Engaging the World: The Making of Hamas's Foreign Policy 0994704828, 9780994704825

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This book challenges successfully the common misrepresentation of Hamas in the west. It is a must read for anyone engaged with the Palestine issue, and interested in an honest introduction to this important Palestinian movement. This book is also a crucial contribution for a better understanding of the relationship between the west and political Islam in general. The history, aims and vision of the movement have not before been explained in such a lucid and professional way.

IlanPappe Author and professor at the College

ef Social Sciences and International Studies,

University ef Exeter

'Palestine represents one of the great moral and political causes of our time, it unites people everywhere.' This undeniable truth is reiterated in the final chapter of this comprehensive study on 'the making of Hamas's foreign policy'. In my period as foreign minister- during the government of President Lula, Brazil was deeply involved in the struggle for a fair and peaceful solution to the conflict in the Middle East. One of our last decisions in the field of foreign policy was the recognition of Palestine as an independent and sovereign state. This bold step unchained a series of similar moves in Latin America, and beyond in the Global South, helping in the overall movement towards the resolution by the UN General Assembly. During that period, in our private conversations, President Lula and I strongly argued in favour of a broad and non-discriminatory inter-Palestinian dialogue. Our representative to Ramallah visited Gaza and had discussions with Hamas authorities there. It was with great interest that I went through Dr Daud Abdullah's well-researched work, which illuminates an essential aspect of "Hamas's" evolution: its international dimension. As a firm supporter of Palestinian rights and a defender of a solution

through peaceful means, I was very much encouraged by the author's concluding words to the effect that through the intensification of diplomatic efforts and global alliances, 'Hamas can play a pivotal role in the restoration of Palestinian rights'.

Celso Amorim Former Minister if Foreign Affairs ef Brazj4 under President Lula da Silva Dr Daud Abdullah's Engaging the World: The making

ef Hamas's foreign

polity is a rare and honest probe of the Palestinian resistance movement's political maturity and growth, despite countless obstacles. While the discussion on Hamas in mainstream media and academia have centred largely on its Islamic origins and character, and have somewhat reduced the movement to a confining, stifling discussion on 'terrorism' and 'suicide bombings', Engaging the World dismantles and reconstructs the old discourses to present an entirely refreshed analytical realm. The book delves into Hamas's internal dynamics, continual diplomacy, and attempts to break away from its Israel-led isolation. Equally important, Abdullah's book offers a new and crucial case study of Palestinian politics in the modern era amid tumultuous and vastly changing regional and international powerplays resulting from ongoing revolts and wars.

A truly riveting and

revealing account. A must read.

Ramzy Baroud Editor if Palestine Chronicle; Non-resident Senior Research Fellow at Afro-Middle East Centre and Centre for Islam and Global Affairs

This is a major undertaking, studying the ways by which Hamas conducted its foreign relations from the early 1990s to the present. Throughout the past three decades, Hamas has received great attention from scholars of modern Islam and the Middle East. Although it has emerged as a highly influential Islamic movement and partner in deciding the course of the Palestinian problem, no other study was dedicated to understanding Hamas's foreign policy. Here, Daud Abdullah steps in to fill this lacuna with an extensive coverage of the regional and international dynamics shaping the longest conflict in the modern world, and provides profound insight into the impact of these dynamics on Hamas and its role in Palestine. This work is an invaluable addition to the fields of political Islam, the Middle East, and Palestine studies.

Dr Bashir Nafi Research Fellow at AlJazeera Centre for Studies A must-read study of a foremost political movement in Palestine, this is the most comprehensive account of Hamas's international relations to

date.

Meticulously

documenting the

achievements

and

shortcomings of Hamas, the book shows how a pragmatic and highly dynamic non-state actor, rooted in the realities of Palestinians under occupation, can transform itself into a regional actor which seeks to project power on the global stage.

