Elements of controversy: the Atomic Energy Commission and radiation safety in nuclear weapons testing, 1947-1974 9780520083233
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English Pages [644] Year 1994
Frontmatter (page N/A)
Maps (page xi)
Foreword by Bruce W. Church (page xiii)
About this Book by William J. Brady (page xv)
Introduction: Testing and Radiological Safety (page 1)
1. Operation Sandstone: The AEC Test Program Begins, 1947-1948 (page 10)
2. A Continental Test Site: Operation Greenhouse and Ranger 1948-1951 (page 36)
3. Developing Weapons and Tactics in Nevada (page 60)
4. Testing Jeopardized: Fallout from Ivy and Upshot-Knothole, 1952-1953 (page 82)
5. The cost of Sheep: Fallout and the Future of Nevada's Testing (page 106)
6. Operation Castle, 1954 (page 131)
7. Routinization and Controversy: Accelerated Testing and Rising Public Concern, 1955-1956 (page 159)
8. Atmospheric Testing Challenged: Safety Issues and the Test Ban Movement, 1956-1961 (page 185)
9 From Moratorium to Test Ban: Radiation Safety in Transition, 1961-1964 (page 211)
10. Testing Underground: The New Character of Radiation Safety, 1964-1974 (page 236)
Epilogue: After the AEC, 1975-1990 (page 259)
Appendix (page 281)
Acronyms and Abbreviations (page 283)
Notes (page 291)
Bibliography (page 491)
Test Index (page 565)
Notes Index (page 591)
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Elements of Controversy
The Atomic Energy Commission and Radiation Safety in Nuclear Weapons Testing 1947-1974
Barton C. Hacker
University of California Press Berkeley / Los Angeles / London
University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University of California Press London, England Copyright © 1994 by The Regents of the University of California Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hacker, Barton C., 1935~ Elements of controversy: the Atomic Energy Commission and radiation safety in nuclear weapons testing, 1947-1974 / Barton C. Hacker.
p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-520-08323-7 1. Nuclear weapons—United States—Testing—Safety measures— History. 2. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission—History. I. Title. U264.3.H333 1994 355.8’25119’0973—dc20
93-41611 CIP Printed in the United States of America
123456789 The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984
For Sally
Contents
Maps xi
Foreword © Bruce W. Church xiii About This Book ¢ William J. Brady = xv Preface = Xxi
Introduction: Testing and Radiological Safety 1 The Manhattan Project Legacy l
The Third Wave 6
1 Operation Sandstone: The AEC Test Program
Begins, 1947-1948 10 The Formation of Joint Task Force 7 10 Establishing the Pacific Proving Ground 14 Planning Radiation Safety 19 Preparations at Enewetak 23
X-Ray 27 Yoke, Zebra, and Roll-up 3]
2 A Continental Test Site: Operations Greenhouse
and Ranger, 1948-1951 36 Greenhouse Plans 36 Finding a North American Test Site 40 Preparing for Operation Ranger 44 vil
vill Contents Testing in Nevada Begins 48 Greenhouse at Last 53 Thermonuclear Experiments 56
3 Developing Weapons and Tactics tn Nevada:
Testing and Troop Maneuvers, 1951-1952 60 Jangle Feasibility 60 Military Needs and AEC Standards 65
Buster-Jangle 69 Rad-Safe Plans and Training 72 Desert Rock and Tumbler-Snapper 77
4 Testing Jeopardized: Fallout from Ivy and
Upshot-Knothole, 1952-1953 82 Toward Thermonuclear Weapons 82
Mike and King 86 Safeguarding Civilians and Troops 89
Desert Rock V 95 Upshot-Knothole 99
Fallout in Nevada and Utah 102
5 The Cost of Sheep: Fallout and the Future of Nevada Testing, 1953 106 Livestock Problems Emerge 106 Preliminary Findings 111 Exposure Standards under Attack 115 Hard Thinking about Safety Problems 119 Absolving Radioactivity 123 Scientists versus Stockmen 127
6 Operation Castle, 1954 131 Castle Foundations 131
Bravo 136 Evacuation 140 The Unlucky Dragon 148 Castle after Bravo 152 First Repercussions 155
Contents Ix 7 Routinization and Controversy: Accelerated Testing and Rising Public
Concern, 1955-1956 159 Reshaping Public Safety 159 Operation Teapot 164 Testing Underwater 170 Safety Testing Begins 172 Operation Redwing 176 Strontium and Sunshine 180
8 Atmospheric Testing Challenged: Safety Issues and the Test Ban
Movement, 1956-1961 185 New Guidelines 185 Plumbbob and the End of Desert Rock 189 Hardtack and Argus 192 Toward the Moratorium 196 Nuclear Rockets and Ramjets in Nevada 200 Tunnels, Shafts, and Craters 205
9 From Moratorium to Test Ban: Radiation
Safety in Transition, 1961-1964 211 Nougatand Gnome 211 The Last Pacific Tests 215 Fallout from Sedan 219 Radioiodine Matters 222 Testing and Thyroid Disease 226 Problems of Treaty Compliance 230
10 Testing Underground: The New Character
of Radiation Safety, 1964-1974 236 Nuclear Excavation 236 Plowshare’s Fading Promise 241 From Mississippi to Alaska 244
Baneberry 247 The Issue of Low-Level Radiation 251
Caring forthe Natives 254
Xx Contents Epilogue: After the AEC, 1975-1990 259 Congressional Initiatives 259 Executive Action 261 The Quest forCompensation 266 Radiation Exposure versus Radiation Damage 272
History and Health Effects 276
Appendix 281 Acronyms and Abbreviations 283
Notes 291
Bibliography 491
Books 491 Conference Proceedings and Other Edited Works 500 Magazine and Journal! Articles 511 Newspaper and News Magazine Articles 530 Congressional Hearings and Reports 532 Nuclear Test Personnel Review Reports 535 Other Government Documents 541 Unpublished Articles, Manuscripts, and Dissertations 560
TextIndex 565 Notes Index 591
Maps
1. The Central Pacific 5 2. The northern Marshall Islands 15
3. Enewetak atoll, 1948 16 4. The southwestern United States 41
5. Nevada Test Site and vicinity, 1951 49
6. Bikini atoll, 1954 133
7. Castle Bravo dose contours after 96 hours, 1-5 March 1954 144
xi
Foreword
This project was conceived more than fifteen years ago, its objective to document the history and development of the radiological safety program that supported America’s nuclear weapons testing program. Elements of Controversy 1s the second of two volumes, following The Dragon’s Tail, published in 1987. Together the two books cover over fifty years of often-controversial history, demanding of the author, Barton Hacker, an extraordinary research and writing effort. Hacker was hired in 1978 by Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Company, Inc. (REECo), a Department of Energy Nevada Operations (DOE/NV) prime contractor, specifically to write this history, which he continued to work on even after leaving REECo in 1986 for Oregon State University. In 1992, he assumed the newly created post of historian at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The development of this book, like the subject itself, has not been without
controversy. Its title could not be more appropriate. As project manager of this work, I have found one of my most difficult jobs to be ensuring that history, facts, and interpretations were acceptable both to the author and to those of whom he has written. I have learned a great deal about the recording of history and its interpretation as these two books have progressed. Simply put, it is much easier to write about history so old that only documents remain. Contemporary events are much more difficult to write about because one has to deal with the memory and interpretation of events by those who actually lived them and produced the written records. Without a doubt, none of us—not the author, not myself, not anyone else at REECo or DOE/NV—fully understood when this project was launched how large an undertaking it would prove to be. It has certainly taken considxiii
xiv Foreword erably more time than we had projected, much of it consumed during the review process. Many individuals who participated in this history provided critiques of the work. Comments did not always agree, and Hacker was required to resolve any conflicts, a process that sometimes generated heated emotion. Time-consuming though it might have been, the review process was vital in ensuring the greatest possible accuracy of the final product. I hope that the many thousands, perhaps millions, of those whose lives have been affected by the testing of nuclear weapons will find this work of value. The author, management, and project staff have long labored to bring together an account of events that involved both those working in the radiological safety program and those it served to protect. I have learned that a truly perfect history of contemporary events is impossible. Some of the reasons for this are stated above; in addition, the written word is fallible, can be incomplete, and can be shaped by personal experience and perceptions. However, I believe the author has tried to be objective. As he states in his epilogue, the conclusions are his. Reviews have served primarily to clarify and establish facts surrounding events. For those who question this written account, virtually all the documents cited in the book’s voluminous source notes are available to the public. The same DOE/NV project that sponsored Hacker has archived nearly 250,000
documents that are open for public examination and research at the Coordination and Information Center, 3084 South Highland Drive, Las Vegas, Nevada. Information or requests can also be handled by telephone; call (702) 295-0731. In conclusion, I wish to thank Dr. Hacker for his dedication and hard work in producing the two books. I would also like to thank alli those who assisted in finding, recording, and archiving many of the source documents, as well as those who gave their time for interviews and reviews. The many federal and contract staff members who worked to bring this project to fruition are to be congratulated; I extend sincere thanks to them as well. Bruce W. Church Assistant Manager for Environment, Safety, & Health Nevada Field Office U.S. Department of Energy Project Manager
About This Book
Memory fades as time passes, and history may be the loser if setting down the facts is delayed too long. Because Elements of Controversy originated in unusual circumstances embedded in controversy, the review panel for this
book concluded that some account of its institutional and political provenance would help readers to evaluate what they find here. In the panel’s view, my long association with the project made me the logical person to explain the book’s background. Endless questions might be raised about such a project. What unlikely mix of political, legal, and bureaucratic concerns induced a government agency to
sponsor such a work in the first place? How could interest in a relatively modest fact book become long-term support for a major scholarly study of an intensely sensitive subject? Why did the parties involved agree to seek an outside professional historian? How was Barton Hacker chosen to write the book? What arrangements were made to ensure that he could do so without
compromising professional standards? How was the manuscript to be reviewed and approved? What problems did he face in completing the work? I cannot answer all these questions definitively, but having been personally involved at virtually every stage of the project, I can offer some observations on the process. For me the story began in 1957 with Reynolds Electrical and Engineering
Co., Inc., at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), where I worked with Floyd W. (Wes) Wilcox, then superintendent of REECo’s Radiological Safety Division.
At that time personnel radiation exposure, or dosimetry, records were scattered about the country, and not much thought had been given to preserving them. Wes and I were sure, however, such records would one day be needed XV
xvi About This Book for epidemiological studies and radiation injury litigation, so we began collecting them.
When Wes left REECo in 1963, we had already acquired a room full of records, and they were still coming. Shelves contained different record types—reports, rosters, card files—all organized by test series, an impossible situation for determining an accurate and complete exposure history for an individual who may have participated in several series of tests, particularly if participation dates were unknown. Hundreds of thousands of records had to be searched, many of them duplicates and some of them wrong. Later complaints that we and others before us maintained “double sets of records” only provoked gallows humor. It would take money to overcome this impasse, but our Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) counterparts would provide no funds. Fortunately, an air
force captain from Wright-Patterson Air Force Base agreed to trade me $200,000 in Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA) funding for a U.S. Air Force/AEC dosimetry encoding project if I would ghostwrite dosimetry pro-
cedures for the Joint Task Force 8 Readiness Program (a plan to keep us ready to begin our own testing again in the Pacific if the Russians resumed their atmospheric testing). From 1966 until 1969, this money was used to encode our exposure records into what would become a computerized “master file” of nuclear testing personnel dosimetry records. By the end of the decade, the source documents backing up the master file
filled about 350 cubic-foot archive boxes. An air force lieutenant from Wright-Patterson and I made the best decisions we could without in-depth research, but errors, omissions, and lack of data persisted for another decade. Not until the late 1970s under the impetus of public pressure and congres-
sional hearings did cleaning up the file become a high-priority goal for REECo and the Nuclear Test Personnel Review program of the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA, DASA’s successor), but more about that later. By 1969, at least a reasonably correct exposure history could be researched in about fifteen minutes from hard copy computer reports for each year of testing on the continent and in the Pacific.
Inevitable intracompany politics ensued; individuals vied for control of this politically popular new resource and sometimes changed it to entrench their responsibilities. An ill-conceived 1972 effort alphabetized the records by individual names and consolidated the data on 35 mm microfilm in a common 80-column format (IBM card size). Trying to cram too much data into too little space resulted in lost data and other problems, a tragic mistake from which the master file has never fully recovered. The immediate product was a system always unwieldy and often unusable. When the U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) succeeded the AEC in January 1975, the system was no longer working at all. Expressing concern because REECo had been unable to respond promptly
to requests for individual radiation exposure histories—some remained un-
About This Book KVII answered even after six months—Bruce W. Church, Chief of the Radiation Branch in ERDA’s Nevada Operations Office (ERDA/NY), ordered an investigation of the company’s dosimetry record-keeping and administrative practices. Shortly after the investigation began, my division manager called a meeting with my department manager and me (I reported to both of them). He instructed me to again assume control over dosimetry records, determine the problem areas, and repair the damage. Layton J. O’ Neill, Radiation Safety Specialist, and Ivor L. Kilmer, Systems Analyst, both of ERDA/NV, conducted the investigation, and J assisted them. In the process, I developed interim procedures for radiation exposure histories, dated 5 June, which were appended to their report of 20 June 1975. Among the tasks proposed for REECo in the June report was to “develop a chronological history fact book from historical documents and key personnel interviews to assist in determining and supplementing exposure records.” Church and O’ Neill had earlier asked me to write such a “fact book,” a request to which I had halfheartedly acceded—it would be a big job and probably thankless—but this mention in the June report is the first time I can recall seeing it on paper. The June report resulted in the Dosimetry Records System Reorganization
project, and the fact book became part of the formal tasking letter from ERDA/NV to REECo dated 25 August 1975. In addition, there is a need for REECo to develop a historical fact book which will describe the varying circumstances relating to the practices that were uttlized to provide personnel dosimetry and record keeping for the various historical time frames. It is our understanding that Mr. W. J. Brady has initiated such a document; however, the input of other knowledgeable individuals should be obtained while they are still available.
Directing the reorganization project, to say nothing of any number of other assignments, left me little time for writing. I had less than fifty pages done when I submitted the project’s final progress report on 22 February 1977. In an attempt to avoid facing a demand for the fact book’s immediate completion, I left it entirely unmentioned. Church, however, continued to press for the fact book, even as my workload increased dramatically with growing numbers of exposure history requests. I was responsible for assuring accuracy of responses, among other duties, during this hectic time. The master file and fact book assumed even more importance as public and media concern about past exposure to radiation from nuclear tests multiplied during the mid-1970s. A major reason was the widely reported case of Paul Cooper, a former soldier dying of leukemia, and the preliminary judgment by Dr. Glyn Caldwell of the Center (later Centers) for Disease Control that troops who had participated in Smoky, a test in the 1957 Plumbbob series at the Nevada Test Site, contracted cancer in excessively large numbers. Mounting government concern led in June 1977 to a Las Vegas conclave
Xvili About This Book on “historical dosimetry.” Representatives from ERDA headquarters, Nevada Operations, REECo, Los Alamos, and the armed forces met to discuss the problem. I explained to the group that identification of military participants
and their exposures was not complete and that much work remained to be done. Both ERDA and military representatives understood the need for a fullscale records project, and the wheels were set in motion. History appeared
among the initial objectives of what became identified as the Central Dosimetry Records Project. ERDA requested REECo to submit a proposal, and I helped make sure that the 14 June 1977 submission included the following item: Accumulate data from operational reports, SOPs, and interviews with personnel who were present during past test operations to document the history of nuclear testing dosimetry programs in a permanent historical report. Hire full-time oral historian, with assistance and training from health physicist, supervisor, and others.
That effectively ended the much-delayed fact book, though it long lingered in memory.
ERDA became the Department of Energy (DOE) in October 1977, and funding for the Central Dosimetry Records Project arrived a few weeks later. The search for a historian then began in earnest and made rapid progress. Billie P. Smith, who directed our department’s laboratory and oversaw the dosimetry section, took charge of the job search, placing notices in likely journals and interviewing candidates at the year-end meeting of the American Historical Association. We invited three finalists individually to Las Vegas, where I interviewed them and told them about the project, which I took the liberty of expanding to include nearly all phases of radiation safety in nuclear weapons testing, not dosimetry alone. My choice was Bart Hacker, a choice I never regretted, although I suspect he has, on occasion. Officially, he became a REECo employee on 20 March 1978 as radiation dosimetry historian in the Central Dosimetry Records Project (later the Dosimetry Records Centralization Project; finally in 1979, the Dosimetry Research Project [DRP] in conjunction with the newly created Fallout Records Centralization Project). The project’s name changes reflected,
in part, continuing, probably inevitable, intracompany politics, which also produced several changes of manager and some confusion about who Bari reported to. The important point, though, is that through all these changes and beyond, Bart remained responsible for only one thing, researching and writing a history of radiation safety. Just what that entailed was not self-evident at the outset, and an early pri-
ority became defining his mission more appropriately. First conceived as writing a fact book on personnel dosimetry in nuclear testing, that mission expanded in his interview to writing a history of dosimetry related to radio-
About This Book xix logical safety in nuclear testing. There was more to come. Bart drafted, with my help, his Statement of Mission, Procedures, and Goal, which called for “a complete and fully documented account of personnel dosimetry and radiation safety in the United States nuclear testing program from its beginnings during World War II to the present.” REECo submitted the final three-page statement on 27 September 1978 to DOE/NV (Bruce Church). Thirty days later, no objections having been made, the statement went into force. For all practical purposes, the transformation of fact book into history was complete, though further details remained to be resolved.
Bart started working from cramped quarters—a desk and file cabinet jammed into a janitor’s closet being used as a laboratory balance room—in the Health and Safety Building at NTS, learning about radiological safety functions and nomenclature while he waited the many months that even a routine security clearance required. When his DOE “Q” security clearance was granted, Bart could research classified documents and discuss classified information during interviews in secure areas. Convenient as it was, access to classified information served mainly to show that those without clearances were missing little of significance to the history of radiation safety. Convenience came at a price, though that became clear only later when the manuscript was subject to endless reviews ostensibly to assure that it included no security classified information; this process became all the more irksome when information declassified by one government agency might still be considered classified by another. While serving as DRP technical director (and, temporarily, project manager), I also functioned as Bart’s health physics coach. He and I discussed each chapter, with factual accuracy and narrative clarity as the prime goals. After he decided what needed changing and revised the manuscript accordingly, REECo forwarded the comment draft to DOE/NV. Specific readers there were never formally identified, but a few comments eventually trickled back through REECo to Bart. Despite comments more often critical than constructive, Bart retained the final say in revising the text. The next step was sending the revised text to a number of Bart’s colleagues and others—the socalled peer reviewers—for additional comments, the value of which was in some instances substantial. Finally, a panel of experts created by REECo with DOE/NV blessing reviewed the manuscript to decide whether or not it ought to be published. The panel’s endorsement, with support from the DOE historian, unblocked the road to publishing The Dragon’s Tail, a history of radiation safety in the Manhattan Project, bumpy though that road still remained. Elements of Controversy has proved even harder to steer through the bureaucracy. Unlike The Dragon’s Tail, this book centers on an agency still fresh in memory. The long-defunct Manhattan Project was merely an ad hoc wartime effort with no true offspring, but the much more recent Department of Energy is acknowledged the Atomic Energy Commission’s direct heir, and
XX About This Book loyalty to the AEC still burns fiercely in many breasts. Indeed, this fact of life in part explains why we divided the manuscript in two: the relatively noncontroversial Manhattan Project story might slip through to set precedents for what we knew would be a much more vigorously contested account of radiation safety under the AEC.
Some in DOE were not thrilled when Bart tried “telling it like it was.” Even The Dragon's Tail drew fire, but by and large our hopes proved well founded. Critics reserved their most ardent attacks for the AEC story. They construed any hint of less than perfect performance by past individuals or organizations as painting the government in a bad light, and even the mildest conclusion drew charges of “editorializing.” Government and peer reviewers alike have been notably more vocal this time around, some even urging altered quotations. Seemingly endless reviews and repeated requests for changes imposed frustrating delays, even after the review panel of experts completed its careful study of the manuscript and endorsed publication. Bart has met and overcome challenges and problems far beyond any he, or any of us, could have anticipated initially. What began as a dosimetry fact book became a history of radiological safety in nuclear weapons testing, and one volume became two, as public concern and radiation injury litigation mounted. Bart left Las Vegas early in 1986 to rejoin his wife, Sally Hacker, professor of sociology at Oregon State University in Corvallis. First as a REECo consultant, then under contract to REECo for the book, he continued working. Since early 1989, that has mostly meant responding to endless reviews and rereviews of his manuscript, some inspired by genuine professional concerns but most imposed by current and former government officials vaguely troubled by what they perceived as an excess of candor. Throughout this process Bart has studied each comment, weighed its merits, balanced it against sometimes conflicting claims, and decided whether or not it justified changing the text. Objectivity may be more dream than reality, but scholarship and the careful weighing of evidence certainly lie within the realm of practice, and Bart has pursued both without compromise. The victor is truth. His book seeks to inform the public about radiological safety efforts during nuclear weapons testing, not to cover up some nonexistent conspiracy
or to point the finger at some phantom miscreant. Instead, it is the story of thousands upon thousands of conscientious men and: women who tried to do the best job they could at radiological safety, even if they sometimes failed. The public will never know how much Bart endured through fifteen years to write The Dragon’s Tail and Elements of Controversy. Most important for the reader to understand is that he did a very good job. William J. Brady Principal Health Physicist, retired Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Company, Inc.
Preface
Elements of Controversy represents the culmination of fifteen years’ work. When my study began early in 1978, the published history of radiation protection in nuclear weapons testing amounted to scattered paragraphs. This imposed the burden of building an account on the smallest pieces—memos, letters, studies, reports, and other contemporary documents, supplemented by interviews where feasible and appropriate. Little in the way of scaffolding for the structure existed; with few exceptions, no one seems likely to have seen the documents from their first filing until their transfer to the archives. But lack of a ready framework also presented an opportunity, a chance to approach the everyday stuff of administration and action with a relatively open mind. I could scarcely avoid knowing something about the outcome of events, of course, but neither did any special knowledge of the nuclear weapons testing program constrain me. Relying instead for context on my years of studying modern American history, the history of science and technology, and military history, I resolved to read the documents in as nearly chronological order as possible and to write the book the same way. Perhaps the hindsight that too often mars the history of controversial events could thus more easily be avoided, or at least blurred. Without pretending complete blindness to the future, I could still focus on contemporary perspectives. And so I did. That secondary accounts did not yet exist made the choice easier, but as they began to appear, I set them aside while drafting my own version. Always my first goal remained getting the story straight. Consistently seeking to keep my analysis and criticism restricted to what a knowledgeable observer might have attained at the Xx
xxi Preface time, I hoped to provide a sounder basis for understanding than formerly existed. This is a point worth emphasizing. Reflective historians today can seldom sustain the faith in objectivity that once characterized the American historical
profession, certainly not after reading Peter Novick’s critique, That Noble Dream.' Yet the Rankean ideal of writing history that reveals the past “wie es eigentlich gewesen war,” how it actually (or essentially) was, from which that faith however mistakenly derived, retains its appeal.2 What happened is the first question the historian must answer, if not definitively, at least to the greatest extent possible. If I have succeeded in getting the story straight, in elucidating the institutional frameworks that constrained or promoted actions, in recapturing some sense of how those involved perceived the issues they faced, I will have achieved my major goal. As these remarks should make clear, a pretense of objectivity does not explain the dispassionate, even aseptic, tone of this book. Nor does my selfrestraint with respect to comment on my findings mean that I have no views on the subject. Quite the contrary, as the careful reader may discern. For the most part, however, my views remain in the background, though they inevitably inform my research and writing. In an area of great controversy, where passions run high and have often led to extreme judgments on beth sides, the cause of understanding seems to me better served by enabling readers to draw their own conclusions. Straightforward, clear, and thoroughly documented prose seems to me the likeliest path to that goal. Only in lengthy epilogues to each book have IJ allowed myself to comment on the past from a present-day viewpoint. Originally, the goal was a single manuscript covering the entire history from World War II through the present. Its tentative tithe was Elements of Controversy: A History of Radiation Safety in the Nuclear Weapons Testing Program. Midway through the project, for reasons both scholarly and practical, I divided the manuscript in two. Suitably revised and augmented, the first third of the manuscript yielded The Dragon’s Tail, a history of radiation safety in World War II nuclear weapons testing.? The remaining ten chapters then became the basis for a history of radiation safety in nuclear weapons testing under AEC auspices, the present volume. These books are, in a sense, official history, but they also are value-neutral history in the original Weberian sense. They reflect no values or purposes imposed by outside authority, though they must, of course, as I freely admit, reflect my own.’ I was hired in 1978 as a professional historian explicitly to write the history of radiation safety in nuclear weapons testing. Both books were funded by the Nevada Operations Office (now the Nevada Field Office) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE/NV), although the money did not come to me directly. Instead, DOE/NV accepted a proposal from its contractor, Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Co., Inc., commonly referred to as
Preface Xxili REECo, to add history to its newly created Dosimetry Research Project. REECo hired me with the title of Dosimetry Research Historian. Despite my status as a company employee, my autonomy with respect to writing history remained fully intact throughout my tenure in Las Vegas, and writing history was my only assignment. J retained control of the plan of the work, and final decisions about the text belonged to me.
In fact, only strong assurances beforehand, from both DOE/NV and REECo, of support for my independence as a scholar induced me to accept the position; preparing a formal statement of this commitment became my first major task after coming to Las Vegas. Nonetheless, the road to this book proved bumpy, for it passed through contested terrain. Defending the agreement that DOE/NV, REECo, and I had concluded cost time and energy, though it was never explicitly challenged. Some current and former test officials seemed to fear the consequences of admitting any past error or accident, however minor. Several would even now prefer something much more like the originally proposed data book prepared in house, all “facts” and no “editorializing.” Throughout this struggle, REECo staunchly supported my independence and shielded me from the kind of bureaucratic infighting that might otherwise have distracted me from the task at hand. Most critical readers, too, recognized the value of a thorough historical account and supported my efforts to retain the integrity of the text. In a few instances I have altered wording in accordance with the sensibilities of one or another reader, though only when I believed such changes did not violate my reading of the sources. Substantive revisions without exception reflected new evidence, not divergent viewpoints. This account adheres closely to the documentary record, supplemented by
more recent scholarship and, in a few instances, by interviews with certain participants. Interviews are a mixed blessing. Conversations with people who were there surely is one of the compensations of coping with recent history. However much they may help us recapture the spirit of the times, though, they must be used with caution. When even vivid memories of seemingly innocuous events long past may play us false, as Stephen Jay Gould reminds us, how much trust can we place in memories of events emotionally charged and highly controversial?> Documentary sources thus provide the bedrock for my narrative. My sources are cited as fully as possible, even though, as in this book based so heavily on innumerable individual documents, that means a daunting multiplication of source notes. This important point deserves amplification.
Citation in full derives from the normal canons of scholarly writing, of course, but it may serve other ends as well. One such purpose I had not at first fully appreciated: substantial source notes helped armor me against charges of editorializing. They may also argue for the representativeness of what might otherwise be dismissed as idiosyncratic opinion, as well as the
XxiV Preface converse, identifying those views not widely held. Perhaps my most important reason for complete citation, though, was showing those who might have a personal or intellectual stake in the issues discussed how much is publicly accessible. Although I received a security clearance that allowed me to consult still-classified documents, they proved few and largely irrelevant to my story. I had no trouble writing this book entirely from declassified and open sources, all of them available to anyone who asks. Providing public access to such documents is, after all, the central purpose of the Las Vegas Coordination and Information Center (CIC), with which I worked closely (the origin and purpose of the CIC is discussed in the epilogue). This account of radiation safety in nuclear weapons testing closes with the Atomic Energy Commission’s demise at the beginning of 1975. Stictly speaking, therefore, the current controversy over health effects of low-level radiation exposure (discussed more fully in the epilogue) lies outside the scope of my study, as indeed does the most recent controversy over human experi-
ments. Insofar as this book concerns human exposure to radiation, it addresses accidental exposure to fallout or other phenomena attendant upon nuclear weapons testing, not human experiments of the kind Secretary of Energy Hazel O’Leary publicized in late 1993. Although test accidents might sometimes teach valuable lessons about radiation effects on humans, as this account will show, the data were essentially by-products of research intended for other purposes. Such inadvertent side effects from field operations should not be confused with experiments on human subjects in clinical and laboratory settings designed to observe the effects of plutonium and other radioactive elements deliberately injected or ingested.® In another sense, of course, my work stands squarely in the middle of such controversies, if for no other reason than its origin in the rising public concerns of the late 1970s and their continuing relevance. Suffice it to say at this
point that the book focuses on the chief facts at issue in weapons testing: How did nuclear weapons testing affect health and safety during the third quarter of the twentieth century? Answering that question, as I have suggested above, always remained my primary goal in writing both The Dragon's Tail and Elements of Controversy. Understanding the past must, I am convinced, rely on as clear as possible an account of what happened, free of official interpretation as well as passionate accusation. It is to this basic need that I address my study of the history of radiation safety.
Introduction Testing and Radiological Safety
The Manhattan Project Legacy Radiological safety emerged as a peculiarly twentieth-century issue, dating
from the discovery of X rays and radioactivity in the late 1890s. Initially, only a few doctors and technicians risked harm from prolonged or intense contact with X-ray machines or radium. Working together they devised radiological safety codes to protect themselves and, in due course, others whose work might put them at risk. These self-imposed standards defined what in-
formed medical judgment accepted as safe levels of exposure to external X rays and gamma rays or to radioactive substances that somehow entered the body. By and large, they worked, though much remained unknown or unclear when World War II began and the United States embarked on the Manhattan Project,! the bold attempt to make atomic bombs. Notwithstanding novel demands for handling huge amounts of unfamiliar substances by a vastly expanded workforce during World War II, wartime safety programs largely followed prewar standards. From 1928 onward, standards setters had expressed acceptable limits for
external radiation in roentgens. Technically defined in terms of radiationcaused ionization of air, the roentgen, strictly speaking, measured exposure, not dose. Specifying dose required another unit that took into account both energy absorbed in tissue and the relative biological effect of the kind of radiation. Though one such unit, the rem, was devised during the war, many practitioners persisted in using roentgens to express exposure or dose indifferently for another decade or more. By the late 1950s, however, the rem had become the standard unit of dose, while still another unit, the rad, was coming into 1
2 Introduction Table 1 Probable Early Effects of Acute Radiation Doses Over Whole Body
Acute Dose Probable Effect 0-25 rfoentgens] No obvious injury 25-50 r Possible blood changes but no serious injury 50-100 r Blood cell changes, some injury, no disability
100-200 r Injury, possible disability
200-400 r Injury and disability certain, death possible
400 r Fatal to 50 percent
600 r Fatal
Source: Samuel Glasstone, ed., The Effects of Atomic Weapons (Los Alamos: Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Sept. 1950): 342, table 11.28.
use to express energy absorbed. Because the conversion factor was close to unity in many common applications, shifting from one unit to another did not greatly. alter the numbers, which may account for the sometimes casual usage of the several units. Doses from internally deposited radionuclides are likewise measured in rems or rads, with quantity of material deposited—that is, amount of radioactive substance—measured either in micrograms or, more commonly, in curies, a unit based on the fixed rate of radioactive decay. The meaning of these units is perhaps best explained in terms of the biological effects of radiation, since few readers will share any intuitive understanding of their physical meaning. According to an authoritative 1950 manual, acute whole-body exposures of up to 50 roentgens produced little more than blood changes, while serious injury and any likelihood of disability took
more than 100. The acute effects of radiation exposure are summarized in table 1, first published in 1950. Essentially similar tables, with r standing for rads instead of roentgens, can be found in the latest textbooks.’ The view that biological thresholds for radiation damage exist—that is, that below some dose cells and tissues can repair themselves—largely pre-
vailed during the first half-century of radiation protection and finds many supporters today. Experiment cannot easily resolve the issue. Meaningful data on the rare and often minor damage inflicted by very low doses or dose rates could come only from huge numbers of animals studied over long periods of time. Possible in theory, such studies simply exceed the limits of any realistic
research program, especially because animal findings will not necessarily apply to humans: even closely related species may show markedly different effects. Practically, this seeming impasse poses no insuperable problem. Radiation safety has never relied on final answers. Pragmatic safeguards countered the everyday hazards long before science could explain either hazard or safeguard. Threshold thinking shaped early safety codes. “Tolerance” expressed the basic idea: living things could survive without patent ill effect some defined
Introduction 3 level of radiation for an indefinitely long time. Inhabitants of Denver, after all, seem as healthy as New Yorkers, although Denver’s altitude means they receive double the background radiation of dwellers at sea level. “Permissible exposure’”’ first emerged as an alternative concept in the mid-1930s, though it gained wide currency only in the early 1950s. The newer term added socialpolitical views about what might be allowed to medical-biological judgments about what might be harmless. Its adoption would, in effect, shift the thrust of radiation protection from seeking biological thresholds to weighing risks and benefits. Although the bulk of evidence in fact argued threshold, guide-
line writers assumed the philosophical stance that any exposure was risky. Whatever they believed about physical realities, many experts came to prefer erring on the side of caution, acting as if any exposure could be harmful. This attitude strongly colored radiation safety practices when the University of Chicago began its work on the plutonium project in 1942. Alert to the risks, the university’s Metallurgical Laboratory created a strong health division, Imposed strict safety standards, and launched a research program on biological effects of radiation. Chicago safety practice and research became a model for the entire Manhattan Project, but safety was never the top priority. Winning the war took precedence, especially in view of the circumstances. Early in the war, fear of a Nazi bomb made almost any risk seem worth taking. Later, field-testing a fission bomb overshadowed safety issues. Although Gen. Leslie R. Groves and his army team in charge of the bomb project rarely ignored safety, they seldom made it their first concern. Neither did civilian members of the project. Getting the job done mattered more, especially for the bomb makers at Los Alamos, the hidden laboratory on a mesa in New Mexico.
Led by J. Robert Oppenheimer and a constellation of past and future Nobel Prize winners, they scheduled the first test of a full-size bomb for early
summer 1945 at a desert site near Alamogordo in southern New Mexico. Both test and site were code named Trinity. Danger clearly attended what loomed as by far the most violent explosion humankind had ever achieved with a single weapon. Radioactivity might become an even worse problem if plutonium dust or fission products threatened lives and health miles down-
wind. Yet risks at first seemed minor. Relatively well informed and controlled, test workers would, in any event, find little reason to ignore rules intended to assure their own well-being. Secrecy, however, denied the public any knowledge of the test or of safety measures. Still, the only likely threat seemed bad weather or winds blowing fallout the wrong way. Planners countered that danger with a schedule based on trustworthy forecasts of perfect weather and winds. But proving the bomb and keeping it secret, not safety, dictated Trinity planning. Politics impinged on test timing, and the test proceeded even when fears about radioactive fallout increased. Bad weather on the eve of Trinity, in fact, delayed firing only briefly. At 5:30 in the morning of 16 July 1945, the radiance of the first atomic bomb
4 Introduction outshone the dawn. It proved everything its makers hoped, and more. Physicists relaxed, but the health and safety team faced a grueling, sometimes alarming, day. Detonated atop a 100-foot tower and sucking huge amounts of earth and other debris into the rising fireball, Trinity produced enough fallout to worry those in charge. Radiation monitors took disquietingly high instrument readings at several points outside test site borders. Eventually they convinced themselves that safe limits had not been exceeded and that no one suffered lasting harm. Superficially burned livestock appeared the only victims. Like other aspects of Trinity, safety met the needs of a wartime program. Operation Crossroads, though mounted a year later, also looked much like a wartime program. In contrast to Trinity, however, it was a widely observed and reported event. A joint army-navy task force conducted Crossroads at Bikini atoll in the Central Pacific, 4,500 miles from American shores. Joint
Task Force 1 deployed 42,000 men and women (the Trinity team never topped 700, including shot-day observers) plus 242 ships and 156 aircraft. Radiological safety—promptly reduced to some variant of “rad-safe” in common usage—in so huge an effort so far from home posed big problems. Such problems had more to do with finding enough instruments and men for the rad-safe section than with safety principles. Crossroads adhered to Manhattan Project radiation safety standards and practices.
In July 1946, two atomic bombs, the same kind used the year befote in Trinity and at Nagasaki, exploded at Bikini. A B-29 dropped one to burst hundreds of feet above the target fleet. Suspended from a landing ship used as a floating platform, the second erupted beneath the surface of Bikini lagoon. Test Able held no surprises, but Baker shocked even the experts. As thousands upon thousands of tons of water collapsed back into the lagoon, a surg-
ing wall of radioactive mist blanketed the target fleet. Dismayed salvage teams could scarcely approach most target vessels for days, and some ships remained off limits much longer. Eventually a few target ships sailed from Bikini under their own power, but most had to be towed when the task force abandoned Bikini for nearby Kwajalein. Three-fourths of the target fleet never left the Marshall Islands at all, either sunk in the tests or destroyed afterward as unsalvageable. Only twenty-two of the original ninety-three target vessels again dropped anchor in West Coast ports, where they underwent further decontamination and intense study.
Worse than aborted salvage plans, spreading contamination after Baker threatened the task force’s own ships and crews. Accumulating radioactivity from seawater cycling through ship systems created one hazard, radioactivity concentrated by marine life on ships’ hulls another. Vigorously striving to protect work crews and other task force members, the rad-safe team achieved only limited success. In the midst of this effort, signs of widespread contamination from unfissioned plutonium proved the last straw. Decontamination work ceased at the strong urging of the rad-safe section, and the task force
introduction 5
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withdrew from Bikini in some haste. Eventually the navy launched a special program for clearing as safe every ship aside from targets that spent any time in Bikini lagoon after Baker. Joint Task Force 1 reported no apparent harm to any of its members, but many safety experts saw too close a call for comfort. The advent of controlled nuclear fission and then atomic bombs during World War II transformed the nature and scope of radiation hazards. Nuclear energy exploited for war required huge new plants of novel design and unprecedented kinds of field-testing. These activities not only put more workers
at risk than any prewar program but might also threaten large numbers of people who happened to be in the neighborhood. Prewar safety standards and
practices nonetheless met most wartime needs. Radiological safety in the Manhattan Project remained firmly based on methods proved through nearly five decades of trial and error. Developing nuclear reactors and bombs might
mandate new safety measures ranging from routine use of film badges to founding health physics (as the profession concerned with radiation protection came to be styled), but such changes, for the most part, simply augmented well-tried techniques. Greater changes marked the postwar world. Radiological safety faced new demands, political as well as technical. Trinity and Crossroads not only de-
fined the future shape of radiation safety for nuclear weapons testing but
6 Introduction foreshadowed many of the issues such testing raised. An earlier book, The Dragon's Tail, on which the summary above rests, described in detail the nature and results of radiological safety in the wartime test program. This volume undertakes to extend the story with an account of what happened to radiological safety when the United States decided to continue testing nuclear weapons in peacetime.
The Third Wave Since the United States began testing nuclear weapons in 1945, public fears of radiation have generated three waves of public protest.* The first centered on fallout, especially radiostrontium, and played a major role in the nuclear test ban debate. Criticism arose and flourished in many public forums; growing doubts about the wisdom of atmospheric nuclear weapons testing among President Dwight D. Eisenhower and a number of his key advisers by 1956, though decisive in the long run, remained almost entirely unknown outside government circles. The public outcry peaked in the mid-1950s, faded
with the test moratorium of 1958, and vanished when testing went underground after the 1963 limited test ban treaty.° The less well known second wave built on a larger measure of internal dissent. Most intense during the late 1960s, it paralleled the more visible debate on potential hazards of nuclear reactors. Like the latter, it addressed hazards
from low-level radiation, but its focus on past fallout exposures stemmed from a new concern for the threat radioiodine might have posed.® By the early
1970s, however, mainstream scientific opinion agreed that very low doses carried proportionately small risks and that direct attempts to study their effects on human health held little promise. Influential 1972 statements by the American National Academy of Sciences—National Research Council’s Advisory Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation and by the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, the first of the so-called BEIR and UNSCEAR reports, endorsed these views. They judged that investigating effects so small and so ambiguous was not only inordinately difficult but also unlikely to yield significant health benefits.’
Thus the radiation-safety slate looked clean at the beginning of 1975, when the Atomic Energy Commission split into two new agencies: the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Energy Research and Development Administration. The regulatory commission survived, but ERDA lasted only until 1977 before becoming part of the still newer Department of Energy. Like the AEC it was created to oversee, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy also perished in 1977.9 As the AEC’s successors soon learned, the issue of low-dose effects had merely quieted, not died. The apparently
Introduction 7 settled conclusions of 1972 looked much less secure a few years later. As 1978 opened, the trade newsletter Nucleonics Week noted that “a major controversy is brewing up over low-level radiation and its effects on population, long after many . . . thought it had been laid to rest. The issue was a principal
one... in the late 1960s and early ’70s.”!° This third wave of protest, still with us, provides the context for this book. What happened? For one thing, not everyone agreed with the 1972 BEIR and UNSCEAR reports. During the 1960s and early 1970s, several scientists, some connected with the AEC, had challenged prevailing views about the relative harmlessness of exposure to low-level radiation, and they never joined the 1972 con-
sensus. Despite obvious flaws in data and analyses, their critiques did not merely annoy the AEC or, as opponents charged, needlessly distress the public. In an evenhanded effort to assess the issues and comment on the literature for the American Journal of Physics in 1972, R. H. Romer observed that the dissidents also had raised the issue of low-level radiation effects to salience in the research community." Although in due course their findings and theories
entered the public debate as well, they did not trigger the revived controversy.!2 That arose from almost mundane events outside the research community entirely. The issue, in fact, had less to do with current research than with events long past.
The latest round of controversy began in late 1975 with a patient at the Veterans Administration hospital in Salt Lake City, retired army sergeant Paul
Cooper. He suffered from acute myelocytic leukemia. On active duty eighteen years earlier, Cooper was assigned to Task Force Big Bang, a provisional company of the 82d Airborne Division, for a training exercise in Nevada dur-
ing Operation Plumbbob. All tests in the 1957 series provided settings for military maneuvers or training under the overall designation of Exercise Desert Rock VII and VIII. Cooper’s unit was to witness a nuclear explosion, the test code named Smoky, then run an obstacle course to provide psychological data ‘on how the experience might affect combat performance. The unit arrived at Camp Desert Rock, the military post just south of the AEC’s Nevada Test Site, in mid-August and stayed until early September. When Smoky was postponed, the task force still watched it, but threatened contamination kept the men from the exercise area. They later witnessed the Galileo shot, then completed the course, though Cooper recalled his experience in running the course as part of Smoky.!°
Cooper’s case intrigued staff physician Thomas Cosgriff, formerly an epidemiologist at the federal Center (later Centers) for Disease Control in Atlanta. Because leukemia was a well-known sequel to radiation exposure, Cosgriff wondered about a link. Might troops have received higher doses than believed? Alternatively, could doses assumed to be harmlessly low actually have caused cancer? He contacted his former colleague at the Atlanta center, cancer branch chief Glyn G. Caldwell. Meanwhile; Cooper went public after
8 Introduction the Veterans Administration for the third time denied his claim for serviceconnected disability. Television and newspapers carried the story in spring 1977, as what began with questions about one man’s disease burgeoned into a national debate.!* By summer the Center for Disease Control had authorized Caldwell to launch a detailed Smoky study, while the Department of Defense and ERDA discussed how to collect the required data.!5
Despite such efforts under way, nothing suggested any urgency. Congressional hearings in January and February 1978 changed that decisively. Publicity about Paul Cooper had prompted thousands of calls and letters to the Center for Disease Control. One came from another leukemia patient and
former sergeant who had been at Camp Desert Rock at the same time as Cooper, Donald Coe of Tompkinsville, Kentucky. Coincidentally, Tompkinsville also was the hometown of onetime country doctor and then Republican congressman Tim Lee Carter.!® Having lost his own son to the disease, Carter voiced outrage that official action might have increased leukemia risks for thousands of young soldiers: “I am mad as hell about the way the government has treated veterans who were exposed to nuclear radiation. Congress should investigate, and I am going to do my best to see that it is done.”!” As ranking minority member of the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, Carter’s best was better than most. The subcommittee chaired by Paul G. Rogers, Democrat of Florida, took extensive testimony on the health effects of low-level radiation.!® It set the pattern for subsequent House and Senate probes. During 1978 and 1979, congressional hearing rooms echoed with merciless questions and repeated chal-
lenges to Energy Department claims.!? Only after 1978 did members of Congress for the first time seem fully to grasp that aboveground tests overexposed many hundreds of test workers and soldiers. Technically, of course, as official spokesmen sought time and again to explain, that simply meant exposures in excess (slightly, as a rule) of then-current guidelines, which in any event included what were widely believed to be large safety margins. Overexposure in itself, however undesirable, should thus not necessarily, indeed not usually, be deemed harmful. Yet valid as such niceties might be in principle, they seemed almost irrelevant before a leukemia-stricken veteran testifying from his wheelchair.” In a real sense, the purpose of this book is to account for that 1978 confrontation by tracing the events from which it ensued. What exactly happened during the AEC’s nuclear weapons testing program, particularly during the
fifteen years from 1948 to 1963 when almost all tests took place above ground and many included military maneuvers? Did the Atomic Energy Commission and its contractors neglect proper safety precautions? Were the scientists, physicians, and technicians responsible for radiation safety competent? Did they, or anyone, know enough about fallout hazards from nuclear explosions to take proper precautions? Did they make mistakes? Were test
Introduction 9 participants or innocent bystanders deliberately exposed to radiation? Such questions—and many like them—have proliferated since the late 1970s. Persuasive answers must depend on going back to the sources and reconstructing as fully, carefully, and dispassionately as possible just what did happen. The thesis this book argues is itself straightforward and relatively simple.
Those responsible for radiation safety in nuclear weapons testing under the auspices of the Atomic Energy Commission were competent, diligent, and cautious. They understood the hazards and took every precaution within their power to avoid injuring either test participants or bystanders. Testing, of course, meant taking risks, and safety could never be the highest prionty. Those in charge sometimes made mistakes, but for the most part they managed to ensure that neither test participants ‘nor bystanders suffered any apparent damage from fallout. Describing how they did so, in terms as neutral as possible and as fully as the sources will allow, defines this book’s ultimate purpose.
Operation Sandstone The AEC Test Program Begins 1947-1948
The Formation of Joint Task Force 7 By early 1947, bomb designers at Los Alamos had reached an impasse. Theoretical advances since the 1945 Trinity test in New Mexico and Operation Crossroads in 1946 suggested ways to use scarce resources more efficiently. Laboratory tests alone, however, would not allow them to choose between alternative bomb designs. Improving weapons required more data, which could come only from full-scale tests. Accordingly, Los Alamos proposed a proof-testing program to the Atomic Energy Commission. The AEC’s
General Advisory Committee agreed with Los Alamos and early in April 1947 strongly urged the commission to sponsor new tests. The program would both validate the theory behind three new bomb designs and prove the bombs themselves; successful tests would spread current sources of fissile metals over a larger stockpile of weapons. These tests, in contrast to Operation Crossroads, would focus on how the bombs performed, not on their effects. They would also remain far more fully shielded from the public eye.! In the months since Crossroads, much had changed. The Atomic Energy Commission itself was new on the scene. Established by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 after a bruising political struggle, the new civilian agency began its formal career on 1 January 1947. The central issue had been civilian control of the atom. Although intended to sponsor peaceful uses of atomic energy, the AEC also controlled bomb design, development, and production. It took over from the Manhattan Engineer District most of the wartime program and its facilities: a complex of plants, laboratories, and offices that spread across thirteen states and employed over 44,000 women 10
Operation Sandstone 11 and men. Seven-eighths of that work force drew paychecks from private companies or universities under government contract, rather than from the government itself. This pattern persisted under the AEC. Los Alamos remained a project of the University of California and survived as the AEC’s weapons laboratory. That outcome, however, hung in the balance for many months. To leaders facing an uncertain postwar world with fading prospects for international control of atomic energy, a strong weapons program appeared urgent.? Logically, Los Alamos seemed the place for such a program, but it had fallen on hard times. Most of its brightest stars departed when the war ended, among them the laboratory’s now-famous wartime leader, J. Robert Oppen-
heimer. Norris E. Bradbury, who replaced him as director, was highly regarded but relatively young and inexperienced. Physical hardships at the remote site, a wartime fact of life, not only worsened but became intolerable in peacetime. Uncertain prospects compounded these problems. Morale plummeted, and research foundered. Although Operation Crossroads in summer 1946 lifted spirits briefly, it also diverted resources from weapons development. Technically, the 1946 bombs marked no advance over Trinity or Nagasaki. The General Advisory Committee knew all this. Chaired by Oppenheimer with members drawn from the highest levels of the wartime program, the committee’s advice played a key role in forming AEC policy. Among the first topics it addressed were the future of Los Alamos and the weapons development program.4
The proposed Los Alamos test program closely matched the advisory committee’s own views. In an April 1947 meeting, it readily concurred in Los Alamos plans, even to details of what needed testing and how.> Authority to
conduct the tests, however, rested elsewhere. AEC Chairman David E. Lilienthal must now win administration support. Before the war Lilienthal had become a prominent figure in the New Deal as head of the controversial Tennessee Valley Authority; controversy had surfaced again when Congress considered his nomination to the AEC. Ultimately, President Harry S. Truman would decide if proposal became policy, and Lilienthal could count on support from the man who had nominated and backed him for the chairmanship. But the AEC must also convince the departments of State, War, and Navy: renewed bomb testing might threaten the nation’s foreign relations,
because tests would once again require a Pacific site; that also meant a task force, making armed forces support vital as well. On 25 April 1947, Lilienthal addressed a formal request to the Military Liaison Committee for help.®
Military concerns in AEC affairs raised questions from the outset, and they cut both ways. Nonmilitary control of weapons development and production might leave the armed forces without a proper voice in matters of vital import. At the same time, the AEC’s control of nuclear weapons seemed
12 Operation Sandstone inherently precarious, given the force of military demands. Just these issues, in fact, had provoked much of the conflict that surrounded the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. To meet such concerns, the 1946 act required the AEC to establish the Division of Military Application, its head by law a general or flag officer. The act also created the Military Liaison Committee (MLC) to ensure the military voice a hearing. Representatives of the War and Navy departments (later of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and of the departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force) formed the committee, with which “the Commission shall advise and consult . . . on all atomic energy matters which the [MLC] deems to relate to military applications.” The liaison committee became as well the AEC’s contact with the armed forces on the policymaking level. Commission and committee were to keep each other fully informed about the relevant activities of their agencies.’ As senior military member, Air Force Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton became chairman. The air force also provided the AEC’s first director of military application, newly promoted Brig. Gen. James McCormack. Military liaison remained more promise than fact during the AEC’s hectic early months. When Lilienthal requested its help, the committee had yet to hold its first formal meeting with the AEC. That came on 30 April. Reasoning that almost every aspect of their program had some bearing on military concerns, AEC officials discussed the full range of activities. The proposed Pacific tests nonetheless furnished a central theme. Preparations needed at least nine months, and the matter was urgent: decisions about the nation’s nuclear stockpile, a total of but thirteen weapons in 1947, depended on test results. The Military Liaison Committee agreed, and Brereton promised to pass the AEC’s request for military support to the Joint Chiefs. Weeks passed, though, with no sign of action. Attempting to enlist State Department support, Lilienthal likewise found a friendly hearing but no movement. Finally, on 27 June 1947, a White House meeting resolved the issue. The secretaries of state, war, and navy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff all attended, as did AEC Chairman Lilienthal. President Truman heard the AEC case, weighed the views of cabinet officers and the Joint Chiefs, then approved the test program.® Now the pace of events quickened. Navy Capt. James S. Russell, McCor-
mack’s deputy, journeyed to Los Alamos in July for a planning session. Discussions covered everything from test objectives to cleaning up afterward, but two points emerged as crucial: Los Alamos must ensure that testing truly advanced bomb development, and complete secrecy appeared out of the question. Returning to Washington, Russell outlined plans at a joint meeting of the AEC and the Military Liaison Committee. They affirmed the central role of Los Alamos in directing technological aspects of testing and agreed that some easing of security made sense. Specific information about test purposes and timing would remain secret, but President Truman approved a brief notice for the AEC’s semiannual report to Congress: “The Atomic Energy Com-
Operation Sandstone 13 mission is establishing a proving ground in the Pacific for routine experiments and tests of atomic weapons.” The report appeared on 23 July, the same day Los Alamos learned that the AEC had approved a three-test series for early 1948.9
Planning now focused on the details of getting and using test data. To handle the effort, Los Alamos formed the new J- (Weapons Test) Division headed by Darol K. Froman. Second in command was Alvin C. Graves, like Froman a physicist who had joined the Manhattan Project at the University of Chicago’s Metallurgical Laboratory before moving to the Los Alamos bomb project. While Froman and Graves planned tests and assigned experiments to groups within the division, the armed forces prepared to support the mission. Though strictly ancillary, the military role remained vital. Logistically, the proposed test program imposed major demands for transport, manpower, and supplies. The Joint Chiefs informed the AEC early in September that the answer was again, as in Crossroads, a special joint task force. Lt. Gen. John E. Hull, former War Department operations chief and newly appointed head of army forces in the Pacific, assumed command. Its formal activation dated from 18 October 1947, when the Joint Chiefs approved the planning report and forwarded it to the AEC.!° Designated Joint Task Force 7—the number deliberately chosen to obscure any link to Crossroads’ Joint Task Force 1 and thus to atomic tests— Hull’s new command mustered over 10,000 persons. Secrecy shrouded the mission, and the Joint Chiefs provided a block of code names for task force use. The proof-test program became Operation Sandstone. Responsibility for testing proper fell to Froman’s J-Division, and the AEC named him Sendstone scientific director. The title of test director went to James Russell. As an experienced naval officer, Russell became the natural choice to command task group 7.1, the Los Alamos science team in Joint Task Force 7. Unable to do everything itself, Los Alamos enlisted outside aid. Contingents from Argonne National Laboratory, AEC contractor Edgerton, Germeshausen and Grier, Inc., and several government agencies—the National Bureau of Standards, the Naval Research Laboratory, the navy’s David Taylor Model Basin, the army’s Aberdeen Proving Ground—each took charge of specific experiments under J-Division auspices.?! The Armed Forces Special Weapons Project played a larger role. Established early in 1947 by joint directive of the secretaries of the army and the navy, AFSWP (pronounced Af-swop) began as an ad hoc assemblage of the Manhattan Project’s military remnants when the AEC took over the bulk of the project’s functions and facilities. Ultimately, it became the overseer of nuclear weapons doctrine, training, and logistics for the entire military establishment. Like the Military Liaison Committee at the policy level, AFSWP provided the key contact between the AEC and the armed forces at the level of operations. Organizer and first chief of AFSWP was the wartime head of
14 Operation Sandstone the Manhattan Project, Gen. Leslie Groves, but he was soon succeeded by his former deputy and commander of the Manhattan Engineer District, Kenneth D. Nichols. Drawing on all branches of the service to fill its ranks, AFSWP took its place as one of several combined agencies prompted into being by imminently merging armed forces. That movement climaxed in July, when President Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947. The act created a vaguely defined entity called the National Military Establishment presided over by a secretary of defense. It made the air force an equal partner of the army and navy and imposed other far-reaching changes on the larger structure of national security.!2 Meanwhile, though, newly assigned AFSWP members often lacked training and experience in atomic matters. They welcomed the chance Sandstone offered to learn more. Benefits also accrued to Los Alamos. AFSWP accounted for two-fifths of Froman’s team, the largest fraction provided by any single agency, Los Alamos included.!3
Establishing the Pacific Proving Ground The top secret target date for the first test became 15 April 1948. As they had for Operation Crossroads in 1946, the Marshall Islands would furnish the site. Yet it was a choice reached only after much deliberation. Initially, the State Department favored keeping tests within the United States, largely to avoid foreign criticism. For technical reasons, the AEC preferred a Pacific site. Strongly seconded by the Joint Chiefs, the AEC view prevailed. The
president approved that option at the same June 1947 meeting when he agreed to the test program. That settled, the next question became where in the Pacific. Los Alamos first proposed a return to Bikini. Though Bikini retained the advantages of wind, water, and isolation that made it the Crossroads choice, it lacked certain features required for long-term use. In particu-
lar, its islands were too small, its land surface too limited, to support the instrumentation that proof-testing demanded.'4 Other northern Marshall Islands atolls, however, shared features of geography and climate that had fitted Bikini for the 1946 tests. Further study confirmed the region as the best place for a new proving ground, and the choice
soon narrowed to Kwajalein or Enewetak.* Kwajalein held an early edge. *The name of the atoll chosen for Operation Sandstone in 1947 was at that time spelled Eniwetok. Prompted by growing concern for Marshallese sensibilities, the U.S. government in 1974 altered official spelling of Marshallese names to conform more closely to actual pronunciation by native speakers. Eniwetok, the former usage, has thus become Enewetak, with similar changes in the names of some other islands. Since most names will be unfamiliar to present-day readers anyway, this account employs the improved Marshallese-preferred spelling. Older spellings will appear only in quotations or organization names, where they should cause no confusion. For a convenient tabulation of variant spellings and code names for islands in the atoll, see
Kaman Tempo, Operation Sandstone: 1948, by L. H. Berkhouse et al., Report DNA 6033F (Santa Barbara, 19 Dec. 1983): Appendix C.
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Initial plans also called for a three-hour pause between firing and beginning the radiological survey. Transportation problems cropping up the night before the test, however, demanded an early start on recovery. Cooney and his rad-safe team reached the shot island, Enjebi, by helicopter just half an hour after firing. Particles falling onto his hands and face convinced Cooney
that his first reading, 0.4 roentgen per hour, would go higher. It did, and Cooney radioed the first recovery party to wait offshore. Two stray dogs wandered in, seeming none the worse for wear. The highest reading came at 8:30,
2 roentgens per hour, but then dropped swiftly to 0.2 roentgen per hour by 9:30. Recovery parties began landing fifteen minutes later. The effort proceeded smoothly, for the most part, although both the land and water cables had broken. Everyone cleared the island by late afternoon. Recovery work during the next three days created no problems.!!®
Shot Item also dropped fallout on the three islands where members of Joint Task Force 3 were stationed: Parry, Japtan, and Enewetak. Fallout began to arrive four hours after the shot, shortly before ten o’clock in the morning. Instrument readings at the rad-safe building on Parry Island rose and fell, but
the trend was upward through much of the day. Activity began to decline along the normal decay curve only at ten o’clock that night, sixteen hours after the shot. Much the same pattern appeared on the other two islands. What the final rad-safe report referred to as “total doses for future times’—that is, the total number of roentgens a person might receive if exposed continuously in the most active area—were predicted at 7.37 roentgens for fifteen days and 9.52 for thirty days.!!7 Ambiguous evidence of heavy rains starting a week after Item, which would have washed away most of the active residue, led some to conclude that these figures were too high; more recent study rejects rainfall as a cause but still finds the figures too high.!!8 Survey instruments and dosimeters provided on-the-spot guides for workers and monitors. Photographic film, however, created the permanent record.
Monitors and those whose work brought them into radiation areas wore badges; other members of the task force did not. Periodic reviews of filmrecorded exposures allowed Cooney to check rad-safe efforts. The first such review came on 27 April 1951, a week after the second shot. Data “from 2,323 individuals,” he reported, “showed an average radiation dose of 355 mr
58 A Continental Test Site [0.355 roentgen].”"? Excluding casual visitors and other factors that might distort results raised the figure to a more realistic 0.473 roentgen. Members of the rad-safe section, including the largely unexposed lab workers, averaged nearly three times higher, 1.32 roentgens. The second review on 15 May likewise caused no alarm: 3,180 badged, average 0.422 roentgen (or 0.6 roent-
gen without casuals), rad-safe average 2.06 roentgens. The final check on 28 May, the day before Cooney’s team left Enewetak, yielded comparable results: individuals badged 3,335, average 0.51 roentgen, adjusted to 0.71 roentgen minus casuals.!2° Cooney noted one source of confusion tied to fallout and operational exposure limits. “To establish a limit of 3 r per test and then have more than this as a result of fallout alone creates confusion in the mind of both the military
and the civilian worker.”!*! Seeking to deal with this anomaly, the Health Division later adjusted recorded exposures with fallout figures. Fallout background for the length of time an individual resided on one of the islands was estimated. Then 70 percent of that figure (to allow for time spent indoors) was added to the film badge reading to provide total exposure. Given Enewetak’s weather, Cooney believed fallout would simply have to be accepted. He suggested studying higher limits as a way around the problem.!2 The latest dose reconstructions have arrived at somewhat different figures. Most shipboard personnel had not worn film badges because their activities were deemed unlikely to expose them to radioactivity. Several ships did receive fallout, however, and their crews’ average doses ranged from a high of 1.1 rem to a low of 0.2 rem; some members of one ship’s crew might have received as much as 1.5 rem. All these doses fell well within Greenhouse operational limits. For task force members stationed at one of the three base islands, doses may have been higher. Exposure from fallout for someone present throughout Greenhouse might well have exceeded the limit.}2? The radiological safety unit nonetheless had to be credited, Cooney con-
cluded, with “a much more efficient job than was performed on any of the preceding tests,” chiefly because of the “closer integration of the radiological safety unit with the over-all scientific program.” Integration was not complete, however, and to just that extent radiological safety suffered. Because each Sandstone task group supported its own rad-safe unit, only Cooney’s team, as part of the right task group, could maintain the day-to-day contact with the science program that so enhanced radiological safety. Combining all rad-safe work in a single unit under the scientific director seemed to Cooney the best guarantee of safety in future testing.!24 The view from Los Alamos was less sanguine. Although the Greenhouse rad-safe effort struck Shipman as “basically ... Jim Cooney’s program,” mil-
itary manpower seemed in short supply. Shipman resented new claims on Health Division resources even as Greenhouse drew to a close. “I cannot feel it should be necessary for us to bear the burden right down to the final gasp,
A Continental Test Site 59 in view of the fact that we have intensive work to be done before we move to Nevada again.’!25 Administrative questions aroused concern. Who, for instance, would take charge of Greenhouse rad-safe records? Who would staff Enewetak radiation safety between tests?!76 But that was only part of the
problem. Voicing a theme repeated again and again in months to follow, Shipman deplored the “administration of Rad Safe programs at test operations” that left his division “virtually depopulated for varying periods two or three times a year,””!27
Another much repeated theme emerged from Greenhouse. Reading the task force commander’s final report gave Shipman’s deputy, Thomas White, “the feeling that the report favors liberally dosing the military personnel with radiation at future operations, for the purpose of eliminating undue timidity, particularly in the military rad-safe personnel.’’!28 Exaggerated though the words may seem, the issue was a real one. Military needs related to the prospect of using nuclear weapons conflicted with AEC concerns in testing them. When testing returned to Nevada later in 1951, questions of proper safety standards assumed mounting importance.
