Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean Region 3031096029, 9783031096020

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Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean Region f l oros f l ou ros

Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean Region

Floros Flouros

Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean Region

Floros Flouros Athens, Greece

ISBN 978-3-031-09602-0 ISBN 978-3-031-09603-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09603-7 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To my mother Stavroula Flourou (You left quite early)

Preface

In today’s world, society’s effort for sustainable development is accompanied by the need to make the necessary resources available and to manage them properly in order to meet the requirements for food, energy and materials, which must now take into account the obligation of compliance with the rules for tackling climate change and its effects. Demands in today’s unstable world are changing rapidly and, in most cases, increasing, due to the effects of external magnitudes. The international system continues to be globalized, with changes taking place rapidly while reducing the time required to implement new measures and applications. Technology is a game changer, as it brings about unpredictable changes in the available methods of many issues, including energy. Ongoing discoveries and new developments on a range of energy issues are expected to make a significant contribution to reducing consumption and energy intensity, lowering greenhouse gas emissions and, consequently, achieving climate change goals. Energy security is an issue to be achieved for every actor and it ultimately contributes to the strengthening of a state’s national security, thus increasing its power in the international environment, compared to other stakeholders. Initially, the EU always considering the necessity and the obligation to fulfil its role as a leading force on the world stage and in international developments. Its transformation from an initial economic union of states into a political organization later, with a single presence on the international stage, was a course of adulthood. This historical path took place

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through disagreements and compositions, facing the diversity and multiculturalism of society. In addition, the constant enlargements themselves give a new impetus to the dynamics of the European economy, while increasing the complexity and the degree of difficulty in responding more quickly to the modern demands of international politics and economics. For most of the EU history, international relations and its presence have been inspired by a mixture of realism and liberal views, with varying doses of proportions between its components, depending on time and leadership in the EU Member States. However, the management of events for its part is characterized as operational and remained for years at the working level. The strategic vision and approach to the major problems and challenges it faced showed serious shortcomings, for various reasons; the main one appeared to be the diversity and pluralism of the individual Member States, which, however, did not easily lead to groundbreaking decisions and actions. EU cohesion is recognized as an important area for improvement, as it could lead to a reduction in structural differences between its Member States. The Eastern Mediterranean region is a geographical set of countries and cultures that meet in this place, where the dimension of Europe, Asia and Africa coexists, forming a crossroads of multinational activities with economic and political implications. The energy dimension in the Eastern Mediterranean adds value to the economies of the countries of the region, through the relatively recent discoveries of hydrocarbon deposits in the marine area of the Mediterranean basin. The dilemma of the implications of hydrocarbon exploration and extraction from the Eastern Mediterranean Sea remains a key one and continues to divide the international community today, both among developed and developing countries. On the one hand, the view of strengthening energy stocks and energy security, in the sense of the availability and diversification of energy sources, is supported, both for neighbouring countries and for those concerned. On the other hand, the discovery of new energy sources creates tensions and competition for their access, while on the other challenging the territorial waters and the sovereignty of countries from other neighbouring countries. This reminds us of the need for a comprehensive approach to the issue of energy security and the need to link it to national diplomacy and foreign policy in the region. The theoretical approach of realism highlights the parameter of the power of each state and its effect on international relations and competition between countries, with historical precedents that shows the

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importance of the energy factor, which ultimately acts as a catalyst for geopolitical developments. Based on the international intention to increase the decarbonization of energy sources, the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean region are aligning their policies with the aim of harmonizing them with environmental protection policies and the necessary actions to adapt to the existing serious climate change. Finding a balance between the desired improvement of energy security on the one hand and the strategic choice for green energy on the other is a challenge in itself, since the difficulties are obvious and many. At the same time, climate change is constantly deteriorating and intensifying, with effects on the environment and tangible effects on the planet and organisms, many of which unfortunately will not be fully reversible in the short term. Awareness-raising of the international community and citizens is a crucial necessity, because in addition to the expressed desire to tackle and prevent the effects of climate change, there is also the crucial factor of capacity and effective action, in the context of acceptance and tolerance by the society. The COVID-19 pandemic was an unexpected event that found the world community and societies unprepared. Nevertheless, the EU has managed to mobilize and join forces to counter its wide spread and protect its inhabitants, with a series of unprecedented measures to support both the health sector and the economies of its member states. It seems that the situation of the pandemic has significantly improved lately and the acquisition of more useful experience by the member states is a legacy for future crisis management. Both cases prompted the EU to take a decision to become climate neutral on gaseous emissions by 2050, a decision combined with a series of measures of unprecedented intensity, with a budget of around 1 trillion Euros for the period 2022–2027. In order to achieve this strategic goal, a series of actions have to be outlined and to be carried out with time horizons in 2030 and 2050. The energy transition recently decided by the EU is one of the most emblematic initiatives that have taken place in recent decades and which pervades all activities since it concerns actions in individual industries and markets that will have to be adapted accordingly, in order to finally make Europe the first energy-neutral continent from air pollutants. In this energy transition, natural gas is expected to play a crucial role as a more environmentally friendly fuel. Its availability and unhindered supply are policies that are necessarily linked to the EU’s energy security, where diversification of energy sources has already been described

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as a critical and imperative necessity. Climate change measures already seem to entail increased energy costs, which are passed on to the final consumer and to the burden of the annual budget and economy: international, European, Eastern Mediterranean region. Russia remains the largest supplier of natural gas to the EU with more than 40% and with the alternative of supplying liquefied natural gas from third parties. At the time of writing, Russia has decided to invade Ukraine, with Russian President Vladimir Putin claiming that Russia’s main goal was to defend the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine, especially in the two selfproclaimed republics Donetsk and Lugansk, which, since 2014, were not under Ukrainian control. The reality is probably different from the current political declarations of the leaders, because in this case it seems that the purpose of Russia’s intervention in Ukraine will not only be to change the geographical borders in this part of Europe with the risk of removing a country from the world map, but at the same time destroying the European security structure described at previous EU summits, such as in Helsinki in 1999. It seems that the Russian invasion of Ukraine marks a turning point in European and world history and threatens both the European edifice and the entire post-war order. The importance of security has been always seen as self-evident and invaluable, while in our modern times has become even more critical. Security consists of individual components, each one affecting with a different degree the overall outcome, while at the same time they interact and affect each other. Energy security is such an individual component, which constitutes a critical parameter for a country and a region; it finally affects their national security. Nowadays, the recent health pandemic of the coronavirus COVID-19 since the beginning of 2020 has led to rapid developments in security issues—primarily human and societal, followed by economic and industrial and, of course, energy. The need for an immediate and proper management of such unforeseen risks related to the security has violently restored the discussion and analysis to issues of foresight, preparation and the ability to optimally adapt to such random and unexpected disruptions in the future. In this book, we try to review contemporary energy issues in relation to the security, while we examine the main vulnerabilities and challenges that have appeared lately with an impact beyond country borders. We try to analyse energy security in International, European and finally in the Eastern Mediterranean region, with special reference to the countries of the State of Israel and the Republic of Cyprus. Energy is now linked

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to the issues of sustainable development and tackling climate change, which is also taken into account in the analysis. The aim of this book is to study and provide an overview of crucial aspects related to the interconnection between the Political Economy of Energy Security and National Security, which is of great importance globally, due to great volatility and complexity. Finally, this book is expected to contribute to the existing literature and provide an in-depth study that gives a fresh approach both to the academic and political community. Athens, Greece

Floros Flouros

Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to Alina Yurova, Senior Editor at Politics and Development Studies and Aishwarya Balachandar, Project Coordinator Books Production at Springer Nature for all the support that I received during this long-lasting effort as their guidance helped me in designing and processing this work. In addition, I would like to express my warm thanks to the managers and responsible professionals of companies, organizations and government agencies for their help and positive response to give their consent and permission to use appropriate material and information from the respective websites. Their positive response was essential for the integrated approach of the project, resulting in the use of appropriate and useful information as part of the overall picture that ultimately emerges from the project. Last but not least, I would like to deeply thank my family for supporting me spiritually when writing this work and for their understanding in general. I thank them for their silent patience shown to me all previous years since I could have spent all this invaluable time with them instead. Thank you!

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About This Book

The scope of this book is mainly to study and analyse the subject of energy security in the Eastern Mediterranean region. The importance of energy and in particular of its security lead our interest to examine the potential challenges in that particular geographical area, where three continents are met, while its historical importance is a strong mortgage for its significant role for the neighbouring nation states in the near future. The current energy situation is described in three different cases: the International, the European and finally, the Eastern Mediterranean. The structure of each chapter begins with a description of the general energy situation, followed by the analysis of the energy transition— from solid fuels to environmentally friendly forms of energy—while vulnerabilities and challenges are also examined at the end. Furthermore, a main question that has been standing is whether energy security of a nation state can contribute to the stability of a region and consequently whether a country’s growth act as a real threat or an opportunity for its security. A new approach to deal with energy security issues could be followed by the main actors, since energy policies of the past have shaped the current landscape and thus today’s decisions will affect the future. For that, a structured approach in presenting views and thoughts is seen as useful in order to contribute any researcher, scholar and policymaker to understand the data required in order to study energy security issues of a nation state and region.

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Finally, a comparison between two countries located at the Eastern Mediterranean region is seen as a challenge; thus, it was decided to narrow down the study of the relationship between energy security and national security with a particular focus on the cases of Israel and Cyprus. The choice of selecting to study and examine these particular countries was mainly because they both have many similarities and things in common like: – They are of comparable size in terms of land area. – They are both located in the Eastern Mediterranean region, which is of primary importance for global and regional energy issues and also for geopolitical ones. – In both countries, there have been recent discoveries of oil and gas in their fields. – They both became independent states in the twentieth century, while they are both continuously trying to establish their territory in a hostile environment. – Consequently, they both concern for their national security and being very sensitive with issues related to that. In the first chapter, the overall scope of this particular work and the structure of the book is described with a brief reference to its contents. An introduction is given regarding issues of both energy and security at the geopolitical level considering the nation state playing the role of the main actor. Based on the available theoretical approaches in international relations field, the prevailing one that best proceeds towards and explains the issues of energy security and national security seems to be the theory of realism with a particular focus on the global environment. In the second chapter, a general review of the contemporary international energy landscape is presented. In addition, it is described the energy transition from fossil fuels to environmentally friendly fuels with a projection into the future. At the same time, there is a critical approach to vulnerabilities and challenges to major issues that concern the international community and that affect issues of energy security and geopolitics, such as climate change, the emergence of pandemic crises, technology and material resources. In the third chapter, the energy security in Europe is examined since it is seen as a key priority for the sustainable development of the continent.

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Europe and in particular European Union (EU) designed an articulated strategy to ensure long-term autonomy and flexibility within the international geopolitical firmament. The recent EU announcement of a green deal and the goal of a neutral climate continent by 2050 are new crucial data that should be taken seriously into account when member states are planning their actions and policies. In the fourth chapter, an overview of the regional area of Eastern Mediterranean is presented with a reference to the main stakeholders that are considered as the energy actors affecting each other. The balance of power and the intensity of the conflicts in the Mediterranean region continue to be characterized by constant changes that lead to geopolitical realignments and new alliances with the participation of neighboring states from the Middle East. In the fifth chapter, an analytical framework concerning the relationship between the notions of “energy security” and “national security” is presented in details. A useful coherent and concise description of the required stages to design and implement a proper conceptual framework is provided. Factors and parameters related to the examined notions are presented with a projection and involvement of other scientific fields that contribute to an interdisciplinarity approach. In the sixth chapter, the two main case studies of the selected countries—Israel and Cyprus—are presented under the topics of energy security and national security in their territory; each country is analyzed in a different section of this chapter. A quite extensive study is given with the main data presented including analysis of the country in terms of political, economic, social and technological view. Furthermore, necessary information regarding country’s energy state is provided, while at the same time a focus on their national policies related to the examined parameters is given. Finally, a comparison between the two cases of Israel and Cyprus is presented with specific focus on their national policies regarding the examined parameters of energy security and national security. In the last chapter of this book, a general outlook for the future is provided. Our life is characterized by unpredictable events that happen more often than before and with more severe intensity. Uncertainty tends to become a constant nowadays and because of that it should be included in any analysis and interpretation of security-related issues, such as the energy security. In such a rapidly changing global environment, both energy and security are critical parameters that need to be always considered by the involved parties; they are parameters of the highest

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importance and priority for the nation states and geopolitics, while it is expected that they will continue to play a critical role in the design of their high-level strategy.

Contents

1

Introduction 1.1 International Relations 1.2 International Political Economy 1.3 Security References

1 5 14 19 24

2

The International Energy Landscape 2.1 General 2.2 The International Energy Transition 2.3 Vulnerabilities and Challenges References

27 27 48 52 57

3

The Energy Security in Europe 3.1 General 3.2 The Energy Transition in Europe 3.3 Vulnerabilities and Challenges in Europe References

63 63 79 84 88

4

The 4.1 4.2 4.3

Energy Security in the Mediterranean Region General The Eastern Mediterranean Energy Transition Vulnerabilities and Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean References

91 91 115 120 122

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CONTENTS

5

Conceptual Framework and Research 5.1 General 5.2 The Conceptual Framework 5.3 The Research References

127 127 131 140 142

6

Case Studies 6.1 General 6.2 The Case of Israel 6.3 The Case of Cyprus 6.4 Comparison of the Cases References

145 145 145 158 171 172

7

Conclusions and Recommendations 7.1 General 7.2 Conclusions 7.3 Recommendations References

177 177 178 181 192

Appendices

195

Glossary

203

Further Readings

207

Index

215

About the Author

Dr. Floros Flouros is an Assistant Professor in International Political Economy: Energy, Environment and Climate Change at the University of Neapolis, Pafos in Cyprus. He holds a Diploma in Chemical Engineering from Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, a Master in Business Administration (M.B.A.) from NTU, a Master of Science (M.Sc.) in Oil and Gas (O&G) from Hellenic University, a Master (M.A.) in Mediterranean Studies and a Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations from University of the Peloponnese. He is a Post-doctoral Research Fellow at the University of Aegean on climate change and energy security in the Mediterranean and Middle East regions. In parallel, he is a senior business advisor with an impressive record in several sectors in EMEA region such as Chemicals /Petrochemicals /Polymers /Energy /Manufacturing /Supply Chain /Consulting. He is a highly efficient executive with cost reduction techniques throughout the value chain in organizations. He is a very experienced professional with unique insight into matrixed management structures and multicultural teams. His research interests include fields related to Security and National Security, Energy and Energy Security, International Political Economy, International Relations, Global Politics, Geopolitics, Climate Change and Environment. He is a Research Fellow in several centers, an Alumni Fellow at NTU/Nottingham Business School and a member in various

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organizations and associations. He is the author of publications in scientific journals and conferences, while also a speaker at general public with scientific and political interest.

Abbreviations

APS Bbd Bcf Bcm Btu

Cf

DV EI

EJ ES EU GDP

Announced Pledges Scenario Billion barrels per day. A measurement unit used in the oil industry. Billion Cubic Feet. A unit of gas measurement approximately equal to one trillion (1,000,000,000,000) Btu’s. Billion Cubic meters. British thermal unit. The Btu is the standard unit of measurement for heat. A Btu is defined as the amount of energy needed to raise the temperature of one pound of water one-degree Fahrenheit from 58.5 to 59.5 degrees under standard pressure of 30 inches of mercury. I Btu is equivalent to 2.52 x 10–14 Mtoe. Cubic feet. A unit of measurement for volume. It represents an area one foot long, by one foot wide, by one foot deep. Natural gas is measured in cubic feet, but the measurements are usually expressed in terms of Mcf, Bcf, Tcf or Quads. Dependent Variable: A variable that takes its units/results based on the units of another variable. Energy intensity: The ratio of energy supply to GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms to enable differences in price levels among countries to be taken into account. Exajoule [EJ] = 1,000,000 Terajoule [TJ]. Energy Security. European Union. Gross Domestic Product. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes xxiii

xxiv

ABBREVIATIONS

GIC

GW Hx Cy

IPE IV Liquefaction LNG

LPG

MJ MMcf Mmtpa N/A NEPA

NG

and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Gross Inland Consumption of energy. Gross inland energy consumption, sometimes abbreviated as gross inland consumption, is the total energy demand of a country or region. It represents the quantity of energy necessary to satisfy inland consumption of the geographical entity under consideration. Giga Watt (equals to 106 Watt). HydroCarbon. An organic compound containing only carbon and hydrogen. Hydrocarbons often occur in petroleum products, natural gas and coals. International Political Economy. Independent Variable. A variable that does not takes its units/results based on the units of another variable. The process by which natural gas is converted into liquid natural gas. Liquefied Natural Gas: Natural gas that has been cooled to – 260 degrees Fahrenheit (–162 degrees Celsius) and at which point it is condensed into a liquid which is colourless, odourless, non-corrosive and non-toxic. Liquefied Petroleum Gas: Gas consisting primarily of propane, propylene, butane and butylene in various mixtures. Stored as a liquid by increasing pressure. Mega-Joule: a unit of work or energy equal to one million joules. A volume measurement of natural gas; one million cubic feet. Million tonnes per annum—one tonne (or metric ton) is approximately 2.47 cubic meter of LNG. Non-Available. National Environmental Policy Act. The environmental law that establishes federal energy policy, sets goals and provides means for carrying out the policy. A national policy for the purpose of encouraging “productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to Nation; and to establish a Council on Environmental Quality” (NEPA, 1969). Natural Gas: A hydrocarbon gas that is usually obtained from underground sources, often in association with petroleum and

ABBREVIATIONS

NS NZE O&G Peak Use

Peak-Shaving

Psi

Psia

PV R/P Reserves

Reservoir STEPS Storage NG

Tcf

TOE

UN US USD

xxv

coal deposits. Natural gas generally contains a high percentage of methane and inert gases. See Methane. National Security. Net Zero Emissions Oil and Gas: Oil and gas are the major products which are produced in the petroleum industry. The period of time when gas use on a particular system is at its maximum. This is the period when gas supply is most likely to be suspended for interruptible service customers. Using sources of energy, such as natural gas from storage, to supplement the normal amounts delivered to customers during peak-use periods. Using these supplemental sources prevents pipelines from having to expand their delivery facilities just to accommodate short periods of extremely high demand. Pounds per Square Inch: Pressure with respect atmosphere pressure. A pressure gauge reading in which the gauge is adjusted to read zero at the surrounding atmospheric pressure. Pressure, Absolute: Gauge pressure plus barometric or atmospheric pressure. Absolute pressure can be zero only in a perfect vacuum. See Absolute Pressure. PhotoVoltaic. Reserves-to-Production ratio. Volumes of hydrocarbons (measured in Bcf, Tcf or billions of barrels) that are considered to be economically recoverable using current technology. The portion of a resource, such as natural gas, that has been discovered and that is technically and economically extractable. Stated Policies Scenario Facilities used for storing natural gas. These facilities are generally found as gaseous storage facilities and liquefied natural gas (LNG) storage facilities. Trillion Cubic Feet: A volume measurement of natural gas; approximately equivalent to one Quad. 1 tcf equals to 28.316 bcm. Tonne of Oil Equivalent: Unit representing energy generated by burning one metric ton or 7.4 barrels of oil, equivalent to the energy obtained from 1.4 metric tons of coal which is 41.87 gigajoules (GJ) or 11.63 megawatt hours (MWh). United Nations. United States. United States Dollar.

List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Fig. 2.1

Fig. 2.2 Fig. 2.3 Fig. 2.4 Fig. 2.5 Fig. 2.6

Fig. 3.1 Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig.

3.2 3.3 3.4 4.1 4.2

Fig. 4.3 Fig. 4.4 Fig. 4.5

Stakeholders’ definitions Global GDP growth (2010–2050) (Source OECD, 2022. Available at https://data.oecd.org/gdp/gdp-long-termforecast.htm [1]) Historical Evolution (Source Author, 2019 [5]) Crude oil prices and major events (1970–2021) (Source U.S. Energy Information Administration (2022) [9]) World energy consumption (quadrillion Btu) (Source U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2018) Global proven reserves in oil (1980–2020) (Source BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2021 [15]) Market Capitalization of the top-10 O&G Producers (2022) (Source Author, 2022 [based on Companies Market Cap 2022]) Primary energy entering the energy system of the EU27 (2010) (Source EEA, 2022 [4]) Primary energy in EU (2019) (Source Eurostat [6]) EU27 imports of NG (2020) (Source Eurostat) Main EU27 NG import routes (Source Bruegel, 2022 [9]) Eastern Mediterranean region (Source World Bank [1]) Eastern Mediterranean GDP (US$billion) (2010–2019) (Source Author, 2022 [based on the World Bank, 2022]) Arab Gas Pipeline (AGP) (Source [12]) EU27—imports of NG (2019) (Source Eurostat, 2021) East Med Pipeline (Source Depa [49])

4

29 30 33 37 38

47 69 70 72 73 92 92 97 110 116

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Fig. 4.7 Fig. 5.1 Fig. 5.2 Fig. 5.3 Fig. 5.4 Fig. 5.5 Fig. 6.1 Fig. 6.2

Fig. 6.3 Fig. 6.4 Fig. 6.5

Fig. 6.6

Fig. 6.7 Fig. 6.8 Fig. 6.9

Fig. 7.1

LIST OF FIGURES

Installed wind and solar PV power in Mediterranean countries (2019) (Source Author, 2022 [based on data retrieved from Irena [52]]) Observed (black) and calculated (red) temperature trends in the Mediterranean (Source [57, 58]) Chain theory example (Source Author (2019) (based on Van Evera, 1997: 89–95 [12])) Road map to scientific knowledge (Source Author, 2019 [14] (based on Kellstedt & Whitten, 2013: 3–4)) Road map to hypothesis (Source Author, 2019 (based on Kellstedt & Whitten [11, 84–97]) Conceptual framework (Source Author, 2019 based on [14]) Design and execution (Source Author, 2019 based on [14])) Map of Israel (Source US Energy Information Administration, 2022 [5]) Military expenditures of Israel (% GDP) (Source Based on the CIA Factbook, 2022 [8] at The World Factbook 2021. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2021. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/) Energy intensity of primary energy (MJ/US$2011 GDP) for Israel (Source The World Bank, 2022 [11]) Israeli Gas reservoirs (Source Israeli Ministry of Energy [14]) Map of Cyprus (Source The World Factbook 2021. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2021. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/) Military expenditures of Cyprus (% GDP) (Source Based on data available in The World Factbook 2021. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2021. https://www.cia. gov/the-world-factbook/ [37]) Energy intensity of primary energy (MJ/US$2011 GDP) for Cyprus (Source The World Bank, 2022) Cyprus gas reservoirs (Source Ministry of Energy, Commerce and Industry of Cyprus [39]) National Energy and Climate Governance System in Cyprus (Source Based on data from the Ministry of Energy, Commerce and Industry in Cyprus (2019) at http://www.meci.gov.cy/meci/hydrocarbon.nsf/pag e16_en/page16_en?OpenDocument) 3D Analysis (Source Author, 2019 [22])

118 121 134 135 136 140 141 147

150 151 153

160

164 164 167

169 182

List of Tables

Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 3.1 3.2 5.1 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 7.1

Historical evolution of resources Proven oil reserves (’000 million barrels) Seven Sister oil companies Top 20 O&G companies globally (2022) Evolution of non-conventional fuels EU production and consumption (1995–2018) Key milestones for H2 in EU Types of analysis in political sciences Energy data for Israel (1990–2015) Gas fields in Israel Energy balance for NG use in Israel Energy data for Cyprus (1990–2015) Gas fields in Cyprus Policy proposals for energy

32 37 46 47 51 71 83 132 151 152 157 165 168 185

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Energy is considered a key and integral component of a nation state’s potential and its power that needs to be maintained and strengthened continuously, especially in today’s rapidly changing world where energy is required for sustainable development more than ever. It is one of the critical goods, whose seamless possession offers to the society infinite advantages and opportunities for their development, while its absence, on the other hand, causes large and incalculable problems and threats to their survival. Nation states should design their high-level strategy by taking into consideration the worst case that energy could eventually become extremely scarce. Thus, both policy advisors and politicians should consider in advance of such a probable risk where energy would cause unforeseen changes of a tectonic nature for societies. The use of energy is intertwined with the development and progress of today’s human civilization, regardless of differences between cultures and civilizations, among different types of religion or any other possible division. Due to the irrational and sometimes reckless development of societies nowadays, the need for manageable development has become more important and imperative than ever. The demand to look at things from a different, innovative and even heretical point of view may also be supported by the sudden and

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Flouros, Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09603-7_1

1

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F. FLOUROS

completely unexpected arrival of the recent health pandemic of the coronavirus COVID-19, which appeared at the end of 2019 in China and in just a few months had spread rapidly worldwide. It was not until March 2020 that the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the infection COVID-19 as a pandemic [1]. At the time of writing this book, the coronavirus health disease was still very active and deadly worldwide with almost the same level of intensity as when it first appeared, despite any progress and solutions provided by medical and pharmaceutical sciences and even though much valuable experience concerning its treatment and therapy has been achieved, albeit with frequent and recurring errors and omissions. The coronavirus pandemic has brought about enormous changes in all activities and spheres of life across the globe. Its effect is horizontal and does not discriminate between nations, states, entities, businesses, population groups and individuals, showing different levels of intensity and application. The deadly pandemic is already a point of reference in the historical retrospection of human existence, and just two years after its onset, the effects of this unpredictable event are more than evident in every human activity at global, regional and national level. The unprecedented health crisis has challenged countries’ existing health systems and highlighted in the most obvious way the chronic weaknesses and deficiencies in both human and material resources. This is a world-scale historical event that has existed as a pandemic also in the past in different forms of health crisis. However, all the technological advances and great developments in all fields of science found today have meant that no one expected to see such vulnerabilities to such a high degree, which has lead us to reconsider our important priorities and redefine assumptions and processes. The turmoil in international and financial markets has dealt a major blow to the emerging growth of all economies with significant cracks in long-term planning and budgeting issues. It is becoming increasingly clear that rational planning and scheduling are no longer possible on a horizon beyond three or at most five years, due to a lack of basic data and proper information. This mainly happens due to growing global uncertainty and the unpredictable nature of the events that overwhelm the world. Warning and alarm signals may require more in-depth study and adjustment to the ever-changing reality, which consequently demands a different approach, and technology is likely to be one of the available tools that will help significantly in this regard.

1

INTRODUCTION

3

At the same time, the political system and political institutions at all levels—globally, regionally and locally—seemed relatively unprepared and too weak to conduct a proper initial assessment of the situation and adequately cope with that. However, after the initial numbness and inaction in the face of the unprecedented crisis of the pandemic, the authorities and involved parties reorganized and proceeded to take measures and to redesign proper actions in order to deal with a crisis of such magnitude. The recognition of the need for cooperation and mutual support of actions among countries appeared to be almost a one-way street, since such supranational phenomena are not expected to be dealt with piecemeal and with individual actions. The concept of energy security is subject to manipulation and several interpretations, while a personal perspective may affect the consideration of risk to energy security and opportunities to enhance it [2]. It is seen helpful to conceptualize the meaning of each item/term, since it is subjective, and thus, it is recommended to give a more specific definition to a term. In addition, basic assumptions are also defined later in the main text of the book. Energy has been scientifically described as the “thermodynamic quantity needed by a system of mechanic, organic, electronic and of other structures to do work; work defined as mental and/or physical activities of all kinds for any reason” [3, p. 12]. In addition, many scholars have referred to energy’s security implications [3, p. 12; 4–6] and energy security can be defined as access to adequate, affordable and reliable suppliers of energy. More particularly, the term “energy security” can be described with at least 45 different definitions, although some of them are very similar [7]. One explanation for the large number of these different definitions is that people progress different notions of energy security and in this way they can justify actions and policies on energy security grounds. With regard to the definition of “national security”, a national security policy includes any resolutions and actions that are required in order to safeguard any internal values from any external threat. It is the national security consideration that can finally provide an overall framework for an appropriate foreign policy study since it combines both internal and external dimensions [8, 9]. A short reference to stakeholders’ theory is considered necessary, since stakeholders are the participants and identities involved in any examined case. Stakeholders can be characterized as any group who can affect or

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Normative

Strategic

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Broad

Narrow

Legal/official

Stakeholders are

identification of

considered critical

stakeholder

for success

Stakeholders are

Stakeholders that

considered as

hold significant

humans only

responsibility

Fig. 1.1 Stakeholders’ definitions

can be affected by the achievement of a country’s purpose [10]. Moreover, stakeholder is seen as a genre of stories about how we could live generating arguments or further narrative that may include business and how corporations ought to be governed and how managers ought to act [11]. Different definitions regarding the term “stakeholders” are given in the Fig. 1.1, with the proposed options depending on whether a broad or narrow approach is chosen in combination with a normative or more strategic consideration. One can view stakeholder interests as joint rather than opposed and it is difficult to reach a common understanding in order to meet all stakeholders’ interests. Many stakeholder groups receive a degree of protection in law and law is created from cases in an incremental and ad hoc fashion [10]. An added value can be created if we understand and satisfy the needs and concerns of the stakeholders, which means managing stakeholder relationships effectively is less about stakeholders’ attitudes and more about their behaviour and their beliefs about the businesses. In order to identify significant spheres of influence, it is helpful to apply and follow a systematic identification of stakeholders and their interests. Trying to manage stakeholders properly can also be supported by the fact that the interests of these groups should follow the same route. Stakeholder interactions can be seen among networks of influences, organizations and

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countries, and thus, they don’t always respond to each stakeholder individually but rather to the interaction of multiple influences from the stakeholder environment. Organizations and mainly countries that are interested in dealing properly in the foreign affairs arena need to be careful about stakeholder integration mechanisms since they may provide the leverage that is needed to meet their goals [12]. As stakeholders can be considered states, unions of states, independent players as actors in the international scene, companies acting in the markets and others. All of them collaborate and compete at the same time, while people from all kind of levels can be included—from the individual level up to the group level. Although the decision-making process is mostly related to quantitative methods, it is widely used in the social sciences and political sciences. Decision theory is used as a subset of the international political economy that is the normative study of international and national economies and their markets. Making decisions in a process includes risk and it is related/linked to the stakeholders around the barriers of the system under examination. The decisionmaking process is can be seen as a science by itself and it is found in almost all other sciences with a wide range of application and level of presence.

1.1

International Relations

The science of international relations helps us to recognize and study behaviour, transactions and relationships between actors in the international system through a more codified perspective. In this way, it is possible to have a common denominator in the approach and typology of the respective periods and cases and be able to derive scientific findings that ultimately aim at the best possible study of the phenomena of the actors in the international system. During occasional discussions and lectures, it is mentioned that there are various possible choices in the theoretical approaches to issues that international relations study and interpret, and that in the end there may not be a completely correct choice for a scholar, an expert or a politician. Each theoretical approach can more or less describe a particular situation, in a certain period of time within which a phenomenon such as international relations between two or more actors takes place. Of course, it is customary to choose the best possible and most appropriate theoretical approach which describes the issue or phenomenon in question and for this reason to adopt its choice for the

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study and export as much as safer conclusions possible. The main theoretical approaches in the science of international relations are: realism, liberalism and constructivism. For realism, conflicts among sovereign nation states are difficult to be avoided mainly because international anarchy is predominant. Realism is an image of international relations based on four principal assumptions which are indicated as follows [13, p. 39]: (a) states are the principal actors in an anarchical world lacking central legitimate governance, (b) the state is viewed as a unitary actor, (c) the state is essentially a rational actor and (d) within the hierarchy of issues that a state faces, national or international security usually tops the list. The approach of realism may be seen through Machiavelli who considered that military power is much more important than wealth during a war conflict and Thucydides who paid attention to meanings like power and security and he believed that wealth plays a very important role to enhance military power. With regard to the other theoretical approaches, realism provides a distinctive approach to international political economy as it puts the emphasis on power. There are four main reasons that realism has as an ideology [14, p. 31]: (a) the distinctive social form of the modern state has to be addressed theoretically, (b) realism expresses common-sense assumptions about world politics, (c) as long as international relations remain a more Western view in social science, the persistence of realism seems assured and (d) in the absence of any alternative conceptualization of the political structure of the global system, realism is the one extrapolated from normative political theory and the behaviour of the critics of realism. In general, the main characteristics of the Realism can be summarized as follows: • Nation state is the main actor. • Anarchy exists in the global system as there are no hierarchical connections among the states. • Unbreakable relation between power and wealth. • Focus on politics and history rather than the economy. • Power is linked more to security issues rather than to economic ones. Since there is not one unique global society and one government above all, but anarchy exists in reality, then the work and approach given by several theorist and scholars still remain scientific firmly. Thucydides (c.460 – c.400 BC) was an Athenian historian and general in the army

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and his history has been recognized as a classical work of realistic analysis. Thucydides has been named as the father of the scientific history with his claims related to strict standards of impartiality and evidence-gathering and analysis of cause and effect, without reference to intervention by the deities [15, p. 179]. As per Thucydides [16], there will be incidents and cases to happen in the future, similar to those he described and wrote about during his time, according to what he called as “human” which means the humanitarian situation. He tried to view the incidents in relation to the broaden summation or a general truth. What realism means from the angle of Thucydides is related to his intention to see people, human relationships and the world as they are, without illusions and any effort to hide the hard truth of things [17, p. 4]. He wrote the History of the Peloponnesian War between Sparta and Athens until the year 411 BC where the democratic, naval Athens fought totalitarian, land-based Sparta providing a simple but awesome allegory for our recent times. Thucydides’ work revealed a precedent for our own polarized world and might provide a guide through the perils of contemporary international affairs [18, p. 3]. In his history, the powerful actors supersede the weak ones and power is superior to ethics and justice among states relations. This is also the reason for contemporary historians like Carr and Morgenthau to consider him with high respect, since they believe that he is the founder of political realism and the first analyst with clear view of amoralism of one anarch global system of sovereign states, as the one in ancient Greece during the classic era, who understood that the acts of states are driven by their desire to achieve power and protect their self-interests. It is worth mentioning the incident happened in 1947 when Secretary of US State George Marshall had called attention to the significance of the Peloponnesian War for an understanding of the contemporary world: “I doubt seriously whether a man can think with full wisdom and with deep convictions regarding certain of the basic international issues today who has not at least reviewed in his mind the period of the Peloponnesian War and the Fall of Athens” [18, p. 3]. The Melian Dialogue of Thucydides is one of the critical points of the History as it attracts the reader by its pure clarity in the analysis of power. The Melians were unable to make the Athenians recognize the advantages of their arguments for justice or convention and the Athenians could not convince the Melians to capitulate. Logos (speech), despite its clarity and argumentative power, failed to

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avert the violence and destruction of war and is itself narrowed, distorted and perverted.1 It is important to understand how the social sciences have been developed and more particular the Political Realism, which seems to be the dominant scientific discipline in the international relations. Robert Gilpin in his “Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order” [19] has seen Political Realism as a more disciplined scientific approach, that it is “ideologically detached”. The realism describes, interprets and highlights the nature of the problems while at the same time is not “prescriptive”. Realism considers that the decision and prescription should belong to those actors that are involved in the politics and who (should) know the nature and structure of the problems and issues and consequently the appropriate choices and solutions. Realism believes that the decisions should not be taken by the academics probably because they are not under any social controls on them. Realism considers a normative position with regard to the independence of the sovereign states of the international system, the international institutions and the international law that support such independence. Realism can be considered as a state-centred since it adopts terms such as “sovereignty” and “international institutions”, while political realism supports the idea that the sovereignty of each state remains the only politically structured group. Realists support the nature of competitiveness in the international relations and they also refer to the absence of legalized distributive justice institutions. They tried to examine and study the multifunctionality of the international system and order, the difference and duality of the causes and aims of the war, that are included between the international institutions and international politics. A short description and analysis of such notions is given as follows: a. Classic Realism: In this theory, not so much attention is given to the macro-level of analysis. Basic theorists of this approach are Carr, Morgenthau, Kennan and Aron. They believe that many local and national factors like national consciousness, culture and public opinion affect the shape of the national interest and states’ choices. In the Twenty Year’s Crisis (1919–1939) [20], Carr categorized scholars into two groups of thought: realists and utopians. He was influenced by the “League of Nations”, 1 In the Appendix A, the Melian Dialogue as it was written by Thucydides in 416 B.C. is given for any researcher to refer to.

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an intergovernmental organization established in 1920 as a result of the Paris Peace Conference that ended the First World War and thus he attacked “utopians” who thought that a better international structure could be seen around the League. In his opinion, the international order constructed at Versailles, France was flawed and the League was a hopeless dream that could never do anything practical. Carr was looking to identity the rational within the real, rather than imposing rationality upon the real and he is seen to be the more sophisticated when compared to Morgenthau and a true realist. The main difference between Carr and Morgenthau is that Morgenthau never recovered a coherent definition of the function of reason. As Carr understands ideas, purpose and interest, they all form an inseparable triad held together by reason that acts as the locus of action and reason engenders understanding via experience, conditioning interests and desires [21, pp. 77–79]. Morgenthau’s view about political realism can be seen through the below principles [22]: • Realism considers that both politics and society are governed by objective laws that have their origin back in human nature. Thus, in order to improve society, it is a prerequisite to accept the governmental laws ruling the society. • It is more necessary that realism considers the concept of interest defined in terms of power. It sets politics as an autonomous area of action separate from other areas like economics, ethics and religion. • Realism believes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but it does not grant it with a meaning that is same for everyone. • Realism is aware both of the moral significance of political action and also of the ineluctable tension between the moral command and the requirements of successful political action. • Even if an individual keeps a moral right to sacrifice himself in defence of a moral principle, however the state has no right to let its moral right disapprobation of the infringement of liberty. • Finally, realism does not identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe.

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Kennan in his famous “Long Telegram” from Moscow in February 1946 and through an anonymous article in Foreign Affairs in 1947 laid out a new way among the extremes of war and appeasement—containment. He considered Stalin as more patient and methodic than Hitler. He believed that if the US could remain patient and address Soviet’s expansionism without war or appeasement over a sufficiently long period of time, so then the Soviets would change their priorities. Finally, he proposed to develop a coherent strategy on non-provocative resistance, which would cause a settlement with the Soviet Union or even to the break-up of the Soviet Union [23]. Aron promoted a morality of wisdom which gives a central place to the defence of values alongside considerations of power. He provides a view of survival that focuses on the significance of shared values for the existence of political communities, and thus consequently the need to uphold them even though ethical perfection cannot be achieved in the political sphere [24]. All these realists succeeded to confront with the “ideologies and trends” under development during their times that they were trying to be established in the international relations area. Finally, another expression of classic realism is the “neoclassic realism” that confronts the assumption that states are “like-units” and Schweller [25] is one of the theorists who supported this idea and he believes that the local factors co-shape the foreign affairs policy and affect final choice of the state. b. Neorealism: It is related mostly to the macro-level of analysis. It considers that the states are “like-units” and they differentiate themselves only in relation to their position in the international distribution of power. As “like-units”, the states adopt similar targets with the most important one their survival. One of the famous scholars who supported this theory was Kenneth Waltz. He is considered by some scholars as a “structural realist”, as he has focused on the structure of the international system. Others see him as neorealist, due to the fact that his approach differs to some critical points from that of traditional realists. Referring to Realists and particularly to structural ones, Kenneth Waltz’s ten basic principles of Political Realism [26, pp. 10–22] are as follows: 1. Anarchy in the international system: There is no central government to impose order. 2. Competitive international system: Among nations, the physical situation is a misty situation. This anarchy structure of international

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system that creates conditions for competition is the main cause of war in the international relations. 3. The principle of self-help: States are obliged to organize their self-help, which is the necessary principle of action in an anarchy situation. 4. Security-Dilemma: Measurements that states take to protect themselves are seen as reducing the security of others. 5. State-centred international system: States have never been the only actors; structures are defined not by all actors, but by the man ones. 6. The principle of rationalism: In the International Relations is often seen redistribution of power and finally a natural choice rule is applied. 7. Basic national interest: The main and basic aim of nations is to maximize their security. Should they secure their survival, only after they can set ambitious targets. 8. Struggle for power: States are obliged to seek for power, in order to survive in the anarchy international system. 9. Balance strategy: The primary objective of the states is to maximize their security. In practice, this means that states should take care by themselves [as mentioned above herein “The principle of self-help”], which urged them to deal with balancing of their opponents. Balancing can be achieved by two ways: a) internal and b) external balancing. 10. The principle of equilibrium power: It is a micro-theory and one of the distinctive political theories of international politics. A system will have a tendency towards equilibrium and equilibrium power is constantly being created. Especially for the struggle for power, Waltz considers it as not an end in itself, but a mean of pursuing politics and thus he believes that power is defined as a) control over resources, b) control over others and c) control over outcomes. Waltz realizes that power is always relative: a factor is powerful, only if affects the others more than they are affected by any third one, so he chooses to define the term of “power” by using the first of the three definitions—the one referring to control over resources. Moreover, he clarifies that among nations’ competition the important factor is the total power which is seen by contemporary scholars of realism as “hard power”. States are ranked in a proper level, depending on how they are classified

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in all of the following elements: population size and land area, natural resources, economic capabilities, military power, political stability and ability. Defensive Realism: In this approach, the nation states adopt such targets that they can finally support their efforts to maximize their security, while the main parameter in the International Relations should be considered the operation of the mechanism of the balance of power. The more prevailing option is that a state tends to balance power, enough to defend an assault and the security dilemmas caused by the states’ efforts to maximize their power and they suggest caution. The defensive realism focuses on the structure of power and the contribution of other external parameters, such as location and technology. The main argument is the relatively easiness or not of conquest, which affects the level of security among the states in an anarchy system. Nation states are more concerned with maintaining their security rather than maximizing it and they support the belief that security is not rare since they are not capable of perceiving/realizing the other state’s willingness and thus be ready for the worse scenario. Basic theorists of this approach are Robert Art, Stephen Walt, George Quester and Stephen van Evera. Offensive Realism: In this approach, the nation states focus on their survival through their efforts to maximize their power. States are rational actors seeking to survive and they are capable of hurting each other, not fully aware of each other’s plans. It is proposed that states should always seek to increase their power in order to be capable of repelling any attack. The offensive realism studies the big power states and supports the idea that they feel insecure exactly because they hold adequate offensive military capabilities enough to hit their competitors/opponents. It is believed that due to increasing difficulty of competition, the most prevailing and efficient option is that a state tends to increase/maximize the power. Basic theorists of this approach are John Mearsheimer, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Steven Lobell. The political scientist John Mearsheimer has been one of the most famous critics of US foreign policy since the end of Cold War. He has written extensively about security issues and international politics more generally. He has published six books: Conventional Deterrence (1983), which won the Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., Book Award; Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (1988); The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001, 2014), which won the Joseph Lepgold Book Prize and has been translated into nine different languages; The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (with Stephen M. Walt, 2007), which made the New York

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Times best seller list and has been translated into twenty-four different languages; Why Leaders Lie: The Truth about Lying in International Politics (2011) and The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (2018). Mearsheimer (2001) considers three options for a state to choose when forming an alliance and they are presented from the most preferred and efficient to the least, as follows: (a) buck-passing: leave to another state to deal with/handle the challenge and subsequent cost, (b) alliance formation: a state to participate in a balanced alliance and (c) bandwagoning: be linked to a great power. Following the political realism theory and the “scientific discipline” approach, there are some other also important scholars as follows: • Stephen Krasner and Robert Gilpin: They had studied and explained the causes of the war. More specifically, the factors existed between the international institutions and the states about equal transactions, part of them are the economic ones. • Susan Strange: She had been raised serious concerns and objections against the post-modern ideas and theories that were expressed in the academic community at that period. She has been successful to support and establish her view for a holistic consideration of the international political and economic issues. • Joseph Grieco indicates that realism has dominated international relations theory since World War II and for realists, international anarchy fosters competition and conflict among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate even when they share common interests. He claims that a fundamental Realist insight is that states are positional in character, which means that realism observes a deeprooted tendency in states to assess their level of achievement in any domain of activity—whether it be military power, industrial prowess or educational excellence—by comparison with their own individual performance to the performance of other states [27]. • Knud Erik Jørgensen: He works on theorizing within the theory of realism which is related to six main features like (a) realism is a theory that basically demands a monopoly on understanding the realities of international politics, (b) Realism is characterized by a strong sense of tragedy as we know our destiny but not able to change much, (c) scholars consider “political’ in distinct conception of politics, (d) theory is seen as a distinction between domestic and international politics, (e) theory within the tradition is all theory of conflict and (f) theory inclines to nourish a cyclical view of history [28, pp. 102– 107].

