Engaging with the World: Critical Reflections on India's Foreign Policy 9788125053415

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ENGAGING WITH THE WORLD

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Engaging with the World CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

Edited by Rajen Harshe K.M. Seethi

Orient Blackswan Private Limited Registered Office 3-6-752 Himayatnagar, Hyderabad 500 029 (A.P.), INDIA e-mail: [email protected] Other Offices Bangalore, Bhopal, Bhubaneshwar, Chennai, Ernakulam, Guwahati, Hyderabad, Jaipur, Kolkata, Lucknow, Mumbai, New Delhi, Noida, Patna © Orient Longman Private Limited 2005 First Published 2005 eISBN 978 81 250 5341 5 e-edition:First Published 2013 ePUB Conversion: Techastra Solutions Pvt. Ltd. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior written permission of the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews and certain other noncommercial uses permitted by copyright law. For permission requests write to the publisher.

Dedicated to the memory of Krishna Raj Editor, Economic and Political Weekly December 1969 – January 2004

Contents

Acknowledgement Introduction RAJEN HARSHE AND K.M. SEETHI

Part I The Global Setting 1.

Neoliberal Globalism and India's Foreign Policy: Towards a Critical Rethinking A.K. RAMAKRISHNAN

2.

India and the Challenges of Globalisation K. RAMACHANDRAN NAIR

3.

Political Economy of India's Third World Policy K.M. SEETHI AND VIJAYAN P.

Part II The Nuclear Question 4.

Nuclear Weapons and India's Foreign Policy NINAN KOSHY

5.

The Ethics of India Going Nuclear G.P. RAMACHANDRA

6.

India's CTBT Policy: From 'Text' to 'Testing Times' K.M. SEETHI

Part III The Big Powers 7.

Indo-US Relations in the Post–Cold War Era: Changing Security Perceptions SHAILAJA MENON

8.

India and Russia in a Changing World RAJEN HARSHE

9.

India-China Relations: Critical Issues VENUGOPAL B. MENON

10.

Emerging Trends in Chinese Nationalism: Rethinking Indian Perspectives T.G. SURESH

Part IV South and Southeast Asia 11.

India, Bhutan and Nepal: Perceptions and Relations

LOK RAJ BARAL

12.

India's Policy towards its South Asian Neighbours: Constraints, Impediments and Perspectives B.C. UPRETI

13.

Rethinking India–Pakistan Relations: Challenges Ahead K. RAMAN PILLAI

14.

Kashmir: Rethinking Security beyond the Line of Control K.M. SEETHI

15.

India–Pakistan Conflict Dynamics: Prospects for Resolution M.S. JOHN

16.

Free Trade Area Accord between India and Sri Lanka: Implications for South Indian States K.N. HARILAL AND K.J. JOSEPH

17.

India's Bhutan Policy MATHEW JOSEPH C.

18.

India and Southeast Asia: The Look East Policy in Perspective A.M. THOMAS

Part V Regional Cooperation in South Asia and the Indian Ocean 19.

South Asian Regional Cooperation: Problems and Prospects RAJEN HARSHE

20.

The Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation: Regional Cooperation in the Indian Ocean K.R. SINGH

21.

India and the Indian Ocean Rim Cooperation P.V. RAO

Part VI West Asia and Africa 22.

Kashmir, Pakistan and the Pan-Islamic Challenge to India NOOR AHMAD BABA

23.

India and the Gulf States: Challenges and Opportunities A.K. PASHA

24.

India's Israel Policy: Changing Dimensions R. SREEKANTAN NAIR

25.

Recasting Indo-African Development Cooperation RAJEN HARSHE

About the Contributors

Acknowledgement his volume owes much to the excellent expositions of various aspects of the foreign policy of India as reflected in the essays. It is the result of a modest but earnest interest that we maintained, over the last few years, in the new perspectives emerging from the realm of India's foreign policy. This interest was realised when the School of International Relations, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kerala, hosted a three-day national seminar on India's Foreign Policy: Emerging Perspectives in 1998 to commemorate the fiftieth year of India's independence. The scholars and policy-makers who assembled there lit the way ahead for us, and their insights and thoughtful advice have been indispensable in bringing this book to fruition. Some of the essays in this collection have already appeared earlier, in draft form, in Economic and Political Weekly and Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research We are grateful to the editors of these journals for permission to use and modify them for this volume.

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We would like to express our gratitude to our colleagues in the School of International Relations, Mahatma Gandhi University Kottayam; the Department of Political Science, University of Hyderabad; the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India; and the B.P. Koirala Foundation, Kathmandu. We also gratefully acknowledge the service rendered by Sreeraj T.S., Mathew Andrews and Sunny C.P. of Mahatma Gandhi University; and Shaji, Research Scholar, Department of Political Science, University of Hyderabad, in making this volume. Rajen Harshe K.M. Seethi

Introduction RAJEN HARSHE AND K.M. SEETHI

orld politics witnessed a defining historical moment with the end of the cold war and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the contest for developmental alternatives among contending ideologies of capitalism and communism, as also the struggle for supremacy between the two superpowers on the world scale, came to an end. Consequently, capitalism as a mode of development and as a world system has almost received a green signal to carry out its relentlessly expansive march in the areas that formerly came under the Soviet sphere of influence.1 In fact, in the post–cold war phase, the world is living in the shadow of an intricately intertwined association between capitalism and globalisation. In this phase, world politics appears to be in a constant state of flux. Hence, defining the central trends, powers and forces that govern world politics, in an unambiguous manner, has become an uphill task. Countries from practically all over the world have been grappling to come to terms with the changing circumstances in world politics and world economy. Under these circumstances, India is constrained to reorient its foreign policy with a number of developments forming the backdrop. Indeed, some of the significant developments after the cold war such as the emergence of the United States as the sole military superpower, the steady growth of distant but co-equal trading blocs such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), European Union (EU) and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), as well as the advent of multilateral trading arrangements like the World Trade Organisation (WTO), certainly call for innovative modes of engaging with the world. However, the rise of such constructive initiatives to integrate economies on the regional and global scales has also been accompanied by destructive trends. Such destructive trends are manifesting themselves in the alarming growth of different forms of terrorism and international networks of crime syndicates. Similarly, problems such as the cancerous spread of HIV/AIDS, the epidemic proportions of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), environmental degradation and the uncontrollable growth of refugee population are exposing the weaknesses of contemporary developmental systems. India has to engage with and relate itself to an infinitely more complex world. Plausibly, the very act of India's engagement with contemporary political circumstances in world politics could prove more fruitful with the help of fresh and critical perspectives on India's foreign policy. Such perspectives necessarily have to review the past and link it with the present without losing sight of the future. In this regard, the essays included in the present volume are significant in two-fold ways. First, by historically and empirically analysing a period spanning over fifty years – India's foreign policy since its independence – most of these essays equip readers to understand world politics in the post–cold war world. Second, they also attempt to grasp the major challenges before India's foreign policy in the light of momentous changes that are taking place in the post–cold war global political, strategic and economic landscape.

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It also needs to be underscored that India began to meet the challenges of the post–cold war world, suitably modifying its domestic developmental strategy, by inaugurating the phase of reforms in 1991. Such reforms entail the gradual rolling back of the state from business and the overall public sphere, the promotion of private initiatives and the maintenance of fiscal discipline through cutting excessive state expenditure on salaries and subsidies. The reform process in India is also committed to mobilising additional resources to meet the needs of social sectors that have suffered from immense backlog in terms of development. As India is integrating with the world economy, especially through its association with organisations like the WTO, it would be compelled to find ways to encounter the challenges of globalisation. The accelerated pace of globalisation after the cold war has certainly been shrinking distances in the world. It is bringing in its wake new forms of cooperation as well as conflict, and hence new sets of alliances and counter-alliances. For

instance the integrationist movements, as initiated by the EU, in western and central Europe were accompanied by the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in eastern Europe. If finance capital is becoming borderless, alliances among human rights or environmental groups too are cutting across the boundaries of states, nations and continents. Globalisation has brought new opportunities as well as difficulties for India. For instance, thanks to its reservoir of skills in information technology (IT), India is among the prime group of countries guiding the IT revolution. However, it also has to rectify the impact of intensive competition unleashed by globalisation on the productive units and the work force in its industrial and agrarian sectors. While rectifying such impact, India will be constrained to modify the nature of international trade regimes, in its favour, through collective bargaining. This would warrant the formation of international coalitions with other developing countries. Moreover, India would also require the support of an international coalition to fight the terrorism unleashed by fundamentalist forces. In substance, the policy-makers in India, as the phase of globalisation unfolds, will encounter a variety of challenges in the realm of the state, political economy and foreign policy. An important question at this juncture is how best India can put together the elements of change and continuity which operate through the very processes of the conceptualisation, formulation and execution of policies. Admittedly, the notions of continuity and change subsume a melange of endogenous as well as exogenous factors. Also, the foreign policy is a reflection of domestic policy. At one level, the gradual manner in which India is undergoing structural reforms and at another level, its urge to be part of the world economy, reflect the tensions of transition. Such transition has prompted policy-makers to combine elements of both continuity and change in India's domestic and foreign policy. To put it more tersely, while continuity can be discernible in the context of pursuing specific national interests in an overall framework of geopolitical and geoeconomic priorities, change is generally reckoned to be the most dynamic aspect of a nation's capability to respond to the evolving international environment. The exercise in analysing India's foreign policy, in this volume, primarily concentrates on the analysis of the interactive framework of elements – of continuity and change – that have cumulatively shaped India's efforts in negotiating with the external world. It also attempts to situate India's role in the context of the Third World. We would also like to underline that this volume is an outcome of the three-day deliberations of the national seminar on India's Foreign Policy: Emerging Perspectives organised by the School of International Relations, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam. The seminar was organised as a part of the golden jubilee celebrations of Indian independence. The essays included in this volume deal with a vast spectrum of subjects and issues, encompassing the political, ideological, security-related and economic aspects of India's foreign policy. They address some of the crucial issues in the specific and general contexts of India's engagement with the international system. They also probe these issues with questions such as: Does India have a coherent foreign policy agenda to help cope with the challenges in the global scenario? Is India's foreign policy attuned to the priorities of its social and economic development? Can India any longer serve its vital national interest through the policy of non-alignment? What contribution has India made and can it make in building solidarity among the Third World countries? Does any common endeavour with the Third World countries suit India's priorities and requirements? What are the dynamics of relationships between India and major powers like the US, Russia and China? Can India play a major role in building regional cooperation in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region? What are the political and economic implications of the Gujral doctrine for the bilateral and multilateral relations in South Asia? How can India's policy be analysed with reference to the countries of Africa, West Asia and Southeast Asia? Did the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998 have any politico-strategic implications for regional stability in South Asia? What lessons can India learn from the Kargil conflict in the broader context of its own security and the principle of peaceful coexistence? These and several other related issues are addressed in this book providing new insights and critical perspectives. In view of the vast scope of this volume, we have tried to place all the contributions under major significant themes that emerged from this exercise.

I

The Global Setting

The global setting today, in the post–cold war era, presents a complex formation within which a variety of actors, ranging from states and international organisations to classes, social movement,s transnational

corporations, non-governmental organisations and communication media operate and interact in diverse, yet intricate, ways. These complex processes and interactions call for new methods of investigation and analysis. In traditional foreign policy studies, the behaviour of states is often explained in terms of particular national priorities and interests, and relatively less attention is given to the external environment and the pressures of the international system. The post–cold war situation, however, warrants new and innovative ways of analysing the foreign policy behaviour of states keeping in view the challenges emanating from the international system. Here, it is important to analyse the changing role of state and transnational actors, besides the political and ideological implications of the techno-economic changes that transcend national boundaries. Analysing the linkage between globalisation and foreign policy, A.K. Ramakrishnan argues that there are significant 'sites and fault-lines' which are important pointers towards evolving a critical perspective on both globalisation and India's foreign policy in contemporary times. In his argument, the global assertion of economic interests at the expense of the political freedom, interests and democratic aspirations of people is characteristic of neoliberal globalism. The peculiarity of neoliberal global ascendancy is that the state itself tries to introduce and promote an idea and practice that undermines the primacy of politics. Ramakrishnan asserts that even though the influence and even domination of neoliberal globalist ideas on India's domestic and foreign policy have become a fait accompli, foreign policy analyses have not accounted for this perceptible shift. Ramakrishnan is not suggesting that Indian foreign policy in the post–cold war context denotes a fundamental break from the past. Far from that, it has shown remarkable openness about its neoliberal moorings as against an ideological commitment to state-centred capitalist economy and polity. The very language of India's foreign policy shifted in the 1990s, from an ideological orientation of non- alignment in the cold war period to what is very often referred to as 'pragmatic'. Ramakrishnan argues that the shift in the sphere of India's public policy, including foreign policy, in substantive terms is not from ideology to pragmatism, as it has often been described, but from an earlier developmental statist ideology and practice to a neoliberal ideology and practice. K. Ramachandran Nair highlights the challenges of globalisation to India using the perspective of political economy. The process of globalisation – if completed as per the agenda drawn up by the US and its rich allies, and supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)–World Bank (WB)–WTO trinity – would have unfavourable implications for the poorer countries. For, such a policy would result in a highly interdependent world of pluralistic power configuration in international politics, with the marginalisation of the poor and the further enrichment of the rich. Far-reaching international treaty obligations regarding trade, investment, taxation, intellectual property rights, banking and financial sector supervision, currency convertibility, foreign policy, the non-proliferation treaty (NPT), the comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) and even control of bribery would be imposed on sovereign states in the global community, thereby throwing up complex challenges. In this scenario, according to the essay's argument, we must see to it that our domestic economic growth, employment, macroeconomic stability, and inter- personnel equity are not sacrificed by the plunge into the fast track of globalisation. India must also mobilise similarly affected and like-minded nations so that a collective voice is heard in the global fora, asserting economic and political independence, and revealing a strong political will to stand together and fight injustice in global relations. K.M. Seethi and Vijayan observe that the attempts to integrate the Indian economy with the world capitalist system have been accompanied by a series of measures that call for fundamental changes in the realm of polity and foreign policy. Nowhere is this more evident than in the sphere of India's Third World policy. In the earlier phase of its development strategy, India could resist external pressures, though in a limited way, by mobilising support from the Third World. However, with the changing nature of the state and the dynamics of a global environment, India finds it hard to sustain a sovereign political space in advancing the cause of the Third World. The new techno-economic world order is very critical in that pressures on the Third World are more decisive and formidable than ever before. India's accession to the WTO has made several policy changes inevitable in the areas of trade, investment, service, industry and agriculture. The new obligations that India has been called upon to undertake in this post-accession period have made the welfare agenda of the Indian state obsolete. An ideological shift has taken place, from a liberal-democratic framework to a neoliberal agenda of development. The structural and ideological shift from Keynesianism to the new political economy of neoliberalism has fully brought to light the vulnerability of the Indian state and the

complex character of the Indian ruling authority which has become more dependent on global capital than ever before. This raises several questions about the sustainability of the autonomy, sovereignty and the independent decision-making powers of the Indian state in the face of the pressures and dictates applied by advanced capitalist countries. No wonder India has been retreating from its own proclaimed politicoeconomic policies, which, for a long time, supported and advanced the cause of the Third World. Seethi and Vijayan argue that this has obvious implications for its non-alignment and the long-sustained policy of manoeuvrability vis à vis the big powers.

II

The Nuclear Question

Nuclear weapons certainly pose a perennial problem to humanity. Issues such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the continued attempts to scuttle disarmament initiatives dominate the current global nuclear scenario. This is most evident in South Asia where India and Pakistan have braced themselves with nuclear weapons and advanced missiles. Ninan Koshy discusses the implications of nuclear weapons for India's foreign policy from the wider perspective of security. He argues that national security cannot be achieved by policies that lead to international insecurity. Security is a common responsibility; one nation's security cannot be achieved at the expense of other nations. Ninan Koshy contends that India's nuclear tests have profound implications for India's foreign policy. If the public pronouncements of the ruling elite adversely affected the process of normalisation with China, the post-Pokhran belligerence of the cabinet ministers helped Pakistan in the pursuit of its main strategic aims. Koshy says that an impression has been created that India was governed for the first time since its independence by a government that was not only overtly aggressive in its designs, but also impulsive and unreliable in its international conduct. Analysing the ethics of India going nuclear, G.P. Ramachandra poses the question of whether the acquisition of nuclear weapons would actually lead to deterrence. He contends that India's acquisition of nuclear weapons creates a much greater risk of a nuclear holocaust, rather than leading to self-limitation. This is because it greatly increases the risk of an India–Pakistan nuclear conflagration and, to a much lesser extent, of a Sino-Indian nuclear conflagration. Other countries are provoked, and not deterred by India's nuclear weapons. A decision to go nuclear means an arms race in South Asia (involving nuclear bombs, warheads and delivery systems as well as conventional weapons), intensifying mutual suspicion and fear against the background of the continuing crisis in Kashmir; in short, an atmosphere in which the risk of nuclear war between India and Pakistan becomes too high for comfort. Yet another controversial area of India's nuclear policy is its postures with respect to the NPT and the CTBT. K.M. Seethi tries to establish that India's CTBT policy has been inherently contradictory and bereft of any moral credibility. He points out that the 'progressive' character of India's nuclear posture has been legitimised and reinforced by a vast section of the Indian society, from the extreme left to the right. The contestations surrounding the CTBT have even been given an aura of 'holiness' so that India's 'unalloyed nationalism' has a legitimate political space to prosper in. More often, the text of the CTBT has been presented as 'unholy' and the Pokhran tests presented as 'sacred'. Questions of national security and threat perception have been blown out of proportion in order to rationalise and legitimise the militarisation of Indian society. This tends to harden the mindset of the people as well as the policy-makers and accelerate the action-reaction spiral in South Asia in a much more aggressive manner. Seethi further argues that in the future India may find it difficult to sustain a credible and transparent position on the nuclear question, particularly in the background of the Pokhran-II tests. The implications of this should be understood in the larger context of peace and stability in the region.

III

The Big Powers

India's relations with the big powers, notably with the US, the Soviet Union (later Russia) and China have always generated controversy, particularly in the context of the cold war and the complex relations the latter sustained with both India and Pakistan. In the post–cold war setting, the nature and dynamics of these relationships have assumed new dimensions. This is particularly evident in India's engagements with the US. Analysing Indo-US relations in the post–cold war period, Shailaja Menon argues that the distrust which had

characterised the relationship between the two for so long seems to have ended. Earlier, the US had contributed to India's acrimonious relations with Pakistan and steadfastly refused to countenance any kind of conciliatory effort. Now, India has shown a willingness to accept the help of the US, though not its mediation, to restore stability in South Asia. The divergent viewpoints on Kashmir, nuclearisation and China, which had bedevilled Indo-US relations earlier, have become less divisive in recent times. The US has attempted to accommodate Indian interests and has accepted India's efforts to work for a more equitable world order. However, Menon maintains that the US has, through its non-proliferation regime, managed to prevent many countries from nuclearising themselves but its questionable stance on total disarmament has not popularised the cause. The US could neither prevent Pakistan from becoming a nuclear power, nor did it stop China from selling nuclear technology to others, including Pakistan. The end of the cold war ought to have sensitised India to the futility of possessing nuclear weapons, their lack of utility and the problems related to the storage and disposal of such weapons. India's offer of a no-first- use pledge to Pakistan cannot put the genie back but it can lead to more effective confidence building measures (CBMs). It is here, Shailaja Menon suggests, that the US can play an important role in offering concrete suggestions to improve relations between India and Pakistan. If India's relations with the US have promised more opportunities and challenges in the post–cold war era, Indo-Russian ties have come under pressure in the context of the developments after 1991. The nature and dimensions of Indo-Russian relations, as well as the challenges emanating from the present global scenario have been analysed by Rajen Harshe. He argues that the cordiality of Indo-Soviet ties sustained over three and a half decades since the mid 1950s could provide a useful basis to restructure Indo-Russian ties in the politicostrategic, economic and military spheres. Harshe points out that instead of dismantling the well worked-out network of bilateral ties, post-Soviet Russia as well as successive Indian regimes have been working to give continuity to Indo-Russian rapports. He believes that in the politico-strategic sphere, an agreement over the status of Kashmir continues to be a meeting ground between the two countries. Likewise, the strategic significance of the mineral rich and contiguous states of Central Asia to Russia and that of Kashmir to India are compelling enough to activate Indo-Russian cooperation. Harshe feels that the coming together of Russia, China and India could also challenge the global dominance of the US-led western powers over globalisation. But China's sustained military cooperation with Pakistan and India's apprehensions about China's interference in South Asian affairs have worked as stumbling blocks in the building of any viable project of Sino-Indian strategic cooperation. Nonetheless, Russia continues to be a viable politico-strategic partner for India in South Asian and global affairs. Russia's urge to build a Euro-Asian identity and India's aspirations to play a significant role in the South, the Southwest and Central Asia could well strengthen the politico-strategic understanding between the two states. However, Harshe points out that Indo-Russian economic ties have been undergoing a phase of transition characterised by the decline in Indo-Russian trade. The prospects of improving Indo-Russian economic ties would hinge on sustained efforts from both countries to identify areas of complimentary interest and initiate measures to promote them. India's relations with China have generated controversies since the Sino-Indian war of 1962. Venugopal B. Menon points out that as long as the border dispute remains unresolved, there is going to be an element of uncertainty, and from this uncertainty stems the adversarial nature of Sino-Indian relations. However, Menon believes that China's changed world view could pose some challenges to India's security interests. He also suggests that Indian diplomacy should discard its overloaded dogma and try to cultivate some amount of creativity. Mutual accommodation of each other's vital interests will force China to honour its word on the Mcmahon line in the eastern sector, which is strategically important to India. However, in contrast to Menon, T.G. Suresh argues that for India, Chinese nationalism in its present form, far from posing any challenge, offers greater accommodative space and flexibility. He states that India has not been seen from a pejorative perspective either by Chinese popular imagination or by state nationalism in the recent past. India cannot also remain insensitive to the Chinese transition from socialism to full bloom market economy. Moreover, the constraints of the present international environment are such that China cannot afford to remain perpetually hostile towards India.

IV

South and Southeast Asia

While there has been a perceptible shift in the ideology and practice of the Indian state in the post–cold war period, its relations with South Asian countries have not been marked by any substantial change except in the sphere of perceptions where developments such as the 1998 nuclear tests and the 1999 Kargil conflict tended to have a bearing on India's defence and security policies. Analysing India's policy towards its immediate neighbours from Nepal's point of view, Lok Raj Baral contends that India's democratic stability and economic performance would be immensely important in terms of causing an impact on other South Asian countries. Baral underscores the dominant role played by India, especially in relation to its smaller neighbours such as Nepal and Bhutan. He contends that good governance, which implies both political and performance legitimacy, is the need of each country. If India wants to be taken seriously, it has to be more confident of its economic progress and offer minimum public morality and accountability. India and democracy are almost identical terms for the world but how the rot that has affected Indian public life and democratic institutions will be removed is a matter of great interest to all, according to Baral. B.C. Upreti's essay on India's policy towards its South Asian neighbours deals with a wide range of issues in the regional and subcontinental contexts. He insists that India's regional policy has to sustain its politicostrategic and economic interests, on the one hand, and the process of strengthening ties with neighbouring countries, on the other. Though India and Pakistan are victims of a deep-rooted psychology of mistrust and suspicion, there cannot be any alternative other than a cordial relationship between them, which is a prerequisite for regional peace, stability and cooperation. Tracing the course of fractured ties between India and Pakistan to the partition days, K. Raman Pillai argues that the latter had a vested interest in preventing bilateral dialogue, and if the dialogue promised to fructify, in working for its failure. This was Pakistan's considered strategy for securing international attention which it believed would help solve the Kashmir issue to its satisfaction and on its terms. According to Pillai, even in normal circumstances, Pakistan actively canvassed for third party mediation while engaged in bilateral talks with India. It was this duality that hampered the normalisation of relations between the two countries. As New Delhi reorients its policy towards Islamabad, and gears up to meet new threats, it should not lose sight of the strategic objective that has emerged in the wake of the Kargil crisis—to seek a final solution to the Kashmir dispute. Analysing the Kashmir question in the broader context of the changing security paradigm, K.M. Seethi suggests that one must go beyond the stereotyped assessments which foster the attitude that Kashmir is just a 'property dispute' between India and Pakistan, and that military action alone is the answer to Pakistan's struggle to grab Kashmir. This gives an impression that all is well with India and that the only bane of India's existence has been and is Pakistan. Obviously, this is a one-sided assessment of the problem, the real dimensions of which need to be placed in the broader psychohistorical setting of India's 'holier than thou' approach to and obsession with Pakistan as the 'other'. Evidently, feelings of enmity and hostility towards the 'other' have deeply entrenched themselves in the blood of the average Indian and the average Pakistani. Seethi believes that this built-in antagonism has been perpetuated for more than fifty years and is often legitimised with Kargil-type operations and cross-border tensions. As the encounters take place in a variety of forms, one conveniently forgets the fact that the terrain of this confrontation has long been inhabited by a population whose democratic aspirations and secular credentials were never disputed but have been subjected to scrutiny in recent times. In the process, he argues, the very survival of the Kashmiris is caught in the unyielding hostility between the Indian and Pakistani states whose betrayals and involvements have only alienated and marginalised the people. Seethi suggests that there is a need for initiatives towards democratic decentralisation in Jammu and Kashmir in the larger context of the aspirations of the people of the state as well as in the interest of peace in the region. Democratic decentralisation and participatory development could be potential strategies of dealing with not only the human security question within Kashmir, but also the national security problem vis à vis Pakistan. Seethi argues that this will certainly enhance India's strategic bargaining power in any dialogue process across the international fora involving Pakistan. India should, therefore, be much more realistic and pragmatic, not in the conventional national security sense, but in terms of addressing the fundamental questions of democratic governance and participatory development. M.S. John attempts to examine the problems in India–Pakistan relations from the perspective of conflict

resolution strategies. In his view, the Kashmir question is a protracted conflict that has crossed the thresholds of conflict resolution theory. It is notoriously rigid, readily re-enacted and recalcitrant to change. India and Pakistan are so deeply locked in conflict mentality that every attempt to address the conflict becomes an added issue in the conflict. The process of interaction is self-perpetuating and highly resistant to outside influence. According to John, India's bilateralism in dealing with states, and inflexibility with regard to agenda setting and bureaucratic decision making work against the cause of peace building in South Asia. John also believes that the people of Kashmir should be brought into the peace process in an intimate way so that their feelings are reflected adequately in any type of future negotiations. Analysing the possibilities of a preferential trading bloc in the South Asian region, K.N. Harilal and K.J. Joseph come to the conclusion that the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) is more likely to remain a statement of intention than become a reality. The political conflicts that distance the countries of South Asia are too complex to be resolved in the framework of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in the near future. It may be this limitation of the regional arrangement that prompted the governments of India and Sri Lanka to experiment via the bilateral route to achieve the goal of free trade between the two countries. According to Harilal and Joseph, the India–Sri Lanka Free Trade Accord signed in 1998 could have far-reaching implications for bilateral trade and, hence, for both the national economies. However, they warn that given the structure of trade, the new accord could worsen Sri Lanka's trade deficit with India not only in absolute terms but also as a proportion of the bilateral trade. Consequently, Sri Lanka would be hard pressed to try and push the exports of commodities and goods into the Indian market. This may, in turn, have a regional impact, they point out, in that the South Indian states would have to bear a disproportionately larger share of the adverse consequences of the new free trade treaty. Small states in South Asia seldom receive the attention they deserve. Most often, countries like Nepal and Bhutan are perceived as vassal states of India, supposedly sustaining its geopolitical interests. This has generated considerable misgivings and concerns about the role of India in South Asian politics, particularly India's attitudes and orientation towards democratic process in these countries. Mathew Joseph argues that India's Bhutan policy, premised as it has been on security and strategic concerns, is a continuation of the colonial policy, which could be detrimental to the democratisation of Bhutan. Since 1985, Bhutan has been in the midst of a political crisis that has no parallel in the history of Bhutan. The 'Bhutanese programme' of its government resulted in various ethnic conflicts and resistance movements, which later developed into a mass movement for the establishment of human rights and democracy in the country. Mathew Joseph argues that to India, the monarchy under Wang Chuck in Bhutan is the most faithful and dependable ally in the region. Considering the importance of Bhutan in its strategic designs, India does not want Bhutan to be politically disturbed. This has led India to take a stand of non-endorsement towards the struggles for human rights and democracy in Bhutan. Mathew Joseph thus brings to light the continuing dilemma of the Indian state in its attitude towards the democratic aspirations of the people of neighbouring states. A.M. Thomas contends that one important characteristic of the new policy orientation of Indian diplomacy in the post–cold war period is the focus on areas previously neglected or accorded minimal importance. This is quite obvious in the case of India's policy towards Southeast Asia. During the cold war period, India's Southeast Asia policy was shaped by considerations of the East–West conflict, India's differences of perception with countries of the region and its preoccupations elsewhere. All these prevented India from having a realistic and comprehensive policy towards the region. In the current scenario, India's Look East policy is an attempt to rectify this neglect. According to Thomas, India's Look East policy is multifaceted, the genesis of which can be traced to the transformations that have occurred in the country's foreign policy after the end of the cold war. The economic and strategic dimensions of India's policy are influenced and shaped not only by India's interests but also by factors like Southeast Asia's international significance and the interests and policies of internal and external actors in the region. This policy takes into account the importance of economic issues in an era of globalisation and the necessity to engage with an area that is economically vibrant and fast growing. Also, India's new perspectives on security accord Southeast Asia considerable importance. The region is as much the neighbourhood as the rest of South Asia, particularly with the increase in multifarious cross-border interactions, combined with the advances in technology, transport and communication that have considerably reduced distances.

V

Regional Cooperation

Regionalism is a persistent theme in international relations. Various international institutions from the United Nations (UN) to the WTO have reckoned with its dynamic influence. In the post–cold war global scenario, the significance of regional cooperation has been underscored by the requirements of international trade and transnationalism. Keeping in view the imperatives of a regional cooperative ambience in South Asia, Rajen Harshe suggests that India must initiate a diverse range of measures with its neighbours, including Pakistan, notwithstanding the problems posed by inter-state borders and various ethno-national identities in the region. In fact, Harshe discusses in some detail how the problems emanating from the rise of ethno-nationalist movements and inter-state borders have been acting as impediments in the process of building regional cooperation. And yet, encouragement of regional cooperation is the need of the hour. According to him, the network of cooperative ties in the region must spread much wider to encompass trade, joint ventures, investments, rural development, sharing of information technology, prevention of environmental degradation, population control, etc. besides combatting, collectively, the problems related to cross-border terrorism and the flow of arms and drugs. Underlining the spirit and relevance of the Gujral doctrine in the wider context of the region, Harshe points out that the core states, India and Pakistan, will have to live with each other by working out enduring modes of coexistence rather than resorting to modes of mutual destruction. K.R. Singh argues that the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) does not, and cannot represent, the high point of India's policy-making with respect to the Indian Ocean region. At best, it can only be one of the several means towards that end. Singh suggests that a subcontinental approach to regional cooperation is very inadequate. The geopolitical isolation of India can be broken only if India adopts a maritime perspective for its foreign policy. According to him, while the subcontinental approach tends to contain India within South Asia, the maritime approach opens up India to the entire Indian Ocean region and even beyond that. Once the centrality of this new maritime perspective in determining India's future regional policy is recognised, then India's Indian Ocean policy will acquire a new and much wider perspective than the narrow framework of the IOR-ARC. According to P.V. Rao, the WTO regime carries farreaching implications for the Indian Ocean region, which represents three-fourths of the world's developing societies. These Third World countries, which once defied the bipolar world by espousing an alternative model of peace and an alternative economic system, today have little choice but to lend themselves to the forces of global economic integration. Under the impact of globalisation, the countries of the Indian Ocean region are engaged in forging new forms of economic linkages and groups. Rao says that India's participation in the IOR-ARC can be justified on every conceivable ground—historical, cultural, political, economic, scientific and technological. The significant role that India had in the postcolonial age in the IOR – the Nonaligned Movement, the North–South dialogue, the disarmament crusade, the region's peace zone movement – qualifies its active involvement once again in the region's affairs, albeit in a changed global political and economic scenario. In fact, given the shift in world power structure from military to economic strength and the shift of global attention towards the Indian Ocean, it is natural and imperative for a country of India's size and potential to respond actively to the rapidly altering scenario.

VI

West Asia and Africa

The imperatives of India's West Asia policy are rather obvious. The geostrategic location of the region, its oil wealth, and India's long-standing religious and cultural affinity with the region have cumulatively shaped its policy towards the region. While India's stand on the Palestine question has been quite consistent, it has been very keen to ensure that Pakistan does not take advantage of its Islamic identity in West Asia to offset New Delhi, particularly on the question of Kashmir. Discussing the Kashmir question in a broader setting of India's West Asia policy, Noor Ahmad Baba underscores how the nature of India's diplomatic response to pan-Islamism and its organisational expression, the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), has been dictated primarily by Pakistan's attempts to use such platforms to settle its score with India. In fact, Pakistan sought to identify itself with the rest of the Muslim world, in order to strengthen its ties using Islam as the bond of affinity. However, it had very little success in this endeavour. Disappointment on this score led

Pakistan to enter into the western alliance system in the mid 1950s. However, the creation of the OIC gave Pakistan a convenient diplomatic tool with which to attack India, as was evident from the OIC resolutions and the Pakistani diplomatic behaviour. Yet, the Indian response has been to reject all this 'undue' and 'unwarranted' interference in its internal affairs. Baba holds that India was, to some extent, able to dissuade some of the influential and friendly Muslim countries from supporting such positions as Pakistan's. Analysing the challenges and opportunities which India faces in the Gulf region, A.K. Pasha argues that Indian interests lie in ensuring the safety and security of Indian workers in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, continued supply of oil and gas from the region, and political stability for mutual cooperation and increase in trade, aid and investment opportunities. From the strategic point of view, India and the Gulf states can work towards reducing the role of non-regional states whose policies, those of the US and Israel specifically, are undermining peace, security and stability in the region. From the Indian perspective, increasing bilateral ties with Iran is important because of trade, oil and gas, and also due to the unique proximity of Iran to events in Afghanistan, Central Asia, Iraq and the Gulf region. Pasha points out that the time has come for India to approach the OIC much more seriously than has been the case so far. Though Pakistan's parochial religious approach has made a limited impact on the OIC states, India has actively sought to vindicate its position, especially its secular credentials, in West Asia. India's non-aligned policy and secular political system coupled with its military and economic capability can help it in developing relations with these states, based on equality and mutual benefit. Sreekantan Nair examines the multifaceted dimensions of Indo-Israel relations, highlighting specific policy orientation over the last fifty years. He argues that the emerging relationship between India and Israel, though bilaterally significant, is likely to bring about considerable changes in the strategic and defence equations in South Asia. According to him, the shift in India's policy has been in accordance with the developments in West Asia and the changes in the balance of forces. As such, the new policy remains within the parameters of the political and strategic calculations of India's foreign policy. Analysing the need for recasting Indo-African ties in the current phase of the liberalisation initiated in India, Rajen Harshe points out that India will have to be sufficiently sensitive towards the changing economic and political circumstances of Africa and the world. For instance, due to acute developmental problems such as mounting debts, constant deterioration of the terms of trade, bad governance leading to ethnic, religious and others forms of strife and the monstrous spread of AIDS, most of the states in Africa are finding it hard to encounter the phase of globalisation effectively. However, in the post–cold war world India is already building new cooperative ventures with African states in the domains of information technology, trade and military ties. By conceiving long-term ties with African states more imaginatively India can succeed in building coalitions with developing countries to meet the challenges of globalisation more effectively. Harshe puts across several suggestions to underscore this point. First and foremost, India has to make conscious efforts to shed its patronising attitude towards Africa. Also, India has to be positive and proactive while facing globalisation and building coalitions with fellow developing countries to negotiate globalisation. Such a mindset would prove handy in working out how India can deploy its existing assets in international relations to meet the external world with greater confidence. Thus, evolving a new strategy to forge relations with the African countries forms a part of this entire process. Harshe argues that India should establish viable links with the African Union (AU) and most of the important regional organisations in Africa. It should also concentrate on select African countries and use them as anchors to spread the network of its ties in the continent. Middle ranging or regionally dominant countries like Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa could provide opportunities for India to expand its network of ties in Africa so that growing Indo-African ties could be further consolidated in the areas of trade, technology transfer and military cooperation on a reciprocal bilateral and multilateral basis. In brief, the present volume indeed covers a wide variety of relevant themes dealing with diverse dimensions of India's foreign policy. In the process, it not only aspires to enrich readers with fresh perspectives but also exposes them to a wealth of facts in a systematic manner. It will also become evident to our readers that the contributors do not necessarily agree with each other on several major issues related to India's foreign policy. However, we have been able to promote divergent and critical perspectives because the contributors have expressed themselves with a shared and convergent vocabulary. While concluding our introduction, we would like to add that India's foreign policy continues to be a fascinating field of study

among scholars and students of international relations within and outside India. We are happy to share this collective travail with our readers in the hope that we have merely begun the process of stimulating interactions and debates amongst them.

PART I The Global Setting

ONE

Neoliberal Globalism and India's Foreign Policy: Towards a Critical Rethinking A.K. RAMAKRISHNAN

n recent years, scholars of international relations (IR) have engaged in various levels of analyses regarding the process of globalisation. They have addressed from varied perspectives, questions on the origins of this process, its causes and consequences the transformation of the nation-state as an entity, the influence of transnational actors, and the extent of economic, particularly financial, implications of the process. Many of them stressed on the nature of flow of international capital and its implications for labour at the international and domestic levels. Globalisation has also been discussed in relation to processes like economic liberalisation, structural adjustment and privatisation in different economies. In most of these discussions, comparatively less attention is paid to the analysis of the linkage between globalisation and foreign policy. This essay attempts to look into some important aspects of such a linkage, with particular reference to India's foreign policy. The focus of this essay will be on capturing the significant sites and fault-lines of such a linkage, with a view to providing certain pointers towards evolving a critical perspective on both globalisation and India's foreign policy in contemporary times.

I

Neoliberal Globalism The process of globalisation is governed doctrinally and ideologically by what I have called 'neoliberal globalism' (Ramakrishnan 2001). I use this term as the global variant of neoliberalism. Neoliberal globalism envisages global ascendancy of non-state actors like markets and transnational corporations. Neoliberal globalists argue for the separation of economy and politics (markets and states), and the end of political control of the economy. The 'minimum government' doctrine of neoliberalism developed by Hayek and Friedman views the state as 'parasitic' and 'non-productive', providing "little or no positive contribution to society's material well-being" (Goldsmith 1995: 648). In the words of Norberto Bobbio, Neo-liberalism today refers primarily to a widely supported economic doctrine, while political liberalism is regarded as no more than a means (and not even always a necessary means) to its realisation; or else it represents an uncompromising commitment to an economic liberty of which political freedom is viewed as no more than a corollary. (1990) The global assertion of economic interests at the expense of political freedom, political interests and democratic aspirations of people is the most significant characteristic of neoliberal globalism. It is curious that in this period of neoliberal globalist ascendancy the state itself tries to introduce and promote an idea and practice that undermines the primacy of politics. A critical look at the foreign policy implications of neoliberal globalism in the Indian case requires a perspective that places politics at the centre of our concern.

The Shift in India's Foreign Policy India's foreign policy making has undergone noticeable transformation in the post–cold war era. Even though

the influence and even domination of neoliberal globalist ideas on India's domestic and foreign policy arenas have become established facts, foreign policy analyses have not accounted for this perceptible shift. I am not suggesting that Indian foreign policy in the post–cold war context denotes a fundamental break from the past. Far from that, the policy has shown a remarkable openness about its neoliberal moorings as against that of ideological commitment to state-centred capitalist economy and polity. In the foreign policy realm, we have witnessed the strong influence of the forces of globalisation in both ideology and practice. The language of India's foreign policy shifted from an ideological orientation of non-alignment in the cold war period to what is very often referred to as 'pragmatic' policy in the 1990s. I would argue that the shift in the sphere of India's public policy, including foreign policy, in substantive terms, is not from ideology to pragmatism, as it has often been described, but from an earlier developmental statist ideology and practice to a neoliberal ideology and practice. The transition to neoliberalist orientation in policy making was becoming evident even in the 1980s, but it gained visibility in the 1990s. In the political realm, international events like the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ideological and political rise of American power, and the resultant wars in the Persian Gulf and later in Afghanistan, on the one hand; and domestic developments like the collapse of the dominance of Congress rule and the demands for share in power from various quarters of the polity, on the other hand, provided the momentum for transformation of the domestic and foreign policies. In the economic realm, the redefining of the role of international agencies, the exacerbation of the dependence of Indian economy on international financial institutions and global capital, and the economic implications of the Gulf war, contributed to the policy changes. It is pertinent to note that these political and economic imperatives are integrally linked to one another in various proportions. Policy-makers claim that, as in the past, India's foreign policy today is a matter of 'national consensus'. It is true that the majority of political parties in India support and, if in power, try to implement domestic and foreign policy reforms suited to the global capital's demands and the changing scenarios in global trade, investment, capital flows and business environment—as dictated by the neoliberal globalist forces. It is interesting to note that Indian policy-makers traditionally asserted the claim of national consensus in the foreign policy sphere with regard to the cold war policy of non-alignment. The present claim of consensus denotes the extent to which the political parties, the media and a large chunk of intellectuals have tried to hammer out a notion of unanimity in a context of contentious struggles over national polity and the globalisation process. Though the state leadership's attempts at gaining ideological hegemony for neoliberal globalism seemed to be partially successful, major challenges to neoliberal forces were emerging and spreading in Indian civil society in a myriad ways during the 1990s. Much of the complex socioeconomic and political undercurrent associated with the process of globalisation have been played out recently in the Indian context in very substantial ways. Rajen Harshe (1998: 27–28) has pointed out at least four major transformations that the Indian polity has to envisage or confront in the context of globalisation: 1. the disappearance of the support for the 'vague socialist order' of the Nehru period and the inauguration of a policy of privatisation; 2. the subjection of the Indian state to pressures from transnational regimes and movements; 3. the increasing trend towards regionalism; and 4. the internal compulsions from separatist regional movements. In order to grasp the complexity of the processes that the Indian state has to face and translate into domestic and foreign policy measures, we have to decipher the changing nature and role of the nation-state in the era of globalisation.

State and Neoliberal Globalism Multiple points of view exist on the implications of neoliberal globalism for the state in its functional and nation-state dimensions. The views range from the demise of the nation-state, to its mutation. Many IR scholars have examined the erosion of national and state sovereignty during this era of globalisation. Liberal internationalist and neoliberal institutionalist IR theorists have argued that there has been a progressive replacement of state sovereignty with the emergence and strengthening of international regimes and international institutions promoting cooperation and norms of global governance. The traditional realists, on the other hand, have continued to focus on national interest and security analysis, and have failed to meaningfully explore the intricacies of global change. IR scholars like James Rosenau (1997: 361–62) have

written about the contradictory nature of contemporary changes—the tension between globalisation and localisation. For Rosenau, this tension between 'boundary-broadening' globalisation and 'boundaryheightening' localisation constitutes the core of today's world affairs. In his usual enthusiasm for wordplay, Rosenau coined the term 'fragmegratio' n to denote the tension between fragmenting forces of localisation and integrating forces of globalisation. Given such extremely generalised notions of globalisation in IR writings, the utility of a major chunk of these IR perspectives in grasping the relationship between global capital and the politico-economic determinants of foreign policy is very limited. I would argue that the nature and role of the nation-state is in a dynamic transition due to the operation of forces at various levels—forces unleashed by the neoliberal assertion of global capital. This is a far cry from the neoliberals' own thesis of the 'end of state'. Anthony Giddens' notion of the present-day globalised 'runaway world' proposes that both changes in the global financial system and the ensuing governmental changes affect the western world substantially. To Giddens (2000: 34–35) 'reverse colonisation' is a major aspect of this globalised world; that is, the influence of non-western countries on the developments in the West, exemplified by the Latinising of Los Angeles, the selling of Brazilian television programmes to Portugal, or the emergence of the global high-tech sector in India. In this view, the continued presence of colonialism in new forms in the contemporary world gets blurred; Indian software ascendancy and Brazilian presence in Portugal are not seen as part of capitalist development in its new global dynamics, but as threats of colonisation of the West. One will also be struck by the argument's resonance with rightwing national claims (especially in countries like India) that reiterate what Sadiq Jalal al-Azm called 'orientalism in reverse' (1981: 5–26). Susan Strange proposes that state authority has declined in the neoliberal globalist era in three major areas: defence, finance and welfare (1997: 368–69). In the case of India, while state authority has weakened considerably in the fields of finance and welfare, there has been no decline with respect to defence, especially in the context of the assertion of Hindu nationalism by the extreme right and the renewed territorial claims to and conflicts over Kashmir. Samir Amin points to the crisis of the nation-state, which to him "is the product of the growing contradiction between the transnationalisation of capital on the one side and on the other the persistence of the idea that the state is the only political system that exists in our world" (1997: 55). In the case of India, Amin suggests that "the compradorisation of the bourgeoisie – which had been able to pass through various stages of national (but not popular) development – has placed the unity of the state at risk" (70). It is this crisis of the nation-state in the era of neoliberal globalisation, that has to become the central aspect of our analysis of a country's foreign policy. The contradictory claims of Indian foreign policy-makers, on a number of substantial issues, emanate from this crisis. These contradictions are reflected politically in the nationalist ideological assertion, and economically in the neoliberal ascendancy in both domestic and foreign policy realms.

Changing Role of the State: The 'External' and the 'Internal' Levels of Change As noted earlier, the shift in the role of the nation-state in the era of globalisation is a significant factor that should inform our explanation and analysis of the changes in India's foreign policy. I wish to identify two levels of change in the role and function of the nation-state during the neoliberal phase of global capitalist development—external and internal. My description of the internal and the external levels of change in the role of the nation-state goes beyond the prevalent notion of the state in IR, as both a domestic and an international actor. The existing two-dimensional notion holds the view that a "state seeks to compete with other states by mobilising resources internally, and to use its international role to consolidate its position domestically" (Halliday 1994: 84). The 'external' in my analysis signifies the role of a nation- state in the remoulding of international institutions and multilateral agencies, and in the reworking of global rules for state conduct in the neoliberal environment. The 'internal' denotes the role of a nation-state in making domestic policy changes to adjust and conform to neoliberal requirements in both political and economic realms. The 'external' pertains to the pivotal role of nation-states in evolving the legal regime and the global architecture of the neoliberal world order, or what Stephen Gill (n.d.) has called the 'new constitutionalism' of global capital. Leo Panitch captures this role when he identifies states as "the authors of a regime that defines and guarantees, through

international treaties with constitutional effect, the global and domestic rights of capital" (1994: 64). The 'internal' relates to the state's role in economic liberalisation and privatisation, in rewriting national legal regimes to fit with neoliberal globalist interests, and in unleashing economic and social policies that correspond to minimum public control and maximum private benefits.

Prescriptions for Change in the Foreign Policy Apparatus The shift in the level of significance of the apparatus of foreign policy making has been an important implication of the reorientation of the state's role. The Indian foreign ministry's pivotal role in formulating policies regarding the state's external relationships has given way to its sharing of responsibilities with the commerce and finance ministries—the cumulative effect has been the assignment of an overall secondary role for the foreign ministry, in setting the agenda of India's foreign policy. This means that politics is taking the back seat in policy making, to economic and commercial interests. Where policy matters regarding IndoPakistan relations or Kashmir are involved, the boundaries of the state apparatus's freedom of action are dictated by American pressure. Such a phenomenon typifies the neoliberal character of state policy. A report entitled Globalisation: What Challenges and Opportunities for Governments? prepared by the Public Management Service of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 1996) in the mid-1990s provides prescriptions for structural and institutional changes in government machinery for the conduct of foreign policy. It recommends that governments adapt the role of foreign ministries to function in an environment where they no longer have a monopoly over foreign relations; improve the internal management of external relations, including the need for greater internal policy coordination, mechanisms to manage participation in international fora, and development of strategic direction; exploit opportunities for international problem solving and exchange of policy strategies; and develop international skills amongst public officials. The report maintains that foreign affairs ministries are losing their monopoly over external relations due to the fact that other institutions are assuming external relations functions. A major implication is that when "individual ministries develop relations with foreign counterparts or negotiate in international fora, there are few guarantees that their actions will reflect the 'national interest' or a national position, as opposed to a narrow sectoral perspective." The document makes forthright recommendations about the direction in which foreign policy making structures ought to be modified in the context of neoliberal globalisation.

Changing Role of the Indian Foreign Policy Apparatus: The Case of GATT One of the initial tasks of Indian policy-makers in the new global dispensation was to embark upon negotiations on the Dunkel Draft proposals of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) during the Uruguay Round. The Uruguay Round marked the transition of GATT from a multilateral instrument of trade negotiations to the fulcrum of linkages between most human activities and trade. The new intellectual property regime and the new investment regime evolved during the Uruguay Round are significant advances in the evolution of the 'new constitutionalism' of global capitalism. It is interesting to look at the nature of Indian participation in the Uruguay Round negotiations, particularly on the Dunkel Draft. Manmohan Agarwal's observation on this matter is worth noting: "The history of the negotiations and the actions on the Dunkel Draft show lack of any attempt to develop proposals that would serve India's interests. No effort is being made to involve other segments of Indian society which would be affected by the changes" (1993: 139). Initially, in the Uruguay Round, when the United States was raising intellectual property, services and investment measures as new trade-related arenas in the GATT system, India argued that those issues of the developing and less developed countries that were neglected in the earlier Tokyo Round should be taken up for consideration rather than entirely new issues (Agarwal 1993: 137). At this stage in the early 1980s, India

sounded like it was interested in promoting the interests of the global South. India, along with Brazil, openly challenged the attempts of the US to neglect the demands of the South and impose the new agenda. But, we could see a reversal of India's stand in the Uruguay Round by the late 1980s, totally caving in to the agenda of the US. A number of reasons have been cited by analysts for this shift in the Indian stance (Agarwal 1993: 137–38). The significant point is that the 1980s marked a period of transformation in the 'internal' and the 'external' roles of the Indian state in such a way as to suit the neoliberal global agenda. The state's urge to redefine its role in the global order, and ensure its participation in authoring new rules and regulations for this order, at the expense of the country's interests, marks the policy shift at the 'external' level. This is no surprise given the situation, as Aijaz Ahmad has lucidly pointed out: "[the nation-state] seems less and less to represent the interests of the nation in world affairs [and] seems to represent the interests of global capital to the nation" (1996: 43). The earlier-mentioned unwillingness on the part of the Indian government to engage the opinions of different segments of the Indian population in evolving a broad-based platform to launch government policy at GATT and other fora denotes the fact that neoliberal global capitalist interests have become the priority for the Indian state over democratic political mechanisms and genuine interest articulation. Neoliberalism's emphasis on economy over politics, and markets over state, is clearly visible in India's policy shifts at the Uruguay Round.

India's Foreign Policy in the Neoliberal Era and the Crisis of Legitimacy The dominant realist paradigm of international relations asserts the dichotomy between the domestic and the international realms of state activity. It assumes that the international is an autonomous sphere characterised by anarchy, as there is no overarching power above the sovereign state. One can draw parallels between this domestic–international dichotomy in realism and the economy–politics/market–state dichotomy in neoliberalism. Any critical analysis of the working of global capital and the role of the state and civil society will indicate the complex levels at which the global and the local are linked integrally. It is not enough to challenge the domestic–international dichotomy and maintain the conventional wisdom that foreign policy is the extension of domestic policy. In order to capture the changing character of India's foreign policy, one has to look into the interface between the crisis of legitimacy of the Indian state and the realm of its foreign policy. This connection has to be understood by capturing the determining influence of global capital over both state legitimacy and foreign policy making. I have argued in an earlier paper (1986) that, for the Indian state, foreign policy had functioned as a significant source of political legitimacy, given the discursive power of the policy of non-alignment, and the earlier hegemony of the Congress in Indian politics with its charismatic leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi. Even though Indian foreign policy experts like M.S. Rajan point towards the continuing relevance of non-alignment in India's external orientation (1993: 141–50), its utility for regime legitimation, if not its relevance itself, has been in serious doubt since the Indian state's commitment to the neoliberal globalist agenda became obvious in the 1990s. The dissolution of the power and influence of the Congress Party into "a permanent slump" (Said 2000: 225); the neutralisation of the normative and strategic function of Nehruvian non-alignment (Rana: 1992: 111–21); and the replacement of the Nehruvian developmentalist state apparatus with the neoliberal agenda, obviously brought forth a legitimacy crisis. In the new neoliberal context, as Jayati Ghosh notes, "the proclivity of the state is essentially to seek forms of external legitimisation, whether through the approbation of foreign financiers or the perceived discipline of international markets" (1998: 180). Partha Chatterjee maintains that the ambiguities in the legitimisation process in India emanate from what he calls "the fundamental problematic of the postcolonial state", and he points out three important aspects of the legitimation problematic: first, that these ambiguities arenecessary consequences of the specific relation of the postcolonial developmental state with the people–nation; second, that it is these ambiguities which create room for manoeuvre through which the passive revolution of capital can proceed; and third, that these ambiguities cannot be removed or resolved within the present constitution of the state. (1993: 216–17)

Such ambiguities in legitimation are also associated with contradictory aspects of the neoliberal claims of progress, transparency, and even fight against poverty, on the one hand; and, on the other hand, the reality that "neo-liberal transition privileges inequality" (Watson 2000). The fact of increased inequalities resulting from neoliberal policies is reflected in, as noted by Ghosh, the "lack of genuine popular internal legitimisation for the process of structural change" (1998: 180–81) in India. The crisis of legitimacy of the Indian state is made abundantly clear from the way in which economic reforms were introduced without any deliberation or exchange of ideas at the level of democratic institutions like parliament. The sidestepping of the Indian parliament in policy decisions regarding economic liberalisation, India's signing the GATT treaty, and its acquiring the membership of World Trade Organisation (WTO), etc. are stark examples of the state's utmost fear of its public. The introducing of neoliberal reform by 'stealth' (Jenkins 1999: 172–207) not only reflects this legitimation crisis but also contradicts the very claims of democratic ascendancy that the neoliberal globalists so loudly pronounce. The undermining of democratic institutions and practices of decision making is going to be a major challenge to the protection of the interests of various national constituencies at the international level through the nation's foreign policy. The legitimation crisis of the Indian state, manifested through the open defiance of its neoliberal policies by various sections of the people across the country, has been addressed and confronted by an important segment of the state through the heightened assertion of extreme nationalism as its political doctrine. Such a problem-solving mechanism – the ideological solution to the crisis of legitimacy – has accentuated existing political conflicts or created newer ones. The revival of the Indo-Pakistan and the Kashmir conflicts, the Indian state's adventures with the nuclear explosions, etc. can be read in such a context. At the 'external' level of the state's role – the role of evolving norms and institutions at the international level to oversee the roles of states themselves – Indian policy-makers were keen to show that the Indian state is part and parcel of the neoliberal global order and that it should be allowed to assume more active global responsibility. Old demands and new ones are now positioned in such a manner that the state's claims attain global legitimacy in spite of domestic high nationalism. This 'external' orientation of the Indian state is exemplified by its demand for United Nations (UN) Security Council membership; its increased stress on UN peace-keeping operations; its urge to join a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT) regime in spite of the conduct of the nuclear tests and contradictory verbal rhetoric internally; its close cooperation and collaboration with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the WTO; and above all, its eagerness to join the global campaign against terrorism in the framework provided by the US.

Neoliberal Globalism and Resistance The hegemony of neoliberal globalism has met with strong intellectual and political challenges from across the world. Such critical thinking and action have been forthcoming due to the need to confront the implications of neoliberalism in the daily lives of people. As stated by a Mexican scholar, "neither logically nor empirically is there the least reason to believe that neoliberal measures will lead to the development of humanity or to the solution of the developed world's own social problems" (Casanova 1996: 39–49). The unleashing of neoliberal reforms in India generated various forms of resistance from different segments of the population. A wide array of such resistance movements not only exacerbated the legitimation crisis of the Indian state, but also exerted tremendous pressure on the conduct of foreign policy. The waging of environmental, farmers', fishworkers', and labour movements, for example, compelled the state to renegotiate at least a few agreements it had reached with transnational corporations and international financial institutions. They also raised pertinent questions regarding local-global linkages in the era of globalisation by challenging the neoliberal top-down approach and by focussing on a bottom-up approach. The relationship between civil society, the state and the international realm is complex, given the overlapping and contradictory claims of identity and power. The resistance movements' ways of negotiating this identity/power problematic provide us with new sites of alternative theorising in international relations. Contemporary IR theories have not been able to grasp the significance of such movements to any substantial level. The kinds of IR theories that are available now, on the relationship between global forces and local

movements, are those concerning 'international civil society'. Most IR theoretical notions of international civil society treat it as an arena of activity of non-governmental organisations and civil society groups. This approach does not take into consideration the 'resistance to globalisation' aspect of the movements, rather it views the movements only as organisations and groups advancing the neoliberal non-state realm of global governance. This uncritical notion of international civil society that is being evolved in neoliberal terms does not confront important questions of state–civil society relations, the politics of movements, etc. It needs to be stressed here that one cannot possibly imagine international civil society without reference to the nation-state and the integral civil society–state linkage. As the implications of resistance movements in civil society are becoming increasingly evident for state politics and foreign policy making, it is necessary to account for these factors through an emphasis on civil society–state dynamics rather than through the neoliberal non-state approach, in IR.

Conclusion A critical perspective on India's foreign policy requires bringing politics back into our theory and practice in order that the neoliberal undermining of the political is squarely addressed and reversed. Such a perspective necessarily interrogates the working of global capital and its implications for national and local lives. It also focusses on the crisis of legitimacy of the nation-state, and on the political and institutional implications of such a crisis for foreign policy making. What we need is a foreign policy analysis as if people mattered.

References Agarwal, Manmohan. 1993. Implications of Economic Liberalisation for India's Foreign Policy. International Studies 30 (2): 131–39. Ahmad, Aijaz. 1996. Globalization and the Nation-state. Seminar 437: 43–48. Amin, Samir. 1997. Capitalism in the Age of Globalization. London: Zed Books. Bobbio, Norberto. 1990. Liberalism and Democracy. London: Verso. Casanova, Pablo Gonzalez. 1996. Globalism, Neoliberalism, and Democracy. Social justice 23 (1–2): 39–49. Chatterjee, Partha. 1993. The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Goldsmith, Arthur A. 1995. The State, the Market and Economic Development: A Second Look at Adam Smith in Theory and Practice. Development and Change 26 (4): 633–50. Ghosh, Jayati. 1998. Development Strategy in India: A Political Economy Perspective. In Nationalism, Democracy and Development: State and Politics in India, eds. Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, 165–83. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Giddens, Anthony. 2000. Runaway World. New York: Routledge. Gill, Stephen, n.d. New Constitutionalism, Democratisation and Global Political Economy. Unpublished paper. Halliday, Fred. 1994. Rethinking International Relations. Vancouver: UBC Press. Harshe, Rajen. 1998. The Challenges of Globalisation and India: Some Critical Reflections. In Globalisation and the South Asian State, ed. B. Ramesh Babu, 27–28. New Delhi: South Asian Publishers. Jalal al-Azm, Sadiq. 1981. Orientalism and Orientalism in Reverse. Khamsin 8: 5–26. Jenkins, Rob. 1999. Democratic Politics and Economic Reform in India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. 1996. Globalisation: What Challenges and Opportunities for Governments? Paris: Public Management Service. http://www.oecd.org/puma/gvrnance/strat/pubs/glo96. Panitch, Leo. 1994. Globalisation and the State. In Socialist Register 1994. eds. Ralph Miliband and Leo Panitch, 60–93. London: Merlin Press. Rajan, M.S. 1993. India's Foreign Policy: The Continuing Relevance of Nonalignment. International Studies 30 (2): 141–50. Ramakrishnan, A.K. 2001. Neoliberalism, Globalisation and Resistance: The Case of India. In Globalisation of Liberalism, eds. Eivind Hovden and Edward Keene, 242–62. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Ramakrishnan, A.K. 1986. Foreign Policy as Instrument of Regime Legitimation. Paper presented at the National Seminar on India's Foreign Policy, School of International Relations, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam, India. Rana, A.P. 1992. Nehru and the Qualitative Dimensions of India's Foreign Policy Strategy. In Nehru: Indian Polity and World Affairs, ed. S.J.R. Bilgrami, 111—21. Delhi: Kanishka Publishing House. Rosenau, James N. 1997. The Complexities and Contradictions of Globalisation. Current History 96 (613): 361–62. Said, Edward. 2000. The End of The Peace Process: Oslo and After. New York: Pantheon Books. Strange, Susan. 1997. The Erosion of the State. Current History 96 (613): 368–69.

Watson, Hilbourne. 2000. Social Capital, Capitalism, and Democracy in Contemporary Globalization. Paper presented at the International Conference on Rethinking Marxism, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, USA.

TWO

India and the Challenges of Globalisation K. RAMACHANDRAN NAIR

ollowing the economic crisis of 1991, India has been forced to adopt the model founded on liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation (LPG). The governments under the Congress, United Front, and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition led by the Bharatiya Janata Party, have taken pains to describe the LPG policy regime as 'economic reforms'. But the regime has been attuned to the process of globalisation, which plays a crucial role in the agenda of the Washington Consensus, sponsored by the United States, International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Globalisation aims at the establishment of a single global marketplace by integrating national economies through unrestricted flow of commodities, services, labour, capital, technology, information and knowledge. The IMF, the World Bank and the WTO are acting as marketing agents to sell 'globalisation' all over the world. But in the emerging world economic order, globalisation is often identified with Pax Americana of Uncle Sam and this indeed has raised several challenges for India (Das Gupta 1996).

F

The fundamental characteristics of globalisation are many and have been well documented by United Nations Development Programme in its Human Development Report (UNDP 1999). They include global sourcing of inputs; transnationalisation of production; homogenisation of tastes and preferences, products and consumption styles; production of exotic goods to tempt the world's poor; instant communication and information explosion; transformation of nature and quality of work; exportation of jobs; uncontrolled growth of global money and financial markets causing attacks on national currencies; and transformation from a nation-centred system of capitalism to a transnational globalised world. The process of globalisation – if completed as per the agenda drawn up by the rich countries (the US and its allies), and supported by the IMF–WB–WTO trinity – would result in a highly interdependent world of pluralistic power configuration in international politics with the marginalisation and pauperisation of the poor and the further enrichment of the rich (Chatterjee 1994; Hurrell and Woods 1999). There would emerge a set of new rules and codes of behaviour and increased harmonisation of economic institutions (Patnaik 2000). State-led models of development would crash everywhere and would be replaced by market-based development led by the private sector (Webster and Dunning 1991). Far-reaching international treaty obligations regarding trade, investment, taxation, intellectual property rights, banking and financial sector supervision, currency convertibility, foreign policy, non-proliferation treaty (NPT), comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), and even control of bribery, would be imposed on sovereign nations in the global community, thereby throwing up complex challenges (Dubey 1996). India also faces these challenges. One of the premises behind globalisation is that trade based on comparative advantage would benefit the poor more than the others. This premise is totally false (Patnaik 2000). What would be India's fate when the country's exports constitute less than one per cent of its gross domestic product (GDP)? It is also argued that the degree of outward orientation determines the productivity and efficiency of a country's economy. How far is this true? India is told that the goal of self-reliance makes no sense in a closely integrated global economy. Therefore, India should seek self-reliance and security through trade. What India needs now is security, rapid economic growth, macroeconomic stability, and drastic reduction of unemployment and income inequality, which would ensure that the minimum basic human needs of its masses are met. Specific challenges facing India may be mentioned here for which we need to formulate bold and aggressive action.

Faced with a real threat to its hegemony, the US is trying to unilaterally change the character of globalisation to its advantage (The South Commission 1992). In this process, it is forming alliances with members of the rich club and turning them against the weak and poor. 'Global' cannot always be 'American'. The US has been blatantly adopting a variety of trade restrictions like safeguards, anti-dumping legislation, countervailing duties, voluntary export restraint (VER), multi-fibre arrangement (MFA), Super-301 and Voluntary Import Enhancement (VIE), while functioning as a prominent member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and pleading for freer trade. Under the WTO too the US has exhibited that it would not change its policies despite the schedule of commitments (Sachs and Warner 1995; Sachs 1998). The collapse of the Soviet Union and disintegration of the socialist bloc have led to the erosion of the bargaining power of the poor as there is no countervailing force or an alternative power centre to approach for support. The formation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and Non-aligned Movement (NAM) did not help. To further weaken the poor countries, the rich had been planning the New Millennium Architecture of multilateral organisations and canvassing universal support for it (Lloyd 1999). In the GATT negotiations, poor countries, including India, were looked down upon as backwards and free riders which always sought concessions, but had nothing to offer in return. They lacked cohesion, homogeneity, skilled negotiators, and the political unity and will to resist the rich. The time has come for us to resist these new moves by the rich at any cost. India must now take the lead in the following directions: 1. Locate areas of strength and develop them and be proud about it. 2. Mobilise similarly affected as well as like-minded nations to make the group's collective voice heard in the global forums (for example, forming Third World groups/alliances, sub-regional pacts), in order to assert economic and political independence and reveal a strong political will to stand together and fight injustice in global relations. India should remember George Herbert's words, "having a sword ensures that others keep their swords in their sheath".1 We shall not allow the US to mould every country and bring them into the grip of Pax Americana. 3. Particularly in the context of the US sanctions in the wake of India's nuclear test in 1998, the greatest challenge that India faces is to convince all its citizens to Be Indian and Buy Indian and note that they have nothing to lose but their Kentucky Fried Chicken or Colas. At one stage in the history of the US, President Abraham Lincoln had asked his fellow Americans to buy their coats from America rather than import them from Great Britain. He had told them that when they buy their coats in America, they can have their coats, and their fellow Americans will have new jobs. Of course, this might have looked like crude protectionism. But one cannot forget that today's globalised market does not offer a level playing field, a set of mutually acceptable rules of play and a neutral umpire to oversee the game of international transactions. 4. India should see that its domestic economic growth, employment, macroeconomic stability and interpersonal equity are not sacrificed by the plunge into the fast track of globalisation. 5. Educate the people of the Third World that globalisation is essentially a unilinear theological view of world development and the rich who are marketing it have no altruistic motives. 6. The world's poor should mobilise and apply pressure on the IMF–World Bank institutions to shed their brutal colonial and imperialistic character and free themselves from the control of the Washington Consensus (US Treasury, US Federal Reserve, Wall Street, and the multinational and transnational corporations). These institutions need to become democratic, problem sensitive and problem responsive, equitable and effective. The politics of the fight against globalisation needs to be spelt out by constant interaction among the affected sections. This is particularly important in the present scenario when deliberate attempts are being made to divide and fragment anti-globalisation protest groups and seduce the common citizen with the promise of a dream world founded on globalisation. The history of globalisation so far, however, does not offer any tangible evidence of having delivered such a dream world in any part of the globe. So the fight must go on with added vigour. In this, India should lead from the front.

References Ahluwalia, I.J., and I.M.D. Little, eds. 1998. India's Economic Reforms and Development. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Amin, Samir. 1997. Capitalism in the Age of Globalization. London: Zed Books. Banuri, Tariq. 1991. Economic Liberalisation: No Panacea. The Experience of Latin America and Asia. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Bhagwati, Jagdish. 1993. India in Transition. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Bhagwati, Jagdish and T.N. Srinivasan. 1995. India's Economic Reforms. New Delhi: Ministry of Finance, Government of India. Budhoo, Davison. 1990. Enough is Enough. New York: The Apex Press. Cassen, Robert and Vijay Joshi, eds. 1995. India: The Future of Economic Reform. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Chatterjee, Partha. 1994. The Nation and Its Fragments. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Das Gupta, Biplab. 1996. Structural Adjustment, Global Trade and the New Political Economy of Development. New Delhi: Vistar. Diwan, Ramesh. 2000. Globalisation: Myth Vs Reality. Indo-Link Analysis. Dubey, Muchukund. 1996. An Unequal Treaty: The World Trading Order after GATT. New Delhi: New Age International. Hurrell, Andrew and Ngaire Woods, eds. 1999. Inequality, Globalisation and World Policies. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Joshi, Vijay and I.M.D. Little. 1996. India's Economic Reforms 1991–2001. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Lewis, John. 1995. India's Political Economy, Governance and Reform. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Lloyd, P.J. 1999. Symposium: Economic Dynamics and the New Millennium Architecture of Multilateral Organisations. journal of Asian Economics 10, No. 2 (Summer): 211–36. Patnaik, Utsa. 2000. The Costs of Free Trade: The W.T.O. Regime and the Indian Economy. First E.M.S. Memorial Lecture delivered at Trivandrum, India. (Mimeograph) Sachs, Jeffrey. 1998. International Economics: Unlocking the Mysteries of Globalisation. Foreign Policy 110 (Spring): 97–100. Sachs, Jeffrey and A. Warner. 1995. Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. http://www.brookings.edu/es/commentary/journals/bpea_macro/1995_1.html The South Commission. 1992. The Challenge to the South: Report of the South Commission. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Srinivasan, T.N., ed. 2000. Eight Lectures on India's Economic Reforms. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Swamy, Subramaniam. 2000. India's Economic Performance and Reforms: A Perspective for the New Millennium. New Delhi: Konark. United Nations Development Programme. 1999. Human Development Report. Washington: UNDP. Waltz, Kenneth. N. 1993. The Emerging Structure of International Politics. International Security (Fall): 44–79. Webster, Allen and John Dunning, eds. 1991. Structural Change in World Economy. London: Routledge.

THREE

Political Economy of India's Third World Policy K.M. SEETHI AND VIJAYAN P.

ndia's Third World policy has undergone significant changes in the post–cold war period. Since the late 1980s, there has been a perceptible shift in its approach and attitude towards the problems of the developing countries.1 Historically, the evolution of the Indian state has been an important factor in determining the priorities and shifts in its foreign policy. The changing nature of the Indian state2 has significant influence on long-existing economic/trade regimes, with implications for its Third World policy. The attempts to integrate the Indian economy with the world capitalist system have been accompanied by a series of measures that call for fundamental changes at different levels of the polity and economy. Until the early 1980s, India had been able to resist external pressures, though in a limited way, by mobilising countries in the Third World. However, in the emerging global setting, India has apparently lost a sustainable sovereign political space in advancing the cause of these countries. The neoliberal regime, as it has been sustained by global financial institutions and other donor agencies, is very critical in that pressures on the Third World are more decisive and formidable than ever before. Can India take up this challenge in right earnest within the broad parameters of its own proclaimed foreign policy goals? This is a crucial question which India must address itself to in the context of its own retreat from the early policy regime.

I

India's Third World policy has evolved within the structural constraints of the domestic and international economy. The post-war international system saw a gradual awakening of the Third World to the exogenous nature of underdevelopment or, in other words, to the links which existed between under-development and the operation of the international economic system, in particular the conditions imposed on Third World countries in the course of international trade. The world economic system, conceived and created by the industrialised nations, functioned primarily for the benefit of those nations by essentially meeting their requirements. It represented the principal obstacle to development, by keeping the poor countries in a position of dependence and inequality, which was a source of stagnation. In a world economic system over which the Third World countries had no control, they could not exercise true economic sovereignty and without this, the political sovereignty they had gained would be meaningless. The awareness that the obstacles to development were inherent in the very structure of the international system thus gradually added impetus to the challenge to the international order and the demand for profound structural changes. The international division of labour constituted one of the central points of this challenge to the international order by the Third World countries. In view of their low level of industrialisation, these countries played only a limited part in world trade and they were primarily oriented towards the basic commodities sector. This situation was perpetuated, and even strengthened, by the existence of tariff and non-tariff customs barriers which hit hard against products imported by the industrialised countries as soon as they involved a certain element of manufacturing, thus competing with the industries of those countries. The transfer of technology and the provision of financial resources operated in a manner which was far from favourable to the industrialisation of the Third World: industrialisation that was indispensable for the changing of this vertical international division of labour (Amin 1997: 12–45; Baran and Sweezy 1966; The South Commission 1992). The Third World countries felt particularly unhappy about their position in the international division of labour. In fact, the terms of trade were considered unfavourable to basic commodities and there was a feeling that these terms were worsening with the course of time. The income, which the Third World countries were

also to obtain from their production, was extremely insecure. There was a great deal of fluctuation in the prices of raw materials and, consequently, great instability of income for many of the countries which produced them, so that they found themselves incapable of guaranteeing finance for an economic policy involving major development projects. The challenge by the Third World to the structures of the world economic system thus became part of a fight for decolonisation. More precisely, the economic demands were conceived as indispensable conditions for complete decolonisation and development of the Third World India's options and strategies after 1947, in this perspective, seemed to be conducive to a good international bargain.

India's Third World Policy The dynamics of India's foreign policy, as unfolded through its national self-assertion in a world dominated by two antagonistic blocs and the structures of the world economic system, had a profound impact on the politics and foreign policies of most of the newly independent states. India, however, did not seek a complete break with world capitalism, but envisaged greater manoeuvrability and flexibility within the limitations imposed by the circumstances of the world economic system. Most of the Third World states had also shared this policy of sustaining manoeuvrability in international transactions. Though rhetorics like socialist path of development and mixed economy tended to masquerade the development dynamics at home, the Nehru government pursued a new line of foreign policy different from the policies of the two dominant blocs, making proclamations for the unity and solidarity of the Third World. This was certainly a powerful instrument in the hands of India, to bargain with the two blocs. India knew that an independent policy strategy like non-alignment would help sustain not only its interests but the interests of a vast majority of the Third World states (Nehru 1983: 24–85). India had been able to articulate the Third World interests in the most effective way since the 1940s. A major initiative was the first Asian Relations Conference convened in New Delhi just before independence (Government of India 1983a: 297–304). It was at the Bandung Conference in 1955 that India played an effective role in developing an economic agenda for the Third World. The conference dealt with subjects like technical assistance; establishment of a special United Nations fund for economic development; stabilisation of commodity trade and prices through bilateral and multilateral arrangements; increased processing of raw materials; establishment of national and regional banks, and insurance companies, etc3. The role of India, in subsequent years, was very significant in mobilising the Third World, particularly its efforts in the democratisation of the international political order. Its contribution during the 1950s and the 1960s to the movement for change in international economic relationships was very critical. Planned development at home and diversified economic relations abroad had set in a practical model for newly independent nations to give economic content to their national freedom. India's experience and skills had been deployed as and when necessary to join with others in analysing problems, evolving new concepts, putting forward practical proposals, negotiating compromises and pressing for concrete action (Lal 1983: 221–22). There were natural linkages between the expansion of the Indian economy and the evolution of India's external economic policy, and the unfolding of the developmental process across the underdeveloped regions of the world. The Second Five Year Plan documents reveal that Indian planners were aware of similarities in developmental problems and processes and were conscious of the fact that the scope for complementary effort and mutual assistance between developing countries had remained largely unexplored (Government of India 1983b: 90–106). Accordingly, they recognised poverty, low standards of living and economic backwardness to be 'problems of common interest' and accepted the view that interchange of ideas, experiences and technical personnel would be of mutual value. At the global level, however, it was clear that political freedom and economic serfdom could not coexist for long. Newly independent nations inevitably strained at the limits set to their social and economic activities by the continued domination of the economic scene by the erstwhile metropolitan powers. Over the years, it became clear that without drastic change in the rules of the game, the relative and absolute positions of the developing economies could only worsen. Indian representatives took a hand in initiating debate and discussion, at least on marginal changes. After some effort, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was amended to permit the developing countries to impose import restrictions

with the aim of implementing their programmes and policies of economic development. The need for more positive efforts on the part of the 'Contracting Parties' to secure a fair share in international trade for the developing countries was also recognised. A blanket ban on increase of customs charges was accepted in principle; appropriate measures were to be devised to attain equitable pricing for primary products; greater scope was to be provided for imports of new manufactures from the developing countries into the markets of the industrial nations It took almost a decade to achieve these nominal gains. The movement for affecting marginal changes in financial and monetary relationships was even slower, but a number of consortia came into existence to organise and stimulate financial flows to meet at least some of the more urgent development needs. Articles 54 and 55 of the United Nations Charter provided a convenient base for the erection of a superstructure for economic cooperation within the UN system itself. Indian representatives played a leading role in persuading the UN to designate the 1960s as the First Development Decade and to undertake preparatory measures for setting up the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD 1964; Government of India 1968: 55–62). In the first UNCTAD meeting held in 1964, India's commerce minister said that in order to promote industrialisation and the rapid expansion of export trade of the developing countries, it was necessary that preferential treatment be accorded to the exports of the developing countries; such a system had to be nondiscriminatory, and be applicable as a whole to all the developing countries of the world, so that the complex system of discrimination between one group of countries and another or between one region of the developing countries and another was avoided. He said that in addition to the removal of non-tariff barriers and reduction and removal of tariff barriers, India attached the greatest importance to the industrialisation of the economies of the developing countries (UNCTAD 1964: 218–24). In the second UNCTAD meeting held at New Delhi in 1968, India proposed that the scheme of general and non-discriminatory preferences in favour of all the developing countries, for their manufactures and semi-manufactures, must also be nonreciprocal (Government of India 1968: 55–68). In subsequent years, India made use of the Economic and Social Council, the General Assembly and its committees, and the UNCTAD for mobilising support for the cause of the Third World by sponsoring and co-sponsoring resolutions and moving amendments to resolutions sponsored by other countries. By this time, the desire of the Third World countries to initiate a forum in defence of their economic interests had materialised in the form of the Group of 77 which, over the years, constituted practically all the Third World states (Elyanov 1987: 165–84; Seethi and Vijayan 1996: 87–94). India was one of the dominant powers in the group which had been initiating the restructuring of international relations by drawing up documents which outlined the fundamental principles of the struggle of the Third World for decolonisation of this sphere of social life. India had presented a united front on major issues of restructuring world economic relations, in spite of substantial difficulties and contradictions. In the Charter of Algiers in 1967 the Third World's formal demand for a transformation of the international structure that maintained an unequal distribution of benefits was first formulated. It was drawn up at a ministerial level meeting of the Third World countries (Group of 77) in the background of the limited success achieved in the implementation of the decisions of UNCTAD-I pertaining to the developing countries. However, UNCTAD-II also failed to make any contribution to the evolution of a global strategy of development based on convergent measures for developed and developing countries. In the Lusaka Summit (1970) the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) countries acknowledged that structural imbalances in the existing world economic order were responsible for continued economic dependence and poverty.4 India, along with other non-aligned countries, understood the imperative to position development issues ahead of political issues and to take advantage of the UN system. This change of emphasis from cold war issues along an East– West axis towards rich–poor issues along a North–South axis was symbolic both of changes in the world system and the increase in the influence of the Third World (Shaw 1999: 142). In the third UNCTAD meeting held in 1972, an attempt was made to further advance the cause of the Third World, but the hopes to induce sovereign nations to cooperate in modifying mutual economic relationships once again failed to materialise. The Algiers Summit of NAM (1973) again provided a new beginning for consolidation and activism, besides highlighting in categorical terms the need for restructuring the international economic order (Government of India 1983c). During this period the Third World, with the leadership of India, demonstrated tremendous solidarity in international bargaining with the developed countries (Government of India 1973). Although the

attempts to bring about a new international economic order (NIEO) did not progress in the desired direction, countries like India continued to mobilise the international community to act and negotiate. In the UN General Assembly, India was in the forefront, advancing the cause of the NIEO. At the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, India made proposals for a comprehensive policy for the revalorisation of prices of raw materials; provision of additional liquidity for concerned countries; equitable pattern of voting rights in IMF and other international financial institutions; provision of external capital for the development of developing countries; and financial and technical assistance to developing countries. Most of these proposals were incorporated into the Declaration on the Establishment of the New International Economic Order adapted by the General Assembly on 1 May 1974 (UN 1974a). The programme of the NIEO contained a number of fundamental concepts directed against oppression and exploitation. This applied, first and foremost, to the principles of self- determination of peoples and the sovereign equality of status, full sovereignty of states over their natural resources and all forms of economic activity, equal participation of all countries in the solution of global economic problems, etc. The programme of the NIEO was directed at restructuring commodity flows and reorganising the mechanism which governed international economic relations, in the light of the interests of Third World countries (UN 1974b). The main efforts of India had been directed at the solution of this three-fold task. The objectives of the NIEO constituted a coherent programme responsive to the aspirations of the states of the Third World. The internal logic of the programme – raising the prices of raw materials exported by the Third World; a new push in export-oriented industrialisation geared to the markets of developed countries and based on cheap humanpower and abundance of natural resources; and the acceleration, at reduced cost to developing countries, of technological transfer – reflected the contradictory nature of the accumulation of capital on a world scale (Amin 1987). The essence of this official demand for a new order was a call for the redistribution of the world's wealth and economic opportunities, and the restructuring of the international economic system and its institutions—to guarantee that the interests of developing states were directly taken into account. The new order was to be based on principles of equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interests and cooperation among all states. An integral aspect of the NIEO was the development of collective self-reliance. It envisaged measures to be taken by developing countries to promote collective selfreliance and strengthen mutually beneficial international economic cooperation with a view to bringing about accelerated development. One of the basic assumptions of the concept of collective self-reliance and the general faith in the positive results of economic cooperation was that the countries of the South had a common interest based on the fact that their enemies shared some basic structural features. At the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly, India made several proposals for the establishment of the NIEO, which included, among other things, a greater say for developing countries in the management of the international monetary system, and greater regulation of the activities of transnational corporations.5 India continued its efforts at UNCTAD-IV held at Nairobi in May 1976. During 1977–79, when the Janata government was in power, India did not seek any change in its policy orientation towards the NIEO. In June 1978, Prime Minister Morarji Desai pointed out that the road to the new international economic order might be "rough, tortuous and long, but it must not be allowed to become a mirage. It is here that countries like the United States have a crucial role to play by giving the lead on and the implementation of various decisions aimed at eradicating the sin of poverty."6 Later in the year, Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee said that mere tinkering with the present world economic order and hesitant ad hoc concessions would no longer be enough. He called for time-bound means to attain the goals of the NIEO, which included common fund for commodities; adequate flow of financial resources on a dependable basis, and on the softest terms and conditions; and reformation of the international monetary system and a code of conduct for transnational corporations.7 The changes demanded by the Third World countries in the global system went beyond strictly economic considerations and demonstrated a cultural dimension also, as witnessed by the call for a world information order aimed at safeguarding the identity and cultural self-reliance of the Third World. This gave rise to great debates, particularly within the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). During the 1970s, India, in association with the other Third World countries, had made some genuine attempts to terminate their submission to an inequitable communication order. The NAM Algiers Summit

(1973) declared that the activities of imperialism were not confined solely to politics and economics but also covered culture and society, thus imposing an alien ideological domination over the people of the Third World. The Colombo Declaration of the NAM (1976) asserted that a new international order in matters of information and the mass media was as important as a new international economic order.8 Since then India and other Third World countries have been making efforts at different levels to eliminate the obstacles impeding the free flow of information, to reduce the existing imbalance in the facilities available for communication, both within countries and between countries (Seethi 2000: 218–19; IIMC 1983). Meanwhile, the myth of a 'crisis-free capitalism' was exposed by the acute crises that set in from the 1960s onwards in advanced capitalist countries (Gilpin 1987; Gill and Law 1989; Madison 1982; Roxborough 1979; Mandel 1978). A characteristic feature of this crisis was unparalleled stagnation coupled with worsening inflation (often called stagflation) resulting in an unprecedented drop in agricultural and industrial production, and a rise in unemployment and prices. In terms of its severity and duration, this stagflation turned out to be the worst. As stagflation appeared to be against the basic tenets of Keynesianism – which could never visualise the coexistence of inflation and stagnation – the first causality of this crisis was Keynesianism itself and its concomitant—the much trumpeted welfare capitalism (Amin 1999: 11–40; Amin 1997). The efforts by US-led capitalist countries to transfer the burden of this mounting economic crisis to the shoulders of African–Asian–Latin American countries culminated in an ever-increasing global appropriation by international capital using the multilateral institutions like International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and GATT (George 1990).

Liberalisation and Change in India's Third World (TW) Policy In India, the 1980s witnessed major decisions, which greatly changed the political economy of the Indian state, reoriented industrial production, altered alignments of economic forces and prepared the ground for a far-reaching transition. The major features of the new policy regime that took shape in the 1980s were deregulation of industries, decontrol of prices, liberalisation of imports, tax reductions, downsizing of welfare funds and increase in deficit spending. These trends – which had emerged immediately after the 1974 low conditionality IMF loan – crystallised into a coherent package in the early 1980s when India had committed to another IMF loan. This was followed by various initiatives to further liberalise the economy in accordance with the recommendations of various official committees (Jha 1985; Narasimham 1985; Sengupta 1984; Hussain 1985; Ahluwalia 1985). During this new phase of liberalisation, the Indian economy experienced a dramatic and fundamental shift in order to enable Indian business to make up for the long-term stagnation of the domestic market by seeking external markets. Such a shift of priorities required that concessions should be given to foreign capital, in general, and US multinationals, in particular, and structural adjustments stipulated by the IMF should be carried out. The justification given for the turnaround of economic policy was that it provided access to foreign technology as well as creating conditions under which Indian business houses and state enterprises using high technology would be in a position to enter external markets. Throughout the 1980s, the Indian economy experienced a deepening integration with world economy and foreign capital, and became susceptible to international economic fluctuations over which it could exercise no control whatsoever. However, by the beginning of the 1980s, India was on the verge of a debt trap. Three decades of policies had already brought the country to an irreversible balance of payment crisis. The huge loan from the IMF in 1981 tore up all declarations of self-reliance by successive governments. In essence, this implied that the economy was pushed into a vicious circle of trade and imports. The advent of Rajiv Gandhi in the mid 1980s and his government's proclamation of taking India into the twenty-first century, heralded the final abandonment of slogans like 'self- reliance' and 'import substitution'. These were replaced by 'export orientation', 'technological upgradation', 'efficiency' and 'modernisation'. During this period, the IMF- and World Bank-led import-pushed, export-oriented development strategy accelerated the integration of Indian economy with global capitalism. The consequences were acute fiscal and balance of payments crises; inflationary pressures; and deceleration in productive economic activities, including a decline in employment growth rate, widening of economic inequalities, etc. (Government of India 1992a; Jalan 1991). The economic and industrial policies announced and implemented from the mid 1980s, under the Rajiv Gandhi and V.P.

