employment.81 Persons taking

74 See T-526/08 P, Commission v Strack, 2010, para. 70. 75 See 85/82, Schloh v Council, 1983, para. 14; T-163/89, Sebastiani v Parliament, 1991, para. 24; T-422/04, Lavagnoli v Commission, 2006, para. 31; T-843/19, Correia v EESC, 2021, para. 46; F-34/05, Lebedef and Others v Commission (order), 2006, paras 21–29. 76 See T-396/03, Vanhellemont v Commission, 2005, paras 26– 32; F- 71/05, Milella and Campanella v Commission, 2007, paras 47–49. 77 See 17/78, Deshormes v Commission, 1979, para. 9; T-119/89, Teisonnière v Commission (order), 1989, para. 19; T-135/05, Campoli v Commission, 2006, para. 42. 78 See 90/74, Deboeck v Commission, 1975, para. 12. 79 See 90/74, Deboeck v Commission, 1975, paras 13–16. The plea must also be able to be inferred from the content of the complaint (see para. 16.26). 80 Staff Regulations, Art. 91(1); Conditions of Employment, Art. 46 (temporary staff), Art. 117 (contract staff), and Art. 124 (special advisers). Members of an institution are not considered to be members of staff. Accordingly, an action brought against a decision taken in connection with a member of the Court of Auditors was declared inadmissible: see F-46/08, Thoss v Court of Auditors (order), 2008, paras 19–44. An action for annulment should have been brought in accordance with what is now Art. 263 TFEU. See also T-334/21, Mendes de Almeida v Council (order), 2022, paras 54–57. 81 See Ch. 15. Regarding the application of national law to the employment relationship of local staff, see C-165/01, Betriebsrat der Vertretung der Europäischen Kommission in Österreich, 2003.

16.08

598 STAFF CASES part in recruitment procedures are also among those deriving rights under the Staff Regulations or the Conditions of Employment,82 together with the legal successors of persons whose relationship with the Union was governed by the Staff Regulations or the Conditions of Employment.83

16.09

16.10

(2) Staff of bodies, offices, and agencies Members of staff of Union bodies, offices, and agencies with legal personality may also bring actions in the General Court where it appears from the regulation establishing the relevant body, office, or agency that its staff are in a legal position equivalent to that of servants of Union institutions.84 (3) Trade unions and staff associations of employees Trade unions and staff associations of employees of the Union which have legal personality are not entitled to bring proceedings pursuant to Art. 270 TFEU because the procedure for complaint and appeal established by Arts 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations is designed to deal exclusively with individual disputes.85 Consequently, they must satisfy the requirements of the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU in order to bring an action for annulment, and those of Art. 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU in order to bring an action for damages. In addition, they may intervene in support of the form of order sought by a party in proceedings instituted under Art. 270 TFEU.86

82 See 23/64, Vandevyvere v Parliament, 1965 ECR 157, 163–164; T-334/21, Mendes de Almeida v Council (order), 2022, para. 34. 83 See 18/70, Duraffour v Council, 1971; 24/71, Meinhardt (née Forderung) v Commission, 1972, para. 2; T-65/92, Arauxo-Dumay v Commission, 1993. 84 The Union Courts have jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes between the EIB and its servants: see 110/75, Mills v EIB, 1976, para. 14; T-192/99, Dunnett and Others v EIB, 2001, para. 46. As far as the ECB is concerned, Art. 36.2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, in its initial version, provided that ‘The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction in any dispute between the ECB and its servants within the limits and under the conditions laid down in the conditions of employment.’ The ECB argued that, under that provision, the Court of Justice, and not the then Court of First Instance, was the competent court to hear and determine disputes between the ECB and its staff. The then Court of First Instance held, however, that the interpretation of that provision should not conflict with the general and uniform system of legal remedies for servants of the Union laid down by Decision 88/591 (Council Decision of 24 October 1988 establishing a Court of First Instance of the European Communities (OJ 1988 L319/1)) and based on what is now Art. 257 TFEU. The term ‘the Court of Justice’ was therefore to be interpreted as referring to the Union Courts as a whole within the meaning of what is now Art. 19(1) TEU and thus as including the Court of First Instance. Consequently, the then Court of First Instance stated its jurisdiction to hear the dispute (T-333/99, X v ECB, 2001, paras 36–44). The current version of Art. 36.2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank refers to ‘Court of Justice of the European Union’. See also, as regards the European Aviation Safety Agency, T-30/04, Sena v EASA, 2005. 85 See 175/73, Union Syndicale and Others v Council, 1974, para. 19; 18/74, Syndicat Général du Personnel des Organismes Européens v Commission, 1974, para. 15; 193/87 and 194/87, Maurissen and European Public Service Union v Court of Auditors, 1989, para. 29; T-78/91, Moat and TAO/AFI v Commission (order), 1991, para. 7. 86 In accordance with the second para. of Art. 40 of the Statute. See, by way of example, T-84/91, Meskens v Parliament, 1992, para. 9: trade union organizations are widely allowed to intervene in staff cases where the decision is likely to affect a collective interest.

Special Characteristics 599

B. Defendants (1) Union institutions Actions are brought against the Union institution from which the act at issue emanated.87 (2) Union bodies, offices, or agencies A staff member employed by a Union body, office, or agency with legal personality in its own right has to bring his or her claim against that body, office, or agency, not against a Union institution.88

16.11

16.12

III. Special Characteristics A. The requirement for a pre-litigation procedure (1) General Litigation before the Union Courts is considered to be the ultimate way to settle 16.13 disputes between staff members and their appointing authority. A mandatory pre- litigation procedure has thus been provided for in Art. 90 of the Staff Regulations, the purpose of which is to come to an amicable settlement.89 The procedure consists of one or two phases, depending on whether the appointing authority has already adopted an act adversely affecting the staff member. In case such an act has been adopted, the staff member has to file a complaint with the appointing authority.90 In the absence of an act having an adverse effect, the staff member should first request a decision from the appointing authority in relation to him or her. An unfavourable reply or the absence of

87 See 18/63, Wollast (née Schmitz) v EEC, 1964 ECR 85, 96. Compare T-177/94, Altmann and Others v Commission, 1994, paras 32–45; T-17/17, Constantinescu v Parliament, 2018, para. 30; T-689/19, ZU v EEAS (order), 2021, paras 47–53. 88 In accordance with Art. 4 of Decision 2002/620/EC of the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the Court of Justice, the Court of Auditors, the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions, and the European Ombudsman of 25 July 2002 establishing a European Communities Personnel Selection Office (OJ 2002 L197/53), an action against a decision of EPSO must be brought against the Commission. See C-300/18 P, UF v Parliament and Council (order), 2018, para. 5; T-713/20, OQ v Commission, 2022, paras 9–10; see also T-466/20, LF v Commission, 2021, paras 27–31 in relation to the delegation of powers conferred upon the appointing authority to another body. 89 See T-43/07 P, Neophytos Neophytou v Commission, 2008, para. 89; T-100/04, Massimo Giannini v Commission, 2008, para. 39; T‑693/16 P-RENV-RX, HG v Commission, 2021, para. 118; F-143/14, Gervais Singou v Council (order), 2015, para. 12. The conciliation procedure and administrative review procedure provided for by the Staff Regulations of the EIB and the pre-litigation procedure provided for by the Staff Regulations of the ECB have the same purpose: see T-134/19, AM v EIB, 2021, para. 33; T-585/19, EJ v EIB, 2021, para. 23; T-311/21, SV v EIB, 2022, para. 70. See also Art. 125a(1) of the GC Rules of Procedure, by which the General Court is allowed to examine at all stages of the procedure the possibility of an amicable settlement. Where an amicable settlement has been reached, an action is not possible against acts covered by that amicable settlement, including acts which are indissociably linked to those acts. Thus, where an amicable settlement has been reached in respect of a decision nominating another candidate to a particular position, a party to such an amicable settlement can also no longer challenge the legality of the decision rejecting his or her candidature for that position: see T-129/21, Colombani v EEAS, 2022, paras 29–44 (appeal pending in C-595/22 P). 90 Staff Regulations, Art. 90(2).

600 STAFF CASES a reply to that request will then constitute an act having adverse consequences against which a complaint can be filed.91 Upon the rejection of the complaint, an action will lie before the General Court against the act adversely affecting the legal position of the staff member. The action will be declared inadmissible if the pre-litigation procedure was not lawfully conducted.92 The question whether the pre-litigation procedure was lawfully conducted may be examined by the General Court of its own motion in considering whether the application made to it is admissible.93 The General Court will further examine whether the time- limits prescribed by Arts 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations were complied with in the course of the pre-litigation procedure94 and whether the complaint and the application to the General Court are consistent with each other.95

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(2) Course of pre-litigation procedure (a) Requests If a person to whom the Staff Regulations apply seeks to challenge an omission to take a decision relating to him or her, he or she must first submit a request to the appointing authority pursuant to Art. 90(1) of the Staff Regulations for the decision in question to be taken.96 The appointing authority then has four months, starting from the date on which the request was made,97 to notify the person concerned of its reasoned decision. If at the end of that period no reply to the request has been received, this will be deemed to constitute an implied decision rejecting the request. A complaint may be submitted against such a decision, just as in the case of a decision whose content is unfavourable to the person concerned.98

91 Staff Regulations, Art. 90(1). 92 See T-316/19, Lucaccioni v Commission, 2021, para. 62. 93 See T-57/89, Alexandrakis v Commission, 1990, para. 8; T-200/02, Tsarnavas v Commission (order), 2004, para. 41; T-584/16, HF v Parliament, 2017, paras 64–65. 94 The time-limits for introducing a complaint and an action are of public policy and are not at the discretion of the parties (see C-399/20 P, XH v Commission (order), 2021, para. 4; C-63/20 P, Dickmanns v EUIPO, 2021, para. 54; C-172/20 P, WV v EEAS, 2022, para. 43; T-648/20, NB v CJEU (order), 2021, para. 64; T-672/20, Kerstens v Commission, 2021, para. 17). They are applied strictly in light of the requirement of legal certainty and the need to avoid discrimination or arbitrary treatment in the administration of justice (see C-406/01, Germany v Parliament and Council (order), 2002, para. 20; C-172/20 P, WV v EEAS, 2022, para. 45). The strict application of Union rules regarding procedural time-limits does not affect the objectives of Art. 90 of the Staff Regulations, but rather reinforces the legal certainty pursued by Art. 90(2) of the Staff Regulations (see C-63/20 P, Dickmanns v EUIPO, 2021, paras 56–57). Moreover, such strict application is not contrary to Art. 41 (concerning the right to good administration) or Art. 47 (concerning the right to an effective remedy) of the Charter: see C-63/20 P, Dickmanns v EUIPO, 2021, paras 58–60. 95 See T-57/89, Alexandrakis v Commission, 1990, para. 8. 96 If he or she submits a ‘complaint’ at the same time and then brings an action before the General Court when that ‘complaint’ is rejected, the action will be inadmissible for infringing Art. 90(1) and (2) of the Staff Regulations: see T-64/91, Marcato v Commission (order), 1992, paras 31–46. 97 This should be understood as the day on which the appointing authority has the possibility to obtain knowledge of the request, as distinguished from the date on which the appointing authority takes actual notice of the request: see C-172/20 P, WV v EEAS, 2022, paras 49–54. 98 See C-63/20 P, Dickmanns v EUIPO, 2021, paras 30–31. If the appointing authority has already taken a decision adversely affecting the official concerned, that official may no longer commence the pre-litigation procedure by submitting a request for a decision under Art. 90(1) of the Staff Regulations, but must directly submit a complaint pursuant to Art. 90(2): see T-113/95, Mancini v Commission, 1996, para. 28. However, where an appointing

Special Characteristics 601 The same holds true for non-contractual liability disputes. When a civil servant seeks compensation from the appointing authority for damages not originating in a decision adversely affecting him or her, he or she is required to submit a request for compensation via the pre-litigation procedure first.99 The decision not to award the requested compensation will then constitute a decision adversely affecting him or her, which can subsequently be challenged by submitting a complaint to the appointing authority.100 If, in contrast, the damage is caused directly by a decision adversely affecting the civil servant, he or she is required to submit a complaint pursuant to Art. 90(2) of the Staff Regulations.101

authority has failed to respond to a request for assistance within four months and only adopted an express decision thereafter, the official concerned, without challenging either the implicit or express decision, may seek compensation from the appointing authority for the alleged wrongful behaviour consisting in adopting the requested decision belatedly, provided that a separate request for compensation pursuant to Art. 90(1) of the Staff Regulations has been introduced: see T-308/10 P, Commission v Nanopoulos, 2012, paras 58–71. Compare T-570/16, HF v Parliament, 2017, paras 52–66, where a request for assistance led to the opening of an administrative inquiry within four months after that request was made but had not led to a final decision within those four months as the inquiry was still ongoing. In light of the nature of an administrative inquiry, and given the absence in the Staff Regulations of a specific time within which the inquiry should be concluded, the absence of a final decision in such circumstances does not give rise to an implied decision by the administration denying the facts or allegations stated in that request for assistance. 99 See T-391/94, Baiwir v Commission, 1996, paras 45–48; T-308/10 P, Commission v Nanopoulos, 2012, para. 61; T-641/19, FD v European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy, 2021, para. 162; T-79/20, AI v ECDC (order), 2021, para. 118; T-208/20, JH v Europol (order), 2021, paras 72–83; T-148/20, FC v EASO (order), 2022, paras 106–107; T-681/20, OC v EEAS, 2022, para. 47. The request must be lodged within a reasonable time; the five-year time-limit laid down in Art. 46, first para. of the Statute does not apply: see T-144/02, Eagle and Others v Commission, 2004, paras 66–68; T-632/19, DD v FRA, 2021, paras 102–103 (appeal pending in C-587/21 P). This requirement applies to everyone to whom the Staff Regulations apply, including applicants for the position of a civil servant or a contractual agent: see C-126/90 P, Bocos Viciano v Commission, 1991, para. 13; C-310/19 P, Schokker v EASA, 2020, paras 23–24. However, where the Staff Regulations do not apply to a person, but a decision of the institutions nevertheless concerns the employment of that person by the institutions, an action for annulment on the basis of Art. 263 TFEU will lie: see T-107/99 R, García Retortillo v Council (order), 1999, paras 44–48 (this particular situation occurred within the context of the integration of the Schengen Secretariat into the General Secretariat of the Council). 100 If there is a close link between an action for annulment and a claim for compensation, the compensation claim will be admissible as ancillary to the action for annulment and does not have to be preceded by a request to the appointing authority to make good the alleged damage, followed by a complaint directed against the implied or express rejection of that complaint: see T-27/90, Latham v Commission, 1991; T-238/02, Barbosa Gonçalves v Commission, 2004, para. 26; T-365/21, TJ v EEAS, 2023, paras 65–68. Conversely, in such a situation, the claim for compensation will be rejected when the claim for annulment was dismissed as unfounded: see C-460/18 P, HK v Commission, 2019, para. 93; T-570/16, HF v Parliament, 2017, para. 69; T-79/20, AI v ECDC (order), 2021, para. 115; T-179/20, JP v Commission, 2022, para. 76; T-357/22, Das Neves v Commission, 2023, para. 104. This does not necessarily mean, however, that an applicant is obliged to bring an action for annulment when he or she is seeking damages resulting from the unlawful nature of a decision: see T-299/20, KF v EIB, 2022, paras 141–143. Moreover, an action for annulment can also be ancillary to an action for damages. This is, for example, the case where an action for annulment is brought against a decision rejecting a complaint made in respect of a decision not to award the requested compensation. In such a case, the action for annulment will not be considered independently from the claim in damages, since the claim for damages constitutes the actual subject-matter of the proceedings: see T-500/16, BE v ECB, 2021, paras 42–43; T-681/20, OC v EEAS, 2022, paras 36–37; see further T-159/20, Hamers v Cedefop, 2021, para. 132 (appeal pending in C-111/22 P). 101 See T-79/20, AI v ECDC (order), 2021, para. 114; T-681/20, OC v EEAS, 2022, para. 44. Note that this is also the case for persons who, while not being members of staff, are covered by the Staff Regulations. For example, family members of a deceased official that seek compensation from the Union in addition to the amounts paid under the staff insurance scheme must first submit a request or a complaint pursuant to Art. 90 of the Staff Regulations. See F-50/09, Missir Mamachi di Lusignano v Commission, 2011, para. 116; C-417/14 RX-II, Missir Mamachi di Lusignano v Commission, 2015, paras 29–53.

602 STAFF CASES 16.15

(b) Complaints Under Art. 91(2) of the Staff Regulations, an appeal to the General Court will lie only if the applicant has previously submitted a complaint within the prescribed period to the appointing authority about the act allegedly adversely affecting him or her, and the complaint has been rejected by express or implied decision.102 A complaint is defined as an act by which an official protests in a specific manner against an act that adversely affects him or her.103 The appeal should be brought against the act in respect of which the official has filed a complaint pursuant to Art. 90(2) of the Staff Regulations and not against the reply of the Union institution, body, office, or agency to the complaint, for this will only constitute a decision of a purely confirmatory nature.104 That being said, as long as an action was brought within the appropriate time-limits, the Union Courts will interpret an action for annulment brought against the rejection of a complaint as an action for annulment against the decision against which the complaint was filed.105 Exceptionally, the Union Courts may hold that a decision rejecting a complaint contains new elements and can itself be the object of an action for annulment.106 However, the fact that a decision rejecting a complaint qualifies as a reviewable act does not have as its consequence that the bringing of proceedings before the Union Courts is made subject to the requirement of having submitted a fresh complaint against that decision. Therefore, the decision taken in response to the first complaint continues to serve as the relevant point of departure for the calculation of time-limits.107

102 See T-132/04, Bonnet v Court of Justice (order), 2004, paras 11–17; T-677/21, TL v Commission, 2022, para. 16 (appeal pending in C-96/23 P). An action against an act which is connected to another act against which the applicant lodged a complaint is admissible, even though the applicant did not submit a prior complaint in respect of the related act (806/79, Gerin v Commission, 1980 ECR 3515, 3524). 103 See F-138/06 and F-37/08, Meister v OHIM, 2009, para. 189. 104 See T-389/20, KO v Commission, 2021, para. 14; T-634/19, YF v EUAA, 2022, paras 34–35. 105 See C-326/16 P, LL v Parliament, 2018, para. 37; T-584/16, HF v Parliament, 2017, paras 70–72; T‑568/16 and T‑599/16, Spagnoli and Others v Commission, 2018, para. 50; T-119/20, IN v EISMEA, 2021, para. 38; T-389/20, KO v Commission, 2021, para. 15; F-107/11, Ntouvas v ECDC, 2012, paras 45–47. Where the decision rejecting the complaint contains additional reasons or details regarding the reasons for the contested decision, those additional reasons or details will be taken into account for examining the legality of the contested decision: see T-83/18, CH v Parliament, 2018, para. 57; T-880/19, Lianopoulou v Commission, para. 23; T-253/19, BG v Parliament, 2021, para. 40; T-119/20, IN v EISMEA, 2021, para. 39; T-677/21, TL v Commission, 2022, para. 17 (appeal pending in C-96/23 P); T-164/20, BG v Parliament, 2023, para. 28. The fact that the decision rejecting the complaint contains additional reasons for the contested decision cannot by itself justify the conclusion that the decision rejecting the complaint is a reviewable act where the statement of reasons in the latter decision coincides, in substance, with the contested decision: see T-641/19, FD v European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy, 2021, para. 30. 106 See T-277/19, BK v EASO, 2021, paras 41–45; T-378/19, DF and DG v EIB, 2021, paras 22–28; T-65/19, AI v ECDC, 2021, para. 57; T-79/20, AI v ECDC (order), 2021, paras 51–54; T-148/20, FC v EASO (order), 2022, paras 33–35; T-517/21, Grieger v Commission, 2022, paras 16–18; T-296/21, SU v EIOPA, 2022, paras 25–26. On the consequences of the annulment of a decision rejecting a complaint for the decision against which the complaint was brought, see T-742/16 RENV, CW v Parliament, 2017, paras 45–61. 107 See T-728/20, OM v Commission (order), 2021, paras 31–32. This is different, however, where the decision rejecting the complaint does not solely confirm the contested decision, but actually constitutes the reply to a request in which substantial new facts are relied on, and whereby the administration is requested to reconsider its previous decision: see T-605/18, ZF v Commission, 2020, para. 71; T-277/19, BK v EASO, 2021, para. 55; T-148/20, FC v EASO (order), 2022, paras 84–86. See further para. 16.17.

Special Characteristics 603 An exception to the requirement that a complaint should be submitted to the appointing authority exists in relation to decisions of a jury. Since the appointing authority has no power to alter the decision of a jury, an action for annulment lies directly against a decision of a jury without the requirement to conduct a pre-litigation procedure.108 However, if an official chooses to launch the pre-litigation procedure, it has to be conducted in a lawful way before an admissible action for annulment can be brought before the General Court.109 (3) Time-limits (a) General The complaint must be submitted to the appointing authority within three months.110 When time starts to run depends on the type of measure against which the complaint is brought.111 The appointing authority then has four months from the date on which the complaint was lodged to notify its reasoned decision to the person concerned. If at the end of that period no reply to the complaint has been received, this will be deemed to constitute a decision rejecting the complaint. (b) Point of departure A civil servant is obliged to request the appointing authority to communicate to him or her a decision adversely affecting him or her within a reasonable period of time after he or she gained knowledge of that decision.112 It is only upon receiving the decision that the period in which the civil servant can submit a complaint starts to run. Failure to request the communication of the decision within a reasonable period of time will cause the three-month period in which a complaint can be submitted to run from the moment the civil servant became aware of the existence of the decision adversely affecting him or her.113 When a request is rejected by means of an implicit decision114 pursuant to Art. 90(1) of the Staff Regulations and later on followed by a decision expressly rejecting that same 108 See 44/71, Marcato v Commission, 1972, paras 4–9; C-71/19 P, Barata v Parliament, 2019, para. 81; T-455/04, Beyatli and Candan v Commission (order), 2007, para. 38; F-83/11, Cristina v Commission, 2012, para. 36. See also T-298/20, KD v EUIPO, 2022, paras 22–31 (appeal pending in C-5/23 P), regarding an action for annulment against an appraisal report provided for in Article 43 of the Staff Regulations. If the applicant nevertheless submits a prior complaint against such a decision to the appointing authority, it cannot be objected that his or her application is inadmissible for being out of time. 109 See T-386/00, Gonçalves v Parliament, 2002, para. 35; F-96/09, Cuallado Martorell v Commission, 2012, paras 53–58. 110 Where the last day of the three-month period is a public holiday, Sunday or Saturday, the period shall expire at the end of the following working day: T-271/20, JS v SRB, 2022, paras 32–42. 111 Art. 90(2) of the Staff Regulations determines when time starts running in each case. Failure to comply with the time-limit for submitting a complaint will inevitably result in a subsequent action being declared inadmissible: T-55/92, Knijff v Court of Auditors (order), 1993. In case of an act of general application, online publication on the intranet of a Union institution or other Union body is sufficient for the purposes of Art. 90(2) of the Staff Regulations: see T-319/17, Aldridge and Others v Commission, 2019, para. 54. 112 See T-288/04, Van Neyghem v Committee of the Regions, 2007, para. 52; T-750/20, Correia v EESC, 2022, para. 24 (appeal pending in C-423/22 P). 113 See T-288/04, Van Neyghem v Committee of the Regions, 2007, paras 39–54. 114 The goal of an implicit rejection decision is to provide an applicant with access to judicial review in case the administration fails to respond to a complaint. The notion of an implicit decision cannot be used by the

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604 STAFF CASES request, an admissible complaint can only be brought against the implicit decision. The express decision confirming the implicit decision is considered to be an act of a purely confirmatory nature against which no admissible complaint can be brought.115 Time- limits thus start to run from the moment of the implicit rejection of a request. The fact that the subsequent explicit decision is the first decision to contain the reasons for the rejection of the request does not change its confirmatory nature.116 In case of multiple requests with the same object in relation to a single omission, only the first request is relevant for the calculation of time-limits. All subsequent writings addressed to the appointing authority will be considered to be merely reiterating the civil servant’s position and cannot have the effect of prolonging the time-limits of the pre-litigation procedure.117 The time-limit for a request for compensation starts to run from the point in time at which the civil servant became aware of the situation complained of.118

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(c) Absence of a time-limit in the Staff Regulations Art. 90(1) of the Staff Regulations does not specify a time-limit by which a civil servant has to submit to the appointing authority a request that a decision should be taken relating to him or her. However, this does not mean that civil servants have an unlimited period of time to submit such requests.119 The Union Courts have held that, in the absence of specific time-limits set out in the applicable regulations, a reasonable period should be taken into account.120 The ‘reasonableness’ of the period in which a civil servant has submitted a request is to be appraised in the light of all the circumstances specific to the case and, in particular, the importance of the dispute for the person concerned, its complexity, and the conduct of the parties to the dispute.121 administration to remedy the potential defects of an explicit rejection decision taken on the same day: see T-219/20, JK v Commission, 2021, para. 63. 115 See T-368/09 P, Sevenier v Commission, 2010, paras 24–37; C-63/20 P, Dickmanns v EUIPO, 2021, para. 32. Note that a different solution is applied in the situation where the implicit rejection of a complaint is followed by the notification of an express rejection within the three-month period for bringing the action before the General Court. That situation is different, since Art. 91(3) of the Staff Regulations expressly states that a new time-limit starts to run upon notification of such express decision: see T-66/05, Sack v Commission, 2007, para. 48. In the absence of any specific provision in the Staff Regulations, this solution is, however, not transposable to the situation in which an implied rejection of a request is followed by an express rejection of a request: see F-59/10, Barthel and Others v Court of Justice (order), 2011, paras 25–26. 116 See C-63/20 P, Dickmanns v EUIPO, 2021, para. 37. 117 See C-171/20 P, WV v EEAS, 2022, paras 55–56; T-66/05, Sack v Commission, 2007, para. 37. However, where a member of staff introduces a request for assistance on account of harassment and relies on previous decisions which have become final, the General Court takes them into account as factual evidence of the existence of such harassment: see T-641/19, FD v European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy, 2021, para. 44; T-299/20, KF v EIB, 2022, paras 50–51. The request for assistance cannot give rise, however, to a reopening of the time-limits to contest the legality of those decisions: see T-599/19, EM v Parliament, 2021, para. 90 (set aside in part on other grounds in C-299/21 P). 118 See T-114/08 P, Marcuccio v Commission (order), 2009, para. 22. 119 See T-433/10 P, Allen and Others v Commission, 2011, para. 26. 120 See T-144/02, Eagle v Commission, 2004, paras 57–65; T‑615/15 RENV, LL v Parliament, 2019, para. 95; T-415/20, KT v EIB, 2021, para. 66; T-750/20, Correia v EESC, 2022, para. 37 (appeal pending in C-423/22 P). 121 See C-334/12 RX-II, Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB, 2013, para. 28; T-338/16 P, Zink v Commission, 2018, paras 27–31; T-750/20, Correia v EESC, 2022, para. 38 (appeal pending in C-423/22 P).

Special Characteristics 605 This issue is of particular importance in the context of compensation claims submitted by civil servants when the alleged damage does not originate in a decision adversely affecting him or her. In the absence of a specific time-limit, the Union Courts have drawn inspiration from the action for damages to consider a period of five years as reasonable.122 However, since the time-limit is to be appraised in the light of all the circumstances specific to the case, it should not be applied rigidly123 and a separate assessment should be made in each individual case.124 This implies that a request for compensation submitted more than five years after the point in time at which the civil servant became aware of the situation complained of cannot be held inadmissible only on that account.125 Conversely, it may happen that, taking into account the circumstances of the dispute, a request submitted within five years after the point in time at which the civil servant became aware of the damage will be declared inadmissible.126 That being said, as soon as a decision adversely affecting the civil servant has been taken, the time-limits spelled out in Art. 90(2) of the Staff Regulations apply.127 Further to this, the time-limits laid down in Arts 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations cannot be applied by analogy to procedures provided for in the staff regulations of the European Investment Bank where no specific time-limits have been laid down in those regulations. Thus, in order to evaluate whether an action brought by a member of staff of the EIB before the General Court is out of time, the General Court may not apply the three-month time-limit provided in Art. 91(3) of the Staff Regulations by analogy as a rule to determine whether the action was brought within a reasonable time.128 The same applies to requests made by members of staff of the EIB in the context of internal procedures provided for in the staff regulations of the European Investment Bank, such as the opposition procedure in sickness insurance matters129 or the conciliation procedure.130 (d) Excusable errors Only excusable errors will allow a civil servant to bring a complaint out of time. Being an exception to the general rule, the concept of excusable error is interpreted strictly and can only concern ‘exceptional circumstances in which, in particular, the conduct of the institution concerned has been, either alone or to a decisive extent, such as to give rise to a pardonable confusion in the mind of a party acting in good faith and exercising all the diligence required of a normally experienced civil servant. In such an event, the

122 See T-45/01, Sanders and Others v Commission, 2004, para. 69; F-21/07, Marcuccio v Commission (order), 2007, para. 21. 123 See F-42/08, Marcuccio v Commission (order), 2009, para. 22. 124 See F-30/08, Nanopoulos v Commission, 2010, paras 116–120. 125 See, by analogy, C-334/12 RX-II, Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB, 2013, paras 25–46. 126 See F-21/07, Marcuccio v Commission (order), 2007, paras 19–23; F-42/08, Marcuccio v Commission (order), 2009, paras 19–28. 127 See T-180/08 P, Tiralongo v Commission (order), 2009, paras 45–47. 128 See C-334/12 RX-II, Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB, 2013, paras 25–46. 129 See T-418/11 P, De Nicola v EIB, 2013, paras 29–31. 130 See T-264/11 P, De Nicola v EIB, 2013, paras 49–52.

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606 STAFF CASES administration may not rely on its own failure to observe the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations out of which the civil servant’s error arose.’131

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(e) New facts The presence of new and substantial facts may justify a request to have a decision that has become definitive as a result of the expiry of the time-limits set out in Art. 90(2) of the Staff Regulations reviewed.132 (4) Formal requirements Requests for decisions and complaints are not subject to any requirement as to form.133 A mere e-mail may suffice.134 Art. 90c of the Staff Regulations provides that requests and complaints must be lodged with the appointing authority entrusted with the exercise of powers. The institutions themselves may lay down procedures for the submission and processing of requests and complaints. Internal procedures, however, may not lay down conditions that affect a civil servant’s possibility to bring an admissible complaint pursuant to Art. 90(2) of the Staff Regulations.135 (5) Substantive requirements (a) Content of a complaint The aim of the pre-litigation procedure is to enable the dispute to be settled amicably. Consequently, the complaint must put the appointing authority in a position to know in sufficient detail the applicant’s criticisms of the contested act.136 Therefore, a complaint should spell out in a clear and precise manner the reasons why the civil servant contests the decision taken in relation to him or her.137 (b) Content of a decision rejecting a complaint There is no obligation incumbent upon the appointing authority to inform the civil servant about the possibility of bringing judicial proceedings against the act adversely affecting him or her, or about the time-limits by which such proceedings should be

131 See C-172/20 P, WV v EEAS, 2022, para. 65; T-271/08 P, Boudavo and Others v Commission, 2009, paras 71– 72; T-127/07 P, Bligny v Commission, 2008, paras 40–41. 132 See C-631/19 P, Dickmanns v EUIPO (order), 2020, para. 4; C-63/20 P, Dickmanns v EUIPO, 2021, para. 38; C-399/20 P, XH v Commission (order), 2021, para. 4; C-167/20 P, WD v EFSA, 2021, para. 39; T-271/08 P, Boudavo and Others v Commission, 2009, para. 38; T-605/18, ZF v Commission, 2020, para. 71. 133 See 54/77, Herpels v Commission, 1978, para. 47; T-316/19, Lucaccioni v Commission, 2021, para. 64; F-103/15, Alberto de Pretis Cagnodo v Commission (order), 2016, para. 35. 134 See F-141/06, Hartwig v Commission (order), 2007, para. 27. See, however, T-462/20, ZU v Commission, 2021, paras 35–37. 135 See F-138/06 and F-37/08, Meister v OHIM, 2009, paras 136–142. 136 See 58/75, Sergy v Commission, 1976, para. 32; 133/88, Del Amo Martinez v Parliament, 1989, para. 9; T-57/89, Alexandrakis v Commission, 1990, para. 8; T-560/16, Schneider v EUIPO, 2018, para. 40. A ‘complaint’ is an act whereby an official or servant specifically challenges an administrative measure which adversely affects him or her. It is necessary to give priority to the content of the document rather than to its form or title (C-154/99 P, Politi v European Training Foundation, 2000, para. 17); see also T-354/03, Reggimenti v Parliament, 2005, paras 43, 44. 137 See F-141/06, Hartwig v Commission (order), 2007, para. 26.

Special Characteristics 607 brought.138 The appointing authority is also not required to indicate that the complaint was inadmissible and that further judicial proceedings will thus be inadmissible.139 (6) Action before the General Court (a) General If the pre-litigation procedure does not bring the dispute to an end, an action may be brought in the General Court.140 (b) Time-limits The action must be brought within three months.141 Time starts running on the date of notification142 of the decision taken in response to the complaint or, in the case of an implied decision rejecting the complaint, on the date of expiry of the period of four months after the complaint was lodged.143 Furthermore, when an implicit decision rejecting a complaint is followed by the notification of an express rejection within the three-month period for bringing an action before the General Court, time only starts to run from the moment of notification of the express decision.144 An express rejection decision notified after the expiry of that period does not give rise to a new period for lodging the appeal.145 In addition, in case a member of staff has submitted multiple complaints with the same object in relation to one act adversely affecting him or her, only the first complaint will be taken into account. All subsequent writings addressed to the appointing authority will be considered to be merely reiterating the civil servant’s position and cannot have 138 See T-306/08 P, Braun-Neumann v Parliament, 2009, paras 34–36. 139 See T-306/08 P, Braun-Neumann v Parliament, 2009, para. 37. 140 Under Art. 91(4) of the Staff Regulations, an applicant may bring an action in the General Court without awaiting the reply from the appointing authority, provided that he or she applies for interim measures at the same time. The proceedings in the main action are then suspended until such time as the appointing authority has responded to the complaint. 141 The question of admissibility will be raised by the Union Courts of their own motion (see T-14/03, Di Marzio v Commission, 2004, para. 37; T-804/19, HC v Commission, 2021, para. 19. An adaptation of the application submitted to the General Court must be made within those three months (GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 86(3)). 142 For the purposes of the Staff Regulations, the validity of a notification depends not only on the communication of the decision to the addressee, but also on whether the addressee has been given the opportunity to gain effective knowledge of its contents: see 5/16, Jänsch v Commission, 1976, para. 10; C-447/21 P, Kerstens v Commission, 2022, paras 20–26; T-272/19, TO v EEAS, 2020, para. 37; T-723/18, Barata v Commission, para. 31. 143 Art. 91(3) of the Staff Regulations provides as follows: where a complaint is rejected by express decision after being rejected by implied decision but before the period for lodging an appeal has expired, the period for lodging the appeal shall start to run afresh. The date of adoption of the decision is relevant in this respect, not the date of its notification: see T-55/02, Finch v Commission (order), 2004, paras 46–49. That provision may not be invoked to the detriment of an applicant where the latter has already brought an action and the defendant institution seeks to remedy, by means of a late, reasoned rejection of the complaint, the fact that the act adversely affecting the applicant entirely lacked any statement of reasons: see T-52/90, Volger v Parliament, 1992, paras 31–42 (upheld in C-115/92 P, Parliament v Volger, 1993, paras 22–24). Where an express decision rejecting a complaint is taken after the period for lodging an appeal has run out, time does not start running afresh; although the express decision makes it clear why the complaint was rejected, it constitutes merely confirmation of the implied decision rejecting the complaint: see C-312/97 P, Fichtner v Commission (order), 1998, paras 16–17. 144 Staff Regulations, Art. 91(3); T-66/05, Sack v Commission, 2007, para. 48; T-284/09 P, Meister v OHIM (order), 2010, para. 28. 145 See T-414/06, Combescot v Commission, 2008, paras 36–47.

16.24

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608 STAFF CASES the effect of prolonging the applicable time-limits.146 An action for annulment will thus lie against the decision rejecting the first complaint, and time-limits should be calculated accordingly. When the decision rejecting the complaint is drafted in a language which is neither the mother tongue of the civil servant nor the language in which the complaint was drawn up, a translation may be requested. Provided that such a request was made within a reasonable period of time, the time-limit to bring an action before the General Court will only start to run from the moment the translation is notified to the civil servant.147

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(c) Parallelism between the complaint and the application The prior complaint defines the subject-matter of the action to a negative extent only. The action may not extend the purpose or the subject-matter of the complaint, but may curtail them. Consequently, the subject-matter of the action is defined solely by the application, provided that it remains within the limits laid down by the complaint.148 That being said, Art. 84(1) of the GC Rules of Procedure on the introduction of new pleas based on matters which come to light in the course of the judicial procedure does not cease to apply in the context of staff litigation.149 Further to this, the General Court can always raise public policy pleas of its own motion, even if not raised in the complaint.150 Generally, the complaint will not be drawn up by a lawyer and will be very informal, since it aims at achieving an amicable settlement of the dispute.151 Complaints should thus not be interpreted restrictively.152 Consequently, it is sufficient if the pleas set out in the application emerge implicitly from the complaint153 or are closely linked thereto if they do not appear as such in the complaint.154 The General Court takes a flexible

146 See T-66/05, Sack v Commission, 2007, para. 37. 147 See F-31/11, BI v European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (order), 2012, para. 20. 148 See T-134/89, Hettrich and Others v Commission, 1990, para. 16; T-144/03, Schmit v Commission, 2005, paras 90–93; T-129/17 RENV, DI v EASO, 2018, paras 56–62; T-511/18, XH v Commission, 2020, paras 57–58; T-575/19, Hill Mansilla v Commission, 2021, paras 50–51; T-316/19, Lucaccioni v Commission, 2021, paras 65– 66; T-630/19, AH v Eurofound, 2021, paras 40–62; T-641/19, FD v European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy, 2021, para. 43; T-757/20, OT v Parliament, 2022, para. 154; T-357/22, Das Neves v Commission, 2023, paras 26–28. 149 See T-43/07 P, Neophytou v Commission, 2008, para. 90; T-468/20, Kühne v Parliament, 2022, para. 41. 150 See C-601/19 P, BP v FRA, 2020, paras 47, 91; T-880/19, Lianopoulou v Commission, 2021, paras 38–41; T‑693/16 P-RENV-RX, HG v Commission, 2021, para. 116; T-311/21, SV v EIB, 2022, para. 71; F-20/09, Juvyns v Commission, 2011, para. 65. 151 However, the complaint may be lodged by a lawyer acting on behalf of his or her client: see T-139/89, Virgili- Schettini v Parliament, 1990. 152 See T-511/18, XH v Commission, 2020, para. 59; T-575/19, Hill Mansilla v Commission, 2021, para. 142; T-757/20, OT v Parliament, 2022, para. 157; T-357/22, Das Neves v Commission, 2023, para. 29. Merely changing the legal basis of a dispute does not amount to changing its subject-matter: see T-129/17 RENV, DI v EASO, 2018, para. 61; T‑693/16 P-RENV-RX, HG v Commission, 2021, paras 121–122. Further to this, the purpose of the incidental plea of illegality provided for in Art. 277 TFEU justifies declaring admissible a plea of illegality raised for the first time before the General Court, in derogation from the rule of concordance between the application and the complaint: T-787/14 P, ECB v Cerafogli, 2016, para. 47; T-490/21, Vanhoudt v EIB, 2022, paras 63–64 (appeal pending in C-106/23 P). See further para. 9.17. 153 See 184/80, Van Zaanen v Court of Auditors, 1981, para. 13. 154 See 133/88, Del Amo Martinez v Parliament, 1989, para. 10; T-57/89, Alexandrakis v Commission, 1990, para. 9; T-2/90, Ferreira de Freitas v Commission, 1991, para. 41; T-312/02, Gussetti v Commission, 2004, para. 47; T-56/07 P, Commission v Economidis, 2008, para. 94.

Special Characteristics 609 approach in this regard.155 It is not the purpose of the complaint to fix rigorously and definitively the scope of the judicial proceedings in relation to its content.156 Provided that the subject-matter and the grounds of the complaint are not altered, the application and the pleas adduced in support of it will be admissible.157 The test is whether an open-minded assessment of the complaint carried out by the appointing authority would have enabled it to know the heads of complaint set out in the application to the General Court in order to reach an amicable settlement of the dispute.158 If the heads of complaint, from the point of view of their subject-matter and purpose, remain the same in the complaint and the application, the application will be admissible, even if those heads of complaint are given a more legal character in pleas and arguments which were not raised as such in the complaint.159 Moreover, where the complainant learns of the reasons for the contested decision by way of the response to his or her complaint or where those reasons modify or supplement substantially the reasons contained in the contested decision, any plea put forward for the first time in the application which seeks to dispute the merits of the reasons set out in the response to the complaint must be deemed to be admissible.160 Furthermore, according to the case-law, a claim for compensation for damage arising out of the contested act may be made even if no mention was made of it in the complaint. This flexible approach is attributable to the close link between such a claim and the complaint made against the contested act.161 (d) Intensity of judicial scrutiny Actions are often brought against decisions which are the outcome of a procedure in which the appointing authority enjoys a wide margin of appreciation. This is, for example, the case where a staff member seeks to dispute his or her evaluation report162 or the decision not to renew his or her contract.163 In such instances, the review by the Union Courts is limited to manifest errors or an abuse of powers.164 Similarly, in the 155 See F-45/07, Mandt v Parliament, 2010, para. 112. 156 See T-511/18, XH v Commission, 2020, para. 59; T-757/20, OT v Parliament, 2022, para. 158; F-60/07, Martin Bermejo v Commission (order), 2007, para. 35. 157 See 75/82 and 117/8,2 Razzouk and Beydoun v Commission, 1984, para. 9. 158 See T-312/02, Gussetti v Commission, 2004, para. 47; T-43/07 P, Neophytos Neophytou v Commission, 2008, para. 89; T-100/04, Giannini v Commission, 2008, para. 39; T-757/20, OT v Parliament, 2022, para. 159. 159 For a case in which this condition was not satisfied, at least as regards one of the pleas raised, see T-4/92, Vardakas v Commission, 1993, paras 16–17; see also T-588/93, G v Commission, 1994, paras 27–30; T-361/94, Weir v Commission, 1996, para. 32. 160 See T-644/11 P, Kimman v Commission, 2014, para. 61; T-511/18, XH v Commission, 2020, para. 69; T-663/21, Zegers v Commission, 2022, para. 65. 161 See 126/87, Del Plato v Commission, 1987, para. 12; 224/87, Koutchoum-off v Commission, 1989, para. 10; T-44/93, Saby v Commission, 1995, para. 28; T-238/02, Barbosa Gonçalves v Commission, 2004, para. 26. 162 See C-875/19 P, FV v Council, 2021, paras 62–68; T-119/20, IN v EISMEA, 2021, para. 189; T-677/21, TL v Commission, 2022, paras 38–40 (appeal pending in C-96/23 P). 163 See T-119/20, IN v EISMEA, 2021, para. 132; T-438/21, TL v Commission, 2022, para. 37. However, where an administration has adopted internal guidelines providing for specific arrangements intended to guarantee the transparency of the contract renewal process and the correct application of certain procedural conditions, those arrangements are analysed as a self-limitation of the institution’s discretion and their correct application can be reviewed by the Union Courts: T-164/21, QM v Europol, 2022, paras 87–92. 164 See C-875/19 P, FV v Council, 2021, para. 65; T-575/19, Hill Mansilla v Commission, 2021, para. 61; T-670/19, Carbajo Ferrero v Parliament, 2021, paras 136–137; T-41/20, Di Bernardo v Commission, 2021, paras 76–78; T-689/20,

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610 STAFF CASES context of an action brought against a decision suspending a staff member, given the provisional nature of such a measure, the Union Courts will limit their review of the decision to checking whether the allegations of serious misconduct are sufficiently plausible and whether they are not manifestly unfounded.165

B. Priority of an action brought under Art. 270 TFEU 16.28

Any dispute arising out of the employment relationship between a person and the Union must be brought before the Union Courts in accordance with the conditions prescribed by Art. 270 TFEU and Arts 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations.166 No other judicial procedure may be used for this purpose.167 The subject-matter of the application determines whether it has to be regarded as a ‘staff case’.168 Accordingly, an action brought by members of an official’s family pursuant to Art. 268 and the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU for compensation for damage suffered by them personally as a result of effects of ‘the conduct of an institution’ on the career of the official in question will be inadmissible on the ground that the official himself was ‘in a position to avail himself of the opportunities afforded by the [Treaties] to challenge any decision of the institution concerned’.169 Similarly, a claim for damages brought by family members of a deceased official against the Commission based on an alleged failure of the Commission to fulfil its duty to ensure the protection of its officials falls within the scope of Art. 270 TFEU.170 HB v EIB, 2021, paras 68–69; T-118/22, OM v Commission, 2022, para. 38 (appeal pending in C-98/23 P). On the notion of manifest error, see T-119/20, IN v EISMEA, 2021, para. 132; T-341/21, Rauff-Nisthar v Commission, 2022, para. 54. 165 See T-634/19, FC v EUAA, 2022, para. 117. 166 See C-310/19 P, Schokker v EASA, 2020, para. 50; C-54/20 P, Commission v Missir Mamachi di Lusignano, 2022, para. 42. This does not exclude, however, the possibility for officials to bring issues regarding their employment relationship with the institutions to the attention of the European Ombudsman and/or the European Parliament: see T-186/11, Schönberger v Parliament, 2013. 167 See 9/75, Meyer-Burckhardt v Commission, 1975, para. 7; T-30/96, Gomes de Sá Pereira v Council (order), 1996, paras 24–26. Even if the legality of a recruitment procedure initiated by a Union institution may depend on whether certain acts of the national authorities, to which that institution has turned, are themselves lawful (where, for instance, the Union institution asks the Member State concerned to present suitable candidates for appointment as members of the temporary staff), it is for the person aggrieved to exercise, within the time-limits laid down by the Staff Regulations, the remedies provided for in the Staff Regulations, even if only as a precautionary measure: see C-246/95, Coen, 1997, para. 22; see also F-30/08, Nanopoulos v Commission, 2010, paras 70–74. However, the Union may act as a civil party in national criminal proceedings brought against a member of its staff for acts of corruption in relation to the management of public procurements in order to seek compensation for the non-material damage to the Union’s reputation caused by the acts of that member of staff: see C-851/19 P, DK v EEAS, 2021. 168 See, in this regard, T-45/01, Sanders v Commission, 2004, paras 42–54; T-144/02, Eagle and Others v Commission, 2004, paras 40–52; T-277/03, Vlachaki v Commission, 2005, paras 29–39. 169 See 114/79 to 117/79, Fournier v Commission (order), 1980 ECR 1529, 1531. See also T-462/93, T-464/93, and T-470/93, Lenz v Commission (order), 1995, paras 55–59. 170 See C‑417/14 RX-II, Missir Mamachi di Lusignano and Others v Commission, 2015, paras 42–50; C-54/20 P, Commission v Missir Mamachi di Lusignano and Others, 2022, paras 38–57. It should also be pointed out that the conditions for liability of the Union institutions under Art. 270 TFEU differ from those under Art. 268 and the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU (see Ch. 11). Given the duty of care imposed upon the Union institutions vis-à-vis their personnel, a mere illegality committed by a Union institution suffices for the Union to incur liability: see T-143/09 P, Commission v Petrilli, 2010, para. 46; T-164/19, AQ v eu-LISA, 2021, paras 97–98; T-670/19, Carbajo Ferrero v Parliament, 2021, para. 154; T-681/20, OC v EEAS, 2022 paras 65–66; T-296/21, SU v EIOPA,

Consequences 611 Conversely, a decision of the Commission rejecting a request of a civil servant for access to documents on the basis of Regulation No. 1049/2001 does not constitute an act adversely affecting the civil servant within the meaning of Arts 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations and thus does not fall within the scope of Art. 270 TFEU.171 In addition, disputes relating to costs between a civil servant and an institution following legal proceedings before the General Court should be brought on the basis of Art. 170(1) of the GC Rules of Procedure and not be settled in the context of Arts 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations.172

IV. Consequences A. Decision of the General Court Depending upon the purpose and outcome of the proceedings, the General Court may dismiss the application, annul the contested act,173 award damages174—together, where 2022, paras 72–73. Compare C-337/15 P, European Ombudsman v Staelen, 2017, paras 29–46: while the European Ombudsman has a duty to act diligently in regard of complaints submitted to it by personnel of Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies, the European Ombudsman is in such instance not bound by the specific duty of care by way of a relationship of employment and, therefore, a mere breach of the duty to act diligently is not sufficient to establish the liability of the European Ombudsman. See further, regarding the requirement of a causal link, T-401/11 P-RENV-RX, Missir Mamachi di Lusignano and Others v Commission, 2017, paras 64–95. 171 See T-197/11 and T-198/11, Commission v Strack, 2012, paras 43–60; T-488/18, XC v Commission, 2021, paras 107–114 (appeal pending in C-527/21 P). 172 See F-70/07, Marcuccio v Commission (order), 2009, paras 15–20. 173 A procedural irregularity that occurred in the course of the procedure leading to the adoption of a decision, including a breach of the rights of the defence, will only result in the annulment of the contested decision if the outcome of the procedure might have been different if the irregularity had not occurred: see 209/78 to 215/78 and 218/78, Van Landewyck v Commission, 1978, para. 47; C-558/17 P, OZ v EIB, 2019, para. 76; C-570/18 P, HF v Parliament, 2020, paras 72–74; T-253/19, BG v Parliament, 2021, para. 87; T-119/20, IN v EISMEA, 2021, para. 171; T-122/21, QI v Commission, 2022, para. 151 (appeal pending in C-32/23 P); T-357/22, Das Neves v Commission, 2023, paras 83–84; see also T-220/20, Kerstens v Commission, 2021, paras 44–50, in which an official warning given to the applicant was annulled because the administrative investigation had not been conducted with all guarantees of impartiality. Further to this, the lack of competence of the author of a decision is not a mere procedural irregularity and entails in itself the annulment of the contested decision: see C-139/18 P, CJ v ECDC, 2019, paras 52–53; T-52/19, AH v Eurofound, 2021, para. 68. Moreover, when deciding on the consequences of an irregularity affecting a measure relating to a selection procedure for Union staff, the Union Courts must seek to reconcile the interests of candidates disadvantaged by an irregularity which occurred during that procedure with the interests of other candidates and the interests of the service. Thus, while the annulment of the whole selection procedure may at times be considered to be an excessive consequence, for example, in light of the number of successful candidates that will be affected, this cannot be excluded as a rule of law: see C-243/18 P, European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy v Galocha, 2019, paras 46–51, 65 (confirming T-561/16, Galocha v Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy, 2018, paras 65–70 (annulment)); T-202/17, Calhau Correia de Paiva v Commission, 2021, paras 130–138 (no annulment). That being said, depending on the circumstances of the case, it is not always necessary to consider whether the annulment of an appointment decision is disproportionate: see C-613/21 P, Parliament v Carbajo Ferrero, 2023, paras 84–92; compare C-613/21 P, Parliament v Carbajo Ferrero, AG Medina Opinion, 2022, points 66–69; T-365/21, TJ v EEAS, 2023, paras 51–56. In relation to an unlawfulness affecting the constitution of a reserve list for future recruitment by way of an open competition, the rights of an applicant are sufficiently protected if the selection board and the appointing authority reconsider their decisions and try to seek a just solution for the situation of the applicant. Consequently, an action seeking the annulment of a reserve list is only admissible in so far as it is directed against the refusal of a selection board to include an applicant on the reserve list: see T-488/18, XC v Commission, 2021, para. 180 (appeal pending in C-527/21 P); T-804/19, HC v Commission, 2021, para. 176 (appeal pending in C-102/22 P); T-624/20, MV v Commission, 2022, para. 29 (appeal pending in C-786/22 P). 174 The award of compensation for not-material damage together with the annulment of the contested act will only occur where the applicant demonstrates having suffered non-material damage that is separable from the

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612 STAFF CASES appropriate, with default interest175—and, in disputes of a financial nature,176 impose such measures as it may grant in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction.177 However, the General Court may not substitute itself for the Union institution, body, office, or agency party to the proceedings or issue injunctions,178 as it is in the first place for the Union institution, body, office, or agency concerned to decide on the measures necessary to comply with the judgment in accordance with Art. 266 TFEU.179 At most, the General Court may provide guidance as to the measures to be taken in order to comply with its judgment.180

B. Appeal 16.30

An appeal, limited to points of law,181 may be brought before the Court of Justice— within two months of notification of the decision appealed against—against final decisions of the General Court and decisions of that Court disposing of the substantive issues in part only or disposing of a procedural issue concerning a plea of lack of

unlawfulness leading to the annulment of the contested decision and which cannot be entirely compensated for through the annulment of the contested decision: see T-843/19, Correia v EESC, 2021, paras 86–89; T-299/20, KF v EIB, 2022, paras 134–137; T-20/21, VI v Commission, 2022, para. 83; T-365/21, TJ v EEAS, 2023, para. 70; F-116/14, Murariu v EIOPA, 2015, para. 150. Thus, the feeling of injustice and distress caused by the fact that an individual is required to undergo a pre-contentious procedure and then a contentious procedure in order to ensure recognition of his or her rights is likely to constitute damage which may be inferred from the mere fact that the administration has acted unlawfully: see T-164/20, BG v Parliament, 2023, para. 66. 175 See T-387/19, DF and DG v EIB, 2021, para. 77; T-370/20, KL v EIB, 2021, para. 124. 176 See T-370/20, KL v EIB, 2021, paras 114–119. 177 See C-583/08 P, Gogos v Commission, 2010, paras 44–50; T-370/20, KL v EIB, 2021, paras 110–112; T‑693/16 P-RENV-RX, HG v Commission, 2021, para. 318. 178 See C-243/18 P, European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy v Galocha, 2019, para. 69; T-588/93, G v Commission, 1994, para. 26; T-880/19, Lianopoulou v Commission, 2021, para. 28; T-316/19, Lucaccioni v Commission, 2021, para. 56; T-709/20, OJ v Commission, 2022, para. 27; T-538/16, Schaffrin v Commission, 2022, para. 23; F-57/06, Hinderyckx v Council, 2007, para. 65. It is thus not possible to order the reinstatement of a staff member in his or her previous position: see T-805/21, NS v Parliament, 2023, paras 130–131. 179 See 225/82, Verzyck v Commission, 1983, paras 19–20; C‑119/19 P and C‑126/19 P, Commission v Carreras Sequeros and Others, 2020, paras 56–57; C-399/20 P, XH v Commission (order), 2021, para. 4; T-236/02, Marcuccio v Commission, 2011, para. 163; T-583/16, PG v Frontex, 2017, paras 41–45; T-632/19, DD v FRA, 2021, para. 45 (appeal pending in C-587/21 P); T-750/20, Correia v EESC, 2022, paras 64–66 (appeal pending in C-423/22 P). Art. 266 TFEU does not require that the appointing authority whose decision was annulled adopts a new decision with the same objective as the previous decision (C-170/18 P, CJ v ECDC, 2019, para. 38). However, where a termination decision has been annulled in its entirety by a judgment of the Union Courts, including the grounds for that decision, the appointing authority who considers taking a new termination decision is required to carry out a new full review of the facts and to assess afresh the consequences to be drawn from that judgment after hearing the person concerned (C-170/18 P, CJ v ECDC, 2019, para. 55). Under certain circumstances, compliance with a judgment may imply taking a decision to compensate fairly the person concerned for the disadvantage resulting from the annulled decision: T-286/15, KF v SatCen, 2018, paras 249–254; T-266/21, Casanova v EIB, 2022, paras 86–88. 180 See T-37/89, Hanning v Parliament, 1990, para. 79; T-73/89, Barbi v Commission, 1990, para. 38; T-514/19, DI v ECB, 2021, para. 39 (appeal pending in C-513/21 P). This does not exclude, however, the possibility for the member of staff concerned to start a new pre-litigation procedure concerning the way the institution whose decision was annulled has implemented the judgment of the Union Court. Subsequently, this may culminate in new proceedings before the Union Courts, which will then be required, while respecting the discretion allotted to the institution concerned under Art. 266 TFEU, to evaluate the implementation of an earlier judgment: see T-824/19, RY v Commission, 2021, paras 24–33; T-632/19, DD v FRA, 2021, paras 39–50, 80–99 (appeal pending in C-587/21 P). 181 See T-338/07 P, Bianchi v ETF, 2010, para. 58. See further Ch. 19.

Consequences 613 jurisdiction or inadmissibility. Such an appeal may be brought by any party which has been unsuccessful, in whole or in part, in its submissions. However, interveners other than the intervening Member States and Union institutions may bring such an appeal only where the decision of the General Court directly affects them.182 Moreover, by way of exception to the general rule, Member States and Union institutions that did not intervene in the proceedings before the General Court cannot bring an appeal.183

182 183

Statute, Art. 56, second para. Statute, Art. 56, third para.

17 JURISDICTION OF THE UNION COURTS OVER DISPUTES RELATING TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS I. Subject-Matter A. General overview To date, three Union intellectual property rights have been created by regulations adopted on the basis of what is now Art. 352 TFEU: EU trade marks,1 Community plant variety rights,2 and Community designs.3 These intellectual property rights are granted by Union offices especially set up for the purpose. EU trade marks and Community designs are granted by the European Union Office for Intellectual Property (EUIPO), whereas Community plant variety rights are conferred by the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO). These two Offices may also declare intellectual property rights falling within their jurisdiction null and void or cancel them, and take decisions on observations or objections submitted by third parties.

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B. System of Legal Protection (1) Boards of Appeal Each of the three regulations mentioned above introduces a specific system of legal protection which safeguards the rights of parties affected by the Offices’ 1 Regulation (EU) No. 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L154/1). The EU trade mark was introduced by Council Regulation (EC) No. 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (OJ 1994 L11/1) and subsequently regulated by Council Regulation (EC) No. 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark (OJ 2009, L 78/1). Note that while the date of the application for registration is determinative for the identification of the applicable substantive rules, procedural rules apply from the date they enter into force. This means that the substantive aspects of a dispute may continue to be regulated by Regulation (EU) No. 207/2009, while the procedural aspects are regulated by Regulation (EU) No. 2017/1001: see C-74/20 P, Hästens Sängar v EUIPO (order), 2020, para. 27; T-176/21, CCTY Bearing Company v EUIPO, 2022, para. 12; T-287/21, Pejovič v EUIPO, 2022, paras 20–22; T-217/22, Lifestyle Equities v EUIPO, 2023, para. 15. 2 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2100/94 of 27 July 1994 on Community plant variety rights (OJ 1994 L227/1), as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No. 15/2008 of 20 December 2007 amending Regulation (EC) No. 2100/94 as regards the entitlement to file an application for a Community plant variety right (OJ 2008 L8/2). 3 Council Regulation (EC) No. 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community designs (OJ 2002 L3/1), as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1891/2006 of 18 December 2006 amending Regulations (EC) No. 6/2002 and (EC) No. 40/94 to give effect to the accession of the European Community to the Geneva Act of the Hague Agreement concerning the international registration of industrial designs (OJ 2006 L386/14).

EU Procedural Law. Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak, Oxford University Press. © Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833086.003.0017

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616 DISPUTES RELATING TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS decisions and takes account of the specific characteristics of intellectual property rights. One or more Boards of Appeal have been set up at the two Offices to which appeals may be brought against the decisions of other authorities of the relevant Office. 4 Accordingly, as far as the EU trade mark is concerned, an appeal may be brought before the Boards of Appeal5 against decisions of the examiners (who are responsible for taking decisions in relation to an application for registration of an EU trade mark), 6 decisions of the Opposition Divisions (which are responsible for taking decisions on an opposition to an application to register an EU trade mark),7 decisions of the Department in charge of the Register (which is responsible for taking decisions in respect of entries in the Register8 and keeping the list of professional representatives 9), decisions of the Cancellation Divisions (which are responsible for taking decisions in relation to an application for the revocation or declaration of invalidity of an EU trade mark or the assignment of an EU trade mark 10), and decisions of any other unit or person appointed by the Executive Director (responsible for decisions required under Regulation No. 2017/1001 which do not fall within the competence of an examiner, an Opposition Division, a Cancellation Division, or the Department in charge of the Register11). An appeal may be lodged against decisions of the Boards of Appeal in the General Court.12

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(2) The General Court (a) Jurisdiction of the General Court (i) Legality control The purpose of an action before the General Court is to review the legality of a decision of the Board of Appeal on grounds of lack of competence; infringement

4 Under Art. 67 of Regulation No. 2100/94, appeals will lie against a declaration that a Community plant variety right is null and void (Art. 20), the cancellation of such a right (Art. 21), decisions concerning objections lodged against the grant of such a right (Art. 59), the refusal of applications for a right (Art. 61), the grant of a Community plant variety right (Art. 62), the approval and amendment of a variety denomination (Arts 63 and 66), decisions concerning the fees payable under Art. 83 and costs under Art. 85, the registration and deregistration of particulars in the registers under Art. 87, and public inspection under Art. 88. The Office may grant compulsory exploitation rights under Art. 29 of Regulation No. 2100/94, and may in certain circumstances grant exploitation rights to a person not being the holder of the relevant plant variety right under Art. 100(2) of that regulation. Decisions under Arts 29 and 100(2) of Regulation No. 2100/94 may also be challenged before the Boards of Appeal or be the subject of a direct appeal to the General Court under Art. 74(1) thereof. Under Arts 55 and 106 of Regulation No. 6/2002, an appeal will lie from decisions of the examiners (Art. 103 empowers the examiners to take decisions in relation to an application for registration of a Community design), the Administration of Trade Marks and Designs and Legal Division (responsible under Art. 104(2) for taking those decisions which do not fall within the competence of an examiner or an Invalidity Division and decisions in respect of entries in the register), and Invalidity Divisions (responsible under Art. 105 for taking decisions in relation to applications for declarations of invalidity of registered Community designs). 5 Regulation No. 2017/1001, Arts 66 and 165(1). 6 Regulation No. 2017/1001, Art. 160. 7 Regulation No. 2017/1001, Art. 161(1). 8 Regulation No. 2017/1001, Art. 162(1). 9 Regulation No. 2017/1001, Art. 162(2). 10 Regulation No. 2017/1001, Art. 163(1). 11 Regulation No. 2017/1001, Art. 164. 12 Regulation No. 2017/1001, Art. 72(1); Regulation No. 2100/94, Art. 73; Regulation No. 6/2002, Art. 61.

Subject-Matter 617 of an essential procedural requirement; infringement of the Treaties, of the applicable Regulations, or of any rule of law relating to their application; or misuse of power.13 This entails a full review14 of the legality of the decision of a Board of Appeal.15 Such review implies, inter alia, examining whether a Board of Appeal has made a correct legal classification of the facts of the dispute16 and evaluating whether its assessment of the facts submitted to it was erroneous.17 Therefore, judicial review before the General Court cannot consist of a mere repetition of the review previously carried out by a Board of Appeal.18 Conversely, the General Court cannot go beyond the context of the dispute as presented before a Board of Appeal. It can only exercise its power within the limits of Regulation No. 2017/1001 (Art. 72(2)), Regulation No. 2100/94 (Art. 73(2)), or Regulation No. 6/2002 (Art. 61(2)). (ii) Jurisdiction to annul or alter the contested decision In addition to its power to annul a decision of a Board of Appeal, the General Court is vested with a form of unlimited jurisdiction to alter the Board’s decision and replace it with its own.19

13 Regulation No. 2017/1001, Art. 72(2); Regulation No. 2100/94, Art. 73(2); Regulation No. 6/2002, Art. 61(2). See also C-448/09 P, Royal Appliance International v OHIM (order), 2010, para. 43; T-535/19, H.R. Participations v EUIPO, 2020, para. 23; T-250/19, Tradición CZ v EUIPO, 2022, para. 18. 14 See C-281/10 P, PepsiCo v Grupo Promer Mon Graphic, 2011, para. 66; C-263/09 P, Edwin v OHIM, 2011, para. 52; C-598/14 P, EUIPO v Szajner, 2017, para. 37; C-728/18 P, EM Research Organization (order), 2019, paras 15–17. The requirement of a full review implies that, due to the functional continuity between the Opposition Divisions and the Boards of Appeal, where the Board of Appeal has endorsed the grounds set out in the Opposition Division’s decision, the grounds of the Opposition Division’s decision must be taken into account in addition to the grounds of the contested decision: see T-201/20, Zoom v EUIPO, 2021, paras 34–35; see also T-117/21, Deichmann v EUIPO, 2022, para. 19. 15 See C-461/09 P, The Wellcome Foundation v OHIM (order), 2010, para. 25; T-579/19, The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann v EUIPO, 2021, paras 25–27 (appeal pending in C-382/21 P). A decision must not necessarily constitute the final position of the EUIPO bodies on an application. It may also encompass a decision by a Board of Appeal, after annulment of a decision, to remit the case to an Opposition Division or Cancellation Division for further examination: see T-421/18, Bauer Radio v EUIPO, 2020, paras 44–45; T-124/20, M/S. Indeutsch International v EUIPO, 2021, para. 38. 16 See C-311/05 P, Naipes Heraclio Fournier, 2007, para. 39; C-396/15 P, Shoe Branding Europe v OHIM (order), 2016, paras 65–67. 17 See C-16/06 P, Les Éditions Albert René, 2008, para. 39; T-35/20, Monster Energy Company v EUIPO, 2020, paras 48–49; T-644/19, Linde Material Handling v EUIPO, 2021, paras 17–20. 18 See C-29/05 P, OHIM v Kaul, 2007, para. 55; C-442/15 P, Pensa Pharma v EUIPO, 2016, para. 25. However, this does not mean that arguments submitted during proceedings before the EUIPO cannot be repeated before the General Court. Points of law examined by the EUIPO can be the subject of debate before the General Court provided that the applicant contests the EUIPO’s interpretation or application of Union law: see T-571/20, Luna Italia v EUIPO (order), 2021, para. 30. 19 See Regulation No. 2017/1001, Art. 72(3); Regulation No. 2100/94, Art. 73(3); Regulation No. 6/2002, Art. 61(3); see also C-448/09 P, Royal Appliance International v OHIM (order), 2010, para. 43; T-385/09, Annco v OHIM, 2011, para. 52; T-686/20, Asian Gear v EUIPO, 2021, para. 16; T-231/21, Praesidiad Holding v EUIPO, 2022, para. 58. The Court will not alter a decision when the applicant’s interests are sufficiently safeguarded by the annulment of it: see T-461/09, CheapFlights International v OHIM, 2011, para. 51. The alteration of a decision is conditional upon the prior annulment of all or part of the decision. Where an applicant seeks to have a decision of the Board of Appeal altered without also requesting the annulment of that decision, the application for alteration necessarily includes an application for annulment: see T-296/19, Sumol +Compal Marcas v EUIPO, 2020, paras 18–19; T-355/21, Polo Club Düsseldorf v EUIPO, 2022, para. 16. However, some case-law appears to suggest that an application for annulment is not necessarily included in an application for alteration and that it depends on the content of the application: see T-640/21, bet-at-home.com Entertainment v EUIPO, 2022, para. 11; T-287/21, Pejovič v EUIPO, 2022, paras 18–19. For examples of cases in which the contested decision was altered, see T-288/19, Divaro v EUIPO, 2020, paras 85–89; T-20/19, Pablosky v EUIPO, 2020, paras 119–122; T-21/19, Pablosky

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618 DISPUTES RELATING TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

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(b) Limits to the General Court’s jurisdiction (i) General The General Court may exercise its jurisdiction to annul or alter only where the Office has taken a decision.20 Where the Office has not processed a claim or an application, the General Court is not empowered to consider whether the claim is well-founded for the first time.21 Accordingly, the General Court is not empowered to consider whether a trade mark applied for has distinctive character in consequence of the use which has been made of it22 where that argument was not raised before the Board of Appeal.23 However, exceptionally, the General Court may take a decision without a prior decision of the Office. That possibility is limited to situations ‘in which the case has reached a stage appropriate for judicial adjudication’,24 where the General Court is in a position to determine, on the basis of elements of law and fact as established, what decision the Board of Appeal was required to take.25 This is not the case where the General Court is deciding for the first time on the substance of the claims on which a Board of Appeal has failed to rule.26 Therefore, an application for (partial) revocation of an EU trade mark should be rejected when a Board of Appeal did not consider the facts and the evidence at issue with regard to the (partial) revocation.27 (ii) No power to issue an injunction to the Office Since the Office itself has to draw the appropriate inferences from the operative part and grounds of a judgment, it is not for the General Court to issue injunctions to the Office.28 This is a consequence of Art. 266 TFEU29 and the obligation laid down in Art. 72(6) of Regulation No. 2017/1001 that the Office has to take the necessary measures v EUIPO, 2020, paras 114–117. When exercising its power to amend a decision of the EUIPO, the General Court may annul not only the contested decision, but also the decision of the Opposition Division (see T-334/01, MFE Marienfelde v OHIM, 2004, para. 19). The General Court may also give a decision on the opposition and reject it (see T-821/19, Herlyn v EUIPO, 2021, para. 23). It can exercise the same power in the context of invalidity (see T-30/20, Promed v EUIPO, 2020, para. 22) or revocation proceedings (see T-97/16, Martin Kasztantowicz v EUIPO, 2017, para. 17). 20 Decisions may be annulled or altered only where they contain a substantive or procedural irregularity: see T-247/01, eCopy v OHIM, 2002, para. 46; T-360/03, Frischpack v OHIM, 2004, para. 25. In the absence of an irregularity, the Court cannot dismiss the action while substituting its own reasoning for that of the Office: see T-70/08, Axis v OHIM, 2010, para. 29. 21 See T-323/00, SAT.1 v OHIM (SAT.2), 2002, para. 18; T-504/09, Völkl v OHIM, 2011, para. 121; T-177/20, Himmel v EUIPO, 2021, para. 64. See also para. 17.21. 22 Regulation No. 2017/1001, Art. 7(3). 23 See T-30/00, Henkel v OHIM, 2001, para. 66; T-337/99, Henkel v OHIM, 2001, para. 62. 24 See T-419/07, Okalux v OHIM, 2009, para. 20; T-238/15, Novartis v EUIPO, 2017, para. 35. 25 See C-263/09 P, Edwin v OHIM, 2011, para. 72; T-615/18, Diesel v EUIPO, 2020, para. 116; T-266/20, Global Chartered Controller Institute v EUIPO, 2021, para. 54; T-628/21, Tequila Revolución v EUIPO, 2022, para. 14; T-287/21, Pejovič v EUIPO, 2022, paras 86–87; T-758/21, Dorsum v EUIPO, 2023, para. 20. 26 See T-419/07, Okalux v OHIM, 2009, para. 20; T-380/07, Kaloudis v OHIM (order), 2008, paras 37–40, where the General Court rejected a head of claim dealing with the substance of the case as inadmissible, since the Board of Appeal had only ruled on the admissibility of the appeal before it. See further C-678/19 P, Retail Royalty v EUIPO (order), 2019, para. 22; T-93/20, Albert Darboven Holding v EUIPO, 2021, paras 46–48; T-436/20, Sedus Stoll v EUIPO, 2021, paras 89–92; T-465/21, Ionfarma v EUIPO, 2022, paras 19–21. 27 See T-419/07, Okalux v OHIM, 2009, paras 19–20; T-677/19, Polfarmex v EUIPO, 2020, paras 130–132; T-768/20, Standard International Management v EUIPO, 2022, para. 51; see also C-104/18 P, Koton Mağazacilik Tekstil Sanayi ve Ticaret v EUIPO, 2019, paras 72–73. 28 See T-434/10, Hrbek v OHIM, 2011, para. 15; T-737/18, Siberia Oriental v CPVO, 2020, para. 21; T-159/21, Dante Ricardo Bustos v EUIPO, 2021, para. 16. 29 See T-441/05, IVG Immobilien v OHIM, 2007, para. 12.

Subject-Matter 619 to comply with a judgment of the Union Courts. Therefore, the General Court cannot order the Office to register30 or to refuse registration of31 an EU trade mark. It also cannot compel the Office to remove an intervener’s name from the register as the proprietor of an EU trade mark and replace it with the applicant’s name32 or to declare a trade mark invalid.33 It should be pointed out, however, that a specific claim may often be interpreted both as an alteration and an injunction.34 Since the General Court is competent to alter a decision of a Board of Appeal, it is therefore necessary to distinguish between a claim seeking an alteration and a claim seeking an injunction.35 When the General Court takes a decision which the Board of Appeal ought to have taken or could have taken,36 rather than compelling the Office to follow a certain course of action, such a decision constitutes an alteration within the meaning of Art. 72(3) of Regulation No. 2017/1001.37 (iii) No declaratory or confirmatory judgments The General Court’s jurisdiction is limited to the review of the legality of decisions of the Boards of Appeal. Claims which seek, in reality, to obtain from the General Court statements of law and a ruling on the merits of certain of the submissions put forward

30 See T-371/19, Itinerant Show Room v EUIPO, 2020, para. 13; T-323/20, Hell Energy Magyarország v EUIPO, 2021, paras 11–12; T-464/20, Eggy Food v EUIPO, 2021, para. 16; T-173/20, Henry Cotton’s Brand Management v EUIPO, 2021, para. 34. Moreover, it should be pointed out that such an order is also not possible because the registration of an EU trade mark is a consequence of the finding that all conditions laid down for registration have been met and not of the adoption of a formal decision of the departments of the EUIPO responsible for registration: see T-654/18, Giorgio Armani v EUIPO, 2020, para. 16; T-437/21, Greenwich Polo Club v EUIPO, 2022, para. 14. That being said, a claim requesting the Court to declare possible the registration of an EU trade mark may be declared admissible when it can be interpreted as a request for annulment. This is the case when it appears clearly from the submissions of the applicant that the actual form of order sought was the annulment of the decision of the Board of Appeal. See T-412/06, Vitro Corporativo v OHIM, 2008, para. 16; T-295/07, Vitro Corporativo, v OHIM, 2008, para. 17. 31 See T-366/11, BIAL-Portela v OHIM, 2012, para. 14; T-333/11, Wessang v OHIM, 2012, paras 15–16. 32 See T-83/09, Chalk v OHIM, 2011, para. 18. 33 See T-137/05, La Perla v OHIM, 2007, paras 17–18; T-326/20, Bibita Group v EUIPO, 2021, para. 19. For other examples, see T-279/09, Aiello v OHIM, 2012, para. 17 (claim that the Court should direct the EUIPO to declare an opposition inadmissible); T-579/19, The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann v EUIPO, 2021, para. 29 (claim that the priority of the Community design should be recognized and that the publication of the Community design concerned should be corrected to this extent) (appeal pending in C-382/21 P). 34 See T-15/09, Euro-Information v OHIM, 2010, paras 13–14; T-28/10, Euro-Information v OHIM, 2011, paras 12–13; T-372/09, Visti Beheer v OHIM, 2011, para. 14; T-497/11, Euro-Information v OHIM, 2012, paras 11–13; T-882/19, Kerangus v EUIPO, 2020, paras 24–25; T-669/20, Pluscard Service v EUIPO, 2022, paras 18–19. For instance, a claim requesting the Court to refer the case back to the lower adjudicating body—an Opposition Division—whose decision was challenged before a Board of Appeal was considered to be an alteration in Beifa Group (T-148/08, Beifa Group v OHIM, 2010, para. 42), but a request for an injunction in Phildar (T-99/06, Phildar v OHIM, 2009, paras 15–17). 35 See T-152/07, Lange Uhren v OHIM, 2009, para. 39. 36 See T-148/08, Beifa Group v OHIM, 2010, para. 43; T-274/09, Deutsche Bahn v OHIM, 2011, paras 20–24. 37 See T-190/04, Freixenet v OHIM, 2006, paras 16–18 and T-188/04, Freixenet v OHIM, 2006, paras 16–18 (decision that the conditions for publication of the requested trade mark are fulfilled); T-363/04, Koipe Corporación v OHIM, 2007, paras 29–30 (decision that conditions for opposition have been fulfilled); T-152/07, Lange Uhren v OHIM, 2009, para. 39 (decision that a trade mark could be registered under certain conditions); T-413/07, Bayern Innovativ v OHIM, 2009, para. 14–16 (decision finding that the conditions for allowing an opposition had not been fulfilled); T-124/20, M/S. Indeutsch International v EUIPO, 2021, paras 36–37 (decision finding that the mark has been registered in breach of Art. 7(1) Regulation 201/2009). It should be pointed out, however, that a decision of a Board of Appeal can only be altered to the extent that the Board of Appeal itself is competent to take that decision: see T-169/19, Style & Taste v EUIPO, 2021, para. 16; T-624/19, Welter’s v EUIPO, 2021, paras 10–13; T-669/20, Pluscard Service v EUIPO, 2022, para. 20. For example, since the Board of Appeal does not have the power to delete a specific term from the decision of the examiner, the power of the General Court to alter decisions does not extend to such an application for alteration: see T-651/19, Brands Up OÜ v EUIPO, 2020, paras 14–15.

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620 DISPUTES RELATING TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS in support of the claims for annulment are inadmissible.38 Therefore, the General Court cannot give declaratory or confirmatory judgments.39 A claim requesting the General Court to confirm the validity of a registration of a contested EU trade mark is thus inadmissible on that account.40 For the same reason, a claim requesting the General Court to declare that a decision does not comply with Regulation No. 2017/1001 has been declared inadmissible.41 An application for a declaratory judgment may nevertheless be declared admissible42 if, despite the wording of the form of order sought in the application, it is clear from the application that the applicant seeks, in substance, the annulment of the contested decision.43 17.08

(iv) Decision concerning the costs of proceedings before the Office Often, parties may claim that the General Court should order the EUIPO to reimburse them for certain costs they have incurred in the course of the proceedings before the Office. However, the General Court is only competent to rule on recoverable costs as defined by Art. 190(2) of the GC Rules of Procedure, meaning ‘costs necessarily incurred by the parties for the purposes of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal’.44 Therefore, a claim for reimbursement of costs incurred in the course of other EUIPO proceedings is inadmissible.45

II. Identity of the Parties A. Defendants 17.09

(1) The Office is the defendant An appeal will lie to the General Court against decisions of the Offices’ Boards of Appeal. Nevertheless, the Boards of Appeal of these Union offices are not the defendants in proceedings before the Union Courts, but rather the Offices themselves.46 It should be noted in this connection that, although the members of the Boards of Appeal are independent and not bound by any instructions, they constitute an integral part of the relevant Office and hence a decision of a Board of Appeal is ascribed to the Office to

38 See T-207/09, El Jirari Bouzekri v OHIM, 2011, para. 17; T-607/19, Itinerant Show Room v EUIPO, 2020, paras 14–15. 39 See T-353/19, Gamma-A v EUIPO, 2020, para. 13; T-100/19, L. Oliva Torras v EUIPO, 2020, para. 21; T-86/21, Distintiva Solutions v EUIPO, 2022, para. 25; T-528/21, Neratax v EUIPO, 2023, para. 34. 40 See T-416/10, Yoshida Metal Industry v OHIM, 2012, paras 12–13. See also T-77/10 and T-78/10, Certmedica International and Lehning entreprise v OHIM, 2012, paras 30–33. 41 See T-118/08, Actega Terra v OHIM, 2010, para. 10; T-377/09, Mövenpick v OHIM, 2011, para. 12; T-455/09, Jiménez Sarmiento v OHIM, 2011, paras 17–18; T-500/10, Dorma v OHIM, 2011, paras 16–17. 42 See T-500/10, Dorma v OHIM, 2011, para. 18. 43 See T-273/10, Olive Line International v OHIM, 2012, para. 22; T-341/22, Deutsche Bank v EUIPO, 2023, paras 14–16. 44 See T-50/12, AMC-Representações Têxteis v OHIM, 2013, para. 64; T-589/11 DEP, Phonebook of the World v OHIM (order), 2013, para. 9; T-663/19, Hasbro v EUIPO, 2021, para. 127. 45 See T-44/20, Chanel v EUIPO, 2021, para. 57; T-382/19, Turk Hava Yollari v EUIPO, 2021, para. 56; T-338/21, F I S I Fibre sintetiche, 2022, para. 14; T-443/21, YAplus DBA Yoga Alliance v EUIPO, 2023, para. 128. 46 See C-598/14 P, EUIPO v Szajner, 2017, paras 23–24.

Identity of the Parties 621 which it belongs in the course of proceedings before the General Court.47 A Board of Appeal therefore cannot be regarded as being a court or tribunal.48 (2) Forms of order that may be sought by the Office The Office is not entitled to ask the General Court to annul or alter a contested decision of a Board of Appeal on a point not raised in the application initiating proceedings.49 This is because the Boards of Appeal form an integral part of the Office and the Office does not have the right to appeal against a decision of one of the Boards. In addition, the GC Rules of Procedure designate the Office as the sole defendant.50 However, there is nothing to prevent the Office from endorsing a head of claim of an applicant or from simply leaving the decision to the discretion of the General Court, while putting forward all the arguments that it considers appropriate for giving guidance to the General Court.51

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The distinction between an admissible claim by which the Office asks the General Court to grant the applicant’s claim for annulment of the contested decision and an inadmissible claim by which the Office asks the General Court to annul the contested decision may not seem convincing. Nevertheless, it is established case-law that the Office may claim that the form of order sought by the applicant or another party be granted and put forward arguments in support of the pleas in law advanced by that party.52 The Office cannot be required to defend systematically every contested decision of a Board of Appeal or to claim automatically that every action challenging such a decision should be dismissed.53

B. Applicants Art. 72(4) of Regulation No. 2017/1001, Art. 73(4) of Regulation No. 2100/94, and Art. 61(4) of Regulation No. 6/2002 provide that an action may be brought by any party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal adversely affected by its decision in whole or in part.54 The other parties to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal may participate, as interveners, in the proceedings before the General Court and have the same

47 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 172. 48 See T-63/01, Procter & Gamble v OHIM, 2002, para. 20. 49 See C-97/12 P, Louis Vuitton Malletier v OHIM, 2014, para. 81; T-110/01, Vedial v OHIM, 2002, paras 16–25 (confirmed on appeal in C-106/03 P, Vedial v OHIM, 2004, para. 31); T-443/05, El Corte Inglés v OHIM, 2007, para. 21. 50 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 172. 51 See T-107/02, GE Betz v OHIM, 2004, paras 29–37; T-71/20, Puma v EUIPO, 2021, paras 16–17; T-195/20, Sociedade da Água de Monchique v EUIPO, 2021, para. 15. 52 See T-466/04 and T-467/04, Dami v OHIM, 2006, paras 27–33; T-191/04, MIP Metro v OHIM, 2006, para. 14. 53 See T-181/05, Citigroup and Citibank v OHIM, 2008, para. 18. 54 The identity of parties to proceedings before a Board of Appeal depends on the type of decision against which an appeal has been brought before the Board. Art. 67 of Regulation No. 2017/1001 provides that any party to proceedings adversely affected by a decision may appeal to a Board. Any other parties to the proceedings are parties to the appeal as of right.

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622 DISPUTES RELATING TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS procedural rights as the main parties.55 This means that, unlike ‘ordinary’ interveners in direct actions,56 they can present an autonomous form of order sought and autonomous pleas in law. An application will be admissible only insofar as the applicant has an interest in bringing proceedings.57 This means that annulment or alteration of the measure must of itself be capable of having legal consequences.58 A decision may therefore only be the subject of an application for annulment or alteration insofar as it denies the applicant’s claims.59 A particular issue concerns the transfer of ownership of the contested EU trade mark in the course of proceedings and the right to act before the General Court. Where the transfer takes place before the Board of Appeal has adopted a final decision, the transfer has to be registered at the Office. The new owner will then be allowed to act before the General Court either as the applicant or as an intervener pursuant to Art. 173 of the GC Rules of Procedure depending on the procedural status of the former owner.60 Where the trade mark is transferred after the decision of the Board of Appeal, but before proceedings were brought before the General Court, the new owners of an earlier trade mark may bring an action before the General Court and should be accepted as a party to the proceedings once they have proven ownership of the right invoked before the Office.61 In case the transfer takes place after proceedings have already been brought before the General Court, the successor to that right may apply to replace the original party in the proceedings before the General Court.62 If the original trade mark holder objects or replacement may not be appropriate, the new holder can be admitted to the proceedings only as an ‘ordinary’ intervener pursuant to Art. 40 of the Statute.63 55 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 173(3). Under the 1991 GC Rules of Procedure, such parties only acquired the status of intervener after lodging their responses to the application (1991 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 134(1)). See C-206/15 P, Sun Mark v OHIM (order), 2015, paras 29–35. Under the current GC Rules of Procedure, a party acquires the status of intervener upon lodging a procedural document, which is not necessarily the response to the application (compare C-35/14 P, Enercon v Gamesa Eólica (order), 2015, paras 24–25, where, in application of the 1991 GC Rules of Procedure, a party was not considered to be an intervening party because it submitted only a number of procedural documents, but not a response to the application). However, that party will lose the status of intervener where it fails to respond to the application in the manner and within the time-limits prescribed (GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 173(2)). See T-325/20, Unger Marketing International v EUIPO (order), 2021, para. 54. 56 Statute, Art. 40. See paras 23.02–23.03. 57 See T-31/20, West End Drinks v EUIPO, 2021, para. 21. 58 See T-129/00, Procter & Gamble v OHIM, 2001, para. 12; C-608/18 P, Cyprus v EUIPO (order), 2020, paras 27–33; C-320/18 P, Crocs v EUIPO (order), 2020, paras 10–14; T-169/19, Style & Taste v EUIPO, 2021, para. 18. 59 See T-342/02, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Lion v OHIM, 2004, paras 36–50; T-589/19, Gothe v EUIPO, 2020, paras 21–24; T-421/18, Bauer Radio v EUIPO, 2020, paras 47–53; T-535/20, Müller v EUIPO, 2021, paras 19–23; T-747/21, Borussia VfL 1900 Mönchengladbach v EUIPO, 2022, paras 13–15. 60 See T-298/10, Arrieta D. Gross v OHIM, 2012, paras 33–42. 61 See T-301/03, Canali Ireland v OHIM, 2005, paras 18–20; T-361/08, Peek & Cloppenburg and van Graaf v OHIM, 2010, para. 31. 62 GC Rules of Procedure, Arts 174–175. See T-37/19, Cimpress Schweiz v EUIPO, 2020, paras 17–21; T-670/20, Sam McKnight v EUIPO (order), 2021, paras 16–20; T-566/20, Residencial Palladium v EUIPO, 2021, paras 12–17; T-273/21, The Bazooka Companies v EUIPO, 2022, paras 13–18. Under the 1991 GC Rules of Procedure, no specific rules were foreseen for the substitution of parties in instances where the transfer took place after the decision of the Board of Appeal and the transfer was not the consequence of an individual’s death or the cessation of a legal person. See T-94/02, Hugo Boss v OHIM (order), 2004, paras 22–32. 63 See T-94/02, Hugo Boss v OHIM (order), 2004, para. 29. On the relationship between Art. 40 of the Statute and Art. 173 of the GC Rules of Procedure, see T-748/18, Glimarpol v EUIPO (order), 2019.