Developing Weapons and Tactics in Nevada Testing and Troop Maneuvers 1951-1952
Jangle Feasibility Hastily mounted and swiftly completed, Operation Ranger had escaped any major problems. Uncertain about what to expect, test planners had proceeded with caution; work focused on the narrow technical questions that prompted the series. Relatively small weapons bursting high above the ground had combined with good weather to restrict fallout problems and avert any chance of injury. Leaving behind no residue of problems, Ranger once completed required no further thought. Although makeshift facilities had sufficed for the urgent Ranger series, an ongoing test program required more. The Atomic Energy Commission swiftly approved a proposed building plan and finally settled on a name, officially announced on 8 July to be Nevada Test Site. The first order of business became the tests long planned for fall 1951. But for Ranger, this series called Buster would have inaugurated the new site. Now it would merely begin regular testing.! Meanwhile, however, the Department of Defense had begun its own test program. Military concerns centered on the effects of weapons, not their design or development. Spectacular results from the 1946 Crossroads Baker underwater test raised questions about the effects of shallow underground detonations. The AEC agreed to support such tests under Department of Defense auspices. Presidential approval followed in mid-1950, time and place as yet undecided, Radiological safety for such novel tests sharply constrained the choices. After a wide-ranging search, the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project picked Amchitka in the Aleutian Islands. AFSWP planned between mid-September and mid-November 1951 to fire two 20-kiloton devices, one 60
Developing Weapons and Tactics in Nevada 61 at ground level, the second some tens of feet beneath the surface. The White House approved Operation Windstorm in November 1950. Defense would run the program; Los Alamos would provide only technical support.’ Geologically, however, Amchitka proved less well suited for testing than preliminary surveys suggested. Questionable prospects for useful data dimmed Windstorm’s promise. Accordingly, in February 1951, the Military Liaison Committee inquired about using the Nevada site for ground-level trials. The AEC rejected the idea, chiefly on safety grounds: “Such a detonation would introduce a positive hazard of radiological contamination in the neighborhood of the site, exceeding, at least for some months, the maximum permissible levels for routine operations.”3 Contaminated dust might become an off-site danger, to say nothing of a public relations nightmare that could foreclose long-term use of the site. But a month later, at the end of March, a revised plan found a warmer welcome.‘ Substituting a pair of 1-kiloton shots in Nevada for the higher-yield tests on Amchitka, the new plan also added a preliminary test. Radiological safety was the primary reason. Relevant data on shots at or very near the surface of the ground scarcely existed. Safety dictated a cautious approach, the AEC explained, beginning with a “shot, set off far enough below the surface to minimize surface rupture, intended primarily to help assess the potential radiological hazards of subsequent shots.” If all went well, then “fa second shot would be detonated at a lesser depth.” Finally, ‘“‘a third test would be made, this time at the surface.” Stressing “the radiological hazard of these shots” was not meant “to exaggerate the difficulties which may attend their execution. We only intend to make clear that the unknowns involved make it impossible to say positively in advance that any given plan is certain of success.”> The General Advisory Committee agreed. Its chairman, J. Robert Oppenheimer, professed himself “sympathetic with [the] concern, but. . . not infected with alarm about the radiological hazards of the proposed underground bursts.”® Reservations about safety in ground-level testing, however, could not so easily be laid to rest. Discussions between the AEC and the Department of Defense through the spring resolved the main features of the new program: where to conduct it, when, who would provide what. President Truman approved the revised program on 4 June 1951. Renamed Jangle, it would join the AEC’s Buster series in Nevada beginning in October. Meanwhile safety remained a much-discussed topic.’ Before Buster-Jangle, the first full-scale test series conducted in Nevada, many questions needed answers. Shields L. Warren, head of the AEC Division of Biology and Medicine, called a meeting at Los Alamos “to consider the feasibility and conditions for a preliminary radiologic safety shot for Jangle.’’® The Jangle Feasibility Committee, as it became known, had neither formal charter nor fixed membership. Its findings, however, exerted profound effects on safety standards at the Nevada Test Site.
62 Developing Weapons and Tactics in Nevada More than twenty experts attended the first meeting in May 1951. They discussed the best physical setting for the first test, the most helpful weather and winds, and the specific radiological data worth seeking. They also proposed off-site exposure standards. These, for the first time, included limits on amounts of activity and size of particles to which populated areas might be exposed. Available data suggested that “beta or gamma external radiation hazard would not occur beyond a 40-mile radius under the proposed test conditions.” Because huge amounts of active dust would be created by a nearsurface burst, greater concern centered on risks “from the inhalation and retention in the lung of radioactive particles . . . up to 10 micra in diameter [which] may be carried for hundreds of miles. . . . The hazard in the lung is that of carcinogenesis.” Opinion divided sharply over what “the actual risk involved” might be, a question “currently under study.”? Suitably restricted limits, however, might produce reasonable safeguards. Radiological safety for the first 1-kiloton test required, in the committee’s view, that 1. The external dose to non-participating inhabitants, of radiation from gamma rays, shall not exceed the accepted international permissible dose level of 300 mr/wk (1.8 mr/hr). 2. At any point of human habitation, the activity of radioactive particles shall be limited to one microcurie per cubic meter of air (cor-
responding approximately to a ground level gamma intensity of 0.3 mr/hr). 3. The 24-hour average radioactivity per cubic meter of air, due to suspended particles having diameters in the range 0.5 micron to 2.0 microns, shall not exceed 10°? [0.01] microcurie; nor is it desirable that any individual particle in this size range have an activity greater than 10-2 microcurie calculated to 4 hours after the blast.
No one dissented. Under the stated conditions, the panel concluded, “a test involving the explosion of a 1 kiloton... bomb... can be carried out without undue hazard. The Committee recommends that the test be made.””!® But words heard in May without comment provoked second thoughts when
seen on paper in June, as Warren learned when he asked panel members for comments before making his draft report final. Gioacchino Failla, for one, urged a reworded and much expanded version of the proposed limits on airborne activity and particle concentration. For decades a nationally known expert in radium protection, Failla also served as chairman of Subcommittee No. 1, on Permissible External Exposure, of the National Committee on Radiation Protection. His views thus carried unusual weight. Clarification more than critique, Failla’s remarks offered no direct challenge to the recommended test. But Los Alamos Director Bradbury carried no less weight than Failla and raised more difficult questions.!! Recommending the test demanded more than a few remarks about pur-
Developing Weapons and Tactics in Nevada 63 ported lessons from Trinity and Enewetak, Bradbury objected. He wrote that he would have much preferred to see the recommendation supported by calculations involving assumed distributions of particle size . . . which would lead to the best current guess of radiation intensity and microcuries per cubic meter as a function of down wind distance. In other words, I am afraid that if there were trouble on the first shot, and the Atomic Energy Commission were called upon to explain “how come,” one of the first questions to be asked would be “What did you expect to be the radiation and volume contamination at *x’ miles, and on what was this estimate based?” The absence of any predictions on this point together with a clear understanding of the relevance and degree of conservatism of the assumptions troubles me.
Although the committee might well prove to be correct, Bradbury admitted, “T would only prefer to have more ammunition.” He had asked his staff, he told Warren, “‘to see if we can either add some support (or worry) as to the safety of the proposed operation.” !2
The first look added more worry than support. Late in June, Los Alamos health and weapons-testing experts met to discuss the “serious problems of radiological safety at moderate distances from the test site . . . [that] the Jangle test program has raised, for the first time since Trinity.” A theoretical model derived from Trinity data seemed the most useful basis for trying “to predict radiation levels as a function of distance for various conditions of particle size, cloud height, and wind velocity.” Calculation required many assumptions, however, and the fit between a tower shot like Trinity and a surface test in Jangle could hardly be precise.!3 The results nonetheless struck Bradbury as “rather startlingly different from those which were being suggested earlier.””!4
Ironically, the deeper shot proposed for safety appeared likely to cause the severest fallout problem. The Los Alamos panel’s crude model precluded more than informed guesswork. It could not, for instance, predict exactly how large a threat Jangle dust might pose to human lungs. But it did allow the panel to conclude “that on the average worse conditions will result from lower cloud heights than from higher,” and the deepest shot meant the lowest cloud.!> Health Division Leader Shipman, a panel member, strongly urged forgoing the deeper shot and firing the surface test first. Most nearly resembling Trin-
ity, it presented the fewest unknowns; at the same time, it also seemed to threaten the least danger. Bradbury’s ad hoc panel, in effect, reversed the preferred order of the shots.!¢
This argument persuaded the Jangle Feasibility Committee to alter its recommendations. Meeting in Washington on 13 July 1951, “the Committee agreed that the 1.25 KT deep underground weapon would be unnecessary from a strictly radiological safety viewpoint. Furthermore, that the order of firing should be, first the surface and second the scaled sub-surface.” The
64 Developing Weapons and Tactics in Nevada committee also discussed at length “the level of radioactivity that the outside populations should be allowed to take.”!? Bradbury’s ad hoc panel had noted the expected dangers from “external y and B-dosage.” Much better understood than the effects of inhaled or ingested particles, however, the gamma-
beta problem aroused little concern: “sporadic exposure of the kind” that might occur in Jangle differed from “the repeated regular exposure suffered by workers in radiological fields.” The allowed dose “can, from the safety point of view, very well be raised to 5 or 10 roentgens (publicity considerations disregarded ).”!8 Shipman strongly endorsed this view.!9
The Jangle Feasibility Committee demurred. Its members much preferred keeping public faith over some doubtful short-term gain. “Since there are
plans to use the Nevada Test Site on a recurring basis,” the committee believed “the AEC had no right to exceed established accepted safe maximum permissible doses for people outside the range.” Furthermore, “the pub-
lic has confidence in the safety of AEC operations, and nothing should be done to lessen this confidence.” Substituting the AEC emergency standard of 10 roentgens for “the only generally recognized safe maximum permissible dose’—0.3 roentgen per week—“the Committee felt. . . would be unwise,’’20
Committee members did, however, revise the radiological safety standards, as Failla had urged. Although the external dose standard remained unchanged, the statement now allowed integrating it over ten weeks. The only other significant change raised the limit for measured airborne activity to a more realistic 100 microcuries per cubic meter of air, equated to a groundlevel gamma intensity of 30 milliroentgens per hour. Radioactive airborne dust did appear to pose a threat, but external gamma still controlled.?! Pragmatically, “the y-dose is the best criterion for judging the degree of radiologi-
cal hazard,” as the Los Alamos panel had remarked, chiefly because the gamma level could so easily and accurately be measured in the field.2? External gamma radiation was assumed throughout the 1950s to pose the greatest threat to health and safety; controlling gamma meant handling the chief risk. Committee members endorsed stringent limits “even if this means evacuation of some of the nearby populated areas.” Once again, they deemed public trust not something lightly discarded. “It was the feeling of the group that the public would better accept continued use of the test site if the AEC were hon-
est and straightforward, by explaining the possibility of temporary evacuation, rather than take the risk of injuring any outside person.”?3 Echoing his remarks before Ranger, Shipman still preferred only to “consider evacuation if the estimated total dose seemed to be somewhere between 25 or 50 1, provided we could be certain that such evacuation would not serve to increase the exposure rather than decrease it.”*4 So high a limit the committee would not accept.
Developing Weapons and Tactics in Nevada 65 On a related matter, however, Shipman and committee members saw eye
to eye. Evacuation or other emergency action, Shipman insisted, was no proper rad-safe responsibility. Monitors would have their hands full in an emergency; another group assigned full time to the task seemed a much better idea. Fortunately, a perfect choice waited in the wings. Shortly after Ranger, Shipman had sketched a plan for using the Federal Civil Defense Adminis-
tration in rad-safe operations. In May 1951, the then year-old agency had contacted the AEC to propose a huge study of bomb effects on buildings and structures for the fall test series. When the AEC pleaded time and space con-
straints, the administration returned with a far more modest program. Although still under study during the summer, its prospects looked good.25 Now the Jangle Feasibility Committee suggested a genuine role for civil defense in Buster-Jangle: emergency planning “might be a very proper practice function for the Civil Defense Administration.”6
Military Needs and AEC Standards Neither the Jangle Feasibility Committee nor Bradbury’s ad hoc panel had
treated worker safety. That belonged to Shipman’s Health Division. His thinking about Buster-Jangle safety closely followed Ranger and Greenhouse precedents. He saw no reason to alter the 3-roentgen operational limit. “Experience in the two recent tests has shown this to be realistic and workable. We do not consider it a calculated risk; neither does it appear to be unduly restrictive.” In contrast to Greenhouse, however, he wanted this limit to include fallout-caused exposure. Circumstances at Enewetak may not have allowed “totally unexpected” fallout levels to alter worker assignments, Shipman observed, but “I do not feel that we can afford to adopt a similar policy again.”?? Buster-Jangle planning was already well under way. In New Mexico, Test Director Graves forwarded a preliminary plan for Buster-Jangle to the Santa Fe Operations Office on 16 July 1951. Tentatively, Buster called for three to six shots—most likely five, one tower and four airdrops—while Jangle would comprise just two, one on the surface and one 17 feet deep. Santa Fe Oper-
ations passed the plan to the Division of Military Application (DMA) in Washington. DMA accepted the proposed changes, as did the Division of Biology and Medicine. The commissioners discussed the military division report when they met on 27 July. They also reviewed the findings of the Jangle Feasibility Committee. Although certain questions remained, mostly matters of detail about specific AEC and military projects, the commissioners approved the plans.?8 The so-called Operations Plan of mid-July 1951, however, more nearly resembled a planning memo. It projected a schedule, sketched an organization, and listed proposed measurements and tests. Mainly, it outlined the scope and
66 Developing Weapons and Tactics in Nevada nature of military support for Buster-Jangle. Typically, rad-safe appeared chiefly in the form of personnel rosters, the men being tapped for service with the rad-safe unit.2? Graves issued the real plan late in August. He reserved to himself sole right to permit excess doses: “The Rad-Safe Officer has no authority to and will not permit increases in the permissible integrated doses quoted in Annex R.” That rad-safe annex limited “total integrated permissi-
ble dose . . . [to] three (3) roentgens (measured gamma only) based on a three (3) month operational period.” The August order was emphatic: “INDIVIDUALS AND PARTIES WILL BE GOVERNED BY THE RADSAFE FINDINGS AND DECISIONS OF THE ASSIGNED MONITOR OR MONITORS.”0 Matters were not quite that simple. Some jobs truly might carry risks of greater exposure than others, notably, flying the cloud-sampling aircraft. For earlier tests, radio-controlled drone aircraft had collected samples. During Sandstone, however, a weather aircraft equipped with filter boxes accidentally entered the Zebra cloud, and the crew suffered no ill effects. “No one keeled over dead and no one got sick,” commented the pilot. “In fact, there seemed to be no undue alarm among the crew members.’’3! The samples also seemed better. That led the air force to a series of experimental manned sampling flights in Ranger and Greenhouse, although drones still provided most samples.>* Encouraged by the results, the air force proposed manned sampling for Buster-Jangle, and Los Alamos agreed. Three modified B-29s as used in earlier trials plus three T-33 two-seat jet aircraft on an experimental basis replaced the drone cloud samplers.*? Promptly sampled bomb debris provided crucial test data, but crew members flying through a highly active cloud might well exceed the 3-roentgen limit too quickly to finish the job. Shipman worried that some air force people seemed “to feel that they can go ahead and get higher exposures if they wish.”34 Although he rejected such views in principle, he also understood the special needs of cloud sampling. His request to Washington for a higher limit in special circumstances received a favorable but guarded reply.35 As Shipman explained the matter in his posttest report, “The Division of Biology and Medicine agreed to an unpublicized exposure of 3.9 r, which was used to give the 3-r limit added flexibility where absolutely necessary.’’%° The Los Alamos Health Division furnished a third of the 187-man Buster-
Jangle rad-safe unit. Several agencies, including the U.S. Public Health Service, augmented the unit. White, Shipman’s deputy, headed the rad-safe unit proper. Relatively few of those on the roster served as monitors: administration, record keeping, and special studies claimed most of them. The Jangle Feasibility Committee had requested a thorough study of fallout. Within a 10mile radius of ground zero, one of the military weapon effects programs collected the required data. For ground surveys in the region between 10 and 200 miles from ground zero, Shipman had a mobile monitoring unit, two-man
Developing Weapons and Tactics in Nevada 67 teams in radio-equipped cars or trucks dispatched by William R. Kennedy, Jr. Aerial fallout surveys in the same region fell to another group directed by Harry F. Schulte.3?
Beyond 200 miles, the AEC’s Health and Safety Laboratory directed the fallout survey. This effort arose from problems observed after Ranger and Greenhouse, particularly fallout effects on film manufacturing in the eastern United States. Responding to industry complaints, the AEC agreed to collect and report fallout readings throughout the country. Manufacturers needed the
data to safeguard their film, but the AEC might also bolster its defense against legal action.*8 Buster-Jangle called for special effort, the Division of Military Application believed, “because of the possibility of unusual radioactive contamination.”3? The HASL created a fallout monitoring network sited at existing weather stations from Maine to California; mobile sampling teams,
with air force help, sought to track the cloud through the air and over the ground. The effort far surpassed anything attempted previously.” Buster-Jangle, like Ranger, offered splendid prospects for rad-safe field training; both the AEC and the military again exploited the chance. AEC installations across the country sent monitors to augment the Buster-Jangle radsafe unit, seventeen in all; three others came from the Federal Civil Defense
Administration, the as yet modest result of efforts to make civil defense an active partner in test site safety. Military monitors, however, once again formed the largest single contingent. The Armed Forces Special Weapons Project was especially eager to augment its reserve pool of experienced moni-
tors. A last-minute request to assign a special group of trainees for Jangle caused a minor flurry but no great hardship. The rad-safe unit provided fifty-
two slots for military monitors, although the number who served proved much larger; newcomers replaced veterans as test followed test.*! Meanwhile, Buster-Jangle planning received a shock from the Department
of Defense. Whatever constraints Nevada might impose compared to Amchitka, it also offered a useful setting for other military purposes. In mid-July 1951—the same day, in fact, that Graves forwarded the Buster-Jangle plan to Santa Fe Operations—the Military Liaison Committee submitted a request to the AEC in Washington. The army wanted a troop exercise as part of the fall test series. Other branches of the armed forces hoped to send observers. Despite concerns about support for the large numbers involved—an army regimental combat team and service units counting 5,000 men in all, plus 3,500 observers—the AEC endorsed the proposal. Maj. Gen. William B. Kean commanded III Corps. He directed the exercise, code named Desert Rock, and his command furnished the troops.” Initial army hopes to practice battlefield tactics failed to survive AECimposed safety rules: no troops closer than 7 miles to ground zero at H Hour. A revised plan reduced troop strength to the level of battalion combat team. The men would dig themselves in, then leave their gear behind as they retired
68 Developing Weapons and Tactics in Nevada to safety beyond the 7-mile limit. Film badges spotted around the forward positions, including one clipped to each nifle, recorded exposures that entrenched troops might have received. Penned sheep also remained on the scene to display bomb effects more graphically. Once monitors confirmed the posttest safety of the forward area, troops would return to see what happened and
learn how minor the risks of staying in place might have been.*? Psychological testing before and after would reveal how firsthand experience altered attitudes.4 Advised by a technical expert from the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, the army provided its own rad-safe unit—supervised, instructed, and often led in the field by 15 AEC monitors. Personnel from the army’s Chemical Corps School at Fort McClellan, Alabama, formed the core of the unit. On 16 October 1951, the 3 officers and 12 enlisted men reported to Camp
Desert Rock, established just off the test site, two miles south of Mercury base camp. During the next two weeks—Desert Rock was scheduled for Buster Dog on 1 November—they trained 60 new monitors, all assigned to the safety unit from battalion and support troops. Thé unit also controlled its own film badging and decontamination.* Desert/Rock troops observed a “one roentgen total” exposure limit, and “no individual was permitted to enter an area where the radiation intensity was higher than one roentgen per hour.” Monitors led all troop movements, and every soldier received a film badge.*
Radiological safety standards never became a major issue in BusterJangle, despite Shipman’s concern. Military planners deferred to AEC views about running the Nevada Test Site safely, just as they accepted Los Alamos technical judgments. Interests, however, could and did diverge with respect to test goals. Military effects testing sought data quite distinct from AEC development testing. Furthermore, Jangle in Nevada could not provide the ample time, space, and resources that the pristine Windstorm program might have enjoyed on Amchitka. Predictably, there was friction. Members of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project resented AEC questions about military needs and feared cuts too deep in its effects programs. The proposed biomedical program, though endorsed by the AEC Division of Biology and Medicine, became particularly controversial.*
Carroll L. Tyler, manager of Santa Fe Operations, strongly objected to weapons development cluttered with effects testing. Workable but undesirable, he judged, as did the Los Alamos experts. They preferred a special test conducted the following spring. That would allow more thorough planning and training to secure the most useful returns on the effort. Washington rejected this advice. Effects would be studied in Buster-Jangle. At the same time, however, AEC headquarters began laying the groundwork for better future relations, perhaps a joint AEC-military screening committee for later tests. Military interests would benefit as well. Efforts to pinpoint precise weapon effects were not well served by development tests, which often used
Developing Weapons and Tactics in Nevada 69 devices that varied greatly from true weapons or imposed conditions sharply different from what might prevail in combat.*8 The commission also urged on Defense greater respect for command prin-
ciples. As manager of Santa Fe Operations, Tyler received the AEC post of test commander for Buster-Jangle. Military planners claimed the right to review his decisions; even minor changes were to require “the advice and concurrence of the Test Director and the Commanding General, SWC [Air Force Special Weapons Command].”49 From the AEC viewpoint, this demand
violated a tacit understanding. The test commander in Nevada required no less free a hand than the task force commander at Enewetak. Unity of command had prevailed at the Pacific Proving Ground and merited equal respect at the Nevada Test Site. Eventually, the AEC and the Military Liaison Committee resolved the issue, vesting full authority in the test commander during actual test operations. Agreement came none too soon. Buster was already beginning.°°
Buster-Jangle When President Truman formally approved Buster-Jangle on 9 October 1951, Buster Able was but ten days away. Earlier public statements had been quite limited.°! An AEC press release on 28 August provided no details. It simply announced that testing “will resume. . . in the near future,” stressing the absence of public danger. Off-site radiation above normal levels which resulted from the previous Nevada tests was far below the levels which could be harmful to humans, animals or crops. Similar radiation levels which are slightly above normal may be anticipated following some experiments. This will occur not only in Nevada but also in other sections of the country. All necessary precautions, including radiological surveys and patrolling of the surrounding territory, will be undertaken to insure that safe conditions are maintained.°?
Further statements early in October repeated the message. Security barred much official comment, but the radiation monitoring and warning system fully safeguarded the public.*3
Elaborate AEC public relations planning centered chiefly on keeping things quiet: “Experience at Operation Ranger indicated that the low key approach to continental test operations can be reasonably effective.”54 Following the AEC lead, Department of Defense information experts also downplayed Desert Rock. They intended to allow “no public discussion nor release of technical, scientific, or programmatic data which exceeds the AEC’s August 28 announcement.”>> But they did draft a fact sheet intended to allay
any concerns about troop safety. Security restricted details, of course, but
70 Developing Weapons and Tactics in Nevada within those limits the statement offered a clear picture of actual plans and precautions.*6
Operation Buster began inauspiciously. On 19 October 1951, a bad electrical connection in the control circuit aborted the first test. Then an outbreak of food poisoning brought work to a standstill. Finally fired atop its 100-foot tower three days late, the Able device fizzled: a yield under 0.1 kiloton. Radiological safety control went smoothly, although the blast scattered radioactive debris a few hundred feet about the tower. Subsequently, Buster met greater success, four shots in little more than a week. All dropped from air force B-29s over Yucca Flat, each larger than the one before: Test Baker, 3.5 kilotons on 28 October; Charlie, 14 on the thirtieth; Dog, 21 on 1 November; Easy, 31 on the fifth. None exploded below 1,100 feet. On-site surveys the day after even the largest shot found readings above 0.1 roentgen per hour limited to a 1,000-yard radius of zero. Although both Dog and Easy at least matched the yield of Ranger Fox, its radioactivity around ground zero, and its fallout toward Las Vegas and Mount Charleston, they seemed to concern radsafe much less. Press releases duly announced off-site radiation either absent or far too slight to pose any danger.>’ Shipman later reported that measurable airborne activity beyond 1,000 yards from ground zero everywhere fell “far below the permissible concentrations recommended by the Feasibility Committee.’’>8
No one had expected much trouble from Buster. Jangle, however, might be another.story. Meanwhile, despite qualms about radiological safety, the AEC
decided to honor an army request to extend Exercise Desert Rock. Several hundred troops assigned to service units during the exercise had not seen a test. The army proposed letting them witness the two Jangle shots. Once the commissioners assured themselves that army planners understood the perhaps novel dangers Jangle might pose, they acceded to the request—reluctantly. General Kean and the bulk of the reinforced battalion combat team returned to their home bases as planned. Remaining troops under a new commander became part of what the army now labeled Desert Rock II (Jangle Sugar) and Desert Rock II (Jangle Uncle).°9 The two Jangle shots took place ten days apart, on 19 and 29 November 1951. Each had a yield of 1.2 kilotons. Sugar, the surface shot, left a crater 21 feet deep and 90 feet across. The Uncle device, fired 17 feet below ground, expended less of its energy in the air. It left a crater nearly three times deeper and broader than Sugar. As expected, both shots produced huge amounts of radioactivity at ground zero. Based on later surveys—the areas were far too
active to approach at once—the lips of both craters one hour after firing would have measured 7,500 roentgens per hour. Dangerously high levels of activity near the crater decayed rapidly. Recovery efforts after Sugar and Uncle nonetheless accounted for all Buster-Jangle overexposures. The rad-
Developing Weapons and Tactics in Nevada 71 safe unit badged 1,749 civilian and military members of the AEC test organization. Of that total, 62 received exposures above 3 roentgens; 13 exceeded the 3.9-roentgen emergency limit, though no one by more than 2 roentgens.
Overexposure meant a worker’s immediate removal, and Shipman issued warnings when records showed anyone nearing the limit.®! Exposures recorded by the Desert Rock rad-safe unit appeared to reverse
the AEC pattern; they were higher in Desert Rock I (Buster) than in Desert Rock II and III (Jangle). This made sense, given contrasted purposes and procedures. Maneuvering troops came as near as 500 yards to ground zero less than five hours after the shot in Desert Rock I. Monitors had, of course, first checked the area. In any event, air bursts rarely caused high levels of ground activity. According to the army’s report on Desert Rock I, none of the 883 film badges issued to members of the combat team read above 0.2 roentgen. The 1,587 badges worn by Desert Rock support troops produced a high reading of 0.225 roentgen. Ironically, the highest reading, 0.32 roentgen, came from the badge of one of the 2,796 observers; he and a few others wandered closer than planned to ground zero during their postshot tour of the forward area. Even this highest reading, however, fell “well within the militarily acceptable limits’ set for Desert Rock.®* Despite the presumed dangers of Jangle, Desert Rock II and III appeared to cause no problems. Troops merely witnessed the shots from a safe distance. Although they, too, toured the forward area, they remained aboard buses and so avoided much chance of exposure. The absence of film badges for most of these troops, however, leaves much uncertainty. A recent attempt to reconstruct doses for Desert Rock I, II, and III concludes that all three entailed similar levels of exposure.© The Health and Safety Laboratory detected fallout from Jangle—by direct instrument readings within a few hundred miles and through collected sam-
ples farther away—but nothing of concern. The highest reading came from Elko, Nevada, 300 miles north of Yucca Flat, where a team recorded 2 milliroentgens per hour after Jangle Sugar. Rochester once again received levels of fallout high enough to concern film manufacturers but far below anything deemed to pose a health threat. Based on its survey, the laboratory concluded, “The external radiation and radioactive dust measurements gave no indication that the exposure criteria of the Jangle Feasibility Committee were exceeded in the area beyond 200 miles from the Test Site.”® Within 200 miles, the story was the same. Shipman’s fallout survey like-
wise reported an absence of major problems. “Air concentrations of active material did not exceed the recommendations of the Jangle Feasibility Committee at any point, although they approached these figures at several points as much as 50 miles distant from the point of detonation.”® Surprisingly, air concentration proved a poor guide to ground contamination. Sugar spread debris over the larger surface, although Uncle produced the higher air readings.
72 Developing Weapons and Tactics in Nevada Both Jangle shots, like Trinity in 1945, dropped intense fallout in uneven patterns: particles of earth coated with fission products condensed from the cool-
ing cloud and falling to the ground. So-called hot spots—ground areas of much higher activity than their surroundings—on the test site some miles northeast of zero caused readings as high as 35 roentgens per hour.’ Nothing that high was observed off site. Someone standing for a lifetime in the open at one point just outside the test site, 40 miles from zero, however, might have received a total dose as high as 30 roentgens. Fortunately, no one was there— “Probably more good luck than good management,” Shipman later observed. Some people did live that near, in fact, but not in just that direction,®
Conditions at the test site remained spartan, despite the building effort under way since spring. Improvements at the control point made work easier,
but life at Mercury, the base camp, meant sleeping in plywood huts and scrounging for supplies. Shipman complained about Buster-Jangle, as he had about Ranger: there often seemed too much to do in too little time with too few hands. Unreliable radio contact still plagued off-site operations, as it had since Trinity, and most monitors drove rental cars. But in Buster-Jangle as in Ranger, the job got done. “So far as can be determined, no individual was
injured by radiation, either within the test program or in the surrounding countryside,” Shipman reported.7°
For its own part in Desert Rock, the army agreed: “Radiological safety measures were adequate as witnessed by the fact that no individual received a
hazardous dosage of radiation.’’”! Even before the series ended, the AEC voted to commend “the Test Director and his staff. . . [for] excellent work done. . . under very difficult circumstances.” Buster-Jangle results also allayed fears about ongoing use of the test site. Neither film manufacturing nor public health seemed in danger from testing.”? That was just as well, as plans for the next round of tests were already well advanced.
Rad-Safe Plans and Training Test-site workers were still setting up Buster when AEC planners decided to call the next series Operation Snapper. Slated for spring 1952, Snapper, like Buster, soon added a military program. The reason was not, as one might suppose, the special test for weapon effects and training that Tyler had suggested before Buster. Reconsidered in Washington after more thorough study by the Division of Military Application, that special test again failed to win commission support. Radiological safety in effects testing remained one of the crucial issues. Commissioners felt that Defense should accept full responsibility for effects testing within the continental United States.74 They also largely shared the test organization’s view of effects testing as a hindrance to development. Military claims could not, however, always be postponed. The
Developing Weapons and Tactics in Nevada 73 army, in particular, pressed for data on which to base its designs for combat units suited to nuclear battlefields. —
In a letter to the Military Liaison Committee, the AEC allowed a loophole, accommodating “effects tests of extreme urgency.”’> That became the basis for Operation Tumbler. Anomalous blast pressure data from Buster had wak-
ened military concerns; nuclear tactics depended on such data to define proper heights for air bursts. In Washington on 2 January 1952, the AEC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed on the urgent need for an air blast effects test. Meeting at Los Alamos a week later, AEC and military test officials arranged
lines of command and other aspects of this special test. By the end of the month, the spring series had become Tumbler-Snapper, scheduled to begin in April 1952 with the first of eight or nine shots.”6
Considerable overlap—several shots counted for both Tumbler and Snapper—made the line between the two largely academic. Los Alamos J-Division directed Tumbler-Snapper, as it had Buster-Jangle. The Los Alamos Health Division, however, happily surrendered its central role in safety. Supervising rad-safe at the Nevada Test Site had strained his resources, as Shipman noted after both Ranger and Buster-Jangle. Apparent manpower shortages had also raised questions at AEC headquarters in Washington. Thus the Department of Defense offer to provide the rad-safe team for TumblerSnapper found a warm welcome. That offer came at the January meeting that set responsibilities for the spring tests.” The Armed Forces Special Weapons Project chose James B. Hartgerng as rad-safe planner for Tumbler-Snapper. A Medical Corps officer on the AFSWYP staff, Hartgering had served as rad-safe adviser to Exercise Desert Rock. He met with Shields Warren and his staff in Washington on 25 January to arrange off-site monitoring. Assignments followed much the same lines as Buster-Jangle. Hartgering’s team would survey fallout within a 200-mile ra-
dius. The Health and Safety Laboratory, working with the air force and weather bureau, would again oversee nationwide surveys. Warren’s Division of Biology and Medicine intended to play a more active role than it had before—monitoring fallout between 200 and 500 miles of ground zero—but that, too, in the end became a task for the New York laboratory.”
Hartgering remained with Tumbler-Snapper as rad-safe adviser when AFSWP Test Command named an air force officer, Philip S. Gwynn, to head the radiological safety group. On 1 March 1952, the Los Alamos Health Division transferred to Gwynn formal responsibility for rad-safe at the Nevada Proving Ground, the newly renamed Nevada Test Site. The rad-safe group included officers and men from the air force, the navy, and AFSWP, but the bulk of Gwynn’s 200-man command came from the army.” Indoctrination and training for the rad-safe group began 20 March 1952. Few of its members had any rad-safe field experience or had even witnessed a test. This “dearth of men with previous experience in test operations” had, in fact, prompted
74 Developing Weapons and Tactics in Nevada J-Division to form a special advisory committee. “I feel that your peace of mind will best be assured,” Shipman told Graves, “if the work of the rad-safe organization is, at all times, under careful scrutiny.’®°
Formal training lasted until the first Tumbler-Snapper shot on 1 April 1952, then resumed during the two weeks before the second; on-the-job training remained an active pursuit throughout the series. Organizationally, the rad-safe group comprised four departments: on-site operations, off-site operations, Indian Springs operations, and logistics and supply. The three operational sections divided the work by region and function. On-site operations checked test workers, surveyed the proving ground, and maintained exposure records. Off-site operations contained two distinct groups, one concerned with surface monitoring and one handling an air-sampling fallout survey much like the one in Buster-Jangle. Indian Springs operations oversaw rad-safe and aircraft decontamination procedures at the airfield close by the proving ground, the base for crews and machines engaged in cloud sampling, tracking, and other air force tasks. Cloud sampling was again divided between jet aircraft and B-29s.8!
When Gwynn issued the Tumbler-Snapper “Radiological Safety Plan,” the first shot was less than a week away. By spring 1952, however, such matters seemed well understood; exposure limits for test workers no longer required
extended debate. In Tumbler-Snapper, like Buster-Jangle, cloud samplers used a 3.9-roentgen limit. Otherwise, the plan simply noted that “the total permissible integrated dose for personnel involved in this operation is three (3) roentgens, gamma only.’’®?
As experience at Crossroads and Sandstone amply confirmed, beta radiation might become a full-fledged hazard in its own right. But it was also hard to measure in the field or record on film badges. Pragmatically, rad-safe plan-
ners chose some beta/gamma ratio and assumed that safeguards against gamma would also cope with beta, while research sought better answers.® Off-site standards likewise appeared to be taken for granted, the safety plan citing no figures and leaving the subject otherwise largely untouched. The recent deliberations of the Jangle Feasibility Committee may have made renewed debate of the issues seem redundant. Evacuation plans, whether for test workers or for a threatened off-site public, likewise cited no figures; the decision was left to the judgment of the test director.*
Radiological safety for the troops of Exercise Desert Rock IV raised harder questions. This exercise came late to Tumbler-Snapper. Shortly after Jangle ended, the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project had converted Camp Desert Rock to standby status. Military planners hoped to extend what they judged a much needed and so far successful program: it provided useful training for some troops in the novel demands of nuclear warfare, a chance for others at least to see the bomb in action. The army already expected to
Developing Weapons and Tactics in Nevada 75 send another battalion combat team to Snapper, plus several hundred observers. Other services might well follow suit, but nothing was yet firmly decided as 1951 ended. Noting the problems that troop training could pose for the test program, the AEC urged prompt action.®
Preliminary figures for military participation reached the AEC in midFebruary 1952. Excluding camp personnel, troops and observers would total almost 4,500. Such numbers caused no concern in AEC headquarters, provided the Department of Defense accepted certain strictures—foremost among them, a demand that it assume “complete overall responsibility for safety of
troops” and assure the AEC “that such responsibility is completely understood by DOD.”® The issue received a new twist early in March. In a letter from its deputy chief, Air Force Brig. Gen. Alvin R. Luedecke, AFSWP sought revised ground rules for troop maneuvers “in the interest of indoctrination of ground troops to an extent which would be of value in readying them for the actual use of atomic weapons.” Specifically, that meant putting troops at a safe distance from ground zero but not farther than “1s reasonably sound from a tactical standpoint.” Troops should also be allowed to “maneuver in the vicinity of ground zero as soon as practicable after the explosion.”®’
General Luedecke defined “a safe but tactically sound distance” as far enough from ground zero to avoid harming the troops, close enough to offer some semblance of a battlefield event. He explained how AFSWP had arrived at a figure of 7,000 yards, just under four miles, to meet the need. Describing the planned maneuver as “little more than advancing on foot, within an allotted zone of action, to an area as near ground zero as 1s feasible,’’ Luedecke assured the AEC that “necessary precautions required to avoid possible overexposure to gamma radiation are understood, and proper monitoring proce-
dures will be carried out throughout the advancing tactical formation during the post-detonation maneuver.” Observers, in contrast, would adhere to precedent. After watching the tests from seven miles away, they would take guided tours of displays ranged outward from ground zero.*® The response from Los Alamos was guarded. Although the figures checked
out—indeed, appeared conservative—policy barred manned stations nearer than five miles to a bomb run. Desert Rock maneuvers were slated for shots 3 and 4, both airdrops; the chance of error in flight path or bomb release could not be dismissed. Los Alamos nonetheless simply pointed out the dangers and listed the options, with one exception. J-Division insisted “that no requirement whatever will be placed on the Test Organization for monitors or monitoring services.”8? The AEC Santa Fe Operations Office backed this demand. Its manager, Carroll Tyler, who doubled as test manager, also questioned the wisdom of cutting the five-mile limit. “If troops are permitted in positions at closer distance, it seems mandatory that a clear understanding be had as to hazard which exists, both from the standpoint of bomb-delivery
76 Developing Weapons and Tactics in Nevada accident and thermal or light effects, and that acceptance of responsibility be
adequately documented.” The Division of Biology and Medicine stood firmer yet. Shields Warren refused to endorse any limit below the seven miles observed in former Desert Rock exercises. Troop safety might, strictly speaking, concern solely the Department of Defense. But “both in fact and in the public mind,” safety at the Nevada Proving Ground was an AEC responsibility. Experimental devices sometimes produced unplanned results, and even experts made mistakes. The risks might well be very small, Warren admitted, but “accidents occurring at the time and place of an atomic explosion are magnified by the press out of all proportion to their importance, and any injury or death during the operation might well have serious effects.” Compromising safety, however slightly, could cost far more than it was worth.%! Acknowledging the risks, the Division of Military Application nonetheless favored the 7,000-yard limit. Opinion within the Department of Defense had, if anything, hardened, the commissioners heard from Brig. Gen. Kenneth E.
Fields, who in mid-1951 had succeeded James McCormack as director of military application. “So strong is the feeling about the importance of being at a tactically realistic distance from ground zero that the Marines have stated they would not participate if the seven mile limitation fixed during Desert Rock were again imposed.” Fortunately, the dangers appeared either minor or controllable. Although doubts persisted about the risk of a bomb dropped too early or too late, Fields believed a proper safety plan well enforced “will pro-
vide sufficient protection.” The commissioners agreed, though only after two days of discussion.” AEC Chairman Dean informed his AFSWP counterpart, Army Brig. Gen. Herbert B. Loper, of the decision and suggested a schedule. Virtually all details were left to be settled between the AEC test manager and AFSWP Test
Command. Most of the lengthy letter, a product of the commission’s prolonged discussion of the Division of Military Application report, reflected still troubling safety issues. The letter centered on “possible hazards to troops stationed at a distance of 7000 yards from. . . ground zero.” But that explained, the choice remained military. If officials of the Department of Defense, after review of the hazards involved, still feel that a military requirement justifies the maneuver, the Commission would enter no objection to stationing troops at not less than 7000 yards from ground zero, provided that the [DOD] Exercise Director prepares a safety plan to minimize risk of injury which is acceptable to the [AEC] Test Manager.
Responsibility for making troops comply “with this safety plan rests, of course, with the Exercise Director.’
Developing Weapons and Tactics in Nevada 77
Desert Rock and Tumbler-Snapper Flexible planning marked Desert Rock IV throughout. Maneuvers followed four of the eight Tumbler-Snapper tests: two airdrops, Charlie on 22 April 1952 and Dog on 1 May; and two tower shots, Fox on 25 May and George on 1 June. When the AEC accepted the 7,000-yard limit, the Marine Corps sent two battalion combat teams for Dog. The army again provided the bulk of the forces: ground troops, for the most part, but also an airborne company to jump after Charlie and a tank unit to join the advance after George.
Early moming airdrop or tower shot found the troops entrenched at the agreed distance, convoyed from Camp Desert Rock in the predawn darkness. Protection afforded by trenches, first used in Tumbler-Snapper, was a key factor in placing troops so near ground zero. In each instance, the units involved provided their own monitors. After George, in fact, they surveyed approaches
to the display areas without help from either the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project or the AEC, the first bid to free themselves of AFSWP control. During Tumbler-Snapper, however, the safety rules came only from the rad-safe group. Desert Rock troops adhered to the same 3-roentgen limit as everyone else. They also restricted their movements to areas with readings under 0.5 roentgen per hour, as the AEC test manager insisted. Military observers, some with the maneuver units but most no closer than seven miles, swelled the total of troops at Tumbler-Snapper by several thousand. They were not, however, the only witnesses. Stung by press criticism, especially after Buster-Jangle, when excluded reporters heard invited congressmen talking freely about what they had seen, the AEC decided to crack the door. Test Director Alvin Graves suggested opening the third shot, and the commissioners agreed. Security problems, costs, the general nuisance—all seemed small enough to manage. Neither the White House nor the Pentagon objected. Invitations went to members of Congress and the Federal Civil Defense Administration as well as the press. More than four hundred “uncleared observers,” as the AEC termed them, showed up for Tumbler-Snapper Charlie on 22 April 1952.%
Radiological safety concerned the AEC; local and nationwide monitor programs, ongoing studies, and prolonged debate testified to that fact. Safeguarding test workers and the public was not, however, wholly an end in itself. Public safety must not only be assured; it must be noticed. Unfounded fear might hinder testing, even threaten use of the Nevada Proving Ground. “The continuing goal is to remove the possibility of unreasoning public reaction from operations determinations, and to permit continued use of a continental site,” explained the Santa Fe Operations Office.?” The AEC director of information services in Washington linked public safety and public knowledge even more explicitly.
78 Developing Weapons and Tactics in Nevada As part of the radiation monitoring program, both local and national, it is necessary to allay unfounded fears of damage to humans, animals, crops and property from radiation created by the tests. In the event of emergency it might be necessary to evacuate residents of a local area, and this would require explicit public announcements.8
Fortunately, Tumbler-Snapper proved to require nothing so drastic. Operation Tumbler-Snapper began with Able on 1 April 1952, the first of four successive airdrops. Baker followed two weeks later, like Able using a 1-kiloton device for blast and other weapon effects studies. Detonated well above ground—Able just under 800 feet high, Baker just over 1,100—neither
caused problems, although a private team at North American Aviation in southern California detected post-Baker traces of fallout. A yield of 31 kilotons made Charlie on 22 April the largest in the series. Detonated above 3,400 feet, however, it departed little from routine. Desert Rock troops began
marching toward zero an hour later, closing to 175 yards without incident according to the army’s report.*? In the final airdrop, Dog on 1 May, the 19kiloton device burst just over a 1,000 feet above ground. Like the first three shots, the fourth caused little fallout off site. But on Yucca Flat the story was
different. “Due to the high levels of contamination, much recovery work was unavoidably delayed.” The rad-safe group restricted access for ten days. “Accumulated doses for individuals after Shot 4 showed a marked increase over those received after previous shots,” reported Gwynn, rad-safe chief. As many as fifteen workers exceeded the 3-roentgen limit, the highest topping 6 roentgens.!}
The last half of Tumbler-Snapper comprised four shots, all with yields from 11 to 15 kilotons, each fired from a 300-foot tower. Detonation so low allowed the swiftly rising fireball to suck in and vaporize large amounis of dirt and other surface debris scoured by the shock wave, which then condensed, coated with fission products, to demonstrate “very forcibly the prob-
lems of fall-out in areas . . . 20 to 100 miles from the test site.” Shot Easy produced Tumbler-Snapper’s first crisis. Stronger than normal winds aloft, up
to 75 miles per hour, strewed heavy fallout well beyond expected ranges. Monitors at Lincoln Mine, a community of 110 men, women, and children 45 miles northeast of ground zero, found “the largest fall-out we have ever had over a populated area’’!°!—neglecting Trinity. The highest reading came as the cloud passed, 0.8 roentgen per hour. Ely, Nevada, 150 miles farther northeast, also received fallout from the cloud reading as high as 0.03 roentgen per hour, and traces (under 0.01 roentgen per hour) fell on Salt Lake City, Utah, 200 miles still farther away. !% The AEC announced merely that “fallout readings . . . in the mining areas north and northeast of Nevada Proving Grounds. . . were primarily of scientific interest.’’!°3 Reporting the results of the fifth test to the commissioners in
Developing Weapons and Tactics in Nevada 79 Washington, Warren advised care “in the future to avoid tests when the winds in the upper air reach high velocities.”!®% Further study suggested an even smaller problem than first appeared. Calculations showed lifetime exposures
at Lincoln Mine of 2.25 roentgens; concentrations of active airborne dust were, at worst, a thousand times lower than the standard set by the Jangle Feasibility Committee the year before. Water samples collected throughout the area measured almost nothing. At Ely, the computed lifetime exposure was no more than 0.5 roentgen; at Salt Lake City, negligible. Ironically, the AEC noticed the greatest public concern where the danger seemed least, in Salt Lake City.!© In sharp contrast, the Public Health Service officer who vis-
ited the day after the test “observed no excitement or concern at Lincoln Mine, but a lively interest because AEC and Test Command should be concerned about them. Their attitude was that they were not affected, so there was nothing to worry about.’’!% Test officials nonetheless decided “that Lincoln Mine could be ‘hit’ only once more with the same intensity within a tenweek period.” That risk looked small. The product of freakish conditions, fallout so heavy seemed unlikely to recur in Operation Tumbler-Snapper.!” Although better foreseen, on-site problems were also worse than those off site. “Residual ground contamination of relatively high intensities” was widespread. Monitors could complete only partial surveys the first day, or even the second. Recovery parties found themselves delayed for hours, their missions sometimes left for another day altogether. Extra rad-safe control points restricted traffic, but the vehicle decontamination station still needed to add a full night shift for the expanded workload. “Accumulated doses,” the rad-safe group reported, “showed a sharp rise over . . . previous shots.” Exposure also began shrinking the rad-safe manpower pool. The former “few . . . in the neighborhood of 3 r,” became “after Shot 5 many . . . [with] accumulated doses . . . sufficiently high to preclude their use as field monitors on later shots.”” Monitors exchanged jobs with other members of the rad-safe group to maintain field strength and spread the training around as well.!° Among its other effects, Tumbler-Snapper Easy contaminated the nearby sites slated for the next two shots. Both tests were postponed. The delay grew longer when the predawn countdown for Fox on 20 May reached zero and nothing happened. Electrical failure in the firing circuit, announced a press release approved in Washington the same morning.!© Five days later, the next try succeeded, although some watchers remained “dubious until the characteristic brilliant flash lit up the valley floor. . . . This shot turned out to be the spectacular one of the entire series.” The action was not limited to sky and clouds. Less than an hour after the shot, “Frenchman Flat and the road
towards Mercury were shrouded by a haze of slightly radioactive dust.” Collecting stations at some points on site “produced samples each hour... . too hot to count.’’!!°
Fox spread heavy fallout northeastward, although neither so heavy nor so
80 Developing Weapons and Tactics in Nevada far as Easy. Lincoln Mine escaped almost untouched, but nearby Groom Mine recorded the highest reading of the day, 0.19 roentgen per hour in the wake of a brief morning rain shower. Isolated and remote though Groom Mine was, an enterprising Las Vegas reporter had reached the scene. Arriving the day before, he spent the night, watched the predawn shot, and left three hours later. What he learned of high readings alarmed him, and he sought official comment. The AEC response was reassuring: “Sensitive instruments recorded a peak radiation in the open somewhat comparable to that a person would receive from a chest X-ray.”"!! Although the estimated lifetime exposure, under 1.8 roentgens, far exceeded anything an X ray might cause, it still seemed low enough to preclude any great health hazard. Air and water samples after Fox as after Easy likewise measured well below Jangle Feasibility Committee standards.}!2 Although expert judgment endorsed the safety effort, public response re-
mained less certain. Questions of public safety raised by successive shots moved Test Information Director Richard G. Elliott to urge a better method “of informing the concerned public quickly and factually of exposure and especially of hazard created by tests.’’ Consistent format, expert advice, and clear guidelines seemed crucial. “Radiation is too complex technically,” he argued, “there is too much variation in official attitude toward the actual hazard involved and to the degree of public information advisable, and it is too important to the future of tests to be left solely to the Information Director.”!3 For Tumbler-Snapper, however, the crisis had passed. When Elliott
issued his call for action, only two shots remained. Neither George nor How during the first week of June 1952 created much off-site fallout, and the next test series in Nevada was not scheduled until the following spring.!!4 Rad-safe on-site operations coped with much the same pattern of problems after each of the final four shots: contamination widespread, monitor exposures rising, resources stretched thin. But on site as off, after Easy the worst was over. Experience allayed most early concerns. According to contemporary documents, only 62 of 2,243 test workers received more than 3 roent-
gens, 27 of whom also exceeded 3.9 roentgens, the highest 10.8. Overexposures, concludes a recent review, totaled 50: 8 members of the air force cloud-sampling unit who exceeded their special limit of 3.9 roentgens and 42 other members of the test organization who topped 3 roentgens. Civilian workers over 3 roentgens accounted for the remaining four overexposures.!!> Off site, Tumbler-Snapper fared better and worse than earlier test series. Favorable weather greatly reduced claims for damages from blast effects— only 15, the AEC announced in late May. With the series still under way that number might rise, but it still contrasted sharply with the 132 claims from Ranger and 294 from Buster-Jangle.!!6 For the first time since Trinity, however, some nearby cattle may have suffered burns.!!7 “The reported injuries were . . . loss of hair and ulcerations
Developing Weapons and Tactics in Nevada 81 down the middle of the animals’ backs,” Shipman told Graves—“suspiciously like the descriptions of the Trinity cattle.”!!8 Los Alamos veterinarian
Robert E. Thompsett agreed. Familiar with the New Mexico cattle, he inspected the Nevada animals and found them afflicted with milder damage from the same cause.!!9 They, too, suffered deflated market value. The aggrieved rancher’s attempts to recoup his loss, however, met little success. Legal limits to the dollar value of claims settled administratively shifted the issue to the courts.!2° In mid-1952, this seemed a relatively minor problem. For the ongoing test program, Gwynn concluded, Tumbler-Snapper proved “that 10 to 20 KT atomic bombs could be detonated from 300-foot towers at Nevada Proving Ground without creating a radioactive hazard to test personnel or the population in the vicinity of the test site, and without damage to plant or animal life.”!2! The test program in Nevada might resume in due course.
Testing Jeopardized Fallout from Ivy and Upshot-Knothole 1952-1953
Toward Thermonuclear Weapons Planning for Operation Ivy began shortly after President Truman decided in January 1950 that the United States needed a fusion bomb. By May, the likeliest season for the first thermonuclear test appeared to be spring 1952.! Thermonuclear testing took place in the Pacific. Maximum yields allowed in Nevada for aboveground tests were measured in tens of kilotons, far below the megatons of fusion test devices. As in past Pacific testing, the AEC sought Department of Defense support. Anticipating an increased testing tempo, the AEC urged a new approach to military support at the Pacific Proving Ground. Instead of a joint task force created anew for each series, Joint Task Force 3 might extend its mission for Operation Greenhouse in spring 1951 to cover Ivy a year later. Defense complied, though not precisely on AEC terms. Shortly after Greenhouse ended, Joint Task Force 132 formed. Under a new commander, Maj. Gen. Percy W. Clarkson, it absorbed key members of Joint Task Force 3 and took charge of the cleanup at Enewetak.? Shot George in Greenhouse had produced the largest fission yield to date; it also achieved a thermonuclear reaction. Yet the practicality of a fusion bomb
remained far from certain. The conceptual breakthrough at Los Alamos, in fact, overlapped Greenhouse in the Pacific. A new design converted the hydrogen bomb from technical question mark to likely weapon.? The earlier program, which Oppenheimer described as “a tortured thing that you could well argue did not make a great deal of technical sense,” became by mid1951 “technically so sweet that you could not argue about that.”4 Planners hoped to confirm the new concept as quickly as possible, most likely in 82
Testing Jeopardized 83 Operation Ivy now scheduled for late 1952. This would involve a strictly experimental device. Later, Operation Castle could allow testing a useful weapon.° “Operations Ivy and Castle are each planned to include the firing of a complete experimental thermonuclear device,” explained Director of Military Application Kenneth Fields. “Ivy is principally directed toward establishing thermonuclear feasibility from a purely experimental device. . . . Castle, however, is further directed toward a deliverable emergency weapon.”® The prospect of more frequent Pacific testing induced the AEC to form the Eniwetok Field Office. It fell under the Santa Fe Operations Office, which
already oversaw Nevada testing. The AEC also renewed its contract with Holmes & Narver, the Los Angeles engineering firm that had designed, built, and run Enewetak test facilities since 1948.7 In February 1952, the AEC issued its last public statement about Pacific tests, barring an emergency, for months to come. Revealing neither name nor date for the forthcoming series, both highly classified, the AEC merely announced “that preparations for a new series of tests at the Commission’s Pacific Proving Grounds are being carried out by Joint Task Force 132. Full security restrictions of the Atomic Energy Act apply to preparations for and time of the test.”® Work at Enewetak was already under way. Mike required a bulky 65-ton structure to liquefy and store deuterium, the heavy isotope of hydrogen needed to fuel the explosion. The specific site was Eluklab, an island on the atoll’s north rim.? Organization for radiological safety in the upcoming tests had likewise
begun. Navy Com. Russell H. Maynard added the duties of chief rad-safe officer to his main job, chief of technical operations on the task force staff. He also assumed command of the task force’s key rad-safe unit, task unit 132.1.7; Army Maj. John D. Servis served as deputy commander and operations officer. Activated on 22 January 1952, the rad-safe task unit formed part of the scientific task group, task group 132.1, staffed largely from Los Alamos J-Division and headed by Division Leader Graves. But the armed forces provided the bulk of the rad-safe unit: officers and enlisted men accounted for 47 of a planned strength of 52, though only 44 actually served as technicians, monitors, and clerks. Organizationally, in other words, Ivy rad-safe adhered to the well-tried pattern confirmed once again in Greenhouse the year before.!°
Defense-supplied radiation safety both relieved and concerned the Los Alamos Health Division. “None of us,” Division Leader Shipman wrote to Graves, “desire wholesale participation of a large number of H-Division representatives over an extended period of time’”—especially when that “undoubtedly would saddle [them] with the responsibility for an organization over which they have no actual control.” As rad-safe work became routine, it also began to seem burdensome, distracting workers from their main jobs at Los Alamos. Shipman acknowledged, however, that no one “would like the rad safe work at Operation Ivy to proceed entirely without H-Division partici-
84 Testing Jeopardized pation.” He strongly endorsed the views of his deputy, Thomas White, who had served with rad-safe units both in the Pacific and in Nevada during the last year.!!
Like Shipman, White welcomed a larger military rad-safe role to reduce the strain on Los Alamos. The problem, in White’s view, was that only the Health Division maintained “a continuity of interest, information and expe- rience in rad-safe planning and operations.” Military planners, he thought, failed to stress enough “the value of prior experience in rad-safe units.” They appear to regard “the rad-safe operation as a training exercise,” needing only a few experts to ensure success. Undue burdens on those few experts was one of “two bad consequences” White saw. The other was potentially stifling routine. Inexperience might feed “a complacent notion that we know all the main rad-safe requirements of an operation” and bolster the all too common military tendency to go by the book.!2 Shipman and Maynard discussed the Health Division’s role in Ivy at some length over the next few months. Shipman preferred his men clearly divided from the military rad-safe unit, partly for flexibility in Ivy itself. Although the rad-safe task unit served as central rad-safe unit for the task force, each of the other task groups maintained its own unit as well; Shipman feared that rigid lines of command might limit freedom to consult and advise these other radsafe officers. Precedents for future tests, however, seemed of greater moment. ‘As far as Ivy is concerned,” he explained to Graves, “our relations with Russ Maynard are on such a friendly basis that administrative lines will make very
little difference one way or the other.” That might not be true in the future. By holding Health Division members distinct from the task force rad-safe unit—placing them on the test director’s staff, Shipman suggested—their roles might more easily be adjusted to new demands. Such long-term concerns had little impact on Operation Ivy itself. Safety planning for Mike built on well-tried practice, but the special nature of a thermonuclear test suggested several changes. Modifications applied to ships— notably, the installation of newly designed apparatus for washing down decks and other exposed surfaces before, during, and after fallout—promised lesser hazards to crew members. Aircraft also acquired new features. In contrast to the radio-controlled drones of prior Pacific tests, Ivy would rely on manned aircraft, air force F-84G single-seat jet fighters, for cloud sampling. Despite trials of manned techniques at Enewetak in 1948 and 1951 and the Nevada experience of 1951 and 1952, the pilots clearly faced novel risks. Safetyinspired aircraft changes included special filter systems and instruments, while the pilots themselves donned glass-lead fabric shrouds for the missions. Experience and training, however, served as the main safeguards: intensive ground classes and flight practice during Operation Tumbler-Snapper in Nevada, followed by carefully rehearsed flights from Kwajalein.“ Mike plans also called for evacuating everyone from Enewetak atoll prior
Testing Jeopardized 85 to the shot. Predictions of blast, thermal, water wave, and radiological effects from a June 1952 conference at Los Alamos furnished the bases for planning. Those finished with their jobs would simply go home; experts who might be needed in case of problems would stand by in Honolulu; everyone left would see the test from ship or plane at least twenty miles away. A conference in Chicago during September decided that evacuation, or at least plans for it, had best include other islands as well; this was more a precaution against the danger of tsunami than fallout, although neither seemed at all likely. Evacuation plans thus extended to Ujilang, where the former inhabitants of Enewetak now lived. They, too, would ride out the shot at sea.) Exposure standards, like other safety measures, mixed old and new. Joint Task Force 132 followed precedent with a routine limit of 0.3 roentgen per week, the accepted national standard for exposure on a lifetime basis.!© Like former task forces, it also planned an operational limit: “The total permissible dose for personnel participating in Operation Ivy is 3.0 roentgens (measured gamma only), based on a three month operational period.”!” This figure later became 3.9 roentgens, the same used in the latest Nevada tests; that is, 0.3 roentgen per week for a thirteen-week quarter. Operational limits for Ivy included the routine weekly limit; in Operation Greenhouse the year before, the two limits had counted separately.!8 Ivy rules, again in contrast to Greenhouse but like recent Nevada tests, also covered “permissible contamination levels”: acceptable meter readings for skin, clothing, and vehicles as well as “levels of radioisotope content in air and water generally considered to be safe.””! Perhaps the sharpest contrast with past practice stemmed from the use of
manned cloud samplers. “Special rules apply to sampling aircraft pilots,” noted the rad-safe operations plan.2° Two special factors complicated the question of what exposure limits to impose on samplers: one was the huge cloud expected from a full-fledged thermonuclear reaction; the other, self-. monitoring for radiation added to all the other tasks demanded of sampler pilots flying single-seat jet aircraft. Concerned that limits too stringent might hamper the mission, Ivy planners in spring 1952 sought AEC and air force
agreement to a 20-roentgen standard. Suitably restricted—sampler pilots only, no new exposure for two years, detailed medical records, follow-up physicals—this figure was accepted by both the AEC Division of Biology and Medicine and the air force surgeon general. Late that summer, in fact, the AEC approved a limit of 25 roentgens for sampler pilots, the same figure then accepted as the civil defense emergency onetime exposure.?! No one expected any pilot to receive such high exposures. Planning was geared to a 5-roentgen maximum, and none of these fliers, in fact, even exceeded the 3.9-roentgen operational limit. At the same time, cloud samples were vital, and even 25 roentgens fell far below any level then judged truly harmful.” “Uniform acute (immediate) dosage of 50 roentgens to a group of armed forces personnel will not appreciably affect their efficiency as a fight-
86 Testing Jeopardized ing unit,” stated the Joint Task Force 132 Operation Plan, citing “current Department of Defense information on exposure to gamma radiation.” Exposures “substantially above 100 roentgens” must occur before posing “‘a grave risk” of illness, 200 roentgens or more to threaten life. Although such figures
may appear extraordinary to modern eyes, they reflected the thinking of the early 1950s. Even today, in fact, they remain fully valid statements about the short-term effects of acute radiation exposure.”3
Mike and King Indoctrination and training formed a major part of the rad-safe unit’s work at Enewetak. Every member of the task force received at least four hours of basic “non-technical instruction in radiological safety measures and _ techniques.” According to the operation plan, such training would “enable them to perform their assigned duties efficiently within the allowable low exposures, regardless of the presence of radioactive contaminants.”24 A second level of training converted selected task force members to reserve monitors. Given Operation Ivy’s unknowns and the limited strength of the rad-safe unit, prudence suggested a backup force. The new men might step in should “regularly assigned monitors [receive] their prescribed dosage limit before the completion of the operation.”*5 During October, the month before Mike, those selected learned the basics of instrument use and calibration as well as monitoring and decontamination techniques. Such foresight paid off after Mike, when many monitors approached their limits and could be shifted to standby status. Key members of the rad-safe unit themselves received advanced training during the final weeks before Mike: technical seminars on special aspects of radiological safety and Operation Ivy.76 Rehearsals for Mike surpassed in detail and scope anything since the early days of Pacific testing. As always, weather was crucial. Accurate forecasts for the Marshall Islands remained a problem; several years of work had only begun to expose the structure of mid-Pacific weather systems. Complicating matters were the special demands Mike imposed, particularly on the direction and strength of upper-level winds to preclude fallout on the islands. Meteorologists with Ivy, claimed the official history, felt “the weather problem... . to have been one of the most difficult in the history of meteorology.” Just
because things worked out must not “obscure one very important fact of fate—Mike was detonated on the date scheduled several months earlier and
this date was, providentially, the only day during . . . approximately one month when acceptable conditions prevailed.’’27 Detonated on the first day of November 1952 at 7:15 in the morning, Mike
surprised the experts and awed observers. One shipboard eyewitness found the shot “not easily described.” First “a brilliant light” and “the heat. . . felt
Testing Jeopardized 87 immediately” 35 miles away. Then “the tremendous fireball, appearing on the horizon like the sun when half-risen,” swelling quickly to a mile across. “The shock wave and sound arrived . . . two and one-half minutes after the deto-
nation, accompanied by a sharp report followed by an extended, broken, rumbling sound.” By then, the “tremendous . . . mushroom-shaped cloud” already topped 100,000 feet, “balanced on a wide, dirty stem.” Within half an hour the mushroom cloud spanned 60 miles, the stem 20 miles.”