Singh governments, while undermining major public sector units and indigenous cottage and small-scale industries, paved the way for large-scale entry of multinational companies into even those sectors which were apparently denied to them previously. In the 1980s and 1990s, India's monopoly houses, which supported autonomous capitalist development in the immediate postcolonial period, became vigorous supporters of liberalisation and globalisation. The business houses began to identify themselves with foreign capital and global economy rather than with the national priorities and interests. Preferential credit to small and medium-sized enterprise was eliminated and the big business families, in partnership with foreign capital, began entering into a variety of areas previously reserved for small-scale industry. Apart from the big industrialists, other groups like the capitalist farmers and rural landlords, the urban middle class, bureaucrats and professional elite enjoyed personal benefits from globalisation and provided the social base for the structural adjustment policy (Patnaik 1994: 683–90). The New Economic Policy (NEP) announced in 1991 and the subsequent import–export policies were fully in accordance with the trade liberalisation prescriptions of the IMF–World Bank combine. The new policies can be categorised into two groups—macroeconomic stabilisation and structural adjustment. Stabilisation policy was first initiated under the direction of the IMF with a view to achieving both external payment viability and internal macroeconomic stability. It was followed by a structural adjustment policy dictated by the World Bank with the following important changes: 1. gradual withdrawal of the state from economic activities; 2. the encouragement of private investment; 3. increasing reliance on external private capital for economic development; 4. the gradual privatisation of public enterprises; 5. the introduction of fiscal and monetary policies that will help pass control of overall direction of economic policies from the Indian state to external private finance capital. These measures had tremendous implications for the Indian economy (Jalan 1992; Gupta 1993; Kurien 1995; Bhattacharya 1999: 1408–10) and its sustainability in the context of the fast-changing global economic scenario, particularly in the era of globalisation. In the 1990s globalisation acquired momentum through the successful completion of the Uruguay Round GATT negotiations, which resulted in the Marrakesh Agreement (1994), and the formation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995. Notwithstanding the fact that the WTO sought to ensure the legitimacy of the global market mechanism and the hegemony of global capital (Dubey 1996; Amin 1994), India decided to become a member of this trade regime. India's accession to the WTO made several policy changes inevitable in the realm of trade, investment, service, industry and agriculture. The new commitments and obligations that India was called upon to undertake in this post-accession period made the welfare agenda of the state completely obsolete. This was a crucial phase—of an ideological shift from a liberal-democratic framework to a neoliberal agenda of development. The transition from Keynesianism to the new political economy of neoliberalism fully brought to light not only the vulnerability of the Indian state but also the complex character of the Indian ruling authority, which became more dependent on global capital than ever before. This raises several questions about the sustainability of autonomy and sovereignty of the Indian state in the face of the pressures and dictates being brought upon by advanced capitalist countries. India's Third World policy should be contextually viewed against the neglect of the interests and objectives of the developing countries in world economic transactions and negotiations. It may be noted that even after several rounds of multilateral trade negotiations in the GATT, Third World countries continued to face many problems with industrialised countries. As India's former Foreign Secretary Muchkund Dubey points out, when the Uruguay Round was launched, more than half the Third World countries had become dependent on the developed countries, and the IMF and the World Bank. He says: "In forcing the Uruguay Round, with its agenda of the new areas of negotiation, the developed countries fully exploited this vulnerability and the consequent disarray among the developing countries, and succeeded in breaking their unity" (1996: 5). Third World countries like India had become incapable of dealing with such issues. The NAM and Group of 77 had already ceased to be forums for effective joint action. According to Dubey, "at critical moments in the negotiations, they used to wilt under bilateral pressure and give up the common position" (1996: 6). A major reason for this could be that though the Third World had recognised the need for solidarity in North– South negotiations, individual Third World countries were not able to sustain that solidarity in the face of the temptation to seek remedies for pressing national situations. With diverse national priorities, individual

countries were incapable of withstanding the pressures selectively exerted upon them by the advanced capitalist countries. Moreover, inadequate appreciation of the long-term implications of matters under negotiation led some of them to break ranks with other countries of the Third World without realising that this would affect the prospective interests of all, including their own (The South Commission 1992: 20–21). As the 1990s unfolded, India sought to "bring about adjustments in (its) foreign policy, in its basic principles and objectives, as in terms of reordering of priorities, shift of emphasis and changes in approach and method..." (Government of India 1992b: 104–05). For the government, the path to choose was very clear —to mingle with the currents of globalisation, because they were in tune with the internal economic reform package adopted formally in 1991. Even as India initiated steps to integrate its economy with the global capitalist system, it became more susceptible to the pressures of international financial institutions dominated by the US, thereby steadily moving towards greater dependency. Evidently, the NEP itself was necessitated by the burgeoning crisis on the external payments front (Government of India 1995: 99–102). However, much before the signing of the Final GATT Treaty in 1994, India had taken decisions – covering foreign capital, tariffs on manufactured imports, liberalising the financial services sector and subsidies – under the pressure of the IMF and the World Bank (Dubey 1996: 8). The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) and Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTP) were amended to expand the scope for globalisation. India was not alone in this. As Muchkund Dubey says, between 1986 and 1994, "more than 60 developing countries reported unilateral liberalisation measures to GATT, 24 acceded to GATT, 24 others were in the process of doing so" (1996: 8). India's accession to the Final GATT Treaty also fitted into the whole philosophy of development as conceived through the programme of NEP (World Bank 1996: 238–42; ADB 1997: 121–28; World Bank 1995). During the entire course of the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations, which began in September 1986, the Third World countries were under various pressures from the advanced capitalist countries, notably the US, European Union and Japan. Meanwhile, new areas such as services, agriculture, domestic investment policies, intellectual property rights (IPR), etc. had been brought into the ambit of negotiations with the avowed purpose of wearing off the sovereign space still enjoyed by Third World states. Yet, it may seem strange, India was not at all interested in evolving a serious negotiating position, either independently or in association with other Third World countries. According to Dubey, during the best part of this period, India "did not take any step known to the public, to renegotiate on issues of interest to India." India also "stuck to its policy of not taking any initiative to mobilise the support of other developing and like-minded countries, to bolster its position" (1996: 9). This certainly marked a fundamental shift from India's position in the 1960s and 1970s. The policy changes that have come about in the economic and communication spheres run counter to the programmes initiated in the direction of the NIEO and the New International Information Order (NIIO). The new discipline and dispute settlement procedures prescribed by the Final GATT Treaty, which became part of WTO, were certainly biased in favour of the advanced capitalist countries which continued to exercise their bilateral and unilateral options, no matter how strict these obligations (Dubey 1996: 106). J.N. Dixit, India's foreign secretary during 1991–94, acknowledged that India was not successful in fully safeguarding all its interests. He said that the issues pertaining to intellectual property rights and export of goods and services were not resolved to India's satisfaction, and continued to pose problems. Dixit even saw "a thinly veiled attempt at reviving the protectionist trends in international trade" by advanced capitalist countries like the US, Germany, Japan and France (Dixit 1996: 395–96). There are quite a number of areas in which the new trade regime could be harmful to the country—agriculture, drugs and pharmaceuticals, to name only a few. The new regimes under trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS), trade-related investment measures and services (TRIMS) would erode the self-reliance of the country in many areas and take away even the power to formulate public policies not only in relation to trade but in areas such as agriculture, investment and social welfare (Chossudovsky 1997). Muchkund Dubey has rightly pointed out that they would "have serious implications in terms of abridging the economic sovereignty of developing countries, upsetting their development priorities and inhibiting their pursuit of self-reliant growth based on the maximum utilisation of their own material and human resources" (1996: 11). Successive governments that came to power in India in the 1990s developed some sort of a 'consensus' on economic reforms and globalisation, hardly addressing problems of equality and social justice from a larger perspective. While the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was in opposition, it had resisted India's joining of the

WTO saying that to become a member was to subordinate the laws of the country to foreign laws, thereby compromising the country's independence and sovereignty. Once the BJP-led coalition assumed political power, it vigorously followed the neoliberal economic reforms package suggested by the IMF–World Bank– WTO trio, as demonstrated in the initiatives to bring about structural changes in insurance, telecom and power sectors, and in further liberalising the export–import regime under the exim policy for 1999–2000 (Government of India 2001; RBI 2001). That India is aware of what is in store for the Third World in the emerging situation is evident from the statements of Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee: …the decade of the 1990s has fallen far short of expectations; nowhere is this more apparent than on the global economic scene. The sense of triumphalism that heralded the wave of global capitalism is now giving way to caution and realism....In developing countries and in western financial capitals, there is now a growing acceptance that premature liberalisation of capital markets has been a primary cause of the current crisis. (Government of India 1998: 94–98) Earlier, while addressing the NAM Durban summit in 1998, Vajpayee said: Protectionism, currency speculation and flight of capital have been a set back to the economies of many developing countries Pressures on developing countries have intensified as the new architecture of the multilateral regime in trade, investment, development cooperation, environment and human rights shrinks the political space available to developing countries. Protectionism has returned in markets of the developed world; trade and investment are being increasingly used to promote political objectives, on labour standards, intellectual property rights, human rights and the environment...These members of our movement have emerged in the vanguard of international growth, but others have not only been economically marginalised by globalisation, even the stability of their societies is threatened. (Government of India 1998: 99–103) Concerns expressed from a platform of Third World collectivity hardly reflect the actual domestic policy package where the overriding consideration of policy-makers has been how to reap the windfall in the age of globalisation. To the extent that India has committed itself to the neoliberal economic regime, the country does not have the sustainable strength to retain its sovereign space against the pressures of the global capital. Surely, the long-sustained image of India as a leader of the oppressed and marginalised nations has disappeared on account of its newfound role in the emerging global order. One can hardly agree that the position of the Third World has changed for better in the new equations of international relations. It has, rather, moved from bad to worse as could be seen in the ever-widening gap between the rich and poor, both within and across nations, as globalisation and capital accumulation get intensified with all their contradictions. This is, perhaps, the most crucial challenge that India and other Third World countries will have to address in the coming years.

References ADB. See Asian Development Bank. Asian Development Bank. 1997. Asian Development Outlook 1997 and 1998. New York: Oxford University Press. Ahluwalia, I.J. 1985. Industrial Growth in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Alavi, Hamza. 1982. State and Class under Peripheral Capitalism. In Introduction to Sociology of Developing Societies, eds. Hamza Alavi and T. Shanin, 289–307. London: Macmillan. Amin, Samir. 1987. After the NIEO: The Future of International Economic Relations. In Economic Theory and New World Order, eds. Hans Singer et al. New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House. ——. 1994. India faces enormous danger from Globalisation. Mainstream 32, no. 2 (15 January): 7–12. ——. 1997. Capitalism in the Age of Globalisation: The Management of Contemporary Society. New Delhi: Madhyam Books. ——. 1999. Spectres of Capitalism. New Delhi: Rainbow Publishers. Baran, Paul and Paul M. Sweezy, 1966. Monopoly Capitalism. New York: Modern Reader Paperbacks. Bardhan, Pranab. 1984. Political Economy of Development in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Bhattacharya, Budhadev. 1990. Dominant Mode of Production and the Character of the State in India. In Capitalist Development: Critical Essays, ed. Ghanshyam Shah, 137–48. Bombay: Popular Prakashan.

Bhattacharya, Dipankar. 1999. Political Economy of Reforms in India. Economic and Political Weekly 34, no. 23:1408–10. Chossudovsky, Michel. 1997. The Globalisation of Poverty, Impact of IMF and World Bank Reforms. London: Zed Books. Dixit, J.N. 1996. My South Block Years: Memoirs of a Foreign Secretary. New Delhi: UBSPD. Dubey, Muchkund. 1996. An Unequal Treaty: World Trading Order after GATT. New Delhi: New Age International. Elyanov, Anatoly Victor Sheinis. 1987. Developing Nations at the Turn of Millennium. Moscow: Progress. George, Susan. 1990. A Fate Worse than Debt: The World Financial Crisis and the Poor. New York: Grove Weidenfeld. Gill, Stephen and David Law. 1989. The Global Political Economy. Johns Hopkins: Johns Hopkins University Press. Gilpin, Robert. 1987. The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Gupta, S.P., ed. 1993. Liberalization: Its Impact on the Indian Economy. New Delhi: Macmillan. Hussain, A. 1985. Report of the Committee on Trade Policies. New Delhi: Ministry of Commerce, Government of India. IIMC. See Indian Institute of Mass Communication. Indian Institute of Mass Communication. 1983. News Agencies Pool of Non-aligned Countries: A Perspective. New Delhi. Government of India. 1968. Foreign Affairs Record 14:55–62. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs. ——. 1973. Indira Gandhi's address at IVth Non-Aligned Conference held at Algiers in 1973. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs. ——. 1983a. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches. Vol. 1. New Delhi: Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. ——. 1983b. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches. Vol. 3. New Delhi: Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. ——. 1983c. Two Decades of Non-Alignment: Documents of the Gatherings of the Non-Aligned Countries 1961–1982. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs. ——. 1992a. Economic Survey 1991–92. New Delhi: Ministry of Finance. ——. 1992b. Foreign Affairs Record 38 (3): 104–05. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs. ——. 1995. Economic Survey 1994–95. New Delhi: Ministry of Finance. ——. 1998. Foreign Affairs Record 64, no. 9: 94–98. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs. ——. 2001. Economic Survey 2001. New Delhi: Ministry of Finance. Jalan, Bimal. 1991. India's Economic Crisis: The Way Ahead. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. ——. 1992. The Indian Economy: Problems and Prospects. Delhi: Viking. Jha, L.K. 1985. Report of the Economic Administration Reforms Commission on Government and Public Enterprises. New Delhi: Bureau of Public Enterprises, Government of India. Kurien, C.T. 1995. Global Capitalism and the Indian Economy. Hyderabad: Orient Longman. Lal, K.B. 1983. Struggle for Change: International Economic Relations. New Delhi: Allied Publishers. Madison, Angus. 1982. Phases of Capitalist Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mandel, Earnest. 1978. Late Capitalism. London: Verso. Mukerjee, Aditya and Mridula Mukerjee. 1990. Imperialism and Growth of Indian Capitalism in the Twentieth Century. In Capitalist Development: Critical Essays, ed. Ghanshyam Shah, 77–114. Bombay: Popular Prakashan. Murthy, T.V. Satya, ed. 1994. State and Nation in the Context of Social Change Vol. 1. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Narasimham, M. 1985. Report of the Committee to Examine Principles of Possible Shift from Physical to Financial Controls. New Delhi: Government of India. Nehru, Jawaharlal. 1983. India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches September 1946—April 1961. New Delhi: Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Patnaik, Prabhat. 1994. International Capital and National Economic Policy: A Critique of India's Economic Reforms. Economic and Political Weekly 29, no. 12: 683–90. Raj, K.N. 1973. The Politics and Economics of Intermediate Regime. Economic and Political Weekly 8, no. 27: 1189–98. RBI. See Reserve Bank of India. Reserve Bank of India. 2001. Annual Report 2001. New Delhi: Government of India. Roxborough, Ian. 1979. Theories of Underdevelopment. London: Macmillan. Seethi, K.M. and Vijayan P.. 1996. Political Economy of India's Third Worldism: From Postcolonial Conditions to Neocolonial Captivity. Kerala journal of Social-Science 1, no. 1: 87–94. Seethi, K.M. 2000. Towards a Cross-national Communications Order in South Asia: An Agenda for the Future. In SAARC: Dynamics of Regional Cooperation in South Asia Vol. 2 of Areas and Dimensions of Cooperation, ed. B.C. Upreti. New Delhi: Kalinga. Sengupta, A. 1984. Report on the Committee to Review Policy for Public Enterprises. New Delhi: Ministry of Finance, Government of India. Shaw, Timothy M. 1999. The Non-Aligned Movement and the New International Economic Order. In Transforming the World Economy? ed. Herb Addo. Tokyo: United Nations Publication. The South Commission. 1992. The Challenge to the South: The Report of the South Commission. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Thorner, Alice. 1982. Semi-Feudalism or Capitalism? Contemporary Debate on Classes and Modes of Production in India. Economic and Political Weekly 17: 49–50. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 1964. Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, March 23–June 16, Geneva. Vol. 2. New York: United Nations. United Nations. 1974a. General Assembly. Declaration of the Establishment of a New International Economic Order. 2229th Plenary Meeting, 1 May, New York. ——. 1974b. General Assembly. Programme of Action on the Establishment of a NIEO. 2229th Plenary Meeting, 1 May, New York. Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1986. Incorporation of Indian Subcontinent into Capitalist World Economy. Economic and Political Weekly 20, no. 4 (25 January): 28–39. The World Bank. 1995. Economic Developments in India: Achievements and Challenges. Washington D.C.: The World Bank. ——. 1996. Trends in Developing Economies 1996. Washington D.C.: The World Bank.

PART II The Nuclear Question

FOUR

Nuclear Weapons and India's Foreign Policy NINAN KOSHY

ndia's foreign policy has been profoundly affected by the nuclear explosions conducted in May 1998. The statements and actions of the leaders of the government reflect confusion and disorientation. The departure from its professed peaceful nuclear policy has had several implications for India's defence and foreign policies, but there is no evidence of an effort to achieve clarity in direction, or even a comprehensive review. The explosions in Pokhran have exacerbated tensions in South Asia by disrupting diplomatic initiatives in the negotiations with Pakistan and China. Diplomacy has now been reduced to damage control, that too without the real damage being identified. More important than the apparent isolation of India in international affairs is the lack of coherence in the country's foreign policy. No attempt has been made to rehabilitate foreign policy on the basis of a genuine national consensus. The government seems to believe that consensus can be manufactured.

I

Former Prime Minister I.K. Gujral said that Pokhran had engendered an atmosphere of war mongering and jingoism in the neighbourhood. In the process, he said, all of the nation's foreign policy and its vision of the country's place in the globe had been reduced to a narrow Pakistan-centric perspective. Gujral proposed that it was time to rebuild a doctrine of engagement with the neighbourhood and the world, premised upon the fundamental requirements of peace, good neighbourliness and disarmament (Ramdas 1998). The foreign policy implications of the Pokhran-II were self-evident in Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee's letter to the United States President Bill Clinton.1 He did not feel the need to address the world community, particularly the Third World countries that had looked upon India "as a leader in the movement for the destruction of nuclear weapons", as a nation whose early years had been linked to the making of a non-aligned world and promulgation of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.2 Jawaharlal Nehru accorded the promotion of world peace a high place among India's national interests. India's efforts to promote international peace were necessarily linked to its basic thrust on peaceful settlement of disputes and peaceful coexistence, repudiation of power politics, and disarmament. Prime Minister Vajpayee in his statement in parliament on 27 May 1998 alluded to the Nehruvian position: "Our leaders also realised that a nuclear weapon free world would enhance not only India's security but the security of all nations. That is why disarmament continues to be major plank in our foreign policy" (Government of India 1998: 40–42). However, in his rationale for nuclear explosions he claims, In the absence of universal and non-discriminatory disarmament, we cannot accept a regime that creates an arbitrary division between nuclear haves and have-nots. India believes that it is the sovereign right of every nation to make a judgement regarding its supreme national interests and exercise its sovereign choice....At the global level there is no evidence yet on the part of the nuclear weapon states to take decisive and irreversible steps in moving towards a nuclear weapons free world. Instead the N.P.T. has been extended indefinitely and unconditionally perpetuating the existence of nuclear weapons in the hands of the few countries that are also permanent members of the U.N. Security Council (Government of India 1998: 41). The prime minister's claims – that the tests have been a continuation of India's nuclear policy and that disarmament was, and continues to be, a major plank in foreign policy – need to be examined. The explosion of India's first nuclear device in May 1974 gave rise to many questions and doubts concerning India's nuclear

policy and its implications for the foreign policy, and also India's claims of not wanting to be a power of any kind. Statements made by leaders and government officials at various national and international fora repeatedly emphasised the peaceful purpose of this experiment in an attempt to check doubts and criticisms regarding India's intention. "There is a difference between a nuclear country and a nuclear weapon country," India's then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi stated: "We don't have any bombs. We don't intend to use this knowledge or this power for any purpose other than peaceful purposes."3 In her letter to the prime minister of Pakistan, she further said, "We remain fully committed to our traditional policy of developing nuclear energy resources entirely for peaceful purposes. The recent nuclear experiment conducted by our scientists in no way alters the policy" (Sharma 1980: 64). In marked contrast, the nuclear explosions in May 1998 were announced as steps towards immediate weaponisation. While India had maintained for a long time that it would keep its nuclear option open, the declaration that it was a nuclear weapon state was a clear departure from the earlier policy, definitely not a continuation of it. As Jean Dréze points out, by reversing "a long tradition of balanced concern for nationalism and internationalism [India] seems to have jettisoned internationalism in favour of a dangerous form of chauvinistic nationalism".4 Concluding from the prime minister's parliamentary statement and various other speeches that preceded it, it is clear that the Indian government is no longer fundamentally opposed to the division of the world based on membership in the nuclear weapon club, brought about by the unequal global nuclear bargain (UGNB) and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT). India seems ready to accept the conditions for joining the nuclear club. The United States (US) spearheads an international campaign backed by a regime of sanctions that makes demands on India (and Pakistan): 1. to sign and ratify the comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) quickly and without any conditions; and 2. to participate in the negotiation and speedy conclusion of a fissile material cut off treaty (FMCT) at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The irony, as N. Ram points out, is that when the old nuclear policy characterised by its pursuit of independence, its conditional self-restraint, its non-military orientation, its refusal to come into the UGNB and its high ground moral and political arguments—was at work, India's nuclear option and leverage in international nuclear energy dealings could be preserved and even strengthened. India might not have succeeded in shaping negotiations, but its principled policy resistance to the UGNB and the use of its leverage to push for movement towards global nuclear disarmament could not be ignored.5 For genuine coordination in foreign and defence policies, the doctrine of Robert Mc Namara should be the starting point: "defence policy has only one purpose: that is to act as the servant of foreign policy" (Appadorai and Rajan 1985: 664). The proposal for the creation of a national security council deserves close study in this connection. It has been claimed that the council's primary tasks must be to promote threat perception, extend diplomatic influence, and forge national political consensus on defence and foreign policy.

National Security and Nuclearisation But what is the concept of national security as defined by such a council? Jawaharlal Nehru defined national security as the means for achieving security, peaceful approaches to the solution of international problems, non-alignment and friendship with all countries: "The normal idea is that security is protected by armies. That only is partly true. It is equally true that security is protected by policies; a deliberate policy of friendship with other countries goes further in gaining security than almost anything else" (Appadorai and Rajan 1985: 47). Prime Minister Vajpayee stated in parliament that the "touch stone that has guided us in making the correct choice clear was national security" (Government of India 1998: 40–42). The claim that nuclear weapons are necessary for national security is new. India's former Foreign Secretary Salman Haider told the Conference on Disarmament in March 1996 that India did not believe that the acquisition of nuclear weapons was essential for national security and that India had followed a conscious decision in this regard" (Bidwai

and Vanaik 1999: 70–72); a view reiterated by Gujral as foreign minister in July 1996. "There were no security compulsions when I laid down office, for carrying out the tests," Gujral said on 29 May 1998. He said that the conduct of the tests was guided by partisan and political considerations and not by any threat perception. He added, "unfortunately an atmosphere of jingoism and war-mongering has been created after the tests" (Ramdas 1998). In the course of fighting World War II and preparing for peace, a new theory – the doctrine of national security – was developed to explain the relationship of the US with the rest of the world. The term national security was not common in American political parlance until the mid 1940s. Just before World War II, some scholars had begun to adopt the phrase. Their aim was to explain the relationship between military affairs and foreign policy. National security became a unifying concept for analysing the connection between the two. The doctrine described a new relationship between the US and the rest of the world and suggested policies to be followed in the light of this perceived condition. One must remember that national security is not a given fact, but a perception, a state of mind. The phrase expressed the new conventional wisdom of the post-war military establishment. In a speech at the Army Industrial College in the autumn of 1945, a war department planner listed some of the basic requirements of national security: "A much expanded intelligence service, a national realism that will permit us to start all out preparation for war when we see aggressive intent in another nation and the ability to speedily mobilise for war" (Yergin 1980). The concept of national security postulated the relationship of many political, economic and military factors. Problems in foreign relations were viewed as urgent and immediate threats. Thus, durable foreign policy goals were translated into issues of national survival and the range of threats became limitless. "[National security] demands that the country assumes a posture of military preparedness; the nation must be on a permanent alert" (Yergin 1980: 196). National interest is a key concept in foreign policy. In essence it amounts to the sum total of all the national values—national in pertaining both to the nation and to the state. It can also be described as the general and continuing ends for which the nation acts. As V.M. Tarkunde points out: The nuclear tests and the nuclearisation programme fit in well with the BJP's conception of the Indian nation as an entity which stands above the heads of the people and as an object of veneration. From the democratic humanist point of view, our national interests simply mean the interests of the people of India. Of course, such national interests include the interests of the Indian people in protecting themselves and their country from any real danger. Democracy and humanism equate the nation with its people and do not treat the nation as an entity, which stands over and above the people constituting the nation. The second interpretation of the nation exalts it above the people, as a deity or an object of reverence, which deserves to be worshipped by the people, and regards it to be the duty of the people to undergo whatever sacrifices may be entailed for promoting the greatness of that imaginary entity. This concept of the nation is potentially fascist and it can be shown that the growth of fascism in Europe was based mainly on this concept of the nation. (1998: 1696–97)

Nuclearisation and its Impact on Foreign Policy The increasing role of subsidiary services in making or altering foreign policy should not be underestimated. Foreign policy is not conducted by diplomacy alone. It relies heavily on military forces and the scientists who supply them with up-to-date weapons, on economists, and on intelligence and propaganda services. These services are generally subsidiary to diplomacy, but in some circumstances they can exercise great influence upon the decision-making process. For example, the military when it comes to securing bases, strategic frontiers or allies; the scientists concerning the development of weapons; the intelligence service when they act without full governmental control or diplomatic guidance. When Indian scientists claim that nuclear threat from outside has been 'vacated' and that the explosions have provided 'security', they assert undue political pressure on the government to follow a particular policy without any scientific basis. The proactive stance of a small group of scientists in positions of administrative importance and political influence, with their increasingly open advocacy of the weaponisation option, is a significant departure from the public style of the Indian scientific establishment. A section of the top scientists, in the process of helping

overturn established nuclear policy and subsequently defending the new line, has not merely provided support to the pursuit of the jingoistic agenda of a particular political formation. They have contributed to dangerous illusions of strength and invincibility on the subject of national defence and security, and thus altered defence and foreign policies. The nuclear explosions had an adverse impact on Sino-Indian relations, disrupting a careful process of forging close ties that was started in the late 1980s. Defence Minister George Fernandes in several public statements and Prime Minister Vajpayee in his 11 May 1998 letter to President Clinton signalled a hostile attitude towards China. China was referred to as "an overt nuclear weapon state on our borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962." The letter also said: "That country has materially helped another neighbour of ours to become a covert nuclear weapon state. At the hands of this bitter neighbour we have suffered three aggressions in the last 50 years".6 It is clear that the nuclear explosions have worsened regional tensions. Home Minister Advani's statement linking nuclear weaponisation to the Kashmir issue has become a convenient argument for Pakistan to pursue its strategic objective. The reply to Pokhran-II at Chagai signals a new and dangerous nuclear arms race in South Asia. As Prem Shankar Jha points out, the best result of the tests has been the world's realisation that it cannot sit on the fence any longer on the Kashmir dispute. The prospect of two extremely hostile countries with nuclear-tipped missiles pointing at each other has so alarmed the major powers that they can no longer follow their private agendas behind a cloak of seeming neutrality. The Indian government's lack of awareness of the way the tests have changed its options is reflected in its adherence to the stand that the Kashmir dispute is a bilateral issue that can be settled only by India and Pakistan. No one can drag India or Pakistan into mediation, let alone arbitration. But, as Jha asks, "What is the harm in seeking another country's good offices in an Oslo-type secret negotiation?"7 The Indian government was perturbed by the fact that the only joint statement issued at the end of the Clinton-Jiang summit was on South Asia and that it contained critical references to India. "It would be profoundly wrong to think that the United States is playing the China card against India," Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot said in Washington. "On the contrary, the US has been using its influence with China to impress upon its leadership the imperatives of contributing to peace and stability in South Asia by pursuing non-proliferation policies."8 Mira Sinha Bhattacharjea comments: "The joint statement on South Asia manifested a new 'togetherness' in US-China relations. It was replete with the use of the collective pronouns 'we' and 'ours'. This will undoubtedly cause alarm in India and there are many in India who will be tempted to describe it as a condominium, a duopoly, and a great power division of the world" (Bhattacharjea 1998: 1698). India's reaction to this statement was unfortunate. It rejected the 'notion' that any power or powers could arrogate to themselves the responsibility for peace and stability in South Asia. None can do that provided India conducts itself as a mature, confident and responsible power. Unfortunately the BJP's handling of Pokhran-II and its consequences – which could have been anticipated – did not live up to this criterion. If India continues to read the US-China joint statement in this manner it will only bring about joint action by both these countries, which India is apprehensive about. It should be axiomatic that Indian security is best enhanced when the interests of these two powers do not converge and when India's relations with China are cordial and not inimical (——1998: 1698). Though the US speedily imposed sanctions on India in accordance with its domestic laws and vehemently criticised India's nuclear explosions, there is enough evidence of a deal between the two countries; a deal for which India showed willingness from 11 May itself, and for which negotiations have been carried out, the details of which are deliberately denied to the Indian public. When Vajpayee said that India would not sign the CTBT unconditionally, he meant 'unconcessionally'. He knew that no changes would be made in the treaty and all that India could expect were some concessions from the US. There is an orchestrated attempt by New Delhi to prepare the public for an accommodation with the US. C. Raja Mohan says: The broad contours of a nuclear accommodation between India and the USA may have already emerged from the two rounds of talks between Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbot, U.S Deputy Secretary of the State over the last few weeks. The first stage of the nuclear deal is clearly centred on the Indian support for C.T.B.T and the lifting of the recent U.S. sanctions. It is within the power of the Indian government

to join the C.T.B.T and the Clinton administration will soon have the authority to waive the sanctions against India.9 In this connection it is worth recalling that it was Samuel P. Huntington who first spoke of 'accommodation' with regard to proliferation: In 1993 the primary goal of the west, as defined in American policy shifted from non-proliferation to counter-proliferation. This change was a realistic recognition of the extent to which some nuclear proliferation could not be avoided. In due course U.S. policy will shift from countering proliferation to accommodating proliferation. (1996: 192) While the refusal to receive the UN Secretary General's special envoy reflected both immaturity and confusion, India's reaction to the UN Security Council's resolution showed that it was oblivious to its own diplomatic failures. India objected to confining the problem of non-proliferation to a narrow geographical segment and not dealing with it in the global framework. But it was not the Security Council resolution that confined the issue but Vajpayee's letter to Clinton which spoke of deterioration in India's security environment, linking it mainly to China and then to Pakistan. It is the reference to Kashmir made by Advani in the context of nuclear weaponisation, and the nuclear brinkmanship indulged in by him and his colleagues, that made the Security Council act under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter where Article 33 says: "The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger maintenance of international peace and security, shall..." (Simma 1994: 505). Did the Government of India think that the country could blast its way into not only the nuclear club, but also the club of permanent members in the UN Security Council? The chances of India becoming a permanent member have actually receded at least for the time being. The US has said that the nuclear tests conducted by India made it impossible under the current circumstances for the country to join the UN Security Council as a permanent member. Rubin, the state department spokesperson argued that countries like Germany and Japan, which the US had supported regarding their permanent membership in the Security Council, have forsworn nuclear weapons.10 So there is no relationship between having nuclear weapons and American support for permanent membership. On the contrary the current trend away from the proliferation of nuclear weapons, with more and more countries forswearing them, has made it far harder for India to join the Security Council as a permanent member. The new nuclear policy of India has resulted in the disorientation of its foreign policy. In giving foreign policy a clear and purposive orientation a new national consensus has to be built—but not around a nuclear weapons programme. The declared moratorium on testing has to be followed by a declaration of moratorium on weaponisation and deployment. Only then can foreign policy regain its purpose of both serving national interests and promoting international peace.

References Appadorai and M.S. Rajan. 1985. India's Foreign Policy and Relations. New Delhi: South Asian Publishers. Bhattacharyea, Mira Sinha. 1998. Pokhran Reassures the Beijing Summit. Economic and Political Weekly (July 4–10): 1698. Bidwai, Praful and Achin Vanaik. 1999. South Asia on a Short Fuse: Nuclear Politics and the Future of Global Disarmament. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of the World Order. New Delhi: Viking. Government of India. 1998. Foreign Affairs Record 45 (5). New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs. Ram, N. 1999. Riding the Nuclear Tiger. New Delhi: LeftWord. Ramdas, C. 1998. Pokhran II and its Fallout. Frontline (4–17 July). Sharma, Shriram. 1980. Indian Foreign Policy: Annual Survey 1974. New Delhi: Sterling. Simma, Bruno, ed. 1994. The Charter of the United States: A Commentary. New York: Oxford University Press. Tarkunde, V.M. 1998. Nuclear Tests and 'Nation'. Economic and Political Weekly (July 4–10): 1696–97. Yergin, Damil. 1980. Shattered Peace. New York, London: Penguin.

FIVE

The Ethics of India Going Nuclear G.P. RAMACHANDRA

thical issues surrounding the decision to go nuclear, a hitherto neglected area of philosophical inquiry in India, deserve serious consideration in studies on Indian foreign policy. Since this essay employs a utilitarian approach – the policy which is the most conducive to human welfare is the best – the discussion will inevitably involve a consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of India going nuclear, in particular of the risks involved in India's nuclear policy. It is again an exercise in applied ethics, and such an exercise will require an accurate factual basis for the ethical conclusions.

E

The utilitarian aspect will separate the approach of this essay from that based on God's commandments as revealed in some sacred book, a principle which has been much used in arguments concerning nuclear ethics. It is true that the utilitarian principle often fails to give practical guidance. Even if we agree that the best policy is the one which is the most conducive to human welfare, 'most' and 'welfare' are likely to be defined differently by different people. However, it is this writer's contention that such problems of definition will not be encountered when discussing the ethics of India going nuclear. We shall try and identify ethical positions, and it is true that an ethical position acquires its status because we are considering facts in the light of some ethical assumption or value and (often in nuclear ethics) some calculation of the probabilities of outcomes. We may agree in principle that others may arrive at different ethical positions if they bring in competing utilitarian or other values and different probability calculations. But this cannot be done plausibly when discussing the ethics of India going nuclear (or, for that matter, of the West retaining nuclear weapons). This essay is not written from a nationalist standpoint— nationalism is not an ethical position at all. Of course, some forms of nationalist behaviour can be defended ethically (e.g. the Indian nationalist struggle against the British), but only by using utilitarian or other ethical principles. It might be objected that ethical principles cannot be appropriately applied to governments because of their character as trustees for the welfare of their citizens. Even if one accepts this concept (this writer does not) it cannot be used in the case of India's nuclearisation to reach conclusions different from those arrived at here. Another point to be registered is that the West has lived with nuclear weapons for a long time and there emerged during the cold war a sophisticated literature on nuclear ethics. This essay will apply ideas contained in that literature to the case of India. When we consider the question of when India went nuclear, it becomes clear that we are dealing with a long-drawn-out and ongoing process. Pokhran-II was certainly not the beginning of the process. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government inherited the wherewithal for the tests from others. Nor was Pokhran-I the beginning—the wherewithal for Pokhran-I existed because of policies instituted long before that event. In 1974 a decision was taken to explode an atomic device (Pokhran-I). After that, Pakistan developed its own nuclear weapon technology and both India and Pakistan stockpiled nuclear devices and acquired delivery systems. Then Pokhran-II tests were conducted. The Indian government claimed, and we shall accept the claim in this essay, that one of the devices tested was a hydrogen device; such a device must surely have been developed (along with the other devices and delivery systems) under previous governments, since the BJP government had been in power for only a few weeks before the tests were carried out. Pakistan subsequently tested nuclear devices. The Indian defence minister announced that India would deploy its nuclear weapons.1 Pakistan presumably will do the same, although it has proposed to India that both sides agree not to deploy weapons. Both countries appear to be under pressure from the United States not to deploy nuclear weapons. There can, however, be no doubt that Pokhran-II was a major escalatory act (even if it was

only one event on a continuum) and some of the argumentation of this paper will relate specifically to Pokhran-II.

Nuclear Ethics Nuclear weapons are morally objectionable because they carry with them the possibility of a nuclear disaster. But we must recognise that the expression 'nuclear disaster' accommodates many possibilities. An atomic bomb, similar to those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, could kill a hundred thousand people and injure a similar number, most of whom would either die or require medical attention all their lives. A thermonuclear or hydrogen bomb would cause a much greater disaster but the extent of the disaster will depend upon the yield of the weapon, whether it is exploded in the air or on the ground or under it, and other factors. It is possible to device a hydrogen bomb or several hydrogen bombs mounted on one missile, which could kill a million people and injure a similar number, most of whom would either die or require medical attention all their lives. A temperature of a million degrees centigrade, equal to that on the sun, would be created. Most of the casualties would result not from heat or blast, but from radioactive dust, which will be carried by the wind to other places. The extent of a nuclear disaster will depend upon the scale on which nuclear weapons are used, but it cannot be calculated exactly. A full-scale nuclear exchange between the US and the former Soviet Union, involving the use of thousands of hydrogen bombs, could result in the deaths of hundreds of millions, perhaps the end of all life in the northern hemisphere, or even the end of all life on earth, owing to the depletion of the ozone layer, a nuclear winter caused by the blotting out of sunlight by dust clouds, and other factors. And the Earth may be the only inhabited planet in the universe! A thermonuclear war between India and Pakistan, involving dozens of hydrogen bombs on each side, could result in hundreds of millions dead, perhaps the end of all life in the subcontinent. Even an atomic exchange involving a few dozen atomic bombs on each side could result in millions dead on both sides, a disaster from which it would take a century to recover. It appears to be the case, at the time of writing, that India has both atomic and hydrogen bombs while Pakistan has only atomic bombs. But Pakistan can still impose huge losses on India. Moreover, since fallout in a thermonuclear attack will kill more people than the heat or blast, and fallout is carried by the wind, a large proportion of the casualties in an Indian hydrogen bomb attack on Pakistan might be sustained in northwestern India. We might infer from all this that no humane person would tolerate the idea of nuclear weapons. Yet, the issue of nuclear ethics was much discussed in the West during the cold war and western ethical philosophers did not, by any means, unanimously reject nuclear weapons. It must be remembered that the philosophers had to deal with many possible nuclear outcomes, as also many possible non-nuclear alternative outcomes (i.e. resulting from giving up or not using nuclear weapons). Assessments of the magnitude of harm and benefit involved in both nuclear and alternative outcomes, and the rightness and wrongness of the means of causing these outcomes, could vary; as also assessments of the probabilities of all such outcomes. Even if assessments were the same, the ethical prescriptions based on these assessments could differ. Discussion in the West usually took the form of a weighing of alternatives, of weighing the consequences of retaining or even using nuclear weapons, against those of giving them up or refraining from their use. Once the lesser of two evils was identified, choosing it could be (although it did not have to be) regarded as a moral duty. The first use of nuclear weapons might seem to have been unacceptably evil, but the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with several hundred thousand fatalities, has been defended as a lesser evil since it avoided the loss of a million Allied lives, which an invasion of Japan would have caused. But those who emphasised the status of the people affected – Japanese civilians as opposed to Allied soldiers – did not accept this argument (Graham 1998: 76–81). (There is also a view, which this writer shares, that Japan was about to surrender anyway; this shows how important it is in applied ethics to have an accurate knowledge of facts). The British philosopher and humanist, Bertrand Russell, favoured an atomic attack on the Soviet Union in the late 1940s, to prevent the spread of the Stalinist system to western Europe and the loss of the core values of the West (Clark 1975: 645–61). According to him the probable outcome of refraining from an atomic attack on the Soviet Union was the loss of core western values—a greater evil than the attack.

In these arguments the issue was the use of the atomic bomb. The advent of the hydrogen bomb made the first-use of nuclear weapons much more difficult to justify. Even so, some defended the limited first-use of the hydrogen bomb in certain contexts; for example, in case the Soviet Union launched an invasion of western Europe with conventional forces. After all, nations have sometimes shown a readiness to inflict and sustain millions of casualties in conventional warfare to protect their core values like independence. A few million casualties resulting from a limited nuclear war seemed to some to be a lesser evil than the Soviet conquest of western Europe. But others thought that such use was ethically indefensible. Yet others thought it would be wrong, but for a different reason—the danger that such an attack would escalate into a full-scale nuclear war; they did not object to the limited first-use of the hydrogen bomb in principle. The acquisition and retention of nuclear weapons to deter a Soviet nuclear attack upon the West, which was officially stated to be the main purpose of the western deterrent, seemed ethically justifiable to many philosophers. Because, a government is duty bound to protect its citizens, to prevent what is infinitely horrible from happening to them. But it was also possible to argue, and some did argue, that it was unethical to intend to kill millions of innocent people, even for the purpose of preventing the killing of millions of equally innocent people in the West. (The principle behind deterrence was that the Soviet Union would not launch a nuclear attack upon the West if it knew that its own destruction was assured; that the West would respond with an equally devastating attack upon the Soviet Union.) Therefore, deterrence was morally wrong unless it was purely a bluff, which was not really a workable policy. Deterrence did give rise to a more specific moral problem. What if it failed, and the other side launched a nuclear attack, which completely devastated one's own country except for one's nuclear weapons, enough of which survive for an equally devastating counterblow? There would no longer be any benefit to one's own side in doing this; the only purpose would be to punish the aggressor (Graham 1998: 81– 97; McCall and Ramsbotham 1990; Sims 1981). A majority of western writers felt (and this writer agrees with them) that it would be wrong to take millions of innocent lives purely for the sake of punishment. To some, nuclear weapons seemed to be justified because they believed the West might otherwise have to surrender to each and every demand made by a nuclear-armed Soviet Union, or a Soviet Union which had given up nuclear weapons but had acquired a crushing political and military ascendancy in the Eurasian continent. But others thought that such considerations could not justify the retention of weapons of mass destruction. Discussion of the magnitude of harm, the benefit of various outcomes and the probability of outcomes, saw the expression of many different viewpoints. All agreed, of course, that an apocalyptic nuclear war would be a horrible catastrophe. But Finnis, Boyle Jr., and Grisez (1987), authors of an important book on nuclear ethics in the 1980s, thought that Soviet world domination, which in their view was the likely outcome of the West giving up nuclear weapons, would be every bit as horrible an outcome. Nevertheless, their ethical prescription, based on the Christian principle that one cannot knowingly intend to kill huge numbers of innocent non-combatants (they were by no means absolute pacifists), was that the West should unilaterally renounce nuclear weapons. That Soviet world domination would be as bad an outcome as an apocalyptic nuclear war was a minority viewpoint. Western writers generally agreed that an apocalyptic nuclear war would indeed be the worst possible outcome, but some brought in probabilistic considerations which they used to justify nuclear weapons conditionally, as a lesser evil compared to the consequences of renouncing them. Retention of nuclear weapons to protect the core values of the West was a leading theme. Even if a philosopher thought that a nuclear holocaust was the worst possible outcome, his assigning a very low degree of probability to it would make it possible for him to justify the nuclear deterrent in terms of the need to protect the core values of the West (by preventing Soviet world domination, ensuring the freedom and political survival of western communities, deterring a Soviet invasion of Western Europe with conventional forces, preventing the neutralisation of Western Europe and so on) if he thought that the likelihood of the loss of core values if the deterrent was given up was much greater than that of a nuclear holocaust if the deterrent was retained. For example, Gregory Kavka argued that while a nuclear holocaust was indeed the worst possible outcome, the probability of a nuclear war happening under current conditions was much less than that of unilateral western disarmament leading to Soviet world domination—also a very bad outcome. Therefore deterrence was morally superior to unilateral disarmament, although mutual disarmament was better than either. Kavka, therefore, favoured a policy of decreasing the probability of a less bad but more likely outcome instead of decreasing the probability of a worse but less likely outcome. He emphasised disaster probability rather than disaster size (1987: 57–77).

On the other hand, Jefferson McMahan thought unilateral disarmament morally superior to the deterrent because it would decrease the probability of the very bad outcome of nuclear war. The consequent increase in the probability of the less bad outcome of Soviet world domination would not be significantly greater than the decrease in the former, and the adoption of the policy would not have other undesirable consequences which, together with the increase in the probability of the less bad outcome, would outweigh the advantage of reducing the probability of the worse outcome (Finnis, Boyle Jr., and Grisez 1987: 224). It is obvious that such probability calculations were likely to be highly controversial and that the writer's values were likely to influence them. Robert Goodin presented another viewpoint: if there was a risk of something infinitely awful happening, probabilistic considerations were out of place, and everything had to be done to avoid that evil (Finnis, Boyle Jr., and Grisez 1987: 230). It is not totally senseless, however, to argue that a nuclear holocaust might in some contexts be more likely under unilateral disarmament than under deterrence. Both Stalin's Soviet Union and Mao's China may have had more security with nuclear weapons than without them.

Ethics and India's Nuclear Position Turning now to the case of India, we shall find not only that is it possible to identify ethical positions but also that there is no scope for ethical controversy unlike in the West during the cold war (the present-day West is a different matter). It is not possible to treat the possession of nuclear weapons convincingly as a necessary or lesser evil, or to successfully bring in competing values which would make possessing them arguably India's moral obligation. Nuclear weapons are capable of causing immense suffering. We can conclude from this that certain kinds of reasons for acquiring them are wrong. One must be able to argue that some huge evil is being deterred or some great good is being made available; reasons which do not lend themselves to such use do not justify the acquisition or retention of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons should not therefore be acquired for 'Great Power' status, for a place at the top of the international table. Nuclear weapons should not be acquired for internal political advantage. Nuclear weapons should not be acquired to strengthen one's hand in diplomatic and trade negotiations, for general national advantage (we reserve questions of supreme national importance, involving core values, for later examination). They should not be acquired to make a conventional war in South Asia less likely; the India–Pakistan wars of the past have not been particularly bloody and in a conventional war (but this is not an ethical argument) India would have the advantage. More than one of these considerations probably influenced the Indian decision to stage Pokhran-II, but they do not justify it, although they may help to account for it; in fact, they do not appear to be ethical considerations at all. Many people would probably reject this ethical position. They certainly would not say that Great Power status, for example, or general diplomatic advantage, would be worth a nuclear war. But they would invoke probability. They would say that such things are still worth having and that the probability of a subcontinental nuclear war is so infinitesimally small that the risk of it should be accepted. There would be a difference in moral assumptions between this writer and such advocates of nuclear weapons. In this writer's view, nuclear weapons are abominable and their acquisition can be argued for only if one can plausibly point to the deterrence of some immense evil, or the protection or gain of some immense good—which is not the case with reference to India. But the present writer's probability calculations are also different. In his view, which will be defended later, the risk of a South Asian nuclear war is uncomfortably high. If there is a possibility that another country may attack India with nuclear weapons, we can agree (although absolute pacifists and some others would dispute it) that the government has a right, indeed a duty, to protect its citizens from a nuclear holocaust. If the acquisition of nuclear weapons is the most efficacious way of ensuring protection, the Indian government has a right and a duty to acquire these weapons. Here, the outcome that is sought to be prevented is not a non-nuclear event whose probability is greater than that of a nuclear holocaust under deterrence, even if its magnitude of evil is less. Even those who think that a nuclear holocaust is the worst possible outcome and all our efforts should be directed towards avoiding it, can accept this argument if they are convinced that there really is a nuclear threat, although they are likely to insist that disarmament efforts should also be vigorously pursued. (There does seem to be an inescapable intellectual tension between maintaining that there is a nuclear threat and implicitly assuming that the adversary in

question will allow us to acquire the means of counteracting it without delivering the attack; but we shall overlook this difficulty.) But is there really a nuclear threat to India which justified Pokhran-I and Pokhran-II? Most observers agree that Pakistan's nuclear policy is reactive to India's policy. It might be argued that China attacked India in 1962 and is still illegally occupying Indian territory. Therefore, it may attack us again, perhaps with nuclear weapons this time. An accurate knowledge of the facts is essential in applied ethics, and the ethics of India going nuclear cannot be determined without an accurate knowledge of what really happened in 1962. Outside India, there is scholarly consensus that China did not attack India in 1962 and is not illegally occupying Indian territory now. Indian thinking on this subject has been done inside a cocoon. Or is it only the talk that is going on in a cocoon and not the thinking? Some other considerations should be kept in mind. China faced a threat of nuclear attack from the US and the Soviet Union, which justified its decision to go nuclear. China has never threatened other countries with nuclear weapons. It has promised no-first-use of nuclear weapons, and has agreed to give up nuclear weapons if other countries do so, which the US and Britain are unwilling to do. China's nuclear record is the cleanest among the nuclear weapon states. The likely adverse effects of nuclear adventurism towards India, on China's known priorities, which are economic, should be kept in mind. There are no political or ideological rivalries between China and India which might encourage Chinese nuclear blackmail aimed at forcing concessions from India; there are political and ideological differences but no rivalries. (The relationship between the West and the former Soviet Union was quite different.) The last consideration also rules out the possibility of a Chinese conventional invasion of India. Another decisive consideration in this context of trying to prevent a nuclear holocaust: the acquisition of nuclear weapons rather than self-limitation by India, to deter a nuclear attack, creates a much greater risk of a nuclear holocaust. For it greatly increases the risk of an Indo-Pak nuclear conflagration and to a much lesser extent, of a Sino-Indian nuclear conflagration. Other countries are provoked and not deterred by India's nuclear weapons. A decision to go nuclear means an arms race in South Asia (involving nuclear bombs, warheads and delivery systems, as well as conventional weapons), intensifying mutual suspicion and fear against the background of continuing crisis in Kashmir. In short, an atmosphere is created in which the risk of nuclear war between India and Pakistan becomes too high for comfort. There also exists the grave danger of nuclear war by accident. Neither India nor Pakistan can afford the electronic systems used by the superpowers during the cold war to lessen the danger of a nuclear war happening by accident. A pattern on a radar screen may be read wrongly as a missile attack. This may lead the country to launch its own nuclear weapons, for fear of losing them to an enemy strike, or for fear that the enemy strike may incapacitate its own command structure, making it impossible to deliver a retaliatory blow. An Israeli strike against Pakistani nuclear facilities might be mistaken by Pakistan for an Indian strike. When the US President Bill Clinton launched cruise missile attacks on targets in Afghanistan, an American general was sent to Pakistan to inform the government that the missiles that would be passing over their territory were American, not Indian.2 (This precaution was very necessary and one can only hope that it will be repeated in the future.) It may become necessary, in order to ensure the delivery of a retaliatory attack, to delegate decision-making power to field commanders, thus increasing the risk of nuclear war happening without a decision by the government. Even more serious, probably, is the risk of nuclear war by deliberate decision, but in an atmosphere of crisis, when decision-makers are likely to act out of psychological compulsions instead of rational calculations. The plain truth is that tested Pakistani nuclear weapons are now ready for deployment on aircrafts and missiles or perhaps have already been deployed. Few would deny that this is the outcome of Pokhran-I and Pokhran-II, and India's space programme. The likelihood of a Sino-Indian nuclear war is much smaller than that of an Indo-Pakistan war, if only because the Sino-Indian border problem is not a live wound like Kashmir. However, the chances are that there were no Chinese nuclear weapons targetted on India before Pokhran-II. Subsequent to India's announcement of its intention to deploy its nuclear weapons on delivery systems, there are Chinese weapons targetted on India. (Before Pokhran-II, there was no need for China to target Indian cities, because India could not have converted its nuclear devices into missile warheads without the additional tests that were carried out during Pokhran-II.) Moreover, it was reported after Pokhran-II that China was developing a short-range missile that would be deployed in Tibet to target Indian cities. It is easy for China to target north

Indian cities from Tibet, but economically prohibitive for India to target major Chinese population centres. That nuclear weapons can be acquired for deterring nuclear attack is a moral rule that would be acceptable to most. But one must always ask in such cases if deterrence is actually happening. Far from deterring a nuclear threat from China and Pakistan, Pokhran-II has created a Chinese nuclear threat where none existed and greatly aggravated the already existing threat from Pakistan, itself the product of Pokhran-I. China and Pakistan have been provoked, not deterred. Some might accept that China has never been a nuclear or any other kind of threat to India, but might still argue that past experience is not an infallible guide, that China might become a nuclear threat in the future, and India should therefore acquire nuclear weapons now, so as to be ready for such an eventuality. When the magnitude of a disaster is unimaginably great, why should even an infinitesimally small risk of it be accepted? But the infinitely small risk of the unimaginably great disaster happening must be weighed against the much greater risk of that disaster happening now, because of India's nuclearisation. Moreover, a moral rule must surely be universally acceptable. This argument would justify every nation in the world going nuclear, including all of India's South Asian neighbours. A variant of this phoney argument is being used by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, which claim a right to retain nuclear weapons in order to ward off alleged nuclear threats, lying in the future, from so-called rogue states and individual terrorists. Deterrence as a justification for acquiring nuclear weapons cannot apply uniquely to any one country. The India–Pakistan relationship has special features (historical circumstances, the festering wound of Kashmir and other factors) which make it much more reasonable for India to fear a nuclear threat from Pakistan if Pakistan goes nuclear, and for Pakistan to fear a nuclear threat from India if India goes nuclear, than for India to fear a nuclear threat from China. Had Pokhran-I and Pokhran-II been staged by Pakistan, the Indian government would have been justified in adopting the measures actually adopted by Pakistan. In other words, Pakistan's nuclear policy can be defended ethically. This is not because of their superior virtue, but the force of circumstances. While most people would agree that a country has a right to acquire nuclear weapons in order to deter a nuclear attack, this right does not exist in a vacuum. A policy of deterrence must be accompanied by sincere efforts for mutual disarmament. Since Pokhran-I, Pakistan has made numerous proposals which seem exactly calculated to lessen or to totally eliminate the nuclear threat both from India and towards India—adherence by both countries to the non-proliferation treaty (NPT), mutual inspection of each other's nuclear facilities, adherence by both countries to the comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), and so on. This is consistent with our moral rule, and shows that the Indian threat is a reality to Pakistani planners, and that their nuclear policy is truly a response to Indian activities. On the other hand, India offers to give up its nuclear options if the Big Five do so, not if China does so. This suggests that the Chinese threat is not a reality to Indian planners. It is Great Power status that is at stake. Of course, the retention of nuclear weapons by the Big Five is a great evil, but our present focus is on deterrence and Indian nuclear weapons are not meant for deterrence against those countries, not even, it appears, against China. A thermonuclear retaliatory strike by India against Pakistan would result in a huge number of Indian casualties from fallout, and a thermonuclear retaliatory strike by Pakistan in northwestern India would result in a huge number of Pakistani casualties. Even a purely nationalistic approach would have to take account of this factor when evaluating the nuclear policies of India and Pakistan. The moral difficulty involved in deterrence – intending to take millions of innocent lives, even if only to protect millions of one's own citizens – and the dilemma that would present itself if deterrence failed, arise in the South Asian context as well.

Conclusion Far from deterring an unimaginably evil outcome, which can be a justification for acquiring nuclear weapons, India's nuclear policy has created the possibility of such an outcome, in the form of a South Asian nuclear holocaust. Renouncing nuclear weapons would remove the threat from China, while Pakistan's position all along has been that it would give up nuclear weapons if India did so. The possibility of Pakistan cheating in a disarmament arrangement, influenced by a distrust of India, should not be treated lightly. But Pakistan's nuclearisation is the product of Pokhran I and II, and India must weigh this risk against that of continuing

with present policies. The solution would appear to lie in the strictest possible mutual or third party inspection. If there is a threat to India's core values, it comes not from China and Pakistan but from the developed world in the form of so-called globalisation. But how can nuclear weapons help India here? The Indian contention, that the perpetuation of the present nuclear club is unjustifiable, is morally sound. The present members of the nuclear club, except China, have all violated one or more of the ethical positions identified in this essay, and others as well. The cold war is over, but Britain and France have retained nuclear weapons to preserve Great Power status. Americans have said that although the cold war is over, they should retain nuclear weapons for the sake of general political and economic advantage. It is unpardonable in nearly all circumstances to use nuclear weapons first, but the US and Britain have refused to give a no-first-use pledge, probably in order to be sure of prevailing in situations like those created by the Gulf War. The US, Britain and France are perfecting their hydrogen bomb technology by trying to replace fission triggers with laser triggers. There is no move to prohibit such practices, while there is a move to curb fissile material production. The three western nuclear powers are acquiring overwhelming nuclear superiority, which could be used to tailor the world according to their specifications—a very different matter from protecting supreme national interests. What would happen if the far-right movements in some western European countries came to power aided (as before the Second World War) by the world depression, which seems to be in the offing? What would be the consequences for non-white nations, particularly those situated close to western Europe? The West justifies its retention of nuclear weapons as defence against rogue states and individual terrorists who may acquire them. But a law-abiding nation can become a rogue state, given the appropriate circumstances. If the rogue state/terrorist argument is valid for the western countries, it is valid for all countries. Such dangers imply that there should be a universal ban on nuclear weapons; they do not imply that a privileged few should retain them. The retention and continuous improvement of nuclear weapons by the West are great evils, but how are we to tackle this? It has been suggested that Pokhran-II was meant to contribute to the efforts at eliminating nuclear weapons globally, that it would act as a catalyst in international efforts in this regard. While the magnitude of good involved in such an outcome is very great, it is not clear exactly how Pokhran-II will mediate that outcome. There is also the question of the probability of, and the magnitude of harm involved in, a nuclear conflagration in South Asia as an outcome of Pokhran-II. We have seen that the probability of it is high; it is certainly a much more likely outcome of Pokhran-II than global nuclear disarmament. Moreover, it is not at all certain that the magnitude of harm which might result if the West retained nuclear weapons (the possible outcomes are nuclear blackmail or the use of nuclear weapons) would be greater than that resulting from a South Asian nuclear conflagration. Therefore, the West's hegemony must be fought in other ways, such as refusing to sign, or repudiating western-engineered arms control agreements. To conclude, there does not seem to be any scope for genuine ethical controversy over India going nuclear. It is ethically wrong for India to weaponise, and for the West to retain and refine its nuclear weapons. There seems to be no room here for ethical controversy, for weighing alternatives and making comparative judgements.

References Clark, Ronald W. 1975. The Life of Bertrand Russell. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Finnis, John, Joseph M. Boyle Jr., and Germain Grisez. 1987. Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Graham, Gordon. 1998. Ethics and International Relations. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Kavka, Gregory S. 1987. Deterrence, Utility and Rational Choice. In Moral Paradoxes of Nuclear Deterrene, ed. Gregory S. Kavka, 57–77. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McCall, Malcolm and Oliver Ramsbotham, eds. 1990. Just Deterrence: Morality and Deterrence into the Twenty-first Century. London: Brassey's. Sims, Nicholas P., ed. 1981. Explorations in Ethics and International Relations: Essays in Honour of Sydney D. Bailey. London: Croom Helm.

SIX

India's CTBT Policy: From 'Text' to 'Testing Times' K.M. SEETHI

outh Asia has become a veritable powder keg after a series of nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998. The Pokhran-II and Chagai tests escalated the tensions and conflicts in India– Pakistan relations, and accelerated the pace of nuclear arms spiral in the region. But the question of nuclearisation has been haunting the political communities in the subcontinent for more than three decades. The nuclear debate had acquired momentum when negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) reached a critical stage in the mid 1990s, particularly when India took a position in sharp contrast to its own tradition in fighting nuclear arms build-up across the world. For some time after Pokhran-II, it seemed as though the entire debate revolved around the nuclear adventurism exhibited by India. As Pakistan too activated its programme through the Chagai tests, the debate soon shifted to the subject of the India–Pakistan nuclear arms race. The unfolding scenario, in fact, presented a pathological obsession with nuclear arms and ballistic missiles. What did all this mean for the commoner in the subcontinent? The people of India and Pakistan celebrated the golden jubilee of their independence during 1997–98, and if the nuclear tests should be considered the logicalconsummation of fifty years of freedom, it would only amount to an exercise in ostentation, particularly when too many critical problems loomed large in the two countries in the post–cold war era.

S

Critics said that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has always been committed to a 'hidden agenda' behind its coalition parade. However, it has, without any inhibition, displayed its nuclear bravado in public view! The BJP has never tried to conceal its nuclear posture1 and, therefore, it is not surprising that the party has appropriated a convenient political space for its own advantages. Ironically, it is the 'hidden agenda' of the Indian state, as legitimised by the so-called secular parties, that has been unveiled. One must see how the Congress, the Janata Dal and the left parties have responded to this. They accused the BJP-led government of making a sudden shift in India's nuclear policy for its own partisan ends and saw no reason as to why the government should have undertaken the tests at that particular point of time. And, in the same voice, they congratulated the Indian scientists on making the tests a great success. Some of them even said that India's nationalist fervour would have been proved more meaningfully and effectively had these explosions been carried out before by secular governments. The leftists in India were not different either. In the context of the CTBT debate, they supported the 'hidden agenda' of the Indian nuclear lobby without reserve.2 As the debate was underway in India, the defence/strategic specialists whose views had been reinforced by political parties, academics and the media in general, had wholly appropriated the intellectual space. Lack of expertise and information in defence-related subjects led the general public to say that the defence specialists alone have the intellectual capacity and political privilege to engage in security discourses. The role of the Indian media has been equally sensitive. Very often, the media hype surpassed even the basic limits of mature and balanced reporting/analysis. On the issues of CTBT and nuclear adventurism, the media, in general, was in full support of the government position.3 Thus, the entire debate on the nuclear option and CTBT generated questions concerning the objectivity in assessment, on the one hand, and interpretations of nationalism, national security, national pride, self-determination, anti-imperialism and sovereignty, on the other. India's CTBT policy should, however, be placed within the broad spectrum of issues surrounding its nuclear programme with its history of more than half a century. It is true that not many people in India knew, until Pokhran-II, that India's nuclear programme was also linked with defence research and development. A veil of secrecy had always been maintained over the entire nuclear establishment. This had invited criticism

right at the beginning. Meghnad Saha, a celebrated nuclear scientist, had called India's nuclear decisionmaking 'extremely retrograde' (Sharma 1983). The secretive nuclear programme, which Saha referred to, got momentum after Homi J. Bhabha became chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which, in turn, was restructured granting extensive powers to him. The Atomic Energy Act of 1962 further strengthened the hands of Bhabha in sustaining this secretive programme. The Act restricted the disclosure of any information related to nuclear development activities (Sharma 1986: 5–17). The government was not obliged to reveal anything pertaining to this and even the amount being spent on nuclear development was not subject to official auditing. People were always kept in the dark and no public debate was encouraged on this subject until the CTBT question loomed large. Bhabha's stature grew, over the years, under the guardianship of the Nehru government. Though Nehru never publicly supported a military-oriented nuclear programme,4 Bhabha was able to continue with the dual-purpose nuclear project (Government of India 1988; Abraham 1999; Perkovich 1999). A public pronouncement on this subject was, however, not possible because Nehru's commitment to peace and nuclear disarmament always acted as a political check on Bhabha's ambition (Government of India 1983: 506–07). Yet, he made a statement in 1961 indicating that India could produce nuclear weapons in two years, if it so decided. In fact, the 1962 war with China and the Chinese nuclear explosion in 1964 provided the necessary political and strategic climate for contemplating weaponisation (Kapur 1976:193). Bhabha's statement in 1964 favouring a nuclear deterrent strategy reflected the mood in the nuclear establishment. At a Pugwash Conference in Udaipur, he said that with the help of nuclear weapons "a state can acquire what we may call a position of absolute deterrence even against another having many times greater destructive power under its control." Bhabha further said that "a country with a huge population, such as China, must always present a threat to its smaller neighbours, a threat they can only meet either by collective security or by recourse to nuclear weapons to redress the imbalance in size" (Bhabha 1964: 75). The nuclear hawks seized the occasion to clamour for an aggressive militarisation programme in which the nuclear establishment would be a willing partner. After Bhabha got a subterranean nuclear explosion project (SNEP) sanctioned by the Shastri government in 1964–65, weapon-oriented research gained momentum and ever since then the government has been committed to developing nuclear technology for military purposes. However, successive governments pursued a two-pronged strategy of preaching a 'peaceful nuclear development programme' and sustaining defence-oriented activities within the establishment. It was Vikram Sarabhai, successor of Bhabha, who, for the first time, designed a profile for atomic energy and space research keeping in view the development of advanced technology in these sectors for both peaceful and military purposes (Government of India 1970). In the meantime, India's opposition to the nuclear non- proliferation treaty (NPT) became more strident. Apart from questions relating to the discriminatory character of the treaty, paramount in its opposition to NPT was India's ambition to develop nuclear weapons. In early 1970 India was determined to pursue an explosion policy. The May 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) was the logical culmination of India's ambitious nuclear programme for politico-security objectives (Government of India 1975; Kargil Review Committee 2000: 203). Even while India's nuclear policy had shifted from 'peaceful' purposes to political and defence purposes, the policy-planners continued to argue that India would not produce nuclear weapons and that its commitment to disarmament and arms control had been quite genuine and consistent. Nonetheless, a powerful and influential bomb lobby in India had been asking for a more pronounced policy statement on India's nuclear options. A number of factors provided impetus for this lobby's campaign—Pakistan's nuclear ambitions, Chinese nuclear superiority and the latter's support to Islamabad's nuclear development programmes. Meanwhile, within a few years, India demonstrated that it could produce weapon-grade plutonium. The first such plutonium capability research reactor was built near Mumbai. The Indian government had declared that any plutonium produced would not be used for nuclear weapons, but the fact was that it was used for the nuclear explosion devices. India had since constructed and was operating a large nuclear research reactor that had significant plutonium production potential. There were also other indications which showed that India was keen on developing nuclear weapons. The Kargil Review Committee's report (2000: 199) acknowledged that the Indian nuclear programme had been "weapon-oriented at least since 1983". Alongside this, India

initiated a missile development programme, and the testing of a number of missiles, including Agni I and II in the 1980s and 1990s, pointed to India's ambition and capability in this field (Seethi 1997). Though successive governments dismissed allegations that the Agni missile was a nuclear weapon delivery system, the bomb lobby which desired the quick nuclearisation of India saw the Agni missile as a significant contribution to India's negotiating strength. In the 1980s, the collaboration between the defence, nuclear and space establishments had gathered momentum and, consequently, the defence build-up in India began on a massive scale (Kargil Review Committee 2000: 165–68; Seethi 1993). The action-reaction spiral continued in the region with both India and Pakistan testing and developing new classes of missiles and other sophisticated weapons. The atmospheric tension seemed to be subsiding for a while in the late 1980s, but got further impetus in the 1990s with the militarism of both India and Pakistan reaching a decisive stage.

Towards a Test Ban Regime It may be noted that India was one of the first countries to make a proposal for a nuclear test ban treaty (Government of India 1988: 10). The proposal at that time was quite genuine and reflected the mood and sentiments of the national leadership on this question. In the 1950s, Nehru had called for negotiations for prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and, in the interim, a standstill agreement to halt nuclear testing (Nehru 1983: 195–201). It is true that Nehru's proposal for a test ban was subsequently presented before the United Nations by India, and it strove hard to translate the proposal into reality. It is also true that all nuclear weapon powers were opposing a test ban treaty fearing that it would foreclose the possibility of developing and refining their nuclear weapons. They had strongly resisted such a test ban regime for forty years, defying at least eighty UN resolutions on this question. Yet, India continued its efforts at various levels to achieve complete nuclear disarmament, notwithstanding the fact that it too had sustained a weaponoriented nuclear programme under the pretext of peaceful research and development. India even signed the partial test ban treaty (PTBT) in 1963 knowing fully well that it was only 'partial' and that it did not put a ban on all types of nuclear tests and weapon development. However, over the years, a reorientation of India's nuclear posture was well underway, particularly after 1974. The Kargil Review Committee's report (2000: 204) says that in 1983, Indira Gandhi approved a nuclear test after discussions with Raja Ramanna, but it was abandoned due to pressure from the United States. Yet, the subsequent governments continued to nurture the test option even while nuclear ambiguity was the tactical choice of India. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, then scientific adviser to the defence minister, in his discussions with the Kargil Review Committee indicated that "the nuclear programme was well under way in 1989. Development has been completed and weaponisation took place between 1992 and 1994." Former Prime Minister Narasimha Rao also confirmed to the Committee that "the nuclear programme was fully weaponised during 1992–94" (Kargil Review Committee 2000: 205). However, the strategic landscape of the international system changed profoundly following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and other East European countries. In the early 1990s, the risk of nuclear war between the US and the Soviet Union (later Russia) seemed to have reduced with the end of the cold war, but the nuclear weapon powers still felt concerned about the emergence of new nuclear weapon states, particularly in the Third World. The proposal for a test ban treaty was revived against this background. The nuclear weapon powers then began negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty, which they had opposed for more than four decades. It was in this context that India and the US co-sponsored a resolution to this effect in the UN during 1993–94. However, India had apparently made it clear to the US officials that "where India's national security interests were involved, there could be no compromise, nor would we succumb to any external pressure" (Dixit 1996: 372). India, perhaps, did not anticipate that the test ban regime would become a reality given the fact that the nuclear weapon powers themselves had consistently opposed such a move. The dilemma for the Indian nuclear establishment and political leadership was that India was about to carry out nuclear tests and this would affect its nuclear posture in the global arena very badly. But leakage in the American press and subsequent American pressure on India again prevented the explosion project (Kargil Review Committee 2000: 205)Yet, the official perception was still in favour of a demonstration of India's nuclear weapon capability. According to J.N. Dixit, the relevance of measured ambiguity with respect to India's nuclear weapon programme and missile capacity was coming to an end: "Just declaring that we have certain potentialities is not enough. We must provide concrete proof that our potentialities are not limited to conceptual claims and that our potentialities are, in fact, operational realities. Eventually the world at large

will deal with us in terms of our proven capacities and strengths" (1996: 374). The debates on CTBT acquired momentum with such perceptions, and preparations were underway. The CTBT was negotiated over a period of two and a half years in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. However, the CD was not able to arrive at a consensus and forward the text to the UN because of India's reservations about some clauses of the proposed treaty. In August 1996, Australia requested the UN to reconvene the fiftieth UN General Assembly for the purpose of receiving and acting on the treaty. On 10 September 1996, the UN General Assembly adopted the CTBT by a vote of 158 to 3, with 5 abstentions. The treaty was opened for signature on 24 September 1996. The CTBT, as it had come into being, sought to prohibit all nuclear weapon test explosions or other nuclear explosions anywhere in the world. In order to verify compliance with its provisions, the treaty established a global network of monitoring facilities and allowed for on-site inspections of suspicious events. The treaty has a preamble, 17 articles, two treaty annexes and a protocol with two annexes detailing verification procedures. The preamble, while setting the overall political context of the treaty, stresses the need for the continued reduction of nuclear weapons worldwide with the ultimate goal of their elimination. It recognises that a test ban will constitute an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation by "constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons." As of 15 May 2000, 155 nations had signed, including all five nuclear weapon states, and 56 states, including France and the United Kingdom, had deposited their instruments of ratification.5 However, the treaty has been opposed by India, which projected it as a case of 'discrimination', in order to prolong the issue of its own adherence to the ban. India's CTBT policy itself was legitimised on the strength of a 'national consensus', political will, national sovereignty and self-determination. After Pokhran-II, arguments were even made in terms of India successfully breaking the monopoly of the hard-bargainers in the prestigious nuclear club. These were all narrow, short-sighted visions of public policies. Admittedly, there was hardly any continuity in India's public position on nuclear arms, except for these rhetorical expressions. There has, however, been a remarkable continuity in India's nuclear development programme, which always had, and still has, a military dimension. After Pokhran-II, the contradictions between New Delhi's public position and the hitherto clandestine weapon-oriented programme came to the fore, exposing the inherent contradictions in India's nuclear posture. The crucial phases of India's CTBT policy must be briefly outlined to expose these contradictions. In the first stage from 1954 to 1993, the general Indian position was in favour of a nuclear test ban regime, notwithstanding its own nuclear ambitions and the 1974 PNE. India took pride in the fact that Jawaharlal Nehru was the first statesman who put this proposal across to the world community. However, it fell through because all the nuclear weapon powers including the former Soviet Union and China opposed it for obvious reasons. During 1993–94 the nuclear weapon powers, including Russia and China, concluded that the time had come for a test ban regime because a nuclear diffusion order – particularly in the Third World, where it had been in the offing – would be extremely dangerous. The second stage in India's nuclear position began here, when India co-sponsored (with the US) a resolution to this effect in the UN. For a short while this seemed to have sustained the earlier Indian position (Dixit 1996: 372). However, as the test ban regime was seriously conceived and about to be materialised in the form of a draft text, India began to change its position (Dixit 1996: 373). The apparently idealist position sustained until then was soon to be thoroughly redefined with a mix of hyperrealism and 'global commitments'. The draft text was X-rayed to find loopholes, and the diagnosis pointed to some 'genetic defects' in the proposed treaty. The nuclear hawks in India seized the occasion to pick holes in the text, thereby calling it 'discriminatory' and 'unequal'. Here, the basic arguments of the Indian state need to be examined. First, India argued that the CTBT in its 'present form' was 'discriminatory' and 'unequal' in the sense that it would foreclose the possibility of other countries, especially those like India, enjoying or developing the technological capabilities which the advanced nuclear weapon powers already possessed. However, at no point did India raise this issue before 1993 (except in the context of the NPT debate), nor even during 1993– 94 when the draft text of the CTBT was getting ready. The arguments relating to the 'discriminatory' clauses of the CTBT further stressed that the treaty was not 'comprehensive' enough to prohibit sub-critical or zeroyield tests and computer simulation processes which would lead to fourth generation nuclear weapons (Government of India 1996b). There are several implications of this argument. First of all, did all the nuclear

weapon powers have the technological capability to conduct sub-critical tests? Certainly, the US had developed this technology. But what about other nuclear weapon powers who had already adhered to the CTBT? The fact was that India did not have adequate information to confirm the status of others. If it did, that should have been brought to the attention of the CD in Geneva and subjected to debate. However, other nuclear weapon powers like China, France, Russia, Britain, Pakistan and Israel had not insisted that subcritical tests be brought within the purview of the treaty. On the other hand, there was a provision in the treaty to incorporate changes or amendments into the text, the protocol or the annexes to the protocol under Article VII, and any state party could propose these changes at any time after signing the treaty. If India's concerns were genuine, couldn't it have been possible to bring in the question of sub-critical tests by proposing amendments to the original text as a state party? It is true that amendments require a positive vote of a majority of the state parties with no state party casting a negative vote in the amendment conference (Article VII-5). Yet, India's principled position and demands could have been forcefully argued within the Conference, and if there had been no results India could have safely withdrawn from the treaty. Article IX provides a provision by which each adherent shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardised its supreme interests.6 Curiously enough, the Indian posture was fully exposed when the government announced, after the Pokhran-II tests, that Indian scientists had collected sufficient data for conducting sub-critical experiments, as also other non-explosive research and development activity.7 Since then the Indian position has been fairly clear—not to press for bringing the question of sub-critical tests within the purview of the CTBT, because prohibition of such tests would be a set back to Indian nuclear adventurism. Thus, the 'unequal' and 'discriminatory' character of the treaty is no longer relevant to India! One must note here the duplicity of India's approach. But the irony of the situation was that India did not find any problem in adhering to the highly discriminatory GATT Final Treaty, and thereby becoming a founding member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) – one of the most powerful unequal economic regimes in the post-war period – almost at the same time that the CTBT question was being seriously debated. India's bartering away of its freedom and sovereignty to the WTO regime has been masqueraded in its opposition to CTBT, as if national selfdetermination was still in the hands of the Indian state. Another major argument against the CTBT was that Article XIV of the treaty would seriously jeopardise the sovereign right of the Indian state. Under Article XIV, the treaty will not enter into force until it has been signed and ratified by 44 states— including the five nuclear weapon states and the three 'threshold states' (India, Israel and Pakistan) listed by name in Annex 2 to the treaty. This clause was interpreted in such a way that under the existing conditions it was for the countries concerned to decide whether they should accede to it or not and, hence, nothing could be imposed on sovereign nations by unilateral measures. Ostensibly, the US was not very particular about this clause but it was vigorously insisted on by Russia, China and Britain with whom India had fairly good relations in the 1990s. However, an impression was created that these three powers were hiding behind India's opposition because if India refused to sign the treaty – whereupon it could not come into force – they could proceed with their nuclear ambitions. Did this mean that the US was simplistically accepting this argument? The strength of Article XIV, it should be noted, is that all 44 countries listed in Annex 2 were expected to be willing partners in this test ban regime, and if this annex was set aside, it would amount to diluting the very commitment of the regime, creating new loopholes in the treaty, thereby prolonging the possibility of test ban and disarmament into an indefinite future. India also sought a linkage between the CTBT and nuclear disarmament, and it was pointed out that a time-bound nuclear disarmament programme would be asine qua non for India's joining the test ban regime (Navlakha 1999; Jayaprakash 2000). In fact, the preamble of the treaty recognises that an end to all nuclear explosions will constitute a meaningful step in the realisation of a systematic process to achieve nuclear disarmament. It also recognises that the cessation of such test explosions constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects. Wouldn't it be premature to expect the adherents of the treaty to concede to any time frame for nuclear disarmament at a stage when even preliminary negotiations towards that end have not been completed? As a matter of fact, the CTBT and the

fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) would be positive steps in the direction of nuclear disarmament and they should not be prematurely interpreted to mean 'disarmament treaties'. As it turned out, the Indian position was intended only to expand on the question and the post–Pokhran-II responses of the government have confirmed this. At a later stage India also began to advance national security reasons to veto the treaty. This became more pronounced after the Pokhran-II explosions. Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh in a statement said that the decision to conduct the tests "was taken after due consideration of all factors relevant to India's national security. These tests ... address the security concerns of the Indian people and provide them with necessary assurance." He also said that in undertaking these tests, "India has not violated any international treaty obligations. The CTBT, to which we do not subscribe, also contains provision permitting state parties to withdraw if they consider that their supreme interests are being jeopardised" (Government of India 1998: 39). The 'principled' position of India thus stands exposed. Earlier, on 11 May 1998, the government, while justifying the nuclear tests, said that India would be prepared to consider being an adherent to some of the undertakings in the CTBT: "But this cannot obviously be done in a vacuum. It would necessarily be an evolutionary process from concept to commitment and would depend on a number of reciprocal activities" (Government of India 1998: 37). The 'reciprocal activities' actually meant beginning fresh bargains with the US in the military-strategic realm. This reflected a collaborationist attitude on the part of the BJP-led government towards the US, rather than a confrontationist stance at a higher level (Singh 1998: 41–52; Talbot 1999: 110–122). Yet, the fundamental question is whether India had any serious security threats that warranted militarisation and development of nuclear weapons during 1995–97. In fact, the so-called threats from Pakistan and China were largely blown out of proportion at that stage, and also contradictory to the statements of the ministry of external affairs and the Report of the ministry of defence. Contrary to popular belief, India's relations with Pakistan had shown signs of improvement in the mid 1990s. Notwithstanding occasional setbacks, the two countries understood each other's interests and had taken a number of steps to improve relations until the nuclear explosions in May 1998. More importantly, in the unfolding scenario, the US was not interested in setting up Pakistan against India. Former Prime Minister I.K. Gujral says that while he was in office he had taken a decision that India's foreign policy should not be Pakistan-specific. The BJPled government failed to appreciate the positive changes and what followed was a deliberate policy of accentuating tension in the region. In the post–Pokhran-II security scenario, Pakistan's policy was to secure a credible balance vis à vis India, and the parity syndrome, at last, gave way to nuclear adventurism. Relations with China were improving remarkably well in the 1990s. The Sino-Indian agreements of 1993 and 1996 – on the maintenance of peace and tranquillity along the line of actual control (LoAC), and confidence building measures (CBMs) – were good examples of this benign phase (Government of India 1996a: 169–71). Even when the relations were on a firm footing, India's Defence Minister George Fernandes, and a few others, were impudent enough to call China a 'potential threat'. The specific references to China in the letter written by Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee to US President Bill Clinton on 11 May 1998, in the wake of Pokhran-II explosions,8 and in the response of the ministry of external affairs on 16 May 1998, to a statement made by China (Government of India 1998: 35–36), reflected the BJP-led government's policy of indiscreet provocation of its neighbours. Interestingly, the ministry of external affairs had issued a statement on 6 May 1998 saying that "there has been a steady improvement inIndia–China relations" and that "the highlevel political dialogue has made an important contribution to deepening understanding and fostering cooperation in diverse fields" (Government of India 1998: 35). Furthermore, the ministry of defence in its Annual Report 1998–99 said India does not regard China as an 'adversary' , and sees Beijing as a 'great neighbour' with whom relations have "improved in recent years" (Government of India 1999). All this would confirm that there was a conscious manipulation of the views on India's security environment by the government in order to justify its nuclear explosions, thereby scuttling the CTBT. It is true that in the broader agenda of the BJP, India's nuclear weapon status has been a critical factor in mobilising popular sentiments for its militant nationalism. This certainly calls for 'new' and 'potential' threats to India's security. But if India argues that it cannot take any chance on the question of national security, the same logic could be applied to all countries, particularly the nuclear weapon powers. India is not the only country in the world facing threats from internal and external sources. The US has, perhaps, the largest

number of enemies across the world, and that would have been sufficient for it to sabotage the treaty as it did till the early 1990s (interestingly, the hardliners in the US used precisely the same argument for rejecting the CTBT in the Senate). But the US government was forced by circumstances to go along with the test ban treaty, as was the case with Britain, France, China and Russia. This, however, does not mean that the US track record has all along been clean and trustworthy. Nonetheless, its nuclear imperialist machinations could be effectively countered through legitimate international mechanisms of control and containment, and the question is whether countries like India should shirk their responsibility by moving away from their longproclaimed goals of nuclear disarmament and world peace. It was certainly bad news for New Delhi that a large majority of the Third World countries did not share India's viewpoint. Except Bhutan and Libya, not even a single non-aligned country supported the Indian position, and it was nothing but the most ignominious isolation in the world fora in its fifty-year history. New Delhi still claimed that it had the mandate of the Indian people and the Third World to fight an 'unjust' CTBT! But hardly was there any Third World country which believed that India's position was genuine and in tune with its disarmament policy. The contradictions of the Indian nuclear posture became fully evident with the Pokhran-II explosions. In fact, India's CTBT policy entered the third stage with it. Evidently, the nuclear test explosions were the end result of intense lobbying by the hawks who had become increasingly obsessed with weaponisation, and whose impatience had grown over time due to a lack of opportunity for staging a public demonstration of their 'hard work'. It is true that the BJP seized the opportunity, for it felt no qualms about the implications of the tests for India's future disarmament policy or for its relations with its South Asian neighbours. The nuclear tests have been used by the party to promote its narrow political objectives by whipping up jingoistic, narrow nationalist sentiments. Later on, India announced that it would observe a 'voluntary moratorium' and refrain from conducting underground nuclear test explosions (Government of India 1998: 40–42). At the same time, India pointed out that it would "ensure credibility of its nuclear deterrent through other means that did not require explosive testing". On 17 August 1999, the government of India released India's draft nuclear doctrine, prepared by the 27–member National Security Council and Advisory Board (NSAB), which called for "development of a credible, minimum deterrent" (The Kargil Review Committee 2000: 205). The doctrine was "necessitated by the security environment" and "strategic autonomy in decision-making". It "envisages assured capability to shift from peacetime deployment to fully employable forces in the shortest possible time, and the ability to retaliate effectively even in a case of significant degradation by hostile strikes."9 When doubts were expressed by press persons in New Delhi whether the doctrine would come in conflict with the provisions of the CTBT, K. Subrahmanyam, Convenor of the NSAB, contended that the "treaty did not prohibit ... research and development, including sub-critical testing".10 India's Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh later said that after the Pokhran-II nuclear tests "we have ensured the credibility of our nuclear deterrent into the foreseeable future; our scientists are now confident of conducting sub-critical tests, as also other non-explosive R and D activity necessary for the purpose."11 Interestingly enough, the CTBT debate has been revived in the post–Pokhran-II phase with an entirely different objective and dimension, and, surprisingly, the most vociferous opponents of the treaty during 1993–1997 have now become the best defenders of the treaty (Dubey 1999; Bidwai 2000). The earlier arguments against the CTBT are apparently 'outdated' in the context of the newfound role of India as a 'nuclear weapon power'!12 In fact, the proclaimed willingness to sign the CTBT was apparently another tactical posture by India seeking to legitimise its nuclear weapons and 'limited nuclear deterrent' doctrine rather than reflecting the basic commitment of the country to nuclear disarmament.