ProfNur Masalha Editor, Journal of Holy Land and Palestine Studies, SOAS, University of London

ENGAGING THE WORLD:

THE MAKING OF HAMAS'S FOREIGN POLICY

Daud Abdullah

AMEC

Engaging the World: The making of Hamas's foreign policy First published in 2020 by the Afro-Middle East Centre (AMEC) PO Box 411494, Craighall 2024,Johannesburg, South Africa www.amec.org.za ISBN (soft cover) 978-0-9947048-2-5

© 2020 Daud Abdullah All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without prior permission from AMEC. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the views of AMEC or indicate that AMEC endorses the views of the author. In quoting from this publication, readers are advised to attribute the source of the information to the author and not to AMEC. Cover design by Syed Choudhury Copyediting by Mary Ralphs Proofreading by Mary Starkey Text design and layout by Afrika Impressions Media (AIM) Printed in South Africa by AIM Digital Printed in the UK by CPI Antony Rowe Cover image: Hamas leader-in-exile, Khaled Meshaal (L), and Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip, Ismail Haniyeh, I, in Rafah, southern Gaza on 7 December 2012. Meshaal was making his first-ever visit to Gaza for festivities marking Hamas's 25 th anniversary. (Photograph by Suhaib Salem/AFP via Getty Images) British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Suggested citation: Abdullah D (2020) Engaging the world: The making efHamas's foreign poliry. Johannesburg: Afro-Middle East Centre.

Contents Endorsements

i

Aclrnowledgements

ix

Foreword

xi

Preface

xv

Acronyms and Abbreviations

xviii xix

Maps Introduction A Vision of Liberation Non-Intervention in the Affairs of Other States The Means The Structure of this Book

1

6 11 15 16

l_Hamas and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait The Dilemma The Third Nakba Return to Jordan A Gentlemen's Agreement The Final Expulsion

23 28 32 34 38

2 Rejecting the Call to Oslo Compromises without Benefits Hamas and Negotiations From Madrid to Oslo Overtures Rebuffed Opening Regional Offices

44 50 56 59 63

3 Opportunities from Marj az Zuhur Israel's Strategy of Forced Expulsion Lebanon's Unwanted Guests A Turning Point Relations with Regional Governments Non-Governmental and Civil Society Support

70 74 75 82 84

4 Relations with the USA Eradicating the Islamists Enforcing the US Security Agenda Dayton and The Peace-through-security Project Disquiet in Washington

89 94 98 104

23

43

67

89

The Unresolved Dilemma

107 111

5 The 2006 Elections and the Trial of Democracy Planning a 'Hard Coup' Democracy with Conditions

114 126

6 Hamas, the European Union and Public Opinion in Europe Blacklisting Pragmatists and Hardliners 'West Bank First' Dissenting European Voices The Legal Challenge Sorry is Not Enough

132 135 137 140 143 144

7 Engaging Russia, China and the Global South Russia The People's Republic of China South Africa Malaysia India Brazil

150 156 161 168 171 173

8 The Arab Uprisings and Hamas's Departure from Syria Arab Uprisings Syria Meshaal's Initiative Political and Diplomatic Support Unlimited Assistance Irreconcilable Differences Iran Relocating to Qatar and Turkey 9 Afterword: Achievements, Shortcomings and Challenges External Challenges Internal Weaknesses Facing the Future

131

149

177

178 179 180 183 186 187 190 195 199

200 203 205

Notes

209

References

229

Index

241

Acknowledgements

My old friend and colleague, Dr Ramzy Baroud, has been an invaluable source of support at every twist and turn. I am deeply indebted to Suzanne Baroud for editing the first draft and making many insightful suggestions. To Clare Short who wrote the foreword, I express my sincere thanks. Dr Salman Abu Sitta of the Palestine Land Society prepared the maps used in this volume and Dr Mohsen Saleh of Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies (Beirut) provided me with many important references; I remain ever thankful to them both. To my publisher, who is also the director of the Afro-Middle East Centre, Na'eem Jeenah, as well as to AMEC's reviewers, copyeditor Mary Ralphs and proofreader Mary Starkey, I express my profound thanks. Your insights and comments helped to enrich this final product immensely. To the members of Hamas's political bureau who agreed to be interviewed, and others who assisted in one way or another, I am extremely thankful. Without exception, they welcomed my initiative, gave their time generously, and gracefully endured my interrogations. I was honoured to have a number of distinguished scholars read and endorse the final manuscript. They include: Professor Celso Amorim, Professor Ilan Pappe, Professor Nur Masalha, Dr Basheer

IX

The Making of Hamas's Foreign Policy

Nafi and Dr Ramzy Baroud; I remain ever thankful to you all. There were, of course, others who were solid pillars of support and who prefer to remain anonymous. Nevertheless, I record my deepest appreciation. Finally, to the staff at the Middle East Monitor, and my dear wife Shanaz, who patiently tolerated my absences, silence and untold requests, I owe you all an enormous debt of gratitude. I cannot thank you enough.

