Ethnophilosophy and the Search for the Wellspring of African Philosophy 3030788962, 9783030788964

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Ada Agada   Editor

Ethnophilosophy and the Search for the Wellspring of African Philosophy

Ethnophilosophy and the Search for the Wellspring of African Philosophy

Ada Agada Editor

Ethnophilosophy and the Search for the Wellspring of African Philosophy

Editor Ada Agada Centre for Interdisciplinary and Intercultural Studies (CIIS) Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen Tübingen, Germany

ISBN 978-3-030-78896-4    ISBN 978-3-030-78897-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78897-1 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To my father Aba Agada And my sisters Happiness Ojo Agada and Debbie Onmonya Agada

Foreword

A work of this nature locating the source of African philosophy in ethnophilosophy should be situated within its proper historical context. Its ancestry probably dates back to the time when Placide Tempels’ Bantu Philosophy appeared in print and the debate on the poverty or promise of ethnophilosophy in giving birth to a modern African philosophy capable of passing muster as philosophy in the strict sense of the term, and thus contributing to the pool of mankind’s philosophic heritage, began to inundate the literature. I recall with nostalgia the emergence of trends championed by those called Universalists or Modernists, Purists, Particularists, Complementarists, Communi­ tarianists and now Conversationalists in charting a course for and establishing African philosophy as a respectable discipline capable of introducing positive changes in the African mindset and humanhood and carving a niche for itself in the global patrimony of philosophy. Interconnected with these trends were clearly identified schools of thought, namely (i) the colonial missionary school, (ii) the African logical neo-positivist school, (iii) the Egyptological school, (iv) the ideological school and (v) the purist school. The colonial missionary school affirmed the existence of African philosophy but posited that its birth was delivered by European missionary education. In other words, that African philosophy came into being with the advent of civilizing missionary literary culture which made documentation of ideas possible. This is not entirely true because before the invention of writing, whole civilizations preserved their traditions and cultural practices including their worldviews by orature (oral literature). However, this orature provided the basis for the awareness of and the controversies around the philosophical quality of ethnophilosophy. William Abraham, Placide Tempels, John Mbiti, Chukwudum Okolo and, perhaps, Theophilus Okere have been classified as members of this school. The hurly-burly was begun by the disputation of the very idea of African philosophy by those who described themselves as “modernists” and categorized by Moses Akin Makinde and Campbell Shittu Momoh as “Euro-African philosophers” and “African logical neo-positivists”, respectively. The first reaction of the modernists,

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when works purporting to be on Bantu, Dogon, Zulu, Yoruba, Igbo and African philosophy began to make the rounds, was to posit that African philosophy did not exist, a position that soon gave way to the question concerning the source, nature, style and content of African philosophy. The African logical neo-positivist school first ridiculed the idea and denied the existence of African philosophy and, when presented with rudimentary specimens of it gathered from ethnological studies and missionary research activities, dismissed it as an exercise in anachronisms (Wiredu); a pre-philosophy, “a crazed language” and “a self-deluding invention that hides behind its own product” (Hountondji). They claimed that as a universal discipline like mathematics and physics, the very idea of African philosophy emanating from myths, proverbs and linguistic structures of some wise African elders is merely an exercise in linguistic games. Peter Bodunrin insisted that philosophy was a western European concept about which Africans were not at liberty to foist any meaning that suited their fancy. He posited that philosophy was basically western philosophy and that there could never be any autochthonous African species of it. Odera Oruka added that only philosophy in a debased sense could be presented as African philosophy. Gene Blocker capped it all by positing that there was a frustrating dilemma in a work being both African and philosophy. A work was either philosophy in content and devoid of African concepts and notions or African in content but totally bereft of philosophy. However, as the controversy heated up with the challenge of the purists, some members of the modernist school admitted that the deployment of conventional western philosophical tools of linguistic analysis in clarifying concepts that proffer solutions to social and political problems in the post-colonial African State would create a robust African philosophy (Blocker and Sogolo). I have personally addressed some of the contentions of this school in “Disguised Denials of African Philosophy” and “The Dilemma Doctrine in African Philosophy”. The Egyptological school parades members who tended to conflate or equate African philosophy with Egyptian philosophy or contend that the latter was the origin of the former. They not only held that African philosophy existed, they contended that Egyptian philosophy and western European philosophy (Greek philosophy) originated from African philosophy. But they tended to play down the fact that as much as Egyptian culture might have influenced Greek culture and philosophy the latter might also have influenced the former since cultural influence is not a one-­ way traffic. It has also been contested that the Egyptological school had tended to neglect the fact that Egyptian culture and philosophy belonged more appropriately to the Mediterranean culture than to the African culture given the facts of geography, early contact and migration. Cheikh Anta Diop’s Nations negres et culture and L’ Afrique Noire pré-coloniale, G.G.M.  James’ The Stolen Legacy, and Innocent C. Onyewuenyi’s The African Origin of Greek Philosophy, among others, championed the cause of Egyptology. Next is the ideological school of thought whose members were largely political philosophers ranging from cerebral Marxists and socialists, radicals and social

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critics to practising politicians, who mainly deployed the tool of the European materialistic interpretation of history as ideology for decolonization and reconstruction of post-colonial African states. Early members of this school include Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo, Aminu Kano and Mbonu Ojike. The intellectual gadflies of this group include T.U. Nwala, Dipo Fasina, Abubakar Momoh, Edwin Madunagu and Lai Olurode, among others. Like the missionary school, the modernists and the Egyptologists, the ideological school married the development of African philosophy to the advent of European culture and civilization. In other words, what has become known as African philosophy for this group was basically contingent upon the emergence of western philosophy. Only the likes of Mbonu Ojike emphasized the need to base political practice on the culture and tradition of the people. The last group, which brings us to the book at hand, is what C.S.  Momoh described as the Purist school. Members of this school affirmed the existence of African philosophy. They go further to maintain that elements of this philosophy existed long before the European contact with Africa. The members of this school include, J. Olubi Sodipo, K.C. Anyanwu, Barry Hallen, Akin M. Makinde, Innocent C.  Onyewuenyi, Campbell Shittu Momoh, Sophie Bosede Oluwole, Jim Ijenwa Unah, C. B. Okoro and Godwin Ehi Azenabor, among others. In “Uchi Conception of Being and the Traditional Problems of Freedom and Determinism”, Momoh demonstrated that pristine African communities harboured wise men and women who pondered about the nature of the world, how to understand and master the environment, and pontificated on how to achieve social bonding with fellow humans. All of these were concerns which gave birth to Greco-European philosophy. Why couldn’t the same concerns result in the birth of African philosophy? Likewise, Sophie Bosede Oluwole demonstrated in a recent work, Socrates and Orunmila: Two Patron Saints of Classical Philosophy, that virtually all the activities that Socrates was credited with had been accomplished by Orunmila in Ifa Literary Corpus, even without contact of both personalities. From the comparisons made between Socrates and Orunmila from what is written about both of them, Oluwole makes the point that if the one is recognized as a classical Greek philosopher there is no reason whatsoever for not recognizing the other as a classical Yoruba philosopher. To connect with the present work and to put the matter clearly in perspective, in the early days of the discourse on African philosophy the controversy had always revolved around the question of what it might be and that of its source and origin. All the specimens presented of what it might be by the missionary group and other groups that affirmed the existence of unadulterated views of African sages and elders as raw materials for philosophical reflections were initially derided by the modernists or African logical neo-positivists as constituting a racial agenda of European anthropologists and ethnologists calculated to jinx and stunt any further development of African thought into the mainstream of global philosophy. The point here is that ethnophilosophy was largely produced by Europeans and

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European-trained African writers and it seemed to the modernists that the objective of presenting myths, proverbs, folklores, and subtle thought systems as specimens of African traditional philosophy was a European intellectual scheme to downgrade the philosophical quality of African thought. Thus, they perceived their protests and devastation of ethnophilosophy as a patriotic service to the integrity of African philosophic scholarship. The modernists would endorse only the philosophical activities which “typifies the thought of the tradition from Plato to Strawson”  – a tradition of rigorous debates, of analysis and clarification of language, of arguments and counterarguments. Eventually, however, the modernists grudgingly conceded that the criticism of ethnophilosophy and the analysis and clarification of terms exhumed in the process, which could be useful in addressing social and political problems of African States, would create a viable African philosophy. Ada Agada and his peers, in this marvellous collection of essays, seek to affirm the view that the forage of ethnophilosophy is indispensable in creating authentic African philosophy. They seek to establish that ethnophilosophy is the “wellspring” of African philosophy by exploring the native African themes and concepts such as those pioneered by Innocent Asouzu (Ibuaru and Ibuanyidanda) and Mogobe Ramose (Ubuntu) and a host of others in focusing the attention of research to propel and drive change in the African life-world. They interrogate and clarify the concepts of “Interculturality”, “Ezumezu logic”, “Missing link” and “Complementary reflection”, “Ethnophilosophy”, “Othered patient”, “Communitarianism”, “Universalism and Particularism”, “Uwa”, “Consolationism” and their pet methodology of “Conversationalism”. They let these concepts speak for themselves, in a phenomenological manner, as they are used and understood in the African life-world to interrogate personhood and establish the centrality of the community in the life of the individual person. Surely, a work of this nature, building on the foundation laid by early African philosophers, though now championed largely by young academics, will stimulate thinking and challenge the philosophy community in African universities to focus more on interrogating concepts, notions, perceptions and practices in daily usage and encounter in African societies. Witchcraft, for instance, has been introduced as a subject of study in some South African universities. I hear that some universities in Ghana are toeing a similar path. A controversial conference on witchcraft was convened at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, sometime in 2020. All these go to show that African cultural practices, experiences and concepts, accessible largely through ethnophilosophy, are demanding the attention of African philosophers. The practice of polygamy, considered native to Africa, rightly or wrongly, has been left un-interrogated and unclarified by philosophers in Africa. Likewise, the notion of creative African womanhood has been left unexplored and consigned to the vagaries of misguided western feminism. So too are several other concepts, notions, practices and perceptions in the African life-world begging for the attention of ethnophilosophers to bring to the front burner for full-blown philosophical reflection. I see this book, Ethnophilosophy and the Search for the Wellspring of African Philosophy, as a gadfly rousing Africans from slumber to confront their stark

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realities, instead of habitually looking elsewhere, by exploring the boundless possibilities of their cultural heritage extractable from ethnophilosophy to create a robust African philosophy that would speak to both the cultural realities of Africans and the universal concerns of humankind. Fellow of the Nigerian Academy of Letters (FNAL) & President, Philosophers Association of Nigeria University Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Lagos, Nigeria May 2021

Jim Ijenwa Unah [email protected]

Acknowledgement

I thank Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture, and Religions and its editor-in-chief Dr J.O. Chimakonam for granting me permission to reproduce the article “Are We Finished with the Ethnophilosophy Debate? A Multi-­ Perspective Conversation” which was first published in 2019 in Volume 8, Issue 2 of the journal.

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About the Book

As the title of this book implies, it is a scholarly search for what can be pinpointed as the wellspring of African philosophy, that unique source that distinguishes the African philosophical tradition from its counterparts from around the world. The adventurous and yet critical chapters in this book revisit the ethnophilosophy question with the aim of locating its enduring value as African philosophy continues its progress as a universally relevant thought-tradition with a unique message for humanity in a continually globalizing era that predicts, perhaps correctly, that the future of philosophy is one of intercultural dialogue between the different philosophy traditions of the world.

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As an African philosopher, I have always been aware of a supreme irony in African philosophy which has its legacy in Africa’s colonial experience. This irony revolves around the tendency of certain African philosophers with a universalistic inclination to denigrate the intellectual orientation in African philosophy now commonly referred to as ethnophilosophy while, at the same time, depending on ethnophilosophical resources to advance the various ideas and concepts to which they are committed. Indeed, it is difficult to find philosophers working within a decidedly African philosophical framework who can boldly claim to have finally rid themselves of ethnophilosophy. In one form or the other, ethnophilosophical currents animate the thoughts of not only philosophers like Placide Tempels, L.S.  Senghor, Alexis Kagame, and John Mbiti but also sympathisers of universalism like Pauline Hountondji, Kwasi Wiredu, Kwame Gyekye, H.  Odera Oruka, Innocent Asouzu, and Bernard Matolino. Hountondji’s reputation as an eminent African philosopher would not have been firmly established if ethnophilosophy had not supplied him a foundation to question and repudiate the ethnophilosophical orientation in the infancy of modern African philosophy. It would be expected that the early radical critique of ethnophilosophy would completely annihilate the orientation. The annihilation has not happened. Indeed, a good number of African philosophers have deemed it necessary to explore the traditional worldviews of their ethnic group in the hope of distilling elements worthy of the philosophical enterprise and subjecting the emergent elements to philosophical analysis. Against this particular trend, it can be argued that it portends dangers for African philosophy since group thinking is elevated to the pedestal of authentic philosophy at the expense of individual thinking. But if we can find fault with the above mentioned trend that unabashedly returns to group thinking in the search for philosophical wisdom, there is another trend that bodes well for African philosophy, which has recognised the special status of ethnophilosophy as an orientation in no way different from what we may call cultural philosophy, the critical exploration of worldviews associated with specific ethno-­ religious groups. Contemporary philosophers like Asouzu, Mogobe B. Ramose, and

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J.O. Chimakonam and Afro-communitarian philosophers like Polycarp Ikuenobe, Matolino, and Motsamai Molefe have all seriously sought to develop original ideas or construct original systems through the ingenious transformation of concepts taken directly and indirectly from raw traditional African worldviews. The current volume nudges African philosophy in this direction. This brings me to the challenge of defining and explaining the concept of ethnophilosophy as clearly as possible. Ethnophilosophy broadly construed is the intellectual perspective that promotes the worldviews of traditional African societies as philosophically valuable and viable. These worldviews consist of traditional wisdom, unsystematised thinking about the world and the place of humans in the world, proverbs, riddles, and sundry linguistic resources. While universalists, the group of philosophers impressed with the critical form of Western philosophy, dismiss ethnophilosophy, the orientation is defended by particularists like Onyewuenyi (1996) who favour the establishment of a unique and independent African philosophical tradition. There is also a marginal ultra-particularist orientation championed by philosophers like Fainos Mangena (2014) which identify ethnophilosophy with the whole range of African philosophy. The sense of ethnophilosophy that involves the mere description of traditional phenomena is particularly targeted by universalists who insist that philosophical methodology must be critical wherever philosophy is practised (see Bodunrin 1981; Appiah 1992; Hountondji 1997). The critical methodology favoured by universalists is, of course, the type developed in the West which lauds argumentation (see Ikuenobe 2004). Hountondji is famous for his critique of ethnophilosophy which levelled the charges of unanimism and non-­ criticality at the orientation. Chronicling the ills of ethnophilosophy, Hallen (2002, 50) writes: Ethnophilosophy presents itself as a philosophy of peoples rather than of individuals...one is given the impression that there can be no equivalent to a Socrates or a Zeno. Ethnophilosophy speaks only of Bantu philosophy, Dogon philosophy, Yoruba philosophy; as such, its scope is collective, tribal, and of the worldview variety. Ethnophilosophy’s sources are in the past, in what is described as authentic traditional African culture of the precolonial variety, of the Africa prior to modernity. These sources are to be found primarily in products of language: parables, proverbs, poetry, songs, myths–oral literature generally.

From the charge of collectivism, or unanimism, follows the charge of the non-­ criticality of ethnophilosophy, for which Hountondji (1996, 72) warns: We shall never create an authentic African philosophy, a genuine philosophy, genuinely African (that’s what I mean by the term ‘authentic’), if we skirt round the existing philosophical tradition. It is not by skirting round, and still less by ignoring, the international philosophical heritage that we shall really philosophize, but by absorbing it in order to transcend it.

However, a careful study of African philosophical texts reveals that there are two types of ethnophilosophy, the descriptive type championed by Senghor and Tempels and the academic type which has been embraced by many African philosophers, including Hallen himself. The charges of collectivism and non-criticality is majorly directed at descriptive ethnophilosophy.

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Questioning Hountondji’s radical critique of ethnophilosophy and making a case for what he correctly identifies as academic ethnophilosophy, Hallen (2010, 83) notes that: “Ethnophilosophy” began its conceptual life as an appellation used to stigmatize what was said to be a distinctively dysfunctional form of African philosophy. It was then ‘liberated’, insofar as it was then used to legitimize the inclusion of distinctively African cultural elements in a scholarly discipline that could be considered African-oriented yet philosophically scrupulous as far as professional or academic standards were concerned.

The liberation of academic ethnophilosophy from its mother, descriptive ethnophilosophy, through the infusion of argumentation as supplied by the individual does not obscure the fact that descriptive ethnophilosophy, or ethnophilosophy proper, continues to function as a wellspring of concepts in the thought of the individuals coming to the rescue of African philosophy. Far from radically transcending ethnophilosophy, academic ethnophilosophers like Wiredu, Gyekye, and Onyewuenyi continue to overwhelmingly refer to Akan and Igbo worldviews as viable sources of philosophical inspiration. If such references have not been eliminated, then I submit that the stigmatisation of ethnophilosophy was unfair from the beginning and marked an attempt by African philosophers to hide their failure to rise to the challenge of the kind of innovative thinking that alone can render ethnophilosophy unattractive. In this spirit, I wrote elsewhere that [A]ny honest study of the history of African philosophy so far will reveal that the most productive thinkers have been those who did not lightly dismiss ethno-philosophy–regardless of whatever reservations some might have held about this sub-tradition–but incorporated it in their projects in one way or the other, in varying degrees of dependence on ethno-philosophy. Either we build on ethno-philosophy and create new, original thought-­ structures that can be labelled ‘African’ or we lurk behind Western philosophers and ever find our intellectual bearing using Western philosophical compasses. Either we have African philosophy or Philosophy in Africa. The latter will follow from our taking our cues from the West. (see Imafidon et al. 2019, 119–120)

Recognising that the stagnation of African philosophy and the delay in replacing collective philosophies with original individual thought-systems cannot be blamed on ethnophilosophy, it struck me that the way forward may well pass through a re-­ evaluation of ethnophilosophy with special focus on how latent ideas in the orientation can spur creativity. The awareness is all the more striking in view of the seeming incapacity of ideas generated by Western philosophers to instigate the much-desired creativity. I kept reading Western philosophers in the hope of chancing upon an idea that will ignite my mind and generate the much needed creative sparks to no avail. While I was gaining critical sharpness, I was not benefitting creatively and felt I did not belong to the Western tradition. I finally came to the conclusion that for African philosophers to contribute in any significant way to world philosophy, they must generate ideas that spring essentially from non-Western sources even while making judicious use of Western analytical methods. Other African philosophers of my generation have been struggling to come to terms with the theory of a wellspring of the ideas earlier philosophers employed and the innovative concepts which we are today employing. The question of the

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wellspring of African philosophy has become acute in view of the salutary decolonisation project animating much of current African humanities. The decolonisation project seeks to find a place for indigenous knowledge systems and remedy the epistemic injustice of the past that continues to determine the value attached to the intellectual traditions of the world. In a 2019 philosophy roundtable organised on the Naijaphil website under the auspices of the Conversational School of Philosophy, the overwhelming majority of participants were of the opinion that the denigration of ethnophilosophy was always unwarranted and that it is necessary to rehabilitate the orientation and locate its permanent place in African philosophy. Many participants sympathetic to ethnophilosophy were, however, opposed to the ultra-particularism that tends to equate ethnophilosophy with African philosophy. These moderate philosophers rather regarded ethnophilosophy as a special source of African philosophy, among other sources like logic, religion, common sense, science, and even Western philosophy. The special status of ethnophilosophy is seen as following from its cultural rootedness. This rootedness alone can give African philosophical products the kind of flavour that distinguishes them from Western, Latin American, and Asian philosophical products If the above is false, then there is no reason why we should talk about African philosophy, or even philosophy in Africa, since what we will produce in Africa will likely be Western philosophy scholarship. This outcome will spell disaster for the project of decolonisation and the cause of epistemic justice as the renunciation of indigeneity becomes indistinguishable from the equation of the universal with Westernism. The authors represented in this volume reject the equation of the universal with Westernism and insist that African particulars can legitimately aspire to the status of universals. In making a case for ethnophilosophy, this volume invites African philosophers to reconsider the rich possibilities of an African philosophy that expands the horizon of human thought through the critical transformation of common concepts found in African languages and worldviews. The volume is divided into three parts, with each part laser-focused on highlighting the undeniable role ethnophilosophy has played in the works of some of the most productive African philosophers while arguing trenchantly for the de-­ stigmatisation of ethnophilosophy as African philosophy enters a new innovative stage of its unstoppable march. Part 1, titled Some Metaphilosophical Issues Revisited, traces the evolution of the ethnophilosophy debate. Part 2, titled Continuities and Discontinuities, the Past and the Present, highlights the place of ethnophilosophical thinking in the works of Kwame Gyekye, H Odera Oruka, and Kwasi Wiredu and notes the tension between the universalist aspiration of these philosophers and the particularist content of their thought. The last part, titled Ethnophilosophy, System-Building, and Contemporary Expansion of Thought, is the most significant section of the volume and shows how ethnophilosophy can remain relevant to contemporary African philosophy without jeopardising the universalist credentials of African philosophical products. Bruce Janz in his “Ethnophilosophy and the Wellspring of Philosophy in Africa” sets up Hountondji’s exclusionist perspective for criticism and argues persuasively

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that the orientation called ethnophilosophy can create a new space for the flourishing of new ideas and concepts beyond the stigmatising particularist horizon to which Hountondji confined it. In “A Wellspring of African Philosophical Concepts? The What and Why Questions in the Context of Interculturality”, Ada Agada argues that at a time of rising interest in interculturality and increasing assertiveness of previously marginalised identities, utilising ethnophilosophical resources in the development of new, innovative concepts will enable African philosophy to contribute something new at the roundtable of global philosophy. In “What is ‘Ethno’ and ‘Philosophy’ in Ethnophilosophy?” Diana-Abasi Ibanga convincingly demonstrates the continuing relevance of ethnophilosophical thinking to modern African philosophy by arguing that the creative tension bridging the independent spheres of the “ethno” as culture and the “philosophy” as critical individual thinking ensures that the former can continue to act as a wellspring of ideas for contemporary African philosophy. L. Uchenna Ogbonnaya in “Beyond the Universalist Critique and the Particularist Defence of Ethnophilosophy” puts the universalism-particularism dichotomy in proper perspective and defends the thesis that ethnophilosophy is the foundation of African philosophy. In “African Philosophy: With and Beyond Ethnophilosophy”, Aribiah David Attoe asserts that recognition of the philosophical viability of ethnophilosophy should not be an excuse for African philosophers to stagnate at the level of ethnophilosophical thinking. He insists that African philosophers must defend the universalism of African philosophy by transcending ethnophilosophy. Edwin Etieyibo argues convincingly in “Beyond Placide Tempels’ Bantu Philosophy and in Defense of the Philosophical Viability of Ethnophilosophy” that ethnophilosophy can genuinely claim to be philosophy by reason of its status as the study of indigenous philosophical systems. He asserts that the thoughts of individuals in the community which eventually came to constitute ethnophilosophy cannot be regarded as merely bald statements lacking philosophical rationale since the originators of these thoughts had their reasons for submitting their propositions even if these reasons can no longer be pinpointed. Anthony C. Ojimba in “The Case Against Ethnophilosophy” reminds us of the cogency of the radical critique of ethnophilosophy. He points out, as Attoe has done, the necessity of African philosophers transcending ethnophilosophy in order to adequately project the universalist credentials of the philosophical concepts they employ. In “Ethno-philosophical Currents in Kwame Gyekye’s Philosophy”, “H.  Odera Oruka’s Philosophical Sagacity as a Variety of Ethno-philosophy”, and “‘Ethnophilosophy’ and Wiredu’s Programme of Synthesis”, Hasskei M. Majeed, Pius Mosima, and Martin Odei Ajei convincingly demonstrate the debt owed to ethnophilosophy by Gyekye, Oruka, and Wiredu, respectively. Elvis Imafidon in “African Ethno-ethics and Bioethical Principlism: Implication for the Othered Patient” shows how the cultural dimension of the “ethno” can invigorate an authentic African bioethics and contribute to the doctrine of principlism, thus redirecting modern health care providers to new ways of catering to the needs of vulnerable patients. In “The Cultural Background of Ezumezu Logical System”, Umezurike J. Ezugwu and Jonathan O. Chimakonam exhibit the ethnophilosophical

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foundation of the twenty-first century African logical system of Ezumezu. In the process of showing how Ezumezu benefits from the “ethno”, they also exhibit the universalist credentials of Ezumezu logic. Ada Agada explores Ramose's largely overlooked but highly innovative concept of be-ing becoming in “The Ethnophilosophical Foundation of Ramose’s Ubuntu Ontology of Be-ing Becoming” and argues that Ramose’s articulation of the concept shows how ethnophilosophical thinking can inspire original thinking that transcends ethnophilosophy itself. In “Ethnophilosophical Tendencies in African Feminist Thought and Philosophy”, Anke Graness demonstrates the far-reaching impact of the “ethno” by identifying ethnophilosophical currents in the thought of African feminists like Oyèrónké Oyěwùmí, Molara Ogundipe-Leslie, and Catherine Acholonu. In “The Ethnophilosophical Foundation of Pantaleon Iroegbu’s Uwa Ontology: A Hermeneutical Investigation”, Jude Onebunne presents key ideas in the thought of the largely unknown but intriguing Nigerian philosopher Pantaleon Iroegbu and highlights Iroegbu’s debt to ethnophilosophy. Iroegbu’s thought is presented to an international audience in this volume for the first time by a scholar familiar with his writings. Maduka Enyimba and Ada Agada argues in “The Ethnophilosophical Foundation of Asouzu’s Concept of Missing Links” that despite Asouzu’s renunciation of ethnophilosophy, his famous concept of missing links owes a major debt to the ethno of traditional Igbo worldviews. In “The Ethnophilosophical Foundation of Conversational Thinking”, Amaobi Nelson Osuala and Maduka Enyimba identify the foundational ethnophilosophical elements of conversational thinking, a twenty-­ first century African philosophical innovation that seeks to establish a new methodology for advancing contemporary African philosophy. Emmanuel Ofuasia in his chapter “The Challenge of the ‘End of Metaphysics’ for Ethnophilosophy: A Discourse on the Process Implication of the Metaphysics of Terror” shows how ethnophilosophy-inspired thinking in contemporary African philosophy can overcome the “end of metaphysics” challenge posed by Martin Heidegger, which makes the claim that metaphysics has reached a dead end over the question of what being is. The final chapter, titled “Are We Finished with the Ethnophilosophy Debate? A Multi-Perspective Conversation”, features Elvis Imafidon, Bernard Matolino, Ada Agada, Lucky Uchenna Ogbonnaya, Aribiah David Attoe, Fainos Mangena, and Edwin Etieyiboin in a roundtable discussion on the continuing relevance of ethnophilosophy. The chapter first appeared as a 2019 article in Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture, and Religions. Matolino rejects the orientation outright as retrogressive while Mangena counters that ethnophilosophy is the only authentic African philosophy. The remaining discussants adopt a more moderate tone and agree that ethnophilosophical thinking in one form or the other can inspire new and exciting thinking that itself transcends ethnophilosophy and lays claims to global relevance in an age that must take epistemic justice seriously. Ada Agada

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References Appiah, Kwame A. 1992. In my father’s house: Africa in the philosophy of culture. New York: Oxford University Press. Bodunrin, Peter. 1981. The question of African philosophy. Philosophy 56 (216): 161–179. Hallen, Barry. 2010. “Ethnophilosophy” redefined? Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya 2 (1): 73–85. http://ajol.info/index.php/tp/index Hountondji, Paulin. 1997. From the ethno-sciences to ethno-philosophy: Kwame Nkrumah’s thesis project. Research in African Literatures 28 (4): 112–120. ———. 1996. African philosophy: Myth and reality. Trans. H. Evans. Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Ikuenobe, Polycarp. 2004. Logical positivism, analytic method, and criticisms of ethnophilosophy. Metaphilosophy 35 (4): 479–503. Mangena, Fainos. 2014. Ethno-philosophy is rational: A reply to two famous critics. Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya 6 (2): 23–38. https://doi. org/10.4314/tp.v6i2.3. Onyewuenyi, Innocenct C. 1996. African belief in reincarnation: A philosophical reappraisal. Enugu: Snaap Press.

Contents

Part I Some Metaphilosophical Issues Revisited  Ethnophilosophy and the Wellspring of Philosophy in Africa ��������������������    3 Bruce B. Janz  Wellspring of African Philosophical Concepts? A The What and Why Questions in the Context of Interculturality��������������   17 Ada Agada  What Is ‘Ethno’ and ‘Philosophy’ in Ethno-Philosophy?����������������������������   39 Diana-Abasi Ibanga  Beyond the Universalist Critique and the Particularist Defence of Ethnophilosophy����������������������������������������������������������������������������   57 L. Uchenna Ogbonnaya  African Philosophy: With and Beyond Ethnophilosophy����������������������������   71 Aribiah David Attoe Beyond Placide Tempels’ Bantu Philosophy and in Defence of the Philosophical Viability of Ethnophilosophy����������������������������������������   87 Edwin Etieyibo The Case Against Ethnophilosophy����������������������������������������������������������������  105 Anthony Chimankpam Ojimba Part II Continuities and Discontinuities, the Past and the Present  Ethno-Philosophical Currents in Kwame Gyekye’s Philosophy������������������  119 Hasskei M. Majeed  Odera Oruka’s Philosophic Sagacity as a Variety H. of Ethno-Philosophy����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  137 Pius Mosima

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 “Ethnophilosophy” and Wiredu’s Programme of Synthesis������������������������  159 Martin Odei Ajei Part III Ethnophilosophy, System-Building, and Contemporary Expansion of Thought  African Ethno-Ethics and Bioethical Principlism: Implication for the Othered Patient ��������������������������������������������������������������  175 Elvis Imafidon  The Cultural Background of Ezumezu Logical System ������������������������������  189 Umezurike J. Ezugwu and Jonathan O. Chimakonam  The Ethnophilosophical Foundation of Ramose’s Ubuntu Ontology of Be-ing Becoming��������������������������������������������������������������������������  203 Ada Agada Ethnophilosophical Tendencies in African Feminist Thought and Philosophy����������������������������������������������������������������������������������  215 Anke Graness  The Ethno-Philosophical Foundation of Pantaleon Iroegbu’s Uwa Ontology: A Hermeneutic Investigation������������������������������������������������  233 Jude I. Onebunne  The Ethnophilosophical Foundation of Asouzu’s Concept of Missing Links��������������������������������������������������������������������������������  245 Maduka Enyimba and Ada Agada  The Ethnophilosophical Foundation of Conversational Thinking��������������  261 Amaobi Nelson Osuala and Maduka Enyimba  The Challenge of the “End of Metaphysics” for Ethnophilosophy: A Discourse on the Process Implication of the Metaphysics of Terror������������������������������������������������������  271 Emmanuel Ofuasia  Ethical and Political Issues in Afro-Communitarianism������������������������������  287 Isaiah A. Negedu  Are We Finished with the Ethnophilosophy Debate? A Multi-perspective Conversation������������������������������������������������������������������  299 Elvis Imafidon, Bernard Matolino, Lucky UchennaOgbonnaya, Ada Agada, Aribiah David Attoe, Fainos Mangena, and Edwin Etieyibo Index������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  325

About the Editor

Ada Agada  received his PhD from the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. He has published widely in reputable national and international journals and publishing houses. His first research monograph Existence and Consolation: Reinventing Ontology, Gnosis, and Values in African Philosophy was named a 2015 Outstanding Academic Title winner by CHOICE. He has taught and researched in Africa and Europe. He is currently a senior researcher with the Conversational School of Philosophy, Calabar, Nigeria.

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Part I

Some Metaphilosophical Issues Revisited

Ethnophilosophy and the Wellspring of Philosophy in Africa Bruce B. Janz

Abstract  Ethnophilosophy is a concept which became activated by a question that Paulin Hountondji asks and a problem that he wishes to solve. It led to a space of thought that many others participated in. Other spaces of thought, though, are available which would continue to recognize ethnophilosophy as a useful concept but take it out of the context that Hountondji set for it when he activated it. Thinking about the wellspring of African philosophy leads us to think about the ways in which it continues to renew itself today, and suggests that ethnophilosophy is not just the study of anonymously held beliefs from the past but can be an intellectual space for the emergence of new concepts today. Keywords  Ethnophilosophy · Hountondji · Concept formation · Questions

1  Introduction If we see the beginning of the use of ethnophilosophy as a concept in African philosophy to be in Paulin Hountondji’s essay “African Philosophy: Myth and Reality”, first given as a lecture in various places in Africa in 1973–1974 and then published in French in 1976, with an English language first edition in 1983 and a second edition in 1996, then we have a rough idea of the historical time period in which the concept was activated. While it is not the first recorded use of the term (more on that later), it is the beginning of a space of thought, that is, it is the point at which the concept is activated for African philosophers in a particular manner, one to which discussions to this day can trace their origin. The discussion among philosophers since Hountondji’s essay has sometimes been framed as the struggle between particularists, who see culturally based philosophy in Africa as essential to African philosophy, and universalists, who see B. B. Janz (*) Department of Philosophy, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Agada (ed.), Ethnophilosophy and the Search for the Wellspring of African Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78897-1_1

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philosophy as being an enterprise that has the same methodology and questions everywhere, and so African philosophy must be the activity which conforms in both style and substance to the ways it is done elsewhere. Hountondji comes down on the side of universalism, as understood in this manner. But this distillation of the debate is, I think, overly simplistic. I addressed some of this in an earlier paper (Janz 2010), but there is more to be done to understand the space of thought in which ethnophilosophy is central and to see what other spaces might be available. Understanding the history of the existing space requires that we tease apart several elements. The elements I have in mind to separate out are the following: (1) the question that is being asked, (2) the problem that is being solved, (3) the concept that is being created and activated, (4) the solution that is proposed, and (5) the new spaces of thought that might emerge, either deliberately or as an unintended state, once we see the limits of the space of thought created by the initial question and problem. Only when we see how these operate can we evaluate the concept of ethnophilosophy, and only then can we understand how this concept might travel (to use Mieke Bal’s term) into other spaces of thought.

2  The Question Being Asked Hountondji does not explicitly ask a question at the beginning of the chapter in which ethnophilosophy plays a central role, but questions are certainly implied. At one level (i.e. at the level of a question that is the least loaded), Hountondji’s question is fairly straightforward: “Is there philosophy in traditional Africa?” And his answer is equally straightforward – there is no philosophy without a philosophical literature, and such a literature is scant at best. So, there is to this point no philosophy. That does not mean that Africans are not capable of philosophy or that there is nothing philosophically interesting in traditional Africa that could be analysed by a trained philosopher. It simply means that it does not currently exist because the vehicle for it does not exist. Well, it means slightly more than that. It also means that what had been presented as African philosophy up to the point in time he was writing was not really philosophy at all. And so, we might see a somewhat more loaded question: Why have “most African authors, when trying to engage with philosophy, … thought it necessary to project the misunderstood reality of their own discourse on to such palpable fiction” (Hountondji 1996: 56)? To what fiction does he refer? The fiction of “an implicit ‘philosophy’ conceived as an unthinking, spontaneous, collective system of thought, common to all Africans or at least to all members severally, past, present and future, of such-and-such an African ethnic group” (55–56). Questions elicit (indeed, require) concepts, and this case is no different. The central concept created here is that of ethnophilosophy, along with the concept of a “literature” also necessary to address the question. What exists, for Hountondji, is not a philosophy: “that which exists, that which is incontrovertibly given is that literature. As for the object it claims to restore, it is at most a way of speaking, a verbal invention, a muthos” (55).

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And so, the question lays out the terms of the space of thought by telling us what actually exists (a literature) and what does not exist but is merely invented (that to which ethnophilosophy refers, which is philosophy embedded within African traditional practices). Questions always are loaded for exactly this reason – they assume the existence of some things and the nonexistence of others and tell us what to prioritize or value in those things that do exist. This is why there is a space of thought that is made available. This is the space in which the debate between universalism and particularism in African philosophy can happen. It is important to note that there is a reciprocal relationship between the question and the concept. Neither can exist without the other. Without a concept (i.e. without the right concepts), one cannot ask a question. The question that is asked is shaped, defined, and limited by the concepts available. And, the concept can travel outside of the bounds of the question that activated it. In other words, while it is important to recognize the question out of which the concept of ethnophilosophy emerges, it is also important to realize that it need not remain bound by that question.

3  The Problem Being Solved The problem being solved is not the same thing as the question being asked. Problems often appear before questions can be clearly and coherently asked. They can exist as intuitions  – they can be only partially formed. They can come from mystics and theologians, or griots and sangomas, or witches, or poets, or anyone else, because the recognition that there is a problem might happen because of some lived or collective experience that does not yet have a name. They can be produced by the simplest of things, the moment that catches you and stops you dead, the “Hmm, that’s weird” feeling about what you expect to happen and doesn’t, or what things happen in relation to each other. Problems rely on implicit narratives and their ruptures. Problems exist in the realm of abductive reasoning. So, what is the problem for which some people (those whom Hountondji is criticizing) propose the concept of ethnophilosophy as the solution? It is, in part, the problem presented by Africa’s encounter with Europe and all that entailed – a dismissal of African intellect at the hands of Europeans. But if it were only a problem that came from the outside, it might have been easily brushed off, at least at an intellectual level. It was also an African problem, one which perhaps occurred within the context of European violence and colonial structures but which posed a problem for Africans. The problem had to do with the distance, both cultural and temporal, that emerged between the thought that had been nurtured and sustained within communities and the present-day lives of Africans, which might include moving to urban environments, away from the bulk of their communities. The problem that the concept of ethnophilosophy purports to describe and then solve is the problem of giving a single identity to a wide range of historical and contemporary intellectual and cultural practices. As with all concepts, the emergence of this one has a purpose, which is to reject these practices as a class or group from the realm of philosophy.

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There are a few things to note about the problem that the concept of ethnophilosophy is meant to solve. First, it is a problem of demarcation, specifically between philosophical and non-philosophical activities and artefacts. By “artefact”, I am referring to the proper, approved, or desired vehicles for philosophy. Second, it is a problem of the location of philosophy. By creating a class of rejected things, Hountondji has created a class that includes communally performed reasoning, reasoning which replicates and modifies past reasoning, and reasoning found outside of a narrow form of artefact, specifically the discursive argument (in other words, proverbs, tales, songs, myths, and so forth are not adequate vehicles for philosophy in this view). By creating the concept of ethnophilosophy, he defines the problem in a manner that sharpens his preferred solution (philosophy occurs as a critical activity advanced by an individual using discursive argumentation) and blurs the many kinds of performance and artefact which might be found in traditional Africa across many cultures and times, reducing it all to being the same kind of thing. Third, it renders the problem as an ahistorical one, despite the fact that it is tradition which is bundled together under the general heading of “ethnophilosophy” (which might seem intrinsically historical). The practices within this category are seen as non-progressive, indeed fairly static. The actual use of things like myths, stories, or proverbs within a social exchange of argumentation is not considered. The idea that no piece of traditional wisdom actually stands as a timeless nugget of shared thought, but is instead deployed within specific situations and often altered to address a specific question, is also not considered. Even if we limit the range of ethnophilosophy to the kinds of examples Hountondji considers, which are linguistic ones that we can find in Tempels, Kagame, Mbiti, and others, we still have the situation of contextual meaning, performance, and positionality of speakers that is ignored. In other words, the problem that Hountondji wants to solve is really a problem dictated by the preferred solution, which is that traditional thought is not philosophy and contemporary discursive thought at least potentially is. This is the discontinuity in the implicit narrative, the “Hmm, that’s weird” moment – if we assume that ethnophilosophy really is philosophy, African philosophy does not look like any other kind of philosophy anywhere else. That discontinuity could be resolved in one of the two ways – either what we understand as philosophy needs to be broadened to include traditional content or African philosophy needs to look for something that actually does fit the narrative of philosophy elsewhere in the world. Hountondji takes the second of these options.

4  The Concept Being Created and Activated Hountondji did not invent the concept of ethnophilosophy in 1973. He had, in fact, used it earlier, in an article in Diogenes in 1970, in much the same way he used it later (Hountondji 1970). And it had been used by others well before him, including Kwame Nkrumah in an unpublished manuscript (Nkrumah 1943) and Ethel Albert in 1956 (Albert 1956) in an article that treated ethnophilosophy as more or less

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equivalent to a general cultural conceptual system (so, not far from how Hountondji uses it). Likewise, Melville Herskovits uses it in 1959 as the “investigation into the nature and significance of values, with its central theoretical problem of cultural relativism” (Herskovits 1959: 392). The creation of a concept does not, though, equate with the creation of the word we use for the concept, or its first appearance. The concept took on energy and became a live part of African philosophy (in my terms, it was “activated”) when Hountondji identified it and, further than that, used it as a catch-all term to reject much of what was thought as African philosophy before it. The activation of a concept is different from its creation. Creation refers to the use of a concept within a space of thought, which has been established by asking a question and given force by a problem. The activation of a concept is something that the initial asker of a question might hope for, but which is in the hands of those who explore a space of thought. Many questions are asked which go nowhere. As Kwame Gyekye suggested in the case of tradition, it is not that something is handed down but that it is taken up by later generations. A previous generation might hope that certain cultural forms or values might be taken up, but it is not theirs to say. Likewise, a question might not be taken up, but if it is, taking it up means activating a concept which makes that space of thought viable. In the case of ethnophilosophy, we have an activated concept, and we know it is activated because even Hountondji’s critics use it. Hountondji surveys those who he argues fit the definition of ethnophilosophy at his time. As already mentioned, many of these locate philosophy within shared linguistic phenomena which extend across Africa (often through the Bantu language group). Ethnophilosophy is, then, a representation of a group of practices and patterns of thought which Hountondji regards as non-philosophical or pseudo-philosophical. It is an umbrella concept, one which stands in for a number of specific cultural practices and beliefs in cultures across Africa. The concept is related to but not identical to “traditional philosophy”, “worldviews”, and “traditional knowledge systems”, among others. Ethnophilosophy arises at a particular time to fulfil a particular role, which is to answer a question that Hountondji poses – “Is there philosophy in traditional Africa, and if there is, what does it look like?” (that’s not actually a quotation, but that’s what he’s trying to answer). The similarities that are grouped under the heading of ethnophilosophy have to do with the lack of a critical edge to the philosophy and its anonymous nature (i.e. it is not held by individuals but by cultures or groups). “Critical” is not well defined, either in Hountondji or those who try to answer him, but it might refer to a difference or divergence between what an individual holds and what other individuals hold or what culture hands down as the worldviews of a group. The concept of critique since Kant, in the West, has not particularly been one of difference but rather has functioned much as the term “radical” functions – getting to the root or foundation of something. Kant’s critical philosophy was not critical because it disagreed with someone else but because it gave a different reading of epistemology and metaphysics first, and thereafter every other part of philosophy, from the assumptions

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that others had held before. But what was critical was not the disagreement with those assumptions, but the positive case made for a different understanding. That case solved some nagging problems that preceded him, some of which had already been noticed by others and some of which were only formulated by Kant. The point is that holding a critical position might not simply about differing from someone else. We can imagine that Kant could have reached back to older thinkers to answer more recent ones. He could have, that is, been critical by recovering a tradition rather than by differing from one. The category of the individual is also interesting here – it seems that it must be a biological being who has an inner consciousness or inner life of the sort that enables him or her to be the locus of beliefs or ideas. Individuality itself has a history of development in the West, and for good reason – at various points in the past, it was not always clear where the biological individual stopped, in terms of beliefs and ideas, and the collective started. We can, in fact, tell a story about the rise of the individual in European philosophy during the Middle Ages and into early modernity. If we were to look at philosophy that existed before the rise of the individual, we would be equally hard pressed to tell the difference between individuals and schools or places. We now give names to ancient Greek philosophers, for instance, but in the case of some of them, at least (Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, and others) true authorship cannot be fixed on one biological person and in fact might indicate the work of a school of thought. Furthermore, we can look at groups of thinkers which, while we can identify individuals within them and their positions, also operate within the space of thought established by the questions asked within that group. In other words, it may be too reductionist to see the thinkers within a group as philosophers only because of the individual work they do, and not because of the space of thought they inhabit along with others. And so, Hountondji’s insistence that philosophy must be the product of an individual cannot even be clearly sustained in Western philosophy. Individuals might not be known or might be obscured, and in any case, the space in which their questioning exists may well be a shared one. So, it is not clear why any other tradition should be held to that which the implicit paradigm case of philosophy (and that, of course, is its own problem, the idea that the model of real philosophy has already been established outside of Africa) cannot maintain. It is important to note with all this that for Hountondji, the problem is not with any specific beliefs or claims that are made by ethnophilosophers but the form in which those beliefs or claims come. He would, by this logic, have to reject the categorical imperative if it came in the form of ethnophilosophy, that is, as a culturally held belief passed down through stories and not assignable to any specific person as its advocate. And so, if this is all about the form and not about the content of the beliefs, it is worth asking what form he thinks philosophy must necessarily come in. And that brings us to his own alternative. Once this category can be dealt with, his alternate proposal has a chance of succeeding, which is to base philosophy on a literature that looks much like scientific thought. Such thought, he maintains, does not exist in any extensive manner in traditional Africa, and so the clear conclusion is that African

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philosophy is still under development, waiting to emerge as the conditions for it become ripe. Philosophy qua philosophy cannot yet exist, even though wisdom might.

5  The Solution Being Proposed Hountondji’s solution to the problem of African philosophy, to which ethnophilosophy provides an inadequate solution in his view, is to ground African philosophy in the same thing that has grounded philosophy around the world – a literature. And not only a literature, but a literature that looks like scientific literature. “Scientific” here should not be understood as it might be in North America, as being a literature that follows the scientific method, but as something slightly broader but still defining a particular kind of analytic engagement with the world. So, philosophy has its own methods that are not identical to the scientific method(s) as used by physics, chemistry, biology, and so forth, but in Hountondji’s mind, it is closer to that kind of method than to the arts or practices within cultures of knowledge production and maintenance. The solution, then, is to find and/or make a literature which can sustain philosophy in this sense. Hountondji believes it exists: “There can no longer be any doubt about the existence of African philosophy, although its meaning is different from that to which the anthropologists have accustomed us to” (Hountondji 1996: 66). A comment like this should, though, make us wonder whether this is really about whether philosophy exists in traditional Africa or whether this is all about a disciplinary battle between anthropology and philosophy. It is worth noting that the space of thought created by the question, problem, and concepts has been addressed in ways different from how Hountondji does. That is what makes this a space of thought – it is possible to think different, even conflicting things, but about the same questions and concepts. So, for example, we could see Odera Oruka working within the same space of thought when he proposed sage philosophy as a method of African philosophy. He was in effect taking seriously the same question that Hountondji asked, but coming to a different conclusion – that there were indeed philosophers in traditional Africa. He found them and interviewed them. He distinguished between folk sages and philosophic sages to drive the point home that it was possible to hold culturally produced wisdom and, on the other hand, it was possible to hold ideas of your own within the space of that wisdom and critique it yourself. This was a different solution within the same space of thought to Hountondji’s rejection of philosophy in traditional Africa. It is, it should be noted, an empirical answer to a question that was not empirical to begin with, and so Hountondji might respond that his original question was not answered. But whether it was or not, the problem was solved in a different way than he did, within a space of thought. Secondly, we could look to those who make the case for African philosophy in traditional African culture on the basis of the existence of a literary tradition. Afrocentrists and others point to Egyptian texts, for instance, while others might

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point to texts hundreds of years old in Ethiopia, or Muslim works in Timbuktu or along the Swahili coast, or even works like Augustine’s or other early Christian thinkers in North Africa. While someone like Hountondji might have responses to these which would rule them out (claiming, for instance, that they are either not really African, or that a literature requires a sustained set of interchanges and not a one-off text, or that the texts are really religious ones and not philosophical), these historical texts at least complicate the idea that there is no literature in traditional Africa. Advocates of a literary tradition might also point to the destructive effects of colonialism as a reason why it might look like there is little such tradition and that this should be a reason to search for a written past rather than just assume it does not exist. Thirdly, we could likewise see Sophie Olúwọlé’s essay “The Africanness of a Philosophy” as another engagement within the same space of thought, but from a different angle (Olúwọlé 1989). She is interested in the idea of a literature of African philosophy. What she proposes is very different from Hountondji’s model of a literature. Olúwọlé does not choose a side between universalism and particularism. Instead she wants to ask what makes a piece of African literature truly African (and by “literature” she does not restrict herself to creative works, but to any text). She is interested in a literary tradition, but by that, she does not restrict herself to a scientific or analytic literature. For instance, she wants to include feeling (not as understood within negritude, but something more like affect) in literature – a “mind-set unique to Africans” – which suggests a synthetic and interpretive approach to philosophy not found in Hountondji. The problem she wants to solve is different from his – she is less interested in a line of demarcation between philosophy and non-­ philosophy, or between African and non-African, and more interested in a lifeworld and how it is understood and developed. We are faced with a choice at this point. Do we solve the problem and answer the question that Hountondji posed? Do we analyse the issue in the terms that he set forth to create the space of thought that has emerged over the years? Or do we change something about it or alter the space of thought while keeping concepts which have now been created and which have currency within African philosophy? Oruka answers the question Hountondji posed, although he comes to a different answer than Hountondji did. Likewise, those who identify a textual history in Africa are making the claim that Hountondji’s question is right, but he is factually wrong about the details and therefore wrong in his conclusion. In Olúwọlé’s hands, the question has shifted slightly, enough that a new space of thought can emerge. It is doubtful that Hountondji would be very satisfied with this shift, and he might simply regard any of these answers as not having taken the initial conditions of his question seriously enough. But there is no requirement that the initial conditions of a space of thought be honoured, particularly if they are unsustainable for some reason. Olúwọlé opens the door to the possibility that there is philosophy in traditional Africa, not by rethinking ethnophilosophy but by rethinking literature. And so, we can see some cracks forming in this space of thought, and in part, it is because the question and the problem have started to diverge. These responses to Hountondji, and others we could mention, try to find a solution for a problem that is

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larger than the question Hountondji wants to ask. The problem has become one of the legitimacy of African philosophy in the face of the dismissal and indifference of the rest of the world. To limit the discussion to Hountondji’s question suggests that the issue is really in the hands of Africans alone, that is, that they have not done the right things in order to have a coherent philosophy. But that response is deeply unsatisfying in a world which had colonialism, apartheid, and numerous other incursions from the West into Africa. The problem is a different one and requires a different space of thought to understand.

6  N  ew Spaces of Thought for Ethnophilosophy: The Wellspring(s) of Philosophy in Africa The problem with this space of thought is in the initial question. Hountondji invents a concept that allows him to answer the question of whether there is philosophy in traditional Africa. We need not get rid of the concept in order to see that the question it was invented to answer is problematic, but to use this concept for another question will require adjustments in it. So, what would a better question look like? I suggest that this comes closer: What is the wellspring of philosophy in Africa? This is a question I suggested in an earlier paper, specifically in relation to the search for the experience of awe and wonder in Africa (Janz 2016: 48). How does this differ from Hountondji’s question? By wellspring, I do not mean “origin”, or “proper location”, or “the point in historical time when philosophy started”. It does not ask for a pure cultural past or a verifiable line of transmission (as we might hope for in a literature, traditionally understood). It also does not ask a question of demarcation either – where is the line between African philosophy and other kinds of philosophy? And finally, it does not ask for a structural means to authorize content as being authentically African and authentically philosophical. I mean instead to ask about what gives philosophy its creative energy in Africa. As I have argued elsewhere (e.g., Janz 2009), Africa is a place (and is also comprised of places). Anyone competent in one of the cultures in Africa has to be competent in a range of place identities, from the most general (what I call elsewhere a long focal length) to the most specific (a close focal length). Being in place means engaging in the meaningfulness of place. Humans do not simply draw meaning from place; they are emplaced, that is, they inhabit a place; and they have habits and practices which inscribe meaning in a place and are who they are by those individual and collective bodily and material activities. Philosophy is a form of human engagement with the world, and does not abstract away from the human in anything but the most fleeting manner, for a specific purpose. The wellspring of philosophy asks the question of what resources are available for philosophy to emerge and what the event of emergence actually looks like. Those are questions that blur the boundaries of the individual and collective, because

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place itself does that. Being competent in place does not just mean being able to navigate a place as an individual but also to understand interaction, recognize one’s part in collective action as well as individual, be able to read public space and see one’s own place in that meaningful space, and so forth. When we think of the wellspring of philosophy, we recognize that traditional forms of knowledge in Africa are better thought of as resources rather than as claims that are understood as nuggets of eternal wisdom. There was always a dynamism of thought in traditional Africa, and the caricature of traditional African philosophy that produces timeless beliefs expressed as propositions and embedded within a system of other propositions does not do justice to the development of thought within traditional cultures. Ethnophilosophy can be understood as a toolbox for thought, which gives the ability to understand how to think about complex things. How, for instance, does one think about the past? Ancestors (and, to some extent, also witches) can be seen less as metaphysical entities and more as ways of addressing the question of how knowledge from the past, some of it earned by individuals and some of it appropriated by larger groups, can continue to have force in present-­ day society. Instead of asking first about the conditions for the possibility of the existence of spirits, one might instead ask what question a belief in spirits enables people to answer. This is more than just a version of anthropological functionalism. It is not just the question of how a culture maintains stability through its representations to itself, in mythology, in institutions, and so forth. It is, rather, an attempt to ask about the pressing questions that one must answer and what kinds of resources one might need to answer those questions. It resists the progressivist (or even triumphalist) idea that we are rational now and whatever we thought before this point was less rational. At every point in history, we have been rational in the manner available to us at the time, using the resources we had at our disposal. Those resources invariably came both from the present and from the past. And so, to denigrate the rationality of the past is to not understand it in the present. That does not mean that we are bound to accept the conclusions of the past in its own terms or ignore the ways of being irrational that forebears had (and present-day people still have) but that rationality at all times is not a settled matter but an experimental one, an enterprise which makes sense of the world and which has a range of criteria for what counts as sense. Rationality is not simply the application of a method to the phenomena of the world in order to come up with a trustworthy result. It is, to follow Emmanuel Eze’s argument in On Reason, the organization and prioritizing of forms of reason (Eze 2008; Janz 2008). So, let’s take the concept of ancestors and think about the question it might be an answer to. Let us further think about what colonial structures demanded to be the right or proper question and the answer to that question. Colonialism insists that the relationship to the past must come through a mythological structure mediated by Western religion. It must come through texts. It must adhere to a scientific method (at least by the heyday of colonial activity in Africa). In other words, the colonial imposition upon Africa, as far as its own narratives about the past are concerned, does not value community wisdom and knowledge, insists that the trustworthy

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sources of knowledge must have published books on the issue at hand, and filters all of this through British Anglican or French Catholic or Calvinist perspectives, which include a layer of theology developed elsewhere for other purposes and other questions. Against all this, belief in ancestors looks like little more than superstition. And yet, what is missed in that account is that the African question has been changed at a fundamental level. This is no longer an African question being asked, but a European one, to which colonial institutions and knowledge then provide an answer. The African question about relating to the past, though, still remains – how does experiential knowledge get passed down within a community, how is it authorized, who should be believed and why, and how does this relate to living a good and ethical life? Ancestors help to answer all those questions. They mediate between hard-­ won community wisdom and individual decisions. The trope of the ancestor does not suggest a static knowledge, a tradition imposed upon the present by the past. It is and always was a dialogue, a tension between what worked in an earlier time and what may or may not work now. This is the question of the wellspring of philosophy. It is not contained in the colonizer’s book, at least not inasmuch as that purports to answer a question not asked in Africa but only in the colonizer’s mind. None of this means that those books could not be of interest or useful in addressing the African questions. Indeed, a fruitful dialogue could be imagined between ways of dealing with the lived experience of the past in present community as understood through the lens of the ancestor and similar kinds of questions as we might see them worked through in China, or in Mayan culture, or in Western thought. There is nothing hermetically sealed about African thought, and engaging in traditional knowledge does not cut off Africans from seeing similarities in questions across multiple places. But it does mean that there have been ways of addressing these questions within Africa that have been developed over a long time and which deserve respect and a modern articulation. They may be rich and profound; they may be flawed; they may be adequate answers to questions posed at different times but need to be developed for questions asked today. This is what it means to think within an African place. Ethnophilosophy can, in other words, be about new question and new ideas. We can imagine an ethnophilosophy of digital technology, for instance. If we stop thinking of ethnophilosophy as simply the answer to Hountondji’s question and instead see it as the space of creativity of African thought, the wellspring of thought, there is no reason why we could not pose African questions to the lived experience of digital technology in Africa and draw upon both traditional and modern forms of thought to see how digital technology is meaningful within Africa. Does digitality, for instance, bring African life closer to or further from a communal habitus in the modern world? How do forms of justice developed for traditional social groups deal with violations of the self and of the community in digital space? What does personhood look like when one has avatars and social media accounts? The questions are endless, but the point is that we could see ethnophilosophy not as a static collection of beliefs but as a resource for addressing an uncertain world and then actually try to use its insights to address that world.

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What we call ethnophilosophy is an attempt to live in the tension and anxiety produced by a particularization (Africa) and a universalization (philosophy). The question that prompted the initial formation of the concept of ethnophilosophy, that of whether there is philosophy in traditional Africa, attempts to lessen the anxiety of that tension by seeing most traditional African thought as regionalist and thus particular. For Hountondji, it only becomes philosophy when it asks universal questions and proceeds with the form of thought that we find elsewhere in the world. But the regionalism does not go away under those conditions – it is still Africa’s contribution to someone else’s questions, a local variation in a world of perspectives. Ethnophilosophy does not need to answer that question, as I have argued here. It can instead be seen as searching for the wellspring. But to do that properly, it must come to terms with the tension and anxiety inherent in its formation as a concept. It will always draw on patterns of thought developed throughout history, in order to address questions asked in Africa today. As such, it is not a perspective on world questions but cognitive strategies to address African questions. To the extent that these questions resemble questions elsewhere, a conversation is possible. The fact is every philosophical tradition must ultimately be ethnophilosophical in the sense I have sketched out here – most simply do not own up to that fact. Most assume that their questions are universal questions when they are not. Most assume that the concepts created in order to answer those questions are also universal, when they are not or when they stand as multiples (to quote Deleuze). Feminist philosophy remains a useful parallel here. Feminist philosophers ask questions from a place, the place of women’s experience and symbolic representations, and so create concepts in that place. If feminist philosophy were only a form of particularism, “women’s thought”, it might be dismissed by men. But in fact, that is not what it is. It is thought made available by women’s experience in the world. It is a collection of concepts that could not have been activated except within the spaces of thought created by the questions and problems women pose, out of their experience. The entire world of philosophy (indeed, the entire world) is richer for it. And this is the potentiality of African philosophy as well, which has been obscured by a question that leads to a debate between universalism and particularism. With a different question, a concept like ethnophilosophy can be activated anew, for a different purpose.

7  Conclusion Ethnophilosophy is a concept which became activated by a question that Paulin Hountondji asks and a problem that he wishes to solve. It led to a space of thought that many others participated in. I have argued here that other spaces of thought are available which would continue to recognize ethnophilosophy as a useful concept but take it out of the context that Hountondji set for it when he activated it. Thinking about the wellspring of African philosophy leads us to think about the ways in which it continues to renew itself today and suggests that ethnophilosophy is not

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just the study of anonymously held beliefs from the past but can be an intellectual space for the emergence of new concepts today. The chapters collected in this book take one of the paths that have been outlined in this introductory chapter. In some cases, they engage the space of thought that Hountondji established and explore answers to his question and solutions to his problem. In other cases, the concept of ethnophilosophy is allowed to travel into different questions, establishing new spaces of thought. As the book’s title suggests, the idea of the wellspring of African philosophy is never far behind any of these explorations. The hope here is that these reflections can begin to model a new way of thinking about the concept of ethnophilosophy and the questions, problems, and spaces of thought that come along with it.

References Albert, Ethel M. 1956. The classification of values: A method and illustration. American Anthropologist 58 (2): 221–248. Eze, Emmanuel C. 2008. On reason: Rationality in a world of cultural conflict and racism. Durham: Duke University Press. Herskovits, Melville J. 1959. Past developments and present currents in ethnology. American Anthropologist 61 (3): 389–398. Hountondji, Paulin. 1996. African philosophy: Myth and reality. 2nd ed. Indiana University Press. ———. 1970. Comments on contemporary African philosophy. Diogenes 18 (71): 109–130. Janz, Bruce. 2008. Reason and rationality in Eze’s On Reason. South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (4): 296–309. ———. 2009. Philosophy as if place mattered. Lanham, MD: Lexington Press. ———. 2010. The folks in Paulin Hountondji’s African philosophy: Myth and reality. Philosophical Papers 39 (1): 117–134. ———. 2016. Conversation in place and about place: Response to Chimakonam, Conversational philosophy as a new school of thought in African philosophy: A conversation with Bruce Janz on the concept of “philosophical space”. Journal of World Philosophies 1: 41–50. Nkrumah, Kwame. 1943. Mind and thought in primitive society. A study in ethno-philosophy with special reference to the Akan peoples of the Gold Coast, West Africa. Unpublished. National Archives of Ghana. Olúwọlé, Sophie. 1989. The Africanness of a philosophy. In Readings in African philosophy, An Anthology, ed. S.  Olúwọlé. Lagos: Masstech Publications. Also, 1992. Postkoloniales Philosophieren: Afrika, eds. Herta Nagl-Docetal and Franz Wimmer, 101–122.Vienna and Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag.

A Wellspring of African Philosophical Concepts? The What and Why Questions in the Context of Interculturality Ada Agada

Abstract  In this cmhapter, I defend the claim that ethnophilosophy is a major source of African philosophy, among other identifiable sources, and that, more than any other source, it is the most obvious candidate for the title of “wellspring of African philosophical concepts”. Ethnophilosophy boasts an advantage in contributing to the essential ingredient of culture-specified uniqueness that can distinguish African philosophy from non-African philosophies and enhance African philosophy’s intercultural competitiveness. This cultural defining essence lies in the primordiality of ethnophilosophy as the form of thought most deeply rooted in the African lifeworld or age-old tradition. This chapter argues that traditional forms of thought need not be opposed to a modern way of life and can, in fact, supply universalisable philosophical concepts. The chapter engages in a philosophical genealogy of Innocent Asouzu’s notion of missing links and Mogobe B. Ramose’s idea of being becoming that have emerged in the twenty-first century and exhibit their ethnophilosophical origin. The chapter argues along the line that rather than dwelling sentimentally on the racial baggage that early promoters of ethnophilosophy like Placide Tempels carry, African philosophers should explore the possibilities of finding transformative concepts rooted in ethnophilosophy that permit the most radical expansion of the horizon of African philosophical thinking. Keywords  African philosophy · Ethnophilosophy · New humanism · Missing links · Be-ing becoming · Intercultural philosophy

A. Agada (*) Centre for Interdisciplinary and Intercultural Studies (CIIS), Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Agada (ed.), Ethnophilosophy and the Search for the Wellspring of African Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78897-1_2

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1  Introduction Modern African philosophy as a written tradition is still very much a developing discipline. This chapter explores what it means to talk about a unique wellspring of African philosophy and why it is important to talk about this ultimate source of the concepts African philosophers employ, the usage of which makes it possible for us to have the “African” in “African philosophy”. For, if we decide that the “African” is not relevant, then we must turn to the philosophies of other cultures – Western, Asian, and Latino – for the validation of what Africans are promoting as a distinct philosophical tradition. It is all but certain that Western philosophers will not agree that much of what today goes by the label African philosophy is part of the Western canon. Indeed, there is a long history of race-motivated marginalisation of African philosophical thinking dating back to David Hume and Immanuel Kant (Ramose 1999; Matolino 2011). This marginalisation continues today in the unwillingness of Western philosophy departments to throw their doors open to African philosophy scholarship (cf. Van Norden 2017; Etieyibo and Chimakonam 2018). A delineation of the term Africa and what African philosophy is awakens an old metaphilosophical question which, perhaps, had never really been resolved. The term “Africa” itself is believed to have been coined by the ancient Greeks who were intrigued by the climactic difference between ancient Egypt (North Africa) and Europe, the one hot and the other cold. The Greek term aphrike means “without cold” (Majeed 2017, 17–18; Mazrui 1986, 23).1 Today, the word Africa normally refers to the continent of Africa populated by Arabo-Islamic peoples in the north and the mostly black peoples in the rest of the continent, with a sprinkling of Europe-descended people in the south. Arab-Islamic culture is so unique in itself that it is distinguishable from the culture of black Africans. Arabic philosophical thought often comes under the heading of Islamic philosophy. When the term “African philosophy” is used today, there is little ambiguity about what it designates. African philosophy pointedly designates the philosophical canon claimed by the black people of Africa. But a relevant question arises at this juncture. Why can such a philosophical tradition be called African philosophy? Granted that it is the tradition of thought established in sub-Saharan Africa, what makes it different from Western and Asian philosophies, for example? This question is by no means an easy question. It involves the question of the history of African philosophy. Afrocentric thinkers like Cheikh Anta Diop, George James, Innocent Onyewuenyi, and Théophile Obenga prefer to trace African philosophy as a written tradition of thought to ancient Egypt and ancient North African Christian thought, while scholars like Chimakonam regard the exercise as lacking an objective foundation and insist that African philosophers should work within the

1  Another account traces the name “Africa” to an ancient Berber people known as the Afarik or Aourigha, with the word Afriga or Africa referring to the land of the Afarik; yet a third account traces the name to the Phoenician words pharikia, meaning the land of fruits, and faraqa, indicating something like “separation” (Ki-Zerbo 1981, 1).

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part of the African philosophical history untouched by controversy, the history that can be traced to the 1920s (see James 1954; Diop 1974; Onyewuenyi 1993; Osuagwu 1999; Obenga 2004; Masolo 2004; Chimakonam 2015). It was in the first half of the twentieth century that thought-systems laying claims to Africanness began to emerge, championed basically by black thinkers like L.S.  Senghor, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, John Mbiti, and other pioneers of modern African philosophy. The philosophy of North African Christian philosophers like St. Augustine and the early black philosopher Anton Wilhelm Amo was articulated within a purely European epistemological framework. The arrival of Western-trained philosophers (the professionals) like Paulin Hountondji, Kwasi Wiredu, Moses Makinde, Marcien Towa, Tsenay Serequeberhan, Peter Bodunrin, and others marked the beginning of the stigmatisation of the Afrocentric stance of earlier thinkers like Senghor and Mbiti. The Afrocentric stance was labelled “ethnophilosophy” by the emergent professional philosophers and denigrated as pandering to an unflattering Western view of the African intellect. The new development marked the beginning of the universalism-particularism conflict that persists until today. Particularism favours the entrenching of an African philosophical tradition that owns its history and pursues its own methods and concerns without undue deference to the internationally dominant Western tradition. A subgroup of the particularist school, the ethnophilosophers, go further to affirm that African philosophy has only one source, namely, ethnophilosophy. Ethnophilosophy for some particularists is, indeed, a substantive African philosophy and not merely a unique source (Mangena 2014). This chapter will argue that the inferior status assigned to ethnophilosophy by the universalists – who promote the methods of Western philosophy as universal paradigms – is in part due to the fact that for a long time African philosophy did not see the emergence of original thinkers able to transform concepts supplied by ethnophilosophy in a way that radically transcends ethnophilosophy itself. In arguing for the de-stigmatisation of ethnophilosophy, this chapter will go beyond metaphilosophical questions and show how contemporary system builders like Asouzu and Ramose, in particular, attempted to transcend the universalism-particularism divide using data supplied by ethnophilosophy.

2  T  he What and Why of a “Wellspring” of African Philosophy Philosophical traditions across the world work with certain familiar concepts, the articulation of which constitutes the history of these traditions, and from which additional concepts emerge to tackle the questions generated by the old familiar concepts. African philosophy as a written tradition, with a fast-unfolding history, is not an exception. Some of the concepts familiar to the student and scholar of African philosophy are ubuntu, ujamaa, Afro-communitarianism, vital force, God, spirit,

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matter, ancestor, family, community, individual, mind, body, sunsum, ōkra, emi, chi, ori, morality, reincarnation, life, death, immortality, unity, goodness, evil, creation, transcendence, immanence, theism, and atheism. In a welcome sign that African philosophy is evolving in a robust way, with conceptual continuities and discontinuities marking its unfolding history, newer concepts have emerged to further expand the horizon of African philosophical thinking. Some of these new concepts include ibuanyidanda, ezumezu, mood, complementarism, consolationism, conversationalism, panpsychism, protopanpsychism, protophenomenalism, equiphenomenalism, sense-phenomenalism, and partiality (see Asouzu 2004, Agada 2015; Molefe 2016; Chimakonam 2019). While there can be no doubt that some of these emergent concepts, like the old familiar ones, have been more or less influenced by Western philosophy, it is instructive that the formulators of these emergent concepts look beyond Western philosophy for their ultimate inspiration. While Western philosophy is indeed a source of ideas, it is the African thought-world – the established worldviews and belief structure of traditional African societies embedded in African languages – that stands out as the ultimate inspiration and makes a strong case to be regarded as the major source of African philosophy (cf. Ogbonnaya 2018). In the absence of this major source, it will be apparent that African philosophers are not making original contribution to the philosophical heritage of the world in the sense of having a philosophy tradition with a history that provides its own perspectives on the human condition and the universe (cf. Bernasconi 1997). While developing the concept of sense-phenomenalism to address the mind-­ body problem, Chimakonam tapped into traditional African thought in advancing a body-only approach to consciousness studies. He coins the term sata to indicate the body’s capacity to transform raw data received from the environment through intricate neural processes, making the final available information experience-like but which is in fact nothing more than sense receptibility of brain-processed information. Since sata is dependent on the data received from the outside, it is not an internal phenomenon but an illusion (shadow) derived from the data coming from the outside (Chimakonam et  al. 2019, 15–19). As if subconsciously realising the need to engage in some form of genealogy of his body-specific sense-­phenomenalism concept, Chimakonam notes that: In African philosophy, a related discussion has been on-going for nearly five decades on the question of personhood...Identity...is not a private business, it is a social or public affair...it is through biological features that an individual is capable of identification in the society. (Chimakonam et al. 2019, 20)

Here, Chimakonam uses ethnophilosophy as a wellspring of the concept of sense-­phenomenalism, a common procedure for many African philosophers desirous of contributing originally to world philosophy. Chimakonam’s materialist theory echoes Wiredu’s body-leaning quasi-physicalist theory of mind-body interaction (see Wiredu 1996, 53, 128). What puts Chimakonam’s formulation in the orbit of the history of African philosophy rather than Western philosophy is the background influence of traditional African thought on his mind, serving as it were the function

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of a wellspring of an idea spurred by ontological and cognitive wonder (see Sect 2.3). Just as Chimakonam traced his ethnophilosophy-transcending concept of sense-phenomenalism back to ethnophilosophy through an appeal to African communitarianism, so did Motsamai Molefe (2016) trace the concept of partiality to ethnophilosophy through Afro-communitarianism while articulating an African theory of partiality and recommending it as different from the Western conception. Ethnophilosophy, broadly speaking, is an orientation in African philosophy which claims that the unsystematised traditional worldviews of the black people of Africa are philosophically valuable and viable. While some African thinkers, the ethnophilosophers, believe that these worldviews constitute a unique philosophy when described using the tool of language (Tempels 1959; Senghor 1964; Mbiti 1969), the professional philosophers or universalists insist that ethnophilosophy is mere folk wisdom by reason of its critical deficiency (Appiah 1992; Hountondji 1996; Wiredu 1996). For the second group, ethnophilosophy is doubly objectionable on account of its racial association, having been championed by Western missionaries like Placide Tempels who implicitly or explicitly rated the African intellect low (Matolino 2011). Hermeneutic thinkers like Okere (1983), Okere et al. (2005), and Serequeberhan (1994) sought to transcend the universalism-particularism divide on the understanding that philosophical traditions everywhere are tied to the particular culture in which they were incubated and have the culture as a horizon of discourse. For the hermeneuticists, ethnophilosophy is a veritable source of philosophy since the project of philosophy cannot be exhausted by the rigorous written form of thought. In seeking to transcend the great divide, however, hermeneuticists like Serequeberhan and Towa seemingly envision an African philosophy that loses sight of the metaphysical, logical, and epistemological preoccupations that underpin the enterprise of philosophy, such that African philosophy becomes merely a sociopolitical praxis, a field of political science  – in my opinion  – dedicated to African political, economic, and cultural liberation. Serequeberhan (1994, 5) asserts that a hermeneutical African philosophy seeks to “think through the historicity of post-colonial ‘independent’ Africa...the struggle to expand and properly consummate our presently unfulfilled and paradoxical ‘independence’”. The radical universalist critique of ethnophilosophy notwithstanding, the orientation has had a profound impact on African philosophical development as even its critics have depended on it to thrive philosophically. As Osha (2011) has noted with regard to the greatest critic of ethnophilosophy, Hountondji, the radical critique of ethnophilosophy fed on the works of ethnophilosophers to gain relevance. Given the inescapable reach of ethnophilosophy, moderate critics like Wiredu and Oruka embarked on the systematisation of the descriptive component of ethnophilosophy in order to impart to it the needed criticality. Wiredu, Hallen, and other professional philosophers who critically investigated traditional phenomena of African ethnic groups are sometimes regarded as academic ethnophilosophers, as their writings later became increasingly ethnophilosophical in content (see Rettová 2002; Hallen 2010; Osha 2011, 3, 14–15; Agada 2019a, 5). Wiredu, in particular, shifted focus from Western formal logic to the clarification of traditional Akan thought in an endeavour for which African philosophy will be eternally grateful. I use the label

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“ethnophilosophy” in this paper to mean both descriptive and academic ethnophilosophies. Academic ethnophilosophy is merely a more rigorous form of descriptive, or narrative, ethnophilosophy. The very basic intuition that African philosophy must have an ultimate or major source which marks the concepts it generates as making new contributions to world philosophy, rather than merely mimicking Western ideas, has always suggested itself to African philosophers. Kwasi Wiredu famously posed the question of the ultimate source of African philosophy early in the context of conceptual decolonisation, the rethinking of conceptual categories received from the colonising West and the reinterpretation of African concepts influenced by these foreign categories with the goal of recovering the original meaning of African concepts. Wiredu (1996, 93) identified notions like God, mind, soul, substance, and existence as deserving a reinterpretation and reconceptualisation from an African perspective. While Wiredu avoided harshly criticising ethnophilosophy, Hountondji delivered a critique of ethnophilosophy so devastating in its brilliance that many philosophers after him viewed ethnophilosophy in a negative light, as a form of thought that Africans should be ashamed of in view of the racist circumstances that surrounded some very obnoxious comments made by distinguished Western thinkers like Hume, Kant, and Hegel (see Matolino 2011). Having dismissed ethnophilosophy as ethnography given the former’s lack of critical rigour, Hountondji (1996, 107) betrays the fascination with the success of Western philosophy as a major reason for the stigmatisation of ethnophilosophy when he unabashedly invites African philosophers to undertake the “systematic appropriation of the international philosophical heritage, which is inseparable from the scientific heritage”. By “international philosophical heritage”, he, of course, means the history of Western philosophical thought. As recently as 2016, while expressing reservations about the popular decolonisation and Africanisation project in contemporary African thought, Barry Hallen wrote that: “Hountondji’s and other colleagues’ critiques of ethnophilosophy have reduced its influence, but it still has its defenders” (Hallen 2016, 403). The irony here is that Hallen’s more original contribution to African philosophy did not escape the reach of ethnophilosophy as he, with J.O. Sodipo, explored traditional African phenomena like witchcraft and communal belief systems in the light of Western ordinary language analytic tools (see Hallen and Sodipo, 1997). Having found ethnophilosophical data useful in articulating an African philosophical perspective, Hallen was, unfortunately, not willing to give credit where it was due. In 2016, Hallen was willing to denounce ethnophilosophy. But in 2010, he clearly recognised and admitted his debt to ethnophilosophy when he appears to criticise Hountondji’s early radical stance. Hallen (2010, 83) writes that: “Ethnophilosophy” began its conceptual life as an appellation used to stigmatise what was said to be a distinctively dysfunctional form of African philosophy. It was then “liberated”, insofar as it was then used to legitimize the inclusion of distinctively African cultural elements in a scholarly discipline that could be considered African-oriented yet philosophically scrupulous as far as professional or academic standards were concerned.

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While Hallen should be commended for recognising the cultural sphere of traditional African thought, and therefore ethnophilosophy, as the wellspring of African concepts that confers a distinctive African character on thought labelled African philosophy, his attempt to de-stigmatise academic ethnophilosophy while continuing to stigmatise descriptive ethnophilosophy must be rejected. For Hallen, the mere introduction of the element of rigour is enough to decisively differentiate descriptive ethnophilosophy from academic ethnophilosophy. This position cannot be correct because, as noted earlier, the works of academic ethnophilosophers like Wiredu, Oruka, and Hallen himself inevitably blurred the line between descriptive and academic ethnophilosophy, thus demonstrating the narrowness of the epistemic distance between the two manifestations of ethnophilosophical thinking. The conceptual analysis of data supplied by ethnophilosophy does not automatically mean the elimination of ethnophilosophy since new methods do not destroy the contents that are analysed but only transform contents. It is noteworthy that majority of the recent defenders of ethnophilosophy do not champion the recognition of the maligned form as substantive African philosophy but rather seek to de-­ stigmatise ethnophilosophy and get African philosophers to see it for what is has always been: a minefield of African philosophical concepts (see Imafidon et  al. 2019). An implacable critic like Matolino goes as far as demanding an end to debates about an orientation that so thoroughly permeates African philosophy. He declares: If there is any form of commitment to or resuscitation of ethno-philosophy, such commitment must reckon with the political baggage that comes with this disreputable trend in African philosophy...the conquest and subjugation of the black person. Ethnophilosophy has continuously misrepresented the black person as lacking a precise and clear logic. It has always depicted the black person as a philosophical practitioner of voodoo and mysterious forces. (Imafidon et al. 2019, 116)

In other words, Matolino advocates the sacrifice of truth on the altar of politics even in the face of overwhelming evidence in support of the thesis that African philosophers have depended on ethnophilosophical data in constructing theories of human nature, human existence, and the universe. Indeed, Matolino’s works on Afro-­communitarianism would have been impossible without the foundational projects of thinkers like Mbiti, Menkiti, Kwame Gyekye, and others who relied directly on traditional African worldviews in constructing their thought-systems. The radical critics of ethnophilosophy are able to live with the contradiction of rejecting a thought-form while transforming it with conceptual tools sourced from Western philosophy through the subtle self-delusion that distinguishes between “academic ethnophilosophy” and ethnophilosophy proper. The assignation of the descriptive category to ethnophilosophy and its subsequent stigmatisation is not just the result of a deep-seated concern over the supposed inferiorisation of the black intellect, but, more importantly, the contempt arises from an uncritical and unnecessary adulation of Western analytical methods by the radical critics of ethnophilosophy, as earlier suggested (cf. Ikuenobe 2004). With Western philosophy succeeding so spectacularly and with its longevity advantage, African philosophers like Hountondji and Matolino can be even excused for

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undervaluing philosophical tools like narration and reflection and focusing attention on analysis. If the so-called ethnophilosophers like Senghor, Nyerere, Mbiti, and Onyewuenyi concentrated on description rather than analysis, the answer to the trend, in my opinion, lies in the fact that they were trying to build systems without being well equipped, conceptually, to complete their projects. They arrived on the scene when there was virtually nothing to analyse (cf. Agada 2015, 20–22, 35–51). These early thinkers were trying to do for African philosophy what Greek pioneers like Anaxagoras, Xenophanes, and Parmenides did for Western philosophy. They met African philosophy without a foundation and tried to establish the missing foundation, a project which might not have been spectacular but which successfully supplied a template for future refinement and advancement. The foundation, however shaky, is today supporting new thought-structures that seek to transcend traditional thought, with the immense promise of emergent currents like complementarism, consolationism, and conversationalism. The marginalisation of ethnophilosophy based on the inability to overcome a Western historical misjudgement that impinges on race relations and celebrates the contribution of ethnophilosophy to African thought is reminiscent of the widely acknowledged current marginalisation of African philosophy by Western philosophers and institutions which Matolino himself has decried while defending philosophical particularism. Ethnophilosophy is the archetype of philosophical particularism. With regard to a Western analytic tradition that appropriates universalism and a supposedly particularist African philosophy, Matolino (2015, 435) notes that: “As both traditions begin to converse openly with mutual respect, it is not totally inconceivable that they will arrive at new and enriched metaphysical schemes”. Yet he does not wish to see ethnophilosophy, as an intellectual orientation, engage with African philosophy as the broader context of philosophical engagement in Africa. He defies Western analytic philosophy and says pointedly in defence of African philosophy “[T]he history and method of each tradition must be treated as equal. Both traditions derive their equality from the fact that they are both engaged in the business of reflecting on the nature of humankind and its surroundings” (Matolino 2015, p. 436). Apparently, Matolino prefers to sacrifice an entire thought-tradition in which much of African philosophical thinking is rooted for the ridiculous reason that some of its advocates either had a racist agenda or they inadvertently contributed to strengthening the view that Africans are backward. A direct comparison of ethnophilosophy with Western philosophy is inappropriate given the operational modes of both systems, the one mostly prescientific, to use Wiredu’s term, and the other having the full benefits of an entrenched history of thought (cf. Wiredu 1980).2 It 2  Harping on the necessity of distinguishing between the traditional and prescientific mode of thinking on the one hand and the modern and scientific mode on the other hand, Wiredu (1980, 39) writes: “However, instead of seeing the basic, non-scientific characteristics of African traditional thought as typifying traditional thought in general, Western anthropologists and others besides have mistakenly tended to take them as defining a peculiarly African way of thinking with unfortunate effects”.

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makes more sense to compare ethnophilosophy with pre-Socratic Greek philosophy since ethnophilosophy, more or less, plays for African philosophy the kind of foundational role Greek philosophy plays for Western philosophy. Senghor’s early attempt to construct an African epistemology universally applicable has been consigned to the ethnophilosophical category and equally condemned as devaluing the African intellect (Hountondji 1996). Since Senghor exaggerated black emotionality and European rationality on the basis of a perceived more robust African sociality, scholars like Matolino will prefer to hang him than dispassionately consider the merits and demerits of Senghor’s decidedly flawed epistemology.3 Sodipo, a professional philosopher, has a balanced valuation of Senghor’s work. He declares that “it is in my view to Leopold Senghor’s eternal credit that he boldly even if poetically asserted the existence of a distinctively African conception of the universe and of a mode of existence founded upon that conception” (Sodipo 1975, 117). Radical critics of ethnophilosophy will prefer that we perpetually follow the West wherever it goes. Curiously, avowed critics of ethnophilosophy like Hountondji and Matolino appear not to take systematic philosophy seriously, preferring to focus intellectual energy on metaphilosophical analysis in spite of African philosophy’s relative lack of system builders, whose works are important to the flourishing of any philosophical tradition. Sanya Osha (2011, 3) has correctly, in my opinion, surmised that Hountondji’s restriction of his considerable intellect to metaphilosophical engagement, in particular the critique of ethnophilosophy, limited him as an African philosopher to the extent that he never was able to rise above the universalism-particularism conundrum. Comparing Hountondji with Wiredu, Osha (2011, 3) writes: “Part of his [Wiredu] success obviously comes from working beyond the strictures of the grids”. What has prevented Matolino from decisively going the way of Hountondji and getting lost in metaphilosophical labyrinths is the former’s realisation of the indispensability of ethnophilosophy as an incubator of philosophically viable African concepts. Matolino, accordingly, appropriated the labour of ethnophilosophers while denigrating the tradition. Responding to Matolino’s contempt for ethnophilosophy, I noted that: Matolino’s works in the field of African ethics are, to a significant extent, instances of a philosopher applying the tools of analysis to a body of philosophical knowledge that is largely ethno-philosophical in content. The traditional African understanding of the human being as a communal being was articulated by ethno-philosophers. Matolino’s philosophical project is founded on this articulation. If ethno-philosophy must be rejected, the rejection must be comprehensive. If it cannot be comprehensively rejected, then we must admit to ourselves that it continues to be relevant. (Imafidon et al. 2019, 118f)

Had Matolino taken care to engage in what Bruce Janz has called a genealogy of African philosophical concepts, he would have realised that the concept 3  In constructing the consolationist system and arriving at a new conception of the human being as homo melancholicus, or melancholy being, I was influenced by Senghor’s epistemology of emotion. See Agada (2015).

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“Afro-­communitarianism”, which is his dominant working concept, has ethnophilosophy as its wellspring. Thinkers like Mbiti (1969), Menkiti (1984), and Gyekye (2010) whose works on Afro-communitarianism greatly benefitted Matolino’s ethical project directly reported on the worldviews of their ethnic groups and established a communal conception of the person on the basis of these worldviews. In his hugely influential essay “Person and Community in African Traditional Thought” (1984) which kicked off a flurry of scholarly reactions that show no sign of abating even today, Menkiti appeals directly to the proverbs of his Igbo ethnic group. He notes: That full personhood is not perceived as simply given at the very beginning of one’s life... indicates straight away that the older an individual gets the more of a person he becomes. As an Igbo proverb has it, “What an old man sees sitting down, a young man cannot see standing up”. (Menkiti 1984, 173)

The rejection of ethnophilosophy entails the rejection of Afro-communitarianism since, as the dictum goes, ex nihilo nihil fit. It may be that the contempt for ethnophilosophy stems in part from the relative failure of African philosophers to build great thought-systems on the foundation of ethnophilosophy, as I previously suggested. On this matter, I noted that: The so-called primitivity, non-criticality, and unanimity of ethno-philosophy are not problematic once we regard the sub-tradition as a wellspring of ideas rather than substantive African philosophy in the manner of Mangena... I dare say that the job of the 21st century African philosopher who values ethno-philosophy is similar to what Martin Heidegger did in his time: she can go back to ethno-philosophy, to the past, and unearth concepts and inspiration that will help her introduce radical thinking into the African canon as Heidegger did in his recasting of the question of being in general and the human being. Either we build on ethno-philosophy and create new, original thought-structures that can be labelled “African” or we lurk behind Western philosophers and ever find our intellectual bearing using Western philosophical compasses. Either we have African philosophy or Philosophy in Africa. The latter will follow from our taking our cues from the West. (Imafidon et al. 2019, pp. 119–120)

As recently as 2018, Hountondji revisited his famous critique of ethnophilosophy and appears to favour the term “Philosophy in Africa” rather than African philosophy on the grounds that the latter suggests the existence of a uniquely African epistemic mode (Hountondji 2018). Hountondji (2002, p. 129) had previously considered the possibility that his critique of ethnophilosophy might have been too harsh and unnecessarily dismissive. If fear of being seen as too particular and the desire to look like a Western philosopher get the better of African philosophers, scholars of “Philosophy in Africa” will have to trace the wellspring of the concepts they work with within the history of Western philosophy. Either these concepts will be Western philosophical concepts and, therefore, uncontroversial in the context of Western thought or they are a mixture of African and Western concepts which Western philosophy (if not welcoming to interculturality) will reject as alien and which African philosophy cannot recognise as sufficiently original, useful as they may be. In the latter case, African scholars need not be troubled by the Western rejection of resulting syncretistic concepts in the knowledge that Western

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philosophy is a source of African philosophical thinking. In the former case, there will be no pretext about doing African philosophy even as Africa will have nothing to contribute to a new humanism that emerges out of diversity. However, if we are going to have concepts incubated and hatched in the African thought-world, we must stick with the term “African philosophy” (see Hallen 2010). And while sticking with this term, our task will be the universalisation of the African particular in a manner that makes it recognisable by non-African cultures. It is only as African philosophy that the products of the African reason can have intercultural competitiveness and be relevant in a globalised world where dialogue and tolerance means listening to the other and understanding difference rather than obliterating difference. The Western universal which radical critics of ethnophilosophy have held up as a true universal model for a long time must be superseded by a representative universal reached by an intercultural philosophising that seeks to promote a dialogical philosophy, rather than a fusion or monolithic philosophy, premised on the fact of diversity and the broader horizon of human thought which interfacing creates (see Mall 2000; Janz 2016). As Hountondji himself has noted with some dismay, his campaign against ethnophilosophy has not succeeded in obliterating it, which can only mean that: they [contemporary ethnophilosophical works] meet a real need within the African academic community itself and are not just intended for an external audience which means that these works are not as extroverted as I initially asserted but at least to some extent an African way to meet the Socratic demand: “Know yourself”. (Hountondji 2018, p. 11)

Hountondji’s candid confession validates the idea of an African philosophy  – rather than Philosophy in Africa – with multiple sources but with ethnophilosophy standing out as its wellspring. It is in knowing the wellspring of African ideas that African philosophers can be better placed to rise to the greatest challenge facing them in the twenty-first century which is making an original contribution to world philosophical heritage.

3  J anz’s Challenge to African Philosophers: The Proximity of the Wellspring Making an original contribution, with intercultural philosophy gaining ground as the Global South becomes more assertive, involves transcending the particular through the universalisation of this same particular. Identifying a wellspring exposes African scholars to a source that is primordial, worthy of celebration rather than eliciting the shame that so consumes philosophers like Matolino. With the source known and acknowledged, as Hountondji himself appears to have finally done, African philosophers can confidently set about projecting their concepts as universally applicable just as their Western counterparts have been doing for ages. Janz first noted the necessity of African philosophers locating the wellspring of the concepts they use so that their Africanness can be better accentuated.

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Aristotle famously identified wonder as that which spurs the enterprise of philosophy. Chimakonam (2015, 9) identified elements of frustration as playing a role in spurring African philosophy in view of the charged political and racial environment in which modern African philosophy emerged. Chimakonam’s idea of frustration can be reduced to Aristotle’s wonder since the African philosopher confronting racist opinions must wonder why unfounded racist beliefs have taken a strong hold on otherwise brilliant people and proceed to delve into her own mind, at the level of wonder not tainted with political considerations. This wonder can in turn be understood ontologically in terms of there being something that arouses a feeling of amazement or the affect of curiosity and directs behaviour (see Gallagher et  al. 2015, 118) and cognitively in terms of the reasons and concepts that clarify the feeling or affect. The activity of thinking always reveals the wonder element that directs its trajectory, however significant the major political agenda that shapes thinking. African philosophical thinking is, therefore, spurred by ontological and cognitive wonder. But the term “wellspring” does not merely connote a relationship between a knower and the thing known; it directly denotes a fundamental source of things known. This source is fundamental in the sense of its capacity to cause things known to be defined as having special characteristics. In the context of African philosophy, traditional worldview, or descriptive ethnophilosophy, functions as a fundamental source, although by no means the only source of African philosophy. When Janz uses the term “wellspring” in relation to African philosophy, it is in the sense of the fundamental source of a thing known. Janz (2016, 48) writes specifically: One project I would love to see African philosophers engage in would be a kind of philosophical genealogy, a return to the source. By that I do not mean another attempt to locate philosophy in some culturally ancient form, but rather, to think about the unique well-­ spring of concepts that continues to this day for African philosophy. If philosophy begins in wonder, what does that mean in a place like Africa...? Does it need to have the implicit transcendentalism of thaumazein or the unprecedented nature of cognitive wonder, or is there another wellspring of conceptual formation?

Janz’s challenge requires unpacking. Janz uses the notion of “cognitive wonder” technically to indicate the possibility of “unprecedented” experience, that is, wonder as an original phenomenon of the mind that can be grasped with a concept furnished solely by the experience, with no necessary relation to other concepts. This understanding of cognitive wonder is mystical and cannot be discussed in detail here. The cognitive wonder that necessarily accompanies ontological wonder and which is integral to the African philosopher’s thinking process involves the rational awareness of having a particular emotion of amazement at an unusual state of affairs. Ontological wonder may follow directly from the fact of thinkers of genius like Kant, Hegel, and Hume holding outlandish racist beliefs, while the cognitive wonder will involve the search for a more complete awareness of the amazement, leading to sustained philosophical activity. Neither ontological nor cognitive wonder can function as a wellspring of African philosophical concepts. Clearly, Janz is aware of the ever-present temptation of conflating the ontological component of wonder (thaumazein) and the cognitive (in the ordinary nontechnical

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sense) component with a wellspring. But realising that the idea of a wellspring demands that which is decisive in the formation of the character of knowledge, he asks if there is another dimension of a wellspring in the African context. The idea of ethnophilosophy is already suggesting itself to Janz because he warns that: “By that I do not mean another attempt to locate philosophy in some culturally ancient form, but rather, to think about the unique well-spring of concepts that continues to this day for African philosophy”. He seems unwilling to endorse ethnophilosophy, perhaps worried about the reaction of scholars like Matolino whose grouse appears to be basically against the very term ethnophilosophy and the racist history it evokes rather than any seriously reasoned view of ethnophilosophy’s demerit. If ethnophilosophy is not the candidate for the title of “wellspring of African philosophical concepts”, what else can be? It cannot be science or logic in general or common sense since these are too general to give African philosophy the character that distinguishes it from other philosophical traditions in the space of intercultural and comparative philosophy, what Chimakonam will call a globally expanded space of thought (Chimakonam 2015) where dialogical philosophy emerges as the true universal philosophy. This wellspring also cannot be Western philosophy or Asian philosophy although these two traditions may be seen as sources of African philosophy. I am of the view that ethnophilosophy is precisely this wellspring of African philosophy because, as a special source, it is culture-specific and can stamp the character of uniqueness on thought-products that clings to these products even after they have transcended ethnophilosophy by attaining an abstraction distance which causes particularities to get lost in generalities. In the next section, I will show how the concepts of missing links and be-ing becoming developed by the innovative Asouzu and Ramose, respectively, attain an abstraction distance that detaches them from ethnophilosophy even as these concepts can still be traced back to ethnophilosophy. Previously, I briefly attempted a philosophical genealogy of sense-phenomenalism (see Sect 2.2). By “abstraction distance”, I mean thinking at a level that goes decisively beyond the ethnophilosophical foundation of thought to reach general claims and conclusions. The interculturality context anchors the idea of a new humanism that finds a solidarity basis in diversity. The new humanism is not an African humanism, an Asian humanism, or a Western humanism per se but a representative humanism forged out of differences, a synthesis of diverse sociocultural insights and values in the globalised twenty-first century (Rüsen 2009, 17–18). This new humanism supports the claim that ethnophilosophy provides African philosophy with a distinctive character which other sources of philosophy can only further refine and modify. These other sources, which I have repeatedly mentioned for emphasis, include science, general logic, common sense, Western and non-Western philosophies, and religion. Yet, one notices that interculturality, which globalisation sets in sharp relief, risks being exposed as over-optimistic in view of the relative indifference of Western philosophers to non-Western thought-traditions. Janz (2016, 45) highlights this problem when he asks rhetorically with regard to Africa’s invitation of the West to dialogue: “We can say that this interaction ought to happen, but what if no one cares to make

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it happen? Or what if the care is only on one side? It remains the case that African philosophers are far more open to engaging Western philosophy than the reverse”. I believe Bryan W. Van Norden (2017) supplies the perfect answer. According to Van Norden, Western philosophy risks becoming an intellectual curiosity if it ignores interculturality in view of the increasing assertiveness of the Global South (cf. Hidayat 2015) and the political ascendency of minority groups in the United States and elsewhere in Europe. Bryan W. Van Norden (2017, 9) insists that Western intellectual insularity demands that Western philosophy departments change their names to departments of Anglo-European philosophy. In other words, the future that awaits an isolated Western philosophy is the ethnophilosophical fate that African philosophy is today trying to overcome. Asouzu and Ramose, like other notable African philosophers, critically explored the ethnophilosophical resources of African ethnic groups. However, these two philosophers went further to show that philosophical concepts motivated by ethnophilosophy can radically transcend the particular and lay claims to universalism.

3.1  A  souzu: A Philosophical Genealogy of the Concept of Missing Links The concept of missing links marks the highest generalisation in the thought of Asouzu and is pivotal for his optimistic philosophy. Asouzu conceives the universe in dialectical terms. In his monistic universe, reality is constituted by missing links. Missing links presuppose the imperfect realisation of the universe as each link requires another link or many links to become either complete or more complete. Asouzu’s philosophy is ultimately an optimistic perspective because he believes that the perfection or completion of missing links is possible.4 Before explaining what a missing link is, Asouzu asserts that his philosophy of complementarism (ibuanyidanda) is: [A] philosophy of categorisation, sorting, harmonisation, pairing-up, and complementation. In complementarity, we seek to relate world immanent realities to one another in the most natural, mutual, harmonious and compatible ways possible...to allow being assume its natural completeness as the joy that unifies all realities. Herein is rooted the joy of being as the transcendent joyous experience of the ultimate foundation of reality. In this way, complementation is a philosophy that seeks to consider things in the significance of their singularity and not in the exclusiveness of their otherness in view of the joy that gives completion to all missing links of reality. (Asouzu 2004, 39. Original italics)

Specifically, missing links are: 4  In this regard, Asouzu’s dialectics is similar to Hegel’s dialectics. A major difference is that Asouzu’s dialectics looks beyond the play of theses and antitheses in oppositional terms and regards theses and antitheses as fundamentally interacting missing links in search of a grand synthesis. Asouzu’s dialectics emphasises complementarism in line with African communitarianism while the Hegelian dialectics emphasises opposition.