Others who witnessed the first thermonuclear blast found more vivid words: “A flash many times brighter than the sun,” heat that felt like the “momentary touch of a hot iron.” Wrote one sailor, “You would swear that the whole world was on fire.”2? When AEC Chairman Gordon Dean first reported
Mike results to President Truman, his colorless words may have been the most eloquent of all. From early and incomplete evaluation of results, the yield is estimated roughly to have been more than 6 megatons, possibly as high as 12 megatons. . . . The
shot island Eugelab [Eluklab] is missing, and where it was there is now en underwater crater of some 1500 yards in diameter.*°
The cloud drifted north and west, “the wind pattern for this shot... nearly ideal from the Rad-Safe standpoint.”’3! Quick surveys found the atoll’s southeastern quadrant, including Enewetak and Parry islands, fallout-free. Re-
entry began within the hour as a crew landed on Enewetak to open the airstrip for emergency use. Helicopter surveys later that day found high readings only along the northern rim of the atoll.32 A full aerial survey after twenty-four hours showed “contamination of all northern and western islands.’’33 Radiological safety dictated task force movements, the normal effort
to balance desire for data against demands of safety but a practice pursued with unusual rigor after Mike. Islands adjacent to the now-vanished Eluklab remained strictly off limits for as much as a week and then were only touched briefly.** At sea and on the atoll, the effort scored a perfect record: no one exceeded the prescribed limit. In the air, matters went less smoothly. “No seri-
ous overexposure,” rad-safe reported, but on Mike day two aircraft crews, nineteen men in all, received exposures well above Ivy limits.*> One incident occurred over the northern rim of the atoll. En route to photograph the crater, a C-54 arrived half an hour early and half a mile low. One
and a half hours (instead of two) after the shot, at 2,500 feet (rather than 5,000), the plane flew into a cloud of highly active particles. Aborting the mission, the pilot headed for Kwajalein, flying through rain squalls along the way to wash off the contaminants. All twelve crew members recorded overexposures; their film badge readings ranged from 8.6 to 11.6 roentgens. The other incident occurred at roughly the same time over Enewetak lagoon. Summoned to the aid of a downed F-84G, a rescue aircraft flew through the
88 Testing Jeopardized , fallout region.*° Specifically exempt from safety limits—‘rescue operations
will be carried out without regard to the radiological hazard,” the rules stated?’—the seven crew members were not, strictly speaking, overexposed. Their film badge readings, which ranged from 10 to 17.8 roentgens, nonetheless included the five highest recorded during Operation Ivy.38
Responsibility for fallout readings everywhere but Enewetak atoll belonged to the AEC’s Health and Safety Laboratory. Military support helped the program begun in 1951 for Nevada tests to expand worldwide.%9 Instrumented aircraft met limited success in tracking the cloud northward from Enewetak. Whatever intense fallout may have occurred confined itself largely to open sea and so escaped notice. Where detected, fallout often could scarcely be measured. Automatic air samplers at Bikini, Ujilang, and other nearby islands, for instance, failed to trigger themselves because local levels never reached the required 0.5 milliroentgen per hour. The highest non-Enewetak ground reading came from the northern Marianas, a thousand miles away: “approximately 1.5 milliroentgens per hour of gamma radiation at 60 hours
after detonation . . . , an estimated lifetime dose of 450 milliroentgens.” Some stations in the AEC’s fallout network detected airborne activity across the United States in mid-November. But “none of these observed concen-
trations,” the AEC concluded, “were of significance in terms of health hazards.’’40
Mike caused fewer problems than planners had feared. King, as expected, proved even less troublesome. Weather delayed the test until 16 November, when an almost cloudless morning met the stringent experimental constraints. Half an hour before noon off the eastern rim of Enewetak atoll, an air force B-36 dropped the bomb, a stockpile weapon modified to obtain a yield of 500 kilotons. It burst 1,500 feet above the sea, north and east of Runit.*! To the
task force historian, the sight seemed “more spectacular in many respects than Mike Shot—due, primarily, to the relatively close distance (approximately eleven miles) of observers to ground zero.””42
Strong shearing winds aloft ripped the cloud to long streaks below the tropopause. Rapidly dispersed, the cloud produced even less fallout than might have been expected from an air burst. Residual activity from Mike obscured any King effects on Enewetak’s northern islands. Runit and the southwestern islands produced higher readings briefly, but rapid decay left even Runit clean within five days. During post-King recovery work, two members
of the science group exceeded the Ivy limit, though so slightly as to fall within the margin of error for limits based on film badge readings. According to their film badges, one received 3.95 and the other 4.10 roentgens.* Outside Enewetak atoll, “the highest gamma readings observed following King Shot were about 1/3 those found after Mike Shot.’’4 Radiological safety for Operation Ivy, concluded those in charge, “was successfully accomplished with a minimum number of exposures.”” Recom-
Testing Jeopardized 89 mended changes were few and minor: add space to the rad-safe building on Parry Island; procure rad-safe equipment for use between operations; and establish a rad-safe cadre to fill the key posts in later rad-safe units.* The system, in other words, seemed sound. It required only fine-tuning to meet the demands of future testing, whatever those demands might be. Meanwhile, Mike’s success redounded greatly to the credit of Edward Teller and of the new nuclear weapons laboratory in California he did so much to foster. The Livermore branch of the University of California Radiation Laboratory (renamed Lawrence Radiation Laboratory in 1958, later Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, now Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), in fact, had nothing to do with Ivy, Teller very little. Authorized by the AEC in June 1952 only after a long struggle, Livermore had, in essence, been forced on the AEC by military and congressional pressure. The new laboratory’s unwarranted public credit for Mike added to already strained relations between Livermore and Los Alamos. Although Mike owed much to Teller’s ideas and Teller had a large role in founding Livermore, Los Alamos was the laboratory that designed and conducted the actual test, in which Teller himself played no part. Livermore would in time earn a reputation in nuclear weapon development, but Herbert York, its first director, and his colleagues were still struggling to organize themselves when Ivy took place.*
Safeguarding Civilians and Troops Like Buster-Jangle in 1951 and Tumbler-Snapper in 1952, the spring 1953
series in Nevada merged once-distinct AEC and Department of Defense programs: development tests code named Upshot and military effects tests tagged Knothole. Conjointly with Upshot-Knothole, the army planned Exercise Desert Rock V, troops once again taking the field to witness a test or practice the tactics of nuclear war. Upshot-Knothole also promised the Federal Civil Defense Administration its long-awaited chance to study civil effects, called Operation Doorstep after it borrowed a press-coined nickname.*? So crowded an agenda drew protests from Los Alamos and Santa Fe Operations. Again the main issue was mixing the problems of testing new weapons with the quite distinct demands of learning more about weapon effects on troops, buildings, and equipment.*®
Responsibility for safety also remained a matter of concern. Regardless of who might be officially in charge, Santa Fe Operations Manager Carroll Tyler reminded the commissioners, “The general public will hold the AEC responsible for the safe conduct of any nuclear tests in the continental United States.”4? Following Tumbler-Snapper in spring 1952, however, workers on the Nevada Proving Ground became the first concern. Before then, the site had largely closed down between series. During most of the four months be-
90 Testing Jeopardized tween Buster-Jangle and Tumbler-Snapper, for instance, a single noncommissioned officer had handled rad-safe duties on a full-time basis. Much more needed doing after Tumbler-Snapper. Cleaning up test areas and new building for 1953—-Tumbler-Snapper “roll-up” in test jargon—became a five-month job. Involving large numbers of workers, it demanded a far greater and more formal rad-safe effort. Initial questions about the exact nature and scope of that effort resolved, the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project provided a sixteen-man unit to begin coping with the task.°° Problems persisted, however, raising concerns in Washington about the fate of workers. AEC Chairman Dean, in particular, wondered just what standards and safeguards applied.*! Santa Fe Operations reported matters well under control. Areas reading 100 milliroentgens per hour or more were posted; work parties in such areas required a monitor present. Personnel film badges were read and recorded daily, after each shift for workers in areas regarded as contaminated. The accepted national standard of 0.3 roentgen per week was strictly enforced but integrated over a longer time. Santa Fe Operations set
the limit for Tumbler-Snapper roll-up as 3 roentgens, gamma only, in ten weeks; the Division of Biology and Medicine concurred but only after changing the limit to 3.9 roentgens per quarter. Nearing that total barred a worker from contaminated areas; exceeding it meant transfer or layoff.>2
Immediate questions about worker safety merged into larger questions about the wisdom of further testing in Nevada. The request from Washington
for a report on workers also asked for “an early study of the operational future for Nevada Proving Ground.’? Tyler formed a group to review the'reasons for testing in Nevada, assess the current problems such testing created, and decide if the results outweighed the costs.°* Overseeing the study, General Fields, the director of military application, stressed three questions: “a. What steps can be taken to minimize contamination both in the immeciate test area and off site? b. What steps can be taken to improve decontamination
procedures? c. What steps can be taken to eliminate or minimize existing and anticipated health and public relations problems?’”*> Membership on the fifteen-person study group divided almost equally between AEC headquarters and field units. Seven came from the Washington Divisions of Biology and Medicine, Information Services, and Military Application. Santa Fe Operations, Los Alamos, and other users furnished the balance. The Committee on the Operational Future of the Nevada Proving Ground, as it came to call itself, met in mid-January 1953.°¢
Questions about the precise purpose of the Nevada Proving Ground quickly emerged. The lines seemed drawn mainly between Washington and the field. Los Alamos objected to the very name. The switch to “proving ground” from “test site” implied an unwelcome change in concept and function.” Los Alamos and Santa Fe Operations saw Nevada as a backyard work-
Testing Jeopardized 91 shop, Ranger as a model operation. Less than three months in all had divided first proposal from final shot, just five weeks in the field to prepare the site
and complete the five-shot series. Nothing could have contrasted more sharply with Upshot-Knothole, six months of site work already spent, the last of its ten planned shots still four months away. From the field this looked like
“interference,” development testing delayed or prolonged by military and civil effects tests, troop maneuvers, and public displays.°* From Washington that view appeared, at best, “oversimplified.” The Los Alamos notion of Nevada “as a backyard quick testing area was never realistic,” in concept or in practice. Developmental data could be vital without being everything. “The costs involved, and the magnitude of the issues concerned, give to such
operations a character that involves far more than the details of weapons development.’”»?
Divergent views about the precise nature of the test program in Nevada never seriously divided committee members. All agreed on the soundness of reasons for originally choosing a Nevada site. No one doubted that it had served its purpose well, or that the need remained as great as ever. Fallout on and near the site was the major constraint on testing in Nevada; distant fallout was too weakly radioactive to threaten health, so far as anyone knew, while such other effects as blast were predictable. Limiting fallout in the region of the Nevada Proving Ground demanded careful choice of yield, placement, and mode of delivery. The committee urged special care in surface and tower shots. “Good fortune has contributed materially,” it warned, to “fallout [that] has not exceeded permissible exposure in the highest reading recorded in any nearby off-Site inhabited locality.’”6! The committee recommended upper limits of 1 kiloton for surface or subsurface shots, 35 kilotons for tower shots, and 50 kilotons for air bursts.® A test program meant risk. Absolute safety could only result from an end
to testing, as Tyler pointed out. “It is impracticable to conduct, with sound economy of effort and money and with maximum utilization of the proving ground toward expeditious forwarding of weapons development, a series of tests], conditioning each shot on weather, atmospheric and technical characteristics[,] which insure no possible radiation or blast hazard to any persons or communities.” Such factors as weather and wind are keys “in deciding whether or not we will fire but they are and must be weighed with many other considerations.”®3 Although Tyler’s remarks came in the midst of UpshotKnothole, they reflected more general concerns. The Committee on the Operational Future of the Nevada Proving Ground submitted its report in May 1953. It was only the first phase of study. Further work would follow UpshotKnothole. With that latest series assessed and more research on the background of Nevada testing, the revived committee might present a definitive Statement on the problem.™ Important though such questions might be in the
92 Testing Jeopardized long run, they had little direct impact on Upshot-Knothole. But a related safety question—exposure limits for troops in Desert Rock V—immediately affected the spring 1953 series.
Discontent with AEC-imposed limits had surfaced after earlier Desert Rock exercises. Concluding that “the three (3) roentgen tolerance level established is too low for practical military test requirements,” the December 1951 report on Exercises Desert Rock II and III in Operation Buster-Jangle had
recommended that the “Department of the Army . . . review the radiation dosage information available and. . . establish for test operation an approved military operational dosage which should have the general concurrence of the Atomic Energy Commission.” The report also urged “complete military con-
trol” to provide a “more efficient” troop rad-safe program. When Desert Rock IV became part of Tumbler-Snapper, planners secured the desired rad-safe self-sufficiency for the troops involved. The Armed Forces Special Weapons Project also proposed to lower the distance from ground zero at which troops might be stationed during a shot; the AEC reluctantly agreed, but no effort was made to raise troop exposure limits.© Recommendations derived from Desert Rock IV followed the same lines but went much further. The army wanted still greater freedom of movement on the proving ground, as well as full autonomy in rad-safe planning and operations. A key demand involved cutting the distance from ground zero to
entrenched troops: the main body as near as 3,000 yards for tower shots expected to yield 5 kilotons or less, special volunteers perhaps even closer.®
Exposure limits still seemed too low. The Desert Rock [V report recommended raising the “dosage limit for Armed Forces participation in future exercises from the present three [roentgens].” Proposing no hard figure, the report merely stated “that the dosage which the troops may safely take can be raised materially.” The reason? Although “doubtless [reasonable] for continuing exposure by AEC and AFSWP personnel over long periods of time,” military planners deemed 3 roentgens “too low for personnel such as troops who will not be exposed for long periods, and. . . its continuance will unduly hamper military experimentation.” An officer assigned to the Division of Military Application promptly challenged the Desert Rock IV recommendations. Arbitrary the 3-roentgen limit might be, Navy Capt. Harry H. Haight admitted. It “is not a magic number and . . . [probably] could be increased . . . [without] significant biological damage.” But nowhere, he insisted, did the report show that AEC-impcsed limits, either on exposure or on distance from ground zero, affected military results. “For the Commission to prescribe one limitation for the test personnel and allow greater latitude for the DoD would seem to be unwise and unnecessary,” Haight continued. The AEC “should strongly object to any special dispensation to the DoD which could possibly result in personnel casualties whether immediate or delayed.’®? These comments preceded by only a few
Testing Jeopardized 93 weeks the AEC’s first look at military plans for Desert Rock V. Only then did matters begin to come to a head.”°
Immediately on learning of Defense plans, Military Application asked Biology and Medicine for “its recommendations as to desirable upper limits
for exposure.” The problem was “that some people in the Department of Defense have felt the AEC was not realistic in setting present exposure limits.” Why, they wondered, had “20R ... been allowed crews of sampling aircraft without apparent ill effect while the limit for ground personnel has been maintained at 3R.’”! Referring to Shields Warren’s policy statement of October 1951, the response from Biology and Medicine urged “no change from the established AEC policy for test operations of a total exposure of not over 3.9 r of gamma radiation per 13 weeks.’’”* Objections to higher limits for troops likewise came from the field. The Santa Fe Operations Office and the Los Alamos Test Division insisted on at least some qualification. “Our position is that we probably cannot dictate exposure limits to the military, but we do have the responsibility of informing them of the hazards in order that they may be fully aware of the responsibility which they assume.”?3 So far, however, AEC concerns derived only from preliminary Defense thinking about the conduct of Desert Rock V. The formal plan reached the AEC in mid-October 1952. It included a pro-
posed working agreement on safety—no figures but a promise from the Department of Defense to “assume full responsibility.” That meant not only staffing rad-safe units and setting standards but also taking the blame if something went wrong. “Appropriate Service(s) will provide monitors,” supervised by “the Exercise Director... , [who] will establish suitable safety criteria, including permissible radiation dosages.” The Department of Defense promised a public statement “if the safety standards of the DOD are less conservative than those established by the AEC, and if accident or criticism results.’’74 In his cover letter, AFSWP Chief Herbert Loper asked the AEC to concur in “the policy that the DOD assume full responsibility for the physical and radiological safety of troops and troop observers while in the Nevada Proving Grounds.””?5
This request became “the controversial point” in December, when Director of Military Application Fields reported to the commissioners. “DOD might set less conservative limits for exposure than the AEC” if the AEC agreed to its request. “Military personnel might be injured, and .. . the fault might be attributed to the AEC’s ‘failure to control the maneuver.’”’© The Pentagon did, in fact, propose higher limits, up to 6 roentgens for the operation.7”7 Much
of Fields’s report centered on how the Department of Defense and the AEC might best cope with troop safety. He rejected the extremes that would “require the DOD to observe AEC safety limits” as in Tumbler-Snapper, on the one hand, or would “turn over to them complete responsibility for safety,” on the other. Instead, Fields opted for a middle course: “to advise the DOD of
94 Testing Jeopardized our Safety limits, recommend they observe them, but allow them to set their own safety limits within the exercise area.”’8 The AEC might thus avoid seeming to constrain DOD efforts to advance military doctrine but still retain enough control to forestall any real danger. Responsibility for troop safety, Fields concluded, “can and should be delegated to the DOD,” provided the AEC saw the safety plan in advance and Defense issued a public statement of
its safety role before the tests.79 |
On 23 December 1952, Fields outlined Defense plans and his proposed response. The commissioners ceded “responsibility for physical and radiological safety of troops and troop observers in the exercise area at UpshotKnothole to the DOD,” as Fields recommended. That cession was, however, “contingent upon the [military] Exercise Director’s transmitting to the [AEC] Test Manager, for information, the safety plan for the exercise including statements as to which particular limits, if any, of the AEC’s safety limits are being exceeded and by how much.” The commission also approved, again as Fields recommended, “a public statement by the Exercise Director . . . prior to the exercise, clarifying DOD responsibility for’ troop safety “and including the paragraph on responsibility for safety criteria.’’®° Military Application had drafted the cited paragraph and sent it to the Pen-
tagon earlier that month. The Department of Defense Office of Public Information preferred a statement without hard numbers for levels of exposure permitted by either the AEC or the department. The reason “is that DOD has not yet established the level for troops and that it will have a classified status. Reference to the AEC level is valueless from a news point of view without the comparative DOD level.’”8! AEC Public Information, however, reserved judgment on the DOD-revised draft and insisted on a footnote. As approved, the paragraph read, Military monitoring teams trained by AEC radiation safety monitors at previous tests will govern the movement of troops in test areas to prevent exposure to harmful radiation. The maximum permissible level of radiation for troops who will participate will be slightly higher than the AEC’s standard industrial level. Individual troop units, however, will take part in only one test whereas the AEC standards were established for workers who are faced with possible exposure every day in laboratories and production facilities. *The maximum permissible
level for troops under Department of Defense standards is far below that at which any detectable radiation effects have been found in the human body.®2
The starred sentence, explained the note, will be included only if confirmed by the Divisions of Biology and Medicine and Military Application. This paragraph formed part of the AEC response to General Loper’s October proposals. The reply dated 8 January 1953 centered on the safety 1issue. Responsibility for safety practices and standards at the Nevada Proving Ground belonged to the AEC test manager; the Department of Defense might
Testing Jeopardized 95 nonetheless “assume full responsibility for physical and radiological safety of troops.” The AEC “adopts this position in recognition that doctrine on the tactical use of atomic weapons, as well as the hazards which military personnel are required to undergo during their training, must be evaluated and determined by the Department of Defense.” But Defense should also recognize that the AEC deems its “established safety limits. . . to be realistic, and further, .. . that when they are exceeded in any Operation, that Operation may become a hazardous one.” The AEC asked only for a copy of the safety plan, however, “so that we may know in which particulars and by how much these safety standards are being exceeded.”83 When Santa Fe Operations Manager Tyler once again assumed the role of test manager as Upshot-Knothole approached, his orders from Washington spelled out the divided rad-safe responsibilities. He would set “over-all (including radiological) safety criteria at the Nevada Proving Grounds for all participants” but oversee their “implementation” only for those “other than
troops and troop observers.” Desert Rock V troop safety “has been transferred to the Exercise Director.” If his plan, when Tyler saw it, appeared “to unduly jeopardize participating personnel, you will forward the plan with your comments to us for such action as is deemed necessary and advise the Exercise Director of your action.’’84 Radiological safety for Desert Rock V and Operation Upshot-Knothole were, in fact, conducted quite independently.
Desert Rock V As exercise director for Desert Rock V, Brig. Gen. William C. Bullock as-
signed rad-safe to his staff operations officer. The 50th Chemical Service Platoon, seventy men strong, became the core of the radiological safety section. Monitor training before each shot was its major task. Participating units selected one or two men per platoon to attend the section’s school for that purpose. Instruction centered on learning to use survey meters and to compute from readings the length of time troops might remain in an area without risking overexposure. Scouting the ground before them during the advance, these new monitors became the first line of defense for their units. The radsafe section oversaw the effort. Its members also conducted the first surveys in the maneuver sectors, marking off the “hot” areas—ground readings of 2.5
roentgens per hour or more—from which troops were excluded. Finally, north of the test control point at Yucca Pass, the section ran the decontamination station for men and machines.® Over 13,000 troops fought the mock battles of Desert Rock V. Observers, mostly officers, numbered 4,500. Another 2,000 men ran Camp Desert Rock. Maneuvers followed six of the eleven shots in Upshot-Knothole, with fresh units assigned for each test.8° The directive for Desert Rock V from the Office
96 Testing Jeopardized of the Chief of Army Field Forces fixed the distances from ground zero at which troops would be deployed; it also set limits for heat and pressure and a “maximum permissible dosage of six (6) roentgens for the exercise.”®’ Desert
Rock V also included a volunteer observer program. Officers deemed well trained enough to understand fully the risks—quantitatively as well as qualitatively—could observe some tests from as near ground zero as 2,000 yards. Participants in this program themselves computed the safe distance for their trenches; they would be allowed up to “10 r in any one test, . . . with the further limitation that no volunteer shall take more than 25 r in this series of tests,’’88
Exposure records for Desert Rock V are spotty, but some troops appear to have exceeded the 6-roentgen limit in two instances. Initial plans called for all soldiers in forward areas to wear film badges; for the first two tests, Annie on 17 March 1953 and Nancy on 24 March, they did. No overexposures were reported. Desert Rock V provided its own film processing through the 505th Signal Service Group. But almost 1,200 troops in Annie taxed—and double that number in Nancy exceeded—the group’s resources.®? “The work load on the photo dosimetry organization was excessive,” reported Camp Desert Rock after the second shot. “This caused delay in reporting results of the film badge readings and dosage data.” With numbers of troops expected in later tests closer to Nancy than Annie, a change seemed mandated: “In view of the Surgeon General’s policy that one-time exposures need not be reported, it was decided that maneuver troop units would be issued one film badge per platoon and observers would be issued one. . . per bus. On this basis the average dose received by the group would be known.” Actually, two badges per platoon and two pocket dosimeters per company were issued to the 2d Marine Corps Provisional Atomic Exercise Brigade at shot Badger on 18 April. This was the sixth shot in Upshot-Knothole but next in Desert Rock. Thereafter, the rule of one badge per unit prevailed.?! Meanwhile, after shot Badger the marines suffered the first overexposures in Desert Rock. Detonated at 4:35 in the morning atop a 300-foot tower, the device had a yield of 23 kilotons. The two battalions were entrenched 4,000
yards from ground zero. A joint AEC-DOD press release described it this way: As the roaring blast rolled over the trench, the troops were showered with dirt and stones. The entire desert seemed to erupt and when the men left their foxholes visibility was limited to fifty yards. The intense heat wave ignited hundreds of Joshua trees and as the strong winds carried the dust away the whole desert was aglow with these flaming torches.*”
Immediately after the shock wave passed, the marines began to advance toward their objectives. On the right flank, the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, ran into trouble: heavily contaminated ground a few hundred yards beyond the
Testing Jeopardized 97 trenches. Shifting winds exposed the men “to an unprecedented and unanticipated radiation fall-out,” reported the brigade commander. Pocket dosimeter
readings showed “dosages up to 7.5 roentgens as early as H+36 minutes. Since this exceeded the AEC’s [sic] total allowable dosage for this exercise, the lst Battalion was evacuated immediately.” For the entire battalion, “the average total dosage .. . was 4.8 roentgens.””? Subsequent analysis of film badge and other data has not greatly altered these figures and has confirmed some overexposures.%4
Volunteer officers had been entrenched well forward of the marines for Badger. This was the second time a group had stationed itself nearer ground zero than the main body of troops. The first, a month earlier, had been largely uneventful, notwithstanding a flurry of concern stirred by press charges of “human guinea pigs.”95 Nine officers—four army, four navy, one air force— sat out Nancy in a reinforced trench 2,500 yards from zero. Instrument readings in the trench never topped 4.5 roentgens per hour, and no one’s film badge read higher than 0.545 roentgen.” The twelve army and marine officers 2,000 yards from Badger had a more exciting time. Crouching in a trench six feet deep, one marine colonel was first “blinded by absolute whiteness” from the flash, then “shaken back and forth very strongly a number of times” by earth shock. “The blast wave then hit with a high pitched crack.” “Very heavy dust” blocked his view of the mushroom cloud, and high readings on the group’s survey meter prompted them “to evacuate the position.” He continued, “During the light, earth shock and pressure phases, I was rather overwhelmed by the magnitude of these effects, but immediately thereafter in a matter of 6 to 7 seconds I had complete control of all faculties and could have engaged in close combat.’’” The latter remark was not spontaneous marine bravado; it responded to a question asked by social scientists studying the psychological effects of nuclear weapons. The AEC test director reported the group’s highest film badge reading as 9.6 roentgens. Volunteers wore both AEC and Desert Rock film badges. Discrepancies between them proved meaningless; inappropriately designed for the task, as the Desert Rock V final report admitted, the army badges could simply be discounted. Additionally, pocket dosimeters ranging from 5.2 to 9.5 roentgens confirmed AEC badge readings. Volunteers also were exposed to prompt neutrons, measured by neither film nor pocket meter but later estimated to have averaged 2.4 rem. Average gamma exposure was 7.2 roentgens.%8
A week later volunteers again watched a test from trenches 2,000 yards away. On 25 April 1953, Simon, like Badger, exploded atop a 300-foot tower at 4:30 in the morning. Its yield, 43 kilotons, was much greater than Badger’s. Simon also exceeded its predicted yield by more than 20 percent, a greater than expected margin. Instruments showed 100 roentgens per hour at the forward trenches. Evacuation began five minutes later, readings by then
98 Testing Jeopardized having dropped to 20 roentgens per hour. Walking toward the rear, the eight officers passed through sometimes heavy fallout, up to 50 roentgens per hour from sand-sized particles. Noting “the wide range of [film badge] readings,” the Desert Rock V final report questioned “‘the reliability that should be assigned to readings so obtained.” Subsequent analysis shows the misunderstanding behind such a question. Each volunteer carried three badges: one under his helmet, one in his breast pocket, and one in his hip pocket. Readings did vary—the lowest average for a set of three was 11.7 roentgens, the highest 16.3—but unreliable dosimetry was not the culprit. Men were shielded by the trenches they crouched in, and their film badge readings differed with each individual’s depth, orientation, and movement. All eight volunteers exceeded their 10-roentgen limit for the shot. One officer watched all three shots, Nancy and Badger as well as Simon, from forward trenches; his total topped the 25-roentgen exercise limit by 1.6 roentgens. The latest study concludes that Simon volunteers averaged total gamma doses of 13.6 rem; inadequate data, however, mean the average might have been as little as 8.3 or as much as 21.8 rem. Reconstructed neutron doses are even less certain, averaging as low as 12 or as high as 53 but most likely 28 rem.!} The two army battalion combat teams at Simon, like the two marine battalions at Badger, had problems. The most powerful device yet fired in Nevada produced a striking display at trenches 4,000 yards from ground zero. The ground shock was heavy, and the earth appeared to roll for a moment. Noise accompanying the blast was deafening, loudest of this series of shots. Dust conditions following the blast and debris falling into the trenches obscured the vision of personnel in the trenches. As usual for tower shots, the fireball was engulfed in a large dust cloud initially. The cloud rose steadily and actually formed the well known “atomic mushroom.” This was by far the most picturesque atomic cloud to be observed, from a tower shot, in this series of shots. An initial radiation intensity of 5 r/hr registered on survey meters in the trenches; however, the radiation lasted for such a short time, the initial radiation dose was less than 25 mr.!0!
Radiological contamination “more wide-spread . . . than previously encountered” hampered maneuvers, reported Camp Desert Rock. Monitors held up the advance on the right flank, then curtailed the planned tour of the display area. Decontamination of troops and vehicles on the test field, the normal practice after former shots, had to be removed to the station at Yucca Pass. !02 Exposure data came from a limited number of troops who carried pocket dosimeters. Authorities estimated an average of 3 roentgens, a figure supported by recent analysis, which also finds no evidence of overexposure. !® This marked the last time overexposure threatened Desert Rock V troops.
Testing Jeopardized 99 The final two maneuvers, after the eighth and tenth Upshot-Knothole tests, Encore on 8 May 1953 and Grable on 25 May, caused few problems. An air burst at over 2,400 feet, Encore left litthke debris. Troops easily stayed well within shot limits through the mock attack and subsequent tours of the display area.!% Grable provided the world’s first glimpse of atomic artillery in action. Amazon Annie, a slightly altered version of one of the army’s new 280-millimeter guns, fired the shell seven miles. It exploded 500 feet above a vast array of trees, buildings, bomb shelters, and vehicles emplaced on Frenchman Flat to study blast effects. Meanwhile, 5,000 yards away, two entrenched army battalion combat teams waited. They launched their attack within minutes after the blast. Extremely high winds and dense clouds of dust curtailed the exercise, but troops again avoided overexposure; the highest pocket meter reading was 6 roentgens.!® The final report on Exercise Desert Rock V judged the results quite favorably. It did conclude, however, that tactics rather than effects should be the major focus of future trials. That meant, among other things, higher exposure limits for the troops. “From experience gained in Exercise Desert Rock V it is
concluded: . . . That the criteria for nuclear radiation to be accepted should be increased to permit maneuver closer to ground zero than was possible in this exercise.” Recommendations also included maneuvers in more rugged terrain, during less perfect weather, and perhaps even after several shots fired at once, as well as at higher levels of radiation. !°
Upshot-Knothole Radiological safety for Desert Rock V was largely self-directed. An army radiological safety section oversaw the task and provided training, but each unit largely monitored itself. Rad-safe for the joint test organization, though also chiefly drawing on army manpower, functioned quite differently. Three times larger than the Desert Rock unit at the outset, a peak strength of 218 just before the first Upshot-Knothole test, it also assumed a far greater role in the field. Tom D. Collison, an Army Chemical Corps lieutenant colonel with a master’s degree in nuclear physics from Ohio State University, took charge
of the rad-safe unit. He had joined the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project in 1952 as radiological safety officer in the Directorate of Weapons Effects Tests and would later command the Ist Radiological Safety Support Unit (ist RSSU), when that unit was formed shortly after Upshot-Knothole ended. Another AFSWP officer seconded to the test organization for UpshotKnothole was Clinton S. Maupin, a Medical Corps colonel who served as rad-safe staff officer to the test director. Several former rad-safe leaders— Thomas Shipman, James Cooney, and James Hartgering—joined other ex-
100 Testing Jeopardized perts to advise Tyler as members of the formal Test Manager’s Advisory Panel. Representing the Division of Biology and Medicine on the panel was Gordon M. Dunning. !°
The main body for Upshot-Knothole radiation safety was the 9778th Technical Support Unit from the army’s Chemical Corps Training Center at Fort McClellan, Alabama. The navy and air force sent twenty-eight officers and men to join the unit in Nevada. The Los Alamos Health Division furnished three experts, the Public Health Service fifteen officers.!°8 Like earlier test series, Upshot-Knothole used more monitors than these figures suggest. Halfway through the program, for instance, the Public Health Service replaced its entire force with a fresh group of officers. This was a planned move, but to cope with “the burnout problem for monitors for this operation,” Collison explained in his final report, “arrangements were made with the Chemical Corps Training Center to keep a reserve group of monitors, approximately 20, at Fort McClellan. These would be available to the Rad-Safe Unit at any time during the operation.’’!© Overall, the rad-safe roster listed 264 names for the entire series, though the number at any one time never exceeded the 218 present for the first shot.!!° Fluctuating strength early in the program became sharp decline toward the end. Especially after the ninth shot, Harry on 19 May, “total strength of the unit was steadily decreased . . . as monitor personnel who had received their total permissible radiation dosage were returned to their home stations. On 6 June, the total number present was 98.”!!! And some of those accepted a special exposure limit. Monitors, like all other members of the joint test organization, were allowed a “total permissible dose for . . . this operation [of } 3.9 roentgens, gamma only.”’!!? But a late program change, explained the radsafe final report, required a higher limit: “With the addition of the eleventh shot, it was found necessary to request the Test Director to authorize an increase in the 3.9 r tolerance dosage for 22 monitors in the [on-site operations] section to 4.5 r as a total dosage for the operation and the roll-up period.’”!!? The highest exposure received by anyone in the rad-safe unit was 16.8 roentgens. At least forty-five other unit members also topped 3.9 roentgens, although most by no more than 1 roentgen. The pattern was familiar from prior tests. Less than a tenth of test organization strength, the rad-safe unit nonetheless counted two-fifths of its 116 recorded overexposures.!!4 The Air Force Special Weapons Center adopted the same limit, 3.9 roentgens, as the joint test organization. The special weapons center provided the bombers for the three airdrops in Upshot-Knothole as well as the cloud
samplers for all shots. As in past Nevada tests, the two air force bases involved—Kirtland outside Albuquerque, Indian Springs near the Nevada Proving Ground—relied on their own rad-safe effort. Cloud sampling and tracking, as always, posed the greatest risks of overexposure. Estimates in December 1952 that Upshot-Knothole cloud samplers might total 5.8 roent-
Testing Jeopardized 101 gens caused a change of plans. The special weapons center assigned two groups of pilots to ensure that none exceeded the 3.9-roentgen limit.!!> This, Collison complained, “diminished to some extent the efficiency of the cloudtracking operation,”"® but it also succeeded in its main purpose. Only one cloud sampler overexposure was reported.!!’ Although chiefly intended for other purposes, cloud sampling and tracking, like near and distant fallout research, might have a direct impact on testing in progress. Relevant findings, if any, of fallout, air concentrations, or other matters of concern were expected to be reported to the joint test organization. Responsibility for this work beyond 200 miles remained, as in former tests, with the Health and Safety Laboratory (under the New York Operations Office) and its still growing national monitoring network. The air force provided planes and crews for aerial cloud tracking. Such research, however, would more likely affect future testing than current operations. For the rad-
safe unit, off-site work extended no farther than 200 miles from proving ground borders. Concentrating on this region were most of the unit’s nonmilitary members.!!8
Following Tumbler-Snapper, the Los Alamos Health Division had proposed for future tests merging off-site rad-safe and fallout sampling within the 200-mile ring. Division Leader Shipman suggested putting William S. Johnson in charge. Johnson, an industrial hygienist in the Health Division, had performed such work since the test site opened.!!? Circumstances were, in
fact, somewhat ambiguous. Shipman was eager to sever links between the Health Division and Nevada testing. ““We are no longer looking at this as aresearch problem,” he explained. “The work to be done is purely operational.” But he also “felt that the Armed Forces could not assign properly experienced individuals to this phase of the work and at the same time provide reasonable continuity from one test to another.”!2°9 The AEC agreed and put Johnson on the job.!2! His first efforts centered on finding the two groups of fifteen Public Health Service officers he believed the task required. They became the core of the rad-safe unit’s off-site operations.!22
As part of the rad-safe unit, Johnson also could call on a dozen of Collison’s soldiers assigned to off-site work.!?3 Inexperience, shortages of manpower and equipment, and questions of military nicety and prerogative all caused a degree of friction between the military members of the rad-safe unit and Johnson’s group; at least so thought a visitor from Washington who observed an early planning session.!*4 Whatever may have been true at the outset, Collison’s final report had nothing but praise for Johnson and his team.!25
They earned it. For the first time since Trinity in 1945, off-site fallout after some Upshot-Knothole shots reached levels high enough to cause real concern and in 1953, unlike 1945, to provoke emergency action. Operations through the first half of Upshot-Knothole caused few off-site rad-safe problems. Excellent weather for Annie, fired from a 300-foot tower
102 Testing Jeopardized on 17 March 1953 with a yield of 16 kilotons, held fallout to a narrow band across largely uninhabited country.!26 Next came Nancy, at 5:10 A.M. on 24 March, also a tower shot but not quite so smooth. The yield was higher, 24 kilotons, the weather not quite so perfect; a slight wind shift at shot time put Lincoln Mine in the path of fallout. Monitors at the mine saw the cloud pass overhead an hour after the shot. Detecting fallout at 6:50, they asked the miners to take cover. Fallout peaked at 0.58 roentgen per hour twenty minutes later.!27 “Residents,” announced the AEC promptly, “as a routine precautionary measure. . . were advised to remain in-doors for a period of two hours from shortly after 7 A.M. until 9 A.M.’?!?8 The early reports from Lincoln Mine “caused some anxiety,” Collison admitted. But “the external gamma lifetime
dose did not exceed 3.4 r, and with the population indoors almost immediately after the start of fall-out this value is substantially reduced.”!29 The next two shots, Ruth on 31 March and Dixie on 6 April, were troublefree. Although a tower shot, Ruth had a yield of only 0.2 kiloton and caused “very minor” problems.!°° Dixie had a higher yield, 11 kilotons, but also exploded 6,000 feet in the air. “The radiological problem,” Collison reported, “was almost nonexistent.’’!3! The fifth shot, Ray on 11 April, like Ruth had a yield of 0.2 kiloton. Ruth and Ray were the first tests of designs from the new Livermore laboratory; both fell so far short of their expected yields as to be derisively termed “‘fizzles.” Ray, unlike Ruth, however, was fired from a 100-
rather than a 300-foot tower, and fallout extended 45 miles south and west into Death Valley. Fortunately, the very narrow pattern touched no populated area.!32 Another tower shot a week later had a much higher yield, 23 kilotons.
After shot Badger the rad-safe unit faced its worst problem in UpshotKnothole so far, but it was a problem largely confined to the test area itself. It affected Desert Rock maneuvers, as discussed earlier, and hampered postshot work by the test organization. The very narrow path of heavy fallout, however, this time toward the southeast and the Grand Canyon, again missed any populated area.!*3
Fallout in Nevada and Utah On 25 April 1953, the 43-kiloton yield of the Simon device, seventh shot in the series, exceeded forecasts by more than 20 percent. Contamination on site again partly disrupted Exercise Desert Rock. Postshot missions by the test organization produced the worst rash of overexposures to date. “A
total of 39 persons exceeded the 3.9 r permissible dosage on D-day and D + 1 day,” Collison reported.!34 Off-site fallout from Simon spread eastward, like earlier shots in a path narrow but intense. “Radiation intensity was very
high even at the 250 mile limit. The infinity dose at this distance was Sr... . The 25 r infinity iso-dose line extended for 60 miles from ground zero, and
Testing Jeopardized 103 the 10 r infinity iso-dose line extended for 110 miles.”!> Good weather and planning meant no town of any size in the path of fallout. Unexpectedly, however, two major highways east of the proving ground became contaminated.
The first report of highway fallout came three and a half hours after the shot, just before eight o’clock, from a stretch of State Highway 93 running north and south between Glendale Junction and Alamo, Nevada. Later reports added Highway 91 northeast of Glendale Junction toward the Utah border. Monitoring teams converged on the area, finding ground readings as high as 0.46 roentgen per hour. Contaminated vehicles began turning up by midday: several trucks, a Greyhound bus, private cars. At 1:30, Test Director Graves ordered the contaminated region bracketed with roadblocks at Alamo to the north, North Las Vegas to the south, and St. George, Utah, to the east. Aided by state and local police, monitors stopped all vehicles passing through the fallout region. Cooperative local gas stations washed any vehicle with an inside reading above 7 milliroentgens per hour.!36 At 3:30 that afternoon in Las Vegas, the joint AEC-DOD Test Information
Office announced that “vehicle contamination checks have been established by Test Organization radiation monitoring personnel, assisted by local police.” Fallout detected on wheels or mudguards called merely for washing the outside of the vehicle. ‘‘The radiation levels are not hazardous,” concluded the statement, “but it is AEC . . . policy to limit unnecessary exposure to radiation.”’!37 By then, however, the job was nearly finished. Monitors removed the Alamo and North Las Vegas roadblocks by 4:30, although car washing lasted into the next day. At St. George, farther from the proving ground, the roadblock remained in place until almost 7:00 that evening. Monitors at the three roadblocks checked nearly 400 vehicles in all and sent 40 for washing. !38
“In general, the reaction of the public was most cooperative. No one questioned our authority for our actions,” reported one monitor. Told “they were
riding in contaminated vehicles,” drivers “appeared to be not overly concerned when informed that there was no danger of any great magnitude. They merely wanted to know what to do and how to go about it. Once this was explained, everything flowed very smoothly.”!39 Although caught by surprise, the rad-safe unit rose to the challenge. All that really seemed to be needed was a formal plan to deal with any future crisis of the same nature. Such a plan was duly prepared and issued in mid-May, just in time to meet that very contingency.!*°
The test after Simon, Encore on 8 May, involved an air burst at 2,400 feet. Despite a yield of 27 kilotons, it again caused only “very minor’ problems. ‘“‘No contamination was found outside the Proving Grounds, and only minor contamination was found within.”!*! Unfavorable weather delayed the next shot three days past its scheduled firing on 16 May. Detonated atop a 300foot tower just after five o’clock in the morning on 19 May, Harry had a yield
104 Testing Jeopardized of 32 kilotons. The test organization had, of course, judged the new weather system “to be perfectly satisfactory for this shot.” That proved a small error with large consequences when the wind shifted slightly. Wiring Washington from Nevada the next day, Deputy Test Director John Clark outlined what happened: “Actual cloud fall out pattern occurred slightly north and farther from target. A populated area approximately 50 by 50 miles centered approximately at St. George Utah received the heaviest fall out.”!42 Collison later reported “radiation doses for infinite exposure” as high as 5.2 roentgens in Hurricane, near St. George. St. George itself received 4.2 roentgens, a number of other nearby places not much less.!43 On the morning of 19 May itself, the threat of fallout from Harry to towns due east of the proving ground along Highways 91 and 93 caused concern and quick action. Monitors began setting up roadblocks less than an hour and a half after the shot. Following the new “Highway Rad Safe Plan” based on Simon’s lessons, this time they had less to improvise.! At 7:00, the test information office in Las Vegas announced that “highway check points are being established at St. George, Alamo, Glendale, and Nellis Air Force Base.” Motorists on Highways 91 and 93 “will be advised that . . . there may be radioactive fallout” when the cloud passes. “The highway check points are simply precautionary,” the statement concluded. Fallout, if any, “will not exceed the non-hazardous levels experienced after the April 25 shot.”!4 Some roadblocks that morning held traffic for an hour or more.!46 For the most part, though, drivers simply received a warning. The “Highway Rad Safe Plan” provided “standard phrases” for the purpose. They were then checked, again prefaced by standard phrases, on the far side of the fallout area. Interior readings of 20 milliroentgens per hour or more brought a request, once more couched in standard phrases, to have the car washed or vacuumed at AEC expense. Over a hundred cars required washing during the day. Monitors meanwhile had asked the people living in Mesquite and Bunkerville on the Nevada-Utah border to remain indoors from 7:30 to 8:15. In St. George, a reported reading of 0.3 roentgen per hour at 9:30 led Graves to warn residents to take cover. Schoolchildren missed outdoor morning recess but were allowed out by lunchtime. Monitors removed the last roadblock shortly after 5:00.14”
The test organization thought the crisis well handled.!48 Others were less certain. Congressman Douglas R. Stringfellow of Utah described himself to AEC Chairman Dean as “greatly disturbed” by reports from alarmed, bitter, and anxious constituents.!49 At their meeting the day after Harry, AEC Chairman Dean and his fellow commissioners “requested a statement of the criteria which determine when and under what circumstances test detonations are fired.”'5° Reconvening the next day, 21 May 1953, the commissioners heard from John C. Bugher, director. of biology and medicine, on fallout at St. George. He assured them “it was highly probable that no one exceeded
Testing Jeopardized 105 the maximum permissible thirteen-week dose of 3.9 r.”!5! Graves also attended the meeting. He and Bugher faced unusually sharp questions about criteria for testing. Finally, “Dean asked that the concern of the Commission be conveyed to the test organization and that everything be done to avoid another fall-out over St. George.”’!>2
Complicating matters at this juncture was the Los Alamos bid to add a test to Upshot-Knothole. Variations in yield during the current series had raised concerns about chances for similar problems at next spring’s Operation Castle. Climax, as the proposed eleventh test was labeled, would lay such concerns to rest. If successful, the single added Upshot-Knothole test might well
furnish another large reward: it could obviate the need for Domino, the planned fall 1953 series at the Nevada Proving Ground. Estimated yield for Climax, however, was 70 kilotons, greater by far than any device yet tested in Nevada. Graves assured the commissioners that the added test posed little threat of blast damage or fallout. Detonation at 1,000 feet or higher, and then only if ideal weather prevailed, promised small risk despite the high yield. Without any pressure to meet schedules, the test could wait for the right conditions. The commissioners approved the proposed test the day before shot Harry. This may account, at least partly, for the sharp questions Graves faced when he returned to explain what had gone wrong on 19 May.!%3
Reservations persisted, but the success of the long-planned tenth shot, Grable on 25 May 1953, eased many concerns.!>4 The 15-kiloton artillery shot caused problems neither on site nor off. The highest off-site fallout reading was 7 milliroentgens per hour at Lincoln Mine.!55 On 27 May, President Eisenhower approved the eleventh shot, promptly scheduled for 1 June. Though the promise to wait for perfect weather delayed the test three days, it proved as trouble-free as predicted. The device exploded at 1,300 feet with a yield of 61 kilotons.!5® “Highest off-site reading was 12 mr on highway south of Glendale,” Graves wired Washington.}57
Operation Upshot-Knothole ended on an upbeat note, despite the still pending decision on future uses of the Nevada Proving Ground. The test organization had shown itself able to cope with the human as well as technical problems of testing. Preliminary reports in late May of livestock, especially sheep, deaths in unusual numbers seemed no worse than had followed some earlier tests—apparently, at that point, merely a new and probably minor public relations problem.’ The Division of Biology and Medicine was assigned “to be responsible for monitoring and correlation of the procedures and steps for getting complete data on the condition of the animals and for establishing the criteria for determining extent of damage on which claims could be considered and paid.”!>? For the moment, the continuing success of the test program remained much the greater concern. That would soon change.
The Cost of Sheep Fallout and the Future of Nevada Testing 1953
Livestock Problems Emerge Privately owned land was rare around the Nevada Proving Ground. Vast tracts of public land, however, though arid, furnished grazing for cattle and winter pasture for thousands of sheep. The AEC had received claims of fallout damage to cattle after Operation Tumbler-Snapper in 1952.! Similar claims as Upshot-Knothole ended in spring 1953 caused no great surprise. The first complaint came from the Stewart ranch north of the proving ground. During the final week of testing, the Las Vegas Field Office learned that several head of cattle had been found dead and a number of horses suffered scabs and sores on their backs. Joe B. Sanders, deputy Las Vegas field manager, drove out to see the alleged damage on 1 June. With him were Thomas White of the Los Alamos Health Division and Robert H. Clark, Nevada deputy state veterinarian. The fourth member of the party came from AEC headquarters: Gordon Dunning had spent the spring in Nevada as a member of the test manager’s advisory committee for Upshot-Knothole. Several recent accounts have cast him as a central figure in the AEC’s prolonged effort to resolve the livestock problems just then emerging; he recalls a more modest staff role.* Dunning, who received his Ph.D. in science education from Syracuse University in 1948, had
joined the Division of Biology and Medicine in 1951 after three years of teaching. As an analyst in the biophysics branch, he had worked closely with the test program ever since.4 Radiation did appear to be involved in damage to the Stewart livestock. 106
The Cost of Sheep 107 Instruments could still detect active spots on the backs and flanks of both cattle and horses. Dunning thought fallout from the ninth Upshot-Knothole test, Harry on 19 May, the likely source. “The highest readings were essentially the same for both groups of animals,” he reported, “20-30 mr/hr of beta plus gamma.” Only the horses, however, showed beta burns; the skin of both live and dead cattle appeared unharmed. Dunning blamed these beta burns on earlier fallout, perhaps from the first or second Upshot-Knothole test in March.° During the weeks to follow, the Stewart livestock received other visits. Veterinarians who studied the animals later in June confirmed early findings: beta-burned horses but cattle showing “no evidence of total or partial body 1rradiation.”® Malnutrition and related problems seemed the most likely cause of the reported cattle deaths. Negotiations between the AEC and the ranchers were under way by mid-July. Eventually the AEC paid for twenty horses but rejected any claim for cattle killed or injured.’ The cattle owners remained mildly doubtful but appeared little disposed to challenge the AEC ruling.® That seemed to settle the matter much as such matters had been settled in the past. Allegedly radiation-caused sheep deaths presented a new and, as time would show, tougher problem. Utah Commissioner of Health George A. Spendlove first alerted the AEC to possible trouble on 2 June. Unusually large numbers
of ewes and lambs in the area around Cedar City had died that spring, all in flocks lately returned to Utah from winter pastures north and east of the Nevada Proving Ground. Veterinarians and sheepmen alike were baffled by symptoms they had never seen before. F. H. Melvin, who headed the federal Bureau of Animal Industry’s Salt Lake City office, and Utah State Veterinarian John I. Curtis saw the animals on 24 May. Melvin reported the sheepmen “very convinced that their sheep were suffering from the effects of atomic experiments, while they were in that area in Nevada.’ Dunning, who received the warning cali, persuaded Spendlove to support an AEC study. “It was my belief,” he explained, “that a more convincing investigation (to the sheep owners) could be made by a team composed of both AEC and outside personnel.’’!°
Accompanied by two veterinary consultants—Robert Thompsett from Los Alamos and Maj. Robert H. Veenstra of the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory in San Francisco—Sanders drove to Utah for a firsthand look at the sheep on Friday, 5 June. Three Public Health Service veterinarians met them in Cedar City: Arthur H. Wolff, acting chief of radiological health training at the Cincinnati Environmental Health Center; William J. Hadlow, pathologist from Rocky Mountain Laboratory in Montana; and Monroe A. Holmes, assigned to Spendlove’s office in the Utah State Department of Health. Their presence was Spendlove’s doing. Himself a veteran of the Public Health Service, he naturally contacted his former colleagues when Dunning requested
108 The Cost of Sheep support. The Cedar City veterinarian who in May had first treated the sick sheep, A. C. Johnson, also joined the party, as did the county agricultural agent, Stephen L. Brower.!!
They talked to a number of owners and closely inspected three herds. Usually the owners had first observed scabby face and ears. Normal shearing proved difficult; the wool “slipped,” or pulled loose easily, to reveal thick scabs along the back. Many animals died, and lambing produced more losses:
lambs were born stunted, half normal size, and survived no longer than a week.!? By June, when Sanders and his party arrived, symptoms had largely run their course. Relying on an owner’s advice, Hadlow chose two representative ewes from one herd for postmortem, taking organ and tissue samples for laboratory study. Veenstra obtained bone marrow from one of the animals,
and Thompsett collected scab and blood samples.!3 Inquiries from local newspapers began reaching the Santa Fe Operations Office at almost the same moment. The AEC responded with a press release the next day, and stories Sunday and Monday, 7 and 8 June, matter-of-factly reported the AEC view: radiation might be implicated in sheep deaths, but further studies were under way.!4
In Washington, Dunning conferred “on the subject of sheep allegedly dead from radiation” with Director of Military Application Kenneth Fields and two
senior staff members. Fields’s division, the largest in AEC headquarters, oversaw testing among its other duties. “Before the meeting ended the subject broadened into other incidents of alleged radiation injury,’ Dunning noted. “Finally,” it turned to “the general subject of public relations in connection with the tests at NPG [Nevada Proving Ground].”!5 Reaction followed much the same course the next day, 10 June, when Dunning briefed the commissioners. “Some of the sheep grazing in an area approximately 50 miles from the site,” he reported, “were determined to have beta burns in their nostrils and on their backs.” Discussion quickly focused on “the serious public rela-
tions problem . . . from the fall-out incidents.” Dealing with the problem meant “presenting immediately to the public the full facts,” which included AEC “precautions taken . . . to insure against creation of any hazards to health and safety.” The commissioners were much concerned to arrest what Dunning described as a loss of “faith in the AEC. . . [by] people in the vicinity of the Nevada Proving Ground.”!¢
Investigation meanwhile continued in Utah. Sanders returned to Cedar City that weekend, this time joined by William W. Allaire of Santa Fe test operations. They talked to several ranchers and arranged to obtain more animals
for study. Holmes arrived from Salt Lake City with two new experts, both veterinarians: W. T. Huffman of the Bureau of Animal Industry, a specialist in
plant toxicology; and Robert C. Bay from the Radiobiology Laboratory, University of Utah Medical School. The group conducted postmortems on
The Cost of Sheep 109 several animals, taking samples for themselves as well as others requested by Hadlow, Thompsett, and Veenstra. Instrument readings along head and back were as high as forty times background on nine of the ten animals.!” “Several of the sheep owners,” Allaire reported, “expressed appreciation for the manner in which the AEC was proceeding to determine the reasons for illness and death of sheep.” But he also observed “that a program of enlightenment as to the danger, or absence of danger from radiation, and its effects on humans and livestock, is necessary if we are to maintain good public relations in this area.” Should radiation not prove the cause of death, Allaire predicted, “the livestock owners will not be convinced unless they are informed as to the true cause.,’’18
With so many non-AEC experts already involved, Fields in Washington had begun to fear that studies might become “fragmentary.” He discussed the
problem with John Bugher, head of Biology and Medicine. They thought Bugher’s division, much smaller as well as more expert in the field, should take charge of “getting complete data on the condition of the animals.” Biology and Medicine might then set “the criteria for determining extent of damage on which claims could be considered and paid.”!? AEC General Manager Marion W. Boyer agreed. Bugher chose the chief of his biology branch, Paul B. Pearson, to direct the effort. Himself a Utah native and graduate of Brigham Young University, Pearson held a doctorate in biochemistry and nutrition from the University of Wisconsin. He had joined the AEC in 1949 after more than a decade teaching animal nutrition at Texas Agricultural and Mechanical College.” Pearson quickly reviewed the current status of the sheep “losses from an unknown cause.” Wintered in Nevada, the animals had begun trailing back to
Utah late in March, but “heavy outfall from Shot #2 (March 24)” reached “the vicinity where the sheep were grazed,” northeast of the proving ground. “Practically all the deaths occurred prior to May 24,” Pearson noted, with death rates “much higher in newborn lambs than in mature sheep.” Fallout might be implicated, because some “mature animals showed lesions around the nose and on the back after shearing,” which “could have been beta ray burns.”’ Alternatively, they “may also be the typical photosynthesization lesions that are seen with many poisonous plants.” (Pearson’s “photosynthesization lesions” have nothing to do with photosynthesis; he meant damage from the then poorly understood phenomenon of photosensitization caused by some plant poisons.) Although “sheep were examined by several competent veterinarians”—Pearson mentioned Veenstra, Thompsett, and Clark—no clearcut answers emerged. “The main need,” he believed, “is to have veterinarians familiar with radiation damage in large animals survey the situation and examine some of the animals.” He wanted to include experts from local colleges. “Acquainted with local range conditions,” they also would “personally
110 The Cost of Sheep know the people who have had losses of livestock in the areas of outfall.” . Pearson scheduled a meeting in Las Vegas for Monday, 15 June 1953.?! The group that met at the Las Vegas Field Office included three members of the AEC-sponsored project at the University of Tennessee founded in 1945 to study Trinity cattle, five experts from Utah State Agricultural College and the University of Nevada, and Nevada Deputy State Veterinarian Clark. Also
present was William Johnson, head Los Alamos off-site monitor, as were Sanders and two other officials from the Las Vegas Field Office, Allaire, and Pearson himself.?? After reviewing livestock losses, they would first decide “whether or not radiation could have been a factor contributing to the losses or injury of livestock,” then “determine as far as possible other causes that may have contributed to losses of livestock around the area.” When they met, most of them had yet to see an injured animal from the fallout area. But as Pearson observed, they knew a great deal about “radiation effects on farm animals, veterinary medicine, range management and range botany, biochemistry and nutrition, fallout of radioactivity material.” They also enjoyed “a vast background of contacts with the livestock men and local situations.” The group toured the Nevada ranges Monday and Tuesday, then drove to Utah on Wednesday.” Several things made the sheep question difficult to answer. On one hand, it was the driest year in two decades, and there were clear signs that the animals were poorly nourished; on the other, were odd lesions on faces and backs and
the radiation readings. One sheep counted that week had liver readings 2 times, lung and bone 4 times, and thyroid over 150 times background; a second had liver and bone readings 2 to 3 times and thyroid 180 times background—“probably,” Pearson reported, “all beta counts.” That left the worst dosage “the animals could have received . . . far below the amount required for physiological effects.” Such figures nonetheless suggested sheep had “picked up significant amounts of radiation or radioactive material.” Nine sheep 1n all provided blood and tissue samples. Beta counts on their backs ranged from 1.7 to 50 milliroentgens per hour, and one animal “showed internal hemorrhage.’’4
Malnutrition nonetheless seemed to Pearson more likely the cause of sheep losses than radiation. He reserved final judgment, however, and would release “no conclusions or statements . . . until the laboratory tests and studies have been made.’’> Despite his growing conviction that malnutrition accounted for the trouble, none of these studies addressed a well-known and perhaps related fact, the radiosensitivity of the gastrointestinal tract. Fission products on forage must pass through the gut before reaching any internal organ, but even severe exposure produces no gross lesions in the intestine.?° Unfortunately, postmortems and other analyses of sheep that survived omitted all but a passing glance at the digestive system.?’ Confronted with the
The Cost of Sheep 111 omission years later, Wolff offered no excuse. Simply speaking, “sampling for residual radioactivity in the gastrointestinal tract was overlooked.’
Preliminary Findings On 17 June 1953 in Washington, Fields and Bugher reviewed the status of livestock studies for the commissioners. In contrast to Dunning’s report the week before, Bugher described as “the opinion of the investigators that the deaths ... of sheep . . . had not been caused by radiation.” Acknowledging that “the animals might have suffered some radiation injury,” however, entailed the possibility “that this was a contributing factor in their deaths.” The commissioners urged still greater “effort to obtain conclusive information.” Like Pearson, Bugher claimed to reserve final judgment until all studies were completed. He also shared Allaire’s concern about how to persuade sheepmen not to blame radiation for their losses. “It would not be enough to say that they [sheep] had not died of radiation,” he observed. The AEC must “be able to say with authority precisely what the causes of death had been.’ Determining that, however, proved no easy task. Initial reports only partly supported the views expressed by Pearson and Bugher. The three-man team from the University of Tennessee AEC project found “no lesions . . . among the several thousand sheep observed which could be attributed to radiation sickness.” Veterinarians Robert Bay in Salt Lake City and John L. O’Harra in Nevada publicly blamed malnutrition rather than radiation for the sheep deaths. Hadlow’s studies left him less certain. Radiation might have caused some of the observed changes, he believed, but other agents could not be excluded.3! Yet after seeing Hadlow’s protocols, an army veterinarian on the Tennessee-AEC team took a much stronger stand. Radiation had nothing to do with the sheep deaths, insisted Lt. Col. John H. Rust, listing fourteen reasons why. “I therefore must reaffirm my statement that I have seen no evidence of any type of irradiation syndrome either partial, local or total body.’’32 Hadlow backed down. “Fortunately we agree on the overall interpretations,” he told Rust. “T find no reason to disagree with your findings.’’34
Others found the evidence more ambiguous. Based on his own findings, Veenstra concluded “that radiation was at least a contributing factor to the loss of these animals.”’>4 Range ecologist L. A. Stoddart of the Utah Agricultural Experiment Station had attended Pearson’s mid-June meeting. He ruled out malnutrition or plant poisoning as cause for most losses, as did Huffman, the Bureau of Animal Industry’s local expert on stock poisoning by plants. In a public statement, Spendlove refused to dismiss malnutrition as a cause of sheep deaths but also stressed the presence of radiation.*5 Radioassays of sheep tissue showed, Wolff reported, “surprisingly high concentra-
112 The Cost of Sheep tions of radioactive elements . . . in the thyroid gland,” although not high enough “to produce any acute syndrome or pathology.”36 The report from Bay’s Radiobiology Laboratory later reached much the same conclusion.*’ Robert Thompsett, the Los Alamos veterinarian who was among the first
outside experts to see the sheep, was among the last to report—apparently with some reluctance.38 He also most strongly expressed the view that radiation was a major factor in the sheep losses. “There is no doubt about the origin of the lesions on the sheep,” he stated. They “are absolutely typical of the Trinity lesion both macroscopically and in the laboratory.” And, he concluded, they killed the sheep. “Radio-active burns” were not the sole cause of death but rather the last straw for animals already weakened by trailing, pregnancy, and other stresses. “A thorough study of sheep diseases as well as a survey of endemic diseases at this time makes the syndrome of our sheep sickness aim toward a diagnosis of radio-activity damage,” Thompsett argued. “I am of the opinion that the Atomic Energy Commission has contributed to great losses.’’39
Bugher, however, was already “quite convinced” that Upshot-Knothole had exposed no person or animal to fallout “levels [that] will . . . result in recognizable injury.” Furthermore, “the human hazard is generally less than that experienced by grazing animals in the same area,” he wrote on 8 July to Lewis L. Strauss, who had just succeeded Gordon Dean as AEC chairman. Not only did sheep tend to be more radiosensitive than humans but they did not normally enjoy the human benefits of washing radioactivity away; grazing also made them more likely to eat freshly contaminated food. Bugher assured Strauss “we are expending considerable effort in the attempt to reach a proper evaluation of the contribution, if any, of radioactive fallout to the general problem of animal mortality resulting from the drought and failure of food supply of range animals in the Nevada-Utah area.” Future limits on numbers and yields of tower shots in Nevada would, in any event, largely solve the fallout problem. The real issue lay elsewhere, Bugher believed, making “a clear distinction between actual hazards to health . . . and the psychologic climate in which the actual environmental factors may be relatively minor in importance.” Psychology “is a public relations problem,” he continued. “While it is entangled with the fundamental medical concerns, it is by no means completely solved merely by assuring ourselves that no actual injury has occurred.’’4°
Reporting to the full AEC again in mid-July, Bugher took a cautious stance. He now favored Pearson’s theory of sheep killed by eating toxic plants, but “since they had apparently also suffered some radiation injury, studies would be continued to determine whether or to what extent this had been a factor in their death.”4! Initial plans for quick findings quickly made public had to be discarded.” In its fourteenth semiannual report to Congress at the end of July, the AEC had little to say on the subject: “Malnutrition was
The Cost of Sheep 113 a major factor,” and “experts . . . are making further investigations to determine whether the animals were affected by radiation.” Hopes for settling the question now rested on a meeting in Salt Lake City scheduled for 3-4 August 1953. Persistent “differences of opinion [among] the people who have studied the losses of sheep,” Pearson thought, partly reflected the simple fact that they had not all met one another. The Salt Lake City meeting would bring everyone together, allow them to resolve outstanding issues, and clear the way for a final report.44 The AEC assured Utah Congressman Douglas Stringfellow that “a complete report will be prepared as soon as possible after this meeting.’*> Differences, however, proved more stubborn than Pearson had hoped. The conference did indeed bring “together for the first time the various people who have been concerned with or participated in the studies.” They presented technical reports, discussed the results, and learned that matters could not so easily be settled.4’ Evidence that radiation played no part in sheep deaths seemed overwhelm-
ing to the AEC and its contractors, once they allayed their early doubts. Consultants Thompsett and Veenstra remained notable exceptions. They most strongly argued the case that, as Joe Sanders reported, “radiation could have been a weakening factor and these [beta burns] could have contributed to the high death rate.”48 The non-AEC experts—from the Public Health Service, the Bureau of Animal Industry, and Utah State Agricultural College—for the most part adopted a neutral stance. Monroe Holmes could see no direct evidence for choosing between radiation and malnutrition as the cause of sheep losses: there were “too many variable factors,” complicated by “investigations .. . conducted so late in the stage of this affliction” and by the fact that “much of the data is by hearsay and not by observation.’’*? James G. Terrill, Jr., chief of the Public Health Service’s radiological health branch, also attended the meeting. “Evidence relative to the cause of the death in the sheep is conflicting,” he concluded. It “merely indicates the need for more knowledge and a system of measuring the fall-out at future tests which will provide more significant health and biological effects data.”°° Pearson clearly needed more data before he could write his final report. Pearson and his colleagues agreed on several short-term studies intended
to resolve outstanding questions: reexaminations of skin samples to settle once and for all the presence or absence of beta burns; experiments on sheep to pinpoint the exact nature of ovine beta burns; and an analysis of correlations between fallout patterns and reported sheep deaths.*! For longer-term studies of “the general problems of livestock production adjacent to the test site and on the summer range area east of Cedar City,” Pearson planned contracts with Utah State Agricultural College and the University of Nevada. The schools also would “undertake [to study] more specific problems when future tests are held.’”>? Meanwhile, however, Pearson faced more pressing matters. A week after the Salt Lake City meeting, he went to Cedar City for
114 The Cost of Sheep talks with the sheepmen. Terrill, Spendlove, and Sanders also attended. So did, among others, Director of Information Services Morse Salisbury and Las Vegas Field Office Manager Seth R. Woodruff, Jr.>?
Stenographic records of the meeting suggest that all nine sheepmen present, as well as the local veterinarian, were troubled by events outside any prior experience. Normal reasons for losses, like drought, could not fully explain what happened. At the same time, a unique factor had also appeared. “When. . . you mentioned some sheep were hot,” one rancher asked, “what did you mean? . . . You said, “This sheep isn’t as hot’ or “This is a hot one.’ What did you mean?” Another wondered 1f sheep might not have picked up radiation from forage or by other indirect means. Perhaps doses less than lethal had hurt sheep that were not thriving, still another suggested. “Any radiation could have pushed a poor sheep on to the other side.”>4 Although the AEC offered no answers, the tone of the meeting was not hostile. Quite the contrary, reported Terrill. He saw “no evidence of any attempt by individuals or groups to emphasize damages. They all apparently have a patriotic understanding of the national defense needs of the tests’’ and seemed quite willing “to help collect data and provide sound information.’>° Reasonable though the questions might be, nobody had all the answers. Pearson could only promise to continue the investigation. Terrill joined Joe Sanders in one of the first of the new tasks, a survey of the area north and west of the proving ground. The main purpose was learning whether any sheep outside the known fallout area had displayed symptoms like those within. They spent two days talking to local officials and ranchers in and around Ely and Eureka, Nevada. Essentially, they confirmed that only sheep grazing in a limited area had caused their owners concern. “These investigations,” Terrill reported, “indicate that sheep located north and west of the fall-out were apparently unaffected by the symptoms reported in the herds which wintered along the Utah-Nevada border.”’5° Other phases
of Pearson’s expanded research program also were under way by midAugust.>?