X

Foreword

Clare Short, Former UK Secretary ofState for Intemational Development When Daud asked me to provide a preface for his book on Hamas foreign policy, I was keen to agree for two reasons. The first is that I respect his work on the question of Palestine. This is an issue that raises great passions and, although Daud has long been committed to justice for the Palestinians, he remains calm, considered and thoughtful at all times. I knew his book would have these qualities. My second reason is that I believe everyone who cares for justice and wishes to see an end to the terrible cruelties inflicted on the Palestinian people is entitled to know more about Palestinian realities. This is not easy in the case of Hamas because such a barrage of hostile propaganda surrounds the movement, and the powers that be refuse to meet with or provide platforms for Hamas spokespeople. This makes it very difficult for objective observers to be well informed. It is indisputable that, in 2006, Hamas won a substantial majority of votes in the elections held in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Those elections were scrutinised by delegations from all over the world and found to be entirely free and fair. However, the Hamas victory was unexpected and Wes tern powers were determined to prevent them taking power, even in the fairly powerless Palestinian xi

The Making of Hamas's Foreign Policy

Authority that was established under the Oslo Peace Accords. Violent resistance to Hamas was organised and supported. In consequence Hamas took control of Gaza. Following this, a cruel siege was imposed on the people of the area, and it continues to this day. In the cases of Hamas, Sinn Fein and Hizbullah, I took the view that if, in any conflict area, large numbers of people voted for a group that Western powers boycotted and denounced, then democrats should seek to find out about their views and try to understand why large numbers of local people supported them. For this reason, I joined one of the boats that travelled to Gaza from Cyprus to 'break the siege'. I also took part in a number of parliamentary delegations that visited Gaza through the Rafah crossing, in the days when the Egyptian Government was willing to facilitate this. Of course, it is not possible for everyone to visit Gaza. It is, therefore, essential that written material should be available that gives a sympathetic and accurate account of Hamas's thinking and actions. I did, however, have some doubts about whether an account of Hamas's foreign policy was really necessary. Surely states have foreign policies, and it is a little odd to think of liberation movements having these too? Having read Daud's book, I now realise that, of course, I was wrong in thinking liberation movements don't need or have foreign policies. Obviously, they have to relate to other states and groupings if they wish to win support for their cause. I therefore have no hesitation in recommending this book. I see the story of Hamas's relations with the rest of the world as substantially involving Hamas's history. Daud does not deal with the detail of Hamas rule in Gaza but otherwise he takes us through all the major milestones - including the effect of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1991 and the launch of the Madrid Process, the impact of Hamas's victory in the 2006 elections, the movement's relations with countries

Xll

Foreword

in Europe, Russia and the Global South; and the Arab spring of 2011. Daud is sympathetic to Hamas and their origins in the Muslim Brotherhood, so his account is sympathetic but not uncritical. This is a valuable and readable book and I recommend it warmly.

2 April 2020

xiii

Preface

Towards the end of 2018, I confided to a colleague that I intended to write a book in the coming year. When I mentioned that it would be about the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement - Hamas - the response I got was almost dismissive: 'Another book on Hamas! Isn't there enough on that subject?' Naturally, I had to make a compelling case that this book would be different. From the deep recesses of my memory emerged a vision of Sr Mary Noel Menezes, a Guyanese Roman Catholic nun and historian who taught me in my undergraduate years. 'It doesn't matter how much you write,' she would declare. 'You'll never have the final say. Someone else will always come and add their piece.' I quickly realised that, yes, I wanted to have my say about Hamas. But not just for the sake of doing so. I genuinely believe that Hamas's international relations and its attempts to develop a dynamic and effective foreign policy have not been covered elsewhere in the depth that it warrants. While pursuing graduate studies in Sudan m the 1980s, I befriended a number of Palestinian students. Through those early contacts, I met some Hamas members.Years later, I accompanied delegations of British journalists, parliamentarians and former government ministers on visits to Beirut and Damascus where we met some of the movement's political leadership.