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[T]he diverse units that make up an entity within the framework of the whole and as they are complementarily related. They are all the imaginable, fragments, units, components, and combinations that enter into our understanding of any aspect of our world. They are also all the units and combinations necessary in the conceptualisation of an entity or of the whole. This missing links are, for example, thoughts and the thoughts of thoughts. They are diverse modes of manifestation of being in history. They are categories and the categories of categories. They are the units and the units of units, entities and the entities of entities, things and the things of things. They are ideas and the ideas of ideas, etc. as these can ­possibly be abstracted and related to each other as conditions of possibility of their perfectibility in a harmonious systemic manner. (Asouzu 2004, 277–278)

More precisely, complementarism views “all things that exist as missing links of reality” (Asouzu 2011, 102). The radical claim that whatever exists is a missing link of reality is different from the fairly straightforward claim that “some things are links of reality”. The former holds where interaction is a constant process that breaks down rigid borders, while the latter holds where borders clearly demarcate spheres of influence. I will return to the logical conundrum when I take up the issue of the wellspring of the concept of missing links, for both the radical and conservative claims implicate Afro-­ communitarianism and, ultimately, traditional Igbo worldview (ethnophilosophy). Asouzu regards the sphere of human interaction as a historical given. However, he goes beyond the finiteness of the historical to arrive at a monistic ontology that admits of the infinite world outside human subjectivity. The finite and infinite worlds are ultimately one, with the former stretching into the latter as reality advances dialectically towards perfection or completion. The possibility of this perfection, according to Asouzu, is adequate cause for human beings as conscious (missing) links to experience an intellectual-cum-emotional state in the world that he calls the joy of being, or jide ka iji (Asouzu 2011, 106). This joy is apprehended in the unity of consciousness, the coming to the realisation that all things are missing links and that the destiny of the universe is the achievement of perfection in history within the fullest or infinite (transhistorical) reality. Jide ka iji is an intellectual attitude in its cognitive dimension of a dispassionate awareness of the possibilities of progress which can be verified in the world by the various achievements of the human spirit. It is an emotional attitude in its immediacy as a spontaneous reaction to positive developments in the world that reinforce the conviction that all may be well even though all is not well now. It is in this sense that the concept of missing links underlines Asouzu’s optimism. A critical exploration of complementarism is, however, beyond the scope of this chapter. One may now ask where the concept is coming from. The answer is that it is coming from Afro-communitarianism, the widely held view among African philosophers that the individual is fundamentally a social being who realises her fullest potentials only when subordinating her interests to the interests of the community in a way that adequately reconciles individualist and communalist privileges (Agada 2019b). Afro-communitarianism also entails a monistic ontology since the unification model of the human community is extended to physical nature, thus bringing the spheres of living things and non-living things together (Senghor 1964; Nyerere 1968; Mbiti 1969; Gbadegesin 1991; Menkiti 2004; Asouzu 2007; Agada 2019b).

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Here lies the source of the idea that a link is any existent thing, be it living or non-­ living, thought or feeling, actual or abstract. Reality is dialectical. The dialectics implies that existent things interact dynamically. The very nature of independent things is, ab initio, an anticipation of complementarism. Consequently, an understanding of things as simply discrete essences rigidly obeying the law of contradiction, a human intellectual construct intended to help structure reality, is a mistaken position. A truer picture of reality emerges only when things are “viewed and measured within the framework of the totality of reality” (Asouzu 2007, 189). This is the spirit of ibuanyidanda which literally means “no task is impossible for danda the ant”, an Igbo saying that alludes to the industriousness of various species of social ants that work together to accomplish complex tasks. While tracing the origin of complementarism, Asouzu delves into Igbo worldviews and an analysis of common Igbo wise sayings as well as terms in the Igbo language. Uwa ezuoke (the world is incomplete), onye ka ozuru (who is perfect?), ihe ukwu kpe azu (the greatest events are in the future), and njiko ka (togetherness is the greatest virtue) are traditional Igbo values that constitute the kernel and raw materials of Asouzu’s optimistic philosophy (Asouzu 2004, 108–109; cf. Agada 2019a, 14). In Asouzu’s attempt to avoid acknowledging his debt to ethnophilosophy, which he rates low, he attributes the ultimate source of his philosophy of missing links to anonymous Igbo philosophers who supposedly practised complementarism in their time. But he is unable to identify these philosophers. Since the proverbs and wise sayings he utilises and the language he analyses are the collective property of the Igbo ethnic group, it is apparent that he found in ethnophilosophy a wellspring of philosophical concepts (Agada 2019a, 13–14). The unjustified stigmatisation of ethnophilosophy deprives him of the courage to acknowledge the obvious. But like other philosophers who denounced ethnophilosophy only to turn around and incorporate elements of it into their thoughts, Asouzu is forced to live with the great contradiction. The African view of the universe as dialectical, or rather complementary, validates the claim that everything, rather than some things, is a missing link of reality. Chimakonam’s articulation of a logical system that accounts for the African communitarian perspective within the broader purview of classical logic is instructive. In Chimakonam’s Ezumezu logical system, the truth and falsity values act as subcontraries rather than contradictories because there is a third value (called ezumezu) in which truth and falsity merge and become complementary (Chimakonam 2019, 136). The Ezumezu system de-absolutises the classical laws of thought on the assumption that the classical laws undermine “dynamism and short-changes other facets of human reasoning by being overtly deterministic” (Chimakonam 2019, 138). To logically underpin a system such as Asouzu’s, Chimakonam adds the integrativist and inclusivist laws of njikọka, nmekọka, and ọnọna-etiti to the classical laws of identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle. The law of njikọka acknowledges the interconnected nature of things that makes an existent thing a necessary link in a network even while retaining its identity. The law of nmekọka broadens the context of necessary interconnection to encompass complementarism,

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while the law of ọnọna-etiti contextualises logic by determining spheres where excluded middle cannot hold absolutely (Chimakonam 2019, 138–140). Applied to Asouzu’s major concept, the claim that all existent things are missing links means that, in a monistic system characterised by incompleteness, the ezumezu phase of objects constantly comes into play as these objects strive to complete themselves by taking from others what they lack. In their discrete phases, objects can be rigidly classified and the rule “some things are missing links” hold. Yet, commitment to the complementary ontological framework means that objects do cross their individual borders and actively interact. Their incompleteness already anticipates the ezumezu phase. Thus, objects are no longer independent entities but become interconnected entities and, therefore, missing links of reality. Entities are not “missing” in the sense of absence but rather in terms of their incompletion. Neither Asouzu nor Chimakonam, nor Ramose, as I will soon show, implies that all things become one; they rather insist that although things exists as individuals, they are so constituted that their individuality is an anticipation of interconnection and complementarism.

3.2  R  amose: A Philosophical Genealogy of the Concept of Be-ing Becoming In the opening paragraph of his landmark work African Philosophy Through Ubuntu, Ramose (1999, 49) declares confidently: “Ubuntu is the root of African philosophy. The be-ing of an African in the universe is inseparably anchored upon ubuntu...the African tree of knowledge stems from ubuntu...Ubuntu then is the wellspring flowing with African ontology and epistemology”. Ramose is directly identifying ethnophilosophy as the wellspring of African philosophical ideas. Ubuntu as a term captures the essential complementarity and communalism of traditional African worldviews. In this sense, ubuntu is similar to concepts from other parts of Africa like the Igbo term igwebuike and the Idoma term opiatoha that both imply cooperative togetherness or complementarity (Agada 2019b, 298). The ubu in ubuntu can be roughly translated as “commonality” or “universality” of a thing, while ntu means life force or life principle (Weidtmann 2019, 135). Consequently, for Ramose, ubuntu means universal being or being in its universality, that which is shared by all things and stands as a common denominator. Based on his analysis of the Bantu term ubuntu, he comes to an eventist or processual understanding of be-ing becoming (with a hyphen) as distinct from being (without a hyphen) which is a static rendering of the authentic be-ing becoming by human language. Ramose’s conception of be-ing becoming is eventist because, like Asouzu, he does not deny the existence of individuals. As noted earlier, Asouzu believes that individuals are so constituted that their structure anticipates a motive world rather than the static universe language seeks to create for logic to impose its categories.

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For Ramose, the logic of language always seeks in vain to fragment a reality that is fundamentally a constant process of be-ing becoming. Be-ing becoming is the permanent event state of reality in which all things participate. He argues against opposing be-ing becoming with becoming. There is no real opposition since being (or be-ing becoming, for the emphasis on change) as what is most real is a constant change (becoming). The introduction of the opposition by a non-rheomodic, or border-fixing, human language, according to Ramose, indicates the wish of reason for be-ing becoming to actually exist as becoming be! (the static thing conceived as being). A rheomodic language replaces the verb in conventional language with the verbal noun or the gerund, which reflects continuing activity (Ramose 1999, 57). Ramose thinks that this error arises because we identify order with the be! and chaos with becoming. In reality, however, there is no opposition. Be-ing and becoming are one. Ramose does not prioritise chaos although he recognises its primordiality. The phenomenon of a kind of inherent change that promises order is what fascinates him rather than change in its direct connotation of disorder. He, indeed, ponders over the possibility that the idea of order is an arbitrary imposition of human reason on the fundamentally unstable constitution of things given that the nature of reality is change rather than becoming in transition to a static be! Yet, he also wonders, loudly, whether an internal logic of be-ing becoming necessitates the emergence of order out of chaos. Ramose (1999, 55) writes: But since the projected order is based upon an unbridgeable opposition between be-ing and becoming, how then can “order” come out of chaos? The question cannot be answered unless we ground “order” in the very experience of fundamental disequilibrium in be-ing. By so doing we may well hold that order not only can but does indeed come out of apparent chaos.

A radical interpretation of Ramose that implies the rejection of individuality will mean he does not subscribe to Asouzu’s notion of missing links but rather the idea of lost links. This is the case since incompleteness is no longer the basic problem in be-ing becoming; incompleteness is then replaced by flux as the totality of be-ing becoming. The possibility of order in a universe of striving and change is, accordingly, denied. Ramose will then have to explain away the fact of individuality. Realising the difficulty a commitment to a radical understanding of be-ing becoming as mere flux introduces into his ubuntu ontology, he tries to locate the basis of a possible order in the disorder of be-ing becoming. That which is in flux does change states, meaning that flux is not absolute. Be-ing must become and flux must recognise borders for be-ing becoming to be what it is, a universe of possibilities. The transgression of borders is what creates possibilities, not their elimination. According to Ramose, the umuntu, or human be-ing, is a specific manifestation of ubu-ntu, or be-ing becoming. The human be-ing: Umuntu is the specific entity which continues to conduct an inquiry into being, experience, knowledge, and truth. This is an activity rather than an act. It is an ongoing process impossible to stop unless motion itself is stopped. On this reasoning, ubu- may be regarded as be-ing becoming and this evidently implies the idea of motion...-ntu may be construed as the temporarily having become...Because motion is the principle of be-ing for ubuntu, do-­

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ing takes precedence over the doer without at the same time imputing either radical separation or irreconcilable opposition between the two. (Ramose 1999, p. 51)

Here Ramose clearly accepts the claim that individuals exist. He only disagrees with the claim that borders are permanently fixed. Indeed, he is bold enough to say process precedes the individual. Denial of individuality will not only mean that entities are permanently lost links and reality a search for these lost links (without the knowledge of when the links were lost forthcoming) but also that interaction is not necessary. But the system he describes is an interactive, complementaristic system, not mere flux. The eventist or processual understanding of be-ing becoming opens the door to dynamic interaction between individuals  – a breach in the borders appearing to separate individuals  – leading to a new horizon of possibilities for ontology and ethics in relation to the human being. Human beings and everything constituting reality become Asouzu’s missing links, and the logic that validates the resulting interconnected universe is Chimakonam’s ezumezu logic. In this universe, humans have a shared responsibility of care towards one another and the physical environment since both humans and the physical environment are actuated by the same ntu, or life force. Ramose’s remarkable and highly original conception of be-ing becoming transcends the ethnophilosophy that birthed it and lays claim to universalism. While Ramose has not attempted to build an elaborate philosophical system based on his idea of be-ing becoming, the admirable level of generality the articulation of the concept attained is yet another indication of the error of stigmatising ethnophilosophy and an invitation to African philosophers to pay closer attention to the orientation. Such attention will be rewarded with the discovery of original concepts that become building blocks of philosophical systems that enable intercultural and comparative philosophising in a continually globalising world where a new humanism is emerging out of the legitimate difference existing between cultures.

4  Conclusion In this chapter, I developed the idea that ethnophilosophy is the most worthy candidate for the title of “wellspring of African philosophical concepts” while acknowledging that there are other sources like science, general logic, common sense, and religion. I premised the special status of ethnophilosophy as a wellspring of African philosophy on the fact that, more than any other source, it has the capacity to imbue African philosophy with the character that helps distinguish the African thought-­ tradition from Western and Asian thought-traditions, for instance, at a time of rising interest in interculturality. I pointed out that the stubborn persistence of ethnophilosophical currents in the thought of some of the most productive African philosophers indicates the usefulness of ethnophilosophy as a wellspring of African philosophical concepts. In arguing for the de-stigmatisation of ethnophilosophy in a globalising century where difference forms the basis of solidarity, I attempted a

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genealogy of the philosophical concepts of missing links and be-ing becoming formulated by Asouzu and Ramose. I showed that these concepts not only attained a universal status but also have their root in ethnophilosophy. Thus, the charge that ethnophilosophy is the bane of African philosophy is finally dismissed, and African philosophers are challenged to usher in an era of innovative thinking that acknowledges the place of ethnophilosophy in African philosophy while radically transcending this misunderstood current.

References Agada, Ada. 2015. Existence and consolation: Reinventing ontology, gnosis and values in African philosophy. St Paul: Paragon House. ———. 2019a. The sense in which ethno-philosophy can remain relevant in 21st century African philosophy. Phronimon 20 (1–20): 10.25159/2413-3086/4158. ———. 2019b. The afro-communitarian framework for tackling financial corruption in Nigeria. In Combating the menace of corruption in Nigeria: A multi-disciplinary conversation, ed. Akogwu Agada, 286–305. Awka: Black Towers. Appiah, A.K. 1992. In my father’s house: Africa in the philosophy of culture. New York: Oxford University Press. Asouzu, Innocent I. 2004. The method and principles of complementary reflection in and beyond African philosophy. Calabar: University of Calabar Press. ———. 2007. Ibuarụ: The heavy burden of philosophy beyond African philosophy. Zurich: LIT Verlag GmbH & Co. ———. 2011. ‘Ibuanyidanda’ and the philosophy of essence. Filosofia Theoretica 1 (1): 79–118. Bernasconi, Robert. 1997. African philosophy’s challenge to continental philosophy. In Postcolonial African philosophy: A critical reader, ed. E.C. Eze, 183–196. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Chimakonam, Jonathan O. 2015. Dating and periodization questions in African philosophy. In Atụọlụ Ọmalụ: Some unanswered questions in contemporary African philosophy, ed. Jonathan O. Chimakonam, 9–34. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. ———. 2019. Ezumezu: A system of logic for African philosophy and studies. Cham: Springer. Chimakonam, Jonathan O., Uti O. Egbai, Samuel T. Segun, and Aribiah D. Attoe. 2019. New conversations on the problems of identity, consciousness and mind. Cham: Springer. Diop, Cheikh A. 1974. The African origin of civilisation: Myth or reality. Trans. Mercer Cook. New York: Lawrence Hill & Co. Etieyibo, E.E., and J.O. Chimakonam. 2018. The state of African philosophy in Africa. In Method, substance, and the future of African philosophy, ed. E.E.  Etieyibo, 71–90. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-­3-­319-­70226-­1. Gallagher, Shaun, Bruce Janz, Lauren Reinerman, Jӧrg Trempler, and Patricia Bockelman. 2015. The phenomenology of unprecedented experience: Ontological and cognitive wonder. In A Neurophenomenology of awe and wonder: Toward a non-reductionist cognitive science, ed. Shaun Gallagher, Bruce Janz, Lauren Reinerman, Jӧrg Trempler, and Patricia Bockelman, 115–129. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Gbadegesin, Segun. 1991. African philosophy, traditional Yoruba philosophy and contemporary African realities. New York: Peter Lang. Gyekye, Kwame. 2010. Person and community in African thought. In Person and community: Ghanaian philosophical studies, I, ed. Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye, 102–122. Washington, DC: Council for Research in Value and Philosophy.

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Hallen, Barry. 2010. “Ethnophilosophy” redefined? Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya 2 (1): 73–85. http://ajol.info/index.php/tp/index. ———. 2016. Some comments on Africanising a philosophy curriculum. South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (4): 401–403. https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2016.1238259. Hallen, Barry, and J.O. Sodipo. 1997. Knowledge, belief, and witchcraft: Analytic experiments in African philosophy. Rev. ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Hidayat, Ferry. 2015. On the struggle for recognition of southeast Asian and regional philosophy. Prajnā Vihāra 16 (2): 35–52. Hountondji, Paulin. 1996. African philosophy: Myth and reality. 2nd ed. Trans. H.  Evans. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. ———. 2002. The struggle for meaning: Reflections on philosophy, culture and democracy. Athens, OH: Ohio University Centre for International Studies. ———. 2018. How African is philosophy in Africa? Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture, and Religions 7 (3): 9–18. https://doi.org/10.4314/ft.v7i3.2. Ikuenobe, Polycarp. 2004. Logical positivism, analytic method, and criticisms of ethnophilosophy. Metaphilosophy 35 (4): 479–503. Imafidon, Elvis, Matolino Bernard, L. Uchenna Ogbonnaya, Ada Agada, Aribiah D. Attoe, Fainos Mangena, and Edwin Etieyibo. 2019. Are we finished with the ethnophilosophy debate? A multi-perspective conversation. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture, and Religions 8 (2): 111–138. https://doi.org/10.4314/ft.v8i2.9. James, George. 1954. Stolen legacy: Greek philosophy is stolen Egyptian philosophy. New York: Philosophical Library. Janz, Bruce. 2016. Conversation in place and about place: Response to Chimakonam, ‘conversational philosophy as a new school of thought in African philosophy: A conversation with Bruce Janz on the concept of “philosophical space”’. Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies 1: 41–50. https://doi.org/10.2979/jourworlphil.1.1.04. Ki-Zerbo, J. 1981. In General introduction to general history of Africa I: Methodology and African prehistory, ed. J. Ki-Zerbo, 1–23. California: University of California Press. Majeed, Hasskei M. 2017. Reincarnation: A question in the African philosophy of mind. Pretoria: UNISA Press. Mall, R.A. 2000. Intercultural philosophy. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Mangena, Fainos. 2014. Ethno-philosophy is rational: A reply to two famous critics. Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya 6 (2): 23–38. https://doi. org/10.4314/tp.v6i2.3. Masolo, D.A. 2004. African philosophers in the Greco-Roman era. In A companion to African philosophy, ed. Kwasi Wiredu, 50–65. Oxford: Blackwell. Matolino, Bernard. 2011. Tempels’ philosophical racialism. South African Journal of Philosophy 30 (3): 330–342. ———. 2015. Universalism and African philosophy. South African Journal of Philosophy 34 (4): 433–440. https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2015.1116331. Mazrui, Ali A. 1986. The Africans: A triple heritage. New York: Little, Brown & Co. Mbiti, J.S. 1969. African religions and philosophy. London: Heinemann. Menkiti, Ifeanyi. 1984. Person and Community in African Traditional Thought. In African philosophy: An introduction, ed. Richard A.  Wright, 3rd ed., 171–181. Lanham, MD: America University Press. ———. 2004. On the normative conception of a person. In A companion to African philosophy, ed. Kwasi Wiredu, 324–331. Oxford: Blackwell. Molefe, Motsamai. 2016. A critique of Kwasi Wiredu’s humanism and impartiality. Acta Academica 48 (1): 91–110. https://doi.org/10.18820/24150479/aa48i1.5. Nyerere, Julius K. 1968. Ujamaa: Essays on socialism. Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press. Obenga, Théophile. 2004. African Philosophy: The Pharaonic Period: 2780–330BC. Trans. Ayi Kwei Armah. Popenguine, Senegal: Per Ankh.

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Ogbonnaya, U.L. 2018. What makes African philosophy African: A conversation with Aribiah David Attoe on “the foundational myth of ethnophilosophy”. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture, and Religions 7 (30): 94–108. https://doi.org/10.4314/ft.v7i3.7. Okere, Theophilus. 1983. African philosophy: A historico-hermeneutical investigation of the conditions of its possibilities. Lanham: University Press of America. Okere, Theophilus, C.A.  Njoku, and Réne Devisch. 2005. All knowledge is first of all local knowledge: An introduction. African Development 30 (3): 1–19. https://doi.org/10.4314/ ad.v30i3.22226. Onyewuenyi, I.C. 1993. The African origin of Greek philosophy: An exercise in Afrocentrism. Nsukka: University of Nigeria Press. Osha, Sanya. 2011. Postethnophilosophy. Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi. Osuagwu, I.M. 1999. African historical reconstruction: A methodological option for African studies. Owerri: Amamihe. Ramose, Mogobe B. 1999. African philosophy through Ubuntu. Harare: Mond Books. Rettová, Alena. 2002. The role of African languages in African philosophy. Rue Descartes 2 (36): 129–150. https://doi.org/10.3917/rdes.036.0129. Rüsen, Jӧrn. 2009. Humanism in the era of globalization: Ideas on a new cultural orientation. In Humanism in intercultural perspective: Experiences and expectations, ed. Jӧrn Rüsen and Henner Laass, 11–19. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag. Senghor, L.S. 1964. On African socialism. Trans. Mercer Cook. London: Pall Mall. Serequeberhan, Tsenay. 1994. The hermeneutics of African philosophy. New York: Routledge. Sodipo, J.O. 1975. Philosophy in Africa today. Thought and Practice: Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya 2 (2): 115–123. Tempels, Placide. 1959. Bantu philosophy. Trans. Colin King. Paris: Presence Africaine. www. congoforum.be/upldocs/TempelsBantuPhilEnglish1959.pdf. Van Norden, Bryan W. 2017. Taking back philosophy: A multicultural manifesto. New York: Columbia University Press. Weidtmann, Niels. 2019. The historical dimension of Ubuntu in everyday life. In Ubuntu and the everyday in Africa, ed. James Ogude and Unifier Dyer, 135–155. Trenton: Africa World Press. Wiredu, Kwasi. 1980. Philosophy and an African culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 1996. Cultural universals and particulars: An African perspective. Bloomington/ Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

What Is ‘Ethno’ and ‘Philosophy’ in Ethno-Philosophy? Diana-Abasi Ibanga

Abstract  There is an ongoing debate in the African philosophical place regarding the issue of relevance of ethno-philosophy to modern thinking in Africa. On the one end, the universalists argue that ethno-philosophy does not bear any relevance to modern African thinking because of its reliance on traditional thought in its methodology. On the other end, the particularists argue that ethno-philosophy remains relevant to modern thinking as the foundation and source of African thought in the present. The aim of this chapter is to resolve this issue. I do this in two ways. First, I determine that the question of relevance arises because of the poor understanding of the relation between ethno and philosophy. I resolve this issue via a conceptual analysis. I demonstrate that ethno and philosophy are mutually independent concepts, which are in arumaristic relationship. This position is different from earlier views that ethno and philosophy are mutually dependent concepts in a complementary relationship. Second, I demonstrate that ethno-philosophy is a bridge between the traditional and modernity, which allows the traditional to contribute to modernity. I use Epistemic Progression Curve (Fig.  3) and Concept Conversion Model (Fig. 4) to demonstrate how pre-philosophical and non-philosophic notions transform and progress from ethno to philosophy. Drawing from these, I show that ethno-­ philosophy is relevant to modern thinking in Africa and beyond insofar as its methodology remains philosophical. Keywords  Ethno-philosophy · African philosophy · Philosophy of culture · Traditional wisdom · Philosophical methodology · Pre-philosophy · Non-philosophy

D.-A. Ibanga (*) Department of Philosophy, University of Calabar, Calabar, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Agada (ed.), Ethnophilosophy and the Search for the Wellspring of African Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78897-1_3

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1  Introduction The last millennium came to a close with a decisive conclusion that there is indeed African philosophy. This conclusion followed from more than half a century of arguments (usually designated as the period of the Great Debate) on the existence or otherwise of African philosophy. Two strands were obvious in the debate. First, there were those who argued that there is no regional philosophy – such as African philosophy, European philosophy, American philosophy and so on (Hountondji 1996; Jones 2001). The argument was that philosophy is philosophy irrespective of the nationality of the philosopher or her cultural leaning. The methods of doing philosophy are the same all over the world and could not vary based on geography (Appiah 1992; Hountondji 1996). Further, the origin of the philosophy is not important; what matters is the method. Philosophers, therefore, are world citizens, that is, people who cannot be identified with any intellectual tradition and who can be identified with global intellectual culture. Second, however, were those who argued that there is indeed African philosophy just as there is European and American philosophies (Momoh 1991; Oluwole 1999). The argument was that philosophy is place-­ specific and culture-bound. Method of doing philosophy is not universal, but it is informed by its place of origin and the logic of reasoning in the particular place, and this logic of reasoning is different in different ethnographies (Etuk 2002). In this direction, a philosopher may be identified as an African philosopher because of her logic of reasoning and cultural specifics that bound her thought. It is these logic, method and cultural milieu that form the character of her philosophy and give identity to it as either African or European philosophy (Azenabor 2002). The place-­ specific elements cannot be neglected, ignored or transcended by the thinker who appeals to reason as a means of resolving local or global issues. The first group (known as the universalists) and the second group (known as the particularists) generated much of the debate that heated up the African philosophical place for more than half a century. The Great Debate polarized African philosophy for so long and led to the neglect of broader philosophical themes in the continent. The echoes of the Great Debate are still resonating in the works of emerging young African philosophers, which may constitute what may be called the second wave of the Great Debate. This new group to the debate emerged in the last decade. The second wave of the debate is not as polemical as the first wave because the debate is not about identity of African philosophy or its existence as such. In the second wave, the debate has shifted to the legitimate method of doing African philosophy. All parties to the second debate agree that there is indeed a philosophy with the identity ‘African’ (Imafidon et  al. 2019).1 However, the contentious issue

 The two parties in the second debate are still identified as universalists and particularists, respectively. Although Ogbonnaya (2018; cf. Imafidon et al. 2019) classifies the debaters into universalists, particularists and foundationalists, I prefer the universalist-particularist distinction popular in the literature. 1

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borders on the philosophical legitimacy and relevance of the method of doing modern African philosophy (Ibanga 2017a). On one end, it is argued that ‘authentic’ African philosophy must be based on the ‘universal’ character of philosophy, that is, criticality, rigour, criticism, etc. (Imafidon et  al. 2019). Those holding this viewpoint explicitly deny ethno-­ philosophy a place in ‘authentic’ African philosophy (sometimes described as modern African philosophy) and reject its methodology as non-philosophical (Attoe 2016; Bisong 2019). They concede that ethno-philosophy was relevant during the beginning of African philosophy as a professional discipline but now cannot be relevant to modern African thought. For them, what makes philosophy African is African themes/issues, not the method. It is the African issues that a philosophy addresses that make a philosophy African. The methodology of philosophy remains universal. On the other end, it is argued that ‘authentic’ African philosophy must be based on its ‘particular’ character, that is, cultural and traditional logic of knowing (Ogbonnaya 2018). They maintain that although African philosophy must be critical, rigorous and interrogatory to merit the name philosophy, it must adopt ethno-­ philosophical approach to resolving perennial philosophical issues to merit the name African (Mangena 2014a). For them, ethno-philosophy remains relevant to the modern African thought both as a method (Mangena 2014b) and as the ore to mine raw materials for modern philosophy (Agada 2015, 2019). It is not the issues that a philosophy addresses that makes it African because African philosophy must address global issues but the method with its logic that makes it African philosophy. It is obvious that the central focus of the first and second waves of the Great Debate is ethno-philosophy. While the first wave centred on its legitimacy to be called philosophy at all, the second wave centred on its relevance to modern philosophy. In the first wave, the universalists denied African philosophy as non-­ philosophical because of its appearance as ethno-philosophy, which was not identified with rationalism (Oruka 1990; Bodurin 1991; Appiah 1992; Hountondji 1996). The particularists had countered that rationalism is not an African thing and that African thought is rooted in affectionism, such that rather than criticality identified with rationalism, African consciousness is non-critical but conciliatory and non-polemical (Senghor 1995; Etuk 2002; Ijiomah 2014). Nevertheless, African thought is rational even though it is affectionate (Momoh 1991; Oluwole 1999). In the second wave, the universalists and particularists are not bothered about the philosophical legitimacy of ethno-philosophy but its relevance to modern thinking in Africa. While the universalists argue that ethno-philosophy is outdated and anachronistic, the particularists argue that ethno-philosophy remains relevant as the wellspring of African philosophy (Imafidon et al. 2019). This chapter focuses on resolving the issue of relevance of ethno-philosophy to modern thinking, particularly in Africa. I do this in two ways. First, I determine that the question of relevance arises because of the poor understanding of the relation between ethno and philosophy. I resolve this issue via a conceptual analysis. I demonstrate that ethno and philosophy are mutually independent concepts, which are in arumaristic relationship. This position is different from earlier views that ethno and

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philosophy are mutually dependent concepts in a complementary relationship. Second, I demonstrate that ethno-philosophy is a bridge between the traditional and modernity, which allows the traditional to contribute to modernity. I use Epistemic Progression Curve (Fig. 3) and Concept Conversion Model (Fig. 4) to demonstrate how pre-philosophical and non-philosophic notions transform and progress from ethno to philosophy. Drawing from these, I show that ethno-philosophy is relevant to modern thinking in Africa and beyond insofar as its methodology remains philosophical.

2  Ethno-Philosophy: A Conceptual Analysis Ethno-philosophy refers to a body of philosophical abstractions drawn from cultural relics such as proverbs, fables, taboos, artefacts, indigenous languages, etc. The concept of ethno-philosophy was first introduced into literature by Kwame Nkrumah and popularized by Paulin Hountondji – who used it as an umbrella term to describe the kind of philosophy that was emerging in the works of early African academic philosophers, which was mainly ethnographic representation of worldviews of African traditional communities (Ibanga 2018a). Since then, the concept has gained increasing attention and was the major subject of contention in the Great Debate. Many African thinkers have continued to appeal to it as the uniquely African philosophy, whereas some have disputed that ethno-philosophy lacks the unique characteristics that define an intellectual work as philosophy (Imafidon et  al. 2019). Still, others argue that ethno-philosophy is too elementary and base to warrant any relevance to the contemporary trend in thinking in the African academy (Attoe 2016). The concept ‘ethno-philosophy’ comprises two root words, namely, ‘ethno’ and ‘philosophy’. A conceptual analysis involves taking each of the root words independent of the other and, thereafter, synthesizing them (i.e. show how the root words enter into each other).

2.1  ‘Ethno’ ‘Ethno’ is used as a prefix to ‘philosophy’. Therefore, the first question to ask is what role does a prefix play in a concept? A prefix is added to another word to transform the meaning of the word to which it is affixed. According to Cambridge Dictionary, a prefix ‘can make a word negative or express relation of time, place or manner’. In this direction, the word ‘ethno’ (used as a prefix in a loose sense) expresses relation of time, place and manner. ‘Ethno’ is a combining form used in the formation of compound words, for example, ethnobiology, ethnomedicine, ethnobotany, ethnomusicology, etc. It is derived from the Greek word ‘ethnos’ which means race, culture, people, nation, tribe or a group of people accustomed to live

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together. In anthropology, ‘ethno’ is used alternatively with ‘culture’ (Unah 1993). This means that even if you use the word ‘culture’ in place of ‘ethno’ (in relation to philosophy as ‘culture philosophy’ instead of ‘ethnophilosophy’), as Bernard Matolino suggests, it still means the same thing alternatively (see Imafidon et al. 2019). In sociopolitical thought, ‘ethno’ is often used alternatively with ‘nation’ and ‘race’ (Unah 1993). In this direction, those who refer to ‘African philosophy’ as ‘ethnophilosophy’ (Mangena 2014a, 2014b) are in order, insofar as African philosophy is viewed as the thought of a particular race, namely, Africans. In the first wave of the Great Debate, the universalists reasoned that the thought of a race could not be properly or legitimately named as ‘a philosophy’, insofar as philosophy (in the traditional sense) is, one, criticism (of culture) and, two, abstraction (Bodurin 1991; Hountondji 1996), of which the particularists had countered that philosophy criticizes a particular culture and that abstract thinking takes departures from an established body of thought that produces the thinker (Momoh 1991; Oluwole 1999). Despite this contention, the main issue was that those who pretended to do ethno-philosophy merely described African cultures in the name of doing African philosophy. Describing African cultural practices without any form of philosophical criticism or abstraction could not be properly called philosophizing or philosophy. In the second wave of the Great Debate, the issue is about relevance, insofar as ‘ethno’ expresses time, place and manner. Both sides to the debate maintain, although erroneously, that ethno-philosophy is about pre-modern thought of the African people (Imafidon et al. 2019). In this relation, the universalists, especially Aribiah Attoe and Peter Bisong, are arguing that insofar as pre-modern and modern societies are different, structurally, in time, place and manner, the ideas (or thought) of the pre-modern could not be relevant to the modern as such. The particularists, that include Fainos Mangena, Ada Agada, Lucky Ogbonnaya, etc., have countered that the ‘old’ always have something to teach the ‘new’ at least historically. It is in this sense that Mangena (2014a) and Agada (2015) compare ethno-philosophy with ancient Greek philosophy while designating the latter as mythical thought. Despite this contention, the issue is the erroneous belief held by both sides that anything ‘ethno’ is pre-modern. I will engage this misconception later in the chapter.

2.2  ‘Philosophy’ ‘Philosophy’ is the word to which the prefix ‘ethno’ is affixed. So what does ‘philosophy’ mean, independently of ‘ethno’? The definition and meaning of philosophy are as many as the different traditions and schools of philosophy. This is due to the deliberative nature of philosophy itself. However, this does not imply that the meaning of philosophy is that vague as it seems. One can always undertake an etymological journey to discover the basic definition of philosophy. The term ‘philosophy’ means ‘love of wisdom’, which is derived from two Greek words ‘philia’

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(love) and ‘sophia’ (wisdom). From this definition, philosophy is usually interpreted to mean ‘search for wisdom’ or ‘search of wisdom’, based on the ancient Greek tradition of philosophical search. Of course the phrase ‘love of wisdom’ is not to be understood in a passive sense as having armchair meaning. The original Greek understanding of the word ‘philosophy’ is not as a common noun but as a verbal noun, indicating action. It is probably in this sense that philosophy also implies ‘search for wisdom’. From this definition, one can deduce that later attributes, such as criticism and abstraction, are means by which the search is conducted. But they do not imply in the sense of finality that these are the only means by which we should express our ‘love for wisdom’. There are obviously other ways of ‘searching for wisdom’ or expressing our ‘love for wisdom’. Contingent with this definition, ‘love of wisdom’ and ‘search for wisdom’ are the questions of what, where, why and how. The first question is ‘what wisdom?’ Is it ancient or contemporary wisdom? Is there some sort of linkage between old and new wisdom? Or, can we even create a binary in the stream of thought as old and new; isn’t wisdom a continuum – a continuous flow?2 This is where the question of relevance lies. In considering the question ‘what wisdom’, one finds that the answer one gives would be biased based on what philosophical tradition one leans towards. The next is ‘where is the wisdom?’ Where do I find the wisdom; is it in ancient or modern tradition? Or, is there such a binary in the first place? The answer to these questions would depend on the philosophical tradition I appeal to. But it is important to note that the question of ‘where’ connects ‘love of wisdom’ with ‘search for wisdom’. The problem, however, is ‘where am I to conduct the search?’ This problem is obviously the contention between the universalists and the particularists in the second debate  – because one searches for wisdom where it would be found thereby making the search a matter of relevance. The particularists insist that one can search for wisdom in ethnographic materials, whereas the universalists maintain that ethnography is not the place to find philosophical wisdom. The question that follows next is ‘how?’ This question is presented in two ways. First, how do I know the stuff that is called wisdom? When I find an idea, how do I know that the given idea is the wisdom? Are there certain characteristics that qualify an idea as a philosophic wisdom? All philosophers are in agreement that there are certain properties that qualify an idea as a philosophic wisdom. The problem, however, is that there is no consensus as to what specific characteristics qualify an idea as philosophic wisdom. This is the bone of contention between the universalists and the particularists. Second, how am I to conduct the search in order to find philosophic wisdom? Are there certain techniques to conduct a philosophic search? Philosophers generally agree that there are distinct ways of conducting philosophical research. But there is no consensus among the different traditions and schools as to what specific characteristics constitute a philosophical methodology. The universalists insist on outright criticism and abstraction as the methodology for philosophic search, whereas the particularists endorse some form of experimental method in addition to criticism and abstraction.

 Some of the issues raised in these questions are outside the scope of this chapter.

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2.3  Ethno-Philosophy There are at least two ways ethno-philosophy has been used in the literature: (1) as one word (ethnophilosophy) and (2) as hyphenated word (ethno-philosophy). There is a third way it can be written, namely, as separate words (ethno philosophy). Each of these usages appears to communicate different meanings. The third usage, which I coin here as ‘ethno philosophy’, may mean ‘culture philosophy’  – that is, the worldview, beliefs-set, axioms, ethos, etc. of a particular culture as given as such. ‘Ethno philosophy’ may mean ‘a way of life of a people living together’ and the description of this worldview. Of course, this excludes any form of interrogation or criticism of the said worldview or cultural practice. ‘Ethno philosophy’ was what most early African academic philosophers were doing in the name of philosophizing – that is, describing the cultural practice of their people. In agreement with the universalists, this, of course, was neither philosophy nor philosophizing. Now, let me focus on the first two usages, ‘ethnophilosophy’ and ‘ethno-­ philosophy’, commonly found in the literature. At first glance, there appears to be no tension in the meanings communicated by the two different usages. It seems to be a grammatical preference of the person deploying the concept in discourse. Philosophically, however, the two usages do not communicate the same meaning. ‘Ethnophilosophy’ indicates a complete marriage of ‘ethno’ and ‘philosophy’ such that they become indistinguishably one in a way that ‘ethno’ becomes philosophy and ‘philosophy’ becomes ethno. There is a total symbiosis of ethno and philosophy. Here, both ethno and philosophy are seen as mutual inclusive categories and in complementary unity. In other words, philosophy is seen as alienated from culture and philosophizing a process of re-appropriation of philosophy in culture as ethnophilosophy. ‘Ethnophilosophy’, seen in this mutual inclusive sense, is as problematic as ‘ethno philosophy’ – because of its tendency to see ethno as philosophy and philosophy as ethno. With this conciliatory tone in the unity of ethno and philosophy, it becomes quite difficult (or even impossible) for the thinker to bring philosophical reasoning to bear on ethno. Because of the conciliatory marriage of ethno and philosophy, philosophy becomes emotional and sympathetic towards ethno and begins to merely describe ethno rather than engage or interrogate it. ‘Ethnophilosophy’ is the variant promoted by the particularists; and, as the universalists have pointed out, it is quite dangerous to the progress of philosophy (reason). It is best, philosophically, to approach this concept as a hyphenated word, viz. ‘ethno-philosophy’. The point I am focusing on here is the hyphen (-), which distinguishes it from other two considerations. What role is the hyphen playing in this construct – ‘ethno-philosophy’? Hyphen is a sign indicating a compound word or two words read as one. It sometimes functions to disambiguate certain words, for example, re-form (form again) as different from reform (radical change). In addition, if a prefix is used as a modifier, then it is hyphenated. It is in this sense I use the term ‘ethno-philosophy’ as different from ‘ethnophilosophy’. On one hand, the prefix ‘ethno’ describes the stem ‘philosophy’ and distinguishes it as a sort of philosophy that is different from other kinds. It is the identity marker.

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On the other hand, the hyphen serves a more fundamental function than merely categorization. The term ‘ethno-philosophy’ comprises two independent concepts, namely, ‘ethno’ and ‘philosophy’. These two independent concepts are mutual exclusive categories linked together via the hyphen to form an ‘arumaristic relationship’. ‘Arumaristic’ describes a condition in which ‘opposed variables’ (i.e. mutual exclusive categories) meet ‘without the expectation of synthesis’ (Chimakonam 2017, 17). Arumaristic relationship does not result in a symbiosis. The hyphen connecting ‘ethno’ and ‘philosophy’ is arumaristic. It demonstrates that there is no symbiosis between ethno and philosophy and that the identity of one does not disappear in the other in a mutual inclusive sense. There is mutual independence between them, and the hyphen serves to demonstrate this distinctiveness. There is strict separation between them, in such a way that ethno is not an unfoldment of philosophy and philosophy is not an unfoldment of ethno. There is no identity crisis: ethno is strictly ethno and philosophy is strictly philosophy. Ethno and philosophy are mutually exclusive notions that are in arumaristic relation via the hyphen. They are independent categories existing not as isolated notions but as interconnected variables. The hyphen is a sort of ‘benoke point’ but also a ‘dialectical bridge’. On one hand, ‘benoke point’ is ‘the point beyond which opposed variables cannot get closer’ (Chimakonam 2017, 19). This is the terminal point in the relationship between the two concepts. The hyphen as ‘benoke point’ demonstrates that ethno and philosophy cannot become symbiotic or synthesized. On the other hand, the hyphen as ‘dialectical bridge’ demonstrates the necessity of the relationship between ethno and philosophy – whereby one is the reflex of the other. Tension of incommensurability arises in the condition in which ethno and philosophy meet, which causes/triggers philosophy (reason) to react against the illogicality of culture and creates an arumaristic relationship with it in the process. Philosophy is born in ethno (culture) as a reaction to it. Yet, there is no possibility of reconciling philosophy to culture and vice versa because of the irreconcilable differences in their basic constitution and character. Philosophy does not become complacent with culture. Ethno does not supplant or overwhelm philosophy. Rather, culture is dominated by philosophy on the basis of its superior logic and epistemological power. The prefix ‘ethno’ only serves to colour the stem ‘philosophy’ in relation to time and place. The point I am making here is that all philosophies depend on some sort of pre-­ philosophy foundation.3 Some particularists, especially Mangena and Agada, support this view. However, my view differs from theirs in the sense that while the particularists conceptualize the relationship between ethno and philosophy as non-­directional (i.e. conciliatory, symbiotic and mutually inclusive), I advance the view that the hyphenated relationship between ethno and philosophy is mutually exclusive and conflictual, with philosophy dictating. What I mean is that the hyphenated relationship allows philosophy to question, interrogate and scrutinize ‘ethno’ philosophically. Ethno does not engage philosophy in return; it remains passive throughout the process. It is only philosophy that is active in the relationship. So

3  In fact, Theophilus Okere (1983) carried out an analysis of Western philosophy, whereby he traced theoretical systems of Plato, Hegel and Heidegger to their religious and cultural foundations.

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ethno is ‘a clearing’, which allows philosophy to emerge in relation to place and time. But this does not mean that because philosophy emerged out of culture, it is bound to it. Rather, philosophy progresses from ethno to philosophy. I will pursue this idea in detail in the next section where I demonstrate, via the ethno-philosophic method, how philosophy emerged out of ethno and progresses from ethno to philosophy.

3  Ethno-Philosophy as a Method of Research What would a general methodological framework of ethno-philosophy look like? Ethno-philosophy as a method ‘involves searching for metaphysical, epistemological and ethical materials from proverbs, fables, African languages, arts, music, religion, and so on, by analyzing them for the purpose of making philosophical import from them or representing them as philosophies’ (Ibanga 2018a, 127). The method does not only imply going back into time to unearth pre-modern cultural ideas for the purpose of subjecting them to critical test and determining their philosophical relevance to contemporary discourse. It is a process which can be compared to sourcing of raw materials and transforming them into a sophisticated product. Fainos Mangena recommends a two-phase or two-level methodology for ethno-­ philosophy, namely, the ‘Collection Level’ and the ‘Analysis Level’. The Collection Level is a field data collection phase; the Analysis Level is the data description and analysis phase (Imafidon et  al. 2019, 128. cf. Mangena 2014a, 32–35). I find Mangena’s two-phase technique inadequate. Firstly, the Collection Level does not suggest any systematicity in data collection, which is crucial at this stage. Secondly, the Analysis Level is shown to be merely data description, with frequent recourse to the traditional culture for justification. Mangena (2014a, 35) argues that the analysis does not necessarily need to be critical. Thirdly, both Collection and Analysis Levels look more like the exploratory technique in descriptive statistics. On the account of these weaknesses, I reject Mangena’s technique and proceed to develop a systematic methodology of ethno-philosophy that is credible, reliable and plausible. The ethno-philosophic method I advance here is a three-stage or three-phase technique. The first phase may be called the ‘Survey Stage’. It involves harvesting the raw ethno-data (proverbs, sayings, fables, artefacts, songs, totem, etc.) by either interviewing of select individuals or collecting the non-philosophic materials from archives. This stage looks scientific in procedure because it often involves employing survey and experimental techniques used in social science research. In the second phase, the raw data, collected at the initial stage, is subjected to fact test to ascertain its scientific accuracy. The data is further exposed to the rigours of philosophical analysis, to deep questioning, criticality and scrutiny, and should lead to philosophical abstraction. This may be called the ‘Critical Stage’. At this point the concept moves from the non-philosophic place to the philosophic place. Here, the research philosopher is not only expected to engage the ethno-data but to make critical judgement on the data – clearly underlining its philosophic worth. Also, during abstraction, there is consistent deconstruction and reconstruction of the notion.

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Philosophically worthless data are labelled as such and disregarded accordingly. Every abstraction and inference is philosophically justified  – without necessarily appealing to the traditional worldview as the basis of reason. The third phase is the ‘Referencing Stage’. It involves deliberate generalization of the emergent conceptual scheme (the abstraction) through intercultural referencing and linkage to established philosophical theories, thus, the concept moves from the philosophic place to the philosophic space.4 The idea here is not necessarily to ground the abstraction on established philosophical traditions or appeal to the extant conceptual scheme for justification. Rather, via referencing the idea is shown how it may be comparable (or even competitive) with existing philosophical schemes by either converging or diverging thereof. This gives the idea a sort of global exposure. Suffice it to state that the entire process of the abstraction must be guided by what I call ‘Principle of Incommensurability’ and ‘Deviation Principle’ (in line with the clarification in Sect. 2.3). The Deviation Principle states that a non-philosophic notion is likely to deviate epistemically upon critical test but the deviation is not necessarily philosophical (see Fig.  1). Deviation  of traditional wisdom does not necessarily validate an analysis as philosophical. The Principle of Incommensurability states that the more philosophical a notion is, the less ethnographic it is and the more ethnographic it is, the less philosophical it is (see Fig. 2). A notion is philosophical if the basis of its justification is not extraneous to logical reason but is based on reason itself. These principles are a sort of barometer, which allows the philosopher to measure the philosophic quotient in the abstraction.

Fig. 1  Deviation Principle

 Chimakonam (2015) refers to it as ‘philosophical place and philosophical space’ as different from ‘platial philosophy and spatial philosophy’ preferred by Janz (2009). My usage ‘philosophic place and philosophic space’ is a stylistic preference; it does not differ substantially from the way Janz and Chimakonam deploy theirs. Janz (2009) and Chimakonam (2015) see different philosophical traditions as ‘places’, while ‘space’ refers to a clearing for interculturality or the point where the different philosophical traditions meet in conversation. Place is ‘traditional’, while space is ‘modernity’ (Janz 2009, 13–14). My understanding of ‘modernity’ for space is ‘inter-traditional’. 4

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Fig. 2  Principle of Incommensurability

An example of how the Principle of Incommensurability has been used in literature is the systematization of Ibuanyidanda and Ezumezu by Innocent Asouzu and Jonathan Chimakonam, respectively, which, though relying on Igbo ethno-data to build their respective systems, ‘they referenced Igbo belief-system less frequently’ (Agada 2019, 12). That is to say, they increasingly detach their theories from Igbo traditional worldview. I notice this principle also at play in the works of Thaddeus Metz on ‘relational ethic’ that appeals to Bantu worldview (Metz 2007) and Diana-­ Abasi Ibanga’s work on ‘Braai ethic’ that appeals to Afrikaans worldview (Ibanga 2018b) as well as Julius Nyerere’s ‘Ujamaa’ that appeals to Zanaki worldview (Nyerere 1968). The Principle of Incommensurability allows the thinker to decisively detach her thinking from ethnocentric commitment while remaining rooted in the indigenous ontology that inspired the thinking. The Deviation Principle serves to restraint the modernity-obsessed thinker from drawing fallacious and misleading inference from the data/reflection. These principles will act to guard against chauvinistic sentiments while increasing the philosophic traction of the analysis. The ethno-philosophic method demonstrates an ‘epistemological progression’ of thought (as demonstrated in Fig. 3) from ethno (non-philosophy) to philosophy – whereby a non-philosophic notion passes into philosophy. As non-philosophic notion passes into philosophy, there is a complete break away from ethno-data in its final constitution, ‘such that references to the particular culture to which ethnophilosophy is affiliated becomes minimal as thought attains higher levels of generalities’ (Agada 2019, 14). Figure  3 demonstrates that philosophical thought originates from ethno as a reaction to it and progresses away from ethno (q) as ethno-philosophy (p + q), and as it progresses, there is ‘de-ethnocentrification’ (−q) towards becoming pure thought or philosophy (p). Epistemological progression of

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Fig. 3  Epistemic progression curve

thought is illustrated with the Epistemic Progression Curve (Fig. 3) and represented mathematically as:

t   p  q n  q n    p  q n  q 3    p  q n  q 2    p  q n  q1 



This implies that as thought progresses in the direction of reason, there is continuous detachment from the traditional worldview of which it is affiliated until the ‘transcendence point’ (t) where thought completely breaks away from ethnocentricism and passes into pure (abstract) philosophy. This means that philosophical detachment from culture is greater as ethno-philosophy assumes more philosophical character. At the transcendence point, ethno completely withers away, leaving philosophy to progress as pure reason. To say that ‘ethno completely withers away’ means that reason begins to be self-conscious, begins to question itself, namely, the philosophical notion that emerged from the thinking.That is, thinking completely focuses on the abstracted (philosophical) notion without reference to the particular culture which it emerged from. The transcendence point is the point reason breaks off from the empirical conditions of discourse (i.e. historically verified shared view of a particular place and time) and enters into the trajectory of normative principle

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(the normative path) where philosophical notions are legitimized independently of particular place and time as well as of prevailing popular belief.5 This is the point that reason has transcended ethno-data, which philosophy begins to critically question itself rather than continuously engaging the traditional worldview (i.e. ethnodata) or making reference to it. Here, the thinker is no longer mentally attached to her culture; her thought has assumed a universal character. She no longer uses such referential as ‘our people say’ or ‘according to Annang traditional worldview’ and so on; her language has assumed universal character, detached from the particularities and peculiarities of culture. This does not mean she stops using her native language to philosophize6 but she no longer appeals to traditional worldview as the basis of reason.7 The methodology of ethno-philosophy empowers the thinker to explore and exploit indigenous conceptual schemes, in terms of making them relevant to modern society. However, the research philosopher should not merely do expository work on the indigenous conceptual schemes but, instead, critically examine those traditional models for their philosophic merit and make them relevant to the need of modern society. The reconstruction past schemas in the present must be done in such a manner that avoids reproducing the exact given conditions of the past (Asouzu 2011; Lauer 2020). The imported or reinvented ancient practices must be embedded in the light of contemporary society; otherwise, such philosophical import would be dead on arrival, since there are significant differences in the structures of pre-modern and modern societies (Ibanga 2017b). Ethnophilosophy should not result in anachronism. The tendency to place premium on age and tradition as the basis for philosophic wisdom, and the adoption of cultural ideas without critical input, is counterproductive and should be jettisoned (Wiredu 1980; Egbai and Edor 2015; Bisong and Shenge 2019; Ibanga 2020a). The emphasis placed on deep questioning, logical analysis, criticism and rigour serves to ensure that the thinker does not import anachronistic elements of culture into her research in the name of maintaining African flavour. Above all, ethnophilosophy should lead to philosophical abstraction. It was  the ‘ethnographic character of ethno-philosophy’, the rigid attachment to the particular culture to which ethno-philosophy is affiliated, that denied it universal applicability (Agada 2017, 6). Ethno-philosophy ‘is not just [about] interrogating traditional worldview’; it should lead to philosophical abstraction; ethno-philosophy has to break  Philosophical legitimacy is drawn neither from the historical proof of notion in terms of factuality and veracity nor from the prevailing philosophical consensus in the present but, as Lauer (2020) opines, from ‘logical reasoning’. 6  This is not the same as writing philosophical works in her indigenous language as advocated in Eyo and Ibanga (2018). To philosophize with her native language means she has to reinvent her language philosophically. An example is how Chimakonam reinvented the Igbo words ‘Benoke’ and ‘Arumaristic’, which is in polarity to its everyday use (see Chimakonam 2017, 16–20). 7  Lauer (2020) appears to have made the point I am making here, when she put succinctly that normative account of African notions need not appeal to past events as the basis for reasoning but to ‘moral reasoning’ (implied as logical reasoning). Thus, that traditional notions are needed only to shade the context of innovation and not as a basis for reason. 5

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away from ethno-data and attains higher levels of generalities (Agada 2019, 12–14). There should be less frequent references to the particular culture to which ethno-philosophy is affiliated. Rather, there should be deliberate generalization of the conceptual scheme through intercultural referencing and linkage to establish philosophical theories, thereby tempering on its ethnocentric character and demonstrating its universal applicability.

4  Conclusion: Further Clarifications It is a common parlance among African philosophers the claim that ‘philosophy is culture-bound’. This expression is found in almost all important literature on African philosophy. It is a phrase that was invented to justify the existence of African philosophy. Attoe (2016,102) rightly observes that a ‘more profound thesis of ethnophilosophy is that philosophy is a product of culture and as such, culture and/or geographical bearing remains the supreme determinant factor of one’s philosophy’ instantiating differing philosophy for different cultures and places. He denounced this claim as a myth while maintaining that the tools of philosophizing are independent of culture (104). To say that something is culture-bound is to imply that it is limited by, or valid only within, a particular culture. Actually, this is the claim most African philosophers are trying to make, to wit that philosophy is culture-bound. The systems of African logic are constructed to justify this claim (Etuk 2002; Ijiomah 2014). This claim, as Attoe has pointed out, is outright myth. Precisely, it is born out of a misunderstanding of the role of a place in philosophical development. Indeed, philosophy is born in a place, in a particular culture, but philosophy is not bound to culture. Philosophy is not tied to culture the way a goat is tied to a stake to prevent it from leaving a place. Philosophy is born out of a place in terms of being a negation of culture. Philosophy is a sort of revolt against culture, which means that philosophers are ‘rebels of culture’. Philosophy is a revolutionary act, a rebellion against cultural acceptancism (i.e. the complacency of culture). Philosophy is a product of the thinker’s reaction to cultural circumstances she belongs or that she finds herself. To react, therefore, means that philosophy takes a different path of consciousness, which is radically different from the path of cultural consciousness. In reacting to culture, philosophy creates a different intellectual culture that is at variance with culture itself. In this sense, philosophy arises as a subculture within a particular culture in the first instance and as a subculture to cultures in general in the second instance. So, in a way, one can admit that ethno-philosophy is a philosophy of culture, since philosophy of culture is the application of logical thinking ( reason) to the study of culture. But ethno-philosophy is neither culture philosophy nor cultural philosophy since it is not based on merely a particular culture. Rather, ethnophilosophy begins as a reaction to a particular culture to a reaction to culture in general.

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When it is said that philosophy is a reaction to a particular culture, it does not mean that it is limited to a particular culture – so that someone can accuse it of being culture-bound. When, for example, Bruce Janz (2015, 144) says that ‘it matters where ideas come from, who hold them, what cultural context they developed in’, it does not mean that philosophical thinking is tied to a place. ‘Every concept is born in a place and is traceable to it but it is not unsavourily tied to it’ (Ibanga 2020b, 160). Thinking is about a place. But thinking is not bound to a place. The philosopher thinks about a place philosophically. In ethno-philosophy, concepts do progress from non-philosophic place to philosophic place, from cultural consciousness to philosophical consciousness (see Figs. 3 and 4). Concepts travel in thinking in either non-philosophic or philosophic thinking. (I am interested in the concepts transported in philosophic thinking.) And so, when concepts progress from cultural consciousness to philosophical consciousness, two things happen to them. Firstly, they are affected by the radical nature of philosophical thinking in which they are transported. Secondly, they are affected as they cross jurisdictional boundaries from non-philosophy to philosophy. Therefore, when concepts progress from cultural to philosophical place, they are radicalized subtly or violently and being transformed in the process. What transforms non-philosophic notion into philosophy is the philosophical thinking that transported it and the philosophic place to which it is transported. But the progress of reason does not stop at the philosophic place. Thinking is not bound to a place. Philosophical thinking has to progress further from philosophic place to philosophic space and beyond. This progress of concepts from non-­ philosophic place to philosophic place to philosophic space and the associated transformation is demonstrated with the Concept Conversion Model (see Fig. 4). The progress of reason means that philosophical thinking would not remain the same. Philosophical thinking is in a state of flux, in perpetual self-transformation, and transforms the concepts in the process. The philosophical negation of culture (as shown in Fig. 3) reveals the general direction of philosophical development. Philosophy arises out of culture by questioning culture, and it develops by further questioning itself. Philosophical development cannot take place unless philosophy negates itself after it has negated culture. As Bisong (2019, 38) opines, ‘Philosophy always transcends its result’. However,

Fig. 4  Concept conversion model

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ethno-philosophy proceeds from the premise that philosophy does not completely obliterate culture but retains the best in it and assimilates it and raises it to a higher level of thinking. Therefore, it is necessary for philosophy to make use of the cultural heritage of the past, to reflect upon it in order to create a philosophical abstraction. But one must bear in mind that when philosophy engages culture, it never takes over the dimensions of culture completely nor does it assimilate the essential aspects uncritically; rather, it transforms them to conform to its own nature. To assimilate a positive aspect of culture means that the non-philosophic notion is recast philosophically and continuously interrogated until the point where the idea is no longer seen in its traditional spotlight. At that point, the concept passes from non-­philosophy to philosophy. This is why criticality is a crucial stage for ethno-­philosophy. Through the critical attitude to culture, the contradictions of culture are resolved, which gives way for philosophy to arise. But this does not bring philosophical development to an end. Philosophy does not remain fixed, static and monolithic. Internal contradictions definitely arise in philosophical thought over time and in relation to place. Philosophy must therefore critically question itself in order to resolve these contradictions. In the process, philosophy gives birth to new premises. This process continues ad infinitum.

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Beyond the Universalist Critique and the Particularist Defence of Ethnophilosophy L. Uchenna Ogbonnaya

Abstract  In this chapter, I critically and creatively converse with the universalists and particularists on the place of ethnophilosophy in African philosophy. The two groups of scholars sought to answer the question does ethnophilosophy still have a place in contemporary African philosophy? While the universalists deride ethnophilosophy and contend that it be done away with given that it lacks criticality, individual authorship and scientificity and is non-universalisable, the particularists argue that ethnophilosophy is genuine African philosophy due to its African cultural origin. Beyond the critique and defence, I assert that ethnophilosophy still has a role in contemporary African philosophy. In line with the foundationalists, Ada Agada and L.  Uchenna Ogbonnaya, I argue that ethnophilosophy is the foundation of African philosophy and that authentic African philosophy that has individual authorship is a product of individual African philosophers employing criticality to creatively engage ethnophilosophy as Ramose, Asouzu, Chimakonam, etc. have done. Keywords  African philosophy · Ethnophilosophy · Foundationalists · Particularists · Universalists

1  Introduction Among the six trends in African philosophy which are ethnophilosophy, nationalistic/ideological philosophy, professional philosophy, sage philosophy/philosophic sagacity, literary/artistic philosophy and hermeneutics (Oruka 1991, 49; Bodunrin 1991, 63–65; Chimakonam 2014 [2017], 5–7), ethnophilosophy remains the most controversial, enduring current, raising lots of seemingly unending debates. The questions that beg for answers are: what is ethnophilosophy? And why is it a controversial trend in African philosophy?

L. U. Ogbonnaya (*) Department of Philosophy, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Agada (ed.), Ethnophilosophy and the Search for the Wellspring of African Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78897-1_4

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Ethnophilosophy is a trend in African philosophy which has Placide Tempels (1959), L.S. Senghor (1956, 1962, 1964) and John Mbiti (1969) and others as its major proponents. This trend holds that there exists philosophy in traditional African societies and that this philosophy can be rediscovered, revived, rehabilitated and revitalised from African culture which has been bastardised by European colonisers and Christian missionaries. Ethnophilosophy holds that African philosophy is philosophical thought excavated from pristine traditional African culture or cultural elements such as proverbs, fables, folk tales, folk songs, myths (orality, or oral literature), religion and other social institutions (Ogot 1968, 35; Nasseem 2003, 312) and documented by African philosophers. If African philosophy, according to ethnophilosophers, is derived from African cultural elements, then it is a collective or communal cultural ideology, philosophy, thought or wisdom of the African people (Azenabor 2010, 25). This philosophical trend is said to be descriptive but uncritical about African culture and worldview. However, the proponents of this trend have argued that African philosophy should be done through the lens of ethnophilosophy. The above recommendation has been received with mixed feelings and heated debate. Camps have emerged among African philosophers; on the one hand, we have the philosophical universalists (simply referred to as universalists), and on the other hand, we have the philosophical particularists (simply referred to as particularists). For the universalists, ethnophilosophy cannot be regarded as African philosophy; it should, therefore, be discarded (Hountondji 1996; 2019; Appiah 1992; Attoe 2016; Imafidon et al. 2019). On the part of the particularists, ethnophilosophy is an integral part of African philosophy, and it should be elevated to the status of African philosophy proper (Mangena 2014a, b; Imafidon et  al. 2019). For Ada Agada (2013a, b, 2015a, b), ethnophilosophy has an indispensable role in African philosophising – the foundational role. In this chapter, I will go beyond the above contentions and submissions and argue that ethnophilosophy cannot be done away with as advocated by the universalists and that it cannot pass as African philosophy as the particularists wish. I will look at the universalist critique of ethnophilosophy. This will be followed by a section on the particularist defence of ethnophilosophy. Thereafter, I will assert my own position on ethnophilosophy which transcends the universalist and particularist stances.

2  The Universalist Critique of Ethnophilosophy The universalists have strongly critiqued ethnophilosophy. The universalists include Henri Maurier (1984), Peter Bodunrin (1991), Kwasi Wiredu (1991), Lansana Keita (1991), Paulin Hountondji (1991, 1996), Kwame Anthony Appiah (1992), Aribiah Attoe (2016) and Bernard Matolino (see Imafidon et al. 2019). Given that it will be cumbersome to consider the critiques raised by each of these scholars against ethnophilosophy, I restrict myself to those of Hountondji, Appiah, Attoe and Matolino.

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The universalists’ central argument against ethnophilosophy is that it is not philosophy in the first place. Their contention is that it lacks the basic components of philosophy which include criticality, scientificity and individual authorship. Agada summarises their critique in his remark: The following are frequently adduced by opponents of ethnophilosophy in support of their nay-saying: 1.) Ethnophilosophy is unscientific and panders to the Eurocentric narrative of African people’s incapacity for abstract thinking (the thesis of primitivity). 2.) Ethnophilosophy cannot pass as genuine philosophy because it does not exhibit critical rigour (the thesis of non-criticality). 3.) Ethnophilosophy promotes the myth of subsisting collective philosophy shared by members of a community or ethnic group (the thesis of unanimity). (see Imafidon et al. 2019, 118)

I add the charge that ethnophilosophy is a culture-bound philosophy (the thesis of non-universalisability). i. The thesis of primitivity: It is claimed that (a) ethnophilosophy is not scientific and (b) ethnophilosophy is Eurocentric. On the former claim, Hountondji argues that thinking is scientific if and only if it is embodied in a written text (1996, 99). This argument emphasises “the primacy of the written word” (Dübgen and Skupien 2019, 34). It follows that if a thought does not align itself with this scientific criterion, it cannot be philosophical or philosophy. Given that ethnophilosophy is based on orality instead of written text, it is unscientific and cannot pass as philosophy and, specifically, African philosophy. The second part of the primitivity thesis is the Eurocentric idea that Africans were irrational and incapable of doing philosophy. Ethnophilosophy projects the idea that African philosophy is distinct from Western philosophy. For the universalists, this implied difference makes African philosophy a debased philosophy that is unequal with Western philosophy (Asouzu 2007). Matolino explains this point when he contends that ethnophilosophy misrepresents and mischaracterises the philosophical standing of the Black person since it has nothing positive, representative or instructive (see Imafidon et al. 2019, 115). He goes further to state that ethnophilosophy gives the impression that (1) Black Africans lack a clear and precise logic and (2) Black African philosophy panders to mysterious forces and voodooism (see Imafidon et al. 2019, 116). This is the way that the Europeans represented Africa. Thus, Hountondji and Matolino, respectively, argue that ethnophilosophy is a European invention to deny Africans a proper philosophy as well as to demoralise the African intellectually and politically in order to facilitate colonial conquest and the Christianisation mission in Africa (Hountondji 1996; Imafidon et  al. 2019, 114–116). Matolino also notes that ethnophilosophy, which emphasises difference between African and Western philosophies, inferiorises the African before the Whites who are the main intended audience of ethnophilosophy. According to Matolino, instead of contributing to the development of African philosophy, ethnophilosophy has functioned as a hindrance (see Imafidon et al. 2019, 115). ii. The thesis of non-criticality: The universalists are of the view that ethnophilosophy is not African philosophy because it lacks the criticality which is associated with philosophy (Hountondji 1996; Attoe 2016). For the universalists, criticality, or critical rigour, is what defines or is at the foundation of philosophy. Given that

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ethnophilosophy is descriptive, according to Matolino, it is associated with the uncritical aspect of anthropological and ethnological approaches to philosophy (see Imafidon et al. 2019, 115). Hountondji also asserts that African philosophy done through the lens of ethnophilosophy equals ethnology, or ethnography, or folk philosophy (1996, 62–63). Although Hountondji acknowledges the existence of oral folk philosophy in pristine traditional African cultures (1996, 62), he does not see it as proper philosophy. This is because, for him, it involves description instead of analysis. In the same vein, Appiah asserts that even though there exists oral folk philosophy in pristine Africa, it is not genuine African philosophy. His rationale is that such philosophy lacks evidence and reason  – the hallmarks of philosophy (Appiah 1992, 91) – which implies the criticality of a genuine philosophy. It is on this ground that Appiah avers that it is unwise to review and preserve philosophical ideas that are not critical as projected in ethnophilosophy (1992, 92). iii. The thesis of unanimity: The myth of unanimity is another basis for the universalist critique and disqualification of ethnophilosophy. This “myth of unanimity” holds that “one single world-view is shared by all members belonging to a homogenous group” (Dübgen and Skupien 2019, 21), that is, ethnophilosophy is a collective or community philosophy. According to the universalists, philosophy is an individual enterprise, but ethnophilosophy reduces African philosophy to community enterprise. For Hountondji, ethnophilosophy gives the impression that pristine African societies were united in their beliefs, thoughts and philosophies (1996, 60). For him, unity of belief systems and philosophy was not possible in pristine African societies given that they lacked written texts that could prove the veracity of the unity claim. Hence, he argues that the claim to unanimity in philosophical thought among the pristine people of African societies is an imaginary invention of the ethnographer. The point of Hountondji is that the collective memory of the African people is not the right place to look for philosophy. Kwame Appiah agrees with Hountondji and adds that the idea of unanimity in pristine African societies is unfounded because these societies did not have common traditional cultures, religious systems, language and vocabulary (1992, 26). According to him, this lack of unanimity in traditional African societies discredits the ethnophilosophy project. Additionally, universalists claim that the myth of unanimity gives the false impression that the assumed cultural homogeneity of pristine African societies is the source of African identity, which ought to be recovered in modern times. For Hountondji, the ethnophilosophers employed ethnophilosophy to essentialise and romanticise pristine African culture. This endeavour, for Hountondji, amounts to a misapplication of philosophy. iv. The thesis of non-universalisability: The main contention of the universalists is that philosophy is universal and that ethnophilosophy tends to depict African philosophy as culture-bound, non-universalisable philosophy. Hountondji argues that African philosophy ought to be a trans-cultural philosophy and not a cultural discipline. In his opinion, philosophy is a critical, pluralistic and universal discipline carried out by an individual. Franziska Dübgen and Stefan Skupien substantiate this as they posit that “Hountondji’s focus on philosophy as a form of a responsible, individual and rigorous critique offers to keep a distance from

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homogenising culturalist assumptions that influenced earlier as well as contemporary political and philosophical arguments” (2019, 1). For Hountondji, the detachment of philosophy from culture makes it a trans-cultural and universal discipline. Matolino has declared that ethnophilosophy is a dead and buried discourse that should not be woken from its grave. He distinguishes ethnophilosophy from culture philosophy, which he sees as “reflections on cultural practices and beliefs by Africans in their attempts to make sense of reality” (see Imafidon et al. 2019, 114). He goes on to argue that culture philosophy, instead of ethnophilosophy, ought to be the source of African philosophy. Pascah Mungwini argues that the critique of ethnophilosophy has two effects on African philosophy – a liberating effect for those who see African philosophy as a rigorous academic discipline and a paralysing effect for those who equate African philosophy with ethnophilosophy (Mungwini 2019, 8, 17). While the liberating effect amounts to African philosophers reconstructing African philosophy beyond ethnophilosophy, the paralysing effect demoralise African philosophers who see ethnophilosophy as the gateway to African philosophy. Mungwini dwells more on the negative effect of the critique as he argues that it leads African philosophers with interest in ethnophilosophy to distance themselves from the orientation. For the universalists, ethnophilosophy as a false philosophy imprisons African philosophy and Africa. Therefore, anyone who associates herself or her work with ethnophilosophy is seen as an intellectual outcast. According to Mungwini, this state of affairs prevents African philosophers from looking for alternative ways of doing African philosophy (2019, 8–17). The point here is that the universalist critique of ethnophilosophy has done African philosophy more harm than good.

3  The Particularist Defence of Ethnophilosophy Regardless of the strong criticisms raised against ethnophilosophy, there are African philosophers who argue strongly in support of ethnophilosophy. These philosophers include particularists such as Fainos Mangena (2014a, b), Pascah Mungwini (2019) and Edwin Etieyibo (see Imafidon et  al. 2019). The central argument of these African philosophers is that ethnophilosophy is integral to African philosophy. There are three basic propositions that define the particularist defence of ethnophilosophy: (1) philosophy and its methodology are not the same everywhere, (2) philosophy and its methodology are context- and culture-dependent, and (3) African philosophy exists with its distinct African logic, knowledge, metaphysics and values (Mangena 2014b, 99). It is in the light of the above that Mangena agrees with Ikechukwu Kanu that ethnophilosophy is indigenous African philosophy that is untainted by foreign ideas (Kanu 2013, 278; Mangena 2014b, 99). Accordingly, he notes that “ethnophilosophy is the only philosophy that an African of black extraction can be proud of as it is rooted in African traditions and cultures” (Mangena 2014b, 96). Mangena goes on to state that “ethnophilosophy is just like Western philosophy, as it is based on a

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recognized form of reasoning, namely inductive reasoning, which is packaged in proverbs, riddles and other cultural resources” (2014a, 24). The point he seeks to make here is that ethnophilosophy is a philosophy that is based on reason and evidence like Western philosophy. He substantiates this point as he contends that what the African ethnophilosopher does is to collect proverbs, riddles and other cultural resources and then analyse them to arrive at ethnophilosophy. Mangena also asserts that the universalists stop at the idea that ethnophilosophy involves the collection of proverbs, riddles and other cultural resources but neglect the aspect of analysis. Inasmuch as ethnophilosophy involves collection and analysis of cultural data, it makes no sense to argue that it is devoid of evidence and reason. For Mangena, the evidence involves the collected proverbs, riddles and other cultural resources, while the “reason” is embedded in the analysis of these collected proverbs, riddles and other cultural resources. If this is the case, then it is unwarranted to argue that ethnophilosophy lacks criticality. Consequently, ethnophilosophy is exonerated from the universalists’ accusation that it is not critical (non-criticality thesis). If this is the case, then ethnophilosophy is philosophy and, by extension, African philosophy. This is premised on the fact that reason (analysis) and evidence (collected African cultural elements) are aspects of ethnophilosophy. Also, Mangena contends that the universalist discrediting of ethnophilosophy based on the assessment that it does not follow Western philosophy’s methodology is not tenable. He argues that philosophy is conditioned by the cultural circumstances, geographical location and worldview of a people. Given that these factors are not the same across cultures, the questions asked and answered by philosophy might not be the same across cultures. But within the same geographical location, the questions asked and answered by philosophy are similar. For instance, Mangena asserts that Africa is today confronted, and is grappling, with problems such as diseases, ethnic conflict and economic disorder which are quite different from the challenges of the Western world. If this is the case, then it will be inappropriate and misleading to apply the same approaches/methods employed by the Westerners in addressing their own challenges to African questions or situations (Mangena 2014a, 34–35). What this implies is that African questions and problems demand a distinct philosophical method. For the particularists, this is where ethnophilosophy becomes the way forward for African philosophy. This discredits the contention of the universalists that philosophy must proceed as trans-cultural. Although one cannot negate the fact that philosophy is a universal discipline, it is also undeniable that the universality of a philosophy is premised on the fact that it is first contextual and cultural (Chimakonam 2017a, b). Even Western philosophy was first a contextual and cultural philosophy because it was aimed at primarily addressing Western existential challenges as they emerge from the Western philosophical place. Of course, philosophy begins from a (philosophical) place and moves into the (philosophical) space. The idea is that the place is the context or culture from where philosophy is first articulated; the space is the realm outside the place of its origin where this philosophy is also applicable and relevant. So, there is no philosophy that is not first cultural before being trans-cultural (Chimakonam 2019). If this is the case, it is difficult to agree with Hountondji that a work is

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African philosophy because it is written by an African and not because it is of African cultural origin. This is what Chimakonam called “Hountondji’s dilemma” (Chimakonam 2015a, b; Ogbonnaya 2018a). If we accept that African philosophy refers to a body of work done by Africans, it implies that non-Africans cannot do African philosophy. This somehow implies that African philosophy is not universal as Hountondji would want us to believe. The reason is that Hountondji bars non-­ Africans from engaging with African philosophy. But one can argue that the particularists do not limit the categories of scholars who should do African philosophy. For them, ethnophilosophy as African philosophy is open to both Africans and nonAfricans. This implies that African philosophy is universal from the perspective of ethnophilosophy. With respect to the unanimity thesis, Mangena argues that most African countries were colonised by Europeans and that they have similar existential challenges such as diseases, hunger, religious imperialism and wars; therefore, there is unanimity in Africa. This existential unity leads to the idea that Africans have, and should embrace, a common philosophy  – ethnophilosophy (2014a, 36). Mangena also notes that there is commonality in the ideas of community, peaceful co-existence and communitarianism (the belief that the interest of the community comes before the interest of the individual) and that some countries in Eastern and Southern Africa share some linguistic commonalities (2014a, 36). Consequently, it is wrong for Appiah to argue that there was no commonality or unanimity in pristine African cultures and societies. Also, it is unjustified to discredit ethnophilosophy on the ground of unanimity. Mangena concludes his defence of ethnophilosophy by invoking what he calls common moral position (CMP) in Shona ethics. In his words, “The CMP is attained when the moral opinions of the elderly group (considered to be custodians of values in an African context) are put together in order to come up with a common position regarding issues of right and wrong” (see Imafidon et al. 2019, 129). He is aware that at first the experiences and opinions of the elders on these moral issues are varied; thus, he notes further that the moment the divergent opinions are brought together and embedded within the people’s beliefs, customs, folklores, idioms, proverbs, riddles, etc., they become a common moral position (see Imafidon et al. 2019, 129). The idea is that what becomes the common thought or position of the people was initially individual thoughts. Thus, ethnophilosophy is communal philosophy derived from the collective individual thoughts now buried in communal beliefs, customs, folklores, idioms, proverbs, riddles, social organisation, etc. Etieyibo contends that ethnophilosophy is culture philosophy and genuine African philosophy in opposition to Matolino (see Imafidon et al. 2019, 130–134). According to Etieyibo, ethnophilosophy has two broad components, the visible and the immanent. He posits that the visible components are elements of a particular culture such as customs, institutions, proverbs, traditions, etc., which are observable as one engages with the said culture. He sees these components as the ethno (cultural part, or the non-philosophical) of ethnophilosophy. Etieyibo contends that the immanent part of ethnophilosophy is the thinking or thought, the critical feature, which makes it philosophical. He also notes that it is

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this critical or philosophical (immanent) aspect of ethnophilosophy that makes the ethno aspect ethnophilosophy. He assets that ethnophilosophy is “an unpacking of African cultures or a critical reflection on the indigenous systems” (see Imafidon et al. 2019, 131). He goes on to state categorically that “literally and linguistically, ethnophilosophy could then be said to mean culture philosophy or philosophy in culture, where ethno means culture (ethnic, people or racial groupings)” (Imafidon et al. 2019, 131). It becomes clear why Elvis Imafidon argues that Matolino’s distinction between ethnophilosophy and culture philosophy is unnecessary; ethnophilosophy can be equated with culture philosophy (Imafidon et al. 2019, 113). Given that ethnophilosophy is culture philosophy, Etieyibo argues that it is not non-­ philosophy or pseudo-philosophy as the universalists claim. Etieyibo goes on to substantiate his claim that ethnophilosophy is genuine philosophy by contending that although philosophy is an individual venture, it is also a communal practice. He refers to his initial argument that the immanent element grounds the visible (ethno) element to demonstrate that what is today communal thought was first individual thoughts, which the community has endorsed. This causes a shift from the “I” to “we” or “our” (see Imafidon et al. 2019, 132). This implies that community thought is “nothing other than the thought of the individuals in the community” (Omoregbe 1998, 6). This perspective agrees with Mangena’s “common moral position (CMP)”. Furthermore, Etieyibo contends that if the thoughts of individuals within the community constitute a critical and reflective activity, then the resulting communal thought and philosophy ought to be a critical and reflective activity. He emphasises this point by employing notions such as group mind and collective intentionality. Collective intentionality occurs when individual minds are jointly focused on facts, goals, objects or states of affairs and values to achieve a common aim. In this context, it is the collective intention that is recognised and not the intentions of the individual. On group mind, he posits that as individuals pull together into a group, they lose their individuality and develop a group mindset or thought pattern. Here, the individual within the group loses her individual consciousness and takes up the group consciousness (see Imafidon et al. 2019, 133). More so, Etieyibo employs Kwame Gyekye’s ideas of embedded morality and reflective morality to drive home his point that ethnophilosophy is African philosophy. Gyekye is of the view that embedded morality is first-order philosophy, while reflective morality is second-order philosophy (cited in Imafidon et al. 2019, 133). For him, embedded morality is the idea of rightness or wrongness of societal practices enshrined in social beliefs, which shape social attitudes, behaviours and relations as well as bring about social cooperation and harmony. According to Etieyibo, this embedded morality is the ethno-morality (morality immanent in the ethno), which can be unpacked. The point Etieyibo and other particularists make is that ethnophilosophy is philosophy and, by extension, African philosophy.

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4  T  he Place of Ethnophilosophy in African Philosophy: Beyond the Universalist Critique and the Particularist Defence Both the universalist and particularist theses bring African philosophy face to face with Robert Bernasconi’s “double bind challenge”. According to Bernasconi, “either African philosophy is so similar to Western philosophy that it makes no distinctive contribution and effectively disappears; or it is so different that its credentials to be genuine philosophy will always be in doubt” (1997, 188). If we go with the universalist’s thesis, what we will have as African philosophy is simply Western philosophy in Africa. However, if we accept the particularist’s thesis, we end up with an African philosophy that cannot pass as genuine philosophy (cf. Agada 2019). The fact is that if we follow Western philosophical methodology in doing African philosophy as advocated by the universalists, we deny ourselves the ability to think from an African perspective and risk not contributing original thoughts to world philosophy. African philosophers risk becoming copycat philosophers (Asouzu 2007, 291), copying and pasting Western philosophical ideas and thoughts as African philosophy. Or at best, African philosophers will be engaged with transliterating Western philosophy as African philosophy (Ozumba 2015). Likewise, if we accept hook, line and sinker the advocacy of the particularists, we run the risk of denying African philosophy innovative and original thinkers who should propel the discipline forward. Given that ethnophilosophy is derived from community thought, it will be unwise to place African philosophy at this level. The reason is that at the stage when and where the thoughts of individuals became communal, they ceased to be critical and dynamic. I do not believe that ethnophilosophy equates African philosophy, nor do I believe that ethnophilosophy is a dead discourse that no longer has a place in contemporary African philosophy. Like Agada, my position is that ethnophilosophy still has a foundational role in African philosophy. Agada, who is the first proponent of this view, holds that at the early stage of academic philosophising in Africa, African philosophers had no foundation to fall back on for their philosophy and ran into the problem of doing ethnophilosophy as African philosophy. Agada also argues that in the twenty-first century, ethnophilosophy ought not to be seen as authentic African philosophy but the starting point of, and first progress in, African philosophy which holds strong promise for the future of African philosophy (2013b, 246). In the words of Agada: While it is true that ethno-philosophy marked a watershed in the history of African philosophy, it cannot advance African philosophy beyond the foundation level which it actually is. Ethnophilosophy is the foundation of African philosophy rather than the definitive African philosophy because it represents the first attempt to render the worldviews of the various African tribes in a philosophically intelligible mode, thereby reducing oral philosophy to written philosophy and launching African philosophy as a written tradition, in the very process of the systematization of tribal worldviews. (2013a, 43)

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Therefore, what contemporary African philosophers need to do is to build their philosophical thoughts on these systematised philosophical materials made available in ethnophilosophy. This foundational role of ethnophilosophy has been misunderstood by Attoe who argues that it renders African philosophy unphilosophical given that ethnophilosophy is descriptive and lacks criticality, which for him is the bedrock of philosophy (2016, 100–101). Attoe’s advocacy for African philosophy to have criticality, instead of ethnophilosophy, as its foundation has two flaws. The first is that criticality is a tool of philosophising and a tool cannot function as a foundation (Ogbonnaya 2018b, 103). Agada has argued that criticality is not even a philosophical method but a property of robust thinking and that even if it were a method, no method of philosophy is universal or absolute. Given this condition, it is uncalled for to impose Western methods on African philosophy as universal paradigms (see Imafidon et al. 2019a, 119). The second is that Attoe failed to read Agada between the lines. Agada makes it so clear that authentic African philosophy cannot be ethnophilosophy since ethnophilosophy is primitive (2015a, 42) or descriptive. Agada notes that African philosophy has to be critical and constructive (2015a, 42). If Attoe had paid attention to this submission, he could have withdrawn his assertion that the foundational role of ethnophilosophy renders African philosophy descriptive. Also, if Attoe had read and understood Agada and Ogbonnaya’s argument that African philosophers should build African philosophy on ethnophilosophy by critically and creatively engaging concepts, ideas and thoughts inherent in ethnophilosophy in order to make African philosophy an individual enterprise (Agada 2015b, 242–243; Ogbonnaya 2018b, 103), he could have dropped his unwarranted view that the positions of Ogbonnaya and Mangena are not different (see Imafidon et al. 2019, 124). This is because there is a big distinction between ethnophilosophy as authentic African philosophy (Mangena and other particularists’ position) and ethnophilosophy as the basis of authentic African philosophy (the foundationalists’ position). Attoe argues vehemently that the word foundation does not mean precursor and source but rather the underlying principle from which other principles are directly generated (see Imafidon et al. 2019, 124). For him, ethnophilosophy is not the foundation of African philosophy because it is the latter’s precursor and source material. While I do not disagree with Attoe on his definition of the term foundation, it is noteworthy that foundation could also mean (1) an underlying base or support, (2) the underlying basis or principle of a thought-system, (3) an idea or fact that something is based on and (4) the basic idea or structure from which something important develops. If these four senses of foundation are accepted to be true, then one can say that (a) that which gives support or provides a base for a thing comes before the thing (it is its precursor) and (b) idea, principle, structure or thought from which further ideas, principles, structure and thought are derived is a source (source of inspiration or source material). If this is the case, as I believe it is, then ethnophilosophy can be presented as the foundation of African philosophy in terms of being its precursor and source material. As its precursor, Agada asserts that ethnophilosophy is a protophilosophy to African philosophy. This means that ethnophilosophy is the first philosophy that precedes, and is the starting point of, authentic African

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philosophy, the forerunner that clears the way for contemporary African philosophy. As protophilosophy, ethnophilosophy is securely rooted in African culture and therefore is a wellspring of ideas, as Agada has argued (see Imafidon et al. 2019, 119), for contemporary African philosophers. The above assertion implies that ethnophilosophy, as precursor philosophy to authentic African philosophy, is also its source. Agada notes: “As the foundation of African philosophy, ethno-philosophy will remain a source of inspiration for the innovative individual thinkers who African philosophy patiently awaits” (Agada 2015b, 246). Agada contends that what the twenty-first-century African philosopher ought to do is to “go back to ethnophilosophy ... and unearth concepts and inspiration that will help him introduce radical thinking into the African canon” (see Imafidon et al. 2019, 120). Even Matolino somehow shares this view. For instance, he contends that culture philosophy ought to be the foundation, or source, of authentic African philosophy rather than ethnophilosophy. He writes that “culture philosophy, which predates ethnophilosophy, is and should be the source of African philosophical reflection” (see Imafidon et al. 2019, 115). A critical look at Attoe’s argument against the foundational role of ethnophilosophy reveals that his primary concern is with the philosophicality, and not the Africanity, of African philosophy (see Imafidon et al. 2019). This is what drives his advocacy for the foundational role of criticality in African philosophy. But the foundationalists are concerned with both the Africanity and philosophicality of African philosophy. This concern informs the foundationalist argument that while ethnophilosophy is at the base of African philosophy, critical rigour is one of the instruments with which African philosophers can transform ethnophilosophy into authentic African philosophy. It is pertinent to note that there is no authentic, or distinctive, African philosophy today that is not the production of ethnophilosophy and criticality. Ethnophilosophy is the wellspring of ideas, or ideas incubator, for the critical and profound thought of African philosophers such as Wiredu, Mogobe B. Ramose, Pantaleon Iroegbu, Asouzu, Chris Ijiomah, Matolino, Chimakonam, etc. (see Imafidon et  al. 2019, 118). Attoe himself readily admits that critical rigour underlies the philosophy of Ramose and Asouzu, but he does not see that underneath their philosophy rests ethnophilosophy. Before Ramose developed his ubuntu philosophy, other scholars in theology, anthropology, education, etc. had documented ubuntu as a profound idea in Southern African thought. However, Ramose is one of the first South African philosophers to employ critical rigour to raise ubuntu to the level of philosophy. But could he have produced his intriguing philosophy without the ethnophilosophical resource of ubuntu? The answer is no! Asouzu clearly acknowledged that his Ibuanyidanda philosophy is derived from the complementary thoughts of anonymous traditional African philosophers and Igbo-African worldview (2005). Thus, ethnophilosophy lies at the foundation of his Ibuanyidanda philosophy.

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5  Conclusion The questions that have guided my reflection in this chapter are: should we follow the universalist critique and say goodbye to ethnophilosophy in the African philosophy project since Matolino has declared it a dead discourse? Should we proceed along the line of the particularist claim that ethnophilosophy is African philosophy in its purest form? Is there a place for ethnophilosophy in African philosophy? Two distinct positions were highlighted. The first is that ethnophilosophy is not critical and lacks individual authorship and, therefore, cannot pass as African philosophy. The second position is that ethnophilosophy is the only genuine African philosophy given that it is authentically African and distinct from Western philosophy in terms of its approach. While the first position, which is the universalist posture, advocates that African philosophy should follow the Western approach to philosophising, the second position, which is the posture of the particularists, holds that ethnophilosophy lends the elements of distinctness and originality to African philosophy. In this chapter, I argued that while ethnophilosophy cannot be excised from the discipline called African philosophy, it is also not genuine African philosophy. I asserted with evidence that ethnophilosophy lies at the foundation of African philosophy conceived as a distinct discipline.

References Agada, Ada. 2013a. African philosophy and the challenge of innovative thinking. Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya 5 (1): 41–67. http://www.ajol. info/index.php/tp/article/view/93795/83215. ———. 2013b. Is African philosophy progressing? Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy. Culture and Religions 2 (1): 239–273. ———. 2015a. Existence and consolation: Reinventing ontology, gnosis and values in African philosophy. St Paul, MN: Paragon House. ———. 2015b. The future question in African philosophy. In Atuolu Omalu: Some unanswered questions in contemporary African philosophy, ed. Jonathan O.  Chimakonam, 241–267. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. ———. 2019. The sense in which ethno-philosophy can remain relevant in 21st century African philosophy. Phronimon 20: 1–20. Appiah, Kwame A. 1992. In my father’s house: Africa in the philosophy of culture. New York: Oxford University Press. Asouzu, Innocent I. 2005. The method and principles of complementary reflection in and beyond African philosophy. London: Transaction. ———. 2007. Ibuaru: The heavy burden of philosophy beyond African philosophy. London: Transaction. Attoe, Aribiah D. 2016. An essay concerning the foundational myth of ethnophilosophy. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 5 (1): 100–108. Azenabor, Godwin. 2010. Modern theories in African philosophy. Lagos: Byolah. Bodunrin, Peter. 1991. The question of African philosophy. In In African philosophy: The essential readings, 63–86, ed. Tsenay Serequeberhan. New York: Paragon.

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Chimakonam, Jonathan O. 2014[2017]. History of African philosophy. Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. https://www.iep.utm.edu/afric-­hi/. ———. 2015a. Addressing Uduma’s Africanness of a philosophy question and shifting the paradigm from metaphilosophy to conversational philosophy. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 4 (1): 33–50. ———. 2015b. The criteria question in Africa philosophy: Escape from the horns of jingoism and Afrocentrism. In Atuolu Omalu: Some unanswered questions in contemporary African philosophy, ed. Jonathan O. Chimakonam, 101–124. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. ———. 2017a. Conversationalism as an emerging method of thinking in and beyond African philosophy. Acta Academica 47 (2): 11–33. ———. 2017b. What is conversational philosophy? A prescription of a new doctrine and method of philosophy in and beyond African philosophy. Phronimon 18: 114–130. ———. 2019. Ezumezu: A system of logic for African philosophy and studies. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Dübgen, Franziska, and Stefan Skupien. 2019. Paulin Hountondji: African philosophy as critical universalism. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. Hountondji, Paulin. 1991. African philosophy: Myth and reality. In African philosophy: The essential readings, ed. Tsenay Serequeberhan, 111–131. New York: Paragon House. ———. 1996. African philosophy: Myth and reality. Bloomington: Indiana University. Imafidon, Elvis, Matolino Bernard, L. Uchenna Ogbonnaya, Ada Agada, Aribiah D. Attoe, Fainos Mangena, and Edwin Etieyibo. 2019. Are we finished with the ethnophilosophy debate? A multi-perspective conversation. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 8 (2): 111–138. https://doi.org/10.4314/ft.v8i2.9. Kanu, Ikechukwu A. 2013. Trends in African philosophy: A case for eclectism. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 2 (1): 275–287. Keita, Lansana. 1991. Contemporary African philosophy: The search for a method. In African philosophy: The essential readings, ed. Tsenay Serequeberhan, 132–155. New  York: Paragon House. Mangena, Fainos. 2014a. Ethno-philosophy is rational: A reply to two famous critics. Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya 6 (2): 23–38. https://doi. org/10.4314/tp.v6i2.3. ———. 2014b. In defense of ethnophilosophy: A brief response to Kanu’s eclecticism. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 3 (1): 96–107. Maurier, Henri. 1984. Do we have an African philosophy? In African philosophy: An introduction, ed. Richard A. Wright, 25–40. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Mbiti, John S. 1969. African religions and philosophy. London: Heinemann. Mungwini, Pascah. 2019. The critique of ethnophilosophy in the mapping and trajectory of African philosophy. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 8 (3): 1–20. Nasseem, Subairi ‘B. 2003. African heritage and contemporary life. In The African philosophy reader, ed. P.H. Coetzee and A.P.J. Roux, 304–317. London: Routledge. Ogbonnaya, L. Uchenna. 2018a. Between the ontology and logic criteria of African philosophy. In Method, substance and the future of African philosophy, ed. Edwin Etieyibo, 113–134. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2018b. What makes African philosophy African? A conversation with Aribiah David Attoe on ‘the foundational myth of ethnophilosophy’. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 7 (3): 94–108. Ogot, Grace. 1968. The African writer. East Africa Journal 5: 35–37. Omoregbe, Joseph. 1998. African philosophy: Yesterday and today. In African philosophy: An anthology, ed. Emmanuel C. Eze, 3–8. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Oruka, H. Odera. 1991. Sagacity in African philosophy. In African philosophy: The essential readings, ed. Tsenay Serequeberhan, 47–62. New York: Paragon House.

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Ozumba, Godfrey O. 2015. The transliteration question in African philosophy. In Atuolu Omalu: Some unanswered questions in contemporary African philosophy, ed. Jonathan O. Chimakonam, 171–185. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Senghor, L.S. 1956. African-negro aesthetics. Diogenes 16: 23–38. ———. 1962. Negrohood: Psychology of the African negro. Diogenes 37: 1–15. ———. 1964. On African socialism. London: Pall Mall. Tempels, Placide. 1959. Bantu philosophy. Paris: Presence Africaine. Wiredu, Kwasi. 1991. On defining African philosophy. In African philosophy: The essential readings, ed. Tsenay Serequeberhan, 87–110. New York: Paragon House.

African Philosophy: With and Beyond Ethnophilosophy Aribiah David Attoe

Abstract  African philosophy must have a direction, and this direction must not be solely tied to ethnophilosophy. If ethnophilosophy is neither the foundation/substructure nor the entire superstructure of African philosophy, then we must think of ways in which African philosophy can progress with and beyond ethnophilosophy. In this chapter, I present my views about the nature and potential of African philosophy today. While scholars like Ada Agada find ethnophilosophy, laced with some critical reflection, as the foundation of African philosophy, I specifically locate the foundation of African philosophy in criticality (as one half of the equation) and Jonathan Chimakonam’s idea of okwu (as the second part of the equation). While criticality involves interrogating opinion or other such hypothetical claims with certain logical rules in order to appraise those claims as valid/sound, I define okwu (an idea first put forward by Jonathan Chimakonam) to mean an individual’s “vantage point”, which constitutes the individual’s history, prejudices, culture, body states, etc., which then forms the raw material that forms the individual’s thoughts and philosophy. The foundation of African philosophy, thus, expresses itself fully in the coming together of okwu with criticality, where the latter interrogates the former. From this foundation, I lay down the implications for growth that this foundation has and how it transcends ethnophilosophy. Keywords  African philosophy · Ethnophilosophy · Foundation · Okwu · Okwucentrism

A. D. Attoe (*) Centre for Leadership Ethics in Africa, University of Fort Hare, Alice, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Agada (ed.), Ethnophilosophy and the Search for the Wellspring of African Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78897-1_5

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1  Introduction For some African philosophers, African philosophy is founded on ethnophilosophy1 or one ethnophilosophical idea or the other. We can see this in Mogobe Ramose’s (1999) positioning of Ubuntu as the basis for African philosophy, Fainos Mangena’s (2014) faithful defence of ethnophilosophy or Lucky Ogbonnaya’s “ezin’ulo”, which insists that African philosophy must be tied to a communal ontology (2018, p. 99). For these scholars, ethnophilosophy must, by implication, be the foundation of African philosophy. It is hard to fault them because how else would one ensure the uniqueness that should characterize a distinct philosophical tradition such as ethnophilosophy? However, there are problems with this sort of thinking, with scholars like Paulin Hountondji (1996) quick to point them out. For me, the problems are further compounded by the fact that ethnophilosophy is christened as the foundation of African philosophy when my understanding of what a foundation is, and the fact that ethnophilosophy is only a part of the African philosophy story, shows that ethnophilosophy can neither be the foundation of African philosophy nor its sole future. My main claims are as follows: In describing the foundation of African philosophy, we must understand that what I mean by the “foundation”, in the context of African philosophy, is nothing other than the underlying principle(s) on which the edifice, African philosophy, stands. With this in minds, we cannot conclude that ethnophilosophy (itself, only a branch of African philosophy) is the foundation of African philosophy. I, instead, claim that the underlying principle of African philosophy is criticality and okwu2 and the conversation that springs from their interaction. Even at the level of critical ethnophilosophy (which goes beyond the mere regurgitation of tribal beliefs), it is criticality and okwu that underline the enterprise. I further claim, as I shall show in this chapter, that this understanding has its implications for the way we ought to do African philosophy and the way African philosophy must proceed. By juxtaposing both criticality and okwu together, I proffer novel accounts of what constitutes the foundation of African philosophy and how African philosophy ought to proceed. Indeed, apart from being the first real analysis of Chimakonam’s concept of okwu, the views in the chapter surpass my earlier thoughts on the matter (Attoe 2016; Imafidon, et al. 2019). It is from this foundation that ethnophilosophy and original ideas in African philosophy spring from. To fully articulate my views, this chapter is structured as follows. In the first section, I revisit the thinking that endorses ethnophilosophy as the foundation of

 It is important to note that I use the term “ethnophilosophy” in a strictly African context. Beyond this, we must also realize that there are various variants of the school. On the one hand, we have its strictly descriptive manifestation, where ethnophilosophers merely regurgitate and describe tribal norms, beliefs, myths, etc., and describe the same as philosophy. On the other hand, we have the more critical versions of ethnophilosophy, where African philosophers analyse and critically reproduce traditional values, norms and ideas as tangible philosophies that can stand global scrutiny. In both cases, regurgitative and critical, none stands as the foundation of African philosophy, and only the latter is part and parcel of the superstructure of African philosophy. 2  The concept “okwu” is a difficult concept to delineate in a few lines. See the third section of this chapter for a detailed description of my understanding of the concept. 1

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African philosophy. I further unpack the meaning of the word “foundation”, in the context of African philosophy, and show why ethnophilosophy is not the foundation of African philosophy. In the second section, I present criticality as one half of the foundation of African philosophy. I show that it is the rigorous interrogation, which encapsulates criticality, that transforms opinion to philosophy. In the third section, I analyse the concept of okwu, as propounded by Jonathan Chimakonam (2019), as the other half of the foundation of African philosophy. I show that it is the conversation that exists between okwu and criticality that forms the underlying principle on which African philosophy is built. In the final section, I show the implications of this new understanding of African philosophy and what it means for the growth and development of African philosophy.