Special Characteristics 623

III. Special Characteristics A. Pleas in law (1) Parallelism with Art. 263 TFEU An action for annulment or alteration brought under Regulation No. 2017/1001 (Art. 72(2)), Regulation No. 2100/94 (Art. 73(2)), or Regulation No. 6/2002 (Art. 61(2)) may be brought on grounds of lack of competence;64 infringement of an essential procedural requirement; infringement of the Treaties, of the relevant regulation, or of any rule of law relating to their application; or misuse of power.65 These grounds are similar to the pleas which may be raised in an action for annulment brought under Art. 263 TFEU (see paras 7.161–7.194). Likewise, the case-law on raising pleas of the Court’s own motion applies to proceedings brought in the General Court against decisions of the Board of Appeal. On that account, pleas relating to a lack of competence or an infringement of an essential procedural requirement66 should be invoked by the General Court ex

64 By virtue of the principle of continuity of functions between the examiners and the Boards of Appeal, the Boards can re-examine the application without limiting themselves to the reasoning of the examiner (see T-122/99, Procter & Gamble v OHIM, 2000, para. 17; T-198/00, Hershey Foods v OHIM, 2002, para. 25). This case-law may also be applied to relations between the other authorities of the EUIPO which can give rulings at first instance, such as the Opposition and Cancellation Divisions, and the Boards of Appeal: see T-419/09, Cybergun v OHIM, 2011, paras 13–29; T-308/01, Henkel v OHIM, 2003, para. 25; C-349/10 P, Claro v OHIM (order), 2011, para. 44; C-308/10 P, Union Investment Privatfonds v OHIM, 2011, para. 40. If, in taking his or her decision, the examiner infringes the right to be heard, that defect may be remedied by the Board of Appeal given the continuity that exists in terms of their functions (T-16/02, Audi v OHIM, 2003, paras 80–82). That being said, while the Board of Appeal cannot automatically leave out a particular fact merely because it was raised before it for the first time and not raised before the authority which ruled at first instance, the Board of Appeal cannot be obliged either to admit facts or evidence not submitted in due time. Art. 95(2) of Regulation No. 2017/1001 grants the EUIPO a wide discretion to decide, while giving reasons for its decision in that regard, whether or not to take such information into account (see C-29/05 P, OHIM v Kaul, 2007, paras 41–43 (setting aside T-164/02, Kaul v OHIM, 2004, paras 25–30); C-634/16 P, EUIPO v European Food, 2018, paras 54–58; C-150/18 P, El Corte Inglés v EUIPO (order), 2018, para. 6; C-908/19 P, European Food v EUIPO (order), 2020, para. 18; T-15/20, Skyliners v EUIPO, 2021, para. 80; see also, in relation to the CPVO, C-625/15 P, Schniga v CPVO, 2017, para. 56. However, the Board of Appeal may be required to exercise its discretion restrictively where the surrounding circumstances do not justify the delay in the submission of proof by a party, for example, where the party concerned should have been aware of the precise documents which it had to produce in support of its opposition: see C-122/12 P, Rintisch v EUIPO, 2013, paras 39–46. Further to this, it should be pointed out that the discretion of the Office regarding the taking into account of evidence submitted after the time-limit imparted by the Office relates only to supplementary evidence and not to new evidence: see C-597/14 P, EUIPO v Grau Ferrer, 2016, paras 25–27 (invalidating the General Court’s reasoning on this point, which considered that the Board of Appeal should also exercise discretion in relation to new evidence: T-543/12, Grau Ferrer v EUIPO, 2014, paras 45–48). For the distinction between supplementary evidence and new evidence, see C-418/16 P, mobile.de v EUIPO, 2018, paras 48–55; T-567/14, Group Good v EUIPO, 2016, paras 57–58. 65 See C-482/15 P, Westermann Lernspielverlage v EUIPO, 2016, para. 27; T-363/10, Abbott Laboratories v OHIM, 2011, para. 15; T-172/10, 2012, Colas v OHIM, 2012, para. 22. 66 The duty to state reasons is an essential procedural requirement (see T-516/20, Mandelay Kft. V EUIPO, 2022, para. 138). It has been laid down in Art. 94(1) of Regulation No. 2017/1001 and has the same scope as that which derives from Art. 296 TFEU (see T-215/20, Fidia farmaceutici v EUIPO, 2021, para. 111). Infringement of the duty to state reasons is a matter of public policy and must be raised by the Union Courts of their own motion (see C-442/15 P, Pensa Pharma v EUIPO, 2016, para. 26). The Board of Appeal will infringe an essential procedural requirement if it applies absolute grounds of refusal of its own motion without according the applicant an opportunity to express its view thereon (see T-289/02, Telepharmacy Solutions v OHIM, 2004, paras 22–30). It should be pointed out, however, that procedural defects that have no impact on the final decision will not lead to the annulment of the decision of the Board of Appeal (see C-795/18 P, FCA US (order), 2019, para. 5; T-215/20, Fidia farmaceutici v EUIPO, 2021, para. 84). An infringement of the rules governing the language of proceedings will lead to the annulment of the decision of the Board of Appeal only if the procedural irregularities violated the

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624 DISPUTES RELATING TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS officio, since they concern the external legality of the decisions and are thus a matter of public policy. Conversely, substantive defects of decisions of the Board of Appeal cannot be raised by the Union Courts of their own motion and should be raised by the applicant.67 However, absolute grounds for refusal may always be invoked ex officio.68 The corollary of the General Court’s power to invoke certain pleas of its own motion is that parties are allowed to put such pleas forward for the first time before that Court.69

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(2) Review of the contested decision The legality of the contested decision falls to be assessed on the basis of the elements of fact and of law existing at the time when that decision was adopted.70 Further to this, as the EU trade mark regime is an autonomous system that applies independently of any national system,71 neither the EUIPO nor the Union Courts can be bound by national decisions,72 for example, regarding the registration of a sign73 or the genuine use of a national trade mark.74 Moreover, since decisions concerning the registration of a sign as an EU trade mark which the Boards of Appeal of the EUIPO take under Regulation No. 2017/1001 are adopted in the exercise of circumscribed powers, that assessment must be made solely on the basis of that regulation as interpreted by the Union Courts, and not on the basis of EUIPO’s previous decision-making practice75 or the EUIPO Guidelines.76 applicant’s rights of the defence (see T-242/02, Sunrider v OHIM, 2005, paras 39–45; see also C-100/11 P, Helena Rubinstein and L’Oréal v OHIM, 2012, paras 100–105; T-346/09, Winzer Pharma v OHIM, 2012, paras 21–40). 67 See C-442/15 P, Pensa Pharma v EUIPO, 2016, paras 26, 37. This is the case, for example, with a plea invoking the existence of a possible error of law in the application of Art. 95(2) of Regulation No. 2017/1001: see C-728/18 P, EM Research Organization (order), 2019, para. 17. Compare T-487/21, Neoperl v EUIPO, 2022, paras 24–29, where the General Court raised a plea of its own motion regarding the possible violation of the scope of application of the law (appeal pending in C-64/23 P and C-93/23 P). 68 Regulation No. 2017/1001, Art. 95(1). 69 See T-6/05, DEF-TEC Defense Technology v OHIM, 2006, paras 21–24. 70 See C-440/15 P, AgriCapital v OHIM (order), 2016, para. 23; C-340/17 P, Alcohol Countermeasure Systems (International) v EUIPO, 2018, para. 116; T-247/01, eCopy v OHIM, 2002, para. 46; T-341/22, Deutsche Bank v EUIPO, 2023, para. 19. 71 See C-325/13 P and C-326/13 P, Peek & Cloppenburg v OHIM, 2014, para. 55; C-190/15 P, Fetim v OHIM (order), 2015, para. 24; C-656/17 P, Berliner Stadtwerke v EUIPO (order), 2018, para. 3; T-433/21, Vitronic v EUIPO, 2022, para. 63. 72 See C-536/17 P, Josel v EUIPO (order), 2018, para. 5; C-32/17 P, Apcoa Parking Holdings v EUIPO, 2018, paras 32–34; C-118/18 P, Hochmann Marketing v EUIPO (order), 2018, paras 21; T-583/19, Electrolux Home Products v EUIPO, 2020, para. 29; T-809/19, Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional v EUIPO, 2021, para. 73; T-357/21, Jose A. Alfonso Arpon v EUIPO, 2022, para. 68. 73 See C-488/16 P, Bundesverband Souvenir—Geschenke—Ehrenpreise v EUIPO, 2018, paras 72–73; C-744/18 P, Volkswagen v EUIPO (order), 2019, para. 31; T-36/19, PE Digital v EUIPO, 2020, para. 62; T-210/20, Square v EUIPO, 2021, para. 95. 74 See T-771/15, Hochmann Marketing v EUIPO, 2017, para. 56. 75 See C-412/05 P, Alcon v OHIM, 2007, para. 65; C-374/13 P, Metropolis Inmobiliarias y Restauraciones v OHIM (order), 2014, para. 44; T-562/20, Upper Echelon Products v EUIPO, 2021, para. 56; T-197/21, Lea Nature Services v EUIPO, 2022, para. 54; T-349/22, Hacker-Pschorr Bräu v EUIPO, 2023, para. 49. However, regarding factual findings made in earlier decisions, the Office is not relieved of the obligation to state reasons for a departure of previous decisions relied upon by a party: see C-564/16 P, EUIPO v Puma, 2018, paras 76–86; T-882/19, Kerangus v EUIPO, 2020, paras 64–66; T-598/20, Skechers USA v EUIPO, 2021, para. 64; T-777/21, Trend Glass v EUIPO, 2022, para. 73. That being said, the Boards of Appeal are not bound by decisions of lower adjudicating bodies of the EUIPO: see T-349/19, Decathlon v EUIPO, 2020, para. 86; T-8/22, Topcart v EUIPO, 2023, para. 31. On the distinction between prior decisions as evidence of a factual situation and a decisional practice, which involves the same application of legal rules to comparable situations: see T-42/19, Volkswagen v EUIPO, 2020, para. 69; T-623/21, Puma v EUIPO, 2022, para. 109. 76 See C-162/17 P, Poland v EUIPO, 2019, para. 59; T-851/19, Body Attack Sports Nutrition v EUIPO, 2020, para. 102.

Special Characteristics 625 (3) Pleas must relate to a decision of a Board of Appeal Since by virtue of Art. 72(1) of Regulation No. 2017/1001, actions may be brought before the Union Courts only against decisions of the Boards of Appeal, only pleas directed against the decision of the Board of Appeal itself are admissible. As a result, pleas relating to a decision of the Opposition Division or the Cancellation Division will be inadmissible.77 (4) Pleas must not change the subject-matter of the proceedings Art. 188 of the GC Rules of Procedure provides that the parties’ pleadings may not change the subject-matter of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal.78 On that ground, claims not put forward by a party before the Board of Appeal, but in its application (or at a later stage) in the proceedings before the General Court will be inadmissible.79 This is because the review by the General Court must not exceed the factual and legal context of the dispute as it was brought before the Office.80 In accordance with Art. 72 of Regulation No. 2017/1001, it will only assess the legality of the contested measure on the basis of the elements of fact and law existing at the time the measure was adopted.81 Consequently, parties cannot invoke facts in proceedings before the General Court which they have not invoked in the course of proceedings before the Office.82 For the same reason, arguments raised for the first time before the General Court will be inadmissible where their assessment (such as the assessment of the reputation of an older mark83) would be based on factual data not adduced in the course of the proceedings before the Office,84 or when the Office was not required to raise those arguments of its

77 See T-303/03, Lidl Stiftung v OHIM, 2005, paras 59–60; T-137/09, Nike International v OHIM, 2010, para. 13; T-159/21, Dante Ricardo Bustos v EUIPO, 2022, paras 21–23; T-353/21, KTM Fahrrad v EUIPO, 2022, paras 17–19. 78 See C-534/10 P, Brookfield New Zealand and Elaris v CPVO and Schniga, 2012; T-134/09, Basile and I Marchi Italiani v OHIM, 2012, para. 15; T-380/20, Tubes Radiatori v EUIPO, 2022, para. 55; T-341/22, Deutsche Bank v EUIPO, 2023, para. 20. 79 See T-423/04, Bunker & BKR v OHIM, 2005, paras 17–22; T-53/10, Reisenthel v OHIM, 2011, paras 24– 26; T-84/16, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena v EUIPO, 2017, paras 49–52; T-492/20, S. Tous v EUIPO, 2021, para. 46. It should be noted, however, that the party bringing an appeal before a Board of Appeal has to determine only the subject-matter and not the extent of the examination which the Board of Appeal must conduct. The extent of the examination which the Board of Appeal must conduct is not determined by the grounds relied on by the party who has brought the appeal. Even if the party that has brought the appeal has not raised a specific ground of appeal, the Board of Appeal is nonetheless bound to examine whether or not, in the light of all the relevant matters of fact and of law, a new decision with the same operative part as the decision under appeal may be lawfully adopted at the time of the appeal ruling (see T-308/01, Henkel v OHIM, 2003, paras 29–30, 34). 80 See T-194/01, Unilever v OHIM, 2003, para. 16; T-66/03, Koffiebranderij en Theehandel ‘Drie Mollen sinds 1818’ v OHIM, 2004, paras 40–49; T-232/20, Biovene Cosmetics v EUIPO, 2021, para. 27; T-573/21, Brand Energy Holdings v EUIPO, 2022, para. 79. 81 See T-367/12, MOL v OHIM, 2013, para. 22; T-739/20, Unite the Union v EUIPO, 2022, paras 33–34. This also means that the Court cannot take into account documents the Board of Appeal should not have examined: see T-53/10, Reisenthel v OHIM, 2011, paras 52–56. 82 See C-442/15 P, Pensa Pharma v EUIPO, 2016, para. 47; C-248/18 P, Moscow Confectionery Factory ‘Krasnyiy oktyabr’ OAO v EUIPO (order), 2018, para. 6; C-308/18 P, Schniga v CPVO (order), 2018, para. 23. 83 See T-510/19, Puma v EUIPO, 2021, paras 73–83. 84 See T-66/03, Koffiebranderij en Theehandel ‘Drie Mollen sinds 1818’ v OHIM, 2004, paras 46–47; T-57/03, SPAG v OHIM, 2005, paras 30–32: an argument concerning the reputation of an older mark which is raised for the first time before the General Court will be inadmissible. In contrast, the assessment of the intrinsically distinctive character does not presuppose any matter of fact which is up to the parties to establish. Accordingly, an argument

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626 DISPUTES RELATING TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS own motion.85 Similarly, facts raised for the first time before the General Court cannot affect the legality of the Office’s decision, unless the Office should have taken them into account of its own motion,86 which is the case where the mark of which registration is sought falls under one of the absolute grounds of refusal.87 In proceedings concerning relative grounds for refusal, the Office is not obliged to examine facts of its own motion. This is because Art. 95(1) of Regulation No. 2017/1001 confines review by the Office as regards relative grounds for refusal to the facts, evidence, and arguments adduced by the parties.88 However, since that rule constitutes a restriction to the general rule that the Office examines the facts ex officio, it should be interpreted restrictively.89 Therefore, the Board of Appeal is allowed to take well- known facts into account.90 These are facts which are likely to be known by anyone or which may be learned from generally accessible sources.91 They must, however, not be without contestation, as the Union Courts have not adopted a strict interpretation of the notion of well-known facts.92 Moreover, arguments that report well-known facts can be relied upon for the first time before the Union Courts,93 suggesting that in some

in that regard raised for the first time in the General Court will be admissible: see C-702/18 P, Primart v EUIPO, 2020, para. 43. Similarly, arguments that consist of a mere amplification of arguments raised before the Board of Appeal will also be admissible: see C-412/05 P, Alcon v OHIM, 2007, para. 40; T-134/09, Basile and I Marchi Italiani v OHIM, 2012, para. 16; T-726/21, Rolex v EUIPO, 2023, para. 54. 85 See T-6/05, DEF-TEC Defense Technology v OHIM, 2006, paras 21–24; T-189/05, Unisor v OHIM, 2008, para. 20. 86 See T-396/02, Storck v OHIM, 2004, para. 24 (it is not the function of the General Court to re-examine the facts in the light of documents submitted for the first time before it) (confirmed on appeal in C-24/05 P, Storck v OHIM, 2006, paras 45–50); T-185/02, Ruiz-Picasso and Others v OHIM, 2004, paras 27–32; T-115/03, Samar v OHIM, 2004, paras 13–15; T-97/08, KUKA Roboter v OHIM, 2010, para. 11; T-207/08, Habanos v OHIM, 2011, para. 18; T-332/10, Viaguara v OHIM, 2012, para. 15. 87 See C-24/05 P, Storck v OHIM, 2006, para. 50. 88 See T-115/03, Samar v OHIM, 2004, paras 13–15; T-185/02, Ruiz-Picasso and Others v OHIM, 2004, paras 27–32; T-396/02, Storck v OHIM, 2004, para. 24; T-57/03, SPAG v OHIM, 2005, paras 17–35; T-738/20, Deutschtec v EUIPO, 2022, para. 70. This applies not only to the factual context, but also to the legal context of the dispute: see T-232/20, Biovene Cosmetics v EUIPO, 2021, paras 28–29. Similarly, regarding invalidity proceedings pursuant to Art. 59 of Regulation No. 2017/1001, the Office shall limit its examination to the grounds and arguments submitted by the parties: see T-856/19, Franz Schröder v EUIPO, 2021, para. 40; T-254/20, Dochirnie pidpryiemstvo Kondyterska korporatsiia ‘Roshen’ v EUIPO, 2021, para. 136. However, this does not preclude the Board of Appeal from raising of its own motion a plea based on the breach of an essential procedural requirement, provided that the subsequent annulment does not go beyond the form of order sought by the parties: see T-712/20, Škoda Investment v EUIPO, 2021, paras 21–27. 89 See T-185/02, Ruiz-Picasso and Others v OHIM, 2004, para. 30; T-554/14, Messi Cuccittini v EUIPO, 2018, para. 60. 90 See C-461/19 P, All Star v EUIPO, 2019 (order), para. 18. This applies as well in relation to the restriction regarding invalidity proceedings: see T-48/19, smart things solutions v EUIPO, 2020, paras 67–69; T-856/19, Franz Schröder v EUIPO, 2021, para. 41; T-237/21, Fidelity National Information Services v EUIPO, 2022, para. 41. See n. 93. 91 See T-185/02, Ruiz-Picasso and Others v OHIM, 2004, para. 29; T-261/19, Stada Arzneimittel v EUIPO, 2021, para. 42. 92 See C-461/19 P, All Star v EUIPO, 2019 (order), para. 19. 93 See T-554/14, Messi Cuccittini v EUIPO, 2018, paras 61–63 (upheld in C‑449/18 P and C‑474/18 P, EUIPO v Messi Cuccittini, 2020, paras 69–75). Compare C-468/13 P, MOL v OHIM, 2014, paras 35–43, in which the Court of Justice held that the case-law regarding the production of new documents by the EUIPO with a view of establishing the accuracy of well-known facts on which the Board of Appeal had relied in its decision does not allow for the production of new evidence by parties in proceedings before the General Court with a view of proving facts they had submitted to the Board of Appeal, regardless of whether such facts are considered to be well-known.

Special Characteristics 627 instances an obligation may exist for the Office to take well-known facts into account in relation to proceedings concerning relative grounds for refusal. Lastly, it should be pointed out that the prohibition to extend in proceedings before the General Court the subject-matter of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal does not relate to the issues on which the Board of Appeal is required to take a decision.94 Thus, parties may for the first time before the General Court rely on arguments seeking to call into question the considerations of the Board of Appeal relating to the issues on which it was required to take a decision.95 This is because the Board of Appeal is required to decide on all issues which, in the light of the facts, evidence, and arguments provided by the parties and the relief sought, are necessary to ensure a correct application of Regulation No. 2017/1001 and in respect of which it has all the information required in order to be able to take a decision, even if no element of law related to those issues has been relied on by the parties before it.96 Therefore, the prohibition to extend the subject-matter of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal does not concern purely legal questions, as they are considered to form part of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal.97 (5) Change of the subject-matter of the proceedings According to Art. 49(1) of Regulation No. 2017/1001, an applicant may at any time withdraw his or her EU trade mark application or restrict the lists of goods or services contained therein. A withdrawal or a restriction subsequent to the start of the proceedings may be taken into account by the Union Court when it does not change the subject-matter of the proceedings. A mere withdrawal of categories of goods or services from the list in respect of which the trade mark application is filed is in principle not capable of changing the factual context of the examination carried out by the Board of Appeal.98 This type of restriction will be considered as a request for partial annulment of the decision of the Board of Appeal and taken into account by the General Court.99 Conversely, a restriction will in principle not be allowed when it leads to the introduction of new elements not taken into account during the Board of Appeal’s examination of the trade mark application.100 For instance, this is the case where the object of the

94 See T-601/19, Osório & Gonçalves v EUIPO, 2020, para. 19. 95 See C-702/18 P, Primart v EUIPO, 2020, para. 42. 96 See C-702/18 P, Primart v EUIPO, 2020, para. 41. 97 Note that AG Bobek proposed that this would also apply to issues of fact: ‘Article 76(1) of Regulation No. 207/2009 cannot be read as obliging the Board of Appeal to refrain from examining matters of law or fact that, despite not having been specifically raised by one of the parties, are inextricably linked to those raised by the parties.’ C-702/18 P, Primart v EUIPO, AG Bobek Opinion, 2019, point 48. The Court of Justice, however, restricted the obligation of the Board of Appeal to issues of law, which appears clearly from paras 42–43 of its judgment, as well from the fact that the Court of Justice limited its reference to the AG Opinion to those points relating to issues of law: C-702/18 P, Primart v EUIPO, 2020. 98 See T-325/04, Citigroup v OHIM, 2008, para. 26; T-387/06 to T-390/06, Inter-Ikea v OHIM, 2008, para. 25; T-386/08, Trautwein v OHIM, 2010, para. 12; T-17/20, adp Gauselmann v EUIPO, 2021, para. 22; T-359/20, Team Beverage v EUIPO, 2022, para. 23. 99 See T-458/05, Tegometall International v OHIM, 2007, para. 24; T-464/07, Korsch v OHIM, 2009, paras 12–13. 100 See T-17/20, adp Gauselmann v EUIPO, 2021, paras 23–24; T-489/20, Eos Products v EUIPO, 2021, paras 17–20.

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628 DISPUTES RELATING TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS restriction is to change the description or characteristics of goods included in the application in such a way that it influences the assessment of the similarity of goods or the determination of the target audience.101 Such restriction would change the factual context presented before the Board of Appeal and cannot be taken into account by the General Court.

17.17

(6) New evidence Since it is not the General Court’s function to re-examine the facts in the light of documents produced for the first time before it, evidence sought to be adduced for the first time before the General Court will also be inadmissible,102 independently of whether it was adduced in support of admissible facts and arguments103 or merely to substantiate arguments submitted before the Board of Appeal.104 The General Court has thus held that annexes containing extracts of archived internet pages were inadmissible, even though they showed how those pages appeared at the time of proceedings before the Office.105 In addition, documents submitted in support of answers to questions asked by the General Court were inadmissible.106 In a similar vein, the General Court declared inadmissible a document containing the international registration of a mark,107 a decision of a national patent office,108 extracts from national registers,109 witness statements,110 and a decision of a member of a foreign government.111

101 See T-458/05, Tegometall International v OHIM, 2007, para. 25; T-412/08, Trubion Pharmaceuticals v OHIM, 2009, paras 19–25; T-819/19, Man and Machine v EUIPO, 2020, paras 17–22; T-341/20, EAB v EUIPO, 2021, paras 22–23; T-481/20, Magnetec v EUIPO, 2021, paras 11–13; T-359/20, Team Beverage v EUIPO, 2022, paras 24–26. See also T-795/21, Protectoplus v EUIPO, 2022, paras 13–14. 102 See C-414/14 P, Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian v OHIM (order), 2015, para. 38; C-449/18 P and C-474/18 P, EUIPO v Messi, 2020, para. 71; T-75/20, Abitron Germany v EUIPO, 2021, para. 27; T-562/20, Upper Echelon Products v EUIPO, 2021, para. 19; T-315/21, Laboratorios Ern v EUIPO, 2022, paras 18–19; T-250/21, Zdút v EUIPO, 2022, para. 15; T-38/22, Romedor Pharma v EUIPO, 2023, paras 18–19. The fact that the party submitting a document for the first time before the Court only gained knowledge of that document after the Board of Appeal had adopted its decision does not lead to a different conclusion: see T-144/19, Kludi v EUIPO, 2020, para. 19. 103 See T-296/02, Lidl Stiftung v OHIM, 2005, paras 36–38; T-693/19, Kerry Luxembourg v EUIPO, 2021, para. 34. 104 See T-358/09, Sociedad Agricola Requingua v OHIM, 2011, paras 14–17; T-738/19, Clouds Sky v EUIPO, 2020, paras 17–19. 105 See T-409/07, Cohausz v OHIM, 2009, para. 19. The General Court has consistently declared documents containing extracts of websites inadmissible if submitted for the first time before it (see T-335/07, Mergel and Others v OHIM, 2008, para. 9; T-391/07, Alber v OHIM, 2009, paras 10–11; T-502/07, IIC v OHIM, 2011, para. 18; T-38/22, Romedor Pharma v EUIPO, 2023, paras 23, 27), even when it concerned extracts from the EUIPO website (see T-9/07, Grupo Promer Mon Graphic v OHIM, 2010, paras 22–25). Also, an article published on a website on a date prior to the contested decision of the Board of Appeal will not be taken into account: see T-639/19, Sánchez Romero Carvajal Jabugo v EUIPO, 2020, paras 19–21. 106 See T-344/07, O2 (Germany) v OHIM, 2010, para. 11. 107 See T-502/07, IIC v OHIM, 2011, para. 19. 108 See T-269/06, Rautaruukki v OHIM, 2008, paras 19–23. However, where such decisions are submitted in order to contribute to the interpretation of Union law, and not with the aim of providing evidence in relation to the examination of facts, the Court will accept the submission of decisions of national patent offices: see T-215/16, Cop v EUIPO, 2017, paras 20–22; T-677/18, Galletas Gullón v EUIPO, 2020, para. 140. Further to this, a party may refer for the first time to documents related to the decision-making practice of the EUIPO: see T-552/21, Worldwide Brands v EUIPO, 2023, para. 25. 109 See T-303/06 and T-337/06, UniCredito Italiano v OHIM, 2010, para. 21. 110 See T-187/08, Rodd & Gunn Australia v OHIM, 2010, paras 22–24. 111 See T-678/19, Health Product Group v EUIPO, 2021, para. 24.

Special Characteristics 629 However, depending on the circumstances of a case, documents produced for the first time before the General Court may not be declared inadmissible if they do not change the subject-matter of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal.112 This is the case, for example, where the accuracy of well-known facts relied upon by the Board of Appeal is disputed in proceedings before the General Court.113 While the Office is allowed to rely on well-known facts, it is not obliged to establish the accuracy of well-known facts in its decisions.114 Where parties challenge the accuracy of such facts in proceedings before the General Court,115 the EUIPO is allowed to submit new evidence with a view of establishing the accuracy of the fact that it considered to be well-known.116 Thus, in LG Electronics,117 the Court of Justice held that the EUIPO could submit documents for the first time before the General Court to establish the accuracy of the well-known fact relied upon by the Board of Appeal that hoovers can be used as compressors in a certain configuration. Likewise, the party disputing or seeking to establish the accuracy of a well-known fact relied upon by the EUIPO is allowed to produce documents for the first time before the General Court to this extent.118 Further to this, parties are allowed to refer to national judicial decisions for the first time before the General Court where the plea is not that the Board of Appeal failed to take the factual aspects of a specific national judgment into account. This is because neither the parties nor the General Court are precluded from relying on national or international case-law to interpret Union law.119 As far as the inadmissibility of new facts, evidence, and arguments is concerned, the same rules apply for the applicant, the Office, and the interveners participating in the proceedings before the General Court pursuant to Art. 173 of the GC Rules of Procedure. The principle of equality of arms requires that all parties before the General Court have the same means at their disposal.120

112 See T-187/08, Rodd & Gunn Australia v OHIM, 2010, para. 24; T-677/18, Galletas Gullón v EUIPO, 2020, paras 17–21; T-515/19, Lego v EUIPO, 2021, paras 18–21; T-678/19, Health Product Group v EUIPO, 2021, para. 22. This is the case, for example, where a party submits documents with the aim of refuting the relevance of arguments or examples put forward by the Board of Appeal for the first time in its decision. Such documents necessarily relate to factual matters referred to in the contested decision and thus fall within the subject-matter of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: see T-224/17, Adapta Color v EUIPO, 2019, paras 16–17; T-573/18, Hickies v EUIPO, 2020, para. 18. 113 See T-43/22, Sanrio v EUIPO, 2022, para. 19. 114 See C-25/05 P, Storck v OHIM, 2006, para. 51; C-88/11 P, LG Electronics v OHIM, 2011, para. 27; C-461/19 P, All Star v EUIPO (order), 2019, para. 18; T-443/21, YAplus DBA Yoga Alliance v EUIPO, 2023, para. 25. 115 See C-88/11 P, LG Electronics v OHIM, 2011, para. 29. 116 See C-468/13 P, MOL v OHIM, 2014, para. 42; C-461/19 P, All Star v EUIPO (order), 2019, para. 18. 117 See C-88/11 P, LG Electronics v OHIM, 2011, paras 31–32. 118 See T-357/10, Kraft Foods Schweiz v OHIM, 2012, para. 16; T-451/11, Gigabyte Technology v OHIM, 2013, paras 20–23; T-573/18, Hickies v EUIPO, 2020, para. 18; T-109/19, Kerry Luxembourg v EUIPO, 2020, para. 35; T-105/19, Louis Vuitton Malletier v EUIPO, 2020, para. 30. Such documents must by their nature be able to establish whether facts relied upon are well-known. This is not the case for extracts from a technical dictionary, as such a dictionary is by its nature specialist and thus cannot be considered as a source for establishing that a fact is well- known: see T-172/10, Colas v OHIM, 2012, para. 28. 119 See T-270/06, Lego Juris v OHIM, 2008, paras 24–25; T-291/09, Carrols v OHIM, 2012, paras 33–36; T-878/19, Gábor Bende v EUIPO, 2012, para. 56. The same goes for decisions of national patent and trade mark offices: see T-215/16, Cop v EUIPO, 2017, paras 20–22; T-677/18, Galletas Gullón v EUIPO, 2020, para. 140. 120 See T-57/03, SPAG v OHIM, 2005, para. 23.

630 DISPUTES RELATING TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 17.18

(7) Objection of illegality When seeking the annulment or alteration of a decision of the Office, a party may raise an objection of illegality notwithstanding the fact that Regulation No. 2017/1001 does not expressly mention such a plea as a collateral legal remedy that persons bringing actions may use in the General Court.121

B. Time-limits 17.19

An action has to be brought within two months of the date of notification of the decision of the Board of Appeal.122

C. Content of the application 17.20

According to Art. 177 of the GC Rules of Procedure, an application shall state the subject-matter of the proceedings and a summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based. That summary must be sufficiently clear and precise so as to enable the General Court to rule on the action without any other supporting information.123 Although specific points in the text of the application may be supported and supplemented by references to specific passages in attached documents,124 a general reference to other documents, even those annexed to the application, cannot compensate for the lack of sufficiently detailed legal arguments in the application.125 Consequently, arguments based on a general reference to the case-file before the Board of Appeal, whether or not annexed to the application, will be declared inadmissible.126 The General Court cannot be expected to identify the relevant facts and legal arguments in the file.127

121 See T-120/99, Kik v OHIM, 2001, para. 21. 122 Regulation No. 2017/1001, Art. 72(5); Regulation No. 2100/94, Art. 73(5); Regulation No. 6/2002, Art. 61(5). Time-limits for bringing actions are a matter of public policy, which must be raised by the Union Courts of their own motion: see T-564/19, Lozana Arana v EUIPO, 2020, para. 41. 123 See T-460/07, Nokia v OHIM, 2010, para. 26; T-624/19, Welter’s v. EUIPO, 2021, para. 16; T-747/21, Borussia VfL 1900 Mönchengladbach v EUIPO, 2022, para. 17. It is, however, sufficient that pleas in law are expressed in terms of their substance rather than their legal classification, provided that the application sets out those pleas sufficiently clearly: see T-435/17, Grendene v EUIPO, 2018, para. 17; T-729/19, Dinamo v EUIPO, 2020, para. 12; T-738/20, Deutschtec v EUIPO, 2022, para. 15. 124 See T-535/18, Peek & Cloppenburg v EUIPO, 2020, paras 33–34. 125 See C-452/15 P, Best-Lock (Europe) v EUIPO (order), 2016, paras 12–15 ; T-85/08, Exalation v OHIM, 2010, para. 34 ; T-303/08, Tresplain Investments v OHIM, 2010, para. 38 ; T-615/19, Point Tec Products Electronic v EUIPO, 2021, para. 68; T-205/20, Angela Frommer v EUIPO, 2021, para. 41; T-680/21, Funline International v EUIPO, 2022, paras 21–24; T-141/22, Sport1 v EUIPO, 2023, para. 58. This case-law applies by analogy to observations submitted by interveners: see T-15/20, Skyliners v EUIPO, 2021, para. 85. 126 See T-737/18, Siberia Oriental v CPVO, 2020, paras 23–27; T-26/20, Forex Bank v EUIPO, 2020, paras 16–17; T-205/20, Angela Frommer v EUIPO, 2021, para. 43. 127 See T-303/08, Tresplain Investments v OHIM, 2010, para. 38; T-328/19, Scorify UAB v EUIPO, 2020, para. 21; T-535/20, Mülle v EUIPO, 2021, para. 29. See para. 22.15.

Consequences 631

IV. Consequences A. Successful action If the General Court upholds the claim, it may annul or alter the decision of the Board of Appeal.128 Annulment has the same characteristics as a declaration of nullity made pursuant to Art. 263 TFEU.129 If the General Court alters the Board’s decision, the General Court’s decision replaces that of the Board.130 In either case, the Office is required to take the necessary steps to comply with the General Court’s judgment.131 The General Court is not entitled to issue directions to the Office in relation thereto,132 although the Office is obliged to draw the necessary conclusions from the operative part and the grounds of the judgment.133 However, the General Court does consider that it is competent to remit the case back to the examiner.134 The reason for this is that, by remitting the case to the examiner, the General Court would not be imposing on the Office any obligation to take action or refrain from doing so and would not therefore be issuing directions to the Office.135

17.21

If the appeal is dismissed,136 the Board’s decision stands.

17.22

B. Action dismissed

128 See T-796/16, CEDC International v EUIPO, 2020, paras 200–201. This does not encompass a power to substitute its own assessment for that of a Board of Appeal of the EUIPO (see C-226/15 P, Apple and Pear Australia v EUIPO, 2016, para. 67; C-678/19 P, Retail Royalty v EUIPO (order), 2019, para. 22; T-628/21, Tequila Revolución v EUIPO, 2022, para. 14; T-352/22, De Dietrich Process Systems v EUIPO, 2023, para. 27) or to revoke a decision of the EUIPO (see T-197/20, JT v EUIPO, 2021, paras 22–23). 129 As is the case under Art. 263 TFEU, annulment may be partial: see T-622/20, Aldi v EUIPO, 2021, para. 38. 130 The Union Courts can only amend a decision of a Board of Appeal to the extent that the Board of Appeal itself can take cognisance of an application for a decision with the same effect: see T-562/20, Upper Echelon Products v EUIPO, 2021, para. 15; T-699/20, Fashion Energy v EUIPO, 2021, paras 24–25. 131 Art. 266 TFEU; Regulation No. 2017/1001, Art. 72(6); Regulation No. 2100/94, Art. 73(6); Regulation No. 6/2002, Art. 61(6). See T-677/19, Polfarmex v EUIPO, 2020, paras 15–16; T-749/20, Veronese v EUIPO, 2021, para. 29; T-281/21, Nowhere v EUIPO, 2022, para. 49 (appeal pending in C-337/22 P). 132 See T-247/01, eCopy v OHIM, 2002, para. 13; T-216/02, Fieldturf v OHIM, 2004, para. 15; T-437/21, Greenwich Polo Club v EUIPO, 2022, para. 13. See also para. 18.03. 133 See T-359/99, DKV v OHIM, 2001; T-123/04, Cargo Partner v OHIM, 2005, para. 32. Such grounds may at times be very specific, leaving not much room for discussion on what the Board of Appeal should do: see C‑581/13 P and C‑582/13 P, Intra-Presse v OHIM, 2014, paras 84–86; T-478/21, Les Éditions P. Amaury v EUIPO, 2022, para. 86. 134 See T-106/00, Streamserve v OHIM, 2002, paras 17–19. In that judgment, the General Court considered that the applicant’s interests were sufficiently secured by annulment of the contested decision. 135 The General Court refers in this connection to the fact that remission of the case to the examiner may be ordered by the Board of Appeal under Art. 71(1) of Regulation No. 2017/1001. See also T-659/19, FF Group Romania v EUIPO, 2020, paras 33–34. It therefore falls within the measures which may be taken by the General Court in the exercise of its power to amend decisions, as provided for in Art. 72(3) of Regulation No. 2017/1001 (see T-106/00, Streamserve v OHIM, 2002, para. 19). 136 The General Court may declare in a reasoned order that an application is manifestly inadmissible (see T-79/99, Euro-Lex v OHIM (order), 1999) or manifestly lacks any foundation in law (see T-235/02, Strongline v OHIM (order), 2003; T-261/03 Euro Style 94 v OHIM (order), 2004).

632 DISPUTES RELATING TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

C. Appeal 17.23

An appeal against the decision of the General Court to the Court of Justice is not to proceed unless the Court of Justice first decides that it should be allowed to do so.137 This is so only where the appeal ‘raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of Union law’138 (see Ch. 19).

137 138

Statute, Art. 58a, first para. Statute, Art. 58a, third para.

18 UNLIMITED JURISDICTION OF THE UNION COURTS IN RESPECT OF ACTIONS RELATING TO SANCTIONS I. Subject-Matter A. Legal basis According to Art. 261 TFEU,1 regulations adopted jointly by the European Parliament and the Council and by the Council, pursuant to the provisions of the Treaties, may give the Union Courts unlimited jurisdiction with regard to sanctions provided for in such regulations.2 Accordingly, there must be a legal basis for the Union Courts’

1 2

Art. 261 TFEU applies to the EAEC Treaty. See also Art. 144 EAEC. The relevant regulations are currently those listed as follows: (1) Regulation No. 11 of 27 June 1960 concerning the abolition of discrimination in transport rates and conditions, in implementation of Art. 79(3) of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (now Art. 95(3) TFEU) (1959–1962 O.J. English Spec. Ed. I, 60), Art. 25(2); (2) Council Regulation No. 31 (EEC), 11 (EAEC), laying down the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community (1962 O.J. English Spec. Ed. I, 135, as last updated OJ 2022 C474/38, Arts 22, third para. and 91(1); (3) Council Regulation (EC) No. 2532/98 of 23 November 1998 concerning the powers of the European Central Bank to impose sanctions (OJ 1998 L318/4), Art. 5; (4) Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Arts 81 and 82 of the Treaty (now Arts 101 and 102 TFEU) (OJ 2003 L1/1), Art. 31; (5) Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) (OJ 2004 L1/1), Art. 16; (6) Regulation (EC) No. 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 laying down Community procedures for the authorization and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European Medicines Agency (2004 OJ L136/1), as amended in particular by Regulation (EU) 2019/5 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 amending Regulation (EC) No. 726/2004, Regulation (EC) No. 1901/2006 on medicinal products for paediatric use and Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use (OJ 2019 L4/24), Art. 84a(9); (7) Regulation (EC) No. 80/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 January 2009 on a Code of Conduct for computerized reservation systems and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2299/89 (OJ 2009 L35/47), Art. 15(5); (8) Regulation (EC) No. 391/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on common rules and standards for ship inspection and survey organizations (OJ 2009 L131/11), Art. 6(4); (9) Regulation (EU) No. 513/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies (OJ 2011 L145/30), Art. 36e; (10) Regulation (EU) No. 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area (OJ 2011 L306/1), Art. 8(5);

EU Procedural Law. Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak, Oxford University Press. © Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833086.003.0018

18.01

634 UNLIMITED JURISDICTION unlimited jurisdiction, and where a particular act does not confer such jurisdiction, a claim submitted on this basis is inadmissible.3 In addition, the Union Courts may have unlimited jurisdiction under an arbitration clause (Art. 272 TFEU) or a special agreement (Art. 273 TFEU).

(11) Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties, and trade repositories (OJ 2012 L201/1), as amended in particular by Regulation (EU) 2019/2099 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 amending Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012 as regards the procedures and authorities involved for the authorization of CCPs and requirements for the recognition of third-country CCPs (OJ 2019 L 322/1), Arts 25n and 69; (12) Regulation (EU) No. 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012 (OJ 2014 L173/84), as amended in particular by Regulation (EU) 2019/2175 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2019 amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), Regulation (EU) No. 1094/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority), Regulation (EU) No. 1095/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), Regulation (EU) No. 600/2014 on markets in financial instruments, Regulation (EU) 2016/1011 on indices used as benchmarks in financial instruments and financial contracts or to measure the performance of investment funds, and Regulation (EU) 2015/847 on information accompanying transfers of funds (OJ 2019 L334/1), Art. 38m; (13) Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 [TFEU] (OJ 2015 L248/9), Art. 8(6); (14) Regulation (EU) 2016/1011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on indices used as benchmarks in financial instruments and financial contracts or to measure the performance of investment funds and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2014/17/EU and Regulation (EU) No. 596/2014 (OJ 2016 L171/1), as amended in particular by Regulation (EU) 2019/2175 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2019 amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), Regulation (EU) No. 1094/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority), Regulation (EU) No. 1095/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), Regulation (EU) No. 600/2014 on markets in financial instruments, Regulation (EU) 2016/1011 on indices used as benchmarks in financial instruments and financial contracts or to measure the performance of investment funds, and Regulation (EU) 2015/847 on information accompanying transfers of funds (OJ 2019 L334/1), Art. 48k; (15) Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2018 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and amending Regulations (EC) No. 2111/2005, (EC) No. 1008/2008, (EU) No. 996/2010, (EU) No. 376/2014 and Directives 2014/30/EU and 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Regulations (EC) No. 552/2004 and (EC) No. 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3922/91 (OJ 2018 L212/1), Art. 84(5); (16) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No. 1296/2013, (EU) No. 1301/2013, (EU) No. 1303/2013, (EU) No. 1304/2013, (EU) No. 1309/2013, (EU) No. 1316/2013, (EU) No. 223/2014, (EU) No. 283/2014, and Decision No. 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No. 966/2012 (OJ 2018 L193/1), Art. 143(9); (17) Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 45/2001 and Decision No. 1247/2002/EC (OJ 2018 L295/39), Art. 64(3); (18) Regulation (EU) 2019/6 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on veterinary medicinal products and repealing Directive 2001/82/EC (OJ 2019 L4/43), Art. 136(10); (19) Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (OJ 2022 L330/1), Art. 45. Note that sometimes it may be the case that other Union instruments besides regulations provide for the Union Courts’ unlimited jurisdiction: see, e.g. Council Decision (EU) 2016/1351 of 4 August 2016 concerning the Staff Regulations of the European Defence Agency, and repealing Decision 2004/676/EC (OJ 2016 L219/1), Art. 26, third para.; Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/824 of 15 May 2017 concerning the Staff Regulations of the European Union Satellite Centre (OJ 2017 L123/7), as amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1838 of 18 October 2021 (OJ 2021 L372/24), Art. 28(5). 3 For example, as regards the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, see C-418/06 P, Belgium v Commission, 2008, paras 153–156; T-263/06, Greece v Commission, 2008, para. 209; T-158/09, Greece v

Subject-Matter 635

B. Objective Sometimes, an action for annulment is too narrow to be used in order to contest a Union act imposing a fine. This is because, in annulment proceedings, a Union Court has jurisdiction only to review the legality of the Union act in the light of pleas raised in the application or of its own motion. If the Union act is found to be unlawful, it may only be annulled entirely or in part. In the event that the Union act is partly annulled, the sanction imposed may become unreasonable, having regard to the breach of Union law remaining extant.4 Moreover, a ‘lawful’ Union act may possibly impose a sanction not consonant with what is considered to be just for reasons peculiar to the person on whom the sanction is imposed or relating to the particular circumstances of the case which may not be taken into account in the judicial review of the legality of the act. For example, the amount of a fine imposed by the Commission for infringement of the competition rules may be reduced by the Union Court on the grounds that the calculation was based on defective data provided by the relevant undertaking, without any blame attaching to the Commission.5 Consequently, the system of judicial review of Commission decisions relating to proceedings under Arts 101 and 102 TFEU consists in a review of the legality of the acts of the institutions for which provision is made in Art. 263 TFEU, which may be supplemented, pursuant to Art. 261 TFEU and at the request of the applicant, by exercise of the Union Courts’ unlimited jurisdiction with regard to the penalties imposed in that regard by the Commission.6

18.02

C. Extent of unlimited jurisdiction The precise extent of the Union Courts’ unlimited jurisdiction in actions brought against sanctions has not yet been definitively determined.7 The case-law has, however, provided Commission, 2012, para. 177; as regards restrictive measures, see T-301/11, Ben Ali v Council (order), 2012, para. 62. Furthermore, the Union Courts’ unlimited jurisdiction under Art. 261 TFEU cannot be inferred from the wording of Art. 258 TFEU or Art. 260 TFEU in the context of a judgment for failure to fulfil obligations: see T-139/06, France v Commission, 2011, para. 81. 4 According to the case-law, it is only after the Union Court has finished reviewing the legality of the decision referred to it that, in the event that it does not annul the decision in full, it is to exercise its unlimited jurisdiction in order, first, to draw the appropriate conclusions from its findings with respect to the lawfulness of that decision and, second, to establish, according to the information which has been brought to its attention, whether it is appropriate, on the date on which it adopts its decision, to substitute its own assessment for that of the Commission, so that the amount of the fine is appropriate: see, e.g. T-425/18, Altice Europe v Commission, 2021, para. 352 (appeal pending in C-746/21 P); T-326/17, Air Canada v Commission, 2022, para. 562 (appeal pending in C-376/22 P). However, the Union Court may also annul the provision imposing the sanction altogether: see, e.g. T-385/06, Aalberts Industries and Others v Commission, 2011, para. 122. 5 See, e.g. T-322/01, Roquette Frères v Commission, 2006, paras 293–316; T-217/06, Arkema France and Others v Commission, 2011, paras 247–280; T-772/15, Quanta Storage v Commission, 2019, para. 276 (set aside in part on other grounds in C-699/19 P). 6 See, e.g. C-603/13 P, Galp Energia España and Others v Commission, 2016, para. 71; C-98/17 P, Philips and Philips France v Commission, 2018, para. 49; T-612/17, Google and Alphabet v Commission, 2021, para. 129 (appeal pending in C-48/22 P). 7 See further A. Arabadjiev, ‘Unlimited Jurisdiction: What Does It Mean Today?’ in P. Cardonnel, A. Rosas, and N. Wahl (eds), Constitutionalising the EU Judicial System: Essays in Honour of Pernilla Lindh (Hart, 2012) 383; F.

18.03

636 UNLIMITED JURISDICTION some clarification. On the one hand, the Union Courts have recognized that unlimited jurisdiction under Art. 261 TFEU does not constitute an autonomous remedy; rather, its sole effect is to enlarge the extent of the powers the Union Courts have in the context of an action for annulment under Art. 263 TFEU and thus an action in which the Union Courts are asked to exercise their unlimited jurisdiction with respect to a decision imposing a penalty includes a request for the annulment, in whole or in part, of that decision.8 On the other hand, the Union Courts have consistently held that the unlimited jurisdiction conferred on them represents more than a simple review of legality within an action for annulment, which only permits dismissal of the action for annulment or annulment of the contested act, and authorizes them to vary the contested act, even without annulling it, by taking into account all of the factual circumstances, so as to amend, for example, the amount of the fine. 9 Therefore, by virtue of their unlimited jurisdiction, the Union Courts are empowered, in addition to carrying out a mere review of the lawfulness of the penalty, to substitute their own appraisal for that of the Commission and, consequently, to cancel, reduce, or increase the fine or penalty payment imposed.10 Furthermore, the discretion enjoyed by the Commission and the limits which it has imposed in that regard do not prejudge the exercise by the Union Courts of their unlimited jurisdiction.11 Unlimited jurisdiction embraces all the sanctions which are available to the Union Courts in other procedures.12 However, according to the case-law, in the context of the competition rules, the scope of the Union Courts’ unlimited jurisdiction is strictly limited (unlike the review of legality provided for in Art. 263 TFEU) to determining the

Castillo de la Torre and E. Gippini Fournier, Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in EU Competition Law (Edward Elgar, 2017) paras 6.109–6.174; A. Kornezov, ‘Judicial Review of Commission Decisions and Judicial Protection’ in E. Rousseva (ed.), EU Antitrust Procedure (OUP, 2020) paras 18.181–18.221. 8 See, e.g. T-252/03, FNICGV v Commission (order), 2004, paras 20–26; T-1/16, Hitachi-LG Data Storage et Hitachi-LG Data Storage Korea v Commission, 2019, paras 53–55. 9 See, e.g. C‑238/99 P, C‑244/99 P, C‑245/99 P, C‑247/99 P, C‑250/99 P to C‑252/99 P, and C‑254/99 P, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission, 2002, para. 692; C-123/16 P, Orange Polska v Commission, 2018, para. 106; T-11/06, Romana Tabacchi v Commission, 2011, para. 265; T-1/16, Hitachi-LG Data Storage et Hitachi- LG Data Storage Korea v Commission, 2019, para. 143. 10 See, e.g. C-606/18 P, Nexans France et Nexans v Commission, 2020, para. 96; C-440/19 P, Pometon v Commission, 2021, para. 136; C-42/21 P, Lietuvos geležinkeliai v Commission, 2023, para. 152. As the General Court properly substituted its assessment for that of the Commission as regards the exercise of the power to sanction, the fact that it ultimately considered it appropriate to maintain the same amount of fine as that which has been fixed in the contested decision does not affect the propriety of that exercise of power: see C-523/15 P, Westfälische Drahtindustrie and Others v Commission (order), 2016, para. 40; see also, by way of example, T-334/17, Cargolux Airlines v Commission, 2022, paras 647–648 (appeal pending in C-401/22 P); T-350/17, Singapore Airlines and Singapore Airlines Cargo v Commission, 2022, paras 711–712 (appeal pending in C-379/22 P). 11 See, e.g. T-259/02 to T-264/02 and T-271/02, Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich and Others v Commission, 2006, para. 227; T-551/08, H&R ChemFarm v Commission, 2014, para. 221. 12 Thus, in staff cases, it has been held that the Union Court, in exercising its unlimited jurisdiction, may annul an act or award damages, as well as order any other form of redress: see C-135/06 P, Weißenfels v Parliament, 2007, paras 64–70; C-583/08 P, Gogos v Commission, 2010, paras 44–51; C-417/14 RX-II, Review Missir Mamachi di Lusignano v Commission, 2015, para. 40; C-162/20 P, WV v EEAS, 2022, paras 120–125; T-10/02, Girardot v Commission, 2004, para. 89; T-231/14 P, EMA v Drakeford, 2015, para. 46; T-693/16 P RENV-RX, HG v Commission, 2021, paras 102, 124; T-370/20, KL v EIB, 2021, paras 111–125; see also, in that regard, C-197/09 RX- II, Review M v EMEA, 2009, paras 56–58; T-491/08 P, Bui Van v Commission, 2010, para. 88; T-260/09 P, OHIM v Simões Dos Santos, 2010, para. 86.

Subject-Matter 637 amount of the fine.13 It follows that the Union Courts’ unlimited jurisdiction concerns solely the assessment of the fine, which means that they are precluded from altering the constituent elements of the infringement lawfully determined by the Commission in the contested decision.14 Unlimited jurisdiction also does not extend to assessments which do not fall within the Commission’s power to impose sanctions.15 Furthermore, the Union Courts have no power to issue directions, for instance, to order repayment of a fine which has been paid.16 In that connection, the Union Courts have emphasized that the exercise of unlimited jurisdiction does not amount to a review of the Union Court’s own motion, and that proceedings before the Union Courts are inter partes. Thus, with the exception of pleas involving matters of public policy which the Union Courts are required to raise of their own motion, it is for the applicant to raise pleas in law against the contested act and to adduce evidence in support of those pleas.17 The absence of an own-motion review of the whole of the contested act has been held not to contravene the principle of effective judicial protection as guaranteed in Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter), as compliance with that principle does not require that the Union Court—which is indeed obliged to respond to the pleas in law raised and to carry out a review of both the law and the facts—undertake of its own motion a

13 See C-603/13 P, Galp Energia España and Others v Commission, 2016, paras 76–77; C-123/16 P, Orange Polska v Commission, 2018, paras 112–113. However, the Union Court’s unlimited jurisdiction does not go so far as to fill a gap in the investigation of the file, thus going beyond the substitution of its assessment for the Commission’s, since in that case, its assessment would be the first and only such assessment of material that the Commission should have taken into account: see T-208/13, Portugal Telecom v Commission, 2016, paras 248–250. 14 See C-98/17 P, Philips and Philips France v Commission, 2018, para. 50; C-588/16 P, Generics (UK) v Commission, 2021, para. 123. For an example in which the Court of Justice set aside the General Court’s ruling for doing so, see C-603/13 P, Galp Energia España and Others v Commission, 2016, paras 76–81. 15 See C-611/18 P, Pirelli & C. v Commission, 2020, paras 108–111. 16 See, e.g. C-5/93 P, DSM v Commission, 1999, paras 36–37; T-202/02, Makedoniko Metro and Michaniki v Commission (order), 2004, para. 53; T-91/06, Theofilopoulos v Commission (order), 2007, para. 21. The Union Court not only lacks jurisdiction, in an action for annulment, to hear submissions seeking to order the defendant institution to take the measures necessary to comply with an annulment judgment, but also in principle in the context of an action involving its unlimited jurisdiction, such as an action for damages in which an applicant seeks an order that the defendant institution take specific measures to make good the damage alleged. See, e.g. T-500/16, BZ v ECB, 2021, para. 87; T-575/19, Mansilla v Commission, 2021, para. 164. Moreover, the Union Court has no power, either in the context of an action for annulment or in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, to amend the decision of a Union institution by replacing the addressee thereof by another natural or legal person when that addressee still exists; that power belongs only to the institution that adopted the measure concerned, and it is not for the Union Court to substitute another person for the identity of the person to whom that measure is addressed. See, e.g. T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00, and T-78/00, JFE Engineering and Others v Commission, 2004, para. 47; T-259/02 to T-264/02 and T-271/02, Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich and Others v Commission, 2006, para. 72. 17 See C-386/10 P, Chalkor v Commission, 2011, para. 64; C-99/17 P, Infineon Technologies v Commission, 2018, para. 194; T-363/18, Nippon Chemi-Con Corporation v Commission, 2021, para. 516 (appeal pending in C-759/21 P); T-324/17, SAS Cargo Group and Others v Commission, 2022, para. 920 (appeal pending in C-403/22 P). The General Court cannot of its own motion, in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, review all the pleas in law and evidence relied on in support of the application for annulment of the contested decision without the applicants having shown which of those pleas or evidence concretely and specifically demonstrate the alleged inappropriateness of the fine: see, e.g. T-530/15, Huhtamäki and Huhtamaki Flexible Packaging Germany v Commission, 2019, paras 238–239. See further F. Clausen, Les moyens d’ordre public devant la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne (Larcier, 2018) 335–419.

638 UNLIMITED JURISDICTION new and comprehensive investigation of the file.18 In order to satisfy the requirements of Art. 47 of the Charter when conducting a review in the exercise of their unlimited jurisdiction with regard to the fine, the Union Courts are bound, in the exercise of the powers conferred by Arts 261 and 263 TFEU, to examine all complaints based on issues of fact and law which seek to show that the amount of the fine is not commensurate with the gravity or the duration of the infringement.19 On that basis, in the context of the competition rules, the review of legality provided for under Art. 263 TFEU, supplemented by the unlimited jurisdiction in respect of the amount of the fine, has therefore withstood challenge in the light of the requirements of the principle of effective judicial protection as guaranteed by Art. 47 of the Charter.20

II. Identity of the Parties 18.04

The exercise of unlimited jurisdiction is most often requested by applicants in the sense of a reduction of a fine. Nevertheless, according to the case-law, there is nothing preventing the Union defendant concerned from requesting alteration of the sanction.21 For instance, in the context of the competition rules, the Commission may request an increase in the amount of the fine imposed on an undertaking.22

18 See C-386/10 P, Chalkor v Commission, 2011, para. 66; C-644/13 P, Villeroy and Boch v Commission, 2017, para. 71. 19 See, e.g. C-99/17 P, Infineon Technologies v Commission, 2018, para. 195; C-606/18 P, Nexans France et Nexans v Commission, 2020, para. 97; T-530/15, Huhtamäki and Huhtamaki Flexible Packaging Germany v Commission, 2019, para. 237; T-324/17, SAS Cargo Group and Others v Commission, 2022, para. 922 (appeal pending in C-403/22 P). 20 See C-386/10 P, Chalkor v Commission, 2011, para. 67; C-122/16 P, British Airways v Commission, 2017, para. 104; T-240/17, Campine and Campine Recycling v Commission, 2019, para. 381. 21 Although the exercise of unlimited jurisdiction is most often requested by applicants in the sense of a reduction of the fine, there is nothing preventing the Commission from also referring to the Union Court the question of the amount of the fine and from applying to have that fine increased: see, e.g. T-69/04, Schunk and Schunk Kohlenstoff-Technik v Commission, 2008, para. 244 (ultimately finding no grounds to justify an increase of the fine: see paras 251–262); T-772/15, Quanta Storage v Commission, 2019, para. 274 (rejecting the Commission’s request that the amount of the fine be increased: see paras 277–283) (set aside in part on other grounds in C-699/19 P). 22 The Union Court is empowered to exercise its unlimited jurisdiction where the question of the amount of the fine is before it and that that jurisdiction may be exercised to reduce that amount as well as to increase it: see, e.g. C-3/06 P, Group Danone v Commission, 2007, para. 62; T-146/09 RENV, Parker Hannifin Manufacturing and Parker-Hannifin v Commission, 2016, para. 169. In the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, the Union Court may take account, where relevant, of an undertaking’s lack of cooperation and consequently increase the fine imposed on it for infringement of Arts 101 TFEU or 102 TFEU, on condition that that undertaking has not been punished in respect of that same conduct by a specific fine based on Art. 23(1) of Regulation No. 1/2003: see, e.g. T-343/06, Shell Petroleum and Others v Commission, 2012, para. 118 (though ultimately reducing the amount of the fine in those proceedings: see paras 277–279); see also T-91/11, Innolux v Commission, 2014, para. 168 (though ultimately reducing the amount of the fine in those proceedings: see paras 170–174). For an example in which the Union Court has granted a request for an increase in the fine, see T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01 to T-246/01, T-251/01, and T-252/01, Tokai Carbon v Commission, 2004, paras 112–113, 457 (appeal upheld on other grounds in C-301/04 P and C-308/04 P); see also T‑101/05 and T‑111/05, BASF and UCB v Commission, 2007, paras 22–223 (finding that an undertaking could no longer benefit from a certain reduction in the fine). For an example in which the Union Court has dismissed a request to increase the amount of the fine, see T-33/05, Cetarsa

Special Characteristics 639

III. Special Characteristics A. Review of the sanction By virtue of its unlimited jurisdiction, the Union Court is empowered to review the sanction imposed by the contested act. The applicant may adduce submissions which are targeted exclusively against the sanction,23 alleging, for instance, that the amount of the sanction is such that it is in breach of the principle of equal treatment or proportionality, or that the reasoning for the sanction is insufficient or erroneous.24 It should also be borne in mind that where an infringement of the right to observance of a reasonable time within which to conclude proceedings may be found to exist due to the long duration of the administrative and judicial proceedings, such an infringement cannot by itself lead the General Court, or the Court of Justice in the context of an appeal, to reduce the amount of the fine which has been imposed on that company in respect of the infringement at issue.25 Although an infringement by the Commission of the ‘reasonable time principle’ can justify the annulment of a decision taken by it following an administrative procedure based on Arts 101 or 102 TFEU, the excessive length of the administrative procedure cannot lead to a reduction of the fine imposed.26 In addition, the sanction for a breach by a Union Court of its obligation under the second paragraph of Art. 47 of the Charter to adjudicate within a reasonable time must, notwithstanding the Court’s unlimited jurisdiction, be an action for damages brought on the basis of Art. 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU.27

v Commission, 2011, para. 127; T-41/05, Alliance One International v Commission, 2011, para. 197; see also citations in previous n.; T-334/17, Cargolux Airlines v Commission, 2022, paras 640, 642 (rejecting the Commission’s request that the benefit of a certain reduction in the fine be withdrawn) (appeal pending in C-401/22 P). As regards the Union Court’s reticence to increase the amount of the fine and the main situations in which this may occur, see Castillo de la Torre and Gippini Fournier, Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in EU Competition Law (n. 7), paras 6.166–6.172. 23 Where an application pursues two objectives—that is to say, principally an action for annulment and in the alternative, an application for the annulment or reduction of the fine—it may be the case that the pleas in law submitted by the applicant do not distinguish between the two; under these circumstances, the Union Court may have to inquire into the scope of application of certain arguments and determine how they will be examined: see, e.g. T-69/04, Schunk and Schunk Kohlenstoff-Technik v Commission, 2008, paras 24–26; T-73/04, Le Carbone-Lorraine v Commission, 2008, paras 31–32. 24 See, by way of example, T-11/06, Romana Tabacchi v Commission, 2011, para. 267 (erroneous assessment of sanction and breach of equal treatment); T-146/09 RENV, Parker Hannifin Manufacturing and Parker-Hannifin, 2016, paras 178–187 (erroneous assessment of sanction); T-240/17, Campine and Campine Recycling v Commission, 2019, paras 424–425 (erroneous assessment of sanction); T-758/14 RENV, Infineon Technologies v Commission, 2020, paras 193–199 (breach of proportionality); T-324/17, SAS Cargo Group and Others v Commission, 2022, paras 924–962 (erroneous assessment of sanction) (appeal pending in C-403/22 P). 25 See C-414/12 P, Bolloré v Commission, 2014, para. 107; C-608/13 P, CEPSA v Commission, 2016, para. 71. 26 See C-616/13 P, PROAS v Commission, 2016, para. 74; C-644/13 P, Villeroy and Boch v Commission, 2017, para. 79. 27 See, e.g. C-608/13 P, CEPSA v Commission, 2016, para. 64.

18.05

640 UNLIMITED JURISDICTION

B. Reasonableness of the sanction 18.06

In previous case-law, it had been held that it was possible for the Union Court to exercise its unlimited jurisdiction under Art. 261 TFEU only where it has made a finding of illegality affecting the decision, of which the undertaking concerned has complained in its action, and in order to remedy the consequences which that illegality has for determination of the amount of the fine imposed, by annulling or adjusting that fine if necessary.28 However, this narrow view has been superseded. Indeed, it is now generally held that the Union Court is entitled to assess the reasonableness of the sanction even where the act imposing it is not tainted by any illegality.29 Conversely, the Union Court may find, taking into account the particular circumstances of the case, that it is not appropriate, in the context of its unlimited jurisdiction, to vary the amount of the fine imposed on an undertaking.30 The fact that the examination of the pleas challenging the lawfulness of a Commission decision imposing a fine for infringement of the competition rules has revealed an illegality does not dispense the Union Court from examining whether it is necessary to amend the contested decision.31 Depending on the circumstances of the case, the Union Court may determine, for example, that despite the fact that the contested act is vitiated by an illegality, it is not necessary to modify the amount of the fine set by the Commission.32 It may also be the case that the annulment of the contested act, either in whole or in part, may make it unnecessary for the Court to exercise its unlimited jurisdiction.33

28 See, e.g. T-15/02, BASF v Commission, 2006, para. 582. 29 For some examples in which the Union Courts did not annul the contested act, but only reduced the fine, see 6/73 and 7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italian and Commercial Solvents v Commission, 1974, paras 51–52; C-3/06 P, Group Danone v Commission, 2007 (upholding General Court judgment in which the fine was reduced on account of the fact that the Commission was wrong to find against the applicant in relation to aggravating circumstances); C-534/07 P, Prym and Prym Consumer v Commission, 2009 (upholding General Court judgment in which fine reduced on the ground that the applicant had been wrongfully refused the benefit of the provisions of the Commission Notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases); T-13/89, ICI v Commission, 1992, paras 389–394; T-814/17, Lietuvos geležinkeliai v Commission, 2020, paras 389–406 (upheld in C-42/21 P, Lietuvos geležinkeliai v Commission, 2023, paras 150–160); T-425/18, Altice Europe v Commission, 2021, paras 357– 369 (appeal pending in C-746/21 P). As recognized in the case-law, the unlimited jurisdiction conferred on the Union Court authorizes it to vary the contested act, even without annulling it: see, e.g. C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P, and C-254/99 P, LVM and Others v Commission, 2002, para. 692; C-123/16 P, Orange Polska v Commission, 2018, para. 106; T-1/16, Hitachi-LG Data Storage and Hitachi-LG Data Storage Korea v Commission, 2019, para. 143; T-612/17, Google and Alphabet v Commission, 2021, para. 605 (appeal pending in C-48/22 P). 30 See, e.g. T-342/18, Nichicon v Commission, 2021, paras 589–590 (appeal pending in C-757/21 P); T-612/17, Google and Alphabet v Commission, 2021, para. 704 (appeal pending in C-48/22 P); T-799/17, Scania and Others v Commission, 2022, para. 573 (appeal pending in C-251/22 P). 31 See, e.g. T-348/08, Aragoneses Industrias y Energia v Commission, 2011, para. 306. 32 See, in that regard, T-42/07, Dow Chemical and Others v Commission, 2011, para. 167: notwithstanding the fact that a plea challenging the legality of the contested act was upheld, which resulted in its partial annulment, the General Court considered it unnecessary to adjust the amount of the relevant fine, since the Commission’s error could not have had any effect on the increase applied for the duration of the infringement. 33 See, e.g. T-105/17, HSBC Holdings and Others v Commission, 2019, para. 354 (set aside in part on other grounds in C-883/19 P); T-286/09 RENV, Intel v Commission, 2022, paras 529–532 (appeal pending in C-240/22 P).

Special Characteristics 641

C. Criteria Generally, the gravity and the duration of the infringement of Union law are the most important criteria which are used to determine the amount of the sanction. In addition, consideration is given to the particular circumstances of the case and the nature of the infringement in question, as well as to the context in which the infringement took place.34 In the context of unlimited jurisdiction in connection with the competition rules, the Union Court’s assessment of the appropriateness of the fine imposed by the Commission may justify the production and taking into account of additional information which is not mentioned in the contested decision.35 It is also well-settled that the Union Court is bound, when exercising its unlimited jurisdiction, by certain requirements, including the requirement to state reasons and the principle of equal treatment.36 The exercise of unlimited jurisdiction cannot result in discrimination between undertakings which have participated in an infringement of the competition rules.37

18.07

D. Role of the Court of Justice on appeal If an undertaking asks the Court of Justice on appeal to vary the amount of a fine imposed by the Commission on the basis of arguments put forward on appeal, the Court, without also setting aside the judgment of the General Court for infringing the law, has no jurisdiction to reconsider this matter. This is because it is not for the Court of Justice, where it is deciding questions of law in the context of an appeal, to substitute, on grounds of fairness, its own appraisal for that of the General Court adjudicating, in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, on the amount of a fine imposed on an undertaking by reason of its infringement of Union law.38 Accordingly, only where the Court of Justice considers that the level of the penalty is not merely inappropriate, but also excessive to the point of being disproportionate, would it have to find that the General Court erred in law on account of the inappropriateness of the amount of a fine.39 The Court of Justice has made clear that the exercise of that jurisdiction cannot result in a breach of the principle of equal treatment between undertakings which have participated in an agreement or concerted practice contrary to Art. 101 TFEU and thus

34 See C-603/13 P, Galp Energia España and Others v Commission, 2016, paras 89–90; C-440/19 P, Pometon v Commission, 2021, para. 160; T-240/17, Campine and Campine Recycling v Commission, 2019, para. 382. 35 See C-286/98 P, Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags v Commission, 2000, para. 57; T-132/07, Fuji Electric v Commission, 2011, para. 209; T-814/17, Lietuvos geležinkeliai v Commission, 2020, para. 392. 36 For an example where the statement of reasons has been found lacking, see C-440/19 P, Pometon v Commission, 2021, paras 145–153. 37 See, e.g. C‑434/13 P, Commission v Parker Hannifin Manufacturing and Parker-Hannifin, 2014, para. 77; C-440/19 P, Pometon v Commission, 2021, para. 138. 38 See, e.g. C-310/93, BPB Industries and British Gypsum v Commission, 1995, para. 34; C-58/12 P, Groupe Gascogne v Commission, 2013, para. 101; C-591/16 P, Lundbeck v Commission, 2021, para. 197. 39 See, e.g. C‑123/16 P, Orange Polska v Commission, 2018, para. 115; C-591/16 P, Lundbeck v Commission, 2021, para. 198; C-42/21 P, Lietuvos geležinkeliai v Commission, 2023, paras 153, 159.

18.08

642 UNLIMITED JURISDICTION the Court of Justice may entertain pleas on that basis.40 Moreover, the Court of Justice must be able, in appeal proceedings where a party disputes whether such exercise took place, to ascertain whether the General Court has actually exercised its unlimited jurisdiction.41

IV. Consequences 18.09

Under Art. 261 TFEU, the substance of the Union Court’s unlimited jurisdiction is determined by the regulations which provide for such jurisdiction. Generally, they indicate that the Union Court may cancel, reduce, or increase the fine or penalty payment imposed.42 Generally, a reduction of the fine is commonly requested by the applicant. Even if the applicant has not expressly claimed that the fine should be cancelled or reduced, the Union Court may do so if it can infer such a claim indirectly from another claim.43 As for the possibility of increasing the amount of a fine or penalty payment, it must be considered not whether this would be ultra petita, but rather whether it respects the rights of defence.44 Where the General Court finds that an undertaking has had a fine imposed on it which infringes the principle of equal treatment on the grounds that the fines imposed on other undertakings which participated in the same way in the same infringement were lower, the General Court logically has two ways of bringing the infringement of that principle to an end. It can either reduce the fine imposed on the first undertaking or increase the fines imposed on the other undertakings. The latter possibility is contingent on the other undertakings also having brought an application before the Union Court and been given the opportunity to comment on such an increase. If those conditions are not fulfilled, then the most appropriate means of remedying the unequal treatment is for the fine imposed on the other participants in the infringement to be reduced.45

40 See, e.g. C-266/06 P, Degussa v Commission, 2008, para. 114; C-434/13 P, Commission v Parker Hannifin Manufacturing and Parker-Hannifin, 2017, para. 77; C-440/19 P, Pometon v Commission, 2021, para. 138. 41 See C-606/18 P, Nexans France and Nexans v Commission, 2020, para. 99; see also, in that regard, C-99/17 P, Infineon Technologies v Commission, 2018, paras 206–207: the Court of Justice set aside the General Court’s ruling insofar as it had failed to provide any response to the applicant’s arguments concerning the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction. 42 For the references to the relevant regulations, see n. 1 of this chapter. 43 See 8/56, ALMA v High Authority, 1957–1958 ECR 95, 99–100; T-65/89, BPB Industries and British Gypsum v Commission, 1993, para. 162; but see T-382/06, Tomkins v Commission, 2011, paras 55–59 (upheld in C-286/11 P, Commission v Tomkins, 2013, paras 56–57): in the context of the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction to vary the fine imposed, the General Court considered that, since the applicant withdrew its complaint alleging error of assessment with regard to the increase in the amount of the fine for the purpose of deterrence, it could not rule on that point without going beyond the bounds of the dispute, although it found in another judgment issued on the same day concerning the same cartel that the Commission had erred in applying a multiplier of 1.25 for deterrence (T-386/06, Pegler v Commission, 2011). 44 See, in that regard, C-3/06 P, Group Danone v Commission, 2007, paras 56–64. See also para. 18.04. 45 See T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00, and T-78/00, JFE Engineering and Others v Commission, 2004, paras 566– 579; T-217/06, Arkema France and Others v Commission, 2011, para. 342; T-352/09, Novácke chemické závody v Commission, 2012, paras 55–56.

19 APPEALS I. Subject-Matter A. General overview The system of judicial protection in the European Union provides for an appeal procedure, by which a party1 may bring an appeal before the Court of Justice against a decision of the General Court based on alleged errors of law committed by the latter Court in reaching its decision, with a view to setting aside, in whole or in part, that decision.2 The fact that an appeal is possible against judicial decisions means that they have to be scrupulously reasoned. A system of two-tier legal protection by which the Court of Justice reviews the decisions of the General Court enhances the legitimacy of judicial decisions and the quality of legal protection.3 Under Art. 169(1) of the CJ Rules of Procedure, an appeal before the Court of Justice must seek to set aside, in whole or in part, the decision of the General Court as set out in the operative part of that decision.4 Moreover, under Art. 170(1) of the CJ Rules of Procedure, an appeal must seek the same form of order, in whole or in part, as that sought at first instance and cannot seek a different form of order.5 In the context of an appeal, the purpose of review by the Court of Justice is primarily to examine to what extent the General Court took into consideration, in a legally correct manner, all of the arguments that the appellant relied on.6 This chapter addresses the main characteristics

1 The party bringing the appeal is referred to as the appellant, and the opposing party the respondent. 2 In the context of an appeal, the Court of Justice has no power to issue directions to the Union institutions and therefore requests to that effect are inadmissible: see, e.g. C-241/19 P, Haswani v Council, 2021, para. 111. 3 See K. Lenaerts, ‘Le Tribunal de première instance des Communautés européennes: regards sur une décennie d’activités et sur l’apport du double degré d’instance au droit communautaire’ (2000) C.D.E. 323; C. Naômé, Appeals before the Court of Justice of the European Union (OUP, 2018). 4 That provision encapsulates the basic principle applying to appeals, namely, that an appeal must be directed against the operative part of the General Court’s decision, and may not merely seek the amendment of some of the grounds of that decision: see, e.g. C-337/19 P, Commission v Belgium and Magnetrol International, 2021, para. 46. In the latter case, the appeal or relevant ground of appeal will be dismissed as inadmissible: see C‑84/17 P, C‑85/17 P, and C‑95/17 P, Société des produits Nestlé v EUIPO, 2018, paras 41–55; C-174/19 P and C-175/18 P, Scandlines Danmark and Scandlines Deutschland v Commission, 2021, paras 45–54; C-833/19 P, Council v Hamas, 2021, paras 37–40. Thus, any appeal seeking a substitution of the grounds, which cannot lead to the operative part of the judgment under appeal being set aside, even in part, is inadmissible: see C-262/18 P and C-271/18 P, Commission v Dôvera zdravotná poistʼovňa, 2020, para. 54. 5 See para. 19.23. 6 See, e.g. C-202/07 P, France Télécom v Commission, 2009, para. 41; C-933/19 P, Autostrada Wielkopolska v Commission and Poland, 2021, para. 50. With regard to the review of a judgment of the General Court pronouncing

EU Procedural Law. Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak, Oxford University Press. © Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833086.003.0019

19.01

644 APPEALS of appeals against decisions of the General Court before the Court of Justice.7 This includes, in particular, the preliminary admission mechanism for certain types of appeals (see para. 19.20).

B. Appeals are confined to points of law 19.02

19.03

(1) Points of law An appeal brought before the Court of Justice against a decision of the General Court is not an appeal on the facts and the law. Appeals are confined to points of law,8 irrespective of the type of decision of the General Court against which they are brought.9 The Court of Justice’s jurisdiction to hear appeals is thus confined to reviewing the legality of decisions of the General Court in order to remedy errors of law and hence guarantee the necessary coherence of the Union legal order10 and the uniform interpretation of Union law.11 This avoids the Court of Justice having to inquire into findings of fact already made by the General Court, which satisfies the dual aim of alleviating the workload of the Court of Justice and improving the legal protection of natural and legal persons or Member States in direct actions. An error of law may have been committed by the General Court in its appraisal of a particular plea or argument raised before it. The omission of the General Court to examine a plea of law raised before it or a form of order sought by the applicant also constitutes an error of law which may lead to the annulment of the decision of the General Court.12 (2) The Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to make findings of fact on appeal The fact that appeals are confined to points of law means that the General Court has exclusive jurisdiction to make findings as to the facts underlying the proceedings at

on the legality of a Commission decision in relation to the application of Art. 101 TFEU, see, e.g. C-636/13 P, Roca Sanitario v Commission, 2017, para. 46; C-606/18 P, Nexans and Nexans France v Commission, 2020, para. 95. 7 For specific aspects dealing with procedure in relation to appeals, see Chs 22, 23, and 24. 8 Art. 256(1), second subpara. TFEU; Statute, Art. 58, first para. See also C-136/92 P, Commission v Brazzelli Lualdi and Others,1994, para. 29; C-295/07 P, Commission v Département du Loiret and Scott, 2008, para. 95; C-362/19 P, Commission v Fútbol Club Barcelona, 2021, para. 46. 9 See C-148/96 P(R), Goldstein v Commission, 1996, para. 22; C-512/16 P(R), EMA v MSD Animal Innovation and Intervert Internation (order), 2017, para. 36. Consequently, an appeal against an interim relief order or an order dismissing an application to intervene may be based only on the pleas listed in Art. 58, first para. of the Statute: see C-149/95 P(R), Commission v Atlantic Container Line and Others, 1995, paras 17–18. 10 See, in that regard, C-49/92 P, Commission v Anic Partecipazioni, 1999, paras 70–71; C-132/90 P, Schwedler v Parliament, AG Tesauro Opinion, 1991 ECR 5745, 5757. 11 See Council Decision 88/591/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 24 October 1988 establishing a Court of First Instance of the European Communities (OJ 1988 L319/1), fifth recital. 12 See, e.g. C-123/03 P, Commission v Greencore, 2004, paras 40–41; C-396/03 P, Killinger v Germany and Others (order), 2005, paras 11–13; C-167/06 P, Komninou and Others v Commission, 2007, paras 22, 26–28; C-200/10 P, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, 2011, paras 30–43; C-44/16 P, Dyson v Commission, 2017, paras 54–71. The plea that the General Court failed to rule on a plea or arguments relied on at first instance amounts essentially to relying on a breach of the obligation to state reasons incumbent upon it: see, e.g. C-283/90, Vidrányi v Commission, 1991, para. 29; C-583/08 P, Gogos v Commission, 2010, para. 29; C-593/11 P, Alliance One International v Commission (order), 2012, para. 27; for some examples, see C-44/16 P, Dyson v Commission, 2017, paras 37–43; C-665/19 P, NeXovation v Commission, 2021, paras 50–58. See also para. 19.09.

Subject-Matter 645 first instance, save where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings are apparent from the documents submitted to it.13 Parties are not entitled on appeal to contest the factual findings of the General Court14 or to offer to adduce evidence of facts which were not found by the General Court.15 This is because, if they were so entitled, it would oblige the Court of Justice to make a determination of the facts, which it is not competent to do on appeal. Consequently, the Court of Justice must leave out of account in reviewing the decision of the General Court any new facts raised. (3) Appraisal of the evidence by the General Court Finding certain facts may be straightforward. For example, parties may agree that a particular event occurred on a particular date or that an uncontested fact appears from an act contested (on other grounds) before the General Court. However, often the finding of facts by the General Court has to be preceded by an appraisal of the evidence. On appeal, the Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to make findings of fact or in principle to inquire into the evidence on the basis of which the General Court made its findings of fact.16 According to settled case-law, it is not for the Court of Justice to substitute its assessment of the evidence or to criticize the choices made by the General Court in that regard, particularly where it decides to rely on certain items of evidence and reject others.17 Where the evidence has been properly obtained and the general principles of law and the rules of procedure in relation to the burden of proof and the taking of evidence have been observed, it is for the General Court alone to assess the value which should be attached to the evidence produced to it.18 Consequently, on the one hand, an appeal brought against decisions of the General Court concerning the assessment of the facts and evidence adduced before it will be inadmissible, unless the General Court has allegedly distorted the facts or evidence, or else committed an error of law.19 On the other hand, in this latter respect, the appellant 13 See, e.g. C-413/06 P, Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America—Impala v Commission, 2008, para. 29; C-440/07 P, Commission v Schneider Electric, 2009, para. 103; C-515/17 P and C-561/17 P, Uniwersytet Wrocławski v REA, 2020, para. 47; C-933/19 P, Autostrada Wielkopolska v Commission and Poland, 2021, para. 92; C-666/19 P, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Commission, 2022, para. 73. 14 See, e.g. C-225/19 P, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Others v Council, 2019, para. 122; C-653/17 P, VM Vermögens-Management v EUIPO, 2019, paras 68–71; C-378/16 P, Inclusion Alliance for Europe v Commission, 2020, paras 99–100; C-174/19 P and C-175/19 P, Scandlines Danmark and Scandlines Deutschland v Commission, 2021, para. 86; C-718/20 P, Zhejiang Jiuli Hi-Tech Metals v Commission, 2022, paras 56, 141. 15 See, e.g. C-396/93 P, Henrichs v Commission, 1995, para. 14; C-660/17 P, RF v Commission, 2019, para. 30. 16 See, e.g. C-24/01 P and C-25/01 P, Glencore and Compagnie Continentnale v Commission, 2002, para. 65; C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P, and C-219/00 P, Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission, 2004, paras 48–49; C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P, and C‑604/18 P, Council v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others, 2020, para. 128; C-165/19 P, Slovak Telecom v Commission, 2021, para. 68; C-933/19 P, Autostrada Wielkopolska v Commission and Poland, 2021, paras 92–93. 17 See C-191/09 P and C-200/09 P, Council and Commission v Interpipe Niko Tube and Interpipe NTRP, 2012, para. 160; C-373/14 P, Toshiba v Commission, 2016, para. 68; C-718/20 P, Zhejiang Jiuli Hi-Tech Metals v Commission, 2022, para. 133. 18 See, e.g. C-413/06 P, Bertelsman and Sony Corporation of America—Impala v Commission, 2008, para. 29; C-440/07 P, Commission v Schneider Electric, 2009, para. 103; C‑447/17 P and C‑479/17 P, EU v Guardian Europe, 2019, para. 137; C-742/8 P, Czech Republic v Commission, 2020, para. 106; C-440/19 P, Pometon v Commission, 2021, para. 50; C-79/20 P, Yieh United Steel v Commission, 2022, para. 54. 19 See, e.g. C-15/92 P, Hilti v Commission, 1994, para. 42; C-143/95 P, Commission v Socurte and Others, 1997, para. 36; C-418/16 P, mobile.de v EUIPO, 2018, para. 65; C-356/20 P, AL v Commission (order), 2020, para. 9.

19.04

646 APPEALS may argue that evidence was not lawfully obtained or that the General Court failed to respect the legal principles and rules relating to the burden of proof or has not taken the right legal criteria as the basis for its appraisal of the facts and evidence.20 Furthermore, the General Court must respect the parties’ right to be heard.21 This does not mean, however, that the General Court has to incorporate in full in its decision all the submissions put forward by each party. The General Court, after listening to the submissions of the parties and assessing the evidence, has to decide whether or not to grant the relief sought in the application and give reasons for its decision.22

19.05

(4) Distortion of the facts or evidence It is not always straightforward to distinguish between points of law in relation to the interpretation and application of Union law which come within the scope of the Court of Justice’s jurisdiction on appeal and questions of fact which fall solely within the purview of the General Court.23 It appears from the case-law that, in exceptional circumstances, a manifestly wrong finding of fact by the General Court may nevertheless produce a point of law which can be reviewed by the Court of Justice on appeal.24 This will be the 20 See, e.g. C-140/96 P, Dimitriadis v Court of Auditors (order), 1997, paras 26–27; C-199/92, Hüls v Commission, 1999, paras 64–65; C-155/14 P, Evonik Degussa and AlzChem v Commission, 2016, para. 26; C-623/15 P, Toshiba v Commission, 2017, paras 39, 44; C-593/18 P, ABB v Commission, 2019, para. 28; C-599/18 P, Silec Cable and General Cable v Commission, 2019, para. 32; C-425/19 P, Commission v Italy and Others, 2021, paras 53–54. In particular, the question whether the General Court observed the rules relating to the burden of proof and the taking of evidence in its examination of the rules relied on by the Commission to support the existence of an infringement of the competition rules constitutes a point of law: see, e.g. C-613/13 P, Commission v Keramag Keramische Werke and Others, 2017, paras 29, 49 (finding, inter alia, that the General Court infringed the relevant rules applicable to the taking and appraisal of evidence and erred in law in respect of corroborating evidence: see paras 42–45). Additionally, the question of the allocation of the burden of proof, although it may have an impact on the findings of fact made by the General Court, is a point of law: see C-2/01 P and C-3/01 P, BAI and Commission, 2004, para. 61; C-440/19 P, Pometon v Commission, 2021, para. 108. 21 The question whether the General Court acted in breach of the rights of the defence is a point of law: see, e.g. C-462/98 P, Mediocurso v Commission, 2000, para. 35; C-82/01 P, Aéroports de Paris v Commission, 2002, para. 38; C-566/14 P, Marchiani v Parliament, 2016, para. 38. 22 See C-221/97 P, Schröder and Thamann v Commission, 1998, para. 24; C-506/13 P, Lito Maieftiko Gynaikologiko kai Cheirourgiko Kentro v Commission, 2015, para. 48. The General Court cannot, subject to its obligation to observe general principles and the rules of procedure relating to the burden of proof and the adducing of evidence and not to distort the clear sense of the evidence, be required to give express reasons for its assessment of the value of each piece of evidence presented to it, in particular, where it considers that that evidence is unimportant or irrelevant to the outcome of the dispute: see, e.g. C-237/98 P, Dorsch Consult v Council and Commission, 2000, para. 51; C-332/18 P, Mytilinaios Anonymos Etairia—Omilos Epicheiriseon v Commission, 2019, para. 154. 23 For some applications finding points of law, not questions of fact, see, e.g. C-47/07 P, Masdar v Commission, 2008, para. 77; C-109/10 P, Solvay v Commission, 2011, para. 51; C-110/10 P, Solvay v Commission, 2011, para. 46; C-331/17 P, France v Schlyter and Commission, 2017, para. 30; C-128/16 P, Spain v Commission, 2018, paras 31–32; C-162/17 P, Poland v Stock Polska and EUIPO, 2019, para. 38; C-69/19 P, Credito Fondiario v SRB, 2020, para. 29; C-515/17 P and C-561/17 P, Uniwersytet Wrocławski v REA, 2020, paras 47–48; C-51/19 P, World Duty Free Group v Commission, 2021, para. 113; C-458/19 P, ClientEarth v Commission, 2021, para. 77; C-638/19 P, Commission v European Food and Others, 2022, para. 74; C-167/19 P, Commission v Freistaat Bayern, 2022, para. 47. For an application finding some points of law and other questions of fact, see C-174/19 P and C-175/19 P, Scandlines Danmark and Scandlines Deutschland v Commission, 2021, paras 126–128. In particular, the Court of Justice has held that the General Court’s examination of a contractual term cannot be considered to be an interpretation of law and cannot therefore be reviewed in the context of an appeal without encroaching upon the jurisdiction of the General Court to establish the facts. By contrast, the alleged infringement of Union law applicable to contracts is subject to a review by the Court such as that carried out in the context of an appeal: see C-78/14 P, Commission v ANKO, 2015, para. 23; C-280/19 P, ERCEA v Aristoteleio Panepistimio Thessalonikis, 2021, paras 43–44; C-572/19 P, Ertico—ITS Europe v Commission, 2021, para. 70; see also, in that regard, C-78/14 P, Commission v ANKO, AG Szpunar Opinion, points 13–35. 24 The national courts to which jurisdiction in cassation has been conferred consider that they have a general power to quash decisions of inferior courts where it appears that their assessment of the facts does not square

Subject-Matter 647 case where it is manifest from the documents in the case remitted to the General Court that the findings of fact are substantially incorrect or that the General Court has distorted the clear sense of the evidence,25 which must be obvious from the documents in the Court of Justice’s file without any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts or evidence.26 To that end, the appellant must clearly identify the evidence which is said to have been distorted by the General Court, and demonstrate the errors of analysis which, it is claimed, led to the distortion of that evidence by the General Court.27 Proposing an interpretation of the evidence which differs from that adopted by the General Court is not sufficient to demonstrate that that evidence has been distorted.28 It may indeed happen that the General Court makes a wrong reading of the contested act.29 According to the Court of Justice, this error constitutes a question of law because the General Court read something into the contested act which was not there and thereby infringed the law by substituting its own reasoning for that set out in the contested act.30 Similarly, where the General Court wrongly presents the evidence adduced with reality as perceived by a normal observer. Such a manifestly wrong assessment of the facts is regarded as an infringement of the law (case-law or statute law). If the Court of Justice were to put itself in a position in which findings of fact could be reviewed, this would undermine the objectives of setting up the General Court because the former power of the Court of Justice to take cognizance of certain categories of cases necessitating an inquiry into complicated facts was transferred to the General Court. In this way, the Court of Justice can concentrate on its essential task, which is guaranteeing uniformity in the interpretation of Union law, and can maintain efficient and effective legal protection in the Union legal order. See, in that respect, the preamble to Council Decision 88/591 (n. 11); Lenaerts (n. 3). 25 There is a distortion of the clear sense of the evidence where, without recourse to new evidence, the assessment of the existing evidence appears to be clearly or manifestly incorrect (see, e.g. C-45/15 P, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council, 2017, para. 76; C-99/17 P, Infineon Technologies v Commission, 2018, para. 103; C-599/18 P, Silec Cable and General Cable v Commission, 2019, para. 39; C-742/18 P, Czech Republic v Commission, 2020, para. 107) or manifestly at odds with its wording (see, e.g. C-623/15 P, Toshiba v Commission, 2017, para. 40; C-330/18 P, Gollnisch v Parliament (order), 2019, para. 110). The fact that the Court of Justice finds that General Court distorted the facts and evidence does not necessarily result in the General Court’s decision being set aside: see, e.g. C-84/16 P, Continental Reifen Deutschland v Compagnie générale des établissements Michelin and EUIPO, 2017, paras 39–45, 101–103; C-419/17 P, Deza v ECHA, 2019, paras 86–89; C-528/18 P, Outsource Professional Services v EUIPO, 2019, paras 55–73. 26 See C-260/09 P, Activision Blizzard Germany v Commission, 2011, para. 53; C‑622/16 P to C‑624/16 P, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission, 2018, para. 86; C-933/19 P, Autostrada Wielkopolska v Commission and Poland, 2021, para. 34. For an application of the obvious requirement, see C-191/09 P and C-200/09 P, Council and Commission v Interpipe Niko Tube and Interpipe NTRP, 2012, paras 116–117. 27 See, e.g. C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P, and C-219/00 P, Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission, 2004, para. 50; C-70/16 P, Comunidad Autónoma de Galicia and Retegal v Commission, 2017, para. 50; C-162/17 P, Poland v Stock Polska and EUIPO, 2019, para. 71; C-933/19 P, Autostrada Wielkopolska v Commission and Poland, 2021, para. 94; C-666/19 P, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Commission, 2022, para. 74. Where the appellant fails to do so, the relevant ground of appeal will be inadmissible: see, e.g. C‑818/18 P and C‑6/19 P, Yokohama Rubber v Pirelli Tyre, 2021, para. 53; C-890/19 P, Fortischem v Commission, 2021, paras 69–73. 28 Under the case-law, while a distortion of the evidence may consist in an interpretation of a document contrary to its content, it is not sufficient, in order to establish such a distortion, to show that that document could have been interpreted differently from the interpretation adopted by the General Court. To that end, it is necessary to establish that the General Court manifestly exceeded the limits of a reasonable assessment of that document, in particular, by reading it in a manner contrary to its wording: see, e.g. C-403/18 P, Alcogroup and Alcodis v Commission, 2019, para. 64; C-615/19 P, Dalli v Commission, 2021, para. 139. 29 See, e.g. C-164/98 P, DIR International Film and Others v Commission, 2000, paras 43–48; C-197/99 P, Belgium v Commission, 2003, paras 58–67; C-172/01 P, C-175/01 P, C-176/01 P, and C-180/01 P, International Power v Commission, 2003, para. 156; C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P, and C-219/00 P, Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission, 2004, paras 381–385; C-337/19 P, Commission v Belgium and Magnetrol International, 2021, in particular paras 87–99, 122–125. 30 See, e.g. C-164/98 P, DIR International Film and Others v Commission, 2000, para. 49; C-50/19 P, Sigma Alimentos Exterior v Commission, 2021, paras 66–69; C-51/19 P, World Duty Free Group v Commission, 2021,

648 APPEALS or distorts it, this will constitute a question of law which the Court of Justice may review.31 It should, however, be stressed that the actual assessment of the evidence by the General Court is to be regarded as definitive (see para. 19.04).