Santa Fe Operations Manager Tyler thought the evidence already “ample . . . that radiation did not kill the sheep.” These findings, as well as the more certain results for cattle and horses, he judged “sufficiently conclusive to support an official report to livestock owners and the NPG region public.” Tyler wanted “to conclude this as soon as possible.” That meant a prompt statement that “conforms with the facts as made known to me... .. , finally answers public questions of radiation damage to horses and cattle, and answers the major public relations problem by establishing radiation did not kill the sheep.” On 18 August 1953, Tyler sent his proposed statement to Fields in Washington.*8 Most of Tyler’s draft described horse and cattle findings. These completed studies furnished the basis for AEC action on damage claims from
livestock owners. Just what had happened to the sheep, however, remained
The Cost of Sheep 115 doubtful. “The investigation of sheep losses has progressed far enough to permit an evaluation of the effect of radiation fallout, but has not determined the precise cause of death and is being continued for that reason.”°9
The draft statement described “a group of Utah sheep owners who had grazed their stock over a wide area between Nevada Proving Grounds and Caliente” and who had “reported unusually high losses among ewes and lambs.” Despite “extensive field investigations, autopsies, and laboratory tests,” cause of death remained unclear. “Malnutrition was presumably a major fac-
tor,” but the “federal and state agencies concerned have not fully satisfied themselves as to the basic reason for such unusually heavy losses.” Although
“there was some radiation fallout” where the sheep grazed, and “some showed lesions on their backs and in their nostrils . . . , our experts were unable to determine that these resulted from radiation exposure,” nor do “field and laboratory findings to date . . . show that there was any hazardous intake of radiation particles.” All findings so far “show that radiation was not a primary nor a major contributing cause of death,” and further study will “determine the primary cause of death.” In short, “the AEC concludes on the basis
of present findings that radiation fallout did not cause the deaths of the sheep.”’60
Although he had fairly described the general status of the sheep problem from the AEC’s point of view, Tyler had overlooked some of the nuances. He also said too much, as he learned from Washington within the week. Fields approved Tyler’s “proposed action with respect to the horse and cattle cases” but not “the release of the proposed statement.” A revised version excised all but the barest mention of sheep. “The investigation of sheep losses is continuing because the precise cause of death of the sheep has not yet been determined,” it read. “When the investigation of the sheep losses is completed, the
findings will be made known in a joint statement by the AEC and Public Health Service.” The reason, Fields explained to Tyler in the same message, involved Thompsett and Veenstra, “whose services as experts in this field” the AEC had requested. Both “have made statements indicating that radiation from fallout of our atomic tests was a contributory factor to sheep losses.” Contradicting them before all studies were completed, Fields feared, “might very well precipitate court action on part of sheep owners and place AEC in position of having to refute findings and or opinions of its own technical con-
sultants.Ӣ! Several months more would elapse before AEC headquarters judged the time ripe for a public statement.
Exposure Standards under Attack Unfortunately, the sheep problem had emerged at an awkward time. The Committee on the Operational Future of the Nevada Proving Ground had
116 The Cost of Sheep submitted its first report in the midst of Upshot-Knothole. Deliberations would resume in a few months, when data from the latest tests could be pooled with earlier findings.®* But even before the AEC learned that livestock might have been injured, off-site fallout from Upshot-Knothole had become an issue. Some called “over-emphasizing the effects of fall-out. . . a serious
mistake.’ Extreme “precautions taken by the AEC. . . caused undue public concern.” These comments at a May meeting of the AEC and Military Liaison Committee sparked a revealing exchange of views. ‘“Arousing public
fears,” warned the chairman of the Miliary Liaison Committee, Robert F. LeBaron, could cause “large-scale public opposition to the continental tests.” Commissioner Henry Smyth defended the AEC approach. Emphasizing “the
extreme care taken by the AEC in avoiding hazard to the public. . . is believed to be the best way to create confidence and allay public fear.” The AEC, Fields added, “has no right to subject the public to the radiation permitted for its own employees.’’® Earlier that month, Fields had asked a staff officer in his test branch to as-
sess the prospects for Nevada testing. Lt. Col. Raymond P. Campbell, Jr., foresaw real problems. ‘The level of radiation here is such that, if fallout occurred in a populated area immediately adjacent to the Proving Ground, beta burns might be experienced,” he noted. “This would probably arouse immediate public clamor for the closing of the Proving Ground.” Unless the test organization imposed proper limits on Nevada testing, Campbell warned, the result will “almost certainly be ultimate overexposure of nearby populations and conceivably the enforced closure of the Nevada Proving Ground.’ Like many others within and outside the AEC, Campbell knew full well the test organization’s “concern . . . with maintaining the safest possible conditions in what is, after all, a dangerous business.” Whatever merits the test organization’s safety system might have, however, it remained “the same system
which has been in effect thus far in the operations at the Nevada Proving Grounds.” Such business as usual would not work, Campbell insisted. People living near the proving ground, “for reasons which are understandable and human if not always scientifically sound,” have expressed “a lively disquietude to the President, Congress, and the Commission.”®© The leader of the Los Alamos Health Division agreed in substance. Though Campbell’s figures might be challenged, Shipman allowed, that “would not, in my opinion, alter the conclusion that there should be a definite limit on the yield of tower shots detonated in Nevada.’ But the Los Alamos test organization, backed by the local AEC manager, questioned both the figures and the
conclusion.®’ Part of the problem derived from lack of clear guidelines. ‘Between the ‘safe’ laboratory standard of 3.9r/quarter and the ‘militarily significant’ dose of 5O0r there is a wide region in which one must operate if test operations are to be conducted,” Test Director Alvin Graves explained in a paper prepared later that year. To the lack of such guidelines he “attributed
The Cost of Sheep 117 much of our public relations problem with respect to the Nevada Proving Grounds.” Graves deplored “our overselling the public on the hazards of radiation on the one hand, and our possible overselling the public, and perhaps
ourselves, on the radiation they receive from fall-out.” Instead of vaguely “using the term hazard in this connection,” he suggested, state clearly “the magnitude of the hazard we are talking about.” Exposure to radiation was one of the risks testing entailed. Graves wanted an authoritative statement that would balance the value of testing against the degree of risk.® On the eve of Upshot-Knothole, Bugher had traced “confusion concerning radiation standards. . . to the failure to differentiate between AEC functions and military operations.” AEC standards “with respect to radiological safety and personnel exposure,” he wrote on 12 March 1953, “are established by the Division of Biology and Medicine. The Division has a firm policy that the in-
tegrated dose of 3.9 r over a 13-week period should not be exceeded.’ Averaging exposure over thirteen weeks, as the AEC did, diverged from international practice. “Operational purposes” dictated the extended time span, as Gordon Dunning later commented, though the “International Commission on Radiation Protection has recommended 0.3 r per week of whole-body radiation as a maximum.’”?”°
The issue was not minor. That became clear at the Tripartite Conference on Radiation Hazards in Harriman, New York, at the end of March 1953. Representatives of both the United Kingdom and Canada, Bugher reported, “had been unwilling to endorse the standards in effect at the Nevada test site.” Integrating exposure over a quarter without a weekly limit was the stumbling block. “The U.K. and Canadian conferees had suggested a maximum of .9 r per week,” he explained. “Although they did not consider that exposure at the present levels would endanger the health of the limited number of workers at the test site, they did believe that general application of the
standards in effect there would be inadvisable.” Accepting such a weekly limit, however, Bugher warned the commissioners, would cripple work in Nevada.”!
Santa Fe Operations, in fact, wanted “to extend the integration period to one year.” Current practice, Tyler told Fields in the midst of the UpshotKnothole series, “does impose a serious and perhaps unrealistic limitation upon an expensive, important and onerous operation.” Integrating over a full year without raising the allowed total “would provide a workable annual limit for the foreseeable future,” Tyler claimed, both on site and off. The test manager’s advisory panel deemed such a limit neither “unrealistic [nor impracticable.” In fact, it might be the only way of keeping the Nevada site in use, barring “the improbable solution of raising the radiation limits three or four times.”’?? Establishing standards, however, was only part of the safety problem. Operational demands, as in overseas tests and cloud sampling, had some-
118 The Cost of Sheep times required stretching standards to complete missions. “Such disregard of the safety criteria,’ Bugher noted, never meant anything deemed “an unacceptable exposure from the standpoint of the individual’s welfare.” Instead, higher limits set “a ceiling on the degree of departure from safe operation.” Expedience must not rule in Nevada. “It is erroneous to assume that one can alter the fundamental character of radiation injury by a simple administrative re-definition of allowable limits,” Bugher insisted. “I see no reason, therefore, for continued reiteration of the desire to re-define the concepts of safety merely for operational convenience.”?3 Secrecy so shrouded the test program, however, that such matters as worker safety could not then emerge as subjects of public debate.
The major challenge to AEC standards came when off-site fallout appeared to threaten public safety during Upshot-Knothole. Reaction began mildly, despite enough fallout to demand the first posttest safeguards imposed publicly outside the proving ground. Reassurances from AEC spokesmen, prompt action, and the absence of overt harm to anyone exposed all helped mute criticism. Initially, at least, fears that testing had somehow disturbed weather across the country seemed far more pronounced.”4 The focus of concern began to change with the first hints of radiation damage to livestock. From early June onward, the topic of public and congressional reaction to testing surfaced again and again in AEC councils. This was a major reason for calling the Committee on the Operational Future of the Nevada Proving Ground back to work in July 1953, long before all the Upshot-Knothole data were ready.’° It was not quite the same group that had recessed in May. Now dubbed the Committee to Study Nevada Proving Ground, it had fewer members but more advisers. It also had a new chairman, Carroll Tyler, head of Santa Fe Operations.” In Washington, Fields awaited “at the earliest practicable date” a report on the Nevada site’s prospects in “light of developments during and after Upshot-Knothole,” Tyler informed his panel. What types of tests could be conducted there? What weather standards should govern? What steps “are or may be taken to safeguard persons and animal stock in downwind areas
as well as . . . to decontaminate persons or property outside the Nevada Proving Grounds?” What “educational or other measures. . . can be taken to alleviate present existing public concern over dangers popularly conceived to be caused by these test operations?’ On answers to such questions hinged further “use of Nevada Proving Grounds for atomic tests.””7 Tyler called the first meeting for early August. Proposing no agenda, he instead posed more questions: What limits on off-site exposure did public safety, public inconvenience, or economic interests impose? What factors affected fallout to what degree and how predictably? How great were the hazards of blast and shock? Did Nevada remain the best site for weapons testing, and how badly was it needed? Would a better-informed public help, and how could public understanding be improved? Exactly what kind of recommenda-
The Cost of Sheep 119 tions should the committee make? As the first step, Tyler wanted the committee to define the scope of the report, decide what data were required, and assign the right person or group to each task. “I feel that the increased publicity which we have received during and following the Upshot/Knothole Operation requires that we go into greater detail than we did in January,” he explained. We must “support any conclusions . . . by supplemental reports or documentation of some kind.’’”8
When the committee met on 6 August 1953, it did just as Tyler asked. Preliminary reports were defined, assigned, and scheduled for mailing to every member by the end of the month. The committee would sit again late in September “to arrive at conclusions and consider recommendations.””? Half the reports addressed the value of continental testing to the AEC, the Department of Defense, and other agencies.®° The rest focused on how to preserve the Nevada site. That clearly demanded coming to grips with radiation safety, both as practiced and as explained to the public.?! The issues, though, were not as clear-cut as they might have seemed.
Hard Thinking about Safety Problems The special reports required by the committee broke little new ground, their purpose more didactic than investigative. They covered much the same issues discussed since Nevada testing began. Reviewing the 1950 decision to create a test site in Nevada, in fact, was one of the committee’s major priorities.82 Radiological safety had been a key issue at the outset and remained a central concern. Bugher himself reported on safety standards. Relatively brief, his report nevertheless provided room for something the normal round of routine and crisis seldom vouchsafed: a chance to expound the basic thinking that guided AEC standard setting. Bugher stressed the crucial distinction between two classes of people who might be exposed. Participants in the test program formed the smaller group, its members marked by special traits. They were adults who would be exposed, if at all, only during a limited working life. Voluntarily present, they were also better informed and more closely observed than outsiders. Bugher again defended, as “a special case” justified in testing, “the integration of the occupational permissible exposure rate over a reasonable period of time,” thus the operational limit “set at 3.9r gamma exposure in thirteen weeks.” He admitted that Upshot-Knothole had raised questions about this approach. “Relatively high onsite contamination and the protracted character of the series” caused almost 4 percent of workers to exceed the prescribed limit, versus Only 1 percent in the preceding series, Tumbler-Snapper. Because Upshot-Knothole employed a much larger work force, that translated into over five times as many workers overexposed.*4 Bugher “stated with considerable certainty,” however, that levels even
120 The Cost of Sheep “two or three times as high” as those recorded by workers in UpshotKnothole—mostly under 9 roentgens and none over 18—would cause “no significant injury.” Still, he knew of “no threshold to significant injury in this field, and the legal position of the Commission at once deteriorates if there is deliberate departure from what may be generally considered a reasonable interpretation of the accepted permissible level.” Operation plans allowed the test director to depart from normal safety standards in saving a test. In essence, he could decide with good reason “that an unknown increase in hazard be accepted.” Accepting “command responsibility” for a higher figure, however, only imposed an ad hoc “upper limit for such a departure.” It did “not constitute a re-statement of what is to be considered safe and acceptable practice.” Safe practice still meant sticking to prescribed limits.%5
The second class of people threatened by radiation exposure—those who merely lived nearby—posed, if anything, harder problems. “Through no desire of their own, these people become more or less exposed due to fallout of bomb debris,”’ Bugher noted. Their role “is involuntary, the numbers of people involved may become very large, and there is no limitation with respect to age or occupational relationship.” This brought into play a new principle: “an exposure level which may be acceptable occupationally should be reduced by an appreciable factor where large populations are concerned.” The Tripartite Conference on Radiation Hazards earlier that year had ‘“‘agreed that where exposures to large populations were involved the permissible limit for occupational exposure might be reduced by a factor which could be as large as 10.”8° Admitting that “a considerable number of authorities may consider [it] too low,”’ Bugher proposed a factor of four. “From the practical point of view,” he suggested, “a figure of 3.9r applied to off-site communities over a period of a year constitutes a workable relationship” between on-site and offsite standards.®?
The absence of any direct measure of bystanders’ exposures may have posed the most difficult problem of all. Reasonably precise methods such as the use of standard film badges by workers were not available off site. For the offsite populations, no better procedure has come to light than the use of the fission product decay curve based upon careful measurements some time after the total fallout has been established. The integration under this curve for the requisite number of weeks gives a figure for total exposure which cannot be exceeded under any circumstances. Experience in the field has given the magnitude of the factors which may be applied to this theoretical exposure to make due allowance for environmental decay and individual behavior with relation to the exposure field.
Uncertainty could not be fully resolved, though, and off site as on, safety depended on good judgment.®8 For worker and bystander alike, safety also was assumed to depend only on safeguards against gamma exposure. “We have no
The Cost of Sheep ‘21 evidence at the present time,” Bugher commented, to suggest that when gamma limits “have been met. . . there need be concern with regard to inhalation or the ingestion of contaminating material in drinking water.” Radioisotopes of strontium, as bone seekers, seemed likely to pose the greatest risk. But, Bugher explained, “in no case does the likelihood of acquiring anything like the permissible limit of these isotopes appear significant.”®?
Biophysicist Howard L. Andrews reached much the same conclusion. Associated with testing since Crossroads, he had directed research for the Public Health Service and, since 1948, headed the nuclear radiation biology section of the National Institute of Health. Andrews reported specifically on fallout to the Committee to Study Nevada Proving Ground. He shared Bugher’s view of the main “off-site radiological hazards.” Only two really mattered: “whole body gamma radiation received from particles deposited on the ground and beta radiation from particles deposited on the skin.’’! Andrews dismissed other hazards as minor. Exposure to the passing radioactive cloud was too brief to pose much risk. Someone close enough to breathe active dust in dangerous amounts also would receive gamma radiation too great to survive. Fallout “in water supplies can result in the ingestion of radioactive materials,” Andrews allowed. But “in any Nevada situation this will be a transient effect and the total radiation dose received can be neglected.’
Other committee members agreed with Bugher that “actual hazards to health” presented the lesser problems. The greater source of trouble for the AEC derived from “the psychologic climate . . . , a public relations problem.”?? That was the subject of the special report from Richard Elliott, information director in the Santa Fe Operations Office. He provided a thoughtful analysis, unique in stressing what the AEC owed the public and in tracing the roots of the problem to AEC shortcomings. “An operation involving some degree of public hazard, resulting in a very real public impact, and requiring public acceptance for its continuance,” in Elliott’s view, carried “certain obligations which are intensified if the operator is a public agency.” This meant, in particular, showing both that the test program was vital to the nation and that it was conducted as safely as possible. These, in turn, entailed four related obligations: (1) To inform concerned publics of the hazards created and of preventive action which may be taken; (2) To warn people in advance of potentially hazardous situations, or of situations which may alarm them; (3) To report after the fact not only with reassurances but also with details and interpretations; (4) And, to the extent of the agency’s responsibility, to reimburse the public for its losses.
Obviously, such an approach also would reward the AEC by earning it greater public trust.™
Elliott reviewed the background of Nevada testing and discussed several factors that helped explain the AEC’s failure fully to meet its obligations: in-
122 The Cost of Sheep adequate planning, poorly defined hazards, security demands, and legal constraints.°> Radioactive fallout clearly aroused the greatest public concern, despite the commission’s “repeated expressions . . . that continental tests have been conducted with adequate assurance of safety.” AEC efforts to inform the public may indeed have fallen short, Elliott suggested, but the problem very likely went “deeper to a lack of agreement and acceptance, first, within AEC and test management, and, second, among health, medical, and other scientific individuals and groups.” Anyone trying to improve relations must face not only that problem, he added, but “the extreme sensitivity of the subject” and “the resulting nervousness of the various levels of management”
as well.?’ Elliott also noted other reasons for public concern: radiation as a mysterious, poorly understood threat; secrecy around test-related fallout; confusion in official statements; contradictory remarks by scientists; and inadequate AEC action.%8 Efforts to correct these shortcomings in UpshotKnothole had enjoyed only modest success, and Elliott proposed a series of steps to produce better results in the future. That became a central topic, in fact, when the Committee to Study Nevada Proving Ground held its second and final meeting on 24 and 25 September 1953. Salisbury from AEC headquarters led a discussion based on Elliott’s
paper. “It was determined that the degree of probable exposure was sufficiently low and acceptable to the public, if they were simultaneously convinced of the value and economies of Nevada tests.”!© The committee also reviewed the other reports submitted. It concluded unanimously that the nation required a continental proving ground; continental testing had proved its value; the Nevada Proving Ground remained the best choice of site; operational controls to assure public safety could be strengthened; and the AEC needed a better program to educate and inform the public. Although one or more of the reports assigned in August supported each finding, some questions persisted.!°! Operational controls to enhance public safety, in particular, needed further study. Tyler assigned a number of reports, focused on such hazards as fallout, to bolster the committee’s conclusions.!®2 The committee nonetheless recommended, again unanimously, that the Nevada Proving Ground remain in use. It also urged the AEC to expand its public information programs both in the region and throughout the nation. Uncertainty and the need for further work in some areas delayed a final report but not the speedy passage of conclusions
and recommendations. “Recognizing that various decisions and actions... may have been held in abeyance pending completion of its study,” the committee decided to forward a preliminary report, merely noting areas still being studied.!03 The committee would later explain such prompt action as “intended to advance an interim AEC decision to proceed with construction at NPG.” !° Meanwhile, sheep once again returned to center stage.
The Cost of Sheep 123
Absolving Radioactivity Elliott’s report had listed the sheep problem among those poorly handled by the AEC: “In mid-September the AEC still felt unable to disavow that fallout caused the deaths of hundreds of sheep.”!®> Congressman Stringfellow described himself as “still anxiously awaiting information,” unable to “understand the long delay in issuing your report and making repatriation [sic] to the injured parties concerned.” Southern Utah sheepmen were still “asking what
action has been taken or will be taken to settle these claims.”!°% On 25 September 1953, just as the Committee to Study Nevada Proving Ground was discussing Elliott’s critique of AEC public relations, AEC Chairman Lewis
Strauss sent Stringfellow a brief status report. It illustrated much of what Elliott had criticized. Strauss offered three reasons to deny “that radiation exposure contributed to the deaths of the sheep”: (1) lesions observed in sheep differed from beta
burns induced in other experimental animals; (2) cattle and wild animals ranging the same area showed no signs of radiation burns; and (3) possible gamma exposure had not exceeded 5 roentgens, fifty times too low to produce any observable effects in domestic animals. Each point was strictly true, but each was also misleading. Sheep lesions resembled, as well as differed from, beta burns in other animals. Strauss mentioned cattle and wild animals but omitted the horses that had clearly suffered radiation burns, leading to claims the AEC had already settled. Finally, the crucial issue in sheep deaths was ingested radionuclides, not external gamma levels. Final answers were not yet in, however, and Strauss hoped work in progress at the AEC laboratories would soon “provide experimental evidence which may throw further
light on the question.”!° |
Two major programs were under way. One fit into an ongoing project at the AEC’s Hanford Works in the state of Washington. Radioiodine toxicity studies had begun there in 1950. Iodine-131, a major fission product, appeared not only in fallout from tests in Nevada but also as gaseous waste from plutonium production at Hanford. Emitted gas might contaminate forage in the area. That the thyroid gland concentrated ingested iodine to hundreds of times its level in the blood was well known, but many questions remained: How much ingested radioiodine, for example, caused what kinds of damage? What levels should be allowed on vegetation? How would chronic effects differ from acute? How would effects vary between growing animals and adults? As the chief local grazing animals, sheep became the experimental subjects. By great good fortune, therefore, a body of relevant findings was at hand to help decide whether or not fallout had hurt the sheep in Nevada. Elevated thyroid levels of iodine-131 suggested it had. Comparing in
detail thyroid tissue of Utah and Hanford sheep, as well as other tissues
124 The Cost of Sheep and symptoms, suggested otherwise: “The Utah sheep showed no evidence of the radiation damage observed in experimentally treated sheep,” concluded the Hanford report.!© The second program began as a more direct response to the 1953 problems. Pathologist Clarence C. Lushbaugh led the group from the Los Alamos Health Division that conducted the main research. At the University of
Tennessee-AEC project, army veterinarian Bernard F. Trum and his colleagues commenced a related but smaller study. Both teams sought to compare the skin damage of Utah sheep with lesions produced by controlled beta irradiation of similar sheep in the laboratory.!° On 27 October 1953, Lushbaugh and Shipman hosted a meeting at Los Alamos to describe the early results. Whether or not intended, this gathering marked a turning point in the long-running controversy. The AEC sent Dunning from headquarters, Allaire from Santa Fe Operations, and Sanders from Las Vegas. The other five men present had all been among the first veterinarians to study the injured sheep in the field: Thompsett, Trum, Melvin, Wolff, and Holmes.!!° During the morning they saw the sheep and compared samples of their tissues under the microscope with slides made from Utah sheep and the betaburned Nevada horses. “There was some difference of opinion among Veterinary Consultants, as well as by the pathologist of the Los Alamos Project,”
Holmes observed. “In my personal opinion, I feel that the lesions seen on these animals were similar to those we observed on the Utah sheep.”!!! Wolff thought “the data presented at this meeting did not throw much light on the Utah sheep situation except perhaps to cast a little more doubt as to the impli-
cation of radiation in the production of skin lesions.’ Although himself convinced that radiation had nothing to do with the Utah sheep deaths, Trum clearly understood why Public Health Service officers like “Wolf [sic] and Holmes are careful about their statements. They have. . . plenty to be cautious about because permissible tolerances seem to have been exceeded.’ That afternoon, as the all-day meeting drew to a close, Dunning asked those present to sign a statement he had just drafted. It began by sketching the facts of injured and dead sheep. “The question was raised as to the possibility of radiation damage causing or contributing to the lesions or deaths.” He advanced three reasons for exonerating fallout: (1) sheep elsewhere suffered “the same lesions” as those “in areas of relatively heavy fall-out,” which was, in any case, nowhere “sufficient to produce the lesions noted”; (2) “microscopic examinations and comparisons of tissues both from the sheep in fallout areas and. . . sheep on which skin beta burns were produced experimentally . . . present a preponderance of evidence to support the conclusion that the lesions were not produced by radioactive fall-out’; and (3) because it concentrated radioiodine in fallout, the critical internal organ was the thyroid, but “the amount of highest radiation dosage to the thyroid has been calculated to be far below the quantity necessary to produce detectable injury.” The five
The Cost of Sheep 125 veterinarians—Trum, Holmes, Wolff, Thompsett, and Melvin—signed the statement, as did Lushbaugh and Sanders. Dunning, who saw himself merely acting as a “scientific secretary,” did not, nor did Allaire or Shipman."!4 Confusion surrounded the meaning of Dunning’s statement. Writing long
after the meeting, Lushbaugh strongly endorsed the conclusion “that the deaths of the Utah sheep were not related in any way to exposure (internal or external) from fallout radioactivity” but could not recall how others present had reacted.!!5 Reporting much closer to the event, Melvin perceived “considerable disagreement,” though “all present agreed to the final report submitted.”16 Holmes would not even go that far: “Although we all did not agree
with the conclusions, as a group, drawn up by Gordon Dunning... , we were asked to sign this attesting to our attendance, which I did.”!!” Confusion also prevailed about Dunning’s purpose. He claimed to require the statement “pertaining to the Utah sheep situation,” Wolff reported, “before Commissioner Zukert [sic] will open up the ‘purse strings’ for future continental weap-
ons tests. Accordingly, a statement was agreed upon by the group.” But, Wolff added, only after “Dr. Dunning emphasized that this statement is for internal use only within the AEC and it is not to be construed as a joint PHSAEC statement.’!!8 Holmes and Melvin stressed this restricted use in their reports as well. Three decades later, in fact, Trum thought the key issue had not
been the statement’s substance but whether or not signing it committed the signer’s agency.!!9
Several factors may account for the confused response to Dunning’s proposed statement. For one, Dunning apparently thought of those who attended the Los Alamos meeting as a committee or panel; from that standpoint, his attempt after “all-day discussions” to “get the Panel to agree to summarize their many discussions into conclusive statements” looked reasonable.!° Participants, however, defined themselves only as a group invited to see some recent experimental results. To them, the broad scope of Dunning’s hastily
drafted statement might well appear puzzling.!2! Indeed, only the second of Dunning’s three reasons to absolve radiation of blame in sheep deaths— disparities between lesions observed on range sheep and lesions produced experimentally—pertained to the main subject of the Los Alamos meeting. Holmes and Wolff were not the only signers who retained doubts on this score. Shortly before the meeting, in fact, Sanders received a telephone call from Thompsett, who was working with Lushbaugh’s team. In a note to Trum about the call, Sanders reported Thompsett saying “they had reproduced com-
parable burns to those found on the Cedar City sheep in the Lab. of Los Alamos and we are really in trouble.”!22 Sanders questioned that interpretation, as did others. Although his views received short shrift at the meeting, Thompsett remained adamant.!23
Dunning’s other two reasons related only tangentially to the Los Alamos meeting. None of the non-AEC experts could be expected to have expert
126 The Cost of Sheep knowledge of the first, that sheep outside the fallout area displayed the same lesions, even if fallout had been heavy enough to cause the lesions. After the meeting, Sanders was asked to confirm that statement. He did, in a carefully worded memorandum focused on low levels of fallout recorded; he omitted mention of his August survey with Terrill that found affected sheep only in the fallout region. Acknowledging uncertainties about the precise location of sheep, Sanders said nothing about fallout readings largely confined to towns and roads.124
Ingested fission products as source of damage posed another kind of question. In 1953, degree of risk from fallout was perceived largely in terms of external gamma radiation; the only short-term internal hazard of even minor significance was thought to be radioiodine, and that was where attention focused. No one at the Los Alamos meeting would have been likely to challenge taking the thyroid as the critical organ.!25 At issue was how great the hazard, and whether or not radioiodine was the only fission product to worry about. Earlier in October, Wolff had objected strongly to a report he received from Trum and Rust of the Tennessee-AEC project. They had concluded that a thyroid reading 4 percent above background was “biologically insignificant.”!26 Wolff again argued as he had in June that judgment had best be postponed. Such a concentration would not injure the thyroid, he admitted, but “‘it is presumptive evidence again of appreciable exposure to gross fission products. Coincidentally it is in the order of the concentrations found in the Cedar City animals.”!27 This was also one of Veenstra’s major concerns. He did not attend the Los Alamos meeting, but Pearson sent him Dunning’s estimated thyroid doses. As
his contribution to the Salt Lake City technical meeting of early August, Dunning had computed the thyroid dose to sheep in Nevada after the second Upshot-Knothole test (Nancy) and to sheep near Cedar City after the ninth test (Harry).!28 Calculating the latter dose was straightforward, since measurements from 8 July allowed interpolation to 19 May with only modest assumptions.!29 Estimating the dose from Nancy on 24 March was not so easy; by July, any radioiodine present from March had decayed to insignificance. Accordingly, Dunning decided “to estimate the dose of the thyroid based on known degrees of contamination due to fallout in the area where the sheep were grazing.” That meant extrapolating the amount of radioiodine from recorded gamma readings. Choosing the highest known reading in the area, Dunning concluded that the highest combined thyroid dose sheep could have received fell between 772 and 1,139 reps.13° “This 1s, of course, only a fraction of the dose that the Hanford office has found is required to produce detectable changes in the thyroid gland and much larger doses before observable effects can be seen in the animals,” Pearson informed Veenstra. “I would also like to have an expression from you as to whether or not in view of these data you feel that radiation was a
The Cost of Sheep 127 contributing factor to the death of the sheep around Cedar City.”!3! Veenstra remained unpersuaded, largely because his judgment had not relied only, or even chiefly, on ingested radioiodine; he thought other fission products might have caused more damage.}2?
Meanwhile, however, Dunning seemed highly pleased with his Los Alamos success, as he promptly informed Director of Information Services Salisbury. “After prolonged discussions I was able to get the group to agree to a series of statements which . . . members of the committee signed,” he reported. “I doubt if we will ever obtain more positive conclusions from this committee than are contained in the attached statements.”!33 Pearson quickly passed the good news to Bugher. What made it so pleasing to the AEC high command was the improved prospect of support from both the Public Health Service and the Bureau of Animal Industry when a public statement on sheep was at last released.!*4
Scientists versus Stockmen The Division of Biology and Medicine’s first full status report on sheep losses came the week after the Los Alamos meeting. It opened with a state-
ment of the problem and the reason for a final report so long delayed. Although the division believed “the evidence so far does not justify a present conclusion by us that the spring tests were factors in these losses,” two missing pieces prevented closure: “the lack of unanimity of scientific opinion” and “the lack of positive findings as to the etiology of the losses.”!35 A full review of events and evidence followed, ending with a comment on the “sheepmen’s attitude.” Coincident losses and tests “naturally raised a question in [their] minds,” but they still trusted the AEC for an answer and had not “so
far . . . alleged that their losses were due to radiation or the spring tests at the NPG,”!6 The report concluded with an even stronger denial of AEC blame. Only “the fact that Dr. Thompsett who studied the sheep losses did not concur in this view makes it desirable to carry on further studies and investigations before a final conclusion is reached.” Thompsett may have been singled out because only he had yet firmly refused to alter his judgment: “On the basis of the gross examination of the experimentally produced lesions he has reaffirmed his opinion that the lesions he saw on the sheep around Cedar City were produced from beta radiation.”!5’ Veenstra likewise saw no reason to change his mind, although he told Pearson so only in late December. He, like Thompsett, found the AEC evidence less persuasive than his own findings, !38 But early in November 1953, Pearson’s main concern was drafting a final report. Thompsett and Veenstra aside, the last pieces fell into place when the reports from Hanford and Los Alamos arrived at the end of the month. Plans
128 The Cost of Sheep for handling the public release were already well along. Both the Public Health Service and the Bureau of Animal Industry had promised to endorse the AEC findings. Pearson also expected backing from Utah state health officials at the planned January meeting with sheepmen.}39 Attaching copies of the Hanford and Los Alamos reports, he dispatched his draft for comment in mid-December. Packages went to the Public Health Service, the Bureau of Animal Industry, and the Utah State Department of Health as well as other AEC offices, !4°
The nine-page report stressed Hanford and Los Alamos findings as bases for judgment. It made no mention of dissenting views. Considering all of the information and data available, it is now evident that the peculiar lesions observed in the sheep around Cedar City in the spring of 1953 and the abnormal losses suffered by the several sheepmen can not be accounted
for by radiation or attributed to the atomic tests conducted at the Nevada Proving Grounds. This opinion is concurred in by the U.S. Public Health Service (HEW), the Bureau of Animal Industry, and the Departments of Agriculture and Health of the State of Utah.!*!
Thompsett and Veenstra were not among those to see the draft. Of those who did, only Holmes went beyond noting a few passages in the report that might need more careful phrasing.'*? He still believed the case remained open. Evidence of sheep harmed by “radiation effects [has] not been found,” Holmes commented, but neither had “conclusive evidence that will completely rule out radiation as a contributing factor.’’!43 Pearson needed to alter the draft but slightly. The greatest change deleted Utah agencies as concurring with AEC findings. Gone was the final phrase in the draft passage quoted above, replaced by a new sentence: “This report has been reviewed by the Department of Health of the State of Utah.” !44 Dis-
tribution of the AEC’s long-awaited report on sheep losses began early in January 1954. This time the AEC sought to avoid any hint of special treatment for Thompsett and Veenstra. They received advance copies, as did certain members of Congress. Although press packages went out at the same time, public release of the AEC findings waited until 13 January and Pearson’s scheduled meeting with sheepmen in Cedar City. !45
He arrived in Salt Lake City on Monday, 11 January 1954. His first stop was the Bureau of Animal Industry, where Melvin and Huffman “were in full accord with the report.” Visiting Spendlove and Holmes at the State Capi-
tol later that day proved less happy. “Dr. Spendlove said that he did not agree with the report,’ Pearson told Bugher, “and that for this reason he did not think that either he or Holmes should go to the meeting in Cedar City.” Spendlove’s doubts focused on the AEC’s failure to prove “that the deaths of the sheep were not contributed to by the spring tests.” At a closeddoor preview on Tuesday of the next day’s public meeting, he again “asked
The Cost of Sheep 129 many questions and expressed doubt that the data justified definite conclusions.” The Utah commissioner of agriculture, himself a sheepman, in contrast “thought the AEC and other agencies had done a good job.””!46
The Wednesday morning meeting with sheepmen in Cedar City lasted more than three hours. Stenographic records again suggest men more puzzled
than angry. One wondered about something heard last spring: “Two men said, ‘This one is hotter than a $2 pistol.’” Asked a local veterinarian, “Is it possible that radiation might disturb natural body functions enough to cause death?” Symptoms so baffling led another owner to comment, “TI had never seen it before.”’!4/ For the most part, though, Pearson thought the sheepmen kept their questions and remarks “on a friendly and cordial basis,” despite the lack of direct AEC answers. The Cedar City meeting as a whole, he judged, “went off very well.”!48 Absolving radiation of blame for lost sheep, however, solved only half the problem. Satisfying sheepmen, as well as congressional
and state officials, also meant fixing blame on some other agent. Pearson promised further research, and contracts soon went to the Utah Agricultural Experiment Station and the University of Nevada.149
The issue would not, however, be so easily settled. As early as March 1954, Sanders talked to one sheepman who “refuses to accept the information presented. . . at the January 13 meeting as evidence that the sheep were not
burned and that radiation did not cause their death.” Sanders learned the rancher had “asked Pearson for copies of reports, one by Thompsett and the other he did not know who prepared it, Veenstra I guess, and was told that they were lost in the military shuffle.” Sanders thought this unlikely but “decided that any further efforts on our part to change his thinking would be folly.”15° He may have been right. In any event, less than a year later the matter was in court. Sheep owners filed five separate complaints against the United States, seeking damages that totaled $176,959 for lost ewes and lambs.!5! In 1956, the federal district court in Salt Lake City rejected their claims.!>2
Meanwhile, however, as 1953 gave way to 1954 and the sheep problem seemed near resolution, the Committee to Study Nevada Proving Ground also approached the end of its task. Late in December 1953, Chairman Tyler still awaited the last of the special studies assigned in October but promised a final report within weeks. He already knew that its findings “will sustain the continued use of the Nevada Proving Grounds.”!53 And so they did when the committee reported at the end of January 1954. Bolstered by twenty-four special studies and other attachments, the final report made the strongest possible case for testing in Nevada. Procedures needed some improvement, both in testing proper and in telling the public about it, but the basic program was sound, }54
Such findings were more than enough for the commissioners. They promptly approved a start on plans for 1954-1955 Nevada testing and re-
130 The Cost of Sheep leased fiscal year 1954 construction funds. Before making a final commitment, however, they sought the views of the General Advisory Committee and the Advisory Committee for Biology and Medicine.!*° Both agreed on the need for Nevada testing, with only minor and easily accommodated reservations. At its meeting on 30 June 1954, the commission formally approved further use of the Nevada Proving Ground under the proposed guidelines. The next test series was scheduled for spring 1955,!56
Operation Castle 1954
Castle Foundations Early Castle planning meshed with Ivy operations. The two test series complemented each other: Ivy would confirm the principle, Castle would prooftest actual thermonuclear weapons. Organization and schedule reflected such close links. The Joint Chiefs of Staff extended the life of Joint Task Force 132 for Operation Castle, retaining Maj. Gen. Percy Clarkson as commander. Clarkson’s staff could thus begin planning Castle even while it prepared for Ivy. One result was a new look at the Pacific Proving Ground. As early as May 1952, six months before Ivy, Clarkson talked to AEC Chairman Dean about using Bikini again. Holmes & Narver, the Los Angeles engineering firm that built and operated Pacific test facilities for the AEC, reconnoitered Bikini that summer. Preliminary schedules showed the first Castle shot slated for September 1953, only ten months after Ivy ended.! Alvin Graves, head of the Los Alamos Test Division, went to Washington in September 1952 to brief the commissioners on Castle plans. Specific designs awaited results from the next spring’s Upshot-Knothole test series in Nevada, he explained, but Enewetak was clearly not big enough for all thermonuclear testing. For one thing, the permanent base camp on Enewetak limited test sites to the atoll’s northern sector. Residual radioactivity could preclude a rapid sequence of tests with suitable sites so few and close together. Furthermore, high-yield shots might damage the base camp or instruments installed on other islands and impose more delays. Reactivating Bikini, unused since Operation Crossroads in 1946, as part of an expanded proving ground seemed a likely answer to all these constraints. Notwithstanding the costs—to 131
132 Operation Castle exiled Bikinians of further delay in going home, to an overextended AEC of an unplanned budget item—the commissioners agreed to the proposal.2 Work at Bikini started early the next month, despite lack of a firm Castle agenda. Tentatively, the AEC planned two megaton-range tests and two tests
of high-yield fission devices, divided between the two atolls: one test at Bikini, the other three at Enewetak. No sooner had he learned of this plan than Clarkson protested. It seemed to subvert the purpose of adding Bikini to the proving ground. Facilities such as the airstrip at Enewetak could not be fully used, while safety for a thermonuclear test meant moving the entire task force out to sea. Precisely such problems in Ivy stretched task force resources
to the breaking point, a major reason for seeking an extra Castle site. Far from solving anything, shifting a single Castle test to Bikini 180 miles away threatened merely to increase the burden of a program already larger than Ivy.3
Technical results from Ivy, however, helped render the issue moot. By December 1952, revised Castle plans called for six shots instead of four, now scheduled for spring 1954 rather than fall 1953. Though all six test devices would be designed for megaton yield, only two were slated for Enewetak. New plans were well advanced by February 1953, when Joint Task Force 132 became a permanent testing unit as Joint Task Force 7.4 Maj. John Servis, deputy commander of the Ivy rad-safe unit, took charge of the radiological safety unit for Castle. The unit belonged to the scientific task group under William E. Ogle of the Los Alamos Test Division. Initially, Servis sought a
hundred-man unit but halved that figure after talks with Graves and Ogle. Several changes permitted lower numbers: supervisors doubled as monitors; the scientific and AEC base support task groups merged their rad-safe functions; and the army task group assumed a larger rad-safe support role. Experienced monitors from the army’s Ist Radiological Safety Support Unit, formed after Nevada’s Operation Upshot-Knothole in 1953, became the backbone of Servis’s Castle unit.°
In February, Servis asked Thomas Shipman of the Los Alamos Health Division for advice on the likely hazards of a series of surface shots. He knew from past tests that fallout from one shot “will contaminate the lagoon for a considerable period of time.” Preparing for the next shot in a series, however, could not wait for all danger to subside; ships and men would have to go in promptly. The problem was, Servis believed, “to psychologically prepare the Task Force for this eventuality.” He “felt that the military services understand the nature of external radiation hazards, but are somewhat confused in their concept of hazards from the possible ingestion or inhalation of fission and fissile material.” Servis expected to provide “proper indoctrination of the Task Force in potential health hazards following surface thermonuclear detonations [which] will lead to increased efficiency of Task Force operations in contaminated areas.”
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Consulting other experts and his own knowledge, Shipman replied with a wide-ranging statement of likely problems. The “actual health hazards,” he believed, “will be similar to those at previous Eniwetok operations only more so.” Detonations measured in megatons could produce hard-to-predict fallout patterns, which might cover ships or islands—“annoying” perhaps, though “in all probability not. . . truly hazardous.” But Shipman also “admitted that some uncertainties regarding this matter still exist, and if all conditions were just right, it might be possible to produce a situation more than annoying, at
least in the immediate vicinity.” Radioactivity in the lagoon after a shot Shipman also deemed more nuisance than hazard. Organization and administration posed the more pressing questions. Two aroused Shipman’s special concern: Would the navy’s extreme stance against running in contaminated waters affect the role of the navy task group? And how could the need for better-trained rad-safe officers throughout the task force be met?’
Within a week of Shipman’s reply, Servis outlined his views on lagoon contamination. Crossroads reports and Ivy records defined the likely patterns
134 Operation Castle and suggested a problem centered on ships more than crews. Radioactivity would not likely reach levels high enough to pose “serious health hazards.” Rather “water evaporators, water distribution lines, and microorganisms adhering to the bottom of the ship will tend to concentrate the radioactive particles of the lagoon.” That might mean “extensive decontamination procedures . . . at the completion of the operation.” Like Shipman, Servis judged the risk slight. He proposed no more than telling everyone what to expect and urging “ship commanders to minimize possible concentration of contamination” so as to limit the required “amount of decontamination work.’ How naval vessels might best work in contaminated waters remained a question for planners throughout spring 1953.9 Lt. Col. Richard A. House, the task force staff officer for rad-safe, worried less about radiation hazards than about leaders made timid by “over-cautious” standards “having large factors of safety built-in.” Recalling Crossroads, he deplored “standards for ship operation . . . carried to such extremes as to cause costly delays or extremely difficult and cumbersome methods for getting the job done.” Experience since 1946 suggested little danger in contaminated waters, but the word had yet to reach “operational commanders and staffs.” Indoctrinating officers and crews in proper methods, House believed, “could go a long way toward pav-
ing the way for a smooth operation through a more realistic approach to the true nature of the operational nuisance expected to exist in the Bikini lagoon.”!° Eventually, Joint Task Force 7 settled for a warning that Castle was a “special operation” within the meaning of naval regulations; task force orders thus
superseded routine usage.!! In practice, this held the navy task group to the same standard as the rest of the task force: maximum permissible exposure of 3.9 roentgens for a series lasting up to thirteen weeks, plus 0.3 roentgen for each extra week.!2 Commanders were exhorted to ensure that personnel of ships and boats are not over-exposed to radiation and that ships and boats are not contaminated excessively. The criterion in both cases is that no personnel will be over-exposed as defined . . . above, except in emergencies or tactical operations, and that after the operational period no personnel will receive more than 0.3 roentgen per week from contaminated
equipment. Any ship nowhere reading more than 15 milliroentgens per day might receive final clearance when Castle ended. “Operational clearance” awaited ships that exceeded this limit; such “clearance implies that contamination exists and that special procedures as necessary are instituted aboard ship.”!4 Unlike crews who might live aboard ship for days or weeks, flight crews measured their duty tours in hours at most. Aircraft could thus sustain higher exposure limits than naval vessels, interior surface readings no greater than 7 milliroentgens per hour.!> Following Ivy precedent, Joint Task Force 7 also
Operation Castle 135 authorized 20-roentgen maximum permissible exposures for the crews of sampler aircraft.!6 Precedent likewise allowed emergency air-sea rescue to be conducted without formal regard for stated limits. Flexibility, in any case, marked all limits aloft or afloat. Due to the special nature of field tests . . . a policy of strict adherence to the radiological standards prescribed for routine work is not realistic. The[se] regulations . . . have been designed as a reasonable and safe compromise considering conservation of personnel exposures, the international import of the test and the cost aspects of operational delays chargeable to excessive radiological precautions.!”
Radiological safety remained, for Castle as for all former Pacific test series, a command responsibility.!8 Indoctrination for all task force members and special technical training for monitors were well under way by summer 1953.!9 Believing that “an effective radiological-safety operation would be a test operation in which all par-
ticipants understood the fundamentals of the program of protection from radioactivity,” Servis also compiled and widely disseminated the “Field Monitor’s Manual,” based on the Los Alamos Health Division’s “General Monitoring Handbook.” It covered basic principles, nature of hazards, instruments, monitoring, and decontamination as well as the rad-safe plan and regulations, a glossary, and other handy data.2°
Monitor training began with a three-day school at the Nevada Proving Ground focused on practice fieldwork. Emergency versions of the same course, condensed to one day, later met mixed success at Bikini and Enewetak but still certified 200 monitors. Another 75 monitors came from similar courses taught to their own personnel by Edgerton, Germeshausen and Grier, by Livermore, and by the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory. Members of the rad-safe unit also instructed other units in handling the special problems they would likely meet. Military technicians received special training in instrument repair at the Navy Atomic Defense School and in radiochemi-
cal laboratory techniques and photodosimetry procedures at Evans Signal Laboratory.?!
Joint Task Force 7 planned no special safety effort beyond the immediate test region, but adding Bikini enlarged the danger area. The navy’s Pacific command suggested a new set of boundaries; the AEC proposed shifting the eastern boundary westward to exclude as many inhabited islands as possible.?? Questionable in hindsight, that decision could still be defended. If the danger area had included such inhabited atolls as Rongelap and Utirik it would have required that the natives of those atolis be evacuated and that a permanent home be found for them elsewhere. Since the Department of the Interior was not sympathetic to removing the natives, having experienced con-
136 Operation Castle siderable difficulty with the Bikini natives who were relocated. . . , it was finally decided to exclude Ailingnae [sic] from the danger area.?3
As required by trusteeship rules, the United States notified the United Nations of the proposed danger area on 2 April 1953. Exclusion commenced in July 1953. Publicly, the AEC announced only that the extended Pacific Proving Ground would include Bikini, with construction to begin shortly.** Preferring to “keep them confused as to ‘fission’
and ‘fusion,’ President Eisenhower informally urged the AEC to “leave ‘thermonuclear’ out of press releases and speeches. Also ‘fusion’ and ‘hydrogen.’”*> Although aimed at the Russians, the president’s policy kept the American people confused as well. The AEC itself preferred a low profile. “National policy requires maximum security of information concerning overseas test operations,” Santa Fe Operations Manager Tyler reminded his staff,
especially any hint about future tests.26 ! Bravo
Joint Task Force 7 fell under operational command of the U.S. Navy’s Pacific Fleet. Accordingly, the task force sent copies of the proposed rad-safe plan and regulations for comment to the Pacific-Fleet Command in Hawaii as well as to the AEC in Washington. Aside from a few factual details and some concern about clarity, the AEC Division of Biology and Medicine found little wrong with the proposed rules.?? Fleet command, in contrast, raised serious
questions about how the task force expected to handle fallout problems. Several aspects of the plan aroused concern, but two linked issues appeared most salient. One was the decision to forgo any cloud tracking beyond proving ground borders. That raised the second issue: lacking such data, the task force command must remain unsure about the precise threat to Marshallese on distant islands and so would be hard-pressed to decide for or against evacuation.28 Revised plans met these concerns. Cloud tracking would be augmented, and great caution would be exercised in the decision to fire.?? “The impact of fall-out on populated islands will be one of the major factors in the task force commander’s decision to shoot,” Clarkson assured the commander in chief, Pacific. “In the event that cogent and compelling post-shot reasons arise requiring temporary evacuation of natives, task force security ships will be made available.’’3°
Military aircraft would once again sample and track the cloud. Early in 1953, the Air Force Special Weapons Center in Albuquerque formed a permanent unit equipped with modified F-84G fighters and B-36 bombers.?! Detailed climate data for the testing area came from the Air Weather Service. The AEC also expanded its tracking network, headed by Merril Eisenbud of
Operation Castle 137 the AEC Health and Safety Laboratory. In July 1953, he conferred with staff members of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. Because Ivy suggested that major fallout might remain undetected at sea, all naval vessels in the Pacific would carry gummed-paper collectors. Joint Task Force 7 agreed to cooperate
fully with Eisenbud, whose program also included robot stations at sea, manned flights, and passive detectors at weather stations worldwide. Director of Biology and Medicine John Bugher assured the commissioners that Castle fallout would be well tracked.32 As the scope of Castle testing became clearer, rad-safe problems loomed larger. One member of the Los Alamos Test Division startled Bugher with his forecast. Tripling the number of shots (Ivy included only two) would also multiply average exposure of task force members; the mean Ivy exposure of 3 roentgens could become 7 to 14 roentgens in Castle.*3 To make matters worse, pressure for less restrictive limits grew, at least partly to avoid calling such numbers overexposures. William Ogle, heading the science task group, felt constrained by the stated limit: “The Maximum Permissible Exposure (MPE) for personnel involved in this operation is 3.9 roentgens.”34 Rather
than accept that figure for the entire operation, he preferred to allow test workers up to 3.9 roentgens per calendar quarter. Test Division Leader Alvin Graves agreed.35
Although a test series would almost surely span two calendar quarters, in each of which a worker could receive up to 3.9 roentgens, Ogle denied any “intent of avoiding the sense of the establishment of 3.9 roentgens per operation.” The problem was “the nature and length of operations at Castle. Every effort will be undertaken to minimize radiation exposure, and the mere fact that 3.9 roentgens is authorized will not mean indiscriminate use of the maximum permissible exposure,” he insisted. The higher limit merely “will permit a more efficient recovery program without the inherent adverse publicity that results from the term overexposure.”3¢ When the request reached Biology and Medicine, however, Ogle’s case failed to persuade Biophysics Chief Walter D. Claus. He termed it “simply a subterfuge for getting a permissible dose statement of 7.8 r for the test.”’3?
Bugher rejected Ogle’s request. The limit remained 3.9 roentgens for as long as Operation Castle lasted, up to thirteen weeks; each additional week added 0.3 roentgen to the permitted total. Convinced that so low a limit would hamper the mission, the task force staff felt compelled to rely on a makeshift.78 The revised safety rules of November 1953 added a new provision to stated maximum permissible exposures and limits: “The MPEs and MPLs [maximum permissible limits] are subject to revision by waiver from the task force commander in individually designated cases when circumstances indicate the need and justification therefor.”3? Everyone within the task force, as well as the AEC and the military surgeons general, agreed “that such authority is good and necessary. In fact, John Bugher stated that he
138 Operation Castle would raise no question on any over-exposure case covered under this provision.’4° Delegating waiver authority seemed unwise for legal reasons; both request and waiver would be in writing, with careful attention to the precise unexpected conditions that demanded waiver “only as a last-ditch measure when all else fails.” Justification should hinge only on two factors: technical need and medical risk.*!
Servis and other members of the scientific task group saw flaws in the waiver policy. Waiving limits might be an extreme measure, but that should not mean wrapping the process in red tape. Once decided on, in other words, waiver granting must be quick and easy. Authority to decide whether or not to waive limits, they also believed, must extend to a larger group than the task force staff intended. Personally, Servis questioned vesting waiver authority
solely in the task force commander. He deemed the task force scientific deputy better qualified in practice to balance technical need and safety.*? These claims appeared to carry weight. Joint Task Force 7 issued a standard operating procedure for waiver requests just before testing began.*? Largely free of red tape, the waiver process did become very nearly routine when Castle imposed unexpected demands. Uncertainties about what to expect from the high-yield shots in Castle hampered rad-safe planning. Harold F. Plank of the Los Alamos Test Division was not alone in voicing doubts about predicted cloud characteristics and fallout. “Too few observations by observers with too little experience,” he insisted. ““The result has been the creation of a theoretical picture and conclusions . . . not supported by the facts.”** Exactly what radiological conditions the Castle series would produce remained unclear, just how high a yield to expect from each shot doubtful. Servis wondered about tritium monitoring and how to minimize beta hazards in temporary radiochemical laboratories on Parry Island.45 Uncertainty also might affect experiments: “The present most probable yields and limits are given, but limits are not absolute. Experimenters must instrument to accept a rather wide range yieldwise on the respective shots.”46
October 1953 saw another change in Castle plans. The number of shots rose to seven, only one slated for Enewetak. Construction at Bikini proceeded smoothly and on schedule.*’ But off San Diego, a trial run of task force procedure and communication “revealed many discrepancies which would require resolution before the on-site phase of Castle.’4* Although test plans remained secret, one classification officer complained “bitterly” about leaks from Washington. He wondered how to tell workers not to discuss what they could read about in the newspapers.*? Santa Fe Operations reminded everyone that nothing was yet public beyond the use of Bikini. As required by the Operation Castle information plan, the AEC and the Department of Defense released a joint statement on 8 January 1954. They tersely announced only that tests would be conducted at the Pacific Proving Ground.>°
Operation Castle 139 Two days later, USS Curtiss sailed from Port Chicago, California, carrying
in her hold the devices to be tested in the Marshall Islands. The voyage recalled the tense days of 1948 when the cargo destined for testing seemed equally precious: then a large share of the nation’s nuclear weapons potential, now the first models of the hydrogen bomb. Fianked by destroyers and covered by aircraft when possible, the small convoy avoided normal shipping lanes, sailing with lights out and radios silent. It reached Enewetak on 24 January 1954. Scientific task group headquarters was already at work. Task Force Weather Central began to issue twice-daily forecasts for Bikini and Enewetak on 4 February.*! Conditions appeared “most promising.’’>2 Plans for Bravo on 1 March 1954, first test in the Castle series, included
routine evacuation of Bikini. Everyone would leave the atoll except for a small firing party to remain bunkered on one of the islands throughout the test. A series of February staff conferences also discussed emergency evacua-
tion plans for Enewetak and Ujilang, though chances of dangerously high fallout seemed remote.>3 Lesser degrees of fallout required forethought as well.54 Most concern, however, centered on the test itself. Rehearsing Bravo on 23 February revealed many technical and procedural problems, despite limited participation: scientists still working hard to instrument the test could spare no time for practice, and not even all military units took part.> As Bravo day approached, the weather seemed cooperative. “RadSafe outlook very favorable,” reported the staff weather officer on Saturday morning, 27 February 1954, forty-eight hours before scheduled firing.*¢ That even-
ing, with Bravo now thirty-six hours away, the weather still looked good, except for only the most minor qualification.>’ It “would have been an ideal shot day,” the weather officer later observed.*® By next morning, though, “the trend,” at least in retrospect, “was toward an unfavorable or marginal condition.”’>? It was, in any event, the slightest of trends. Forecast and actual wind
patterns remained favorable, neither weather nor rad-safe problems being raised during Sunday’s scheduled command briefings at 11:00 A.M. and 6:00 P.M. Populated islands appeared to be in no danger, and the open sea that might receive fallout appeared to be free of ships. Bravo remained firm for
6:45 Monday morning. At midnight the weather still held, but low-altitude winds now light and variable raised chances of fallout in the wrong place. Bikini’s weather outlook was downgraded to unfavorable with respect to close-in fallout, and the task force ordered its ships 20 miles farther out to sea, 50 miles from the shot island. Assuming the worst, some higher-altitude winds might blow toward the nearest inhabited atolls, but predicted speeds and altitudes seemed to preclude any real danger; debris would reach Rongelap or Rongerik only after twelve to fifteen hours, by then having decayed to safe levels. Two hours before shot time the earlier forecast remained valid. Task Force Commander Clarkson confirmed his order to fire at 6:45.°
140 Operation Castle Bravo went off as scheduled, just before dawn Monday morning, 1 March 1954, on the reef off Nam Island at Bikini atoll. At an air force weather station on Rongerik, 135 miles to the east, the warrant officer in charge saw “the western sky” so brightly lit for a full minute as “almost requiring shading of the eyes. . . . Almost eleven minutes later the sound came through, rattling the buildings.” Twice as far away toward the southeast, a marine corporal stationed at Kwajalein was startled “when all of a sudden the sky lighted up, a bright orange, and remained that way for what seemed like a couple of minutes. About 10 or 15 minutes later,” he recalled, “we heard a very loud rumbling that sounded like thunder. Then the whole barracks began shaking as if there has been an earthquake. This was followed by a very high wind.’’63 Ten times farther yet from ground zero, Bravo lit the predawn sky over Hawaii. Clarkson pronounced “the test. . . highly successful.” Perhaps too successful, despite his understated coda. “The yield was much greater than expected, which resulted in certain effects not foreseen.” An estimated yield of 14 to 15 megatons in fact more than doubled pretest predictions.© The first sign of trouble came within twenty minutes of firing: “Firing party reported receiving large shock, much water and rather heavy fallout.”® Crouching in their bunker on Eneu, 20 miles from the shot island, they detected rising levels of radiation, not only outside the building but soon within as well.
Evacuation Original plans to retrieve the nine-man firing party soon after the shot collapsed. So, too, did plans for routine recovery of scientific data. Returning vessels met heavy and unexpected fallout 30 miles from ground zero shortly
after eight o’clock. Highly radioactive white particles large enough to see covered their decks. Intensities as high as 5 roentgens per hour were measured on Bairoko’s flight deck, 25 roentgens per hour in the flight deck drains. The navy task group commander ordered a top-speed retreat to the 50mile range at which the task force had awaited the test. Saltwater washdown systems aboard each ship and such other damage control measures as keeping crew members below reduced the hazard. By eleven o’clock, three hours after it began, fallout ceased. The fleet was ordered to stations 10 miles off Bikini. But the move proved futile when the first post-Bravo radiological survey of the atoll reported “wide spread fallout of surprising intensity’®—600 roentgens per hour at one spot 7 miles eastnortheast of ground zero, 125 roentgens per hour 20 miles east-southeast.” Such results, though only partial, were “enough to cancel all activities except those of an emergency nature for Bravo & Bravo + 1 day.”7! Clearly needing new plans, Joint Task Force 7 retired to Enewetak to reorganize and prepare a delayed return to Bikini.?2
Operation Castle 141 Before leaving, however, the task force rescued the firing party on Eneu. That ranked as an emergency. After many long hours of rising radiation levels in a sealed bunker with air-conditioning shut down and a failing generator that left them without lights and only battery-powered radio, they were more than ready to go. A Geiger counter just outside the blockhouse still read over 20 roentgens per hour late in the afternoon of Bravo day. Swathed in bed sheets and pillowcases sealed with masking tape, the men hurried to their jeeps for the half-mile drive to the landing mat. Helicopters hovering just offshore landed as the men arrived. Five minutes after leaving the bunker, they were airborne; twenty minutes later, back aboard ship. Showered and checked by rad-safe, they concluded “none of us had received any harmful amount of radiation.””3 Next day they learned how lucky they had been. Although fallout near the bunker totaled 800 roentgens, “our film badges showed that we had accumulated only a few hundred milliroentgens, less than half a roentgen.”’4 Too much, to be sure, yet well within operational himits. But they also heard the first hints that others had not shared their good fortune. High-altitude cloud tracking had begun with a modified B-29, the socalled Wilson 2, flying west of Bikini to warn the task force if fallout threat-
ened Enewetak. It should have left its holding pattern 50 miles west of ground zero just before noon to follow the actual cloud moving east-northeast. Wilson 2 was late, though, and too far north; instrument problems added to the muddle. Apparently missing the main cloud, it found high readings of 500 to 1,000 milliroentgens per hour. Such readings matched pretest forecasts in both range and bearing, seeming to confirm the absence of any danger to inhabited islands, though early afternoon reports began to cast doubt on that comfortable assumption. Meanwhile, the seaplane tracking the cloud at lower altitude was contaminated early in the mission and had to be replaced. This cost the task force another chance to obtain prompt and precise fallout data.”5 Inhabitants of islands east of Bikini in fact began to receive dangerously high levels of radiation in early afternoon, but the facts only emerged slowly. At Rongerik, site of a 28-man air force weather station, the auto monitor hit the top of its scale, 100 milliroentgens per hour, and remained pegged the rest of the day.’ Unfortunately, the 3:00 message from Rongerik to the task force was both terse and cryptic: “GR MIKE over 100 CHARLIE—Over 100.”7 Probably this translated as “Geiger-Mueller over 100 counts [per minute],” but no one could be quite sure what that meant either, and it received no special handling. Preoccupied by close-in fallout, radioactive debris that never reached higher altitudes, task force members spared little concern for distant problems that might not even exist. In any event, Rongerik seemed to be faring no worse than vessels of the task force. Afternoon and early evening saw fallout once again strike the fleet; unlike the morning fallout, it was light and invisible, peaking at 6:00 with readings no higher than 500 milliroentgens per
142 Operation Castle hour and averages under 300. Light fallout also hit Enewetak, but a flight over Rongerik at 7:45 inexplicably detected nothing.78 All this helped explain why the message from Rongerik “was not viewed
with concern” by task force staff members. “It was generally believed that Rongerik and the task force ships were caught in a general pattern of finely divided . . . particles over a wide area” which posed no severe danger”? A second message from Rongerik at 8:15 that evening conveyed greater urgency: “Auto monitor present reading is 100 plus repeat present reading is 100 plus, pen off chart and has been in this position since 0250Z [= 2:50 p.M., local time].’’8°
_ The weather station belonged to the air force task group. Finally alerted to the potential problem, officers met just before midnight to discuss options. Not yet knowing enough, they detailed Capt. Louis B. Chrestensen, the unit rad-safe officer, to catch the regular supply flight from Kwajalein to Rongerik early ‘the next morning. They also asked the New York Operations Office team responsible for distant rad-safe survey to send a morning flight over the northern Marshalls region, which included Rongerik.®! Although the danger appeared small, as a precaution Maj. Fellie F. Robinson, who commanded the weather unit, radioed Rongerik: “Cease all operations immediately and all personnel remain inside metal buildings until further notice. Maintain rotating shift radio communications with one DR for further instructions.”’? The message arrived at half past midnight.®3 The supply plane reached Rongerik at midmorning; its crew wore film badges. Chrestensen had the pilot fly a survey pattern before landing. “Instruments indi-
cated that the atoll had experienced events that had not been anticipated,” discretely reported 1st Lt. Joseph W. McDaniel, deputy commander of the weather unit. “That made it imperative that all personnel be evacuated as soon as possible.’’84
Chrestensen took readings of 200 milliroentgens per hour at 500 feet, 340 milliroentgens at half that altitude. After unsuccessful efforts to contact task force headquarters for advice and help, he decided to evacuate as many as possible from Rongerik at once. The seaplane set down in the lagoon, and Chrestensen conducted a quick survey. Readings were high: 0.6 roentgen inside the building, 1.2 roentgens on a bed, 2.4 roentgens outside on the sand.