2  R  evisiting the Foundationalist Perspective of Ethnophilosophy3 Ethnophilosophy has been defined as “that variant of philosophical methodology which considers collecting, describing and informing over the general worldview of a people the target of philosophical investigation” (Asouzu 2007, 37). In African philosophy, this would involve the African cultural worldview. Now, there are many layers to this proposition. In the first instance is the belief that a mere rehash of cultural and anthropological views, ideas, norms, rituals, etc. − what I call tribal memories – counts as philosophy. Within this context, the tribal memories of specific tribes are merely described as the philosophies of those said tribes. Thus, self-­ reflection, criticisms and philosophical rigour are not the immediate concern since it is already assumed that these tribal memories are intrinsically philosophical by default. Amaku, as quoted by Asouzu, reflects on this type of ethnophilosophy as follows: “one stumbles over a book interestingly entitled ‘African philosophy’, but a glance at it exposes one to mere descriptions of marriages, new yam festivals, initiation rites, wrestling matches, burial ceremonies, folklore and so on…” (Asouzu 2007, 47). This bundling of raw culture and specific lifestyles is the less rigorous form of ethnophilosophy. The second layer of ethnophilosophy is what I call “practical ethnophilosophy”. While it retains the idea that what counts as authentic African philosophy are tribal memories, the view is extended to include the idea that to solve practical issues that continue to plague the African continent, one must revert and look back to tribal memories/principles, as they are ready-made to solve contemporary problems.

3  I acknowledge that this section is mostly culled, with permission from the publisher, from a section (written by me) titled “Attoe: Revisiting the Foundationalist Perspective of Ethnophilosophy” in  an  article published by Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of  African Philosophy, Culture and Religions, titled “Are we Finished with the Ethnophilosophy Debate?: A Multi-Perspective Conversation”. I have made some major changes and additions to this section that reflect my current views and correct certain mistakes.

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Julius Nyerere’s Ujamaa and Kwame Nkrumah’s consciencism stand as strong examples of this kind of ethnophilosophy. Now, there are reasons why African scholars may be quick to legitimize ethnophilosophy and all its layers. We can begin to rehash the vile history from which ethnophilosophy was developed, but that point has already been made by philosophers from Mabogo More (1996) to Chris Ijiomah (2014) and to Aribiah Attoe (2016). However, the main thesis is this: that Western philosophers found Africans and African thought to be at best “pre-logical” and that to prove these Western scholars wrong, one must then dive into precolonial African ideas, excavate these ideas and present them as “philosophy”, in a bid to prove that Africans are not pre-­ logical. Mix that up with a sense of pan-Africanism, and we get a method of philosophizing that is not only specific to a geography or culture but one that envelopes the philosopher in a contextual cocoon and is inherently stubborn to outside criticism. This is not to say that ethnophilosophy is not valuable in some respects, but pushing that value to the extent of recognizing it as a “foundation” for African philosophy has always been the point I have disagreed and continue to disagree with. Born out of a critique of my disagreements, this contribution has allowed me to analytically unpack my views on the myth of ethnophilosophy (whether ethnophilosophy in the sense of a method of philosophy or in the sense of a philosophy) as the foundation of African philosophy.4 It is best to start by contextually defining what a foundation is and what it is not. A foundation is simply understood in terms of an underlying principle from which other principles are directly built/generated. Etymologically, the word is derived from the Latin word fundare, which means “to lay a bottom or base”. Now, what can we claim to be the underlying principle or base of African philosophy – the substructure on which the superstructure is built? For the discipline of African philosophy, the context in which the word “foundation” is used will not necessarily be commensurate with the idea of a historical moment. By historical moment, I mean the events that lead up to the emergence of a thing. It is the same way that the underlying principle of, say, chemistry is not the historical moments associated with the development of chemistry but is instead related to the need to understand the chemical relationships of various types of reality. Put in another way, we cannot claim that the foundation of a building comprises necessarily of the factors, events, etc. that led to the conviction to have a house built. This is why the foundation of African philosophy is not the great debate that led up to it. Similarly, the idea of a foundation or an “underlying principle” is not synonymous with the idea of a precursor. So what precedes a thing is not necessarily the previous attempts at that thing that may not have measured up. Thus, the idea of alchemy as the foundation of chemistry, on the basis of the fact that it is a precursor to chemistry, is unattractive. Put in another way, we cannot claim that the foundation 4  Ada Agada (2015, 3) claims, and boldly so, that “the school of African philosophy called ethno-­ philosophy necessarily became the foundation of African philosophy….” (emphasis mine). Holding on to the idea that foundation means “source (of inspiration)”, Ada is cocksure that the foundation of African philosophy is the ethnophilosophical ideas that inspire it. The natural question would be: what of philosophies by Africans?

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for the first skyscraper ever built was the previous emergence of somewhat tall buildings, which inspired the building of that skyscraper. The foundation of the skyscraper is simply the mass of iron and concrete, holding the structure from collapsing. Similar to the above view, a foundation is also not synonymous with the idea of a “source”. Indeed, it is very easy to confuse source with foundation. This is because the idea of a “source” usually rings in our memories the idea of a thing from which a thing originates or the very inspiration of that thing. Indeed, when African philosophers look at ethnophilosophy, they see this source, this starting point from which African philosophy proceeds – what else could be the foundation of African philosophical thought? If we suppose that I am inspired to build a house, the foundation of that building would neither be my brain from which the idea to build a house sprang from nor my bank account from which the money to build is sourced; the foundation would consist of the block of concrete on which such a building stands. Let us examine another example of what I mean. When Rene Descartes (1641) sought to ground human knowledge on a sure and certain foundation, he was simply looking to ground knowledge (or at least his philosophy) on a sure and certain underlying principle or foundation. And so he searched for this foundation until he struck at his famous cogito ergo sum. Examining the cogito carefully, we do not see a “source”, for the cogito is neither the source of knowledge (being itself, a nugget of knowledge that must come from a source) nor the source of inspiration for knowledge (since the cogito is hardly a lesson in the history of Greek/Egyptian mythology or philosophy). The source of knowledge (depending on your philosophical leanings) is either the mind/brain (rationalist) or the senses (empiricist) or even a combination of the two. These sources (mind, senses or both) are not the foundation of knowledge; in Descartes’ mind, it is the cogito that is the foundation of knowledge. It is on this strong base that Descartes built his idea of God and the external world. Indeed when foundationalists in epistemology are looking to end the regress problem, they only seek out the bedrock belief from which other beliefs can be built and not necessarily a source of inspiration or a source of knowledge such as our sense or our minds and the likes (Audi 2011). And so we see that the source (of inspiration) of an idea/philosophy is not necessarily its foundation. Finally, a foundation is not synonymous with a distinguishing mark. It is easy to think that what makes African philosophy distinguishable from other types of philosophy, i.e. what gives African philosophy its identity, is its foundation. What distinguishes a building from other buildings is the way such a building is aesthetically designed, perhaps even the way it is structured. This is quite different from the foundation which is basically what supports the superstructure. An underlying principle is, therefore, something specific to the thing which it is a foundation to. It stands as that thing whose destruction only allows the superstructure to crumble. It is precisely what gives support and legitimacy to a thing. For some African philosophers like Agada (2015) and Lucky Ogbonnaya (2018), ethnophilosophy is this underlying principle of African philosophy. Ogbonnaya (Imafidon, et al. 2019, 121) makes this clear when he states: The foundationalists’ orientation in African philosophy is championed by Ada Agada and supported by L. Uchenna Ogbonnaya (2018). Agada’s argument is that African philosophy is not ethnophilosophy (2013, 2015) but that ethnophilosophy should act as a foundation for African philosophy.

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Ogbonnaya’s (2018) position is instructive to look at. For him, a philosophy is African philosophy, if and only if it pays fealty to a relational ontology – what he calls “ezin’ulo” (2018, p. 99). Relationality, as seen in Afro-communitarianism, is, of course, a product of ethnophilosophy. So, for Ogbonnaya, any claim to African philosophy crumbles when it is not founded on the ethnophilosophical base of relationality. But these are strong claims to make, and it is best to analyse these propositions more closely. Now, there are good reasons why one might think the way Agada, Ogbonnaya and others like them do. If we put into context the politics I alluded to in the first paragraph of this section, and the easily made claims that contemporary African thought is influenced (or adulterated) by non-African worldviews, then it is easy to claim that ethnophilosophy, by virtue of the fact that it presents supposedly genuine precolonial African thought, must then be the foundation of authentic African philosophy. Mimicking Alfred North Whitehead (1978, 39), one can say that African philosophies today are simply footnotes to ethnophilosophy. But are these good reasons? I like to think they are not, and I shall show why. Ethnophilosophy is not the foundation of African philosophy because it is a precursor to African philosophy or because it captures the history of African thought/ philosophy or even because it is a source material for precolonial African thoughts/ philosophies. Like I have previously explained, these do not constitute what we mean when we use the word “foundation”. It is easy to assume that what African philosophy is is dependent on a mere rehash of contents that are decidedly tied to the geographical place and its historical contents, traditions, values or ideas. The focus here is on the prefix “African” rather than on “philosophy”, as the underlying principle. If this is the case, one must then ask what differentiates African philosophy from the history of African ideas, anthropology or sociology? If the underlying principle must absorb the very essence of what the discipline is, then it is the case that regurgitating traditional African ideas would not serve as the foundation of African philosophy, since some ideas on their own are not always philosophical. Beyond this, ancient ideas alone relegate contemporary philosophical thoughts and the philosophical status of those who like to think them to the background. Something, then, is missing in this narrative, and to fill that gap, one must first turn her attention from the word “African” to the word “philosophy”.

3  Criticality5: The First Half I begin by asking what underlying principle makes African philosophy philosophical? The answer to this question does not lie in the rehashing of thoughts, whether old or new, but in the logic and rigorous critical appraisal of those thoughts. 5  I acknowledge that this section is mostly culled, with permission from the publisher, from a section (written by me) titled “Attoe: Revisiting the Foundationalist Perspective of Ethnophilosophy” in article published by Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions,

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Criticality is seen here as an attitude and as a method for juxtaposing/interrogation of hypothetical claims with certain rules (i.e. a logic) in a bid to decipher the validity and soundness of those claims. African myths told under moonlit skies remain myths – an exercise in storytelling. To transcend from the mythical to the philosophical would then involve a critical appraisal – a search for logical soundness – and whatever is left is what you would then term “philosophy”. This “philosophy” is constantly refined and contextualized through critical engagement  – similar to what Chimakonam calls arumaristics (2017, 121). Thus, the underlying principle of philosophy would then be criticality. If African philosophy must be considered philosophy and not something else, then it must possess this underlying principle. To further buttress this point, I find that when we look at the word ethnophilosophy, we immediately realize that mere regurgitation of thought history or cultural beliefs cannot count as philosophy – Asouzu (2007, 45–46) has soundly criticized individuals who adopt this approach and thinking by writing pieces on new yam festivals, masquerades, etc., of their various cultures, and presenting those anthropological exercises as philosophical. Yet, real philosophies, like the much-­referenced Ubuntu philosophy of the southern parts of Africa or Asouzu’s Ibuanyidanda philosophy, are also ethnophilosophical. What gives legitimacy to ethnophilosophies like Ubuntu is the level of criticality that is usually invested in the enterprise, unlike in the former. One must go deeper to find what makes ethnophilosophical ideas philosophical. So, even at the level of ethnophilosophy (what is being touted as the foundation of African philosophy), the underlying principle is still criticality. My analysis has not denied the importance of ethnophilosophical thinking in African philosophy – I have only denied that it is the foundation, or part of the foundation, of African philosophy. Also, while ethnophilosophy is built on the foundation of criticality and makes up the structure of what we determine to be the edifice – African philosophy – it is not the only superstructure. This brings me to my next point. Much of African philosophy so far has been ethnophilosophical in some way: from Oruka’s sage philosophy [basically a repeat of cultural beliefs via individual sages (Odera 1990)] to critical ethnophilosophy. For those individuals who may want to break the mould, locating individual ideas outside an ethnophilosophical current would mark such philosophers/philosophies as “un-African”. It seems then that, ironically, the geographical perspectivism that so characterized the legitimacy of a distinct African philosophy fails to inhere, in the same vein, to the individual African philosopher – it stopped its journey at the cultural level. So, as an African with creative new philosophical ideas that are not necessarily tied to precolonial traditional thought, or with my unique critique of exogenous non-African traditions/ ideas, my views remain “un-African”, despite my context as an individual, born, bred and living in contemporary Africa. There is, of course, a danger to this sort of

titled “Are we Finished with the Ethnophilosophy Debate?: A Multi-Perspective Conversation”. I have made some major changes and additions to this section that reflect my current views and correct certain mistakes.

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thinking – African philosophy would barely develop beyond ancient cultural views, and being a unique African philosopher is impossible. I think solving this problem is simple. Paulin Hountondji had redefined African philosophy as “a set of texts, specifically the set of texts produced by Africans and described as philosophical by their authors themselves” (2018, 12). Beyond the dilemma (non-Africans cannot do African philosophy) that this sort of definition enables, some insight can be salvaged. Ethnophilosophy is not the foundation of African philosophy and should also not be the only superstructure that forms African philosophy. In this way, when Hountondji says “produced by Africans”, he would mean exactly that and without always necessitating the silent extension “…in relation to pre-colonial thought” that the ethnophilosophers would like us to have. Professional African philosophy  – described here as the unique creative views of African philosophers regardless of cultural views – must be seen as also important and mutually complementary with its ethnophilosophical counterpart (which would also absorb non-African philosophers of African philosophical thought). Thus, in the same way that Western philosophers can talk about Plato’s world of forms and in the same vein talk about neurophilosophy and still be talking Western philosophy, African philosophers would be able to also talk about Ubuntu and some other new contemporary ideas and call the same “African philosophy”  – this is how African philosophy must develop.

4  Okwu: The Other Half It is important to take this idea of criticality a bit further. The reason for this is my recent encounter with Chimakonam’s idea of okwu and what he eventually terms okwucentricity. As Chimakonam’s writing on the idea of okwu is more enigmatic than it is precise, I would not only attempt my take on what he means by the term; I would also unpack it. I will further relate it to its implication for doing African philosophy with and beyond ethnophilosophy. Okwu, according to Chimakonam, is the very raw materials from which words are formed. In his words: Okwu is an Igbo-African concept which has no cognates among English words. It is not a “word” rather; it is that raw material from which words are formed. Its meaning is definite. It does not imply or connote anything else. It carries no further figurative interpretation. If there be other languages that have a meaning for okwu, it can easily be translated without a loss or an addition of meaning. This, I think makes the Igbo concept “okwu” more definite and stable than its near equivalents in other languages.… Unlike the English concept “word”, okwu is not a unit in the syntax of a sentence. The Igbo term for word is “mkpuru-­ okwu” (meaning “the first fruit of okwu” or that which is derived from okwu). Thus okwu precedes “word”. It is the very ancestor of word, and it is raw, formless and shapeless. I do not know many languages in the world that have a cognate for this wonderful concept. (Chimakonam 2019, 13–14)

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We can glean two major facts from the above. First, we see that okwu is protoword6 and, second, we see that it is a raw material of some sort. As proto-word, one can deduce that it is that thing that comes to mind before one speaks. Now, we can think of words as representational of objects in the world, as we perceive them. So, for Chimakonam, okwu must be the perceptive raw materials that inform our use of words. If this is true, then few interesting facts emerge. First, our proto-word is dependent on our body states and our location in time and space. Most philosophers, like Russell (2001), would agree that it is plausible to claim that perception is subjective. Whether it is the perceiver or the perceived that perceives, it does so from a subjective standpoint. Why this is the case is simple. We encounter external realities with our senses, and our understanding of those external objects is cocooned within the confines of our senses. But like all forms of cocooning, there is a limitation that fails to allow us to grasp certain aspects of what is real or, even, how that reality truly exists. For instance, with my eyes, I can see that my laptop is silver-coloured. If I were to wear a blue spectacle, that silver colour will fail to appear as vividly as it previously did. If I had achromatopsia, a condition that makes it impossible to see colour, then my laptop would seize to be silver-coloured. If I were a bat, I would, presumably, not see that my laptop is silver; I do not even know what my perception would be like. Even as human beings, we are all individually different, with unique body types. If it is our neural and body states that enable and recognize a certain perception (Chimakonam et al. 2019), then we must also admit that as similar but different human beings, our perception of the world is also similar but different. Beyond this, our position in time and space also determines how/what we perceive. What the foregoing means is that when we perceive, the raw data that we receive may be similar but at the same time different and subjective. This is because, although one can argue that reality is out there, our perception of reality is both subjective and contextual. Second, is the idea that beyond body states and context, one’s history plays a great role regarding what he/she sees or perceives. This history includes all the biases, prejudices, culture, social interactions and impressionable encounters that the individual has experienced over time. Take, for instance, the following statement by Kwasi Wiredu: A human person is the product of culture. Whatever else goes into the essence of personhood, mind must be a crucial factor. But we are not born with a mind, not even with one that is a tabula rasa; we are only born with the potential of a mind (in the form of a nervous system). This potential is actualised to a certain degree through the barrage of sensory stimulation emanating from the purely physical (i.e., non-social) environment; but the person-­making attribute of mind is not attainable without another kind of barrage, namely, the cultural or socialising barrage of sensory stimulation from kith, kin and kindred. And this means nothing but sundry forms of communication. (Wiredu 1990, 5–6)

For Wiredu, what influences communication or speech is the barrage of physical, social and cultural stimuli. What Wiredu had was a brief glance at some of those things that come together to form our okwu. This point is even more apparent when  By proto-word, I refer to something that stands as the raw material from which words are formed.

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he states that “We may say… that communication [speech/word] makes the mind. But we may say also that the mind is just the thing, more strictly, the capacity that makes communication. Two basic factors are involved in communication, namely, conceptualisation and articulation” (Wiredu 1990, 6) (emphasis mine). What Wiredu calls conceptualization, here, is a weaker sense of what I understand to be okwu. Thus, all these things – history, prejudices, culture, body states, etc. – come together to form what I term “vantage point7”, which then forms the raw material that informs our thoughts and, ultimately, our words and philosophy. These raw materials all come together to form the okwu that Chimakonam is telling us about. In other words, okwu is simply and precisely one’s vantage point. It then follows from the above that if philosophy is a form of reflection, then what also serves as the underlying principle of that reflection is okwu. Okwu is both a raw material and an underlying principle  – just like the “solid rock” is both the raw material and the foundation on which the house that never falls is built, in biblical parables. Now, what okwu teaches us is that our understanding of reality is fragmented and contextualized. So, when one claims that he/she has the ultimate access to knowledge, to which all other individualities must succumb, such a person is, at best, mistaken or proud. This understanding also shows that there are various perspectives to knowledge. Finally, this understanding sufficiently plays down geographical labellings, such that the ethno-unanimous stance is eliminated. For instance, it is plausible to imagine that at vastly different vantage points (A, B, C), the okwu that influences our understanding of a reality may be different from one another. It may not be radically different, and it may be similar in certain ways, but it would be different in some other ways. It is also plausible to imagine, in the same vein, that those standing besides a particular individual, in a particular vantage point (A), would share a more similar understanding of that reality than those standing nearer to a different vantage point (B or C). However, this is where those similarities end, for within those similar understanding of reality based on one’s vantage point (A, B or C), there are individual differences and histories (A1, A2, A3, etc.). And so, whereas individuals from a particular context may share a few similar ideas, those ideas cannot be the same in all ramifications and may not be understood in exactly the same way. Thus, with okwu as the other foundation of African philosophy, both universalism and particularism in African philosophy cannot be taken as seriously as the particularists and the universalists want us to take it. Philosophy cannot be extremely universal in all ramification since we philosophize with different okwu as our proto-­ word – our okwu is not exactly the same. We cannot also be extremely particularist, like the ethnophilosophers would have us, because even though we share a similar 7  Vantage points constitute our place in time (including the history that that time affords) and space (which includes our geographical location, cultural and social affiliations and context), our body states (including the condition of our senses, our level of cognition, our prejudices and biases) and even our engagement with realities (like the books we read and the ideas we engage with). These vantage points are the components of okwu.

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vantage point, we do not share exactly the same time, space and history in the world. From the contexts that we belong, we also have our own mini-vantage points. What I am saying, in other words, is that no two versions of okwu can be the same, but some are more similar than others. In an ironic twist, one can say that part of what can unite us at the level of universal is the fact that we understand that we are all seeking to understand reality, but from our specific vantage points – our own okwu. There is an obvious problem with this sort of understanding. Is it ever possible to get at truth in African philosophy? Is truth such a matter of perspective that every opinion is a truth claim since they proceed from okwus that are markedly different in content? These questions are the sorts of questions that always pop up when a relativist or subjectivist episteme comes to the fore. These questions are even more important for African philosophers in a global space, who must project their contextualized views of reality in such a way that it is universally appealing and intelligible. To answer this question within the framework I am proposing, I must first provide answers to the questions that I have just posed. For some philosophers, philosophy is the search for truth – and this truth is usually objective. As Ezeani puts it, “To philosophize is to think, and to think is to question. To philosophize is to ask questions and question the answer to the question and continue the process until one arrives at the ultimate answer- the truth…” (Ezeani 2005, 7). Now, there are idealists who opine that what we perceive as reality, what we call objects of reality, are only mental – in other words, our cognitive faculties create what we believe to be objects of reality, and it is only these mental data that are conceivable (Russell 2001, 5). For me, whether or not our sense organs receive data differently, or whether or not our interpretation of this data may or may not correspond to the object as it really is, it is plausible and conceivable to think that there must, first, be an encounter with an external object, for, at least, sense experience (and, ultimately, knowledge) to be possible. Whether or not the pain one feels when one stubs his toe on kerb is mainly a homeostatic emotional response from the brain is moot since there must first be a real kerb, external to the individual which induces that response. Now, if okwus/vantage points are subjective to the individual, then one can conclude that the simple utterance of an opinion is an utterance of truth. But this is a counterintuitive position to hold. African logics, such as Ezumezu, would fall flat on its face since it would no longer be a three-value logic but only a one-value logic – with “true” as that sole value. Indeed, the need for logic in any philosophical tradition would be moot. Such an idea cannot obviously hold, because there is some truth out there, and even though we can only wish for an incomplete grasp of these matters of facts, it is within the realm of possibility to actually clutch at some incomplete version of reality or truth. How do we get to the truth of the matter as it were? And so we come full circle back to criticality. It is through the interrogation of okwu with criticality that we begin to sharpen the content of our okwus towards truth. Whether this truth is ultimately achieved is another matter altogether, but what is certain is that okwus grow closer to truth insofar as they are constantly sharpened by criticality. This is ultimately how African philosophy (and all its branches, including ethnophilosophy, sage philosophy, etc.) is built on the foundation of okwu and

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criticality. One must, however, also note that this journey towards truth is a journey towards a proper understanding of an aspect of reality. In all these, one can sincerely think that criticality would, in a sense, govern over one’s okwu, thus allowing one to believe that criticality is the dominant partner in the duo. This then brings the question where does one draw the line in the relationship between okwu and criticality?8 It would be wrong, in my mind, to approach the relationship between okwu and criticality as, first and foremost, a power play where one is dominant and the other is inferior or something of the sort. In conversation, both okwu and criticality are in a mutually dependent relationship. On its own, criticality alone cannot stand as the foundation of African philosophy.9 One cannot critically analyse nothing – if one has to be critical of something – and so, in the context of African philosophy, okwu is this item for which critical engagement is necessary. Okwu, alone, cannot be the foundation of African philosophy because vantage points, on their own, beget mere opinion and not necessarily philosophy. Thus, there must be a relationship between both okwu and criticality. It is the same way that sand, stones, cement and water, on their own, cannot form the foundation of a building, except they are in a specific relationship with one another. I had said earlier that the specific relationship between okwu and criticality is what Chimakonam and other Conversationalists would call arumaristics. Their relationship is not one of violence where clashes between okwu and criticality would yield a victor that dominates the other. It is a relationship of mutual dependence. When okwu interacts with criticality, it is criticality’s job to interrogate okwu in a bid to shed away faulty implausible intuitions and restructure one’s vantage point positively (when that restructuring leads to a new vista of thought) or negatively (when that exfoliation and restructuring require the letting go of certain intuitions – the reduction of the content of one’s vantage point). When the African philosopher encounters a philosophical question that requires a response, what comes to mind before that philosopher is a lightning-fast conglomeration of all the factors that form his vantage point in conversation with criticality. Thus, for instance, when that African philosopher is asked “is life meaningful?”, that African philosopher’s okwu/ vantage point bears witness to the ethereal vital force it believes is present in all persons and the praise of those who have augmented that vital force to higher degrees and intuits that perhaps augmenting one’s vitality can lead to meaningfulness. Then criticality comes in to question that idea of vitality and reminds that African philosopher that one can rarely explain the qualities of something he/she has never perceived or experienced. This allows the African philosopher to shed the property of ethereality and focus more on the observable properties of vitality such as wellbeing and creative energy. These proto-words then form what would  Many thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this wonderful point.   In an earlier contribution titled “Attoe: Revisiting the Foundationalist Perspective of Ethnophilosophy” in article published by Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions, titled “Are we Finished with the Ethnophilosophy Debate?: A Multi-­ Perspective Conversation”, I had projected criticality, lone, as the foundation of African philosophy. I no longer hold that view.

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constitute the African philosopher’s eventual speech: “yes, life can be meaningful if one finds a way to augment his/her wellbeing and creative energy”.10 In this little story, we see how okwu and criticality relate and play the role of the underlying principle of African philosophical thought. Outside the foundation of okwu and criticality, whatever is being built forms something other than “African” “philosophy”.

5  O  kwu, Criticality and African Philosophy: With and Beyond Ethnophilosophy No doubt, as I have shown, we cannot begin to talk about (even critical) ethnophilosophy as the foundation of African philosophy. This is mainly because such an assertion would not capture what we mean to say when we say that x is the foundation of y. Now that I have (re)identified the foundation of African philosophy as the mixture of okwu and criticality, what then does this mean for African philosophy moving forward? First, this foundation (of okwu and criticality) allows us to decide who can count as an African philosopher. When Hountondji (1996, 33) famously defined African philosophy as “a set of texts, specifically the set of texts written by Africans and described as philosophical by their authors themselves”, he was precisely saying that African philosophy could only be done by Africans. Even his more recent iteration of that definition, which sees African philosophy as “a set of texts, specifically the set of texts produced by Africans and described as philosophical by their authors themselves” (2018, 12), does not save him from that same conclusion. For a universalist, whose criticisms of ethnophilosophy nailed that tradition to a cross, this was the most ethno-centred definition of African philosophy that one can provide. I believe that the problem lies in the treating of the prefix “African” (in African philosophy) as a mainly geographical label (see Segun 2014, 107). Based on the foundation that I have laid out, the term African is not necessarily a geographical label but a vantage point, an aspect of okwu. To be an African philosopher is to place one’s self in a position to absorb that okwu (the pertinent values, norms, tradition, history of thought, etc.) into one’s own and critically engage them from there. Within this framework, Africans themselves can be African philosophers, if they critically engage with their okwu and/or from the vantage point which is common to them or if they engage with other different thoughts/philosophies but with their okwu/vantage point. Non-Africans or Africans whose okwus are moulded from a vantage point that is too far away could also be African philosophers, insofar as they familiarize themselves with the vantage point and/context from which Africans view reality and critically engage with them. This echoes Oruka’s point, which suggests that a philosophical work versed with/interested in the African reality – and by 10

 This example heavily references Metz’s view of the idea of vitality (Metz 2012).

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extension, a philosopher versed with, and doing work on, the African reality – can be referred to as “African (philosopher)” (Oruka, 1975, p. 50). Within this framework, African philosophers can be original as they need not rehash cultural norms but have to critically engage their okwu, in order to either rework their beliefs or produce (from their okwu) new beliefs/theoretical systems. Indeed, it is the similarities that may be characteristic of the African vantage point that allows us to slap the label “African” to philosophy. However, while this is the case, the individual is never cocooned or forced into a particular narrative or expectation. This is because whereas the African vantage point may share some characteristics, individuals standing from this vantage point are standing from their own micro-vantage points. In other words, individuals possess subject-specific okwu that determines how they perceive and interpret reality. So with okwu and criticality as the foundation of African philosophy, individual philosophical expressions are also captured as legitimate contributions to African philosophy. Another implication that this understanding entertains is the inevitable importance of conversations – arumaristics11 – for African philosophy. At the foundational level, conversations characterize the relationship that must exist between the two foundational parts of African philosophy – criticality and okwu. This conversational relationship plays out in the interrogation of the later by the former. Thus, a “conversation” expresses itself in the coming together of okwu and criticality, where okwu is to be tested with criticality, if it is to ever refine itself, shed the falsehoods and if it is to understand the limitations that may be part of it, and evolve to become words of truth. At the macro-level, when individuals from various vantage points converge at the international philosophical arena to present their own opinions about a subject and converse among themselves (and this is where Chimakonam’s arumaristics flourishes), aiming for a synthesis at the global arena is, at best, a long shot. Since our individual claims to truth are only incomplete aspects of truth (some of which are still riddled with some inconsistency), the need to sharpen one’s okwu (and, ultimately, one’s portion of truth), as much as possible, becomes the primary objective. For Chimakonam and Conversationalists, this is done via arumaristics. Thus, by extension, African philosophy must continue to move to sharpen its concepts, theories and ideas. Finally, to move beyond ethnophilosophy, African philosophers must be original. To understand why this is necessary is to understand Bernasconi’s double bind. Bernasconi (1997, 188) quips that: …either African philosophy is so similar to Western philosophy that it makes no distinctive contribution and effectively disappears; or it is so different that its credentials to be genuine philosophy will always be in doubt.

With the idea of okwu in our minds, we can say that the second half of the bind is not as strong as Bernasconi would have us believe. This is because he is implicitly

 Chimakonam describes arumaristics as a “…a procedure for reasoning in which thesis and anti-­ thesis complement rather than conflate and maintain their individualities in order to frustrate the emergence of synthesis. It is from the English translation as ‘conversation’ that the concept conversationalism—as a description of the method—is adopted” (2017, 121).

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suggesting that Western philosophy is the paradigm for true philosophy, and a veering away from Western philosophy is a veering away from philosophy proper. He is wrong because Western philosophy is mainly a vantage point – one with a unique but incomplete view of reality. The first part of the bind is, however, true – and one can stretch the idea further: Either African philosophy is so similar to Western philosophy that it makes no distinctive contribution and effectively disappears; or African Philosophy, as a whole, veers so close to descriptive ethnophilosophy that nothing critical emerges.

This is the true bind that African philosophers today encounter. If African philosophers need not always look backwards to rehash tribal memories or ethnophilosophy (whether laced with criticality or not) in order to move forward and, at the same time, need not do Western philosophy (if their views are to be counted as African philosophy), then the only escape must be originality. African philosophers, moving forward, are obliged to produce novel ideas that are both beyond the collective and/or memorial nature of ethnophilosophy and different from Western philosophy.12 This avoids a certain type of reductionism. Reductionism, as I use it here, describes that situation where the lack of originality encourages a strong dependence on ethnophilosophy, such that, before long, the whole edifice of African philosophy is eventually reduced to ethnophilosophy. For growth in African philosophy to be possible, new and novel ideas must emerge. For this to happen, one must embrace his/her okwu. By engaging with one’s unique worldview – unique even to the subjective level  – the individual is forced to present an understanding of the world that emanates from his/her okwu, which is peculiar to him/her and different from those of others (even though they might be similar in some ways).

6  Conclusion In this chapter, what I have done is an attempt to proffer an alternative proposal with regard to the foundation of African philosophy and the framework with which African philosophy ought to proceed. In my earlier writings, I had thought this foundation to be simply criticality (Imafidon et  al. 2019). However, more recent reflections have availed me more insight into the matter with the addition of okwu. Thus, in this paper, I have sought to present the mixture of okwu and criticality as that which stands as the underlying principles on which African philosophy, specifically, is built. Beyond this, I have shown what this new understanding means for doing African philosophy, with and beyond ethnophilosophy. The critical engagement with one’s okwu produces a brand of African philosophy that is either completely novel or one that interrogates communal history. Indeed, understanding what African philosophy is all about, in this way, would project the discipline forward.  My conversations with African philosopher, Ada Agada, have further deepened my acceptance of this view.

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References Agada, Ada. 2013. Is African philosophy progressing? Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 2 (1): 239–273. Agada, A. 2015. Existence and consolation: Reinventing ontology, gnosis and values in African philosophy. Minnesota: Paragon House. Asouzu, I. 2007. Ibuaru – The heavy burden of philosophy beyond African philosophy. Zurich: LIT VERLAG. Attoe, A. 2016. An essay concerning the foundational myth of ethnophilosophy. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religion 5: 100–108. Audi, R. 2011. Routledge contemporary introductions to philosophy. 3rd ed. New York: Routledge. Bernasconi, R. 1997. African philosophy’s challenge to continental philosophy. In Postcolonial African philosophy: A critical reader, ed. Emmanuel Eze, 183–196. Cambridge MA: Blackwell Publishers. Chimakonam, J. 2017. What is conversational philosophy? A prescription of a new doctrine and method of philosophising, in and beyond African philosophy. Phronimon 18: 115–130. ———. 2019. Ezumezu: A system of logic for African philosophy and studies. Cham: Switzerland. Chimakonam, J., E.  Uti, S.  Segun, and A.  Attoe. 2019. New conversations on the problems of identity, consciousness and mind. Cham: Springer Nature. Descartes, R. 1641. Meditations on first philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (1996). Ezeani, E. 2005. Philosophy as intelligent and pragmatic questioning. London: Veritas Lumen Publishers. Hountondji, P. 1996. African philosophy: Myth and reality. Indiana: Indiana University Press. ———. 2018. How African is philosophy in Africa? Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 7: 9–18. Ijiomah, C. 2014. Harmonious Monism: A philosophical logic of explanation for ontological issues in supernaturalism in African thought. Calabar: Jochrisam Publishers. Imafidon, E., et al. 2019. Are we finished with the ethnophilosophy debate? A multi-perspective conversation. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 8: 111–137. Mangena, F. 2014. In defense of ethno-philosophy: A brief response to Kanu’s eclectism. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 3: 96–107. Metz, T. 2012. African conceptions of human dignity: Vitality and community as the ground of human rights. Human Rights Review 13: 19–37. More, M. 1996. African philosophy revisited. Alternation 3: 109–129. Odera, O. 1990. Sage philosophy: Indigenous thinkers and modern debate on African philosophy. Nairobi: Masaki Publishers. Ogbonnaya, L. 2018. What makes African philosophy African? A conversation with Aribiah David Attoe on the ‘foundational myth of ethnophilosophy’. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 7: 94–108. Oruka, O. 1975. The fundamental principles in the question of African philosophy. Second Order 4: 44–65. Ramose, M. 1999. African philosophy through Ubuntu. Harare: Mond Books. Russell, B. 2001. The problems of philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Segun, S. 2014. The prefix “African” and its implication or philosophy in Africa. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 3: 106–123. Whitehead, A. N. 1978. Process and reality. New York: The Free Press. Wiredu, K. 1990. Are there cultural universals? Quest 4: 5–19.

Beyond Placide Tempels’ Bantu Philosophy and in Defence of the Philosophical Viability of Ethnophilosophy Edwin Etieyibo

Abstract  I take the question of the status of culture in African philosophy to be one about the place and foundational role that African culture plays in African philosophy. There are two issues that arise in connection with this claim. One concerns the role that African culture ought to play in African philosophy, and the other is about whether culture-bound worldviews qualify as authentic or genuine philosophy. Both issues are deeply connected to ethnophilosophy and the question as to whether or not ethnophilosophy is genuine philosophy, where ethnophilosophy can be taken to be either (a) the study of indigenous philosophical systems or (b) culture as it exists, encountered or lived. In this chapter, I explore these issues as part of my attempt to move beyond the philosophical resources provided by Placide Tempels in Bantu Philosophy. My analysis proceeds by making a number of distinctions – the distinction between the radical and moderate positions and that between the component and contentful stances. The analysis I provide regarding these distinctions offer me some useful space and foundation to be able to gesture towards the view that ethnophilosophy can be treated as articulating a viable philosophy and, accordingly, could be treated as genuine philosophy. Keywords  Africa · African · African culture · African philosophy · Bantu · Culture · Ethnomorality · Ethnophilosophy · Excavationists · Modernists · Philosophy · Placide Tempels · Universalists

1  Introduction There is view, and I think rightly so, that Placide Tempels with the publication of his book Bantu Philosophy (1945/1959) paved the way for contemporary discussions and debates – positively or negatively – about African philosophy. As Souleymane Bachir Diagne has noted, in the Ink of Scholars: Reflections on Philosophy in Africa, E. Etieyibo (*) Department of Philosophy, School of Social Sciences, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Agada (ed.), Ethnophilosophy and the Search for the Wellspring of African Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78897-1_6

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Bantu Philosophy “can be considered one of the pioneering works that made so-­ called ‘African’ philosophy a question of importance for philosophical reflection in general” (2016, 9).1 Having said this, it is important to point out that the reception of Tempels’ book can be divided into two camps. There are those like Léopold Sédar Senghor, Alioune Diop and Cheikh Anta Diop who welcomed the book and embraced it positively. On the other hand, there are critics of the book such as Aimé Césaire (and others who Tempels took to be pseudo-“évolués”) who were sceptical of the book and dismissed it. Of the latter camp, the worry appears to gravitate around issues of the political agenda of Bantu Philosophy and a seeming “bastardization” of African philosophy. In particular, the thought seem to be that Bantu Philosophy has not done African philosophy any favours. As Diagne succinctly put it, “this Bantu philosophy, and all the other philosophies it had given birth to  – Wolof, Akan, Yoruba and others  – would need to be stored where they belonged: on the shelves of the ethnological literature and its ethno-philosophical appendages, so that the African intellectual landscape would not find itself upside down in a total confusion of genres. So that ‘true’ African philosophy would be possible, and produced by authors taking individual responsibility for their theses, arguments and propositions” (2016, 10). It is these issues – issues about the ethnophilosophical status of African philosophy and whether the possibility of African philosophy is undermined because of the acceptance of ethnophilosophy – which are raised by the critic camp that I am interested in this chapter. While the two camps that I have talked about above ignited the debate about the ethnophilosophical status of African philosophy, it was not until in the 1970 that the term “ethnophilosophy” acquired its negative or bad reputation in the work of Paulin Hountondji who criticized Tempels’ Bantu Philosophy as ethnophilosophy (1970, 1983). By doing this, Hountondji pitched himself with those that Tempels had labelled pseudo-“évolués”. And it is on the heel of Hountondji’s discussion of Bantu Philosophy and ethnophilosophy in 1970 and 1983 and Odera Oruka’s discussion of philosophical sagacity and ethnophilosophy as trends in African philosophy in a number of his works (1981, 1983, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c, 1991a and 1991b) that the debate about the ethnophilosophical status of African philosophy took on a much more rigorous and sustained focus. Since then, the debate has become one of the most pivotal and robust debates in contemporary African philosophy. As a trend in African philosophy, ethnophilosophy equates African philosophy with culture-bound systems of thought. At the heart of the debate is the question as 1  Although Diagne notes that Bantu Philosophy can be taken as one of the ground-breaking works in African philosophy, he does raise an important issue regarding its importance and that of another work on the philosophy of the Bantu peoples. The point is that given that Tempels was not the first to write a book that focused on the philosophy of the Bantu peoples and given that someone like William Vernon Brelsford published a more theoretical work on Primitive Philosophy in 1935 that dealt with the philosophy of the Bantu peoples, why did the latter (Primitive Philosophy) not acquire the sort of prominence that the former (Bantu Philosophy) gained? His response is to suggest that it possibly has to do with the title of the book and “the adjective ‘primitive’ which seem to have diluted the import of the word ‘philosophy’” (Diagne 2016, 11).

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to whether ethnophilosophy is authentic or genuine philosophy. While some African philosophers take the view that ethnophilosophy is not (and at best pseudo-philosophy), others take a contrary view and are quite happy to present ethnophilosophy as authentic philosophy. Since ethnophilosophy takes culture-bound systems of thought to be African philosophy, it is appropriate to call ethnophilosophers excavationists insofar as they seek to excavate elements of African cultural life and experiences and highlight the ways in which these can be said to constitute African philosophy. As I have noted, Oruka discussed ethnophilosophy as a trend in African philosophy in some of his works in the 1980s and 1990s. One may also take the nationalist-ideological philosophical ltrend of African philosophy as a part of ethnophilosophical worldview insofar as it could be considered a sub-school of the excavationism school.2 In this understanding, members of this school will include Placid Tempels, John Mbiti, Alexis Kagame, Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Toure, Julius Nyerere, Leopold Sedar Senghor, Aime Cesaire and Amilcar Cabral. In general, the excavationism project is one that attempts to (a) build the edifice of African philosophy by articulating and systematizing the African cultural worldviews, (b) systematically retrieve and reconstruct African identity from the raw materials of African culture and (c) develop and construct African political ideologies and systems from the ground up, i.e. fundamental and native political systems of African peoples. In contrast to the ethnophilosophers or excavationists, we have the modernists or universalists. The modernists/universalists have sometimes been called Afro-deconstructionists (Chimakonam, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy), and they take ethnophilosophy to be inauthentic philosophy. Some members of this group are Paulin Hountondji, Kwasi Wiredu, Peter Bodunrin, Marcien Towa, Fabien Eboussi Boulaga, Richard Wright and Henri Maurier. The typical move of the modernists/universalists is to undermine the project of the excavationists by primarily severing any grounding of African philosophy on African culture. Their central argument is that the raw materials of African culture are not genuine elements of philosophy and at best deficient cultural elements and paraphernalia. My interest in this chapter is not to resurrect or engage with this debate in the form that pitched the ethnophilosophers/excavationists against the anti-­ excavationists or modernists/universalists. Rather, my interest is to engage with some distinctions that I think are implicated in the debate and by so doing gesture towards the view which may seem to support some of the intuitions of the excavationists as well as reasons for thinking that ethnophilosophy articulates a form of philosophy and, accordingly, could be treated as genuine philosophy. In particular, I seek to engage with the question regarding the role that African culture ought to play in African philosophy in ways that will in a roundabout way make some case for ethnophilosophy, where ethnophilosophy can be taken to be either (a) the study of indigenous philosophical systems or (b) culture as it exists, encountered or lived. My hope is that the distinctions that I make and discuss in the paper – the distinction between the radical

 I will discuss the nationalist-ideological philosophical school later on in the essay.

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and moderate positions and that between the component and contentful stances – will provide me some useful space and foundation to be able to gesture towards the view that ethnophilosophy can be treated as genuine philosophy. In this sense, I can be taken to set myself up for two critical tasks: one, to make a case that every philosophy is a philosophy of place or of culture and, two, that ethnophilosophy articulates a form of philosophy and, accordingly, could be treated as genuine philosophy.

2  Some Riders Before I go any further, let me issue some provisos. My issuing these riders should not be interpreted as an evasiveness technique, that is, as me trying to evade some of the most difficult and pressing worries in respect of the issues I examine and the position that I defend. Rather, I issue them so as to properly delineate the scope of my philosophical investigations. Firstly, as the title of the essay suggests, this essay is a move beyond Tempels’ Bantu Philosophy in ways that attempt to present some philosophical defence of the value and possibility of ethnophilosophy. As part of pursuing this aim, I will not discuss Tempels’ Bantu Philosophy beyond flagging it here as presenting a metaphysical view about the African hierarchy of beings that is underpinned by the force thesis drawn from Bantu metaphysics. On the force thesis, beings are hierarchically ordered, namely, there is a causal dependence and relationship of forces. The hierarchy is this: God is at the top, followed by spirits and then ancestors (nameless dead and living dead), humans, animals and inanimate beings. As Tempels (1945/1959) notes, the Bantus conceive of entities or beings as essential energies or vital forces, that is, force is not just a necessary element in being; it is inseparable from the definition of being, meaning then that force is the nature of being, force is being and being is force.3

3  For a discussion of this African hierarchy of beings and connections with debates about anthropocentrism, see Edwin Etieyibo (2019). And for discussions of Bantu metaphysics as the “force of living” as well as the presentation of Bantu Philosophy in terms of some of its ontological principles, see Diagne (2016, 9–34) and Léo Apostel (1981). In the book, African philosophy: Myth or reality, Apostel identifies the following seven ontological principles of Bantu Philosophy:

(A1) The existence of anything is its being a force, and the essence of anything is its being a force. (A2) Every force is specific. (A3) Different types of beings are characterized by different intensities and types of force. (A4) Each force can be strengthened or weakened. (A5) Forces can influence each other and act upon each other in virtue of their internal natures. All forces are radically interdependent internally. (A6) The universe is a hierarchical order of forces according to their strengths. (A7) Beings occupying a higher rank in the hierarchy can influence all beings of lower rank, at any distance; beings of higher rank can influence beings of lower rank or equal rank, indirectly by using beings of lower rank; beings of equal rank can weaken or strengthen directly and internally the force of another being of equal rank.

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Secondly, I’ll use the term Africans to refer generally to sub-Saharan Africans, namely, autochthonous or indigenous  black peoples to the south of the Sahara Desert. Thirdly, African culture will be used as a shorthand and generic way of pointing to or picking out particular experiences, practices, beliefs, values and ways of life that are salient among sub-Saharan Africans and which are shared among them. On this rider, my use of phrases “Africans” and “African culture” should not be taken as an attempt at homogenizing Africa or Africans. Fourthly, I’ll take the issue of the status of culture in African philosophy to be one about the connection between African culture and African philosophy, that is, the place and foundational role of African culture in African philosophy. Fifthly, I will take culture to be shared and passed on from one generation to another (Eboh and Ukpong 1995) and as meaning a set of shared attitudes, beliefs, values, goals and practices that characterizes an institution, an organization or a group (see Uwagie-Ero et al. 1998; Etieyibo and Omiegbe 2016). And finally, in engaging with the question “What role should African culture play in African philosophy?”, I should not be taken to be engaging with a descriptive question. Rather, I should be taken to be generally engaging with a normative question, that is, the question about why or why not African philosophy should be determined or grounded (at some level) on African culture. On a normative question about African culture and African philosophy, the aim is to tease out some standard that inform a correct way of doing African philosophy. But on a descriptive question about African culture and African philosophy, the aim is about highlighting what is empirically the case. Indeed, empirically, it might be that African culture does not play any role in African philosophy. But this will not impugn my project, as it can still be argued that even though African culture does not play any role in African philosophy it ought to play a role. Of course, ultimately, the way I deal with the normative question does have implications for the descriptive/empirical question particularly in the way it suggests the impossibility of doing a placeless philosophy.

3  W  hat Role Should African Culture Play in African Philosophy? I will begin by laying out two positions about African culture and African philosophy. I will call the first the “radical view” and the second the “moderate view”. On the “radical view”, African culture ought to play no role in African philosophy. The point about this view is that African philosophers that do philosophy have to transcend African culture; they have to present a philosophy that is universal or has a universal culture as its founding. The motivation and thinking here seems to be that since philosophy is universal, any work presented as African philosophy must be universal. I will take the modernists/universalists to support this view. I come to this

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point in a moment. On the “moderate view”, African culture ought to play an important role in African philosophy. The point of this view is that given that philosophy is always about some particular culture and given that it is not possible to have an African philosophy that is not tied to African culture, African philosophers ought not to present African philosophy as if it transcends African culture. I will take this view as being consistent with the position of the excavationists/ethnophilosophers. I will be focusing on the “moderate view” since I think that not many people will be found that defend the “radical view”. This seems a reasonable move since it does appear to me that anyone that takes philosophy as explicating, in general, views about reality and values will have to be committed to saying that culture does have to influence the articulation of those views, even if understood negatively. I will say more about this idea of culturally informed philosophy later on. I think there are two aspects to the “moderate view”, which I will call the “component stance” and the “contentful stance”. On the “component stance”, African culture is taken to be the ingredient of African philosophy, that is, African philosophers draw on African culture to create, develop and calibrate African philosophy. And on the “contentful stance”, African culture properly understood and analysed is African philosophy. There are two aspects to this. One aspect to the “contentful stance” is that African culture as it exists and as encountered is African philosophy. The second is that once African philosophers excavate African culture and properly analyse it, what they produce is African philosophy. Both the “component stance” and “contentful stance” share something in common – they take African culture to be the context or place from where African philosophy emerges. The difference between both is that on the former, context is understood less robustly (weakly or loosely) and, on the latter, it is understood more robustly (strongly or tightly), that is, context for the “component stance” is the material for African philosophy and, for the “contentful stance”, context, pure and simple, is African philosophy or constitutes African philosophy. In the literature, we can say the following propositions or claims or reflections on African philosophy provide us the basis for making the distinction between the “component stance” and the “contentful stance”. The statement made by Wiredu regarding the collection, interpretation and distribution of culture-bound material provides us a way of thinking of one aspect of the “contentful stance”. In Philosophy and an African Culture, he talks about the philosophical enterprise and the method of “collecting, interpreting and disseminating African proverbs, folk tales, myths, and other traditional material of a philosophical tendency” (Wiredu 1980, 3–4). There is also the statement by Paulin Hountondji that points to the “contentful stance”. Hountondji talks of critical cultural worldviews, in particular, the interpretation of the worldview of “customs and traditions, proverbs and institutions…concerning the cultural life of African people” (Hountondji 1983, 34). The first set of reflection in respect of the “component stance” comes from Didier Kaphagawani (1998). According to him, African philosophy proceeds from reflection (found in the modern developments in knowledge and techniques), namely, reflecting on cultural particulars to make them universals. This method, according

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to him, is one of joint venture and product of the traditional and modern philosophers (Kaphagawani 1998). This reflection is similar to that which we find in Wiredu when he says that African philosophers ought to take a decolonial approach in philosophy and by so doing excavate and exploit thoughtfully and judiciously “the resources of our own indigenous conceptual schemes in our philosophical meditations on even the most technical problems of contemporary philosophy” (Wiredu 1996, 136). Finally, the reflections of Osuagwu (2005) who takes culture-bound worldview to inform and constitute the necessary background, ingredient, raw material, vessel, source and nourishment of philosophy generally (2005, 58–69). Given the debate as to whether ethnophilosophy is genuine philosophy or not, I take the disagreement between the excavationists/ethnophilosophers and the modernists/universalists to be one that mostly implicates the “contentful stance”. Stated differently, the disagreement concerns the issue of a particular context, that is, whether a robust (strong) or not so robust (tight) context can indeed be considered philosophical or proper philosophy. If this is right, then I take it that the “component stance” will be agreeable to the modernists/universalists, according to which the context is understood weakly or loosely and where the context provides only the material for African philosophy. Even though I’m saying that the “contentful stance” is invariably the position of the excavationists/ethnophilosophers, I do think that the “component stance” is agreeable with it (the “contentful stance”) in so respect. This is so insofar as minimally the “component stance” is simply about the importance of African culture to African philosophy. In discussing aspects of what I have been calling the “component stance”, I will make a detour to Wiredu’s book, Philosophy and an African Culture, where he makes a number of claims which I think are important for making the argument about the situatedness or rootedness of African philosophy. The following are some of the crucial claims he makes: (a) Philosophy can play a key role in Africa’s development, as it unavoidably modernizes. (b) Since philosophy is a critical, reflective, rational enterprise, it not enough to identify a traditional set of African beliefs and call it philosophy. (c) Indigenous belief systems can be the starting point of African philosophy, but they will truly become a philosophical tradition only insofar as they become the grist for critical philosophizing. (d) What we will have is a blend of traditional beliefs and modern, Western critical reflection. (e) Philosophy can contribute to African culture and it can draw from it. (f) Contemporary African philosophers can contribute to African philosophy (e.g. they can assimilate the positives and advances of analytic philosophy and apply them to the general social and intellectual changes associated with “modernization”; they can exploit traditional resources and test the assumptions of Western philosophy against the suggestions and ideas of their own language and culture. What Wiredu says in (f) is similar to what he says in Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective (1996), in particular, what he says on page 136

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regarding the judicious and thoughtful exploitation of “the resources of our own indigenous conceptual schemes in our philosophical meditations on even the most technical problems of contemporary philosophy”. His points in (b) and (c) clearly show that he does not share the “contentful stance” of gathering, “collecting, interpreting and disseminating African proverbs, folk tales, myths, and other traditional material of a philosophical tendency” (Wiredu 1980, 3–4). However, (b) and (c) in conjunction with (d) and (f) give us the “component stance”, which is simply that African culture is important for African philosophy insofar as African philosophy is inspired and motivated by African culture or it can and ought to draw on African culture. The minimal conclusion that follows then is that African philosophers produce African philosophy (1) when they draw on African culture and (2) when such drawing involves critical reflections of indigenous or culture-bound resources, experiences, ideas and beliefs.

4  C  omponent and Contentful Stances and Some Trends in Modern African Philosophy What I want to do in this section is to summarize what I have done so far by placing my discussion of the “component” and “contentful” stances within the context of some of the trends in modern African philosophy identified by Oruka (1981, 1990c).4 I realize that there are more trends in African philosophy than the ones I have discussed here. However, I want to point out that my analysis or discussion of the trends is not meant to be exhaustive but rather illustrative of how my discussion of the “component” and “contentful” stances relates to some of the trends.

4.1  Ethnophilosophy School I have indicated that both aspects of the “moderate view” (“component” and “contentful” stances) are consistent with ethnophilosophy – the later (“contenful”) more so than the former (“component”) or the former at least minimally closer to the later. Literally and linguistically, ethnophilosophy mean culture philosophy where ethno means culture (people or even race). And on a broad understanding of ethnophilosophy, ethnophilosophy concerns either the recording of the beliefs, values, categories and assumptions that are implicit in the language, practices and beliefs of African cultures or the interpretation of the worldview, “customs and traditions, proverbs and institutions…concerning the cultural life of African people” (Hountondji 1983,

4  The other trend in African philosophy identified by Oruka that I will not be discussing in this section or in other places in this chapter is the philosophical sagacity school (see Oruka (1990a, 27–40); Oruka (1990b); and Oruka (1990c)).

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34). There are two aspects to the literal, linguistic and broad understanding of ethnophilosophy – aspects that are consistent with the “component” and “contentful” stances of the “moderate view”. The first aspect is the analysing, recording and interpreting of cultural elements and resources (or culture), and the second is the culture that is being analysed, recorded and interpreted. On both aspects, a work can be said to be ethnophilosophy if it is either (a) the study of indigenous philosophical systems or (b) the culture itself as it exists, encountered or lived. On both aspects of ethnophilosophy, African philosophy is taken as a communal property rather than an activity of the individual or this and that person. An example of a classic piece of thought or work in ethnophilosophy which falls into the first aspect can be said to be Placide Tempels’ Bantu Philosophy (which concerns the metaphysical categories of the Bantu people and how they are reflected in their linguistic categories. Another is E. J. Alagoa’s idea of African philosophy of history stemming from traditional proverbs, according to which African philosophy provides the context for reclaiming wisdom and interpreting the past. Examples of piece of thought in ethnophilosophy that fall into the second aspect are any piece of indigenous thought system as presented. This can range from proverbs to riddles, mythology and things like the Ifa corpus. Other works that fall into the category of ethnophilosophy will be works that are prefaced by an ethnic group or a people’s cultural group and followed by some philosophical designation such as the “Yoruba, Zulu or Akan concept of a person” or “Logic in Acholi or Urhobo proverbs or language” or “The notion of freewill or immortality in X”, where X denotes some ethnic group or a people’s cultural group. Given the modernists/universalists’ emphasis on a universalist worldview of philosophy and the point that ethnophilosophy does not fit the bill, two of the foremost criticisms that have generally been levelled against ethnophilosophy are that (a) it presents cultural beliefs as static and not much emphasis on rigorous argumentation and criticism and (b) it considers African philosophy to be “...the individual views hidden under a collective veil and identified with an ethnic group... a philosophy which, instead of presenting its own rational justification, shelters lazily behind the authority of a tradition and projects its own theses and beliefs on to that tradition” (Kebede 1999, n.p.).5

4.2  Nationalist-Ideological Philosophical School I mentioned in the introduction that ethnophilosophy or broadly  the ethnophilosophical perspective can be said to include the nationalist-ideological philosophical school or rather that the nationalist-ideological philosophical school is a sub-school 5  For some sustained response to some of the criticisms against ethnophilosophy, albeit those that target the variant raised by Paulin Hountondji, see Chimakonam (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy), and for varied discussions and viewpoints on ethnophilosophical project, see Imafidon, Matolino, Ogbonnaya, Agada, Attoe and Mangena and Etieyibo (2019).

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of excavationism. This means then that both aspects of the “moderate view” (“component” and “contentful” stances) will apply to it. The degree to which they apply will vary from philosopher to philosopher and the particular philosophical work in question. In any case, peeling the layers of the major elements of the nationalist-­ ideological philosophical school, which takes African philosophy as socio-political in nature, will help determine the degree that the “component” and “contentful” stances apply. In general, the elements of the nationalist-ideological philosophical school include the following: 1. It is an attempt “to evolve a new...unique political theory based on the traditional African socialism and familyhood” (Bodunrin 1991, 64). 2. It embraces political manifestos of liberation movements that situate their ideologies in Africa. 3. It is generally founded in the struggle for the liberation of the Africans from colonial rule. 4. It encompasses philosophic reflections on the authentic African personality and identity in order to recover and revive the humanity of Africans dehumanized by enslavement and colonialism (Birt 1991, 95–109). 5. It involves the (re)construction of a characteristically African social and political philosophy from indigenous social values and communalism (Birt 1991, 95–109).

4.3  Modernist/Universalist Philosophical School The modernists/universalists take the standard of African philosophy to be a critical and individual-centred discourse which is universal. One can say that the modernists/universalists are those that Oruka called professional philosophers. Members of this school, who are generally trained in the Western philosophical tradition or traditions, are mostly united by their attempts to undermine ethnophilosophy as authentic philosophy. They hold a universalist worldview of philosophy, namely, they embraced a universal view of the methods and concerns of philosophy. For them, any work is considered philosophical just in case such work is accessible and applicable to all peoples and cultures in the world. On the surface, both aspects of the “moderate view” (“component” and “contentful” stances) do not seem to apply to the modernists/universalists. But on closer reflection, this is not the case. For, as I indicated above, the “component stance” will be agreeable to the modernists/universalists. This is because I take it that insofar as the modernists/universalists will not disagree with the claim that there is no philosophy that is not of some place (whether the place is one particular place or the world as a place), then the follow-up claim that context or culture provides some of the material for African philosophy will not be disagreeable to them. I will now present an argument for the “component stance”, with the hope of teasing out the position that the claim that African philosophy draws on context or

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culture will be acceptable to the modernists/universalists. This is the first of the two of the critical tasks that I set myself up for – making a case that every philosophy is a philosophy of place or of culture.

5  Component Stance, Culture and Philosophy The main point of the “component stance” is that philosophy is not placeless or simply that there is no philosophy that is not rooted. The philosopher as being I will say is what Martin Heidegger would call Dasein, a being-in-the-world. To be a Dasein is to be there, and to be there is to be in the world, to be characterized by existentials. Being in the world is to be spatial, and Dasein’s spatiality is one of place whereby being-in-the-world is bounded (see Heidegger 1962; Wollan 2003, 31–39). This can be likened to Thomas Nagel’s point of the “view from nowhere”. As Nagel reminds us, the “view from nowhere” is pretentiously an objective perspective that takes a more detached perspective where reality and valuable ideas are supposed to be derived independently, whereas the subjective perspective which one can call “the view from somewhere” is a perspective that is not detached from place, a perspective where reality and valuable ideas are derived not independent of place but in response to some particular context (Nagel 1989). The point is that philosophy whether we think of it as particular or universal, as the modernists/universalists have claimed, is always philosophy of place. If this claim is right and philosophy is not placeless and philosophers build their philosophical systems on the edifice of some place, the argument that one can extend from this then is that the place from which the philosophical enterprise springs from is one of culture and the elements that one draws on when one philosophizes from that place are cultural paraphernalia and imperatives. On this view, then there is no “culture-less”, “ethno-less” or “cultural-less” philosophy or indeed African philosophy since philosophers or African philosophers invariably draw on some culture or some African culture to create, develop and calibrate philosophy or African philosophy. Even if one thinks that the ideas, insights, arguments and conclusions of a philosopher who belongs to a particular epoch, culture or society are not tethered to such epoch, culture or society, she certainly does draw from the ideas and insights of such epoch, culture or society. The philosopher may transcend his or her epoch, culture or society in generating ideas and proffering solutions to problems; such ideas and insights do not happen in a vacuum or come to him or her from some emptiness – they come to her from a particular place, and the place is her epoch, culture or society. The point is that when the philosopher comes up with ideas and insights that constitute solutions to problems, she is drawing on her epoch, culture or society  – or simply that her answers to the questions presuppose some prior response to the question as to whether she perceives philosophical ideas or doctrines as relative and relevant first and foremost to the times and cultures from which she is conceiving them. If K.C. Anyanwu is right that “philosophy is relative to its basic

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assumption about the nature of experienced reality as well as its epistemological attitude or method” and that “different assumptions and models of experienced reality lead to different philosophical doctrines” (Anyanwu 1987, 237), then the conclusion we may draw is that there is no “God’s eye view” in the philosophical enterprise and it is not meaningful to talk of a universal philosophy that is not culture-bound or constrained by a particular cultural space. For to talk of such a philosophy is to talk of no philosophy or to talk of a philosophy-less content.6 Kwame Gyekye has made this point about culture-bound philosophy very forcefully: [T]he historical-cultural moorings of philosophical ideas and proposals are sufficient evidence of their particularity and of the inappropriateness of applying them universally to other cultures or societies, that those ideas — and the problems that gave rise to them — derive from experiences that are specific to cultures or historical situations. (Gyekye 1997, 28)

I now come to my second task, namely, making a case that ethnophilosophy articulates a form of philosophy and, accordingly, could be treated as genuine philosophy.

6  Ethnophilosophy as a Form of Philosophy So what are the reasons for thinking that ethnophilosophy articulates a form of philosophy and, accordingly, could be treated as genuine philosophy? I will examine two. The first reason has to do with the fact that when ethnophilosophy is properly unpacked, one will see that it meets the salient features of philosophy. Traditionally and etymologically (from Egypt and Greece), philosophy is taken to be the “love of wisdom” (in Greek “Philia” = “love” and “Sophia” = “wisdom”). This view of philosophy is cryptic, and it is not unexpected given that it is an etymological understanding of philosophy. This understanding can be fleshed out to give us philosophy as the systematic search for a reasoned and general understanding of reality and values or as Joseph Omoregbe puts it as “essentially a reflective activity”, one that draws on human experience (objective and subjective) and that involves three stages (Omoregbe 1998, 3–8). These stages, according to Omoregbe, are (a) “wonder”, which follows either human objective or subjective experience, (b) “wonder” that leads to fundamental questions or questioning and (c) reflecting on these fundamental questions in search of answers (Ibid). As I have indicated above, ethnophilosophy is generally classified as communal or cultural thoughts. However, if my analysis of the “moderate view” (i.e. the “component” and “contentful” stances) is correct, then it will be wrong to dismiss African culture or communal or cultural thoughts as unphilosophical. As I have highlighted, 6  For further discussion of the idea of the rootedness of philosophy and cultural perspectives, see Osuagwu (2005:58–69); Oguejiofor (2007, 31–36); Onyewuenyi (1991, 29–46); Ikuenobe (1997, 189–210); Okere (1983); Serequeberhan (1994); Etieyibo (2014, 2015); Hallen (2002); Hallen (1996a, 136–140); Hallen (1996b); and Fasiku (2008, 100–116).

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the “contentful” aspect of the “moderate view” takes African culture to be African philosophy once the culture is properly understood and analysed. That is, according to the “contentful stance”, African culture as it exists, encountered or lived is African philosophy or the excavation of African culture and properly analysed is African philosophy. In addition to this, I also said that the “contentful stance” may be taken to be philosophy at least minimally insofar as it takes African culture to be important for African philosophy. One way to defend this is to say that the “contentful” aspect of the “moderate view” meets the features of philosophy that I have identified above just in case what has been classified as communal or cultural thoughts are in reality thoughts of individuals that have come to be appropriated by the community. Let us say, for example, that a community has a particular worldview, say “X’s community concept of the person”. It is clear that this is presented as communal or cultural thoughts, i.e. thoughts of X’s community on the concept of the person. However, it will be hasty to end the discussion here. For, as Omoregbe has noted, firstly, it is not necessary that every thinker or individual in a community carries out the reflective activity (of philosophy, which I identified above) in the same way as that of the Western thinkers or that reflective activity that constitutes philosophy is not carried out in the same manner in all philosophical traditions (1998: 4) and, secondly, community thought “can mean nothing other than the thought of individuals in a community, for thinking is always done by individuals” (1998, 6). The point is that what today counts as communal or cultural thoughts or, in the case of our example, the thoughts of X’s community on the concept of the person is nothing other than thoughts and ideas that individual thinkers in this community have put forward – thoughts which ultimately became the thoughts of X’s community. I now come to the second reason for thinking that ethnophilosophy is genuine philosophy, and this is provided to us by what I take to be an embedded morality and reflective morality that we find in Gyekye (2010). In Gyekye’s analysis, embedded morality can be taken as first-order philosophy or philosophical synthesis, while reflective morality can be construed as second-order philosophy or philosophical analysis. Embedded morality or the morality or “ethics of a society is embedded”, according to Gyekye, when such morality is rooted (a) “in the ideas and beliefs about what is right or wrong, what is a good or bad character”; (b) “in the conceptions of satisfactory social relations and attitudes held by the members of the society”; and (c) “in the forms or patterns of behavior that are considered by the members of the society to bring about social harmony and cooperative living, justice, and fairness”. This idea of an embedded morality makes sense considering that “African societies, as organized and functioning human communities, have undoubtedly evolved ethical systems—ethical values, principles, rules—intended to guide social and moral behavior” (Gyekye 2010). In contrast to embedded morality, reflective morality refers to the analysation, articulation and interpretation of the embedded morality that is done by modern, professional philosophers. This is reflected in various statements made by Gyekye, which include: (i) similar to “African philosophy itself, the ideas and beliefs of the African society that bear on ethical conduct have not been given elaborate investigation and clarification and, thus, stand in real need

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of profound and extensive analysis and interpretation”; (ii) “The ideas and beliefs about moral conduct are articulated, analyzed, and interpreted by the moral thinkers of the society”; and (iii) “In the last three decades or so, attempts have been made by contemporary African philosophers to give sustained reflective attention to African moral ideas”. What one can draw from the distinction between embedded morality and reflective morality is that whereas the latter meets our description of the “component stance” of the “moderate view”, the former is consistent with the “contentful stance”. On this distinction and consideration, embedded morality is ethnophilosophy; more correctly, it is ethnomorality. It is ethnomorality because, as Gyekye (2010)) has articulated, such morality concerns critical ideas and beliefs about how to live, justice and injustice, what is right or wrong and what is a good or bad character. This form of morality falls into the first aspect of the “contentful stance” of the “moderate view” or ethnophilosophy that I identified above, and this is African morality (which is part of culture) as it exists, encountered and lived. If this morality (i.e. African moral point of view) – the view according to which African morality implicates critical ideas and beliefs about how to live, justice and injustice and what is right or wrong – is ethnomorality that is morality proper then insofar as this provides us as an instantiation of one aspect of the “contentful stance”, ethnophilosophy can be said to articulate a form of philosophy and, accordingly, could be treated as genuine philosophy.

7  Conclusion What I have done in this chapter is to interject myself into the debate concerning whether or not ethnophilosophy articulates a form of philosophy and, accordingly, could be treated as genuine philosophy, and in doing this, my motivation is to go beyond Tempels’ Bantu Philosophy as part of my presentation of some philosophical defence of the value and viability of ethnophilosophy. Along the way, I examined the foundational role that African culture ought to play in African philosophy. However, my interjection into the debate did not position me in a way that would have allowed me  to engage with it in the traditional form. An interjection in the traditional way will more or less pitch  the excavationists against the modernists/ universalists. Rather, my entrance into the debate is grounded on the distinction that I made between the radical and moderate positions and that between the component and contentful stances. Overall, I attempted to discharge two critical tasks: firstly, that there is no placeless philosophy, that is, every philosophy is a philosophy of place or of culture whether one thinks of some particular or universal culture, and, secondly, that ethnophilosophy articulates a form of philosophy and, accordingly, could be treated as genuine philosophy. My defence of ethnophilosophy as genuine philosophy raises a number of issues. On the embedded morality or ethnomorality worldview, how did members of

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traditional African societies come to socially embed moral ideas and beliefs without these ideas and beliefs not being implicated in any of the three stages of philosophy that Omoregbe identified as crucial to any philosophical work or enterprise? One will think that at some stage, the individual ideas and beliefs were products of philosophical analysis before getting to the stage of philosophical synthesis. To take ethnophilosophy as not genuine philosophy is to take the view that the social embedding of moral ideas and beliefs came as a result of some non-rational and reflective process. This seems highly unlikely. The more likely position is that ideas and beliefs that developed in community and come to form part of communal moral thoughts were the product of some thinking, reflective and rational process. Curiously, one of the criticisms of ethnophilosophy, the one brought out by Kebede (1999), takes ethnophilosophy to be the individual views hidden under a collective veil and identified with an ethnic group. There is something else that is mentioned in this criticism, and that is ethnophilosophy is a philosophy that does not present its own rational justification but rather accommodates itself lazily behind the authority of a tradition and projects its own theses and beliefs onto that tradition. This idea of the “communal thought” or ideas of the individual thinkers that have been appropriated by the community not having its own rational justification have been stated differently by Wiredu. In Philosophy and an African Culture, Wiredu describes the thoughts (of the community) as bald assertions, that is, they are statements put forward without supportive arguments (1980, 47). Like Omoregbe (1998, 6-7), I think this view is mistaken. For, in putting forward his or her thoughts and ideas, it seems preposterous to claim that the individual thinker never engaged with the reason(s) underlying the views or reflected on the views or had reason(s) for holding such views. That we do not know what the reasons behind the assertions (of certain individuals embedded in the community) are does not mean that there are no reasons as to why they have been made.  Those who are very eager or moved to criticize these ideas as uncritical, non-rational, or irrational and those who peddled them as lazy, irrational and unreflective need to be careful not to make themselves  look too good and better  than those who lived  in precolonial African communities or traditional African societies. The fact that we currently  use modern  technologies or that we  can speak (very well)  modern languages including languages of colonialism or of the West or that we have gone to universities to acquire many degrees including PhDs does not mean that we are better or superior or necessarily more industrious or rational and reflective than our forebears in precolonial  societies who never employed or embraced any of these  Western garbs or paraphernalia  or used modern technologies or acquired  degrees or  got schooled in modern educational  institutions  or  universities. Formal education or ability to use and manipulate modern technologies are no indication of intelligence or wisdom or rationality or superiority.

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References Anyanwu, K.C. 1987. The idea of art in African thought. In Contemporary philosophy: A new survey, Vol. 5, ed. Guttorm Floistad, 235–260. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Apostel Leo. 1981. African philosophy: Myth or reality? Gent: Scientific Publishers. Birt, Robert E. 1991. Review: Identity and the question of African philosophy. Philosophy East and West 41 (1): 95–109. Bodunrin, Peter O. 1991. The question of African philosophy. In African philosophy: The essential readings, ed. T. Serequeberhan, 63–86. St Paul: Paragon House. Chimakonam, Jonathan Okeke. History of African philosophy. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/afric-­hi/ Diagne, Souleymane Bachir. 2016. Ink of scholars: Reflections on philosophy in Africa. Dakar: Codesria. Eboh, O., and D.E.  Ukpong. 1995. Social studies education for Nigerian universities. Owerri: Whyte Publishers. Etieyibo, Edwin. 2014. Post-modern thinking and African philosophy. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 3 (1): 67–82. ———. 2015. The question of cultural imperialism in African philosophy. In Atuolu Omalu: Some unanswered questions in contemporary African philosophy, ed. Jonathan O.  Chimakonam, 147–170. Lanham: University Press of America. ———. 2019. African philosophy and nonhuman nature. In Debating African philosophy: Perspectives on identity, Decolonial ethics and comparative philosophy, ed. George Hull, 164–181. London: Routledge. Etieyibo, Edwin, and Odirin Omiegbe. 2016. Religion, culture, discrimination against persons with disabilities in Nigeria. African Journal of Disability 5 (1): 1–6. Fasiku, Gbenga. 2008. African philosophy and the method of ordinary language philosophy. The Journal of Pan African Studies 2 (3): 100–116. Gyekye, Kwame. 1997. Tradition and modernity: Philosophical reflections on the African experience. New York: Oxford University Press. ———. 2010. African ethics. In Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Hallen, Barry. 1996a. Does it matter whether linguistic philosophy intersects ethnophilosophy? APA Newsletters, A Publication of The American Philosophical Association 96 (1): 136–140. ———. 1996b. Analytic philosophy and traditional thought: A critique of Robin Horton. In African philosophy: A classical approach, ed. Parker English and Kibujjo M. Kalumba. New Jersey: Prince Hall, Inc. ———. 2002. A short history of African philosophy. Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Heidegger, Martin. 1962. Being and time. Trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Hountondji, Paulin J. 1970. Remarques sur la philosophieafricaine. Diogène 71: 120–140. ———. 1983. African philosophy: Myth and reality. Trans. Henri Evans. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Ikuenobe, Polycarp. 1997. The parochial universalist conception of ‘philosophy’ and ‘African philosophy’. Philosophy East and West 47 (2): 189–210. Imafidon, Elvis, Bernard Matolino, Lucky Uchenna Ogbonnaya, Ada Agada, Aribiah David Attoe, Fainos Mangena, and Edwin Etieyibo. 2019. Are we finished with the ethnophilosophy debate? A multi-perspective conversation. Filosofia Theoretical: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 8 (2): 111–137. Kaphagawani, Didier N. 1998. What is African philosophy? In The African philosophy reader, ed. P.H. Coetzee and A.P.J. Roux, 86–98. London: Routledge. Kebede, Messay. 1999. Development and the African philosophical debate. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 1 (2): 39–60. Nagel, Thomas. 1989. The view from nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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The Case Against Ethnophilosophy Anthony Chimankpam Ojimba

Abstract  The case against ethnophilosophy has been a compelling one ever since the publication of Placide Tempels’s book Bantu Philosophy (1959). The chief argument against the current is that it hypes a presumed collective African philosophy that does not actually exist, lacks the kind of analytical rigour that is assumed to characterise good philosophy, and promotes the idea of an African philosophy closely linked with primitive phenomena such as folk wisdom, juju, and witchcraft. In this chapter, I highlight the case against ethnophilosophy and supply arguments that buttress the weightiness of the case. I conclude with the suggestion that overcoming the pitfalls of ethnophilosophy means that African philosophers should engage in the kind of innovative thinking that makes conceptual schemes generated in a particular cultural horizon universally applicable in an exercise that ushers in a postethnophilosophical African philosophy. Keywords  Ethnophilosophy · African philosophy · Postethnophilosophy · Critique of ethnophilosophy

1  Introduction I argue in this chapter that in view of the strength of the charge of primitivity, unanimism, and lack of rigour levelled against ethnophilosophy, the current impedes the progress of African philosophy. The case against ethnophilosophy has been a compelling one ever since the publication of Placide Tempels’s book Bantu Philosophy (1959). First used by Kwame Nkrumah to designate traditional African perspectives on the nature of reality (see Hountondji 1997), the term “ethnophilosophy” received a pejorative characterisation in the works of Paulin Hountondji who saw in the rising preoccupation with the current a repudiation of the worldwide A. C. Ojimba (*) Department of Philosophy, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Agada (ed.), Ethnophilosophy and the Search for the Wellspring of African Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78897-1_7

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commitment to philosophy as a rigorous discipline and an uncritical embrace of particularism. Over the years, the stigma of primitivity, unanimism, and non-­ criticality has stuck with ethnophilosophy even as the current has retained its influence in African philosophy in one form or the other. In this chapter, I will argue that ethnophilosophy cannot advance the African tradition of philosophical thinking given the emphasis on the description and discussion of traditional African phenomena such as indigenous knowledge systems, proverbs, and wise sayings. Accordingly, this chapter will be divided into three sections. Section 1 reviews the concept of ethnophilosophy. Section 2 presents a critique of ethnophilosophy, pointing out the baggage that the current carries and its incapacity to advance African philosophy. Section 3 introduces the idea of postethnophilosophy as a framework for imagining the future of African philosophy.

2  The Idea of Ethnophilosophy The term ethnophilosophy was first used by Nkrumah, as noted in the introduction. Hountondji later used it to describe the works of sociologists, anthropologists, ethnographers, and philosophers who present collective worldviews of African peoples, their myths and folklores, wisdom, etc. as philosophy. Rather than regarding philosophy as a body of logically argued thoughts of individuals, ethnophilosophers equate African philosophy with the communal thought of various ethnic groups (Aja 2015, 153). As Hountondji (1997, 116) notes: The critique of ethnophilosophy was no doubt facilitated by what must be called the naїveté of an author like Tempels, who thought he was doing philosophy when in reality he was doing ethnophilosophy; and by the naїveté of his cohort of disciples. But, beyond this naїveté, something else was at stake: namely, the total silence surrounding the possibility of a living philosophy, of a plural philosophy in the societies appropriated by the ethnologist, the stated or tacit belief that for such societies only an ethnophilosophy passing for philosophy was thinkable, in other words, a type of discuss constructed by the ethnologist and impossible without his/her active intervention.

Ethnophilosophy, itself, is a radical orientation of particularism. Broadly speaking, particularism in African philosophy is a school of thought that maintains that African philosophy has its own history and evolves within a defined African cultural environment. Particularism is contrasted with universalism, the rival school that asserts that “in terms of methodology, philosophy should be the same in Western and African discourses, namely, universal, systematic, rational, scientific and rigorous” (Etieyibo 2015, 152). The radical particularity of ethnophilosophy follows from the fact that it goes beyond affirming the cultural dimension of African philosophy to submitting that African phenomena like ethnic worldviews and wise sayings are legitimate philosophical forms that imprint authenticity on African philosophy (cf. Van Hook 1997; Eze 2001; Jones 2001; Mangena 2014; Agada 2019). In the search for an African philosophy that is distinct from Western philosophy, ethnophilosophers exaggerate the philosophical viability of traditional African worldviews, and in their anxiety to debunk the idea that Africans are incapable of philosophising, they direct their works at a European audience rather than an African

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audience. They claim that philosophy is grounded in the linguistic, mythical, and religious views of different cultural backgrounds. Critics maintain that by pointing to collectivist values as the source of philosophy, ethnophilosophy eclipses the individual, who then gets lost in the group (see Njoku 2002). Hountondji (1996) is of the view that ethnophilosophy promotes a neo-colonial mentality that considers African a continent of primitive people. He belongs to the universalist group that affirms the universality of the philosophical enterprise and insists on the necessity of philosophy exhibiting a critical character wherever it is practised. Hountondji regards ethnophilosophy as a discourse carried out in Western categories, merely an uncritical reaction to European othering of Africans and Africa. In his book, Bantu Philosophy, Tempels articulates a collectivist Bantu philosophy, which translates into the birth of what is today known as ethnophilosophy. From the study of the myths and rituals of the Bantu people, Tempels generalises and arrives at a conclusion that philosophy can be teased out of a peoples’ worldview. This is suggestive of the idea that philosophy becomes an expression of a worldview, the collective values of a people often developed unconsciously in proverbs, riddles, stories, and songs. In this connection, Imbo (1998, 9) argues that for ethnophilosophers, “everyday experiences and practices–even practices that do not specially deal with thinking or reflection–are seen as embodying deep aspects of the culture’s philosophy”. Tempels (1959, 30–31) further sees the philosophy of the Bantu as reducible to the idea of force. According to him, force is a category of being, not just its attribute, in Bantu philosophy. This further suggests that there is no idea, among the Bantu, of “being” separate from the idea of force. Without the element of force, being cannot be conceived. In his African Religions and Philosophy, Mbiti argues for the needlessness of compartmentalisation of the African world to ascertain which part is philosophical, religious, or social. He notes that: Religion permeates into all the departments of life so fully that it is not easy or possible always to isolate it … While religion can be discerned in terms of beliefs, ceremonies, rituals and religious officiants, philosophy is not so easily distinguishable … Philosophy of one kind or another is behind the thinking and acting of every people, and a study of traditional religions bring us into those areas of African life where, through word and action, we may be able to discern the philosophy behind. (Mbiti 1969, 1)

While acknowledging that philosophical theories are unlikely to exist in a rigorous form in traditional African worldviews, he nevertheless concedes that philosophy is latent in these worldviews. The task of the African philosopher becomes one of teasing out the latent philosophy which can then be attributed to an entire people rather than individuals. In his interview with the sage Ogotemmeli, Griaule (1965) affirms that a system of philosophy is latent in Dogon religion and cosmology. He reveals the cosmology of the Dogon people of Mali as an expression of their collective myths of origin. In the conversation, as recorded by Griaule, Ogotemmeli expounds the entire thought-­ system of the Dogon people. For Griaule, Dogon worldview and wisdom can easily be categorised into cosmology, metaphysics, and religion (cf. Njoku 2002). Critics of Griaule maintain that he imported Western conceptual schemes and categories to explain Dogon ontology and worldview (see Imbo 1998). They maintain that

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Ogotemmeli was not philosophically literate enough to possess the intellectual capacity to exhibit Dogon cosmology in a thorough way (see Masolo 1994). Alexis Kagame, another renowned ethnophilosophical scholar, articulates a philosophy similar to that of Tempels. Despite his disagreement with Tempels on the later’s depth and accuracy of systematisation, he praises Tempels’ discovery of a unique and collective Bantu philosophy. Kagame’s Kinyarwanda linguistic ethnophilosophy teases out a philosophy of being using Aristotelian categories (see Njoku 2002). Kagame identifies ntu as the most general category of being, which is further divided into four categories: muntu (human being), kintu (thing), hantu (place and time), and kuntu (modality). Furthermore, Kagame maintains that ntu stands for that which is general or universal. This implies that it is the ultimate unifying notion. Ntu is conceived in the Tempelsian sense of force, thus making Kagame’s system an ethnophilosophy. Generally, ethnophilosophy represents the attempt by some philosophers to view philosophy from the perspective of a collective consciousness – a people’s culture, tradition, myth, wisdom, folklore, music, language, etc. It robs the individual philosopher of her originality and, in so doing, impedes the progress of African philosophy.

3  The Critique of Ethnophilosophy The critical scrutiny of the premises, aims, and legitimacy of ethnophilosophy took off in the second half of the twentieth century in the works of philosophical universalists like Hountondji and Bodunrin and hermeneutical scholars like Serequeberhan and Towa. Such scrutiny continues into the early twenty-first century in the writings of philosophers like Asouzu and Matolino. The critique of ethnophilosophy reveals how a well-intentioned project can end up creating the problems it was designed to solve. Ethnophilosophy emerged as an African response to Western scepticism about Africans having the capacity to philosophise. The scepticism assumed a racist aspect right from the time of David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and G.W.F. Hegel, who individually thought that Africans lacked the capacity for productive intellectual work. This kind of race-linked scepticism implicates the question of rationality, the possession of which is said to be a condition for philosophising.1 1  The concept of reason and rationality is not a clear one, notwithstanding the familiarity of the terms. Both terms are sometimes used interchangeably. Rationality is regarded as an expression of reason and reason as a special capacity or function within the human being that coordinates logical thinking and intelligent behaviour. The special sense of reason tends to lead to its reification as the human mind. The term rationality is frequently used in the sense of instrumentality given its orientation towards problem solving. In Kant’s works, reason is often used in the sense of a faculty of the mind concerned with organising human knowledge of the phenomena of the world into a coherent system. He defines reason as the “faculty through which he [the human being] distinguishes himself from all other things, and even from himself insofar as he is affected by objects” (Kant 2002, 68; 4:452, Academy Edition). This definition does not appear adequate because it

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While making sweeping subjective statements on the predispositions of peoples and nations in various geographical locations of the world, Hume seems to have suddenly realised that he had overlooked the African people and in a footnote infamously remarked thus: I am apt to suspect the negroes naturally inferior to the whites. There scarcely ever was a civilized nation of that complexion, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences...there are NEGROE slaves dispersed all over EUROPE, of whom none ever discovered any symptoms of ingenuity...In JAMAICA, indeed, they talk of one negroe as a man of parts and learning; but it is likely he is admired for slender accomplishments, like a parrot, who speaks a few words plainly. (Hume 1987, 208n)

In his own subjective exercise in human geography, Kant takes his cue from Hume and ventures that: The Negroes of Africa have by nature no feeling that rises above the ridiculous. Mr Hume challenges anyone to adduce a single example where a Negro has demonstrated talent, and asserts that among the hundreds of thousands of blacks who have been transported elsewhere from their countries, although very many of them have been set free, nevertheless not a single one has ever been found who has accomplished something great in art or science or shown any other praiseworthy quality, while among the whites there are always those who rise up from the lowest rabble and through extraordinary gifts earn respect in the world. (Kant 2011, 58–59; 2:253, Academy Edition page number)

Blatantly denying Africans the power of exercising robust reasoning and tying them to the magical, Hegel (2001, 111) notes: In Negro life the characteristic point is the fact that consciousness has not yet attained to the realization of any substantial objective existence–as for example, God, or Law–in which the interest of man’s volition is involved and in which he realizes his own being...The Negro, as clearly observed, exhibit the natural man in his completely wild and untamed state... Religion begins with the consciousness that there is something higher than man. But even Herodotus called the Negroes sorcerers–now in Sorcery we have not the idea of God, of a moral faith.

It is believed that the negative assessment of the worth of Africans made by outstanding philosophers like Hume, Kant, and Hegel gives a measure of the intensity of anti-black sentiments (Matolino 2011). In view of the negative stereotype of

overlooks the role of language and cultural environment in conditioning the way people think and what belief structures are admissible and seemly. The cultural dimension is particularly interesting as it reveals the empirical aspect of rationality, its emergence from collective human experience. This environmental dimension is particularly relevant to the philosophical question of rationality raised by Eurocentric thinkers who despised African phenomena for one reason or the other. Eze approaches the idea of reason as merely a way of explaining the world and its multiplicities through the exercise of thinking. Reason is not a mental substance but a creative tension in the mind expressed through language and enabled through the mind’s encounter with diversity in the world. In this sense, thought becomes an activity that “spontaneously composes itself as, in itself, an object of work: the work of freedom...the freedoms of cultures, and the freedom of the world” (Eze 2008, 9). The attempt to exoticise rationality and ally it closely with a particular culture is, therefore, a misplaced one.

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primitivity and intellectual vacuity, it is understandable that African philosophers should be anxious about reflecting in ways that reinforce the stereotype. Ethnophilosophy is regarded by its critics as reinforcing the negative stereotype on the basis of which Africans have been despised and maltreated as individuals lacking rationality even though the idea of rationality itself is a contested one (see footnote 1). Tempels is particularly blamed for fuelling what Okere (1983) calls a revolution, albeit a negative revolution that imputes magicality to Africans and logicality to Europeans. Tempels thinks that the Bantu (Africans) can either be regarded as animists to the extent that they believe that all things possess a soul – a belief, incidentally, found in almost all traditional societies and even in much of early Greek philosophy – or dynamists to the extent that they hold that a vital force animates everything in the universe (Tempels 1959, 22–23). After taking pains to assure his European readers that the Bantu are not as primitive as the average European supposes, Tempels proceeds to a comparison of Bantu and European ontology, an unequal exercise given that while Bantu thought is basically composed of unsystematised traditional worldviews, the European ontology Tempels uses as a foil is the product of sophisticated individual thinking.2 He asserts that the Bantu cannot separate the idea of being as a fixed substratum (which Nietzsche, for instance, combated vigorously all his life) from its accident or property which is force. He claims that vital force, or universal energy, replaces the classical Western notion of being in its fixity and immutability as the fundamental principle in Bantu ontology. Tempels is accused of couching his force hypothesis in the language of magic and, thus, pandering to the established bias against Africans. We read that: The Bantu say, in respect of a number of strange practices in which we see neither rime nor reason, that their purpose is to acquire life, strength or vital force, to live strongly, that they are to make life stronger, or to assure that force shall remain perpetually in one’s posterity... vital energy are the objects of prayers and invocations to God, to the spirits and to the dead, as well as of all that is usually called magic, sorcery or magical remedies. (Tempels 1959, 30–31)

Tempels’ work impressed an entire generation of African scholars. For this reason, Okere (1983, 5) used the word revolution to describe the Tempels effect. But, it is a negative revolution since it is an articulation of an anthropology of the magical rather than a genuine metaphysics. Tempels’ thinking is ethnophilosophical because it describes the worldviews of a particular group and passes it off as substantive philosophy. This ethnophilosophical thinking draws a strong line between a peculiarly African way of thinking which is assumed to be magical and a European way of thinking which is assumed to be logical or rational. This exoticism, calculated to evince difference on which discrimination can be based, has been condemned by many African philosophers (see Bodunrin 1981; Towa 1991; Appiah 1992; Serequeberhan 1994; Hountondji 1996; Asouzu 2004; Matolino 2011).

2  Tempels is here guilty of “uneven, incongruent comparison in terms of subject matter and history period” (Ramose 2007, 352; cf. Wiredu 1980, 39–40).

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An indication of the strong influence of Tempels is seen in Senghor’s attempt to construct a unique African ontology by proposing a theory of knowledge that has been condemned for explicitly reinforcing racist stereotypes about Africans. Believing he was doing Africa much good by exclusively imputing emotionality to Africans and rationality to Europeans, Senghor (1956, 52) infamously notes that: It has often been said that the Negro is the man of Nature. By tradition he lives of the soil and with the soil, in and by the Cosmos. He is sensual, a being with open senses, with no intermediary between subject and object, himself at once the subject and the object. He is, first of all, sounds, scents, rhythms, forms and colours; I would say that he is touch, before being eye like the white European. He feels more than he sees; he feels himself...Stimulated, he responds to the call, and abandons himself, going from subject to object, from Me to Thee on the vibrations of the Other: he is not assimilated: he assimilates himself with the other, which is the best road to knowledge.

Serequeberhan (1994, 47) responds to Senghor by accusing the latter of presenting “negative Eurocentric descriptions...as positive Negrocentric manifestations of an ontological difference in and for the being of the Negro-African”. Ethnophilosophy reinforces racist attitudes towards Africans by appearing to cut the African from the sphere of the universality of reason which simply means the inborn capacity of every mentally healthy human being to reflect rationally or logically. Ethnophilosophy undermines African philosophy by placing unwarranted emphasis on traditional phenomena like proverbs and wise sayings which, though reflecting native wisdom, lack the analytical rigour required for a robust tradition of philosophy to emerge and flourish. It is true that Mangena, who defends the idea of ethnophilosophy as substantive African philosophy, has noted that: [E]thno-philosophy is not a mere collection of beliefs, customs, values and traditions of a particular group of people; it also involves critical analysis of the same. Reasoning involves analyzing the relationship between or among given premises and drawing conclusions from them. Thus reasoning – as an analytical task – is a product of two mental processes, namely, deduction and induction...It is unfortunate that most definitions of ethno-philosophy, especially by professional philosophers, have tended to focus on the “collection” task, thereby deliberately ignoring the “analysis” task. (Mangena 2014, 31–32)

He suggests that one way the ethnophilosopher can produce what will pass as genuine African philosophy is to analyse proverbs with the aim of extracting thinking with a robust philosophical value. The problem here is that there is no guarantee that worthwhile philosophy can emerge from the mere analysis of traditional phenomena; instead of such exercises producing valuable philosophy, they, in fact, reduce African philosophy to a system of worldviews assumed to be shared by a particular African group while distorting the role of the critically reflecting individual. Hence, Hountondji (1996, 72) warns: [T]he African philosophers must not shirk the technicalities of philosophical language. We shall never create an authentic African philosophy, a genuine philosophy, genuinely African (that’s what I mean by the term “authentic”), if we skirt round the existing philosophical tradition. It is not by skirting round, and still less by ignoring, the international philosophical heritage that we shall really philosophize, but by absorbing it in order to transcend it.

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What is more, the idea of a collectivist philosophy has been called into question. According to Appiah (1992, 95), the assumption that “there is some central body of ideas that is shared by black Africans” is not supported by evidence given the remarkable cultural diversity in Africa. Even if there is such a collectivist philosophy embedded in African languages or cultures, he does not think the goal of recovery is an important philosophical objective since such an exercise will be hard-pressed to find evidence from divergent cultural milieus in support of controversial claims. Rather than embarking on a voyage of recovery of something that may well be beyond discovery, Appiah favours an African philosophy that embraces the idea of the universality of reason by transcending the particular and engaging a global audience. Defenders of ethnophilosophy typically respond that the critique of ethnophilosophy panders to Western ideas of what philosophy should be while pretending to defend the interest of African philosophy. The defence of ethnophilosophy insists that it is the critics of ethnophilosophy who are unwittingly reinforcing the anti-­ black racist stereotypes by uncritically accepting Western analytical methods as the only possible ways of philosophising, thereby capitulating to epistemic injustice – the idea that non-Western knowledge-forms are fundamentally inferior to Western thought-forms. Ikuenobe notes that the mantra of the primitivity, unanimity, and non-analyticity ignores the fact that the investigation of traditional phenomena can yet produce knowledge that will supply a solid foundation for the production of ever more valuable philosophy. He notes: This sweeping criticism of ethnophilosophy assumes the inherent pejorative view of African traditions and inherent honorific view of Western modernisation and ideas...[It] also comes, partly, from a kind of European colonial mentality that tells Africans that their cultural traditions are all evil, inherently bad, and that Africa must modernise, which involves embracing wholesale, without criticism, everything that is Western or modern. This has led many to advocate the decolonisation of the minds of African people, in terms of changing or Africanising African education and school curricula in order to try to change Africans’ intellectual perspectives so that they can see something good in African traditions. (Ikuenobe 2017, 559)

Ikuenobe is right in advocating a keener appreciation of traditional African phenomena in the African’s search for epistemic authenticity. It is true that the Western appropriation of rationality is baseless since rationality emerges in historical and cultural contexts in reason’s search for universality (cf. Eze 2008). It is also true that the increasingly popular clamour for decolonisation and Africanisation promises a path to a modern reinvention of Africa by Africans through the adaptation of what is believed to constitute traditional phenomena to contemporary realities. Yet, in the specific case of African philosophy, preoccupation with tradition that does not promise the transcending of the particular risks leaving African philosophical thinking stuck with ethnic worldviews, making it difficult for the genius of the individual to flourish in the process of the individual reinventing Africa and reconstructing a new African universe that absorbs whatever good remains from the past while projecting into a future where the African reason fully emerges in its universality.

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Consequently, the critique of ethnophilosophy makes a strong case against contentment with traditional worldviews, systematised or unsystematised. The critique is justified as a clarion call to African philosophers to look beyond their cultural horizon and appropriate the universal by actively exploring the full creative potentials of a kind of postethnophilosophical thinking which endorses the notion of the universality of human reason, the capacity of thought generated in one culture to resonate in other cultures. There is evidence that this kind of thinking is taking roots in contemporary African philosophy. Philosophers like Wiredu (1996), Ramose (1999), and Asouzu (2004) have developed concepts like sympathetic impartiality, missing links, and be-ing becoming, which draw inspiration from traditional African worldviews while projecting universal applicability, with the last two articulated in the context of system-building. Sympathetic impartiality seeks to clarify the conditions of the possibility of an ethical Akan prescription having universal validity, while the idea of missing links seeks the ground of universal solidarity in a complementaristic perspective. The idea of be-ing becoming, like the concept of missing links, also seeks to establish the ground of the commonality of all entities in the universe. A detailed discussion of these concepts is, however, beyond the scope of this chapter.

4  The Idea of Postethnophilosophy With the critique of ethnophilosophy discrediting the orientation, it is worth speculating about the form a postethnophilosophical African philosophy should take. The very notion of postethnophilosophy recalls Sanya Osha’s work with the title Postethnophilosophy. The term itself is a recent one and has not fully gained traction. But, its import is clear. It conveys a sense of the strong impact of ethnophilosophy in African philosophy and underlines the necessity of the twenty-first-century African philosophy going beyond the orientation. Osha himself does not provide a clear definition of postethnophilosophy. However, he uses it to encompass an entire intellectual outlook that acknowledges the inadequacy of an ethnophilosophical perspective rooted in the obsession with a romanticised precolonial past and seeks a fundamental and more or less intercultural approach to pressing problems of postcolonial Africa. These concerns include globalisation, development, poverty, gender inequality, race relations, decolonisation, and neo-colonialism (see Osha 2011). In attempting to define the term as precisely as possible, Mungwini (2014, 22–23) notes that it “addresses themes relating to the traumas and realities of colonisation, the dynamics of postcolonial subjectification, processes of decolonisation, questions of agency and modes of knowledge construction in Africa”. While ethnophilosophy responds to the present of Africa by looking back to the past for clues about how problems of postcolonial existence can be solved, postethnophilosophy responds to Africa’s present by looking towards the future for clues about how postcolonial Africa’s problems can be solved.

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Postethnophilosophy keenly recognises the fact that postcolonial Africa finds itself in a globalised world and must, therefore, adopt an intercultural modus vivendi that enables it to interact in a dignified manner with the rest of the world. For African philosophers, the challenge of postethnophilosophy will then be how to decolonise the knowledge-tradition while at the same time communing with the knowledge-­ traditions of the rest of the world, in particular Western, Asian, and Latino philosophies. In other words, a postethnophilosophical African philosophy will need to acquire cross-cultural competence. The acquisition of such competence has its own drawbacks. African philosophy risks becoming dependent on Western philosophy in the process of engaging with the latter at the level of comparative and cross-cultural discourse, given the current international dominance of the Western tradition. This possibility, perhaps, accounts for the insistence on African philosophy’s uniqueness by ethnophilosophers. All the same, it is important for African philosophy to rise to the challenge of cross-culturality in view of the changing dynamics of a continually globalising world. What is clear to us, in all this, is that the case against ethnophilosophy is a strong one. African philosophers will have to find a way of invigorating the discipline and achieving uniqueness without undue conceptual dependence on ethnophilosophy. By so doing, the tradition will be ready for a polycentric knowledge dispensation that will see African philosophers contributing significantly to the philosophical heritage of the world. African philosophers like Wiredu, Ramose, and Asouzu appear to have already taken the postethnophilosophical route, as we briefly noted in the previous section, with the movement towards the articulation of innovative concepts that transcend ethnophilosophy.