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Waltz tried to save the overlap between realist theory and the boundaries of the discipline of International Relations by his efforts to deal with the turmoil of the discipline. At the same time, realists started to reconsider basic aspects of their theory trying to fit themselves better in the international system and thus these “realist theories became part of a different branch of International Relations, if not a different discipline, namely International Political Economy” [29, p. 142]. Based on the theoretical background presented so far and from the above three main approaches in the International Relations, the theory of Realism is the one that will be used/adopted for the analysis in this study, since it can better describe the several phenomena taking place in the international scene, while it also interprets with higher clarity the real economic and political world. As per Gilpin [19], “Realism emphasizes the primary importance of the state and the national security” while realism is essentially a political ideology and statism (mercantilism) an economic one. Liberal scholars seem to follow an old view of how to see universal harmony of interests, which is a position that hides hegemonic aspirations of power of each dominant power. From liberal theory of international relations, we can refer to some of the most important ones as Robert Keohane και Joseph Nye. They may disagree with some political realists regarding the nature of the international institutions and the hegemonic role of the great powers, but they look to agree with the main theory of realism concerning the characteristics of the international system and the effect of the power in the international scene. They also seem to agree with the main realistic view that the international institutions are affected by the power and they are institutions of order and not of justice. There were several liberalists like Nye, Keohane and Lake and constructivists/post-Marxists such as Wallerstein and Cox who supported their ideas, but at the end it is the political realism theory promoted by scholars like Stephen Krasner, Robert Gilpin and Suzan Strange that succeeded to win in the public debate today.

1.2

International Political Economy

In order to reach a thorough understanding and thus be able to study more effectively several issues related to policy, economy, society and technology, the International Political Economy (IPE) approach can really contribute to this effort. This is reinforced by the fact that IPE combines

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specialized sciences such as politics, economy and international relations. The IPE helps us to perceive the way that politics shape the economy and the way that economy shapes politics and it has been developed due to the fact that several global issues could not be explained inside a conventional framework of knowledge. The IPE has become very quickly one of the main areas of the International Relations, in the broader Political Sciences area. It is seen as one of the most challenging and promising areas of the International Relations that can describe and explain successfully the international system through a holistic interpretation. The IPE is considered as a science with dual characteristics; the economic science that covers the knowledge fields of macro- and micro-economy up to the international trade while at the same time it is the political science of the international relations. The strong initial relation between the IPE and the economic theory is also one of the main contributions that IPE has given to the international studies. There is a lot of discussion whether the theory of international relations includes the IPE or the other way which may be also more possible in case economists include into their analysis the theory of international relations. The whole Political Economy has been built and established upon the notion of rational behaviour of the individual and the economists accept that such a rational behaviour cannot be anything else apart from the egoistic intention of the man to maximize its individual interest. The economic theory can be seen mostly as a challenge of optimization, in other words a challenge of better usage of the limited resources; a dynamic macroeconomic pattern assesses the operation of an economy during a period and in such a pattern there are some key-variables (which are the means of the economic policy and they are named as control variables) and the scope is to make an optimum choice of those key-variables as a function of time. The evolution in the Political Economy took place mainly from the 1980s, and by the end of that decade, the epistemology of Political Economy was a district category of economy sciences. In summary, the basic epistemological trends and theories in the last centuries can be summarized as follows [30, pp. 11–12]: • First half of seventeenth century: The first organized economical trend appeared in France at the first half of the seventeenth century; it was the mercantilism having its main focus on the land that occupied by the feudal lord who was the decision maker for the monetary policy and the external commerce. After the failure of mercantilism,

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the naturalists took over and they changed the reference base from the feudalism to the individual piece of land and its grower. This led them to the first theory of value, which linked the wealth with money. • Until mid of eighteenth century: There was no political economy with the meaning of a complete and systematic theory which could interpret the economic reality and lead to suggestions of economic policy. At that time, the classic theorists changed the focus of interest of the theory of value, from the nature to the man. It can be said that the Political Economy starts with the publishment of Adam Smith’s book “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 1776). Adam Smith stopped any political and deterministic approach of the economic phenomena and he chose as the main task of his analysis the production and exchange of goods within a society of man and trade-producers (Homo Economicus). The success of the classical theory can be explained from this new theoretical framework and the fact that it was established upon the base of the Enlightment. However, the theory of value has been abandoned (except from Marx), because it was considered as metaphysics and the interest of the economists been attracted by more practical aspects as price, by keeping basic philosophical foundations of the classic theory, like the optimum behaviour of the individual and the operation of the free market. In addition, the Newtonian physic urged the economists to introduce the calculus into the economic theory and thus to use mathematics to express several causalities. • Mid-nineteenth century: The new classic theory prevails, by which a maximization of social wealth can be achieved if the individual aims to maximize its own wealth. The new theory contributed a lot to the industrial revolution era, which requested a free market to grow in. During the same period of the new classic theory, another theory, the Marxism came up as a sub-branch of the classic theory. Marxism dealt with the labour theory of value when the classic theorists left it and they started focusing on the aspect of price. • Beg of twentieth century: In Europe, the philosophical trend of logical positivism—or else logical empiricism—appeared: the main idea was to establish an epistemological philosophy, meaning a philosophy that would be based upon the “logic” as the basic tool of any science, while the “positivism” would accept only knowledge based on tangible and specific confirmation of the experience.

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Basic followers of this trend were Schlick, Waismann, Neurath, Hahn and Carnap. As per the logical positivism theory, the process of methodological approach to form a scientific statement starts from the experience and then a hypothesis is formed; based on the deductive reasoning an empirical forecast comes out and the theory is subject to the control and measurement through the experimental procedure. This is the verification principle. Theorists that followed the logical positivism believed that the progress of science is a continuous, accumulative process in which any new is built upon the old one and not next to that. • 1930-1950s: The “General Theory” of Keynes (1936) confronted the law of Say and supported the idea of actual demand, redefined the notion of economic reality and giving new tools for the study of economy. Keynes introduced in the political economy the macroeconomic analysis and it constituted the new Paradigm in the economic theory, but only a Paradigm; on this theory, many other theoretical approaches have been built on, like the theory of Harrod and Domar about the economic enlargement and the work of Tobin about the monetary theory (Nobel prize 1981). One of the weak areas of the theory of Keynes is the stagflation that appeared after the implementation of the theory in the Western countries for more than three decades. Thus, the theory of Friedman appeared but it does not constitute a new Paradigm in the political economy. From the theory of Friedman what is more appealing is not so much its focus on the monetary policy, but its claim that the economic activity is autonomous, that the economic policy needs to be oriented to that and that the economy has to operate based on the system of the free market. • 1950s: Karl Popper, one of the greatest philosophers in the twentieth century, brought up the falsification principle. As per Popper, the knowledge does not start from the observation and thus any description of scientific hypothesis in not based on the experience; any scientific hypothesis starts clearly from the scientist and it is a guess regarding the scientific phenomenon. After the hypothesis is formed, the deductive reasoning follows that delivers the scientific principle which is tested through the experience. Since Hegel considered the battle between the nations and the wars as the main root cause of any historical change and Marx believed the battle between the classes as the driving force of history, Popper supported the idea

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that there is no historical determinism and he introduced the notion of piecemeal social engineering. • 1960s: After the criticism that took place against the logical positivism, a new epistemological trend, historicism or relativism appeared and its main followers were Kuhn, Feyerbend, Hanson and Toulmin. The notion of “paradigm” appeared, which is not just a simple scientific theory but a more spherical dimension since it consists of a powerful grid of notional, theoretical, experimental and methodological assumptions. Thus, the “normal science” is appeared after several unsuccessful results in its implementation the period of “extraordinary science” follows which is characterized by a scientific crisis. As per Kuhn, the evolution of science is not a smooth, linear accumulative process, but a more complex phenomenon with periods of continuity and non-continuity (discontinuity), with radical reviews and deep rifts. • A third scientific approach during the twentieth century was proposed by Imre Lakatos by introducing the scientific research programme which consists of a hard core of basic hypothesis and a sum of positive heuristic. This theory of Lakatos is positioned in the middle of the aforementioned theories of logical positivism and the theory of relativism of Kuhn; it accepts what the logical positivism supports, that any new theory is built upon the previous one by keeping the positive areas of that previous one and it also accepts what Kuhn believed that the scientific research programmes are discreetly or else that the new is grown next to the old and not on that. As per the analysis Dudley Dillard published in the Southern Economic Journal (1978), there is an average of around 40 years between two main economic theories to be revealed and adopted by the society; this period of time seems that it does not happen randomly, but it is because economies are being developed and enriched. • 1980s: After the 1980s, the evolution of the Political Economy took place and the epistemology of Political Economy becomes a district category of economy sciences. If one considers the political science of the international relations close to the Thucydides work and view, there can be seen three levels of analysis: the human, the state and the international system. During the twentieth century, there were too many conflicts and clashes that

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occurred among and between internationalist movements; Communists, Liberalists and Nazis unfortunately did not finally contribute a lot to “maturity of thought” in relation to the international scene and practice. An explanation to this could be that all of these movements did not follow the three levels of analysis already mentioned above herein, which could have helped them to avoid mistakes in their implementation during the period of time. One of the well-known complications of risk in the International Political Economy (IPE) approach is included in the term “political risk”, which can also be found as “country risk” when it is related to the decisions made in politics that can affect the welfare of stakeholders. More useful definitions of terms and notions are given below as it is important to have a clear understanding of them for the purpose of our study. • State boundary: It exists and concurs with the sovereignty and geopolitical boundary. It represents a “set of interaction thresholds where the political and economic activity of any state is separable from other states”. • State stakeholders : The main actors, such as governments, policy- and decision-making institutions, societies. • Factors and indicators : Each factor may be comprised of indicators, both/either qualitative and/or quantitative. These indicators are found in categories such as political, economic, social, technological, cultural and others. • Timeline: A time unit as it is considered in the calendar year and multiples thereof. • Policies : They are seen to emanate at the state boundary and can be directed either outside or inside this boundary level. Furthermore, policies are often determined as a result of endogenous or exogenous influence exerted on the state stakeholders and therefore the state boundary.

1.3

Security

According to the theory of realism, the relative standing and survival and thus existence of a state are strongly affected by its material and resource capabilities and also its ability to legislate them in their efforts to gain power; if not available or in case there is a lack of such resources, then

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the state is vulnerable and in danger [31, pp. 9–10]. Realism considers security in relation to the state and it places particular emphasis on the preservation of the state’s territorial integrity and the physical safety of its inhabitants. A nation state is seen as secure when it is possible to defend against an external attack and resist other nation states from urging it to change its behaviour significantly or to sacrifice basic political values. The theory of realism views that the ownership of resources and also the capability of the nation state to utilize them properly and efficiently continues to determine the relative standing and status of that nation state in the global system [32, pp. 1–6]. Realism considers that sovereign states—the main actors—coexist in anarchy, which is the prevailing type of structure at global level. States are obliged to face competition and deal with insecurity; both of which are a situation that a state cannot avoid. The concept of security plays a main role in the theory of realism and Walt claims that “realism sees the insecurity of states as the main problem in international relations” and he indicates that “states must provide security for themselves because no other agency or actor can be counted on to do so”. Realists claim that security is a rare occurrence for several reasons: man’s innate desire for power, conflicts of interest among states with different resource endowments, economic systems, political orders and “ordering principle” of international anarchy [33]. There is a distinction between the hard type of power and the soft one, while it also refers to the instruments and variables of power. More specific: • Hard power: As hard power is seen as a nation’s ability to use economic incentives or military strength to influence other actors’ behaviours. Hard power is a form of power that appears to be simpler and more understood when compared to the soft one, since it easily experienced because its effects are more visible and measurable. As per Nye (2004), most of the stakeholders are familiar with it. Thus, hard power is heavily resource-based and it is usually seen as the type of power that replies on the capacity of an actor to collect and control many resources and then to utilize them properly to strengthen his position. • Soft power: Mostly related to influence, which means effort to convince the other party by using other appropriate methods. Soft power is considered to be close to the liberal tradition even if there

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is no contradiction between realism and soft power, while soft power emphasizes not the ever-possibility of war, but the possibility of cooperation; not military power, but the power of ideas [34, p. 82]. Soft power enables countries to get the outcomes they want by cooption rather than coercion. Nye proposed that a country’s soft power links with its culture, quality of education, ideology and values and its foreign policies. A country’s soft power comes from its attractiveness and thus is linked with its attributes such as culture, way of life, ideology, politico-economic system, quality of education, think tanks, scientific and technological prowess, reach of intelligentsia and media, legitimacy of action and international influence. • Instruments of power: Force in general, armed forces, law enforcement, intelligence agencies, governmental diplomatic departments and institutions, foreign aid and international financial controls. • Variables of power: Military strength, economic capacity, the will of the government and people to use power, and the degree to which legitimacy (as a perception either the people or other nations or international organizations) affects how power is applied. Security challenges can happen for several contemporary issues such as: non-availability of critical resources, industrialization of the developing world (i.e. China, India, SE Asian countries, African countries), increasing demand in industrialized countries, growth of population, higher living standards than in previous decades, new technology that requires more energy, modern consumer behaviour to buy and consume more and in particular from young ages, the Internet of Things (IoT) and many more. Issues related to IPE and energy security are seen as a paradox among the universal character of energy demand and the nation state’s exclusive right of management of natural resources present in its territory [32, pp. 1–4]. The latest developments and achievements in the globalized environment formed the need for a different approach to understand security and not through the previous, traditional channels that are obsolete and no longer effective. Contemporary views on a state’s security requires re-focusing and understanding on the fact that a new parameter appeared after the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center in New York, US, in 2001: this parameter is terrorism. It seems that one of the major challenges and threats to a state’s security will not only come from other states but also from non-states actors, in the near future. The theory of realism considers that societies expect from their national governments to

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apply new measures and take preventive actions to deal with such new challenges and threats. The intellectual link between the theory of realism and the concept of security is very strong. The concept of national security is often defined in excessively narrow terms and it is taken to simply connote the preservation of territorial integrity and sovereignty of a state, as well as its core political and cultural values, against military threats. Since these threats are seen to arise from the use- or threat of use- of force, national security is regarded to hinge essentially on the coercive power of the state and on the reliability and strength of its friends and allies. Accordingly, safeguarding of national security is believed to be largely dependent upon the state’s military capabilities, the efficacy of its internal security system, notably its paramilitary, police and intelligence apparatus, and its ability to forge an effective foreign policy designed to keep at bay threats from inimical foreign elements. National security is not only a security issue linked with military security of a nation. Especially, after the World War II, the meaning of the national security has been widened and it has become a broaden notion including other kind of characteristics. In general, there are two school of thoughts that are linked to the notion of national security: (a) American liberal internationalists with their dedication to the United Nations and international governance and (b) realists who tend more to the views of Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) and other philosophers who espoused the supremacy of the nation state. National security can be seen through the suggestions proposed by Holmes [35, pp. 17–25]: • Preserve the safety of the nation’s homeland and protect the integrity of the nation’s domestic institutions and systems vital to that purpose. This goal requires strong Active, Guard and Reserve forces as well as effective intelligence, law enforcement, counter-terrorism, cybersecurity and immigration policies to protect the homeland and secure nation’s borders. • Maintain an armed force capable of successfully completing all of the military missions assigned to it and fulfilling commitments to defend the security of the country. • Exert nation’s influence as much as possible overseas through the entire spectrum of instruments of power, including diplomacy, foreign aid, selective intelligence sharing, public diplomacy, and human rights and humanitarian programmes. This requires

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integrating nation’s diplomacy and foreign aid and humanitarian programmes more closely to achieve the purposes of the national strategy. • Focus nation’s energy security policy on developing domestic resources and having an open international energy market (free from harmful political manipulation). • Ensure that the nation’s dedication to values and their promotion overseas reflects not only its own history of liberty, but also the universal principles of freedom—thus defining human rights as freedom of expression, the right of democratic self-government, economic freedom, equality before the law, and freedom from persecution and oppression. This will make other nations to support and provide help in the international arena. The theory of realism has been criticized as having a narrow view of national security as following an approach that is mainly focused on force and which implies that a nation’s security relies on its ability to avert an attack. Therefore, it would be helpful to update and use a complementary approach to this theory and it is important to take into consideration some additional parameters and factors that have an impact on national security of a nation state, such as globalization, climate change and economic strength. National security cannot be seen and/or explained only by military terms, as it transfers incorrect icon of reality and it can bring nation states to focus mainly on military threats while to neglect other probably more harmful risks which can consequently affect the whole security itself. The main factors that have been seen as necessary for the assessment of a country’s national power are: size and intrinsic resources, human capital, technological capabilities, economic strength, military power and leadership quality. For the purpose of this work, it is necessary to assume that both the energy security and national security of a state are seen to be situated at the state boundary level and thus they can be directed either outside or inside that boundary level. The notions of energy security and national security of a nation state can be studied through the lens of International Political Economy (IPE). Several definitions for these notions are available in the literature that they vary based on the nature of the objective and aim each time. The selection of the two case studies, Israel and Cyprus, did not happen accidentally, as they were chosen because of the fact that they

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both have similar characteristics and it would be useful to compare them as case studies concerning energy in the Eastern Mediterranean region. This book can contribute to the existing literature through different perspectives: • Provide a contemporary view of energy and related developments at both international and European level. A coherent reference to the current situation is presented together with the energy transition that is already taking place and the challenges that exist due to the effects of megatrends coming from the external environment. • An updated approach for how to design and implement a conceptual framework regarding the energy security of a nation state under the view of International Political Economy, with the necessary stages described herein. • The relationship between the energy security and the national security of a nation state is examined and studied under the International Political Economy umbrella and in particular through the lenses of the theory of realism. • An interdisciplinary approach is followed, which gives a fresh view of how things happen. In order to view things differently, it is important and helpful to benchmark through unrelated differentiation.

References 1 World Health Organization. (2020). Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus2019. Last accessed 28 December 2021. 2 Fischhendler, I., & Nathan, D. (2014). In the name of energy security: The struggle over the exportation of Israeli natural gas. Energy Policy, 70, 152–162. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ENPOL.2014.03.020 3 Bilgin, M. (2012). Energy transitions and international security in the twenty-first century. In S. F. Krishna-Hensel (Ed.), New security frontiers: Critical energy and the resource challenge. Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 4 Weissebacher, M. (2009). Sources of power: How energy forges human history. Praeger. 5 Cook, E. (1971). The flow of energy in an industrial society. Scientific American, 225(3), 134–148. https://doi.org/10.1038/scientificamerican 0971-134

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6 Andrews, J., & Jelley, N. A. (2007). Energy science: Principles, technologies, and impacts. Bell & Bain Ltd. 7 Sovacool, B. K. (2011). The Routledge handbook of energy security. Routledge. 8 Leffler, M. P. (1990). National security. The Journal of American History, 77 (1), 143–152. 9 Wolfers, A. (1952). National security as an ambiguous symbol. Political Science Quarterly, 67 (4), 481–502. https://doi.org/10.2307/2145138 10 Freeman, E., Harrison, J. S., & Wicks, A. C. (2007). Managing for stakeholders: Survival. Yale University Press. 11 Jensen, T., & Sandstorm, J. (2011). Stakeholder theory and globalization: The challenges of power and responsibility. Organization Studies, 32(4), 473–488. https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840611400290 12 Freeman, E. R., & Miles, S. (2005). Stakeholders: Theory and practice. Oxford University Press. 13 Viotti, P. R., & Kauppi, M. V. (2012). International relations theory (5th ed.). Pearson. 14 Rosenberg, J. (1994). Empire of civil society: A critique of the realist theory of international relations. Verso. 15 Cochrane, C. (1929). Thucydides and the science of history. Oxford University Press. 16 Zagorin, P. (2006). Thucydides-An introduction for the common reader. Princeton University Press. 17 Crane, G. (1998). Thucydides and the ancient simplicity: The limits of political realism. University of California Press. 18 Connor, W. R. (1984). Thucydides. Princeton University Press. 19 Gilpin, R. (2001). Global political economy: Understanding the international economic order. Princeton University Press. 20 Carr, E. H. (1946). The twenty years’ crisis, 1919–1939: An introduction to the study of international relations (2nd ed.). St. Martin’s Press. 21 Evans, G. (1975). E. H. Carr and international relations. British Journal of International Studies, 1(2), 77–97. https://doi.org/10.1017/S02602105 00116444 22 Morgenthau, H. J., & Thompson, K. W. (1993). Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace. McGraw-Hill. 23 Gaddis, J. (2011). Quick study: George Kennan’s cold war policy of containment. A conversation with Kennan’s biographer. Economist. https:// www.economist.com/blogs/prospero/2011/11/quick-study-george-ken nan’s-cold-war-policy-containment. Last accessed 22 November 2018. 24 Coziete, M. (2008). Raymond Aron and the morality of realism (Working Paper). Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs. Australian

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National University. http://ir.bellschool.anu.edu.au/experts-publications/ publications/1659/raymond-aron-and-morality-realism. Last accessed 22 November 2018. Schweller, R. (1996). Neorealism’s status-quo bias: What security dilemma? Security Studies, 5(3), 90–121. https://doi.org/10.1080/096364196084 29277 Waltz, K. (2011). International political theory. Poiotita. Grieco, J. (1988). Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: A realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism. International Organization, 42(3), 485– 507. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706787 Jorgensen, K. E. (2018). International relations theory. A new introduction. Macmillan Education UK. Guzzini, S. (2003). Realism in international relations and international political economy. Routledge. Antonakis, N. (2015). The adventure of political economy. Ocelotos. Molchanov, M. (2012). Energy security and the revival of geopolitics: The Russian case. In S. F. Krishna-Hensel (Ed.), New security frontiers: Critical energy and the resource challenge. Ashgate Publishing Ltd. Krishna-Hensel, S. F. (2012). Introduction. In S. F. Krishna-Hensel (Ed.), New security frontiers: Critical energy and the resource challenge. Ashgate Publishing Ltd. Walt, S. M. (1991). The renaissance of security studies. International Studies Quarterly, 35(2), 211–239. https://doi.org/10.2307/2600471 Nye, J. (2011). The future of power. Public Affairs. Holmes, K. (2015). What is national security? The Heritage Foundation. http://index.heritage.org/military/2015/important-essays-analysis/ national-security/. Last accessed 12 October 2017.

CHAPTER 2

The International Energy Landscape

2.1

General

International relations are currently facing challenges in terms of basic stereotypes and constants, with fundamental changes in the system of power. This is mainly driven by the transformation of the previous bipolar world—ruled by the US and the USSR1 until the end of the Cold War at the late 1980s—into the current multipolar world. The initial weakening and eventual collapse of the USSR gave way to Russia, which was slow in finding the required pace and becoming economically strong. The absence of an awe-inspiring rival was probably the reason that reduced the strong US presence on the international stage until now, while one would expect its total supremacy, due to the collapse of its main competitor, the USSR. The emergence of other actors on the international stage has changed the status quo and the reference points are no longer obvious or visible as before. New powers are claiming an increased role in world affairs, including Russia as the immediate successor to the USSR and China as the other superpower that is seeking an appropriate role on the international stage. Another actor, which is considered to be of a special specific geopolitical weight and it is seen as a potential superpower, is the European 1 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Flouros, Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09603-7_2

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Union (EU), although it has not been possible to implement a common foreign and defence policy yet. Several efforts in this direction have not been successful so far, while the leading EU member states, Germany and France, are pursuing their own personal agenda through bilateral agreements with other third countries instead of being aligned with a common EU central foreign policy. In addition, the United Kingdom (UK), after 47 years of full membership in the EU, recently decided to exit the club of Europe and become autonomous in an attempt to take on a new role on the international stage. The UK, along with the British Overseas Territory of Gibraltar, was initially a full member of the European Economic Community (EEC) from 1973 and then of its successor, the European Community (EC), and finally, the European Union (EU) until 31 January 2020. It is interesting to follow its path and see whether it will be possible to regain the power and role it had on the international stage in the relatively recent past and until the beginning of the last century. In some countries where centralism of power is in the hands of a few, such as Russia, China and Turkey, their leadership has remained unchanged over the last many years: Vladimir Putin has served as president of Russia (1999–2004, 2004–2008, 2012–2018, 2018–) and he was also the country’s prime minister (1999, 2008–2012); Xi Jinping has served as vice-president of the People’s Republic of China (2008–2013), general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP; 2012–) and president of China (2013–); Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan has served as prime minister (2003–2014) and president (2014–) of Turkey. As it is well known, leadership is an important feature for defending the interests of a country and the best possible promotion of its geopolitical vision on the international stage. Leadership is a key factor of power for a country, and historical events have shown the noticeable difference it brought to the benefit of the country where it was exercised. The world economy is constantly changing with a view to continuous and sustainable development, which is often challenging to achieve. Globalization and technology have brought about tectonic changes, and energy is a key component of development and prosperity for any country. One of the economic parameters that are most frequently used to study the economy and growth is the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). A change in the GDP can always provide useful information about the macroenvironment and indication about expected events to follow. The trend in global GDP, including long-term baseline projections until 2050, in real terms is shown in Fig. 2.1. Forecasts are based on an assessment by

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Fig. 2.1 Global GDP growth (2010–2050) (Source OECD, 2022. Available at https://data.oecd.org/gdp/gdp-long-term-forecast.htm [1])

the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) of the economic climate in individual countries and the world economy, using a combination of model-based analyses and expert judgement. The indicator is measured in US$ at 2010 purchasing power parity (PPP). The main GDP growth on a global scale is primarily due to the effect from G20 economies, a strategic multilateral platform where the world’s major developed and emerging economies participate. The G20 members2 represent more than 80% of world GDP, 75% of international trade and 60% of the world population (G20, 2022) [2]. Historical and Global Data [3] In human history, there are several periods that can be categorized with the use of different parameters. Taking into consideration the changes of energy types, then six separate periods in human history can be identified, which are generally named as follows: primitive, hunting, primitive 2 The members of the G20 are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union. Spain is also invited as a permanent guest.

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agricultural, advanced agricultural, industrial and technological) [4]. The parameters mentioned below are chosen in order to represent main historical periods and milestones related to global growth and other energy-related topics. Specifically: • Beginning of the Industrial Revolution. • Use of fuel type. • Ratio between carbon (C) and hydrogen (H) in the fuel used (C/H). • World population. • Population living in cities. • Number of central governmental authorities in a region. There are numerous different parameters to use and it can be an endless process that includes new data available every time. However, the above parameters are considered representative enough to depict the evolution and changes that took place from the early centuries of human life until today and the horizon of 2050; such an approach may provide useful information for further analysis and reference (Fig. 2.2). The energy transitions that took place resulted in different industrial revolutions. From wood to coal, then to oil and diesel, followed by natural gas and then recently to more renewable energy sources, human history has undergone drastic changes that consequently affected the

Fig. 2.2 Historical Evolution (Source Author, 2019 [5])

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shape of the world that we know today. It is very helpful and important to understand the several different transition periods, since it will give us a tool for studying the details of the changes and identifying the critical success factors in each case. Since this study focuses on security and particularly national and energy security, the information presented in the figure was selected to relate to these examined factors. The growth and development in most of the cases/parameters presented in this figure have been tremendous in a short period of time during the last few decades, when compared to the total period of human existence. This growth is expected to continue with a numerical progress and not just a linear one. Focusing on the last period, at the beginning of the twentieth century, a very important consideration about the changes between various types of fuel can be examined. All such changes—from wood to coal and then to oil—led to significant developments in the international political economy [5, 6, p. 32]. The causes and effects of the changes and transitions that happened in the past and in previous periods are not expected to remain the same in the near future. More specifically, the initial changes in fuel, from wood to coal and even to oil, were probably linked to and affected by the need to provide better services to society; the latest changes may be “purposive” and they can be seen as “driven, among other things, by concerns about greenhouse gas emissions, nuclear risks, energy prices or energy import dependence” [7, pp. 291–292]. Security has been facing more challenges due to globalization, some of them being related to the availability of resources such as water, food and energy. During the evolution of human history, the notion of “resources” has changed meaning. A useful summary of such different considerations is given in Table 2.1, while the effect of such resources on energy security is given along with reference to the basic scholars and theorists. With regard to energy and oil, there were key post-World War II oil shocks such as the Suez Crisis of 1956–1957, the OPEC oil embargo of 1973–1974, the Iranian revolution of 1978–1979, the Iran–Iraq War initiated in 1980, the first Persian Gulf War in 1990–1991 and the oil price spike of 2007–2008. Following each major oil shock, there were other major or minor disturbances in terms of economic downturns [8, pp. 239–240]. Crude oil and related petroleum product prices are usually affected by events that eventually disrupt the oil supply; such events can be due to geopolitical, economic, social, weather-related or even technological developments. These events can eventually cause disruptions and

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Table 2.1 Historical evolution of resources Period

Resources

Before the – Initially human industrial revolution (manpower) – Animals (horsepower) – Sun, wind, water 1900s Oil

Characteristics

Effect on Energy Security (ES)

Readily available, replenishable and almost inexhaustible resources

No ES problem existed

High production rates of automotive, shipping (conversion from coal to oil) and air industry brought Focus on new countries rich with natural resources

US, Britain and European countries seek oil fields abroad

Colonialism

Fossil fuels (coal)

Industrial revolution, WWI, WWII

Fossil fuels (coal, oil)

Neo-colonialism

Fossil fuels (coal, oil)

Cold War

Fossil fuels (coal, oil), natural gas

Non-replenishable resources, energy-intense economies, higher demand for energy Far-away energy resources and raw materials US–Soviet rivalry, OPEC

1990s –

– Fossil fuels (coal, oil) – Natural gas – Renewable energy sources – Fossil fuels (coal, oil) – Natural gas – Renewable energy sources

China an emerging polar vs US in the global politics, emergence of global terrorism

Post 9/11

Sources Author, 2019 (based on [20, PP. 9–11])

Need to get access to natural resources not available at home, so more need to secure them (as energy)

The ES context appeared

Efforts from nation states to reassert national sovereignty over resources US invasion of Iraq in Start of a unipolar 1991 can be seen as moment in global the first war to take politics place over oil A political parameter reappears in the equation of energy security

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they may bring uncertainty about future supply or demand in the markets that will finally bring volatility in oil prices. Such events happened in the previous 40 years and an overview of oil price changes along with major events since the 1970s is graphically indicated in Fig. 2.3. The indicated major events are: 1: US spare capacity exhausted 2: 3: 4: 5:

Arab oil embargo Iranian revolution Iran–Iraq War Saudis abandon swing producer role

6: Iraq invades Kuwait 7: Asian financial crisis

8: OPEC cuts production targets by 1.7 mmbpd 9: 9–11 attacks 10: Low spare capacity 11: Global financial collapse 12: OPEC cuts production targets by 4.2 mmbpd 13: OPEC production quota unchanged 14: Global pandemic reduces oil demand

Fig. 2.3 Crude oil prices and major events (1970–2021) (Source U.S. Energy Information Administration (2022) [9])

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Global oil prices have been changed frequently during previous decades mainly due to: • Supply–demand balance disruption: Global demand for oil has been increasing faster than production capacity; thus, a real production capacity, which is always different from the nominal/installed one, was insufficient to meet the demand. This means that even slightly minor supply disruptions knock the supply–demand balance and for that reason oil prices go up dramatically. • Production and raw materials costs : Costs are affected by changes in the global economy and technology that seriously act as a critical factor. • External effects : Such as disruptions caused by natural, economic or geopolitical factors, military conflicts and terrorism. • Market expectations and speculation: Future contracts and derivatives opened the oil market to speculative capital flows and they have become highly reflexive, which does not cope with changes in the other factors. A speculative market with low spare capacity and high uncertainty can quickly cause price bubbles and longer-term volatility. A three-variable endogenous model [10, pp. 871–909] could be used to indicate three different shocks that may impact energy prices: • Crude oil supply shocks: Caused by exogenous events. • Aggregate demand shocks: Related to industrial commodities in the global market. • Oil market specific demand shocks: Which are specific to the global crude oil market, usually based on fear of future events that might cause oil prices to change. Oil and gas production, transportation and refining infrastructures are geographically located in different places and possible disruptions may cause shortages if supply is not replaced before stockpiles run out. There were 24 oil supply shocks during the period 1950–2010, which can be seen as incidents that took place every eight months or so, or 3.7% of the global supply [11, p. 421]. There have been several cases where oil and gas incidents caused both direct and side effects to the global economy.

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Global fundamentals are expected to continue to shape long-term prices, since short/medium-term volatility has returned. The highest growth is expected in the developing countries of Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, but, because of the competitive advantages caused by the development in shale gas, growth will be strong in North America, whereas Europe and Japan are expected to lag behind [12]. The biggest increases in oil consumption within a decade came from the developing world. It can be seen that continents like Asia–Pacific, South America and Africa showed an increase of 60–80% during that period, while the Middle East almost doubled the consumption volume. At the same time, Europe and Eurasia reported a decrease in oil consumption, which can be partly explained by new types of energy already starting to be used in these regions and also by the energy-saving behaviour shown by their citizens, something that is not the case in other places. It is always necessary to study security of supply together with security of demand; otherwise, the approach of any research will be weak and incomplete and at the same time enhances risks for consumers in energy planning. There is an “indissoluble link” between both sides of energy security and thus a reliable energy policy should take into consideration the related stakeholders [13, p. 586]. The global energy system is highly interconnected, with more than a third of oil production to be traded internationally and around a quarter of natural gas. Because of that, there are big energy imbalances such as surpluses and deficits that are related to states with large resource deposits and inventories that export energy to states with less natural energy resources. Typical examples are China and India; the population of both countries together constitutes one-third of the world population with almost 2.75 billion people out of 7.6 bn in 2018. At the same time, during that year, China imported 70% of its needs in oil and around 40% of its consumption in natural gas, while India imported 80% of its needs in oil and around 50% of its consumption in natural gas. Within the next 30 years, this may remain the same at such high levels, while India’s imports in both oil and natural gas are expected to double by 2050. This is caused by the energy transition that is expected to take place in the country from coal fuel to gas by increasing the dependence of the country on energy suppliers from abroad. With regard to exports related to oil and gas, Russia and Middle East producers are expected to lead in the coming decades. The US has become a sizeable net exporter mainly

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due to the latest developments in shale fracturing along with a decrease in local consumption, which may reach a peak around 2030 [14]. According to the annual outlook report by British Petroleum (BP, 2020) [14], several important indications related to the global energy issues are given as follows: • There will be a “regional imbalance” (production–consumption) in every geographical region until 2040, which is expected to have an impact on energy trade and consequently the energy security of regions and countries. • North America has been a net exporter since 2016/2017, while Asian countries will be growing in terms of energy needs “accounting for around 70% of inter-regional net imports by 2035”. • The Middle East will continue to be the largest energy exporter even if its share will be reduced “from 46% in 2013 to 36% in 2035”. World energy consumption rises, while it will reach a total of 28% between 2015 and 2040. More specifically, energy consumption during this period is expected to be: • in OECD3 countries: increased by 9% and • in non-OECD countries: increased by 41%. The world energy consumption during the period 1990 to 2040 is presented graphically below for both OECD and non-OCED countries. Again, the energy consumption in non-OECD countries is increasing much faster than that in OECD countries (Fig. 2.4). The greatest increase in energy demand is expected to be caused by non-OECD countries, due to economic growth, access to marketed energy and high growth rates in populations; all these factors cause higher energy demand. In both OECD and non-OECD countries, the reduction in energy intensity is expected to be marked since many of the larger

3 The 34 OECD member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States (OECD, 2018).

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Fig. 2.4 World energy consumption (quadrillion Btu) (Source U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2018)

economies have started to change their production from high energyintensive to less energy-intensive industries and services. The countries that hold most of the proven oil reserves are non-OECD members and proven reserves increased at almost the same rate among OPEC and non-OECD countries between 2000 and 2020 (Table 2.2). The world’s proven oil reserves have changed significantly during the last 40 years, increasing by almost 2.5 times more than those at the end of the 80s. The total volume of the proven oil reserves globally reached 1732 thousand million barrels in 2020, which was less by two billion barrels compared to 2019. The biggest share belongs to the non-OECD countries, which account for almost 85% of the world’s total oil reserves, while OPEC members account for around 70% of that. The most highly ranked countries regarding global oil reserves are Venezuela (17.5%), Saudi Arabia (17.2%) and Canada (9.7%) (Fig. 2.5). Table 2.2 Proven oil reserves (’000 million barrels)

OECD non-OECD OPEC non-OPEC EU

End 2000

End 2010

End 2020

262.7 1038.2 833.0 468.0 3.9

238.5 1398.3 1137.7 499.1 3.2

260.0 1472.4 1214.7 517.7 2.4

Source Author, 2022 (based on BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2021 [15])

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Thousand million barrels 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 1980 OECD

1990 Non-OECD

2000 OPEC

2010 Non-OPEC

2020 European Union

Fig. 2.5 Global proven reserves in oil (1980–2020) (Source BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2021 [15])

At the same time, the global R/P ratio4 estimates that current oil reserves in 2020 could last for a period of over 50 years provided that the production rates are kept at the same rate as today [15]. The fuel mix used for global energy production in 2015 mainly came from fossil fuels, representing 85% of the total amount of energy produced globally, while renewable energy resources represented only 1%. It should be mentioned that crude oil, coal and natural gas are considered fossil fuels, while geothermal, sunlight, wind and recycling are considered renewable energy resources. Fossil fuels have played a dominant role in the energy mix, while it is expected that it will continue the same during the coming decades, even though there are new types of energy that will eventually start increasing in percentage in the energy mix. The disruptor factor is innovation and technology, which can replace the existing types of fuel with new ones that should be more efficient and economical. As regard to available resources of fuels (like fossil, oil, gas and coal), one of the best-known peak oil theories is the Hubbert peak theory

4 The R/P ratio estimates how many years a resource site can continue to be considered productive taking into account current production rates.

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(1956). According to this theory, for any geographical area, either a single state oil-producing actor or the planet earth, the rate of petroleum production tends to follow a bell-shaped curve, which is the nominal distribution curve (otherwise known as “Gauss”). Based on this curve: • There is a point of maximum production, which is a function of production rates, accumulated production and any new discovery rates. • Before the max point: the production rate increases mainly due to the discovery rate and any new infrastructure. • After the max point: production declines mainly due to resource depletion. The Hubbert peak theory is based on the perspective that the oil and gas reservoirs under the ground in any region are not infinite and consequently the rate of discovery that initially increases fast should reach a maximum point and then start falling. In addition, it is important to consider the economics. One of the factors that can be used to assess whether energy in a particular region, form or use can be used is also the EROEI (Energy Return on Energy Investment). This is the ratio of energy extracted to the energy expended in the process. If the EROEI ratio reaches one, then the oil or gas production can no longer be considered as a net energy source [16]. Main Actors in the Geopolitical and Energy Field Global oil and gas supply growth is supported by several countries, including Saudi Arabia and most of the Gulf countries, the US, and Russia, China, Brazil and Norway as the biggest sources. This significant build-up of supply was the result of substantial investments during previous years and mostly in the upstream industry. In 2021, global oil production decreased by 6.6 million bpd, with OPEC countries being responsible for almost two-thirds of that; Libya, with around 920,000 bpd less, was followed by Saudi Arabia with around 790,000 bpd less. Among non-OPEC countries, Russia lost around 1.0 million bpd from its production and the US around 600,000 bpd. The refinery utilization declined by almost 8% down to 74%, which was the lowest since 1985. Oil demand fell by a record 9.1 million bpd, which was the lowest during

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the last decade; around 25% of this reduction came from the US market, followed by the EU, which accounted for 15% of that. On the other hand, China was almost the only case where demand increased, by 0.2 million bpd [17]. An overview of the most important actors in the energy scene will help us to obtain a better understanding of trends and dynamics for the benefit of critical analysis and for producing useful policy conclusions and proposals. US The energy status in the US has changed critically during the last decade in favour of energy autonomy and the energy security of the country. The shale gas revolution that took place in the US played a significant role and contributed to its energy autarky, making the country a net exporter and improving its international position in the energy nexus, where other great oil and gas powers like Russia and Saudi Arabia coexist. At the same time, a few important events contributed to enhance the US’s international power. During the last few administrations in the US, the strategic orientation of the country in the international firmament has changed. One of the key changes in the US priorities was the redirection of its main focus and priorities from Europe and the Middle East region, while at the same time they withdrew troops from many places, such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Germany, where US was keeping a strong military presence before, for quite a long period. In the US, the Secretary of State said that “energy security and supply disruptions should be viewed as threats to the NATO alliance” [18, p. 1], while in another case the US government has recently expressed its intention to “implement an Energy Security Trust, which will address some of the insecurities that climate change poses” and at the same time to reduce “the influence that foreign oil producers have on national decisions” [19, p. 152]. A short summary of such doctrines released by US administrations follows: • Jimmy Carter in 1980: This was characterized by the US’s rights “to intervene with force, if necessary, to ensure uninterrupted energy supply from the Gulf”, [20, pp. 17–19] and moreover, it stated that any effort “by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region” would be seen “as an assault on the vital interests of the USA” [21, pp. 46–49].

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• Ronald Reagan in 1985: He adopted Carter’s doctrine and he even applied it to the Iran–Iraq War. It was a doctrine to overwhelm the global influence of the Soviet Union in an attempt to end the Cold War. • George H.W. Bush in 2002: This refers to various related foreign policy principles of his administration, including unilateralism and the use of preventative war to protect the nation’s interest and enhance the national security of the country [22]. • Colin Powell Doctrine in 1990: This is a more journalist-created term, named after General Colin Powell in the run-up to the 1990– 1991 Gulf War. It was based, in large measure, on a long-simmering debate in the military about how, when and where the US should use force [23]. • Bill Clinton in 1992, 1996: Decision to procure additional warships, cargo planes, assault vehicles and other equipment intended for “power projection” into distant combat zones. Furthermore, US efforts to transform NATO from a defensive alliance into a regional police force governed by the US [24]. • Barak Obama in 2009: Obama subscribed to a different doctrine, which was usually summarized in polite company as “don’t do stupid stuff”. He viewed the US’s foreign policy establishment, which he secretly disdained, and made a fetish of “credibility”—particularly the sort of credibility purchased with force [25]. • Donald Trump in 2016: He called Russia and China “rival powers” and reaffirmed commitment to his “America First” doctrine [26]. • Joe Biden in 2021: As per the US National Security Council [27], immediate actions under Joe Biden’s administration included, among others, a focus on controlling the COVID-19 pandemic, tackling climate change and restoring America’s standing in the world. Referring to climate change actions, the US president’s desire is to “mobiliz[e] a whole-of-government effort to reduce climate pollution in every sector of the economy and increase resilience to climate impacts” [27]. The Biden administration aims to deliver “an equitable clean energy future, and put the United States on a path to achieve net-zero emissions, economy-wide, by no later than 2050” [27]. Especially with the last action in mind, the US declared its intention to strengthen its national security workforce and rebuild democratic alliances across the globe. The new National Defense Strategy (NDS), which is nested under the National Security

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Strategy, was about to become public in early 2022 and will focus on “the concept of integrated deterrence to address national security threats from adversarial states while increasing collaboration with international allies and partners” according to Mara Karlin, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategies, Plans and Capabilities in the US [28]. The interim National Security Strategy [29, 30] Doctrine refers to advances in clean energy technologies, which are seen as essential for slowing climate change and making the clean energy transformation a central pillar of US economic recovery efforts at home. Furthermore, it is mentioned that the US intends to support the growth in RES, invest in climate-friendly infrastructure, build resilience to climate change, modernize its energy grid “and provide the international leadership required to encourage countries around the world to do the same”. China China’s annual growth and energy consumption growth have slowed in recent years, which is in line with the stated policy goals of the government and China’s 13th Five-Year Plan that was adopted in March 2016 [31]. The country has been paying serious attention to several regions abroad in order to increase the available sources of energy and diversify the risk of supply, namely Asia, the Middle East and Africa. Furthermore, there is a strong effort and focus to strengthen its navy power in order to support its aim for better access to markets [32, pp. 427–429]. In China, the National Oil Companies (NOC) are seen as the “arms of the Chinese government that are aggressively snapping up exploration and production assets around the world to enhance China’s energy security at the expense of that of other consumers” [33, p. 73]. China’s doctrine and policies during the periods of each of its last three leaders can be summarized as follows: • Jiang Zemin: His foreign policy is seen as passive and nonconfrontational; however, he strengthened China’s economic stature abroad, attempting to establish cordial relations with countries whose trade is largely confined to the American economic sphere [33]. • Hu Jintao: During his presidency, there was continuous economic growth and development that strengthened China further as a major

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world power. He supported “China’s peaceful development”, aiming for soft power in international relations and a corporate approach to diplomacy. China’s influence in Africa, Latin America and other developing regions increased [34]. • Xi Jinping: In September 2013, he introduced a plan for building the “New Silk Road” from China to Europe, a huge investment plan heavily focused on infrastructure related to new roads, ports, pipelines, etc., that will support China’s increasing needs, in both importing goods and energy resources and exporting its own products to the world. The New Silk Road initiative contributes to the country’s plans for expansion: the more choices related to infrastructure, the better for transportation and thus ease in reaching countries outside and in reaching higher levels of access to energy sources [35]. Russia After the Cold War era and the long rivalry between the US and USSR, the collapse of the Soviet Union urged the ex-communist countries towards a new phase of capitalism where the state would still have a strong role to play, but privatization of many sectors allowed a new class of rich businessmen to emerge. After the advent of perestroika and the fall of the Berlin Wall, Russia finally took the place of the former Soviet Union in the international arena. Russia’s doctrines—for both the Soviet Union and later Russia as its continuation—can be briefly summarized as follows: • Leonid Brezhnev in 1964: The Soviet policy of control and coercion in Eastern Europe was known as the Brezhnev Doctrine. At the same time, the country moved from being an autarkic economy to a country trying to integrate into the world market [36]. • Yuri Andropov in 1982: He declared continuation of the domestic and foreign policies followed under Brezhnev [37]. • Konstantin Chernenko in 1984: In a pivotal event, the Soviet regime shifted towards a policy of the “iron fist” with regard to Afghanistan [38]. • Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985: He applied a series of changes in the Soviet Union in most areas: social, economic and foreign policies designed to bolster the domestic standard of living and bring a new

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•

•

• •

era of relations with the US. His “new thinking” approach caused the end of the Cold War, but also the breakdown of the Soviet Union itself [39]. Boris Yeltsin in 1991: After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the state focused on the growing opposition in the former republics of the Soviet Union and in East Central Europe to its foreign and economic policies, and in particular on demands that Russian military forces withdraw from the newly independent states [40]. Vladimir Putin in 1999: The energy strategy of the state referred to several main priorities, such as an increase in energy efficiency, energy development, technological development, eliminating the impact on the environment and sustainable development. At the same, there has been a view in the West that Russia is considered a threat since the country uses “energy as a weapon to rebuild its empire” [41]. Dmitry Medvedev in 2008: He followed the same doctrine as his precursor Putin. Vladimir Putin in 2018: In his presidential address to the Federal Assembly on 1 March 2018, [42] Vladimir Putin emphasized that Russia’s growing military power should be seen as a guarantee of global peace since this power preserves strategic parity and the balance of forces in the world, which remain a key factor of international security after World War II until today. He expressed his willingness to negotiate and devise together with the other great powers “a new and relevant system of international security and sustainable development for human civilization”. In addition, he mentioned that Russia “observes international law and believes in the inviolable central role of the UN”. Furthermore, he referred to new technologies for the generation, storage and relay of energy and he mentioned that there was a plan to attract 1.5 trillion rubles in private investment until 2014 in order to modernize their power generation sector and have all of them converted to digital technology.