xv

The Making of Hamas's Foreign Policy

At the time, it was not a question of if, but when, I would write about the insights I was gaining into Hamas and its approach to international relations. Just two earlier studies on this subject stand out. The first is The Foreign Poliry efHamas by Muhammad Muslih, a monograph published in 1999 by the US Council on Foreign Relations. The second is Abdalhakim Hanaini's book, Hamas' Foreign Poliry: Syria as a Case Stutfy 2000-2015, published in Arabic by Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies in Beirut in 2018. Given the palpable dearth of publications on Hamas's foreign policy, my aim was to write a reliable reference that would help fill the void and appeal to the interests and needs of diplomats, journalists, activists and students of the Middle East. After three decades of involvement in Palestinian national politics, Hamas continues to enjoy significant popular support in both the Occupied Territory and the diaspora. Neither the military onslaught of successive Israeli governments nor Hamas's proscription by certain western governments have been enough to dismantle the movement's infrastructure or extinguish its appeal. Engaging the World: The making

ef Hamas's Foreign poliry explains how Hamas

has used its

domestic strength to forge a foreign policy strategy that has enhanced its standing both regionally and within the broader international community. The importance of this book is that it is based on interviews with the movement's leaders and copious Arabic sources. Accordingly, it offers a first-hand account of how the movement responded to challenges emanating from regional political shifts that started in 1993 with the Oslo Accords. On the whole, the movement has maintained a delicate balance between strategic consistency and tactical flexibility. Accordingly, while pursuing its goal of liberating Mandatory Palestine, xvi

Preface the movement has been careful not to become crippled by ideological dogma. In his 2015 book about Hamas, Khaled Meshaal, former head of the movement's political bureau, explained its approach as follows: A movement is like a living organism; it grows and develops. It cannot act like a five-year old when it is ten; this is just part of life. Each phase has its own responses and responsibilities. The present realities in the Occupied Territory are markedly different from what existed in the late 1980s, when Hamas was providing social services through its charities and other civil society organisations. Today, the movement's responsibilities are far greater; it has to administer Gaza and provide for its two million people. Despite being a non-state actor, Hamas is now obliged to engage with states, some of which are avowedly friendly while others are patently hostile. This book is an account of how Hamas has harnessed its international relations to survive military aggression, economic blockade and political isolation. For me, the task of researching and compiling this volume was relatively straightforward. The real challenge was getting my ideas past my editors, peer reviewers and publisher. Everyone had strong views and some disagreed entirely with aspects of my approach, to the extent that I decided to omit a chapter that provided a historical overview and reorder the book. Although it was laborious, I eventually saw that this enabled me to take a more direct and deliberate approach to my subject. I am now delighted to commend this final version to you, the reader, for your own understanding and appraisal. I take full responsibility for its shortcomings and acknowledge with profound gratitude everyone who assisted me throughout this journey.

XVll

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ANC

African National Congress (South Africa)

BBC

British Broadcasting Company

BDS

Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions

BRICS

Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa

Centcom

US Central Command

CPC

Communist Party of China

DFLP

Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine

DOP

Declaration of Principles

ECJ

European Court of Justice

GID

General Intelligence Directorate Qordan)

ICRC

International Committee of the Red Cross

MENA

Middle East and North Africa

NAM

Non-Aligned Movement

PA

Palestine Authority

PFLP-GC

Popular Front for the Liberation of PalestineGeneral Command

PIJ PLO

Palestinian Islamic Jihad Movement Palestine Liberation Organisation

PNC

ussc

Palestine National Council US Security Co-ordinator

USSR

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

xviii

LEBANON/

Legend

r··-·r"·"·

West Bank and Gaza, 22% of historic Palestine

i

1967 Green Line

i

i

!

----~-~--_,.

!