5  Conclusion Ethnophilosophy features prominently in the history of African philosophy. It has been a controversial orientation since Tempels published his Bantu Philosophy, with African philosophers either passionately opposing it or defending it. In this chapter, I examined the idea of ethnophilosophy and revisited the core charges of primitivity and non-criticality levelled against the orientation. I showed that there is merit in the radical critique of ethnophilosophy and favoured the transcending of the orientation through individual innovative thinking. I introduced the idea of postethnophilosophy and suggested that an African philosophy that comes after ethnophilosophy will have to be original enough to contribute to the philosophical heritage of the world. I briefly mentioned Wiredu’s notion of sympathetic impartiality, Ramose’s idea of be-ing becoming, and Asouzu’s theory of missing links as African conceptual schemes that suggest that ethnophilosophy can be transcended. Given the scope of this chapter, which focuses merely on making a case against ethnophilosophy, it will be interesting and necessary to discuss in a different chapter, and in greater details, how these schemes transcend ethnophilosophy.

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References Agada, Ada. 2019. The sense in which ethno-philosophy can remain relevant in 21st century African philosophy. Phronimon 20: 1–20. https://doi.org/10.25159/2413-­3086/4158. Aja, Egbeke. 2015. What is philosophy? An African inquiry. Enugu: University of Nigeria Press. Appiah, A.K. 1992. In my father’s house: Africa in the philosophy of culture. New York: Oxford University Press. Asouzu, Innocent I. 2004. The method and principles of complementary reflection in and beyond African philosophy. Calabar: University of Calabar Press. Bodunrin, Peter. 1981. The question of African philosophy. Philosophy 56 (216): 161–179. Etieyibo, Edwin. 2015. The question of cultural imperialism in African philosophy. In Atuolu Omalu: Some unanswered questions in contemporary African philosophy, ed. J.O.  Chimakonam, 147–170. Lanham: University Press of America. Eze, Emmanuel C. 2008. On reason. Durham/London: Duke University Press. ———. 2001. African philosophy and the analytic tradition. Philosophical Papers 30 (3): 205–213. Griaule, Maecel. 1965. Conversation with Ogotemmeli: An introduction to Dogon religious ideas. London: Oxford University Press. Hegel, G.W.F. 2001. The philosophy of history. Trans. J. Sibree. Kitchener: Batoche Books. Hountondji, Paulin. 1996. African philosophy: Myth and reality. Trans. H. Evans. Bloomington/ Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. ———. 1997. From the ethno-sciences to ethno-philosophy: Kwame Nkrumah’s thesis project. Research in African Literatures 28 (4): 112–120. Hume, David. 1987. Of National Characters. In Essays: Moral, political, and literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller, 197–225. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. Ikuenobe, Polycarp. 2017. Matolino’s misunderstanding of Menkiti’s African moral view of the person and community. South African Journal of Philosophy 36 (4): 553–567. Imbo, S.O. 1998. An introduction to African philosophy. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Jones, Ward E. 2001. Belonging to the ultra-faithful: A response to Eze. Philosophical Papers 30 (3): 215–222. https://doi.org/10.1080/05568640109485085. Kant, Immanuel. 2011. In Observations on the feeling of the beautiful and sublime and other writings, ed. Patrick Frierson and Paul Guyer. New York: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2002. In Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals, ed. Allen W. Wood. New Haven/ London: Yale University Press. Mangena, Fainos. 2014. Ethno-philosophy is rational: A reply to two famous critics. Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya 6 (2): 23–38. https://doi. org/10.4314/tp.v6i2.3. Masolo, D.A. 1994. African philosophy in search of identity. Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Matolino, Bernard. 2011. Tempels’ philosophical racialism. South African Journal of Philosophy 30 (3): 330–342. Mbiti, John S. 1969. African religions and philosophy. London: Heinemann. Mungwini, Pascah. 2014. Postethnophilosophy: Discourses of modernity and the future of African philosophy. Phronimon 15 (1): 16–31. Njoku, F.O.C. 2002. Essays in African philosophy, thought and theology. Owerri: Claretian Institute of Philosophy. Okere, Theophilus. 1983. African philosophy: A historico-hermeneutical investigation of the conditions of its possibilities. Lanham: University Press of America. Osha, Sanya. 2011. Postethnophilosophy. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Ramose, M.B. 1999. African philosophy through Ubuntu. Harare: Mond Books. ———. 2007. But Hans Kelsen was not born in Africa: A reply to Thaddeus Metz. South African Journal of Philosophy 26 (4): 347–355. https://doi.org/10.4314/sajpem.v26i4.31492.

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Senghor, L.S. 1956. The spirit of civilization or the laws of African Negro culture. Presence Africaine 8-10: 51–64. Serequeberhan, Tsenay. 1994. The hermeneutics of African philosophy. New York: Routledge. Tempels, Placide. 1959. Bantu philosophy. Trans. Colin King. Paris: Presence Africaine. www. congoforum.be/upldocs/TempelsBantuPhilEnglish1959.pdf. Towa, Marcien. 1991. Conditions for the affirmation of a modern African philosophical thought. In African philosophy: The essential readings, ed. Tsenay Serequeberhan, 187–200. New York: Paragon House. Van Hook, J.M. 1997. African philosophy and the universalist thesis. Metaphilosophy 28 (4): 385–396. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-­9973.00067. Wiredu, Kwasi. 1996. Cultural universals and particulars: An African perspective. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. ———. 1980. Philosophy and an African culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Part II

Continuities and Discontinuities, the Past and the Present

Ethno-Philosophical Currents in Kwame Gyekye’s Philosophy Hasskei M. Majeed

Abstract  In the past few decades, there have been serious criticisms of the content of traditional African thought, particularly in respect of its philosophicality and, for that matter, relevance to the discipline of African philosophy. The chief critic of traditional thought and its presentation in academic African philosophy has been Paulin Hountondji who disparages it as mere ethno-philosophy. This chapter examines Kwame Gyekye’s perspectives on ethno-philosophy and the manifestation of ethno-philosophical ideas in his philosophy. It pays specific attention to the debate between Hountondji and Gyekye with the intention of bringing to light how ethno-­ philosophical themes are to be understood in the works of Gyekye. Those themes serve the purpose of illustrating better ethno-philosophical currents in Gyekye’s philosophy. The chapter argues that ethno-philosophy is an important part of African philosophy and recommends ways of dealing with some of the problems surrounding the notion of ethno-philosophy and its accompanying terminologies. Keywords  Ethno-philosophy · Paulin Hountondji · Kwame Gyekye · Particularism-universalism · African philosophy · Akan philosophy

1  Introduction Self-engineered ignorance commences with a refusal or reluctance of otherwise knowledge-seeking people to interrogate their environment and is sustained by a lack of commitment to understanding both the roots of their experiences and the consequences of their doings. Philosophy is a discipline that particularly discourages this; it instils in philosophers a critical attitude that has as its immediate telos the clarification of thought. With it, they are able to put critical aspects of human H. M. Majeed (*) Department of Philosophy and Classics, University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Agada (ed.), Ethnophilosophy and the Search for the Wellspring of African Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78897-1_8

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experience and intellectual history into perspective and continually influence the time to come. This attitude has been shown by professional African philosophers in their effort to interrogate consistently the question of African philosophy and fashion out its basic features. At the time that this activity was at its consistent best, one of the notable terminologies that were discussed was “ethno-philosophy”. The term has since become for different philosophers synonymous with folk philosophy, cultural philosophy, pseudophilosophy and even African philosophy itself. While the question of the existence of African philosophy appears settled, the basic features  – especially, as to whether or not ethno-philosophy deserves to be included – are still an ongoing debate. The debate has also influenced how African philosophers are categorised, that is, as universalists or particularists. I argue against these categorisations, nonetheless. Paulin Hountondji (1983) has been a strong adversary of traditional thought, rejecting it as a credible feature of what is truly African philosophy. He regards it as not philosophical but ethnological. Accordingly, academic philosophers who present traditional African thought as philosophy would be regarded by Hountondji as ethno-philosophers. Gyekye rebuts Hountondji’s claims about traditional thought and, in the process, produces some of the best points against Hountondji’s conception and deployment of ethno-philosophy. This chapter explores ethno-­philosophical currents in Gyekye’s philosophy in the following sequence: Sect. 1 pays attention to the concept of ethno-philosophy as presented by Hountondji, as well as my initial observations on it; Sect. 2 discusses ethno-philosophy and the key positions of Hountondji and Gyekye; Sect. 3 is where I reflect on the debate between Hountondji and Gyekye; Sect. 4 brings out ethno-philosophical currents in Gyekye’s works; and Sect. 5 further discusses the question of ethno-philosophy and suggests the way forward.

2  Ethno-Philosophy: Preliminary Observations Regarding African philosophical literature and thought, Paulin Hountondji uses the term “ethno-philosophy” to denote what he essentially regards as pseudo-­philosophy, a “philosophy” which has a number of identifiable features: First, it is collective. In presenting what is deemed to be (indigenous) African philosophy, what is often offered, in the thinking of Hountondji, amounts to nothing but a negation of what philosophy is about. For, the term philosophy is made to denote “merely a collective world-view, an implicit, spontaneous, perhaps even unconscious system of beliefs to which all Africans are supposed to adhere” (1983, 60). But this, according to him, is “vulgar” because collective thinking or worldview is not what philosophy entails in Western philosophy, for example. Thus, even as it is remarked for the sake of “humour” that philosophy, like other English words or Western-originated ideas, tends to mean something else in African contexts, Hountondji moves beyond witticism to make intellectual capital out of it, stressing that “Words do indeed change

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their meanings miraculously as soon as they pass from the West to the African context” (60). He thinks that African writers have consciously copied Western authors – who apparently seek a differentiation of the African, from the Western, context – to bring this about. However, there is reason to question whether, from his own writing, Hountondji’s claim about miraculous change of meaning in the African context is entirely correct. For instance, by mentioning that both African and Western authors are responsible for this change, he appears to rely on Henry Odera Oruka’s observation about what those authors write about Africa: that in their works, “superstition is paraded as African religion”, “mythology is paraded as ‘African philosophy’”, “dictatorship is paraded as ‘African democracy’” and “de-development or pseudo-development is described as ‘African development’” (Hountondji 1983, 60). The problem with this assertion is the lopsidedness in grounding the so-called miraculous change in the ideas of a few individuals who, most probably, miscategorised superstition, mythology, dictatorship and pseudo-development for different reasons. For, it cannot be uttered that there are not some others who would not see, for instance, dictatorship and pseudo-development for what they are. One also wonders if this so-called miraculous (mis)use of words occurs only in the African context. Further, it is not quite clear what precisely is “miraculous” about mythology being presented as African philosophy. If by this it is meant the authors of such an idea imply “all that African philosophy is about is mythology”, then the claim of miraculous change is correct. But that cannot be taken seriously by any philosopher to suggest that this is the nature of African philosophy and proceed to deny the existence of it (African philosophy or, in this case, traditional African philosophy). One cannot judge on the basis of a misconception. However, if the claim is based on the observation that, for instance, mythology is offered by those authors as a way of obtaining or understanding African philosophy, then that can neither be wrong nor different from what holds in Western philosophy, as Plato’s dependence on myths shows. Hountondji’s reference to the miraculous, as noted by Oruka, is meant to be derisive; but it is most probably founded on a conception of a non-existent reality and, as such, should not be taken as seriously as Hountondji does. The second feature of ethno-philosophy is the mythical character of its unanimity. This point is closely related to the first. As Hountondji explains, ethno-­philosophy is that kind of philosophy that gives the impression that “everybody always agrees with everybody else. It follows that in such societies there can never be individual beliefs or philosophies” (1983, 60). But this alleged unanimity advanced by ethno-­ philosophers is, according to Hountondji, false because “ethno-philosophical literature offers us a rich harvest of not only diverse but also frankly contradictory works” (61). It is true, as Hountondji notes of Alexis Kagame and Placide Tempels, that there are sometimes variations in the ethnological accounts given by authors about a particular people. And, it would be philosophically inappropriate to suggest that every member of an ethnic community accepts or holds the same views as other members, for that would not be conceptually or empirically supported. Yet, it would not be out of place to assert that a philosophical idea is in the traditions of a people (Majeed 2017a).

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The third feature Hountondji highlights is ethno-philosophy’s tendency to present an opportunity, albeit a bad one, for authors to invent their own ideas and impose them on a people without providing the conditions for the justification of the invented ideas. But in philosophy, he thinks, it should be possible to determine the truth of statements and the propriety of arguments. What partly accounts for this difficulty is the unwritten character of traditional African ideas. Thus, Hountondji writes: Ethno-philosophy can now be seen in its true light. Because it has to account for an imaginary unanimity, to interpret a text which nowhere exists and has to be constantly reinvented, it is a science without an object, a “crazed language” accountable to nothing, a discourse that has no referent, so that its falsity can never be demonstrated. (1983, 62)

Hountondji implies that ethno-philosophy “is a smokescreen behind which each author is able to manipulate his own philosophical views” (62). But there are two crucial questions: First, assuming that ethno-philosophy “has to account for an imaginary unanimity”, would it be true to claim that “its falsity can never be demonstrated”? Of course not, someone may say, since Hountondji is able to tell the truth (about unanimity) that there is no absolute unanimity in African thought – at least, as expressed in ethno-philosophical literature. But this line of reasoning appears to miss the import of Hountondji’s critique. His problem is really that when there are divergent or contradictory accounts, there cannot be a way of determining which one is true. But I do not think the picture painted by Hountondji is necessarily the case. It is quite possible to establish the accuracy or credibility of claims made in different ethno-philosophical works about the values, beliefs and practices of people. For example, a value, belief or practice on which divergent views have been expressed could be assessed through an encounter with the culture itself or in relation to other kindred values, beliefs and practices in that same culture. It would, for instance, be incorrect to say of people who believe in serial rebirth (of a baby) that they have no conception of reincarnation, as Innocent Onyewuenyi (1996) once failed to notice. Again, it is not clear why divergence in the interpretation of cultural values, beliefs and practices of people should be seen as “manipulations”. A basic requirement, in my estimation, for a philosophical interpretation of a concept or belief or value is that it should not exclude the author’s personal contribution or judgement – especially if the author is open about it. And for authors who write from or on a cultural perspective, their judgements on the perspectives they seek to interpret need not necessarily be seen in a negative light when the judgements do not converge.1 It is a different kind of philosophy to reflect on the views of a known individual as the practice usually is in academic (Western) philosophy; but it is also not bad philosophy to reflect on statements of wisdom that have become part of the lives of people. What needs to be guarded against is distortion or fraud  – something which is

1  This is not to say that ethno-philosophers cannot manipulate. What I intend is to argue that manipulation is possible in every kind of philosophy and can be discovered using appropriate research tools.

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possible both in cultures that have the tradition of philosophical writing and those that do not. Divergence of opinion on, or understanding of, traditional philosophical ideas is in itself not bad – it might even be an energiser of philosophical curiosity. However, determining the accuracy of ethno-philosophical accounts is difficult. If there is no literature on the subject already, which sometimes is the case, then the next plausible step (as stated above) might be to directly engage the traditions of the culture under discussion. But this requires sufficient knowledge of the traditions themselves – and this is not always available. We may anticipate some genuine difficulties here. How can we expect a professional philosopher, African or non-­ African, who probably lacks this knowledge or does not just want to rely on traditional knowledge, to proceed with the assessment of disparate ethno-­ philosophical views? Would this not be an attempt to request of researchers on ethno-philosophy what we would not often require of, say, an African student of British philosophy? The answer is “not really”, because in conventional Western philosophy, British philosophy comprises the ideas of specific, named individuals, but this is not true of British public philosophy.2 And, since the question raised above relates to the former sense of philosophy (academic British philosophy), the African situation is different because only the latter sense of philosophy applies (British public philosophy). But the fact that it takes more of a philosopher to evaluate the views of an ethno-philosopher does not mean that ethno-philosophy should not be employed or enquired into. There are niceties in traditional thought that are not yet fully explored or understood and many extrapolations that are yet to be made in connection with emerging events, problems and human experiences. Therefore, there is a lot in the traditions of Africa to be lost to the posture that African philosophy should really be about the ideas of named, especially modern, African thinkers. Unfortunately, however, this posture is real today even though it is often not openly expressed. But, I am convinced about the position that ethno-philosophy ought to be done by professional philosophers with all the needed criticality, although not as the only way to carry out contemporary African philosophy.

3  Ethno-philosophy: Hountondji and Gyekye In this section, I focus on how Gyekye approaches the problem of ethno-philosophy, especially as presented by Hountondji. One matter of interest, for Gyekye, relates to the issue mentioned in the preceding paragraph. It is the relation which (contemporary) African philosophy must have with the traditional wisdom of African peoples. He notes that “a history of philosophical thought in Africa will have to include the 2  By public philosophy, I mean ideas of philosophic significance or character that are entrenched in British public life; some, perhaps, originate from the period preceding recorded British philosophical history. Such ideas, having been part of the British culture, could have in diverse ways influenced the perspectives of named, individual philosophers who we read about in what is referred to as British philosophy in academic circles.

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philosophical productions of past African traditional thinkers (sages)”3 but not that “every piece of philosophical work by the modern African philosopher should involve enquiry into, or reference to, the traditional” (1995, xii). But in drawing attention to the importance of traditional philosophy, Gyekye is fully aware of the enervating challenge arising from the specific sense4 in which Hountondji characterises traditional philosophy as ethno-philosophy. In Gyekye’s understanding, ethno-philosophy as used by Hountondji is based on two wrong assumptions: that, first, there is absence of individual thinking in traditional philosophy and, two, members of traditional African communities unanimously/collectively hold “the same set of ideas or beliefs” (1995, xvii). Now, while it should be admitted that Hountondji is led to these assumptions by how, for example, Tempels and Kagame present traditional thought and communal life in their works, Gyekye’s preoccupation, in my understanding, is not with how well Tempels and Kagame present traditional thought – although that matters. Rather, it has a lot to do with how acceptable the notion or tenets of ethno-philosophy are, as well as Hountondji’s reliance on them to dismiss traditional philosophy. Hountondji’s reliance on the idea of collectivity in African thought, for instance, is puzzling given – according to Gyekye  – Hountondji’s own admission that Tempels and Kagame’s thesis of “collective system of thought” about African thought is “erroneous” (1995, xviii). For Gyekye (1995, xix), there are factual inaccuracies in the assumptions identified above: from the impossibility of (absolute) unanimity of views among any peoples to the conceptual impossibility of thought not to originate from individual brains. Finally, Gyekye points out that the idea of communal unanimity can only make sense in the context of public philosophy (which is found in the philosophies of all peoples).

3.1  Reflections on the Debate Between Hountondji and Gyekye Hountondji and Gyekye are great philosophers in their own right. The quality of their numerous works has never been in doubt. But when two learned individuals are in disagreement with respect to a fundamental question – in the nature of what 3  Gyekye (1995, ix) also regards ancient Egyptian thinkers as African traditional sages. Like Gyekye, Agada proposes the inclusion of traditional thought in African philosophy. In reaction to Fainos Mangena’s contrary view that ethno-philosophy constitutes the “original and true philosophy of Africans” (Mangena 2014, 31), Agada writes, “A philosopher like Mangena will say that the ultimate source of original African concepts can only be found in African traditional worldviews, the cosmology, ethics, metaphysics, values, and general practices of the African people. I agree with Mangena here, but I am also persuaded that the universalist critique of ethno-philosophy commits African philosophers to go beyond ethno-philosophy and develop critical systems of thought, which can enrich not only African philosophy but also world philosophy, especially in the age of globalisation that has seen the fast evolution of intercultural philosophy” (Agada 2019, 11). 4  There are different senses of ethno-philosophy. I will show these later.

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is “A”? – then it will be amateurish to suppose that one of them understands the question but not the other. Accordingly, it will not be appropriate to suppose that one of them does not know the import of the question what is African philosophy? Yet, depending on what their informed positions are on what philosophy itself is, what it is about African thought which could count as (part of) African philosophy may legitimately not be the same. It is therefore opportune to consider briefly Hountondji and Gyekye’s conceptions of philosophy which should enable us to appreciate the positions they adopted, as I showed in the previous section of this chapter. From two relevant works of Hountondji, Martin Ajei (2013, 135) makes a good observation: According to Hountondji, philosophy is a scientific practice in the sense of a recorded, systematized and integrated form of knowledge (Hountondji 1983: 99–101) which recognizes “internal diversity and pluralism” of thought within a culture and therewith promotes internal debate within that culture. (Ajei, quoting Hountondji 2000, 9)

This reveals an interesting fact about Hountondji which is not often written about: that there is a cultural element to philosophy, that philosophy could be carried out from within a cultural context and that there could be cultural philosophy. While it cannot be inferred from this that African philosophy, for instance, would not have a universal appeal, it does not permit us to label him as “universalist” without qualification. For Gyekye (2004a, 7), although philosophy asks “fundamental or profound questions about experience in order to explore its meaning and construct from it a synthetic and coherent picture of ultimate reality”,5 it is also a discipline which, essentially, is a “conceptual response to human situations or basic human problems” (2004a, 9), thereby linking critical, abstract thinking to “concern for the practical affairs of society” (2004a, 13). I am not sure whether, in relation to Hountondji’s conception of philosophy, Gyekye would deny that there was or is internal debate or the promotion of it in traditional African intellectual history. Nor would he deny all forms of plurality or diversity in African thought.6 It is not necessarily the case that Hountondji would not accommodate Gyekye’s claims about philosophy as stated above. What these two philosophers disagree about is Hountondji’s specific scientific criterion, the insistence that philosophy must be recorded, a criterion which is entirely absent from Gyekye’s writings. This absence effectively launches Gyekye into unwritten African thought which Hountondji identifies with, or as, the roots of ethno-philosophy, a pseudo-philosophy. Yet, the originator of the term “ethno-philosophy”, Kwame Nkrumah, presented it in simple terms as “philosophy of culture” or the “philosophy of anthropology” (Ajei 2013, 139), devoid of any “pejorative connotations”. From Hountondji and

5  This is quite consistent with Kwame Nkrumah’s conception of philosophy as a discipline that would “seek and unravel the deepest and basic meanings underlying human life, thought and activities” (see Nkrumah’s uncompleted doctoral thesis “Mind and Thought in Primitive Society”, Sect. 4, quoted in Ajei 2013, 138). 6  This is in spite of the consensual orientation of African communities.

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Gyekye’s conceptions of philosophy, therefore, we see two trained philosophers who know what philosophy is but present to us different ways of understanding what they know. Their perspectives do not cancel out each other in all respects but are not of equal coverage. For, it is quite possible that Hountondji would, in principle, accommodate Gyekye’s perspective on the meaning or essence of philosophy; yet, he (Hountondji) grants writing a crucial role in his articulation of what philosophy is about. This, therefore, arouses the suspicion that he introduces the element of writing to prevent the safe passage of traditional thought to the domain of philosophy. That said, it is expected – as it has seemingly turned out to be – that the perspectives on philosophy expressed by the duo inform their positions on the existence and nature of African philosophy. Gyekye’s critique of ethno-philosophy is largely about the factual and conceptual accuracy of Hountondji’s ideas regarding traditional thought on the basis of which they are regarded by Hountondji as ethno-philosophical. It is not based on how well Hountondji understands Nkrumah’s usage of ethno-philosophy. Indeed, Gyekye states that Hountondji has claimed coining the term “ethno-philosophy” (Gyekye 1995, xvi, citing Hountondji 1983, 34), yet he does not take on Hountondji on that. For this reason, it may be advanced that Gyekye’s positive outlook on traditional African philosophy emanates from his strong belief in the philosophical content and purity of traditional thought. And there is nothing more demonstrative of this conviction than how often he makes reference to traditional ideas in support of his views. Another way of confirming this is by considering his usage of the expression “Akan thinkers” or “traditional Akan thinkers”. Initially, there appears to be a semblance of what Hountondji rejects about African philosophy  – namely, unanimity of views or collective thinking  – in Gyekye’s reference to “Akan thinkers”, or “traditional Akan thinkers”. For, this seems to suggest that any idea attributed by Gyekye to the Akan thinkers is shared by all of them. Yet, in spite of Hountondji’s objections, Gyekye goes ahead to use the expression 67 times or more in An Essay on African Philosophical Thought (1995),7 mostly after responding to Hountondji in the front matter of the book. Gyekye’s major work after the Essay is Tradition and Modernity (1997); in this latter work, as in other minor works, “Akan thinkers” or similar expressions are also used. Gyekye does not mean by such reference that traditional philosophical ideas must emerge from the context of nameless authorship nor that all Akan thinkers share the same views. For, he is able to isolate specific thinkers in the Akan setting.8 Rather, his thinking is that not naming or knowing the author of an idea does not undermine the philosophical relevance of that idea. Here, an objection could be raised: that given Gyekye’s assertion that thought or idea (and, for that matter, thinking) is an activity of “individual intellects” (Gyekye 1995, xix), why would he not write in singular terms – say, “according to the originator of the idea” – instead of the general, “Akan, or traditional Akan, thinkers”?

 Henceforth, Essay  For one such thinker, see Gyekye (1995, 48).

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Two reasons may be offered: One, it is as a result of the ethno-philosophical character (not his characterisation, though) of traditional ideas which tend to be heavily embedded in the oral history of the Akan people. Such ideas are still being held by some individual sages – and sometimes non-sages – who, nonetheless, are not the originators of the ideas. But before these contemporary sages, there were probably a chain of sages who individually examined and held the views as well. Hence, Gyekye uses the term Akan (or traditional Akan) thinkers. Interestingly, this practice of examining, re-examining and subsequently rejecting or affirming existing views is common in all kinds of philosophy: written, unwritten, African, non-­ African, modern and ancient. The only difference is that the specification of the chain of philosophers, in reference to the history of an idea or its development, is easier with written than non-written philosophy. Two, there are times that Gyekye gives the impression that he has the opinion of the majority of (contemporary) Akan thinkers on an issue; sometimes he even talks about the view of most Akans (1995, 69) who, in any case, include sages. With this mode of presentation, an objection might be raised about the factual accuracy of the claim that one can know the intellectual position of “most” Akan people or sages. Strictly speaking, this sort of claim would be difficult, if not impossible, for any human to substantiate. Therefore, the claim invites us to consider whether Gyekye possibly intends something other than how the objector has just understood him. The only explanation, in my view, which would be factually acceptable, would be to assert that Gyekye has in mind the majority position of those he has come into contact with or what is most often heard from his kinsmen. Yet Gyekye does not accept such ideas because they are of the majority but because they have philosophical grounding.

4  Ethno-Philosophy in Gyekye’s Works Gyekye has produced works ranging from African philosophy and Arabic/Islamic philosophy to Western philosophy. In African philosophy, his ideas have been very significantly shaped by traditional Akan wisdom. In this section, I tease out some of the key areas of Gyekye’s philosophy and how ethno-philosophy contributed to their development.

4.1  Logic, Clarity of Thought and Respect for Justification The absence of systematic logic or, at least, its development to a high degree in Akan thought is acknowledged by Gyekye, but he attempts an articulation of the logical foundations or implications of some Akan beliefs or ideas. For instance, using his rich knowledge of the Akan language, he is able to uncover the locative complement of existential expressions in Akan (Gyekye 1995, 179). The Akan expression that translates as “exists” or “there is” is, according to him,

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“­ represented in modern logic as (〉X) Fx”. The logical implication of the Akan existential expression is then used by Gyekye to oppose the ontological argument for the existence of God. According to Gyekye, “existence” has no direct equivalent in Akan but can be literally translated as “‘that something is there (exists)’ sε biribi ” (1995, 181). As a result, the question that preoccupies the ontological arguer, which is is existence an attribute?, would roughly translate into Akan as “Is that something is there an attribute?” – a question which is utterly nonsensical in the Akan context. Kwasi Wiredu contributes briefly to the interpretation of the Akan existential statement, indicating that may also mean “at some place” (1998, 24). Consequently, he posits “the spatial connotation of the Akan concept of existence” or “the necessary spatiality of all existents” (33). This, however, implies that in the expression Nyame (God exists), we are led to a conception of God’s existence in, at least, quasi-physical sense. But I reject Wiredu’s idea of the necessary spatiality of existence in Akan language (Majeed 2017a, 145). Logical thinking and respect for the rules of logic are of concern to Gyekye. He believes that since philosophy is a universal enterprise, philosophers of all cultures, whether or not they are aware of academic logic and its involutions, would be able to apply rules of logic or would generally have an intense logical orientation. With the wise saying aso mu nni nkwanta (there are no crossroads in the ear), for example, Gyekye illustrates how, in Akan public philosophy, the law of non-contradiction is applied (1995, 7, 20).9

4.2  Akan Sociopolitical Philosophy One of Gyekye’s strengths as an African scholar is his thorough understanding of the social structure of the Akan community. His masterful carving of democratic elements out of Akan sociopolitical beliefs and practices has been one of the most visible, though controversial, aspects of his philosophy. In the wake of this exercise, Gyekye has projected such virtues as deliberation, freedom of speech and respect for the rule of law (1997, 2004a) in Akan sociopolitical thought. He argues, for instance, that the proverbs “one head does not go into council” and “wisdom is not in the head of one person” presuppose deliberation, compromise and consensus in Akan sociopolitical thought (2004a, 64–65). It is quite instructive how traditional democracy combines with communalism in Gyekye’s philosophy to produce a highly complex but organised social structure that he refers to as “moderately communitarian” (1995, 1997). In essence, Gyekye argues for social democracy and the sociality of the individual. The doctrine of moderate communitarianism is a reaction to the version of communitarian philosophy propounded by other African philosophers, especially the Nigerian Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984). The doctrine continues to be

9  Find more on the application of logical rules and the respect for justification of views in Majeed (2015).

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investigated and debated upon among contemporary African philosophers such as Polycarp Ikuenobe (2017, 2018), Matolino (2009), Motsamai Molefe (2016, 2017) and Majeed (2018a, 2019).

4.3  Human Values and Dignity The pervasiveness of themes on human values and dignity in the writings of Gyekye makes him a humanist – if humanism is understood as any philosophy that has as its object the promotion of human well-being. Gyekye does not just draw attention to the imperative of enhancing human welfare but also tenders this as the solution to some of the major problems of Africa and the world. For instance, it is the measuring rod by which African cultural products are to be assessed in determining which ones are fit for today and the future (Gyekye 1997, ch. 2). It is also a crucial reason why Gyekye finds ethnocentrism indefensible, as the ethnocentrist's own culture  – and, indeed no culture –  can perfectly  enhance  the welfare of its members in all aspects of life. Ethnocentrism thus entails a tendency which is inconsistent (Gyekye 2004b, 63-67).  Another concept which appeals to all humans is development. In Gyekye’s work, development is not to be measured in quantitative, economistic terms but in qualitative terms, especially in terms of the total well-being of the people (1994). Finally, in an Akan community, the highest political authority is the chief, and, for good reasons, the effectiveness or success of a chief is always a big issue, which appears to depend on the vision and conduct of the chief himself or herself. Thus the success or failure of the chief and, indeed, any other traditional authority depends on the effects of his or her actions on the people. These effects are in turn assessed against the standard of human well-being. So, the promotion of the well-being of the people is the ultimate reason why a traditional political authority would maintain or lose power (1997, 115–132; 2004a). Indeed, the promotion of human well-being is the anvil of Akan ethics (1995, 143–146; 1996, 55–58; 2013, 218–223; Wiredu, 1998, 34–35; Majeed 2013).

4.4  Conceptions of the Person In different works, Gyekye directs his attention to the identity of a person. He identifies two main conceptions of a person in Akan thought, moral and non-moral (ontological). In the moral sense, personhood (onipa) is a status conferred on someone by virtue of his or her consistent exhibition of good conduct. Ultimately, such a conduct is expected to conduce to the well-being of individuals and society. Individuals are accordingly brought up in the Akan society to strive towards the achievement of this status. This does not only suggest the human capacity to do good, but it also confirms the humanistic and communal orientation of the Akan society. It does not mean also that individuals in the Akan society would be

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necessarily good to others and/or society. Rather, the human being is regarded as good by nature10 and, thus, has the tendency to bring goodness to others. Consequently, the natural goodness of the human being is an ideal quality, a property whose activation by the individual brings about an ideal community, that is, a community in which human well-being is the measure of all goodness. An individual who submits to this noble imperative of activation is a person (1997, 36–60). The non-moral conception of a person presents a collection of elements that every human being possesses, as that which gives identity to a person. In Akan philosophy, the elements are honam (body), sunsum (spirit) and (soul). According to Gyekye (1995, 98), the can be said to contain sunsum (spirit). The characterisation of some of the elements is, however, the subject of disagreement between Gyekye and Wiredu. For instance, Wiredu takes exception to the translation of as soul, arguing that unlike, at least, in Western thought where the soul is deemed to be spiritual, is quasi-physical (Wiredu 1983, 120). With further evidence from the Akan culture, Gyekye (1995, 86) denies the quasi-physicality of the . In both Wiredu and Gyekye, however, the is the philosophical basis for the concept of life after death. The two conceptions of a person presented above have sometimes not been clearly delineated by Gyekye. For instance, in interpreting the moral conception of a person, Gyekye initially insists, as against Ifeanyi Menkiti, that such personhood is not acquired: “A human person is a person whatever his age or social status. Personhood may reach its full realization in community, but it is not acquired or yet to be achieved as one goes along in society” (1992: 108). However, Gyekye (1997, 50–51) soon changes his position and affirms that personhood is earned. Gyekye suggests that “humans, including children who have not stepped into the moral arena, are only capable of moral choice but are not necessarily persons yet” (Majeed 2017b, 41). There is evidence that not every African philosopher interprets the African conception of a person in a twofold manner as we see in Gyekye. Menkiti (1984), for instance, presents the moral conception as the true African conception, entailing a progression from minimal to maximal levels of personhood. The minimal level is the non-moral (or, in his framework, non-person level), and the maximal level is the moral (or personhood stage). Some may argue that such a perspective does not attach the same level of philosophical significance to the identifiers – viz. the minimal and maximal. For, Menkiti claims that the minimal criterion is met by everyone including babies and children, yet they are not identified as persons. He cites how babies are never referred to as persons, not even in the English language. But someone might object that in some sense, babies are persons maximally if all they need, as required in the non-moral conception, is the possession of body, soul and/or spirit. Menkiti’s argument may, however, avoid this objection if it could be shown that, first, he takes the non-moral conception as a legitimate African conception of a

 By this, Gyekye (1992, 109) means a person “is considered to possess an innate capacity for virtue, for performing morally right actions”.

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person in its own right, worthy of presentation as an African philosophy of person, and, second, that he only chooses to restrict his usage of the word “person” (and, for that matter, personhood) to the moral sense in the work cited. But if the first response is denied, then it may be asked, on the pain of begging the question, in what way does the possession of non-moral identifiers then become a minimal sense of what it is not (morality)? In other words, how can the lower end of moral identity be non-­ moral? This objection does not falsify the claim that a physico-spiritual person is capable of causing a moral effect, but it implies that (moral) personhood begins with the conscious creation of that effect. It is worthy of note, however, that both Gyekye and Menkiti have agreed that in the conception of a person from a moral perspective, it is not enough for one to be a human being. As shown above, Gyekye’s discussion of moral personhood also has some problems, problems which I discuss further in another work (Majeed 2017b).

4.5  Akan Ontology The discussion of ontology especially in the sense of Akan cosmology and cosmogony is carried out by Gyekye in a way that is particularly worthy of note. This question, ontology, is not just one complex dimension of Akan philosophy (especially, metaphysics) but also is a problem that Gyekye could not have articulated well without making use of some ethno-philosophical data. The cosmogony and cosmology of the Akan people are entrenched in the Akan society – in the form of myths, proverbs and religious beliefs and practices. In Chap. 5 of the Essay, the Akan universe and the categories of physical and non-physical beings that exist therein are discussed. Belief in the divine origin of the universe is obtained from the appellation or . However, Wiredu and Gyekye disagree on what this means for the nature of God ( ). While Wiredu thinks that the appellation a quasi-physical being who made things from other things (a “cosmakes mic architect”) and did not create things ex nihilo, Gyekye conceives of as a spiritual being who created the universe ex nihilo (Wiredu 1998, 36–37; Gyekye 71–73). What is interesting about Gyekye is that he employs philosophical methods and principles to explain the worldview of the Akan people in ways that have far-­ reaching consequences. For instance, from the proverb that “when someone was taking leave of the Supreme Being no one else was standing by”, he is able to show the divine origin of human destiny and the unknowability of this destiny (1995, 177), and from belief in the good nature of , he expresses the logical impossibility of the human being having a bad destiny (Gyekye 1995, 115–116). Ethno-philosophical information is thus critical for understanding the place of the human being in the Akan universe, causation and human welfare. Elsewhere, I interpret Gyekye further in this light, highlighting the implications of Akan ontology for humanism (Majeed 2018b). The foregoing also shows the relevance of ethno-­ philosophy to Gyekye’s exposition of free will and predestination.

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5  The Question of Ethno-philosophy: The Way Forward Hountondji is regarded as a universalist, meaning that he shares the view (with Bodunrin, Wiredu and Appiah) that the concerns and method of African philosophy must be the same as those of Western philosophy (Ikuenobe 1997, 189). This position on the nature of African philosophy contrasts with the view of the particularists (who, Ikuenobe notes, include Gyekye and Sodipo) that “different cultures have different ways of explaining reality; hence Africans must have a philosophy that is essentially different from other philosophies” (Ikuenobe 1997, 189). Nevertheless, to be a particularist is not to be an ethno-philosopher, especially if we take ethno-­ philosophers to be “radical particularists” who “promote ethno-philosophy as a unique form of thought that effectively distinguishes African philosophy from Western philosophy” (Agada 2019, 4; cf. Agada 2015). Yet, not being an ethno-­ philosopher does not make one a universalist (or sympathetic to the universalist cause). For instance, Gyekye does not argue that Western rationality is the core determinant of that which is (African) philosophy, nor does he endorse the criterion of writing.11 However, Agada labels Gyekye as sympathetic to the “universalist stance” (2019, 5). So, what possibly accounts for the distinct characterisation of Gyekye? Is there any prospect for synthesis here? My answer to the second question is in the affirmative. With respect to the first, there is every indication that there is a moot dichotomy between particularism and universalism in African philosophy. This is demonstrated by how the difficulty in pinning the universalist label on Gyekye does not still result in his dissociation from all universalist views. For instance, he believes in the universal appeal of philosophy – except that it must originate from cultural contexts (2004a, 25).12 He would accordingly give an Akan exposition of a concept which, qua concept, would resonate with philosophers everywhere. But he does not assert as Kagame or Tempels does, or as Mangena proposes, that a cultural worldview or belief system, an African system, is sufficient in itself, complete in its identity and distinct in its entirety from all others – especially, the Western. This notably suggests that Gyekye would not be a particularist in the sense explained above. However, if particularism is explicated as the view that “African philosophy should develop along its own line and not be limited by Western philosophy” (Agada 2019, 4; he cites Etieyibo 2015; Matolino 2015), then someone may assert that Gyekye is a particularist. Then what happens to his apparent universalist orientation which Agada most probably noticed? I do not think that that orientation could be easily dismissed.

 These are two of the criteria of universalism listed by Ikuenobe.  He writes: “In terms of the criteria or conditions for a genuine African philosophy, my substantive position has been that a modern African philosophy must be linked to – take its rise from – African cultural and historical experience ... [and this experience, like culture, may include elements that are] endogenously created as well as those that can be said to have been inherited or appropriated exogenously” (1995, xii-xiii).

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Gyekye shares his own views on the subject. He understands universalism as a doctrine that sees philosophical ideas as “transcending the times and cultures that begat them, and hence of transparticular (universal) applicability”, while particularism considers philosophical ideas to be “relative and relevant only to the times and cultures out of which they emerged” (2004a, 21). Notably, he admits that some particularists, like Rawls, do not “rule out the possibility of [their theories] having a wider, even a universal application” (2004a, 26, square brackets mine). This admission is important, just as Gyekye’s reaction to Oruka’s claim that particularists deny African philosophy the Western sense of reason and rather present it in the form of the magical and “extra-rational” (Oruka 1987, 56, 66). Gyekye replies “no particularist thesis would deny the place of rationality in human thought, African or non-­ African”, although particularists deny the universality of Western standards of rationality (Gyekye 2004a, 23). For Gyekye, traditional African thought and indeed any discourse at all would be impossible without the use of reason. Reason thus fails to successfully identify the universalist (as Oruka thought), for it is possible for both particularists and universalists to expect the universal adoption of their ideas. Believing in “our common humanity”, however, Gyekye identifies with universalism (2004a, 24, 26). While this might confirm Agada’s categorisation above, there are lingering issues. He does not think that philosophy should always be universalistic. He writes: If, in fact, the subject matter of philosophy is human experiences, and human experiences differ in some respects, then we would expect the contents and concerns of philosophies produced by thinkers with different cultural or historical experiences to differ in some respects. This is what I consider the essential point of the particularist thesis. And therefore, the particularist thesis cannot be set aside cavalierly. (2004a, 25)

The question, then, is if a particularist would expect a universal application of his theory, and would not necessarily reject the importance of reason in human affairs, and the universalist (here, Gyekye) expects some particularity in doing philosophy, how distinct is universalism from particularism? Does the foregoing mean that Gyekye is a disguised particularist? Is he a confused universalist? My response is no, to both questions. In my view, he simply shares some of the beliefs of the so-­ called particularists and universalists, although he aligns himself with “universalism”. Therefore, I do not regard Agada’s labelling of Gyekye as wrong, neither do I regard Ikuenobe’s. If Gyekye has to be categorised, and I doubt he has to be, then he probably is partly universalist and partly particularist, or he is strictly neither universalist nor particularist. But these categories lack precise meaning anyway. A similar lack of clarity is observed by Agada. According to him, “the willingness” of a professional thinker “to subject communal worldviews to rigorous philosophical scrutiny, blurs the line between  ethno-philosophy and academic ethno-philosophy up to a point” (Agada 2019, 5; he cites Njoku 2002; Rettová 2002). There are many confused concepts in philosophy – and the concepts of particularism and universalism in African philosophy are perfect examples. Philosophers may even endorse one doctrine while sometimes practising the opposite. I am not therefore surprised that:

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Wiredu is counted among the universalists; yet, he pioneered what is now regarded as academic ethno-philosophy. Wiredu sees no reason for African philosophers not to interrogate ancestral wisdom as long as this interrogation is carried out in the best critical tradition of philosophy. (Agada 2019, 5)

Amid this confusion of isolating without trouble the two sets of philosophers, I have to get into other comments made in connection with this chapter’s concerns – Hountondji, Gyekye and ethno-philosophy – still within the context of particularism and universalism. In this regard, the alleged particularist’s study of the worldviews and thought patterns of specific African peoples is rejected by the “universalists” (especially, Hountondji) as being less of philosophy, as not philosophy proper – but as ethnology or folk philosophy. Gyekye is regarded by Ikuenobe as a particularist. However, Ikuenobe lists writing as one of the universalist’s criteria of philosophy and suggests, like Gyekye, that the ability to meet this criterion is not wholly true of Western philosophy itself (Ikuenobe 1997, 201).13 Gyekye and Ikuenobe both argue that ancient Greek philosophy did not strictly meet this criterion. Yet, Gyekye describes himself as a universalist. This confirms the difficulty in using writing as a criterion for not just (African) philosophy but for “universalism” itself. This is another reason why “universalism” and “particularism” are indecipherable. In spite of the foregoing, it might not be right for anyone seeking a rejection of the “universalist” position to insist that African philosophy should not involve the analysis of abstract (universal) concepts or should not care about the ideas of specific thinkers. Meeting these two conditions is part of the demands or tenets of “universalism” as listed by Ikuenobe (1997, 201). The point that ought to be stressed is that these demands do not necessarily eject African thought systems from the domain of philosophy. Perhaps, instead of seeking a divide between “universalists” and “particularists”, it would be more helpful to look into the possibility of having a workable framework within which to do African philosophy comprehensively. Thus, I feel that going forward, the point made by Gyekye that attention be paid to both traditional and modern African thought ought to be respected. Indeed, I have argued in this chapter that there is a lot to lose if ethno-philosophy is neglected in African philosophy, as Hountondji would wish. Many life situations will arise in the future where ethno-philosophical ideas will provide us with the tools (or, at least, some tools) with which those situations could be addressed or appreciated. Also, given that some African philosophers tagged as “universalists” do sometimes show “particularist” tendencies in their works or adopt some rather “particularist” positions, and given that there are no precise markers of “particularists” and “universalists”, it is my view that these two categorisations have probably outlived their usefulness and, hence, must be abandoned.

 It is also maintained that “the conception of the nature of philosophy is itself a philosophical question, any conception constitutes a stance, which requires a good argument, and this the universalists have not satisfactorily provided” (Ikuenobe 1997, 201).

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6  Conclusion This chapter has presented ethno-philosophical currents in Kwame Gyekye’s philosophy. It has examined the concept of “ethno-philosophy”, pointing out that from the perspective of Hountondji, it stands for the sort of thought that is collective, allegedly unanimously held and, thus, not worthy of consideration in the practice of African philosophy. Gyekye disputes Hountondji’s characterisation of traditional thought and subsequent elimination of it from African philosophy. And, following Gyekye’s recognition and usage of traditional thought, the chapter demonstrated the extent of the usage and relevance of ethno-philosophy in his philosophy. The paper has argued, finally, that ethno-philosophy is important for the future of African philosophy.

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———. 1997. The parochial universalist conception of ‘philosophy’ and ‘African philosophy’. Philosophy East and West 47 (2): 189–210. Mangena, Fainos. 2014. Ethno-philosophy is rational: A reply to two famous critics. Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya 6 (2): 23–38. Majeed, H.M. 2013. Rationality, supernaturalism, and humanism: traditional Akan Thought questions some Western claims. In A celebration of philosophy & classics, ed. M.C. Simpson, H.M. Majeed et al., 113–123. Oxfordshire: Ayebia Clarke Publishing. ———. 2019. Moderate communitarianism and the idea of political morality in African democratic practice. Diametros 16 (61): 51–71. ———. 2018a. Moderate communitarianism is different: A response to J.O.  Famakinwa and B. Matolino. Journal of Philosophy and Culture 16 (1): 3–15. ———. 2018b. Humanistic supernaturalism: What shape else humanism could take. Journal of Religions and Human Relations 10 (1): 234–253. ———. 2017a. Reincarnation: A question in the African philosophy of mind. Pretoria: UNISA Press. ———. 2017b. The nexus between ‘person’, ‘personhood’, and ‘community’ in Kwame Gyekye’s philosophy. Unizik Journal of Arts and Humanities 18 (3): 26–45. ———. 2015. An exposition of Akan conception of rationality. Journal of Pan-African Studies 8 (2): 302–315. Matolino, Bernard. 2015. Universalism and African philosophy. South African Journal of Philosophy 34 (4): 433–440. ———. 2009. Radicals versus moderates: A critique of Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism. South African Journal of Philosophy 28 (2): 160–170. Menkiti, I.A. 1984. Person and community in African traditional thought. In African philosophy: An introduction, ed. R.A. Wright, 3rd ed., 171–181. Lanham: University Press of America. Molefe, Motsamai. 2017. Personhood and rights in an African tradition. Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies 45 (2): 217–231. https://doi.org/10.1080/02589346.2017.1339176. ———. 2016. Revisiting the Menkiti-Gyekye debate: Who is a radical communitarian? Theoria 63 (4): 37–54. Njoku, F.O.C. 2002. Essays in African philosophy, thought and theology. Owerri: Claretian Institute of Philosophy. Onyewuenyi, I.C. 1996. African belief in reincarnation: A philosophical reappraisal. Enugu: Snaap Press. Oruka, H.O. 1987. African philosophy. In Contemporary philosophy: A new survey. (vol. 5, African philosophy), ed. G. Floistad, 45–78. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff. Rettová, Alena. 2002. The role of African languages in African philosophy. Rue Descartes 2 (36): 129–150. https://doi.org/10.3917/rdes.036.0129. Wiredu, Kwasi. 1998. Toward decolonizing African philosophy and religion. African Studies Quarterly. 1 (4): 17–46. http://africa.ufl.edu/asq/v1/4/3.pdf. ———. 1983. The Akan concept of mind. Ibadan Journal of Humanistic Studies 3: 113–134.

H. Odera Oruka’s Philosophic Sagacity as a Variety of Ethno-Philosophy Pius Mosima

Abstract  In this chapter, I argue that Henry Odera Oruka’s conception of philosophic sagacity remains among the most important trends which continue to play a leading role in contemporary African philosophical discourses. More specifically, I contend that philosophic sagacity is a variety of ethno-philosophy. Oruka identifies four trends in current African philosophy. These are ethno-philosophy, professional philosophy, nationalist–ideological philosophy, and philosophic sagacity (Oruka HO, Trends in contemporary African philosophy. Shirikon, Nairobi, 1990). He later added the hermeneutical and artistic/literary trends (Oruka HO, Sage philosophy. ACTS Press, Nairobi, 1991). In his conception of philosophic sagacity, Oruka dismisses ethno-philosophy as a collective mode of philosophizing and endorses the individual sage as the valid mode of philosophizing. This, according to Oruka, is different from ethno-philosophy, and is standard African traditional wisdom, which obtains in the African context. He claims that philosophic sagacity is the only trend that can give an all-acceptable decisive blow to the position of ethno-philosophy. None of the other two trends can objectively, decisively play this role. The reason is because they are suspected of smuggling Western techniques into African philosophy. He also opines that in launching philosophic sagacity, one has the possibility to seek for and find a philosophy in traditional Africa without falling into the pitfall of ethno-philosophy. Nevertheless, I re-examine Oruka’s project and method of philosophic sagacity and his criticisms of ethno-philosophy and provide strong reasons showing that the differences Oruka makes between both approaches are plastic and not cast iron. I ascertain that if progress should be made in Oruka’s philosophic sagacity, it needs to take ethno-philosophy seriously. Both approaches to African philosophy are based on the African cultural context in which the sages find themselves and outline their philosophy. Keywords  African philosophy · Philosophic sagacity · Sage philosophy · Ethno-­ philosophy · Philosophic sage · Folk sage · Culture

P. Mosima (*) University of Bamenda, Bamenda, Cameroon © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Agada (ed.), Ethnophilosophy and the Search for the Wellspring of African Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78897-1_9

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1  I ntroduction: Oruka’s Conception of the Nature and Possibility of African Philosophy The late and much lamented Kenyan philosopher, Henry Odera Oruka (1944–1995), remains one of Africa’s most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. His immense contributions to the growth of contemporary African philosophy, as well as the way in which he helped to locate African philosophy within global philosophical discourses, need no recommendation. His works in areas such as normative and applied ethics, political philosophy, epistemology, and, most notably, sage philosophy/philosophic sagacity remain among the most important trends in African philosophy which have attracted quite a good number of scholars and continue to play a leading role in contemporary African philosophical discourses.1 Philosophic sagacity has also made significant contributions in the search for wisdom in oral sources and helped in situating the validity and relevance of indigenous African knowledge systems. One of the major challenges Oruka undertook was to structure the issues of the discourse on African philosophy in an orderly manner. He contributes to this debate by identifying four trends in current African philosophy (Oruka 1990). These are ethno-philosophy, professional philosophy, nationalist–ideological philosophy, and philosophic sagacity. They were presented to the debate on African philosophy in Oruka’s Trends in Contemporary African Philosophy.2 He also classifies African philosophy into ‘schools’ of African thought.3 Before a brief discussion of his trends below, it must be noted that Oruka claims that philosophic sagacity ‘…is the only trend that can give an all-acceptable decisive blow to the 1  For more critical perspectives on Oruka’s philosophic sagacity, see, for example, Azenabor (2009); Chaungo (2002); Dikirr (1997/1999); Graness and Kresse (1997); Janz (1999); Kalumba (2002, 2004); Kazeem (2012); Kresse (1993, 2007, 2008); Masolo (1994, 1997, 2005); Mosima (2016, 2018); Nyarwath (1997/1999); Ochieng’-Odhiambo (1994, 1996, 1997, 2002a, b, 2006,2007); Ogutu (1995/1996); Oluwole (1997/1999); Oseghare (1985); Presbey (1996,1997, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2007, 2012, 2017); Tangwa (1997); and Van Hook (1995). 2  Oruka (1991: 5) later added two other approaches to African philosophy: the hermeneutic and the artistic or literary trends. The hermeneutic trend more specifically accommodates those who choose a linguistic approach. Oruka understands the hermeneutic trend as involving ‘the philosophical analysis of concepts in a given African language to help clarify meaning and logical implications arising from the use of such concepts’ (ibid. 11). The main proponents of this school include the Ghanaian philosophers Kwasi Wiredu (1987) and Kwame Gyekye (1995, 1997) and Barry Hallen and his late co-author John Olubi Sodipo (1986), from the United States and Nigeria, respectively. The artistic or literary trend applies to African intellectual figures in the humanities who address themselves to themes basic to Africa’s cultural identity. The main proponents include the Ugandan poet and social critic Okot p’Bitek, Kenyan writer and social critic Ngugi wa Thiong’o, and Nigerian playwright, poet, and social critic Wole Soyinka. 3  Oruka mentions the ethnographical school which he subdivides into the ‘ethnographical descriptivist’ (Placide Tempels, John Mbiti) and ‘ethnographical rationalists’ (Robin Horton, E.A. Ruch, Innocent Onyewuenyi, and K.C.  Anyanwu), the rationalist school (Kwasi Wiredu, Bodunrin, Paulin Hountondji, and Campbell Momoh), and the historical school (Claude Sumner, Valentin Yves Mudimbe, Dimas Masolo, and Lucius Outlaw). For more description of these ‘schools’, see Oruka (1991:15–31).

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position of ethno-philosophy. None of the other two trends can objectively, decisively play this role. The reason is because they are suspected of smuggling western techniques into African philosophy’ (Oruka 1991: 47). He also opines that in launching philosophic sagacity, one has the possibility to seek for and find a philosophy in traditional Africa without falling into the pitfall of ethno-philosophy (Oruka 1990: 23). What does Oruka’s tendentious decisive blow and rejection to the position of ethno-philosophy mean to the discourse in African philosophy? Are ethno-philosophy and philosophic sagacity really polar approaches in African philosophy? In this chapter, I revisit and rethink Oruka’s criticisms of ethno-­philosophy and (1) I concur with Peter Bodunrin (1981), Didier Kaphagawani (1987), and Lansana Keita (1985) in arguing that philosophic sagacity is a variety of ethnophilosophy. The differences Oruka makes between both approaches are plastic and not cast iron, and (2) if progress should be made in Oruka’s philosophic sagacity, it needs to take ethno-philosophy seriously. Philosophic sagacity needs to work hand in glove with ethno-philosophy for a better sagacity. Both approaches to African philosophy are based on the African cultural context in which the sages find themselves and outline their philosophy. I submit that Oruka's criticisms of ethno-philosophy and his claim of having given a final decisive blow to it, as it is seemingly adopted, uncritically, by a majority of African philosophers as a true rendition of the orientation for African philosophy, need to be revisited.

2  P  hilosophic Sagacity/Sage Philosophy as a Response to, and Deviation from, Ethno-Philosophy As earlier mentioned, in launching philosophic sagacity, Oruka intends to deviate from ethno-philosophy, defined as communal thought, by presenting the views of individual thinkers on certain issues. What is the rationale for such a dismissive tone towards ethno-philosophy? In order to define philosophic sagacity, it is necessary to explain what sage philosophy is about. According to Oruka: Sage philosophy consists of the expressed thoughts of wise men and women in any given community and is a way of thinking and explaining the world that fluctuates between popular wisdom (well-known communal maxims, aphorisms and general common sense truths) and didactic wisdom (an expounded wisdom and a rational thought of some given individuals within a community). While popular wisdom is conformist, didactic wisdom is at times critical of the communal set-up and popular wisdom. Thoughts can be expressed in writing or as unwritten sayings and arguments associated with some individual(s). (Oruka 1991: 33–34. Italics in the original, but I have added the bold)

Some of Oruka’s critics have disparagingly called his sage philosophy ‘culture philosophy’, suggesting that it cannot be distinguished from ethno-philosophy (Kaphagawani 1987). Lansana Keita (1985) is quite sceptical of Orua’s claim that philosophic sagacity is the movement best eqipped to ‘give an all-acceptable decisive blow to the position of ethno-philosophy’, which is not fully defensible since it can be shown that philosophic sagacity as defined by Odera Oruka himself would

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seem to be an attempt at mere revision of the principles of ethno-philosophy. Moreover, an interesting phrase in the definition above points to the fact that the thoughts of the sages fluctuate between popular wisdom (what he likens to ethnophilosophy) and didactic wisdom (what he likens to philosophic sagacity). While popular wisdom is conformist, didactic wisdom is at times critical of the communal setup and popular wisdom. This distinction, in my opinion, is not clear. It rather shows the overlap between between both forms of wisdom and justifies the claim that philosophic sagacity is another form of ethno-philosophy. Philosophic sagacity is the reflection of a person who is a sage and a thinker. As a sage, a person is—as already pointed out—well versed in the wisdoms and traditions of his people. As a thinker, he is critical and transcends the communal wisdom. Philosophic sagacity, therefore, is the expounded and well-reasoned thought of some individuals in a given culture. Serequeberhan sees sage philosophy as Oruka’s attempt to carve out a middle way between ethno-philosophy and professional philosophy and describes it as the thought of indigenous wise men ‘who critically engage the established tradition and culture of their respective ethnic groups and/or societies’ (Serequeberhan 1991: 19). These sages, says Serequeberhan, occupy a critical space in their culture; they are not merely preservers of tradition. The thesis put forward by Oruka that philosophic sagacity differs from ethno-philosophy on the grounds that philosophic sagacity entails critical and personal thought, while ethno-philosophy does not, cannot be sustained. This is because any belief system must have been first initiated by an individual thinker or a restricted group of thinkers before becoming a generally accepted belief system. According to Oruka, contemporary African philosophers would be ill-advised to ignore the belief systems of traditional Africa in their quests to establish a viable African philosophy. Bodunrin, for example, posits that ‘The African philosopher cannot deliberately ignore the study of the traditional belief systems of his people. Philosophical problems arise out of real life situations’ (Bodunrin 1981:173); and Hountondji thinks that ‘... there exists a considerable body of oral literature, esoteric or exoteric, the importance of which we are only beginning to suspect. We must have the patience to study it, investigate its logic, its function and its merits’ (Hountondji 1983:168). Oruka himself shows the importance of the cultural context on the lives of the people when he states that ‘Culture often has a profound influence on people whether or not they are sages or philosophers’ (Oruka 1991:4).Tempels and his followers have done the same. The major difference, as earlier mentioned, is that Oruka focuses on individual thinkers and tries to subject African philosophy to the same canons of Western philosophy. Consequently, Oruka’s thesis that philosophic sagacity should replace ethno-­ philosophy as a legitimate representative to the foundations of African thought based on the assumed distinction between ethno-philosophy and philosophic sagacity is not supportable.

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3  Oruka’s Trends in Contemporary African Philosophy As earlier mentioned above, Oruka classifies African philosophy into trends, and I proceed to present the various trends in this section.

3.1  Ethno-Philosophy Among the four trends listed above, ethno-philosophy is perhaps the earliest approach of them all (Boele van Hensbroek 1998, 1999). It treats the subject of African philosophy as a form of folk wisdom. Thus, beliefs, which are generally known to be characteristic of anthropological or religious systems, are depicted as typical examples of African philosophy. The earliest known works in this trend include La philosophie Bantoue (1945) of the Belgian missionary Rev. Fr. Placide Tempels, La philosophie Bantu-Rwandaise de l’Etre (1956) of the Rwandan priest Rev. Fr. Alexis Kagame; and African Religions and Philosophy (1970) of the Kenyan Rev. Pastor John Mbiti. According to Oruka, ethno-philosophy claims that African philosophy is unique and radically different from European philosophy. He asserts that ethno-philosophy rejects two factors that are often identifiable with European or Greek philosophy. These are logic and individuality. He substantiates this with Leopold Sedar Senghor’s doctrine that logic is Greek, while emotion is African. It is presupposed that Africans have a unique way of thinking and conceptualizing that makes them radically non-European. Hence, African philosophy is understood as a corpus of thoughts and beliefs produced by this way of thinking. This dimension brands European philosophy as critical and rigorous analysis, logical explanation, and synthesis, as opposed to African philosophy, which is believed to be innocent of such properties. African philosophy is supposed to be based on intuition, related to mysticism, and opposed to or beyond rationalism (Oruka 1991:20–21). European philosophy is taken for granted to be individualistic, i.e. a body of thoughts produced or formulated by individual thinkers as opposed to African philosophy, in the ethno-philosophical sense, which is communal. Oruka cites from Tempels to show that communality is an essential attribute in African philosophy: ‘Wisdom of Bantu based on the philosophy of vital force is accepted by everyone, it is not subjected to criticism, for it is taken by the whole community as the “imperishable truth”’ (Oruka 1990:15). What is conceived, from this perspective, as African philosophy is the collection, interpretation, and dissemination of African proverbs, folktales, myths, and other traditional material of a philosophical tendency (Oruka 1990:15–16). Hountondji, in an effort to disentangle African philosophy from ethno-philosophy, groups ethno-­ philosophy into three main genres: first, Western ethno-philosophy (as conducted by European authors such as Marcel Griaule, Dominique Zahan, and Tempels who tried to reconstruct an African ‘philosophy’ and attempted contrasting this African

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pseudo-philosophy with an equally imaginary European philosophy); second, African churchmen who have endorsed this genre of Western ethno-philosophy such as Kagame, Mgr. Makarakiza, Rev. Fr. Rahajarizafy, Rev. Fr. Francois-Marie Lufuluabo and Rev. Fr. Vincent Mulago, Rev. Pastor Jean-Calvin Bahoken, and Rev. Fr. Hebga; and third, African laymen such as Senghor and Alassane N’daw from Senegal, Prosper Laleye from Togo, and Basile-Juleat Fouda (Hountondji 1983: 57–70).

3.2  Nationalist–Ideological Philosophy Nationalist–ideological philosophy refers to the works of modern African political nationalists such as Kenneth Kaunda, Julius Nyerere, and Kwame Nkrumah. It is basically political philosophy and is found in manifestos, pamphlets, and discourse related to the anti-colonial struggle for liberation. It mostly refers to the political thoughts of post-independence African leaders, but it can also refer more generally to radical political thought. These thinkers assume that communalism, as the supposed basic tenet of traditional Africa, should form the cardinal principle of any sound ideology for modern Africa. Oruka distinguishes this trend from ethno-­ philosophy on three counts: first nationalist–ideological philosophy does not assume or imply that European thought or philosophy is radically different from or irrelevant to African thought as ethno-philosophy expounds. Second, the authors of this trend do not give the impression that the philosophy they are expounding is that of a whole African community or continent. Even though this philosophy is claimed to be rooted in the traditional or communal Africa, it is explicit that it is actually a philosophy of the individual authors concerned. Third, this philosophy is practical and has explicit problems to solve, namely, those of national and individual freedom, whereas ethno-philosophy appears as a political and free-for-all metaphysics (Oruka: 1990: 18).

3.3  Professional Philosophy The professional philosophy trend is opposed to ethno-philosophy but not to the nationalist–ideological trend. This is a critical approach used by scholars who have undergone university training in philosophy as a discipline and who have published on various themes. Advocates of professional philosophy are united in their opposition to ethno-philosophy and in their affirmation of the centrality of critical rationality in the activity of philosophy.4 For them, for anything to pass as philosophy proper, it must involve rigorous, sustained, and independent thought. There are differences of emphasis among them, however, about the importance of African

 See, for example, Wiredu (1980, 1990) and Hountondji (1996).

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philosophy’s ‘relevance’ to independence and development. Oruka’s main criticism of both nationalist–ideological philosophy and professional philosophy is that ‘.. they are suspected of smuggling western techniques into African philosophy’ (Oruka 1991: 47). He also thinks none of them can give an all-acceptable decisive blow to the position of ethno-philosophy. He claims philosophic sagacity can objectively, decisively play this role.

3.4  F  rom Ethno-Philosophy to Philosophic Sagacity: Fusions and Ruptures From a brief presentation of the trends above, ethno-philosophy portrays African philosophy as unique, distinct from Western philosophy in a pejorative manner. African philosophy is seen as collective and lacking the basic characteristics ordinarily attributed to Western philosophy. Professional philosophy is opposed to the position of ethno-philosophy. For this trend, there exists African philosophy in the strict and technical usage of the term. The professional African philosophers having been schooled in the Western tradition are influenced by it when treating African philosophy. And consequently the end result is not African, but a scholarly exercise in Western philosophy by Africans. Between ethno-philosophy (folk philosophy) and professional philosophy (written critical discourse), sage philosophy comes in as the third alternative (Oruka 1991:43). It demonstrates the fact that traditional Africa had both folk wisdom and critical individualized philosophical wisdom. I focus on Oruka’s criticisms of ethno-philosophy because it will give us a clearer picture of his rationale for endorsing philosophic sagacity. From these criticisms, we shall also identify the fusions and ruptures of both approaches.

3.5  O  ruka and Ethno-Philosophy: From Antagonism to Compromise In his attempt to trace the development of Oruka’s thoughts in African philosophy from the early 1970s to the 1990s, a period spanning slightly more than 20 years, Kenyan philosopher Frederick Ochieng’-Odhiambo, who happens to be a former student of Oruka, shows the evolution of philosophic sagacity and its rapport with ethno-philosophy (Ochieng’-Odhiambo 2002a). He demarcates Oruka’s views on African philosophy in general and philosophic sagacity in particular into three stages: pre-1978, 1978–1984, and 1984–1995.5According to Ochieng’-Odhiambo,

5  Presbey (2007) prefers to call Ochieng’-Odhiambo’s distinctions the early, middle, and later Oruka, similar to the way people refer to the early or later Heidegger or Wittgenstein to help scholars know the context of one’s remarks.

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the struggle against ethno-philosophy and a search for the best possible definition of African philosophy is what punctuates and characterizes the pre-1978 period. During this period, Oruka is very uncompromising and antagonistic towards ethno-­ philosophy. He attempts to dislodge ethno-philosophy from African philosophy because it does not constitute philosophy in any proper sense of the term. The second period is the era of philosophic sagacity. It also marks the beginning of a compromise and accommodative stance towards ethno-philosophy in explaining and defining African philosophy. The third stage (post-1984 period) is the sage philosophy era. This period, according to Ochieng’-Odhiambo, witnesses a continued and increased compromising spirit to the extent that the distinction between ethno-­ philosophy and sage philosophy becomes quite blurred. Ochieng’-Odhiambo is re-­ stating the judgement Bodunrin (1981) and Kaphagawani (1987) earlier made of philosophic sagacity, that of likening it to ethno-philosophy. Bodunrin suggests that philosophic sagacity is similar to French anthropologist Marcel Griaule’s Ogotemmêli, who ‘displays a great philosophic sagacity in his exposition of the secret doctrines of his group’ and to the approach carried out by Barry Hallen and J.O. Sodipo among the Yoruba in Nigeria. Kaphagawani judges that philosophic sagacity is a second-order philosophy to ethno-philosophy and, hence, could not exist without the latter. He speaks of a probable (though only apparent) ‘misconception’ by Oruka in annotating four trends in African philosophy as types, and he later endorses this ‘misconception’ as valid, as they turn out to be bivalent: they represent types of African philosophy, on the one hand, and methods of philosophizing in Africa, on the other. However, Oruka clarifies that philosophic sagacity is rather a second order to culture philosophy. Sages reflect upon culture, not as it is summarized in consensus form and analysed by professional philosophers, theologians, or missionaries (as in ethno-philosophy) but based on their personal experiences in the community. This view is defended by American philosopher Gail Presbey who does not agree that Oruka had a compromising spirit or ended up embracing ethno-­ philosophy as Ochieng’-Odhiambo asserts. Sage philosophy, Presbey maintains, is distinct from ethno-philosophy and remains a unique approach within African philosophy. The main differences stem from the fact that Oruka’s sages are critical, reflective, rigorous, and dialectical. She also asserts the importance of naming the individual thinkers who share their personal thoughts (Presbey 2007).6

4  Oruka’s Criticisms of Ethno-Philosophy Oruka argues that one of the greatest shortcomings of ethno-philosophy is that it is derived not from the critical but from the uncritical part of African tradition (Oruka 1990: 16). Ethno-philosophy is more mythology and ethnology than philosophy  See also Ochieng’-Odhiambo (2002a) for this distinction.

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proper (Oruka 1972, 1975). In his ironic title, Mythologies as African Philosophy (1972), Oruka posits that mythologies should not be regarded as part of philosophy. He also draws a distinction between debased and exact usage of the term philosophy: When one uses philosophy in the debased form one might (rightly) substitute mythology for philosophy. (Oruka 1997: 28)

This is what Tempels and his disciples, according to Oruka, did when they used philosophy in the debased form. Consequently, their works do not contain philosophy but mythologies. He refers to Tempels’ notion of vital force as a ‘mythical and ugly phrase’ (Oruka 1997: 30). He laments that these mythological, ethnological, and religious writings ‘have so far been causing us trouble’ in identifying African philosophy. This is what he proposes to ethno-philosophers: Although those writings may have played a role in initiating authentic philosophical works in Africa, the most they can now be offered is ‘thanks’; but it would be too much to offer them the philosophically serious title of ‘African philosophy’. (Oruka 1975: 53)

According to Oruka, ethno-philosophy cannot even be regarded as a meta-theory of a worldview, because it is thwarted by the emic–etic problem (Oruka 1991: 24–25). He uses Ludwig Wittgenstein’s view of religious belief and Willard van Orman Quine’s ‘indeterminacy thesis of radical translation’ as possible supporters of the ethno-philosophical thesis. In his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein argues that the non-believer cannot understand the believer. The believer has a completely different ‘form of life’ from that of the non-believer,7 and the believer and non-­believer participate in different forms of life that have no essential relationship to one another. Each language game is logically distinct from another.8 The language of faith or commitment of the believer is inexpressible and unintelligible in that of the non-believer. This is because each of them plays a different language game. Oruka’s use of Wittgenstein is interesting and impressive, but Wittgenstein’s basic fallacy is that he considers religion as an act of faith, a commitment to a truth claim, in the first place. Secondly, experience with African religion also shows his claim to be wrong. Religion is not just limited to knowing doctrinal elements; religion also helps in social identification with co-religionists, implying that it takes social and political dimensions. At the existential level, African religion, for example, is not just limited to faith but extends to therapeutic benefits and sociability in the community which this form of religion generates (van Binsbergen 1981). It is not totally true that the non-believer cannot understand the believer. As with the case of all transboundary/intercultural understanding, the non-believer may in some ways understand the believer, while in other ways, such understanding is impossible for him/her. Wittgenstein’s analogy between the believer and the non-believer can be extended to the relation between an insider in traditional African philosophy and the outsider

 See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Basil Blackwell and Mott (1968, sec. 23, p. 11). 8  Ibid. sec. 7, p. 5.

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who analyses or describes this philosophy in the language of Western thought. From this point of view, Oruka asserts that the two (i.e. insider and outsider) cannot meaningfully express their thoughts to each other. It would be absurd to find that one can be an expert in the thought of the other (Oruka 1991: 25). Oruka’s use of this argument is in need of some modification, because it is an exaggeration. There is no absolute difference in thought between the insider and the outsider. The insistence on such difference would deny the possibilities of any valid transcultural representation of knowledge. American philosopher W.V.O. Quine has a similar view to that of Wittgenstein in one of his most famous books, Word and Object. Quine’s thesis is that there are no culturally universal meanings or propositions. This suggests that the ontological– epistemological status of meanings cannot be explored or analysed outside of the context in which human beings speak or act. Consequently, behaviour is the determinant of meaning within a language. It is therefore not possible to unequivocally translate and compare theoretical concepts between radically different languages. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the Wittgenstein–Quine distinction supports the tenets of ethno-philosophy, ethno-philosophers are denied their own thesis. Oruka asserts: For if their thesis is correct, then the authors are not themselves capable of understanding, let alone rationalizing the nature of African philosophy. And this is because, so far, all of them (whether Europeans or Africans) have championed what they term ‘African philosophy’ by terminologies given in Western scholarship. None, so far, has given out what is to be treated as the language of African philosophy. Their very concept, ‘vital force,’ is, if they are to be consistent, ‘a Western notion’: it is a concept by postulation, not intuition. (Oruka 1991: 24–25)

Oruka’s assertion gives the impression that Quine’s thesis is about impossibility. It is not. It is rather about indeterminacy—in other words, about the same distortion of representation. A distorted picture of a person may still be recognized as representing that person. In addition, it cannot be the person because it is merely a representation. Furthermore, what Quine and Wittgenstein postulate has nothing to do with the contents of African philosophy, but with the possibility of its valid rendering in discursive academic French or English prose. It is not totally impossible to get intercultural knowledge. Even though that possibility is limited, it is there. If, then, it turns out that African philosophy has a logic similar to or identical with Western logic, that is a further step, to be determined by ordinary methods of hermeneutics. However, it is far from impossible that we will find, as Wiredu (1990) and Hallen and Sodipo (1986) claim, that African and Western logic are one or not so different after all.

4.1  Oruka’s Project of Philosophic Sagacity According to Oruka, the philosophic sagacity project aims to show that the problem in traditional Africa is not the lack of logic, reason, or scientific curiosity. This explains why in 1974 he formulated a research programme at the University of

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Nairobi in Kenya, entitled ‘Thoughts of Traditional Kenyan Sages’. Oruka outlined the research programme in the following words: The real purpose in this project was to help substantiate or invalidate the claim that traditional African peoples were innocent of logical and critical thinking. Was traditional Africa a place where no persons had the room or mind to think independently and at times even critically of the communal consensus? ...Would it be possible to identify persons of traditional African culture, capable of the critical, second-order type of thinking about the various problems of human life and nature; persons, that is, who subject beliefs that are traditionally taken for granted to independent rational re-examination and who are inclined to accept or reject such beliefs on the authority of reason rather than on the basis of a communal or religious consensus? (Oruka 1991: 17)

Four years later, between 24 and 29 July 1978, Oruka introduced the idea of philosophic sagacity into the debate on African philosophy. He set out to reject three negative claims regarding the philosophical status of indigenous African thought: first, the claims of ethno-philosophy that Africa is a place of philosophical unanimity; second, that writing is a precondition for philosophy; and third, the Eurocentric claim that Greek sages are philosophical, while African sages are not (Oruka 1991: 1).

4.2  E  thno-Philosophy, Unanimity, and African Critical Thought According to Oruka, ethno-philosophy is based on the assumption that traditional Africa is a place of philosophical unanimity and anonymity and steeped in myths. This implies that traditional Africa encouraged unanimity regarding beliefs and values and discouraged individual, critical thought. If this were true, it would allow no room for individual thinkers of the likes of, say, Socrates or Descartes, with their own views on such matters. Philosophic sagacity objects to this claim of ‘imaginary unanimity’ in Africa, a claim which Oruka regarded as absurd, by presenting empirical evidence of the ‘internal pluralism’ among indigenous African thinkers (Hountondji 1983). The element of individuality is crucial to Oruka’s conception of philosophic sagacity. The individual thinkers in a given cultural orientation reflect upon and critically assess conventional beliefs. This explains why he categorizes Griaule’s Ogotemmêli as a folk and not a philosophic sage.9 According to Oruka, all that Ogotemmêli does is to summarize Dogon beliefs (no matter how esoteric) on a variety of topics, and there is minimal evidence of critical and independent reflection on the beliefs by Ogotemmêli himself.

 We will come back to Oruka’s categorization of sages shortly.

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4.3  Oral Tradition and Literacy in Philosophic Sagacity Oruka’s second subject of disagreement is the colonial bias against unwritten or oral thought. By publishing his interviews with the sages, he aimed to counter the claim: The second philosophical claim is that philosophy is and can only be a ‘written’ enterprise; a tradition without writing is incapable of philosophy. Therefore, any claim that there is philosophy (even when termed sagacity) in illiterate Africa is a non-scientific, mythological claim. This claim too is false. (Oruka 1991: 1)

He posits that there are illiterate African thinkers whose memories are, in terms of consistency and organization, as good as information recorded in well-composed books and better than poorly written books (Oruka 1991: 53–54).

4.4  The African Sage Tradition and Eurocentric Bias Oruka’s third cause of disagreement is based on the Eurocentric bias created by colonialism that Greek sages used reason, while Africans do not philosophize. This hegemonic frame of reference explains why the sayings of numerous pre-Socratic Greek sages such as Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and other pre-­ Socratics were paraded as ‘philosophical’ and ‘unprecedented philosophical innovators of genius’ (van Binsbergen 2012: 11), whereas those of traditional African sages were not. This false belief that the sayings of the Greek sages are ‘philosophical’, while those of traditional African sages are anything but philosophical (Oruka 1991: 1) had further led to the image of philosophy as the restricted property of Greeks or Europeans and, even more exclusively, the property of white males. When recorded in books, the sayings of the Greek sages came to be widely regarded as ‘philosophical’ and the people who made the utterances ‘philosophers’ (Oruka 1991: 1–2). This triggers Oruka to wonder why the sayings of Kenyan sages like Mbuya Akoko, Oruka Ranginya, and Osuru should not be similarly regarded after they are committed to writing by professional philosophers. He maintained, in an interview with Kai Kresse (1993), that rationality or reason is always a part of any culture, no matter whether the people are Chinese or African or from anywhere else.

4.5  Some Comments on Oruka’s Three Negative Claims We notice that Oruka’s project in countering the Eurocentric bias regarding the philosophical status of African philosophy is quite similar to the main aims of the ethno-philosophers. Tempels, for example, was also influenced by the intellectual climate of their time. The ugly episodes of slavery, colonialism, and racialism not only shaped the world’s perception of Africa but also instigated a form of frustration and intellectual revolt from the African and Africanist intelligentsias. The African

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was considered as one who was incapable of rigorous and dialectical enquiry. This racist orientation led Europeans to refer to Africa as the ‘dark continent’, one with ‘primitive’ knowledge systems and ‘savage or inferior mentality’, and inhabited by the ‘Other’. The colonial caricature of Africa as culturally naïve, intellectually docile, and rationally inept had a profound influence on Tempels’ axial work, Bantu Philosophy. Tempels called for the need to recognize the identity and rationality of the so-called primitive man, their place in history, and their contributions to world civilization. Tempels projected a systematic exposition of an indigenous African system of philosophical thought, characterized as an ontology in which being is conceived as ‘vital force’. His project was meant to counter European prejudice about the supposed intellectual deficiencies of Africans and also help in encountering and understanding the Africans. This call marked an incisive refutation of the ideas of colonial scholars like Lévy-Brühl on ‘primitive mentality’, dethrones the colonially built episteme, and confronts the ‘colonial library’ (Mudimbe 1988, 1994). It can be stated that the reactions of Oruka and Tempels fall under this form of intellectual revolt against the corrosive effects of colonialism, racialism, as well as the legacies of slavery. Consequently, Tempels and Oruka counter the Eurocentric bias and alter many notions of Western superiority in philosophy. I think the major variation Oruka makes is that he identifies individual sages and carries out interviews with them. In presenting each of the sages, Oruka gives a brief biographical sketch, a photograph, and then the interview with the sage. This approach is in contrast with ethno-philosophy, where the thoughts of informants (often anonymous) are presented in a bid to search for a common denominator. Ethno-philosophy lays more emphasis on collective thought and looks for meaning in collective practices. It tends to downplay the dynamics of culture and the role of cultural criticism. In this context, philosophy here is treated as a general communal activity in which ready-made beliefs and emotions rather than reflection decide the outcome (Oruka 1991: 47). Oruka’s fascination for the individual thinker is understandable. The reason is that in a modernist conception of philosophy, which Oruka endorses, the individual is the subject, the author. These individuals assume privileged access to truth, reason, and scientific knowledge. However, these identifiable individuals live in a cultural context, and Oruka cannot afford to induce us to adhere to the dream of constructing valid knowledge only along Western modernist lines. This erroneous assumption is largely shared by the so-called academic philosophers, that any philosophy worth the name must be the work of some identifiable individual. A typical African sage exists in a typical African community. Hence, future research on the notion of philosophic sagacity as advanced by Oruka needs to rethink his criterion for separating philosophic sagacity from sage philosophy.

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4.6  Oruka’s Methodology According to Oruka, advocates of ethno-philosophy assume that traditional Africa is a place of philosophical unanimity, steeped in anonymity and myths. To solve this apparent misconception, he decides to interview individual thinkers who are knowledgeable of their customs and traditional beliefs. The method used in searching for the traditional harbingers of sage philosophy may be called philosophical anthropology. Ethno-philosophers, according to Oruka, used this method but were unable to go beyond anthropology, which they accepted as the definition of African philosophy (Oruka 1991:5). Traditional individual African sages are often identified, and dialogue is carried out with them. Traditional Africa here refers to an era when the dominance of beliefs and practices in an African setting, as shown by the sages who represent a domain, a sphere of life, that was constituted prior to the penetration of the North Atlantic and/or global post-seventeenth-century technology and that has managed to more or less survive as a relatively autonomous, relatively intact domain of thought and action ever since. The discourses were held in the native language of the presumptive wise men or women. Such selected persons are capable of giving detailed explanations concerning the beliefs and practices of their community. They are also at times capable of offering reasonable criticism of some of such beliefs and practices. Therefore, one major task of the professional philosopher becomes to identify the sages in a culture and then record their potentially unique insights on certain themes of fundamental importance to human life such as the existence of God, the nature of time, the nature of freedom, the nature of death, the nature of education, etc. The insights of some of the sages could be termed unique because they may very well differ from conventional beliefs in their societies.

4.7  Distinguishing the Philosophic Sage from the Folk Sage After conducting interviews with his sages in Kenya, Oruka identifies two main categories of sage philosophy (Oruka 1991:34): 1. First of all, there is the folk sage, who is well versed in the popular wisdom, culture, and beliefs of his people. He is essentially a conformist in relation to the communal setup. He is a folk sage because he produces ethno-philosophy and does not transcend the set beliefs, celebrated folk wisdom of his people, or even attempts to provide a perspective that is new. 2. Second, the philosophic sage individually expresses rational thoughts and moral teachings. Such a sage is at times critical of the culture, beliefs, and popular wisdom of his people. Such a sage exposes the basic principles of the group to rational enquiry, a kind of meta-culture philosophy, wherein the assumptions and culture are challenged, critically and logically (Kaphagawani 1987), which is didactic wisdom. This second-order philosophy is what is referred to as philosophic sagacity.

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Oruka justifies this distinction in his comparison of Griaule’s Ogotemmêli, whom he considers a folk sage, with Paul Mbuya Akoko, whom he considers a philosophic sage. For him, Ogotemmêli says hardly anything that suggests a thought beyond the generally given and revered Dogon beliefs. Oruka is also quick in dismissing the Sodipo–Hallen approach, who had Yoruba onisegun as the professional group with whom they primarily worked. The views of the onisegun, Oruka contends, are representative of the thoughts of the ordinary Yoruba (Oruka 1991, 50). I think Oruka’s categorization of Griaule’s Ogotemmêli and Sodipo–Hallen approach as folk philosophy needs to be questioned. This is because Oruka argues that wisdom does not occur in a vacuum but develops and grows within a cultural context (Oruka 1991. 35ff). Nevertheless, if Oruka has the competence in comparing the sagacity of a Dogon sage (Ogotemmêli) or Yoruba sages (onisegun) with the Luo (Paul Mbuya Akoko), it implies that all African cultural contexts have the same standard and structure of knowledge, thereby undermining the diversity in African epistemology. It could also counteract Oruka’s criticism of ethno-philosophy as one of unanimity. The point is that the Dogon sage (Ogotemmêli) or Yoruba sages (onisegun) could be philosophic sages in their diverse cultural contexts, beyond the personal evaluations of Oruka. These sages live in well-known African communities; the ability of the sages to recollect and present the communal, collective, thought and lived ontology of their respective communities is what strikes Tempels, Griaule, Hallen, and Sodipo as sagacious. Oruka is going against that and prefers an individualistic position of each sage he chooses to engage, like Paul Mbuya Akoko, who is a variety of Ogotemmêli or the onisegun. Yet, I think that we cannot limit the construction of wisdom, especially in an African context, just to the individual. A culture is, by definition, a collective thing, being shared by thousands and usually millions of people. Such a cultural orientation is inherently diverse and inconsistent. Moreover, the individual merges with the ever-changing community in a bid to face daily problems. The fact that the folk sages have a mastery of their cultural beliefs suggests their interest in their respective communities. Could this not be a valid base for an African social and political philosophy? The distinction between popular and didactic wisdom, according to Oruka, is not cast iron but plastic, as it fluctuates (Oruka 1991, 33, my emphasis) between the two poles. This means that there are folk sages that can be philosophic sages and vice versa. Oruka himself admits that a criterion for separating wise statements from foolish statements is difficult to establish. This is because the area between wisdom and non-wisdom sometimes overlaps (Oruka 1991:64). This also shows that philosophic sagacity is a variety of ethno-philosophy. Nevertheless, Oruka does not respect that qualification in his categorization of sagacity. This explains van Hook’s (1995) proposal that Oruka’s categorization of sages into ‘folk’ and ‘philosophic’ is more flexible than Oruka advocates. He wonders why Oruka does not consider the views of folk sages as philosophical (Oruka 1991, 58). Gail Presbey thinks that the folk sages even show talent that is more philosophical than Oruka’s description of them would make us believe. She thinks folk sages should be included as philosophic sages because some of the sages distinguish their views from those of their communities on at least one topic (Presbey 2007: 142–143). Instead of

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distinguishing folk sages from philosophic sages, she thinks that the distinction often occurs within the same individual sage. The individual sage is even an ‘active interpreter of tradition’ (Oruka 1991 143). Elsewhere (Mosima 2018), I have extensively argued that Peris Muthoni, Oruka’s lone female sage, qualifies as a philosophic sage and not as a folk sage as Oruka insinuates. And even if the distinction between the folk and philosophic sage is a matter of degree (Presbey 2007), I still think Oruka’s criterion for distinguishing a philosophic sage from a folk sage needs further clarifications.

5  B  eyond a Unifying Theoretical Perspective: Oruka’s Trends/Schools as Complex and Interrelated Oruka has classified African philosophy into six different but interrelated trends and into schools of African thought (Oruka 1991: 15–31). The ethnographical school is parallel to ethno-philosophy and premised on the assumption that African societies are communal and uniquely, strongly religious. Thought is not a monopoly of any given elite. Thought is exercised as a cooperative but pious identification with the perennial wisdom of people as derived from their ancient traditions. Critical, abstract, independent, and so-called objective thought and postulation are not foreign to African thought, though the African mind is but an extension of the body as a whole. There is no distinction of a cogito and a ‘sum’ (Oruka 1991: 21). The rationalist school appears comparable to professional philosophy as it is premised on the assumption that philosophy is a universal enterprise, ‘… which should be distinguished from religion, mythology and mysticism even if there is much intermingling between philosophy and these others…. Philosophy is a conceptual, logical discourse, a discourse that is self-critical’ (Oruka (1991:26). Oruka classifies work in sage philosophy as subscribing to the rationalist school (Oruka 1991:26–30). Finally, the historical school refers to the class of scholars who have not been explicit on the nature of African philosophy, but ‘…they are mostly concerned with collecting and evaluating texts which, in their views, should be seen as important to the subject on African philosophy’ (Oruka 1991:30–31). From this classification into trends and schools on African philosophy, we realize that Oruka recognizes diversity in African thought, but this classification implies his static notion of the African philosophical tradition and consequent antagonism towards ethno-philosophy. Yet, I think these trends have distinct interpretations of the nature of African philosophy and Oruka seems to have ignored the context, influences, challenges, and interrelationships between them. Ethno-philosophy, for example, provides the cultural base or grounding from which Oruka launched his philosophic sagacity. Philosophic sagacity is closely related to the professional trend because it assumes a universalist definition of philosophy based on individual critical thinking and applies these principles to the African traditional context. The nationalist–ideological trend, in asserting African socialism and democracy, leans

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on ethno-philosophy’s interpretation of the communalistic nature of African society. Hence, the intricate relationships between the trends indicate the complex, multifarious nature and structure of African philosophy. For Oruka to outrightly dismiss ethno-philosophy is tantamount to ignoring this complex web of relationships and interrelationships which are evident in the dynamism between the trends in the entire discourses on the existence and development of African philosophy.

5.1  Oruka and the Question of the Anthropological Method In terms of his methodology, Oruka makes a difference between the techniques used in social anthropology and oral history, on the one hand, and that used by philosophic sagacity, on the other. Since ethno-philosophy largely depends on the former, and Oruka thinks it is debased for it implicitly denies the people of Africa the potential to think individually, Oruka wants to show the uniqueness of philosophic sagacity. Yet we realize that the methods used in searching for the harbingers of philosophic sagacity are anthropological in nature because he identifies a specific community or group, identifies sages, and carries out interviews with them. Oruka endorses ethnography as ‘one way of looking for traces of African philosophy is to wear the uniform of anthropological field workers and use dialogue to pass through anthropological fogs to philosophical ground’ (Oruka 1991:5). However, Oruka rebukes ethno-philosophers for wearing the uniform of anthropological fieldworkers and using its assumptions in arguing that African philosophy is necessarily communal and unanimous, with no room for individual thinkers (Oruka 1991:1). I think Oruka is visibly fascinated with individuality as a criterion for philosophy that he intends to find the philosophic sage par excellence. Moreover, it will be difficult for research in sagacity if ethnography is left out as Oruka persists in his critiques of ethno-­philosophy. Interestingly, Oruka admits that there need not be any iron curtain between philosophy and anthropology. He notes that ‘… one way to search for African philosophy is to pass through anthropology… collaboration between philosophers and anthropologists can be very useful especially if the two groups are conscious of what they know and do not know about each other’ (Oruka 1991: 10).

6  Conclusion Throughout this chapter, I have tried to present philosophic sagacity as a variety of ethno-philosophy. I have done so by taking a closer look at Oruka’s conception of African philosophy, his project, and method of philosophic sagacity. In spite of the creative response he gives the nature of African philosophy, I think his dismissive tone of ethno-philosophy should be thoroughly scrutinized for such an attitude may actually undermine the status of philosophic sagacity in the twenty-first century. It

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is clear Oruka has succeeded in changing the conceptions of African peoples, as held by themselves and as held by others, especially in his response to the sordid and corrupt views held by Europeans in terms of the African continent and her people. He recognizes the input of the general African folk and wages the debates among the folks (indigenous sages). In fact, Oruka breaks the barriers between the professional philosophers and the rural simple African folk. Yet, the difference between ethno-philosophy and philosophic sagacity is plastic. The budding philosopher wishing to follow up and continue research in sage philosophy needs to take into consideration ethno-philosophy seriously in a bid to locate and rethink the mores of a given community and African wisdom traditions in general. We live in global intercultural times, and if we are searching for the wellspring of African philosophical concepts, ethno-philosophy could be such a genuine base for Africa’s contributions to world philosophy. This requires taking ethno-philosophy to a new level in a bid to overcome its supposed debased and substandard assumptions (Agada 2019; Imafidon et al. 2019). It could rather be used as a base for building knowledge systems in African philosophy as the Nigerian philosopher Jonathan Chimakonam does with African logic through Ezumezu and his fellow countryman Innocent Asouzu’s Ibuanyindanda ontology. They lean on it for logical and metaphysical systems which are not just unique but with universal validity and applicability. Asouzu and Chimakonam’s Ibuanyindanda ontology and Ezumezu logical system, respectively, demonstrate the viability of a philosophical programme that seeks to transcend ethno-philosophy by enriching it with concepts that promote the criticality and analyticity demanded by critics of ethno-philosophy, in a manner conducive to system building. While Asouzu adopts the epistemological instrument of complementary reflection to achieve his goal (Asouzu 2004), Chimakonam adopts what he calls the conversational method to build coherent systems and not just critically interrogate these traditional worldviews (Chimakonam 2015a, b, 2019). I think this enriched version of ethno-philosophy makes a case for the continued relevance of ethno-philosophy and its dynamic interrelationship with philosophic sagacity in the twenty-first century and beyond.

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———. 2000. On a mission to morally improve society: Odera Oruka’s African sages and the Socratic paradigm. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 14/2 (Fall 2000): 225–240. ———. 2002. African sage philosophy and Socrates: Midwifery and method. International Philosophical Quarterly 42 (2): 177–192. ———. 2007. Sage philosophy: Criteria that distinguish it from ethno-philosophy and make it a unique approach within African philosophy. Philosophia Africana 10 (2): 127–160. ———. 2012. Kenyan sages on equality of the sexes. Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya (PAK), New Series 4 (2): 111–145. ———. 2017. Oruka and sage philosophy: New insights in sagacious reasoning. In The Palgrave Handbook of African philosophy, ed. Afolayan Adeshina and Toyin Falola, 75–96. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Serequeberhan, Tsenay, ed. 1991. African philosophy: The essential readings. New  York: Paragon House. Tangwa, Godfrey B. 1997. Sagacious Reasoning: Henry OderaOruka in Memoriam (Review). Quest-Philosophical Discussions: An International African Journal of Philosophy/Revue Africaine Internationale de Philosophie XI (1–2): 175–182. ———. 1959. Bantu philosophy. Paris: Présence Africaine. First published as. Van Binsbergen, Wim M.J. 1981. Religious change in Zambia: Exploratory studies. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. ———. 2012. Before the Presocratics: Cyclicity, transformation, and element cosmology: The case of transcontinental pre- or protohistoric cosmological substrates linking Africa, Eurasia and North America. Haarlem: Shikanda. van Hensbroek, Pieter Boele. 1998. African political philosophy, 1860–1995: An inquiry into three families of discourse. Thèse, Université de Groningen. ———. 1999. Political discourses in African thought, 1860 to present. London: Praeger Publishers. Van Hook, Jay. 1995. Kenyan Sage philosophy: A review and a critique. Philosophical Forum XXVII (1): 54–65. Wiredu, Kwasi. 1980. Philosophy and African culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 1987. ‘The concept of mind with particular reference to the language and thought of the Akans. In Contemporary philosophy, Vol. 5, African philosophy, ed. Guttam Floidstad, 153–179. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. ———. 1990. Are there cultural Universals? Quest: Philosophical discussions: An International African Journal of Philosophy 4 (2): 4–19.