19.06

19.07

(5) Evidence on which the parties were not heard at first instance The question whether the General Court can base its dismissal of the appellant’s case on evidence on which the appellant was not heard is a question of law on appeal. Furthermore, under these circumstances, the Court of Justice may also examine whether the decision of the General Court is in fact based on such evidence. This is because that examination is directed at the procedure followed before the General Court and is not an examination of the facts relating to the substance of the case.32 (6) Legal categorization of the facts In addition, the fact that appeals are confined to points of law does not preclude the Court of Justice from reviewing the legal categorization of facts found by the General Court.33 This is because infringements of Union law not only occur in the form of a wrong interpretation of the Union rule which has been applied or not applied, but also in that of a wrong legal categorization of a given situation of fact, as a result of which the rule at issue is wrongly applied—or, conversely, not applied—in a particular case. For example, this includes the legal categorization of the facts in order to determine whether the appellant is directly and/or individually concerned for the purposes of the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU34 or the date on which the appellant became aware paras 119–122; C-52/19 P, Banco Santander v Commission, 2021, paras 100–103; C‑53/19 P and C‑65/19 P, Banco Santander and Santusa v Commission, 2021, paras 119–121; C-54/19 P, Axa Mediterranean Holding v Commission, 2021, paras 101–104; C-55/19 P, Prosegur Compañía de Seguridad v Commission, 2021, paras 101–104. 31 For some successful applications, see, e.g. C-229/05 P, PKK and KNK v Council, 2007, paras 37–54 (distinguished in C-19/16 P, Al-Faqih and Others v Commission, 2017, paras 41–42); C-326/05 P, Industrias Quimicas del Valles v Commission, 2007, paras 60–69; C-44/16 P, Dyson v Commission, 2017, paras 33–43; C-346/17 P, Klein v Commission, 2018, para. 132; C-647/19 P, Ja zum Nürburgring v Commission, 2021, paras 86–92. For some counterexamples, see, e.g. C-260/09 P, Activision Blizzard Germany v Commission, 2011, paras 51–58; C 239/11 P, C 489/11 P, and C 498/11 P, Siemens and Others v Commission, 2013, paras 44–46; C-403/18 P, Alcogroup and Alcodis v Commission, 2019, paras 63–66; C-160/19 P, Comune di Milano v Commission, 2021, para. 86; C-876/19 P, PlasticsEurope v ECHA, 2021, paras 88–91. 32 See, in that regard, C-480/99 P, Plant and Others v Commission and South Wales Small Mines Association, 2002, para. 20; C-470/02P, UER v Commission (order), 2004, para. 75; C-413/18 P, H v Council, 2019, paras 105–117. 33 See, e.g. C-440/07 P, Schneider Electric v Commission, 2009, para. 191; C-152/19 P, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, 2021, para. 68; C-666/19 P, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Commission, 2022, para. 73. For some examples, see C-515/17 P and C-561/17 P, Uniwersytet Wrocławski v REA, 2020, paras 47–48; C-529/18 P and C-531/18 P, PJ v EUIPO, 2022, paras 55–57; C-51/19 P and C-64/19 P, World Duty Free Group v Commission, 2021, para. 112. In the case-law, such a question of law may also be framed, for example, as to whether the General Court applied the correct legal standard (see, e.g. C-109/10 P, Solvay v Commission, 2011, para. 51; C-110/10 P, Solvay v Commission, 2011, para. 46), or whether the General Court has taken the right legal criteria as the basis for its appraisal of the facts and the evidence (see, e.g. C-623/15 P, Toshiba v Commission, 2017, para. 39; C-425/19 P, Commission v Italy and Others, 2021, para. 53; C-638/19 P, Commission v European Food and Others, 2022, para. 59). The question whether a ‘fact’ on which an application for revision can be regarded as a ‘new fact’ within the meaning of Art. 44 of the Statute is a question of law which is amenable to appeal: see C-2/98 P, De Compte v Parliament, 1999, paras 15–23; C-5/93 P, DSM v Commission, 1999, paras 30–33. 34 See, e.g. C-465/16 P, Council v Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association, 2019, para. 49; C-466/19 P, Council v Marquis Energy, 2019, para. 37; C-565/19 P, Carvalho and Others v Parliament and Council, 2021, para. 38; see also, as regards an appellant’s standing in the context of the case-law relating to the safeguarding of the

Subject-Matter 649 of the contested act for the purposes of the time-limit set out in the sixth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU.35 Likewise, the classification for legal purposes of an act or a measure, such as a letter, by the General Court is a question of law which may be raised in an appeal.36 In addition, the identification of the relevant product market for the purpose of determining whether a given undertaking is in a dominant position within the meaning of Art. 102 TFEU is a point of law. Accordingly, the Court of Justice is entitled to examine whether the General Court took account of all the relevant factors. If relevant factors were not taken into consideration, the General Court will have erred in law by basing its conclusions on insufficient reasoning.37 (7) Error with respect to the interpretation of national law The distinction between fact and law is also not straightforward when an error with respect to the interpretation of national law is alleged. As regards the examination, in the context of an appeal, of findings made by the General Court with regard to national law, the Court of Justice has held that it ‘has jurisdiction to determine, first of all, whether the General Court, on the basis of the documents and other evidence submitted to it, distorted the wording of the national provisions at issue or of the national case-law relating to them, or of the academic writings concerning them; second, whether the General Court, as regards those particulars, made findings that were manifestly inconsistent with their content; and, lastly, whether the General Court, in examining all the particulars, attributed to one of them, for the purpose of establishing the content of the national law at issue, a significance which is not appropriate in the light of the other particulars, where that is manifestly apparent from the documentation in the case-file’.38 procedural rights of interested parties under Art. 108(2) TFEU, C-757/18 P, M-Sansz v Commission (order), 2019, para. 14. A party’s interest in bringing proceedings is also a question of law: see C-544/17 P, BPC Lux 2 and Others v Commission, 2018, para 31. 35 See, e.g. C-69/19 P, Credito Fondiario v SRB, 2020, para. 29; C-498/19 P, Romania v Commission, 2020, para. 24. 36 See, e.g. C-351/20 P, Dragnea v Commission, 2022, para. 65. That is true, for example, of the question whether a letter must be regarded as a complaint within the meaning of Art. 90(2) of the Staff Regulations (see C-442/03 P and C-471/03 P, P &O European Ferries (Vizcaya) v Commission, 2006, para. 90), whether a letter constitutes notification of aid (see C-442/03 P and C-471/03 P, P &O European Ferries (Vizcaya) v Commission, 2006, para. 91), or whether a letter sent by a Union institution in response to a request to act does or does not bring an end to the failure to act alleged against that institution under Art. 265 TFEU (see C-596/15 P, Bionorica v Commission, 2017, para. 55). 37 See C-82/01 P, Aéroports de Paris v Commission, 2002, paras 84–97 (as regards the correct delimitation of the relevant market) and paras 98–102 (as regards the existence of a dominant position); C-53/92 P, Hilti v Commission, AG Jacobs, 1993, point 28; see also, e.g. C-413/06 P, Bertelsman and Sony Corporation of America—Impala v Commission, 2008, paras 117–118 (as regards the legal criteria in respect of a collective dominant position); C-152/19 P, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, 2021, paras 70–71 (as regards the exercise of decisive influence of a parent company over the market conduct of a subsidiary); compare, e.g. C-95/04 P, British Airways v Commission, 2007, paras 78–79, 88, 101, 114, 122, 136–137 (finding various elements, such as assessment of market data and competitive position constitute questions of fact, not law); see also, in that regard, C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, 2010, para. 53. 38 C-263/09 P, Edwin v OHIM, 2011, para. 53; see also C-598/14 P, EUIPO v Szajner, 2017, para. 56; C-76/11 P, Tresplain Investments v OHIM (order), para. 66; C-601/16 P, Arrow Group and Arrow Generics v Commission, 2021, para. 61; C-425/19 P, Commission v Italy and Others, 2021, para. 93. Thus, with respect to the assessment, in the context of an appeal, of the General Court’s findings on national law, which, in the field of State aid, constitute findings of fact, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction only to determine whether that law was distorted. By contrast, since the assessment, in the context of an appeal, of the legal classification which has been given to that national

19.08

650 APPEALS 19.09

19.10

(8) Extent of the obligation to state reasons The extent of the obligation to state reasons is a question of law reviewable by the Court of Justice on appeal.39 The obligation for the General Court to give reasons for its decisions does not go so far as to require it to provide an account that follows exhaustively and one-by-one all the arguments articulated by the parties to the case, and the reasoning may be implicit, so long as it enables the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the decision taken and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient material for it to exercise its power of review.40 In that regard, the General Court must have taken account of the requirement to state reasons also in assessing purely factual matters (for instance, in determining the amount of damage sustained41) because the Court of Justice must be in a position to check that the General Court has not breached the law in assessing the facts.42 In addition, the question whether the grounds of a decision of the General Court are contradictory or inadequate is a question of law.43 (9) Assessment of damages In an appeal against a judgment given in an action for damages against the Union brought pursuant to Art. 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU, the General Court has the last word on whether there has been loss or damage or an event causing damage, except where there is a wrong presentation or a distortion of evidence.44 Thus, in the particular context of actions for damages, once the General Court has found the existence of damage, it alone has jurisdiction to assess, within the confines of the claim, the means and extent of compensation for the damage. However, in order for the Court of Justice to be able to review the judgments of the General Court, those judgments must be sufficiently reasoned and, as regards the assessment of the damage, indicate the criteria taken into account for the purposes of determining the amount decided upon.45 Moreover, the question whether there has been an error of law with regard to the legal categorization of facts in relation to the assessment of a sufficiently

law by the General Court in the light of a provision of Union law constitutes a question of law, it falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. See, e.g. C-203/16 P, Andres (liquidation Heitkamp BauHolding) v Commission, 2018, para. 78; C-51/19 P and C-64/19 P, World Duty Free Group v Commission, 2021, para. 113; see further M. Prek and S. Lefèvre, ‘The EU Courts as “National Courts”: National Law in the EU Judicial Process’ (2017) 54 C.M.L. Rev. 369, 396–401. 39 See C-413/06 P, Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v Commission, 2008, para. 30; C-601/11 P, France v Commission, 2013, para. 82; C-99/18 P, FTI Touristik v EUIPO, 2019, para. 14. 40 See C‑105/15 P to C‑109/15 P, Mallis and Others v Commission, 2016, para. 45; C-56/19 P, RFA International v Commission, 2021, para. 33; C-167/19 P and C-171/19 P, Commission v Freistaat Bayern, 2022, para. 78. For some examples in which the General Court was found to have infringed its obligation to state reasons, see C-613/13 P, Commission v Keramag Keramische Werke and Others, 2017, paras 37–42 (as well as the rules applicable to the taking and appraisal of the evidence); C-647/19 P, Ja zum Nürburgring v Commission, 2021, paras 107–109. 41 See, e.g. C-348/06 P, Commission v Giradot, 2008, para. 45; C-34/12 P, Idromacchine and Others v Commission, 2013, para. 80; C-612/19 P, CC v Parliament, 2020, para. 58; C-399/20 P, XH v Commission (order), 2021, para. 33. 42 See, e.g. C-200/10 P, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, 2011, paras 30–43. 43 See, e.g. C-224/15 P, Rose Vision v Commission, 2016, para. 26; C-460/18 P, HK v Commission, 2019, para. 39; C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P, and C‑604/18 P, Council v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others, 2020, para. 142. 44 See C-62/01 P, Campogrande v Commission, 2002, para. 24. 45 See C‑138/17 P and C‑146/17 P, EU v Gascogne Sack Deutschland and Gascogne, 2018, para. 60.

Subject-Matter 651 serious breach of Union law,46 the existence of a causal link between the wrongful act and the damage,47 and the existence of actual and certain damage48—which are conditions for Union non-contractual liability to be incurred (see para. 11.35)—raise points of law subject to review on appeal by the Court of Justice. (10) Exercise by the General Court of its unlimited jurisdiction On appeal, the Court of Justice is not empowered to substitute, on grounds of fairness, its own assessment for that of the General Court exercising its unlimited jurisdiction to rule on the amount of pecuniary sanctions imposed for infringements of Union law.49 The review which the Court of Justice may conduct in this connection mainly consists of considering whether the General Court responded to a sufficient legal standard and in accordance with the principles of equal treatment and proportionality to all the arguments raised with a view to having the sanction cancelled, reduced, or increased (see para. 18.08).50

19.11

C. Decisions of the General Court against which an appeal will lie (1) Final decisions Under the first paragraph of Art. 56 of the Statute, an appeal may be brought against final decisions of the General Court and against decisions of that Court disposing of substantive issues in part only or disposing of a procedural issue concerning a plea of lack of competence or inadmissibility.51 Therefore, appeals lodged against decisions of the General Court which do not fall under these categories have been found inadmissible.52 In particular, an appeal will not lie against the part of a judgment of the General Court in which that Court considers that it is unnecessary to rule on an objection

46 See C-337/15 P, Ombudsman v Staelen, 2017, paras 53–55. 47 See C-440/07 P, Commission v Schneider Electric, 2009, paras 192–193; C-363/17 P, Equipolymers and Others v Council, 2018, para. 22. 48 See C-611/12 P, Giordano v Commission, 2014, para. 31. 49 See, e.g. C-310/93, BPB Industries and British Gypsum v Commission, 1995, para. 34; C-58/12 P, Groupe Gascogne v Commission, 2013, para. 101; C-591/16 P, Lundbeck v Commission, 2021, para. 197. 50 According to the case-law, only where the Court of Justice considers that the level of the penalty is not merely inappropriate, but also excessive to the point of being disproportionate, does it have to find that the General Court erred in law on account of the inappropriateness of the amount of a fine: see, e.g. C-123/16 P, Orange Polska v Commission, 2018, para. 115; C-591/16 P, Lundbeck v Commission, 2021, para. 198. 51 The Court may examine of its own motion whether the claim submitted by the appellant is directed against a decision open to appeal: see C-23/00 P, Council v Boehringer, 2002, para. 46; see also C-570/18 P, HF v Parliament, 2020, para. 30 (underlining that it is for the Court to examine of its own motion any question relating to the admissibility of an appeal or the grounds of the appeal). 52 For some examples, see C-349/99 P, Commission v ADT Projekt (order), 1999 (order made by the General Court instructing party to produce documents); C-366/03 P to C-368/03 P, C-390/03 P, C-391/03 P, and C-394/03 P, Associazione Bancaria Italiana and Others v Commission (order), 2003 (decision of the General Court to stay proceedings); C-526/07 P, Combescot v Commission (order), 2008, para. 36 (decision of the General Court concerning joinder of cases); C-59/09 P, Hasbro—Enercon v OHIM (order), 2009, paras 7–9 (a letter from the Registry rejecting appellant’s request to be represented at the hearing by a ‘Trade Mark and Design Litigator’); C-450/20 P, Comprojecto-Projectos e Construções and Others v ECB and Banco de Portugal (order), 2021, paras 15–17 (decision of the General Court declaring inadmissible an application for rectification of an order or correction of an omission to adjudicate made under Arts 164 and 165 GC Rules of Procedure); C-654/17 P, Bayerische Motoren Werke v Commission and Freistaat Sachsen, 2019, paras 26–56 (decision of the General Court to grant leave to intervene).

19.12

652 APPEALS of inadmissibility, since the claims have, in any event, to be dismissed on the merits. This is because that decision makes the objection to no purpose.53 An appeal will also lie against decisions of the General Court dismissing an application to intervene.54 Additionally, decisions of the General Court relating to applications for interim relief may be the subject of an appeal (Arts 278–279 TFEU), together with decisions suspending the operation of acts of the Council, the Commission, or the European Central Bank which impose a financial obligation on natural or legal persons (Art. 299, fourth para. TFEU).55

19.13

(2) Appeal regarding costs Under the second paragraph of Art. 58 of the Statute, no appeal shall lie regarding only the amount of the costs or the party ordered to pay them.56 Moreover, where all the other pleas put forward in an appeal have been rejected, any plea challenging the decision of the General Court on costs must be rejected as inadmissible by virtue of that provision.57

II. Identity of the Parties A. Appellants 19.14

An appeal may be brought by any party which has been unsuccessful, in whole or in part, in its submissions made before the General Court,58 provided that the appeal, if 53 See C-23/00 P, Council v Boehringer, 2002, para. 51. However, this position is different in the case of a judgment where the main application is rejected as unfounded after the General Court has also rejected an objection of inadmissibility. An appeal directed only against the rejection of the objection of inadmissibility will lie in that event: see C-73/97 P, France v Comafrica and Others, 1999; C-23/00 P, Council v Boehringer, 2002, para. 50; C-234/02 P, Ombudsman v Lamberts, 2004, paras 31–33; C-141/02 P, Commission v max.mobil, 2005, paras 45–52; C-362/05 P, Wunenburger v Commission, 2007, paras 37–40; C‑445/07 P and C‑455/07 P, Commission v Ente per le Ville vesuviane and Ente per le Ville Vesuviane v Commission, 2009, para. 40. 54 Statute, Art. 57, first para. See, in that regard, C-654/17 P, Bayerische Motoren Werke v Commission and Freistaat Sachsen, 2019, paras 26–56 (no provision in Union law capable of constituting a legal basis for a party to bring an appeal before the Court of Justice against a decision of the General Court to grant leave to intervene). See also C-31/22 P(I), Atlas Copco Airpower and Atlas Copco v Magnetrol International and Commission (order), 2022, paras 36–57; C-32/22 P(I), Anheuser-Busch Inbev and Ampar v Magnetrol International and Commission (order), 2022, paras 36–57; and C-74/22 P(I), Soudal and Esko-Graphics v Magnetrol and Commission (order), 2022, paras 37–54: the decision by which the General Court—by refusing to place on the file of a case which has been referred back to it by the Court of Justice after annulment of its decision, the observations of an intervener in the appeal, on the ground that they constitute a document not provided for in the Rules of Procedure of the General Court— implicitly denies that intervener the status of intervener in that case can be the subject of an appeal on the basis of the first paragraph of Art. 57 of the Statute. 55 See Statute, Art. 57, second para. See further para. 13.42. 56 See C-122/07 P, Eurostrategies v Commission, 2007, paras 21–24; C-447/13 P, Nencini v Parliament, 2014, paras 22–26. 57 See, e.g. C-263/09 P, Edwin v OHIM, 2011, paras 78–79; C-127/13 P, Strack v Commission, 2014, paras 151–152; C-69/19 P, Credito Fondiario v SRB, 2020, paras 68–69; C-130/21 P, Wagenknecht v Commission, 2022, paras 62–63. 58 Statute, Art. 56, second para. Parties that have not, in whole or in part, been unsuccessful for the purposes of Art. 56, second para. of the Statute are therefore not entitled to bring an appeal: see, e.g. C‑663/17 P, C‑665/17 P, and C‑669/17 P, ECB v Trasta Komercbanka and Others, 2019, paras 52–53; see also C-499/18 P, Bayer CropScience and Bayer v Commission, 2021, para. 43 (finding the appeal inadmissible in respect of a person which did not take

Identity of the Parties 653 successful, is likely to procure an advantage to the party bringing it, that is to say, it must have an interest in bringing appeal proceedings.59 An appeal that does not seek to have the judgment under appeal, that is to say, the operative part thereof, set aside, even in part, but merely to amend some of the grounds of that judgment, is inadmissible.60 Moreover, an appellant cannot raise a ground of appeal for the benefit of another party to the proceedings.61 The Court of Justice may, of its own motion, raise the objection that a party has no interest in bringing or maintaining an appeal on the ground that an event subsequent to the judgment of the General Court removes its prejudicial effect as regards the appellant, and thus declare the appeal inadmissible or devoid of purpose for that reason.62

B. Interveners Persons who have been refused leave to intervene may appeal against that decision of the General Court.63 A separate issue is whether persons that have intervened before the General Court may appeal against that Court’s final decision. With respect to interveners other than Member States or Union institutions, an appeal will lie only if their situation is directly affected by the decision of the General Court.64 The interest which such an intervener—including Union bodies, offices, and agencies, as well as any other person—must establish in order to be able to bring an appeal is in principle the same as it had to establish in order to obtain leave to intervene at first instance (Statute, Art.

part in the proceedings before the General Court and did not invoke any circumstances which might conceivably entitle it to bring an appeal). 59 See, e.g. C-418/16 P, mobile.de v EUIPO, 2018, paras 37–38; C-378/16 P, Inclusion Alliance for Europe v Commission, 2020, paras 61–62. In that regard, an appellant’s interest in bringing proceedings does not necessarily disappear by reason of the fact that the contested act has ceased to have effect in the course of the proceedings: see, e.g. C-499/18 P, Bayer CropScience and Bayer v Commission, 2021, paras 40–41; see para. 7.144. For cross-appeals, see, e.g. C-293/13 P, Fresh Del Monte Produce v Commission and Commission v Fresh Del Monte Produce, 2015, paras 45–47. Similarly, for a request for substitution of grounds to be admissible, the party concerned must have an interest: see, e.g. C-364/20 P, Bernis and Others v SRB, 2022, para. 37. 60 See para. 19.001. See also C-666/20 P, GVN v Commission, 2022, paras 23–26, in which the Court of Justice found that the Commission’s arguments contesting the General Court’s decision to dismiss the action on the merits without ruling on the grounds of inadmissibility which it had invoked were not intended to call into question the operative part of the judgment under appeal and thus were regarded as ineffective. 61 See C-201/09 P and C-216/09 P, ArcelorMittal Luxembourg v Commission and Commission v ArcelorMittal Luxembourg and Others, 2011, para. 83. 62 See, e.g. C-19/93 P, Rendo and Others v Commission, 1995, para. 13; C-535/06, Moser Baer India v Council, 2009, para. 2; C-399/06 P and C-403/06 P, Hassan and Ayadi v Council and Commission, 2009, para. 58. 63 Statute, Art. 57, first para. See para. 23.13. See, in that regard, C-31/22 P(I), Atlas Copco Airpower and Atlas Copco v Magnetrol International and Commission (order), 2022, paras 36–57; C-32/22 P(I), Anheuser-Busch Inbev and Ampar v Magnetrol International and Commission (order), 2022, paras 36–57; and C-74/22 P(I), Soudal and Esko-Graphics v Magnetrol and Commission (order), 2022, paras 37–54: the decision by which the General Court— by refusing to place on the file of a case which has been referred back to it by the Court of Justice after annulment of its decision, the observations of an intervener in the appeal, on the ground that they constitute a document not provided for in the Rules of Procedure of the General Court—implicitly denies that intervener the status of intervener in that case can be the subject of an appeal on the basis of the first paragraph of Art. 57 of the Statute. 64 Statute, Art. 56, second para. See C-461/18 P, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Distillerie Bonollo and Others, 2020, paras 122–133. This applies to interveners, not applicants or defendants at first instance: see, e.g. C-598/14 P, EUIPO v Szajner, 2017, para. 24; C-418/16 P, mobile.de v EUIPO, 2018, para. 37.

19.15

654 APPEALS 40, second para.),65 but the Court of Justice has, in the decision of the General Court, a more concrete basis for testing that interest than the General Court has when appraising the interest of a would-be intervener before any decision on the substance has been taken. It is therefore possible that the intervener at first instance may be refused leave to appeal.

C. Member States and Union institutions 19.16

Member States and Union institutions may invariably appeal,66 even if the decision of the General Court does not affect them directly67 and they did not intervene in the proceedings at first instance,68 with the exception, in the latter case, of staff cases.69

D. Respondents 19.17

Any party to the proceedings in the General Court ‘having an interest in the appeal being allowed or dismissed’ may submit a response to the appeal.70

III. Special Characteristics A. Procedure 19.18

The procedure before the Court of Justice in the case of an appeal brought against a decision of the General Court is generally comparable to that concerning direct actions (see Ch. 24).71 65 Note that, while Arts 129–132 of the CJ Rules of Procedure concerning intervention apply to the procedure before the Court of Justice on an appeal against decisions of the General Court, by way of derogation from Art. 130(1) of those rules, an application to intervene must, according to Art. 190(2) of the CJ Rules of Procedure, be made within one month, as opposed to six weeks, of the publication of the notice of appeal referred to in Art. 21(4) thereof. 66 Statute, Art. 56, third para. 67 Member States and Union institutions do not have to show an interest in order to bring an appeal against a judgment of the General Court: see C-27/09 P, France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, 2011, paras 43–45; C-104/16 P, Council v Front Polisario, 2016, paras 69–70; C-823/18 P, Commission v GEA Group, 2020, paras 36–38. 68 Statute, Art. 56, third para. See, by way of example, the appeal brought by Poland against T-137/16, Uniwersytet Wrocławski v REA (order), 2017 (C-561/17 P), or the appeals brought by Germany and Hungary against T‑339/16, T‑352/16, and T‑391/16, Ville de Paris and Others v Commission, 2018 (C-177/19 P and C-178/19 P). 69 Statute, Art. 56, third para. See, in that regard, C-434/98 P, Council v Busacca and Others, 2000, para. 21. As to how Member States and Union institutions become aware of decisions of the General Court to be appealed against if they were not parties to those proceedings, see Statute, Art. 55. 70 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 172. A response that does not seek to have the appeal allowed or dismissed, in whole or in part, as provided under Art. 174 of the CJ Rules of Procedure, is inadmissible: see, e.g. C-263/09 P, Edwin—OHIM v Fiorucci, 2011, paras 83–85; C-152/18 P, Crédit mutuel Arkéa v ECB, 2019, para. 42. As regards the distinction between the response and the cross-appeal, see para. 19.19. 71 Note that under Art. 168(1)(b) of the CJ Rules of Procedure, an appeal must contain, inter alia, a reference to the decision of the General Court appealed against. Thus, it is not required that that decision be attached to the appeal: see C-122/16 P, British Airways v Commission, 2017, paras 46–49. In addition, with respect to a reply and rejoinder, a duly reasoned application must be submitted by the appellant, or the party that brought the cross-appeal,

Special Characteristics 655 (1) Cross-appeals Any party entitled to submit a response may submit a cross-appeal, which must be introduced by a separate document.72 A cross-appeal must seek to have set aside, in whole or in part, the decision of the General Court.73 It may also seek to have set aside an express or implied decision relating to the admissibility of the action before the General Court.74 The pleas in law and arguments relied on must identify precisely those points in the grounds of the decision of the General Court which are contested and which must be separate from those relied on in the response.75 Under the case-law, a cross-appeal sets out pleas seeking to have set aside the decision of the General Court which differ from those raised in the main appeal and the response, with the result that if the party does not introduce the cross-appeal by a document separate and distinct from the response, it will be inadmissible.76 By the same token, a response may not seek to have the decision under appeal set aside on the basis of distinct and independent grounds from those raised in the appeal, since such grounds may be raised only as part of a cross-appeal.77 Importantly, the case-law has been further developed starting in Commission v Fútbol Club Barcelona.78 That case involved an appeal brought by the Commission against a judgment of the General Court by which that Court had annulled a Commission decision on State aid. The annulment proceedings were based on five pleas in law, the General Court having rejected the first of those pleas and upheld the second. On appeal, the Court of Justice set aside the judgment under appeal to the extent that it upheld the second plea in law relied on at first instance and consequently annulled the decision at issue. The Court pointed out that, given that the General Court rejected the

as the case may be, within seven days of service of the response or response to the cross-appeal: see Arts 175 and 180 of the CJ Rules of Procedure. 72 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 176(2). The cross-appeal must be submitted within the same time-limit as that prescribed for the response (CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 176(1)). The Court of Justice has held that there is nothing to preclude a party from bringing both an appeal and a cross-appeal against a decision of the General Court: see C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P, and C-519/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v Commission, 2009, paras 31–39; C-337/15 P, Ombudsman v Staelen (order), 2016, paras 16–17. 73 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 178(1). Thus, a cross-appeal or ground thereof merely seeking a substitution of the grounds, which cannot lead to the decision of the General Court being set aside even in part, is inadmissible: see, e.g. C-200/13 P, Council v Bank Saderat Iran, 2016, para. 115; C-236/17 P, Canadian Solar Emea and Others v Council, 2019, para. 75; C-262/18 P and C-271/18 P, Commission v Dôvera zdravotná poistʼovňa, 2020, para. 54; C-570/18 P, HF v Parliament, 2020, para. 34. 74 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 178(2). See, in that regard, C-174/19 P and C-175/19 P, Scandlines Danmark and Scandlines Deutschland v Commission, 2021, paras 182–183, in which the Court of Justice rejected the Commission’s allegations that the General Court was wrong to accept implicitly that the appellants had standing to bring proceedings, finding that the General Court did not take a decision on the admissibility of the actions and did not err in law by dismissing those actions on the merits. 75 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 178(3). See, e.g. C-449/14 P, DTS Distribuidora de Televisión Digital v Commission, 2016, paras 108–113; C-323/16 P, Eurallumina v Commission (order), 2017, para. 33. 76 See, e.g. C-422/12 P, Industrias Alen v The Clorox Company v OHIM, 2014, para. 55. 77 See, e.g. C-449/14 P, DTS Distribuidora de Televisión Digital v Commission, 2016, paras 99–101; C-45/15 P, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council, 2017, para. 20; C-323/16 P, Eurallumina v Commission (order), 2017, paras 30–31; C-817/18 P, Vereniging tot Behoud van Natuurmonumenten in Nederland and Others v Commission, 2020, para. 48. 78 See C-362/19 P, Commission v Fútbol Club Barcelona, 2021, paras 109–111; see also C-833/19 P, Hamas v Council, 2021, paras 81–82; C-389/21 P, ECB v Crédit lyonnais, 2023, para. 79.

19.19

656 APPEALS first of those pleas, without the applicant (or intervener) at first instance challenging, in the context of a cross-appeal, the merits of that part of the judgment under appeal, the setting aside of that judgment by the Court of Justice does not affect that judgment inasmuch as the General Court rejected that plea. The Court of Justice considered that Art. 178(1) of the CJ Rules of Procedure provides that the forms of order sought in the cross-appeal are to seek the annulment, in whole or in part, of the decision of the General Court, without limiting the scope of those forms of order to the decision of the General Court as set out in the operative part of that decision, unlike Article 169(1) of those rules, which relates to the forms of order sought in the appeal. It follows that the applicant (or intervener) at first instance in that case could have brought a cross-appeal challenging the rejection by the General Court of the first plea in law put forward at first instance. In the absence of such a cross-appeal, the judgment under appeal has the force of res judicata insofar as the General Court rejected the first plea in law relied on at first instance.

19.20

(2) The preliminary admission mechanism for appeals As set out in Art. 58a of the Statute and Arts 170a and 170b of the CJ Rules of Procedure, a preliminary admission (or filtering) mechanism for appeals has been introduced.79 It pertains to appeals brought before the Court of Justice against a decision of the General Court concerning a decision of an independent board of appeal of certain Union offices and agencies, which so far include: (1) the European Union Intellectual Property Office;80 (2) the Community Plant Variety Office; (3) the European Chemicals Agency; and (4) the European Union Aviation Safety Agency.81 This mechanism applies to all 79 There are other procedural mechanisms for streamlining the determination of appeals. In particular, the Court may decide, by reasoned order, to dismiss, in whole or in part, an appeal or cross-appeal which is manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded under Art. 181 of the CJ Rules of Procedure (see C-23/18 P, Ccc Event Management v CJEU (order), 2018; C-816/21 P, Novais v Portugal (order), 2022; see also, in that regard, C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P, and C-219/00 P, Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission, 2004, para. 38 (dismissing at the outset as manifestly inadmissible and/or manifestly unfounded by reasoned orders a number of the pleas in law and arguments put forward by the appellants); C-337/15 P, Ombudsman v Staelen, 2017, para. 20 (dismissing the cross-appeal by reasoned order, while reserving judgment on the main appeal and on the costs relating to the cross-appeal)). In addition, the Court may decide by reasoned order to declare an appeal or cross-appeal manifestly well-founded under Art. 182 of the CJ Rules of Procedure (see C-58/19 P, Azarov v Council (order), 2019; C-663/20 P, Hypo Vorarlberg Bank v SRB (order), 2022; C-664/20 P, SRB v Portigon and Commission (order), 2022). There is also an internal system in respect of the application of Art. 181 of the CJ Rules of Procedure for appeals falling within certain areas of Union law concerning public procurement (see, e.g. C-794/18 P, Pracsis and Conceptexpo Project v Commission and EACEA (order), 2019), access to documents (see, e.g. C-332/19 P, Hércules Club de Fútbol v Commission (order), 2019), and staff cases (see, e.g. C-305/21 P, Barata v Parliament (order), 2022)—along with intellectual property before that mechanism went into effect (see, e.g. C-455/18 P, Spieker v EUIPO (order), 2018)—whereby the Advocate General’s view is expressed by way of a ‘position’, which is reproduced in the Court’s order. See further paras 23.52–23.58 (preliminary issues) and para. 24.02 (reasoned orders). 80 See para. 17.23. 81 Statute, Art. 58a, first para. According to Art. 58a, second para. of the Statute, this procedure also applies in respect of appeals brought against General Court decisions concerning a decision of an independent board of appeal set up after 1 May 2019 within any other Union office or agency, which has to be seized before an action can be brought before the General Court. There is a request to amend Art. 58a of the Statute which would add other Union offices and agencies existing on 1 May 2019, including the European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, the Single Resolution Board, the European Banking Authority, the European Securities and Markets Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, and the European Union Agency for Railways. This proposal would also extend the scope of this mechanism to appeals brought against decisions of the General Court relating to the performance of a contract containing an arbitration clause within

Special Characteristics 657 such appeals lodged as from 1 May 2019.82 Pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 58a of the Statute, an appeal brought against a decision of the General Court concerning a decision of an independent board of appeal of one of those Union offices or agencies is not allowed to proceed unless the Court of Justice first decides that it should be allowed to do so. According to the third paragraph of Art. 58a of the Statute, such an appeal is only allowed to proceed, wholly or in part, ‘where it raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of Union law’.83 The appellant must annex to the appeal a request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, setting out the issue raised by the appeal that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency, or development of Union law and containing all the information necessary to enable the Court of Justice to rule on that request; if there is no such request, the appeal is inadmissible. 84 The decision on this request is made by a chamber of the Court of Justice specifically set up for this purpose, which is presided over by the Vice-President of the Court of Justice. 85 Such decision takes the form of a reasoned order, and is published.86 Where the Court of Justice decides that the appeal should be allowed to proceed, the case continues in accordance with the appeal procedure.87 Consequently, under this mechanism, the Court of Justice essentially decides whether or not to admit an appeal in cases already considered twice: first, by an independent board of appeal of the Union offices or agencies concerned and, second, by the General Court. The aim of this mechanism can be considered to improve efficiency and legal protection of parties, thereby allowing for a third-level review by the Court of Justice, provided that the appellant makes the effort required; if the request is not accepted, the General Court’s decision becomes final and binding on the appellant.88 the meaning of Art. 272 TFEU. See Request submitted by the Court of Justice pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 281 [TFEU], with a view to amending Protocol No. 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, available on the Court’s website (under ‘Institution’, ‘Various documents’). 82 Appeals will be held inadmissible where an appellant fails to submit a request for admission of the appeal, or fails to regularize the appeal (see Art. 170a(3) CJ Rules of Procedure), by the required time-limit for filing appeals: see, e.g. C-499/19 P, Lupu v EUIPO (order), 2019, paras 7–9; C-468/21 P, Electrodomésticos Taurus v EUIPO (order), 2021, paras 4–6 (providing an example of the calculation of such time-limit); see para. 19.28. 83 Statute, Art. 58a, third para. For appeals which have been allowed to proceed, see C-382/21 P, EUIPO v The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann (order), 2021; C-801/21 P, EUIPO v Indo European Foods (order), 2022; C-337/22 P, EUIPO v Nowhere (order), 2022; C-580/22 P, bonnanwalt v EUIPO (order), 2023; C-751/22 P, Shopify v EUIPO (order), 2023. Compare the language used as regards the review procedure involving ‘a serious risk of the unity or consistency of Union law being affected’: see Ch. 20. 84 Art. 170a(1) of the CJ Rules of Procedure; see also Art. 170a(2)–(3) of those rules for further specifics as regards page-length (the request is not to exceed seven pages) and formal requirements. For some examples, see C-201/21 P, Foundation for the Protection of the Traditional Cheese of Cyprus named Halloumi v EUIPO (order), 2021, paras 5–6; C-610/21 P, Svenska Metallkompaniet v EUIPO (order), 2022, paras 4–6; C-611/21 P, Bese v EUIPO (order), 2022, paras 4–6. 85 Art. 170b(2) of the CJ Rules of Procedure. Art. 170b(1) of those rules states that the Court of Justice is to rule as soon as possible on the request. 86 Statute, Art. 58a, fourth para.; Art. 170b(3) of the CJ Rules of Procedure. 87 Art. 170b(4) of the CJ Rules of Procedure, which further stipulates that the Court’s decision on the request is served, together with appeal, on the parties to the relevant case before the General Court, and specifies, where the appeal is to proceed in part, the pleas in law or parts of the appeal to which the response must relate. 88 See further L. De Lucia, ‘The Shifting State of Rights Protection vis-à-vis EU Agencies: A Look at Article 58a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union’ (2019) E.L.Rev. 809; M.-A. Gaudissart, ‘L’admission préalable des pourvois: une nouvelle procedure pour la Cour de justice’ (2020) C.D.E. 177.

658 APPEALS It is for the applicant to demonstrate that the issues raised by the appeal are significant with respect to the unity, consistency, or development of Union law.89 Accordingly, under the case-law, the request must indicate clearly and in detail the grounds on which the appeal is based; the issue of law raised by each ground of appeal; whether that issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency, or development of Union law; and the specific reasons why that issue is significant according to that criterion.90 The fact that an appeal raises questions of law does not in itself allow the view to be taken that that appeal must be allowed by the Court of Justice to proceed for the purposes of Art. 58a of the Statute.91 The appellant must demonstrate that, independently of the issues of law invoked in its appeal, the appeal raises one or more issues that are significant with respect to the unity, consistency, or development of Union law, the scope of that criterion going beyond the judgment under appeal and, ultimately, its appeal.92 It is necessary to establish both the existence and significance of such issues by means of concrete evidence specific to the particular case, and not simply arguments of a general nature.93 For example, an argument that the General Court distorted the facts and evidence cannot in principle be capable, as such and even if well founded, of raising an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency, or development of Union law.94 Allegations regarding factual assessments made by the General Court also cannot in principle raise such an issue.95 Likewise, an alleged non-conformity of the judgment under appeal with the case-law96 or an alleged failure of the General Court to

89 See, e.g. C-613/19 P, Porsche v EUIPO, 2019, para. 13; C-19/22 P, Sanford v EUIPO, 2022, para. 14. Only grounds of appeal that raise such issues and that are established by the appellant are to be examined by the Court in an appeal: see, e.g. C-538/21 P, Cyprus v EUIPO, 2021, para. 16. 90 See, e.g. C-613/19 P, Porsche v EUIPO, 2019, para. 15; C-743/21 P, Marine Yachting Brand Management v EUIPO, 2022, para. 14. As indicated therein, in particular, as regards the grounds of appeal, the request must specify the provision of Union law or the case-law that has been infringed by the judgment or order under appeal, explain succinctly the nature of the error of law allegedly committed by the General Court, and indicate to what extent that error had an effect on the outcome of the judgment or order under appeal. Additionally, where the error of law relied on results from an infringement of the case-law, the request must explain, in a clear and precise manner, first, where the alleged contradiction lies by identifying the paragraphs of the judgment or order under appeal and those of the ruling of the Court of Justice or the General Court alleged to have been infringed, and, second, the concrete reasons why such a contradiction raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency, or development of Union law. A request that fails to satisfy those requirements is not capable of demonstrating that the appeal raises such issues justifying the appeal being allowed to proceed: see, e.g. C-744/21 P, Henry Cotton’s Brand Management v EUIPO (order), 2021, para. 15; see, by way of example, C-475/21 P, Franz Schröder v EUIPO (order), 2021, paras 15–19; C-678/21 P, Sony Interactive Entertainment Europe v EUIPO (order), 2022, paras 18–26; C-730/21 P, Collibra v EUIPO (order), 2022, paras 17–20. 91 See, e.g. C-587/19 P, L’Oréal v EUIPO, 2019, para. 11; C-381/21 P, Lee v EUIPO, 2021, para. 17. 92 See, e.g. C-382/21 P, EUIPO v The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann (order), 2021, para. 27; C-801/21 P, EUIPO v Indo European Foods (order), 2022, para. 33. 93 See, e.g. C-382/21 P, EUIPO v The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann (order), 2021, para. 28; C-801/21 P, EUIPO v Indo European Foods (order), 2022, para. 34. The fact that an issue might concern a large number of cases cannot clearly be regarded as relevant for the purpose of establishing the legal significance of the issue with respect to the unity, consistency, or development of EU law: see, e.g. C-19/22 P, Sanford v EUIPO (order), 2022, para. 22. 94 See, e.g. C-415/21, Comercializadora Eloro v EUIPO, 2021, para. 21; C-381/21 P, Lee v EUIPO, 2021, para. 19; C-599/21 P, AM.VI. and Quinam v EUIPO (order), 2022, para. 19. 95 See, e.g. C-61/20 P, Billa v EUIPO (order), 2020, para. 19; C-114/21 P, Cinkciarz.pl v EUIPO (order), 2021, para. 20; C-599/21 P, AM.VI. and Quinam v EUIPO (order), 2022, para. 18; C-762/21 P, St. Hippolyt Holding v EUIPO (order), 2022, para. 18. 96 See, e.g. C-613/19 P, Porsche v EUIPO (order), 2019, para. 17; C-5/21, Deutsche Post v EUIPO (order), 2021, para. 18; C-19/22 P, Sanford v EUIPO (order), 2022, para. 18.

Special Characteristics 659 state reasons97 is not sufficient in itself to allow the appeal to proceed. The mere fact that a question of law is new cannot be equated with an issue that is significant for the unity, consistency, or development of Union law.98

B. Appeal must be sufficiently detailed According to the case-law, it follows from the second subparagraph of Art. 256(1) TFEU, the first paragraph of Art. 58 of the Statute, and Arts 168(1)(d) and 169(2) of the CJ Rules of Procedure that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal, failing which the appeal or the ground of appeal in question will be dismissed as inadmissible.99 Therefore, in a nutshell, an appellant is required in principle to identify the paragraphs of the decision of the General Court which it seeks to criticize100 and to explain sufficiently the errors of law allegedly made by the General Court.101 An appeal that does not contain any arguments aimed at specifically identifying the error of law by which the decision in question is allegedly vitiated does not satisfy those requirements. 102 Nor does a ground of appeal which is limited to general statements and does not contain precise indications as to which points of the decision may be vitiated by an error of law.103 In addition, arguments which are not directed at the decision of the General Court under appeal, but merely

97 See, e.g. C-400/20 P, Dermavita v EUIPO (order), 2020, para. 19; C-26/21 P, Dermavita v EUIPO (order), 2021, para. 20. 98 See, e.g. C-461/19 P, All Star v EUIPO (order), 2019, para. 16; C-722/20 P, Ultrasun v EUIPO (order), 2021, para. 17; C-678/21 P, Sony Interactive Entertainment Europe v EUIPO (order), 2022, para. 23; C-19/22 P, Sanford v EUIPO (order), 2022, para. 21. 99 See C-105/15 P to C-109/15 P, Mallis and Others v Commission and ECB, 2016, para. 33; C-87/19 P, Test Tech Bio and Others v Commission, 2019, para. 42; C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P, and C‑604/18 P, Council v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others, 2020, para. 127; C-453/19 P, Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission, 2021, para. 95; C-833/19 P, Hamas v Council, 2021, para. 50; C-351/20 P, Dragnea v Commission, 2022, para. 53. In particular, under Art. 169(2) of the CJ Rules of Procedure, the pleas in law and legal arguments relied on must identify precisely those points in the grounds of the decision of the General Court which are contested: see, e.g. C-105/15 P to C-109/15 P, Mallis and Others v Commission and ECB, 2016, para. 34; C-874/19 P, Aeris Invest v SRB, 2021, para. 50; C-666/19 P, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Commission, 2022, para. 186. For some examples of insufficiently detailed appeals, see, e.g. C-419/17 P, Deza v ECHA, 2019, paras 92–95; C-396/19 P, ECB v Insolvent Estate of Espírito Santo Financial Group, 2020, paras 24–26; C-666/20 P, GVN v Commission, 2022, paras 51–53 (but see para. 65: while the appellant did not identify expressly the points of the judgment under appeal which it sought to criticize, those points were apparent from the substance of its arguments and thus the relevant plea was held to be admissible). For some examples of sufficiently detailed appeals, see, e.g. C-418/16 P, mobile.de v EUIPO, 2018, paras 35–36; C-874/19 P, Aeris Invest v SRB, 2021, paras 50–52; C-122/20 P, Gollnisch v Parliament, 2021, paras 45– 47; C-364/20 P, Bernis and Others v SRB, 2022, paras 32–33; C-638/19 P, Commission v European Food and Others, 2022, paras 75–76; see also C-696/17 P, Alex v Commission (order), 2018, paras 31–34, in which the Court of Justice held admissible an appeal which did not refer any point of the decision under appeal, but still identified the elements of the contested decision which were the subject of criticism and set out legal arguments in support of those pleas. Depending on the circumstances of the case, the Court of Justice may take a ‘global’ reading of the pleas to deduce that they are sufficiently detailed: see, e.g. C-271/16 P, Panalpina World Transport (Holding) and Others v Commission, 2018, paras 17–19; C-373/17 P, Agria Polska and Others v Commission, 2018, paras 33–37; C-132/19 P, Groupe Canal +v Commission, 2020, paras 20–21. 100 See, e.g. C-79/20 P, Yieh United Steel v Commission, 2022, paras 76–78. 101 See, e.g. C-666/19 P, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Commission, 2022, paras 186–190. 102 See, e.g. C-662/19 P, NRW.bank v SRB, 2021, para. 36. 103 See, e.g. C-351/20 P, Dragnea v Commission, 2022, para. 55.

19.21

660 APPEALS seek to criticize the relevant decision of the Union institution, body, office, or agency, are inadmissible.104 It is not enough for the appellant to support a plea by merely referring back to arguments raised in connection with another plea.105 It is also not permitted in an appeal, without even including an argument specifically identifying the error of law allegedly vitiating the decision of the General Court, simply to repeat pleas already raised in that Court, since to interpret an appeal in that way would be no more than an attempt to have the case retried, and no provision is made for retrials by the Court of Justice.106 Consequently, a plea declared inadmissible by the General Court cannot be raised afresh by the appellant, although the latter may challenge on specific grounds the General Court’s finding that the plea is inadmissible.107 The appellant must raise arguments in this connection establishing that the General Court has erred in law.108 However, where an appellant submits that the General Court did not respond to a plea, its submission cannot be challenged, in terms of the admissibility of the ground of appeal, on the basis that it does not cite any passage or part of the contested judgment as the specific object of its complaint. Such submission can also not be challenged on the ground that it simply repeats or reproduces the plea raised at first instance.109

C. Pleas 19.22

(1) Specific pleas According to the first paragraph of Art. 58 of the Statute, appeals must be based on pleas alleging lack of competence of the General Court, a breach of procedure before it which adversely affects the interests of the appellant, or infringement of Union law by the General Court.110

104 See, e.g. C-577/15 P, SV Capital v ABE, 2016, para. 69; C-281/18 P, Repower v EUIPO, 2019, para. 45. 105 See C-51/95 P, Unifruit Hellas v Commission (order), 1997, para. 33; C-403/10 P, Mediaset v Commission, 2011, para. 89. Conversely, the fact that one ground of appeal is linked to another and thus may only be upheld if the other ground is upheld is not sufficient, in and of itself, to declare either of them inadmissible: see C‑167/19 P and C‑171/19 P, Commission v Freistaat Bayern, 2022, paras 86–88. 106 See, e.g. C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P, and C-219/00 P, Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission, 2004, para. 51; C-594/18 P, Austria v Commission, 2020, para. 91; C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P, and C‑604/18 P, Council v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others, 2020, para. 127; C-453/19 P, Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission, 2021, para. 96; C-466/19 P, Qualcomm and Qualcomm Europe v Commission, 2021, para. 45. Importantly, however, a point of law examined at first instance may be discussed again in the course of an appeal, provided that the appellant challenges the interpretation or application of Union law by the General Court: see, e.g. C-440/19 P, Pometon v Commission, 2021, para. 52; C-833/19 P, Hamas v Council, 2021, para. 53; see para. 19.23. 107 This may be inferred from C-354/92 P, Eppe v Commission, 1993, para. 13; see also C-202/07 P, France Télécom v Commission, 2009, para. 93. 108 See C-30/96 P, Abello and Others v Commission (order), 1998, para. 45; C-202/07 P, France Télécom v Commission, 2009, para. 69. 109 See C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P, C-251/99 P, C-252/99 P, and C-254/99 P, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission, 2002, paras 416–428, in particular para. 423; see also, e.g. C-382/12 P, MasterCard and Others v Commission, 2014, para. 148; C-490/15 P, Ori Martin v Commission, 2016, para. 138. 110 See, e.g. C-241/19 P, Haswani v Council, 2020, para. 47; see also, in that regard, C-203/07 P, Greece v Commission, 2008, paras 40–41 (holding that it is not contrary to Art. 58 of the Statute for the pleas put forward in

Special Characteristics 661 A plea which merely takes issue with a factual assessment made by the General Court will be inadmissible.111 (2) No change in the subject-matter of the proceedings The limited range of pleas which may be raised on appeal against a decision of the General Court precludes any change in the subject-matter of the proceedings as compared with the proceedings before the General Court.112 As already mentioned in para. 19.01, parties are not entitled to seek a new form of order—that is, relating to pleas not raised before the General Court.113 The reason for this is that it would involve the Court of Justice, not in reviewing the decision of the General Court, but in carrying out an additional substantive inquiry, thereby changing the subject-matter of the proceedings.114 Importantly, however, there is no requirement that each argument put forward on appeal must previously have been discussed at first instance, since otherwise an appeal would be deprived of much of its purpose.115 Furthermore, the Court of Justice has held that, if the appeal is not to be rendered meaningless, it must have jurisdiction to review the findings of law on the pleas argued before the General Court, as well as the legal conclusions drawn by the General Court from those findings, since such

support of the application to have the judgment of the General Court set aside to entail an analysis of the scope of legal acts which cannot themselves be contested before that Court). 111 See, e.g. C-594/18 P, Austria v Commission, 2020, para. 76; C-56/19 P, RFA International v Commission, 2021, para. 76; C-79/20 P, Yieh United Steel v Commission, 2022, paras 84–85; see para. 19.03. 112 The last sentence of Art. 170(1) of the CJ Rules of Procedure states: ‘The subject-matter of the proceedings before the General Court may not be changed in the appeal.’ 113 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 170(1). See, e.g. C-136/92 P, Commission v Brazzelli Lualdi and Others, 1994, paras 57–60; C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telecom v Commission, 2010, paras 34–52; C-45/15 P, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council, 2017, paras 108–110; C-99/17 P, Infineon Technologies v Commission, 2018, paras 96–97; C-560/18 P, Izba Gospodarcza Producentów i Operatorów Urządzeń Rozrywkowych v Commission, 2020, paras 82–85; C-342/19 P, De Masi and Varoufakis v ECB, 2020, paras 34–41; C-165/19 P, Slovak Telecom v Commission, 2021, paras 98–104; C-440/19 P, Pometon v Commission, 2021, paras 51, 55–56; C-586/20 P, P. Krücken Organic v Commission, 2021, paras 49–52; C-666/20 P, GVN v Commission, 2022, paras 43–46, 55; C-666/19 P, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Commission, 2022, paras 78–79, 148. Under the case-law, an argument which was not raised at first instance does not constitute a new plea that is inadmissible at the appeal stage if it is simply an amplification of arguments already developed in the context of a plea set out in the application before the General Court: see, e.g. C-330/15 P, Tomana and Others v Council and Commission, 2016, paras 33–36; C-331/15 P, France v Schlyter, 2017, para. 31 (also finding that one of the appellant’s arguments did not constitute a new plea, but supplemented a plea already set out before the General Court: see para. 29); C-4/17 P, Czech Republic v Commission, 2018, paras 25–27; C-132/19 P, Groupe Canal +v Commission, 2020, paras 28–29; C-761/18 P, Leino-Sandberg v Parliament, 2021, paras 27–30; see also, e.g. C-373/15 P, France v Commission, 2017, paras 88–92 (the appellant’s reference for the first time at the appeal stage to certain provisions of Union law supported arguments which it had made at first instance and were not regarded as new); C-934/19 P, Algebris (UK) and Anchorage Capital Group v SRB, 2021, paras 43–45 (finding the appellant’s arguments were not new pleas in law, but corollaries of the criticism of the General Court’s interpretation and, therefore, of the relevant grounds of appeal). 114 See, e.g. C-136/92 P, Commission v Brazzelli Lualdi and Others, 1994, para. 59; C-10/18 P, Marine Harvest v Commission, 2020, para. 126; C-362/19 P, Commission v Fútbol Club Barcelona, 2021, para. 47; C-51/19 P, World Duty Free Group v Commission, 2021, paras 54–55. 115 See, e.g. C-440/19 P, Pometon v Commission, 2021, para. 52; C-851/19 P, DK v EEAS, 2021, para. 33; C‑174/19 P and C‑175/19 P, Scandlines Denmark and Scandlines Deutschland v Commission, 2021, para. 85; C-833/19 P, Hamas v Council, 2021, para. 53; C‑167/19 P and C‑171/19 P, Commission v Freistaat Bayern, 2022, para. 48.

19.23

662 APPEALS conclusions may not necessarily be anticipated by the parties during the proceedings at first instance and thus should not be regarded as changing the subject-matter of the proceedings.116 Pleas withdrawn by a party in the proceedings before the General Court are also inadmissible on appeal.117 This is because the Court of Justice’s jurisdiction is confined to a review of the findings of law on the pleas argued at first instance118 (and of the legal conclusions drawn by the General Court from those findings119). Moreover, a party that tolerates the rejection of a plea raised at first instance before the General Court by not contesting the point in question of the decision of the General Court in the pleas set out in its appeal cannot contest the General Court’s decision on this point for the first time in the reply. It cannot rely on a new plea based on a new matter of fact or law within the meaning of Art. 127(1) of the CJ Rules of Procedure, which is directly linked to a plea which the General Court rejected. If such a plea were admissible, this would be tantamount to allowing the appellant to challenge for the first time at the stage of the reply the dismissal by the General Court of a plea which it had raised before that Court, whereas nothing prevented it from submitting such a plea at the time of its appeal to the Court of Justice.120

19.24

(3) Inoperative or ineffective pleas A plea alleging that the grounds of a judgment are unlawful is inoperative or ineffective and will therefore be rejected where those grounds had no effect on the judgment.121 Thus, a plea directed against a superabundant ground of the decision of the General Court, that is, a ground given in a judgment of the General Court merely for the sake of completeness, will be nugatory and cannot lead to the setting aside of that decision, and is therefore ineffective.122

116 See C-295/07 P, Commission v Département du Loiret and Scott, 2008, paras 97–102. An appellant is entitled to lodge an appeal relying, before the Court of Justice, on grounds and arguments which arise from the judgment under appeal itself and seek to criticize, in law, its correctness: see, e.g. C-4/17 P, Czech Republic v Commission, 2018, para. 24; C-594/18 P, Austria v Commission, 2020, para. 59; C-51/19 P and C-64/19 P, World Duty Free Group v Commission, 2021, paras 56–59, 111, 132; C-362/19 P, Commission v Fútbol Club Barcelona, 2021, paras 47–51; C-638/19 P, Commission v European Food and Others, 2022, paras 77–79. In addition, with respect to an objection to the inadmissibility of the appeal based on the principle of res judicata, the Court has held that a party cannot be compelled to act against its own interests in order to safeguard its procedural rights, including the right to bring an appeal before the Court of Justice: see C-180/16 P, Toshiba v Commission, 2017, paras 69–80. 117 See C-354/92 P, Eppe v Commission, 1993, para. 13. 118 See, e.g. C-136/92 P, Commission v Brazzelli Lualdi and Others, 1992, para. 59; C-49/96 P, Progoulis v Commission (order), 1996, para. 32; C-589/15 P, Anagnostakis v Commission, 2017, para. 55; C-19/18 P, VG v Commission, 2019, para. 51; C‑362/19 P, Commission v Fútbol Club Barcelona, 2021, para. 47. 119 See C-295/07 P, Commission v Département du Loiret and Scott, 2008, paras 97–102. 120 See C-104/97 P, Atlanta v EC, 1999, paras 17–23. 121 See, e.g. C-302/99 P and C-308/99 P, Commission and France v TF1, 2001, paras 26–29; C-119/19 P and C-126/19 P, Commission v Carreras Sequeros and Others, 2020, paras 89–91; C-453/19 P, Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission, 2021, paras 70–71; C-51/19 P and C-64/19 P, World Duty Free Group v Commission, 2021, para. 146. For a contrary example, see C-551/19 P, ABLV Bank v ECB, 2021, paras 33–34 (holding that the appeal could not be rejected as ineffective). For some examples of ‘manifestly ineffective’ pleas, see C-330/18 P, Gollnisch v Parliament (order), 2019, paras 56, 81; C-860/19 P, Magnan v Commission (order), 2019, paras 48–49, 59; C-747/19 P, Rosellò v Italy (order), 2020, paras 16–17. 122 See, e.g. C-152/19 P and C-153/19 P, Crédit Mutuel Arkéa v ECB, 2019, para. 68; C‑167/19 P and C‑171/19 P, Commission v Freistaat Bayern, 2022, para. 108.

Special Characteristics 663 (4) Pleas of public policy The bar on raising new pleas on appeal and hence on changing the subject-matter of the proceedings does not prevent pleas of public policy relating to a matter of public interest (moyens d’ordre public) from being raised for the first time on appeal if the General Court has failed to raise such pleas, since the Court of Justice can do so of its own motion.123 It is, however, difficult to distinguish admissible pleas relating to a matter of public interest from ordinary inadmissible new pleas.124

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D. Injury suffered as a result of the bringing of the appeal In the response, the respondent may not claim damages for injury allegedly suffered as a result of the bringing of the appeal. This may be inferred from Art. 174 of the CJ Rules of Procedure, stipulating that a response must ‘seek to have the appeal allowed or dismissed, in whole or in part’, read together with the rules concerning the form of order sought in the appeal.125

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E. Measures of inquiry The limitation of appeals to questions of law means that the Court of Justice cannot order measures of inquiry in order to determine facts nor the way in which the Union institution, body, office, or agency adopted the act contested before the General Court. Such measures of inquiry would necessarily lead the Court of Justice to decide questions of fact and, as a result, to go beyond its competence in appeals.126 The General Court is the sole judge of any need for the information available to it concerning the cases before it to be supplemented through measures of inquiry, as is generally the case for measures of organization of procedure, save where there is a distortion of the evidence or an inaccuracy in its findings apparent from the case-file.127 In these circumstances, a 123 See, e.g. as regards the force of res judicata, C-442/03 P and C-471/03 P, P&O European Ferries (Vizcaya) and Diputacion Foral de Vizcaya, 2006, para. 45; the admissibility of an action for annulment, C-176/06 P, Stadtwerke Schwäbisch Hall and Others v Commission, 2007, para. 18; C-654/17 P, Bayerische Motoren Werke v Commission and Freistaat Sachsen, 2019, para. 44; C-701/19 P, Pilatus Bank v ECB (order), 2021, para. 23; C-647/19 P, Ja zum Nürburgring v Commission, 2021, para. 53; the Court of Justice of the European Union’s jurisdiction over an action, C-134/19 P, Bank Refah Kargaran v Council, 2020, para. 25; a ground of appeal alleging an irregularity in the composition of the General Court, C-341/06 P and C-342/06 P, Chronopost and La Poste v UFEX and Others, 2008, paras 46–48; see also C-542/18 C‑542/18 RX-II and C‑543/18 RX-II, Review Simpson v Council and HG v Commission, 2020, para. 57. 124 K. Lenaerts, ‘Le Tribunal de première instance des Communautés européennes: genèse et premiers pas’ (1990) J.T. 409, 414. As regards the grounds for annulling an act which the Union Courts may raise of their own motion and certain requirements for admissibility which they may inquire into of their own motion, see paras 7.159, 7.162. 125 See Arts 169(1) and 170(1) of the CJ Rules of Procedure. Under former Art. 116(1) and (2) of the CJ Rules of Procedure, this was specifically indicated in relation to the response: see C-35/92 P, Parliament v Frederiksen, 1993, paras 33–36; see also C-35/92 P, Parliament v Frederiksen, AG van Gerven Opinion, 1993, point 12; C-122/16 P, British Airways v Commission, AG Mengozzi Opinion, 2017, point 63. 126 See C-234/92 P, Shell v Commission, 1999, paras 70–73; C-233/17 P, GX v Commission (order), 2018, para. 39. 127 See C-315/99 P, Ismeri v Court of Auditors, 2001, para. 19; C-260/05 P, Sniace v Commission, 2007, paras 77–79; C-47/07 P, Masdar (UK) v Commission, 2008, para. 99; C-440/18 P, Verein Deutsche Sprache v Commission,

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664 APPEALS plea relating to the refusal of the General Court to order the production of a document, which had been explicitly requested by a party, will only be successful if it is apparent that the General Court was not in a position to rule on the correctness of the allegations made by that party without ordering the measure of inquiry concerned.128

F. Time-limits 19.28

An appeal must be lodged within two months of notification of the decision appealed against.129 Time starts to run on the date of reception of the notification of the contested decision by the appellant.130 By virtue of Art. 51 of the CJ Rules of Procedure, ten days for distance are added.131 Appeals against decisions of the General Court refusing leave to intervene must be brought within two weeks of notification of the decision dismissing the application.132 Cross-appeals must be brought within two months after service on the respondent of the appeal, that is to say, within the time-limit for lodging the response.133

IV. Consequences A. No suspensory effect 19.29

Appeals do not have suspensory effect, but the parties are entitled under Arts 278 and 279 TFEU to apply for suspension of the operation of the decision of the General Court and for interim measures.134 If, however, the contested decision of the General Court declares a regulation void, the decision takes effect only as from the date of expiry of the

(order), 2019, para. 9; C-666/19 P, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Commission, 2022, paras 156–157. The Court of Justice has held that the General Court’s discretion in this regard is in line with the fundamental right to a fair hearing, in particular, the provisions of the second paragraph of Art. 47 and Art. 48(2) of the Charter: see C-702/19 P, Silver Plastics and Johannes Reifenhäuser v Commission, 2020, paras 26–43. 128 See C-119/97 P, Ufex and Others v Commission, 1999, paras 107–112; compare, e.g. C-6/06 P, Cofradía de pescadores ‘San Pedro’ de Bermeo and Others v Council, 2007, paras 71–73; C-465/09 P to C-470/09 P, Territorio Historico de Vizcaya—Diputación Foral de Vizcaya and Others v Commission, 2011, paras 108–110; see also C-462/10 P, Evropaïki Dynamiki v EEA (order), 2012, paras 22–23 (while the Court of Justice must examine the question whether the General Court committed an error of law in refusing to order such measures at the request of the appellant, the appellant made no such request in those proceedings). 129 Statute, Art. 56, first para. 130 See C-7/99 P, Campoli v Commission, 1999, paras 5–7. 131 For an example of calculating the time-limit for submission of an appeal, see C-450/20 P, Comprojecto- Projectos e Construções and Others v ECB and Banco Portugal (order), 2021, paras 11–14 (appeal lodged out of time). For a general discussion of calculating time-limits, see paras 22.65–22.70. 132 Statute, Art. 57, first para. By virtue of Art. 51 of the CJ Rules of Procedure, ten days for distance are added. For an example, see C-74/22 P(I), Soudal and Esko-Graphics v Magnetrol and Commission (order), 2022, paras 61–84 (excusable error). 133 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 176(1). That provision makes clear that the submission of a cross-appeal is subject to the ‘same time-limit as that prescribed for the submission of a response’. 134 Statute, Art. 60, first para. See para. 13.11.

Consequences 665 period for lodging an appeal or, if an appeal is brought within that period, as from the date of the dismissal of the appeal.135

B. Dismissal of the appeal (1) Dismissal of the main appeal If the appeal is unfounded, it will be dismissed. In the event that the reasoning of the contested decision of the General Court contains an infringement of Union law, but its operative part is nevertheless lawful, the appeal will also be dismissed. In that event, the Court of Justice sets out the ‘correct’ grounds in its judgment, but does not set aside the judgment of the General Court (substitution of grounds).136 The Court of Justice may also find that the operative part of the judgment of the General Court is correct in law and dismiss the appeal on a legal ground different from the ground or grounds put forward by the General Court, without pronouncing on the legality of the grounds of the General Court’s judgment. In such case, the pleas put forward on appeal will not be considered.137 (2) Effect on the cross-appeal Dismissal of the main appeal does not necessarily have an effect on the treatment of the cross-appeal, though this depends upon the pleas submitted. The Court of Justice may examine the cross-appeal even if the main appeal is dismissed.138 It may happen, for instance, that the Court of Justice first examines the cross-appeal and then decides that there is no longer any need to adjudicate on the main appeal.139 Conversely, the Court may find that, in the light of its findings regarding the main appeal, the cross-appeal

135 Statute, Art. 60, second para. Under Arts 278 and 279 TFEU, a party may also request the Court of Justice to suspend the operation of the regulation declared void or to grant any other interim measures. 136 See, e.g. C‑622/16 P to C‑624/16 P, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission, 2018, para. 48; C-594/18 P, Austria v Commission, 2020, para. 47; C-611/16 P, Xellia Pharmaceuticals and Alpharma v Commission, 2021, para. 149; C-56/19 P, RFA International v Commission, 2021, para. 61; C-499/18 P, Bayer CropScience and Bayer, 2021, para. 54; C-933/19 P, Autostrada Wielkopolska v Commission and Poland, 2021, paras 58–76; C-529/18 P and C-531/18 P, PJ v EUIPO, 2022, paras 76–82. Such a substitution may also be relevant in the context where an appeal is successful: see, e.g. C-463/10 P and C-475/10 P, Deutsche Post and Germany v Commission, 2011, para. 64. Where, however, a fresh appraisal of the facts of the case is required by reason of the adoption of other legal grounds, the Court of Justice may carry out that appraisal only after setting aside the decision of the General Court. It then gives final judgment on the ground that the state of the proceedings permits it to do so. In this way, the Court of Justice may set aside a judgment of the General Court and then produce an operative part identical to that set out in the judgment at first instance after making its own assessment of the law and the facts. See, e.g. C-298/93 P, Klinke v Court of Justice, 1994; C-337/15 P, Ombudsman v Staelen, 2017. 137 See, e.g. C-32/92 P, Moat v Commission, 1992, para. 11; C-480/93 P, Zunis Holding and Others v Commission, 1996, paras 15–16; C-170/02 P, Schlüsselverlag J.S. Moser and Others v Commission, 2003, paras 25–39. 138 See, e.g. C-301/19 P, Commission v Printeos, 2021, paras 113–126 (cross-appeal upheld); C-260/20 P, Commission v Hansol Paper, 2022, paras 115–145 (cross-appeal dismissed). 139 See, e.g. C-486/01 P, Front National v Parliament, 2004; see also C-208/04 P, Commission v Salzgitter, 2008, para. 17 (though ultimately dismissing the cross-appeal and upholding the main appeal). It may also be the case that the Court will address the cross-appeal first, where it is only necessary to address the main appeal if the cross- appeal is dismissed: see, e.g. C-362/05 P Wunenberger v Commission, 2007, para. 25 (though ultimately dismissing the main appeal and the cross-appeal). The Court of Justice may first find certain grounds of the cross-appeal well- founded, followed by its assessment of the main appeal: see, e.g. C-461/18 P, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Distillerie Bonollo and Others, 2020, para. 104.

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666 APPEALS must be dismissed as unfounded.140 In any event, by virtue of Art. 183 of the CJ Rules of Procedure, a cross-appeal becomes devoid of purpose in the following three situations: (a) if the appellant discontinues the appeal; (b) if the appeal is declared manifestly inadmissible for non-compliance with the time-limit for lodging an appeal; (c) if the appeal is declared manifestly inadmissible on the sole ground that it is not directed against those kinds of decisions of the General Court in which an appeal will lie, namely, a final decision of the General Court or a decision disposing of the substantive issues in part only or disposing of a procedural issue concerning a plea of lack of competence or inadmissibility within the meaning of the first paragraph of Art. 56 of the Statute.141

C. Successful appeal 19.32

An appeal will be well-founded if at least one of the appellant’s pleas succeeds. In that event, the Court of Justice will set aside the decision of the General Court against which the appeal was brought. That decision may be set aside in its entirety or only in part. It may be set aside in part, not only if it determines a number of claims made in a single action—the decision on one claim being quashed, for example, and the appeal dismissed as regards the others142—but also if the decision of the General Court relates only to a single claim. In that case, the Court of Justice will confine itself to quashing one or more grounds of the decision.143

D. Consequences of a successful appeal 19.33

In the event that the Court of Justice sets aside a decision of the General Court, it may itself give final judgment in the matter if the state of the proceedings so permits or refer the case back to the General Court for judgment.144 Depending on the circumstances of the case, the Court of Justice may, for example, decide to give final judgment on a plea of inadmissibility raised during the proceedings at first instance, while referring the case back to the General Court to rule on the substance of the action.145 Alternatively, 140 See, e.g. C-404/10 P, Commission v Editions Odile Jacob, 2012, paras 137–138. Or the Court may find that, in the light of its findings on the main appeal, there is no need to examine the cross-appeal or certain grounds thereof, where the main appeal is upheld (see, e.g. C-150/17 P, EU v Kendrion, 2018, para. 66; C-337/19 P, Commission v Belgium and Magnetrol International, 2021, para. 155; C-638/19 P, Commission v European Food and Others, 2022, para. 148) or dismissed (see, e.g. C-847/19 P, Achemos Grupé and Achema v Commission, 2021, para. 68; C-850/19 P, FVE Holýšov I and Others v Commission, 2021, para. 71). 141 See, e.g. C-806/19 P, Commission v HSBC (order), 2021, para. 6 (concerning Art. 183(a) of the CJ Rules of Procedure). 142 See, e.g. C-622/16 P to C-624/16 P, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission, 2018, para. 112; C-607/18 P, NKT Verwaltungs and NKT v Commission, 2020, paras 289–295. 143 See, e.g. C-404/19 P, France v Commission, 2020, para. 73; C-362/19 P, Commission v Fútbol Club Barcelona, 2021, para. 106. 144 Statute, Art. 61, first para. According to Art. 170(2) of the CJ Rules of Procedure, where the appellant requests that the case be referred back to the General Court if the decision appealed against is set aside, it is to set out the reasons why the state of proceedings does not permit a decision by the Court of Justice. 145 See, e.g. C‑663/17 P, C‑665/17 P, and C‑669/17 P, ECB v Trasta Komercbanka, 2019, paras 81–83, 118–119; C-872/19 P, Venezuela v Council, 2021, paras 94–95; C-99/21 P, Danske Slagtermestre v Commission, 2022, paras

Consequences 667 the Court of Justice may decide to give final judgment on certain pleas in law or parts thereof, while referring the case back to the General Court with regard to others. 146 The subject-matter of the proceedings concluded by the Court of Justice or resumed by the General Court after a judgment setting aside a decision of the General Court depends on various factors. It appears from the wording of the first paragraph of Art. 61 of the Statute and Art. 217 of the GC Rules of Procedure that the judgment setting aside the decision of the General Court does not extend to the written and/or oral procedure which preceded that decision. What is annulled is therefore determined, in the first place, by the form of order sought and the pleas put forward by the parties in the pleadings which they originally lodged with the General Court. Consequently, the judgment setting aside the original decision of the General Court does not enable them to seek a new form of order or to raise new pleas and to have completely new proceedings determined by the Court of Justice or the General Court, as the case may be, except where a new plea is based on a new matter of law or of fact within the meaning of Art. 127(1) of the CJ Rules of Procedure or Art. 84(1) of the GC Rules of Procedure.147 In the second place, regard must be had to the extent to which the judgment of the Court of Justice annulled the decision of the General Court. This can be determined from close consideration of the judgment on appeal. It is clear from earlier case-law that, in order to comply with a judgment and to implement it fully, regard must be had not only to the operative part, but also to the grounds which led to the judgment and constitute its essential basis, insofar as they are necessary to determine the exact meaning of what is stated in the operative part.148 Depending on the reasoning of the judgment of the Court of Justice, the assessment made by the General Court of all the pleas submitted may be rejected or the Court of Justice may reject the assessment of one or more pleas and accept the remainder of the General Court’s reasoning.149 In the third place, the content of the decision of the General Court which is set aside influences the way in which the case is finally resolved. Where the General Court dismisses 64–65; C-348/20 P, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, 2022, para. 152. Where the Court decides to give final judgment on the admissibility of an action, this may result in dismissal of the action as inadmissible: see, e.g. C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P, and C‑604/18 P, Council v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others 2020, paras 210–216; C-177/19 P to C-179/19 P, Germany—Ville de Paris and Others v Commission, 2022, paras 104–107. 146 See, e.g. C-56/18 P, Commission v Gmina Miasto Gdynia and Port Lotniczy Gdynia Kosakowo, 2020, paras 162–166; C-638/19 P, Commission v European Food and Others, 2022, paras 150–155; C-891/19 P, Commission v Hubei Xinyegang Special Tube, 2022, paras 174–175. For an example in which the Court gives final judgment on some aspects of admissibility of the action, but refers back others, see C-465/16 P, Council v Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association, 2019, paras 128–133. 147 Where a case is referred back to the General Court after the latter’s judgment has been set aside, the parties may not present facts which were not brought before that Court when it first considered the case: see T-36/96, Gaspari v Parliament, 1999, para. 77. 148 See 97/86, 99/86, 193/86, 215/86, Asteris and Others v Commission, 1988, para. 27; C-458/98 P, Industrie des poudres sphériques v Council, 2000, para. 81; C-41/00 P, Interporc v Commission, 2003, para. 29; C-361/14 P, Commission v McBride and Others, 2016, para. 35. 149 See, e.g. C-341/06 P and C-342/06 P, Chronopost and La Poste—UFEX and Others v Commission, 2008, paras 134–140; C-389/19 P, Commission v Sweden, 2021, paras 59, 69.

668 APPEALS an application, having considered all the pleas raised, and the Court of Justice then sets aside the decision on account of an error of law in assessing one of the pleas, the further proceedings will be confined to a re-examination of the plea which the General Court wrongly assessed, having regard to the determination made by the Court of Justice of the point of law at issue.150 Where, in contrast, the General Court grants the application on the basis of a plea without considering the other pleas raised and the Court of Justice sets aside its decision on appeal, it appears that, in order to wind up the case, not only the plea which wrongly succeeded will have to be re-examined, but also consideration will have to be given to those pleas which the General Court did not examine in its original decision,151 although it is possible that the case may be able to be resolved by upholding only one of the pleas raised.

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(1) The Court of Justice gives final judgment The Court of Justice will give final judgment where it has all of the necessary information before it to adjudicate the case. For example, the Court of Justice may find that all the appellant’s claims can be rejected because the action is inadmissible,152 the Union act at issue was lawfully adopted,153 or that the action should be dismissed, in whole or in part, on other grounds.154 Alternatively, the Court of Justice may determine that the contested Union act must be annulled in whole or in part155 or otherwise dispose of the matter before it.156 In Commission v Carreras Sequeros and Others,157 the Court of Justice has made clear that the fact that the General Court did not rule on all of the pleas relied on at first

150 See, e.g. C-570/18 P, HF v Parliament, 2020, paras 71–78; C-440/19 P, Pometon v Commission, 2021, paras 155–166, in particular para. 157. 151 See, e.g. C-579/16 P, Commission v FIH Holding, 2018, paras 77–83; C-650/19 P, Vialto Consulting v Commission, 2021, paras 137–148. 152 See, e.g. C-597/18 P, C-598/18 P, C-603/18 P, and C-604/18 P, Council v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others, 2020, paras 210–216; C-177/19 P to C-179/19 P, Germany—Ville de Paris and Others v Commission, 2022, paras 105–107. 153 See, e.g. C-262/18 P, Commission v Dôvera zdravotná poist'ovňa, 2020, paras 55–70; C-396/19 P, ECB v Insolvent Estate of Espírito Santo Financial Group, 2020, paras 59–64. 154 See, e.g. C-447/17 P, EU v Guardian Europe, 2019, paras 146–149; C‑262/18 P and C‑271/18 P, Commission v Dôvera zdravotná poist'ovňa, 2020, paras 56–70. 155 See, e.g. C‑622/16 P to C‑624/16 P, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission, 2018, paras 113–116; C-456/18 P, Hungary v Commission, 2020, paras 76–79. 156 See, e.g. C-301/19 P, Printeos v Commission, 2021, para. 129 (awarding the appellant default interest from the date on which the action was brought until the date of full payment by the Commission in a damages action); C-440/19 P, Pometon v Commission, 2021, paras 158–166 (setting the amount of the fine imposed on the appellant for infringement of the competition rules). 157 See C-119/19 P and C-126/19 P, Commission v Carreras Sequeros and Others, 2020, para. 130; see also C-362/19 P, Commission v Fútbol Club Barcelona, 2021, para. 108; C-665/19 P, NeXovation v Commission, 2021, para. 60; C-57/19 P, Commission v Tempus Energy and Tempus Energy Technology, 2021, para. 178; C-647/19 P, Ja zum Nürburgring v Commission, 2021, para. 112; C-337/19 P, Commission v Belgique and Magnetrol International, 2021, para. 158 (also finding that the state of the proceedings did not permit final judgment to be given on certain pleas: see paras 168–171); C‑884/19 P and C‑888/19 P, Commission v Xinyi PV Products (Anhui) Holdings and GMB Glasmanufaktur Brandenburg, 2021, para. 104 (also finding the state of the proceedings did not permit final judgment to be given on certain pleas: see paras 126–128); C-351/10 P, Dragnea v Commission, 2022, para. 80 (finding that, since the pleas relied on had not been the subject of an exchange of arguments before the General Court and had not been examined by that Court, the state of the proceedings did not permit final judgment to be given).

Consequences 669 instance did not mean that the Court of Justice could not decide the case itself. In that case, the Court of Justice considered that, in the light, in particular, of the fact that the action for annulment was based on pleas that were the subject of an exchange of arguments before the General Court and whose examination did not require any further measure of organization of procedure or inquiry to be taken in the case, the state of the proceedings was such that the Court of Justice may give final judgment in the matter and that it should do so. Furthermore, starting with Commission v Fútbol Club Barcelona,158 under circumstances where the parties to the proceedings could have challenged by way of a cross- appeal the rejection by the General Court of certain pleas in law, but did not, the Court of Justice has held that the judgment under appeal—albeit annulled as a result of the main appeal for an error of law in the General Court’s decision on other pleas in law— has the force of res judicata in respect of that rejection and thus only examines the other pleas in law raised in the General Court (see para. 19.19). (2) Referral back to the General Court The Court of Justice will refer the case back to the General Court for final judgment where it is not in a position to rule on the substance of the action, the case has not been completely decided and additional findings of fact are needed, or a fresh look has to be taken at those already made.159 Where a case is referred back to the General Court, that Court is bound by the decision of the Court of Justice on points of law.160 (3) Effects of a successful appeal brought by a Member State or a Union institution Where an appeal brought by a Member State or a Union institution which did not intervene in the proceedings before the General Court is well-founded, the Court of Justice may, if it considers it necessary, state which of the effects of the decision of the General Court which has been set aside are to be considered definitive in respect of the other parties to the litigation.161

158 See C-362/19 P, Commission v Fútbol Club Barcelona, 2021, paras 109–111. In that judgment, the Court of Justice came to this conclusion in the light of the fact that Art. 178(1) of the CJ Rules of Procedure provides that the forms of order sought in the cross-appeal are to seek the annulment, in whole or in part, of the decision of the General Court, without limiting the scope of those forms of order to the decision of the General Court as set out in the operative part of that decision, unlike Art. 169(1) of those rules, which relates to the forms of order sought in the appeal. See also C-833/19 P, Hamas v Council, 2021, paras 81–82; C-389/21 P, ECB v Crédit lyonnais, 2023, para. 79. 159 See, e.g. C-413/14 P, Intel v Commission, 2017, paras 149–150; C-123/18 P, HTTS v Council, 2019, para. 109; C-823/18 P, Commission v GEA Group, 2020, paras 114–117; C-662/19 P, NRW.Bank v SRB, 2021, para. 57. 160 Statute, Art. 61, second para. See para. 25.14. 161 Statute, Art. 61, third para.

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20 THE REVIEW PROCEDURE I. Subject-Matter From the point of view of the parties concerned, the Member States, and the Union institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies, neither decisions of the General Court in appeals brought against decisions of specialized courts1 nor its decisions on preliminary rulings (when such jurisdiction would be conferred on it)2 are open to be challenged. Exceptionally, however, by virtue of the review procedure provided in Art. 256(2) and (3) TFEU,3 such decisions may be subject to review by the Court of Justice ‘where there is a serious risk of the unity or consistency of Union law being affected’.4 The review procedure is currently dormant, since there are no such specialized courts, and no preliminary ruling jurisdiction has yet been conferred on the General Court. Nevertheless, this procedure remains relevant insofar as the heads of jurisdiction conferred on the General Court under Art. 256(2) and (3) TFEU, in particular preliminary ruling jurisdiction, would be activated (see para. 2.43). Only the First Advocate General of the Court of Justice5 can take the initiative for a review of decisions of the General Court when he or she considers that such a risk 1 At present, only one such specialized court has been created, the EU Civil Service Tribunal, which has since been dissolved in the context of the Union judicial reforms: see para. 2.39. 2 A transfer of jurisdiction to the General Court over preliminary rulings is envisaged under the first subparagraph of Art. 256(3) TFEU: see para. 2.43. 3 See, in that regard, C-197/09 RX-II, Review M v EMEA, 2009, para. 26: the review procedure constitutes an objective review by the Court which is completely independent of any initiative on the part of the parties. This review procedure should be distinguished from applications for revision of a judgment, which constitutes ‘an exceptional review procedure that allows an applicant to call in question the authority of res judicata attaching to a judgment bringing the proceedings to an end on the basis of the findings of fact relied upon by the Court’ and ‘presupposes the discovery of elements of a factual nature which existed prior to the judgment and which were unknown at that time to the court which delivered it as well as to the party applying for revision and which, had the court been able to take them into consideration, could have led it to a different determination of the proceedings’: see, e.g. T-616/19 REV, Katjes Fassin v EUIPO (order of 13 September), 2021, para. 22; see further paras 25.41–25.49. 4 Art. 256(2), second subpara. TFEU; Art. 256(3), third subpara. TFEU. In preliminary ruling proceedings, the General Court may avoid a review by referring a case which falls under its jurisdiction to the Court of Justice. This is because Art. 256(3), second subpara. TFEU provides: ‘Where the General Court considers that the case requires a decision of principle likely to affect the unity or consistency of Union law, it may refer the case to the Court of Justice for a ruling.’ Compare the language used for the preliminary admission mechanism for appeals, in which, according to Art. 58a, third para. of the Statute, such an appeal is only allowed to proceed, wholly or in part, ‘where it raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of Union law’: see para. 19.20. See further A. Tizzano and P. Iannuccelli, ‘Premières applications de la procedure de “réexamen” devant la Cour de Justice de l’Union européenne’ in N. Parisi, M. Fumagalli Meraviglia, A. Santini, and D.G. Rinoldi (eds), Scritti in onore di Ugo Draetta (Editoriale scientifica, 2011) 733; M. Brkan, ‘La procédure de réexamen devant la Cour de justice: vers une efficacité accrue du nouveau règlement de procédure’ in S. Mahieu (ed.), Contentieux de l'Union européenne: Questions choisies (Larcier, 2014) 489; R. Rousselot, ‘La procédure de réexamen en droit de l’Union européenne’ (2014) C.D.E. 535. 5 The First Advocate General is appointed for three years by the Court and has the rank of a President of Chamber. See CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 14(1); see further para. 2.16. EU Procedural Law. Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak, Oxford University Press. © Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833086.003.0020

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672 THE REVIEW PROCEDURE exists.6 The review procedure should therefore be distinguished from an appeal, which in principle is brought by one of the parties to the case7 and may be based on any error of law which the General Court may have committed in the judgment under appeal.8 Given its exceptional nature, the review procedure has been employed in a small number of cases. There have been several occasions in which the Court of Justice has decided that there should be a review of a decision of the General Court pursuant to the second paragraph of Art. 256(2) TFEU.9 In the majority of cases, the First Advocate General’s proposal has not led to a review by the Court of Justice.10

II. Special Characteristics A. Determination whether there is a serious risk of the unity or consistency of Union law being affected 20.02

(1) Circumstances where the unity or consistency of Union law is affected As the case-law on the review procedure has developed, the Court of Justice has clarified the circumstances where there is a serious risk of the unity or consistency of Union law being affected. Starting with the judgment concerning the review of Case T-12/08 P, M v EMEA,11 the Court of Justice found that, in view of several circumstances

6 Statute, Art. 62, first para. This provision specifies that, where the First Advocate General considers that there is a serious risk of the unity or consistency of Union law being affected, he or she ‘may’ propose that the Court of Justice review the decision of the General Court. Thus, the initiative to propose a review is at the First Advocate General’s discretion. See also, in that regard, C-542/18 RX-II and C-543/18 RX-II, Review Simpson v Council and HG v Commission, 2020, para. 49 (where the First Advocate General considers that the judgment does not constitute a serious risk to the unity or consistency of Union law being affected, the conditions for review of that judgment are not met). 7 With the exception of cases relating to disputes between the Union and its servants, an appeal may also be brought by Member States and Union institutions which did not intervene in the proceedings before the General Court (Statute, Art. 56). 8 Art. 256(1), second subpara. TFEU. 9 See C-197/09 RX, Review of Judgment T-12/08 P, M v EMEA (2009) (followed by the review of the judgment itself in C-197/09 RX-II, Review M v EMEA, 2009); C-334/12 RX, Review of Judgment T-234/11 P, Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB, 2012 (followed by the review of the judgment itself in C-334/12 RX-II, Review Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB, 2013); C-579/12 RX, Review of Judgment T-268/11 P, Commission v Strack, 2012 (followed by the review of the judgment itself in C-579/12 RX-II, Review Commission v Strack, 2013); C-417/14 RX, Review of Judgment T-401/11 P, Missir Mamachi di Lusignano v Commission, 2014 (followed by the review of the judgment itself in C-197/09 RX-II, Review Missir Mamachi di Lusignano v Commission, 2015); C-542/18 RX, Review of Judgment T-646/16 P, Simpson v Council, 2018, and C-543/18 RX, Review of Judgment T-693/16 P, HG v Commission, 2018 (followed by the review of the judgments themselves in C-542/18 RX-II and C-543/18 RX-II, Review Simpson v Council and HG v Commission, 2020). 10 See C-216/08 RX, Review of Judgment T-414/06 P, Combescot v Commission, 2008; C-21/09 RX, Review of Judgment T-90/07 P and T-99/07 P, Belgium and Commission v Genette, 2009; C-180/09 RX, Review of Judgment T-492/07 P, Sanchez Ferriz and Others v Commission, 2009; C-183/10 RX, Review of Judgment T-338/07 P, Bianchi v ETF, 2010; C-478/10 RX, Review of Judgment T-157/09 P, Marcuccio v Commission, 2010; C-17/11 RX, Review of Judgment T-143/09 P, Commission v Petrilli, 2011; C-312/16 RX, Review of Judgment T-29/14 P, Andres and Others v ECB, 2016; C-141/18 RX, Review of Judgment T-639/16 P, FV v Council, 2018; C-740/18 RX, Review of Judgment T-334/16 P, FN and Others v CEPOL, 2018. 11 See C-197/09 RX-II, Review M v EMEA, 2009, paras 60–66; compare C-197/09 RX-II, Review M v EMEA, AG Mazák View, 2009, points 6, 31–34 (considering that an incorrect decision of the General Court can affect the unity or consistency of Union law only if it is inconsistent with a general principle of Union law).

Special Characteristics 673 taken as a whole—(1) the judgment concerned could constitute a precedent for future cases; (2) the General Court departed from established case-law of the Court of Justice; (3) the errors of the General Court related to rules which did not pertain solely to the law relating to the employment of Union officials, but were applicable regardless of the matter at issue; and (4) the rules which the General Court failed to comply with occupied an important position in the Union legal order (in casu, the Statute and the Annex to the Statute constitute primary Union law)—the judgment concerned affected the unity and consistency of Union law. Likewise, in the judgment concerning the review of Case T-268/11 P, Commission v Strack,12 the Court of Justice considered that the judgment concerned adversely affected the unity and consistency of Union law. By dismissing, in its interpretation of the Staff Regulations, the right of every worker to paid annual leave as a principle of social law, which is affirmed by Art. 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter), the General Court caused an adverse effect on the unity of Union law, since that provision of the Charter has the same value as the Treaties and the Union legislature is required to observe it both when it adopts acts such as the Staff Regulations on the basis of Art. 336 TFEU and when it adopts other acts on the basis of the legislative powers conferred on it under the Treaties. Furthermore, by interpreting the relevant provisions of the Staff Regulations as not covering rules on the organization of working time referred to by Directive 2003/88,13 in particular those concerning paid annual leave, the General Court adversely affected the consistency of Union law, as this ran counter to the case-law of the Court of Justice. Similarly, in the judgment concerning the review of Cases T-646/16 P, Simpson v Council and T-693/16 P, HG v Commission,14 the Court of Justice held that the error of law vitiating the judgments concerned affected the unity and consistency of Union law. Those judgments could constitute precedents for future cases, since the General Court’s erroneous interpretation and application of Art. 47 of the Charter could have repercussions for other cases in which the appointment of a member of a panel of judges and, more generally, the right to an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law is put in issue. Moreover, that right is fundamental and cuts across all subject areas in the Union legal order, the interpretation and the consistency of which must be ensured by the Court of Justice, particularly when questions arise in that respect in a specific context that has not yet given rise to settled case-law of that Court. 12 See C-579/12 RX-II, Review Commission v Strack, 2013, paras 57–60; see also, in that regard, C-579/12 RX-II, Review Commission v Strack, AG Kokott View, 2013, point 75 (considering that the unity of Union law is adversely affected, in particular, where the General Court has misconstrued rules or principles of Union law which have particular importance, while the consistency of Union law is adversely affected where the General Court has misconstrued existing case-law of the Union Courts); C-542/18 RX-II and C-543/18 RX-II, Review Simpson v Council and HG v Commission, AG Sharpston View, 2019, point 143 (adopting similar position). 13 Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organization of working time (OJ 2003 L299/9). 14 See C-542/18 RX-II and C-543/18 RX-II, Review Simpson v Council and HG v Commission, 2020, paras 84– 87; see also C-542/18 RX-II and C-543/18 RX-II, Review Simpson v Council and HG v Commission, AG Sharpston View, 2019, points 143–151.

674 THE REVIEW PROCEDURE In certain cases, the Court of Justice has considered solely that the unity or the consistency of Union law was affected by the judgment under review. In the judgment concerning the review of Case T-234/11 P, Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB,15 the Court of Justice found that, in view of several circumstances taken as a whole—(1) the judgment concerned could constitute a precedent for future cases; (2) the General Court departed from established case-law of the Court of Justice; (3) the errors of the General Court relate to a procedural concept which did not pertain solely to the law relating to the employment of Union officials, but is applicable regardless of the matter at issue; and (4) the rules which the General Court failed to comply with occupy an important position in the Union legal order (in casu, the right to an effective remedy guaranteed by Art. 47 of the Charter)—the judgment concerned affected the consistency of Union law. In the judgment concerning the review of Case T-401/11 P, Missir Mamachi di Lusignano v Commission,16 the Court of Justice held that the errors of law vitiating the judgment concerned undermined the unity of Union law. By referring the present action to itself so that it could hear and determine that action as the court of first instance, the General Court had deprived the EU Civil Service Tribunal of its original jurisdiction and put in place a jurisdiction rule to its advantage, of a type that would have consequences for the determination of the court with jurisdiction in appeals and on the structure of the levels of jurisdiction within the Court of Justice of the European Union. The rules on the jurisdiction of the Union Courts, as laid down by the Treaties and Statute, form part of primary Union law, and are central to the Union legal order. Respect for those rules, beyond the issues involved in being the only jurisdiction for EU civil service disputes, therefore constitutes a fundamental requirement in that legal order and is crucial in ensuring the unity of Union law.

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(2) Circumstances where no review is necessary By comparison, in its decision concerning the review of Case T-143/09 P, Commission v Petrilli,17 the Court of Justice considered that the circumstances involved—that the judgment concerned allegedly showed a divergence in the case-law of the General Court concerning the conditions governing the non-contractual liability of the Union in staff cases and that the Court of Justice had not yet ruled on whether the specific nature of litigation in staff cases justifies making the non-contractual liability of the Union in this area subject to special conditions—did not justify the proposed review. This was based on two grounds. First, it was not for the Court of Justice, in the context of the review procedure, to rule on the merits of the General Court’s development of its own case-law when acting in its appellate capacity. Second, the fact that the Court of Justice

15 See C-334/12 RX-II, Review Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB, 2013, paras 47–54; see also C-334/12 RX-II, Review Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB, AG Mengozzi View, 2012, points 69–76 (reaching similar conclusion). 16 See C-197/09 RX-II, Review Missir Mamachi di Lusignano v Commission, 2015, paras 54–58; see also C-197/09 RX-II, Review Missir Mamachi di Lusignano v Commission, AG Wathelet View, 2015, points 54–68 (concluding that the judgment concerned affected the unity and consistency of Union law). 17 See C-17/11 RX, Review of Judgment T-143/09 P, Commission v Petrilli, 2011, paras 2–5.

Special Characteristics 675 has not yet ruled on a point of law was not in itself sufficient to justify a review, insofar as it was for the General Court and the then EU Civil Service Tribunal to develop the case-law in matters relating to the civil service, since the Court of Justice has jurisdiction only to prevent the decisions of the General Court affecting the unity or consistency of Union law, which was not the case in those proceedings.