SYRIA

Ras al-Naqurah \

International boundry

l

City { __ .... ·- ·- ·,

\

__ j ·, l.-.""

·-... ........ .....

Mediterranean Sea

.

Beersheba

\

\ \ \

I

\

I

\

\

i

\

\

i

\

i

_;

\.,

i

\i

i i

\

i

I

JORDAN

{ \ i i

"·,.\ EGYPT

,.i,

\

i \

\

i.,

\

., \

li

., \

I

!I

.,.,

i

.,

\

i

! I

Om•"-:l !

0

km

50

Map 1: The Occupied Territory of Palestine and its neighbours

xix

I

-

L.....

······~~T..-.hury -•-• h_,.tc..-111 hound.,-

-

J.,~~--

i

--riL,111...u,v

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illfdpwids~

...

- .

~ad:.·/

Map 2: The area around Marj az Zuhur in Lebanon, where 415 Hamas members were abandoned in December 1992 by Israeli security services in an attempt to deport them from Gaza and the West Bank.

xx

Introduction

The Islamic Resistance Movement, better known as Hamas, is one of the foremost political actors in Palestine. Originating within the Palestine branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, the movement was launched at the onset of the first intifada in 1987. Much has been written about Hamas's historical origins and ideology but, prior to this, no comprehensive accounts of its international relations or its attempts to develop a coherent foreign policy have been published. Here, I attempt to fill that void. Proceeding from the premise that international relations and foreign policy are closely intertwined, I evaluate the principles that have guided Barnas in conducting its international relations and developing its foreign policy. In particular, I examine patterns of change in the evolution of these policies, tracking their successes and failures, as well as their impact on the wider Palestinian national movement. Since the 1980s, perceptions of the state as the primary force in international relations have been strongly challenged. Non-state

The Making of Hamas's Foreign Policy

actors have begun to play important roles globally, thus entangling states in a network of interdependencies. 1 Hamas is especially notable in this regard. In this book, I show how Hamas has used its domestic strength to forge a foreign-policy strategy that addresses its immediate Arab environment, Muslim countries and the broader international community. While Hamas adheres to a number of guiding principles in its relations with sovereign states and non-state agencies, the movement has not yet espoused any particular theory of international relations. However, as a self-declared liberation movement, the authors of Hamas's foreign policy can be described as idealists in the sense that they are driven by an understanding of what the Palestinian people could achieve if they were to overcome existing domestic and international challenges. 2 Similarly, to the degree that Hamas has attempted to establish a social model rooted in the principles of Islam, so too have the movement's foreign relations been guided by Islamic principles. As Imad al-Alami, a former Hamas representative in Iran, pointed out, the movement's approach was to secure the liberation of Palestine and the restoration of its people's rights in ways that are consistent with Islamic law. 3 Realist theorists, such as Hans Morgenthau, have tended to dismiss the role of morality in international relations. Like the medieval diplomat Niccolo Machiavelli, Morgenthau argued that policies based on morality or idealism can lead to weakness and the destruction or domination of a state by its rival. 4 Thus, a primary assumption of realist theory is that nation-states exist in a largely anarchic world; a world in which the survival of the state is the highest goal. Consequently, realist theorists argue, the actions of states should be judged according to the requirements of their own national interests rather than moral principles. 5 Unlike idealists, who favour

2

Introduction

the resolution of disputes through negotiations and goodwill, realists emphasise the role of power over morality. In other words, they believe that the more economic and military power states have, the more likely they are to achieve their objectives. 6 Nevertheless, it is possible for a country to weave both idealism and realism into its foreign policy without contradiction. In 1969, soon-to-be-British prime minister Edward Heath reviewed the history of the USA and Britain from 1800, and argued that the governments and peoples of the two nations had been happiest when these two strands had operated in harmony. 7 To back up his view, Heath cited an 1848 speech by Lord Palmerston (Henry John Temple), who served as British foreign secretary and (twice) as prime minister: We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow ... With every British Minister, the interests of England ought to be the shibboleth of his policy ... I hold that the real policy of England is to be the champion of justice and right: pursuing that course with moderation and prudence, not becoming the Quixote of the world, but giving her moral sanction and support wherever she thinks justice is, and whenever she thinks that wrong has been done. 8 Heath noted that, although these remarks were first made in the mid-nineteenth century, he was sure that both quotes could be matched by almost every foreign secretary or secretary of state since then. Heath conceded that tensions between claims to idealism and realism are inevitable in both US and British foreign policy. Nevertheless, he affirmed, the first sentence of the above quotation has 'served as a text down the years for the instruction of new entrants into the British Foreign Service'. 9