“Ethnophilosophy” and Wiredu’s Programme of Synthesis Martin Odei Ajei

Abstract  This article distinguishes two mutually exclusive conceptions of the term “ethnophilosophy” in the history of African philosophy. Following overviews of these conceptions, I proceed to associate Wiredu’s work with the earlier and more obscure version of the two, even though he never explicitly used the term. I argue that this neglected version of ethnophilosophy was germane to Wiredu’s philosophical agenda and that current African thinkers should pursue this agenda by fruitfully harnessing the notion to re-invigorate the philosophical thought intrinsic to indigenous sub-Saharan African cultures and aid the effort to properly steer these thought systems into the arena of global discourse on philosophical norms. Keywords  Ethnophilosophy · African philosophy · Philosophy of culture · Nkrumah · Wiredu

1  E  lements of Wiredu’s Meta-philosophy: Philosophy and What It Is Not The body of Kwasi Wiredu’s work displays two salient meta-philosophical characteristics. First it stresses the need for Africans – especially African philosophers – to become logically and rationally minded. Second, it calls for the decolonization of African philosophical thought and prescribes a model for doing so. These characteristics are interrelated in their conducing to his particular conception of the nature and purposes of philosophy. He defines philosophy as an open- and broad-minded quest into first principles – by which he means the most fundamental principles – which underlie human life (Wiredu 1980, 100). As such, philosophy is intuitively self-critical and open to plural perspectives on its subject matters. Additionally, Wiredu considers philosophy as a discipline that must necessarily exhibit an orientation in its application, and in Africa, this orientation ought to refer to the vital role M. O. Ajei (*) Department of Philosophy and Classics, University of Ghana, Legon, Accra, Ghana © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Agada (ed.), Ethnophilosophy and the Search for the Wellspring of African Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78897-1_10

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it can play in the much needed process of development (1980, 26). Such a concern primarily involves “the securing of such conditions as shall permit the self-realization of men as rational beings” (Wiredu 1980, 53), reforming and adapting traditional culture to modern life, and examining the intellectual foundations of our life to secure knowledge for human well-being. The importance of these objects of philosophy does not in any way override the importance of the manner of its pursuit, and the test of a sound philosophical account is that it provides a plausible judgement that, upon reflection, rational people would endorse. In thus defining the nature and functions of philosophy, Wiredu finds armour to inveigh against anthropologists who “fasten on our folk world views and elevate them to the status of a continental philosophy” (Wiredu 1980, 47). These anthropologists peddle “traditional worldviews” or “folk worldviews”, a category of thought which he sees in radical contrast to philosophy, conceived as the work of individual Africans using the intellectual resources of the modern world (1980, 36–37). In doing so, Wiredu appears to equate surreptitious attempts to pass off anthropological work as philosophy with a “nationalist approach”, presumably pursued by these anthropologically minded authors, as he considers these nationalists to be mainly concerned with espousing “traditional philosophies”, which he defines as the accumulated wisdom in the collective mind of our societies which has been handed down through verbal and ceremonial traditions (1980, 28). He, thus, establishes a strong correlation between nationalists, anthropological work, and traditional or folk philosophies and perceives these folk philosophies to generally consist of “what elders said or are said to have said” (1980, 28). In his view, a defining characteristic of such philosophies is that they are prescientific, in the sense of their being riddled with hasty generalizations and a penchant for unanalytical frame of mind ((1980, 29–30), as opposed to the variety of exact and rigorous continual dialectic of documented individual thought that standard philosophical practice yields (1980, 143). Although Wiredu doesn’t identify a particular author as a proponent of the nationalist approach, his identification of nationalism with traditional and folk views deserves comment, as it remains curious in the context of the evolutionary history of African philosophy. To my knowledge, the only other explicit use of the term as descriptive of a philosophical approach in the 1980s and 1990s comes from Odera Oruka, who identified the “nationalist/ideological” approach as one in his catalogue of four methodological orientations in African philosophy (Oruka 1990). Oruka’s “nationalist” philosophy converges and diverges with Wiredu’s view of it, as it offers compelling refutation of the idea that traditional thought systems are ineffectual for modern use. For Oruka, nationalist philosophy is characterized by Kwame Nkrumah’s Consciencism and Julius Nyerere’s Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism. Both are the work of individual thinkers reflecting on liberating African societies from conceptual and existential domination and articulating visions and strategies for doing so. It would be a stretch too far to consider either of these two works as devoid of critical analysis and rational enquiry. Both Nkrumah and Nyerere stressed the crucial role that traditional African normative values and social organizational principles should play in the pursuit of their strategies of liberation. But nowhere in either work would one find an espousal of tradition as constraining its bearers from

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theoretical alternatives to its prevailing principles and values and from debating the merits of alternatives to those prevailing principles and values. On the contrary, both Nkrumah and Nyerere considered African traditions as capable of inspiring the prudent selection, elaboration, and adaptation of the progressive elements of their modes of thought for application to contemporary life. Much later in his career, Wiredu echoes these perspectives of Nkrumah and Nyerere in his claim that aspects of traditional African philosophies are “fit to be resurrected” for contemporary life and that this imposes on the African philosopher the need for conceptual clarification and reconstruction as methods for identifying and appropriating valuable normative elements embedded in these philosophies for modern life (Wiredu 2004, 11). Although the foregoing reflections on Wiredu’s conception of philosophy would seem to suggest his disparagement of the intellectual foundations of traditional cultures, it would be uncharitable to Wiredu to attribute to him the claim that philosophy is absent from the traditional setting of Africa. He states explicitly that there exist “folk in traditional African societies who are not formally trained but capable of critical and original philosophical ideas” (Wiredu 1980, 37). The presence of such philosophical impulses is presupposed in what Kai Kresse has labelled Wiredu’s “programme of synthesis”, an agenda that Wiredu acknowledges as the abiding object of his philosophical career: [I]n Africa we [i.e. philosophers] have two important tasks facing us: first, to study our own philosophies and correct wrong interpretations, and second, to use everything that we can get from our own philosophies and combine that with what we can gain from the modern world… Such a synthesis is essential, if Africa is to thrive in this contemporary world. (quoted in Kresse 1996)

Wiredu advocates two complementary strategies for African philosophers for achieving this synthesis: first, critical self-awareness that guides the avoidance and reversal of unexamined assimilation of the conceptual frameworks embedded in foreign philosophical traditions and, additionally, the judicious exploitation of the resources of African indigenous conceptual schemes in the philosophical reflections (Wiredu 1996, 136). What is obvious from the foregone is that conceptual analysis is pivotal to Wiredu’s idea of philosophy and programme of synthesis. Traditional philosophical thought must not only be documented but also expounded and evaluated, and this latter task involves critically reflecting on and reconstructing those thought systems, as “no other way to philosophical progress is known than through criticism and adaptation” (Wiredu 1980, 20). Preliminary commentary on Wiredu’s perceptions of the nature and purpose of philosophy is appropriate at this juncture, as a prelude to discussing his relation to ethnophilosophy. Firstly, it is clear that Wiredu inclines toward the epistemological assumptions of logical positivism in his conception of the approach to philosophy (1980, 39, 161–162). The verification principle, upon which logical positivism rests, asserts that X is cognitively meaningful if and only if it is either analytic or empirically verifiable. What this means is that the criteria of truth and meaning are contingent on whether propositions are logically meaningful or not and whether or not they can be empirically verified. This becomes the basis of Wiredu’s

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determination of the criterion of truth and of distinguishing between traditional (or prescientific) and modern (i.e. scientific) thought (1980, 38–39). This hardly accords with the status he proclaims for traditional thought in his proclaimed programme of synthesis. Secondly, whereas Wiredu considers philosophy to be concerned with the investigation of first principles, Ayer, a principal proponent of logical positivism whose work Wiredu acknowledges as an influence on his own thinking, categorically denies this is a function of philosophy. For Ayer, first principles are the foundations of knowledge, yet all such foundations are to be found in the laws of nature, which can either be mere definitions or hypotheses liable to confutation by experience; hence, they cannot be first principles (Ayer 1952, 46). This variance has implications for Wiredu’s normative thought, as we shall see shortly. Thirdly, I share Ansell-Pearson’s concerns with whether Wiredu’s acceptance of logical positivism as a model of philosophy in the context of an African culture is a sound choice. Ansell-Pearson argues that the verification principle is burdened with inherent circularity, as it establishes and justifies itself as a criterion of truth and meaning while presupposing its own truthfulness and meaningfulness, and that such arbitrary and unexamined philosophical assumptions about the nature of knowing and truth are not dependable criteria for distinguishing meaningful propositions or statements (scientific ones) from meaningless ones (“prescientific” or metaphysical thought) (Ansell-Pearson 1987, 75–90, 85). Furthermore, Wiredu’s advocacy of logical positivism as an approach to a philosophy that can secure human well-being in contemporary Africa (Wiredu 1980, 62) conflicts with his normative work. The notion of human well-being necessarily implies justified belief in several concepts that are staple to normative theorizing, yet logical positivists consider every true sentence to be either a logical truth or a statement of fact. Substantive moral judgements do not fit either of these categories: they can neither be logical truths as such truths convey no more information than what is already contained in the definitions of their terms nor can they be statements of verifiable fact. In Language, Truth and Logic, Ayer rehabilitated Hume’s emotivist meta-ethics – exemplified by the claim that the employment of reason does not necessarily prefer the scratching of a person’s finger to the destruction of the whole world – and set forth a view of moral judgements as emotional expressions of one’s approval or disapproval of some action or person. On this view, although such judgements may convey prescriptive traits in their capacity to arouse similar feelings in others, they have no objective value as they refer to no objective state of affairs. Yet, a key characteristic of ethical claims is their objectivity, or trans-­ subjectivity. This logical positivists’ characterization with axiology is hardly consistent with Wiredu’s work, for several reasons. Firstly, Wiredu did extensive normative theorizing and was emphatic on the rational and substantive content of those theories. For him, moral judgements reflect an objective state of the world that requires humans to adopt a mindset of “sympathetic impartiality” as a resource in the process of adjusting their interests in moral deliberation (Wiredu 1996, 31–33). Thus, Wiredu rejected the strand of Hume’s meta-ethics upon which logical positivist emotivism rests: although he may have accepted Hume’s argument that reason alone cannot be the source of moral judgements because they are characterized by a

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natural inclination to action which reason is incapable of providing without some prior want or desire, Wiredu would roundly reject Hume’s judgement that because of this, one cannot assert that preferring that “actions do not derive their merit from a conformity to reason, nor their blame from a contrariety to it” (Hume 2017, 458), and so preferring “the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger”, is not contrary to reason. Secondly, he rejects Hume’s other meta-ethical impulse, by moving effortlessly from “is” to “ought”. This is displayed in his basing on an objective state of being human – on an ontology that renders the human being to be that being who is “in need” by nature. Additionally, palpable tension is discernible between Wiredu’s statements of the nature and functions of philosophy. He seems to suggest that human well-being necessarily require rational belief, yet there could be times when the best knowledge and reflection for securing human well-being may stem from non-rational, or even superstitious, belief. Decisions and attachments to love and religion offer obvious examples of such. Finally, Wiredu’s conceptions of tradition and modernity are likewise saddled with unresolved friction. According to him, post-colonial African societies cannot but welcome the march toward modernization (Wiredu 1980, x); and he perceives an intense kind of humanism in the foundations of the ethics of traditional cultures that he encourages African societies to nurture in policies, as doing so would be one dependable route to realizing the well-being of their citizens (1980, 6). Yet he perceives, inversely, inherent flaws in African traditions that can ruin, or at least retard, the process of modernization, anachronism, authoritarianism, and supernaturalism, and a pervasive anachronism which afflicts the development of the traditional society from which he hails is the unanalytical and unscientific attitude of mind (Wiredu 1980, 1–5). These tensions between Wiredu’s understanding of philosophy and its utility for contemporary African life have significance for his attitude towards the term ethnophilosophy. I turn to the genesis and evolution of this term in the next section as a prelude to clarifying Wiredu’s attitude to it.

2  “ Ethnophilosophy”: Nkrumah’s Meta-philosophical Gauntlet Spawns A Muddle Contrary to Barry Hallen’s claims that the term “ethnophilosophy” was first introduced to philosophy by Paulin Hountondji (Hallen 2010, 74), its genesis in philosophical vocabulary is in Kwame Nkrumah’s uncompleted1 thesis entitled Mind and Thought in Primitive Society: A Study in Ethno-philosophy, which was intended for 1  Professor Hountondji, in an email correspondence with me dated 22 August 2010, opined that the thesis is not well described as “uncompleted” because “it seems to be quite complete as it is”. Although this is a fair judgement of the state of the work, I maintain the description as uncompleted for the reason that in his autobiography, Nkrumah confirms going to England with the aim of “completing his thesis in ethno-philosophy”. He does not indicate anywhere else in his writings that the work was actually completed. Therefore I consider it is safer to describe it as “uncompleted”.

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partial fulfilment of the award of a PhD degree at the University of Pennsylvania.2 To the best of my knowledge, Wiredu never used the term in his writings. I am convinced the absence of his heed to the term is related to his understanding of “African philosophy” as a culturally determined specification of philosophy comprising both oral and written traditions of speculative and analytical thought (Wiredu 1995, 17–18), a specification that accords with his project of synthesis. The route to this understanding, and its current prevalence in the African philosophical community, is dotted with considerable debate that began in earnest with Hountondji’s article “African Wisdom and Modern Philosophy”, which was presented in a colloquium in Copenhagen in 1967 (Hountondji 2002, 81–84). Several participants in this debate unequivocally concluded that ethnophilosophers engage in something other than the practice of “philosophy” since their work disregards the kind of enquiry that characterizes philosophy. What is striking about this conclusion is that most of its proponents advanced it without reference to the origins of the concept. However, Hountondji, whose insistent opposition to it has earned him the distinction of authoring “the bible of anti-ethno-philosophy” (Mudimbe 1985, 149–233, 199), has engaged with the genesis of term and continued to carry “the bible” by accepting the linkage with his philosophical reputation with “the critique of ethnophilosophy” (Hountondji 2002, xvii). The remainder of this section assesses Hountondji’s criticism of Nkrumah’s meaning of “ethnophilosophy” with a view to grounding in its outcome the suggestion that even though Wiredu must have been acquainted with Nkrumah’s thesis, he chose to avoid Hountondji’s interpretation of the term as that interpretation is at odds with the components of his “programme of synthesis”, which components are consistent with Nkrumah’s meaning of ethnophilosophy. To place Hountondji’s criticism in context, let us note what Nkrumah conceives the aim of his thesis to be. He states that the work aims to: Postulate a synthetic ethno-philosophy by which problems of anthropology will not only concern themselves with the reconstruction of human history, the determination of types of historical phenomena and their sequences, or the dynamics of change so as to arrive at a basic Weltanschauung, by which mankind may realize that even though race, language and culture may be separate and distinct entities yet they are one in the sense that there is but one race: The Homo Sapiens. (Nkrumah 1945, vi-vii)

The thesis seeks to elucidate a concept of mind that is held in Akan culture and is primarily expository. But melded in the exposition are two implicit meta-­ philosophical postures. First is the task of critically deconstructing notions of the 2  Henceforth, I will refer this work as “the thesis” and date it to 1945. The most probable period for authoring this work is between 1943 and 1945. As narrated in his Autobiography, Nkrumah “began to prepare himself for the Doctorate of Philosophy examinations” at the University of Pennsylvania in 1943 (Nkrumah 2002, 31–33). It is safe to suppose, from this, that work on the thesis continued until 1945 when he departed the USA for England intending to study law and “completing his thesis for a doctorate in philosophy”. However, “as soon as he arrived in London [he]…. abandoned the research work that I had been doing in ethno-philosophy, which was the subject of my original thesis, and decided to work on another thesis on what was then a new theory of knowledge, ‘Logical Positivism’”, under Professor A. J. Ayer (2002, 51).

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“primitive” mind of the African and its cognates by showing that “essentially, man is not primitive until he is made ‘primitive’ by man” (Nkrumah 1945, 159). Additionally, the thesis calls for joining anthropology and philosophy, for the purpose of achieving a more synthetic perception of the facts and data of ethnology “and reaffirms the fundamental identity of the constitution of the psychic processes of the so-called ‘civilized’ individual and the so-called ‘primitive’ individual, the latter being always already a fully rational human being, and the former, sometimes, a primitive who does not recognize himself as such” (Hountondji 1997, 115–116). Hountondji admits to formulating much of his objections to ethnophilosophy before acquainting himself with Nkrumah’s thesis. In spite of this and of his willingness to credit the thesis with better “coherence and conceptual solidity” (1997, 117) than other works which he characterizes as ethnophilosophical, he considers those objections as applicable to the thesis since the thesis does not resolve the “troubling problems” (1997, ibid.) that inspired his objections to ethnophilosophy in the first place. This, then, brings to the fore the question of what is it for Hountondji for a work to be philosophical and what ethnophilosophical and why Nkrumah’s thesis falls into the latter category even though its author meant it to be a work of philosophy. Philosophy, according to Hountondji, is a scientific practice, in the sense of it being a recorded, systematized, and integrated form of knowledge (Hountondji 1983, 99–101). This practice recognizes “internal diversity and pluralism” of thought within a culture and therewith promoting internal debate within that culture (Hountondji 2000, 1–2, 9). Proceeding from this, he defines African philosophy as “written works intended as philosophical by Africans writing in a field that is conventionally acknowledged as that of philosophy” (Hountondji 2002, 97) and sought to clarify his criteria for distinguishing philosophy from ethnophilosophy in a number of publications.3 These works collectively yield the view that ethnophilosophy refers to a type of discourse commonly considered philosophical but which in fact belongs to ethnology (Hountondji 1997, 112). Hountondji identifies several correlated characteristics as criteria for ethnophilosophical work. Discussion of two of these will suffice for our purposes. The first is that it is a specialty of ethnology, a branch of the ethnosciences, a term to which he assigns two distinct meanings. First, ethnoscience refers to “an inventory of preexisting knowledge” and, second, to “the application of a given science to the study of a particular aspect of so-called ‘primitive’ culture” (1997, 113–114). In the sense of ethnophilosophy being an exemplar of ethnology, it offers simplistic reduction of descriptions of the belief and value systems of primitive cultures as “philosophical”

3  Those that I am acquainted with are The Struggle for Meaning; (2) “From Ethnosciences to Ethno-philosophy: Kwame Nkrumah’s Thesis Project”; (3) “Tradition, Hindrance or Inspiration”; (4) “The Particular and the Universal”; and (5) African Philosophy: Myth and Reality. Besides these, Hountondji also mentions as elements of his criticism of ethnophilosophy an “article written in 1969, which appeared in Diogenes in 1970, and which was to constitute the first chapter of African Philosophy: Myth and Reality”, in “The Particular and the Universal”, and a lecture presented to the Sorbonne on 23 May 1987 and mentioned at page 113 in “From Ethnosciences to Ethno-philosophy”.

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(Hountondji 1997, 113). In the other sense of it being an ethnoscience, ethnophilosophy is tasked with applying philosophical theories and methods to these cultures (Hountondji 1997, 113) and therewith displays an inherent ambiguity that spawns principal questions about the source of this supposed “philosophical” knowledge, and whose interests it serves, which the propagators of ethnophilosophy are unable or unwilling to answer satisfactorily (1997, 113). Another distinguishing feature of ethnophilosophy, according to Hountondji, is that its practitioners advocate the existence of a “collective system of thought, common to all Africans, or at least to all members severally, past, present and future, of such-and-such an African ethnic group” (Hountondji 1983, 55–56). As such, its adherents propagate the “myth of unanimism” and the “myth of consensus” (Hountondji 1995, 174), which are antithetical to the nature of philosophy. This is because these myths serve to reify plural tensions and neutralize dialectical contradictions internal to the intellectual heritage of cultures. Yet, as established, such pluralism and its attendant dialectical practice are a hallmark of philosophy (1997, 117). The two myths thus facilitate a “total silence surrounding the possibility of a living philosophy, of a plural philosophy in the societies appropriated by the ethnologist” (1997, 116). In this way, the ethnophilosopher pursues a “strategy of exclusion” by assuming the role of “spokesperson whose task it was to reveal the treasures of his own culture to the external world” (1997, 117). The cumulative outcome of these reflections is Hountondji consigning Nkrumah’s thesis to a work of anthropology that masquerades as a “form of African philosophy” (1997, 117). Hountondji’s characterizations accord with those of Peter Bodunrin, who uses the term ethnophilosophy and considers folklore, myths, religious beliefs and practices, and cultural practices as characterizing it. This he differentiates from philosophy, which is characterized by the thought of individuals (Bodunrin 1991, 169).

3  V  ariegated Conceptions and “Ethnophilosophic” Impulses in Wiredu’s Programme of Synthesis The brief exposition of aspects of Nkrumah’s thesis in Section 2 offers some indication of why Hountondji’s consignment of the thesis to his understanding of ethnophilosophy is implausible. This section and the next flesh out this indication and point to reasons why Wiredu abstained from using the term. Nkrumah and Hountondji certainly conceive philosophy differently. For Nkrumah, philosophy serves to “seek and unravel the deepest and basic meanings underlying human life, thought and activities” (Nkrumah 1945, iv). In pursuit of such meanings, his thesis sought to “find justification for the presupposition that the mind of primitive man may be equated with that of civilized man” (1945, 1) and thereby demonstrate the fundamental identity of the human race. Ethnophilosophy, for him, was a vehicle for achieving this purpose, and by it, Nkrumah “means the philosophical consideration, analysis and interpretation of those ethno-metaphysical problems which have to do

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with the analysis of the basic concepts and presuppositions of ethnological and anthropological data” (1945, 8). Unlike Hountondji’s conception of it, this understanding of ethnophilosophy differs from ethnology, as it considers ethnology to answer the “whats” and “hows” of culture”, whereas ethnophilosophy endeavours to answer the “whys” of culture” (ibid.). This provides adequate grounds to interpret Nkrumah to mean that ethnophilosophy examines the essence and meaning of the intellectual products of human societies and their cultural traditions and as such corresponds to the philosophy of anthropology. The second-order nature of this practice, for Nkrumah, is reflected in its foundational concerns: “to grasp the full meaning of the significance of the culture of any people, we [ethnophilosophers] must study the basic philosophy that underlies, generates and gives it impetus” (1945, 158). On Nkrumah’s view, ethnophilosophy is not a specialization of anthropology for two reasons. First, his definition of the term implies that its subject matter are the descriptive methodology and conclusions of anthropology. And a subject matter cannot itself define the principles and methods that are employed to investigate it. Thus, Nkrumah depicts the descriptive methods of anthropology as unsuitable for the purposes of his thesis. Additionally, Nkrumah’s intention to surpass the premises and conclusions of anthropology and enquire into “the basic and fundamental meanings underlying all cultures” suggests that he is aware of the second-order nature of the work he is undertaking in his thesis. Thus, the validity of Hountondji’s conclusions on the philosophical character of Nkrumah’s thesis dissipates in the light of Nkrumah’s own substantive definition of ethnophilosophy and his conception of the nature and purposes of philosophy. Additionally, it is difficult to locate Hountondji’s two myths in Nkrumah’s thesis. Nkrumah does not state or imply anywhere in his work that he is elaborating notions that are universally held by Akans. What can be legitimately attributed to the work is emphasis on a particular perspective of mind which he claims belongs to Akan culture. Several African philosophers, reflecting on collectively held ideas, point out that one cannot reasonably deny the existence of some body of shared conceptions of a philosophical nature among members of a cultural unit (Owomoyela 1995, 245). Such shared conceptions may be vital for their identity, as it may constitute “the intellectual sheet anchor of their life in its totality” (Gyekye 1995, 9). In tandem with this, some scholars have argued the soundness and philosophical justifiability of the idea of collective moral responsibility and agency, for instance, and outlined sufficient conditions for such (Petit 2007, 175). Foremost African justifications of such responsibility are premised on theories of personhood, with an embedded moral vision that “prescribes a regulative ideal that is normatively relational” (Okeja 2017, 258), by virtue of its imposition of an “imperative to care about the humanity of other human beings” (2017, 259). In my view, such shared conceptions need not imply in any way that all members of that society uphold that particular view, as Gyekye has sufficiently argued (Gyekye 1995, 24, 29); and we will see later in this section that Wiredu shared this perspective on collectively held philosophical ideas. On account of this, Nkrumah’s claim that a particular concept of mind is an Akan concept in no way implies a claim of universal subscription by all Akans to it.

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It is a claim, simply, that that concept of mind has numerous advocates in Akan culture. This in no way implies the fallacy of composition that Hountondji’s “myth of unanimity” and “myth of consensus” imply. From the preceding analysis, one can hazard to conjecture why Wiredu didn’t use the term even though the period of the bulk of his writing coincides with Hountondji and Bodunrin’s. Such speculation should not be taken as explaining why Wiredu is against using the term. I am inclined to thinking that he steers clear of the word because its common usage violates the exclusive disjunction he poses between philosophy and non-philosophy, in which the laws of excluded middle and identity are fully observed. As seen, Wiredu was not averse to Hountondji and Bodunrin’s description of ethnophilosophy as non-philosophy: he also rejects the ethnological encroachment on the domain of philosophy and any subversion of what he considered the crucial function of philosophy. But it is reasonable to suppose that he had reservations with the “ethno” in Hountondji’s characterization of ethnophilosophy. Wiredu accepts that philosophical terms stand for things that occur, by which I mean that they have reference – something they refer to or denote. Therefore, “ethnophilosophy” denotes X. This means that there is something that a thought is like for it to be “ethnophilosophy”. And that which it is like to be ethnophilosophy, according to Hountondji and Bodunrin, is the negation of philosophy – a not-philosophy. One can say that this in itself does not constitute a successful objection to the use of the term: one can say, for instance, that no inconsistency is incurred in holding that philosophy of science is not science, because one can explain why one says it is unlike science. From logical analysis and philosophy of language, the term negative existentials such as “the king of Ghana” or “the golden mountain” emerged to indicate propositions which are meaningful but have no denotation (Cartwright 1960, 629–630; Clapp et al. 2019, 205). On this reasoning, one may say that Hountondji and others may have used the term ethnophilosophy to denote an approach to philosophy that is not philosophy but which others deem as philosophy and that there is nothing wrong with their having done so. This perspective cannot be cast aside cavalierly. A substantial body of Wiredu’s work accepts that one can engage in abstraction without necessarily having a definite object that it picks out its description in the world – that descriptions don’t necessarily have to refer to an object (Wiredu 2011, 21–22). But there is good reason to suppose that he abstains from using the term because of its etymology  – precisely the meaning assigned to it at its genesis – which implies that reflective analysis is germane to the notion of ethnophilosophy. In my view, therefore, Wiredu’s avoidance of the term is likely to stem from his perception that the term cannot at once denote a kind of philosophy and a not-philosophy and that even though it is a misnomer to characterize work that is devoid of critical reflection, which is the touchstone of philosophical thinking, as a kind of philosophy, one cannot identify Nkrumah’s thesis as a specimen of such work. African philosophical concerns with “ethnophilosophy” have to do primarily with distinguishing between empirical – if sometimes qualitative – work (anthropology) and analytical-normative work. I do acknowledge that at some level, this qualitative-empirical distinction from the analytical-normative may be a

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hair-splitting, as qualitative investigations can provide such discursive and in-depth examination of underlying assumptions and motivations for cultural practices, as to be commendably analytical.4 Conversely, normative claims may be derived from the empirical, as argued in Sect. 1 of this chapter. That the empirical-normative categories may dovetail into each other is well supported by Oruka’s approach to researching sage philosophy, which deploys the analytical tools of technical philosophy to lay bare philosophical capability among traditional African thinkers. The point I strive for, however, is that if the concern is that African philosophy should avoid elevating to philosophy descriptions of empirically observed practices or the pitfalls of shoddy philosophical analysis, then Nkrumah’s thesis can hardly be judged to be in the category Hountondji places it, as the rigour of his documentation and reflection on traditional thought and practices in his thesis dovetails the line between the normative and qualitative-empirical investigation. It is doubtful that Wiredu’s programme of synthesis sets up an unbreachable threshold between these categories. His work illustrates how empirical feeders can enrich analytical-normative work. As noted in Sect. 1, his normative theorizing tends to proceed partly from the assumption that collectively cherished social and moral value judgements reflect an accessible state of the objective world that requires humans to have “sympathetic impartiality” for the adjustment of their interests in moral deliberation and that this idea of systematically adjusting personal interests proceeds from a preexisting ontology of the person. Thus, one can hardly disconnect the wealth of Wiredu’s normative thought and its analytical guide for theory from collectively determined imperatives of care and moral obligations, and this places into question Hountondji’s description of such collectively determined imperatives as myths. Much of Wiredu’s substantive work, and the programme of synthesis that he proclaims as its over-arching goal, bears clear resemblance to Nkrumah’s statement of another purpose of ethnophilosophy, that of “promotion of intertribal, inter-racial understanding and confidence – the building of international mind, spiritual unity and true cooperation” (Nkrumah 1945, 10–11), thereby facilitating intercultural dialogue and understanding, international cooperation, and harmonious coexistence (ibid.). This goal, in Nkrumah’s view, can be achieved because the mind and its processes are “a socio-historical phenomenon existent in and subject to the influences of its epoch” (1945, 7): culture determines the specific contents of our mind and consciousness, and all human beings handle the same materials transmitted to them by culture. This establishes Nkrumah’s universalist methodological approach to philosophical practice. His central thesis that ethnophilosophy can disclose a universal feature of mind and its processes is another way of stating that his notion of ethnophilosophy goes beyond anthropological descriptions and taxonomy of cultures to demonstrate the universalist features of human nature and culture. Wiredu’s project of synthesis invites African philosophers to turn their critical reflection on indigenous thought with a view to making their specific philosophical

 I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer of this work for bringing this point to light.

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traditions visible and understandable and examining how these traditions can contribute to shaping the future of humanity. Thus, intercultural philosophical deliberation is a goal of Wiredu’s programme of synthesis; and this goal is contingent on the universal ability of humans to learn and use the rules of language (Wiredu 1996, 25). This ability to formulate rules of thought and its correlate the ability to communicate norms of thought are “necessary conditions for the very possibility of a human community” (1996, 34), and it is this that underlies the objectivity of, and motivation for accepting, moral rules (1996, 31).

4  Conclusions I have argued that Hountondji’s conception of ethnophilosophy ignores the meaning assigned to the term at its genesis in African philosophy and that his objections to this initial understanding of the term are unsound. The teleology of Wiredu’s project of synthesis – that elements of indigenous and exogenous culture must be blended with the goal of appropriating from exogenous cultural elements that African culture have either not given adequate thought to or have not succeeded to give thought to all,  e.g.,  the formalization of logical reasoning  - is  to improve the quality of African thought and life. This is consistent with Nkrumah’s notion of ethnophilosophy. A point of departure for this synthesis would be excavating and explicating problems, concepts, and themes in indigenous thought systems and critically commenting on them. It is through this process that not only the synthesis Wiredu seeks but also his goal of conceptual decolonization would be carried out. Some of this work of interpretation may be overly charitable and have low analytic content – perhaps not very persuasive philosophy; but one can hardly say they are “not-philosophy”. Wiredu subscribes to the view of philosophy as essentially a cultural phenomenon (Wiredu 1980, 26–27). Were this not the case he would accept, as Hallen has pointed out, that “every manifestation of even academic philosophy, wherever it occurs, might be said to represent a form of ethnophilosophy” in Hountondji’s sense (Hallen 2010, 83). Yet Wiredu admits that language and ideas are cultural universals; hence culturally generated “views” of philosophy – a culture’s ethnophilosophy, as Nkrumah sees it – should be regarded as a participant in the category of a cultural universal. It would be worthwhile for African philosophers to consider identifying the term “ethnophilosophy” with the philosophy of anthropology. I have argued that this was Wiredu’s inclination, most likely because he noticed the relevance of the insights and inspiration that the thesis provides for African philosophers who opt to work on reconstructing traditional African philosophy, for his programme of synthesis. This was good reason for him to avoid using the term ethnophilosophy and the connotations Hountondji and others assigned to it. Nkrumah has received much credit for his philosophy of liberation and statesmanship. Rehabilitating “ethnophilosophy” to accord with his meaning of it is another credit that he deserves.

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References Ansell-Pearson, Keith J. 1987. The question of African philosophy and Kwasi Wiredu’s Philosophy and an African culture. Journal of Humanities 1: 75–90. Ayer, Alfred J. 1952. Language, truth and logic. New York: Dover Publications Inc. Bodunrin, Peter O. 1991. The question of African philosophy. In Sage Philosophy: Indigenous thinkers and modern debates on African philosophy, ed. H.O.  Oruka, 163–180. Leiden: E.J. Brill. Cartwright, Richard L. 1960. Negative existentials. The Journal of Philosophy 57 (20/21): 629–639. Clapp, Lenny, Marga Reimer, and Anne Spire. 2019. Negative existentials. In The Oxford handbook of reference, ed. J.  Gundel and B.  Abbott, 204–245. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfor dhb/9780199687305.013.11. Gyekye, Kwame. 1995. An essay on African philosophical thought: The Akan conceptual scheme. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Hallen, Barry. 2010. “Ethnophilosophy” redefined? Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya 2 (1): 73–85. Hountondji, Paulin J. 1983. African philosophy: Myth and reality. Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. ———. 1995. The particular and the universal. In African philosophy: Selected readings, ed. A.G. Mosley, 172–198. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. ———. 1997. From ethnosciences to ethno-philosophy: Kwame Nkrumah’s thesis project. Research in African Literatures 28 (4): 112–120. ———. 2000. Tradition, hindrance or inspiration. QUEST: An African Journal of Philosophy XIV (1–2): 5–11. ———. 2002. The struggle for meaning: Reflections of philosophy, culture and democracy in Africa. Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies. Hume, D. 2017. A treatise of human nature: A critical edition, ed. D. F. Norton and M. J. Norton. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Kresse, Kai. 1996. Decolonization, multilingualism, and African languages in the making of African philosophy: Kwasi Wiredu in dialogue with Kai Kresse. https://them.polylog.org/2/ dwk-­en.htm. Mudimbe, Valentine Y. 1985. African Gnosis. The African Studies Review 28 (2–3): 149–233. Nkrumah, Kwame. 1945. Mind and Thought in primitive Society: A Study in Ethno-philosophy. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Pennsylvania. ———. 2002. Ghana: The autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah. London: Panaf Books. Okeja, Uchenna. 2017. Evaluating societies morally: The case of development and ‘developing’ societies, Analyse & Kritik. 39 (2): 241–263. Oruka, Henry O. 1990. Trends in contemporary African philosophy. Nairobi: Shirikon Publishers. Owomoyela, Oyekan. 1995. Africa and the imperative of philosophy: A skeptical consideration. In African philosophy: Selected readings, ed. A. Mosley, 236–262. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. Petit, Philip. 2007. Responsibility incorporated. Ethics 117: 171–201. Wiredu, Kwasi. 1980. Philosophy and an African culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 1995. African philosophy. In The Oxford companion to philosophy, ed. T.  Honderich, 17–18. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 1996. Cultural universals and particulars: An African perspective. Bloomington/ Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. ———. 2004. Introduction: African philosophy in our time. In A companion to African philosophy, ed. K. Wiredu, 1–28. Malden: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. ———. 2011. Empiricalism: The empirical character of an African philosophy. In Identity meets nationality: Voices from the humanities, eds. H.  Lauer et. al., 18–34. Accra: Sub-Saharan Publishers.

Part III

Ethnophilosophy, System-Building, and Contemporary Expansion of Thought

African Ethno-Ethics and Bioethical Principlism: Implication for the Othered Patient Elvis Imafidon

Abstract  This chapter affirms the importance of the ethno in African moral discourse with particular reference to bioethical discourse. It begins by showing that the deductions of moral theories  – normative, meta or applied  – from African thought are made possible through a deliberate and careful understanding of the ethno-ethics of African peoples often revolving around the concept of relationality or Ubuntu. It instantiates this by showing that the primary contribution of African bioethicists to the predominantly Western notion of principlism and its four cardinal principles of respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice is the principle of relationality which is extrapolated from African ethno-moral culture. If this is the case, the chapter asserts further that the understanding of who the othered patients are in an African bioethical context and how the principlist principle of relationality may be beneficial or harmful to them is only possible within the context of the ethno of personhood in African cultures. The chapter concludes by highlighting some practical ways healthcare providers can take the ethno and context more seriously in order to improve the quality of healthcare delivery to patients. Keywords  Ethno · African · Bioethics · Relationality · Principlism · Personhood · Othered patients

1  Introduction In recent times, philosophy is practised, and the act of philosophising is engaged in, as if, and because, place matters (cf. Janz 2004). There is an ongoing and increasing interest in comparative and dialogical world philosophies as against, and as a reaction to, the hegemonic and supremacist claim of philosophy by the West. The context and place situatedness of philosophy is necessitated partly by recent recognition E. Imafidon (*) Department of Religions and Philosophies, School of History, Religions and Philosophies, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, London, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Agada (ed.), Ethnophilosophy and the Search for the Wellspring of African Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78897-1_11

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and realisation that philosophy in general, or specific concerns in philosophy in particular such as epistemological, moral, ontological, aesthetic and feminist concerns, cannot be understood and fully appreciated solely from the philosophical lenses of the West but through a deliberate and concerted effort to unveil and appreciate the cultural, racial, geographical, ideological and placial determinants of these concerns. To be sure, even Western philosophy that enjoyed a strong supremacist hold on philosophy for a long time is a product of the deliberate articulation and projection of culture, place and race of the self over the other. Therefore, to avoid the poverty of philosophical knowledge, the importance of place and context cannot be overemphasised. As Elvis Imafidon (2019, 25) puts it: Philosophierensehr stark charakterisiertistdurchDifferenzen; Differenzen, die von spezifischenKontexten und Diskursortenherreichen. Das Rohmaterial, oder die Zutaten, mitdenenPhilosoph/innenringen, und der Stil, der Ansatz und die Methode, die sieanwenden, um dies zutun, sind oft bestimmtdurch die Orte, an denensiewohnen, Ortesowo­hlimgeogra phischenalsauchtheoretischen Sinn. Die ArbeiteinesPhilosophenkann in der Regel am bestenverstanden und gewürdigtwerden, wenn man zuallererst den physischen Ort und die Ereignisse, die an diesem Ort zu seiner Lebenszeitdortgeschehen, sowie die vorherrschendenphilosophischenTraditionen seiner Zeit, mitdenenerimEinklangstehtoder von ­denenersichabtrennt, versteht. JederVersuch, die ArbeiteinesPhilosophenaußerhalb dieses geographischen und theoretischenKontextszu verstehen, machtesschwierig, die Arbeitangemessenzuwürdigen, und istmöglicherweiseauchschwierigzubewerkstelligen. (… philosophising is densely characterised by difference, differences ensuing from specific contexts and spaces of discourse. The raw materials or ingredients as it were that philosophers grapple with and the style, approach and methods that they employ in doing so are often determined by the space in which they dwell, spaces that are both geographical and theoretical. A philosopher’s work can often best be understood and appreciated by first of all, understanding the physical space and events within that space happening within his time and age as well as the dominant philosophical tradition in his time that he aligns with or breaks from. Any attempt to understand a philosopher’s work outside of these geographical and theoretical contexts makes it difficult to appreciate such work and may in fact be difficult to do.)1

Emphasising the importance of place in philosophical discourse does not in any way undermine the very essence of philosophy or what makes any discourse from a Western, African, Eastern or other place philosophical, for although ‘a philosopher’s philosophising is one of many forms philosophising determined by the context from which she philosophises from,… her philosophising remains philosophical because it has the very essence of philosophy which [includes]… rigorous criticism and formulation of new concepts’ (Imafidon 2019a, b, 19). Thus, the ethno has found its way into philosophical discourse because researchers in philosophy are more than ever aware of the importance of the place of culture, context and race in understanding the various aspects of philosophical concerns. A case in mind is the ethnophilosophy trend in African philosophy. Although there is a protracted debate in African philosophy on the extent and degree to which the ethno is relevant for African philosophy, its actual relevance is hardly in question  Translation is mine.

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(see Imafidon et al. 2019). Therefore, I begin in the first section of this chapter by showing the importance of African ethos and ethno-ethics as wellspring for the theorising of African moral philosophy. In the second section, I show further that the primary contribution of African bioethicists to the predominantly Western notion of principlism and its four cardinal principles of respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice is the principle of relationality which is extrapolated from African ethno-moral culture. In the third section, I explore the concept of othered patients in an African bioethical context and show how the principlist principle of relationality may be beneficial or harmful to them through an understanding of the cultural concept of personhood in African cultures. The chapter concludes by highlighting some practical ways healthcare providers can take the ethno and context more seriously in order to improve the quality of healthcare delivery to patients.

2  The Ethno as the Wellspring of African Moral Theory Perhaps, it may be best to begin by making clear the sense in which I use African moral philosophy. By African moral philosophy, I mean the attempt by academic (African) philosophers to construct normative moral theories and to analyse moral concepts and terms, through a deliberate reflection on, examination of, and a comprehensive understanding of African moral or ethical culture. It also includes employing and applying the constructed moral theories and the understanding of moral concepts and terms in an African context in the resolution of moral dilemmas and issues as we see, for example, in African bioethics (e.g. Tangwa 2010; Murove 2005; Metz 2010a), African environmental ethics (Behrens 2013, 2014; Chemhuru 2014), African business ethics (Taylor 2014) and African land distribution ethics (Masitera 2020). By African moral or ethical culture, I mean what is customarily permissible or impermissible, good or bad, right or wrong and the reasons provided for such in African traditions. It consists of what has become the characteristic feature, the ethno and ethos of the good in African cultures. African moral culture can thus be described aptly as African ethno-ethics, and my goal in this section is to show that it has for long been the wellspring and raw material for African moral philosophy. The distinction I draw between African moral philosophy (or African ethics) and African ethno-ethics (or African moral culture) is aptly captured by Thaddeus Metz (2007, 321) when he writes that: In the literature on African ethics, one finds relatively little that consists of normative theorisation with regard to right action, that is, the articulation and justification of a comprehensive, basic norm that is intended to account for what all permissible acts have in common as distinct from impermissible ones… The field lacks a well-defended general principle grounding particular duties that is informed by such values… one more often finds something that is closer to moral anthropology or [ethical] cultural studies, i.e., discussion recounting the ethical practices or norms of a certain African people.

Thirteen years after Metz made these claims, one can say with much certainty that there is much more now than a little in the area of African moral philosophy partly because he (Metz) urged many African philosophers through his writings in African

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moral philosophy (e.g. 2007, 2010b, 2013) to go beyond African ethno-ethics to African moral philosophy and see the former mainly as a resource for the latter. Hence, in the literature now available in African moral philosophy, it is difficult to see it discussed independent of African moral culture. African ethno-ethics provides a rich resource for theorisation, articulation and conceptualisation in African moral philosophy. Consider, for example, African communitarian ethics, also called Ubuntu, which has been articulated and defended extensively by African philosophers and ethicists as the holy grail of African moral philosophy. Thus, it is perhaps most fitting to describe normative ethics or moral theory in African traditions as communitarian owing to the emphasis that African communities place on togetherness, solidarity, communalistic behaviour and cooperation. The African way of speaking about morality in African communities reflects intensely a co-dependency ethos since its primary focus is communal well-being (Imafidon 2014). John Mbiti’s (1969, 108–109) is famous for aptly capturing the co-dependency ethos in African communities when he says that ‘only in terms of other people does the individual become conscious of his own being, his own duties, his privileges and responsibilities towards himself and towards other people… The individual can only say: “I am, because we are; and since we are, therefore I am”.’ Metz (2007, 334) succinctly captures the African moral theory discernible from its communitarian ethno-ethics in the proposition: ‘An action is right just insofar as it produces harmony and reduces discord; an act is wrong to the extent that it fails to develop community’. Thus, ‘harmony, friendliness, community’, Desmond Tutu says, ‘are great goods’, adding that ‘social harmony is for us the summum bonum– the greatest good. Anything that subverts or undermines this sought-after good is to be avoided like the plague. Anger, resentment, lust for revenge, even success through aggressive competitiveness, are corrosive of this good’ (1999, 35). In articulating and defending African moral theory as communitarian, African philosophers and ethicists have thus depended largely on African moral culture or ethno-ethics, drawing resources from maxims, proverbs, adages, lived experiences, storytelling and community systemic structuring and organisation. We find these glaringly in several of the major works in African ethics such as Bujo (2003), Wiredu (1992), Gyekye (1996) and Bewaji (2004), to mention but a few. John A. I. Bewaji, for example, argues for African communitarian ethics by drawing from the Yoruba understanding of the person in relation to the family. As a social self, the individual represents not only herself but also her family and must be careful not to bring disgrace to her kin. In Bewaji’s words, ‘one is expected, even as one pursues one’s own goals, to be careful not to tarnish any tradition of excellence in conduct established by one’s lineage’ (2004, 396). Benezet Bujo (2003, 115) relies on maxims, adages and stories in African communities to emphasise how individual actions affect communal well-being, For example, he explains that an adage in Burundi says that ‘if one member of the family has eaten dog meat, all the members of the clan is disgraced. To eat the flesh of a dog is utterly disgraceful for a Burundi; one who does so should not think that he alone can bear responsibility as an individual for this deed, since all the members of his family and clan are involved. The wicked or erroneous conduct of one single

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member infringes the personal dignity of all of them, for [and here is a second adage] “when the eyes weep, it makes the nose weep too”.’ Using more adages, Bujo (2003, 115–116) further explains the effect of individual actions on the highly cherished solidarity and togetherness in African communities: Solidarity makes itself known in good things and in bad, but with different consequences; solidarity in good things is required if one is to become a person, whereas solidarity in bad things is harmful. But not only solidarity in bad things kills the whole community; a lack of solidarity has the same effect. As the Baganda say, “a lazy person kills the whole community.” The underlying ethical concept concerns the existential dynamism that operates only in reciprocity… Each one who commits himself to act in solidarity for the construction of the community allows himself to be brought to completion by this same community… [as] the Bashi in Congo Kinshasa say: “two ants are able to carry a locust,’ and ‘one bone cannot put up any resistance to two dogs.”

In response to the usual critical point raised against African communitarian ethics as to whether the individual blindly follows the group, having no say of her own or not being rationally convinced that she ought to follow the group, Bujo (2003, 118) uses a story to clearly assert that the individual maintains her individuality even within the communitarian and solidaristic ethical framework: … one fairy tale concerns a leopard and a very cunning little animal called Mbepele who were good friends and lived together in fellowship. All that they did was done in fellowship and in harmony. One day, however, Mbepele tricked the leopard by suggesting that they should each kill their respective mothers, since these obviously were useless. The mothers were to be thrown into a river. Both set off; each had to carry his mother on his head to the river and then throw her in. but Mbepele hid his mother. He wrapped a wooden mortar in a garment that he had smeared with red pigment, and when he threw the mortar into the water, the colour resembled blood – proof that he had actually killed his mother. The leopard was convinced and killed his mother… until the day came when he realised that his friend had deceived him. Then the leopard went in secret to Mbepele’s mother and killed her, and from that day on, they two friends were enemies… The message of the fairy tale undoubtedly concerns the problem of the individual and the group since it shows that the individual may not blindly follow the group.

In articulating and defending the humanistic nature of African moral philosophy as primarily concerned with human welfare, Kwasi Wiredu (1992, 194) also depends largely on the moral culture of the Akan people of Ghana as expressed in adages, maxims and lived experiences. He argues regarding Akan humanism, for example, that all values derive from human interests and that human fellowship are the most important of all human needs. He draws inspiration from the Akan maxim, Onipa ne asem: mefre sika a, sika nnye so; mefrentama a, ntamanmye so; onipa ne asem, which means a person may have all the gold and stocked wardrobe in the world, but in the hour of need, those things would not respond; only a human being will. Hence, what is good in general is what promotes human interests. He thus asserts that the term ‘humanistic’ is very apt in describing Akan moral thinking. Further efforts made by African philosophers to advance African moral philosophy consist of the analysis of moral concepts in African cultures, which is, speaking more strictly, a meta-ethical exercise. Wiredu, for example (1992, 196), clarifies

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who a moral agent is in an Akan culture by analysing the Akan term obadwenma, which literally means ‘child, thinking child’. In analysing this term, he shows that it depicts a person of ethical maturity who possesses a sense of responsibility. Bewaji (2004) also analyses various Yoruba terms in elucidating the nature, contents and aspects of Yoruba moral philosophy. For example, he explains how the terms eewo and abuku which could translate as ‘taboo’ and ‘blemish’, respectively, are essential in articulating what sort of acts is impermissible in Yoruba moral culture. The very few examples examined above show clearly that African (moral) philosophy has remained true to one of the very essence of philosophising: abstraction from, and formulation of concepts from, the ethno and lived experiences of peoples and cultures. It is therefore practically impossible to separate African ethno-ethics or moral culture from African ethics or moral philosophy. In what follows, I pay particular attention to how this is true for African bioethics.

3  African Bioethics, Principlism and Relationality Bioethics is one of those terms that do not always submit to a simple, straightforward definition; yet, those who use them do so as if they and their audience have a pretty good idea of what they are talking about. The difficulty in defining bioethics is partly because since the emergence of the term in the 1960s and 1970s, it has quickly become a highly multidisciplinary field, cutting across such areas of interest and subjects as philosophy, science, theology, sociology, law, history and literature, such that it becomes difficult to offer a definition that properly encompasses its diverse areas of interest and, by implication, themes and issues. But there is some consensus as to what the focal point of bioethics is, which provides some basis for definitions that are widely accepted, raising minimal dust, even while accepting that the issues and themes remain varied and continue to unfold in this very vibrant and multidisciplinary field of study. In the introduction to the third edition of Encyclopedia of Bioethics (2004, xi), the editor-in-chief, Stephen G. Post, explains that the word ‘bioethics’ ‘was coined in the early 1970s by biologists in order to encourage public and professional reflection on two topics of urgency: (1) the responsibility to maintain the generative ecology of the planet, upon which life and human life depends; and (2) the future implications of rapid advances in the life sciences with regard to potential modifications of a malleable human nature’. Therefore, one can define bioethics as the systematic study of the moral dimensions of the life sciences and healthcare, employing a variety of ethical methodologies in an interdisciplinary setting (see Tubbs Jr. 2009). It consists of a multidisciplinary attempt to draw up moral principles and codes of conduct that should guide activities in the medical sciences and healthcare as well as a critical reflection on the moral implications of activities in the medical sciences and healthcare. By implication, bioethics focuses on ‘health care delivery, research,… public policy… knowledge and ethical reflection from multiple disciplinary vantage

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points, recognizing the value of ethical wisdom from varied perspectives as well as the commonality of many issues and dilemmas we face’ (Tubbs Jr. 2009, vii). Peter A. Singer and A. M. Viens (2008, 1) in their introduction to The Cambridge Textbook of Bioethics identify three broad spheres of bioethics that all its issues and themes can be conveniently grouped into. They are: 1. Academic bioethics, a sphere primarily focused on how theoretical and practical aspects of medicine affect considerations such as special obligations or responsibilities of clinicians, what is valuable, good, right, etc., in the biomedical context and how one might go about providing systematic accounts of such considerations 2. Public policy and law bioethics, where concerns lie in how legal and extralegal institutions can and should be involved in the regulation of clinical and research practices 3. Clinical ethics, and its focus, which is directly related to how the incorporation of bioethics into clinical practice can help to improve patient care To be sure, these spheres are interwoven and overlapping in their focus and discourse. For example, findings in academic bioethics, public policy and law bioethics are essential for any considerations and decisions in clinical ethics, and decisions in clinical ethics and public policy are often raw materials for critical and extensive deliberations in academic bioethics. Recent developments and advancements in bioethics show that there is no singular universal approach to bioethical issues. Although evolving from a Western space of discourse, the Western approach to bioethics remains only one lens or vantage point from which to approach bioethical issues, and any attempt to impose such an approach on other peoples and cultures will result in an unchecked hegemony and supremacy, and the colonisation of knowledge. Hence, we now have robust researches in, and contributions from, African bioethics (e.g. Tangwa 2010), Confucian bioethics (e.g. Fan 2002), Hindu bioethics (e.g. Crawford 2003), African-­ American bioethics (e.g. Prograis Jr. and Pellegrino 2007) and other contexts and places. This has led to a richer and more robust field of study. Bioethics has no doubt become very essential for the biomedical sciences and healthcare particularly in the decision-making process related to healthcare and the well-being of patients. Decisions must be made by healthcare providers at short notice, particularly concerning clinical ethics as they may not have the liberty to engage in a protracted and long deliberation on what the right course of action should be, in the same way academic bioethicists might have. In the words of Khushf (2004, 11): Bioethics is a compromise between the demands of practice and broader ideals about the ways humans should interact with one another, especially in the context of health care. On one hand, decisions must be made. Health care workers do not have the luxury of endless reflection. They must act. If they linger too long, the uncertainty and delay itself will cause major difficulties. On the other hand, if the patterns of practice are too hastily codified, the deeper ends of a humane medicine will be compromised and more problems will be created.

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The recognition of the need to be decisive and yet ethical led to the establishment and adoption, by healthcare professionals and providers, of a working understanding of fairly abstract moral principles deduced from philosophical ethics that were deemed essential in making the right decisions with regard to the healthcare and well-being of patients. This set of principles is what is now widely referred to as principlism, consisting of four key moral principles. In the words of Donald C. Ainslie (2004, 2100), ‘Tom Beauchamp and James Childress present the canonical account of this method in their Principles of Biomedical Ethics, where they suggest that four principles–respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice–provide the proper justificatory framework for bioethics’. The label ‘Georgetown approach’ is invoked to characterise principlism because Beauchamp and Childress wrote their book while based at the Kennedy Institute of Ethics of Georgetown University. Principlism is thus characterised by these four principles that constitute the core of its account of bioethics. These principles are so deeply entrenched in the mind of many bioethicists and healthcare professionals that clinical, moral problems are often grouped according to which principle is deemed more relevant and necessary for resolving them (Gert et  al. 2006, 100). Consider the principle of respect for autonomy, for example. Ainslie (2004, 2100) explains that although the principle of respect for autonomy is a controversial philosophical concept, it is understood and applied by healthcare professionals in the principlist sense as autonomous choice or the intentional choices of agents who understand what they are undertaking and who are free from undue influences on their decisions. Critical analysis, particularly from academic bioethicists, has sought to lay down rules that help to improve the practicality of these principles and determine their limitations and the conditions of their application. However, principlism often sticks to these four principles and often does not create room for other principles that may be vital in the healthcare and well-being of patients, particularly in specific contexts and places. This has been the critical point raised against principlism by African bioethicists. African bioethics as a decolonisation imperative has emerged and become a vibrant research area in, roughly, the last three decades as a reaction to the strong tendency in bioethics scholarship to present bioethics as a purely Western discourse. It is an attempt to Africanise bioethics (Barughare 2018), presenting it as a set of moral principles derived from African communitarian values. African bioethics is thus the exploration of African contribution to reliable healthcare delivery and the well-being of patients through indigenous African moral principles, medical ethics and academic discourse. In the words of Cletus T. Andoh (2011, 69): ‘This is what might be referred to as ethno-ethics and consists of a set of shared beliefs, values, categories, and assumptions that are implicit in the languages, practices and beliefs of African cultures’. Andoh specifically identifies traditional phenomena and practices like proverbs, maxims, tales, songs, mythology, male circumcision and marriage as sources of African bioethics. One key African contribution to bioethics is the communitarian moral theory discussed in the first section of this chapter. In communitarian ethics, relationality is salient in understanding aspects of bioethical discourse in African contexts such as

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healing, well-being, care for patients and the resolution of bioethical issues. An African relational bioethics emphasises harmonious coexistence among individuals and between individuals and the universe as a whole, respect for human dignity and the preservation of the physical environment (Andoh 2011, 69–70). In the words of Kevin Behrens (2013, 34): The emphasis on community, identifying with others and solidarity and caring makes ubuntu a relational ethic that prizes harmonious relationships. This challenges Western bioethics, which focuses on individual autonomy and the rational application of abstract theories and moral principles to ethical issues. It also resonates with the ethics of care, highlighting the central importance of caring, emotion and relationships in moral decision making. This philosophy echoes the call from other communitarian perspectives for bioethics to take the fact that we are embedded in communities and families more seriously.

This contributes immensely to principlism by introducing a new principle of relationality to the four cardinal moral principles. By implication, when necessary clinicians and health workers will take into consideration and acknowledge the importance of relationality and harmony in ensuring the well-being of patients and in reaching other health-related decisions. If, for example, webs of relationships and solidarity are essential for well-being, it becomes imperative for decision makers and policy makers in the healthcare and medical sciences to ensure that such a web is sustained while making decisions. Autonomy, justice, non-maleficence and beneficence would not be the only factors that count but relationality as well. Relationality as an African contribution to principlism does not only assist bioethics to understand healing and well-being in (African) healthcare systems but provides a unique vantage point for understanding the challenges faced by what I refer to as othered patients in the healthcare sector. I dwell more on this in the section that follows.

4  Personhood, Relationality and the Othered Patient I should begin this section perhaps by clarifying what I mean by the othered patient. The othered patient is a patient who suffers more deprivation of quality healthcare service on the basis of a perceived difference, or alterity. A patient is othered, or take the position of the other, if medical and healthcare personnel within the particular context of the patient see her as different from the self and allow such difference to influence positively or negatively the quality of healthcare service and healthcare-­ related decisions reached with regard to the patient. There is a sense in which my idea of the othered patient is similar to the notion of minority patients in bioethical discourses (e.g. White 1977; Degrie et al. 2017). In one of the earliest articles on the subject of minority patients titled ‘Giving Health Care to Minority Patients’, White (1977) notes that despite the widely held view that healthcare is a basic individual right, the economic and racial situation of groups like blacks, Indians, Mexican-­ Americans, Puerto Ricans and Asians puts them at a disadvantage even as they are poorly represented in the healthcare delivery system. While calling for a more

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culturally responsive healthcare workforce, White (1977, 27) writes that: ‘Schools of nursing are beginning to include cultural differences in nursing curriculums, but the majority of the nurses who practice are not aware of and are not sensitive to the needs of nonwhite patients’. Minority patients therefore often include non-white, non-Western patients, generally speaking. Healthcare providers are therefore challenged to provide a more holistic healthcare service that is culture-sensitive and that deliberately strives hard to provide quality healthcare to vulnerable and minority groups (Degrie et al. 2017). However, although othered patients and minority patients both portray how difference and otherness may influence healthcare delivery, othered patients, it seems to me, more robustly exemplify the problem because not all othered patients belong to a minority group. Consider, for example, when a Catholic priest sees a medical doctor who diagnoses him of a chronic sexually transmitted disease or when a married woman in an African society who has just been told by her doctor that she is pregnant immediately demands for an abortion. In these scenarios, the difference is not based on minority status but otherness; there is often the tendency that the doctor may approach the patient as an other based on her self-understanding as well as her understanding of the difference of the priest and of the married woman such as the belief that a priest should be celibate and ought not to be having chronic STDs and the African married woman being under the authority of her husband and should not be making such a decision independent of the husband. These accounts of difference may impair the medical doctor’s objectiveness in delivering the best healthcare possible for the well-being of her patient. These effects may emerge from a negative and even violent encounter of the other, the different, the not-self. But there is a sense in which there is a positive encounter of the other. To be sure, otherness, or difference, is an essential part of our being; it is, in fact, desirable and imperative for growth. How we encounter and appropriate it is what should either be accepted or rejected (Baum 2020). A positive encounter of the otherness or difference of the priest and the married African woman rather than inhibit quality healthcare delivery may provide the basis for better healthcare delivery. The doctor may be more confidential in treating the priest knowing fully well how others’ awareness of the priest’s infection with STD may be harmful to the priest’s reputation and general well-being since it calls his celibacy into question. The doctor is not just able to do her job, but she is also able to satisfy her patient because she recognises the otherness of her patient and encounters it positively. To understand who othered patients are in an African context is to understand the African concept of personhood, for it is those who fail to fit within the understanding of personhood that are othered or regarded as different. A human being must fulfil certain ontological and normative criteria to be seen as a person and enjoy the benefits of personhood which include, primarily, contributing to, and receiving from, the unity, togetherness, relationality and solidarity of the community. Essential to the ontological conditions for personhood is possessing the biological features of an African person which, beyond the expected physical structure of the human being, also include being black or brown skinned or, more generally speaking, being melanin-privileged. This explains why persons with disability such as persons with

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albinism and persons with angular kyphosis will have a hard time being accepted as persons in many African communities (Imafidon 2019a, b). On the other hand, the primary normative condition for personhood is that a human being must live a community-accepted lifestyle and contribute to community building. An African person has the moral responsibility to protect the community and relationality among persons and beings in the community. Failure to do so may result in the denial of one’s personhood, which explains various forms of ostracism in African communities. Hence, a person must both be ontologically and normatively compliant. Those who pass as persons in African cultures enjoy a harmonious relationship, and there is smooth relationality among such persons which is beneficial for general survival and well-being, including access to quality healthcare and a relational healing process. But those who do not fulfil the necessary criteria for personhood may face challenges accessing the same benefits and, by implication, may be unable to access quality healthcare services. They are what we can conveniently refer to as the othered patients. The list of othered patients may vary from one African place to another, but it includes, generally speaking, persons with disabilities and queer persons. There are two key reasons why healthcare providers and bioethicists must pay attention not only to the principle of relationality discussed in the previous section but also to the notion of personhood introduced in this section. First, understanding relationality and personhood provides a unique perspective for understanding the healthcare challenges that the othered patients may be confronted with in African healthcare systems and how such may be best tackled. It explains, for example, why persons with albinism may not receive proper medical attention or qualitative healthcare service from healthcare personnel who have imbibed the African conception of personhood. Second, and flowing from the first, it provides a basis for understanding the limitations of relationality as an essential moral principle in African bioethics since relationships are often understood in the narrow sense to flourish between community-accepted persons. Modifications can then be made to encompass a broader sense of relationality that includes the value of relationships among all persons. The respect for relationships will, then, not be restricted by ontological or narrowly conceived normative features. Thus, simply attempting to provide quality healthcare for persons with disabilities, queer persons and other disadvantaged patients in African societies without factoring in the ethnocultural understanding of personhood and relationality in African cultures may not yield solutions.

5  Concluding Remarks There is no doubt that for a long time, there has been a deeply entrenched hegemony in our global knowledge systems, including those related to healthcare delivery, a hegemony that is mostly Western, or Eurocentric. What becomes obvious from the foregoing discourse is that there is poverty of knowledge and, by implication, poor, less qualitative services, if we continue to ignore the ethno in contexts, places and

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cultures. However, the recent clamour for person-centred approach to healthcare or patient-centred healthcare shows that healthcare providers are in the process of overcoming deeply rooted biases and are now taking more seriously patients’ ethnic diversity; patients’ choices, decisions, beliefs and rights; and the sociocultural determinants of patients’ attitudes, beliefs and convictions in planning and achieving qualitative care, treatment and healing for patients. Person-centred healthcare assists healthcare workers to be more compassionate and sensitive to the social and cultural peculiarities of patients. But this would be difficult to achieve if healthcare workers have a myopic, god’s eye perception of reality while expecting patients to fit into that perspective. Part of the training of healthcare workers particularly in the area of bioethics should consist of the study in the form of programmes, recurrent workshops and other forms of training in ethno-diversity, variations in beliefs and understanding of reality, and ethnocultural differences in conceptions of healing, well-being, treatment and care. Such training should be diverse enough to provide a proper appreciation of the diversity within a context. It should also be rich and critical enough to understand these cultural diversities, how they could be beneficial or harmful to the well-being of those who hold them and how to navigate the prospects and limits of culture for the well-being of patients. This is what African bioethicists have been doing, and continue to do, with regard to personhood and relationality as essential elements of African ethno-ethics, and navigating the prospects and limits of these elements in providing quality healthcare for African patients.

References Ainslie, D.C. 2004. Principlism. In Encyclopaedia of Bioethics, ed. Stephen G.  Post, 3rd ed., 2099–2103. New York: Thomas Gale. Andoh, C.T. 2011. Bioethics and the challenges to its growth in Africa. Open Journal of Philosophy 1 (2): 67–75. Barughare, J. 2018. African bioethics: Methodological doubts and insights. BMC Medical Ethics 19 (98): 1–10. Baum, R. 2020. Moral good, the self and the m/other. In African philosophy of difference, ed. Elvis Imafidon. Cham: Springer. Behrens, K.G. 2013. Toward an indigenous African bioethics. South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 6 (1): 32–35. ———. 2014. Toward and African relational environmentalism. In Ontologized ethics: New essays in African meta-ethics, ed. Elvis Imafidon, 55–72. Lanham: Lexington Book. Bewaji, J.A.I. 2004. Ethics and morality in Yoruba culture. In A companion to African philosophy, ed. Kwasi Wiredu, 396–403. Malden: Blackwell Publishing. Bujo, B. 2003. Foundations of an African ethic: Beyond the universal claims of Western morality. Trans. Brian McNiel. Kenya: Paulines Publications Africa. Chemhuru, M. 2014. The ethical import in African metaphysics: A critical discourse in Shona environmental ethics. In Ontologized ethics: New essays in African meta-ethics, ed. Elvis Imafidon, 73–88. Lanham: Lexington Book. Crawford, S.C. 2003. Hindu bioethics for the twenty-first century. New York: State University of New York Press.

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Degrei, L., C. Gastmans, L. Mahieu, B.D. de Casterlé, and Y. Denier. 2017. How do ethnic minority patients experience the intercultural care encounter in hospitals? A systematic review of qualitative research. BMC Medical Ethics 18 (2). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12910-­016-­0163-­8. Fan, R. 2002. Confucian bioethics. New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Gert, B., C.M. Culver, and K.D. Clouser. 2006. Bioethics: A systematic approach. 2nded. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gyekye, K. 1996. African cultural values: An introduction. Ghana: Sankofa Publishers. Imafidon, E. 2014. On the ontological foundation of a social ethics in African traditions. In Ontologized ethics: New essays in African meta-ethics, ed. Elvis Imafidon, 37–54. Lanham: Lexington Book. ———. 2019a. African philosophy and the otherness of albinism: White skin, black race. London: Routledge. ———. 2019b. Between the ingredients and the dish as such: Philosophy in places and beyond. [Trans. Britta Saal, Zwischen den Zutaten und demGerichtalssolchem: Philosophie an Orten und Daruberhinaus]. Polylog 40: 19–35. Imafidon, Elvis, Matolino Bernard, L. Uchenna Ogbonnaya, Ada Agada, Aribiah D. Attoe, Fainos Mangena, and Edwin Etieyibo. 2019. Are we finished with the ethnophilosophy debate? A multi-perspective conversation. FilosofiaTheoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture, and Religions 8 (2): 111–138. https://doi.org/10.4314/ft.v8i2.9. Janz, B. 2004. Philosophy as if place mattered: The situation of African philosophy. In What philosophy is, ed. H. Carel and D. Gamez, 103–115. London: Continuum. Khushf, G. 2004. Handbook of bioethics: Taking stock of the field from a philosophical perspective. New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Masitera, E. 2020. Creating the Other in the Context of Land Redistribution. In Elvis Imafidon (ed.) Handbook of African Philosophy of Difference. Cham: Springer, 525–544. Mbiti, J. 1969. African religions and philosophy. London: Heinemann Publishers. Metz, T. 2007. Toward and African moral theory. The Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (3): 321–341. ———. 2010a. African and Western moral theories in a bioethical context. Developing World Bioethics 10: 49–58. ———. 2010b. The African ethic of Ubuntu/Botho: Implications for research on morality. Journal of Moral Education 39 (3): 273–290. ———. 2013. Two conceptions of African ethics. Quest: An African Journal of Philosophy XXIX: 141–161. Murove, M. 2005. African bioethics: An explanatory discourse. Journal for the Study of Religion 18: 16–36. Post, S.G. 2004. Encyclopaedia of bioethics. 3rd ed. New York: Thomas Gale. Prograis, L.J., Jr., and E.D. Pellegrino. 2007. African American bioethics: Culture, race and identity. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Singer, P.A., and A.M. Viens. 2008. The Cambridge textbook of bioethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tangwa, G.B. 2010. Elements of African bioethics in a Western frame. Mankon, Cameroon: Langaa Research and Publishing CIG. Taylor, D. 2014. Defining Ubuntu for business ethics: A deontological approach. South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (3): 331–345. Tubbs, J.B., Jr. 2009. A handbook of bioethical terms. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Tutu, D. 1999. No future without forgiveness. New York: Random House. White, E.H. 1977. Giving health care to minority patients. Nursing Clinics of Northern America 12 (1): 27–40. Wiredu, K. 1992. Moral foundations of an African culture. In Person and community: Ghanaian philosophical studies 1, ed. Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye, 193–206. Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.

The Cultural Background of Ezumezu Logical System Umezurike J. Ezugwu and Jonathan O. Chimakonam

Abstract  In this chapter, we show the cultural inspiration of Ezumezu logic. As a system of logic, Ezumezu can be said to be culture-inspired but not culture-bound. In the first instance, it means that its rudimentary concepts are derived from an African world-view, while in the second, it means that its application is not reduced to the provenance of the culture from which it derives its formulation. In other words, Ezumezu logic is African in inspiration but universal in application. We employ the idea of “ontological quadrant,” which holds that African world-view defines African ontology, which in turn defines African thought system that goes on to define African logic, to show how the system of Ezumezu logic benefits from cultural raw materials or what is often described in African philosophy as ethno-­ philosophy. This research will be expository, hermeneutical, and conversational in approach. Keywords  Ethno-philosophy · Ezumezu logic · Particularist school · Universalist school · African philosophy

1  Introduction One question which critics are asking concerning Ezumezu logic is about its connection with culture or what is described as ethno-philosophy. In other words, is Ezumezu logic an ethnologic? Some say that since some of its major concepts are derived from the Igbo linguistic culture, Ezumezu must be an Igbo logic. To address some of these misconceptions, we affirm that African cultural world-view, undeniably, has a place in Ezumezu logic. Put differently, Ezumezu logic is culture-inspired U. J. Ezugwu General Studies Unit (Philosophy), Nigeria Maritime University, Okerenkoko, Nigeria J. O. Chimakonam (*) Department of Philosophy, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Agada (ed.), Ethnophilosophy and the Search for the Wellspring of African Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78897-1_12

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but not culture-bound. All logical traditions might be universal in application, but they were first particulars rooted in different cultural world-views. We reiterate the preceding, but with the caution that Ezumezu logic is not ethnologic or culture-­ bound. Ethno-philosophy can be a source or a resource material for African philosophizing. This is the idea which Ezumezu logic manifests. Here, we want to show that the system of Ezumezu logic aligns with the idea of “ontological quadrant”,1 which holds that African world-view defines African cosmology/ontology, which inspires African thought system that goes on to define African logic as an instrument for reasoning. It is only in this regard that Ezumezu logic can be said to have an ethno-philosophical or cultural background. By ethno-­ philosophy, we refer to a system of collectivist philosophy that describes cultural accumulations and accomplishments in the areas of language, norms, and values, etc. With this, in mind, we are contending that some of the concepts of Ezumezu logic are derivatives of African culture. It enjoys or benefits from the African cultural raw materials, but it is not all about African communal existential history and cultural world-view. This is because it is not a description of what is as such; it is more a prescription of how one ought to reason correctly in a complementary manner. In as much as we agree that Ezumezu logic is an African culture-inspired logic, we maintain that it is not an African culture-bound logic. If we accept that it is culture-­bound, then, we may be saying three things: (1) that Ezumezu logic is ethnologic, (2) that there is a theoretic similarity between ethno-philosophy and Ezumezu logic, and (3) that Ezumezu logic is descriptive of a narrow provenance of reasoning. Any of these three suppositions would be incorrect. Just as we acknowledged at the beginning of this chapter, Ezumezu logic is not culture-bound, restrictive, closed system or exclusive, but culture-inspired, dynamic, and an open system. This is what makes it different from ethno-philosophy, which is a “variant of philosophical studies which considers communal world-view or culture of a people the target of the philosophical investigation” (Asouzu 2007, 37). Some members of the particularist school in African philosophy such as Placide Tempels, John Mbiti, and Henry Olela held the same view, as they aver that philosophy is a function of the culture of a given people (Mangena 2014, 97). Most particularists believe, therefore, that philosophy is tied down to the culture and traditions of a particular society. This, they arrived at, without due consideration that that paraphernalia, which they thought constituted philosophy, might not be enough. They give little room for transcultural features such as critical, rigorous individual discourse, intercultural engagements, and objective argumentation, which underlie the practice of philosophy as a universal discipline. Ezumezu logic as a tool for reasoning is universal in application. The universalists like Kwasi Wiredu (1980), Peter Bodunrin (1991), Odera Oruka (1990), and Paulin Hountondji (1996) saw philosophy as being the same everywhere, and as such must use the same method. 1  This structure is a proposal that seeks to explain how different components in the African scheme of thought relate and affect one another. It holds that the African world-view defines African cosmology/ontology, which in turn defines African thought system that goes on to define African logic in that order. See Chimakonam (2012, 11).

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This is not far from what the eclectics are projecting too. Andrew Uduigwomen, one of the eclectics, was of the view that an intellectual romance between the universalist conception and the particularist conception will give rise to an authentic African philosophy, in that for a discourse to be proper philosophy, it has to combine the elements of culture and universal methodology (2009: 6). We do not quite agree with Uduigwomen here. The reason being that the intercourse which he advocates cannot hold sway if we shift from methodology to metaphysics. For example, the universalist understanding of reality cannot be equated with that of the particularist conception of reality. As the former claims that philosophy is the same everywhere and has a uniform method, the latter refutes that claim and sees philosophy as a cultural enterprise that has the trait of communal norms and values and, as a matter of fact, operates differently because of its communal and cultural masks, which decouples it from other philosophical traditions. We believe that there are various systems of logic, with each capable of being contrasted or distinguished from others. Chimakonam (2019) corroborates this when he considers African logic in terms of logic relativity rather than logic relativism. For him, logic relativity further allows us to contrast African logic with, say, Western logic. But logic relativism does not. This is because it makes any system of logic so described as culture-bound, that is, an ethnic logic underpinned by ethnic values, norms, and traditions both in the formulation and in the application (Chimakonam 2019, 47). While ethno-philosophy is culture-bound in the description and application of its maxims, Ezumezu logic is not, due to the universal applicability of its principles. In the first section, we will discuss an overview of the system called Ezumezu logic. In the second, we will discuss the cultural background of Ezumezu logic. We shall argue that Ezumezu logic is a culture-inspired logic but cannot be said to be culture-closed or culture-bound logic. The fact that it has benefited or tapped from the African linguistic culture in the articulation of some of its concepts does not entrap it in the provenance of African culture, as it is both prescriptive and universal in application.

2  An Overview of the System of Ezumezu Logic It is important to begin this section with what led to the system of Ezumezu logic. The idea of Ezumezu logic was hatched to discourage unlimited imitation of the European methodological approach to doing African philosophy and the broader African  scholarship in the humanities. Cultures borrow from one another which mean that similar borrowing is to be expected amongst various intellectual traditions. What is abhorable is a situation in which a culture throws overboard its intellectual accumulation and copies everything from another culture. Members of the universalist school imported and popularized a way of philosophizing that alienated Africans from their thought systems. For example, on the one hand, some of the universalists insist on the Anglo-American-styled method of analysis as a veritable

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approach to doing African philosophy. On the other hand, those who had been educated in Western Europe returned to Africa to popularize the phenomenological/ continental methodology. Members of the universalist school ridicule any other approach, especially those developed in Africa as unphilosophical or ethnophilosophical. This universalist philosophical orientation gradually cemented its place in the philosophical curricula of many universities in sub-Saharan Africa such that when the likes of Meinrad Hebga (1958) and CS Momoh (1989) mooted the idea of a new logical base to drive home-grown methodologies, there was serious opposition. But the question of each philosophical tradition is supposed to arise in its cultural place. Bruce Janz (2009, 2014, 2017) has devoted a lot of space to discussing the platial location of philosophy, so we will not belabor that here. The issue was never about the cultural location of philosophy because each tradition of philosophy necessarily has to have cultural roots. The issue is always about cultural entrapment of reason. The questions of philosophy may arise in a place, but philosophizing about those questions and the method used should never be culturally entrapped. We must preserve the cultural roots of philosophy but should never oppose its universal appeal, and vice versa. The trend in some schools of African philosophy where the cultural link of philosophy is denied or its universal appeal is rejected has an unfortunate political undertone. Much of this politics stem from colonial impositions and brainwash which have found their way into the educational curricula with which the contemporary African philosopher is trained. As Chimakonam and Nweke explain: Every individual approaches reality with a given methodological disposition and conceptual scheme; and the methodological disposition and conceptual scheme of a given scholar are often impressed on the scholar through his/her formal training or orientation, the use of a predominantly Western curriculum in the professional training of philosopher flows from, as well as consolidates, the original presumption that philosophy is solely an intellectual heritage of the West. (2018, 280)

The idea held by some that it is only the West that knows it all is the very reason the project on the home-grown methodological framework for African philosophy is neglected and rejected. If philosophy were to be taken to be an intellectual heritage or business of the West alone, where then is the place of African mood, mode, and method of reflections? Or do we now say that Africans lack the above just because they have a different mode of thinking when compared to the other cultures? Some European scholars, for example, would want us to believe that we cannot do without their own method or that our logical reasoning or pattern of thinking is tied down to theirs. This is not correct. Some decolonial thinkers inform us that the hegemonic attitude often demonstrated by some scholars in the West, in view of reality, is the reason for the “injustices” that have long been experienced in the annals of the history of philosophy in particular and knowledge in general (see Maldonado-Torres 2007; Quijano 2007; Grosfoguel 2012; Raju 2017). Chimakonam affirms this when he avers that “the imposition of a cultural appurtenance of the Global West on the rest of humankind creates a serious schism in the order of knowledge” (2017a, 126). Indeed, there is a discord in the way knowledge is approached today. Ordinarily, knowledge is an open-ended discourse that does not allow or encourage restriction.

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Due to the epistemic bifurcation of cultures, which for us was created by Aristotle2 through his system of two-valued logic, and popularized by scholars like Kant, Hume, Hegel, and Lévy-Bruhl, knowledge is taken to be that kind of discourse that endorses and denies competences along cultural lines. Having known that some of the problems we experience today, in the field of knowledge, originated in some of the lopsided Western literature, the challenge facing Africans is how to undo this imperial/colonial epistemological damage, as part of their drive to create decolonial future (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2014, 195). To avoid the imperialism, polarized mentality and epistemic impositions from the West and to demonstrate that African inferences are not illogical, Chimakonam took the bull by the horn and produced Ezumezu logic, which is today seen as the logic that can axiomatize the complementary inferences in African world-view (in addition to those in other climes), which the likes of Lévy-Bruhl (1932) and Placide Tempels (1959) thought were contradictories. Ezumezu, as a system of African logic and a variant of trivalent logic has three (supplementary) laws which include nmekọka, njikọka, and ọnọna-etiti, in addition to the three existing laws such as the law of contradiction, law of identity, and law of excluded middle. These three supplementary laws were made possible because of the dynamic and flexible nature of aspect of reasoning in African world-view. Ezumezu may have been formulated to account for the expression of thought in African world-view, but it is capable of universal applicability insofar as dynamism and context are taken into account. According to Chimakonam, one of the main differences between Ezumezu and “the Lukasiewicz logic and other logics that are three-valued or even the two-valued system of logic is that in Ezumezu logic two standard values are treated as sub-contraries rather than contradictories” (Chimakonam 2019, 106). The preceding is possible because of (a) the three supplementary laws that variously weaken the three traditional laws. The three traditional laws are straitjacketed, thus conforming the evaluation of proposition to strict bivalence, (b) but the three supplementary laws transform bivalence into trivalence and accommodate the notions of relationship and contextual analysis of values. These legal parameters provide the basis for the formulation of Ezumezu as a variant of three-valued logic. Moreover, in Ezumezu system, the universe of discourse that contains (a) “the T- set (all statements that affirm), b) the F- set (all statements that deny) and c) the C-set (some statements that affirm and some statements that deny)” (Chimakonam 2019, 133) is upheld by the three supplementary laws of thought. The reason for the introduction of the supplementary laws of thought that relax the traditional laws of thought is to handle some of the errors, inconsistencies, and contradictions caused by the latter in non-Western contexts due to their inflexibility. In other words, the three supplementary laws of thought were invented or designed to further explain that the statement of formal logic ought not always to be analyzed in terms of contradictory, inconsistent, tight, or absolute. Chimakonam cemented this 2  I. I. Asouzu (2011, 16–17) also advances a view that what he describes as Aristotle’s metaphysical essentialism was responsible for much of the cultural epistemic polarization, dichotomization, and marginalization in the world intellectual history. We merely add that this metaphysical layer has basis in Aristotle’s system of two-valued logic.

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idea with what he calls the first and second universalness theorems in logic. Here, he insists that a system that is universal and consistent need not be absolute. This is because “statements of all logic traditions are meant to be context-dependent or specific and universal but not context non-specific or absolute” (2019, 131). It is as a result of this that the three supplementary laws of thought were deemed necessary to relax the traditional laws of thought that are deterministic, exclusive, and absolutistic in nature. More so, in the elementary syntactic and semantic mapping of Ezumezu logic, the understanding is that “Ezumezu is an African logic that is three-valued, arụmaristic and value complementary” (2019, 135). This implies that Ezumezu logic does not negotiate between two poles alone, where a statement is either true or false, and the third value is undetermined, as can be found in Lukasiewicz’s logic (1920/1970), but within the sphere of three poles, where a statement can be true or false and both true and false. The third value here is called “ezumezu”; hence, it has the capacity to bring the two opposing variables into a complementary functional relationship. When we say that a statement can be both true and false, we simply mean that a proposition is being evaluated at a complementary mode rather than in particular contexts. It is due to this complementation in the third value known as “ezumezu” (with small letter e) that we talk about truth-value glut in Ezumezu logic rather than truth-value gap that characterizes Lukasiewicz’s three-valued logic. Lukasiewicz’s logic operates under the ambience of the correlative “either or” without a serious consideration of the third value as a real value in itself. In Ezumezu logic, the third value is possible due to the fact that two standard values are seen as sub-contraries not contradictories, unlike in Lukasiewicz’s logic. Ezumezu logic is context-dependent and operates under the idea that that which is true is true only in context, thus leaving room for the same statement to be false in another context. In other words, there is a constant movement of variables in the contextual mode of interpretation (cmi2),3 in Ezumezu logic, for the purpose of complementation. This draws the line of difference between Ezumezu logic and Aristotelian logic that is bivalent and deterministic. However, the three supplementary laws of thought in Ezumezu logic, namely, njikọka, nmekọka, and ọnọna-etiti, were introduced to weaken the long-celebrated traditional laws of thought, namely, identity, contradiction, and excluded middle, and to show the inflexibility, exclusivity, and contradictory features in the same. Put differently, the unaccommodating and bifurcated nature of the traditional laws of thought necessitated the inauguration of the three supplementary principles, for 3  In Ezumezu logic, there are two types of modes which determine not only the interpretation of propositions but the values they are assigned to. The first is the complementary mode of interpretation (cmi1). Here, seemingly opposed variables can be seen as complementary rather than contradictory. In this mode, the value of proposition is a truth-glut in a trivalent reading. The second is the contextual mode of interpretation (cmi2). In it, propositions attract the values of truth or false in strict bivalent reading, but with a caveat, that context is specified. This emphasis on context, then, allows for change in values as the context of the proposition changes. This is often presented in Ezumezu logic as the principle of Context dependence of Value (CdV). See JO Chimakonam (2019, 99, 119–122).

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inclusiveness and mutual complementation. The preceding is a type of thinking that advocates complementation and reflective dynamism. In the supplementary laws, njikọka maintains that there is an integrative circuit of network among everything that exists. By implication, there exists a necessary link in reality, and nothing exists in isolation of the others, though, in a relationship set through njikọka, no identity is lost, as everything within the sphere of the said network upholds its identity. Njikọka is, therefore, more individualistic in nature for the singular purpose that context is highlighted above the collective. The individuals’ opinions are respected but are seen as secondary within the group or community. Despite the autonomy of the individual,  the collective is seen as more powerful, safer, and better for greater achievements. Nmekọka sees variables as missing links of reality. In other words, to be is not to be alone but to be with others. Context is here seen as the stepping stone to the construction of the collective. The kind of complementation advocated here is not dialectical but arụmaristic, in that the purpose of being together is far from a synthesis. The difference between njikọka and nmekọka lies in the fact that “the former centres on the enhanced group power achieved through the coming together of individual identities, while the latter centres on the enhanced individual identities within the group” (Chimakonam 2019, 138–139). For ọnọna-etiti, variables and values are context-dependent. It is under the ambit of this supplementary law of thought that Ezumezu logic introduces the third value ‘ezumezu’ or nwa-izugbe in ontological terms from the interaction of nwa-njụ and nwa-nsa. It shows how differing contexts can be reconciled in a collective. It is the law that animates the third value as a complementary point of seemingly opposed values. In all, Ezumezu logic cannot be equated with Socratic, Marxian, and Hegelian dialectics, as two standard values within its purview do not dissolve into a synthesis. Furthermore, there are two theses in Ezumezu logic, namely, the ontological and logical theses. In the ontological thesis, reality is seen as a network of variables, some opposing the others, yet they are interconnected and interrelated. This is why in the conversational curve, which an instrument for measuring relationships of variables, even the opposed variables that are in disjunctive motion interconnect, interact, and can enter into a conjunctive motion. However, there is a limit to which disjunctive motion can sustain the opposition of variables. That limit is called the complementary bar, which when reached tilts the motion toward a conjunctive one where seemingly opposed variables begin to complement each other. Yet, in spite of this complementation that can exist among the opposed variables, there is a limit to which the opposed variables can complement. That limit is what is known as benoke point. Benoke is a point where the opposed variables cannot sustain their complementary relationship due to their ontological variance, which disallows synthesis in Ezumezu logic (Chimakonam 2017b, 19). This is another point of difference between Ezumezu logic that accommodates two types of inferential relationships, namely, arụmaristic and ọhakaristic, and the Marxian and Hegelian dialectical mode of relationship that are both synthetic. Ontologically,  there are three pillars of thought, namely, nwa-njụ, nwa-nsa, and nwa-izugbe. As nwa-njụ is seen as the opponent of an argument, nwa-nsa is taken to be the proponent of an argument, and nwa-izugbe stands as a state where both sides can form a complementary relationship.

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These three pillars could stand because of the help often rendered by nmekọ, a logical relationship that operates under two inferences, namely, arụmaristics and ọhakaristics. Arụmaristics is when the peripheries (nwa-njụ and nwa-nsa) move toward the center for a logical relationship of inclusion in the complementary mode marshaled by the law of ọnọna-etiti, and ọhakaristics is when the center moves toward the peripheries (nwa-njụ and nwa-nsa) for the logical relationships of integration to occur between the peripheries from their contextual modes (Chimakonam 2019, 117). Under these two inferential types, driven by conjunctive and disjunctive motions, respectively, the expectation is not a synthesis, in the case of arụmaristics, and not dysthesis4 in the case of ọhakaristics, but the sustenance of conversations. This makes Ezumezu logic a value-complementary logic, in which variables are capable of specific types of relationship, but with the aim not to fuse or synchronize realities in such a way that they cannot be contrasted with other realities that exist. Thus, Ezumezu logic is opposed to the strict bivalence of the Aristotelian logic that makes a thing to be either true or false. It rather provides for a proposition to be both true and false (truth-value glut). Moreover, another thesis of Ezumezu logic is the logical thesis, which states that “values are assigned to propositions not on the ground of the facts they assert but on the context in which those propositions are asserted” (Chimakonam 2019, 142). It is within this thesis that the principle of Context dependence of Values (CdV) was articulated to show that in Ezumezu logic, truth is seen in its dynamic manner, not in its rigidity. The reason is because of the variations or context dependency in the truth value of propositions. In view of this, variables can stand on their own but in one way or the other are interconnected and interrelated.

3  A  n Exposition of the Cultural Background of Ezumezu Logic The word ezumezu is derived from the Igbo language. Literally, it means “the collective, the aggregate or the totality of all that is most viable, most potent and most powerful” (Chimakonam 2019, 94). Like its name portends, most of the key concepts in Ezumezu system are derived from the Igbo linguistic and cultural resources. The three supplementary laws, the three pillars, the two types of inferences, the two central notions, etc. all have Igbo names. The derivation of such concepts and terminologies is as a result of the direct connection with salient ideas in African worldview which they depict. This substantiates the fact that Ezumezu logic is grounded 4  We coin this word as an opposite of synthesis. Here, it means a total collapse in conversational relationship where nwa-nsa and nwa-njụ go separate ways and can no longer come together to engage. This is a bad thing because nothing good can come out of a scenario where there is no relationship. Another way in which relationships can be ended is what Chimakonam (2015, 470) tagged conversationund, that is, a scenario where the variables nwa-nsa and nwa-njụ agree perfectly or melt into a synthesis which can bring conversations to an end.

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in African culture. When it is spelt with a small letter “e,” it refers to the intermediate value, and when it is written with an uppercase letter “E,” it refers to the system of three-valued logic. Furthermore, the cultural background of Ezumezu logic is traceable to what we mentioned earlier as the idea of “ontological quadrant” but which we shall now explain in some detail. The reason for this coinage or philosophical idea was to demonstrate the stages of development of metaphysics or human thinking that birthed logic. These stages include world-view, cosmology/ontology, thought system, and logic. The first stage is the world-view. At this point, metaphysics is unclear and dormant; hence, it is inherent in superstitions and unscientific beliefs. Second is the stage of cosmology/ontology. This is a stage in which metaphysics becomes active and no longer dormant to the question, explanation, and interpretation of the world/being. At this stage, people deem it necessary to know more about the existent reality or being. They ask questions specifically to know “the order of being in the universe, and to know if being is material or immaterial or both material and immaterial” (Ijiomah 2014: 48). Within the African ontology, it is argued that being is triadic in nature. This means that being is material, immaterial, and both material and immaterial. Edeh corroborates this in what he describes as the Igbo theory of duality. For him, “all beings exist in a dual and interrelated fashion” (1985, 74). Ijiomah reaffirms this when he said that “reality is cyclical, and that the physical has an inbuilt spirituality and the spiritual has an inbuilt physicality” (2014, 119). This means that in African cosmology/ontology, there are two kinds of realities, physical and nonphysical, and each reality yearns for the other. In African ontology, therefore, being operates in two compartments that can complement into the third, unlike in Western ontology, where being operates in two compartments or a system known as a dualism. In Africa, there is a belief that the spirit and physical entities or realities interact. This is because there is an inherent spirituality in physicality and physicality in spirituality. The third stage is the thought system. According to Chimakonam (2012), this is “the purest development of metaphysics. At this stage, common beliefs as can be found in world-view are separated from the basic beliefs.” It is, perhaps, for this reason, that Solomon saw thought system as “the study of what is most real” (1982, 87). Here, the real beliefs, cultural diversities, and modes of life of various people are known. Those who believe that being can be either physical or nonphysical are classified to be those whose thought system is two-valued or bivalent. Those who are of the belief that being is physical, nonphysical, and both physical and nonphysical are seen as those whose thought system is three-valued or trivalent. The fourth stage is “where metaphysics births logic” (Chimakonam 2012). Ezumezu logic is a product of the processes of these four stages of development of metaphysics. As a matter of fact, it is built, anchored, and embedded on the ontological quadrant of the African culture and triadic thinking, where being or reality is seen as having three dimensions. It is from the trivalent structure of the African thought system that the three-valued character of different systems of African cultureinspired logic is developed. A few examples would include Innocent Asouzu’s complementary logic (2004, 2013) and Chris Ijiomah’s harmonious monism (2006, 2014).

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This clears the doubt of many who are interested in employing Ezumezu logic in philosophizing but are confronted with the question about the place of ethno-­ philosophy in it. With this, it can be stated that Ezumezu logic is a beneficiary of African cultural raw materials. But the project of Ezumezu logic is not a representative of the particularist orientation in African philosophy which Van Hook says “is an expression of specific historical and cultural contexts and of the problems and proposed solutions, as well as of the world-views found in them” (1993, 26). To think in this direction, as ethno-philosophers do, is to suggest that philosophy deals with narratives of a particular people and their world-view. Though the system of Ezumezu benefited from the African cultural materials, ethno-philosophy or culture philosophy is largely a resource material for African philosophizing. In other words, there is a cultural background to every philosophical thought or logic, but that does not mean that the philosophical thought or logic gotten from the said background remains closed or will not have intercultural value(s). In saying the preceding, we also nullify the position that “African philosophy is a set of text written by Africans and described as philosophical by the authors themselves” (Hountondji 1996, 33). The particularists such as Tempels (1959), Otterbein (1960), Mbiti (1969), Okere (1983), Iwe (1986), and Ijiomah (2014), who conceive philosophy as a field that is reducible to culture, beliefs, and norms of a given society, limit the sources of human knowledge. We maintain that culture of a certain group of people could be the foundation of their philosophy, but that is not to say that their philosophy should be narrowed down to it. Questions of philosophy may arise in a place, but they should not be tied to such a place. It is not the goal of philosophy, or reason, to be specific or to be culture-bound. Reason is never stagnated in its journey. It always strives to manifest at a universal level. Its journey that often begins from a definite cultural location aims at an intercultural engagement and manifestation. On May 10, 2019, a colloquium was organized and hosted by the Department of Philosophy at the Lagos State University following the publication of Ezumezu: A System of Logic for African Philosophy and Studies. The theme was spectacularly chosen to read “Glocal Conversations on the Journey of Reason in African Philosophy: From CS Momoh to JO Chimakonam,” and the presentations/discussions centered on the viability of Ezumezu as a tool for reasoning and the veracity of its claims. One prominent observation was that its major concepts were derived from the Igbo linguistic culture, and as a result, some narrow-minded critics believed that such conceptual relationship with the Igbo language makes Ezumezu an Igbo logic. But this is not only unfounded; it is myopic. Would they also say that the philosophies of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle which derive several of their concepts from the Greek language are thus Greek philosophy? Or would they say the same of Heidegger and other German philosophers who sourced their concepts from the German language? Or of all the philosophers who source their concepts from one language or the other, or even the English language? Are these critics suggesting that there is one language for philosophy or that conceptualization cannot be done in native African languages? Their problem is clear, they confuse concept with word, and prescription with description. Philosophers possess the poetic license to derive their concepts from anywhere. These concepts are then given stipulative

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definitions to reflect the ideas of the thinker. This approach is not descriptive of the cultural world-view from where those concepts are derived. So, it makes no sense at all for anyone who understands the process of philosophical conceptualization to give a culture-bound, descriptive interpretation to Ezumezu system. Chimakonam contends that “a thing is universal only when it does not destroy the identity of its constituent particulars or becomes border-sensitive, in issues pertaining to the particulars” (Chimakonam 2019, 21). That is to say that universal becomes logical only in recognition of its root, which is particular. With this, therefore, we do not agree with the universalists that the approach to philosophy is the same everywhere and uses the same methodology, which is characterized by analysis (Azenabor 2000, 27). We also do not agree with the particularist who gives reductive cultural interpretation to philosophy. What we insist on is that there are various methods of philosophizing. Hence, we have different approaches, cultural backgrounds, and experiences in life shaped by specific structures of logic. In all, we have been able to establish, especially at the beginning of this section, that Ezumezu logic is culture-oriented, as its formulation is not without the cognizance of the African culture and ontology. But in spite of its cultural background, it cannot be said to be culture-bound, as it is universal in application.

4  Conclusion In this work, we have shown why Ezumezu logic should be seen as a logic that can address the problem of marginalization and epistemic injustices in scholarship. Ezumezu logic as a system is capable of transcending the African place to space (cultural to intercultural), for a viable tool for intellectual engagement. The development of Ezumezu can be seen as the correct answer to the question: which logic underlies the method(s) of African philosophy? Consequently, we have addressed some of the challenges facing scholars who want to employ Ezumezu logic as a framework for philosophizing. Such a challenge as the place of ethno-philosophy in Ezumezu logic yearns for attention. To address the above challenge, we agree to the fact that ethno-philosophy has a rudimentary and linguistic place in the derivation of key concepts in Ezumezu system, but with the caveat that Ezumezu logic is not ethnologic. This implies that Ezumezu logic is culture-inspired but not culture-bound.

References Asouzu, I. Innocent. 2007. Ibuaru: The heavy burden of philosophy beyond African philosophy. Berlin: LIT VERLAG GmbH and Co. KG Wien. ———. 2011. Ibuanyidanda and the philosophy of essence. Calabar: University of Calabar Press. ———. 2004. The method and principles of complementary reflection in and beyond African philosophy. Calabar: University of Calabar Press.

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The Ethnophilosophical Foundation of Ramose’s Ubuntu Ontology of Be-ing Becoming Ada Agada

Abstract  Ramose’s ubuntu ontology is among the most innovative formulations in African philosophy. Ramose’s originality is due, in large part, to his intriguing reconceptualisation of being in terms of what he calls be-ing becoming. His innovative concept of be-ing becoming emphasises the processual nature of reality. In this chapter, I identify the ethnophilosophical source of the concept of be-ing becoming in ubuntu worldview and explore the implication of the concept for the integrity of the existential borders separating discrete entities from each other. Deploying an expository and critical method, I demonstrate how Chimakonam’s ezumezu logical system buttresses Ramose’s ubuntu eventism which makes change the permanent essence of things. Keywords  Ethnophilosophy · Be-ing becoming · Ezumezu logic · African philosophy · Ramose

1  Introduction In this chapter, I identify the ethnophilosophical source of Mogobe B.  Ramose’s concept of be-ing becoming in the basic complementaristic ubuntu worldview and explore the implication of the concept for the integrity of the existential borders separating discrete entities from each other. Ramose’s ubuntu ontology is among the most innovative formulations in African philosophy. His originality is due, in large part, to his intriguing reconceptualisation of being in terms of what he calls be-ing becoming. His innovative concept emphasises the processual nature of reality and

A. Agada (*) Centre for Interdisciplinary and Intercultural Studies (CIIS), Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Agada (ed.), Ethnophilosophy and the Search for the Wellspring of African Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78897-1_13

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seeks to account for this reality not merely as a totality but as a dynamically interactive totality in which the borders separating individual parts, or entities, are not sacrosanct (cf. Janz 2019, 263–267). The emphasis on change as the only permanent feature of being and the recognition of chaos as a dialectical counterpart of order, rather than a rigid opposite, make Ramose’s ubuntu ontology an ubuntu monistic eventism. Ramose’s metaphysics of be-ing becoming has, surprisingly, not attracted the attention it deserves, especially in view of the status of this concept as the basis of his ethical and sociopolitical thinking which has received more attention from African philosophy scholars. This chapter is timely as it helps fill the gap in Ramose studies while exploring the relationship between his concept of be-ing becoming and that current in African philosophy that has been labelled ethnophilosophy. Ramose’s eventist approach to ontology has an antecedent in the crude ubuntu metaphysics of Placide Tempels. While Tempels failed to adequately universalise his claims that in Bantu ontology the category of (vital) force replaces the static Aristotelian conception of being, Ramose presents an eventist perspective of being as be-ing becoming that advances Tempels’ position in the very attempt of reconciling the universalism-particularism conflict in African philosophy. The conflict itself followed in the wake of Tempels’ Bantu Philosophy (1959), a book which was disparaged as an exercise in ethnophilosophy by professional (universalist) philosophers who rejected the Tempelsian idea that African philosophy is particular to the extent that it can be asserted that there exists a kind of philosophy uniquely African in the sense of having a basic structure resistant to the analytical method that undergirds Western philosophy. Consequently, the chapter will be divided into three sections. Section one highlights the place of ethnophilosophy in the universalism-particularism conflict and Ramose’s project of transcending the divide by incorporating elements of ethnophilosophy in the articulation of his ubuntu ontology. Section two exhibits the ethnophilosophical foundation of Ramose’s innovative concept of be-ing becoming. Section three critically analyses the concept of be-ing becoming and the implicit idea of the violability of borders separating individual entities, with reference to Chimakonam’s ezumezu logical system as the grounding logic of Ramose’s complementaristic ontology.