B. Procedure (1) Initiation of the review The proposal of the First Advocate General must be made within one month of delivery of the decision of the General Court, and the Court of Justice must decide within one month of receiving the proposal whether or not the decision should be reviewed.18 As soon as the date for the delivery or signature of a decision to be given under Art. 256(2) or (3) TFEU is fixed, the Registry of the General Court is required to inform the Registry of the Court of Justice, whereby that decision and the file in the case is made available to the First Advocate General.19 (2) Reviewing Chamber A Chamber of five Judges, referred to as the reviewing Chamber, is designated for a period of one year to handle review proposals made by the First Advocate General pursuant to Art. 62 of the Statute.20 This Chamber is in principle responsible both for the decision on whether to follow the proposal made by the First Advocate General and for the final decision if the review procedure is launched.21 (3) Decision whether to review The proposal of the First Advocate General to review a decision of the General Court under Art. 256(2) or (3) TFEU is forwarded to the President of the Court of Justice and to the President of the reviewing Chamber; notice of that transmission is also given to the Registrar at the same time, whereby he or she communicates the file in the case before the General Court to the members of the reviewing Chamber.22 As soon as the proposal to review has been received, the President of the Court designates the 18 Statute, Art. 62, second para. 19 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 192. 20 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 191. 21 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 191; Art. 195(4). However, as regards the judgment on the substance of the case after a decision to review, the reviewing Chamber may request the Court of Justice to assign the case to a formation of the Court composed of a greater number of Judges: see CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 195(5). For an example, see C-542/18 RX-II and C-543/18 RX-II, Review Simpson v Council and HG v Commission, 2020 (Grand Chamber). Under Art. 123b of the former CJ Rules of Procedure, there had been a special Chamber set up for the purposes of deciding whether a decision of the General Court was to be reviewed, which had been composed of the President of the Court of Justice and the Presidents of the then four Chambers of five Judges; see C-197/09 RX, Review of Judgment T-12/08 P, M v EMEA (2009); C-334/12 RX, Review of Judgment T-234/11 P, Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB, 2012. 22 ECJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 193(1)–(2); Art. 194(1)–(2). With particular regard to the review of preliminary rulings of the General Court, it is further provided that the Registrar informs the General Court, the referring court or tribunal, the parties to the main proceedings, and other interested persons referred to in the second para. of Art. 62a of the Statute of the existence of a proposal to review: CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 194(3).

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676 THE REVIEW PROCEDURE Judge-Rapporteur from among the Judges of the reviewing Chamber on a proposal from the President of that Chamber.23 That Chamber, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur, then decides whether the decision of the General Court is to be reviewed, and the decision to review indicates only the questions which are to be reviewed.24 The General Court, the national court or tribunal in the case of preliminary rulings, those referred to in Art. 23 of the Statute, and, in the cases provided for in Art. 256(2) TFEU, the parties to the proceedings before the General Court are informed as to whether or not the decision of the General Court is to be reviewed.25 Notice of the date of the decision to review the decision of the General Court and of the questions which are to be reviewed is published in the Official Journal of the European Union.26

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(4) Judgment on the substance of the case after a decision to review The Court of Justice will give a ruling on the questions which are subject to review by means of an urgent procedure on the basis of the file forwarded to it by the General Court.27 The review procedure does not constitute a mere appeal in the interest of the law.28 Indeed, the parties to the decision under review and, in the case of a preliminary ruling, all interested parties within the meaning of Art. 23 of the Statute are entitled to lodge statements or written observations with the Court of Justice relating to the questions which are subject to review.29 The Court of Justice may decide to open the oral procedure before giving a ruling.30 As soon as a decision to review a decision of the General Court has been taken, the First Advocate General assigns the review to an Advocate General.31 The reviewing Chamber rules on the substance of the case, after hearing the Advocate General.32

23 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 193(3) and Art. 194(4). 24 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 193(4) and Art. 194(5). As far as the language of the procedure is concerned, see CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 37(2)(b), which provides that ‘where, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 62 of the Statute, the Court decides to review a decision of the General Court, the language of the case shall be the language of the decision of the General Court which is the subject of review’. 25 Statute, Art. 62a; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 193(5) and Art. 194(6). 26 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 193(6) and Art. 194(7). 27 Statute, Art. 62a, first para. Provision for the urgent procedure had been envisaged with particular regard to the review of preliminary rulings by Declaration (No. 15), annexed to the Nice Treaty, on Art. 225(3) of the Treaty establishing the European Community [now Art. 256(3) TFEU] (2001 OJ C80/80), which stated: ‘The Conference considers that in exceptional cases in which the Court of Justice decides to review a decision of the Court of First Instance [now General Court] on a question referred for a preliminary ruling, it should act under an emergency procedure.’ 28 It was already apparent from Declaration (No. 13), annexed to the Nice Treaty, on Art. 225(2) and (3) of the Treaty establishing the European Community [now Art. 256(2) and (3) TFEU] (2001 OJ C80/80), that the parties concerned were to be involved in the review procedure. This Declaration stated: ‘The Conference considers that the essential provisions of the review procedure in Article 225(2) and (3) [now Art. 256(2) and (3) TFEU] should be defined in the Statute of the Court of Justice. Those provisions should in particular specify: – the role of the parties in proceedings before the Court of Justice, in order to safeguard their rights; – the effect of the review procedure on the enforceability of the decision of the Court of First Instance [now General Court]; – the effect of the Court of Justice decision on the dispute between the parties.’ 29 Statute, Art. 62a, second para. This must be done within one month of the date of service of the decision to review: CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 195(2). 30 Statute, Art. 62a, third para. 31 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 195(3). 32 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 195(4).

Consequences 677 (5) Suspensory effect If the review concerns a decision given upon appeal by the General Court, the procedure will not in principle have suspensory effect.33 By contrast, a preliminary ruling of the General Court takes effect only as from the date of expiry of the period for opening a review procedure or, if a review procedure is initiated within that period, as from the end of such review procedure, unless the Court of Justice decides otherwise.34 The review procedure concerning a preliminary ruling of the General Court will thus in principle have suspensory effect.

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III. Consequences If the decision of the General Court is reviewed, the effects of such review will be as follows. As regards a decision given upon appeal by the General Court which has been reviewed by the Court of Justice, and where the Court of Justice finds that this decision affects the unity or consistency of Union law, the Court of Justice will, after having given a correct interpretation of the law, refer the case back to the General Court. The General Court will be bound by the decision of the Court of Justice on points of law. If necessary, the Court of Justice will state which of the effects of the decision of the General Court are to be considered as definitive in respect of the parties to the litigation.35 Exceptionally, the Court of Justice may itself give final judgment where, having regard to the result of the review, the outcome of the proceedings stems from the findings of fact on which the decision of the General Court was based.36 In addition, where the decision of the General Court which is the subject of review was given on appeal, the Court of Justice makes a decision as to costs.37

33 Statute, Art. 62b, first para., though this is ‘without prejudice to Articles 278 and 279 [TFEU]’. Thus, interim relief can be granted. 34 Statute, Art. 62b, second para. 35 Statute, Art. 62b, first para. It follows from the first paragraph of Art. 62b of the Statute that the Court of Justice cannot confine itself to finding that the unity or consistency of Union law is affected without drawing the necessary inferences from that finding as regards the dispute in question: see, e.g. C-197/09 RX-II, Review M v EMEA, 2009, para. 69; C-542/18 RX-II and C-543/18 RX-II, Review Simpson v Council and HG v Commission, 2020, para. 89. For examples, see C-197/09 RX-II, Review M v EMEA, 2009, paras 69–71; C-334/12 RX-II, Review Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB, 2013, paras 58–59; C-197/09 RX-II, Review Missir Mamachi di Lusignano v Commission, 2015, paras 61–65; C-542/18 RX-II and C-543/18 RX-II, Review Simpson v Council and HG v Commission, 2020, para. 90. Note that the decision subsequently given by the General Court as a court of appeal cannot be challenged by means of an appeal before the Court of Justice: see C-150/22 P, HG v Commission (order), 2022, paras 5–9. 36 See, e.g. C-197/09 RX-II, Review M v EMEA, 2009, para. 68; C-197/09 RX-II, Review Missir Mamachi di Lusignano v Commission, 2015, para. 59; C-542/18 RX-II and C-543/18 RX-II, Review Simpson v Council and HG v Commission, 2020, para. 88. For an example, see C-579/12 RX-II, Review Commission v Strack, 2013, paras 63–69. When the appeal before the General Court is limited to points of law (as in the case of decisions of the EU Civil Service Tribunal), the facts on which the decision of the General Court is based will necessarily be the facts on which the decision of the specialized court was based. 37 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 195(6). In the context of cases where the Court of Justice refers the case back to the General Court, since there are no specific rules governing orders for costs in the case of a review, the parties are ordered to bear their own costs: see, e.g. C-197/09 RX-II, Review M v EMEA, 2009, paras 72–73; C-334/12 RX-II, Review Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB, 2013, paras 60–61; C-542/18 RX-II and C-543/18 RX-II, Review

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678 THE REVIEW PROCEDURE In the case of the review of a preliminary ruling of the General Court, where the Court of Justice finds that the decision of the General Court affects the unity or consistency of Union law, the answer given by the Court of Justice to the questions subject to review will be substituted for that given by the General Court.38 The interpretation of the Court of Justice will thus be binding on the national court.

Simpson v Council and HG v Commission, 2020, para. 92. In the context of cases in which the Court of Justice gives final judgment, costs incurred by the successful party in the course of the proceedings before the General Court and the review proceedings may be paid by the unsuccessful party: see C-579/12 RX-II, Review Commission v Strack, 2013, paras 70–71.

38

Statute, Art. 62b, second para.

21 JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE UNDER CONVENTIONS CONCLUDED BY THE MEMBER STATES I. Subject-Matter A. General overview Formerly, both the EC Treaty and the EU Treaty expressly empowered the Member States to conclude agreements with each other in certain areas. In the resulting conventions or in protocols annexed thereto, additional jurisdiction was often conferred on the Court of Justice.1 The jurisdiction conferred generally involved a special power to give preliminary rulings on a different legal basis than what is now Art. 267 TFEU.2 In addition,

1 It should be noted that jurisdiction may also be conferred upon the Court of Justice by way of an international agreement concluded between the Member States and third States. These agreements are different in nature, as they are not agreements between Member States (see J. T. Nowak, ‘Dispute Resolution among Member States at the Court of Justice on the Basis of Article 273 TFEU: A comment on C-648/15 Austria v Germany’ in, Yearbook on Procedural Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural Law, 2020) 105, 115–116). They are not part of the subject-matter of this Chapter. See Agreement establishing an Association between the EEC and Turkey, Art. 25 (OJ 1973 C113/1); Agreement on the European Economic Area–Protocol 34 on the possibility for courts and tribunals of EFTA States to request the Court of Justice of the European Communities to decide on the interpretation of EEA rules corresponding to EC rules (OJ 1994 L1/204); Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on Air Transport, Art. 20 (OJ 2002 L114/73); Monetary Agreement between the Government of the French Republic, on behalf of the European Community, and the Government of His Serene Highness the Prince of Monaco, Art. 13 (OJ 2002 L142/59) (repealed by the Monetary Agreement between the European Union and the Principality of Monaco, OJ 2012 C310/1). Further to this, jurisdiction may also conferred upon the Court of Justice by way of an international agreement between the Member States and the European Union: see, e.g. Convention defining the Statute of the European Schools, Art. 26 (OJ 1994 L212/3); Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, Art. 6 (OJ 2005 L299/62); Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on the service of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters, Art. 6 (OJ 2005 L300/55); see also Agreement of 30 April 2017 on Operational and Strategic Cooperation between Denmark and Europol. 2 Protocol on the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Consolidated version in OJ 1998 C27/1); Second Protocol on the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Communities of the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Consolidated version in OJ 2005 C334/1); Protocol on the interpretation, by way of preliminary rulings, by the Court of Justice of the European Communities of the Convention on the establishment of a European Police Office (OJ 1996 C299/2); Protocol on the interpretation, by way of preliminary rulings, by the Court of Justice of the European Communities of the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests (OJ 1997 C151/2); Protocol on the interpretation, by way of preliminary rulings, by the Court of Justice of the European Communities of the Convention on the use of information technology for customs purposes (OJ 1997 C151/16); Convention on the fight against corruption

EU Procedural Law. Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak, Oxford University Press. © Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833086.003.0021

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680 CONVENTIONS CONCLUDED BY THE MEMBER STATES conventions which the Member States concluded in the area of cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs (i.e. the original third pillar of the Union) often provided for a direct action which could be brought before the Court of Justice in order to resolve disputes relating to the application or interpretation of the relevant convention and arising between Member States or between one or more Member States and the Commission.3 With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the pillar structure was eliminated and the provisions of the former Title VI of the EU Treaty concerning Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM), or the so-called third pillar, were reformulated and consolidated in Title V of Part Three of the TFEU on the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Moreover, by virtue of the changes brought by this Treaty, Art. 293 EC was repealed, and the instrument of the convention in the former third pillar (under former Art. 34(2)(d) EU) was eliminated. Nevertheless, to the extent that such conventions have not been superseded by Union instruments, the special features of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice under the conventions concluded by the Member States (and the Union, as the case may be) that are still in force remain relevant. However, since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, conventions concluded between Member States conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Justice do so, in the absence of any other provision in the Treaties, on the basis of Art. 273 TFEU (see Ch. 15).4

B. What conventions are involved? 21.02

(1) The Brussels Convention Former Art. 293 EC required Member States, as far as was necessary, to enter into negotiations with each other with a view to removing barriers in certain areas related to the sound functioning of what was then the common (now internal) market. It was pursuant to that provision that the Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union, Art. 12 (OJ 1997 C195/2); Convention on the service in the Member States of the European Union of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters, Art. 17 (OJ 1997 C261/2); Convention on mutual assistance and cooperation between customs administrations, Art. 26 (OJ 1998 C24/2); Convention on Driving Disqualifications, Art. 14 (OJ 1998 C216/2); Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters, Art. 45 (OJ 1998 C221/2). 3 Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, Art. 8 (OJ 1995 C316/49); First Protocol to the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, Art. 8 (OJ 1996 C313/2); Second Protocol to the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, Arts 13–15 (OJ 1997 C221/12); Convention on the use of information technology for customs purposes, Art. 27 (OJ 1995 C316/34); Convention on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union, Art. 12 (OJ 1997 C195/2); Convention on mutual assistance and cooperation between customs administrations, Art. 26 (OJ 1998 C24/2); Convention on Driving Disqualifications, Art. 14 (OJ 1998 C216/2); Internal agreement between the representatives of the governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on measures to be taken and procedures to be followed for the implementation of the ACP–EC Partnership Agreement, Art. 6 (OJ 2000 L317/376). 4 See Art. 37 of the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism concluded on 2 February 2012 between the Eurogroup Member States as well as Art. 8 of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union of 2 March 2012, concluded between 25 Member States, conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Justice on the basis of Art. 273 TFEU; Art. 12 of the Monetary Agreement between the European Union and the Principality of Monaco (OJ 2012 C310/1).

Subject-Matter 681 the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters came about (the Brussels Convention).5 Since the Brussels Convention contributed towards the attainment of the internal market, it was essential that, just like Union law in the ordinary sense,6 it was applied uniformly in the Member States. To that end, the Protocol of 3 June 1971 conferred on the Court of Justice jurisdiction to interpret the Brussels Convention by preliminary ruling at the request of certain national courts.7 In the meantime, the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (the Brussels I Regulation).8 This Regulation was based on former Art. 61(c) and Art. 67(1) EC. As a result, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to give preliminary rulings was based on Art. 68(1) EC (and no longer on the Protocol); with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, however, this provision was repealed and the Court of Justice’s preliminary ruling jurisdiction is no longer subject to the restrictions placed on it thereunder.9 The Brussels I Regulation entered into force on 1 March 2002.10 Under Art. 68 of this Regulation, as between the Member States, the Regulation supersedes the Brussels Convention, except as regards the territories of the Member States which fall within the territorial scope of that Convention and which are excluded from the Regulation pursuant to Art. 355 TFEU. Initially, the Brussels I Regulation did not apply to relations between Denmark and the other Member States, to which the Brussels Convention and the Protocol continued to apply. However, with the entry into force on 1 July 200711 of the Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on

5 On 16 September 1988, the Member States of the Community concluded with the member countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) the Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, which contains rules on jurisdiction and enforcement similar to those of the Brussels Convention (OJ 1998 L319/9). The Court of Justice had no power to interpret that convention. Yet, the Contracting Parties did sign a Protocol setting up an information-exchange system providing for the centralization of judgments of the Court of Justice and courts of last instance in the Contracting Parties with a view to uniform interpretation. That convention has been replaced by the second Lugano Convention (OJ 2007 L339/3; corrigenda in OJ 2009 L147/44). Since the European Union is a party to the second Lugano Convention, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of the second Lugano Convention. See C-296/20, Commerzbank, 2021. 6 The Court of Justice observed that the Brussels Convention was concluded on the basis of the fourth indent of former Art. 293 EC, whose purpose was to facilitate the working of the common (now internal) market through the adoption of rules of jurisdiction and through the elimination, as far as possible, of difficulties concerning the enforcement of judgments in the territory of the Contracting States. It is for these reasons that the provisions of the Brussels Convention and also the national provisions to which the Convention refers were linked to the former EC Treaty: see C-398/92, Mund & Fester, 1994, paras 11–12. 7 Protocol on the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, which entered into force on 1 September 1975. The original protocol has been adjusted each time new Member States have acceded to the Union (Consolidated version of the Brussels Convention and the Protocol in OJ 1998 C27/1, which lists the publication references of the successive official versions of the Convention and the Protocol). 8 OJ 2001 L12/1; corrigendum in OJ 2001 L307/38. 9 In relation to Denmark, see C-49/12, Sunico, 2013, para. 28. 10 Brussels I Regulation, cited in n. 8, Art. 76. 11 Information concerning the date of entry into force of the Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2007 L94/70).

682 CONVENTIONS CONCLUDED BY THE MEMBER STATES jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters,12 the Brussels I Regulation applies to Denmark as well.13 Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 has been replaced by Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.14 Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 does not apply to relations between Denmark and the other Member States. However, Denmark has made use of the possibility of applying the amendments to Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 pursuant to Art. 3 of the Agreement on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.15

21.03

(2) The Rome Convention Furthermore, the Member States concluded the Convention of 19 June 1980 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (the Rome Convention), even though this subject was not specifically mentioned in former Art. 293 EC. Yet, it did link up with the aims underlying that provision. It was probably for that reason that the Second Protocol of 19 December 198816 conferred on the Court of Justice jurisdiction to interpret the Rome Convention by preliminary ruling at the request of certain national courts.17 Thereafter, the European Parliament and Council adopted Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (the Rome I Regulation).18 This Regulation was based on former Art. 61(c) EC and the second indent of Art. 67(5) EC, which meant that, similar to the Brussels I Regulation, the Court of Justice’s preliminary ruling jurisdiction was based on former Art. 68(1) EC until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, when such jurisdiction was mainstreamed to the 12 Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2005 L299/62); Council Decision 2006/325/EC of 27 April 2006 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2006 L120/22). 13 Albeit in a slightly different version: see Art. 2 of the Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. See C-368/16, Assens Havn, 2017. 14 OJ 2012 L351/1. See further C-700/20, London Steam-Ship Owners’ Mutual Insurance Association, 2022, para. 42. 15 Denmark informed the European Commission of its decision to implement the contents of Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 by a letter of 20 December 2012 (OJ 2013 L79/4). The implementing law was enacted on 28 May 2013 and entered into force on 1 June 2013: Law nr 518 of 28 May 2013, Act amending the Act on the Brussels I Regulation, etc., Justitsmin., j.nr. 201340000033. For an application, see C-352/21, A1 and A2, 2023. 16 Second Protocol of 19 December 1988 on the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Communities of the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Consolidated version in OJ 2005 C334/1). 17 First Protocol of 19 December 1988 on the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Communities of the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Consolidated version in OJ 2005 C334/1). The First Protocol entered into effect on 1 August 2004. See, e.g. C-133/08, ICF, 2009; C-29/10, Heiko Koelzsch, 2011; C-384/10, Jans Voogsgeerd, 2011. 18 OJ 2008 L177/6; corrigendum in OJ 2009 L309/87. Previously, the European Parliament and Council had adopted Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (the Rome II Regulation) (OJ 2007 L199/40). Ireland (and the United Kingdom) decided to take part in this Regulation, but Denmark did not.

Subject-Matter 683 ordinary procedure set down in Art. 267 TFEU. The Rome I Regulation entered into force on 17 December 2009 (save for Art. 26, which applied from 17 July 2009) and applies to contracts entered into after that date.19 Under Art. 24 of this Regulation, it supersedes the Rome Convention as between the Member States, except as regards the territories of the Member States, which fall within the territorial scope of that Convention and which are excluded from the Regulation pursuant to Art. 355 TFEU. Moreover, while Ireland has opted in, the Rome I Regulation does not apply to relations between Denmark and the other Member States, to which the Rome Convention and its accompanying Protocol continue to apply.20 (3) Further conversion of conventions concluded by the Member States into Union instruments Similar to what occurred with the Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation, several other conventions that had been concluded between the Member States concerning private international law and other aspects of judicial cooperation in civil matters were gradually transformed into Union instruments.21 For example, this occurred with the Convention on the service in the Member States of the European Union of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters, for which there was an accompanying Protocol on the interpretation by the Court of Justice of this Convention,22 by virtue of the adoption of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1348/2000,23 which has subsequently been replaced by Regulation (EC) No. 1393/200724 and then again by Regulation (EU) No. 2020/1784,25 applicable to Denmark26 as well as the other Member States of the EU. Similarly, the Convention on the jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and its accompanying Protocol on the interpretation by the Court of Justice of this Convention27 was replaced by Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 (the Brussels IIbis Regulation)28 and subsequently by Council Regulation (EU) No. 2019/1111.29 Yet, this Regulation does not 19 Rome I Regulation, Arts 28–29. 20 Rome I Regulation, recitals 44–46. The United Kingdom did not take part in the adoption of the Rome I Regulation but requested to participate in the regulation at a later date. See Commission Decision of 22 December 2008 on the request from the United Kingdom to accept Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and the Council on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) (OJ 2009 L10/22). 21 There was also adoption of Union instruments in this area which emanated from international conventions between Member States which had not entered into force (for example, Regulation (EC) No. 1206/2001 on taking of evidence) or involved international conventions to which both the Union and Member States were parties (for example, 2007 Hague Convention, which was taken into account in the adoption of Regulation (EC) No. 4/2009 on maintenance obligations). 22 See n. 2. 23 OJ 2000 L160/37. 24 OJ 2007 L324/79. 25 OJ 2020 L405/40. 26 OJ 2008 L331/21 and OJ 2021 L19/1. 27 See n. 31. 28 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No. 1347/2000 (OJ 2003 L338/1). 29 Council Regulation (EU) 2019/1111 of 25 June 2019 on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction (OJ 2019 L178/1).

21.04

684 CONVENTIONS CONCLUDED BY THE MEMBER STATES apply to Denmark, to which the Convention and accompanying Protocol remain applicable.30 Similar to what was said earlier, as these former Community instruments had been based on the provisions of the former EC Treaty concerning judicial cooperation in civil matters, Art. 68(1) EC placed restrictions on the Court of Justice’s preliminary ruling jurisdiction until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, when this provision was repealed and the Court of Justice’s preliminary ruling jurisdiction was mainstreamed to the ordinary procedure set down in Art. 267 TFEU.

21.05

(4) Conventions based on the EU Treaty in the version in force before the Treaty of Lisbon Furthermore, the Member States concluded conventions under the first and third subparagraphs of former Art. K.3(2)(c) of the EU Treaty in the version in force before the Lisbon Treaty, which conferred on the Court of Justice, in some cases by separate protocols, jurisdiction to interpret them31 and sometimes to rule on disputes between Member States or between one or more Member States and the Commission regarding their application and interpretation in a direct action brought by a Member State or the Commission.32 30 Council Regulation (EU) 2019/1111, recital 96. 31 Protocol on the interpretation, by way of preliminary rulings, by the Court of Justice of the European Communities of the Convention on the establishment of a European Police Office (OJ 1996 C299/2). The Convention has been replaced by Council Decision 2009/371/JHA of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (OJ 2009 L121/37), which was replaced by Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and replacing and repealing Council Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA, and 2009/968/JHA (OJ 2016 L135/53). Since Denmark did not decide to take part in the adoption of the latter regulation, Denmark is now regarded as a third State with respect to Europol. However, an Agreement on Operational and Strategic Cooperation was concluded between Denmark and Europol on 30 April 2017 (available at www.euro pol.europa.eu), conferring jurisdiction upon the Court of Justice for disputes relating to the agreement, including preliminary ruling jurisdiction); Protocol on the interpretation, by way of preliminary rulings, by the Court of Justice of the European Communities of the Convention on the use of information technology for customs purposes (OJ 1997 C151/16); Protocol on the interpretation, by way of preliminary rulings, by the Court of Justice of the European Communities of the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests (OJ 1997 C151/2); Second Protocol to the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, Art. 13(3) (OJ 1997 C221/12); Convention on mutual assistance and cooperation between customs administrations, Art. 26(4) (OJ 1998 C24/2); Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters, Art. 45 (OJ 1998 C221/2) and accompanying Protocol on the interpretation, by the Court of Justice of the European Communities of the Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial (OJ 1998 C221/20). The convention was subsequently replaced by Union legislation, of which Council Regulation (EU) 2019/1111 of 25 June 2019 on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction (OJ 2019 L178/1) is the most recent version; Convention on Driving Disqualifications, Art. 14(2) (OJ 1998 C216/2. This latter convention never entered into force and was repealed by Regulation (EU) 2016/95 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 January 2016 repealing certain acts in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (OJ 2016 L26/9). 32 Convention on the use of information technology for customs purposes, Art. 27 (OJ 1995 C316/34), replaced by Council Decision 2009/917/JHA of 30 November 2009 on the use of information technology for customs purposes (OJ 2009 L323/20); Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, Art. 8 (OJ 1995 C316/49), replaced by Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union's financial interests by means of criminal law (OJ 2017 L198/29) (PIF Directive). However, the Convention continues to apply in relation to Denmark (and, at the time, the United Kingdom), while Ireland is bound by the PIF Directive, as it notified the President of the Council under Protocol 22 to the EU Treaties of its wish to take part in the adoption and application of that directive; First Protocol to the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, Art. 8 (OJ 1996 C313/2); Second Protocol to the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, Arts 13–15 (OJ 1997 C221/12); Convention on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or

Special Characteristics 685

II. Special Characteristics A. Jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings (1) Different rules Different rules govern the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of these Conventions and Protocols. The differences have to do with limiting the number of courts which are entitled to make references to the Court of Justice. (2) The Brussels and Rome Conventions Under the Protocols annexed to the Brussels Convention and the Rome Convention, which are at present only relevant within the confines set out in paras 21.02–21.03, only a limited number of courts are entitled to make a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. Only those mentioned in Art. 2(1) of the Protocol of 3 June 1971 and in Art. 2(a) of the First Protocol of 19 December 1988 and appellate courts may request a ruling.33 A similar restriction is contained in Art. 2(2)(a) (the ‘highest courts’) and Art. 2(2)(b) (courts sitting in an appellate capacity) of the Protocol of 28 May 1998 (jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters).34 This restriction was introduced out of concern that too many questions might be referred in all sorts of private-law disputes. In addition, it was thought that no more heed should be given to differences of interpretation of these Conventions by inferior courts in applying them than was paid to differences as between decided cases of lower courts in a given Member State. Finally, there was a concern that the Court of Justice should only be required to give preliminary rulings where it was ‘fully informed’, so as to allow stable case-law to develop.35 Art. 2(1) of the Protocol of 28 May 1998 was novel, in comparison with the 1971, 1988, and 1997 Protocols, in that it allowed each Member State to restrict by declaration the courts empowered to make references for preliminary rulings to the highest courts. The reason for this was that judgments on matters covered by the Convention (divorce, legal separation, marriage annulment, parental responsibility for children of a

officials of Member States of the European Union, Art. 12 (OJ 1997 C195/2); Convention on the service in the Member States of the European Union of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters, Art. 17 (OJ 1997 C261/2) and the accompanying Protocol on the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Communities of the Convention on the service in the Member States of the European Union of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (OJ 1997 C261/18). The convention has been replaced by Union legislation, of which Regulation (EU) 2020/1784 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2020 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (OJ 2020 L405/40) is the latest version; Convention on mutual assistance and cooperation between customs administrations, Art. 26 (OJ 1998 C24/2); Convention on Driving Disqualifications, Art. 14(1) (OJ 1998 C216/2). 33 See 80/83, Habourdin International and Others (order), 1983; 56/84, Von Gallera (order), 1984; C-69/02, Reichling, 2002; C-24/02, Marseille Fret, 2002. 34 See para. 21.08. 35 See the Jenard Report (OJ 1979 C59/68).

21.06

21.07

686 CONVENTIONS CONCLUDED BY THE MEMBER STATES marriage) needed to be given as promptly as possible in order not to prejudice the interests of individuals.36 A court which, under Art. 37 of the Brussels Convention, has to decide on an appeal against a decision authorizing enforcement of a judicial decision given in another Member State37 may, under Art. 2(3) of the Protocol of 3 June 1971, also refer questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. A court which, pursuant to Art. 40 of the Brussels Convention, has to give judgment on an appeal against a refusal to grant an application for enforcement may make a reference for a preliminary ruling under the general provision contained in Art. 2(2) of the Protocol of 3 June 1971.38

21.08

(3) Conventions based on the EU Treaty in the version in force before the Treaty of Lisbon Member States have to accept the Court’s jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings pursuant to other Conventions and Protocols drawn up on the basis of Art. K.3 of the EU Treaty in the version in force before the Lisbon Treaty by means of a declaration, either that any national court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law may make a reference for a preliminary ruling if the court or tribunal in question considers it to be necessary in order to give judgment, or that any national court or tribunal may request a preliminary ruling.39 Courts or tribunals which may request a preliminary ruling are not obliged to do so, even if they consider such a ruling to be necessary in order to give judgment.

B. Direct actions 21.09

(1) Disputes between Member States A direct action under Conventions concluded on the basis of Art. K.3 of the EU Treaty in the version in force before the Lisbon Treaty may be brought in the Court of Justice in the event of a dispute on the ‘interpretation or application’ of the Convention in question. In an initial stage, such disputes are to be discussed by the Council with the aim

36 Explanatory report (OJ 1998 C221/66, point 4). 37 Art. 37 of the Brussels Convention sets out the courts in which an appeal may be brought against a decision authorizing enforcement of a judgment given in another Member State. The court granting an enforcement order does so in the absence of the person against whom enforcement is sought (Brussels Convention, Art. 34). 38 See 178/83, Firma P., 1984. 39 Protocol on the interpretation, by way of preliminary rulings, by the Court of Justice of the European Communities of the Convention on the establishment of a European Police Office, Art. 2; Convention on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union, Art. 12(4) and (5); Convention on mutual assistance and cooperation between customs administrations, Art. 26(4) and (5); Protocol on the interpretation, by way of preliminary rulings, by the Court of Justice of the European Communities of the Convention on the use of information technology for customs purposes, Art. 2; Protocol on the interpretation, by way of preliminary rulings, by the Court of Justice of the European Communities of the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, Art. 2; Second Protocol to the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, Art. 12(3); Convention on driving disqualifications, Art. 14(2) and (3).

Procedure before the Court of Justice 687 of finding a settlement. If the dispute is not settled within six months, one of the parties may submit it to the Court of Justice.40 (2) Disputes between the Commission and Member States The Commission or one or more Member States may bring a dispute between that institution and one or more Member States on the ‘application’ of a Convention directly before the Court of Justice if it cannot be settled through negotiation.41 (3) Disputes between private applicants and the European Union Art. 14 of the Second Protocol to the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests declares what is now Art. 268 TFEU and Art. 340, second para. TFEU concerning an application for damages against the Union to be applicable. Art. 15 of that Protocol gives the General Court (and, on appeal, the Court of Justice) jurisdiction in proceedings instituted by any natural or legal person for annulment of a decision of the Commission which is addressed to that person or of direct and individual concern to that person under what is now the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU, or for interim measures, on the grounds of infringement of Art. 8 of the Protocol (infringement of the duty to provide a level of protection of personal data equivalent to that set out in what is now Regulation (EU) 2016/679) or any rule adopted pursuant thereto or misuse of powers in connection with the exchange of information between the Member States and the Commission in connection with combating fraud, active and passive corruption, and money laundering.42

21.10

21.11

III. Procedure before the Court of Justice The Statute and the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice are applicable insofar as the relevant Convention or Protocol do not provide otherwise.43 Consequently, the

40 Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, Art. 8(1) (see also Art. 8(1) of the First Protocol and Art. 13(1) of the Second Protocol); Convention on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union, Art. 12(1); Convention on mutual assistance and cooperation between customs administrations, Art. 26(1); Convention on the use of information technology for customs purposes, Art. 27(1); Convention on driving disqualifications, Art. 14(1). 41 Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, Art. 8(2) (see also Art. 8(2) of the First Protocol and Art. 13(2) of the Second Protocol); Convention on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union, Art. 12(2); Convention on mutual assistance and cooperation between customs administrations, Art. 26(2); Convention on the use of information technology for customs purposes, Art. 27(2); Convention on driving disqualifications, Art. 14(1). 42 See also Art. 19 of the Agreement on Operational and Strategic Cooperation between Denmark and Europol. 43 Second Protocol conferring on the Court of Justice of the European Communities certain powers to interpret the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations, Art. 1(1); Protocol on the interpretation, by way of preliminary rulings, by the Court of Justice of the European Communities of the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, Art. 3(1); Protocol on the interpretation, by way of preliminary rulings, by the Court of Justice of the European Communities of the Convention on the use of information technology for customs purposes, Art. 3(1); Protocol on the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Communities of the Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters, Art. 7; Convention on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities

21.12

688 CONVENTIONS CONCLUDED BY THE MEMBER STATES procedure applicable to requests for preliminary rulings and the rules applicable to direct actions generally apply.44

IV. Consequences A. Preliminary references 21.13

Judgments given by the Court of Justice pursuant to the Conventions and Protocols discussed earlier have the same consequences as preliminary rulings generally (see paras 6.32–6.39).

B. Direct actions 21.14

Judgments given in direct actions are enforceable under Arts 280 and 299 TFEU in the same way as any other judgment (see para. 25.10).

or officials of Member States of the European Union, Art. 12(6); Convention on mutual assistance and cooperation between customs administrations, Art. 26(6) and (7); Convention on Driving Disqualifications, Art. 14(4).

44

Note that Art. 205 of the CJ Rules of Procedure has been repealed.

PART V

PRO C E DU R E BE F OR E T H E U N ION C OU RT S

22 START OF THE PROCEDURE I. Act Initiating the Procedure A. The order for reference (1) Formal and substantive requirements (a) Order for reference made by a national court The order for reference is to be sent by the national court directly to the Court Registry 22.01 electronically or by post.1 That being said, the Court recommends the use of the e- Curia application for reasons of expediency and optimal communication.2 Upon arrival, it will be registered at the Registry. This is when the case receives its serial number. Notice is given of the request for a preliminary ruling in the Official Journal of the European Union.3 The Registry requests the national court to lodge the whole of the case-file, so that the Court of Justice may be better placed to give a useful answer.4 (b) Content of the order for reference The decision by which a national court or tribunal refers a question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling may be in any form allowed by national law as regards procedural steps. The order for reference must be succinct but sufficiently complete and contain all the relevant information to give the Court and the parties entitled to submit observations a clear understanding of the factual and legal context of the main proceedings. In particular, the order for reference must contain (see paras 3.21–3.22): – a summary of the subject-matter of the dispute and the relevant findings of fact as determined by the referring court or tribunal, or at least, an account of the facts on which the questions are based;5 – the tenor of any national provisions applicable in the case and, where appropriate, the relevant national case-law;6

1 Recommendations to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings (OJ 2019 C380/1) (Recommendations), point 33. It should be addressed to the Registry of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Rue du Fort Niedergrünewald, L-2925 Luxembourg; telephone number: +352-4303-1. 2 Recommendations, point 32. 3 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 21(4). 4 Recommendations, point 24. 5 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 94(a). 6 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 94(b).

EU Procedural Law. Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak, Oxford University Press. © Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833086.003.0022

22.02

692 START OF THE PROCEDURE – a statement of the reasons which prompted the referring court or tribunal to inquire about the interpretation or validity of certain provisions of Union law and the relationship between those provisions and the national legislation applicable to the main proceedings;7 – precise references for the national provisions applicable to the facts of the dispute and for the provisions of Union law that form the subject-matter of the reference for a preliminary ruling.8

Furthermore, the national court or tribunal may include a brief summary of the relevant arguments of the parties to the main proceedings.9 Finally, if it feels itself able to do so, the national court or tribunal may briefly state its view on the answer to be given to the question referred for a preliminary ruling.10

22.03

22.04

(c) Length of the order for reference The reference should in principle not exceed ten pages.11 The question or questions themselves should appear in a separate and clearly identified section of the order for reference, generally at the beginning or the end. It must be possible to understand them without referring to the statement of the grounds for the reference.12 (2) Anonymity The Court will respect in the proceedings before it the decision of the referring court to grant anonymity.13 The Court itself may also grant anonymity, either at the request of the referring court on a duly reasoned request of a party to the main proceedings, or of its own motion.14

B. The application in direct actions 22.05

(1) Lodging of application A case is brought before the Union Courts by addressing an application to the Registrar.15 The common procedural rules on the lodging of procedural documents apply to applications; that is, the application must be signed, dated, and accompanied by the requisite annexes, schedule, and number of copies (see paras 24.13–24.15)

7 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 94(c). 8 Recommendations, point 16. 9 Recommendations, point 17. 10 Recommendations, point 18. 11 Recommendations, point 14. 12 Recommendations, point 19. 13 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 95(1). 14 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 95(2). From 1 January 2023, all new anonymized cases involving proceedings between natural persons or proceedings between natural persons and legal persons that do not have a distinctive name will be allocated a fictitious name suggested by a computerized automatic name generator. 15 Statute, Art. 21, first para. It is thus not possible to bring a new action seeking the annulment of an act by lodging a document in the course of proceedings which are pending: see T-525/19, Intereing and Others v Commission, 2021, para. 39.

Act Initiating the Procedure 693 (2) Content of application (a) Requirements The identity of the parties, the subject-matter of the proceedings, and the pleas in law adduced are determined by the application.16 In the course of the procedure, the application may not, or only exceptionally, be modified in this respect. The following must appear at the beginning of each application: – the applicant’s name and address; – the name and capacity of the applicant’s agent or lawyer;17 – the identity of the party or parties against whom the action is brought; – in proceedings before the Court of Justice, the address for service and/or agreement to service by telefax or any other technical means of communication.18 The application must also state: – the subject-matter of the proceedings, the pleas in law and arguments relied on, and a summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based; – the form of order sought by the applicant; – where appropriate, the nature of any evidence offered in support.19 (b) Name and address of the applicant This requirement raises few problems.20 Nevertheless, the General Court was once faced with the question whether the applicant’s details could be altered at the request of the defendant. The latter contended that the partnership which had brought the action had no capacity to bring proceedings and asked the Court to designate the two sole partners as applicants. The General Court joined the partners as applicants after finding that they had signed the authority of the lawyer acting in the case.21 An application may be lodged on behalf of several parties,22 provided that it has the same subject-matter and raises the same pleas in law as regards each of them.23 An 16 Art. 120 of the CJ Rules of Procedure and Art. 76 of the GC Rules of Procedure set out general conditions with which every pleading must comply. See also, as regards the structure and layout of the application, CJ Practice Directions, points 13–14; GC Practice Rules, points 112–122. 17 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 76(b). Note that the CJ Rules of Procedure do not contain such a requirement. That being said, all procedural documents in direct actions must bear the handwritten signature of the party’s agent or lawyer: CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 57(1). 18 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 121. Note that the GC Rules of Procedure no longer require an address for service as, with the exception of documents lodged pursuant to Art. 105(1) and (2) and Art. 147(6) of the GC Rules of Procedure, all procedural documents must be lodged via e-Curia: GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 72(1). 19 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 120; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 76. 20 Where the applicant is a natural person, the General Court may decide to omit the full name of the applicant and any other personal data mentioned in the documents and information which relate to the case and to which the public has access. This also applies for other natural persons, whether they are parties or third persons (GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 66). Further to this, the General Court may also decide to omit data other than personal data of natural persons if there are legitimate reasons why such data should not be publicly disclosed (GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 66a). 21 See T-482/93, Weber v Commission (order), 1994, para. 4; see also T-185/02, Ruiz-Picasso and Others v OHIM, 2004, paras 19–22. 22 The unintentional omission of the name of one of the applicants can be subsequently remedied if the defendant does not object: see 21/58, Felten und Guilleaume Carlswerk Eisen-und Stahl and Walzwerke v High Authority, 1959 ECR 99, 101. 23 See 13/57, Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen-und Stahlindustrie and Others v High Authority, 1957–1958 ECR 265, 277.

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694 START OF THE PROCEDURE applicant’s successors are entitled to continue proceedings started by the deceased.24 If there are no successors or if the successors decline the succession, the proceedings will become devoid of purpose.25 A legal person resulting from the merger of legal persons which have brought proceedings before the General Court—or an appeal before the Court of Justice—may continue the proceedings where that person has acquired the rights and obligations of the original applicants/appellants.26

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(c) Address for service The GC Rules of Procedure require that all procedural documents are lodged at the Registry via the e-Curia application.27 Consequently, since the General Court will correspond with the parties via the e-Curia application, it is not required to state an address for service in the application.28 It is, however, required per Art. 21 of the Statute that the application contains the applicant’s permanent address.29 The CJ Rules of Procedure, however, have not made the lodging via the e-Curia application mandatory as of yet30 and, consequently, still require the application to ‘state an address for service’.31 To this end, the application must state the name of the person that is authorized and has expressed willingness to accept all service.32 In addition to, or instead of, specifying an address for service, an application brought before the Court of Justice may state that the lawyer or agent agrees that service is to be effected on him or her by telefax or any other technical means of communication.33 If either of these two requirements are not satisfied, all service on the applicant for the purpose of the proceedings will be effected for so long as the defect has not been cured by registered letter addressed to the agent or lawyer of the party. Service is then deemed to be duly effected by the lodging of the registered letter at the post office in the place where the respective Court has its seat.34 Any applicable procedural time-limits start to run as from the said deemed service, which means that the entire risk of delay in the post is borne by the applicant in the event that the applicant has neglected to provide a more reliable address for service.35

24 See 92/82, Gutmann v Commission, 1983, para. 2; T-314/16 and T-435/16, VG v Commission, 2018, para. 31. 25 See T-360/02, Yorck von Wartenburg v Commission (order), 2004, paras 5–10; T-228/11 P, Barbin v Parliament (order), 2012, para. 9. 26 See 294/83, Les Verts v Parliament, 1986, paras 15–18. With respect to succession in proceedings relating to intellectual property rights, see GC Rules of Procedure, Arts 174–175; para. 17.11. 27 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 72(1). 28 It should be pointed out, however, that there are two exceptions whereby procedural documents should still be lodged via post, namely, in case of an application for confidentiality and in case of an application for legal aid: GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 72(1). For all other documents, lodging via the e-Curia application is mandatory. It is thus not possible to lodge, for example, an application via post: see T-674/20, TLP v Parliament and Council (order), 2021, para. 9. 29 GC Practice Rules, point 102. 30 That being said, the lodging of procedural documents via the e-Curia application is the Court of Justice’s recommended method of lodging procedural documents: CJ Practice Directions, point 47. 31 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 121(1). An address for service in Luxembourg is, however, not required. 32 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 121(1). 33 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 121(2). 34 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 121(3). 35 Formerly, the stricter sanction of holding the application to be inadmissible applied: see 297/84, Sahinler v Commission (order), 1986.

Act Initiating the Procedure 695 (d) Designation of the party against whom the application is made (i) General The requirement that the application states the name of the party against whom it is made is satisfied if it is sufficiently clear from the application as a whole against whom the action is being brought. The omission of the defendant’s name by an oversight does not necessarily mean that the application is inadmissible, provided that the rights of the defence are not impaired.36 It is sufficient for the judgment to designate the defendant correctly.37 The defendant’s identity may also emerge from the contested act.38 However, it is not possible to extend the application to include a defendant who is not designated in the application and whose identity does not emerge therefrom.39 (ii) Measure imputable to another Union institution, body, office, or agency In some areas of Union law, agencies have been given the power to adopt decisions of a binding nature. For example, the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products indirectly has the power to refuse market authorizations. Since the division of power between such an agency and the Commission is not always clear, applicants will designate both the Commission and the agency as the party against whom the application is made. The Union Courts will then determine whether the act is imputable to the Commission or to that agency.40 (iii) Staff cases Actions relating to disputes between the Union and its servants41 must be brought against the institution in which the applicant is or was employed, in which the applicant’s predecessor was employed, or where the applicant took part in a recruitment procedure.42 As regards the non-contractual liability of the Union,43 actions for damages must be brought against the institution(s) whose conduct gave rise to the alleged liability.44 36 See 85/86, Commission v EIB (order), 1986 (the application, which stated that the defendant was the ‘European Investment Bank’ instead of the ‘Board of Governors of the European Investment Bank’ was declared admissible on the ground that it appeared from that pleading that the action brought under what is now Art. 271(b) TFEU was directed against the European Investment Bank’s Board of Governors). 37 See 44/76, Milch-, Fett-und Eier-Kontor v Council and Commission, AG Reischl Opinion, 1977 ECR 393, 413. See also T-163/04, Schäfer v OHIM (order), 2005, para. 23. 38 See C-184/02 and C-223/02, Spain and Finland v Parliament and Council, 2004, para. 17; C-439/13 P, Elitaliana v Eulex Kosovo, 2015, para. 73. 39 See 90/77, Stimming v Commission (order), 1977, paras 1–4. 40 See T-439/08, Joséphidès v Commission and EACEA, 2010, paras 33–39 (act imputable to the EACEA); T-133/03, Schering-Plough v Commission and EMEA (order), 2007, paras 16–23 (act imputable to the Commission). However, if the challenged act is imputable to the Commission, but an applicant designates another entity as the defendant, the action will be inadmissible where the application is without ambiguity made against that other entity: see C-439/13 P, Elitaliana v Eulex Kosovo, 2015, paras 72–74. Further to this, it should be pointed out that acts adopted by the Publications Office in the context of a tender procedure are attributable to the Commission and thus an action for annulment should be brought against the Commission, and not against the Publications Office: see T-422/11, Computer Resources International (Luxembourg) v Commission, 2014, para. 13. 41 Art. 270 TFEU. 42 See 18/63, Wollast (née Schmitz) v EEC, 1964 ECR 85, 96; T-497/93, Hogan v Court of Justice, 1995, para. 31. When the recruitment procedure is organized by EPSO, the action should be brought against the Commission: see Art. 4 of Decision 2002/620/EC of the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the Court of Justice, the Court of Auditors, the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions, and the European Ombudsman of 25 July 2002 establishing a European Communities Personnel Selection Office (OJ 2002 L197/53). See para. 16.12. 43 Art. 268 and Art. 340, second para. TFEU. 44 See para. 11.22.

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22.11

696 START OF THE PROCEDURE

22.12

22.13

(e) Subject-matter of the proceedings and the pleas in law and arguments on which the application is based (i) General The application must set out a brief summary of the facts and the subject-matter of the proceedings. This means that both its purpose and, where appropriate, the act against which the proceedings are brought must be specified. In addition, the application must contain the pleas in law and arguments relied on and a summary of those pleas in law.45 (ii) Subject-matter and pleas must be clearly stated The Union Courts require the subject-matter of the proceedings and the pleas raised to be stated clearly and precisely in order that the defendant may prepare its defence and the respective Union Court may give judgment without having to have further particulars.46 In order to secure legal certainty and the sound administration of justice, the essential facts and law on which the application is based must be set out— at least summarily—in the text of the application itself in a coherent and comprehensible manner.47 If the application fails to provide details of the underlying facts and circumstances, it will be inadmissible on the grounds that the Union Court is unable to rule on it.48 The text of the application may be elucidated by references to passages in documents appended to it, but a general reference to such documents cannot constitute a statement of the essential facts and law on which the action is based.49 These must be included in the application itself.50 Annexes will only be taken into account insofar as they support pleas or arguments expressly set out in the application and to the extent that it is possible to determine precisely what are the matters they contain that support or supplement those pleas or arguments.51 It is not for the Union Court to seek out and identify in those annexes the pleas and arguments relied on in the application, since the annexes have a purely evidential and instrumental function.52 Furthermore, information may 45 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 120(c); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 76(d). 46 See 281/82, Unifrex v Council and Commission, 1984, para. 15; C‑116/21 P to C‑118/21 P, C‑138/21 P, and C‑139/21 P, Commission v VW and Others, 2022, para. 161; T-737/18, Siberia Oriental v CPVO, 2020, para. 25; T-113/20, BSEF v Commission, 2022, para. 167. For actions for damages, see T-590/15, Onix Asigurări v EIOPA (order), 2016, para. 81; T-257/17, RE v Commission, 2018, paras 72–87 (an application initiating an action for damages must contain particulars which make it possible to determine what conduct the applicant attributes to the institution, the grounds for which the applicant considers that there is a causal link between that conduct and the alleged damage, and the nature and extent of the damage). 47 See T-607/17, Volotea v Commission, 2020, para. 229; T-716/17, Germanwings v Commission, 2020, para. 145; T-280/18, ABLV Bank v SRB, 2022, para. 65. 48 See C-139/20, Commission v Poland, 2022, paras 55–57. 49 See T-55/15 and T-759/15, Luxembourg v Commission, 2019, para. 174 (appeal pending in C-885/19 P and C-898/19 P); T-15/20, Skyliners v EUIPO, 2021, para. 85; T-76/21, Masterbuilders, Heiermann, Schmidtmann v EUIPO, 2022, para. 57. 50 See T-112/15, Greece v Commission, 2017, para. 53; T-725/15, Arysta LifeScience Netherlands v EFSA, 2018, para. 113. 51 See T-201/04, Microsoft v Commission, 2007, para. 99; T-191/16, Lito Maieftiko Gynaikologiko kai Cheirourgiko Kentro v Commission, 2021, para. 22. Annexes going beyond their purely evidential function by providing fresh arguments will only be taken into consideration insofar as they support pleas and arguments set out in the application: see T-461/07, Visa Europe and Visa International v Commission, 2011, paras 52–53. 52 See T-112/15, Greece v Commission, 2017, para. 53; T-245/15, Klymenko v Council, 2017, para. 235; T-864/19, AI and Others v EUIPO, 2022, para. 107.

Act Initiating the Procedure 697 not be provided at the hearing in order to fill gaps in the application.53 The degree of precision required of an application depends on the circumstances of the particular case.54 Yet, the Union Courts may not go so far in specifying the subject-matter of the application as to impair the rights of the defence or of interested third parties.55 (iii) Union Courts are bound by the subject-matter of the case The Union Courts are bound by the subject-matter of the case as stated in the application.56 A dispute between the applicant and the defendant about the demarcation of the subject-matter of the litigation will not have any bearing on the admissibility of the application so long as the Union Court is able to define the subject-matter of the action precisely on the basis of the application.57 (iv) Presentation of pleas The application must contain the pleas and arguments relied on. This means that it must be possible to identify from the text of the application what the applicant’s specific complaints are and the legal and factual particulars on which they are based.58 The resulting exposition must enable the defendant to protect its interests and the Union Court to carry out judicial review.59 An application should thus be clear, coherent, and well-structured.60 Apart from these substantive requirements, the applicant is not bound to set out the pleas in any particular way.61 It is also unnecessary for express reference to be made to the provision of Union law which has allegedly been breached62 or for a legal categorization to be given to the pleas raised in the application,63 provided that the pleas emerge sufficiently clearly from the application.64 Even an error in citing the provision of Union law on which a plea is based will not cause that plea to be inadmissible.65

53 See T-247/01, eCopy v OHIM, 2002, para. 17; T-108/09, Ravensburger v OHIM, 2010, para. 42. 54 See T-20/94, Hartmann v Council and Commission, 1997, para. 37; T-655/18, Aupicon v EEAS, 2021, paras 73–76. 55 See 30/68, Lacroix v Commission, 1970, paras 21–28; T-640/18, Intercontact Budapest v CdT, 2020, para. 20. 56 See 232/78, Commission v France, 1979, para. 3; T-99/16, De Nicola v Court of Justice, 2017, para. 61; T-52/19, AH v Eurofund, 2021, para. 94; T‑286/09 RENV, Intel v Commission, 2022, para. 111. 57 See 168/78 Commission v France, 1980, paras 17–25; C-342/10, Commission v Finland, 2012, paras 17–23; C‑715/17, C‑718/17, and C‑719/17, Commission v Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic, 2020, paras 111–121. 58 See C-213/19, Commission v United Kingdom, 2021, para. 132; C-139/20, Commission v Poland, 2022, para. 56. It is possible that the summary of some pleas satisfies this condition and the summary of others does not. In this event, the Union Court will declare inadmissible only those pleas which are not sufficiently defined and not the application as a whole (see T-457/07, Evropaïki Dynamiki v EFSA, 2012, para. 225). 59 See T-326/17, Air Canada v Commission, 2022, para. 391; T-680/21, Furline International v EUIPO, 2022, para. 21. 60 See T-729/19, Dinamo v EUIPO, 2020, para. 12. A plea will be rejected when a lack of clarity does not allow the defendant to prepare its defence: see T-678/19, Health Product Group v EUIPO, 2021, para. 89. 61 See T-60/20, Enosi Mastichoparagogon Chiou v EUIPO, 2021, para. 50. 62 See T-738/20, Deutschtec v EUIPO, 2022, para. 15. A fortiori, it is not necessary to submit pleas or complaints in respect of the particular provisions of a contested act if an action for annulment is brought against the act in its entirety: see C-505/09 P, Commission v Estonia, 2012, para. 36. 63 See 19/60 and 21/60, 2/61, 3/61, Société Fives Lille Cail and Others v High Authority, 1961 ECR 282, 295; T-379/18, WI v Commission, 2019, para. 24. 64 See 62/65, Serio v Commission, 1966 ECR 561, 568; T-535/19, H.R. Participations v EUIPO, 2020, para. 26. But see T-370/11, Poland v Commission, 2013, para. 113 (claim ‘that the contested decision must comply with European Union law in its entirety’ did not specify the provision allegedly infringed ‘to the requisite legal standard’). 65 See T-504/20, Soapland v EUIPO, 2021, para. 30.

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22.15

698 START OF THE PROCEDURE A mere enumeration of pleas, however, does not suffice.66 The application must set out the grounds on which each plea is based.67 Unsupported arguments will be declared inadmissible.68 It is not for the Union Court to speculate about the reasoning and precise observations that lie behind an action.69 A reference to pleas raised in another case, even if the two cases are linked, does not constitute a sufficient statement of the pleas in law on which the application is based.70 The same goes for references to proceedings before the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) Board of Appeal in intellectual property disputes.71 Such a reference, however, will not render the application inadmissible if, leaving aside that reference, the application contains all the necessary particulars.72 22.16

(v) New pleas in law New pleas in law—that is to say, pleas not raised in the application—may not be introduced in the course of the proceedings, unless they are based on matters of law or of fact which come to light in the course of the proceedings.73 An amendment, in the course

66 See T-540/18, ASL Aviation Holdings and Others v Commission, 2022, para. 56; T-325/17, Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij v Commission, 2022, para. 331. 67 See 19/60 and 21/60, 2/61, and 3/61, Société Fives Lille Cail and Others v High Authority, 1961 ECR 281, 295; C-162/20 P, WV v EEAS, 2022, para. 67; T-881/19, GABO:mi v Commission (order), 2021, para. 37; T-86/21, Distintiva Solutions S. Coop. Pequeña v EUIPO, 2022, para. 89. 68 See T-152/09, Rintisch v OHIM, 2011, para. 48; T-369/11, Diadikasia Symbouloi Epicheiriseon v Commission and Others, 2012, para. 63. 69 See T-74/15, European Dynamics Luxembourg and Others v Commission, 2017, para. 98; T-271/16, Pempe v EUIPO, 2017, para. 88. 70 See 9/55, Société des Charbonnages de Beeringen and Others v High Authority, 1954–1956 ECR 311, 325; T-827/14, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, 2018, paras 77–79. See also GC Practice Rules, point 27, which specifies that a procedural document and annexes thereto produced in another case and placed on the file of that case may not be taken into account for the purposes of preparing another case for hearing. 71 See T-419/16, Carrera Brands v EUIPO, 2017, paras 20–25; T-278/18, Nemius Group v EUIPO, 2019, paras 24–26. See also para. 22.13. 72 See 4/69 Lütticke v Commission, 1971, paras 2–4; T-86/21, Distintiva Solutions S. Coop. Pequeña v EUIPO, 2022, para. 22. 73 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art.127(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 84(1). The fact that the applicant became aware of a factual matter during the course of the procedure before the Court of Justice or the General Court does not mean that that element constitutes a matter of fact coming to light in the course of the procedure. A further requirement is that the applicant was not in a position to be aware of that matter previously (see T-149/15, Ben Ali v Council, 2017, para. 69). For instances in which a new plea was not admitted, see T-140/12, Teva Pharma and Others v EMA, 2015, para. 48; T-579/20, Genekam Biotechnology v Commission, 2022, paras 72–73. A judgment which merely confirms a point of law which ought to have been known to the applicant when it brought an action cannot be regarded as a new matter allowing a fresh plea to be raised (see 11/81, Dürbeck v Commission, 1982, para. 17; T-154/10, France v Commission, 2012, para. 56). The same goes for any other event which merely confirms a legal situation of which the applicant was aware when he or she brought the action (see C-669/19 P, BP v FRA, 2020, para. 16). In the course of an action for damages, a submission which changes the very basis of liability constitutes a new plea in law which cannot be introduced in the course of proceedings (see T-462/17, TO v EEA, 2019, T-52/19, AH v Eurofound, 2021, para. 94). Accordingly, the applicant cannot submit for the first time in its reply that the Union is non-contractually liable for a lawful act, even if the plea, in common with the alleged liability for an unlawful act raised in the application, is based on the second para. of Art. 340 TFEU (279/84, 280/84, 285/84, 286/84 Rau and Others v Commission, 1987, para. 38; C-104/97 P, Atlanta v EC, 1999, para. 27). Considerations relating to economy of procedure or respect for the rights of the defence cannot justify extending the exceptions to the rule which prevents new pleas in law beyond those expressly provided for in the Rules of Procedure (see C-104/97 P, Atlanta v EC, 1999, para. 28). But see T-271/10 RENV II, H v Council, 2020, paras 87–88; para. 21.19. The fact that a party had initially misinterpreted a provision of Union law also does not allow that party to introduce a new plea at a later stage of the procedure: see T-381/08, DAI v Commission (order), 2012, paras 34–35. For cases in which a new plea was admitted, see T-808/14, Spain v Commission, 2016, paras 34–37; T-688/19, VeriGraft v EISMEA, 2022, paras 59–60; T-468/20, Kühne v Parliament, 2022, paras 50–52. It is also possible for

Act Initiating the Procedure 699 of proceedings, of the contested measure constitutes a new factor which allows the applicant to amend its pleas and the form of order sought.74 Similarly, new pleas may be introduced where a relevant provision of Union law is annulled or declared invalid by the Union Courts after the submission of the application.75 Given the absence of express, unequivocal rules on the matter, a new plea does not have to be submitted immediately, or within a particular period, after the matters of fact or law to which it refers come to light, in order to avoid being time-barred.76 If a new plea in law is presented in the course of proceedings at the Court of Justice, the President may prescribe a time-limit in which the other party may respond to that plea.77 The GC Rules of Procedure are a bit more demanding and state that the President shall give the other parties a possibility to respond to that plea.78 This is without prejudice to the decision to be taken on the admissibility of that new plea.79 Moreover, at the General Court, parties are required to introduce their new pleas in the second exchange of pleadings. However, where matters of fact and law justifying new pleas in law only arise after the second exchange of pleadings or when no second exchange of pleadings is held, parties must introduce their new pleas in law as soon as they obtain knowledge of these matters.80 While no corresponding obligation is stated in the CJ Rules of Procedure, it may be presumed that similar requirements will apply.81

only part of a new plea to be declared admissible where, following a measure of organization of procedure by which all the applicants are granted access to the file (also those which did not enter a plea alleging infringement of their right of access to the file), a party introduces a new plea based on documents of which they had cognizance only in the course of the proceedings: see C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P, C-251/99 P, C-252/99 P, and C-254/99 P, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission, 2002, paras 366–375; T-19/95, Adia Interim v Commission, 1996, paras 22–24. See also para. 24.31. 74 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 86(1). See T-364/15, ADR Center v Commission, 2021, para. 65; T-254/20, Dochirnie pidpryiemstvo Kondyterska korporatsiia ‘Roshen’ v EUIPO, 2021, para. 22. See also paras 7.09 and 22.20. 75 See T-574/08, Syndicat des Thoniers Méditerranéens and Others v Commission, 2012, para. 53. 76 See T-32/91, Solvay v Commission, 1995, para. 40. Nevertheless, an applicant must act diligently: see T-477/16, Epsilon International v Commission, 2018, paras 48–50. 77 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 127(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 84(3). 78 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 84(3). 79 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art.127(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 84(3). 80 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 84(2). The General Court has declared a request to amend an application inadmissible because it was made seven months after the matter justifying an amendment of the application came to the knowledge of the applicant and no justification for such a delay was provided (see T-477/16, Epsilon International v Commission, 2018, paras 48–50). 81 See CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 128, which specifies that parties may produce or offer further evidence in reply or rejoinder and, exceptionally, after the close of the written part of the proceedings. Moreover, it appears from the case-law that the Court of Justice is willing to consider the admissibility of new pleas raised in the reply or at the hearing in light of the substantive conditions, namely, that it is based on matters of law or fact which come to light in the course of the procedure, and does not limit the raising of new pleas to a particular stage in the proceedings. See C-593/18 P, ABB v Commission, 2019, para. 33; C-607/18 P, NKT Verwaltungs v Commission, 2020, paras 183–184. In addition to this, it should be pointed out that the situation of introducing new pleas in law and of producing or offering further evidence is not entirely the same when it comes to appeals. This is because the subject- matter of the proceedings before the General Court may not be changed on appeal. Thus, contrary to Art. 127 of the CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 128 of the CJ Rules of Procedure is not applicable in appeal proceedings: CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 190(1). See also C-436/19 P, Abaco Energy and Others v Commission (order), 2020, paras 39–40.

700 START OF THE PROCEDURE 22.17

(vi) Elaboration of pleas raised in the application The rule that, in principle, new pleas may not be entered does not mean to say, however, that pleas adduced in the application may not subsequently be enlarged upon.82 Even pleas only raised implicitly may be extended in this way.83 Accordingly, the applicant is entitled to raise additional arguments in the reply in support of pleas raised in the application or pleas enlarging upon the pleas raised in the application.84 These arguments must, however, present a sufficiently close connection with the pleas or heads initially set out in the application in order to be considered as an amplification of the original application.85 In addition, the applicant may clarify in the reply the factual basis on which its pleas are based.86 Obviously, however, the applicant may ‘clarify’ only pleas which have already been raised in the application. The rule that, in principle, no new pleas may be raised applies only to the parties, not to the Union Courts.87 Accordingly, the rule does not prevent the Union Courts from raising pleas of their own motion.88

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(vii) Submissions supplementing the application Despite the lack of express mention in the Statute and the Rules of Procedure of the Union Courts, submissions supplementing the application initiating proceedings which were submitted after the application was lodged but before the deadline for bringing proceedings have been held admissible by the General Court.89 However, the General Court has rejected supplementary pleadings to the original application where such pleadings modified the subject-matter of the dispute by setting out new claims that were not covered by the various heads of claim in the original application. In particular, the General Court took issue with the fact that the applicant sought to transform a manifestly inadmissible action into an admissible action by modifying the subject-matter of the dispute. The fact that the supplementary pleadings were lodged 82 See C-521/15, Spain v Council, 2017, paras 140–141; C-185/20 P, Hungary v Commission (order), 2022, para. 46. 83 See 306/81, Verros v Parliament, 1983, paras 9–10; C-504/09 P, Commission v Poland, 2012, para. 34; T-271/10 RENV II, H v Council, 2020, para. 86. 84 See 2/54, Italy v High Authority, 1954–1956 ECR 37, 51; C-66/02, Italy v Commission, 2005, paras 85–89; T-342/07, Ryanair Holdings v Commission, 2010, para. 325; T-263/15, Gmina Miasto Gdynia and Others v Commission, 2017, para. 70; T-433/20, KY v CJEU, 2021, para. 26. Some case law may suggest that a distinction should be made between pleas and arguments on this point and that a plea could only be enlarged upon in admissible way by way of an argument. (On the distinction between a plea and an argument, see C-272/12 P, Commission v Ireland and Others, AG Bot Opinion, 2013, point 66.) However, it appears that the Union Courts use the notions plea and argument interchangeably in this context. Compare C-66/02, Italy v Commission, 2005, paras 84–89, with C-412/05 P, Alcon v OHIM, 2007, paras 38–40; see also C-185/20 P, Hungary v Commission, 2022, para. 46; T-468/20, Kühne v Parliament, 2022, paras 41–49. In the end, both a plea and an argument unconnected to the pleas raised in the application will be declared inadmissible unless based on matters of fact and law justifying the introduction of new pleas. See further para. 22.16. 85 See T-203/18, VQ v ECB, 2020, para. 56; T-510/17, Del Valle Ruiz and Others v Commission and SRB, 2022, para. 260 (appeal pending in C-539/22 P). 86 See 74/74, CNTA v Commission, 1975, para. 4; C-456/03, Commission v Italy, 2005, paras 32–34; T-369/06, Holland Malt v Commission, 2009, para. 32. 87 See C-252/96 P, Parliament v Gutiérrez de Quijano y Lloréns, 1998, para. 30; T-114/02, BaByliss v Commission, 2003, para. 306. 88 See para. 7.162. 89 See T-338/08, Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Pesticide Action Network Europe v Commission, 2012, paras 16–25; T-883/16, Poland v Commission, 2019, paras 43–47.

Act Initiating the Procedure 701 before the expiry of the time-limit to bring proceedings did not make a difference in this regard.90 Conversely, supplementary pleadings that are confined to pleas and arguments in relation to the act contested in the application are admissible, provided they have been lodged in time.91 (f) Form of order sought by the applicant (i) Form of order sought must be unequivocal The form of order sought (also referred to as ‘conclusions’ or ‘claims’) sets out the decision which the applicant is claiming that the Union Courts should give.92 It generally takes the form of the operative part of a judgment or order. However, the Union Courts may also infer that a particular form of order is sought from the wording of the application.93 The precise wording of the form of order sought must be set out at the beginning or the end of the application94 so that the Union Courts may avoid either giving judgment ultra petita or failing to give judgment on one of the heads of the form of order sought.95 This also protects the rights of the defence.96 A head of claim set out in the form of order sought which is unclear will be regarded as inadmissible.97 Since the form of order sought flows from the subject-matter of the proceedings and from the pleas in law and arguments put forward in the application, it may only exceptionally be amended in the course of the proceedings.98 The condition that no new plea in law may be introduced in the course of proceedings unless it is based on matters of law or fact which come to light in the course of the procedure is, a fortiori, applicable in the case of a modification of the form of order sought.99 However, such modification may not alter the subject- matter or the nature of the proceedings,100 for example, by transforming an action for failure to act into an action for annulment101 or an action of a contractual nature into 90 See T-493/14, Mayer v EFSA, 2017, paras 23–25. 91 See T-883/16, Poland v Commission, 2019, paras 43–47. 92 See 55/64, Lens v Court of Justice, 1965 ECR 837, 841; T-165/20, JF v EUCAP Somalia, 2022, para. 50. 93 See C-388/93, PIA HiFi v Commission (order), 1994, para. 10; C‑715/17, C‑718/17, and C‑719/17, Commission v Poland and Others, 2020, paras 113–121. 94 See CJ Practice Directions, point 41; GC Practice Rules, point 114. Note that the CJ Practice Directions specifically require that the form of order sought should be set out at the end of the application. 95 See C-130/19, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, 2021, para. 308; C-213/19, Commission v United Kingdom, 2022, para. 132. 96 See 46/59 and 47/59, Meroni and Others v High Authority, 1962 ECR 411, 419; T-104/14 P, Commission v Verile and Gjergji, 2015, para. 107. 97 See 188/73, Grassi v Council, 1974, paras 5–9; T-404/20, Global Translation Solutions v Commission, 2021, paras 23–31 (failure to precisely identify the acts of which annulment was being sought). But see T-123/04, Cargo Partner v OHIM, 2005, para. 34: the applicant formally asked for the case to be sent back to the OHIM. The form of order was considered to be admissible, since it was clear from the application that the applicant sought, in substance, the annulment of the contested decision. See also, as regards an appeal, C-239/21 P, Fryč v Commission (order), 2022, para. 21. 98 See 232/78, Commission v France, 1979, paras 2–4; T-236/17 and T-596/17, Balti Gaas v Commission, 2020, para. 71; T-581/20, YP v Commission, 2021, para. 136. A form of order sought which is unsupported by any plea will be inadmissible (see T-15/18, OCU v ECB, 2021, para. 68). 99 See 83/63, Krawczynski v Commission, 1965 ECR 623, 633; T-477/16, Epsilon International v Commission, 2018, para. 46; T-437/16, Italy v Commission, 2020, para. 227. 100 See 191/84, Barcella and Others v Commission, 1986, paras 5–6; C-346/18 P, Rose Vision v Commission, 2019, para. 43; T-525/19, Intereing and Others v Commission, 2021, para. 40. 101 See 125/78, GEMA v Commission, 1979, para. 26; T-28/90, Asia Motor France and Others v Commission, 1992, paras 43–44.

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702 START OF THE PROCEDURE an action for annulment.102 That being said, taking into account the proper administration of justice and the requirements of procedural economy, the General Court has allowed an application for annulment to be supplemented by an application for damages because the material loss allegedly suffered by the applicant was within the factual context that arose after the application for annulment was lodged, while being connected with the act set out in the application for annulment.103 Further to this, the applicant can ‘clarify’ the form of order sought in its reply or at the hearing,104 for instance, by restricting the scope of its claims in an action for annulment.105 22.20

(ii) Contested act replaced by a new act In the circumstance where the institution concerned replaces the contested act by an act which does not essentially diverge from it, the applicant may adjust the form of order sought accordingly.106 It would not be in the interests of the proper administration of justice or of the requirements of procedural economy to oblige the applicant to make a fresh application to the Union Court against the new act.107 This is because the actual subject-matter of the proceedings is not changed.108 It is also possible for

102 See T-235/19, HIM v Commission, 2021, paras 67–68. But see C-584/17 P, ADR Center v Commission, 2020; C-378/16 P, Inclusion Alliance for Europe v Commission, 2020. See further para. 15.13. 103 See T-271/10 RENV II, H v Council, 2020, paras 87–88; see also T-573/16, PT v EIB, 2019, para. 200. 104 See C-456/03, Commission v Italy, 2005, paras 39–40; T-178/00 and T-341/00, Pflugradt v ECB, 2002, para. 34. 105 See T-178/96, Eridania and Others v Council (order), 2011, para. 42. The subject-matter of the proceedings is not extended where the Commission, after alleging that a Member State has failed to transpose a directive at all, specifies in its reply that the transposition pleaded for the first time by the Member State concerned in its defence is in any event incorrect or incomplete so far as certain provisions of the directive are concerned. Such a complaint is necessarily included in the complaint alleging a complete failure to transpose and is subsidiary to that complaint (see C-456/03, Commission v Italy, 2005, para. 40). Conversely, an applicant is not allowed to put forward new claims for the first time at the hearing, as this would deprive the defendant of an opportunity to prepare a response and thus breach the rights of the defence. For this reason, an additional claim requesting that the amount of default interest should be set at zero in the event that the Court would declare certain costs eligible was held to be manifestly inadmissible (see T-364/15, ADR Center v Commission, 2021, para. 65). 106 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 86(1). It should be pointed out that this provision solely concerns the situation in which an individual decision has been replaced by another decision having the same subject-matter and the situation in which the validity of a provision of secondary Union law is extended without affecting the principle which it lays down and which forms the essence of the dispute (see T-159/20, Hamers v Cedefop, 2021, para. 41). Subsequent acts which are relevant to the dispute, but do not modify or replace an act of which the validity was contested in the original application, are not covered by Art. 86(1) of the GC Rules of Procedure (see T-170/18, Mupompa v Council, 2020, paras 34–38). The same goes for acts that have not yet been adopted at the moment when the statement of modification is submitted (see T-401/18, SFIE-PE v Parliament (order), 2019, para. 37; T-402/18, Aquino, 2020, para. 45) or merely confirmatory acts, as they do not replace or change an act (see T-175/15, Mabrouk v Council, 2017, para. 154; T-515/15, Joint-Stock Company ‘Almaz-Antey’ Air and Space Defence Corp. v Council, 2018, paras 45–47). Furthermore, a modification of the application is not required where an act is corrected by an institution after an action was brought against that act if the rectification only relates to clerical errors and has no bearing on the subject-matter and the context of the dispute (see T-388/20, Ryanair v Commission, 2021, para. 26). Conversely, where the rectification modifies the contested act, a statement of modification should be lodged within the two-month period provided for in Art. 263, sixth para. TFEU, starting at the end of the fourteenth day after publication of the rectification in the Official Journal and extended by ten days on account of distance (see T-168/16, Grizzly Tools v Commission, 2018, paras 26–27). On the distinction between Art. 84 and Art. 86 of the GC Rules of Procedure, see C-114/17 P, Spain v Commission, 2018, para. 56. 107 See T-276/12, Chyzh and Others v Commission, 2015, para. 65; T-573/16, PT v EIB, 2019, para. 196. See also para. 7.11. 108 See 14/81, Alpha Steel v Commission, 1982, para. 8; T-235/19, HIM v Commission, 2021, paras 65–66. However, once the claims have been adjusted, the new act becomes the sole object of the action before the General Court. Pleas on appeal relating to the initial act cannot lead to the setting aside of the judgment of the General Court and will therefore be regarded as immaterial: see C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, 2008, paras 159–160.

Act Initiating the Procedure 703 the applicant to amend the form of order sought in this way where a contested implied decision is replaced by an express decision with the same content.109 However, the act against which the original application was brought must be an act against which an action would lie.110 If that is not so and the original act is replaced by a reviewable act, the form of order sought may not be amended because that would change the subject- matter of the proceedings contrary to Art. 21 of the Statute.111 The form of order sought must in principle be adjusted within two months of the replacement of the contested act.112 The modification of an application takes the form of a statement of modification, which must be made by a separate document113 before the oral part of the procedure is closed or before the decision of the General Court to rule without an oral part of the procedure114 and, where appropriate,115 contain the modified pleas in law and arguments relied upon.116 The statement of modification is a procedural act that is equivalent to the lodging of an action for annulment by way of application.117 Therefore, the case-law setting out the requirements as to the form and content of such an application applies by analogy.118 A statement of modification should set out unambiguously and in a sufficiently clear and precise way the subject- matter of the proceedings and the form of order sought.119 That being said, the Union Courts have held that these formal requirements do not apply for their own sake. Thus, for example, where the act replacing the act initially challenged in the application is essentially the same or differs only in purely formal respects, the General Court may not declare a statement of modification inadmissible for failure to include the pleas in law and arguments relied upon. In such a situation, requiring the applicant to repeat in his or her statement of modification pleas in law and arguments identical to those relied

109 See 103/85, Stahlwerke Peine-Salzgitter v Commission, 1988, paras 11–12; T-649/17, ViaSat v Commission, 2020, paras 16–20; T-734/17, ViaSat v Commission, 2020, paras 16–20; T-277/19, BK v EASO, 2021, paras 39–40. 110 See T-727/18, ZW v EIB (order), 2019, para. 27; T-154/21, Saure v Commission (order), 2022, para. 39. 111 See T-64/89, Automec v Commission, 1990, paras 68–69. 112 In a number of cases before the entry into force of the GC Rules of Procedure of 4 March 2015, the General Court held that, by way of exception, the two-month time-limit did not apply if the new act had the same object, grounds, and content as the repealed act (see T-348/07, Stichting Al-Aqsa v Council, 2010, paras 34–35; T-53/12, CF Sharp Shipping Agencies v Council, 2012, paras 28–30; T-421/11, Qualitest v Council, 2012, paras 21–28). However, the General Court revisted this point in subsequent case-law and confirmed that requests to adapt the forms of order sought must comply with the two-month time-limit (see T-441/11, Peftiev v Council, 2014, para. 69). Further to this, Art. 86(2) of the GC Rules of Procedure only refers to the time-limit laid down in Art. 263, sixth para. TFEU. See also T-400/10 RENV, Hamas v Council, 2018, para. 116 and T-235/19, HIM v Commission, 2021, para. 70. The situation is different in disputes between the European Investment Bank and its members of staff since no specific time-limits have been set out in the applicable regulations. A member of staff must introduce his or her statement of adaptation within a reasonable time: see T-573/16, PT v EIB, 2019, para. 192. See further para. 17.18. 113 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 86(3). This means that a statement of modification cannot be made orally at the hearing (see T-149/15, Ben Ali v Council, 2017, paras 61–62). Only in very exceptional circumstances, the General Court cannot declare inadmissible a statement of modification made orally at the hearing: see C-423/16 P, HX v Council, 2017, paras 18–28. 114 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 86(1). 115 See T-573/16, PT v EIB, 2019, para. 209. 116 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 86(4)(b). 117 See T-347/14, Yanukovych v Council, 2016, para. 80. 118 See T-316/19, Lucaccioni, 2021, para. 70. 119 See C-114/17 P, Spain v Commission, 2018, para. 59.

704 START OF THE PROCEDURE upon in the original application would be contrary to the principles of the proper administration of justice and procedural economy.120

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(g) Supporting evidence The applicant must adduce, where appropriate, evidence in support of its pleas. It is apparent from the expression ‘where appropriate’ that the application does not necessarily have to contain offers of evidence.121 Evidence must, however, be offered or produced in the first exchange of pleadings.122 The only sanction concerning offers of evidence is that they may be rejected on account of delay if they are submitted for the first time, and without justification, at the reply or rejoinder stage.123 Further to this, in exceptional circumstances, evidence may even be offered or produced after the close of the written part of the procedure (Court of Justice)124 or before the close of the oral part of the procedure (General Court).125 It should be noted that the possibility to submit further evidence after the first exchange of pleadings in the General Court is limited to the main parties of the proceedings.126 The evidence shall be annexed to the application, together with a schedule listing each item.127 While the following indications can no longer be found in the GC Practice Rules, they still contain good advice. All evidence offered in support must be expressly and accurately indicated, in such a way as to show clearly the facts to be proved:128 – documentary evidence offered in support must refer to the relevant document number in a schedule of annexed documents.129 Alternatively, if a document is not in the possession of the party concerned, the pleading must clearly indicate where and how the document may be obtained; 120 See C-313/17 P, Haswani v Council, 2019, paras 30–44. For an application, see T-540/19, Sharif v Council, 2021, paras 176–190. Conversely, the General Court may declare a statement of modification inadmissible for failure to include pleas in law and arguments where the subsequent act differs substantially from the act challenged in the original application and necessitates the modification of the pleas in law and arguments relied upon in the original application. See T-231/15 RENV, Haswani v Council, 2019, paras 57–64. Moreover, the General Court is not required in such a case to invite the applicant to regularize the failure to submit modified pleas in law and arguments (see C-313/17 P, Haswani v Council, 2019, para. 40). Compare T-257/17, RE v Commission (order), 2018, para. 46; T-10/16, GABO:mi v Commission, 2018, para. 52. If an applicant has doubts regarding the admissibility of his or her statement of modification, he or she should withdraw it, and not start new proceedings by way of a fresh application, as this may lead to a situation of lis alibi pendens: see T-269/16, Salama and Others v Council (order), 2016, paras 19–20. 121 See T-110/17, Jiangsu Seraphim Solar System v Commission, 2020, para. 148 (appeal pending in C-439/20 P). 122 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 85(1); also implicit from CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 128(1). 123 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 128(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 85(2). Note that this rule only applies to fresh evidence. It does not apply to evidence in rebuttal and the amplification of previous evidence, to which CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 64(3) and GC Rules of Procedure Art. 92(7) apply: see T-236/16, Biogena Naturprodukte v EUIPO, 2017, para. 17; T-573/16, PT v EIB, 2019, paras 126–128. 124 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 128(2). 125 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 85(3). This may the case where parties produce new documents in the context of measures of organization of procedure, for example, to support their answers to questions asked by the Court: see T-477/16, Epsilon International v Commission, 2018, para. 57; T-151/18, Ben Ali v Council, 2020, paras 37–38. In case a main party wishes to produce further evidence at the hearing (GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 155(2)), it is advised to bring sufficient copies where appropriate: GC Practice Rules, point 167. 126 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 85(2) and (3). 127 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 57(4); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 72(3). See para. 22.05. 128 Former GC Practice Rules, point 26. 129 The case-law shows that non-compliance with that obligation may entail the inadmissibility of the action if it is of such a kind as to hamper the other parties in the preparation of their arguments. See, in this respect, T-19/01, Chiquita Brands International and Others v Commission, 2005, para. 72.

Act Initiating the Procedure 705 – where oral testimony is sought to be given, each proposed witness or person from whom information is to be obtained must be clearly identified.130

(h) Accompanying documents Certain documents must accompany the application in order for the action to be validly brought. (i) Certificate of the lawyer The lawyer assisting or representing the applicant must lodge at the Registry a certificate that he or she is entitled to practice before a court of a Member State or of a State party to the EEA Agreement.131 The lawyer must lodge an official document or an authority to act conferred upon on him or her by the party he or she represents.132 Failure to provide the requested documents might ultimately lead to the inadmissibility of the action,133 or, in the General Court, to the lawyer being regarded as not representing or assisting the party concerned.134 (ii) Contested act If the annulment of an act is sought, the application must be accompanied by the contested act.135 If the application is for failure to act, documentary evidence must be provided of the date on which the relevant institution was requested to act.136 An application pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in a contract must be accompanied by a copy of the contract which contains that clause.137 (iii) Documents relating to legal persons If the applicant is a legal person governed by private law, the application must be accompanied by proof of its ‘existence in law’. Such proof consists of the instrument or instruments constituting or regulating that legal person or a recent extract from the register of companies, firms, or associations, or any other proof.138 The fact that the legal person is governed by private law is determined by the law of its country of origin. 130 Former GC Practice Rules, point 26. 131 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 119(3); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 51(2). The certificate does not necessarily have to the professional identity card of a lawyer: see T-6/20, Dr. Spiller v EUIPO, 2021, paras 22–23. The lodging of such certificate is not required in each individual case where that certificate has already been lodged for the purposes of opening an account giving access to e-Curia. 132 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 119(2); GC Rules of Procedure Art. 51(3). Note that the GC Rules of Procedure no longer require proof that such authority to act has been conferred properly (see T-596/15, Batmore Capital, 2017, paras 18–22; T-43/20, AV and AW v Parliament, 2021, para. 119). However, this does not exclude a party from questioning the validity of the authority conferred upon a lawyer (see T‑344/19 and T‑356/19, Front Polisario v Council, 2021, paras 160–170). Further to this, there is no need for the power of attorney to make an express mention of the contested act the applicant seeks to challenge: see T-320/07, Jones and Others v Commission, 2011, para. 56. 133 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 119(4); GC Rules of Procedure Art. 51(4). See T-107/12, LTTE v Council (order), 2012, paras 25–28 (authority to represent a legal person); T-400/12, Hârsulescu v Romania (order), 2012, paras 7–11 (lawyer’s certificate). Further to this, if a party has ended a representative’s mandate and has not replaced him or her with a new representative within the period required by the Union Courts, the action will become devoid of purpose: see T-123/08, Spitzer v OHIM (order), 2010, paras 4–8. But see C‑663/17 P, C‑665/17 P and C‑669/17 P, ECB v Trasta Komercbanka and Others, 2019, paras 52–79. 134 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 51(4). This will only be the case where a party is represented by multiple lawyers. 135 Statute, Art. 21, second para.; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 122(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 78(1). 136 Statute, Art. 21, second para.; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 122(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 78(1). 137 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 122(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 78(3). 138 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 78(4).

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706 START OF THE PROCEDURE Further to this, the lawyer of a legal person must lodge at the Registry an authority to act given by that legal person.139 22.26

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(iv) Disputes relating to intellectual property rights An application bringing a dispute relating to intellectual property before the General Court140 in the form of an action against the EUIPO or against the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO), where the applicant was not the only party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal, must also contain the names of all the parties to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal and the addresses they had given for the purposes of the notifications to be effected in the course of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal.141 In addition, the contested decision has to be appended to the application and the date on which the applicant was notified of it must be indicated.142 (v) Summary for publication The Court of Justice and the General Court require each application to be accompanied by a summary (not more than two pages long) of the pleas in law and main arguments relied on designed to facilitate publication of the notice in the Official Journal.143 (3) Consequences (a) Case becomes pending The lodging of the application at the Registry causes the case to become pending before the Court of Justice or the General Court, as the case may be. The Registrar enters the case in the register and gives it a serial number reflecting the order in which it was lodged. The case numbers of the Court of Justice are preceded by the letter ‘C’ (for the French ‘Cour’) and those of the General Court by the letter ‘T’ (for the French ‘Tribunal’).144 (b) Publication of the application The Registrar ensures that notice is given in the Official Journal of the date of registration of the application initiating proceedings, the names and addresses of the parties, the subject-matter of the proceedings, the form of order sought by the applicant, and a summary of the pleas in law and of the main supporting arguments.145 The purpose of the notice in the C series of the Official Journal is to put Union institutions, Member States, and natural and legal persons on notice of the proceedings, giving them the opportunity of intervening.146 Where the European Parliament, the Council, or the 139 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 78(5) juncto Art. 51(3). 140 See Ch. 17. 141 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 177(2). 142 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 177(3). 143 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 120(c); CJ Practice Directions, point 14; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 76(d); GC Practice Rules, points 118–119. 144 GC Practice Rules, point 16. The case numbers for the now-dissolved EU Civil Service Tribunal were preceded by the letter ‘F’ (for the French ‘Fonction publique’). See further para. 2.39. 145 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 21(6); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 79; GC Practice Rules, point 58. This is subject to the application of GC Rules of Procedure, Arts 66 and 66a. 146 See para. 23.01.

Act Initiating the Procedure 707 Commission is not a party to the case, the Registrar sends them copies of the application and of the defence, or of the plea of lack of competence or inadmissibility, without the annexes thereto, to enable them to assess whether the inapplicability of one of its acts is being invoked under Art. 277 TFEU.147 (c) Regularization of the application If the application does not comply with certain requirements or if the requisite accompanying documents are not appended to it, the Registrar prescribes a reasonable period within which the applicant is to comply with these requirements, either by putting the application in order or by producing any documents missing.148 However, the Registrar cannot be reproached for failing to detect a procedural irregularity.149 If the applicant fails to comply with the Registrar’s directions, the President of the Court of Justice or the General Court,150 as the case may be, decides whether this renders the application formally inadmissible.151

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C. The appeal The appeal must be lodged at the Registry of the Court of Justice or of the General Court.152 The appeal must be brought within two months of the notification of the decision appealed against.153 It must seek to have set aside, in whole or in part, the decision of the General Court as set out in the operative part of that decision.154 The appeal has to comply with certain requirements generally applying to applications.155 The following must appear at the beginning of each appeal: the appellant’s name and address; a reference to the decision of the General Court appealed against and the names of the parties before the General Court;156 the date on which the decision of the General Court was served on the appellant;157 and an address for service and/or agreement to service by telefax or other technical means of communication.158

147 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 125; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 82. 148 CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 119(4) and 122(3); GC Rules of Procedure, Arts 78(6) and 177(6). 149 See C-69/12 P, Noscira v OHIMI (order), 2012, para. 16. 150 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 123; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 80(2); GC Practice Rules, point 98. 151 See C-69/12 P, Noscira v OHIM (order), 2012, para. 16; T-101/95, Zedelmaier v Council and Commission (order), 1995. However, not all irregularities can be rectified: see para. 22.58. Regarding statements of modification not complying with Art. 84(3)(b) of the GC Rules of Procedure, see C-313/17 P, Haswani v Council, 2019, para. 40 and text accompanying n. 120. 152 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 167(1). 153 Statute, Art. 56, first para. 154 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 169(1). See C-833/19 P, Council v Hamas, 2021, paras 36–40. 155 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 168(2), which refers to CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 119 (obligation to be represented), 121 (information relating to service), and 122(1) (annexes to the application). 156 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 168(1)(a) –(c). 157 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 168(3). 158 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 168(2) juncto Art. 121. If the Court of Justice finds that the appeal was lodged within the prescribed period starting from the date on which the General Court gave judgment, failure to mention

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708 START OF THE PROCEDURE The appeal must also contain the pleas in law and legal arguments relied on, a summary of those pleas in law, and the form of order sought.159 The decision of the General Court appealed against must be referred to in the appeal.160 An appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the decision which the appellant seeks to have set aside, and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal.161 An appeal which confines itself to repeating or reproducing word for word the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the General Court does not satisfy that requirement.162 In case the appeal against the decision of the General Court concerns a decision of an independent board of appeal of the EUIPO, the CPVO, the European Chemicals Agency, or the European Union Aviation Safety Agency,163 a request that the appeal should be allowed to proceed must be annexed to the appeal as well.164 Such a request may not exceed seven pages165 and must be sufficiently detailed as to the grounds of the appeal and the issue of law raised by each ground. Moreover, it should state how each ground is significant with respect to the unity, consistency, or development of Union law.166 The Vice-President of the Court of Justice may decide that the appeal is inadmissible where an applicant has failed to put in order within the time-limit prescribed by the Registry a request that does not comply with these requirements.167

the names of other parties to the relevant case before the General Court and the date on which the judgment was served on the appellant does not make the appeal inadmissible: see C-91/95 P, Tremblay and Others v Commission, 1996, paras 10–11. Mention in the appeal of a wrong address is not ‘so substantial’ an irregularity as to make the appeal inadmissible where the correct address can be found from other documents in the case-file, such as the contested judgment annexed to the appeal: see C-161/97 P, Kernkraftwerke Lippe-Ems v Commission, 1999, para. 55. See also, with respect to documents referred to in the appeal but not annexed to it, C-82/01 P, Aéroports de Paris v Commission, 2002, paras 8–13 (the defect was not sufficient to render the appeal inadmissible, since those documents were known to the parties). 159 CJ, Rules of Procedure, Art. 168(1)(d)–(e). A clerical error in an application, for instance, an incorrect reference to a provision of the Statute as constituting the basis for an appeal, which has no effect on the subsequent course of the proceedings is not a ground for finding the appeal inadmissible: see C-149/95 P(R), Commission v Atlantic Container Line and Others (order of the President), 1995, para. 14. If the appellant requests that the case be referred back to the General Court if the decision appealed against is set aside, the appellant must set out in the appeal the reasons why the state of the proceedings does not permit a decision by the Court of Justice: CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 170(2). 160 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 168(1)(b). It is not required that the decision of the General Court appealed against be attached to the appeal: see C-122/16 P, British Airways v Commission, 2017, paras 46–49. 161 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 169(2); see C-322/21 P, Macías Chávez and Others (order), 2022, para. 53; C-172/20 P, WV v EEAS, 2022, paras 62–63; C‑116/21 P to C‑118/21 P, C‑138/21 P, and C‑139/21 P, Commission v VW and Others, 2022, para. 43. But see C-239/21 P, Fryč v Commission (order), 2022, para. 21, in which the Court of Justice interpreted a formal request to send the case back to the General Court as an appeal to set aside the judgment of the General Court. 162 See C-666/20 P, GVN v Commission, 2022, para. 63. 163 Statute, Art. 58a. 164 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 170a(1). 165 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 170a(2). 166 CJ Practice Directions, point 24. See C-784/21 P, Kappes v Sedus Stoll and EUIPO (order), 2022, paras 15–17. 167 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 170a(3).