Conclusion Much has been said and written about India's 'principled' position on the CTBT. Yet, India's own retreat on the question has been consciously omitted in the debate for obvious reasons. The contestations surrounding the CTBT have even been given an aura of 'holiness' so that the BJP-led government's 'unalloyed' nationalism has a legitimate political space to prosper in. Here, the text of the CTBT is presented as 'unholy' and the test is

projected as sacred! With that, India's obsession for militarism has reached a decisive stage. This essay has attempted to delve into this by exposing the myth of 'credibility' and 'strength', which India was supposed to have gained while encountering critics, both at home and abroad. In sum, one can say with a fair degree of certainty that in the future India may find it difficult to sustain a credible and transparent position on the nuclear question, particularly in the background of the Pokhran-II tests. The ambiguity that has been maintained all along is still perpetuated in one form or another, even after the tests. Nowhere is this more evident than in India's CTBT policy, which is inherently contradictory.

References Abraham, Itty. 1999. The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State. New Delhi: Orient Longman. Bhabha, Homi J. 1964. The Implications of a Wider Dispersal of Military Power for World Security and the Problem of Safeguards. In Proceedings of the Twelfth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, January 27–February 1 1964. Udaipur. Bidwai, Praful. 2000. Mushroom Cloud of Unreason. Economic and Political Weekly, 35 (14): 1134–1135. Communist Party of India (Marxist). 1995. Documents of the Fifteenth Congress of the Communist Party of India, 3–8 August 1995, Chandigarh. New Delhi: CPI(M). Dixit, J.N. 1996. My South Block Years: Memoirs of a Foreign Secretary. New Delhi: UBSPD. Dubey, Muchkhund. 1999. Signing the CTBT. The Hindu, 28 December. Government of India. 1983. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches: 1953–57. Vol. 3. New Delhi: Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. ——. 1970. Atomic Energy and Space Research: A Profile for the Decade 1970–80. Mumbai: Department of Atomic Energy. ——. 1975. Annual Report 1974—75. Bombay: Department of Atomic Energy. ——. 1988. Disarmament: India's Initiatives. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs. ——. 1996a. Foreign Affairs Record, 42 (11). New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs. ——. 1996b. India's official stand on the CTBT: Statement by Arundhati Ghose, India's Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva, at the Plenary Session of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs. ——. 1998. Foreign Affairs Record, 44 (5). New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs. ——. 1999. Annual Report 1998–1999. New Delhi: Ministry of Defence. Jayaprakash, N.D. 2000. Nuclear Disarmament and India. Economic and Political Weekly, 35 (7): 523–33. Kapur, Ashok. 1976. India's Nuclear Option: Atomic Diplomacy and Decision Making. New York: Praeger. The Kargil Review Committee. 2000. From Surprise to Reckoning. New Delhi: Sage. Navlakha, Gautam. 1999. Nuclear weapons: Demystifying Restraint Regime. Economic and Political Weekly, 34 (26): 1664–1665. Nehru, Jawaharlal. 1983. India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches: September 1946–April 1961. New Delhi: The Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Perkovich, George. 1999. India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation. Berkeley: University of California Press. Ram, N. 1999. Riding the Nuclear Tiger. New Delhi: Leftword. Seethi, K.M. 1997. Nuclear/Space Technology for Defence: The Indian Experience. Kerala Journal of Social Science, 1.2 (1): 55–66. ——. 1993. Political Economy of India's Arms Build-up. Occasional Paper No. 1. School of International Relations, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam. Sharma, Dhirendra. 1983. India's Nuclear Estate. New Delhi: Lancers. Sharma, Dhirendra. 1986. The Indian Atom Power and Proliferation: A Documentary History of Nuclear policies, Development and the Critics 1958–1986. New Delhi: Philosophy and Social Action. Singh, Jaswant. 1998. Against Nuclear Apartheid. Foreign Affairs, 77 (5): 41–52. Talbot, Strobe. 1999. Delink with the Bomb in South Asia. Foreign Affairs, 78 (2): 110–122.

PART III The Big Powers

SEVEN

Indo-US Relations in the Post–Cold War Era: Changing Security Perceptions SHAILAJA MENON

ndia's relations with the United States have entered a crucial phase in the era of globalisation and post– cold war global realignments. Even as relations get strengthened across a wide spectrum of areas, questions have been raised whether non-alignment, which had been instrumental in navigating the pitfalls of superpower rivalry, should still be relevant or be explained and understood in the light of the emerging world realities, India's economic backwardness, social problems and political compulsions (Government of India 1998c: 99–103; Dixit 1996: 376–78; Rajan 1993). Increasingly, India has allowed the terms of engagement with the US to preclude the policy of non-alignment, which previously had been an area of discord between the two countries. The report of the Carnegie Endowment Study Group on US–India relations brought out in 1993 noted that during the cold war years, "India's policy of non-alignment and its significant military dependence on the Soviet Union was a continuing focus of American distrust." The report further stated that as Indian military capabilities have grown, so have American concerns and anxieties with regard to India's policy towards the US interests in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, as well as its "development of a nuclear weapons options, together with successful tests of a nuclear- capable intermediaterange ballistic missile" (Harrison and Kemp 1993: 7).

I

Evidently, India and the US have had different views on the role of their respective countries. During the cold war, the United States had considered communism and the Soviet Union (significantly, not China) the chief threats to world peace. India held a different position, preferring to focus on the development of the country by attempting to obtain aid from both superpowers by enunciating the policy of non-alignment (Government of India 1983: 24–85). The structure of the global order after World War II, based as it was on strategic interests, created two blocs, with nations identified as either supporters or antagonists of one of the camps. India's non-alignment did not win much favour with the US, particularly in the 1950s when the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles called it "an immoral and shortsighted conception".1 Successive American administrations followed this policy of viewing non-alignment rather critically. For instance, President Richard Nixon's reservations about India and its policy of non-alignment are really well known (Kux 1994: 279 and 318; Kissinger 1979: 848). India also did not appreciate the American policy of equating Pakistan with India rather than China, in Asia. There have always been serious objections in India to the tendency to devalue India's role vis à vis China and Pakistan (Government of India 1983: 215). In short, the US and India have held different views on foreign policy, security and the latter's place in Asia. Over the years, however, India's growing military strength had been recognised by the US and a pragmatic relationship had evolved despite the US–Pakistan military collaboration (constructed to offset the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan). Dennis Kux observed that for Washington, "the most logical policy" would be "to treat India as a significant Asian power with which the United States should seek friendly relations, including expanded security cooperation....India is large enough, and economically and militarily of sufficient importance, that the Indo-US relationship could have strategic importance in its own right" (1994: 451). Indeed, one could trace the beginnings of not an alliance but a friendly strategic understanding between the two countries in the mid 1980s. The US had begun to assist India in the light combat aircraft (LCA) project (Kux 1994: 430) and military exchanges had begun to take place between the two defence forces and navies (Harrison and Kemp 1993: 35). However, this understanding was based on the premise that India would not

disturb the status quo—this again did not reflect a true appreciation of India's security needs. The report of the Carnegie Endowment Study Group stated that "the United States has correctly emphasised that (joint training exercises) should not be viewed as the harbinger of a formal military alliance or of concessional arms sales." Moreover, the report suggested that the US Central Command and the Pacific Command "should coordinate their activities in South Asia, including both India and Pakistan within their purview and treating them on similar basis" (Harrison and Kemp 1993: 35). The US had, from time to time, fuelled subcontinental differences due to cold war politics and given little credence to India's concerns regarding China and crossborder terrorism in Kashmir. Nor did it take into consideration India's reservations on the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Thus, India's security relations with the US have been conflictual because of their differing viewpoints on the role of Pakistan (especially with regard to the Kashmir question), the role of China and the nuclear issue. However, the Central Asian region and the issue of terrorism originating in India's neighbourhood have been of concern to both countries. Yet, the US and India had been on opposite sides during the Afghan crisis following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1979) and have still not been able to tackle the problem of terrorism emanating from that area effectively. The US had attempted to bring in a new international order at the end of the cold war, which was to be hierarchical in nature. It comprised the US at the top and the other United Nations Security Council members as partners of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) grouping, and Japan, etc. as allies. This hierarchy followed an agenda comprising global nuclear non-proliferation, protection of human rights (even though that was not to China's liking) and globalisation (Government of US 1992). Such issues also form the structure of Indo-US relations. Besides, both the countries have held several sessions to discuss matters which are obviously derived from the politics of the subcontinent. Though India has persisted in its decision to discourage any third party mediation to solve disputes in the region, contending that inter-state conflicts have to be solved from within the region and not at the urging of the US, it has been pragmatic enough to confer with the US on ways of reducing tensions, without involving its active participation (Dixit 1996: 172–207).

Nuclearisation, Pakistan and Security India with its anti-colonial legacy did not succumb to superpower pressure during the cold war days and continued to resist the pattern set by the US in the new order. However, both the countries, over the years, donned a self-righteous tone in their dealings with each other. India's desire to promote universal disarmament rather than be a signatory to a discriminatory system (Government of India 1988) which permitted only a few to possess nuclear weapons, provoked the ire of the US (Kux 1994: 316–17). India had never agreed to American terms of nuclear engagement, but with the test explosions in May 1998, the question could be asked whether India now wanted to be part of this discriminatory system. Seen in a historical perspective, these tests were not totally unexpected. India had been moving from the conventional defence posture of the 1980s to its present argument of nuclear deterrence (Government of India 1998a: 38– 42). The balance between India's penchant for nuclear deterrence and urge to become a maritime power, on the one hand, and the desire to continue the old policy of sufficient border defence against Pakistan and China, on the other hand, has always been shifting and undecided. The situation today is indicative of a definite shift towards the former and necessitates a change in its relation with the US. India's threat perceptions regarding China and Pakistan hardly received any attention in the US.2 The reaction of the US to India's nuclear explosion reflected its disregard for nations possessing different viewpoints on security (Government of India 1998a: 46), although its subsequent pronouncements apparently took note of the fact that India had its owns reasons for conducting a test.3 However, much before the Pokhran-II tests, there were indications that the US would accept India's status as a nuclear power in the future (Harrison and Kemp 1993: 2). But was it worth exploding the bomb or proceeding to build a stockpile to secure this kind of recognition? It is also inconceivable to think that Pakistan would refrain from raking up the Kashmir controversy or seeking parity of arms with India by any means. Nor would China halt its missile transfers or the modernisation of its army by the mere fact of an Indian nuclear bomb. Many have argued that

poor countries like India can ill-afford to neglect the social indicators of development and invest enormous amounts in militarisation and the manufacturing of bombs (Ghosh 1999: 17–23; Reddy 1998). It is certainly a question of purchasing security at a very high cost where the threat of even minimum deterrence adds only to suspicion and the extreme right fringe wielding fearful influence. The US had, through its non-proliferation regime, managed to curb many countries from nuclearising themselves (Yager 1980), but its questionable stance on total disarmament did not popularise the cause. Evidently, the US could not prevent Pakistan from weaponisation, nor did it halt the Chinese from selling nuclear technology to others. The cold war and its end should have taught one lesson—the futility of possessing nuclear weapons, its lack of utility and the problems of storage and disposal. India's declaration of a voluntary moratorium on further tests (Government of India 1998c: 96–97) and its offer of no-first-use pledge to Pakistan cannot put the genie back, but it can lead to more effective confidence building measures (CBMs). It is here that the US can play an important role in offering concrete suggestions to improve relations between India and Pakistan. In fact, the report of the Carnegie Endowment Study Group had already recommended that the US should continue to press for nuclear restraint in South Asia, and both India and Pakistan should be drawn into "worldwide agreements" barring further nuclear testing and further production of fissile materials for weaponisation purposes by any state (Harrison and Kemp 1993: 36). However, the US had, for long, been a party to the subcontinental conflict because of its arms sales to Pakistan, but the halt to such sales since the 1990s (Dixit 1996: 138; Harrison and Kemp 1993: 34) and the growth of pragmatic relations between the US and India created a climate whereby the latter could engage in talks with the US, even after the Pokhran-II tests (Government of India 1998b: 68–69). The economic sanctions slapped by the US because of the nuclear tests could have compelled India to pursue a series of measures that would have had an impact on its security but, as recent events have shown, the country has been able to withstand them with some success. In fact, the US has already initiated measures to waive sanctions, for they have become an ineffective tool. In the ultimate analysis, the nuclear explosions did not bring any significant gains to India. However, the opprobrium which it had faced then has vanished, and the US has accepted the reality of both India and Pakistan being not just two nuclear capable powers, but nuclear weapon states. But it is a dubious recognition, which has not led to any enhancement in India's security. Recent events have only served to indicate the seriousness of the tinderbox situation in the South Asian region. India has been quite restrained in its response to Pakistani aggression and cross-border terrorism, primarily because of the fear that Pakistan would not hesitate to use its nuclear arsenal in the place of its comparatively weaker conventional forces.

The China Factor China is also a sensitive factor in Indo-US relations. In American foreign policy China outweighs countries like India and, naturally, a feeling prevails in New Delhi that Indian concerns are never taken seriously in Washington. The report of the Carnegie Endowment Study Group also noted this: The American tendency to treat Beijing as more important than New Delhi has long been a major irritant in Indo-American relations. Washington rails at China for not becoming a democracy, but minimises the fact that India already is one. In American imagery, a strong, powerful China is often contrasted with a backward India. (Harrison and Kemp 1993: 32) For the US, China, a Security Council member, a fellow nuclear power state and more recently, a rising new economic power, carries more weight in Asia. These factors, as well as the part played by China in the American economy, can explain China's importance to the US. Dixit is right in saying that the US motivation in the post–cold war era is to exploit "economic opportunities available in China to the maximum possible extent in the context of modernisation and liberalisation of that country" (1996: 175). Therefore, it was in line with this policy of coopting China that US asserted a joint role in preventing an arms or nuclear missile race in South Asia (Dixit 1996: 370). But this has been viewed with disfavour by India. China, because of its role in Pakistan's nuclear weapon capability and its missile deployment potentialities (Dixit 1996: 411), could be a part of the problem not the solution. The US stance on China has obviously been a source of tension for India. And New Delhi cannot rely on current US policies to protect it from violations of international regimes

by China and Pakistan. Thus, India will have to negotiate for strong commitments by the US to prevail upon China when international obligations are violated, in return for India's commitment to nuclear treaties. Here India needs to define its objectives very clearly, and not in relation to just Pakistan and China. The US counter argued that it had wanted China to get involved only because India had first pointed it out as a security threat. The US also argued that it had worked hard to eliminate the Chinese transfer of technology and had successfully limited this, as it could have been worse.

Kashmir and Kargil Kashmir, of course, has been a major irritant in Indo-US relations. Kashmir has been the focus of the India– Pakistan conflict, and continues to be so. It has been the long-held position of the US that peace will prevail in South Asia only if it settles the Kashmir problem and undertakes CBMs to reduce the arms race and weaponisation programmes in the region. Though the US has many times offered its services as a mediator, it has accepted India's contention that differences between Pakistan and India can only be resolved through bilateral discussions (Dixit 1996: 179; Harrison and Kemp 1993: 34). However, the US does not accept that Kashmir is purely an internal issue of India and has stated that negotiations can be conducted only by taking into account the interests of the people of Kashmir. The American officials expressed the view that "India should be more transparent about the situation in Kashmir and should pay more attention to maintaining high standards of human rights" (Dixit 1996: 179). The report of the Carnegie Endowment Study Group, in fact, favoured "American support for some form of UN involvement, provided that both parties join in inviting a UN role and that such a role is predicated on adherence to past UN resolutions on Kashmir" (Harrison and Kemp 1993: 34). A test case for Indo-US relations, in the post–cold war era, came during the Kargil conflict in May 1999, when Pakistan undertook to change the balance of power in the region by sending in armed forces under the guise of 'freedom fighters' for a jihad in Kashmir. They occupied the heights in Kargil in a bid to raise the ante and win territory or points in the perennial Indo-Pakistan tug of war (The Kargil Review Committee 2000). The Indian government showed commendable restraint in not letting the conflict spread further. The government consciously refrained from sending troops into Pakistan and stuck to the task of throwing out the infiltrators. India managed to win over those countries which had been very vocal and critical about its nuclear stance and, in fact, gained global support in the Kargil conflict. The Kargil problem highlighted a specific dimension of India's relationship with the US. Pakistan clearly was not attuned to the post–cold war parameters of politics in which global values of democracy, economic progress and good governance held sway. Having realised that the US was the sole superpower, it still continued to entertain the idea of mediation to solve the Kashmir issue. It had sought to change the contours of South Asia but failed in its endeavour because the US did not respond in the expected manner. The US very clearly told Pakistan that its actions did not have US support and urged it to call back its forces and return to the negotiating table. Pakistan did finally retreat, not just due to American pressure but also due to India's own determined effort to clear its territory of Pakistani soldiers. However, the US later underlined its role in reducing tensions in the region. In an interview in September 2000, President Bill Clinton said: "We will continue to encourage resumption of a dialogue that will lead to a settlement that takes into account the wishes of the people of Kashmir, and to assist in that dialogue, if that is the desire of the parties" (Government of US 2000: 17–18). He said that the US would be "willing to offer further assistance if both countries request, but we are not mediators" (17). Apparently, the US continues to influence much of Pakistan's policy direction, but the question is: 'For how long?' The Kargil crisis was a pointer to this influence but the subsequent military takeover was equally telling. The army is a more potent force than any political party and that reality cannot be wished away, a fact that India will have to eventually recognise and the Americans will have to accept. It is true that the US had been urging the Pakistanis to revive democracy and restart the Lahore peace process that had been interrupted by the Kargil war. In fact, President Clinton had touched down in Islamabad on the way back from the state visit to India in March 2000 to convey his concerns and strong disapproval of Pakistani actions. Undoubtedly, over the years, the American style of dealing with India has changed. The hectoring tone of the earlier Clinton administration, in which Robin Raphael, assistant secretary of state in charge of the South Asian Bureau, had alienated many in India (Dixit 1996: 191–93), does not prevail any more. True, Madeleine

Albright, the secretary of state under the Clinton administration, also made unpalatable statements, and American officials have argued that what she said on Kashmir and non-proliferation was not new. But American assessment in recent times has moved closer to Indian perceptions. A combination of terrorist activities, commercial interests and nuclear politics has driven the US to take on a more proactive role in the region. President Clinton's visit to India in March 2000 and Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to the US in September that year were milestones in Indo-US relations. Richard Celeste, the American ambassador to India, had in fact stated in a virtual admission of American blindness, that the president's visit was long overdue. Part of the reason for this visit was commerce because India was going to be a big market of the future. Partly, it was because of a growing Indian American lobby in the US. But it was also because, as the ambassador said, the US was looking down the road twenty or thirty years to check out those countries which would be important to the US and the world (Government of US 2000: 11–12). When President Clinton ventured on this much-awaited visit to the region, it was to set this lacuna right and pursue American economic and security interests in the region. The American statements during this time seemed to indicate that a policy had been formulated that took into account both Indian concerns as well as the US global interests. Indeed, President Clinton said that South Asia faced enormous challenges, which he thought could be addressed with the help of the US. He elaborated them as poverty alleviation, promotion of economic growth, defeating terrorism and averting conflicts and nuclear confrontation. He also recognised the latent strengths in India saying that the Indian economy was one of the fastest growing in the world.4 He came to India to try, among other things, to persuade it to sign the comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), though he had not succeeded in convincing his own Congress to ratify it. He did not succeed in his task in India as well, but he went a long way in addressing the genuine worries about America's role vis à vis Pakistan. Later, during Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to the US, the two countries reaffirmed their intention to develop a broad political consensus on the issue of the CTBT and reiterated their support for a global treaty to halt the production of fissile material for weaponisation purposes and for the earliest possible start of fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) negotiations in Geneva (Government of US 2000: 72–73). Earlier, during Clinton's visit, India and the US had brought out a joint statement known asIndia–US Relations: A Vision for the 21st Century in which the two countries resolved to build a dynamic political partnership and "work together for strategic stability in Asia and beyond". At the same time thevision statement acknowledged the respective differences in their perceptions and policies: "The United States believes that India should forgo nuclear weapons. India believes that it needs to maintain a credible minimum nuclear deterrent in keeping with its own assessment of its security needs. Nonetheless, India and the US are prepared to work together to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery" (Government of US 2000: 138). The two countries decided to forge closer ties in key areas such as terrorism, defence, science and technology. In spheres where the two had disagreements, they decided to continue talks. This was an important result of the visit—the attempt to place the relationship in a long-term perspective rather than constrain it to an immediate framework. The US, during this period, came closer to the Indian position on Kashmir, stating that there had to be respect for the line of control. In a very important political shift, the US urged the creation of an appropriate environment for the resumption of a purposeful India– Pakistan dialogue. Indian officials were delighted by the concessions made by the US though the president was careful to assert that there could be no 'military solution to Kashmir' only a political one. In response to American demands to end cross-border violence, Pakistan's president, General Pervez Musharraf, insisted on reciprocal action from India. But the US stated that it was up to Pakistan to restore trust with India. After the initial bitter reaction, Pakistan seemed to have accepted the advice of the US and stated that they would plan to call the extremists in their country to the negotiating table to discuss ways of establishing peace. However, it remains to be seen whether their intention can be translated into a reality. It is very clear that Pakistan will not agree to a bilateral dialogue with India easily and is still hoping for American mediation. The distrust, which has characterised the relationship between India and the US for long, seems to have ended. Earlier, the US had been part of the problem for India's acrimonious relations with Pakistan and it had steadfastly refused to countenance any kind of conciliatory effort. Now, India has shown a willingness to

accept US help, though not mediation, to restore stability in South Asia. The divergent viewpoints – on Kashmir, nuclearisation and China – which had bedevilled relations between the two nations earlier, have become less divisive in recent times. The US has attempted to accommodate Indian interests and has accepted India's efforts to work for a more equitable world order.

Conclusion India has certainly evolved a pragmatic foreign and defence policy, which may take the next few years to pay any concrete dividend. At present, there is a discernible shift in the security relations between the two countries, which ought to augur well for the future. The US still tends to see India as an important player in the 'most dangerous place in the world'. But it is, unlike before, shifting away from the previous approach of weighing in with Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir or terrorism. There is a clear signal that the US no longer equates the two countries—an attitude welcomed by New Delhi. TheVision statement signed by the leaders of the two countries outlined a mechanism which needs to be strengthened so that a mutually beneficial relationship would evolve in time.

References Dixit, J.N. 1996. My South Block Years: Memoirs of a Foreign Secretary. New Delhi: UBSPD. Ghosh, Jayati. 1999. The Bomb, the Budget and the Economy. In Out of Nuclear Darkness: The Case for Disarmament. New Delhi: MIND (Movement in India for Nuclear Disarmament). Harrison, Selig S. and Geoffrey Kemp. 1993. India and America After the Cold War: Report of the Carnegie Endowment Study Group on U.S.Indian Relations in a Changing International Environment. Washington D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Government of India. 1983. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, 1963—1964. Vol. 5. New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. ——. 1988. Disarmament: India's Initiatives. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs. ——. 1998a. Foreign Affairs Record, 44 (5). New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs. ——. 1998b. Foreign Affairs Record, 44 (7). New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs. ——. 1998c. Foreign Affairs Record, 44 (9). New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs. The Kargil Review Committee. 2000. From Surprise to Reckoning. New Delhi: Sage. Kissinger, Henry A. 1979. The White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Kux, Dennis. 1994. Estranged Democracies: India and the United States 1941–1991. New Delhi: Sage. Nehru, Jawaharlal. 1983. India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches. September 1946–April 1961. New Delhi: The Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Rajan, M.S. 1993. India's Foreign Policy: The Continuing relevance of non-alignment. International Studies 30, no. 2 (April–June): 141–50. Reddy, C. Rammanohar. 1998. The Wages of Armageddon. The Hindu, 31 August. Government of US. 1992. US Defence Planning Guide for the Post-Cold War Era. Washington D.C.: Department of Defence. ——. 2000. Official Visit of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to the United States: September 13–17, 2000.. New Delhi: Public Affairs Section, Embassy of the United States of America. Yager, Joseph, ed. 1980. Non-proliferation and US foreign Policy. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution.

EIGHT

India and Russia in a Changing World RAJEN HARSHE

ince the end of the cold war and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, international relations have constantly been in a state of flux. Naturally, the relatively unfamiliar trajectories of the post–cold war international system are difficult to understand with the help of existing schools of thought in international relations studies. Keeping this uncomfortable reality as the backdrop, this essay would make a modest effort to recast the changing dimensions of Indo-Russian ties in the context of international relations after the cold war. The sequence of this exercise is as follows. It begins by highlighting a few significant changes that have been affecting international relations. Subsequently, it briefly underlines the impact of such changes on India and Russia. Finally, it presents an analysis of Indo-Russian ties in politico-strategic, economic and military spheres to appraise their changing nuances. In view of this sequence, it would be appropriate to discuss the major changes in international relations by underlining the role of capitalism in the post–cold war world.

S

Capitalism and Globalisation With the end of the cold war, capitalism has emerged, at least for the time being, as the triumphant mode of development. Owing to its resilience, capitalism has steadily evolved over the span of the past four centuries by acquiring a measure of stability as well as durability. In fact, as a constantly evolving world system, capitalism has demonstrated extraordinary capabilities to encompass almost the entire globe within the orbit of its operations. Even apparent radical adversaries of capitalism such as China, in effect, are following a variant of the capitalist model under 'market socialism'. The East European states as well as the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have already inaugurated the process of capitalist development. What is more, Third World countries like Angola, Ethiopia and Vietnam, after the collapse of their socialist experiment, are being integrated into the world capitalist system. In view of the operational complexities of capitalism, it might be difficult to arrive at a neat definition. However, as a resilient system, capitalism can be broadly identified with the following features: (a) private/corporate ownership of the means of production; (b) growth and development of wage labour; (c) socialisation of the process of production with private appropriation of surplus (that is accrued through production) in the form of profits; (d) relationship between wage labour and capital characterised by a mélange of conflict and cooperation; and (e) an in-built drive to stimulate the process of accumulation and reproduction of capital. Being essentially global in its expanse, capitalism is inevitably associated with the process of globalisation. Before reflecting on the nature of such an association, it would be necessary to understand a few major implications of the phenomenon of globalisation. At the outset it must be stated that the process of globalisation is infinitely complex. These complexities, with all their subtle nuances, are going to unfold themselves continuously in the forthcoming decades. In a way, owing to the acceleration of the pace of globalisation, capitalism and its potential to operate in the global space are likely to be constantly tested. Under the circumstances, it would sound quite imprudent to jump to any hasty conclusions about the content as well as the course of globalisation. The process of globalisation, as Roland Robertson (1992) has put it, involves compression of the world

and the intensification of the consciousness of the world as a whole. Such consciousness can gradually take shape as the structures of integration unleashed by the process of globalisation widen as well as deepen the interactions among the diverse parts of the world. In substance, internationalisation, in all its aspects, is a step towards globalisation. The spread of the process of globalisation is likely to be uneven. Moreover, as this process unwinds itself, the benefits of globalisation are also going to spread unevenly across diverse parts of the world. Obviously, certain states as well as classes would gain more from globalisation than the others. In a word, an intertwined association between globalisation and capitalism could perpetuate the process of combined and uneven development that has been integral to the development of capitalism. Owing to the uneven gains it would be unrealistic to expect a uniform response towards the process of globalisation from the diverse actors participating in this process. For instance, the captains of multinational corporations (MNCs) in New York can view globalisation as a triumph of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism has essentially aimed at releasing the market forces from state control by giving paramount importance to various measures of privatisation and liberalisation. Hence, neoliberalism welcomes trends towards globalisation. In contrast to neoliberal proponents of globalisation, the clerics from Tehran might be apprehensive enough to locate the invisible hand of the US imperial machine behind the whole process of globalisation. With the growing politicisation of Islam in West Asian and North African (WANA) countries, vehement opposition to the US-led globalisation from the Islamic groupings of various hues has become all the more imminent, especially after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the US. Notwithstanding these uneven responses, since globalisation brings a multiplicity of organisations from diverse places across nations and states into one single space, it would inevitably unfold an impressive array of projects directed towards multilateral cooperation. Such cooperation, in its turn, would assume complex forms of interdependence as well as patterns of social relations. Like cooperation, conflict, with all its diverse forms and nuances, would be embedded in this very process. Indeed, multilateral and multilayered dimensions of conflicts would gradually unveil themselves under globalisation. The phenomenon of globalisation is pregnant with immense possibilities of homogenisation. It might well boil down to the export of the lifestyles or worldviews of the stronger states to the weaker states. Thus, people around the world might appear depressingly similar in their choices in different spheres of life. However, homogenisation need not be confused with abolition of differentiation in power. On the contrary, globalisation will provide a new context for power rivalries by providing wider horizons of political action, and throwing up new sets of values, opportunities and alliances. This would qualitatively change the modes of operation of power (Brown 1995: 54–68). The growing significance of transnational regimes like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, the United Nations (UN) and the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) regime, offer evidence of this proposition. Similarly, transnational movements concerned with issues of global significance have already witnessed a phenomenal growth. For instance, issues like human rights or environment have come to the foreground owing to the growing transnational intersocietal networks of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which are promoting these causes across the world. In view of these complex implications of globalisation, an intertwined association between globalisation and capitalism merits special attention. Indeed, the process of globalisation need not be reduced to capitalism (Scholte 1997: 427–52). However, thanks to the capacity of capitalism to be expansive, on the global scale, capitalism and globalisation will mutually reinforce each other. For instance, contemporary capitalism is characterised by increasing dominance of the MNCs as well as finance capital. In fact, activities of the giant MNCs are increasing in range, depth and power. The continued spread of the MNCs has bolstered mechanisms like intra-firm trade, to the detriment of international trade. Also, MNCs with headquarters in diverse countries are forming huge conglomerates. These conglomerates are enhancing the stateless and nationless character of the MNCs. In general, the MNCs are involved in practically all the important activities associated with modern life. The rise of the MNCs is being supported by progressive deregulation of finance capital and the growing power of gigantic transnational banks. The coordination of activities between the MNCs and the banks, in its turn, has facilitated the free flow of capital in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI). And there has been an unprecedented mobilisation of currency markets across the world. In substance, globalisation after the

cold war is certainly providing space for the expanse and consolidation of capitalism. The growth of multilateral interdependence and transnational regimes under capitalism is likely to strengthen inter-societal networks in the long run. This, in turn, would progressively lead towards the formation of an international civil society which will be concerned with issues of global importance such as environment, gender equality, human rights, etc. Furthermore, the phenomenon of globalisation has also been accompanied by the trend towards regionalism. Since the Second World War, international relations have witnessed the rise and growth of various kinds of regional organisations. For instance, organisations like North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) dealt with defence, European Economic Community (EEC) with economic and commercial cooperation, and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) aimed at promoting the unity of the African continent. Evidently, international relations are not unfamiliar with the trends towards regionalism. The phenomenon of globalisation, if anything, has promoted the process of constituting and reconstituting regions in international relations. A closer look at regionalism can reveal that three distant, co-equal and powerful regional trading groups are being consolidated in the phase of globalisation—the European Union (EU), North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). These three significant organisations are getting constituted around the three dominant core centres of the world economy—Germany, the US and Japan. Simply put, these powerful states are going to shape the contours of the world economy conjointly (Wallerstein 1989: 279–88). However, the notion of a region need not be confined to the economic sphere. For, the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) also defined its version of a region by constituting it on a religio-cultural basis. Such organisations are likely to pose continued challenges to diverse forms of western imperialism. Moreover, the course of globalisation is also likely to be shaped by the trends towards regionalism. Nevertheless, the role of the nation-state in promoting trends towards regionalism or globalisation need not be underestimated. In fact, the nation-state continues to be a primary as well as significant unit in international relations in spite of globalisation. The nation-state is witnessing existential strains owing to its paradoxical association with regionalism as well as globalisation.1 In fact, modern states act as mediating agencies to work out formal legal arrangements at the regional as well as global levels through different treaties. The Maastricht Treaty that binds the states of the European Union, or World Trade Organisation (WTO) that binds a majority of the states in trading arrangements offer evidence of the same. Thus, states create such organisations, on the one hand; and on the other hand, in the interest of safeguarding the collective interests of their member states such organisations exercise control over the states. In the process, states have to constantly encounter pressures generated by transnational organisations that may impinge on their sovereignty. Apart from these external pressures, contemporary states have been facing challenges from the secessionist ethno- nationalist movements within, as amply demonstrated in the cases of Sri Lanka, Iraq, India, Turkey, Canada, Ethiopia and Somalia. It could as well be argued that the emergence of transnational regimes and movements, and sub-national movements, has brought transnational and sub-national actors to the centre stage of international relations. These actors, in their own ways, are posing challenges to state sovereignty. However, the rise of these actors in no way marks the end of the nation-state. Being a resilient entity, the modern state is capable of adapting itself to new realities. For instance, successive US regimes, since the late 1970s, have built a pan-American identity or the US state. This pan-American identity eventually led to the formation of NAFTA. While constituting the NAFTA, the US took cognisance of the Mexican market and the likely competition for the US in Mexico from Japan and Germany, and opted to induct Mexico within NAFTA (Geske 1996: 91–120). In substance, the contemporary state is capable of adapting itself to changing conditions by acquiring as well as building new identities. In the context of these changing realities of international relations, we shall endeavour to assess the impact of such changes on India and Russia.

Impact of the Changing World on India and Russia Both India and Russia have been considerably influenced by the major developments in international relations after the cold war. Such developments have virtually compelled both these states to rework their

development alternatives as well as foreign policy orientations. Let us look at a brief sketch of the changing dimensions of domestic as well as foreign policies of India and Russia. First, both India and Russia have steadily reconciled themselves to the idea of living within the paradigm of capitalism. Accepting some form of welfare capitalism as a mode of development was a hard option for both these states, which were experimenting with the socialist alternative. The Nehruvian model of development in India launched developmental projects under a partially planned economy and parliamentary democracy. It did allow India to build a wide industrial base. However, the public sector, which enjoyed commanding heights in the economy, was, by and large, mismanaged. The development model adopted by India was ineffective in resolving major national problems like poverty, unemployment and growing socioeconomic inequalities. On the whole, it had failed to advance the twin objectives of growth and equity effectively. The overall mismanagement of the economy reached its peak in 1991 when India faced severe balance of payment crises due to depletion in its foreign exchange reserves. India chose to shed its socialist preferences and embraced the project of reforms after 1991, out of compulsion rather than conviction. The ruling classes have had no time to prepare the Indian masses to accept reforms by changing their mindset. Broadly, the agenda of reform in India is designed to roll back the state from the economy through liberalisation measures, to ensure rapid economic growth. Like India, Russia too was compelled to embrace capitalism. The upheaval in the socialist world after the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 had thoroughly discredited the socialist experiment in the former Soviet Union. And even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, leaders like Boris Yeltsin had vigorously upheld the agenda of economic reforms. Irrespective of opposition from nationalists and communists, President Yeltsin had unequivocally opted to espouse reforms. He had also aimed at speeding up the process of their implementation.2 The agenda of reforms has entailed several uphill tasks, including attracting FDI, reducing the role of the state sector in the economy through privatisation, promoting Russia's exports and dismantling excessive bureaucracy. Apart from responding to the globalised world by developing their own brand of capitalism, both India and Russia are also engaged in devising their own modes of interacting with transnational regimes. This needs to be highlighted with a few examples. First, both the states have sought external financial assistance from international donor agencies like the IMF to manage financial crises and stimulate economic growth. More than India, it is Russia's urge to seek assistance from the IMF that has made the IMF more global than ever before. For, the former Soviet Union was not functioning within the parameters of the world capitalist economy. Second, in the political sphere, the two countries are trying to reassert their positions in forums like the United Nations through mutual cooperation. India, especially, needs Russian support to achieve permanent membership in the UN Security Council. Third, being a developed nuclear power, Russia is already a part of the privileged group of nuclear states. However, India's refusal to sign the comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) represents a unique mode of asserting autonomy vis à vis the transnational NPT regime. By exercising its nuclear option after the Pokhran-II test in 1998, India has already joined the select club of nuclear states. Finally, like all other contemporary states, India and Russia are falling well within the purview of transnational movements being built around issues of global concern, like human rights. Such movements are primarily stemming from the continuous growth in transnational inter-societal cooperation. As more and more states participate in promoting them, such movements might transform themselves into transnational regimes. Furthermore, both these states are also relating themselves to the trend of regionalism. India is carving out a dominant position for itself in South Asia by activating cooperation among the member states of the South Asia Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC). However, the very functioning of the SAARC has been affected adversely by protracted conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, and overall disharmony in their ties over the past five decades. In addition, India, owing to the initiatives undertaken by the Narasimha Rao government (1991–96), has consciously decided to befriend Southeast Asian states, as exemplified by its bid to acquire membership of the regional economic groupings like the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Like India, Russia is responding to regionalism by trying to rebuild its Euro-Asian identity (Adomeite 1995: 35–68).3 Russia's urge to attend the Group of 7 (G-7) summits and take part in the debates

on European security arrangements, including those related to the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), has certainly made it an integral part of Europe. Moreover, Russia continues to assert its Asian identity through direct involvement in the security matters of the former Soviet Asian republics, as also through its newly acquired status as a member of the APEC. Finally, like all contemporary states, India and Russia have been witnessing existential strain from within. In both these states, the federal arrangements have come under strain. In India, secessionist movements, since the 1980s, in the states of Kashmir, Punjab and the Northeast have been constantly threatening the country's unity and integrity. Even if the challenge to India's unity is muted, the quasi-federal arrangements in India certainly warrant critical attention. For instance, a number of regions (e.g. Vidharbha in Maharashtra and Telengana in Andhra Pradesh) as well as ethnic groups (e.g. Bodos in Assam) have been agitating to form separate states within the Indian Union. Similarly, Russia has had to continuously encounter the problem of Chechnya since the mid 1990s. In fact, the heterogeneous populations of India and Russia clamour for more pluralistic federal arrangements that would give diverse regions and population groups an autonomy of selfexpression under a newly reconstituted state. However, unlike India, post-Soviet Russia does carry the burdens of its Soviet past. In fact, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), which preceded Russia, was the dominant unit in the former Soviet Union. Such dominance was also manifested in the significant role played by the people of Russian ethnicity outside the RSFSR. Even now, over twenty-five million Russians and several million Russophiles are living outside the Russian Federation. And the forces which aspire to build Russia as a great power on a more ethnically defined Russian base, do not necessarily adhere to the present frontiers of Russia. Both the multinational state in India and the large-sized state of Russia, with a sizeable number of Russians outside its frontiers, have been facing a diverse range of internal challenges. Having appraised the impact of the main trends in post–cold war international relations on India and Russia respectively, we shall now proceed to examine the bilateral ties between the two countries by stating the essence of Indo- Soviet/Russian ties.

Essence of Indo-Soviet/Russian Ties The cordiality of Indo-Soviet ties that blossomed over three and a half decades from the mid 1950s can provide a useful basis to restructure Indo-Russian ties. In fact, the coincidence of interests in politicostrategic, economic and military domains had cemented a long-term bond of cooperation between India and the Soviet Union. In the process, the Soviet Union had supported India's claims over Kashmir; counterbalanced the Sino-Pak-US axis in South Asia by throwing its weight behind India, especially in the Indo-Pak war of 1971; provided a market for Indian goods; and contributed substantially in strengthening India's military capabilities. Naturally, instead of dismantling such a well worked-out network of bilateral ties, post-Soviet Russia as well as successive Indian regimes have been grappling to give continuity to IndoRussian rapport. We can proceed to appraise the politico-strategic basis of this rapport. Politico-strategic significance: In the politico-strategic sphere, an agreement over the status of Kashmir continues to be a meeting ground for India and Russia. Like the Soviet Union, Russia continues to support India's claims over Kashmir as well as the resolution of the Kashmir question on the basis of the Indo-Pak agreement signed in Shimla in 1972. It agrees that the Kashmir issue essentially needs to be resolved through bilateral arrangements between India and Pakistan. Besides, India and Russia can hardly be impervious to the fact that the Kashmir question is getting increasingly linked up with growing political instability in Southwest and Central Asia. The advent of the forces of Islamic fundamentalism and their subversive activities are destabilising the state–society ties in Southwest and Central Asia. But for the Russian military intervention in the civil war in Tajikistan in the 1990s, the Iran-backed Islamic forces could have captured power in that country. Similarly, Pakistan's active support to the Taliban during 1994–2001 had placed Afghanistan in the jaws of civil strife. The activities of destabilising forces, in their turn, had fuelled cross-border terrorism as well as trade in arms and narcotics. The terrorist outfits in Kashmir took full advantage of the free flow of arms in the Afghan civil war by deploying them in the pursuit of secessionist ends. The strategic significance of the mineral-rich and contiguous states of Central Asia to Russia and that of Kashmir to India are compelling enough to activate Indo-Russian cooperation.4 In fact, the Indo-Russian pact, signed in 1995, on combatting crimes like illegal migration, smuggling of weapons, ammunition,

explosives, poisonous substances and radioactive materials, as well as illicit traffic of drugs, can go a long way in bolstering Indo-Russian cooperation in the politico-strategic domain. Apart from bilateral cooperation, both the countries are also contemplating moves to enhance cooperation with China. Like India and Russia, China is also trying to combat Islamic rebels in its Xinjiang province. The coming together of Russia, China and India can probably also challenge the dominance of the US-led western powers over globalisation. China's sustained military cooperation with Pakistan and India's apprehensions about China's interference in South Asian affairs have almost worked as a stumbling block in the building of any viable project of SinoIndian strategic cooperation. However, Russia still continues to be a viable partner in the politico-strategic sphere for India in South Asian and global affairs. In November 2001, with the Moscow declaration, India and Russia finalised a major security pact to build a cooperative security order that involves a joint fight against all forms of terrorism.5 Economic ties: Unlike in the politico-strategic sphere, the economic ties between the two countries have not yet gathered momentum. The Indo-Russian economic ties have been undergoing a phase of transition characterised by the decline in Indo-Russian trade. Indeed, post-Soviet Russia has been keen on strengthening trade relations with states such as Germany, US, Italy, Japan and China, while Indo-Russian trade is becoming almost negligible from the Russian side. For instance, India accounted for almost two per cent of the Soviet trade annually, whereas by 1993 only 1.4 per cent of Russia's trade was with India (Singh 1995: 69– 81). But now, certain problems pertaining to the rupee–rouble exchange as well as the modes of working out India's debt repayment to the former Soviet Union have been resolved while arriving at the Indo-Russian trade arrangements. Accordingly, Russia, through its available rupee funds, will import a large proportion of Indian consumer goods. A part of these funds will be devoted to Indo-Russian joint ventures. Thus, Russia's contribution towards equity of joint ventures will be financed out of the rupee funds. Also, these funds will be deployed to set up new industries, modernise existing units and develop infrastructure. The prospects of improving Indo-Russian economic ties would constantly hinge on sustained efforts from both sides to identify areas of complementary interests and initiate measures to promote them. For instance, Russia's help in building hydroelectric and nuclear power stations in India will have a long-term impact on India's quest to develop sound economic and strategic capabilities. The construction of the 2000MW Koodankulam Atomic Power Plant in Tamil Nadu with Russian aid is a case in point. Likewise, India's participation in a large construction project at Novoressiysk seaport will not merely boost Russia's trade but also give India berthing facilities at the port (Singh 1995: 69–81). Furthermore, the Indo-Russian Joint Business Council (JBC), comprising the Russian Chamber of Commerce, and the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ACCI) in India, can be used as a medium to promote bilateral cooperation. Over thirty joint ventures have already taken off in diverse areas including leather goods, computer hardware and engineering plastic.6 The prospects of widening and deepening Indo-Russian ties have brightened after the conclusion of the fourth meeting of the Indo-Russian working group on trade and economic cooperation in New Delhi on 12 December 1997. In substance, while working out the long-term bilateral trading arrangements, India will export items like tea, tobacco and pharmaceuticals, while Russia will export newsprint and fertilisers. Engineering and electronic goods as well as information technology products and computer software also have the potential to enhance Indo-Russian trade. The Indo- Russian trade in iron and steel is on the rise and the two countries are carrying out research in ferrous metallurgy. In the long run, Indian organisations like Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation (MMTC) and Projects and Equipment Corporation (PEC) will interact with their Russian counterparts to boost joint cooperation, particularly in aluminium, zinc and copper industries. Finally, as the subsidiaries of Indian banks, including Canara Bank, Central Bank and State Bank of India, commence their operations in Russia, the banking links between the two countries will be strengthened. Indeed, the collaborative venture between the State Bank of India and Roseximbank of Russia to set up a joint bank is a step in this direction. Military Cooperation: Like economic cooperation, the dimensions of Indo-Russian military cooperation are also undergoing a steady transition. The growing significance of Indo- Russian military cooperation can hardly be underestimated (Malik 1993: 69–88). In fact, post-Soviet Russia has inherited the Soviet repute for producing sophisticated weapons, frontline fighters and strike aircrafts such as Su-27, Su-30 and MiG-31.

With Russian support India is going to build an air defence shield. Russia is also going to help India in building its long-range anti-aircraft missiles. What is more, due to Russian assistance, India has already been able to produce a small number of MiG aircrafts and upgrade its tanks. The two countries have also promoted joint production of S-30 BK bombers. Cooperation with Russia will help India in building its long-term defence industrial base. For, rather than participation in off-the-shelf purchasing or licensing, such cooperation will take the form of joint ventures.7 The joint ventures between Mikoyam and Hindustan Aeronautics of India to manufacture spare parts for MiG range aircraft is a case in point. A new firm called Indo-Russian Aviation Private, established for this purpose, will also upgrade India's MiG-21 bus aircraft. Also, with joint production India can actively engage in defence-related transactions with its eastern neighbours. For instance, India is already participating in a MiG-29 deal between Russia and Malaysia through provision of training pilots and maintenance crews. The prospects of India's growing military capabilities as also the widening Indo-Russian cooperation did invoke a hostile response from the US. For instance, the US ventured to obstruct the implementation of the Indo-Russian contract dealing with the supply of cryogenic rocket engines and transfer of rocket engine technology to India in 1993. The US justified its intervention on the grounds that cryogenic engines could be used to power ballistic missiles. This, in its turn, would violate the requirements of missile technology control regime (MTCR)8. Evidently, India needs to be prepared to counter any possible hostile responses, especially those from the US and Pakistan, while consistently bolstering its multidimensional military ties with Russia.

Conclusion The post–cold war phase has witnessed a qualitative change in international relations. Some of the dominant trends of this phase, such as ascendance of capitalism as a world system, acceleration of the pace of globalisation coupled with movements to build viable regional cooperation, and the growing challenges to contemporary states from transnational as well as sub-national forces, have had a pervasive impact. Evidently, India and Russia have been affected by these trends and are devising new modes to ensure survival in these international relations characterised by turbulence. Reviving a well-established network of friendly ties with post-Soviet Russia has been a major challenge for India. For, Russia has been keener to develop its links with the western world as well as East Asian states. Even though Russia at present is not giving high priority to rebuilding ties with India, the cooperation between the two countries will eventually grow. Russia's urge to build a Euro-Asian identity, and India's aspirations to play a significant role in South, Southwest and Central Asia may well strengthen a politico-strategic understanding between the two states. Plausibly, an imaginative treatment would further stimulate their economic and military cooperation on mutually advantageous lines and set the Indo-Russian ties back on the rails.

References Adomeite, Hannes. 1995. Russia as a Great Power in World Affairs: Images and Reality. International Affairs 71(1): 35–68. Brown, Robin. 1995. Globalisation and the End of National Project. In Boundaries in Question, New Directions in International Relations, eds. John Macmillan and Andrew Linklater, 54–68. London: Pinter. Chafetz, Glen. 1996–97. The Struggle for a National Identity in Post-Soviet Russia. Political Science Quarterly 3(4): 661–88. Geske, Mary B. 1996. Sovereignty and Citizenship in Contemporary US Foreign Economic Policy. Alternatives 21(2): 91–120. Gordon, Sandy. 1995. South Asia after the Cold War: Winners and Losers. Asian Survey 35(10): 879–95. Malik, J. Mohan. 1993. India Copes with the Kremlin's Fall. Orbis 37(1): 67–88. Robertson, Roland. 1992. Globalisation: Social Theory and Global Culture. London: Sage. Rubinstein, Alvin Z. 1997. Russia: In Search of a New Role. World Affairs 1(2): 62–79. Singh, Anita Inder. 1995. India's Relations with Russia and Central Asia. International Affairs 71(1): 69–81. Scholte, Janaart. 1997. Global Capitalism and the State. International Affairs 73(3): 427–52. Treisman, Daniel. 1996. Why Yeltsin Won. Foreign Affairs 75(5): 64–77. Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1989. The Capitalist World Economy: Middle Run Prospects. Alternatives 14(3): 279–88.

NINE

India–China Relations: Critical Issues VENUGOPAL B. MENON

elations with China constitute a critical domain of India's foreign policy. The two countries have mended the distance which the 1962 war had caused considerably, yet, they have not resolved their cardinal border dispute. A series of high-level exchanges between India and China have taken place during the 1980s and 1990s and the agreements of 1993 and 1996 are, in fact, a formal acknowledgement of existing realities. The rapprochement based on the Sino-Indian agreements of 1993 and 1996 does not, however, indicate any significant step towards the resolution of the border dispute. The existence of formidable hurdles to normalisation of relations is reflected in the nature of negotiations between the two countries. The negotiations first began on the border question, but later, the focus shifted to determining the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and the so-called confidence building measures (CBMs). And the two countries have not succeeded in either. The current emphasis is on improvement in all other areas except the border issue.

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The inability of India and China to normalise their relations has led to a situation envisaged by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1950. He had then written to Sardar Vallabhai Patel, the home minister, that bad relations or enmity with China should be avoided at any cost, failing which the situation would be exploited not only by Pakistan but also by the superpowers (Das 1974: 342–47). Nehru's prophecy came true with the 1962 war. And, in subsequent years, India's China policy had to contend with the Sino-Pak-US axis. This essay tries to analyse the critical issues in India–China relations focussing on: 1. the Sino-Indian border dispute and the progress of normalisation of relations; 2. the Sino-Pak-US axis and its effects on Sino-Indian relations; and 3. Pokhran-II nuclear tests and their impact on India's relationship with China.

Sino-Indian Border Dispute and the Normalisation Process The different perceptions the two sides have add to the complexity of the border dispute between India and China. Perceptions differ mainly due to the historical baggage and national sentiments involved on both sides. India is more emotional on the matter because of its defeat in the 1962 war. After the revival of India– China talks in 1980, the Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping, proposed a package according to which both the countries should make concessions, China in the eastern sector and India in the western sector, on the basis of the actually controlled border line so as to solve the Sino-Indian boundary question, thereby demonstrating the spirit of "mutual accommodation and understanding". The Indian reaction was bound to be negative and the then foreign minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao, responded by stating that "India has never accepted the premise on which it is based, namely, that the Chinese side is making concession in the eastern sector by giving up the territory which they allege is illegally incorporated into India. Nevertheless, we welcome the prospect of the eastern sector being settled without any particular difficulty" (Aneja 1998). As long as India maintains this position, it is doubtful whether China will make any concessions for the settlement of the border dispute. The status quo is advantageous to China as the cease-fire line could be the line of peace instead of a "permanent cease-fire line". Hence the different perceptions regarding the LAC. Recognising that the full implementation of some of the provisions of the present agreement will depend on the two sides arriving at a common understanding of the alignment of the LoAC in India–China border areas, Para 2 of the Sino-Indian Accord states:

Pending the completion of the process of clarification and confirmation of the Line of Actual Control, the two sides shall work out modalities for implementing confidence-building measures envisaged under the agreement on an interim basis without prejudice to their respective positions on the alignment of Line of Actual Control as well as on the boundary question. (Government of India 1996: 172) It highlights the fact that to the Chinese the border dispute was only of peripheral interest and that the agreements of 1993 and 1996 were more of a "confidence of expression than confidence building". Therefore, pulling out the troops completely may not be possible till border settlement is reached. The inability to reach an agreement on the border dispute with India seems to have frustrated the Chinese. Deng Xiaoping, during Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Beijing in 1988, said that the future generations could solve the border problem, thereby implying that the border solution would take time. The Chief of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), during his visit to India in 1998, once again reiterated the above position by saying that the time was not yet ripe for the settlement of the border dispute.1 With India's refusal to respond to the Chinese proposal for mutual accommodation on the border dispute, the Chinese have apparently laid a trap by leaving the choice of further action to India. Unfortunately, India has not suggested any alternative formula. A former foreign secretary of India has rightly said in this regard: "I don't think that in the intervening period from 1962 we have really applied ourselves seriously to a negotiating stance. We have exchanged views but we have not taken a decision on what basis we are prepared to reach a settlement. I do believe that we should have put forward our own proposals" (Noorani 1998a). The failure on the part of India to come up with an alternative proposal is further highlighted by India's stance in 1992. The then foreign secretary, J.N. Dixit, stated in his memoirs that in February 1992, the Chinese Vice Minister Xu Din Xin, wanted him to specify the negotiating stance that India would take on the boundary question. He firmly asserted that he could not discuss India's negotiating stance or its negotiating approach on the substantive question of Sino-Indian boundary. He specified that his brief was to concentrate on the joint directive given by the prime ministers of India and China to initiate discussions on maintaining peace and tranquillity along the LAC. He added that India would be willing to discuss the substantive question of boundary only after the first task was completed (1996: 235–36). India's inability to take a negotiating stance in this regard was also due to the failure of successive governments to decide the case on its merit. Instead, India has been trying to score with verbal jugglery, which may be of no use with the Chinese. The Indian stance in this regard has been concealed due to the resolution passed by the Indian Parliament declaring that not an inch of land would be mortgaged to China. In this regard it would be pertinent to examine India's claim in the western sector of the Sino-Indian boundary where the Chinese want concessions from India. The crux of the Sino-Indian dispute is Aksai Chin, lying in the western sector, which is a desolate plateau 17,000 feet above sea level. This region is an uninhabited area and a place where "not even a blade of grass grows" (Government of India 1983: 193–200). As this region was very desolate, the British rulers did not properly mark it during their rule in India. The Survey of India maps also do not show it as part of the defined boundary. Hence, the dispute on the legitimacy of this line. India did not attach any importance to it in the beginning. The lack of clarity on India's part with respect to its claim to this region can be discerned from the letters written by Jawaharlal Nehru to the Chinese Premier Zhou En-Lai between August and September 1959 (Appadorai 1982: 504–47). Aksai Chin as an area is of no use to India whereas it is important to China as it connects the province of Xinjiang with that of Tibet. From the military angle too it is of no use to India (Noorani 1998b). Prime Minister Nehru, in spite of his clear understanding of the situation, provocatively declared that the area claimed by China – which had always been depicted as a part of India on the official maps – had been surveyed by Indian officials and that even a Chinese map of 1893 had shown it as Indian territory (Government of India 1959: 86). In the beginning, India had tried to solve the problem by glossing over it, but later the matter worsened when the Indian prime minister assumed a stance hostile to China. Thus, the territory of Aksai Chin became an issue of contention between India and China, and even today not only remains a major area of discord, but also prevents further progress in the resolution of the Sino-Indian border dispute. During the 1962 war China occupied more than what it had claimed in this region in 1956 and 1960. After the resumption of talks between India and China in 1979, the then foreign minister of India, A.B. Vajpayee, during his visit to China, called for the restoration of the status quo of April 1959. The Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping responded by

offering a package deal based on the status quo of post–October 1962. The Chinese were trying to apply pressure on India and legitimising their gains in the west. Further, the post-1962 claims in the western sector could be used for bargaining with India over areas in the central sector (the Uttar Pradesh region) and in the Ladakh region where the frontiers are undefined. The Xinhua news agency report of June 1980 on Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's meeting in Belgrade with the Chinese prime minister indicated this strategy. The report states: China has never asked for the return of all the territory illegally incorporated into India by the old colonialists. Instead China suggested that both countries should make concessions—China in the eastern sector and India in the western sector, on the basis of the actually controlled border line so as to evolve the Sino-Indian boundary question in a package plan, thus fully demonstrating the spirit of mutual understanding and concession, (Noorani 1998a: 113) The progress of the talks between India and China has to be assessed against this background. Such an assessment becomes necessary because India has been criticised for having disturbed the normalisation of relations with China following the Pokhran-II blasts in May 1998. An analysis of the peace process that has been going on for the past ten years will prove the contrary. From the mid 1970s onwards the Chinese worldview changed considerably. China no longer viewed the world as divided into two hostile camps, and its ideas on war and peace underwent a fundamental change. China began to get involved in the global economic and political network, and favoured an environment of peace, stability and security so as to facilitate its process of development and modernisation. It is this changed worldview which encouraged China to respond to India's initiatives towards normalisation. This, however, does not mean that Chinese nationalism in its present form poses no challenge to India's security interests.2 China strongly believes that it is a major power in the world (Dutt 1997: 237). In accordance with Deng's modernisation plan China was eager to hold talks with India for economic reasons, more eager than India was, to participate in talks with China (Sen Gupta 1991). Naturally, to China, the border dispute with India became a peripheral matter and it wanted to develop a "working and constructive partnership" rather than an enduring relationship. An enduring relationship would require resolution of the border problem and, like India, China too does not seem to be in a position to make substantial concessions for the settlement of the border dispute.3 As long as the border dispute remains unresolved, there is going to be an element of uncertainty, and from this uncertainty stems the present problematic nature of India–China relations, which cannot be underestimated at any cost. To China, constructive partnership with India would be productive notwithstanding China's policy of setting other South Asian countries – with whom India has differences – against India. The thaw in Sino-Indian relations in the early 1990s resulted in the expansion of trade between the two countries. The volume of trade with China was really low during the mid 1980s, but by 1991 the total trade between India and China had gone up to $265 million, and by 2000 it stood at $3.27 billion. The annual growth of trade between the two countries had increased by 30 per cent from 1991 to 1997 and by 26 per cent over 2000 (Governent of India 2000: 27). China was naturally more interested in promoting trade to mobilise resources for its modernisation programme than in worrying about the border dispute. The Chinese ambassador to India, in an address to Indian industrialists in New Delhi, said that the increase in volume of trade was incompatible with the total economic strength of either China or India, with a huge market of a total population of 2.2 billion in the two countries. He further said: "India and China are pursuing a serious economic agenda where there are reasons for the two countries to come together and facilitate each other in implementing this agenda."4 For the eleven years prior to the Pokhran-II tests, Indian and Chinese delegations had been meeting at regular intervals, but nothing emerged from the discussions. There was no real progress towards settlement. It was conceded that the "dialogue has been in slow motion and that ten years after the resumption of bilateral talks, China has yet to supply its maps of the border along with its perception of Line of Actual Control" (Bhargava 1998). The Chief of Indian Army at an Army Commanders Conference had reiterated this shortly before the visit of the Chinese PLA Chief. General V.P. Mallik said that the longstanding border dispute could not be settled quickly. The Chinese perception in this regard seemed to be no different from that of India. The Chief of Chinese Army stated on the slow progress of the border dispute: "We should not say this has been

delayed. It is important for both sides to carry out a gradual realisation of boundary demarcation" (Chengappa 1998). In China, there appear to be two different schools of thought on foreign policy matters. Batuk Vora, a frequent visitor to China who is familiar with that country's power structure, says that "since Deng Xiaoping's death the foreign policy (together with domestic policy) apparatus has transformed itself from the vertical to horizontal authoritarianism, with both liberal and hardliners playing their role sometimes equally effective" (Bhargava 1998: 16). He further states that a section of the Chinese bureaucracy is prepared to facilitate Pakistan's nuclear capability but not in a manner that could be directly traced back to China. The Chinese military establishment may remain not very keen on complete normalisation just so that it can continue to use Pakistan for export of arms, greatly subsidising the costs of the higher grade defensive and offensive systems developed for its own use. Here China is following what the United States has been doing with its arms sales proceeds. The other school in China seems to differ from its military counterpart. A former Chinese ambassador to India and now a senior member of a leading think-tank affiliated to the state council of China, said about the Sino-Indian relations: Regional economic cooperation between China, Myanmar, India, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan could be carried out in a gradual step by step process including expansion of border trade with preferential treatment, establishment of sub regional economic zones, cooperation in science and technology, education, in air transport, development of international tourism, cooperation in exploitation of water, agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishing resources. Most important but also difficult to all is to construct a new continental bridge in the South West Asia. .To achieve this goal in the 21st century joint efforts of China, Myanmar and India are needed together. (Ranganathan 1998) The existence of these two schools have compelled China to state that the 'time is not yet ripe' for a settlement of the territorial dispute with India, whereas it has solved similar territorial problems with its neighbours like Russia and Myanmar. China remains intensely suspicious of India's Tibetan policy and seeks repeated assurances from India on Tibet without reciprocating India's gestures on matters like Kashmir. The Chinese stance in recent years has invariably been to take a position which is neither hostile nor friendly. It has been reluctant to support India's permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council, giving an impression that it does not see the need for any special equation between India and China on strategic matters.

Sino-US-Pak Axis The 1962 war, which could have been avoided, ultimately resulted in India–China enmity; an enmity exploited by Pakistan and the US, as predicted by Nehru in 1950. The Kautilyan dictum – Your enemy's enemy is your friend – was put to practise by China and Pakistan. China began to cultivate Pakistan as a political military counter to India. By the end of the 1960s Chinese perceptions changed, the Soviets were seen as a greater threat to China. With the help of Pakistan, China built a policy of rapprochement with the US. The Sino-US-Pak cordiality changed China's ideological stance. The development of Indo-Soviet friendship during this time further strengthened the Sino-Pak-US cordiality. The improvement in Sino-US relations also assured China that the US would not use Tibet to destabilise China. Further, it also became clear to China that the US would not have any strategic relations with India, which, if it happened, could be detrimental to China. The alteration in Sino-Indian relations after the 1962 war facilitated the concept that "the balance of power in major third world regions and within developing countries must remain on the whole stable" (Sen Gupta 1998). That is, it should be favourable to the US. India's independent policy of non-alignment was seen as an assertion against the US 'policy of global polarisation'. The Sino-US cordiality not only altered the course of the cold war, it also forced most of the non-aligned nations to align with one superpower or the other. In the changed circumstances China's using Pakistan against India seemed to have received the tacit approval of the US. This would keep the subcontinent in a state of tension, thereby making it conducive to outside interference, and prevent the emergence of a regional power in South Asia. The origin of this policy can be traced to the first document signed between China and the US in 1972 in Shanghai under the

leadership of Zhou En Lai and Richard Nixon. It also helped both the United States and China in preventing India from tilting towards one of them. The Chinese were fully conscious of the fact that their biggest ally of the present, the US, could become a rival in the future, and they expected the US to use India to counterbalance China. Correspondingly, the US too wanted to keep India and China apart as a stable SinoIndian equation on the regional plane and on some global developmental issues would upset its dominant position.5 The US, through its involvement with China, can prevent Asia's three large landmasses – China, Russia and India – from coming closer.6 The 'strategic accommodation' of China helps the US to play a major role on a global scale. Such an alliance in Asia helps the US to counter India's independent policies, which pose a threat to its strategic interests both in the region and the world at large. Another important legacy of the 1962 war was the 'momentum' it provided to China's relations with South Asian countries. Besides Pakistan, Beijing began to promote, through military cooperation, one neighbour after another against India in view of India's differences with these countries. By cultivating such relationships against India, China seems to be pursuing the ancient Chinese military/strategic perception—to win without fighting is the best. China, by using Pakistan against India, is emulating US policy in West Asia. Chinese analysts were reported to have told former US State Department officials that "Pakistan is our Israel."7 Naturally, China's commitment to Pakistan appears to be very solid, deep and long-term. To both the US and China, Pakistan is an important country to subserve their interests in West Asia and Central Asia. The US wants to have a long-term political understanding with China in the east, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in the west, and Turkey in the northwest, to promote its interests in Central Asia and West Asia. Such an alliance can offset any Russian-Indian alliance to control Central Asia, which has abundant natural resources, notably oil. The relationship with China has to be kept on positive terms to avoid Sino-US competition and confrontation in Central Asia. Pakistan is to be used as a US surrogate, catering to the regional policies which the US intends to pursue (Alavi 1998: 1551–557). Like the US, China's future too is linked with some of the major trouble spots in the world today. China may also have interests in the West Asian and Central Asian oil resources for its expanding economy, as China lacks oil. Therefore, China's strategic goal could be to forge a Chinese-Islamic nexus with the help of Pakistan to subserve its interests. The Sino-US-Pak alliance has contributed to instability in the region and Pakistan has utilised the SinoUS nexus to hurt India. As a result of this nexus, the gap between the two South Asian countries has not only widened, but also contributed to the hardening of the Kashmir dispute over the years. American calculations are that maintaining Indo-Pak rivalry would prevent the emergence of a regional threat to the US and provide an opportunity for Washington to assume a role in the region.8 In 1994, the US refused to acknowledge that the Kashmir issue could serve as a defining reason for Islamabad's suspected nuclear armament agenda. But, in 1998, the same US administration stated: "We made it clear to Pakistan Government that we respect its own determination of its national security needs.9 "To isolate, corner and browbeat India into submission, the US even turned a blind eye to the arms race encouraged by China's material support to Pakistan. The US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Non-proliferation, Robert Einhorn, said: "We are terribly concerned about the behaviour of Iran. Pakistan of course is a friend of US and we wish to have good bilateral relations with Pakistan. We also recognise China as a good friend of Pakistan and we don't intend to interfere in anyway with their close relationship."10 Similarly, China's strategic ties with Pakistan have not only undermined India's strategic interests, but the former has justified its military transfers as promoting self-defence. Thus, China is following a dual policy by trying to improve relations with India while at the same time continuing to provide military (including nuclear) assistance to Pakistan.11 It is this dichotomy between China's public stand and actual reality that contributed to a situation in South Asia, leading to the Pokhran-II explosions in May 1998. India's nuclear tests in May 1998 attracted worldwide condemnation and the accusation of promoting a nuclear race in the subcontinent. But those who accuse India of creating the nuclear race are oblivious to the fact that it had started much before 1998, due to US ambivalence towards the nuclear proliferation perpetuated by the SinoPak nexus.12 Pokhran-II tests reflected the change in the nuclear policy pursued by India—of keeping the options for nuclear weaponisation open, a euphemism for clandestine development of nuclear weapons. The Pokhran-II tests were a rude shock to the Sino-US strategic content planned for the twenty-first

century, and an assertion of India's independent policy defying the nuclear weapon powers at a time when the comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) was being implemented. India faced a situation with four powers (China, Russia, Pakistan and the US) on and around the frontiers, either nuclearised or nuclearising. Except Russia, all others could cause India problems. In these circumstances threat perception had to adequately take the nuclear challenge into consideration. Threat perceptions of a state are not based on another nation's or adversary's pronouncements, but on their capabilities, which ultimately shape their intentions (Bhargava 1998). The Sino-Pak alliance in nuclear proliferation with US approval would definitely pose a serious threat to India. Security has to be comprehensive, including the military,economic,social and political components. Without comprehensive security, internal and external security cannot be guaranteed. And economic security cannot be sustained if a state is vulnerable to external and internal threats. To meet such threats military capability of high order is a must. The Sino-US opposition to India's nuclear programme should be examined in the light of the above statements. In the contemporary world, international politics is centred on economic struggle. Future conflicts could be over energy, water or slots in outer space (Kalam and Rajan 1998). In these conflicts nuclear powers could interfere with an implied intermediary threat of the use of nuclear weapons (Subrahmaniam 1997). The US has bilateral security arrangements with Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and many other countries in West Asia and Latin America. Asia is predicted to be one of the most dynamic areas of international politics in the twenty-first century, as the first seven economies of the world (India included) are in Asia. The US has a major interest in Asia and it wants to maintain its position as a military power of the first magnitude, acting as a balancing force so as to prevent the emergence of a vacuum or a regional hegemony. The nuclear tests have, thus, thrown up the possibilities of India becoming a major player in the global scene.

Pokhran-II and China's Reaction China was very critical of India, following the Pokhran-II nuclear tests in May 1998. The Chinese reaction was directed, to some extent, at India's unnecessary justification of its nuclear tests by demonising China. India did not have to explain or complain as it was a sovereign nation's legitimate right to strengthen its security in the best possible manner. After the nuclear tests, China accused India of pursuing hegemonic designs.13 Its criticism of India's nuclear tests was inconsistent with Beijing's own declared nuclear policy. It is ironic that China, which earlier used to run down the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and the global nonproliferation regime as a 'construct' of the US-Russian hegemony, and proclaim that it was the sovereign right of every nation to define its security needs, should react to Indian nuclear tests in such a harsh manner. China's defence policy, according to the Chief of the PLA, "is totally of defensive nature with no intent at hegemony, aggression or expansion" (Dixit 1998a). Having evolved such a defence doctrine for itself in a region where it is the most powerful nation and has normal and cordial relations with most of the countries in the neighbourhood, the Chinese reaction was unjustifiable. China's complicity in Pakistan's nuclear and missile technology promotes Islamabad's hostile capabilities against India and fuels the worst suspicions about its intentions. Therefore, China's neutrality and peace posturing need not be seen as sincere. China views itself as the next superpower or 'third polar' in the Asia-Pacific region following the US–Russia detente. Over the years, the consistent thrust of China's policy has been the drive for power so as to assert its role as the 'Middle Kingdom'. China's defence build-up has been on the increase and there has been a six per cent rise in its military expenditure, "quite above the level required for meeting the cost of inflation" (Dutt 1997: 236). The Pokhran-II nuclear tests signalled that India was also poised for developing a deterrence strategy.14 The tests questioned the Chinese accretion of military and nuclear power. Thus, Indian nuclear weaponry is likely to influence China's strategic framework. The Indian nuclear stance also disturbed the Chinese perception that India would not take any strategic initiatives to safeguard its long-term interests from potentialities of competition or confrontation with China, allowing China to continue its dual policy of working towards normal relations with India and, at the same time, increasing its defence cooperation with Pakistan (Dixit 1998b). China as a nation shows no hesitation in flexing its muscle if necessary, a recent example being China threatening Taiwan, and the US remaining indifferent to China's posture. During Rajiv

Gandhi's visit to Beijing in 1988, India proposed signing a no-first use of nuclear weapon accord. China refused to sign the accord then on the ground that India was not a nuclear weapon power. When the Indian Prime Minister reiterated the proposal after 1998 the Chinese remained indifferent to the proposal and insisted on India signing the NPT and CTBT unconditionally. The Chinese foreign ministry spokesman said: "The most urgent task for India is to implement the UN Security Council resolution, abandon [its] nuclear programme and accede to NPT and CTBT as soon as possible."15 Thus, the Chinese, who had earlier said that the no-first use accord couldn't be signed as India was not a nuclear power, now refused to recognise India's nuclear status. China's insistence that India should be covered by the 'entry into force' clause in CTBT betrayed its urgency in denuclearising India. China has been supporting Pakistan's proposal to make South Asia a nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) so that it would leave China's own nuclear weapon status untouched. The Chinese military establishment appeared upset by India's technological advancement. On 21 May 1998 the deputy chief of the PLA and an officer close to the Chief of Chinese Army said: "India would never become a nuclear power and that New Delhi should pay more attention to feeding its poor than building nuclear weapons" (Rappai 1998). China is fully supported by the US in its efforts to denuclearise India, not out of concern for nuclear non-proliferation but to give a permanent strategic character to the Sino-US relationship. China's lack of sincerity on nuclear non-proliferation is reflected in its inability to reach a broad common stand with India in relation to big powers and on major international issues such as the NPT and the CTBT, despite the fact that India and China increasingly share similar perceptions on these issues. After Pokhran-II, China took the lead in calling the P-5 conference in Geneva and the move was acknowledged and appreciated by the US. China's insistence on India signing the CTBT went against its own assertion. On 10 September 1996, the Chinese ambassador to the United Nations said: The disarmament negotiation conference is the only international forum for negotiating a multilateral disarmament and arms control treaty and represents security and interests of different political groups. Only by adhering to the principle of reaching unanimity through consultation can it continue to make contributions to safeguarding international peace and security and promoting multilateral disarmament and arms control.16 China's relationship with India after Pokhran-II has been unhappy because it has been forced to reckon with India's proven capabilities and is compelled to treat India as another major interlocutor on nuclear matters as far as Asia is concerned.

Conclusion To normalise relations India should try to tackle the complex Sino-Indian border dispute by suggesting an alternative proposal on the matter, or it should agree to exchange or swap areas which would be strategically more important to India. Around the world it has become an accepted norm to trade off land for security. For example, the Israelis have swapped territories with Egypt. Indian diplomacy should discard its dogmatism and try to cultivate some amount of creativity. Mutually accommodating each other's vital interests will force China to honour its word on the McMahon line in the eastern sector, which is strategically more important to India. China has been repeatedly saying that it wants to improve relations with India and establish bonds of strong friendship. India should reciprocate by giving the Chinese a chance to prove that they are true to their statement. The resolution of the Sino-Indian border dispute would compel China to dilute its relations with Pakistan. The normalisation of Sino-Indian relations could contribute positively beyond the area of South Asia. The change in Sino-Indian relations can upset the strategic partnership which the US and China have avowed for the twenty-first century. However, India should be sufficiently prepared to face any threat and be on constant vigil.

References Alavi, Hamza. 1998. Pakistan-US Military Alliance. Economic and Political Weekly 33(25): 1551–557.

Aneja, Atul. 1998. Hurdles Still Remain. The Hindu, 14 August. Appadorai, A. 1982. Select Documents on India's Foreign Policy and Relations 1947–1972 Vol. 1. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Bhargava, G.S. 1998. Perceived Threat from China: Phantom or Fact? Mainstream 36(26): 16. Chengappa, B. 1998. Playing Chinese Checkers. Indian Express, 5 May. Das, Durga, ed. 1974. Sardar Patel's Correspondence. Vol. 1. Ahmedabad: Navjivan Press. Dixit, J.N. 1996. My South Block Years: Memoirs of a Foreign Secretary. New Delhi: UBH Publishers. ——. 1998a. Strange Way to Make Friends. The Indian Express, 14 May. ——. 1998b. China–US Equation. The Hindu, 10 July. Dutt, V.P. 1997. India–China: Promise and Limitation. In Indian Foreign Policy Vol. 2, ed. Foreign Service Institute. New Delhi: Konark. Government of India. 1959. White Paper Vol. 1. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs. ——. 1983. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches Vol. 4: September 1957-April 1963. New Delhi: Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. ——. 1996. Foreign Affairs Record. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs. ——. 2000. Annual Report 2001–2002. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs. Kalam, A.P.J. Abdul and Y.S. Rajan. 1998. INDIA 2020: A Vision for a New Millennium. Delhi: Penguin. Noorani, A.G. 1998a. Negotiating with China. Frontline, 14 August. ——. 1998b. Negotiating with China. Frontline, 28 August. Ranganathan, C.V. 1998. India–China Ties after Pokhran-II. The Hindu, 16 August. Rappai, M.V. 1998. China: a status quo nuclear power. The Hindu, 18 June. Sen Gupta, Bhabani. 1991. India's Borders: Problem of National Security. In India's Borders: Ecology and Security Perspectives, eds. Ramakrishna Rao and R.C. Sharma. New Delhi: Scholars Publishing Forum. ——. 1998. The Security-Insecurity Syndrome. Economic and Political Weekly 33(10): 519. Subrahmaniam, K. 1997. India and the Changes in the International Security Environment. In Indian Foreign Policy, Vol. 1, ed. Foreign Service Institute. New Delhi: Konark.

TEN

Emerging Trends in Chinese Nationalism: Rethinking Indian Perspectives T.G. SURESH

ome dramatic developments preceded Pokhran-II in May 1998 chief among them being the manner in which the Indian government invented and announced a new security theory. According to it the principal danger to India's security originated from China. So imaginatively constructed was the demonisation of China that by the time the climax did occur, it became the raison d'etre for the explosions. This official declaration of the threat posed by China, that could be neutralised by India's nuclearisation, came, unfortunately, at a time when Sino-Indian relations were progressing steadily. However, the question that needs to be addressed here is whether the 'Chinese threat' theory is an accurate description of the regional security environment. Or does it indicate a new phase in India's state nationalism, which found expression with the electoral victory of the political right? In the present context, this issue merits serious attention. And it can be argued that in order to formulate a rational and realistic policy towards China, it is essential to have a broader understanding of the factors that give shape to China's foreign policy.

S

Contemporary Nation-State: An Overview The nation-state is the most celebrated political formation in modern times. But with the end of the twentieth century, it appears that the idea of the nation-state has become less inspiring for its early protagonists in heartland Europe. The latecomers (from the Third World) soon realised that their projects were fraught with serious internal tensions. In our time, the nation-states have been formed (and forged), lacerated and destroyed in a manner and with a speed never imagined. Apart from the internal discontent, a host of external factors have endangered the efficacy of the nation-state. As observed by Beetham (1993: 219), a combination of historical, economic, military and politico-cultural forces unceasingly question the ability of sovereign nation-states to protect the economic welfare, physical security and cultural identity of its inhabitants. In the era of late capitalism the primacy of the nation-state in the international system has been challenged more directly by the promiscuous flights of finance capital from Europe, North America and Japan. In parallel with this development, the electronic media has emerged as a powerful and secular global force which promotes a universal paradigm obliterating the specifics of local national cultures. States located in the peripheries of the globe have conveniently accommodated themselves into the very logic and structure of international political economy by trying to articulate the interests of transnational corporations to their respective local subjects. At the same time, these peripheries have emerged as the most potent repository of state nationalism, a rhetorical site that seeks to legitimise the cohesiveness and forward march of the nationstate. India and China, despite being two distinct state formations, fit rather neatly into this description. The historical conjecture that gave birth to India and China in the late 1940s had all the ingredients that promised a long and fraternal coexistence. At the outset, it looked like a perfect script that history had enacted on the Asian continent. The people in the Indian subcontinent and in mainland China had been shouldering similar burdens. Paramount among them were colonial subjugation, feudal despotism and backwardness.For both these predominantly agrarian societies national salvation meant the immediate vacation of these conditions. The freedom movement forced the British Raj to leave the subcontinent in 1947. Two years later

in China, a coalition of essentially subaltern social classes, led by the communist peasant army, successfully completed a prolonged revolutionary war that finally liberated China from semi-colonial conditions and feudal rule. Two distinct state formations notwithstanding, India and China began their careers as postcolonial states which promised their people, among other things, livelihood, social justice and development. As the two nations encountered an inherently unjust international order, they found the domination of global capitalism a stumbling block to their political independence. The euphoria kindled at the Bandung Conference (1955) with an eloquent declaration of Sino-Indian solidarity was short-lived. India and China, owing to a host of reasons, soon allowed the Bandung fraternity to collapse. In less than a decade, these two nations fought a war, which put further obstacles in the process of building peace and friendship. Perceptions began to be moulded antithetically, bringing in issues of nationalism, realpolitik and security. It is in this background that we try to analyse the twentieth-century history and the implications of emerging trends in Chinese nationalism.

The Historical Career of Chinese Nationalism till 1977 The history of modern China can be divided into periods of successive state formations – in the imperial, early republican (1912–27) and communist models – that aspired for national salvation and reunification. Each state formation and movement of the twentieth century advocated a distinctive definition of the national self. As Fitzgerald (1996: 57) observed, for the Confucian literati, China represented a distinctive civilisation; liberal Republicans conceived of the nation as a community of citizens; the nationalist (Guomindang) revolutionaries invoked the idea of a Chinese race; the Marxist-Leninists in China defined people by reference to social classes. 'Class' entered the nationalist discourse as a critical category and an alternative to 'citizen' and 'race'. The Chinese communists employed the idea of class as much as liberals used the ideals of citizenship or the nationalists used race, to assert the essential unity of the Chinese people. It must also be emphasised that Marxist-Leninists in China did not abandon the idea of a distinctively Chinese nation when they set out to create a new state based on the solidarity of various revolutionary social classes. They attacked the earlier 'bourgeois', 'feudal' and 'bureaucratic capitalist' state formations on the ground that they had failed to represent the nation adequately. The nationalist ideology constructed by the Communist Party of China (CPC) during the wars of liberation and afterwards was intended to serve the project of socialism. Externally, it was pitted against imperialism and internally it aimed at the overthrow of bureaucratic capitalism and feudalism. The Chinese collective imaginary was largely shaped by this ideology. After the revolution in 1949, CPC's foreign policy statements articulated a desire for national sovereignty vis à vis its powerful former foes. In its anti-imperialist battle cries, the CPC espoused a kind of internationalism which was essentially hierarchical in nature, in the sense that the supposedly fraternal world of the Bandung Conference was placed against North American and European domination. But it has been, as Lee (1996: 27) commented, an internationalism which ensured the paternalistic dominance of China in the liberation struggles and the solidarity of the Third World. This internationalism was so convenient that it served the goals of the state nationalism of the People's Republic of China (PRC). State nationalism portrays the state as the embodiment of the nation's will and tries to create a sense of nationhood among all its citizens. To distinguish state nationalism from ethnic nationalism in a country like China is difficult in as much as political and cultural communities are largely congruent and reinforce each other. The PRC is a multinational/multiethnic state. Han Chinese constitute approximately ninety-three per cent of the population. According to official status, the other seven per cent non-Han communities are divided among 55 ethnic minorities. State nationalism claims that the Chinese nation includes all PRC citizens irrespective of their ethnic nationality. In conformity with the conventional international norms, the state nationalism of the PRC vigorously asserts the indivisibility of territorial integrity. Popular movements reflecting state nationalism have a prominent place in the history of the PRC. In a broader sense, state nationalism and its nation-building project imbued every state policy with nationalism. Accordingly, development programmes became expressions of a nationalist movement, a collective effort to

transform China into a powerful and modernised nation as well as a new national community integrating all states, territories and peoples. Scholars on nationalism have pointed out the significant role that social communications play in the growth of nationalism. From this perspective, it can be argued that the real nationalist revolution in China came after 1949. It is these post-1949 developments in the field of transportation, postal and electronic communications, media industries, education and the popularisation of the national language that have contributed to the growth of national consciousness. The PRC's international conflicts were important factors in provoking nationalist sentiments in China. As Townsned (1996) commented, each conflict was backed by popular mobilisation; for example, the 'Resist America–Aid Korea' campaign mobilised popular solidarity for the war efforts. In terms of military action and popular emotion, this 1950–51 episode found no parallel in subsequent conflicts. The Korean model was followed in later instances, albeit with receding intensity. Military action coupled with nationalistic rhetoric and popular demonstrations can be seen in the Taiwan straits crisis of the mid 1950s, the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, the Sino-Soviet border clash of the 1960s and the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979. The PRC's efforts to regain Taiwan were also accompanied by a steady outpouring of nationalist appeal in the official media. An overview of the Chinese foreign policy since 1947 would reveal that it has remained one of the most fluctuating foreign policies of the twentieth century. The policy of leaning to the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc in the 1950s was succeeded by China developing solidarity with national liberation movements all over the world in the 1960s. In the context of the Sino-Soviet schism, the Soviet Union was accused by China of being revisionist, for advocating peaceful coexistence. When differences with the Soviet Union developed into a full-scale conflict, China beat a strategic retreat and opened channels for rapprochement with the United States. The Soviet Union then was condemned as social imperialist and the main source of international conflicts. Abandoning its solidarity with the oppressed nations, China developed full diplomatic and political relations with the most authoritarian regimes in the Third World. It has been primarily the state's perception of national security, and its aspirations, that have made the core elements in these conflicts. They largely influenced popular imagination and found entry into popular culture, forming the subject for film, drama, poetry and song. This is an intricate process in which goals of state nationalism and popular imagination reinforced each other. In China, the state's mobilisation of popular support against foreign threat often appeals to Han history and symbols, thus defining the nation as Han. This contradicts the ideological pretensions of the Chinese state that portrays the PRC as a multiethnic/multinational community. A close look at the rhetorics of Chinese nationalism from the 1980s to the present would suggest that the state nationalism of the PRC has bid farewell to its 1950–51 archetype. The aggressive tone in foreign policy pronouncements, official propaganda and state-promoted demonstrations has markedly waned in the 1980s and 1990s. Between 1949 and 1969, state nationalism was at its most intense. The state's call for national defence during the Korean war, tension in the Taiwan straits and the conflict with the Soviet Union had struck a responsive chord in the minds of the people. But later the PRC sought to accommodate itself to the realities of the new world order and redeemed itself from the politics of mass mobilisation.