In general, the development of industries during the last few decades has raised concerns about the availability and sustainability of critical resources. In the case of China, with its large industrial sector, the uninterrupted and secure supply of critical resources has become crucial in ensuring the continuous and proper operation of the industries [43,

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p. 136]. One of the possible options would be the reduction of usage of critical metals and their replacement with non-critical ones, thereby increasing the production efficiency in the manufacturing sector, while a circular economy and developed technologies would contribute more to the materials and energy security [44, p. 15]. Moreover, China seeks energy and raw materials that are of crucial importance for the sustainability of its economy, while Russia seeks to export its energy goods, which are of critical importance for the stabilization and strengthening of its economy, as it strongly relies on energy products and in particular fossil fuels, which are subject to price fluctuations in international markets. Oil & Gas Players From the beginning of the exploration and production of oil and gas (O&G), hundreds of changes have affected O&G producers. It is worth remembering that “Seven Sisters Oil Companies” was a phrase used by Italian state oil company ENI CEO Enrico Mattei in the 1950s in describing the seven Anglo-American oil companies [45]. It was proved that they became so powerful that they dominated the global petroleum industry until the 1970s when OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries)5 became more active than in the past, as a result of the oil crisis. During the last few years, a new group of O&G companies have emerged since they have consolidated their power and replaced the previous biggest listed energy companies. The new “Seven Sisters” were identified in cooperation with executives from the O&G industry (Table 2.3). Finally, the initial ones in the middle of the last century have become four: ExxonMobil, Chevron (Texaco), BP and Royal Dutch Shell. Comparing the companies of the two periods, firstly it can be seen that there is a shift to new companies in different countries and regions, which is in line with the global shift to the emerging countries and developing ones. Moreover, there is no US company in the new group, while US foreign policy has been proven to be offensive against most of the countries where the “new Seven Sisters” are located. For example, four out of seven of these countries (57% of the total) have been seen by the US 5 The OPEC member countries are Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Venezuela (OPEC, 2018).

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Table 2.3 Seven Sister oil companies No.

Old Seven Sisters oil companies

New Seven Sisters oil companies

1

Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (United Kingdom)—this company became British Petroleum Gulf Oil (United States)—in 1984, most of Gulf Oil was acquired by SoCal and the enlarged SoCal entity became Chevron Royal Dutch Shell (Netherlands/United Kingdom) Standard Oil Co. of California (SoCal) (United States)—became Chevron in 1984 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey (Esso) (United States)—became Exxon, which renamed itself ExxonMobil following the acquisition of Mobil in 1999 Standard Oil Co. of New York (Socony) (United States)—became Mobil, which was acquired by Exxon in 1999 to form ExxonMobil Texaco (United States)—acquired by Chevron in 2001

Saudi Aramco (KSA), 100% state owned

2

3 4 5

6

7

Gazprom (Russia), 50.023% state owned CNPC (China), 100% state owned NIOC (Iran), 100% state owned PDVSA (Venezuela), 100% state owned

Petrobras (Brazil), 32.2% state owned

Petronas (Malaysia), 100% state owned

Source Author, 2022 (based on Sampson, 1975 and Hoyos, 2017)

government in recent years, and as per the doctrines of recent administrations (i.e. Trump, Clinton, Bush), as “enemies” and high-risk actors in terms of the national security doctrine of the nation, namely Russia, China, Iran and Venezuela. The top 20 O&G companies (out of the total of 2,000 globally) are available together with their marker capitalization in 2022 (Table 2.4). The majority belong to US companies (six), with Russia and China following in second and third place (three each), then Canada (two). Finally come the UK, the Netherlands, Brazil, France and Saudi Arabia, whose total market capitalization of almost US$ 2.1 trillion alone almost equals all the other 19 companies together. The top ten oil and gas producers in the world are presented in terms of their annual turnover, which ranges from US$455 billion down to US$144 billion per year. It is interesting to note that the total revenue of these ten bigger oil and gas producers in the world accounts for almost 4.3% of the Global GDP, which was US$ 3287.7 trillion as of 2014 (Fig. 2.6).

2

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Table 2.4 Top 20 O&G companies globally (2022) #

Company

Market value (US$, bn)

#

Company

Market value (US$, bn)

#

Company

1

Saudi Aramco (Saudi Arabia)

2,094

8

BP (UK)

105.9

15

2

Exxon (US)

327.9

9

97.1

16

3

Chevron (US)

257.1

10

Equinor (Norway) Gazprom (Russia)

94.5

17

4

Shell (Netherlands) Petrochina (China) Total Energies (France) Conoco Phillips (US)

204.2

11

91.4

18

154.6

12

83.8

19

149.9

13

79.2

20

116.7

14

Petrobras (Brazil) Enbridge (Canada) Sinopec (China) Duke Energy (US)

Southern Company (US) Rosneft (Russia) Canadian Natural Resources (Canada) Novatek (Russia) CNOOC (China) Schlumberger (US)

5 6 7

Market value (US$, bn) 67.6

66.2 61.3

58.6 57.3 56.4

76.7

Source Author 2022 (based on Companies Market Cap, 2022) [46]

Marketcap (US$) 2400

2094

2000 1600 1200 800 400

327.9

257.9

204.2

154.6

149.9

116.7

105.9

97.1

94.5

0

Fig. 2.6 Market Capitalization of the top-10 O&G Producers (2022) (Source Author, 2022 [based on Companies Market Cap 2022])

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The total annual revenue of the top ten O&G producers in 2014 was almost US$ 3.3 trillion, which comprised around 4.1% of the global GDP in the same year (USD79.5 trillion) [47]. According to the secretary general of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), serious changes have occurred globally in the energy industry since the establishment of OPEC in 1960.6 Even though many areas and parameters of energy are no longer the same, energy security still remains at the same level of importance. In parallel, new investments related to both downstream and midstream are required for both maintaining existing infrastructure and additional expansion projects that are necessary for anyone to keep the access to the markets.

2.2

The International Energy Transition

Even though the world population and per capita income are projected to continue increasing until 2040, the consequent increase in energy demand, which is inevitable, can be balanced by some critical factors; for example, the amount of energy used per unit of economic growth (energy intensity7 ) has declined steadily for many years on a global scale. During the next period of 2020–2045, the global primary energy demand may increase by 28% as the global economy is expected to double and the global population to increase by 20% [48], reaching around 9.5 billion people worldwide [49]. The geopolitics of RES appears to require quite a different approach when compared to conventional fuels.8 Almost all energies reported growth except for coal, with RES claiming the highest increase followed by natural gas. However, oil will still remain the most important and highest in the energy mix. In order to meet the energy demand in the future, investment on a grand scale is required, while any underinvestment will cause delays and risks to the energy industry, which has been greatly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. 6 OPEC is a permanent, intergovernmental organization, established in Baghdad, Iraq,

on 10–14 September 1960. The organization comprises 13 members: Algeria, Angola, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Venezuela. The organization has its headquarters in Vienna, Austria. 7 Energy consumed per dollar of GDP. 8 Crude oil, natural gas, lignite and coal.

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The experience and maturity shown by politicians, governments and other involved parties have not reached the required level yet, since most of the participants seem to be still on a learning curve regarding best practices and the most efficient policies to apply. Energy production from RES is more decentralized within a country, while there is a requirement for new distribution networks and appropriate networks of suppliers and consumers. In that case, energy production intensifies the requirement for proper energy storage solutions for handling any seamless interruptions of electrical power and thus contributing to a nation state’s energy security. The current energy transition, with the replacement of traditional forms of energy by RES, is taking place together with a correlated geopolitical risk that causes new challenges to international politics [50–52]. This energy transformation is already facing many difficulties and brings together issues related to infrastructure, network interconnection, the pace of transition and the readiness and capability of each country and society to manage the new situation. At stake is how ready and mature nation states and societies are to accept the burden of necessary changes today and not shifting them to the next generation. At the same time, the energy transition is expected to influence nation states to enhance their efforts to access the required natural resources that are seen as critical for the development of RES [53, 54]. Competition to increase the influence of the concerned countries and their power is expected to be intense and strong, as it is a prime opportunity for change on the current stage of the international political economy. RES may contribute to peaceful settlement of disputes and disagreements at state level, since their greater contribution to the energy mix may decrease any geopolitical risk and support international cooperation, through the interconnection of energy systems between states [55, 56]. Moreover, energy production based on “green” RES may contribute even more to the energy security with consequently less tension and friction among states [57, 58]. The energy production from RES may positively affect the geopolitical relations between nation states, while RES still need more time in order to have them properly integrated into the nation state network. In general, it is expected that global fundamentals will continue to shape long-term prices, while short/medium-term volatility has returned. The strongest growth is seen to happen in the developing nations in Asia, the Middle East and Latin America; however, due to competitive advantages from shale gas, growth will be strong in North America as well, while at the same time Europe and Japan are expected to lag. Regional

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trends for energy intensity by 2030 can be foreseen in advanced, emerging and developing economies as follows: In advanced economies: Focusing on energy-related issues, the economy of the developed and advanced countries has been mostly driven in recent years by the need to reach net-zero carbon levels in order to confront climate change, which has become more visible and inevitable. The main challenge is to minimize the negative consequences that are acknowledged by all; even though countries’ response in dealing with such a megatrend is not the same. Energy demand increases by 0.1% annually (STEPS scenario), and improvements may happen due to the energy efficiency policies to be implemented. Such improvements can be related to higher fuel economy standards, new construction regulations, efficient energy management systems in industry, electrification of transport and heat. The energy intensity of GDP improves by 2.1% a year (STEPS scenario) or 2.8% (APS scenario) or 4% (NZE scenario). Energy demand per capita today is already high and thus the effort is aimed at energy efficiency improvements in order to save energy and consequently to reduce energy demand. In emerging and developing economies: Energy demand is expected to increase by around 2% per year through to 2030 considering both the STEPS and the APS scenarios. The energy intensity in terms of GDP improves by 2.8% annually in both scenarios, which is faster than the global average. Mostly in developing economies, energy demand per capita is expected to increase until 2030 due to the growing needs of billions of people looking to improve the quality of services and life. The consumption of non-conventional fuels9 during this century is expected to grow significantly. More specifically, it is expected to be doubled by 2040 when compared with the volume consumed at the beginning of this century. Furthermore, consumption of nonconventional fuels may be four times more by 2100 than what it was in 2000. A summary of the evolution is given in the table below, where the expected CO2 change is also represented for each year until 2100 (Table 2.5). It is quite impressive that many of the well-known international oil and gas companies have already started a massive corporate transformation aimed at becoming “an energy company”, in general. In this effort, they

9 Coal, shale gas, oil sand, etc., are considered non-conventional fuels.

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Table 2.5 Evolution of non-conventional fuels 2000 Consumption of non-conventional fuels CO2 (bill tpa)

x 6

2020

2040

2060

2100

2x

3x

4x 20

Source Author, 2022 (based on Rifkin, 2002)

are guided by the generally agreed aim to become a net-zero emission actor and trying to be among the first to earn the bigger share from the new market that energy transition brings. Sustainability is heavily taken into consideration and integrated into their corporate strategy for the future, which eventually affects their investments, their production and operations, and their final holistic philosophy and approach to the enduser and consumers. For that, they are reinventing and diversifying their energy offering to promote renewable and decarbonized energies, as well as a well-considered use of fossil energies. Useful information and references about such declared corporate targets and strategies can be found on the official site of the international companies [Appendix B]. The pace/rate of progress with which energy transition takes place depends on several factors, including: • The level of development for each country: developed, developing, underdeveloped. • The price of the energy coming from RES when compared to other types of energy. • How close the world oil production reaches the peak? • The level of appropriate infrastructure in the country that can support the replacement of the old, existing energy sources with the new ones in a reasonable period of time. • The percentage of energy poverty among households and families. • The regulation level of the country and the extent to which the energy sector becomes liberalized and open to competition. • The degree of public awareness that can lead to acceptance of new forms of energy and avoidance of opposition to them (see several examples in island areas due to aesthetic intervention and tourism).

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2.3

Vulnerabilities and Challenges

Awareness and ultimately the response of the international community in tackling the phenomena brought about by climate change also play an important role in the pace of the energy transition. According to the United Nations (UN), out of Sustainable Development Goals few of them are the most important ones related to this study and listed below: • • • • •

Ending hunger. Achieving food security. Achieving improved nutrition. Promoting sustainable agriculture. Ensuring availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all. • Ensuring access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all. Some of the main aims of sustainable development are: • • • •

Combating climate change. Tackling global warming. Reducing emissions. Energy issues.

Energy security means “different things to different people, particularly the 1.3 billion people without access to electricity and the 2.7 billion people relying on biomass for their basic needs”[59]. It is very important that the proposed seventh goal of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDG7) calls for countries to ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all. During the last COP26 [60] that took place in Glasgow, Scotland, in November 2021, energyrelated issues, and in particular energy transition, were discussed in regard to the proper measurements required to adapt to climate change. The latest COP26 Summit is the most recent coordinated effort to draw up a common line for the international community and take action to achieve the stated objectives by 2030 and 2050. The main goals of COP26 can be summarized as follows:

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• Secure global net zero by the middle of the century and keep 1.5 degrees within reach. • Adapt to protect communities and natural habitats. • Mobilize finance. • Work together to deliver. The challenge of global warming will continue to appear even more severe due to the temperature increase of the planet. Even though CO2 emissions have been reduced as a unit of primary energy consumed globally by around 0.3% per annum during the last 140 years, due to the increased amount of coal and oil used/consumed, CO2 emissions as an absolute figure have increased throughout this period [61, pp. 278–300]. A critical challenge for the future is also the degree of replacement of traditional forms of energy sources by “new”10 forms of energy, with those of renewable and clean energy, such as nuclear and hydrogen, being predominant. The aim of transforming and modifying the entire energy system demands considerable progress in current energy technologies, including hydrogen. Furthermore, a higher amount of electricity would require new types of storage, such as chemical storage, again in the form of hydrogen. Society’s acceptance regarding the rapid transition from one form of energy to another necessarily goes hand in hand with the political initiatives taken—or not taken in many cases, which unfortunately concern those of the world’s powerful economies: for example, the cases of the US, China and India, whose political will is to continue using fossil fuels because of the low cost and consequently competitive price of energy production for the benefit of domestic industry and their economies. Hydrogen is one of the basic and may be the cheapest element in nature. It is a clean fuel, which, when it is burnt (which means reacting with oxygen), produces water and energy (exothermal reaction). Today, the challenges and efforts are mostly related to the warehousing, distribution and supply network of this type of fuel since these processes are not ready for mass use and thus not much economically. In general, there are four types of hydrogen as a primary source:

10 The term “new” is used to emphasize the latest development, even though nuclear energy has been known and used for years.

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• Grey hydrogen, made by fossil fuels like oil and coal. In this case, when hydrogen is combusted, CO2 is revealed in the atmosphere. • Blue hydrogen, made also by fossil fuels. However, in this case, the CO2 that is revealed from the combustion is captured and then stored properly by using new technological processes. • Green hydrogen, made by using electrolysis that is powered by renewable energy. • Turquoise hydrogen, produced by using heat to split methane through the pyrolysis process, in which solid carbon is finally produced. The potential for development and success of using hydrogen in several applications may depend on certain factors, such as: i. Technical possibility of being combined with existing infrastructure of gas corridors and pipelines. ii. Developing effective storage solutions. iii. Contributing to a sustainable production in the medium and long term. iv. Profitable use as an energy carrier. v. Creation of a global hydrogen market with competitive terms. Today, more than 90% of the hydrogen produced is made from fossil fuels, while both green and blue hydrogen are still not seen as cost-competitive. Fossil fuels are expected to maintain their dominant role over the next two decades; however, the trend is in favour of other forms of energy that will eventually earn a greater share in the global nexus. The demand for oil products is expected to slow down during 2015–2040, while new forms of energy will gradually be preferred by states and societies. Both wind and solar lead the race for the transition to renewable energy sources (RES), while technology is playing a vital role in accelerating the transformation rate globally. The great challenges are seen in the storage and batteries sector as well as new materials that can eventually provide the required stability in the energy grid and normalize any disturbances caused by the low efficiency of energy systems that are solely related to RES.

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Carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS) is expected to heavily contribute to the energy transition since it is the appropriate option to support towards optimizing the operation of power plants. It is foreseen that around 60% of the global coal-fired power plants will still be operational in 2050 (IEA, 2020). CCUS can become a significant parameter that can further support the achievement of emissions targets, while its use is expected to capture up to 18 billion tonnes until 2050, as per the net-zero scenario (BP, 2020). The new COVID-19 pandemic crisis has disrupted the global economy and rapidly changed well-established methods, routines and business-asusual practices. Such an unexpected hit also occurred in the supply chain and logistics sector, as the economies were not prepared to deal with new rules and habits that society was urged to take on and changes that took place all over the world in such a short period of time. The efforts to combat COVID-19 during the years 2020 and 2021 brought closed borders to protect a state’s society from the coronavirus spread, disorganization of the economies of almost every region, an increase in the sea freight costs for overseas trading and unstable demand information that made even short-term forecasts almost impossible to consider and rely on. The disruptions in the supply chain have been so severe that one could never have imagined that such a chaotic situation could occur all over the world. After a huge drop in 2020, energy and oil consumption rose remarkably during 2021, which is expected to last in the long term. In 2020, investments related to the oil industry dropped by almost 30%, with a direct effect caused by the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. The absence of required investments will probably lead to more volatile and unstable markets, with direct consequences for energy availability and energy security globally. The disruptions associated with COVID-19, together with the increase in trade disputes and sanctions in recent years, may lead to rising concerns about energy security, particularly in countries that are highly dependent on energy imports. The potential impact of a shift towards deglobalization and increased concerns about energy security in the global energy system will be further explored and will continue to be of high concern [62]. The security of supply and security of demand cannot be decoupled and a comprehensive examination of energy security is needed over the short-, medium- and long-term timescales. Energy issues, which are strongly related to economics, can irritate or ease tensions or conflicts

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of a political nature depending on the willingness of the actors involved. Economic power continues to shift eastward and it is very interesting to study energy security in the broader area of the Eastern Mediterranean and its effect on national security in the countries located there. The existence and degree of energy security will continue to be considered a critical factor of stability in a region and for the nation states, with energy being one of the most important parameters of power. Strengthening energy security is expected to bring positive results in terms of power and the strengthening of a country’s position in the international environment with an increased role. It is also expected to provide to a nation state more degrees of freedom in the options for concluding alliances and selecting suitable suppliers and customers in the international markets. The pursuit continues to be the way to achieve the highest possible degree of energy security, which presupposes the availability and preexistence of other parameters such as a strong economy, military strength and the willingness of the leadership to make proper and timely decisions in the international arena. The degree of progress of a society is analogous to the energy consumption per capita in a region, i.e. state, region or internationally [61, pp. 69–77]. Furthermore, there are additional factors that may be taken into consideration: the efficiency of technological tools for capture and energy usage, and the size of products and services being produced for serving human needs. A schematic representation of this relationship is given below: Degree of progress of a civilization, C: ⎧ ⎪ quantit y o f energy used per capita ⎨ C = f( ) e f f iciency o f technology tools f or captur e and energy usage ⎪ ⎩ si ze o f pr oducts and ser vices being pr oduced f or ser ving human needs

In our modern society of globalization and interconnection between goods and services, one of the contemporary challenges is the optimal approach to energy management in order to maximize the return of value to citizens, society and our nature. Energy management concerns all stages of a value chain, including production, distribution, storage, consumption, control and reuse. One of the challenges today is the possibility of training citizens for energy production at home and even at social level, through energy cooperatives, in order to meet the energy needs of

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the family and society respectively. In addition, choosing the right energy mix is of vital importance for governments in designing their policies. In this regard, the contribution of technology is crucial and recent developments in new forms of energy are already reflected at the commercial level: photovoltaics, fuel cells and other small-scale units are available for home use. In this regard, the contribution of the Internet and the World Wide Web is expected to be important: citizens can generate energy locally to meet their personal and household needs, and additionally, they can provide any excess energy to the available energy web. Such a practice is becoming more popular in many countries of the Western world, with dynamic and greater support from local authorities and the central government of each country.

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25 Krieg, A. (2016). Externalizing the burden of war: The Obama doctrine and US foreign policy in the Middle East. International Affairs, 92(1), 97–113. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12506 26 Lerner, A. B. (2020). Social science and the problem of interpretation: A pragmatic dual(ist) approach. Critical Review, 32(1–3), 124–144. https:// doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2020.1842329 27 The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/priorities/. Last accessed 21 February 2022. 28 Executive Gov. https://executivegov.com/2021/12/pentagons-2022-nat ional-defense-strategy-to-focus-on-integrated-deterrence/. Last accessed 21 February 2022. 29 The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/ 2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf. Last accessed 21 February 2022. 30 The US Department of Defense. https://history.defense.gov/Historical-Sou rces/National-Security-Strategy/. Last accessed 21 February 2022. 31 EIA. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=36752. Last accessed 21 February 2022. 32 Klare, M. (2016). No blood for oil? Hydrocarbon abundance and international security. In T. van de Graaf et al. (Eds.), Palgrave handbook of the international political economy of energy. Palgrave Macmillan. 33 Downs, E. (2010). Who’s afraid of China’s oil companies? In C. Pascual & J. Elkind (Eds.), Energy security: Economics, politics, strategy, and implications. Brookings Institution Press. 34 Lam, W. W-L. (2006). Chinese politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New leaders, new challenges. M.E. Sharpe. 35 Zhang, W., Alon, I., & C. Lattemann (Eds.). (2018). China’s belt and road initiative: Changing the rules of globalization. Palgrave Macmillan. 36 Sailus, I. (2017). The Brezhnev doctrine’s influence on Eastern Europe. Study. https://study.com/academy/lesson/the-brezhnev-doctri nes-influence-on-eastern-europe.html. Last accessed 24 February 2018. 37 Burns, J. (1982). Andropov is chosen to head Soviet Party; Vows he will continue; Brezhnev Policies. The NYT . http://www.nytimes.com/1982/ 11/13/world/andropov-is-chosen-to-head-soviet-party-vows-he-will-con tinue-brezhnev-policies.html?pagewanted=all. Last accessed 24 February 2018. 38 Brown, A. (1984). The Soviet succession: From Andropov to Chernenko. The World Today, 40(4), 134–141. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40395598 39 US Dept of State. 2009. Last accessed 21 February 2022. 40 Smith, K. (2010). Managing the challenge of Russian energy policies. CSIS. https://www.csis.org/analysis/managing-challenge-russian-energy-policies

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41 Perovic, J., & Orttung, R. (2007). Russia’s energy policy: Should Europe worry? Russian Analytical Digest 18/07. https://www.researchgate. net/publication/265184252_Russia%27s_Energy_Policy_Should_Europe_ Worry_2_By. 42 The Kremlin. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957. Last accessed 21 January 2022. 43 Anderson, P. (2019). Chinese assessments of “critical” and “strategic” raw materials: Concepts, categories, policies, and implications. The Extractive Industries and Society, 7 , 127–137. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2020. 01.008 44 Yan et al. (2021). Criticality assessment of metal resources in China. iScience, 24, 102524. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2021.102524 45 Pozzi, D. (2021). Before ‘Mattei’s Formula’: AGIP-ENI’s foreign policy, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Daniele-Pozzi/public 1926–1957 . ation/308307785_Before_Mattei’s_formula_AGIP-ENI’s_foreign_policy_ 1926-1957/links/57e18f2608ae427e2957e191/Before-Matteis-formulaAGIP-ENIs-foreign-policy-1926-1957.pdf. Last accessed 21 February 2022. 46 Companies Market Cap. https://companiesmarketcap.com/oil-gas/largestoil-and-gas-companies-by-market-cap/. Last accessed 21 February 2022. 47 The World Bank. (2022). https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP. MKTP.CD. Last accessed 12 November 2021. 48 World Meters. (2022). https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/. Last accessed 12 December 2021. 49 UN. (2019). https://population.un.org/wpp/DataQuery/. Last accessed 22 December 2020. 50 Pascual, C., & Elkind, J. (2010). Introduction. In C. Pascual & J. Elkind (Eds.), Energy security: Economics, politics, strategies and implications. Brookings. 51 Rothkopf, D. (2009). Superclass: The global power elite and the world they are making. Farrar. 52 Laird, F. (2013). Against transitions? Uncovering conflicts in changing energy systems. Science as Culture, 22(2), 149–156. https://doi.org/10. 1080/09505431.2013.786992 53 Paltsev, S. (2016). The complicated geopolitics of renewable energy. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 72(6), 390–395 https://doi.org/10.1080/009 63402.2016.1240476. Last accessed 13 January 2022. 54 O ’Sullivan et al. (2017). The geopolitics of renewable energy (Vol. 1255). Center on Global Energy Policy. Columbia University. SIPAp. 10025. 55 Overland, I. (2019). The geopolitics of renewable energy: Debunking four emerging myths. Energy Research & Social Science, 49, 36–40. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.erss.2018.10.018

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56 Yang, K., Wei, Y., Li, S., & He, J. (2021). Geopolitical risk and renewable energy stock markets: An insight from multiscale dynamic risk spillover. Journal of Cleaner Production, 279, 123429. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcl epro.2020.123429 57 Kostyuk, V., Makarov, A., & Tatyana, M. (2012). nepgetika i geopolitika (Energy and geopolitics). Energoacademy, 1, 46–59. https:// www.academia.edu/34471516/The_Geopolitics_of_Renewable_Energy 58 Krewitt, W., Nitsch, J., & Kristina, N. (2009). The importance of renewable energy and energy efficiency in various global energy scenarios. Forschen Für Globale Märkte Erneuerbarer Energien. In Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the ForschungsVerbunds Erneuerbare Energien (FVEE) in Cooperation with the Agency for Renewable Energy (AEE), Umweltforum, Berlin, Germany, 24–25 November, 18–23. 59 El-Badri, A. S. (2015). Security of energy supplies inextricably linked with demand. OPEC. http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/3013.htm 60 UK COP26. https://ukcop26.org/. Last accessed 21 December 2021. 61 Rifkin, J. (2002). The Hydrogen economy: The creation of the worldwide energy web and the redistribution of power on earth. J.P. Tarcher/Putnam. 62 BP, Energy Outlook 2020. https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/ene rgy-economics/energy-outlook.html. Last accessed 28 December 2021.

CHAPTER 3

The Energy Security in Europe

3.1

General

Europe always plays a critical role in the geopolitical developments globally with a presence with its foreign affairs and external relations, while it actively participates in the international markets through its products and services as well as research and innovation activities in many sectors. European economy tends to be a market in relative stagnation and strong signs of saturation during last years, when compared to other developing economies. However, one typical competitive advantage is the high educational level that can be combined well with research and development in a variety of applications and sectors, including energy. The quality of products and services produced in Europe seems to be superior to others in the international markets, although that may work against its competitiveness due to the higher costs resulting from a series of effects on raw material costs, labour costs, energy costs and high taxation. Europe, the so-called “old continent”, and its states continue to play a key role on the international stage and in the international economy, as a single market which is one-third larger than the US. Furthermore, even though EU has not achieved a common single voice in its foreign policy, it has more international experience than in previous decades. In the shadow of the war in Ukraine, in March 2022 the EU approved the so-called Strategic Compass, which is considered to be an ambitious plan of action for strengthening the EU’s security and defence policy by © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Flouros, Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09603-7_3

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2030. The recent unexpected changes in the neighbourhood of Europe with the military invasion of Russia into Ukraine have transformed the previously EU’s behaviour from relatively inactive or otherwise sluggish into an awake union that has violently perceived the new reality and the entry into a new era. For EU, the new hostile security environment requires to make a quantum leap forward and increase its capacity and willingness to act, strengthen its resilience, and invest more and even better in their defence capabilities. The objective of the Strategic Compass is to make the EU a stronger and more capable security provider, while it needs to be able to protect its citizens and to contribute to international peace and security. This is very important at a time when war has returned to Europe, following the Russian invasion against Ukraine, as well as of major geopolitical shifts. The Strategic Compass is expected to further enhance the EU’s strategic autonomy and its ability to cooperate with partners to secure its values and interests. In the new era, it is required more than before to have a stronger EU in regard to security and defence in order to be able to support to global and transatlantic security, which remains the foundation of collective defence for its members. The Strategic Compass consists of concrete and actionable proposals, with a very accurate timetable for action, in order to improve the EU’s ability to act decisively in crises and to defend its security. More specific, there are four pillars that are covered: (a) act, (b) invest, (c) partner and (d) secure. a. Act: EU has decided to act rapidly and robustly and ensuring greater financial solidarity, even alone, at any time a crisis happens and for that a EU Rapid Deployment Capacity of up to 5000 troops will be established for different types of crises. In addition, there will be available to deploy 200 fully equipped security experts within 30 days, including in complex environments. EU will be able to conduct regular live exercises on land and at sea and enhance military mobility. b. Secure: Aiming to further strengthen its ability to anticipate, deter and respond to external emerging threats and challenges, and safeguard the EU’s security. For that, the EU will enhance its intelligence analysis capacities and develop Hybrid Toolbox and ResponseTeams bringing together different tools to detect and respond to a broad range of hybrid threats and cyberattacks, Furthermore, an EU

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Space Strategy for Security and Defense will be developed along with EU’s role as a maritime security actor in the wider region. c. Invest: It has been seen as necessary that the Member States will enhance their defence expenditures and thus fill any critical military and civilian capability gaps. For that, EU will exchange on national objectives on increased and improved defence spending to match its security needs and will provide more incentives to engage in collaborative capability development and support defence technological innovation. d. Partner: EU will strengthen cooperation with strategic partners such as NATO, the UN and regional partners, including the OSCE, AU and ASEAN and there will effort to develop more tailored bilateral partnerships with like-minded countries and strategic partners, such as the US, Canada, Norway, the UK, Japan and Western Balkans countries [1]. The recent war crisis started with the invasion of Russia in Ukraine in February 2022 has brought about a completely new situation at the time of completion of writing this book. The unexpected military conflict in the territory of Ukraine, a country in the eastern part of Europe, is an event of critical importance not only because of its strong impact on energy-related issues but primarily because of questioning of the sovereignty of one state by another, which is the first time that such an event happens in Europe since the end of the Cold War. The rivalry of the great powers for the strengthening of their power over the rest rivals is fiercely returning to the forefront and seems to surprise the leaders of the countries of Europe and the EU itself unexpectedly. A crisis of such intensity is obviously forcing all stakeholders to rearrange their priorities both strategically and tactically. There is an urgency for decent and careful analysis of what is currently happening in the region of Eastern Europe, in order to properly analyse and predict the future. EU is obliged to be prepared to deal with the effects of this new crisis. In the wider energy sector, the threefold challenge of tackling climate change, achieving economic growth and ensuring energy efficiency can be achieved only through a fundamental change in the way the economy is organized; by creating energy networks, reducing marginal costs through utilizing big data and drastically improving the efficiency of the supply chain. The fourth industrial revolution and tackling climate change is not

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just a theoretical debate among futurists, but the most critical battle of the modern world. It usually happens that “successful” leaders follow a path that brings economic growth and prosperity for their country, which makes them feel relaxed and become complacent for some time after. However, as it happens many times, leaders do not maintain the required level of readiness to respond to unforeseen crisis that is happening more often than before. In such critical moments that Europe is currently experiencing, where international law is challenged and even not followed, leadership is expected to play again a decisive role in the development of events and in preventing more unpleasant situations than those that are already happening. It is a primary concern of the EU leadership to identify the possible options that will be the best possible in order to emerge from the current crisis. One of the most important challenges for EU leadership is energy security, with the simultaneous stated goal of decoupling from Russian natural gas, as it is currently its largest natural gas supplier, which works against its energy security and its national security. There is a need more than ever for the modern leadership to keep part of the forces and capital of the country (political, economic, social, technological) in reserve for the difficult days that may come in a lawful manner. The question is not about the event of a new crisis but when and how often. Otherwise, the lack of critical resources and goods is expected to lead to panic and mishandling under pressure is usually resulting in a tendency towards more chaotic conditions. Managing a crisis requires vigilance, preparation and observation of magnifications with a proper perception of space and time. There are several cases where the pace of several phenomena has increased and strengthened further due to a crisis. Typical cases are the rate of information transmission, the movement of groups of people either due to necessity—such as immigration. The IMF describes the global recession not in terms of declining GDP but in terms of declining incomes, job losses and other factors. Economic growth is neither self-evident nor enduring, it only appears in cycles in history, with falls and recovery that cannot be avoided and that history can teach us. The rules are subject to the constraint of probabilities and are based on a circular motion of a temporary world. Perpetual growth is not supported by any theory or logic, but instead fluctuations and alternations are the state that is expected to occur. It is possible to consider some basic conditions that affect the rules and these are: transient phenomena are common and for this reason the short-term economic forecast is considered better

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than any long-term one; avoid thinking and designing a linear form, but perhaps a more quantum approach could be better to describe the evolution of phenomena; take decisions for growth within a reasonable framework and without exaggeration; and find out the critical factors that will allow change happens [2]. High energy cost and consequently the high cost of many consumer products are expected to be maintained for a long time and thus burdening the purchasing power of consumers. Such an event will consequently affect the standard of living and the growth or slowdown of EU’s economy. The European Union of 450 million citizens, instead of acting decisively, seems to be lagging behind in collective decision-making, a feature of the chronic state of bureaucracy and time-consuming processes. The successful action in tackling the health pandemic with the total supply of vaccines to all Europeans with adequate prices does not seem to be able to be repeated immediately at the moment. It is necessary that EU can act properly to address current high energy costs and problems and look for alternative energy sources. There is a need for a comprehensive European effort to negotiate and make possible to reserve the quantities of natural gas that the EU needs annually. The EU is a very large economic power and, in this way, it should be possible to reach the appropriate agreements on both quantities and prices that will further contribute to ensuring adequacy and strengthening its energy security. Until now, Europe’s strength remains its economic union, a fact that should be used efficiently in order to deal with the energy crisis and current inflation. The new crisis caused by the Russian invasion into Ukraine seems to have suddenly awakened European leaders as they are now rushing to re-target new priorities and realizing the need for coordinated action to achieve the best possible outcome. On the other hand, challenges continue to plague the EU, with the supply chain experiencing severe shortages in a number of cases with a consequent instability and declining productivity in the EU. Although at this stage in Europe, the cause of the evil for the continuous rise in natural gas prices is considered the action of Russia to military intervene in a neighbouring country, however, what seems also to be playing a decisive role in international markets is the explosive growth of economic activity internationally—North America, Europe and Asia. After the extensive lockdowns due to the health crisis, the consequent increase in energy demand could not be met in periods of sharp and high demand. Such a sharp economic recovery inevitably led to a much higher demand for

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electricity and natural gas, which is the basic fuel to generate electricity after the closure of many coal-fired power plants as a result of carbonation measures in the context of tackling climate change. In 2019, the European Green Deal was announced to become effective for the period 2021–2027, with the aim of preparing the EU economy for climate neutrality by 2050. In doing so, with targeted actions focused primarily on energy, technology would further promote energy security, energy efficiency, the development of RES and decarbonization. In 2020, a 7–10% economic downturn occurred in the EU due to the COVID-19 pandemic crisis, while the persistence of the crisis continues to have severe impacts on the economies and the energy sector of the member states. In particular, in the energy sector, which is of vital importance for society, energy security has become one of the highest priorities. Even though the physical resilience of the EU energy sector has been strong so far, its financial resilience has come under severe stress. In parallel, there has been important progress in the integration of the internal market for electricity and gas in the EU. Basic indicators for the EU27 as of 2019 [3] are as follows: • • • • •

Surface area: 4,172,839 sq km Population: 451 million GDP: US$15.69 trillion FDI: US$118.3 billion Military expenditure: 1.39% GDP

Using a Sankey diagram, the composition of the primary energy entering the energy system of the EU27 and the final end-users and losses by specific sectors of the economy are given in the figure below (Fig. 3.1). In the meantime, based on Eurostat statistics [5], there were substantial changes in the EU regarding primary production during the period of 2009–2019. In particular: • • • • •

RES:increased by 48.3%. Natural gas:decreased by 49.4%. Crude oil:decreased by 34.6%. Fossil fuels:decreased by 33.2%. Nuclear:decreased by 7.2%.

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Fig. 3.1 Primary energy entering the energy system of the EU27 (2010) (Source EEA, 2022 [4])

Finally, in 2019, the production of primary energy in the EU came from the following sources: 36.5% from RES, 32% from nuclear, 16.2 from solid fossil fuels, 8.5% from natural gas, 3.2% from crude oil and 3.6% from other sources (Fig. 3.2). RES are currently leading the primary production in the EU, with nuclear energy in 13 member states with France at the top with around 77% of its local primary energy production, followed by Belgium with more than 70%. The percentage of both fossil fuels is around double than that of natural gas in the EU. Based on the energy balance results in the EU, the production within the EU is much less than the consumption and EU member states have become net importers since 2013, with the biggest of those states that are leading the economy in this region being [7]: Germany (US$3,861

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Fig. 3.2 Primary energy in EU (2019) (Source Eurostat [6])

billion in 2019), France (US$2,715 billion in 2019), Italy (US$2,003 billion in 2019) and Spain (US$1,393 billion in 2019). During the period 2009–2019, the biggest increase in the production occurred in Sweden by 340.6 PJ, followed by Italy by 221.4 PJ, Spain by 190.8 PJ and France by 173.9 PJ (Table 3.1). In 2019, the production of primary energy in the EU was 25,788 PJ lower from consumption, so the difference between imports and exports of primary energy in the EU reached 38,062 PJ. In that year, the production of primary energy in the EU was almost 8% lower when compared to a decade before. This general downward direction of EU primary energy production can be explained by the decarbonizing strategy of the EU energy system. Origin of EU Energy Imports In 2020, the main exporter of NG to EU was Russia (39.3%), followed by Norway (19.2%), similarly to previous years. Other exporting countries to the EU27 are Algeria (12.3%), the UK (6.7%) and the US (6.7%). In the

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Table 3.1 EU production and consumption (1995–2018)1 Exajoules (EJ) Consumption

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2018

1995–2018 CAGR (%)

EU Fuels Oil Natural gasc Coal Nuclear Hydro Renewablesb Oil (Mbd) Natural gasc (Bcm) Sectorsa Transport Industry Non-combustible Buildings Inputs to power Production Oil Natural gasc Coal Oil (Mbd) Natural gasc (Bcm) Emissions Net CO2 emissions (Mt)

71

74

77

74

69

70

−0.1

29 14 15 9 3 0 14 389

30 17 13 9 4 1 15 460

31 19 13 10 3 1 15 518

28 19 12 9 4 3 14 521

26 15 11 8 3 6 12 417

26 16 9 7 3 7 13 457

−0.5 0.7 −2.1 −0.8 −0.3 15.0 −0.4 0.7

15 28 4 24 27

16 28 4 25 29

18 28 4 27 31

18 25 4 27 30

17 23 3 25 29

18 23 4 25 29

1.0 −0.8 −0.7 0.1 0.3

7 8 12 4 221

7 9 9 4 245

5 8 8 3 222

4 7 7 2 183

3 5 6 2 125

3 4 5 2 109

−3.6 −3.0 −3.4 −3.1 −3.0

4106

4127

4305

3984

3530

3484

−0.7

a Includes electricity and hydrogen, and their associated conversion losses b Renewables include wind, solar, geothermal, biomass, biomethane and biofuels c Natural gas does not include biomethane

SourceBP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021 [8]

US in particular, the natural gas also comes in the form of LNG (Liquid Natural Gas), as it is analysed in one of the next sections of this chapter (Fig. 3.3). 1 In the above analysis, the following countries are considered to comprise Europe: Austria,

Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Other Europe.

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Fig. 3.3 EU27 imports of NG (2020) (Source Eurostat)

The main natural gas pipeline import routes into the EU are presented in the following figure, with the biggest portion coming from Russia through four distinct corridors: Nord Stream, Yamal (via Poland), Ukraine and Turk Stream (via Turkey). At the same time, these Russian natural gas pipeline import routes are situated at the centre of contemporary geopolitical disputes that also affect the progress of the Nord Stream II route (Fig. 3.4). The idea of energy corridors is the outcome of so-called spatial planning (Frances, 2013 in [10, p. 89]). In regard to Europe, the term is seen as referring to the geographical area around the continent and for that the main corridors listed below comprise a network:

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Fig. 3.4 Main EU27 NG import routes (Source Bruegel, 2022 [9])

i. The North–South Corridor, which runs from Northern Europe (Norway and the North Sea) to the south (UK and European continent). The capacity is estimated to be around 130 bcm/yr. ii. The South-North Corridor, which is also known as the Mediterranean Corridor, which runs from south of the Mediterranean Sea (Libya) to its northern side (Spain and Italy). The capacity is estimated to be around 65 bcm/yr. iii. The East–West Corridor, which runs from Eastern (Russia) up to Western Europe (EU), via two main routes: one route through Ukraine with a capacity of around 162 bcm/yr and the other route that runs from Russia, through the Baltic Sea with the Nord Stream directly to Germany, with a capacity of around 55 bcm/yr.