Methods of Service 709

II. Methods of Service A. Service of procedural documents Generally, there are two main methods of service, dealing with either physical service 22.32 at the addressee’s address or service via electronic means, in particular, the e-Curia application. First, where the CJ or GC Rules of Procedure require that a document be served on a person, the Registrar of the Court of Justice effects such service at that person’s address for service (see further para. 22.08), which may be either by dispatch of the copy of the document concerned by registered mail with a form of acknowledgment of receipt, or by personal delivery of the copy of the document concerned against a receipt.168 The Registrar of the General Court, however, ensures that service is effected through the e-Curia application,169 as this is the default method of service at the General Court.170 Second, the Registrar of the Court of Justice, where the addressee has agreed that service is to be effected by telefax or any other technical means of communication, in particular, e-Curia, will serve any procedural document, including a judgment or order of the Court of Justice, by transmission of a copy of that document by such means.171 Yet, there is an exception where, for technical reasons or on account of the length or the nature of the document, transmission by the e-Curia application, telefax, or any other technical means is impossible or impracticable. In such case, the Registrar of the Court of Justice is required, if the addressee has not specified an address for service, to effect service at their address.172 The Registrar of the General Court is required to serve the procedural document at the address of the representative of the party concerned.173 In both cases, service shall be effected either by registered post with acknowledgment of receipt or by personal delivery against a receipt, and the addressee is so informed via e-Curia, telefax, or other technical means of communication.174 Under these circumstances, service is then deemed to have been effected on the addressee by registered post on the tenth day following the lodging of the registered letter at the post office of the place in which the respective Court has its seat, unless it is shown by the acknowledgment of receipt that the letter was received on a different date or the addressee informs the Registrar within three weeks of being informed by e- Curia, telefax, or any other technical means of communication that the document to be served has not reached him or her.175

168 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 48(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 100(1). As further specified in the foregoing provision, the Registrar prepares and certifies the copies of the documents to be served, unless the parties themselves supply the copies. 169 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 57(1). 170 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 56a(1); GC Practice Rules, point 89. This comes, however, with exceptions, notably, where the defendant has no e-Curia account. See para. 22.36. 171 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 48(2). 172 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 48(3). 173 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 57(2). 174 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 48(3); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 57(2). 175 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 48(3); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 57(2).

710 START OF THE PROCEDURE

B. Service of the order for reference

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(1) Notification to the parties in the main proceedings, the Member States, and the Commission The order for reference is immediately translated into the other official languages of the European Union.176 The Registrar of the Court of Justice notifies it to the parties to the main proceedings (i.e. to all ‘parties’ to the case, including any interveners), the Member States (a copy of the original order for reference and a translation into an official language of the Member State in question), and the Commission.177 Notice is given by registered letter with a form for acknowledgement of receipt, addressed to the lawyers of the parties to the main proceedings or, if the parties are not represented, to their personal address as set out in the order for reference; notice is given to the Member States by registered letter with a form for acknowledgment of receipt, addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (with a copy sent to the Permanent Representation in Brussels). (2) Notification to other Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies The Registrar of the Court of Justice further notifies the order for reference to the Union institution, body, office, or agency which adopted the act, the validity or interpretation of which is in dispute.178 In exceptional cases, the order for reference is also notified to other Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies if the Court of Justice wishes to obtain information from them (for example, if the question referred has a bearing on their prerogatives).179 The Registrar also notifies the order for reference to the States, other than Member States, which are parties to the EEA Agreement and to the EFTA Surveillance Authority.180 (3) Notification to the Member States The Member States are notified by service of a copy of the original version of the decision of the national court or tribunal, accompanied by a translation into the official language of the recipient Member State.181 Where appropriate, on account of the length of the national court’s decision, such translation is replaced by the translation into the official language of the Member State to which it is addressed of a summary of the decision, which will serve as a basis for the position to be adopted by that State.182 States party to the EEA Agreement which are not Member States and the EFTA Surveillance 176 But see CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 98 regarding translations in the context of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure. See further para. 23.36. 177 Statute, Art. 23, first para. 178 Statute, Art. 23, first para. 179 Such a request for information is based on Art. 24 of the Statute. For an example, see 20/85 Roviello, 1988. See also C-408/95, Eurotunnel and Others, 1997 (the European Parliament was heard in a case concerning the validity of a Council directive). 180 Statute, Art. 23, third para. 181 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 98(1). 182 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 98(1). The summary includes the full text of the question or questions referred for a preliminary ruling. It also contains, insofar as that information appears in the national court’s decision, the subject-matter of the main proceedings, the essential arguments of the parties in the main proceedings, a succinct presentation of the reasoning in the reference for a preliminary ruling, and the case-law and provisions of Union law and domestic law relied on.

Methods of Service 711 Authority receive a copy of the original version and a translation of the decision or, where appropriate, of a summary into the official language of their choice.183

C. Service of the application The Registrar serves the application on the defendant.184 At the Court of Justice, this is done by dispatch of a copy by registered post with a form for acknowledgement of receipt or by personal delivery against a receipt.185 Alternatively, documents shall be served by means of e-Curia if a party’s representative has expressly accepted this method of service.186 At the General Court, the application shall be served on the defendant if it has an e-Curia account.187 Where this is not the case, a certified copy of the application shall be sent by registered post with a form for acknowledgment of receipt or by delivery of the copy against receipt.188 In disputes relating to intellectual property rights, the application shall be served under the same conditions on the relevant Office, on the defendant, and on all parties to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal that have become a party to the proceedings before the General Court in accordance with Art. 173(2) of the GC Rules of Procedure, after having determined the language of the case in accordance with Art. 45(4) of the GC Rules of Procedure.189

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Should the application not comply with the formal requirements laid down in the Rules of Procedure of the Union Courts, service of the application on the defendant will be effected as soon as the application has been put in order or the Court in question has declared it admissible, notwithstanding the failure to observe the formal requirements in question.190

D. Service of the appeal If the appeal complies with the requirements set out in Art. 168(1)–(3) of the CJ Rules of Procedure, it will be served on all the parties to the proceedings before the General Court.191 Should the application not comply with the formal requirements laid down in the CJ Rules of Procedure, service will be effected as soon as the appeal has been put in

183 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 98(2). 184 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 20(1) juncto Art. 123; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 35(1) juncto Art. 80(1). 185 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 48(1). 186 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 48(2); CJ Decision of 16 October 2018 on the lodging and service of procedural documents by means of e-Curia (OJ 2018 L293/36), Art. 6. 187 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 80(1); GC Decision of 11 July 2018 on the lodging and service of procedural documents by means of e-Curia (OJ 2018 L240/72), Art. 6. 188 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 80(1). In case of an unsuccessful attempt at service, the Registrar prescribes a time-limit to the applicant for providing additional information for service or asks the applicant whether he or she is willing to use, at his or her own expense, the services of a judicial officer: GC Practice Rules, point 64. 189 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 178(1)–(4). 190 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 123; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 80(2). 191 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 171(1).

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712 START OF THE PROCEDURE order or the Court in question has declared it admissible, notwithstanding the failure to observe the formal requirements in question.192

E. Service by e-Curia 22.38

As instructed by the relevant Rules of Procedure,193 the Union Courts have set down by decision published in the Official Journal the criteria for a procedural document to be served by means of the e-Curia application (see further para. 22.73).194

III. Language Arrangements A. Language of a case 22.39

22.40

(1) Official languages of the European Union At present, a case before the Union Courts may be conducted in any of the following twenty-four languages: Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish, and Swedish.195 In other words, a language listed among the foregoing twenty-four official languages of the European Union may constitute the language of the case. (2) Determination of the language of the case in preliminary ruling proceedings In principle, the language of the case is the language of the national court or tribunal which made the reference for a preliminary ruling.196 This means that written observations must be drawn up, and the parties have to plead, in that language.197 Yet, this is subject to a number of derogations: Member States may use their official language or one of their official languages when taking part in preliminary ruling proceedings (including both written and oral observations);198 and States other than Member States which are party to the EEA Agreement, the EFTA Surveillance Authority, and non-Member States taking part in preliminary ruling proceedings pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Art.

192 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 171(2). 193 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 48(4); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 100(3). 194 For the Court of Justice, see Decision of 16 October 2018 on the lodging and service of procedural documents by means of e-Curia (n. 186), Arts 6–7. For the General Court, see Decision of 11 July 2018 on the lodging and service of procedural documents by means of e-Curia (n. 187), Arts 6–7. See also the document available on the website of the Court of Justice of the European Union on e-Curia applicable to the Union Courts: Conditions for the use of e-Curia, done at Luxembourg on 17 October 2018, points 21–27. 195 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 36; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 44. Accordingly, a language not listed in the foregoing provisions of the CJ and GC Rules of Procedure (e.g. Welsh, Luxembourgish, or Turkish) cannot serve as the language of a case. However, witnesses and experts may be authorized to use a language not capable of being a language of the case: CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 38(7); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 46(6). 196 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 37(3). 197 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 38(1). 198 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 38(4).

Language Arrangements 713 23 of the Statute (involving an agreement relating to a specific subject-matter concluded by the Council and one or more non-Member States providing for their participation in such proceedings) may be authorized to use an official language of the European Union other than the language of the case when they take part in preliminary ruling proceedings (again, with respect to both written and oral observations).199 Moreover, at the duly substantiated request of one of the parties to the main proceedings, the use of another official language of the European Union may be authorized, after the other party to the main proceedings and the Advocate General have been heard, but this is only in respect of the oral part of the procedure, and, where granted, such authorization applies in respect of all interested parties referred to in Art. 23 of the Statute.200 (3) Determination of the language of the case in direct actions In principle, the applicant chooses the language of the case,201 subject to the following exceptions: – Where the defendant is a Member State,202 the language of the case will be the official language of that State; where the State has more than one official language, the applicant may choose between them.203 – Where an application is submitted by an institution pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in a contract concluded by or on behalf of the Union, in accordance with Art. 272 TFEU, the language of the case will be the language in which the contract was concluded.204 – At the joint request of the parties, the President of the Court of Justice or the General Court may authorize another Union language to be used for all or part of the proceedings.205 – At the request of only one of the parties (which cannot be a Union institution206), the use of another official Union language may be authorized as the language of the case for all or part of the proceedings, but only after the opposing party and the Advocate General have been heard.207 Although requests for the use of another language are generally decided upon by the President of the Court of Justice or the General Court, where the President 199 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 38(5)–(6). 200 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 37(3). 201 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 37(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 45(1). 202 A Member State is also entitled to use its official language when it is bringing a matter before the Court of Justice pursuant to Art. 259 TFEU concerning an action for infringement against another Member State for its failure to fulfil its obligations under the Treaties: CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 38(4). 203 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 37(1)(a); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 45(1)(a). 204 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 45(1)(b). Where the contract has been drawn up in multiple languages, the applicant may choose between them. 205 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 37(1)(b); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 45(1)(c). 206 See T-630/19, AH v Eurofound, 2021, para. 20. 207 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 37(1)(c); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 45(1)(d). See T-535/19, H.R. Participations v EUIPO (order), 2020 (use of French instead of English during the oral part of the procedure). In the context of default proceedings, where a defendant party has not responded to the application and it appears from the facts that the defendant could not have ignored the notification of the application, the General Court appears to take a flexible approach towards GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 45(1)(c) and (d), allowing the use of another language for the application than the language applicable on the basis of Art. 45(1)(a) thereof in absence of a joint request or without hearing the defendant: see T-384/19, Parliament v Axa Assurances Luxembourg and Others, 2021,

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714 START OF THE PROCEDURE wishes to give such authorization but the parties do not agree, he or she must refer the request to the Court of Justice or the General Court, as the case may be.208

Although not expressly mentioned in the text of the CJ and GC Rules of Procedure, a request for leave to derogate from the rule on the use of the language of the case must be accompanied by a detailed and specific statement of reasons, especially where the request is made by the applicant in the course of the proceedings.209

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(4) Determination of the language in appeals and other special forms of procedure For certain types of proceedings—namely, appeals against decisions of the General Court,210 the review procedure by which the Court of Justice decides to review a decision of the General Court in accordance with Art. 62 of the Statute,211 and in the case of challenges concerning the costs to be recovered, applications to set aside judgments by default, third-party proceedings, and applications for interpretation or revision of a judgment or for the Court of Justice or General Court to remedy a failure to adjudicate (see Ch. 23)212—the language of the case is the language of the decision of the General Court or of the decision to which the particular application is brought.213 (5) Disputes relating to intellectual property rights The language of the case in disputes relating to intellectual property rights is determined in accordance with a special procedure laid down in Art. 45(4) of the GC Rules of Procedure on account of the fact that these disputes involve individuals. Under this provision, the language of the case is the language, chosen from among the twenty-four official Union languages, in which the application is drafted where the applicant was the only party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal or if no other party objects.214 If, within a period following the lodgement of the application determined by the Registrar, the parties agree to use an official Union language other than the one used in the application, that language will become the language of the case. If a party objects to the language used in the application being the language of the case and the parties cannot agree on the choice of language, the language of the decision that is contested before the General Court becomes the language of the case.215 However, if the President

paras 52–56 (appeal pending in C-766/21 P; opposition pending in T-384/19 OP); T-318/17, Clean Sky 2 Joint Undertaking v Revoind Industriale di Pindaru Gelu, 2021, paras 29–31. 208 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 37(4); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 45(2). 209 See T-738/16, La Quadrature du Net and Others v Commission (order), 2017, para. 32. 210 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 37(2)(a). 211 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 37(2)(b). 212 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 37(2)(c); see C-64/98 P-REV, Petrides v Commission (order), 2010, paras 14–16; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 45(3). 213 In case the appeal was drafted in another language than the language of the decision of the General Court, the appeal will be declared inadmissible without a possibility to regularize the mistake: see C-602/18 P, Star Television Productions v EUIPO (order), 2018, paras 6–11. 214 GC Rules of Procedure, Arts 45(4)(a) –(b). 215 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 45(4)(c).

Language Arrangements 715 or the General Court, on the matter being referred to it, finds that the use of that language would not enable all parties to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal to follow the proceedings and defend their interests and that only the use of another language would make it possible to remedy that situation, the President or the General Court may designate another official language as the language of the case after receipt of a reasoned request by any party and after hearing the other parties.216 (6) Use of the language of a case The language of the case is used in the written and oral pleadings of the parties, including supporting documents, that is, the items and documents produced or annexed to such pleadings, and also in the minutes and decisions of the Union Courts.217

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In proceedings before the Court of Justice, any supporting documents expressed in another language must be accompanied by a translation into the language of the case.218 This means that, if an intervener is not a Member State (see para. 23.04), it must in principle produce a translation into the language of the case of all documents and annexes which it produces.219 In the General Court, where material annexed to a procedural document is not accompanied by a translation into the language of the case, the Registrar shall require the party concerned to make good the irregularity if the President decides, of his or her own motion or at the request of a party, that a translation is necessary for the purposes of the efficient conduct of the proceedings.220 In case substantial items or lengthy documents are involved, translations may be confined to extracts, unless the Court of Justice or the General Court, as the case may be, calls for a complete or fuller translation of its own motion or at the request of a party.221 (7) Witnesses and experts A witness or expert who is unable adequately to express themselves in the language of the case may be authorized to use another language, even a language not included among the list of possible languages which may be used before the Court of Justice or the General Court.222 The Registrar arranges for translation into the language of the case.223

216 In application of GC Rules of Procedure, Arts 45(1)(b)–(c) and (2). 217 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 38(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 46(1). As regards written pleadings, see also GC Practice Rules, point 93, which states that, except for the cases expressly provided for in the GC Rules of Procedure, the Registrar refuses to accept procedural documents of the parties drawn up in a language other than the language of the case. 218 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 38(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 46(2). The translation of supporting documents may be lodged at the stage of the reply: see C-354/10, Commission v Greece, 2012, paras 31–35. 219 See T-11/95, BP Chemicals v Commission (order), 1996. But see paras T-699/20, Fashion Energy v EUIPO, 2021, 67–68. 220 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 46(2). 221 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 38(3); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 46(3). 222 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 38(7); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 46(6). 223 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 38(7); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 46(6).

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(8) Members of the Union Courts The President, the Vice-President, and also the Presidents of Chambers in conducting oral proceedings; Judges and Advocates General in putting questions; and Advocates General in delivering their opinions are entitled to use a language other than the language of the case.224 Here, too, the Registrar is responsible for arranging for translation into the language of the case.225 (9) Intervening States A Member State intervening in a case is entitled to use its official language (or one of its official languages at its election) during both the written and oral part of the procedure.226 Likewise, EEA States not being Member States of the European Union (i.e. Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway) and the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be authorized to use an official Union language other than the language of the case where they intervene in proceedings before the Court of Justice or the General Court for the purposes of both the written and oral part of the procedure.227 In these instances, again, it is the Registrar who arranges for translation into the language of the case.228 (10) Responsibility of the Registrar Furthermore, the Registrar is responsible for arranging for anything said or written in the course of the proceedings before the Court of Justice or the General Court to be translated into the languages chosen from the list of official Union languages which may serve as the language of a case.229 (11) Authentic text The texts of documents drawn up in the language of the case or, where applicable, in another language authorized by the Court of Justice or the General Court, as the case may be, are authentic.230

B. Internal language arrangements at the Court of Justice of the European Union 22.50

(1) Working language The working language of the Court of Justice of the European Union is French.231 This should not to be confused with the language of the case in which the proceedings before 224 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 38(8); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 46(7). 225 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 38(8); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 46(7). 226 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 38(4); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 46(4). 227 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 38(5); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 46(5). 228 CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 38(4)–(5); GC Rules of Procedure, Arts 46(4)–(5). 229 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 39(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 47. 230 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 41; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 49. 231 For a critical assessment of the continued use of French as the working language of the Union Courts, see K. Schiemann, ‘La langue de travail de la Cour’ in A. Tizzano, A. Rosas, R. Silva de Lapuerta, K. Lenaerts, and J. Kokott (eds), La Cour de justice de l’Union européenne sous la présidence de Vassilios Skouris (2003–2015). Liber amicorum Vassilios Skouris (Bruylant, 2015) 563.

Representation 717 the Union Courts are conducted. This means that the Union Courts use French for the purposes of their internal workings, for example, in their deliberations and for drafting preliminary reports, judgments, and orders. (2) Publications Publications of the Union Courts are issued in the languages referred to in Art. 1 of Council Regulation No. 1,232 that is to say, the twenty-four official languages of the European Union.233 (3) Language service The Court of Justice of the European Union has a language service staffed by experts with adequate legal training and a thorough knowledge of several official languages of the European Union.234

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IV. Representation A. General (1) Distinction between direct actions and preliminary ruling proceedings There is a distinction to be drawn between direct actions and preliminary ruling proceedings as regards the representation of the parties.235 In direct actions before the Union Courts, generally speaking, a party must be represented either by an agent or a lawyer, depending on its status,236 and, in turn, either a party or an agent may be assisted by an adviser.237 In preliminary ruling proceedings, the Court of Justice has regard to the rules of procedure applicable to the referring court or tribunal as far as the representation of the parties to the main proceedings (and their participation before the Court) is concerned.238 Consequently, parties to preliminary ruling proceedings do not necessarily have to be represented by a lawyer, in contrast to direct actions. This is the case where, in accordance with the applicable national rules of procedure, such a party may validly be otherwise represented before the national court (for example, by a representative of a trade union in employment disputes in some jurisdictions) or where a party is entitled to represent himself or herself.239

232 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 40; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 48. 233 See para. 22.39. 234 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 42. 235 See C‑515/17 P and C‑561/17 P, Uniwersytet Wrocławski v REA, 2020, para. 57. 236 Statute, Art. 19, first, second, and third paras; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 119(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 51(1). 237 Statute, Art. 19, first and fourth paras; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 44(1)(c); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 53(1)(c). 238 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 97(3). 239 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 47(2). For an example, see C-359/09, Ebert, 2011.

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22.55

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(2) Intermediaries The agents, advisers, and lawyers are intermediaries representing the parties. Only the person, Member State, or institution represented is a party to the proceedings before the Union Courts.240 (3) Agents Union institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies; Member States; EEA States which are not Member States of the European Union; and the EFTA Surveillance Authority are represented by an agent,241 who has to lodge an authority to act with the Registry of the Court of Justice or the General Court, as the case may be.242 An agent may be assisted by an adviser or by a lawyer entitled to practise before a court of a Member State.243 (4) Lawyers All other parties (for the purposes of direct actions) must be represented either by a lawyer who is entitled to practise before a court of a Member State or of an EEA State or by a university teacher who is a national of a Member State whose law accords him or her a right of audience244 (that is to say, as a university teacher and not as, say, a member of the Bar), even if the applicant is a lawyer with rights of audience before a national court or tribunal.245 It should be borne in mind that these are two cumulative conditions.246 Therefore, a person—other than a university teacher—having a right of audience before the courts of a Member State without being a lawyer cannot validly represent a party before the Union Courts.247

240 See T-151/03, Nuova Agricast v Commission (order), 2005, para. 29. 241 Statute, Art. 19, first and second paras. 242 CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 44(1)(a) and 119(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 51(3). 243 Statute, Art. 19, first and fourth paras; C-529/18 P and C-531/18 P, PJ and Others v EUIPO and Others, 2022, para. 62. 244 Statute, Art. 19, third, fourth, and seventh paras; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 47(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 56. It does not suffice that the person who signs the application is entitled to plead before a court of a Member State; the lawyer has to be a member of the Bar (see T-445/04, Energy Technologies v OHIM (order), 2005, paras 1– 3). The lawyer who signs the original of each pleading must be entitled to practise before a court of a Member State, even where the lawyer signs a pleading ‘on behalf of ’ another lawyer who satisfies this requirement and represents the party concerned (T-37/98, FTA and Others v Council (order), 2000, paras 26–32: application inadmissible on the grounds that the lawyer who had signed the pleading on behalf of a colleague was not entitled to practise before a court of a Member State); T-508/09, Guillermo Canas v Commission (order), 2012, paras 21–43 (a Swiss lawyer with right of audience in France was entitled to represent a party before the General Court); T-422/21, Daimler v EUIPO (order), paras 17–24 (lawyers with right of audience in the United Kingdom not entitled to represent a party before the Union Courts where the action in question is not covered by one of the situations referred to in the Withdrawal Agreement). 245 See C‑515/17 P and C‑561/17 P, Uniwersytet Wrocławski v REA, 2020, paras 58–59; C-529/18 P and C-531/18 P, PJ and Others v EUIPO and Others, 2022, para. 61; T-719/21, Correia de Matos v Commission (order), 2021, para. 8. 246 See C‑515/17 P and C‑561/17 P, Uniwersytet Wrocławski v REA, 2020, para. 55; T-128/21, Bese v EUIPO (order), 2021, para. 8. 247 See T-487/07, Imperial Chemical Industries v OHIM (order), 2008, paras 8–22; and T-422/21, Daimler v EUIPO (order), paras 14–16 (although having a right of audience before the courts of a Member State, a Patent Attorney Litigator is not a lawyer within the meaning of Art. 19 of the Statute and therefore cannot represent a party validly before the Union Courts); T-191/21, Svenska Metallkompaniet v EUIPO (order), 2021, paras 9–12 (a licensed legal counsel with a right of audience before the Finnish courts who is not a member of the Finnish bar is not a lawyer within the meaning of Art. 19 of the Statute).

Representation 719 The requirement to use a ‘third person’ as one’s lawyer is based on a conception of the lawyer’s role as collaborating in the administration of justice and as being required to provide, in full independence and in the overriding interests of justice, such legal assistance as his or her client needs.248 A lawyer is prevented from acting where it is obvious that the lawyer, although formally a third party in relation to the applicant, has economic or personal links either with the dispute or with one of the parties that call into question his or her genuine independence.249 Thus, the lawyer representing the party cannot be an officer of the applicant (for example, the director of the applicant company)250 or a member of the law firm in which the applicant is a co-partner and founding member.251 However, this does not exclude that certain ties between the lawyer representing a party and that party may exist. For example, a lawyer who is connected to a university by a contract for the provision of lecturing services or through a public-law statutory relationship, without defending the interests of that university in the context of a hierarchical relationship, is sufficiently independent and is allowed to represent that university before the Union Courts.252 The lawyer must lodge a certificate that he or she is entitled to practise before a court of a Member State or of a non-EU EEA State and an authority from the party which he or she represents.253 (5) Representation of legal persons If, in a case brought before the General Court, the applicant is a legal person governed by a private law, the lawyer must lodge an authority to act conferred on him or her by someone authorized for that purpose.254 Such authority must continue to exist throughout the proceedings. Revocation of an authority to act can only be done by somebody who has no conflict of interest. That is not the case, for example, where the authority of a lawyer representing a bank in an action for annulment against a decision of the European Central Bank (ECB) to withdraw the authorization of that bank is revoked by the liquidator of that bank where that liquidator was appointed at the suggestion of the financial services authority which also proposed to the ECB to withdraw the authorization of that bank. Since the annulment of the decision of the ECB would deprive the liquidation proceedings of their legal basis, the liquidator finds himself or

248 See C‑515/17 P and C‑561/17 P, Uniwersytet Wrocławski v REA, 2020, para. 62; C-529/18 P and C-531/18 P, PJ and Others v EUIPO and Others, 2022, para. 64; C-110/21 P, Universität Bremen v REA, 2022, paras 47–48. See also GC Practice Rules, ninth recital, which specifies that the parties’ representatives also act as ‘officers of the court’ in this regard. 249 See T-727/20, Kirimova v EUIPO (order), 2022, para. 24. 250 See T-184/04, Sulvida v Commission (order), 2005, paras 8–9; T-175/10, Milux v OHIM (order), 2011, para. 20; T-243/11, Glaxo Group v OHIM (order), 2011, paras 13–20 (an in-house lawyer for a company which is part of the same group of companies as the applicant cannot be considered a third person within the meaning of Art. 19 of the Statute). See also T-120/13, Codacons v Commission (order), 2013, paras 7–14. 251 See C-529/18 P and C-531/18 P, PJ and Others v EUIPO and Others, 2022, para. 81. See also T-727/20, Kirimova v EUIPO (order), 2022, paras 31– 34; T-83/20, bonnanwalt v EUIPO (order), 2022, paras 18– 36 (appeal pending in C-580/22 P). 252 See C‑515/17 P and C‑561/17 P, Uniwersytet Wrocławski v REA, 2020, para. 66; C-110/21 P, Universität Bremen v REA, 2022, paras 59–68. 253 CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 44(1)(b)–(c) and 119(3); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 51(2). 254 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 51(3). A similar requirement applies to proceedings before an EUIPO Board of Appeal (T-293/21, Muschaweck v EUIPO, 2022, paras 19–34).

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720 START OF THE PROCEDURE herself in a conflict of interests, both because of the role of the financial services authority in his or her appointment and in his or her own right, as it would mean the end of his or her appointment as a liquidator. Consequently, the power of that liquidator to revoke the authority of the lawyer infringed the right to effective judicial protection of the bank.255

22.58

(6) Regularization If necessary, the authority and proof of the status of the agent, lawyer, or adviser in question may be furnished within a ‘reasonable time’ to be prescribed by the Registrar.256 The sanction for failing to produce them within the time prescribed is that the Court of Justice, after hearing the Advocate General, or the General Court will decide whether non-compliance renders the application or the defence formally inadmissible.257

B. Rights and obligations 22.59

22.60

22.61

(1) Immunity Agents, advisers, and lawyers who appear before the Union Courts or before any judicial authority to which the Court of Justice or the General Court has addressed letters rogatory258 enjoy immunity in respect of words spoken or written by them concerning the case or the parties.259 (2) Privileges and facilities Agents, advisers, and lawyers also enjoy certain privileges and immunities, mainly concerning the exemption from search and seizure of papers and documents relating to the proceedings and being able to travel without hindrance.260 (3) Qualification and waiver To qualify for such privileges, immunities, and facilities, agents must produce an official document issued by the party for whom they act, with a copy immediately sent to the Registrar,261 while lawyers must produce a certificate that they are authorized to practise before a court of a Member State or an EEA State and, where the party they represent is a legal person governed by private law, an authority to act issued by that person.262 Advisers must produce an authority to act issued by the party whom they are assisting.263 These privileges, immunities, and facilities are granted exclusively in the 255 See C‑663/17 P, C‑665/17 P, and C‑669/17 P, ECB v Trasta Komercbanka, 2019, paras 72–75. 256 See T-6/20, Dr. Spiller v EUIPO, 2021, para. 23. 257 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 119(4); GC Rules of Procedure, Art 51(4). The regularization cannot, however, encompass the designation of a new lawyer where the lawyer mentioned in the application did not satisfy the ‘third person’ requirement: see C-573/11, ClientEarth v Council (order), 2013, para. 23. 258 See para. 24.62. 259 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 43(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 52(1). 260 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 43(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 52(2). 261 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 44(1)(a); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 53(1)(a). 262 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 44(1)(b); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 53(1)(b). 263 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 44(1)(c); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 53(1)(c).

Time-Limits 721 interest of the proper conduct of the proceedings.264 The Court of Justice or the General Court, as the case may be, may waive immunity where it considers that the proper conduct of the proceedings will not be hindered thereby.265 (4) Exclusion from the proceedings Any agent, adviser, or lawyer whose conduct towards the Court of Justice or the General Court is incompatible with the dignity of the respective Court or with the requirements of the proper administration of justice, or who uses his or her rights for purposes other than those for which they were granted, may be excluded from the proceedings by way of reasoned order with immediate effect.266 Where an agent, adviser, or lawyer is excluded from the proceedings, the proceedings will be suspended for a period fixed by the President of the respective Court so that the party concerned can appoint another agent, adviser, or lawyer.267

22.62

V. Time-Limits A. Distinction between procedural time-limits and limitation periods The procedural time-limits prescribed by the TFEU, the EAEC Treaty, the Statute, and the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice and the General Court are calculated in a uniform manner.268 Procedural time-limits, such as the time-limit for bringing an action for annulment269 or an appeal,270 are intended to ensure legal certainty, clarity, and the due administration of justice. They guarantee that an administrative or court decision becomes final after a certain period of time and thus serve the public interest. Therefore, procedural time-limits are a matter of public policy, compliance of which can be examined by the Union Courts of their own motion.271 Procedural time-limits are different from limitation periods, for example, in the context of an action for damages.272 Expiry of a limitation period leads to the extinction 264 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 45(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 54(1). 265 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 45(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 54(2). 266 CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 46(1)–(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Arts 55(1)–(2). Such decisions may be rescinded: CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 46(4); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 55(4). See also T-302/00 R, Goldstein v Commission (order of the President), 2001, paras 40–42. 267 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 46(3); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 55(3). 268 Any time-limit prescribed by the Union Courts pursuant to the Rules of Procedure (such as the time-limit for lodging the defence, reply, or rejoinder) may be extended: CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 52(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 61(1). Thus, a procedural document lodged out of time may be accepted where authorized by the President: GC Practice Rules, point 68. By contrast, time-limits imposed by the Treaties, such as the time-limit for bringing an action for annulment (Art. 263, sixth para. TFEU) or for failure to act (Art. 265, second para. TFEU) cannot be extended. 269 Art. 263, sixth para. TFEU. 270 Statute, Art. 56. 271 C-469/11 P, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, 2012, para. 50; T-562/19, Klein v Commission, 2020, para. 77. 272 See C-469/11 P, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, 2012, para. 49. Another example of this distinction is the revision of a judgment: while the time-limit for bringing an application for revision is within three months

22.63

722 START OF THE PROCEDURE of a legal action, which is a matter of substantive law, since it affects the enforceability of a subjective right which the person concerned can no longer effectively assert before the relevant court.273 On the one hand, a limitation period protects the interests of the aggrieved party, while, on the other hand, it protects the party responsible for the harm from a claim for damages unrestricted in time. A limitation period is thus not laid down to serve the public interest. Consequently, a claim that a limitation period has been breached cannot be examined by the Union Courts of their own motion.274

B. Preliminary objection 22.64

The correct calculation of procedural time-limits is of utmost importance for a litigant being able to enjoy judicial protection before the Union Courts, since if a party lodges its application after the expiry of the procedural time-limit concerned, its application will be held inadmissible. Moreover, if a defendant considers that the applicant has lodged its action out of time, that defendant may lodge by separate document an objection of inadmissibility on such grounds without even having to go into the merits of the case (see para. 23.52).275

C. Main steps in the calculation of procedural time-limits 22.65

The calculation of a procedural time-limit prescribed by the Treaties, Statute, and Rules of Procedure of the Union Courts can generally be summarized as involving four main steps, which are each elaborated further in this section. – The first step concerns the determination of the dies a quo, or the day on which time starts running, and there is special consideration in the case of actions for annulment where the contested act has been published in the Official Journal. – The second step concerns the counting of the duration of the particular procedural time-limit, for example, two months in the case of an application for an action for annulment,276 six weeks from publication of the notice of the application in the Official Journal in the case of intervention,277 three months in case of an appeal against a rejection of a complaint by an appointing authority,278 of the date on which the facts on which the application is founded came to the applicant’s knowledge (CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 159(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 169(2)), the Statute prescribes a limitation period of ten years from the date of judgment, after which time no application for revision may be made (Statute, Art. 44, third para.). For further discussion of revision, see para. 25.41. 273 See C-469/11 P, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, 2012, para. 52. 274 See C-469/11 P, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, 2012, para. 51. 275 See CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 151; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 130. 276 See Art. 263, sixth para. TFEU. In addition to the present section, for further discussion of the calculation of time-limits in the context of an action for annulment, see para. 7.146. 277 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 130(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 143(1). See further para. 23.14. 278 Staff Regulations, Art. 91(3). See para. 16.25.

Time-Limits 723 or two months after service in the case of the filing of the defence to an application.279 – The third step involves adding on ten days for distance.280 – The fourth step concerns the determination of the dies ad quem, or the final day on which time stops running, including whether such day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or official holiday, in which case it must be carried over to the next business day.

These steps must all be followed, and in the right order; that is, there should be no checking whether the applicable day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or official holiday until the last step, which is sometimes an error made by parties.

D. Dies a quo As far as the day from which time starts running (dies a quo) is concerned, the following is important. Time-limits calculated from the moment at which an event occurs or an action takes place start to run on the day after the event occurs or the action takes place.281

22.66

E. Starting point in case of publication Where the time-limit allowed for initiating proceedings against an act adopted by an institution runs from the publication of that act, that time-limit shall be calculated from the end of the fourteenth day after publication of the act in the Official Journal.282

279 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 124(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 81(1). See further para. 24.25. 280 The extension of ten days on account of distance applies irrespective of the method of lodging a procedural document and thus also for lodging an action by means of the e-Curia application: see T-467/20, Inditex v EUIPO, 2021, paras 31–35. 281 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 49(1)(a); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 58(1)(a). Note that an implied decision rejecting a request may also constitute an event or action that makes time run: see T-726/17, Commune de Fessenheim and Others v Commission (order), 2018, para. 29. See also Art. 91(3) of the Staff Regulations. 282 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 50; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 59. This rule applies to all acts published in the electronic version of the Official Journal, and not only to acts whose publication is necessary in order for them to enter into effect (see T-264/03, Schmoldt and Others v Commission (order), 2004, paras 51–62). Under former Art. 102(1) of the GC Rules of Procedure of 2 May 1991, this rule also applied if an act was only published on the website of a Union institution, body, office, or agency, and not in the Official Journal (see C-625/11 P, PPG and SNF v ECHA, 2013, paras 30–37). However, with the entry into force of the GC Rules of Procedure of 4 March 2015, this case-law is no longer valid. Art. 59 GC Rules of Procedure refers exclusively to publication in the Official Journal. Therefore, the fourteen-day period does not apply in case of a website publication, and the two-month period starts to run on the day of publication (see T-160/20, 3M Belgium v ECHA (order), 2021, paras 45–59; see T-883/16, Poland v Commission, 2019, paras 36–37). An action against an act can, however, be brought prior to its publication if the applicant has knowledge of the existence of such act at an earlier date (C-626/11 P, PPG and SNF v ECHA, 2013 para. 41), for example, where the act was notified to it before publication in the Official Journal (see T-556/15, Portugal v Commission (order), 2016, paras 27–28). However, the date of publication of a press release announcing the adoption of a decision does not cause the two-month time-limit to run (see T-883/16, Poland v Commission, 2019, para. 42). Conversely, in the context of Regulation (EC) No. 1907/2006 (REACH), the publication or the update on ECHA’s website of a candidate list for inclusion of substances in Annex XIV in accordance with Art. 59(10) of that regulation is considered a publication that causes the two-month time limit for bringing an action provided for in Art. 263, sixth para. TFEU to run (see T-160/20, 3M Belgium v ECHA (order), 2021, paras 33–35).

22.67

724 START OF THE PROCEDURE Since 1 July 2013, only the Official Journal published in electronic form is authentic and produces legal effects.283 In particular, this rule applies in the case of lodging an action for annulment which, in the absence of notification, must in principle be instituted within two months of the publication of the contested act in accordance with the sixth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU (see para. 7.150).284 Further to this, where the contested act constitutes a restrictive measure vis-à-vis a natural or legal person, the Union institutions are under an obligation to communicate as soon as possible after the publication of the act in the Official Journal the grounds on which that restrictive measure is based. Time-limits do not start to run in respect of the affected natural or legal person as long as the restrictive measure has not been notified or otherwise communicated to that person.285

F. Duration of the period 22.68

As far as the running and duration of the period are concerned, it should be noted that Saturdays, Sundays, official holidays, and judicial vacations count towards the period.286 In other words, they are included as part of the calculation; it is only if the last day on which time stops running (the dies ad quem) falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or official holiday that time must be extended as discussed below (see para. 22.70).

G. Extension of ten days on account of distance 22.69

In addition, all procedural time-limits are currently subject to a standard extension of ten days on account of distance.287 This extension applies to all parties, including Union institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies.288 Formerly, there were different extensions on account of distance for different countries. The idea behind this was that, even

283 Council Regulation (EU) No. 216/2013 of 7 March 2013 on the electronic publication of the Official Journal (OJ 2013 L69/1), Arts 1(2) and 5. 284 This rule also applies in the case of the lodging of an application initiating third-party proceedings which must be submitted within two months of publication of the contested decision in the Official Journal: see CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 157(3); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 167(2). See further para. 25.36. 285 See T-322/19, El-Qaddafi v Council, 2021, paras 51–72 (appeal pending in C-413/21 P). This case-law also applies to a statement of modification in case of a renewal of a restrictive measure subsequent to the decision contested in the application (see T-151/18, Ben Ali, 2020, para. 69; T-322/19, El-Qaddafi v Council, 2021, para. 71). Furthermore, in case a person has been notified of a restrictive measure taken against him or her before the publication of that decision in the Official Journal, the date of notification is the relevant date and not the date of publication (see C-478/11 to C-482/11, Gbagbo and Others v Council (order), 2013, paras 53–64). See further para. 7.152. 286 CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 49(1)(d) and (e); GC Rules of Procedure, Arts 58(1)(d) and (e). See T-75/14, USFSPEI v Parliament and Council, 2017, para. 57. For the current list of official holidays (which according to CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 24(6) are published annually in the Official Journal), see the Decision of the CJ of 1 February 2022 on official holidays and judicial vacations (OJ 2022 C138/02), which is applicable to the General Court (GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 58(3)). Under Art. 1 of this Decision, eleven official holidays are listed: New Year’s Day, Easter Monday, 1 May, 9 May, Ascension Day, Whit Monday, 23 June, 15 August, 1 November, 25 December, and 26 December. 287 Statute, Art. 45, first para.; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 51; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 60. 288 See C-245/95 P, Commission v NTN Corporation and Koyo Seiko, 1998, paras 19–23.

Time-Limits 725 though procedural documents were validly served at the parties’ address for service in Luxembourg, an extension of time was necessary for parties that resided or were established a long way away so as to give all the parties the same time in which to prepare for their participation in the proceedings before the Union Courts. These extensions were subsequently replaced with a blanket extension of ten days, irrespective of what country a party comes from. The extension on account of distance is not to be regarded as separate from the procedural time-limit, but merely as a prolongation of it.289 As the five-year limitation period for bringing an action for damages290 is not a procedural time-limit,291 no extension on account of distance is applicable when such action is lodged.292

H. Dies ad quem As far as the day on which time stops running (dies ad quem) is concerned, two 22.70 aspects must be borne in mind. First, there is the rule that if the period would otherwise end on a Saturday, a Sunday, or an official holiday, it is extended until the end of the first following working day.293 Second, the last day of the period is determined as follows: ‘A time-limit expressed in weeks, months or in years shall end with the expiry of whichever day in the last week, month or year is the same day of the week, or falls on the same date, as the day during which the event or action from which the time-limit is to be calculated occurred or took place. If, in a time-limit expressed in months or years, the day on which it should expire does not occur in the last month, the time-limit shall end with the expiry of the last day of that month; where a time- limit is expressed in months and days, it shall first be calculated in whole months, then in days.’294 It should be noted that the key day for determining the last day of a period is the actual day corresponding to the one on which the event or action occurred which caused time to start running, and not the day after, even though that is the day on which time

289 See T-85/97, Horeca-Wallonie v Commission (order), 1997, para. 26. Consequently, the last day of the time- limit is the day on which the procedural time-limit, together with the time on account of distance, runs out. This is important in order to determine whether the time-limit may be extended because the last day is a Saturday, a Sunday, or an official holiday (see para. 22.68). In the Horeca-Wallonie case (T-85/97), the applicant argued that the procedural time-limit, the ‘last’ day of which fell on Easter Monday—an official holiday—had to be extended, after which time on account of distance started to run. The General Court rejected this argument. See also T-75/14, USFSPEI v Parliament and Council, 2017, para. 57. 290 Statute, Art. 46. 291 See para. 22.63. 292 C-469/11 P, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, 2012, para. 59. For further discussion of the limitation period for actions for damages against the Union, see para. 11.62. The time-limits for bringing the defence, reply, and rejoinder are, however, extended on account of distance, even in the context of an action for damages, since they constitute procedural time-limits. 293 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 49(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 58(2), first para. For the list of official holidays, see n. 286. 294 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 49(1)(b) and (c); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 58(1)(b) and (c). These provisions on the dies ad quem codify the rule developed in the case-law. See 152/85, Misset v Council, 1987, para. 8; 281/85, 283/85 to 285/85, and 287/85, Germany and Others v Commission, 1987, paras 5–6.

726 START OF THE PROCEDURE actually started to run. Although this may appear contradictory, it is in fact logical, as the following example shows: if the period for bringing an action for annulment starts running as a result of notification of the contested act on 3 April, then the two months within which the action must be brought run from 4 April at 0 hours (i.e. the dies a quo, being the day after notification) to 3 June at 24 hours (i.e. the dies ad quem, that is to say, the day which falls on the same date as ‘the day during which the event or action from which the period is to be calculated occurred or took place’, namely, the date of notification). Thus, the period amounts to precisely two months. A further example involving notification of the contested act may be used to illustrate the rules set out above: a Commission decision is notified to an undertaking established in the Netherlands on 14 October 2022. The usual two-month time-limit ends at midnight on 14 December 2022, but is extended by ten days on account of distance, that is, to midnight on 24 December 2022, a Saturday, which produces a further extension to midnight of the first working day, that is, of Tuesday 27 December 2022, as Monday 26 December 2022 is an official holiday.295 If the act is published in the Official Journal on 15 October (of any year), time starts running from the end of the fourteenth day after publication, meaning from 29 October at 24 hours, which equals 30 October at 0 hours. The two months are reached on 29 December at 24 hours, but ten days on account of distance must be added. The dies ad quem is 8 January at 24 hours, unless it is a Saturday or a Sunday, in which case it is extended until 24 hours of the next working day.296

I. The Court of Justice of the European Union is never closed 22.71

On a practical note, documents may be handed in at the entrance of the Court of Justice and the General Court at any time of the day or night; the relevant staff member will note the exact time of receipt and this will be decisive evidence.297

J. Lodgement at the Registry 22.72

Under Art. 57(6) of the CJ Rules of Procedure and Art. 72(2) of the GC Rules of Procedure, the day to be taken into account for calculating procedural time-limits is the date of lodgement of the original at the Registry. The date on which a pleading or other document is registered at the Registry is therefore not determinative.298

295 For the list of official holidays, see n. 286. 296 See T-436/14, Neka Novin v Council (order), para. 27; T-674/20, TLP v Parliament and Council (order), 2021, para. 9. 297 CJ Practice Directions, point 48; GC Practice Rules, point 7. 298 See T-145/98, ADT Projekt v Commission, 2000, para. 80.

Time-Limits 727

K. Lodgement by telefax, e-Curia, or any other means of communication Where a procedural document is lodged with the appropriate Registry by telefax or any 22.73 other technical means of communication available to the Court of Justice (i.e. e-mail), the date of receipt is deemed to be the date of lodgement,299 provided that the signed original of the pleading is lodged at the Registry no later than ten days thereafter.300 A similar rule applies at the General Court for procedural documents lodged via e- Curia before the supporting documents required for validation of the access account have been produced.301 Such requirement does not exist for the lodging of documents made by means of e-Curia. For the calculation of time-limits, a procedural document is deemed to have been lodged by means of e-Curia at the time of the party representative’s validation of lodgement of that document.302 A party’s representative lodging documents by telefax has to take into account the average transmission time between two telefaxes. Only the time of receipt at the Registry will constitute the time of lodgement, not the time of sending as confirmed by the telefax of the representative. This is of particular importance if applications are lodged by telefax only minutes before the expiry of the time-limit.303

L. Excusable error, unforeseeable circumstances, or force majeure Finally, it should be mentioned that the expiry of a procedural time-limit cannot be pleaded if the other party proves the existence of an excusable error,304 unforeseen circumstances,305 or force majeure.306 This exceptional rule is applicable to any procedural

299 The time-zone of the seat of the Union Courts applies, which is Luxembourg time. This should be taken into account when lodging applications from a different time-zone. See T-468/10, Doherty v Commission (order), 2011, para. 16; T-469/10, Conneely v Commission (order), 2011, para. 16; T-470/10, Oglesby v Commission (order), 2011, para. 16. 300 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 57(7). The period of ten days is not a procedural time-limit and cannot be extended by the period on account of distance (see para. 22.69). In the event of any discrepancy between the signed original and the copy previously lodged, only the date of lodgement of the signed original will be taken into consideration (CJ Practice Directions, point 49). For an example, see C-138/14 P, Faktor B. i W. Gęsina v Commission (order), 2014: the application was inadmissible because the original was not lodged with the Registry within ten days. 301 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 56a(4). 302 CJ Decision of 16 October 2018 on the lodging and service of procedural documents by means of e-Curia (n. 186), Art. 5; GC Decision of 11 July 2018 on the lodging and service of procedural documents by means of e-Curia (n. 187), Art. 5. 303 See T-468/10, Doherty v Commission (order), 2011, para. 22. 304 See C-575/19 P, GMP-Orphan v Commission (order), 2020, para. 36 ; C-74/22 P(I), Soudal and Esko-Graphics v Magnetrol and Commission (order), 2022, para. 70. 305 See T-36/18, Asahi Intecc v EUIPO, 2018, paras 22–24. 306 Statute, Art. 45, second para. On the notion of force majeure, see T-544/21, Cheers Interactive (India) Private Ltd v EUIPO (order), 2022, para. 28. On the distinction between an excusable error, on the one hand, and an unforeseeable circumstance or force majeure, on the other, see C-426/10 P, Bell & Ross v OHIM, 2011, paras 47–48; T-404/08, Fluorsid and Minmet v Commission, 2013, paras 60–61.

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728 START OF THE PROCEDURE time-limit,307 but the Union Courts take an extremely strict view.308 A temporary unavailability of e-Curia just before the expiry of the time-limit does not in itself constitute a case of force majeure, since a party’s representative should make use of any other appropriate means available to lodge the application, inter alia, via e-mail.309 Force majeure will also not be accepted when a representative is faced with a temporary dysfunction of the Registry’s telefax while sending a large number of applications just before the expiry of the time-limit.310 It is thus advised not to wait until the last moment to lodge an application. The typical case of a clerical error made by the representative of one of the parties is not enough to bring the rule into play.311 Likewise, the slowness of postal services does not constitute in itself a case of force majeure or an unforeseeable circumstance.312 Conversely, the Union Courts have referred to circumstances that could lead to a finding of force majeure, such as an administrative breakdown, a natural disaster, or a strike.313 Nonetheless, to rely on this exceptional rule remains a great—and hence unwarranted—risk.314

307 But see C-187/18 P(I), Müller and Others v QH and Parliament (order of the Vice-President), 2018, para. 39. 308 See T-160/20, 3M Belgium v ECHA (order), 2021, para. 63. For example, the General Court did not accept the ‘chaotic situation’ created by the dramatic severity of the Covid-19 pandemic in India as an unforeseen circumstance or a case of force majeure. Among various other reasons, the General Court pointed out that the health measures implemented by the local government to which the applicant referred were only introduced thirty-five days after the date on which the period for bringing the action started to run. The General Court also did not accept that the circumstances upon which the applicant relied were unforeseeable at the time since they occurred 12 months after the global outbreak of the pandemic. Ultimately, the General Court attributed the failure to bring an application in time to a lack of diligence on the part of the applicant company: see T-544/21, Cheers Interactive (India) Private Ltd v EUIPO (order), 2022. Conversely, the Court of Justice accepted on the basis of a combination of factors (departure by the General Court from long-standing practice, letter sent by the Registry of the General Court giving rise to pardonable confusion in the mind of the party acting in good faith as to the scope of that letter and the opportunity of bringing without delay an appeal against the decision contained therein, and lack of clarity regarding the legal basis on which the appeal should have been brought) that the error that led an appellant to bring an appeal out of time was excusable: see C-74/22 P(I), Soudal and Esko-Graphics v Magnetrol and Commission (order), 2022, paras 69–84. 309 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 56(a)(5). These include lodging of a paper version or transmission by post, e-mail, or fax. See GC Decision of 11 July 2018 on the lodging and service of procedural documents by means of e-Curia (n. 187), Art. 7. See T-652/20, TO v EEA (order), 2021. 310 See T-468/10, Doherty v Commission (order), 2011, 1497, paras 20–22; T-469/10, Conneely v Commission (order), 2011, paras 20–22; T-470/10, Oglesby v Commission (order), 2011, paras 20–22. In these cases, the representative tried to lodge seven applications just before midnight. Only one application reached the General Court before the expiry of the time-limit. The representative claimed that this was caused by a temporary dysfunction of the Registry’s telefax between 23:53 and 23:57 while sending the first application, which reached the General Court in time. The General Court rejected this argument, stating that, as a result of the average transmission time, the other applications would never have reached the Registry before midnight, even if the Registry’s telefax had functioned correctly. 311 See para. 7.148. 312 See C-660/17 P, RF v Commission, 2019, para. 42. 313 See C-138/14 P, Faktor B. i W. Gęsina v Commission (order), para. 23; T-728/18, BRANDIP Licensing v EUIPO (order), 2019, para. 18. 314 See C-239/97, Ireland v Commission (order), 1998, paras 7–10 (the fact that a courier service had not been able to deliver the application to the Registry on time because of technical difficulties was not considered to constitute force majeure, particularly since the applicant had waited until the day before time was due to run out (including time on account of distance) before sending the application from Ireland); T-880/16, RF v Commission (order), 2017, para. 30 (the fact that the signed original of the application had taken seventeen days to arrive at the Registry of the General Court, even though it was sent by registered mail on the day of lodging the application by telefax, was not considered to constitute force majeure or an unforeseen circumstance).

Legal Aid 729

VI. Legal Aid A. Legal aid in preliminary ruling proceedings Parties to the main proceedings unable to meet the costs of the proceedings before the Court of Justice may apply at any time for legal aid.315 The applicant should submit all documents necessary to allow the Court to assess its financial situation.316 A certificate issued by the competent national authorities attesting to the financial situation of the applicant is required.317 The Court will also take into account whether the applicant received legal aid before the referring court.318 The decision on the application for legal aid is taken by the smallest formation to which the Judge-R apporteur in the case has been assigned.319 The application for legal aid can be granted in whole or in part. The order refusing the application for legal aid, either wholly or partially, shall be reasoned.320The order granting the legal aid sets out the conditions under which the Court’s cashier shall be responsible for the costs involved. Parties and their representatives may request an advance on those costs to be paid.321 Legal aid may be withdrawn where the circumstances which led to its being granted change in the course of proceedings to such an extent that legal aid is no longer required.322

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B. Legal aid in direct actions (1) General A party that is wholly or in part unable to meet the costs of the proceedings may at any time apply for legal aid.323 The application, which need not be made through a lawyer,324 has to be accompanied by evidence of the applicant’s need of assistance, in particular by a document from the competent authority under national law certifying that party’s lack of means.325

315 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 115(1). 316 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 115(2). 317 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 115(2). 318 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 115(3). 319 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 116(1)–(3). 320 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 116(4). 321 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 117. 322 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 118. 323 GC Rules of Procedure, Arts 146(1) and 147(1). Taking into account the allocation of jurisdiction between the Union Courts, it should be pointed out that legal aid in direct actions is only relevant in proceedings before the General Court. This explains why there are no provisions on legal aid included in the specific title on direct actions in the CJ Rules of Procedure, as compared to that concerning preliminary ruling proceedings and appeals. See further CJ Supplementary Rules, Arts 4–5 and Annex II. 324 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 147(6). 325 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 147(3) (a legal aid application form is available on the website of the Court of Justice and should be used to this effect).

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730 START OF THE PROCEDURE 22.77

22.78

22.79

22.80

(2) Application may be made prior to proceedings An application for legal aid may be made prior to proceedings which the applicant wishes to commence. If such an application is made, it must briefly state the subject of the proceedings.326 The introduction of an application for legal aid suspends the period prescribed for the bringing of the action until the date of notification of the decision of the General Court with respect to the legal aid.327 (3) Decision of the Court Orders of the General Court relating to legal aid are not amenable to appeal.328 If the application for legal aid is refused, the order will state the reasons for such refusal.329 If circumstances alter during the proceedings, the General Court may at any time, either of its own motion or on application, withdraw legal aid.330 In the General Court, the President decides whether legal aid should be granted.331 (4) Legal aid is granted If legal aid is granted, the cashier of the General Court advances the necessary funds. An order granting legal aid may specify an amount to be paid to the lawyer appointed to act for the person concerned or fix a limit which the lawyer’s fees and disbursements may not, in principle, exceed.332 Subsequently, the General Court may recover these costs from the opposing party if a costs order is made against it.333 (5) Necessity The principal reason why legal aid must be available is that individuals must invariably be represented before the General Court by a lawyer. In the event that they were unable to pay lawyer’s fees, they would have no access to the Union Courts.334 This is why the budget of the Court of Justice of the European Union contains an item covering legal aid.

326 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 147(4). 327 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 147(7). The suspension of the time-limit also covers the act replacing or amending the act initially referred to in the application where the replacement or amendment occurs during the time-period to process the application for legal aid and the claims directed against both acts have in essence the same subject-matter. An applicant is thus not obliged to submit a second application for legal aid, but may modify the initial application by way of a statement of modification: see T-151/18, Ben Ali, 2020, paras 31–65. 328 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 148(8). 329 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 148(3). 330 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 150(1). 331 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 148(2). 332 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 149(1). 333 GC Rules of Procedure, Arts 149(3)–(4). Under normal circumstances, legal aid does not cover the expenses of the other party. Since the risk for the impecunious party of having to bear the other party’s costs in the event that that party loses the case may in itself constitute an impediment to access to justice, Art. 149(5) of the GC Rules of Procedure provides: ‘Where the recipient of the aid is unsuccessful, the General Court may, in its decision as to costs, closing the proceedings, if equity so requires, order that one or more parties should bear their own costs or that those costs should be borne, in whole or in part, by the cashier of the General Court by way of legal aid.’ 334 However, an application for legal aid made by the defendant at the moment the General Court had already decided to give judgment under the default procedure without opening the oral procedure does not serve any purpose and will be dismissed: see T-464/09, Commission v New Acoustic Music Association and Hildibrandsdottir, 2011, paras 72–75. Indeed, as a rule, legal aid must be restricted to covering the costs of proceedings incurred either at the same time as, or after, the making of the application: see T-320/07 AJ, Jones v Commission (order), 2009, para. 10.

Legal Aid 731

C. Legal aid in appeals There are specific provisions concerning legal aid in appeals as set forth in Arts 185–189 of the CJ Rules of Procedure. By and large, they parallel the procedural rules governing legal aid in direct actions before the General Court. However, there are specific rules regarding the formation of the Court of Justice that gives the decision on the application for legal aid.335

335

See CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 187.

22.81

23 INCIDENTAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE I. Intervention A. Aim of intervention (1) Objective The outcome of proceedings before the Union Courts may affect Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies; Member States; and natural or legal persons, even though they are not parties. Intervention generally allows them to join voluntarily in the proceedings on the side of one of the parties. This enables the Union Courts to take their standpoint into account in deciding the case. (2) Pleas which an intervener may raise Intervention does not constitute a means for third parties to enter the proceedings by the back door as parties thereto. In the first place, interveners’ submissions must be limited to supporting, in whole or in part, the form of order sought by one of the parties (see paras 22.19 and 24.32).1 The intervener may therefore only raise pleas and arguments in support of this form of order.2 Although an intervener cannot submit claims

1 Statute, Art. 40, fourth para.; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 129(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 142(1). The Court of Justice seems to interpret this provision flexibly, depending on the particular circumstances of the proceedings before it. If it appears from the statement in intervention as a whole and from the context that the intervener intends to cast further light on the dispute and so contribute to the success of the claim of the party which it is supporting, the ‘form of order sought’ set out in the statement in intervention is intended to support the party in favour of whom intervention is made, even if its literal wording seems to refer to another aim (see C-377/98, Netherlands v Parliament and Council, 2001, paras 7–11). However, where the intervening party intends an outcome different from that pursued by the party it supports, the intervention will be declared inadmissible. See C-38/03, Commission v Belgium, 2005, paras 7–9 (intervening Member State seeking the dismissal of the infringement action, while Member State at issue not seeking the dismissal of the infringement action). Moreover, in appeal proceedings, the interplay with the outcome at first instance must be taken into account for the purposes of such an assessment: see C-689/19 P, VodafoneZiggo Group v Commission (order of the President), 2020, para. 20 (intervention in support of form of order sought by Commission to dismiss appeal against decision that action was inadmissible not allowed, as intervening party sought the dismissal of the appeal on substantive grounds). 2 See C-449/14 P, DTS Distribuidora de Televisión Digital v Commission, 2016, para. 121; T-303/16, Mylan IRE Healthcare v Commission, 2022, para. 41 (appeal pending in C-237/22 P). A party which intervenes on appeal and was not a party to the proceedings before the General Court cannot therefore claim that the annulment pronounced by that Court in the contested judgment should apply equally to it: see C-245/95 P, Commission v NTN Corporation and Koyo Seiko, 1998, para. 24.

EU Procedural Law. Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak, Oxford University Press. © Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833086.003.0023

23.01

23.02

734 INCIDENTAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE which go beyond those in support of which it makes its intervention, it may support those claims only partly.3

23.03

(3) Pleas, arguments, and procedural rights The intervener is at liberty to put forward different pleas and arguments independently.4 Indeed, if it were not able to do so, intervention would serve no purpose, as the intervener would have to confine itself to repeating the pleas and arguments put forward by the party which it supported.5 An intervener is, moreover, not bound to discuss all the arguments put forward by the parties.6 That being said, the pleas and arguments developed by the intervener may not alter the framework of the dispute as defined by the forms of order sought and the pleas raised by the main parties.7 Consequently, new pleas and new arguments that are unconnected with the subject-matter of the dispute as defined by the main parties cannot be invoked by the intervener.8 Thus, an intervener is not entitled to raise an objection of inadmissibility not raised by the defendant.9 The

3 See T-171/02, Regione Autonoma della Sardegna v Commission, 2005, para. 93. 4 See T-380/17, HeidelbergCement and Others v Commission, 2020, para. 81; T‑816/17 and T‑318/18, Luxembourg v Commission, 2021, para. 135 (appeal pending in C-457/22 P). 5 See 30/59, De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v High Authority, 1961 ECR 1, 18; T-612/17, Google and Others v Commission, 2021, para. 192 (appeal pending in C-48/22 P). 6 See C-156/93, Parliament v Commission, 1995, para. 15; T-459/93 Siemens v Commission, 1995, paras 21–23. 7 See C-883/19 P, HSBC Holdings and Others v Commission (order of the President), 2020, para. 9; T-616/18, Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo v Commission, 2022, paras 111–114 (appeal pending in C-255/22 P). A contestation of elements of the factual framework set out by the main parties does not automatically entail a change of the legal framework of the dispute: see T-279/19, Front Polisario v Council (order), 2019, para. 42. It should be pointed out that older case law suggested that an intervener could only raise new arguments but no new pleas (see T-114/02, BaByliss v Commission, 2003, paras 416–419). While it is in theory possible to make a distinction between pleas and arguments (C-272/12 P, Commission v Ireland and Others, AG Bot Opinion, 2013, point 66), it is not always possible to do so in practice (see C-185/00 Commission v Finland, 2003, paras 91–92). Also, the Court has used the notions interchangeably (see C-71/07 P, Campoli v Commission, 2008, para. 63). At present, the distinction has become less important, as the Union Courts appear to give largely the same procedural treatment to pleas and arguments. See, in relation to the amplification of pleas in law in the course of proceedings, C-439/11 P, Ziegler v Commission, 2013, para. 46; C-185/20 P, Hungary v Commission (order), 2022, para. 46. 8 See C-654/17 P, Bayerische Motoren Werke v Commission and Freistaat Sachsen, 2019, para. 50. See T-447/93, T-448/93, and T-449/93, AITEC and Others v Commission, 1995, para. 122: the intervener stepped outside the framework of the dispute by contesting that a measure constituted State aid within the meaning of Art. 107 TFEU, while the main parties had not questioned its nature as State aid; T-243/94 British Steel v Commission, 1997, paras 70–73: an argument based on the EEA Agreement raised by the intervener was held to be inadmissible because the applicant had not alleged that the Agreement had been breached. Consequently, the argument fell outside the framework of the dispute; T-2/03, Verein für Konsumenteninformation v Commission, 2005, paras 49–53: arguments raised by an intervener supporting the form of order sought by the Commission (dismissal of an action for annulment), which would permit a finding that the contested decision is unlawful are inadmissible since consideration by the Court of such arguments would have the effect of altering the framework of the dispute as defined in the application and the defence; T-263/15 RENV, Gmina Miasto Gdynia and Others v Commission, 2021, para. 86 (appeal pending in C-163/22 P): an intervener cannot put forward a plea in law which the main parties to the proceedings cannot raise in an admissible way. 9 See C-313/90, CIRFS and Others v Commission, 1993, paras 19–22; C-225/91, Matra v Commission, 1993, paras 11–12; T-471/11, Éditions Odile Jacob v Commission, 2014, paras 36–38; T-413/13, City Cycle Industries v Council, 2015, paras 42–43; T-276/13, Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association v Council, 2016, para. 157; compare the old case-law: 42/59 and 49/59, SNUPAT v High Authority, 1961 ECR 53, 75 (where an objection of inadmissibility not raised by the defendant was allowed to be raised on the ground that it sought the rejection of the form of order sought by the applicant). The broad wording employed in that judgment was, however, qualified in C-305/86 and C-160/87, Neotype Techmashexport v Commission and Council, 1990, para. 18, in which the Court of Justice left it undecided whether an intervener is entitled to raise an objection of inadmissibility not raised by the party it is supporting because it held that the objection was one based on public policy which the Court could raise of its own motion under Art. 150 of the CJ Rules of Procedure. In the CIRFS, Matra, Éditions Odile Jacob,

Intervention 735 reasons for this are that submissions in an application to intervene must be limited to supporting the submissions of one of the parties,10 and that the intervener must accept the case as it finds it at the time of its intervention.11 This means that the intervener is bound by any acts which have already been carried out in the course of the proceedings. In proceedings for interim relief, in which the urgency of an application for interim measures is assessed in the light of the extent to which they are necessary in order to avoid serious and irreparable damage, the intervener may assert its interests, but cannot widen the subject-matter of the dispute by laying claim to a personal right to interim legal protection.12 Finally, the intervention does not give rise to any right for the interveners to request that a hearing be held.13

B. Substantive requirements (1) Who can intervene? Union institutions, Member States, and States that are parties to the EEA Agreement, as well as the EFTA Surveillance Authority, insofar as the case falls within the field of application of the EEA Agreement, are entitled to intervene in cases before the Court of Justice or the General Court.14 The same right is ‘open to bodies, offices and agencies of the Union and to any other person establishing an interest in the result of any case submitted to the Court’.15 The term ‘case’ refers only to contentious procedures before the Union Courts designed to settle a dispute, and does not encompass preliminary ruling proceedings.16 The expression ‘any other person’ covers both natural and legal persons. Entities not formally having legal personality may be given leave to intervene if they have the ability, however circumscribed, to undertake autonomous action and to assume liability. This is because those characteristics constitute the basis for legal personality.17 Consequently, an entity within the EU framework which takes decisions that have legal effects only within the Union institution of which it constitutes a part has no autonomy

and City Cycle Industries cases, the Court denied the right of an intervener to raise an objection of inadmissibility not raised by the party whose submissions it supports, but then considered the objection of its own motion on the grounds that it involved public policy considerations. See further T-167/19, Tempus Energy Germany and T Energy Sweden v Commission, 2021, para. 36. See also, in the context of infringement proceedings, C-13/00, Commission v Ireland, 2002, paras 3–6, in which in proceedings for failure to fulfil obligations, the United Kingdom submitted that the Court should declare that it had no jurisdiction to rule in the dispute. This was held to be inadmissible, since the defendant Member State, Ireland, accepted that it had failed to fulfil an obligation and had not contested the Court’s jurisdiction. 10 Statute, Art. 40, fourth para. 11 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 129(3); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 142(3). 12 C-329/99 P(R), Pfizer Animal Health v Council (order of the President), 1999, paras 93–94. 13 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 129(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 142(1). 14 Statute, Art. 40, first and third paras. 15 Statute, Art. 40, second para. 16 See para. 23.23. 17 See 41/73, 43/73 to 48/73, 50/73, 111/73, 113/73, and 114/73, Générale Sucrière and Others v Commission (order), 1973, para. 3.

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736 INCIDENTAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE vis-à-vis third parties and hence does not possess characteristics such as to entitle it to intervene.18

23.05

23.06

(2) Privileged interveners Union institutions19 and Member States20 are privileged interveners and do not have to establish an interest in the outcome of the case.21 (3) Non-Member States States party to the EEA Agreement, not being Member States of the European Union, and the EFTA Surveillance Authority may intervene in cases before the Union Courts where one of the fields of application of that Agreement is concerned.22 Conversely, they must establish an interest in the outcome of the case if they want to intervene in a case where none of the fields of application of the EEA Agreement is concerned. Furthermore, they are not allowed to intervene in cases between Member States, between the Union institutions, or between Member States and Union institutions.23 Further to this, a right to intervene in proceedings before the Union Courts exists for the United Kingdom under the conditions set out in the EU–UK Withdrawal Agreement.24 Other third States are considered, for the purposes of the intervention, like any other person and must demonstrate a direct interest in the outcome of the case.25

23.07

(4) Union bodies, offices, and agencies Union bodies, offices, and agencies that can establish an interest in the outcome of a case submitted to the Union Courts26 or can establish that the intervention falls within the scope of the tasks conferred upon them27 may intervene. They cannot intervene, 18 See, in connection with the staff committee of the European Parliament, 15/63, Lassalle v Parliament (order), 1964 ECR 50; and AG Lagrange Opinion, 1964 ECR 40, 52–57. 19 The European Economic and Social Committee is not an institution and therefore not a privileged intervener (see C-176/03, Commission v Council (order of the President), 2004, paras 9–10). 20 Similar to the action for annulment, regional and local entities cannot be considered to be Member States for the purposes of Art. 40, first para. of the Statute and must prove an interest in the result of the case in accordance with Art. 40, second para. of the Statute: see T-68/08, FIFA v Commission (order of the President), 2008, para. 10. 21 See 138/79, Roquette Frères v Council, 1980, paras 17–21; 139/79, Maizena v Council, 1980, paras 17–21: if the institutions’ right to intervene were to be restricted, it would adversely affect their institutional position. 22 Statute, Art. 40, third para. See C-493/09, Commission v Portugal (order of the President), 2010, para. 9; C-239/11 P, Siemens v Commission (order of the President), 2012, paras 3–8; T-289/11, Deutsche Bahn and Others v Commission (order), 2012, paras 9–12. 23 Statute, Art. 40, second and third paras; C-542/09, Commission v Netherlands (order of the President), 2010, paras 4–8. 24 EU–UK Withdrawal Agreement, Art. 90. 25 See C-12/18 P(I), United States of America v Apple Sales International and Others (order of the Vice- President), 2018, para. 9. 26 Statute, Art. 40, second para. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is equated with ‘bodies, offices and agencies of the Union’ for the purposes of the intervention procedure: see C-551/21, Commission v Council (order of the President), 2022, para. 14. An organ of the Union that is not an institution, such as the European External Action Service, does not demonstrate a direct and present interest in intervening in a dispute involving an institution of the Union on the sole ground that the resolution of the dispute could have repercussions on the management of that organ: see C-119/19 P, Commission v Carreras Sequeros and Others (order of the President), 2019, para. 17. 27 See C-144/21, Parliament v Council (order of the President), 2021, paras 12–14; T-82/09, Gert-Jan Dennekamp v Parliament (order of the President), 2009, para. 7.

Intervention 737 however, in cases between Member States, between Union institutions, or between Member States and Union institutions, unless a provision of Union law specifically entitles them to intervene in such proceedings.28 (5) Non-privileged interveners Any natural or legal person must make out a reasonable case that it has an interest in the outcome of a case brought before the Union Courts.29 In accordance with settled case-law, this must be understood as a direct and existing interest in the decision on the forms of order sought.30 Furthermore, natural and legal persons are not allowed to intervene in cases between Member States, between Union institutions, or between Member States and Union institutions.31 Such an interest will exist if the intervener’s legal position or economic situation32 may actually be directly affected by the operative part of the decision to be taken by the Court of Justice or the General Court.33 The interest can therefore not be assessed in the light of abstract legal arguments that go

28 See, in this regard, Art. 58(4) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 45/2001 and Decision No. 1247/2002/EC (OJ 2018 L295/39); C-317/04, Parliament v Council (order), 2005; C-318/04, Parliament v Commission (order), 2005 (with respect to the European Data Protection Supervisor that was given leave to intervene); compare C-176/03, Commission v Council (order of the President), 2004: the European Economic and Social Committee was not given leave to intervene. 29 Statute, Art. 40, second para. 30 See C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P, and C‑604/18 P, Council v Chrysostomides & Co and Others (order of the President), 2019, paras 11–12; C-649/21 P(I), Fastweb v Iliad Italia and Commission (order of the Vice- President), 2022, para. 35. 31 Statute, Art. 40, second para. See C-717/17 P(I), Minority SafePack—one million signatures for diversity in Europe v Romania and Commission (order of the Vice-President), 2018, para. 24; C-212/22 P(I), SES Astra v Spain and Commission (order of the Vice-President), 2022, para. 18. 32 See C-649/21 P(I), Fastweb v Iliad Italia and Commission (order of the Vice-President), 2022, paras 42–45 (undertaking had an interest in intervening in an appeal against a decision authorizing a concentration because it was active in one or more markets identified by the Commission as capable of being affected by the likely anticompetitive effects of that concentration and it could not be ruled out that the authorization and the obligations and conditions attached to the authorization were likely to have an impact on the activities of the intervening undertaking; contrary to the General Court’s findings, it was sufficient for the intervening undertaking to have an interest that the change in the competitive situation resulting from the transaction was likely to influence the available economic choices to the intervening undertaking as well as its negotiation power in organizing its operations); T-339/00, Bactria v Commission (order of the President), 2001, paras 12–14 (party had an interest in intervening insofar as the decision in the pending case would considerably affect the substantive situation, rules, and procedures on the basis of which it marketed its products); T-210/01, General Electric v Commission (order of the President), 2002, paras 28–29 (competitors of undertakings which had brought an action against a Commission decision declaring a merger incompatible with the internal market had an interest in intervening in support of the Commission); T-111/08, Mastercard v Commission (order of the President), 2008, paras 13–14 (number of banks had an interest in intervening in an action for annulment brought by Mastercard against a Commission decision determining that the so-called fallback interchange fee merchants had to pay to their acquiring bank for accepting payment cards in the EEA was in breach of Art. 101 TFEU, since the loss of the fallback interchange fee affected them financially). Conversely, despite their important financial and economic interests, shareholders of a company do not have a sufficient interest to intervene in proceedings alongside that company when their legal circumstances are not directly affected: see C-418/15 P(I), Cap Actions SNCM v SNCM and Commission (order of the Vice-President), 2015, para. 20. The same goes for the creditor of a party to the main proceedings where the judgment is not likely to have an effect on the legal classification of the debts concerned: see C-385/15 P(I), Etairia Larymnis Larko v Larko and Commission (order of the Vice-President), 2015, paras 19–20. 33 See 40/79, P v Commission (order), 1979 ECR 3299, 3300; C-649/21 P(I), Fastweb v Iliad Italia and Commission (order of the Vice-President), 2022, para. 36; T-537/08, Cixi Santai Chemical Fiber and Others v Council (order of the President), 2010, paras 16–17.

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738 INCIDENTAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE beyond the specific subject-matter of a case.34 In addition, the interest must be safeguarded by the form of order sought by the party in support of which the intervener seeks to join in the proceedings.35 It is not sufficient for the intervener to be in a similar situation to that of one of the parties to the proceedings and for it to maintain on that ground that it has an indirect interest in the grounds of the decision to be given by the Court of Justice or the General Court.36 A person’s interest in one of the pleas raised by a party to the proceedings succeeding or failing is insufficient if the operative part of the decision to be taken by the Union Court has no bearing on that party’s legal position or economic situation.37 The strict interpretation of the notion ‘interest in the result of a case submitted’ is motivated by the aim to ensure the effectiveness and the proper course of the procedure.38

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(6) Associations An association may be allowed to intervene only if: (1) it represents a significant number of undertakings active in the sector concerned; (2) its object includes the protection of the interests of its members; (3) the case may raise questions of principle affecting the functioning of the sector concerned; and (4) the interest of its members may therefore be significantly affected by the forthcoming judgment.39 Further to this, the aims pursued by an association should be sufficiently closely connected to the questions raised in the proceedings in which it seeks to intervene.40

34 See C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission (order of the President), 2009, paras 8–9. 35 See 111/63, Lemmerz-Werke v High Authority (order), 1965 ECR 716, 717–18; C-649/21 P(I), Fastweb v Iliad Italia and Commission (order of the Vice-President), 2022, para. 35. T-587/08, Fresh Del Monte Produce v Commission (order of the President), 2010, para. 25. 36 C-352/19 P, Region of Brussels-Capital v Commission (order of the President), 2019, para. 14; C-220/21 P(I), ratiopharm and Others v Commission (order of the Vice-President), 2021, paras 20–24; T-370/08, Csepeli Áramtermelő v Commission (order), 2009, para. 12. 37 See C-144/21, Parliament v Council (order of the President), 2021, para. 10; T-587/08, Fresh Del Monte Produce v Commission (order of the President), 2010, para. 25. 38 See T-167/08, Microsoft v Commission (order of the President), 2008, para. 66. 39 See C-157/16 P(I), Bundesverband der Pharmazeutischen Industrie v Allergopharma and Commission (order of the Vice-President), 2016, para. 11; C‑515/17 P and C‑561/17 P, Uniwersytet Wrocławski v REA (order of the President), 2019, para. 10; C-471/18 P, Germany v Esso Raffinage (order of the President), 2019, para. 14; T-245/11, ClientEarth v ECHA (order), 2012, para. 12; T-561/14, European Citizens’ Initiative ‘One of Us’ and Others v Commission (order), 2016, para. 24; T-274/15, Alcogroup and Alcodis v Commission (order), 2016, para. 17; T-227/21, Illumina v Commission (order), 2021, paras 23–24. See further, in that regard, C-611/22 P, Illumina v Commission (order of the President), 2023; and C-625/22 P, Grail v Commission and Illumina (order of the President), 2023, in which those four conditions were expressly set out, in line with the General Court’s case-law, and which made it clear that a representative professional association, whose object is to protect the interests of its members, may be allowed to intervene when the dispute raises questions of principle likely to affect those interests; therefore, the requirement of a direct and present interest in the resolution of the dispute is satisfied on the part of the association when it establishes that it is in such a situation, independently of the question whether the resolution of the dispute is such as to modify the legal position of the association as such. In the first case just mentioned, the test was met, as the dispute raised questions of principle affecting the operation of the specific sector in which the members of the association were active and which were of specific interest to them, while in the second one, it was not, since the associations did not establish that their interests or those of their members would be affected by the outcome of the dispute. 40 See C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission (order of the President of February 5), 2009, para. 14.

Intervention 739 In particular, in the area of anti-dumping, an association which has brought the complaint on the basis of which an anti-dumping regulation was adopted and which has actively taken part in the administrative procedure leading to the adoption of the regulation at issue has, in principle, an interest to intervene in an action for annulment brought against that regulation.41 In contrast to the case of natural or other legal persons applying to intervene, associations therefore do not have to show that their own legal position or economic situation is likely to be affected by the outcome of the case. An association will be regarded as having an interest in intervening if it coincides with that of its members in a context in which the association’s intervention will enable the Court of Justice or the General Court better to assess the background to the case.42 This somewhat more flexible approach with regard to the interest required to be established by an association wishing to intervene makes up, to some extent, for the strict approach taken to applications by individuals for leave to intervene.43 However, like individuals, associations are not entitled to intervene in cases between Member States, between Union institutions, or between Member States and Union institutions,44 unless a provision of Union law specifically entitles them to intervene in such proceedings. (7) Intervention within the framework of an action for damages In the context of an action for damages against the Union, while in principle intervention is not precluded, in practice it is difficult for a person in a similar situation to the applicant to show that he or she has a ‘direct and continuing’ interest. Since the form of order sought by the applicant in such an action is directed only towards obtaining compensation for the damage sustained by it, a would-be intervener does not have a direct interest in the outcome of the application but, at most, an indirect interest in a judgment whose grounds might influence the manner in which the defendant institution(s) would deal with the intervener’s own situation. Such an interest is insufficient.45 41 See T-192/08, ENRC Marketing v Council (order of the President), 2009, para. 12. 42 See C-499/18 P, Bayer CropScience and Bayer v Commission (order of the President), 2019, paras 5–12 (Dutch environmental organization for the protection of bees allowed to intervene in case about conditions of approval for use in the Union of active substance that is allegedly harmful to bees); C-471/18 P, Germany v Esso Raffinage (order of the President), 2019, paras 14–21 (representative organization for the petrochemical industry allowed to intervene as its members included an appreciable number of leading companies in the sector, its objective consisted, inter alia, in handling legal issues arising from its objective, and case raised questions of principle that were liable to affect its members); T-37/04 R, Autonomous Region of the Azores v Council (order of the President), 2004, paras 57–71 (cooperative defending the interests of fishermen active in the Azores allowed to intervene in the proceedings regarding the partial suspension of a Regulation governing, inter alia, fishing activities within Azorean waters, but the request of the WWF was rejected on the grounds that its interests were too wide and general to be significantly affected by the outcome of the proceedings). Associations who are themselves members of an umbrella organization have to show a specific interest if they want to be granted leave to intervene at the same time and to the same effect as the umbrella organization: see C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission (order of the President), 2009, para. 13. 43 See T-561/14, Initiative citoyenne européenne ‘One of Us’ v Commission (order), 2016, para. 25. 44 Statute, Art. 40, second para. For an example, see C-40/10, Commission v Council (order of the President), 2010, paras 4–5. 45 See C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P, and C‑604/18 P, Council v Chrysostomides & Co and Others (order of the President), 2019, paras 14–16. Member States are privileged interveners and can also intervene in the framework of an action for damages: see, e.g. T-139/01, Comafrica and Dole Fresh Fruit Europe v Commission, 2005; T-309/10, Klein v Commission, 2014.

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740 INCIDENTAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE 23.11

(8) Intervention within the framework of an action for annulment A natural or legal person to whom a particular Union act is addressed—for example, a decision of the Commission finding an infringement of Art. 101 TFEU46—has an interest in intervening in annulment proceedings brought by another addressee of the decision.47 A person having an independent right of action must be considered as having an interest in the outcome of a case brought by another addressee.48 The fact that this person did not bring an action for annulment does not detract from that.49 A competitor of an undertaking which allegedly violated Art. 102 TFEU has an interest in intervening in support of the form of order sought by the Commission.50 This is because such an undertaking has indeed a direct interest that the decision finding an abuse of a dominant position and obliging the addressee of the decision to put an end to the abuse be upheld. Conversely, the undertaking targeted by a complaint has an interest to intervene in an action for annulment brought by a competitor against a Commission decision rejecting the complaint on the basis of Art. 102 TFEU.51 Further to this, an undertaking that is the beneficiary of an aid measure which is the subject of a decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure within the meaning of Art. 108(2) TFEU has a direct interest in the outcome of an action for annulment brought against that decision. This is also the case where that party is no longer receiving aid at the moment on which the decision to open the formal investigation procedure is adopted, since such a decision may be invoked before national courts, exposing the beneficiary of the aid to an order to repay the aid concerned as long as the decision is in force.52 In contrast, where the prospective intervener only establishes an interest in the outcome of the case by reason of similarities between its situation and that of one of the 46 An undertaking which has lodged a complaint which has resulted in the Commission’s initiating a procedure and adopting a decision finding an infringement of competition law has an interest in the outcome of proceedings brought against the Commission by undertakings to which the decision is addressed. It may therefore intervene in support of the Commission: see T-35/91, Eurosport v Commission (order), 1991, paras 1–6. Similarly, an undertaking which argues in the national courts the nullity of a contract on the basis of Art. 101 TFEU has an interest in intervening in a case by which the other party to the contract is challenging a Commission decision finding an infringement of Art. 101 TFEU: see C-36/09 P, Transportes Evaristo Molina v Commission (order of the President), 2010, paras 5–10. 47 See C-245/95 P, Commission v NTN Corporation (order), 1996, para. 9; T-35/91, Eurosport v Commission (order), 1991, para. 15; T-587/08, Fresh Del Monte Produce v Commission (order), 2010, para. 30. But that person may only act as intervener, i.e. only support the form of order sought and the pleas submitted by the applicant. 48 See T-35/91, Eurosport v Commission (order), 1991, para. 15; T-587/08, Fresh Del Monte Produce v Commission (order), 2010, para. 30. However, an addressee of a decision regarding the application of Art. 101 TFEU cannot intervene to support the form of order sought by the Commission (see T-410/03, Hoechst v Commission (order), 2004, paras 13–22). 49 See T-587/08, Fresh Del Monte Produce v Commission (order), 2010, para. 31. 50 See C-649/21 P(I), Fastweb v Iliad Italia and Commission (order of the Vice-President), 2022, para. 40. 51 See T-119/09, Protégé International v Commission (order of the President), 2010, para. 8. Further to this, an undertaking which is the subject of a complaint made to the Commission for infringing Art. 102 TFEU has an interest to intervene in proceedings for failure to act (Art. 265 TFEU) brought by the person that made the complaint against the Commission for failing to take any action. This is because the intervener has an interest in the complaint not causing the Commission to take binding measures against it and therefore in the Union Courts not declaring the Commission’s failure to act contrary to Union law: see T-74/92, Ladbroke Racing v Commission (order), 1993, paras 8–9. 52 See C-536/19 P(I), EDP España v Naturgy Energy Group and Commission (order of the Vice-President), 2019, paras 38–43; see further C-410/15 P(I), Comité d’entreprise SNCM v SNCM and Commission (order of the Vice- President), 2015.

Intervention 741 parties in the main proceedings, its application will be dismissed.53 This will be the case, for instance, where a regional or local authority merely refers to the similarity of an aid regime applicable in its region to that applicable in another region in an action for annulment of a Commission decision finding the latter aid regime incompatible with the internal market.54 After granting a party leave to intervene, the Court of Justice or the General Court may consider the admissibility of the application afresh if the circumstances warrant this.55 (9) Intervention within the framework of interim proceedings An application for leave to intervene within the framework of interim proceedings should be assessed in relation to the specific interest the applicant has in the outcome of the interim proceedings.56 A direct interest in the outcome of the main action is thus not sufficient to establish an interest to intervene in interim proceedings.57 (10) Intervention within the framework of an appeal Similarly, an application for leave to intervene in the framework of an appeal should be assessed in relation to the specific interest the applicant in intervention has in the outcome of the appeal. An applicant in intervention does not have such an interest where it seeks to intervene in support of an appeal brought against a decision of the General Court declaring an action for annulment against a regulation inadmissible for lack of standing of the appellant (applicant at first instance), where the applicant in intervention argues that it has an interest in the annulment of the regulation by the General Court after referral back to that Court of the merits of the case.58 The fact that an applicant in intervention may have a direct interest in the outcome of a case at first instance is not sufficient in itself to establish a direct interest in the outcome of appeal proceedings relating to that case.59

53 See T-191/96, CAS Succhi di Frutta v Commission (order), 1998, paras 31–32; see also C-186/02 P, Ramondín and Others v Commission (order of the President), 2003, paras 14–17. 54 C-186/02 P, Ramondín and Others v Commission (order of the President), 2003, paras 14–17. However, where an aid scheme in a region has a direct and present effect on the economic situation of a neighbouring region, either by causing the relocation of some undertakings or by adversely affecting the competitive position of other undertakings, the authorities of the neighbouring region have a direct, present interest in seeing the form of order sought by the Commission granted (see C-186/02 P, Ramondín and Others v Commission (order of the President), 2003, para. 9). 55 See T-158/96, Acciaierie di Bolzano v Commission, 1999, para. 33. 56 See C-584/20 P, Commission v Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (order of the President), 2021, para. 5; T-462/12 R, Pilkington Group v Commission (order of the President), 2013, para. 16; T-732/16 R, Valencia Club de Fútbol v Commission (order of the President), 2017, para. 6; see also para. 13.17. 57 But see T-5/00 R, Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied v Commission (order of the President), 2000, para. 25, in which it was held that a party which has already been given leave to intervene in support of a party in the main action has in principle an interest in supporting the form of order sought by the latter in interim proceedings. See also T-533/10 R, DTS Distribuidora de Televisión Digital v Commission (order of the President), 2011. 58 See C-352/19 P, Region of Brussels-Capital v Commission (order of the President), 2019, para. 14. 59 See C-572/18 P, thyssenkrupp Electrical Steel v Commission (order of the President), 2019, paras 10–13.

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742 INCIDENTAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE The applicant in intervention must respect the subject-matter of the appeal proceedings in which it seeks to intervene. That means that, if it so chooses, an applicant in intervention must support the form of order sought by the defendant without changing the subject-matter of the dispute. For that reason, the President of the Court of Justice held that an applicant in intervention had no direct interest in supporting a form of order sought by the defendant seeking the dismissal of an appeal brought against a decision by which the General Court had declared an action for annulment inadmissible, since the arguments developed by the applicant in support of its application in intervention solely related to substantive issues raised by the action for annulment, whereas the appeal concerned the question whether the act at issue was a reviewable act.60 Where the Court of Justice annuls a decision of the General Court and refers the case back to that court for final judgment, an intervener in the appeal automatically enjoys the status of intervener before the General Court.61

C. Formal requirements 23.14

(1) Time-limits and requirements An application to intervene must be made within six weeks of publication in the Official Journal of the European Union of the notice of the date of registration of an application initiating proceedings, the names of the parties, the form of order sought by the applicant, and a summary of the pleas in law and of the main supporting arguments.62 Consideration may be given by the Court of Justice to an application to intervene which is made after the expiry of this six-week period, but before the decision to open the oral procedure.63 An application to intervene in support of the defendant may be lodged before the defence is lodged. In that case, the intervener runs the risk of supporting a form of order sought whose content is still unknown to it.64

60 See C-689/19 P, VodafoneZiggo Group v Commission (order of the President), 2020, paras 17–18 (see also paras 11–12). 61 C-31/22 P(I), Atlas Copco Airpower and Atlas Copco v Magnetrol International and Commission (order), 2022, para. 96; C-32/22 P(I), Anheuser-Busch Inbev and Ampar v Magnetrol International and Commission (order), 2022, para. 96; C-74/22 P(I), Soudal and Esko-Graphics v Magnetrol and Commission (order), 2022, para. 124. See further J.T. Nowak, ‘L’intervention devant la Cour de justice et devant le Tribunal sur renvoi’ (2023) J.D.E. 9. 62 CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 21(4) and 130(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Arts 79 and 143(1). For the calculation of time-limits, see paras 22.65–22.70. 63 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 129(4). While applications made within the six-week period set in motion a mandatory procedure, consideration of applications made after the expiry of that period is a mere possibility: see C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission (order of the President), 2009, para. 8. Where the six-week period has expired and there is no oral procedure (where, for instance, the case is decided by order), the application to intervene will be inadmissible (see C-445/02 P, Glaverbel v OHIM (order of the President), 2004). Where the six-week period has expired, but the application to intervene has been made before the decision to open the oral part of the procedure, the intervention may be allowed (see C‑818/18 P and C‑6/19 P, The Yokohama Rubber Co v Pirelli Tyre (order of the President), 2019, para. 13). Note that a similar provision in the former 1991 GC Rules of Procedure (Art. 116(6)) has been repealed on purpose and that Art. 129(4) of the CJ Rules of Procedure will not be applied by analogy: see C-187/18 P(I), Müller and Others v QH and Parliament (order of the Vice-President), 2018, paras 26–27. 64 See T-158/00, ARD v Commission (order), 2000, paras 5–8.

Intervention 743 (2) Disputes relating to intellectual property rights In the case of disputes concerning intellectual property rights in which a decision of the European Union Intellectual Property Office or of the Community Plant Variety Office is brought before the General Court, special rules on intervention apply as regards parties other than the applicant or the defendant Office which were involved in the proceedings before the relevant Board of Appeal. Such parties may take part as interveners in the proceedings before the General Court.65 They have the same procedural rights as the main parties.66 In addition, they may, unlike ‘ordinary’ interveners, apply for a form of order and put forward pleas in law independently of those applied for and put forward by the main parties.67 (3) General requirements applicable to procedural documents Applications to intervene have to comply with the general requirements applicable to procedural documents.68 Each application has to contain a description of the case, a description of the parties, the intervener’s name and address, the intervener’s address for service—in a case before the Court of Justice—t he form of order sought in support of which the intervener is applying for leave to intervene, and, except in the case of applications made by Member States or Union institutions, a statement of reasons establishing the intervener’s interest in the result of the case.69 (4) Language Applications to intervene are to be lodged in the language of the case (see para. 22.41).70 Member States, however, are always entitled to use their official language when intervening in a particular case (see para. 22.47).71 Under the case-law so far, a request by an intervener (other than a Member State) to use a language other than the language of the case during the oral procedure may be granted.72

65 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 173(1). 66 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 173(3). 67 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 173(3). 68 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 130(4); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 143(4). They must also be represented: CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 130(3); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 143 (3). 69 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 130(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 143(2). 70 Point 100 of the GC Practice Rules provides, however, that where an application to intervene originating from a third party other than a Member State is not drawn up in the language of the case, the Registrar will require the application to be put in order before it is served on the parties. If, however, a version of such an application drawn up in the language of the case is lodged within the period prescribed for this purpose by the Registrar, the date on which the first version, not in the language of the case, was lodged shall be taken as the date on which the document was lodged for the purposes of registration. 71 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 38(4); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 46(4). 72 See T-330/94, Salt Union v Commission (order), 1995, paras 25–28 (emphasizing that the Union Court takes a flexible approach where the request submitted by the intervener relates only to the oral procedure and no justified objection has been made by the parties); T-353/08, Vereinigte Wirtschaftsdienste v Commission (order), 2009; T-289/11, Deutsche Bahn and Others v Commission (order), 2012, paras 15–18 (request from EFTA Surveillance Authority granted for both written and oral procedures). But see para. 22.44.