With eight of the island garrison, all the plane had room for, Chrestensen headed for Kwajalein. The other twenty men left that afternoon. Estimated exposure of the first eight men totaled 85 roentgens; of the other twenty, 95 roentgens. Policy had not required routine badging for most members of the Rongerik garrison. Only three men wore film badges on Bravo day. Data from these three badges, plus others spotted about the camp, became the basis for assigning individual exposures ranging from 40 to 98 roentgens. The lat-
est analysis of dosimetry data concludes that external doses on Rongerik
Operation Castle 143 ranged from 32 to 52 rem, figures low enough to explain the absence of symptoms of radiation sickness.®>
Americans, however, were not the only ones at risk. Soon after returning to Kwajalein, Chrestensen radioed his commanding officer: “Suggest immediate survey of inhabited islands of Rongelap. High possibility exists that immediate steps must be taken to evacuate natives.’ Rongelap lay west of Rongerik, closer to Bikini and only 100 nautical miles from ground zero. High levels of fallout on Rongerik could mean still higher levels on Rongelap. A radio report from Flight Able, the aerial survey of the northern Marshalls, confirmed Chrestensen’s fears. Preliminary figures showed almost 7 roentgens per hour on the ground at Rongelap.®? Graves radioed Bugher in Washington the bad news: “Theoretical maximum infinity dose at Rongelap estimated 340 roentgens.”®8 Circumstances clearly demanded prompt action; exposures that high could claim lives. Joint Task Force 7 dispatched a destroyer and notified the Trust Territory to have someone meet the vessel by dawn the next morning at Rongelap. Meanwhile the task force ordered a seaplane to get on-the-spot readings before dark. Monitors landed at 6:30 Tuesday evening and thirty-six hours after Bravo measured 1.4 roentgens per hour.®? Based on these figures and a guess about when fallout hit Rongelap—estimated from Rongerik data, since no local record existed—“calculations of dosage to 3 March indicated about 110 roentgens so the order to evacuate was given.” Evacuation began early Wednesday morning, first from Rongelap, then from nearby Ailinginae where some of the Rongelapese had gone fishing. While inhabitants boarded, monitors surveyed the islands and took high readings of 3 roentgens per hour at Rongelap, 0.45 at Ailinginae. A seaplane flew to Kwajalein with the sixteen people who seemed most ill, while the destroyer sailed with the other sixty-six.9! “Estimate gamma dose from meter readings 100 to 125 roentgens before evacuation,” Ogle informed Bugher. ‘Many complained of stomach aches and headaches accompanied by vomit-
ting [sic] on first day with similar symptoms to lesser degree on second day.”92
Rongelap was not the only atoll hit with fallout. Flight Able reported 240 milliroentgens per hour just before five o’clock at Utirik, which lies 150 miles east of Rongerik. Estimated “maximum infinity dose . . . at Utirik,” Graves reported to Washington, was 110 roentgens.”? Actual exposures, of course, proved much lower. Monitors flew to the atoll, and their data suggested Utink’s inhabitants had received an average 58 roentgens. Although this figure, too, proved high, a destroyer sailed for Utirik with orders to begin evacuation at dawn on 4 March.” Utirik presented problems, an unmarked reef that barred ship traffic from the lagoon. Rafts carried the evacuees past the surf, where they transferred to boats for the trip to the destroyer. Fresh-
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Flight Able also had found evidence of uncomfortably high fallout at Ailuk, south of Utirik: 95 milliroentgens per hour at 6:45 Tuesday evening. Ailuk posed a delicate problem. The atoll’s 400 inhabitants almost doubled the combined population of Rongelap and Utirik, while the best guess of task force experts projected total exposure at 20 roentgens, “less,” as the task force rad-safe officer observed, “than the minimum standard used by the task force for its sampling aircraft crews. This was the major factor in the decision not to evacuate Ailuk.’’%
Flights Baker and Charlie on 3 March completed the aerial survey of the Marshalls and removed any further prospect of evacuation. A number of inhabited atolls, however, had received fallout great enough to warrant further study. Directed by Thomas White of the Los Alamos Health Division, special surveys of these atolls began on 5 March.?8 Another team headed by Herbert Scoville, Jr., of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project visited the evacuated atolls. He chiefly sought further ground readings as well as water and soil samples, but the task force also wanted to safeguard property left behind in the inhabitants’ hasty departure.% Meanwhile Joint Task Force 7 faced the problem of dealing with the exposed Marshallese and servicemen. The last of the twenty-eight Americans from Rongerik reached Kwajalein at 7:00 Tuesday evening. Decontamination crews met them. Fortunately, they showed no symptoms, and blood counts proved normal. Security loomed as a key concern.!® Major Robinson “gave orders that no one evacuated from Rongerik would talk to anyone concerning the incident or conditions at Rongerik regardless of rank, without express permission.”!°! AEC Chairman Strauss also intended to maintain close control over information about the Marshallese. On 1 March he had tersely announced only that a test had occurred. Newspapers in Hawaii took little notice, and elsewhere concern seemed still less.!°2 Bravo fallout at first prompted
no change of plans. Strauss decided against any public release on fallout or evacuation unless pressed. If forced by leak or other reason, the release would come from Washington. He “urgently request[ed]’ that neither task force nor High Commission “make anything public on these matters.”!%
_ Graves objected. In an “Eyes Only” message to Kenneth Fields, director of military application, he described himself as “very much concerned reference the recent decision not to make a release on evacuation of natives unless forced to do so.” This could only create, to Graves’s deep regret, “the impression that we are being furtive in our actions with regard to these people.”!% The guarded reply from Washington asked for more details. ““Your request for
146 Operation Castle such release is thoroughly understood, however, the impact of such a release
must be carefully weighed by highest authorities before decision can be reached.” Included among the needed details: “number people who vomited or were acutely sick before evacuation from islands; exact number people evacuated from each; number chronically ill before February 28; any seasickness aboard ship; estimated skin doses of beta; estimated fallout at Rongelap, Rongerick [sic] and Utirick [sic] in curies per square mile at some specified time; type care available for evacuees at Kwajalein.”!% From Fields’s point of view, a release seemed ill-advised “until we know reasonably confidently whether or not serious illness or worse is going to result.”!0 Evacuation as such had caused no great concern in Washington, Fields told Clarkson and Graves, although he expected pressure from “higher authority for an explanation regarding the circumstances that led to the exposure of the natives and why they were not evacuated in advance and also for your estimate in the light of the fallout information now available from Bravo of the risks to other populated areas during rest of operation.”!°8 Joint Task Force 7 responded promptly. “The natives were not evacuated prior to detonation because, on the basis of information available to us, it was not considered necessary and no significant fall-out was expected on inhabited areas.” Bravo showed, “as Mike did not, that radioactivity from high yield detonations can be carried hundreds of miles away from ground zero in intensities sufficient to become health hazards.” Criteria for wind and weather at time of firing must simply become more stringent.!© Evacuated Marshallese meanwhile remained under observation at Kwajalein. Capt. Harry Haight, an experienced navy medical officer attached to the task force, consulted with the station surgeon. Examination suggested exposures to the Utirikese too low to pose any real threat; the navy moved them to another island in Kwajalein atoll. Initially, the doctors found no symptoms among the Rongelapese either, despite claims by as many as twenty to have been sick during the first two days. But all too soon they displayed classic symptoms of high exposure: depressed white blood cell counts, hair loss, skin lesions.!!° In his official report, Task Force Commander Clarkson noted, “From a blood picture standpoint, the Rongelap natives corresponded very well with the Japanese who were about 1.5 miles from ground zero at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In this group two to three per cent lost some hair, ten per cent had sore mouths, and five per cent experienced hemorrhages under the skin,”!! They clearly warranted further study, and a joint AEC-Department of Defense medical research team was on its way even before written orders could be issued,!!2
The twenty-one-man team joined the task force as Project 4.1, “Study of Response of Human Beings Exposed to Significant Beta and Gamma Radiation Due to Fall-Out from High-Yield Weapons.” Com. Eugene P. Cronkite of the Naval Medical Research Institute became project officer. He, like most
Operation Castle 147 members of the team, already had test experience, and all held secret clearances, or higher.!!3 Cronkite’s instructions stressed the importance of secrecy. You will instruct all personnel participating in Project 4.1 that the project is classified SECRET RESTRICTED DATA. Due to possible adverse public reaction, you will specifically instruct all personnel in this project to be particularly careful not to discuss the purpose of this project and its background or its findings with any except those who have specific “need to know.””!4
The team reached Kwajalein on 8 March, a week after Bravo, and began to gather data: photographs, case histories, blood counts, urinalyses, and physical examinations.!!5
Secrecy proved a fleeting hope. On 11 March, a Cincinnati newspaper quoted two letters that a marine stationed on Kwajalein had written his mother. The first described Bravo itself from the marine’s vantage point. The other, dated 5 March, mentioned “two destroyers that pulled in here today bearing
natives. . . . They were suffering from various burns and radio activity.”!!6 The resulting furor forced the AEC to issue a brief statement.!!” During the course of routine atomic tests in the Marshall Islands, 28 U.S. personnel and 236 residents were transported from neighboring atolls to Kwajalein island according to plan as a precautionary measure. These individuals were unexpectedly exposed to some radioactivity. There were no burns. All are reported well. After completion of the atomic tests, they will be returned to their homes.?!!8
“There will be no elaboration of the above statement,” Fields told Clarkson.!9
And for good reason. The carefully worded release nowhere misstated facts, but it was misleading and disingenuous throughout. “Routine atomic tests” stretches words to their limits when the subject is the first trial of a deliverable hydrogen bomb hundreds of times more powerful than the fission bombs used on Japan. “According to plan” does not suggest resort to emergency evacuation procedures in a crisis compounded of poor wind forecasts, an unexpectedly large explosion, and misunderstood fallout phenomena. “Some radioactivity” scarcely conveys levels of exposure high enough to invite comparison with Hiroshima and Nagasaki. There were, indeed, “no burns” —-yet. But a day or two later the first signs of severe beta burns among the exposed Marshallese surprised no expert. That all “are reported well” was
true ten days after Bravo but omitted mention of symptoms they had displayed at the time of evacuation and significant blood changes already observed, other symptoms anxiously awaited, and as yet uncertain prognoses for the hapless victims. “After completion of the atomic tests” gave no hint that months, or even years, might elapse before all the Marshallese went
148 Operation Castle home. Elaborating on such statements very likely would lead quickly into treacherous waters.
The Unlucky Dragon Less than a week later AEC public relations suffered a worse jolt. An Associated Press release datelined Tokyo 16 March reported that the twentythree-man crew of a Japanese fishing vessel just returned from the Marshalls displayed all the symptoms of radiation sickness. The first story had appeared
in a Japanese newspaper, Yomiuri Shimbun, that morning, two days after Daigo Fukuryu Maru (No. 5 Lucky, or Fortunate, Dragon) docked at Yaizu and a day after two crew members had been hospitalized in Tokyo. Lack of details could not prevent the obvious inference from being drawn: Fukuryu Maru had sailed too near the announced test of 1 March, and its crew had been exposed to radiation great enough to sicken them.}20
In the early morning of 1 March, Fukuryu Maru had been trawling for tuna 100 miles east of Bikini. Crew members saw a bright flash on the western horizon, then felt the shock about seven minutes later. As a mushroom cloud spread to darken the sky, the captain decided to head for home. Three hours later, halfway through hauling in the fishing lines, crew members saw, and felt, the first white flakes falling on the vessel. Later termed “ashes of death,” fallout lasted four hours and covered the ship with a thin snowlike blanket. The first symptoms appeared quickly, as crew members suffered itching skin, smarting eyes, and nausea. Several vomited. Worse followed during the two-week voyage home: skin discolored and blistered, hands swelled and ached, hair loosened and fell out, eyes and ears oozed a thick yellow secretion. Fukuryu Maru reached Yaizu, its home port 100 miles from Tokyo, on 14 March. Although a Sunday, the most badly affected crew members sought help at the local hospital. Two caught next morning’s train to Tokyo, where they were hospitalized for observation. Radioactivity aboard Fukuryu Maru was confirmed on 16 March, the same day the story broke, and the rest of the crew entered the hospital at Yaizu.!2! The AEC acted promptly on hearing the news. A message to the American embassy in Tokyo named sources of help and steps to take. The AEC Division of Military Application launched a review of past announcements about the Pacific Proving Ground danger zone and tests. Joined by the Departments of Defense and State, the AEC formed a committee to evaluate the rest of the Castle test series. Telephoning Hiroshima, Bugher asked the director of the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC), John Morton, to offer his services to the Japanese government.}?* The commission had evolved from the somewhat troubled joint studies by Japanese and American scientists of Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki survivors. Primarily funded by the AEC through the
Operation Castle 149 National Academy of Sciences, with cooperation from the Japanese National Institute of Health, the commission focused on research into the late effects of radiation exposure. Accordingly, American doctors with the right knowledge were on the scene. !?3
Bugher also dispatched Merril Eisenbud from the New York Health and Safety Laboratory to advise Morton. Well before Eisenbud arrived, Morton contacted Masao Tsuzuki, the eminent radiologist at Tokyo University who had played so large a part in studying the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki less than a decade earlier. Tsuzuki had charge of the two patients in Tokyo University Hospital, and Bugher had wired him an offer of support. Tsuzuki invited Morton to examine the patients. Accompanied by four other doctors, two American and two Japanese, plus a Japanese technician expert in hematology, Morton flew to Tokyo on Thursday, 18 March. His Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission team examined the two patients and found less damage than feared. One of Morton’s Japanese colleagues, a member of the National Institute of Health serving as ABCC co-director, meanwhile flew to Yaizu. He judged the twenty-one patients there in no severe danger.!*4 Fish, in fact, seemed of more urgent concern. Fukuryu Maru returned with several tons of shark and tuna in her hold, and much was sold Monday morning before the danger became clear. Panic seized Japan, and fish prices collapsed as authorities tracked down the contaminated fish. During the next two weeks, the so-called tuna panic spread in Japan and the United States, where
much of the Japanese catch would ordinarily be marketed. Most such fears proved groundless; although a number of other Japanese fishing vessels showed up contaminated in port, edible portions of their catches presented no danger to consumers.!25 Meanwhile, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration demanded to know what Japan was doing to prevent shipment of contaminated fish, whether canned or frozen. The AEC drafted a statement intended to reassure the public about the general safety of ocean fish but also sought urgently to learn where all Japanese and American tuna fishers were on 1 March.!6 Initial American offers of help were well received in Japan, and cooperation between scientists of the two countries promised success. After examining the two patients in Tokyo, Morton announced that they seemed less badly injured than first thought. But hints of trouble appeared all too soon. Newspapers speculated about Japanese scientists exploited as mere information gatherers while Americans took the credit—exactly, in Japanese eyes, what happened after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japanese scientists did indeed harbor such fears, as Eisenbud learned from Tsuzuki shortly after he arnved in Tokyo. Tsuzuki recalled only too well the shabby treatment he and his colleagues had received in 1945 and 1946. That was only part of the problem. Yaizu doctors resented American recommendations to transfer their patients to Tokyo. Rivalry between the Japanese medical teams exacerbated the prob-
150 Operation Castle lem and involved not only Tokyo and Yaizu but also a third group centered in the Japanese National Institute of Health.!27 Ambassador John Allison urged his government to assume responsibility for medical expenses of the hospitalized crewmen, while leaving the question
of legal responsibility for injury to be settled. The State Department approved. American and Japanese officials and scientists, including Eisenbud who had just arrived in Tokyo, discussed care and treatment of the patients in an unexpectedly cordial all-day meeting on 24 March. The next day, Rokuzo Kobayashi, head of the Japanese National Institute of Health, formed a group
to advise the Ministry of Health and Welfare about the so-called Bikini incident. !28
Promising efforts to smooth over fears of contaminated tuna in both Japan and the United States added to a sense of crisis controlled. The AEC made funds available to further research into the incident. The United States still had occupation forces in Japan, and they also lent a hand. On 28 March, American planes flew the Yaizu patients to Tokyo, where they entered two hospitals. Japanese officials assured the Americans of better access to patients, but hopes of improved cooperation proved short-lived. Medical staffs at both hospitals resisted letting Caucasian doctors see the patients. From the American viewpoint, this barred the most proficient members of the casualty commission staff.!?? Ambassador Allison took the issue of cooperation straight to the Japanese prime minister. Although the prime minister agreed to help, he could do little.
Allison warned that his government’s acknowledgment of liability might hinge on patients evaluated by American standards. American medical advice likewise demanded valid clinical data. Suggesting treatment without full access to such data, Bugher insisted, would be too risky and ought to be avoided. But a few urine samples from patients at Tokyo University Hospital presented to Eisenbud marked the limit of cooperation.!°° Eisenbud sent the samples to New York for analysis. Preliminary findings suggested “that the body burden of both the Japanese fishermen and the natives was not excessively high.”!3! The tuna question worsened, too, as month’s end brought new reports of contaminated vessels. Expanding the restricted danger area around the Marshall Islands raised concerns not only in Japan; State Department ex-
perts wondered whether closing a wide swath of the high seas for weeks or months could be justified in international law.!>? Restricted waters remained a persistent source of Japanese—American friction.!33 By the end of March matters seemed to reach an impasse. Japanese mis-
givings about American motives were exacerbated when AEC Chairman Strauss stated publicly that Fukuryu Maru “must have been well within the danger area” and that the crew’s injuries “are thought to be due to the chemical activity of the converted material in the coral rather than to radioactivity.”’!34 Perhaps because he remained sure that Fukuryu Maru was a “Red
Operation Castle 151 spy ship,” as he told President Eisenhower’s press secretary, James C. Hagerty, Strauss never changed his mind about the trawler’s presence far inside the restricted zone.!5> All evidence suggested otherwise. Appearing also to reject official Japanese findings presented to the American ambassador on 27 March, the statement provoked a lengthy refutation in another Japanese note two weeks later. 136
Although clearly outside the restricted area announced by the United States, the fishermen would still have been warned of their danger had they been spotted. Unfortunately, surveillance aircraft missed them, both before and after the shot.!?? A warning might not have helped. The Patapsco, an American tanker, had sailed from Enewetak for Pearl Harbor two days before Bravo. Misguided by a search plane, the vessel changed course and steered under the cloud. Almost 600 miles from Bikini and thirty-one hours after Bravo, fallout reached Patapsco and exposed its crew to significant radiation. According to recent studies, crew members accrued doses of 10 to 13 rem.}*8 In Japan matters improved little during April. The patients, too, now resisted examination by American doctors. One reason, explained Japanese doctors, was suspect American motives: they resented the prospect of becoming more objects of study than subjects of treatment.'5? This may have been closer to the mark than they knew. “Data possibly derivable from these patients and available nowhere else may have highest importance U.S. scientific security and planning,” Ambassador Allison had cabled Bugher. “Request [State] Department and AEC evaluation this point.’’!4?
An early Japanese estimate put the crew members’ exposure at roughly 200 roentgens. Further study suggested they had been exposed to external gamma radiation ranging from 50 to 200 roentgens on the first day, to a total by the time they reached port of between 130 and 450 roentgens. Researchers also noted beta burns and what seemed to be the effects of ingested radionuclides.!4! The leader of the Los Alamos Health Division, Thomas Shipman, thought crewmen had “received significantly larger doses, both internal and external,” than the Marshallese. “They almost certainly represent the precise dose range in which we are most keenly interested,” he observed. “We know that with smaller doses the people will get well anyway, and with larger doses they will die before we can do anything about it and in spite of what we can
do. The Japanese received about the doses where they might die without treatment but might be saved under proper management.”!4? The required clinical and laboratory data were lacking, however, and prospects for greater cooperation appeared slim. Attempts to secure fuller Japanese data declined sharply after Eisenbud
and Morton visited the Marshall Islands in mid-April.'43 On his return Morton informed Ambassador Allison “that medical and scientific information being developed within [Marshallese] area [will be] more complete than would now in any case be possible [to] derive from 23 Fukuryu Maru pa-
152 Operation Castle tients,” adding that the “importance of Tokyo patients to U.S. national health
interest [is] now minimal.” The key problem thus became how to reduce strains on U.S.-Japanese relations. That brought the question of compensation to the fore.'4* Kobayashi’s Atomic Bomb Injury Investigation Committee, formed in late March, issued its first public statement in mid-April and, at long last, agreed to provide weekly urine samples from all patients.!* At the same time, however, the American embassy reported a “new low point in official Japanese medical hostility.”!*6 Continued testing at Bikini did nothing to help.
Castle after Bravo On 3 March 1954, its first day in Bikini lagoon after Bravo, Joint Task Force 7 had shown the effects of disrupted plans. Confusion prevailed as recovery missions were altered, postponed, or scrapped. Contaminated boats proved a short-lived problem. Not so the effects of fallout on shore-based facilities. “Radioactive levels on all islands of Bikini have hampered our operations,” Clarkson reported to Washington. “We have been forced to operate from afloat since Bravo, and this has materially reduced our efficiency.”!47 Operations afloat rather than ashore as all work shifted to shipboard presented
endless problems, many linked to radiological safety. After Bravo, for instance, all ships running within 450 nautical miles of Bikini were ordered to badge 5 percent of their crews. There never seemed to be enough film badges, though, or easy ways to get them where needed. Servis’s rad-safe unit found itself overtaxed and compelled to seek reinforcements from elsewhere in the task force. !48
The large number of task force members exposed in Bravo’s immediate aftermath also posed a problem. The navy task group, for one, reported 123
men, more than 2 percent of its total strength, exposed to 4 roentgens or more. Individual exposures were assigned on the basis of measured fallout, most crewmen having not worn film badges. Several crew members of Bairoko and Philip on deck during post-Bravo fallout also suffered beta burns.!49 Later, during recovery work, three sailors who did wear badges be-
cause they operated small boats in Bikini lagoon recorded readings of 85, 95, and 96 roentgens, respectively. They showed no symptoms, though, nor could the clinic at Kwajalein find evidence of any damage at all. “Some discrepancy in badging or wearing of badges” was the verdict, because others on the same boats had far lower film badge readings.!°° Joint Task Force 7 strove to safeguard the most severely exposed against further risk. It also raised the exposure limit for key task force members to 7.9 roentgens via waiver. After a conference on 12 March, Clarkson informed Washington of his intent “to authorize double the maximum permissible ex-
Operation Castle 153 posure of 3.9 roentgens for small boat crews, helicopter pilots, [and] a small number of other select personnel.”!5! Commanding the navy task group, Rear Adm. Henry C. Bruton submitted the formal waiver request on 18 March. It covered 225 helicopter, small boat, and flight deck crew members. It also sought a retroactive increase in maximum permissible exposure for the entire crew of the destroyer Philip “to cover exposures already received.’’!>? Expeditiously granting Bruton’s request, Clarkson authorized maximum exposures of 7.8 roentgens.!53 Washington, in turn, promptly endorsed Clarkson’s action as “in conformity with intent [of] radiological safety regulations which recognize necessity for commanders to depart from occupational safety standards in situations where completion [of] mission essential.” 154
Long delays in recovery missions lessened as hard work brought order to chaos in Bikini lagoon. A new shot schedule included yields revised to reflect the Bravo surprises, with Romeo, the second test, slated for mid-March.!>> Just a week after Bravo, an entry in the daily diary of the Los Alamos test unit at Bikini reflected the upbeat mood: “Operations here definitely have pre-shot complex[ion] instead of recovery. There is no reason to believe that the schedule cannot be met.”!5° That proved unduly optimistic. Bravo’s lesson imposed new and much more stringent weather standards for firing on later Castle tests. General Clarkson planned to “take every precaution to avoid danger during the course of future operations to other populated areas of the Pacific.” Winds “favorable for firing will be restricted to a narrow sector of the compass and I propose to wait until I am reasonably assured ... that fall-out of significant levels will not occur on inhabited areas in the group.”!57 As he later observed, “the stringency of the new criteria had a profound effect upon the course of all following Castle operations and cannot be overemphasized in their determining influence upon the remainder of the Operation.”!58
Romeo was first armed and ready for firing on 12 March but then delayed
day by day for two weeks. By 25 March, the task force again revised the schedule and announced plans to prepare Enewetak as an alternate firing site, in addition to its scheduled role in one test; the 180 miles between the two atolls made a difference in local weather. Two days later, at 6:30 Saturday morning, 27 March, the streak of bad luck ended.!5? Detonated on a barge in the Bravo crater, the 11-megaton Romeo blast (corrected from the 14 first estimated) was a “very impressive sight to witness,” Clarkson reported.'© But fallout was light, damage minor, and recovery promptly under way. Initial rad-safe survey results suggested little to worry about. Secondary fallout that night lightly dusted the task force and the southern part of Bikini but went no farther. Preparations for the next test, Koon, scheduled a week later at Bikini, began quickly and proceeded smoothly.!®!
Like Romeo, Koon fell behind schedule (though not so far) but otherwise caused problems neither before nor after the test. Actual time of firing was
154 Operation Castle 6:20 A.M. on 7 April.!® “The surprisingly low yield,” 110 kilotons, marked the third straight failure of a Livermore design. Koon furnished enough data, to be sure, but the fizzle convinced the AEC to cancel Echo, the later test of a similar device. Castle reverted to a six-shot program.!®? Three days sufficed to complete Koon and shift work to the next tests, Union now scheduled for 16 April at Bikini, Nectar two days later at Enewetak. Union and Nectar both suffered repeated weather-caused delays. As such delays mounted, the task force altered operational methods. Postponement might be announced as little
as one hour before zero time, and firing could be scheduled in as little as eight hours. The admitted strain on some units was offset by the chance to use favorable weather on short notice.!™
Gradually mounting exposure totals meanwhile began to affect work in other parts of the task force. To get the job done, “it may . . . be necessary to work certain H&N personnel to the 7.8 R limit now authorized for certain. . . personnel,’ warned the AEC support task group. This also suggested “immediate revision of radiation exposure portion of employee general information pamphlet to delete any reference to exposure figures such as 3.9 R, also that radiation exposure letter to terminated employees be done away with after this operation.”!© The Honolulu doctor Holmes & Narver employed to check homebound workers found them unduly frightened by what they heard in the forward area and proposed telling them less.!©* Forwarding a partial list
of cumulative exposures above 2.5 roentgens through 21 April, a member of the scientific task group commented, “The exposures have been running pretty high. They have been granting waivers to people requesting them for the maximum exposure to be doubled.””!®
Finally at 6:10 A.M., 26 April, Joint Task Force 7 succeeded with Union. The yield was 6.9 megatons. Contamination was relatively limited, fallout posed no problems, and recovery proceeded apace.'® But Nectar suffered still further delays, ultimately losing almost a month.!© Originally slated to conclude Castle on 5 May, Yankee moved ahead of Nectar to fifth place in the series when it met its scheduled date. With a yield of 13.5 megatons, Yankee added its share to Bikini’s burden of radioactivity but dropped no significant fallout beyond proving ground borders. Recovery proceeded as planned, shifting smoothly into final cleanup as the task force closed Castle operations at Bikini and completed final security, safety, and rad-safe surveys on 11 May.!7° Cumulative exposures mounted, however, waiver requests multiplied, and the need for higher limits became a constant refrain in Castle’s closing weeks.!7!
Nectar was ready to go on twelve hours’ notice the day after Yankee, awaiting only the proper winds. To forestall problems, the task force sent home before the test anyone who had already received 6 roentgens or more. Everyone leaving the forward area was “again cautioned as to any disclosure.”!72 Evacuation plans for the four hundred persons who remained on
Operation Castle 155 Enewetak had been long prepared. The right wind direction tipped the scale on 14 May, despite otherwise marginal weather. Heavy rain after the 6:20 A.M. shot, in fact, badly hampered recovery missions. The same rain, of course, materially reduced radiation levels in the contaminated area along the northern rim of the atoll. For the rest, Nectar ended uneventfully; despite its yield of 1.69 megatons, it caused no major rad-safe problems. Joint Task Force 7 formally closed its Enewetak headquarters at noon on Saturday, 15 May 1954. Enewetak reverted to garrison status under army control.!75 Servis began his final report by calling Castle “the nightmare of radiological-safety test operations,” citing “the extended nature of the operation in the presence of high-level contamination in the Bikini Area of the Pacific Proving Grounds, the completely ship-borne operations some distance from a supply base, the decentralized system of operational control, instrumenthumidity difficulties, morale problems, and poor communications.”!”4 Re-
flection has since softened his judgment, or at least shifted his focus. A quarter-century later he preferred to stress the challenge successfully met—of protecting the task force’s 17,000 members.!”> This revised viewpoint is not altogether unreasonable.
Virtually all the damage belonged to the first test; the rest of the series caused few problems compared to Bravo. Joint Task Force 7 did, in fact, escape largely unscathed, despite granting 767 waivers of maximum permissible exposure—mostly doubling the limit to 7.8 roentgens but in a number of cases simply authorizing the precise exposure received.!7 “The use of waivers,” reported the commander of the scientific task group, “becomes a needless routine without much significance when operations are conducted in
large contamination areas. . . . A large number of individuals did exceed 3.9 r but very few exceeded 6.0 r.”!7” Including the twenty-eight from Rongerik, forty-four task force members exceeded 10 roentgens. None showed any sign of lasting damage.!78 Unfortunately, Marshallese and Japanese victims of Castle Bravo were not so lucky.
First Repercussions Staff Medical Officer Clinton Maupin met Haight, Cronkite, and Charles L. Dunham, Bugher’s deputy, on Kwajalein in mid-March 1954 to discuss the condition of the patients. Rongelap evacuees began losing hair two weeks after Bravo, children first, then adults. Abnormal blood counts, depigmented skin spots, and small skin lesions were other symptoms. None seemed serious. Maupin felt “the possibility of extensive hospitalization or serious illness remains but the likelihood is lessening.”!’9 Cronkite’s daily reports on the injured Marshallese supported the same conclusion. The Americans more lightly exposed to Bravo fallout at Rongerik showed no symptoms other than
156 Operation Castle depressed white blood cell counts. Transferred to Enewetak after a short stay at Kwajalein, they eventually reported to Cronkite’s team on 17 March; fearing psychological repercussions, the task force high command had resisted their return to Kwajalein. }8°
To allay concerns about ingested radionuclides among the Marshallese, Shipman flew to the islands to obtain 24-hour urine samples. Preliminary analyses at Los Alamos showed traces of plutonium and radioiodine but nothing then judged serious.!8! By early April the worst appeared over. For the first time, Cronkite reported positively on at least short-term prospects: “Since hematologic picture appears stabilized,” since an epidemic of colds produced no “serious complications and since skin 1s healing rapidly a favorable prognosis for the immediate future can be given.’’!8? On his return to Los
Alamos, Shipman reviewed the status of the Marshallese. Despite several minor puzzles, concern now shifted toward how soon the Marshallese might themselves return home and what compensation they deserved.!83
A survey of Rongelap and Utirik in late April 1954 produced mixed results: conditions allowed the Utirikese to return home in June, as soon as Castle ended; Rongelap stayed off-limits. Though fallout had badly contaminated the home island, Rongelap’s northern islands, the main source of food, had received ten times more. For the time being the AEC moved the Rongelapese to Majuro, where AEC contractor Holmes & Narver built them a new village.!8+ Cronkite doubted whether they could ever go home to Rongelap. He strongly recommended they be followed medically for the rest of their lives. “Returning these people who have already received excessively large exposure,” he warned, “would subject them to radiation levels above the . . . maximum permissible doses for both external and internal radiation.”!85 Acknowledging the prospect that Bravo victims might face future health problems, the AEC included medical care in its long-term plans to study the exposed Marshallese. 186
What to do about the overexposed Americans, who now numbered thirtyone with the three boat-pool sailors added, likewise posed a problem. Clarkson proposed sending them to Walter Reed Army Hospital in Washington. That rejected, they remained under medical observation at Kwajalein until the end of April. Then, still seeming none the worse for their ordeal, they transferred to Tripler Army Hospital in Honolulu.!8? The AEC prepared another carefully worded statement intended as a response to specific inquiries rather than a general release; it omitted the men’s names to avoid “pressure from home town newspapers and wire services for individual stories and/or interviews on the men’s experiences on an uncontrolled basis.”!8§ Negative findings from complete medical examinations at Tripler allowed their return to
full duty.189
» Meanwhile, the Marshallese petitioned the United Nations to end testing. The United States responded with assurances that everyone was getting the
Operation Castle 157 best possible treatment, and no one should suffer any long-term effects.! Fearing refusal could suggest cover-up, the AEC and the navy also agreed to allow an Associated Press reporter access to the inhabitants of Majuro and
Kwajalein for a story.!?! In July 1954, the fourteenth session of the U.N. Trusteeship Council took up the question. Attending as adviser to the U.S. delegation, Bugher thought anti-U.S. sentiment underlay much of the debate.!” “We are fortunate, indeed, that the prompt response of the medical groups
concerned was so effective in insuring the medical care of these people,” he concluded when he later reviewed events at the New York meeting for his AEC colleagues, “and that the whole thing has turned out so happily, as far as the welfare of these people is concerned, apart from the human concern that one does not like to be responsible for injury to anyone.”’!93 Equally prompt
and skillful medical relief might have averted the less happy outcome in Japan. By late April, however, the United States had largely ceased pressing offers of help on the reluctant Japanese, turning instead to the question of compensation. Officials from the White House, Bureau of the Budget, Department of State, and AEC met in Washington to discuss sources of funding. Responsibility for choosing a proper course of action rested with the State Department, but the AEC endorsed negotiation of a lump-sum settlement.!9* Ambassador Allison had proposed such an approach as the quickest way to settle outstanding issues and to weaken “the position of neutralists, pacifists, feminists, and professional anti-Americans.”!9> Despite limited data and the apparent recovery of the Japanese fishermen from their worst injuries, AEC experts judged “it. . . unwise to assume at this point that all will recover.” Several patients still suffered depressed white blood cell counts, and the longer that persisted, the worse the prognosis. !%
Yet the approach of summer 1954 found all patients better and levels of tension reduced. Negotiating the size of the American indemnity to Japan and questions of direct versus indirect damage, although difficult, aroused little passion.!9? The end of Castle removed another source of friction, while an informal Japanese-American conference on radiobiology at the end of June resolved other issues.!98 Already fading concern about radioactivity in fish largely vanished after an American-sanctioned Japanese summer research cruise to the Marshall Islands found no reason to worry. Gratified American officials noted that even the newspaper reporters who sailed with the expedition filed generally rational and balanced accounts.!9 But late summer saw Fukuryu Maru’s radioman, Aikichi Kuboyama, take a sudden turn for the worse. The Japanese committee issued the first of frequent progress reports on 30 August 1954. Although jaundice from blood transfusions seemed the immediate cause, AEC officials fretted over the prospect of Kuboyama’s being labeled the first H-bomb fatality. They had good reason to fear such an association, which was in fact widely made.2
158 Operation Castle British historian Richard Storry observed firsthand “resentment in Japan at least equal to that occasioned by the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.” That had been war, “but the ‘Bikini Incident’ took place in time of peace, and the nation responsible claimed to be Japan’s principal friend and ally,’’201
Kuboyama died on 23 September 1954. Autopsy confirmed hepatitis as proximate cause of death but left the role of radiation ambiguous.?® A virus, not radiation, caused hepatitis, yet radiation was clearly implicated. Hepati-
tis is a well-known complication of blood transfusion, a major part of the stricken seaman’s treatment for radiation sickness. At the very least, Kuboyama’s exposure to the virus hinged on his earlier brush with fallout. Possibly, too, radiation injury had weakened him and so contributed to the fatal outcome.?93 The State Department dipped into emergency funds for an immediate award to Kuboyama’s widow of one million yen ($2,777.78 at the prevailing rate of exchange).*°* The next few months concluded official settlement of the incident. Moderation seemed largely to prevail, despite all that had happened. In November, a long-planned Japanese—American conference on basic radiobiological principles proved both cordial and fruitful.?© Agreement on the full American indemnity to Japan quickly followed. The
United States tendered an ex gratia payment of two million dollars to the Japanese government. This explicitly sidestepped the question of legal liability in favor of compensating victims for personal injury and property damage. Most of the money went to the tuna industry and to institutions that had handled the problems, but surviving members of Fukuryu Maruw’s crew divided $151,000 among themselves. Apparently recovered, they ended their fourteen-month hospital stay in May 1955.2°% Twenty years after Bravo, chromosome abnormalities in white blood cells remained the only detectable trace of their ordeal. Saved from the scrap yard, the restored Fukuryu Maru
became in the mid-1970s the centerpiece of a Tokyo shrine to nuclear disarmament.?°7
Routinization and Controversy Accelerated Testing and Rising Public Concern 1955-1956
Reshaping Public Safety Emergency measures to protect the public from fallout in Operation Upshot-Knothole proved only mildly disquieting. For those most directly af-
fected, people living in the region around'the Nevada Proving Ground, it seemed little more than an inconvenience, hardly touching their bedrock patriotism and faith in their government. But matters did not end there. Whether or not fallout from Upshot-Knothole injured sheep became a question that would not go away. Then 1954 brought Castle Bravo and opened a frighten-
ing vista on how great a danger fallout might become. Together UpshotKnothole and Castle marked the beginning of the fallout controversy that, in due course, reshaped the test program. None of that was fully evident at first. For the Atomic Energy Commission, the problem seemed more one of educating the public, while the test organization pragmatically sought to upgrade its safety practices.
The dust had scarcely settled on Upshot-Knothole before the commissioners began to discuss likely problems of future testing. Among the most pressing, Commissioner Eugene M. Zuckert believed, were “the highly interrelated public relations and safety problems that we have created.” Educating the public seemed most urgent, since “this is not something which can be done just prior to a continental test. I feel sure that we should have somebody start to work on this problem immediately.”! Substantive safety issues also received renewed attention. Using the National Committee on Radiation Protection’s soon-to-be-published recommendations, the AEC Division of Biology and Medicine drafted guidelines for limiting exposure to workers and the 159
160 Routinization and Controversy public. Links between safety and public relations became a central theme in AEC planning for later nuclear tests. The Santa Fe Operations Office oversaw testing at the Nevada Proving Ground. During summer 1953 it was already beginning to address the closely related issue of responsibility for off-site radiological safety. Because “the problems created by radioactive fallout continue after the Test Organization is disbanded and the key personnel returned to their normal duties at their home stations,” Manager Carroll Tyler proposed shifting “responsibility for all offsite monitoring and contacts with the public in the general area on a continuous basis” to the Las Vegas Field Office. Reorganizing this work and choos-
ing the right leader, he believed, required prompt action. Another useful change seemed less urgent: transferring such on-site radiological services as laundry, instrument repair, and routine monitoring from test organization to field manager.?
The Los Alamos Test Division readily agreed to surrender off-site monitoring, saying it was “of no direct interest to the Test Director’s major effort.” But Division Leader Alvin Graves strongly objected to losing control over any aspect of on-site radiological safety. “Successful and safe operation” demanded “the intimate correlation of” monitoring with technical work, he asserted. It “cannot, in my opinion, be assured if these two portions of the work are separated organizationally.” Even when “tried under the best conditions,” as in Operation Sandstone, he added, “lack of coordination between the sc1entific task group and the RadSafe task group resulted in an extremely poor operation from the point of view of both groups.’4 Graves’s views colored the revised statement of the field manager’s functions that Tyler issued in September 1953. The field manager had responsibility for “off-site radiological safety at all times” but, for on-site safety, only “during nontest periods.” Operationally, the field manager would merely “assist scientific directors. . . in executing their responsibility of providing radiological safety.”> Reorganization along the new lines began quickly.®
Public Health Service officers had played a crucial role in off-site radiological safety during Upshot-Knothole, while the New York Health and Safety Laboratory supplied teams to monitor radioactivity farther from the test site. The system had worked well enough to warrant forging more permanent links.” This, too, required “highly qualified personnel not only from the technical but also the public relations point of view,” as Director of Biology and Medicine John Bugher observed.’ Santa Fe Operations invited the Public Health Service to become an integral part of the projected off-site safety organization. Discussions during fall 1953 led to a revised memorandum of understanding between the two agencies.° Fall 1953 also saw planning for the next Nevada test series, Operation Teapot, strike an early snag. Santa Fe Operations learned that the Department of Defense might try to “include a high altitude (40,000 ft.) air burst on the
Routinization and Controversy 161 order of one to eight kilotons, and a surface burst with a yield greater than ten kilotons.” The high air burst posed safety problems for aircrews, though nothing insurmountable with proper handling. But “a 10 KT surface burst would create an entirely different situation.” Not only would it cause “serious contamination and health problems, both on and off-site” but it “could conceivably result in the abandonment of the continental test site.” Tyler urged Director of Military Application Kenneth Fields to inform Defense “that the proposal for a large surface burst is unrealistic and inconsistent with AEC policies of safety.”!° Informally advised of AEC concerns, the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project promised “that a careful evaluation including the contamination and health problems . . . will be made in determining the Department of Defense need for a 10-KT surface burst.” Still, little need be done unless the suspect test were to appear in the formal Defense program submitted to the AEC.!!
Fearing the worst, however, the AEC meanwhile revived the Jangle Feasibility Committee. This group had met in 1951 to assess the dangers of finng 1-kiloton surface bursts and write safety guidelines for Operation Jangle. The Division of Biology and Medicine recalled the former members to a January 1954 meeting in Washington.!? They “took a dim view” of the proposed surface use of 10-kiloton devices in Nevada.!3 The time was not yet ripe, though, to settle the issue. Other measures addressed broader safety problems. The AEC contracted with the U.S. Weather Bureau to study close-in fallout from Nevada tests. At the same time, Los Alamos explored means of cutting both the amount and the range of off-site fallout. Several Teapot tests would use 500-foot towers; the tallest in earlier series had been 300 feet. Experimental trials of another promising technique—using water, oil, or some other binder on soil near test
towers—also were slated for Teapot.'* Adequate weather reports remained the key to safety. Forecasts still came chiefly from the air force. The Air Weather Service worked closely with Los Alamos and the AEC to learn more about local weather patterns; weather experts also sought better ways to gather and report the data on which firing decisions hinged.!5 Air force crews retained the central role in cloud sampling and assisted other teams in off-site data collection and monitoring.!° Partly because responsibilities shifted, partly because the public feared Nevada testing, off-site safety played an unusually large part in early Teapot planning.!?
As off-site plans for Teapot matured, second thoughts began troubling both the AEC and the Public Health Service. AEC concerns arose in Washington: Gordon Dunning, the Division of Biology and Medicine’s specialist on testing, questioned the new arrangements. With on-site monitoring already
in military hands, he wondered “if the AEC is not working itself into an undesirable position” by making off-site monitoring a non-AEC function as well. To make matters worse, Washington appeared to have little voice in
162 Routinization and Controversy local decision making. Negotiations between the Las Vegas Field Office and the Public Health Service were well advanced before anyone in Biology and Medicine learned of them.!® In contrast to the AEC, Public Health Service doubts worked their way in from the field. Officers feared seeing again what had happened in Upshot-Knothole: “GIs without training had work responsibilities that were practically identical with those given to personnel who had professional engineering backgrounds.”!9 The Public Health Service official who arranged the AEC agreement assured his officers their special skills and training would be respected.?° Military effects tests remained a stumbling block. When submitted to the AEC in June 1954, the formal Teapot proposal from the Department of Defense included the unwelcome 10-kiloton surface test. Since the turn of the year, the AEC’s position had hardened. The commission had just received the
final, slightly amended report of the ad hoc Committee to Study Nevada Proving Ground. Continued testing in Nevada, concluded the committee from its yearlong study, demanded stricter guidelines. In particular, no surface or subsurface shot should exceed 1 kiloton. The commission approved the report on 30 June 1954 and replied to the Defense program the next day.?! Quoting the just-approved guidelines, AEC Chairman Lewis Strauss reminded the Department of Defense that “these criteria are incompatible with either a surface
or an underground detonation of devices of a yield of 10 KT as proposed
in. . . your letter.” The Armed Forces Special Weapons Project reviewed data from past tests
that might have some bearing on the problem. “The maximum height of cloud for the underground shot for Teapot will be less than 4,500 ft above the ground or 9,000 ft msl [mean sea level],” it concluded. A low cloud should mean “that all significant fall-out will occur within 2.5 hours.” That being true, “an average wind speed to 9,000 ft msl of 20 mph or less will spread significant contamination no further than 50 miles from ground zero.” And
that would make 3 the “maximum infinite dose in roentgens at . . . 50 miles.”?3 Uninhabited paths 50 miles long were common enough at the proving ground to permit the test. The chief of the Teapot fallout prediction unit, Thomas White of the Los Alamos Health Division, judged the study sound and objected no further to the proposed surface test.24 The AEC remained unpersuaded, however, and no such surface test occurred in Teapot, although a 1-kiloton device buried 67 feet deep was tested.?5 As summer approached, renewed testing in Nevada had yet to be publicly announced. Long-standing AEC policy kept the time between public statement and test as short as possible. But news of the Public Health Service role in forthcoming tests had already been published. The Federal Civil Defense Administration likewise leaked word of plans to train rescue teams during the next series. Although Teapot would not begin before early 1955, Santa Fe Operations proposed mentioning it in the AEC’s July 1954 semiannual report
Routinization and Controversy 163 to Congress. Confirming an open secret would cost little but achieve much: secrecy hampered the Public Health Service search for volunteer monitors and hindered AEC efforts to expand the proving ground work force. Uncertain plans and schedules, however, to say nothing of questions about how much to reveal, convinced Washington to reject early notice, despite further pleas from the field.”°
As expected, delayed approval of a firm program for Teapot constrained Public Health Service efforts to organize off-site safety. Manpower would come chiefly from inactive reservists who volunteered for the project, and they needed special training. If they were to obtain leave from their regular jobs for training, then for the test series itself, timing was crucial. Tentative training and duty assignments were completed, however, while the Teapot schedule remained undecided.?’ The Public Health Service also helped the Las Vegas Field Office draft an off-site rad-safe plan, but many questions remained open.”® Exposure limits both for the public off site and test workers on site, in particular, demanded further discussion.?? For workers the issue was conflict between quarterly and operational limits, both set at 3.9 roentgens: if an operation crossed the line between calendar quarters, workers might exceed operational limits while staying within quarterly limits. Much the same issue had been argued before Castle, and the answer was the same— precedence for the operational limit. Representatives of the Los Alamos Health Division, the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, and the Santa Fe Operations Office settled the offsite exposure limit in a mid-September 1954 conference at Los Alamos. It would be 3.9 roentgens during any twelve-month period. Recommended by the Division of Biology and Medicine as the highest that would allow the Nevada Proving Ground to remain in use, this figure struck “a reasonable compromise between the philosophy of conducting a test program without causing radioactive fallout in populated areas and the more realistic approach that some of the populace may be subjected to slight exposures due to unpredictable changes in the meteorological pattern.” The AEC would warn people to stay indoors only if fallout threatened the 3.9-roentgen-per-year limit. Evacuation would “not ordinarily be considered until. . . the anticipated theoretical infinite dosage will exceed 25 roentgens’—and then only if “‘it is determined that the amount of dosage to be saved in any particular situation will significantly reduce the probability of radiation injury.’’° In Washington, Dunning drafted a more precise statement of these standards as AEC policy. Although routine total exposure would be limited to 3.9 roentgens, up to 30 roentgens outdoors called only for a warning to stay indoors. Experiments had shown that merely getting under cover could reduce exposure by half. Contamination of food, water, and air at such levels appeared to pose no danger. Optional between 30 and 50 roentgens, evacuation became mandatory when readings pointed to an infinite exposure above 50
164 Routinization and Controversy roentgens. Dunning also defined decontamination policy for people and vehicles. Implementing rules in the field would fall to the Public Health Service. Dunning’s work appeared 1n two forms: the secret version discussed reasons for the standards adopted and went only to a limited number of officials; the other version, unclassified and broadcast widely for field use, simply stated the rules and how to apply them.?! The AEC issued no public release about its newly adopted policy; only if specifically questioned would it explain its position in a prepared statement.?2
Operation Teapot On 18 August 1954, the AEC had at last firmly decided to conduct Operation Teapot. Tentatively scheduled over two and a half months in early
1955, Teapot would include twelve nuclear tests, more than any Nevada series so far. It also would observe the test standards proposed by the Committee to Study Nevada Proving Ground. Specific justification for each test and detailed plans were due from the test organization by the end of the year. Meanwhile Chairman Strauss sought President Eisenhower’s formal approval.33 The first public statement followed in late September, a brief notice
of renewed testing expected to begin “early in 1955, probably about midFebruary.”34 Immediate questions from the press induced the AEC to sketch the test organization in a second release later the same day.*> Harder ques-
tions centered on the purposes and safety of testing. Concern had begun to mount within the AEC about adverse “public reaction to the long test period during which, on the basis of exaggerated reports, the public will be bracing itself against larger and larger yields and higher and higher levels of contamination.’’6 To ease such concerns, Washington mapped a two-pronged strategy. It involved separating the test of the 30 KT devices in the public mind as unpleasant but necessary tests which are limited to the smallest number possible and explaining the small-yield tests as completely controlled experiments which will not affect the public residing in the areas beyond the test range and which have és their purpose the development of atomic warheads which would be used over our own cities to protect against enemy air attack. In short, these should be sold as “friendly blasts” offering comforting protection.’
The Santa Fe Operations Office and Los Alamos demurred, chiefly on grounds of long-standing policy against any public statement about “the specific purpose of individual shots (except perhaps on the atomic cannon) nor the purpose of the whole or a portion of a full series schedule.” Teapot might
Routinization and Controversy 165 call for “greater frankness” but only in general terms, not details, “stressing that there would be a number of shots of very little public interest (based on observable effects) and probably of little off-site interest because of fallout.”38 Reassurances still took precedence over information.%9
On 5 October 1954, top officials of the test organization briefed the commissioners in Washington. Radiological safety off site was the main focus. Weather was the key factor because it controlled “the location and intensity of fallout,” noted Test Manager James E. Reeves. “Only by waiting for satisfactory weather conditions can shots falling in the ‘serious’ category be executed without a possibility of undesirable degrees of fallout occurring in areas of relatively high population density.” Undesirability had less to do with health than with “public relations. . . , if there are repeated occurrences in a particular location during a single test.” The program’s fate hinged on “public reaction between now and the time of our formal schedule,” Reeves believed. Therefore, he felt, “an early and thorough local education program is of the utmost importance.’’4°
The AEC devised an elaborate public education plan to precede Teapot.*! Test officials visited nearby communities to explain the program and enlist support from local opinion leaders.*? A fact sheet intended for such leaders as
well as reporters supplied a wealth of background data on weapons testing history, facilities, and operations in Nevada.* For the general public, a pamphliet described in broad terms the effects of radiation, the nature of weapons testing, and work at the test site. Thousands of copies flooded the region of the Nevada Proving Ground.4 An AEC motion picture, Atomic Tests in Nevada, also was widely shown; it opened in St. George, the Utah town hard hit by fallout from Upshot-Knothole.*5 Public information during Teapot was the subject of another plan, a joint effort of the AEC Division of Information Services and the Defense Department’s Office of Public Information. Radiological safety became a frequent topic of press briefings.*®
Innovation marked Teapot scheduling. Realistically, Deputy Test Director Gaelen L. Felt explained, Teapot should be conceived as two series running simultaneously, “one (of higher priority) containing those shots which are potentially hazardous fallout-wise, and the other containing the remaining shots.”*” Shots in the first series would be fired as ready, but only if strictly defined winds prevailed. Much less stringent restrictions governed shots in
the second group, which could thus easily be inserted as needed. So the Teapot schedule listed “ready” rather than “firing” dates. Test Manager Reeves bore the detailed plans to Washington in December 1954.48 Approval from the AEC’s General Advisory Committee and the commission itself followed in short order, despite technical problems already beginning to alter the sched-
ule. The Department of Defense concurred, and late in January 1955 President Eisenhower authorized the proposed test program.*?
Radiation safety rules for Teapot included a new departure: tolerance
166 Routinization and Controversy levels for plutonium at the test site for the first time became the subject of proposed limits.*° Exposure limits for test workers during Teapot otherwise adhered to the familiar operational standard of 3.9 roentgens. As in past tests, safety standards might conflict with obtaining experimental results. This produced frequent requests for special higher limits, much discussed and sometimes allowed—up to 15 roentgens, for instance, in the case of four air force officers assigned to a special test project, flying into an atomic cloud to measure dose and dose rate.*!
The aircrew assigned to drop the bomb in the high-altitude test sought a similar limit. They received a guarded dispensation, “authorized a total accumulated radiation dosage, gamma plus neutrons, sufficient to accomplish their mission,” with the added stricture “that all precautions possible be taken to keep the total exposure of the aircraft crew to a minimum.”>? A revised flight plan removed the need. It expected “dosage. . . less than 3.9 R, maximum set for Operation Teapot,” and promised “the drop aircrew will not be permitted to receive dangerous radiation and the utmost care will be exercised to maintain exposure to the barest minimum.’’4 Calculation of projected exposures confirmed that planned Teapot air operations, including the highaltitude drop, posed no serious threat to aircrews.°> The same 3.9-roentgen limit applied to military participants in support and training operations linked to Teapot. Air force, navy, and marine corps missions addressed problems of aerial strategy and tactics in atomic warfare.°°
On the ground, army and marine units would again send several thousand troops for training exercises in Desert Rock VI, which included maneuvering an armored task force.5? Monitors both for observer groups and for units engaged in maneuvers came from Desert Rock’s own rad-safe unit, the 50th Chemical Service Platoon. The army once more set a short-term limit higher than the AEC allowed but balanced that with a more restricted long-term limit: up to 6 roentgens in any one test but no more than 6 roentgens in any six-month period. As in Upshot-Knothole, the army also authorized a limited number of volunteer officers to observe tests from positions much closer than other troops; they might receive up to 10 roentgens in any one test but no more than 25 roentgens in the series.~°
As it had prior to former Desert Rock exercises, Santa Fe Operations insisted “that the Department of Defense should publicly acknowledge, prior
to participation, that the DOD is responsible for the safety of its troops.” Defense had honored a similar demand before Upshot-Knothole in 1953.°° The AEC test manager would merely delegate safety: “Responsibility for safety of troops, troop observers, and Department of Defense sponsored personnel within the areas assigned by the Test Manager to Operation Desert Rock VI will be assured by the [DOD] Exercise Director, Desert Rock VI.’
But the issue remained bothersome. After seeing the army’s Desert Rock
Routinization and Controversy 167 directive in January 1955, Santa Fe Operations asked Biology and Medicine to assess the safety of proposed troop-placement criteria. Posting troops as the army wanted would meet the army’s self-defined exposure standards, but those standards “are at variance with the recommendations made by the Division of Biology and Medicine,” the limit of 3.9 roentgens applied since testing began in Nevada.® The army nonetheless stood firm. Organizationally, in sharp contrast to former practice, on-site and off-site rad-safe units scarcely overlapped. Thomas White came from Los Alamos to serve on the test manager’s staff as rad-safe coordinator for the two groups. Although the on-site unit did perform certain technical functions for both— film processing, instrument repair, record keeping—it otherwise strictly observed the borders of the test site. Public Health Service officers formed the core of the off-site unit, 33 positions through which a total of 66 regular and reserve officers rotated. As in the past, they formed mobile monitoring teams, but for Teapot some also manned fixed posts at twelve towns in Nevada and Utah throughout the series. Oliver R. Placak, who had helped run the Nevada effort since spring 1954, became the Public Health Service officer-in-charge. He also served as deputy to Joe Sanders of the Las Vegas Field Office, who oversaw the program as off-site rad-safe officer. Communications and mapping support came from AEC contractors Silas Mason Company and Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Company, while the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project helped with aerial terrain monitoring and cloud tracking. The on-site rad-safe group was military and reported to the test director. Its commander came from the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, the same Lt. Col. Collison who headed radiological safety for Upshot-Knothole. Unit strength varied, peaking at 30 officers and 120 enlisted men when Teapot began. Although several services detailed men for rad-safe duty, the core of Collison’s group, as in Upshot-Knothole, was the army rad-safe unit from Fort McClellan, Alabama. Relatively low strength reflected a decision to allow individual projects to monitor themselves. The on-site unit qualified such designated monitors through special training courses but otherwise chiefly provided routine services.“ The training program comprised four-day courses for novice monitors and one-day refresher courses for those more experienced. Several such courses preceded the first test, while others were offered during the series.® Military rad-safe at the proving ground, though not new, aroused complaints before Teapot. Members of the test organization objected to soldiers who acted as if they ran things, when their proper roles involved “monitoring, clerical work, vehicle decontamination, laundry, instrument maintenance, film badge processing, etc.”—doing, in other words, “the tedious and dirty jobs.” Observing that his colleagues should be grateful for such help, Gaelen Felt suggested a series of minor changes to lessen friction. They “are de-
168. Routinization and Controversy signed,” he explained, “to provide us as much latitude in using our own judgment and as much freedom from bureaucratic control as are compatible with adequate health safeguards and satisfactory protection of critical materials and equipment.” Felt’s plan allowed such day-to-day functions as handling clearances into contaminated areas, film badging, and decontamination to run
more smoothly. By mid-February 1955, Teapot plans covered everything human foresight
could conceive, from routine safety to the crash of a device-carrying airplane.®” Technical problems had already reshuffled the Teapot schedule and would again—including the addition of two tests.6® But weather still loomed as a larger question mark. Regulations stricter than ever not only demanded good weather forecasts but also required expert judgment. This task fell to the new test manager’s advisory panel. As scientific adviser to the test manager, Alvin Graves chaired the panel, which decided if a shot posed undue danger. Planners regarded weather-caused delays as probable. Unfavorable winds did, in fact, delay the first test. The chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, who had flown from Washington to observe the test but left as soon as it was postponed, promptly wrote the AEC about his concerns. Can the Nevada site, Sen. Clinton P. Anderson of New Mexico wanted to know, “be utilized effectively and economically under the present criteria for anything other than very small yield devices?””? The implied threat was clear; a distraught commission feared loss of the test site and
a severe setback to the test program. Enlisting military support, the AEC quickly drafted a lengthy reply. It stressed the deep thought and careful study on which Nevada testing was founded and argued that a few days’ delay early in a series should not be grounds for too hasty action.?! The AEC also began sending Sen. Anderson brief Teapot progress reports that explained signifi-
cant delays.’ Unfortunately, delays were many, each a source of greater or lesser AEC discomfiture. Perhaps the most embarrassing involved the so-called open shot, which featured an elaborate civil defense training program and a host of observers, some foreign. Although scheduled late, it still suffered day-by-day delays for over a week and lost a fourth of its audience.’? Yet results vindicated such rigid standards. Monitors detected no significant off-site fallout, and the AEC avoided much of the adverse publicity that had plagued earlier series. “We have had no heavy fall out anywhere in this series,” a pleased
John Bugher told the Advisory Committee on Biology and Medicine as Teapot drew to a close. “Partly by careful work and partly by good luck, the fall out has all taken place in areas uninhabited and away from towns.””
Radiological safety in Desert Rock VI also seemed much improved, though spotty records leave results less than certain. Almost eight thousand Desert Rock troops joined in nine of the fourteen Teapot tests. Exposure aver-
Routinization and Controversy 169 aged well under 2 roentgens. Although ninety-seven men received between 3 and 6 roentgens, only seventeen exceeded 6 roentgens. Volunteer observers, though allowed higher limits, in fact saw only one shot and averaged film
badge readings of 1.3 rem; their reconstructed mean neutron doses were 4.5 rem.” For test workers the results were not quite so favorable. Despite a record no worse than former series, Teapot seemed to the head of the Los Alamos Health Division, Thomas Shipman, to have caused a “large number of unnecessary overexposures.” Inexperienced and often low-ranking Teapot monitors seldom assumed, as had Health Division monitors in the past, “responsibility to prevent overexposures if possible.” They almost seemed to have “been reduced to little more than recording the exposures which have been received.” Shipman blamed long-standing military policy that ignored “the importance of previous experience for all of the officers who have responsible positions in the rad-safe group.””° In all, sixty-six test workers exceeded the 3.9-roentgen limit, four of them the airmen authorized a higher limit in advance. The rest fell mostly within
5 roentgens over limit, and once again members of the rad-safe group accounted for more than their share. Immediately on topping the limit, a worker was barred from further access to all radiation danger areas, and a memorandum of the action with a record of his overexposure went to his parent organization.”7 One overexposure pointed to a flagrant lapse: on 1 March 1955, a security guard accidentally entered the test area too soon after the third shot,
Tesla, and received an exposure of 39 roentgens. The AEC promptly announced the mistake and its result: “a higher exposure than has ever been experienced before by any worker at” the Nevada site.”? The guard showed no symptoms of radiation damage and soon returned to work. When he died of cancer thirty years later at age sixty-five, however, his wife sought compensation.” Another incident followed Tesla as well. Two members of the Ist Radiological Safety Support Unit drove within 50 yards of ground zero seeking samples of glazed material; finding none, they left with a hastily collected soil sample and exposures of 19.3 and 16 roentgens, respectively. These two episodes led to much tighter controls on postshot reentry.®° During Teapot, as in earlier series, only those assigned to enter test areas after a shot or to work in radiation areas received film badges. Others could, if they wished, obtain film badges from rad-safe. But they also were free not to wear badges. Because radiation warning signs alone barred entry to danger zones—guards had that job only on shot days—unbadged workers might be exposed without film records. For the next series, Operation Plumbbob in 1957, everyone who entered the Nevada Test Site required an NTS film badge, except Desert Rock convoys and certain observers.®!
170 Routinization and Controversy
Testing Underwater On 14 May 1955, the day before Operation Teapot ended in Nevada, another test took place deep in the Pacific. The navy task group of Joint Task Force 7 conducted the test in the open ocean 500 miles southwest of San Diego. Operation Wigwam was long in the planning. In a sense, it began with Charlie, the canceled deep underwater test of Operation Crossroads in 1946.°2 Specifically, however, the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project in 1951 commenced the work that led directly to Wigwam. Deciding late in 1952 that such a test was still needed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sought AEC help.® The test’s main purpose was finding how the shock from a bomb exploded 2,000 feet below the ocean’s surface might affect naval vessels, submarines especially. Such effects tests held little interest for the AEC or its contractors. Though ready to help, they willingly left the lion’s share of the project to AFSWP and the navy. Initially, the only real concern was avoiding any conflict between the military test proposed for early 1955 and AEC-planned tests: the spring 1955 Teapot series in Nevada or Operation Redwing, the AEC developmental test series then tentatively scheduled for the Pacific in fall 1955.4 Serious Wigwam plans began reaching paper toward the end of 1953. Aside from a few experiments, the AEC’s role centered on building and firing the test device, which had a yield of 30 kilotons.® In April 1954, AFSWP issued a fifty-page test outline, its main question, What happened when a bomb exploded deep underwater? Of special concern was the effect of shock wave on submerged and surface vessels.8 One project by the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory studied “the radiological hazards to personnel.’’8? With manpower from other military and AEC units, the naval laboratory also formed the radiological safety unit for Wigwam under health physics head Albert L. Baietti. The navy rad-safe school on San Francisco’s Treasure Island trained novices and refreshed veterans. Exposure standards followed Castle precedent, 3.9 roentgens for the operation, but Wigwam also imposed strict contamination limits for personnel, clothing, and equipment.®®
A second project explored “effects of nuclear explosion on marine biology” under the aegis of San Diego’s Scripps Institution of Oceanography.®? Wigwam troubled the AEC director of biology and medicine. Bugher feared that “adverse public reaction to this test could create an unfavorable public disposition toward the AEC’s regular test program.’®® He was not alone. Upshot-Knothole problems and “more recent repercussions arising from conduct of the Castle series at the Pacific Proving Ground,” wrote Chairman Strauss on 10 August 1954 to Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, required the AEC to “examine the implications of Wigwam more fully prior to reaching a decision.” Pending further study, the AEC refused to concur with the Defense Department’s Wigwam plans. Strauss expressed special concern
Routinization and Controversy 171 for the unknown “effect that a deep underwater test in the area suggested would have upon the food chain of commercially important fish.’’! Fall 1954 arrived before the AEC agreed that Wigwam posed no threat to commercial fishing, indeed no danger to man or beast.?* “Reasonably assured that conduct of the test will not be prejudicial to health and safety,” the AEC concurred in Defense plans, provided further study cast no doubt on early findings.°3 The Department of State followed the AEC lead, and President Eisenhower approved the test by the end of the year. In February 1955, the chief of naval operations directed Joint Task Force 7 to proceed with Wigwam. Rear Adm. John Sylvester commanded the navy task group. When he and his staff in mid-March briefed the commissioners on Wigwam plans, they stressed the absence of any threat to public safety.” Unfortunately, a promise of safety might not alone resolve “the problem of
public relations,’ Strauss observed. “It is quite possible that as a result of Wigwam the United States might be subject to criticism at home and abroad as was the case of Castle.” Countering this threat, too, demanded action. “To reduce the probability of adverse public reaction and to prevent public misunderstanding and apprehension over the project, as well as to lessen propaganda opportunities for inimical interests which might hamper future testing,’ Strauss suggested that the AEC and the Department of Defense devise “an appropriate joint information plan.”®> Producing such a plan proved troublesome, however, and the effort lasted well into 1955.9° Memories of post-
Castle panic inspired by radioactive fish remained all too fresh. How the public would react to renewed threats of contaminated fish posed a major question in the months before Wigwam. Monitoring West Coast fish for radioactivity seemed to offer one likely approach to an answer. That became the only large “off-site” program in Wigwam.??