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iv. The Southern Corridor, which runs from the Caspian Sea (Azerbaijan) to Europe. It does not pass through Russia and it is seen as the correct way to diversify the available energy sources and thus strengthen the energy security of the region. The initial nominal capacity is foreseen to be around 10–20 bcm/yr, which is considered relatively small, and it may fulfil the EU’s total gas needs only by around 1.5–3%. Energy Security in the EU Energy policy in the EU has been an unstructured process in which member states participated voluntarily in the recent past, while they have been acting independently without a common energy strategy. There are several political parameters and beliefs affecting the stance of member states since they have been unwilling to act and contribute to any common policy in EU. Until the end of the last century, there was no vision within the EU to create a common energy policy, even though its existence was critical for member states and other involved parties including the European Commission. From the beginning of the 2000s, it became clear that EU had to deal with contemporary challenges that affected its economy and industries. Finally, in 2005, the EU decided to establish a new energy policy, and after two years, the European Commission issued “An energy policy for Europe”, which was then adopted by the European Council and the European Parliament (European Commission, 2007). According to that [11], A European Energy Policy will firmly commit the European Union (EU) to a low consumption economy based on more secure, more competitive and more sustainable energy. Priority energy objectives involve ensuring the smooth functioning of the internal market in energy, security of strategic supply, concrete reductions in greenhouse gas emissions caused by the production or consumption of energy and the EU’s ability to speak with a single voice on the international stage.

Based on Article 194 of the Lisbon Treaty that followed, energy policy was included as one of the main issues due to the liberalization process that took place within the EU, which helped the EU’s international image concerning both energy and environmental issues [12] [13].

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Taking into account each country’s specific conditions, energy security should be dealt with in parallel with developing domestic energy sources and their best possible use with increased energy efficiency, shifting to a more balanced energy mix. This should be done especially in countries that are mostly dependent on fossil fuels and thus the EU should take actions such as: • Increasing their geographical diversification of energy import sources. • Avoiding single sourcing policies from sole suppliers. • Improving the level of integration within the EU gas and electricity markets. • Developing cross-border interconnections between neighbouring countries. • Increasing storage capacity for oil and gas. With regard to the energy security of European countries, some countries are more vulnerable to the risk and one of them is considered to be Cyprus. EU member states, and particularly the vulnerable ones, should improve their energy security and rank it as a priority of their policies and actions. EU legislation forces member states to maintain minimum stocks of oil in order to secure the oil supply to the EU. Any supply crisis related to the supply of petroleum from third countries being unexpectedly interrupted would most probably have a significant effect on the European economic activity. Many researchers consider the energy security of the EU to be “a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) question”. The policy of the EU is aimed at minimizing its dependency on irregularities in energy supplies due to the growing dependence on energy imports of or via politically unstable regions [14, p. 586]. However, this is not actually happening as the EU continues to be highly dependent on imports from unstable regions or even from countries where foreign affairs relations have not been kept at a healthy level. The best example is the relations between the EU and Russia, where the EU’s energy imports are the biggest from Russia, while at the same time the economic sanctions raised against the country do not match with such a fact at all.

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In December 2014, the European Energy Security Strategy (EUESS) (COM/2014/0330 final) [15] was communicated from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. In that document, the EU Strategy was prepared based on lessons learnt from current policies and the previous effectiveness of the Union’s response to energy supply crises. The EU made important progress towards completion of the energy internal market with increased interconnections and having reached high rates of energy intensity and a more balanced energy mix globally. However, energy security issues mostly occurred at a national level and not at the European one, which was recognized as a key issue to be improved. Thus, proper actions were required to reach higher levels of collaboration between member states, while a more open internal market would be needed. Apart from the existing member states, that would need to adjust and align themselves to a common direction, other candidate and potential members had to ensure that they would be following the general rules as proposed by the EU. A few months later, in February 2015, a framework strategy for a resilient energy union with a forward-looking climate change policy (COM/2015/080 final) [16] was issued. The main scope was a resilient EU with an ambitious climate policy at its core that would provide to endusers “secure, sustainable, competitive and affordable energy”. In order to fulfil this aim, a fundamental change in the EU’s energy system was required. The described vision was of an energy union where member states would realize the need to cooperate between themselves and have a common voice in order to achieve energy security. According to Article 102 of the TFEU, the abuse of a dominant position that may affect trade between member states is prohibited. The implementation of this provision is defined in the Antitrust Regulation (Council Regulation No. 1/2003), which can be applied by the Commission and by the national competition authorities of EU member states [17]. According to the EU Commissioner in charge of competition policy, Margrethe Vestager (2015), Gas is an essential commodity in our daily life: it heats our homes, we use it for cooking and to produce electricity. Maintaining fair competition in European gas markets is therefore of utmost importance. All companies that operate in the European market – no matter if they are European or not – have to play by our EU rules.

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The EU’s polycentric system of governance does not support “swift and bold power projection abroad”, having a type of territorial control that is rule-abiding through the extension of the “acquis communautaire”, dealing with neighbours that are aspiring to become EU member states, like Turkey [18]. The EU does not act as a coordinating actor, but most of the time the member states act for themselves in order to support their own national policies and interests, either directly or taking actions through the EU’s mechanisms and institutions. Council Directive 2006/67/EC required member states to continuously keep minimum stocks of oil equal to 90 days of the average daily internal consumption during the previous calendar year. Then, this Directive was repealed by Council Directive 2009/119/EC with effect from 2013. The new directive aligned the stockholding obligation with that of the International Energy Agency (IEA). This means that from 2013, for most member states, the overall obligation was the same as the one set by the IEA: 90 days of net imports. The obligation of major producing countries will continue to be based on consumption. Even net exporting countries (e.g. Denmark) are expected to continue to have a stockholding obligation under EU law. Furthermore, member states need to hold a minimum third of their obligation in the form of finished products. For the EU12 countries, a large energy trade deficit, even if counterbalanced by surpluses in other trade categories, could serve as a channel through which an energy price shock hits the economy. It would also be important to consider this subject in the broader context of monitoring macroeconomic imbalances and their impact on EU stability and prosperity. The economic crisis in 2009 motivated the EU to treat its energy strategy as a top priority, in an attempt to establish an energy union that could provide more secure and sustainable energy to end-users. Finally, in 2015, the European Commission disclosed the energy union strategy with relative progress reports for the member states. In December 2019, the European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced the need for an energy policy and climate change adaptation, while she disclosed the vision of Europe becoming “the first climate-neutral continent” until 2050. During her speech ahead of her European Parliament debate with MEPs, Ursula von der Leyen said [19]:

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This is a very special day. This morning the College of Commissioners agreed on the European Green Deal. The European Green Deal is, on the one hand, our vision for a climate-neutral continent in 2050, and on the other hand a very dedicated road map whose goal is 50 actions for 2050.

Based on the recently announced European Green Deal, all 27 EU member states agreed to turning the EU into the first climateneutral continent by 2050. In order to achieve this grandiose goal, they pledged to reduce emissions by at least 55% by 2030, compared to 1990 levels. It is necessary to ensure the required preconditions for achieving such a goal that will support social cohesion, long-term growth and sustainability. The European Commission [20] recognizes that policy recommendations and decisions should be “bold and comprehensive and seek to maximize benefits for health, quality of life, resilience and competitiveness”. The EU declared that they would like to have “a clean energy transition”, which can contribute to the aims declared in the Paris Agreement. According to the EU’s objectives for 2030, these are: i. Reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by a minimum of 40%, ii. Increase the RES quota to a minimum of 32% of EU energy use, iii. Increase energy efficiency by a minimum of 32.5%, iv. Guarantee a minimum of 15% electricity interconnection levels among neighbouring member states, and v. Support research and innovation (RandI) initiatives through available financing tools. In order to achieve the European Union’s energy and climate targets until the year 2030, EU member states are required to design and set up a ten-year integrated National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) [21] that needs to be applied during the period 2021–2030. In such a NECP, every EU member state has to analyse, design, propose and implement the process that will help them to meet the targets related to greenhouse gas emission reductions, renewables, energy efficiency, interconnections, research and innovation [22]. Member state governments were asked to submit their final NECPs by the end of 2019 and then prepare biannual progress reports, under the European Commission’s supervision, to ensure prompt and successful responses, as well as member states’ alignment with the set targets. Finally, for the process of monitoring proper

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implementation among member states, the EC published special recommendations and comprehensive “Staff Working Documents” (SWDs) for each member state. There was also the euro crisis coming from Europe and the scepticism of the next period’s economic situation within the European countries, which creates a tremendous amount of European inward-looking. Interests for the EU can be seen as the following: • First of all, energy security and diversification away from a dependence on Russian gas. This is the most important interest from the European point of view. • Secondly, peace and security in this region. • Thirdly, its freedom of transporting commerce. One of the things that the Europeans would really not want to see is that the territorial and maritime boundary issues start to impinge on the freedom of commerce.

3.2

The Energy Transition in Europe

Energy is considered to be a major asset for the EU, given the high level of growth that its member states have reached for decades, despite the stagnation in recent years due to rising international competition and the transfer of production to the East and China. Nevertheless, the EU remains one of the main pillars of the international economy and consequently energy needs remain high and continue to increase. Even though Europe is rich in coal, the North Sea continues to be the main European source of crude oil and natural gas, however production from this area is declining while it is considered insufficient to meet the consumption of these products. At the same time, in many Western European countries, electricity prices have increased rapidly in recent years and they are one of the highest in the world, which puts their economies in a less competitive position compared to others. In an effort to make the EU a climate-neutral coal-fired continent by 2050, and with the recent announcement of the grand green plan, the European Commission has proposed that natural gas investments to be included in the European Union’s new classification as sustainable “green” investments, supporting the EU’s carbonization strategy and the achievement of its climate and environmental objectives. The NECP of

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each EU member state envisage a significant increase in the use of natural gas, highlighting the role of natural gas as a critical “bridge” technology in the efforts to build an energy system that will be dominated by RES technologies. Natural gas import risks remain very high for many countries in Europe. Since the end of 2021, gas supplies in Europe have been kept below the critical limit, while NG storage tanks are emptying very quickly. Should there is a shortage of fuel, gas-fired power plants would suffer first with serious consequences for energy costs and the European economy. The EU is strongly reliant on LNG cargoes as a feasible alternative to reduce its energy dependence on Russia and its leading, oligopolistic position as the main and largest gas supplier in Europe. It has been reported that approximately 500 bcm of LNG per year are available. Should the EU boycott Russian gas supplies or Russia itself stopps supplying the EU, then the European market would ideally be able to buy LNG, which can be seen as the alternative fuel even though it is more expensive. European LNG terminals could allocate 220 bcm to the European gas market each year, while Russia supplies the EU with 170 bcm of NG per year. Thus, in an ideal, alternative scenario, Russian NG deliveries could be completely replaced by LNG ones; however, this is a challenge and requires the considerable time for such a transition. The European gas market is currently the main market globally where gas-on-gas competition is active, while at the same time it is keeping a critical position as the balancing market for liquefied natural gas (LNG) cargoes. The gas-on-gas competition in Europe is seen through the form of pipeline imports, mainly from Russia, competing against LNG imports, coming mainly from the US. This competition between LNG and pipeline gas is of great concern and is taken into account in the policy design and actions by the EU. It is a question of how effectively natural gas suppliers like Russia can finally compete against the LNG imports to the EU, in the long term. Imports from Russia were decreased by around 4% within a year and fulfilled almost 31% of the total needs of natural gas in the EU. Even though the EU demand for NG has been high during the last two years, the market share of Russian gas has remained the same without significant change. In contrast, LNG exports to the EU have been on the rise in recent years, accounting for around 21% of the total needs in the EU. From the supply–demand balance perspective, less availability of goods indicates that the supply, and thus the demand, is accompanied by

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price increases in the market, higher costs and more inflation for the customers and importing countries, while at the same time more profits for the producers and exporters. In parallel, the alternative option of LNG increases the competition and leads to prices falling to lower levels, depending on the costs and strategy of the suppliers and how they would aim to compete in the medium and long term. From 2020, the EU LNG forward prices reduced even below these operating costs and that affected US LNG exports. Even though the utilization of US LNG facilities reduced, reaching a low of around 30% in some months, the exports to the EU increased by a similar percentage with a tendency to be even higher if the supply chain and logistics permitted (BP, 2021) [23]. The shale gas revolution in the US came about as a result of extensive efforts to bring together horizontal drilling with the hydraulic fracturing of bedrock, thus making it possible to extract oil and gas from shale formations. The new Biden administration is more concerned and sensitive about environmental issues and climate change actions than its predecessor, and thus, it may differentiate the US gas policy and exports to third countries. One of the main challenges for both the US and the EU is whether gas consumption can be replaced by RES and therefore more environmentally friendly energy sources. The US actions, which are expressed in their opposition to the undercurrent of Nord Stream II, also contribute in this direction. US governments strongly oppose against the Nord Stream II project for several reasons such as (a) EU will support their energy independence from Russia, through the reduced amount of gas Russia can export to the EU, (b) in the meantime US could benefit from the cancellation of this project because any reduction in the amount of gas through the pipelines could be replaced by the corresponding amount of LNG that US can trade and (c) the cancellation of this project further weakens Russia’s power politically and economically, and therefore its geopolitical influence in neighbouring countries and regions such as Ukraine. During the energy transition, the initial considerations count gas as the fuel that can support the smooth transition, as it is the most environmentally friendly when compared to other fossil fuels, which is why the EU has already announced the decision to re-consider it as one of the available energy sources. However, in this energy transition, the discussion and design focuses on the form and the source of gas. Apart from the

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techno-economic aspect of price competitiveness, natural gas versus liquefied has a strong geopolitical dimension. The EU’s effort to strengthen its energy security is directly related to the effort to increase the degree of diversification of energy sources and reduce the degree of dependence on the largest gas supplier, Russia. In this regard, the US appears to be of strategic importance with the option to export LNG to the old continent. In this way, US can boost their exports with the fuel available to them, while at the same time engaging in a power rivalry against Russia’s other great rival. A typical struggle for power example is the highly dangerous issue of the crisis in Ukraine, in which Russia has been attempting to increase its geographical and geopolitical power with both energy and economic consequences. In 2014, Russian troops took over control of the Crimean Peninsula, following a public referendum, with 97% of residents voting for secession and joining with Russia, although the results were disputed at that time by Western countries. Russia’s President Putin finally declared the Russian annexation of Crimea, while the US and the EU imposed economic sanctions on Russia since they have never recognized it. In February 2022, Russia recognized as independent entities Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and consequently decided to send Russian troops to those regions. The presidents of the European Commission and the European Council stated that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was illegal and unacceptable and that it violated international law, Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty [24]. In regard to energy developments, among all potential energy options, hydrogen is a clean fuel source as it simply produces water as a by-product when it is burned [25]. Hydrogen can be generated from several renewable sources through different conversion techniques such as electrolysis, and biochemical and thermochemical conversion. Four main types of hydrogen are currently available as a primary source: (a) grey hydrogen, which is made using fossil fuels like oil and coal, which emit CO2 into the air as they combust; (b) blue hydrogen, which is made in the same way, but carbon capture technologies prevent CO2 being released, enabling the captured carbon to be safely stored deep underground or utilized in industrial processes; (c) green hydrogen, which is made using electrolysis powered by renewable energy, like offshore wind, in order to produce a clean and sustainable fuel; and (d) turquoise hydrogen, which is produced by using heat to split methane

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through a process known as “pyrolysis” where instead of CO2 , solid carbon is produced. The efforts taking place to transform and change the entire energy system require significant progress in current energy technologies including hydrogen, while in the long term larger amounts of electricity would need new types of storage, such as chemical storage in the form of hydrogen too. Since hydrogen can be finally obtained via electrolysis from electricity produced with surplus renewables, in case a corresponding energy demand exists, then hydrogen can fulfil it immediately. The effective use of green hydrogen along with the availability of incentive systems can contribute to the aim of the EU greenhouse gas reduction target for fuels. As hydrogen is considered a key element of the EU’s strategy for energy system integration and having a broader scope, the European Commission adopted in July last year a new dedicated strategy on hydrogen in Europe [26]. The successful use of green hydrogen can be considered together with the offering of incentive systems that can contribute to the EU’s greenhouse gas reduction target for fuels. Since hydrogen is seen as a basic ingredient of the EU’s strategy for energy system integration, the European Commission decided to proceed with a new strategy on hydrogen in Europe (European Commission, 2020). The basic elements of that new strategy on hydrogen can be seen presented together in the Table 3.2. Finally, the proper operation of the global supply chain is another parameter that directly affects the supply–demand equation, since the Table 3.2 Key milestones for H2 in EU Period

Installed capacity

Production of clean H2

2021–2024

EU to support the installation of a min. of 6 GW of renewable H2 electrolysers in the EU H2 to become an intrinsic part of the EU’s integrated energy system, with a min. of 40 GW of renewable H2 electrolysers Clean hydrogen will be deployed on a large scale across all hard-to-decarbonize sectors

EU to support the production of up to 1 million tonnes of renewable hydrogen EU to support the production of up to 10 million tonnes of renewable hydrogen

2025–2030

2031–

Source Author, 2021 (based on European Commission, 2021)

Clean hydrogen will be deployed on a large scale across all hard-to-decarbonize sectors

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foreseen lead times for proper deliveries of goods worldwide are not always met as scheduled. On the contrary, the supply chain and logistics have dramatically changed during the last two years, driven by the general instability in the markets that the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has brought. The results in the markets are obvious and we can identify many of them: a lack of workers due to illness, but also because of relocation of foreign workforce back to their countries; the slowdown of operations and production overseas that creates a gap in the availability of products and a longer time required for their readiness for shipment; congestion and delays at the ports—both at origin and destination; an increase in freight rates that directly affects the transportation costs and price of the final products; a shortage of basic raw materials, which is sometimes critical for particular industries, such as electronics and automotive, among others.

3.3

Vulnerabilities and Challenges in Europe

In the European Union (EU), slowing growth is straining public finances for environmental protection and increasing inequality. This rebalancing presents competitive threats but also economic opportunities in meeting the demands of a fast-growing global middle class. At the same time, the increasing demand for material resources is a major concern for EU since its economy is structurally dependent on imports. Key risks for Europe include flood events, droughts and other weather extremes threatening human well-being and infrastructure as well as ecosystems and biodiversity. According to the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) [27, p. 11], the definition of a strategic material is as follows: A strategic material is one for which the quantity required for essential civilian and military uses exceeds the reasonably secure domestic and foreign supplies, and for which acceptable substitutes are not available within a reasonable period of time.

Unequal geographical distribution of several resources might cause price increases and a decline in living standards, and of course support any geopolitical conflicts. There are several non-renewable resources that require a special focus due to their economic impact on green-energy technologies. The European Commission has identified 20 “critical raw

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materials” by taking into account the risks of supply shortage and their economic importance to Europe [28]. The need to deal with climate change, among other things, has led to mobilizing institutions and authorities within the EU and thus to achieving the required coordination for the necessary alignment of the member states towards the common scope in order to achieve really difficult objectives set by them. Aligning national policies with the current central policy of the EU and its institutions does not necessarily mean a smooth process, without disagreements and tensions. On the contrary, such a transition to the new era is expected to bring about structural changes in the economic and social fabric of each member state. EU member states need to prepare their structures and functions in order to be able to change and adapt resources and capabilities within them. At the same time, it should be possible to have the availability and operation of appropriate infrastructure and services, both in the government mechanism and among the stakeholders (credit institutions and banks), in order to best respond to the needs of climate change. The European Parliament has recently stated that it wants to be at the heart of the EU recovery package, and in its resolution of 15 May 2020, it called for an ambitious recovery plan that is in line with the core of the Green Deal. During the pandemic, the impact of COVID-19 on public life at European and global level has become unprecedented, leading to a slowdown in global economic activity. In particular, in Europe the decline in GDP of the euro area was 3.8% in the first quarter of 2020. At the same time, due to the reduced economic and social activity of its citizens, there seemed to be a temporary reduction in energy consumption and carbon dioxide (CO2 ) emissions, which could affect the energy mix and the subsequent retargeting of member countries. The European Commission announcement on the European Union Next Generation puts forward a e750 billion recovery plan for the period 2021–2027. This plan, together with the next long-term EU budget approved by the EU member states and Parliament, aims to create a greener, more digital and ultimately more sustainable Europe, as well as to increase resilience to other crises such as the climate crisis [29]. The newly elected European Commission has presented the European Green Deal (Green Deal), a road map for Europe, which is expected to become a climate-neutral continent by 2050 (EC, 2020). In this context, energy and the way it is produced and used is a critical factor in the success of, and contribution to achieving, the goals set by the 2050 time

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horizon for a climate-neutral continent with zero emissions into the atmosphere. The analysis of this transition and the socio-economic impact on EU member states, local regions, local communities and, ultimately, on European citizenship is interesting and useful. The transformation of the economy and structures seems to require sound and appropriate management in order to avoid social and regional disparities among member states. The key EU priorities outlined in the energy union strategy also refer to the various funding programmes for which the EU needs to demonstrate their proper performance, impact and added value. For example, Horizon 2020 is a financial instrument that implements the Innovation Union, a flagship initiative aimed at ensuring Europe’s global competitiveness. Horizon 2020 is seen as a tool for economic growth and job creation, while it has the political support of European leaders and members of the European Parliament, who have agreed that research is an investment in the future and for this reason is the focus of the EU’s plan for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth and jobs. The study, identification and recording of the social impact of each proposal for research and innovation are now a necessary condition but also an evaluation criterion for all types of funded projects for approval and implementation within the EU. In this way, the principles of responsibility are applied along with transparency in transactions and actions, as well as in gathering the necessary information and providing evidence for the effectiveness and strengthening of the decision-making process. With the various projects to be approved and subsequently to be implemented, it is considered prudent to include an impact assessment study, not only to satisfy and apply the principle of responsibility but also to create new collaborative knowledge and disseminate it to other applications, stakeholders and areas of their own empowerment and reinforcement. In addition, it is increasingly necessary to study and include the social impact of business actions and investments that take place. The need for sustainable financing concerns the consideration and study of environmental, social and intergovernmental (environment, social and governance (ESG)) issues when making investment decisions in the financial sector, leading to any long-term investments in sustainable economic activities and projects. Environmental assessments may include climate change mitigation and adaptation, as well as the wider environment.

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Typical examples include the conservation of biodiversity, the avoidance and prevention of pollution, the adoption of the philosophy and techniques of the circular economy, etc. Social concerns could address issues of inequality, participation, labour relations and investment in human capital and communities, as well as human rights issues. Finally, the governance of public and private institutions—including management structures, employee relations and staff remuneration—plays a key role in ensuring that social and environmental factors are included in the decision-making process [30]. In particular, the environmental criteria (E, environmental) may include the energy used by the final consumer, any waste disposals and also any required resources. In addition, it takes into consideration gas emissions released in the atmosphere. As regards the social criteria (S, social), it concerns the relationships between involved participants and stakeholders within communities. Social criteria may include employment relationships, social activities and integration into the society. Finally, governance (G, governance) refers to the internal framework of policies and procedures followed by the citizens in order to comply with both legal and ethical obligations [31]. The strength of EU has to remain its unity, solidarity and determination to act bold and properly while in parallel it has to increase its security against any external threat that may eye its vital interests. Energy is a commodity of critical value which must be ensured that it is available to all and under such terms and conditions that can be tolerated by the society and citizens. The energy transition towards a continent climate neutral by 2050 needs to be redefined with new goals and priorities, since the latest situation and facts have changed the parameters and degrees of freedom in the system and therefore in the available choices for decisionmakers and politicians. One of the relatively direct effects of the military conflict in the eastern part of Europe is the cost increase in raw materials including energy and food. The higher cost of fossil fuels leads to a continuation of the increase in heating bills and fuel prices for transportation with a greater impact on the lower income strata of society, many of whom are already unable to meet their financial obligations. At the same time, there is a risk of a sharp increase in social discontent, with the danger of mass unrest and protest movements, resulting in a deterioration in the security climate within the Member States of the EU as well. Based on the new situation, an updated package of proposals and actions is needed in the short term and for this reason a redefinition of

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the priorities is required that can contribute primarily to ensure survival and human living at tolerable levels. The ambitious plan to wipe out gaseous pollutants from fossil fuels already seems like an almost impossible scenario to be achieved in its original time limits by 2050. However, such a new action plan should not be misinterpreted as a backtracking and cancellation of the vision, which was declared to contribute to preventing and tackling the phenomena resulting from the climate change. It is imperative that a faster progress is required with a number of necessary measures such as: carbon capture technologies, improving the efficiency of energy conversion processes, contributing to energy savings at all levels by using the appropriate materials that consume less energy and using smart innovative solutions as technology has been proven that can be a game changer and provide innovative solutions. The current crisis at all levels needs to be addressed immediately and that is why there should be no one left behind. The participation and assistance of the society can be decisive, since member state leaders would be able to take necessary political decisions for the benefit of their society and citizens. The situation that prevailed until today within the EU, with its lengthy and sluggish procedures, needs to be improved immediately and needs to be readjusted and have forces redeployed towards a common force that will strengthen EU’s presence in the international arena and in the markets.

References 1 EEAS. (2022). https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-hom epage_en/106337/A%20Strategic%20Compass%20for%20the%20EU. Last accessed 28 March 2022. 2 Sharma, R. (2016). The Rise and Fall of Nations. W.W.Norton & Company. 3 The World Bank. (2022). https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.SRF. TOTL.K2?locations=EU. Last accessed 18 January 2022. 4 European Environment Agency. (2021). https://www.eea.europa.eu/dataand-maps/figures/summaries-the-overall-picture-of/ener36_2012_fig01sankey-decc-model.eps/image_large. Last accessed 16 November 2021. 5 Eurostat. (2022). https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/ index.php?title=Energy_production_and_imports#More_than_half_of_EU_e nergy_needs_are_covered_by_imports. Last accessed 26 November 2022. 6 Eurostat. (2020). https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-dat asets/-/nrg_bal_c. Last accessed 19 November 2021.

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7 The World Bank. (2020). http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/4.2. Last accessed 29 November 2021. 8 BP Statistical Review of World Energy. (2021). https://www.bp.com/con tent/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-econom ics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2021-full-report.pdf. Last accessed 21 February 2022. 9 McWilliams, B., Sgaravatti, & G. Zachmann, G. (2021). European natural gas imports. Bruegel Datasets. https://www.bruegel.org/publications/dat asets/european-natural-gas-imports/. Last accessed 18 January 2022. 10 Schröder, M. (2019). EU gas supply security: A geopolitical vision of the southern gas corridor. Studies on the European Union. Vol 16. Nomos Verlag. 11 EUR-lex. (2007). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri= LEGISSUM%3Al27067. Last accessed 29 December 2021. 12 Oberthür, S., & Roche, K. (2008). EU Leadership in international climate policy: Achievements and challenges. The International Spectator, 43(3), 35– 50. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932720802280594 13 Van Schaik, L., & Schunz. S. (2011). Explaining EU activism and impact in global climate politics: Is the Union a norm- or interest-driven actor? JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 50(1), 169–186. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2011.02214.x 14 Kaveshnikov, N. (2010). The issue of energy security in relations between Russia and the European Union. European Security, 19(4), 585–605. https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2010.531707 15 EUR-lex. (2014). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri= CELEX%3A52014DC0330. Last accessed 19 October 2021. 16 EUR-lex. (2015). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:1bd 46c90-bdd4-11e4-bbe1-01aa75ed71a1.0001.03/DOC_1&format=PDF. Last accessed 19 October 2021. 17 European Commission. (2003). https://ec.europa.eu/competition-policy/ antitrust/legislation/regulation-12003_en. Last accessed 19 October 2021. 18 Zielonka, J. (2011). The EU as an international actor: Unique or ordinary? European Foreign Affairs Review, 16(3), 281–301. https://www.resear chgate.net/publication/327571535_The_EU_as_an_international_actor_U nique_or_ordinary 19 The Parliament Magazine. (2019). https://www.theparliamentmagazine. eu/news/article/europes-man-on-the-moon-moment-von-der-leyen-unv eils-eu-green-deal. Last accessed 19 October 2021. 20 European Commission. (2019). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52019DC0640&from=ET. Last accessed 22 February 2022.

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21 European Commission. (2019). https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/ene rgy-strategy/national-energy-and-climate-plans-necps_en. Last accessed 29 October 2021. 22 European Commission. (2019). https://ec.europa.eu/energy/topics/ene rgy-strategy/national-energy-climate-plans_en. Last accessed 10 October 2021. 23 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021. (2021). https://www.bp. com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energyeconomics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2021-full-report.pdf. Last accessed 25 October 2021. 24 European Commission. (2019). https://ec.europa.eu/commission/pressc orner/detail/en/statement_22_1281. Last accessed 23 February 2022. 25 Pudukudy, M., Yaakob, Z., Mohammad, M., Narayanan, B., & Sopian, K. (2014). Renewable hydrogen economy in Asia—Opportunities and challenges: An overview, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 30(C), 743–757. https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:rensus:v:30:y:2014:i:c: p:743-757. 26 European Commission. (2020). https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/ files/hydrogen_strategy.pdf. Last accessed 12 October 2021. 27 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. (1985). Strategic materials: Technologies to reduce U.S. import vulnerability, OTA-ITE-248. https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk2/1985/8525/8525.PDF 28 European Environment Agency. (2022). https://www.eea.europa.eu/soer/ 2020, Last accessed 22 February 2022. 29 European Commission. (2022). https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/rec overy-plan-europe_en. Last accessed 22 February 2022. 30 European Commission. (2022). https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-eco nomy-euro/banking-and-finance/sustainable-finance/overview-sustainablefinance_el. Last accessed 12 October 2021. 31 CERI. (2020). https://ceri.ca/assets/files/CERI%20Natural%20Gas%20R eport%20-%20December%202020.pdf. Last accessed 22 February 2022.

CHAPTER 4

The Energy Security in the Mediterranean Region

4.1

General

The Eastern Mediterranean region is formed where three different continents are met, namely Europe, Asia and Africa. It consists of the following countries that are located in that part of the Mediterranean basin1 : Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority (Fig. 4.1). The total population that resides in that region amounts to around 243 million people, which was more than half of the EU27 population in 2020. At the same time, the total GDP of all the countries in the region reached approximately US$1.8 trillion (in current values in 2020), which is almost 10% of the respective total GDP of the EU27. While energy supply is important for the economic growth of a country, there is a correlation between energy use and GNP. Since GNP is not the only factor “of the level of civilization or quality of life in a country”, it is necessary “when planning for the energy needs of a nation to consider alternative socio-economic models, with emphasis on the socio-economics and not only the economics” [2, p. 142] (Fig. 4.2). The GDP of the countries in the Eastern Mediterranean region during the period 2010–2018 has been increased by around 11%. The West Bank

1 In alphabetical order.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Flouros, Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09603-7_4

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Fig. 4.1 Eastern Mediterranean region (Source World Bank [1]) Turkey Syrian Arab Republic Lebanon Jordan Israel Greece Egypt, Arab Rep. Cyprus 0 Cyprus 2019 2010

24.9 25.7

Egypt, Arab Rep. 303.1 219

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Greece

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394.7 234 2019

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Jordan Lebanon 44.5 27.1

52 38.4

700

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Syrian Arab Turkey Republic 0 761.4 0 777

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Fig. 4.2 Eastern Mediterranean GDP (US$ billion) (2010–2019) (Source Author, 2022 [based on the World Bank, 2022])

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and Gaza Strip territories in the Palestinian Authority showed a significant change in their GDP which was increased by around 77% reaching US$ 17.13 billion (2019). The economy of the Eastern Mediterranean region is foreseen to grow further, while at the same time the population of the region is expected to grow by additional 68 million people by 2030 and additional 80 million during the subsequent period up to 2050 [3]. In parallel, energy demand in this region would be expected to increase significantly over the coming years, which becomes a challenge to be met and it is strongly related to the energy security of that region. According to the World Bank List issued in June 2017, Cyprus is considered a country that belongs to the “Europe & Central Asia” region, while Israel is categorized in the “Middle East & North Africa” region. For the purpose of our study, both countries are considered to be part of the same “Eastern Mediterranean” region. Furthermore, both Cyprus and Israel are ranked as “high-income” countries, defined as those countries with a GNI per capita of US$12,236 or more [4]. Based on current levels of consumption, regional energy (oil and natural gas) reserves are not enough to last for more than a few decades. However, the latest discoveries of large HydroCarbon (HX CY ) resources in Natural Gas (NG) in the offshore Levant Basin and Zohr resin are affecting the supply-side forecasts for the region. These discoveries have the potential to provide the necessary energy supply to meet the growing regional demand and possibly even spur exports [5]. The relatively recent discoveries of hydrocarbons in the wider Eastern Mediterranean region seem to be catalyzing a number of sub issues of an energy, economic, political and finally geopolitical nature. This development concerns initially the directly involved parties that coexist in the same geographical area, but at the same time other third parties that are characterized as interested parties. The effort to protect national security and at the same time increase the power of the states in the region affects any opportunities for cooperation, by creating conditions of uncertainty and instability in the wider region. This is supported by the creation of a new situation in the hegemony of the region, given the desire of the US to disengage not only from this region but also the wider Middle East. The current situation in the region is characterized by fast development, which is seen as a positive signal for the neighbouring countries. However, there is a major energy security risk due to the quick rush for exploration and exploitation of NG from the region, which may be interrupted within the next five-year period for different reasons, such as:

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• Technical problems, probably in field operations. • Environmental problems, due to a hurricane or earthquake, like in some of the gas fields in the Gulf of Mexico that were hit in the recent past after the Katrina and Rita hurricanes, while this region is earthquake prone. • Strategic problems, like possibilities of ground missiles and sky missiles which should be protected against. If there is a major interruption of gas supply from the production field, then countries like Israel will most likely be in the dark and this is going to be most likely the case to deal with, since there is not much backup of energy. There were various examples where the decision to implement an energy project (e.g. the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline) was based on political and geopolitical conditions and not economic ones, because the latter did not always support the continuation of a project [6]. There has been limited debate about the strategic implications of the major hydrocarbon findings in the Eastern Mediterranean region. There are scholars who are not optimistic since they do not believe in the industry potential of the gas findings, not because they are not available, but they are concerned whether the wealth that’s in the seabed will actually be used for political reconciliation. One of the fundamental problems is a tendency towards a zero-sum approach in the region regarding the handling of the gas findings. Although it looks obvious that the gas findings in the Eastern Mediterranean seabed present a tremendous opportunity for the interested countries, it is not evident that there is also a secure and stable environment that will attract the requested investments from abroad. On the contrary, such projects do not look easy due to the strategic implications of the gas findings in that region. It is important to consider what these resources mean for the overarching political framework, since at the same time there is no issue with the gas industry because this type of industry is very familiar with operating in very difficult places. The challenge lies with the vision of political cooperation. The strategic context in the Eastern Mediterranean is characterized by uncertainty, by changes in the regional balance of power and tremendous political instability. Many incidents occurred in the last decade (2010–2020), including the recent Arab Spring that caused widespread disaster in most of the countries it took place, with the example of the humanitarian crisis in Syria, which has continued to this day and persists unabated. There were

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some disruptions in gas supply and it remains to be seen how the relationship between the involved stakeholders in the Eastern Mediterranean region will evolve in the near future. Apart from a nation state approach, energy security issues also have an important regional dimension mainly because countries are present in geographic proximity, which provides them with the same conditions regarding their access to energy resources, interaction with energy carriers, the structure of energy use and trading with third parties. Neighbouring Countries In order to better approach and rationalize the players in the region of the Eastern Mediterranean, the neighbouring countries of the region are listed below [1], except for Israel and Cyprus, which are presented in a separate chapter of this book. The order of appearance of the neighbouring countries is then presented in alphabetical order and with no intention of priority or preference. Egypt Basic indicators for the country as of 2020 [7] are as follows: • • • • •

Surface area: 1,001,450 sq. km Population: 102.2 million GDP: US$365.2 billion FDI : US$9.0 billion Military expenditure: 1.2% GDP

The Arab Republic of Egypt is a Mediterranean country that extends from the north-east corner of Africa to the south-west corner of Asia. It borders with the Gaza Strip and Israel to the north-east, the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea to the east, Sudan to the south and Libya to the west. Across the Gulf of Aqaba lies Jordan, across the Red Sea lies Saudi Arabia, and across the Mediterranean lie Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, although none of them share a land border with Egypt. The latest turmoil that occurred in Egypt during the Arab Spring brought instability to the country and thus further reduced flows of energy in and out of the country. In addition, there was another export

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pipeline from Egypt to Israel from El-Arish to Ashkelon, but the available quantities have been recurrent over the last few years [8]. The average daily petroleum production in the country had reached around 7.1 billion cubic feet (bcf) per day by the end of 2018, which is 75% more than five years earlier. The primary energy supply from RES during the period 2013–2018 did not change, but it was increased by just 0.8% in 2018, reaching approximately 295,000 TJ. In that year, the majority of the share in RES was from bioenergy (77%), followed by hydro/marine (16%), while solar and wind each held an equal amount (4%) [9]. At the same time, the biggest share from NG production in Egypt exists in the Mediterranean Sea with 62%, followed by the Nile Delta with 19% and the Western Desert with 18%. There have been recent discoveries of NG such as the Nooros discovery in the Nile Delta, North Alex and West Nile Delta and the Zohr discovery in the Mediterranean Sea. These new discoveries contribute to meeting the demand of local market [10]. The Zohr discovery occurred within the Shorouk concession, around 190 km north of Port Said, and it is seen as the largest natural gas discovery in the Mediterranean Sea and one of the largest natural gas discoveries worldwide. The participant stakeholders are: 50% ENI, 30% Rosneft, 10% British Petroleum and 10% Mubadala Petroleum. In 2019, the daily NG production from the field was more than 2.7 bcf with a further increase in 2020 up to 3.2 bcf due to the drilling of two additional wells and their connection to onshore production facilities [11]. The Arab Gas Pipeline (AGP) runs from El-Arish in Egypt through Jordan and Syria and from there to Lebanon; there are further thoughts about a pipeline to finally connect with Turkey, but the unstable environment in Syria does not fully support such an option in the coming years. Moreover, as regards Turkish-Egyptian relations, they do not follow the previous decades path, while the period after Morsi’s removal marked a historic deterioration of bilateral ties (Fig. 4.3). There are several stages that the AGP consists of [13]: (a) phase 1 is a 265 km pipeline from Arish to Taba in Egypt, ending in Aqaba in Jordan, which was completed in 2004 and since then, Egyptian natural gas has been provided to the Aqaba power station; (b) from there, phase 2 was the gas network that runs to the Syrian border to Samara, Rehab and Manakhir power stations, which was completed in 2007; (c) phase 3 was the gas network in Syria, which runs from the Jordanian-Syrian border to the Syrian-Turkish border ending in Lebanon. The AGP is seen

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Fig. 4.3 Arab Gas Pipeline (AGP) (Source [12])

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as “the backbone of the future Arab Gas Network” since there are many advantages for the Arab countries: almost 80% of the power generation in Jordan is fuelled by AGP; Iraq and Syria agreed to connect the Western Iraqi gas fields to the gas processing centres in Syria, in order for Iraq to become a part of AGP; AGP can promote Arab gas to Turkey and consequently to Europe. Referring to Egypt, it is important to mention one major issue for Cyprus (and Greece) to seriously consider: the fact that the former alliance between Israel, Egypt and Turkey looks to be no longer the same. Based on the Cairo Declaration that was signed between Greece, Cyprus and Egypt, the importance of respecting the sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is clear, and Turkey is being asked to terminate all seismic exploration within the maritime zones of Cyprus and to avoid similar activities in the future. As for Egypt’s production levels, the following are under discussion: • Production for Zohr, as competitive to the East Med project (US, Italy, technical). • Electrical connectivity with Cyprus and Greece. • Exports from and to both Cyprus and Israel, as they could potentially supply Egypt since they were both driven by their recent natural gas findings in their territorial fields. Greece Basic indicators for the country as of 2020 [14] are as follows: • • • • •

Surface area: 131,960 sq. km Population: 10.7 million GDP: US$188.8 billion FDI : US$4.99 billion Military expenditure: 2.8% GDP

The country has been working towards finalizing the delineating of its EEZ with its neighbour countries, namely Egypt, Italy and Albania, while various changes have occurred on the regional energy map in recent years.

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In addition, there have been continuous efforts to be in close cooperation for energy issues with other countries in the region and mainly with Cyprus, Israel and Egypt. In Greece, there is a blend of different types of fuel sources that can be used, with primary and secondary oil fuel representing the largest proportion. Other important fuel sources are hydro and NG, with the latter mainly starting at the end of the last century and increasing its share among the other types. The primary energy supply from RES during the period 2013–2018 increased by 20% in 2018, reaching approximately 112,200 TJ. In that year, the majority of the share in RES was from bioenergy (46%), followed by wind (25%), with solar and hydro/marine each holding an equal amount (15%) [15]. In regard to NG fields in Greece, there are three different geographical zones where geophysical hydrocarbon exploration takes place and where the prospects for exploration of NG deposits are either confirmed or high: (a) marine plots in the Ionian Sea; (b) marine plots in the Aegean Sea and (c) marine plots south of the island of Crete. Geophysical research is taking place at a time when gas is a key component of the debate on energy security and the transition to Europe, both due to the recent sharp rise in energy costs and also because of geopolitical developments and tensions between Russia and the West over the issue of Ukraine. The EU considers investment in NG to be a sustainable “green” investment that supports the EU’s carbonization strategy and the achievement of its climate and environmental objectives. Previous studies and estimates by Greek and international analysts have shown that the potential value of Greece’s natural gas reserves could create a turnover in excess of e250 billion, supporting the process of replacing coal with natural gas in the wider region and accelerating the transition to a more sustainable lowenergy energy system [16]. There are gas projects that Greece has shown a strong interest in that have now been cancelled, such as South Stream. The country has been included in the design of the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which is a key part of the Southern Gas Corridor and it is expected to transport 10 billion cubic metres (bcm) of NG per year to Greece, Albania and Italy, and thereby contribute to the security and diversification of NG supplies to Europe [17]. The main requirement for a state to become a reliable and strong power is not only its hegemonic character, which means other countries’ agreement to power this force. On the contrary, such a power needs to

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ensure that other countries take into serious account any clearly expressed or indirect messages that are communicated by this country. Greece has been following an unstable, accidental energy policy, which is mostly affected by any new government in place—like almost every political aspect in the country. The country has been swinging between the US’s and Russia’s amicable projects, however the winner in this informal competition turned out to be the US. An amendment to the US–Greece Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (MDCA) was signed in December 2021. The MDCA is considered the basis of the defence cooperation and is expected to contribute to their common defence for the next three decades. This evolution enhances the efforts by both countries to deal with the security challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean region through their strategic relationship. The initial MDCA has allowed the US to operate within Greece since 1990, while the second amendment is foreseen to allow Greece and the US to advance security and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond [18]. Jordan Basic indicators for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as of 2020 [19] are as follows: • • • • •

Surface area: 89,320 sq. km Population: 10.2 million GDP: US$43.6 billion FDI : US$0.85 billion Military expenditure: 5.0% GDP

The country covers around 80% of its energy demands from petroleum products, since the domestic hydrocarbon sources only accounted for around 3% of the country’s needs in 2011. During previous decades the country’s production of oil was declining and it reached zero in 2012. The country has been planning to start production and usage of its oil shale resources to power a 500-megawatt (MW) electric plant, as there are oil shale deposits that are estimated to be around 65 billion tonnes. Provided that they are assessed to be economically viable, these resources may contribute to decreasing the country’s dependence on foreign energy sources.

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The local production of natural gas was around 9.5 bcf during the period 2000–2011. Jordan’s Risha field was estimated to have a production of around 15 MMcf/d in 2012, and this already contributed 50% of the country’s natural gas while the potential of the field’s output has been over 300 MMcf/d during the last few years. However, the country still relies on imports to cover its natural gas needs, while there was a serious impact on the country’s energy balance due to the interruptions to the Arab Gas Pipeline (AGP). Crude oil imports have been fluctuating, reaching a maximum point in 2005–2006 and then returning to a lower point in 2010 compared to the starting one in 2000. Residual fuel oil seems to have been reduced, while motor gasoline increased continuously every year from 2000 to 2010. The primary energy supply from RES during the period 2013–2018 increased 3.2 times, reaching approximately 11,335 TJ in 2018. In that year, the majority of the share in RES was from solar (51%), followed by bioenergy (27%), while wind ranked in third place (22%) [20]. The share of electricity from RES changed from less than 1% (2017) to more than 13% in 2019, which put the country in first place in the region in RES. Jordan has prepared proper policies and regulations in order to further support RES. Jordan’s energy diversification strategy has been designed with RES at the centre of the policy, as is described in the National Energy Strategy 2020–2030 that proposes the vision for the development of the energy sector [21]. Lebanon Basic indicators for the country as of 2020 [22] are as follows: • • • • •

Surface area: 10,450 sq. km Population: 6.8 million GDP: US$31.7 billion FDI : US$2.2 billion Military expenditure: 3.0% GDP

Lebanon relies mostly on imported energy products. The overall petroleum consumption of Lebanon during the period 2000–2010 increased by around 20,000 bpd, which was mainly driven by an increase in consumption of distillate fuel oil. Other oil products like residual and motor gasoline remained almost the same in terms of volume consumption.