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23.17

744 INCIDENTAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE 23.18

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(5) Application to intervene is served on the parties The application to intervene is served on the parties, which are given the opportunity to submit written or oral observations.73 (6) Decision on the application to intervene Where an application to intervene is submitted by a Member State or a Union institution, or, before the Court of Justice, by a State that is a party to the EEA Agreement or by the EFTA Surveillance Authority, the President will decide on the intervention by way of a simple decision.74 The intervention will be allowed, provided that the parties in the case have not put forward observations on the application to intervene of the State that is a party to the EEA Agreement or of the EFTA Surveillance Authority, or have not identified secret or confidential items or documents of which the communication would be prejudicial to them.75 In any other case, the President decides on an application to intervene by order and, where applicable, on the communication of confidential information.76 Alternatively, at the Court of Justice, the President may refer the application to the Court, as the case may be, which then decides by order.77 If the application is rejected, the order will be reasoned.78 A decision granting leave to intervene does not prevent the Court of Justice or the General Court, as the case may be, from reconsidering the admissibility of the application to intervene in the final judgment and declaring it wholly or partially inadmissible.79 (7) Statement in intervention If the application to intervene is granted, the intervening party may submit a statement in intervention. The statement in intervention has to contain a statement of the form of order sought by the intervener, the pleas in law and arguments relied on by the intervener, and, where appropriate, the nature of any evidence offered.80 With a view to expediting the proceedings, the statement should be as short as possible.81 The intervener receives a copy of every procedural document served on the parties.82 However, in its observations on an application to intervene, a party may ask the Court of Justice or the General Court to treat certain documents in the case as confidential and not send them 73 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 131(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Arts 144(1) and (2). 74 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 131(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 144(4). 75 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 131(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 144(4). 76 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 131(3); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 144(5). 77 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 131(3). 78 This is specifically prescribed by Art. 144(6) of the GC Rules of Procedure, since an appeal may lie against the order (see para. 19.15). In fact, all orders concerning applications to intervene are reasoned. 79 See C-200/92 P, ICI v Commission, 1999, para. 25; C-235/92, Montecatini v Commission, 1999, para. 75. See also C-31/22 P(I), Atlas Copco Airpower and Atlas Copco v Magnetrol International and Commission (order), 2022, para. 80; C-32/22 P(I), Anheuser-Busch Inbev and Ampar v Magnetrol International and Commission (order), 2022, para. 80; C-74/22 P(I), Soudal and Esko-Graphics v Magnetrol and Commission (order), 2022, para. 108. 80 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 132(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 145(2). 81 For the Court of Justice, 10 pages (CJ Practice Directions, point 34); for the General Court, maximum 20 pages (GC Practice Rules, point 105). 82 CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 131(2) to (4); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 144(7).

Intervention 745 to the intervener.83 An application for confidential treatment must accurately identify the particulars or passages to be excluded and briefly state the reasons for which each of those particulars or passages is regarded as confidential. Such an application must be strictly limited to material which is genuinely confidential and may not cover the entirety of a pleading. The application must be accompanied by a non-confidential version of each pleading or document concerned with the confidential material deleted.84 If the request for confidential treatment is not granted, the party concerned may ask for certain documents to be removed from the case-file, but that request will not necessarily be granted.85 In proceedings before the Court of Justice, where an application to intervene is made after the expiry of the period of six weeks after publication of the notice in the Official Journal, the intervener may only submit oral observations (if an oral procedure takes place).86 The intervener will receive a copy of every document served on the parties.87 (8) Reply to the statement in intervention Parties may, where this is deemed necessary by the President, reply to the statement in intervention.88

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(9) Time-limits A party intervening before the Court of Justice may submit its statement in interven- 23.22 tion within one month after the communication to it of all procedural documents served on the parties. On a duly reasoned request, the President may extend the time- limit.89 No time-limit is specified in the GC Rules of Procedure. Parties have to submit their statement in intervention within the period prescribed by the President of the General Court.90 No time-limits have been prescribed for a reply to a statement in intervention. The President of the Court of Justice or of the General Court, as the case may be, will prescribe an appropriate time-limit.91

83 CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 131(2) to (4); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 144(4) and (5). See further para. 23.47. 84 GC Practice Rules, point 181. 85 See 30/78 Distillers v Commission (order), 1979, referred to in the report for the hearing in 30/78, Distillers v Commission, 1980 ECR 2229, 2237. 86 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 129(4); 87 CJ Rules of Procedure, 131(1). See T-142/01 and T-283/01, OPTUC v Commission, 2004, para. 24: a statement lodged by the intervener was not placed on the file. This was because the intervener was only allowed to make its observations orally at the hearing. Where there is no hearing (for instance, where a case is dispatched by order), the application to intervene will be inadmissible: see C-445/02 P, Glaverbel v OHIM (order of the President), 2004. Even if unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure prevented the intervener from making its application to intervene within six weeks of the publication in the Official Journal of the notice of initiation of the action, the intervener will not be allowed to file written submissions (see T-201/04, Microsoft v Commission (order of the President), 2005, paras 19–20, 46–47). 88 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 132(3); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 145(3). 89 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 132(1). 90 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 145(1). 91 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 132(3); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 145(3).

746 INCIDENTAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE

D. No intervention in preliminary ruling proceedings 23.23

A request by a natural or legal person to intervene in preliminary ruling proceedings— pursuant to Art. 40 of the Statute—in order to submit observations is inadmissible.92 This is because a preliminary ruling procedure is not a ‘case before the Court’ within the meaning of Art. 40 of the Statute. A natural or legal person that wants to be joined to preliminary ruling proceedings must become a party to the dispute before the national court, since all parties to the main proceedings may participate in the procedure before the Court of Justice.93

II. Expedited and Urgent Procedures A. Expedited and urgent preliminary ruling procedures 23.24

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(1) General There are at present two types of procedures that allow the Court of Justice to deliver its preliminary ruling on a speedier basis than the normal procedure for preliminary ruling proceedings: the expedited and the urgent preliminary ruling procedures (for a distinction between the two, see para. 23.41). (2) Expedited preliminary ruling procedure (a) General At the request of the national court or, exceptionally, of his or her own motion, the President may decide, after hearing the Judge-Rapporteur and the Advocate General, to apply an expedited procedure where the nature of the case requires that a ruling on the question put to the Court is delivered in a short time.94 (b) Conditions Generally, this does not depend on the nature of the dispute in the main proceedings as such but requires the existence of exceptional circumstances particular to the case in question, which must establish that a ruling on the questions referred is a matter of exceptional urgency95, meaning a situation in which a decision of the Court is necessary to

92 See C-73/07, Satakunnan Markkinapörssi and Satamedia (order of the President), 2007, paras 8–13 (no right to intervene for the European Data Protection Supervisor); C-403/08 and C-429/08, Football Association Premier League and Others (order of the President), 2009, paras 5–11; C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke (order of the President), 2010, paras 4–9. 93 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 97(1) and (2). But see C-403/08 and C-429/08, Football Association Premier League and Others (order of the President), 2009, paras 5–11, in which the President dismissed the applications of persons which had become parties in the proceedings before the national court only with a view to participation in the preliminary proceedings. 94 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 105(1). In the former version of the CJ Rules of Procedure, there had been an expedited procedure in the case of direct actions (Art. 62a), whereas for preliminary ruling proceedings, this was called an accelerated procedure (Art. 104a). 95 See C-158/21, Puig Gordi and Others, 2023, para. 27.

Expedited and Urgent Procedures 747 prevent the risks that would be incurred in case the procedure would follow its normal course.96 The importance to the Union of the area of law in which the order for reference has been made will also be taken into account.97 While the decision to apply the expedited procedure depends upon the particular case,98 the Court of Justice’s Recommendations to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings provides a non-exhaustive list of circumstances in which the referring court or tribunal may consider submitting a request for the application of the expedited procedure.99 Further to this, the President has ruled that the following circumstances by itself do not justify recourse to the expedited procedure:100 the interest a party has in obtaining a rapid decision on the rights conferred by Union law;101 economic interests;102 damaging effects;103 the existence of conflicting case-law;104 the need to unify divergent national case-law;105 the fact that the reference was made in the context of an application for interim measures;106 the length of criminal proceedings before a national court;107 the fact that a large number of similar cases is pending before the referring court;108 the fact that a large number of cases are stayed pending the outcome of the reference for a preliminary ruling;109 the large number of persons or legal situations potentially

96 See C-132/20, Getin Noble Bank, 2022, para. 52. Conversely, when the expedited procedure would not lead to a judgment within time to prevent the risk from materializing, the application will be rejected: see C-300/04, Eman and Sevinger, (order of the President), 2005, para. 18; C-14/21 and C-15/21, Sea Watch (order of the President), 2021, paras 30–31. 97 See C-550/09, E and F (order of the President), 2010, para. 10 (fight against terrorism); C-188/10 and C-189/10, Melki and Abdeli (order of the President), 2010, para. 14 (Area of Freedom, Security and Justice; the functioning of Article 267 TFEU). In C-497/20, Randstad Italia, 2021, para. 39, the Court considered that the fact that the dispute in the main proceedings related to the field of public procurement was not a reason to establish the exceptional urgency required to justify an expedited procedure. 98 See C‑357/19, C‑379/19, C‑547/19, C‑811/19, and C‑840/19, PM and Others, 2021, para. 118; C-132/20, BN and Others, 2022, para. 53; and C-688/21, Confédération paysanne and Others, 2023, para. 28, in which the Court held that the sensitive and complex nature of the legal problems raised in these cases did not lend themselves easily to the application of an expedited procedure. 99 Recommendations to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings (OJ 2019 C380/1) (Recommendations), point 34. 100 See C-45/21, Banka Slovenije, 2022, paras 33–37. This does not exclude that a case will be given priority in accordance with Art. 53(3) CJ Rules of Procedure. See C-497/20, Randstad Italia, 2021, para. 40; C-581/20, Skarb Państwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej reprezentowany przez Generalnego Dyrektora Dróg Krajowych i Autostrad, 2021, para. 31; C‑14/21 and C‑15/21, Sea Watch, 2022, para. 67. 101 See C-686/18, OC and Others (order of the President), 2019, para. 14; C-760/18, M.V. (order of the President), 2019, para. 18; C-590/20, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri and Others, 2022, para. 29; C-642/20, Caruter, 2022, para. 24. 102 See C-493/17, Weiss and Others (order of the President), 2017, para. 10; C-642/20, Caruter, 2022, para. 24; C-229/21, Port de Bruxelles, 2022, para. 42. 103 See C-3/10, Affatato (order of the President), 2010, para. 13; C-282/13, T-Mobile Austria (order of the President), 2013, para. 12. 104 See C-350/20, O.D. and Others, 2021, para. 35; C-590/20, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri and Others, 2022, para. 30. 105 See C-350/20, INPS, 2021, para. 35. 106 See C-508/19, M.F. and Others, 2022, para. 40; C-44/21, Phoenix Contact, 2022, para. 17. 107 See C-375/08, Pontini and Others (order of the President), 2008, para. 10; C‑357/19, C‑379/19, C‑547/19, C‑811/19, and C‑840/19, PM and Others, 2021, para. 117; C-480/21, WO and JL (order), 2022, para. 22. 108 See C-330/05, Granberg (order of the President), 2005, para. 8. But see C-439/08, VEBIC (order of the President), 2008, para. 7. 109 See C-932/19, JZ and Others, 2021, para. 23; C-590/20, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri and Others, 2022, para. 28; C-480/21, WO and JL (order), 2022, para. 23.

748 INCIDENTAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE affected by the questions referred;110 and the sensitive economic or social nature of a case.111 The application of the expedited procedure will also be rejected where the outcome of the main proceedings will only have an impact at a point far in the future.112 Further to this, the expedited procedure cannot be used to allow the concomitant treatment of similar references for a preliminary ruling.113 Additionally, the fact that an order for reference was sent to the Court a long period after it had been delivered is an indication that the case is not of exceptional urgency.114 Conversely, the fact that a national court is required to decide the case pending before it within a specific time-limit may justify recourse to the expedited procedure.115 This is motivated by the spirit of cooperation characterizing the relationship between the Court of Justice and the national courts.116 The President has also accepted exceptional urgency where a decision on a point of Union law was necessary to rule on the legality of the continued detainment of persons;117 where uncertainty about the validity of a Union law measure would adversely affect the financial stability of the euro area;118 where in a large number of criminal proceedings the expiry of a limitation period and thus a risk of impunity was at issue;119 where uncertainties about the application of Union law prevented the parties in the main proceedings from living a normal family life;120 where a quick answer of the Court could help ensure that a child was able to obtain a passport more swiftly;121 and where a reply of the Court within a short period of time would be likely to remove serious uncertainties facing the referring court as regards important questions of Union law relating to the independence of the judiciary, in particular in light of the consequences of that reply for the functioning of the referring court as a national supreme court, as well as the impact on the functioning of the preliminary reference procedure.122 Generally, as indicated by the Recommendations, the expedited procedure may be applied where a prompt decision of the Court may help to avert a serious and immediate danger to public health or the environment, or where particular 110 See C-938/19, Energieversorgungscenter Dresden-Wilschdorf, 2021, para. 46; C-642/20, Caruter, 2022, para. 24. 111 See C-760/18, M.V. (order of the President), 2019, para. 18; C-247/20, VI, 2022, para. 45. 112 See C-264/10, Kita (order of the President), 2010, paras 7–9. 113 See C-228/10, UEFA and British Sky Broadcasting (order of the President), 2010, para. 6. 114 See C-132/20, BN and Others, 2022, para. 53. See also C-938/19, Energieversorgungscenter Dresden- Wilschdorf, 2021, para. 44. 115 See C-411/10, N.S. (order of the President), 2010, para. 8. However, this cannot be the sole circumstance justifying the application of the expedited procedure: see C-688/21, Confédération paysanne and Others, 2023, para. 26. 116 See C-188/10 and C-189/10, Melki and Abdeli (order of the President), 2010, para. 15. But see C-33/07, Jipa (order of the President), 2007, para. 7. 117 Art. 267, fourth para. TFEU. For examples, see C-550/09, E and F (order of the President), 2010, paras 13–14; C-188/10 and C-189/10, Melki and Abdeli (order of the President), 2010, paras 13–14. Conversely, the fact that the persons subject to the main criminal proceedings are not in custody is a reason for not applying the expedited procedure: see C-158/21, Puig Gordi and Others, 2023, para. 30. On the relationship between the expedited procedure and the urgent procedure, see para. 23.41. 118 See C-370/12, Pringle (order of the President), 2012, para. 7. 119 See C‑357/19, C‑379/19, C‑547/19, C‑811/19, and C‑840/19, PM and Others, 2021, para. 120. 120 See C-127/08, Metock and Others (order of the President), 2008, para. 16; see also C-709/20, CG, 2021, paras 43–44. 121 See C-490/20, V.M.A., 2021, para. 35. 122 See C-668/18, BP (order of the President), 2018, para. 12; see also C-430/21, RS, 2022, paras 31–32.

Expedited and Urgent Procedures 749 circumstances require uncertainties concerning fundamental issues of national constitutional law and of Union law to be resolved within a short period of time.123 In a number of cases, the President rejected the application for an expedited procedure because the national court provided very few or no elements substantiating the request or because it merely referred to the arguments of the parties without making an assessment on the exceptional urgency of its own.124 (c) Procedure The expedited procedure does not substantially differ from the ordinary procedure. The treatment of the case is expedited, which means that shorter terms are respected not only by the parties and interested persons, but also by the Court internally. Therefore, as soon as it is decided to apply the expedited procedure, the President immediately fixes the date for the hearing and the period (not less than fifteen days) within which parties and other interested persons may lodge written observations.125 The expedited preliminary ruling procedure is generally concluded within three to six months.126 (3) Urgent preliminary ruling procedure in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (a) General As of 1 March 2008, a reference for a preliminary ruling which raises one or more questions concerning the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) may, at the request of the referring court or tribunal, or exceptionally of the Court’s own motion, be dealt with under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure derogating from certain provisions of the Statute and the CJ Rules of Procedure.127 The urgent preliminary ruling procedure is laid down in Art. 23a of the Statute and Arts 107–114 of the CJ Rules of Procedure. The urgent preliminary ruling procedure has two key features that distinguish it from the ordinary preliminary ruling procedure and from the expedited procedure applicable to preliminary rulings, with a view to achieving substantial savings in the duration of the proceedings: (1) only the parties to the main proceedings, the Member State of the referring court or tribunal, the Commission, and the other Union institutions, if one of their acts is at issue, may participate in the written procedure;128 and (2) references 123 Recommendations, point 34. For an example, see C-621/18, Wightman and Others (order of the President), 2018, paras 10–11. 124 See C-748/19 to C-754/19, WB and Others, 2021, para. 26; C-289/20, IB and Others, 2021, para. 26. When the national court refers both to the urgent preliminary ruling procedure and the expedited procedure, the President of the Court of Justice will first examine whether the conditions of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure are met: see C-369/13, Gielen and Others (order of the President), 2013, paras 8–9. 125 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 105(2) and (3). The President may request the interested persons within the meaning of Art. 23 of the Statute to restrict the matters addressed in their written observations to the essential points of law raised by the request for a preliminary ruling. See also Recommendations, point 34. 126 Sometimes the procedure is concluded within a shorter period: see C-189/01, Jippes and Others, 2001 (2 months and 15 days); C-188/10, and C-189/10 Melki and Abdeli, 2010 (2 months and 6 days). However, see C-490/20, V.M.A., 2021 (1 year, 2 months, and 12 days). 127 For the first reference to be dealt with under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure, see C-195/08 PPU, Rinau, 2008. 128 But see CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 109(3) and para 23.36.

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750 INCIDENTAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE dealt with under the urgent procedure are referred to a five-Judge Chamber specifically designated for that purpose, which gives its ruling without first going through the General Meeting of the Court.129

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(b) Scope The urgent preliminary ruling procedure is limited to references which raise ‘one or more questions in the areas covered by Title V of Part Three’ of the TFEU,130 which is the specific title in the Treaties devoted to the AFSJ (Arts 67–89 TFEU).131 Consequently, a request for the application of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure which concerns a reference for a preliminary ruling which falls outside this field will be rejected.132 (c) Initiative (i) Request by national court To request the application of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure, the referring court or tribunal must set out the matters of fact and law which establish the urgency and justify the application of that exceptional procedure and, insofar as possible, indicate the answer that it proposes to the questions referred.133 A request that does not satisfy these conditions will be rejected.134 (ii) Request by Court of its own motion Exceptionally, the Court may decide of its own motion that a reference for a preliminary ruling be dealt with under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure.135 In that regard, Art. 107(3) of the CJ Rules of Procedure provides that the President of the Court of Justice may, if the application of that procedure appears, prima facie, to be required, ask the designated Chamber to consider whether it is necessary to deal with the reference under that procedure.136 (d) Application (i) Decision to apply urgent preliminary ruling procedure taken by designated Chamber The decision to deal with a reference for a preliminary ruling under the urgent procedure is taken by the designated Chamber of five Judges, acting on a proposal from the 129 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 108. It is, however, possible for that five-Judge Chamber to decide to sit in a formation of three Judges or to request the Court to reassign the case to a formation composed of a greater number of Judges: CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 113. 130 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 107(1). See also Art. 23a of Statute. 131 See para. 6.06. 132 See C-375/08, Pontini and Others, 2010, paras 42–43 (noting that, in any event, the degree of urgency was not such as to warrant application of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure). 133 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 107(2). See also Recommendations, points 37 and 38, which provide that the referring court’s request ‘must be included in a clearly identifiable place in its order for reference (for example, at the head of the page or in a separate judicial document)’. Therefore, there appears to be no requirement that such a request be made by separate application, although the national court is free to do so. See C-192/12 PPU, West, 2012, para. 32. As part of the Court of Justice’s preliminary ruling in a particular case, generally there is a section devoted to the decision for the use of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure: see C-804/21 PPU, C and Others, 2022, paras 36–42. 134 See C-261/09, Mantello, 2010, para. 31. 135 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 107(1). 136 See C-491/10 PPU, Aguirre Zarraga, 2010.

Expedited and Urgent Procedures 751 Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate General.137 So far, the Court has, each judicial year, designated one or two Chambers of five Judges for that purpose. However, the designated Chambers may decide to sit in a formation of three Judges138 or may request the Court to assign the case to a formation composed of a greater number of Judges.139 (ii) Circumstances warranting application of urgent preliminary ruling procedure Given that the urgent preliminary ruling procedure imposes considerable constraints on those concerned, the application of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure should be requested ‘only where it is absolutely necessary for the Court to give its ruling very quickly on the questions submitted by the referring court or tribunal’.140 For example, the large number of persons or legal situations potentially affected by the decision that the referring court has to deliver after bringing the matter before the Court for a preliminary ruling does not, in itself, constitute an exceptional circumstance that would justify the use of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure.141 In addition, the fact that a national court is required to decide the case pending before it within a specific time-limit has so far not justified recourse to the urgent preliminary ruling procedure.142 Conversely, it is established case-law that recourse to the urgent preliminary ruling procedure is justified where persons are deprived of their liberty at the date of the request for an urgent preliminary ruling procedure and the continuation of their custody depends on the outcome of the dispute in the main proceedings.143 This might be the case where proceedings relate to detention in the context of European arrest warrant proceedings144 or of migration and asylum 137 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 108(1). As indicated therein, the composition of that Chamber is determined in accordance with CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 28(2) either on the date on which the case is assigned to the Judge- Rapporteur if the application of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure is requested by the referring court or, if the application of that procedure is considered at the request of the President of the Court, on the day on which that request is made. 138 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 113(1). 139 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 113(2). See C-354/20 PPU and C-412/20 PPU, Openbaar Ministerie, 2020, para. 31; C-479/21 PPU, SN and Others, 2021, para. 37; C-562/21 PPU and C-563/21 PPU, Openbaar Ministerie, 2022, para. 37; C-435/22 PPU, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft München, 2022, paras 61–62. 140 Recommendations, point 35. See also C-278/12 PPU, Adil, AG Sharpston View, 2012, points 32–33. 141 Recommendations, point 36. 142 See C-168/13 PPU, F, 2013, paras 28–32, in which the Court did not take into account the fact that, under national procedural law, the referring court had to give a decision within a three-month period. See, by contrast, in relation to the expedited procedure, para. 23.26. 143 See C‑479/21 PPU, SN and SD, 2021, para. 34; C-804/21 PPU, C and CD, 2022, para. 39; C-72/22 PPU, M.A., 2022, para. 37. See also Recommendations, point 36. 144 See C-296/08 PPU, Santesteban Goicoechea, 2008, paras 32–34; C-665/20 PPU, X, 2021, paras 31–35; C‑428/21 PPU and C‑429/21 PPU, Openbaar Ministerie, 2021, paras 27–34; C‑479/21 PPU, SN and SD, 2021, paras 32–36; C-562/21 PPU and C-563/21 PPU, Openbaar Ministerie, 2022, paras 32–38; C-435/22 PPU, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft München, 2022, paras 56–61. This is also the case where a person, at the time of the referral, is being held in custody pursuant to a sentence imposed by a national court where that custodial sentence will end during the proceedings and the person will be held in custody for the purpose of executing a European arrest warrant immediately thereafter (see C‑354/20 PPU and C‑412/20 PPU, Openbaar Ministerie, 2020, paras 28–30). The condition of urgency is equally fulfilled where the answer of the Court will have an impact on the validity of an arrest warrant which may, if maintained, result in a less lenient execution of a sentence already imposed upon that person or have an impact on the decision on the conditional suspension of that sentence (see C‑195/20 PPU, XC, 2020, paras 22–23). In general, the situation of the person concerned must be assessed as it stood at the time when the request to apply the urgent preliminary ruling procedure was dealt with (see C-571/17 PPU, Ardic, 2017, para. 58).

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752 INCIDENTAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE law.145 Regarding the application of the Brussels IIbis Regulation,146 a request to apply the urgent preliminary ruling procedure has been granted where, in a case of wrongful removal to or retention of a child in another Member State, the length of the child’s stay in that other Member State and the length of the procedure might be detrimental to the development of the relationship between the child and the parent concerned147 or further jeopardize the integration of the child in his or her family and social environment in the event of a return.148 While the decision to apply the urgent preliminary ruling procedure depends upon the particular case, the Recommendations provide a non-exhaustive list of circumstances in which the referring court or tribunal may consider submitting a request for the urgent preliminary ruling procedure to be applied in proceedings in which a person is in custody or deprived of his or her liberty, ‘where the answer to the question raised is decisive as to the assessment of that person’s legal situation, or in proceedings concerning parental authority or custody of children, where the identity of the court having jurisdiction under European Union law depends on the answer to the question referred for a preliminary ruling’.149 23.34

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(iii) Reference may become devoid of purpose It may be the case that, even where the request for the application of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure has been granted, subsequent proceedings before the national court make the request for a preliminary ruling to no purpose and thus the Court of Justice will find it unnecessary to give a ruling where, for instance, the ruling would entail an advisory opinion or be on general or hypothetical questions (see para. 3.33).150 (e) Procedure (i) General The procedure in the case of references for a preliminary ruling involving the application of the urgent procedure generally contains both a written and an oral stage. In essence, the idea underlying the procedure is that the written stage is confined to the parties to the main proceedings, the Member State from which the reference is made,

145 As regards Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (OJ 2008 L348/98), see C-186/21 PPU, J.A. (order), 2021, paras 22–28; as regards Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast) (OJ 2013 L180/86), see C-61/11 PPU, El Dridi, 2011, paras 26–28. 146 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No. 1347/2000 (OJ 2003 L338/1). 147 See C-262/21 PPU, A and B, 2021, paras 34–38. 148 See C-603/20 PPU, MCP, 2021, para. 34. 149 Recommendations, point 36. See also Report on the use of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure by the Court of Justice, 31 January 2012, available on the website of the Court of Justice, in particular point 5 (identifying two types of situations which have resulted in the Court delivering a ruling in the shortest possible time in the context of the urgent procedure: first, a risk of irreparable damage in the parent/child relationship; and, second, where a person is being detained and further detention depends on the ruling to be given by the Court). For an application of the risk of irreparable damage in the parent/child relationship, see C-403/99 PPU, Detiček, 2009, paras 29–31; C-211/10 PPU, Povse, 2010,6673, paras 36–36; C-400/10 PPU, McB., 2010, paras 26–29. 150 See C-155/11 PPU, Mohammad Imran (order), 2011.

Expedited and Urgent Procedures 753 the Commission, and the Union institution which adopted the act whose validity or interpretation is in dispute. The other Member States and interested parties referred to in Art. 23 of the Statute are allowed to participate in the proceedings, but are in principle limited to the oral stage. (ii) Written stage The request for a preliminary ruling and the decision as to whether or not to deal with the reference under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure are first served on the parties to the main proceedings, the Member State from which the reference is made, the Commission, and the Union institution which adopted the act whose validity or interpretation is in dispute.151 If granted, the decision to deal with the reference under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure prescribes the time-limit within which those parties or entities may lodge statements of case or written observations,152 and that decision may specify the matters of law to which such statements of case or written observations must relate and the maximum length of those documents.153 As soon as service is effected, these documents are also communicated to the other interested parties referred to in Art. 23 of the Statute, which are also informed as soon as possible of the likely date of the hearing.154 Where a request for a preliminary ruling refers to an administrative procedure or judicial proceedings conducted in a Member State other than that from which the reference is made—which is regularly the case in child custody proceedings—the Court may invite that first Member State to provide all relevant information in writing or at the hearing.155 Where the reference is dealt with under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure,156 the statements of case or written observations which have been lodged are served on the parties to the main proceedings, the Member State from which the reference is made, the Commission, and the Union institution which adopted the act whose validity or interpretation is in dispute, as well as the other interested parties under Art. 23 of the Statute.157 The date of the hearing is communicated at the same time as these

151 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 109(1)–(2). 152 Statute, Art. 23a, second para. 153 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 109(2). See also Statement of the Council annexed to Council Decision 2008/79/EC, Euratom of 20 December 2007 amending the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice (OJ 2008 L24/44), second para., in which the Council calls upon the Court ‘to ensure that deadlines in this regard are not, in principle, less than 10 working days, and to adapt the oral procedure to the requirements of the urgent procedure’. It further states that ‘the urgent preliminary ruling procedure should be concluded within three months’. 154 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 109(4)–(5). Depending on the circumstances of the case, the Court may request the other Member States to submit written statements in accordance with Art. 24 of the Statute. For an example, see C-601/15 PPU, N., AG Sharpston View, 2016, points 42–45. 155 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 109(3). 156 Where the reference is not to be dealt with under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure, the proceedings continue in accordance with Art. 23 of the Statute and the applicable provisions of the CJ Rules of Procedure (CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 109(6)). 157 CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 110(1)–(2). For other interested parties referred to in Art. 23 of the Statute, the order for reference may be accompanied by a translation, where appropriate, of a summary, in accordance with Art. 98 of the CJ Rules of Procedure (CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 110(1)).

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754 INCIDENTAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE documents are served.158 In cases of extreme urgency, the designated Chamber may decide to omit the written part of the procedure altogether.159 23.37

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(iii) Electronic transmission of procedural documents Procedural documents submitted in the context of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure (for example, statements of case or written observations) are generally transmitted electronically.160 In practice, documents, both internal and those of interested parties within the meaning of Art. 23 of the Statute, have been communicated through the creation of ‘functional mailboxes’ specifically dedicated to communication in relation to the urgent preliminary ruling procedure.161 (iv) Oral stage The focus in urgent preliminary ruling proceedings lies with the oral stage of the procedure. Member States—other than the Member State from which the reference is made—can only submit their observations during that stage of the procedure.162 (v) Opinion of the Advocate General After the close of the written and oral stages, the Advocate General delivers his or her Opinion163 on how the particular reference for a preliminary ruling should be determined. (vi) Decision on the substance The designated Chamber (or another formation of the Court, as the case may be) delivers its preliminary ruling after hearing the Advocate General.164 (4) Relationship to expedited procedure The expedited procedure may be used, for example, where a reference needs to be dealt with within a short period of time but falls outside the field of the AFSJ. Moreover, depending on the circumstances of the case, a national court or tribunal may request that a reference concerning questions falling within the field of the AFSJ be decided under the expedited procedure, notwithstanding the existence of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure.165 That being said, a request submitted by the referring court for the application of the expedited procedure may not be likely to succeed where its request for the application of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure has been refused for failure to satisfy the requisite conditions, particularly that concerning urgency.166 158 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 110(3). 159 Statute, Art. 23a, third para.; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 111. See C-477/16 PPU, Kovalkovas, 2016. 160 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 106, applicable by virtue of Art. 114. 161 See Report on the use of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure by the Court of Justice (n. 147) point 6. 162 See, however, CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 109(3) and para. 23.28. 163 Until the beginning of 2016, the Advocate General did not deliver an ‘Opinion’ in the urgent preliminary ruling procedure, but a ‘View’. 164 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 112. 165 See C-188/10 and C-189/10, Melki and Abdeli, 2010 (order of the President), 2010; C-296/10, Purrucker (order of the President), 2010; C-329/11, Achughbabian (order of the President), 2011. See also L. Clément-Wilz, ‘Special Procedure at the Court of Justice: A Focus on the PPU’ in E. Guinchard and M.-P. Granger (eds), The New EU Judiciary. An Analysis of Current Judicial Reforms (Wolters Kluwer, 2017) 307, 319–320. 166 See C-375/08, Pontini and Others, 2010, paras 42–45; compare C-329/11, Achughbabian, 2011, para. 27 (noting that the referring court had submitted a request for the application of the urgent procedure which was

Expedited and Urgent Procedures 755 Finally, when the referring court requests the urgent preliminary ruling procedure, the President of the Court of Justice can still of his or her own motion decide that the reference is to be determined pursuant to the expedited procedure.167 Such course of action may be indicated when, given the importance of the questions raised, it is considered necessary to invite all interested parties within the meaning of Art. 23 of the Statute to submit written observations.168

B. The expedited procedure in direct actions (1) General On application by the applicant or the defendant, the President of the Court of Justice (after hearing the other party, the Judge-Rapporteur, and the Advocate General)169 or the Chamber concerned of the General Court (after hearing the other party and the Advocate General when designated)170 may decide that a case is to be determined pursuant to an expedited procedure where the nature of the case requires that it be dealt with within a short time.171 (2) Separate document An application for a case to be decided under an expedited procedure must be made by a separate document lodged at the same time as the application initiating the proceedings or the defence, as the case may be.172 The party concerned must state in detail the reasons for the particular urgency of the case.173 In proceedings before the General Court, the application may state that certain pleas in law or arguments or certain passages of the application initiating the proceedings or the defence are raised only in the event that the case is not decided under an expedited procedure.174

refused by the designated Chamber); C-329/11, Achughbabian (order of the President), 2011 (granting the referring court’s request to apply the accelerated procedure). 167 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 105(1). 168 Contrary to the urgent procedure, all interested parties within the meaning of Art. 23 of the Statute have the right to submit written observations in the context of an expedited procedure: see CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 105(3). 169 Exceptionally, the President of the Court of Justice may also take such decision of his own motion: CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 133(3). 170 In contrast to the expedited procedure before the Court of Justice, it is the General Court that rules upon the application for an expedited procedure, and not the President of the General Court: GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 151(1). Exceptionally, that Chamber, on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur, may also take such a decision of its own motion: GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 151(2). For an example, see T-125/22, RT France v Council, 2022, para. 31. 171 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 133(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 151(1). 172 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 133(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 152(1). The General Court has directed that an application in respect of which the expedited procedure is requested must not in principle exceed a maximum of 25 pages (GC Practice Rules, point 25). 173 CJ Practice Directions, point 18; GC Practice Rules, point 208. 174 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 152(2).

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756 INCIDENTAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE 23.44

(3) Importance of the oral part of the procedure The Court of Justice and the General Court are not bound to accept such an application.175 If the application is accepted, in principle, the parties may not lodge a reply or a rejoinder unless the President of the Court of Justice, after hearing the Judge- Rapporteur and the Advocate General, or the General Court, as the case may be, considers this to be necessary.176 The same goes for the statement in intervention.177 The key point here is the important role of the oral part of the procedure, in the course of which parties may supplement their arguments and offer evidence (reasons must be given for any delay in tendering it).178 This is in contrast to the normal procedure before the Court of Justice, in which there is in principle no oral hearing unless there is a reasoned request made by one of the parties (see para. 24.65). In practice, where an application for the expedited procedure is accepted, the Court of Justice179 or the General Court180 generally reach a final decision within an average period of three to nine months.

175 For a case in which such an application was rejected, see C-540/03, Parliament v Council (order of the President), 2004. The Court of Justice considered that this case, in which the annulment was sought of a directive which had to be implemented by the Member States only 22 months following lodgement of the application, was not particularly urgent. The Court further held that the fact that a large number of persons would be affected by the provisions of the directive did not in itself warrant recourse to the expedited procedure. A similar reasoning was used in C-40/10, Commission v Council (order of the President), 2010, para. 12. Additionally, a significant economic loss cannot by itself justify recourse to an expedited procedure: see C-69/09 P, Makhteshim-Agan Holding and Others v Commission (order of the President), 2009, para. 10. 176 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 134(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 154(3). Under an expedited procedure brought before the General Court, the period for lodging the defence is one month. The CJ Rules of Procedure do not specify a shorter than the usual two-month time-limit. 177 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 134(2); GC, Rules of Procedure, Art. 154(3). 178 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 135(2); GC, Rules of Procedure, Art. 155(2). 179 For some examples, see C-104/16 P, Council v Front Polisario (order), 2016, paras 10–15 (appeal against a judgment annulling a Council decision concluding an international agreement with a third country expedited because the annulment of such an act could have a significant negative impact on the Union’s relations with that third country and a suspension of diplomatic relations between the Union and the third country had already occurred in the context of the present case); C-581/20 P and C-621/20 P, Commission v Landesbank Baden-Württemberg and Others, 2021, paras 41–42 (appeal against a judgment calling into question the procedures followed by the Single Resolution Board to collect ex ante contributions to the Single Resolution Fund and the methods of calculating those contributions expedited because the continuing uncertainty regarding the conditions governing the financing of the Single Resolution Fund would have a significant, systemic adverse effect on the functioning of the banking union and thus the stability of the euro area); C-156/21, Hungary v Parliament and Council, 2022, para. 31; and C-157/21, Poland v Parliament and Council, 2022, para. 28 (action for annulment against conditionality mechanism expedited, as a swift judgment was of fundamental importance to the Union legal order, in particular, because it concerned the Union’s power to protect its budget and financial interests against consequences that may flow from breaches of the values laid down in Art. 2 TEU). It is not possible to use the expedited procedure in the case of an application for an opinion on the compatibility with the Treaties of an international agreement to be concluded by the Union pursuant to Art. 218(11) TFEU (see Opinion 1/04, Proposed agreement between the European Community and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of Passenger Name Record data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (order of the President), 2004). 180 For some examples, see T-677/20, Ryanair and Others v Commission, 2021, para. 11; T-227/21, Illumina v Commission, 2022, para. 37; T-125/22, RT France v Council, 2022, para. 31. In T-392/02 R, Solvay Pharmaceuticals v Council (order of the President), 2003, para. 104, the President of the General Court held that the fact that the General Court had rejected an application for the expedited procedure did not mean that an application for interim measures would also have to be rejected for want of urgency. Conversely, the fact that the General Court has decided to expedite a procedure may tip the balance of interests in favour of a defendant in proceedings for interim measures, since a swift decision can be expected: see T-125/22, RT France v Council (order), 2022, paras 65–66.

Confidentiality 757

III. Confidentiality A. General The proceedings before the Union Courts in direct actions are adversarial. In view of 23.45 this, the Union Courts will only take into account procedural documents and items that have been made available to the representatives of the parties and on which they have been given an opportunity to comment.181 Consequently, information or material presented to the Union Courts is by default non-confidential and will be communicated to the other parties to the proceedings. Reasons may exist, however, for the non- disclosure of information or materials to other parties to the proceedings on account of the confidential nature of that information or those materials or because of the status of the other parties to the proceedings. In specific circumstances, the Union Courts may thus decide to limit the full communication of all information and materials, in keeping with the principle of effective judicial protection.

B. Materials that are the outcome of a measure of inquiry The General Court may ask parties to provide it with certain information or any material relating to the case by way of a measure of organization of procedure.182 Where a party refuses to produce the information or material requested on account of its confidential nature, the General Court may, in accordance with Art. 91(b) of the GC Rules of Procedure, order that party to produce information or any material relating to the case where the General Court considers that the information or material is relevant for it to rule on the case.183 Subsequently, the General Court will examine the confidential nature of the information and the materials obtained through the measure of inquiry. Pending the outcome of that examination, the information or materials concerned will not be communicated to the other parties.184 If it comes to the conclusion that the information or materials are both relevant for the outcome of the proceedings and confidential, the General Court will balance that confidentiality and the right to effective judicial protection of the other parties, in particular the right to be heard and the equality of the parties.185 The General Court may come to the conclusion that the information or material should be communicated to the other parties. In that case, the General Court may request the representatives of the other parties to give an undertaking to preserve the

181 See GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 64. 182 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 89(3)(d). 183 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 92(3). The General Court may specify in that order that the inspection of the information or material obtained through the order may only take place at the Registry and that no copies can be made. 184 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 103(1). 185 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 103(2); GC Practice Rules, point 190.

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758 INCIDENTAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE confidentiality of the document or item by not communicating to their respective clients or to a third party the disclosed information or material.186 Where the General Court is of the opinion that the confidential information or material should not be communicated to the other parties, it shall ensure that those parties are provided with non-confidential information in order to make their views known. To this end, the General Court shall order the main party that produced confidential information or material to communicate to the other parties certain particulars in such a way as to enable them to exercise their rights of defence. This may involve the communication of a non-confidential version of the information or material concerned or the communication of the information or material in summarized form.187 In case that communication enables the other parties to exercise their rights of defence, the confidential information or material that has not been brought to the attention of those parties shall not be taken into consideration by the Court and will be removed from the file.188

C. Intervening parties 23.47

Intervening parties will, in principle, be provided with the whole case- file.189 Consequently, they will have access to all the information and the materials that have been exchanged between the main parties or that have come in the case-file through measures of organization or inquiry. For this reason, the main parties to the proceedings may apply for certain confidential information in the file not to be communicated to an intervener.190

186 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 103(3); GC Practice Rules, point 191. 187 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 103(3); GC Practice Rules, point 192. 188 GC Practice Rules, point 193. 189 CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 131(2), (3), and (4); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 144(7). To this end, it is necessary for the Court of Justice or the General Court to ascertain, in respect of each document in the case-file for which confidential treatment is claimed, the extent to which the applicant’s legitimate concern to prevent substantial damage to its business interests can reconciled with the interveners’ equally legitimate concern to have the necessary information for the purpose of being fully in a position to assert their rights and to state their case before the Court: see T-89/96, British Steel v Commission (order), 1997, para. 23. If documents in the case-file contain confidential information about natural or legal persons that are not parties to the proceedings, such persons have the right, in principle, to have the confidential nature of that information protected, unless they have business relations with the intervener or the information is known to third parties: see T-24/93, CMBT and Others v Commission (order), 1996, para. 7. In proceedings for interim relief, it is sufficient for the information for which confidential treatment is sought to appear, at first sight, to comprise business secrets: see T-65/98 R, Van den Bergh Foods v Commission (order of the President), 1998, para. 32; T-73/98 R, Prayon-Rupel v Commission (order of the President), 1998, para. 18; see further para. 13.16. Because the assessment of whether items in the case-file are or are not confidential is relatively onerous, the General Court proceeds as follows. The party claiming confidentiality is asked to put together a non-confidential file. This is communicated to the intervener. If the intervener then contests the confidentiality of certain documents, the General Court will determine by order (of the President of the Chamber concerned) whether or not the contested documents are confidential; see T-354/08, Diamanthandel A. Spira v Commission (order of the President), 2012, paras 33–64; T-258/10, France Télécom v Commission (order of the President), 2012. 190 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 131(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 144(2). See C-584/20 P, Commission v Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (order of the President), 2021, paras 15–17; C‑584/20 P and C‑621/20 P, Commission v Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (order of the President), 2021, paras 8–10 (confidentiality of certain documents accepted vis-à-vis intervening Member State).

Confidentiality 759 For every procedural document or item subsequently lodged, a main party must submit together with that document or item an application for confidential treatment if it wishes for information contained in a document or item to remain confidential.191 Such an application must be made by a separate document and may not contain any confidential information.192 It must specify the party in relation to which confidentiality is requested and accurately identify the particulars or passages of a document or item to be excluded and provide reasons for their confidential nature.193 The application must be limited to what is strictly necessary and cannot cover the entirety of a procedural document. Confidential treatment of an entire annex to a procedural document is only possible in exceptional circumstances. It should, in principle, be possible to provide the intervener with a non-confidential version of a procedural document or item.194 Moreover, on lodging an application for confidential treatment, a party applying for confidential treatment must in any event provide the Court with a full non-confidential version of the procedural document or item concerned in which the confidential parts are removed.195 In case of an application for confidential treatment, the President will decide on the communication of the information or material of which it is claimed that it is confidential vis-à-vis the intervener.196

D. Joinder of cases In case of a joinder of two or more cases, parties to those cases can request the communication of the procedural documents in the files of the joined cases. Where such a request is made, the procedural documents shall be served via e-Curia on the parties who requested them. The President may, however, exclude certain information from the case-file of such service where it is claimed to be confidential.197 For procedural documents and items subsequently lodged, the same rules apply as in the case of intervention.198

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E. Actions in which a request for access to documents is at issue In an action for annulment brought against a decision of a Union institution, body, office, or agency refusing access to documents, the General Court may order the production of the document concerned by way of a measure of inquiry.199 The production

191

GC Practice Rules, point 178. GC Practice Rules, point 179. GC Practice Rules, point 182. 194 GC Practice Rules, point 181. 195 GC Practice Rules, point 183. 196 CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 131(2), (3), and (4); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 144(5). 197 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 68(5). 198 GC Practice Rules, points 186–187. 199 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 91(c). 192 193

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760 INCIDENTAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE of documents to which access has been denied may also be ordered in the context of other proceedings. While documents of the Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies are in principle public, access to those documents may be restricted or refused if overriding requirements would justify such restriction. The protection of the interest justifying a restriction on the public nature of documents may be undermined where such document would be added to the case-file as a result of a measure of inquiry. Moreover, an action for annulment against a decision to refuse access would be devoid of purpose.200 Therefore, such documents will not be communicated to the other parties to the proceedings.201

F. Exceptional regime relating to the security of the Union or its Member States, or the conduct of their international relations 23.50

A main party to the proceedings may produce information or material that relates to the security of the Union or its Member States, or to the conduct of their international relations, either because that party bases his or her claims on that information and/ or material202 or because that party was requested to do so by way of a measure of inquiry.203 The GC Rules of Procedure provide for an exceptional procedural framework for dealing with such information.204 That framework applies where the information or material produced is European Union classified information. It also applies where information or material is not European Union classified information if the main party producing that information or material has indicated that its communication to the other main party in the proceedings would harm the security of the Union or of one or more of its Member States, or the conduct of their international relations.205 The main party concerned shall produce the information or material at issue by way of a separate document. That document shall be accompanied by an application for confidential treatment thereof, which sets out the overriding reasons justifying confidential treatment of that information or material and which may not contain anything confidential. The overriding reasons put forward by the main party concerned may include those provided by a Member State where the information or material at issue has been

200 GC Practice Rules, point 195. 201 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 104. If the General Court finds that the decision refusing access should be annulled, it will be for the Union institution, body, office, or agency concerned to give access to that document pursuant to Art. 266 TFEU. 202 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 105(1). 203 GC Rules of Procedure, Art 105(2); GC Practice Directions, point 196. 204 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 105; GC Decision (EU) 2016/2387 of 14 September 2016 concerning the security rules applicable to information or material produced in accordance with Article 105(1) or (2) of the Rules of Procedure (OJ 2016 L355/18). See M. Jaeger, ‘Balancing Security Reasons and the Adversarial Principle: The New Article 105 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court’ in K. Lenaerts, J.-C. Bonichot, H. Kanninen, C. Naômé, and P. Pohjankoski (eds), An Ever-Changing Union?: Perspectives on the Future of EU law in Honour of Allan Rosas (Hart, 2019) 185. 205 GC Decision concerning information or material produced in accordance with Article 105(1) or (2) of the Rules of Procedure (n. 204), recital 3.

Confidentiality 761 transmitted to that main party by a Member State.206 During the examination by the General Court of the information or material at issue as to its relevance to the ruling in the case and its confidential nature, that information or material shall not be communicated to the other main party.207 Where the General Court concludes that the information or material is relevant for its ruling, but that it is not confidential, it will ask the party concerned to authorize the communication of the information or material to the other main party. The General Court will not take the information or material into account and send it back to the party concerned where that party objects to its communication within a period prescribed by the President or fails to respond within that period.208 If, however, the General Court is of the opinion that the information or material is confidential, it will not communicate that information or material to the other party, but will make a reasoned order, after having weighed the right to effective judicial protection against the requirements flowing from the security of the Union or the Member States, or the conduct of their international relations, specifying the measures to be taken, for example, the communication of a non-confidential version or a non-confidential summary.209 Within two weeks after service of this order, the main party that produced the information or material at issue may decide to withdraw it, in whole or in part.210 Where the General Court considers that information or material which is not communicated to the other party on account of its confidential nature is essential for its ruling, it may, exceptionally, derogate from the adversarial nature of the proceedings and base its decision on the confidential information or material, provided that it confines itself to what is strictly necessary. The General Court must take into account in its assessment the fact that a main party has not been able to make its view known on that information or material.211

G. Confidentiality in appeals Since appeals are limited to points of law, parties should refrain from mentioning confidential information or material in their written pleadings. However, where, exceptionally, a party relies on the confidentiality of certain matters in his or her written pleadings, it must submit a duly reasoned request for confidential treatment by separate document. In that request, it should set out the scope of the confidentiality request and the parties to whom that request relates and add a non-confidential version of the pleading that can be served on the parties concerned by the request. If the request

206

GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 105(1). GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 105(3). 208 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 105(4). 209 GC Rules of Procedure, Arts 105(5) and (6). 210 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 105(7). 211 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 105(8). 207

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762 INCIDENTAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE for confidential treatment is only approved in part, a new non-confidential version of the written pleadings that can be served on the parties concerned must be produced.212 Where the appeal concerns a decision in relation to proceedings in which information or material has been produced that relates to the security of the Union or its Member States, or to the conduct of their international relations, and which has not been communicated to the other main party, the Registrar of the General Court must make that information or material available to the Court of Justice,213 which is bound to respect the confidential nature of that information or material.214 At the end of the appeal proceedings, the Court of Justice will return the confidential information or material to the party concerned as soon as the decision closing the proceedings has been served. If the case is sent back to the General Court, the Court of Justice will make the confidential information or material available again to the General Court. The specific rules, procedures and requirements for dealing with such confidential information or material inside of the Court of Justice of the European Union have been set out by the General Court in a decision taken pursuant to Art. 105(11) of the GC Rules of Procedure.215

IV. Preliminary Issues, Discontinuance, Withdrawal of Reference, and No Need to Proceed to Judgment A. Preliminary issues 23.52

(1) General A party may make an application to the Court of Justice or the General Court, as the case may be, under Art. 151 of the CJ Rules of Procedure or Art. 130 of the GC Rules of Procedure, respectively, for a decision on a preliminary objection or other preliminary issue which relates to the course of the proceedings, but does not go to the substance of the case. This possibility is frequently used by the defendant in order to raise an objection of inadmissibility or of lack of jurisdiction (see para. 23.55), but any other application may also be made, such as a request by a party for measures of inquiry,216 for documents to be excluded from the proceedings217 or to be treated as confidential,218 a request that the Union Court concerned declare that there is no need to proceed to judgment (see para. 23.62), or a request to remedy alleged procedural defects.219 212 CJ Practice Directions, point 32. 213 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 190a(1). 214 CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 190a(2) and (3). 215 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 105(11). 216 See 24/58 and 34/58, Chambre Syndicale de la Sidérurgie de l’Est de la France v High Authority (order), 1960; T-481/08, Alisei v Commission, 2010, paras 32, 33, 104; T-346/10 Borax Europe v ECHA, 2011, paras 49–51. 217 28/65 Fonzi v Commission (order), 1966 ECR 506, 507; C-36/04, Spain v Council (order), 2004; C-156/21, Hungary v Parliament and Council, 2022, paras 36–64; T-62/99, Sodima v Commission, 2001, paras 22–25; T-331/11, Besselink v Commission (order), 2013. 218 See C-458/09 P, Italy v Commission (order of the President), 2010; T-108/07, Spira v Commission (order of the President), 2012. 219 See T-47/92, Lenz v Commission (order), 1992.

Preliminary Issues 763 (2) Separate document The application for a decision on a preliminary objection or issue ‘not going to the substance of the case’ must be made by separate document220 and state the pleas in law and arguments relied on, together with the form of order sought, and any supporting documents must be annexed to it.221 In case of an application by which the defendant raises a preliminary objection, such application must be submitted within two months after service of the application.222 (3) Procedure As soon as the application has been lodged, the President prescribes a period during which the opposite party may lodge a document containing its pleas and the form of order sought.223 At the Court of Justice, the remainder of the proceedings is oral, unless the Court of Justice decides to reach its determination on the basis of the documents submitted by the parties.224 At the General Court, the procedure is primarily written. The rules regarding the opening of the oral part of the procedure do not apply and parties cannot submit a request to this effect. The General Court may, however, decide to open the oral part of the procedure.225 For example, if the action is clearly inadmissible, there is a tendency to uphold the objection of inadmissibility without holding a hearing. In such a case, the Court of Justice, after hearing the Advocate General, declares the action inadmissible by reasoned order.226 The Court of Justice, after hearing the Advocate General, decides on the application for a decision on the preliminary objection or, where special circumstances so justify, reserves its decision until it rules on the substance of the case.227

220 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 151(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 130(1) and (2). However, not every plea of inadmissibility must be raised by a separate document. The lodging of a separate document is required only if the party submitting it applies for a decision on admissibility ‘not going to the substance of the case’: C-401/09 P, Evropaïki Dynamiki v ECB, 2011, paras 43–46; T-17/09, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, 2012, para. 33. Therefore, it is not required that a plea only seeking the partial inadmissibility of an action is raised formally: see T-172/09, Gem-Year Industrial and Zhejiang v Council, 2012, para. 20. Further to this, the requirement in Art. 130(3) of the GC Rules of Procedure that documents relied on in support of a request for a ruling on the inadmissibility must be annexed to that request cannot be interpreted as meaning that the General Court should confine itself to documents annexed to the request, as this would not be in line with established case-law that the time-limit for bringing an action is of public policy: see T-160/20, 3M Belgium v ECHA (order), 2021, paras 43–44. 221 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 151 (2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 130(3). 222 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 130(1). While the CJ Rules of Procedure do not contain a similar provision, it follows from the general rules regarding the admissibility of a defence that a two-month time-limit also applies with respect to the Court of Justice. 223 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 151(3); GC Rules of Procedure, Arts 130(4) and (5). 224 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 151(4). 225 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 130(6). See also C-113/05 P, European Federation for Cosmetic Ingredients v Parliament and Council (order), 2006, para. 26 (no obligation for the General Court to organize a hearing). 226 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 53(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 126. For examples, see C-224/03, Italy v Commission (order), 2003; T-318/12, Communicaid Group v Commission (order), 2012, para. 3; T-532/12, Morea v Commission (order), 2012, para. 3. 227 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 151(5); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 130(7).

23.53

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764 INCIDENTAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE

23.55

23.56

23.57

(4) The preliminary objection of inadmissibility (a) Separate decision or decision reserved for final judgment If the Union Court decides to dismiss the objection of inadmissibility or reserves its decision on it for final judgment, the President will prescribe new time-limits for the further steps in the proceedings. 228 In practice, this means that the defendant is given a new time-limit for lodging the defence and hence for the resumption of the written procedure on the substance. (b) Examination of the substance without examining objection of inadmissibility The Union Court might rule immediately on the substance of the case without examining the objection of inadmissibility if this is justified by the proper administration of justice. This will be the case when it appears clearly that the action will not succeed on the merits.229 (c) Moment in time taken into account to determine the admissibility of an action The admissibility of an action is judged by reference to the situation prevailing when the application was lodged.230 Therefore, new rules on standing for natural or legal persons cannot be adduced to assess the admissibility of an action if the application was lodged before the entry into force of those new rules.231 More interesting is the situation of lis pendens (often used interchangeably with lis alibi pendens), where two successive actions with identical parties, subject-matter, and submissions are pending before the Union Courts.232 If both actions are still pending at the moment where the Court of Justice or the General Court rules on the admissibility of the action, only the second action will be declared inadmissible on account of lis pendens.233 This is logical, as the situation of lis pendens only existed in respect of the second action at the time of lodging. The situation becomes more complicated when the first action has been declared inadmissible. Applying the rule that the admissibility of an action should be assessed by reference to the situation prevailing when the application was lodged might also lead to the inadmissibility of the second action, since, at the time of lodging the application, there was a situation of lis pendens. The Union Courts, however, have rejected such a reasoning. It was held that the dispute arising from the first action ceased to exist when the action was declared inadmissible and thus caused the situation of lis pendens to disappear.234 Consequently, the second action could not be declared inadmissible on account of lis pendens. The reasoning also applies when the first action has been withdrawn by the parties.235

228 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 151(6); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 130(8). 229 See C-439/11 P, Ziegler v Commission, 2013, para. 45; T-561/08, Gutknecht v Commission, 2011, paras 22–23. 230 See C-71/09 P, C-73/09 P and C-76/09 P, Comitato ‘Venezia vuole vivere’ and Others v Commission, 2011, para. 31. 231 See T-291/04, Enviro Tech v Commission, 2011, para. 98. 232 See 358/85 and 51/86, France v Parliament, 1988, para. 12; T-531/11, Hamas v Council (order), 2012, para. 15. 233 See T-378/06, IMI and Others v Commission, 2011, paras 28–32. 234 See 146/85 and 431/85, Diezler and Others v ESC, 1987, para. 12; C-71/09 P, C-73/09 P and C-76/09 P, Comitato ‘Venezia vuole vivere’ and Others v Commission, 2011, para. 31. 235 See C-71/09 P, C-73/09 P, and C-76/09 P, Comitato ‘Venezia vuole vivere’ and Others v Commission, 2011, para. 32.

Preliminary Issues 765 (d) Reasoned order As already mentioned, the Court of Justice or the General Court may decide by reasoned order, without taking further steps in the proceedings and without hearing the parties (although the Court of Justice is obliged to hear the Advocate General), that it has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the case or that the application is manifestly inadmissible.236 The General Court can also decide by reasoned order that an action manifestly lacks any foundation in law (see para. 24.02).237 It is not clear whether the defendant can raise an objection by which it calls on the General Court to declare, by order, that an action is manifestly ill-founded in law.238

23.58

B. Discontinuance (1) Amicable settlement of the dispute If, before the Court of Justice or the General Court has given its decision, the parties notify the Court in question that they have reached a settlement of their dispute and that they have abandoned their claims, the President orders the case to be removed from the register and gives a decision as to the costs.239 Where parties to proceedings for interim measures reach an amicable settlement whereby the applicant declares that it will withdraw its application for interim relief, the Judge hearing the application must of his or her own motion order the application to be removed from the register if the applicant does not honour the undertaking given in the amicable settlement. This is because the amicable settlement is legally binding and, as such, must be enforced by the Judge.240 (2) Unilateral discontinuance The applicant may also discontinue proceedings without the agreement of the opposite party.241 It does so by informing the Court of Justice or the General Court, as the case may be, in writing. In this case, too, the President orders the case to be removed from the register and decides as to the costs.242 236 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 53(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 126. 237 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 126. The words ‘or manifestly lacking any foundation in law’ were added to Art. 126 of the GC Rules of Procedure in order to make it clear that the General Court cannot deal with a case under that provision where the outcome of the proceedings depends on an assessment of the facts. For an example, see T-442/11, Evropaïki Dynamiki (order), 2012, para. 42. 238 Art. 130(1) of the GC Rules of Procedure does not seem to afford any basis for the defendant’s doing so, since it expressly provides that the General Court is to rule on an application made in this way which does not ‘go to the substance of the case’. Of course, the defendant may claim at any time in its defence that the application is manifestly ill-founded in law and ask the General Court to rule on that claim without taking further steps in the written procedure. See T-62/12, ClientEarth v Council (order), 2012, para. 10. 239 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 147(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 124(1)). Those provisions do not apply to proceedings under Arts 263 and 265 TFEU: CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 147(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 124(2). The decision on costs is taken in accordance with Art. 141 of the CJ Rules of Procedure or Arts 136 and 138 of the GC Rules of Procedure, as the case may be. 240 See T-42/98 R, Sabbatucci v Parliament (order of the President), 1998, para. 30. 241 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 148; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 125. The defendant cannot object to the other party’s discontinuing the proceedings: see C-503/04, Commission v Germany, 2007, para. 12; C-188/08, Commission v Ireland, 2009, para. 86. 242 Again, the decision on costs is taken in accordance with Art. 141 of the CJ Rules of Procedure or Arts 136 and 138 of the GC Rules of Procedure, as the case may be.

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766 INCIDENTAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE

C. Withdrawal of the reference for a preliminary ruling 23.61

A referring court has the possibility of withdrawing a reference for a preliminary ruling.243 This may happen, for instance, when the parties before the national court have come to an amicable settlement or proceedings were discontinued. The Court will in principle grant such a request since, in the context of Art. 267 TFEU, it only has jurisdiction if an actual dispute is pending before the referring court. Delivering a preliminary ruling in the context of proceedings that are no longer pending before the referring court amounts to the delivery of an advisory opinion or answering hypothetical questions.244 However, for reasons of procedural economy, the Court will not take the request for withdrawal into account when it has been made after the notice of the date of delivery of the judgment has been served on the interested persons referred to in Art. 23 of the Statute.245 That being said, the Court may at any time declare that the conditions of its jurisdiction are no longer fulfilled.246

D. No need to proceed to judgment

23.62

(1) Action devoid of purpose (a) General The Court of Justice or the General Court, as the case may be, may decide that there is no need to proceed to judgment on the grounds that the action has become devoid of purpose.247 The respective Court may do so at any time, of its own motion, on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the parties and the Advocate General, by way of reasoned order.248 If the respective Court makes a finding to this effect, this closes the proceedings.249 Where the Court decides that there is no need to give judgment in an action which has ceased to have any purpose, it is not necessary for it to examine the admissibility of that action.250

243 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 100(1). 244 See Chs 3 and 6. 245 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 100(1). 246 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 100(2). 247 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 149; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 131. This can also be done by way of judgment: see C-66/12, Council v Commission, 2013. 248 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 149; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 131. 249 For examples, see C-337/09 P-R, Council v Zhejiang Xinan Chemical Industrial Group (order of the President), 2011, paras 39–49 (with respect to interim measures); T-411/09, Terezakis v Commission, 2011, para. 21 (act against which the action for annulment was brought repealed, so there was no need to adjudicate); T-141/05 RENV, Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission (order), 2011, para. 23 (the referral by the Court of Justice of a case back to the General Court cannot derogate from the principle that the General Court can rule on a request for an order that there is no need to adjudicate which concerns an absolute bar to proceedings, such as a lack of interest in bringing proceedings). Where the applicant dies and the successors do not take over the proceedings, the application becomes to no purpose: see T-81/98, Boyes v Commission (order), 1999, paras 3–9. Exceptionally, proceedings can become to no purpose as a result of the passiveness of the applicant, in particular, where the applicant repeatedly fails to lodge certain procedural documents: see T-365/08, Phoenix-Reisen v OHIM (order), 2010; T-164/09, Kitou v ECDP (order), 2010. 250 See C-302/99 P and C-308/99 P, Commission and France v TF1, 2001, para. 28; T-291/10, Martin v Commission (order), 2011, para. 23. But see T-103/99, Associazione delle Cantine Sociali Venete v Ombudsman and Parliament (order), 2000, para. 41, in which the General Court held that it can rule on whether the application is to no purpose only after it has determined that the application is admissible.

Preliminary Issues 767 (b) Effect on cross-appeal of dismissal of the appeal The dismissal of a main appeal does not necessarily have an effect on the treatment 23.63 of the cross-appeal, although this very much depends upon the pleas submitted. The Court of Justice may examine the cross-appeal, even if the main appeal is dismissed.251 It may happen that the Court of Justice first examines the cross-appeal and then decides that there is no longer any need to adjudicate on the main appeal.252 Conversely, the Court may find that in the light of its findings regarding the main appeal, the cross- appeal must be dismissed as unfounded.253 In any event, by virtue of Art. 183 of the CJ Rules of Procedure, a cross-appeal becomes devoid of purpose in the following three situations: (1) if the appellant discontinues the appeal; (2) if the appeal is declared manifestly inadmissible for non-compliance with the time-limit for lodging an appeal; and/or (3) if the appeal is declared manifestly inadmissible on the sole ground that it is not directed against those kinds of decisions of the General Court in which an appeal will lie, namely, a final decision of the General Court or a decision disposing of the substantive issues in part only or disposing of a procedural issue concerning a plea of lack of competence or inadmissibility within the meaning of the first paragraph of Art. 56 of the Statute.254 (2) Absolute bar to proceeding with a case The Court of Justice or the General Court may also decide at any time, of its own motion (ex officio), after hearing the parties (and the Advocate General in the case of the Court of Justice), to rule by reasoned order on whether there exists any absolute bar to proceeding with a case.255

251 See C-234/02 P, Ombudsman v Lamberts, 2004, paras 72–94. 252 See C-486/01 P, Front National v Parliament, 2004, para. 48: the General Court had dismissed the application of the Front National on the merits and the Front National appealed against that judgment; the European Parliament, in its cross-appeal, successfully alleged that the action brought before the General Court should have been declared inadmissible. In these circumstances, there was no longer need to adjudicate on the main appeal. It may also be the case that the Court will address the cross-appeal first, since it is only necessary to address the main appeal if the cross-appeal is dismissed: see C-362/05 P, Wunenberger v Commission, 2007, para. 25. 253 See C-404/10 P, Commission v Editions Odile Jacob, 2012, paras 137–138. 254 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 183. 255 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 150; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 129. See C-298/00 P, Italy v Commission, 2004, para. 35 (examination ex officio whether the applicant was individually concerned); T-142/01 and T-283/01 OPTUC v Commission, 2004, para. 30 (examination ex officio of the expiration of the time-limit for bringing an action); T-29/02, GEF v Commission, 2005, para. 72 (examination ex officio of jurisdiction to hear the case); T-228/00, T-229/00, T-242/00, T-243/00, T-245/00 to T-248/00, T-250/00, T-252/00, T-256/00 to T-259/00, T-265/00, T-267/00, T-268/00, T-271/00, T-274/00 to T-276/00, T-281/00, T-287/00, and T-296/00, Gruppo ormeggiatori del porto di Venezia and Others v Commission, 2005, paras 38–40 (exception of lis pendens examined ex officio). See also para. 7.159.

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24 MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE I. Procedures for Dealing with Cases A. General (1) Written and oral part In general, without prejudice to the special provisions laid down in the Statute or the Rules of Procedure of the Union Courts,1 the procedure before the Union Courts consists of a written part and an oral part.2 In essence, the purpose of the written part of the procedure is to define the subject-matter of the action and to put before the Court of Justice or the General Court all of the facts, pleas, and arguments of the parties, interested persons within the meaning of Art. 23 of the Statute, or others involved in the proceedings, and the forms of order sought by way of procedural documents or pleadings,3 while the purpose of the oral part of the procedure (except where a case is dealt with under an expedited or urgent procedure) is to afford the parties and others involved in the proceedings the opportunity to present oral arguments, to develop their claims, and to clarify any issues or questions before the respective Court.4 (2) Reasoned order Where it is clear that the Court of Justice or the General Court, as the case may be, has no jurisdiction to hear and determine a case or where a request or application is manifestly inadmissible, the Court concerned may decide at any time, after hearing the Advocate General in the case of the Court of Justice, to give a decision by reasoned order without taking any further steps in the proceedings.5 Further to this, the Court of Justice can give a decision by reasoned order where an appeal or cross-appeal is manifestly unfounded6 or, alternatively, manifestly well-founded.7 In addition, in the context of the preliminary ruling procedure, the Court of Justice may give a reply by reasoned order in case of an identical question, where the reply to a question may be

1 See CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 76; GC Rules of Procedure, Arts 106, 191, and 207. Furthermore, no hearing is held when the Rules of Procedure allow the respective Court to determine a case by means of reasoned order. See further para. 24.67. 2 Statute, Art. 20 (applicable to the General Court under Art. 53, first para.); CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 53(1). 3 See CJ Practice Directions, point 1. 4 See CJ Practice Directions, point 1. 5 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 53(2) and Art. 181; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 126. 6 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 181. See para. 19.20. 7 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 182. See para. 19.20.

EU Procedural Law. Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak, Oxford University Press. © Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833086.003.0024

24.01

24.02

770 MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE clearly deduced from the case-law, or where the answer to the question admits of no reasonable doubt.8 Similarly, the General Court can also give a decision by reasoned order where the action manifestly lacks any foundation in law9 or, alternatively, where an action is manifestly well-founded, on account of the fact that the Union Courts have already ruled on one or more questions of law identical to those raised in an action.10

24.03

24.04

(3) Priority Generally, the Court of Justice and the General Court take cognizance of cases brought before them in order, depending on when the preparatory inquiry is completed (see para. 24.44).11 In special circumstances, however, the President of the respective Court may decide that a particular case be given priority over others.12 He or she may do so of his or her own motion, although parties may request him or her to do so.13 (4) Expedited procedures A case before the Court of Justice or the General Court may be dealt with under an expedited procedure in accordance with the applicable rules of the Statute and Rules of Procedure. An expedited procedure may be used in respect of direct actions (see para. 23.42)14 and preliminary rulings proceedings (see para. 23.25).15 A reference for a preliminary ruling may also be dealt with under an urgent preliminary ruling procedure applicable in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (see para. 23.28).16 Such procedures essentially allow the Court of Justice or the General Court to deal with the particular case on a more speedy basis than the normal procedure.

B. Joinder of cases 24.05

(1) Connection between cases The President of the Court of Justice or the President of the Chamber concerned at the General Court may, at any time after hearing the Judge-Rapporteur and, at the Court of Justice, the Advocate General,17 and the parties (save in the case of preliminary ruling proceedings), order that two or more cases concerning the same subject-matter be 8 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 99. 9 The words ‘or manifestly lacking any foundation in law’ were added to former Art. 111 (now Art. 126) of the GC Rules of Procedure in order to make it clear that the General Court cannot deal with a case under that provision where the outcome of the proceedings depends on an assessment of the facts. 10 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 132. 11 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 67(1). 12 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 53(3); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 67(2). For some examples, see C-497/20, Randstad Italia, 2021, para. 40; C-19/21, I and S, 2022, para. 23; C-14/21 and C-15/21, Sea Watch, 2022, para. 67. 13 In the General Court, the President of the Chamber to which a pilot case is assigned is obliged to give priority to that case over others: GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 71a(3). 14 CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 53(4) and 133; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 151(1). 15 CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 53(4) and 105–106. 16 CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 53(5) and 107–114. For the distinction between the expedited and the urgent procedure for preliminary rulings, see para. 23.41. 17 This only applies when the cases have already been assigned.

Procedures for Dealing with Cases 771 joined, on account of the connection between them, for the purposes of the written or oral procedure or of the final judgment.18 The President may refer the decision to the Court of Justice or the General Court, as the case may be. Cases will be regarded as sufficiently connected, inter alia, where they contest the same act19 using the same submissions,20 or where the same parties are involved in different proceedings based on similar facts.21 Only cases ‘of the same type’ concerning the same subject-matter may be joined.22 A joinder of direct and indirect actions is therefore precluded. Furthermore, Art. 77 of the CJ Rules of Procedure expressly precludes the organization of a joint hearing for cases of a different type, but with the same subject-matter.23 Cases of a different type having the same subject-matter will be heard in sequence, either on the same day or during a number of consecutive days.24 (2) Objective Cases are joined in order to facilitate the processing of cases by avoiding unnecessary repetition of procedural acts. Joinder has sometimes been justified on the grounds that it avoids conflicting interpretations of judgments.25 (3) Effect In principle, joinder has no effects on the parties’ legal position.26 It does not preclude separate examination of the cases in the judgment.27 Furthermore, it is possible for one of the cases to be declared inadmissible after joinder. The arguments put forward in the

18 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 54(1) and (2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 68(1) and (2). 19 See 19/74 and 20/74, Kali & Salz and Kali-Chemie v Commission, 1975, para. 2; T-259/02 to T-264/02 and T-271/02, Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich and Others v Commission, 2006. 20 See 112/73, 144/73, and 145/73, Campogrande and Others v Commission, 1974, para. 5; T-494/08 to T-500/08 and T-509/08, Ryanair v Commission, 2010. 21 See C-305/86 and C-160/87, Neotype Techmashexport v Commission and Council, 1990. 22 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 54(1). Compare former CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 43, which merely specified ‘two or more cases concerning the same subject-matter’. The GC Rules of Procedure do not contain a similar rule, since cases of a different type (i.e. a direct action, on the one hand, and an appeal or proceedings relating to intellectual property rights, on the other hand) brought before the General Court will, in any event, not concern the same subject-matter. See GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 68(1). Nevertheless, it is possible for the General Court to organize a joint hearing of two or more cases if similarities between those cases so permit. See GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 106a. 23 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 77 provides: ‘If the similarities between two or more cases of the same type so permit, the Court may decide to organise a joint hearing of those cases.’ This constitutes a departure of an established practice under the former Rules of Procedure, in which the Court of Justice organized a joint hearing involving both direct and indirect actions, for instance, a joint hearing for a reference for a preliminary ruling and infringement proceedings. See C-318/05, Commission v Germany, 2007; and C-76/05, Schwarz and Gootjes- Schwarz, 2007, both dealing with a rule of German income tax legislation limiting a tax deduction for school fees to school fees paid to German private establishments. While both cases were not joined for the purposes of the final judgment, a common hearing was organized, and the Advocate General issued a common opinion (C-76/05 Schwarz and Gootjes-Schwarz and C-318/05, Commission v Germany, AG Stix-Hackl Opinion, 2006). 24 See M.-A. Gaudissart, ‘La refonte du règlement de procédure de la Cour de justice’ (2012) C.D.E. 603, 631–632. 25 See 36/59 to 38/59 and 40/59, Präsident Ruhrkohlen-Verkaufsgesellschaft and Others v High Authority, 1960 ECR 423, 438. 26 Consequently, after joinder, the Union Court may not rely, as against one party, on documents from the case- file of another party to which the first party did not have access. See C-480/99 P, Plant and Others v Commission and South Wales Small Mines Association, 2002, paras 24–34. 27 See 7/54 and 9/54, Groupement des Industries Sidérurgiques Luxembourgeoises v High Authority, 1954–1956 ECR 175, 188.

24.06

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772 MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE case declared inadmissible may be taken into account in determining the second or other cases joined.28 The President may at any time disjoin cases.29

C. Stay of proceedings 24.08

24.09

(1) Circumstances The proceedings before the Court of Justice and the General Court, as the case may be, may be stayed in a variety of circumstances, which predicate the procedure to be followed before the respective Court.30 In all cases except, in the Court of Justice, for those specified in the third paragraph of Art. 54 of the Statute (where the Court of Justice and the General Court are validly seized of cases in which the object is identical or similar: see para. 2.56), the proceedings may be stayed before the Court of Justice or the General Court by decision of the President of the Court of Justice or the President of the Chamber concerned of the General Court, adopted after hearing the Judge- Rapporteur, the Advocate General in the case of the Court of Justice, and the parties (except in the case of references for preliminary rulings).31 However, in the circumstances specified in the third paragraph of Art. 54 of the Statute, the proceedings before the Court of Justice may only be stayed by order of the Court,32 made after hearing the Advocate General, and thus not merely by a decision of the President. For both Courts, the proceedings may be resumed following the same procedure.33 The order or decision of the Court of Justice or the General Court, depending on the circumstances, is served on the parties, or, in the case of preliminary ruling proceedings, on the interested persons within the meaning of Art. 23 of the Statute.34 (2) Effect and time-limits The stay of proceedings takes effect on the date indicated in the order or decision of stay, or, in the absence of such indication, on the date of that order or decision.35 While proceedings are stayed, time ceases to run for the parties or interested persons within the meaning of Art. 23 of the Statute for the purposes of procedural time-limits.36 Where the order or decision does not fix the length of the stay, it ends on the date indicated in the order or decision of resumption or, in the absence of such indication, on the date of the order or decision of resumption.37 From the date of the resumption of proceedings

28 See 26/79 and 86/79, Forges de Thy-Marcinelle and Monceau v Commission, 1980, para. 4. 29 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 54(3); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 68(3). 30 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 55(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 69. 31 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 55(1)(b); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 69(a) to (d) and 70(1). This includes cases being stayed in application of the pilot case mechanism. See GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 71a. 32 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 55(1)(a). 33 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 55(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 70(2). 34 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 55(3); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 70(1). 35 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 55(4); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 71(1). 36 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 55(5); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 71(2). However, according to the GC Rules of Procedure, time continues to run, notwithstanding the stay of proceedings with respect to applications to intervene. 37 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 55(6); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 71(3).

Written Part of the Procedure 773 following a stay, the suspended procedural time-limits are replaced by new time-limits, and time begins to run from the date of that resumption.38

D. Deferment of the determination of a case The President of the Court of Justice may in special circumstances, either of his or her own motion or at the request of at least one of the parties, defer a case to be dealt with at a later date, after hearing the Judge-Rapporteur, the Advocate General, and the parties.39

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II. Written Part of the Procedure A. Lodging of procedural documents As part of the written part of the procedure, there are common procedural rules dealing with the lodging of procedural documents, irrespective of the type of action (for example, direct actions, preliminary ruling proceedings, and appeals).The lodging of a procedural document means that it is handed in to the Registry of the Court of Justice or is sent by post, telefax, e-Curia, or any other technical means available to that Court.40 It should be borne in mind that while at the Court of Justice e-Curia is only one of the means for lodging procedural documents, although recommended,41 e-Curia is the default means for lodging procedural documents at the General Court.42 (1) e-Curia The use of e-Curia allows a party’s representative to submit a procedural document via electronic means only, without the need for such lodging to be confirmed by post.43 The procedural documents lodged will be considered to be the original documents when lodgement is effected by using the representative’s user identification and password; such identification is deemed to constitute the signature of the document concerned.44 In case of a technical impossibility to use e-Curia, parties are required to inform the

38 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 55(7); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 71(4). 39 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 56. 40 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 57(7); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 72(1). Fax number of the CJ: (352) 4337 66; e-mail address of the CJ: [email protected]. Fax number of the GC: (352) 4303 2100; e-mail address of the GC: [email protected]. 41 CJ Practice Directions, point 47. 42 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 72(1); GC Practice Rules, point 77. 43 CJ Decision of 16 October 2018 on the lodging and service of procedural documents by means of e-Curia (OJ 2018 L293/36) (CJ e-Curia Decision), Art. 4, second para. By contrast, with respect to the date and time on which a particular procedural document is lodged, a procedural document sent by telefax or any other technical means of communication has to be confirmed by lodging the original document at the respective Court within ten days of its transfer by telefax or any other technical means of communication: see CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 57(7). 44 CJ e-Curia Decision, Art. 3; GC Decision of 11 July 2018 on the lodging and service of procedural documents by means of e-Curia (OJ 2018 L240/72) (GC e-Curia decision), Art. 3. See para. 24.13.

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774 MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE Registry of the respective Union Court immediately and to take the necessary steps to lodge the document concerned with the Registrar of the Court of Justice or the General Court, as the case may be.45 At the Court of Justice, the procedural rules applying to applications sent by post, telefax, or any other technical means of communication will apply.46 At the General Court, the protocol set out in the GC Decision on the lodging and service of procedural documents by means of e-Curia should be followed.47

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(2) Original procedural documents must be signed The original of every procedural document must be signed by the party’s agent or lawyer, or, in the case of observations submitted in the context of preliminary ruling proceedings, that of the party to the main proceedings or its representative, if the national rules of procedure applicable to those main proceedings permit that party to bring court proceedings without being represented by a lawyer.48 If the procedural document has not been signed accordingly, it will not be registered by the Registrar of the Court of Justice49 and will be returned to the party concerned.50 Notably, in the case of applications, defects concerning the signature that come to light after the expiry of the time-limit for bringing the action cannot be rectified and will lead to the inadmissibility of the action.51 Where e-Curia is being used for lodging procedural documents, the use of the representative’s username and password is equivalent to his or her signature on the procedural document.52 That representative must, of course, meet all the requirements laid down in Art. 19 of the Statute.53 The obligation for individuals to have each pleading signed by a lawyer is designed to ensure that what is submitted to the Court of Justice or the General Court consists of only legal opinions and explanations of fact which are considered by a lawyer to be fit to be put forward.54 Save for circumstances in the context of preliminary ruling proceedings where a party to the main proceedings is allowed to represent himself or herself (see para. 22.53), a pleading which was drafted by

45 Conditions of use of e-Curia of 17 October 2018, point 28 (available at http://curia.europa.eu). 46 See CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 57. 47 GC e-Curia Decision, Art. 7. The representative of the party should immediately notify the Registry of the General Court by email. If the representative is bound to comply with a time-limit, he or she must transmit a copy of the document in question to the Registry by any other appropriate means. That transmission should be followed as soon as possible thereafter by the lodging of the document in question via e-Curia. 48 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 57(1). The fact that the applicant is a lawyer himself or herself does not detract from the obligation to have the procedural document, in casu, the application, signed by the party’s representative: see T-157/11, Adămuţ and Others v Romania (order), 2011, para. 9. See further para. 22.56. 49 Art. 21(1) of the CJ Rules of Procedure and Art. 36(1) of the GC Rules of Procedure require the respective Registrars to keep a register in which all pleadings and supporting documents have to be entered. 50 See 220/78 and 221/78, ALA and ALFER v Commission, 1979, paras 3–5; T-56/92, Koelman v Commission (order), 1993, para. 1. 51 See C-426/10 P, Bell & Ross v OHIM, 2011, para. 42; T-708/14, Marpefa v EUIPO (order), 2015, paras 21–23. 52 CJ e-Curia Decision, Art. 3; GC e-Curia Decision, Art. 3; GC Practice Rules, point 79. 53 GC Practice Rules, point 78. 54 This suggestion was put forward in 108/63, Merlini v High Authority, AG Roemer Opinion, 1965 ECR 14, 16. For those reasons, the lawyer signing the pleading must be a ‘third person’ collaborating in the administration of justice and being required to provide, in full independence and in the overriding interests of justice, such legal assistance as their client needs. See para. 22.56.

Written Part of the Procedure 775 the party and merely formally signed by the party’s lawyer may be regarded, in the light of all the circumstances, as being an inadmissible pleading.55 (3) Copies and translations The original, accompanied by all annexes referred to therein and a schedule listing them (see para. 22.05), must be lodged together with five copies for the Court of Justice, and in the case of proceedings other than preliminary ruling proceedings, there should be copies for every other party to the proceedings. Copies must be certified by the party lodging them.56 At the General Court, where an annex to a procedural document cannot be lodged via e-Curia on account of its nature, the annex shall be sent by post to the Registry or shall be delivered to the Registry. The annex should be submitted together with one copy for the General Court and one copy for each of the parties to the proceedings. Copies must be certified as identical.57 Further to this, where in view of the length of the material only extracts are annexed to a procedural document lodged via e-Curia, the whole item or a full copy must be lodged at the Registry.58 In addition, the Union institutions are required to produce, within time-limits set down by the respective Court, translations of any procedural documents into the other languages provided for by Art. 1 of Council Regulation No. 1, that is to say, the other official languages of the European Union (see para. 22.39).59 At the Court of Justice, again, they should provide five copies for the Court and a copy for every other party to the proceedings, save for preliminary ruling proceedings.60 (4) All procedural documents must be dated All procedural documents must be dated, but for the purposes of the calculation of procedural time-limits, only the date and time of lodgement of the original at the Registry is taken into account (i.e. the date and time when that document arrives at the Registry).61 Where, however, a copy of a signed original of a procedural document

55 See 108/63, Merlini v High Authority, 1965 ECR 1, 9. In its judgment, the Court of Justice seems to have gone further than the Opinion of the Advocate General, who considered the merely formal signature of a pleading by a lawyer only as ‘negligence by the lawyer in his conduct of the proceedings’ which might perhaps be considered incompatible with the requirements of the proper administration of justice (CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 46(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 55(1)). All the same, this judgment should be approached with some caution, given that the Court of Justice held that the pleading drafted by the applicant itself, which the lawyer had signed and lodged as the reply, should be rejected not only as being in breach of Art. 20 of the ECSC Statute and Art. 127(1) of the CJ Rules of Procedure, but also because it ‘rais[ed] fresh submissions and arguments’ (Art. 20 of the ECSC Statute and Art. 127(1) of the CJ Rules of Procedure). 56 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 57(1), (2), and (4). Failure to initial the stamp on the first page of a procedural document certifying that the copy is true to the original is a formal error that does not render the lodging of the document inadmissible: see T-336/09, Häfele v OHIM, 2011, para. 17. 57 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 72(4). 58 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 72(5). 59 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 57(3); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 6. 60 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 57(3). 61 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 57(6); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 72(2). A party has the right to lodge a document instituting legal proceedings at any time up to the last working day of the period set by the Statute. This means that, prior to the expiry of that period, that party must be allowed to withdraw a first document instituting legal proceedings in order to replace it, within the same period, by a new version of that document (see C-274/00 P, Simon v Commission, 2002, para. 30).

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776 MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE is received by the Registry of the Court of Justice (together with the schedule of items and documents) by telefax or any other technical means of communication available to the Court of Justice, apart from e-Curia,62 the date of lodgement for the purposes of compliance with the procedural time-limits is deemed to be the date of receipt of that copy, provided that the signed original of the pleading, accompanied by the annexes and copies, is lodged at the Registry no later than ten days thereafter.63 The Registrar is not obliged to bring promptly to the attention of a representative the existence of procedural defects in this regard.64 For lodgements via e-Curia, a procedural document is deemed to have been lodged at the time of the representative’s validation of lodgement of that document (according to Luxembourg time).65

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(5) Length of procedural documents The pleadings should be as short as possible in order to expedite the disposal of the case. The CJ Practice Directions state that, save in exceptional circumstances, an application and a defence should not exceed thirty pages, a reply and a rejoinder should not exceed ten pages, and a statement in intervention should not exceed ten pages.66 In its Practice Rules, the General Court lays down the maximum number of pages for a series of pleadings.67 The maximum number of pages for an application and a defence should not, in principle, exceed fifty pages.68 The corresponding figures are twenty-five pages for the reply and the rejoinder, 69 twenty pages for an objection of inadmissibility and observations thereon, 70 and twenty pages for statements in intervention.71 These limits may be exceeded in cases involving particularly complex legal or factual issues.72 The

62 See CJ e-Curia Decision, Art. 3. 63 CJ, Rules of Procedure, Art. 57(7); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 43(6). In the event of any discrepancy between the signed original and the copy previously lodged, only the date of lodgement of the signed original will be taken into consideration: CJ Practice Directions, point 49. Note that such requirement no longer exists at the General Court, since all procedural documents should be lodged via e-Curia. However, where procedural documents are lodged via e-Curia before the supporting documents required for the validation of the e-Curia access account have been produced (this is where the representative of the party concerned has not taken the requisite steps to open an account in good time before the expiry of a time-limit for lodging a procedural document with the General Court: Conditions of use of e-Curia, point 13), those supporting documents must be received by the Registry of the General Court in paper format within ten days of the lodging of the procedural document. Where the supporting documents are not received by the General Court within ten days, the procedural documents lodged via e-Curia shall be declared inadmissible: GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 4. 64 C-69/12 P, Noscira v OHIM (order), 2012, para. 14. 65 CJ e-Curia Decision, Art. 5; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 72(2); GC e-Curia Decision, Art. 5. 66 CJ Practice Directions, points 13, 16, 17, and 34. 67 GC Practice Rules, point 105. Non-compliance with these Practice Rules can lead to an unfavourable costs order for the party concerned: see T-191/98, T-212/98 to T-214/98, Atlantic Container Line and Others v Commission, 2003, paras 1645–1647. 68 In direct actions brought under Art. 270 TFEU, the maximum number of pages for the application and the defence is thirty pages. 69 In direct actions brought under Art. 270 TFEU, the maximum number of pages for the reply and rejoinder is fifteen pages. 70 In direct actions brought under Art. 270 TFEU, the maximum number of pages for an objection of inadmissibility and observations thereon is ten pages. 71 In direct actions brought under Art. 270 TFEU, the maximum number of pages for statements in intervention is ten pages. 72 GC Practice Rules, point 106.

Written Part of the Procedure 777 Union Courts may, by decision, set the maximum length of written pleadings or observations lodged before them.73 (6) Directions for preparing procedural documents (a) General Procedural documents lodged by the parties must be submitted in a form in which they can be consulted and processed electronically by the Court of Justice or the General Court.74 For that purpose, the following requirements must be complied with, depending on the method of lodging:

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– the paper must be white, unlined, and A4 size; – the text must be easily legible and appear on one side of the page only; – the text must be in a commonly used font (such as Times New Roman), in at least 12 pt in the body of the text and at least 10 pt in the footnotes, with single line spacing at the General Court75 and 1.5 line spacing at the Court of Justice,76 and upper, lower, left, and right margins of at least 2.5 cm; – the pages of the documents must be numbered consecutively in the top right-hand corner. That numbering must also cover all the pages of any annexes to the pleading, so as to make it possible to check that all the pages of the annexes have been duly scanned; – when not sent electronically, paper documents produced must be assembled in such a way as to be easily separable (they must not be bound together or permanently attached by means such as glue or staples) and must appear on one side of the page only.

(b) First page The following information must appear on the first page of the procedural document:77

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– the title of the document (application, appeal, defence, response, reply, rejoinder, application for leave to intervene, statement in intervention, observations on the statement in intervention, objection of inadmissibility, etc.); – the case-number, if it has already been notified by the Registry; – the names of all the parties concerned (or their initials if the case has been anonymized); – the name of the party on whose behalf the pleading is lodged (or their initials if the case has been anonymized).

(c) Procedural documents lodged by means of e-Curia Procedural documents lodged by means of e-Curia should comply with the requirements set out above and must be transmitted as PDF files (both image and text).78 In

73

CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 58; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 75. CJ Practice Directions, point 40; GC Practice Rules, point 81. 75 GC Practice Rules, point 81(b). 76 CJ Practice Directions, point 40. 77 CJ Practice Directions, point 41; GC Practice Rules, point 80. 78 Conditions for use of e-Curia, point 15. 74

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778 MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE addition to this, the User Guide spells out a number of further requirements.79 The file by which the procedural document is lodged should contain a name identifying the document (for example, Pleadings, Annex Part 1, etc.). The document does not have to bear a handwritten signature—the login details of the party’s representative lodging the document will constitute a signature for the purposes of the Rules of Procedure—and must include the schedule of annexes. The text of the document can immediately be saved in PDF format without scanning the document. Annexes to a procedural document must be contained in a separate file.80

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(d) Paragraphs need to be numbered Each paragraph of the pleading must be numbered.81 (e) Annexes There must be annexed to every procedural document a file containing the items and documents relied on in support of it, together with a schedule listing them.82 Only those documents mentioned in the actual text of a pleading which are necessary in order to prove or illustrate its contents may be submitted as annexes.83 Annexes will be accepted only if they are accompanied by a schedule indicating, for each document annexed, the number of the annex and a short description of the document (e.g. ‘letter’), followed by its date, author, addressee, number of pages, the page reference and paragraph number in the pleading where the document is mentioned, and its relevance.84 Each reference to a document lodged must state the relevant annex number, as given in the schedule of annexes in which it appears, and indicate the pleading to which it is annexed.85 Where, in view of the length of a particular item or document, only extracts are annexed to the procedural document, the whole item or document or a full copy of it must be lodged at the Registry.86

B. Particularities regarding preliminary ruling proceedings 24.22

(1) Written observations The parties to the main proceedings, the Member States, the Commission, and, where appropriate, the Union institution, body, office, or agency which adopted the act which

79 See e-Curia User Guide, which is a document available at the website of the Union Courts: https://curia.eur opa.eu/jcms/jcms/P_78957/en/, 9. 80 e-Curia User Guide, 9. 81 CJ Practice Directions, point 40; GC Practice Rules, point 81(c). 82 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 57(4); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 72(3). 83 CJ Practice Directions, point 44; GC Practice Rules, point 85. 84 CJ Practice Directions, point 44; GC Practice Rules, points 82–83. For the General Court, an annex should also be numbered in such a way as to identify the procedural document in which it is produced (thus, for example, Annex A.1, A.2, etc. in an application; Annex B.1, B.2, etc. in a defence; Annex C.1, C.2, etc. in a reply; Annex D.1, D.2, etc. in a rejoinder). 85 CJ Practice Directions, point 44; GC Practice Rules, point 87. 86 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 57(5); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 72(5).