3

The Making of Hamas's Foreign Policy

Heath argued that Britain's preference for realism over idealism was evident in several clashes between British and American policy that occurred in the twentieth century. Notably, between Woodrow Wilson and David Lloyd George at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and 1920; between Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt in the closing years of the Second World War; and between John Dulles and Anthony Eden over Indochina in 1954. In each of these, Heath pointed out, Britain's preference for realism was resisted by its American counterparts, who preferred to pursue a master principle that they could uphold as a universal ideal. 10 Hamas sees foreign relations as an integral and important part of its political ideology and liberation strategy. Soon after the movement emerged, foreign policies were developed to help its leaders and members navigate this tension between idealism and realism. This pragmatism is evident in the fact that Hamas was able to establish relations with the regimes of Muammar Gaddhafi in Libya and Bashar al-Assad in Syria, both of whom were fiercely opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood. Ever since, the movement has had to contend with changing international policies towards Palestine. For example, immediately after achieving independence in the 1960s, many former colonies supported the Palestinians' right to self-determination as a matter of principle. Much of this support was channelled through the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and was led by Egypt, India and Indonesia. However, by 1993, when the PLO signed the first Oslo Accord, several of these countries had gradually abandoned their ideals in favour what they saw as a more 'realistic' approach to Palestine - with this 'realism' often tied to the receipt of aid from Israel and its western allies. In this context, Hamas sees its three foremost targets for engagement as other governments, civil society and Palestinian

4

Introduction communities in the diaspora. The movement also acknowledges that, to make progress internationally, it must have a strong presence on the ground and among the masses. However, as Khaled Meshaal, Hamas leader from 1996 to 2017, explained, internal efforts cannot take precedence over foreign relations; the two must complement each other. 11 Hence, for Hamas, establishing effective relations with international state actors and civil society is essential for ensuring wider recognition and understanding of the movement's programme and for creating opportunities for collaboration. With the Palestinian people in the vanguard and at the heart of their movement, Hamas would like the Arab, Islamic and wider international community to be genuine partners in their struggle. 12 Accordingly, Hamas leaders identified the following principles to guide the adoption of its foreign policies: •

Non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.

•

Independence in decision making.

•

Search for common ground.

•

Avoidance of conflicting alliances.

•

Avoidance of promoting hostility to others.

•

Control of armed resistance to within the boundaries of the British mandate of Palestine. Although these principles are deemed consistent with Islam, they

were also derived from the experiences of other liberation organisations, including the PLO. In this book, I offer a critical assessment of how Hamas has used these guidelines to develop a foreign policy capable of mitigating the tensions that inevitably arise between ideals and reality as they engage with countries across the Middle East, North Africa and beyond. In so doing, I identify three distinct phases in the evolution of Hamas's

5

The Making of Hamas's Foreign Policy

foreign policy. The first phase, from 1987 to 1992, was largely confined to relations with several regional states, notably Jordan, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Saudi Arabia. The second phase began after Israel expelled hundreds of Hamas members to Marj az Zuhur in 1992 and lasted until January 2006, when Hamas won the parliamentary elections in the Occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. During this period the movement established contacts with a number of western media and civil-society organisations. The third phase is from after the 2006 elections to the time of writing in 2019, during which Hamas has established formal contacts with governments in Europe as well as with Russia, Malaysia and South Africa. Before I explore these three phases in the chapters that follow, some basic information about Hamas's main aims, principles and activities is provided below.

A Vision of liberation Hamas asserts that all the land of Palestine is an Islamic endowment for

Muslims

in

perpetuity.