State Nationalism and the Collapse of Socialist Project In this context, it would be relevant to examine the changes that swept over the ideology of the CPC. The breaking down of the Maoist grand theory by the late 1970s, both as the official orthodoxy and as the dominant ideology in the society, only deepened the crisis of people's faith in the Chinese party-state. Against this backdrop, the post-Mao CPC leadership under Deng Xiaoping initiated a set of new social and economic policies by which China deviated decisively from the original vision of the revolution. These policies have brought about far-reaching changes in the structural relations of economy, culture and politics. The CPC redefined its own historical project. The most important element in this programmatical and rhetorical shift was the abandonment of the original vision of the Chinese revolution. The CPC and the official media celebrated an idea of modernity without making any reference to the position of the social classes. As China slowly integrated itself into the global economy, the widening social disparities were brought to the open. A

new social stratum comprised of senior party bureaucrats and private entrepreneurs emerged as a power elite having enormous political and social clout. But, on the other hand, the liberalisation process made the Chinese working class politically powerless and materially impoverished. The state did not acknowledge these irreconcilable social cleavages. The official rhetoric moved increasingly towards the celebration of 'modernisation'. As a response to China's open door policy global corporate attention turned swiftly towards China. Factors such as an immensely huge market, cheap labour and political stability made China an irresistible destination for transnational corporations. Along with massive foreign-capital inflow came western ideas of liberal democracy, human rights and citizenship. And, on a wider canvas, the most compelling influence on Chinese society was the fascinating cultural rhetoric of the West. Nike and jeans, discos and Macerina, Coke and McDonalds, impacted tremendously on the psyche of the post–cultural revolution youth in China. For them, it was much more than being trendy. It offered, above all, prospects for a 'great escape' from social suffocation under a repressive system. China's tryst with late-twentieth-century western culture and capital turned socialism upside down—Maoist China stood on its head. The social process of westernisation was swiftly underway, before the party hardliners could wake up to the reality. As Schell (1989: 276) noted, it represented a powerful symbolic rejection of everything which China's communist revolution had strived for since the 1920s, as well as a refutation of everything in traditional Chinese culture. At a time when the CPC was relying increasingly on the ideology of nationalism and was frequently invoking the 'glorious past' of the nation in an effort to fill the intellectual vacuum created by the loss of faith in the official orthodoxy, the westernisation of Chinese popular culture appeared an anathema to the party-state. However, all these social processes produced evocative countercurrents from not only the CPC establishment, but also from China's cultural producers and academic intellectuals. This provided a perfect historical conjecture which paved the way for the resurgence of nationalist sentiments in Chinese society. A host of popular cultural products which appeared in the 1980s echoed this trend. In those works, China was represented as a nation ruthlessly humiliated by western imperialism after the opium war. It was military and spiritual weakness that had made China an easy prey for aggressive foreign powers. The new generation of intellectuals, through their works expressed a strong urge for national independence and strength. Mass sentiments longed for powerful national icons. To an extent the early 1990s nostalgia for Mao was a reflection of those sentiments.

Conclusion Given these emerging trends, it can be seen that for India, Chinese nationalism in its present form, far from posing any challenge, offers greater accommodative space and flexibility. In the articulation of a realistic foreign policy, India cannot remain insensitive to the following considerations: First, neither Chinese popular imagination nor state nationalism views India from a pejorative perspective. Second, in spite of the grand claims about the size and strength of its economy, the PRC is still in a period of transition from socialism to the full bloom of market economy. Compulsions of this transition have pushed the Chinese government to a precarious position, far more serious than one might imagine. Third, economic development that would lend legitimacy to the continuation of the CPC in power seems to be the overriding concern of China. The constraints of the present international environment are such that China cannot afford to remain in perpetual hostility towards India. But, unfortunately, the ruling coalition in India failed to appreciate these factors. Contrary to the claims of the Indian government, the objectives behind the official whipping up of anti-China sentiments in India cannot be explained by considerations on strategic realities. It rather suggests the inauguration of a new phase in Indian state nationalism, which is essentially the official expression of the ideology of the political Right.

References Beetham, David. 1993. The future of the nation states. In The Idea of Modern State, eds. Gregor Mc Lennan, David Held and Stuart Hall. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

Fitzgerald, John. 1996. The Nationless State: The Search for a Nation in Modern Chinese Nationalism. In Chinese Nationalism, ed. Jonathan Unger. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. Lee, Gregory B. 1996. Troubadours, Trumpeters, Troubled Maker: Lyricism, Nationalism and Hybridity in China and its Others. Durham: Duke University Press. Schell, Orville. 1989. Discos and Democracy: China in the Throes of Reform. New York: Anchor Books. Townsned, James. 1996. Chinese Nationalism. In Chinese Nationalism, ed. Jonathan Unger. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.

PART IV South and Southeast Asia

ELEVEN

India, Bhutan and Nepal: Perceptions and Relations LOK RAJ BARAL

ndia's Pokhran-II nuclear tests received mixed reactions. Controversies and debates continued at home, while condemnation, reprisals and sanctions came from the nuclear weapon states and other countries. France and Russia, among the nuclear weapon powers, adopted moderate lines, and the United States and China took more hawkish positions either by imposing sanctions or by blaming India for creating an unwarranted nuclear race in the region. Reactions were varied among India's neighbours too. Sri Lanka was supportive at the beginning and moderate in response later; Nepal expressed anxiety over the fallout of nuclear proliferation anywhere in the world and urged its nuclear neighbours (India and Pakistan) to come to a negotiated settlement of all contentious issues; Bangladesh issued mild protest; and Bhutan supported the nuclear tests by India. Reacting nervously to the Indian detonation, Pakistan exploded its nuclear device, effectively establishing its nuclear capability. Now both India and Pakistan are nuclear weapon states, regardless of the lack of information about the actual capability of the two adversaries.

I

Could India's nuclear blasts enhance its bargaining power in the world arena? Did they seem provocative to countries opposed to such tests? What is the net gain of the new development? These questions are being debated objectively by Indians themselves. Some are of the view that India could have ended its nuclear ambiguity long ago by declaring itself a nuclear weapon power as almost all Indian governments were unanimous on not 'rolling back' the nuclear programme. Nonetheless, its ambivalence – at variance with China which kept testing weapons contrary to the opinion of the West and others – presented India as a reluctant power lacking adequate confidence and boldness in its pursuit of power. Yet, for its South Asian neighbours, barring Pakistan, bilateral issues constituting non-military threats to security were more significant and immediate than the denunciation of India on the nuclear count.

India's status in South Asia India's status needs to be evaluated on the basis of its overall performance in various fields—economy, politics, science and technology, and stability as a nation-state. It continues to remain a single territorial entity despite heterogeneity and the resulting turbulence. The rising aspirations and increasing frustrations of the Indian people are kept within manageable bounds, thus avoiding serious frictions and separation of its units, however strenuous such endeavours might be. India is the largest country in the South Asian region. Its increasing population is likely to surpass that of China in AD 2025. It straddles the whole of the South Asian subcontinent touching all its neighbours and creating uneasiness among its immediate smaller neighbours, who fear domination. India as a British colony had pursued and harboured expansionist designs either by going to war with Nepal and Bhutan, or by bringing Ceylon into its fold. It was then an undivided India with no competitive powers in its immediate neighbourhood. British India's influence over the rest of the South Asian countries was so overwhelming that it "became the most important political and economic centre of the British colonial system in the east" (Guang 1992: 45). Today, India's influence and proximity produce stress and strain in its relations with neighbours providing them no alternatives but to treat India with objectivity and adroitness rather than the emotioncharged populism employed in the conduct of neighbourly policies. This essay seeks to underscore the major changes that have taken place since the partition of India in

1947, focussing on the configuration of new powers in South Asia. The birth of Pakistan, its disintegration, and the creation of Bangladesh, demonstrated that state building alone is inadequate to maintain the unity and integrity of a nation. The emergence of Bangladesh as an independent nation-state had apparently changed the power balance in South Asia due to the truncated status of Pakistan. But the arms race has contributed to further changes. Following the Chagai tests, Pakistan claims that India can no longer tilt the strategic balance in its own favour. All these developments and trends continue to keep India in a state of flux, despite certain geopolitical constants conferring it some kind of a permanent status in the region. India's position in the South Asian region can thus be examined on the basis of some of its peculiar characteristics which the neighbours lack: geographical position, population, economic base, industrial and technological infrastructure, military and nuclear balance, ability to cope with the emergent crises of nation building, dynamic political system and aspirations for high international status. A country's foreign and security policies are shaped to a considerable extent by its size and location. India, which is almost a subcontinent, shares boundaries with all its neighbours and, therefore, occupies a central location in the region. Most of India's neighbours are not comparable in size, strength, etc. except when it comes to the extent of poverty. All the countries of the region are poor with less than $500 per capita (the Maldives with about $700) despite their long postcolonial history. India's preponderance in the subcontinent is primarily determined by its size and then by other elements of national power. If size and centrality have played a part in giving rise to the fears of being dominated among India's South Asian neighbours, the psychology of these countries and their attempts at distancing themselves from the giant neighbour are no less problematic in defining their relations with India. Geographically, Nepal, for example, is a landlocked country with India on three sides, and China on one side (Tibet). Nepal's extensive relations with India cannot be placed on equal footing with its relations with China despite the latter being its immediate neighbour. The Nepali ruling elite, perhaps with the objective of serving their own interests, have occasionally tried to play 'the China card' in order to offset the pressures brought to bear upon them by India when the two neighbours pursued divergent approaches to various issues concerning the structure of relations between them. Surprisingly, China, unlike India, does not figure in the domestic politics of Nepal because of two factors. First, China is too far away to be as interactive as India. The China–Nepal links are confined to Tibet—for trade, or regarding the Tibetan refugees living in Nepal since 1959–60 following the flight of the Dalai Lama. The overwhelming geographical determinism is influential at all levels—popular, economic and political. As it has been aptly described by Rose: There are, however, substantial qualitative and quantitative differences between Nepal's historic relationship with India and that with China. As has been noted, relations with the former have been intimate and continuous over virtually all levels of contact for at least 2,500 years, .in contrast, Nepal's relations with China have been intermittent at best, and usually have been restricted to the official level (e.g., governmental missions) prior to 1950, and even thereafter. (1971: 16) Nepal's act of balancing between China and India was clearer following its establishment of diplomatic relations with China in 1955. The manner in which King Mahendra used the China card during the SinoIndian border conflict and embarked on a new political course by imposing his personalised regime after dissolving the parliamentary multi-party system (in 1960), is an interesting aspect of the link between domestic politics and foreign policy. The royal regime became a source of conflict between India and Nepal with major political parties then operating from across the border. The king objected and urged India not to allow such anti-regime activities, stigmatising it as anti-national. Although the ideological component of India's Nepal policy was suspect, its democratic set-up showed tolerance by allowing the Nepalese political leaders to live in India. The Maoists, who were also anti-Indian in their strategic orientations, were not extradited by the Indian government. This demonstrates how even the pro-Chinese communists preferred India to China. Other countries of the region, except Bhutan, are not so handicapped, because of their access to sea routes. Yet, India is a proximate power determining the nature and patterns of relations. The military support given by India to Sri Lanka in 1971 by way of quelling the extremist Sinhala guerrillas, India's role in quashing the

anti-Gayoom elements in the Maldives, are examples of how India acts – as a subcontinental power – during crisis situations experienced by its smaller neighbours. Pakistan's case is slightly different as it looks towards West Asia, thus trying to be independent of India's influence. Its military might and the support it receives from the major powers, especially the US and China, plus its inherited threat perception and mistrust of India have made it India's only South Asian rival. Pakistan's anxiety about Indian proximity and dominance is being compensated by its identification with West Asia and other Islamic states. Pakistan's nuclear tests, for example, were interpreted by many countries as 'Islamic', as if Pakistan's nuclear achievement had added status and security to many Muslim countries. Now Pakistan seems to be willing to extend and expand its Islamic contacts with many Central Asian states. Bangladesh shares a border with India, though it is not as dependent on India as Nepal and Bhutan which lack sea outlets and easy surface roads for third country trade. Their northern neighbour, the Autonomous Region of Tibet (China), cannot compensate for any kind of third country trade and other interactions as India does. Some Indian strategic thinkers seem to believe that Nepal is more central to India because of its location in the central Gangetic region, considered to be the heart of India both civilisationally and strategically. In their view, India's security interest is therefore inextricably linked to Nepal and Bhutan, imposing severe limitations on the conduct of the foreign and security policies of these countries. The Indian government has repeatedly objected to Chinese presence near the Indo-Nepal border. A Chinese contract to construct a portion of the East–West highway was cancelled after Indian objection. Other examples abound, on the working of the foreign policy of a small landlocked state under specific geopolitical constraints.

Open and Porous Borders: Implications for Relations Indocentric foreign policy is a feature common to most South Asian neighbours of India, especially the smaller countries. The size and the centrality of India, and the high density of population in countries contiguous to India have encouraged cross-country migrations whose regulation is becoming difficult. India is worried about the influx of a large number of people crossing the Indo-Bangladesh borders in Bengal, Bihar and the Northeastern states. West Bengal alone recorded that, of the illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, in 1991, 24.86 per cent were Hindus and 75.04 per cent Muslims. In 1977, Hindus constituted 34.99 per cent and the Muslims 55.19 per cent respectively (Ahmed 1997–98: 197). Such rapid increase in the Muslim population in West Bengal, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh could be correlated with the rise in the Muslim population in Nepal, now about eight per cent of the country's total population. The open border regime existing between India and Nepal facilitates the easy flow of cross-country migration. This regime is unique in the world and whatever migration takes place across the Indo- Nepal border can be conceptualised as an open migration with the following characteristics: 1. Inter-state migration is taken as a natural process and cannot be easily discontinued. 2. National identity of peoples crossing the border is blurred. 3. Migrants have the tendency to settle permanently once they cross the international border. 4. Migrants and local people of both India and Nepal can easily inter-mix if they speak a common language, share common customs and religions (Baral 1990: 2). The open border regime has its positive and negative dimensions. On the one hand, it represents the traditional relations between the peoples of India and Nepal whose cultural and civilisational links remain unbroken. As both the peoples are predominantly Hindu and share other values in common, the open border regime has continued to consolidate such links. More importantly, the open border regime is also identified with the free movement of peoples without the requirement of the valid travel documents demanded by other countries. Indians and Nepalese numbering millions work in both the countries putting both Nepal and India in an embarrassing situation because of the lack of records of these people. Today, it is estimated that about six million Nepalese are in India and millions of Indians have either settled or have been working as seasonal labourers in Nepal. The open border regime is also subject to excessive misuse by criminals, smugglers and underground

gangs having both national and transnational connections, creating crises of governance. The spill-over effects of mobile population, the free play of such gangs and criminals, and the alleged role of foreign intelligence agencies are likely to sour Indo-Nepal relations in the future. India has repeatedly expressed concern over Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) activities in Nepal, despite Nepalese denial of any anti-Indian activity on its soil. Nevertheless, the government of Nepal has helped curb such hostile activities by cooperating with the Indian security agencies when requested. The infiltration of peoples into each other's territories in South Asia is a common phenomenon despite tight security measures, including the fencing of borders adopted by concerned countries. The IndoBangladesh border and even the Indo- Pakistan border are porous, enabling people to cross them illegally. Pakistanis or Bangladeshis entering India can move into Nepal posing as Indians. They can spend their lives as Indians or Nepalis from the Tarai. The Sri Lankan case is somewhat different because of the crisis situation created by ethnic conflict. The problem of Tamils in Sri Lanka has two facets: 1. Indian Tamil plantation workers and the question of repatriation or awarding them citizenship; 2. indigenous Tamils who constitute 12.5 per cent of the Sri Lankan populace. Yet, when the Sinhala–Tamil military conflict began in 1983, the flow of refugees into India increased. Immigration cannot be linked to the general growth of population in India, but refugees and migrants seem to have precipitated the population pressure considerably in South Asian countries, sparking off controversies on the issue of 'foreigners'. India, possessing contiguous and proximate borders with all the countries, is criticised for paying short shrift to lingering bilateral problems. Nepal: Nepal in particular feels that the Indian immigrants in Nepal, a smaller country in terms of size and other resources, would eventually pose a threat to national security if the two countries continue to allow cross-country migrations in the current manner. It is feared that unregulated flow of Indians into Nepal would outnumber the Nepalese who themselves are virtually sukumbashi (landless people) within their own country. India, on the other hand, is of the opinion that the existing structure of Indo-Nepal relations as articulated by the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950 that allows the peoples of the two countries to enjoy certain privileges in Nepal and India should suffice to deal with the problem and there is no need to find alternatives. Articles 6 and 7 of the treaty lay down principles with regard to the treatment of the two peoples. According to Article 6, Each government undertakes, in token of the neighbourly friendship between India and Nepal, to give to the nationals of the other, in its territory, national treatment with regard to participation in industrial and economic development of such territory and to the grant of concessions and contracts relating to such development. Article 7 says, The Governments of India and Nepal agree to grant, on a reciprocal basis, to the nationals of one country in the territories of the other the same privileges in the matter of residence, ownership of property, participation in trade and commerce, movement and privileges of a similar nature.1 The 1950 treaty with Nepal encompasses all security-related areas such as the development of a common security perception in accord with the letter and spirit of the treaty. Although it was concluded by the tottering Rana regime on the eve of the anti- Rana movement, the old British-India policy towards its neighbours was reformulated with Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim (now an Indian state) with the objective of mitigating threats coming from third countries (in that context, the People's Republic of China). Many of the security clauses, however, became irrelevant following Nepal's establishment of a diplomatic relationship with China in 1955 and other later developments. King Mahendra maximised Nepal's foreign policy manoeuvrability until India established its credential as a regional power with its success in creating the new republic of Bangladesh. However, the security and economic agendas of both India and Nepal continued to sour their relations. In 1989 India decided against renewing the trade and transit treaties on the ground that Nepal began to import

Chinese arms without consulting India, which the latter considered a violation of the letter exchanged between the two governments along with the treaty of 1950. The hardened Indian attitude proved to be disastrous for the king as the opposition forces utilised the opportunity to initiate a movement for the restoration of democracy in Nepal. The regime, which had already exhausted its credibility and strategies, had to give in to the forces of change in April 1990. Nepal reverted to its earlier model of parliamentary democracy. The movement had the overwhelming support of various Indian political parties whose leaders attended the Nepali Congress Conference in January 1990. Such unanimous support was itself an indication of India's desire to improve relations with the democratic government of Nepal. It seemed that the new rulers of Nepal had better personal rapport with some of the important leaders of India and therefore were more confident of handling Indo-Nepal relations during their tenures in power. Moreover, the new relationship was characterised by transparency and a sense of accountability unlike the personalised rule of the king. Some of the agreements concluded by the new elected government of Nepal were criticised, though they were subsequently tackled based on a broad national consensus. One example was the Mahakali Integrated Project for utilising the resources of the Mahakali Basin. Coming as it did amidst political controversies and debates, the Mahakali Treaty was signed in February 1996 though political parties in Nepal are yet to reach a consensus on a detailed project report (DPR) on the Mahakali. Bangladesh: India has traversed a considerable distance in forging relations with its neighbours. The IndoBangladesh agreement on the sharing of the Ganga waters and other confidence building measures adopted by the two governments in recent years have considerably allayed the fears and suspicions of Bangladesh, regardless of the political opposition's tendency to whip up anti-India feeling when out of power and to retract such postures while in power. Political parties in South Asia are devoid of issues with which to mobilise support and therefore try to project themselves as 'nationalist'. But with the strengthening of democracy in Nepal and Bangladesh, their political parties are becoming more sensitive to issues of development. Therefore their future agendas of governance would have to reflect their concerns. Pakistan: 'The Gujral doctrine' of India's foreign policy has transformed the nature of bilateral relations between India and its immediate neighbours. Yet, the hard issues concerning Pakistan have remained unchanged. Both the then Indian prime minister, I.K. Gujral, and his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, had shared perfect personal rapport as both hailed from undivided Punjab and had many things in common including the Punjabi language and Urdu couplets, but no substantive issues were dealt with because the Kashmir issue formed the core of Indo-Pakistan relations, according to Pakistan. Sri Lanka: India's Sri Lanka policy took a new positive turn in the 1990s particularly following Indian confirmation of the alleged hand of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in assassinating the former prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi. New Delhi appreciated the difficulties faced by the Sri Lankan government in managing the long drawn out ethnic conflict. The nervousness with which the Sri Lankan government despatched its foreign minister to New Delhi to establish the same working relationship with the new Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government as it had with earlier governments, demonstrated India's significance to Sri Lanka's domestic crisis. Bhutan: India has had special relations with Bhutan both strategically and economically. Secluded in location and preoccupied with maintaining the traditional interest of the regime, Bhutan seems to be pursuing a calculated foreign policy objective, i.e. continuity in status quo. However, the internal developments of Bhutan have compelled it to be proactive, albeit in a highly selective manner despite it being a member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the United Nations and the Non-aligned Movement. Mounting political pressure exerted by Bhutanese dissidents now working for basic democratic reforms in the power structure, and criticism by Bhutanese expatriates has led to King Jigme Singye Wangchuk's taking some policy measures for 'reforming' the regime and appointing some ministers from amongst the members of the National Assembly. India's support to Bhutan does not involve persuading or pressuring it to introduce democratic reforms. According to the Treaty of Friendship concluded between the two governments in 1949, "The Government of India undertakes to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part, the Government of Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations" (Kohli 1982: 217–18). India's own strategic interest seems to guide its Bhutan policy, as this

landlocked Buddhist country is a defence bulwark in view of India's northern border with China. If Bhutan continues to serve India's strategic and economic interest in accord with the spirit of the treaty, India would not like to be misunderstood by its neighbour. India's two landlocked neighbours – Bhutan and Nepal – are at loggerheads due to the eviction of more than a hundred thousand Bhutanese of Nepali origin from Bhutan, the evicted Bhutanese finding their way into Nepal. Bhutan does not consider them as refugees because in its view, they left the country voluntarily. And if some of them were forced to leave under duress, such cases would be examined. Nepal does not accept Bhutan's interpretation. The issue remains unresolved despite several rounds of ministerial-level talks between the two countries. Nepal wants India to mediate between the two countries in order to find a negotiated settlement. But India has been avoiding the mediator's role urging both countries to solve the refugee problem through bilateral means. Economically, both Bhutan and India are tied to each other's interest. Bhutan's process of modernisation and development depends to a large extent on improvement of agriculture and the development of hydropower. The first big hydropower project, Chukha (336 MW), has been serving the interests of both countries, with Bhutan selling its surplus power to India. Another power project, Tala (1,020 MW), is in progress and is expected to increase the living standard of the Bhutanese people. India has constructed all Bhutan's roads in addition to providing aid to other sectors. Bhutan's dependence on India is dictated by both domestic and external factors. Internally, the existing regime wants to be left alone without having to face any external pressure. Externally, India's strained relations with China, with Bhutan supporting India's security interest, have brought them closer thus allowing India to conduct its foreign security policy within the parameters of its strategic framework in the south of the Himalayas. Although Bhutan has sometimes ventured to formulate a more independent foreign policy like Nepal, it seems to have compromised its posture following India's reactions to such moves. Our short resume of India's neighbourly policy demonstrates that India, given the complexity of its position in the South Asian region, seems to be capable of holding its smaller neighbours together, contrary to the geopolitical pulls and pressures witnessed during the cold war period. Its power and influence have often been viewed critically, but it has been able to maintain its traditional ties with its smaller neighbours.

Democratic Policy and Pursuit of Power Democratic government in India has entered a phase of multi-party coalition both at the central and state levels, prompting many analysts to comment that the prime minister, a dominant patriarchal figure, has been stripped of his initiatives and dynamism due to divergent alliance partners. Yet, given the nature of coalition politics across the world, such a dramatic reversal in India is not surprising. For the first time in the postcolonial period of democratic governance, people have begun to realise that the western model of democratic evolution and institutional development would be transformed in the totally different socioeconomic and political setting of South Asia. And the Indian laboratory of democracy impacts on its neighbours too. Indian democracy has been a perennial source of bilateral conflict between India and its neighbours governed by authoritarian regimes. But with the increase in interactions, India is better understood in the region today and not so feared as an expansionist power. Some political parties talk about so-called Indian designs and paternalistic policies, warning incumbent governments not to be pliant. Their behaviour shifts when they are in power. Political leaders in Nepal, without weighing the magnitude of their own undemocratic behaviour, often issue statements of some kind of a conspiracy thesis that most governments in Nepal have fallen due to Indian machination. Such conspiracy theories advanced by politicians lack veracity and are often dismissed, though they get enough space in the muddled local press causing damage to mutual understanding. Nevertheless, transparency and frankness have rectified the sources of misunderstanding. Surprisingly, such accusations by the various parties and leaders have also proved to be useful by triggering public debates on certain decisions executed by the government. On some issues concerning Indo-Nepal relations, the opposition parties have put the government on the defensive. An example is the Tanakpur

agreement concluded by India and Nepal in 1991. Rejecting the government's position – which interpreted India's compensation to Nepal for using 567 metres of Nepali land for the construction of an afflux bundh on the left bank of the Mahakali river, as an 'understanding' requiring no parliamentary ratification as stipulated by Article 126 of the Constitution of Nepal – the Supreme Court of Nepal gave a verdict saying that it was an 'agreement' or a 'treaty' and therefore needed parliamentary ratification as per clause 126. But the Court also said that it was up to the government to determine the procedures of parliament for passing it, either by simple or two-thirds majority depending upon the nature and importance of the agreement.2 The Tanakpur issue was an eye-opener for both India and Nepal, prompting the latter to be conscious of the need for a national consensus to conclude treaties. It brought to the surface the severe constitutional and legal constraints of a government whose hold in parliament was diminishing due to the coalition of multimini parties. How could a government muster adequate support for getting a treaty ratified through parliament? It can be said in retrospect that Article 126 of Nepal's Constitution was inserted for fear of any future deals with India. The Kosi and Gandak projects led to the Nepal government being criticised for succumbing to Indian pressure. Writing about the Kosi and Gandak projects, a former minister of water resources of Nepal says: The original agreement provided no irrigation for Nepal and flood-control for a tiny portion of Nepalese territory. The 1959 Gandak agreement allowed India to use this river to irrigate Bihar and U.P. Indian sources have themselves estimated that the benefits to Nepal were 5 per cent of those expected to accrue to India. (Rana 1996: 207) Today, India and Nepal are once again at an impasse on the Mahakali Integrated Project. Although the Mahakali Treaty was passed by two-thirds of the joint session of parliament of Nepal, India seems to have demanded the right of a lower riparian state asking for the release of more water about 161 kilometres downstream of the Tanakpur barrage. In Nepal's opinion, such an arrangement had not been included in the Mahakali Treaty. Another issue dominating existing Indo-Nepal relations is the issue of the Kalapani border area where Indian border force (for the India–Tibet border) has been stationed since 1962. Both India and Nepal are claiming the territory on the grounds of maps and border demarcation evidences. A joint technical team has been set up to determine the actual border claimed by India and Nepal, though, of late, India has issued more details of its claim.

Conclusion India's neighbourly policy reflects both continuity and change. The reiteration that smaller landlocked countries like Bhutan and Nepal are integral parts of its security framework points to an aspect of continuity. Economic interactions, and the open and free border between Nepal and India are other aspects. India's relations with Bhutan have been guided by strong bilateralism, while Nepal has been trying to moderate the relationship pattern in view of the changed regional and international context. The demand for either revision or review of the 1950 treaty is not supported by research on the part of Nepal. In 1997 the Nepalese foreign minister proposed a new draft of the treaty, while the prime minister insisted on a review, first at the official level and then, if necessary, at the political level. Parties referring to the treaty as irrelevant in the present context are apparently coy when more clarity is sought by India. Since 1990 Nepal has effectively lacked an India policy because politicians and politically based intelligentsia are bereft of any proposal acceptable to both the countries. Only cool and objective analyses of the emergent situation and the role to be played by Nepal can lead us to some sort of an understanding. Moreover, parties should consider the issue of national importance above short-term party interests and generate consensus on the next agenda to be placed before India. Changes in relations have been quite obvious and treaties have not prevented Nepal from establishing its own national identity and status in the wider world. Although the review of the treaty is essential for two different reasons—to determine the appropriateness of the treaty in the present context; and to cause

satisfaction that for a country like Nepal, the appearance of independence and freedom in formulating foreign policy is as important as substance, despite the highly interdependent nature of the relationship between the two neighbours. The concept of absolute sovereignty has been diluted by powerful trends of globalisation and regionalism as the countries are promoting free trade, more investment and more interactions with the world at large. The trend of regional cooperation or regional integration is less powerful than the tendency of each SAARC member to move closer to the global market. Intra-SAARC trade and investment do not figure significantly as in the case of other regional organisations. The elements of the Gujral doctrine, especially its two components – non-reciprocity (India not asking for reciprocity from its neighbours but providing all that it can in good faith and trust), and non-interference in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries – had been well received by the neighbours. India could concede to various long-standing demands such as treaties of trade and transit with Nepal; a new transit point for Nepal's third country trade and the Mahakali Treaty for harnessing water resources; the Ganga Treaty with Bangladesh; and the Tala project with Bhutan. If India wants to be taken seriously by others, it has to be more confident of its economic progress, and exhibit minimum public morality and accountability. What India needs today is clean, effective governance and fast economic progress for alleviating poverty, in order to present itself as a power to be taken seriously by both Indians and others.

References Ahmed, Imtiaz. 1997–98. Rethinking National Security: The Issues of Refugees in Bangladesh-India Relations. Theoretical Perspectives 4 and 5: 197. Baral, Lok Raj. 1990. Regional Migrations, Ethnicity and Security: The South Asian Case. New Delhi: Sterling. Guang, Lin Liang. 1992. India's Role in South Asia: A Chinese Perspective. In India's Role in South Asia, ed. Vernon L.B. Mendis, 45. Colombo: S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike National Memorial Foundation. Muni, S.D. 1992. India and Nepal: A Changing Relationship. New Delhi: Konark. Kohli, Manorama. 1982. India and Bhutan: A Study in Interrelations. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal. Rana, Pashupati Shumsher, J.B. 1996. Nepal-India Relations: Water Resources. In Looking To the Future: Indo-Nepal Relations in Perspective, ed. Lok Raj Baral, 207. New Delhi: Almond. Rose, Leo E. 1971. Nepal: Strategy for Survival. Bombay: Oxford University Press.

T WELVE

India's Policy towards its South Asian Neighbours: Constraints, Impediments and Perspectives B.C. UPRETI

nter-state relations in South Asia have been marked by deep-rooted turbulence and hostilities. Though the pattern of these relations has continued to be more or less the same, India's unique centrality and vastness have made it the axis around which the region has forged its common identity and image. However, these qualities have also played a negative role in moulding the neighbours' perception vis à vis India. Numerous other factors emanating from the legacies of the past, the socio-cultural mosaic, and political and economic constraints have played a vital role in shaping India's relations with its South Asian neighbours as well as their perception and attitude towards it. India's policy towards its South Asian neighbours has reflected the paradoxical nature of the region. The neighbouring countries too have been preoccupied with their preconceived notions of Indian hegemony and supremacy, and its possible threat to their identity and independence. As a result, India's relations with its neighbours have been characterised by disharmony, suspicion and apathy to a large extent. This is not to state that India has failed to pursue a policy of mutual benefit in the region. Many such efforts were made, but inherent suspicions could not be converted to amity. Hence, they proved to be short-lived.

I

Admittedly, the Nehruvian approach to foreign policy had accorded greater importance to international relations than to regional issues. With the strategy of non- alignment the Indian leadership visualised a greater role for India in world politics, particularly in the cold war atmosphere. Non-alignment had a limited role to play in the region. This apart, because of contentious political, economic, territorial, hydrological and ethnic issues with the neighbouring countries, India overlooked the needs and possibilities of strong regional ties and cooperation. India acted only to the extent that its security interests and regional pre-eminence were not challenged. By the end of the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s, a number of developments had taken place at the international level, which compelled individual states to recast their priorities and policies so as to adjust with the changes taking place all over the world. Even as the disintegration of the Soviet Union was under way, ending the cold war, globalisation and liberalisation set new trends, challenges and opportunities in the arena of international relations. Geoeconomics was beginning to appear more important than geopolitics. The need to accord pre-eminence to regional policy, regional cooperation and regional organisations was felt keenly at this time. These developments provided tremendous opportunities for evolving long-term policies for regional harmony and for the resolution of contentious bilateral issues. The central question to be addressed here is: How far has India been able to adjust with its South Asian neighbours in this changing global scenario?

Sources of Dissonance and Discord in South Asia South Asia encompasses seven independent sovereign countries – Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka – which dominate the northern half of the Indian Ocean. It is the largest geographical entity of the Indian Ocean community and almost a continental whole. The region is, therefore, easily identifiable (Anand 1991: 3). South Asia is one of the most populous regions of the Asian continent. It contains nearly one-fifth of world's total population and has emerged as the poorest region of the world. The

per capita gross national product (GNP) of South Asia (US$ 309) is lower than that of any other region. Over 500 million people in the region live below the poverty line. Interestingly, while South Asia contains 22 per cent of the world's population, it generates only 1.3 per cent of the world's income. The adult literacy rate (48 per cent) of the region is the lowest in the world. Half of the children in South Asia are underweight. About 26 million people lack safe drinking water, 830 million have no access to basic sanitation facilities and over 400 million people go hungry every day (Haq 1997: 2–25). India is the largest country in the South Asian region. Its features of size, population, resources, economic development, scientific and technological advancement, military strength, etc. are quite disproportionate in comparison with those of other countries of the region. It occupies nearly seventy-six per cent of the area of the total region. India's population is three times more than the combined population of the other six countries and its GNP is 78 per cent of the total GNP of the region. Geography has provided India a central position, as it shares 4046 km land border with Bangladesh, 3310 km with Pakistan, 1752 km with Nepal and 587 km with Bhutan, apart from a maritime border with Sri Lanka (Bedi 1997)India has major or minor border disputes with all these countries except Bhutan. No other country of the region shares border with any other country except India. This Indocentric nature of the region has been a major source of dissonance (Sisson and Rose 1990). The Indocentricity, along with asymmetry in size, resources and capabilities, have given rise to feelings of insecurity among the smaller states of the region. They feel themselves overshadowed by India. Because of its vastness India has a natural sphere of influence, which has often caused suspicion among the smaller states. India's initiatives are not only misunderstood but often characterised as 'hegemonic', meant to serve its own vested interests. The smaller states, therefore, tend to develop their own distinct identities and, in this process, affinities with India are often ignored, and points of diversity are stressed repeatedly. The South Asian countries have problems of systemic diversities and dissonant ideologies unfolding in the conflict between democratic forces and authoritarian political structures. Yet, India has been able to secure accommodation, tolerance and consensus because of its democratic process and adherence to secularism. A complex and heterogeneous state like India has survived because of the democratic consensus developed within the country (Rizvi 1993: 39). The other countries of the region generally lack this framework. Some rulers/governments even foster an aggressive and narrow ideological stance, rooted more in notions of antiIndianism than indigenous traditions and values. Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh have experimented with the establishment of democratic political systems. Except for Sri Lanka, the other countries could not sustain democracy and soon turned to authoritarian systems. Such systemic and ideological divergences have prevented the development of a coherent foreign policy approach. India, being a democratic country, naturally sympathised with the democratic forces in the region, and this was perceived by the authoritarian rulers as a threat to their survival (Prasad 1987). Hence, their efforts have been to draw away from India in the name of identity, independence and sovereignty. The geopolitical problems of the region, including boundary disputes, have further facilitated this process. The political boundaries demarcating the postcolonial South Asian states were determined arbitrarily and are not products of historical evolution. Therefore, they ignore the reality of geography and ethnicity. Such demarcation has given rise to a number of contentious bilateral issues. The borders between different countries cut across communities, and religious and ethnic groups, resulting in the existence of similar religious and ethnic groups across boundaries (Ghosal 1996: 19–20). These ethno-cultural affinities arouse fear of irredentism and have been a source of tension between the concerned countries (Mahan 1991). Since the various ethno-religious communities in South Asia have their origin in India, any kind of ethnic tension arising in any country becomes a source of tension in India. India's reaction is viewed as interference and the concerned country responds sharply.1 Though South Asian countries represent one of the poorest regions of the world, the imperative need for mutually beneficial cooperation has generally been ignored by them. The economies of these countries are more competitive than complementary. It is a fact that the region is quite rich in natural resources, and these countries can seek India's cooperation and assistance in the utilisation of these resources (Adiseshiah 1987). But they are afraid of being pressurised by India and seem to be more concerned about reducing their economic dependence upon India (Khatri 1987).

Because of an inherent threat perception against India, the smaller countries of the region tend to follow divergent foreign policy approaches. Their foreign policies accord more importance to extra-regional linkage, which has been responsible for inviting superpower rivalry in South Asia (Phadnis 1989), and thereby contributing to inter-regional hostilities (Buzan and Rizvi 1988). The smaller countries of the region are also faced with a dilemma as to how to deal with the perceived threat from a strong regional power and follow a coherent policy vis-à-vis India (Khatri 1987). Their approach has been three-dimensional in this regard: 1. they interact closely with the extra-regional powers at bilateral and multilateral levels so as to reduce their economic, political and security dependence on India; 2. they use extra-regional powers as a counterweight against the regional power; and 3. they internationalise contentious bilateral issues, be it a border dispute or the question of sharing natural resources. It must be stressed here that South Asian countries are faced with numerous problems of nation-building and national reconstruction (Ramakant and Upreti 1990). These have also adversely affected bilateral relations among the countries of the region (Mitra 1990). It is clear from the above discussion that the sources of dissonance in South Asia are numerous and they have played a negative role in shaping inter-state relations in the region. Some of them are of a permanent nature, and cannot be ignored at any period of time. However, there are a number of commonalities as well, that have potential for building strong regional ties. Most of the countries of the region share a common historical and political legacy. There are also ethno-linguistic and religio-cultural commonalities (Varma 1969). There is a vast scope for sharing the natural resources for mutual benefit. The extent to which these potential areas of cooperation and friendship can be explored, by containing the sources of dissonance, has been a major challenge for India's policy in South Asia.

Changing Scenario The last decade of the twentieth century has been marked by changes of lasting importance in international relations. In many respects, it presented a striking departure from the past. The disintegration of the Soviet Union was a significant development. It witnessed the collapse of a vast multi-ethnic country with the biggest land mass, a global military and nuclear power (Gupta 1991). The break-up of the Soviet Union was followed by the weakening of communism as an ideological force. In the context of world politics it meant: 1. the end of the cold war era in international relations; 2. the end of the need for building military alliances; and 3. the opening up of possibilities for global cooperation (Jain 1996). The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the redrawing of the map of Europe without a war. The East European countries began to look towards the West, and democratise their polities and liberalise their economies. Sustained growth through democratic policy began to be recognised all over the world. Economic forces assumed greater premium; the globalisation of national economies based on the principles of privatisation and liberalisation, and the expansion of multinational corporations acquired significance. The emerging new world order was also characterised by diffusion of scientific and technological knowledge (Dubey 1993: 117–29). These changes underlined the fact that geoeconomics was becoming more important than geopolitics. There has been a growing concern for environmental protection and ecological balance. The fact that implications of environmental damage are not confined within national boundaries is being realised by countries all over the world. Maintenance of the ecosystem calls for meaningful cooperation at regional and international levels. The emergence of the European Economic Community (EEC)/European Union (EU) as a strong economic entity; the integration of Germany; the weakening of the United States as an economic power, etc. were other major developments which influenced the world political scenario. Cooperation at the regional level was becoming a necessity for countries to adjust to the forces of globalisation and liberalisation. Notwithstanding the emergence of new forces, traditional concepts of sovereignty, nationalism, self-identity and independence continued to acquire relevance in the context of the nation-state paradigm. That national boundaries were bound to become less formidable due to growing economic interdependence and the expansion of market forces, was becoming acceptable. The new world order also envisaged greater emphasis on regional ties and understanding.

India's Response to the New International Order

India, like many other developing countries, responded to the post–cold war developments in the arena of international politics. It tried to adjust to the situation and, accordingly, attempted to rearrange its foreign policy priorities, both at the global and regional levels. India's adherence to the policy of non-alignment, peace, friendship and stability continued. Yet, it was necessary to bring about certain changes in India's foreign policy in response to the new emerging world order (Chopra 1993; Rasgotra 1993; Kapur 1994; Thakur 1994). In fact, it was not possible for any country to remain isolated from the growing emphasis on globalisation and privatisation, on the one hand, and the reshaping and realigning of global political and strategic forces, on the other. In fact, these changes posed new challenges for India's foreign policy and the disintegration of the Soviet Union particularly necessitated the recasting of its foreign policy priorities. India realised that in the changed circumstances regional issues had become more important and it was necessary to build strong ties at the regional level. In response to the changing world scenario and the need for a fresh look at India's foreign policy, India's prime minister, Narasimha Rao, said in parliament on 20 December 1991 that his government was prepared to adapt itself to the changing international environment. India was conscious of the need to structure a regional and international order based on harmony, consensus and willingness to strive for peace, stability and development. It became essential for Indian foreign policy to take into account: 1. India's security and territorial integrity; 2. the economic well-being of the people which required keeping pace with the external economic environment; and 3. stability and peace in the region. In the context of India's policy towards its neighbouring countries, certain aspects acquired significance. Firstly, there was a pressing need to recast India's approach and envisage its role with regard to the politicostrategic issues in the context of two major developments: the disintegration of its dependable ally, the Soviet Union, and the lessening of possibilities of big power involvement in regional affairs. Secondly, in the context of the globalisation and privatisation of economies, regional cohesion and the activation of regional economic cooperation became necessary in order to cope with the changes. Thirdly, there was an increasing need for greater and more sustained efforts to promote better bilateral relations with the neighbouring countries, which could help develop a congenial atmosphere for financial investment, joint ventures, expansion of market facilities, transfer of technology, liberalisation of trade regimes, etc. at the regional level. Fourthly, India began to realise that the growth of democratic institutions in the neighbouring countries could be an asset for the development of healthy bilateral relations and regional solidarity. Fifthly, India's response to and initiatives in the emerging world order had an inevitable impact on and significance for its South Asian neighbours. And lastly, India's concern in reshaping its foreign policy, in accordance with changing priorities in regional affairs, was induced not only by the changes at the global level but also by the changes in the neighbouring countries themselves (Ramakant and Upreti 1995).

Shift in Regional Scenario The changes taking place at the global level influenced the countries of South Asia. It appeared that competitive polity was gradually taking the place of controlled regimes. In Pakistan, with the death of President Zia ul-Haq in 1988 the army realised that it could no longer prevent the advent of democracy and, for a few following years, the country moved back to the path of democracy. In Sri Lanka presidential elections took place in 1989. In Bangladesh democracy came into operation with the 1988 general elections. In Nepal the 1990 democratic movement succeeded in establishing democracy. Along with the democratisation of polity in the neighbouring countries, India also witnessed political changes at home. The formation of non-Congress governments not only marked a change of ruling party but also indicated the beginning of weak governments and weak political leadership in India. These changes impacted on India's relations with its South Asian neighbours. At this point, we must note that India had strained relations with Pakistan over the issues of Siachen, nuclear tests, Kashmir and cross-border terrorist activities; with Nepal over the issues of arms purchase from China and the renewal of trade and transit treaties; with Sri Lanka over the issue of withdrawal of the Indian Peace-keeping Force (IPKF); and with Bangladesh over the issues of sharing the Ganga waters, illegal migrants and arms supply from China. With the change in party and leadership in India a change in the attitude of the government was obvious. It can be concluded that the post–cold war period was marked by significant changes, which had a bearing on the pattern of international relations. Individual countries had to

reshape their foreign policies in accordance with the changing international scenario. It called for an increased emphasis on building strong regional ties by improving relations with immediate neighbours. India's preparedness to accept these developments and recast its foreign policy priorities helped influence the foreign policy orientation of its neighbouring countries. However, it may be pointed out here that the new emerging world order could notlead to the disappearance of deep-rooted differences and conflict,s it could only create certain opportunities which could help minimise conflicts and develop good neighbourly relationships.

Initiatives and Constraints In the 1990s India began to take initiatives to improve relations with its neighbouring countries. With Bhutan, India's relations had been cordial and continued to be the same despite the emergence of ethnic conflict in Bhutan and strained Bhutan–Nepal relations. India refrained from commenting on the issue and did not allow its relations with Bhutan to be disturbed (Upreti 1996). With Nepal, a process of normalisation of relations started with the signing of the accord in June 1990, restoring the status quo ante April 1987. The revision of trade and transit treaties, which had become a note of discord between the two countries during 1987–88, further strengthened their relationship. India agreed to provide economic concessions to Nepal in order to encourage trade. India and Nepal also developed an understanding on the issue of mutually beneficial utilisation of the Mahakali river. For Sri Lanka, India's withdrawal of the IPKF in 1990 was a great relief. It indeed paved the way for the improvement of relations between the two countries. In 1991 the two countries agreed to the setting up of a joint commission to provide an institutional framework to their bilateral relations. India's relations with Bangladesh remained unstable during 1975–90 (Ahmed 1997). The Khalida Zia government, which came to power in February 1991, could not make much headway, except in resolving the Tin Bigha issue. India's relations with Pakistan, however, remained as they were in the past, vitiated by an enmity that was basically the legacy of history (Gupta 1993). The suitable environment created after 1990 did not help much in removing mutual distrust and suspicion. India did try to improve trade relations and encourage cultural relations with Pakistan but issues concerning Kashmir, cross-border terrorist activities, nuclear development, narcotic and drug trafficking, etc. remained unresolved. On the whole, India's South Asia policy still lacked a clear and broad perspective. Rather it followed a piecemeal approach. Yet, India's initiatives were significant in many respects. It realised the need for stronger economic ties with its neighbouring countries and was prepared to take the necessary steps to achieve this. It also recognised the need to stabilise the region through economic cooperation and conflict resolution. India's initiatives towards improving relations with Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh were important. It is significant that India agreed to the view that countries like Nepal required economic concessions and encouragement. However, India's problems with Pakistan remained. All efforts towards building bridges and the confidence building measures proved to be mere rhetoric and were confined to strengthening public relations (Gonsalves 199.1)

Policy of Good Neighbourhood India appeared to follow a policy of good neighbourly relations on a long-term basis with the installation of the United Front (UF) government in 1996. Despite being a weak government it took concrete steps towards resolving contentious bilateral issues with neighbouring countries. India's foreign minister, and later prime minister of the UF government, I.K. Gujral, understood the need to adopt a liberal attitude towards the problems of the neighbouring countries, and stressed that India should take initiatives in resolving longstanding problems without expecting reciprocity. Gujral's capacity for persuasion and conciliation had already been acknowledged in 1990 in his efforts, as foreign minister, towards the withdrawal of the IPKF from Sri Lanka and the normalisation of relations with Nepal. In the form of the 'Gujral doctrine' India tried to formulate a perspective on its relations with the South Asian neighbours. The doctrine essentially promoted the accommodation of the interests of the neighbouring states, without expectations of reciprocity.

In an interview Gujral firmly acknowledged the regional component in the policy of globalisation. He stressed that every worthwhile foreign policy needs to focus on regionalism.2 India's initiatives to improve relations with its neighbours began with a dialogue with Bangladesh. Gujral admitted that relations with Bangladesh constituted the most difficult dimension of India's regional policy. However, his government received necessary feedback from Bangladesh with the installation of the Awami League government in Dhaka. Prime Minister Gujral paid a visit to Bangladesh in September 1996 along with leaders of West Bengal. The leaders of the two countries agreed to find a permanent solution to the long-standing Ganga river water dispute. On 12 December 1996 the two countries signed a historic 30–years treaty on sharing of the Ganga waters.3 The resolution of the Ganga water dispute opened fresh opportunities for the management of water- and environment-related issues in the region (Upreti 1993). On 9 March 1997 the Chakma leaders and the Bangladesh government concluded an agreement for the repatriation of an estimated 50,000 refugees from India belonging to the Chittagong hill tracts (CHT) in Bangladesh. It may be noted here that the influx from Bangladesh to the Northeastern states of India had caused a serious ethnic problem in this region.4 The agreement also provided some relief to India. There can be no doubt that India has done much to improve its relations with Bangladesh. However, the opposition parties and fundamentalist forces in Bangladesh did not appreciate these developments.5 A strong foundation was laid for bilateral relations between India and Sri Lanka with President Chandrika Kumaratunga's visit to New Delhi in March 1995. India indicated clearly that it wanted to mend fences with its neighbours. In an important policy statement Gujral pointed out that ground realities had to be taken into consideration while dealing with neighbouring countries. During a visit to Sri Lanka in January 1997 Gujral reiterated that a peaceful and stable environment was a prime necessity for the economic development of all the countries in the region.6 The issue which was creating a misunderstanding between India and Sri Lanka was the ethnic crisis in the island. Sri Lankans were apprehensive of India's attitude and role in the crisis. The Indian government made it clear that Sri Lanka and Sri Lankans alone must sort out this issue. India realised that there are certain permanent and inescapable realities, which require the existence of a close understanding with Sri Lanka (Rajapakse 1998). In June 1997 Prime Minister Gujral paid a visit to Nepal. Earlier India had achieved an important breakthrough in the issue of sharing river water resources by signing the Mahakali River Treaty. India also declared a number of economic concessions to Nepal such as reduction in tariff rates and reduction in the percentage of Nepali contents in its export items to India. India's liberal attitude was expected to boost Nepal's exports to India, thereby reducing the serious problem of trade imbalance between the two countries. In March 1997 India agreed to increase its investment limit in Nepal, avoiding the dual taxation system and the 'one window' approach to enable early clearance of Indian investment proposals in Nepal. During Gujral's visit, Nepal's long-standing demand for an alternative trade route to Bangladesh through Indian territory in Phulbari, was accepted. This would facilitate Nepal with alternative port facilities in Chittagong. The Gujral doctrine, which provided a perspective on India's policy towards its South Asian neighbours, failed to draw much enthusiasm in the context of relations with Pakistan. India made certain efforts from the beginning of the 1990s towards initiating trade and cultural relations with Pakistan and using track-two and track-three diplomacy in mending fences. Nawaz Sharif initially emphasised democracy, development and regional cooperation. The United Front government in India showed gestures of the Gujral doctrine. The initial dialogues between the two countries generated some goodwill but this process was soon retarded by other pulls and pressures. Pakistan began to stress that unless some progress was achieved on the core issue of Kashmir it would not be possible to initiate meaningful cooperation in economic and cultural fields. India's diplomatic moves, which proved to be fruitful in the case of other South Asian countries, did not succeed in the case of Pakistan. Not only did Pakistan continue to insist on resolving the Kashmir issue, it also raised the problem of Siachen, nuclear non-proliferation, etc. Pakistan continued to encourage cross-border terrorist activities and a proxy war against India, which ultimately culminated in the Kargil conflict in May–June 1999. It appears that Pakistan's domestic political compulsions played an important role in its foreign policy. Its transition to democracy is still riddled with problems. The army again became the ruling authority after the October 1999 coup and is capable of subverting any improvement in Indo-Pakistan relations. Some scholars believe that the strengthening of Indo-Pakistan relations is an essential prerequisite to curbing the military

influence in Pakistan's politics (Rizvi 1993). The rise in fundamentalism and Islamisation has also encouraged Pakistan to take aggressive postures against India. The country is faced with a crisis of cultural identity. Religion has failed to provide a strong basis for the Pakistani nation. The communal divide has created animosity between the two countries. In such circumstances Pakistan has followed contradictory policies and has not responded to India's initiatives in a coherent manner. Meanwhile, India has reacted strongly to extraregional interference in South Asian affairs. It did not accede to the request of the US to sign the nonproliferation treaty (NPT) and the comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT). India had to pay for this in the Security Council, but it has resisted US pressure.

Initiatives towards Sub-regional Cooperation Apart from laying full faith on regionalism and focussing on its interest in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Indian Ocean Rim (IOR), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Central Asia, India has stressed upon the need for sub-regional cooperation. One unit for such cooperation, constituting Northeast India, Nepal, Bangladesh and Bhutan, has been suggested. Nepal has been requested to coordinate this programme. Nepal, Bangladesh and Bhutan have appreciated this policy move. The Nepalese minister for water resources, Pashupati Shumshere JBR said: The Mahakali Treaty, the Ganga Water Sharing Treaty of Farakka, the power purchase agreement between Nepal and India, the Nepal–India Trade Treaty and the understanding reached in principle for a transit route for Nepal through and to Bangladesh are some of the innovative path breaking chapters which open enormous prospects for enhanced cooperation aimed at developing the economies of the region. We need not be prisoners of the past. (Bhattacharjea 1997) In fact, this sub-region constitutes the most populated and the most poverty-ridden part of the subcontinent, but it is rich in natural resources, particularly river water resources. If these resources are tapped, it is possible to change the economic condition of the people of the region. Another potential unit for sub-regional cooperation is Sri Lanka, Maldives and south India. India's insistence upon sub-regionalism is an indication of its acceptance of the need for multilateral cooperation in place of bilateral cooperation. If the breakthrough in sub-regional cooperation is fully exploited, the Ganga–Brahmaputra triangle may well set an example of transnational cooperation in development. Pakistan has opposed the idea of sub-regional cooperation in South Asia with the belief that it is a strategy being pursued by India to isolate it in the region. Pakistan has also pleaded that such an idea is against the concept of the SAARC. India has insisted that subregional cooperation is aimed neither at isolating Pakistan nor going against the SAARC. The idea of such cooperation is very much in conformity with the framework of the SAARC.

Nuclear Explosion: A New Dimension in India's Regional Policy The Pokhran-II tests held in May 1998 by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government made India's nuclear policy clear, and demonstrated the country's nuclear capability and strength. It was also a reflection on India's political will and courage in displaying its nuclear capabilities (Dubey 1998). At home, the opposition leaders and parties viewed it as a political strategy. There was universal disapproval of India's nuclear tests, particularly from the US, which had been pressing hard upon India and Pakistan to sign the CTBT. India's position was such that this step was necessitated by security considerations. The US and Chinese supply of sophisticated arms to Pakistan and Pakistan's testing of the Ghauri missile (Dixit 1998: 36– 37) had raised new challenges to India's security. The growing US–China alliance had emerged as a new but long-term factor. The US had accepted China as its leading ally. Both considered Pakistan a strategic partner in South Asia. India believed that the US–China–Pakistan axis could harm its security and strategic interests in the region. Pakistan reacted to India's nuclear explosion by carrying out its own nuclear tests. These nuclear explosions have definitely had serious implications for Indo-Pakistan relations, though both countries have their justification regarding nuclear tests (Ray 1998: 7). But May 1998 onwards, India and Pakistan have been heading towards serious economic challenges that are likely to retard the sustainable

development agenda of the two countries. There is also a possible security risk to the people of the region, caused by nuclear weapons (Rajan 1998). Pakistan tried to include bilateral issues on the agenda of the July 1998 Colombo SAARC summit, but other members did not accept its request. Pakistan also stressed that any process of peace and security in the region must focus on the Kashmir issue. It has been reported that Pakistan would not sign the CTBT unless it was linked with the Kashmir issue. Pakistan's foreign secretary also said that unless the Kashmir dispute was addressed meaningfully and purposefully, the cause of peace and security in this part of the world would remain totally elusive.7 The nuclear issue has added to the atmosphere of suspicion between the two countries. As far as the other countries of the region are concerned, it may not affect their attitude vis à vis India, so long as India continues with its good neighbourhood policy towards them.

Conclusion To sum up, it can be said that nature has provided a complex character to the South Asian region. There is a vast country at the centre of the region around which there are smaller countries. The partition syndrome has resulted in the artificial division of states, people and resources, thereby leaving behind bickering, disharmony, mistrust and communal feelings. The socio-cultural and religio-linguistic spectrum overlaps national boundaries and creates ethno-religious complexities in the region. There has been in-built suspicion among smaller countries about India's role in the region. It has given rise to identity crises among them. As a result, the smaller countries tend to look towards extra-regional powers to play a role in regional affairs, so as to balance India's regional pre-eminence. This naturally has security risks for India. Containing these ground realities and developing regional harmony and understanding have been serious challenges to India's policy in the region. However, the neighbouring countries have often misperceived India's initiatives and policy measures. The end of the cold war with the disintegration of the Soviet Union required the reshaping of foreign policy in the context of changing politico-strategic and security parameters. Globalisation,liberalisation and privatisation required the opening up of national economies. Geoeconomics superseded geopolitics. The strengthening of regional ties became an essential requirement. India's understanding and preparedness to reshape its foreign policy in order to accommodate itself to the global changes was reflected in its initial measures to improve relations with the neighbouring countries. India prioritised the consolidation of its relations with the neighbouring countries. It gave preference to accommodating the economic needs and demands of the neighbouring countries. The UF government tried to provide a clear perspective on India's policy towards the neighbouring countries. India succeeded in resolving certain long-standing problems with Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Its encouragement of sub-regional cooperation was a welcome development. However, suspicion and confusion still persist among the neighbours. Nepal and Bangladesh lack a national consensus over the issue of sharing river waters. Sri Lanka still appears suspicious about India's attitude towards the Tamil problem because of the influence of regional parties in the central government (Guha 1998). Bhutan also seems to be worried about Bodo and United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) activities in its territory. Thus, fear and suspicion among the smaller neighbours will persist. However, India needs to initiate confidence building measures towards strengthening ties with its neighbours in the form of long-term policy. The smaller countries should also respond to India's efforts in a positive manner. With Pakistan, India's attempts towards economic and cultural cooperation have not been very successful. Pakistan's insistence upon taking up the 'core issues' first has repeatedly thwarted the process of normalisation of relations. There cannot be any doubt that cordial relations between Pakistan and India are a prerequisite for regional peace, stability and cooperation. But both countries are victims of a deep-rooted psychology of mistrust and suspicion. The recent nuclear tests by the two countries have further worsened the situation. Pakistan's domestic constraints continue to be a critical factor in its relations with India. Unless the democratisation process is stabilised in the country and until the political ascendancy of the military is neutralised, it would not be possible for India to improve relations with Pakistan. Hence, the process of rapprochement between the two is bound to be gradual, slow and uneven.

In the context of these realities, India's regional policy has to be two-fold: 1. to secure its politico-strategic and economic interests in the region, and 2. to continue the process of strengthening ties with its neighbouring countries. A balance between the two is essential. India's South Asian neighbours also need to reciprocate India's initiatives in terms of friendship and generosity They need to realise that India's needs and problems, and its role are larger, and that their support to India would enhance regional solidarity and the image of South Asia outside the region.

References Adiseshiah, Malcolm S. 1987. The Economic Rationale of SAARC. South Asia journal 1(1). Ahmed, Fakhruddin. 1997. Bangladesh Policy in the Regional context. Dhaka Courier, 12 September. Anand, R.P. 1991. South Asia: Search of a Regional Identity. New Delhi: Banyan Publications. Bedi, Rahul. 1997. Not so Friendly Neighbourhood. Indian Express, 15 May. Bhattacharjea, Ajit. 1997. Neighbour Friendly policy. The Hindu, 30 January. Buzan, Barry, Gowher Rizvi, et al. 1988. South Asian Insecurity and Great Powers. London: Macmillan. Chopra, Pran. 1993. The Crisis of Foreign Policy: Perspective and Issues. New Delhi: Wheeler Publications. Dixit, J.N. 1998. Psycho Skirmish, Pakistan's Success in Test Firing the Ghauri Calls for Strategic Analyses, not Political Bravado. Outlook, April 20. Dubey, Muchkund. 1993. India's Foreign Policy in the Evolving Global Order. International Studies, 30(2): 117–129. —. 1998. Demonstration of Political Will and Courage. Mainstream (23 May): 3–4. Haq, Mahbub, 1997. Development in South Asia 1997. Karachi: Oxford University Press. Ghosal, Baladas. 1996. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics in South Asia. New Delhi: Konark. Gonsalves, Eric. 1991. Post-Cold War South Asia, Quest for a Peace Dividend. The Times of India, 15 January. Guha, Seema. 1998. Triggering Unhappiness in Lanka, India–Sri Lanka Relations. The Times of India, 21 June. Gupta, Shekhar. 1991. Soviet Union: End of an Empire. India Today, September. Gupta, Subir Das. 1993. Enemy Images, Legacy of History in South Asia. Sunday Times, 8 November. Jain, H.M. 1996. India's Foreign Policy: Projections for Future. In India and the New World Order, ed. Annpurna Nautiyal, 10–25. New Delhi: South Asian Publishers. Kapur, Harish. 1994. India's Foreign Policy, Shadow and Substance. New Delhi: Sage. Khatri, Sridhar K. 1987. Foreign Policy and Security Perceptions of South Asian Nations. In Regional Security in South Asia, ed. Sridhar K. Khatri. Kathmandu: CNAS. Mahan, Rajan. 1991. From Sphere of Suspicion to Area of Amity: A Perspective on SAARC. In SAARC: A Study of Perceptions and Policies, ed. Virendra Narain and B.C. Upreti. New Delhi: South Asia Publishers. Mitra, Subrata, ed. 1990. The Post Colonial States in South Asia. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Phadnis, Umashankar. 1989. India: Geo-political Strategic Concerns. World Focus (January 1989): 10–17. Prasad, Bimal, ed. 1987. Regional Cooperation in South Asia: Problems and Prospects. New Delhi: Vikas. Rajan, Sudhir Chella. 1998. South Asian Security Hinges on Welfare. The Times of India, 16 July. Rajapakse, Jayarath. 1998. South Asian Prospects, Perceiving Reality. Sri Lanka Guardian, May. Ramakant and B.C. Upreti, ed. 1990. Nation-Building in South Asia. 2 Vols. New Delhi: South Asian Publishers. Ramakant and B.C. Upreti. 1995. Changing Nature and Priorities of India's Foreign policy vis-à-vis the India–Nepal Relations. In New Perspective on India-Nepal Relations, ed. Kalim Bahadur and Mahendra P. Lama, 140–41. New Delhi: Har Anand. Rasgotra, M.K. et al. 1993. India's Foreign Policy in the 1990s. New Delhi: Patriot. Ray, Barren. 1998. Nuclear Bangs in the Subcontinent Expose New Global Alliance. Mainstream (June 20): 7. Rizvi, Gowher. 1993. South Asia in a Changing International Order. New Delhi: Sage. Sisson, Richard and Leo E. Rose. 1990. War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh. Berkeley: University of California Press. Thakur, Ramesh. 1994. The Politics and Economics of India's Foreign Policy. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Upreti, B.C. 1993. Politics of Himalayan River Waters. New Delhi: Nirala Publications. —. 1996. The Nepali Immigrants in Bhutan: Growing Conflict Between National and Ethnic Identities. In Bhutan: Society and Polity, ed. Ramakant and R.C. Mishra, 78–91. New Delhi: Indus. Varma, S.P. 1969. South Asia as a Region: Problem and Prospects. In Foreign Policies in South Asia, ed. S.P. Varma and K.P. Misra, 345–47. New Delhi: Orient Longman.

THIRTEEN

Rethinking India–Pakistan Relations: Challenges Ahead K. RAMAN PILLAI

ndia's relations with Pakistan have seen many critical phases and turbulent events. The entire gamut of problems in India–Pakistan relations has a historical context (Hodson 1969; Gupta 1958; Levi 1952) which continues to dictate the turn of events in bilateral relations. Even as the adversaries of the cold war years became allies in the 1990s, India and Pakistan continued to be locked in perpetual and unyielding hostility. The events of the 1990s, particularly the nuclear tests and the Kargil conflict, further underscore the necessity for new initiatives towards establishing peace and harmony in the region.

I

Historical Context Evidently, many of the problems in India–Pakistan relations emanated from the partition of the subcontinent. The circumstances of partition and the differing perceptions of the causes led to the major strain during the first two decades. In fact, the leaders of both India and Pakistan did not take adequate precaution to address some of the outstanding problems that emerged from partition. The problems were vast and varied, encompassing the dispute over the demarcation of boundary, the minorities' question, the settlement of evacuee property, the refugee inflow/outflow, the sharing of river waters, etc. (Gupta 1966; Brines 1968). Admittedly, some of these problems were settled or cautiously addressed within the first twenty-five years after independence, but tensions and conflicts persisted in many other areas; the most sensitive being the Kashmir question which continued to be a critical factor in India–Pakistan relations. As Michael Brecher pointed out, Kashmir symbolised the root of conflict between India and Pakistan and was "the final test of the validity of the two nation theory, the basis of Pakistan which rent the subcontinent asunder in 1947" (1959: 277). The Kashmir problem has its origin in the partition when both India and Pakistan staked their claims. However, following the invasion of tribals from the Pakistani side in October 1947, India brought the question before the United Nations Security Council and charged Pakistan, under Article 35 of the UN Charter, with an act of aggression against India. Earlier, in accepting Kashmir's accession on 26 October 1947, Mountbatten said that when the invaders were expelled and law and order established, the question of state's accession should be settled by a reference to the people (Menon 1985: 399–400). Pakistan had agreed to the plebiscite, but called for the withdrawal of Indian troops; the substitution of Sheikh Abdullah's government by a coalition government; and the holding of a plebiscite under international auspices. These conditions were unacceptable to India. A cease-fire was, however, brought into being under UN auspices on 31 December 1948. The UN mediators right from Fleet Admiral Chestar Nimitz to Gunnar V. Jarring failed to recommend a feasible solution to the problem mainly due to the sharp difference of opinion that existed between India and Pakistan on the terms and conditions for the plebiscite. Meanwhile, the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) ratified the state's accession to India in 1954. The Constitution of J&K was adopted in November 1956. India formalised the accession of J&K on 26 January 1957 and made it irrevocable (Gupta 1966; Gupta 1958; Lakkanpal 1965; Lamb 1966). But Pakistan did not accept this position and raised the issue of Kashmir in almost all international fora, such as the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), Islamic summits, Commonwealth summits and the United Nations, whenever it got a chance to do so, and insisted on a plebiscite in Kashmir. To India, committed as it has been to a secular democratic state, possession of Kashmir is a virtual

demonstration of the fact that Muslims and Hindus can live together as a peaceful community. To Pakistan, possession of Kashmir, with its overwhelming Muslim population, is vital as the fulfilment of the ideal upon which Pakistan rests—a national home and a nation-state for the Muslims of the subcontinent (Bhutto 1964; Bhutto 1966; Khan 1969; Burke 1973). It is not often realised that the Kashmir problem owes its origin substantially to the British interest after August 1947, in retaining control over or access to the Gilgit Agency in J&K. This area, where Britain had a military base, had come to be seen as important to the western powers, as it was in the proximity of the Soviet Union and China. The British-led takeover of Gilgit on behalf of Pakistan synchronised with the raid on the rest of Kashmir, ostensibly by tribals. Major Brown, whose Gilgit scouts were directly under British control, led the action in Gilgit and hoisted the Pakistani flag there on 4 November 1947, nine days after the accession of J&K to India. The strategically more important part of Kashmir (including Gilgit) bordering Afghanistan and China, thus came under Pakistani control. Pakistani and Anglo-American opinion had gone along with, and often led to, talk of self-determination for the people of J&K (Pillai 1969; Pillai 1970). It is doubtful that Pakistan and the western countries were really interested in independence for J&K. The existence of an independent state of J&K would mean, in the first instance, Pakistan losing the advantages it gained from the 'tribal raid' of 1947–48. Kashmir's strategic importance for Pakistan is the land link it provides with China. The loss of this link would reduce Pakistan's importance to both the West and China. The geographical basis of the China–Pakistan axis would also disappear. China too would lose direct and unfettered access to the port of Karachi. Therefore, a strategic partnership developed between Pakistan and China in the 1960s, in particular after the India–China war of 1962. This assumed a new dimension when Sino-Soviet relations became strained during the decade and the Soviet Union began to play a significant role in South Asia. The post-1971 period was distinguished by the fact that the perceived threat from India figured less and less in Pakistan's domestic politics. An elected leadership had assumed office in Pakistan. The United States and Chinese equations with Pakistan compelled India to seek external support in the form of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971. In the altered balance of power in the subcontinent after the Bangladesh war, Pakistan's strategy of maintaining parity with India receded to the background. Its alliance with the US, however, retained relevance in the context of the need to serve US interests in the Gulf area. The Shimla Agreement signed between the prime ministers of India and Pakistan in July 1972 underlined the need for bilateralism in the relations between the two countries and ruled out intervention by third parties. Clause 4(ll) of the agreement states that in Jammu and Kashmir the Line of Control (LoC) resulting from the cease-fire of 17 December 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. This clause adds, "neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretation" (Government of India 1972: 192–93). Both sides further agreed to refrain from the threat or use of force in violation of this line. The diplomatic relations between the two countries, which got ruptured in the 1960s, were restored in the second half of the 1970s during the Janata government. Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee's visit to Pakistan evoked criticism and was interpreted as the Janata regime lending legitimacy to the military rule in Pakistan which began in 1977. In a speech in the UN General Assembly in September 1978, Agha Shahi, the Pakistani spokesperson said: "In relations between India and Pakistan the process of normalisation set in motion by the Shimla Agreement of July 1972 has maintained satisfactory progress." He claimed that Pakistan would continue to strive for a just and honourable settlement in accordance with the spirit of the Shimla Agreement and on the basis of relevant resolutions of the UN. However, the re-emergence of the military-bureaucratic establishment in Pakistan put the clock back. Pakistan's draft for a no-war pact in early 1980s suggested a joint commitment to non-aggression and non-use of force, and resolution of disputes exclusively by peaceful means. This was not acceptable to India as it felt that the pact would dilute the Shimla Agreement. The Indian government was worried about Pakistan allowing itself to be sucked into the American concept of strategic consensus and feared that Pakistan might offer military bases to the US. India's draft for a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation incorporating such concepts as respect for each other's territorial integrity, non-interference and renunciation of the use of force was not acceptable to Pakistan. The draft treaty advocated joint commitment to the principle of bilateralism and renunciation of the right to give military bases or even facilities to a third country. There was very little that General Zia and Indira Gandhi could do during the brief meeting in November 1982 to resolve

the differences over the scope, purpose, relevance and inter-relation of the three propositions—the no-war pact, the treaty of peace and the joint commission. However, they agreed to continue their search for durable peace in the subcontinent. They also agreed to the establishment of a joint commission to promote better relations. The foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan reached an agreement for establishing a joint commission with a number of sub-commissions aimed at strengthening understanding and promoting cooperation for mutual benefit in the economic, trade, industrial, scientific, technological, educational, cultural, information, travel and tourism spheres. The joint commission would have the foreign ministers of the two countries co-chairing it while the sub-commissions would be headed by senior officials dealing with specific subjects. A formal agreement on the establishment of the joint commission and its subsidiary commissions was signed by the foreign ministers in March 1983. Both sides wanted to prevent an intensification of the border tensions, although neither was prepared to make concessions beyond a point. For over a decade, India–Pakistan relations did not show any significant improvement in spite of change of governments in both countries (Dixit 1996: 113–40). Meanwhile, there were intense consultations between Islamabad and Washington to find a mutually acceptable compromise that would allow the US to resume military and economic assistance to Pakistan, suspended in the early 1990s, and revive frayed bilateral relations. Pakistan at this stage tabled a resolution on Kashmir in the UN Commission for Human Rights at Geneva in February 1994. It, however, did not succeed in its bid to censure India over the situation in the Kashmir Valley. During the visit of US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot, in April 1994 to Islamabad, Pakistan sought to convince him that the US should at least facilitate a settlement of the Kashmir issue. But Talbot reaffirmed US willingness to assist if, and only if, both India and Pakistan asked for mediation. Subsequently, Pakistan sought to involve the political committee of the UN General Assembly in the Kashmir issue, but did not succeed. Pakistani interference in Kashmir and its role in organising insurgency in the state continued unabated. The India–Pakistan conflict dynamics began to affect other issues in the region, particularly the South Asian regional cooperation efforts. It had taken about six years for the South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) to be signed in 1993. Even then the Indo-Pakistan hostility syndrome came into play and Islamabad dragged its feet. It was in March 1995 that Pakistan came round and SAPTA promised to become a reality. In 1996, Prime Minister Deve Gowda suggested the resumption of the secretary-level talks that had been discontinued since 1994. The meeting on 23 June 1997, of the two foreign secretaries, however, represented a departure from the past and indicated a potential breakthrough. It identified eight areas for discussion between the two countries: 1. peace and security; 2. Kashmir; 3. Siachen Glacier; 4. Wullaibarrage/Tulbul navigation project; 5. Sir Creek; 6. terrorism and drug trafficking; 7. economic and commercial cooperation; and 8. promotion of friendly exchange in various fields. It was at this meeting that a decision was taken to place J&K on the negotiating agenda and have it addressed at the level of foreign secretaries. That decision imparted a higher degree of credibility to bilateral parleys even as it had the potential of defeating Islamabad's strategic end game of internationalising the issue. Even before the breakdown of the dialogue of the foreign secretaries in September 1997, Pakistan had called upon the western world to intervene and help resolve the Kashmir issue. In a situation where Pakistan obtained western support for its position on Kashmir, it would discredit the bilateral dialogue by saying that New Delhi was not serious about addressing the Kashmir issue. Under Pakistan's 11 June 1997 proposal special priority had to be accorded to the issues of peace and security and Kashmir in any future dialogue between the foreign secretaries. This relegated the other seven areas identified for discussion to the background. In January 1998, at the time of the Tripartite Summit in Dhaka, prime ministers I.K. Gujral and Nawaz Sharif agreed on a way out of the stalemate over the modalities of the dialogue. Earlier the two sides had differed on whether Kashmir should be given primacy (as demanded by Pakistan which regarded it as a 'core' issue) or taken up along with the other outstanding matters identified earlier by the foreign secretaries (as suggested by India). Pakistan wanted a separate working group on Kashmir, while India cited the earlier agreement that this matter, along with peace and security, including confidence building measures (CBMs), should be taken up by the foreign secretaries themselves. They also differed on the order of discussion of the

eight identified issues. Gujral then suggested that all matters be taken up simultaneously at the same venue on the same dates, and Sharif agreed. The two prime ministers instructed their foreign secretaries to proceed accordingly. The follow-up action, however, was not possible because of political developments in India. The nuclear tests conducted by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government on 11 and 13 May 1998, and the tests conducted by Pakistan on 28 May brought the issue of Kashmir into sharp focus. India's moves to acquire nuclear weapon capability reflected its belief that its strategic concerns were much wider. National security and parity with India are the two key considerations underlying Pakistan's nuclear programme. Its concern with respect to India, and issues of national pride and domestic political and public pressures overrode the international call for restraint. Pakistan did not want to be seen engaged in a bilateral dialogue with India lest that should weaken the momentum which it believed was building up for the internationalisation of the Kashmir issue as a result of the declared nuclearisation of the subcontinent. As seen by Islamabad the climate had never been so propitious for a decision by the world community (Pakistan's description of some of the industrialised countries) to play a role in the solution of Kashmir and other problems between India and Pakistan. It did not want to squander this advantage by entering into a direct dialogue with India especially when it was clear that New Delhi would not agree to discuss the 'core issue' on Islamabad's terms. India took the lead in announcing a unilateral moratorium on tests, followed it up with its offer of an agreement on no-first-use of nuclear weapons and expressed its willingness for nuclear CBMs at the bilateral level (Government of India 1998). Pakistan must have been considerably heartened when the US President Bill Clinton suggested that because of the history of the Kashmir problem and other differences between India and Pakistan, "China should have been a part of any ultimate resolution of this matter". Clinton developed a full thesis on this subject saying that America's interest in the security agenda in South Asia required the cooperation of China. Pakistan rejected the Indian proposal for a no-first-use of nuclear weapons agreement between the two countries ahead of the bilateral meeting of the prime ministers scheduled for July 1998 in Colombo on the sidelines of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif expressed the hope that he would have fruitful discussions with the Indian prime minister on 'all issues' between the two countries. The Pakistani prime minister was quoted as having said that Kashmir remained the 'root' of all problems with India. He maintained that the Group of 8 (G-8) should intervene to resolve the differences between Pakistan and India. Sharif told the press in Lahore on 11 July 1998 that Pakistan would not hesitate to hold talks on the comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) provided the Kashmir problem was solved first. A solution to the Kashmir dispute would safeguard Pakistan's interest after which it would be willing to talk about the CTBT. It must be acknowledged with a sense of regret that the chauvinist and bellicose manner in which the leading members of the BJP-led government used the fact of India's newly proclaimed nuclear status to suggest that its stance on Kashmir had been strengthened, had the opposite effect of making India's position more vulnerable internationally. Islamabad lost no time in justifying its own nuclear tests and, indeed, reasserting its long argued thesis that Kashmir could not be settled bilaterally, pointing to the provocative statements made by BJP spokespersons. The meeting of the two prime ministers at Colombo was the first after the change of government in India and also the first contact at that level after the nuclear tests by the two countries. Pakistan, as is known, set its heart on the Kashmir issue and wanted it to be taken up first, to the exclusion of other matters. India had no objection to holding a discussion on Kashmir along with others, notably CBMs in both the nuclear and conventional fields. The concept of a comprehensive dialogue was in keeping with the stand taken by India in January 1998 at the Tripartite Summit in Dhaka. India certainly was not prepared for a solution of the issue on Islamabad's terms—through a plebiscite or with the help of a third party. As regards the totality of the India–Pakistan relationship, the premises on which New Delhi proceeded and would continue to do so are as follows (as officially stated): 1. India stands for the stability and prosperity of Pakistan. 2. It is keen to establish a basis of trust and confidence. 3. It is keen on the two countries working together closely.

4. It is committed to resolving differences with Pakistan through peaceful bilateral negotiations. 5. There is no animosity or ill will towards Pakistan. New Delhi would like Pakistan to comprehend India's position as a stabilising factor in South Asia. 6. India has noted with regret: 7. the intensely vicious and virulent propaganda spread against it by Pakistan; and 8. cross-border terrorism in the garb of 'freedom struggle' in Kashmir. India should assure the neighbouring countries of its peaceful intent and make positive efforts to improve the climate for peace that has been vitiated over a period of time. While remaining firm on essentials New Delhi could work harder to promote bilateralism. The confidence building process has to be strengthened further. The Chinese support for Pakistan can be expected to continue although it could be tempered by several considerations including the growing strategic reach of India. Normalisation of bilateral relations will take a few years. Prime Minister Vajpayee declared in Parliament that there was no question of accepting the LoC as an international border and that the whole of Jammu and Kashmir was an inalienable part of India by legal accession. Sharif restated Pakistan's insistence on a plebiscite as required in the old UN resolution and attempted to lure the G-8 and the P-5 to intervene in the Kashmir issue. The statements of the two prime ministers added up to a prescription for unending friction and disagreement. But the statements were probably intended as hard postures prior to bargaining for an eventual compromise. As regards the plebiscite, it could have been held 50 years ago if Pakistan had withdrawn its forces and tribals as the resolutions required. Today the situation has changed beyond recognition. For a mutually acceptable and effective compromise, both India and Pakistan should be realistic and respectful of history. If Islamabad has any concern for the future of the state of Pakistan and its people, it might as well shed the unrealistic dream of obtaining for itself the part of J&K that is under India's control, by summoning spurious arguments such as the 'Islamic' content of the valley, or by internationalising the issue and luring or extorting support from the G-8 and P-5 powers, or by harping on a now unworkable plebiscite. New Delhi has to relax the hard posture that has locked its limbs and movement for half a century. It should be noted that in the first India-Pakistan war in J&K, the commanders of the forces on the two sides were British—General Gracey in Pakistan and General Bucher in India. Alastair Lamb (1966) says that the two men had remained in close touch despite the strained relations between the two nations they served. When the issue went to the UN, the major powers were more concerned with their own national interests than with any kind of settlement on Kashmir. The Kashmir issue provided them with a useful handle for effecting instability in South Asia whenever it suited them. To the industrialised world an unsettled Kashmir with the accompanying friction and instability provided a lucrative arms market. An Indo-Pakistan settlement for peace in J&K should bring significant financial relief and other benefits to both countries, especially to Pakistan. The much awaited meeting between the prime ministers of India and Pakistan took place on 29 July 1998. Both struck notes of personal warmth—a true index of the mood during their meeting. There was no other sign that the gap in their positions on substantive issues had narrowed or that there was an agreement on the basis of which the dialogue was being resumed. They agreed to resume the dialogue process stalled in June 1997 and directed their foreign secretaries to meet immediately. Nawaz Sharif insisted on the foreign secretaries picking up the thread from where it was left off in June 1997. In other words, he demanded that priority be given to the 'core' issue Kashmir, preferably through discussion in a separate working group. According to Pakistan, India had accepted that arrangement but later gone back on it. While contesting that insinuation, India called for comprehensive and composite dialogue. The foreign secretaries held two rounds of talks on 29 July 1998, but failed to reach any sort of conclusion. They were expected to meet again for yet another effort, so as to possibly report an agreement to the two prime ministers before their departure from Colombo. The two leaders had mandated them to evolve the basis of the dialogue, which they agreed needed to be restarted. In case they did not succeed, the discussion would have to be continued in some other form. No time-frame could be set but it would have to be done soon to enable the two sides to start the dialogue well before the NAM summit towards the end of August

1998 when the prime ministers would have another opportunity for talks. India and Pakistan failed to agree on the modalities for resuming the dialogue and with that the process set in motion by the two prime ministers ended abruptly. The foreign secretaries who held three rounds of talks could not find common ground. It was expected that the two prime ministers would have their next meeting on the sidelines of the NAM summit in Durban. Sharif told an interviewer that the outcome of his talks with Vajpayee was 'zero'. However, both sides agreed to remain in touch through diplomatic channels. After the failure of the talks at the level of the foreign secretaries on the sidelines of the South Asian summit in Colombo in July 1998, the two again met during the NAM summit in Durban in early September to work out the modalities of resuming the bilateral dialogue. The formal announcement came after the prime ministers met later during the UN General Assembly session in New York. An agreement was drafted to resume the dialogue under a 'two plus six' formulation of the agenda. They also reached an agreement to start a bus service between New Delhi and Lahore.

Bus Diplomacy and the Lahore Declaration Vajpayee's bus trip to Lahore and the signing of the Lahore Declaration on 21 February 1999 was an earnest attempt to improve bilateral relations on the pattern of the Shimla Agreement. The bus journey and its symbolism indicated that there was a desire at the highest level to improve relations. The Lahore Declaration, the joint statement and the memorandum of understanding (MOU) bound both countries to the process of dialogues on a range of issues (Government of India 1999: 16–19). The MOU says: "The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security concepts and nuclear doctrines with a view to developing confidence-building measures in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at avoidance of conflicts." The prime ministers of India and Pakistan also agreed that the countries would intensify their efforts to resolve all outstanding issues including the problem of J&K, and refrain from interventions and interferences in each other's internal affairs. Despite all the euphoria built around the Lahore Declaration, it was opposed by the hawkish elements in Pakistan. When Pakistani service chiefs did not greet Vajpayee at Wagah border, as protocol demanded, it ought to have been a warning. Knowing fully well that there were hostile elements within the Pakistani establishment, the government should have been more vigilant. The Jamaat-i-Islami organised demonstrations and enforced a strike to protest against Vajpayee's visit. Pakistani opinion-makers who have taken a hawkish stand on the nuclear issue fear that the western game plan to make India and Pakistan sign the CTBT will prove detrimental to Pakistan's strategic interests. Political commentators feel that the Pakistani government suffers from a lack of vision and swings from one extreme position to another. The Lahore Declaration has certain weaknesses too. The declaration and the joint statement are silent on the crucial issue of non-deployment of nuclear weapons and missiles. Even a general reference to the issue is conspicuously absent. The question of visa is another area of weakness. Although relaxing the requirement of police reporting is being considered, the system of city specific visa seems to have come to stay. The two prime ministers did not say anything on the crucial issue of reopening the consulates in Karachi and Mumbai, a move that would be welcomed by families divided by the partition. In relationships as difficult as that between India and Pakistan, negotiations and declarations constitute a fine art. However, there are a host of agreements that have not been implemented and good intentions that have not been followed up, forming part of India–Pakistan history. Lahore did not prove to be any different.

The Kargil Conflict Soon after the Lahore Declaration, intruders from the Pakistani side, mainly Taliban mercenaries, aided and abetted by Pakistan's regular army, crossed the LoC all along the Kargil sector clearly violating all canons of international law and in complete violation of the principles embodied in the Lahore Declaration (The Kargil Review Committee 2000). The realisation that Pakistan's armed forces were busy plotting against India when their prime minister was affixing his signature on the Lahore Declaration and when the bus diplomacy

appeared to promise a reversal of the adversarial past, jolted India rudely. The catalyst of the mischief was the G-8 countries' resolution adopted in the wake of nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, on 19 May 1998, declaring that "Kashmir is a flash point for a possible nuclear holocaust in South Asia." Pakistan latched on to the declaration and refused to solve the Kashmir problem bilaterally under the Shimla Agreement. It tried hard to internationalise the issue pleading for third party mediation, preferably by the US. Not only that, Pakistan thought that the time was ripe to exploit the political instability in India. The initiative for planning and executing the Kargil operation was, from the very beginning, taken by the army and the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), and Nawaz Sharif's government may not even have been aware of the plan. For the army there was only one goal—to annex Kashmir and complete the unfinished task of 1947–48. After the secession of Bangladesh, another motive was added—to avenge the vivisection of Pakistan. There was no disagreement between the army and the civilian establishment on either of these goals so long as Pakistan remained under one or the other form of army rule. By 19 October 1998, when the preparations for the Kargil invasion must have been finalised, civilian control over the army was at its lowest ebb. The Pakistan army has been a powerful spokesperson of the anti-India campaign. The army was not on good terms with Sharif especially after the dismissal of General Karamat. Kargil led to further contradictions in the complex civil/military leadership. Kargil obviously tarnished the image of Pakistan as a nation. The decisive Indian military response to Pakistani intrusion and the refusal of the international community to countenance Pakistan's brazen violation of the LoC should make the writing on the wall clear to Pakistan. Islamabad decided to withdraw its troops and mercenaries from Kargil only when the Clinton administration left it with no other choice. By the time the decision came, it had lost much of its significance on the ground as 'Operation Vijay' launched by the Indian army was beginning to push the infiltrators out of the key strategic heights. While rethinking its policy towards Pakistan and gearing up to meet new threats from Islamabad, New Delhi should not lose sight of the strategic objective that has emerged in the wake of the Kargil crisis—to seek a final solution to the Kashmir dispute. Five decades of tension with Pakistan over Kashmir have hobbled India's efforts to live in peac.e Good fences make good neighbours. The absence of defined boundaries with both Pakistan and China has long complicated India's efforts to look beyond the subcontinent and play a larger role in world affairs. India cannot afford to let Pakistan commit aggression every winter in Kashmir, and spend the summer clearing it with the lives of its brave soldiers. India should increase monitoring and patrolling of the LoC in the winter months so that it is not surprised again. It needs to force Pakistan into negotiations aimed at strengthening the inviolability of the LoC. With the restoration of the LoC, all other issues including Siachen and the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir can be taken up.