Written Part of the Procedure 779 is in dispute are entitled to submit statements of case or written observations within two months of notification of the order for reference.87 States party to the EEA Agreement which are not Member States and the EFTA Supervisory Authority may likewise submit written observations within two months if the national court’s decision concerns one of the fields of application of the EEA Agreement.88 Where an agreement relating to a specific subject-matter, concluded by the Council and one or more non-Member States, provides that those States are entitled to submit written observations where a court or tribunal of a Member State refers to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling a question falling within the scope of the agreement, the decision of the national court or tribunal containing that question shall also be notified to the non-Member States concerned.89 Within two months of such notification, those States may lodge written observations at the Court.90 (2) Calculation of the two-month period for submission of written observations The two-month period is calculated according to the common procedural rules on time-limits, including the extension of ten days for distance (see paras 22.65–22.70). Time starts to run as from notification, which is determined from the form for acknowledgment of receipt attached to the registered letter sent by the Court. The fact that a Member State received an advance notice of the reference for a preliminary ruling does not detract from that.91 The two-month period may be extended only in the event of ‘unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure’ within the meaning of Art. 45 of the Statute. Late submissions will be sent back to the interested person’s representative and not taken into account by the Court.92 This does not preclude participation in the oral part of the procedure.93 (3) No second exchange of written observations The written procedure consists solely of this opportunity to submit observations to the Court. The observations received are sent to all those to whom the order for reference

87 Statute, Art. 23, second para.; see also CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 96(1)(a)–(d). Whatever distinction was meant between ‘statements of case’ and ‘written observations’ in various provisions of the Statute and CJ Rules of Procedure on the preliminary ruling procedure (see Art. 20, second para., Art. 23, second–fourth paras, and Art. 23a, second para. of the Statute and Arts 1(2)(c), 105(3)–(4), 109(2), and 110 of the CJ Rules of Procedure) has in practice been lost: see D. Anderson and M. Demetriou, References to the European Court (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2002) para. 10.12. 88 Statute, Art. 23, third para.; see also CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 96(1)(e). 89 Statute, Art. 23, fourth para.; see also CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 96(1)(f). According to CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 98(3), the original version of the decision of the national court or tribunal will be communicated to it together with a translation of the decision, or where appropriate of a summary, into one of the languages to be chosen by the non-Member State concerned which are mentioned in CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 36. 90 Statute, Art. 23, fourth para. 91 See C-137/08, VB Pénzügyi Lízing, 2010, paras 26–35. Such an advance notice does not create an imbalance between the interested persons involved in the proceedings. The two-month period has only the effective administration of justice as its object and not the procedural equality of arms. See C-137/08, VB Pénzügyi Lízing, AG Trstenjak Opinion, 2010, points 78–82. 92 For an example, see C-364/11, Abed El Karem El Kott and Others, AG Sharpston Opinion, 2012, point 21. 93 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 96(2). See also CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 76(3).

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780 MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE was notified. There is no ‘reply’ as between those who have submitted observations should they disagree with each other’s views. This follows from the fact that the preliminary ruling procedure is not, formally speaking, a dispute between ‘parties’.

C. Particularities regarding direct actions

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(1) The defence (a) Lodging the defence (i) Time-limit The defendant has two months following service upon it of the application in which to lodge a defence.94 The President of the Court of Justice or the General Court, as the case may be, may exceptionally extend this time-limit on a reasoned application by the defendant, which must be lodged before the original time-limit runs out.95 (ii) Defence must be signed and dated As a pleading, the defence is subject to the same formal requirements as the application initiating the proceedings and all other procedural documents (see paras 23.49–23.55 and 25.02–25.22). It must therefore be signed by an agent or a lawyer. Nonobservance of this requirement leads to the inadmissibility of the defence.96 (iii) Disputes relating to intellectual property rights In disputes relating to intellectual property rights, the Office, as defendant, and interveners within the meaning of Art. 173(1) of the GC Rules of Procedure may submit responses to the application within a period of two months from the service of the application.97 Since, in such disputes, interveners may apply for a form of order and put forward pleas in law not applied for or put forward by the main parties (a cross- claim),98 the other parties to the proceedings may, within two months of service of the responses, submit a pleading in response to the form of order sought and pleas in law put forward by an intervener in a cross-claim. The President may exceptionally extend the time-limit.99

94 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 124(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 81(1). See, in that regard, C-59/99, Commission v Pereira Roldão & Filhos and Others, 2001, para. 19 (the Court of Justice found that the application could not be served on one of the defendants; the applicant then informed the Court that the proceedings were to be pursued in relation to the other two defendants, thereby implicitly abandoning the proceedings so far as the untraceable party was concerned). Instead of lodging a defence, the defendant may submit an application, by separate act, to the Court of Justice or the General Court (within the time prescribed for lodging a defence) for a decision on an objection of inadmissibility or lack of competence (or other preliminary objection): see further para. 23.53. 95 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 124(3); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 81(3). The fact that the defendant applies for an extension of time for lodging its defence does not prevent it from raising an objection of inadmissibility pursuant to Art. 114 of the GC Rules of Procedure on the basis of facts which were already known at the time the extension was applied for. This does not render the application for an extension an abuse (see T-387/00, Comitato organizzatore del convegno internazionale v Commission (order), 2002, para. 359). 96 The applicant may then apply for the form of order sought to be granted by default: see C-279/03, Commission v Implants, 2005, paras 22–23. 97 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 179. 98 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 184(1). 99 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 185.

Written Part of the Procedure 781 (b) Content (i) Requirements In addition to the case-number and the applicant’s name, the following must appear at the beginning of each defence:

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– the defendant’s name and address; – the name and capacity of the defendant’s agent or lawyer; – in the Court of Justice, an address for service and/or agreement to service by telefax or other technical means of communication.100

The defence further contains: – the pleas in law and arguments relied on; – the form of order sought by the defendant; – where appropriate, any evidence produced or offered.101

(ii) Name and address of the defendant The defence is subject to the same requirements as the application, for instance, as regards the address for service in the Court of Justice, assistance, or representation by a lawyer and proof of the existence in law of a legal person governed by private law.102 (iii) Pleas in law and arguments relied on Pleas and arguments must be clearly set out—The pleas and arguments of fact and law relied on must be clearly set out in the defence.103 At the Court of Justice, the description of the factual and legal background should only be recapitulated in the defence insofar as its presentation in the application is disputed or calls for further particulars.104 The GC Practice Rules do not contain such a dispensation, which could be explained by the different nature of the direct actions before the General Court. Further to this, where a fact alleged by the applicant is contested, this must be clearly indicated, and the basis on which that fact is contested must be stated explicitly.105 New pleas—The defendant is limited to pleas set out in the defence. In subsequent pleadings, the defendant may introduce new pleas in law only if they are based on matters of law or of fact which come to light in the course of the proceedings.106 Consequently, ‘new pleas’ have the same standing for both the applicant and the defendant in order to secure observance of the principle of audi alteram partem. If the defendant could keep its defence pleas undisclosed until it lodged the rejoinder or, a fortiori, until the hearing, the applicant would lose any chance of making a ‘reply’ and of preparing its counterarguments for the hearing, which would jeopardize proper debate, with both parties putting forward pleas and counterpleas. The defence has to take issue only with

100

CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 124(2) CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 124(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 81(1). 102 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 124(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 81(2). 103 CJ Practice Directions, point 15. See T-133/07, Mitsubishi Electric v Commission, 2011, para. 25. 104 CJ Practice Directions, point 16. 105 GC Practice Rules, point 125. 106 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 127(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 84(1). 101

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782 MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE pleas raised by the applicant.107 A counterclaim may be made, provided that it is related to the applicant’s claim.108 24.32

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(iv) Form of order sought by the defendant Generally, the form of order sought by the defendant, which must be precisely specified at the end of the defence,109 will claim that the application and the claims set out therein should be dismissed and the applicant ordered to pay the costs. The claim for a costs order is very important, since both the Court of Justice and the General Court, as the case may be, will order the unsuccessful party to pay the costs only ‘if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings’.110 This means that the defendant, too, should not omit to ask the respective Court to make a costs order against the applicant in case it is successful in its defence (see also para. 25.16). (v) Any evidence produced or offered in support At the first possible opportunity—that is, in the defence—the defendant should tender any supporting evidence. If, subsequently, the defendant offers further evidence in the rejoinder or at the hearing, it must give reasons for the delay in tendering it.111 In this respect, too, the positions of the defendant and the applicant are parallel. Once again, it is the quality of the judicial debate before the Union Court which requires that each party puts forward supporting evidence at a time when the other can still effectively put forward a counterargument. (vi) Accompanying documents Just as in the case of the application, documents may have to be submitted with the defence (see paras 22.22–22.27). (2) The reply and the rejoinder (a) General After the defence has been lodged, the applicant may supplement its application by lodging a reply within a time-limit prescribed by the President of the Court of Justice or the General Court.112 The defendant may then lodge a rejoinder on the same terms.113 The parties are not obliged to lodge a reply and a rejoinder.114 In proceedings before the General Court, it is expressly provided that that Court may decide that a second exchange of pleadings is unnecessary because the documents before it are sufficiently 107 CJ Practice Directions, point 16; GC Practice Rules, point 126. 108 250/78, DEKA v EEC, 1983, para. 5: in this case, the Commission sought to set off against compensation which the then Community had to pay the applicant, a claim which had been assigned to the Commission for repayment of an amount which had been wrongly paid to the applicant by way of export refunds and monetary compensatory amounts for exports of maize gritz. As a ‘defence plea’, the claim for repayment of the amounts wrongly paid was apparently admissible. 109 CJ Practice Directions, point 41. At the General Court, the form of order sought may also be stated at the beginning of the defence: GC Practice Rules, point 124. 110 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 138(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 134(1). 111 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 128(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 85(2). 112 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 126(1) and (2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 83(1) and (3). 113 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 126(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 83(1) and (3). 114 By virtue of the use of the term ‘may’ in CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 126(1) and GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 83(1).

Written Part of the Procedure 783 comprehensive to enable the parties to elaborate their pleas and arguments in the course of the oral procedure.115 However, the General Court may authorize the parties to supplement the file in the case if the applicant presents a reasoned request to that effect within two weeks from the notification of that decision.116 The President fixes the time-limits within which these documents are to be lodged.117 Either party may apply to the President for an extension of time.118 If a party allows the relevant period to expire without lodging such a pleading or if it waives its right to do so, the proceedings continue. The President may specify the matters to which the reply or the rejoinder should relate.119 (b) Formal requirements No specific formal requirements are laid down for replies and rejoinders, although they do have to comply with the general requirements which all procedural documents have to satisfy (see paras 24.11–24.21).120 (c) Objective The reply and the rejoinder afford each party an opportunity to supplement the application and the defence, respectively, in the light of its opponent’s observations. They may contain supplementary arguments supporting or clarifying the pleas raised by the parties. As already noted, if a party offers further evidence in the reply or the rejoinder (or possibly even at a later stage in the proceedings), reasons must be given for the delay in tendering it.121 However, parties may tender evidence in rebuttal and the amplification of the offers of evidence submitted in response to evidence in rebuttal contained in the defence or the reply of the other party. Naturally, they do not have to give further reasons for this.122 (d) No new pleas As has also already been observed, neither the reply nor the rejoinder may raise new pleas, unless they are based on matters of law or of fact which have come to light in the course of the proceedings123 or constitute pleas which the Union Courts have to examine of their own motion.124 This will not be the case where, although the party raising the new plea was not previously aware of a matter of fact on which the new substantive plea is based, it could have known of it at the time when the application or the defence, as the case may be,

115 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 83(1). 116 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 83(2). 117 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 83(3). 118 If no extension of time is requested, a rejoinder lodged out of time will not be joined to the file (see T-208/01, Volkswagen v Commission, 2003, para. 11). 119 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 126(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 83(3). 120 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 57; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 72. 121 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 128(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 85(2). 122 See C-185/95 P, Baustahlgewebe v Commission, 1998, para. 72; T-198/09, UOP v Commission (order), 2013, para. 32. 123 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 127(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 84(1). 124 See C-833/19 P, Council v Hamas, 2021, para. 56; T-344/17, Latam Airlines Group v Commission, 2022, para. 79.

24.36

24.37

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784 MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE was lodged.125 If, in contrast, a matter of fact is mentioned for the first time in the defence, the applicant is entitled to raise a plea based thereon in the reply.126 Finally, new claims made in the reply or the rejoinder are inadmissible.127

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(e) Improper use of procedural documents Parties may not make improper use of procedural documents to which they have access in the course of the proceedings. They may use such documents only for the purpose of pursuing their own case. If a party uses some of the procedural documents of other parties for other purposes, such as for provoking public criticism of the other parties’ arguments as a result of the disclosure of the documents in question, it infringes a general principle of the due administration of justice, according to which parties have the right to defend their interests free of external influences, and particularly from influences on the part of the public. Such an abuse of process may be penalized in the order for costs.128 However, a party may join an application by which another party has brought other proceedings as a document annexed to its own application if the third party agrees. This is because there is no rule or provision to prevent parties from disclosing their pleadings to third parties.129 (f) Disputes relating to intellectual property rights In disputes relating to intellectual property rights before the General Court, the written part of the procedure is closed after the response of the defendant and, where applicable, of the intervener.130 There is no second exchange of pleadings.

D. Particularities regarding appeal 24.41

(1) Response Within a period of two months after service of the appeal, which may not be extended, any of the parties to the proceedings before the General Court ‘having an interest in the appeal being allowed or dismissed’ may lodge a response.131 The following heads must appear at the beginning of the response: the name and address of the party lodging it; the name and capacity of the agent or lawyer acting for that party; the date on which the appeal was served on that party; and an address for service and/or agreement to service by telefax or any other technical means of communication.132 The response 125 See C-110/10 P, Solvay v Commission, 2011, para. 58; T-149/15, Ben Ali v Council, 2017, para. 69. 126 See 12/64 and 29/64, Ley v Commission, 1965 ECR 107, 118–119; T-198/09, UOP v Commission (order), 2013, para. 32. 127 See T-236/07, Germany v Commission, 2010, para. 28; T-381/08, DAI v Commission, 2012, paras 34–37. 128 See T-174/95, Svenska Journalistförbundet v Council, 1998, paras 135–139, where the applicant published the Council’s defence on the Internet, requesting the public to inform the Council of their comments. See also T-135/09, Nexans France and Nexans v Commission, 2012, para. 108. 129 See C-376/98, Germany v Parliament and Council (order), 2000, para. 10; T-618/15, Voigt v Parliament, 2017, para. 92. 130 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 181. 131 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 172. 132 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 173(1)(a)–(b); CJ Practice Directions, point 26. Under Art. 173(2) of the CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 119 (obligation to be represented) and 121 (information relating to service) of the CJ Rules of Procedure apply to responses.

Written Part of the Procedure 785 must also contain the pleas in law and legal arguments relied on, and the form of order sought.133 (2) Cross-appeal Any party entitled to submit a response may submit a cross-appeal, which must be introduced by a document separate from the response.134 The cross-appeal must contain: the name and address of the party bringing the cross-appeal; the date on which the appeal was served on that party; the pleas in law and legal arguments relied on; and the form of order sought.135 A cross-appeal must seek to have set aside, in whole or in part, the decision of the General Court; it may also seek to have set aside an express or implied decision relating to the admissibility of the action before the General Court.136 The pleas in law and legal arguments relied on must identify precisely those points in the grounds of the decision of the General Court which are contested and must be separate from those relied on in the response.137 Where a cross-appeal is brought, the applicant at first instance or any other party to the relevant case before the General Court having an interest in the cross-appeal being allowed or dismissed may submit a response, which must be limited to the pleas in law relied on in that cross-appeal, within a period of two months after the cross-appeal being served on it, with no extensions being allowed.138 (3) Reply and rejoinder The appeal and the response may be supplemented by a reply and a rejoinder only where the President, on a duly reasoned application139 made by the appellant within

133 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 173(c)–(d). See also CJ Practice Directions, point 26. A response that does not seek to have the appeal allowed or dismissed, in whole or in part, as provided under Art. 174 of the CJ Rules of Procedure, is inadmissible: See C-263/09 P, Edwin v OHIM, 2011, paras 83–85 (dismissing claim for amendment of judgment under appeal). 134 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 176. The Court of Justice has ruled that there is nothing to preclude a party from bringing both an appeal and a cross-appeal against a judgment of the General Court: see C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P, and C-519/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v Commission, 2009, paras 31–39. 135 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 177(1). Under Art. 177(2) of the CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 119 (obligation to be represented), 121 (information relating to service), and 122(1) and (3) (annexes to the application) of the CJ Rules of Procedure apply to cross-appeals. Both Art. 122(1) and (3)—not just Art. 122(1)—of the CJ Rules of Procedure apply in relation to cross-appeals, since for the appeal, there is already a provision similar to Art. 122(3) set forth in Art. 168(4) thereof. In particular, by virtue of the cross-reference to Art. 119 of the CJ Rules of Procedure, agents and lawyers must lodge at the Registry an official document or an authority to act issued by the party whom they represent (Art. 119(2)). The fact that such authority is annexed only as a document to the application brought before the General Court does not make the appeal inadmissible: see C-234/06 P, Il Ponte Finanziaria v OHIM, 2007, paras 21–22. Moreover, depending on the wording of the power of attorney, it may be deemed to cover proceedings before the Court of Justice, although not explicitly mentioning that Court as such: see C-401/09 P, Evropaiki Dynamiki v ECB, 2011, paras 34–39. 136 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 178(1)–(2). Importantly, it is not necessary that the cross-appeal be against the operative part of the General Court’s decision, since this would generally deprive the cross-appeal of its useful effect. See C-362/19 P, Commission v Fútbol Club Barcelona, 2021, para. 110; C-833/19 P, Council v Hamas, 2021, para. 82. See further para. 19.19. 137 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 178(3). 138 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 179. 139 In principle, such application must not exceed three pages and must be confined to summarizing the precise reasons for which, in the appellant’s opinion, a reply is necessary. The request must be comprehensible in itself without any need to refer to the appeal or the response. See CJ Practice Directions, point 29.

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786 MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE seven days of service of the response, considers such further pleading necessary, after hearing the Judge-Rapporteur and the Advocate General, in particular, to enable the appellant to present its views on a plea of inadmissibility or on new matters relied on in the response.140 The President fixes the date by which the reply is to be submitted and, upon service of that pleading, the date by which the rejoinder is to be submitted; in so doing, the President may limit the number of pages and the subject-matter of those pleadings.141 Similar rules apply in connection with the submission of a reply and a rejoinder on a cross-appeal.142

III. The Preliminary Report and Assignment of Cases A. General 24.44

When the written part of the procedure is closed (for example, in the case of direct actions, after the rejoinder has been lodged or the parties have refrained from lodging a reply or a rejoinder, or the General Court has decided that the application and the defence do not need supplementing), the President fixes the date on which the Judge- Rapporteur is to present a preliminary report (often referred to by the French wording rapport préalable) to the Court of Justice or the General Court, as the case may be.143 The preliminary report is not published. It is intended for the general meeting of the Court of Justice (the Judges, the Advocates General, and the Registrar) or for the meeting of the competent Chamber of the General Court (the Judges and the Registrar).144 The preliminary report contains proposals as to whether particular measures of organization of procedure or measures of inquiry should be undertaken (see para. 24.46), and, in the case of the Court of Justice, whether requests for clarification to the referring court or tribunal should be made in the context of preliminary ruling proceedings.145 Furthermore, in proceedings before the Court of Justice, the Judge-Rapporteur proposes the formation which will deal with the case (three-or five-Judge Chamber, Grand Chamber, or the Full Court) in the preliminary report, which also includes proposals as to whether to dispense with a hearing and/or an Opinion of the Advocate General pursuant to the fifth paragraph of Art. 20 of the Statute.146 In contrast, before the General Court a case will normally be handled by the three-Judge Chamber of which the Judge- Rapporteur is a member. The Judge-Rapporteur will therefore deal with the question of the formation in the preliminary report only where he or she recommends that the case should be referred to the Grand Chamber, a five-Judge Chamber, or a single Judge.147

140

CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 175(1). CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 175(2); CJ Practice Directions, point 30. 142 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 180. 143 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 59(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 87(1). 144 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 59(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 87(1). 145 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 59(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 87(2). 146 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 59(2). 147 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 87(2). 141

Measures of Organization of Procedure and Measures of Inquiry 787 The Court of Justice, after hearing the Advocate General, and the General Court decide on the Judge-Rapporteur’s proposals set forth in the preliminary report.148 The respective Court may decide to open the oral proceedings without proceeding to measures of organization of procedure or measures of inquiry. If so, the President fixes the opening date.149 At the Court of Justice, the President will generally also fix the date for the hearing where only measures of organization of procedure are taken, such as preparatory measures requested by the Advocate General or the Judge-Rapporteur.150 Measures of inquiry decided upon have to have been completed before the President fixes the date for the opening of the oral part of the procedure.151 After the inquiry, the Court of Justice may prescribe a time-limit within which the parties are to submit written observations. The oral part of the procedure follows after that time-limit has expired. In addition, during the oral part of the procedure, measures of organization of procedure or measures of inquiry may still be prescribed.152 At the General Court, parties will be served with a notification of the close of the written part of the procedure after the measures of inquiry have been completed.153

B. Preliminary ruling proceedings After the written observations have been submitted or none have been received within 24.45 the prescribed period, the Judge-Rapporteur draws up the preliminary report for submission to the general meeting of the Court and the case is assigned to a particular formation of the Court—three-or five-Judge Chamber, Grand Chamber, or the Full Court (see para. 2.10). From that point onwards, the procedure for preliminary ruling proceedings— from the oral part of the procedure to delivery of the judgment or order by the Court of Justice—is the same as in the case of other types of actions before the Court of Justice.

IV. Measures of Organization of Procedure and Measures of Inquiry A. Burden of proof on the parties and role played by the Union Courts in fact-finding (1) General The purpose of measures of organization of procedure is in particular to ensure efficient conduct of the written and oral procedure and to facilitate the taking of 148 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 59(3); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 87(3). 149 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 60(4); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 107(1). 150 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 62(1). 151 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 75(1). 152 For an example, see T-79/89, T-84/89 to T-86/89, T-89/89, T-91/89 to T-92/89, T-94/89, T-96/89, T-98/89, T-102/89, and T-104/89, BASF and Others v Commission, 1992, 315, para. 25. See also C-287/11 P, Commission v Aalberts Industries and Others, AG Mengozzi Opinion, 2013, point 9: measures taken after hearing. 153 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 106(2).

24.46

788 MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE evidence, and also to determine the points on which the parties must present further argument or which call for measures of inquiry.154 Measures of inquiry are intended to prove the veracity of the facts alleged by one of the parties in support of its pleas in law.155 They are taken by order and have a binding character.156 Generally, measures of organization of procedure and measures of inquiry may be employed in all types of proceedings before the Union Courts, although in the context of preliminary ruling proceedings, measures of inquiry are in principle not availed of when such proceedings relate to the interpretation, as opposed to the validity, of Union law (see para. 24.51). The development of each of these types of measures is situated against the backdrop of the interplay between the parties and the Union Courts in fact-finding.

24.47

(2) Active role played by the Union Courts Fact-finding is the outcome of a complex interplay between the parties and between the parties and the Union Courts. The classic apportionment of the burden of proof, whereby each party proves the facts on which its claim or defence is based, also applies in Union law.157 The Union Courts may adjust this by means of presumptions designed to mitigate the substantive inequality between the parties in terms of their ability to prove the necessary facts.158 For this reason too, a party not having to discharge the burden of proof may nevertheless be obliged to release information to which only it has access, in order to enable its opponent to provide the necessary evidence.159 The Union Courts may further play an active role in fact-finding provided, however, that the parties have been able to define their position as regards the facts on which the respective Court grounds its decision.160 This involvement in fact-finding originates in the mission of the Court of Justice and the General Court of ensuring that the law is observed.161 They may do so only if the facts on which the application of the law

154 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 89(1) and (2). See also T-141/01, Entorn v Commission, 2005, paras 129–130; and T-560/08 P, Commission v Meierhofer, 2010, para. 64 for the distinction between measures of organization of procedure and measures of inquiry. See further para. 24.46. 155 T-141/01, Entorn v Commission, 2005, paras 129–130 and T-560/08 P, Commission v Meierhofer, 2010, para. 64; T-671/20, OA v EESC, 2022, para. 18. 156 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 92(1). 157 See C-213/19, Commission v United Kingdom, 2022, para. 221; C-187/22 P, Laboratorios Ern v EUIPO (order), 2022, para. 17; T-433/16, Pometon v Commission, 2019, para. 107; T-235/19, HIM v Commission, 2021, para. 206; T-7/19, Scandlines Danmark v Commission (order), 2022, para. 8; T-251/21, Tigercat International v EUIPO, 2022, para. 106. 158 See 10/55 Mirossevich v High Authority, 1954–1956 ECR 333, 343–344; T-691/14, Servier and Others v Commission, 2018, para. 1377. 159 See 45/64, Commission v Italy, 1965 ECR 857, 867. Pursuant to Art. 4(3) TEU, Member States are under a duty to provide the Commission with the information necessary in order for it to monitor whether Union law is being complied with. If a Member State fails to comply with that duty, this in itself is enough to justify proceedings under Art. 258 TFEU (see para. 5.70). In the course of such proceedings, the Court of Justice may put questions to Member States and order measures of inquiry. See C-213/19, Commission v United Kingdom, 2022, paras 117–118. 160 See C‑514/07 P, C‑528/07 P, and C‑532/07 P, Sweden v Commission, 2010, para. 65; C-301/19 P, Commission v Printeos, 2021, para. 58. 161 Art. 19(1), first para. TEU.

Measures of Organization of Procedure and Measures of Inquiry 789 is based accord with reality. At the same time, the decisions of the Court of Justice and the General Court often affect the general interest, alongside the individual interest of the parties concerned. The potential ramifications of their decisions may prompt the Court of Justice and the General Court to prescribe measures of inquiry. Finally, sometimes the facts and the law are so closely intertwined that it is difficult to make a hard-and-fast distinction between fact-finding and making determinations of law. The allocation of duties as between the Court and the parties which is encapsulated in the maxim da mihi factum, dabo tibi jus cannot be unqualifiedly applied in the context of Union law. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 2 (see para. 2.36), the jurisdiction transferred from the Court of Justice to the General Court was primarily to hear and determine cases requiring a thorough investigation of complex facts, the aim being to relieve the Court of Justice of the time-consuming task of making findings of fact. For its part, the General Court incorporated in its Rules of Procedure provisions specifically designed to facilitate greater interaction between that Court and the parties with a view to this task. This highlights the importance of measures of organization of procedure.162 The General Court makes avid use of such measures, acting in a more inquisitorial manner than the Court of Justice formerly did. (3) Parties must prove their assertions The fact that the Union Court has the power to order measures of organization of procedure to be carried out does not release the parties from their obligation to prove their assertions. This is because the judicial contribution to fact-finding is only optional and complementary. Evidence offered in support by the parties163 must make out a plausible case for their allegations and so constitute at least prima facie evidence. This means, for instance, where a party asks the Union Court to order the opposite party to produce documents in its possession, that the party requesting production must identify the documents requested and provide at least minimum information indicating the utility of those documents for the purposes of the proceedings.164 It is only if the evidence satisfies those conditions that the Union Court will decide, in an appropriate case, to investigate the allegations further by means of measures of organization of procedure or measures of inquiry.165 Whether the Union Court does so decide will be largely determined by the context of the proceedings. In this way, the Union Court’s decision to take particular measures may be influenced by the fact that one party has difficulty, by comparison with its opponent, in obtaining evidence or by the fact that the parties agree on the existence of certain facts. Furthermore, the Union Court is obliged to

162 See CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 61–62; GC Rules of Procedure, Arts 89–90. 163 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 120; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 76 as regards the application; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 124(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 81(1) as regards the defence; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 132(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 145(2) as regards statements in intervention. 164 See C-185/95 P, Baustahlgewebe v Commission, 1998, para. 93; T-616/18, Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo v Commission, 2022, para. 61. 165 See T-53/96, Syndicat des Producteurs de Viande Bovine and Others v Commission (order), 1996, para. 26; T-20/04, Aguar Fernandez and Others v Commission (order), 2005, para. 36.

24.48

790 MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE order measures of inquiry where this is necessary in order to be able to rule on whether a plea is well-founded.166

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(4) Inadmissible means of proof Union law does not lay down any specific rules on the use of evidence. All means of proof are admissible, except for evidence obtained improperly167 and internal documents, such as an opinion of the legal service of an institution.168 Internal documents should not be disclosed in the framework of proceedings before the Union Courts, unless such production has been authorized by the institution concerned or ordered by the Court concerned.169 However, it may happen that an applicant adduces as evidence internal and/or confidential documents which were not lawfully obtained. If the Union Courts find, having regard to the subject-matter and the particular nature of the action brought, that such documents are manifestly relevant for determining the dispute, they will order that the documents must remain in the case-file.170 In that event, an application from the defendant to remove the documents from the file and return them to it will be rejected.171 (5) The adversarial principle As a rule, the Union Courts will base their decision only on evidence to which the parties to the proceedings have had access.172 However, in some cases, it may be necessary for certain information to be withheld from the parties in order to preserve the fundamental rights of a third party or to safeguard an important public interest. Any

166 For an example in which the Court of Justice held that the General Court had wrongly rejected a party’s request for the production of documents, see C-119/97 P, Ufex and Others v Commission, 1999, para. 111. 167 See 197/80 to 200/80, 243/80, 245/80, and 247/80, Ludwigshafener Walzmühle and Others v Council and Commission, 1981, para. 16; C-130/19, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, 2021, paras 104–105; C-348/20 P, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, 2022, para. 129; T-141/01, Entorn v Commission, 2005, paras 37–39 (evidence will be admissible if applicant could have obtained the evidence properly). 168 See C-36/04, Spain v Council, 2004, paras 1–5; C-432/04, Commission v Cresson (order), 2005, paras 2–7; C-156/21, Hungary v Parliament and Council, 2022, paras 46–64; C-157/21, Poland v Parliament and Council, 2022, paras 50–53; C-348/20 P, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, 2022, paras 135–141; T-671/20, OA v EESC, 2022, paras 18–21. 169 See C-445/00, Austria v Council (order), 2002, para. 12; T-18/10 R, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Commission (order of the President), 2010, paras 19–23; T-576/08, Germany v Commission, 2011, paras 42–43. 170 See also, in that regard, C-130/19, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, 2021, para. 107 (finding that the applicant did not demonstrate that there was an overriding public interest to justify the production of the document in question: see paras 108–116). 171 31/86, LAISA v Council (order), 1986; T-149/09, Dover v Parliament, 2011, paras 60–64; compare C-36/04, Spain v Council (order), 2004; T-331/11, Besselink v Commission (order), 2013. See also, in that regard, C-348/20 P, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, 2022, paras 129–131, 142–149: where evidence has been improperly produced by a party, such as internal documents covered by Regulation No. 1049/2001, the production of which has been neither authorized by the institution concerned nor ordered by a Union Court, it is necessary to weigh the interests of the respective parties to the proceedings in connection with their right to a fair hearing, taking into account the interests protected by the rules that have been breached or circumvented in obtaining that evidence. Therefore, the Union Court hearing a request for the withdrawal of such evidence must weigh up the interests at stake, and cannot base its decision exclusively on the provisions of that regulation. 172 See C-199/99 P, Corus UK v Commission, 2003, para. 19; C-89/08 P, Commission v Ireland and Others, 2009, paras 52–55 (the adversarial principle also, as a rule, implies a right for the parties to be apprised of pleas in law raised by the Union Courts, of their own motion, on which they intend to base their decisions, and to discuss them).

Measures of Organization of Procedure and Measures of Inquiry 791 restriction to the adversarial principle must be limited to what is strictly necessary to preserve such rights or safeguard such public interest.173 (6) No measures of inquiry in preliminary ruling proceedings In principle, the Court of Justice will not prescribe measures of inquiry in preliminary ruling proceedings relating to the interpretation of Union law, since it is for the national court to make the findings of fact in relation to the main proceedings and to draw the necessary conclusions for the purposes of reaching its decision.174 Moreover, the Court may not verify the facts placed before it.175 However, where the question relates to the validity of an act of Union law, the Court’s role is similar to the one in the context of an annulment action. The examination of the validity of a Union act may compel the Court to order a measure of inquiry.176 Further to this, the Court may, after hearing the Advocate General, request clarification from the national court.177 (7) No measures of inquiry in appeals Although the CJ Rules of Procedure do not formally exclude the application of the common procedural rules with respect to measures of inquiry178 in appeal proceedings, the Court of Justice will, in principle, not order such measures in such proceedings. Measures of inquiry would indeed exceed the bounds of an appeal, since it is limited to questions of law and is based on the facts as found by the General Court.179

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B. Measures of organization of procedure (1) Court of Justice Art. 61 of the CJ Rules of Procedure delineates the measures of organization of procedure which may be prescribed by the Court of Justice. In addition to the measures which may be prescribed under Art. 24 of the Statute,180 the Court may invite the parties or the interested persons within the meaning of Art. 23 of the Statute in the context of preliminary ruling proceedings to answer certain questions in writing, within a 173 See C-300/11, ZZ, 2013, paras 65–66; C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P, and C-595/10 P, Commission and Others v Kadi, 2013, paras 119–130. GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 104 provides that where a document to which access has been denied by a Union institution has been produced before the General Court in proceedings relating to the legality of that denial, that document will not be communicated to the other parties, but will be examined by the Court in camera: see C-135/11 P, IFAW v Commission, 2012, paras 73–75; T-301/10, Sophie in ‘Veld v Commission, 2013, paras 33, 143, 149, 153. 174 See 17/81, Pabst & Richarz, 1982, para. 12. See para. 6.31. 175 See 104/77, Oehlschläger, 1978, para. 4. See para. 6.22. 176 For an example, see C-338/10, GLS (order), 2011, para. 8. 177 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 101(1). The Court may also address questions to the parties to the main proceedings and other interested parties. See C‑143/20 and C‑213/20, A, 2022, para. 57; C-349/20, NB, 2022, paras 32–33. 178 CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 63–75. 179 See C-198/99 P, Ensidesa v Commission, 2003, paras 30–32. See also para. 19.03. 180 Art. 24 of the Statute provides in relevant part that the Court of Justice ‘may require the parties to produce all documents and to supply all information which the Court considers desirable’, as well as ‘require the Member States and institutions, bodies, offices and agencies not being parties to the case to supply all information which the Court considers necessary for the proceedings’.

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792 MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE certain time-limit set by the Court, or at the hearing.181 Where a hearing is organized, the Court invites the parties, insofar as is possible, to concentrate their oral pleadings on one or more specified issues.182 Pursuant to Art. 62 of the CJ Rules of Procedure, measures of organization may also be prescribed by the Judge-R apporteur or the Advocate General to which the case has been assigned. Each may request the parties or the interested persons within the meaning of Art. 23 of the Statute to submit within a specified period all such information relating to the facts and all such documents or other particulars as they may consider relevant.183 Moreover, the Judge-R apporteur or the Advocate General may send to the parties or such interested persons questions to be answered at the hearing.184 This power serves to facilitate the preparation of the Court’s decision and the Advocate General’s Opinion. There is no equivalent provision in the GC Rules of Procedure.185 However, similar to those Rules, the measures of organization of procedure prescribed by the Court of Justice, the Judge-R apporteur, or the Advocate General are less formal than measures of inquiry and are not issued by means of orders.

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(2) General Court Art. 89 of the GC Rules of Procedure enables the General Court to prescribe measures in order to ensure that ‘cases are prepared for hearing, procedures carried out and disputes resolved under the best possible conditions’.186 In the light of the General Court’s tasks as discussed (see para. 24.47), the rules on measures of organization of procedure are more elaborate in the GC Rules of Procedure as compared to the CJ Rules of Procedure. Such measures may, in particular, include: putting questions to the parties; inviting them to make submissions on certain aspects of the proceedings; requesting the parties to concentrate their oral pleadings on one or more specified issues; asking them or third parties for information or particulars; asking for documents or any papers relating to the case to be produced; and summoning the parties’ agents or the parties in person to meetings.187 Measures of organization of procedure are relatively informal. They do not have the compelling nature of measures of inquiry and—unlike such measures—are not prescribed by order, but notified to the parties by letter from the Registrar. In fact, any party may, at any stage of the procedure, propose the adoption or modification of measures 181 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 61(1). 182 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 61(2). 183 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 62(1). As provided therein, the replies and documents provided in response to such requests are communicated to the other parties or interested persons within the meaning of Art. 23 of the Statute. Such measures can also be taken after the hearing: see, in that regard, C-287/11 P, Commission v Aalberts Industries and Others, AG Mengozzi Opinion, 2013, point 9. 184 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 62(2). 185 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 90(2) only provides that if the General Court prescribes measures of organization of procedure and does not undertake such measures itself, it entrusts the task to the Judge-Rapporteur. 186 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 89(1). 187 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 89(3).

Measures of Organization of Procedure and Measures of Inquiry 793 of organization of procedure, in which case the other parties must be heard before any measures are prescribed.188 If a request for measures of organization of procedure is intended to obtain new factual evidence and is made at a stage in the procedure when the production of new evidence is in principle no longer allowed,189 it is necessary, in particular, for the party requesting those measures to set out the reasons why the request could not have been made earlier.190 Where an application for measures of organization of procedure is made, the President gives the other parties an opportunity to submit comments orally or in writing.191 The Judge-Rapporteur may be given the task of putting the measures into effect.192 The General Court makes frequent use of this type of measure in order to streamline somewhat the processing of large or complex case-files. The General Court may, without infringing Art. 84 of its Rules of Procedure, base its judgment or order on matters which came to its knowledge from replies to questions put to the parties as measures of organization of procedure on which the parties had the opportunity to state their views in the course of the proceedings.193

C. Measures of inquiry (1) General To recall, measures of inquiry are intended to prove the veracity of the facts alleged by one of the parties in support of its pleas in law.194 Such measures of inquiry as the Court of Justice or the General Court should deem necessary are prescribed by order.195 The order sets out the facts to be established. Before prescribing such measures, the Court of Justice hears the Advocate General,196 whereas the parties are heard in the General Court where it proposes to hear oral testimony, to commission an expert’s report, or to inspect a place or a thing.197 The Court of Justice or the General Court, as the case may be, may entrust the undertaking of the inquiry to the Judge-Rapporteur (or to the Chamber to which the case was originally assigned if the measures are ordered by the Grand Chamber of the General Court).198 During the inquiry, evidence may

188 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 88(1). This is not provided for in the CJ Rules of Procedure. 189 See para. 22.21. 190 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 88(2). 191 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 88(3). 192 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 90(2). 193 C-259/96 P, Council v De Nil and Impens, 1998, para. 31. See also para. 24.57. 194 See T-141/01, Entorn v Commission, 2005, para. 130. See para. 24.46. 195 Generally, the Court of Justice decides in its general meeting whether a measure of inquiry is necessary, but where the case has already been assigned to a formation of the Court, the decision on measures of inquiry is taken by that formation: CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 63. It is the Chamber of the General Court to which the case has been assigned which takes the decision regarding the measure of inquiry. 196 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 64(1). 197 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 92(2). Where a party makes an application for measures of inquiry after the oral procedure is closed, such a request may be admitted only if it relates to facts which may have a decisive influence on the outcome of the case and which the party concerned could not put forward before the close of the oral procedure (see C-200/92 P, ICI v Commission, 1999, para. 60). 198 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 65(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 92(4).

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794 MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE be submitted in rebuttal and further evidence may be adduced.199 The parties may be present at measures of inquiry.200 The CJ and GC Rules of Procedure prescribe the following five types of measures of inquiry which may be adopted: personal appearance of the parties; a request for information and production of documents; oral testimony; the commissioning of an expert’s report; and an inspection of a place or a thing.201

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(2) Personal appearance of the parties The Union Courts may summon parties to appear personally in order to provide explanations about the case or answer questions.202 Unlike experts and witnesses, they are not heard under oath.203 A party that does not comply with a summons from the Court of Justice or the General Court may not be fined, unlike a witness. As in the case of any hearing, minutes are kept, in which the appearance of parties is recorded. The President (of the Chamber) and the Registrar sign the minutes.204 (3) Requests for information and production of documents The Union Courts have the power to require parties—and even Member States and Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies not parties to the proceedings—to produce all documents and to supply all information which the respective Court considers desirable.205 The Court of Justice and the General Court may request only the production of documents which are relevant, having regard to the subject-matter of the proceedings.206 Formal note is taken of any refusal.207 No formal sanctions attach to a refusal to provide information or to produce documents, but this may possibly affect the outcome of the case.208 A claim that a document produced is allegedly confidential209 puts the Court under a duty to exercise

199 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 64(3); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 92(7). 200 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 65(3); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 92(6). 201 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 64(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 91. Note that, as regards a request for information and production of documents, the GC Rules of Procedure distinguish between, on the one hand, a request to a party for information or for production of any material relating to the case and, on the other hand, a request for production of documents to which access has been denied by an institution in proceedings relating to the legality of that denial. 202 It is not because parties may ‘plead’ only through their representatives (Statute, Art. 29) that they themselves may not even address the Court in an inquiry based on the appearance of the parties. For an example, see T-59/89, Yorck von Wartenburg v Parliament (order), 1989. 203 Statute, Art. 28. 204 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 74(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 102(1). 205 Statute, Art. 24. 206 T-192/99, Dunnett and Others v EIB, 2001, paras 38–39. Internal documents of the institutions are not to be communicated to the applicants, unless the circumstances of the case are exceptional and the applicants make out a plausible case for the need to do so (see T-9/99, HFB and Others v Commission, 2002, para. 40). Where, however, the Commission spontaneously joins internal documents to the case-file, the other parties cannot prevent it from doing so (see T-266/03, Groupement des Cartes Bancaires ‘CB’ v Commission (order), 2004, para. 19). See also para. 24.49. 207 Statute, Art. 24. 208 See C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P, and C-595/10 P, Commission and Others v Kadi, 2013, paras 119–130, 151–165. 209 A document may be confidential on grounds, for instance, of State security (Art. 346(1) TFEU) or professional or business secrecy. See also para 23.45.

Measures of Organization of Procedure and Measures of Inquiry 795 care in disclosing it in inter partes proceedings.210 It may do so, after carefully weighing the interests at stake, only where the document is genuinely necessary in order for it to decide the case or in order to respect the rights of defence.211 Where a document to which access has been denied by a Union institution has been produced before the General Court in proceedings relating to the legality of that denial, that document will not be communicated to the other parties.212 (4) Oral testimony and experts’ reports (a) Witnesses Occasionally, the Court of Justice or the General Court may, either of its own motion or on an application by a party, order that certain facts be proved by witnesses.213 The Union Court’s order sets out the facts about which the witness is to be examined.214 Witnesses give their main evidence, after which the President (of the Chamber), the Judges, the Advocate General, and, subject to the control of the President (of the Chamber), the parties’ representatives may put questions to them.215 The hearing may be in open court or, on application, in camera.216 After giving his or her main evidence, the witness takes the oath, although he or she may be released from this requirement.217 The Registrar takes minutes, in which the evidence is reproduced. The minutes are checked by the witness and signed by him or her, the President (of the Chamber), or the Judge-Rapporteur responsible for conducting the examination of the witness and the Registrar. On penalty of a fine, a witness who has been duly summoned must attend the hearing, give evidence, and take the oath.218 Proceedings for perjury are taken at the instance of the Court in the competent court of the Member State concerned.219 Member States are obliged to treat any violation of an oath by witnesses as if the offence had been committed before one of its courts with jurisdiction in civil proceedings.220 210 Under Art. 64 GC Rules of Procedure, the General Court is to take into consideration only those documents which have been made available to the lawyers and agents of the parties and on which they have been given an opportunity of expressing their views. However, if the General Court has to review the confidentiality of a document that may be relevant for the determination of a dispute, that document will not be disclosed to the parties at the stage of the review. In addition, the General Court may consider the substantive accuracy of a non-confidential summary of a confidential document without disclosing the confidential document to the party with respect to which that document is confidential: GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 103. See para. 23.46. 211 See C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P, and C-595/10 P, Commission and Others v Kadi, 2013, paras 119–130. 212 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 104. For an application, See T-63/10, Jurašinović v Council (order), 2011; T-301/10, Sophie in ‘Veld v Commission, 2013, paras 33, 143, 149, 153. 213 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 66(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 93(1). A party applying for a witness to be heard must state precisely about what facts and for what reasons the witness should be examined, failing which the General Court may decline the request without considering whether it is appropriate to hear the person in question (see T-9/99, HFB and Others v Commission, 2002, paras 34–38). 214 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 66(3); GC Rules of Procedure, 93(1). 215 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 67(2) to (4); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 94(2) to (4). 216 Statute, Art. 31. For an example, see T-172/01, M v Court of Justice, 2004, para. 29 (in camera). 217 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 68(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 94(5). Art. 97(2) of the GC Rules of Procedure provides that witnesses may take the oath in a manner laid down by their national law. 218 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 69; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 95. Yet, as provided therein, this is only where the witness, ‘without good reason’ fails to appear, give evidence, or take the oath. 219 Statute, Art. 30. See further CJ Supplementary Rules, Arts 6–7 and Annex III. 220 Statute, Art. 30. See further CJ Supplementary Rules, Arts 6–7 and Annex III.

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796 MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE 24.59

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(b) Experts The Court of Justice and the General Court may also order that an expert’s report be obtained.221 The order appointing the expert defines his or her task and sets a time-limit within which the report is to be made.222 After making his or her report, the expert is sworn in,223 unless exempted from taking an oath.224 The Union Court may order that the expert be examined.225 The rules on perjury and non-compliance of witnesses are applicable to experts.226 (c) Compensation Witnesses and experts are entitled to reimbursement of their travel and subsistence expenses.227 In addition, witnesses are entitled to compensation for loss of income, and experts to fees for their services.228 (d) Objection to a witness or an expert Parties may object to a witness or an expert on the grounds that he or she is not a competent or a proper person to act as such or for any other reason.229 An objection to a witness or an expert must be raised within two weeks after service of the order summoning the witness or appointing the expert; the statement of objection must set out the grounds of objection and indicate the nature of any evidence offered.230 The Court of Justice or the General Court, as the case may be, decides on the objection. (e) Letters rogatory In order to obtain a statement from witnesses or experts who cannot appear before the Court of Justice or the General Court, letters rogatory may be issued for the purpose of having them examined.231 The competent national authority obtains the statements and sends the resulting documents to the Registrar of the Court of Justice or the General Court, as appropriate. (5) Inspections of the place or thing in question To date, the Court of Justice has only very rarely undertaken inspections of a place.232 Possibly on account of their infrequency, the Rules of Procedure of the Union Courts contain no specific provisions on the conduct of an inspection.

221 For examples, see C-89/85, C-104/85, C-114/85, C-116/85 to C-117/85, and C-125/85 to C-129/85, Ahlström and Others v Commission, 1993, paras 31–32; T-313/01, R v Commission (order), 2013. 222 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 70(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 96(1). 223 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 71(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 96(5). 224 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 71(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 96(6). 225 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 70(2) to (4); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 96(2) to (4). Notably, this includes questions put by, inter alia, the representatives of the parties, subject to the control of the President. 226 See CJ Supplementary Rules, Arts 6–7 and Annex III; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 98. 227 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 73(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 100(2). 228 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 73(3); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 100(3). 229 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 72(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 99(1). 230 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 72(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 99(2). 231 Statute, Art. 29. See further CJ Supplementary Rules, Arts 1–3 and Annex I; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 101. 232 See 14/59, Société des Fonderies de Pont-à-Mousson v High Authority, 1959 ECR 215, 224; 42/59 and 49/59, SNUPAT v High Authority, 1961 ECR 53.

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V. Oral Part of the Procedure A. Opening of the oral part of the procedure (1) Timing When the Court of Justice or the Chamber concerned of the General Court decides, upon examination of the preliminary report of the Judge-Rapporteur, to open the oral procedure, the President of the Court or of the Chamber, as the case may be, will fix the date of the hearing.233 They may decide to open the oral proceedings without proceeding to measures of organization of procedure or measures of inquiry. (2) Optional character of the hearing On a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate General, the Court of Justice may decide not to hold a hearing if it considers on reading the written pleadings or observations lodged during the written part of the procedure that it has sufficient information to give a ruling.234 Parties may request the Court that a hearing should be held. The reasoned request must be submitted within a period of three weeks after service on the parties or the interested persons within the meaning of Art. 23 of the Statute of the notification of the close of the written part of the procedure.235 In practice, it is rare for a hearing to be organized in the absence of such a request. Even if a duly reasoned request has been submitted by one of the parties, the Court of Justice has the final say. It may indeed decide, on the proposal of the Judge-Rapporteur (see para. 24.44 concerning the preliminary report) and after hearing the Advocate General, not to hold a hearing when it considers, on reading the written pleadings or observations lodged during the written part of the procedure, that it has sufficient information to give a ruling.236 Yet, such a decision is foreclosed where a reasoned request has been submitted by an interested person within Art. 23 of the Statute who did not participate in the written part of the procedure.237 At the General Court, only in the absence of a reasoned request by the main parties may the General Court decide not to hold a hearing if it considers that it has sufficient information available to it from the material in the file.238

233 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 60(4); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 107(1). 234 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 76(2). See also Statute, Art. 59. 235 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 76(1). Yet, as provided therein, that time-limit may be extended by the President. 236 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 76(2). 237 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 76(3). 238 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 106; GC Practice Rules, point 143. However, in case the General Court decides to give a decision by way of reasoned order without taking further steps in the proceedings in application of Art. 126 of the GC Rules of Procedure, that Court may reject a request from a party to hold a hearing: see T-684/20, Legero Schuhfabrik v EUIPO (order), 2021, paras 18–19 (leave for appeal on this point rejected because the applicant had not sufficiently explained why the General Court’s refusal to hold a hearing affected the unity, consistency, or development of Union law: see C-152/22 P, Legero Schuhfabrik v EUIPO (order), 2022, paras 18–20).

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798 MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE 24.66

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(3) Reasoned request The reasoned request must specify why the party or interested person within the meaning of Art. 23 of the Statute wishes to be heard. That reasoning must be based on a real assessment of the benefit of a hearing to the party in question and must indicate the documentary elements or arguments which that party considers it necessary to develop or disprove more fully at a hearing. It is not sufficient to provide a general statement of reasons referring to the importance of the case or of the questions to be decided.239 (4) Cases in which no hearing is held The Union Courts will dispose of a case without an oral hearing where the Court in question has no jurisdiction to hear and determine a case or where a request or an application is manifestly inadmissible.240 The General Court may also dispose of a case where an action is manifestly lacking any foundation in law.241 Further to this, the powers of the Court of Justice to dispose of appeals (and cross-appeals) by reasoned order may also result in no oral hearing being held. Where an appeal or cross-appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the Court of Justice may at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge- Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate General, decide by reasoned order to dismiss that appeal or cross-appeal in whole or in part.242 Moreover, the CJ Rules of Procedure provide that the Court may answer a question referred for a preliminary ruling without a hearing by reasoned order where the question is identical243 to a question on which the Court has already ruled, where the answer to such a question may be clearly deduced from existing case-law, or where the answer to the question referred admits of no reasonable doubt.244 The Court will then refer to an earlier judgment or to the relevant case-law.245 The Court may at any time give its decision by reasoned order, on a proposal from the Judge-R apporteur and after hearing the Advocate General.246

239 CJ Practice Directions, point 53; GC Practice Rules, point 142. 240 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 53(2). GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 126. 241 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 126. 242 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 181. See C-211/00 P, Ciments Français v Commission (order), 2002, and other orders given on the same day in the ‘Cement cases’, by which the Court dismissed by order a number of pleas which were manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded. The remainder of these cases proceeded to judgment: see C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P, and C-219/00 P, Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission, 2004. The Court may also declare arguments inadmissible which are raised in connection with pleas that are admissible per se, for instance, where the arguments do not contest the legal assessment but rather the findings of fact made by the General Court on the basis of the documents submitted as evidence (see C-449/99, EIB v Hautem, 2001, paras 46–49). 243 The wording used need not be exactly identical. It is enough for the questions to be essentially identical: see C-250/02 to C-253/02, and C-256/02, Telecom Italia Mobile (order), 2004, paras 9–10. 244 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 99. While similar, these circumstances allowing the Court to deliver a preliminary ruling by reasoned order are not the same thing as the CILFIT conditions in respect of relieving the national courts of last instance from their obligation to make a reference for a preliminary ruling under Art. 267, third para. TFEU: see paras 3.51–3.55. 245 For some applications, see C-493/21, K.M. (order), 2022; C-728/21, OF (order), 2022; C-480/21, WO (order), 2022. 246 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 99.

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B. Participation In the context of the preliminary reference procedure, the Court of Justice allows parties which have not exercised their right to submit written observations to take part in the hearing.247 This signifies that a failure to make use of the time-limit for submitting written observations does not mean that there is no right to state one’s case orally and answer any questions put by the Court. It is important, since generally the so-called non-contentious nature of preliminary ruling proceedings appears to be no more than a fiction. Indeed, note should be taken, for instance, of the case where a Member State submits written observations contending that a part of its national law is compatible with Union law248 or where a party to the main proceedings seeks implementation of an agreement while the other party claims that the agreement is contrary to Union law.249 Even if written observations are lodged by all involved, the oral part of the procedure affords a full opportunity for explanations and counter-arguments to be presented. This fits within the underlying rationale of the preliminary ruling procedure, which is in effect a ‘debate’ before the Court of Justice requiring the largest possible participation in the written and oral parts of the procedure, especially since the preliminary ruling will have binding effects on the referring court as well as on national courts generally.

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Further to this, it is possible to participate in a hearing via video conference. While this was at first a temporary measure allowing the Union Courts to continue to operate during the health crisis that arose in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic,250 it has become a permanent option which party representatives may make use of under strict conditions.251

C. Course of the oral procedure (1) General Before the hearing begins, the agents or lawyers are called to a short meeting with the relevant formation of the Court of Justice or the General Court, as the case may be, in order to plan the hearing. At that point, the Judge-Rapporteur and the Advocate General, as the case may be, may indicate the matters they wish to hear developed in the arguments.252 The proceedings are opened and directed by the President (of the Chamber).253 In principle, they are open to the public, unless the Court of Justice or the

247 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 96(2). 248 See 26/62, Van Gend & Loos, 1963 ECR 1, 8; 293/83, Gravier, 1985, para. 12. 249 See 261/81, Rau, 1982, para. 4. 250 See M.-A. Gaudissart, ‘La Cour de justice de l’Union européenne face à la crise sanitaire’ (2020) R.A.E – L.E.A. 97, 105. 251 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 107a. While the Court of Justice exceptionally accepts requests for participation in a hearing via video conference, it currently has no corresponding provision in its Rules of Procedure. 252 CJ Practice Directions, point 57; GC Aide-mémoire—Hearing of oral argument, 2. 253 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 78; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 110(3).

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800 MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE General Court decides otherwise, of its own motion or on application by the parties, for serious reasons.254

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(2) Report for the hearing Since the entry into force of the current CJ Rules of Procedure, the requirement that a report for the hearing should be prepared has been abolished. A report for the hearing is therefore only used by the General Court, albeit in a summary form compared to previous practice. The report for the hearing contains the pleas in law and a succinct summary of the parties’ arguments.255 The judgment of the General Court will be largely based on the report for the hearing, so it is important for the parties that its contents are accurate. Therefore, it is sent to the parties a few weeks before the hearing.256 At the beginning of the sitting, the President (of the Chamber) mentions that the report has been sent out and invites comments.257 (3) Oral argument Oral argument is heard from the parties and any interveners (on intervention, see paras 23.01–23.23).258 Each party may address the Court of Justice or the General Court for fifteen minutes.259 This time may be extended by parties making a reasoned application to the Registry at least fourteen days before the hearing. Oral argument is intended to clarify the pleas and arguments raised during the written procedure, of which the Judges—and in the Court of Justice, the Advocate General—are already apprised, and to touch on certain aspects of them. In pleading before the respective Court, the parties may not raise any new pleas, unless they are based on matters of law or of fact which have come to light in the course of the proceedings260 or it is a question of pleas which the Union Courts have to raise of their own motion.261 Exceptionally, new evidence may be presented at the hearing, although an explanation must be given as to why it was not tendered during the written procedure.262

254 Statute, Art. 31; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 79(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 109(1): some proceedings must be held in camera (see Art. 348 TFEU). 255 GC Practice Rules, point 148. 256 GC Practice Rules, point 147. 257 GC Practice Rules, point 149. 258 Very often, the Judges and Advocate General will listen to oral argument via simultaneous interpretation. In order to make that interpretation possible, agents and lawyers should speak at a natural and unforced pace and use short sentences of simple structure. To facilitate interpretation, parties’ representatives are requested to send any text or written notes for their submissions to the Directorate for Interpretation in advance either by fax ((+352) 4303 3697) or by email ( or ) (CJ Practice Directions, points 67–68; GC Practice Rules, points 168–171). 259 CJ Practice Directions, point 60; GC Practice Rules, point 162 (interveners may address the General Court for ten minutes). 260 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 127(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 84(1). 261 See T-718/20, Wizz Air Hungary v Commission, 2022, para. 29; T-584/19, thyssenkrupp v Commission, 2022, para. 962. 262 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 128(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 85(3).

Oral Part of the Procedure 801 (4) Questions After the parties have presented their oral arguments, the President (of the Chamber), the Judges, and the Advocate General may put questions to the agents, advisers, or lawyers of the parties.263 This affords an opportunity to elucidate any aspects of the case-file remaining unclear and may result in measures of inquiry being repeated or expanded, this being ordered by the Court of Justice or the General Court after hearing the Advocate General. (5) Closure of the oral part of the procedure The oral stage of the procedure is closed by the President (of the Chamber) after the Advocate General has presented his or her Opinion. The Advocate General reads out the operative part of the Opinion generally several weeks after the hearing.264 Where it considers that the case raises no new point of law, the Court of Justice may decide, after hearing the Advocate General, that the case shall be determined without an Opinion from the Advocate General.265 In that case, the oral part of the procedure will be closed after the hearing.

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In proceedings before the General Court, where an Advocate General has not been designated in a case, the President (of the Chamber) declares the oral part of the procedure closed at the end of the hearing.266 The President (of the Chamber) also declares the oral proceedings closed where an Advocate General has been designated in a case and he or she delivers his or her Opinion, either orally or in writing by lodging it at the Registry.267 (6) No right to respond to the Advocate General’s Opinion The parties do not have the possibility under the Statute and the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice and the General Court of submitting written observations in response to the Advocate General’s Opinion.268

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D. Reopening of the oral procedure (1) Objective The Court of Justice or the General Court may, after hearing the Advocate General, order the reopening of the oral procedure.269 It will do so if an apparently determinative

263 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 80; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 110(3). 264 A document which is lodged after the Advocate General has read out the operative part of the Opinion will be inadmissible. However, the Court of Justice may decide to reopen the oral proceedings (see C-380/01, Schneider, 2004, paras 14, 19). 265 Statute, Art. 20, fifth para.; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 59(2) and (3). 266 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 111. 267 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 112. 268 See C-17/98, Emesa Sugar (order), 2000, paras 8–20: having regard to both the organic and the functional links between the Advocate General and the Court, the Court considered that the fact that it is not possible for a party to submit written observations in response to the Advocate General’s Opinion does not breach the right to adversarial proceedings. See also C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P, and C-595/10 P Commission and Others v Kadi, 2013, para. 57; C-791/19, Commission v Poland, 2021, para. 41; C-882/19, Sumal, 2021, para. 21; C-673/20, EP, 2022, para. 40; C-98/21, Finanzamt R, 2022, para. 30; C-158/21, Puig Gordi and Others, 2023, para. 40. 269 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 83; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 113.

24.75

802 MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE matter only becomes apparent after the oral procedure has been closed or, even more generally, if it needs further clarification on a certain point.270 When the quorum of three Judges in the case of three-or five-Judge Chambers and of eleven Judges in the case of the Grand Chamber is no longer met, the respective Court will in principle also decide to reopen the procedure.271 If the procedure is reopened, the parties may make further written submissions, additional measures of inquiry may be ordered, and, following further oral argument, the Advocate General may deliver a supplementary Opinion.272 Under the same conditions, the Court of Justice may order the opening of the oral procedure in a case where it had previously decided not to organize a hearing in the first place.273

24.76

(2) Request for reopening In refusing to reopen the oral procedure after the judgment in the Polypropylene cases,274 the General Court equated the circumstances in which a request to that effect might be granted with the conditions which have to be met in order to obtain revision of a judgment. On appeal, the Court of Justice confirmed that this is the case.275 The oral procedure will be reopened only if the applicant or the defendant adduces a fact or reasonable evidence of a fact of which neither it nor the Union Court could have been aware at the time of the hearing and which possibly had a decisive bearing on the case. Naturally, the fact must be connected with the case in issue. Indications of a general nature or declarations made in other proceedings are not sufficient.276 Consequently, the deliberations will be upset only for serious reasons, in the same way as the authority of a judgment as res judicata may be revised only very exceptionally (see para. 25.41).

270 See C-578/19, X, 2021, para. 25. For example, in C-181/16, Gnandi (order), 2017, the Court of Justice decided to reopen the oral part of the procedure after the formation dealing with the case considered it necessary that a particular issue regarding a previous judgment of the Court required the attention of a larger formation, i.e. the Grand Chamber. Similarly, in C-163/16, Louboutin (order), 2017, the formation dealing with the case decided to refer the case to the Court in order to have it reassigned to a larger formation because the case raised issues of principle involving Union law on trade marks. Upon the decision to reassign the case to the Grand Chamber, the oral part of the procedure was reopened and a new hearing was organized. Conversely, a party’s disagreement with the Advocate General’s Opinion, irrespective of the questions that he or she examines in his or her Opinion, cannot in itself constitute grounds justifying the reopening of the oral part of the procedure. Therefore, applications to that effect are rejected. See C-791/19, Commission v Poland, 2021, paras 41–42; C-158/21, Puig Gordi and Others, 2023, paras 37–38. 271 See GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 113(1). See T-314/06, Whirlpool Europe v Council, 2010, paras 54–57. 272 For examples, see C-163/16, Louboutin, 2018; C-181/16, Gnandi, 2018. That being said, the Court of Justice may reopen the oral procedure before the Advocate General has delivered his or her Opinion (see C-524/15, Menci (order), 2017) or when it had initially been decided that no Opinion would be rendered by the Advocate General (see C-353/16, MP (order), 2017). 273 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 83; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 106(3). 274 See T-9/89, Hüls v Commission, 1992, paras 382–385; T-10/89, Hoechst v Commission, 1992, paras 372–375; T-11/89, Shell v Commission, 1992, paras 372–374; T-12/89, Solvay v Commission, 1992, paras 345–347; T-13/89, ICI v Commission, 1992, paras 399–401; T-14/89, Montedipe v Commission, 1992, paras 389–391; T-15/89, Chemie Linz v Commission, 1992, paras 393–395. 275 See C-199/92 P, Hüls v Commission, 1999, para. 127; C-200/92 P, ICI v Commission, 1999, para. 61 (the General Court is probably obliged to order the procedure to be reopened when these conditions are met); C-235/92, Montecatini v Commission, 1999, para. 102. 276 See C-199/92 P, Hüls v Commission, 1999, para. 130; C-235/92, Montecatini v Commission, 1999, para. 105.

Oral Part of the Procedure 803 (3) Absence during initial hearing In addition, a party may apply to have the oral procedure reopened if it was not present 24.77 when it was originally held. Such an application will be granted if the party in question proves that its absence was due to force majeure, which, according to settled case- law, means abnormal difficulties, independent of the will of the party concerned and apparently inevitable, even if all due care is taken.277 If the person providing the address for service for the absent party forgets to forward the summons to attend the hearing, this does not constitute a sufficient ground for ordering the oral procedure to be reopened.278

277 See T-325/20, Unger Marketing International v EUIPO (order), 2021, para. 44; T-544/21, Cheers Interactive (India) v EUIPO (order), 2022, para. 26. 278 T-235/94, Galtieri v Parliament, 1996, para. 17.

25 CONCLUSION OF THE PROCEDURE I. Judgments and Orders A. The judgment or order (1) General The decision of the Court of Justice or of the General Court which brings the proceedings to an end takes the form of a judgment 1 or order. 2 Occasionally, however, a judgment is given which determines only some of the issues. Examples are a judgment merely declaring the action admissible 3 or one finding the Union non-contractually liable, but not making any determination of the amount of damages to be paid.4 (2) Orders Orders are given by the Union Courts in a variety of circumstances.5 Specifically, in certain cases, the order must be reasoned (for example, where it is clear that the Court of Justice or the General Court do not have jurisdiction or the case is manifestly inadmissible or manifestly lacking any foundation in law (see para. 23.58).6

1 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 87; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 117. 2 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 89, GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 55. 3 In application of CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 151 or GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 130. 4 See C-152/88, Sofrimport v Commission, 1990, operative part; C-440/07 P, Commission v Schneider Electric, 2009, operative part; T-333/10, Animal Trading Company and Others v Commission, 2013, operative part. 5 For example, in the context of a stay of proceedings involving circumstances of the third paragraph of Art. 54 of the Statute. For other instances in which orders are involved, see as regards common procedural rules, CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 64(1) and GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 92(1) concerning measures of inquiry; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 83 and GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 113(1) on the reopening of the oral part of the procedure. With particular regard to preliminary ruling proceedings, see CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 103 on rectification; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 116(4) on legal aid. With further regard to direct actions and appeals, see CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 131(3) and GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 144(5) in the context of intervention; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 145(1) and GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 170(3) concerning a dispute on costs; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 154 and GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 164(4) on rectification; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 159(5) and GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 169(5) concerning revision; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 187(3) concerning legal aid in the context of appeals; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 148(2) concerning legal aid in the context of actions before the General Court. 6 For other instances in which reasoned orders are involved, see CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 46(2) and GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 55(2) concerning exclusion of a party’s representative from the proceeding; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 66(3) concerning oral testimony (compare GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 93(1)). With regard to preliminary ruling proceedings, see CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 99; with further regard to direct actions and appeals, see CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 149 and GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 131(1) concerning cases that do not proceed to judgment; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 150 and GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 129 on absolute bar to proceeding with a case; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 162(1) and GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 158(1) concerning interim measures; CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 181 and 182 concerning appeals.

EU Procedural Law. Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak, Oxford University Press. © Koen Lenaerts, Kathleen Gutman, and Janek Tomasz Nowak 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833086.003.0025

25.01

25.02

806 CONCLUSION OF THE PROCEDURE 25.03

(3) Timing There is no principle of immediacy in Union law on the basis of which the Court of Justice and the General Court are bound to give judgment shortly after the hearing. This is because there is at present no provision of the Statute or the Rules of Procedure of the Union Courts which stipulates that the judgments or orders of the respective Court must be delivered within a specified period after the close of the oral procedure, if there is one. Nevertheless, the general principle of Union law, derived from Art. 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and codified in Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, that everyone is entitled to fair legal process applies, with the result that the respective Court has to render its decision within a reasonable time.7

B. Content and formal requirements 25.04

(1) Content Judgments and orders of the Court of Justice and the General Court essentially consist of three parts: the introductory part (the facts, relevant Union and other law, and procedural background); the grounds for the decision (the respective Court’s reasoning); and the operative part (the Union Court’s holding, typically in bold at the end). In the CJ Rules of Procedure, there is an explicit distinction drawn between judgments and orders, on the one hand, and orders and reasoned orders, on the other, in relation to their content. A judgment must contain the following fourteen items: (1) a statement that it is the judgment of the respective Court; (2) an indication as to the formation of the respective Court; (3) the date of delivery; (4) the names of the President (of the Chamber and of the Judges who took part in the deliberations, with an indication as to the name of the Judge-Rapporteur; (5) the name of the Advocate General, if designated; (6) the name of the Registrar; (7) a description of the parties or the interested persons within the meaning of Art. 23 of the Statute that participated in the proceedings; (8) the names of their representatives; (9) in the case of direct actions and appeals, a statement of the form of order sought by the parties; (10) where applicable, the date of the hearing; (11) a statement that the Advocate General has been heard and, where applicable, the date

7 For examples involving infringement of that principle, see C-40/12 P, Gascogne Sack Deutschland v Commission, 2013, para. 102; C-50/12 P, Kendrion v Commission, 2013, para. 106; C-58/12 P, Groupe Gascogne v Commission, 2013, para. 96; T-40/15, ASPLA and Others v European Union, 2017, para. 83; T-673/15, Guardian Europe v European Union, 2017, para. 139. For examples where duration of period justified and no infringement of that principle, see C-217/00 P, Buzzi Unicem v Commission (order), 2002, in particular paras 86 and 91, in which the Court of Justice held that that principle was concerned not so much with the passage of time but with any unjustified delay in the proceedings which could be attributed to the Union Courts; C-403/04 P and C-405/04 P, Sumitomo Metal Industries and Nippon Steel v Commission, 2007, paras 116–123; C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P, FIAMM and Others v Council and Commission, 2008, paras 212–214.

Judgments and Orders 807 of his or her Opinion; (12) a summary of the facts; (13) the grounds for the decision; and (14) the operative part of the judgment including, where appropriate, the decision as to costs.8 An order always contains ten of the fourteen items listed above (all except for points (9), (10), (12), and (13)), with certain modifications on account of the nature of the orders; for example, there is the additional requirement that the legal basis of the order be indicated.9 Where an order must be reasoned, it contains three additional items, which track points (9), (12), and (13), that is to say, it must also include a statement of the forms of order sought by the parties in the case of direct actions and appeals, a summary of the facts, and the grounds for the decision.10 (2) Language The judgment or order is given in the language of the case (see paras 22.40–22.43).11 The judgment or order in that language is the only authentic version,12 and it is translated into the other official languages of the European Union, as the case may be. (3) Delivery and service of judgments The judgment is delivered in open court, and the parties or interested persons within the meaning of Art. 23 of the State are informed of the date of delivery of a judgment.13 The original of the judgment, signed by the President (of the Chamber), by the Judges who took part in the deliberations, and by the Registrar, is sealed and deposited at the Registry, and certified copies are served on the parties and, where applicable, the referring court or tribunal, the interested persons referred to in Art. 23 of the Statute, and the General Court.14 (4) Signature and service of orders Much the same holds true for orders as for judgments, except that orders are not delivered in open court; they are adopted, as opposed to delivered.15 The original of the order, signed by the President (of the Chamber) and the Registrar, is sealed and

8 Statute, Art. 36; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 87; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 117. 9 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 89(1). 10 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 89(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 119. Note that, in that latter provision, the General Court does not make a distinction between orders and reasoned orders, but only sets out the content for orders against which an appeal may lie pursuant to Arts 57 and 58 of the Statute. These are comparable to reasoned orders, however. No appeal lies against orders other than reasoned orders. 11 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 38(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 46(1). 12 T-334/00, Goldstein v Court of Justice (order), 2001, para. 6. 13 Statute, Art. 37; CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 86 and 88(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Arts 116 and 118(1). 14 Statute, Art. 37; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 88(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 118(2). 15 See, in this regard, T-213/08 REV, Marinova v Université Libre de Bruxelles and Commission (order), 2009, para. 26: contrary to the applicant’s assertion, the fact that an order was not signed by all the Judges of a Chamber and that it does not bear the seal is explained by compliance with the requisite formalities of Art. 37 of the Statute, applicable by analogy to the signing of orders, and thus does not in any way signify that it was not adopted in the regular manner by that Chamber.

25.05

25.06

25.07

808 CONCLUSION OF THE PROCEDURE deposited at the Registry, and certified copies are served on the parties and, where applicable, the referring court or tribunal, the interested parties referred to in Art. 23 of the Statute, the Court of Justice, or the General Court.16

25.08

(5) Publication A notice containing only the date and the operative part of the judgment or order of the respective Court which closes the proceedings is published in the Official Journal of the European Union.17

C. Legal force 25.09

25.10

(1) Binding nature of judgments and orders A judgment of the Court of Justice and the General Court is binding from the date of its delivery,18 while an order is binding from the date of its service.19 However, a judgment of the General Court which annuls a regulation takes effect only as from the date of expiry of the period for bringing an appeal or, if an appeal is lodged within that period, as from the date of dismissal of the appeal.20 Apart from this, an appeal has no suspensory effect (see para. 19.29). (2) Judgments are enforceable The fact that the judgment is binding means that anyone to whom it applies is bound to take the necessary steps to comply with it. That obligation stems from the Treaty provisions which specify the effects of judgments.21 On a more general level, it also arises because of the function performed by judicial pronouncements. The principle of res judicata extends only to matters of fact and law actually or necessarily settled by the judicial decision in question.22 Judgments imposing a pecuniary obligation on natural or legal persons are enforceable per se.23 They have an order for enforcement appended to them by the competent national authority without any review as to their substance and are enforced in accordance with domestic law, if necessary with the cooperation of the competent judicial and other authorities.24

16 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 90; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 120. 17 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 92; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 122. 18 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 91(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 120(1). 19 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 91(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 120(2). 20 Statute, Art. 60, second para.; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 121. 21 See Arts 260, 266, 280, and 299 TFEU. 22 See also para. 7.224. 23 Art. 280 TFEU, according to which Art. 299 TFEU applies to judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union. 24 Art. 299 TFEU provides that enforcement may be suspended only by a decision of the Court of Justice. In Comune di Montorio al Vomano v Commission (C-334/97 R-EX, Comune di Montorio al Vomano v Commission (order of the President), 2001, paras 20–21), the President of the Court of Justice rejected an application made by the municipality of Montorio on the basis of former Arts 244 and 256 EC (now Arts 280 and 299 TFEU, respectively) for suspension of the enforcement of the Court’s judgment of 10 June 1999 (C-334/97, Commission v Comune di Montorio al Vomano, 1999).

Judgments by Default and Applications to Set Them Aside 809

II. Judgments by Default and Applications to Set Them Aside A. Default judgment If, despite the fact that the application was duly served on the defendant, the latter fails to lodge a defence in the proper form within the time prescribed, the applicant may apply for the form of order sought to be granted.25 The Court of Justice or the General Court may then give judgment by default.26 In the Court of Justice, the application for judgment by default is served on the defendant.27 In the General Court, however, the defendant will not be served by any other procedural document than the decision which closes the proceedings.28 No special formal requirements apply, although the application must comply with the general requirements laid down for pleadings.29 Before giving judgment by default, the Court of Justice or the General Court, as the case may be, after hearing the Advocate General, considers whether the application initiating proceedings is admissible, whether the appropriate formalities have been complied with, and whether the application appears well-founded.30 The Court of Justice may decide to open the oral procedure relating to the application to grant the applicant’s claims.31 Naturally, only the applicant will be heard. The Court of Justice may adopt measures of organization of procedure or order measures of inquiry.32 A judgment by default is enforceable, although the Court of Justice or the General Court, as the case may be, may grant a stay of execution until the Court concerned has given its decision on any application to set it aside,33 or it may make execution subject to the provision of security. In the latter case, the security will be released if no application to set the default judgment aside is made or if such an application fails.34

25 The applicant may waive the right to avail itself of the procedure for judgment by default (see C-32/02, Commission v Italy, 2003, paras 11–12). 26 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 152(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 123(1); for disputes relating to intellectual property rights, see GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 173(6). For some examples, see C-279/03, Commission v Implants, 2005, paras 22–23 (defence had not been submitted by a lawyer authorized to practice before a court of a Member State); T-552/19, Malacalza Investimenti v ECB, 2020 (defence lodged by the European Central Bank was late and applicant applied for default judgment); T-318/17, Clean Sky 2 Joint Undertaking v Revoind Industriale di Pindaru Gelu, 2021, paras 27–28 (defendant did not react to an application that had been duly served). 27 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 152(2). 28 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 123(2). 29 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 57; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 76. 30 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 152(3); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 123(3). See T-591/17, EIB v Syrian Arab Republic, 2019, paras 21–23 (the European Investment Bank did not provide any evidence enabling the General Court to assesses whether the claims were well-founded). 31 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 152(2). In contrast, the provision of the GC Rules of Procedure allowing for the opening of the oral procedure on the application has been repealed (see former GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 122(1)). 32 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 152(3). In contrast, the provision of the GC Rules of Procedure allowing for inquiry measures has been repealed (see former GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 122(2)). 33 See T-552/19 OP, Malacalza Investimenti v ECB (order), 2020. It should be pointed out that an application for a stay of the execution of a default judgment is not the same as an application for interim measures. An application to stay the execution of a default judgment should thus be addressed to the General Court, and not to the President of that Court. See T‑348/16 OP-R, Aristoteleio Panepistimio Thessalonikis v ERCEA (order of the President), 2017. 34 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 152(4); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 123(4).

25.11

810 CONCLUSION OF THE PROCEDURE

B. Application to set aside a default judgment 25.12

An application to set aside a judgment by default must be made within one month of service of the judgment35 and submitted in the form prescribed for applications initiating proceedings (see paras 22.05 et seq.).36 After the application has been served, the President prescribes a period within which the other party may submit written observations.37 After a possible preparatory inquiry, the oral procedure takes place.38 Finally, the Court concerned gives judgment. No application may be made to have that judgment set aside.39

C. Consequences 25.13

If an application to set aside a default judgment is rejected,40 the default judgment remains in place. Conversely, if the application is successful,41 the judgment setting aside the judgment by default takes its place.

III. Procedure When Case Is Referred Back to the General Court 25.14

The procedure followed where the Court of Justice sets aside a decision of the General Court and refers the case back to that Court is set forth in Arts 215–223 of the GC Rules of Procedure. The conduct of the proceedings depends on the stage of the proceedings during which the decision of the General Court that was set aside by the Court of Justice was made. Where that decision was made after the written procedure on the substance of the case had been closed, the parties to the proceedings before the General Court may lodge their written observations on the conclusions to be drawn from the decision of the Court of Justice for the outcome of the proceedings within two months of the service on them of the decision of the Court of Justice.42 Where that decision was made when the written procedure before the General Court on the substance of the case had not yet been closed, the proceedings shall be resumed at the stage which it had reached.43 The General Court decides on the costs relating to the proceedings instituted before it and to the proceedings on the appeal before the Court of Justice.44

35 Statute, Art. 41. For the calculation of time-limits, see paras 22.65–22.70. 36 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 156(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 166(2). 37 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 156(3); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 166(3). 38 However, a judgment can be delivered without holding a hearing. 39 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 156(5); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 166(5). 40 See T-42/89 OPPO, Parliament v Yorck von Wartenburg, 1990; T-85/94 OPPO, Commission v Branco, 1995. 41 See T-348/16 OP, Aristoteleio Panepistimio Thessalonikis v ERCEA, 2019 (by which the default judgment was partially annulled). 42 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 217(1). 43 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 217(2). 44 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 219.

Costs 811

IV. Costs A. Costs in preliminary ruling proceedings The question of the costs incurred by the parties to the main proceedings on account of the reference for a preliminary ruling—in practice, lawyers’ fees and expenses, since the actual procedure before the Court of Justice is free of charge—is a matter for the national court.45 The Court of Justice merely adverts to this in its judgment. The costs incurred by Member States and Union institutions as a result of their intervention in preliminary ruling proceedings are not recoverable.46 Costs which under national procedural rules have to be borne by a successful party to the main proceedings may not be the subject of an action for damages against the Union under Art. 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Art. 340 TFEU, even though the judgment in the main proceedings was based on a declaration made in a preliminary ruling that an act of a Union institution was invalid. This is because to hold the Union liable in damages on this ground would call into question the existence and exercise of the exclusive jurisdiction which national courts enjoy in the matter of the costs of the reference for a preliminary ruling under Art. 102 of the CJ Rules of Procedure.47

25.15

B. Costs in direct actions (1) Decision in the judgment or order The order for costs is contained in the final judgment or order which closes the proceedings.48 (2) What costs are recoverable? (a) Proceedings are free of charge Proceedings before the Union Courts are free of charge.49 Exceptionally, a party may be ordered to refund avoidable costs which it has caused the Union Courts to incur, or to pay for, in respect of excessive copying or translation work carried out at the party’s request.50 Further to this, a party may be required to pay for avoidable costs incurred by the Union Courts, in particular, where an action is considered to be a manifest abuse of process.51

45

CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 102. For an example, see C-674/20, Airbnb Ireland, 2022, para. 51. 47 See T-167/94, Nölle v Council and Commission, 1995, paras 37–39. 48 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 137; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 133. 49 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 143; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 139. 50 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 143(b); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 139(b). 51 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 143(a); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 139(a). 46

25.16

25.17

812 CONCLUSION OF THE PROCEDURE 25.18

(b) Disputes about the amount of the recoverable costs Under the CJ Rules of Procedure, the party concerned may bring a dispute about the amount of recoverable costs before the smallest Chamber to which the Judge- Rapporteur who dealt with the case is assigned.52 The GC Rules of Procedure do not contain a similar rule, but disputes about the amount of the recoverable costs will generally be decided by the Chamber that initially dealt with the case. The Chamber decides by order against which no appeal will lie, after hearing the opposite party.53 While both the CJ Rules of Procedure and the GC Rules of Procedure do not subject an application for taxation of costs to any time-limit, it must be made within a reasonable period.54 Such an application for the taxation of costs is admissible only if it genuinely relates to a dispute about the amount of recoverable costs.55 As far as the costs of the proceedings for the taxation of costs are concerned, the Court of Justice and the General Court do not take a separate decision thereon. The reason for this is that, in determining the recoverable costs, the Union Courts take account of all the circumstances of the case up to the time of their decision on the taxation of costs.56 As the right to recover costs has its basis in the order of the Court of Justice or the General Court fixing the amount recoverable, interest thereon is payable only from the date of the service of that order.57 An application for an order for costs to be reviewed is not considered a dispute about the amount of recoverable costs and thus is inadmissible.58

25.19

(c) Recoverable costs Recoverable costs are sums payable to witnesses and experts and expenses necessarily incurred by the parties for the purposes of the proceedings, in particular, travel and subsistence expenses, the remuneration of agents, advisers, or lawyers,59 and office costs.60 The costs must have been caused by bringing the proceedings before the Union Courts. This means that costs incurred during the pre-litigation stage of a staff case61 52 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 145(1). 53 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 145(1) and (2) (in the Court of Justice, the Advocate General is also heard); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 170(1). If the parties cannot agree on the amount of the recoverable costs, the interested party must bring the dispute before the Court of Justice or the General Court, as the case may be. A party cannot enforce the payment of such costs by offsetting in the event that the other party refuses to pay them: see T-214/00, X v Commission, 2001, paras 28–41. 54 See C-100/17 P-DEP, Council v Gul Ahmed Textile Mills (order), 2021, paras 20–21. 55 See T-227/12, Saobraćajni institute CIP v Commission (order), 2012, para. 20. The application becomes devoid of purpose when it concerns only the costs of the (initial) procedure before the General Court in the event that the Court of Justice annuls the judgment of the General Court and refers the case back to the General Court. In such case, the General Court will have to take in its final judgment a new decision with respect to the costs taking into account the proceedings both before the General Court and the Court of Justice: see T-237/00 DEP, Reynolds v Parliament (order), 2004, paras 10–17. 56 See C-514/18 P-DEP, Schmid v Landeskammer für Land-und Forstwirtschaft in Steiermark (order), 2021, para. 21; C-558/17 P DEP, OZ v EIB (order), 2022, para. 22; T-429/08 DEP, Millers v OHIM (order), 2011, para. 53; T-298/10 DEP, Gross v OHIM (order), 2013, para. 38. 57 See C-71/16 P-DEP, Zumex Group v Comercializadora Eloro (order), 2020, para. 49. 58 See T-33/89 and T-74/89 DEP, Blackman v Parliament (order), 1993, paras 5–6. 59 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 144(b); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 140(b). 60 See C-71/16 P-DEP, Zumex Group v Comercializadora Eloro (order), 2020, para. 48, in which the Court accepted office costs which were set at a flat rate of 5 per cent of the fees. 61 See T-270/16 P-DEP, Kerstens v Commission (order), 2017, para. 24.

Costs 813 or during the administrative investigation into a purported infringement of competition law62 or State aid63 are not recoverable, since they are not related to the judicial proceedings.64 Similarly, costs incurred in submitting complaints to the European Ombudsman before instituting proceedings before the Union Courts are not recoverable.65 The expense of paying a litigation insurance premium is not considered to be an indispensable expense, unless, in exceptional circumstances, the party concerned can prove that it would not have been able to bring its action without such an insurance policy.66 In intellectual property cases, costs necessarily incurred by the parties for the purposes of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal and costs incurred for the purposes of the production of translations of pleadings or other documents into the language of the case67 are regarded as recoverable costs.68 All costs incurred for the purposes of the judicial proceedings, including the costs of any interlocutory proceedings, may be recoverable on condition that they were necessary.69 Fees relating to the period after the oral procedure (such as lawyers’ fees for considering the Advocate General’s Opinion) cannot be regarded in principle as being necessary costs incurred in connection with the proceedings.70 The same goes for fees relating to a long period of inactivity before the oral hearing.71 The salaries of officials who represent a Union institution before the Court of Justice or the General Court do not constitute recoverable costs, since a salary is by law paid not as a fee for representing the institution, but for the purposes of fulfilling an obligation imposed on the institution concerned by the Staff Regulations.72 However, the travel and subsistence expenses

62 See T-128/11, LG Display and Others v Commission, 2014, para. 261 (costs incurred in providing a bank guarantee in order to avoid enforcement of a decision finding an infringement of competition law). 63 See T-641/13, Gemeente Bergen op Zoom v Commission (order), 2014, para. 4. 64 See C-294/90 DEP, British Aerospace v Commission (order), 1994, para. 12; C-558/17 P DEP, OZ v EIB (order), 2022, para. 39; T-745/17 DEP, Kerkosand v Commission (order), 2022, para. 16. A party cannot, by way of an action for damages, seek to recover costs which are in principle not recoverable: see T-138/18, De Esteban Alonso v Commission, 2019, para. 126. 65 See C-331/05 P, Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission, 2007, paras 25–27. 66 See T-78/99 (92), Elder v Commission (order), 2000, paras 17–18. 67 Pursuant to GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 45(4)(c). 68 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 190(2). See also Arts 62–66 of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) Boards of Appeal Rules of Procedure of 27 February 2020, available at . This is not the case, however, for costs incurred for the purposes of proceedings before the Cancellation Division: see T-9/15, Ball Beverage Packaging Europe v EUIPO, 2017, para. 102. 69 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 144(b); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 140(b). 70 See C-61/16 P-DEP, Giant (China) v EBMA (order), 2019, para. 33; T-321/19 DEP, Maternus v EUIPO (order), 2021, para. 40. See also, in that regard, C-104/89 DEP, Mulder and Others v Council and Commission (order), 2004, paras 48–50: fees relating to negotiations conducted by the parties in order to establish the amount of damages payable by agreement where the Court of Justice itself expressly called upon the parties in the operative part of an interlocutory judgment to inform it of the amount of such damages within a specific period dating from the date of delivery of the judgment may not be excluded from the category of necessary costs. Where, in the interests of procedural economy, the Court of Justice itself does not rule on the amounts due, but calls on the parties to reach agreement on them, the successful party would be placed at a disadvantage if the recovery of the costs incurred because of those negotiations was not taken into account. 71 See C-204/07 P-DEP, C.A.S. v Commission (order), 2009, para. 24; T-455/05 DEP, Componenta v Commission (order), 2010, para. 44. 72 This does not mean that the Union institutions cannot have recourse to the assistance of a lawyer: see C-100/17 P- DEP, Council v Gul Ahmed Textile Mills (order), 2021, para. 27; T-212/18 DEP, Romańska v Frontex (order), 2021, paras 17–18.