2  E  thnophilosophy, the Universalism-Particularism Divide, and Ramose’s Challenge It is a striking irony that while ethnophilosophy has been thoroughly maligned by prominent African philosophers, the orientation inserts itself into the works of a good number of the most productive African philosophers. The productive philosophers who employed ethnophilosophical resources in the articulation of their philosophical theories cut across different schools and orientations. They include

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professional philosophers/universalists (Oruka 1991; Gyekye 1995; Wiredu 1996), particularists (Senghor 1964; Mbiti 1969; Onyewuenyi 1996; Ikuenobe 2004; Mangena 2014), hermeneuticists (Okere 1983; Okolo 1991), and system builders (Ramose 1999; Asouzu 2004; Metz 2007; Agada 2015; Chimakonam 2019). Indeed, the vast body of literature that has accumulated as the analytical exploration of the traditional worldviews of African peoples and indigenous knowledge systems has been aptly labelled academic ethnophilosophy by Barry Hallen (2010). In this regard, a good number of Africa’s best known philosophers will count as academic ethnophilosophers. Academic ethnophilosophers include Kwame Gyekye, Kwasi Wiredu, Oruka, Innocent C. Onyewuenyi, Segun Gbadegesin, M.A. Makinde, Sophie Oluwole, and Ifeanyi Menkiti. Having previously disparaged the descriptive ethnophilosophy of L.S. Senghor and J.S. Mbiti as uncritical and anthropological, Hallen distances himself from the radical critique of ethnophilosophy which seeks to excise the orientation from African philosophy. Agreeing with the idea of ethnophilosophy as a kind of foundation or special source of African philosophy, Hallen (2010, 83) notes that: “Ethnophilosophy” began its conceptual life as an appellation used to stigmatise what was said to be a distinctively dysfunctional form of African philosophy. It was then ‘liberated’, insofar as it was then used to legitimize the inclusion of distinctively African cultural elements in a scholarly discipline that could be considered African-oriented yet philosophically scrupulous as far as professional or academic standards were concerned. Yet, disdain for the orientation persists even among African philosophers whose works would have been the poorer without the extensive ethnophilosophical research conducted by descriptive and academic ethnophilosophers. Ethnophilosophy itself is simply a term referring to the body of work that explores traditional African worldviews and phenomena such as language, wise sayings, and myths with the goal of uncovering systematic thought of a philosophical nature. Descriptive ethnophilosophers are accused of presenting mere cultural data as philosophy in their enthusiasm about a supposedly unique African philosophy with a method different from the Western argumentative procedure. Realising that the radical rejection of ethnophilosophy means marginalising some of Africa’s best philosophers, critics of descriptive ethnophilosophy like Bernard Matolino try to draw a line between culture philosophy and ethnophilosophy while claiming that academic ethnophilosophers like Oruka and Wiredu engaged in culture philosophy rather than ethnophilosophy. Matolino argues circuitously that: Culture philosophy, according to Oruka, not only predates ethnophilosophy but must be understood as an authentic form of philosophy. Culture philosophy refers to reflections on cultural practices and beliefs by Africans in their attempt to make sense of their reality. This sense making exercise occurs in a context in which people, in their locality, systematically account for the totality of their experience…Ethnophilosophy on the other hand, as an invention that promotes unanimity is incapable of philosophic reflection and is incapable of handling divergent commitments. (See Imafidon et al. 2019, 114)

The distinction between culture philosophy and ethnophilosophy is murky because the thematic focus of the former is about the same as the thematic focus of the latter. Like culture philosophy, ethnophilosophy also reflects on African cultural practices

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and beliefs. These cultural practices and beliefs are collectively held by a large majority of traditional societies. It is in this sense that ethnophilosophers can be accused of promoting a collectivistic, unanimous philosophy as Hountondji (1996) famously charged. To say there is nothing critical in ethnophilosophy is to project open bias because a reading of Senghor and Mbiti reveals critical reflection. At the most, one can argue that they were not sufficiently critical to meet the taste of the professional philosophers who had been trained in Western universities and were in awe of Western philosophical methods which they, understandably, accepted as universal philosophical procedure. The grouse of critics of ethnophilosophy like Matolino does not arise chiefly from the conviction of the philosophical aridity of ethnophilosophy but from its history. The early attempt of Western anthropologists and missionaries to exoticise Africa as a radical European other in the process of trying to understand Africans accounts for the disdain for the very term ethnophilosophy, for the most part. The Belgian missionary Placide Tempels, in particular, is regarded as having presented a magical narrative of the Bantu people as authentic Bantu ontology (Okere 1983; Hountondji 1996; Asouzu 2007). Consequently, African philosophers of the universalist persuasion made it their duty to oppose ethnophilosophy for supposedly lending support to the Eurocentric belief that Africans could not engage in high-level abstract thinking of the type demanded by philosophy. The rising popularity of ethnophilosophy in the wake of the publication of Tempels’ Bantu Philosophy accentuated the universalism-particularism conflict which continues to have consequences to this day as every committed African philosopher is compelled to take the history of the conflict into consideration before launching her philosophical agenda. The conflict is a significant one on account of the historical circumstances of Africa, the continent’s experience of colonialism, and the imposition of Western cultural norms which encompass an internationally dominant Western philosophy. As noted earlier, the universalist philosophers were impressed by the success and dominance of Western philosophy and agreed that its critical method must be universal. Broadly speaking, universalism is the philosophical perspective that insists that the analytical and scientific method of philosophising developed in the West is applicable everywhere and will advance the cause of African philosophy, while particularism challenges the universal applicability of the Western method in the firm belief that philosophical themes, interest, and questions evolve within the space of cultural horizons (see Etieyibo 2015; Agada 2019a). Particularism itself is not synonymous with ethnophilosophy although it has been strongly associated with the latter on account of ethnophilosophy championing the cause of particularism the loudest. Thus, ethnophilosophy can be regarded as an ultra-particularist orientation since its proponents not only assert the reality of a history of African philosophy separate from the history of Western philosophy but also propose that the philosophy latent in the traditional worldviews and belief structure of Africans is the authentic African philosophy (see Mangena 2014). According to ethnophilosophers like Mangena (2014) and Etieyibo (see Imafidon et al. 2019), it is philosophically rewarding for African philosophers to pursue projects like the analysis of proverbs and wise sayings and their philosophical

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systematisation. Mangena has argued that ethnophilosophy is analytical in addition to being descriptive and, therefore, has all the ingredients that make good philosophy. He laments that “most definitions of ethno-philosophy, especially by professional philosophers, have tended to focus on the ‘collection’ task, thereby deliberately ignoring the ‘analysis’ task” (Mangena 2014, 32). Agreeing with Mangena, Etieyibo identifies two aspects of ethnophilosophy, namely, what he calls the visible part, or phenomena like traditional practices and belief systems, and the immanent part which consists of the subjective factor of philosophical reflection and analytical transformation. He notes that: “When properly excavated and unpacked, the visible and immanent elements constitute…genuine philosophy, both in the broad and strict sense” (see Imafidon et al. 2019, 130). Mangena and Etieyibo are merely boldly declaring a truth which many African philosophers try to overlook for fear of being derided by their Western counterparts, another clear indication of the hegemony of Western philosophy and African philosophers’ struggle to be on the side where research funding and career progress are assured. Mangena and Etieyibo are reminding us that much of modern African philosophy is either descriptive ethnophilosophy of the Mbiti type or academic ethnophilosophy of the Wiredu type. In defending the philosophical viability of ethnophilosophy, Etieyibo persuades us that what Matolino is inclined to label culture philosophy is, in fact, descriptive ethnophilosophy, the visible elements of African culture. Awareness of the significance of ethnophilosophy can be identified as the reason universalist philosophers like Wiredu and Gbadegesin do not harshly criticise descriptive ethnophilosophy even while acknowledging its philosophical pretensions. Unlike Hountondji, for instance, Wiredu and like-minded philosophers have sought to transcend the universalism-particularism divide by critically transforming traditional worldviews and belief structures in ways that make these traditional African phenomena applicable beyond the African epistemic space. A discussion of the success recorded by these philosophers in achieving the stated goal is beyond the scope of this chapter. Here, I seek to demonstrate how Ramose responds to the universalism-particularism conflict as a particularist who has not overtly championed ethnophilosophy but whose writing reveals sympathy for the maligned orientation. Inspired by ubuntu worldviews, Ramose ambitiously identifies a fundamental principle in the African universe which he labels be-ing becoming and which he considers revolutionary for African metaphysics. The next section will explore the ethnophilosophical foundation of Ramose’s concept of be-ing becoming.

3  T  he Ethnophilosophical Root of the Concept of Be-ing Becoming Ethnophilosophy has a controversial history as an orientation of African philosophy, with some philosophers passionately denouncing it and others passionately defending it, as I showed in the previous section. Even as ethnophilosophy has remained

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controversial, it has continued to inspire some very original philosophical thinking in a philosophical discipline in urgent need of original thinkers. The basic claim of ethnophilosophy is that the worldviews of traditional African societies as encapsulated in indigenous languages and belief structures are philosophically valuable and viable. Ramose’s ontology of be-ing becoming validates this claim. The hyphenated be-ing in be-ing becoming is intended by Ramose to underline his understanding of being in a processual sense that is at odds with the substance metaphysics of Aristotle, for instance, which conceives being as having a fixed essence even while its properties may be defined in a language reflecting dynamism. Be-ing becoming itself is not the individual but corresponds with being when construed as the fullest possible reality. While individuals, or entities, are bounded, be-ing becoming is an unbounded universal principle; it is what imparts reality and dynamism to individuals, thus ensuring the violability of borders and establishing the ground of commonality. Be-ing becoming is the unifying principle in the Bantu universe. Before Ramose, Tempels (1959, 35) had explored traditional Bantu worldviews and suggested controversially that: We [Westerners] can conceive the transcendental notion of ‘being’, by separating it from its attribute, ‘Force’, but the Bantu cannot. ‘Force’ in his thought is a necessary element of ‘being’, and the concept ‘force’ is inseparable from the definition of being. There is no idea among Bantu of ‘being; divorced from the idea of ‘force’…We hold a static conception of being, they a dynamic.

Critics of ethnophilosophy like Hountondji and Asouzu have condemned the essentialism of Tempels and accused him of imputing magicality to African epistemological modes while promoting the logicality of Western epistemological modes (see Agada 2019a). The outcry eclipsed a glaring fact, which is that Tempels was working within the framework of a substance metaphysics that had already been discredited by two outstanding Western philosophers, Nietzsche and Bergson (see, for instance, Nietzsche 1968; Bergson 2007). Indeed, so thoroughly did Nietzsche undermine substance metaphysics that Heidegger was compelled to announce that with Nietzsche’s withering critique, Western metaphysics had come to a dead end (see, for instance, Heidegger 1991). Ramose recognises that Tempels is not mistaken in supposing that the Bantu conceive being dynamically. However, he goes further than Tempels by eliminating the latter’s essentialism and transforming the undeveloped theory of vital force into the ubuntu eventist ontology of be-ing becoming, which replaces the particularism of Tempels with a universal conception of being. Ramose’s predilection for hyphenated words follows from his strong endorsement of an eventist, or what he calls a rheomodic, view of reality as the dynamic interactive unity of entities that constitutes a totality. In this spirit, he favours the hyphenation of the very term ubuntu as ubu-ntu. The hyphenation, then, reveals ubuntu as consisting of two words with mutually reinforcing meanings. While ubuindicates what exists in its absolute singularity, its enfoldment, the suffix -ntu indicates the specific ways in, and through, which ubu- is expressed. In other words, ubu- as being in general is necessarily oriented towards -ntu which is the mode of

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unfolding of the former. In a language reminiscent of Tempels’ controversial claim that (vital) force is the fundamental thought category in Bantu worldview (see Tempels 1959), Ramose declares that: “Accordingly, ubu-ntu is the fundamental ontological and epistemological category in the African thought of the Bantu-­ speaking people” (Ramose 1999, 50). The assertion is not as controversial as it appears initially once one realises that Ramose is here referring to ethnophilosophy which claims that traditional African societies have worldviews that are philosophically viable. These worldviews are collectively owned in the sense that they cannot be claimed by identifiable individuals in the society although they may well have been the reasoned opinions of individuals in the beginning (see Oruka 1991; Agada 2019a). It is widely accepted that traditional African worldviews reflect a holistic and interconnected perspective. Ramose’s analysis of ubuntu captures this complementaristic perspective. Thus, he is bold enough to say that the ubuntu perspective is a Bantu perspective and that this Bantu perspective is the very basis of African philosophy. The ethnophilosophical understanding of ubuntu as an ontology and epistemology of the dynamically interconnected whole becomes the foundation of the radical idea of be-ing becoming.

4  The Ontology of Be-ing Becoming The human being in Ramose’s ontology is a special being to the extent that it is capable of observing and interpreting the behaviour of other beings relative to its own interests. He notes: The word umu- shares an identical ontological feature with the word ubu-. Whereas the range of ubu- is the widest generality, umu- tends towards the more specific. Joined together with -ntu then umu- becomes umuntu. Umuntu means the emergence of homo-loquens who is simultaneously a homo sapiens…ubu- may be regarded as be-ing becoming and this evidently implies the idea of motion. (Ramose 1999, 51)

The human being is, therefore, a manifestation of universal being. This specific being, umuntu, is special not in the sense of having a composition different from that of other beings but in the sense of having its ubu- so constituted that as -ntu it employs the instrument of language for thinking and exploiting ubu-. Ramose is concerned at once with both being in general and the human being. The being that constitutes Ramose’s interest is not the being that interested Aristotle and which Tempels contrasted with the Bantu notion of “force” (as a fundamental principle). Tempels’ Aristotelian conception of being follows the tradition of regarding being as that which ultimately accounts for the contingent features of appearance and which in itself is stable and static. Tempels thinks that this understanding of being as superior to its accidents or properties indicates a substantial difference between Bantu and Western approaches to the question of being. But Ramose (2003) is now universalising the Bantu particular. He is insisting like Nietzsche (2002) that the Bantu perspective is closer to the truth than the perspective Tempels prefers.

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Be-ing becoming is constant change, endless motion. For Ramose, it is best regarded as a process rather than as a stable unity. Ramose (1999, 51) compares the concept to a gerund, a verbal noun, presenting universal being as a dynamic unity, “a -ness and not an -ism”. The understanding of being as implying an “ism” is rejected because such an understanding arises from the error in the logic of conventional human language which erects rigid borders and unjustifiably polices the lines demarcating the subject or doer from the verb and the object. Conventional human language is thus fragmentary, but the reality it seeks to capture is an ever-changing reality. Human language “posits a fundamental irreconcilable opposition in be-ing becoming. On the basis of this imputed opposition, be-ing becoming is fragmented into pieces of reality with an independent existence of their own” (Ramose 1999, 52). While Ramose is willing to grant that entities have an independent existence as individual things, he insists that the independence is not absolute because entities possess being in common. Since being is a dynamic unity, or wholeness, borders are violable. No entity is absolutely independent of other entities. Borders cannot be policed. Having indicted human language and, therefore, the human mind as the source of the fragmentation of reality and its structuring in terms of being instead of be-ing becoming, Ramose plays up the rheomodic language as one that adequately reflects the flux state of reality proposed by ubuntu ontology. He finds some inspiration in David Bohm (1980) who favours a monistic universe in which reality is a constant state of becoming. According to Ramose, a rheomodic language will break down the borders separating the doer of a deed from the process of doing and that which is transformed. The loosening of existential borders will make it impossible for the subject or doer to step outside the flux in which it is caught up and attempt to impose the reifying categories of the language-tutored mind on reality to create a highly idealised image of reality. For Ramose, a possible rheomodic language will have a gerund rather than a verb. While a verb creates a distance between the subject and the sphere of action, a gerund, which functions as a verbal noun, opens the border and brings the subject and the action into intimate contact. Reality as a dynamic unity is the basic thesis of ubuntu worldview, and by replacing the conventional language verb with the gerund, the rheomodic language upholds the logic of ubuntu. About this logic, Ramose (1999: 57) writes: “It is…for the preservation of be-ing as a whole-ness. Accordingly, it is against the fragmentation of be-ing through [conventional] language”. Since the rheomodic language is presented as a mere suggestion, Ramose does not insist that we replace ordinary human language with the former. He is content inviting us to pay careful attention to the possibility a rheomodic language offers in helping us reconceptualise being as be-ing or, more precisely put, be-ing becoming, that which reveals itself as an interacting unity, an endless quest for permanence and perfection (cf. Agada 2019b). While Ramose rails against the fragmentation of reality and favours porous borders, he does not deny that entities exist. For example, if there are no individuals but only flux, there will be no event and no becoming; there will be only one endless chaos without the possibility of a modicum of order emerging out of the flux.

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Ramose (1999, 55) clearly asserts the possibility, nay, actuality of order emerging out of chaos when he reflects on the order-chaos dichotomy thus: Be-ing becoming, the incessant flow of motion is perceived as chaos since it is considered to provide neither certainty nor equilibrium…To solve this problem, language invokes the concept of order as the means to establish and maintain equilibrium… But since the projected order is based upon an unbridgeable opposition between be-ing and becoming, how then can ‘order’ come out of chaos? The question cannot be answered unless we ground ‘order’ in the very experience of fundamental disequilibrium in be-ing. By so doing we may well hold that order not only can but does indeed come out of apparent chaos.

Be-ing becoming, as the fundamental principle of reality, is not synonymous with the word “entity” but is rather a universal (vital) force instantiated in all beings. Be-ing becoming, therefore, animates entities and establishes a basis for solidarity by enabling entities to transgress their individual borders. In this way, Ramose’s ubuntu ontology demonstrates the coherence and correctness of the vaunted communitarianism and complementarism of traditional African worldviews. We now see clearly the relationship between ethnophilosophical thought and post-­ ethnophilosophical thought, the one represented by ubuntu philosophy and the other by ubuntu eventism. Post-ethnophilosophical thought here refers to universally applicable African philosophical formulations that achieve originality by borrowing and transforming fundamental elements of ethnophilosophy rather than depending heavily on Western philosophy. Ubuntu eventism is a post-ethnophilosophical theory; it is inspired by ubuntu philosophy even as the former surpasses the latter in its general applicability. Nevertheless, a logical basis for Ramose’s insertion of entities into the flux state of reality is required. The South African philosopher does not provide a visible argument in defence of a system of borderless entities, one that shows how entities can retain their individuality if it is assumed that borders are continually transgressed. Luckily, Chimakonam (2019) solves the problem. Chimakonam’s ezumezu logical system, which itself grows out of a complementaristic ontology, makes additions to the classic Aristotelian laws of thought that are very well known as the laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle. The supplementary laws of njikoka (law of integration), nmekoka (law of complementarity), and onona-etiti (law of included middle) make all the difference in accounting for the kind of ontology espoused by Ramose since they recognise an active truth value, the complemented (C), in addition to the classical truth (T) and false (F) values. Chimakonam conceives the true and false values as subcontraries rather than as contradictories, meaning that the opposition between both values can be regarded more as a friction than a rigid relation not open to compromise. This stance mirrors Ramose’s be-ing becoming concept of universal flux. The two standard values interact with each other in the third value of complemented (C). In a strict specific context, the classical law of contradiction holds, according to Chimakonam. Thus, what is true is true in the specific context. But since the true and false values can have a wider context, both being contradictories, this wider context breaks down the rigid borders established by the human mind to come to terms with the undoubted

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dynamism of real-world situations. Accordingly, the complemented value emerges where the true and false values are present, more or less. While the law of njikoka asserts that a statement is true only if other statements do not contradict it in the integrity of its specific context or sphere, the law of nmekoka asserts that a statement that is true in a strict, specific context may not be true when taken out of context even as one that is false in a specific context may not be false in another (Chimakonam 2019, 94–100). The complemented (C) value, which reflects a value glut or completeness, accounts for the ambiguity of the law of nmekoka. Here the true and the false coexist in the unitary, non-fragmentary complemented ezumezu (C) value. The law of onona-etiti asserts that a statement can be both true and false in the sense that it may not be altogether true or altogether false. Like nmekoka, the law of onona-etiti makes allowance for ambiguous situations. Someone completely isolated in the world of Aristotelian logic may find ezumezu logic unsettling. Yet, the logical system reveals adequate consistency given the important role played by the context principle which determines when rigid demarcation of borders is necessary and where such is superfluous. We may use examples like the contradictory statement “B is a thin and fat man” to undermine a logical system like ezumezu that emphasises the law of included middle. For every such example, one can identify counterexamples like how to account for a mango seed growing into a large mango tree, a zygote developing into a baby, and an adult human being dying and becoming dust. In eschewing the untenable logical rigidity and sophistry of classical logic, the ezumezu system is able to support Ramose’s reconceptualisation of being as be-ing becoming. Ramose makes the point that reality is dynamic, contradictory, and dialectical. The applicability of the law of njikoka assures us that entities exist besides the flux state of be-ing becoming which characterises and essentialises all entities. The operation of the laws of nmekoka and onona-etiti means that entities intimately interact with each other as existential borders are continually transgressed.

5  Conclusion In this chapter, I made a case for the continuing relevance of ethnophilosophy by demonstrating how ethnophilosophy functions as a wellspring for Ramose’s intriguing concept of be-ing becoming. I highlighted the contradiction in African philosophy which consists of African philosophers harshly denigrating ethnophilosophy on the one hand while relying on the controversial orientation to advance the frontiers of African philosophy on the other hand, as the discipline cements its position as a distinct philosophy tradition in the manner of the Western, Asian, and Latino traditions, for instance. The chapter demonstrated the integrative progress African philosophy is making on the foundation of ethnophilosophy by exploring how Chimakonam’s ezumezu logical system supplies logical warrant for Ramose’s ethnophilosophy-­inspired, universally applicable concept of be-ing becoming.

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Ethnophilosophical Tendencies in African Feminist Thought and Philosophy Anke Graness

Abstract  African feminist and gender theories are rarely taken into consideration in the broad discourse on the merits and faults of ethnophilosophy. However, quite a number of these theories follow ethnophilosophical patterns, as I want to show in this chapter. The first part of the chapter deals with terminological and conceptual alternatives which have been developed by African scholars in order to capture the lived experiences of African women in an adequate way, such as Womanism, Motherism, Stiwanism, and Nego-feminism. Some of those conceptual alternatives are the subject of controversy both within and outside of African feminist discourse, especially for their ethnophilosophical tendencies, as I will try to show in this chapter. The second part presents two approaches which are based on anthropological case studies, namely Oyèrónkè Oyĕwùmí’s and Nkiru Nzegwu’s research on precolonial Yoruba and Igbo society which they characterize as genderless societies, i.e. societies where gender is not of fundamental importance for the social role of an individual. Both argue that the ‘patriarchal lens’ of ‘Western’ ethnographers has often led to a misrepresentation of family relations and social roles in African societies. And they conclude that the gender discourse that dominates the ‘Western’ feminist interpretation of society is ultimately a particularist discourse that should not be uncritically transferred to other cultures. The third part of the chapter points the critique of such anthropological/ethnophilosophical approaches. For example, Zimbabwean scholar Fareda Banda points to the pitfalls of invented traditions, such as the restriction of women’s rights in order to protect ‘cultural rights’ of such invented traditions. And South African theorist Desiree Lewis explicitly argues that an approach based on anthropological studies is an obstacle to progress in gender studies because it tries to inscribe a radical difference between ‘Western’ and African societies. Her critique resembles the famous critique of Paulin Hountondji on ethnophilosophy, namely that an assumed unanimity of the African hides internal contradictions and that the idea of shared African cultural values and norms excludes

A. Graness (*) University of Hildesheim, Hildesheim, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Agada (ed.), Ethnophilosophy and the Search for the Wellspring of African Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78897-1_14

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everybody who does not belong to the designated form of cultural identity prescribed as authentically African. Keywords  African feminist theory · Gender · African Womanism · Stiwanism · Chikwenye Okonjo Ogunyemi · Oyeronke Oyewumi · Nkiru Nzegwu African feminist and gender theories are rarely taken into consideration in the broad discourse on the merits and faults of ethnophilosophy. However, quite a number of these theories follow ethnophilosophical patterns, as I want to show in this article. Theories which are directed to the emancipation and liberation of women in Africa south of the Sahara emerged in the twentieth century in an emphatic dissociation from European/North American or ‘white’ feminism. European/North American feminist theories and movements are perceived by many African scholars and activists as being guided by the interests of women of the ‘white’ middle class and, therefore, as not corresponding to the interests, goals, and lived experiences of African women. Critics cite the unawareness of the problems and living conditions of African women that is evident in European and North American feminist theories and movements, as well as the unawareness of feminist knowledge production in Africa, knowledge which is simply neglected in the dominant discourse on women’s liberation. Moreover, African scholars point to European/North American feminism’s blindness to the intertwining of ‘white’ women in the oppressive system of colonialism and neocolonialism, from which ‘white’ women profited just as much as ‘white’ men, and a blindness to racist elements in the European/North American women’s movement and feminist theory. European/North American feminism is accused of paternalism, Eurocentrism, and racism (Ogundipe 2015, 260–61). In particular, the presumption of universalism by ‘white’ feminists, who assume that they can speak on behalf of all women, has been questioned and refuted. European/North American feminism’s claim to sovereignty over the interpretation and representation of all the world’s women is rejected by many theorists and activists in the global South as an expression of ‘Western’ (neo)colonialism and imperialism. Many African activists and theoreticians therefore consciously avoid calling themselves feminists, since they regard feminism as an ideology that continues European/North American domination and reproduces mechanisms of exclusion and oppression. At the same time, African-American or Black feminism is criticized in a similar way. African-American feminism is accused of speaking in a generalizing way of the experiences, interests, and needs of Black women. Representatives of African-­ American feminism often overlook the fact that they speak from their North American standpoint only and that their concepts do not apply to all Black women. What is needed are concepts that capture the lived experiences of African women as well as power structures in Africa’s specific historical, cultural, political, and religious contexts, concepts which represent the interests of African women, and propose ideas for their emancipation from different structures of oppression. In order to

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develop adequate theories for political agency in the African context, terminological and conceptual alternatives have been developed, the most important of which are Womanism, Motherism, Stiwanism, and Nego-feminism. As Nigerian scholar Mary E. Modupe Kolawole emphasizes, such attempts at self-designation are an important component of a process of self-definition (Kolawole 1997, 26–27). However, certain conceptual alternatives are the subject of controversy both within and outside of African feminist discourse, especially for their ethnophilosophical tendencies, as I will try to show in this chapter. But first we should define more precisely what ethnophilosophy is. For this purpose, I refer to a definition proposed by the Kenyan philosopher Dismas A. Masolo, who describes ethnophilosophy as follows: The underlying position of ethnophilosophy is that philosophical ideas and views regarding different aspects of reality and experience are neatly woven into communities’ cultural systems, such as in the different aspects of their language, in their customary regulations of the conduct of everyday life, and in the relatively more formal expressions of abstract thought, such as one finds in religious beliefs and rituals. What is required to expose the philosophical significance of these aspects of culture is a careful description that utilizes familiar philosophical terminology and categories of thought. It is in this sense that the term is the result of joining together what were originally two separate terms, namely “ethno-,” meaning “of or from community,” and “philosophy.” (Masolo 2010, 358)

Masolo argues that the basic assumption of representatives of ethnophilosophy is that bodies of belief and knowledge are manifested in the thoughts and actions of people who share a common culture. For this reason: Most of the literature now widely regarded as constituting ethnophilosophy is written about existing and precolonial African cultures and asserts that in them there are unified and uniquely African ideas of value and conceptualizations of reality, which account for, or form the basis of, the beliefs and practices of African peoples. (Ibid.)

Such basic assumptions, as well as a focus on precolonial African cultures, are also to be found in certain African feminist theories.

1  Renaming Probably the best known and most influential attempt to redefine and rename feminism to produce an African theory of women’s emancipation is African Womanism. Independently of African-American writer and theorist Alice Walker, the Nigerian literary scholar Chikwenye Okonjo Ogunyemi developed the concept of Womanism, which she later specified as African Womanism. Her article entitled ‘Womanism: The Dynamics of the Contemporary Black Female Novel in English’ appeared in 1985  in the magazine Signs.1 Here Ogunyemi argues that facing prejudices and 1  Ogunyemi emphasizes that she submitted the manuscript 2 years before its publication. Thus, her article would have been written at about the same time as Alice Walker’s book In Search of my Mother’s Garden (1983), where Walker defines her own concept of Womanism.

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structural societal constraints based on assigned gender roles does not lead Black women writers automatically to become feminists like their ‘white’ colleagues but rather to become Womanists. Although Womanism shares with feminism a concern for achieving freedom, independence, and equal rights for women, a Black woman quickly realizes that in addition to sexism, the question of skin colour and cultural, national, economic, and political issues must also be taken into account (Ogunyemi 1985, 64). A Black woman is not only ‘deprived of her rights by sexist attitudes in the Black domestic domain and by Euro-American patriarchy in the public sphere’ but also ‘as a member of a race that feels powerless and under siege’. As a result, ‘she is a womanist because of her racial and sexual predicament’ (Ogunyemi 1985, 79). A Black woman is burdened with racism combined with sexism in both her own domestic environment and the public sphere. It is not enough to protest sexism alone, which is only one of the many other evils Black women face. In addition, Black women have to struggle with the dehumanizing effects of racism and poverty and—in the case of African women—with neocolonial structures of exploitation and dependence. The full force of the mechanisms of racial and sexist oppression converges upon Black women. For this reason, the struggles of a Womanist are more complex than those of a feminist and go far beyond gender issues. Black women are situated in a multidimensional network of dependencies due to racial discrimination, socio-economic oppression, and the cultural imperialism of the ‘Western’ world. Feminism is, according to Ogunyemi, part of such cultural imperialism. Due to social, economic, and historical circumstances as well as global power asymmetries, the experiences of Black women and women of colour differ fundamentally from those of ‘white’ women. Ogunyemi’s approach clearly shows similarities to a way of analysing intersecting mechanisms of oppression and exclusion which later became famous as the theoretical framework of ‘intersectionality’. The term, which was coined by the African-American legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw in 1989, refers to a mode of analysis that pays attention to exclusionary mechanisms not only based on gender but also combined with class, race and culture, sexual orientation, disability, age, geographical region, etc. Crenshaw, in her legal practice, argued that Black women are discriminated against in such a way that does not fit into the categories either of racism or sexism, but is often a combination of both. Since the time of slavery, Black women have experienced multiple oppressions of race, class, and gender; they were dominated by ‘whites’ (women included), enslaved, or oppressed by segregationist laws and the general patriarchal and racist workings of society. Intersectionality gained prominence in the 1990s, particularly in the wake of the further development of Crenshaw’s work in the writings of sociologist Patricia Hill Collins. Like Crenshaw, Collins argues that cultural patterns of oppression are not only interrelated but are bound together and influenced by the intersectional systems of society, such as race, gender, class, and ethnicity. Collins calls intersectionality the ‘matrix of dominations’ and highlights the structural elements of power that shape different forms of oppression (Hill Collins 1991).

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However, Ogunyemi underlines in her work that the experiences of Black women are not uniform, either. In her book Africa Wo/man Palava (1995), Ogunyemi states that both ‘feminism and African-American womanism overlook African peculiarities’, and, thus, ‘there is a need to define African womanism’ (Ogunyemi 1995, 114). In an interview with Susan Arndt, she stresses: When I was thinking about womanism, I was thinking about those areas that are relevant for Africans but not for blacks in America—issues like extreme poverty and in-law problems, older women oppressing younger women, women oppressing their co-wives, or men oppressing their wives. Religious fundamentalism is another African problem that is not really relevant to African Americans—Islam, some Christian denominations, and also African traditional religions. These are problems that have to my mind to be covered from an African-womanist perspective. (Arndt 2000, 714–15)

Besides the broader perspective African Womanism offers concerning structures of oppression, Ogunyemi characterizes the concept as more community-oriented and less oriented towards the individual (Ogunyemi 1995, 119 and 124). She underlines that African Womanism is about healing and (re)establishing harmony in the African community and healthy relationships between people (see Ogunyemi 1985, 72 or 1995, 123). The holistic character of African Womanism explicitly includes men. As early as 1985, Ogunyemi emphasized that her concept of Womanism does not exclude men but rather strives to work with them to solve the problems at hand: ‘… the ultimate aim of womanism is the unity of blacks everywhere under the enlightened control of men and women’ (Ogunyemi 1985, 71). And in her 1988 article ‘Women and Nigerian Literature’, she emphasizes: Womanism is black centred, it is accommodationist. It believes in the freedom and independence of women like feminism; unlike radical feminism, it wants meaningful union between black women and black men and black children and will see to it that men begin to change from their sexist stand. (Ogunyemi 1988, 65)

According to Ogunyemi, African Womanism is characterized by a maternal spirit of comprehensive integration and willingness to compromise (Ogunyemi 1995, 114 and 133). Black men and women are above all united in the shared struggle of their race against their social marginalization and for an independent cultural identity. This is a particularist approach, as Ogunyemi admits (Ogunyemi 1985, 71), which explicitly excludes ‘white’ women (and men). Another important difference from ‘Western’ feminist theories as well as African-American Womanism is that African Womanism is conceptualized as mother-centred. The aspect of motherhood is central for many African theorists. For example, Mary E.  Modupe Kolawole argues in her book Womanism and African Consciousness (1997) for a Womanism that is anchored in African values (Kolawole 1997, 27, 202), which explicitly includes a special appreciation of motherhood (see Kolawole 1997, 62f.). On the other hand, according to Kolawole, lesbianism definitely does not belong to African values: To the majority of ordinary Africans, lesbianism is a non-existent issue because it is a mode of self-expression that is completely strange to their world-view. It is not even an option to millions of African women and can therefore not be the solution as … many … Western or westernized women propose. (Kolawole 1997, 15)

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Homosexuality therefore has no place in this concept. Ogunyemi also emphasizes that her concept of Womanism excludes lesbian lifestyles (Ogunyemi 1995, 133). This marks a fundamental difference from Alice Walker’s concept of Womanism. Motherhood is even more central in Nigerian theorist Catherine Acholonu’s concept of Motherism, another attempt to recast feminist theory in African terms. Acholonu’s book Motherism: The Afrocentric Alternative to Feminism (1995) aims to create an alternative to European/North American feminism, based on key African values. Acholonu assumes that motherhood is one of these values. Motherism is an Afrocentric feminist theory anchored in the matrix of motherhood. According to Acholonu, the traditional role of the African woman has been to be a mother, matriarch, and nurturer of the community (Acholonu 1995, 110). Close communion with nature is central to the concept. Therefore, Motherism includes motherhood, nature, and nurture (Acholonu 1995, 110). According to Acholonu, Motherism is intended to heal and protect the web of connections between family, society, and nature. A Motherist is both a humanist and an environmentalist. She defines a Motherist as somebody who respects the interdependence of all life, the ecosystem, and all humanity (Acholonu, 1995, 112). A Motherist must address the following structural problems: The theory of Motherism is a melting pot for all people, men and women, even feminists who are concerned about the menace of wars around the globe, racism, malnutrition, political and economic exploitation, hunger and starvation, child abuse and mortality, drug addiction, proliferation of broken homes and homelessness around the world, the degradation of the environment and depletion of the ozone layer through pollution. The Motherist is a man or woman committed to the survival of Mother Earth as a hologrammatic [sic] entity. (Acholonu 1995, 111)

Also, Motherism illustrates the overlapping of different dimensions of oppression in an almost intersectional way. However, gender is not included. Acholonu argues that in contrast to the emphasis on gender as a factor of oppression in ‘Western’ feminism, in Africa social status is essentially determined by economic power, but hardly by gender: The notion that women are subordinate to men is un-African. … The truth is that what determines social status in Africa, in all parts of Africa, is economic power, and hardly gender. (Acholonu 1995, 44)

She assumes that women in traditional African communities were not disadvantaged or oppressed. The concept of the inferiority of women was imported by ‘Western’ and Arab colonialism and the introduction of Islam and Christianity (Acholonu 1995, 10–11; 44–45; 69–79). This is an idea also held by other African scholars like Amadiume, Oyĕwùmí, and Nzegwu, which we will discuss in a moment. Acholonu argues that undermining the position of women was part of the destructive mechanisms of colonialism which destabilized African societies (Acholonu 1995, 78–79). In her view, in precolonial Africa the relationship between men and women was complementary, and each gender’s role was distinct from yet supportive of the other (Acholonu 1995, 107). No gender dominated the community as a whole. While men dominated the sociopolitical sphere, women dominated the

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spiritual and metaphysical sphere. For this reason, she (like Amadiume 1987a, b) rejects European terms such as ‘patriarchy’ and ‘matriarchy’, which she considers Eurocentric, and prefers instead the terms patrifocality (father focus) and matrifocality (mother focus) to describe African conditions (Acholonu 1995, 7). She writes: Patriarchy, the system that places men on top of the social and political ladder, seems to be an inappropriate term for describing the organization of the social systems of the African peoples. This is because several African societies reflect systems with ranging degrees of dual-sex hierarchies in which men and women exist in parallel and complementary positions and roles within the society. (Acholonu 1995, 6, emphasis in original)

The target of Motherism is not to achieve equality between the sexes but rather their complementarity. Acholonu criticizes the concept of equality as confrontational and self-destructive. Complementarity, in contrast, is diplomatic, mutually supportive, and dynamic (Acholonu 1995, 107). Acholonu is very critical of European/North American feminism. She accuses these theories of having a negative attitude towards mothers, children, nature, and culture (Acholonu 1995, 82 and 85). These theories focus on the individual, and moreover on lesbian love. She writes: ‘This excessive individualism among radical feminists has in some cases given rise to an extremist radical lesbian feminism bordering on masochism’ (Acholonu 1995, 85, emphasis in original). She accuses radical feminism of having contributed to the destruction of families, the alienation of children, the rise in crime, drug addiction, and homelessness in Western cities (Acholonu 1995, 108–09). Alice Walker’s Womanism is criticized: … because her womanist is first and foremost a lesbian. Thus, Black feminism has become synonymous with lesbian. This is a negative development, especially for those for whom lesbianism is a taboo. (Acholonu 1995, 89)

The theory of Molara Ogundipe (formerly Ogundipe-Leslie), also from Nigeria, takes a completely different direction. In 1994, she coined the word Stiwanism (Ogundipe 1994, 207–41). STIWA is an acronym for ‘Social Transformation Including Women in Africa’. The concept takes men and women as equal partners in Africa’s social transformation. In an interview Ogundipe states: I wanted to stress the fact that what we want in Africa is social transformation. It’s not about warring with the men, the reversal of role, or doing to men whatever women think that men have been doing for centuries, but it is trying to build a harmonious society. The transformation of African society is the responsibility of both men and women and it is also in their interest. (Ogundipe quoted in Adebayo 1996, 1)

Ogundipe explains that a new term was needed, since feminism is ‘a red rag’ for the African man (Ogundipe 2015, 283). Stiwanism was coined to escape the heated discourse on feminism in Africa and accusations of being ‘westernized’. But a conceptual distinction from ‘Western’ feminist theory is also important to Ogundipe. In her concept, motherhood remains a central value, and she emphasizes that women do not have to negate their biological role (Ogundipe 2015, 278). She asserts that a focus on African values is a precondition for increasing the social acceptance of feminist theories and movements in African societies. However, Ogundipe points out that the conditions of women in Africa should be analysed in the overall context

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of the production and reproduction of society. The basis of her analysis is not an abstract image of a precolonial African culture but specific historical and economic conditions. Stiwanism is a holistic as well as intersectional approach: Ogundipe insists that the entirety of the conditions under which women in Africa live must be addressed; a focus on gender issues alone is not sufficient. African feminism must deal with multidimensional structures of oppression, especially with the question of Africa’s economic and political dependencies in the world economy and its influence on the situation of women. Ogundipe refers to these structures as ‘the six mountains on the back of African women’: colonialism and neocolonialism, oppression by traditional structures, the backwardness of the African woman, the African man, racism, and feelings of inferiority internalized by women (Ogundipe 2015, 281). The condition of women in Africa should be analysed in the overall context of the production and reproduction of society, and, thus, also in a way that considers the situation of men and children. The social realities of African women are shaped by different systems and practices of domination. Since oppression is structural, the gender question must be included in all processes of social transformation. Moreover, Ogundipe emphasizes the importance of women’s participation in all areas of social transformation. Gender relations can only be changed if the conditions of the social framework as such are changed—both in the global and in the intra-African context. Ogundipe’s Stiwanism emphasizes not only the anticolonial critique but also the necessity of a critical analysis of intra-African conditions of exploitation and a cultural conservatism that goes hand in hand with rigid gender roles and homophobia (Ogundipe 1994, 282). Somewhat less known than the three theories mentioned above is the concept of ‘Nego-feminism’ by the Nigerian theorist Obioma Nnaemeka. ‘Nego’ refers to both ‘negotiation’ and ‘no-ego feminism’, i.e. a feminism that is not self-centred (Nnaemeka 2004, 360–61). Nnaemeka argues that the principle of negotiation— despite the continent’s diversity, which she emphasizes—is a key value in indigenous societies and cultures in Africa, as a principle of give and take, compromise, and balance or restoration of communal harmony. Here she refers, among other things, to proverbs of different African peoples (Nnaemeka 2004, 276). African feminisms—Nnaemeka repeatedly emphasizes the plurality of feminist theory in Africa (see Nnaemeka 1998, 5 and 2004, 360)—are basically characterized by a readiness to negotiate and compromise: African feminism (or feminism as I have seen it practiced in Africa) challenges through negotiations and compromise. It knows when, where, and how to detonate patriarchal land mines; it also knows when, where, and how to go around patriarchal land mines. In other words, it knows when, where, and how to negotiate with or negotiate around patriarchy in different contexts. (Nnaemeka 2004, 378)

Nnaemeka sums up the distinguishing features of African feminism (in contrast to ‘Western’ feminism) as follows: 1. African feminism is not radical feminism.

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2. Especially the rejection of motherhood by radical feminism is foreign to African feminism. 3. The language of African feminism, which aims at negotiation and collaboration, is different from the language of ‘Western’ feminism, which is about deconstruction, challenge, and interference. 4. There is resistance to the focus of ‘Western feminism on sexuality. 5. There are different priorities; questions of class, race, or sexual orientation are not at the top of the list of priorities for African feminists. 6. African feminists reject the exclusion of men from women’s issues and want to include them in the problem-solving process. 7. There is resistance to the claim of universal validity of ‘Western’ terms and concepts (Nnaemeka 1998, 6–8). Nnaemeka’s concept is a holistic approach to both the analysis of the situation of African women and the search for solutions. She emphasizes contextuality and intersectionality. However, she tries to shift the intersectional approach from an ontological understanding of race, gender, class, ethnicity, sexuality, religion, culture, nationality, etc. to a normative understanding. In this context she speaks of ‘functional imperatives’ (Nnaemeka 2004, 261). At its core, Nego-feminism is about a shift from a primarily historical focus on origins and genealogy to a focus on the present and actions that encompass both present and past: being and becoming, ontology, and evolution. In this respect, African feminism is explicitly understood by Nnaemeka as a theory and practice. ‘It seems to me that for African women, to be or to think feminist is to act feminist’ (Nnaemeka 1998, 5). To sum it up, the goal of all the concepts presented so far is to establish an autonomous African alternative to ‘white’ as well as African-American feminism. Gender relations are perceived and analysed in the context of complex power relations, the change of which can only be achieved together with men. All four theories do not claim to be universal and do not pretend to speak for all women, but are explicitly concepts for the emancipation of Black women and men. All of the approaches introduced so far are closely related to African values, culture, and skin colour. In other words, they are in varying degrees (completely in the case of Motherism) characterized by particularist features which show close parallels to core features of ethnophilosophy (as it is exemplified in the works of such authors as Kagame, Mbiti, Menkiti, and the Négritude of such writers as Senghor) which include the argument that African societies are community-oriented and less oriented towards the individual; the existence of a ‘maternal spirit of comprehensive integration’; willingness to compromise; and, particularly, that African theories for the emancipation of women are claimed to be ‘mother-centred’. The outstanding example here is, of course, Acholonu’s concept of Motherism, which shows not only features of cultural but even of biological essentialism, which assigns women a clear social role based on their biological sex—completely detached from historical, economic, or other social aspects. Moreover, its homophobia, and the extremely uncritical treatment of precolonial African social conditions,

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which are portrayed in an almost romanticized way, make Acholonu’s concept of Motherism particularly problematic. Before we turn to examples of inter-African critique on such ethnophilosophical tendencies in African feminist theory, let me briefly present two theories which are at least partially based on anthropological case studies.

2  A  nthropological Approaches: Oyèrónkè Oyĕwùmí and Nkiru Nzegwu Oyèrónkè Oyĕwùmí and Nkiru Nzegwu (both from Nigeria) are among the most prominent African feminist thinkers today. They critique ‘Western’ feminist theories’ claim of universal validity, as well as those theories’ central theses and categories, in particular the thesis that all societies perceive the body in a gender-specific way and classify men and women into social categories on the basis of this assumption (see, among others, Oyĕwùmí 1997, 175), and the assumption that socially assigned gender roles are always accompanied by mechanisms of oppression. Using case studies, they show that this thesis does not apply to Africa, or at least not to the African societies they are concerned with. One of the forerunners of such criticism is the Nigerian ethnologist Ifi Amadiume. She argues that Africa had a unique matriarchal system of social values that also had an effect of neutralizing biological gendering. Her anthropological study Male Daughters, Female Husbands (1987b) characterizes the gender system of the precolonial Nnobi culture (a subgroup of the Igbo in Nigeria) as flexible or neutered; that is, social roles were not rigidly masculinized or feminized (Amadiume 1987a, b, 185). In her study, Amadiume shows that a dichotomous understanding of gender is a ‘Western’ construct not found in precolonial Africa. Sex and gender were not necessarily identical in the society she investigated, but the society of Nnobi Igbo was characterized rather by fluid male and female social roles. Amadiume stresses the economic independence of Igbo women and the various titles and functions that women were able to acquire. She argues that colonialism led to the erosion of these institutions and increasingly pushed women into a marginalized social and political situation. The Nigerian sociologist Oyèrónkè Oyĕwùmí also intends to counter the prejudice that women in Africa have always been economically powerless and politically without influence. In her award-winning book The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourses (1997), she explains the problems and dangers of uncritically transferring ‘Western’ categories and theories to other cultures. She argues, like Amadiume, that the gender discourse that dominates the ‘Western’ feminist interpretation of society is ultimately a particularist discourse that should not be uncritically transferred to other cultures. The current application of the concept of gender as a universal and timeless category is closely linked to the dominance of European/North American culture in the global system and cannot be

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viewed in isolation from the biological determinism underlying the ‘Western’ system of knowledge. Based on her studies of the social structure and language of the Oyo-Yoruba, she concludes that in the precolonial society of the Yoruba, social relations and hierarchies do not derive their legitimacy from biological conditions: ‘Biological facts do not determine who can become the monarch or who can trade in the market’ (Oyĕwùmí 1997, 12). It is not anatomical differences that defined social positions but rather the affiliation to a certain line of kinship and the principle of seniority, i.e. the age of a person (Oyĕwùmí 1997, 13). Age as the basis of social classification has the advantage that no group is permanently disadvantaged because age, unlike gender, is a dynamic category. With increasing age, the social position and influence of a person change. Oyĕwùmí argues that in the Oyo-Yoruba community, no link has been established between the biological body (sex) and the social body (gender). Age and the integration into a certain line of kinship were important in determining the social position of the individual. Accordingly, analyses of internal power structures and oppression must not be based on gender roles but on the position within the structure of a kinship line and age privileges. Oyĕwùmí’s analysis explicitly refers to the society of the Oyo-Yoruba before colonization. Since then, the non-patriarchal social structure and the prevailing ethical values and norms were changed, particularly during the colonial period, for example, by the colonial state. Here only male leaders were recognized as representatives of their communities, whereas female leaders were increasingly deprived of legitimacy, for example, by discrimination in access to education, by the introduction of private land ownership that was only available to men, or by the masculinization of the Yoruba gods and Yoruba history in the process of writing and translating it into English (Oyĕwùmí 1997, 121–56). Oyĕwùmí argues that linguistic studies show that anatomical differences had no effect on social roles. The Yoruba language is gender-neutral; certain words that are taken for granted in English are missing. For example, there are no gender-specific words to describe son and daughter (but rather only the neutral ‘offspring’) or brother and sister (but rather only ‘siblings’). Likewise, the construct of ‘women’ as a social group with shared interests and a common social position subordinate to men did not exist in this community before contact with the West. Oyĕwùmí concludes: ‘The creation of “women” as a category was one of the first accomplishments of the colonial state’ (Oyĕwùmí 1997, 124). The uncritical application of English categories has contributed to a ‘patriarchalization’ of the history and culture of the Yoruba. Gender categories penetrated to the heart of Yoruba discourse, and too little has been done to expose the misinterpretations related to the usage of foreign categories. Too little attention has been paid to linguistic differences between Yoruba and English. The fatal adoption of foreign categories in the description of African contexts has not only semantic implications but also epistemological ones: Intellectual tools (concepts, patterns of thought, methods) influence the kind of knowledge that is produced by shaping our thought and our research—and ultimately our political practice.

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The Nigerian philosopher Nkiru Uwechia Nzegwu uses a similar analytical strategy in her book Family Matters: Feminist Concepts in African Philosophy of Culture (2006), although she bases her analysis on Igbo society. Nzegwu criticizes generalizations about Africa, which in her view do not do justice to the cultural diversity of the continent. She argues that the unhistorical and decontextualized image of ‘the African woman’ and ‘the African family’ is the result of colonial interpretations and distortions. In these constructs, which are universally accepted as valid for all of Africa, women are assigned a subordinate position to men. Moreover, it is claimed that in precolonial times, ‘the African family’ was organized along patriarchal structures, an idea shared by ‘Western’ feminists as well as African men (Nzegwu 2006, 18). Nzegwu argues that precolonial Igbo society was a genderless society that was displaced by Western colonial powers, who introduced gender roles and gender discrimination where previously none existed. Today’s patriarchal structures are the result of a fundamental structural change that Igbo society has undergone since 1854, when the first missionaries of the British Church Missionary Society settled in the Igbo area. Colonial law and the new ethical and legal norms imposed by colonialism led to the current gender injustice in Igbo society and in the new nation state of Nigeria. Nzegwu develops a non-patriarchal, non-gendered portrait of Igbo society, where seniority and lineage were more fundamental determinants of social status than gender. She describes fluid identities and changing hierarchies, which could constantly change with age, family circumstances (marriage, maternity), as well as new family or political responsibilities, for example, if one became head of a household, a member of the Ikporo Onitsha (Council of Mothers), or an Omu (female monarch): These ever-shifting hierarchies and fluid identities mean that no one is permanently stuck in a position of dominance. We agree we are biologically different from men, and men are different from women. But these biological differences are not rooted in power or ideological ranking and so the idea of sex differentiation does not imply the subjugation of women as a group […]. (Nzegwu 2006, 185)

Nzegwu also emphasizes the importance of women’s economic independence. Even after marriage, all profits from an Igbo woman’s business belonged exclusively to herself (Nzegwu 2006, 179). In contrast to the social significance of such precolonial Igbo women’s political institutions as the Omu (a female monarch) and the Ikporo Onitsha (Council of Mothers), most ethnological descriptions surprisingly omit women and their political representation. Nzegwu suspects that the patriarchal European views of ethnologists, missionaries, and colonial officials, who assumed women to be socially subordinate and unimportant, rendered Europeans unable to perceive the importance of these female political institutions (Nzegwu 2006, 182). Therefore, Europeans failed to grasp that the Omu and Ikporo Onitsha had the same political influence as the Obi (male monarch) and his advisors on community decisions. The consent of the Ikporo Onitsha was necessary in decisions of importance for the entire community (Nzegwu 2006, 188). The male-privileging policy of colonialism, which ensured that only men could act as contacts in negotiation or as informants,

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undermined the role of the Council of Mothers and led to its quasi-abolition at the end of the nineteenth century. Like Oyĕwùmí, Nzegwu does not stop with the description of the non-patriarchal and non-gendered structures of Igbo society, but uses linguistic peculiarities as well to prove her arguments. For example, Nzegwu shows that the category ‘woman’ does not exist in the Igbo language (Nzegwu 2006, 205). Prior to colonial rule, Igbo society was characterized by a dual-sex system based on separate male and female lines of government (2006, 15, 192ff) in which political, economic, and social relations were distinct but interdependent and balanced in power (2006, 15, 192ff.). From this social system, Nzegwu derives a concept of complementary equality. In contrast to the Western feminist model of gender equality, which defines equality as equal rights for men and women (men’s rights being the yardstick), the complementary model of equality is oriented on the universal equality of all humans, but at the same time takes biological differences between men and women into consideration. Out of respect for those differences, a society that embraces complementary equality must create conditions for men and women that accommodate the specific interests and needs of both sexes (2006, 199ff). To sum up, Oyĕwùmí and Nzegwu undoubtedly deserve credit for having courageously and fundamentally challenged the idea of gender as a universal category, thus taking a major step towards conceptual decolonization and creating a new understanding of the history and role of women in Africa. Central to their critique is an examination of the imposition of European epistemologies and categories in the process of describing African social structures and concepts. Basically, they argue, European colonialism in Africa has led not only to a de facto destruction of existing social structures but also to a distorted representation of precolonial conditions. The ‘patriarchal lens’ of ‘Western’ ethnographers (and also of ‘Western’ feminists) has often led to a misrepresentation of family relations and social roles in the different African societies. Both Oyĕwùmí and Nzegwu argue that the oppression of anatomically female persons on the basis of their biological sex is a relatively new phenomenon in the respective African societies they studied. Here it can be shown that gender, particularly the idea of the subordinate position of women, was ultimately introduced by European colonial policy, missionaries, and colonial officials. What is today considered ‘traditional’ or ‘indigenous’ is largely an invention of colonialism. The ‘invention of traditions’ has serious consequences—not only with regard to writing the history of precolonial societies but also with regard to the everyday life of many African women today, their rights, and the conditions of their personal development. Oyĕwùmí’s book has been the subject of controversy in recent years. A central and especially critical point which was raised is related to the question of method. For example, the sufficiency of the linguistic basis for such far-reaching assertions about precolonial gender relations has been called into question: How is it possible to draw conclusions about precolonial social relations on the basis of language, an entity which is subject to permanent change on its own? Moreover, there is discomfort with the argument that there is a precolonial original meaning of certain words, an original meaning that was falsified under the influence of colonialism and

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improper translation into English (Bakare-Yusuf 2004, 68). The idea of static original meanings often leads to an essentialist approach. Bakare-Yusuf also argues that Oyĕwùmí did not properly consider that the seniority principle works equally well within the framework of a patrilineal system (Bakare-Yusuf 2004, 63). Moreover, Oyĕwùmí’s work does not address internal power relations and mechanisms of oppression, problems of the abuse of power by women, or violence by women against women. Such problems must not be ignored (see Nnaemeka 1998, 1920). A partially romanticized image of precolonial African societies can also be imputed to both Oyĕwùmí and Nzegwu, particularly since they ignore those power structures in precolonial African societies which offered ‘connecting points’ for the ‘Western’ patriarchal system. Bakare-Yusuf particularly stresses that a concealment of indigenous structures of power and oppression is not helpful in increasing the agency of African women.

3  Invented Traditions and Women Rights Invented traditions cause several problems, for example, in the sphere of law. Here the restriction of women’s rights in order to protect cultural rights and traditions of a certain community is widely criticized by African feminist scholars. Such cases are not uncommon in legal practice in Africa and include land and inheritance rights, and women’s access to education, health care, and jobs. This is precisely where the analyses of the Zimbabwean legal scholar Fareda Banda come in. In an increasingly globalized world, which does not leave questions of jurisdiction untouched, the question of the relationship between local values, local legal practices, and global standards, such as human rights, has taken on a new urgency. Banda points to the fact that the major debates about universality versus particularity in social sciences and humanities in Africa run along the gender line. So-called customary law plays a central role in this field of tension. During the period of colonialism, a new legal system was imposed on the colonies that was oriented on the model of the metropolises. The scope of this newly introduced law extended mainly to the public sphere. In the private sphere, colonized people were allowed to follow their own legal concepts and systems of norms and values, not least because of massive resistance and the difficulty of controlling this sphere of life. In contrast to public law, so-called customary law was limited to the private sphere and deemed ‘traditional’ or premodern and considered the sphere of cultural particularities. It referred primarily to aspects of personal law such as marriage, divorce, child rearing, inheritance, and property rights—areas that particularly affect the lives of women. Hence, during the colonial period, two legal systems coexisted and enforced a division between the public and private spheres. The rules of customary law were created on the basis of indigenous, orally transmitted legal and moral concepts. For the purpose of standardization, such rules were transcribed by ethnologists and colonial officials. In this process, mainly men served as informants and advisors. For this reason, it is not surprising that a male

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interpretation of norms, values, and the understanding of indigenous law has prevailed, Banda argues; many other female African scholars share her (see among others). They argue that the process of establishing customary law or so-called ‘cultural rights’ stands on a selective, one-sided perception of the rules, norms, and values of a particular indigenous community by (male) colonial officials and (male) informants. This inevitably led to a change of social rules, norms, and values: They were not only adapted to the interests of the colonial power but also interpreted in a patriarchal way. Banda calls this process a reinterpretation or redefinition of traditional law (Banda 2003, 8). Women were not included in this process, and therefore, customary law cannot be regarded as gender-neutral. Customary law is an example par excellence of the ‘ethnological view’ and the invention of a culture. At the same time, it has a number of direct effects, not only on the image of ‘African women’ and their role in precolonial times but also on the concrete life of African women here and now, who are deprived of former social rights, roles, and positions on the basis of an imagined customary law and system of values. This is why feminist scholars rightly complain that ‘respect for cultural values’ has become a euphemism for the prevention of women’s rights (Moller Okin 1998, 36). Decisive questions in this context are: What is a tradition or a culture? What significance do traditions have for the community? Who has the power to decide what is considered worth preserving and what is not? Must individual rights, especially women’s and children’s rights, be sacrificed in order to preserve cultural values and norms? And why? These are explosive questions that require political and legal answers. The problem is further complicated by the fact that the preservation of cultural rights is seen as part of a process of decolonization and liberation from the illegitimate claim to universality of a European and thus particularistic world view.2 With respect to Africa, Banda considers two documents of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to be an important step towards securing the rights of women in Southern Africa, namely, the Gender and Development Declaration (1997) and the Declaration on Violence Against Women (1998). Both declarations are based on the UN Declaration of Human Rights and aim to achieve the goals of the World Conference on Women in Beijing (1995). They intend to abolish discrimination against women by abolishing discriminatory laws, to eliminate violence against women and children, and to promote gender justice as a 2  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and further UN resolutions and conventions guarantee the right to free cultural development. For example, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), a multilateral treaty adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 16 December 1966, confirms the right of all peoples to self-determination, including the right to freely shape one’s own cultural development. The Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (UNGA 1992) also stipulates that ‘Persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities … have the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, and to use their own language, in private and in public, freely and without interference or any form of discrimination’ (Article 2.1). However, the ICESCR also underlines that equality between women and men must also be protected in the area of cultural rights.

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fundamental right. This includes the political participation of women, equal rights with regard to inheritance and land rights, improved access to health care and education, and the right to work and be adequately paid. At no point in these declarations are concessions made to ‘cultural’ rights. Rather, the declarations aim to empower women to participate in the process of negotiating norms and values. They take a clearly universalistic position—in contrast to a cultural relativistic one which justifies gender discrimination as part of a minority culture. Banda summarizes her own position as follows: Ultimately, what matters is not whether we attach the label “universal” or “relativist”, “northern” or “southern”, but that all change feeds into the goal of according to women worldwide their full humanity. (Banda 2003, 19)

South African theorist Desiree Lewis explicitly argues that an approach based on anthropological studies is an obstacle to progress in gender studies because it tries to inscribe a radical difference between ‘Western’ and African societies. In such an approach, African women are portrayed as static, albeit with glorifying intent. In her argument, Lewis notes that Amadiume’s analysis, which describes the power women held in precolonial Igbo society (Lewis 2004, 29), reflects a structural functionalism, since it deals primarily with kinship lines and family. During recent decades, anthropological discourse has shaped entire research agendas and frameworks of interpretation that still determine research on African women today. An example is the essentializing way in which African women are represented, e.g. in Acholonu’s Motherism and its claim that African feminism is heterosexual and pro-natal. An obsession with cultural difference shapes such theoretical approaches. The problem with these discourses is the assumption that concepts and their meaning can be clearly distinguished from the repertoire of a globalized culture, a culture that has been shaped by ‘Western’ dominance for centuries. However, according to Lewis, language, terminology, and theory are irrevocably ‘Creole’ in Africa (Lewis 2004, 31). What we define as pre- or postcolonial today will always be entangled in ‘Western’ discursive practices. This dilemma can best be addressed not by trying to overcome hybridization as ‘contaminated’ but by recognizing and working with it to develop new modes and theories. Lewis also criticizes the Afrocentrism of these concepts, as in the case of Motherism, which attempts to build African unity on the basis of conservative gender and class hierarchies. Here the unity of previously colonized Black men and women is ostensibly evoked, thereby undermining the differences that exist between men and women in the struggle for resources, power and honour, or opportunities for self-realization. The consensus between Black men and women in the fight against colonialism and neocolonialism should not hinder the analysis of gender hierarchies. There is no reason to prefer one type of oppression to another; rather both ‘Western’ feminism and patriarchal oppression in Africa should be addressed and criticized. If a racial or national identity is preferred and structural inequalities between men and women are ignored in postcolonial African politics, power relations are cemented, and changes on the continent are suppressed and stifled (Lewis 2004, 31).

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At this point, Lewis’ critique resembles Paulin Hountondji’s famously rigorous analysis of ethnophilosophy Hountondji 1997 [1983], which raised several similar objections. One of them is that ethnophilosophy is a system of thought that deals with collective worldviews of people and pursues a homogeneous understanding of a community accompanied by an essentializing concept of African culture. Hountondji rightly points to the problem that such a presumption of unanimity hides internal contradictions on the one hand, and the plurality of positions on the other. Thus, the idea of shared African cultural values and norms excludes everybody who does not belong to the designated form of cultural identity prescribed as authentically African (Hountondji 1989, 22). Motherism—as an extreme in the wide range of African gender theories—designates both Africans with homosexual orientations and African women who do not focus their life around being a mother as ‘un-African’. Other theories share similar problems in a varying degree.3 Hountondji shows that one aspect of the problem stems from the fact that ethnophilosophy is in large part a response to ‘Western’ views of African thought which are uncritically affirmed. He describes it as a continuation of the imperial practice of exoticizing and othering African modes of thought established within colonial times. And thus, he emphatically calls for redirecting the discourse away from ethnographic descriptions and ethnological studies, and making it independent from Europe. Lewis’ counter-suggestion goes in a similar direction: In order to prevent the fragmentation of knowledge as it arises from the dominant anthropological discourse, communication between scientists, students, and researchers must be deepened, and, above all, a strongly interdisciplinary approach must be adopted in order to be able to do justice to the complexity of the questions and problems being considered. Interdisciplinary exchange is not yet developed as far as is necessary in the field of African women’s and gender studies. The main obstacle here is the university, which hardly supports research beyond the borders of conventional disciplines. Interdisciplinary work is committed to the transformation of gender relations. Here it is recognized that power relations between men and women are complex, multidimensional, and mutually pervasive, and will therefore require different tools and perspectives to shed light on these complex problems.

References Abbas, Hakima, and Sokari Ekine, eds. 2013. Queer African Reader. Nairobi: Pambazuka Press. Acholonu, Catherine. 1995. Motherism: The Afrocentric Alternative to Feminism. Owerri: Afa Publications. Adebayo, Aduke, ed. 1996. Feminism and Black Women’s Creative Writing: Theory–Practice– Criticism. Ibadan: AMD Publishers.

3  African queer theory, for example, criticizes particularly the homophobic stance of quite a number of African gender theorists (see Abbas and Ekine 2013).

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Amadiume, Ifi. 1987a. African Matriarchal Foundations: The Igbo Case. London: Karnak House. ———. 1987b. Male Daughters, Female Husbands: Gender and Sex in an African Society. London: Zed Books. Arndt, Susan. 2000. African Gender Trouble and African Womanism: An Interview with Chikwenye Ogunyemi and Wanjira Muthoni. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 25 (3): 709–726. Bakare-Yusuf, Bibi. 2004. “Yorubas Don't Do Gender”: A Critical Review of Oyèrónkè Oyĕwùmí's The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourse. In African Gender Scholarship: Concepts, Methodologies and Paradigms, ed. Signe Arnfred, 61–81. Dakar/Oxford: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa/African Books Collective. Banda, Fareda. 2003. Global Standards: Local Values. International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 171: 1–27. Collins, Patricia Hill. 1991. Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment. New York: Routledge. Crenshaw, Kimberlé. 1989. Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics. University of Chicago Legal Forum 139 (1): 139–167. Hountondji, Paulin. 1997 [1983]. African Philosophy: Myth and Reality. 2nd English ed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. ———. 1989. Occidentalism, Elitism: Two Answers to Two Critiques. Quest: Philosophical Discussions, An International African Journal of Philosophy 3 (2): 3–30. Kolawole, Mary E.M. 1997. Womanism and African Consciousness. Trenton: Africa World Press. Lewis, Desiree. 2004. African Gender Research and Postcoloniality: Legacies and Challenges. In African Gender Scholarship: Concepts, Methodologies and Paradigms, ed. Signe Arnfred, 27–41. Dakar/Oxford: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa/ African Books Collective. Masolo, Dismas A. 2010. Ethnophilosophy. In The Oxford Encyclopedia of African Thought, ed. F. Abiola Irele and Biodun Jeyifo, vol. 1, 357–361. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Moller Okin, Susann. 1998. ‘Feminism, Women’s Human Rights, and Cultural Differences.’ In Hypatia 13 (2): 32–52. Nnaemeka, Obioma. 1998. Introduction: Reading the Rainbow. In Sisterhood, Feminisms, and Power: From Africa to the Diaspora, ed. Obioma Nnaemeka, 1–35. Trenton: Africa World Press. ———. 2004. Nego-Feminism: Theorizing, Practicing, and Pruning Africa’s Way. Signs 29 (2): 357–385. Nzegwu, Nkiru. 2006. Family Matters: Feminist Concepts in African Philosophy of Culture. Albany: State University of New York Press. Ogundipe-Leslie, Molara. 1994. Stiwanism: Feminism in an African Context. In Recreating Ourselves: African Women and Critical Transformations, 207–241. Trenton: African World Press. ———. 2015. Stiwanismus: Feminismus im afrikanischen Kontext. In Afrikanische politische Philosophie, ed. Franziska Dübgen and Stefan Skupien, 260–291. Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag. Ogunyemi, Chikwenye Okonjo. 1985. Womanism: The Dynamics of the Contemporary Black Female Novel in English. Journal of Women in Culture and Society 11 (1): 63–80. ———. 1988. Women and Nigerian Literature. In Perspectives on Nigerian Literature, Vol 1, ed. Yemi Ogunbiyi, 60–67. Lagos: Guardian Books. ———. 1995. African Wo/man Palaver: The Nigerian Novel by Women. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Oyěwùmí, Oyèrónkẹ́. 1997. The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourses. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. UNGA. 1992. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/minorities.aspxUNGA

The Ethno-Philosophical Foundation of Pantaleon Iroegbu’s Uwa Ontology: A Hermeneutic Investigation Jude I. Onebunne

Abstract  The basic fundamental problem of being is deeply rooted in the conceptualization of being as it concerns its valid meaning, proper understanding and authentic application. The emergence of contemporary African metaphysicists, in the chequered history of African philosophy, allows for a coordinated attention to this age-long ­problem on the proper idea, apt understanding and fitting meaning of being in other philosophical traditions. This work is on a metaphysical issue which necessitates a few basic questions that confront this paper thus: What is being? What is Uwa ontology? Is Uwa ontology an alternative theory of being? What is the basis and source of Uwa ontology? In ­contemporary African metaphysics, Pantaleon Iroegbu assiduously understood and appreciated Uwa ontology as the African metaphysicist’s framework for a reassessment of the Western appreciation of being as the ground-breaking subject matter for the entire philosophical enterprise. The concept of Uwa for Iroegbu, deeply rooted in his sociocultural milieu and ingrained in the Igbo-African weltanschauung, rightly expresses being as holistic reality. Using the method of hermeneutics, this paper tries to locate and ­situate Uwa ontology as a metaphysical offshoot sprouting from an ethno-philosophical foundation and background. Uwa ontology, deeply rooted and reflected in Theophilus Okere’s philosophemes, therefore, is Pantaleon Iroegbu’s attempt at universalizing the concept of being both in its Africanity and philosophicality. Keywords  Being · Ethno-philosophy · Uwa ontology · African metaphysics · Hermeneutics · Philosophemes

1  Introduction Philosophy is traditionally understood as philosophia, and it is classically defined as cognitio rerum per altissimas causas, solar rationis, that is, science that studies all things in their ultimate and universal principles. Equally, it is scientia rerum per J. I. Onebunne (*) Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Agada (ed.), Ethnophilosophy and the Search for the Wellspring of African Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78897-1_15

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ultima causas, that is, knowledge of things through their ultimate causes. It is, therefore, a human enterprise. This is why philosophia is transliterated love (philos) of wisdom (sophia). At any point man seeks to know with an unaided reasoning and understands effectively the reason and wisdom behind every reality, philosophy is involved and at play. Philosophy is an attempt at personal comprehension, trying to fathom or understand one’s own environment. As Okere (1983, 114) will say: “Philosophy is an effort at self understanding, a giving of meaning to one’s own world and existence. It is always ‘my’ philosophy – in other words, a first-person effort”. Hence, Maritain (2005, 72) maintains that philosophy is the highest of human sciences, that is, of the sciences which know things by the natural light of reason. The basic fundamental problem of being is deeply rooted in the conceptualization of being as it concerns its valid meaning, proper understanding and authentic application. Pantaleon Iroegbu assiduously understood and appreciated Uwa ontology as the African metaphysicist’s framework for a reassessment of the Western appreciation of being as the ground-breaking subject matter for the entire philosophical enterprise. The concept of Uwa for Iroegbu, deeply rooted in his sociocultural milieu and ingrained in the Igbo-African weltanschauung, rightly expresses being as holistic reality. Using the method of hermeneutics, this paper tries to locate and situate Uwa ontology as a metaphysical offshoot sprouting from an ethno-­ philosophical foundation and background.

2  Biographical Profile of Pantaleon Iroegbu Pantaleon Iroegbu (1951–2006) is, in my opinion, one of the finest African philosophers of the twentieth century. Paradoxically, he is not well known. He is an Igbo thinker from the south-eastern region, precisely from Umueze-Umunumo, Ehime Mbano, Imo State, Nigeria. Iroegbu had his primary education at St. Charles’ School Umunumo (1959–1965). Later, he gained admission into Immaculate Conception Seminary, Umuahia, Abia State, where he sat for and got his Ordinary Level (O level) and Advanced Level (A level) in the General Certificate Examinations. He proceeded to Bigard Memorial Seminary, Enugu (1973–1980), for his Diploma in Philosophical Studies and Bachelor of Theology and graduated with first-class honours. Having been ordained a Catholic priest in 1980, Iroegbu was sent for further studies at the Catholic University of Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. There, he bagged his master’s degree in Philosophy and Ecclesiastical Sciences with corresponding double doctorate degrees within a short time. His doctoral dissertations were titled Communalism: A Theory of Justice for Contemporary African Communities (Philosophy) and Theology and Community: Through Narrative Theology to an African Ecclesiology (Theology). These works, exercises in Afrocentricism, were upheld as original contributions to African philosophico-theological studies. With his academic background deeply rooted in African realities (thoughts and culture) and as a very prolific writer, a sound academic, an avowed original thinker, Iroegbu

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worked as a lecturer at the Seat of Wisdom Seminary, Owerri (an affiliate of Urbanian Universitas, Rome, as well as Imo State University, Owerri), and later at the Major Seminary of All Saints, Uhiele, Ekpoma (an affiliate of the University of Benin). He developed and manifested his great interest in African philosophy and African studies when many of his contemporaries were pessimistically branding African philosophy mere cultural-philosophy, philosophical sagacity, nationalist-­ ideological philosophy, etc., and doubting the possibility of African philosophy. Iroegbu has contributed significantly to African philosophy through his astute critical engagement with African cultural phenomena in all his philosophical works. He defended the general understanding of philosophy as the global participation of all realities and entities in the general fact and understanding of being as being whether in African, Asian or Western philosophy. Hence, his critical engagement, rooted in his cultural milieu and continental worldview, made him to propound philosophical and theological theories like Enwisdomization and Uwa ontology. His works include Communalism: The Kpim of Politics, Metaphysics: The Kpim of Philosophy and The Kpim of Time: Eternity. Iroegbu died in 2006 while completing a work on time titled African Concept of Time.

3  On Ethno-Philosophy Many African scholars opine that the term ethno-philosophy was first used by Kwame Nkrumah, although it is Paulin Hountondji who first defined it as a combination of ethnography and philosophy. Ethno-philosophy was, and still is, regarded by some African philosophers as a debased form of philosophy that is no different from mere ethnic worldviews (Agada 2019). Osuagwu (2010, 28) note that “the major argument is that Africans lack the natural faculty and cultural capacity of reason, and so could not have formally philosophized or historicized”. Ethno-­ philosophy defined as such is philosophy that is based on the works of ethnographers, sociologists and anthropologists; it is the view that African worldviews as well as myths and folklores constitute part of African philosophy. Ethno-philosophy is a reaction against the age-old bias that Africans lacked a civilization and history. Ethno-philosophy etymologically is derived from ethnos and philosophia. Hence, it is the philosophy of the ethnos. It is ethnos philosophy. The Greek word ethnos means a multitude or a nation. For Merriam-Webster online dictionary, the Greek word ethnos means nation, people, caste and tribe and is akin to Greek ethos meaning custom. Philosophy as love of wisdom does not just happen or falls from the sky; it is a human enterprise and engages one with his sociocultural milieu alongside other realities confronting his existence as homo sapiens as well as homo loquens and, more, as homo cogitans and animal culturalis. According to Iroegbu (1994, 129), “no author has to my knowledge declared that there can be no African Philosophy”. The problem has been in Iroegbu’s perspective thus: is the bulk of what is called African philosophy by their authors, readers or researchers genuine philosophy and genuine African philosophy? Are the

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tradition-­based narratives in the texts of Placide Tempels, Alexis Kagame and John Mbiti as well as the political thoughts of L.S. Senghor, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere and Nnamdi Azikiwe really philosophical in a sense or a mere collection of stories? However, no serious mind will doubt the philosophical dexterity and critical status of authors and scholars like Paulin Hountondji, Theophilus Okere, Kwasi Wiredu, Peter Bodunrin, Odera Oruka and Pantaleon Iroegbu to mention but a few. The first group mentioned above were classified as ethno-philosophers with the implication that they were not proper philosophers. The second group were regarded as professional or real philosophers. Nevertheless, as Oguejiofor and Onah (2005, ix) assert, “whatever one may say of Placide Tempels, one has to admit that it was his work Bantu Philosophy that initiated that debate”, that is, the debate surrounding the existence and non-existence of African philosophy and, consequently, its source. Ethno-philosophy, therefore, is the tribal, communal response, cultural view or customary critical view of a people. Every philosophy, right from the dawn of the history of philosophy, emanates from the peoples’ appreciation of environmental realities around them. Whatever is around a people becomes the primary source of their critical views and appreciation. Philosophy as the critical worldview of the people or ethnos remains according to Okere (1983, 18) the hermeneutics of culture. To philosophize, therefore, is to interpret the way of life of the people embedded in their belief system and customs. Philosophy, therefore, is interpretation of culture. It is a clarification and explanation of the way and life of a people. Within the culture of the people as ethnos exists raw philosophical materials for critical engagement which Okere Theophilus refers to as philosophemes. Onebunne (2019, 22) adds that: “Philosophemes is a concept used by Theophilus Okere which represents those cultural materials, data or givens that we use in philosophizing. It is the cultural and natural realities which are veritable products for philosophical enterprise”. According to Okere (1983, 120): [W]e assert, however, that in black Africa there exists a reservoir of cultural philosophemes from which any future philosopher can inspire himself or borrow his share of philosophical raw material. In such a culture a philosopher can plant his root and from inside it, and as forming part of it, develop a philosophy with his culture as non- philosophical background.

Ethno-philosophy to this extent cuts across every known philosophical tradition of the globe. Yet, Hountondji (1996) has dismissed ethno-philosophy as myth, with arbitrary interpretations and no texts. Hountondji regrettably concludes that Bantu philosophy and the likes are myths that have to be definitively destroyed if real philosophy can ever take roots in Africa. The pertinent question is: from where, then, should African philosophy take roots if not in African people’s culture and worldviews? Instructively, Hountondji himself has confessed that “we Africans can probably today recover philosophical fragments from oral literature” (1996, 106). Uwa ontology is Iroegbu’s response to what reality or, better put, being is all about in African metaphysics. For Iroegbu (1995, 338), Uwa ontology speaks to the “formulation of the fundamental question of reality as it confronts one as a human person, above all, as an African person”. African metaphysics is a main branch of African philosophy that has depended heavily on ethno-philosophical resources.

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Uwa is an African metaphysical concept that deals with the proper appreciation of being from an African standpoint of view as it concerns the hierarchy and the structures of being. Okere (1983, 38) asserts that “all philosophy is essentially an historical and time bound interpretation of being”. Philosophy, and African philosophy in particular, is rooted in the culture and worldviews of a people. These sociocultural data and worldviews remain the given for critical appraisal in the quest or search for knowledge or wisdom, which is philosophy. This is philosophizing per se. Okere (1983, 15) notes that: “It is only within the context of hermeneutics that African culture can give birth to African philosophy”. As a reflective activity, philosophy interprets human experience from specific perspectives. Thus, ethno-philosophy is simply philosophizing and reflecting on African realities and culture. As Paul Ricœur asserts: “One can philosophize from culture, or at least from those elements of culture that can be called symbols” (see Okere 1983, 18). Okere (1983, 18), buttressing, further remarks that “symbols are pregnant with meaning …philosophical discourse is, therefore, a hermeneutical development of the symbols, these enigmas which precede and nourish it”. Therefore, having ethnos at the foundation of philosophical reflection is very proper. On the possibility of ethno-philosophy inspiring African philosophers to higher heights of philosophical achievement, Okere (1983, i) writes that: The ongoing artistic and intellectual renaissance in Black Africa includes the search for an African Philosophy. But designating what is African Philosophy needs some criteria. Philosophy is a unique cultural form and, despite affinities, is not to be confused with other forms such as myth, Weltanschauung and religion. But it grows out of a cultural background and depends on it.

Iroegbu’s philosophy, especially his Uwa ontology, is a product of critical cultural symbolism: that is, philosophical reflection on the symbols of his culture. African cultures are symbolically structured and are, therefore, laden with vital and significant meaning.

4  Uwa Ontology and Its Ethno-Philosophical Sources In his magnum opus, Metaphysics: Kpịm of Philosophy, Iroegbu (1995, 338) begins his ontosophical and metaphysical articulation of Uwa ontology with the reflection: Ụwa, gịnị ka ọbụ? Gịnị dị n’ime ya? Kedu mbido ya, Kedungwụcha ya? Ụwa m: isi ya, ọ bụ gịnị? (World, what is it, what is in it, its origin, its end, my world (life): what sense (meaning) has it?). Ụwa is an Igbo concept and in Igbo language there is only one Ụwa, and it comprises Ụwa a and Ụwa ọzọ with a kind relational symbolism. There is only one Ụwa as there is one reality. Hence, Iroegbu (1994, 144) reiterates on this thus: There is only one reality, the reality of Ụwa. There are no ụwas (plural) but Ụwa (singular). Yet in the singularity is embedded plurality, hierarchy and multiplicity…Everything has its own world and everything is in Ụwa, the Ụwa of Ụwas

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Furthermore, Iroegbu (1995, 338) affirms that: My perception of reality in its different aspects is synthesized in my perception of Ụwa. Ụwa defines being. It summarizes being and beings for me. It englobes all beings in the bossom of Ụwa-being. Ụwa ontology thus is the way I envision the questioning of, and the responding to, the problematic which whatever is, confronts me with: particularly and universally.

According to Iroegbu (1994, 143), Uwa is reality. Iroegbu (1995, 338) later writes that, “the direct and simple translative understanding of Uwa is World (English), le monde (French) die Welt (German), il Mondo (Italian), Mundo (Spanish), and Mundus (Latin). Uwa, however, has a much deeper meaning, scope, connotation and global elasticity than English world”. Edeh (1985, 93) had noted that reality or a thing is ifedi in the Igbo language. Thus, Ife-di means what is, being, what exists. Iroegbu (1995, 320) is not comfortable with Edeh’s empirical methodological approach through questionnaire and oral interviews of contemporary villagers, which led Edeh to the metaphysical concept of being as ife. Iroegbu (1995, 336) criticized Edeh thus: His tools of analysis are neither brought out nor clarified. This weakness, very serious as it is, clearly shines out when one considers some cases where the author tries to interpret certain names, events or phenomena in Igbo worldview. What one reads is more a glorified anthropology, a simplified philosophy of religion, chequered linguistics, or simply a scattered sociology of the religio-cultural data of the Igbo people. This is exemplified in his interpretations of Chineke, Chukwu (pp. 37f), Onye, ife (pp. 94f) and Madu. (IM, 97f)

Iroegbu tried to develop a deeper conceptualization. He identifies Uwa as a thing in African worldview, as an all-encompassing essence. Uwa as a thing captures reality in its most intimate dimensions and projections. However, the concept of Uwa in African philosophy was first used by Okere (1983, 70) when he opined thus: If philosophy is to be auto-generated from a culture, if it is to represent an articulated self-­ expression of man within his culture, one has to look for a different metacategory, more pertinent to Igbo culture than Being. Perhaps the notion of life, perhaps even the Igbo conception of ‘Uwa’ (literally the world, but really englobing both the cosmos, nature, and destiny), could take over the role of Being. This need not imply that an Igbo cannot understand the notion of Being or a philosophy based on this notion. It means, however, that a philosophy original to this culture would not take its orientation from a concept so strange to it.

In his dealing with the concept of Ụwa in addition to the linguistic translative understanding of it, Iroegbu (1995, 338–340) indicates the different senses and nuances of Ụwa thus: (i) Life (existence): Ụwa m, my world means my life, my existence. (ii) Cosmos: Ụwa, English, world. This is determined by reality that we perceive in its concreteness. Elu Ụwa means the surface of the earth. Ime Ụwa means inside…ontologically…nature’s inner side. (iii) Field of action: Ụwa ndị nta (world of hunters). This is Ụwa symbolically understood.

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(iv) Time (and space): Ụwa mbụ ka mma (the old or ancient world is better than ours). And our future and destiny is bright or gloomy depending on our Ụwa time, space, talent and opportunities now. (v) Destiny: Ụwa ọma (good world, good destination). (vi) Fate: Ụwa-ọjọọ (bad world). (vii) Condition: Ụwa alịghịlị (a world of difficulties). (viii) Tragedy: Ụwa ike (false steps). (ix) Age-limit: Ụwa ụmụaka (children’s world). (x) Nature: Ụwa osisi, mmiri na kpakpando (the world of trees, rivers and stars). (xi) Persons: Ndị ụwa, Ụmu ụwa (people, children of the world). (xii) Nation: Ụwa anyị na ha mekọrọ ihe (the world, or people, with whom we have dealings). (xiii) Land: Ụwa Igbo, Ala Igbo. This includes language, culture, worldview and experiences that unite and identify a people. Ala also represents different other connotations and identifications of realities: Ala Mụọ is spirit world, Ala-Ụmụagbara (bad-spirit world), Ala anụmanụ (world of or land of animals), Ala-Bekee (the white man’s land) and Ala m or Ala anyị, which signifies the area (country, tribe or zone) from where I come. (xiv) Earth: The globe is the world we live in. Ụwa nile in this context means the whole world, known, not known and yet to be known. (xv) Ụwa: Totality. Iroegbu brings together these relational aspects of Ụwa that makes the very concept of Ụwa unique. Ụwa connotes any and everything that is known, not known and yet to be known. On Uwa as a totality, Iroegbu (1995, 340) writes: This is the abstract, unqualified subject of all speech and predication. Ụwa in this totalitarian or universal sense is, as pointed out above all-englobing. It is the most universal concept in Igbo language and culture. Whatever is, in so far as it exists, is Ụwa.

The all-enfolding concept of Uwa was later applied by Iroegbu (1994, 140; 1995, 338) in his conceptual analysis of African philosophy with particular reference to Igbo typology of the ancestral world when he enumerated the six worlds, namely, Cosmos as Uwa anyi no n’ime ya (the universe in which we live), Divine world, Godian world, good-spirit world, bad-spirit world and Ancestral world. Uwa anyi, or Cosmos, however, seems to pose a central relationship to the rest as everything happens in Uwa anyi. According to Iroegbu (1994, 143), “the central locus is Uwa Anyi, the present world in which we are. Every other thing is focused on this”. The inter- and intra-relationship in the Igbo typology of six worlds shows interconnectivity and a reserved hierarchical relationship among the six worlds of which Cosmos (Uwa anyi) is central. This is the case since everything is related to Uwa and Uwa is all-englobing and accommodates every facet of human enterprise as reality. Whatever exists is in Uwa. Uwa, in fact, extends its reach beyond visible realities to the realm of invisible or immaterial entities. The concept of Uwa implicates every existential possibility. According to Iroegbu (1994, 144), “in Igbo language there is only one Uwa, comprising Uwa a and Uwa ozo. There is only one

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reality, the reality of Uwa. There are no Uwas (plural) but Uwa (singular). Yet in the singularity is embedded plurality, hierarchy and multiplicity”. Hence, Uwa also refers to one’s destiny as Uwa m or Uwa mu na Chim. The general and in-depth understanding of Uwa is well defined by Iroegbu (1994, 144) when he asserts thus: The entirety of existence from God the highest being to inanimate beings of our cosmos can be summarized in the englobing concept of Igbo term Uwa. Uwa is all-inclusive It mirrors being, existence, entity, all reality. It englobes all that is: animate and inanimate, visible and invisible. It is comprehensive, universal and global.

The Divine world is the world of the Supreme Being known as Chukwu and understood as the high or great God or Chineke, Creator. This world is connected to Uwa anyi. The Godian world is the world of spirits. The good-spirit world is “the spiritual area where the benign spirits of the dead dwell and from there they operate. These are ancestors who have become spirits because of the loss of living memories and concrete kith and kin relations with their families” (Iroegbu 1995, 341). The bad-spirit world is the abiding place for the hostile spirits of the dead. They were, according to Iroegbu (1995, 341), evil people in this world who cannot reincarnate because of their wicked lives on earth. The zonal interaction here is vindictive and punitive. These bad spirits make the living their victims while the living combat them through punitive measures. The Ancestral world is the abode of ancestors, Ndị-ichie, the living dead, who are capable of reincarnation. They are the deceased members of a family who are still remembered and venerated. Activities in these zones occur within the boundary of Ụwa anyị, or Cosmos, with the human being as the locus of operation. The zones of influence are related. There is no fixed boundary. Iroegbu (1995, 342) notes that: [I]n fact, there are not ontologically a multitude of worlds but one world: Ụwa. Though it can be analyzed as we have done above into different world-spheres. There is the Ụwa of Ụwaga (world of worlds), and there is the Ụwaga (worlds) of the one Ụwa (world).

Iroegbu in this metaphysical exercise tailors his African metaphysical project along the line of the classical being of beings depicted in open relational interaction between the 15 connotations of Ụwa and 6 zones of Ụwa. All these zonal depictions and connotative implications make Ụwa a universalizing concept. The Igbo people’s worldview is a holistic one.1 Iroegbu engaged this understanding of the Igbo holistic worldview in developing his Igbo typology with the identification of six operative worlds as properly explained in the hermeneutics of Uwa above. 1  This worldview is linked closely with the Igbo belief system and day-to-day living. Edeh (1985, 117) emphasizes this point when he notes that “the symbolism of the earth has a special practical significance for the Igbos. An Igbo is truly himself when in his consciousness he is one with the earth. To be one with the earth is to be one with the whole reality”. Mbaegbu (2012, 112) reiterates further that “the Igbo believe in the existence of two worlds: physical and metaphysical or the sensible and the supra-sensible worlds. Among the Igbos there is no sharp dichotomy between the two worlds”. The human being is the focal point of both worlds. As Mbaegbu (2012, 122) asserts, Igbo ontology “is an anthropocentric ontology, that is to say, an ontology that is man-centred. This ontology can be classified into …three main broad categories, namely 1. Muo (Spirit), 2. Madu (human beings) and 3. Ihe (Things)…Nothing in Igbo ontology can be conceived outside them”.

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For Iroegbu, Uwa is the totality and fullness of being in its self-expression. On this point, Asouzu (2007, 204) notes that the concept of Uwa “gives us some feelings concerning the comprehensiveness, totality and wholeness of reality itself; an understanding of reality quite in consonance with the teaching of traditional philosophers of the complementary system of thought”. Through different mutual dynamics of relationship, the connotations of Uwa which are broadly dual, earthly and spiritual make the term Uwa a universalising concept. Iroegbu puts forward the idea of Umunna which is expanded around communalism, thereby introducing the principle of belongingness as a definitive principle in any human community. For him, belongingness is the most important modal expression of being and the African metaphysics of to be.

5  B  elongingness as Expressing the Proper Understanding of Uwa Ontology Belongingness is a fundamental quality in understanding being. No being can be understood in terms of its completeness but in its relation to other beings. Being fundamentally belongs. Belongingness is a social aspect of being. Ụwa in its connotative nuances and zonal aspects entirety makes belongingness possible. By belonging to the community, a human being, for example, develops his or her potentials and ability as a person. This community in question concretizes the concept of Ụwa within the zonal and connotative nuances of Ụwa. Uwa, however, becomes a locus of operation. Every being is defined by a relation to something or in terms of its attributes. This fact of beingness, which is a form of relation, is a form of belonging to, belonging with and belonging in. This relation spells out a place where being realizes itself, a place of social reality, a kind of integrated universe. This relational form or way of belonging as an integral universe is not a differential one but a fundamental or ontological integration. And for this particular being in itself, it is through this fact of belongingness that it integrates itself in reality. For Iroegbu, being belongs and this belongingness is a fundamental condition for a thing to be considered real. Being and belongingness are fundamental and indivisible. Reality, therefore, is better understood with reference to belongingness. In other words, reality or being, in its total manifestation, is a process involving belongingness. Whatever is part of reality is belonging to something. Iroegbu (1995, 374) writes: What is it that makes being, being? To be; what is it? Ụwa is reality or being. What is it then that Ụwa fundamentally is? Why Ụwa? For what is Ụwa? To be part of Ụwa is to be part of what? To share in Ụwa is to share in what, to become what, to give what, to have what identity? One word that responds to the above questions is the term Belongingness. It is enunciated in the Igbo proverbial dictum: Egbe bere Ugo bere (EBUB): Let the kite perch, let the eagle perch.

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Iroegbu (1995, 374) defines belongingness as “the synthesis of the reality and experience of belonging…belongingness is an abstract term, an ontological one that a thing is, because it belongs. In this general sense: To be is to belong. To belong is to be”. Being’s identity, therefore, is in belongingness. Belongingness identifies being as such. Being’s nature is in belonging. Its role is in belonging. Its mode and operations are in belonging. Belongingness, as such, is the ontological value of being. Through belongingness, an entity is related to other entities. In understanding being as belongingness on the onto-relational level, there should be, as Iroegbu asserts, solidarity in being and solidarity of being, in the manner in which we exist and relate in the reality of being and belongingness. He writes: “Belongingness holds that our existence as human beings, as well as our integral participation in the society in which we find ourselves, are to be defined by our being given the sense and substance of belongingness” (Iroegbu 1995, 374). Being as belongingness is necessitated when we try to comprehend it as expressing itself. The question is: can being be without belongingness? Uwa is a metaphysical concept in African philosophy derived from the communal interpretation and appreciation of being that primarily belongs. Igbo philosophy would nevertheless consist in the interpretation at a certain level of the various symbols and institutions or traditions of Igbo culture. The concept of Uwa captures an essential aspect of Igbo philosophy, that is, Igbo ontology. Uwa ontology represents a veritable moment for African or Igbo philosophy; it is founded on categories native to Igbo culture and proper to its symbolismic universe. With the methodological moment of proper hermeneutics, one can dependably and realistically infer that an African philosophy is a philosophy with African sources and nourished from African culture.

6  Conclusion Philosophy in many philosophical traditions remains a lively human enterprise that studies any and every other subject. From the standpoint of hermeneutics, African philosophy is philosophical reflection that uncovers and critically interprets African cultural symbols and heritage. Iroegbu’s Uwa ontology emerges from traditional Igbo-African worldviews. Uwa ontology is an African philosophy of being, which grew out of the sociocultural understanding and appreciation of the concept of Uwa that facilitates the investigation of being in its comprehensiveness which Iroegbu understood in terms of belongingness.

References Agada, Ada. 2019. The sense in which ethno-philosophy can remain relevant in 21st century African philosophy. Phronimon 20: 1–20. https://doi.org/10.25159/2413-­3086/4158.

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Asouzu, Innocent I. 2007. Ibuanyidanda: New Complementary Ontology. Zurich: LIT Verlag GmbH & Co. Edeh, Emmanuel M.P. 1985. Towards an Igbo metaphysics. Chicago: Loyal University Press. Hountondji, Paulin. 1996. African philosophy: Myth and reality. 2nd ed. Trans. H.  Evans. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Iroegbu, Pantaleon. 1994. Enwisdomization and African philosophy. Owerri: International University Press. ———. 1995. Metaphysics: Kpim of philosophy. Owerri: International University Press. Maritain, Jacques. 2005. An introduction to philosophy. London: Continuum. Mbaebgu C. C. A. 2012. Hermeneutics of God in Igbo Ontology. Awka: Fab. Oguejiofor, Obi J., and Igwebuike G.  Onah. 2005. Introduction. In African philosophy and the hermeneutics of culture: Essays in honour of Theophilus Okere, ed. J.  Obi Oguejiofor and Igwebuike G. Onah. Piscataway: Transaction Publishers. Okere, Theophilus I. 1983. African philosophy: A historic-hermeneutical investigation of the conditions of its possibility. Lanham: University of American Press. Onebunne, Jude I. 2019. Being as belongingness: Expanding the hermeneutics of African metaphysics of to be. Awka: Fab Anieh Nig Ltd. Osuagwu, Maduakolam I. 2010. A modern history of African philosophy, Amamihe Lectures. , Vol. III: Focus on Anton Wilhelm Amo, an African Philosopher in 18th Century German Diaspora. Enugu: Snaap Press Ltd.

The Ethnophilosophical Foundation of Asouzu’s Concept of Missing Links Maduka Enyimba and Ada Agada

Abstract  The claim that reality encompasses the totality of missing links undergirds Asouzu’s ibuanyidanda philosophy. This chapter explores the significance of the concept of missing links within the epistemological-cum-metaphysical framework of Asouzu’s complementary reflection. We present an overview of Asouzu’s ibuanyidanda philosophy and highlight the Nigerian philosopher’s debt to ethnophilosophy, notwithstanding his own hostility towards the orientation. We show that Asouzu’s complementaristic philosophy is an innovative attempt to account for the widely held holistic, interdependent and interconnected worldview of traditional African societies in the language of metaphysics. Adopting an expository, analytical and evaluative method, we explore the implication of the concept of missing links for the optimistic hypothesis of the perfectibility of the universe and the human beings privileged to be the observers of this universe. Keywords  African philosophy · Ethnophilosophy · Missing links · Ethnophilosophical foundation · Ibuanyidanda · Complementary reflection

1  Introduction All philosophies are the natural products of cultures in the sense that one cannot avoid or overlook the philosophical in a people’s cultural experience. A number of scholars, both Western and African, have argued that philosophy in general is the articulation of the ideas within the context of a people’s cultural experience and heritage, that is, the experiences and worldviews of a given people (Russell 1945, 14; Momoh 1993, 1). African philosophy in particular has been described as a M. Enyimba Department of Philosophy, University of Calabar, Calabar, Nigeria A. Agada (*) Centre for Interdisciplinary and Intercultural Studies (CIIS), Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Agada (ed.), Ethnophilosophy and the Search for the Wellspring of African Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78897-1_16

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critical analysis and interpretation of the traditional worldviews and wise sayings of the African people as embedded in their languages and cultural values. This approach to African philosophy is what has been denigrated as ethnophilosophy, and scholars of this trend such as Alexis Kagame, Cheikh Anta Diop, Placide Tempels, J. S. Mbiti and a host of others have been labelled ethnophilosophers. Ethnophilosophy perceives African culture and African philosophy as two sides of the same coin, in which case the philosophical nature of African cultural practices, experiences and collective worldviews, as well as the cultural nature of African philosophy, is laid bare. For example, C. S. Momoh explains that: A genuine philosopher like a genuine individual is a child of experiences, time and culture…A philosopher can write to reflect or react positively, negatively or critically towards his experience, time and cultures. A positive reflection can sometimes end up in the speculative and holistic system building; a negative reflection may sometimes end up in a devastating and uncompromising criticism and rejection of one’s experiences, times and culture. But a critical reflection can build on the ruins of the latter to erect the former. (1993, 1)

Momoh’s declaration above lends credence to the relationship between philosophy and culture and between the philosopher and their cultural experiences or milieu, which the ethnophilosophy project emphasises. For ethnophilosophers, this interdependence is so intrinsic that the philosopher becomes a product of his cultural experiences and culture becomes the springboard for philosophical cogitations. This idea has been variedly expressed by Makinde (2010, 14), Okolie and Nweke (2017, 18) and others. Ethnophilosophy has had a chequered history right from the days of the great debate over the existence or non-existence of African philosophy. While it has come under severe criticisms from numerous scholars such as Hountondji (1996, 63) and Appiah (1992, 91), it has been vigorously defended in recent times by other scholars like Mangena (2014a, 31–35, 2014b, 103) and Agada (2013, 240). More interestingly, some other African scholars like Asouzu (2004), Chimakonam (2015a, b) and Agada (2013, 2015) have erected philosophical systems on the foundation of ethnophilosophy. This chapter focuses on the ethnophilosophical foundation of Innocent Asouzu’s philosophical system, ibuanyidanda philosophy, or complementary reflection. The major question here is: to what extent is Asouzu’s philosophy of complementarity indebted to ethnophilosophy? In response to this question, we argue in this chapter that to the extent that Asouzu’s ideas were derived from the traditional worldview and wise sayings of the Igbo people, ethnophilosophy serves as the foundation upon which he built his philosophy of complementary reflection. Asouzu innovatively and creatively weaves together Igbo language, Igbo wise proverbs and traditional Igbo worldview into a philosophical system that presents reality as interdependent, interconnected and a totality of missing links. This is evident in the numerous philosophical concepts of Igbo origin employed by Asouzu in the execution of his ibuanyidanda project. The chapter proceeds with an analysis of ethnophilosophy and an overview of ibuanyidanda philosophy. It relates ibuanyidanda philosophy to its ethnophilosophical influences as deciphered from Asouzu’s reliance on Igbo worldviews and the Igbo language in which traditional Igbo wisdom is stored. The chapter critically explores

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Asouzu’s concept of missing links and its implication for the perfectibility hypothesis.