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It has been seen that there is an intention from the government of Lebanon to focus on the share of natural gas in the country’s energy mix with a view that it could be reaching around 65–70% by the year 2030. However, this is a very ambitious target, since natural gas is no longer part of the country’s energy mix after the loss of Egyptian supplies previously [23]. The Lebanese are currently making progress in the legislation process and despite the political turmoil in Lebanon they intend to continue exploration activities. In January 2018, the Lebanese Minister of Energy and Water signed the Exploration and Production Agreements (EPAs) for blocks 4 and 9, with the consortium consisting of Total 40% (operator), Eni 40% and Novatek 20%. Recently, Lebanon relaunched a second offshore licensing round for eight remaining blocs in their gas fields [24]. In regard to regional cooperation for Lebanon, it appears that Cyprus could have been an excellent place for a hub for exporting gas to an energy facility, however each country has its own priorities and internal needs that precede the choice of exports and cooperation with third parties that comes second. Even if a country succeeds in finding considerable gas reserves in its territory, often it is the strategic context that prevails, which is mainly defined by political arguments and not necessarily by the economics. Palestinian Authority The overall petroleum consumption of Palestinian territory during the period 2000–2010 was doubled and increased by around 7–8,000 bpd. This was mainly driven by an increase in consumption of kerosene, while other products like motor gasoline and liquified petroleum gases remained almost the same in terms of volume consumption. The Palestinian Natural Gas field, Gaza Marine, is located in Palestinian maritime zones and the estimated reserves of NG are of 1 tcf, as discovered in 1999 by British Gas (BG). The development of Gaza Marine is expected to play a major role in Palestine’s energy security; it will be used for local power generation purposes: (a) the existing Gaza power plant with a capacity of 140 MW—expandable to 280 MW; and (b) the PPGC Jenin power plant with a capacity of 450 MW [25]. In terms of RES and in particular the wind field in Gaza, there were development steps during the period 2013–2018 and the renewable energy supply increased by almost 64%, reaching around 5,900 TJ in 2018 [26]. However, the total share of RES slightly increased by around

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3% during that period, which is seen as a slow response by the Palestinian Authority. Hopefully in the future, the geopolitical and economic conditions will favour the development of this field. Syria Basic indicators for the country as of 2020 [27] are as follows: • • • • •

Surface area: 185,180 sq. km Population: 17.5 million GDP: US$22.7 billion FDI : N/A Military expenditure: N/A

In Syria, there were oil shale resources of around 50 billion tonnes in 2010 [28]. The main problem at the moment is the severe situation in the country and the serious instability that does not allow any thoughts and discussions about inviting any international energy company to operate in the country. Given such difficulties, and the higher cost of developing unconventional hydrocarbons relative to conventional hydrocarbons, no serious progress is foreseen in Syria in the short/medium term. There’s the Syrian conflict that may be escalated and thus may also influence the dynamic in Lebanon, and it might actually be a gamechanger that we’re not really considering that extensively today. Syria has an issue of common interest between Turkey and Israel, and this cooperation on Syria could actually be an opportunity to amend the relations between these two important regional powers. The Israeli–Turkish cooperation in both countries is of long-term strategic interest. Gross production and consumption of natural gas in Syria followed the same trend during the period 2002–2009 with a gap difference of around 80–100 billion cft. For the next two years, the consumption increased a lot, reaching a point in 2010 where production and consumption were almost equal. Power generation from RES in 2020 accounted for around 3% of the total and it was mostly from hydro and marine. During the period 2015–2020, there was basically no capacity change in the energy sector of the country [29]. Turkey Basic indicators for the country as of 2020 [27] are as follows:

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Surface area: 785,350 sq. km Population: 84.3 million GDP: US$719.9 billion FDI : US$9.2 billion Military expenditure: 2.8% GDP

Turkey has undergone several transformations internally during the last decade and the country probably intends to have a new strategic role in the Eastern Mediterranean region. At the same time, it was both the “Arab Spring” initiated in 2011 and also the “hegemonic decline” of the US that made Turkey appear more important as a potential counterpart to manage relations in the Arab world and seek for a new order in the Eastern Mediterranean region [30, p. 39]. Turkey had been used as a model by many stakeholders for the way in which the Arab world confronting the Arab revolutions could develop. At the same time, the Turkish–Israeli tensions that started early in the previous decade still continue, while the two countries cancelled their yearly military exercises that they had previously shared with the US. The basic parameters that characterize the country and that are seen as important include the following: • Internal problems related to the democratization progress in the country, especially after the failed coup attempt in 2015. • Power game against the secular elite of the country (Kemalists) driven by the leading party AKP.2 • Accession to the EU and obligations to be fulfilled. Turkey’s interests look not to be in line with those of the EU while the country considers itself more powerful than in the past and thus it does not see reasons to compromise or to abide by international rules and laws. • Turkey may have problems as a candidate for membership of the EU due to human rights. • Kurdish minority in combination with new conflicts at its Southern borders with Syria. • Arab Spring and Turkey’s failure to apply Davutoglu’s “zero problem” dogma with its neighbour countries. 2 The Justice and Development Party, abbreviated officially to AK Parti in Turkish.

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• Islamic State issue and international pressure on Turkey from its allies to be actively involved against ISIS. • Migration flow from Syria seriously affects the country and its economy/demographics. Turkey continues to successfully play the card of its geopolitical location by exacting and obtaining gradually from its Western allies all those concessions that finally reinforce their role as a regulator in the wider region. It would not be an exaggeration if Turkey’s treatment by powerful Western countries is characterized as appeasement policy with all the known negative connotations. There was a relatively reluctant US stance on developments in the Eastern Mediterranean region combined with the hegemony gap that has been building in the region for a decade. At the same time, Washington has consistently brought home and reiterates that it recognizes the right of the Cyprus Republic to conduct surveys for gas and oil in the EEZ. The representative of the State Department on several occasions declined to criticize Turkey limiting themselves to a vague appeal to avoid actions that could increase tension in the region. He noted that “the US continues to believe that deposits of oil and gas on the island like all resources should be shared fairly (equitably) between the two communities in the context of a comprehensive settlement” [31]. The choice of the word “fairly” is not random, but a competent official elaboration, according to which any gains that arise should be shared according to the percentage of the population. In regard to the energy sector, apart from being a growing transit hub, Turkey is considered a major energy market itself with a fast-growing demand for energy. This demand is driven mostly by the power generation sector, which depends greatly on imported natural gas. Even though the market is still highly regulated, Turkey has taken important actions to liberalize mainly the electricity and natural gas sectors. The state has been involved in pipeline politics and massive investments, especially in cases where intergovernmental deals contributed to form long-term relations. The Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) is an NG pipeline from Azerbaijan to Europe and it was decided that it could be a central part of the Southern Gas Corridor, which would connect the Shah Deniz gas field in Azerbaijan to Europe through the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), TANAP and the TAP (Trans-Adriatic Pipeline). It is a project of strategic importance as it will allow Azerbaijani gas exports to Europe and

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it is expected to strengthen the role of Turkey as a regional energy hub since it passes through the country [32]. The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (MENR) [33] is a government ministry office of the Republic of Turkey, responsible for natural resources-related affairs and energy in Turkey. Turkey’s energy strategy, as set out by the MENR, stems from domestic market characteristics while it also represents global and regional dynamics. The official strategy proves to be energy securityoriented, with responsiveness to state and private company involvement. This characteristic extensively explains how Turkey synchronizes the tangible characteristics of energy security with geopolitical features and foreign policy priorities. The Strategic Plan as set out by the MENR for the period 2009–2014 was composed of five strategic pillars [34, pp. 60–75]: i. Energy supply security. ii. The regional and global effectiveness of Turkey in the field of energy. iii. The environment. iv. Natural resources. v. Corporate structure. The ability of Turkish foreign policy to design long term and to follow its strategic targets with stability makes the country capable of claiming the role of a regional superpower in the greater area. The new role of Turkey constitutes the most important advantage, which is exchangeable at many levels against the West, regardless of whether this advantage of the Turkish foreign policy constitutes a potentially insignificant expectation. Turkey had set the following objectives of an Energy Security Policy: • Secure energy to meet 5% GDP growth year-over-year: this could be achieved either by increasing capital investments in the upstream industry or by increasing its energy imports from abroad, which does not solve the issue in the long term. • Reduce natural gas imports from Russia: this could be arranged by targeting the EU’s SGC corridor, which does not seem to have occurred. On the contrary, Turkish–Russian relations have strengthened a lot in recent years, including in the energy sector.

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• Diversification of both energy sources and types of imports: this seems to have been in progress since the country opened its energy sector to DPI in the 80s–90s, and it was largely driven by Turkey being an EU candidate member. The nexus of Turkey’s energy politics and foreign policy is mainly driven by two parameters: i. Its import dependence on natural gas supplies. ii. Its aim to become the region’s energy hub in terms of gas pipelines and corridors from Asia and the Caspian Sea. This is mostly supported by PKK’s defeat, former Soviet countries’ cultural and linguistic relations, EU candidacy, G20 membership and NATO membership. Fatih Donmez, Turkey’s Energy and Natural Resources Minister, announced that Turkey’s installed power capacity had reached almost 100,000 megawatts and more than half of that came from RES. It was mentioned that Turkey’s electricity production from RES has been above the 40% band during the 2019–2022 period having used RES as the only resource, shares of which continue to increase in the energy mix, not least due to the COVID-19 pandemic situation. Mr Donmez said that more than US$2 trillion has been invested in RES in the global markets since 2010, which is estimated to reach additional US$1.3 trillion in the next five years [35]. Finally, it has been suggested that the appeal of renewable energy will only increase with factors such as decreasing costs, incentives and combating climate change. Turkey’s role as an increasing regional power is discouraging the willingness of the Europeans, as well as the US, to press Turkey too hard, particularly over the issue of the gas findings in the Eastern Mediterranean. This is also supported by its important role in managing the Syrian conflict. There is a need to have an adequate framework for conflict resolution and wealth sharing as the increasing securitization is an issue to take seriously. Rhetoric is becoming more inflammatory, and military exercises have been undertaken in recent years with an eye to protecting the gas interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

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Stakeholders France France has always been very active in the wider Mediterranean Sea and has multiple interests, political and economical, through the previous colonial policy (Lebanon, Syria), including military, commercial, cultural, etc. Referring to the maritime disputes among Greece, Cyprus and Turkey regarding the delimitation of maritime boundaries and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), France strongly backed both Greece’s and Cyprus’s positions. At the time that Turkey tried to start oil and gas drilling activities within Cypriot territorial waters, French President Emmanuel Macron referred to “unacceptable” Turkish conduct in the Eastern Mediterranean and asked for a European united front in addressing Turkey’s “aggressive” behaviour [36, p. 1]. Apart from that regional dispute, the disagreement between France and Turkey in the Mediterranean region is mainly found in three other cases [36, pp. 9–12]: (a) Libya, (b) Syria and (c) Lebanon. a. In Libya: the dissension changed from a “proxy” to a direct contest after an incident when a French military vessel asked permission to conduct research on a Turkish navy vessel near the Libyan coast in June 2020. According to the European Parliament, there was evidence that the Turkish government since 2019 had regularly smuggled arms shipments into Libya in breach of the UN arms embargo. In addition, Turkey was seen to be engaged in a military exercise involving eight warships and 17 aircraft in the Eastern Mediterranean off the Libyan coast [37]. b. In Syria: France does not approve the involvement of Turkey in this geographical area, but rather, it views their actions with mistrust since it believes that Turkey uses the Syrian crisis to benefit and expand influence in the region. Furthermore, France built up contact with the PYD/YPG dominant political and military entities in north-eastern Syria, which is why Turkey considers them a national security threat.3 c. In Lebanon: Turkey did not appreciate France’s “Lebanon Initiative” and it became frustrated with the actions taken by French 3 Democratic Union Party (PYD), a Kurdish nationalist group linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

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President Macron during his visit to Beirut after the explosion on 4th August 2020. Turkey views France’s action as external interventionism and accused Macron of “colonialism”, mostly because Turkey sees Lebanon as part of its own sphere of influence. All these political and military differences between the countries also affect the energy sector, as instability in the wider Mediterranean region directly affects its energy security and that of neighbouring countries. Russia The country has a new assertive foreign policy that is making the EU quite uneasy. Energy security risks can result from focusing on one source of gas for long periods of time. Costs and benefits in this respect are very much dependent on Russian gas, while Russia has stopped the flow of gas six times since January 2006 and the Europeans are also in favour of multiple sources. Policy differences between the EU and Russia are based on interests and material capabilities, but also on several perceptions of energy and its role in society, while Russia’s policy for energy seems different from that of the EU. At the same time, Russia shows a real interest in the Turkish energy market and related alternative solutions regarding the transfer of natural gas through Turkey. Especially after its blockage through the embargo and the cancellation of the South Stream—transfer of Russian NG through Turkey and Bulgaria to Europe—Russia has been very interested in reaching a political agreement with Turkey that would bring unpredictable energy alliances in the region. It seems that there are two main characteristics of modern Russian–Turkish relations in the natural gas sector [38, pp. 102–105]: • Turkey’s strong dependence on Russian natural gas supplies. • Turkey’s position as an alternative transit state for supplying Russian NG to Europe. Russia is considered one of the dominant energy powers in the region since it has been playing a significant role in providing NG to Europe in recent years. In 2019, the imports of NG to the EU27 from Russia comprised approximately 41% of the total EU needs (Fig. 4.4).

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Fig. 4.4 EU27—imports of NG (2019) (Source Eurostat, 2021)

At the same time, Russia’s strong interest does not allow Turkey to gain a major role as an energy hub; but whenever necessary, both countries cooperate together in order to design and implement the right strategy that will serve their aims. Russia’s interest in Mediterranean affairs and particularly on the island of Cyprus was always active and it has recently been increased by “making Cyprus a new Russian foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean”. The military presence of the Russian Navy and at the same time long-lasting relations in the economic field reflect Russia’s active involvement in the region. Thus, Russia had expressed its real interest in participating in the explorations of the Aphrodite gas field and the one in Block 9. However, in the end, neither project was in favour of Russia [39, pp. 87–88]: • Development and operational licences for Block 12 were granted to a consortium led by the US company Noble. • The Russian focus on negotiations over the development of Block 9 between a consortium led by the French company Total and the Russian Novatek and GPB Global Resources, the latter belonging to Gazprom, collapsed in December 2012 after the Cypriot authorities were denied their request to upgrade the French–Russian offer.

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US The US had already started a process of disengagement from the Middle East. The extent of this disengagement was linked both with the withdrawal from Iraq and with their new foreign policy orientation towards the Asia–Pacific. Traditional US allies in the Middle East region have shown increasing hesitation in following the US strategy in the region, and thus it would be better to be upfront about a new posturing with respect to the Middle East. Having seen an opportunity, both Russia and Turkey tried to fill the hegemonic gap in the Eastern Mediterranean region. The US seems to view current developments in Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean region from the perspective that the situation is very fluid and it could never possibly disapprove directly of any Turkish action—at least while the crisis is not upgraded to a military one. The US has been looking at the “big picture” in the Middle East, and this can be described as Iraq–Syria–ISIS and Israel. The exploitation of the hydrocarbons in that region has brought about a closer cooperation between Cyprus and Israel and between Cyprus and Egypt, while a future pooling of Cyprus’s gas field “Aphrodite”, which abuts with Israel’s EEZ, may prove important for the protection of Cyprus’s interests. The US decided to develop an alternative, which was called “Noble Dina”, together with Greece and Israel. Based on a statement on East Med Energy Cooperation issued by the US Embassy in Greece on 10 January 2022 [40], the US declared its commitment to strengthening its regional relationships and promoting clean energy technologies in the Eastern Mediterranean region. More specifically, they have expressed their support regarding: • The 3+1 alliance in which the Republic of Cyprus (ROC), Greece, Israel and the US participate. They believe that this mechanism “continues to strongly support regional efforts that enhance and promote cooperation and regional stability”. • The physical interconnection of East Med energy to Europe. • The electricity interconnectors that will contribute both gas and RES. • Projects like (i) the already scheduled EuroAfrica interconnector from Egypt to Crete and the Greek mainland and (ii) the proposed EuroAsia interconnector to link the Israeli, Cypriot and European electricity grids. They believe that these projects could connect vital

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energy markets and further support the region in its aim for clean energy transition. NATO NATO and the EU: there was a deadlock in NATO and EU cooperation for many years. The gas findings in the Eastern Mediterranean have the potential to create more tensions between NATO’s member Turkey and EU’s member state Cyprus. The EU would like to avoid a deepening of tension between Turkey, Israel and Cyprus, which obviously reduces the influence of Russia; this is connected to the diversification strategy of energy security policy and European business opportunities. Finally, global resource security does not necessarily concern the supply or the availability of resources, but guaranteed access is dominating the current environment when it comes to resources. Thus, the gas findings are influenced by this strategic context. Gas findings might be an opportunity to meet these interests, but risks still remain. • At regional level there is an exacerbation of regional tensions. There is an increase in the securitization of the dynamic in the Eastern Mediterranean. • At international level there is political turmoil in the shape of the Arab Spring, the Syrian conflict and greater Russian assertiveness, so the influence of third parties in the region is an issue to take into account, along with the euro crisis. • The euro crisis creates a very negative financial economic framework in which this discussion takes place. Institutions There are numerous existing institutions and alliances that are involved in energy-related issues, but they have not been successful in reducing national energy security concerns, mainly because of their narrow view on a particular energy sector, region or group of countries. They seem not to reflect the systemic nature of energy security risks and their connection with other energy issues such as climate change. The energy security landscape is expected to rely on both national strategies and the nature of international energy institutions. There can be two scenarios:

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• Scenario A: National strategies focus on sovereignty concerns and international institutions are seen as not being so powerful; this combination can cause a regional but not internationally integrated energy system and the existence of unstable markets that are ruled by resource nationalism. • Scenario B: National strategies focus on resilience and international institutions are powerful and strong; this combination can cause a move to more secure energy systems independently if they do not have the capacity to deal with that by themselves. Cooperation Schemes The 3+1 Alliance As per the joint declaration between Cyprus, Greece, Israel and the US after the 6th Trilateral Summit [41], the governments reaffirmed their commitment to promoting peace, stability, security and prosperity in the Eastern Mediterranean region. The US underlined its support for the trilateral mechanism established by Israel, Greece and Cyprus, referring to the importance of increased cooperation, while the leaders agreed to enhance the regional cooperation, to support energy independence and security, and to defend against external malign influences in the Eastern Mediterranean and the broader Middle East. They also welcomed the recent natural gas finds in the Eastern Mediterranean and their potential to contribute to energy security and diversification. The Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) On 9-3-2021, the 4th Ministerial Meeting took place with the participation of the Founding Energy Ministers of Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Jordan and Palestine and the Italian Vice Minister of Economic Development. It was announced that the EMGF Statute would enter into force starting in March 2021. The ministers acknowledged that it is an important step and a result of the intensive cooperation among founding members, and the big efforts exerted by their professional teams. The EMGF has finally become one of the main energy forums in the Mediterranean region, acting as a diplomatic breakthrough and a transformational project. The importance of the EMGF is not only related to energy, but it also acts as an “enabler of regional peace, and a vital engine for economic growth and prosperity” [42].

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The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) is well-positioned to play a constructive role in helping to facilitate this outcome, as the UfM is a forum to which all the concerned European and Middle Eastern parties already belong. The UfM acts as a platform for facilitating and promoting regional dialogue and cooperation and also projects and initiatives in the fields of energy and climate action. Thus, it can eventually contribute to dealing with energy and climate change challenges in the region and also advancing towards more secure and sustainable energy models. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) [43] The main reason for the EMP was the EU’s aim to promote regional stability in the region, which could happen through economic integration and democratization in a multilateral forum, including Israel [44]. The EMP was started with the scope to create a regional entity that was advanced economically, politically and socially [45]. The launch of the EMP happened in 1995; Spain, the EU member states and the 12 Mediterranean Partners (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Cyprus, Malta) started the ambitious Euro-Med Partnership (EMP), which is also wellknown as “the Barcelona Process”. Later on, in 2004, due to the EU enlargement, the EMP consisted finally of 37 members: 27 EU member states and ten Mediterranean partners (Libya had only participated as an observer since 1999). In the Barcelona Declaration, the EU–Med partners concluded their three basic objectives (baskets), which are described as follows [46]: 1. Political and Security basket: The definition of a Common area of Peace and Stability, through the reinforcement of political and security dialogue. 2. Economic and Financial basket: The construction of a Zone of Shared Prosperity, through an economic and financial partnership and the gradual establishment of a free-trade area. 3. Social, Cultural and Human basket: The rapprochement between peoples, through a Social, Cultural and Human Partnership aimed at encouraging understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies.

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EU Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) The EU Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was initiated in 2004 with the main scope to “support and foster stability, security and prosperity in the countries located in the EU’s Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods” [47]. More specifically, energy security is seen as an opportunity for cooperation between the EU and its neighbouring countries as a security parameter and also as a tool for sustainable economic development. It is evident that Eastern Mediterranean gas cooperation fits perfectly into the framework of the ENP [47].

4.2

The Eastern Mediterranean Energy Transition

The main net energy exporter among the Eastern Mediterranean countries has been Egypt, initially through hydrocarbons and with a view to electricity in the near future. Such exports contribute to the country’s budget revenues and thus possibly supporting any local socio-economic and financial actions for the society. The availability of energy heavily supports the economic growth of involved countries, while its absence works in the opposite way and causes obstacles to those with limited energy resources. One of the reliable choices for the Eastern Mediterranean gas market in the next decade is seen as the current LNG option that is available in Egypt, mainly for exports to the EU since the EU is always interested in differentiating its energy suppliers—especially Russia—and thus improving one of the basic elements of its energy security. The East Med Pipeline is one of the EU’s Projects of Common Interest (PCIs), included since 2013 in the EU PCI list and benefitting from the fast-track procedures provided by EU Regulation 347/2013 [48]. It is planned to transport NG from Israel, Cyprus and Egypt via Greece to the EU. This action contributes to the development of the PCI 7.3.1 “Pipeline from offshore Cyprus to Greece mainland via Crete”, which is aimed at connecting directly and on a long-term basis the recently discovered gas reserves in the Levantine Basin with the European gas markets, crossing Cyprus and Greece and reaching Italy through the Poseidon Pipeline. The CAPEX of the East Med Pipeline had been estimated to be around 5.2 billion EUR for a 10 bcm/y capacity (Fig. 4.5).

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Fig. 4.5 East Med Pipeline (Source Depa [49])

The East Med Pipeline, which is approximately 1900 km long, runs from the offshore fields to Cyprus and to Greece, through Greece and, via the Poseidon Pipeline, to the Italian gas system. The connection to the Poseidon Pipeline enables the East Med to deliver additional gas sources from the Levantine Basin to Europe, thus further enhancing the integration of the EU market and strengthening its energy security. The East Med Pipeline is supported by the concerned countries; since 2018, Cyprus, Greece, Israel and Italy have completed negotiations on an Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) to support the realization of the East Med. Furthermore, the Poseidon Pipeline project extends 970 km, with the main part being the 760 km onshore section that starts from the

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Greek–Turkish border and the subsequent 210 km offshore section that connects Greece to Italy. It was designed with an initial capacity of 12 bcm per year with an option to upgrade up to 20 bcm per year. The Poseidon Pipeline project strengthens Europe’s energy security since it connects Europe and other gas sources from the Caspian, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean Basin regions [49]. However, this project appeared to be a challenge with many constraints mainly due to the long undersea distance of 1250 km to the European end-market destination and the technical difficulties during the construction phase, due to the high depth underneath the sea level. Based on the increasing EU energy need for NG by 2030 and since NG can contribute to the energy transition phase that the EU is currently undergoing until 2050, this project can strategically contribute to the EU security of supply. In addition, it seems that there are sufficient volumes available, even after the local needs have been met, to allow international exports to Europe or to the global LNG market and that the East Med Pipeline can be complementary to other export routes [50]. Nowadays, there is a big potential and opportunity for the other Eastern Mediterranean countries to adapt and use RES together with the achievement of energy efficiency and proper energy usage locally. Due to the latest technological developments, all countries in the Eastern Mediterranean could benefit from such a great opportunity. In the past, it was mainly the hydropower potential exploited in Greece, Turkey and Egypt, while today all countries have taken actions to include RES in their energy mix. For that, it is necessary for each country to apply socio-economic reforms supported by a proper strategy that can optimize energy economics and management, rationalize energy pricing structures and secure new financing instruments to deal with renewable energy development and energy efficiency actions. In the Eastern Mediterranean Basin, the potential for energy production from RES is significant due to the temperate climate with mild winters and warm and sunny summers. Larger wind potentials have been studied to be installed in the Aegean Sea in Greece as indicated by satellite data sets and climate modelling. Offshore installations can generally extract more kinetic energy from the lower atmosphere than onshore installations in large-scale wind farms. Around 100 GW are currently installed in Eastern Mediterranean countries, however the prospects are for more. Solar resources are of particular interest in Mediterranean countries due to the high mean solar irradiance in the region. Solar radiation

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10000 8000 6000 4000 2000 0 Cyprus

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Fig. 4.6 Installed wind and solar PV power in Mediterranean countries (2019) (Source Author, 2022 [based on data retrieved from Irena [52]])

changes from north to south in the Mediterranean Basin, with annual average values of 150–250 W m−2 , and 1300–2000 kWh m−2 yr−1 [51, pp. 273–274] (Fig. 4.6). The primary energy consumption in the Mediterranean region is expected to grow a lot until 2040 driven by economic development, demographic growth and rapid urbanization, and this will create a critical challenge to energy security. In particular, energy experts think that energy consumption may double by 2040 in the Southern Mediterranean countries and electricity consumption may even triple. In addition, carbon dioxide emissions are expected to increase by almost 45% for all regions and more than double in the Southern Mediterranean. It is seen as necessary to reach a new energy system based on a partnership between renewable energies and natural gas for the Mediterranean region, with NG to be the only fossil fuel to increase its consumption, especially for the southern part of the Mediterranean, which may see NG as the main component of the energy mix for the future. For that, gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean can contribute to improving the energy security of the countries—particularly for Egypt and Israel, which can meet their future local gas needs. The higher energy consumption in the region affects the energy security, since local needs work against any hydrocarbon exports. Furthermore, climate change in the Mediterranean Sea is expected to have a high impact, and thus updated policies and capital investments are required in order to be able to adapt properly. Critical actions for an effective strategy

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need to take into consideration energy efficiency issues and the development of RES. The integration of RES with energy storage solutions and the digitalization of energy systems are the highest-priority issues to be dealt with. The peculiarity and sensitivity of the Mediterranean region regarding climate change make the integration of a power system more critical, due to higher electricity consumption, the development of RES, higher NG consumption and unforeseen weather conditions. It is foreseen that the main share of power generation capacity will be produced from RES until 2030. Bearing in mind how critical NG is for the Eastern Mediterranean region, the integration between electricity and gas networks has to be seen as “a cooperative platform able to foster energy transition”. Seamless and capable access to natural resources is related to energy security, especially in the current unforeseen international environment. In Europe there is the expressed desire for the use of green energy and full transition to RES by 2050 [53]. However, hydrocarbon and in particular NG are expected to continue as critical means of competition as a strategic energy source. Under these circumstances, the EU and their energy suppliers are interdependent and thus energy resources are seen as a strategic policy tool to be used. In the case of the Eastern Mediterranean region, the discovery of significant hydrocarbon reservoirs changed the priorities and energy strategy of the neighbouring countries. In particular, Greece and Cyprus as EU member states need to adopt and implement the general EU policy for reduced use of fossil fuels; Israel and Egypt should continue with the successful management of finding and pumping NG from their subsoil, but also exploration to find other deposits in the area. Turkey, meanwhile, continues to seek greater involvement in such activities, not only in areas of its own responsibility but also in other disputed areas of the wider Eastern Mediterranean. However, this situation causes maritime border disputes and geopolitical conflicts between the countries of the region. Cross-border hydrocarbon resources are under study and consequently the degree to which NG reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean can finally work as an alternative to Russian NG. The redefinition of priorities by the last few US administrations and their reduced interest in the Eastern Mediterranean provide the opportunity to other stakeholders, and in this case Turkey, to fill such a strategic gap. However, recent developments in the Ukraine issue and the attempt to isolate Russia from the international

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political scene present a new opportunity for Turkey to strengthen its role as a rising power in the region. Diplomatic relations between Egypt and Turkey are not going through their best period, due to Turkey’s political support for the opposition party in the Arab Republic. In addition, Turkey’s attempt to emerge as a regional power seems to have pushed Egypt to strengthen its relations with the rest of the region and at the same time participate in new regional cooperation schemes, both in terms of energy and politics. For that, Egypt initiated a process of developing strategically significant, trilateral economic and security cooperation with Greece and Cyprus, and the LNG marketing scheme formed one part of Cairo’s larger regional approach. The recently announced “Abraham Accords” [54] were a great initiative aimed at normalizing the diplomatic relations between Israel and the Arab countries of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), as well as Morocco and Sudan. This agreement obviously works towards changing the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East landscape. Moreover, in February 2021, Egypt’s Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Tarek El Molla, visited Israel five years after the last government official visit by Egypt to the country. The discussions between the two ministers were a milestone that further supported the normalization of relations between Israel and the other Arab countries. In terms of energy, Egypt’s energy relationship with Israel would form a solid foundation for multilateral energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean through the EMGF framework.

4.3

Vulnerabilities and Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean

The Mediterranean Sea is the largest of all and it was even close to being called an ocean, while it is separated from the Atlantic Ocean by the Straits of Gibraltar. The water temperature increases from west to east, while there is approximately a 10-degree Celsius difference between winter and summer periods [55]. In the wider Mediterranean region, a consistent warming trend was found in the period 1982–2016. It has been noted that even though the Mediterranean Sea is a relatively small and semiclosed basin, the Mediterranean Sea Surface Temperature (SST) should

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not be taken as a uniform field because there is a significant spatial variability, depending on the time of year, in which the summer SST has higher values [56, p. 7–8]. Furthermore, it is predicted that there will be a continuous increase in the mean temperature of about 1–3 °C in the next three decades, 3–5 °C by mid-century and 3.5–7 °C by the end of the century. This means that the Eastern Mediterranean region will probably experience a faster rate of warming than the global mean rate of 2.8 °C by the end of the century [57, p. 2] (Fig. 4.7). The expected changes in temperature are predicted to cause changes in energy consumption in the Eastern Mediterranean region, during both extreme warm and cold weather conditions. The energy intensity will reach its peak during a period when continuous and large-scale air conditioning will be needed to provide comfortable living conditions. It is expected that along the Northern Mediterranean coast an extra period of two to five weeks per year of air conditioning will be required up to 2100. This will lead to a high increase in energy demand, especially during the warm and dry summers in the near future, which may happen together with water scarcity during that period; this may cause additional challenges and problems to deal with, since a lack of water usually reduces the energy production by hydroelectric plants. In addition, these conditions will occur at the same time as a growing demand for desalinated water will come. In the Eastern Mediterranean region an increasing

Fig. 4.7 Observed (black) and calculated (red) temperature trends in the Mediterranean (Source [57, 58])

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disparity in power supply will occur, while there will be a greater demand for state-of-the-art solutions, such as the co-generation of heat and power by using natural gas, and desalination of seawater by using solar power, among others [57, p. 12]. The Eastern Mediterranean is considered a climatic hot spot, which is primarily an area where the effects of the climate crisis are felt significantly more than the global average. At the same time, apart from climate change effects, other processes are also occurring such as desertification and population growth in the same region. In order to effectively deal with such challenges, regional cooperation on climate change is vital to the success of overcoming the climate crisis, because it will not be possible for countries to do it on their own and thus international assistance is very much required. Some of the main challenges for the Eastern Mediterranean include: • High energy needs, with peaks during summer months. • Water shortages, mostly dealt with by the desalination process and reuse of sewage water. • Forest fires during warm summers, air quality and extreme precipitation events. • There are many vulnerable groups, including the poor, the elderly, those working outside or with pre-existing conditions, and immigrants. General recommendations for a Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy include considering climate change as an internal ingredient of the national strategic threat and readiness for extreme events; climate-adapted planning; higher ecosystem sustainability; better meteorological forecasting; social resilience; usage of electric vehicles; and usage of renewable energy sources.

References 1 The World Bank. (2021). https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?sou rce=2&country=TUR,GRC,EGY,CYP,ISR,LBN,SYR,JOR. Last accessed 12 November 2021. 2 Sonnino, T. (1977). A national energy policy for Israel. Energy, 2(2), 141– 148. https://doi.org/10.1016/0360-5442(77)90040-8 3 The World Bank. (2021). https://databank.worldbank.org/source/popula tion-estimates-and-projections. Last accessed 12 November 2021.

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4 The World Bank. (2017). https://data.worldbank.org/. Last accessed 12 May 2017. 5 U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2022, February). https://www. eia.gov/international/analysis/regions-of-interest/Eastern_Mediterranean. Last accessed 21 February 2022. 6 Nourzhanov, K. (2006). Caspian oil: Geopolitical dreams and real issues. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 60, 59–66. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/10357710500494499 7 The World Bank. (2021). https://data.worldbank.org/country/EG. Last accessed 15 December 2021. 8 Energy Information Administration. (2022, February). https://www.eia. gov/international/analysis/country/EGY. Last accessed 22 February 2022. 9 IRENA. (2021). https://www.irena.org/IRENADocuments/Statistical_Pro files/Africa/Egypt_Africa_RE_SP.pdf. Last accessed 21 February 2022. 10 Arab Republic of Egypt, Ministry of Petroleum & Mineral Resources. (2022). https://www.petroleum.gov.eg/en/gas-and-petrol/discovery-sea rch-production/Pages/gas.aspx. Last accessed 22 February 2022. 11 ENI. (2022). https://www.eni.com/en-IT/operations/egypt-zohr.html. Last accessed 22 February 2022. 12 U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2013). https://www.eia. gov/international/analysis/regions-of-interest/Eastern_Mediterranean. Last accessed 23 February 2022. 13 Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development. (2022). https://www. arabfund.org/default.aspx?pageId=457. Last accessed 22 February 2022. 14 The World Bank. (2021). https://data.worldbank.org/country/GR. Last accessed 15 December 2021. 15 IRENA. (2022). https://www.irena.org/IRENADocuments/Statistical_Pro files/Europe/Greece_Europe_RE_SP.pdf. Last accessed 19 January 2022. 16 Greek Hydrocarbons. (2022). https://www.greekhydrocarbons.gr/index_ gr.html. Last accessed 19 January 2022. 17 EC. (2020). https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/news-events/newsroom/transadriatic-pipeline-enters-operational-phase. Last accessed 11 March 2022. 18 US Department of State. (2022). https://www.state.gov/signing-of-pro tocol-of-amendment-to-the-mutual-defense-cooperation-agreement-withgreece/. Last accessed 18 February 2022. 19 The World Bank. (2021). https://data.worldbank.org/country/JO. Last accessed 15 December 2021. 20 IRENA. https://www.irena.org/IRENADocuments/Statistical_Profiles/ Middle%20East/Jordan_Middle%20East_RE_SP.pdf. Last accessed 27 January 2022.

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21 IRENA. https://www.irena.org/publications/2021/Feb/Renewables-Rea diness-Assessment-The-Hashemite-Kingdom-of-Jordan. Last accessed 22 February 2022. 22 The World Bank. (2021). https://data.worldbank.org/country/LB. Last accessed 15 December 2021. 23 U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2022). https://www.eia.gov/int ernational/overview/country/lbn. Last accessed 05 February 2022. 24 Lebanese Petroleum Administration. (2022). https://www.lpa.gov.lb/eng lish/oil-amp-gas/major-developments. Last accessed 05 February 2022. 25 Massader. (2022). http://www.massader.ps/en/project/1518343423. Last accessed 05 February 2022. 26 IRENA. (2022). https://www.irena.org/IRENADocuments/Statistical_ Profiles/Middle%20East/State%20of%20Palestine_Middle%20East_RE_SP. pdf. Last accessed 29 January 2022. 27 The World Bank. (2021). https://data.worldbank.org/country/SY. Last accessed 15 December 2021. 28 U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2022). https://www.eia.gov/int ernational/analysis/country/SYR. Last accessed 18 February 2022. 29 IRENA. (2022). https://www.irena.org/IRENADocuments/Statistical_ Profiles/Middle%20East/Syrian%20Arab%20Republic_Middle%20East_RE_ SP.pdf. Last accessed 12 January 2022. 30 Aras, B., & Akarçe¸sme, S. (2012). Turkey and the Arab Spring. International Journal, 67 (1), 39–51. https://doi.org/10.1177/002070201206700104 31 Euractiv. (2017). https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/theyear-in-review-the-most-popular-euractiv-articles-videos-of-2017/. Last accessed 11 March 2022. 32 EC. (2020). https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/connecting-europe-facility/cefenergy/7.1.1-0015-tr-s-m-18. Last accessed 11 March 2022. 33 Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources. (2022). https://enerji. gov.tr/homepage. Last accessed 19 January 2022. 34 Bilgin, M. (2015). Turkey’s energy strategy: Synchronizing geopolitics and foreign policy with energy security. Insight Turkey, 17 (2), 67–81. https:// www.insightturkey.com/file/253/turkeys-energy-strategy-synchronizinggeopolitics-and-foreign-policy-with-energy-security-spring-2015-vol17-no2 35 Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources. (2021). https://enerji. gov.tr/news-detail?id=10837. Last accessed 21 January 2021. 36 Jabour, J. (2021). France vs. Turkey in the EastMed a geopolitical rivalry between a “Keeper” of the old order and a challenging emergent power. IFRI. https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/jabbour_france_ vs_turkey_eastmed_2021.pdf. Last accessed 11 November 2021. 37 European Parliament. (2021). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/doc ument/E-9-2020-003726_EN.html. Last accessed 19 December 2021.

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38 Nurieva, G. (2017). Natural gas factor in Israel–Turkey–Russia “Energy Triangle”. Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 4(1), 102–129. https://doi.org/10.26513/tocd.306752 39 Delanoe, I. (2013). Cyprus, a Russian foothold in the changing Eastern Mediterranean. Middle East Review of International Affairs, 15(2), 84– 94. https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/cyprus-russian-footholdchanging-eastern/docview/1448006737/se-2 40 US Embassy in Greece. (2021). https://gr.usembassy.gov/statement-oneast-med-energy-cooperation/. Last accessed 28 December 2021. 41 US Embassy in Greece. (2021). https://gr.usembassy.gov/joint-declar ation-between-cyprus-greece-israel-and-the-u-s-after-the-6th-trilateral-sum mit/. Last accessed 28 December 2021. 42 East Mediterranean Gas Forum. (2021). https://emgf.org/. Last accessed 19 December 2021. 43 European Commission. (2021). https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countr ies-and-regions/regions/euro-mediterranean-partnership/. Last accessed 19 December 2021. 44 Cavatorta, F., & Rivetti, P. (2014). EU–MENA relations from the Barcelona process to the Arab Uprisings: A new research agenda. Journal of European Integration, 36. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2014.922237 45 Radwan, S., & Reiffers, J. L. (2005). The Euro-Mediterranean partnership 10 years after Barcelona: Achievements and perspectives. https://www.res earchgate.net/publication/238787824_The_Euro-Mediterranean_Partner ship_10_years_after_Barcelona_Achievements_and_Perspectives 46 Union for the Mediterranean. (2021). https://ufmsecretariat.org/. Last accessed 19 December 2021. 47 European Parliament. (2022). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/ etudes/STUD/2017/578044/EXPO_STU(2017)578044_EN.pdf. Last accessed 18 December 2022. 48 Euro-lex. (2022). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/ PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R0347&from=en. Last accessed 19 January 2022. 49 DEPA. (2022). https://www.depa.gr/international-infrastructures/?lan g=en. Last accessed 19 January 2022. 50 European Commission. (2021). https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/connec ting-europe-facility/cef-energy/7.3.1-0025-elcy-s-m-15. Last accessed 29 January 2022. 51 Drobinski, P., Azzopardi, B., Ben Janet Allal, H., Bouchet V., Civel, E., Creti, A., Duic, N., Fylaktos, N., Mutale, J., Pariente-David, S., Ravetz, J., Taliotis, C., & Vautard, R. (2020). Energy transition in the Mediterranean. In W. Cramer, J. Guiot, & K. Marini (Eds.), Climate and environmental change in the Mediterranean Basin—Current situation and risks

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CHAPTER 5

Conceptual Framework and Research

5.1

General

This chapter will use the insights from the disciplines of energy, security and international relations to examine the correlation between the national security and energy security of a state under the broader concept of the International Political Economy (IPE). Finally, a conceptual framework is proposed that can serve as a model for future reports and as a methodological tool for study by researchers and scholars in such fields like energy and security. The state is regarded as the main—but not the only—actor in international politics, which is one of the basic principles of the theory of realism. Realism may be seen as a dominant theory that focuses on high politics and security issues and it is adopted as the prism for the analysis that takes place herein. It is necessary to point out that the security of the global environment is continuously changing at an increasingly rapid pace, especially from the beginning of the new century, while there are new factors and parameters that are included in the contemporary challenges that security confronts [1]. In order to achieve a deep and thorough understanding of contemporary issues related to policy, economy, society and technology, the International Political Economy (IPE) approach may contribute significantly to this effort, since it combines specialized sciences such as politics, economics and international relations. The IPE helps us to understand © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Flouros, Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09603-7_5

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how politics affects the economy and how the economy affects politics, and it has been developed due to the fact that several global issues cannot be explained within a conventional framework of knowledge. The IPE has very quickly become one of the main categories of international relations in the broader political sciences area. It is seen as one of the most challenging and promising areas of international relations that can describe and explain successfully the international system through a holistic interpretation. The IPE is considered a science with dual characteristics: the economic science that covers the fields of macro- and micro-economy up to international trade, while at the same time it is the political science of international relations. The strong initial relation between the IPE and economic theory is also one of the main contributions that the IPE has made to international studies. There is a lot of discussion about whether the theory of international relations includes the IPE or vice versa, which may be more likely if economists include in their analysis the theory of international relations. It would be helpful to make a short reference to the basic theoretical approaches of the IPE, since the political economy (PE) of international relations (IR) is complicated, while at the same time there is a need to protect national interests within a balanced power system. The whole political economy has been built and established upon the notion of rational behaviour of the individual, and economists accept that such rational behaviour cannot be anything other than the egoistic intention of man to maximize his individual interest. Economic theory can be seen mainly as a challenge of optimization—in other words, a challenge in terms of better usage of limited resources; a dynamic macroeconomic pattern assesses the operation of an economy during a period and in such a pattern there are some key variables (which are the means of the economic policy and they are called “control variables”) and the aim is to make an optimum choice of those key variables as a function of time. Realists support the nature of competitiveness in international relations and they also refer to the absence of legalized distributive justice institutions. They have tried to examine and study the multifunctionality of the international system and order, the difference and duality of the causes and aims of the war that are included between the international institutions and international politics. If one considers the political science of

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international relations to be close to Thucydides’s work and view,1 three levels of analysis can be seen: the human, the state and the international system. During the twentieth century there were too many conflicts and clashes that occurred among and between internationalist movements; communists, liberalists and others unfortunately did not finally contribute a lot to maturity of thought in relation to the international scene and practice. One explanation for this could be that none of these movements followed the three levels of analysis mentioned above herein, which could have helped them avoid mistakes in their implementation at that time. According to Waltz [2], “theory is just representing things that had happened and it only portrays events”, and he finally claims that a theory “constructs a reality, but no one can ever say that it is the reality” [3]. Especially for the struggle for power, Waltz sees it as not an end in itself, but a means of pursuing politics and thus he believes that power is defined as: a. Control over resources. b. Control over others. c. Control over outcomes. Waltz realizes that power is always relative: a factor is powerful only if it affects others more than it is affected by others, so he chooses to define the term “power” by using the first of the three definitions, namely the one referring to control over resources. Moreover, he clarifies that among nations’ competition the important factor is the total power, which is seen by contemporary scholars of realism as “hard power”. States are ranked at a proper level depending on how they are classified in all of the following elements: population size and land area, natural resources, economic capabilities, military power, political stability and ability [4]. Waltz tried to save the overlap between realist theory and the boundaries of the discipline of international relations through his efforts to deal with the turmoil of the discipline by restricting the global ‘net’ to its classical international component. At the same time, realists started to reconsidering basic aspects of their theory in an attempt to fit themselves better into the international system and thus these “realist theories became part

1 The Melian Dialogue is given in Appendix A.

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of a different branch of international relations, if not a different discipline, namely IPE” [5]. Following the political realism theory and the “scientific discipline” approach, there are also some other important scholars, including: • Stephen Krasner and Robert Gilpin: they had studied and explained the causes of the war and more specifically the factors that existed between international institutions and states concerning equal transactions, including economic ones. • Susan Strange: she had raised serious concerns over, and objections against, the post-modern ideas and theories that were expressed in the academic community in that period. She has been successful in supporting and establishing her view of the need for a holistic consideration of international political and economic issues. • Grieco [6, p. 485] indicates that “realism has dominated international relations theory at least since World War II, and for realists, international anarchy fosters competition and conflict among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate even when they share common interests”. According to Grieco [7, p. 602], one fundamental realistic insight is that nation states can be seen as positional in character, which means that the realism approach is a deep-rooted trend in nation states in order to evaluate their level of achievement in any area such as military power, industrial prowess or educational excellence, by comparing their own performance to the performance of others. Liberal scholars seem to follow an old view on how to see universal harmony of interests, which is a position that hides hegemonic aspirations of power of each dominant hegemonic power. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye may disagree with some realists regarding the nature of international institutions and the hegemonic role of the great powers. However, they seem to agree with the main theory of realism concerning the characteristics of the international system and the effect of the power on the international stage. They also seem to agree with the main realistic view that international institutions are affected by power and they are institutions of order and not of justice. Constructivism has mainly appeared to be a mainstream research approach in IR and a criticism against realism, while it is currently seen as

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one of the main theories in IR on a global scale. Constructivism refers to international hierarchy and states’ struggle, while it considers the international system as a whole. Furthermore, it believes that the capitalist system leads to the underdevelopment of the developing countries [8, p. 112]. Based on the theoretical background presented herein and the three main approaches to international relations, the theory of realism is seen as the most appropriate one as it can better describe the geopolitical phenomena that take place on the international stage, while it also interprets with greater clarity the real economic and political world. In the contemporary era where globalization has affected the relationships between states and countries there is an increasing economic integration and interdependence among them. In the IPE, the global socio-economic actions can only be comprehended by acknowledging the complex interaction between markets and states and domestic decision-making and international relations. In summary, realism is considered a holistic approach that, unlike other theories, simplifies reality and thus there is always a likelihood of ignoring—intentionally or not—some other factors that might play an important role in decision-making. However, such limitations apply to social theories [9]. Realism adds a comprehensive and scientific view to the critical aspects of international politics and specifically issues related to the behaviour of a state; thus, it is considered the most suitable theory for power and security issues since they are of vital interest for the survival of a sovereign state.