Military Coup Following Pakistan's debacle in the Kargil crisis the differences between the civilian government and the army reached a point of no return. Nawaz Sharif wanted to assert his position. He instructed Karachi authorities to deny permission to the plane carrying General Pervez Musharraf (who had gone to Colombo to attend the fiftieth anniversary celebrations of the Sri Lankan Army) to land in Pakistan and ordered them to divert it elsewhere. Musharraf immediately took charge of the situation. He ordered the Karachi control tower to allow the plane to land since it was running short of fuel. By then Musharraf's troops were in command of the airport building. The plane landed safely and Musharraf took over the reigns of Pakistan from Nawaz Sharif in a bloodless coup on 12 October 1999. Nawaz Sharif was dismissed and placed under house arrest. In his very first message addressed to India, General Pervez Musharraf stated, without any provocation from India, that hostility would be met with hostility. Both he and his newly appointed foreign minister tried to denigrate the Lahore peace process by unnecessarily characterising it as only one of the several agreements reached with India. Abdul Sattar, the foreign minister, hardly lost any time after assuming office in reverting to his old game of raising the bogey of Indian hegemony. It was clear from Musharraf's various statements that he was not interested in overall improvement and expansion of relations with India. His sole objective behind a dialogue with India was to discuss Kashmir, and his occasional lip service to dialogue was meant to placate his western benefactors in order to get economic assistance and consolidate the legitimacy of his rule.

The military rule in Pakistan confronts India with a new situation. In the present context, the significance of the Shimla Agreement lies in the fact that it obliges both parties not to resort to force to settle mutual dispute. The Lahore process provides a broad and updated framework for dialogue. The stamp of 'unconstitutionality' given by the Commonwealth to the Musharraf regime rendered the bilateral contacts all the more untenable. However, a substantive move such as dialogue at the political level is still relevant. The chances of resuming the structured talks between the foreign secretaries were remote for some time because this process would involve guidance from the leadership of the respective governments. New Delhi may not like dealing with Islamabad in a situation where the mandate for the dialogue is provided by an 'unconstitutional' regime. The government-to- government dealings, however, continued mostly through diplomatic channels. President Musharraf visited India in July 2001 in response to Vajpayee's invitation. The summit held at Agra during 15–16 July 2001 discussed wide-ranging issues. However, no progress was made because of Pakistan's insistence on the settlement of the J&K issue (Government of India 2002: 8–9). The 9/11, however, radically changed global perceptions on terrorism and Pakistan was compelled to join the US-led campaign against it. In the post-9/11 situation, Pakistan appeared to be willing to resume normalisation of relations and India also reciprocated positively. In the ongoing dialogue with Pakistan, India is eager to see how Pakistan responds to the two crucial tests to which it has been subjected by the West—a drastic revision of its policy of cross-border terrorism and the restoration of its economy to health. Both these tests have implications for India. While remaining ready for a meaningful dialogue with the government of Pakistan, India should constantly strive to maintain contacts with different sections of the people of Pakistan. For this purpose, all normally available diplomatic channels should be fully explored. Pakistan is not in a position to launch any full-fledged offensive against India because of its own domestic compulsions. All the same, it will encourage militancy in Kashmir, to tie down Indian troops and drain the Indian economy. The two countries should show a dynamic vision of the future of South Asia. All that is required might be a decision to temporarily freeze the LoC, and such a freeze could be reviewed after, say, a period of twenty years. Meanwhile, the two countries and the other members of the SAARC could seriously attend to the creation of a South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA). With soft borders in South Asia and free movement of goods, capital and people, the Kashmir issue would become irrelevant and the scheduled review a mere formality. The issue will then have been resolved with the emergence of a togetherness that would not affect the sovereignty of each participant. A great deal will depend on whether India and Pakistan can summon the courage to move forward with diplomacy and determination.

References Bhutto, Z.A. 1964. Foreign Policy of Pakistan. Karachi: The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs. ——. 1966. The Quest for Peace. Karachi: The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs. Brecher, Michael. 1959. Nehru: A Political Biography. Bombay: Jaico. Brines, Russell. 1968. The Indo-Pakistan Conflict. London: Pall Mall Press. Burke, S.M. 1973. Pakistan's Foreign Policy. London: Oxford University Press Dixit, J.N. 1996. My South Block Years: Memoirs of a Foreign Secretary. New Delhi: UBH Publishers. Gupta, J.B. Das. 1958. Indo-Pakistan Relations 1947–55. Amsterdam: Djambatan. Gupta, Sisir. 1961. India's Relations with Pakistan 1954–57. New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs. ——. 1966. Kashmir: A Study in India–Pakistan Relations. Bombay: Asia Publishing House. Government of India. 2002. Annual Report 2001–2002. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs. ——. 1972. Foreign Affairs Record, July. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs. ——. 1998. Foreign Affairs Record, May. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs. ——. 1999. Foreign Affairs Record, February. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs. Hodson, H.V. 1969. The Great Divide: Britain–India–Pakistan. London: Hutchinson. Kargil Review Committee. 2000. From Surprise to Reckoning. New Delhi: Sage. Khan, Mohammed Ayub. 1969. Friends Not Masters. London: Oxford University Press. Lakkanpal, P.L. 1965. Essential Documents and Notes on Kashmir Dispute. New Delhi: International Books.

Lamb, Alastair. 1966. Crisis in Kashmir. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Levi, Werner. 1952. Free India in Asia. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Menon, V.P. 1985. Integration of the Indian States. Hyderabad: Orient Longman. Pillai, K. Raman. 1969. India's Foreign Policy. Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan. ——. 1970. Political Triangle. New Delhi: Young India Publications.

FOURTEEN

Kashmir: Rethinking Security beyond the Line of Control K.M. SEETHI

he concept of security has been broadened in recent times from the perspective of human needs, development, social order, identity and interest. It necessarily addresses the question of maintaining and managing social relations in a way that sustains confidence, cohesion and collectivity. A major challenge before the foreign policy of India, at this critical juncture, is how to cope with the changing notion of security in the domestic, regional and global contexts. This is particularly relevant in dealing with a country like Pakistan with whom India has had many problems. Kashmir is certainly the most sensitive of all these problems where the stakes of both India and Pakistan are generally seen in terms of sustaining their national identity and security. However, in the dominant literature of India's foreign policy, one hardly comes across a position which addresses the question of Kashmir from the larger perspective of the people of that region whose democratic–secular aspirations are under challenge. A debate on Kashmir is, therefore, relevant today, particularly after Kargil and September 11.

T

In fact, the Kargil conflict in 1999 brought into focus many vital questions about national security. As the military operations continued, for more than forty days in May–June 1999, the caretaker government in New Delhi exhorted the Indian people to stand united, show restraint and make sacrifices for the cause of the nation. However, many people in India tend to believe that Kashmir is just a property dispute between India and Pakistan and that military action/war alone is an answer to Pakistan's five-decade-long struggle to grab Kashmir militarily and otherwise (Karnad 1999). This gives the impression that all is well with India, and that Pakistan has been the only bane of its existence. This is a one-sided assessment of the problem, the real dimensions of which need to be understood in a broader psycho- historical setting of India's 'holier than thou' approach and Pakistan-obsessions. One does not dispute the fact that Pakistan played a critical role in exacerbating militancy and tensions in the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Yet, beyond this role and the consequent tensions in India–Pakistan relations, there is a fundamental democratic question with regard to Kashmir, which hardly emerges in the national security discourses that take place daily in both academic and policy-making circles. India cannot simply leave aside this question for the sake of convenience or political exigencies. Nor should India put off (or abandon) a democratic alternative/ solution to the current impasse and the excruciating alienation of the Kashmiri people. A human security perspective calls for an introspection within the broader socio-historical experience of the Kashmiri people, though one may come across a spectrum of uncomfortable realities. These realities persistently escape the attention of the people due to the perceived reason or fear that they might threaten national loyalty and put patriotism to a hard test. This false consciousness continuously dampens our intellectual curiosity to view situations from another angle of the question and hinders our search for a political solution to the conflict. The military-state apparatus and defence think-tanks always look at such issues from strategic/security points of view devoid of any political insight. The question is certainly larger than national security and territorial integrity, larger than international diplomacy and cross-border terrorism. The worsening situation in the Kashmir Valley, particularly after the Kargil conflict, should necessarily awaken us from our deep slumber, and from our self-imposed intellectual censorship, which has extended beyond five decades after independence. The Kashmir question is often understood terms of the trouble along the LoC or the need to secure a favourable international public opinion as against Pakistan's high-voltage campaign across the world. The ultimate solution lies not in finding out the best possible military strategy vis à vis Pakistan and Pakistan-

backed militants (in the manner which military-strategic specialists propound), but in developing a mature, people-centric democratic option which will deliver good to the people of Kashmir, who have been driven from pillar to post during the last five decades. Unless we are able to do this, we will have to face more Kargils, more intrusions, more cross-border tensions and, perhaps, the worst scenario of human rights violations and abuses in Kashmir. This does not mean that there is a case for total demilitarisation in J&K, in the face of Pakistani attacks and cross-border tensions (as in the case of the Kargil war). That is an entirely different question and should be addressed as such. However, there is absolutely no substitute for a mature democratic solution to the current conflict and human security question in Kashmir. The Kargil war itself provided sufficient opportunity for both India and Pakistan to address these issues, but they were not yet ready to go beyond the limits set by military-strategic specialists. In fact, the Kargil war raised many pertinent questions about the role of the Indian and Pakistani states. Apparently, there were institutional/organisational lapses on India's part in taking adequate measures to prevent the cross-border intrusions from Pakistan during the ten months before the outbreak of the Kargil war. Brigadier Surinder Singh, commander of the Kargil-based 121 Infantry Brigade, who became a key figure in the Indian media during the war (Gokhale and Pillai 1999; Swami 1999: 28–33), seemed to have suggested certain measures to the higher authorities months before, which, if taken in right earnest, would have prevented a major conflict. In his first interaction with the Kargil Review Committee, which was constituted to look into the events leading up to the conflict in May 1999, Brigadier Surinder Singh made the point that during the visit of the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) in August 1998, he had projected "the requirement of certain additional resources" for "further monitoring and gaining of confirmed information" about the enhanced activity across the LoC: I feel that if I was given the resources that I had asked for, then this intrusion could never have taken place. It is obvious that the resources were not given because no one up the chain right up to Army HQ had any idea of the enemy attempting an operation of this scale and magnitude. This is basically an intelligence failure at the National level, for which I am being made a scapegoat. (The Kargil Review Committee 2000: 156–157) The Kargil Review Committee, however, came to the conclusion that "the Commander 121 Brigade did not read the threat at that stage as being serious enough to warrant high-risk snow patrolling." Moreover, the Committee stated that Brigadier Surinder Singh "was demanding resources for further monitoring and gaining of information about the enemy activity across the LOC which the nation as a whole did not have." (158). Howsoever conflicting these versions were, there was certainly a lapse on the part of the higher authorities. The Kargil Review Committee, though it tried to bring out "grave deficiencies in India's security management system" (252), failed to reckon the role of the state apparatus in sustaining such lapses. However, underneath these outward lapses, serious as they were, there is the basic lapse of the Indian state, which has a history of more than half a century. All successive governments have perpetuated this fundamental lapse, and the media and political parties are equally responsible for sustaining and legitimising these lapses.1 On every occasion the rhetoric of 'unity and integrity' and of combatting militancy and communalism, tends to dilute, if not divert, the basic democratic question in Kashmir. The Indian political system has certainly come of age and must transcend this sort of false consciousness and these nationalist pretensions. However, this does not mean that all is well across the LoC, in the state of Pakistan. It is a nation in perpetual struggle for its identity, as its people are increasingly alienated due to the political machinations of the oligarchic power structure of the Pakistani state. Successive regimes in Pakistan, which lacked legitimacy and popular mandate, tried to overcome and externalise their internal contradictions by appealing to the masses about the 'unfulfilled mission' in Kashmir (Khan: 72; Bhutto 1966: 103). This is also evident in the speeches and statements of General Pervez Musharraf who continues to bank upon the 'crisis' emanating from the Kashmir conflict with India. Over the years, feelings of enmity and hostility towards 'the other' have deeply entrenched themselves in the blood of the average Indian and the average Pakistani. This built-in antagonism has been perpetuated for more than fifty years and, unfortunately, it gets legitimised with more Kargils and incidents of cross-border tension. Apparently, we are not worried at all that the very survival of the Kashmiris is caught in the

irreconcilable rivalry between the Indian and Pakistani states whose betrayals and involvements only alienate and marginalise these people further. The civil society divided by the LoC is only a victim and passive spectator in this high-tension drama, and is incapable of influencing the course of events. As we proceed to look at the antecedents and implications of the Kargil conflict, we inevitably encounter four betrayals, each of which contributed to the accumulation of tensions and conflicts (Seethi 1999).The first and foremost betrayal originated in imperialism. Britain, at the beginning, and the United States, subsequently, played a decisive role in driving a wedge between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir question (Nehru 1987: 218–24). It is precisely for this reason that India must be extremely cautious when these nations provide reassurance of their role as mediators/honest brokers in the current conflict. If at all Pakistan scored any victory on the Kashmir question during the first decade of independence, as many would have us believe, it was with the open support and assistance of these imperialist powers.2 No wonder that, when the two giants of the imperialist camp traded arguments against India in the UN and elsewhere, India felt isolated and alienated. Nehru was forced to say, after the bitter experience in the UN, that the 'Anglo-American racket' controlled the world body (Ziegler 1985: 450; Nehru 1987: 218–24). Many thought that imperialism would, at last, withdraw from the subcontinent with the emergence of India as a major power in the post-Shimla Agreement period. But imperialism reappeared in different forms, including one of patronising fundamentalism and militancy in the region. The most decisive period came when General Zia ruled Pakistan. He was the most trusted policeman of the US in the region, particularly after the fall of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Pakistan became not only a frontline state in America's South Asian strategy but a safe haven for all tribal-religious militant outfits. Themujahideens stationed across the Pak-Afghan border had received all material and moral support from both the US and the authoritarian regime in Pakistan. Though the US had apparently lost interest in Afghanistan in the post-Soviet withdrawal period, it continued to support the growth of Islamic fundamentalist groups, which culminated in the installation of a Taliban regime in Kabul. Sustained by Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Taliban regime had, till recently, been instrumental in realising the US goals in Central Asia. Obviously the US had reasons to support a shamelessly repressive regime that invoked the most reactionary tenets of its own ideology, in the name of Islam. Likewise, the US could not escape from the charges of aiding and abetting the Chechen rebel leaders in CIA-controlled camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The ISI was liberally supplying the Chechens with weapons and expertise. The US-Pak interest in Chechnya and Dagestan was primarily geopolitical because Russia's main oil pipeline passes through these provinces. It is no secret that many Anglo- American oil companies have identified the Caspian Sea basin as a potential site for exploitation and, therefore, are on the move to control the oil resources and the pipeline corridors. Osama bin Laden, the terrorist much hated in the world today, had once enjoyed the support and patronage of the CIA—as long as his Islamic militant outfits served American geopolitical interests in the region.3 Interestingly, during the same period of time, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had declared Osama bin Ladan the 'most wanted terrorist' in the world. Many Islamic militant groups are aware of the Janus-faced American policy and, hence, cannot take an extreme anti-American posture just as the anti-terrorist drive of the US and its allies, including Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Britain is considerably constrained by the legacy of patronising the very same forces for more than a decade. Thus, both Pakistan and the US have been critical in perpetuating terrorism and fundamentalism in the region. Even the Islamic militants in Kashmir received considerable support from the US and Britain at a certain stage. More importantly, the fallout of the Afghan resistance movement in Kashmir was long lasting. It is against this background of long years of imperialist betrayal and involvement that one must place Pakistan's aggressive posture and the US's role in the current crisis. India must also look at the sincerity of the proclaimed US opposition to Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism with greater caution, particularly in the post-Kosovo global scenario. Second, Pakistan betrayed the democratic secular aspirations of the Kashmiris by taking over a part of J&K in 1947–48 and imposing authoritarian political and military structures all these years. Cultural unity and communal harmony across the LoC were considerably disrupted with the militarisation of Azad Kashmir. Over the years, it became a safe haven for all forms of militancy, facilitating cross-border intrusions and terrorist activities. As Pakistan gained considerable leverage in the late 1980s, with more militant organisations looming large in the valley, the Kashmiris were virtually caught between the militants and the

Indian and Pakistani armies—all these took a heavy toll over the last fifteen years. Ironically, Pakistan's championing of the cause of the freedom of Kashmir betrayed itself because of its own authoritarian and lopsided policies and programmes not only within Azad Kashmir but in the entire state of Pakistan. Pakistan's involvement and frequent interferences only thwarted the democratic secular aspirations of the Kashmiri society. The Kargil conflict further underlined the fact that the people living on both sides of the LoC cannot enjoy a peaceful and orderly life because of these continued cross-border intrusions and Indian and Pakistani military responses. The third betrayal came from none other than India; this has a longer history, perhaps extending to the days of the partition. George Fernandes, when he was India's minister for Kashmir Affairs in 1990, said: "I do not believe any foreign hand created the Kashmir problem. The problem was created by us. others decided to take advantage of it" (1992: 286). Similarly, J.N. Dixit, India's foreign secretary in the early 1990s writes in his memoirs: There was reluctance on the part of our own political leadership and establishment to face the fact that the disturbances in Kashmir were not entirely due to Pakistani activities alone but were also due to the alienation of some segments of the J&K population. There was no consensus in Indian public opinion or in the Indian Parliament on how to deal with the dilemmas and crises in Jammu and Kashmir...there was no integrated or cohesive view on how to meet the aspirations of the people of J&K or how to assuage their feelings of alienation and what should be done to remove their frustrations and get rid of their anxieties. (Dixit 1996: 330–31) Reflections such as these by Fernandes and Dixit are extremely important for a rethinking on India's Kashmir policy from a realistic point of view. But this has to be done within a politico-historical framework— a framework constituting three distinct phases. In the first phase after accession, India's Kashmir policy did not exhibit the consistency, courage and commitment expected of a mature political leadership. Nehru lost courage when he failed to get rid of the Pakistan-backed invaders in 1947–48 for the sake of transient goals and ill-timed international commitments. India fumbled in the UN regarding not only Kashmir's accession, but also the accession of other princely states like Junagad and Hyderabad (Government of India 1948). The commitment on plebiscite was even more disastrous and the promise of a 'reference' to the people was not kept beyond 1954 because of the 'altered conditions' and geopolitical realities (Government of India 1983: 219–25). The second phase of India's betrayal began almost parallel to the UN fiasco. The promise of autonomy, to sustain the political sanctity of the state, did not bear any fruit because of the internal tensions between New Delhi and Srinagar. Consequently, Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which had granted autonomy to the state of J&K, remained a dead letter after 1954, and whatever was offered to the people in the early phase was taken away without any consideration and political honesty (Sathe 1990: 932–33; Kannabiran 1991). This was done through a series of constitutional amendments and presidential orders. Even though 'autonomy' became defunct in Kashmir, an impression was created within the country that the problem of Kashmir emanated from this special privilege enjoyed by the Kashmiris. Even today many attribute the cause of current militancy to the original 'sin' of granting autonomy to the people (Jagmohan 1991). Hence the demand for abrogation of Article 370 without knowing, if not deliberately concealing, the fact that Article 370 has been virtually irrelevant since 1954. This misunderstanding has been accompanied by a long spell of political manipulations by the Indian National Congress (INC) and the National Conference (NC) (Bose et al. 1991; Committee for Initiative on Kashmir 1991; PUCL 1991). Elections in J&K were a mere farce and almost all general elections saw extensive rigging and institutional corruption.4 Thus, both the INC and NC were responsible for alienating the people from the mainstream. The situation worsened when J&K experienced neglect and discrimination by the central government, and the economy was ruined by successive governments in Srinagar and New Delhi. As the 1980s unfolded, unemployment increased phenomenally in J&K, industrial backwardness reached its nadir and agriculture showed no significant improvement.5 The situation in J&K was such that the people lost all faith in the Indian state. Popular discontent began to surface for the first time in the late 1980s in this setting of economic backwardness, institutional corruption and people's alienation (Bose et al. 1991). Militant organisations that never had any mass backing in J&K found this a golden opportunity to make inroads into Kashmiri society. Pakistan capitalised on the situation and began to interpret this phenomenon as a renewal

of self-determination by the people of J&K, and unleashed its campaign (Noorani 1992). The third phase of the Kashmir question started at this stage when India began deploying army and paramilitary forces in the state. The Indian military operation in Kashmir from 1989–90 amounted to widespread human rights violations marked by instances of repression and torture (Amnesty International 1992, 1995; Asia Watch 1991; Asia Watch–Physicians for Human Rights 1993; PUCL 1991; Bose et al. 1991). The encounters between the militants and the Indian army took a heavy toll over the years and there were innumerable cases of arbitrary killings and torture by both the militants and the army. Thousands of pundits were also forced to flee from the valley and attempts were made to communalise the society (Jagmohan 1991). The very identity of the Kashmiris has been consciously divided between Hindus and Muslims who at no point in history ever displayed any religious sectarianism in their social living (Puri 1995: 55–63). The Kashmiri alienation certainly weakened India, but strengthened Pakistan's hand. The fourth betrayal was by the Islamic militants who drew sustenance from various regional and international sources. A major blow to the secular fabric of Kashmiri society came when these militants officially championed the cause of their brand of Islam in Kashmir with Pakistan's connivance and US imperialist support. Cross-border terrorism and militancy grew when popular discontent in the valley ran high. The Islamic militants' appropriation of the cause of the Kashmiris led to further militarisation and repression by the Indian state.6 Thus the plight of the Kashmiris has become more pathetic over the years. Their secular credentials have been destroyed and cultural roots and identity distorted, by the frequent interferences and manipulations by India and Pakistan, on the one side, and imperialism and Islamic militancy, on the other. How do the political communities in the subcontinent account for this political tragedy when India and Pakistan are increasingly obsessed with so-called national security issues? Are they supposed to stand united in liquidating the Kashmiri people? Should they show restraint when Kashmiris are subjected to repression and systematic killing? Reports say that more than 40,000 people have been killed in J&K (official figures are much less) during the last decade in the mutual encounters between militants and the Indian army (Swami 1999: 74–75; Government of India 1999a: 230–32; The Kargil Review Committee: 73–74). Is the scope for mutual extermination inevitably broadened by the militarisation of the entire region? Civil society will have to address these questions very seriously. To add insult to injury, both India and Pakistan braced themselves for a nuclear showdown in 1998 with disastrous consequences for peace and security in the subcontinent. The nuclear hawks in both countries argued that a show of nuclear weapon capability would restrain the two countries and that there would be mutual respect and recognition of each other's power and potential (Government of India 1998; The Kargil Review Committee 2000: 183). In fact, the Kargil conflict has easily demolished this myth of deterrence. Interestingly, when the Kargil operations were over, the very same nuclear hawks seized the argument that the nuclear weapons had greatly restrained the two countries from escalating the conflict into a major war.7 But they conveniently forgot the fact that there was no war between 1971 and 1998 and that the nuclear tests had greatly enhanced Pakistan's self-confidence in undertaking a cross-border operation in Kashmir in spite of Vajpayee's Lahore trip and the joint declaration (Government of India 1999b: 17–18) that followed. Though it failed to achieve anything in Kargil, Pakistan was able to tell the world its own version of the Kashmir struggle. Unfortunately, even as the Kargil operations were under way, one heard incessant calls in India for a crossing of LoC to inflict serious damage on Pakistan's capability and position. The Sangh Parivar was not alone in making demands for an across-LoC operation, including the use of nuclear weapons, to teach Pakistan a lesson. Defence/strategic specialists, ex-army officers and former diplomats also brought in similar arguments in favour of a 'territorial aggrandisement' which India was called upon to undertake in pursuit of the retreating intruders and militants (Karnad 1999). This belligerent position was certainly fraught with dangerous consequences. It was not only unrealistic and dangerous in strategic/military terms, but devoid of any political wisdom and maturity. It once again underlined the fact that the defence think-tanks had become increasingly obsessed with militarism and were incapable of addressing the fundamental problems of the polity, beyond the limits set by military statecraft. The post-Kargil scenario brings home the fact that the overall situation in Kashmir cannot be ignored any

longer even as the two nations are increasingly preoccupied with national security issues. For India, the Kashmir question is much more profound and deep than what one generally thinks of as 'the problem with Pakistan and the militants'. Even from the point of view of 'national security', it requires a comprehensive framework to resolve it, perhaps arrived at through a series of mature political engagements. Certainly, a major task that has to be performed in order to resolve this human security question is the democratisation of Kashmiri society—by convincing rather than alienating people. As Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl (1993) argue, if democracy is to thrive, specific procedural norms must be followed and civic rights respected. Any system that does not conform to the 'rule of law' with regard to its own procedures should not be seen as 'democratic'. More importantly, the system "must be self-governing; it must be able to act independently of constraints imposed by some overarching political system" (1993). The question of autonomy and participatory development may be relevant here. Unfortunately, the autonomy question is often reduced to the level of a break-off/secession from the Indian Union pointing to the implications of restoring the pre-1953 status or reinstating Article 370. For example, in a statement made in the Rajya Sabha on 25 July 2001, Union Home Minister L.K. Advani said that accepting the J&K Assembly's autonomy resolution would mean turning the clock back to a phase where there was no role, in the state, for institutions such as the supreme court, the election commission or the president of India. He added: "This will deprive the people of Jammu and Kashmir the rights and powers they got after 1953."8 In fact, Advani's statement gives the impression that all is well in the post-1953 period and the people of Kashmir have been really enjoying 'rights' and 'powers'. In the same breath, he said that the BJP-led government "favours devolution of powers to states" and that "if Jammu and Kashmir needs special powers, we are willing to give them." If such an offer on the part of the Indian government is genuine, there would be considerable room for a fresh initiative in J&K towards democratic decentralisation and participatory development. Needless to say, there is an urgent need to regenerate the confidence of the Kashmiri people by addressing their immediate grievances. The most immediate concern is to concentrate on the regional economy, education, health care, rural development, public works and other welfare activities. The social and political activists must initiate an aggressive programme to interact with the masses in order to fight the growing isolation of the public from the political process. Kashmir migrants need to be rehabilitated in the valley with the assurance of physical, social and financial security from the state. This calls for social intervention and a display of political will, on the part of the people of the state. There is a need for initiatives towards democratic decentralisation in J&K in the larger context of the aspirations of the people as well as in the interest of peace in the region. It may be a challenging task, but a sustained democratic campaign may prove productive. Inevitably, initiatives should come from different sources—social activists, academics, non-governmental organisations, grass-root movements, political parties (regional and national) and the state (both the union and provincial). The union government has already set up the institutional framework for decentralisation and local self-government, and it should be extended to J&K to sustain a democratic environment. Once implemented earnestly, the participatory/decentralised framework would contribute to economic advances, sustainability, and promote social cohesion and prevent divisive parochialism. A major argument of Pakistan (and the militants) has been the lack of 'democracy' and 'freedom' in Kashmir, and they have used this from time to time to press for the 'self-determination' of the people. No doubt, economic backwardness and institutional corruption, factors that Pakistan and the militants have capitalised on, have worsened the situation. The military solution which India sought to use provided Pakistan with an additional weapon to champion the cause of 'democracy' in Kashmir. Democratic decentralisation and empowerment of the poor, marginalised and alienated sections of the Kashmiri society would be an effective counter strategy to combat Pakistan's campaign. Thus, democratic decentralisation and participatory development could be potential strategies for dealing not only with the human security question within J&K, but the national security problem as such vis-à-vis Pakistan. This will certainly enhance India's strategic bargain in any dialogue process involving Pakistan across the international fora. India should, therefore, be much more realistic and pragmatic, not in the conventional national security sense, but in terms of addressing the fundamental questions of democratic governance and participatory development.

References

Amnesty International. 1992. Country Report on India, March. London. ——. 1995. India: Torture and Deaths in Custody in jammu and Kashmir. London. Asia Watch–Physicians for Human Rights. 1993. The Human Rights Crisis in Kashmir: A Pattern of Impunity. New York. Bose, Sumatra. 1997. The Challenge in Kashmir: Democracy, Self-Determination and a just Peace. New Delhi: Sage. Bose, Tapan, Dinesh Mohan, Gautam Navlakha and Sumantra Banerjee. 1991. India's Kashmir War. In Secular Crown on Fire: The Kashmir Problem, ed. Asghar Ali Engineer. New Delhi: Ajanta Publishers. Bhutto, Z.A. 1966. The Quest for Peace: Selections from Speeches and Writings 1963–65. Karachi: The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs. Committee for Initiative on Kashmir. 1991. Kashmir: A Land Ruled by the Gun. Delhi. Dixit, J.N. 1996. My South Block Years: Memoirs of a Foreign Secretary. New Delhi: UBH Publishers. Fernandes, George. 1992. India's Policies in Kashmir: An Assessment and Discourse. In Perspectives on Kashmir, ed. Raju Thomas. Boulder: Westview Press. Gokhale, Nitin A., and Ajith Pillai. 1999. The War that should never have been. Outlook, 6 September. Gopal, Sarvepali. 1984. Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography 1956–1964. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Government of India. 1948. White Paper on jammu and Kashmir. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs. ——. 1983. Jawaharlal Nehru s Speeches: March 1953—August 1957, vol. 3. New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. ——. 1998. Foreign Affairs Record, May. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs. ——. 1999a. Profile of Terrorist Violence in jammu & Kashmir. New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs. ——. 1999b. Foreign Affairs Record, February. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs. Gupta, Sisir. 1966. Kashmir. A Study in India—Pakistan Relations. Bombay: Asia Publishing House. Jagmohan. 1991. My Frozen Frontiers in Kashmir. New Delhi: Allied Publishers. Kannabiran, K.G. 1991. Abuses of Article 370. In Secular Crown on Fire: The Kashmir Problem, ed. Asghar Ali Engineer. New Delhi: Ajanta Publishers. Kargil Review Committee. 2000. From Surprise to Reckoning. New Delhi: Sage. Karnad, Bharat. 1999. Using LoC to India's Advantage. Economic and Political Weekly, 10 July. Khan, Ayub. n.d. Speeches and Statements: July 1959–June I960. Karachi: Pakistan Publications. Kumar, Vijaya. 1954. Anglo-American Plot Against Kashmir. Bombay: People's Publishing House. Lamb, Alistair. 1993. Kashmir. A Disputed Legacy. Karachi: Oxford University Press. Malik, Gauri Bazaz. 1991. Democracy and Kashmir Problem. In Secular Crown on Fire: The Kashmir Problem, ed. Asghar Ali Engineer. Delhi: Ajanta Publishers. National Security Advisory Board. 1999. Indian Nuclear Doctrine. Strategic Digest (September). Nehru, Jawaharlal. 1987. Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru. Second Series, Vol. 5. New Delhi: Jawaharlal Memorial Fund. Noorani, A.G. 1992. The Betrayal of Kashmir: Pakistan's Duplicity and India's Complicity. In Perspectives on Kashmir, ed. Raju Thomas. Boulder: Westview Press. PUCL. See Peoples' Union for Civil Liberties. Peoples' Union for Civil Liberties. 1991. Report on the Kashmir Situation 1990. In Secular Crown on Fire: The Kashmir Problem, ed. Asghar Ali Engineer. New Delhi: Ajanta Publishers. Puri, Balraj. 1993. Kashmir: Towards Insurgency. Hyderabad: Orient Longman. ——. 1995. Kashmiriyat: The Vitality of Kashmiri Identity. Contemporary South Asia 4(1): 55–63. Sathe, S.P. 1990. Article 370: Constitutional Obligations and Compulsions. Economic and Political Weekly (April 28): 932–33. Schmitter, Philippe and Terry Karl. 1993. What Democracy Is and Is Not. In The Global Resurgence of Democracy, ed. L. Diamond and M. Platter, 39–52. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press. Seethi, K.M. 1999. A Tragedy of Betrayals: Questions Beyond the LoC in Kashmir. Economic and Political Weekly (September 11): 2682–84. Swami, Praven. 1999. The Kargil War. New Delhi: Left Word Books. Ziegler, Philip. 1985. Mountbatten: The Official Biography. London: Collins.

FIFTEEN

India—Pakistan Conflict Dynamics: Prospects for Resolution M.S. JOHN

he South Asian subcontinent remains a hotbed of conflict even after half a century of freedom from colonial rule. While conflicts in many other parts of the world either lost their salience due to the end of the cold war or became more amenable to resolution, the situation in South Asia, especially in Kashmir, continues to be explosive. With the nuclearisation of the region, and the recent intrusion into the Kargil sector by the irredentists and Pakistani regulars, a new dimension has been added to the intractable conflict. The fitful and often truncated negotiations on Kashmir have not yielded any positive outcome, and following the nuclear blasts and the Kargil conflict, the prospects for any meaningful dialogue look grim. At least, until the formation of a stable government in India, no initiative to keep alive the Lahore spirit was forthcoming.

T

Politics arises when there is conflict. At the same time one of the essential functions of politics is the resolution of conflict. Promotion of cooperation, development and associated values are also political functions. If politics is used to perpetuate conflict, it has a negative orientation. The most familiar idea of politics in South Asia is that of engaging in a zero sum game at all levels of interaction. There is an alternative view of politics, as Azar (1990: 1) says, which is positive, involving elements of collective security, community building, prosperity, cooperation, advancement of conflict management and socioeconomic development. This type of politics is yet to emerge in South Asia. The practice of the politics of balance of power and oneupmanship will rarely promote the termination of protracted conflicts.

Psychology and Conflict In South Asia, conflicts get enmeshed with domestic politics of an emotive kind, considerably lessening the freedom to undertake conflict management practices. Conflicts serve the purpose of diverting the attention of the public from other pressing problems or needs, and for the national audience, they meet the need to have enemies, a point developed by Volkan (1998) and other psychologists.1 In South Asia, at least in some regions, there has been an intertwining of the individual's sense of self and that of the group's identity with the concepts of ethnicity and nationality. This intertwining of ethnicity and the sense of the self to which an individual or group tends to adhere stubbornly is manifest in times of social, economic and political crises. Volkan has argued that mourning for a past loss in a normal way would entail a gradual loss of memory. Under political, military or similar stress, the mourning may be made difficult and the representation of what is lost may be seen as a matter of prestige. The inability to mourn adequately has, in this view, deleterious effects especially for national groups. That history is a very powerful source of complaint and that future generations see a historical loss or wrong as a matter of pride which needs to be rectified has relevance in the subcontinent. Historic grievances not assuaged by completed mourning become deeply entrenched in the consciousness of succeeding generations. Most commentators now accept that psychology provides useful insights in the explanation of ethnic nationalism although an exclusive concentration on the subjective and emotional dimensions will only yield erroneous explanations. Psychologists, sociologists and anthropologists are now increasingly studying nationalism and ethnic issues, which were the preserve of political scientists and historians. Horowitz (1985: 140) called for an explanation "that does justice to the realm of the feelings", which was a plea to incorporate psychological explanations for inter-state wars with ethnic origins. Any

interdisciplinary understanding of the meanings and processes of ethnicity must take account of psychology. Volkan (1990: 36) says, "I propose that there is a need to belong to an ethnic or national group and a potential to have social and political enemies and that this need and this potential profoundly influence group psychology and the relationships between groups." The implications of such statements need to be analysed in the specific context of the conflictual relationship between India and Pakistan. Cooperation offered by India or Pakistan is not seen at face value unlike in the 'tit for tat' scheme of Robert Axelrod (1984) based on the principle of rationality. Cooperation in South Asia is often seen as amounting to creating 'cognitive dissonance' in the minds of the public, and politicians are wary of undertaking it for reasons of political survival. In Pakistan opposition parties have ritualised criticism of the ruling parties for being too soft on the question of Kashmir and towards India. Issues of prestige, honour and values are more important in the calculations of the policy-makers in South Asia than shrewd economic judgement. An act of cooperation which may appear genuine is also misinterpreted leading to the meaninglessness of all offers such as no-war pact, no-first-use and treaty of friendship. Western conflict resolution ideas seem to have very little relevance in the subcontinent. Western ideas are supposed to be based on the principle of rationality and a belief that violent conflict creates suffering and should be shunned, an idea rooted in utilitarianism Nevertheless, people in many parts of the world seem to be prepared to suffer for what they believe to be a just cause. This suffering does not cause an inherent dislike of conflict. As Paul E. Salem says, "struggle, and the conflict that comes with it, is central to the groups' political view and is regarded, in some cases, as a progressive, invigorating and purifying process" (1993: 291). He adds: "The Western conflict resolution emphasis on the necessity of resolving conflict because of the salient discomfort that it brings with it may not be relevant in a social setting in which discomfort is widespread. People there may give less importance to the discomfort generated by the conflict and more importance to the justice or outcome of the dispute" (292). The implication is that formulating a problem in a way that satisfies both the parties is difficult to carry through because of the differing perceptions of right and wrong. There cannot be easy win–win solutions of a non–zero sum nature. Whether the Kashmir conflict, a protracted conflict located in South Asia, can be analysed within the constructs of conflict resolution theory is debatable. In addition to a recurring cycle of destruction, the conflict is characterised by a state of stagnation in which fear, enmity and suspicion hamper all efforts aimed at de-escalation. The parties are so locked in a conflict mentality that every attempt made to address the conflict becomes another issue in the conflict. The process of interaction is self-perpetuating and highly resistant to outsider influence. There is often historical enmity and prejudice being passed on from one generation to another in ethnically divided societies. Such generational transfer of hostility is common in South Asia. This is reinforced by the social structure characterised by a closely knit patriarchal order unlike in the West where there is greater space for alternative socialisation. The processes of creation of historical enmity, and the attendant processes of dehumanisation and victimisation are interpreted by the psychologists as having their origin in intrapsychic processes. Demetrios Julius (1990: 100) says: "Historical enmity may therefore be defined as the internal representation of past historical events with their attendant emotional after-effects. It is the way in which we mentally capture and retain the perceived meaning of certain past interactions with others." Dehumanisation is the mechanism internal to the individual, that enables him/her to view the individuals of another group as subhuman or even non-human. The dehumanisation of the 'other' in turn has the potential to dehumanise the 'self'. The third process of victimisation, which is more difficult to define in intrapsychic terms, is "the embodiment of the drive to sacrifice", it can lead to psychological or physical aggression, and is the outcome of the other two (Ibid.: 101).

Is Democracy the Answer? Recently, there has been a spurt in the literature suggesting that the spread and deepening of the democratic base in countries will reduce inter-state belligerence, assuming that rational conflict management is an internal function of democracies, which can also be extended externally. Although trends show that South Asia is moving in this direction, there is neither any abatement in the intensity of conflicts nor any qualitative difference in their communication. If liberal democracy takes root, rational calculations should logically

influence the thinking of policy-makers. Empirical evidence does not allow us to draw the universalistic conclusion that the introduction of majoritarian democracy will automatically create a more conducive setting for conflict resolution and peace.2 Instead, democratisation, followed by unstable regimes with either a weak support base or an evanescent base, can deny any leeway for the policy-makers to engage in conflict resolution moves. Governments formed in the ethnic regions are often drawn into a kind of patron–client relationship with the centre leaving them very little political leverage to take on the ethnic extremists. The conflict story of Kashmir is notoriously rigid, readily re-enacted and recalcitrant to change. It is selfperpetuating and exhibits a structure which forecloses any possibilities of alternative narratives. This is enacted by stabilising the sites in the narrative that threaten to alter the part/whole relations that comprise narrative coherence. In conflict, disputants construct the 'self' via positive discourse positions and the 'other' through negative discourse positions. In the conflict in Kashmir, each party legitimises the 'self' and delegitimises the 'other'. As each is delegitimised, each party tries to work to alter the narrative in which they are negatively positioned through justifications, denials and excuses, which in turn often function to reproduce the narrative in which disputants are delegitimised. Within each narrative one party's positive position is contingent on the other's negative position. Accusations lead to justifications that in turn lead to more accusations. Even if political leaders were keen to work full time at non-violent diplomatic resolution of conflict their constituents would not allow them to move forward.

SAARC and Conflict Resolution The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) road to regional cooperation, which sought to replicate an Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) type regional organisation, failed to learn the lessons of ASEAN, which started with political consensus. SAARC has failed miserably as a conflictregulating mechanism by excluding bilateral issues from the purview of regional cooperation. How can conflict be excluded from the sphere of cooperation when together they constitute a continuum? It is not surprising that bilateral issues cropped up at every moment of the SAARC process. It is often argued that SAARC continues to exist because of this exclusion of bilateral issues. However, the juxtaposition of high premium conflicts and cooperation seems to deprive the SAARC process of any degree of realism and credibility. India sees the SAARC process along functional lines even though the background conditions for the success of such functional formulations are absent. Cooperation cannot take place in an adversarial setting. In fact, cooperation itself is the result of past conflict management regimes (John 1992). In a situation with hardened positions politicians are eager to satisfy their own domestic constituencies and the evaluation of their performance depends on how well they advance and defend the group's position. Communications are directed not to the adversary but to one's own national constituency and third parties. It is not surprising that such interactions reinforce existing images and strengthen each side's commitment to its original position. The internal needs of the two countries may require a conflictual relationship, and such a relationship may in turn generate needs within the parties that perpetuate the conflict. Needs can be of different kinds. Conflicts may provide distraction from internal problems and reduce their salience. They can provide an opportunity to release pent up hostilities through combat with an external actor. It can amount to 'shadow projection'. Every conflict creates a number of people who want its continuance.

Mediation Prospects India's abhorrence of mediation is well known and is based either on erroneous ideas or on viewing mediation as unbecoming for a country of its size. Kriesberg (1982) says that a marked power disparity will strengthen the stronger party's views about the mediator who will be seen as a stumbling block to victory and hence the stronger party would be unwilling to accept mediation. In 1966 India accepted Soviet mediation and itself mediated in Sri Lanka in the 1980s. In its own conflicts or conflicts arising within the region, India vehemently opposes mediation or other forms of third-party assistance. Proponents of cosmopolitan democracy claim that democratic dyads show greater propensity to accept mediation to settle conflict. India has not been able to use the bilateral mode with any degree of success. It may be recalled that the Constitution of India calls for arbitration, which is binding. Negotiations between the parties themselves are the best

solution as this will be more enduring and volitional. Many forms of mediation are third-party assisted negotiations with the mediator playing the role of a facilitator. The Indian government looks upon thirdparty involvements as posing special risks. Most of the mediation exercises are aimed at making the parties talk among themselves to find a solution; they do not inherently imply loss of face. Third parties can assist this process particularly when talks are either deadlocked or are difficult to initiate.3 For example the location in which talks should be held is a delicate issue in the calculations of Pakistan and India, and often both insist on their national venues. But one of the basic steps towards enabling third-party entry is that both sides should agree to the mediation. That first step has not taken place. Only Pakistan has come forward. Certainly third-party roles facilitate the process of peace or prevent the conflict from becoming worse by isolating it or buying time. The US was successful in manoeuvring a cease-fire in the Kargil sector. Reacting to suggestions that such third-party assistance can be of help, the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee said, "The [Clinton– Sharif] joint statement is worth welcoming. But I want to make it clear that it does not pave the way for any third party intervention or mediation. We are committed to bilateral discussion. some concern has been expressed in the country that the government will accept mediation or internationalisation. I tell you categorically that this will not happen".4 Third parties need not always be representatives of countries. It could be a team of mediators who do it in their individual capacities. Such assistance, perhaps of a prolonged nature, may be necessary since the bilateral official route has not made any significant progress. At another level, Kashmir is affecting the stability of both the participant nations. A democratic regime like India has the responsibility of resolving problems by employing the internal human and material resources in the country, and in this case probably by engaging in a dialogue with the militants. In the whole exercise, the people of Kashmir seem to have been left out. It is doubtful that the elected government enjoys a threshold level of legitimation in Kashmir, enabling it to function as an interlocutor. Reports from human rights groups should receive greater attention from both the government and political parties. Perceptions related to the conflict have been monopolised as the prerogative of the governments of India and Pakistan. The role of the civil society has been undermined by the monopolisation of opinion on Kashmir by the state, guided by the assumption that the state represents an unproblematic unity. Neither government has recognised the possibility of a united and independent Kashmir as a policy option. Consider for example the Indian position in the conflict over Kashmir. The relevance of the Shimla Agreement is overly emphasised as the point of departure for talks, without assessing its usefulness in finding a solution to the issue. Whereas in most other conflicts opportunities for 'side payments' exist, broadening the options and possibilities of 'fractionating' the conflict, the conflict between India and Pakistan, in particular over the Kashmir issue, has become impervious to such strategies. The prospects for conflict resolution are intimately tied up with the internal legitimacy of the governments. Interestingly, relations between the two countries have become a domestic issue and any inkling that the government is softening its attitude would elicit a domestic backlash. Political parties in the opposition are likely to capitalise on this.

Role of Civil Society The importance of non-governmental interaction in international affairs is to be reckoned since the number of international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) has grown from less than two hundred to more than eighteen thousand in the last eighty years. More specifically, Montville and others have proposed the strategy of track-two diplomacy as a complementary activity to state-to-state diplomacy to assist in deescalating conflicts and improving relations. Montville(1987: 5–20) defines track-two diplomacy as "unofficial, informal interaction among members of adversarial groups or nations with the goals of developing strategies, influencing public opinion, and organising human and material resources in ways that might help resolve the conflict." Proponents of track-two diplomacy have placed great emphasis on the highly incremental methodology of conflict analysis through problem-solving workshops which brings together influential, unofficial representatives of conflict parties to engage in intensive dialogue and the mutual creation of alternatives for conflict resolution. This does not mean that we should supplant the governmental effort. Governments are constrained by the emotional attitudes of their constituencies and can hardly take risks for peace. It means that the process of working for peace should involve not only the government but also other groups in a polyarchal sense. Hence, instead of track two, it is more apt to call it 'multi-track'

diplomacy. Such coordinated efforts are necessary in South Asia. In India, the government does not look favourably upon such problem-solving workshops. In fact the government only sees them as spoiling the chances of conflict resolution. Pakistan's attitude is more ambiguous. A plethora of cooperative initiatives from NGOs and segments of civil society are found in the region, but they do not seem to have any impact on the policy-making circles. Generally political leaders have rarely recognised the potential of track-two diplomacy. The bureaucracy has also resisted it. Although India has adopted the functional approach to regional cooperation, it sees the state as the sole space for undertaking it—which is a contradiction. Track two is aimed at encouraging non-governmental actors such as groups and individuals from the concerned countries to interact and see mutual perceptions and interests more empathetically. When such interactions thicken, the space for new ideas and options is created and transnational networks of civil associations or an international civil society will emerge. This will allow the participants to work out personal relationships understand the dimensions of conflict from the adversary's point of view, and at some point think in terms of joint strategies for dealing with the conflict. The second process is to influence public opinion; here, reducing the sense of victimhood of the parties and rehumanising the image of the adversary. This is to be followed by cooperative economic development.

Conclusion Although various proposals for the resolution of the conflict over Kashmir have been in the air, there has not been any serious examination of the pros and cons of each proposal from a dispassionate point of view.5 It is important that non-state actors play a more active role in bringing about conflict resolution. Indian bilateralism in dealing with states and inflexibility with regard to agenda setting and bureaucratic decision making work against the cause of peace building in South Asia. There is no inviolable sanctity with regard to the Shimla Agreement. Conflict resolution in South Asia is a long-drawn-out process requiring multi-track efforts. It may not be proper to speak in terms of a quick settlement, as the United Nations–assisted efforts tend to. It is a process that requires years of discussion and learning, educating the public, broadening the agenda, re-perceiving the enemy, and workshops. The so-called Gujral doctrine appeared to be a small beginning in incrementalism. So far only a law-and-order approach has been predominant in the Indian government's attitudes towards the Kashmir issue.6 India has to accept the militants as political actors and engage in constructive talks with them. It is first necessary that conflicts of this kind be transformed so as to create a more hospitable environment for negotiations. It may be noted that the moment the Palestinians took to a civilian-based movement, Intifada, a constituency more responsive to their demands, could be created within Israel and outside. This paved the way for the peace agreement. As long as the Indian and Pakistani governments engage in dialogue only to score points, the Kashmir problem will persist. Further, this conflict and the other complex problems between the South Asian countries are more likely to be resolved if they are dealt with in the context of an overall political relationship, than if they are addressed as simple technical problems requiring technical solutions. Events in Kargil and the creation of a near war-like situation in mid 1999 shows the extent to which both India and Pakistan are prepared to invest militarily in the conflict over Kashmir. Pakistan sees in the Kargil crisis an opportunity for internationalisation of the Kashmir issue, which has been high on its agenda since the nuclear explosions in the subcontinent. Although the Kargil affair damaged itscredentials internationally, the Kashmir issue has received international attention. The effects of military competition and protracted conflict in Kashmir, on the national societies of the two states, have not been properly examined.7 Internationalisation of ethnic strife cannot be arrested given the fact that it is difficult to distinguish between internal and external conflict in such cases. Conflict resolution in South Asia is a painful process requiring time, flexibility, some degree of relaxation in the communication of the conflict, ability to think beyond the logic of the state, and creation of an enabling environment in which people-to-people relationships are made possible. Moving to superordinate goals is not possible now because the salience of the immediate goals is too high. Functional modes of regional cooperation also sound impossible to craft in the region because such categories can come only on the strength of past conflict management regimes. Mediation has a role to play in furthering this process. Unlike arbitration, mediation also addresses the underlying relationship between India and Pakistan. It is possible that mediation by international groups committed to peace in their private

capacity may be encouraged, at the same time ensuring that these processes find some reflection and interest in national policy- making circles. In the meantime, it is necessary that the Kashmir conflict gets transformed so that the moral issues surrounding the conflict are brought to the fore creating constituencies within both the countries that have genuine interest in ensuring a just solution to the conflict. The people of Kashmir should be brought into the process in an intimate way so that their feelings are reflected adequately in any type of future negotiations. Even in bilateral negotiations representatives of the rebel groups of both sides could be brought in. Meanwhile the rights of the people of Kashmir should be held high in the spirit of democracy. The governments of both the countries have exhausted the space for negotiations such that no new option for resolving the conflict appears in sight. At the same time the governments cannot be sidelined. A multi-track approach to bring about a lasting solution to the Kashmir issue is necessary. It is important that we in India think about regional peace from a peace perspective rather than from the official military–security perspective. The idea of peace building is absent as a component of the Indian national defence or foreign policy system, and the country's commitment in terms of national resources. The problem-solving groups tend to downplay the objective. In doing so they assume that the existing configurations are not to be challenged outright. Such a perspective falls far short of the requirements of a critical theory of conflict resolution in South Asia, in which an engagement with the issues of cooperation and conflict resolution should simultaneously address questions of social justice, ethnic demands, human rights and the increasing power of the state to appropriate power at the expense of the civil society.

References Ahmad, Mutahir. 1997. Confidence-building Measures between Pakistan and India: An Argument for Change. Contemporary South Asia 7(2): 137–145. Axelrod, Robert. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books. Azar, Edward E. 1990. The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases. Aldershot: Dartmouth. Ganguly, Sumit. 1997. Kashmir Crisis-Options for the Resolution of the Stalemate. Pakistan Horizon 50: 17–26. Gleditsch, Nils Petter. 1999. Democracy and Peace, journal of Peace Research 29(4): 369–74. Horowitz, D.L. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press. John, M.S. 1992. SAARC: A Theoretical Perspective. Ph.D. diss., Mahatma Gandhi University. Julius, Demetrios, A. 1990. The Genesis and Perpetuation of Aggression in International Conflicts. In The Psychodynamics of International Relationships: Concepts and Theories, eds. V.D. Volkan, Demetrios A. Julius and J.V. Montville 100–01. Vol. 1. Lexington: Lexington Books. Kriesberg, Louis. 1982. Social Conflicts. Greenwich, Conn.: Prentice Hall. Montville, J.V. 1987. The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy. In Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy, eds. W. McDonald and D.B. Bendahmane, 5–20. Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office. Salem, Paul E. 1993. A Critique of Western Conflict Resolution from a Non-Western Perspective. Negotiations journal (October): 291–92. Volkan, V.D. 1990. An Overview of Psychological Concepts Pertinent to Inter-ethnic and/or International Relationships. In The Psychodynamics of International Relationships: Concepts and Theories, eds. V.D. Volkan, Demetrios A. Julius and J.V. Montville, 36, Vol. 1. Lexington: Lexington Books. ——. 1998. The Need to have Enemies and Allies: From Clinical Practice to International Relationships. Northvale, NJ.: Jason Arnson.

SIXTEEN

Free Trade Area Accord between India and Sri Lanka: Implications for South Indian States K.N. HARILAL AND K.J. JOSEPH

he last two decades witnessed the formation of nearly two dozen trading blocs in different parts of the world. Their survival and success rates, admittedly, have not been very impressive. But, the trend is there for everybody to see: The share of intra-bloc trade in world trade has been growing all these years almost consistently at the expense of 'most favoured nation' (MFN) trade. Not to be left out of the race, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries also came up with a proposal for establishing a preferential trading bloc in the region, viz. the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA). But right from the beginning, it was clear that SAFTA would remain a statement of intention rather than reality for a long period of time. The political conflicts that distance the countries of South Asia are too complex to be resolved in the framework of the SAARC in the near future. It may have been this limitation of the regional arrangement that prompted the governments of India and Sri Lanka to experiment with the bilateral route to achieve the goal of freer trade between the two countries. It is quite possible that the India–Sri Lanka free trade agreement would prompt similar bilateral agreements among SAARC countries and ultimately pave the way for SAFTA.

T

The long-term objective of the India–Sri Lanka accord signed on 28 December 1998 by the prime minister of India and the Sri Lankan president was nothing short of establishing a free trade area between the two countries. According to the original time-frame for phasing out the trade barriers affecting mutual trade, India was supposed to remove customs duties on nearly a thousand items of import from Sri Lanka before 1 March 1999. It was also agreed that within a period of three years trade barriers pertaining to other tariff lines would be phased out. On its part, Sri Lanka agreed to remove import duties on around 300 items before the deadline of 1 March 1999. But Sri Lanka was given a period of eight years for phasing out the barriers affecting the rest of the tariff lines On account of certain contentious issues such as the negative lists there were some delays which freed the contracting parties to reschedule the original programme for establishing the free trade area. However, the programme for a free trade area cannot be allowed to lag indefinitely. In addition to mutual commitment, there would be international pressure on India and Sri Lanka, especially from the World Trade Organisation (WTO), to stick to a clear time schedule and complete the process of establishing the free trade area without undue delay. It is true that in spite of its commitment to uphold the MFN clause, the WTO treaty (Article 24 of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994) provides for the formation of preferential trading arrangements (PTAs). But the sanction for a preferential trading arrangement is subject to the condition that the PTA members remove all barriers to intra-bloc trade within a definite period of time. The WTO rules permit discriminatory trading within the regional groupings, but the level of discrimination should be made complete, i.e. 100 per cent, as early as possible! The failure of the PTA members to remove intra-bloc barriers in time may force the WTO to ask them to extend the tariff cuts within the regional union to all WTO members, in accordance with the MFN principle. Whether it would ultimately result in the formation of a free trade area or not, the accord would have farreaching implications for India–Sri Lanka trade and, hence, for both the national economies. The existing literature on PTAs, which is quite extensive and rich, would help us delineate the plausible effects of the new regime of freer trade between the two neighbours. The net welfare effect of the PTA, if we go by the conventional theory of customs unions (Viner 1950), would depend upon the balance between the trade-

creating and trade-diverting influence of the preferential tariff reduction. The preferential arrangement results in trade diversion when imports are switched from third country sources to relatively inefficient member sources. Trade creation, on the other hand, arises when imports are switched from domestic sources to relatively efficient member country sources. Empirical studies based on the above approach, undertaken in the context of existing PTAs, do not entail any definite conclusion on the net welfare effect of such arrangements (Pomfret 1988). Further, according to the above approach, even when there is net welfare gain, such gain from the preferential tariff reduction can be no better than that obtained by unilaterally eliminating the tariffs on a non-preferential basis. Thus, according to conventional theory, PTAs are economically irrational, as compared to the first-best option of non-preferential tariff cuts, and therefore, can be explained only by non-economic motives (Ibid.: 111–16). Further developments in the theory of PTAs, however, could break the impasse of the above framework by relaxing its restrictive assumptions and incorporating the more dynamic effects of preferential trading arrangements, viz. scale economies, improved technical efficiency, possible terms of trade effects and higher growth rates (Lipsey 1960; Corden 1986: 111–23). Thus, the theory can now explain proliferation of PTAs in terms of the economic advantages of preferential tariff reductions, that cannot be replicated by MFN cuts. In short, a study of the bilateral free trade agreement between India and Sri Lanka will have to take into consideration all the plausible static and dynamic effects of preferential trading before arriving at any conclusion on its outcome. The objective of this essay is more modest. We do not intent to problematise the issue as to whether the proposed PTA would be gainful to the partners taken together or individually. Instead, our focus will be on its differential impact on the regions within the national economies. As existing studies show, even a successful PTA, which augments the welfare of individual partners and the community as a whole, could have highly varying impacts on different regions within each partner country. The question of inter-regional difference in the impact of the proposed PTA between India and Sri Lanka assumes importance in the context of the fears expressed by the southern Indian states, especially Kerala. The available evidence in this regard clearly indicates the need for a more cautious approach in the implementation of the new treaty.

Recent Trends in India–Sri Lanka Trade Before we analyse the trends in India–Sri Lanka trade and the likely impact of the free trade agreement on the same, it would be useful to have an overview of the external sector situation in both the partner countries. The literature on economic integration suggests that the macro-economic policies of partner countries, especially those pertaining to the external sector, would have a major influence on intra-community trade, hence also on the prospects of the free trade agreement. In fact, lack of synchronisation of external sector policies among partners could prove to be a major irritant in the process of building up PTAs. This problem is particularly true in the Third World context where the countries are more vulnerable to external shocks. As some of the key indicators presented in Table 1 show, this question of the vulnerability of the external sector would be a major factor of anxiety in the context of the free trade arrangement between India and Sri Lanka too. None of the partners can boast of a blemishless record in this respect, nor can any one of them claim to have reached a safe trajectory. Any instance of instability in either Sri Lanka or India, and the policies used to overcome the same (for instance, devaluation of the currency) would tend to drastically affect the equations of bilateral trade. As we shall argue later, such external sector developments would also have their implications for the regional impact of the PTA. Table 1 External Sector of India and Sri Lanka: An Overview

Source: Report on Currency and Finance, April 1998. Mumbai: Reserve Bank of India; and Statistical Year Book for Asia and the Pacific, 1997. Bangkok: Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, UN.

There are many reasons to believe that the new accord will result in significant improvement in the twoway trade between India and Sri Lanka. First, in recent years, India–Sri Lanka trade has been growing at a faster rate than their trade with the rest of the world. While the total trade of India and Sri Lanka with the rest of the world recorded an annual compound growth rate of 15.3 per cent and 13.3 per cent, respectively, during 1991 to 1996, India–Sri Lanka trade recorded a much higher growth rate of 23.9 per cent. Second, notwithstanding the recent spurt, the bilateral trade even today accounts for only a negligible share of their total trade. In 1996–97 trade with Sri Lanka accounted for only 0.63 per cent of India's total trade and the corresponding share of Sri Lanka was 5.75 per cent. The third and the most obvious reason is the preferential access that the new accord would be extending to the partners, in each other's markets. The preferential arrangement would give the Indian exporters an advantage vis à vis their third country competitors in the Sri Lankan market and vice versa. An important aspect of the India–Sri Lanka trade from the point of view of the current discussion is the burgeoning trade deficit of Sri Lanka with India (Table 2). The imbalance in the two-way trade cannot be taken as a transient phenomenon. The persistence and the magnitude of the trade deficit are good reasons to suspect structural roots to the problem. The severity of the problem is further made clear by the fact that the Sri Lankan deficit with India accounts for an overwhelming proportion of the island country's overall trade deficit. Thus, for instance, while Sri Lanka's trade with India accounted for only 5.7 per cent of its total trade in 1996, the share of its trade deficit with India in the overall trade deficit was as high as 55 per cent. Table 2 Trends in India's trade with Sri Lanka

Source: Foreign Track, 1998. Mumbai: Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy.

Table 3 Commodity Composition: India's Exports to Sri Lanka (Per cent)

Source: Foreign Track, 1998. Mumbai: Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy.

A cursory examination of the structure of trade suggests that the new trade treaty, in all likelihood, would worsen Sri Lanka's trade deficit with India not only in absolute terms but also as a proportion of the bilateral trade. India's exports to the island country, as Table 3 clearly shows, are dominated by complementary products, characterised as they are by either weak or insignificant import competition in Sri Lanka. The list of such products includes transport equipment, machinery and instruments, trucks, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, etc. In fact, with respect to a wide range of products the competition that the Indian exporters face in Sri Lanka is not so much from producers in that country as from third country suppliers. Therefore, the preferential treatment accorded to Indian exporters vis à vis other foreign suppliers would have a direct and favourable effect on the Indian sales in the island market. Now, the more favourable the effect of the treaty on India's exporters, the higher would be the pressure on Sri Lanka to push its exports to India and keep the trade deficit within manageable limits. It would assume added importance because any efforts towards improving the trade balance with India would have a significant bearing on improving Sri Lanka's overall external balance. This could be accomplished only through an increased penetration of the Indian market by focussing on those products in which Sri Lanka finds export potential or comparative advantage. What are the potential areas of higher import penetration of India by Sri Lankan exports? Only by answering this question can one identify the regions which are likely to be adversely affected by the new treaty.

Export Structure of Sri Lanka Any discussion of the export structure of Sri Lanka has to be carried out against the backdrop of far-reaching economic reforms implemented since 1977. Even though a detailed account of the policy changes is beyond the scope of the present discussion, it may be noted that the reforms initiated in Sri Lanka were much more thorough going than the reforms introduced in India. These policy reforms were manifested inter alia in the move away from the system of non-tariff barriers, drastic reduction in the rate and dispersion of tariff across different products, sustained devaluation of the Sri Lankan rupee and many other measures intended to attract foreign investment. The policy reforms resulted in some major changes in the structure of exports. The structure of Sri Lankan exports in 1977 exhibited all the characteristics of a typical underdeveloped economy, with the traditional primary commodities accounting for more than 75 per cent of total exports. Moreover, the exports were highly concentrated in a few products like coconut, rubber and tea. But by 1992, the share of primary commodities declined to a level as low as 33 per cent of total exports. Along with the change in the commodity composition there was a change in the ownership of exports as well. The share of foreign firms in manufactured exports increased from 9 per cent in 1979 to more than 71 per cent in 1992 (Wignaraja 1998: 65). Thus, the reforms initiated since l977 have been quite successful in attracting foreign direct investment. In this respect, Sri Lanka's performance is rated on par with that of the Southeast Asian countries. Interestingly, it is often argued that apart from the liberal incentive structure that the policy reforms ensured, Sri Lanka's proximity to the large Indian market has also been a major factor in attracting foreign firms. These achievements of the Sri Lankan economy, commendable though they are, do not appear to pose any major threat of import penetration to the modern manufacturing sector in India, at least in the near future. An analysis of the manufactured exports at the disaggregate level reveals a very high level of concentration in low-skill/low-technology products. In fact, the share of skill-intensive items in the manufactured exports of Sri Lanka has declined from 11.6 per cent in 1977 to 7.6 per cent in 1992 (Wignaraja 1998: 62). Further, there is evidence in terms of revealed comparative advantage indices to argue that the competitiveness of Sri Lanka in skill- and technology-intensive products has been declining over time (ibid.: 63). The disaggregated data on Sri Lanka's global exports presented in Table 4 conform to the above argument. The standard international trade classifications (SITCs) 5 and 7, which cover most of the technology-intensive items, are very poorly represented in the Sri Lankan export basket. This leaves us with tropical agricultural products and some labour-intensive manufactures, which account for more than 85 per cent of the export earnings. These areas, in which Sri Lanka has proven its competitive presence in the international market, could also be taken as the potential areas of Sri Lankan import penetration of the Indian market, viz. fish and its preparations, vegetables and fruits (mainly coconut, fresh and dried), tea, spices, tobacco manufactures, natural rubber, rubber manufactures, textile yarn, pearl, precious and semi-precious stones, clothing and accessories, and toys. But, unlike the Indian exporters in the island country's market, the Sri Lankan exporters would face tough import competition in India. Significantly enough, India has a well-entrenched production base in each

of the areas identified above. More importantly, these products are also prominent export items of India. Table 4 Commodity Composition: Sri Lanka's Global Exports

Source: Statistical Year Book for Asia and the Pacific, 1997. Bangkok: Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, UN.

However, given the huge trade deficit with India, and the likelihood of its worsening in the context of the new treaty, Sri Lanka would be hard pressed to try and push the export of the items identified above to the Indian market. Thus Indian exporters of the products identified would find themselves in the unenviable situation of having to share a part of the hitherto protected domestic market with their archrivals in the international market. Thus, the sectoral impact of the new agreement on India is fairly clear. The non-

traditional manufactures, especially capital goods and chemicals, would find their market expanded to the neighbouring country. This, in the long run, as studies on economic integration suggest, might also help the producers in such sectors to reap economies of scale and attain higher competitiveness. Their exports to the Sri Lankan market would be more at the cost of third country suppliers than the Sri Lankan producers. The Indian industries, which use natural rubber, copra, etc. as raw materials might also benefit because of the increased competition in the Indian market. The producers of the tropical products and labour-intensive manufactures listed above, on the other hand, would tend to lose a part of their home market to Sri Lanka. The loss of control over the home market might also affect their performance in the international market. Coming to the question of regional impact, it appears that the south Indian states would have to bear a disproportionately larger share of the adverse consequences of the new free trade treaty. South India accounts for a lion's share of both area as well as production of the crops which are likely to face Sri Lankan competition. Its dependence on the listed tropical products, viz. tea, natural rubber, coconut and spices is also well known. The importance of and the dependence on the above products would appear more dramatic in the case of Kerala. In 1996–97, coconut, rubber and tea accounted for about 66 per cent of the net-cropped area in Kerala. With the limited industrial base, these crops are also major sources of income and employment in the state. Therefore, even apparently minor changes in the above markets would have farreaching effects on the state's economy. Notably, the adverse impact of the treaty would not be limited to a reduction in domestic sales. The international market for the products in question, like other primary commodity markets, is known for sharp price fluctuations. It was the presence of a fairly large and protected home market that helped defend the Indian producers from the vagaries of the international commodity market. The proposed regime of free trade with Sri Lanka would reduce the scope of government intervention and leave the producers at the mercy of market forces. The neoliberal advice to the producers threatened by free imports from Sri Lanka would be to take on the challenge of competition by reducing the cost of production and enhancing productivity. The unprecedented crisis that the natural rubber producers of the country currently face would help us show how naive such arguments could be (Harilal and Joseph 1998). The average productivity of 1,140 kg/ha in Kerala is quite high even according to international standards. But the prevailing prices are not remunerative even to those who have higher than average levels of productivity. Cost of production, productivity, etc. are important parameters that determine prices, profitability and market shares of competitors. But there are other crucial parameters, many of which could be beyond the control of producers. The external sector policies, more specifically those related to the international value of the currency, would have a major bearing on competitiveness and trade. This brings us back to the question of the vulnerability of the external sector of partner countries. Both the countries have been depreciating their national currencies almost continuously over the last decade. While there were phases when the Indian rupee depreciated faster than the Sri Lankan counterpart, there were also periods when the Sri Lankan rupee depreciated faster. The current phase appears to be one of deeper cuts in the value of Sri Lankan currency. We do not need to discuss its impact on the competitiveness of Sri Lankan exporters vis à vis Indian producers. We only need to underline the fact that there are many factors, like the relative value of currency and the differential rates of inflation, which are beyond the control of producers and shape their fate in the market; the new environment of free trade with Sri Lanka would reduce the space for helpful state intervention. In conclusion, it may be reiterated that PTAs would have highly varying impact on sectors and regions within the community. There is no reason to believe that the case of Indian and Sri Lankan arrangements would be an exception. It is important, therefore, to foresee such effects and provide safeguards for the sectors and regions that are likely to bear the costs of adjustment. The experience of successful PTAs, especially that of the European community, shows the importance of preparatory studies and careful planning in minimising such adjustment costs. The long preparatory phase and the community-wide debates that preceded the introduction of the Euro may be cited here. It is this quality of transparency and willingness for open debates on the possible impact that are sadly lacking in the context of the India–Sri Lanka treaty. It is true that there are certain in-built mechanisms in the bilateral agreement, like the negative lists, to take care of the problem of adjustment. But how long can the negative lists be maintained? The Sri Lankan trade deficit and provision of article 24 of GATT 1994 suggest that the period of maintaining negative lists cannot be too long. If so, what are the measures needed to prepare the concerned sectors for the period beyond the negative

lists? Is there any understanding on synchronisation of external sector policies? That many such important questions are left unaddressed does not augur well for the future of the new treaty.

References Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy. 1998. Foreign Trade. Mumbai: Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy. Corden, V.M. 1986. The Normative Theory of International Trade. In International Trade: Survey of Theory and Policy, ed. Jones W. Ronald. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publications. Harilal, K.N. and K.J. Joseph. 1998. Natural Rubber: Perils of Policy. Economic and Political Weekly (July 4–12): 1689–91. Lipsey, G. Richard. 1960. The Theory of Customs Unions: A General Survey. Economic journal 70: 466–513. Pomfret, Richard. 1988. Unequal Trade: The Economics of Discriminatory International Trade Policies. New York: Basil Blackwell. Reserve Bank of India. 1998. Report on Currency and Finance, April. Bombay. United Nations. 1992. International Trade Statistics Yearbook. Vol. 1. New York: United Nations. ——. 1997. Statistical Year Book for Asia and the Pacific. Bangkok: Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. Viner, J. 1950. The Customs Union Issue. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Wignaraja. 1998. Trade Liberalisation in Sri Lanka: Exports, Technology and Industrial Policy. London: Macmillan Press.

SEVENTEEN

India's Bhutan Policy MATHEW JOSEPH C.

ndia's Bhutan policy has long been determined by security and strategic concerns, and the history of the relationship between the two countries. During the colonial period, the British considered Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan as buffer states between British India and Tibet. While Nepal was given the status of an independent country, Sikkim was considered a protectorate and Bhutan a semi-protectorate. This colonial mentality seems to have dominated independent India's policy towards Bhutan.

I

The pattern of Indo-Bhutan relations during the colonial period was institutionalised by the Sinchula Treaty of 1865 (Singh 1988: 323–24). Various articles in this ten-article treaty were humiliating for the Bhutanese. For example, Article 8 of the Treaty stated: The Bhutan Government hereby agree to refer to the arbitration of the British Government all disputes with, or causes of complaint against, the Rajahs of Sikkim and Cooch Behar, and to abide by the decision of the British Government; and the British Government hereby engage to enquire into and settle all such disputes and complaints in such manner as justice may require, and to insist on the observance of the decision by the Rajahs of Sikkim and Cooch Behar. (Kohli 1982: 211) Bhutan became a monarchy in 1907. The first major political act under the monarchy was the revision of the Sinchula Treaty. A new treaty was signed on 8 January 1910 at Punakha in Bhutan (Labh 1974: 174–75). The most important aspect of the Punakha Treaty was the revision of Article 8 of the previous treaty. By revising this article, the British government in India enhanced its power from an arbitrator to an adviser: The British Government undertakes to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part, the Bhutanese Government agrees to be guided by the advice of the British Government in regard to its external relations. In the event of disputes with or causes of complaint against the Maharajas of Sikkim and Cooch Behar, such matters will be referred for arbitration to the British Government which will settle them in such manner as justice may require and insist upon the observance of its decisions by the Maharajas named. (Kohli 1982: 214) The Punakha Treaty was a turning point in the history of Bhutan and Indo-Bhutan relations. Ram Rahul comments on its impact: It put Bhutan, so far as the management and conduct of its foreign relations was concerned, on the same footing as Sikkim....It lost its external sovereignty and became in effect a British protectorate even though the word 'protectorate' was not mentioned in the treaty. To be sure, the treaty did not make Bhutan a part of the British Empire. All that it did was to enable the British secure the north-east frontier of India from both external aggression and intrigue. (1971: 52) The main debate during 1910–47 between the British Indian government and the Bhutanesedurbar centred on the status of Bhutan. In 1924, it was made clear that Bhutan was not a native Indian state, though it was under British suzerainty (Labh 1974: 201). And the British maintained the policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of Bhutan till they left the subcontinent in 1947. After the British withdrew from India, the status of Bhutan with regard to India was undecided. Its position was between Nepal and Sikkim—less independent than Nepal but more free than Sikkim. This confusion was resolved by the conclusion of the

Indo-Bhutan Treaty signed on 8 August 1949 at Darjeeling (Appadorai and Rajan 1988: 172). The new ten-article treaty, in a way, was the continuation of the previous two treaties as far as the foreign affairs of Bhutan were concerned. Article 2 of the 1949 Treaty states: The Government of India undertakes to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part the Government of Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations. (Kohli 1982: 217–18) The 1949 Treaty – especially Article 2 – is viewed as a device that limits the political sovereignty of Bhutan. The Bhutanese Prime Minister Jigmie Palden Dorji framed it in a subtle manner during a news conference: "We do not consider ourselves dependent. But we are not hundred per cent independent because of the 1949 Treaty" (Kohli 1993: 85). The accession of Tibet in 1950, by China, sent shock waves throughout the Himalayan region. Bhutan closed its northern borders with Tibet in anticipation of Chinese penetration. In 1954 India and China signed the historic agreement on Tibet (Appadorai and Rajan 1988: 118). Under this agreement India accepted Tibet as an 'autonomous region' of China. The loss of Tibet's political independence had wider strategic and security implications both for Bhutan and India. King Jigme Dorji Wangchuck paid a state visit to India in January 1954. The visit was reciprocated by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in September 1958 (Varma 1988: 181–82). During his visit, in a public meeting at Paro, he said: Some may think that since India is a great and powerful country and Bhutan is a small one, the former might wish to exercise pressure on Bhutan. It is, therefore, essential that I make it clear to you [Bhutanese people] that our wish is that you should remain an independent country and taking the path of progress according to your will. At the same time, we two [India and Bhutan] should live with mutual goodwill. We are members of the same Himalayan Family and should live as friendly neighbours, helping each other. The freedom of both Bhutan and India should be safeguarded, so that no one from outside can do any harm to them. (Appadorai and Rajan 1988: 173) During his discussions with King Dorji Wangchuck, Nehru emphasised the need for the opening up of Bhutan in the context of the security situation that prevailed in the Himalayas at that time. The king was noncommittal at first, but later accepted Nehru's proposition. The aborted revolt in Tibet in 1959 was to an extent instrumental in this change of policy. The security threat which both India and Bhutan came to perceive from China resulted in the inclusion of Bhutan in India's defence strategy. As a result of this, strategically and economically, Bhutan was integrated into India. Regarding India's involvement in the initial phase of the modernisation of Bhutan, Rose writes: Bhutan's alignment with India took a number of forms. In 1959–60, several economic-aid agreements, including a major road project linking central Bhutan with India, were concluded between the two governments. In 1961, the training of the Royal Bhutan Army was formally entrusted to the Indian Army, by implication at least bringing Bhutan within the Indian security and defence system. Prime Minister Nehru specifically declared in 1959 that an attack on Nepal or Bhutan would be interpreted as an attack on Indian Territory, thus extending the Indian security system to the entire sub-Himalayan region. (1992: 78) The sociopolitical and economic changes initiated in Bhutan under King Jigme Dorji Wangchuck in turn gave birth to certain new social forces (Joseph 1996: 116–133). The struggles of the Bhutan State Congress (BSC) in the 1950s and 1960s for the abolition of feudalism and the democratisation of the society (Sinha 1992: 20), and the assassination of Prime Minister Jigmie Palden Dorji in 1964 due to palace intrigues (Paramanand 1992: 91), clearly illustrated the simmering discontent within the Bhutanese polity (Joseph 1999: 132–35). Owing to the close relationship between the Bhutanese royal family and the Indian strategic elite, India always took an ambivalent position towards the struggles for democratisation in Bhutan. India justified its position of non-endorsement by pointing to Article 2 of the Indo-Bhutan Treaty of 1949.

Since 1985 Bhutan has been subject to political crises unparallelled in the history of Bhutan. The 'Bhutanisation' programme of the government, which included the Citizenship Act of 1985, the census conducted in 1988 to identify illegal immigrants, and the promulgation of Driglam Nam Za1 in 1989 created a gulf between the Ngalong-dominated state elite2 and the Bhutanese of Nepali origin. The consequent ethnic conflict between the Ngalong-dominated state elite and the Bhutanese of Nepali origin led to more than one lakh of the latter becoming refugees. According to certain reports, an estimated 105,000 ethnic Nepalese have left Bhutan since 1990.3 They are scattered all over the Himalayas. Resistance to the 'Bhutanisation' programme later developed into a mass movement for the establishment of human rights and democracy in Bhutan. The movement for the establishment of human rights and democracy involves various human rights groups such as the People's Forum for Human Rights, Bhutan (PFHRB), the Human Rights Organisation of Bhutan (HUROB) and the Association of Human Rights Activists, Bhutan (AHURA, Bhutan); and political parties like the Bhutan People's Party (BPP), the Bhutan National Democratic Party (BNDP) and the Druk National Congress (DNC). India has assumed an ambivalent position of non-involvement with regard to these developments, which only helps the oppressive Ngalong-dominated state headed by King Jigme Singye Wangchuck (Joseph 1994: 8–11). India's Bhutan policy based on the 1949 Treaty at the moment protects the status quo forces in Bhutan. According to the Indian strategic elite, the monarchy under the Wangchucks in Bhutan is the most faithful and dependable ally India has in the region. Considering the importance of Bhutan in India's strategic designs, India does not want the country to be politically disturbed. This has led India to take a stand of nonendorsement towards the struggles for human rights and democracy there. In short, India's Bhutan policy, which is a continuation of the colonial policy based only on security and strategic concerns, is detrimental to the democratisation of Bhutan.

References Appadorai A. and M.S. Rajan. 1988. India's Foreign Policy and Relations. New Delhi: South Asian Publishers. Joseph C., Mathew. 1994. Ethnic Cauldron in Bhutan: Indian Response. Himalya Today 5 (3): 8–11. ——. 1996. Political Economy of Ethnic Conflict in Bhutan. In Bhutan: Society and Polity, eds. Ramakant and R.C. Misra. 116–33. New Delhi: Indus. ——. 1999. Ethnic Conflict in Bhutan. New Delhi: Nirala. Kohli, Manorama. 1982. India and Bhutan: A Study in Interrelations 1772–1910. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal. —. 1993. From Dependency to Inter-dependence: A Study of Indo-Bhutan Relations. New Delhi: Vikas. Labh, Kapileshwar. 1974. India and Bhutan New Delhi: Sindhu. Parmanand. 1992. The Politics of Bhutan: Retrospect and Prospect. New Delhi: Pragati. Rahul, Ram. 1971. Modern Bhutan. New Delhi: Vikas. Rose, Leo E. 1992. The Politics of Bhutan. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Singh, Amar Kaur Jasbir. 1988. Himalayan Triangle: A Historical Survey of British India's Relations with Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan 1765–1950. London: The British Library. Sinha, A.C. 1992. The Bhutan State Congress: First Political Stirrings. Himal 5, no. 4 (July/August): 20. Varma, Ravi. 1988. India's Role in the Emergence of Contemporary Bhutan. New Delhi: Capital Publishing House.

EIGHTEEN

India and Southeast Asia: The Look East Policy in Perspective A.M. THOMAS

he 'east' is important for many cultures and religions. The heliolatrous association of the east is central in the minds of many people in India.1 However, from a geopolitical point of view in India, a reference to the east involves ambiguity. In a broad sense, the east means the entire Asia Pacific region that includes China and East Asia, Southeast Asia and Oceania but excludes North America. In a narrow sense, the term refers to East Asia and Southeast Asia, the latter in particular since, geographically, it is the most proximal of the Asia Pacific region for India, barring China. Drakakis-Smith (1992: 1) uses the term 'Pacific Asia', which he says is relatively new and refers to the developing countries of the Asia Pacific region. Pacific Asia is the part of Asia that is close to the waters of the Pacific Ocean (Maull, Segal and Wanandi 1998: x). Keeping these classifications in mind, the focus of this analysis will be on Southeast Asia.

T

Southeast Asia, which is part of the larger Asia Pacific region, occupies an important place as far as India is concerned and remains the focus of the Look East policy initiated by India in the early 1990s. In fact, India's Look East policy is multifaceted, the genesis of which can be traced to the transformations that occurred in India's foreign policy in general during the post–cold war period. The economic and strategic dimensions of India's policy are influenced and shaped not only by India's interests but also by factors like Southeast Asia's international significance, and the interests and policies of internal and external actors in the region. Southeast Asia appears to give an impression of being geographically far removed from India. But no other region can be in greater proximity to India. India shares a long border with Myanmar, and the Nicobar Islands are separated from Indonesian territory only by a few hundred kilometres. The Afro-Asian Conference of Bandung held in 1955 witnessed the peak of Indian involvement in the region, which waned in the subsequent years. During the cold war period, Southeast Asia was dominated by the United States, while many countries in the region identified India, despite its vanguard role in the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), with the Soviet Union. India's foreign policy stance differed from a majority of the Southeast Asian countries, on regional as well as global issues. India, which was the chairman of the International Control Commission on Indo-China, stood by the position that the security of countries like Laos and Cambodia could be assured through a policy of non-alignment rather than military alliances with external powers. Sardesai (1992: 163) states that with respect to Indo-China, India's policy of non-alignment was in crisis. He maintains that, as a non-aligned country, India had considerable influence with the superpowers to resolve major international crises, yet lacked adequate leverage with minor pro-West states, even less so in disputes between a non-aligned country and a member of either bloc. The formation of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in the 1950s led by the US was, in the Indian perspective, a western scheme to preserve the status quo in the region and protect western interests.2 In the early years of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Indian attitude towards it was ambivalent, if not hostile, largely due to the ASEAN's western orientation. In the 1970s, while India established relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, it followed a policy of neutrality with regard to Cambodia by favouring neither faction in the conflict there. It tried to maintain impartiality in the crisis by demanding both Chinese withdrawal from Vietnam and Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia. India's decision in 1980 to recognise the Heng Samrin government in Cambodia "gave cause for alarm even if it did not produce any corresponding gesture among other non-aligned states" (Leifer 1989:

110). New Delhi's policy on Cambodia was shaped by its assessment of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict and the security threat posed to Vietnam by the Chinese-backed Pol Pot regime as well as the conviction that Indian interests in Southeast Asia were best served by cooperation with middle powers such as Vietnam. Although India shared with countries like Indonesia and Malaysia the perception that China would pose, in the long run, a major threat to Southeast Asia, it failed to take advantage of this commonality (Suryanarayan 1996: 24– 25).

A Dynamic Region The end of the cold war had several implications for both India and Southeast Asia. With cold war considerations no longer haunting relations, they are in a better position to interact with each other. The explosive growth of the economies of the region is shifting the balance of world economic power eastward, away from western Europe and the US, towards East and Southeast Asia (Tipton 1998: 1). If for several centuries the Atlantic Ocean dominated international relations, today the centre of gravity has shifted to the Pacific Ocean and its littoral countries. Not surprisingly, the twenty-first century has been christened the Pacific century. Southeast Asia is one of the most dynamic and economically vibrant regions in the world. Economic changes in the region have been astonishing in their speed and scope. In a short span of time the economies of these countries have not only expanded but also transformed and the rapid rates of growth have often been highlighted as role models for other developing countries (Rigg 1991: 233). As Evans (1996: 5) suggests, Southeast Asia's industrial revolution has been compressed into less than half a generation. The new and dynamic capitalism of the region has produced spectacular results. The most obvious is the high growth rate that much of the region has enjoyed for a long time. This growth has created a large middle class, a new group of successful capitalists and growing self-confidence among states and leaders (Ibid.: 7–8). The region has emerged as one of the hubs of growth of the world economy. In the 1970s and early 1980s, rising foreign investment and deregulation in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand spurred this momentum, with entrepreneurial city-states like Singapore acting as the region's growth poles. These countries form a formidable force motivating even relatively less successful countries like Philippines and drawing in the residual non-capitalist economies of Vietnam and Laos. As the region becomes increasingly self-sufficient in terms of intra-regional trade and investment, it is less dependent on external markets and assistance, and its rigorous economic growth becomes self-sustaining (Lassere and Schutte 1995: xv). Apart from the size of its market, the region remains an important supplier of natural resources such as tin, rubber, edible oil, crude oil and gas. The second supply base, namely human resources, in the form of cheap labour, is gaining importance. Apart from these, technology is also an emerging area of strength. Robison and Goodman (1996) state that dramatic changes have occurred in these social and economic systems, like the growth of a substantial middle class. These 'new rich' have captured the imagination of the West because they represent massive new markets for western-style products. Although there was a setback as a result of the financial crisis of 1997, these countries have recovered.3 Whatever yardstick of comparison is used, the economies of the region are growing rapidly.