No

individual, government

or

organisation, whether regional or international, has the right to relinquish, cede or dispose of any part of this land. The movement defines Palestine as an integral territorial unit that extends from the River Jordan in the east to the Mediterranean in the west, and from Ras al-Naqurah in the north to Umm al-Rashrash in the south (see Map 1 on page xix). Hamas derives its vision of the state and its functions from the Muslim Brotherhood, whose founder Hassan al-Banna said, 'Islam is ruling and implementation - legislation and education, and law and judiciary - none is separable from the other.' 13 Accordingly, its members see no contradiction between belonging to a national

6

Introduction

liberation movement and adhering to Islam as an ideological reference. As Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, one of Hamas's founding leaders explained, 'Since our homeland is occupied, we want to liberate it.' 14 From its inception, the movement was determined to establish strong and effective alliances with other peoples who have experienced colonisation or are still under its yoke. Thus, while many of Hamas's publications and public statements have focused on the need for strong Arab and Islamic support, the importance of having allies in the wider international community has always been accepted. Essentially, Hamas views the establishment of the state of Israel tn

Palestine

as

a

manifestation

of European

colonialism,

acknowledging that the Zionist enterprise in Palestine could never have succeeded without western political and military support. In this regard, the first Zionist Congress, convened in Basle in August 1897, acknowledged the importance of European support for Zionism and specifically entrusted Theodor Herzl with the task of finding a colonial sponsor. Britain agreed to play this role, thus paving the way for the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. The pro-Israeli lobby has exerted considerable influence over US and European policies toward Palestine ever since, and western support for Israel remains strikingly unconditional. For example, less than a year after Israel's assault on Gaza in 2008 and 2009, EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana told a conference in Jerusalem that Israel was even closer to the EU than those countries that are poised to become EU members, and stated: There is no country outside the European continent that has this type of relationship that Israel has with the European Union. Israel, allow me to say, is a member of the European Union without being a member of the institutions. It's a member of all the programmes, it participates in all the

7

The Making of Hamas's Foreign Policy

programmes. 15

In June 2010, former Spanish prime minister Jose Maria Aznar expressed similar sentiments in an article he wrote for The Times in the UK.

16

Aznar claimed that Israel must be protected as it is the

West's first line of defence against the chaos that the Middle East could allegedly unleash on the world at any given moment. The article titled, 'Support Israel: If it goes down, we all go down', was written in the wake of widespread condemnation of Israeli commandos who stormed a civilian vessel, the Mavi Marmara, killing nine activists who were attempting to deliver humanitarian aid to Gaza under blockade. Such statements have reinforced Hamas's conviction that the existence of the state of Israel is indeed a western-led enterprise that is opposed to the flourishing of Arabs and Islam worldwide. Furthermore, Hamas believes that if official circles in the West truly see Israel as representing western civilization in the region, then it is imperative that this be challenged by an alliance of Arab, Islamic and other international resistance forces.

17

In the mid-1990s, Hamas leaders produced a document titled This is What we Struggle For. They did so in response to a request from a European diplomatic mission in Amman that Hamas explain its objectives. The document affirmed that the movement is a 'Palestinian national liberation movement that struggles for the liberation of the Palestinian occupied lands and for the recognition of Palestinian legitimate rights'.

18

Unlike al-Qa'ida, the Islamic State

group and similar organisations, Hamas is not interested, or engaged, in a global jihad. Its sole adversary is Israel's settler-colonial project in Palestine. Hamas's vision of Palestine's liberation is no different from that of any former colony. It seeks the restoration of all usurped rights, including the right of return, the right to re-establish a state, and the

8

Introduction

right to self-determination. The movement sees a direct correlation between the liberation of Palestine and the establishment of a free, democratic state. The latter is a necessary consequence of the first. It must be underscored that Hamas views democracy not as an ideology but as a methodology and a mechanism for decision making. As contemporary Muslim scholars, including Tawfiq al-Shawi and Rachid Ghannouchi, have pointed out, its mechanisms can be beneficial, and are compatible with Islamic values and principles. Rejecting democracy, they argue, would clear the way for tyranny and autocracy.