2  A Review of Ethnophilosophy It appears plausible to infer that the great debate on the existence or otherwise of African philosophy in the early 1990s gave impetus to the emergence of different schools of thought as regards the very nature and methodology of doing African philosophy. The question of methodology then became the focus of African scholars, as a result of which different methods and schools of doing African philosophy were developed by different scholars on the basis of their different philosophical inclinations (cf. Azenabor 2002, 111). Numerous schools and methods of doing African philosophy competed with each other. These schools and methods include universalism, particularism, ethnophilosophy, philosophic sagacity, professional philosophy and the nationalist, rationalist, historical, hermeneutical, literary/artistic and African ideological schools (see Bodunrin 1985; Oruka 1990, 1991; Oladipo 1992; Van Hook 1993; Dukor 1994; Azenabor 2002). In this chapter our concern is with the ethnophilosophical school, method or approach to African philosophy. Ethnophilosophy represents the attempt at extracting from African traditional thoughts, proverbs, myths, folklores, worldviews and culture some philosophically relevant materials, data or information, and presents them as the basis of African philosophy. In truth, there seems to be no philosophy, philosophical system, methodology or school today that is not in some sense culturally influenced. In other words, cultural property of one form or the other informs, even at the early stage, the formation of a given philosophical idea, theory, system or school. We shall substantiate this claim in the course of this essay using Asouzu’s complementary system of thought as an instance. But before then, it is pertinent to examine the journey of ethnophilosophy among scholars over the years. Paulin Hountondji is believed to have first employed the term ethnophilosophy in a derogatory sense to label an approach to African philosophy that considers the collective worldviews and cultural properties of pristine African societies such as folklores, wise sayings, proverbs, languages, etc., as philosophically relevant. In distinguishing two senses of philosophy, Hountondji identifies the popular and theoretical senses of the word philosophy. For him, philosophy in the popular sense connotes any kind of individual or collective wisdom and any set of principles presenting some degree of coherence and intended to govern the daily practice of a person or a people (Hountondji 1996, 63). This is the debased or vulgar sense of philosophy which warrants his submission that African philosophy done with this approach is ethnophilosophical and, therefore, non-philosophy. In a similar vein, Oruka (1991, 17) distinguishes between an ordinary sage and a philosophic sage. An ordinary sage is one who is versed in the wisdom, culture, customs and traditions of his people and is recognised by the people as having such

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an ability. Ordinary sages may be poets, herbalists, medicine men, musicians and fortune tellers. According to Oruka, although these persons are wise and sagacious, they are not philosophical and as such cannot cope with modernity or foreign innovations that may interfere with their culture. Hence, he refers to them as cultural philosophers and as practitioners of ethnophilosophy since they rely on the collective worldview of their people. A philosophic sage, on the other hand, is one who is not just wise but rational and critical in understanding and in solving the inconsistencies of his culture such that he is able to cope with foreign influences. Such a person for Oruka is a sage philosopher or philosophic sage, especially as he transcends communal wisdom. Oruka believes that by presenting an individualised view of traditional Africans rather than a collective view, he has been able to overcome the charge that his idea of philosophic sagacity is a variant of ethnophilosophy. Fainos Mangena (2014a, 24) argues that ethnophilosophy is just like Western philosophy in the sense that it is founded on inductive reasoning, which is itself packaged in proverbs, riddles and other cultural resources. He also contends that religious beliefs rather than present a barrier to the scientific development of thought in Africa create an enabling atmosphere for it. Following this, Mangena challenges the anti-ethnophilosophical views of Hountondji (1996, 62) and Appiah (1992, 95) on the ground that the premises of their argument warrant the conclusion that African philosophy must conform to Western philosophical forms of thought, if it must be truly a philosophy. We agree with Mangena that ethnophilosophy is a philosophy based on reason and evidence just like Western philosophy. What is notable here and which is in consonance with our claim in this chapter is that ethnophilosophy is neither uncritical nor irrational when it is perceived as a collection and analysis of indigenous African thought systems that aids Africa’s quest for identity (Mangena 2014a, 26). Despite the avalanche of criticism directed at ethnophilosophy, Ada Agada (2019a, 2) makes a case for the continued relevance of ethnophilosophy both as a communal worldview of African societies and as an academic enterprise. According to him, ethnophilosophy still serves as a source of philosophical ideas for contemporary philosophers such as Asouzu and Chimakonam who are committed to the understanding of philosophy as an individual, critical enterprise. Ethnophilosophy for Agada is a proto-philosophy which is not only a real source of philosophical ideas that can give African philosophical thought a distinct character in the global space of all philosophies (2019a, 3). One significant thing in Agada’s view here is the use of the prefix ‘proto’ to describe ethnophilosophy. ‘Proto’ is used to indicate an earlier field of study. This means that ethnophilosophy is an earliest field or form of philosophising before the emergence of modern or scientific form of philosophising. It is not useless but very fundamental in contemporary African philosophical discourse. Hence, he urges African scholars to be more innovative in their thinking in order to accord African philosophy the universal acceptance and interest that it deserves (Agada 2013, 42). Aribiah David Attoe (2016, 100) attempts a demystification of what he describes as the foundational myth of ethnophilosophy and argues that the degree of

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descriptive storytelling in ethnophilosophy renders the orientation problematic as it inhibits the future growth of African philosophy. He suggests that African philosophy should be built on criticality and not on ethnophilosophy. What is clear here is that Attoe seems to subscribe to the views and criticisms of scholars like Hountondji and Appiah on ethnophilosophy as non-philosophy. This position of Attoe is a function of his understanding of ethnophilosophy as involving a mutual exclusivity and isolation of varying philosophies based on geographical and cultural divide (2016, 102). Lucky Uchenna Ogbonnaya (2018, 94) argues that Attoe misunderstands Agada’s position that ethnophilosophy plays a foundational role to African philosophy and erroneously suggests that criticality should rather be the foundation of African philosophy. Ogbonnaya explains that Attoe’s position is misleading in the sense that criticality is only a tool of philosophy and a tool of philosophy cannot be its foundation at the same time (2018, 94). Ogbonnaya also contends that the disagreement between the two scholars (Agada and Attoe) stems from their inability to explain what makes African philosophy African. Hence, he submits that African communitarian ontology (ezin’ulo) is what grounds African philosophy and makes African philosophy African (2018, 99).

3  Asouzu’s Ibuanyidanda Philosophy: An Overview Asouzu perceives philosophy as a reflective activity that is aimed at analysing and understanding ideas with the aim of relating them to action and human interest in such a way that enables us to explain and understand reality better in a comprehensive, total and universal manner (2004, 6). This definition reveals philosophy as the science which addresses ultimate causes and questions of ends of human actions and the relationship between ideas, human actions and interests. This conception of philosophy, to a large extent, informs Asouzu’s articulation of the method and principles of ibuanyidanda philosophy, also known as complementary reflection. Ibuanyidanda philosophy is aimed at eliminating the dangers of the ambivalence of human interest in order to open up channels for the understanding of reality and human actions in a comprehensive, inclusive and mutually harmonious manner. Ibuanyidanda is, thus, a method of doing philosophy in a manner that enables one to overcome the limitations of the ambivalence of human existential situations which inhibits the mind’s ability to perceive and comprehend reality clearly and authentically. Asouzu’s ibuanyidanda philosophy can easily be understood from the perspectives of the two essential principles of progressive transformation and integration enunciated by him. The principle of progressive transformation is a practical equivalent of the metaphysical principle of integration. While the principle of integration specifies the general metaphysical implication of the philosophy of ibuanyidanda (complementary reflection), the principle of progressive transformation addresses specifically the relevance of ibuanyidanda philosophy for human actions (2004,

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273). The import of this is that ibuanyidanda philosophy aims at understanding reality at the same time helping one to resolve conflicts in the society. Ibuanyidanda, in its practical dimension, deals with existential issues of human concerns. These principles of integrative transformation state that ‘anything that exists serves a missing link of reality’ (Asouzu 2003, 60), while the principle of progressive transformation states that ‘all human actions are geared towards the joy of being’ (Asouzu 2004, 39). These are the basic principles of human action which uphold the complementary unity of being and consciousness. Compliance with the dictates of these principles would enable one to manage the ambivalence of human situations more successfully, and a violation or neglect of the demands of these principles in our thoughts and actions will create conflicts in the society. Asouzu posits that these two principles enable one to formulate what he calls the ‘imperative of complementarity’ which states the condition for the former’s realisation in the relative and fragmented moments of existence. This principle which says ‘allow the limitation of being to be the cause of your joy’ (Asouzu 2003, 60; 2004, 39) signifies the fact that a thing serves a missing link of reality (the concept of ‘missing link’ shall be discussed more critically in a subsequent section of this chapter) if and only if in the process, it can also gain its authentic legitimisation. This means that all human acts including the act of knowing or the act of metaphysical speculation must be directed to their authentic source as a condition for them to be source of our joy. For instance, those who perform negative actions derive some form of negative joy from it, but this joy which the limitation of being provides must be transformed to authentic joy in order to have its meaning. Asouzu’s idea of the joy of being is the driving force of human life made evident in conscious attempt to live authentically through mastering our situation. For Asouzu, a person is said to have allowed the limitation of being to be the cause of his or her joy if he or she participates in the joy embedded in the ultimate foundation of being and which is made evident in authentic living and in conscious attempt to choose the positive side of this ambivalent interest. Asouzu argues that there is a joy that is constitutive of our existence as human beings and it is known to us proleptically and referentially in all those moments where we make honest commitment to experience it authentically in our existential situation (Asouzu 2004, 39–40). Thus, complementary reflection aims at allowing being assume its natural completeness as the joy that unifies all relative entities in a common foundation of meaning and legitimisation in a universal and comprehensive perspective. Essentially, Asouzu’s complementary reflection is a life philosophy seeking to understand reality from the preceding conditions of its African background, without committing itself uncritically to these preconditions. In other words, it seeks to outline the conditions for understanding and interpreting human life and situation with a view to proving the tools necessary for harmonious co-existence. It is pertinent to note that the principles and method of Asouzu’s philosophy of complementarity, though relevant and applicable in, and beyond, African philosophy, are first a culturally inspired philosophy that relies heavily on African traditional worldview as embedded in the rich languages, proverbs, wise sayings and other cultural properties of the African peoples. This is evident in the numerous

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concepts of Igbo (African) origin employed by Asouzu in the development of his thought. We shall show in the next section of this work that Asouzu’s ibuanyidanda (complementary) philosophy is foundationally and etymologically ethnophilosophical. This signifies that the foundational role of ethnophilosophy in the development as well as in system building in African philosophy ought not to be in doubt.

4  Ethnophilosophy and Ibuanyidanda Philosophy We begin this section by exploring the Igbo (African) cultural influence on Asouzu’s complementary reflection in order to be able to demonstrate the veracity of our claim that ethnophilosophy is the foundation of ibuanyidanda philosophy. Against this backdrop, it is important to state that the major concepts and principles that constitute ibuanyidanda philosophy are products of Igbo (African) notions, maxims, proverbs and worldviews. These notions include but are not limited to the following: ibuanyidanda, I di, Ka so mu di (Ka so mu adina), Ihe Mkpuchi anya, Ima onwe onye, Ibu-aru and Ikwa Ogwe. In his book, The Method and Principles of Complementary Reflection in and beyond African Philosophy, published in 2004 and which can be regarded as his magnum opus, Asouzu began with an account of the Igbo (African) traditional worldview that forms the background of his theory. He believes that there existed anonymous philosophers in traditional Igbo society who propagated the complementary mode of thinking; however, the assumed anonymous philosophers did not adequately systematise their thoughts (Asouzu 2004, 11–12). Asouzu’s ibuanyidanda philosophy is inspired by the basic principles embedded in the traditional African thought system, or worldview. It is Asouzu’s creative and innovative appropriation and reformulation of these basic principles of African traditional worldviews, and his subsequent employment of same as a paradigm for explanation and understanding of reality and human actions in comprehensive, total and universal manner that constitute the foundation of ibuanyidanda philosophy. The pristine African philosophical principles that Asouzu enunciates are basically complementary, interdependent and interrelated. Asouzu explains that his village Akunwata in Arondizuogu has always flourished due to the type of mutual complementary spirit that exists among the inhabitants. This exceptional spirit of complementarity and mutuality has always been the foundation of the survival of the people of Akunwata in the olden times. It was a life devoid of excessive selfishness, in which personal survival was intricately related to the common good (Asouzu 2004, 17–18). Indeed, the authentic Igbo spirit is the spirit of complementarity (ibuanyidanda) which has helped the Igbo to surmount all difficulties in the olden times. It is a spirit born of mutual support and captured by such common Igbo adages as igwe bu ike and njikoka which connote togetherness (Asouzu 2004, 19). Ibuanyidanda is a composite of three Igbo words, namely, ‘ibu’ (load), ‘anyi’ (not insurmountable) and ‘danda’ (ant). Ibuanyidanda, then, is an Igbo maxim expressed as no task/load is insurmountable for danda. Ibuanyidanda is one of the

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most important observational statements/principles in the language of the Igbo of Nigeria. Asouzu himself explains that the Igbo derive the statement by observing a colony of the ant danda which have the capacity to successfully carry loads that appear bigger and heavier than them when they work together (Asouzu 2007a, 252; 2011a, 102). In his words, ‘the concept of ibuanyidanda draws its inspiration from the teachings of traditional Igbo philosophers of the complementary system of thought’ (2011b, 102). Ibuanyidanda, then, becomes the new ontological horizon employed by Asouzu to articulate the idea of being in the universe. This clearly exposes the indebtedness of Asouzu’s complementary reflection to ethnophilosophy. To further make sense of the ethnophilosophical nature of Asouzu’s ibuanyidanda philosophy, an explanation of the meaning and nature of similar concepts, expressed as maxims or proverbs in Igbo traditional worldview, will suffice. The notion of ibuanyidanda can be understood in the light of other positive maxims in Igbo traditional worldview such as: 1. Egbe bere ugo bere, which states, ‘give that the other may also give in such a way that none would refrain from giving’. 2. Ezin’ulo principle, which reflects an inevitable, pre-deterministic, mutual interdependence which necessarily characterises the relationship among members of the family in African setting. It demonstrates the mutual interdependence of all humans. 3. Igwe bu Ike, which represents the power of group resolve or group production ability. 4. Nmekoka, which is another word for complementary reflection. It prioritises the mutual complementation of individuals. 5. Njikoka, which is the power in interconnectivity, interdependence and networking or bonding of individuals. 6. Onye aghala nwanne ya, which is a positive, moral maxim that states that ‘march and also help the other to march who could not march on his or her own’ (Ozumba and Chimakonam 2014, 128–133; Ogbonnaya 2018; Kanu 2014, 87–98). Another interesting concept employed by Asouzu in the articulation and development of his ibuanyidanda philosophy and which also reveals its ethnophilosophical foundation is the notion of I di (to be). By this Asouzu refers to ‘the act of existing’. I di in Igbo language can be translated to mean ‘to be’ or ‘to live’. It simply connotes ‘existence’, ‘living’ or ‘being’. The idea inherent in the notion of I di (existence) is better understood in the light of Asouzu’s idea of Ka so mu di (the act of existing alone) which is dependent on the idea of Ihe Mkpuchi anya (the phenomenon of concealment) which leads to a negative perception of reality in a disintegrated and fragmented manner. In line with the philosophical principles inherent in these Igbo notions, Asouzu explains that reality is so mutually interconnected that no aspect is meant ‘to be alone’ (ka so mu adina). Nweke and Ogbonnaya (2020, 1) emphasise this point when they argue that the social ontology of humans suggests that to be is not to be alone; hence, it is both unsound and counterproductive for any individual or group of individuals to act contrary to this ontological principle. For

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these scholars, the principle to be is not to be alone is a basic presupposition of Asouzu’s ibuanyidanda ontology. Everything is a missing link of reality. So we cannot authentically exist alone, but in mutual complementary relation to one another. The moment one thinks himself or herself capable of existing alone, that person is misguided by the phenomenon of concealment (Ihe mkpuchi anya). This phenomenon not only deceives one, but it also beclouds one’s intellect and consciousness and causes one to perceive things in their singularity. This is the cause of the numerous conflicts, struggles, disharmony and inhumanity prevalent in the society (Asouzu 2007a, 253; 2011a, 95–96). According to Asouzu, the traditional Igbo philosopher of the complementary system of thought employs ka so mu adina (that I may not be alone/to be is not to be alone) to show that to exist in the true sense of the word entails the capacity to affirm the complementary co-existence of existent realities. A negation of this which is ka so mu di (that I may exist alone/to be is to be alone) is a negation of true complementary co-existence. This happens when one suffers from ihe mkpuchi anya (the phenomenon of concealment). On the contrary, these anonymous traditional Igbo philosophers of the complementary thought system use the notion of ima onwe onye (being in control) to represent the ability of one to act in such a self-­ conscious manner that enables one to overcome the limitations presented by ihe mkpuchi anya (phenomenon of concealment) and human tension-laden ambivalent existential situations (Asouzu 2011b, 10–11). Thus, one is said to be in control (oma onwe ya) when he/she is able to perceive things in their complementary and interdependent nature. Furthermore, Asouzu employs the notion of ibuaru to demonstrate the heavy burdens of philosophy such as ‘unintended ethnocentric commitment’ that must be overcome to give room for authentic philosophical investigation of reality in a comprehensive and complementary manner. Ibuaru is a composite word drawn from the rich Igbo language and culture and is constituted of the two words, ibu (load/task) and aru (heavy). Hence, ibuaru means ‘heavy burden’ or ‘heavy load’. From this Igbo root word, Asouzu deals with one of the heaviest loads or burdens of philosophy which is the tendency of philosophers to approach their subject matter with unintended ethnocentric mindset (Asouzu 2007b, 9). Again, from the Igbo proverb onye kwa ogwe, amara uche ya (it is when one builds a bridge that we know his mind), Asouzu develops another fundamental notion in his ibuanyidanda project. The notion ikwa ogwe is derived from the two Igbo words, ikwa (building) and ogwe (bridge). When put together it means ‘building bridge’. For Asouzu, this, in the scientific sense, means adopting a methodological systematic approach in philosophical inquiry. It is because systems and methods serve as guides that Asouzu refers to them as bridges (ogwe) through which reality can be apprehended more transparently and comprehensively (Asouzu 2007c, 5). The point we have been making is that ethnophilosophy is not to be construed as a debased form of philosophising. It is rather to be embraced as a legitimate springboard for philosophising in Africa. This is because it provides the needed raw materials for a methodic and systematic philosophical cogitation. Ethnophilosophy is

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construed here as critical, creative, innovative and rigorous analysis of the philosophical principles and materials inherent in traditional African worldviews, proverbs, wise sayings and folklores. As Asouzu rightly points out: [O]ne can say that philosophical ideas and systems are deeply enshrined in wise sayings and religious symbols of all peoples and at all times. These can be considered the much-­ needed materials of history of ideas, which need to be made explicit in the process of personal critical reflection. This is valid, not only for African philosophy, but also, for all peoples who equally have their own symbols, wise sayings, proverbs, witches, fortune ­tellers, wizards, sorcerers, lands of the living dead, medicine men and women and all those phenomena that many have come to regard as typically African experiences. (Asouzu 2007b, 61)

While it is obvious that the Nigerian philosopher is indebted to ethnophilosophy, he has, ironically, opposed ethnophilosophy as an orientation in African philosophy. The next section will show that his innovative concept of missing links has an ethnophilosophical wellspring.

5  T  he Metaphysics of Missing Links and the Overcoming of Ethnophilosophy Asouzu magnifies the shortcomings of ethnophilosophy even while relying on it in the construction of his metaphysics of missing links. This ambiguous relationship reveals the relevance of ethnophilosophy as a wellspring of African philosophical concepts. Asouzu’s opposition stems from his belief that commitment to the particularism which ethnophilosophy promotes promises nothing good for the development of African philosophy since focusing on narrow ethnic worldviews will mean the failure of philosophy in Africa to reach hypotheses, generalisations and conclusions that are universally applicable, or relevant to the whole of humanity. In truth, Asouzu’s opposition to ethnophilosophy cannot be construed as amounting to the rejection of the maligned current of thought as a major source of African philosophy. This is true because his reliance on traditional Igbo wisdom betrays him as endorsing the stance that ethnophilosophy necessarily interests the African philosopher who is socially rooted in an African cultural milieu and wishes to make an original contribution to world philosophy. His main grouse is against the presentation of uncritical observational statements as philosophical hypotheses and theories. He writes: How to derive synthetic-analytical concepts of the kind “ibuanyidanda” from mere illustrative statements of the kind “ibu anyi danda” turns out to be one of the most difficult challenges in philosophy. This challenge is also quite evident in African philosophy. How it is addressed can go a long way in determining how philosophy progresses in any given context. A cursory look at many theories devised to investigate reality, by practitioners of African philosophy, immediately reveals that such theories are largely founded on observational statements. (Asouzu 2011b, 11)

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Asouzu uses the term ‘synthetic-analytical’ in a non-Kantian sense to refer to conceptualisations that have successfully transcended their cultural milieu. In the specific case of ibuanyidanda philosophy in the framework of which the concept of missing links is articulated, we find three Igbo terms combining to generate statements and hypotheses at higher level of applicability, thus drastically expanding the horizon of intellectual engagement. Ibu means load, anyi means possible or surmountable, and danda refers to the hard-working small black ant. From the observation of how these tireless ants organise themselves in an efficient manner to execute complex tasks, traditional Igbo societies reached conclusions about ibuanyidanda – that is, no task is too big for the ant. According to Asouzu, describing ibuanyidanda, for instance, without the radical investigation of its deeper philosophical import amounts to ethnophilosophical indulgence. Asouzu’s way of overcoming the ethnophilosophy in which his thought is rooted is transcending the ethnophilosophical dimension of his thought through the introduction of the concept of missing links. With the concept of missing links, he abstracts a doctrine of the incompleteness of the universe from the craving for belongingness or togetherness implied in the notion of ibuanyidanda. This intellectual exercise produces the hypothesis that the incompleteness of entities and their quest for completeness in mutual interaction indicates the possibility of the universe reaching perfection. A sufficiently general statement is thus reached and Asouzu overcomes ethnophilosophy. While it is not within the scope of this chapter to provide a detailed discussion of Asouzu’s philosophy, it is important to pay some attention to the ethnophilosophical roots of the concept of missing links. In general, ibuanyidanda is a philosophical perspective that regards the universe as interconnected, interdependent and therefore holistic. It is: [A] philosophy of categorisation, sorting, harmonisation, pairing-up, and complementation. In complementarity, we seek to relate world immanent realities to one another in the most natural, mutual, harmonious and compatible ways possible…to allow being assume its natural completeness as the joy that unifies all realities. Herein is rooted the joy of being as the transcendent joyous experience of the ultimate foundation of reality. In this way, complementation is a philosophy that seeks to consider things in the significance of their singularity and not in the exclusiveness of their otherness in view of the joy that gives completion to all missing links of reality. (Asouzu 2004, 39)

He goes further: Missing links are the diverse units that make up an entity within the framework of the whole and as they are complementarily related. They are all the imaginable, fragments, units, components, and combinations that enter into our understanding of any aspect of our world. They are also all the units and combinations necessary in the conceptualisation of an entity or of the whole. This missing links are, for example, thoughts and the thoughts of thoughts. They are diverse modes of manifestation of being in history. They are categories and the categories of categories. They are the units and the units of units, entities and the entities of entities, things and the things of things. They are ideas and the ideas of ideas, etc. as these can possibly be abstracted and related to each other as conditions of possibility of their perfectibility in a harmonious systemic manner. (Asouzu 2004, 277–278)

It is widely held that traditional African societies value a holistic perspective of the universe that regards the individual things that constitute it as necessarily

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interacting interconnectedly (see, for instance, Agada 2019b). Such an outlook is favourable to optimistic perspectives of human existence and the universe. Unsurprisingly, Asouzu’s unique articulation of a perspective rooted in the basic traditional African outlook is optimistic in its promotion of the idea of cumulative realisation of what conduces to human joy. In formulating a theory of complementation that reflects the complementaristic perspective of traditional African worldview, Asouzu goes back to the philosophical resources of his Igbo people as they persist in the Igbo language. Indeed, he asserts that there were, or are, Igbo philosophers in the distant past, and in the present, who reflected critically, and continue to reflect, and masterminded the philosophical outlook latent in Igbo language. He calls these unknown individuals ‘anonymous traditional African philosophers’ and believes that they were, or are, forerunners of ibuanyidanda philosophy (Asouzu 2007b, 235). Asouzu is unable to show that there were, and are, indeed, philosophers in the distant past, and in the present, who were, and are, actually complementary thinkers and who can claim credit as forerunners of complementary reflection, the framework within which Asouzu articulated ibuanyidanda philosophy and which consists in the intellectual openness to the broadness of human experience and the resulting search for a more authentic knowledge through comparison, contrast and distillation of divergent perspectives. The one justification Asouzu can claim for holding fast to the belief of the historical reality of undocumented Igbo philosophers (cf. Oruka 1991) follows from the knowledge that since a society is composed of individuals, the collective wisdom or worldviews of this society can be dissolved into the personal views of individuals. Thus, what is regarded as collective worldviews, or ethnophilosophy, which Hountondji (2002) criticised as unanimism may, in fact, be the aggregated views of serious thinkers who lived at one time and whose personal views became so widely appropriated by ever-expanding segments of the society that the views later became part of the semantic structure of indigenous language. The idea here is that these individual philosophers would have owned, and continue to own, their thoughts if a culture of writing had existed in their time. However, what this justification really amounts to is the impossibility of tracing Asouzu’s anonymous Igbo philosophers of the complementary hue and the compulsory assumption that his inspiration derives from traditional Igbo worldviews and, therefore, ethnophilosophy. There is clear evidence of his debt to the Igbo language, its proverbs, wise sayings and semantic structure. He affirms unambiguously that the Igbo generally refer to the notion of ibu anyi danda to express their deeply held complementaristic and communalistic conception of human reality in particular and reality as a whole. Like a Western philosopher poring over ancient Greek texts on the nature of reality to find inspiration for the articulation of a modern-day metaphysics, Asouzu sweeps every facet of traditional Igbo life with his gaze in search of inspiration. He finds this inspiration in a number of phenomena, some of which we mentioned earlier. Traditional songs with philosophical import are yet another source of the concept of missing links. Asouzu (2004, 108) praises the following traditional Igbo work song as reflecting the idea of complementary reflection:

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Bunu bunu oo ibu anyi danda Bunu bunu oo ibu anyi danda Bunu bunu oo ibu anyi danda.

The song encourages work participants to persevere because unity is the source of the strength of tiny ants. The group works better than the isolated individual. Asouzu (2004, 108–109) asserts that the very notion of complementarity ‘spans the whole Igbo thought system in its understanding of man as a being caught in the challenges of historicity and relativity…of community as a union of complementary parts…the Igbo idea that togetherness is better (njikọ ka)’. Philosophically pregnant terms like ihe ukwu kpe azu (the greatest events are in the future) and uwa ezuoke (the world is incomplete) are empirical propositions that supplied Asouzu raw materials for articulating the metaphysics of missing links (see Sect 3). From the song bunu bunu oo ibu anyi danda, it can be inferred that the danda, or ants, represent the human and non-human complements. The complements are the missing links of reality. Since complements constitute the totality of reality, they embrace non-human animals, the physical world and, in fact, what is possible but which is yet to be. To the class of possibilities belong the world of logic and imagination. In the empirical world, humans, animals, trees and physical nature interrelate and interdepend. A human being cannot live without water, for instance, and pets can provide companionship where human company is absent or lacking. The network arising from human-world interaction can expand to accommodate whole communities and entire continents in such a way that may involve a keener appreciation of the aspect of reality that does not speak but which plays a necessary role in the preservation of human life, and life in general. This silent, yet active, aspect is the physical environment. In preserving the environment, which is subject to the law of entropy and degradation as much as humans, the interests of living things and non-living things coalesce. This is an example of complementarity. This complementarism indicates the possibility of completion, or perfection. This possibility also entails the negative, the fact of the empirical incompleteness of reality. While Asouzu’s philosophy is optimistic, it yet acknowledges the reality of what has become famous in metaphysical thinking as the problem of evil in the world. The philosophy of consolation which the metaphysics of missing links offers shies away from confronting the more pessimistic insights that the same metaphysics reveals. It is true that the future orientation of missing links indicates the gradual realisation of the purpose of the universe, which may be the perfection of the system of nature (cf. Agada 2015). It is also true that human complements, for instance, frequently inflict violence on each other through the negative exercise of their volition. It is also true that non-living complements like rocks can generate earthquakes and destroy cities when they drop from the sky as asteroids even as a microbe like the Covid-19 virus, a missing link, can terrorise an entire continent. Yet, according to Asouzu, these manifestations are to be regarded as limitations that can be overcome. Rather than eviscerate our joy, the limitations of a striving universe should

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strengthen human resolution and instil in humans the attitude of resignation to what cannot be helped and the enjoyment of the intellectual thrill that comes with the knowledge of the actuality of progress in the world. This is the point Asouzu makes when he invites us to allow the obvious limitations of reality to motivate human joy. In his words: We are also in a position to see new meanings in all situations of life, most especially in those new and alternative ways that bring surprises and the unexpected…we see such surprises as moments of inexhaustible missing link of reality, as those limitations of being that constitute the cause of our joy. In this way, a complementary mindset is one that welcomes competition and sees challenges and disappointments not as a threat to its existence but as an enabling condition towards the perfectibility of all missing links of reality of which it is a part. (Asouzu 2004, 396. Emphasis ours)

A thorough discussion of the thesis of perfection is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, it is worth asking about the relation of a missing link to other missing links. There is a suspicion that if everything in the world, rather than some things, is a missing link, then nothing is actually a missing link since we will have one continuous flow of reality rather than discrete things linked together. Is Asouzu saying that everything in the universe is a missing link or that some things in the universe are missing links? Chimakonam (2016, 146), Nweke and Ogbonnaya (2020, 279) and Edet (2016) have all understood the concept of missing links in the strong sense of all things qualify as missing links. The definition of being as ‘that on account of which anything that exists serves a missing link of reality’ (Asouzu 2011a, 103) is vague enough to persuade someone not impressed by monistic ontologies that the strong sense of missing links is inapplicable. But being is that which is fundamental. Whatever exists has being and missing links exist. Therefore, missing links constitute the totality of being. Accordingly, everything that exists now in actuality or exists as a possibility is deemed a missing link. Corroborating this perspective, Asouzu (2011b, 103) writes shortly after defining the concept of being that ‘within an ibuanyidanda context reality presents itself to us as missing links…within whose framework the idea of being reveals itself and is defined’. There can be no talk about being without talk about missing links, for the latter constitute being. The concept is pivotal in Asouzu’s metaphysics because it is what lends coherence to the idea of the perfectibility of reality, the basis of the optimism that sees progress as cumulatively linear and continuing. Assessment of this optimism is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.

6  Conclusion In this chapter, we provided a survey of the concept of ethnophilosophy and highlighted the debt the philosophy of complementary reflection owes to ethnophilosophy, notwithstanding Asouzu’s stigmatisation of the ethnophilosophical orientation. We demonstrated that the concept of missing links, which marks Asouzu’s most important contribution to the African philosophical canon, has an

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ethno­philo­sophical origin. The exhibition of the ethnophilosophical wellspring of ibuanyidanda philosophy means that there is no further justification for the stigmatisation of ethnophilosophy. The work of Asouzu demonstrates that while indeed ethnophilosophy can be a source of inspiration for creative African philosophers, it is in itself not the terminus of African philosophy. Asouzu’s contribution shows that the creative African thinker faces the challenge of transforming the everyday insights of African cultural experience into compelling philosophical formulations. This is a challenge that the Nigerian philosopher has overcome and which others can also overcome.

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———. 2016. Globalisation versus ibuanyidanda ontology: Confronting the tension between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’. Phronimon 17 (1): 140–157. https://doi. org/10.17159/2413-­3086/2016/123. Dukor, Maduabuchi F. 1994. Theistic humanism: Philosophy of scientific Africanism. Lagos: Chimah and Sons. Edet, Mesembe I. 2016. Afroxiology, conceptual mandelanization and the conversational order in the new era of African philosophy. Calabar: 3rd Logic Option Publishing. Hountondji, Paulin. 1996. African philosophy: Myth and reality. Trans. H. Evans. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. ———. 2002. The struggle for meaning: Reflections on philosophy, culture, and democracy. Athens: Ohio University Centre for International Studies. Kanu, I.A. 2014. Igwebuikology as an Igbo-African philosophy for Catholic-pentecostal relations. Jos Studies 22: 87–98. Makinde, M.A. 2010. African philosophy: The demise of a controversy. Ile Ife: Obafemi Awolowo University Press. Mangena, Fainos. 2014a. Ethno-philosophy is rational: A reply to two famous critics. Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya 6 (2): 23–38. https://doi. org/10.4314/tp.v6i2.3. ———. 2014b. In defense of ethno-philosophy: A brief response to Kanu’s eclecticism. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 3 (1): 96–107. Momoh, C.S. 1993. The philosophy of a past and old future. Auchi: African Philosophy Project Publications. Nweke, Victor C.A., and L. Uchenna Ogbonnaya. 2020. To be is not to be alone: Interrogating exclusivism from an African context. In Handbook of African philosophy of difference, ed. Elvis Imafidon, 273–288. Cham: Springer. Ogbonnaya, U.L. 2018. What makes African philosophy African: A conversation with Aribiah David Attoe on “the foundational myth of ethnophilosophy”. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture, and Religions 7 (30): 94–108. https://doi.org/10.4314/ft.v7i3.7. Okolie, C.N., and V.C.A.  Nweke. 2017. A Russellian perspective on the socio-political challenge of African philosophy. International Journal of Innovative Research and Development 6 (1): 13–19. Oladipo, O. 1992. The idea of African philosophy. Ibadan: Molecular Publishers. Oruka, Odera H. 1990. Trends in contemporary African philosophy. Nairobi: Shirikon Publishers. Oruka, Henry O. 1991. Sage philosophy: Indigenous thinkers and modern debate on African philosophy. Nairobi: ACTS Press. Ozumba, G.O., and J.O.  Chimakonam. 2014. Njikoka Amaka: Further discussions on the philosophy of integrative humanism (a contribution to African and intercultural philosophies). Calabar: 3rd Logic Option Publishing. Russell, Bertrand. 1945. History of Western philosophy and its connection with political and social circumstances from the earliest times to the present day. New York: Simon and Schuster. Van Hook, J.M. 1993. African philosophy: Its quest for identity. Quest 7 (1): 28–43.

The Ethnophilosophical Foundation of Conversational Thinking Amaobi Nelson Osuala and Maduka Enyimba

Abstract  This chapter argues that conversational philosophy, a current doctrine in African philosophy, is rooted in ethno-philosophy. The Igbo notion of ‘arumaru-­uka’ interpreted as ‘critical conversations’ is etymologically the root word of Chimakonam’s method of conversational thinking. Conversational thinking, or conversationalism, is a philosophical methodology in which two or more variables or epistemic agents consciously interact, relate as well as engage in exchange of ideas in a constructive, critical, creative and mutually respectable manner. The main aim of such interaction is to open new vistas for thought. Ethno-philosophy as one of the definitive schools of thought in African philosophy holds that the cultural productions, proverbs, adages, folklores and myths of traditional African societies contain rich raw materials for constructive philosophical cogitations. Employing the methods of exposition and critical analysis, this chapter argues that despite the acclaimed universal applicability of conversational thinking, its reliance on the rich language and worldview of the Igbo-African traditional culture betrays its ethnophilosophical colouration. Keywords  Ethno-philosophy · Conversational thinking · Arumaru-uka · Arumaristics · Conversationalism

1  Introduction Is there a connection between conversational thinking and ethno-philosophy? This chapter responds to this question in the affirmative and argues that conversational thinking is ontologically and etymologically rooted in ethno-philosophy. Conversational thinking otherwise known as conversationalism is a new technique or method of philosophical cogitation developed from the African place that claims universal relevance. Its significance lies in the fact that it recognizes the relevance A. N. Osuala University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria M. Enyimba (*) Department of Philosophy, University of Calabar, Calabar, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Agada (ed.), Ethnophilosophy and the Search for the Wellspring of African Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78897-1_17

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of contending variables in a given project, and creates room for their creative engagement that leads to new thoughts, concepts and interactions (Enyimba 2019, 1). Elaborating on the nature of conversational thinking and its applicability beyond the borders of African philosophy, Chimakonam explains that conversational thinking is founded on an underexplored notion of relationship or communion or mutual dependence that is inherent in sub-Saharan African culture (cf. Agada 2019a). Chimakonam maintains that the idea of conversational thinking goes back to the Igbo notion of ‘iruka’ or ‘arumaru-uka’ which translates to engaging in a critical exchange or critical conversation. For him this entails both an act and a mechanism of engaging in a critical exchange. As an act, it denotes the doctrine of conversational philosophy, whereas as a mechanism it describes the methodic ambience (Chimakonam 2017a, 14–17). From the above, it is evident that conversational thinking as articulated by Chimakonam is to a large extent a product of ethno-philosophy. Chimakonam as shown above admits his borrowing from and leaning on the rich language and worldview of (Igbo) African traditional societies in the development of his thought, which further exposes the ethnophilosophical foundation of conversational thinking. In his words: What I claim here is simply that this notion of relationship understood as “a state of coming together to share and to care” is replete in the life-word of different cultures in the Sub-­ Sahara regions and I here wish to tap into that to frame a method of thinking. (Chimakonam 2017b, 14)

Diana-Abasi Ibanga (2017, 73–78) in an attempt to expose the nature of conversational thinking establishes a relationship between sage philosophy and conversational thinking and argues that both philosophical doctrines and methodologies draw inspiration from the rich culture of the African traditional societies. This implies that even though conversational thinking, like sage philosophy, strives to overcome the limitations of ethno-philosophy by attempting to go beyond traditional communal thinking and culture philosophy, it undeniably draws heavily from the richness of African languages and worldviews. Considering the fact that ethno-philosophy describes African philosophy mainly as traditional communal thinking as can be found in proverbs, fables and special features of African languages (Graness 2012, 9), this chapter argues that Chimakonam’s conversational thinking rides on the crest of ethno-philosophy. Thus, the chapter proceeds with an overview of the nature of conversational thinking and the significance of the notion of ‘arumaristics’ within the ontological framework of conversational thinking. It then demonstrates the ethnophilosophical dimension of conversational thinking by highlighting the Igbo-African origin of the major concepts and notions that constitute it.

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2  An Overview of Conversational Thinking Conversational thinking is a method of philosophizing which was meticulously and rigorously systematized by Jonathan O.  Chimakonam, a contemporary African philosopher-­logician, in a manner that could lead to innovation and evolution of new ideas and research. Conversational thinking is very significant for contemporary philosophical cogitations, especially in Africa. It is a method that encourages intersubjectivity and the questioning of the veracity of ideas through creative intellectual struggles between and among scholars. The main purpose of this type of approach is to birth new concepts and open doors for the development of new thoughts and ideas that are of existential importance. As defined by Chimakonam, conversational thinking is a philosophical method that allows individual thinkers to engage each other philosophically on phenomenological issues of concern. For him it is not a mere exchange of ideas or simply an informal dialogue between interlocutors but rather a strictly formal intellectual exercise orchestrated by philosophical reasoning in which critical and rigorous questioning creatively unveils new concepts from old ones (Chimakonam 2015b, 19–20). Conversational thinking promotes a strict, formal intellectual engagement between or among ‘proponents called nwa-nsa and opponents called nwa-nju who engage in an arumaristics on a specific thought in which critical and rigorous questioning and answering are employed to creatively unveil new concepts and open new vistas for thought’ (Chimakonam 2015a, 463; 2015b, 19; 2017b, 116). Nwa-­ nsa is the party in a relationship that holds and defends a position. Nwa-nju is the other party in that creative relationship whose duty is to question the veracity and viability of the position of nwa-nsa. In other words, nwa-nju and nwa-nsa may represent different scholars with different ideas and from different philosophical places that constructively engage with each other in a mutually beneficial and creative encounter. The aim is to reveal the loopholes and creatively fill up the lacuna and not to destroy, discount or displace the identity of the other. This relationship between nwa-nsa and nwa-nju is flexible and accommodative of other indices, traditions, cultures, identities or positions in order to ensure progress and development that can be sustained for a long time (Enyimba 2019, 11). The implication of this is that nwa-­ nsa and nwa-nju are discreet in their interactions with each other and with other stakeholders in order to avoid dogmatization or absolutization of one position above the other. Chimakonam, in distinguishing conversational thinking from Socratic dialectics, explains that while Socratic dialectics is targeted at establishing the falsity of a position and the truth of its negation, conversational thinking places premium on sustaining the intellectual and creative encounter rather than the outcome of such encounter (Chimakonam 2017a, 16). Conversational thinking is in this sense continuous and sustainable in conceptualization and in knowledge creation following the possibility of new ideas and evidence. The eight canons of conversational philosophy developed by Chimakonam further lend credence to the above observation. These canons according to him are intended to underline the minimum

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requirements, modes, focus and direction of thinking in a conversational manner in contemporary African philosophy. Accordingly, these canons include the need for critical conversation, transformative indigenization, noetic re-Africanization, moderate decolonization and constructive modernization, non-veneration of authorities, theoretic interrogation and checking of perverse dialogue (2017b, 19–20; Nweke 2016, 56–63). Chimakonam explains very clearly that conversational philosophy is a school, conversation is the movement aimed at advancing the idea of conversational philosophy, while conversationalism is the method (2017b, 19). In recent works, Chimakonam (2019) employs conversationalism interchangeably with conversational thinking. Chimakonam developed the theory of conversational philosophy, its methods and principles with the aim of demonstrating how different philosophical traditions can move from their particular philosophical places to a universal philosophical space which he identifies as intercultural philosophy (2015a, 412–479). For him, philosophy should never be exhausted within the encounters of a given place. It is not supposed to be a place thing alone but also an inter-place activity. Thus, he defines intercultural philosophy as what happens when reason emanating from different places converges at a borderless epistemic point. The tool of reason being what drives thought (Chimakonam 2017a, 118). This conception of intercultural philosophy stems from his conviction that philosophy has many traditions conditioned by different cultures that inspired them, but that it is possible for these traditions to get involved in a type of relationship that Chimakonam describes as global expansion of thought (GET) (2015a, 466–468). GET is the point of intercultural philosophy, and this is clearly one of the aims of conversational philosophy. According to Chimakonam and Nweke (2018, 209), conversational thinking speaks to a strategy of exchange derived from the African notion of relationship that undergirds the method of African philosophy teased out of the worldview that reality exists as a network in which everything depends on everything else. This points to the culturally inspired nature of conversational thinking and, therefore, its ethnophilosophical dimension. This shall form the major concern of a subsequent section of this chapter. The notion of arumaristics upon which Chimakonam founded the method of conversationalism is drawn from an Igbo word ‘arumaruka’, which he describes as critical ‘conversation’. In his words: The idea of conversationalism goes back to the Igbo notion of “Iruka” or “arumaru-uka” which roughly translates to engaging in a critical exchange or conversation and has two senses: (1) The Act (but not the state) of engaging in a critical exchange and (2) The mechanism for engaging in a critical exchange. While the first sense describes its doctrine of conversational philosophy, the second sense describes its methodic ambience. When corrupted, the adjective arumaristic may be derived to qualify any relationship that is characterized by a critical exchange. The noun arumaristics therefore may be defined as a type of critical encounter that involves the re-shuffling of thesis and anti-thesis, each time at a higher level without the expectation of synthesis (2017a, 17)

From the above, one can perceive that conversational thinking is rooted in the Igbo word ‘Arumaru-Uka’ or ‘Iruka’ which Chimakonam has christened ‘arumaristics’. ‘Arumaristics’ describes a procedure for reasoning where thesis and antithesis

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complement rather than coalesce or fuse together, and maintain their individualities. For Chimakonam, the English rendition of ‘arumaristics’ is ‘conversation’. We shall explain this notion in details in the next section. In conversationalism, there is no victor or vanquished; all that is expected is a critical and rigorous exchange of ideas that generates new concepts and new areas of research. In what follows, we demonstrate the indebtedness of conversational thinking to ethno-philosophy.

3  Conversational Thinking and Ethno-Philosophy It is true that scholars like Hountondji (1996, 63), Appiah (1992, 91) and Attoe (2016, 102) have ridiculed ethno-philosophy as a debased form of philosophizing based on communal thought pattern and devoid of critical rigour; yet it has continued to prove relevant in contemporary times (Agada 2013, 240; 2015; 2019b, 1–20; Mangena 2014a, 31–35; 2014b, 103). The philosophical perspective that insists that the rich culture, languages and worldviews of African people present useful raw materials for philosophical rumination is what has come to be known as ethno-­ philosophy. Ethno-philosophy is the conscious effort at sifting the philosophical ideas and principles inherent in African proverbs, folklores, languages and cultural experiences. Hence, a scholar is described as an ethnophilosopher and his/her work as ethnophilosophical if critical rigour is employed in excavating the philosophical elements implicit in African cultures, languages, wise sayings and worldviews, and the application of same in solving problems confronting the African and his environment. In this regard, for instance, a work exposing the nature of new yam festival in Boki local government area could pass as a philosophical treatise in the sense that the philosophical elements inherent in such festival are laid bare. The truth of the idea that “every philosopher is a product of his or her cultural and social environment or experiences” (Momoh 1993, 1; Russell 1945, 14) gives one the impetus to trace the ethnophilosophical foundations of most contemporary African philosophical methodologies, one of which is conversational thinking. The point being made here is that the cultural climate of an individual philosopher defines, to some extent, his or her philosophical temperament. This is because no philosophy emanates from a vacuum and conversational thinking is not an exemption. Having exposed the nature of conversational thinking in the preceding section, here we concentrate effort at establishing the claim that conversational thinking is ethnophilosophical by virtue of its etymology and ontology. Conversational thinking derives its inspirations and influences from the rich cultural experiences, languages, proverbs and wise sayings of the Igbo (African) lifeworld. This is evident in the numerous concepts formulated to enrich the methodology. These concepts include arumaristics, nwa-nsa and nwa-nju, benoke and nmeko, among others. We shall unpack these concepts and demonstrate their ethnophilosophical nature. Arumaristics is a type of encounter that involves the reshuffling of thesis and antithesis, each time at a new level without the expectation of a synthesis

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(Chimakonam 2017b, 116). The concept arumaristics is the adjectival form of the Igbo root word arumaru-uka. Arumaru-uka is derived from the Igbo language spoken by well over 70 million people whose ancestral land lies in the West African country of Nigeria, east of the Niger River (Chimakonam 2017b, 116). Arumaru-­ uka, or iruka, which is another variant of it, has roughly been translated to mean ‘engaging in critical and creative conversation’. Now it is important to examine the concept of arumar-uka more closely. Arumar-uka is a combination of two Igbo words, namely, arumaru and uka. Arumaru, then, refers to doubting, disbelieving or argumentation. Uka, on the other hand, refers to matters of concern or matters at hand. Arumaru-uka would then imply doubt or disbelief over an issue or matter, expressed through continuous questioning and answering. Similarly, iruka is a coinage of two Igbo words, namely, iru and uka. Iru means arguing or questioning. It represents what in conversational thinking would be described as ‘critical engagement’ or ‘interrogation’. Uka on the other hand means matters or issues at hand. Thus, iruka means doubt on matters/issues or doubting of matters or issues. It refers to the act of argumentation by continuous asking of questions in order to clear disbelief. From the foregoing analysis of the root concept of conversational thinking, the cultural embeddedness of these root words becomes so obvious that one cannot legitimately deny the ethnophilosophical leaning of conversational thinking. Chimakonam (2017b, 119) states clearly that apart from the notion of arumau-­ uka, another main inspiration behind the method of conversational thinking is the notion of relationship found among the various sub-Saharan African cultures such as the Igbo. To show the nature of this idea of relationship, communion and mutual interdependence, Chimakonam again appeals to the rich Igbo (African) culture and language to derive the concept of nwa-nsa and nwa-nju. The interaction between nwa-nsa and nwa-nju is used in conversational thinking to demonstrate the beauty of mutual dependence, complementary interaction and the relationship of interdependence between and among seemingly opposed variables. This type of relationship is what conversational thinking leverages on. Nwa-nsa and nwa-nju are two epistemic agents in conversational thinking that creatively and mutually engage with each other without losing their individual identities. Instead they make each other significant in the knowledge production process. A critical analysis of the root meaning of the two concepts is of importance at this point, as it will further reveal their cultural derivations and, by extension, the ethnophilosophical nature of conversational thinking. Nwa-nsa like nwa-nju is a derivation of two Igbo words, namely, nwa and nsa as well as nwa and nju, respectively. Nwa is an Igbo word that refers to a child, a person or a human being. Nsa is an Igbo word for a respondent or one who answers questions. Nju is used to describe an interrogator, investigator, a doubter or one who questions or doubts issues or matters. From the above, one can clearly perceive again the influence and significance of the rich Igbo cultural experiences and language on conversational thinking. This is the reason conversational thinking thrives on rigorous and critical encounter or interaction between the two epistemic agents known as nwa-nsa and nwa-nju. While nwa-nsa is that party in the relationship that

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puts forward a new idea and rationally and rigorously defends it, nwa-nju is the other party in the relationship that engages nwa-nsa in a creative struggle by questioning the veracity of propositions and claims. Through this procedure in conversational thinking, knowledge grows and new concepts are formulated. The ethnophilosophical foundation or source of conversational thinking is further unveiled by the formulation and deployment of the concept of benoke. This term, as used in conversational thinking, shows the point in the interaction between the opposed variables (nwa-nsa and nwa-nju) at which they cannot get any closer (Chimakonam 2017a, 19). This is known as the benoke point. This concept is another ethnophilosophical concept derived from the Igbo statement bere n’oke, which is itself a collection of two Igbo words, namely, bere which means ‘reaching’ and n’oke which means ‘the limit or terminal point’. When put together, berenoke or benoke means ‘reaching the limit or terminal point’. Benoke can be rightly said to have inspired Chimakonam to theorize that nwa-nsa and nwa-nju are not expected to resolve their struggle. Instead every answer is expected to give birth to new questions and new concepts. In the same vein, every question is expected to open new vistas for thought and elevate the discourse to a higher level (Chimakonam 2017a, 22). Nwa-nsa and nwa-nju’s mutual relationship in conversational thinking is made even clearer by appeal to another concept of Igbo cultural origin, namely, nmeko. Nmeko is that logical relationship that activates nwa-nsa and nwa-nju by bringing them together. Nmeko is the Igbo word for communion or mutual dependence of individuals (Chimakonam 2019, 117; Ozumba and Chimakonam 2014, 132). Thus, nmeko is the interactive engagement between nwa-nsa and nwa-nju, in order to establish the veracity or otherwise of a given claim or theory. It points to a relationship of contestations, protestations and conversations which are the hallmark of conversational thinking. Another notion which underscores and further buttresses the ethnophilosophical foundation of conversationalism is the Igbo notion of ‘okwu’, one which Chimakonam (2019, 13–18) has argued is what better defines the African traditional worldview, which for him is okwu-centric as against the Western worldview which is logo-centric. The term logocentrism is used to describe that predominant and hegemonic Western philosophical tradition that privileges reason or logos as an absolute and universally definitive attribute of philosophy across all cultural epistemologies and traditions. According to Chimakonam, the contemporary African philosophical discourse that would ensure a ‘global expansion of thought (GET)’ through the method and principles of conversational thinking is that which must take a necessary departure from logocentrism to okwu-centrism. This is why Chimakonam (2019, 18) asserts that the notion of okwu serves as the raw material that enables the formation of language, and is thus employed during conversation. According to him, the recognition of okwu as a philosophical centre inevitably presents conversational thinking as one of the veritable modes of any philosophical inquiry, and African philosophy in particular. Okwu is synonymous to uka and is implied in the notion of ‘arumaru-uka’ which, as noted earlier, is that creative and innovative method that ensures a critical and constructive emendation, contestation

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and protestation that defines the relationship between interlocutors as they engage in mutual criticism. Another principle in traditional African culture that undergirds conversationalism is implied in the Igbo composite word ‘ekwu-eme’, which is a disposition that sustains the intellectual encounter between the two epistemic agents, nwa-nsa and nwa-nju. According to Nweke (2017, 63), the notion of arumaru-uka is also implied in the Igbo cultural principle ‘onye na ekwu, na kwa-eme’ (an individual is characterized by action rather than mere words). Explaining this traditional moral principle of association and relationship, Nweke asserts that ‘Ekwu-eme’ is defined as a composite of two Igbo words, namely, ‘ekwu’ and ‘eme’, which can loosely be translated as ‘saying and doing’. Conceptually, it embodies the Igbo-African value of the correspondence between one’s thoughts, words and actions. Other traditional Igbo concept which grounds conversational philosophy is the notion of njikoka, mmekoka and onona-etiti. In conversational thinking, the three concepts serve as the three basic principles that undergird the logic of conversational thinking. The notion of njikoka as a principle is expressed as the traditional Igbo value of harmony and integration. The Igbo say: Ayu kota mamiri onu, o gba ofufu. This can be loosely translated as: ‘it is only when two or more persons urinate at a convergent spot that their collective urine would produce foaming’. This principle, implicit in conversational thinking, underlines the value of group unity. The notion of mmekoka refers to the importance of mutual dependence and harmonious existence. The Igbo will say, ka so mu adina which means ‘No one can exist alone or in isolation’. The principle of onona-etiti underscores the importance of complementarity and the fact that there is no vacuum in nature. These principles and concepts are derived from the Igbo language, cultural values, proverbs and wise sayings to enrich the method of conversational thinking. Conversational thinking drew inspiration from the rich indigenous cultural epistemologies of the traditional Igbo (African) system of thought.

4  Conclusion The argument of this chapter is that the ethnophilosophical current in African philosophy is a major inspiration for the method of conversational thinking as developed by Chimakonam. Igbo worldviews, language, wise sayings and proverbs were critically and creatively employed by Chimakonam in the formulation of the major concepts that make up the method of conversational thinking. Consequently, we presented ethno-philosophy as the foundation of conversational thinking.

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The Challenge of the “End of Metaphysics” for Ethnophilosophy: A Discourse on the Process Implication of the Metaphysics of Terror Emmanuel Ofuasia

Abstract  The later Martin Heidegger claims that metaphysics has reached a dead end. He arrives at this conclusion using Friedrich Nietzsche’s critique of Western metaphysics as a template. He claims that with Nietzsche, all the possible configurations of any metaphysical theory had been expended. This is owing to his conviction that authentic efforts towards the grounding question of Being have been compromised and replaced with the God concept, hence the ontotheological denotation. The principal questions that inform this chapter then are: How can ethnophilosophy, which is deeply interwoven with metaphysics within the African philosophical purview, serve productive thinking among Africans in the wake of Heidegger’s proclamation? What future is there for African metaphysical doctrines that are emerging in the aftermath of Heidegger’s pronouncement? Specifically, in what way is an African metaphysical doctrine such as Ada Agada’s metaphysics of terror implicated by Heidegger’s submission? I assert that process metaphysics, first codified by Alfred N.  Whitehead, is immune to the grouses of Heidegger. After showing how Heidegger’s indictment extends mainly to the mainstream and dominant substance metaphysical orientation in the history of Western philosophy, I articulate how Agada’s strand of metaphysics possesses a process-relational undergirding which renders it immune to Heidegger’s charge. I posit that Agada’s metaphysics is a strand of process thinking that is not bedevilled by the hurdles that beset substance metaphysics and stress that ethnophilosophy-inspired African metaphysical theories possess a process underpinning. Keywords  Ada Agada · African metaphysics · Alfred N. Whitehead · Ethnophilosophy · Martin Heidegger

E. Ofuasia (*) Department of Philosophy, Lagos State University, Lagos, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Agada (ed.), Ethnophilosophy and the Search for the Wellspring of African Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78897-1_18

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1  Introduction When he entered the metaphysical domain nearly a century ago, Martin Heidegger was full of confidence as he felt the urgency to put the question of Being to rest once and for all through his much celebrated publication, Being and Time (1962), and other early works. The ontological dissimilarity between Being (Sein) and entities (Seienden) is a crucial commitment that continues even in his later thoughts, only to be abandoned eventually. Heidegger could not provide a convincing analysis of the nature of Being, only to recommend later that “instead of imposing our thoughts on things, we must think in a quiet, nonimpositional way so that we can catch a glimpse of Being as it shows itself” (see Moore and Bruder 2011, 173). The consequence here is the oblivion of Being since metaphysics has been concerned with entities (Seienden) but neglected Being (Sein). Where authentic measures are aimed towards the articulation of the latter, Heidegger finds that God soon creeps into the framework, and this is the basis for his assertion that the history of Western metaphysics confuses Being with God. He therefore channels his energy towards the critique of Western metaphysics, as he feels he does not want to continue the tradition that has neglected Being. Whether Being may be grasped through fundamental ontology or through any other means, the later Heidegger (1991) is no longer sure. Consequently, he announces that metaphysics has come to an end. If a scholar of the calibre of Heidegger, after years of thorough engagement with metaphysics, concludes that metaphysics has reached a dead end, it is pertinent to determine what hope persists for African metaphysical thought, with its ethnophilosophical foundation, which is emerging after Heidegger’s declaration. In this chapter, I defend African metaphysics in the face of Heidegger’s assertion about metaphysics reaching a dead end by arguing that African metaphysics falls under a shade of metaphysics called process metaphysics, which is immune to the charge of Heidegger. Specifically, I disclose how Ada Agada’s (2015) twenty-first-­ century metaphysics of terror inadvertently passes itself as a version of process metaphysics. I draw parallels between Agada and Alfred North Whitehead, the first codifier of process metaphysics, and show how Agada’s metaphysics overcomes the metaphysical nihilism Heidegger points out.

2  M  artin Heidegger on the “End of Metaphysics” and the Challenge to Ethnophilosophy At this juncture, a critic may reflect over the appropriateness of my research justification. The grouse may be related to the fact that a declaration by a European scholar concerning the end of metaphysics in Europe does not speak to Africa. Such a pronouncement as Heidegger’s is only limited to his intellectual history – the West! Much as this idea of philosophical restriction and seclusion seems apposite, it is important to chronicle and forestall how such warrants must not in any way extend

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to Africa, subtly or forcefully, in the near future. No African scholar has engaged the implication of Heidegger’s assertion for ethnophilosophy  – the springboard of African metaphysics. What then is Heidegger’s problem and how does it present itself both within the Western and non-Western metaphysical purviews? This is the crucial question that this section seeks to explore. “The End of Metaphysics” (Heidegger 1991, 147) is a section in the fourth volume of one of Heidegger’s later publications titled Nietzsche. In this work, one finds Heidegger wrestling with the intellectual giants in the history of Western only to arrive at the conviction that it is with Friedrich Nietzsche that all the possible configurations of metaphysics had been expended. The major problem which Heidegger deduces from his historical excursion of traditional metaphysics is the neglect of the grounding question: What is Being? (Was ist das Sein?), for the guiding question – what is being? (Was ist das Seiende?). As a result of this, David Farr (2005, 87) notes that: It is due to this singular focus on beings, or entities themselves, that Western metaphysics develops as onto-theology. That is, metaphysics only investigates entities (onta) and the greatest of all entities (theos) and in doing so never considers, and therefore never answers, the grounding question, thereby neglecting Being (Sein).

From another later publication, The End of Philosophy, Martin Heidegger credits Aristotle for being the first to formalise Western metaphysics. Being was first understood among the pre-Socratics in two senses: “emerging” (physis) and “unconcealment” (aletheia), but it was Aristotle who coalesced these senses into ousia – “presence and permanence in the sense of enduring” (Heidegger 1973, 4). If metaphysics, then, makes a statement about God (theos) away from the formulation of Being as ousia, Heidegger (1969, 55) ponders: “How does deity enter into philosophy, not just Modern philosophy, but philosophy as such?” His inquiry pushes him to the almost perfect fit between Christian philosophy and ancient Greek thinking, as the latter through the guiding question soon become embroiled with the search for the arche, the ultimate reason or explanation. Ancient Greek thinkers cultivated the outlook that perfection was synonymous with changelessness (Masong 2013, 14). And it is this “notion of perfection and its synonymy with changelessness [that] served as the backdrop for monotheistic theologies” (Ofuasia 2017, 155). Aristotle’s system therefore accounts for the unmoved mover, God as “the first principle and causes, namely of being” (Heidegger 1958, 57). Hence, Being was soon passed as the arche and then into God, making Heidegger to lament that “the Being of beings is represented fundamentally, in the sense of ground only as causa sui. This is the metaphysical concept of God” (Heidegger 1969, 60). The mainstream and dominant history of Western metaphysics continues in this direction of confusing the grounding question with the guiding question, invoking God (an entity) as the answer to the former, in the process. It is, however, with Nietzsche that the “ultimate metaphysical variation is fully realized” (Farr 2005, 111). The distinction between the phenomena, the fleeting world of appearance, and the noumena, the house of values, initiated by Plato but expounded further by Kant was forceful in Nietzsche. What Nietzsche did, according to Heidegger, was to

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eliminate the noumena and transfer all the values there into the physical world. In Farr’s words (2005, 112), “Nietzsche simply removes the noumenal. No longer shall the other world contain all value. Nietzsche’s desire is to have us live in the real world with value and truth”. Heidegger (1977, 75) further states that “Nietzsche holds this overturning of metaphysics to be the overcoming of metaphysics. But every overturning of this kind remains only a self-deluding entanglement in the Same that has become unknowable”. He continues: “Even in Christian theology we define God, the summum ens qua summum bonum, as the highest value” (Heidegger 1977, 70), and this renders the emphasis on “value and the valuable [to] become the positivistic substitute for the metaphysical” (Heidegger 1977, 71). By transferring values into this world, Nietzsche, according to Heidegger, completes metaphysics. This means that metaphysics “has gone through the sphere of prefigured possibilities”. As a way of making the point more lucid, Heidegger (1977, 92) reflects deeply: This kind of overcoming of metaphysics, which Nietzsche has in mind in the spirit of nineteenth century positivism is only the final entanglement in metaphysics, although in a higher form. It looks as if the ‘meta,’ the transcendence to the suprasensuous, were replaced by the persistence in the elemental world of sensuousness, whereas actually the oblivion of Being is only completed and the suprasensuous is let loose and furthered by the will to power.

The implication is that Nietzsche too fails. While purporting to banish the suprasensuous (i.e. the noumenal), he yet revives it through his notion of the Will to Power, a term which was originally a reaction against nihilism metamorphoses into “an empty abstraction, and therefore just as nihilistic, as previous formulations. It is empty because the explanatory principle is nothing more than an abstraction from entities, which by definition, excludes Being (Sein)” (Farr 2005, 113). And according to Heidegger, it is the neglect of Being that accounts for nihilism and the end of metaphysics. As David Farr (2005, 115) notes Heidegger’s verdict: “For metaphysics there is no place left to go. There only remains the constant repetition of its previously composed variations. It is at an end”. The crucial challenge that Heidegger’s verdict hold for ethnophilosophy in the African context is that no original metaphysical reflection can ensue, following Nietzsche’s critique. Heidegger seems to admit that there is no way the grounding question can be successfully tackled without recourse to God – ontotheology. In a century in which African philosophy as an academic discipline is emerging after it had been deeply steeped in Western philosophical paradigms, it is pertinent to show that ethnophilosophy, which inspires much of African metaphysical thought, is not bothered by the ontotheological constitution of Being. In spite of the raging battles and debates concerning the term “ethnophilosophy”, I make bold to insist that it “is the only philosophy that an African of black extraction can be proud of as it is rooted in African traditions and cultures” (Mangena 2014, 96). Ada Agada (2015, xiv) seems to hold a similar outlook as he asserts that “ethnophilosophy is the proper foundation of authentic African philosophy even though it is not the definitive African philosophy”. Thus, even when ethnophilosophy does not serve as a critical philosophy, in itself, it is that foundation upon which

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authentic African thinking thrives and can improve. Many African philosophical theories with an ethnophilosophical foundation explore a dynamic notion of Being, such that becoming and complementarity are emphasised. This is true if one pays attention to Placide Tempels’ (1959) vital force, Léopold Sédar Senghor’s (1995) negritude, Innocent I. Asouzu’s (2007) ibuanyidanda and most recently Agada’s (2015) consolationism. The common denominators of complementarity and becoming within the African ethnophilosophical purview are not limited to the scholars mentioned above; they persist in the works of other notable greats such as John Mbiti (1969), Mogobe B.  Ramose (2002) and Sophie Oluwole (2014). One another important point of interest is that these metaphysical theories, with their African ethnophilosophical leaning, shy away from presenting God as the ground of all that is. For instance, Kwasi Wiredu notes that the Akan people of Ghana “seem to operate with the notion of the power of God implying rather less than absolute omnipotence. That power is still unique in its extent, but it is conceptually not altogether unlike that of a human potentate” (Wiredu 1998, 41). This does not, however, endorse disbelief in the existence of deity. It rather means that the view of deity as the arche, the ultimate explanation, has no place in the thought of most African metaphysical theorists. Belief in God was taken for granted in traditional African societies. In this connection, John Bewaji (2007, 369), speaking on the Yorùbá notion of deity avers that: The existence of Olodumare is not geotactic, nor is it dependent upon any human whim. This, perhaps, explains why no elaborate arguments of proofs are thought necessary for the existence of God in Yoruba religion. The starting point of wisdom among the Yoruba is the acceptance of the de facto existence of Deity.

As a way of corroborating the foregoing, John Mbiti (1969, 49) maintains that “in all African societies without a single exception people have a notion of God…Everybody knows God’s existence almost by instinct, and even children know Him”. From the analysis provided thus far, two crucial factors are clear regarding African ethnophilosophy in the light of the critique put forward by Heidegger to signal the end of metaphysics. Firstly, African metaphysical doctrines with ethnophilosophical bases, like those cited above, do not place God as the arche. Secondly, rather than seeking permanence and stability in the modus operandi of the universe, interpenetration, dynamism and unity of the seemingly diverse become key elements. It is in this sense that I make two inferences: (1) African metaphysics of the type cited earlier are not affected by Heidegger’s proclamation about metaphysics’ reaching a dead end in the ontotheological; and (2) these shades of African thought share semblance with process thinking, first codified by Whitehead (1978).

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3  P  rocess Metaphysics and the Futility of Heidegger’s “Proclamation” In Heidegger’s spirited effort to show how metaphysics had reached a dead end, he left out a shade of metaphysical thinking in the Western tradition – process thought. Several reasons have been given for this neglect (Farr 2005). Whitehead, the proponent of process thinking, was known more as a philosopher of science and mathematician than as a metaphysician, since he ventured into metaphysics late. The language barrier too may have proved an impasse. And when one adds to the list, the errors and revisions that greeted Process and Reality, until its standardisation in 1978, it becomes apparent that both scholars would not have been able to encounter one another. Nevertheless, these are not enough reasons for Heidegger to have sealed the metaphysical enterprise. “Ontologically speaking”, Kenneth Masong (2013, 14) writes, “there are two types of metaphysics that inform the conceptual articulation of religion, a metaphysics of substance and a metaphysics of event”. It is, however, interesting to note that the history of Western philosophy emphasised substance metaphysics over process. This is a paradox since process thinkers have not failed to initiate Heraclitus as the first process thinker (Ofuasia 2017, 155; Mesle 2008, 4). Heraclitus’s emphasis on change was simply dropped for an enduring substance which is in itself perfect and unyielding in the face of change or flux. Process metaphysics proposes that “the world is composed of events and processes and reality is understood through becoming” (Mesle 2008, 8). Whitehead steps in to revive process thinking by replacing the notion of an enduring substance with the term: “actual entity/occasion”. It is clear that “Whitehead may be interpreted to be doing away with the traditional notion of substance which maintains identity in the face of flux. To be an actual entity, in Whitehead’s view is to be in process” (Ofuasia 2019, 66). The point being made is that all existents are actual entities or a fusion of these. Whitehead is also quick to push that there are gradations among them: “God is an actual entity, and so is the trivial puff of existence in far-off empty space. But though there are gradations of importance, and diversities of function, yet in the principles which actuality exemplifies all are on the same level” (Whitehead 1978, 18). He maintains that actual entities or actual occasions are “the final real things of which the world is made. There is no going behind actual entities to find anything more real” (Whitehead 1978, 18). It is for this reason that Whitehead does not bother himself with a cosmogony but a cosmology and ontology. This is keeping in line with the unique aim of his speculative agenda, “the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted” (Whitehead 1978, 3). God, therefore, is not an actual entity that is before all creation but with all creation (Whitehead 1978, 343). Process metaphysics admits some elements of panpsychism as it seems to propose that there is no part of reality that is lifeless. Life, from this perspective, is in grades. The living

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consciousness of humans is lower than God’s, and, in a similar way, a stone’s consciousness is lower than a human’s consciousness. A human, for instance, as an actual entity, is dipolar, possessing a mental pole and a physical pole. The mental corresponds to what the mainstream metaphysical orientation passes as the mind and its other, the body. Whitehead avoids this distinction as he insists that it is through the mental pole that an actual entity, which could be an ant, rock, table or elephant, prehend1 the eternal objects or possibilities initiated by God for their essence. God too, as an actual entity, has mental and physical aspects which correspond to His primordial and consequent natures. In the former state, God provides eternal objects for all entities to choose from since all actual entities have subjective aims. In this regard, “the subjective aim is constituted by the complete conceptual envisagement of all eternal objects laced with the urge toward their realization in the actualities of the world” (Onwuegbusi 2013, 253). Another term for eternal objects is possibilities. These are options open to all actual entities to admit into their essence or not. The reaction of the choices of eternal objects chosen by actual entities informs the consequent nature of God. In Whitehead’s terms God’s consequent nature “is the physical prehension by God of the actualities of the evolving universe” (Whitehead 1979: 46). God is able to serve all actual entities in the actual world possibilities because He is the only being capable of prehending these possibilities positively, whereas other actual entities with their subjective aims may prehend positively or negatively, leading to the emergence of disorder or evil in the actual world. His submission that “every entity on its finer side introduces God into the world” (Whitehead 1978, 345) is suggestive of the positive prehension of God’s will for the world, which is the best. Being a persuasive agency, if it is the case that God wants what is best for the world, and there is evil in the world, process theology says the evil is a result of deviation from what God intends for the world. Evil surfaces “as a result of the individual deviating from what God intends for him, which is in fact the best” (Onwuegbusi 2013, 259). The main place that Whitehead gives to God is the role of the actual entity that guarantees order in the actual world, and this to him is an adequate reason for maintaining the existence of God. In his words: [I]t is not the case that there is an actual world which accidentally begins to exhibit an order of nature. There is an actual world because there is order in nature. If there were no order, there would be no world. Also, since there is a world, we know that there is an order. The ordering entity is a necessary element in the metaphysical situation presented by the actual world. (Whitehead 1957, 104)

God, for Whitehead, is also bound by the metaphysical laws that operate for all actual entities, even if he may exemplify them uniquely, as in the case of positively prehending possibilities for all actual entities. Hence, it is true to say that “although Whitehead’s God does not transcend the world, he does transcend every other actual

1  This is a technical term in process metaphysics, initiated by Whitehead to account for how knowledge may be acquired even outside the sphere of the five senses. He considers perception as too weak and limited a concept for his purpose.

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entity within the world” (Lawhead 2002, 495). “The immanence of God”, Whitehead (1978, 494) states, “gives reason for the belief that pure chaos is intrinsically impossible”. Unlike in mainstream and dominant substance metaphysics where God is perceived as an almighty agent, the Being of beings, Whitehead (1978, 343) deviates, advancing that for process metaphysics “God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save them from collapse. He is their chief exemplification”. If God is not the ultimate category in process thinking, then it means that process metaphysics is not ontotheological after all. A crucial poser would then be: What is the ultimate category in process metaphysics? To this Whitehead poses the principle of Creativity. “Creativity”, says Whitehead (1978, 21), “is the universal of universals characterizing ultimate matter of fact”. It subsumes “in the nature of things that the many enter into one complex unity” (Whitehead 1978, 31). At this juncture, Whitehead turns to an impersonal agent  – Creativity but not God as the arche. Creativity, as the ultimate principle, functions in such a way that it accounts for the unity amidst diversity that persists among all actual entities, including God. He makes his point thus: The novel entity is at once the togetherness of the ‘many’ which it finds and also it is one among the disjunctive ‘many’ which it leaves; it is a novel entity, disjunctively among the many entities which it synthesizes. The many become one, and are increased by one. (Whitehead 1978, 21)

One will notice how Whitehead struggles with language as he attempts to unravel Creativity, the equivalent of Being in the substance tradition that Heidegger proclaims to have ended. It is for this reason that he notes that “the history of ideas has been the persistent struggle of novel thought with the obtuseness of language” (Whitehead 1967, 120). A critic could however object to Whitehead’s elevation of the notion of Creativity as the arche or the Being that supersedes God, by posing: What if Creativity is an aspect of God distributed through creation, thereby signifying His essence? This objection would have been apposite in a substance metaphysical framework, where God supersedes all that is not God. The implication of this superintendence, as I have shown earlier, is the ontotheological constitution of Being where God and Being become one and the same thing. Whitehead’s system is, however, a process metaphysics where God uniquely exemplifies metaphysical laws and principles but is not beyond them. Creativity then is that which is primordial. Hence, Creativity cannot be merely a vital aspect of God, as only the converse is possible as Whitehead (1978, 47) harps: “God is at once a creature of Creativity and a condition for Creativity”. In another publication, Whitehead insists that God is “the actual but non-temporal entity whereby the determination of mere Creativity is transmuted into a determinate freedom” (Whitehead 1957, 90). God is a tool in the “hands” of Creativity. Being or Creativity, and not God, discloses itself as a composite of all that exists (cf. Edet 2011, 28–32). It is, therefore, safe to infer that the ontotheological articulation of Being that beset the substance metaphysical framework in the West does not extend to process

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metaphysics. The grounding question (Was ist das Sein?) has not been compromised with the guiding question (Was ist das Seiende?). In process philosophy, entities are treated as entities and Being as Creativity. It is for this reason that I deduce that Heidegger’s proclamation is not extendable to process metaphysics. I now turn to how an African metaphysical theory with a process outlook renders Heidegger’s proclamation ineffective in African metaphysics.

4  F  rom Ethnophilosophy to the Process Foundation of the Metaphysics of Terror Thus far, I have been able to counter the view of Heidegger that metaphysics has ended by showing how his pessimism does not extend to process metaphysics. In this section, my first aim is to draw parallels between process metaphysics (as briefly articulated above) and the African understanding of reality before settling for Agada’s metaphysics – the second preoccupation of this chapter. Owing to the limitation of space, I will restrict my analysis to Agada’s metaphysics of terror2 for two reasons: Firstly, it is an original or authentic African metaphysical theory that derives its raw data from ethnophilosophy; and secondly, because his metaphysics is newly codified and reflective of previous African metaphysical doctrines. One striking semblance or parallel between process metaphysics and nearly all African metaphysical doctrines is the insistence on dynamism, interdependence and interconnectivity. Mesle, a Whiteheadian scholar, evinces the “urgency in coming to see the world as a web of interrelated processes of which we are integral parts, so that all of our choices and actions have consequences for the world around us” (Mesle 2008, 9). Another process scholar Adrian Ivakhiv (2018) notes that process metaphysics places premium on dynamic interaction among entities which may lead to the emergence of novelties. He asserts that: “Process-relational thought rejects the Cartesian idea that there are minds, or things that think, and bodies, or matter that acts according to strict causal laws. Rather the two are considered one and the same, or two aspects of an interactive and dynamically evolving reality” (Ivakhiv 2018, 234). The foregoing may be contrasted validly with the pronouncement of African thinkers where regard is given to humans as “communal beings possessing physical and spiritual attributes, destined for communion with their fellow human beings and interaction with the ancestors, the gods and even the seemingly inanimate physical environment” (Agada and Egbai 2018, 142). Recently, Victor Nweke and Lucky Ogbonnaya (2020, 279), while discussing the significance of the African metaphysical view, add that “the existence of every entity is intricately interconnected and 2  Agada describes his system as a “metaphysics of terror” because it posits the universe as imperfect. This imperfect universe is an expression of mood and, therefore, characterised by yearning. However, whatever yearns in an imperfect universe cannot reach the perfection which is its goal. Hence, the yearning universe is a tragic universe (see Agada 2015).

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interrelated with the existence of another reality; the entities in the world affirm and make possible the being of each other. Thus, to be is not to be alone”. While articulating the interrelated character of African reality, Senghor (1964, 93–94) adds: “Negro African society puts more stress on the group than on the individuals, more on solidarity than the activity and needs of the individual, more on the communion of individuals than on their autonomy”. Just as process philosophy vitiates the Cartesian cogito and emphasises the individual vying for interdependence among all entities, so does African metaphysics, especially when gleaned from the stance of Ubuntu which hints that a person is a person because of or through others. Ramose (2002, 49) conceives it as “the foundation and edifice of African philosophy”. Accordingly, he assures that “the rheomodic character of ubu-ntu underlies the widely recognized view that the African philosophic view of the universe is holistic…This makes it dynamic” (Ramose 2003, 275). It is clear, at this juncture, how ethnophilosophy serves as the backdrop for the African conception of reality. The interconnected and interdependent metaphysical standpoint of ethnophilosophy inspires African philosophers to formulate philosophical theories with a process foundation. For the remainder of this inquiry, I will now take an instance of the African view of reality to validate my contention that process, but not substance metaphysics, is implied in nearly all African metaphysical doctrines. Agada’s Existence and Consolation will be the model of my philosophical exploration. I will, as much as possible, limit my analysis of his stimulating thought to aspects that concern the “proclamation” of Heidegger, putting premium on the discourse on God and Being as well as highlighting semblances with Whitehead’s processism. Agada’s metaphysics of terror pays homage to ethnophilosophy as its foundation. He confesses: “I arrived at this theory without any reference to Greek philosophy. My intellectual encounter with Senghor was a confirmation of my early conviction. Later encounter with the ethno-philosophers, Asouzu and the African logician Chimakonam strengthened this conviction” (Agada 2015, 37). In a more recent publication, Agada (2018) does not fail to add another ethnophilosopher, Godfrey Ozumba, to the list of the source of his metaphysics of terror. What then is the inner kernel of Agada’s metaphysics of terror? The metaphysics of terror relates to the derivation of a universe that operates on the basis of mood and yearning. Agada (2015) is convinced that the fundamental arche or Being is Eternal Mood, a quasi-impersonal principle or force, like Whitehead’s Creativity, which accounts for why the universe, with its constitutive elements, functions the way it does. I say quasi-impersonal because mood “alternates between the impersonal principle of fatalism and the personal principle of creation” (Agada 2015, 76). Another way of corroborating the quasi-impersonal nature of mood is disclosed in the cosmic tension which involves “a swing from impersonality and indifference to personality and love and back again, in perpetuity” (Agada 2015, 78). Mood, then, “is yearning and the driving force of that which yearns is intellectual love, the desire for creation and replication” (Agada 2015, 76). This is endorsed by the conviction that “humans exist as beings of emotion. The meaning of our life is joy and sadness” (Agada 2015, 111).

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In a universe that is given, imperfect and continuously yearning for perfection in a fatalistic sense, the emotions of joy and sadness rule and these are grounded in mood. Mood, then, is “a primal emotion carrying within itself the sufficient grounds of the universe. To say it exists fatalistically is the same as saying it came into being undetermined and without any reason beyond the fact that it is yearning” (Agada 2015, 74). It is the “most fundamental reality, the essence of things, implicating reasons, feelings, dispositions, orientations, and affects, both conscious and unconscious” (Agada 2019a, 4). It is the factor that accounts for all as “everything in the universe is a development of mood, both the animate and the inanimate” (Agada 2019a, 4). This clearly underscores his doctrine of proto-panpsychism, a variant of panpsychism, which Whiteheadians also refer to as panexperientialism (to be explored later on). Hence, the state of being in a universe characterised by yearning and in which the goal of yearning, which is perfection, is unattainable is called consolation (Agada 2019a, 5). This universe is one that exhibits the twin features of beauty and terror, good and evil and joy and sadness, but also seeks to find balance between optimism and pessimism. In a universe of this kind, what then is the purpose? Agada argues that in a consolation universe, teleological and mechanistic explanations of purpose will not do. Purpose, which becomes relative to a context, may be achieved only in the yearning for perfection in a universe that is imperfect. Specifically, “human struggle for survival is meaningful or meaningless only against the background of the ideal of perfection which gives us a picture of how things can get better relative to their current states. Thus, the yearning for perfection accounts for the yearning for survival” (Agada 2019a, 6). As teleology and mechanicism, individually, attempt to explain the purpose of the universe incompetently, fatalism enters the fray to hint at the unavoidable yearning for an unattainable perfection. It is within this fatalistic position that, for Agada (2015, 253) “teleology is another term for mechanicism and vice-versa”. Regardless of status and grade, all existents are ruled by mood, including God. It is, therefore, not a surprise that “what holds for humanity holds for nature, more or less, that humanity and nature are in solidarity. If humans yearn, nature yearns too. If nature or the objective universe did not yearn there would be no universe in the first place and no one to observe its motions” (Agada 2015, 70). It is, however, instructive to note that God exhibits mood in a unique way since He is a being “that has conquered the eternal despair of mood within Himself and has become the being of power and glory rather than omnipotence and omniscience” (Agada 2015, 78). This God obviously is not the Judeo-Christian version but “a sufficiently powerful God defined by His glory as the conqueror of cosmic silence” (Agada 2015, 79; cf. Agada 2019b). The implication is that God is subordinate to Eternal Mood. God is also the consolation of the universe, the being who guarantees eternal peace for human consciousness in an imperfect world (Agada 2015, 119). By saying God is the consolation of the universe, Agada comes close to Whitehead who had reflected almost a century ago that “God is the great companion – the fellow-sufferer who understands” (Whitehead 1978, 351). A careful look at other aspects of Agada’s

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metaphysics of terror also reveals other places of semblances, which account for the process implication in the system. Both Agada (2015) and Whitehead (1978) admit that the universe is in a state of flux or motion and they shun the persistence of an enduring substance in the face of change. What presents itself to substance metaphysicians as matter and mind are aspects of the same reality for these thinkers. In addition, the systems of the two philosophers are not open to the ontotheological charge of Heidegger as they have not placed God as Being. Whereas the one pursued the grounding question to arrive at Creativity, the other deduced Eternal Mood. Their systems also regard reality as a web of interrelated or interconnected parts, in spite of slight variations. It is clear that much as they (individually and independently) explored the guiding question (unaware of Heidegger’s “proclamation”), they did not allow that to cloud the urgency or pertinence of the grounding question  – the charge Heidegger brings against notable Western intellectuals from Aristotle to Nietzsche. However, Agada’s (2015, 120) insistence that God is in solidarity with the universe, and, therefore, immanent, contrasts sharply with Whitehead’s (1978, 348) submission that “God and the World stand over against each other, expressing the final metaphysical truth that appetitive vision and physical enjoyment have equal claim to priority in creation. But no two actualities can be torn apart: each is all in all”. Both of them clearly seem to be referring to Heidegger’s accentuation “of a most primordial ground that sustains all other grounds, including God” (Okoro 2011, 117). Whitehead is here hinting at the contrast between the actual world and God. Whereas the expression of this truth may seem to hint that the world and God are distinct, Whitehead is quick to add that they are together and are interwoven. Another crucial similarity in the ideas of these scholars is the belief that consciousness is displaced and primordial in all existents. Agada (2019a) endorses what he calls panpsychism, a concept that denotes that “mentality, primarily and most especially consciousness, is fundamental and ubiquitous” (Seager 2010, 167), to address the perennial metaphysical problems of freedom, determinism and mind-­ body interaction. What Agada and other scholars such as William Seager call panpsychism, Whitehead and foremost Whiteheadians such as Charles Hartshorne and David Ray Griffin pass as panexperientialism – a term which indicates that “experience, and thereby spontaneity, intrinsic value, and internal relations go all the way down to the most primitive units of nature” (Griffin 2007, 12). Interestingly, just like Agada, the Whiteheadian Griffin (2007) has also used the idea of panpsychism to diminish the problems of determinism, freedom, mind-body interaction and philosophy of nature. The depth of their analyses is, however, beyond the scope of the present inquiry. In spite of the semblances noted above, I need to hint that whereas Whitehead is concerned with a cosmology and ontology, Agada considers both and adds cosmogony to the list. These three aspects are so important to codifying reality that the inspired the lamented Campbell Shittu Momoh (2000, 8) to define metaphysics as “the philosophical corporate name for cosmology (what exists), cosmogony (the origin of what exists) and ontology (the constituent of what exists)”. Whitehead seems not to be motivated by cosmogony because of his confidence that actual

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entities are “the final real things of which the world is made. There is no going behind actual entities to find anything more real” (Whitehead 1978, 18). Since all actual entities are composed of mental and physical poles, he is able to stick with ontology and cosmology. Agada, on the other hand, engages in a cosmogony as he labours to show how mind and matter emerged from mood as two distinct aspects of the same reality. This is evident in the posed questions in the opening line of the third chapter of Existence and Consolation  – “what was the universe like in the beginning? Did matter detach itself from mind or did mind evolve from matter?” (Agada 2015, 69). I must end this comparison by briefly commenting on the religious doctrine the metaphysics of these thinkers imply. From my analyses, I deduce that both Whitehead and Agada have a panentheistic outlook in their proposals. And panentheism “is the view that God includes the world in his being (since he is affected by every event within it) and at the same that he is more than the events in the world (God has his own unique aims and actions)” (Lawhead 2002, 495). This implies that the world and God are forever locked in a continuous interaction. This is already made manifest in the preceding discussion on the transcendent and immanent natures of God.

5  Conclusion The essential focus of this essay is to attain two ends – (1) show that African metaphysical doctrines have ethnophilosophy as their foundation and that ethnophilosophy reveals a process perspective of the universe and (2) demonstrate that African metaphysics basically escapes the grounding problem of Being which, according to Heidegger, has brought Western metaphysics to a dead end. I employed Agada’s metaphysics of terror to make my claim more solid. This chapter on process thinking in African metaphysics and its advantages invites African philosophers to make this strand of thinking more potent and forceful. Agada’s utilisation of process thinking makes his metaphysics a system of thought to reckon with among other popular African metaphysical systems with ethnophilosophical underpinning.

References Agada, Ada. 2015. Existence and consolation: Reinventing ontology, gnosis and values in African philosophy. St Paul: Paragon House. ———. 2018. Consolationism: A postmodern exposition. In Ka osi so onye: African philosophy in the postmodern era, ed. Jonathan O. Chimakonam and Edwin Etieyibo, 231–252. Wilmington: Vernon Press. ———. 2019a. Rethinking the metaphysical questions of mind, matter, freedom, determinism, purpose and the mind-body problem within the panpsychist framework of consolationism. South African Journal of Philosophy 38 (1): 1–16.

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———. 2019b. Kant and the classical metaphysical proofs of God’s existence: How the proofs can play a regulative function in the sphere of pure/speculative reason. Journal of African Studies and Sustainable Development 2 (2): 88–106. Agada, Ada, and Uti Ojah Egbai. 2018. Language, thought, and interpersonal communication: A cross-cultural conversation on the question of individuality and community. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 7 (2): 141–162. Asouzu, Innocent I. 2007. Ibuanyidanda: New complementary ontology (beyond world-­ immanentism, ethnocentric reduction and impositions). Munster: LIT Verlag. Bewaji, John Ayotunde. 2007. An introduction to the theory of knowledge: A pluricultural approach. Ibadan: Hope Publication. Edet, Mesembe. 2011. Being as missing-links. Journal of Complementary Reflection: Studies in Asouzu 1 (1): 28–32. Farr, David. 2005. A critical examination of A.N. Whitehead’s metaphysics in the light of Martin Heidegger’s critique of onto-theology. PhD diss., McMaster University. Griffin, David R. 2007. Whitehead’s radically different postmodern philosophy: An argument for its contemporary relevance. New York: State University of New York Press. Heidegger, Martin 1958. What is philosophy? Trans. William Kluback and Jean T.  Wilde. New York: Twayne Publishers Inc. ———. 1962. Being and time. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper San Francisco. ———. 1969. Identity and difference. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. New  York: Harper & Row Publishers. ———. 1973. The end of philosophy. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. New  York: Harper & Row Publishers. ———. 1977. The question concerning technology and other essays. Trans. and ed. William Lovitt. New York: Harper & Row Publishers. ———. 1991. In Nietzsche Vols 1–4, ed. David Farrell Krell. New York: Harper San Francisco. Ivakhiv, Adrian. 2018. Shadowing the anthropocene: Eco-realism for turbulent times. California: Punctum Books. Lawhead, William F. 2002. The voyage of discovery: A historical introduction to philosophy. Stamford: Wordsworth Thomas Learning. Mangena, Fainos. 2014. In defense of ethno-philosophy: A brief response to Kanu’s eclecticism. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture, and Religions 3 (1): 96–107. Masong, Kenneth. 2013. Becoming-religion: Re-/thinking religion with A.N. Whitehead and Keiji Nishitani. Buddhi: A Journal of Ideas and Culture 17 (2): 1–26. Mbiti, John. 1969. African religions and philosophy. London: Heinemann. Mesle, Robert C. 2008. Process-relational philosophy: An introduction to Alfred North Whitehead. West Conshohocken: Templeton Foundation Press. Momoh, Campbell S. 2000. The substance of African philosophy. Auchi: African Philosophy Project Publication. Moore, Brooke N., and Kenneth Bruder. 2011. Philosophy: The power of ideas. New  York: McGraw Hill Book Company. Nweke, Victor C., and Lucky U. Ogbonnaya. 2020. To be is not to be alone: Interrogating exclusivism from an African context. In Handbook of African philosophy of difference, ed. Elvis Imafidon, 273–288. Cham: Springer. Ofuasia, Emmanuel. 2017. On the dearth of God in Aristotle’s substance metaphysics: A process-­ relational riposte. Philosophia 15: 145–161. ———. 2019. Unveiling ezumezu logic as a framework for process ontology and Yorùbá ontology. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 8 (2): 63–84. Okoro, Chidozie. 2011. The problems of metaphysical philosophy. African Nebula 3: 113–138. Oluwole, Sophie B. 2014. Socrates and Ọ̀rúnmìlà: Two patron saints of classical philosophy. Lagos: Ark Publishers.

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Onwuegbusi, Martin O. 2013. God in Whitehead’s process metaphysics. Philosophia: International Journal of Philosophy 14 (2): 247–262. Ramose, Mogobe B. 2002. African philosophy through ubuntu. Harare: Mond Books. ———. 2003. The philosophy of ubuntu and ubuntu as a philosophy. In The African philosophy reader, ed. P.H. Coetzee and A.P.J. Roux, 270–280. London: Routledge. Seager, William. 2010. Panpsychism, aggregation and combinatorial infusion. Mind and Matter 8 (2): 167–184. Senghor, Leopold S. 1964. On African socialism. Trans. Mercer Cook. London: Pall Mall Press. ———. 1995. On Negrohood: Psychology of the African Negro. In African philosophy: Selected readings, ed. Albert Mosley, 116–127. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. Tempels, Placide. 1959. Bantu philosophy. Trans. Colin King. Paris: Presence Africaine. Whitehead, Alfred N. 1957. Religion in the making. New York: Macmillan. ———. 1967. The adventure of ideas. New York: The Free Press. ———. 1978. In Process and reality: An essay in cosmology, ed. David R. Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne. New York: The Free Press. Wiredu, Kwasi. 1998. Toward Decolonizing African Philosophy and Religion. African Studies Quarterly 1 (4): 17–46. http://africa.ufl.edu/asq/v1/4/3.pdf.

Ethical and Political Issues in Afro-Communitarianism Isaiah A. Negedu

Abstract  I shall investigate the roots of current Afro-communitarian stance and attempt to locate it in traditional African community. I accept the fact that communitarianism is not uniquely African; each society has its own style of communitarian practice that is arguably its own. I acknowledge the imperfections inherent in every society; hence, I have not romanticised the past. I have rather searched for a balanced narrative that paints a more accurate picture of traditional Africa. This chapter is not a critical essay in mere descriptive science. As such, I attempt a normative engagement that bolsters the relevance of Afro-communitarianism in its meta-­ ethical sphere. By this I search for an Afro-communitarian theory that is dependent on the metaphysical and normative notions of personhood and the possibility of a balanced notion of Afro-communitarianism. This is a proposal that should be workable for a functional system in Africa. Keywords  Africa · Afro-communitarianism · Ethics · Personhood · Democracy

1  Introduction In this chapter, I engage in a reflection on the cultural life of the African people as it affects their communal lifestyle. In doing this, I identify its metaphysical and normative dimensions which Afro-communitarian scholars have already exhibited (Menkiti 1984; Gyekye 1997; Ikuenobe 2015; Molefe 2019). I also explain why I think that these dimensions have their flaws. The reason caution should be exercised in doing this kind of analysis is that most Afro-communitarian scholars view the African community as the foundation of personhood. Thus, if there is an error in the

I. A. Negedu (*) School of Religion, Philosophy and Classics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Agada (ed.), Ethnophilosophy and the Search for the Wellspring of African Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78897-1_19

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understanding of the African community, then it will affect our understanding of the notions of personhood. The chapter comprises four sections. The first section introduces what the work sets out to achieve. The second section gives a brief overview of the concept of communitarianism. This section is necessary because it is important to study it from a borderless perspective before I explain the extent of its Africanness. The third section deals with the Afro-communitarian debate, analysing the ideas of key proponents. I then proceed to supply a workable framework for democratic systems. Here, with reference to Akan culture and consensual democracy, I explain how the transition from a tradition-based communitarianism to a civil-based communitarian democracy is possible.

2  What Is Communitarianism? Communitarianism rightly or wrongly is sometimes loosely conceived as a peculiar characteristic of some cultures. However, the science of understanding how ideas (epistemologies really) exist in the world is worth studying from a borderless perspective. So instead of saying an idea or practice is exclusively African or Western, it is necessary to first see what the idea is, strip it of its meme. Communitarianism is the theory that the society is the hub of the activities of its members (Gyekye 1995, 155; Agada 2019). An individual who treats other members of the community properly and has the disposition to act in order to advance the collective interest of the society is viewed as a real person (Hasskei 2018, 4). The two models of communitarianism are the family model and the moderate model. To Kwame Gyekye (1997, 36–37), the family model is unrestricted communitarianism, and the emphasis is on the moral supremacy of the community over the individual. Here the community comes first and is favoured over the individual. Communal relationship here is likened to that of a typical nuclear family, governed by love and shared values. Moderate communitarianism, or restricted communitarianism, favours the balancing of individual rights and social responsibilities (Gyekye 1997, 52). In the bid to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism, the idea of Third Way was formulated; it submits that individual rights should be proportional to social responsibilities (Etzioni 1996, 6). The Third Way views communitarianism as a belief system that incorporates conflicting value systems such as capitalism, communism, Christianity and socialism into a false world value system. It is called a false world value system because it falsely projects the society as the beneficiary of neoliberal system; however, it is driven by corporate profit. There is little hope in thinking that there will be a meeting point between capitalism and socialism without conflict of interest. Both socialism and capitalism are like two corporations dealing in the same commodity in the market; there will always be rivalry since the ultimate goal is for one system to outcompete the other. According to Hans-Jürgen Bieling (2006, 217), the Third Way intends to combine a neoliberal

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view with communitarian ideas. Neoliberal communitarianism, as a more accurate term for the Third Way, takes communitarian values and gives them a neoliberal face. These values (such as solidarity, responsibility, community and inclusion) are merged with neoliberal economic policy needs in order to alleviate the most adverse impacts of neoliberal restructuring (Hager 2007). It emphasises the relevance of an all-encompassing or global society over the inherent rights of the individual and citizen of any community. Therefore, communitarianism evolved into the philosophy trailing the emergence of a socialistic world government system. On another note, communitarianism is a perspective on morals and political philosophy that stresses the psychosocial and ethical significance of being part of societies and maintains that moral reasoning must advance within cultural understandings (Bell 1993, 24–25). Viewed from a different perspective, communitarianism is a range of antiliberalism viewpoints that oppose liberal thought for its downplaying the importance of the community. Thus, communitarianism is most importantly a way of thinking about ethics and political life in opposition to liberalism. It is for this reason that there are different versions of communitarianism that seek to incorporate elements of capitalism, socialism, communism, etc. In communitarianism, the self does not exist in isolation since it is shaped by diverse communal attachments such as connection to the family, political or religious traditions and institutions. The ties are knitted to the extent that the idea of dichotomy is costly. The self is located in an existing social practice. For people to lead their own lives, their actions must be in accordance with the social identity of a province (MacIntyre 1981, 204–205). The importance of the community is featured greatly in the history of ethics and political philosophy. In ethics and political philosophy, the word community is broadly construed as a connection among individuals that is approximately powerful and deeper than mere association. There are two basic premises of community. The first is that individuals who are part of a community have ends which are common that are understood and cherished as ordinary by those individuals; and the second is that knowledge of belonging to a group is a relevant component of identity. For the communitarian, the community occupies a special position even as the relationship between the individual and the community is symbiotic. Having viewed communitarianism from a borderless perspective, I now turn to its practice in Africa to determine whether there is a difference in its functionality in Africa.