Origins of the Look East Policy At the end of the cold war India realised the need for a different approach to security and economic cooperation in Southeast Asia. Such an approach required the recognition that the locus of world affairs in the twenty-first century would increasingly be the Asia Pacific region of which Southeast Asia is an integral part. This region will have the world's most successful economies, high agricultural production, energy and mineral supplies, and growing military power. But it also has a heterogeneous group of states, with many imponderables that could directly affect India's long-term security. In the early 1990s, the Congress government led by P.V. Narasimha Rao, fully cognizant of the tremendous global changes occurring at that time, formulated the Look East policy, which constituted a fundamental shift in India's foreign policy. Until then Southeast Asia had barely figured on the list of foreign-policy priorities and years of neglect left India with a considerable residue of suspicion to overcome in the region (Ghoshal 1996: 96–98). But since the

initiation of the policy, the region has been gradually moving into a more prominent position with regard to India's foreign-policy priorities. By the mid 1990s, India's relations with the countries of the Southeast Asian region had reached a significant point. As an endorsement of a conscious adoption of the Look East Policy, India became a sectoral dialogue partner of the ASEAN in 1992. It became a full dialogue partner when in December 1995 President Suharto of Indonesia backed a proposal by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong of Singapore to this effect. Accordingly, India participated for the first time at the post ministerial conference (PMC) of ASEAN in Jakarta in July 1996. It also participated for the first time in the meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which deliberates on the security and political concerns of the Asia Pacific region. For India, it was, in a sense, a recognition of its importance to the security of that region. In the 1990s, India exchanged high-level bilateral visits with nearly every member country of the ASEAN and, in certain cases, more than once. It also made notable strides in its official relationship with the ASEAN as an organisation, which culminated in the first ASEAN–India summit. Over the last few years, India has consciously focussed on the rejuvenation of its ties with the countries of the ASEAN. But, even as India looked east, the ASEAN moved west through the admission of new countries like Myanmar, literally bringing itself to India's doors. From being a maritime neighbour, the ASEAN became its close neighbour with a land border of nearly one thousand six hundred kilometres. This has added a new dimension to India–ASEAN relations. The first summit between India and the ASEAN in Phnom Penh in November 2002 clearly reflected the new closeness that has now developed between the region and India, and both agreed to work towards negotiating a free trade agreement within the next decade.

External Actors in Southeast Asia As mentioned at the outset, India's policy towards Southeast Asia has also been influenced by the role, interest and the policies of external actors in the Southeast Asian region. Prominent among them are the US, China, Japan and Australia. The US, the world's remaining superpower, has significant strategic and economic interests in Southeast Asia. In the post–cold war period, while it has extended its relations to the countries of Indo-China, where it was previously engaged in prolonged conflict, it has also scaled down its operations in Southeast Asia. The closing down of the Subic Bay naval base in the Philippines is one such act in this direction. However, the US may require access to larger bases in Southeast Asia to project military power across the region if US strategy shifts to the Asia Pacific region. Since there is no immediate threat of war in this region, the present US strategy is centred on fostering these interests in the multilateral forums of the region. The US economic stake in Southeast Asia is also significant. Two-way trade between the US and the ASEAN in 2002 totalled $120 billion, with US exports to the region reaching $44 billion. However, the US is apprehensive of being replaced as the dominant economic influence in the region and of the growing economic prosperity that may lead to assertions of military independence. Southeast Asia's importance to the US increased after the terrorist attacks of 2001, and it is now regarded as the "second front" in the war against terrorism (MacDonald and Lemco 2002: 392). The region, which includes leading moderate Islamic countries, with some facing insurgencies, was quick to join the worldwide war against international terrorism and will continue to play an extremely important role in the effort.4 The country whose growing strategic and economic power are felt most in the region is China, which considers Southeast Asia its own backyard. China is also a rising major power, which is likely to challenge the US for dominance in the Asia Pacific region in the near future. China is using both its economic and military power to penetrate Southeast Asia. It has territorial disputes with most countries along its borders including those of Southeast Asia. Many of its neighbours are great powers in the making. Kanti Bajpai observes that China has a siege mentality and aims to be a formidable military power: "The more China arms against its multifarious threats, real and imagined, the more it frightens its neighbours, the more these countries arm themselves against China, the more they worry the Chinese. This is the security dilemma of Asia" (1997: 9– 10). Further, countries in the region are apprehensive of Chinese ideology, the presence of overseas Chinese, China's political interference in some countries, its nuclear status and its claims over islands in the South China Sea (Hussain 1996: 49). They are also apprehensive of its efforts to secure its sea routes by increasing naval power and of its increasing control over Myanmar. Comparing three regional powers – India, Japan and China – the former chief of Malaysia's defence forces, Gen. Hashim Mohammed Ali, argued that while

India is constrained by domestic problems and Japan by constitutional demands, China has continued to increase its defence spending and military modernisation, and has threatened the use of force to support its territorial claims in the South China Sea (Acharya 1999: 132). Australia is another external actor with great interest in the region. Australia has, in the recent past, moved quite significantly from being identified as a western nation to being seen as a potential Pacific power. At a different level it could be serving as a surrogate for the West in the region. As Paul Dibb suggests, "Australia also needs to coordinate better its defence, foreign and economic policies in the Southeast Asia and Southwest Pacific regions generally if we are properly to contribute to western interests" (1983: 38). Southeast Asia is both Australia's closest political environment and a barrier to political or security problems beyond. In this context Australia must balance somewhat uneasily between various competing pressures. Nossal (1996: 200) argues that Australia, which is seeking to relocate itself in an evolving international political economy, is concerned about economic gains in the region. Australia will, in the future, continue to emphasise issues of a parochial economic nature, regional defence and Pacific trade. At the same time, it will need to devote more attention to the economic or security consequences of Southeast Asian issues and conflicts. Japan is another country which has historical relations with the region and it is dependent on it for its resources as well as markets. Japan is conscious of its negative image, a remnant from the days of its role as an occupier during the Pacific war. The ASEAN and Japan established informal relations only in 1973 and formalised ties with the establishment of the ASEAN–Japan Forum in 1977. Since then the friendly and cooperative relations have been strengthened and expanded through the 1980s and the 1990s. Japan remains the ASEAN's most important trading partner and source of investment. Japan is promoting a cooperative dialogue with the ASEAN on political and security issues through multilateral discussions in the ARF and the ASEAN post-ministerial conference and through various bilateral frameworks with ASEAN countries. Above all, as Masahide (1984: 175) states, Japan and the ASEAN share many characteristics like their attitude to life, their cultural and religious tolerance, and their unique pragmatism and flexibility. We have examined the 'external actor context' of Southeast Asia—where India is attempting an entry through its Look East policy. While India has its own reasons for involvement in as well as concern regarding developments in the region, advocates of the containment of China in particular argue for a greater role for India. Whatever the roots of such analysis, the proponents of this option support a policy of containing the rise of Chinese power. Among other strategies, they espouse the formation of new alignments involving the US, the states of Southeast Asia and other regional powers including India, which have been traditionally antipathetic towards China (Harding 1998: 141). An uncertain US policy towards the region would also compel Southeast Asian countries to look to major regional powers for their security (Raja Mohan 1999: 38). In this setting, many countries may be looking to India to serve as a possible balance in that region. But critics of this school of thought believe that India has a very limited role there. They consider India's main objective in Southeast Asia as not political or strategic, but economic. Economic factors, in general, have been the guiding force of India's foreign policy in the post–cold war period. As Achin Vanaik writes, "the question of India's economic prospects is...pitched into the centre of the Indian debate about the current purposes and the future prospects and limits of India's foreign policy" (1995: 65). As the cold war was winding down, the prime minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, sought to spell out the consequences of America's withdrawal from Southeast Asia. He saw 'medium powers' jockeying to be the frontrunners if the US left. Interestingly, the medium powers he identified as muscle-flexers were India and Vietnam, not China (Khong 1999: 15). Even Chinese analysts saw Vietnam and India as their most probable future adversaries (Lewis and Litai 1994: 216). The very fact that the ASEAN members chose India to become a dialogue partner testifies to the fact that India would function as a balance to China (Leifer 1999: 103).

The Economic Imperative The end of the cold war and the liberalisation of the Indian economy formed the background for India's Look East policy. It was imperative for India to formulate a new economic policy and diversify its trade relations to meet the challenges of the new circumstances and in particular to focus on regions of the immediate neighbourhood, like Southeast Asia. Since 1992 India has had a growing interaction with the ASEAN, which now accounts for 12 per cent of India's foreign direct investment and 8 per cent of total trade; and Singapore,

Malaysia and Thailand happen to be among the top twelve investors in India. This is suggestive of the growing trend in the trade links between India and the ASEAN nations. With the present emphasis on export-oriented economic growth and macro-economic policies, India has much to emulate in the ASEAN economic system. The bilateral trade between India and the ASEAN reached a high of US$ 7.35 billion during 1999–2000. In 2000–2001 this came down to US$ 6.96 billion (see Table 1). Despite an increase in Indian exports to the ASEAN by about 30 per cent, lower imports, particularly in the commodity sector, brought down the volume in trade. Nonetheless, statistics show trends of improving trade. India's major trading partners in the ASEAN are Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand, who share almost 90 per cent of the total trade. But India's trade with the ASEAN compares highly unfavourably with the United States' $120 billion, Japan's $116 billion, China's $70 billion, or South Korea's $32 billion (Limaye 2002). Investments between India and the ASEAN are not significant. Bhaumik (1996: 61–87) points out that the absence of both a conducive economic environment and availability of surplus capital, the two being prerequisites for fostering the flow of investment, has contributed to low two-way investment flows. Table 1 India's Trade with the ASEAN (in US dollars, billion)

Source: Government of India (2001a); and Government of India (2002)

An important reason for India's economic ties with Southeast Asia still being in their infancy is that India's trade liberalisation started only in the 1990s and is far from complete. However, trade has been growing steadily, at 30 per cent during the past three years. In November 2002 India offered a regional trade and investment arrangement (RTIA) to Southeast Asia, emulating free trade proposals by China and Japan. If this is implemented, it could increase India–Southeast Asia trade and investment ties in the future (Limaye 2002). India's cooperation with the ASEAN covers areas as diverse as science and technology, space technology, biotechnology, information technology, human resource development, trade and investment, and tourism. India is particularly interested in taking up projects under the Initiative for ASEAN Integration, which aims at reducing the development gap between the original members of the ASEAN and the four later entrants— Cambodia, Laos, Burma and Vietnam (Government of India 2001b). Of special importance in connection with India's Look East policy is the Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand Economic Cooperation (BIMST-EC), a sub-regional economic cooperation grouping of countries on the rim of the Bay of Bengal, formed in 1997, which represents the reinforcement of India's relations with two of its South Asian neighbours and its link with the ASEAN. This forum envisages functional cooperation in the six sectors of energy, fisheries, technology, tourism, trade and investment, and transport and communications. Of these sectors, India is the lead country for technology, and transport and communication (Government of India 2000). Another Look East initiative is the Mekong–Ganga Cooperation (MGC) which was launched in November 2000 in Vientiane, Laos, to increase cooperation in tourism, culture and education. The signatories to the initiative were India and five Southeast Asian nations— Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar. The initiative was designed to define regions in the new global economy, while keeping their native identity and character intact. The six countries also undertook to develop transportation networks including the East–West Corridor project and the trans-Asian highway. The

Vientiane Declaration said it had been "inspired by a common desire to develop closer relations and better understanding among the six countries to enhance friendship, solidarity and cooperation" (Allison 2001). The initiative has been criticised as having been designed to counterbalance the influence of China in the region, specifically as China, which is a riparian Mekong River country, is not included. Though similar in approach to BIMST-EC, the areas of focus are different in the case of the MGC. A positive point about the initiative is that it will provide India the impetus to have closer relations with countries which have until now been marginally represented in its trade and investment (Ambatkar 2001: 115).

The Security Dimension Though primarily economic in focus, India's Look East policy has not lost sight of the security dimension involved in its relations with Southeast Asia. In a speech to the Institute of Diplomatic and Foreign Relations in Kuala Lumpur in May 2001, the prime minister of India, Vajpayee (2001) said: We are conscious of the striving for a new security structure in the world, moving away from obsolete cold war constructs. We are engaged in a process of dialogue and consultation with our friends and partners to help shape a new security environment free of confrontation and tension. Our security dialogue with ASEAN can also include this theme. India has scored a diplomatic success in preventing Pakistan from being included in the ASEAN Regional Forum. It has been able to manage the situation after the nuclear tests of 1998 and has succeeded in keeping issues like Kashmir from being deliberated at forums in Southeast Asia. It has also been able to reduce suspicions regarding its intentions in the region through confidence building efforts and high-level political and security-related discussions. On the other hand, individual Southeast Asian countries have enhanced bilateral ties with India in sectors that were previously avoided, ranging from software technology to defence cooperation. For example, Indonesia and India have agreed to the latter's proposal for setting up a telemetry tracking ground station in Kalimantan for continuous monitoring of the Indian Space Research Organisation's (ISRO) geosynchronous satellite launch vehicle (GSLV). In January 2001 five agreements on defence cooperation, the establishment of a joint commission, science and technology, cultural exchanges, and agricultural cooperation were signed with Indonesia. The agreement on 'cooperative activities in the field of defence' is especially noteworthy, as no such agreement existed between the two countries in the past. Under its terms, the countries will coordinate defence activities in various fields including training, technical assistance, and supply of defence equipment and materials. Both countries will also share their experiences in the field of defence management and policy (Limaye 2002). India has thus avoided being marginalised in the current international environment. During the cold war, India's naval policy was viewed with apprehension and countries like Indonesia and Malaysia resented the presence of its navy in the vicinity of Southeast Asia. India's traditional security concerns have not changed in the post–cold war environment and it has made it clear that its strategic interests extend from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca. India, in particular, has a vital interest in seeing the Straits of Malacca remain in friendly hands. This is so because the sea lanes to the east are growing in significance for its energy security, taking into account oil and gas supplies from Myanmar, Vietnam and Indonesia. India's Look East policy also envisages an increasing physical presence in Southeast Asia. Myanmar is a Southeast Asian country with which India shares a long land border. India's policy towards Myanmar is influenced by the realisation that the major part of its northeastern states are influenced by developments in Myanmar. Geographically, the northern borders of Myanmar form a junction with Bangladesh, China and the sensitive eastern frontiers of India. Moreover, Myanmar is an important country on the rim of the Bay of Bengal, lying astride India's southeastern trade routes. The southeast coast of Myanmar is close enough to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands of India for developments in the area to affect India's security interests in the Bay of Bengal. In the early 1990s, New Delhi decided to engage with Myanmar's internationally ostracised military regime, both governments cooperating in tackling cross-border terrorism, rebel activities and drug trafficking (Allison 2001). India is keen for Myanmar's help in combatting the smuggling of drugs from Southeast Asia into India (Mahapatra 1997). The insurgency problem in the

northeastern states of India cannot be controlled effectively without help from Myanmar. And Myanmar has significant gas reserves in the Arakan region, which can be piped either to India or Southeast Asia. India can help in the exploration and development of these oil and natural gas fields. New Delhi has been anxious to improve its ties with Myanmar for some time as part of its strategy to contain China's increasing influence in Southeast Asia as a whole and in Myanmar in particular. China has since the late 1980s cultivated the military regime with the intention of turning the country into its satellite in the Indian Ocean. Of late, Myanmar has been apprehensive about the possibility of western sanctions over its human rights record, and is preparing to withstand them by strengthening economic ties with its neighbours (Jagan 2003). On the other hand, New Delhi's policy is based on the reasoning that it is better to engage Myanmar than to ostracise it. The security component remains an important factor in India-Myanmar ties. However, India is now concerned about the naval facilities being developed by Myanmar with Chinese assistance on Great Coco Island. The issue has been compounded by the fact that the island, strategically placed, was gifted by India to Myanmar during Nehru's days and is only eighteen kilometres away from the Nicobar Island. Another issue of concern is the setting up of a modern maritime reconnaissance and electronic intelligence system on the island, with which China can effectively monitor Indian military activities in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and the missile testing activity in Orissa (Kuppuswamy 2003). It is in response to this that India has set up a tri-services command in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The responsibility of the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) is to check the growing Chinese presence in the waters close to India. The ANC indicates India's force projection up to the Malacca Straits, with the capacity to protect and monitor sea traffic bound for the South China Sea. The ANC also signals India's capacity for monitoring the seas to its east and preventing narcotics smugglers and gun-runners from supplying weapons to India's strife-torn northeast. In this context, the importance that the US has attributed to India with regard to Southeast Asia has to be mentioned. It has realised that in the post–cold war period, the best way to promote regional security is to seek the cooperation of regional powers and partners (Cline 2001: 13–19). India may also want continued US presence so that regional stability is assured (Naidu 2000: 1740). In the aftermath of September 11 and the growing insurgencies of an anti-American nature originating in the region, the US has identified India as a potential partner. In May 2002, replying to a question in the Indian Parliament, Omar Abdullah (2002), the minister of state for external affairs, said that India and the US were engaged in the joint patrolling of the Straits of Malacca, which was being carried out on the basis of a request from the US. This represents not only a new dimension in cooperation between the two countries, but also signals India's emergence as a key player in the region and marks an important step in the Indian strategy of imparting an eastward thrust to its foreign policy.

Conclusion The orientation of India's foreign policy has undergone significant transformation in the post–cold war period. One important characteristic of this new orientation is the focus on areas previously neglected or accorded minimal importance. India's policy towards Southeast Asia during the cold war period was shaped by considerations of the East–West conflict, its differences of perception with countries of the region, and preoccupations elsewhere. All these prevented India from having a realistic and comprehensive policy towards the region. India's Look East policy is an attempt to rectify this neglect. Such a policy, first, takes into account the importance of economic issues in an era of globalisation and the necessity to engage with an area that is economically vibrant and fast growing. Second, India's new perspectives on security accord Southeast Asia considerable importance. The region is as much in its neighbourhood as the rest of South Asia, particularly with increased and multifarious cross-border interaction, combined with the advances in technology, transport and communication that have considerably reduced distances. External actors in Southeast Asia also influence India's policy. India may not be seeking to counterbalance China despite the fact that such a role has been ascribed to it. A judicious combination of economic engagement and safeguarding of security interests will help the sustainability of India's Look East policy.

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PART V Regional Cooperation in South Asia and the Indian Ocean

NINETEEN

South Asian Regional Cooperation: Problems and Prospects RAJEN HARSHE

he post–cold war phase in international relations has witnessed a distinctly discernible trend towards regionalism. With the trend growing in strength, a large number of states from different parts of the world are constituting themselves into regions to give fresh impetus to a wide variety of cooperative ventures based on regionalism. Regionalism, in general, has proved to be an effective device to promote economic and commercial cooperation among contemporary states. In the process, the old organisations are being recast and new organisations are being created to suit the changing global political context. The proliferation of diverse regional organisations like the European Union (EU), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) offers adequate evidence of this proposition. Thus, the trend towards regionalism is being espoused by developed as well as developing countries. In the light of this trend, it can be argued that India will be unable to perform its role as a global player without weaving a web of durable cooperative ties with its immediate neighbours. But the prospects of regional cooperation in South Asia will continue to be bleak unless constant constructive efforts are launched to resolve the various differences among the South Asian states. Keeping the imperative of regional cooperation as the backdrop, this essay attempts to relocate India in the context of South Asia. Such an exercise would initially take a critical overview of some of the major political problems between India and its neighbours, and later proceed to assess the significance of India's initiatives to promote a cooperative ambience in South Asia. However, before reflecting on the problems and prospects of regional cooperation in South Asia, it would be useful to make some preliminary observations regarding India's status in the region. These observations can provide a viable basis to appraise the inter-state relations within the South Asian region. Geographically, this region includes the states of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

T

Preliminary Observations It has often been easier to perceive South Asia as a region because of its colonial past. In fact, all the major states of this region including India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka were under the British imperial rule. Britain also controlled Myanmar, while Afghanistan was a buffer state between the British Indian empire and Czarist Russia, as also the Soviet Union. After establishing political control over almost the entire South Asian region, Britain opted to integrate the South Asian countries within its well spread-out network of trade and commercial ties. Imperialism invariably signifies an asymmetrical relationship of interdependence between the materially advanced and backward societies (Harshe 1997: 10). During colonial times, the countries in South Asia were vertically integrated into the international division of labour. This vertical link between the metropolitan power and the states in South Asia created a notion of the South Asian region during colonial times. In contrast, the postcolonial South Asian states would like to conceive a qualitatively different notion of South Asia as a viable region. These states are seeking to work out horizontal forms of interdependence amongst themselves in the process of constructing their notion of a South Asian region.

Any movement towards regional cooperation in South Asia is inconceivable without India's active participation because South Asia is predominantly an Indocentric region. India can easily identify itself with the religious, social and cultural systems of its neighbours due to the presence of obvious similarities. To give some obvious examples, Hinduism is common to both Nepal and India. Like Pakistan and Bangladesh, India has a sizable Muslim population. People of Tamil origin constitute a major ethnic minority in Sri Lanka, and Tamil-speaking people predominantly reside in the state of Tamilnadu in the Indian Union. Furthermore, in addition to the Bengali language the people of Bangladesh and those from the state of West Bengal in India are bound by a common cultural ethos. Likewise the people of Pakistan share the Urdu language with the Urdu-speaking people of India, and culturally there is much in common between Pakistani and Indian parts of Punjab. India has something in common with all its immediate neighbours but the neighbouring states of India do not share similarities of such magnitude or depth among themselves. South Asia can also be characterised as an Indocentric region due to India's overwhelmingly superior power in relation to its neighbours. A combination of some of the principal elements of national power including vast geographical size, a huge population, abundant natural and mineral resources, a wide and reasonably well-developed industrial base, an impressive reservoir of trained humanpower, the large size of the economy, nuclear weapon capability and a vibrant democracy have made India a hegemonic power in the region. The dominant position became obvious, especially after the disintegration of Pakistan and emergence of Bangladesh in 1971. Such dominance has contributed towards a divergence of perception regarding India's policies, between India and its neighbours. For instance, the strategic community in India tends to construe India's military interventions in the neighbouring countries in defensive terms. However, all the smaller and weaker neighbours of India have viewed such interventions in terms of the outward projection and demonstration of military might. India's military interventions in Bangladesh (1971), Sri Lanka (1987–90) and the Maldives (1988) have only added to the insecurity as well as fear of Indian hegemony among its neighbours. In view of its pervasively dominating position in South Asia, it can be convincingly argued that India constitutes the core while all its neighbours form the periphery of the South Asian region. Most often regional organisations are built around dominant core states. For instance, Iran, Nigeria and South Africa have been at the core of organisations like the ECO, ECOWAS and the SADC respectively. Being the dominant country of the region, India, in a substantial manner, could inevitably act as the core of organisations like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Now we shall proceed to analyse some of the substantive problems between India and its neighbours.

Ethnic Nationalities and Inter-state Ties The South Asian region, in the recent decades, has emerged as a theatre of ethnic tensions and rivalries. The question of Tamil minorities in Sri Lanka, perhaps, is the foremost of ethnic problems from the standpoint of India. Ever since Sri Lanka's independence, the people of Tamil ethnic origin living in north and northeast Sri Lanka have continuously experienced a sense of alienation due to the official policies. Indeed, the mainstream political parties dominated by the Sinhala-Buddhist majority have virtually controlled the various state organs in Sri Lanka since independence. However, the majority community, in general, and the successive Sri Lankan regimes, in particular, have not been adequately receptive to the demands of the Tamil minority. And it is this insensitivity of the majority community, towards the legitimate aspirations of minorities, that eventually inspired Tamil militants to launch a struggle for self-determination that entailed a separate state for the Tamils. In the anti-Tamil riots of Sri Lanka almost three thousand people lost their lives and more than a hundred and fifty thousand people of Tamil origin fled the island as refugees (Bose 1994: 209). Since the mid 1980s, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have relentlessly waged a war against the successive Sri Lankan regimes in their quest to attain independent statehood. This has inevitably disturbed the peace and stability in Sri Lanka and prompted India to take interest in the internal political developments of the island. India's interest in maintaining peace and stability in Sri Lanka has been shaped by a combination of factors that have evolved in the course of an on-going interaction between India and Sri Lanka. First, Sri Lanka is strategically located in the Indian Ocean region. The natural harbour of Trincomalee as well as the Palk straits have begun to enjoy growing significance in a world under the spell of globalisation. Being a

major power in South Asia, India has always endeavoured to forge closer trade and business links with Sri Lanka. Second, India has undoubtedly been concerned about the fate of the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka. It has often supported the legitimate aspirations of Tamils in Sri Lanka who fought for their citizenship rights. In order to get just and fair treatment, the Tamil population in Sri Lanka initially tried to achieve some sort of autonomy by invoking mechanisms of devolution of power under a federal arrangement. When the demand for autonomy failed to materialise the militant sections of the Tamil population opted to fight for outright independence (Bose 1994). Since the LTTE started waging a war against successive Sri Lankan governments, there has been an incessant flow of refugees from Sri Lanka to India. And India has had to take steps to reverse the flow of refugees, back to Sri Lanka. Finally, India has always been apprehensive about the intrusion of foreign powers such as China, Pakistan, Israel and the US in the affairs of the island. Therefore India is unlikely to permit foreign governments to establish a viable presence among its neighbours. For, the presence of any foreign power will affect India's long-term national interests. This attitude has been described as the 'Indira doctrine' by some observers and has been compared with the 'Monroe doctrine'. However, the so-called Indira doctrine need not be confused with the Monroe doctrine. There is very little in common between these two doctrines. The former, if at all it is a doctrine, stems from the geographical and cultural unity of South Asia whereas the latter doctrine was pressed into service by US imperial interests in the pursuit of maintaining control over the disparate cultural communities of Latin America (Tanham 1996: 5). In the light of these three factors it may be easier to appraise India's policy towards Sri Lanka. India's policy towards Sri Lanka traversed two different stages. Initially, Indira Gandhi showed sufficient sympathy towards the struggle of the Tamil population and the LTTE freedom-fighters found a sanctuary in Tamilnadu. But by 1987 the Jayawardhane regime of Sri Lanka, in a bid to resolve inter-ethnic tensions, had successfully brought India on its side by signing a peace treaty. India's urge to keep foreign powers out of the Sri Lankan crisis compelled it, as a regional gendarme, to promote peace and stability in the island. In retrospect, the operations of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) between 1987–90 could well be perceived as a major blunder in handling ties with neighbours. For, by deploying the IPKF, India chose to resolve an essentially political problem through military means. Though India has succeeded in the past in liberating Bangladesh from Pakistan by extending military support to the freedom-fighters. After providing covert support to the freedom-fighters, India offered de jure recognition to Bangladesh in 1971. Thus the decks were cleared for India's military intervention in Bangladesh. However, the circumstances in Bangladesh were qualitatively different from those prevailing in Sri Lanka. The former was geographically two thousand kilometres away from Pakistan. Further, an overwhelming majority of the population of Bangladesh had rallied around Sheikh Mujibur Rehman's Awami League to end Pakistani domination in Bangladesh. India's overall diplomatic offensive as well as the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 preceded its military intervention in the Bangladesh liberation movement. Through its military intervention India merely gave impetus to a massively popular political movement. In contrast to the liberation struggle in Bangladesh, the LTTE has been operating well within the geographical boundaries of Sri Lanka and successive Sri Lankan regimes have displayed adequate determination to control the secessionist forces on the island. Nevertheless by actively supporting the Sri Lankan government in its bid to meet the challenge posed by the LTTE, India lost on two counts. On the one hand, the Tamil population in Sri Lanka by and large became increasingly apprehensive about and even allergic towards the role of the Indian military; and on the other hand, a sizable proportion of the Sinhalese population became critical of India's hegemonic designs over the island. Capitalising on the antiIndia sentiments among the Sinhalese, a political party like the Janata Vimukti Perumana (JVP) was able to consolidate its position in Sri Lankan politics. India's military intervention and the unceremonious retreat of the IPKF in 1990 drove home the point that the problem of the Tamil minority needs to be resolved with politico-diplomatic rather than military efforts. India has evidently been placed in a precarious position in terms of handling the question of Tamil minorities on the politico-diplomatic front. The prevailing norms of international relations prevent India from interfering in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka. At the same time, the demand of the Tamil people for a separate state is no longer an internal affair of Sri Lanka. The crisis within the Sri Lankan polity has resulted in a flood of refugees in Tamilnadu and adversely affected the interests of fishing communities in India. And the protracted war in Sri Lanka has caused and will continue to cause a drain on India's economy. Under the prevailing conditions, India can neither support the Sri Lankan government nor the LTTE wholeheartedly. By supporting one of the contending parties India will only aggravate tensions, thereby delaying the settlement of

the problem. Besides, India has also been facing the threat of secessionist forces in Kashmir and the Northeast. It has to be doubly cautious in its policy towards secessionist movements in other states. Any proactive stance adopted by India on the internal affairs of its neighbours can attract undue attention from Pakistan and China. At this juncture, India can plausibly make efforts to bring the contending parties in Sri Lanka to the negotiating table. It can wait and gauge the impact of the on-going Norwegian initiatives towards the cessation of hostilities between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. The problem of ethnic nationalities has also affected Indo-Nepalese relations. For instance, the people of Indian origin in Nepal are uncomfortable with the treatment meted out to them by the Nepalese government, whereas some sections of the people of Nepalese origin in India have been sympathetic towards the demand for Gorkhaland. Under Subhash Gheisingh's leadership, the Gorkha people have been struggling to carve out a place for themselves within the Indian Union by promoting their demand for Gorkhaland through sustained agitation. The people of Nepalese origin in Bhutan have also been allegedly backing the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) morally as well as materially. Finally, the flow of Chakma refugees from Bangladesh to the Northeastern states of India has continued to sour ties between India and Bangladesh. In fact, the migrants from Bangladesh had come to India before 1971. Those who migrated after 1971 came primarily as economic refugees and spread themselves in different parts of India including the states of Tripura, Nagaland, West Bengal and Gujarat, and metropolitan cities like New Delhi and Mumbai. The presence of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh has created problems in the domestic politics of India due to their sizable numbers.1 The growth of Tripura as a Bengali- majority state and the agitation in Assam against the influence of alien (Bengali) population, during the 1980s, are cases in point. The Shiv Sena–BJP alliance has also been protesting against illegal Bangladeshi immigrants in Mumbai. The governments as well as people in South Asia will have to launch sustained confidence building measures to resolve the widespread problem concerning ethnic minorities and refugees in the subcontinent. At times, these problems tend to become more acute owing to unresolved problems of border demarcation

Unresolved Border Problems and the BJP-led Regime Foreign policies begin at the borders. This age-old dictum could well be kept in mind while appraising interstate relations in South Asia, especially those between India and Pakistan. Since the partition of the subcontinent, India and Pakistan have not been able to draw a mutually acceptable frontier between themselves. India is also yet to resolve the problem of delineating a mutually satisfactory frontier with Bangladesh. After the Bharatiya Janata party (BJP)-led coalition government's advent to power in 1998 the question of redefining India's borders as well as strengthening the security forces at the borders acquired added importance. After the Pokhran-II explosions of May 1998, the BJP-led government assumed a fairly jingoistic stance. Subsequently, the Vajpayee regime chose to build bridges with Pakistan with bus diplomacy in 1999 that opened road traffic from Delhi to Lahore. In July 2001, the Vajpayee regime chose to engage General Pervez Musharraf, the Pakistani president, in a dialogue at Agra to resolve the outstanding issues between the two countries. Due to lack of agreement over the Kashmir issue the dialogue virtually failed. Moreover, issues such as Kashmir, unresolved land and maritime frontiers, and the status of Muslim minorities in India have acquired mammoth proportions over half a century. These issues are unlikely to get resolved in the short run. In fact, apprehensions in Pakistan about the BJP-led regime have some historical basis, for the BJP has been quite closely associated with the Sangh Parivar. And some of the high priests of the Sangh Parivar like Guru Golwalkar, who represented rightwing Hindu nationalist groups, were hostile towards partition. Also the BJP and the Sangh Parivar believe in the non-appeasement of Muslims in India. They support the institution of a uniform civil code, the abrogation of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution on Kashmir and the aspirations to build a Ram Mandir in Ayodhya, hurting the sensibilities of Muslims in India. However, as the dominant party within the coalition formed by the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) from 1999, the BJP kept these controversial items of its agenda on the backburner. Nevertheless, Pakistan's Islamic orientation and religio-cultural affinity with the Muslim minorities in India compelled the BJP and the Sangh Parivar to view the status of Muslim minorities with serious concern. Such concern often prompted the Sangh Parivar to suspect the fidelity of Muslims towards India. The Sangh Parivar believes that any extra-territorial

loyalties, especially those of the Indian Muslims, will eventually jeopardise India's security. And the Sangh Parivar, in general, has always thrived on the mistaken notion that only its concern for India's security is genuine! Under the stewardship of L.K. Advani, as home minister, the government was determined to contain the activities of Pakistan-sponsored terrorists throughout the country. Since the 1990s the subversive activities of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan have increased enormously in their range and depth. Pakistan-sponsored terrorism has severely dislocated the normal lives of the Kashmiri people. Although the government has been reiterating its unwavering commitment to resolving the Kashmir issue, the Kashmir question has by now become complex enough to escape any facile solution.

The Kashmir Problem Revisited Kashmir continues to be a central and, perhaps, a perennial bone of contention between India and Pakistan. Pakistan, ever since its birth, has aggressively staked its claims over Kashmir. To examine the validity of such claims a peep into the history of the formation of Pakistan is essential. Pakistan emerged as a unique entity in the history of nation-states. To begin with, it was being constituted fundamentally on the basis of religion. Thus regions which had predominantly Muslim populations sprang up as natural candidates to form Pakistan. Initially the founding fathers of Pakistan conceived of it by separating the western, the eastern and the southern parts of the subcontinent. However, the plans to carve out the southern wing of Pakistan through the state of Hyderabad were convincingly shattered when the Government of India under Sardar Patel's leadership integrated the state of Hyderabad, ruled by the Nizam, with the Indian Union. Second, Pakistan, unlike most contemporary nation-states, was created as a geographically noncontiguous state. Its western and eastern parts were separated by almost two thousand kilometres. Naturally, apart from religion there was little in common between these two parts. In fact, owing to the obvious linguistic and cultural differences between the two parts it was difficult to bring about the national integration of Pakistan. Third, and as a corollary, to ensure the survival of Pakistan the ruling elite in Pakistan actively propagated the myth of the Hindu majority in India having aggressive designs on Pakistan. In the process, Islam as a bond of affinity was deployed to unify Muslims from the two wings of Pakistan. In fact, antiIndianism was an important plank to keep Pakistan together. Finally, Pakistan reconciled itself to the integration of Junagadh and Hyderabad with India with some protest but it fiercely opposed the integration of Kashmir with the Indian Union. Apart from its predominantly Muslim population, the possession of Kashmir was important for Pakistan due to security considerations.

Strategic Significance of Kashmir In the context of the cold war, the territory of Kashmir enjoyed enhanced strategic significance. It shared common frontiers with states such as India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, China and the Soviet Union. Even after the cold war, thanks to its location, Kashmir has become a gateway to South, Southwest and Central Asia. Kashmir is inevitably affected by certain major trends in these regions. These trends include the flow of arms and drugs, the growth of cross-border terrorism and the advent of a host of fundamentalist movements promoting Islam. In fact, territories like Kashmir will always be enormously significant, in times of war as well as peace, due to their location. However, the peacetime significance of Kashmir has seldom been tested because the fate of the Kashmiri people has been hanging in the balance since the 1940s. During all these years, the people of Kashmir have had to constantly think in terms of three alternatives – joining Pakistan, remaining in India and attaining independent statehood – to settle their future.2 However, as time has progressed Kashmir has become a hotly contested area between Pakistan and India; and in the process, the aspirations and anxieties of the people of Kashmir have almost been forgotten by the contending adversaries.

Pakistan's Perceptions and Policy on Kashmir From Pakistan's standpoint India's occupation of Kashmir has been illegal because India has held on to Kashmir without going through the plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations. Paradoxically, it was

the Nehru regime in India which ventured to introduce the Kashmir question in the UN in 1948. To garner support for its position on Kashmir, Pakistan initially turned to the Muslim world and later obtained US military assistance (Gupta 1981: 88–110). In 1953, the US stepped into subcontinent politics by providing weapons worth $1.5 billion for ten years to Pakistan. In the context of the cold war, the US was cultivating Pakistan along with Iran, Iraq and Turkey as a part of its Northern Tier strategy, which aimed at encircling the Soviet Union with the US allies. What is more, Pakistan continued to be a significant US ally to counter the Soviet Union as the latter invaded Afghanistan in 1979. To counter the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan the US offered $2.36 billion worth of armaments to Pakistan during 1979–1988 (Harrison 1997). In addition to US support, Pakistan took advantage of the growing Sino-Indian rivalry after the 1962 war between the two countries and sought Chinese support on Kashmir. China also provided assistance to Pakistan in its missile programmes. The growing Sino-Pak friendship only underscored the importance of Kashmir to India. For, by holding on to Kashmir, India could continue to press its claims over the Aksai Chin region of Ladakh and ward off any threats to Punjab. Conversely, as Ramesh Thakur has put it, the loss of all of Kashmir would deprive Pakistan of a land link with its most important Asian ally and threaten its presence in strategically vital regions on the borders of Afghanistan and China (1994: 35). Apart from gathering support from major world powers like the US and China, Pakistan constantly exploited the discontent among the Kashmiri people vis à vis the successive central governments in India. During the 1980s it went as far as to prop up diverse terrorist outfits in Kashmir in the hope of stagemanaging the eventual secession of Kashmir from the Indian Union (Ganguly 1996 and 1997). Such efforts were crowned with success in the late 1980s when the people of Kashmir experienced an acute sense of alienation from the government in New Delhi. The people in the valley rendered clandestine support to secessionist movements like the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). Pakistan could have struck a hard bargain on the Kashmir issue had it capitalised on India's weakness when the latter was going through an unprecedented economic crisis in 1991. However, India managed to sail through adverse circumstances by meeting the challenges of the JKLF as well as Pakistan.

The Indian Response Indeed, India has also constantly ventured to swing the people of Kashmir on its side. By introducing Article 370 in the Indian Constitution the ruling classes in India conceded to give more autonomy to Kashmir than to the other Indian states. Similarly, Kashmir was made a part of India as it went through periodic elections held under the Indian Constitution. To counter US and later Chinese support to Pakistan, India banked on Soviet support at the UN Security Council. The Soviet veto at the Security Council continued to block any moves towards plebiscite on the Kashmir issue. India also obtained Soviet military assistance through various military cooperation agreements. Eventually India signed a twenty-year treaty of peace, cooperation and friendship with the Soviet Union in 1971 and ensured Soviet support for its policies on a long-term basis. With the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971, India began to enjoy a commanding position in the subcontinent. The Indo-Pak agreement of Shimla signed in 1972 tried to restrict the scope of the Kashmir issue by making it a matter of bilateral concern between the two countries. After the mid 1980s India began to lose its upper hand with regard to Kashmir as successive regimes in India attempted to control Kashmir from New Delhi in a centralised manner. In fact, the alliance between the Congress (I) and the National Conference of Kashmir, prior to the 1987 elections, had alienated Kashmiri Muslims in India (Sen Gupta 1996: 277–80). Then a new generation of politically conscious and assertive Kashmiris was rapidly mobilised against injustice, institutional decay and the increasing alienation of people from the rulers in New Delhi. Under these circumstances some disgruntled sections of the people in the valley went as far as to demand outright political independence from India. Indeed, the emotional bonds between the people of Kashmir and those inhabiting the rest of India were severed. Nevertheless, after the early 1990s India was able to steadily retrieve its hold over Kashmir by firmly handling the terrorists, on the one hand, and by holding elections in Kashmir, on the other hand. The unleashing of the electoral process has by now coopted the elite in the management of the government at the state level. It has also blunted the sharp edges of the terrorist outfits. However, the government has yet to initiate effective measures to rehabilitate Kashmiri Pundits who have fled from Kashmir due to the insecurity unleashed by terrorism. And human rights groups

have been attempting to protect the rights of Kashmiri people against state terrorism. Evidently, maximum transparency is required on the part of the state to win over the confidence of an intrinsically plural Kashmiri society characterised by enmeshed ethnic and religious social identities. For instance, there are Hindus as well as Muslims in the Dogra and Pahari communities, while Ladakhis include the people of Hindu and Buddhist faiths. The government in New Delhi will also have to be more receptive to the ethnic and religious complexities of Kashmiri society, to manage democratic governance in Kashmir. In this context, allegiance to India need not be treated as allegiance to the existing government (Harshe 2001: 29–30). India has always regarded Kashmir as an indissoluble part of itself. At one level the issue of Kashmir is at the heart of the very being of India. If the right of self-determination is conceded to the people of Kashmir, it might inspire several other states, especially those in the Northeast, to demand the same right. Also, if Kashmir becomes independent, the very secular social fabric of India might be destroyed owing to the spiral of communal tensions that it is likely to generate (Cheema 1991). To put it simply, Pakistan would be unwilling to be flexible on its present position regarding Kashmir. In fact, Pakistan's support to terrorist outfits that masterminded the hijacking of the Indian Airlines flight no. 814, in December 1999, from Kathmandu to New Delhi, and the daring but unsuccessful attempt to blow up the Indian parliament on 13 December 2001, further worsened the prospects of resolution of the Kashmir issue. If Pakistan continues to insist on resolving the Kashmir issue before normalising its relations with India, the two countries will move inevitably towards a deadlock. For, India will not be ready to resolve the Kashmir question on the terms and conditions set by Pakistan. Compared to this conflict with Pakistan, India's border problem with Bangladesh is manageable.

India–Bangladesh Border The interdependence between India and Bangladesh in sheer geo-political terms has been substantial. Bangladesh shares a frontier with India on three sides and the Indian navy virtually commands the waves of the Bay of Bengal. Similarly, India has always been interested in transit routes through Bangladesh for the quicker and cheaper movement of its people from the state of West Bengal to the Northeast. Both India and Bangladesh paid little attention to the border problem even though the Indo-Bangladesh agreement of 1975 had conceived the idea of fencing the frontier. As a consequence of anti-alien agitation in Assam during the 1980s the Indira Gandhi regime, in 1983, formally began to work on the idea of fencing roughly two thousand kilometres of the frontier with Bangladesh.3 However, the border was poorly delineated. It ran through villages, houses, markets and the middle of a river. To fence such a border would be a very difficult task. To add fuel to the fire, India and Bangladesh had granted exclusive fishing rights in some places to each other's citizens, in unusual agreements signed in alternate years (Thakur 1994: 182). There was also the problem of adverse possessions, which implied that the territory may belong to one country but traditionally it had been cultivated by the citizens of the other country. In substance, fencing almost sprang up as poor military-type solution to a demographic problem. The BJP, while in the opposition, began to make political capital out of interrelated issues like the poorly delineated border and the flow of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. Since the illegal immigrants were voting for the established parties, the BJP began to fight on the anti-immigrant plank, thereby raising its share of votes in Assam as well as West Bengal. The BJP viewed Hindu immigrants from Bangladesh as refugees while Muslim immigrants were infiltrators.4 It also tried to exploit the issue of Tin Bigha to its own advantage. The Tin Bigha corridor is roughly one hundred and eighty metres by eighty-five metres. Leasing the corridor out to Bangladesh created a 5000–strong Hindu enclave of Kuchlibari, cut off from the rest of India. Naturally, the BJP rose to champion the cause of the Hindu population of the Kuchlibari enclave in order to display its concerns for affected Hindus in general.5 However, after assuming power the BJP opted to play a more reconciliatory role towards Bangladesh. For instance, the attack on the Border Security Forces (BSF) of India by the Bangladesh armed forces and the death of sixteen BSF men in April 2001 invoked a measured response from the Indian government. Further, the Indian government took steps to curb the support from Bangladesh to insurgencies in the Northeastern states. Having discussed some of the main problems in inter-state ties, it will be easier now, to dwell upon the

prospects of inter-state cooperation in South Asia.

Prospects of Cooperation Any worthwhile project of regional cooperation would have certain prerequisites. To begin with, countries which aim at cooperation must have the will to pursue peaceful ties. Even die-hard enemies like France and Germany had to enter a phase of rapprochement before working out an arrangement towards the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. Politically, factors such as the threat of US domination as well as Soviet expansion had brought France and Germany closer. In the process, they chose to promote mechanisms of interdependence through European unity movements to consolidate and further strengthen their respective positions in world politics. However, unlike the successful experiments of regional cooperation such as the erstwhile EEC or the EU, the SAARC countries lack a peaceful environment. They are constrained to build notions of cooperation in the shadow of protracted conflicts between India and Pakistan. The ambition of both these states to build nuclear capabilities has further aggravated tensions in the region. Moreover, the economies of the SAARC countries are competitive and not complementary. In substance, all these countries produce and export primary goods and import sophisticated manufactured products from the advanced industrialised countries. Obviously, the vertical trade and commercial links between the advanced industrialised countries of North America and West Europe, and the SAARC countries, are far stronger than the horizontal links between the SAARC states.6 For instance, the US, countries of the European Union and Japan together are the largest trading partners of the SAARC countries, accounting for more than fifty per cent of the total trade. Furthermore, a substantial portion, i.e. forty per cent of the trade of SAARC countries, is with the APEC region, including China. In contrast, the South Asian countries formally do not trade with each other. As a share of the total exports of South Asia, intra-regional trade amounts to no more than three per cent (Bank 1998). In view of the above mentioned dismal trade within the South Asian region, efforts at the tenth SAARC summit, concluded at Colombo in July 1998, to promote the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) can be perceived as a welcome step. A free trade area would offer the benefits of economies of scale and induce producers from individual countries to be more competitive and efficient. Moreover, the formation of a free trade area is quite likely to prompt outsiders to set up production facilities within the region to avoid discriminatory trade barriers imposed on non-union products (Bank 1998). India played a positive role towards the promotion of regional trade in South Asia at the Colombo summit. It took a bold step in removing quantitative restrictions on two thousand commodities. India is also keen on promoting an investor friendly environment in order to improve its overall economic performance. In fact, if India and Pakistan are able to reduce tensions in their bilateral interactions through a process of sustained dialogue as well as fruitful negotiations, the entire South Asian region will be able to concentrate its attention on the developmental activities. In this context the Gujral doctrine might appear increasingly relevant.

Relevance of the Gujral Doctrine The Gujral doctrine essentially believes in following a policy of non-reciprocity towards neighbouring states, with the idea of accommodating their interests. It has been premised on the fact that being the most powerful state in South Asia, India needs to play a conciliatory and accommodative role vis à vis its neighbours in the larger interest of maintaining peace and stability in the region. Such a policy, in its turn, can provide a visible base to promote diverse cooperative endeavours at bilateral as well as multilateral levels among the South Asian states. During Gujral's tenure as both foreign minister and prime minister (1996–98), the Gujral doctrine virtually became the basis to promote cooperative ties between India and its neighbours. We shall proceed to highlight some of India's achievements during that period. To start with, a 30–year treaty to share Ganga water took effect from 1 January 1997 between India and Bangladesh. Ganga water began to flow from four sides.7 Likewise, India signed a treaty with Nepal in 1996 to share the water of the Mahakali river. Despite several apprehensions at the Nepalese end the treaty can be

operative in the near future if the two governments resolve their bilateral problems through negotiations. The projects of sharing river waters as well as development of barrages between India and its neighbours would link them in the network of interdependence to pursue developmental objectives in the area of agrarian production. Apart from the linkages through the rivers, India supported an initiative to establish a road link between Nepal and Bangladesh through a 161-kilometre transit route. The route goes from Kakarbita in Nepal to Phulbari in India, then into Bangladesh. This would allow Nepal to trade through the Chittagong part of Bangladesh. Similarly, India has long been looking for a route via Bangladesh to its Northeastern states. Such transit routes would drastically reduce transport costs. However, such routes can be made operative, effectively, only through cordial inter-state and inter-societal ties. Being a landlocked state, Nepal has always been dependent on the transit routes provided by India. Taking advantage of such dependence, India could well control the activities of the ISI agents operating from Nepal. It also needs to be underscored that linkages through infrastructure between India and its neighbours can give a boost to intra-regional trade. In its own way, India took constructive measures to promote intra-regional trade. For instance, in order to promote the idea of a South Asian Preferential Trade Area (SAPTA), India offered tariff concessions on 500 consumer goods from least developed countries. Consequently Bangladesh was able to sell goods like textile or leather items with a decreased duty of almost fifty per cent. Thus, increasing exports from Bangladesh was an important step towards trade liberalisation.8 Like Bangladesh, India also ventured to pursue cordial economic relations with Sri Lanka. To start with, India signed an investment promotion agreement with Sri Lanka on 21 January 1997. The Gujral regime unilaterally reduced tariff to remove all non–tariff barriers on 72–80 products exported from Sri Lanka to India. And finally India also offered financial assistance to Sri Lanka to rectify the trade imbalance between the two countries and to rehabilitate the Sri Lankans who have been the victims of domestic civil war.9 Thus, the Gujral doctrine was quite successful in promoting a cooperative environment in South Asia. It also initiated a dialogue with Pakistan on all the important issues, including Kashmir, to bring about cordiality between the two countries. The network of cooperative ties among South Asian states has to spread much wider to encompass a wide range of issues including trade, joint ventures, investments, rural development, sharing of information technology, prevention of environmental degradation, spread of basic education and population control. In addition, the countries in South Asia will be constrained to combat, collectively, the problems related to cross-border terrorism and the flow of arms and drugs. Hopefully, the people-to-people contacts at the sociocultural level through the democratic regimes in all the South Asian states will facilitate the desperately required cooperative environment in the region. In view of the growing imperative for regional cooperation, India will be constrained to curb tendencies to adopt hawkish stances that bring about inevitable discord among the states of the region.

Conclusion Considering the growing trend towards regionalism in international relations, it would be appropriate for India to initiate a diverse range of cooperative measures with its neighbours, to help build the SAARC as a viable forum for regional cooperation. However, problems posed by ethno-nationalities as well as inter-state borders within the region are virtually acting as stumbling blocks to the promotion of any cooperative venture. Perhaps it is possible for India to strike chords of friendship with all its neighbours except Pakistan. In fact, the continued tensions between India and Pakistan have persistently marred the prospects of cooperation within the region. The Kashmir question has not merely attracted international attention but has made intrusive powers like the US, China and the erstwhile Soviet Union important actors in determining the landscape of inter-state ties within South Asia. The continued deadlock over the Kashmir issue has aggravated the arms race between India and Pakistan. Such a race, unfortunately, has also acquired a nuclear dimension now. Though these two countries have already fought four wars in the past, they are still not convinced of diverting the available resources – scarce resources – towards developmental purposes. Being geographically contiguous states, India and Pakistan will have to live with each other. Hence they will have to work out modes of peaceful and cooperative coexistence instead of facing the choice of co-destruction. In this context, the significance of bilateral dialogues and negotiations, at different governmental and non-governmental levels, can hardly be overestimated. The process of fruitful negotiations would inevitably brighten prospects

of cooperation between the two countries. Likewise, the relevance of the Gujral doctrine should not be undermined when India opts to forge cooperative ties with its neighbours.

References Bank, Arandinam. 1998. SAFTA: A Welcome Step. The Economic Times, 1 August. Biswas, Soutik and Farzan Ahmed. 1993. Migrants Tinder-box. India Today, May 15. Bose, Sumantra. 1994. States, Nations, Sovereignty: Sri Lanka, India and The Tamil Eelam Movement. New Delhi: Sage. Cheema, Parvaiz Iqbal. 1991. Security in South Asia: An Approach. South Asia journal 4(3): 281–92. Ganguly, Sumit. 1996. Uncertain India. Current History 95(600): 145–50. ——. 1997. An Opportunity for Peace in Kashmir. Current History 96(614): 414–18. Ghosh, Partha S. 1998. Illegal Immigration from Bangladesh. The Hindu, 11 August. Gupta, Sisir. 1967. Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations. Bombay: Asia Publishing House. ——. 1981. Islam as a factor in Pakistani Foreign Relations. In India and International System: Selections from the Major Writings of Sisir Gupta, eds. M.S. Rajan and Shivaji Ganguly. 88–110. New Delhi: Vikas. Harrison, Selig S. 1997. The United States and South Asia: Trapped by the past? Current History 96(614): 401–06. Harshe, Rajen. 1997. Twentieth Century Imperialism. New Delhi: Sage. ——. 2001. Understanding Conflicts in South Asia. In Intra and Inter-State Conflicts in South Asia, ed. Sudhir Jacob George. 19–33. New Delhi: South Asian Publishers. Kushwaha, G.S. and P.K. Sen. 1995–96. Emerging Patterns of India's Trade in S.A.A.R.C. Indian journal of Nepalese Studies 5 and 6. Special Issue. 16–22. Sen Gupta, Bhabani. 1996. India: Problems of Governance. New Delhi: Konark. Tanham, George. 1996. Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretative Essay. In Securing India: Strategic Thought and Practice in an Emerging Power, eds. Kanti Bajpai et al. 28–111. New Delhi: Manohar. Thakur, Ramesh. 1994. The Politics and Economics of India's Foreign Policy. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

TWENTY

The Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation: Regional Cooperation in the Indian Ocean K.R. SINGH

he Indian Ocean is the only ocean which has witnessed regional interaction since the dawn of civilisation. The only other comparable maritime region, the Mediterranean, is a small land locked sea, which, in a way, has also been closely interlinked with the Indian Ocean in matters of trade and cultural interaction. The Indian Ocean has also interacted with the Pacific. Thus, over a period of time, it has evolved not only as a zone of bilateral and multilateral interaction among its widespread littoral, hinterland and island groups, but also as a major link in the chain of South–South interaction extending from the Mediterranean in the west to the Pacific in the east.

T

This commercial and even civilisational interaction suffered a major setback after Vasco da Gama ignored the traditional route and rounded Africa via the Atlantic Ocean to establish a direct sea route between South and Southeast Asia and the Atlantic littoral of Europe. Over the years, other Europeans followed. By the first half of the nineteenth century, the Europeans had not only dominated trade and commerce in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific regions but were also beginning to impose their political and military hegemony. It had disastrous results for the indigenous people. It not only resulted in political dominance but also destroyed the entire fabric of the socioeconomic system of the region. Above all, the new North–South linkages replaced the traditional South–South linkages. These persist even today. Despite the process of political decolonisation, the effects of the Vasco da Gama era linger even after five centuries. Regional and global environments underwent structural readjustments after World War II. On the one hand, the changes ushered in the process of political decolonisation, thereby offering the opportunity to the newly liberated people to try and forge new South–South linkages. The post–World War II era also witnessed the consolidation of the cold war. Though the conflict between the western mode of capitalism and socialism had become a fact after the consolidation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) during the interwar period, this ideological cold war took a virulent political and military turn after World War II. That gave rise to a new form of regionalism at the global level, that was primarily based on interlinked military pacts like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Central Treaty Organisation (or Baghdad Pact), South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), Australia, New Zealand, United States pact (ANZUS) and the US–Japan treaty that confronted the Warsaw Pact and the Sino-Soviet friendship (at least till 1962). The newly independent states of the Indian Ocean region either joined the new alliance systems or sought to be partners in the alternative Non-aligned Movement (NAM).

Regional Response: Cold War Phase While attempts were made to bring together the newly emerging forces in the Indian Ocean region, through the Asian Relations Conference and the Bandung Conference, these efforts did not focus on the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean became the focus of the littoral states, especially those belonging to the NAM, after 1962–63 when they sought to contain the growing superpower military presence, particularly nuclear-weapon related presence, in the Indian Ocean by asking that the ocean be declared a peace zone. The move was initiated by Bandaranaike of Sri Lanka in the Cairo Conference in October 1964. The matter was pursued with great vigour at the Lusaka Conference in September 1970. Finally, the efforts of the NAM led to the

passing of the oft-quoted General Assembly resolution (A/2832) of 16 December 1971 that called for the establishment of a peace zone in the Indian Ocean. This effort at regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean during the phase of the cold war suffered due to two major limitations. First, though outwardly some Afro-Asian littoral states voted for the United Nations resolution, they were directly or indirectly partners in the superpower politico-military alliance systems in the region. Second, the NAM, despite its rhetoric on South–South cooperation, could never succeed in providing effective economic content to its policy. The net result was that while the political thrust of the peace zone resolution was gradually whittled down, the North–South linkages – both strategic and economic – were further strengthened despite the process of political decolonisation. This period also witnessed intra- regional tensions and conflicts. Obviously such an environment did not favour regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean per se. In the 1970s and the 1980s, one also witnessed a new trend that led to the grouping of like-minded states, most often pro-western, in a given regional sub-system. These new regional arrangements were generally outside the context of the ideological cold war. Though initially the rationale for these groups was projected as cooperation for economic development, soon many of these sub-regional groups developed political and strategic linkages. Thus, the Indian Ocean area was further subdivided into mutually exclusive sub-systems like the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO), South African Development Community (SADC) etc.

Impact of the End of the Cold War The end of the cold war, and more so, the disintegration of the Soviet Union as a countervailing superpower, brought about some basic restructuring in the international order that had far-reaching impact upon the Indian Ocean region as well. The so-called triumph of the western alliance system over that led by the Soviet Union was also projected as a victory of free market economy—a euphemism for capitalism. The disintegration of the Soviet Union deprived many of the developing states of the South of an alternative to the industrialised North. Now these states had to depend wholly upon the West—the prime reason why many of them had to open up their economy, often under duress, to the North. It will not be wrong to say that the move towards the formation of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) partly reflected the ethos of the new post–cold war world order. There were also other factors that favoured a new spurt towards regional cooperation with the Indian Ocean as the main arena. The end of the cold war and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union, in a way, freed India, a non-aligned state, from the imposed image of a pro-Soviet state. That helped to rehabilitate India, especially in Southeast Asia. India was no longer projected as a pro-Soviet and 'hegemonic' power, to be kept isolated in the Indian Ocean region. India had also reoriented its economic policy and its new political elite was more than willing to liberalise the country's economy. This change in policy coupled with a growing middle class and the rising tide of consumerism made India an ideal target for the North. All these developments in the 1990s also enabled India to dovetail its policies with that of the members of the ASEAN and SADC. Another major factor that favoured regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean was the basic change in South Africa. The termination of the apartheid policy ended South Africa's isolation in the Afro-Asian world. South Africa, under the new leadership of Nelson Mandela was welcomed as a major partner in regional cooperation. All these factors paved the way for the new drive towards economic integration in the Indian Ocean region.

Backdrop of the IOR Initiative The Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) initiative after 1993 was not the first such initiative. Two major initiatives in that direction had been launched in the 1980s. The idea of an Indian Ocean Community (IOC) was floated in 1983. It was largely a French initiative with its headquarters in Mauritius. It was, however, confined to a few

states of the western Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean Maritime Affairs Cooperation (IOMAC) was largely the result of an Australian initiative. It had wider participation and included members from even beyond the Indian Ocean. The IOMAC was formally launched from Colombo in 1987. Both these efforts failed largely due to inadequate diplomatic preparation, the environment of the cold war, as well as regional distrust. India too had kept itself aloof from both initiatives, because of its diplomatic isolation in the region at that time and also because it did not wish to join what it considered to be western initiatives. The changed environment after the end of the cold war, however, proved to be more conducive for regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean. New initiatives were launched in November 1993 by Pik Botha, foreign minister of South Africa, who put forward a proposal for convening a conference of the states of the Indian Ocean in Durban in August 1994 to discuss ways and means to improve trade ties. It was an attempt to integrate South Africa in the Indian Ocean region. But Botha was probably not the right person to evoke a positive response, even from India. The visit of Nelson Mandela to India in January 1995, however, helped to modify India's perception, and thus smoothened the path towards the IOR initiative. The first concrete step in that direction was taken when the seven states of the region met in Mauritius during 29–31 March 1995. These seven states – Australia, Singapore, India, Oman, Kenya, South Africa and Mauritius – were supposed to represent seven sub-systems of the Indian Ocean region. The new aspect of diplomacy associated with this initiative towards regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean was the emphasis upon the so-called track-two policy in which informal non-official meetings were held, along with the formal official- level deliberations. And the deliberations of both were dovetailed when reaching the final decision. These informal meetings were attended by the representatives of business groups, retired diplomats and people belonging to the academia. The Mauritius meeting concentrated primarily upon economic matters. It emphasised economic cooperation among a few like-minded states of the Indian Ocean region with the objective of stimulating intra-regional trade and investment, and synergising competitive advantages in commodities, manufacture and service sectors, to collect, classify and distribute data and information and to help establish an IOR members network. Thus, the focus was primarily on economic matters. Political and strategic issues were consciously excluded. Australia, which had been seeking to promote its own version of Indian Ocean regional cooperation since the 1980s, as in the case of the IOMAC, also held a conference at Perth during 11–13 June 1995. Unlike the Mauritius meeting, which had the official stamp despite its track-two diplomacy, the Perth meeting was unofficial. The myth was propagated that even 'officials' had attended in their unofficial capacity. Besides these unofficial officials, business people, retired diplomats and the members of the academia were also present. Twenty-three states of the Indian Ocean region were represented in the Perth meeting. The Perth meeting represented primarily track-two diplomacy though both the Mauritius and the Perth initiatives developed structural linkages. Unlike the Mauritius initiative, the Perth initiative had a wider membership of twenty-three states and also a more comprehensive agenda that included economic and fiscal matters, social, political and strategic issues, as well as maritime issues dealing with the Indian Ocean per se—which the Mauritius group had virtually ignored. A closer scrutiny of the Perth agenda revealed its close parallel to the IOMAC programme. Some participants, particularly from India, unsuccessfully tried to restrict the debate to economic matters. The Perth initiative, though formally unofficial, led to the Australian government promising seed money of 650,000 Australian dollars for a period of three years for the creation of an Indian Ocean Centre at Perth. Also, three institutions, the International Forum on Indian Ocean Region (IFIOR), the Indian Ocean Rim Consultative Business Network (IOR-CBN) and the Indian Ocean Research Network (IORNET) were proposed, mostly as non-governmental initiatives. Their findings and recommendations were to be forwarded to the inter-governmental body at Mauritius for consideration. Thus, the Perth conference institutionalised the second track of the initiative, which was subsequently incorporated in the IOR-ARC Charter in 1997. Since the Mauritius initiative had official blessings, its deliberations, duly supported by the second track, paved the way for the evolution of the IOR-ARC. The Mauritius group of seven states, having noted that there was a degree of consensus among its members, decided to give a more concrete shape to the initiative. A working group composed of members of all the seven sponsoring states was constituted to formulate a

charter, and chalk out a future work programme as well as the composition of future membership. In these deliberations the Mauritius group was to consider proposals forwarded to it through track-two diplomacy, especially unofficial institutions like the IOR-CBN and IORNET, created after the Perth meeting of June 1995. The working group met at Port Louis during 15–17 August 1995. Among other things, it recommended that the membership be expanded from seven to fourteen countries. The following new members were suggested—Indonesia and Malaysia from Southeast Asia, Sri Lanka from South Asia, Yemen from Southwest Asia, and Tanzania, Madagascar and Mozambique from Southern Africa. The IOR-CBN and IORNET also held their meetings in New Delhi in December 1995, under the sponsorship of the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), and forwarded their proposals and recommendations to the Mauritius working group for consideration. The working group, in its meeting on 9 September 1996 finalised the details which were then discussed in the inter-governmental meeting held at Mauritius during 10–11 September 1996. All fourteen states participated in it. The charter was also finalised and recommended for formal approval. A work programme of ten projects was adopted for future implementation. These details were formally adopted when the foreign ministers of fourteen states met in Mauritius during 5–7 March 1997. A new regional programme for economic cooperation was formally launched in the Indian Ocean. The IOR-ARC became a reality.

The IOR-ARC The IOR-ARC Charter very clearly underlines the nature and scope of the regional cooperation that it envisages in the Indian Ocean region. Noting the fact that the region is not as yet a cohesive group, the charter stresses that the IOR-ARC seeks to build and expand understanding and mutually beneficial cooperation through a consensus-based evolutionary and non- intrusive approach. It also stresses that cooperation is to be based upon principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, non-interference in internal affairs, peaceful coexistence and mutual benefit. The charter clearly excludes bilateral and other issues likely to generate controversy and be impediments to regional cooperation. Membership is open to all the states of the region which are willing to subscribe to the principles as laid down in the charter. The charter also recognises that almost all the members of the IOR-ARC are members of other regional organisations. Hence, it explicitly states that the membership of the IOR-ARC does not prevent member states from being members of other economic cooperation organisations. The charter defines the scope of the activities of the IOR-ARC. Economic cooperation is accorded primacy. The focus is on those areas of economic cooperation that provide maximum opportunities to develop shared interests and reap mutual benefits. Towards that end, the IOR-ARC would seek to formulate and implement projects relating to the facilitation, promotion and liberalisation of trade, scientific and technological exchanges, tourism, movement of persons (especially the 'service providers') on a nondiscriminatory basis, and development of infrastructure and human resources. Most of these areas of regional cooperation are also emphasised in the work programmes of the IOR-ARC. The charter also formalises the integrative nature of track-two diplomacy. It recognises the inputs of nonofficial groups like the IOR Business Forum and the IOR Academic Group, which have been involved not only in the conceptualisation of the IOR initiative but also in the formulation and implementation of various projects. The charter represents a direct participation of the economic pressure groups in the formulation and even in the implementation of foreign policy, not only of individual states but also of the region. It will be interesting to watch how the 'privatisation' of foreign policy, especially foreign economic policy, works out at the regional level. There is no doubt that financial institutions, at least in India, are playing a major role in the IOR-ARC. In view of the role of track-two diplomacy, the IOR-ARC has succeeded in having a minimum of institutional mechanisms. Since the work programmes are by and large the responsibility of the second track, official institutions are limited to three bodies. They are—a council of ministers, a committee of senior officials and a small secretariat based in Mauritius. While senior officials and ministers are responsible for formal decisions and their implementation, the secretariat is entrusted with the task of coordination and

monitoring of the implementation of policies and work programmes. At present, the IOR-ARC has formalised ten work programmes that are to be coordinated among different members. The IOR-ARC is a newly formed group in an area that already has several well-knit sub-regional groups that also aim at economic cooperation. Hence the IOR-ARC will have to compete with them. The newly created organisation, however, has an advantage over these sub-regional groups because it enables member states to reach beyond the narrow confines of these sub-regional groups to interact meaningfully with other states in the Indian Ocean region based on an agreed programme. Thus, India can fruitfully interact with Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore without being a member of the ASEAN. It will, therefore, enable India to enlarge its field of economic interaction. India has substantial trade with IOR-ARC members, that amounted to about $7.342 billion in 1995–96. India had also attracted investment from these states to the tune of $2.29 billion till 1995. Though the value of India's joint ventures in the IOR-ARC countries is only $90 million, there is vast scope in that direction with the anticipated improvement in India's technological expertise and financial base. India is already providing technical transfer facilities, consultancy services and expertise to several member states. Indian financial institutions like the FICCI have been taking deep interest in the activities of the IORARC. The FICCI has undertaken to coordinate two components of the IOR Business Centre—the IOR Business Facilitation Centre (IOR-BFC) and the IORNET. The former will provide information so as to facilitate trade and investment, identify potential trade complementaries, etc. The IORNET will involve the setting up of an IOR website for providing an information service centre on the Internet. It will not only collect and disseminate information, but also coordinate match-making exercises between potential business partners, hold specialised seminars, publish a quarterly newsletter and promote research in the related field. The total cost of setting up IOR-BFC over two years is estimated to be about 6 million rupees, and is to be shared between the FICCI and the Government of India. The Indian Institute of Foreign Trade is coordinating a project dealing with the IOR-ARC chair and Associate Fellows. The project is an Indo-Mauritius initiative, which others might join. The total cost over the first two years is estimated to be about 4 million rupees. India is to share half of that. The Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) has formulated a proposal for an IOR Trade Fair to be organised once every two years. The National Council for Applied Economic Research (NCAER) and CII are also jointly coordinating the project dealing with investment facilitation and promotion. The project is to have two components—an investor forum and a research study focussing on investment with particular reference to textiles, telecom and tourism.

India and Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region There is no doubt that India is deeply involved in promoting the newly created IOR-ARC. These efforts must be supported to the extent possible. But the IOR-ARC does not and cannot signify the completion of India's policy in the Indian Ocean region. At best, it can only be one of the several means towards that end. It is important to place the newly created initiative in the overall perspective of India's Indian Ocean policy. That will mean defining two interrelated points—India's overall strategic objectives in the Indian Ocean region and the policies to be adopted to attain them. It is unfortunate that no systematic study has been done on this broader question that is of vital strategic concern for the country. The framers of India's foreign policy have till now highlighted only the subcontinental nature of India's neighbourhood. The SAARC is the logical outcome of that approach. Such a subcontinental approach to regional cooperation is inadequate. India, as a land power, is hemmed in at the north by the mighty Himalayas and is politically sandwiched between Pakistan and Bangladesh. Despite being a close neighbour, India is isolated from the ASEAN in Southeast Asia and the ECO in Southwest Asia. The geopolitical isolation can be broken only if India adopts a maritime perspective for its foreign policy, especially in the context of the Indian Ocean region. The waves provide the binding links and even the littoral and islands across the ocean become next-door neighbours. India's central location in the Indian Ocean favours that type of neighbourhood approach. Thus, while the subcontinental approach tends to contain

India within South Asia, the maritime approach opens India to the entire Indian Ocean region and even beyond it. Once the centrality of this new maritime perspective in determining India's future regional policy is recognised, then India's Indian Ocean policy acquires a new and much wider perspective than the narrow framework of the IOR-ARC. India's objectives would then include, besides promoting trade and investment, other issues like creating an environment of peace and cooperation without which meaningful economic interaction even among like-minded states can be only half-hearted. India will also be vitally interested in promoting integrated regional development, particularly sustainable development, which alone can lay a firm base for a long-term policy of mutually beneficial trade, commerce and investment. There is, therefore, the need to look at cooperation in the Indian Ocean region with the wider framework of three major interrelated themes for cooperation—resource enhancement, resource utilisation and the promotion of a new framework of regional peace and security in the context of the post-cold war ethos. Here, resource enhancement has to be given priority. A policy of resource utilisation without a concurrent policy of resource enhancement will only lead to rapid decline in the existing resources. If one looks at the economic and technological infrastructure of many of the states in the Indian Ocean region, gross disparity can be noticed. While several of the countries are getting sucked into a debt trap, their dependence upon the import of basic necessities like food and energy is increasing. As unemployment rises these states are importing more and more consumer goods. All these factors contribute to growing adverse balance of payment and mounting debt burden. A meaningful policy should, therefore, aim at reversing that process. Food security, a major challenge facing many of the states in the Indian Ocean region, cannot be ensured by import alone. It is possible only with better use of land–water resources and input of better farming techniques. In that context, resources of the sea need special attention. The new law concerning the sea gives the littoral state exclusive right to exploit living resources up to three hundred and twenty nautical kilometres from the coast. At the moment, marine fishery, a rich source of protein, is grossly neglected in several littoral states. It can be a fit agenda for regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean. Communication is of vital importance for development. While land and air travel have been given overdue importance the maritime transport system is grossly neglected. Since the volume of intra-regional trade, except in the case of bulk cargo like oil and ore, is likely to be modest, there is a need to develop smaller and more efficient ships that can also utilise small and medium harbours which are less expensive to construct and handle. Energy is the bedrock of development. Today, most of these states, except the oil-exporting states, are dependent upon imported oil and oil products for their energy requirements. This is a big drain on their scarce foreign exchange resources. A suitable energy-related policy, dovetailed with an appropriate industrial policy, has to be evolved so as to release more foreign exchange for both national development and the import of more essential finished products. Research in the field of alternative sources of energy as well as in the better utilisation of available energy can become an important aspect of regional cooperation. Industrial development or technology for better raw material utilisation is yet another area that can be examined in the context of sustainable development and preservation of the environment. Human resource development in its wider context, therefore, emerges as the key to regional cooperation. India has reached a stage when it can fruitfully cooperate with other regional powers in the Indian Ocean in sharing whatever expertise it has acquired in the areas mentioned above. India's experience in these specific areas will be more valuable to the developing world than the experience of the industrialised North. Regional cooperation cannot ignore the crucial issues of peace and security. New security-related challenges have come up, that need a regional approach. The post–cold war era, especially the pre-eminence of the industrialised North and the leadership role of the US, has posed new equations between the North and the South. Hence, new approaches will be needed, outside the context of the earlier cold war syndrome, to evolve a framework of regional security which has to be based primarily on regional cooperation and a mutually acceptable confidence building mechanism so as to reduce the possibility of direct or indirect intervention of the North in the affairs of the South. Besides, there are several other issues that require regional or sub-regional cooperation. Some of these are

related to disaster management, protecting ecology and environment, containing terrorism, especially maritime terrorism and insurgency, and ensuring the security of the small states located mid ocean. All these need a regional approach. These challenges cannot be wished away. These problems have to be tackled boldly and a regional solution is necessary since peace and stability are the prerequisites for regional cooperation even in economic matters. India, with its central position in the Indian Ocean region, its indigenously developed capability, a willingness to share its experience, its growing technological and industrial base, and a record of friendly relations in the region, is ideally suited to play a significant contributory role in all these sectors. While strengthening its role in the IOR-ARC, India should also seek to enlarge the scope for cooperation in the larger framework of the Indian Ocean policy.

T WENT Y-ONE

India and the Indian Ocean Rim Cooperation P.V. RAO

wo significant developments that have shaped the world in recent years – the end of the cold war and globalisation – have brought in structural changes in the global political and economic system, compelling nations to radically redefine their political and economic policy regimes. They have also influenced states across the world to move speedily and catch up with the rapid pace of the new global phenomenon. The Indian Ocean Rim (IOR), vastly populated and structurally underdeveloped, could hardly remain unaffected by these developments. The withdrawal of the Soviet navy from the IOR, the emergence of newly independent republics in Central Asia, the Gulf war, and the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa are some of the major developments which forced the IOR states to reorient their foreign and security policies. Above all, it is the political and military supremacy of the United States and its overall presence the IOR that is at the core of the new strategic reorientation.

T

In economic terms, globalisation is another equally significant development that has forced a radical reshaping of the economic regimes of both the developed and the developing worlds. The protracted Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations ended in empowering the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) regime with greater scope and mandate to regulate world trade and economic policies, while being monitored by its successor agency the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Through the expansive logic of adding trade and services to the world economic regulatory mechanism, the developed world has succeeded in endowing universality to the philosophy of market economy. However, "despite progressive attempts at formal liberalisation on a global basis through the Kennedy, Tokyo, and Uruguay Rounds, the world trade grew progressively more regionalised across the 1980s and early 1990s within Europe, North America and East Asia" (Colder 1996: 154). The WTO carries far more implications for the IOR, which represents three-fourths of world's developing countries. These Third World countries, which once defied the bipolar divide by espousing alternative models of peace (non-alignment) and economic systems (the new international economic order or NIEO), today have little choice but to lend themselves to the forces of global economic integration. It should, however, be recalled that globalising tendencies are not new to the Indian Ocean. Long ago, when the Portuguese entered the Malabar Coast skirting the Cape of Good Hope and eastern Africa, an alien attempt was made to homogenise the Indian Ocean littorals with European economic, political and religious power. When the four hundred long years of colonial domination ended, the postcolonial societies, whatever the indigenous political and economic systems they adopted, had hardly recovered from metropolitan influence. Movements – such as the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) and the NIEO – provided a facade of political unity to the resurgent Third World countries, most of which constitute the hub of the Indian Ocean, with their demands for greater international equity. Anti-western and anti-neocolonial movements did not help much in terms of improving the marginalised status of the developing countries, in general, and Indian Ocean countries, in particular. This is not to dismiss the historic role of the above movements. They did build ideological consensus and unity of purpose among the developing IOR nations vis à vis the developed North. Meanwhile, various strategies have been adopted by the poorer countries to minimise their dependence on the developed world through South–South cooperation, which again have delivered little result. Regional cooperation is a well-known strategy, variedly experimented by the IOR countries. That the largest number of regional organisations was established in the IOR, particularly in the African region, is stating the obvious. Numbers apart, their performance has been dismal, with rare exceptions. In cumulative terms, the regional

cooperation strategies have hardly reduced the dependency of the IOR on external economies. In the 1990s the IOR states were confronted with more economic and political challenges. During the cold war the Third World countries enjoyed a space in which to bargain with the competing big powers, and obtain political and economic gains. Thus Egypt could approach the Soviet Union seeking aid for the Aswan Dam when the US refused to finance the same and, similarly, the American refusal to aid the Bhilai steel plant led India to successfully explore the option of seeking aid from Moscow. But with the demise of the Soviet Union, the developing countries of the Indian Ocean have lost even the marginal ability to influence events in their favour. The advent of globalisation, along with the breakdown of the bipolar system, has compelled the IOR economies, unavoidably, to adapt themselves to the forces of free market and global economic integration. Market reforms have been undertaken to replace postcolonial economic ideologies of socialist transformation/mixed economy. The commanding heights of economy, which were once so jealously guarded by the state, are being subordinated to private and foreign market forces. Protectionism and import substitution, meant to encourage native entrepreneurial activity, are being replaced by open economies and export-led growth strategies.

Globalisation and New Regionalism The world today is witnessing the parallel processes of global integration of capital, production, services, trade and technology, and a simultaneous regionalisation of economies. Today's regional cooperation is the antithesis of the kind of regionalism practiced during the 1960s through the 1980s. It differs in ideological content and organisational form. Reflecting the political/ideological divide of the cold war period, in the past a 'region' was understood as a homogenous geopolitical entity which also served as the framework for regional economic cooperation. The European Economic Community (EEC), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) were not just economic entities but carried heavier political overtones. The Treaty of Rome (1957), which created the EEC, had the political objective of retaining Europe's identity in the world power structure dominated by superpowers. The ASEAN was a shadow of the defunct South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and it took more than a decade to put economic teeth into that organisation. In comparison, today transregional groupings are emerging primarily for economic purposes. Contemporary regionalism, also called 'new regionalism' (often 'open regionalism'), transcends the conventional definition of regional boundaries and encourages transregional trade blocs and linkages. Earlier, the political element was at the core of regional formations. But today, geoeconomics overshadows geopolitics. The Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) is the best example of the new phenomenon of economic regionalism; the NAFTA and the European Union (EU) follow suit. Chile, Venezuela and Columbia, as also Singapore and South Korea, are being considered as NAFTA's prospective members. Similarly, the EU has been expanded to the north with the admission of Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995, and the inclusion of East European countries does not appear to be far away. Another characteristic feature of new regionalism is that it is outward looking. Instead of the inwardlooking regional economic blocs of the past which were protectionist and restrictive in membership, current efforts are to create bodies like the APEC and NAFTA which allow easier exchange of capital and commodities, create market-friendly regimes and are open- ended in membership. To borrow Jagdish Bhagwati's comparison between old and current regionalism: First, the regionalism of the 1960s represented an extension of import-substitution-industrialisation strategy from the national to the regional level and was therefore inward- looking. The current regionalism is by contrast taking place in an environment of outward-looking policies. Second, in the 1960s developing countries pursued (regional integration) exclusively with other developing countries. Today, these countries especially in Latin America have their eyes on integration with large, developed countries. (de Melo and Panagariya 1992: 199) Broadly speaking, "contemporary regionalism is premised on globalisation (the reinforcement of

international economic links) and the concomitant reinforcement of the international competitiveness of industries" (Kikuchi 1977: 67). Within the IOR, important historic, political and economic events complemented the phenomenon of new regionalism. India's adoption of liberal economic reforms in 1990–91 and the change of regime in South Africa were the two most important events that served as catalysts in the IOR's globalising process. Australia's 'Look West' policy of more recent origin, which emphasised closer economic links with countries to the west of its shores added momentum to the phenomenon of new regionalism in the IOR. The developing countries of the Indian Ocean, while readjusting to the systemic changes brought about by the end of the cold war and a WTO-led free trade regime, also saw an opportunity to retrieve ancient maritime relations and forge themselves into a closer economic community. The departure of the western colonial powers from this region and the emergence of the independent Afro-Asian states, however, did not lead to any stronger political and economic cohesion among these countries. The Afro-Asian solidarity moves made by Nehru's India were submerged by cold war contradictions. Long colonial rule, postcolonial external economic dependence and, of course, intra-regional conflicts, enfeebled any positive endeavours to build a sense of community among the littorals of the Indian Ocean. The current strategic reality of the Ocean being policed by a unipolar power and the prospect of world economic power being concentrated around three mega trade blocs – EU, APEC and NAFTA – induced the IOR states to group themselves into regional formations to seek their political and economic destinies in a thoroughly altered environment. A new mood of urgency and optimism was evident. Thus Nelson Mandela, soon after assuming the reins of a democratic regime, recalled the Nehruvian dreams in support of closer political and economic unity in the IOR. Addressing his Indian hosts in January 1995 in New Delhi, Mandela said: The natural urge of the facts of history and geography that Nehru spoke of should broaden itself to include the exploring of the concept of an Indian Ocean Region of socio-economic cooperation and other peaceful endeavours of a special relationship that should help improve the lot of the developing nations in multinational institutions such as the United Nations, Commonwealth and Non-aligned Movement. The South African guest at the Indian Republic Day celebrations felt that India and South Africa shared a "unique and special partnership" which was "premised on building a future that will benefit our people and the nations of the Indian Ocean region."1 India too shared the African leader's vision of forging closer links among the IOR members. In other words, both the countries wanted to capture the historic mood.