814 CONCLUSION OF THE PROCEDURE of such officials are recoverable, as is the fee payable to a legal practitioner assisting the institution.73

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(d) Disputes over legal fees If the dispute relates to the amount of a lawyer’s fees, the Court of Justice or the General Court, as the case may be, does not rule on whether the fees were appropriate, but only on the extent to which they are recoverable.74 In the absence of provisions of Union law relating to tariffs or to the necessary working time of lawyers, the Union Court makes an assessment of the costs on a case-by-case basis.75 In so doing, it takes account of the subject-matter and the character of the proceedings,76 the importance of the dispute from the point of view of Union law,77 the volume of work involved for the lawyer,78 and the economic importance of the case for the parties concerned.79

73 See C-100/17 P-DEP, Council v Gul Ahmed Textile Mills (order), 2021, para. 46. 74 See C-558/17 P-DEP, OZ v EIB (order), 2022, para. 20. 75 See C-558/17 P-DEP, OZ v EIB (order), 2022, para. 21; T-745/17 DEP, Kerkosand v Commission (order), 2022, para. 18. 76 Whether a case raises questions already raised in other cases may have a bearing on this (see C-100/17 P-DEP, Council v Gul Ahmed Textile Mills (order), 2021, para. 35; C-558/17 P-DEP, OZ v EIB (order), 2022, para. 32). The fact that an appeal on points of law does not necessitate the assertion or evaluation of facts may also be taken into account (see C-265/17 P-DEP, United Parcel Service v Commission (order), 2020, para. 33), as well as the fact that proceedings before the Union Courts were preceded by proceedings before the EUIPO (see C-514/18 P-DEP, Schmid v Landeskammer für Land-und Forstwirtschaft in Steiermark (order), 2021, para. 23). Further to this, an application for taxation of costs is considered to be a largely standardized procedure and does not present, in principle, any difficulties: see C-558/17 P-DEP, OZ v EIB (order), 2022, para. 41. 77 The fact that the Court of Justice required an Opinion of an Advocate General is an indication of the importance of the dispute from the point of view of Union law (see C-558/17 P-DEP, OZ v EIB (order), 2022, paras 32–34). The same goes for the referral of a case to a Chamber of five Judges (see C-100/17 P-DEP, Council v Gul Ahmed Textile Mills (order), 2021, para. 35). Conversely, the absence of a hearing and an Advocate General’s Opinion is an indication that the dispute is not of a particular importance from the point of view of Union law (see C-514/18 P-DEP, Schmid v Landeskammer für Land-und Forstwirtschaft in Steiermark (order), 2021, para. 36). In the context of intellectual property cases, an appeal against a judgment of the General Court dismissing an action for annulment against a decision of an EUIPO Board of Appeal annulling a decision of the Opposition Division upholding the opposition brought against the registration of a figurative mark is considered to be normal Union trade mark litigation (see C-71/16 P-DEP, Zumex Group v Comercializadora Eloro (order), 2020, para. 28); see also C-514/18 P-DEP, Schmid v Landeskammer für Land-und Forstwirtschaft in Steiermark (order), 2021, para. 24 regarding an appeal against a judgment of the General Court dismissing an action for annulment brought against a decision of an EUIPO Board of Appeal annulling a decision of the Cancellation division. 78 The Union Court will look at the nature of the documents submitted, the length of those documents, whether a hearing has taken place, whether the facts were disputed, whether the legal issues were complex, etc. See T-35/07 DEP, Leche Celta v OHIM (order), 2011, para. 26. Further to this, the Union Court will assess whether the hours declared in relation to certain tasks, such as the study or drafting of documents, does not appear to be excessive. For instance, in T-95/06 DEP, Federación de Cooperativas Agrarias de la Comunidad Valenciana v CPVO (order), 2009, paras 53–61, the General Court held that the declaration of 30 working hours for an oral hearing of three hours was excessive, just as were the nine working hours declared for the study of a reply containing twenty-four pages. Similarly, in a case where the application was manifestly inadmissible because it did not meet the requirements of Art. 76(d) of the GC Rules of Procedure, the General Court held that, while the lack of clarity of the application required the defendant’s lawyers to do a considerable amount of work, it would have been possible for the defendant to introduce an application for a decision on inadmissibility without going to the substance of the case on the basis of Art. 130(1) of the GC Rules of Procedure, which would have obviated the need to engage with the substance of the case. Therefore, the General Court only accepted 50 working hours for the defence and 15 hours for the rejoinder instead of 109.50 hours and 54.92 hours, respectively: see T-212/18 DEP, Romańska v Frontex (order), 2021, paras 36–38. 79 See C-558/17 P-DEP, OZ v EIB (order), 2022, para. 21; T-84/91 DEP, Meskens v Parliament (order), 1993, para. 13. It is the amount claimed that determines the financial interest of a party, and not the amount awarded: see

Costs 815 In general, the fees for one lawyer will be accepted as being recoverable costs.80 In complex cases, however, the fees of more than one lawyer will only be recoverable within reasonable limits,81 taking into account the number of hours’ work objectively necessary for the purposes of the proceedings concerned and not the number of lawyers working on the case.82 Coordination costs for the joint preparation of the pleadings will not be recoverable if not asked for by the Court concerned.83 The Union Courts are not bound by national scales of lawyers’ fees84 or by any agreement concluded by the applicant with its lawyer.85 Particularly in the context of proceedings under the competition rules, where the contested Commission decision is largely based on economic considerations, the involvement of one or more economic advisers or experts may sometimes prove necessary and entail recoverable costs in proceedings before the General Court.86

C-558/17 P-DEP, OZ v EIB (order), 2022, para. 40. An applicant has a very significant financial interest in proceedings brought against a measure freezing the funds of the applicant: see T-121/09 DEP, Al Shanfari v Council and Commission (order), 2012, paras 20–21. Regarding fines in the field of competition law, it was held that the economic importance of an action contesting a decision of the Commission imposing a fine on an undertaking was rather limited, since the fine only corresponded to a small percentage of the turnover (in casu, 1.8 per cent) of the undertaking concerned and was only a fraction (i.e. less than one-fifth) of the maximum fine that could have been imposed: see T-25/10 DEP, BASF v Commission (order), 2013, para. 31. Conversely, an action brought against a fine corresponding to 60 per cent of the profits of an undertaking was deemed to be of considerable economic interest to the applicant: see T-40/06 DEP, Trioplast Industrier v Commission (order), 2012, para. 43. Additionally, an action brought against a Commission decision rejecting a complaint about alleged unlawful aid was deemed to have a particularly important economic interest to the applicant, since the losses connected to the alleged unlawful aid complained of amounted to around 80–90 per cent of the net result of the applicant in the preceding years: see T-745/17 DEP, Kerkosand v Commission (order), 2022, para. 36. This is not the case where the beneficiary of State aid brings an action for annulment against a Commission decision declaring the aid partially compatible with the internal market and only small amounts of aid are recovered: see T-103/15 DEP, Flabeg Deutschland v Commission (order), 2020, para. 30. 80 See T-306/10 AJ, Yusef v Commission (order), 2010, para. 15. The Union Court requires a detailed statement of costs broken down according to the work carried out: see T-429/08 DEP, Grain Millers v OHIM (order), 2011, paras 45–46. Failure to provide a detailed statement will lead the Union Court to adopt a strict approach in assessing the costs applied for: see T-266/08 P-DEP, Kerstens v Commission (order), 2012, paras 24–25. For example, in relation to air travel expenses, the General Court held that only air travel expenses duly substantiated by an invoice were to be regarded as necessary costs for the purposes of reimbursement: see T-859/16 DEP, Sociedad Anónima Damm v EUIPO (order), 2019, para. 29. 81 See C-558/17 P-DEP, OZ v EIB (order), 2022, para. 36; T-290/94 (92), Kaysersberg v Commission (order), 1998, para. 20. The VAT paid by a VAT taxable person on lawyers’ and experts’ fees cannot be regarded as a cost (in view of the possibility to deduct VAT) and is therefore not recoverable (see C-514/18 P-DEP, Schmid v Landeskammer für Land-und Forstwirtschaft in Steiermark (order), 2021, para. 48). Compare T-7/98 and T-208/98 DEP and T-109/99 DEP, De Nicola v EIB (order), 2004, para. 37, as regards non-VAT-taxable persons. An appeal procedure will normally not justify the recourse to more than one counsel. This is because an appeal is limited to points of law (see C-286/95 P-DEP, ICI v Commission (order), 2004, para. 26). 82 See C-558/17 P-DEP, OZ v EIB (order), 2022, para. 37; T-425/13 DEP, Giant (China) v Council (order), 2019, para. 30. 83 See C-100/17 P-DEP, Council v Gul Ahmed Textile Mills (order), 2021, para. 38. 84 See C-514/18 P-DEP, Schmid v Landeskammer für Land-und Forstwirtschaft in Steiermark (order), 2021, para. 19; C-558/17 P-DEP, OZ v EIB (order), 2022, para. 20. 85 Remuneration at a high hourly rate is appropriate only for the services of professionals who are able to demonstrate that they are highly qualified, experienced, and capable of working efficiently and rapidly, the quid pro quo being that, in such a case, an assessment must be made—which must be rigorous—of the total number of hours of work necessary for the purposes of the proceedings concerned: see C-100/17 P-DEP, Council v Gul Ahmed Textile Mills (order), 2021, para. 40; C-558/17 P-DEP, OZ v EIB (order), 2022, para. 38. 86 See T-5/02 DEP and T-80/02 DEP, Tetra Laval v Commission (order), 2011, para. 83; T-194/13 DEP, United Parcel Service v Commission (order), 2020, para. 86.

816 CONCLUSION OF THE PROCEDURE

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(3) Who has to pay the costs? (a) Principle In principle, the Court of Justice or the General Court orders the unsuccessful party to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.87 This highlights the importance of including such a request in the pleadings of the parties. It is possible to apply for costs for the first time at the stage of the oral procedure.88 (b) Other possibilities An order may be made that the costs be shared or that the parties bear their own costs where each party succeeds on some and fails on other heads or where the Union Court so decides on specific grounds89 or for reasons of equity.90 In addition, Art. 190(1) of the GC Rules of Procedure provides that where an action against a decision of a Board of Appeal is successful, the General Court may order the Office to bear only its own costs. In such a case, the General Court may order the intervener to pay the applicant’s costs.91 (c) Unreasonable or vexatious procedure The successful party may be ordered to pay costs which the Union Court considers it to have unreasonably or vexatiously caused the other party to bear.92 Thus, for example, where within the framework of infringement proceedings, the defendant Member State fails to provide all the relevant information to the Commission in the pre-litigation procedure, the Court of Justice will order the Member State to bear (part of) the costs. This is because, in such circumstances, it cannot be held against the Commission that it brought an infringement action before the Court of Justice, even though the action is ill-founded.93 The fact that the successful party has raised a number of unsuccessful arguments cannot lead to the conclusion that it has caused vexatious costs. This does not mean, however, that any argument can be made. A successful party will be ordered to pay the costs if it has deliberately raised ‘worthless’ arguments94 or committed another abuse of procedure.95 Furthermore, an institution may be ordered to pay the costs

87 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 138(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 134(1). An application that the other party be ordered to pay the costs must be made without ambiguity: see C-531/06, Commission v Italy, 2009, para. 108. 88 See T-13/92, Moat v Commission, 1993, para. 50; T-423/04 Bunker & BKR v OHIM, 2005, para. 84; compare 298/83, CICCE v Commission, 1985, para. 32, where costs were claimed in the rejoinder, and this was considered to be too late and therefore the claim was inadmissible. This shows a tolerance of the Union Courts vis-à-vis private parties. In CICCE v Commission, the private party lost its case and would therefore have had to pay the costs. In Moat v Commission, the individual was successful, and his claim was not regarded as having been made too late. 89 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 138(3); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 134(3). For examples, see T-335/09, Groupement Adriano, Jaime Ribeiro, Conduril v Commission (order), 2011, paras 37–38 (the Commission did not use clear and unequivocal language in drafting the debit note, which gave rise to the impression in the applicant’s mind that the debit note concerned was a reviewable act within the meaning of Art. 263 TFEU); T-300/20, Nosio v EUIPO, 2021, paras 65–66 (the errors that vitiated the contested decision of the Board of Appeal were not such as to result in the annulment of that decision). 90 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 135(1). 91 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 138(3). 92 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 139; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 135(2). 93 See C-456/03, Commission v Italy, 2005, paras 110–115. 94 See T-45/01 DEP, Sanders v Commission (order), 2009, paras 19–20. 95 See T-561/14, European Citizens’ Initiative ‘One of Us’ and Others v Commission (order), 2016 (inappropriate use of procedural documents aggrieving other parties to the procedure).

Costs 817 of the opposite party where the dispute is attributable in part to the conduct of that institution.96 (d) Interveners As interveners, Member States, Union institutions, EEA States, and the EFTA Supervisory Authority bear their own costs.97 Other interveners may also be ordered to bear their own costs, even if they intervened in support of the successful party.98 Generally, however, an intervener which intervened in support of the successful party will recover its costs from the unsuccessful party.99 An intervener which supported the form of order sought by the unsuccessful party may be ordered to pay the costs together with that party. In particular, the Court of Justice and the General Court may allow the successful party to recover from the intervener the costs it incurred as a result of the intervention.100 (e) Proceedings which are discontinued If a party discontinues or withdraws from proceedings (see paras 23.59–23.60), that party will be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the other party’s observations on the discontinuance or withdrawal.101 Depending on the circumstances of the withdrawal, such costs may also constitute vexatious costs.102 However, the party discontinuing or withdrawing from proceedings may apply for an order for costs against the other party if this appears justified by that party’s conduct.103 Where the parties have come to an agreement on costs, the decision on costs will be in accordance with that agreement.104 If costs are not claimed, the parties bear their own costs.105 (f) Action becomes devoid of purpose Where a case does not proceed to judgment, the costs are at the discretion of the Court of Justice or the General Court, as the case may be.106 96 See T-796/19, HB v Commission, 2021, paras 101–104; T-834/17, United Parcel Service v Commission, 2022, paras 373–374. The same applies to other Union bodies: see T-750/20, Correia v EESC, 2022, paras 103–105. 97 CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 140(1) and (2); GC Rules of Procedure, Arts 140(1) and (2). 98 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 140(3); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 138(3). 99 See T-30/20 DEP, Promed v EUIPO (order), 2021. 100 See T-599/13 DEP, Cosmowell v EUIPO (order), 2017. 101 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 141(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 136(1). 102 See T-466/07, Osram v Council (order), 2008, para. 8. 103 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 141(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 136(2). Where the Commission discontinues proceedings for failure to fulfil obligations because the Member State has brought the infringement to an end, it will normally claim that the Member State concerned be ordered to pay the costs. See C-57/20, Commission v Germany (order), 2022, paras 3–6. Where the Commission withdraws the decision of which the annulment is sought, the action pursuant to Art. 263 TFEU becomes devoid of purpose; in that case, the Commission will have to bear the costs (see T-291/02, González y Diéz v Commission (order), 2004, paras 17–23). 104 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 141(3); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 136(3). For examples, see C-675/16 P, Guccio Gucci v EUIPO (order), 2018, para. 5; T-325/19 DEP, Arrigo Cipriani v EUIPO (order), 2022, para. 3 105 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 141(4); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 136(4). 106 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 142; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 137. See C-850/19 P, FVE Holýšov I and Others v Commission, 2021, paras 74–75 (regarding a cross-appeal); T-766/21, Daw v EUIPO (order), 2022, paras 4–6 (action devoid of purpose because other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal had withdrawn the application for registration of the contested mark; however, since that other party did not intervene in the proceedings before the General Court, it could not be ordered to pay any costs).

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818 CONCLUSION OF THE PROCEDURE

V. Exceptional Procedures Relating to Judgments and Orders A. General 25.27

There are certain exceptional procedures set down in the Statute and the Rules of Procedure of the Union Courts relating to judgments and orders, namely, third-party proceedings against a judgment or order and the revision, interpretation, and rectification of a judgment or order.107 As such, these procedures must be distinguished from the review procedure set forth in Arts 256(2) and (3) TFEU by which some decisions of the General Court may be subject to review by the Court of Justice ‘where there is a serious risk of the unity or consistency of Union law being affected’ (see Ch. 20).108

B. Preliminary ruling proceedings 25.28

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(1) No appeal No appeal will lie before the Court of Justice109 from parties to the main proceedings, Member States, or Union institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies against a preliminary ruling, since it is only for national courts and tribunals to decide whether to make a reference and, if so, what its subject-matter should be.110 Consequently, they decide whether they have received sufficient guidance from the preliminary ruling and whether they consider it necessary to make a further reference to the Court of Justice.111 (2) No interpretation No request for the interpretation of a preliminary ruling can be made.112 Doubts as to the meaning or the scope of the preliminary ruling can only give rise to a new reference.113 The parties to the main proceedings may urge the national court to make a new reference,114 but they have no right to apply to the Court of Justice directly. 107 They also include applications to set aside a default judgment: see paras 25.12. 108 See T-213/08 REV, Marinova v Université Libre de Bruxelles and Commission (order), 2009, para. 34, in which the General Court underlined that this review procedure should be distinguished from applications for revision of a judgment, which constitutes ‘an exceptional review procedure that allows an applicant to call in question the authority of res judicata attaching to a judgment bringing the proceedings to an end on the basis of the findings of fact relied upon by the Court’ and ‘presupposes the discovery of elements of a factual nature which existed prior to the judgment and which were unknown at that time to the court which delivered it as well as to the party applying for revision and which, had the court been able to take them into consideration, could have led it to a different determination of the proceedings’. 109 To be distinguished, an order referring a question to the Court of Justice may be the subject of an appeal in the national procedural framework (though subject to the requirements of Union law pursuant to the referring court’s right to refer under Art. 267 TFEU): see para. 3.27. 110 See 13/67, Becher (order), 1968 ECR 187, 197. 111 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 104(2). See also C-116/96 REV, Reisebüro Binder (order), 1998, paras 6–9; C-35/11, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, 2012, para. 2. 112 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 104(1). See C-345/09 INT, Fokkens (order), 2011; C-309/07 INT, Baumann (order), 2011. 113 See CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 104(2): it is for the national courts or tribunals to assess whether they consider that sufficient guidance is given by a preliminary ruling or whether it appears to them that a further reference to the Court is required. 114 See C-35/11, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, 2012, paras 22–24.

Exceptional Procedures Relating to Judgments and Orders 819 (3) Revision It is not possible to seek revision of a preliminary ruling, since there are no parties to the proceedings and Arts 41–44 of the Statute relating to exceptional pleas are not applicable.115 (4) Rectification On a request of an interested party referred to in Art. 23 of the Statute or of its own motion, the Court may rectify clerical mistakes, errors in calculation, and obvious inaccuracies affecting judgments or orders.116 The decision to rectify a judgment or an order is taken by the Court after hearing the Advocate General.117 The original of the rectification order is annexed to the original of the rectified decision, and a note of the order is made in the margin of the rectified decision.118 No other requests and applications relating to judgments and orders similar to those applicable to direct actions (i.e. third-party proceedings and failure to adjudicate: see paras 25.32 and 25.61) are possible in relation to preliminary rulings.

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C. Direct actions (1) Third-party proceedings (a) Subject-matter Judgments or orders of the Court of Justice or the General Court, as the case may be, may be prejudicial to the rights of third parties. Notwithstanding the force of res judicata, third parties are therefore entitled in exceptional circumstances to contest such decisions.119 Art. 42 of the Statute refers only to ‘judgments’, but as elaborated further in the Rules of Procedure,120 third-party proceedings may pertain to judgments or orders of the Union Courts.121 (b) Substantive requirements and time-limits (i) Third parties Third-party proceedings may be brought by Member States, Union institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies, and any other natural or legal persons ‘to contest a judgment rendered without their being heard, where the judgment is prejudicial to their rights’.122 Consequently, an application to bring third-party proceedings on the part of an intervener will be inadmissible.123 Third-party proceedings instituted by interested third parties who did not have good reasons for failing to intervene in the original

115 See C-116/96 REV, Reisebüro Binder (order), 1998, paras 6–9. 116 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 103(1). For an example, see C-607/19 REC, Husqvarna (order), 2021. 117 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 103(2). 118 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 103(3). 119 See T-624/16 TO, L’Huillier v Gollnisch and Parliament (order), 2019, para. 31. 120 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 157(1)(a); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 167(1)(a). 121 For the distinction between judgments and orders, see paras 25.04. 122 Statute, Art. 42. 123 The same goes for a party whose application to intervene was rejected: T-624/16 TO, L’Huillier v Gollnisch and Parliament (order), 2019, paras 29–34.

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820 CONCLUSION OF THE PROCEDURE proceedings will also be inadmissible.124 The notice published in the Official Journal setting out the subject-matter of the proceedings, the form of order sought, and the pleas in law and main supporting arguments125 is specifically intended to enable third parties to intervene in proceedings whose outcome may be prejudicial to their rights. Only diligent third parties who were unable to become aware on the basis of that notice that their rights might be affected can claim that they were not put on notice and thus an application to bring third-party proceedings by such a party will be admissible.126 The duty of care is assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with due concern not to detract unnecessarily from the authority as res judicata of the contested decision in the interests of legal certainty. The bar is therefore set very high. Accordingly, a decision on the part of an interested third party not to intervene in the original proceedings does not satisfy the duty of care where that decision was based on the party’s own assessment of the probable outcome of the case in light of the information as to the facts and law known by such party at the time the action was started. This is because further facts may emerge in the course of the proceedings to influence the outcome of the case. Moreover, it is not unforeseeable that the Union Courts may depart from settled case-law in the proceedings.127 25.34

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(ii) Third parties which could have taken part in the main proceedings Third-party proceedings may be brought only by parties which could have taken part— at least in theory—in the main proceedings.128 For example, since natural or legal persons are not entitled to intervene in infringement proceedings brought under Arts 258–260 TFEU, they may not bring third-party proceedings against a judgment closing such proceedings.129 (iii) Contested decision must be prejudicial to the rights of the third party The contested decision must be prejudicial to the rights of the third party. It is not enough that the third party has a legitimate interest to protect.130 The prejudice to the third party’s rights must ensue from the operative part or the grounds of the judgment or order itself.131 The alleged prejudice may be material or non-material.132

124 See 42/59 and 49/59 Third-party proceedings, Breedband v Société des Aciéries du Temple and Others,1962, paras 2–3; T-284/08 TO, Avaessian Avaki and Others v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran and Others (order), 2009, para. 15. 125 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 21(4); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 122. 126 See 9/60 and 12/60 Third-party proceedings, Belgium v Vloeberghs and High Authority, 1962 ECR 171, 182. 127 See T-35/89 TO 1, Ascasibar Zubizarreta and Others v Albani (order), 1992, paras 33–35; T-284/08 TO, Avaessian Avaki and Others v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran and Others (order), 2009, para. 17. 128 See C-118/18 P-TO, Hochmann and Others v Hochmann Marketing and Others (order), 2018, para. 6; T-624/16 TO, L’Huillier v Gollnisch and Parliament (order), 2019, paras 29–34. 129 See C-147/86 TO 1, POIFXG and Others v Greece and Commission (order), 1989, paras 11–12; C-147/86 TO 2, PALSO and Others v Greece and Commission (order), 1989, paras 11–12; C-147/86 TO 3, PSIITENSM v Greece and Commission (order), 1989, paras 11–12. 130 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 157(1)(b); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 167(1)(b). 131 See 267/80 TO, Dreher v Riseria Modenese, Council, and Commission, 1986, paras 9–10; T-284/08 TO, Avaessian Avaki and Others v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran and Others (order), 2009, para. 24. 132 See 9/60 and 12/60 Third-party proceedings, Belgium v Vloeberghs and High Authority, 1962 ECR 171, 183– 184, and AG Roemer Opinion, 1962 ECR 186, 190; Case T-284/08 TO, Avaessian Avaki and Others v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran and Others (order), 2009, paras 19, 25–26.

Exceptional Procedures Relating to Judgments and Orders 821 (iv) Time-limits Third-party proceedings must be brought within two months of publication of the contested decision in the Official Journal.133 (v) Third-party proceedings and appeal Where an appeal before the Court of Justice and an application initiating third-party proceedings before the General Court contest the same decision of the latter Court, the General Court may, after hearing the parties, stay proceedings until the Court of Justice has delivered its ruling.134 However, the Court of Justice may defer hearing the appeal pursuant to Art. 54 of the Statute until such time as the General Court has dealt with the application for third-party proceedings.135 (c) Formal requirements (i) General requirements The application initiating third-party proceedings must comply with the general requirements applicable to procedural documents (see paras 24.11 et seq.) and with the specific requirements relating to applications (see paras 22.05 et seq.).136 In addition, the application must specify the contested judgment or order, state how the contested decision is prejudicial to the rights of the third party, and indicate the reasons why the third party was unable to take part in the original case.137 (ii) Application addressed to the parties to the original case The application is addressed to all the parties to the original case.138 If the contested judgment or order is varied, the variation may be relied upon against all the parties to the original proceedings since they were summoned to the third-party proceedings. (d) Consequences If the third-party proceedings are successful, the contested judgment or order will be varied on the points on which the submissions of the third party are upheld.139 The original of the judgment in the third-party proceedings is annexed to the original of the contested decision and a note of the judgment in the third-party proceedings is made in the margin of the contested decision.140 (3) Revision (a) General Revision affords an opportunity of varying the decision of the Court of Justice or the General Court after a ‘new fact’ has come to light.141 Similar to third-party proceedings, 133 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 157(3); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 167(2). On the calculation of time limits, see paras 22.65–22.70. 134 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 163. 135 See C-506/09 P, Portugal v Transnáutica, 2012, paras 34–35. 136 CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 157(1) and 120–122; GC Rules of Procedure, Arts 167(1), 76, and 78. 137 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 157(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 167(1). 138 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 157(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 167(4). 139 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 157(5); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 167(6). 140 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 157(6); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 167(7). 141 Statute, Art. 44; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 159(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 169(1).

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822 CONCLUSION OF THE PROCEDURE although reference is made only to judgments in Art. 44 of the Statute, the Rules of Procedure142 indicate that revision applies to judgments and orders of Union Courts.

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(b) Substantive requirements and time-limits (i) New fact Under the first paragraph of Art. 44 of the Statute, an application for revision of a judgment of the Court of Justice or of the General Court may be made on discovery of a fact which is of such a nature as to be a decisive factor and which, when the judgment was delivered or the order served, was unknown to the Court concerned and to the party claiming the revision. Consequently, revision is not a form of appeal, but an exceptional review procedure that allows an applicant to call into question the authority of res judicata attaching to a final judgment or order on the basis of the findings of fact relied upon by the Union Courts.143 In order for revision proceedings to be admissible, the following three conditions have to be satisfied: (1) matters of a factual nature which existed prior to the decision must have been discovered; (2) those matters must have been unknown at that time to the Union Court which delivered the judgment or issued the order, as well as to the party applying for revision; and (3) the matters must be such that, if the Union Court had been able to take them into consideration, they might have led it to a different determination of the proceedings.144 (ii) Late discovery not attributable to applicant The late discovery of the new fact must not be attributable to the applicant for revision. Accordingly, where the applicant was aware of the existence of a given report, but not of its content at the time of the original proceedings, the report in question did not constitute a new fact.145 This was because the party’s failure to ask for the content of the report to be communicated to it or to apply to the Court for measures of inquiry was part of the reason why the applicant was not apprised of the content of the report before the decision was given.146 The Court of Justice or the General Court, as the case may be, must also not have been aware of the allegedly ‘new’ fact at the time when judgment was delivered or the order was served.147 Accordingly, the Court is aware of the content of a document produced before the end of the oral procedure, even though it was not drawn up in the language of the case, but in another official language of the European

142 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 159; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 169. 143 See C-118/18 P-REV, Hochmann Marketing v EUIPO (order), 2019, para. 30; T-786/16 REV, PV v Commission (order), 2022, para. 22. 144 See C-539/20 P-REV, Hochmann Marketing v Commission (order), 2022, para. 28; T-786/16 REV, PV v Commission (order), 2022, para. 22. Naturally, an application for revision which makes no mention of any new fact will be inadmissible: see C-539/20 P-REV, Hochmann Marketing v Commission (order), 2022, para. 37. 145 See 56/70 REV, Mandelli v Commission, 1971, paras 9–12. 146 See also T-217/11 REV, Staelen v Ombudsman, 2017, paras 27–36: a successful candidate in a competition is expected to monitor with all due diligence the possible publication in the Official Journal of decisions to extend the list(s) of suitable candidates on which his or her name has been entered. He or she cannot claim that such a decision is a fact unknown to him or her. 147 A judgment of the Court of Justice cannot be considered to be unknown to the Court and to the applicant (see C-255/06 P-REV, Yedaş Tarim ve Otomotiv Sanayi ve Ticaret v Council and Commission, 2009, para. 20). The same goes for the Statute of the Court of Justice and the CJ Rules of Procedure, which, apart from not constituting new facts, must be considered to be well known by the Court (see C-118/18 P-REV, Hochmann Marketing v EUIPO (order), 2019, para. 28).

Exceptional Procedures Relating to Judgments and Orders 823 Union. There is an irrebuttable presumption that the Court of Justice and the General Court master all the official languages, and hence they may have cognizance of such a document.148 (iii) Fact had already occurred when decision was given As has been mentioned, the fact on which the application for revision is based must have already occurred at the time when the decision was given.149 The fact must have been in existence—yet unknown—at that time.150 For that reason, subsequent case-law of the Court of Justice or the General Court cannot be regarded as a new fact for the purposes of Art. 44 of the Statute.151 (iv) Decisive factor for the outcome of the case Finally, the fact must be of such a nature as to be a decisive factor for the outcome of the case.152 The new fact must potentially form the basis for amending the operative part of the contested judgment or order. A new fact which is relevant only to an additional ground, but cannot unsettle the judgment or order itself, does not satisfy that requirement.153 The application for revision must contest the determination made in the contested decision, not the order for costs or any measures taken in order to give effect to the decision.154 (v) Time-limits and limitation period An application for revision of a judgment or order must be made within three months of the date on which the facts on which the application is based came to the applicant’s knowledge.155 No application for revision may be made after the lapse of ten years from the date of the judgment or order.156 (c) Formal requirements (i) General requirements The application must be made against all parties to the case in which the contested decision was given157 and must be lodged in the language of the procedure of the decision to be revised.158 An application for revision must comply with the general requirements for procedural documents (see paras 24.11 et seq.) and with the specific requirements for applications (see paras 22.05 et seq.).159 In addition, it must specify the judgment or order contested, indicate the points on which the judgment or order is contested, set 148 See 1/60-REVI, FERAM v High Authority, 1960 ECR 165, 169–170. 149 See C-118/18 P-REV III, Hochmann Marketing v EUIPO (order), 2020, para. 43. 150 See T-616/19 REV, Katjes Fassin v EUIPO (order), 2021, paras 29–32. Assertions or personal opinions which have no official authority relating to facts which might possibly be classified as new facts cannot in themselves constitute such facts (see C-2/98 P, De Compte v Parliament, 1999, para. 32). 151 See C-403/85 REV, Ferrandi v Commission, 1991, para. 13; T-4/89 REV, BASF v Commission (order), 1992, para. 12; T-241/03 REV, Marcuccio v Commission (order), 2012, para. 16. 152 See T-217/11 REV, Staelen v Ombudsman, 2017, para. 37; T-917/16 REV, BP v FRA (order), 2019, para. 61. 153 See 40/71, Richez-Parise v Commission, 1972, para. 21; T-917/16 REV, BP v FRA (order), 2019, paras 61–66. 154 See 235/82 REV, Ferriere San Carlo v Commission, 1986, para. 9. 155 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 159(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 169(2). 156 Statute, Art. 44, third para. 157 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 159(4); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 169(4). 158 See C-64/98 P-REV, Petrides v Commission (order), 2010, paras 12–16. 159 CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 159(3) and 120–122; GC Rules of Procedure, Arts 169, 76, and 78.

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25.45

25.46

25.47

824 CONCLUSION OF THE PROCEDURE out the facts on which the application is based, and indicate the nature of the evidence to show that there are facts justifying revision of the judgment, and that the applicable time-limit has been observed.160 25.48

25.49

25.50

(ii) Procedure Without prejudice to its decision on the substance, the Court of Justice or the General Court, as the case may be, decides on the admissibility of the application in the form of an order having regard to the written observations of the parties (and after hearing the Advocate General in the case of the Court of Justice).161 If the application is admissible, the Union Court proceeds to consider the substance of the application and gives its decision in the form of a judgment.162 As underlined in the case-law, this division of the procedure into two stages is due to the strict conditions applying to revision, which is understandable having regard to the fact that it affects the principle of res judicata.163 (iii) Successful action The original of the revising judgment is annexed to the original of the judgment or order revised. A note of the revising judgment is made in the margin of the original of the judgment or order revised.164 (4) The interpretation of judgments or orders (a) General If the meaning or scope of a judgment or order is in doubt, application may be made to the Court of Justice or the General Court, as the case may be, to interpret it.165 Although reference is made only to judgments in Art. 43 of the Statute, the Rules of Procedure of the Union Courts indicate that this procedure also applies to orders.166 An application for interpretation of a judgment or order must seek only to resolve an obscurity or ambiguity relating to the determination made in the judgment.167 Questions concerning the implications of the judgment or order for other disputes or the content of measures needed in order to give effect to it or points not decided by the judgment or order do not constitute questions of interpretation for this purpose and hence are inadmissible.168 Such questions, however, may form the subject-matter of new proceedings. 160 CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 159(3)(a)–(d); GC Rules of Procedure, Arts 169(3)(a)–(d). 161 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 159(5); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 169(5). 162 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 159(6); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 169(6). 163 See C-5/93 P, DSM v Commission, 1999, paras 66–67; T-616/19 REV, Katjes Fassin v EUIPO (order), 2021, para. 25; T-786/16 REV, PV v Commission (order), 2022, para. 24. 164 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 159(7); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 169(7). 165 Statute, Art. 43; CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 158; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 168. 166 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 158(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 168(1). An application relating to an order was dismissed under the former CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 102, since that provision only referred to judgments: see C-502/06 P-INT, Correia de Matos v Parliament (order), 2008. 167 See C-91/18 INT, Greece v Commission (order), 2020, para. 6. 168 See T-355/19 INTP, CE v Committee of the Regions (order), 2021, para. 10 (application inadmissible because guidance was sought on how to give effect to a judgment of the General Court); C-763/18 P-INT, Unipreus (order), 2021, paras 10–12; C-607/18 P-OST, NKT Verwaltungs and Others (order), 2021, para. 27; C-395/17 INT, Netherlands v Commission (order), 2022, paras 13–19 (application inadmissible because an interpretation was sought of a question not determined in the judgment). An application for interpretation can also not be used to call into question the consequences of the operative part of a judgment or an order: see C-118/18 P-INT, Hochmann Marketing (order), 2018, para. 15.

Exceptional Procedures Relating to Judgments and Orders 825 (b) Who can bring an application for interpretation? (i) Applicant An application for interpretation of a judgment or order may be made by any party to the proceedings.169 An intervener in the original proceedings may make an application, irrespective as to the position taken by the party in whose support it intervened.170 In the case of parallel proceedings based on the same complaints, in which a decision is given in one or more cases by reference to a judgment or order in an initial case, all parties involved are entitled to apply for an interpretation of that latter judgment or order, even if they were not parties to those particular proceedings.171 In contrast, an application for interpretation of a judgment or order which is concerned with merely defining the consequences of an earlier judgment or order constitutes an application to interpret that initial judgment, and so only parties to those proceedings are entitled to bring an application for interpretation.172 (ii) Special position of Union institutions A Union institution173 which establishes an interest in having a judgment interpreted may bring an application for interpretation, even if it was not a party to the proceedings which culminated in the judgment whose interpretation is sought.174 (c) Substantive and formal requirements (i) Doubt as regards the meaning or the scope of a judgment or order In order for there to be a doubt as to the meaning or scope of a judgment or order within the meaning of Art. 43 of the Statute, it is sufficient that parties give differing meanings to it.175 The doubt must relate to an issue determined by the judgment or order in question. It must therefore attach to the operative part or to one of the grounds determining it.176 An application for interpretation may not be made to the Court of Justice or the General Court for interpretation of an ancillary matter which supplements or explains those basic grounds.177 Finally, there must be a real obscurity or ambiguity 169 Statute, Art. 43. See also CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 158(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 168(1). 170 See C-245/95 P-INT, NSK and Others v Commission, 1999, para. 15. 171 See 5/55, ASSIDER v High Authority, 1954–1956 ECR 135, 141–142. 172 See 24/66 bis, Gesellschaft für Getreidehandel v Commission, 1973, para. 3. 173 Art. 43 of the Statute, as well as Art. 158(1) of the CJ Rules of Procedure and Art. 168(1) of the GC Rules of Procedure, refer to ‘any institution of the Union’ and thus do not expressly mention Union bodies, offices, and agencies, as compared to other provisions (Art. 42 of the Statute relating to third-party proceedings). However, for the purposes of the Rules of Procedure of the Union Courts, the term ‘institutions’ is meant to include both the Union institutions listed in Art. 13(1) TEU and Union bodies, offices, and agencies established by the Treaties or by an act adopted in implementation thereof: see CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 1(2)(a); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 2(b)(f). Conceivably, Art. 158(1) of the CJ Rules of Procedure and Art. 168(1) of the GC Rules of Procedure dealing with interpretation could cover both. Yet, these provisions are framed as being in accordance with Art. 43 of the Statute. As such, arguably, Union bodies, offices, and agencies could apply for interpretation under circumstances where they are a party to the proceedings, but would not be accorded the special position given to the Union institutions. 174 Statute, Art. 43. 175 See 5/55, ASSIDER v High Authority, 1954–1956 ECR 135, 142. 176 An application for interpretation can be introduced in order to interpret the Union Court’s determination regarding costs. See T-104/14 P-INTP, Commission v Verile and Others, 2017. 177 See 5/55, ASSIDER v High Authority, 1954– 1956 ECR 135, 142; T-284/08 INT, People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v Council, 2008, paras 8–12.

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826 CONCLUSION OF THE PROCEDURE in the judgment or order.178 The applicant must expressly identify that obscurity or ambiguity. 25.54

(ii) General requirements The application for interpretation must comply with the general requirements for procedural documents (see paras 24.11 et seq.) and with the specific requirements for applications (see paras 22.05 et seq.).179 It must also specify the decision in question and the passages of which interpretation is sought.180 The application must be made against all the parties to the case in which the decision in question was given.181

25.55

(iii) Time-limits An application for interpretation should be made within two years after the date of the delivery of the judgment or the service of the order.182

25.56

(d) Procedure and consequences (i) Procedure The Court of Justice or the General Court, as the case may be, gives its decision after having given the parties an opportunity to submit their observations (and after hearing the Advocate General in the case of the Court of Justice).183

25.57

(ii) Effect If the application for interpretation is successful, the original of the interpreting decision is annexed to the original of the decision interpreted, and a note of the interpreting decision is made in the margin of the decision interpreted.184 The interpreting decision is binding not only on all parties to the proceedings in which the interpreted decision was given, but also on parties to proceedings in which a judgment was given containing a passage ‘exactly similar’ to the passage interpreted.185

178 See T-22/91 INT, Raiola-Denti and Others v Council (order), 1993, paras 7–10. 179 CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 158(3) and 120–122; GC Rules of Procedure, Arts 168(3), 76, and 78. 180 CJ Rules of Procedure, Arts 158(3)(a) and (b); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 168(3)(a) and (b). 181 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 158(4); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 168(5). 182 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 158(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 168(2). 183 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 158(5); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 168(5). These provisions do not specify whether the Union Courts may do so by judgment or order. Of course, if the application for interpretation is manifestly inadmissible, the Union Courts may dismiss it by order (CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 53(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 126). The Union Courts decide by judgment when they proceed to a formal interpretation of judgments (see C-245/95 P-INT, NSK and Others v Council, 1999; T-104/14 P-INTP, Commission v Verile and Others, 2017) and by order when they proceed to a formal interpretation of orders (see T-347/14 INTP, Yanukovych v Council (order), 2017). 184 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 158(6); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 168(6). See T-347/14 INTP, Yanukovych v Council (order), 2017, operative part. 185 See 41/73, 43/73, and 44/73-Interpretation, Générale Sucrière and Others v Commission, 1977, para. 29 (‘This means that an interpreting judgment is binding not only on the applicants but also on any other party, insofar as that party is affected by the passage in the judgment which the Court is asked to interpret or by a passage exactly similar thereto’).

Exceptional Procedures Relating to Judgments and Orders 827 (5) Rectification (a) General Clerical mistakes, errors in calculation, and obvious inaccuracies in a judgment or an order may be rectified by the Court of Justice or the General Court by order setting out the rectified text.186 (b) Procedure The Court of Justice or the General Court, as the case may be, may take this step of its own motion or at the request of a party (including an intervener) made within two weeks after delivery of the judgment or service of the order.187 The parties are entitled to lodge prior written observations. This possibility is limited to rectifications of the operative part or of one of the grounds constituting the necessary support for the operative part.188 The Court of Justice takes its decision after hearing the Advocate General.189 The General Court shall give its decision by way of an order.190 (c) Effect The original of the rectification order is annexed to the original of the rectified decision, and a note of the order is made in the margin of the rectified decision.191 (6) Failure to adjudicate (a) General If the Court of Justice or the General Court has failed to adjudicate—that is to say, failed to give a decision on a specific head of claim or on costs192—that omission can be rectified on application by any party for the respective Union Court to supplement its decision.193 (b) Procedure The application must be lodged within one month after service of the decision in question.194 It is served on the opposite party and, as the case may be, the other parties, and the President prescribes a period within which those parties may lodge written observations.195 After that, the Union Court in question decides both on the admissibility and on the substance of the application (after hearing the Advocate General in the case of the Court of Justice).196

186 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 154; GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 164. 187 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 154(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 84(1). 188 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 154(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 164(3). 189 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 154(3). 190 GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 164(4). 191 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 154(4); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 164(5). 192 See C-201/21 P-OST, Foundation for the Protection of the Traditional Cheese of Cyprus named Halloumi v EUIPO (order), 2021, para. 12. 193 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 155(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 165(1). 194 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 155(1); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 165(2). 195 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 155(2); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 165(3). 196 CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 155(3); GC Rules of Procedure, Art. 165(4).

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25.59

25.60

25.61

25.62

Index

Aarhus Convention 4.28, 6.16 absolute bar to proceeding with a case 23.64 abuse of process 11.14, 24.39 access to (national) court see national procedures and remedies access to documents action for annulment standing 7.68, 7.139 production of document in the course of proceedings 23.49 acte clair 3.50, 3.51 acte éclairé 3.49 action devoid of purpose 23.62–23.63 costs 25.26 adjudicate, failure to 25.61–25.62 administrative meeting 2.13, 2.30 administrative practice (infringement action) 5.10 adversarial principle 24.50 Advocate General Court of Justice 2.05–2.07, 2.16, 2.17 General Court 2.25 no right to respond to Opinion 24.74 see also review procedure amicable settlement of the dispute 23.59 annulment, action for action for damages, and 11.15 admissibility based on type of act see admissibility based on type of act admissibility requirements relating to the person 7.83–7.85 acting on behalf of another party 7.85 legal personality 7.84 nationality 7.83 anti-dumping 7.132–7.136, 7.198 associations 7.133 importers 7.135 original equipment manufacturer 7.136 producers/exporters 7.133 standard of review 7.214–7.215 applicants natural and legal persons 7.82 privileged applicants 7.77 regional and local entities 7.78 semi-privileged applicants 7.80 Union bodies, offices, or agencies 7.79

arbitration clauses, and 15.11, 15.13 assessment of admissibility where different individual applicants 7.140 interest requirement 7.141 Committee of the Regions 7.80–7.81 Court of Auditors 7.80 declaration of nullity erga omnes effect 7.20 obligation to comply with the ruling 7.221 defendants 7.70–7.76 Union bodies, offices, or agencies 7.71–7.72, 7.74 Union institutions 7.70, 7.74, 7.75 dismissal of application 7.223 European Central Bank 7.80 European Parliament, Council, Commission and Member States 7.77 ex officio examination of the admissibility requirements 7.159 ex tunc effect 7.218 failure to act, relationship with action for 8.09–8.10 grounds for annulment see annulment, grounds for interest requirement 7.141–7.145 personal interest 7.143 vested and present interest 7.144 intervention 23.11 maintenance of effects 7.219 merger control 7.196 competitors 7.114 consumer associations 7.116 employees’ representatives 7.115 interest requirement 7.141 referral to national competition authorities 7.117 standard of review 7.205–7.209 objection of illegality 9.17 partial annulment 7.217 power of Union Courts limited to annulment 7.216 preliminary rulings on validity of Union acts, comparison with 10.14 privileged applicants 7.77 public procurement 7.138 regional and local entities 7.78

830 Index annulment, action for (cont.) reimbursement of fines 7.222 request for preliminary ruling 3.26–3.27 reviewable act see reviewable act semi-privileged applicants 7.80 staff cases 16.04 standard of review in competition cases 7.199–7.204 State aid 7.197 associations 7.127–7.130 decisions addressed to Member States 7.118 decisions taken on the basis of the preliminary stage of the procedure 7.119 decisions taken upon completion of the formal investigation procedure 7.120 general aid regimes 7.121–7.123 individual aid measures 7.124–7.125 interest requirement 7.141 regional and local entities 7.126 standard of review 7.210–7.213 trade unions 7.131 time-limits 7.146 burden of proof 7.147 excusable error 7.148 force majeure 7.148 knowledge 7.158 notification 7.155–7.157 publication 7.150–7.154 subsequent acts repealing earlier contested act 7.149 unforeseeable circumstances 7.148 annulment, grounds for competence, lack of 7.164–7.171 delegation of powers 7.168–7.171 substantive competence 7.165–7.166 territorial competence 7.167 infringement of essential procedural requirements 7.172 compliance with internal procedural rules 7.178–7.179 confidentiality 7.177 duty to consult 7.173–7.174 requirement to hear the addressee 7.175–7.176 statement of reasons 7.180–7.184 infringement of rights of defence 7.176 infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application 7.186–7.190 ‘infringement’ 7.189 margin of discretion 7.190 rule of law relating to the application of the Treaties 7.188 Treaties 7.187

misuse of powers 7.191–7.194 pleas raised by applicant 7.161 pleas raised by the Union Courts ex officio 7.162 publication and notification of contested act 7.185 time-frame 7.163 anonymity order for reference 22.04 anti-dumping action for annulment 7.61–7.63, 7.132–7.136, 7.198 associations 7.133 importers 7.135 original equipment manufacturer 7.136 producers/exporters 7.133 standard of review 7.214–7.215 intervention 23.09 preliminary rulings on validity 10.08, 10.11 appeals appellants 19.14 confined to points of law 19.02–19.11 appraisal of the evidence by the General Court 19.04 assessment of damages 19.10 Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to make findings of fact 19.03 distortion of facts or evidence 19.05 error with respect to the interpretation of national law 19.08 evidence on which parties were not heard at first instance 19.06 extent of the obligation to state reasons 19.09 General Court exercising unlimited jurisdiction to rule on pecuniary sanctions 19.11 legal categorization of facts 19.07 costs 19.13 cross-appeals 19.19, 23.63, 24.42 decisions of the General Court 19.12, 19.13 dismissal of appeal 19.30–19.32 effect on the cross-appeal 19.31 General Court, referral back to 19.35 injury suffered as result of bringing of appeal 19.26 inquiry, measures of 19.27, 24.52 interim measures 4.78, 13.11, 13.42 intervention 19.15, 23.13 languages 22.42 legal aid 22.81 pleas inoperative or ineffective pleas 19.24 no change in the subject-matter 19.23

Index 831 pleas of public policy 19.25 specific pleas 19.22 preliminary admission mechanism for appeals 2.49, 19.20 procedure 19.18, 22.31 lodging a response 24.41 reply and rejoinder 24.43 respondents 19.17 service 22.37 successful appeals 19.32–19.33, 19.36 suspensory effect, no 19.29 third-party proceedings, and 25.37 time-limits 19.28 arbitration clauses 15.01 acts of public authority separable from the contractual relationship 15.12 any party to the contract 15.14 applicable law 15.17–15.20 choice of the parties 15.17 contract laws 15.18 contractual provisions 15.20 ‘arbitration clause’, misleading expression 15.07 Common Foreign and Security Policy 15.03 contract concluded by or on behalf of Union 15.04 contractual liability versus annulment claims 15.11, 15.13 contractual versus non-contractual liability claims 15.10 judgment enforceability 15.22 jurisdiction allocation of jurisdiction between the Court of Justice and the General Court 15.06 extent of jurisdiction of the General Court 15.09 national courts 15.08 legal capacity of the parties 15.15 objectives 15.02 procedure before Union courts 15.21 Union institutions, bodies, offices, agencies or other entities 15.05 validity 15.16 arbitrators preliminary rulings, and 3.09 Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) 1.07, 6.06, 6.10, 21.01, 23.28 see also urgent preliminary ruling procedure associations assessment of damages (damages actions) 13.33 consumer associations 7.116 intervention 23.09

standing in annulment actions anti-dumping 7.133 general 7.106 merger control 7.116 state aid general 7.127–7.130 trade unions 7.131 staff cases 16.10 standing in national proceedings general 4.27 environmental matters 4.28 banking union action for annulment 7.64–7.66, 7.137 interest requirement 7.141 Benelux Court of Justice 3.11, 3.43 binding act see also reviewable act (action for annulment) action for failure to act 8.10 infringement action 5.05 preliminary ruling on validity 10.09 staff cases 16.04 binding effect of judgments preliminary rulings on interpretation 6.32, 6.35 preliminary rulings on validity 10.18 Boards of Appeal intellectual property 17.02, 17.09, 17.14 preliminary admission mechanism for appeals 2.49, 19.20 Brussels Convention 6.29, 21.02, 21.07 burden of proof 24.46–24.50 action for annulment time-limits 7.147 inadmissible means of proof 24.49 infringement actions 5.67–5.70 national proceedings 4.46, 4.60 certificate of lawyer 22.23 Chambers Court of Justice 2.11, 2.13 General Court 2.30–2.31 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 5.06, 6.07, 6.24, 10.04, 11.05, 11.45 Civil Service Tribunal see European Union Civil Service Tribunal Committee of the Regions 7.80–7.81 jurisdiction, allocation of 2.52 preliminary rulings on interpretation 6.14 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) annulment, action for 7.03 arbitration clauses 15.03 damages, action for 11.03

832 Index Common Foreign and Security Policy (cont.) illegality, objection of 9.06 infringement actions 5.05 international agreements 12.04 preliminary rulings on interpretation 6.05 preliminary rulings on validity 10.04 Community designs 17.01 see also intellectual property rights Community Plant Variety Office 2.40, 17.01, 22.26, 23.15 Community plant variety rights 2.40, 17.01 see also intellectual property rights compensation see damages, action for competence, lack of see annulment, grounds for composite administrative procedures 3.59 confidentiality 23.45 access to documents 23.49 appeals 23.51 international relations 23.50 interveners, and 23.47 joinder of cases 23.48 materials that are the outcome of a measure of inquiry 23.46 security of the Union or its Member States 23.50 confirmatory acts annulment, action for 7.19, 7.68 staff cases 16.15, 16.17 consumer law see consumer law, ex officio application of Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests 21.11 conventions between Member States 5.08, 21.01 Brussels Convention 21.02, 21.07 direct actions 21.09–21.11, 21.14 disputes between Commission and Member States 21.10 disputes between Member States 21.09 disputes between private applicants and the European Union 21.11 preliminary rulings on interpretation 21.06– 21.08, 21.13 Rome Convention 21.03, 21.07 costs appeals 19.13 direct actions 25.16–25.26 decision in the judgment or order 25.16 liability for payment 25.21–25.26 recoverable costs 25.17–25.20 intellectual property rights 17.08 interim measures 13.41

preliminary rulings 25.15 staff cases 16.28 Council annulment, action for 7.12, 7.20, 7.65, 7.70, 7.77 damages, action for 11.23, 11.24 failure to act, action for 8.02, 8.08, 8.11 jurisdiction 2.50, 2.51, 2.54 preliminary rulings on interpretation 6.11, 6.12 preliminary rulings on validity 10.04, 10.06 Court of Auditors action for annulment 7.70, 7.80 damages, action for 11.23 failure to act, action for 8.11 preliminary rulings on interpretation 6.12 Court of First Instance 2.36, 2.40, 2.41–2.45 see also General Court Court of Justice Advocates General 2.05–2.07, 2.16 Opinion 2.17 assignment of a case to a Chamber 2.13 basic functions 2.22–2.23 Chambers 2.11 collegiate decisions of the Court 2.15 composition of 2.05–2.10 deliberations 2.14 Grand Chamber 2.11 internal organization 2.11–2.21 Judge-Rapporteur 2.16 Judges 2.05–2.07 uneven number of 2.06 jurisdiction 2.41, 2.42, 2, 54 oaths 2.07 President 2.08, 2.18 quorum 2.12 Registrar 2.10, 2.20 staff 2.21 Vice-President 2.09, 2.19 Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 2.04 composition of 2.04 languages language service 22.52 publications 22.51 working language 22.50 see also Court of Justice; General Court; European Union Civil Service Tribunal cross-appeals 19.19, 19.31, 23.63 damages, action for annulment action, and 11.15 appeals 19.10

Index 833 applicants Member States 11.21 natural and legal persons 11.17–11.20 autonomous form of action 11.13 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 11.05 Common Foreign and Security Policy 11.03 defendants 11.04, 11.22 servants in the performance of their duties 11.26–11.28 Union bodies, offices, and agencies 11.24 Union institutions 11.23 Union liability concurrent with that of Member States 11.29–11.34 dismissal of action for damages 11.73 equitable damages 11.53 exclusive jurisdiction of CJEU 11.07 ex nunc effect 11.71 FIAMM case-law 11.10 improper use 11.14 interim measures 13.10 inter partes effect 11.73 intervention 23.10 judgments 11.71–11.73 limitation period continuous damage 11.64 expiry of must be raised by defendant 11.69 future damage 11.65 interruption of 11.70 legislative and individual acts 11.66 materialization of damage causes time to start running 11.63 objective criteria 11.67 period of five years 11.62 unawareness of event giving rise to damage 11.68 Member State breach of Union law 11.16 see also State liability non-contractual liability 11.06–11.11 premature claims 11.37 requirements 11.35 scope of Union law 11.25 staff disputes 11.09 substantive requirements see substantive requirements for liability symbolic damages 11.53 Union liability concurrent with that of Member States 11.29 loss resulting from unlawful joint action of the Union and a Member State 11.34 loss resulting from unlawfulness of the Union measure implemented 11.30–11.33 unjust enrichment 11.11

declaration of invalidity 10.18–10.20 declaration of nullity, comparison with 10.21 declaration of nullity declaration of invalidity, comparison with 10.21 erga omnes effect 7.20 obligation to comply with the ruling 7.221 declaratory nature of the interpretation preliminary rulings on interpretation 6.36 default and compensatory interest 11.56 default judgments 25.11–25.13 application to set aside 25.12–25.13 defence accompanying documents 24.34 content requirements 24.28–24.34 evidence produced or offered in support 24.33 form of order sought by the defendant 24.32 infringement of rights of defence 7.176 intellectual property rights disputes 24.27 lodging the defence 24.25–24.27 name and address of defendant 24.29 pleas in law and arguments relied on 24.30 signature and date 24.26 time-limits 24.25 deferment of the determination of a case 24.10 Deggendorf line of case-law 10.11 deliberations 2.07, 2.14, 22.50, 24.76 dies ad quem 22.70 dies a quo 22.66 direct actions application accompanying documents 22.22–22.27 address for service 22.08 certificate of the lawyer 22.23 content 22.06–22.21 designation of the party against whom the application is made 22.09–22.11 documents relating to legal persons 22.25 form of order sought 22.19–22.20 intellectual property rights 22.26 lodging 22.05 name and address of the applicant 22.07 pleas in law and arguments relied on 22.12, 22.13, 22.15–22.18 subject-matter of the proceedings 22.12– 22.14, 22.18 summary for publication 22.27 supporting evidence 22.21 consequences case becomes pending 22.28 publication of the application 22.29 regularization of the application 22.30

834 Index direct actions (cont.) conventions between Member States 21.09–21.11, 21.14 costs 25.16–25.26 decision in the judgment or order 25.16 liability for payment 25.21–25.26 recoverable costs 25.17–25.20 defence see defence expedited procedure 23.42–23.44, 24.04 languages 22.41 legal aid 22.76–22.80 reply and rejoinder 24.35–24.40 improper use of procedural documents 24.39 intellectual property rights 24.40 new pleas 24.38 representation 22.53 direct concern 7.92–7.98 contested act must directly affect the applicant’s legal situation 7.94 contested act must leave no discretion to addressees entrusted with implementation 7.95 regulatory acts 7.109 see also annulment, action for directives action for annulment 7.96 claims based on a directive not implemented in time 4.64 infringement actions failure to transpose a directive 5.15–5.16 transposition of directives 4.68 discontinuance amicable settlement of the dispute 23.59 costs 25.25 unilateral discontinuance 23.60 EAEC Treaty 1.07 annulment, action for 7.187 infringement actions 5.03 preliminary rulings on interpretation 6.03, 6.04 ECSC Treaty 1.07 infringement actions 5.03 preliminary rulings 3.20 EC Treaty 1.07 e-Curia application 22.08, 22.32, 22.38, 22.73, 24.12 EEA Agreement 3.12, 5.07, 5.42, 12.13, 22.23, 22.34, 22.35, 22.40, 24.22 EEA States 22.55 intervention 25.24 language 22.47 effective judicial protection 4.11

effectiveness principle 4.06, 4.08, 4.57 full effectiveness 4.12 practical effect 4.12 EFTA States 3.12 EFTA Supervisory Authority 24.22 intervention 25.24 EFTA Surveillance Authority 22.34, 22.35 agents 22.55 intervention 5.42, 23.04, 23.06, 23.19 language 22.40, 22.47 environmental law locus standi of non-governmental organizations 4.28 equitable damages 11.53 equivalence principle 4.06, 4.07, 4.57, 4.70 erga omnes effect annulment, action for 7.20, 7.90, 7.220 preliminary rulings on interpretation 6.35, 6.36, 6.37 preliminary rulings on validity 10.18, 10.21 Euro Group 11.25 European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products 22.10 European Anti–Fraud Office (OLAF) 7.15, 8.16, 11.24, 16.04 European Atomic Energy Community Treaty see EAEC Treaty European Central Bank (ECB) 3.59, 5.17, 7.137 action for annulment 7.64, 7.65, 7.66, 7.80 arbitration clauses 15.15 damages, action for 11.23, 11.25 failure to act, action for 8.02 infringement actions 5.33 jurisdiction 2.41, 2.50, 2.54 preliminary rulings on interpretation 6.12 preliminary rulings on validity 10.06 staff cases 16.01 European Coal and Steel Community see ECSC Treaty European Commission annulment, action for 7.77 failure to act, action for 8.02, 8.06, 8.08, 8.11 infringement actions see infringement actions margin of discretion 7.202 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) 3.54, 4.11 European Council annulment, action for 7.77 damages, action for 11.23 failure to act, action for 8.11 preliminary rulings on interpretation 6.12 preliminary rulings on validity 10.06

Index 835 European Court of Human Rights 2.15, 3.11, 3.54, 7.73, 8.16, 11.22 European Court Reports 2.20 European Economic and Social Committee 6.14 European Investment Bank 2.54, 5.33, 11.24 staff cases 16.01 European Ombudsman 7.68, 8.16, 11.24, 11.49, 11.53, 25.19 European Parliament annulment, action for 7.77 damages, action for 11.23 failure to act, action for 8.02, 8.08, 8.09, 8.11 jurisdiction 2.38, 2.50, 2.52 preliminary rulings on interpretation 6.12, 6.14 preliminary rulings on validity 10.06 European Schools 3.11, 7.73 European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 11.25 European Union Civil Service Tribunal 2.39 EU trade marks 17.01 see also intellectual property rights evidence see rules of evidence ex ante judicial control international agreements 12.02, 12.14 excusable error 7.148, 22.74 ex nunc effect 7.144, 11.71 ex officio examination of the admissibility requirements annulment, action for 7.159 ex officio, raising pleas of Union law 4.36–4.41 ex parte orders 13.22 expedited preliminary ruling procedure 23.25–23.27, 24.04 urgent procedure, relationship to 23.41 expedited procedure in direct actions 23.42– 23.44, 24.04 experts inquiry, measures of 24.59, 24.60, 24.61, 24.62 language of a case 22.45 ex tunc effect 6.38, 7.218, 10.22 failure to act, action for action for annulment, relationship with 8.09–8.10 act must be capable of having legal effects 8.08 applicants Member States and Union institutions 8.11 natural and legal persons 8.13 Union bodies, offices, and agencies 8.12 complaints relating to infringements of Art. 101 or Art. 102 TFEU 8.22

defendants Union bodies, offices, and agencies 8.16 Union institutions 8.15 definition of position 8.21, 8.22 identification of act to be taken 8.07 interim measures 13.09 letter of formal notice 8.18, 8.20 obligation to act 8.06 omission to take decision 8.05 pre-litigation procedure 8.17–8.22 procedure before Union Courts letter of formal notice delimits action 8.24 pleas in law 8.25 time-limits 8.23 failure to adjudicate 25.61–25.62 fair trial see right to a fair trial fines breaking of seals 7.29 infringement of Art. 101 and/or Art. 102 TFEU 7.37 reimbursement of fines 7.222 see also sanctions force majeure 5.74, 7.148, 22.74 fumus boni juris 13.28, 13.30, 13.31 fumus non mali juris 13.31 garnishee orders applicants 14.03, 14.07 competent court 14.02 defendants 14.04 immunity, automatic 14.05 limited jurisdiction 14.06 GATT 10.08 General Court Advocates General 2.25 appeals see appeals assigning cases to a Chamber 2.31 Chambers 2.30 intellectual property rights see intellectual property rights internal organization 2.30–2.35 Judges 2.24, 2.26 jurisdiction 2.54 Nice Treaty and subsequent institutional developments 2.37 oaths 2.26 President 2.27, 2.34 procedure 2.33 quorum 2.32 referring a case back to 25.14 Registrar 2.29, 2.34 staff 2.35 Vice-President 2.28, 2.34 see also Court of First Instance

836 Index Grand Chamber Court of Justice 2.11 General Court 2.30 illegality, objection of act of general application 9.05, 9.09 acts of individual application, exclusion of 9.08 admissibility 9.15–9.16 ‘any party’ 9.10 Member States and Union institutions 9.12 natural and legal persons 9.11 CFSP acts 9.06 inter partes effects 9.20 linkage between the type of act and the status of the invoking party 9.07 not an independent right of action 9.01 immunity Court of Justice 2.07 garnishee orders, and 14.05 representation 22.59 implementing measures 7.82, 7.87, 7.90, 7.92, 7.96, 8.13 inadmissibility, preliminary objection of 23.55–23.58 in camera 5.29, 24.58 individual concern (action for annulment) act of general application 7.101, 7.102 act of individual application 7.100 definition 7.99 Les Verts judgment 7.104 regional and local entities 7.105 trade associations 7.106 see also annulment, action for infringement actions applicants 5.32–5.37 Commission 5.32 European Central Bank 5.33 European Investment Bank 5.33 failure of the Commission to bring an infringement action 5.37 individuals 5.35 Member State 5.34 rejection of a complaint 5.36 burden of proof 5.67–5.70 concordance between the letter of formal notice, the reasoned opinion, and the application 5.56–5.61 conditions of admissibility 5.55–5.66 defendants 5.38–5.41 legislative, executive, and judicial authorities 5.40 Member State 5.38–5.39

private companies controlled by public authorities 5.41 direct review of Member State conduct against Union law 5.04 duty of Member State to take necessary measures 5.76 enforcement of the Court’s judgment imposing pecuniary sanctions 5.88 existence of a failure to fulfil obligations 5.62–5.64 failure to comply with a judgment 5.89 ‘failure to fulfil’ act or failure to act 5.14 acts affecting the jurisdiction of the CJEU 5.20 administrative practice 5.10 failure to eliminate unlawful consequences of a breach of Union law 5.17 failure to transpose a directive 5.15–5.16 general and persistent infringements 5.11 international agreements 5.13 judicial decisions 5.12 legal provision no longer applied 5.18 national rules violating treaties but complying with secondary law 5.21 non-binding acts 5.19 interim measures 13.08 intervening parties 5.42 judgment may constitute basis for State liability 5.79 jurisdiction 2.48, 2.53 legal force of judgment declaring Member State has failed to fulfil obligations 5.76–5.80 letter of formal notice 5.45–5.48 completeness 5.46 content and purpose 5.45 essential procedural requirement 5.47 time for lodging observations 5.48 obligation under the Treaties all rules of Union law 5.05 conventions between Member States 5.08 general principles of Union law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 5.06 mixed agreements 5.07 period within which the judgment must be complied with 5.80 preliminary rulings enforcement of the duty to request 3.52 pre-litigation stage 5.44–5.54, 5.55 reasoned opinion 5.49–5.54 coherent and detailed statement 5.51 collegiate responsibility 5.50

Index 837 content and purpose 5.49 measures to be taken 5.53 prescribed period 5.54 relationship with the letter of formal notice 5.52 sanctions for failure to comply with judgment 5.81–5.85 lump sum and/or penalty payment 5.83 retroactive pecuniary sanctions 5.85 special legal procedures 5.22 misuse of derogating provisions concerning the internal market and national security measures 5.29 public procurement contracts 5.30–5.31 public undertakings 5.27–5.28 State aid 5.23–5.26 substantive defence of the Member State compliance with secondary Union law 5.73 illegality of the Union act 5.72 objective nature of the action 5.71 pleas refuting the breach in an objective manner 5.74 temporal effects, limiting 5.77 transposition of legislative directives 5.86–5.87 infringement of essential procedural requirements see annulment, grounds for infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application see annulment, grounds for inquiry, measures of 19.27, 23.46, 24.46–24.48, 24.55 experts 24.59 inspections of place or thing in question 24.63 personal appearance of the parties 24.56 preliminary ruling proceedings 24.51 requests for information and production of documents 24.57 witnesses 24.58 intellectual property rights appeals 17.23 applicants 17.11 Boards of Appeal 17.02 Cancellation Divisions 17.02 Community plant variety rights 17.01 content of the application 17.20 defendants Offices 17.09, 17.10, 24.27 transfer of ownership 17.11 General Court annul or alter the contested decision 17.04

costs 17.08 legality control 17.03 limits to jurisdiction 17.05–17.08 no declaratory or confirmatory judgments 17.07 no power to issue injunctions 17.06 intervention 23.15 new evidence 17.17 objection of illegality 17.18 Opposition Divisions 17.02 languages 22.43 reply and rejoinder 24.40 review of the contested decision 17.13 subject-matter of the proceedings 17.15–17.16 time-limits 17.19 interest annulment, action for 7.141–7.145 personal interest 7.143 vested and present interest 7.144 interim measures 13.17 staff cases 16.07 interim measures before Union Courts, proceedings for admissibility admissibility of the application in the main proceedings 13.23 sufficiency of separate application 13.26–13.27 time-limits 13.24–13.25 ancillary nature of proceedings 13.05–13.11 appeals 13.11, 13.42 applicants 13.15–13.17 competent Judge 13.21 compliance 13.40 costs 13.41 damages, action for 13.10 defendants opponent in the main proceedings 13.18 third parties 13.19 Union bodies, offices, and agencies 13.20 failure to act, action for 13.09 infringement actions 13.08 provisional nature of interim measures 13.12 may not prejudge the decision to be given in the main proceedings 13.14 valid only for a limited period of time 13.13 substantive requirements 13.28–13.38 balance of interests 13.38 damage must affect the applicant personally 13.37 imminence of the damage alleged 13.36 overall assessment 13.29 prima facie case 13.30–13.31

838 Index interim measures before Union Courts, proceedings for (cont.) reasonable diligence 13.35 serious and irreparable damage 13.32–13.34 urgency 13.32–13.37 summary procedure 13.22 suspension of operation of contested act 13.02 types of measure 13.02–13.04 interim relief in national courts 4.19, 4.75–4.79 allegedly illegal national measure 4.76 allegedly illegal Union act 4.77 preliminary rulings 4.79 international agreements preliminary rulings on interpretation 3.11, 6.15–6.18 acts of bodies established by international agreements 6.17 preliminary rulings on validity 10.05, 10.07, 10.08 see also opinions on the compatibility of international agreements with Union law international law 5.71, 7.167, 7.188, 10.05, 10.08, 12.06, 12.12, 15.17, 21.04 inter partes effects 6.36, 9.20, 10.21, 11.73 interpretation judgments and orders 25.50–25.57 intervention annulment, action for 23.11 appeals 19.15, 23.13 application to intervene served on the parties 23.18 arguments and procedural rights 23.03 associations 23.09 confidentiality 23.47 costs 25.24 damages, action for 23.10 decision on application to intervene 23.19 entitlement to intervene 23.04 infringement actions 5.42 intellectual property rights 23.15 interim measures 13.16 interim proceedings 23.12 language 23.17 non-Member States 23.06 non-privileged interveners 23.08 objective 23.01 pleas 23.02–23.03 preliminary ruling proceedings 23.23 privileged interveners 23.05 procedural documents, complying with the general requirements applicable to 23.16

reply to statement in intervention 23.21 staff cases 16.10, 16.30 statement in intervention 23.20 time-limits 23.14, 23.22 Union bodies, offices and agencies 23.07 invalidity, declaration of see declaration of invalidity joinder of cases 23.48, 24.05–24.07 Judge-Rapporteur 2.16 judgments and orders 25.01 binding nature 25.09 content 25.04 default judgments 25.11–25.13 application to set aside 25.12–25.13 delivery and service of judgments 25.06 enforceability 25.10 interpretation of 25.50–25.57 language 25.05 publication 25.08 reasoned orders 25.02 rectification 25.58–25.60 revision 25.41–25.49 signature and service of orders 25.07 special agreements 15.33 third-party proceedings against a judgment or order 25.32–25.40 timing 25.03 judicial panels 2.38, 2.39, 2.42, 2.43 judicial protection 1.01 challenges underlying system of 1.06 gaps in the former Treaty framework 1.07 limitations of present Treaty framework 1.08 coherent system of 1.02 complete system of 1.02 effective judicial protection 4.11 illegality, objection of 9.04 national courts, role of 1.04 rule of law 1.03 two-fold task of the Union Courts 1.05 judicial vacations 22.68 jurisdiction, allocation of Committee of the Regions 2.52 Court of First Instance 2.40, 2.43 Court of Justice 2.41, 2.42, 2.54 direct actions 2.44 exceptions 2.51 formal mistake 2.55 General Court 2.54 historical evolution 2.40–2.49 identical cases pending before different courts 2.56 infringement actions 2.48, 2.53 Lisbon Treaty 2.46

Index 839 Nice Treaty 2.42–2.43 preliminary admission mechanism for appeals 2.49 preliminary references 2.53 staff cases 2.45, 2.47 substantive mistake 2.55 languages appeals 22.42 case, language of determination of the language 22.40–22.43 intervening States 22.47 Members of the Union Courts 22.46 Registrar responsibilities 22.48 official languages of the European Union 22.39 use of the language of a case 22.44 witnesses and experts 22.45 Court of Justice of the European Union language service 22.52 publications 22.51 working language 22.50 direct actions 22.41 intellectual property rights 22.43 intervention 23.17 judgments and orders 25.05 preliminary rulings 22.40 review procedure 22.42 legal aid appeals 22.81 direct actions 22.76–22.80 preliminary ruling proceedings 22.75 legal fees, disputes over 25.20 legal personality 7.84 legal persons see natural and legal persons legal professional privilege (LPP) 7.33 Les Verts judgment 7.104 letter of formal notice 5.45–5.48 see also infringement actions limitation periods damages, action for see damages, action for national law 4.29 procedural time-limits and limitation periods, distinction between 22.63 recovery of unlawful charges 4.55–4.58 lis pendens 7.159, 15.08, 23.57 locus standi 4.28, 7.91 lump sum and/or penalty payment infringement actions 5.83 Member States damages, action for 11.21, 11.29–11.34 disputes between Member States see special agreements

failure to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties see infringement actions illegality, objection of 9.12 see also national procedures and remedies; preliminary rulings; State aid merger control action for annulment 7.196 admissibility 7.89 competitors 7.114 consumer associations 7.116 employees’ representatives 7.115 interest requirement 7.141 referral to national competition authorities 7.117 standard of review 7.205–7.209 reviewable act (action for annulment) 7.41–7.47 ancillary restrictions 7.44 commitments 7.47 dominant position 7.45 final decisions on notification 7.42 initiation of procedure 7.43 referral to national authorities 7.46 misuse of powers see annulment, grounds for mixed agreements 5.07, 6.16 national competition authorities 3.08, 7.117 national courts 2.01 requirements of 2.03 role of 1.04, 2.02 rule of law 2.03 see also preliminary rulings national procedures and remedies access to court 4.23–4.30 alternative dispute resolution 4.25 costs and legal aid 4.30 jurisdiction and competence 4.26 prior exhaustion of administrative remedies 4.24 standing and interest 4.27–4.28 time-limits and limitation periods 4.29 claims based on a directive not implemented in time 4.64 constraints upon the freedom of the Member States to provide remedies 4.16 damages actions against a Member State for breach of Union law 4.18, 4.65–4.71 amount of damages 4.71 conditions 4.66 decisions of national courts adjudicating at last instance 4.69 equivalence and effectiveness 4.70 margin of discretion 4.67

840 Index national procedures and remedies (cont.) State liability 4.65 transposition of directives 4.68 damages actions against private parties for breach of Union law 4.72–4.74 effective judicial protection 4.11 effectiveness principle 4.06, 4.08 equivalence principle 4.06, 4.07 ‘full effectiveness’ 4.12 importance of national procedural rules and remedies 4.02 interim relief 4.19, 4.75–4.79 allegedly illegal national measure 4.76 allegedly illegal Union act 4.77 national procedural autonomy 4.03 obligation to provide effective remedies 4.15–4.21 powers of national courts intensity of review 4.42 raising pleas of Union law ex officio 4.36–4.41 consumer law 4.41 ‘practical effect’ 4.12 reasonable time, proceedings concluded within 4.48 recovery of unlawful charges 4.54–4.62 charge passed on to third parties 4.59–4.60 diversity of national systems 4.54 effectiveness 4.57 equivalence 4.56 interest 4.62 limitation periods 4.55–4.58 payment made under protest 4.61 recovery of unlawful State aid 4.63 res judicata 4.50 right to a fair trial 4.32 equality of the parties 4.35 independent and impartial court 4.34 right to be heard 4.33 rule of law 4.10 rules of evidence 4.43–4.47 burden of proof 4.46 means of proof 4.45 measures of inquiry 4.44 unlawful evidence 4.47 sincere cooperation principle 4.05, 4.09 withdrawal of a decision that has become final 4.51–4.52 natural and legal persons annulment, action for 7.82 damages, action for 11.17–11.20 failure to act, action for 8.13 illegality, objection of 9.11

oaths Court of Justice 2.07 General Court 2.26 objection of illegality see illegality, objection of official holidays 22.65, 22.68, 22.70 operative part 23.08, 24.73, 25.04, 25.08, 25.35, 25.45 opinions on the compatibility of international agreements with Union law adverse opinion 12.19 ‘agreement envisaged’ 12.06–12.08 applicants 12.09 Common Foreign and Security Policy 12.04 declaratory opinion 12.21 EAEC Treaty, comparable provisions of 12.05 ex ante judicial control 12.02, 12.14 favourable opinion 12.20 jurisdiction, extent of 12.11–12.13 non-contentious nature of procedure 12.17 no obligation 12.10 no suspensory effect of request 12.16 opinion 12.18 relationship with other procedures in the Treaties 12.03 subject-matter of envisaged agreement must be known 12.15 oral part of procedure 24.01 absence during initial hearing 24.77 cases in which no hearing is held 24.67 closure 24.73 course of the oral procedure 24.69–24.74 no right to respond to Advocate-General’s Opinion 24.74 optional character of hearing 24.65 oral arguments 24.71 participation 24.68 questions 24.72 reasoned request 24.66 reopening 24.75–24.77 report for hearing 24.70 timing 24.64 order for reference see preliminary rulings orders see judgments and orders organization of procedure, measures of 24.46– 24.48, 24.53–24.54 own motion annulment, action for 7.141, 7.146, 7.159, 7.162, 7.184, 7.202 appeals 19.14, 19.25 damages, action for 11.69 illegality, objection of 9.14 infringement, action for 5.32, 5.47 intellectual property 17.12, 17.15

Index 841 interim measures 13.13 national courts see national procedures and remedies preliminary rulings 3.04, 3.06, 3.09, 3.16, 3.20, 3.40 preliminary rulings on validity 10.11, 10.15 sanctions 18.02, 18.03 staff cases 16.13, 16.26 partial annulment 7.217 pecuniary loss 11.30–11.34 penalty payment 5.81, 5.83 perjury 24.58, 24.59 personal appearance of parties 24.56 points of law, appeals on see appeals Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM) 1.07 annulment, action for 7.03, 7.71 conventions concluded by Member States 21.01 damages, action for 11.03 preliminary rulings on interpretation 6.06 praeter legem preliminary rulings 3.56–3.58 preliminary admission mechanism for appeals 2.49, 19.20 preliminary issues 23.52 preliminary objection of inadmissibility 23.55–23.58 procedure 23.54 separate document 23.53 preliminary report 24.44, 24.45 preliminary rulings administrative bodies 3.07 annulment of request 3.26–3.27 appeal brought against order for reference 3.27 arbitrators 3.09 Benelux Court of Justice 3.11, 3.43 composite administrative procedures 3.59 content of a request Court of Justice may reformulate questions 3.20 factual and legal context 3.22 inadmissibility of a reference 3.23 national court to determine the content 3.19 requirements for an order for reference 3.21 costs 25.15 Court of Justice: sole power to declare Union act invalid 3.03 ‘court or tribunal of a Member State’ 3.05–3.12

determination of relevance of request 3.28–3.38 dispute must be pending before national court 3.13 duty to request 3.39–3.58 enforcement of the duty to request damages 3.53 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 3.54 infringement actions 3.52 national law remedies 3.55 existence of a judicial remedy 3.44 expedited procedure 23.25–23.27, 24.04 Foto-Frost case 3.03 general overview 3.01 highest courts 3.40 illegality, objection of 9.18 independence requirement 3.06 initiative for requesting 3.05–3.27 inquiry, measures of 24.51 interim proceedings 3.42 international courts 3.11 interpretation of 25.29 intervention 23.23 jurisdictional issues 3.15 languages 22.40 legal aid 22.75 limits placed on the duty to request a preliminary ruling 3.46–3.51 acte clair 3.50, 3.51 answer can be clearly deduced from the case-law 3.49 identical or similar questions 3.48 irrelevant questions 3.46 limits set by Union law connection between the dispute and Union law 3.34 general or hypothetical questions 3.33 legislation of another Member State 3.35 presumption of relevance 3.31 reference bears no relation to dispute 3.32 spurious disputes 3.36–3.38 lower court, no remedy available against decision of 3.41 national competition authorities 3.08 national court responsibility for assessing relevance 3.28 no appeal against a preliminary ruling 25.28 order for reference anonymity 22.04 content 22.02 length 22.03 made by a national court 22.01 service 22.33–22.35

842 Index preliminary rulings (cont.) power to request a preliminary ruling binding rulings of higher courts 3.18 initiative with the national court 3.16 interplay with national procedural mechanisms requiring references to the national constitutional court 3.17 presumption of relevance 3.31 praeter legem preliminary rulings 3.56–3.58 rectification 25.31 relevance of questions must appear from order for reference 3.30 representation 22.53 revision of 25.30 rules 3.04 rulings must contribute to resolution of dispute 3.29 third countries’ courts 3.12 timing of a request discretion of the national court 3.24 limits of discretion 3.25 types of proceedings in which a preliminary ruling may be requested 3.14 Unified Patent Court 3.11 urgent procedure 23.28–23.41 application 23.32–23.34 initiative 23.30–23.31 procedure 23.35–23.40 relationship to expedited procedure 23.41 scope 23.29 Vaassen criteria 3.05 wholly exceptional judicial remedies 3.45 withdrawing a reference for a preliminary ruling 23.61 preliminary rulings on interpretation acts of committees established under Union law 6.14 acts of Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies 6.10–6.12 binding effect of judgments 6.32, 6.35 compatibility of national rules with Union law 6.23 conventions between Member States 21.06– 21.08, 21.13 declaratory nature of the interpretation 6.36 distinction between interpretation and application 6.19 ex tunc effect 6.38 facts and points of national law 6.22 further references 6.33 general principles of Union law 6.09 international agreements 6.15–6.18 acts of bodies established by international agreements 6.17

issues raised must fall within scope of Union law 6.24–6.29 judgments of Court of Justice of European Union 6.13 jurisdiction of the national court 6.31 limits placed on the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice 6.21–6.29 national law prohibiting reverse discrimination 6.28 national law refers to Union law 6.29 potential effect of national rule on cross- border activities 6.26 reference back to national court 6.30 reference made in the context of annulment proceedings 6.27 reformulation of questions 6.21, 6.23 sanctions for non-compliance 6.34 scope of 6.03 temporal effects 6.38–6.39 Treaties 6.04–6.08 uniformity in the application of Union law 6.37 written observations 24.22–24.24 preliminary rulings on validity of Union acts action for annulment, comparison with 10.14 acts excluded from review 10.03 acts of bodies established by international agreements 10.07 acts of general application 10.10 acts of individual application 10.11 acts of Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies 10.06 binding and non-binding acts 10.09 Common Foreign and Security Policy, acts in relation to 10.04 Court of Justice of the European Union exclusive jurisdiction 10.13 declaration of invalidity 10.18, 10.19, 10.20 declaration of nullity, comparison with 10.21 Deggendorf line of case-law 10.11 erga omnes effect 10.18 ex tunc effect 10.22 failure to act 10.12 findings of fact necessary to assess the legality of the contested act 10.17 grounds on which validity may be contested 10.15 international agreements 10.05 review of Union acts in light of international agreements 10.08 temporal effects 10.22–10.23 pre-litigation procedure failure to act 8.17–8.22 infringement actions 5.44–5.54, 5.55 staff cases see staff cases

Index 843 President Court of Justice 2.08, 2.18 General Court 2.27, 2.34 primacy of Union law 2.02, 4.12, 15.08 prima facie case 13.30–13.31 priority of cases 24.03 privileged applicants 7.17, 7.77, 9.07, 9.12 privileged interveners 23.05 Privileges and Immunities Protocol 11.27, 11.28, 11.45 Protocols see conventions between Member States publication annulment, action for 7.146, 7.150–7.154 judgments and orders 25.08 public policy 4.34, 4.38, 4.39, 7.146, 7.159, 16.26, 19.25 public procurement 5.30–5.31, 7.67, 7.138 public undertakings 5.27–5.28 questions preliminary rulings general or hypothetical questions 3.33 identical or similar questions 3.48 irrelevant questions 3.46 reformulation of questions 6.21, 6.23 relevance of questions must appear from order for reference 3.30 quorum Court of Justice 2.12 General Court 2.32 reasoned opinion 5.49–5.54 coherent and detailed statement 5.51 collegiate responsibility 5.50 concordance between the letter of formal notice, the reasoned opinion, and the application 5.56–5.61 content and purpose 5.49 measures to be taken 5.53 prescribed period 5.54 relationship with the letter of formal notice 5.52 see also infringement actions reasoned orders 24.02, 25.02 recovery injunctions 7.54 recovery of unlawful charges see unlawful charges, recovery of recovery of unlawful State aid 4.63 rectification judgments and orders 25.58–25.60 reformatio in pejus, prohibition of 4.40 Registrar Court of Justice 2.10, 2.20 General Court 2.29, 2.34

regulatory acts admissibility concept of ‘regulatory act’ 7.108 direct concern 7.109 no implementing measures 7.107–7.111 reimbursement of fines 7.222 reply and rejoinder appeals 24.43 direct actions 24.35–24.40 intellectual property rights 24.40 new pleas 24.38 representation agents 22.55 authority to act 22.57 direct actions and preliminary ruling proceedings, distinction between 22.53 exclusion from proceedings 22.62 immunity 22.59 intermediaries 22.54 lawyers 22.56 privileges and facilities 22.60 qualification and waiver 22.61 regularization 22.58 rights and obligations 22.59–22.62 university teachers 22.56 res judicata 4.12, 4.50, 25.32 action for annulment 7.223 damages, action for 11.73 illegality, objection of 9.16 infringement actions 5.76, 5.82 judgments and orders 25.10, 25.42 oral part of procedure 24.76 preliminary rulings 3.27 retroactive pecuniary sanctions 5.85 reviewable act (action for annulment) 7.05 access to documents 7.68 anti-dumping 7.61–7.63 banking union 7.64–7.66 binding act requirement 7.11–7.12 Commission’s disclosure of documents to third parties 7.34 Commission’s refusal to give access to its file to parties under investigation 7.32 Commission’s rejection of request for protection under legal professional privilege 7.33 commitments 7.36 confirmatory acts 7.19 contested act, requirement for act replacing a withdrawn act 7.09 act which is no longer in force 7.08 existing act 7.06 identification of the act 7.07 non-existent act 7.10

844 Index reviewable act (cont.) enforcement of Arts 101 and 102 TFEU 7.26–7.40 fines breaking of seals 7.29 infringement of Art. 101 and/or Art. 102 TFEU 7.37 inspections 7.28 interim measures 7.35 internal instructions and guidelines 7.21–7.22 legal effects 7.17–7.18 merger control 7.41–7.47 ancillary restrictions 7.44 commitments 7.47 dominant position 7.45 final decisions on notification 7.42 initiation of procedure 7.43 referral to national authorities 7.46 regulatory framework 7.41 notice pursuant to Art. 27(4) of Regulation No. 1/2003 7.31 preparatory acts and acts laying down a definitive position 7.23–7.25 privileged and non-privileged applicants 7.17 public procurement 7.67 resolutions 7.20 State aid 7.48–7.60 correspondence with complainants 7.58 decisions pursuant to a complaint 7.57 existing aid 7.49 final decisions 7.51 ‘information injunction’ 7.55 initiation of procedure 7.53 new aid 7.50 refusal to take appropriate measures 7.59 regulatory framework 7.48 right to file a complaint 7.56 suspension and recovery injunctions 7.54 undertakings by Member State 7.52 statement of objections 7.30 substance over form 7.13–7.16 review procedure 20.01 decision whether to review 20.06 effects of review 20.09 initiation of the review 20.04 judgment on substance of case 20.07 languages 22.42 reviewing Chamber 20.05 serious risk of the unity or consistency of Union law being affected 20.02–20.03 suspensory effect 20.08 revision judgments and orders 25.41–25.49

right to a fair trial (national courts) 4.32 equality of the parties 4.35 independent and impartial court 4.34 right to be heard 4.33 right to be heard 7.116, 7.175–7.176, 19.04 right to effective legal protection 7.111, 10.07 Rome Convention 21.03, 21.07 rule of law 1.03, 4.10, 9.19 annulment, action for 7.186–7.190 damages, action for 11.08, 11.43, 11.46 national courts 2.03 rules of evidence (national courts) 4.43–4.47 burden of proof 4.46 means of proof 4.45 measures of inquiry 4.44 unlawful evidence 4.47 Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice (CJ Rules of Procedure) 1.10 Rules of Procedure of the General Court (GC Rules of Procedure) 1.10 sanctions appeals 18.08 criteria 18.07 extent of unlimited jurisdiction 18.03 fines, reduction or increase of 18.04, 18.09 legal basis 18.01 objective 18.02 reasonableness 18.06 review of the sanction 18.05 unlimited jurisdiction of Union Courts 18.01 semi-privileged applicants 7.80 service appeal 22.37 application 22.36 delivery and service of judgments 25.06 e-Curia application 22.32, 22.38 intervention application to intervene served on the parties 23.18 order for reference 22.33–22.35 procedural documents 22.32 signature and service of orders 25.07 sincere cooperation 4.05, 4.09, 4.51, 5.17, 5.70, 15.32 single resolution mechanism (SRM) 7.64, 7.65, 7.137 single supervisory mechanism (SSM) 7.64, 7.66, 7.137 special agreements between Member States (Art. 273 TFEU) common institutions 15.27 departing Member States 15.29 disputes between Member States 15.23

Index 845 disputes related to the subject-matter of the Treaties 15.25 existence of a dispute 15.24 judgments 15.33 jurisdiction 15.30 Member States 15.26 nature of the relief 15.31 obligation to make use of Art. 273 TFEU 15.32 third States 15.28 specialized courts 2.38 spurious disputes see preliminary rulings staff cases ‘act having adverse effect’ 16.03–16.06 action before the General Court 16.24–16.27 intensity of judicial scrutiny 16.27 parallelism between the complaint and the application 16.26 time-limits 16.25 actions within the scope of Art. 270 TFEU 16.28 appeals 16.30 applicants any member of staff 16.08 staff associations 16.10 staff of Union bodies, offices, and agencies 16.09 trade unions 16.10 binding acts 16.04 costs 16.28 decisions of the General Court 16.29 defendants Union bodies, offices, or agencies 16.12 Union institutions 16.11 interest requirement 16.07 interim measures 13.25 jurisdiction 2.45, 2.47, 16.02 ‘measures of a general nature’ 16.05 pre-litigation procedure 16.13 complaints 16.15 content of a complaint 16.22 content of decision rejecting complaint 16.23 excusable errors 16.19 formal requirements 16.21 requests 16.14 substantive requirements 16.22–16.23 time-limits 16.16–16.20 preparatory measures 16.06 Staff Regulations 16.01, 16.02 State aid action for annulment 7.197 associations 7.127–7.130

decisions addressed to Member States 7.118 decisions taken on the basis of the preliminary stage of the procedure 7.119 decisions taken upon completion of the formal investigation procedure 7.120 general aid regimes 7.121–7.123 individual aid measures 7.124–7.125 interest requirement 7.141 regional and local entities 7.126 standard of review 7.210–7.213 trade unions 7.131 infringement actions 5.23–5.26 violation of the obligation to notify aid 5.25 recovery of unlawful State aid 4.63 reviewable act (action for annulment) 7.48–7.60 correspondence with complainants 7.58 decisions pursuant to a complaint 7.57 existing aid 7.49 final decisions 7.51 ‘information injunction’ 7.55 initiation of procedure 7.53 new aid 7.50 refusal to take appropriate measures 7.59 right to file a complaint 7.56 suspension and recovery injunctions 7.54 undertakings by Member State 7.52 State liability 4.65 amount of damages 4.71 conditions 4.66 decisions of national courts adjudicating at last instance 4.69 equivalence and effectiveness 4.70 infringement action, connection with 5.79 margin of discretion 4.67 transposition of directives 4.68 statement in intervention 23.20 reply to 23.21 statement of objections 7.30 statement of reasons 7.180–7.184 Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Statute) 1.10 stay of proceedings 24.08–24.09 subsidiarity 2.52, 7.81 substantive competence 7.165–7.166 substantive mistake 2.55 substantive requirements for liability (action for damages) 11.38 compensation in kind 11.55 default and compensatory interest 11.56 direct causal link 11.59–11.61

846 Index substantive requirements for liability (cont.) damage must be attributable to a Union institution, body, office, or agency 11.60 reasonable diligence of the applicant 11.61 existence and extent of damage 11.50–11.54 damage must be actual and certain 11.51 future damage 11.54 material damage 11.52 non-material damage 11.53 proof of damage burden of proof 11.57 quantum, determination of 11.58 sufficiently serious breach of a rule of Union law 11.40, 11.47–11.49 consideration of the factors 11.49 discretion of the Union institution, body, office, or agency 11.48 unlawful act or conduct 11.39 framework for assessment 11.40–11.41 rule of Union law infringed must be intended to confer rights on individuals 11.42–11.46 suspension injunctions 7.54 symbolic damages 11.53 third countries’ courts 3.12 third parties Commission’s disclosure of documents to 7.34 interim measures 13.19 proceedings against a judgment or order 25.32–25.40 recovery of unlawful charges charge passed on to third parties 4.59–4.60 time-limits appeals 19.28 calculation 22.65 Court always open 22.71 dies ad quem 22.70 dies a quo 22.66 duration of period 22.68 excusable error, unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure 22.74 extension of ten days on account of distance 22.69 intellectual property rights 17.19 interim measures 13.24–13.25 intervention 23.14, 23.22 lodgment at Registry 22.72 lodgment by telefax, e-Curia or other communications technology 22.73 preliminary objection 22.64

procedural time-limits and limitation periods, distinction between 22.63 publication, starting point in case of 22.67 staff cases 16.16–16.20 see also limitation periods time-limits (action for annulment) 7.146 burden of proof 7.147 excusable error 7.148 force majeure 7.148 knowledge 7.158 notification 7.155–7.157 publication 7.150–7.154 subsequent acts repealing earlier contested act 7.149 unforeseeable circumstances 7.148 trade marks see intellectual property rights trade unions individual concern 7.131 staff cases 16.10 ultra petita 18.09, 22.19 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 10.08 unforeseeable circumstances 7.148, 22.74 Unified Patent Court 3.11 unilateral discontinuance 23.60 United Kingdom withdrawal from EU infringement actions, and 5.43 university teachers 22.56 unjust enrichment 4.59, 4.60, 11.11 unlawful charges, recovery of 4.54–4.62 charge passed on to third parties 4.59–4.60 diversity of national systems 4.54 effectiveness 4.57 equivalence 4.56 interest 4.62 limitation periods 4.55–4.58 payment made under protest 4.61 unlawful evidence 4.47 unlimited jurisdiction 7.204, 16.02 see also sanctions urgent preliminary ruling procedure 23.28–23.41 application 23.32–23.34 initiative 23.30–23.31 relationship to expedited procedure 23.41 scope 23.29 Vaassen criteria 3.05 vacations, judicial 22.68 validity of Union acts see preliminary rulings on validity of Union acts

Index 847 Vice-President Court of Justice 2.09, 2.19 General Court 2.28, 2.34 wholly exceptional judicial remedies 3.45 withdrawal of a decision that has become final 4.51–4.52 withdrawal of a reference for a preliminary ruling 23.61 witnesses inquiry, measures of 24.58, 24.60, 24.61, 24.62 language of a case 22.45 written part of procedure 24.01 lodging of procedural documents 24.11

annexes and schedules 24.14 copies 24.14 date of lodgement 24.15 e-Curia 24.12 length of procedural documents 24.16 signatures 24.13 translations 24.14 preparing procedural documents annexes and schedules 24.21 information appearing on first page 24.18 paragraph numbering 24.20 PDF files 24.19 requirements 24.17 WTO Agreements 10.08, 11.46