Joining forces with the Food and Drug Administration, the Division of Biology and Medicine sought “to initiate monitoring of tuna fish in Califomia to avoid a public reaction from Operation Wigwam” without disclosing “the existence of Wigwam prior to the beginning of the final operational phase.” Instrument and manpower shortages caused by Teapot lasted until the day after Wigwam was fired. That allowed only a modest sampling program. Inspectors from the Food and Drug Administration oversaw the effort. Automatic counters did most of the monitoring, backed up by twenty-three officers and men of the Ist Radiological Safety Support Unit deputized as food and drug inspectors during May and June. The end of Teapot in Nevada freed them for a tour of duty in California.9? What the public needed to know about this effort became a lively and prolonged internal debate. It began with the AEC and the navy but spread to local government and West Coast fish canners, who feared another Castle-like blow to business.!© Several hands joined in drafting a statement for release after the test if public demand for an explanation emerged.!0!
172 Routinization and Controversy Another sticking point was the question of a pretest press release. The AEC favored an early statement largely on the grounds that secrecy could not
be maintained in any event. Announcing “the test beforehand . . . would give the Commission the opportunity to shape press reaction rather than having our own position shaped by the actions of the press.” It also would help “if we should be so unfortunate as to have some unforeseen incident such as unexpected fallout which would make it mandatory to release a statement.” With proper “assurances. . . that it will result in no health or safety hazard to persons anywhere in the world,” the AEC believed, a Wigwam statement should cause no “more adverse reaction than has the announcement concerning Teapot.”!°2 Defense officials preferred merely to announce the task group sailing and the end of testing. Eventually the AEC view prevailed but only after the matter reached the highest level of the Department of Defense.!°3 The statement’s precise wording was itself much discussed before its release on
9 May 1955.1% | Bad weather almost wrecked Wigwam. Expectations of 10-knot winds and 3-foot swells, an AEC observer commented, “were rudely shattered. Surface winds in the test site area at the time of the Task Group arrival ranged from 15 to 30 knots, and swells were 12 to 15 feet in height.”!°5 Equipment damaged by rough weather could not be fully repaired, even after several days’ delay and a shift of location. None of these problems prevented the test on 14 May 1955, but they did mean getting far less data than intended. Radiological safety, in contrast, succeeded admirably. All 6,500 task group members received film badges to be worn through the entire operation. Less than 10 percent recorded gamma exposures, the highest 0.425 roentgen.!© The off-
site program scored an even greater success. Inspectors found no trace of Wigwam-caused radioactivity in 50 million pounds of fish monitored at San Diego, Los Angeles, and Monterey.!°7
Safety Testing Begins When Operation Teapot ended in May 1955, AEC planners foresaw no full-scale tests in Nevada until 1957. This did not preclude a series of smaller safety trials. So-called one-point detonation tests aimed to prove that an accidental discharge of a weapon’s high explosives would not trigger a nuclear detonation. This concern grew in step with Department of Defense plans to deploy large numbers of air defense and antisubmarine weapons. Unlike earlier weapons assembled just before firing, these newer “sealed pit” weapons came with their radioactive cores installed; they would be ready to fire at a moment’s notice. “The natures of the air defense and anti-submarine missions,” Herbert Loper, the chairman of the Military Liaison Committee, told
Routinization and Controversy 173 Strauss, requires weapons “in a constant state of readiness, often in close proximity to densely populated areas and aboard ship.” How to store, transport, and launch such weapons safely were crucial questions.!°
A second reason for safety tests involved questions about the cleanup problem after an accident. Accidental detonation of a weapon’s high explosives, even if failing to trigger a nuclear reaction, could still create a radiation
hazard in the scattered debris, especially plutonium. How hard a task was cleaning up a contaminated airfield, ship, or missile launcher? To answer such questions, Los Alamos would conduct 56-Project NTS, as it was called,
very much the kind of backyard testing that it had always envisioned for the Nevada site. Appropriately, on 31 December 1954, the Nevada Proving Ground had reverted to its original name, the Nevada Test Site. The AEC endorsed Los Alamos plans for four to eight tests beginning in fall 1955, and the president approved.!° The directive for 56-Project NTS issued 19 October 1955 again named as
test manager James Reeves, who headed the test division in the Santa Fe Operations Office. It ordered him to “take every precaution necessary, includ-
ing postponement of any shot, to reduce to a minimum the hazards to the public in the event a nuclear detonation should occur.’’!!® As he had in Teapot,
Oliver Placak of the Public Health Service took charge of off-site rad-safe under Joe Sanders, Las Vegas Branch Office manager acting as support director. For purposes of 56-Project NTS, the test organization defined “off site” to cover everything except Area 11. Nevada Test Site Area 11 included the small valley east of Yucca Lake where the shots occurred. The main task was
setting up a system of fallout trays and air samplers to record the expected traces of plutonium or other alpha emitters outside Area 11.1! John Clark of the Los Alamos Test Division again served as test director
and again assumed responsibility for on-site rad-safe. To oversee this program, he chose William Johnson, a four-year rad-safe veteran of the test program. Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Company (more commonly known as REECo) and Los Alamos provided the monitors. Los Alamos also for a time directed the on-site monitoring program during 56-Project NTS, which REECo then took over. “On site” meant only Area 11. Plutonium seemed the most likely problem. “The philosophy of the radiological safety program for 56-Project NTS was based on the hazard of exposures to plutonium,” Johnson explained. “Exposure to gamma radiation was anticipated as being minor, if present at all.” He reviewed plutonium hazards and outlined basic safety measures, stressing “differences between an alpha contaminating event and the more common fission product contamination.” !!2 Safety began with restricted access to an area half a mile in radius around each zero point and the use of protective clothing within that area after each
test. Effectiveness would be cross-checked by routine urine sampling and
174 Routinization and Controversy analysis. Acceptable weather and winds were defined, as were guidelines for working in contaminated areas and proper methods for handling injured workers.!43 On 10 October 1955, the AEC announced “a series of experiments to determine the safety of various weapons and experimental devices in the event of accidents, such as fires, during handling or storage.”’!!4 Three quick tests during the first week of November completed the first phase of 56-Project NTS. Additional tests were then suspended for technical reasons until further notice.!!5 The safety effort appeared a great success. Urinalysis reports, when they later arrived from Los Alamos, included some positives. Such results, however, might not mean that workers had acquired internal burdens of plutonium. Cross-contamination of samples, in fact, seemed more likely—particularly in view of high airborne activity concentrations recorded in the “change house,” where workers removed anticontamination clothing and masks and where the samples were obtained. !!6 Contamination within the borders of the test site spread more widely than expected. Two zones a mile wide and ten miles long stretching north and east-northeast of Area 11 contained “easily measurable amounts of plutonium on the ground,” the Health Division reported. As time passed plutonium grew harder to detect on the ground but persisted “just below the surface.” Such regions might remain useful for some purposes, but “there now appears to be a considerable number of square miles of NTS which must henceforth be entered and worked in only with the concurrence and approval of the NTS Rad-Safe authorities.” Only further study might “determine how restrictive regulations will have to be.”!!7 Meanwhile the tight controls imposed on work in the affected areas were further strengthened.!!8 Air samplers in towns around the Nevada Test Site ran throughout the series, less for fear of alpha contamination than to record its absence. Consternation ensued when samplers detected plutonium at what had seemed safe distances.'!9 Preliminary figures, however, looked too low to imply any danger. The Division of Biology and Medicine had suggested an off-site limit for airborne plutonium of 400 units; this ad hoc unit equaled disintegrations per minute per cubic meter of air times number of days that concentration was measured.!29 Adapting its practice to published recommendations of the National Committee on Radiation Protection, Los Alamos allowed workers a full forty-hour week without special protection in air measuring up to 8.8 disintegrations per minute per cubic meter. Because the highest readings in any town were 4.7 and 3 disintegrations per minute per cubic meter, Los Alamos concluded “assimilated body burdens will be orders of magnitude less than permissible body burdens.”!2! Concern subsided as further study tended to confirm that plutonium nowhere outside the test site approached dangerous levels.}22
Unwarranted though their fears proved to be, Los Alamos safety experts
Routinization and Controversy 175 welcomed the pause caused by technical problems to assess the precise nature of the hazard.!23 Operational plans for the next safety test, postponed first to December 1955, then to January 1956, were adjusted to newly perceived requirements.!24 The changes proved their worth. Off-site air sampling showed better results than the November tests. The highest totals outside the Nevada Test Site were 24 ad hoc concentration units at Groom Lake and 12 at Indian Springs, well below the proposed limit of 400. Some on-site readings were much higher, but this occurred mostly in empty desert. The highest where any people were, at the test site’s northern Gate 385, amounted to 172, still less than half the limit.!25 Plutonium contaminated much of the eastern portion of the test site without causing any significant health hazard. Systematic urinalyses of test workers mostly confirmed the effectiveness of protective masks
and other safety measures. A few tests showed low levels of alpha activity, but positive results apparently caused no one to question either the sampling procedure or its efficacy. Measurement techniques had become sensitive enough to detect activity well below the limits.!76
Protection against breathing or swallowing alpha emitters, however, offered little defense against gamma radiation. This should have presented no problem, because test plans had called for no nuclear yield—arbitrarily defined by the AEC as anything less than an energy release equivalent to 4 pounds of TNT. But unknown to Johnson and his Los Alamos—REECo rad-
safe team, test plans had changed, and the changes altered the nature of the major hazard. Evidence of some yield below the defined 4-pound limit early in the series had raised questions about inherent design safety. Deliberately seeking to produce a slight yield—over 4 pounds equivalent—in order to pinpoint the problem, testers had altered the fourth device in 56-Project NTS. That meant fission products and gamma radiation, but the rad-safe team had not learned about the added hazard. Recovery plans and safety measures remained geared to alpha rather than gamma hazards. The yield of the device tested in January, though slight, proved even higher than expected.!2? Four members of a data recovery team approached the recovery area and ground zero too soon after the shot and recorded gamma exposures ranging
from 4.3 to 28 roentgens.!”8 To forestall ill-informed press speculation if word leaked, the Las Vegas Branch Office released a brief notice of “four men. . . exposed to radiation exceeding the conservative exposure guide for on-site workers.”!29 Unfortunately, one of the four suffered a fatal cerebral thrombosis only eleven days later. Although radiation was hardly likely to have caused his stroke, new questions forced the AEC to issue another public statement that denied any link between the two events.!2° Analysis of the accident raised no doubts about the underlying structure of the rad-safe program, because the team had violated stated procedures. The report did, however, suggest need for tighter procedural safeguards.'3!
176 Routinization and Controversy
Operation Redwing Operation Wigwam and 56-Project NTS both focused on already developed weapons and so demanded little of the regular test organization. Operation Redwing in spring 1956, however, marked a return to full-scale development testing in the Marshall Islands. It was the first test series there since Castle in early 1954 and by far the most ambitious to date. The seventeen shots in Redwing equaled the total number fired in all five past series at Bikini and Enewetak. Joint Task Force 7, made a permanent unit before Castle, conducted the 1956 series.!32 Although Redwing tested more low-yield than high-yield devices, the hard lessons of Castle dictated changes in the rad-safe program. The radiological safety unit, task unit 7 of scientific task group 7.1, acquired a new commander as Army Maj. Gordon L. Jacks succeeded John Servis. Headquartered on Enewetak, the unit also maintained a virtually independent rad-safe team at Bikini. The armed services furnished the manpower; individual navy and air
force officers and men augmented the army’s Ist Radiological Safety Support Unit, transferred intact to Joint Task Force 7 for Redwing.!33 In contrast to previous Pacific tests, Redwing planners made “rad-safe . . . a responsibility of the task unit commanders, program directors, and project leaders,”!34
Each unit and project found its own monitors. Major Jacks’s unit offered advice and training, handled all film badging, provided instruments and protective clothing, and kept the records. It also conducted aerial surveys and plotted radiation exclusion areas, briefed entry parties, manned checkpoints, ran decontamination stations, and analyzed air and water samples.!%
For the first time, rad-safe attempted to film badge all 15,000 task force members for the entire series. The dosimetry and records section issued, processed, and recorded 40,000 so-called permanent badges. The figures differed because not everyone stayed for the entire series, and badges were exchanged
at three- to six-week intervals. Another 45,000 “mission” badges went to those whose work put them at some risk of exposure; worn with the permanent badges, mission badges were usually issued and processed daily. Operational exposure limited to 3.9 roentgens conformed to past practice. Regulations also cited maximum readings permitted on clothing, vehicles, ships, and aircraft.!56
Like former series, Redwing required special limits for cloud sampling.}37
Exactly what limits, however, still posed a hard question and led to a novel zone-of-exposure formula. The zone’s lower limit for cloud-sampling aircrews was an “authorized dosage” of 10 roentgens, the upper limit a “limiting dosage” of 20. “All efforts will be made,” Jacks explained, to ensure that “no aircrew member is knowingly given a total dose in excess of the 10 roentgen level.” Overexposure, however, would not begin at 10 roentgens but only be-
Routinization and Controversy 177 yond 20. The zone between 10 and 20 roentgens “should provide an adequate cushion to allow for such things as the pilot turning the wrong way and ending up where he shouldn’t be.” Operational flexibility was another bonus, but “any deliberate planned exposure in excess of 10 roentgens. . . is only to be
considered in an emergency .. . , after discussion with and approval by CTG 7.1 [commander, task group 7.1].”!%8
An air force project also sought a higher zone limit. Strategic Air Command proposed a Redwing experiment to explore the effects on its crews of radioactive clouds from megaton-range weapons. Designated Project 2.66, “Early Cloud Penetration,” it required sending aircraft into the cloud as soon as thirty minutes after a shot. Some would merely dip into the cloud and fly out quickly, but others would bore all the way through. Initially, the air force wanted a 75-roentgen limit for the latter maneuver, but the project leader, Ernest A. Pinson, himself an air force colonel working at Los Alamos, argued against so high a figure. “I think we can appreciate,” he explained to his fellow project officers, “from the Teapot work, error factors of up to three times are quite possible and if you multiply 75 by 3 you have got quite a dose.” He persuaded the Strategic Air Command to accept a 25- to 50-roentgen zone.!9? Responsibility for authorizing such special limits belonged to the task force commander, Rear Adm. B. Hall Hanlon. He approved the proposed limits for both cloud sampling and the air force experiment shortly before Redwing began.!40
Radiological safety for those involved in testing, however, never became the major issue. Sufficient numbers of task force members knew enough to avoid the worst dangers, even if the rad-safe organization proper somehow failed. Simple guidelines met the need.!4! Protecting the natives or other bystanders required more. Benevolence and self-interest alike dictated safeguards better than had obtained for Castle.'42 This meant above all better weather forecasts: the near-catastrophe of Castle Bravo had followed the slightest shift in predicted winds. Accordingly, Joint Task Force 7 embarked on a major effort to upgrade its weather services for Redwing. Several staff weather officers received advanced training in tropical meteorology, and experts studied weather patterns over the Marshall Islands using a variety of new techniques. Existing weather stations in the Central Pacific bolstered their facilities, and several new stations improved local coverage. Task force weather central also received and collated data from stations throughout the Pacific, using its own ships and planes to fill in blanks. Eventually Joint Task Force 7 commanded a weather staff of over five hundred. !43 Predicting fallout also came under more intense research by groups at Los Alamos, Livermore, and the U.S. Weather Bureau. Specific cloud models became the basis for new or improved methods of computing fallout patterns. A
new fallout prediction unit headed by Thomas White of the Los Alamos
178 Routinization and Controversy Health Division had tried these novel techniques in Teapot with some success.!4 Encouraged by the results, the task force planned a similar unit for Redwing to work closely with its weather prediction unit.!45 A. Vay Shelton of Livermore assumed command as part of the task force staff. His briefings played a crucial role in decisions to fire. Predictions were cross-checked after firing by the fallout plotting unit. Combining the off-site experience of the New York Health and Safety Laboratory and the Public Health Service, this unit compiled fallout data from land, sea, and air monitoring.!*6 As a final precaution, Joint Task Force 7 stationed rad-safe experts on inhabited atolls east and south of ground zero to advise the residents if danger loomed. Lack of such informed advice had been blamed for the worst injuries after Castle Bravo.!47
Since Sandstone in 1948, the United States had sharply restricted news about Pacific testing. Redwing reversed the trend. This, too, owed much to Castle. A concern for the real public dangers of testing high-yield nuclear devices was not the only reason for altered policy. Attempted secrecy might well revive public outcries, widespread international criticism, and hostile propaganda, the more so since flash and fallout would likely render the attempt futile. As in Nevada, public indoctrination and well-wrought news releases might better serve the nation’s interests.!48 The Redwing education and
information plan went through several drafts over a period of nine months. Finally, on 28 March 1956, the commissioners approved the proposed change in policy. !49
The AEC meanwhile tersely announced in January 1956 the forthcoming tests and began dealing with the expected clamor.!>° Responsibility for the Marshallese still seemed to conflict with testing nuclear weapons, and settling that issue remained a matter of concern.}>! Japanese sensibilities, to say nothing of fishing interests, likewise remained a problem.'? Protection against fallout, however, persisted as the largest question, not only among the public but also within the government. Internal briefings and memorandums from the AEC and the task force assured the State Department and military author-
ities that Redwing dangers had been foreseen and proper measures were being taken. A series of public statements climaxed just before Redwing began. In an unprecedented release, the Department of Defense and the AEC described in detail the steps taken to ensure public health and safety against whatever hazards Redwing might pose.!? Still another reassuring gesture allowed a small group of reporters to observe Cherokee, the first Bikini shot and the second in the series. Since this test also saw the first airdrop of a thermonuclear bomb, opening it had the extra advantage of showing that the United States owned a real weapon.'*4 It also showed just how strict firing conditions had become. “For a time, many of us thought we never would get the right combination of cloud, wind and visibility” to complete Cherokee, wrote an air force officer serving in Redwing weather central.!>>
Routinization and Controversy 179 Overall, Redwing caused little trouble. The program mixed several highyield devices tested at Bikini with a number of much smaller tests of fission devices at Enewetak. Joint Task Force 7 prepared to fire at either Bikini or Enewetak as conditions allowed; like Teapot, Redwing scheduled ready rather than firing dates. High-yield tests imposed far more stringent limits on weather and wind than did smaller devices. Essentially the task force planned to fire the smaller shots while waiting for the right weather to conduct the high-yield tests. This meant a bigger task force, but fewer weather-caused delays largely offset greater manpower demands. From 5 May through 22 July, the task force conducted seventeen tests. The longest gap between firings was just over two weeks; the entire series totaled just over two and a half months, only slightly more time than Castle needed for only a third as many tests. Several Redwing tests spread heavy fallout over nearby islands in the atoll where they were fired. Entirely expected, such results caused few problems and hurt no one.!°6
Unanticipated fallout occurred only once, during Tewa on Saturday, 21 July 1956. It was the sixteenth Redwing test and the last at Bikini. A sudden wind shift occurred just after the 5-megaton device exploded. That wrecked the forecast and put Enewetak on the fringe of the fallout cloud. Task force aircraft tracked the cloud drifting toward Parry and Enewetak islands, site of the Pacific Proving Ground’s major permanent buildings. Detectable fallout began midafternoon, nine hours after the shot. Intensities, at first spotty, rose sharply Saturday evening, then held steady overnight and began falling after eight o’clock Sunday morning. Maximum readings were 130 milliroentgens per hour. Complicating the safety picture were frequent rain squalls, which doubtless increased total fallout but also washed away much contamination. Overall, infinite exposures from Tewa fallout threatened to be no more than 3 or 4 roentgens. But many workers were already nearing their 3.9-roentgen limit before Tewa fallout arrived. Additional exposure, though slight, would push many over the limit.!5’ Emergency evacuation seemed unnecessary, but the task force would remove fifty workers a day from the affected islands. This measured response also maintained the schedule for firing the last Redwing test Sunday morning, 22 July 1956, the day after Tewa. Convenient ways to cope with likely overexposures—shifting workers about the atoll, sending them to Bikini for a few days, or shipping them home—all threatened to hamper Redwing’s closing, the so-called roll-up. To make matters more awkward, much of the task force
was already homeward bound. The best answer seemed waiving the 3.9roentgen limit. Quickly granted, the waiver allowed the required workers up to 7 roentgens to complete their tasks. The cost seemed modest. “I patted my-
self on the back a couple of days too soon,” wrote a rueful Gordon Jacks. Before Tewa “25 people out of the entire Task Force. . . had technical overexposures for the entire operation. 48 hours later we had somewhere around
180 Routinization and Controversy 600 or more with the over-exposure. Such is life.”!58 Although Redwing over-
exposures numbered 617, only a third of the total topped 5 roentgens, and none exceeded 16. Decontamination around buildings on Parry Island proved both successful and instructive; it sharply reduced potential overexposures, in contrast to Enewetak Island where no such effort was made.!°? Although it aroused a flurry of concern in Washington, the matter seemed
merely “slightly embarrassing but not serious” on the spot. William Ogle, task force deputy commander for scientific matters, reported “no serious concern here about the problem.”!© Washington still worried. To forestall overreaction when word reached the press, all too likely given the number of people involved, AEC headquarters pondered an immediate public statement.!®! But as Graves noted, “We have never made releases on such minor exposures of our own personnel in the past and have had them on every operation.”’!® Officially, the only mention of the incident appeared in the final Redwing press release. “Following the firing of the concluding detonations, light fallout occurred on parts of Eniwetok Atoll occupied by the Joint Task Force. The fallout did not necessitate evacuation of personnel and no special protective measures were required.”!©3 The Redwing record seemed to show that weapons testing had solved its worst rad-safe problems. Operation Redwing also prompted the first public statement about development of the so-called clean bomb. In 1955, Livermore had begun working on a “weapon... in which the radioactive after-effects are reduced to a minimum,” as had Los Alamos.!% Some fruits of that effort appeared in Redwing. In a press release after he returned from the Pacific, Chairman Strauss offered guarded remarks about tests showing “maximum effect in the immediate area of a target with minimum widespread fallout hazard.” Bystanders might thus hope to evade the side effects of thermonuclear war, and Strauss could praise the test success “not only from a military point of view but from a humanitarian aspect.”!© Derisive comments about a “humanitarian H-bomb”’ aside, the statement attracted wide notice.!©© Whether or not to say anything in public
about clean bombs had been much debated within the AEC. Some feared it would reveal too much about American bomb design; others argued that the promise of reduced fallout was needed to combat the growing movement to ban all nuclear testing.!6’ Once the armed forces could be convinced they needed clean bombs, the vital importance of developing them became a muchused counter to any proposed ban on testing.!©8 The AEC hoped to produce others with Project Sunshine.
Strontium and Sunshine Although never far from the minds of test planners, safety issues had not much troubled the public before the mid-1950s. Operations Upshot-Knothole
Routinization and Controversy 181 and Castle changed that. Widespread news reports of severe fallout hazards sharply raised public concern and eroded trust in the Atomic Energy Commission. Actually, the AEC found itself with two fallout problems. The first, and most immediate, centered on the regions around its test sites. Whether or not testing could continue, especially in Nevada, became an open question after Upshot-Knothole. The answer was a qualified yes. Given proper operational guidelines, the ad hoc committee convened for that purpose had concluded that the Nevada Test Site did have a future. Operation Teapot in spring 1955 adhered to these guidelines with good results. From an off-site safety viewpoint, in fact, the Teapot record showed a marked advance over past tests.
Despite this success, the effort still seemed too improvised. Scarcely had
Teapot ended in May 1955 before test planners began to review Nevada safety criteria, as the committee had recommended. The crucial question remained how large the yields of devices that could be tested safely, that 1s, would not drop uncomfortably high levels of fallout on nearby communities should weather forecasts go awry. An upper limit of 50 kilotons had hampered the 1955 tests, but new modes of testing using tethered balloons, taller towers, and containment underground could justify higher limits. What limits to impose on Nevada test yields remained a central question throughout 1956, although Operation Redwing in the Pacific preoccupied test planners during the first half of the year.!® The AEC’s second fallout problem was more diffuse, literally and figuratively. In the long run, it also might be more crucial. Megaton-scale tests, whether in the Soviet Union or at Enewetak, spread fallout worldwide. Cumulative exposure from testing year in and year out could threaten large numbers of people. Attempting to pinpoint the nature of this problem, the AEC created Project Sunshine in 1953. Actually, only the name and the focus on testing were new. The commission had long sought to define major hazards of debris from nuclear blasts. Initially, when the United States still enjoyed a monopoly on the bomb, questions related to nuclear attack on the Soviet Union: How many bombs could explode in Russia before lethal or dangerous amounts of radioactivity appeared in the air over North America? Which bomb products posed the greatest threats? In 1949, the problems became more difficult. The Soviet bomb forced planners to take account of bombs exploded in the United States as well. Under the auspices of the AEC Division of Biology and Medicine, Nicholas M. Smith, Jr., of Oak Ridge National Laboratory sought answers in a one-man project called Gabriel. Studying his late 1949 report led Director of Biology and Medicine Shields Warren to conclude that 3,000 nominal (1.e., 20-kiloton) bombs could cause serious contamination and that strontium-90 might be of greatest concern.!” There the matter rested for a year and a half. Stimulated by renewed testing and plans for an expanded weapon stock-
182 Routinization and Controversy pile, Project Gabriel revived in mid-1951. Smith once again got the call. Drawing on data from Operations Ranger and Greenhouse, he completed a revised Gabriel report in November 1951. Insiders were talking about it even
before its highly restricted release, and Warren convened an ad hoc panel to assess Smith’s findings.!7! The panel accepted Smith’s view of ingested radiostrontium as the greatest long-term hazard. If that were true and the midlethal body burden of strontitum-90 were 10 micrograms, then “a number of the order of 105 [100,000] nominal bombs,” the panel agreed, “might be exploded before widespread radioactivity would become generally hazardous.” But the closer in time or space to the blast, the more “external radiation intensities are the limiting features. Other effects, such as inhalation or inges-
tion . . . or soil contamination, are of secondary importance.”!’? External gamma ray exposure from fallout, in short, posed the main short-range threat; farther away the problem centered on radionuclides that might enter the body. Although intrigued by the Gabriel report, the AEC’s General Advisory Committee judged it lacking in hard data at a December 1951 meeting. Independent studies must confirm and expand the early results.!73 Warren’s biophysics staff began that task early in 1952, stressing the potentially severe
local “effects which might result from the tactical use of atomic weapons under various weather conditions.”!”4 In mid-1952, the Rand Corporation agreed to pursue this line of study further under AEC contract. Biology and Medicine also had begun to study long-term, large-scale hazards. For this problem, however, finding someone able and willing to accept a contract proved much harder. The imminent prospect of thermonuclear weapons many times more powerful than the fission bombs assumed in the early studies lent a new urgency to the questions.!?> Reviewing Gabriel’s status early in March 1953, John Bugher, Warren’s successor as director of Biology and Medicine, learned how highly the commissioners now valued the project.!7© Accordingly, he quickly upgraded the effort. ‘““The project known as ‘Gabriel’ is to be accelerated and given a first priority status,” he ordered. The secret project would define “practical limits” for using atomic weapons. “These limits,” Bugher explained, were reached when “the accumulation of the end-products of the reactions would be seriously detrimental to health and the normal balance of populations.’'”” Assembling Task Group Gabriel went smoothly, and its first meeting took place little more than a month Iater.!78 Working under the rubric of Project Horn, Rand Corporation had reviewed physical, chemical, and other nonbiological aspects of fallout. Increasingly, Rand focused its own work on how to predict fallout from a single detonation under a wide range of conditions. Meanwhile,.though, it also arranged with
Willard F. Libby at the University of Chicago for a pilot study of the radiostrontium problem. A Manhattan Project veteran who shortly after the war devised the radiocarbon-dating technique that later won him a Nobel Prize,
Routinization and Controversy 183 Libby had been a General Advisory Committee member since 1950. At his behest, Rand hosted a major conference on Project Gabriel in July 1953.1” Reaffirmed as the key long-term problem, radiostrontium now became the subject of special study. Thus began Project Sunshine. Analysis of samples collected around the world would allow Libby and the AEC to define levels of radiostrontium already produced from testing weapons.!®° Secrecy was a Salient concern, much discussed during the July meeting. Participants afterward were asked not to reveal “the existence of the project and the conference itself. . . to anyone other than those who have been contacted officially in connection with the project.’’!®! Distribution of Sunshine bulletins and reports remained tightly restricted.!82 Collecting some kinds of samples posed distinct problems, the AEC being loath to broadcast its interest
in radiostrontium. Particularly touchy was using infant bones, which were thought likely to provide the best measures of strontium uptake. Actively growing bone tissue concentrates strontium, a chemical analogue of calcium, more rapidly than adult bone. Acquiring such bones from abroad without breaking “security specifications” demanded a well-contrived cover story. As Robert A. Dudley, the man in charge of the effort for the Division of Biology and Medicine, explained to Libby’s chief assistant, the “stated purpose” would be “a survey of the natural Ra [radium] burden of human bones.” As “a problem of genuine scientific interest,” it would “provide a plausible explanation” for bone sampling. Furthermore, it would be a real study, of sorts. We do expect to talk someone into analyzing these samples for Ra, so our story is true as far as it goes. As for the emphasis on infants, we can say that such samples are easy to obtain here, and that we would like . . . our foreign collections comparable. In order to keep the AEC out of the picture where possible, we intend to have the samples shipped directly to you. (We won’t say, of course, that you yourselves will make the Ra measurements.) It might even be desirable to have you send out all requests, though I would still be prepared to do all the work except for providing the signature. }83
Set promptly into motion, the scheme sought bone samples from India, Japan, South Africa, and South America to compare with samples collected in the
United States.184 |
More conventional channels brought plant and soil samples from abroad. Laboratories at Columbia University and the AEC’s New York Operations Office joined the University of Chicago in testing such samples for radiostrontium. Sunshine emerged as the only major research effort supported solely by Project Gabriel. Gabriel touched a wide range of questions about the formation, transport, fallout, and biological hazards of bomb debris. Estimating the “long-range radiological hazards,” explained Bugher early in 1954, depended on tracing “a chain of factors relating radiological effects of
184 Routinization and Controversy radioactive bomb debris in the human body to the design of nuclear weapons
and to the conditions under which such weapons are used.”!8 Except for Sunshine, however, none of these problems fell exclusively within Gabriel’s purview; in varying degrees, Gabriel merely supported work in other ongoing research projects that might apply to the side effects of nuclear war. The joint and growing demands of Gabriel and Sunshine played a large part in causing the AEC to reorganize the Division of Biology and Medicine early in 1957,!8¢
Radiostrontium itself no longer remained an unknown hazard after the shock of Castle Bravo in March 1954, but Sunshine stayed secret for years. Ironically, mounting public controversy underlined the AEC’s perceived need for well-controlled releases of information. Not until spring 1957, three years or more after long-range fallout began raising concern, did Project Sunshine become public knowledge.!87 Meanwhile, though, Libby, its chief architect, moved from the General Advisory Committee to the commission itself. Displaced from the laboratory, he emerged as leading spokesman for the view that fallout posed minor hazards at worst. Reputation as scientist combined with status as commissioner gave him more than his share of speaking platforms. He never mentioned Sunshine by name, of course, but drew freely on data the project had begun to provide.!88 Perhaps needless to say, Libby was only the best known of those to pursue such a course.!8? For a generation, ever since Herbert J. Muller’s path-breaking 1927 article, the so-called threat to the germ plasm had dominated thinking about the long-term hazards of radiation. More than any other single factor through the early 1950s, genetic concern shaped measures to forestall such harm as might reveal itself only after years passed.!% Now that day was ending as the newly perceived hazard of radiostrontium displaced damaged genes from the center of the fallout
controversy.'?! |
Confident in his views and contentious in personality, Libby also wrote letter after letter to refute fear of fallout.!92 Even his colleagues might find him hard to work with. At the very outset of Sunshine, for instance, Robert Dudley questioned Libby’s “urge to rush into the sampling” and feared that “his generally disparaging attitude toward all other workers in the program will make effective coordination between him and the Division of Biology and Medicine a difficult matter.”!93 Certainly, Libby’s prestige and status never meant that everyone within the AEC shared his sanguine outlook. By 1956, indeed, some had begun to wonder about Project Sunshine’s very purposes.!94 Questions about what seemed too benign a view of fallout in time grew into direct challenges to AEC orthodoxy.!9> Nonetheless, Sunshine per-
sisted as the center of AEC fallout research, while the danger from boneseeking radionuclides like strontium-90 remained the greatest concern.!
Atmospheric Testing Challenged Safety Issues and the Test Ban Movement 1956-1961
New Guidelines The National Academy of Sciences in the United States and the Medical Research Council in the United Kingdom each independently completed a major report on biological effects of radiation in mid-1956.! Coincidentally issued the same day, 12 June, they also reached much the same conclusions. For the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, of course, the National Academy of Sciences report was the one that mattered, but it held no unpleasant surprises: the commission escaped undue criticism. It had, in fact, supported the work of several academy panels, furnished many of their members, and supplied much of their data. Summarizing mainly well-known material, the report contained little new. From an AEC viewpoint, the major problem centered on the genetics panel’s proposed lifetime limits on radiation exposure.” One recommendation applied to the general population, which, from “humanly controllable sources of radiations . . . shall not receive . . . an average of more than 10 roentgens, in addition to background, of ionizing radiation as a total accumulated dose to the reproductive cells from conception to age 30.3 This would mean far more stringent limits on off-site exposure than the AEC had allowed a year earlier in Teapot—3.9 roentgens during any twelve-month period.* Prospects of a population exposure limit “roughly equivalent to a limitation to about three Teapots in ten years,” observed Alvin Graves of the Los Alamos Test Division, threatened to curtail sharply “the amount of necessary work that can be done in Nevada.”» Population limits reflected an attempt to deal with the unknown. Defining actual exposures of specific persons among the thousands who might be at 185
186 Atmospheric Testing Challenged risk was beyond the resources of any responsible agency; limits must thus be geared to susceptibilities of the weakest. Circumstances were different for workers and others under direct control of the test organization. Their exposures could be measured and recorded. Accordingly, they as individuals became the subject of a second proposed limit: no one should “receive more than a total accumulated dose to the reproductive cells of 50 roentgens up to age 30 years. . . , and not more than 50 roentgens additional up to age 40.’ This, too, fell well below current AEC standards: 5 roentgens per year was less than a third of the 3.9 roentgens per quarter the AEC routinely allowed workers./ Satisfying these new standards strongly affected planning for the 1957 Nevada test series. Initially code named Pilgrim, the operation became Plumb-
bob shortly before testing began. Publicly perceived danger from fallout needed to be addressed, and that meant dealing with the National Academy’s recommendations. Fortunately, with only the rarest exceptions, AEC practice already held exposures well below allowed limits. Lower limits would nonetheless sharply reduce margins for error, and precise figures were much
discussed during summer 1956, both within the AEC and throughout the safety community.’ Despite some progress, nothing seemed settled as Operation Plumbbob drew near.? The National Committee on Radiation Protection (which added “and Measurements” to its name in 1956 without changing its acronym, NCRP), on which the AEC relied for recommended safety stan-
dards, helped resolve the debate in fall 1956. Responding to urgent AEC pleas, the NCRP executive committee issued revised maximum permissible exposure levels.!° These new figures became the basis for Plumbbob limits. The familiar operational limit of 3.9 roentgens per year for local residents remained in force, despite a much-discussed long-term limit: retroactive to the beginning of Nevada testing in 1951, no one off site was to receive more than 10 roentgens in any ten-year period. To forestall public concerns about slight overexposures, as well as to reflect more accurately the real meaning of administrative limits, both annual and long-term figures would be clearly labeled operational guides rather than maximum exposures permitted. What the proposed limit meant in practical terms, however, left the commissioners divided. Specifically, did the limit mean 10 measured roentgens in an inhabited region, or did it rather impose a limit on any individual’s effective exposure? They decided to defer the limit pending further study, a decision the Advisory Committee on Biology and Medicine strongly endorsed. Ultimately, a tenyear, 10-roentgen limit for off-site exposure went into effect in 1962, a delay greatly prolonged by the intervening test moratorium of 1958-1961." The AEC also imposed new standards for workers. Operational limits dropped from 3.9 to 3 roentgens during any thirteen-week period, with the added proviso of no more than 5 roentgens in any calendar year. Another change involved new lifetime limits for workers, a total of 50 roentgens up to
Atmospheric Testing Challenged 187 age thirty, no more than 50 roentgens per decade thereafter.!2 The AEC also set a new alpha-exposure limit: 10,000 units in any thirteen-week period; exposure was computed by taking the average concentration in air measured in disintegrations per minute. per cubic meter, then multiplying that number by hours of exposure when no protective breathing gear was worn.) Like earlier test programs, the 1957 series faced proposals for special standards applied to sampling pilots and certain other flyers.!4 This time, however, AEC-imposed limits had rougher sailing. The Air Force Special Weapons Center, in the person of its deputy commander, Col. William B. Kieffer, objected to aircraft decontamination standards as too costly in man-hours, a hindrance to readiness, and far stricter than safety required. He announced
plans to cut back sharply on both monitoring and decontamination.'> Los Alamos countered by charging “that Kieffer simply could not understand the philosophy which regards every radiation exposure as injurious but accepts minimum exposures for critical jobs.”!6 Health Division Leader Thomas Shipman saw yet another instance of the military acting as if exposures “which
might hurt other people do not damage them and that rules necessary for other people not apply to Air Force personnel.”!’ In the end, decontamination followed past practice, and ground crews adhered to AEC standards. Samplers were authorized an operational limit of 7.5 roentgens, and pilots flying in an air-to-air missile test could receive up to 15 roentgens.}®
Radiological safety for Desert Rock exercises in Operation Plumbbob followed the pattern of Upshot-Knothole in 1953: the AEC test manager delegated rad-safe responsibility to the Department of Defense. Relatively straightforward reasons induced Defense to set higher limits for troops than did the AEC for test workers. For members of the armed forces, a trip to Camp Desert Rock came only once. They would not risk repeated exposure in the course of normal duty as would test workers; furthermore, military units needed the greater freedom to maneuver that higher limits allowed. Participating troops were allowed up to 5 roentgens in any six-month period, of which no more than 2 roentgens could come from prompt radiation, that is, neutron and gamma radiation instantly on detonation. Established limits for blast pressure and thermal radiation were expressed in terms of the distance from which troops could witness a test.!9 Decisions on safety standards merged with choices about so-called operational criteria, especially limits on test yields. Kenner F. Hertford, manager of AEC Albuquerque Operations (the former Santa Fe Operations Office had moved), noted this interdependence in urging prompt action on safety standards to clear the way for the 1957 tests. Laboratory planners required approved “procedures and criteria.” Technical planning began with “knowledge of the type, kind, and mode of delivery.” But that depended “to a large extent on the operating criteria, .. . [which], in turn, are dependent on the radiological safety criteria and procedures.”*° Because constrained yields might limit
188 Atmospheric Testing Challenged the value of Nevada testing, the subject was much discussed.?! Los Alamos
and Livermore formed a joint planning board to resolve the issues. Ultimately, they decided to endorse the same criteria for Plumbbob as Teapot: maximum yields of 25 kilotons from 300-foot towers, 50 kilotons from 500foot towers, and 80 kilotons from balloons or airdrops.?2 The first test schedule for 1957 appeared in mid-November 1956. It was an ambitious program, divided into a three-month Phase I of sixteen shots in spring 1957 and a two-month Phase II of ten shots in the fall. Additional onepoint safety tests of the kind first performed in 56-Project NTS would be fired as needed throughout the year. Operation Plumbbob comprised proof tests of air defense and antisubmarine warheads to be stockpiled, development tests of bomb components and mockups, and design tests of smaller and lighter warheads. It included one test intended to be contained deep underground, thus fallout-free and unconstrained by weather. About half the tests would use balloon-mounted firing platforms, the other half towers. Two military effects tests were planned, one fired from a balloon, the other from an air-toair missile in flight. Despite doubling the number of shots and total yield over Teapot, the 1957 series was not expected to compromise safety standards. Balloons and taller towers would prevent the fireball from touching the ground and so sharply curtail heavy fallout. The high-level advisory panel first formed for Teapot in 1955 retained an active role in the new test series. Still led by Los Alamos testing chief Alvin Graves, it would examine each test plan in detail with an eye toward safety.?° Commissioner Willard Libby insisted on making the hunt for Sunshinerelated data a large part of Operation Plumbbob. One research program addressed effects of radiostrontium on plants and animals near the test site.*4 Another centered on how to restrict amounts of strontium reaching the biosphere.25 Variations caused by shielding, weathering, and the passage of time became the subject of still another program. Complicating the matter in this instance was a long-running dispute about who should direct the effort.?¢ Eventually, a special team took charge of the fieldwork.?? Although the commissioners approved the proposed schedule, questions still remained. Were some of the planned shots too likely to create high levels of fallout and thus jeopardize the Nevada test program? Might it be wiser to move more difficult shots—that is, those more likely to produce heavy fallout—to the Pacific?28 Unanswered questions like these led the commissioners in December 1956 to reconsider the coming year’s plans. Specifically, they talked about how to reduce or eliminate off-site fallout around the Nevada Test Site. All or part of the program might simply move to Enewetak. The staff favored another option, redesigning the most difficult shots. Other proposed changes included dropping the two-phase approach and firing twentyfive shots in a single series starting May 1957.29 As in Teapot, shots were divided into two groups, based on how likely they were.to cause problems:
Atmospheric Testing Challenged 189 “Requirements on wind structure for safe firing of devices in Group B are much less restrictive than for those in Group A.””20
The commissioners approved the redesign option at their meeting on 5S December 1956, though only tentatively. Further debate marked AEC meet-
ings during the next two weeks. Shifting the most problematic shots to the Pacific retained strong support. The meeting of 18 December finally settled the matter in favor of keeping the full series in Nevada.3?! On 28 December 1956, President Eisenhower granted the AEC’s formal request to approve the spring 1957 test program. A month later the AEC announced the forthcoming test series as Operation Plumbbob, carefully avoiding any mention of radiation exposure standards.32 Though the precise number and type of tests remained as yet undecided, such details could be resolved later. Eventually, the series comprised twenty-four tests.*3
Piumbbob and the End of Desert Rock Administration of weapons testing had altered since Teapot.24 Among the
changes was a larger rad-safe role for REECo. Earlier, Las Vegas-based REECo had merely performed routine rad-safe tasks during nontest periods
as part of its AEC support contract for the test site. But a full-time local health and safety organization began looking all the better with year-round testing under study. The army’s 1st Radiological Safety Support Unit, the 1st RSSU, which had handled Teapot rad-safe, could not be in Nevada full time. REECo, already a strong presence at the test site in its support role, seemed the likely candidate. Soon after Teapot, REECo received an AEC contract to provide all rad-safe services at the Nevada Test Site.35 During Plumbbob, REECo rad-safe reported to the test director. When a test series was in the offing, the test manager (an AEC official, usually from the operations office) appointed a test director (a contractor employee, usually from Los Alamos or
Livermore) to oversee the actual conduct of a test and delegated to him, among other things, responsibility for the safety of test workers.%¢ Working out the precise division of labor proved no easy task.37 Especially
as the scheduled start of testing approached, much effort went to completing the final safety organization.>8 During Plumbbob, REECo provided such major rad-safe services as film badging, radiation detection, shot area surveys, protective gear, equipment monitoring, and decontamination. The company’s rad-safe division also furnished most of -the field rad-safe team, as
many as seventy-two people at the peak of testing.*? From the lst RSSU through the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project came thirty-eight officers and men, chiefly to obtain field training while working with REECo rad-safe. Although the army unit had lost its Nevada job, it still held the rad-safe role in Joint Task Force 7, which would conduct Operation Hardtack in the Pacific
190 Atmospheric Testing Challenged during 1958.49 Each test group at Plumbbob named its own representative to work with the REECo rad-safe division. Groups provided their own monitors, if they could, all of whom either completed the basic monitoring course or attended a brief refresher course. Monitors from REECo rad-safe filled the slots in those groups that could not furnish their own.*! Like Teapot, Plumbbob relied on the Public Health Service for off-site radiological safety. For Plumbbob even more than Teapot, the service stressed educating the public about fallout.*? It again not only relied on serving officers but also called on a diverse and widespread group of volunteers from its reserve system. This meant a large training and retraining effort, but it also enhanced the Public Health Service role.*3 Experienced people could return home better able to assess problems linked to weapons testing and civil defense; they might also provide their home offices, schools, and companies with information and ideas. Public relations continued to grow as part of the off-site program. Several AEC-made films were widely shown in towns near the test site. Public Health Service officers spoke to many local groups and appeared on radio and tele-
vision. With the AEC’s blessing, they also took every opportunity to talk to individuals. They provided material for newspaper and magazine writers, showed rad-safe equipment and methods at county fairs, passed out a booklet called Atomic Tests in Nevada, and briefed state health officials in California, Nevada, Utah, and Arizona.“ How the public might react to renewed testing in Nevada strongly shaped Plumbbob planning. Thus, the Public Health Service’s special role and other
aspects of Plumbbob as well. The AEC had, for instance, complied with National Academy of Sciences guidelines not chiefly for reasons of safety; that, the academy report made clear, the AEC handled adequately. Rather the reason was public concern. Similar motives constrained operations. Ensuring safety mandated a strong research effort on fallout and actual doses received off site.45 Imposing safe limits, however, would not alone serve AEC ends. Equally vital, for Plumbbob no less than for former test programs, the AEC must persuade the public that nuclear weapons could be tested safely in Nevada. Continued use “of Nevada Test Site for full scale nuclear tests depends not only on achieving a ‘safe’ operating record,” observed the office of test information after Plumbbob, but also on the belief “that the degree of hazard or inconvenience to the public is justified and acceptable.”*¢ AEC fears of adverse public reaction sharply curtailed any advance notice of the 1957 series until a few months before the first shot. Fallout went unmentioned.47 The AEC-approved public information plan of February 1957 likewise omitted any special notice of fallout, although it did later acquire a radiation annex.*® None of these efforts at first proved very helpful. Officials
perceived “an atmosphere of almost panic fear of fallout... , much of it. . . an understandable response of people generally to the charges they had heard and read for more than three years [since Castle in 1954].’49
Atmospheric Testing Challenged 191 As Plumbbob moved into its full operational phase in May 1957, two events sharply increased the tension. Congressional hearings on fallout in late May and early June produced statement after statement about hazards, often calling for a halt to testing.»° Of perhaps greater impact was an article published in mid-May, “Clouds from Nevada,” by Paul Jacobs. Although dismissed by experts as biased and ill-informed, the widely noted article raised a host of disquieting questions about public safety and AEC actions.°! Public concern had, however, largely quieted by mid-July. Vigorous counterarguments, effective implementation of the public relations plan, and the largely trouble-free progress of testing did their work.>? Operation Plumbbob proceeded with scarcely a mishap. First came Project 57 in late April, just before full-scale Plumbbob testing began. Initially,
Project 57 was a single safety test, prompted by concerns related to the planned test of an air-to-air missile warhead. Air force studies had shown little chance of an accidental nuclear detonation if the missile hit the ground. But what if the warhead’s conventional explosive fired? How would the plutonium scatter? What biological hazards might it create? Could it be cleaned up? These were the key questions Project 57 was designed to answer. Five other safety tests followed during the next several months. All sought to confirm that accidentally firing a particular weapon’s high explosives would not cause a full-scale nuclear detonation. Overlapping Plumbbob, they were included as part of that series but in fact formed a separate safety series that merely used workers and supplies organized for the major testing.» Operation Plumbbob proper began with test Boltzmann on 28 May and ended with Morgan on 7 October 1957. Thirteen shots were fired from tethered balloons, nine from towers of various heights; the other two were John, the air-to-air missile warhead test, and Rainier, the first test designed for full underground containment. Balloons and high towers again proved their value. Radiological safety as reported after Plumbbob seemed largely routine. Of 9,000 individual radiation exposure records maintained for Plumbbob participants, 44 exceeded the 3-roentgen operational limit. Technically, only half that total counted as overexposures because the other 22 were aircrew members who stayed within the higher operational limits authorized in advance
for cloud samplers and flyers in the air-to-air missile test. Aircraft ground crews and a single strayed helicopter flight accounted for 11 overexposures. Most of the rest accrued from small exposures received over the course of the operation. Four reported instances of possible internal exposure caused some concern. Laboratory tests of body fluids, however, found nothing significant. The off-site program, too, appeared to be a great success. Fallout stayed well within operational guidelines, and complaints seemed muted, at least for the moment.*4
Exercises Desert Rock VII and VIII also took place during Plumbbob. Associated to some degree with all twenty-four Plumbbob tests, armed forces
indoctrination programs and technical projects brought more than 20,000
192 Atmospheric Testing Challenged troops to Camp Desert Rock.>> Maneuvers scheduled with two shots, Hood and Smoky, furnished settings for marine and army field trials of tactics for the atomic battlefield; at a third, Galileo, psychologists sought to test the reactions of troops seeing their first nuclear detonation.5° The Desert Rock radsafe section took charge of troop safety, supported by the 50th Chemical Service Platoon with supplies, equipment, and men.>’ According to the most recent analysis, of the more than 8,400 personnel with recorded exposures in Desert Rock VII and VUI, only 16 exceeded the 5-roentgen limit, though a number reached “warning levels.”’>’ One congressman asked about the effects of testing on servicemen; otherwise little in Plumbbob’s immediate aftermath suggested the drama it would trigger two decades later.°? Unexpectedly, Desert Rock VII and VIII also proved to be the last military exercises at the Nevada Test Site, although the armed forces maintained their roles in the test organization. Two months after Plumbbob ended, safety testing resumed with the socalled 58-Project NTS.© The second test, Coulomb-C on 9 December 1957, produced an unanticipated nuclear yield of 500 tons. Monitors found readings above 50 roentgens per hour on Mercury Highway 42 minutes after the shot. Fallout on Jackass Flats to the southwest forced personnel to take cover in buildings being constructed there for future nuclear rocket testing, then evacuate the area when fallout ceased. Film badge readings for Jackass Flats showed a maximum exposure of 0.12 roentgen.®! The cloud had risen to 13,000 feet and headed west. Although experts foresaw no significant threat, fallout detected in Los Angeles again briefly stirred public concern.® Preparations for Operation Hardtack I in the Pacific required two more
Nevada safety tests. They took place in late winter 1958 as Project 58ANTS.® Detonated in a tunnel, the first test, Venus, produced no fallout. Re-
covery efforts after the shot on 22 February, however, caused problems. Because they entered the tunnel wearing neither protective clothing nor respirators, two men got plutonium on their faces and in their noses; decontamination involved repeated washing and flushing.“ Quickly revised safety rules governed the next test, Uranus, which concluded Project 58A-NTS in midMarch 1958.6 The Nevada Test Site remained quiet for the next six months as work shifted to Enewetak and Operation Hardtack.
Hardtack and Argus Hardtack planning was under way even before Plumbbob began in Ne-
vada. Fallout concerns figured prominently from the outset. So did the prospect of disarmament, which might demand accelerating the program. On 9 August 1957, President Eisenhower approved Hardtack in principle, although he preferred fewer shots and a shorter schedule than the AEC proposed. He
Atmospheric Testing Challenged 193 also wanted nothing public for the time being.®’ Publicity came in midSeptember—a brief statement citing the need for testing “in the absence of a safeguarded disarmament agreement” and stressing the goal of reduced fallout.68 By month’s end the AEC and the Department of Defense had agreed on
a joint program to study how local fallout related to worldwide fallout.% What and how much to tell the public, seldom questioned in early Pacific testing, became major issues in 1958, as in 1956, under the pressure of fallout concerns. The Hardtack public information plan went through several drafts before reaching its final form.’° Complicating matters was the still growing campaign against nuclear tests
led by SANE, the lately formed National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. When the Soviet Union announced on 31 March 1958 a unilateral halt to all nuclear testing, test ban advocates in the United States urged cancellation of Hardtack.”! Partly to meet this challenge, the AEC and the Department of Defense discussed and approved opening one test to outsiders; it would
display a so-called clean bomb, one causing little or no fallout. Test ban opponents led by Edward Teller promised President Eisenhower an almost fallout-free bomb within six or seven years, if only they could continue the test program.’* Through the open Hardtack test they hoped to persuade opinion leaders in the United Nations and the press that a test program need not entail fallout in amounts great enough to alarm the public.” Unfortunately, weather-related test delays later aborted the planned open shot.”4 Within the Eisenhower administration, the long-standing debate on test policy was resolved in favor of seeking a halt to testing—but only after Hardtack ended.’?> Unaware of the secret administration decision, some test
opponents resolved to disrupt testing. Coast Guard cutters first seized the Golden Rule, later the Phoenix, when each vessel tried to sail into the restricted danger zone while Hardtack was in progress.”6
Joint Task Force 7, now commanded by a former AEC director of military application, Brig. Gen. Alvin Luedecke, was gearing up for Pacific operations a year or more before Hardtack began.’’ The pace, however, increased sharply as Plumbbob drew to a close.’? Late 1957 also saw Hardtack’s outlines growing more distinct.?? Ultimately, Hardtack I, as the Pacific phase of 1958 testing became known, comprised thirty-five shots. Joint Task Force 7 conducted the tests, mainly at Enewetak, from 28 April to 18 August 1958.
Hardtack continued the progression toward ever-larger test series. Just as Redwing in 1956 had included as many tests as all previous Pacific programs, so Hardtack I doubled the total through Redwing. Development was the purpose of most Hardtack I tests, along lines familiar from past test programs. Scientists from Los Alamos and Livermore planned and organized the tests to meet AEC objectives.®°
The program also included several tests more explicitly directed to military concerns about using nuclear weapons. To an extent, the AEC develop-
194 Atmospheric Testing Challenged ment program and the Department of Defense effects program ran separately and independently. Two underwater tests, Wahoo and Umbrella, addressed the navy’s long-standing interest in how underwater blasts affected ships and material. Three tests—Yucca, Teak, and Orange—used new techniques to study the new problems of air and missile defense. Yucca was carried aloft by balloon and fired over the ocean between Bikini and Enewetak. The other two were high-altitude shots launched by Redstone rocket from Johnston Island.®! Initially planned for Bikini, Teak and Orange raised serious questions about safety and excessive fallout. Studies allayed concerns about fallout but suggested the high-altitude flash could damage Marshallese eyes.22 After much debate, the tests went to Johnston Island, roughly two-thirds of the way along the 2,500-mile line from Bikini to Honolulu and 540 miles from the nearest innocent bystander.®3
Both the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project and the AEC had issued standard rad-safe rules for Enewetak and Pacific testing in August 1957.8 Joint Task Force 7 completed its Hardtack operations plan in October. All five task groups provided their own radiation monitoring and decontamination units. They also maintained supplies of protective clothing and instruments. Meeting rad-safe needs for the scientific task group fell to a task unit commanded by the experienced Gordon Jacks. Jacks’s unit also played a special rad-safe role for the task force as a whole: it provided film badging and monitor training, in addition to general laboratory and technical support for the other rad-safe units. Most of the manpower came from the army’s lst Radiological Safety Support Unit, but the 132-man task unit drew on all branches of the service and civilians as well. Jacks and his team maintained essentially equivalent organizations at Bikini and Enewetak and also supported the Johnston Island tests.®>
The task force intended to allow its members to receive no more than 3.75 roentgens during any thirteen-week period, not more than 5 roentgens for the entire operation. Only Task Force Commander Luedecke could grant higher limits and then only if the choice lay between overexposure and mission success. Hardtack, like Redwing in 1956, made sampler pilots and crew members a special case. They could receive as much as 10 roentgens during the operation, up to 20 in an emergency, without special authorization. Regulations for Hardtack, as for Plumbbob, also included a lifetime limit,
for the same reasons: some Hardtack participants, especially fliers, might have received high exposures in past tests. Operational limits alone could not deal with this risk. Thus the new standard. Joint Task Force 7 imposed a strict exposure ceiling of 5 roentgens on everyone, fliers included, whose total accumulated dose up to 1 January 1958 equaled or exceeded his age-prorated dose—5 rem multiplied by the difference between current age and eighteen years—or who would exceed 50 rem by the thirtieth birthday (rather than the
Atmospheric Testing Challenged 195 60 rem derived from the 5 [age-18] formula). Practically, however, this problem was largely sidestepped for fliers by using more of them and spreading missions over more crews.°®
Experience suggested other changes from past practice. Weather forecasts improved with better data collection. As always, good forecasts minimized fallout hazards. Tests foreseen to be most difficult from an exposure standpoint—in other words, most likely to produce heavy fallout—were scheduled
later in the series; thus key personnel need not inadvertently exhaust their limits too early. Hardtack I also deployed a far more elaborate off-site radsafe network than earlier Pacific test programs. Through a contract with the Public Health Service, the task force established manned warning stations on several inhabited atolls within the Marshall Islands but outside the proving ground. Existing weather stations within a 1,000-mile radius augmented the system with gamma data. Cloud tracking and the collection of surface samples over a wide area also were keyed to an expanded rad-safe program.®? By and large, the Hardtack safety program worked well enough to forestall any major problem either on or off site. Ground crews handling radioactive cloud samples did begin pushing authorized exposure limits. Identifying them as key personnel, the air force task group requested they be allowed a maximum exposure of 10 rather than 5 roentgens. Task Force Commander Luedecke granted the increase. At the same time and for the same reasons, maintenance crews working on sampler aircraft went to an 8-rem limit.®8 Only one incident exposed a large number of task force members. Fallout from the Fir test at Bikini on 12 May 1958 reached the base islands at Enewetak and persisted for two and a half days. Estimated exposure for those stationed on the base islands amounted to about 1.5 roentgens.89 The AEC support task group felt compelled to request raising the operational limit for thirty-five key members of its contractor, Holmes & Narver, from 5 to 10 roentgens. Luedecke granted the request, on grounds that losing these men would seriously hamper operations.” The Hardtack I record stood up well against other Pacific test programs.
In contrast to Operation Redwing, observed rad-safe commander Gordon Jacks, “on-site contamination during Hardtack was remarkably light.”?! The mean exposure for Hardtack participants was 0.87 roentgen, half the average achieved in Redwing or Castle. Of 19,651 participants badged, only 86 (0.4 percent) exceeded the mandated Hardtack limit, 5 roentgens; the highest exposure recorded was 12.41 roentgens. All but six of the eighty-six, however, including the highest, were air force sampler pilots and ground crews, who had been authorized special limits of 10 or 8 roentgens.”* A single off-site incident proved of little consequence. Two Japanese research vessels outside the danger zone detected fallout after the Poplar shot of 12 July. Crews acted promptly to remove the hazard, and the highest exposure could have
196 Atmospheric Testing Challenged } amounted to no more than an estimated 0.085 roentgen. Both governments wished to avoid publicity, and the matter was quickly resolved.% Operation Hardtack, Phase I, ended on 18 August 1958. Shortly after Hardtack I concluded at Enewetak, the navy conducted Operation Argus, a secret test series in the South Atlantic. Argus more nearly resembled a grand experiment than the usual trial of weapon design or effect. The idea came from a brilliant Greek physicist-inventor working for Herbert York, former head of Livermore now acting as chief scientist for the new Advanced Research Projects Agency in the Department of Defense. Shocked as so many were by the Soviet Sputnik and what it implied for long-range rockets, Nicholas C. Christofilos proposed to erect an electromagnetic shield against ballistic missiles. The question Argus sought to answer thus had important military implications: Would a high-yield weapon exploded at high altitude create a long-lasting radiation belt that could disrupt communications and degrade weapon function?" Task Force 88 comprised 9 ships and 4,500 men. One of the ships, USS Norton Sound, served as launchpad for three modified three-stage ballistic missiles. Each missile carried a low-yield (1-2 kiloton) nuclear warhead to explode hundreds of miles high. Against the remote chance that a malfunction might occur, all ships stood ready to follow standard procedures to make themselves maximally watertight and airtight. The tests took place in late August and early September 1958 near Gough Island, an uninhabited British possession south of Tristan da Cunha. Detonated at very high altitude, the Argus warheads threatened no radiation exposure to the task force. Instruments and film badges at sea level, in fact, detected no fallout from the tests.?> Argus showed the earth’s magnetic field too weak to sustain a long-lived radiation shield, and the project did not long remain secret. The story was on the front page of the New York Times on 19 March 1959.%
Toward the Moratorium What became the second phase of Operation Hardtack was strongly shaped by public concern about fallout, still growing both within the United States and abroad. Apparent prospects for some kind of ban on testing had improved considerably. During summer 1958, while Hardtack I proceeded in the Pacific, U.S. scientists attended an international conference in Geneva to discuss technical problems of monitoring a test ban. Results of the so-called Geneva Conference of Experts convinced American and British governments to propose a moratorium. They announced themselves ready to suspend tests for one year if the Soviet Union, too, refrained from testing and would agree to discuss a complete test ban. Negotiations were to begin 31 October 1958.77 The imminent halt to testing prompted extraordinary efforts to complete as
Atmospheric Testing Challenged 197 many crucial tests as possible before the deadline. This was one reason for the large number of tests scheduled in Hardtack I and also accounted for the rapid testing program in Nevada planned as Operation Millrace but renamed Hardtack II before it began.” The Geneva conference adjourned in late August 1958. Immediately, President Eisenhower approved an accelerated program to be conducted in Nevada
before the moratorium took effect. Midnight on 31 October was the firm deadline. Hardtack II began with a safety test on 12 September. Initial plans called for 18 shots, 11 full-scale tests and 7 safety tests. As testing revealed new needs, the total grew to 38, divided between 20 weapon and 18 safety tests, a third of them underground.!© The entire program took hardly seven weeks, ending with two safety tests
and a weapon test on 30 October. On 31 October the balloon-borne Adams test device remained in the air all day ready to fire. Atmospheric conditions apt to cause a damaging shock wave persisted, however, and public safety took precedence. Officials canceled Adams, the thirty-eighth test, at midnight.!0! Most devices tested in Hardtack II had very low yields. Eleven of the weapon tests were under 1 kiloton. Only one, the tunnel shot Blanca that was last in the series, had a yield as high as 22 kilotons. Among the safety tests, Neptune had the highest yield, 115 tons, while three had no measurable yield at al].102
Many tests and a strict deadline presented a formidable on-site rad-safe task. Time to prepare was short and workers’ hours long. In contrast to the hundred or more rad-safe monitors at Plumbbob, REECo could muster only thirty-nine for Hardtack II. Monitor numbers and workloads, however, told only part of the story. Radiological safety had by now become well organized under a permanent staff following standard procedures for the Nevada Test Site. Experienced monitors and technical experts knew the risks and how to cope with them. While work under such hectic conditions could scarcely be called routine—one memorable day saw four tests conducted—safety needs were well understood and largely met.!%
Exposure standards for Hardtack If differed slightly from the preceding Nevada series. The AEC imposed a gamma plus neutron exposure limit of 3 roentgens per calendar quarter and no more than 5 roentgens per year. Operational limits for cloud samplers were once again higher. Pilots could receive up to 10 roentgens for the current series, 15 roentgens for Hardtack I and If combined.!% None approached that limit. Although seven pilots exceeded 3 roentgens, the highest, at 7.7 roentgens, remained well within the authorized 10 roentgens. Technical overexposures affected only 9 of nearly 1,400 Hardtack II participants, the highest recorded being 10.9 roentgens.! Low yields and many underground shots made off-site fallout a small problem for Hardtack If. Environmental monitoring had long concerned the AEC, however, and the effort expanded sharply during 1958 in response to
198 Atmospheric Testing Challenged mounting criticism. Part of the pressure came from the growing national move-
ment to ban the bomb, but specific local issues began to intrude as well. Questions about downwind fallout in Nevada and southern Utah after Plhimbbob required more firmly based answers than had once sufficed.!© Milk sampling, begun almost casually under pressure during Upshot-Knothole in 1953, had by 1958 become a sustained and systematic effort.!©’ In contrast, increased water sampling reflected a new issue, the risk of groundwater contamination from underground testing.!°8 Every aspect of how testing might affect nearby areas came under more intense study as Hardtack II approached.! Much of this effort involved the Public Health Service. Like Teapot and Plumbbob, Hardtack II relied on health service officers for off-site rad-safe. The same 3.9-roentgen annual off-site limit adopted for Plumbbob remained in force. Once again, the officers played two major roles, watching public safety and soothing public fears.!!° Monitoring on the ground followed famil-
lar practice, but the scope of air sampling expanded substantially. Unexpectedly, ground and air sampling failed to match. “Perhaps the most striking fact,” remarked the off-site rad-safe staff in its final report on Hardtack II, “was the lack of correlation between external gamma as observed by ground monitors and the amounts of airborne radioactivity obtained by air sampling technique.”!"! This implied no threat to the surrounding population: exposure rates observed led to totals far below the 3.9-roentgen limit. Such findings nonetheless underlined how much remained to be learned about fallout.!” Detectable fallout away from the test site, though minor, raised more questions after Hardtack II. The AEC could lay quickly to rest specific concerns linked to recent tests.!!3 New reports of fallout months after testing ceased proved far more troublesome. Radioactive contamination of food became a mounting issue. Particularly vexing were renewed charges of crop contamination from Minnesota, where the issue had already surfaced early in 1958.!4 Strontium-90 in Minnesota wheat was only the most stubborn of several hard problems to face the AEC and the White House early in 1959.!!5 According to one historian, in fact, by spring 1959, “the American people were in the grip of a full-scale radiation scare.”!!© In contrast to 1957, however, congressional hearings in May 1959 on “Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Tests” seemed more help than hindrance to the AEC."” Apparent contradictions at the hearings between Defense and AEC views on fallout hazards, however, fueled old doubts about AEC veracity. Even before the hearings, President Eisenhower had felt compelled to declare, “To my knowledge, there has been no suppression of information on fallout.”!!8 Soon afterward, he formed a committee to decide if the AEC should receive
a measure of relief from its “dual responsibilities for the development of weapons . . . on one hand, and establishment of standards for protection on the other.’!!9
The joint study by the AEC, the Department of Health, Education, and
Atmospheric Testing Challenged 199 Welfare, and the Bureau of the Budget concluded in mid-June 1959. It recom-
mended that “evaluation of the radiological health risk of nuclear tests’ not rest solely with the AEC. A main reason was the link “in the public mind” between the AEC and nuclear weapons. Consequently, “public statements by AEC officials regarding the effects of fall-out are viewed in certain quarters with skepticism as to their adequacy and objectivity.” Radiation standard setting in other hands “would relieve the AEC of the potentially inhibiting influence of the conflict of interest charge.” It also would help assure the public “that health considerations are adequately presented at the time basic decisions regarding nuclear tests are made.”!20 Established by executive order on 14 August 1959, the Federal Radiation Council, chaired by the secretary of health, education, and welfare, would as-
sume a major role in rating hazards and setting standards when testing resumed.!2! Or so its sponsors hoped. In practice, the council proved a weak reed, although it began well. Its series of reports in the early 1960s did, as Merril Eisenbud observed, “contain much of the thinking that has governed radiation protection in the United States.”!22 Unfortunately, perhaps, it lacked a Clear mandate, to say nothing of staff and authority, and seemed particularly indecisive in the area widely believed most to demand action—fallout.!23 We shall return to some of these issues in due course. Suffice it to say here that by 1970, when the new Environmental Protection Agency assumed its task, the Federal Radiation Council’s passing was scarcely noticed. In AEC eyes, meanwhile, much of the problem still seemed merely an illinformed public. Accordingly, the commission launched a massive effort to locate and declassify the relevant facts.!*4 Just what the facts were, however, posed real questions by late 1958. After its existence became public in 1957,
Project Sunshine tended to become merely the strontium program, still important but no longer so central to AEC biological research. Commissioner Libby continued to deny publicly any undue hazard from fallout.!25 As fallout concerns deepened, the flow of demands, disputes, requests, and challenges from Libby’s desk expanded.!7° Criticism also grew as research seemed to
raise more questions than it answered.!2’ Proliferating fallout studies produced great amounts of data, but neither their validity nor their interpretation seemed as clear by 1958 as they had a few years earlier.!28 The new fallout studies branch in the AEC Division of Biology and Medicine sought to bring order to the confused state of affairs. By the time testing resumed in 196], as we shall see, the nature of several problems had become much clearer, even if answers had not.!2?