The Indian Ocean Rim Initiative Reflecting the mood to engage in closer economic arrangements in the IOR, two multilateral initiatives were undertaken to promote intra-regional cooperation. The first was the Mauritius Initiative, also called the M-7 as the original members who proposed the idea of a rim plan were seven in number. The idea of bringing the IOR countries together in a new economic framework was first publicly stated by Mauritius. This small Indian Ocean island initially favoured the approach of "moving through sub-regions rather than getting stuck because all the elements are not there for forward movement in the whole of the Indian Ocean region,"2 as explained by its foreign minister in August 1992. The precise nature of the proposed framework, however, was not spelt out. About eighteen months later, the Mauritian prime minister, elaborating the rim idea, called for the creation of an Indian Ocean Rim trading bloc "at the level of economic cooperation and integration between Asian and African countries, as also Australia". Citing the impending change of government in South Africa and the Indian economic reforms as positive developments which created new opportunities for both intra-regional and international trade, he reasoned that his country could be an important business bridge between India and Africa if the Indian Ocean Rim concept materialised.3 Mauritius, as the former French President Mitterand had complimented, is a model of development with democracy which other African states should emulate. A middle-ranking country with a population of around 1.2 million, Mauritius is ambitious to acquire a new industrialised country (NIC) status. To this end, it has created facilities, an offshore business centre and very attractive tax concessions to invite foreign capital,

humanpower and technology. Its major focus is on India which could, given its transition to market economy, play a key role in the island's drive to emulate the East Asian tiger economies. Mauritius has already been nicknamed the 'Singapore of East Africa'. Synchronising with the Mauritian call for a rim trade bloc, South Africa too, as the apartheid regime was preparing to transfer power to the black majority, started exploring opportunities for closer political and economic links with the IOR countries. Official and non-official exchange of delegations started taking place between South Africa and India from the early 1990s. The chief of South African Trade and Investment visited India in May 1993 and called for an Indian Ocean Rim bloc to be developed both by South Africa and India. Hardly a month later the Federation of Indian Exports Organisation (FIEO) delegation reciprocated the South African visit and supported the idea of a rim trade bloc consisting of India, South Africa, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Seychelles, Madagascar, Cameroon and the Re Union islands. South Africa's well- developed ports were viewed as offering an attractive transit point to India's exports to the hinterland countries of Africa and to the countries of South America. Diplomatic relations between India and South Africa were established in November 1993 when South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha visited New Delhi. The visiting foreign minister greeted the new official relationship with the call for an economic grouping of IOR countries covering East African and Gulf countries, and India and Pakistan. Australia was not mentioned at all. Such a grouping would initially take up environment, marine affairs and similar issues, and later move to matters of trade. Botha expected India's cooperation in holding the first congress of the IOR grouping in the following year, 1994, when his country would go to elections. President Nelson Mandela again reinforced Pik Botha's rim idea when he visited India in 1995. Following the active exploration of the rim idea, the Indian Ocean Rim Initiative (IORI) was launched in March 1995 at Port Louis by seven littorals of the Indian Ocean—Australia, India, Kenya, Mauritius, Oman, Singapore and South Africa. The participating countries declared that the IORI "in the spirit of open regionalism seeks to build and expand understanding, mutually beneficial cooperation through a consensusbased, evolutionary and non-intrusive approach."4 The way to promote such an operation would be through a regional forum, tripartite in nature, bringing together representatives of the government, business and the academia. The second initiative to forge the IOR countries into a wider political and economic forum was mooted by Australia. The Australian foreign minister, Gareth Evans, strongly canvassed for this forum to have participation from non-officials, with business people, academics and bureaucrats as observers. This tracktwo dialogue was held at Perth, and attended by participants from twenty-three IOR countries. While the track-one dialogue, the M-7, was official in nature and took place in March 1995, the Perth meeting or the International Forum on the Indian Ocean Region (IFIOR) was held in June 1995. Delegates included nationals from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka in South Asia, all the M-7 members, and participants from other rim countries. Addressing the delegates Evans said that prospects were better now than at any time since World War II, to actively explore regional cooperation. He cited the Indian liberalisation, among other factors, as having created an atmosphere conducive to such initiatives. The Indian Ocean states, according to Evans, had to become more outward looking, deregularising their economies in order to capture the enormous growth potential that interaction with other states offered. The Australian foreign minister prophesied that "the emergence of regionalism in the Indian Ocean would certainly not be before time," since "many states have come to recognise how effective regional cooperation can be for advancing a broad range of national interests."5 That the two conclaves on Indian Ocean regional cooperation gathered within a negligible gap of three months conveys more than their fortuitous timing. Divergence of approach over the rim plan came to the fore at Perth. Australia preferred security issues to be included along with economic matters in the new type of forum. Similarly Canberra also preferred a broad-based representation of the rim countries. A majority of the delegates at the Perth Forum, led by India and South Africa, insisted on excluding the security agenda and on a limited and graduated membership. Indian official delegates were apprehensive that bilateral disputes might be raised if, in a proposed multilateral association like the Perth Forum, security was placed on the agenda. Some felt that 'Canberra does not seem to be too keen on economic cooperation, since it is part of the

APEC. It is more interested in roping in other countries as a possible bulwark against the rising power of China,' while some even suspected that Australia's interest in regional security may be driven by its desire to ultimately legitimise Western military presence in the Indian Ocean (Mahapatra 1996: 18). At the Perth Forum, the majority opposed bringing regional security into the ambit of the rim agenda, which led the Australian media to conclude that the "defeat of Australia's proposal to establish a new organisation of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean, is a major set back for the 'Look West' strategy" (Mahapatra 1996: 19). Finally, the M-7 consensus emerged as the only rim plan and the Australian plan was dead for all practical purposes. Seven more members were added to the Mauritius-initiated IORI plan by 1996, viz. Indonesia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mozambique, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Yemen. In March 1997, at Port Louis, the foreign ministers of fourteen member-states adopted the IORI charter. The charter formalised the name of the rim group as the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC). At the second ministerial conference of the IOR-ARC held in Maputo, Mozambique, in March 1999, the association's membership was raised to 19 by admitting five more countries—Bangladesh, Iran, Seychelles, Thailand and the United Arab Republic (UAR). Japan and Egypt were invited as dialogue partners to this meeting. The charter of the IOR-ARC declared in its fundamental principles that it "seeks to build and expand understanding and mutually beneficial cooperation through a consensus-based, evolutionary and nonintrusive approach"; that decisions will be taken "on the basis of consensus"; and that "bilateral issues likely to generate controversy, .will be excluded from deliberations". The major objectives as declared by the charter are: To formulate and implement projects for economic cooperation relating to trade facilitation, promotion and liberalisation; promotion of foreign investment, scientific and technological exchanges, and tourism. To promote liberalisation, to remove impediments to, and lower barriers towards, free and enhanced flow of goods, services, investment and technology within the region. To explore all possibilities and avenues for trade liberalisation with a view to augmenting and diversifying trade flows among member states. To encourage close interaction of trade and industry, academic institutions, scholars and the peoples of the member states.6 The IOR-ARC Charter established an institutional mechanism which consisted of a council of ministers, meeting once in two years, to formulate policies; and a committee of senior officials of all member-states to review the implementation of the decisions taken by the former. Two regular agencies, the Indian Ocean Rim Business Forum (IORBF) and the Indian Ocean Rim Academic Group (IORAG) were appointed to develop, monitor and coordinate the work programmes of the association. The ministerial meeting which approved the charter at Port Louis also identified ten major projects, some of which are— cooperation in setting standards and accreditation; investment facilitation and promotion; human resource development cooperation; and technology advancement in the Indian Ocean region. The IOR-ARC is just an intergovernmental agency in which decisions should be reached by consensus. It has not been conceived either as a closed trade bloc or as a preferential trade area. It follows the APEC model of open regionalism. Maximisation of trade and investment opportunities through a flexible regulatory system and elastic rules of membership is the essence of open regionalism. There are no rigid mechanisms and fixed boundaries which could prevent a prospective member from joining the bloc. The concept of open regionalism as defined by Renato Ruggerio, Director General of WTO, means: the gradual elimination of internal barriers to trade within a regional grouping... at more or less the same rate and on the same timetable as lowering of barriers towards non-members. This would mean the regional liberalisation would in practice as well as in law be generally consistent with the MFN principle. (WTO 1996) Trade potentialities and investment opportunities are immensely available in the IOR. While developed countries like Australia, Singapore, South Africa, Malaysia and other NICs have a strong manufacturing base

and proven growth- oriented export economies, developing countries like India and Sri Lanka, and underdeveloped countries like Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique and Madagascar are also competitive in agrobased goods such as textiles, tea, processed foods and beverages, leather goods and other labour-intensive commodities. As Charan Wadhva of the Centre for Policy Research, who has conducted an extensive study on the trade prospects in the IOR-ARC region, observes: There exist sufficient degrees of complementarities (actual and potential) in the IOR-ARC region. The new complementarities are emerging due to the market-orientd reforms now in place in most countries in this region. These economic reforms allow the member countries to explore and exploit opportunities for mutually profitable, growth-oriented and employment enhancing expansion of intra-IOR ARC trade. (2001: 125) That there is complementarity in IOR-ARC economies is evidenced by the presence of a high degree of intra-regional trade intensity, despite a slowdown in such trade due to the Southeast Asian crisis. Wadhva argues that with the revival of growth in the Asian NICs already in sight, intra-regional trade is set to recover its upward trend of the proportion of its trade with the world. Moreover, the IOR-ARC countries, representing the largest regional market with some 20–25 per cent of world's consumers, are perceived to have the potential to invite a sizable amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) (Ibid.).

India and the IOR-ARC India's participation in the Indian Ocean's latest broad-based association representing all the flanks of the region's coast can be justified on almost every conceivable ground—historical, cultural, political, economic, scientific and technological. The pivotal role that India assumed in the IOR in the postcolonial age, either in the Non-aligned Movement, the North–South dialogue, the disarmament crusade or in the region's peace zone movement qualifies its active involvement once again in the region's affairs, albeit in a changed global political and economic climate. In fact, given the shift in world power structure from military to economic strength and the shift of global attention towards the Indian Ocean, it is natural and imperative for a country of India's size and potential to respond actively to the rapidly altering scenario. There is no wonder, therefore, that India assumed a lead role in the evolution of the IOR-ARC, the selection of its venue, the nature of issues for deliberation and the size of membership. Reminiscent of its role in the promotion of Afro-Asian solidarity, India, as explained by V.K. Grover (1995), head of the Indian delegation at Mauritius, "perceives an Indian Ocean Rim Initiative (IORI) from the depths of the Afro-Asian consciousness which Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru imbued in us, as well as from shared experience." The Afro-Asian rationale, however, "does not exclude Australia as Nehru, in defining Asia liked Australia to come nearer to Asia. There they are." India as a leading member of the newest regional group is expected to register considerable economic gains given the size of its economy, level of development and most importantly, by virtue of the recently introduced liberal trade regime. Throughout the 1990s, as Wadhva (2001: 130) computed, India had exported more intensively to the IOR-ARC region than to the rest of the world, the chief exports being manufactured commodities such as garments, chemicals, engineering goods and leather products. India's trade with Kenya, Singapore, Australia and South Africa is expected to rise by many folds and reduce the country's dependence on extra-regional imports, thereby cutting down the import bill in sectors like chemicals, textiles, base metal and machinery (Mohan ty 2001: 142). Symbolising the westward trend, in 1994 the Australian government published a report on India titled India's Economy at the Midnight Hour, Australia's India Strategy. The report listed at great length the economic advantages available to both the countries through their membership in the IOR-ARC. The report projected that at an annual growth rate of 5 per cent India would overtake Australia in economic size by the year 2000 and would also double Australian annual exports to India. As the pace of reforms advanced, it would stimulate the import of capital, goods and services to cater to the 120 million in the Indian middle class. According to the Midnight Hour Australia had opportunities to participate in Indian industrial sectors like gas, transport, communications, construction and manufacturing. The commodities sector included

food, crude materials, oil and coal, base metals, chemicals and machinery equipment. The title of the report, Midnight Hour, expressly underscored another historic epoch in India's destiny following the nocturnal declaration of Indian independence. Explaining the historic significance of the Indian market reforms, the report observed: The passing of the midnight hour on 14 August 1947 marked the achievement of India's independence from Britain. While less precisely marked, its second midnight hour, the opening of the economy, may be equally significant. Australia's India strategy needs to seize the moment of the midnight our of the Indian economy... (Government of Australia 1994: 45) Midnight Hour further stressed that "India is now starting to look east, to the rest of Asias, to fuel its economic growth. And Asia is beginning to take India seriously as a potential regional economic power. In looking east, India is also looking to Australia" (Ibid.). India's economic relations with South Africa were poor as New Delhi refused to trade with the apartheid regime. However, it is a known fact that trade in some commodities was conducted between the two countries through third parties. But the prospects for active economic engagement between the two countries were always recognised. A common colonial background, the presence of a large and active Indian diaspora, as well as the fairly developed industrial and manufacturing sectors in both countries were viewed as contributing factors in enhancing mutual economic interaction once South Africa returned to majority rule. Thus soon after the regime change in Pretoria there was a flurry of official and non-official trade exchanges between the two countries leading to the formal launching of Indo-South African trade relations in 199.3 Membership of both countries in the IOR-ARC was seen as boosting intra- regional economic cooperation, not just bilateral economic participation. Indian exports to South Africa include textiles and garments, drugs, chemicals, leather and engineering goods. Market prospects are present for farm machinery, computer software, jewellery and shipbuilding equipment. Indian imports from South Africa cover transport equipment, fertilisers, zinc, cobalt and dyeing material. The significance of accelerated economic engagement between the two democracies lies in the fact that the access gained by Indian merchant navies to the South African ports of Durban, East London and Port Elizabeth can bring down shipment costs and these ports can serve as halfway houses to Latin America (Roy 1994: 24). India's economic reforms, the democratic transition in South Africa and Australia's western postures raised hopes of building a tripod which could serve as the basis for linking the Indian Ocean littorals in a closer economic framework. The configuration of events as the cold war ended and the globalisation process set in raised an air of optimism, which was unprecedented in the recent history of the Indian Ocean. However, prospects for translating such optimism into operational strategies were conditioned by subjective forces, even contradictions, which are characteristic of the IOR. Thus, as the rim plan moved ahead to implement the objectives enshrined in the IOR-ARC Charter, the members had to encounter obstacles which were not just economic but also political in nature. The fissures that developed in the IOR-ARC once again vindicated that grandiose plans for regional, political and economic cooperation do not work in the Indian Ocean context. The cold war exercise in creating a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean fell prey to the conflicting interests and interpretations of the regional and extra-regional powers. Today, in an entirely different global climate, another attempt to bring the Indian Ocean littorals under the single agenda of economic consensus has not been able to make much progress chiefly because of the heterogeneity of the region and its fundamental diversity. Irrespective of the structural changes in the world political and economic system, intra-regional contradictions and the matrix of power equations have come in the way of harmonising the littoral interests and weaving them into a homogenous framework. Two major developments on either side of the Malacca hindered the pace of the rim movement—the nuclear explosions on the Indian subcontinent in 1998 precipitated by India; and the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis. The first one broke the semblance of regional order while the second shook the foundations of the neoliberal approach to regional cooperation. Both outbursts exposed the fragility of regional, political and economic complementarity. Whether geopolitics commanded geoeconomics or vice versa is a debatable point. Along with Australia and South Africa, several other smaller powers in the IOR-ARC (not Mauritius)

opposed the Indian nuclear explosions. But the most vocal reaction came from Canberra. An indefinite ban on non-humanitarian aid to India and Pakistan was imposed, and military supplies and high-level official visits to the subcontinent were suspended. Canberra also unsuccessfully pressed the following ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting to issue a strong declaration denouncing the tests. India, in turn, withdrew its military attaché from Canberra and announced the banning of Australian ships from Indian waters and overflight facilities to Australia's military aircraft. India is yet to be convinced about Canberra's sincere commitment to the cause of the former's membership in the APEC. Despite occasional gestures on the issue, it is widely known that the labour government of Paul Keating was opposed to India joining the APEC. The later liberal–national coalition led by John Howard had expressed its strong support for India but it needs to be seen if such support was affected by Canberra's knee-jerk reaction to the nuclear tests. The truth is that given its strong pacific orientation and commitment to American political and security doctrines in the IOR, Canberra is yet to convince New Delhi about the genuineness of its recent moves. It is, in fact, rumored in unofficial circles that Australia lost interest in the IOR-ARC under US pressure, as the latter was not keen about its Pacific ally being active outside the APEC. Nevertheless, seen from India's point of view the Australian factor deserves to be taken more seriously. India is ambitiously driving into the Asia-Pacific region and a closer partnership with Australia might help in advancing the former's engagement with the region, apart from the APEC candidature. As the political heat generated by the Pokhran tests decreased, a renewed effort by the Howard government to restore the earlier economic content to Indo-Australian relations became evident. Senior government representatives, including the deputy prime minister, Tom Fisher, visited New Delhi and expressed a conciliatory stance on the Indian nuclear programme. The prolonged thaw in mutual relations over the nuclear subject seemed to have been economically unrewarding in Australia's view, as concerned sections – investors and exporters – did not want to lose out on the emerging opportunities in India. Australia's trade with China was under pressure coupled with the negative impact of the East Asian financial crisis. Such economically ominous trends, perhaps, pushed Canberra towards an early rehabilitation of relations with India. Moreover, as the IOR-ARC lost its earlier momentum, partly due to the Howard government's own sagging interest in the rim forum, strengthening bilateral economic ties with India might have appeared to be the best possible option in the prevailing circumstances. Even if the political divide requires a long-term strategy of mutual trust and respect to bridge it, this should not be allowed, as both the democracies seem to have realised, to keep them from deepening the economic aspect in their relations, especially in the era of global competition. Though post-apartheid South Africans are keen to gain international respectability through their involvement in multilateral fora like the IOR-ARC, their dilemma is, as a South African scholar has explained, that they are unable to decide whether they are of the First World or of the Third.Should it, therefore, concentrate on relations with the North, which it needs so badly or, on its brothers in the South? Those who press for the primacy of the South are accused of being impractical idealists. Pro-Northerners are dubbed 'Eurocentric', which is a highly derogatory term in today's South Africa. (Pienaar 1996: 180) The post-apartheid regime's dilemmas of defining its priorities, of choosing between the North and the South, between concentrating on the immediate African neighbourhood and the broader IOR, led South Africa to take a "low key position in the IOR-ARC, not having a strong stand on any particular issue" (Ibid.). A section of the South African business community is, however, keen on availing the opportunities in India. The influential role played by India in the formation of the IOR-ARC and its continued interest in the project do not blind observers to its political objectives. There is no organisation like the NAM an institute like the NIEO in the IOR today befitting India's growing military and naval strength, economic size and political stature, and channelising India's political aspirations in the region. To quote a keen observer of the rim developments: With the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) having lost much of its relevance in the post-cold war world,

India is not part of any other broad-ranging organisation where it can demonstrate its full potential and status. In these circumstances, the Indian Ocean Rim would be an appropriate forum for the country. (Freer 1999: 11). The statement of the former Indian navy chief, Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat, that the Indian naval forces complement the IOR-ARC activities, should be read in this context. The choice of Mauritius as the venue of the rim initiative could not have been without some political significance. There are close complementarities on foreign policy between the island republic and India. Mauritius was also a non-aligned country with pro-Soviet leanings. India fully supported it on the Diego Garcia issue and on the zone of peace concept. During the recent non-proliferation treaty controversy the Indian stand was backed by Port Louis. Geopolitical location and a large Indian diaspora are the key determinants of Indo-Mauritian relations. Such congruence of foreign policies provides enough reason to surmise that the Mauritius Initiative was inspired by New Delhi. India, unlike Australia, preferred a gradual and a selective approach to the membership question, aiming to avoid letting Pakistan into the new forum. The role played by the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) in coordinating the business network of the IOR-ARC and the choice of an Indian scholar as the first to hold the Indian Ocean Chair established by the ARC are not entirely unconnected to the significance of India's role and long-term objectives in the IOR-ARC. Thus, as an Indian observer has rightly concluded, "wittingly or unwittingly India has taken over the leadership role in this regional cooperation programme" (Chhabra 1996). With South Africa diverted by regional pulls and Australia reconsidering the westward strategy, the earlier euphoria about rim cooperation has waned. The Southeast Asian financial crisis has also aggravated the trough in the first ever grandiose scheme of economic cooperation in the IOR Rim. Smaller states like Oman, Sri Lanka and Mauritius are still interested in the rim association as they need an economic space and hence have a stake in it. But their roles hinge on the degree of involvement of key actors in the association. At present, out of the three leading members of the IOR-ARC, only India is actively involved—for its interests are beyond trade.

References Chhabra, Hari Sharan. 1996. Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Rim. The Hindu, 8 November. Colder, Kent E. 1996. Asia's Deadly Triangle: How Arms, Energy and Growth Threaten to Destabilize Asia-Pacific. London: Nicholas Bradeley. de Melo, Jaime and Aravind Panagariya, eds. 1992. New Dimensions in Regional Integration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Freer, Gordon. 1999. South Africa and the Indian Ocean Rim: Between the SADC and the Deep Blue Sea. The Indian Ocean Review 12 (2): 11. Government of Australia. 1994. India's Economy at the Midnight Hour: Australia's India Strategy. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Commonwealth of Australia. Grover, V.K. 1995. Recharging Economic Cooperation. World Focus 187 (Hy): 5. Kikuchi, Tsutomu. 1977. Interregional Cooperation and Interregional Competition in the Age of Globalisation. Japan Review of International Affairs (Winter/Spring): 67. Mahapatra, Chintamani. 1966. Cooperative Efforts in the Indian Ocean Region. Working Paper No. 41, 1–28. Australian Defence Studies Centre. Mohanty, S.K. 2001. Trade Prospects of India from IOR-ARC: Some Recent Evidences. In Regional Cooperation in Indian Ocean, Trends and Prospects, ed. P.V. Rao, 107–140. New Delhi: South Asia Publishers. Pienaar, Sara. 1996. The Emergence of South Africa. In The Making of an Indian Ocean Community, ed. Indira Gandhi Memorial Trust, 175–87. New Delhi: New Age International. Roy, Mihir. 1994. South Africa as an Emerging Player in Indian Ocean. Journal of Indian Ocean Studies (November): 24. Wadhva, Charan D. 2001. Trade Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Rim: An Indian Perspective. In Regional Cooperation in Indian Ocean, Trends and Prospects, ed. P.V. Rao, 67–92. New Delhi: South Asia Publishers. World Trade Organisation. See WTO. WTO. 1996. World Trade Organisation. Geneva.

PART VI West Asia and Africa

T WENT Y-T WO

Kashmir, Pakistan and the Pan-Islamic Challenge to India NOOR AHMAD BABA

ndian diplomatic response to pan-Islamism and to its organisational expression, the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), has been necessitated primarily because Pakistan, from its very inception, has used such platforms for diplomatic leverage vis à vis India, particularly with reference to the Kashmir issue. Pakistan was born with certain disadvantages as compared to India, and in spite of sharing a common past, both countries have been entangled in serious disputes. As a new country, Pakistan found itself relatively disadvantaged diplomatically, unlike India which had been recognised as a political unit for centuries. In such a situation, the Pakistani leadership began identifying itself with the rest of the Muslim world, on the common ideological basis of Islam, as "Islam was the only bond of belonging in whose name Pakistan could appeal for other nations' support" (Gupta 1956: 234). Therefore, from the early days of its creation, Pakistan has been working for Islamic solidarity with missionary zeal. It made several attempts to organise Muslim countries into a group in which it could assume the role of leader. However, it had very little success in this endeavour as the Arab Muslim world was dominated by secular–nationalist regimes with which India shared comfortable relationships; for example, with President Nasser of Egypt. In spite of its best efforts, Pakistan failed to convene a summit conference of Muslim countries. Disappointment on this score led Pakistan to enter into the western alliance system in the mid 1950s (Baba 1994: 30–34).

I

However, as a result of the Arab defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the situation in the Muslim world changed drastically to the disadvantage of secular–nationalist forces. In the changed situation, conservative forces under the leadership of Saudi Arabia, supported by its increasing financial clout, assumed leadership in Arab Muslim affairs (Baba 1994: 38–62). The first Islamic summit conference was convened at Rabat, in 1969, in the wake of arson in Al-Aksa, which was of historic significance, and the foundation for the OIC was laid. This marked the beginning of a routine periodical convening of summits and minister-level conferences of Islamic countries (Baba 1994: 63–70). The creation of the OIC gave Pakistan a convenient diplomatic platform to bash India. The first diplomatic encounter within the OIC, between India and Pakistan, happened in the first Islamic summit at Rabat on the issue of India's membership. Through a diplomatic manoeuvre Pakistan was able to prevent India from becoming a full-fledged member of the organisation. India aspired for membership on the strength of possessing the third largest concentration of Muslim population in the world. India, from the beginning, had pleaded that since Indian Muslims constituted the third largest Islamic community in the world, it should not be excluded from the summit. And that ignoring this claim would be an act of serious discrimination against the people, particularly the Muslims of India (Dhamiji 1969: 11–12). With the persistent diplomatic support of friendly states like Egypt and Malaysia, India was able to get the conference to reconsider the issue. Consequently, King Faisal's compromise suggestion to allow the official Indian delegation to participate on behalf of the Muslim minority of India was approved (Ibid.: 1969: 11). Immediately after the decision was taken, Ahmad Laraki, the conference spokesperson, declared that the official Indian delegation headed by the minister for industrial development, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmad, would arrive the next day and, until then, the Indian ambassador to Morocco, Gurbachan Singh, would represent his country. At this point, President Yahya Khan of Pakistan, who had earlier agreed to King Faisal's request to allow the Indian delegation to represent the Muslim community, questioned the credentials that qualified Gurbachan Singh – a non-Muslim – to represent the Muslim minority. His contention almost paralysed the conference on 24 September. He withdrew from the conference and would not agree to attend it as long as India was represented. Since no amount of persuasion worked on him, the morning session was cancelled. He

also argued that "if the criterion of participation in the conference is a large Muslim minority then why not to invite Soviet Union, China or Albania, not to say Israel? From the way it treats our brothers, India is to Pakistan what Israel is to the Arabs."1 King Hussain of Jordan, the foreign minister of Turkey and the Shah of Iran supported Yahya Khan. The Shah warned the conference chairman, King Hassan of Morocco, that he would immediately join any walkout by President Yahya Khan should India attend the session. King Hussain of Jordan also decided to stay away in support of Yahya Khan. The United Arab Republic (UAR), Algeria, Sudan, Libya, and South Yemen stood firmly in favour of India's participation. However, the imminent collapse of the conference was averted when a 'mediation mission' headed by the Malaysian prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, conveyed a suggestion to the Indian delegation that it refrain voluntarily from taking part in the meeting. The head of the Indian delegation, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmad, asserted that India should be cosidered a full member of the conference. He rejected the offer of observer status for the Indian delegation. The Tunku mission finally informed him that it was the 'consensus' of the Muslim leaders that he should avoid disrupting the historic summit and stay away. It was only when non-attendance of the Indian delegation was guaranteed that President Yahya Khan was pacified. The conference was extended by another day, up to 25 September 1969 (Dhamiji 1969; Baba 1994). This led to a furious controversy in India. People, particularly those belonging to the opposition, questioned the rationality of India, a secular state, seeking membership in the OIC. The Indian government was subjected to severe criticism, particularly from the rightist segments of the opposition who accused it of having caused 'national humiliation'. But the government justified its decision by referring to the intrinsic political nature of the summit conference and asserting that it was in India's national interest to fight Islamic obscurantism. Indira Gandhi's government, with the support of the left, was able to defeat the opposition motion that was introduced in parliament to censure the government. However, after this fiasco, India never sought the membership of the organisation.2 Subsequently, Pakistan continued to use this group to bolster its own diplomatic standing vis à vis India on a number of issues. However, tied down by the terms of the Shimla Agreement, Kashmir was rarely raked up by Pakistan in the initial two decades of the OIC's existence (from 1969 to 1989). Therefore, during this period the OIC caused little concern to India. It was only from 1990 onwards that Kashmir became part of the proceedings of the OIC as a full-fledged issue on its agenda. Till then, Kashmir figured only occasionally in the OIC sessions, referred to in passing, in the statements of Pakistani representatives. Pakistan's diplomatic success in getting the Kashmir issue on the OIC agenda was due to the deteriorating situation in Kashmir. With the rise of militancy and a pro-independence uprising in Kashmir, the OIC, for the first time in its history, witnessed a thorough debate on the issue during the nineteenth conference of Islamic foreign ministers held in Cairo, 1–5 August 1990. Pakistan took advantage of the ongoing unrest in Kashmir to mobilise support for its position, not only to secure a debate on the issue but also to have a resolution passed. In fact, Pakistan had been successful in getting a statement issued on Kashmir by the OIC Secretariat as early as 22 May 1990. The statement cited information drawn from various sources, including well-known Indian journalists and political analysts, on what it described as the reign of terror let loose on the Muslims of Kashmir. It referred to international press reports about the massacre of hundreds of people, the rape of women and excesses that had attained a level repugnant to the human conscience. It called for urgent action to enforce respect for the fundamental rights of the Muslim people of Kashmir. It cited the example of the firing on the funeral procession of Mirwaiz Maulvi Farooq.3 The statement was issued at a time when the Pakistani prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, was touring eight Islamic countries to mobilise the collective support of the OIC members for its position on Kashmir vis à vis India. This meant that Pakistan was moving out of the Shimla framework of bilateralism. It did not hesitate to raise the issue at multilateral forums. Pakistan's effort to draw attention to Kashmir did seem to be bearing fruit. In the very first speech during the nineteenth session, the outgoing chairman of the OIC, Prince Saud Al-Faisal, foreign minister of Saudi Arabia, raised the Kashmir issue with full vigour, inviting an equally strong refutation from the Indian government and media. Pakistan was satisfied with the comprehensive resolution passed by the OIC. This happened in spite of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait that took place during the conference, relegating issues like Kashmir to the background. However, the resolution on Kashmir called for a peaceful settlement of the

dispute in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions and the Shimla Agreement. The mention of the Shimla Agreement in the resolution reflected some kind of accommodation of the Indian viewpoint on the issue.4 The Pakistan foreign secretary, Tanvir Ahmad Khan, expressed gratitude for the inclusion of the reference to the UN resolution and the expression of deep concern at the violation of human rights of the people of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). He added that the only country (most probably Iraq) that had questioned the inclusion of Kashmir on the agenda had been overruled unanimously by the rest.5 Since then Kashmir has regularly figured on the OIC agenda in all the subsequent conferences. During the twentieth session of the foreign ministers, Pakistan again succeeded in getting the OIC to endorse its position on Kashmir. The debate on the issue was prompted by the report the OIC Secretary General Hamid Al-Gabid presented before the conference. The report, supporting the Pakistan line of argument, dealt with the politicolegal dimensions of the Kashmir issue and the problem of the human rights violation in the Kashmir valley.6 In the final communiqué, the OIC called for a peaceful settlement of the dispute in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions and those agreed upon in the Shimla Agreement. While condemning the massive violation of the human rights of the Kashmiri people, the OIC called upon India to respect these rights and allow international human rights groups and other humanitarian organisations to visit Kashmir. It expressed deep concern over the prevailing tension in the region and asked India and Pakistan to redeploy their forces to peacetime locations. The OIC renewed its offer of sending a good offices mission with a view to easing tension between the two countries and promoting a peaceful settlement of the problem. It also asked the secretary general to constitute a three-member fact-finding mission to visit J&K.7 All this meant the granting of a certain amount of international legitimacy to the Pakistani position on the Kashmir issue. India then reacted strongly to what it identifìed as a pro-Pakistan resolution. An External Affairs Ministryspokesperson said that the OIC had, in any case, no locus standi in the matter. He added that there was absolutely no question of India accepting any good offices mission or fact-finding mission to Kashmir from abroad as suggested by the conference(Baba 1994: 189–207). Since then, in all subsequent conference,s the OIC has been regularly passing resolutions on Kashmir. These resolutions broadly deal with following three aspects: 1. asking India and Pakistan to resolve the problem in accordance with the UN resolutions and the Shimla agreement; 2. impressing India to respect the human rights of the Kashmiri people and condemning the violation of such rights; and 3. asking India to allow OIC's fact-finding mission to visit Kashmir and undertake an on-the-spot study of the situation there.8 The resolutions have been repeated despite India's rejection of the OIC's plea in this regard. In such a situation, the OIC has been accepting and endorsing Pakistan's position on the issue almost in its totality. During the twenty-first conference of the Islamic countries held in Karachi (1993), a new dimension was added to the routine position on Kashmir. The OIC passed a stronger resolution that equated the human rights violation in Kashmir with similar acts in Palestine, South Africa and Bosnia- Herzegovina and asked member-states to take all necessary steps to persuade India to cease forthwith the violation of the human rights of the Kashmiri people and to enable them to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination.9 The resolution on Kashmir was stronger because of the demolition of the Babri Masjid, an act that was strongly condemned by the OIC. This position on the part of the OIC gave Pakistan diplomatic solace, at a time when it was being isolated on the issue of Kashmir in the rest of the world. Subsequently, the OIC gave diplomatic recognition to the over-ground separatist alliance in Kashmir by granting observer status to the Hurriyat Conference. All this also implied that India had lost most of its friends in the Muslim world who could act as friends inside the OIC—a position that it used to enjoy in the 1950s and 1960s. These resolutions drew a strong response from India. The government took strong exception to the resolution adopted at the OIC session and maintained that its reference to Kashmir and the Muslim population in India was totally unacceptable. It asserted that Kashmir was an integral part of India and that the OIC resolutions would serve no purpose other than encouraging Pakistan to persist in extending support to terrorism and subversion directed against India. The Indian government added that it was ironic that the organisation which had

refused to allow India's participation in its activities despite the country having one of the largest Muslim populations in the world now arrogated to itself a role to protect the interest of this population. The members of Indian parliament expressed serious concern over the resolutions having been supported by many Arab and African states with whom India traditionally enjoyed good relations (Noorani 1994: 41–44). The government was urged to initiate immediate diplomatic efforts to counter anti-India propaganda. In such a situation, India initiated some quiet diplomacy to win over a few of the influential Muslim countries. It must be noted that in spite of these resolutions, the OIC has not been a monolithic group strongly united on issues like Kashmir. The unanimity on such issues inside the conference need not be taken as unified and strong concern on such issues outside of conference sessions. Given this context, India began working diplomatically with different influential countries, on an individual basis, achieving reasonably positive results. The presence of some inherent weaknesses in the OIC made diplomacy at the individual level possible. In fact, at the individual level India was able to secure the help of some of the prominent OIC member-countries in dissuading Pakistan from internationalising the Kashmir issue. It must be noted that Pakistan would not have withdrawn its resolution on Kashmir in the UN General Assembly in November 1993, if all the 51 members of the OIC had been solidly behind it. Similarly, its inability to proceed with its resolution at the UN Human Rights Commission in 1994 was in no small measure due to the intervention of some of the influential Muslim countries (Noorani 1994). However, some Muslim countries would support Pakistan on Kashmir even if there were no OIC.10 With the situation in Kashmir attracting international attention, even many non-Muslim states have begun taking interest in Kashmir. In such a situation, there is probably a core group within the OIC that will continue to extend willing support to Pakistan on Kashmir, with the less committed states being unable to afford strong and open resistance. Each of these members will have to take into consideration the public opinion in their own respective countries, especially at a time when pan-Islamic consciousness is growing. Therefore, the best way of handling the issue is to recognise the problem and address it in all its dimensions through a dialogue at different levels involving India, Pakistan and the representatives of the people of Kashmir. This is necessary for the good of the whole subcontinent. The people of the South Asian region have suffered on account of the dispute between the two countries. It is for this reason that, in spite of the establishment of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), regional cooperation could not take off in this part of the world. In the long run, India has to necessarily be in competition with China even beyond the region. China, conscious of this reality, has tried to strengthen its foothold in South Asia. It maintains good relations with Pakistan in spite of various motivations and pressures working against it. Pakistan could be a more natural strategic ally for India—regionally and internationally. Indian diplomacy needs to work with this assumption. We cannot live in a make-believe world. It was in such a state of mind that Jawaharlal Nehru ridiculed the Pakistani offer of joint defence in 1959 by raising the question, 'Defence against whom?'11 There is a need to change this mindset, especially in the light of realities in and around the region.

References Arafat, Ibrahim M. 1998. The Image of India in Egypt. Cairo: Centre for Asian Studies. Baba, Noor Ahmad. 1994. Organisation of Islamic Conference: Theory and Practice of Pan-Islamic Cooperation. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers. Dhamiji, Ram. 1969. The Rabat Episode. India and Foreign Review (November 1): 11—12 and 24. Gupta, Sisir. 1956. Islam as a Factor in Pakistan's Foreign Relations. India Quarterly 18 (1): 234. Noorani, A.G. 1994. Living with the OIC? Frontline (December 2): 41–44.

T WENT Y-THREE

India and the Gulf States: Challenges and Opportunities A.K. PASHA

raq's invasion of Kuwait and its defeat by the United States-led coalition in early 1991, radical changes in the international strategic balance after the cold war, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, have presented India with new opportunities and new challenges, forcing New Delhi to redefine its foreign policy goals, strategies and interests. India's response to these unique global and regional changes in the post– cold war period–especially in its policy towards the Gulf States–forms the subject of this essay, which has been divided into four parts. Part one highlights India–Iran relations and their common political and strategic concerns. Part two focuses on the India–Iraq ties in the context of the former's response to the 1991 Gulf war. Part three examines India–Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) relations with a focus on trade, aid, and the Babri Masjid and Kashmir issues. The final section briefly attempts to study the challenges India faces in the Gulf region and attempts an assessment of the new opportunities available in a region undergoing rapid transformation.

I

Indo-Iranian Relations Iran is one of the most important countries in the West Asian region, with which India has maintained fairly extensive relations in diverse fields, especially after New Delhi signed a treaty of friendship with Tehran on 15 March 1950 which called for 'perpetual peace and friendship' between the two countries. Despite differing perceptions on a number of issues, since 1947 all Indian prime ministers and other prominent leaders have underlined the strategic importance of Indo-Iranian ties. Notwithstanding close ties with Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser, Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister, worked hard to establish cordial ties with the Shah of Iran who, in turn, maintained close ties with the United States and Israel and made Iran a member of the Baghdad Pact later known as the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), of which Pakistan was also a key member. Perception of threats to its security induced Iran to join the western military alliance while India advocated and pursued a non-aligned policy. The cold war, Western hostility and more particularly the Iran– China–Pakistan alliance, propelled India to move closer to the Soviet Union. Despite the Shah of Iran's visit to India in February 1956 and Jawaharlal Nehru making a return visit to Tehran in September 1959, and a number of other high-level visits, Indo-Iranian relations never matured and, in fact, remained cool and, at times, strained. The 1971 Indo-Pak war conclusively established Indian predominance in South Asia whereas the defeat of Pakistan pushed the US to look at Iran as the main pillar of its Gulf policy, resulting in the supply of huge quantities of sophisticated arms to Iran. This, in turn, encouraged the Shah to play an active role in the Gulf/Indian Ocean area. The division of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh, the increase in Iran's income from oil, Arab unity during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) oil embargo, Pakistan's tilt towards the Arab States and India's close ties with Iraq—all persuaded the Shah of Iran to reassess the significance of strengthening ties with India. Soon Indo-Iranian ties developed, as reflected in several high-level visits, expanding bilateral trade and investments (see Pasha 1996a: 145–57; Mudiam 1994: 69–95). The overthrow of the Shah and the emergence of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini were assessed in New Delhi as 'positive development.s' Khomeini was described as the 'father figure of the Iranian revolution.' A.B. Vajpayee (then, India's minister for external affairs) said: "We are

waiting for the day when we can welcome Iran in the Non-Aligned Movement" (Government of India 1981). More significantly, "India viewed the revolution in Iran as a reflection of Iran's quest for identity and national self- assertion and a desire to charter an independent course without outside big power influence" (Gupta 1988: 46). But Iran's preoccupation with Iraq in the eight-year war (1980–88) and the new Islamic regime's penchant for taking up Islamic 'causes' led to strains in India's ties with Iran. Iran's stand on the Kashmir issue, the Babri Masjid and Indian Muslims introduced new factors in Indo-Iranian relations. The Indian response to Iran's attitude was muted because of the importance New Delhi attached to economic ties and Iran's role in the Gulf, Central Asia and Afghanistan, and also due to the conviction that the realists ruling Iran wanted to do business with India (Pasha 1993c: 793–804). The 1990–91 Kuwait crisis, Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the disintegration of the Soviet Union together with the end of the cold war and the emergence of Pax Americana in the West Asian and North African (WANA) region, and identical security threat perceptions, brought India and Iran closer. US attempts to isolate Iran under its dual containment policy, economic sanctions on the Islamic Republic, American influence over the GCC states and Iran's bitter experience with Iraq compelled Tehran to strengthen relations with India and China. These common political and strategic concerns led to extraordinary developments in Indo-Iranian relations, including numerous high-level visits and a large volume of bilateral trade. Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao visited Iran in September 1993 where he told Ayatollah Khomeini that the destruction of the Babri Masjid was an isolated incident and did not impinge on India's secular character. He assured him that the Indian Muslims were very much a part of the national mainstream and the decision-making process in India. The Indian prime minister also made it clear that India was firmly committed to protecting the interests of minorities and that New Delhi could deal with such issues ably and competently without outside help. He drew Ayatollah Khomeini's attention to the passage of the Places of Worship Bill in Parliament, which became effective in July 1991. The bill's main objective was to stop the destruction of places of worship, besides ensuring that fresh demands for breaking down other mosques to build temples were forestalled (see Pasha 1995a: 23–25 and 79–94). Meanwhile, a new chapter was opened in Indo-Iranian ties with Tehran extending full support to India with respect to the Kashmir issue, and acknowledging that Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of India. Iran's assurance to India that it had no desire to interfere in India's internal affairs, even with regard to Kashmir, was received by Kashmiri Muslims and Hurriyat leaders with 'shock and disbelief' because Iran was considered second only to Pakistan in extending support to the Kashmiris in their 'struggle for freedom' (Pasha 1998: 66–74). More significantly, during the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) meeting in Geneva in February-March 1994, Iran played a crucial role in persuading Pakistan to withdraw the resolution it had tabled on Kashmir. In this connection, an ailing Dinesh Singh, then India's foreign minister, travelled to Tehran to discuss the UNHRC meeting in Geneva with Iranian leaders. He also met the Chinese foreign minister in Tehran. There was considerable speculation about a China–India–Iran axis, which had been advocated by Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani while on an official visit to China. He had repeated his recommendation when Rao visited Tehran in 1993. Iran's president, Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, who was to have paid an official visit to India in October 1994, postponed it to April 1995, apparently due to a plague scare in Surat and Delhi. Some called it a 'transparent ploy', ascribing it to the power struggle between President Rafsanjani and Ayatollah Khomeini's so-called 'politics within Tehran's Byzantine power structure.' As one Indian newspaper noted, "as long as Iran remains a regimented society under an Islamic fundamentalist leadership with only the mere trappings of democracy, the relations between New Delhi and Tehran will never quite be free of tension" (Pasha 1994b: 22–50, 54–88).1 When Rafsanjani finally visited New Delhi in April 1995, he emphasised the need for strategic cooperation to ward off outside interference and domination in the region. He also underlined the significance of cooperation among Iran, Pakistan, India and China, which would "give no pretext to foreign forces to interfere in the region" (Patnaik 1998: 84–94). India sought Iran's friendship in view of the importance of the Central Asian Republics, especially the transit facilities offered by Iran for India's trade with the new republics, where Iran was equally keen on increasing its influence. The Afghan civil war, the emergence of the Taliban, Pakistan's support to the fundamentalist regime in Kabul, and Iran's desire to involve India in finding a solution to the Afghan crisis, brought India and Iran closer. The election of Mohammed Khatami as the Iranian president in 1997, the appointment of Kamal Kharrazi

as Iran's foreign minister and the favourable statements made to expand cooperation on the basis of mutual respect augured well for future Indo- Iranian ties. This, notwithstanding the reported Iranian support for the participation of Hurriyat leaders in the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) Tehran Summit in December 1997. The mutual desire for friendship and cooperation seemed to have lessened misunderstandings that had developed between the two countries in the wake of the destruction of the Babri Masjid in 1992 and the turmoil in Kashmir. During the period 1991–97, the Iranian Ambassador to India, Sheikh Ali Reza Attar, undoubtedly made an outstanding contribution to bringing the two countries closer, building a solid relationship based on mutual respect and understanding, and providing the necessary dynamism and stability to their bilateral ties. However, many in India were concerned about the implications of Iran's support to Islamic causes worldwide, for Indian Muslims. The cold war between Iran and Saudi Arabia and its impact on the large Indian Muslim population were seen as likely impediments to mutual cooperation between India and Saudi Arabia. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had visited Riyadh in 1982, thereby ending the 26-year-long communication gap and paving the way for closer ties between India and Saudi Arabia. These ties had been affected by factors such as India's support to Nasser's Egypt, its closer ties with Moscow and its allies in the WANA region. Moreover, Saudi Arabia had been looking for friends in the neighbourhood and, notwithstanding close Saudi-Pak ties, Riyadh had been keen on opening a new chapter with India. When Iraq failed to defeat Iran and the latter crossed the international border into Iraq by mid 1982, the GCC States had taken a series of steps in order to contain Iran. Saudi overtures to India should be seen in this context, in view of New Delhi's close ties with both Iran and Iraq (Pasha 1997a: 24–24, 26). Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the Gulf war in 1991 affected India's ties with some GCC States as India, neither condoning nor condemning the Iraqi invasion, justified its position by saying that 'condemnation is not part of the Indian nature' (Nuri 1992: 42). Of course, by simply 'regretting' the Iraqi move, India did not win the gratitude of either party. In the aftermath of the Kuwait crisis, through its skilful diplomacy India succeeded in clearing up the misunderstanding with the GCC states and, in particular, with Kuwait. Subsequent events like the Babri Masjid demolition and the Kashmir insurgency continued to cast a shadow on ties between India and the GCC. Most of the GCC states (particularly Kuwait) which signed security treaties with the US and its allies in the wake of the Gulf war were now cautious in their dealings with the US and worked to improve ties with Iran. The formidable western (especially US) naval presence in and around the Persian Gulf led to pressures on Iran and India, making it clear to them that both could cooperate on this issue affecting their security. The initiatives taken by Iran and the GCC states have, of late, gradually led to normalisation of ties. The December 1997 OIC summit in Tehran and the participation of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, the Kuwaiti and Qatari Amirs and other GCC leaders, has confirmed the growing rapprochement between Iran and some GCC states. The two-week visit to Saudi Arabia by the former Iranian President Rafsanjani in February–March 1998, the talks with King Fahd and Crown Prince Abdullah, Saudi reservations over the use of its territory by the US and its allies to attack Iraq, and Iranian opposition to the use of force against Iraq have revealed a growing convergence of views between Iran and Saudi Arabia. As the Iranian Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Mohammed Rez Nuri said, "Iran is opposed to any American military action against Iraq and calls on Baghdad to apply the UN resolution on disarmament." Nuri added that Iran and Saudi Arabia would "share the same position". The Iranian ambassador said Rafsanjani's meetings with Saudi leaders focussed on "strengthening bilateral relations in economic, commercial, cultural and security areas." A good relationship between Tehran and Riyadh is the key to security and stability in the Gulf region.2 Indian interests in the Gulf concern the safety and security of over four and a half million Indian migrant workers residing in the GCC states, and continued supply of oil and gas from the region. Besides, political stability is a precondition to ensure mutual cooperation through trade, aid and investment opportunities in the region. From the strategic point of view both India and Iran can work towards reducing the role of nonregional states whose policies, especially those of the US and Israel, are undermining peace, security and stability, leading to periodic threats of military intervention, either against Iraq or to safeguard the Kurds, or to prop up threatened fragile regimes against their own populations which are demanding political participation (as in the case of Bahrain). The US invasion and occupation of Iraq and the continued instability in many parts of Iraq, US accusations of Iranian interference in Iraqi affairs and US pressure on Iran to cease its nuclear programme, are putting pressure on Indo-Iranian ties. The attempts of the US to reshape Afghan affairs to increase Pakistani influence are also meant to strain Indo-Iranian ties. The determination of the US

to stay in Iraq and its attempts to put pressure on Iran for regime change are partly linked to helping project its power into Central Asia, given the enormous oil and gas reserves in that region. From the Indian perspective increasing bilateral ties with Iran is not only important due to trade, oil and gas, but also due to the unique proximity of Iran to events in Afghanistan, Central Asia, Iraq and the Gulf region. The common political and strategic concerns of India and Iran in the Gulf area will reinforce and strengthen mutual cooperation. If India and Iran can jointly reassure the GCC states of their desire to work for peace, security and stability in the region, outside interference, which many perceive to be the root cause of most of the problems which India, Iran and the GCC states face, could be contained. The Iraqi and Pakistani factors will eventually get integrated in the emerging approach. The 1990s have seen the reassertion of regional identities in the face of external interference. The critical space is widening and it is in this context that India, Iran and the GCC states can create opportunities in the oil-and-gas rich Gulf region for mutual benefit and jointly prepare to meet emerging domestic and external challenges (Pasha 1992; Jain 1994).

Indo-Iraqi Ties When Iraq nationalised the Iraqi Petroleum Company in June 1972, the US and the United Kingdom (UK) threatened to impose economic sanctions against Baghdad, and India supported Iraq on this issue. After this, India came to have close ties with Iraq until the latter invaded Kuwait in 1990. While pursuing a Cairo-centric policy, the Iraqi connection provided openings for Indian diplomacy in the Gulf region. This link led to a major breakthrough particularly in Indo-Iranian relations. It was also a lesson for Indian policy-makers that it was not necessary to make an 'either/or' choice between two contending countries and that it was quite feasible to have good relations with both on the basis of mutuality of interests. India's success in cultivating Iraq without alienating Iran was ample proof of this. India's deepening relations with Iraq also facilitated the subsequent process of political understanding and fruitful economic cooperation between India and various Gulf States (Mudiam 1994: 64). The 1970s saw close political and economic ties between India and Iraq. However, the Iran–Iraq war strained Indo-Iraqi ties due to a number of reasons. India described the war as an 'unfortunate development'. Moreover, Iraq did not like the shifting of the venue of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) summit from Baghdad to New Delhi. Iraq also expressed its 'dissatisfaction' to India over the NAM's role in ending the Iran– Iraq war. It was reported that Baghdad sent a low-level representation to Indira Gandhi's funeral to register its unhappiness (Jha 1986: 49–84). In view of the significance of Iraq to Indian interests in the region, New Delhi strove to maintain good bilateral ties in both political and economic spheres based on mutuality of interests. Under these circumstances, an impression was created in the initial stages that India supported the Iraqi takeover of Kuwait. This led to deep misunderstanding between Kuwait, the GCC states and India. However, India voted in favour of the 'mother of resolutions' passed by the UN Security Council (687) on 3 April 1991. In fact, India played a role in drafting and adopting the 21-page resolution, the longest in the UN's history, imposing very harsh conditions on Iraq. It was due to India that the emphasis on bringing an end to the military presence in Iraq was included and adopted. Again it was at India's insistence that a paragraph was added whereby the UN Security Council decided that the UN Secretary General would take into account "the requirements of the people of Iraq in particular their humanitarian needs, Iraqi payment capacity as assessed in conjunction with the international financial institutions, taking into consideration the external debt service and the needs of the Iraqi economy." India was also successful in getting the Security Council to adopt a measure whereby the prohibitions imposed against Iraq "shall not apply to foodstuffs and to materials and supplies for essential civilian needs as identified in the report of the Secretary General and in any further findings of humanitarian needs by the Sanctions Committee established by the Resolution 661 of 1990" (Pasha 1995b: 1278–79). It must be mentioned that India expressed serious reservations against 'the right to interference' in the internal affairs of a member-nation on humanitarian grounds, especially in the context of the Kurds and the Shias in Iraq. In this connection, India voiced its reservations when the Dutch expert on human rights, Max Van Der Stoel, appeared before the UN Security Council and warned that thousands of innocent lives were imperilled by the Iraqi authorities' disregard for human rights. Stoel, a rapporteur for the Switzerland-based Human Rights Commission, asked members to bear in mind that "thousands are in grave danger" (Pasha 1993b: 783–84). India's UN envoy, Chinmaya Gharekhan, said: "My delegation has

reservations about the appropriateness of the Council inviting Van Der Stoel." He stressed that India had always held that the various UN organs and bodies should restrict their deliberations and actions to their respective spheres of competence as defined under the charter. He warned: "deviation from the charter in which the nations of the world have reposed their faith and support, could erode the confidence and have great consequences for the furtherance of the organisation as a whole" (Pasha 1995b). He said the Security Council could focus its legitimate attention on the threat to peace and stability in the region, but it could not discuss human rights situations per se or make recommendations on matters outside its sphere of competence. Matters pertaining to human rights had to appropriately be discussed by the Human Rights Commission or the General Assembly, which were the organs competent to do so. Gharekhan noted the sponsor's explanation that Stoel had been invited in his personal capacity, not in any representative capacity. In his presentation, Stoel accused the Iraqi authorities of denying humanitarian assistance to victims, especially the Shias and Kurds. He said the poorer sections were the hardest hit. In the aftermath of the Gulf war, India, through its skilful diplomacy, succeeded in clearing the misunderstanding with the GCC states and in particular with Kuwait. Nevertheless, it must be noted that ties between India and Kuwait had deteriorated since the Kuwaiti leaders had publicly expressed anguish and surprise at India's ambivalent attitude during Kuwait's occupation by Iraq. The Kuwaiti foreign minister, during his visit to India in February 1992, had said, "We will forgive, but not forget." Not surprisingly, Kuwait, a member of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), in meetings after the war, had launched a scathing attack against India and had supported Pakistan's stand on holding a plebiscite in Kashmir. Even though ties between India and the GCC states improved gradually, the Kashmir and Babri Masjid issues continued to bedevil relations (Pasha and Punjabi 1998: 34–48). Reacting to the movement of Iraqi troops near the Kuwait border in October 1994, the official spokesperson of the Indian ministry of external affairs made the routine statement that India expressed concern over the situation in the Gulf region and hoped that no posture would be adopted "to threaten the territorial integrity of any state". Responding to questions on the events on the Iraqi-Kuwait border, the spokesperson said "India has been taking note of recent developments in the Gulf with concern" (Pasha 1995b). He also said that India had always believed that there should be no use or threat of use of force in international relations. This principle, he stated, applied to the present situation in Iraq and Kuwait. He added that "India supports sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all the states in the Gulf' (Ibid.). He said that this should be seen in the context of the relevant UN resolutions on the subject, and stressed the need for compliance with these resolutions. When Iraq under US pressure, decided to withdraw its forces amassed near the Kuwaiti border, India welcomed Iraq's decision. In a statement, the external affairs minister, Dinesh Singh, hoped that this would lead to Iraq's full compliance with the relevant UN resolutions for settlement of outstanding issues in the region. Interestingly, on 17 October 1994, several youth organisations held a demonstration outside the US embassy in New Delhi to protest against continued economic sanctions against Iraq. The demonstration was organised by the Falah-e-Milat action committee and the Indo-Iraqi Joint Youth Forum. The demonstrators, besides carrying placards, also denounced the US for its massive military and naval build-up in the oil-rich Gulf region. The organisation also submitted a memorandum to the US Ambassador to India Frank Wisner, stating that "imposing of unwarranted sanctions against innocent people of Iraq has caused hardships."3 In a related development, a spokesperson of the Indian external affairs ministry said, on 2 November 1994, that no Indian claimants had received any payment as compensation against their claims for losses suffered during the Iraqi takeover of Kuwait in August 1990. Responding to questions on the status of claims for compensation that had arisen from the invasion of Kuwait, the spokesperson said that no payments had yet been received by Indian claimants from the United Nations Compensation Commission. It was likely that some category B claims would be settled by March 1995. He added that the UN Compensation Commission Fund was actually short of the money needed to make payments for the claims ranging from categories 'A' to 'E' from numerous countries.4 In this connection it must also be mentioned that, according to the Overseas Construction Council of India (OCCI), 24 leading construction companies have not received as much as Rs. 300 crores by way of payment for work done in Iraq since July 1990. This outstanding amount was under different heads like equipment, machinery costs, and retention money and interest dues in Iraq. Soon after the Iraq-Kuwait war, in early 1991, all the exporters' account receivables were transferred to the Government

of India (GOI) whereby the Indian government was to collect all dues from the Iraqi government on behalf of the exporters. Due to the economic sanctions on Iraq and its inability to pay in US dollars, no payment has been received by the GOI. Under the circumstances, Indian companies have not been paid for the projects executed in Iraq. Harshvardan J. Shah, chairman of the Shah Construction Company said: "Our accounts have gone bad, we cannot bid for any new contracts." He added that the scene today is more like "export and perish".5 India's options in the Iraq crisis (2003) appeared to be extremely limited given the insistence of the US– UK alliance, egged on by the GCC, on effecting regime change in Iraq. India was keen to see Iraq remain a secular Arab country as it was one of the few that seemed virtually immune to the spread of Islamic revivalist influence (Pasha 1993: 53–90). During the Iraqi crisis Russia sent its foreign minister to Baghdad and gradually reasserted its independent international role. Even with Russia's stand, the position adopted by China, Germany and France could not prevent the US–UK invasion of Iraq. No doubt there was limited room for India to manoeuvre, but the US domination of the Gulf region has otherwise clearly marginalised India's influence in the area. This is not to deny the benefits from the low oil prices that resulted immediately after Iraq's defeat. Despite enormous pressure from the US, India refused to send troops to Iraq as part of the stabilisation force. However, the US has been going about defending its interests in a rather aggressive manner. But India must neither blindly endorse the US strategy in the area nor suspect it on every issue, but should redouble its diplomatic efforts to quickly assert, protect and promote its interests in the region, which are mainly related to oil, immigrants and security. Initially the assessment was that once tension was removed, the huge western naval presence, which was cause for concern, might decline in the neighbourhood of India. But the US is determined to keep its troops in Iraq for several years to oversee the transformation of Iraq into a US client state. The US is already focussing its attention on Iran and is trying to create similar pressures for a pre-emptive strike against Iran as it did in the case of Iraq the previous year. US inability to bring peace, order and security in Iraq and now the threat of a regime change in Iran via the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Iran's nuclear programme are creating conditions of instability, insecurity and chaos—a perfect situation for the growth of terrorism and religious groups, as happened in Afghanistan. It can be argued that there appears to be a drift in India's policy towards the Gulf region since at the moment, New Delhi does not seem to have close relations with Saudi Arabia or the other Gulf states due to OIC–Kashmir–Pakistan and other issues. The GCC states' overreaction to the plague situation was an indirect message to India concerning its attitude towards Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the issue of Kashmir. Since bringing order to Kashmir is a long-term process, India ought to be cautious with the GCC states, especially Saudi Arabia. In fact, there is an urgent need for a summit meeting with Saudi Arabia and closer ties with other GCC states in the context of normalisation of ties with Iraq. In fact, this ought to be India's priority. At the same time, India should make its interests in Iraq clear to the GCC states. First, New Delhi must be clearer in its objectives and impart the necessary dynamism. But do Indian leaders have the time, interest and ability to pursue more than routine policies? Can India put the Kashmir issue on the right track soon so as to free itself from its obsession with Pakistan? Islamabad's attempt to internationalise the Kashmir issue has, of course, made some impact on some Muslim states, but India's position is well appreciated. New Delhi has succeeded in consistently refuting the insinuations and neutralising the fairly critical anti-Indian resolutions at OIC and other meetings but it must show greater sensitivity towards the security concerns of interested actors in the area. There is need for greater Indian interest and initiative in the area so as to ensure peace, security and stability (Pasha 1997: 22–23).

India and the Kuwait Crisis The Gulf crisis over Kuwait in August 1990 took India by surprise and posed a major challenge. Owing to its close political and economic ties with Iraq, during the initial stages of the crisis it appeared as though New Delhi was leaning towards Iraq. This led to a misunderstanding between Kuwait and India. Actually, India strongly disapproved of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and called it illegal and said that Kuwait should be vacated. India called for immediate Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait but stopped short of condemning Iraq's invasion. Since India did not openly take sides, Kuwait and other GCC states assumed that India's sympathies lay with Iraq. The Kuwait crisis affected India in many ways. Under the pretext of evacuation more than

170,000 Indian nationals were stranded in Kuwait and Iraq. But the Indian government displayed no apparent enthusiasm to resolve the crisis. Public pressure and also the decision of MPs from Kerala to sit on a day-long fast at the Parliament House on 16 August 1990 to protest against the 'inaction of the government regarding the plight of Indians' in both the Gulf states forced the government to accord the safe evacuation of Indians top priority. This partly explains India's decision not to condemn the Iraqi action, as it could have jeopardized the repatriation of Indians from the Gulf. India was also faced with the loss of crude oil supplies from both Iraq and Kuwait, compelling it to look for alternative supplies. During 1990, Kuwait had agreed to sell India about 1.5 million tonnes of oil and Iraq 6.25 million tones, which included about 4.5 million tonnes that Iraq was transferring to India on behalf of the USSR against rupee payment. Before the crisis began India had received only half the oil from the total of about 7.75 million tonnes and it was difficult for India to procure the rest. Moreover, an increase in oil prices in the spot market from about $17 per barrel in July 1990 to $35 per barrel upset India's economy. According to one estimate, India lost nearly $3 billion [US] in foreign exchange alone. This included $2.36 billion as extra import of oil, $200 million to evacuate Indians from the Gulf, $200 million as loss of exports to these two states and about $200 million as loss of remittances sent by Indian workers from both countries. All this pushed India to seek a loan from the International Monetary Fund [IMF] where US support was crucial. India's dependence on the US, the latter's role as the leader of the anti-Iraq coalition, together with the turn in Soviet policy in favor of the West, placed serious constraints on Indian foreign policy. The fact that the V.P. Singh and Chandrasekhar governments were minority governments engaged in serious domestic problems made it easier for the US to influence India. The governments partly shared the fear of the West, particularly the US, that Saddam Hussein would control over fifty per cent of the world oil reserves if he was not pushed out of Kuwait. No wonder India allowed the refuelling of US military planes and went along with its being the sole superpower at the UN. According to K.P. Fabian, who was Joint Secretary, Gulf, at the ministry of external affairs (MEA), "We did not join the USled coalition as we were engaged in finding a non-military resolution. The US resented this. Its friends outside India told us that we were getting isolated. Since our principled position conveyed the impression of a proIraq tilt, the decision was taken at the highest level – under pressure – to agree to the US request for refueling facilities." In fact, India could have played a more worthwhile role in most of the UN Security Council resolutions, which were passed before it became a non-permanent member of the Council. Under the leadership of Yugoslavia, the NAM went along with the West and the UN resolutions, and India's role was marginal. Many have attacked India's approach to the Iraq-Kuwait crisis as 'malleable', 'deliberate ambiguity', 'wait and see', 'opportunism' and so on. Undoubtedly, besides securing oil supplies, getting back Indian workers and ensuring their welfare and safety in the other Gulf States was uppermost in the minds of the policymakers. But New Delhi was equally concerned about the escalation of the crisis and its probable spillover effects. On the one hand, India was committed to adhering to the UN resolutions on Iraq, but at the same time, it took care not to openly condemn Iraq's aggression. This was in line with India's policy to seek friendly ties with all states in the WANA region. India, by neither condoning nor condemning the Iraqi takeover of Kuwait, justified its position by saying that "condemnation is not part of the Indian nature". Of course, by simply 'regretting' the invasion, it did not win the gratitude of either party. It was in fact misunderstood by both the parties and by others also. Room for India to manoeuvre in the Gulf crisis was rather limited, given the resolve of the US/West/GCC to contain Iraq. India could not take peace initiatives on its own to resolve the crisis, because the Indian government was beset with serious domestic problems; as a leading member of the NAM, it did take some feeble initiatives but these came too late, partly because of deep differences within the movement, especially caused by Yugoslavia's one-sided stance.6 Of course, at times the government did give the impression of taking independent initiatives but they appeared half-hearted and ultimately India virtually remained a silent spectator under US pressure. It was very clear that none of India's governments were willing to annoy the US or other western powers given their determination and resolve to teach Saddam Hussein a lesson and cripple Iraq's military machine. The Indian government was unwilling even to criticise the US influence in the UN Security Council and was willing to do what the UN wanted India to do as far as its role in the region was concerned. Unlike Cuba, which opposed, and Yemen and Ecuador, which abstained, India voted in favour of the 'mother of resolutions' passed by the UN Security Council [687] on 3 April 1991. Many criticised India's affirmative vote on the ground that it brushed aside the principle of respect for state sovereignty and imposed a series of humiliating terms for cease-fire, virtually turning Iraq into a demilitarised

nation. Of course, India justified its support to the resolution in the following words: The authors of the draft have assured us, bilaterally as well in the course of informal consultations, that they have put together the various elements of the resolution in the full understanding that the international community is dealing with a unique situation of which there has been no parallel since the establishment of United Nations; hopefully there will be none in the future. We have been urged to look at the resolution in the light of this uniqueness of the situation (Murthy 1992: 17–18). It must be mentioned that India expressed serious reservations about 'the right to interference' in the internal affairs of a member-nation on humanitarian grounds. This was on UN Resolution 688 of 5 April 1991. Moreover, India is a member of the 35-nation United Nations Iraq-Kuwaiti Observer Mission (UNIKOM) to patrol the demilitarised zone [DMZ] along the Iraq–Kuwait border. India is also associated with the monitoring commissions and teams meant to supervise Iraqi payment of compensation and elimination of weapons of mass destruction (Nuri 1992: 36–39). The ambiguous stand taken by India on Iraq's aggression towards Kuwait strained India's ties with the Kuwaitis, who began asking embarrassing questions: Why did India take Iraq's side during the Gulf war? Why did the Indian government refuse an audience to Kuwait's ambassador in New Delhi? Why was India the only country in the world to move its embassy from Kuwait to Basra during the war? Did Kuwait cease to exist as a nation in 1990? These were very difficult questions for Indian officials to answer.

India's Economic Relations with the GCC India's economic linkages with the GCC increased during the 1970s and 80s especially due to growth in oil imports. Also, the oil-rich GCC states with their massive oil revenues embarked on an ambitious economic development programme, which led to a demand for labour in GCC states. India with its surplus labour became a major source of supply. The rapid modernisation of the GCC States generated a demand for goods and services and India seized the opportunity. More than four million Indians send over $10 billion (US) in remittances. Indian banks have also mobilised deposits and investments from Gulf Indians. During 1999–2000 India's exports to the GCC were worth nearly $5 billion (US) and imports from the GCC $7 billion. The bilateral two-way trade exceeded $12 billion. Information Technology exports to the GCC currently at $170 million are poised for a significant upswing. India's exports to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) during 1976–79 stood at Rs 167 crore and imports at about Rs 77.5 crore. In 1979–80 they stood at Rs 130.77 crore and Rs 208.8 crore. With a trade turnover of $4.4 billion in 1999–2000, the UAE was India's biggest trade partner in the GCC. India's exports to the UAE in the same year were worth $2 billion and its imports $2.3 billion. Some of it was for and from third states and Pakistan imported some Indian products via Dubai. UAE was the first GCC state to provide aid to India through the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab economic development (ADFAED). During 1974–75 it gave Rs 37.5 crore. In 1975–76 Rs 15 crore. From 1976–77 the ADFAED started giving aid directly instead of through the UAE government. In 1976–77 it gave Rs 12.9 crore, in 1977–78 Rs 5.25 crore, in 1979–80 Rs 5.94 crore, and in 1980–81 Rs 1.73 crore. The aid has been given to the Garhwal Rishikesh Chila hydroelectric project in Uttaranchal and other projects. A large number of India's public and private companies have taken active part in the industrialisation of the UAE, through either contracts or joint ventures. Some of them are—the refinery in the Ruwais area in Abu Dhabi by Engineering Projects India Limited (EPI), a tube- blending plant and a turnkey project by the Balmer Lawrie group, consultancy work for the Abu Dhabi National Oil Co. by ONGC, the laying of a multipurpose pipeline by Engineers India Limited (EIL) and civil construction work for the airport at Abu Dhabi by Engineering Construction Corporation (ECC) Ltd. Dubai now allows the ownership of real estate by foreigners. Reputed Indian companies like the Tatas, Kamanis, Dastur and others have taken part in the industrial development of the UAE. In the Jebel Ali free trade zone about 160 Indian companies – the largest number from any one country – have taken part. Fifty-six are joint ventures. The Sadiyat free trade zone is attracting many Indian companies. Software is the new field in bilateral trade with firms like Satyam and Infosys active in business. The UAE has about twenty joint ventures—mostly in the private sector— in India, especially in Gujarat and Maharashtra. The offshore and onshore oil drilling platforms plant in Maharashtra

is the most significant. Kuwait-India total trade turnover during 1999–2000 was $2.07 billion. India's exports to Kuwait were worth $154 million and imports $1.91 billion. The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) has been giving economic aid to India on low interest rates since it started in 1975–76, when it gave Rs 31.5 crore; in 1978–79 it gave Rs 19.74 crore; and in 1980–81 Rs 6.12 crore. The fund has tried to limit the impact of political considerations on its lending operations. Most of the studies regarding the operations of the KFAED have noted a lack of discrimination on political grounds in loan disbursements. In 1981–82 it gave Rs 52.50 crore; in 1982–83 Rs 30.03 crore; in 1985–86 Rs 14.70 crore; in 1988–89 Rs 36 crore; in 1990–91 Rs 1 crore; in 1992–93 Rs 6 crore; in 1993–94 Rs 9 crore; in 1994–95 Rs 4 crore; in 1995–96 Rs 17 crore; and in 1996 Rs 134 crore. Kuwait has given aid to the following projects in India: Kalinidi hydroelectric project, power projects I, II (Rs 29 and Rs 31.5 crore); Kopli hydroelectric project (Rs 20 crore); Anpara thermal power projects and coal handling and transport (Rs 3.3 crore and Rs 19 crore); Kerala fisheries development project (Rs 36 crore); and Thal fertilizer project (Rs 36 crore). Despite Kuwait's unhappiness over India's ambiguous position during Iraq's invasion, a number of Indian firms were given contracts in the rebuilding of Kuwait. India has shown interest in Kuwait's downstream petrochemical sector whereas Kuwait has evinced interest in India's petrochemical complexes. India has also shown interest in setting up a gas-based fertiliser plant in view of huge quantities of gas in Kuwait and a refinery on the west coast of India. There is also a one billion dollar joint venture proposal between Indian Oil Corporation and Kuwait Petroleum Corporation [KPC] to build a refinery in Orissa. A fourteen-member delegation from the Powerloom Development and Export Promotion Council visited Kuwait in 2001 and organised a buyer–seller meet. An Indian jewellery and gold exhibition was held in Kuwait from 2–6 June 2001. Lt. General R.K. Sawhney DCIOS (T&C) MOD paid an official visit to Kuwait on 29–30 April 2001 and met with senior officials from Kuwait's defence ministry to discuss defence-related issues. A Bilateral Investment Projection Agreement (BIPA) was signed between the two parties on 27 November 2001. Since the early 1960s Pakistan had become a major irritant in Indo-Saudi ties especially because of its military aid. It is against this backdrop that one should see Indira Gandhi's visit to Riyadh in April 1982 which ended the 26-year-long communication gap between the two states. Her visit paved the way for better relations and heralded a new era. It must be mentioned that despite the lack of political understanding IndoSaudi economic ties flourished. Indira Gandhi's visit to the kingdom paved the way for a new chapter in economic cooperation. The most tangible gain was the setting up of an Indo-Saudi joint commission to promote economic and technical collaboration. It was inspired by the assumption that a combination of Indian technology, skilled manpower and Saudi money could work to strengthen South–South cooperation. The joint commission was established under an economic and technical cooperation agreement in April 1981. The commission met in Riyadh in 1983, in New Delhi in 1986, then again in New Delhi during 13–15 November 1991 and again in 1996 and 2002. India's trade with Riyadh has increased since Nehru's visit in September 1956 and risen steadily since 1973. The two-way trade during 1963–64 was a mere Rs 24.3 crore. India's exports to Riyadh have always been less than its imports. During 1990–2001 imports were valued at Rs 2897.73 crore and exports at Rs 418.42 crore. The trade turnover during 1999–2000 was $3.75 billion. However, much of this adverse balance is made up by the flow of remittances from over 1.5 million Indian workers in the kingdom. Moreover, Indian companies both public and private have taken on and completed numerous lucrative projects in the kingdom and earned huge profits. Saudi Arabia has given loans to India through the Saudi Development Fund as follows: 1977–78 Rs 75 crore; 1981–82 Rs 17.70 crore; 1983–84 Rs 17.23 crore; 1985–86 Rs 28.72 crore; 1987– 88 Rs 50 crore; 1988–89 Rs 6 crore; 1989–90 Rs 43 crore; 1990–91 Rs 30 crore; 1991–92 Rs 27 crore; 1992–93 Rs 2 crore; and in 1996 Rs 152 crore. The loans, given at low interest rates, were for these projects: Sirsailam and Nagarjunasagar power projects in Andhra Pradesh (1977 Rs 75 crore); Rajasthan Canal project; Koel Karo power project in Bihar (1981 Rs 17.70 crore); Koraput Rayagad railway project (1983 Rs 17.23 crore); Ramagundam Thermal power project II (1985 Rs 50 crore); Nhawa Sheva port project (T&C, 1987 Rs 50 crore). A five- member delegation led by the chairman of Indian Oil Corporation visited Saudi Arabia during 6–8 April 2001 to renew a term contract with Riyadh for the supply of crude oil and other petroleum products

to India for 2001–2002. Bahrain is now allowing Indians with more than fifteen years of experience and healthy bank balances to reside in the country even without work permits. The Bahrain–India trade turnover in 1999–2000 was $435 million. India's exports to Bahrain were worth $60 million and its imports $375 million. The Electronics and Computer Software Export Promotion Council sent a fifteen- member delegation to Bahrain in May 2001. They signed an MOU with Bahrain's Economic Development Board for development of the IT sector. The Indo-Qatar trade turnover in 1989 was $38 million and in 1995 $130 million. India's exports to Qatar increased from $22 million in 1989 to $32 million in 1995. In 1999–2000 the trade turnover was $245 million. Indian exports were $35 million and imports $209 million. There is a wide gap in Indo-Qatar trade, which is reflected in an adverse and growing deficit in the balance of trade for India. Qatar's Rasgas has also tied up with Petronet LNG for the supply of 7.5 million tonnes of LNG per annum for Petronet's plants at Dabhol, Maharashtra and at Cochin, Kerala. There are about two lakh Indian workers in Qatar who send valuable foreign exchange, which is quite helpful in reducing the balance of trade deficit faced by India in its trade with Qatar. The Qatar minister of energy met with India's secretary of the ministry of petroleum and natural gas on 16 May 2001 at Seoul and discussed the import of LNG by India from Qatar. A two-member delegation from Indian Oil Corporation visited Qatar during 23–25 June 2001 to discuss cooperation in the areas of technical consultancy and training manpower. Bharti Shipyard of Mumbai signed a contract worth $4.6 million with Halal Offshore Services Company of Qatar in July 2001. An Indian ship builder ABG Shipyard entered into a 100 million QR contract with a Qatar company for four identical supply vessels. India's relations with Oman are very old and historic. Among the Indian rulers Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan of Mysore maintained good political and thriving economic relations. These came to an end with the domination of the Gulf region by the British. It is only since 1970 that Oman has been following an independent foreign policy under Sultan Qaboos. During the 1971 Bangladesh crisis, Oman was the only Arab/ Muslim country that did not completely side with Pakistan. In recent times high-level visits have taken place between India and Oman. Prime Minister Narasimha Rao visited Oman in June 1993; President Shankar Dayal Sharma visited Oman in October 1996; the Omani Sultan came to India in April 1997; and in August 1998 Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee visited Oman. Oman has decided to participate in two oil refineries in India. The Oman-India Fertilizer Company (OMIFCO) is a $1 billion project and is expected to produce 1.65 million tonnes of granulated urea and 0.25 million tonnes of surplus ammonia per year. IndiaOman trade improved from $96 million in 1990 to $134 million in 1996. India's exports to Oman increased from $56 million in 1990 to $114 million in 1996. India's imports from Oman declined from $40 million in 1990 to $20 million in 1996. Among all the GCC states Oman is the only state with which India has balance of trade surplus. During 1999–2000 the Indo-Oman trade turnover was $194 million. India's exports to Oman were worth $132 million and imports $62 million. The two states are working to establish a fertilizer factory in Oman. The Indian minister of chemicals and fertilizers visited Muscat during 4–5 December 2001 and signed key agreements relating to the Oman-India fertilizer project in Qalhat, south of Muscat, during the visit. There are a number of joint ventures which Indian companies have taken up in Oman (Pasha 2003: 9– 15).

GCC and the Babri Masjid Issue The GCC countries described the Babri Masjid incident on 6 December 1992 as 'sacrilege and unpardonable act'. At the thirteenth summit of the GCC in Abu Dhabi, UAE, in December 1992, the council adopted a resolution titled "Aggression against the Babri Mosque" in which it expressed its "deep condemnation of the Babri Mosque demolition" which was described as a "crime against Muslim holy places". The resolution called upon the Indian government to uphold its responsibilities and to take further measures to protect Muslims, their religious rights and places of worship. It urged the Indian government to rebuild the mosque as promised. Clearly, the GCC had gone beyond the expected condemnation of the demolition already voiced by some of the members, the severest of course being from Saudi Arabia and the most moderate stance from the UAE.7 India reacted sharply to the GCC summit resolution regarding the mosque demolition and voiced its

unhappiness. An Indian government spokesperson commented: "These matters pertain to internal affairs of India and concerns expressed from abroad in the context, however well meaning they may be, are not helpful in meeting the challenge posed by communal elements." What upset India about the GCC stand was that it had expected that the summit would merely debate on the Babri Masjid events and in view of the earlier condemnation by individual members would not mention the issue in the final communiqué. In view of Iran's tough stand on the mosque demolition issue, even the moderate members of the GCC like the UAE had to fall in line because no GCC member wanted to be charged with being soft on India. The UAE deplored the event as a "shameful act" and said that actions causing damage to places of worship were against the spirit of harmony and coexistence in society. Further, the UAE called upon India to take urgent steps to end such acts and protect the sanctity of places of worship.8 Meanwhile, several protest processions took place in various parts of the UAE expressing anger and outrage over the demolition. In Dubai the protestors stoned a temple, surrounded the Indian consulate and raised slogans against the Indian Government, and some resorted to looting and stone pelting. The worst affected area was Al Ain, 250 kilometres east of the capital, Abu Dhabi, where angry protestors set fire to the girls' wing of an Indian school and a church was attacked and ransacked. Several police officers were killed in the violence while trying to control the riots without the use of force. Of all the GCC states, it was only in the UAE (maybe due to the large presence of immigrants from the Indian subcontinent) that riots broke out over the Babri Mosque demolition issue. The Pakistanis who attacked Hindu temples and Indian business houses were deported by the UAE. Some Indians were also deported. The UAE acted with unusual firmness against those who indulged in violence. Commander-in-Chief of Dubai Police Brigadier Dhahi Khalfan said: 'Those who want to create unrest here should go back to their countries and launch protest against what annoys them. Our country should not be used as a place to settle the differences that exist between different communities, groups and faiths' (Pasha and Punjabi 1998: 39). The expulsion of thousands of Pakistani citizens from the UAE became embarrassing to Islamabad especially because another Islamic country had done it. Pakistan did everything to prevent many of its nationals from being deported. In fact, initially the Pakistani government tried to play down the issue but due to the public outcry, the UAE ambassador was summoned to limit the damage. The UAE gave all possible support to India in connection with the Bombay blasts, especially in connection with the reported escape of the Memon family via Dubai. It condemned all terrorism and violence which resulted in the killing of innocent people. It agreed to work with India to curb terrorism and step up cooperation in security measures. The Indian ambassador in the UAE, Ranjith Sethi, said: "There has been no adverse impact on our relations in any manner. We have been given every assistance by the UAE authorities at every level" (in the Memon case). He added that the UAE was ready to help in every possible way in matters vital to the security of India.9 The refuge given by the UAE to Indian nationals whom the government of India wanted, for crimes committed in India, had become an issue in bilateral relations. In this connection L.K. Advani, India's home minister, visited the UAE on 13 July 2001 to discuss issues related to the extradition treaty. He called on the president of the UAE and discussed with him regional and international issues of mutual interest. Some people in the government, bureaucracy and mass media of India continue to portray the UAE as a country, especially Dubai, as a haven for Indian criminals. The UAE also gets negative publicity in India. This image needs to be corrected as this might lead to unpleasant problems in the future. Kuwait's first deputy prime minster and foreign minister expressed the hope that India would rebuild the Babri mosque and hand it over to the Muslims. In an interesting development, the Kuwait government blocked a decision by a community-run supermarket to dismiss non-Muslim Indian employees in protest against the Babri Masjid events. The Kuwaiti minister for social affairs and labour, Jassem Mohammed Al Oun, ordered the Al Sabaahiya Al Ahmadi Co-operative Society supermarket to rescind its 15 December 1992 decision. In a related development, in a letter to the editor of Kuwait's Arab Times, writers requested the GCC governments not to recruit the Indian Hindus and to send back those who were already in the country. It was also reported that many in Kuwait were very keen to organise demonstrations and close shops to protest against India, but apparently this could not materialise in view of the Kuwaiti government's tough opposition to such activities.10

GCC and Kashmir

India's External Affairs Minister Madhavasingh Solanki visited Kuwait in mid February 1992, the first ministerial visit to Kuwait since the Iraq–Kuwait war. The visit was primarily aimed at building bridges to overcome the breach created by India's ambivalent attitude during Kuwait's occupation by Iraq. As seen earlier, relations between the two had deteriorated since, and Kuwaiti leaders had publicly expressed their disapproval of India's stand during the Kuwaiti crisis. After holding talks with the Kuwaiti emir and foreign minister, Solanki said Kuwait wanted India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir issue through peaceful negotiations in accordance with international norms. L.L. Mehrotra, secretary in the ministry of external affairs, who accompanied Solanki, claimed that the visit was a diplomatic triumph. Apparently, both were impressed by Kuwait's support of the Shimla Agreement and were also satisfied with its explanation of its attack on India at the OIC meeting. In protest against the demolition of the Babri Masjid, two independent deputies in the Kuwaiti National Assembly, Khalid Al Adwah (an Islamist) and Mohammed Sharar, tabled a proposal in January 1994 for the boycott of Indian Hindus and a ban on their entry into Kuwait. The Kuwaiti government rejected the proposal on 15 August 1994 saying that such a move would worsen Kuwait's relations with India and stressed that the proposal violated political and religious norms. The state minister for cabinet affairs, Abdul Aziz Al Dakheel, said Kuwait was not solely responsible for Muslim affairs around the world: "Defence of Muslims should be made in a collective way through Islamic organisations concerned, especially the OIC." He also said, "only a small group of Hindus were terrorising Muslims in India and this should not be generalised on all of them." He did not support the suggestion to ban Kuwaitis from visiting India. He stressed that Muslim countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh and Indonesia had not even thought of taking such a measure. He felt the proposal was likely to give the impression that Islam was a radical religion and thus would harm the cause of Muslims rather than serving it. He felt that the adoption of the proposal would spoil Kuwait's image and its human rights record. Moreover, Kuwait was still subject to criticism on several issues, including that of human rights. Acceptance of the deputies' demand would also encourage the Islamic fundamentalist group in Kuwait, the Minister pointed out. The Kuwaiti government's firm position in rejecting the call of the two deputies to punish the whole Hindu community for the misdeed of a fraction of the community was commendable and demonstrated the progressive character of the Al Sabah regime in Kuwait. Moreover, any acceptance of the deputies' demand would have called for an end to UN economic sanctions against Iraq from which India had been suffering in terms of loss of export opportunities, a halt in the flow of remittances, and the need of finding alternative sources to offset the loss of oil supplies from Iraq.11 Among all the Gulf states, India enjoys the strongest economic and political relationship with the UAE, where the presence of Indian workers is economically significant. The UAE president, Sheikh Zayed, came to India on a three-day visit on 28 April 1992. He had earlier visited India on two occasions. The stand adopted by the UAE on Kashmir at all meetings so far had been remarkably restrained. But with the demolition of the Babri Masjid and the Bombay bomb blasts, the UAE appeared to shift its earlier position. At the OIC foreign ministers' meeting at Karachi in 1994 the UAE called for guaranteeing the "national rights and Islamic identity of Kashmiri people". The UAE minister of state for foreign affairs in his speech expressed concern over the situation in Kashmir and called for a settlement of the problem. He said, "the situation in Kashmir is still tense and could flare up unless tension is defused, before it is too late." He further added: "We appeal to all parties concerned to work for resolving this problem through wisdom and objectivity and we hope to see a peaceful solution that is acceptable to all parties within the framework of international resolutions and bilateral agreements that will guarantee the national rights and the Islamic identity of the people there [Kashmir]."12 A significant change took place in the UAE's posture towards India. The change was obviously linked to the demolition of the Babri mosque after which the UAE took a series of steps to indicate its displeasure: refusing to receive India's minister of state for external affairs, R.L. Bhatia; attempting to cold-shoulder a goodwill Indian naval visit; and expressing no enthusiasm to specify dates for a visit by Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao. R.L. Bhatia finally visited the UAE on 25 May 1993 where he rejected the suggestion of mediation by another country to resolve the Kashmir issue. He said, "people can advise on friendly basis, but we cannot accept any mediation. Kashmir is a bilateral matter and we do not want any outside interference." Saudi Arabia called for a solution of the Kashmir issue based on UN resolutions, arguing that the long-

standing problem had cast a shadow on Indo-Pak ties. Gaafar M. Allagamy's address to the UN General Assembly said: "It must be noted that this part of the world continues to be an element of instability in the region." Riyadh helped Pakistan build support for intervention in the UN Commission for Human Rights meeting in March 1994. This was possible as Saudi Arabia wielded considerable influence in the OIC, being the leading brain behind its establishment and its main financial backer. The fact of the headquarters being located in Jeddah also enabled it to manoeuvre and direct the OIC operations. Salman Khurshid, India's minister of state for external affairs, in an oblique reference to Riyadh's support to Pakistan, said during the UNCHR meeting that India was not asking for a special rapporteur to be sent to investigate the condition of women in Saudi Arabia. In the wake of the Babri Masjid events it was reported that Hindu workers were being discriminated against in Saudi Arabia. But R.L. Bhatia told the Indian parliament that the Saudi government had denied that there was any discrimination against Indian employees. But India did take up such matters officially with the Saudi government. Bhatia remarked that the government was aware of the biased coverage of India in Saudi newspapers and the instances of deportation of Indian workers at short notice. In an interview with the Saudi newspaper, Arab News, former Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao said that barring the solitary exception of Pakistan, India had cordial relations with all Islamic states and Saudi Arabia in particular. He remarked that cordiality and mutual respect had always marked historic ties between India and Saudi Arabia. He pointed out that the number of Indians presently residing in Saudi Arabia, approximately six hundred thousand, was higher than in any country except India itself. He was happy to note that during the financial year 1992–93 India had purchased over Rs 4332.9 crore worth of crude oil and exported to Saudi Arabia goods worth over Rs 1180.1 crore. These figures were among the highest between India and an Islamic country. During 1990–91, imports were valued at Rs 2897.73 crore and exports Rs 418.42 crore. This was an improvement compared to the 1973–74 figures, which included Rs 1131.35 crore worth of imports while Indian exports to Saudi Arabia were, as they have always been, less than its imports. Narasimha Rao also said, "we are in constant touch with our Saudi friends to strengthen these ties further on the basis of mutual advantage."13 The slackness on India's part in its interaction with Saudi Arabia was revealed when India learnt about the Saudi decision to co-sponsor the Pakistani resolution at the UNCHR meeting, Geneva, March 1994, on alleged human rights violations in Kashmir by India, even though Saudi Arabia was not a member of the UNCHR. The external affairs minister, Dinesh Singh, called the Saudi step to support Pakistan at Geneva "quite wrong", and said the issue should not be given a "communal colour". It would only create difficulties for the Muslims (in India), he added. Meanwhile, Salman Khurshid, his deputy, told a press conference in Geneva that India was not seeking UN observers to monitor the human rights situation in Saudi Arabia. It needs to be underlined that in view of India's lack of sensitivity to Saudi national security concerns, the Saudis have always looked upon India's close ties with the kingdom's enemies with deep suspicion, which has, in fact, driven them to support Pakistan on Kashmir and other issues hurting India. The overreaction to the plague scare in October 1994 by the GCC was due to Saudi Arabian initiative. Again the Saudi decision to be a member of the OIC contact group on Kashmir and its willingness to sponsor a resolution on Kashmir for Pakistan at the UN were hints to India to show greater restraint and sensitivity towards the Saudi security predicament. All this clearly indicated that the time had come for India to take the initiative for a summit meeting not only to prevent stagnation in ties but also to have better Indo-US ties, since Riyadh, like Israel, is perceived by many as the gateway to the US. Saudi Arabia's position on Kashmir now emphasises the bilateral process of a dialogue with Pakistan on the basis of existing agreements like Shimla and Lahore. It has condemned all forms of extremism and made a fervent appeal for peace between India and Pakistan. The appeal was made during Crown Prince Abdullah's meeting with Najma Heptullah in Jeddah in 2001. Riyadh also sent aid to the victims of the Gujarat earthquake and condemned the attack on India's parliament as an act of terrorism. In a smaller or larger measure, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman have either expressed disinterest or toned down their earlier stance on Kashmir. Bahrain, which took a balanced 'UN resolutions and framework of Shimla Agreement' position, has removed the UN resolutions part and kept the Shimla framework.14 India must strive to maintain close ties with Riyadh for a variety of reasons–the location of Muslim holy places, its vast

oil reserves and strong finances, its overwhelming influence on GCC states–which give the Saudi state the ability to influence many groups and parties worldwide as evidenced by its role in Afghanistan, and its weaning of countries like Egypt, Sudan, Somalia and others away from the former Soviet Union. So far many OIC states have not directly adhered to the numerous hostile resolutions adopted against India, and have not allowed the resolutions to interfere in the evolution of bilateral, political and economic ties. Pakistan's attempt to bring about resolutions on Kashmir at the UN and other fora makes it difficult for some of the OIC states, which would prefer their ambiguities to remain unravelled. As an Arab diplomat put it, "This has made it very difficult for us. We are being asked to stand up and be counted."15 It is heartening to note that despite its chairmanship in the OIC and except for Saudi Arabia, Albania and Bosnia, Pakistan was unable to get a single Islamic country to join it at the UNCHR meeting in March 1994 and subsequently at the UN. No country, not even staunch supporters and members of the OIC like Iran, were prepared to be partisan in a dispute between India and Pakistan. Even those OIC states which support Pakistan on Kashmir do not wish to let this issue become an insurmountable obstacle in working with India on the basis of mutual advantage. Nevertheless, it appears as though Kashmir and other issues, for instance those relating to Indian Muslims, are likely to bedevil India's relations with many OIC states. It appears that the time has come for India to approach the OIC much more seriously than has been the case so far. It is essential that periodic summit meetings be arranged and initiatives be taken to prevent stagnation in our ties. With a decline in Arab nationalism and communism, and with the Israeli factor losing its importance due to growing rapprochement between the Palestine Liberation Organisation and Israel and other Arab nations, Pakistan's continued nonrecognition of Israel will not enhance its influence in the area and hence its ability to undermine India's interests by mobilising the OIC states will weaken. Although Pakistan's nuclear explosions have been welcomed by some WANA states, these states have also appreciated the Indian nuclear policy. Pakistan's attempt to use the Kashmir issue to corner India is nothing new. Its parochial religious approach has, of course, made some limited impact on OIC members but India has in the past actively sought to vindicate its position, especially its secular credentials. It has succeeded in consistently refuting the insinuations and neutralising the anti-Indian resolutions at the international forums, especially at OIC meetings. India's secular approach was by and large understood and appreciated, at least until recently. But the Babri Masjid issue and the subsequent large scale communal riots raised serious doubts, perhaps for the first time, about India's commitment to secularism. India's non- aligned policy and secular political system coupled with its military and economic capability alone can help it in developing relations with the Gulf states on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. Despite fear of an oil embargo, stoppage of the Gulf investments, and reduction or expulsion of Indian labour, especially from some oil-producing GCC states, none of them has so far initiated any hostile action against India. Even private firms which took action against some Indians in one or two GCC states had to change their stance due to their government's firm intervention. The GCC states and India face the menace of terrorism and religious extremism and the need to combat such forces has assumed urgency. A modest beginning has been made for cooperation with the GCC states in the field of security, which has rich potential. Many also emphasise the need to fulfill the growing aspirations of the Gulf people to play a greater role in the sphere of political participation and decision making. Political systems which allow more space for civil society and work to enhance their legitimacy would prove to be more enduring and also develop a stake in peace and stability. Of course, outside support will continue to be a major factor in Gulf politics but it is internal support which will eventually decide the final outcome, especially of major issues concerning peace, security and stability. So far Indian diplomacy has been fairly successful in containing the negative impact of domestic issues on India's relations with the GCC states, but things are rapidly changing in the region. Lest India becomes complacent, there is an urgent need to do some hard thinking on how best to keep its house in order and not give others the chance/opportunity to harm its interests. It would be foolhardy to assume that things would remain the same despite serious developments domestically and that any disturbance of status quo would hurt the GCC more than India. India must be vigilant and not allow domestic developments to get out of hand due to electoral politics and posturing and also not allow outsiders to interfere in its domestic affairs.