3  How African Is Communitarianism? I am not here to prove the communal stance or otherwise of African traditional system. I am not also on a voyage to pitch it against the Western system. Basically, my task is to explain how foundational and beneficial communitarianism would be in the African system, with reference to some glorious moments in African tradition that have proven that the communal system is to be preferred. In my view a collectivist society which is composed of random individuals should have freer

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individuals. People in such a society would not be adversely affected if the society loosens its relational laws. I hold this view because a random collection of individuals choose their own volition to take into cognizance the welfare of other members of the community. They are therefore not driven by the consequences imposed by the society. Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984, 171) notes that the definition of a human being cannot be achieved by relying on an aspect of the human person. To arrive at a holistic picture, the community must come into play. This is because in Africa, the human person cannot be fragmented. The human person is not a ready-made project; it is constantly in the making. It is on this note that the journey to perfection is made albeit in the community. The organism goes ‘through a long process of social and ritual transformation until it attains the full complement of excellencies seen as truly definitive of man’ (Menkiti 1984, 172). The journey from potentiality to actuality shows some level of imperfections. This explains the fact that there could be frictions along the way that prevent the human being from attaining the said excellencies. Personhood, according to Menkiti, is acquired in relation to how the individual fulfils his/her obligations in the community. The better he/she fulfils such obligations, the closer he/she comes to the attainment of personhood. I find it problematic that personhood is something that someone acquires. This is because even the society is unsure of what personhood should entail. Goodness and badness are sometimes regulated by the society to the point of being unable to speak of any universal solutions to discourses on such issues. Perspectives on morality evolve with the society. So, some acts considered immoral in former times pass the morality test today. What then is the fate of individuals who had faced moral probity and have been prosecuted on the basis of acts that were immoral before and are moral now? I raise this question because going by the normative understanding of personhood, they were not persons. Therefore, it is the society that partly regulates what is moral at various times, and morality can undergo revision. Since morality can be revised by the community, it means the community may be wrong when it comes to questions of morality and by extension what personhood entails. Motsamai Molefe (2019, 43) attempts to defend the position that the deterioration or elevation of human nature is anchored on morality. However, like some other scholars such as Menkiti and Masolo that share the same line of thought, Molefe does not give answers to the nuances that lead to moral relativism. Is it not from action-based morality that one gets to know the agent-based individual? If that is the case, which I think it is, it becomes difficult to think of the nature of the agent without first of all considering the action. Action therefore elevates the human being to a person. Motsamai Molefe (2019, 165–166) uses the notion of rights of an individual against the community. He relies on the maximalist conception of personhood to buttress his position. The functionality of a people is not dependent on their notion of rights but of friendship and love. The contention for more rights by an individual shows the reduction of friendship and love. But I also understand that what is also referred to as common good may clash with my rights as an individual. Is there a necessary connection between individual rights and decline in societal values of love and friendship? Rights exist so that they can be respected. Regard for human

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rights is based on either categorical imperatives or legal imperatives. The former does not need the law to function, for it regards the individual in spite of the existence of the law. The latter needs the law to function because it recognises the existence of a society of imperfect rational beings. To think that rights are coined positively, for example, right to human dignity, and to imagine their negative impact on the community is actually a contradiction. The rights of the individual exist so that he/she can ensure enforcement through the society. That was the essence of traditional Igbo society. For instance, the Igbo community had right to property, but to the extent that it was useful for the advancement of the community and never infringed on the rights of other individuals or the peace of the community (Amadi 1991, 404–408). It then means that Molefe’s submission that traditional African society does not operate on the basis of rights cannot hold for all cultures. The nuances of every culture should be taken into consideration while searching for a common denominator. So, if the insistence on rights makes one morally defective, then where is the position of moral rights that are enforceable? Do they become morally defective when they migrate to the realm of legality? Every society evolves, and Africa evolved from traditional community to democratic society. If in traditional Africa it is said that ‘thou shall not steal’, it is to preserve the community and ensure that people live harmoniously. On the other hand, if democratic societies have come to state the same rule with legal sanctions, what makes it different from traditional African community? The rules are the same and both attract sanctions. The end in view for both laws is to preserve the peace of the community/society. If there is a need for an adoption of traditional Afro-communitarian practice as against the democratic practice, then there is also a need to explain why the traditional system should be favoured. This is necessary because if both the traditional and democratic systems have come to state the same rules with the same end in view, then it may amount to duplicity to request for a return to the traditional. I think the focus should be on proper enforcement of rules in democratic societies that respond to the needs of the traditional values. Until such anomaly is shown, it may be difficult to tell why the traditional system of Afro-communitarianism is preferred to the democratic system in civil society. The African acknowledges the existence of a physical and spiritual world. But the African at the same time does not create a sharp distinction between the two worlds. In African tradition, there is the acknowledgement of the interaction of forces. So the physical and extraterrestrial communicate in such a way that makes reality more tangible. The individual is a subject that participates in this interaction. This is achieved in relation with the community. At the same time, the individual is not an objectified human that can be tossed about at will. As a rational agent, he/she makes informed choices. This means that a moral agent could make a good decision that is both different from that of the community and at the same time not detrimental to the community. There is therefore no one-fit-for-all system that should subsume the individual. It is this personalised reality that makes limited communitarians and realist perspectivists to think of the independence of the individual in the community. But for the realist perspectivists, neither the individual nor the community pre-exist the another; they have a concurrent existence. Michael Eze (2008, 386)

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captures this view when he says that ‘the individual and the community are not radically opposed in the sense of priority but engaged in a contemporaneous formation’. Dismas Masolo (2004, 485) makes a distinction between the notions of individualism in the French and German senses. His notes that while in the former, the term individual is used in a negative sense that points to self-isolation, in the latter it is used to depict self-realisation. What this shows therefore is that the ideas of the individual and the community have their various nuances in different communities. The individual attains freedom when he/she participates in the life of the community. This is what characterises the notion of community in the Afro-communitarian sense. You do not become free when you stand alone; you become free when you make your attachment to the group self-evident. This also means that there should be some degree of discomfort at the individual level. I call it the proportionalistic communitarianism stance (cf. Kaplan 2000, 121–122); it permits some individual privation for an altruistic goal. The knowledge of difference is made possible when there is an intersection with other members of the community that you belong to. It is therefore not in being separate that you define the individual but in being part of the community. Polycarp Ikuenobe (2015, 1007) is of the view that in African tradition, fulfilment of the normative criteria is what bestows personhood in its proper sense. What this means is that the moral dimensions of personhood are predicated on the metaphysical dimensions. If a person lacks such ontological descriptive features, such an individual cannot be said to be a person. What I decipher from this line of reasoning is the fact that anyone that fails to meet the descriptive test cannot be evaluated based on his/her actions. The descriptive test is to the effect that to be a person, the essential feature of rationality must be present. It is only when the faculty of reason is intact that reasoning as a process is possible. I invoke the concept of personhood in Afro-communitarianism because most scholars in this regard attest to the fact that it is in the community that the individual validates his or her existence. How does the metaphysical dimension explain the soundness of mind of the individual? The metaphysical makeup of an individual could have a negative impact on the individual’s ability to be a person in the descriptive sense. Lack of sound mind makes it impossible to freely determine moral decisions. In lucid intervals of insanity, it is possible to determine what is moral and immoral. If the state of insanity is acute and permanent, then such an individual is not considered a person. This raises another question as to who has fundamental rights in the society, the human being (metaphysical dimension) or the human person (normative dimension). Beyond the physical needs of the individual, there is no strict provision on how to meet the psychological needs of the individual whose freedom has been surrendered to the community. There is also the challenge of the conflation of ideas that eventually become normative principles. Thus, even when we argue that the community comes first before the individual, communitarian principles do not pre-exist the human being. It is individuals with their nuanced backgrounds that come to form the community. Everyone in the group expects his/her interests to be well represented. If, on another hand, I argue that the traditional African society took each person’s interest into cognizance, what about a fast-evolving society with a quest for

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new lifestyle and therefore the demand for more rights? My take is that the society cannot relinquish such rights to traditional Africa. Also, their acceptance or rejection cannot be cogently made by an appeal to traditional community setting. I uphold this view on two grounds: first there is a huge divide between capitalist democracy in most of African countries and the community that is described. Second, democratic regimes in a capitalist society are driven by individual or minute group interest. The end in view is how to preserve and grow one’s personal estate and keep one’s position, even if it is sometimes detrimental to the entire citizens. This goes to prove to a large extent that one of the purposes of democracy is to ensure that people become individuals. It is socialism that takes it further by ensuring that the individual does not live in isolation from other individuals. This is the linkage between the traditional African community and socialist democracy as envisaged in Akan philosophy, which I discuss in the section below. Mogobe Ramose (2005, 56) describes personhood in terms of wholeness. This wholeness begins from birth. The new born must be initiated into the community. This process for the male or female child in some communities involves the spilling of blood. Blood is indicative of the advent of a child into the community of the living and also the acceptance of the child by the community. Without this process, there is a disconnection between the child and the community and also a disconnection from the living dead. An individual is therefore a person to the extent that he/ she fulfils certain obligations. But this perspective of the belongingness to the community is fraught with some problems. Although many communities in Africa performed the traditional rite of circumcision, others did not perform the rite (Marck 1997, 339–340). What is the efficacy of belongingness to the community with the nonperformance of such rite? This unanswered question is a missing link in Ramose’s thought and is fraught with some implications, chief of which is the fact that the lack of blood connection in whatever form suggests the existence of a fractured community. Muntu (human being) is a force imbued with intelligence. The stem Ntu signifies the focal point that unites reality. It is on this harmony that the African traditional system is built. It is this holism that muntu embraces. The wholeness of the person is due largely to the relationship with the community. From the moment of birth of the individual to the point of death, the community bestows relevance through validation of every activity. The community is important to the point that, among the Tswana, only those who have been initiated into the community can become ancestors. Ramose further states three functions that initiation into the community plays: incorporation into the community, linkage between the individual and the community of living dead and participation in marriage as the basis for future community. Afro-communitarianism does not liquidate the individual. The community exists to ensure that the individual is guided. Bernard Matolino (2014) proposes the notion of limited communitarianism. It seems to bear semblance with the moderate stance of Kwame Gyekye. However, here, Matolino focuses emphasis on the primacy of the individual. On this note, Matolino concludes that it is actually the metaphysical dimension and not the normative that determines personhood. He reaches this conclusion because there are

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certain inalienable rights, such as right to life and liberty, which belong strictly to the individual. Such rights are not based on the capacity of the individual to adhere to certain societal norms; they exist independent of the rules of the community. Against Menkiti’s view that all persons are human beings but not all human beings are persons, Matolino proposes that human beings are persons and vice versa. All the various schools of thought have their merits and demerits. All conclusions reached by them have implications for communities that have evolved into representative democracy and other forms of political engagements. I address these concerns in the next part and suggest which I think should be preferred.

4  A Workable Ideological Framework for Africa Human beings live in societies. In a social environment, it is expected that people should conduct themselves in ways beneficial to all members. The performance of actions independent of social disapproval, or approval, will lead to relativity in the expression of ideas and in practice and thus produce chaos in the society. This is because actions will be based on theories conceived by each individual; hence, it will become difficult to speak of general application. This scenario can produce chaos in the society. In a similar fashion, it is the community that should strengthen the individual. I should make it clear that I am not by the above submission making a case for the community against the individual. What exists is a relationship between the community and the individual. It is within the context of localizing relationships that people express same among intergroup members. Secondly, Nyerere’s insistence on social democracy rests on the fact of its relationship with the communal life of the African. Nyerere and Ramose acknowledge that it is not a perfect system; hence, Afro-communitarian culture is constantly in the making. The society should therefore be an extension of what was envisioned before the formation of postcolonial democracy. By postcolonial democracy, I do not suggest that democracy prior to independence of various African countries was devoid of some elements of capitalism that prized the individual over the community (Negedu and Ojomah 2018, 61–63). It is postcolonial democracy that formalised the capitalist lifestyle. The infusion of communitarianism into the political life of the African is hinged on the notion that the idea of participatory democracy needs to carry the masses along. Since democracy is about a government of, by and for the people, there should be a common front from which all differences are sieved and a meeting point is achieved. This point of reference must be beneficial not only to an individual but to the larger group. It is the idea of the African traditional community that should extend naturally to the democratic life. As Gabardi notes: ‘Our sense of justice is the product of our participation in communities that define the good life’ (Gabardi 2001, 549). Democratic governments should therefore be able to reproduce an abridged form of community to make government meaningful to the people. I suggest that we can envision what the African community would look like, when we

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look to its democracy that is composed of people who choose to be individualistic to the detriment of the community, and sometimes individuals operate without the idea of consequences in mind. There is a distinction between a collectivity of individuals that is a product of democracy and the union that is produced by the community. Where you have collective individuals, sometimes people choose to work together because they have to align their interests in order to enhance profits. Robert Kaplan (2000, 59–98) clearly emphasises this position when he explains that the kind of democracy that is promoted around the globe is built on a false premise of freedom and equality for all. In reality, a false democratic regime is usually an enthronement of enlightened despotism. This is possible because capitalism thrives in a democracy and makes the creation of a middle class difficult since there will always be forces that ensure that wealth is accessed only by the elites, who are able to influence government policies. This version of group association is actually what characterises false democracy, where decisions are reached with personalised narrative. This narrative advances the interests of some individuals as public interest. It has the capacity to produce leaders that put their own considerations over the welfare of the group. In such a false system, only practices sanctioned by the leaders are relevant. If the leaders’ interest falls in line with that of the public, then a consensus is reached. This is distinguishable from a scenario where the furthering of the existence of the ‘other’ is my responsibility. This is achieved bearing in mind that no harm is done to the recipient and the giver. The giver may decide to relinquish certain privileges for the general public to the extent that it is not harmful to the giver. The goal of Afro-­ communitarianism in politics is to produce true democratic individuals. It is democratic because by its nature it invites all to participate communally and practise some degree of altruism in dealing with others. To some extent, I focus on the Akan culture to explain the import of the communitarian lifestyle of the African people. Largely there is similarity when it comes to conceiving the communal life that should guide democratic practice in Africa. Gyekye (2010, 110) opines that when the African lives in such a way that contradicts the public morality of the community, such individual is said not to be a person. Personhood among the Akan therefore is hinged on one’s ability to live a moral lifestyle that is worthy of societal praise. An individual does not determine how the community should function. Each person must therefore surrender his/her will to the public morality dictated by the community. To the extent that there is deviation from the norms of the community, it attracts reprobation. Behind every practice, the individual asks the vital question: ‘is my action going to enhance my community?’ It must be clearly stated however that what makes Gyekye’s notion of personhood less rigid is that it creates room for the individual to choose to exert influence in his/her community. For instance, if theft is prohibited, the act comes with defined societal sanctions; but there are no strict sanctions when I refuse to use my knowledge for the growth of the society. If I steal or kill another individual, then I am judged not to be a person. If on the other hand I keep legitimately made wealth to myself, I am a ‘useless person’. Here it must be understood that I am still a person who obeys the strict rules laid down by the community, but I am a person whose

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usefulness in my community has no effect. This is therefore a moderate version than Ifeanyi Menkiti’s extreme notion of personhood. This moderate notion allows an individual to have rights. The traditional democracy of the Akan people is also a product of the level of social welfarism that characterises the people. The workings of the society are determined by the ability of an individual to think of the implications of his/her actions for everyone in that society. The election of a paramount ruler and councillors to represent the people is a process that reflects the community way of life. No one rises to the position of a paramount ruler if he/she did not previously gain the approval of the councillors, who in turn must secure the approval of the clan through the people (Gyekye 2010, 242–244). Gyekye responds to critics who maintain that the communal style of engagement is not sustainable in a democratic setting. The critics base their submission on the notion that it creates a kind of one-party system where everyone is forced to accept decisions made by a group of people without recourse to minority views. However, for Gyekye (1997), in a proposed one-party state modelled after Akan traditional democracy, the ultimate goal is to have consensus in deliberations. Consensus presupposes dissent. A one-party state strives to maximise a rich diversity. There is therefore no majority versus minority rule, because it is the community that wins. Consensus ensures that dialogue is achieved and that at the end of deliberations, no member of the community leaves a meeting aggrieved. At the end of dialogue, there is ‘agreed actions without necessarily agreed notions’ (Coetzee 1998, 56; Wiredu 1995, 53–64). This is different from majority-minority rule where dialogue is not reached. The goal of majoritarian rule that characterises Western-style democracy is the suppression of the rights of the minority, where at the end of deliberations, few dissenting voices leave a gathering with animosity. It is for this same reason that it is more difficult to reach a consensus than a majority decision. Consensual democracy allows for a win-win situation that preserves social harmony. People still have their differences, but they are, at the same time, convinced that the ultimate goal is to make the society a better place for everyone. I do not therefore think that democracy in Africa always stands as an obstacle to Afro-communitarianism. In the first place, democracy exists to give people the freedom to be individuals. In exercising this freedom, people have the opportunity to also ensure that their rights do not encroach on the rights of others. Rights are invaluable to the extent that they are other-regarding. In a democracy, groups can also have rights through representation; this view goes against the school of thought that opines that, traditionally, groups have no rights in African culture (Wellman 1999, 15). However, in democracy, groups can actually exercise their rights through the formation of various civil societies as allowed by the constitutions of different countries. Civil society should therefore exist to revitalise those communitarian tenets in traditional African value system that do not contradict the tenets of modern democracy. As Negedu and Ojomah (2018, 67) note: ‘It is like reaffirming certain values under the nomenclature of a new wave of modernized democracy with a similar essence to traditional African communalistic practices’. This was exactly what Nyerere (1968) sets out to achieve with the ethnophilosophical notion of

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ujamaa. He proposes socialist democracy as a better form of democracy that suits the African condition and reflects Afro-communitarianism. The linkage between community life and socialism also accounts for Nkrumah and L.S. Senghor aligning their views with Nyerere’s on the importance of socialist democracy (see Aborisade 2015, 616–618). It is as individuals that people come to the discovery of their loneliness and then engage in the search for social relationships to fight their emotional battles. The existence of an individual will always lead to awareness of the presence of others and the need to build social bonds. Self-preservation is a human need that is not in any way acquired from outside the community. However, I also understand that self-preservation is an extension of the ‘other’. I see it as a responsibility to protect those with whom I have patrimonial and matrimonial affiliation, because I see them as extension of the self that should be preserved. The same should be applicable in an organised political society. People should be able to feel that sense of belongingness that makes everyone responsible towards every other person.

5  Conclusion I have explained how the metaphysical and ethical dimensions come into play in Afro-communitarianism and the implication for political progress in contemporary Africa. I explained the aspects of the relationship between the traditional African communal practice and democracy and how the latter could borrow from the former. Every government has the responsibility to protect the lives of citizens and pursue their well-being. The individual has a metaphysical dimension that is not predicated on adherence to social norms. A balanced Afro-communitarian perspective that grants the individual space to flourish will enhance the suitability of democracy in modern Africa as countries make a transition from a tradition-based communitarianism to a civil-based communitarian democracy.

References Aborisade, Olasunkanmi. 2015. Liberal and communitarian discourse: An African perspective. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 10 (4): 615–628. Agada, Ada. 2019. The afro-communitarian framework for tackling financial corruption in Nigeria. In Combating the menace of corruption in Nigeria: A multi-disciplinary conversation, ed. Akogwu Agada, 286–305. Awka: Black Towers. Amadi, I.R. 1991. Human rights in pre-colonial Igbo society of Nigeria: An analysis. Africa: Rivistatrimestrale di studi e documentazionedell’Istituto Italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente 46 (3): 403–410. Bell, Daniel. 1993. Communitarianism and its critics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Bieling, Hans-Jürgen. 2006. Neoliberalism and communitarianism: Social conditions, discourses, and politics. In Neoliberal hegemony: A global critique, ed. Dieter Plehwe, Bernard Walpen, and Gisela Neunhöffer, 207–221. New York: Routledge.

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Coetzee, P.H. 1998. The Problem of Political Self-Definition in South Africa: Marxism and Pluralism. In The African Philosophy Reader, eds. P.H. Coetzee and A.P.J. Roux, 337–359. London: Routledge. Etzioni, Amitai. 1996. The responsive community: A communitarian perspective. American Sociological Review 61 (1): 1–11. Eze, Michael. 2008. What is African communitarianism? Against consensus as a regulative ideal. South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (4): 386–399. https://doi.org/10.4314/sajpem. v27i4.31526. Gabardi, Wayne. 2001. Contemporary models of democracy. Polity 33 (4): 547–568. Gyekye, Kwame. 1995. An essay on African philosophical thought: The Akan conceptual scheme. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. ———. 1997. Tradition and modernity. New York: Oxford University Press. ———. 2010. Person and community in African thought. In Person and community: Ghanian philosophical studies 1, ed. Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye, 101–122. Washington, DC: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Hager, Sandy. 2007. The Lisbon agenda and ‘neoliberal communitarian’ citizenship. http://www. aa.ecn.cz/img Hasskei, M.M. 2018. Moderate communitarianism is different: A response to J. O. Famakinwa and B. Matolino. Journal of Philosophy and Culture 6 (1): 3–15. Ikuenobe, Polycarp. 2015. Relational autonomy, personhood, and African traditions. Philosophy East and West 65 (4): 1005–1029. Kaplan, Robert. 2000. The coming anarchy. New York: Random House. MacIntyre, A. 1981. After virtue: A study in moral theory. London: Duckworth. Marck, Jeff. 1997. Aspects of male circumcision in subequatorial African culture history. Health Transition Review 7: 337–360. Masolo, Dismas. 2004. Western and African communitarianism: A comparison. In A companion to African philosophy, ed. Kwasi Wiredu, 483–498. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Matolino, Bernard. 2014. Personhood in African philosophy. Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publications. Menkiti, Ifeanyi. 1984. Personhood and community in African traditional thought. In African philosophy: An introduction, ed. Richard Wright, 171–181. Lanham: University of America. Molefe, Motsamai. 2019. An African philosophy of personhood, morality, and politics. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Negedu, I.A., and S.O. Ojomah. 2018. The question of African communalism and the antithesis of democracy. Filosofia Theoretica Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 7 (3): 53–71. https://doi.org/10.4314/ft.v7i3.5. Nyerere, Julius. 1968. Ujamaa: Essays on socialism. London: Oxford University Press. Ramose, Mogobe. 2005. African philosophy through Ubuntu. Harare: Mond Books Publishers. Wellman, Christopher. 1999. Liberalism, communitarianism, and group rights. Law and Philosophy 18 (1): 13–40. Wiredu, Kwasi. 1995. Democracy and Consensus in African Traditional Politics: a Plea for a Non-­ Party Polity. The Centennial Review 39 (1): 53–64. https://www.jstor.org.

Are We Finished with the Ethnophilosophy Debate? A Multi-perspective Conversation Elvis Imafidon, Bernard Matolino, Lucky UchennaOgbonnaya, Ada Agada Aribiah David Attoe, Fainos Mangena, and Edwin Etieyibo

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Abstract  In line with the tradition of the conversational school of philosophy, this essay provides a rare and unique space of discourse for the authors to converse about the place of the ‘ethno’ in African philosophy. This conversation is a revisit, a renewal of the key positions that have coloured the ethnophilosophy debate by the conversers who themselves are notable contributors to arguments for and against the importance of ethnophilosophy in the unfolding of African philosophy particularly in the last decade or so. There are four key positions that have been argued for in the pages of this paper: E. Imafidon Department of Religions and Philosophies, School of History, Religions and Philosophies, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, London, UK e-mail: [email protected] B. Matolino School of Religion, Philosophy and Classics, University of KwaZulu Natal, Durban, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] L. UchennaOgbonnaya Conversation School of Philosophy, Calabar, Nigeria A. Agada (*) Centre for Interdisciplinary and Intercultural Studies (CIIS), Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany e-mail: [email protected] A. D. Attoe Centre for Leadership Ethics in Africa, University of Fort Hare, Alice, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] F. Mangena Department of Religious Studies, Classics and Philosophy, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe E. Etieyibo Department of Philosophy, School of Social Sciences, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Agada (ed.), Ethnophilosophy and the Search for the Wellspring of African Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78897-1_20

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(1) Ethnophilosophy is not African philosophy and it is useless and inimical to the growth of African philosophy and should thus be jettisoned – Matolino. (2) Ethnophilosophy is the foundation for African philosophy as it provides the raw materials for African philosophical discourse – Ogbonnaya and Agada. (3) Ethnophilosophy has some value for African philosophy, but it is definitely not the foundation for genuine African philosophy the way criticism and rigours are – Attoe. (4) Ethnophilosophy can be adequately conceived as African philosophy particularly in terms of its etymology as culture or race philosophy, dealing with philosophical or critical reflections on, and exposition of, immanent principles in African thought – Mangena and Etieyibo. These conversers provide good arguments for the positions they hold, arguments that are, of course, open for further interrogation. Two points can be concluded from the ethnophilosophy debate provided in this essay: (1) The disparities in views among conversers, it seems, stem ultimately from the understanding of ethnophilosophy that each converser holds, which varies from the notion of a method used at some point in the history of African philosophy to an etymological understanding as culture philosophy. (2) The debate about ethnophilosophy in the spirit of any philosophical tradition remains a perennial one that is yet to be concluded. This essay certainly concretises what is on ground and paves the way for further discussions. Keywords  Ethno · African philosophy · Foundationalist · Universalist · Particularist · The common moral position (CMP) · Ethnophilosophy

1  Imafidon: Introduction The ethno finds its way as a prefix into numerous forms of human inquiry perhaps because humans are in no doubts of the importance and place of culture and race in the understanding of the various aspects of human endeavours. From health, science, history, medicine and music to biology, the ethno takes an established position in these fields of human studies and inquiries. Hence, today we have established fields such as ethnobiology, ethnoscience, ethnomedicine, ethnobotany, ethnohistory, ethnomusicology, ethnography and ethnogenesis. For instance, ethnobotany is the systematic study of the knowledge of indigenous plants in a particular culture and their uses, ethnohistory is the study of the historical development of cultures or races, and ethnomusicology is the study of the music art of a particular culture.1 It is therefore not surprising that the ethno also creeps into philosophy in general and African philosophy in particular. 1  The more classical definition of ethnomusicology as the study of music that is outside the European art tradition is misleading and highly criticised since European art and music is also a cultural form of music which makes it fall under and not outside the rubric of ethnomusicology.

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But why is prefixing the ethno to (African) philosophy so contested and debated? But again, what in philosophy is not so contested and debated? Well, everything in philosophy is contested and debated which makes it a perennial discourse. The better argument with more points and less flaws reigns for a while until more flaws about it are discovered, and another better argument is put forward. The wheel of philosophical debates continues to roll. The ethnophilosophy debate is not different. Each argument put forward for and against ethnophilosophy has its strengths and weaknesses, and the better argument – and this again is quite subjective – stands but is never good enough to completely annihilate other arguments. In this essay, the key arguments on the place of ethnophilosophy in African philosophy are presented. Each section is developed by one of the six conversers who aptly presents his position and provides reasons why his position is a better one than others. Bernard Matolino begins this discourse in the first section by arguing that ethnophilosophy is a dead discourse. In his understanding, ethnophilosophy is nothing more than an invention meant to perpetuate and sustain the othering of African thought as inferior to Western thought. This invention should be rejected completely as it does injustice to African philosophy. He, however, favours culture philosophy as the source of African philosophy. To be sure, Matolino’s understanding of ethnophilosophy, as can be deduced from the positions of other conversers, is only one of several ways of speaking about ethnophilosophy. Also, it is not very clear the distinction made by him between ethnophilosophy and culture philosophy bearing in mind that ethnophilosophy, at least, etymologically speaking, is culture philosophy. In the second and third sections of this essay, Ada Agada and Lucky Uchenna Ogbonnaya discuss the key schools of thought on ethnophilosophy clearly favouring the foundationalist school of thought. Agada discusses the particularist and the universalist (modernist) schools of thought showing clearly how the former understood in the same sense as ancient Greek philosophy provides a rich source for rigorous philosophy – and here, the ethno is not philosophy in itself but the foundational source of philosophy. Ogbonnaya discusses further these two schools of thought and introduces a third, the foundationalist school of thought. He explains why the first two are not only extreme positions to take but are difficult positions to defend. He shows further why the third is a more viable and defensible position about ethnophilosophy. This is because the foundationalist perspective which he (with Agada) champions recognises a valid point in the history of African philosophy, one discernible from the available literature on the subject matter: ethnophilosophy provides the raw materials for African philosophy making it the foundation on which African philosophy should be built. He also recognises the role played by the particularists in systematising the cultural raw materials, making them available for rigorous criticism. But Aribiah Attoe is critical of such foundationalist claim about ethnophilosophy, and he develops such a critique in the fourth section on the basis of a quite contestable understanding of foundation as ‘an underlying principle’. In his view, ethnophilosophy is valuable and important to African philosophy, but it is not the foundation of African philosophy. Citing Ubuntu as an example, he argues that what

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gives African philosophical discourses such as Ubuntu its philosophy-ness is not Ubuntu as ethnophilosophy itself but the critical engagement with Ubuntu. Criticality is thus the foundation of African philosophy. In the fifth section, Fainos Mangena stands his grounds against criticisms and defends his long-standing position that ethnophilosophy is the genuine source from which African philosophy emerges. He makes his case for ethnophilosophy by instantiating with what he calls the common moral position (CMP) in Shona ethics. As he puts it, ‘the CMP is attained when the moral opinions of the elderly group (considered to be custodians of value in an African context) are put together in order to come up with a common position regarding issues of right and wrong’. Hence, CMP is no mere ethno in the sense of say a belief, custom or tradition; it is a moral principle emanating from the ethno. But could it be the case that the fight for and against ethnophilosophy should be as intense as it currently is? Could it be that contenders are in their right depending on the side of the ethnophilosophy coin they are gazing at? Edwin Etieyibo provides interesting answers to these questions in the sixth section. In his view, ethnophilosophy can be likened to a house with both visible (easy to see or outward) elements and immanent or latent elements. The visible elements of ethnophilosophy (the first side of the ethnophilosophy coin) consist of the nonphilosophical elements such as customs, proverbs, beliefs, adages and so on. The immanent elements of ethnophilosophy (the second side of the ethnophilosophy coin) consist of the critical features or thought which give birth to the visible elements such as epistemological, ontological and ethical principles. He provides interesting arguments to show that critics of ethnophilosophy often ignore the immanent elements focusing only on the visible elements in taking their verdict on ethnophilosophy. He further explains why such attacks on ethnophilosophy as ‘philosophy is not a communal practice but an individual practice’ do not succeed in denying the genuineness of ethnophilosophy as philosophy. His analysis of group mind and collective intentionality in this regard is quite persuasive. Exploring Kwame Gyekye’s notion of embedded morality, he argues further that there is philosophy in the ethno that is worth unpacking. Let the conversation begin.

2  Matolino: Ethnophilosophy as a Dead Discourse I start my contribution with two well-known points. These points have been repeated so much in literature it is not necessary to outline them in detail, but it is important to state them so that my manner of proceeding can be better appreciated. The first point is that ethnophilosophy is an invention. It is an invention that was sponsored by people whose names are known to all of us who are interested in African philosophy. The purpose of that invention, as Paulin Hountondji has skilfully shown, was in part to sustain the belief that Africans had a unanimous philosophy. The second point to make is largely owed to Henry Odera Oruka, who when criticised by Didier Njirayamanda Khaphagawani on the difference between philosophic sagacity and

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ethnophilosophy provided an instructive response. To show that there is a vast difference between ethnophilosophy and sagacity, and in particular that sagacity does not depend on ethnophilosophy, Oruka credibly maintains that first-order philosophy is culture philosophy and not ethnophilosophy. Sagacity can be second order to culture philosophy but not to ethnophilosophy. Culture philosophy, according to Oruka, not only predates ethnophilosophy but must be understood as an authentic form of philosophy compared to ethnophilosophy. Culture philosophy refers to reflections on cultural practices and beliefs by Africans in their attempts to make sense of their reality. This sense-making exercise occurs in a context in which people, in their locality, systematically account for the totality of their experience and how it relates to matters beyond their immediate experience. It is a reflective and original exercise that is carried out by thinkers who become sages. As a result, culture philosophy allows for difference in interpretation of reality and accompanying arguments stated in support of different viewpoints. Hence, we see sages differing on what the nature of reality is, though they share the same cultural resource. Ethnophilosophy, on the other hand, as an invention that promotes unanimity is incapable of philosophic reflection and is incapable of handling divergent commitments. Ethnophilosophy actually fears difference as it sees it as a threat to African unity of thought, which ethnophilosophy has an interest in maintaining. Could it be the case that those interested in some ongoing discovery of the relevance of ethnophilosophy are not aware of these discussions? I do not think so. I think they are aware of these discussions but are unable to appreciate their significance. They can’t appreciate that ethnophilosophy, in essence, mischaracterises the black person’s philosophical standing. In all its presentation and in all it seeks to achieve, there is nothing positive, representative or instructive about it. Also, as Oruka argues, culture philosophy, which predates ethnophilosophy, is and should be the source of African philosophical reflection. If we take the social and political struggles of African people, the relationship between Africa and its former colonial masters, with all the difficulties that come with it; we could ask in what way ethnophilosophy can be considered as capable of contributing anything theoretically sound to explain this situation or to pave means of escaping that same situation. In what ways is ethnophilosophy especially capable of speaking to the African experience, in an authoritative and convincing manner? It cannot, because it is an invention that is meant to deride Africans as only capable of the form of thought process that is limited in the same way ethnophilosophy is. If we take the advances of African philosophy that have been registered in the last 30 years and will continue to be registered in the future, what has ethnophilosophy’s distinguished contribution been? The answer to this question is simple and obvious: nothing. There has never been a great ethnophilosopher who has revolutionised the field in the last 30 years. There is not a single name I know among the great names who have made an astounding contribution in the last 30 years, who has openly identified himself or herself as an ethnophilosopher. Maybe my interlocutors know such a name and the feats that name is associated with, in African philosophy. I am always willing and ready to learn and will certainly appreciate a lesson.

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What we actually find in an attempt at a historiography of African philosophy is the way in which ethnophilosophy had to be fought, first as a hindrance to African philosophy. It was a hindrance as it was mainly based on misrepresentations, generalisations, unanimism and a deliberate dumbing down of what could have been philosophy on the continent. What will be shown is how ethnophilosophy has succeeded in fusing itself with an uncritical ethnographical and anthropological approach to philosophy. This is not to mean that these two elements cannot be useful to philosophy, generally, but ethnophilosophy reduced itself to their uncritical parts while at the same time claiming to be a representative of African philosophical viewpoints. But besides an investigation into ethnophilosophy’s shady past, we must also inquire into its capabilities and potentialities as a proposed philosophical orientation. What I am interested in is how we can conceive of ethnophilosophy making a distinctly significant contribution to our theorisation in the present and near future. I do not see how ethnophilosophy can make a contribution to a rapidly changing African personae and environment. The reason for that failure is that ethnophilosophy essentialises who and what the African standpoint is. While theoretical frameworks may be drawn from long-gone millennia, what makes those theories survive is that they are free of immutable essentialisms. Weighed down by its essentialism, ethnophilosophy can never be relevant or useful for the African who either seeks to fix herself in her authentic roots or seeks a useful frame of reference in her theorisation. Ethnophilosophy is capable of neither because, as we have already seen, it is an invention. It is a useless form of an invention which only sought to attribute to Africans’ weird characteristics that made them Africans and weirdly so. It speaks to no single moment that was ever African, and it has no prospect of speaking for or to such a moment in the future. What I need to point out to those who have allowed themselves to be tricked by the passage of time and have fallen into an extended ahistorical slumber is the role that the father of ethnophilosophy, Father Tempels, played. If we look closely at both the intentions and contents of his book Bantu Philosophy, a signature reference of all the ills of ethnophilosophy, we find an intriguing combination of racism and colonial fawning. Tempels does not hide what his intentions are: they are to aid the success of the colonial mission. This is to be done by advancing an understanding of the muntu’s systems and ways of life. Once those systems and ways are fully understood, then the mission to civilise can be undertaken with assurances of success. But here is where Tempels’s whole project gets very tricky; in order to succeed at the mission to civilise, the differences that exist between the black and white persons must be laid bare. The purpose of exposing those differences is meant to demonstrate how the black person is inferior to the white person. Even when Tempels pulls the greatest historical trick of claiming equivalence between force and being, it is his mystification of force both in definition and illustration that proves that the black person is inferior to her white counterpart. Tempels does not begin his project to guarantee the equality of the races so that the black person can be freed so she can enjoy the political liberties that the white person has. On the

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contrary, the black person is in need of civilisation and continued patronage of the white person which comes in the form of the mission to civilise. If there is any form of commitment to or resuscitation of ethnophilosophy, such commitment must reckon with the political baggage that comes with this disreputable trend in African philosophy. Such commitment must understand and appreciate the political significance of ethnophilosophy as an extension of the conquest and subjugation of the black person. Ethnophilosophy has continuously misrepresented the black person as lacking precise and clear logic. It has always depicted the black person as a philosophical practitioner of voodoo and mysterious forces. It is this inferiorised status of the black person in relation to philosophy that allows racist views of the black person as an inferior to be perpetuated. As Hountondji so wisely demonstrated so long ago, even the black philosopher relies on the demonstration of her difference to the other so that she can be recognised. But that craving for recognition as a different other is so hollow that the more she craves for that recognition, the more she is denied the same recognition she craves. There is a real job to be done in African philosophy. So much can be done by philosophers in aid of our buckling continent. There is no greater embezzlement of public funds than to have a group of philosophers attempting to resurrect an anti-­ black, racist and bigoted and depraved philosophical outlook than committing themselves to serious and pressing issues such as racism. All those who fought against intellectual imperialism and belittling of the black person will have a lot to be uncomfortable about even this debate. Yet the resurrection of the dead was only recorded once and was never repeated. Such miracles are rare and hardly welcome, just like the attempt to raise ethnophilosophy. It must be a once-off that must not be repeated except in this instalment.

3  A  gada: Ethnophilosophy as a Special Source of African Philosophy In the aftermath of Paulin Hountondji’s devastating, but by no means fatal, critique of ethnophilosophy in his perennial masterpiece, [African Philosophy: Myth and Reality], it became fashionable for many African philosophers to distance their works from the maligned ethnophilosophy for a number of reasons, some of which I will demonstrate here to lack the kind of cogency necessary for the comprehensive, or at least extensive, rejection of ethnophilosophy as a proto-philosophy integral to the great project of African philosophy. The term ethnophilosophy hardly requires a fastidious academic definition here. For the sake of clarity, however, we may regard ethnophilosophy as an intellectual tradition within the broader African philosophical tradition which consists of the descriptive and analytical presentation of the communal worldviews, belief structures and praxis of the sub-Saharan African people. The controversy surrounding ethnophilosophy stems from its supposedly impudent (because unwarranted) claim

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to philosophical authenticity which goes pari passu with its admission of the philosophical viability of communal worldviews. Philosophers of the universalist or modernist school such as Paulin Hountondji and Kwame Appiah have sternly rejected the claim of ethnophilosophy to philosophicality on the grounds that ethnophilosophy is at best communal wisdom and deficient in the critical rigour which usually accompanies the individual transformation of ideas. On the other hand, defenders of ethnophilosophy like Polycarp Ikuenobe and Fainos Mangena who belong essentially to the particularist or traditionalist school of thought are willing to consider ethnophilosophy a worthy philosophical current in African philosophy. Indeed, a dedicated particularist like Mangena takes a radical stance and insists that ethnophilosophy is the truest expression of African philosophy by virtue of it wearing the natural garment of cultural uniqueness, in the same way that Greek philosophy belongs to the Greeks and German philosophy belongs to the Germans. Such stance contrasts sharply with the similarly radical claim that ethnophilosophy (defined in such a way that the impugned sub-tradition seems to impede the progress of African philosophy) has no place in a vibrant African philosophy tradition held by scholars like Bernard Matolino and Aribiah Attoe. There is a poignancy in the anti-ethnophilosophical stance, in that while this disputed philosophical current is dismissed as mere communal wisdom, it continues to play the role of an idea incubator even in the thought of thinkers like Kwasi Wiredu, Innocent Asouzu, Matolino and others who have produced important works on African metaphysics, ethics and political thought and hold relatively dim views of ethnophilosophy.2 In fact, much of Wiredu’s work in Akan philosophy transgresses the somewhat rigid border Hountondji has set between ethnophilosophy and a historically situated African culture of philosophical discourse. The contradiction we see in staunch opponents of ethnophilosophy boldly making use of ethnophilosophical resources to arrive at higher-order philosophy with semblances of systematicity and constructive aesthetics lies firmly in the fact that ethnophilosophy is a major source – perhaps the most important source – of African philosophy. If the importance of ethnophilosophy is this apparent, why can we not argue for it as a foundation of African philosophy? 2  While commenting on the aspiration and method of those African scholars who come under the umbrella of professional philosophers, Alena Rettová took notice of the contradiction one sees in professional philosophers denigrating ethnophilosophy and, at the same time, applying the tools of analytical philosophy to the communal worldviews that constitute the core of ethnophilosophy. She specifically mentions scholars like Wiredu, Gbadegesin, Oruka, Barry Hallen and J.O. Sodipo (see Rettová 2002, 129–150). In the works of these scholars, one sees, to a significant extent, the blurring of the border between ethnophilosophy and what these scholars consider proper African philosophy. What is true for the above scholars is also true for Asouzu and Matolino. Asouzu’s works clearly betray his debt to Igbo communal worldviews. Matolino’s works in the field of African ethics are, to a significant extent, instances of a philosopher applying the tools of analysis to a body of philosophical knowledge that is largely ethnophilosophical in content. The traditional African understanding of the human being as a communal being was articulated by ethnophilosophers. Matolino’s philosophical project is founded on this articulation. If ethnophilosophy must be rejected, the rejection must be comprehensive. If it cannot be comprehensively rejected, then we must admit to ourselves that it continues to be relevant.

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The following reasons are frequently adduced by opponents of ethnophilosophy to support their naysaying. (1) Ethnophilosophy is unscientific and panders to the Eurocentric narrative of African people’s incapacity for abstract thinking (the thesis of primitivity). (2) Ethnophilosophy cannot count as genuine philosophy because it does not exhibit critical rigour (the thesis of non-criticality). (3) Ethnophilosophy promotes the myth of a subsisting collective philosophy shared by members of a community or ethnic group (the thesis of unanimity). All three major theses find their bearing in the complaint that ethnophilosophy is not universally applicable or, at least, not sufficiently universal. I will concentrate on addressing this ‘universalism’ dimension, as it constitutes the heart of the matter. A good deal of the scepticism over ethnophilosophy arises from the relative failure of African philosophers to produce universally applicable thought systems motivated by ethnophilosophy rather than the perceived particularism of ethnophilosophy. As a proto-philosophy firmly grounded in culture, ethnophilosophy is immune to the charges levelled against it. It is a pristine, wholly majestic form available for transformation, a reservoir of data that may interest the individual thinker in her journey of thought. The so-called primitivity, non-criticality and unanimity of ethnophilosophy are not problematic once we regard the sub-tradition as a wellspring of ideas rather than substantive African philosophy in the manner of Mangena. Criticality itself is not a method of philosophising but a property of robust thinking. Indeed, it will appear that even method is not universal, and we, therefore, cannot impose Western methods on African philosophy as universal paradigms. The rigour philosophy demands will find its natural home as African thinkers transform African philosophy with concepts sourced from diverse quarters, and especially from ethnophilosophy. Criticality, as a feature of robust thinking, does not have to exclude ethnophilosophy. In the circumstances of African philosophy, criticality has the task of masterminding the elevation of ideas inspired by ethnophilosophy to their highest pedestal of universalism. Thought structures initially grounded in ethnophilosophy will then become less particular as individual thinkers expand the abstraction distance between the motivational condition (ethnophilosophy) and final thought products, replacing specificities with generalities, more or less. Ethnophilosophy is in itself not anthropology or sociology. After all, the ‘ethno’ in ethnophilosophy can be conveniently replaced with ‘proto’, and we will have less controversy. African philosophy has many sources: science, logic, common sense, religion, Western philosophy and possibly non-Western philosophy. But can these sources supply logical and ontological bases for the production of thought that can be called ‘African’ to the extent that it is genuinely different in content, subject matter and form from other philosophical traditions of the world, to a degree validating it as non-Western or non-Asian? There is, perhaps, no one necessary and sufficient determinant of the nature or character of African philosophy. Yet, it seems to me that ethnophilosophy as a tendency or current or sub-tradition is a special kind of determinant in that it encompasses a whole people’s unique outlook, holding out promise of truly original and magnificent philosophical engagements coming out of Africa. The challenge for the visionary twenty-first-century African philosopher, I submit,

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is erecting thought structures that are universally applicable on the foundation supplied by ethnophilosophy in an exercise that promises the final bridging of the universalism-­particularism divide in African philosophy. In this way, ethnophilosophy takes its proper place as a starting point, a wellspring of ideas, to borrow Bruce Janz’s apt but controversy-laden term. The submission above is not mere wishful thinking because any honest study of the history of African philosophy so far will reveal that the most productive thinkers have been those who did not lightly dismiss ethnophilosophy – regardless of whatever reservations some might have held about this sub-tradition – but incorporated it in their projects in one way or the other, in varying degrees of dependence on ethnophilosophy (see Agada 2018). I identify some of these outstanding original thinkers as L.S.  Senghor, Wiredu, Asouzu, Mogobe B.  Ramose and Jonathan Chimakonam. The enterprising Afro-communitarian scholars rely, for the most part, on ethnophilosophical data in their normative and metaphilosophical enquiries. Excellent minds like Hountondji and Tsenay Serequeberhan who effectively or selectively (but not completely) rejected ethnophilosophy have come across essentially as polemicists in the field of metaphilosophy and borrowers of key Western concepts that address purely sociopolitical praxis with little promise of progress in logic, metaphysics and epistemology, perpetually telling us what African philosophy is not and what it should be. Plato seized Greek ethnophilosophical concepts of the One and the Many and transformed them into fragments of a unified idealistic philosophy that permanently changed the face of Western philosophy to the extent that Alfred North Whitehead famously, and cheekily, asserted that the whole of Western philosophy is a footnote to Plato. Since we like comparing ourselves to Western philosophers, may I remind African philosophers that pre-Socratic philosophy remains respected in the Western canon up until today. And much of pre-Socratic philosophy is mythological and poetic fragments. I dare say that the job of the twenty-first-century African philosopher who values ethnophilosophy is similar to what Martin Heidegger did in his time: she can go back to ethnophilosophy, to the past, and unearth concepts and inspiration that will help her introduce radical thinking into the African canon as Heidegger did in his recasting of the question of being in general and the human being. Either we build on ethnophilosophy and create new, original thought structures that can be labelled ‘African’ or we lurk behind Western philosophers and ever find our intellectual bearing using Western philosophical compasses. We have either African philosophy or philosophy in Africa. The latter will follow from our taking our cues from the West, and I object to it as well as to Matolino’s declaration that this conversational piece should be the last instalment on the subject of ethnophilosophy.

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4  Ogbonnaya: The Foundationalist Place of Ethnophilosophy in African Philosophy With the existence and reality of African philosophy affirmed, a key question that confronts African philosophers is: should African ethnophilosophy be done away with as we philosophise in the African place? To this question there are three broad positions, namely, the particularists’ orientation, the universalists’ orientation and the foundationalists’ orientation. The particularists (Placide Tempels 1959; John Mbiti 1969; Fainos Mangena 2014a, b; etc.) equate African ethnophilosophy to African philosophy. What they are saying is that one cannot talk about African philosophy unless as ethnophilosophy – a description and/or interpretation of a people’s culture and worldview. By this, African philosophy as Kwasi Wiredu remarks is African community wisdom or thought (1980). The problem with this philosophical disposition towards African philosophy is that it ties African philosophy to the entire African people. What ought to be noted is that nowhere do people or an ethnic group or an entire continent put forward a philosophy. It is an individual that articulates philosophy. But African philosophy as a collective philosophy deprives individuals of their respective contributions to the philosophy nay African philosophy enterprise; their individual contributions are attributed to the people where they belong. In this context, what is produced is not critical or rigorous, hence unphilosophical in a sense. If this be the case, then African ethnophilosophy cannot be African philosophy. This is the hub of the universalists’ criticism against African ethnophilosophy. Consequently, the universalists (Paulin Hountondji 1996, 2018) are of the view that ethnophilosophy is no philosophy and cannot pass as African philosophy. They argue that ethnophilosophy which is not critical, rigorous and an individual enterprise should be done away with in the African philosophy project. For them, ethnophilosophy as communal thought is unphilosophical and therefore should have no place in African philosophy given that philosophy is an individual task. What they seek to establish is that philosophy is a universal enterprise with no cultural affiliation. Thus, philosophy ought to be the same anywhere and everywhere. This conception of philosophy takes away the cultural aspect of philosophy. This anti-­ ethnophilosophy disposition in African philosophy avers that African philosophy should follow Western philosophical approach to philosophising in Africa. This mindset makes African philosophy ape Western philosophy and its approach. It also robs African philosophers of innovative and original contributions to the philosophy enterprise at the African and global levels. Thus, with this, the universalists’ disposition towards African ethnophilosophy is erroneous and serves African philosophy as a peculiar philosophy tradition no good. It is therefore unfounded to displace African ethnophilosophy totally from African philosophy. It is here that the foundationalists’ orientation becomes pertinent. The foundationalists’ orientation in African philosophy is championed by Ada Agada and supported by L. Uchenna Ogbonnaya (2018). Agada’s argument is that African philosophy is not ethnophilosophy (2013, 2015a, b) but that

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ethnophilosophy should act as a foundation for African philosophy. He notes that ethnophilosophy must not be done away with by African philosophers as they engage in contemporary African philosophy/philosophising. For him, African philosophy should build on African ethnophilosophy by reacting to it and not translating it as African philosophy. Against this Agada’s view that ethnophilosophy plays a foundational role to African philosophy, Attoe argues that this view is a myth that ought to be done away with if African philosophy must be regarded as philosophical. In place of ethnophilosophy as the foundation, Attoe posits that criticality should be the foundation of African philosophy and that this is what will make African philosophy philosophical. Ogbonnaya has criticised Attoe’s disposition towards the foundational role of ethnophilosophy stating that it misreads Agada’s argument. Ogbonnaya also asserts that criticality is a philosophical tool among other philosophical tools. He further notes that a philosophical tool cannot be the foundation of philosophising. Thus, for him, Attoe’s position on the foundational role of criticality and ethnophilosophy is groundless and misleading in that it makes African philosophy philosophical without being African. In the paragraphs that follow, I shall push this argument for the foundational role of ethnophilosophy for African philosophy further. It is understandable that African ethnophilosophy is not philosophy in its strongest sense: first, it is communal thought, and, second, it lacks critical rigour which characterises philosophicality of philosophy. This ethnophilosophy is the ‘non-philosophy’ of Theophilus Okere (1983). If this is the case, then one can build on it to arrive at what is philosophical and African philosophy. This is what Agada and Ogbonnaya have respectively argued out. The point is that African ethnophilosophy is the substructure upon which African philosophy ought to be built. The reason is that it is African and defines the Africanity of African philosophy as well as connects us to our distant undocumented and not systematised philosophical past put forward by anonymous African philosophers. The question now is: how can this non-philosophy – African ethnophilosophy – be transformed into an African philosophy, that which is African and philosophical? African ethnophilosophy is not philosophical in that it is not only uncritical and lacks rigour, but that it is also descriptive despite being systematic. It is the duty of African philosophers to transform this African unphilosophical raw data into a philosophical corpus called African philosophy. The African philosopher can do this by critically and creatively engaging this communal thought – the unphilosophical data bequeathed to us by the first-generation African philosophers. African ethnophilosophy is the foundation upon which African philosophy should be built and consolidated. As foundation for African philosophy, African ethnophilosophy is the substructure upon which the main structure rests. And if this structure is not solid, the whole edifice will crumble. But African ethnophilosophy has been well systematised and solidified by the earlier first-generation African philosophers who harvested their data directly from African culture and worldview. Then, they employed this unphilosophical data as if they were philosophical, but now we need to make them philosophical by employing critical rigour in investigating them and their underlying principles.

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As foundation to African philosophy, it is a precursor – a forerunner to African philosophy. This is to say that if it did not exist, African philosophy would not exist today. It cleared the path upon which contemporary African philosophy buds and thrives. Also, as foundation to African philosophy, African ethnophilosophy acts as a source of inspiration for African philosophising today. This is apparent in the arguments of some scholars that African philosophy is an Africa-inspired or African culture-inspired philosophising. By this, African philosophy draws from African ethnophilosophy but does not end there. It takes it from its communal level into an individual level. Here, the philosophical thoughts derived are not termed communal since they have been critically and creatively processed by an individual who has placed her stamp of authority and ownership on it. This is done by questioning the beliefs, concepts, ideas and worldviews of Africans as enshrined in the systematised African ethnophilosophy. As one does this, the underlying principles of these belief systems and worldviews are harvested from the African ethnophilosophy material and engaged with using critical rigour. What I am saying is that African ethnophilosophy is no African philosophy but the foundation of African philosophising. It ought to be the starting point of contemporary African philosophising and not the terminus. Thus, African philosophy must start from somewhere, and that is ethnophilosophy. However, it must transcend this starting point. For to stop at its starting point (ethnophilosophy) is to remain a descriptive work that is not philosophical, though African. But if it is moved into the realm of critical individual rigorous enterprise, it becomes African and philosophical. Therefore, African philosophy is a philosophy that results from a critical and creative exercise on African ethnophilosophy, which provides the veritable basis for the African being in the world. In this light, contemporary African philosophy should involve African ethnophilosophy as its base. By this, African ethnophilosophy is and should provide the basis for contemporary African philosophising.

5  A  ttoe: Revisiting the Foundationalist Perspective of Ethnophilosophy We can begin to rehash the vile history from which ethnophilosophy3 was developed, but that point has already been made by philosophers from Mabogo More (1996) to Chris Ijiomah (2014) and to Aribiah Attoe (2019). However, the main thesis is this: that Western philosophers found Africans and African thought to be at best ‘prelogical’ and that to prove these Western scholars wrong, one must then dive into precolonial African ideas, excavate these ideas and present them as ‘philosophy’, in a bid to prove that Africans are not prelogical. Mix that up with a sense of

3  Ethnophilosophy has been defined as ‘that variant of philosophical methodology which considers collecting, describing and informing over the general worldview of a people the target of philosophical investigation’ (Asouzu 2007, 37).

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pan-Africanism, and we get a method of philosophising that is not only specific to a geography or culture but one that envelopes the philosopher in a contextual cocoon and is inherently stubborn to outside criticism. This is not to say that ethnophilosophy is not valuable in some respects, but pushing that value to the extent of recognising it as a ‘foundation’ for African philosophy has always been the point I have disagreed and continue to disagree with. Borne out of a critique of my disagreements, this contribution has allowed me to analytically unpack my views on the myth of ethnophilosophy (whether ethnophilosophy in the sense of a method of philosophy or in the sense of a philosophy) as the foundation of African philosophy. It is best to start by contextually defining what a foundation is and what it is not. A foundation is simply understood in terms of an underlying principle from which other principles are directly generated. For the discipline of African philosophy, the context in which the word ‘foundation’ is used will not necessarily be commensurate with the idea of a historical moment. It is the same way that the underlying principle of, say, chemistry is not the historical moments associated with the development of chemistry but is instead related to the need to understand the chemical relationships of various types of reality. Similarly, the idea of a foundation or an ‘underlying principle’ is not synonymous with the idea of a precursor. Thus, the idea of alchemy as the foundation of chemistry, on the basis of the fact that it is a precursor to chemistry, is unattractive. Emergentism is therefore not identical to foundationalism. A foundation is also not synonymous with the idea of source. If we suppose that I am inspired to build a house, the foundation of that building would neither be my brain from which the idea to build a house sprang from nor my bank account from which the money to build is sourced; the foundation would consist of the block of concrete on which such a building stands. In the same vein, the source of an idea is not necessarily its foundation. Finally, a foundation is not synonymous with a distinguishing mark. What distinguishes a building from other buildings is the way such a building is aesthetically designed, perhaps even the way it is structured. This is quite different from the foundation which is basically what supports the superstructure. An underlying principle is, therefore, something specific to the thing which it is a foundation to. It stands as that edifice whose destruction only allows the superstructure to crumble. It is precisely what gives support and legitimacy to a thing. For some African philosophers like Fainos Mangena (2014a, b) and Lucky Ogbonnaya (2018), ethnophilosophy is this underlying principle of African philosophy. In fact, for Mangena, an idea does not count as African philosophy in so far as it is not founded on ethnophilosophy. Ogbonnaya’s position seems different at first but is basically the same thing. For him, a philosophy is African philosophy if and only if it pays fealty to a relational ontology – what he calls ezin’ulo (2018 99). Afro-communitarianism is of course a product of ethnophilosophy. So, any claim to African philosophy crumbles when it is not founded on the ethnophilosophical base of relationality. But these are strong claims to make, and it is best to analyse these propositions more closely. Now there are good reasons why one might think the way Mangena and others like him do. If we put into context the politics I alluded to previously and the easily made claims that contemporary African thought is

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influenced (or adulterated) by non-African worldviews, then it is easy to claim that ethnophilosophy, by virtue of the fact that it presents supposedly genuine precolonial African thought, must then be the foundation of authentic African philosophy. Mimicking Alfred North Whitehead (1978 39), one can say that African philosophies today are simply footnotes to ethnophilosophy. But are these good reasons? I like to think they are not, and I shall show why. Ethnophilosophy is not the foundation of African philosophy because it is a precursor to African philosophy, or because it captures the history of African thought/ philosophy or even because it is a source material for precolonial African thoughts/ philosophies. Like I have previously explained, these do not constitute what we mean when we use the word ‘foundation’. It is easy to assume that what African philosophy is is dependent on contents that are decidedly African, or in this context precolonial African traditions, values or ideas. The focus here is on the prefix ‘African’ rather than on ‘philosophy’, as the underlying principle. If this is the case, one must then ask what differentiates African philosophy from the history of African ideas, anthropology or sociology? If the underlying principle must absorb the very essence of what the discipline is, then it is the case that regurgitating traditional African ideas would not serve as the foundation of African philosophy, since some ideas on their own are not always philosophical. Beyond this, ancient ideas alone relegate contemporary philosophical thoughts and the philosophical status of those who like to think them to the background. Something, then, is missing in this narrative, and to fill that gap, one must turn her attention from the word ‘African’ to the word ‘philosophy’. I begin by asking: what underlying principle makes African philosophy philosophical? The answer to this question does not lie in the rehashing of thoughts, whether old or new, but in the logic and rigorous critical appraisal of those thoughts. Criticality is seen here as an attitude and as a method for juxtaposing hypothetical claims with certain rules (i.e. a logic) in a bid to decipher the validity and soundness of a hypothetical claim. African myths told under moonlit skies remain myths – an exercise in storytelling. To transcend from the mythical to the philosophical would then involve a critical appraisal – a search for logical soundness – and whatever is left is what you would then term ‘philosophy’. Thus, the underlying principle of philosophy would then be criticality. If African philosophy must be considered philosophy and not something else, then it must possess this underlying principle. To further buttress this point, I find that when we look at the word ethnophilosophy, we immediately realise that mere regurgitation of thought history or cultural beliefs cannot count as philosophy – Asouzu (2004) has soundly criticised individuals who adopt this approach and thinking by writing pieces on new yam festivals, masquerades, etc., of their various cultures, and presenting those anthropological exercises as philosophical. Yet, real philosophies, like the much-referenced Ubuntu philosophy of the southern parts of Africa, are also ethnophilosophical. What gives legitimacy to ethnophilosophies like Ubuntu is the level of criticality that is usually invested in the enterprise, unlike in the former. One must go deeper to find what makes ethnophilosophical ideas philosophical. So, even at the level of

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ethnophilosophy (what is being touted as the foundation of African philosophy), the underlying principle is still criticality. My analysis has not denied the importance of ethnophilosophical thinking in African philosophy – I have only denied that it is the foundation for African philosophy. Also, while ethnophilosophy is built on the foundation of criticality and makes up the structure of what we determine to be the edifice – African philosophy – it is not the only superstructure. This brings me to my final point. Much of African philosophy so far has been ethnophilosophical in some way: from Oruka’s sage philosophy (basically a rehashing of cultural beliefs via individual sages (Oruka 1991) to (what I shall now describe as) critical ethnophilosophy. Professional African philosophy has been largely derided by the vast majority of African philosophers who are ethnophilosophers. The reason for this derision has mainly been the fact that ideas from those perceived as professional ‘African’ philosophers do not always trace their origins to traditional beliefs. It seems then that, ironically, the geographical perspectivism that so characterised the legitimacy of a distinct African philosophy fails to inhere, in the same vein, to the individual African philosopher – it stopped its journey at the cultural level. So, as an African with creative new philosophical ideas that are not necessarily tied to precolonial traditional thought or with my unique critique of exogenous non-African traditions/ideas, my views remain ‘un-African’, despite my context as an individual, born, bred and living in contemporary Africa. There is, of course, a danger to this sort of thinking – African philosophy would barely develop beyond ancient cultural views, and being a unique African philosopher is impossible. I think solving this problem is simple. Paulin Hountondji had redefined African philosophy as ‘a set of texts, specifically the set of texts produced by Africans and described as philosophical by their authors themselves’ (2018 12). Beyond the dilemma (non-Africans cannot do African philosophy) that this sort of definition enables, some insight can be salvaged. Ethnophilosophy is not the foundation of African philosophy and should not be the only superstructure that forms African philosophy. In this way, when we say ‘produced by Africans’, we would mean exactly that and without always necessitating the extension ‘…in relation to pre-­ colonial thought’. Professional African philosophy – described here as the unique creative views of African philosophers regardless of cultural views – must be seen as also important and mutually complementary with its ethnophilosophical counterpart (which would also absorb non-African philosophers of African philosophical thought). Thus, in the same way that Western philosophers can talk about the Plato’s world of forms and in the same vein talk about neurophilosophy and still be talking Western philosophy, African philosophers would be able to also talk about Ubuntu and some other new contemporary idea and call same ‘African philosophy’; this is how African philosophy must develop.

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6  M  angena: A Case of the Common Moral Position for Ethnophilosophy In my previous works on ethnophilosophy, I have challenged some African philosophers who seem to have looked down upon ethnophilosophy viewing it as an unauthentic trend of African philosophy that represents a mere collection of beliefs, customs, values and traditions of a particular group of people. Some of these African philosophers include but are not limited to Ikechukwu Anthony Kanu (2013) who is an eclectic,4 as well as Paulin Hountondji (1996) and Kwame Anthony Appiah (1992) who are both universalists.5 In this section I build on the criticisms levelled against these African philosophers to argue that ethnophilosophy is authentic and unadulterated type of African philosophy, with the capacity to achieve what other Western philosophies of the world have achieved. In this section, I focus on the following: the semantic discourse of ethnophilosophy and a brief review of relevant literature on the subject, a brief revisit of Kanu, Hountondji and Appiah as well as ethnophilosophy (re)collection and analysis of African thought systems. In my recent article entitled Ethno-philosophy is Rational: A Reply to Two Famous Critics published in 2014, I define ethnophilosophy as the collection and analysis of indigenous African thought systems (Mangena 2014a, b, 26). The collection and analysis levels of ethnophilosophy only help to show that philosophy is not the same everywhere and that its methodology entirely depends on the context in which the philosophy is situated (Mangena 2014a, b, 99). To this end, Mungwini (2017) argues that ‘the intellectual content of African philosophy must be created out of Africa’s conditions and its historic cultures’. Thus, his view on ethnophilosophy is that ‘re-visiting6 the African past in order to distil7 out of it, indigenous systems of knowing across the breadth and length of Africa has to be encouraged’ (Mungwini 2017, 21). By looking at ethnophilosophy this way, I try to avoid falling into the trap of other contributors in the area who have limited ethnophilosophy to the mere (re)collection of beliefs, customs and values of a particular group of people, and thereby misreading and distorting it. Below, I briefly revisit the works of Kanu, Hountondji and Appiah in order to help the reader to have an appreciation of the criticisms that have been levelled against ethnophilosophy. In his spirited defence of eclectism, and subsequently in his criticism of ethnophilosophy, Kanu (2013) cites Uduigwomen, who thinks that in order to have an 4  Eclectics believe that the universalist’s and particularist’s ideas can be combined in order to address the criticisms levelled against African philosophy by Hume, Hegel, Kant, Levy-Bruhl and others and thereby come up with authentic African philosophy. This would mean that African philosophy trends like ethnophilosophy will have to be revised to ensure they reflect that combination. 5  In African philosophy, universalism is a school of thought which holds that philosophy uses one method and it is the same everywhere. 6  The Idea of revisiting the past is synonymous to (re)collection which is the first level of ethnophilosophy. 7  The idea of distilling has the same rendering as the analysis level of ethnophilosophy.

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authentic African philosophy, it is imperative that universalist approaches provide the analytical tools, while particularist approaches provide the raw materials. Kanu’s view is simply that African philosophical thoughts drawn from their various worldviews, myths and proverbs need to be recentred, and professionally trained African philosophers should be given the responsibility to do the recentering (Kanu 2013). I have argued previously that ethnophilosophy (which is an important trend of African philosophy) need not be anchored on foreign concepts and methodologies (c.f. Mangena 2014a, b, 104) as it operates at two levels, namely, the (re)collection and analytic levels. Thus, ethnophilosophy does not need to be eclectised in order to be an authentic trend of African philosophy because it is already a complete and competing trend in its own right by virtue of its ability to (re)collect and analyse African thought systems. Shortly, I will prove that this is the case. Having briefly looked at Kanu, I will now move on to Hountondji. In his full-scale attack on ethnophilosophy, Hountondji (1996, 60) begins by noting that the existence of ethnophilosophy ‘gives the false impression that in “primitive” societies, that is, non-Western societies, people are united on those fundamental issues that define their existence, and that there are no individual beliefs or philosophies but only a collective system of beliefs’. Hountondji thinks that this so-called unity is magnified and exaggerated as it is based on the interpretation of non-­existent texts (c.f. Mangena 2014a, b). Hountondji (1996, 62) thinks that ethnophilosophy is meaningless, as it is a pre-philosophy8 mistaking itself for a metaphilosophy.9 Hountondji maintains that ‘instead of presenting its own rational justification, it relies on the authority of tradition and projects its theses and beliefs onto that tradition’ (1996: 62). Appiah (1992, 95), another universalist, argues in support of Hountondji when he notes that ‘the absence of unanimity of thought in Africa necessarily weakens arguments for the project of ethno-philosophy’. His view is that unanimity of thought should undergird the project of ethnophilosophy, so that any lack of unanimity thereof also entails a bankruptcy of the project of ethnophilosophy (Appiah 1992, 95). Appiah thinks that without unanimity of thought, ethno-philosophy lacks the capacity to represent an authentic or genuine philosophy. Appiah also argues that ‘many traditional African societies have as much in common with traditional societies that are not African as they do with each other, so that there is no reason to think that the folk philosophies of Africa are uniform’ (1992, 92). Appiah (1992, 95) amplifies his argument when he observes that ‘the hallmark of philosophy is reason and evidence, two aspects that are glaringly absent in oral folk philosophy’.10 In what follows, I will attempt a critical analysis of the universalist position first

8  By pre-philosophy Hountondji probably means that it lacks the key features of a philosophical enterprise such as its aims and methods. 9  Metaphilosophy generally investigates the nature of philosophy as a discipline, and its content covers the aims, boundaries and methods of philosophy. 10  Please note that in the text just cited, Appiah more frequently uses the phrase ‘oral folk philosophy’ to refer to ethnophilosophy.

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through (re)collection and, then, through an instantiation with the common moral position (CMP). With regard to the aspect of (re)collection, it is important to note that ethnophilosophy as a system of thought deals with the collective worldviews of diverse African people as a unified form of knowledge based on myths, folk wisdom and the proverbs of the people. From the above definition, we can pick two important points. The first point is that ethnophilosophy is a ‘system of thought’. The second point is that ethnophilosophy represents ‘the collective world views of diverse African people’, which worldviews are a unified form of knowledge (Emagalit 2006). Thus, the diversity that characterises African people (in terms of location and language) does not take away the fact that Africans have ‘a unified form of philosophy’, drawn from their beliefs, customs, values and traditions (c.f. Mangena 2016). It is important to note, therefore, that as ethnophilosophy continues to celebrate its promotion of unity in diversity, it does not remain at the level of mere collection of beliefs, customs, values and traditions of a particular group of people, as put by critics like Kanu, Hountondji and Appiah; instead, it also goes to the level of analysis of the same. This analysis of beliefs, customs, values and traditions, is made possible through reasoning, ‘which is a product of two mental processes, namely; deduction and induction’11 (Mangena 2014a, b, 31). The products of this analysis of beliefs, customs, values and traditions are packaged in proverbs, idioms and folktales among other reservoirs, and the packaging is done through what I would call the common moral position (CMP). The CMP is attained when the moral opinions of the elderly group (considered to be custodians of value in an African context) are put together in order to come up with a common position regarding issues of right and wrong. The justification for respecting the moral opinions of the elderly group is two pronged. Firstly, it is believed that the elderly people have had some sort of experiences of life, which generate wisdom, which have taught them to know that certain actions are right while others are wrong because of the implications they have on the life of the community. Secondly, it is believed that the elders always have access to the spirit world and can therefore easily link the younger generation to this world, should there be need. Having said that, I should now revert back to the first justification by noting that although the experiences of the elders can be varied and diverse, this variation and diversity lose traction the moment these experiences are captured in proverbs that now express a common moral position. For example, the Shona proverb: Mwanawa mambo murandakumwe (The son of a king retains his royal status when he is in his father’s jurisdiction, but loses it when he gets out of it) expresses a common position about right and wrong in the Shona community. It is important to note that this proverb came about as a result of observations which were made and which frequently pointed to the direction that each time a king’s son left his father’s territory,

 No one owns or lays claim to the mental processes of deduction and induction, as these processes are definitive of every rational being, whether white or black.

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he did not receive the same respect he had when he was in his father’s territory, hence mwanawa mambo murandakumwe. So, what matters is the frequency with which it happened. Thus, it is the frequency with which a king’s son lost his royalty each time he left his father’s territory that led to the conclusion that mwanawa mambo murandakumwe. This became (and continues to be) a common position across all generations of Shona people found in Zimbabwe. Turning to the second justification, it is important to note that elders are the link between those gone by (the ancestors) and the young, and since it is impossible not to attribute ethnophilosophy to the influence of those gone by (the ancestors), and since elders have a direct relationship with the spirit world, it means that they are instrumental in the formulation of the CMP as an ethical imperative. This point is also best captured by the Shona proverbial expression: Ukazvidzavakuru, midzimuinotsamwa (If you despise the elders, ancestors will be upset). It therefore holds that despite criticisms, ethnophilosophy still has a lot of influence on discourses related to African philosophy today and continues to provide the raw materials for philosophical analysis.

7  Etieyibo: In the House of Ethnophilosophy In the house of ethnophilosophy, there are a number of elements. Some are visible and others are inherent or immanent. When properly excavated and unpacked, the visible and immanent elements constitute, as l argue, in this section, genuine philosophy, both broadly and in a strict sense. The visible elements of ethnophilosophy are the particular culture or cultural elements and paraphernalia (such as customs and traditions, proverbs and institutions) and are easily observable in one’s engagement with culture and cultural life. These components are generally used to signify the nonphilosophical part of ethnophilosophy, or stated differently, the various cultural elements and paraphernalia (which make up the visible elements of ethnophilosophy) constitute and designate the ethno of philosophy or the ethno part in ethnophilosophy. The immanent elements are the thinking or thought, the philosophical work or critical feature that grounds the cultural components and paraphernalia, and without which there will be no culture or cultural elements. The critical feature or philosophical work (immanent element) which gives birth to the ethno (the visible component) is in a sense invisible and is discernible or becomes only completely apparent as philosophy when we engage both in an excavation and unpacking exercise or activity. In many discussions of ethnophilosophy and in particular in the classification of ethnophilosophy as not philosophy, or pseudophilosophy, or philosophy in the broad sense, the immanent components (the philosophical work) that ground the cultural elements and paraphernalia (visible component) are generally ignored. The excavation and unpacking of the visible and immanent components of ethnophilosophy seem to me to be consistent with the general definition of ethnophilosophy (within discussions of African philosophy) that have been provided by

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scholars like Paulin Hountondji and Barry Hallen (2010), according to which the word ‘philosophy’ is linked to the cultures of Africa. On this understanding, ethnophilosophy can be taken to mean either the study of indigenous philosophical systems, i.e. an unpacking of African cultures, or a critical reflection on the indigenous systems. Literally and linguistically, ethnophilosophy could then be said to mean culture philosophy or philosophy in culture, where ethno means culture (ethnic, people or racial groupings). And since implicit in the notion of ethnophilosophy is the idea that a specific culture can have a philosophy or philosophy in culture, the unpacking, excavation and reflection themselves play the role of uncovering the philosophy that is taken to be inherent in the ethno. It does not strike me that this understanding of ethnophilosophy is in dispute between myself and scholars like Hountondji and others that label ethnophilosophy as pseudophilosophy or philosophy in the broad sense. What is in dispute between myself and these scholars, I think, is the question as to whether ethnophilosophy is the real deal such that it can be called genuine philosophy. With regard to the activity that is brought to bear on ethnophilosophy (and as concerns, say, African philosophy), there are two aspects to ethnophilosophy here that need to be considered. The first aspect takes ethnophilosophy to be the recording of the beliefs, values, categories and assumptions that are implicit in the language, practices and beliefs of African cultures, and the second aspect takes it to be the interpretation of worldview. On both aspects of ethnophilosophy, ethnophilosophy is understood to be a communal property or as the philosophy of some specific people. As culture philosophy, I take ethnophilosophy to be genuine philosophy, and I argue for this claim below. One reason for the rejection of ethnophilosophy, as philosophy or genuine philosophy, is the view that philosophy is not a communal practice and product or a ‘we’ or ‘our’ philosophy but the practice and product of individual minds or the activity of the individual or this and that person – it is an ‘I’ or ‘my’ philosophy or ‘his/her’ philosophy. I think this view is mistaken and unsound on a number of grounds, and I show, in the remaining part of this section, what these grounds are. Firstly, it is true that philosophy is a reflective activity that is guided by a certain disposition. Traditionally and etymologically, philosophy means the love of wisdom (in Greek: ‘Philia’ = ‘love’ and ‘Sophia’ = ‘wisdom’). This view of philosophy is cryptic, and it is not unexpected given that it is an etymological understanding of philosophy. This understanding can be fleshed out to give us a more robust notion of philosophy as the systematic search for a reasoned and general understanding of reality and values. So, philosophy then is about engaging with the entire gamut of realty, a deep reflection guided by some particular attitude and temperament that motivate the peering into and the examination of reality with a view to grasping or revealing or understanding reality. This then raises the question: if philosophy is a reflective activity, who can and cannot do it? Stated differently, is it only individuals or the ‘I’ that is equipped to carry out the reflective activity of philosophy? Suppose for the time being we answer in the affirmative, what would that mean for ethnophilosophy? Since ethnophilosophy is culture philosophy or communal philosophy or philosophy in culture, would

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the claim that philosophy can only be done by individuals mean that it is not philosophy or genuine philosophy? The answer would seem to be yes, for if philosophy, as a reflective activity, is a product of individual minds, then ethnophilosophy being a communal practice and product and not that of individual minds cannot be philosophy in the true sense of the word philosophy. However, this position seems to me too hasty. Recall my point above about the immanent elements in the house of ethnophilosophy, namely, the thinking or thought, i.e. the philosophical work, the critical feature that ground the cultural components and paraphernalia. I noted that without these immanent elements, there will be no culture or cultural elements. These parts are immanent because in contrast to the visible components like customs and traditions, proverbs and institutions, they are generally not apparent and are ignored in many discussions on ethnophilosophy. Because these immanent elements are not apparent and are ignored, people fail to realise that what is usually classified as communal or cultural thoughts are in reality thoughts of individuals that have come to be either endorsed or appropriated by the ‘we’, the community. Thus, the ethnophilosophy that is said to be communal practice and product is indeed philosophy, and its genesis attaches to the ‘I’. In addition, it is grounded by critical or philosophical exercise. Let us, for example, suppose a particular ethnophilosophy view, that is, say a community has a particular worldview such as ‘X’s community concept of personhood’. Generally, this is presented as communal or cultural thought, i.e. thought of X’s community on what constitutes persons. However, it will be hasty to end the discussion here. For as Joseph Omoregbe has noted, firstly, it is not necessary that every thinker or individual in a community carry out the reflective activity (of philosophy) in the same way as that of the Western thinkers, or that reflective activity that constitute philosophy is not carried out in the same manner in all philosophical traditions (1998, 4); and, secondly, community thought ‘can mean nothing other than the thought of individuals in a community…’ (1998, 6). The point then is that what today counts as communal or cultural thoughts or, in the case of our example, the thoughts of X’s community on the concept of personhood is nothing other than thoughts and ideas that individual thinkers in this community have put forward – thoughts which ultimately became the thoughts of X’s community. Simply put, the existence of the cultural elements and paraphernalia gives evidence of critical and systematic thought in ethnophilosophy. That is, the ground for the possibility of the cultural components and paraphernalia is the critical and systematic thought that happens before or prior to the ethno, and without the critical and systematic thought, there would be no ethno. Also, one may question the assumption that only individuals are capable of engaging in and carrying out the reflective activity of philosophy. I do think that reflective activity may be ascribed to a group or a community. If reflective philosophy is rigorousness in engagement in and with experiences, ideas, values, beliefs, etc., it is not clear to me why communal thought or philosophising or the thought of a group cannot be rigorous in this sense. That communal thinking exists or that reflective activity may be predicated on a group or a community is plausible.

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Consider two related ideas – that of group mind (in biology, psychology and the fragile sciences) and collective intentionality (in social ontology). Regarding collective intentionality, this is intentionality in the social context where the power of the minds is jointly directed at objects, matters of fact, states of affairs, goals or values such that what we end up with are not individual and disparate thinking but things like shared or joint intention, common or shared belief, collective acceptance and agreement and collective emotion. As for group mind (in biology, psychology and the fragile sciences), the idea is that mental activity or thinking can be ascribed to group insofar as individuals are pulled together where such coming together give rise to the individuals losing their individuality (including their individual thinking). This is part of what Charles-Marie Gustave Le Bon (1896), the French sociologist, has called the ‘group mind worldview’, or what has come to be called the ‘group-mind theory’, namely, the loss of the individual’s consciousness once such individual joins with others in a group and where this consciousness is consequently supplanted by some other consciousness – the ‘we’ or ‘our’ or group consciousness. As Le Bon has noted about the ‘group mind worldview’, it arises from the coming together of the group and explains the various characteristics of crowd behaviour where the individual behaves differently when they are in a group or crowd. Finally, an important consideration for thinking that ethnophilosophy is genuine philosophy is the idea of the nature of embedded morality and reflective morality that Kwame Gyekye (1997) has discussed. In Gyekye’s analysis, embedded morality is first-order philosophy or philosophical synthesis, while reflective morality can be construed as second-order philosophy or philosophical analysis. Embedded morality or the morality or ‘ethics of a society is embedded’, according to Gyekye, when such morality is rooted (a) ‘in the ideas and beliefs about what is right or wrong, what is a good or bad character’; (b) ‘in the conceptions of satisfactory social relations and attitudes held by the members of the society’; (c) ‘in the forms or patterns of behavior that are considered by the members of the society to bring about social harmony and cooperative living, justice, and fairness’. In the African context, the idea of an embedded morality makes sense considering, as Gyekye puts it, that ‘African societies, as organized and functioning human communities, have undoubtedly evolved ethical systems— ethical values, principles, rules—intended to guide social and moral behavior’ (Gyekye 1997). Given that the notion of embedded morality is simply the idea that morality is hidden or rooted in the ethno, the term ethno itself cannot just be taken to mean culture or cultural elements and paraphernalia without any further qualification and predication. The further qualification and predication are the unveiling of the immanent elements by an excavation and unpacking exercise. That is, this exercise helps us to recognise the philosophy in the ethno or the philosophical work and critical feature that has given birth to the invisible components. Engaging in a proper excavation and unpacking work in the house of ethnophilosophy reveals interesting insights about ethnophilosophy. These insights show that it is genuine philosophy because it exhibits characteristics of both individual and communal thinking in being reflective. And as I have argued, the possibility of

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communal thinking (where the thinking is ascribed to the community) is highlighted by the ideas of collective intentionality and group mind such that when communal thinking is predicated of the community, it is a form of thinking that can be said to be rigorous. Those who reject ethnophilosophy as genuine philosophy and denigrate African ethnophilosophy as not philosophy have failed to appreciate all the important elements in the house of ethnophilosophy. For they have failed to see that in the house of ethnophilosophy, there are visible and immanent components, and a well-­ nurtured visit to the house of ethnophilosophy, namely, a proper excavation and unpacking of the visible and immanent elements, will help them arrive at ‘ethnophilosophical nirvana’ or the conclusion that ethnophilosophy is genuine philosophy, or as the philosophy.

8  Concluding Remarks The conversation about ethnophilosophy that we were just now engaged in has provided a rich insight into the status of ethnophilosophy in African philosophical discourse and has certainly paved the way for further discussions. At least two points can be deduced from the discourse on ethnophilosophy thus far: (1) The disparities in views among conversers about the importance or non-­ importance of ethnophilosophy for African philosophy, it seems, stem ultimately from the understanding of ethnophilosophy that each converser holds, which varies from the notion of a method used at some point in the history of African philosophy to an etymological understanding as culture philosophy. (2) The debate about ethnophilosophy in the spirit of any philosophical tradition remains a perennial one that is yet to be concluded. Philosophy as a form of human inquiry in African and non-African places may never successfully ignore, sideline or push aside the ethno as irrelevant. The extent of relevance or the extent to which philosophy is and should be dependent on the ethno is what would remain debatable, and as it is, this is not a strange dilemma – it is, in fact, the beauty of philosophy. Acknowledgements  We thank the editor of Filosofia Theoretica, Prof Jonathan Chimakonam, for birthing this idea after its conception in a series of debates about ethnophilosophy in yet another brainchild of his, the NaijaPhil Google Group. We also thank all those who participated in that online discourse. Your comments were useful food for thought.

References Agada, Ada. 2013. Is African philosophy progressing? Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 5 (1): 239–273. ———. 2015a. Existence and consolation: Reinventing ontology, gnosis and values in African philosophy. Calabar: 3rd Logic Option.

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———. 2015b. The future question in African philosophy. In AtuoluOmalu: Some unanswered questions in African philosophy, ed. Jonathan O. Chimakonam, 241–267. Lanham: University Press of America. ———. 2018. A truly African philosophy. Aeon Magazine, September 27. https://aeon.co/amp/ essays/consolation-­philosophy-­and-­the-­struggle-­of-­reason-­in-­africa Appiah, Kwame A. 1992. In my father’s house: Africa in the philosophy of culture. New York: Oxford University Press. Asouzu, Innocent I. 2004. The method and principles of complementary reflection in and beyond African philosophy. Calabar: University of Calabar Press. Asouzu, Innocent I. 2007. Ibuarụ: The heavy burden of philosophy beyond African philosophy. Zurich: LIT Verlag GmbH & Co. Attoe, Aribiah, D. 2019. An essay concerning the foundational myth of ethnophilosophy. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 5 (1): 100–108. Emagalit, Z. 2006. Contemporary African philosophy. Mount Saint Mary College. Web. Gustave Le Bon, Charles-Marie. 1896. The crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind. New York: The Macmillan Co. Gyekye, Kwame. 1997. Tradition and modernity: Philosophical reflections on the African experience. New York: Oxford University Press. Hallen, Barry. 2010. ‘Ethnophilosophy’ redefined. Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya 2 (1): 73–85. https://doi.org/10.4314/tp.v2i1.59967. Hountondji, Paulin. 1996. African philosophy: Myth and reality. Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. ———. 2018. How African is philosophy in Africa? Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 7 (3): 9–18. Ijiomah, Chris. 2014. Harmonious monism: A philosophical logic of explanation for ontological issues in supernaturalism in African thought. Calabar: Jochrisam Publishers. Kanu, Ikechukwu A. 2013. Trends in African philosophy: A case for eclectism. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 2 (1): 275–287. Mangena, Fainos. 2014a. In defence of ethnophilosophy: A brief response to Kanu’s eclecticism. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 3 (1): 96–107. ———. 2014b. Ethno-philosophy is rational: A reply to two famous critics. Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya 6 (2): 23–38. https://doi.org/10.4314/ tp.v6i2.3. ———. 2016. Hunhu/Ubuntu in the traditional thought of Southern Africa. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://iep.utm.edu/hunhu/ Mbiti, John. S. 1969. African religions and philosophy. London: Heinemann. More, Mogobe. 1996. African philosophy revisited. Alternation 3 (1): 109–129. Mungwini, Pascah. 2017. Indigenous Shona philosophy: reconstructive insights. Pretoria: UNISA Press. Ogbonnaya, L.  Uchenna. 2018. What makes African philosophy African? A conversation with Aribiah David Attoe on ‘The Foundational Myth of Ethnophilosophy,’. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 7 (3): 94–108. Okere, Theophilus. 1983. African philosophy: A Historico-Hermeneutical investigation of the conditions of its possibility. Lanham: University Press of America. Omoregbe, Joseph I. 1998. African philosophy: Yesterday and today. In African philosophy: An anthology, ed. Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, 3–8. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Limited. Oruka, Odera. 1991. Sage philosophy: Indigenous thinkers and modern debate on African philosophy. Nairobi: ACTS Press. Rettová, Alena. 2002. The role of African languages in African philosophy. Rue Descartes 2 (36): 129–150. https://doi.org/10.3917/rdes.036.0129. Tempels, Placide. 1959. Bantu philosophy. Paris: Presence Africaine. Whitehead, Alfred N. 1978. Process and reality. New York: The Free Press. Wiredu, Kwasi. 1980. Philosophy and an African culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Paperback.

Index

A Academic ethnophilosophies, 22, 23, 205, 207 African bioethics, 177, 180–183, 185 African logic, 52, 61, 81, 154, 190, 191, 193, 194 African philosophy, wellspring of; foundation of, 14, 15, 18–36, 154, 254 Afro-communitarianism, 19, 21, 23, 26, 31, 76, 291–293, 295–297, 312 Agada, A., 20, 41, 58, 74, 95, 106, 124, 154, 190, 205, 235, 246, 262, 272, 288, 301 Akan philosophy, 130, 131, 293, 306 Akoko, P.M., 151 Albert, E., 6 Amo, A.W., 19 Ansell-Pearson, K.J., 162 Anthropology, philosophy of, 125, 167, 170 Appiah, A.K., 58 Arumaristics, 41, 46, 82, 84, 262–266 Asouzu, I., 19, 49, 59, 73, 108, 154, 190, 205, 241, 246, 275, 306 Azenabor, G., 40, 58, 138, 199, 247 B Becoming, 30, 34, 49, 65, 114, 140, 210–212, 223, 275, 276 Being, 4–13, 24–26, 28–35, 52, 53, 62, 66, 72, 75, 77–79, 83, 90, 92, 95, 97, 107–111, 121, 127, 130–132, 134, 139, 146, 149, 151, 160, 163, 165–167, 169, 178, 179, 182, 184, 185, 190, 191, 194, 195, 197,

203, 204, 207–212, 216, 221, 223, 227, 231, 234–238, 240–242, 250, 252, 253, 255, 257, 258, 264–266, 272–283, 289–294, 304, 308, 310, 311, 314, 317, 319–321 Be-ing becoming, 29, 33–36, 113, 114, 203–212, 223 Belongingness, 241–242, 255, 293, 297 Benoke point, 46, 195, 267 Bernasconi, R., 20, 65, 84 Bewaji, J.A., 178, 275 Bioethics, 180–183, 186 Bodunrin, P., 19, 57, 58, 108, 110, 166, 168, 190, 236, 247 C Chi, 20 Chimakonam, J.O., 18, 46, 57, 72, 89, 154, 191, 204, 246, 262, 280, 308 Cognitive wonder, 21, 28 Collective intentionality, 64, 302, 321, 322 Communities, 5, 12, 13, 20, 26, 27, 31, 42, 59, 60, 63–65, 99, 101, 121, 124, 128–130, 139, 141, 142, 144, 145, 149–151, 153, 154, 164, 170, 178, 179, 183–185, 195, 217, 219, 220, 225, 226, 228, 229, 231, 234, 241, 257, 287–297, 307, 309, 317, 320–322 Complementarism, 20, 24, 30–33, 211, 257 Complementary logic, 197 Complementary reflection, 154, 246, 249–252, 256, 258 Consolation, 257, 280, 281, 283

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326 Consolationism, 20, 24, 275 Consolation philosophy, 257 Conversationalist, 82, 84 Creativity, 13, 278–280, 282 Criticality, 21, 41, 47, 54, 59, 60, 62, 66, 67, 72, 73, 76–78, 81–85, 123, 154, 249, 302, 307, 310, 313, 314 Culture philosophy, 43, 45, 52, 61, 63, 64, 67, 139, 144, 198, 205, 207, 262, 301, 303, 322 D Decolonisation, 22, 112, 113, 182 Democracy, 121, 128, 152, 288, 293–297 Descriptive ethnophilosophy, 23, 28, 85, 205, 207 Dialectics, 30, 32, 160, 195, 263 Diop, C.A., 18, 88, 246 E Embedded morality, 64, 99, 100, 302, 321 Eternal Mood, 280–282 Ethno, 39–54, 63, 64, 94, 95, 165, 168, 176–180, 185, 300–302, 307, 318–322 Ethno-ethics, 175–186 Ethnophilosophy, de-stigmatisation of, 19, 35 Ethnosciences, 165, 300 Etieyibo, E., xxi, 18, 61, 63, 64, 87–101, 132, 206, 207, 300–322 Eurocentric bias, 148, 149 Eze, E., 12 Ezumezu logic, 35, 189–199, 212 F Feminist philosophy, 14 Folk sages, 9, 150–152 Friendliness, 178 G Gbadegesin, S., 31, 205, 207, 306 Global South, 27, 30, 216 God, 19, 22, 75, 90, 98, 109, 110, 128, 131, 150, 186, 240, 272–278, 280–283 Graness, A., 138, 262 Great Debate, the, 40–43, 74, 246, 247 Group mind, 64, 302, 321, 322 Gyekye, K., 23, 64, 98, 120, 138, 167, 178, 205, 287, 302

H Hallen, B., 21–23, 27, 138, 144, 146, 151, 163, 170, 205, 306, 319 Harmonious monism, 197 Harmony, 64, 99, 178, 179, 183, 219, 222, 268, 293, 296, 321 Hebga, M., 192 Hegel, G.W.F., 22, 28, 46, 108, 109, 193, 315 Heidegger, M., 26, 46, 97, 143, 208, 308 Hermeneutics, 21, 57, 138, 146, 233–242 Herskovits, M., 7 Hountondji, P., 19, 40, 58, 72, 88, 105, 120, 138, 164, 190, 206, 235, 246, 265, 302 Hume, D., 18, 22, 28, 108, 109, 163, 193, 315 I Ibuanyidanda, 20, 30, 32, 49, 67, 77, 246, 249–256, 258, 259, 275 Igwebuike, 33 Ijiomah, C.O., 41, 52, 67, 74, 197, 198, 311 Ikuenobe, P., 23, 98, 112, 129, 132, 205, 287, 292, 306 Imafidon, E., 23, 25, 26, 40, 58–61, 63, 64, 66, 67, 72, 75, 85, 154, 175–186, 205, 206, 300–322 Imbo, S.O., 107 Interculturality, 17–36, 48 Intercultural philosophies, 27, 124, 264 Iroegbu, P., 67, 233–242 J James, G., 18, 182 Janz, B., 3–15, 25, 53, 192, 308 Jide ka iji, 31 Joy of being, 30, 31, 250, 255 K Kagame, A., 89, 108, 121, 124, 132, 141, 223, 236, 246 Kalumba, K., 138 Kant, I., 18, 108 Kaphagawani, D.N., 92, 139, 144, 150 Kresse, K., 138, 148, 161 L Levy-Bruhl L., 149, 193, 315 Logical positivism, 161, 162, 164

Index M Majeed, H.M., 18, 119–134 Makinde, M., 19, 205 Mall, R.A., 27 Mangena, F., 19, 26, 41, 43, 46, 47, 58, 61–63, 66, 95, 111, 124, 132, 190, 205–207, 246, 248, 265, 274, 300–322 Masolo, D.A., 19, 108, 138, 217, 290, 292 Matolino, B., 18, 22–25, 27, 29, 43, 58–61, 63, 64, 67, 68, 95, 108–110, 129, 132, 207, 293, 294, 300–322 Mbiti, J.S., 19, 21, 23, 24, 31, 58, 89, 107, 138, 190, 198, 205–207, 223, 236, 246, 275, 309 Menkiti, I., 23, 26, 130, 205, 290, 296 Metaphilosophy, 308 Metz, T., 49, 177 Missing links, 29–36, 113, 114, 195, 245–259, 293 Momoh, C.S., 40, 41, 43, 138, 198, 245, 246, 265, 282 Mood, 20, 192, 280, 281, 283 Mudimbe, V.Y., 138, 149, 164 Myths, 3, 6, 52, 58–60, 74, 77, 92, 94, 106–108, 121, 131, 141, 147, 150, 165–169, 205, 236, 237, 247, 248, 305, 307, 310, 312, 313, 316, 317 N Nationalist-ideological philosophy, 235 New humanism, 27, 29, 35 Nietzsche, F., 208, 209, 273, 274, 282 Njikoka, 211, 212, 251, 268 Njoku, F.O.C., 107, 133 Nkrumah, K., 6, 19, 42, 89, 105, 106, 125, 142, 160, 164–167, 169, 170, 235, 297 Nmekoka, 211, 212 Non-philosophy, 10, 49, 53, 54, 64, 168, 247, 249, 310 Nwa-izugbe, 195 Nwa-nju, 263, 265–268 Nwa-nsa, 195, 196, 263, 265–268 Nyame, 128 O Obenga, T., 18 Okere, T., 21, 98, 110, 198, 205, 206, 234, 236–238 Okwu, 72, 73, 78–85, 267

327 Oluwole, S., 10, 40, 41, 43, 138, 205, 275 Onona-etiti, 211, 212, 268 Ontological wonder, 28 Onyewuenyi, I., 19, 24, 98, 138, 205 Opiatoha, 33 Oruka, H.O., 10, 23, 41, 94, 96, 121, 133, 138–154, 160, 190, 205, 209, 236, 302, 306, 314 Osha, S., 21, 25, 113 Othered patients, 175–186 P Panpsychism, 20, 276, 281, 282 Particularism, 5, 10, 14, 19, 24, 80, 106, 132–134, 206, 208, 247, 254, 307 Perfection thesis, 258 Personhood, 13, 20, 26, 79, 129–131, 167, 177, 183–186, 287, 288, 290, 292, 293, 295, 296, 320 Philosophemes, 236 Philosophic sagacity, 57, 138–144, 146–154, 247, 248, 302 Philosophy, wellspring of, 3–15, 32 Pre-philosophy, 46, 316 Presbey, G., 138, 143, 144, 151 Principlism, 175–186 Processes, 20, 28, 31, 34, 35, 45–48, 53, 54, 65, 81, 101, 111–114, 120, 160, 162, 163, 165, 169, 170, 181, 185, 186, 197, 199, 206, 210, 217, 223, 225, 227–230, 241, 250, 254, 266, 271–283, 290, 292, 293, 296, 303, 317 Professional philosophy, 57, 138, 140, 142–143, 152, 247 Proto-word, 79, 80 R Ramose, M.B., 18, 19, 29–31, 33–36, 67, 72, 110, 113, 114, 203–212, 275, 280, 293, 294, 308 Reflective morality, 64, 99, 100, 321 Relationality, 76, 177, 180–186, 312 Rettová, A., 21, 133, 306 Rheomodic language, 34, 210 Rüsen, J., 29 S Sage philosophy, 9, 57, 77, 81, 138–144, 149, 150, 152, 154, 262, 314 Sata, 20

Index

328 Senghor, L.S., 19, 21, 24, 25, 31, 41, 58, 88, 89, 111, 141, 142, 205, 206, 223, 236, 275, 280, 297, 308 Sense-phenomenalism, 20, 21, 29 Serequeberhan, T., 19, 21, 98, 108, 110, 111, 140, 308 Sodipo, J.O., 22, 25, 132, 138, 144, 146, 151, 306 Solidarity, 29, 35, 113, 178, 179, 183, 184, 211, 242, 280–282, 289 Soul, 22, 110, 130 Sunsum, 20, 130 Sympathetic impartiality, 113, 114, 162, 169 T Tempels, P., 6, 21, 58, 106–108, 110, 111, 114, 121, 124, 132, 140, 141, 145, 148, 149, 151, 190, 193, 198, 204, 206, 208, 209, 236, 246, 275, 304 Terror, 271–283 Three-valued logic, 193, 194, 197 Traditional wisdom, 6, 48, 123 Tutu, D., 178 U Ubuntu, 19, 33, 34, 67, 72, 77, 78, 178, 183, 203–212, 280, 301, 302, 313, 314 Ubuntu eventism, 204, 211

Ujamaa, 19, 49, 73, 160, 297 Umuntu, 34, 209 Unanimity, 26, 59, 60, 63, 112, 121, 122, 124, 126, 147, 150, 151, 168, 205, 231, 303, 307, 316 Universalism, 4, 5, 10, 14, 24, 30, 35, 80, 106, 132–134, 206, 216, 247, 307 Universalism-particularism divide, 19, 21, 204–207, 308 V Van Hook, J.M., 106, 138, 151, 198, 247 Van Norden, B.W., 18 Vital forces, 19, 82, 90, 110, 141, 145, 146, 208, 275 W Weidtmann, N., 33 Whitehead, A.N., 76, 272, 275–283, 308, 313 Wiredu, K., 19, 58, 79, 89, 110, 128, 138, 178, 190, 205, 236, 275, 296, 306 Wonders, 9, 11, 28, 98, 121, 148, 151 Y Yearning, 279–281