Officially, the United States began its test moratorium on 1 November 1958. Enough data were on hand from seventy-two tests earlier in 1958 to keep everyone busy for the next year or two.!30 The AEC, however, had only reluctantly accepted a halt to aboveground nuclear weapon testing. Assuming
the moratorium would not last, it held itself ready to begin again at a mo-
200 Atmospheric Testing Challenged ment’s notice.'3! Less certain was whether or not renewed testing would again take place above ground. Proposed underground or deep space testing seemed to some experts mainly stopgaps, not methods of choice if the best data were
to be obtained. Other experts studied results of underground tests since Rainier in 1957 and found prospects more hopeful.!32 Obviously, this was an
issue neither history nor theory could resolve. Satisfactory answers could come only from further testing, and that must await an end to the moratorium. Meanwhile, though, the Nevada Test Site remained active.
Nuclear Rockets and Ramjets in Nevada The moratorium applied only to weapons, leaving the AEC and its contractors free to pursue other projects. One reflected concerns about Soviet prowess in space. The first Sputnik had been launched a year earlier, and the U.S. response was only beginning to take shape in the newly created National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).!33 Developing nuclear reactors for rocket and ramjet engines seemed urgent. Both the Rover rocket and Pluto ramjet programs had begun under air force auspices several years earlier, Legally, however, only the AEC could develop nuclear reactors.!34
First off the drawing board was Project Rover, an attempt to develop nuclear-powered rockets for space missions. Initially, both Los Alamos and Livermore worked on reactor designs. In 1957, the AEC assigned Los Ala-
mos to build a series of Kiwi reactors, flightless but otherwise complete Rover test units using liquid hydrogen as both coolant and propellant.!% When Los Alamos took charge of Kiwi, Livermore switched to Project Pluto and Tory II. Pluto was to show that a ramjet engine could use nuclear power rather than chemical combustion as its heat source; Tory II was the nonflight test reactor (Tory I was a discarded paper design).!3° Facilities for both Kiwi and Tory II trials were built at Jackass Flats, partly on land newly transferred to the Nevada Test Site from the adjacent Nellis Air Force Range, the former Las Vegas Bombing and Gunnery Range.}97 Radiation safety for such trials aroused concern from the outset. “Even a very casual consideration of the radiation levels and other hazards,” wrote Health Division Leader Shipman from Los Alamos in January 1956, “indi-
cates that. . . matters of health and safety . . . [are] nothing which can be left until the last minute.” Involving the AEC and Livermore as well as Los Alamos, reactor testing at the Nevada Test Site in Shipman’s view demanded careful health and safety plans “built into the facility as it grows.” Staffing could wait, but “it is certainly not too early to request a decision as to who shall have the basic responsibility for health and safety matters 1n the area.” Whoever might be in charge, “he deserves an opportunity to get into this field
early and to become familiar with the work and the people involved.’!8
Atmospheric Testing Challenged 201 Though Project Rover was still in flux, Los Alamos Director Norris Bradbury endorsed Shipman’s concerns. }39
When Los Alamos N-Division took sole charge of Rover in 1957, safety strongly shaped test plans. That part of Rover conducted in Nevada, Kiwi testing to begin with, became Project 400. The Kiwi reactors were named after a flightless bird for good reason. Intended only to provide data proving the basic concept, they looked nothing like flight engines and at first used gaseous rather than liquid hydrogen as coolant and propellant.!“° Intense Kiwi fallout seemed likely only a short distance downwind, well within the test site if not the Project 400 area. As N-Division Director Raemer E. Schreiber remarked, however, “not much is known about the fallout pattern from a Kiwi device.”’ Even in normal operation, “a substantial fraction of the fission products will escape into the propellant stream,” he observed. If too many things went wrong, “all of the fission fragments could be spewed out in a reactor burnout or blowup near the end of a run.” Testing would require winds blowing north or northwest and would halt with a wind shift.!*! Schreiber also sought Shipman’s advice on rad-safe issues related to monitoring, fallout, and posttest work.!#2 Shipman’s Health Division played an active part in the Rover program, but
its rad-safe role never moved beyond limited special services and advice.!*3 Responsibility for radiation safety at Jackass Flats, as elsewhere on the test site, fell chiefly to REECo. Shipman briefed William J. Brady, reactor branch
leader in REECo’s rad-safe division, about his concerns. By mid-1958, REECo had completed its Project 400 rad-safe plans.'* Brady began to rehearse rad-safe procedures with the workers who would assemble and disassemble Kiwi reactors at the test site. Los Alamos expected to have KiwiA installed in its test cell and checked out by the end of the year, with tests starting early in 1959,!4 Despite tight schedules, though, the AEC seemed slow to set radiation limits for Nevada reactor tests. A July 1958 meeting brought the AEC directors of military application, reactor development, and biology and medicine to Nevada to learn about Rover, Pluto, and other projects. Radiation safety was among the major topics on the agenda, but at year’s end the only agreed standard was holding off-site exposure to 3.9 roentgens or less.!46 Fortunately, Los Alamos Health Division studies strongly suggested that off-site fallout presented little problem. Hazardous fallout even hard by the test unit was likely to be both scattered and short-lived; the worst case might stretch it briefly to five miles, still well within test site borders.!47 Meanwhile, routine problems delayed the Kiwi-A full-power test until July 1959. Exposure standards both on site and off had by then become much more fully defined.!48 Project 400 used the same on-site standards as Hardtack, though now expressed in dose units (rem) rather than exposure units (roentgens): up to 3 rem in any thirteen-week period but no more than 5 rem
202 Atmospheric Testing Challenged in a year. Off-site limits for routine testing, however, had tightened to “onehalf (0.5) roentgen (estimated dose) gamma for each calendar year during the period of cessation of weapons testing.”’ Before any test run, “a hazard evaluation should show that it will be extremely unlikely that,” should an accident occur, “the estimated dose of off-site persons should not exceed 3.9r (estimated dose) external gamma exposure.” Test planners assumed that these guidelines also “will, in general, limit exposure to internal emitters to acceptable levels.’’!49
As minor a threat as fallout appeared, testers neglected nothing to forestall
problems and cross-check their judgment. They deployed a full range of weather services, air samplers, monitoring devices, and other well-tried radsafe techniques. Radiation safety and fallout figured prominently in pretest briefings.45° On 1 July 1959, the first full-power Kiwi-A run was a spectacular success. Lit with a methane torch, a jet of hydrogen heated in the reactor core shot hundreds of feet into the air from the upward-pointing nozzle. Although reactor and hydrogen were intensely radioactive, fallout proved inconsequential: a very narrow and spotty track extended several miles northward. Burning hydrogen produced no visible cloud, but smoke added to the exhaust allowed sampling aircraft to follow the airborne activity. They found mere traces beyond test site borders. Reactor disassembly in a building designed and built for that purpose near the test cell, the Reactor Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly building, proved more troublesome. To make it mobile, Kiwi was bolted to a railcar. Technicians found the bolts frozen, remote equipment in the building useless. One by one, sixteen men dashed into the disassembly
bay wrench in hand, twisted a bolt loose, and fled. They averaged under 2 rem per bolt.!>!
Despite some rough spots, the rest of the Kiwi-A series produced no insurmountable problems.!52 Radiation safety again seemed not the least troublesome, despite new national guidelines.'53 Project 400 Director Keith Boyer assured Washington that future Kiwi testing would easily comply with Federal Radiation Council guides, “for either normal operation or for the maximum credible accident.”!54 He was as good as his word, despite a spectacular failure. Modified versions of Kiwi-A performed nearly as well as the original,
though the program suffered its share of problems. A hydrogen explosion during one test could be disregarded from the viewpoint of radiation safety but not the results of a full-power run during July 1960. Kiwi-A lost its core and spread radioactive debris a thousand feet from the test cell, posing a serious cleanup problem.'55 These were correctable problems, and Kiwi-A3 did
better in its October full-power run.!*° Project 400 was off to a splendid start.!97
Success bred expansion. The air force had transferred Rover to NASA in 1958. Two years later NASA and the AEC joined forces in a nuclear propulsion office.458 Encouraged by Kiwi-A, they launched two new programs—
Atmospheric Testing Challenged 203 NERVA (Nuclear Engine for Rocket Vehicle Application) and RIFT (Reactor In-Flight Test)—and began placing development contracts with industry.!5?
But Kiwi-A accounted only in part for growing ambitions. In May 1961, President John F. Kennedy committed the nation to a lunar landing by decade’s end. Accelerating NASA’s program meant a brighter prospect for nuclear rockets. Expanded and renamed, the joint NASA-AEC effort became the Space Nuclear Propulsion Office (SNPO) in July 1961. Early the next year SNPO (pronounced Snippo) formed the Nuclear Rocket Development Station at the Nevada Test Site to pursue NERVA and RIFT.!© Nuclear rocket testing had posed few radiation safety problems during the Kiwi-A tests of 1959 and 1960. Although radioiodines caused special concern, the new Kiwi-B design raised only minor safety issues.!®! Radiation safety, in fact, seemed no more difficult for the Kiwi-B than for the Kiwi-A series.!62 Not so the actual testing. Optimism about the Kiwi-B program bred from Kiwi-A success proved ill-founded. Delayed until December 1961, the first Kiwi-B test went very roughly—literally.!©3 Inexplicable vibration during firing posed hard-to-solve problems for Project 400. As delays mounted, the Rover program’s bright promise dimmed. Kiwi-B testing lasted until 1964 and imposed major program changes.!® Development testing after Kiwi proceeded along two lines under SNPO auspices. One produced a series of Kiwi-based research reactors: Phoebus and Pewee tested in the late 1960s, Nuclear Furnace in 1972. The other line
centered on NERVA and included a series of NRX (Nuclear Reactor Experimental) reactors tested in the mid-1960s and the XE prototype engine, tested at full power in 1969.!® Nuclear rocket engines of ever-greater power and longer firing time raised safety questions, both old and new.'!® Individual tests also required careful safety planning.'©’7 Complicating matters was a new rad-safe group: Pan American World Airways received the support contract, including rad-safe services, for the Nuclear Rocket Development Station.'6 Difficulties, however, proved modest. Though real enough, especially for test cell work, the danger never exceeded the competence of the rad-safe teams.!© Nuclear rocket testing was closely watched and strictly controlled during and after firing.!”° On site, nothing proved too hard to handle.!7! Off-site problems scarcely existed.!72
Technologically, the Rover program achieved much that its planners sought. Technical success, however, did not mean program survival. Developed too slowly, NERVA lost its hoped-for role in Project Apollo’s manned lunar missions. When NASA stopped making Saturn V launch vehicles in 1969, NERVA also lost its booster. Implicitly at least, it no longer had any purpose. Without Saturn there would be no manned missions to Mars, the only role now conceived for NERVA. The nuclear rocket program was canceled in 1973. With it went SNPO in Washington and its Nuclear Rocket Development Station in Nevada.!73 Although a few buildings are now back in
204 Atmospheric Testing Challenged use, only tumbleweeds and jackrabbits frequented the abandoned site on Jackass Flats for more than two decades. Pluto’s career differed only in detail from Rover’s. Pluto, unlike Rover, remained an air force program, for which the AEC and Livermore provided the nuclear reactor. Technically distinct as required by law, air force and AEC programs held much in common—a normal practice in such complex programs, as the navy’s nuclear submarine development attests.!74 The same general who headed the air force’s Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Office simultaneously served as aircraft reactors branch chief (later upgraded to assistant director for aircraft reactors) in the AEC Division of Reactor Development
and as assistant deputy air force chief of staff, development, for nuclear systems.!?>
Developing the Tory II test reactor for Pluto, Livermore’s task, was only part of the nuclear ramjet program, but it was a vital part. Any chance of using nuclear ramjets to power missiles depended on Tory II’s success.!”° The Tory II test program in Nevada was called Project 401. It shared Jackass Flats with Kiwi testing (Project 400), each program in its own area.!”7 Projects 401 and 400 also shared early safety concerns, but the rad-safe system already in
place for Kiwi testing sufficed as well for Tory II-A, the nonflight version of the test reactor intended to prove the concept.!”8 Radiation safety caused no problems during the four Tory II-A tests conducted between May and October 1961.19 Tory II-A was a resounding success—so successful, in fact, that the AEC
decided to skip Tory H-B and move ahead with Tory II-C, the flight version.!80 In 1964, Tory II-C proved as great a success as Tory [-A.!*! But Tory
II-C had by then become, in essence, an AEC program. The Department of Defense failed to share the AEC’s enthusiasm. Despite a test program on time and under budget, the air force canceled Pluto at almost the moment of its greatest success. What happened? For one thing, the stakes were going up. Integrating ramjet with missile was no small task in its own right. Perhaps more crucial, flight testing would sharply increase the program’s cost to the air force.!82 And flight tests posed another problem.
Because no test range within the United States was large enough, flight testing seemed headed for the Pacific Missile Range. A missile powered by nuclear ramjet could leave fallout in its wake. Too slight and too widely scattered to pose any health risk, it might nonetheless stir worldwide public feeling if detected. Hard work could reduce but not eliminate the problem. The 1963 test ban treaty added another complication. Radioactive exhaust would not technically break the treaty, which applied only to debris from nuclear explosions, though some wondered if that were too fine a distinction. Unfortunately, that was not the only threat flight testing might pose. Accidentally or intentionally exploded in flight, a missile would scatter radioactive debris; such explosion-caused debris outside U.S. borders might be construed as a
Atmospheric Testing Challenged 205 treaty violation.'®3 Presumably, such issues could have been resolved. The real problem for Pluto lay elsewhere. By 1962, when the crucial funding decisions for the nuclear ramjet came due, the United States had already developed and deployed Atlas on land and Polaris at sea.!8* Chemical ramjets powering cruise missiles like Navaho had competed and lost.!85 Nuclear ramjets shared the stigma. Ballistic missile systems now formed two legs of the strategic deterrence triad, and a new manned bomber to replace the third leg—even then referred to as the aging B-52—had far more air force support than an exotic new cruise missile. In the Pentagon under Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, a defined mission was sine qua non for program approval. The air force could or would find no mission for a missile powered by nuclear ramjet. Technical success helped Pluto no more than it would Rover.!*6
Tunnels, Shafts, and Craters For almost three years the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union refrained from testing nuclear weapons. During the thirty-four-
month moratorium, however, a fourth nation joined the nuclear powers. France conducted four small aboveground nuclear tests between February 1960 and April 1961.!8? Despite a remote testing ground deep in the Sahara desert, fallout was detected worldwide and old fears stirred briefly.!88 Concern subsided after the fourth test on 24 April 1961, when France declared it the last in the series.!®? But the self-imposed test moratorium observed by the other three powers since 31 October 1958 survived only a few months longer. On 31 August 1961, the Soviet government announced its intent to resume testing. This came as no surprise; the Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests meeting in Geneva since late 1958 clearly had not gone well.!9° Negotiations ended in January 1962 with deadlock and mutual recriminations.!9! Meanwhile the United States also opened a new round of testing.
Both the AEC and the Department of Defense had opposed President Eisenhower’s decision to begin the Geneva talks. When Kennedy succeeded Eisenhower as president in January 1961, he faced strong pressure to resume testing. Although the new AEC chairman, Glenn T. Seaborg, favored a test ban treaty as his predecessors had not, pressure continued to mount.!% As early as May 1961 the General Advisory Committee urged the AEC to “be ready to resume weapons testing . . . aS soon as possible after . . . permission
might be given by the President.” Preparations for underground tests in Nevada “should be carried to within a few days of firing time.’’!%3 The director of military application thought that demanded too high a level of prepara-
tion but noted that “in-house studies . . . indicate testing could be resumed,
206 Atmospheric Testing Challenged on a limited scale, in perhaps a few weeks from authorization.”!%4* Though still hoping for success at Geneva, the president in June 1961 allowed preliminary planning to start.!9 When the Soviet Union resumed testing, the United States could follow suit in short order.
The new Soviet program began rapidly. It already counted three atmospheric tests, including a startling 50-megaton shot, when President Kennedy on 5 September 1961 announced “the resumption of nuclear tests in the labo-
ratory and underground, with no fall-out.’ Radioactivity from Soviet tests spreading around the world had revived the fallout issue.!%’ Initially, therefore, the United States restricted itself to testing underground. Operation Nou-
gat began on 15 September 1961, two weeks after the first Soviet test. The series also marked the start of year-round testing at the Nevada Test Site. Nougat, in other words, simply named the forty-four tests in Nevada during the fiscal year ending 30 June 1962. All Nougat tests but one were engineered to be contained underground, mostly in vertical shafts but also in horizontal tunnels. The single exception, Danny Boy on 5 March 1962, was a so-called crater-type excavation test, buried only deeply enough to limit rather than prevent the escape of radioactivity.!%
Cratering required a test device emplaced in a shallow shaft, which allowed the blast to hurl rock debris into the air. Danny Boy used a half-kiloton
device at the bottom of a 110-foot shaft drilled in basalt. Only a fraction of the fission products would escape. Residual radioactivity would remain mostly underground, trapped by ejected rock falling back into the crater. What did escape would not rise very high in the air and so would not travel far.199 This technique meant little threat of off-site fallout reaching even the stringent dose limit recommended for members of the public by the Federal Radiation Council, 0.5 rem per year, much less the 3.0 limit imposed during the last Nevada test series. Still, as Seaborg noted, “such a test will be neither confined completely underground nor purely atmospheric. It could be classed
in either category.” The AEC preferred to class Danny Boy as an underground test, and President Kennedy concurred.2 Danny Boy performed as expected. “Airborne radioactivity and fallout were quite heavy close in, but by the time the cloud had traveled on the order of 35 miles, both had dropped to a small fraction,” concluded the Public Health Service. “No harmful exposures occurred to the off-site population.”?! Whether in shaft or tunnel, Nougat planners intended to contain underground all products of nuclear explosions and still obtain the data they needed. Radioactivity contained meant fallout averted and public concern quieted. Underground testing promised another plus, saving time and money by cut-
ting weather delays. This promise proved, at least in part, false; weather could not be ignored if any chance of venting existed. Unfortunately, events soon showed venting to be all too likely. Underground testing also raised questions about possible seismic damage or groundwater contamination. Be-
Atmospheric Testing Challenged 207 fore Operation Plumbbob in 1957, when the AEC was planning its first fully contained underground test, studies concluded the risks were small.?° The site for that test was a 2,000-foot horizontal tunnel mined through volcanic tuff 900 feet below the top of Rainier Mesa. On 19 September 1957, the test named Rainier (after the mesa), the first designed and engineered to be completely contained underground, was a complete success. It had a yield of 1.7 kilotons, and no radioactivity escaped the tunnel. Another major question,
whether or not good data could be obtained from underground tests, also received a positive response.2%
Operation Plumbbob had included three underground safety tests, as did 58- (and 58A-) Project NTS, which followed. Three took place in tunnels, three in unstemmed shafts, the latter merely holes open to the surface and plugged with concrete. Even such limited measures as shallow burial and plugs reduced the venting of radioactive debris by a factor of ten or more, if nuclear fission occurred. The technique was used only for safety tests, however, designed to hold far less risk of airborne radioactivity than fullscale tests. Stemming, later the normal practice, meant refilling the shaft with rock and sand after the test device was emplaced.™ Half the safety tests in Hardtack II were underground, six in unstemmed shafts and three in tunnels.2°5 Hardtack II also included four weapon tests in tunnels. Only Logan, however, fired on 16 October 1958 with a yield of 5 kilotons, was fully contained. The others vented to the atmosphere.? Containment posed tough engineering problems, as experience had shown. When underground testing assumed greater importance in 1961, efforts to solve these problems increased as well. The scope of mining and drilling under unusual and difficult conditions made industrial safety at the Nevada Test Site a large problem. Industrial safety, in fact, routinely commanded hard day-to-day work.?°’ So, too, did campaigns for safe driving. “Despite the well publicized accidents,” observed the leader of the Los Alamos Test Division, “and the repeated warnings to drive safely that have been issued at NTS, the use of motor vehicles, on and off the Site, is probably the number one risk to our people.”2° It was a familiar pattern. Since the very beginning of nuclear weapons development in World War IJ, mundane hazards wreaked the most damage, though they seldom aroused the most concern. Motor vehicles always ranked among the leading causes of injury and death at the Nevada Test Site. Radiological safety nonetheless held center stage even when other safety
efforts demanded much work. Reliably containing underground nuclear tests thus remained the most salient problem. Why containment failed proved easy enough to answer in broad terms, but fully grasping the problems and learning how to deal with them took longer. There were two major reasons. The first was simply that testing demanded data. Experimental and diagnostic needs meant pipes, cables, and other conduits or structures through which to observe and measure what happened. Ra-
208 Atmospheric Testing Challenged dioactivity sometimes escaped through the same channels. Imperfect knowledge of test site geology and hydrology created the second class of problems. An undiscovered fault in rock around shaft or tunnel could be a source of weakness. So could moisture. The greater its water content, the less compressible the rock and the more likely to transmit greater ground motion and shock to the surface. If much water flashed to steam, pressure could multiply enormously.?!°
Radiation safety standards remained unchanged, for workers and off-site public alike, as work moved underground.2!! What did change was the nature of the hazards. Initially, on-site results pleased test officials. Although twenty-six of forty-four Nougat shots failed to be fully contained, high readings mostly occurred only in shot areas. Recovery efforts sometimes waited on venting, but no one engaged in that work received serious exposures in the immediate aftermath of tests.2!2 Accumulated exposures to miners at the test site, however, soon posed problems because their work was vital and their numbers limited. Experienced miners were scarce, so exposure could not easily be spread over larger numbers of workers. As we shall see, over a hundred miners recorded internal and external overexposures during fall 1961. When AEC headquarters denied requests from Nevada to raise allowed limits for workers underground, tighter controls on workers and new tunnel rules helped ease the crisis.2!3 External gamma exposure was not the only radiation hazard workers faced.
Underground testing, in fact, sharply limited the spread of radionuclides, which remained highly concentrated underground. Low-altitude clouds from venting underground tests might expose a few people on or near the test site, but the special circumstances of underground tests—relatively confined space
into which workers might enter or drill soon after a shot—increased other kinds of danger. Obtaining radionuclide debris samples after a test was just as important underground as above. Mining into tunnels or drilling into shafts
to reach instruments or the shot cavities might expose test site workers to breathing airborne radioactivity. Radionuclides of two elements proved particularly troublesome: one was tritium, an active isotope of hydrogen; the other, radioiodines.?!4
Atmospheric weapons tests dispersed or produced large amounts of tritium. This heavy isotope of hydrogen has a half-life of 12.4 years. Because it emits only a weak beta particle on decay, it is not an external radiation hazard. Like hydrogen, though, tritium forms water that spreads swiftly throughout the body. Inside the cell it can cause damage. This never threatened the general public because tritium does not last long in the body. Natural processes flush half of internally deposited tritium within ten days, its so-called biological half-life. Thus only breathing very high concentrations of tritiated water vapor, or prolonged skin exposure, may cause serious problems.2) Just such dangers affected underground testing.
Atmospheric Testing Challenged 209 Detonated in confined spaces, thermonuclear devices in particular might well produce local amounts of gaseous tritium and tritiated water above allowed limits. Troublesome levels of trittum showed up even with fission devices, when testing first went underground in the late 1950s. Monitors at the Nevada Test Site learned to keep track of tritium in urine, but that was not enough. In fall 1961, the miners who had already received near-limit gamma exposures were reassigned to work in a clean tunnel; that is, one believed to be relatively free of radiation. The new work site solved the gamma problem but also unexpectedly put them at risk of high tritium doses from a previous test when they accidentally broke into an adjacent tunnel. Only during this episode were techniques devised to monitor air concentrations of tritiated water vapor in the presence of other more energetic beta emitters before entry occurred.?!6
Radioiodine became another major problem underground. Nuclear fission produces several isotopes of iodine, iodine-131, with a half-life of eight days being the longest-lived; half-life and activity are inversely correlated, so the shorter-lived isotopes of iodine are also more active. Atmospheric weapons testing during the 1950s produced vast amounts of radioiodines without rousing much concern. Correctly enough, short half-lives suggested little threat to human food. High-yield shots in the Pacific lifted radioiodines to the strato-
sphere, where they largely decayed before ever reaching the earth’s surface. Attention instead focused on such longer-lasting fission products as strontium-90. With a half-life of twenty-nine years, it might persist at significant levels in the atmosphere for decades.?!” Explosions with yields under 100 kilotons, in contrast, like tests in Nevada, spread fission products at lower heights. Fallout within days or weeks still carried enough radioiodine to matter. The problem was not, as with radiostrontium, uptake by plants; radioiodines were too short-lived for that. But
iodine has the unusual property of passing directly from gas to solid as it cools. Thus browsing cattle could ingest radioiodine that merely coated the surfaces of forage plants. Within days, some of that radioiodine would appear in cow’s milk. Mammalian thyroid glands concentrate iodine. The significance of the forage-cow-milk-human chain was not fully recognized before 1957, when a fire at the English Windscale reactor released large amounts of radioiodine; surveys revealed for the first time how great a risk that pathway
might become.*!8 These findings stimulated further research. By the late 1950s, radioiodine had been found in cattle thyroids, then in the thyroids of milk-drinking humans throughout the United States.?!9 Radioiodine from lower-yield nuclear weapons testing, in other words, could work its way into the human food chain despite its short half-life. None of this appeared too serious at the time. Radioiodine in living thyroids was hard to measure with most techniques of the 1950s. Gamma spectrometry, which made thyroid burdens much easier to measure, was not per-
210 Atmospheric Testing Challenged formed at the Nevada Test Site much before the 1958 test moratorium. Systematic data on radioiodine in human tissues thus remained sparse even at the peak of aboveground testing. So, too, did data on milk, in which iodine131 may have reached high levels. The Public Health Service milk surveillance network only began large-scale operation during the moratorium. Radiostrontium and other long-lived radionuclides, especially cesium-137, in any event remained the central concerns until the early 1960s.22° During the moratorium, however, some scientists began to wonder about the effects of short-lived radionuclides in fallout, at first as sources of external gamma exposure.”?! As time passed, questions also emerged about shortlived radionuclides as internal contaminants.?22 Underground tests added a new risk, breathing radioiodine met in the course of mining or drilling. The risk proved all too real.
From Moratorium to Test Ban Radiation Safety in Transition 1961-1964
Nougat and Gnome The problems of testing underground began to manifest themselves as soon as Operation Nougat was under way. It opened on 15 September 1961 with Antler. The test device rested in an underground chamber over 4,000 feet from the mouth of E Tunnel and almost 1,300 feet beneath the surface of Rainier Mesa. Sixty feet of sandbags plugged the tunnel next to ground zero, with two more 20-foot plugs farther away.! Comparison with earlier tests led the advisory panel for the test to see “little probability of appreciable venting.” Panel members also judged “the probability of any measurable fallout off-site . . . to be extremely smail.’’? Satisfied with the weather forecast, they recommended firing, and the test manager approved.3 Although Antler was a low-yield shot, later reported as 2.6 kilotons, a secondary steam explosion breached containment and a cloud of radioactive gas vented from the portal fifteen minutes after firing. Radioactivity also vented
through a pipe to the top of the mesa. Water draining from the portal of E Tunnel five and a half hours after detonation read as high as 180 roentgens per hour at a distance of three feet, while readings at the portal itself reached 50 roentgens per hour. No one had been overexposed, but reentry to the tunnel complex was delayed. Decontamination required a massive effort. It also had to be done promptly. A single portal could give access to as many as ten underground test locations. Several had been prepared in E Tunnel, to which other Nougat tests were assigned. Only two miners received external doses over the 3-rem quarterly limit during E Tunnel decontamination, but many others came close. Ordinarily in such conditions, safety rules dictated spread211
212 From Moratorium to Test Ban ing the dose over more workers. Because more miners were hard to hire and the work was vital, however, they kept digging even when tritium was detected; 108 later recorded overexposures when mining in B Tunnel added internal tritium exposures to their earlier Antler gamma exposures.5 By the time vented radioactivity reached the test site border, it no longer
posed much danger. The off-site rad-safe organization issued its interim Antler report 1 November 1961. It “concluded that no health effect to the offsite population resulted from the Antler event. Survey instrument readings were very low in all areas with the highest off-site reading being a single one of 12.5 mr/hr.’”’ Less than an hour later, the reading had dropped to 1.2 mil-
liroentgens per hour. “The data presented in this report show that for purposes of hazard evaluation there was essentially no radioactivity off-site.” Unlike aboveground tests, the Antler cloud seemed to contain almost no particulates; it was essentially a gas cloud “which resulted in little, if any, fallout.” Radioiodine compounds from the passing cloud, although not fallout in the technical sense, did apparently condense on vegetation. Analysts detected radioiodine on only one leaf sample, however, the amount pointing to air levels well below the maximum permissible concentration.® On 10 October 1961, the next shot, Chena, used another low-yield device
in B Tunnel. Containment once more failed. The outflow of gas produced readings at the portal running as high as 10 roentgens per hour.’ Off site, matters were less clear. “The problems of monitoring gas clouds of low intensities over a large area” made early findings suspect.’ Radioiodine again showed up, this time detected at several places on site, but again well below limits. Still, “no detectable fallout resulting from the Chena event was deposited on the Off-Site areas,” and, according to the off-site rad-safe report, “no acute radiological effect in this area could have resulted from the underground nuclear detonation at NTS on October 10, 1961.”9? Two later Nougat tunnel shots caused greater problems, Platte on 14 April and Des Moines on 13 June 1962. Platte, the thirtieth Nougat test, had a yield of 1.85 kilotons. Immediately after firing “a dark cloud bellowed forth from. . . three locations above the portal and also from the portal,” Test Manager James Reeves wired Washington.!° The merging clouds swiftly rose several thousand feet above the mesa and drifted northward. Hovering off Pahute Mesa to observe and photograph the test, a helicopter crew was exposed as the cloud swept over them, carried northward by higher-level winds.!! Monitors off site blocked off a portion of Highway 25 until the cloud passed. They also chased down three cowboys spotted from the air in the fallout area. Contaminated only slightly, the men required no treatment and after checking, simply went on their way.!2 Initially, the Platte cloud appeared mostly particulate, with iodine predominant in both solid and gaseous portions. At Diablo, a highway maintenance
From Moratorium to Test Ban 213 station 44 miles from ground zero, iodine-131 briefly exceeded the maximum permissible concentration (MPC) in air for the general population. Currant, 115 miles from ground zero, also recorded excess iodine-131. Officials remained calm, however, because MPCs applied to continuous long-term exposure, not brief excesses. Gamma doses, too, were very low. Off-site rad-safe estimated “that the maximum dose received by any of the off-site population was 5.9 mr.” Doses so low seemed inconsequential. “In view of the above report, although several small exposures were received by some of the off-site population, it is the opinion of the Off-Site Radiological Safety Organization that the exposures from the Platte Event of April 14, 1962, were not harmful to the individuals involved.”!5 The low-yield test device for Des Moines, fortieth in the Nougat series, went into a tunnel next to the Platte tunnel. Similar settings produced like results. “Immediately following the detonation, venting occurred at the top of the mesa, then through the face and next out of the portal,” reported Director of Military Application Austin W. Betts.!* High readings near the portal caused no problem. Exposures recorded on site immediately after the shot were minor, limited to the crew of the photography helicopter again caught in
the cloud. The dense black cloud formed south of the portal, rose several thousand feet, then drifted northward toward Highway 25. Unlike the Platte cloud, the Des Moines cloud was mainly gaseous beyond the test site border; losing most of its fallout turned it light brown before reaching the highway. Des Moines produced “the highest reading detected by ground monitoring and radiation monitoring recorders at a populated location” during the entire Nougat series: 100 milliroentgens per hour at Nyala, 75 miles from ground
zero, just under three hours after the shot. As the cloud passed, readings dropped sharply.'® Undesirable such levels might be, but they still improved
over past aboveground testing, and signs of too much radioiodine off site aroused little concern. “Although a large amount of activity was released by this event,” the draft off-site report for Des Moines noted, “MPC’s were only exceeded in populated places for short periods of time. Residual activity was small with a maximum of 1.5 mr/hr in a populated location.”!” For Nougat as a whole, off-site results seemed satisfactory. Elevated levels of radioiodine in the thyroids of a few monitors aroused some concern, but estimated doses came nowhere near the permitted maximum.!8 As Operation Nougat clearly showed, the threat of off-site exposures declined sharply when testing went underground. Radioactivity was detected outside test site borders in only seven tests.!9 “In general,” reported the off-site rad-safe team, “individual results were quite low compared to results of past series at the Nevada Test Site. In no case did activity levels exceed the safety criteria established when averaged over the length of the series.”’2° A single road closing seemed the only bad mark against Nougat.
214 From Moratorium to Test Ban While Operation Nougat proceeded in Nevada, another test took place near Carlsbad, New Mexico. Project Gnome opened field testing in Plowshare, a program the Atomic Energy Commission approved in 1958 to seek peaceful uses of nuclear explosives.?! Ironically delayed by the test moratorium, Gnome had first been scheduled for late 1959. The AEC intended to fire a 10-kiloton device in thickly bedded rock salt deep underground. Analysis of results from the 1957 Rainier test had suggested using the enormous heat of a nuclear explosion to generate power. Could molten salt store that heat to produce electricity via steam-driven generators? Explosion-created radionuclides
also could be of immense value. Could they be recovered for use? These were questions Gnome might answer.?2 Public safety loomed very large in Gnome planning. The first continental test outside Nevada since 1945 required great care.23 Numerous studies during the moratorium-forced delay convinced the AEC that Gnome would cause
no damage.*4 Reassuring people living and working near the New Mexico site that they need fear neither shock nor radiation became just as high a priority. Despite the region’s sparse population (one reason it was chosen), the Project Gnome team worked hard to maintain good public relations. The AEC announced plans for Gnome early and issued frequent progress reports. Officials sought to tell everyone what to expect and how they would be protected.?5 Gnome planners also made sure of strong rad-safe groups, both on site and
off. For Project Gnome they defined “on site” as the area within a 5-mile radius of surface ground zero, the point on the ground above the buried test device. Radiation safety followed the Nevada pattern. REECo provided onsite rad-safe, as well as other support services. Responsibility for off-site radsafe fell to the same Public Health Service team that served the Nevada Test
Site. Exposure limits for Gnome likewise matched those that prevailed in Nevada.?6
When the United States began testing again in fall 1961, Gnome was ready to go. To assuage the last nagging doubt, the planned yield dropped from 10 to 5 kilotons. The test device went into a chamber carved in bedded rock salt almost 1,200 feet below ground, at the end of a tunnel 1,100 feet from the access shaft. It exploded at noon on 10 December 1961 with a yield later reported as 3 kilotons. Plans to contain the blast went awry, because the salt contained water. Radioactive steam and smoke bursting from the top of the access shaft a few minutes after firing geysered 300 feet into the air. High readings of external exposure rate and high tritium concentrations in air and underwater in the shaft delayed recovery of experimental data for several days and final recovery operations for several months.?’ Records show no Gnome worker exceeded the 3-rem operational dose limit. The highest external plus internal cumulative total through the fifty days after Gnome was 2.47 rem, the average but 0.55.28 “There were no significant exposures” on site, concluded Gnome’s AEC project manager. “Con-
From Moratorium to Test Ban 215 tamination of personnel, equipment, and vehicles was negligible.” Off-site results proved just as good. The gaseous cloud spreading from the Gnome access shaft dropped little fallout. Concentrations of radionuclides nowhere measured more than a hundredth of the published maximum permitted to offsite populations. Exposure to the passing cloud seemed the only danger, but the highest dose (33 millirem) and dose rate (160 millirem/hour) fell well below prescribed limits.*° “With these findings,” the off-site rad-safe team
judged it “reasonable to conclude that no persons in the vicinity of the Gnome test site received harmful amounts of radiation either internally or externally.”3! Disaster narrowly averted, however, scarcely boded well for Project Plowshare. Exposures both on site and off, even if judged harmless, still caught the test organization by surprise and raised hard-to-answer questions about future Plowshare tests.
The Last Pacific Tests When Operation Nougat began in mid-September 1961, pressure for renewed atmospheric testing by the United States to match the Soviet program was already building. Both the AEC and the Department of Defense believed they had good reasons. Relatively freer from weather delays and fallout concerns, testing underground also cost more and took longer than testing above ground. Perhaps more crucial, many development, effects, and proof tests
simply could not be conducted underground, at least with the techniques available in 1961. A large backlog of such tests strongly argued for a new atmospheric test program. Initially, however, President Kennedy allowed only planning and preparation; not until March 1962 did he approve Operation Dominic.*?
Dominic was a major new series of atmospheric, underwater, and highaltitude tests in the Pacific, but they were not conducted as before at Enewetak and Bikini. International opinion had induced the United States to shift its base in the Trust Territory of the Marshall Islands to other uses. Seeing small prospect “of resuming surface nuclear testing at EPG [Eniwetok Proving Ground] in the future,” the AEC in 1960 offered the proving ground to the Department of Defense.7> Defense accepted, and Enewetak became part of the Pacific Missile Range.*4 In late 1961 when testing again looked likely, the old proving ground regained some of its lost luster. Deteriorated facilities and
almost certain adverse public reaction, however, ruled out a return to the Marshall Islands.35
Alternatives were found. Christmas Island became the major test site for Dominic. Uninhabited and lying 1,160 miles south of Honolulu, the island had based the first British thermonuclear weapons tests in 1957 and 1958. The United Kingdom traded the United States its use in return for access to
216 From Moratorium to Test Ban the Nevada Test Site and to American test data.*° From late April through early July 1962, aircraft flying from Hawaii dropped twenty-four test devices toward target rafts moored 10 to 20 miles south of the island; all burst in the air, high enough to keep the fireball from touching water and so avoiding much fallout. The same technique was used for five airdrops in October at Johnston Island, the U.S. Air Force base 780 miles west and south of Hawaii.
Actual target zones were 250 to 400 miles east and south of the island. Johnston Island’s main role, however, was missile launching. It had provided
the launchpad for two high-altitude Hardtack tests in 1958. The Dominic schedule included five nuclear-tipped rocket launches. Collectively termed Fishbowl events, they were effects tests designed to explore ballistic missile defense.??
Operation Nougat was still running in Nevada when Dominic began late in April 1962. Lasting until early November, Dominic became a complex program of thirty-six tests at four different sites. Besides development tests at Christmas and Johnston islands and high-altitude tests at Johnston Island, the series included two proof tests in the open ocean. First came Frigate Bird on 6 May 1962. A submerged Polaris submarine launched a stockpile Polaris missile toward Christmas Island, 1,500 miles away. Just over 1,000 miles later and still 11,000 feet high, the warhead exploded as planned, 500 miles short of the island but within the announced Christmas Island danger zone. On 11 May, the second deep ocean test took place 370 miles west and south of San Diego, in the same region as the 1955 Wigwam test. Swordfish prooftested a stockpile ASROC antisubmarine rocket-launched nuclear depth charge of low yield. Fired from a moving destroyer, it exploded underwater 4,000 yards away.*8
As usual, Pacific testing required a military task force, but Joint Task Force 7 had dissolved during the moratorium. Former Director of Military Application Alfred D. Starbird assumed command of a new Joint Task Force 8 for Dominic I.39 Among his first acts were forming safety review committees for each type of test: airdrop, high altitude, Polaris, and ASROC. The AEC heard the results late in March. They were most reassuring. Standard safety measures for missile firing ranges and large announced danger zones should take care of any problem. Radiation safety raised almost no concems. Dominic planners expected all test devices but one to explode high enough to keep the fireball well above land or water surfaces. That meant little or no fallout and no residual radioactivity. The lone exception, Swordfish, would
produce only a short-lived base surge and an ephemeral radioactive pool around surface zero. Keeping ships at least 5,000 yards away ought to avoid any trouble.” Each task group looked after its own rad-safe needs, with advice from a task force rad-safe branch that also provided dosimetry and other technical services. Gordon Jacks again commanded the branch, manned chiefly by
From Moratorium to Test Ban 217 members of the 1st Radiological Safety Support Unit. Film badges went to everyone stationed on Christmas and Johnston islands, as well as to the crews of all ships directly involved in testing. That covered over 25,000 of the more than 28,000 task force members. Maximum permissible exposure was 3 roentgens per thirteen weeks, with two exceptions. Aircrews and ground
crews involved in cloud sampling received advance authorization for a 20roentgen limit; crew members of the Sioux, the naval vessel assigned to sample weapon debris in the radioactive water around Swordfish, were granted an increased limit of 7 roentgens to meet operational needs.*! Less than 4 percent of those badged in Dominic, in fact, had film badge readings higher than 0.5 rem. No one suffered serious overexposure, though flawed film badges made the precise number who exceeded the 3-rem limit a long-lasting question. Defective sealing of some plastic cases allowed mois-
ture to reach film; if that happened, the film showed higher readings than it should have. Processing badges caused another problem. The plastic case had to be sawed open; that sometimes meant torn film wrappers and lightdistorted readings. Officials trying to offset these errors lowered many readings below the 3-rem limit, sometimes incorrectly, as in the case of the Sioux.” These seemed little more than bookkeeping problems, however, and off-site results looked even better. Fallout from the entire test series appeared negligible.*3 “There was no significant exposure to population groups inside or outside the danger areas and for all practical purposes, the background radiation levels were not exceeded,” concluded the final Dominic rad-safe report.“ Riskiest of the Dominic tests were rocket launches from Johnston Island, the so-called Fishbowl events. Unreliable rockets tipped with nuclear warheads caused trouble almost from the start. Certifying the Thor rocket was the first task, achieved in the Tiger Fish test of 2 May 1962; in this trial launch, the missile carried an inert warhead. But in the Bluegill test on 2 June, the first try for a high-altitude burst, the tracking system failed and the missile self-destructed on order. Next was Starfish on 20 June, another failure; the rocket engine quit a minute into flight, and the range safety officer again ordered a missile to destroy itself. Success first came with Starfish Prime on 9 July; the test device exploded with a yield of 1.4 megatons at an altitude of 400 kilometers.*> Unfortunately, success was not soon repeated. Another try at launching the Bluegill test device barely averted catastrophe. Bluegill Prime on 26 July was also the only event during Dominic to pose a major rad-safe challenge. When the Thor rocket malfunctioned, the range safety officer fired the self-destruct system before liftoff. Destroving the warhead prevented a nuclear disaster, but the missile exploded and scattered radioactive debris widely across the launch complex. Cleaning up the mess took weeks, but strict controls protected workers from any significant exposure, internal or external.4° Operations halted while the cleanup progressed, and the long pause allowed defense planners to rethink the Fishbowl
218 From Moratorium to Test Ban series. Although early returns left something to be desired—Bluegill Double Prime on 15 October was another failure—the final four tests, Bluegill Triple Prime among them, went well. Operation Dominic ended with the last Fishbow] event on 3 November 1962.47
Extending well into fiscal year 1963, Dominic overlapped the test series that began at the Nevada Test Site in July 1962. Operation Storax included forty-five underground tests, all but two in shafts. Dominic also overlapped a Nevada series of four low-yield aboveground tests during July, called Operation Sunbeam by its sponsor, the Department of Defense. The AEC used another name at the time, Operation Dominic II, and both names have survived. Reorganized field testing and off-site rad-safe had sought to meet the demands of year-round Nevada operations. Among other things, these early 1962 changes meant a freer hand for test site users. Accordingly, the Defense Atomic Support Agency—the 1959 successor to the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project—played an enlarged role in running tests and doing experiments.*8
Studying weapon effects was Sunbeam’s central purpose. The series went very quickly: Little Feller II on 7 July 1962, Johnie Boy on 11 July, Small Boy on 14 July, Little Feller I on 17 July. Routine rad-safe planning sufficed for the first three, all low-yield test devices fired at or near the surface.*? The final test posed greater challenges. As part of the army’s Exercise Ivy Flats, Little Feller I used a stockpile tactical nuclear weapon, the rocket-propelled Davy Crockett. The firing crew came from a participating army unit. Fired
from an armored personnel carrier, the warhead exploded on target 3,000 yards away. Observers sat in bleachers two miles from ground zero, near them troops crouching in trenches. After a rad-safe survey, troops mounted their vehicles and spent almost an hour maneuvering in the shot area. None of the Ivy Flats troops or observers exceeded Sunbeam’s 3-rem dose limit.>° Two officers and four enlisted men composed the Ivy Flats rad-safe section. They worked closely with the REECo rad-safe division, which provided training, support, and dosimetry. As usual, REECo also handled rad-safe for the other Sunbeam tests. On-site rad-safe went smoothly. Several of the experimental projects had special limits, but only a handful of persons received
doses over 3 rem; the highest was 5.8. Responsibility for Sunbeam off-site rad-safe once again belonged to the Public Health Service. That, too, posed no special problems. The highest gamma reading detected at a populated area was 14 milliroentgens per hour after Small Boy.>!
Atmospheric testing by the United States ended in November 1962 with Tightrope, the final Dominic Fishbowl event at Johnston Island. Despite bleak prospects after the January 1962 collapse of the Geneva talks, hopes for a test ban treaty of some kind never completely died. Dramatically changed circumstances a year and a half later at last produced results.°* Representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union on
From Moratorium to Test Ban 219 5 August 1963 signed the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water? The so-called Limited (or Partial) Nuclear Test Ban Treaty allowed nuclear weapons testing only underground.
Fallout from Sedan Operation Storax, the fiscal year 1963 test series, began with a Plowshare test. Sedan, a cratering shot, was something of an afterthought. Plowshare planners hoped to use the atom more cheaply than conventional explosives for massive earth-moving in engineering projects like canals and harbors.>4 Initially, this concept formed the basis of Project Chariot, a scheme to blast a harbor on Alaska’s arctic coast, first scheduled for fall 1960. Recognizing the fragile nature of the arctic environment, the AEC had promptly contracted for expert studies of every aspect of the project.*> Planning for public safety like-
wise began early. Work on Chariot continued even when the 1958 moratorium rendered the schedule unlikely.*®
The moratorium-caused delay, however, marked a turning point. Opposition had already begun to make itself heard and now had time to organize and ask new questions.*’ Increasingly, the AEC found itself with no ready means to quiet growing public concerns, ill-founded though it believed such concerns to be.*8 Substantial efforts to ensure public safety and to make the facts known—the same linkage of safety and public relations that characterized Nevada operations—met but modest success.*? Although ongoing studies still returned encouraging findings, Chariot seemed less and less likely to take place.© Early in 1962 the AEC tentatively decided to cancel the project by the next September, when Chariot study contracts expired. The Alaskan test would have no place in a new five-year plan to develop nuclear excavation techniques.®!
Neither health risks (“exceedingly remote” according to all the studies) nor public outcry (deemed the work of “small but very vocal groups”) played much part in the decision.°* The AEC had more compelling reasons to cancel Chariot: an obsolescent design, high costs and long lead times at the Alaska site, the prospect of a fight with the Department of Interior over using the land. Yet the AEC hesitated, partly because of money already spent, more because of problems cancellation might itself pose. “The most seriously adverse effect of the decision to cancel Project Chariot would be the lasting 1mpression on certain officials and on public opinion generally that there was
really some danger to the local inhabitants after all.” Critics also might charge the AEC with “the ‘waste’ of $4,000,000 and. . . timidity. . . inthe face of criticism.”®©
Forestalling such charges demanded “a well-planned and timed informa-
220 From Moratorium to Test Ban tion program” that gave “a publicly convincing explanation of the reasons for cancelling the Project.” Spectacular as it promised to be, Sedan might fill the
bill. “The public announcement . . . should be carefully timed to coincide with a convincing event which documents the technical rationale for the decision. Project Sedan will be such an event.” Explaining that Sedan would provide much of the data sought from Chariot and that other tests would pick up the slack more cheaply, the AEC could then plausibly deny that doubts about safety played any major role in the decision. By adding a promise to publish the research results in due course, the issue seemed largely resolved. Sedan might thus allow the AEC to salvage something from the four-year investment in Chariot. It was itself, of course, also a significant test.
Sedan used a 100-kiloton thermonuclear device buried 635 feet below ground level. Technically, Sedan was not an atmospheric test, though it would
not be fully contained. Cratering might trap 95 percent of the radioactivity, but even 5 percent of the debris from a 100-kiloton blast could pose problems. Naturally, the largest test device yet used in Nevada would have made public safety a prime concern in any event. Because Sedan just preceded Sunbeam, concern was all the greater; more than three and a half years had passed since the last aboveground test in Nevada.© Organizing Sedan radsafe presented no problems; safety measures both on site and off followed well-tried practice.©© Appropriate off-site exposure standards soon emerged as the only real question. Past usage again provided the answer.®’ “The off-site
population whole body external exposure shall not exceed 3.9 rem per year, while radioactive airborne concentrations must not exceed one-tenth of the values listed in NBS 69,” the latest handbook on the subject from the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements.® The blast on 6 July 1962 lifted a huge dome of earth 290 feet into the air. That took the first three seconds. Incandescent gases then burst through the dome in a bright flash, the entire mixture of gas and earth shooting up to 2,000 feet. Heavier debris collapsed into the crater as planned, trapping more than 90 percent of the radioactivity but raising a base surge that spread intense fallout two miles in all directions. Atmospheric inversion meanwhile capped the still rising cloud of dust and gas 12,000 feet above the desert floor. Drifting on the wind north-northeastward, the cloud dropped ever-decreasing fallout along a 150-mile path across Nevada. The blast had shifted 6.5 million cubic yards of earth and rock, leaving a hole 1,200 feet across and 320 feet deep; most of the debris never left the vicinity, and the crater’s lip towered as much as 100 feet into the air. The circular fallout pattern was confined largely to the test site. Though greater than expected, it caused little trouble. No Sedan workers exceeded the
3-rem per quarter dose limit. Off-site rad-safe, still under Public Health Service auspices, also functioned smoothly. The chief danger appeared to
From Moratorium to Test Ban 221 be gamma rays from the passing cloud. Temporary roadblocks went up on Highway 25. All fourteen people from Diablo maintenance station, Pennoyer’s ranch, and Tempiute near Lincoln Mine moved away for the rest of the day at AEC expense. The AEC asked another forty-two people living or working north of the test site to stay inside through much of the afternoon. The evacuees from Diablo and Pennoyer’s ranch wore film badges for three days after they returned; recorded doses totaled 150 to 170 millirem.” “None of the off-site population in the vicinity of the Project Sedan test site received significant amounts of radiation either internally or externally,” was the official verdict.”!
Downwind from the Nevada Test Site in Utah, however, Sedan appeared less harmless. Levels of iodine-131 detected in milk samples from Salt Lake City alarmed Utah’s public health director. City and state health officials urged milk producers to use dry feed for their animals. The chief source of radioiodine in humans was drinking milk from cows grazing on plants exposed to fallout. Relatively short-lived radioiodine, however, would soon fall to minor levels in milk after the animals shifted from fresh forage.’ Officials also sought to divert fresh milk to making cheese or powdered milk, thus winning time for radioiodine to decay before reaching consumers. Representatives of the milk industry objected to what they took for demands rather than requests. Flying to Salt Lake City, experts from AEC headquarters persuaded local health officials that no great danger attended the current situation. Success crowned their efforts, easing immediate concerns, if not erasing all doubts.79
High levels of iodine-131 showing up in American milk, first from Soviet weapons tests in 1961, then from American tests soon after, raised serious questions.” Officials at the Nevada Test Site began thinking about a bolstered program to measure iodine-131 in upcoming tests and perhaps monitor actual doses as well. Radioiodine looked more and more like a real problem, not only to experts but also to an increasingly alarmed public.’> Analysis of sum-
mer 1962 results from Nevada testing marked a turning point. Examined closely, data from Sedan and Sunbeam suggested that “internal exposure from ingested iodine-131 may be the controlling exposure in some instances.”76 External gamma exposure, in other words, the central focus of radiation safety efforts since the beginning, might not always present the greatest danger.
The Federal Radiation Council proposed to set new standards for radioiodine in fallout and to suggest measures to counter excess exposure.” To the AEC, such action seemed too narrow. Radioiodine accounted only for part of the fallout hazard, which warranted a much broader approach. Countermeasures triggered by some predetermined figure, however, aroused the greatest concern. Deciding what to do about any particular health hazard was a complex process, the AEC argued; it depended on current data, of course,
222 From Moratorium to Test Ban but issues of policy and a host of other factors should not be ignored.78 In due course the council largely accepted the AEC case. The guide issued in 1964 included iodine-131 countermeasures only as an Appendix.”
Radioiodine Matters Presumably if radioiodine now mattered, then it also may have mattered when fallout clouds from aboveground tests drifted over Nevada, Utah, and Arizona during the 1950s. The idea prompted research, both within and outside the AEC. Several scientists attempted to reconstruct thyroid doses in communities subjected to the largest amounts of fallout in the past. Controversy surrounded such efforts because they relied on so many assumptions. Radioiodine had simply not been included in the fallout surveys of the 1950s; lacking hard figures on radioiodine fallout, dose reconstruction depended on finding some related figures that might serve for estimating radioiodine in the air, on the ground, or in people.®°
Critical studies from outside the AEC were an old story but not so from inside. This may explain the impact of work by Harold A. Knapp, a mathematician who in 1960 had joined the AEC’s new fallout studies branch. In August 1962, Knapp’s first paper on radioiodine sought to estimate potential thyroid doses to milk-drinking infants living within 200 miles of the Nevada Test Site during the 1950s.®! Built on assumptions, wrapped in qualifications, restrained in tone, the paper seemed cautious despite its startling results. Knapp revealed his concerns only in the memorandum that transmitted the report to his chief, Director of Biology and Medicine Charles Dunham. “The possibility that some children in the communities surrounding the Nevada Test Site
may have received thyroid doses of hundreds of rads is genuinely disturbing,” Knapp wrote.®
Distributing the paper widely within the government, Knapp suggested, might save the AEC much grief. If the conclusions are incorrect or misleading at this stage, then they can all be blamed on me; if they are essentially correct we at least have the advantage of telling unpleasant news ourselves, and we are not vulnerable to a charge of -having suppressed or misrepresented information on fallout, or worse still, of not being competent to find our own problems.®3
Dunham demurred. He judged “the draft amateurish to a degree.” Among “its inadequacies” he included “almost total absence of thoughtful basis for many sweeping assumptions” and “uncritical use of analogy and models.” Accordingly, he felt “reluctant to waste any more people’s time on this draft.’’84 Dunham preferred to keep matters within the AEC, chiefly headquarters, at least until Knapp had revised his paper.®
From Moratorium to Test Ban 223 Knapp had improved and retitled his paper by March 1963 to reflect a more tightly focused argument. Correlating 1962 measured external exposure rates from fallout with measured concentrations of iodine-131 in milk gave a ratio that could be applied to recorded 1953 fallout readings. This allowed him to estimate 1953 radioiodine concentrations and then thyroid doses to milk-drinking infants.®° Like the first version, the revised paper centered on data and its manipulation. Knapp again reserved his deeper concerns for a memorandum to Dunham. Earlier Nevada tests had produced much higher fallout than any recorded during 1962 testing. Reconstructing thyroid doses from the 1953 Harry shot in Operation Upshot-Knothole produced striking results. If the assumptions were valid for one of the towns dusted most heav-
ily with fallout, St. George, Utah—and Knapp, knowing it was a big “if,” claimed no more than a rough estimate—“doses to an infant thyroid would be in the range of 76 to 380 rads.’’8’ Once again, Dunham moved cautiously. Unclassified though the report was, he urged readers to “treat it as confidential until its validity [had] been fully assessed.’’88 Although this version of the paper circulated more widely than the first, the verdict remained unchanged. To apply results derived from 1962
measurements to the far less certain data of the 1950s, however carefully qualified, simply forced Knapp to assume more than most readers could swallow.®° A friendly critic felt “that we cannot say unequivocally that the concepts can be applied to past situations. Even if they could be, nothing much could be done about it except add to the great public and political controverSies waging around the concept of strong nuclear deterrents.” Knapp left his
AEC job in April 1963 free of rancor, however, and kept working on the paper.?! He had a new version ready by June. Unfortunately, a review in AEC headquarters now concluded the report held restricted data.°3 A dismayed Knapp found his study classified and subjected to “criticisms which,” he at least believed, “constitute an impenetrable and non scientific barrier for a technical paper.” It also received a scathing
critique from Gordon Dunning, Deputy Director of Operational Safety, though Dunning himself had used much the same technique in his attempt to estimate sheep thyroid doses in 1953.9 Outside headquarters, though, the response was more favorable, if not enthusiastic. Just as before, the sticking point remained that “when one takes the data that is now available, and attempts to prove. . . that it can be extrapolated to other conditions and to past and future situations, then one is taking unreasonable liberty with the facts.” Critics nonetheless agreed that Knapp had improved the report greatly and believed it should be published.®*’ “Considerations being what they are,” one remarked, “publication of the report will do far less harm than further efforts
to modify it.’ Reluctantly, AEC headquarters decided to issue Knapp’s report but not alone. “Because of the potential impact of the report and the possibility that
224 From Moratorium to Test Ban some of its more speculative features will not be recognized as such by the uncritical,” Dunham in early July 1963 asked an ad hoc committee headed by Wright H. Langham of the Los Alamos Health Division to prepare a report “which will be published as an addendum to the document.”®? Knapp took the new delay in good cheer and supplied the committee with a detailed and biting line-by-line response to his severest critic, Dunning.!© Langham promised quick action. Since AEC headquarters also wanted the matter resolved, the committee did move swiftly. Langham submitted the requested critique early in August.!®!
No one questioned Knapp’s analysis: “The committee agree that the author’s mathematical treatment is expertly and meticulously done.”!© At issue,
rather, was the basis of analysis. Could data collected for practical rad-safe purposes in the field support Knapp’s quantitative model? Did rough field surveys of gamma radiation, in particular, justify estimating levels of iodine131 in milk? Even if they did, could such estimates in turn provide valid grounds for calculating thyroid burdens and doses from iodine-131? Did Knapp’s approach have anything but theoretical value? Yes and no. Committee members divided on all the questions.'®3 They concluded that Knapp’s report clarified needs for more research on radioiodine pathways from fallout to thyroid and that his “model is probably qualitatively correct.”’ But they also warned that present data upon which the model is based are fraught with so many assumptions and chances of error that specific conclusions must be regarded with considerable reservation. Extrapolations to past or future situations are fraught with even greater uncertainties because of compounding or possible observational errors and differences in behavior under varying conditions.