References

Abidi, A.H.H. 1994. Relations between India and Iran: 1947–79. Working Paper, Gulf Studies Programme, Centre for West Asian and African Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Gupta, Sushma. 1988. Pakistan as a Factor in Indo-Iran Relations, 1947–1978. New Delhi: S. Chand. Government of India. 1980. Annual Report, 1979–80. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs. ——. 1992. Foreign Affairs Record 38(4). New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs. Jain, P.C. 1994. Aspects of Indian Emigration to Gulf Countries. Working Paper. Gulf Studies Programme, Center for West Asian and African Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Jha, Ajay Nath. 1986. Indo-Iraqi Relations, 1947–86: Need for a fresh initiative. Foreign Affairs Reports 35 (6 & 7): 49–84. Mudiam, Prithvi Ram. 1994. India and the Middle East. London: British Academic Press. Murthy, C.S.R. 1992. India at the UN. World Focus 13(5): 17–18. Nuri, M.H. 1992. India and the Gulf Crisis. BHS Journal 13(1): 36–42. Pasha, A.K. ed. 1992. The Gulf in Turmoil: A Global Response. New Delhi: Lancers. Pasha, A.K. 1993a. Recent Political Reforms in Saudi Arabia. Journal of West Asian Studies 9: 69–89. ——. 1993b. The Struggle for Democracy and Political Change in the Post-War Gulf. In Post-War Gulf: Implications for India, ed. K.R. Singh, 53– 90. New Delhi: Lancers. ——. 1993c. India's West Asia Policy: Continuity and Change. Strategic Analysis 16 (6): 783–804. ——. 1994a. Indo-OIC Relations: Perspectives and Trends. Journal of Peace Studies 1(3 & 4): 22–50. ——. 1994b. Communal Revivalism in India: Its Impact on Ties with West Asia and North Africa. In Communal Revivalism in India: A Study of External Implications, ed. Muchkund Dubey, 54–88. New Delhi: Har Anand. ——. 1995a. India and OIC: Strategy and Diplomacy. New Delhi: Centre for Peace Studies. ——. 1995b. The Recent Gulf Crisis: India's Options. Strategic Analysis 17(10): 1271–1286. ——. 1996a. Indo-Iranian Relations: The Kashmir Issue. In Contemporary Iran and Emerging Indo-Iranian Relations, eds. Girijesh Pant, P.C. Jain and A.K. Pasha, 145–57. New Delhi: Neel Kanth Publishers. ——. 1996b. Aspects of Political Participation in Saudi Arabia. Working Paper No. 7. Gulf Studies Programme, Center for West Asian and African Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. ——. 1997a. Perspectives on Indo-Saudi Relations. Asian Affairs 1(11): 24–26. ——. 1997b. Indo-Israeli Cooperation. Asian Affairs 1(5): 22–23. ——. 1998. India, Iran and the GCC States. Encounter 1(2): 66–74. ——. 2003. India and the GCC States. World Focus 278: 24, No. 2 (February 2003): 9–15. ——. 2004. The Iraq Crisis. World Focus 25, No. 1 (January 2004): 3–6. Pasha A.K. and Riyaz Punjabi, eds. 1998. India and the Islamic World. New Delhi: Radiant Publishers. Patnaik, Jajati K. 1998. Indo-Iranian Relations. In India and the Islamic World, eds. A.K. Pasha and Riyaz Punjabi, 84–94. New Delhi: Radiant Publishers.

T WENT Y-FOUR

India's Israel Policy: Changing Dimensions R. SREEKANTAN NAIR

ndia's foreign policy is formulated against the backdrop of its history, culture, political economy and other socio-political peculiarities. These specific features continue to influence its relationship with the outside world, and India's West Asia policy is a natural corollary. Based on strategic priorities and considerations of the balance of forces, India's Israel policy has received considerable attention in recent times, both at home and abroad. The fact that India started full diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992 has added new dimensions to it. The emerging relationship between the two nations, though bilaterally significant and apparently flourishing, is revealing its own latent limitations. At the same time, other actors of South Asia have viewed such a bilateral tie suspiciously. This suspicion is likely to bring considerable changes in the strategic and defence equations in the region. This makes India's Israel policy politically and strategically more relevant today than in the cold war context.

I

India's Israel policy should be analysed in the context of its historic setting. The basic position taken by India during the early 1950s against the colonial and imperialist forces, the political experience of its own independence struggle, the perceptions and rationale of its leaders on the Palestine question, the political behaviour of the state of Israel, etc. had an impact on Indian policy. Added to this, the presence of a Muslim community and its growing significance in the social and political life of the nation provided new dimensions. Unlike other areas of foreign policy, India's Israel policy lacked domestic consensus. Different political parties maintained different positions on India's policy towards the Jewish state. While the ruling Congress and leftist parties shared the sentiments of the Palestine Arabs, the Janasangh and a section of the socialists criticised India's policy. However, the entire issue seemed to have subsided when India initiated diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992. In fact, the issue did not bring about any serious debate at the national level, as feared. The profound changes in global politics and the developments in the West Asian peace process apparently reduced the gravity of domestic protest, if any. Two distinct features have marked India's Israel policy. First, there was continuity in India's policy during 1948–91. But, along with this continuity, changes have been taking place at a slow pace. The changes in perceptions and positions could be discussed in terms of five phases.

India on the Creation of the Jewish State In the first phase, before 1948, the Indian National Congress (INC) and nationalist leaders like Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru opposed the very idea of creating Israel by partitioning Palestine. The Palestine problem was the result of two contradictory promises made by Great Britain to the native Arabs and Jews. In February 1947, the British government placed the issue before the United Nations, which accepted the partition plan in November 1947. The Jews, the Soviet Union, and the United States accepted the partition plan, but the Arabs vehemently opposed it. The rationale of India's opposition to the partition plan was detailed by it in various international forums and associations. In May 1947, though still in the British domain, India was appointed as one of the eleven members of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). The UNSCOP submitted its report in September 1947. Contrary to the majority decision, India, along with Yugoslavia and Iran, opposed the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. Instead, the three members, in a separate report, recommended a federation of Arab and Jewish states.

Subsequently, India voted against the partition resolution passed by the UN General Assembly on 29 December 1947. Nehru categorically stated that India's suggestion of a federal state was not only a fair and equitable solution of the problem, but the only real solution (Government of India 1947a: 1261). India's opposition to the idea of creating a Jewish state on Arab land was based on several reasons. Primarily, India believed that the proposal to create Israel by partitioning Palestine was a move designed by western powers in furtherance of their common interests. When India opposed the idea of a Jewish state, it was sharing the sentiments of the Arabs. This was mainly due to the fact that India had to consider its Muslim population and also its own historical link with the Arabs, which regulated its interests considerably. Furthermore, the Indian position was evolved on the basis of sentiments that prevented it from agreeing to a proposal of partitioning any national homeland. All national leaders and major political parties of India endorsed the position.

The Recognition of Israel In the second phase (1948–50), India considered long-term implications before according recognition to the new Jewish state. India's reservation in according recognition to Israel was conspicuous. When Israel's inclusion in the UN General Assembly was being considered, though India preferred a positive vote, it was very much reserved on the question of recognising Israel. M.C. Setalvad, India's chief delegate to the UN, clarified the Indian stand: "India could not recognise an Israel, which had been achieved through the use of force and not through negotiation" (United Nations 1949: 47). There were several factors which prevented India from providing recognition to Israel. First, India wished to have continued friendship and confidence in relations with Arab states. Second, the government had to keep in mind the sentiments of Indian Muslims. Third, India also desired that the Arab-Israeli conflict be resolved. Finally, India did not rule out its role as a potential mediator. When the recognition question was raised in the Indian parliament, Nehru admitted that Israel had requested India to accord recognition in June 1948 but the decision had been deferred, for the government had "to be satisfied and to know exactly what the international position is before taking any step" (Government of India 1948: 380–81). Actually, India was being careful about the impact the recognition of Israel would have on its relations with Arab states. This was evident from a reply given by Jawaharlal Nehru in the Constituent Assembly on 6 December 1949. Nehru said: Israel is now member of the United Nations and its recognition by other states cannot obviously be indefinitely deferred. The Government of India would like to act in this matter, which has been the subject of controversy among nations with whom we have friendly relations, that would avoid misunderstanding or ill feelings and a hope that satisfactory decision will be possible in the near future. (Government of India 1947b: 233–34) Whatever be the reasons for delaying the process of recognition, India took as many as twenty-eight months to comply with the Israeli request. The Indian interest in and priority given to recognising Israel were well expressed by Nehru in his letter to the chief ministers in 1948: "We propose to take no action in this matter [i.e. recognition] at present. India can play no effective part in this conflict at the present stage either diplomatically or otherwise. We only watch the events for the time being, hoping that an opportunity may come when we might use our influence in the interest of peace and mediation" (1985: 128). By September 1948 a favourable decision regarding recognition was definitely expected to come and only the exact date remained uncertain. While there was pressure for recognition, Vijayalakshmi Pandit, then India's representative at the UN, hinted that India intended to recognise Israel at an appropriate time and added that this would happen soon after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute (Kumaraswamy 1995: 125). In June 1949 B.N. Rao, India's ambassador to Washington, expressed the view that there was no conflict of interest between India and Israel (Ibid.). In a meeting with E. Elath, the Israeli ambassador to the US, Mrs. Pandit further observed that India was steadily moving towards the recognition of the Jewish state and that the decision could not be delayed further (Ibid.). Subsequently, when Nehru visited the US in October 1949, Elath had a discussion with him. He summed up the discussion and cabled the Israeli foreign ministry saying that India's slow and long journey towards recognition was to justify the recognition objectively and minimise

internal opposition. Finally, on returning home Nehru declared that the recognition of Israel could obviously not be indefinitely deferred and that the "fact of Israel being there as a state is recognised by us" (Government of India 1950a: 495). On 17 September 1950, India issued an official communiqué stating that it had decided to accord recognition to the Government of Israel and the matter was officially conveyed through the Israeli embassy in Washington.1 But before making this final recognition, India tried to ascertain the reaction of the Arab states. On 4 December 1949, A.A.A. Fyzee, the Indian ambassador to Egypt said at a press conference in Cairo that "India wishes to retain the friendship of Egypt and other Arab states but is also thinking whether it were not better now to come to terms with Israel."2 The official press communiqué issued by India at the time of according recognition emphasised that two Muslim states, Turkey and Iran, had already taken similar steps.3 These official views expressed by the government and the opinions of various leaders point to the kind of dilemma India had to face, and finally, when the recognition was announced it was unprecedented—a recognition suspending diplomatic relations.

Recognition but No Relationship In the third phase (1950–87), after recognition, India successfully resisted internal and external pressures to establish diplomatic ties with Israel, though the early 1950s appeared to be the appropriate time for establishing relations. However, in subsequent periods India's decision was conditioned by the aggressive and expansionist policies of Israel. Therefore, during and after the 1956, 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, India could not go back on the commitments it had made over the years. During this period, all governments in New Delhi showed reluctance to make a shift in policy. Soon after the recognition, Nehru ruled out diplomatic exchange due to financial and other reasons, and added that the government was anxious to avoid additional commitments abroad at present (Government of India 1950b: 793). Subsequently, India declared that owing mainly to the existing financial stringency, it could not establish missions in Saudi Arabia and Yemen (Government of India 1952: 10). This second statement showed that the basis for Nehru's decision was not unfounded, and that this decision did not stem from an aversion, on India's part, to establishing diplomatic relations with Israel. The views expressed by S. Gopal substantiate this point further: "In March 1952, Nehru informed the Israeli government [i.e. when Israeli Foreign Ministry Director General Walter Eyten met him in New Delhi] that there was no major objection to the exchange of diplomatic representatives, but it might be better to wait for the formation of a new government after elections" (1979: 70). But due to the various reasons discussed earlier, a bold and independent decision on the exchange of diplomatic personnel was not possible in the 1950s. More importantly, India's decision was influenced by the political developments in West Asia, in general, and the political behaviour of the Jewish state, in particular. During the 1956 Suez crisis India condemned Israeli action. From then on, three distinct factors– anti-colonialist Afro-Asian solidarity, Israel's increasing identification with imperialist powers, and the growing Nehru– Nasser friendship– began to reinforce India's negative attitude towards Israel. As a result, following the Israeli invasion, Nehru declared that "in view of the existing passion," diplomatic exchanges were not possible (Government of India 1956: 595). Such a specific position was a clear shift from the earlier one maintained unofficially by the Indian government.4 Had India taken such a step during the early 1950s it could have avoided a controversial discussion on its Israel policy. But compelled by the socio-political environment, India did not want to establish diplomatic ties with Israel during 1950–87. During the early 1950s, the US and Britain made a strategic move and tried to acquire the support of Arab states for a regional defence alliance in which Pakistan was to be an important member. India tried to foil the Anglo-American efforts to form a military alliance in the region. It convinced the Arab states that by associating with external sponsors they were to gain less and lose more. Hence it thought that any inclination on its part towards establishing relations with Israel would blur its image and would be exploited to its disadvantage. It was also suspicious of the designs of Pakistan, which, in the meantime, was trying to project itself as a staunch supporter of the Arabs on the question of Palestine. India anticipated the natural consequences of such a move for the emerging non- aligned grouping. Apart from these strategic priorities

and considerations of the balance of forces, Nehru had no reservations on Israel. Nehru's approach was made clear in the Bandung Conference of April 1955.5 Subsequently, soon after the cessation of hostilities in Sinai, Nehru informed the Lok Sabha that India desired to lessen the gap between the Arab countries and Israel, but "in view of the existing positions, if we exchanged diplomatic personnel with Israel, our task would become difficult" (Government of India 1958: 869–70). Again, in a different context, V.K. Krishna Menon explained India's position on the Israeli question. He said that India's stand was distinct and "is not the same as that of the Arab countries".6 He clarified to the US press that establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel "would probably add to the complications in the Middle East and while it brings us an advantage, it would not lower tension in that area."7 The same view was expressed by Nehru in March 1959 to Yigal Allen, an Israeli spokesperson, with Nehru saying that India's "failure to establish normal diplomatic relationship had resulted from a series of unfavourable coincidences. We have no wish to aggravate, by any positive action at the wrong moment, the tension in the Middle East."8 The positions taken by Nehru and his colleagues had a profound impact on India's West Asia policy. The subsequent political developments in the South Asian region helped consolidate India's position during the 1960s. The decade witnessed India's difficult political and diplomatic challenges. This was mainly because of its strained relations with China and Pakistan and their growing influence in the Arab world. This compelled India not to go back on its earlier position. During the 1960s India's policy was one of maintaining good relationships with the Arab countries, which it had cultivated cautiously over the years. So India preferred Israel not to be dragged into its equations with these Arab countries. Following the 1962 war with China, India sought sympathy and support from every country. However, India did not get full- fledged support from the Arab countries. The response of Israel was certainly disappointing, but it has been argued that Israel did help India secretly during the crisis by providing arms (Burke 1988: 376; Tayab 1974). It has also been argued that a secret agreement was concluded between the two countries for supply of arms in April 1963 with a view to facilitating military training for both countries on a reciprocal basis (Ashraf 1993: 101). But substantive evidence is not available to confirm this. By the end of the Nehru era, India was hard put to convince its critics on the soundness of its policy towards the Arab world and Israel. However, because of the comfortable majority of the Congress in the Indian parliament there wasn't a demand for any shift in India's Israel policy even in the post-Nehru era. During the tenure of Lal Bahadur Shastri as prime minister there was no change in India's Israel policy. Soon after his taking office, Shastri visited the United Arab Republic (UAR) where he reiterated India's support for the claims of the Arabs to the Jordan waters and for the rights of the Palestine refugees.9 Shastri's support to the Arab cause did not go without criticism in India, and some even believed that while Nehru maintained a certain measure of judicious restraint on the Arab-Israeli question, Shastri overreacted by unconditionally endorsing the Arab position and demands (Srivastava 1970: 251). The critics cited the official reception given to a delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in New Delhi in December 1964, and the granting of full diplomatic status to the League of Arab States in July 1965 as the manifestations of the growing appeasement of the Arabs. In this context, it is worth noting that if some Muslim leaders influenced Nehru, as argued by Michael Brecher (1968), there was no such influence on Shastri's thinking. Even then he followed a pro-Arab policy. Following the death of Shastri, Indira Gandhi opened fresh hopes to Israel for better relations with India. Israel expected a Tashkent-type agreement to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Hoping for a better relationship, Israel felt that India could come closer to it, and that the prospects for this were high especially in the context of greater Indian disappointment with the stand taken by the Arab countries on the India– Pakistan rift. Israel also praised the spirit displayed by India and Pakistan at Tashkent and expressed condolence on the demise of Shastri.10 However, in spite of new hopes and expectations in Israel, Indo-Israeli relations were marked by some misunderstanding during the period. In March 1966, the brief stopover of Israeli President Zalman Shazar at Calcutta, en route to Kathmandu, was disturbed by a group of Arab students. The Israeli Knesset passed a resolution expressing regret at the treatment of its president in India,11 and its press criticised the Israeli government for pursuing "a limited policy of flying the flag and maintaining the consulate in Bombay". The paper asked its government to make the channels available to it, "to induce

awareness of the petty, narrow, short-sighted and petulant policy India employs towards Israel".12 It has also been argued that during the 1971 Bangladesh war, India received military assistance from Israel (Swamy 1982: 20–21). But this was not officially acknowledged by India. The political leadership in India in their private conversations with Israeli leadership or audiences adopted a soft attitude. At the same time that approach was not reflected in their official programmes and policies. This dual policy followed by India also became a subject of criticism. It has been held that Indira Gandhi followed a policy of private contact with, and public denunciation of, Israel. Such a policy was continued till 1977. During the Janata period (1977–80) India's policy vis-à-vis Palestine and Israel remained unchanged. In spite of the Janasangh's declared pro-Israeli policy, its participation in the government of Morarji Desai could not cause any changes in India's West Asia policy. During that period, Moshe Dayan, the Israeli foreign minister, visited India. Prime Minister Desai held talks with him on the question of normalisation of diplomatic ties. Desai maintained the view that diplomatic relations should have been established in 1950 and added that "now we cannot do it unless Israel clears out the captured Arab lands" (Ibid.). Dayan's visit caused a storm of controversy in Indian politics, triggered by Indira Gandhi. When the news of Dayan's visit was made public by her as an electoral strategy to win Muslim support, foreign minister Vajpayee denied the whole issue flatly—evidence that just like the Congress leaders Vajpayee too was afraid of domestic public opinion. Anyway, the issue was a clear indication of the gravity of the sensitive character of India's Israel policy at home. After Dayan's visit in 1977, the next high-level contact with Israel was in London, at the time of Morarji Desai's participation in the Commonwealth Conference. The Israeli defence minister, Weizmann, met Morarji Desai there to urge closer Indo-Israeli relations. Israel also offered military technology to India. This included Mirage III, the Kaffir jet fighters and super battle tank Mevkevah (Ibid.). India considered the offer and in order to explore the possibility further V. Sankar, the principal secretary to the prime minister, visited Israel for four days in early 1979. In the absence of bilateral relations, the Israeli government had agreed to hand over the technology through a third party deal. However, the entire deal turned futile following the fall of the Janata government in July 1979. After Indira Gandhi's return to power, the government maintained the link and about 60 crores worth of defence deals were negotiated with Israel through third party contracts (Ibid.). In spite of these developments, India's official policy on Israel remained unchanged. During the period, however, there were strong demands from Israel's friends in India for a shift in India's Israel policy.

Homework for a Policy Shift In the history of India's Israel policy, the phase from 1988 to 1991 was significant. During 1988–91, India considered, accommodated and yielded to international pressures/factors with regard to a shift in its Israel policy. At this time the relationship between the two nations achieved a significant footing when India changed its traditional policy towards West Asia. This was evident from its vote in favour of the USsponsored move in the UN General Assembly seeking to annul the resolution equating Zionism with racism. This significant change in the Indian approach came after PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat recognised the right of all states to live in peace. Quoting Arafat's statements, K.K. Tiwari, minister for external affairs, stated that the fundamental issues involved in the peace process were the Palestinian people attaining their inalienable right to self-determination and the recognition that all states in the region, including the states of Palestine, Israel and other neighbours, have the right to live in peace and security within internationally recognised boundaries.13 In early 1988, Yitshak Shamir and his foreign minister Moshe Arons expressed the hope that India would have a change of heart and upgrade its relations with Israel—the two being "the largest and smallest democracies".14 They also hoped to post an Israeli journalist in India for better understanding between the two countries.15 In mid 1989, the chairman of the Anti- Defamation League (ADL) based in Washington16 visited India on a fact-finding mission along with some officials seeking prospective Indo-Israeli relations.17 Earlier the ADL had made a report in which it was critical of India's hostile and discriminatory attitude

towards Israel. The delegation found that many Indian officials acknowledged the anomalies of India's policy and felt that an incremental improvement was already underway and the timing was very critical for a real change of policies by India. However, it has been observed that the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) meeting in November 1991, which criticised India for its repressiveness in Kashmir, apparently gave an incentive to India for a pragmatic assessment of Indo-Arab and Indo-Israeli relations (Jerath 1992). India invited Yasser Arafat to assess his reaction to the establishment of an Indian embassy in Israel. India was following a graduated approach towards the issue of upgradation of ties with Israel, and Arafat's visit to India, at such an opportune time, paved the way for establishing full diplomatic ties with Israel. In this mission the Indian task was simplified further when Arafat approved India's belated diplomatic ties with Israel. According to Arafat, "exchange of ambassadors and recognition are acts of sovereignty on which I cannot interfere".18 He also added that India's help in the West Asian peace conference was needed as it was the "second largest Islamic country after Indonesia", it was "responsible and respected" and had with the Arabs "relation of neighbourhood and shared tradition".19 Towards the end of 1991, a conceptual consensus regarding upgrading ties with Israel was already possible in India. Actually it was a compromise between emerging realities, national sentiments and a long-standing principled stance on the prerequisites for establishing diplomatic ties with Israel. The new policy was publicly stated for the first time in the parliamentary consultative committee where it was stated that full "diplomatic ties are conditional upon genuine progress" in the West Asian peace process.20 Various explanations were offered to rationalise India's stand on the issue. India's permanent representative in the UN said the move was inspired by the hope that this would help the progress of West Asian talks, though India's position "in no way reflected a dilution of its support for the Palestine Cause".21 In the view of J.N. Dixit, the former Indian foreign secretary, the decision was taken "after a very careful assessment of our national interests".22 On 9 January 1992, the top officials of both India and Israel met at Washington to discuss the prospects of establishing full diplomatic ties.23 Ironically, when all these preparations and moves were underway, on 17 January 1992, the external affairs minister made an extraordinary declaration that "there is no change in India's policy towards Israel" and he reiterated India's support for the Palestinian and Arab causes.24 He also declared that Israel should vacate the Arab land that it forcibly and illegally occupied. However, this contradictory and paradoxical diplomatic and political exercise was terminated when Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, just before his foreign trip, declared that India had decided to open diplomatic ties with Israel.

Emerging Bilateral Relations In the fifth phase–1992 onwards–India brought about a policy reorientation with respect to Israel and started full-fledged bilateral relations with it. The emerging relationship is, no doubt, multifaceted. Within a short span of time, the two nations have entered into a series of agreements on a variety of fields, such as economy, agriculture, science and defence. However, in the case of defence, according to some, the cooperation does not appear to be promising since Israel has too many political and military obligations to the US (Clarke 1995: 89–109; Kumaraswamy 1996: 75–82). Yet, it has been argued that both nations could cooperate in a number of areas such as the upgrading and modernisation of weapons and systems from the erstwhile Soviet Union, the prevention of cross-border infiltrations, combatting non-conventional proliferations in West Asia and southern Asia, withstanding growing western protectionism in hi-tech areas, military conversions, arms exports, self-sufficiency and cost effectiveness in defence production, etc. (Kumaraswamy 1996: 76). Nonetheless, India seems to be very selective in its deals with Israel. During the initial periods of bilateral relations, when Shimon Peres led a delegation to India, the Israelis were keen to sign as many as ten agreements with India, whereas India agreed to sign only four. This could be because there still existed a wider contradiction between the economic priorities of both countries. Owing to the peculiar features of the state of Israel, India's economic and commercial relations with the Jewish state still continue to be competitive and not complementary.25 It seems that India has already realised this economic reality and it is likely to

continue to limit Indo-Israeli relations even in the years to come.

Conclusion In sum, India's Israel policy has been conditioned by certain factors in the domestic, regional and international environment. Social, political, economic and strategic compulsions did play a significant role in the making of this policy. However, in the course of time the strategic and economic factors outweighed the others and continued to limit India's Israel policy even after the establishment of a diplomatic relationship. India was in a sound political position when it opposed the creation of the state of Israel. But such a position lost its gravity when Israel became a member of the UN and was recognised by the Government of India in 1950. In fact, the recognition itself was a significant development in India's Israel policy. Non-establishment of diplomatic ties in the context of recognition was a lapse on the part of the Indian political leadership. They wilfully allowed some domestic and regional factors (in West Asia) to dominate India's foreign policy. However, such a lapse served Indian domestic and geopolitical interests in different ways. The developments in West Asian politics, following the expansionist policy of Israel and the sensitive dimension given to the question at home, inhibited India from forging a relationship with Israel. Though the Government of India could defend its policy over the years, it was apparently preparing for a shift in its traditional policy towards Israel. The changes in international politics and political developments in West Asia were only the immediate causes of such a shift, for the shift was the culmination of the dual policy followed by India. However, the international and regional developments did help the government to overcome the criticism of its policy reorientation. The framers of India's Israel policy were right in their approach of addressing the balance of forces in the region and the economic priorities of India that have survived the test of time and continue to be relevant even today. In this sense, Israel has been and still is a negligible factor to India, unlike India to Israel. This factor is being revealed in the context of the limitations of India's economic relations with Israel. However, it remains to be seen whether better economic relations between the two nations are possible in the emerging scenario.

References Ashraf, Fathima. 1993. Indo-Israeli Relations. Strategic Studies 16(1 & 2): 101. Brecher, Michael. 1968. India and World Politics: Krishnan Menon's View of the World. London: Oxford University Press. Burke, S.N. 1988. Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Historical Analysis. Karachi: Oxford University Press. Clarke, Duncan. 1995. Israel's Unauthorised Arms Transfers. Foreign Policy (Summer): 89–109. Gopal, S. 1979. Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Vol. 2. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Government of India. 1947a. Constituent Assembly Debates 1 (5). New Delhi: Government of India. ——. 1947b. Constituent Assembly Debates 4 (7). New Delhi: Government of India. ——. 1948. Constituent Assembly Debates 6 (7). New Delhi: Government of India. ——. 1950a. Constituent Assembly Debates 1 (8). New Delhi: Government of India. ——. 1950b. Parliamentary Debates December 11. New Delhi: Government of India. ——. 1952. Report 1951–52. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs. ——. 1956. Lok Sabha Debates November 20, Vol. 1 (9: 2). New Delhi: Government of India. ——. 1958. Lok Sabha Debates 18 (4), August 14. New Delhi: Government of India. Jerath, Arati R. 1992. Delhi's Invitation to Arafat: Clearing Way for Closer Indo-Israeli Ties. The Indian Express, 16 January. Kumaraswamy, P.R. 1995. India's Recognition of Israel, September 1950. Middle Eastern Studies 31 (1): 125. ——. 1996. The Limitations of Indo-Israeli Military Co-operation. Contemporary South Asia 5 (1): 75–82. Nehru, Jawaharlal. 1985. Letters to the Chief Ministers (1947–1964). Vol. 1. ed. G. Parthasarathy. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Srivastava, P.K. 1970. Indo-Israel relations. Indian journal of Political Science 31: 251. Swamy, Subrahmaniam. 1982. Secret friendship between India and Israel. Sunday 10 (28 November–4 December): 20–21. Tayab, Mohammed. 1974. Indo-Israeli Relations. Lahore: Sh. Mohammed Ashraf. United Nations. 1949. General Assembly Official Records. Part II, 191 Pin mtg: 13 April. New York: United Nations.

T WENT Y-FIVE

Recasting Indo-African Development Cooperation RAJEN HARSHE

t has been well over a decade since India embarked on the process of liberalisation in the form of economic reforms. In general, the agenda of reforms has entailed the rolling back of the state from the management of the economy by replacing non-performing public sector units through privatisation measures, reducing fiscal deficit by cutting disproportionate expenditure on salaries and subsidies, and paying greater attention to the backlog in the hitherto neglected social sectors. Reforms have also subsumed forms of trade and investment liberalisation, which could gradually facilitate India's integration with the world economy. Evidently, the links between India's domestic policy and external relations have to be constantly reworked, with the reforms under way (Harshe 2000: 147–64). Thus, the phase of reforms is going to reshape India's external relations in every significant area. Under liberalisation, a dominant regional and middlerange power like India has to play a more proactive role in wooing other like-minded developing countries through diverse networks of development cooperation. In this context, the continent of Africa, with its immense mineral wealth, market and geostrategic location, is incontestably an important area where India could effectively launch projects of development cooperation. Such cooperative ventures need to be carved out imaginatively, in the long run, by being sensitive to changing political and economic circumstances in Africa and the world. It is only through such a policy, pursued on a durable basis, that India can eventually succeed in building coalitions of developing countries to encounter the challenges of the globalising world more effectively. In view of this, we shall briefly take a critical overview of changing social realities in Africa that can provide major inputs from the standpoint of Indo-African development cooperation, and subsequently reflect on a possible strategy to bolster some of the ongoing and potential areas in Indo-African development cooperation.

I

Changing Social Realities in Africa: An Overview A cursory glance at the political economy of Africa offers startling evidence of the marginalisation of Africa in the world economy. Since the 1980s, Africa has been facing acute economic crisis due to accumulated debts of alarming proportions. The poorest continent as it has always been, Africa owes the rest of the world a staggering $375 billion. It would be useful to underline that over 93 per cent of Africa's debts are public or publicly guaranteed. Largely, Africa is indebted to official creditors and multilateral financial institutions. This amount of debt is equal to three-quarters of Africa's gross domestic product (GDP) and nearly four times its annual exports. Roughly thirty African governments spend as much per person in servicing debts as they do on health and education combined, and the number of countries falling into arrears has not been decreasing.1 The problem of repayment of the debts has been exacerbated by the growth of corruption and the falling prices of primary commodities that sustain most of the African economies. Among the prices of these primary commodities, the prices of oil are an exception. However, apart from a few countries such as Algeria, Sudan, Angola, Gabon, Egypt, Libya and Nigeria most African countries import oil, at rising prices. Further, only one per cent of the world private investment goes into Africa. With such a meagre share of the investments, it is not possible to pull the economies of African countries out of the morass. But irrespective of the dragging problems of debts and corruption, there are perceptible signs of progress. For instance, the continent as a whole has seen an annual economic growth of over three per cent in recent years and about thirteen countries have achieved a growth rate of five per cent or more. Most of the African countries have

also liberalised their economies, which has marginally improved their lot. Also the average gap between official and market exchange rates in Africa shrank from 45 per cent in 1991 to just 5 per cent in 1999. In spite of such silver linings, the economies in Africa are in shambles. One of the important reasons that could plausibly account for the dismal economic performance of African economies is bad governance.2 Postcolonial African states, during the past few decades, have not yet been able to synthesise state–society ties in a manner that can pave the way for participatory and democratic decision making. The debt crisis especially was accelerated when military regimes incurred loans and appropriated the loan amount for private purposes by ignoring the developmental requirements of the people. Indeed, when the military rulers incur debts such loans could well be dubbed illegitimate. Nondemocratic regimes can hold on to power in Africa because rulers in Africa have staunchly upheld the principle of non-interference in inter-state relations. Ironically, the same principle was, and has been, utilised by the dictators to control populations under their territory through brutal methods. But now, the dictators of the yesteryears such as Idi Amin (Uganda), Hissene Habre (Chad) and Mengistu Haile Mariam (Ethiopia) are in exile and the people of Africa are becoming increasingly sensitive to the violence and violation of human rights that invariably characterise dictatorial regimes. Consequently, leaders governing through democratic institutions, such as Rawlings (Ghana), Eyadema (Togo), Obasanjo (Nigeria) and Mbeki (South Africa) have acquired greater legitimacy. On the whole, bad governance obviously subsumed a failure, on the part of a large number of political regimes in Africa, to pursue a development agenda actively and protect democratic institutions and human rights. This failure, in its turn, began to meet severe opposition from within and outside in most of the badly governed states after the mid 1980s. What is more, since the 1990s, good governance has acquired paramount importance on the agenda of international lending institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), as well as regional organisations like the European Union (EU).3 Several African countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Tanzania etc. are going through IMFand WB-sponsored structural adjustment programmes (Ezeonu and Okolie 2001: 60). Moreover, even the socalled Marshall Aid Plan for Africa sponsored by Canada along with the G-8 countries after June 2002 is trying to link up development aid and good governance. Good governance inevitably involves democratic/participatory decision-making bodies, protection of the rights of citizens, especially minorities, and, above all, the government functioning with the consent of the people. Periodic elections based on universal adult franchise constitute a necessary, if not sufficient, condition of democratic governance. In fact, because aid from donor agencies was getting tied up with the holding of elections, the African states witnessed a new wave of representative democracy during the 1990s. For instance, states as diverse as Kenya, Zambia, Cote d'Ivoire, Zaire (Congo), Gabon, Benin, Ghana, Senegal and Cameroon have conducted elections (Dickson 1998: 281–306). The emergence of the multi-party system across the continent has been an unprecedented phenomenon. While elections have been conducted in a wide variety of states, instances of rigging, fraud and violence have been a familiar feature all over Africa. Between 1988–96, only in eight African states, namely, Malawi, Zambia, Madagascar, Benin (twice), South Africa, Mauritius and Cape Verde, did contested elections lead to smooth political succession. In fact, experiments in democratic governance in the socially plural settings of most of the African states have proved to be daunting because the contemporary states in Africa are themselves finding it hard to cope with existential challenges. This needs to be illustrated with some obvious examples. For instance, inter-clan clashes have led to the virtual disintegration of Somalia, inter-religious tensions have kept Sudan and Chad in the throes of civil war for decades, inter-ethnic clashes in Rwanda, Burundi and Congo have resulted in incidences of terrible genocide and unleashed an unprecedented flow of refugees across the borders of these states. Finally, the Republic of South Africa has been struggling to establish democracy amid periodic instances of inter-ethnic and inter-racial violence. In general, intra- and inter-state conflicts in Africa have weakened the overall control of the state over society. Today one out of five Africans is affected by armed conflicts, including those sustained by terrorist outfits, and civil wars. This has inevitably affected the capacity of African states to handle developmental problems. Apart from the failure to build a viable infrastructure and sustainable institutions, several African countries have been confronting an intractable problem that has stemmed from the alarming spread of the HIV virus and AIDS. The rate of incidence of such diseases is the highest in Africa. Almost two-thirds of the estimated HIV/AIDS patients worldwide i.e. 22.5 million are

located in Africa (Ezeonu and Okolie 2001: 55). The treatment of slowly dying AIDS patients would require health systems equipped with competent and qualified personnel and medicines at affordable prices. Perhaps the entire community of nations has to view this problem as the problem of humanity and address it on a war footing before AIDS eclipses the rest of the world. However, these ongoing dismal trends in the areas of development and governance need not prompt us to overlook the African attempt to surmount the existing set of hurdles in the path of development. In this context, a fresh surge in Africa to work out programmes such as New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), or the effort to reassert a Pan-African identity on a continental basis through the establishment of the African Union (AU) in July 2002, represent rays of hope at the dawn of this century. In fact, the history of Africa, in the past few decades, has been replete with powerful currents that have striven to forge unity among the black people to wage emancipatory struggles against racial inequalities and forms of colonial and neocolonial domination. Such struggles have been primarily political in their content. With the end of the cold war, as the distinction between so-called radical and conservative states is getting blurred in Africa, unifying impulses have also permeated the realms of development and governance. The birth of the AU could be treated as a concrete manifestation of the same process. Its ambitious charter deals with wide-ranging issues including the prospects of promoting continent-wide economic and political integration, the role of regional economic organisations, conflict prevention mechanisms for intra- and inter-state conflicts and the problems pertaining to human rights and governance. The AU has departed from the Organisation of African Unity's (OAU) state-centric approach by underscoring the significance of state–society partnerships in developmental projects. Some powerful leaders like Mbeki (South Africa) and Obasanjo (Nigeria) who are shaping NEPAD at the global level are preparing Africa to meet the challenges of globalisation through the AU. Keeping these complex changing social realities in the background, India has to work under a few important imperatives that can redefine the parameters of Indo-African ties.

Imperatives for Redefining Indo-African Ties The recasting of Indo-African ties could be a worthwhile exercise if a few general imperatives are used as guidelines. First, policy-makers in India have to make conscious efforts to shed their patronising attitudes towards Africa. Such attitudes often stem from India's relatively more developed status in comparison with African countries. Any relationship, however, has to be interactive and just as African leaders are willing to learn from developmental experiences in India, India too can learn from Africa's experiences on several fronts. For instance, the laudatory effort of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa which brings about a reunion of the 'ex'-culprits and the victims must be unprecedented in human history. Similarly, the coalition experiment in South Africa is equally novel because it inducts most of the minority parties and social groups into the process of decision making and governance. India can surely learn from such experiments! Second, there has been a steady flow of a sizable number of African students into various Indian academic institutions over the past few decades. Several former students from Africa who were trained in India have been placed in high and responsible positions. So far, two Nigerian officers trained in India, including Obasanjo, have risen to become the head of state. Cultivating African students while they are in India by looking after their welfare, without following attitudinal discrimination on racial grounds, will automatically build bonds of affinity between India and the African countries in the long run. Finally, India cannot conduct itself like a gigantic island isolated from the rest of the planet. India and Indians have to be positive and proactive while facing the era of globalisation and building coalitions of fellow developing countries to negotiate globalisation. Such a mindset would prove handy in working out how India can deploy its existing assets in international relations to meet the external world with greater confidence. Thus, evolving a new strategy to forge relations with African countries forms merely a part of this entire process.

New Strategies for Building Ties with Africa The objective of conceiving and vitalising relations with African countries, can plausibly be achieved in two important ways. First, India can establish viable links with the AU and most of the important African regional organisations. Such a policy can simultaneously facilitate India's need to relate to African countries both on a

continent-wide basis and a regional basis on issues of common concern. Second, as a corollary, India can concentrate on select African countries and use them as anchors to spread the network of its ties in Africa. Among the African countries, India has had mutually beneficial ties with Egypt in practically all bilateral areas of development cooperation for the past five decades.4 Apart from furthering Indo-Egyptian ties, India can consolidate its relationship with the large sized, socially plural, democratically governed and regionally dominant states like Nigeria and South Africa. Both these countries constitute the core of regional organisations like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) respectively. Thus, by using Nigeria and South Africa as anchors, India can relate to most of the member-states of ECOWAS and SADC, which comprise almost a half of the AU. Such cooperation has to be built around mutually beneficial bilateral as well as multilateral requirements. Let us begin by analysing the interdependence of India and the African countries in the crucial sector of energy.

Cooperation in the Energy Sector India is engaged in working out an elaborate energy procurement plan through energy diplomacy because of the growing pressure of demand on the energy sector. India is unable to meet such demands with internal resources. In the short run, Nigeria, the Persian Gulf countries and the Southeast Asian countries, particularly Indonesia, are likely to be energy suppliers to India, while in the long run, Bangladesh, Qatar and Turkmenistan are also likely to emerge as India's future partners for the supply of energy, especially natural gas. As for now, Egypt continues to export petroleum products to India. During 2000, India signed a major oil deal with Nigeria.5 As per the deal, Nigeria would eventually supply oil to India at the rate of 120,000 barrels a day on a sustained annual basis. The hydrocarbon deal between the two countries that entailed the annual supply of 6 megatonnes was seen by analysts as an important 'building block' in India's quest to achieve energy security. Likewise Indo-South African joint working groups have been operative since 1998 to promote cooperation between the two countries in the oil sector. The participation of Indian Oil and National Gas Corporation (ONGC) in the South African upstream sector has forged energy ties between India and South Africa. Besides, the two countries are likely to jointly explore oil in other countries. However, India's association with Sudan in its quest to attain energy security has landed it in a precarious situation.

India's Involvement in Sudan After the Government of India approved the ONGC proposal, India decided to buy 25 per cent stakes in the Canadian firm, Talisman Energy Inc, in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company. It decided to invest $750 million in a Sudanese oil field and acquired, for the first time, stake in an oil field abroad. Consequently, the rebel groups in Sudan have also dragged India into the protracted Sudanese civil war. The civil war in Sudan, between the people of the north, predominantly Arab and Muslim and those from the south, Christian and black, has lasted for over forty years. More than two million people have died and as many of them have been displaced due to civil war during the past two decades. Owing to pressure from human rights organisations, the US oil company, Chevron, withdrew from Sudan in 1984. However, the Sudanese government renewed its operations in the petroleum sector by striking partnerships between the Sudanese company, Sudapet Ltd, and China National Petroleum Corporation and Malaysian National Oil Company. What is more, Talisman Energy Inc of Canada aided Sudan with technical expertise to build a 1,450-metre pipeline from the Heglig oil field to Port Sudan on the Red Sea. Eventually, the European and Canadian firms involved in oil exploration in Sudan came under severe criticism from church groups and human rights organisations including Amnesty International. The demand for disinvestment from Sudan from various human rights groups in the West has been comparable with the disinvestment campaigns against apartheid South Africa in the 1980s. In fact, the ruling National Islamic Front (NIF) in Sudan has been deploying revenues earned from the sale of oil to buy weapons and suppress the opposition led by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). The SPLA rebels have warned India of the dire consequences of its cooperation with the NIF regime and its investments in oil fields. India's involvement has posed a difficult challenge to policy-makers. On the one hand, India has to cope with the rising domestic demand for oil. Thus, possession of equity oil certainly can

give India a better opportunity to manage its energy imports.6 On the other hand, this strategic energy diplomacy has exposed India to attacks from human rights and church groups. Besides, the risk involved in investing in a country dominated by civil war could hardly be underestimated.7 However, India has taken the risk by being indifferent to threats from rebel groups in the civil war. By investing in equity oil is India emulating China? In the pursuit of production-sharing contracts, equity investments and refurbishing oil fields China has reached distant places like Nigeria and Venezuela. As India, like China, becomes one of the biggest consumers of petroleum products, energy diplomacy will constitute an essential component of its foreign policy. However, can the urge to achieve energy security make India indifferent to the normative requirements of protecting the human rights of people who have been victims of civil war in Sudan? Any government in India might have to perform a balancing act that will bolster India's energy security and at the same time demonstrate adequate concern for human rights violations by separating the two distinct issues. Unlike in the energy sector, the prospects of Indo-African cooperation in trade, investments and technology are less controversial.

Trade, Investments and Technology Transfer The globalisation phase can offer significant opportunities to India to expand trade, investments and technical cooperation with African countries. Sectors such as drugs and pharmaceuticals, chemicals, information technology, automotive and auto components, machine tools, medical and surgical equipment, agro and food processing, training and research development, and small and medium enterprises offer substantial scope for Indo-African cooperation. India's share in Africa's global trade had been a little less than 2 per cent due to several factors including an information gap concerning business opportunities. However, India's trade with Africa, in general, has grown rapidly and trade with the Sub-Saharan region in fact registered a record increase from $1711.30 million in 1994–95 to $4856.84 million in 1998–99.8 The Indian government has been making systematic efforts to increase trade and investments in Africa. For instance, the government was looking at measures to improve the financing of exports and the system of clearance of overseas investments for public sector companies, and to work out mutually acceptable solutions for the recovery of outstanding dues. Among the African countries Egypt has been India's leading trade partner. India exports auto parts, machinery and equipment, tea and tobacco, etc. to Egypt, and imports petroleum and raw cotton/blended textiles from Egypt. The 'Made in India Show' held in Cairo in April 1998 was a significant event in their trade ties. The exhibition showcased important sectors like software and information technology, agricultural machinery, automobile parts, pharmaceuticals, and the small-scale sector, to boost Indo-Egyptian trade. The Indo-Egypt Joint Business Groups have also been promoting trade ties actively since 1999 (Government of India 2002: 41– 42).9 Moreover, the 'Focus Africa Plan' for the financial year 2000–01 and the 'Made in India Show' have been contributing towards trade and investment promotion in Sub-Saharan Africa.10 The former includes focussed initiatives to strengthen Indo-African cooperation in the areas of trade, technology transfer, investment promotion, education and training, health care, information technology and the empowerment of women. The latter is evolving strategies to expand the market for Indian goods in Africa. The opening day of the 'Made in India Show', held in Johannesburg in July 2001 (Government of India 2002:42–43),itself attracted over 1500 trade and business visitors from South Africa, Mozambique, Namibia, Mauritius and Botswana. About 90 Indian companies could display their products in textiles, drugs and pharmaceuticals, food processing, machine tools, auto components, construction equipment, etc. in the exhibition.11 The Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) has been playing a significant role in building trade and commercial ties between key states like Egypt, South Africa and Nigeria. By holding the 'Made in India Show', with the CII support, India can steadily enhance its market in other parts of Africa. Moreover, after President Obasanjo's visit to New Delhi in January 2000 (Ibid.: 48), Nigeria is emerging as India's important economic partner in Africa. After the third meeting of the Indo-Nigerian Joint Commission held in Abuja in March 2000, the Indo-Nigerian development cooperation has acquired a new impetus.12 Under Obasanjo's leadership, the Nigerian economy is opening up to foreign investments, which could give fresh opportunities for India to strengthen ties with Nigeria.13 As far as Indo-African technical cooperation is concerned, India has been exporting technology to African

states and has already executed projects in the engineering, telecommunications, railways and construction sectors of various African countries successfully. During the past two decades India has secured an enviable position with respect to information technology (IT). To cite a few instances, Sabeer Bhatia of India invented Hotmail, the most popular internet-based mail, and sold it at $400 million to Microsoft. People of Indian origin own over 700 information communication technology (ICT) firms in Silicon Valley. India at the moment has one of the most vibrant government-led national information and communication strategies. During the past decade the rise of IT-related firms like Satyam and Infosys and cities like Bangalore, Hyderabad and Chennai have certainly placed India on the Information Highway. African countries as well as inter-state organisations are mindful of India's strength in IT. Hence, organisations like the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) have been consciously working towards making Africans drivers and not passengers on the Information Highway. In order to accelerate the adoption of information systems on a continent-wide scale the ECA has launched the African Information Society Initiative (AISI). The IndoAfrican cooperation in the IT sector is likely to grow.14 Indian IT firms are helping African countries transform business through integrated technology solutions. In 2001, Infosys Technologies Ltd and Accenture Nigeria announced a non-exclusive strategic partnership for delivery of services and solutions around the Infosys Enterprise Banking E-Platform to clients across the ECOWAS, including Cameroon. What is more, Narayanmurthy, the founder of Infosys, delivered a talk in Johannesburg on 20 July 2001, in the 'Made in India Show', to enhance Indo-African cooperation in the IT sector. Furthermore, Nigeria has revived the prospects of cooperation with India in infrastructure and industry. The two countries have already initiated talks on cooperation in the railway sector. Such cooperation, if it materialises, would entail the participation of the Indian Railway Construction Company to resume construction of the 870-kilometre rail link between Abuja, Nigeria's capital, and its commercial centre Lagos. The two countries are exploring the prospects of the revival of Nigeria's Soviet-equipped Ajaokuta steel plant through the establishment of a captive 110 MW power plant by the Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited. In general, in the realm of technology transfer, India has shown the capacity to adapt western technology to tropical conditions.15 Therefore it is possible to enhance the prospects of Indo-African cooperation in this area.

Military Ties Military cooperation has been one of the important components in Indo-African development cooperation. India and African countries like Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa are already promoting military cooperation to combat terrorism and drug trafficking. In fact, friendly ties between India and Israel have not affected Indo-Egyptian military ties. Egypt is likely to enter tie-ups with India towards the modernisation and maintenance of its weaponry of Russian origin. Egyptians are also interested in India's surveillance equipment, such as radars and submarines. Apart from helping Nigeria build the Nigerian Defence Academy, India has cooperated with Nigeria in the military sphere in several ways. Nigerian armed forces purchased about two thousand trucks from Tata in 1997–98. The scope of Indo-Nigerian military cooperation is being enhanced in defence- related spheres including the supply of armaments, ammunition, accoutrements, helicopters, spares for Dorniers, fast attack patrol, etc. India's support of the secular leadership of Obasanjo in Nigeria, perceived in the broader political framework, could be useful in fighting the rise of radical Islam that is sweeping across the globe—from Afghanistan to different parts of Africa. Nigeria has already been engaged in combatting radical Islam in its northern region. Similarly, the Indo-South African defence pact of September 2000 has facilitated their cooperation in peace building, weapons procurement and combatting of terrorism. In general, the diversified network of Indo-African ties has its role in world politics.

Cooperation at the Global Level In fact, India can attempt to build viable coalitions of southern countries by consolidating its ties with key African countries like Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa in the diverse spheres of development cooperation. Membership of India, Egypt and Nigeria in the G-15 and the forum of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), which is common to all these states, could further be used to firm up southern coalitions. In the NAM

summit of 1998 held in Pretoria, the southern countries pledged to work to rectify structural imbalances in the world economy. Thus, finding appropriate prices for primary commodities, and getting credit and technology transferred on favourable terms from developed to developing countries have become an important part of the agenda of the NAM states. Also, developing countries such as India, South Africa, Nigeria and Brazil have been playing an active role in defining the parameters of the World Trade Organisation's (WTO) future programmes. Eventually, the issue-based coalitions of developing countries will add to their bargaining leverage and permit them to participate in world trading arrangements on better terms. On the issues of human concerns they can gather support from the international civil society. Thanks to such support, in the Fourth Ministerial Conference of the WTO held in Doha in 2001, practically all the developing countries gained owing to the declaration, although diluted, on trade related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS), which supported member-countries' right to formulate their own public health policies to promote access to medicine for all.16 Thus, India and the African countries would benefit from access to cheaper medicines for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics (Mutume 2001: 3).

Conclusion India can recast its ties with Africa by being sensitive to major realities such as the debt crisis and the weaker position of Africa in the world economy; the transition of a substantial number of African countries towards democratic forms of governance; and the resolve of new leaderships in Africa to surmount the challenges to development by obtaining support from international donor agencies, promoting liberalisation programmes and regional economic organisations and consolidating continent- wide organisations like the AU. Countries like Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa could provide anchors for India to build and expand a network of ties in Africa so that growing Indo-African ties can be further consolidated in the areas of trade, technology transfer and military cooperation on a reciprocal bilateral and multilateral basis. Ultimately, a network of such ties would prove handy in building effective coalitions in international forums and add to India's bargaining leverage and stature in world politics.

References Aneja, Atul. 2000. India–Nigeria Strive for Special Ties. The Hindu, 29 March. Dickson, Eyoh. 1998. African Perspectives on Democracy and Dilemmas of Postcolonial Intellectuals. Africa Today 45 (3–4): 281–306. Ezeonu, Ifeani C. and Okolie Andrew C. 2001. The GATT Uruguay Round Agreements and their Implications for Sub-Saharan African Economies. Africa Quarterly 41 (2): 33–75. Gupta, Anirudh. 1997. Governance in Africa: An Overview. In Africa, India and South–South Cooperation, eds. Mathews K. and Vohra N.N., 67– 78. New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications. Harshe, Rajen. 2000. Reconstructing the Links between Domestic and Foreign Policy of India under Liberalisation. Indian Social Science Review 2, no. 1 January–June): 147–64. ——. 2002. EU–African Development Cooperation: The Role of Human Rights. In The European Union in a Changing World, ed. Jain R.K., 200– 220. New Delhi: Radiant Publishers. Government of India. 2001. Call to Expand Trade with Africa. New Delhi: Press Information Bureau. ——. 2002. Annual Report 2001–02. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs. ——. 2003a. India—Egypt Bilateral Relations. Cairo: Embassy of India. ——. 2003b. Indo-Nigeria Bilateral Relations. Lagos: Embassy of India. Koshy, Ninan. 2002. India joins Sudan's Civil War. The Hindu, 24 June. Mohan, Raja. 2002. From Sakhlin to Sudan: India's Energy Diplomacy. The Hindu, 24 June. Mutume, Gumisai. 2001. What Doha Means To Africa. Africa Recovery 15, no. 4 (December). Nkrumah, Gamal and Dina Ezzat. 2001. In The Clear. Al Ahram Weekly 520 (February): 8–14. Ramchandani, R.R. 1997. Some Basics of India–Africa Relations. In Africa, India and South–South Cooperation, eds. Mathews K. and Vohra N.N., 495–523. New Delhi: Har-Anand. Wagih, Salama. 2001. Africa's Uphill Struggle. Al Ahram Weekly 43 (July): 19–25.

About the Contributors is former Chairman, Nepalese Studies Centre, Thribhuvan University, Kathmandu, Nepal. Baral has been ambassador to India for a brief period and there are several books and articles to his credit. LOK RAJ BARAL

NINAN KOSHY,

a distinguished social scientist, was Visiting Fellow, Human Rights Programme, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA, USA. He has been an observer to UN Human Rights Commission and Disarmament Conferences for several years. Koshy was also Director, Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, World Council of Churches, Geneva, and has authored a number of books and articles. is Director, Centre for South Asian Studies, Rajasthan University, Jaipur. He has several publications including Dynamics of Foreign Aid: A Study of Indian Aid to Nepal. He has also edited another two volumes on the SAARC. B.C. UPRETI

is Chairman, Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He also served as the First Secretary of the Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Centre for Indian Culture, Indian Embassy, Cairo. Pasha has authored a number of books and contributed articles to various journals. A.K. PASHA

is Professor, School of International Relations, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam. He has also served in the Netaji Institute of Asian Affairs, Kolkata, for several years and is the author of many books and articles. Ramachandra is also a regular contributor to the Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research. G.P. RAMACHANDRA

is a Fellow at the Centre for National Security and Regional Studies, University of Jammu. He has also taught Political Science and International Relations in several universities. Mathew has authored the book Ethnic Conflict in Bhutan and contributed several articles to various journals. MATHEW JOSEPH C.

is Reader, School of International Relations, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam. He was International Visitor, International Relations Programme, Bucknell University Pennsylvania, during 1999–2001. Ramakrishnan has written several articles and monographs in the areas of international relations, West Asian studies, feminism, etc. A.K. RAMAKRISHNAN

teaches history and international relations at Cochin College, Kochi. He has specialised in India–China relations and contributed articles to journals. VENUGOPAL B. MENON

is Professor and Head, Department of Political Science, Kashmir University, Srinagar. He has written extensively on West Asia, the Organisation of Islamic Countries and Kashmir. NOOR AHMAD BABA

is Assistant Professor, Centre for Political Studies, Jawaharlal University, New Delhi. He has served at the Institute of Chinese Studies, New Delhi. He has also taught international relations at the School of International Relations, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam. T.G. SURESH

is Reader, School of International Relations, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam. He has written a number of articles and the book The American Predicament. A.M. THOMAS

is Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad. He is a frequent contributor to many national and international journals and has brought out several publications, including the books Pervasive Entente: France and Ivory Coast in African Affairs and Twentieth Century Imperialism: Shifting Contours and Changing Conceptions. RAJEN HARSHE

is former Professor and Head, Department of Political Science, University of Kerala. He has also served as Director, V.K. Krishna Menon Centre for International Studies, University of Kerala. There are many books and articles to his credit. K. RAMAN PILLAI

teaches political science in N.S.S. Hindu College, Changanacherry, and specialises in IndoIsraeli relations. He is the author of Dynamics of a Diplomacy Delayed: India and Israel. R. SREEKANTAN NAIR

is Reader, School of Gandhian Thought and Development Studies, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam. He has specialised in conflict resolution theories and has several publications to his credit. M.S. JOHN

is Visiting Senior Fellow, Research and Information System for the Non-aligned and Other Developing Countries (RIS), New Delhi. He also served as Associate Fellow, Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram and Professor at the Centre for Science Policy, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He has brought out many outstanding publications in the areas concerning political economy. K.J. JOHN

is a Senior Research Scholar in the School of International Relations, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam, and is specialising in the political economy of India's foreign policy P. VIJAYAN

is a distinguished economist and the former Professor and Head, Department of Economics, University of Kerala. He has also served with several projects in the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram, and has a number of articles and books to his credit. K. RAMACHANDRAN NAIR

is a Kochi-based scholar teaching history and international relations at the Chinmaya Mission. She has specialised in Indo-American relations. SHAILAJA MENON

is Associate Fellow, Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram. He has taught international political economy at the School of International Relations, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam, for more than a decade. He has also been associated with the State Planning Board, Government of Kerala, and has several publications to his credit. K.N. HARILAL

is Reader, School of International Relations, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam. He has published several papers and monographs on South Asia, India's security, foreign policy and the nuclear question. K.M. SEETHI

is a well-known scholar in international relations who has written extensively on West Asia, Indian Ocean, energy, etc. A former Professor, Centre for West Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, Singh has also been associated with several projects related to defence and maritime policy. K.R. SINGH

is Director, Centre for Area Studies, Osmania University, Hyderabad. He has published many books and articles in the areas of international relations and political science. P.V. RAO

Notes Chapter 2 1. For George Herbert's words, see http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/g/georgeherb152910.html

Chapter 3 1. The terms 'Third World' and 'developing countries' are used interchangeably here. The Third World could be described as a multitude of states and territories in Central and Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, South, East and Southeast Asia. Notwithstanding their cultural and political identity, those states and regions share common characteristics—most of them have tropical and sub-tropical climates (with the exception of Latin America), the majority of their populations is of non-European origin, their economic situation is characterised by poverty and underdevelopment, and their societies are marked by inequality. Besides, most of the Third World states were erstwhile colonies of either a European power or Japan. 2. For various perspectives on the nature of the Indian state see Bardhan (1984), Alavi (1982), Wallerstein (1986), Thorner (1982), Bhattacharya (1990), Mukerjee and Mukerjee (1990), Raj (1973) and Murthy (1994). 3. Nehru told the Lok Sabha that the Bandung decisions represented a break from the generally accepted belief and practice that Asia, in matters of technical aid, and financial or cultural cooperation must rely exclusively on the non-Asian world. The conference proclaimed the reaching out of Asian countries to one another and their determination to profit by one another's experience (Nehru 1983: 274–75). 4. For details see Lusaka Declaration of Peace, Independence, Development, Co-operation and Democratisation of International Relations and Resolutions of the Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries (UN note verbale NV/209, 12 November 1970). 5. For details see UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. 12, No. 9, October 1975. 6. See Desai's address at a meeting in San Francisco on 11 June 1978, Hindustan Times, 12 June 1978. 7. See Vajpayee's address at the UN General Assembly, 11 October 1978, Indian Express, 12 October 1978. 8. New International Information Order: Media News in Perspective 4, 1989: 21–22.

Chapter 4 1. For details see The New York Times, 13 May 1998. 2. See the analysis of Aijaz Ahmed in Frontline, 19 June 1998. 3. See the interview of Indira Gandhi in Newsweek, 3 June 1974. 4. Jean Dréze, The Hindu, 11 June 1998. 5. Frontline, 3 July 1998. For detailed analysis see Ram (1999). 6. The Hindu, 13 May 1998; also see The New York Times, 13 May 1998. 7. The Hindu, 16 July 1998. 8. The Hindu, 3 July 1998. 9. The Hindu, 20 July 1998. 10. For Rubin's comments on India's nuclear explosion, see Mainstream, 23 May 1998; and Mainstream, 6 June 1998.

Chapter 5 1. The Indian Express, 27 March 1998. 2. The Indian Express, 9 December 1998.

Chapter 6 1. For example see the BJP Election Manifesto 1998 at www.bjp.org; also see Organiser 49, no. 42 (12 May 1998); and Kapur (1976: 174). 2. See the statement of Communist Party of India (CPI) leader Indrajit Gupta in Lok Sabha Debates (27 May 1998), www.alfa.nic.in; for the joint statement of CPI and Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI(M)) see The Hindu, 30 May 1998; also see Ram (1999: 108–09); and Communist Party of India (Marxist) (1995: 88–89). 3. For details see The Times of India, 12 May 1998; The Hindu, 13 May 1998; Indian Express, 13 May 1998; The Times of India, 6 June 1998; Indian Express, 29 May 1998. 4. Though Jawaharlal Nehru's commitment to nuclear disarmament is well known, there have been attempts to show that he too was interested in having a weapon option. Such attempts are obviously to legitimise the ongoing weapon-oriented programme in the nuclear establishment. The report of the Kargil Review Committee (2000: 200) is a good example. It says: "Even Jawaharlal Nehru, a champion of disarmament, realised the military significance of nuclear power. In a speech in 1946 in Bombay he hoped that India will use the atomic force for constructive purposes. But if India is threatened, she will inevitably try to defend herself by all means at her disposal (10.41: 200). Elsewhere the report says: "Nehru's vision of a technologically advanced India helped the country build the basic infrastructure to support a nuclear energy as well as a nuclear weapons programme" (10.43: 200). 5. For details see www.ctbto.org 6. Ibid. 7. BARC News Letter 172, (May 1998): 1–4; and Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy, Nuclear India 32, nos. 7–8, (January– February 1999): 14–15. 8. The New York Times, 13 May 1998. 9. The Times of India, 18 August 1999. 10. Ibid. 11. The Hindu, 29 November 1999. 12. See The Times of India, 13 December 1999, and The Hindu, 5 December 1999.

Chapter 7 1. See The New York Times, 10 June 1956. 2. Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee wrote a letter to President Clinton on 11 May 1998, following India's nuclear tests, wherein he said: "We have an overt nuclear weapons state on our borders, a state, which committed armed aggression against India in 1962. Although our relations with that country improved in the last decade or so, an atmosphere of distrust persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem...." See The New York Times, 13 May 1998. 3. The Kargil Review Committee's report (2000: 208) noted that after initial reactions and condemnations of the tests and imposition of sanctions, many countries began to realise that India needed to be engaged in a meaningful dialogue. Several rounds of discussions were held between Indian and US officials on the nuclear and related issues. 4. During Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to the US, President Clinton said: "We see in India today a rising economic leader, an emerging environmental leader, a pioneering health leader, and a leader in our community of democracies" (US 2000: 46).

Chapter 8 1. The concept of nation is psycho-cultural while that of state is legal. The nation-state, in its true sense is rare in international relations. However, the term nation-state is being used here for all the existing states. 2. To understand Yeltsin's capacities to carry Russians see Treisman (1996: 67–77). 3. For details see Adomeite (1995: 50). To understand Russia's identity crisis see Chafetz (1996–97: 661–88). 4. For an incisive analysis of Russia's role in Central Asia see Rubinstein (1997: 62–79). 5. Asian News Digest, Vol. 1, no. 48 (November 25–December 1 2001): 1589. 6. Asian Recorder, Vol. 40, no. 2 (October 15–22 1995): 25138.

7. For an exhaustive analysis of military ties see Gordon (1995: 879–95). 8. Asian Recorder, Vol. 39, no. 35 (August 27–September 2 1993): 23360.

Chapter 9 1. See Indian Express, 5 May 1998. 2. The change in China's attitude towards India could be attributed to four factors: 1. China would prefer to have peace on its borders and concentrate on building up its economic and military strength; 2. China has more important issues to settle, like the dispute over the island territories in South China Sea, which are located in an oil-bearing area and have great economic significance, and Taiwan's unification with the mainland; 3. China views the upgradation of Japan's maritime defence capability as a source of potential danger not only to itself but to the entire Asia-Pacific region; and 4. the Chinese are conscious that politically and militarily, the India of 1998 is not the India of 1962. 3. The territorial dispute becomes very complex when both sides claim territory in each other's control preventing a mutually acceptable and desired solution. Both India and China seem to be in a dilemma, as no country, no leadership would like to say that they made all the concessions and others did not. For example, if India were to cede a part of the territory in the western sector, it would not only invite harsh criticism in domestic politics, but also legitimise China's accusation that India was the aggressor in 1962. Both India and China have made territory a hostage to pride. 4. The Chinese are also strengthening their border trade and economic cooperation with Vietnam and Laos to establish broader economic cooperation and trade. See The Hindu, 13 August 1998. 5. For example, the India–China cooperation in the Kyoto Conference on Global Warning countered the US move to force the developing world into agreeing to set emission cuts. Former Chinese Leader Li Pen had said that in recent times China and India have more and more similar perceptions on major international issues and indicated this as a positive feature. 6. The Chinese envisage a possibility of a strategic partnership with Russia. The complexities of the world will compel them in the future to give a thought to this strategy. 7. Robert Manning and James Presytup, both former senior US State Department officials wrote in the Wall Street journal that on their visit to China, a prominent analyst told them that "Pakistan is our Israel." Cited in F.J. Kherganvala's "Inexperience shows in China Policy", The Hindu, 2 July 1998. 8. US duplicity on the Kashmir issue clearly points to its inclination to meddle in the dispute. On the one hand, the US wants India and Pakistan to discuss the Kashmir issue bilaterally, on the other hand, it describes Kashmir as a disputed territory and flashpoint in South Asia, expressing willingness to help India and Pakistan solve the dispute. 9. The Hindu, 2 May 1998. 10. The Indian Express, 8 May 1998. 11. The US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Non-Proliferation, Robert Einhorn, has said that until recently China had been providing Pakistan with missile technology and this was a "continuing source of disagreement between the US and China". The Senate Sub-Committee Chairman, Sam Brownback, said that China was complicating efforts to cool the arms race between India and Pakistan: "We do believe that China has certainly, until recently, continued to be supportive of Pakistan missile programmes." See The Hindu, 15 July 1998. 12. The US nuclear expert Gary Milohllin has testified before a US Congress committee that the US gave Chinese companies the green signal to sell missile technology to countries like Pakistan and Iran: "The Chinese-supplied M-lls will actually carry nuclear weapons. President Clinton has said the world should try to prevent India and Pakistan from putting war heads on missiles, but his administration refuses to apply a U.S. law designed to prevent Pakistan from acquiring missiles in the first place." See The Hindu, 9 July 1998. 13. See Indian Express, 24 May 1998. 14. The Reagan-Gorbachev declaration of November 1985 had accepted the fact that a nuclear war between nuclear weapon powers would be unwinnable. If so the world should not have any problem in banning nuclear weapons without any discriminatory clause. The very fact that a select few (P-5) want to retain them indicates that they want to change the power structure in the world by narrowing it down to a pyramidical form with the P-5 at the top thus enabling a few to intimidate others if necessary without fear of retaliation. 15. The Hindu, 14 August 1998. 16. The Hindu, 18 June 1998.

Chapter 11 1. See the Text of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the Government of India and the Government of Nepal, 1950 (S.D. Muni 1992: 189). 2. According to Article 126 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990, subjects which have no extensive, severe and enduring consequences

and are of an ordinary nature can be approved by a simple majority of the House of Representatives (Lower House). If they have far-reaching effects for the interests of the country, they require two-thirds majority of the joint session of parliament. Peace and friendship, defence and strategic alliance, boundaries of Nepal, distribution and utilisation of natural resources, all need the two-thirds ratification.

Chapter 12 1. A number of ethnic groups which have their origin in India are scattered in its neighbouring countries as minority groups. Any problem faced by them in the country of their residence raises sharp reactions in India, and India's response is viewed by that country as interference in its internal affairs. 2. Frontline, 4 April 1997. 3. The Hindustan Times, 13 December 1996. 4. For a detailed report see Frontline, 21 March 1997. 5. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party condemned the Water Treaty with the view that it had failed to protect the interests of Bangladesh. 6. The Times of India, 21 January 1997. 7. The Times of India, 24 July 1998.

Chapter 14 1. For details see Bose (1997), Gupta (1966) and Lamb (1993). Dixit (1996: 330), however, views Lamb's work as supporting Pakistan's point of view. 2. See Kumar (1954), Nehru (1987: 218) and Ziegler (1985: 450). 3. Michel Chossudovsky in a recent article highlighted the entire range of activities of the US and Pakistan in the Central Asian Region. See http://globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO109. 4. See Gopal (1984: 262) and Bose (1997: 150–94). 5. For details see Malik (1991: 79) and Bose et al. (1991: 262–67). 6. See Puri (1993) and Bose (1997: 55–104). 7. Taking advantage of the Kargil war, India soon began to undertake large-scale military buildup and, accordingly, the defence expenditure increased substantially after 1999 (Kargil Review Committee: 162–82). Alongside this, India brought out a Draft Nuclear Doctrine in August 1999 which said that in the absence of global nuclear disarmament India's strategic interests required effective, credible nuclear deterrence and adequate retaliatory capability, should deterrence fail (NSAB 1999). 8. The Hindu, 26 July 2001.

Chapter 15 1. Volkan (1998) feels that all humans have the need for enemies and allies and it stems from the development of the child into an adult. Focussing on the development of ethnic identities and enemification, he says that there are both good and bad self-and-object relations. Unmended self-andobject relations when externalised may prove to be unhealthy for the growing child. Referred to as 'adversary symbiosis', it operates on a conscious level to bring about preoccupation with an enemy. We are not the same as the enemy, but the more we stereotype them the more we unconsciously perceive a resemblance to them because they have been made containers of our own unwanted aspects, and become our own shadow. 'Adversary symbiosis' results in a vicious cycle whereby we distance ourselves from the enemy while at the same time being connected with them in an unending and obsessive competition. 2. There is considerable literature on the theme of the spread of global democracy and its effect on conflict management and peace. For a very concise treatment of the subject see Gleditsch (1999: 369–74). 3. Power mediation or mediation with muscle is accompanied by rewards and punishments making the conflict system triadic. Parties who agree to such mediation expect it to work in favour of their interests or bring about a more favourable settlement than direct negotiation would offer. Sri Lanka accepted Indian mediation before the military intervention for fear of antagonising India. Pakistan believes that mediated outcome would guarantee some sort of agreement. In the Tashkent mediation, Pakistan accepted the Soviet Union as a mediator despite Moscow's close relationship with India. In such circumstances Pakistan knew that the Soviet Union was keen on better relations with Pakistan in view of its link with China and also that the Soviet Union's own closeness to India may help bring the latter closer to an agreement. 4. Times of India, 8 July 1999.

5. The proposals include plebiscite in consonance with the United Nations resolutions 48 and 49; joint administration of both the parts of Kashmir with porous borders; handing over of the Kashmir Valley inhabited by Muslims; making India-held Kashmir a protectorate of India; dividing Kashmir along the Line of Control and treating this as the international boundary; placing the disputed territory under the administration of UN for possible calling off followed by plebiscite; and granting of independence to Kashmir. Both Pakistan and India are against the last proposal. Pakistan wants plebiscite followed by the accession of Indian Kashmir. India does not agree to plebiscite and insists on the legality of the accession of Kashmir to India. See Ganguly (1997: 17–26). 6. The Department of Kashmir Affairs, which was until early 1998 with the Ministry of External Affairs, has been handed over to the Home Ministry. After taking charge of the department, immediately after the nuclear test, Advani listed the ingredients of his Kashmir policy:

a. A free hand to the security forces to take on the militants. b. No attempt to engage the secessionist or semi-secessionist elements in any kind of dialogue. c. Relocation and rehabilitation of the migrants. d. Accent on development (The Hindu, 26 May 1998). 7. That the conflict is costly not only in terms of loss of lives but also in its economic impact on the societies concerned is evident from the following figures. India spends 3.1 per cent of its gross national product on defence. Pakistan spends more than double of that—6.5 per cent. India ranks first in arms import—a staggering 12.2 billion during 1988–92. Pakistan's arms imports are the ninth largest in the world. Pakistan's military budget is estimated at 125 per cent of the total sum spent on health and education while the corresponding percentage for India is 65. India is ranked 135 in the UN development index, immediately behind Pakistan which ranks 134. See (Ahmad 1997: 137–45).

Chapter 17 1. Driglam Nam Za encompasses virtues such as respect for the sovereign, teachers, parents, elders, the institutions of marriage and family, civic duties and behaviour that keep together the strands of the Bhutanese social fabric. It also stipulates how people should conduct themselves at different occasions and includes a dress code requiring gho to be worn by men and kira by women. 2. Ngalongs are one among the four major ethnic groups in Bhutan. The others are Sarchops, Khengs and Nepalis. Ngalongs form the major chunk of the ruling elite. 3. The Pioneer, 19 March 1995.

Chapter 18 1. The custom of worshipping the sun stems from antiquity and the east, where it rises, is considered the most honourable part of creation, and seen as the seat of light and brightness. 2. Interestingly, when the SEATO was formed, only two Southeast Asian countries, the Philippines and Thailand, were members. 3. During the crisis, currencies fell, foreign capital exited, stock markets crashed, companies went bankrupt and millions of people lost their savings and their jobs. 4. Non-Muslim countries in Southeast Asia like Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Singapore and the Philippines have significant numbers of people who profess Islam.

Chapter 19 1. For detailed figures of illegal immigrants see Ghosh (1998). 2. For an authoritative study on Kashmir see Gupta (1967). 3. Sir Cyril Radcliffs name is associated with the artificial and unenforceable border that divided the subcontinent between India and Pakistan in 1947. 4. See Biswas and Ahmed (1993). 5. Such a strategy has been consistent within the broader framework of the BJP's overall slant of Hindu cultural nationalism. 6. See Kushwaha and Sen (1995–96). 7. Asian Recorder, Vol. 43, No. 7. February 12–18, 1997: 26239–240. 8. Asian Recorder, Vol. 43, No. 3. January 15–21, 1997: 26188.

9. Asian Recorder, Vol. 43, No. 9. February 26–March 4, 1997: 26383–386.

Chapter 21 1. The Hindu, 27 January 1995. 2. The Hindu, 8 August 1992. 3. The Economic Times, 26 January 1994. 4. See Joint Statement, Indian Ocean Rim Initiative International Meeting of Experts, Mauritius, 22–31 March 1995, 460–61. 5. Australian Foreign Affairs and Trade Department, Insight, 27 June 1995. 6. For a verbatim reproduction of the IOR-ARC Charter see the special issue on Indian Ocean Rim, World Focus 208 (April 1997).

Chapter 22 1. See Yahya Khan's argument during the Rabat conference in Asian Recorde 16, 8–14 January 1970, 9324. 2. For the lengthy debate in parliament on the subject and the censure motion see Lok Sabha Debates, 17 November 1969, 251–52 and 308–24. 3. See Asian Recorder, 13–19 August 1990, 21296. 4. Ibid. 5. For the main points of the foreign secretary's report see Asian Recorder, 18–24 November 1991, 22031. 6. See Final Communiqué of the 20th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (Istanbul), 4–8 August 1991, 22. 7. See Asian Recorder, 13–19 August 1990, 21296. 8. Times of India, 27 April 1993. 9. Ibid. 10. With the growing strength of Islamist forces throughout the Muslim world, there is greater concern and commitment exhibited towards the Kashmiris. The situation affects India's image negatively in these states. See Arafat (1998: 16–17). 11. Rajya Sabha Debates 25, 4 May 1959, 16971–84.

Chapter 23 1. The Observer, 17 May 1994; The Times of India, 10 September 1994, 5, 6 and 14 October and 1 November 1994. 2. The Gulf Today, 22 February 1998, 5. 3. The Times of India, 16 and 18 October 1994. 4. The Pioneer, 3 November 1994. 5. The Observer, 15 January 1993. 6. The Sunday Statesman, 28 October 1990; and Patriot, 25 August 1990. 7. The Times of India, 22, 24 and 28 December 1992. 8. The Times of India, 9 December 1992. 9. The Times of India, 16 March 1993, and 5 April 1993; see also Government of India (1992): 162–63. 10. The Times of India, 12 January 1993, and 11 February 1993; Arab Times, 16 February 1992 and 26 December 1992; Link 34, no. 30, (March 1992): 25–26. 1.1 The Times of India, 17, 18 and 20 February 1992; The Times of India, 17 and 24 August 1994; Kuwait News 2, no. 5 (October 1994): 3. 12. The Times of India, 28 April 1992; The Hindu, 3 May 1993; The Times of India, 26 May 1993; Muslim India 12, no. 134, (February 1994): 77.

13. The Times of India, 12 March 1994; Islamic Voice March 1994, 11; A.K. Pasha, 'Indo-Saudi Arabian Summit is Overdue', The Pioneer, 3 August 1993; and A.K. Pasha, 'Yemeni-Saudi Relations: Implications for India', Third Concept 8, no. 87 (May 1994): 33–36. 14. The Times of India, 11 and 15 October 1993; The Hindu, 3 May 1993; The Times of India, 24 August 1993. 15. The Hindu, 16 November 1994.

Chapter 24 1. Israeli State Archives, File No. 71/14b. 2. The Hindu, 6 December 1949. 3. The Hindu, 18 September 1950. 4. V.K. Krishna Menon had commented, "if we [had] sent an Ambassador at that time [soon after the recognition] there would have been no difficulties" (Brecher 1968: 73). 5. In the conference, India and Burma were in favour of Israel's participation. But the proposal for inviting Israel was subsequently dropped following the protest by Arab states. 6. General Assembly Official Records, Eleventh session plenary meetings. 329. 7. The Hindu, 25 October 1959. 8. The Hindu, 22 March 1959. 9. The Israel Digest 5, No. 23 (9 November 1962): 8. 10. The Israel Digest 9, No. 3 (11 February 1966): 2–3. 11. Jerusalem Post, 4 March 1966. 12. Jerusalem Post, 13 April 1966. 13. The Indian Express, 18 December 1988. 14. The Statesman, 20 March 1989. 15. The Indian Express, 12 June 1989. 16. The ADL was formed in 1973 in order to stop the defamation of Jewish people and to secure justice and fair treatment to all citizens alike. 17. The Statesman, 20 March 1989. 18. The Indian Express, 20 January 1992. 19. The Hindustan Times, 22 January 1992. 20. The Hindu, 28 November 1991. 21. The Statesman, 30 December 1991. 22. Ibid. 23. The Times of India, 11 January 1992. 24. The Times of India, 18 January 1992. 25. The Times of India, 20 May 1993.

Chapter 25 1. For a fascinating analysis of Africa's developmental problems see Wagih (2001: 19–25). 2. See Gupta (1997: 67–78). 3. See Harshe (2002: 200–220).

4. For an imaginative analysis of Indo-Egyptian ties see Nkrumah and Ezzat (2001). 5. Embassy of India (Doha), Monthly Newsletter 3, no. 4, 15 April 2000. 6. See Mohan (2002). 7. See Koshy (2002); and "Sudan Oil Companies Linked With Counterinsurgency." Integrated Regional Information Networks, 19 October 2001. 8. For Omar Abdullah's address in the India workshop of the Asia–Africa Business Forum see Government of India (2001). 9. For an update on these ties see Government of India (2003a). 10. See "Focus-Africa Plan awaits Green Light", Business Line, 9 January 2002. 11. See "Indo-South Africa Free Trade Agreement On the Anvil" (Omar Abdullah Announces Focus Africa Plan), Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) News, Press Releases, New Delhi, 19 July 2001. 12. See Government of India (2003b). 13. To get a comprehensive idea of Indo-Nigerian ties see Aneja (2000). 14. See "Southern Africa Keen on I.T. Solutions from India", Business Line, 13 April 2002. 15. I owe my understanding of this to Ramchandani (1997: 495–523). 16. "The Doha Conference: A Veritable Mixed Bag", TERI Newswire 7, no. 22 (16–30 November 2001).

Introduction 1. It is not easy to arrive at a neat definition of the term capitalism. However, as a resilient system, capitalism can be identified with the following realities: 1. private/corporate ownership of the means of production, 2. development and growth of wage labour, 3. socialisation of the production process along with private appropriation of profits, 4. the relationship between wage labour and capital characterised by a mélange of conflict and cooperation, and 5. an in-built drive to stimulate the process of accumulation and reproduction of capital.