5.2

The Conceptual Framework

A systematic procedure to study complex public policy issues can be established through a proper policy analysis. The main scope is to help policymakers to select a convenient range of actions by clarifying the problem and addressing any alternative solutions. In most real-world policy situations, there are many possible alternatives, many uncertainties, many stakeholders and many consequences of interest. In addition, there is not only one decision-maker and little chance of obtaining agreement on a single set of preferences among the consequences. Thus, there is no way to identify an optimal solution. In contrast, policy analysis uses a variety of tools to develop relevant information and propose it to the stakeholders that participate in the policymaking process in a way that helps them to make a decision. It is a problem-oriented approach that

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does not presume a model structure for assessing the consequences of a policy or ranking the alternatives [10]. One of the main challenges facing social science studies and research is the path forward from “casual theories to scientific knowledge”, and a critical factor for the success of this process is being able to view and consider the external world through the lens of “models” where the areas of study and interest are represented as “variables” that are connected with the usage of “theories” [11]. There are eight types of analysis in the political sciences, each one for a different scope (Table. 5.1). It is a usual practice during research to use predictions in order to structure proper tests for hypotheses; these predictions frame phenomena where the independent variable may finally work provided that the hypothesis works. Such phenomena enclose observable areas of the dependent variable or intervening variables. In other words, any difference between hypotheses and predictions is not due to their nature but rather to the application that they are used for. The experiments that take place in social sciences are very rarely feasible and thus the main method used for assessing the theory is usually observation. Finally, largen methods do not permit as many strong tests as case studies do; case studies are few and far between and consequently are recorded in more depth. In general, case studies serve five types of purpose: testing a theory, building a new theory, identifying previous and existing conditions and Table 5.1 Types of analysis in political sciences Type of analysis

Scope

Theory proposing

It advances a new hypothesis, and then a deductive agreement from this hypothesis is derived It uses empirical evidence to evaluate existing theory. The evidence can take place through a large-n analysis of a case study It evaluates existing theoretical and empirical literature on the subject It evaluates current or future public policies It uses theory to explain the pattern of historical cases It evaluates the factual and theoretical beliefs It applies theories to extrapolate the future world from current events It can be either contemporary or historical

Theory testing

Literature assessing Policy evaluative Historical explanatory (rare) Historical evaluative (rare) Predictive Descriptive Source Author, 2019 [based on 12]

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explaining cases of internal significance. Case studies usually offer two main methods for managing the effect of omitted variables, which can be summarized as follows [12, pp. 28–69]: a. There are tests of predictions of within-case variances. b. There are cases for study which are selected with non-ordinary values. For the examined cases of both Cyprus and Israel, the independent variable of ES is considered to be of extremely high importance nowadays, especially after the recent discoveries of HydroCarbons (HX CY ) in the Eastern Mediterranean region for these countries. It is the theory that supports choosing such a type for the assessment when cases with extreme—very high or very low—values of the standard variable are selected. Case studies applied in the social sciences are not as decisive as in the hard sciences, but this is not due to any weakness in the use of case studies as a method but rather to the difficult nature of social science data and the complexity of social phenomena [12, pp. 58–67]. In general, there can be more ways of linkage between causal and caused variables. An example can be considered where there are two chains of causation that relates variables A and B, and thus a three-chain theory is possible to be derived (Fig. 5.1): It is interesting to note that a theory that cannot be arrow-diagrammed is not a theory and needs reframing to become a theory. There are several criteria for a theory to be proven to be a good one, such as [12, pp. 15– 21]: a. It has a large explanatory power or else the theory’s independent variable causes and affects a large number of phenomena under a large range of conditions. b. It is simple. c. It satisfies our curiosity and thus it is explanatory. d. It is clearly framed (meaning that we need to find/specify any intervening variables, such as m and n), which allows testing and application. e. Exceptions need to be stated; otherwise, the theory might not be well-framed.

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Fig. 5.1 Chain theory example (Source Author (2019) (based on Van Evera, 1997: 89–95 [12]))

f. It explains important phenomena and investigates what concerns the wider world. g. It has prescriptive welfare—which can be reached by identifying dangers that could be avoided—and it can finally produce policy propositions. Trying to design and structure a theory is not always a well-defined process but it relies a lot on the researcher and the case/circumstances. One can probably create a theory by induction, deduction and borrowing theories from other fields [13]. In our case of the countries concerned in the next chapter, we can assume that the examined theory can be seen as coming from the options stated below [12, pp. 20–27]: • To study poorly explained cases using the current theory, “unknown causes must explain their outcome” and the challenge is to understand and explain them while studying the case. • Large n-data can be studied to find the relationship that connects the variables. The drawback of this approach is that a “new large-n data set is usually hard to assemble” so it is better to stick to “existing data sets” and thus it is advisable to “explore theories that use variables that others have already chosen to code”.

5

Casual theory

Hypothesis

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Empirical

Evaluation

Evaluation

test

of

of casual

hypothesis

theory

Scientific knowledge

Fig. 5.2 Road map to scientific knowledge (Source Author, 2019 [14] (based on Kellstedt & Whitten, 2013: 3–4))

A typical road map for translating a casual theory into scientific knowledge is given below in a diagrammatic flow chart (Fig. 5.2): A casual theory usually arises as a “tentative conjecture” of the causes of phenomena that attract our attention and curiosity. Then it is required to assess/test the theory and this takes place with the hypothesis, which is a “theory-based statement about a relationship that we expect to observe”. At this point it is very useful to note that for every hypothesis that is formed, there is also a “null hypothesis”, which is also a “theorybased statement” that is linked to what we observe in cases where there is no relationship (null) between the examined variables (IV and DV). Data collection through empirical tests follows, since they are necessary for the evaluation of the hypothesis—this is called “hypothesis testing”— in order to realize and prove whether the collected data support the hypothesis of the “corresponding null hypothesis”. Finally, if the hypothesis passes the assessment, then it becomes the prevailing/proved and thus consequently the examined theory [11, pp. 4–9]. A useful description concerning the path from theory to hypothesis can be diagrammatically presented as follows (Fig. 5.3): The above step from the theoretical-conceptual level to the empiricalmeasured level can take place either following cross-sectional design or time-series design. In the cross-sectional design, we focus on variation across spatial units in a single time unit; in international relations, the spatial unit is often the nation state. In regard to the study of the International Political Economy, it can be considered from the same

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Theoreticalconceptual level

IV (Concept)

DV Casual theory

Operationalization

Operationalization

IV

(Concept)

Hypothesis

DV (Measured)

(Measured)

Empiricalmeasured level

Fig. 5.3 Road map to hypothesis (Source Author, 2019 (based on Kellstedt & Whitten [11, 84–97])

view/angle as the economics, which means that there are no frequently seen measurement obstacles [11, pp. 84–97]. Conceptual Framework Stages The assessment and measurement of energy security are seen as a challenge that is related to several complexities and uncertainties of a political, economic, social and technological nature. It is not an easy task to make “certain methodological choices” for the assessment and measurement of energy security because of its “multitude of interpretations” [15, p. 147] and thus two different methodological approaches are suggested: i. The decision between perceptions and facts regarding “what constitutes a significant energy concern”; and

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ii. The decision between the generic and specific regarding “what is the appropriate level of detail of the assessment”. In order to consider a contemporary conceptual framework that can be used for future assessment and policy decisions, a summary of the suggested stages that are critical and necessary is given next [14]: a. Choice of IPE theory (realism, liberalism, other). b. Level of analysis (global, regional, nation state, other). c. Choice of timescale for the analysis (short, medium, long term). d. Decide what constitutes a significant ES and NS concern (perceptions and facts). e. Decide what is the appropriate level of detail of the assessment (generic and specific). f. Selection of definitions for the examined variables (ES, NS). g. Identification and selection of indicators for each variable. h. Description of vital systems2 (country, end-users, other). i. Identification of vulnerabilities (robustness, sovereignty, resilience). The above steps can be followed in sequence and each one leads to the next step in such a way that it contributes to the shape and required information that a thorough research may consist of. The above coherent process provides a well-defined frame, while at the same time intending to be as explanatory as possible for any analyst and scholar. Conceptual Framework Design It is suggested to consider methods of communication that have a clear qualitative aspect mainly due to the fact that energy security is “very much about context and perceptions” [15, pp. 164–165]. The following can be assumed [12, p. 8]: • A “causal law” where A causes B; in particular, it can be considered that ES causes NS.

2 A vital energy system is considered an energy system that is “critical for societies” while the term “system” means that it consists of “resources, materials, infrastructure, technologies, markets and other elements” (Cherp and Jewell, 2013: 150).

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• More specifically, in a casual law we can find four patterns: (a) direct causation, (b) reverse causation, (c) reciprocal causation and (d) selfundermined causation. In our case, the ES causes NS and NS causes ES. • A law can be deterministic or probabilistic where A causes B with a probability x. Based on the above and considering our assumption that we have a reciprocal causation law/relationship [14], then the probabilistic approach can be both ways: ES causes NS with a probability x, while NS causes ES with a probability y, so the theory that is framed/studied can be viewed as: ES → m → n → NS

(5.1)

where: • ES is the independent variable; • m and n are the intervening variables and each one can be comprised of other sub variables; • NS is the dependent variable. Thus, it is now possible to suggest that for the two variables, “Energy Security” and “National Security”, their relationship (function g , ) can be considered as: ( ) (5.2) National Security = g , Energy Security where: National Security can be used as the symbol NS and it can take values from a total NSi = {NS0 , NS1 , NS2 , . . . , NSi } (i > 1)

(5.3)

and Energy Security can be used as the symbol ES and it can take values from }( ) { (5.4) ESj = ES0 , ES1 , ES2 , . . . , ESj j > 1

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Furthermore, the specific parameters of each of the basic variables will be attempted to be included/operationalized. Thus, it might be possible to study the relationships between ES and the specific parameters of NSi ( ) g1 , g2 , . . . , gi for the variable of NS (5.5) ( ) f1 , f2 , f3 , ..., fj for the variable of ES

(5.6)

In other words, we can have the following: f1 : NSf10 , NSf11 , NSf12 , NSf13 , . . . , NSfi

(5.7)

f2 : NSf20 , NSf21 , NSf22 , NSf23 , . . . , NSf2i

(5.8)

f3 : NSf30 , NSf31 , NSf32 , NSf33 , . . . , NSf3i

(5.9)

fn : NSfn0 , NSfn1 , NSfn2 , NSfn3 , . . . , NSfni

(5.10)

The identification of specific parameters of basic variables [NSi , ESj ] takes place as the outcome of the design and analysis of a primary qualitative research. In the following figure, there has been a serious effort to correlate and combine the important parameters related to each of the examined variables—energy and national security—which will be helpful for the analysis and study. The dual relationship between the variables of NS and ES is defined as a separate function called “g´” that links them together [see above definition (5.2)] (Fig. 5.4). A conceptual framework may consider some other factors that are seen as important and affect the aforementioned variables. Such factors play a significant role and eventually influence the decision-making process. In this framework, the policymakers and policy process are seen as important since they can seriously affect the ES variable, while there is a link in this framework between the nation state and the NS variable. Subsequently, the International Political Economy (IPE) is also included in this broad conceptual framework as it is the theory in the background that affects and is affected by the nation state.

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Fig. 5.4 Conceptual framework (Source Author, 2019 based on [14])

5.3

The Research

At the beginning of a research, a reference to the design process and the steps that need to be followed is deemed necessary. Such a design and execution process is presented as a block diagram in Fig. 5.2 in Sect. 5.2. A subsequent process model regarding the design process in research is given in the following figure. It can be seen that the independent variable (ES) through several possible functions can cause an effect on the dependent variable (NS) either as a total (NSt ) or any of its subparameters or otherwise named indices (NSi ). The starting point is called the “casual theory” and the hypothesis that is best suited to describing such an initial relationship follows (Fig. 5.5). The use of statistics helps a lot in assessing the hypothesis, and more specifically the assessment refers to the “probability that the relationship we find could be due to random chance”, and if this does not happen (and this is supported by strong evidence) then the confidence of our hypothesis is also strong [11, p. 15].

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Theory (B)

ES

NS

NS1 NS2 NS3 NS4 … NSj

f1 f2 f3 f4 … fi Hypothesis

Fig. 5.5 Design and execution (Source Author, 2019 based on [14]))

Based on the previous analysis, it can be decided whether proper research needs to be designed and conducted or not. In that case, the identity of the research can be as follows: • The scope of the research: Examining the constructs “energy security” and “national security” and their interrelation through primary and secondary research methodologies. • Research objective: To identify the main set of indicators/parameters of each construct, validate the general conceptual framework, study the chosen cases [i.e. Israel and Cyprus], and understand any variances and deviations that might appear in comparison. • Research design: Integrated. • Research methodologies: Exploratory qualitative research up front, in order to accumulate good-quality, educated information on the subject matter; then quantitative analysis of secondary data, in order

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to create comparable data and extract conclusions on the chosen cases [i.e. Israel and Cyprus].

References 1 Krishna, N. Hensel (2012). An economic and national security perspective on critical resources in the energy sector. In S. F. Krishna-Hensel (ed). New Security Frontiers: Critical Energy and the Resource Challenge. Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 2 Waltz, K. (1991). Realist Thought and Neorealist Thought in Robert Rothstein (ed), The Evolution of Theory in International Relations. University of South Carolina 3 Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesley. 4 Waltz, K. (2011) International Politics Theory. Poiotita. 5 Guzzini, S. (2003). Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy. Routledge. 6 Grieco, J. M. (1988). Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: A realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism. International Organization., 42, 85–507. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027715 7 Grieco. (n.d.). Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation: Analysis with an Amended Prisoner’s Dilemma Model. The Journal of Politics., 50(3), 600–624. https://doi.org/info:doi/. 8 Adler, E. (2013). Constructivism in international relations: Sources, contributions, and debates. Handbook of International Relations, 2, 112–144. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446247587.n5 9 Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Norton. 10 Walker, W. E. (2000). Policy analysis: A systematic approach to supporting policymaking in the public sector. J. Multi-Crit. Decis. Anal., 9, 11– 27. https://doi.org/10.1002/1099-1360(200001/05)9:1/3%3c11::AIDMCDA264%3e3.0.CO;2-3 11 Kellstedt, P. M., & Whitten, G. D. (2013). The Fundamentals of Political Science Research (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. 12 Van Evera, S. (1997). Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Cornell University Press. 13 Shively, W., & P. (1990). The Craft of Political Research (3rd ed., pp. 163– 166). Englewood Cliffs. 14 Flouros, F. (2019). A Literature review. In P. Sklias, S. Roukanas and F. Flouros, (eds). The Political Economy of National and Energy Security. NY: Nova Science Publishers.

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15 Cherp, A., & Jewell, J. (2013). Energy security assessment framework and three case studies. In M. Trombetta and H. Dyer (eds.), International Handbook of Energy Security. Cheltenham Glos, Edward Elgar Publishing.

CHAPTER 6

Case Studies

6.1

General

The decision to study two of the Eastern Mediterranean countries, Israel and Cyprus, was mainly driven by the fact that they have many similarities between them: they are of comparable size in terms of land area; they are both located in the same Eastern Mediterranean region, which is of primary importance for global and regional geopolitical reasons, they have both been continuously trying to secure their sovereignty and establish their territory in a hostile environment. Last but not least, both countries are concerned about their national security and they have been very sensitive about issues related to that since the middle of the last century.

6.2

The Case of Israel

Over the last few decades, Israel has experienced a complex and unstable geopolitical environment. In addition to controversy with the Palestinian Authority, Lebanon and Syria, Israel has been facing the rest of the Arab world, which is also an important factor in the energy grid [1, pp. 4– 8]. The problematic relations between Israel and Arab countries have always been a critical obstacle to the country exploring more options that could have contributed to its energy security. Moreover, this has strongly affected the full participation of constructors and global players in cooperating with Israel since they have not wanted to harm their business © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Flouros, Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09603-7_6

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relation with the Arab world while doing business in the Middle East region. However, the diplomatic scene has changed and the diplomatic relations between Israel and the Arab countries of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have been normalized; the recently announced “Abraham Accords” [2] were a great initiative too and they are obviously working towards changing the landscape of the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. Moreover, it is known that the Israeli government has reached an agreement with Cyprus to make use of airfields providing potential strategic depth in the event of an escalation regarding the Iranian question. There is a focus on the risks in the region along with some of the potential that can be learned for Israel, Cyprus and other countries. Analysis of the Country The country is bordered by Lebanon to the north, Syria to the north-east, Jordan to the east, Egypt to the south-west and the Mediterranean Sea to the west (Fig. 6.1). The width of the country, from the Mediterranean Sea in the west to the Dead Sea in the east, can be crossed by car in about 90 min, while the trip from the far north to the country’s southern point may take about nine hours by car [3]. Basic indicators for the country as of 2020 [4] are as follows: • • • • •

Surface area: 22,070 sq km Population: 9.21 million GDP: US$407.1 billion FDI: US$17.3 billion in 2019 Military expenditure: 5.6% GDP

Based on the CIA’s World Factbook (2022) [6], the main historical milestones from the formation of the state of Israel after WWII are as follows: • 1948: Declaration of the state of Israel. • 1967: The six-day war where Israel defeated Jordan and captured the West Bank, defeated Egypt and captured the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula, and defeated Syria and captured the Golan Heights.

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Fig. 6.1 Map of Israel (Source US Energy Information Administration, 2022 [5])

• • • •

1973: Yon Kippur war. 1977: Egypt recognized the state of Israel. 1982: Israel invaded Lebanon against the PLO. 1993: The Oslo Accords, which gave the Palestinian National Authority the right to govern parts of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. • 2011: Cyprus came into a Delimitation Agreement with Israel, even though Israel had not signed UNCLOS yet.

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The following PEST analysis for the case of Israel focuses on some of the main topics of the country; it is not a detailed and exhaustive analysis, but a coherent one with focus on particular points. PEST Analysis Political: Israel is a parliamentary democracy with a 120-member parliament, known as “the Knesset”. The prime minister, who is usually the chair of the largest party, is elected by the parliament and he is the head of the government and head of the cabinet. The Basic Laws of Israel function as an uncodified constitution. Since the formation of the state of Israel in 1948, all governments—except for one case—have consisted of party coalitions with all the implications of this in the political life of a place [6]. The state of Israel is divided into six main administrative districts, known as “mehozot”, which are the Central, Haifa, Jerusalem, Northern, Southern and Tel Aviv districts, as well as the Judea and Samaria Area in the West Bank (although the Judea and Samaria Area is not recognized internationally as part of Israel). Economic: Israel has managed the recent health pandemic extremely well, with a successful vaccination campaign and timely and effective support from the government and its central bank. In terms of the country’s economic policy, although the economy seems to be recovering rapidly, the risks to the outlook remain significant and therefore it has been proposed that economic policies should remain flexible. Despite the timely phasing out of pandemic-related measures, further targeted budget support and monetary easing are likely to be required in the event of increased risk. With regard to the current fiscal policy of the country, it is considered appropriate in general, while in the medium term it may proceed with reforms to ensure revenue that will support spending in order to increase productivity and rebuild fiscal safeguards. There are still risks that need to be addressed and the most important ones are seen as the following: • Regional security/geopolitical tensions: they would hit the tourism sector and moreover business confidence and investment. • Tighter and more volatile global financial conditions: these may affect investments and inflows into the country. • A significant reversal in housing prices: impacts on household debt payments may occur through macroprudential policies. Local

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demand growth could fall significantly and particularly construction activity. • Inflation: the current inflationary pressures require vigilance and in the case of deterioration, then the monetary policy should be tightened accordingly. Medium-term policies should manage labour market constraints, raise barriers to product markets and promote climate targets. Social: Around 75% of the population are Jews from a diversity of Jewish backgrounds. Approximately 77% of Israeli Jews are born in Israel, 16% are immigrants from Europe and the Americas, and 7% are immigrants from Asia and Africa (including the Arab world). Technological: Israel has proven to be a high-tech country, with many companies being active in the IT industry. It looks like this trend will continue and there will be more growth to come. Some 87% of the population of the country were Internet users in 2019 [7]. The state broadcasting network, operated by the Israel Broadcasting Authority (IBA), broadcasts on two channels, one in Hebrew and the other in Arabic. Military and Security: 18 years of age for compulsory military service (Jews, Druze); both sexes are obligated to military service—conscript service obligation. In regard to the military expenditure of Israel, there was a period when military expenditure increased (2007–2014), while since 2014 it has been continuously declining and losing almost 1% of the GDP (2014–today) (Fig. 6.2). Even though the military expenditure as a percentage of the country’s GDP has been declining, however, the military expenditure in absolute figures (US$) has dramatically increased: it rose from US$7.95 bill in 1995 to US$16.52 bill in 2015, an increase of more than double. This was the result of the analogous increase in the GDP of the country within the same period, rising from US$100 bill in 1995 to US$300 bill in 2015, and even to the level of US$400 bill in 2020 [9].

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8 7

% GDP

6 5 4 3 2 2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Year

2017

2018

2019

2020

Fig. 6.2 Military expenditures of Israel (% GDP) (Source Based on the CIA Factbook, 2022 [8] at The World Factbook 2021. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2021. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/)

Energy Sector in Israel General In 2015, the energy intensity for Israel was 3.59 MJ per dollar of GDP— this is the most recent value as of 2022 [10]. Although Israel’s energy intensity has fluctuated substantially in recent years, it tended to decrease through the period 1996–2015, ending at 3.59 MJ per dollar of GDP in 2015 (Fig. 6.3). The evolution of the production, the primary energy supply and the final electricity consumption in Israel are also presented (Table 6.1): The main energy consumption for Israel during the year 2020 was mostly supplied by NG with 38%, by petroleum and other liquids with around 37%, by coal with 21% and by RES with 3%. Within the period 2005–2019, the energy consumption from coal decreased, while at the same time, the energy consumption from natural gas “grew more than fourfold” [12]. NG and Recent Discoveries The game-changer for the Mediterranean region and energy balance was a significant discovery in October 2010 of a big natural gas field offshore of Israel in the Levantine Basin in what Israel declares is its Exclusive

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Fig. 6.3 Energy intensity of primary energy (MJ/US$2011 GDP) for Israel (Source The World Bank, 2022 [11])

Table 6.1 Energy data for Israel (1990–2015)

Energy use (kg oil equivalent per capita) Fossil fuel energy consumption (% total) Electricity final consumption (kWh per capita)

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2460

2796

2899

2661

3042

2777

97.0

97.2

97.2

96.6

96.3

97.3

4176

5127

6323

6572

6953

6600

Source The World Bank (2022) [11]

Economic Zone (EEZ). The Tamar natural gas field off the coast of Northern Israel will continue to yield gas for Israel’s use. In the case of Israel, there has been a transformation from a state that was “dependent on imports to supply its energy” to a new state boasting “a growing natural gas industry”. The recent discoveries of natural gas fields provide new routes to having “adequate amounts of energy to meet domestic demand, while allowing the country to export excess volumes” [12]. The significant gas discovery in October 2010 in the Levantine Basin in Israel’s EEZ represents a critical change in shaping its energy policy. The

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Tamar field has been proven to cover about 10.5 trillion cubic feet (tcf), while Leviathan seems to be the most successful discovery in the history of Noble Energy (Noble, 2014), with an estimated average capacity of about 22 tcf of gas. Commercial sales from the Tamar deposit began as early as 2013, and gas reserves under Israeli waters seem to be quite recoverable, and capable of covering all of the country’s electricity generation needs for the next 40 years (Table 6.2). The gas produced both from the Karish and Tanin reservoirs will eventually supply the local market. The Israeli market is seen as one of the most rapidly growing NG markets in the world, with an annual increase in gas demand of around 15% during the period 2006–2016. The local consumption increased up to 384.7 bcf in 2018 and, according to the Adiri Committee report [15], consumption is expected to reach 504.8 bcm in 2025 and 910.7 bcm in 2042. The total consumption during the period 2018–2042 is estimated to reach 15.95 tcf. The operating company Energean [16] has concluded supply contracts that account for all of the proven reserves in the two fields at an annual production rate of 0.14 tcf (Fig. 6.4). Recent gas exploration in Israel’s territory is expected to cover the country’s needs for many years and it has been estimated that it will be able to provide as much as 73% of Israel’s energy supplies for the next 50 years if they are not exported [17, pp. 155, 156]. These discoveries have increased the importance of critical institutions, namely the antitrust authority and the judiciary, whose decisions, despite causing gas delays, Table 6.2 Gas fields in Israel Gas field

Discovery year

Proven reserves (tcf)

Production in 2020 (bcf/d)

Shareholders

Leviathan

2010

22

1.2

Tamar

2009

10.5

1.2

Tanin Karish Mari-B

2013 2011 2000

1.3 1–1.5 1

TBD TBD TBD

Noa

1999

0.2

TBD

Noble, Delek, others Noble, Isramco, others Energean Energean Tethys Sea partners Noble

Source Energean, 2022 [13, 14]; TBD: to be defined

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Fig. 6.4 Israeli Gas reservoirs (Source Israeli Ministry of Energy [14])

also indicate strongly that Israel’s economy is based on the foundations of competitive markets. In addition, they have strengthened Israel’s energy security while enhancing the state’s ability to improve its political and economic relations with neighbouring countries. Energy Policy Energy development is related to a country’s attempt to “use gas supply disruption to promote its foreign policy objectives”, which strengthens the idea of energy policy as a means of political sovereignty [18, pp. 114, 115]. In Israel, there is the Natural Gas Authority at the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources operating in accordance with the provisions of the Gas Sector Law (Ministry of Energy and Water Resources of Israel, 2015). The Israeli government is extremely receptive to international markets and

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should also deal with domestic price regulation. Based on the opportunities for the state of Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean region, the private sector could benefit from “trade and enhanced cooperation”. However, it seems that the country’s politicians have so far failed to respond accordingly and energy cooperation has been hampered several times due to serious political difficulties among the neighbouring countries of the region [19]. The regulatory situation in the Israeli energy sector remained almost stable for about 60 years until 2011, with Israel being entitled to 12.5% of the sale of energy supplies from licence holders beyond the usual corporate tax rate. This opportunity cost affected friendly licensing conditions for investors. Foreign investors who had concluded contracts with the state of Israel in the energy sector were in a high-risk situation because they lacked the ability to conclude energy contracts with the Arab states due to the Arab economic boycott [20]. In 2012, an inter-ministerial meeting examined Israel’s national gas policy. It was decided that gas exports could not exceed 500 bcm or else the “total export quota” should be less than that. If the quantities of natural gas permitted for export amount to 500 bcm or if five years have elapsed since the date of adoption of the Commission’s recommendations, then the government should reassess the situation “from the point of view of the supply of natural gas and the expected demand for gas for 25 years from that point in time as regards the need to update the total export quota”. The most important conclusions of the Tzemach Committee can be summarized as follows: • A generally accepted international government policy regarding the development and management of gas is a difficult matter. • Securing a long-term strategy in the field of energy is seen as necessary for the country. • The economic benefits for the national economy should be maximized. • It is important to build trusting relations with investors and improve any damage from the past, while the market environment should continue to be competitive. • The market should allow flexibility in the decision-making process, so that the legislator can intervene and regulate supply and demand issues.

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The Tzemach Committee announced that there would be upper limits on export programming [21]. More specifically, there is a different compensation according to stock size, starting from 50% for the largest (200 bcm and above) and reaching 75% for the smallest (25–100 bcm). In 2018, an inter-ministerial team reconsidered Israel’s gas export policy and suggested that an amount of 500 bcm of NG should be kept for local needs for security reasons, which does not affect the substantial amount of NG available for exports. Finally, in 2019, the Israeli government adopted the suggestion of the team [22]. A very important internal discussion on the exploration of hydrocarbons in Israel concerns the role of the state antitrust. In 2014, Israeli antitrust chief David Gilo announced that the Noble–Delek (US–Israel) consortium controlling Israel’s largest natural gas fields “was a cartel that will likely distort competition in the domestic natural gas market and thereby affecting prices for the Israeli consumer”. The decisions of the antitrust chief are binding, but according to a clause in antitrust law the Minister of the Economy gives exclusive authority to circumvent similar decisions taken by the head of the antitrust authority on sensitive strategic issues or serious diplomatic consequences. In 2015, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu announced the signing of an agreement with the Noble–Delek consortium, the key points of which relate to the introduction of a ceiling on the sale price of gas to Israeli companies, and the need for further investment in the Leviathan deposit of US$1.5 billion over the next two years, while over a five-year period there will be a restructuring of the shareholding of the major shareholders [23]. Later that year, the government approved a plan to increase the amount of natural gas produced by the Tamar deposit and the immediate further development of the Leviathan, Karish and Tanin gas fields. However, the Supreme Court of Israel caused further uncertainty and delay in the development of natural gas, based on decision 476, giving a period of one year to the government to bring stability to the energy market [24]. The recent agreement to sell all the rights of Karish and Tanin to the Greek company Energean [25] seems to strongly reject the oligopoly of Delek and Noble, opening the way for open competition among interested parties [25]. Apart from the exploitation of NG deposits, there is also considerable activity on the issue of the Arab Gas Pipeline (AGP), whose operation was previously interrupted due to political turmoil in Egypt. The first deliveries were expected in 2016, when the necessary pipeline operations

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had been completed. In the previous chapter, it was described that the AGP pipeline starts from El-Arish in Egypt and passes through Jordan and Syria, and from there, it also ends in Lebanon. Thought has been given to connecting the pipeline with Turkey, but the unstable environment in Syria does not support such an option for the next few years. The latest turmoil in Egypt has brought some degree of instability and a further decline in flow. In addition, there is another export pipeline from Egypt to Israel that departs from El-Ars in Ashkelon, but the available quantities have been intermittent over the last few years. The Israeli authorities had tried to establish a system for controlling gas prices in Israel in order to keep the cost of electricity under control. As a result, additional uncertainty was added and also keeping away new producers from entering into the country [26]. Gas from the Tamar Sahara could be used to meet Israel’s local needs, and there is always the possibility of exporting to Cyprus or somewhere else by using a floating natural gas liquefaction facility (FLNG) [1, pp. 4–8]. The options for Israel’s export of natural gas are hindered by some restrictions, the main ones being summarized as follows [27]: • Israeli energy policy in relation to exports is hampered by discontinuity and imperfections. • A point would always be the supply–demand and price being appropriate for exports. • The European Union is considering possibilities to reduce project costs. • The energy market in Europe is not friendly to intermediate server countries. The energy balance for Israel’s natural gas is presented in the table below together with export capabilities (Table 6.3). On the basis of a study on the development of energy policy and the capabilities of the state of Israel, there are approaches of different time horizons, such as [1, pp. 4–8]: • Short/Medium Term: NG liquefaction in cooperation with either Cyprus or Jordan (economic zone of Aqaba). It is a credible choice given the current state of Israel’s relations with its neighbours.

6

Table 6.3 Energy balance for NG use in Israel

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Supply of NG

Estimated quantity (bcm)

Expected resources (A) Of these, expected resources with probability above 90% Reserves and possible resources (B) Total resources (A + B) Total resources of NG for the design of policy Accumulated demand for NG for the period of 25 years Maximum allowable quantity for export

680 150 800 1480 950 450 500

Source Ministry of Energy of Israel, 2012 [28]

• Long Term: Construction of an FLNG terminal either in the Tamar field or Elliott, provided that a 250 km pipeline will be constructed to transport NG off the coast. With this option, Israel could face any “political and regulatory complications in the case of onshore, but also address the fear of losing national sovereignty and economic benefit to a third party”. The regional geopolitical complexity of the Eastern Mediterranean has already influenced progress in exporting gas to the region, and once regional conflicts are resolved, growth will increase significantly. According to Moty Kuperberg, Director of Oil and Gas at a shipping company, there is “an urgent need to promote the development of gas for safety reasons” [29]. Israel’s export choices should be selected if they are profitable and can convince investors of their commercial viability, and any progress in resolving the political differences in the region should be seen as an additional positive element [30, pp. 17, 18]. Overview Regional alliances and stakeholders play an important role. For example, the governments of Greece, Cyprus and Israel have been eager to strengthen their relations and cooperate more closely. But this is connected to the new shift in which Israel became a potential exporter while there is also a Greek company involved in the operations in the

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state of Israel. If one looks at the dynamics of it, the timing seems perfect and thus energy, instead of being a dividing element in the geopolitics, can become a connecting element. In regard to export scenarios that the state of Israel may consider for the future, Israel’s decision on how to export will be a very important one: via Cyprus and having a liquidation plant in Cyprus or via Turkey and investing more directly from the state’s treasury. Furthermore, even if one can be a net exporter, it can be seen that a country always has to deal with markets abroad for different reasons: because the sources are much cheaper; the fraction technology for the gas extraction might still be debatable; the politicians are sometimes unpredictable, etc. It looks as though there is a strong intention for the state of Israel to go a step further and invest in renewable energy sources and reduce the country’s dependence on fossil fuels. In the long term, this can give Israel again the diversification necessary not to rely only on limited sources of energy. This is expected to contribute to the country’s energy security and furthermore to its national security. Finally, the state of Israel should continue working closing with neighbouring allies and enhance collaborations in sectors such as energy and the military industry. After years of being alone because it was surrounded by countries that were hostile to it, it would be beneficial for the country to further strengthen recent cooperation schemes. Although the state of Israel is still not self-sufficient in terms of energy resources, it has nevertheless made great strides in developing and applying renewable energy (i.e. solar) and being able to use it in irrigation projects for food sufficiency in arid environments, which are also critical aspects for the country and society. Recent developments in the Israeli gas sector appear to be contributing positively to the country’s delisting of gas imports for its local needs, as until recently Israel has been relying on imports of gas from Egypt “for about 40% of its local needs”. Even taking into account the new gas fields, policy analysts and policymakers in Israel view the Egyptian gas agreement as a positive factor in maintaining peace with Egypt [31, pp. 312, 313].

6.3

The Case of Cyprus

The recent economic problems, after the global financial crisis that first appeared in 2008, weakened the country’s ability and brought up additional problems for the state to deal with and overcome. This is important

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when considering the national security of the country while Cyprus’s EU membership helps the country to raise issues and claim for its rights through European institutions and organizations. Regional conflicts in the Middle East have upgraded the geostrategic importance of Cyprus and remind other stakeholders in the region how important it is for a power to be physically present on the island. Thus involved stakeholders are encouraged to keep their forces on the island and prolong their presence more. Analysis of the Country Cyprus is an island located in the Mediterranean Sea, situated to the east of the Middle East Levant countries and south of Turkey. It is the thirdsmallest EU country in both terms of population and total area. The country has only a few natural resources, and thus it has been dependent on energy product imports to meet local demand for the society and the state. Basic indicators for the country as of 2020 [32] are as follows: • • • • •

Surface area: 9,250 sq km Population: 1.21 million GDP: US$24.61 billion FDI: US$25.93 billion in 2019 Military expenditure: 1.8% GDP

The recent discoveries of natural gas fields in Cyprus’s EEZ in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea created expectations that the energy status of the country could change and that this would be a game-changer as it is expected to contribute to other aspects, including the national security of the country (Fig. 6.5). Based on CIA’s Factbook (2022) [33], the main historical milestones of the republic of Cyprus after WWII are as follows: • 1960: State of Cyprus became independent after being a British colony. • 1963–1964: Tensions between the Greek Cypriot majority and Turkish Cypriot minority both present on the island.

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Fig. 6.5 Map of Cyprus (Source The World Factbook 2021. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2021. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/)

• 1974: Greek government-sponsored attempt to overthrow the elected president of Cyprus was met by military intervention from Turkey, which soon controlled more than a third of the island. • 1983: The Turkish Cypriot-administered area declared itself the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”), but it was recognized only by Turkey. • 1988: Cyprus ratified the European Charter of Local SelfGovernment. • 2004: UN-mediated agreement, the Annan Plan, failed to win approval by both communities. In the same year, the entire island entered the EU on 1 May 2004, although the EU acquis—the body of common rights and obligations—applies only to the areas under the internationally recognized government and is suspended in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots. • 2013: EU decisions led to Cyprus facing an extremely difficult economic situation and the country was obliged to face one of its “worst economic periods since the Turkish invasion of 1974” as “severe austerity measures have been imposed” on the country (GLI, 2019).

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The long-standing problem with the northern part of the island remains unsolved between Cyprus and Turkey, and it is the Cypriot problem that has dominated the relations between the two countries for the last 40 years. Turkey believes that the northern part of Cyprus is of geostrategic importance for at least two reasons: it affects Greek–Turkish relations and it is of global geopolitical interest due to the location [34, p. 34]. According to Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu of Turkey [34], a country that does not consider Cyprus in its geostrategic analysis and strategy, it cannot play an active role in global and regional politics. He emphasizes the fact that such a small island is located in an area where it directly affects strategic connections between Asia and Africa, Europe and Africa and Europe and Asia. However, he declared that Cyprus should be moved out of the “Greek–Turkish” equation, as then the two countries could agree to solve all the pending issues—as defined and recognized by the Turkish side. Cyprus ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1988 in which provisions on marine natural resources and the EEZ are also included. Only in 2004 there was the Law 64(I) which refer to “Law to provide for the Proclamation of the Exclusive Economic Zone by the Republic of Cyprus” (the “EEZ Law”), and it was enforced retroactively with an effective date of March 2003 to allow delimitation of its EEZ with Egypt [35, p. 35]. On the basis of the Exclusive Economic Law (Law No. 64(I) 2004 amended by the 2014 Law), Cyprus declared its EEZ, the outer limit of which shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of territorial sea is measured in accordance with UNCLOS. Despite Turkey’s recent activities in Cyprus’s EEZ, which are mainly aimed at preventing Cyprus from exercising its sovereign rights in its EEZ, all licensed companies finally proceed with their exploration programmes, in line with the licences granted by the competent authorities of the government. In the next section, a Political-Economical-Social-Technological (PEST) analysis for the case of Cyprus is presented focusing on the main topics. Thus, it is not a detailed and exhaustive analysis, but a coherent one with a focus on particular points. PEST Analysis Political: The government type is the Republic of Cyprus with a presidential democracy. There has been stability in its political life in recent

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decades while there is a coherent cooperation between the parties. This is very important since whenever a serious issue for the sovereignty of the state emerges, the parties and the government seem to reach a common understanding and goal, which helps to address a weak appearance on the international stage. The territorial structure consists of six provinces; each one is headed by the governor, who is appointed by the government. The Republic of Cyprus has 523 municipalities, of which 39 are towns and 484 communities. The northern part of the island is possessed by Turkey, while Nicosia still remains the only divided capital in Europe. Economical: Cyprus is already considered a developed country having had a GDP of US$24.6 billion in 2020 [36]. After the latest recession that Cyprus went through, it looks like the economy is coming back on stream, which is very encouraging after all the difficult experiences that the government, banking sector, private sector, foreign investors and other stakeholders have had in recent years. There are risks to be addressed and the most important ones are the following: • Protracted period of slower growth in advanced economies: Significant trade linkages with the EU could slow the growth in Cyprus due to lower exports and tourism and adverse confidence effects. Stagnation and low inflation complicate public debt sustainability and private sector deleveraging and negatively impact banks’ balance sheets. • Regional geopolitical level: An escalation of sanctions against Russia could make the growth in Cyprus slower since the country still keeps strong real and financial links with Russia. High oil prices would spill over into reduced growth in Cyprus and increased external financing needs for energy-related imports. • Sovereign stress re-emerges due to prolonged delay in programme implementation: Financial sector stability, growth prospects and debt sustainability would be severely affected. Pressure on the banking sector in the euro area could extend to Cypriot banks and reignite deposit outflows. Cyprus’s recently restored access to the capital markets could be lost. • Financial sector stress could re-emerge due to a very fast relaxation of external payment restrictions: Financial sector stability could be

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affected, with strong repercussions for economic activity and debt sustainability. • Weak recovery of domestic demand and inability to reduce public and private sector debt: Lower growth and increased opposition to further austerity would prolong Cyprus’s high debt problem and would hurt balance sheets. Social: There are a large number of municipalities of a small and nonfunctional size while the life expectancy is 78.7 years, which leads to the country being ranked 53rd in the world. There are still difficulties in terms of cooperation between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and the negotiations have been in progress for years now, ruling the life of the citizens. The manpower of the country is of a very good quality, well-educated and open. This can be seen from the very good productivity of the employed labour force. Technological: The level of the infrastructural facilities including telecommunications and transportation is quite satisfactory. Around 76% of the population are Internet users and the country has open-wire, fibre-optic cable and microwave radio relay. Military and Security: Cypriot National Guard (CNG): 18–50 years of age for compulsory military service for all Greek Cypriot males; 17 years of age for voluntary service; 14-month service obligation (2016) (Fig. 6.6). In the above figure, the military expenditure of the country as a percentage of its GDP is given. It is seen that there was a continuous decline in military expenditures during the years before 2014, reaching the lowest point in the previous decade. After that lowest point, it appears that the military expenditures of the country started increasing in the following years. Energy Sector in Cyprus General In 2015, the energy intensity for Cyprus was 3.275 MJ per USD of GDP, which is lower than the energy intensity in 1990 at 4.149 MJ per USD of GDP. This is well-presented in the next figure, where the energy intensity for Cyprus had been continuously declining, which is an indication of how much energy is used in order to produce one unit of economic output. Obviously, a lower ratio means that less energy is finally used

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1.9

% GDP

1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Year

Fig. 6.6 Military expenditures of Cyprus (% GDP) (Source Based on data available in The World Factbook 2021. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2021. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/ [37])

to produce one unit of output, which indicates that the economy of a country becomes more efficient in its use of energy (Fig. 6.7).