19

Whereas Article 9 of Hamas's 1988 founding Charter mentions the establishment of an Islamic state as an outcome of liberation, its 2017 Document ef General Principles and Policies is more nuanced. Article 8 of the latter states that 'Islam - for Hamas - provides a comprehensive way of life and an order that is fit for purpose at all times and in all places'. Furthermore, as if to reassure critics and sceptics, it adds, 'Hamas also believes that Palestine has always been and will always be a model of coexistence, tolerance and civilizational innovation.' 20 In essence, Hamas is not attempting to establish a religious state or theocracy in the sense of laying claim to a divine right to rule or to be considered infallible. Instead, it is seeking a civil state with an Islamic frame of reference through which the executive can be held accountable to the people. In a 1996 paper, titled 'Palestinian democratic transformation: An Islamic perspective', Jamal Mansour, a prominent Hamas leader from the West Bank, explained, 'There is no such thing in Islam as theocracy, which declares it represents the will of Allah on Earth.' 21 Consequently, sovereignty and power rest with the ummah, which mandates the state to exercise its jurisdiction on its behalf.

9

The Making of Hamas's Foreign Policy

Admittedly, the issue of governance and fundamental freedoms is one with which all Islamic movements in the region have had to contend. Most have been accused of using democratic processes to mask and entrench a variant of dictatorship. Israeli officials, for example, have spared no effort to promote the view that Hamas's real objective is to establish a system similar to that of the Taliban in Afghanistan - even coining the term 'Hamastan'. In politics, as in cultural relations, it is increasingly acknowledged that individuals should be given the space to define themselves, and thus become known by their own ideas and understandings. That is, selfidentification supersedes the descriptions of any external source. 22 Accordingly, it makes sense to look to Hamas's own Document of

General Principles for a clear insight into the movement's identity. While most sane western leaders acknowledge that there is no ideological equivalence between Hamas and the Taliban, their policies towards Hamas have typically been marked by ambiguity and mistrust. Western fears tend to centre on issues of civil liberties and the rights of minorities. In 2009, two years after Hamas seized control of Gaza, news reports began to emerge of armed officers trying to make the enclave more 'Islamist'. 23 Although Hamas leaders denied that they were trying to imitate the notorious religious police found in some Muslim countries (including in Afghanistan under the Taliban), the seeds of mistrust quickly took hold. Hamas's social vision has been viewed sceptically by western officials ever since. In the same year, Essam Younis, head of Al-Mezan, a humanrights organisation based in Gaza, pointed out that the movement was missing a golden opportunity. Hamas, he said, wanted to be accepted internationally as a successful political Islamic government in the Arab world. They want to be part of the international game, with

10

Introduction

international legitimacy ... They had a chance to provide a model, to prove political Islam can rule and provide good governance and protect human rights. But, so far, they have failed to set this example. 24 Hamas seems to have allowed its moderate vision of Islam to be overshadowed by the more rigid and intolerant interpretation of Salafi groups operating in Gaza. It was only a matter of time before matters came to a head. That August, Abdel-Latif Mousa, mentor of the Salafi group Jund Ansar Allah, proclaimed an Islamic emirate from the Ibn Taymiyyah Mosque in Rafah. Hamas saw this as a challenge to its authority and, to prevent the group's intolerant tendencies from becoming entrenched, Hamas forces stormed the mosque; Mousa and 28 of his followers were killed in the ensuing conflict, and over 150 people were injured. 25

Non-intervention in the affairs of other states In geopolitical terms, the Middle East can be described as a melting

pot of conflicting and compatible interests. Its diverse political systems, cultures and economies tend to precipitate the rapid emergence and demise of political alliances and blocs. For example, during the Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988), several Arab states aligned themselves with Iraq. Yet, in 1991, some of these same countries joined the US-initiated alliance to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. Since the mid 2000s, various non-state actors have also become part of such regional alignments. For instance, before the Arab Spring of 2011 Hamas, the Islamic Jihad organisation and Hizbullah were all part of the Axis of Resistance led by Iran and Syria. As far as Hamas is concerned, these factional alignments and realignment are not necessarily good or bad. What matters is whether and how effectively they can be encouraged to advance the

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The Making of Hamas's Foreign Policy

Palestinian cause. Because Hamas considers the Palestine issue as the central Arab and Islamic cause, the movement has, as a matter of principle, sought to avoid involvement in disputes between competing regional alliances. 26 !