Fig. 6.7 Energy intensity of primary energy (MJ/US$2011 GDP) for Cyprus (Source The World Bank, 2022)

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Table 6.4 Energy data for Cyprus (1990–2015)

Energy use (kg oil equivalent per capita) Fossil fuel energy consumption (% total) Electricity final consumption (kWh per capita)

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

1780

1981

2265

2159

2195

1712

99.5

97.3

97.8

97.4

95.4

92.9

2430

2784

3370

4099

4585

3624

Source The World Bank (2022) [38]

Basic parameters for Cyprus related to energy, such energy use per capita, percentage of fossil fuel energy consumption in the total fuel energy consumption and electricity consumption per capita can be summarized together (Table 6.4). The energy usage per capita in Cyprus increased by almost 23% within 20 years during the period 1990–2010, reaching its highest point in 2008 (2388 kg oil equivalent per capita); however, it started declining and returning back to the same point by 2014. The main reason for that can be referred to the last economic crisis in 2011–2013. The first problems for the Cypriot economy emerged at the end of 2010, when international banking institutions downgraded the credit rating of the country, and many downgrades followed until 2013. The reason was the dependence of the Cypriot banks on foreign activities in other cases of high risk and also the inability of the government to support the banking sector during the crisis. Finally, that downgrade led Cyprus to exclude borrowing from the financial markets from March 2011, and it was finally brought under the European Union support mechanism with strict measurements. The situation became more difficult when, in July 2011, there was an explosion at the naval base of the National Guard of Cyprus, and as a result, the Cyprus Electricity Authority lost 50% of its electricity capacity, with the state and the Cypriot economy falling into a state of emergency. In 1990, almost all the energy consumption in Cyprus was related to fossil fuels. After that, the situation started changing slightly with a reduction of around 2% within the next five years, and it remained stagnant for the following ten years until 2005. Since then, there has been a continuous reduction, which can be explained by the analogous development of renewable energy sources. The dominant fuel type used in Cyprus was primary and secondary oil throughout the previous 25 years, while after

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2000, other types of energy fuels started to emerge and gradually became part of the total mix. These include geothermal, solar and biofuels. NG and Recent Discoveries Hydrocarbon exploration in Cyprus’s EEZ has been a contemporary issue in recent years. However, it has only recently attracted a lot attention since drilling explorations in Cyprus’s offshore field started in September 2011. There is a long-running maritime dispute involving the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, which reached crisis levels. Even though the crisis was reduced in the months following, it is still a subject that continues to fester. Most of the hydrocarbon fields have recently been found in the Eastern Mediterranean area. Oil and gas resources lie in very deep waters, which make it difficult and expensive to carry out exploration in the area. Having state-of-the-art equipment available, oil and gas companies decided to start new explorations in this region, but recently many of them have been put on hold since oil prices dropped dramatically during the year 2015. It is very interesting to see what will happen during the next period and whether the prices in the market will remain as they are or go higher than the critical level, thus allowing the continuation of explorations in the oil and gas fields (Fig. 6.8). In June 2015, NG discovery Block 12 (“Aphrodite”) was named as a commercial field and today the NG resource estimate is in the order of 4.5 tcf. As of today, the licensee with the Ministry of Energy, Commerce and Industry (MECI) believes that the most economical option is to sell the “Aphrodite” gas to Egypt via a submarine pipeline (Table 6.5). According to Cyprus’s Minister of Energy Yiorgos Lakkotrypis, initial NG production from the Aphrodite field is foreseen for around 2024– 2025, after negotiations between the state with operators and an ownership squabble delayed output. The minister said that he would meet with Aphrodite’s stakeholders in June 2019 in order to discuss “the revenue sharing mechanisms between the government and the companies, infrastructure plans and the price at which companies will sell the gas” and expected that discussions would conclude in a few weeks’ time [41]. Cyprus does not produce any primary energy resources except for RES and thus is a heavily energy-imported country with more than 90% of its energy needs being fulfilled from outside, mainly petroleum products. The electricity market is dominated by the state-owned Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC), which plays the dual role of both electricity producer and supplier. Natural gas is expected to be an important fuel

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Fig. 6.8 Cyprus gas reservoirs (Source Ministry of Energy, Commerce and Industry of Cyprus [39])

source for the production of electricity in the next decade. In 2014, the electricity market was officially liberalized, but no new player has entered the market so far. Cyprus can be seen as one of the most vulnerable countries in the EU in terms of energy dependency and security of energy supply. Moreover, it does not have energy interconnections with any other country, either electrical or natural gas, and thus it is seen as an “isolated system”. Petroleum products that are imported comprise around 30% of the total imports of the country, which contributes negatively to the balance of payments and is thus sensitive to any external threat or disruption at the macro level. In regard to the energy design and planning in Cyprus, according to the decision of the Council of Ministers No. 83.709 in 2017, a National Energy and Climate Governance System (NCI) should be established (Fig. 6.9). Energy Policy Cyprus as a full member of the EU is obliged to fully comply with the EU legislation, norms and directives. This also refers to the energy policy of Cyprus, which needs to be aligned with the energy policy of the EU and thus the following laws have been set:

2013

2013

2017

2019

2017

2013

2017

2013

2019

Exploration Licences 2

3

6

7

8

9

10

11

Exploitation Licences 12 (Aphrodite) 4.5 (proven)

N/A

5–8

N/A

N/A

N/A

6–8

N/A

N/A

Possible reserves (tcf)

Noble Energy International (35%) – “Operator”, Delek Drilling (30%), BG Cyprus (35%)

ENI Cyprus (60%) – “Operator”, KOGAS Cyprus (20%), TOTAL E&P Cyprus (20%) ENI Cyprus (50%) – “Operator”, KOGAS Cyprus (20%), TOTAL E&P Cyprus (30%) ENI Cyprus (50%) – “Operator”, TOTAL E&P Cyprus (50%) TOTAL E&P Cyprus (50%) – “Operator”, ENI Cyprus (50%) ENI Cyprus (60%) – “Operator”, TOTAL E&P Cyprus (40%) ENI Cyprus (60%) – “Operator”, KOGAS Cyprus (20%), TOTAL E&P Cyprus (20%) ExxonMobil Exploration and Production Cyprus (Offshore) (60%) – “Operator”, Qatar Petroleum International Upstream LLC (40%) TOTAL E&P Cyprus (50%) – “Operator”, ENI Cyprus (50%)

Shareholders

Source Author, 2022 (based on Ministry of Energy, Commerce and Industry of Cyprus [39] and CHC [40])

Discovery year

Gas fields in Cyprus

Licensed gas field/block

Table 6.5

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House of

Council of

Representatives

Ministers

European Commission

Ministerial Committee

Technical Committee

Green House Committee

RES Committee

Energy Efficiency

Energy Security

Internal Electricity Market

R&D

Transportati on

Fig. 6.9 National Energy and Climate Governance System in Cyprus (Source Based on data from the Ministry of Energy, Commerce and Industry in Cyprus (2019) at http://www.meci.gov.cy/meci/hydrocarbon.nsf/page16_en/page16_ en?OpenDocument)

• in 2003, the Law Regulating the Electricity Market; • in 2004, the Law Regulating the Natural Gas Market. For both laws, the Cyprus Energy Regulatory Authority (CERA) is responsible for regulating both the electricity and natural gas markets. According to the Hydrocarbons Law, the authorized party to manage the upstream activities is the state, and thus the Cyprus Hydrocarbons Company (CHC), a private company with a sole member, the Ministry of Energy, Commerce, Industry and Tourism, was established. Electricity power plants use natural gas as a feedstock that is currently imported from abroad. Recent Hx CY discoveries will contribute positively to the fuel used in such power plants, but such development may take time to become properly efficient. Overview Especially in the case of Cyprus, it can be seen that regional alliances play an important role, as the country has not been allowed to keep its own

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military forces and thus needs to rely on others to protect it from any external threat, and in particular Turkey, as has been proved in recent decades. The country is small, and it is seen as being vulnerable to its external environment and challenges in the region. Contrary to the case of Israel, Cyprus has not been included in any energy interconnection or nexus, and it was only recently that the state of Cyprus started discussions and efforts to design and implement such projects, because of the recent discoveries of oil and gas in its territory. However, this is not seen as contributing to the national security of the country even to a small degree (as was noticed in the aforementioned case of Israel). Cyprus seems to be missing many basic parameters that are not currently in force or widely available, such as military power, and a limited degree of freedom to take decisions (since it has been supervised by third parties). In addition, the recent economic problems during the period 2010–2014 brought serious problems to the country, as it was then not possible to refund its state expenses from the international markets and consequently there were problems for the government in restructuring the financial sector in the country. As regards the state of Cyprus, there is no formal relationship between the energy security and the national security of the country. It can be said that both notions for the case of Cyprus—energy and national security— are still non-existent and the country mostly relies on others to cover both these critical needs. In addition, the recent natural gas discoveries in the economic zone of Cyprus seem to have triggered the country’s opponents to become more aggressive and hostile against it, by exercising threats and showing delinquent behaviour. Energy and resources contribute to the national security of a country, provided that there are some minimum requirements met in the first place, such as military power, leadership and the experience of the politicians and decision-makers in politics, and investments in technology, which can become a critical factor in this relationship. Energy and resources can play the role of a catalyst [42] in several relationships, including the examined one between the energy security and national security of a nation state. A catalyst can act as an accelerator for the speed of a reaction, but also as a decelerator that causes delays and negative outcomes.

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CASE STUDIES

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Comparison of the Cases

Especially for countries located in a hostile environment like Israel and Cyprus, notions such as energy security are critical. Cyprus has to consider options that will help deal with/repel the one country against its sovereignty (Turkey), while at the same time, government decisions for both countries influence which energy resources are consumed and in what priority based on taxes, incentives and manufacturing standards. Small countries are more vulnerable to external factors and other parameters, especially when basic pillars of their national security are not present or clearly available, as in the case of Cyprus, where military power ranges from limited to substandard. Such a minimum number or level of prerequisites needs to be in place for a nation state, which is also supported by the theory of realism as seen before. The current energy mix in the case of Cyprus is almost linked with the use of oil, while in the case of Israel it is mixed, where both crude oil and gas are used as energy sources for the country’s needs and consumption. These examined parameters may last independently and one’s presence and changes may not necessarily affect the presence and changes of the other. Energy security in the case of Cyprus seems to be acting as a catalyst and it may eventually become a negative catalyst considering the existing limitations that prevail at the country’s level. It can be seen that there should be a minimum set of prerequisites at the country’s level in order to materialize any positive change caused by the improved level of energy security of the country. It seems that in the Mediterranean region, political uncertainties, economic hardships (e.g. Cyprus’s economic crisis in this last decade) and military conflicts in the region amplify the economic uncertainties. Referring to the case of Cyprus, especially after the recent natural gas discoveries in its EEZ, there was overexcitement and overstatements were made by the politicians and leaders of the country concerning potential growth and benefits for the country. Such reactions eventually created overexpectations among the society, while at the same time, such overstatements triggered its opponents (i.e. Turkey) to overreact and start causing a serious headache for Cyprus as it has come to be a difficult game to exit from. Natural and energy resources may initiate and consequently sustain conflicts between nation states over small islands and waters, which

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in the case of poor and weak countries may eventually cause insecurity and instability. As Cyprus is a small and weak country, international law is very important, and in its case, small and flexible military units should be the correct solution (state of the art is not always the right solution). In the case of Cyprus, it’s more complicated since the country is divided and in conflict with Turkey. Furthermore, the examined case is seen as a nod/junction (geographical, energy, culture, etc.), so a multi-parameter approach should be considered to understand the dynamics and envision any future actions/solution. Finally, it could be possible to consider a new function for the examined relation between the two notions of energy and national security. The analysis of a parameter like energy security strongly depends on the time framework used each time [43].

References 1 Darbouche, H., El-Katiri, L., & Fattouh, B. (2012). East Mediterranean Gas: what kind of a game-changer? Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. NG71. https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-con tent/uploads/2012/12/NG-71.pdf. Last accessed 24 February 2022. 2 US Department of State. (2021). https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-acc ords/. Last accessed 22 December 2021. 3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel. (2022). https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/Abo utIsrael/Maps/Pages/Israel-Size-and-Dimension.aspx 4 The World Bank. (2022). https://data.worldbank.org/country/IL. Last accessed 9 January 2022. 5 US. Energy Information Administration. (2016). https://www.eia.gov/int ernational/overview/country/ISR. Last accessed 24 February 2022. 6 The World Factbook. (2021). Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2021. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/israel/. Last accessed 19 January 2022. 7 The World Bank. (2022). https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET. USER.ZS?locations=IL. Last accessed 19 January 2022. 8 The World Factbook. (2021). Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2021. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/israel/# military-and-security. Last accessed 19 January 2022. 9 The World Bank. (2022). https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP. MKTP.CD?locations=IL. Last accessed 24 February 2022.

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10 The World Bank. (2022). https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG. EGY.PRIM.PP.KD?end=2015&locations=IL&start=1990&view=chart. Last accessed 10 January 2022. 11 The World Bank. (2022). https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.EGY. PRIM.PP.KD?locations=IL. Last accessed 24 February 2022. 12 US. Energy Information Administration. (2016). https://www.eia.gov/int ernational/analysis/country/ISR. Last accessed 19 February 2022. 13 Energean. (2022). https://www.energean.com/operations/israel/tanin. Last accessed 19 February 2022. 14 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel. (2022). https://www.energy-sea.gov. il/English-Site/Pages/Oil%20And%20Gas%20in%20Israel/History-of-Oil-Gas-Exploration-and-Production-in-Israel.aspx/. Last accessed 19 February 2022. 15 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel. (2022). https://www.energy-sea.gov. il/English-Site/Pages/Regulation/Adiri%20Committee%20Final%20Reco mmendations%2018.12.2018%20Executive%20Summary%20-%20Transla tion.pdf. Last accessed 19 February 2022. 16 Energean. (2022). https://www.energean.com/. Last accessed 19 February 2022. 17 Fischhendler, I. & Nathan, D. (2014). In the name of energy security: The struggle over the exportation of Israeli natural gas. Energy Policy, 70, 152– 162. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.03.020 18 Shaffer, B. (2013). Natural gas supply stability and foreign policy. Energy Policy, 56, 114–125. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.11.035 19 Sachs, N. & Boersma, T. (2015). The energy Island: Israel deals with its natural gas discoveries. Foreign Policy at Brookings. Policy Paper, 35. 20 Glick, C. (2017). Israel’s populist energy crisis. Townhall (2015). http:// townhall.com/columnists/carolineglick/2015/07/03/israels-populist-ene rgy-crisis-n2021085. Last accessed 10 February 2017. 21 Tzemach Committee. (2012). The recommendations of the Inter-Ministerial Committee to examine the government’s policy regarding natural gas. Ministry of Energy and Water Resources, State of Israel. 22 Ministry of Energy, Israel. (2022). https://www.energy-sea.gov.il/EnglishSite/Pages/Gas%20Markets/Israels-Export-Options.aspx. Last accessed 10 January 2022. 23 Delek. (2015). Natural Gas Outline Government Approval. http://ir.delekgroup.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=160695&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=2079875. Last accessed 4 March 2017. 24 Delek. (2016a). Ruling on petition to high court. http://ir.delek-group. com/phoenix.zhtml?c=160695&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=2129952. Last accessed 4 March 2017.

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25 Delek. (2016b). Closing of a transaction for the sale of all of the rights in the I/16 Tanin and I/17 Karish leases to Energean. http://ir.delek-group.com/ phoenix.zhtml?c=160695&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=2232844. Last accessed 4 March 2017. 26 Snow, N. (2015). More pragmatism urged for developing Eastern Mediterranean Gas. Oil & Gas Journal. http://www.ogj.com/articles/2015/ 02/more-pragmatism-urged-for-developing-eastern-mediterranean-gas.html. Last accessed 20 January 2017. 27 Shaffer, B. (2011). Israel-New natural gas producer in the Mediterranean. Energy Policy, 39, 5379–5387. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol. 2011.05.026 28 https://www.gov.il/en/Departments/Units/natural_resources_administr ation 29 Sobczak, B. (2015). Politics deflate Israel’s global gas hopes. Environment & Energy. http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060021202. Last accessed 20 January 2017. 30 Henderson, S. (2013). Natural gas export options for Israel and Cyprus. Mediterranean Paper Series GMF . https://www.europeangashub.com/wpcontent/uploads/attach_315.pdf 31 Siddig, K., & Grethe, H. (2014). No more gas from Egypt? Modeling offshore discoveries and import uncertainty of natural gas in Israel. Applied Energy, 136, 312–324. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2014.09.019 32 The World Bank. (2022). https://data.worldbank.org/country/cyprus. Last accessed 28 January 2022. 33 The World Factbook. (2021). Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2021. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/cyprus/. Last accessed 19 January 2022. 34 Davutoglu. A. (2010). The strategic depth. Poiotita. 35 Giamouridis, A. (2012). The offshore discovery in the Republic of Cyprus: Monetization prospects and Challenges. The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. NG65. 36 The World Bank. (2022). https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP. MKTP.CD?locations=CY. Last accessed 24 February 2022. 37 The World Factbook. (2021). Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/cyprus/#mil itary-and-security. Last accessed 24 February 2022. 38 The World Bank. (2022). https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.USE. COMM.FO.ZS?locations=CY. Last accessed 23 February 2022. 39 Meci. (2022). http://www.meci.gov.cy/meci/hydrocarbon.nsf/page16_ en/page16_en?OpenDocument. Last accessed 14 February 2022. 40 https://chc.com.cy/activities/licensed-blocks/

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41 Kumar, D. (2019). Cyprus expects first natgas output from Aphrodite field by 2025. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyprus-energy/cyp rus-expects-first-natgas-output-from-aphrodite-field-by-2025-idUSKCN1S 91Z6. Last accessed 14 June 2019. 42 Perry, R. H. & Green, W. D. (2007). Perry’s chemical engineering handbook (8th ed). McGraw Hill. 43 Manson, A., Johansson, B., & Nilsson, L. J. (2014). Assessing energy security: An overview of commonly used methodologies. Energy, 73, 1–14.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusions and Recommendations

7.1

General

The International Political Economy can eventually provide a diversified blend of energy security strategies and policies. This situation may be related to a lack of consensus about the nature of the energy security issue and also the need for different approaches in order to deal with diverse resource endowments, political levers, capital availability, risk aversion and other specifics related to the nation states [1]. After the oil crisis in the 1970s, oil producers in the Middle East viewed energy security as “entail[ing] the capability of inflicting political and economic hardship on Western nations dependent on petroleum, as the oil embargoes effectively operated as ‘oil weapons’” [2]. It is imperative “to reduce a nation’s vulnerability to energy supply disruptions” and he claims that “the link between energy and national security is of enormous importance” [3]. Furthermore, the dependence of the US on oil imports up to the 1980–1990s “had been long considered the cause of its energy dilemma” [4]. The ex-Minister of US Foreign Affairs, Henry Kissinger, mentioned that any energy crisis “is not a mere problem of transitional adjustment but it is a grave challenge to the political and economic structure of the free world” [3]. It can have serious consequences for societies and citizens, such as:

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Flouros, Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09603-7_7

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• a constantly increasing price of the fuel that is required to heat houses and move the transportation sector; • an inflation and recession that will follow; • a political crisis of global dimensions that will eventually affect the country’s national security. Moreover, he stated that except for military defence, “there is no project of more central importance to the national security of the country and its independence as a sovereign nation” [3]. It is mainly the governments and states of the producing nations that control the upstream chain of the oil and gas industry while the private companies of the consuming countries mostly regulate the downstream chain [4]. In regard to energy security (ES) and national security (NS), there are several links between these two factors, including [4]: (i) international competition for energy resources, such as oil and natural gas; (ii) reliance on insecure oil and natural gas supplies impacts on the military security in several areas; (iii) political, economic and environmental conflicts over energy development, conservation and end-use increase uncertainty over future economic conditions and the supply and cost of energy. Any economic difficulties as a result of higher oil prices are mainly caused by only moderate shortfalls in oil prices. However, a large disruption would cause almost incalculable problems and the likelihood of such a disruption is always real.

7.2

Conclusions

With regard to the design and execution of a research, which was mentioned previously in Chapter 5, there are valuable and important remarks and conclusions. (a) Contribution to the main theory/literature: An updated conceptual framework concerning energy security (ES) and national security (NS) issues has been proposed herein. Following a systemic approach can contribute methodological choices within energy

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security assessments. Methodological options in energy security assessments can be systematic, rational and transparent. They can meditate configuration of energy systems based on the scope of assessments and clearly presented for the target group they are addressed to. (b) There is a direct relationship between NS and ES and there are various indices that each main parameter/variable may consist of, depending on the research context and the research questions and interests. (c) In selecting indicators and evaluating results, the methodological choices in an energy security assessment should be systematic, rational and transparent. They should reflect the configuration of energy systems (real and perceived), justified and based on the purpose of the assessment and clearly explained for the targeted audience. (d) Assessments of energy security and its dimension in the future scenarios could probably deal with major challenges to describe vital energy systems that could be different from what they currently are today [5]. (e) Based on the current outlook, it can be seen that the energy security landscape is expected to be very different in the near future and many of the existing energy security threats may not exist while new ones may appear. In order to assess energy security and other security related issues in the coming years, it would be necessary to understand: • the diversity of international energy supply in the future; • the diversity of fuels used in key end-use sectors; • the dependency of each region on imported energy sources. Other Considerations Energy security indicators are used to represent any vulnerabilities of a critical energy system and thus they can be selected from those available in the literature or designed specifically for the purpose of a particular assessment. Selection of indicators can be based on the level of representation of a particular risk or vulnerability of an energy system, but in general they should not be considered a direct measurement of them. In such cases, there might be three different routes to follow:

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• Interpret individual indicators, since when proper, indicators may lead to correct conclusions. Such an interpretation of individual indicators may involve comparison between nation states or different time periods. • Reduce the number of indicators by combining them into aggregated metrics, since the number of indicators increases the complexity of the examined case. For this reason, the second strategy is aggregating indicators into energy security “indices” and thus the amount of information can be reduced and hence easier to deal with. • Present the indicators in a format that facilitates the assessment: Check whether all indicators are necessary, since some of them may look promising in the selection phase but eventually prove to be unreliable. Based on the previous analysis, nation states may check and review their energy policies in order to properly design a new energy and national vision for the future. They have to realize and become familiar with both current and coming megatrends, which are going to cause vast changes and effect the international scene. Leadership and experienced politicians can contribute to dealing effectively with global challenges and properly handling any conflicts in the neighbourhood, while attention to the right strategic realignments may be urgently required [6]. In addition, knowledge and experience of technical aspects related to energy can always help in building self-confidence and weakening any risks of confrontation over claims. There is more to be achieved regarding coordination across borders on energy issues, as it always helps to have developed sustainable energy policies [7]. Energy policy decisions are driven by energy security through consideration of major factors [8]. Energy security, along with several other policy issues, can be seen as an umbrella term for international security, economic development and political relations [9]. Energy security can be significantly enhanced if solutions are found that take into consideration the need to balance the geopolitical, economic and environmental implications of energy [10]. Protection from disruptions of vital energy systems may result from: • impermanent/short shocks: natural events, technical failures, deliberate sabotage, malfunctioning markets; or

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• permanent threats: resource scarcity, infrastructure ageing, unsustainable growth. Such disruptions can cause security issues such as the viability of national economies, the stability of political systems and armed conflicts. Although energy security concerns are not the same in every country, they are linked to robustness, sovereignty and the resilience of energy systems. State energy security strategies and policies that are developed to ensure energy security are dominant for the transformations of energy systems. Such state energy security strategies and policies try to deal with the aspects indicated herein and they aim to increase the robustness, sovereignty and/or resilience of national energy systems. More specifically [11]: • Robustness: Efforts to switch to more available and affordable energy sources, induce investments in infrastructure and manage energy demand. • Sovereignty: Efforts to switch to domestic energy resources and achieve long-term contractual arrangements with trustworthy partners to utilize national energy assets, establish nationally controlled energy companies in order to secure energy resources outside of the country and utilize a nation’s power to secure access to energy resources. • Resilience: Efforts to maintain emergency stocks of a strategic nature, e.g. fuels, with the aim of increasing the reliability of energy infrastructure.

7.3

Recommendations

Recommendations and thoughts concerning theory, research and policies for the coming periods—both short term and long term—are as follows, specifically: (a) About theory A new approach including new elements to the theory (see interdisciplinary approach) can be suggested through: • diversification of the results and outcomes through new research;

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• maximization of efforts through collaborations with governmental institutions for the countries of interest, nongovernmental associations involved in security and energy security aspects and academia. One of the main challenges for a new approach—such as the proposed conceptual framework given in Chapter 5—is firstly to overcome any existing perceptions and beliefs that create any resistance. It is always preferred to have a fresh look at each examined new case. It is more difficult to change an existing structure and challenge prevailing patterns of beliefs than build something from the beginning. It is a fact that human perceptions of profit and losses may cause delays or even cancel the progress of the project. In a second, further stage of analysis the parameter of time could also be taken into consideration (Fig. 7.1). For the analysis of the concept of energy security, it is also necessary to take into account the following parameters [12]: • different angles: a variety of parameters have been included in the examined variables; • different time horizons: time is a parameter that is always mentioned and the time framework is defined, in order to have it as a reference base.

Level

Time horizon

Degree of dependence Fig. 7.1 3D Analysis (Source Author, 2019 [22])

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As described earlier in Chapter 5, the functional relationship between the two variables, “Energy Security” and “National Security” (function g, ), is considered through a function like ( ) (5.2) National Security = g , Energy Security where: National Security (NS) can take values from a total NSi = {NS0 , NS1 , NS2 , . . . , NSi } (i > 1)

(5.3)

and Energy Security (ES) can take values from {( ) } ESj = ES0 , ES1 , ES2 , . . . , ESj j > 1

(5.4)

Based on the results and outcome presented herein, the functional relationship NS = g, (ES) can be modified and updated in order to become a type as follows: ] [ (7.1) [NS]t = [g(ES) t−1 f (z)]t where: – g , :The initial functional relationship. – f =f (z):Proposed relationship with z belongs in the sum that includes elements of a nation’s DNA [such as history, political considerations, anxiety for survival, culture]. – t:The time when measured. – t − 1:A previous time, not necessarily one year. During the design phase of a research and subsequently the implementation phase of a new framework, it is important to use “time” as a design variable. Thus, it could be useful to consider a gap, otherwise known as a “phase lag”, which will not only be a negative influencer (i.e. delay) but it can also be seen as a creative factor and perhaps necessary for the quality work of future researches and more complete studies and analysis. It is worth saying that theories, especially in social sciences, are not only “bivariate” as most of them are “multivariate”, which means that the relationship/phenomenon under investigation has more than one cause

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(dependent variables); however, we focus on the chosen ones for the purpose of our study and the reasons mentioned earlier [13]. A theory may explain some or only a few cases either because it needs specific conditions to be applied or because the phenomenon that is caused is not common. Even though such a theory describes very well and explains some or a few cases but not all, this theory is valid. However, the more cases a theory is applied to and explains them, the more useful it is. Furthermore, it is impossible for a theory to be absolutely correct since it is not feasible to think through and imagine and assess every single prediction it makes [14]. Falsification of theories that still keep some explanatory power is not supposed to precede the emergence of a better theory than them [15], and furthermore, if testing shows that a theory has no explanatory power, then we should not keep it independently if a replacement theory exists. Keeping hard questions in the study is mostly advisable, since a theory may be difficult/hard to test/prove during the period of the research but it may become feasible later as “new tests are derived and new data emerge” [14, pp. 43–48]. The maturity of a state’s political culture and level of democracy is an important factor that can contribute to the decision-making process of a government and any authorities responsible for the formulation of a nation state’s policies, and thus for both national and energy security too. Therefore, it may be possible for a government to have options for its policies to choose from and apply, such as market-friendly, environmentally sensitive, short- or long-term view, etc. (b) About research There are several areas for further investigation and study, including: • Repeat a research for the selected countries after a period of five or ten years, when new/more data would be available and thus it may be possible to apply a time-series statistical analysis. • Repeat a research for other countries in the same region [i.e. Turkey, Greece, Egypt]. • Repeat a research for other countries in another region, such as the Caspian Sea, the Arctic, the Middle East, the Gulf of Mexico, etc.

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(c) Policy proposals In regard to thoughts and proposals about proper energy policy, a summary is given below (Table 7.1):

Table 7.1 Policy proposals for energy Short-term

Long-term

General

• Design and implement the right conservation policy • Government and authorities need to intervene to ensure that the energy base rate is in line with prevailing market conditions • More liberal tax incentives for investment in fuel-efficient machinery and insulation • Reorganize the structure and have autonomous energy planning and energy security division at a higher hierarchical level • Form a group of experts that are knowledgeable and aware of energy-related issues. Build an effective response network with officers

Cyprus

• Continue to build strategic alliance in the military sector • Maximize the EU membership effect in securitization of country’s sovereignty • Involve international players in energy sector in the recent O&G developments in order to leverage their lobby and network to protect the country’s position • Train the country’s human capital in energy diplomacy

• Control oil imports and diversify oil suppliers • Develop surge capacity and stockpiling • Develop and implement a National Security Doctrine • Design and implement a comprehensive energy policy on different energy sectors • Develop a state-of-the-art energy industry • Consider clean types of energy with a combination of new technologies and a human capital plan that can establish an industry related to the Internet of Things (IoT) • Design a contingency plan, dealing with policy differences within the same sector of the energy industry and between proponents of each different fuel type • Develop and implement a National Security Doctrine • Policymakers should follow a systemic approach that will contribute to more and correct methodological choices within energy security assessments

(continued)

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Table 7.1 (continued) Short-term Israel

Long-term

• Natural gas liquefaction in • Develop and implement a cooperation with either Cyprus or National Security Doctrine Jordan (in the economic zone of • Israeli energy policy should assess Aqaba) each project both on techno-economic criteria and • Strengthen the cooperation with geopolitical factors neighbour countries in projects like East-Med • Israel’s new energy policy should offer investors a “stable and transparent regulatory environment” • Construction of an FLNG terminal either in the Tamar field or Elliott, provided that a 250 km pipeline will be constructed to transport natural gas off the coast

Source Author, 2019

More specifically: I. General It is useful to have clear and distinguished long-term and shortterm options for a country in order to achieve self-reliance in energy: • Short/medium term: (i) Design and implement the right conservation policy. It is necessary to find a way of “using available fuel supplies more wisely, and also more economical”. Conservation policy needs to be designed by the state, which is necessary to save local resources and at the same time reduce the nation’s dependence on imported fuel oil from abroad. It is also important to clarify that conservation should be seen as follows [4, pp. 39–41]: – wise use of limited resources; – the most effective use of fuels; – substitution of alternative energy, labour and capital for petroleum in order to save money and also lower fuel consumption.

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It is important to mention that “without greater energy production, conservation alone may only temporarily reduce reliance on imported oil” [4, p. 57]. (ii) The role of government is very important in taking the right decisions and avoiding any obstacles raised by any stakeholder/group. (iii) The government and authorities need to intervene in state and local regulation of utilities to make sure that the base rate is in line with prevailing market conditions. Withdraw any legislation that restricts gas use when that restriction contributes to switching to oil. (iv) More liberal tax incentives to invest in fuel-efficient machinery and insulation. (v) Reorganize the structure and have autonomous energy planning and energy security division at a higher hierarchical level. Responsibilities and authorization should not be scattered, but need to be solid and concentrated in/on one place/division/team/person. (vi) Form a group of experts that are knowledgeable and aware of energy-related issues; train the policymakers and make them familiar and experts in energy security areas so they can cope with any plan needed. (vii) Build an effective response network with officers; it is imperative that “any effort to hand emergency plans down from the top without developing a base of local support” will deteriorate the effects of a disruption. Any such network should consist of “effective state and local officers for dealing with energy problems” and it is seen as being as “vital to the nation’s security as a new missile system”. • Long term: (i) Control oil imports and diversify oil suppliers. (ii) Develop surge capacity and stockpiling. (iii) Develop and implement a national security doctrine, which is seen as necessary for the future. Criticism may be levelled at the fact that any forecast for the next ten years is more than risky when “analysis/research that producers forecast in the Middle East risks being proven wrong”, but the opposite view

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is that a “scenario-oriented thinking is vital to the deliberation of the national security strategy” [16]. (iv) A comprehensive policy on different energy sectors needs to be developed in order to deal with/overcome any regulatory, financial and technical obstacles. (v) An urgent programme to develop a state-of-the-art energy industry that can eventually allow more use of electricity to replace oil in most of the sectors of the country’s economy. (vi) An urgent programme to build new and upgrade existing refineries by means of known technologies and reliable costing. (vii) Nuclear power can also be considered seriously as it is a clean type of energy; any environmental and safety concerns mainly due to geological changes of the soil and seismic area will be studied and taken into consideration. (viii) Lead and establish an industry related to the Internet of Things (IoT), which could eventually deal with the fourth industrial revolution that is expected to seriously also affect the energy sector. • Contingency plan: (i) Curtail and rationalize demand for energy. (ii) Take more conservation measures. (iii) Use surge capacity and emergency fuel. (iv) Increase the supply of energy by producing more energy and/or (if the first is not possible) switch from one energy source to another. (v) Analyze the impact on, and risk for, domestic planning (and for Cyprus coordinate with the EU). (vi) Promote a wider understanding about the problems and disruption and create a national consensus for an appropriate response by the state to address the risks. There are also several obstacles to an effective and successful energy policy, such as [14, pp. xxvi and 78–81]:

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• different economic interests of energy-producing vs energyconsuming nation states; • conflicts between production and environmental stakeholders; • policy differences within the same sector of the energy industry; • policy differences between proponents of each different fuel type; • conflicts over the allocation of scare resources; • other economic interests; • competing institutional and industrial interests; • policymakers and government officials involved in energy policy planning don’t have the same clear support of their supervisors and authorities, while they are not free to operate in secrecy. They have to work out energy problems in the context of international obligations and other regulations that were not in place before. They are probably not sure what constitutes a threat to oil security; • during and after any energy crisis, it is difficult for the state to take measures and actions in order to ensure equal distribution of oil supplies and governments may easily fail for several reasons, including: – It is not at all easy to predict how consumers in different parts of the country would behave during a shortfall. – It is not easy to dampen/regulate energy price increases, especially in a free market. – It does not have hardly any influence on the events that caused the energy crisis in the international energy market. It is almost expected that “whatever causes the disruption, normally there would be several months’ delay before a disruption of energy supplies caused a substantial imbalance in the economy”. It can be seen that “no government policy is effective in a panic situation” as usually “diplomatic approaches to political crises are complicated” by assumptions of “how a solution to a problem will affect access to energy supplies”. For this reason, the initial action should be “to reduce both domestic and international panic”. Finally, disruptions are “open-ended” and “it is not always clear when they begin, and it is certainly not clear when they end”. A contingency plan is “a hedge against disaster, a form of national insurance on the energy future” and it needs to be “flexible and open-ended” [4, pp. 78–81]. Design and implementation of a contiguous energy policy looks demanding and it does not always attract the interest of politicians and

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diplomats. More specifically, for the two cases examined and presented herein, policy recommendations are described as follows: (i) Israel The regional geopolitical complexity of the Eastern Mediterranean has already influenced any progress in exporting gas to the region, and once regional conflicts are resolved, growth is expected to increase significantly. According to Moty Kuperberg, Director of Oil and Gas at a shipping company, there is "an urgent need to promote the development of gas for safety reasons” [17]. Israel’s export choices should be selected if they are profitable and can convince investors of their commercial viability, and any progress in resolving the political differences in the region should be seen as an additional positive element [18, pp. 17–18]. On the basis of a study on the development of energy policy and the capabilities of the state of Israel, there are approaches of a different time horizon, such as [19, pp. 25–30]: • Short Term: Natural gas liquefaction in cooperation with either Cyprus or Jordan (in the economic zone of Aqaba). It is a credible choice given the current state of Israel’s relations with its neighbours. The Israeli security service’s position is negative as regards the location of export facilities outside Israeli territory due to the fact that it prefers its infrastructure to be “firmly placed under Israeli sovereignty” and raises objections to the option of joint liquefaction with Cyprus on security/military grounds [19, pp. 26–28]. • Long Term: Referring to the national security of the state of Israel, it is seen as critical that a national security doctrine will be prepared and be in place. In summary [20]: (i), the state of Israel has been facing “threats and challenges related to its security” since its creation, however it “has never had a national security doctrine”. Such a document is “intented to protect and promote” the nation state’s national security. In 2019, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu presented to the Israeli Cabinet a strategic “national security concept” for the year 2030 [16], which is again not exactly a doctrine. A national security doctrine is a document that “encompasses military, diplomatic, economic and social policies” [20].

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Referring to energy, construction of an FLNG terminal either in the Tamar field or Elliott could be examined, provided that a 250 km pipeline will be constructed to transport natural gas off the coast. Israeli energy policy should assess each energy project based mainly on its techno-economic feasibility, while taking into account the geopolitical factors that are also important in the decisionmaking and policymaking process in the state. Israel’s new energy policy should offer investors a stable and clear regulatory environment that is capable of attracting and retaining investment in the country, thereby enhancing its geopolitical position in the region. The above options and recommendations have also been suggested [21] as the proposed options for Israel’s export of natural gas involve some restrictions, as follows: • Israeli energy policy in relation to exports exhibits discontinuity and imperfections. • The European Union is considering ways to reduce project costs. • The energy market in Europe is not friendly to intermediate server countries. (ii) Cyprus • Short/medium term: Strengthen efforts to allow sustainability of its own military power. The momentum is important in considering such an action plan, while in parallel building strategic alliances in the military sector. Maximize the positive effects of EU membership in order to further support the securitization of the country’s sovereignty. Involve international players in the energy sector in the recent oil and gas developments in order to leverage their lobby and network to protect the country’s position. Train the country’s human capital in energy diplomacy and involve more politicians and administration in understanding difficulties related to the nature of energy. • Long term: Policymakers should follow a systemic approach that will contribute to more and correct methodological choices within energy security assessments. Perceptions of policymakers can be created based on critical questions: What to protect? From which risks? And by which means? Answers

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to these questions can lead to the way policymakers understand energy systems that will bring information and facts to them [4, p. 149].

References 1 Brown, M. A., Sovacool, B. K., Wang, Y., & D‘Agostino, A. L. (2011). Energy security dimensions and trends in industrialized countries. Working Paper Series. Working Paper 63. Georgia Institute of Technology, School of Public Policy. https://cepl.gatech.edu/publications/pub/1443, last accessed 2018/3/10. 2 Yergin, D. (1991). The prize: The epic quest for oil, money, and power (597). Simon and Schuster. 3 Kissinger, H. (1982). Foreword. In C. Ebinger (Ed.), The critical link: Energy and national security in 1980s. CSIS. 4 Ebinger, C. (Ed.). (1982). The critical link: Energy and national security in 1980s. CSIS. 5 Stirling, A. (2011). The diversification dimension of energy security. In B. Sovacool (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Energy Security. Routledge. 6 Leigh, M. (2014). Energy: A geopolitical game changer. The International Spectator, 49, 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2014.906929 7 Florini, A. (2010). Global governance and energy. In C. Pascual & J. Elkind (Eds.), Energy security: Economics, politics, strategies and implications. Brookings. 8 Pascual, C., & Elkind, J. (2010). Introduction. In C. Pascual, & J. Elkind (Ed.), Energy security: Economics, politics, strategies and implications. Brookings. 9 Ciuta, F. (2010). Conceptual notes on energy security: Total or banal security? Security Dialogue, 41, 123–144. https://doi.org/10.1177/096701061 0361596 10 Yergin, D. (2010). Forward. In C. Pascual, & J. Elkind (Eds.), Energy security: Economics, politics, strategies and implications. Brookings. 11 Cherp, A., & Jewel, J. (2011). The three perspectives on energy security: Intellectual history, disciplinary roots and the potential for integration. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 3, 202–212. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.cosust.2011.07.001 12 Fermann, G. (2014). What is strategic about energy? De-simplifying energy security. In Espen Moe & Paul Midford (Eds.), The political economy of renewable energy and energy security. Palgrave Macmillan. 13 Kellstedt, P. M., & Whitten, G. D. (2013). The fundamentals of political science research. (2nd ed), Cambridge University Press.

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14 Van Evera, S. (1997). Guide to methods for students of political science. Cornell University Press. 15 Lakatos, I. (1970). Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes. In Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge University Press. 16 Shoval, S. (2019). Israel’s national security strategy for 2030. Israel Defense. https://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/35633, last accessed 2019/7/5. 17 Sobczak, B. (2015). Politics deflate Israel’s global gas hopes. Environment & Energy. http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060021202, last accessed 2017/1/20. 18 Henderson, S. (2013). Natural gas export options for Israel and Cyprus. Mediterranean Paper Series. Washington: GMF. 19 Darbouche, H., El-Katiri, L., & Fattouh, B. (2012). East Mediterranean Gas: What kind of a game-changer? Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. NG71. 20 Golov et al. (2010). A National Security Doctrine for Israel. Policy Paper. Argov Seminar. Lauder School of Government, IDC Herzliya. http:// portal.idc.ac.il/en/argov/documents/a_national_security_doctrine_for_isr ael_-_avner_golov_ran_michaelis_ory_vishkin_rony_kakon.pdf, last accessed 2019/7/6. 21 Shaffer, B. (2011). Israel-New natural gas producer in the Mediterranean. Energy Policy, 39, 5379–5387. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol. 2011.05.026 22 Flouros, F. (2019). The analytical framework. In P. Sklias, S. Roukanas, & F. Flouros (Eds.), The political economy of national and energy security. Nova Science Publishers.

Appendices

Appendix A: The Melian Dialogue (416 B.C.) Thucydides, V.84–116 84 The next summer Alcibiades sailed with twenty ships to Argos and seized the suspected persons still left of the Lacedaemonian faction to the number of three hundred, whom the Athenians forthwith lodged in the neighbouring islands of their empire. The Athenians also made an expedition against the isle of Melos with thirty ships of their own, six Chian, and two Lesbian vessels, sixteen hundred heavy infantry, three hundred archers, and twenty mounted archers from Athens, and about fifteen hundred heavy infantry from the allies and the islanders. The Melians are a colony of Lacedaemon that would not submit to the Athenians like the other islanders, and at first remained neutral and took no part in the struggle, but afterwards upon the Athenians using violence and plundering their territory, assumed an attitude of open hostility. Cleomedes, son of Lycomedes, and Tisias, son of Tisimachus, the generals, encamping in their territory with the above armament, before doing any harm to their land, sent envoys to negotiate. These the Melians did not bring before the people, but bade them state the object of their mission to the magistrates and the few; upon which the Athenian envoys spoke as follows: 85 Athenians. Since the negotiations are not to go on before the people, in order that we may not be able to speak straight on without

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Flouros, Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09603-7

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interruption, and deceive the ears of the multitude by seductive arguments which would pass without refutation (for we know that this is the meaning of our being brought before the few), what if you who sit there were to pursue a method more cautious still? Make no set speech yourselves, but take us up at whatever you do not like, and settle that before going any farther. And first tell us if this proposition of ours suits you. 86 The Melian commissioners answered: Melians. To the fairness of quietly instructing each other as you propose there is nothing to object; but your military preparations are too far advanced to agree with what you say, as we see you are come to be judges in your own cause, and that all we can reasonably expect from this negotiation is war, if we prove to have right on our side and refuse to submit, and in the contrary case, slavery. 87 Athenians. If you have met to reason about presentiments of the future, or for anything else than to consult for the safety of your state upon the facts that you see before you, we will give over; otherwise we will go on. 88 Melians. It is natural and excusable for men in our position to turn more ways than one both in thought and utterance. However, the question in this conference is, as you say, the safety of our country; and the discussion, if you please, can proceed in the way which you propose. 89 Athenians. For ourselves, we shall not trouble you with specious pretences—either of how we have a right to our empire because we overthrew the Mede, or are now attacking you because of wrong that you have done us—and make a long speech which would not be believed; and in return, we hope that you, instead of thinking to influence us by saying that you did not join the Lacedaemonians, although their colonists, or that you have done us no wrong, will aim at what is feasible, holding in view the real sentiments of us both; since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. 90 Melians. As we think, at any rate, it is expedient—we speak as we are obliged, since you enjoin us to let right alone and talk only of interest—that you should not destroy what is our common protection, the privilege of being allowed in danger to invoke what is fair and right, and even to profit by arguments not strictly valid if they

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can be got to pass current. And you are as much interested in this as any, as your fall would be a signal for the heaviest vengeance and an example for the world to meditate upon. 91 Athenians. The end of our empire, if end it should, does not frighten us: a rival empire like Lacedaemon, even if Lacedaemon was our real antagonist, is not so terrible to the vanquished as subjects who by themselves attack and overpower their rulers. This, however, is a risk that we are content to take. We will now proceed to show you that we are come here in the interest of our empire, and that we shall say what we are now going to say, for the preservation of your country; as we would fain exercise that empire over you without trouble, and see you preserved for the good of us both. 92 Melians. And how, pray, could it turn out as good for us to serve as for you to rule? 93 Athenians. Because you would have the advantage of submitting before suffering the worst, and we should gain by not destroying you. 94 Melians. So that you would not consent to our being neutral, friends instead of enemies, but allies of neither side. 95 Athenians. No; for your hostility cannot so much hurt us as your friendship will be an argument to our subjects of our weakness, and your enmity of our power. 96 Melians. Is that your subjects’ idea of equity, to put those who have nothing to do with you in the same category with peoples that are most of them your own colonists, and some conquered rebels? 97 Athenians. As far as right goes they think one has as much of it as the other, and that if any maintain their independence it is because they are strong, and that if we do not molest them it is because we are afraid; so that besides extending our empire we should gain in security by your subjection; the fact that you are islanders and weaker than others rendering it all the more important that you should not succeed in baffling the masters of the sea. 98 Melians. But do you consider that there is no security in the policy which we indicate? For here again if you debar us from talking about justice and invite us to obey your interest, we also must explain ours, and try to persuade you, if the two happen to coincide. How can you avoid making enemies of all existing neutrals who shall look at case from it that one day or another you will attack them? And what is this but to make greater the enemies that you have already, and to

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force others to become so who would otherwise have never thought of it? 99 Athenians. Why, the fact is that continentals generally give us but little alarm; the liberty which they enjoy will long prevent their taking precautions against us; it is rather islanders like yourselves, outside our empire, and subjects smarting under the yoke, who would be the most likely to take a rash step and lead themselves and us into obvious danger. 100 Melians. Well then, if you risk so much to retain your empire, and your subjects to get rid of it, it were surely great baseness and cowardice in us who are still free not to try everything that can be tried, before submitting to your yoke. 101 Athenians. Not if you are well advised, the contest not being an equal one, with honour as the prize and shame as the penalty, but a question of self-preservation and of not resisting those who are far stronger than you are. 102 Melians. But we know that the fortune of war is sometimes more impartial than the disproportion of numbers might lead one to suppose; to submit is to give ourselves over to despair, while action still preserves for us a hope that we may stand erect. 103 Athenians. Hope, danger’s comforter, may be indulged in by those who have abundant resources, if not without loss at all events without ruin; but its nature is to be extravagant, and those who go so far as to put their all upon the venture see it in its true colours only when they are ruined; but so long as the discovery would enable them to guard against it, it is never found wanting. Let not this be the case with you, who are weak and hang on a single turn of the scale; nor be like the vulgar, who, abandoning such security as human means may still afford, when visible hopes fail them in extremity, turn to invisible, to prophecies and oracles, and other such inventions that delude men with hopes to their destruction. 104 Melians. You may be sure that we are as well aware as you of the difficulty of contending against your power and fortune, unless the terms be equal. But we trust that the gods may grant us fortune as good as yours, since we are just men fighting against unjust, and that what we want in power will be made up by the alliance of the Lacedaemonians, who are bound, if only for very shame, to come to the aid of their kindred. Our confidence, therefore, after all is not so utterly irrational.

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105 Athenians. When you speak of the favour of the gods, we may as fairly hope for that as yourselves; neither our pretensions nor our conduct being in any way contrary to what men believe of the gods, or practise among themselves. Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can. And it is not as if we were the first to make this law, or to act upon it when made: we found it existing before us, and shall leave it to exist for ever after us; all we do is to make use of it, knowing that you and everybody else, having the same power as we have, would do the same as we do. Thus, as far as the gods are concerned, we have no fear and no reason to fear that we shall be at a disadvantage. But when we come to your notion about the Lacedaemonians, which leads you to believe that shame will make them help you, here we bless your simplicity but do not envy your folly. The Lacedaemonians, when their own interests or their country’s laws are in question, are the worthiest men alive; of their conduct towards others much might be said, but no clearer idea of it could be given than by shortly saying that of all the men we know they are most conspicuous in considering what is agreeable honourable, and what is expedient just. Such a way of thinking does not promise much for the safety which you now unreasonably count upon. 106 Melians. But it is for this very reason that we now trust to their respect for expediency to prevent them from betraying the Melians, their colonists, and thereby losing the confidence of their friends in Hellas and helping their enemies. 107 Athenians. Then you do not adopt the view that expediency goes with security, while justice and honour cannot be followed without danger; and danger the Lacedaemonians generally court as little as possible. 108 Melians. But we believe that they would be more likely to face even danger for our sake, and with more confidence than for others, as our nearness to Peloponnese makes it easier for them to act, and our common blood ensures our fidelity. 109 Athenians. Yes, but what an intending ally trusts to is not the goodwill of those who ask his aid, but a decided superiority of power for action; and the Lacedaemonians look to this even more than others. At least, such is their distrust of their home resources that it is only with numerous allies that they attack a neighbour; now is it

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likely that while we are masters of the sea they will cross over to an island? 110 Melians. But they would have others to send. The Cretan Sea is a wide one, and it is more difficult for those who command it to intercept others, than for those who wish to elude them to do so safely. And should the Lacedaemonians miscarry in this, they would fall upon your land, and upon those left of your allies whom Brasidas did not reach; and instead of places which are not yours, you will have to fight for your own country and your own confederacy. 111 Athenians. Some diversion of the kind you speak of you may one day experience, only to learn, as others have done, that the Athenians never once yet withdrew from a siege for fear of any. But we are struck by the fact that, after saying you would consult for the safety of your country, in all this discussion you have mentioned nothing which men might trust in and think to be saved by. Your strongest arguments depend upon hope and the future, and your actual resources are too scanty, as compared with those arrayed against you, for you to come out victorious. You will therefore show great blindness of judgement, unless, after allowing us to retire, you can find some counsel more prudent than this. You will surely not be caught by that idea of disgrace, which in dangers that are disgraceful, and at the same time too plain to be mistaken, proves so fatal to mankind; since in too many cases the very men that have their eyes perfectly open to what they are rushing into, let the thing called disgrace, by the mere influence of a seductive name, lead them on to a point at which they become so enslaved by the phrase as in fact to fall wilfully into hopeless disaster, and incur disgrace more disgraceful as the companion of error, than when it comes as the result of misfortune. This, if you are well advised, you will guard against; and you will not think it dishonourable to submit to the greatest city in Hellas, when it makes you the moderate offer of becoming its tributary ally, without ceasing to enjoy the country that belongs to you; nor when you have the choice given you between war and security, will you be so blinded as to choose the worse. And it is certain that those who do not yield to their equals, who keep terms with their superiors, and are moderate towards their inferiors, on the whole succeed best. Think over the matter, therefore, after our withdrawal, and reflect once and again that it is for your country

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that you are consulting, that you have not more than one, and that upon this one deliberation depends its prosperity or ruin. 112 The Athenians now withdrew from the conference; and the Melians, left to themselves, came to a decision corresponding with what they had maintained in the discussion, and answered: “Our resolution, Athenians, is the same as it was at first. We will not in a moment deprive of freedom a city that has been inhabited these seven hundred years; but we put our trust in the fortune by which the gods have preserved it until now, and in the help of men, that is, of the Lacedaemonians; and so we will try and save ourselves. Meanwhile we invite you to allow us to be friends to you and foes to neither party, and to retire from our country after making such a treaty as shall seem fit to us both”. 113 Such was the answer of the Melians. The Athenians now departing from the conference said: “Well, you alone, as it seems to us, judging from these resolutions, regard what is future as more certain than what is before your eyes, and what is out of sight, in your eagerness, as already coming to pass; and as you have staked most on, and trusted most in, the Lacedaemonians, your fortune, and your hopes, so will you be most completely deceived”. 114 The Athenian envoys now returned to the army; and the Melians showing no signs of yielding, the generals at once betook themselves to hostilities, and drew a line of circumvallation round the Melians, dividing the work among the different states. Subsequently, the Athenians returned with most of their army, leaving behind them a certain number of their own citizens and of the allies to keep guard by land and sea. The force thus left stayed on and besieged the place. 115 About the same time the Argives invaded the territory of Phlius and lost eighty men cut off in an ambush by the Phliasians and Argive exiles. Meanwhile, the Athenians at Pylos took so much plunder from the Lacedaemonians that the latter, although they still refrained from breaking off the treaty and going to war with Athens, yet proclaimed that any of their people that chose might plunder the Athenians. The Corinthians also commenced hostilities with the Athenians for private quarrels of their own; but the rest of the Peloponnesians stayed quiet. Meanwhile, the Melians attacked by night and took the part of the Athenian lines over against the market, and killed some of the men, and brought in corn and all else that they could find useful to them, and so returned and kept quiet, while the

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Athenians took measures to keep better guard in future Summer was now over. 116 The next winter the Lacedaemonians intended to invade the Argive territory, but arriving at the frontier found the sacrifices for crossing unfavourable, and went back again. This intention of theirs gave the Argives suspicions of certain of their fellow citizens, some of whom they arrested; others, however, escaped them. About the same time, the Melians again took another part of the Athenian lines which were but feebly garrisoned. Reinforcements afterwards arriving from Athens in consequence, under the command of Philocrates, son of Demeas, the siege was now pressed vigorously; and some treachery taking place inside, the Melians surrendered at discretion to the Athenians, who put to death all the grown men whom they took, and sold the women and children for slaves, and subsequently sent out five hundred colonists and inhabited the place themselves. Source Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War (Book 5, Chapters 84–116). Translation by Richard Crawley. London: Spottiswoode and Co., 1874. Available at http://www.sophia-project.org/ [Accessed on 28 February 2022].

Glossary

Billion Cubic Feet: A unit of gas measurement approximately equal to one trillion (1,000,000,000,000) Btu’s. British thermal unit: The British thermal unit (Btu) is the standard unit of measurement for heat and it is defined as the amount of energy needed to raise the temperature of one pound of water one-degree Fahrenheit from 58.5 to 59.5 degrees under standard pressure of 30 inches of mercury. 1 Btu is equal to 2.52 × 10–14 Mtoe. Bbd: Billion barrels per day. A measurement unit used in the oil market. CAPEX: Capital Expenditures (CapEx) are funds used to acquire, upgrade and maintain physical assets such as property, plants, buildings, technology or equipment. Collective Defence: It is an agreement among nation-states to offer defence support to other nation-states in case they are in danger or under attack. It is the basis of the classic defence alliances (i.e. NATO) and it is separated not only by geographical limitation, but also by its focus on military commitments. Critical Success Factors/Parameters: Limited number of characteristics, conditions or variables that have serious impact on the efficiency and viability of an organization or project. Cubic feet: A unit of measurement for volume. It represents an area one foot long, by one foot wide, by one foot deep. Natural gas is measured in cubic feet, but the measurements are usually expressed in terms of Mcf, Bcf, Tcf or Quads. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Flouros, Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09603-7

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DNA: DeoxyriboNucleic Acid (DNA), a self-replicating material which is present in nearly all living organisms as the main constituent of chromosomes. It is the carrier of genetic information. Downstream: It refers to the major activities usually after the refinery and includes piping, storage facilities, transportation, power stations and marketing activities. Energy: A basic entity of nature which is transferred between parts of a system in the production of physical change within the system and usually regarded as capacity for doing work. Energy intensity: Energy intensity is an indication of how much energy is used to produce one unit of economic output and lower ratio indicates that less energy is used to produce one unit of output. Force: It is one of the instruments of power and it is the use of a military or law enforcement capacity to achieve some objective. Gross Domestic Product: GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. GIC: Gross Inland Consumption of energy. It represents the quantity of energy required to meet inland consumption of a geographical entity. HydroCarbon: An organic compound containing only carbon and hydrogen. Hydrocarbons often occur in petroleum products, natural gas and coals. International Political Economy: International political economy is the study of the interplay of economics and politics in the world arena. Liquefaction: The process by which gas is converted into liquid. Liquefied Natural Gas: Natural gas that has been changed to liquid form, by cooling to around -162 degrees Celsius. Liquefied Petroleum Gas: Gas that consists of propane, propylene, butane and butylene in various mixtures. Mega-Joule: Mega-Joule (MJ) is a unit of work or energy equal to one million joules. Military strength: It refers to military capacity of the armed forces. It is usually seen as a static measure of the power of a state even though it is a variable that is a function of other parameters like the relative strength of opponents. MMcf: One Million cubic feet (MMcf) is a volume measurement of natural gas. National: Related to a nation including characteristic of a nationality.

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205

National defence: It refers to the capability of the armed forces to defend the sovereignty of the nation. NEPA: National Environmental Policy Act: The environmental law that establishes federal energy policy, sets goals and provides means for carrying out the policy. Natural Gas: A hydrocarbon gas that is obtained from underground sources, usually together with petroleum and coal deposits and it contains a high percentage of methane and inert gases. Peak-Shaving: Using sources of energy, such as natural gas from storage, to supplement the normal amounts delivered to customers during peak-use periods. Peak Use Period: The period of time when a material is used on a particular system is at its maximum and this is the period when supply is most likely to be suspended for interruptible service customers. PEST: PEST stands for: Political, Economic, Social, Technological. Pounds per Square Inch: Pressure with respect to atmosphere pressure. A pressure gauge reading in which the gauge is adjusted to read zero at the surrounding atmospheric pressure. Power: It is the nation’s possession of control of its sovereignty and destiny. Pressure, Absolute: Gauge pressure plus barometric or atmospheric pressure. Absolute pressure can be zero only in a perfect vacuum. Reserves: Volumes of hydrocarbons that are considered to be technically and economically recoverable. Reservoir: The portion of a resource that has been found and it is technically and economically extractable. R/P: The Resource to Production (R/P) ratio estimates how many years a resource site can continue to be considered as productive taking into account current production rates. SST: Sea Surface Temperature. Storage Facilities: Facilities used for storing goods (such as oil and natural gas). TOE: Tonne of Oil Equivalent (TOE) is a unit representing the energy that can be produced by burning one metric ton of crude oil. It is equal to 41.87 gigajoules (GJ), 39.68 million Btu (MMBtu) or 11.63 megawatt hours (MWh). Trillion Cubic Feet: A volume measurement of natural gas; approximately equivalent to one Quad. 1 trillion cubic feet (tcf) equals to 28.316 bcm.

206

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Upstream: Exploitation, exploration, crude oil and natural gas production. The major facilities are on- and off-shore wells, pumps, gas-oil separators, water processing plants, pressure maintenance equipment. WWII: World War II.

Further Readings

1 Acharya, A. (2014). The end of American world order. Polity Press. 2 Aklin, M., & Urpelainen, J. (2018). The politics of a global energy transition. The MIT Press. 3 Allison, G., & Zelikow, P. (1971). Essence of decision explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc. 4 Alsahiawi, M. (2021). OPEC and the world’s energy future: Its legacy and promise. CRC Press. 5 Anceschi, L., & Symons, J. (2012). Energy security in the era of climate change. Palgrave Macmillan. 6 Araujo, K. (2017). Low carbon energy transitions: Turning points in national policy and innovation. Oxford University Press. 7 Aricanli, T., & Rodrik, D. (1990). The political economy of Turkey. Palgrave Macmillan. 8 Axlerod, R. (2006). The evolution of cooperation. Basic Books. 9 Balaam, D. N., & Dillman, B. (2013). Introduction to international political economy. Pearson. 10 Balaam, D. N., & Veseth, M. (2004). Readings in international political economy. Prentice Hall. 11 Baldwin, D. A. (1985). Economic statecraft. Princeton University Press. 12 Beitz, C. (1999). Political theory and international relations. Princeton University Press. 13 Belyi, A. V. (2015). Transnational gas markets and Euro-Russian energy relations. Palgrave Macmillan. 14 Bonefeld, W. (2001). The politics of Europe. Palgrave Macmillan. 15 Braun, T. (2014). Understanding energy and energy policy. Zed Books Ltd. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Flouros, Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09603-7

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16 Bromley, S. (1991). American hegemony and world oil: the industry, the state system and the world economy. The Pennsylvania State University Press. 17 Brown, S. (2013). The future of US global power. Palgrave Macmillan. 18 Bull, H. (1995). The anarchical society. Columbia University Press. 19 Buzan, B. (1983). People, states and fear: The national security problem in international relations. Wheatsheaf Books Ltd. 20 Buzan, B. (1991). People, states and fear: An agenda for international security in the Post-Cold War era. University of North Carolina. 21 Buzan. B., Waever, O., & de Wilde, J. (1998). Security: A new framework for analysis. Lynne Rienner Publishers. 22 Buzan. B., & Waever, O. (2003). Regions and powers: The structure of international security. Cambridge University Press. 23 Cadman, T. (2013). Climate change and global policy regimes. Palgrave Macmillan. 24 Caldwell, C., & Williams, R. E., Jr. (2012). Seeking security in an insecure world. Rowman& Litterfield, Inc. 25 Chaturvedi, S., & Doyle, T. (2015). Climate terror: A critical geopolitics of climate change. Palgrave Macmillan. 26 Chin, G. (2013). The economic diplomacy of the rising powers. In A. Fenton (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of modern diplomacy (pp. 881–900). Oxford University Press. 27 Clark, J. (1990). The political economy of world energy: A twentieth century perspective. University of North Carolina Press. 28 Clark, B. (1998). Political economy: A comparative approach. Palgrave. 29 Cohen, B. J. (2000). The geography of money. Cornell University Press. 30 Collins, A. (2013). Contemporary security studies (3rd ed.). Oxford University Press. 31 Conant, M., & Gold, F. (1978). The geopolitics of energy. Westview Press. 32 Cox, R. W. (1997). The new realism. Palgrave Macmillan. 33 Cox, R., & Sinclair, T. (1996). Approaches to world order. Cambridge University Press. 34 Crush, J. (Ed.). (1995). Power of development. Routledge. 35 Dalby S., & O’Lear, S. (Ed.). (2015). Reframing climate change: Constructing ecological geopolitics. Routledge. 36 Dannreuther, R. (2007). International security: The contemporary agenda. Polity Press. 37 David, S. (1992). Choosing sides: Alignment and realignment in the third world. John Hopkins University Press. 38 Dee, M. (2015). The European Union in a multipolar world: World trade, global governance and the case of the WTO. Palgrave Pivot. 39 De Ridder, M. (2013). The geopolitics of mineral resources for renewable energy technologies. The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies.

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40 De Sombre, E. R. (2000). Domestic sources of international environmental policy. The MIT Press. 41 Dewey, J. (1933). How we think. Lexington. 42 Dianu, D., Giorgio Basevi, G., Carlo DâAdda, & Kumar, R. (2014). The Eurozone crisis and the future of Europe. Springer. 43 Dickinson, G. L. (1916). The European anarchy. Macmillan. 44 Dixon, T. H. (2006). The upside of the down: Catastrophe, creativity, and the renewal of civilization. The Island Press. 45 Doornbos, M. (2006). Global forces and state restructuring. Palgrave Macmillan. 46 Dougherty, J. E., & Pfaltzgraff, R. L. (2000). Contenting theories of international relations. Addison Wesley Longman, Inc. 47 Doyle, M. (1997). Ways of war and peace: Realism, liberalism and socialism. Norton. 48 Drezner, D. W. (2007). The new world order. Foreign Affairs, 86(2), 34–46. 49 Ebinger, C. (1982). The critical link: Energy and national security in 1980s. CSIS. 50 Eitzen, D. S., & Zinn, M. B. (2009). Globalization: The transformation of social worlds. Belmont Cengage Learning. 51 Erisman, M. (1992). Pursuing post-dependency politics. Lynne Reinner. 52 Fairgrieve, J. (1915). Geography and world power. University of London Press. 53 Fierke, K. M. (2007). Critical approaches to international security. Polity Press. 54 Gilpin, R. (1981). War and change in world politics. Cambridge University Press. 55 Gilpin, R. (2001). Global political economy. Princeton University Press. 56 Glaser, C. L. (2010). Rational theory of international politics. Princeton University Press. 57 Goldstein, J., Kahler, M., Keohane, R., & Slaughter, A. (Ed.). (2001). Legalization and world politics. The MIT Press. 58 Goldthau, A. (2016). The handbook of global energy policy. Wiley-Blackwell. 59 Gramsci, A. (1973). Prison notebooks. International Publishers. 60 Gray, C. S., & Sloan, G. R. (Eds.). (1999). Geopolitics, geography and strategy. Frank Cass. 61 Grieco, J. M. (1990). Cooperation among nations: Europe, America and nontariff barriers to trade. Cornell University Press. 62 Gruber, L. (2000). Ruling the world: Power politics and the rise of supranational institutions. Princeton University Press. 63 Guzzini, S. (2003). Realism in international relations and international political economy. Routledge.

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64 Guzzini, S., & Neumann, I. (2012). The diffusion of power in global governance. Palgrave Macmillan. 65 Heffron, R. J. (2015). Deconstructing energy law and policy: The case of nuclear energy. Edinburgh University Press. 66 Hobbes, T. (1968). Leviathan. Penguin. Originally published 1651. 67 Hogselius, P. (2019). Energy and geopolitics. Taylor & Francis Ltd. 68 Hook, S. W. (2017). U.S. Foreign Policy: The paradox of world power. Sage. 69 Huntington, S. (1997). The clash of civilization and the making of world order. Simon & Shuster. 70 Huntington, S. (2006). Political order in changing societies. Yale University Press. 71 Huotari, M., & Hanemann, T. (2014). Emerging powers and change in the global financial order. Global Policy, 5(3), 298–310. 72 Jawad, H. A. (1997). The Middle East in the new world order. Palgrave Macmillan. 73 Jervis, R. (2017). Perception and misperception in world politics. Princeton University Press. 74 Kaplan, M. A. (1957). System and process in international politics. John Wiley. 75 Kaplan, R. D. (1996). Balkan ghosts: A journey through history. Vintage Books. 76 Katzenstein, P. J. (1996). The culture of national security. Columbia University Press. 77 Kay, S. (2012). Global security in the twenty-first century (2nd ed.). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 78 Kegley, C. W., Jr. (1994). Controversies in international relations theory: Realism and the neoliberal challenge. Martin’s Press. 79 Kellstedt, P. M., & Whitten, G. D. (2013). The fundamentals of political science research (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. 80 Kennedy, P. (1988). The rise and fall of the great powers. Unwin Hyman. 81 Keohane, R., & Nye, J. (1997). Power and interdependence. Little, Brown, and Company. 82 Keohane, R. (2005). After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy (Princeton Classic Editions). Princeton University Press. 83 Klare, M. (2001). Resource wars: The new landscape of global conflict. Henry Holt. 84 Klare, M. (2004). Blood and oil: The dangers and consequences of America’s growing dependency on imported petroleum. Metropolitan Books. 85 Knorr, K. (1973). The USES of economic power (I). In Power and wealth: The political economy of international relations. Palgrave Macmillan. 86 Kraft, M. (2021). Environmental policy and politics. Routledge. 87 Krasner, S. (1978). Defending the national interest: Raw materials investments and US Foreign Policy. Princeton.

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88 Krasner, S. D. (1983). International regimes. Cornell University Press. 89 Krasner, S. D. (1999). Sovereignty. Princeton University Press. 90 Macfarlane, S. N. (2006). The ‘R’ in BRICs: Is Russia an emerging power? International Affairs, 82(1), 41–57. 91 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (2014). The communist manifesto. International Publishers Co. 92 Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The tragedy of great power politics. W. W. Norton. 93 Mearsheimer, J. (2006). Structural realism. University of Chicago. 94 Mearsheimer, J. (2014). Tragedy of great power politics, W. W. Norton. 95 Moe, E., & Midford, P. (2014). The political economy of renewable energy and energy security. Palgrave Macmillan. 96 Morgan, P. (2006). International security: Problems and solutions. Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 97 Morgenthau, H. J. (1946). Scientific man versus power politics. University of Chicago Press. 98 Morgenthau, H. J. (1973). Politics among nations. Knopf. 99 Morgenthau, H. J., & Thompson, K. W. (1993). Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace. McGraw-Hill. 100 Nagel, E. (1961). The structure of science. Brace and World 101 Neumann, S. (Ed.). (1998). International relations theory and the third world. Martin’s Press. 102 Niebuhr, R. (1932). Moral man and immoral society: A study in ethics and politics. Scribners. 103 Nye, J. (1997). Understanding international conflicts: An introduction to theory and history (6th ed.). Pearson. 104 Nye, J. (2004). Soft power: The means to success in world politics. Public Affairs. 105 Nye, J. (2011). The future of power. Public Affairs. 106 Sim, L.-C. (2008). The rise and fall of privatization in the Russian oil industry. Palgrave Macmillan. 107 Lipman, M., & Petrov, N. (2015). The state of Russia: What comes next? Palgrave Macmillan. 108 Luard, E. (1992). Basic texts in international relations. Martin’s Press. 109 Okpanachi, E., & Chowdhari, R. T. (2021). The political economy of natural resource funds. Palgrave Macmillan. 110 O’Lear, S. (2018). Environmental geopolitics. Rowman & Littlefield. 111 O’Sullivan, M. (2017). Windfall. Simon & Schuster. 112 Oyewunmi, T., & Crossley, P. (Ed.). (2020). Decarbonisation and the energy industry: Law, policy and regulation in low-carbon energy markets. Global Energy Law and Policy. Hart Publishing. 113 Pape, R. A. (1996). Bombing to win. Cornell University Press. 114 Quester, G. (1977). Offense and defense in the international system. Wiley.

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115 Rifkin, J. (2002). The hydrogen economy: The creation of the worldwide energy web and the redistribution of power on earth. J.P. Tarcher/Putnam. 116 Roeben, V., Cameron, P. D., & Mu, X. (Eds.). (2021). The global energy transition: Law, policy and economics for energy in the 21st century. Hart Publishing. 117 Rosenberg, J. (1994). Empire of civil society: A critique of the realist theory of international relations. Verso. 118 Rubino, A., Sapio, A., & La Scala, M. (Eds.). (2021). Handbook of energy economics and policy: Fundamentals and applications for engineers and energy planners. Academic Press. 119 Saderbaum, F. (2004). The political economy of regionalism. Palgrave Macmillan. 120 Sampson, A. (1975). The Seven Sisters. The Viking Press. 121 Schwarzenberg, G. (1941). Power politics: An introduction to the study of international relations and postwar planning. Jonathan Cope. 122 Schnurr, M. A., & Swatuk, L. A. (2012). Natural resources and social conflict. Palgrave Macmillan. 123 Schelling, T. (2008). Arms and influence: With a new preface and afterword. The Henry L. Stimson Lectures Series. Yale University Press. 124 Shively, W. P. (1990). The craft of political research (3rd ed.). Prentice-Hall. 125 Schmidt, B. (1998). The political discourse of anarchy. Stake University of NY Press. 126 Scoones, I., Leach, M., & Newell, P. (2015). The politics of green transformations. Routledge. 127 Semple, E. C. (1911). Influences of geographic environment on the basis of Ratzel’s system of anthropogeography. Henry Holt. 128 Shaffer, B. (2009). Energy politics. University of Pennsylvania Press. 129 Slater, D. (2010). Ordering power: Contentious politics and authoritarian leviathans in Southeast Asia. Cambridge University Press. 130 Snarr, M. T. & Snarr, D. N. (Eds.). (2016). Introducing global issues. Lynne Reinner. 131 Smil, V. (2010). Energy myths and realities: Bringing science to the energy policy debate. AEI Press. 132 Smith, A. (1776). An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. 1 (2nd ed.). W. Strahan; T. Cadell. 133 Smith, M. E. (2010). International security: Politics, policy, prospects. Palgrave Macmillan. 134 Snyder, G. (1997). Alliance politics. Cornell University Press. 135 Sovacool, B. K. (2011). The Routledge handbook of energy security. Routledge. 136 Spegele, R. (1996). Political realism in international theory. Cambridge University Press.

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137 Spero, J. (1997). The politics of international economic relations. Martin’s Press. 138 Strange, S. (1994). States and markets. Pinter. 139 Strange, S. (1996). The retreat of the state, the diffusion of power in the world economy. Cambridge University Press. 140 Strausz-Hupe, R. (1972). Geopolitics: The struggle for space and power (Reprint ed.). Henry Holt. 141 Tunsjo, O. (2013). Security and profit in China’s energy policy: Hedging against risk. Columbia University Press. 142 Van Evera, S. (1997). Guide to methods for students of political science. Cornell University Press. 143 Van Evera, S. (1999). Causes of war: Vol. I: The structure of power and the roots of conflict. Cornell University Press. 144 Van de Graaf, T., Sovacool, B. K., Ghosh, A., Kern, F., & Klare, M. T. (Eds.). (2016). The Palgrave handbook of the international political economy of energy. Palgrave Macmillan. 145 Vasquez, J. A. (2004). The power of power politics: From classical realism to neotraditionalism. Cambridge University Press. 146 Viotti, P. R., & Kauppi, M. V. (2012). International relations theory: Realism, pluralism, globalism. Maxwell Macmillan Canada. 147 Wallerstein, I. (1976). The modern world system. Norton. 148 Waltz, K. (2009). Realism and international politics. Routledge. 149 Waltz, K. (2010). Theory of international politics. Waveland Press. 150 Waltz, K. (2018). Man, the state, and war. Columbia University Press. 151 Weber, C. (2010). International relations theory: A critical introduction (3rd ed.). Routledge. 152 Wendt, A. (1999). Social theory of international politics. Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge University Press. 153 Williams, W. D. (2013). Security studies: An introduction (2nd ed.). Routledge. 154 Woodard, B. (2004). Plan of attack. Simon & Schuster Paperbacks. 155 Yergin, D. (1991). The prize: The epic quest for oil. Simon and Schuster. 156 Yergin, D. (2011). The quest: Energy, security, and the remaking of the modern world. Penguin Press. 157 Yergin, D. (2020). The new map: Energy. Penguin Press.

Index

A Abraham Accords, 120, 146 Actor, 5, 6, 8, 12, 20, 21, 27, 40, 51, 56, 77, 127 Adiri Committee, 152 Advanced economy, 50, 162 Aegean Sea, 99, 117 AKP party, 104 3+1 alliance, 111, 113 Anarchy, 6, 10, 12, 13, 20, 130 Andropov, Yuri, 43 Antitrust Regulation, 76 Aphrodite gas field, 110, 111, 166 Arab Gas Pipeline (AGP), 96, 98, 101, 155, 156 Arab Spring, 94, 95, 104, 112 Arab world, 104, 145, 146, 149 Art, Robert, 12 ASEAN, 65 B Bahrain, 120, 146 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC), 94 Biden, Joe, 41, 81

Brezhnev, Leonid, 43 British Petroleum, 36, 96 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 12 Bush, George H.W., 41, 46

C Canada, 37, 46, 65 Carbon capture technology, 82, 88 Carbon Capture, Utilization and Storage (CCUS), 55 Carr, E.H., 7–9 Carter, Jimmy, 40 Case study, 23, 24, 132, 133 Casual theory, 135, 140 Catalyst, 170, 171 Chernenko, Konstantin, 43 China, 2, 21, 27, 28, 35, 39–42, 44–46, 53, 79 Hu Jintao, 42 Jiang Zemin, 42 Xi Jinping, 43 Civilization, degree of progress, 56 Classic realism, 8, 10

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Flouros, Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09603-7

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INDEX

Climate change, 23, 40–42, 50, 52, 65, 68, 76, 77, 81, 85, 86, 88, 107, 112, 114, 118, 119, 122 Climatic hot spot, 122 Clinton, Bill, 41, 46 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 75 Conceptual framework, 24, 127, 131, 136, 137, 139, 141, 182 update, 178 Constructivism, 6, 14, 130, 131 Contingency plan, 188, 189 COP26, 52 COVID-19, 2, 41, 48, 55, 68, 84, 85, 107 Crimea, 82 Cyprus, 23, 75, 91, 93, 95, 98, 99, 102, 105, 108, 110–113, 115, 116, 119, 120, 133, 141, 142, 145–147, 156–159, 161–163, 165–168, 170–172, 190, 191 Cyprus Energy Regulatory Authority (CERA), 169 D Decarbonization, 68 Defensive realism, 12 Development, 1, 2, 10, 21, 24, 28, 31, 35, 36, 44, 49, 54, 57, 63, 65, 66, 68, 82, 99, 101, 103, 111, 115, 117–119, 131, 155–158, 165, 169, 178, 180, 190, 191 Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy, 122 Doctrine, 40–44, 46, 187, 190 E Eastern Mediterranean, 24, 56, 91, 93–95, 100, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110–113, 115, 117–122, 133, 145, 154, 157, 159, 166, 190

Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), 113, 120 East Med Energy Cooperation, 111 East Med Pipeline, 115–117 Efficiency, 44, 45, 50, 54, 56, 65, 68, 75, 78, 88, 117, 119 Egypt, 91, 95, 96, 98, 99, 111, 113–115, 117–120, 146, 155, 156, 158, 161, 166 Electricity, 52, 53, 68, 78, 79, 83, 101, 105, 107, 111, 115, 118, 119, 150, 152, 156, 165, 166, 169 Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC), 165, 166 Emerging and developing economies, 50 Energy corridor, 72 Energy intensity, 36, 48, 50, 76, 121, 150, 163 Energy policy, 35, 74, 77, 100, 151, 153, 156, 167, 180, 185, 188–191 Energy Return on Energy Investment (EROEI), 39 Energy Security (ES), 3, 21, 23, 24, 31, 35, 36, 40, 42, 45, 48, 49, 52, 55, 56, 66–68, 75, 76, 79, 82, 93, 95, 99, 102, 106, 109, 112, 113, 115–119, 127, 136, 138, 141, 145, 153, 158, 170–172, 177–182, 184 Energy transition, 24, 30, 35, 49, 51, 52, 55, 78, 81, 87, 112, 117, 119 Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI), 45, 96 Environment, Social and Governance (ESG), 86 Erdo˘gan, Recep Tayyip, 28 EU Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 115

INDEX

EuroAfrica interconnector, 111 EuroAsia interconnector, 111 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), 114 European Energy Security Strategy (EUESS), 76 European Green Deal, 68, 78, 85 European Union (EU), 28, 40, 63, 64, 66–70, 74, 75, 77–86, 88, 104, 109, 112, 114, 115, 119, 156, 159, 162, 165, 167, 191 Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), 98, 105, 108, 111, 151, 159, 161, 166, 171 Exploration and Production Agreements (EPAs), 102 External effect, 34

F Factors and indicators, 19 FLNG, 156, 157, 191 Fossil fuels, 38, 45, 53, 54, 69, 75, 81, 82, 87, 88, 119, 158, 165 France, 15, 28, 46, 69, 70, 108

G G20, 29, 107 Gaza Marine, 102 Gaza Strip, 95, 146, 147 Gilpin, Robert, 8, 13, 14, 130 Global fundamental, 35, 49 Global warming, 52, 53 GNP, 91 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 43 Greece, 7, 91, 95, 98–100, 108, 111, 113, 115–117, 119, 120, 157, 184 Green Deal. See European Green Deal Grieco, Joseph, 13, 130

217

Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 28, 29, 46, 48, 50, 66, 85, 91, 106, 149, 150, 162, 163

H Hard power, 11, 20, 129 Health crisis, 2, 67 Hubbert peak theory, 38, 39 Hu, Jintao, 42 Human civilization, 1, 44 Hydrocarbon, 93, 94, 99, 100, 103, 111, 115, 118, 119, 155, 166 Hydrogen, 53, 54, 82 blue hydrogen, 54, 82 green hydrogen, 54, 82, 83 grey hydrogen, 54, 82

I IMF, 66 Industrial Revolution, 16, 30, 65, 188 Institution, 3, 8, 13, 14, 21, 22, 77, 85, 87, 112, 128, 130, 152, 159, 165, 182 Interdisciplinary approach, 24, 181 International Political Economy (IPE), 5, 6, 14, 15, 19, 21, 23, 24, 31, 49, 127, 128, 135, 139, 177 International Relations, 5, 6, 8, 10–15, 18, 20, 27, 43, 127–131, 135 Iran–Iraq War, 31 Iranian revolution, 31 Israel, 23, 91, 93–96, 98, 99, 103, 111–116, 118–120, 141, 142, 145, 146, 148–150, 152–158, 170, 190, 191

J Japan, 35, 49, 65

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INDEX

Jiang, Zemin, 42 Jordan, 91, 95, 96, 98, 100, 113, 114, 146, 156, 190 Jørgensen, Knud Erik, 13

K Karish gas field, 152, 155 Kemalism, 104 Kennan, George, 8, 10 Keohane, Robert, 14, 130 Keynes, John Maynard, 17 Kissinger, Henry, 177 Knesset, 148 Krasner, Stephen, 13, 14, 130

L Lakatos, Imre, 18 Leadership, 23, 28, 42, 56, 66, 170, 180 Lebanon, 91, 96, 101–103, 108, 109, 114, 145, 146, 156 Levant Basin, 93 Leviathan, 152, 155 Liberal, 14, 20, 22, 130, 187 Libya, 39, 95, 108, 114 Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), 71, 80–82, 115, 117, 120 Lisbon Treaty, 74 Lobell, Steven, 12 Long-term, 2, 28, 35, 49, 55, 67, 78, 85, 86, 103, 105, 106, 115, 181, 184, 186, 187, 191

M Machiavelli, 6 Market capitalization, 46 Market expectation, 34 Marxism, 16 Mearsheimer, John, 12, 13 Medvedev, Dmitry, 44

Melian Dialogue, 7 Military defence, 178 Military expenditure, 149, 163 Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (MENR), 106 Morgenthau, H.J., 7–9 Morocco, 114, 120 Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (MDCA), 100 N National Defense Strategy (NDS), 41 National Energy and Climate Governance System (NCI), 167 National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP), 78 National Oil Companies (NOC), 42 National Security (NS), 3, 6, 14, 22–24, 41, 44, 56, 66, 93, 108, 127, 138, 139, 141, 145, 158, 159, 170–172, 177, 178, 180, 187, 190 NATO, 40, 41, 65, 107, 112, 203 Neorealism, 10 Netanyahu, Benjamin, 155, 190 Noble–Delek, 155 Noble Energy, 152 Non-OECD, 36, 37 Nord Stream II, 72, 81 North America, 35, 36, 49, 67 Norway, 39, 65, 70, 73 Nye, Joseph, 14, 20, 130 O Obama, Barak, 41 Offensive realism, 12 Offshore, 82, 93, 102, 115–117, 150, 166 Oil and gas international companies, 45, 51 Oil crisis, 45, 177

INDEX

Oil shocks, 31 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 29, 36 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 31, 37, 39, 45, 48

P Palestinian Authority, 91, 102, 103, 114, 145 Pandemic, 2, 3, 41, 48, 55, 67, 68, 84, 85, 107, 148 Persian Gulf War, 31 PEST analysis, 148, 161 Pipeline import routes, 72 PLO, 147 Policy, 3, 19, 22, 41–43, 57, 63, 101, 107, 119, 154, 181 Political Economy (PE), 128 Political science, 5, 15, 18, 128, 132 Political system, 3, 181 Popper, Karl, 17 Powell, Colin, 41 Power, 1, 6, 7, 10–14, 20, 23, 40, 45, 55, 56, 67, 82, 107, 120, 128–131, 169, 171, 184 Power struggle, 82 Primary energy, 48, 53, 68–70, 96, 99, 101, 118, 166 production of, 70 Primary energy supply, 150 Production cost, 34 Projects of Common Interest (PCI), 115 Proven oil reserves, 37 Putin, Vladimir, 28, 44, 82

Q Quester, George, 12

219

R Raw material cost, 34, 63 Reagan, Ronald, 41 Realism, 6–8, 13, 14, 20, 22, 127, 128, 130, 131, 171 Renewable Energy Sources (RES), 42, 48, 49, 51, 54, 68, 69, 78, 80, 81, 96, 99, 101–103, 107, 111, 117, 119, 166 geopolitics of, 48 Research, 18, 35, 63, 78, 86, 99, 108, 130, 132, 139–141, 183, 184 Reserves-to-Production (R/P) ratio, 38 Resilience, 41, 42, 64, 68, 78, 85, 113, 122, 137, 181 Resources, 2, 11, 12, 15, 19–21, 23, 31, 35, 38, 44, 49, 66, 84, 87, 94, 95, 100, 103, 105, 112, 115, 117, 119, 129, 153, 159, 166, 171, 181 Robustness, 137, 181 Russia, 27, 28, 35, 39–41, 43, 45, 46, 64, 65, 70, 75, 80–82, 99, 109–112, 115 Boris Yeltsin, 44 Dmitry Medvedev, 44 Konstantin Chernenko, 43 Leonid Brezhnev, 43 Mikhail Gorbachev, 43 Vladimir Putin, 44 Yuri Andropov, 43 S Sankey diagram, 68 Saudi Arabia, 37, 39, 40, 46, 95 Security, 12, 20, 63, 64, 112, 127 Seven Sisters, 45 Shale gas, 35, 40, 49, 81 Short/medium-term, 35, 49, 103, 156, 186, 191 Smith, Adam, 16

220

INDEX

Social impact, 86 Soft power, 20, 43 Sovereignty, 8, 22, 65, 82, 137, 145, 153, 157, 162, 171, 181, 190, 191 Staff Working Documents (SWDs), 79 Stakeholder, 4, 5, 20, 65, 87, 95, 96, 119, 131, 159, 162 Stakeholder theory, 3 State boundary, 19, 23 State stakeholder, 19 Strange, Susan, 13, 14, 130 Strategic Compass, 63, 64 Strategic material, 84 Strategic Plan, 106 Sudan, 95, 120 Suez Crisis, 31 Supply-demand balance, 34, 80 Sustainable Development Goals, 52 Syria, 91, 94, 96, 98, 103, 105, 108, 114, 145, 146, 156

T Tanin gas field, 152, 155 The Middle East, 35, 36, 40, 42, 49, 111, 117, 146, 159, 177, 184 Theory, 5, 6, 8, 10, 13–16, 20, 23, 127, 129, 132, 133, 139, 184 Thermodynamic, 3 Thucydides, 6, 7, 18, 129 Timeline, 19 Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), 105 Trump, Donald, 41, 46 Turkey, 28, 72, 77, 91, 95, 96, 98, 103–110, 112, 114, 117, 119, 120, 161, 166, 170–172, 184 Tzemach Committee, 154, 155

U Ukraine, 63–65, 67, 72, 73, 81, 82, 119 Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), 114 United Arab Emirates (UAE), 120, 146 United Kingdom (UK), 28, 46, 65, 70, 73 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 147, 161 United Nations (UN), 22, 44, 52, 160 United States (US), 12, 21, 27, 35, 39, 40, 45, 65, 71, 81, 93, 100, 105, 107, 111, 113, 177 Barak Obama, 41 Bill Clinton, 41 Colin Powell, 41 Donald Trump, 41 George H.W. Bush, 41 Jimmy Carter, 40 Joe Biden, 41 Ronald Reagan, 41 USSR, 27, 43

V van Evera, Stephen, 12, 134 Variables, 15, 20, 21, 128, 132, 133, 135, 138, 139, 184 Vital energy system, 179, 180 von der Leyen, Ursula, 77 Vulnerability, 177, 179

W Walt, Stephen, 12 Waltz, Kenneth, 10, 11, 14, 129 Water temperature, 120 Western Balkans, 65

INDEX

X Xi, Jinping, 28, 43

Yon Kippur war, 147

Y Yeltsin, Boris, 44

Z Zohr, 93, 96

221