The committee approved publication in the hope “that it will stimulate the scientific community’s interest in the I'3! problem.”!™ So it did, but several years passed before the radioiodines began to feature prominently in AEC discussions of fallout. In November 1961, the first AEC
conference on radioactive fallout from nuclear weapons tests scarcely mentioned the iodines. Three years later, the second conference still found much more to say about radiostrontium and radiocesium than about radioiodine.!© To some outside critics, some AEC officials appeared all too guilty of actively campaigning to disparage public concerns about radioiodine from nuclear weapons testing.!% Yet Knapp’s report also helped spur action at the Nevada Test Site, and that happened promptly, partly because such concerns had already awakened among those working there. Narrower questions than Knapp raised had emerged at the test site, where an ad hoc group concerned with rad-safe problems had been meeting since the late 1950s. Drawn from the AEC, the Public Health Service, REECo, the
U.S. Weather Bureau, and test site users, its formal name was the NTS
From Moratorium to Test Ban 225 Committee for Environmental-Radiation Studies. Its members called themselves the “Nuts and Bolts Committee.” Initially, what drew them together
was Project Rover: developing a nuclear rocket entailed special rad-safe problems. Reactor research at first shared with weapons testing the expectation “that the criteria for external exposure . . . will, in general, limit exposure to internal emitters to acceptable levels.”!®’ Radioiodine occurred in amounts small enough to “be considered insignificant.’!8 By spring 1962, Platte and Des Moines had changed the picture; radioiodine began to seem the crucial issue. Estimated thyroid dose versus external gamma dose to a
person immersed in a low-lying effluent cloud—such as firing a nuclear rocket or venting from a tunnel shot might produce—led to the unhappy prospect that inhalation might well pose the greater problem.!® Instead of the accepted rule of thumb, that thyroid dose equaled six times external dose, the ratio now appeared more like 1:20. Early in 1963 concerns about off-site radioiodine from reactor runs and weapons tests came together. A January committee meeting on off-site contamination from the Nevada Test Site noted that “the limiting factor (in terms
of existing off-site criteria) is thyroid dose.”"° Gordon Dunning of AEC headquarters joined in these talks and saw the need for more. He called a March meeting in Las Vegas to discuss radioiodine specifically, provoked in part by Knapp’s “papers on the subject of radioiodine in the environment and . . . certain conclusions” he had reached. The Ad Hoc Working Group on Radioiodine in the Environment, which included most of the Nuts and Bolts Committee as well as other experts, met from 5 to 7 March at the Nevada Operations Office, the expanded successor to the Las Vegas Field Office!!! ‘The release of radioiodine from key activities,” began its report, “has become one of the principal, if not the principal, controlling factor[s] in terms of environmental contamination. This conclusion is based on data and theo-
retical calculations obtained during the past year.”!!* Four subgroups each reviewed a major question: What were the sources and chemistry of radioiodines at the Nevada Test Site? How did radioiodines enter into and spread through the environment? How were they monitored? And, how did humans assimilate them? To promote both safety and better understanding of the problems, the committee recommended a wide range of improved practices, wider sampling, and more research.!!3 The March meeting in Las Vegas laid out a vigorous new course of action that quickly began to reshape radioiodine monitoring and protection.!!4 As if to underscore the need for such measures, a radioiodine accident occurred at the test site just a short time later. On 5 June 1963, Operation Storax conducted its second tunnel shot, Yuba, itself uneventful.!!5 During the graveyard shift early the next morning, however, radioiodine leaked from a cam-
era station into the reentry tunnel miners were digging. Fifteen miners and
226 From Moratorium to Test Ban monitors were exposed. Decontaminated on the outside, their thyroids still set off alarms when the men tried driving through the gate on the way home. Calibrated measuring equipment not being available in Nevada, the University of California’s Donner Laboratory in Berkeley double-checked the men’s exposure. While film badge gamma doses were insignificant, several men received thyroid doses topping the occupational limit of 30 rem per year; the highest exceeded 500 rem.!!6 The tunnel meanwhile had been ventilated before work resumed. Radionuclides vented to the atmosphere in the process, and traces of iodine-131 were detected off site.’ A board of inquiry met to assess just what had gone wrong. Apparently, the chief problems were unclear chains of command and responsibility.!8
Testing and Thyroid Disease Radioiodine also provoked questions from the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy in 1963. Charles Mays of the University of Utah testified on his state’s 1962 radioiodine concerns; he also roughly estimated thyroid doses from testing during the past decade. Represented by Washington University physician Eric Reiss, the St. Louis-based Committee for Nuclear Information presented its own analysis of the iodine-131 hazard from fallout. Knapp’s report and its AEC critique appeared as an Appendix in the published hearings. So did Dunning’s response to both Mays and Reiss."9 Hoping to find better answers to such questions, the Public Health Service with AEC support added thyroid cancer to its ongoing epidemiological study in Nevada and Utah of diseases possibly linked to radiation from Nevada testing.!2° Search-
ing for thyroid abnormalities also became part of another study in 1965. Knapp’s report and the Utah findings were not the only reasons. Marshallese children exposed to intense fallout from the 1954 Bravo test had begun show-
ing such abnormalities. Perhaps the fallout in Utah, though lesser, might cause similar effects. In March 1954, the AEC had quickly decided that learning how the Marshallese victims of Castle Bravo responded to their accidental exposure could be of immense medical and military value. Immediate action centered on seeing them evacuated and decontaminated, then cared for medically. But stud-
ies of their exposures and the aftereffects also began. That effort became project 4.1 in the Castle experimental program.!2! This unfortunate choice of terminology may help explain later charges that the AEC had deliberately exposed the Marshallese to observe the effects.!22 Like the American radium
dial painters of the 1920s and the Japanese of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the Marshallese of 1954 inadvertently were to provide otherwise unobtainable data on the human consequences of high radiation exposures. Findings from project 4.1 soon began to appear in print.!29
From Moratorium to Test Ban 227 Brookhaven National Laboratory took charge of a longer-term study, directed until recently by Robert A. Conard, one of the first doctors to see the exposed Marshallese after their evacuation. The study has followed their lives and health ever since 1954. Examinations of the Rongelap people every year and of the lesser exposed people of Utirik every third year have resulted in a series of internal reports and a number of published papers.!** Other studies by Brookhaven, the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, and the AEC’s Health and Safety Laboratory followed long-term radioecological and environmental trends on the exposed islands. The University of Washingtcn’s Applied Fisheries Laboratory—the Laboratory of Radiation Biology after January 1958—continued the radiological surveys of the Marshalls begun in 1946 but now with special attention to Rongelap.!*> The people of Utrik returned home in a few months, but Rongelap remained off limits for more than three years; until July 1957, the Rongelapese resided on Ejit Island in Majuro, another of the Marshallese atolls.!26 On the whole, the Marshallese endured milder effects in the aftermath of Bravo than did the comparably exposed crew of the Japanese tuna trawler, Fukuryu Maru. Acute effects passed quickly, and all seemed well. After a decade the Brookhaven team noted “few findings . . . that could be related to radiation exposure.”!27 Such effects as were observed seemed both slight and ambiguous; statistical analysis in so small a population provided little help. Miscarriages and stillbirths doubled among the exposed Rongelap women during the first five post-Bravo years, then returned to normal. Evidence of impaired growth and development appeared, especially among younger children, but no clear-cut pattern emerged. Although children of exposed parents showed no genetic effects, persistent blood chromosome abnormalities left the possibility of genetic mutation open.!28 The second decade was another story. Probably because covered food and water supplies on the Fukuryu Maru reduced amounts of fallout the Japanese fishermen ingested, the Marshallese suffered far more serious late effects. A boy one year old when Bravo fallout hit Rongelap died at nineteen of a form of leukemia that radiation might cause. What no one could know for certain, though it seemed likely, was whether or not radiation caused his specific disease. Other cases of cancer appeared unrelated to radiation exposure.!”? About the cause of one affliction, however, no doubt existed. The Rongelapese received not only external gamma doses ranging up to 190 rad but also estimated doses as high as 1,400 rad to the thyroid from radioiodine breathed and swallowed; initial estimates were lower because they assumed only iodine-131 mattered. A decade after Bravo the results began to show in thyroid tumors, benign and malignant, as well as cases of hypothyroidism and retarded growth among those who were children at the time.!3° Children suffered disproportionately, at least in part, because their smaller thyroid glands received relatively higher doses: a 1985 study concludes that
228 From Moratorium to Test Ban for a one-year-old on Rongelap in 1954, the total thyroid absorbed dose might have reached as much as 20,000 rad.!3! Almost a third of those exposed
developed thyroid neoplasms by 1974, and more clearly followed. Fortunately, thyroid cancer is seldom fatal, and none of those afflicted had died of this disease. Although reduced hormone levels from damaged thyroids might cause later trouble, that question remains unresolved.!%? “Thyroid injury and
its sequelae,” concluded the Brookhaven medical team twenty years after Bravo, had become “the most serious late result of the fallout exposure in the Marshallese people.’ 3
Thyroid problems caught the experts by surprise. Though aware of the danger radioiodine might pose, they saw no evidence of damage in 1954. Calculated thyroid doses fell well below what were then thought to be tumorcausing levels. Even five years later, one review of the Rongelap people’s medical status failed to mention radioiodine among the fission products that might have added io their body burdens of radionuclides.!34 This was less a failure of data than of perception. Radioiodines had been measured, only to be dismissed as insignificant: body burdens of 6.4 microcuries were estimated from urinalyses during the first twenty-four days after Bravo. “Radioiodine probably delivered a dose of 100-150 rep to the thyroid . . . , but absorption of isotopes was too small to result in any acute effects,” or long-term effects, either.!35 But the experts then assumed that only iodine-131 mattered; as the Marshallese revealed, the short-lived and therefore highly active radicisotopes of iodine—iodine-132, -133, and -135—also played significant roles.136 But what about low exposure? Could the much lesser levels of radioiodine dropped on Utah have caused thyroid problems as well? This was the question the National Institutes of Health hoped to answer. Medical and dental teams proposed to study schoolchildren in Washington County, Utah, parts of which in 1953 had suffered some of the heaviest fallout ever recorded in the United States outside a restricted area. The subjects were 2,000 children in grades 6 through 12 who had been born by 1953. A matching group in Safford, Arizona, served as controls. Researchers examined each child for any signs of radiation exposure, including the thyroid swelling and nodules that might be linked to radioiodine. The Public Health Service selected Edward S.
Weiss, a veteran biostatistician in the Division of Radiological Health, to coordinate the study.!97
At AEC headquarters, Gordon Dunning learned about the Public Health Service study in June 1965 when Weiss sought his help in choosing a proper control group. Dunning found “so many fallacies in the bases for their proposal that I discussed the problem with Dr. Dunham.” They “concluded, on balance, it might do more harm than good to the Commission to try and stop PHS.” Rather than writing, Dunning “discussed the fallacies informally with Mr. Weiss over the telephone.”’!38 The issue was not thyroid studies as such;
From Moratorium to Test Ban 229 Dunning favored “studies on thyroid, principally because of the allegations made concerning production of thyroid cancer from fallout.’!39 What he objected to was justifying the proposed studies of other effects, particularly genetic, by “flying under the banner of fallout from the Nevada tests.”!40 Whatever the value of such studies, he insisted, “other reasons for performing [them] were more valid than fallout.” !4!
Then in August, Dunning read Weiss’s draft report, “Leukemia Mortality in Southwestern Utah.” Relying chiefly on death certificates, Weiss tried to locate all leukemia deaths in Iron and Washington counties from 1950 through 1964. He then compared the total with the number expected in a population of that size. Acknowledged shortcomings in the data and doubts about the proper basis for judging the expected number still left Weiss uneasy. He found what he termed “an apparently excessive number of deaths,” 28 versus 19, though he also noted that “beyond the fact of extended residence in the area, there is no evidence to associate these cases with fallout exposure.”!4 Criticism may have reinforced his own qualms about the data and their mean-
ing. In any event, Weiss revised the report slightly, then simply filed it. Leukemia was not his central concern, and the report was, after all, only a paper exercise. Not so the thyroid study. Clinical data promised much more useful results. Abnormal thyroids among children ought to be found sooner and more often than leukemia, given the presumed amounts of radioiodine involved,!#3
Unfortunately, the study rested on shaky foundations, in Dunning’s judgment: “Many of the data used by Mr. Weiss and much of what I consider unwarranted conclusions drawn by him had been used by the NIH people for preparing their studies in Southern Utah.” Even if the AEC “might not be wise to attempt to stop the PHS studies,” AEC staff members could address “the fallacies upon which the studies are being based. Hopefully, there might be a chance of averting a potential fallout scare by placing the purpose of the studies in proper context.”!“ Fearing that “these PHS studies could raise serious issues from the legal viewpoint,” Dunning also sent copies of the documents to an AEC lawyer. Dunning objected not only to the leukemia report
but also to the Public Health Service’s draft press release on the thyroid study. !45
The White House, too, wondered about liability should the thyroid study find effects linked to radiation. Representatives of the AEC and the Public Health Service thrashed out these issues in a meeting with lawyers from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (the health service’s parent agency) on 1 September 1965. They found little to worry about. Cooperating with the Utah State Health Department, the Public Health Service stood ready to deal with the handful of illnesses expected. The health service also agreed to look at AEC-suggested changes in the wording of both the press release
230 From Moratorium to Test Ban and the leukemia report. The AEC promptly provided lengthy critiques of the leukemia and thyroid study plans.!* For the press release, the AEC drafted a new paragraph stressing the purely statistical basis for linking “types of naturally occurring defects and radiation exposures that might have been received in the 1950s from fallout.” The Public Health Service duly inserted the AEC words into its mid-September release. !47
Preliminary findings from the thyroid study appeared early in October 1965. It found that as many as seventy Utah and twenty-five Arizona children might have thyroid nodules. What that meant in terms of health no one knew, and the health service convened a panel of thyroid experts both to cross-check the findings and to assess the results for medical significance. They decided to hospitalize several children who appeared to have severe problems.!48 Dunning again protested a study “design . . . so poor that we discussed these matters with PHS,” now coupled with shoddy performance as well, all to no avail.!49 Equally harsh was his view of AEC-sponsored work
at Livermore, where John Gofman and Arthur Tamplin hoped, as Dunning phrased it, to put the AEC “when the PHS studies on children are published . . . in a position to release good estimates as to doses the children received.” What they produced, however, he dismissed as “reworking of old data on paper.’’}°°
Ambiguous data of unclear meaning left the Public Health Service puzzled
and concerned about what to tell the public. Consultation with the White House, the Federal Radiation Council, and the AEC led to an October press release in the form of a brief progress report.!>! A pleased public information officer noted that the widely reported story received “balanced, rather than sensational” coverage.!52 Physicians found several inflamed thyroids and suspected several more, but none of the children proved to have cancer. Again, though, what such findings meant for health remained unclear.'53 Ultimately, the study was inconclusive, as was the effort to link leukemia to low levels of fallout. So, too, was the related effort to relate changing rates of thyroid cancer surgery to fallout. Like the leukemia study, the thyroid cancer study relied on health records. In contrast to the earlier work, however, Weiss and his colleagues trusted their thyroid results enough to publish. Although questions
remained about links between fallout and thyroid disease, science in the mid-1960s could offer only the Scotch verdict “not proven.”!*4
Problems of Treaty Compliance On 5 August 1963, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom signed the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. It sharply restricted nuclear weapons testing. Article I barred all nuclear explosions “in the atmo-
From Moratorium to Test Ban 231 sphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or underwater.” Underground tests remained legal only if they caused no “radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted.”!55 Containment might thus involve not only questions of safety but also issues of international law. The AEC quickly revised test rules to reflect the new limits. This chiefly meant test devices buried deeper. How deep was determined by scaling; the so-called scaled depth was the computed ratio between depth in feet and the cube root of the device’s yield in kilotons. “Before the Test Ban Treaty, it was our practice, for economic and technical reasons, to use as shallow a hole as would give reasonable assurance of containment,” explained AEC Chairman Glenn Seaborg early in 1964. “Current AEC procedures dictate the use of a
conservative scaled depth rather than. . . attempt to approach the minimum containment depth.”!5° Immediate results left something to be desired. From the start of year-round underground testing in 1961 through 1963, half the 113 announced tests had been fully contained. Despite new controls, the 1964 record improved but slightly, to 55 percent of 29 announced tests. This may have surpassed the Soviet record during the same period, but a test meant to be contained that vented in 1964 greatly agitated the AEC by coming uncomfortably close to treaty violation.!5’ Conservatively buried at a depth greater than computed for a test device of its yield, Pike was fired on 13 March 1964. It was the eighteenth announced test in Operation Niblick, the fiscal year 1964 series begun just after the test ban signing. Physically matching prior contained shots, sited in a much-used and geologically well-studied area, Pike should have been no trouble. What
happened came as a complete surprise.!58 “I was literally amazed,” Los Alamos Test Chief Alvin Graves told the commissioners a week later.!°? Within seconds of firing, a 10-foot-long crack opened 130 feet from the zero
point and “a dense black cloud began. . . to spew out of the ground.”!60 Venting lasted less than a minute, but a mass of radioactive air rose above 10,000 feet and drifted southward. At noon Friday, an hour after the shot, the U.S. Weather Bureau predicted
“the trajectory . . . for the lower elevation cloud to reach Western Texas by March 14. Upper elevation may swing eastward over Northern Mexico.”!®! Radioactivity was most intense at the point where Pike vented, but on-site rad-safe posed no real problems. Off site was another matter. Although couched as safety issues, the questions raised pointed to growing public distrust of the AEC. Monitors off site detected only minor fallout; they found their highest reading in Cactus Springs near the test site (5.9 milliroentgens
per hour 50 minutes after the shot). Later and farther readings dropped sharply. Aircraft tracked the cloud southward past Las Vegas, then found it again Saturday morning breaking into small pockets between 2,000 and 7,000
232 From Moratorium to Test Ban feet over the California-Arizona border. By that afternoon, no further trace of the cloud could be found.'® In his first report to the AEC on Pike, Director of Military Application Delmar Crowson concluded, “No health hazards exist and there has been no violation of the treaty.’’!® Unfortunately from an AEC viewpoint, Pike aroused more public concern than the facts seemed to warrant. The cloud dropped hittle if any radioiodine,
and milk supplies escaped contamination. Convincing the critics of that proved troublesome. The Greater St. Louis Citizens’ Committee for Nuclear Information wanted quicker access to fallout figures, and the governor of Arizona objected strongly to what he perceived as the AEC’s failure to notify state health officials promptly of the potential hazard. Eventually, the AEC did persuade critics that the problems had simply been minor enough to ignore.!64 As these concerns faded, however, another issue came to the fore. Could Pike venting have violated the test ban treaty? Initially, the answer seemed clear-cut. Radioactive debris had not reached Mexico in dangerous amounts. That much was certain. Monitoring along the U.S. side of the border, both on the ground and in the air, suggested at worst only trace amounts
crossing. In any event, nothing could be proved one way or the other, as Deputy Director of Operational Safety Gordon Dunning explained. Positive identification would require the collection of an adequate amount of debris for radiochemical analysis using highly sophisticated procedures. In ad? dition, the Mexicans would need to know specifically where and when to monitor and have a determination to do so. The U.S. did not monitor below the Mexi-
can border so that absolute statements cannot be made about the transport of debris into these areas. However, based on all of the observed data and knowledge of what the requirements are to constitute positive identification, there is very little likelihood that such identification can or will be substantiated.'©
Whether or not traces of radioactivity actually violated the treaty posed a much more difficult question.
Some argued that the treaty language—“radioactive debris to be present’”—meant “something more than the minimum amount which can be detected.” International guidelines, as well as American and Soviet practice, defined “present” in terms of significant, not merely detectable, levels—10 percent, for instance, of maximum permissible concentrations.'!© When the AEC sought to explain the Pike incident and its ramifications in a public report, however, the White House demurred. Dunning’s draft may have addressed the sensitive issue of treaty violation too directly.!©? Yet even far more oblique references to the issue could prove troublesome. In October 1964, the Public Health Service forwarded a report on Pike fallout for AEC review. The manuscript included data on short-lived Pike fission products collected in Los Angeles on 16-17 March 1964, and that
From Moratorium to Test Ban 233 presented a problem. “Correlation of the Los Angeles readings with wind trajectories that are in the public domain,” warned the AEC director of public information, “could be taken to show that the material passed through Mexico on its way to Los Angeles.”!©§ Accordingly, he suggested classifying “the manuscript. . . SECRET Defense Information under Executive Order 10501, because the data could be taken to indicate a violation of the limited test-ban treaty and would be detrimental to the security of the United States.” Authorization from the White House must precede any release of such data.!° Different views prevailed in Nevada, where the Pike venting might have
become a public relations fiasco. At least the director of information for Nevada testing thought so. Particularly irksome to Henry Vermillion was how
Washington insisted on handling Pike. Since testing resumed in 1961, he complained, the AEC had sharply limited public statements and allowed few reporters or other visitors on the test site. Such policies not only gave critics free rein but also cost the AEC dearly. “The backlog of goodwill and good relations with the public of the NTS region during our days of open operations in the middle and late 1950s now is dwindling because of our restrictive pub-
lic information policy.” He urged “prompt public announcement. . . in all situations where measurable amounts of gamma radiation move off the test site,””170
James Reeves, who managed AEC Nevada operations, strongly seconded a more open news policy. It would help maintain hard-won gains in “public relations attitude with regard to our testing activities.”!7! Actually, he thought the Pike venting offered a splendid chance to reassure the public. It “turned out to be almost a model accident,” Reeves observed. “Its effects were measured in the precise area where is located perhaps the greatest concentration of capability for measurements in the nation.” With so much data, “a report to the public. . . could help put into perspective the hazards and non-hazards to health from a well-documented venting accident.” The request for a public report, however, went unheeded.!”2 Ironically, the Pike data supported models of maximum venting that served AEC test planners for years to come.!73 Reeves raised the issue again late in 1964. The Pike venting “did not endanger public safety, nor did it result in a claim of violation of the test ban treaty,” he insisted. Problems came only “because we were not allowed to print definitive information regarding the extent of contamination and hazard involved.”!”4 Reeves strongly believed that Pike typified a class of tests that the AEC itself caused to receive bad press: “News treatment of accidents such as ventings is sensationalized when reporters and editors feel that the Atomic Energy Commission is trying to hide something.” Far better to issue “a prompt public announcement of a venting such as Pike,” he argued. That “could take the sting out of the news treatment.”’!75
These were not issues easily resolved. Priority, however, rarely went to
234 From Moratorium to Test Ban keeping the public informed about events in Nevada.!”© Congressional and presidential concerns provoked by the Pike venting brought AEC promises of fuller studies of test site geology and more conservative scaled depths for low-yield shots. Restrictions on test firing marked the chief response to the lessons of the Pike venting.!”7 What came to be known as “post-Pike restrictions” went into effect on 15 April 1964. There were two, both addressed to the test manager: 1. Insure that at your pre-shot weather briefing you give additional weight to those meteorological conditions which predict travel times . . . that might carry vented material to the borders. 2. You should delay firing, if necessary, until weather is more favorable and you should avoid trajectories that would deposit material in areas affected by the Pike shot and particularly avoid deposit on Las Vegas.!78
Deciding to fire, in other words, required weather forecasts that promised no treaty violation if venting should occur and no threat to public health from fallout. Unfortunately, simply digging a deeper hole for the test device was not the whole answer. Too deep could be as bad as too shallow. Why this should be so becomes clearer in the context of what happens when a nuclear detonation occurs in the alluvial fill below Yucca or Frenchman Flat. Detonation creates an expanding sphere of vaporized material that compresses and fractures the surrounding rock. How large the sphere depends on how great the yield. As the vapor cools and condenses, pressure drops and newly fractured rock begins to fall into the cavity from above. Falling rock creates a so-called chimney reaching toward the surface. Given the right conditions, the surface will in time collapse into the chimney to form a shallow crater. “In time,” however, could mean anything from minutes to centuries,!”? as those responsible for testing had soon noted. What made the time a crater took to form a problem was the need to drill for core samples to obtain vital data, especially on yield. Until the ground
subsided, heavy drill rigs could not venture into the area above the test. Burial too deep or yield too low might mean a crater long delayed, or perhaps worse, only partially formed. Bulldozing roads into a crater and moving in drill rigs was risky enough without the threat of further collapse that might threaten workers with physical injury or expose them to venting radioactive gases. Directional drilling from outside the crater has become feasible with modern rigs and advanced techniques, but if the ground above a test has not
subsided, it still remains off limits. Potential crater areas surrounded by fences dot the test site to this day.!°° Thus the dilemma facing those who must decide how deep in little-known ground to bury a test device of uncertain yield. A depth too great for the yield
From Moratorium to Test Ban 235 could delay or disrupt formation of a proper crater and so increase hazards for test site workers. But a device not deep enough or with too high a yield could vent and spread radioactivity beyond the test site, even beyond the nation’s borders. Conservative depth of burial clearly meant one thing to the public, something else to those engaged in testing. Safety for both workers and the public, like treaty compliance, depended much on containment. Containment was a skill testers were still learning when Pike vented, and they had much yet to learn.
Testing Underground The New Character of Radiation Safety 1964-1974
Nuclear Excavation Subsidence craters were the normal result in buried tests of proper depth and yield. But a shallow bowl on the desert floor was not the kind of crater that Project Plowshare sought. Excavation projects, one of Plowshare’s major goals, worked through cratering. Earth moving required lesser scaled depths of burial so the blast could break the surface.! Radioactivity inevitably escaped, though most was trapped in the debris that fell back into the crater.” Cratering shots of this kind thus remained something of an anomaly. As we have seen, they might be hard to classify: “Neither confined completely underground nor purely atmospheric, [they} could be classed in either category.”3 The Atomic Energy Commission preferred to call them underground tests. Such questions became a crucial issue when the United States signed the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963. Whatever the AEC termed them, they did release fission products to the air, and windborne debris might cross U.S. borders. They also resembled bombs in almost every respect but intent. Distinctions between “peaceful nuclear explosions” and “military weapons tests” proved hard to draw; identical devices might be used for either, the difference being chiefly a matter of intent. Some tests, in fact, served both purposes. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, a recent creation of the Kennedy administration, led growing opposition to the AEC’s broad interpretation of the new treaty.‘ Confident of solving the problems with enough time and effort, the AEC nonetheless revised its Plowshare plans, “In lieu of proceeding with large 236
Testing Underground 237 scale field experiments [in] the excavation portion of the Plowshare program,” the commission focused on two main goals: one was “the development of the cleanest, most versatile nuclear explosives practicable”; the other,
“further development of the theory and understanding of crater formation by single and multiple charges to include venting and distribution of radioactivities.”> Developing clean nuclear devices began with six underground tests
at the Nevada Test Site from late 1962 through mid-1964. On 18 December 1964, Project Sulky became the first nuclear cratering experiment since Sedan in mid-1962. Aside from a ten-month delay imposed by presidential order, Sulky went smoothly.® Radioactivity was detected off site, a common
result of crater tests, but radiation safety presented no problems on site or off.?
Well before the event, however, Sulky became the subject of heated debate
within the AEC. Whether or not to announce the test beforehand was the issue, and the test ban treaty was the sticking point. The commission had promised to conduct Plowshare openly, but for Sulky that might entail costs that seemed unnecessary. Crucial data would come from a very small-scale blast, equivalent to less than 100 tons of high explosives. Specifically designed to show if greater scaled depth of burial could reduce the fraction of radioactivity vented to the air, the test posed little danger. Radioactive releases seemed likely to be minor and harmless nearby, all but undetectable farther away.’ The Division of Peaceful Nuclear Explosives believed that “the probability of another nation detecting radioactivity from Sulky is essentially
zero unless they were for[e]warned and activated detecting equipment and techniques not routinely used.” Accordingly, the division urged no advance public notice of the test. It proposed merely “to issue a low key post-shot announcement that a nuclear excavation test of low yield was conducted at the Nevada Test Site to obtain data for peaceful purposes.”? The Division of Public Information objected. Announcing the test in advance would not alter the facts, Public Information insisted; 1t would merely increase chances of radioactivity being detected. Concealing information seemed both improper and indefensible. It also seemed self-defeating. An unusually restrictive information policy on a Plowshare event could well arouse suspicions that this policy was motivated by fear that the U.S. would be detected in a violation of the test ban treaty. The consequences of such a defensive public posture . . . could in our opinion be serious not only for the AEC but also for U.S. foreign policy.
A press release twenty-four hours after the event with no mention of cratering or radioactive release, as the Division of Peaceful Nuclear Explosives proposed, would open the AEC to legitimate charges of deliberately trying to mislead in a devious attempt to withhold potentially embarrassing information. To say only that
238 Testing Underground there was a nuclear test, would undoubtedly raise the question as to whether it was underground. To say only that it was underground would be deliberately to mislead, because to the public “underground” means deep underground for containment.!°
The Nevada Operations Office agreed, but the White House and the Atomic Energy Commission did not. The press release came only after twenty-four hours and included no mention of radioactivity." Unfortunately, Sulky’s showing that greater scaled depth of burial did indeed reduce the vented fraction promised no help for Plowshare. Cratering effects changed so abruptly at increased depth as to render the technique useless for excavation. The next Plowshare test, Palanquin in April 1965, tried another approach to cleaner nuclear explosives. It was called “debris entrapment” or, more familiarly, the “down-hole scheme.” Experimental results from the fully contained Dub test of June 1964 suggested “that applying this technique to cratering may reduce the amount of vented radioactivities by a factor of 100 or more from the levels which would be expected without the use of this technique.” The idea, the AEC explained to the White House, is to drive the debris down an extension of the emplacement hole below the device, at such a rate that the hole will close behind the debris prior to rupture of
the surface. . . . If “debris entrapment” works as predicted in the Palanquin experiment, its effect with relation to radioactivity vented from nuclear excavation will be equal to that which we would expect from many years of device development.!2
Radioactive releases, given the nature of the test, should pose no problems. At worst, venting from Palanquin ought to be about the same as Sulky’s, even though Palanquin was designed for one hundred times Sulky’s yield. Like Sulky, Palanquin would be announced only after the event.!> Furthermore, “as in the case of Project Sulky, there is a need to establish procedures to control information, regarding the radioactive debris from Palanquin, which might provide a basis for allegations that the U.S. has violated the treaty.” Uncertainties mounted, however, as Dub test results received closer study. Palanquin plans changed, and the test was postponed. Redesigning the test for a 4-kiloton yield, Livermore increased Palanquin’s scaled depth to match Sulky’s. Full cratering thus became less likely, but so, too, did any chance of violating the treaty.!5 Still, with everything set, the AEC delayed Palanquin for six days, waiting for just the nght winds. Finally, early on 14 April 1965, came a good weather forecast.!© Detonated shortly after five o’clock in the morning, Palanquin surprised everyone. The gravel stemming the shaft failed to contain the blast; radioactivity hurtled into the air along with the gravel. “Contrary to expectations, a crater was formed,” AEC Chairman Seaborg told President Lyndon B. Johnson. “The dust cloud formed above ground zero and
Testing Underground 239 rose to a height of . . . about 8,000 feet above the surface.” The cloud drifted northward, tracked by aircraft. Although “levels of radioactivity in the cloud were higher than expected,” Seaborg assured the president, they remained “well below any possible health hazard level even close to the test site.’”!” But health hazards were not the chief AEC concern in April 1965. Radioactivity in the cloud might be too low to threaten health, but it was more than high enough to be tracked for one hundred hours. And it was heading toward Canada. Anxious officials waited for reports from flights along the US.— Canadian border. As predicted, the winds appeared to sweep the cloud in a great arc from Nevada northward through Idaho, eastward through Montana, then southward toward Nebraska. Radioactivity never crossed the border, so far as anyone knew, and the test ban treaty remained inviolate.’® Security meanwhile was tight, as the AEC acted to avoid public discourse until the situation became clear. Due to the possible effect that the motion pictures and still photographs showing the Palanquin detonation and cloud may have on the nuclear test ban treaty, it is requested that effective immediately the above information be protected as CONFIDENTIAL DEFENSE INFORMATION. !9
Finally certain that trouble had been avoided, the AEC on 17 April released a brief statement to the wire services, though it retained tight control over further Palanquin news for months.?? Whatever the cloud’s fate, the fact that Palanquin cratered meant the experts did “not fully understand all that happened.” Cratering tests clearly required cleaner test devices and better understanding of basic phenomena.?! When the cloud on shot day caught one airplane, nine Livermore workers had received exposures over the 3-rem limit; another aircraft, this bearing military observers, also was contaminated. Livermore promptly began to revise and enlarge its postshot reentry plan for Palanquin. Radioactivity around the crater and possible high exposures had derailed the original safety plan, except for a few critical recoveries. Now plans also must address “the unexpected behavior of the event and the need for additional data in order to understand it.” The next test, Cabriolet, appeared likely for February or March 1966.22
Meeting that schedule had become vital to the Plowshare excavation program. Planning future tests required Cabriolet data “on means of reducing the amounts of radioactivity vented,” Seaborg informed the White House. Important not only “to the general nuclear cratering program, these future experiments are necessary . . . for the studies on the feasibility of constructing a new sea-level canal.’’ Such a canal would not be “economically feasible unless constructed by nuclear excavation techniques.”23 By mid-1968, the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission was to decide if a sealevel canal was needed, where it should go, and whether building it should
240 Testing Underground use conventional or nuclear explosives. Demonstrating nuclear methods for digging a sea-level canal across Central America became one of Plowshare’s central goals.”4
Preparations for Cabriolet proceeded smoothly. In mid-February 1966, Director of Peaceful Nuclear Explosives John S. Kelly sought final approval for
the test.> It was a long time coming. Once again, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency strongly argued that the test ban treaty precluded such tests. The Johnson administration wavered, then postponed the test until early 1967.76 It also decided to announce Cabriolet, unlike Sulky and Palanguin, in advance.?’ But the January 1967 press release proved too hasty. Cabriolet was again deferred, first until spring, then fall.?8 Finally, on 26 January 1968, the long-delayed event was trouble-free. Cabriolet had a yield of 2.3 kilotons. Radioactivity detected off site was “far below any level that might be considered to constitute any health hazard.” More to the point, “the most dis-
tant contact was about 160 miles north of NTS and had a level of about 0.3 mr/hr.”29
Favorable Cabriolet results allowed the next test to follow quickly. Plowshare planners designed Buggy to show that a series of at least five charges detonated at once could produce a smooth-sided trench. This, of course, had special relevance for the canal project. Buggy used five test devices with a total yield of 5.4 kilotons; they were spaced 150 feet apart, buried 135 feet deep, and fired with slight delays. Everything went as planned on 12 March 1968.39 Buggy produced a fairly smooth-walled trench and little off-site radioactivity; the highest reading anywhere was 5 milliroentgens per hour at a point 100 miles from zero.?! The largest cratering test since Sedan took place at the end of the year. Originally planned in 1963 for a yield of 100 kilotons at a site in southwestern Idaho, Schooner was deferred when the test ban treaty went into effect.*? The 1968 version projected a yield of 35 kilotons at the Nevada Test Site. As plans matured, the test date became 12 December.*? Performance largely matched plans, though the yield was slightly lower than expected.*4 Schocner produced good results and no problems. Radioactivity detected off site again was minor.?>
Despite the successes of 1968, Project Plowshare’s future grew more doubtful. Nuclear earth moving, though proposed for several schemes, retained a role in only one active program, the sea-level canal study. Plowshare
delays, however, meant time was running out. Already twice extended by Congress, the final report was now due December 1970. That deadline was firm. “We will be extremely reluctant to request additional time,” the canal study commission informed the AEC. “It is our present intention to render a report on the prescribed date with or without a final determination of the feasibility of nuclear excavation.” Yet even after Schooner much remained to
be done. The AEC planned four major tests before the deadline. Difficult
Testing Underground 241 though that might appear in terms of workload, schedules, and resources, the canal study commission would accept nothing less, believing “it to be the minimum on which we can make specific recommendations concerning the use of nuclear explosives to excavate a sea-level canal.’’3’ But Schooner became the AEC’s last cratering test, and nuclear excavation remained only a promise. Restrictions imposed by the test ban treaty were but part of the reason. Because further testing required much higher yields, questions of public safety also revived.38 In view of “the potential risks, as higher nuclear yields are necessarily involved,” one veteran of Nevada testing called “for a careful reevaluation of the safety by the Plowshare program, particularly cratering applications.”%? In its 1970 report the canal study commission rejected the technique: not only was it unproved as to safety and perhaps treaty breaking but it might even be too costly. Conventional canal building appeared to carry a price tag lower by $200 million than the nuclear technique. Economy in large-scale earth moving, a major Plowshare selling point, seemed at least questionable.”
Plowshare’s Fading Promise As earth-moving prospects dimmed, Plowshare planners began to stress another goal, sometimes labeled “underground engineering.” “Industrial applications” seemed another useful term for this second major Plowshare program, which trailed nuclear excavation from the starting blocks. The several projects that fell under these rubrics all shared certain common traits. They were proposed or strongly supported by private industry; they centered on efforts to produce gas, oil, or minerals otherwise too costly to extract; and they would all take place deep enough below ground to be fully contained. Depth of burial mattered more than usual because they were not confined to the Nevada Test Site. Containment sharply reduced threats to public safety and
the test ban treaty.*! Development began with Project Handcar at the Nevada site on 5 November 1964. Publicly announced both before and after, it was purely an AEC test to check the results of nuclear explosion in carbonate rock; it was also one of few tests to penetrate water-bearing strata underlying the test site. Detonated at a depth of 1,333 feet with a yield of 12 kilotons, Handcar produced neither crater nor venting.*? Feasibility studies of several projects followed during the mid-1960s.43 Only Project Gasbuggy, however, reached the field.
In January 1967, El Paso Natural Gas Company signed a contract with the Department of the Interior and the AEC to conduct an experiment in northwestern New Mexico: could nuclear explosives replace conventional high explosives or high-pressure fluids to fracture rock and stimulate the flow of
242 Testing Underground natural gas?“ Radiological safety raised questions early, centered during this
phase of the program on normal concerns about venting. The danger appeared small given the planned yield and burial depth; Nevada standards served just as well in New Mexico.* Modestly delayed by drilling problems, Gasbuggy took place on 10 December 1967. The test device exploded 4,240 feet below ground with a yield of 29 kilotons. Initial results looked good, and only traces of activity reached the surface through cabling.*®
Radioactive venting, however, had never seemed the major threat. The harder question was how badly contaminated the gas would be. Reentry drilling began just three days after the shot. Gasbuggy’s final phase required tap-
ping the chimney of fractured rock for gas samples, partly to measure increased flow, partly to learn what radionuclides might present problems. Production tests during 1968 and 1969 hinted that Gasbuggy had multiplied obtainable gas as much as eightfold.47 Contamination, however, remained troubling. Was the gas too radioactive for public use? No—with qualifications. Only tritium seemed to pose a real problem, and that merely needed better explosive design. Despite such promise, El Paso never sold any of the gas.*8
Precautions during drillback and later production tests safeguarded workers and kept the environment free of radioactivity. Eberline Instrument Company of Santa Fe, New Mexico, contracted with the AEC to provide on-site rad-safe services for Plowshare tests beginning with Gasbuggy. REECo provided the required film badges for Eberline’s use. Filling the same role for Gasbuggy as for Nevada tests, the Public Health Service ran the off-site radsafe program.” In its final report, the health service concluded “that production testing of the Gasbuggy re-entry well did not create radioactivity levels in the environment which approached any appreciable fraction of the radiation protection guides.”°° Encouraged by Gasbuggy’s measure of success, the AEC found another joint venture in gas stimulation. A new partner replaced El Paso Natural Gas. Houston’s Austral Oil Company paid much of the cost and hired a Las Vegas corporation, CER Geonuclear, to manage the effort. Taking its name from its parent corporations—Continental Oil, EG&G, and REECo—CER had been formed in 1965 to exploit underground resources with nuclear explosives. The scene shifted as well, to the Rulison field of west central Colorado, where rocks one to two miles deep tightly locked 8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.>! Radiological safety, however, remained a key issue. The Public Health Service and the AEC had long since begun to refine their approach to Plowshare safety. Initially, Gasbuggy largely defined the areas discussed.>? The scope of discourse broadened later in 1968 to meet the prospect of other projects.*4 None of the others made much progress. Gas stimulation remained the only approved field program, and Project Rulison stood next in line.
Testing Underground 243 Despite a well-contained Gasbuggy test and a Rulison burial depth of 8,440 feet for a test device with a yield of 40 kilotons, rad-safe took a major share of Rulison planning. Environmental surveys figured largely in this effort.54 Rulison also revealed anew the tight links between safety and public relations.55 Reassuring local officials as well as the public became as great a
part of the Public Health Service role in Colorado as it had long been in Nevada.*© Opposition based largely on issues of safety, however, began to challenge Rulison.5?7 AEC attempts to argue the facts achieved only modest results.>8
For the first time, local citizens sought in court to enjoin the AEC from testing. They failed. U.S. District Court Judge Alfred Arraj declared himself “impressed with the fact that the Government has up to this point exercised extreme caution and care to protect the persons, animal life, plant life, water supplies and any other thing that might be adversely affected by the detonation of this device.”’59 He denied the injunction on 27 August 1969, though he did impose a six-month pause on-flaring gas. Immediately appealed, the decision was upheld on 2 September, two days before the scheduled firing date. Although weather delayed Rulison almost a week, the test on 10 Septem-
ber 1969 otherwise went as planned.® Litigation had not ended. Plaintiffs now sought a court order to enjoin the AEC from flaring gas. Once again, the government prevailed. Having already achieved some measure of success by having their case heard, plaintiffs did not appeal.©? The central issue had never been the test itself. Impermeable rock over a mile and a half deep seemed shield enough against radioactive contamination of land or water. Anxiety centered rather on posttest reentry drilling and production testing. With some prodding from the court, the AEC tried to assure worried citizens of its own great concern for just that work.© Safety planning had, in fact, focused
chiefly on posttest drilling and testing, with a six-month pause scheduled to allow radioactivity to decay to safer levels.“ During the interim, safety remained the subject of much thought.©
Final plans were still being shaped when drilling began late in April 1970. From a safety viewpoint, matters could scarcely have gone better. “Plans, procedures, and equipment prepared to ensure onsite and offsite radiological safety were generally effective,” reported Nevada Operations Manager Robert E. Miller. “Measurable releases of radioactivity and minor contamination problems” either fell “within the safety guidelines’”’ or were “controlled effectively by the contractors responsible.” The result, he concluded, was “that no measurable exposure occurred to either onsite workers or Offsite populations.”®’ But success had not come cheaply.
Escalating costs hit especially hard on the AEC’s industrial partner in Rulison, Austral Oil. “Although a successful technical achievement was attained, the total cost more than doubled the best original estimates,” Miller
244 Testing Underground observed. “When Austral had to advance funds for preliminary safety studies
to the AEC, this is when Austral realized that they would have no control over these costs or in fact over any of the safety-related costs of the project.” Although the government must concern itself with safety, Miller acknowledged, “industry should not have to sustain the unlimited exposure to cost as was the case in Project Rulison.”6® Commercial success was not one of the project’s technical goals, but Austral’s failure ever to market Rulison gas still seemed disappointing.®©
Technical success and practical failure also marked Plowshare’s third gas stimulation experiment, Project Rio Blanco. Sited in Colorado north and west of Rulison, Rio Blanco was proposed by CER Geonuclear, which had managed the Rulison test. Three test devices, each with a design yield of 30 kilo-
tons, would explode in a single shaft at depths of 5,840, 6,230, and 6,690 feet, respectively, to form a connected chimney of fractured rock 1,300 feet long. Accounted a partial success, Rio Blanco still fell short of expectations.” Environmental and safety concerns may have affected Rio Blanco even more than Rulison. Such concerns derived less from novel test design than from the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. For the first time the AEC had to prepare an environmental impact statement for a nuclear test.
This was no easy job. Again the AEC found itself in court. Despite again winning its case, the AEC could only expect worse to come. Practical ends depended on using large numbers of nuclear explosions, the same bleak prospect that blocked nuclear excavation.”! Although not obvious at the time, Rio Blanco proved to be the last Plowshare test. Underground engineering went the way of nuclear excavation, victim of meager results and rising public opposition, much of it derived from a growing environmental movement to which fear of fallout may well have contributed.”
From Mississippi to Alaska Plowshare was not the only project to depart the Nevada Test Site in the 1960s. When testing moved underground, the AEC could find other locales to pursue its ends without, at first, causing much outcry. Vela Uniform, in fact, began off site. It formed part of the Vela program of seismic research sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. First announced in 1960, Vela’s goal was better monitoring of nuclear weapons testing. Vela Uniform focused on underground tests. In November 1961, the AEC announced plans to conduct Shoal, the first test devoted exclusively to the program (Gnome in December 1961 included Vela Uniform objectives in a mainly Plowshare test). After a wide-ranging search the AEC had chosen a site near Fallon in western Nevada. Geology was the chief criterion. An active earthquake zone of deep granite would per-
Testing Underground 245 mit an attempt to distinguish nuclear from seismic tremors. The end of the test moratorium in late 1961 brought this first phase to a close. Almost two years passed before the test took place.” Burial depth and design yield almost surely precluded any danger of released radioactivity. A slight chance of venting would have mattered little at the Nevada Test Site. Several hundred miles away and more open to public gaze, however, even the most minor escape might present problems of public relations, if not of safety.’4 Accordingly, rad-safe planning began early and persisted throughout.’ So, too, did thinking about what to tell the people living nearby. Cooperative local officials and a striking absence of overt concern eased the way, but public relations assumed a major role in the off-site safety
program.’ In its final version, Shoal used a test device with a yield of 12 kilotons buried 1,500 feet deep. The event itself on 26 October 1963 proved trouble-free and fully contained. Postshot drilling and residual radioactivity caused only the most minor problems.” For the next Vela Uniform test, the AEC chose Tatum Salt Dome near Hattiesburg, Mississippi. Once again, the AEC found a friendly welcome. Project Dribble would study the effect of decoupling; that is, firing in an underground cavity in contrast to firing in contact with the surrounding medium. Early plans were shelved when the moratorium ended and weapons testing resumed in September 1961.78 Reactivated in late 1962 as a three-shot program, Dribble began running into engineering problems during spring 1963. After intense review, the AEC late in 1963 decided to proceed with Salmon, the first Dribble test.” Populated more densely than Fallon, the Hattiesburg region required much greater off-site safety efforts on both test and posttest activities.2° Much of the 1963 work had to be revised after the program resumed in 1964. Evacuating nearby residents at shot time became part of safety plans, chiefly to forestall
any chance of harm from seismic shock. Radioactivity seemed a far less likely source of danger. The AEC nonetheless adopted the lowest off-site exposure limits it had ever imposed: no more than 0.17 roentgen averaged over the entire local population, and no more than 0.5 roentgen for any single person. These figures became standard for all nonweapon tests and after the mid-1970s, for all tests of any kind.®! Unexpectedly, safety questions impeded progress toward meeting an early fall firing date. In mid-July, AEC General Manager Alvin Luedecke sought the commission’s formal approval for Salmon. Deputy Director of Operational Safety Gordon Dunning objected. Opposition from such a source could
only seem surprising. As Dunning himself remarked, “I have never heretofore found it necessary to reach an adverse decision for any nuclear detonations in which I have had a part during the past 13 years.” Technical problems had plagued Salmon since early 1963, he argued. Each might be resolved, but the root cause remained untouched. The problem centered in
246 Testing Underground “the very nature of the concept and design ..., i.e., firing a nuclear device in a unique environment in a populated area.’’82
Even though the risks of venting seemed small, Dunning insisted, the test also had little meaning. Salmon was simply not “a critical experiment.” In return for “one additional datum point,” he asked, “what may we lose?—our whole continental nuclear weapons testing program. The odds are good but the stakes are too high.” Logically, “the very great disparity between what little may be gained and how great may be our losses” could lead to only one
conclusion: “Salmon is not worth the risk.’®? Noting Dunning’s qualms, Luedecke nonetheless favored going ahead with Salmon. The commissioners agreed, though only after prolonged discussion.* One major surprise marred the test on 22 October 1964. Seismic shock from the 5.3-kiloton test buried over half a mile deep caused damage much greater than expected. Radioactivity, though, proved to be no problem on or off site.*5 Originally scheduled to follow Salmon by nine months, the final two shots of Project Dribble were suspended indefinitely. Postshot work on Salmon suggested, however, that the 100-foot cavity could serve for a test of decoupling theory. Project Sterling resulted. On 3 December 1966, a test device with a yield of 380 tons was fired in the center of the Salmon cavity. All went smoothly.86 Two nonnuclear Vela Uniform tests followed in 1969 and
1970 under the code name Miracle Play.’’ That ended the career of the Mississippi test site, though the AEC planned to keep a watchful eye on the area for years to come.®8
Between Salmon and Sterling, Vela Uniform journeyed to Alaska. The program required a large-yield test for which neither Nevada nor Mississipp1 sites would do. Inhabited only by birds and sea otters, Amchitka was part of the Aleutian Islands National Wildlife Refuge. Otherwise, however, it filled the bill nicely. Long Shot was a Department of Defense experiment. Under a
joint Defense-AEC agreement, the AEC provided the test device and the required technical support, as well as on- and off-site safety services. The planned yield of 80 kilotons at a depth of 2,300 feet promised a fully contained test.89 Public relations seemed a larger concern, sea otters posing the keenest question. Although the once-threatened species had come back nicely, many would recall its former status as endangered. The Long Shot test on 29 October 1965, however, was not only fully contained but also left the sea otters and other wildlife unscathed.?!
Vela Uniform returned to the Nevada Test Site for its final two shots, Scroll in 1968 and Diamond Dust in 1970. But Amchitka had not yet ended its career as a test site. Although several high-yield devices had been tested in Nevada, that site was not deemed fully suitable for such tests; Amchitka offered a likely alternative. Designed for a yield of 1 megaton and buried 4,000 feet deep, Milrow was set for 2 October 1969. It would show whether or not tests of still higher yield could safely be conducted at Amchitka. Public con-
Testing Underground 247 cern had grown since 1965, however, and the AEC sought a formal agreement with the Department of the Interior—responsible for the wildlife refuge—
to use the island. To help defuse a key issue, the AEC agreed with Interior and the state of Alaska to help transplant colonies of sea otters to other former habitats along the West Coast. Sea otters were not the only ecological question marks. That a blast so large might trigger earthquakes or tsunamis in a region notorious for seismic activity could hardly be ignored.?3 Fortunately,
such fears proved unwarranted. Seismic effects seemed local only, and the shot was fully contained.” Milrow prepared the way for Cannikin, intended to test the warhead of the Spartan missile with a design yield of 5 megatons. The Cannikin shaft had, in fact, already been drilled before the Milrow test, and planning proceeded apace, with safety again a central focus.* Many of the bioenvironmental questions asked of Milrow now troubled Cannikin and became the subject of special plans. Radioactive releases from a test buried 6,000 feet deep again seemed less likely than earthquakes.%° But much had changed in two years. Members of Congress, state officials, the public at large, all expressed concerns about the planned test. With careful statements of fact and cautious opinion, the AEC sought to assure public officials that Cannikin posed no undue risk.?7 Informal hearings in Juneau and Anchorage were intended to allay widespread concerns.”® Promptly reported to Washington, these efforts achieved only modest success.?? Cannikin also required an environmental impact statement, as Milrow had not.! Cannikin, like Rulison in Colorado, also faced a legal challenge. Organized opposition to the test emerged early and raised hard questions about the test and the AEC’s environmental statement when it appeared.!©! The outcomes differed little. Environmentalists achieved no more against Cannikin than against Rulison, failing to convince the court to enjoin the AEC from firing.!°2 On 6 November 1971, the test went largely as planned. Although seismic shock appeared to have killed some sea mammals, birds, and fish, fears of widespread death and massive damage proved groundless.!% Radioactivity also was fully contained.!&* Amchitka had served its purpose, and long-laid plans to restore this test site were soon under way.!% The AEC would conduct no more tests outside Nevada, though plans to resume testing in the Pacific guarded against collapse of the test ban treaty.!°
Baneberry By the late 1960s fallout from weapons testing had largely ceased, both as a physical phenomenon and as a public issue. Underground testing appeared to be running smoothly. Although minor problems persisted, moving underground had achieved one of its main goals, reducing fallout to insignificance
248 Testing Underground and taking the test program out of the limelight. This was not mere sleight of hand. The AEC and its contractors had devised and installed the changes in practice and organization that safe year-round testing required.!° Rapid but short-lived venting or slow but prolonged seepage still some-
times followed tests, but such small-releases as occurred posed no health hazards. Quarterly and annual exposure limits for on-site workers were seldom exceeded, off-site limits rarely even approached. During the last half of the decade, the ratio of fully contained tests held roughly constant at threefourths, a marked improvement over the record of the early 1960s.! Virtually every test conformed near enough its predicted outcome to require only minor adjustments in the field. Much of the excitement of the early days, the sense that many of those working at the Nevada Test Site recall of joining a great adventure, also had faded. After almost a decade of experience testing underground, safety seemed to demand no more than faithful adherence to the rules.!©? Environmental questions also appeared to be well under control.!"¢ In such a setting, the test called Baneberry shocked the test organization and the public all the more. Detonated 912 feet below Yucca Flat at 7:30 in
the morning of 18 December 1970, Baneberry had a yield of 10 kilotons. Everything at first looked normal. But within a few minutes, a fissure opened 60 feet from surface ground zero stretching 315 feet southwestward. Radio-
active debris jetted massively from the crack, thick black smoke and dust spurting 8,000 feet into the air. The tall plume drifted slowly northeastward, except a few hundred feet above the ground where winds were light and variable. Telemetered readings from remote probe monitoring devices near surface ground zero topped 1,000 roentgens per hour. Even after the ground subsided to form the normal crater thirteen minutes later, venting continued from several places along the fissure, both within and outside the crater. Steacily though ever more slowly, vapor drifted from the crack for the next twentyfour hours.!!! Security guards halted all traffic northbound into Yucca Flat from Mercury, the base camp at the Nevada Test Site. Between Mercury and Yucca Flat was the complex that served as the control point for tests. There the Nye County sheriff turned back everyone who arrived from Mercury. But as many as nine hundred people were in the now suddenly expanded radiation exclusion area. Evacuation of Camp 12 in the northwest corner of Yucca Flat, less than four miles west from Baneberry surface ground zero, started as radiation levels began to rise there after the shot. The highest portable instrument reading taken during evacuation was 1.5 roentgens per hour, beta plus gamma, the highest gamma reading 0.7 roentgen per hour by remote probe on the roof of
the Area 12 cafeteria. Evacuees traveled west, then south, to safety at the control point, because high readings blocked the direct route. Monitored in Area 17 on the way, some read as much as 100 milliroentgens per hour on skin or clothing; vehicle readings reached 300 milliroentgens per hour.!!2
Testing Underground 249 Decontamination began as soon as the caravan arrived at CP-2, the radsafe building at the control point. Cars and trucks, more than four hundred of them, went to the decon pad. Personnel used a decontamination station inside the CP-2 building, idle since the days of aboveground testing. Contaminated clothing and personal effects went into plastic bags under the watchful eye of the sheriff. Their owners showered if required, returned for checking, and donned freshly issued coveralls and rubber boots. By 2:30 that afternoon, most evacuees had been surveyed; the rest, those on duty near Area 12, were relieved and checked through by early evening. Decontamination was required for eighty-six, of whom sixty-six were sent to Mercury for thyroid activity measurements. Of those counted at Mercury, eighteen had their measurements cross-checked on the Public Health Service whole-body counter in Las Vegas. Results, if not reassuring, could have been worse. Prompt action seemed to have met the crisis. The highest film badge reading indicated a dose of 1.045 rem, the highest thyroid count a calculated dose of 3.73 rem. Both these figures represented just over a third of the quarterly limit.!"3 Off-site rad-safe after Baneberry also moved quickly. The Southwestern
Radiological Health Laboratory remained in charge of off-site rad-safe but now under the auspices of the new Environmental Protection Agency rather than the Public Health Service. Though taking place only a week before Baneberry, the change in administration had no effect on action in a crisis. Officials alerted all air sampling network stations west of the Mississippi to check for radioiodine and activated the standby milk network in Nevada and surrounding states. The twenty-six monitors in the field during the day found very little. Exposure rates off site nowhere exceeded 1 milliroentgen per hour. Radioiodine appeared in some Nevada milk samples but only in trace amounts well below federal guidelines. Aircraft tracked the cloud as it drifted mainly east-northeastward and confirmed the very low readings on the ground.!!4 “No public health hazard resulted from the radioactivity which was
detected at any location off the Nevada Test Site,” noted AEC Chairman Seaborg three weeks after the incident. “Radiological survey results to date have not indicated sufficient levels of radioactivity to justify special field studies or the need for instituting protective actions.”!!5 Further studies did little to belie his judgment.!!6 Nonetheless, all testing at the Nevada Test Site ceased. Entry into the affected area remained under tight control for a month and a half while survey and decontamination proceeded in cold, snowy weather. The Area 12 camp
reopened in February 1971.!!7 Meanwhile concerted efforts to learn what caused the unforeseen ground cracking began. Although its scaled depth matched other test devices of its planned yield, the Baneberry test device acted as if it had not been buried deeply enough. Apparently the test device itself performed largely as expected. Analysis pointed to high water content of the rock it exploded in, to a compacted volcanic ash called tuff, and to lay-
250 Testing Underground ers around the shaft of even more highly moisture-laden clay as the major problems. Relatively incompressible because it held so much water, the tuff and clay in effect multiplied the blast pressure.® A computer study concluded that “a yield of 0.5 kt in 100% saturated tuff produced about the same ground motion as 10 kt in dry . . . tuff.” Excess water flashing to steam added to the problem, as did an overlooked fault near ground zero (later named the Baneberry fault).!9 Finding answers was only the beginning. Technical and administrative changes followed. Through such changes, the AEC intended to obtain better information about test settings and more informed advice on test procedures, !20
Geology and physics, however, had little to do with turning mishap into crisis. The test controller, a onetime weatherman, was slow to take alarm; he thought the cloud headed northeastward, not toward Area 12. He was right about the main cloud but overlooked the stem. Unknown to him, the moming sun warming the mesa caused an updraft. Earlier light and variable winds became a steady breeze near the ground, blowing the stem westward toward the camp at the foot of the mesa. This might once have been merely a minor lapse in judgment. By 1970, however, such an error could have more drastic consequences. When testing moved underground and ceased being merely a biennial episode, the nature of work at the test site changed. Further changes followed years of nearly trouble-free year-round operation. Economic motives and the absence of much fallout combined to promote steady work and a stable work force. Support facilities like repair shops and field warehouses moved into forward areas. Temporary camps for work on specific tunnel shots evolved into permanent base camps, like the one at Area 12. Arrangements like these saved money but put many people closer to tests and so began to erode the flexibility that made underground testing so attractive. It took Baneberry and the accidental exposure of a large number of workers to bring these matters sharply into focus. As a result, much stronger controls were imposed on work in the forward area. Evacuation of everyone north of the control point as well as everyone not strictly needed to conduct a test became the rule.!24 When the Nevada Test Site resumed testing in June 1971, it had a new motto: “Economy of operations is subject to the overriding consideration of safety.”’!22
Technical and procedural reforms prompted by Baneberry allowed the Nevada Test Site to much more consistently contain underground shots from 1971 onward. From the beginning of full-time underground testing in 1961
through 1970, 202 of 324 announced tests were fully contained. But the record improved to 136 of 139 in the decade after Baneberry. Beyond test site borders, a surveillance program begun after Baneberry detected nothing significant during the entire decade. Ironically, test containment reached its highest level just when past rad-safe practices began to attract ever harsher criti-
cism. Baneberry played a part in this trend as well. Public concern about
Testing Underground 251 fallout had declined sharply when atmospheric testing ended. Minor releases reported from underground tests since the signing of the test ban treaty, seventeen in all before December 1970, had proved only mildly unsettling.!3 Baneberry seemed quite another matter. Assurances from the AEC that the massive venting posed no off-site threat received a mixed hearing. As news spread, questions poured in from Congress, from other federal and local officials, and from scientists and citizens.!2* During the first twenty-four hours after the shot, 125 reporters phoned for information. Television crews arrived
in Las Vegas the day after, and press queries showed no signs of slowing through the weekend.'!?° Individual questions soon received answers, but that barely touched the real problem as new ones flowed 1n.!26 By mid-January, the Nevada Operations Office had drafted a fact sheet on Baneberry and outlined a plan for telling the public what had happened. The
plan would go into action just as soon as the investigation committee reported. Officials in Washington and Las Vegas did not see eye to eye on the release of information.!2’/ Moving more deliberately, headquarters completed its public information plan by mid-March. Its centerpiece was a press briefing, the director of public information explained, to “be held as soon as possible after test resumption is finally authorized.”!28 That took place two months later, on 14 May. Opening the session, Nevada Operations Manager Robert Miller stressed the inherent safety of underground testing and the AEC’s extreme caution with respect to Baneberry. Only after more than three months of detailed investigation by the technical investigating committee, a further review by an independent panel of consultants, a further review by a special review board appointed by the General Manager
of the AEC, and several appearances by test officials before the AEC and higher levels of the Government, has it been determined that test operations at the Nevada Test Site should be resumed. This decision has been made, and nuclear testing will be resumed . . . under even more stringent and conservative controls than have been practiced in the past.!29
Thirteen local reporters received a prepared news release and copies of Miller’s remarks, the Baneberry summary report and the interim off-site report.!5° “Press response” to a member of the public affairs office appeared to be “excellent.’”!3!
The Issue of Low-Level Radiation Underground testing resumed in Nevada six months after Baneberry, on 13
June 1971. A few weeks later Ernest J. Sternglass, professor of radiation physics at the University of Pittsburgh, called a press conference. Evidence of increased infant mortality rates in thirteen western states during the first quar-
252 Testing Underground ter of 1971, he claimed, could be tied to the Baneberry venting. The AEC dismissed “his charges” as “absurd.”!32 Researchers from the Environmental Protection Agency took a close look at the figures Sternglass used. Their brief study issued in August concluded “that there is no association between changes in infant mortality and exposure to radioactivity from the Baneberry Event.”!33 Controversy over Baneberry was merely the latest—and not the last—episode in a long-running dispute between Sternglass and the government. As a member of the Federation of American Scientists in Pittsburgh during the early 1960s, Sternglass had begun looking at the effects of low-level radiation. He knew the work of Alice M. Stewart and her colleagues at Oxford
University. In a 1958 paper they linked fetal X-ray exposure during pregnancy to later development of leukemia and other cancers in childhood. Independently in 1962, Brian MacMahon of Harvard University found much the same thing. That year, too, Ralph E. Lapp reported learning of unusually high fallout levels in upstate New York from 1953 Nevada tests.!*4 Putting together Stewart’s findings on low-level radiation effects and Lapp’s report that fallout had reached such levels in parts of the United States, Sternglass
concluded that fallout also might damage fetuses. Although his published 1963 paper found more critics than friends, he persisted in trying to prove a linkage.!55
Again and again he found himself lacking the right data. Inadequate data became the chief reason the paper he presented in June 1968 at the annual meeting of the Health Physics Society in Denver “got many people seething mad.”!36 But his efforts to secure better data proved largely futile. When he tried to learn something from Los Alamos about fallout after the Trinity test of 1945, for instance, Sternglass met a stone wall. Los Alamos Health Division Leader Thomas Shipman judged him “a troublemaker of the Ralph LappBarry Commoner type.”!37 He blandly assured Sternglass “there is nothing that is worth sending out.” Secrecy and wartime constraints precluded “a lot of people running around the countryside with strange instruments.” Monitors, Shipman deliberately (and misleadingly) continued, merely were instructed to survey inhabited sites in the vicinity to determine whether or not radiation levels might be truly dangerous with doses in excess of something
like 50 rads. It goes without saying that no exposure levels in this order of magnitude were found. Film badges . . . mailed to. . . surrounding post offices. . . showed [no] evidence of exposure, although it should be remembered that the lower limit of sensitivity for a film badge in those days was in the vicinity of 50 rads. None of the techniques for measuring fallout as we think of it today had been developed at that time. . . . We have found it impossible to derive from [Operations Trinity, Crossroads, and Sandstone] any data which
could reasonably be compared with . . . more sophisticated findings. . . . 1 certainly don’t feel that responsible people in those operations more than 20 years ago merit any criticism for failing to do things which were beyond the
Testing Underground 253 technology of the times. By the same token none of us at this late date should be guilty of trying to draw conclusions from observations which were highly inexact and made for different purposes.!38
None of this was true.}39 Thwarted by what he perceived, clearly at times correctly, as noncooperation from those who had the data he needed, Sternglass made use of whatever public records and published work he could find. Increasingly, he turned to the mass media and popular magazines as outlets for his theories.!*° Popularization, in turn, tended to reinforce the skepticism his work aroused among experts.!*! One Sternglass critic was Arthur Tamplin, a biophysicist at the University of California’s Lawrence Radiation Laboratory in Livermore, California. Writing for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in 1969, he argued that Sternglass had blamed far too many fetal and infant deaths on fallout.!42 Tamplin came
to the question of low-level effects through his work for the AEC, which largely supported Lawrence Livermore. There he worked closely with John Gofman, who had both a doctorate in nuclear physics from Berkeley and a medical degree from San Francisco. In 1963, Gofman had become the first leader of the laboratory’s new biomedical research division. Stimulated by the 1962 furor over radioiodine, as well as the prospects for the Plowshare program in which Lawrence Livermore played a central role, he undertook to direct broad studies of the effects of radiation on the biosphere, especially mankind.!43
Among Gofman’s first tasks in 1963 was serving on the ad hoc committee that decided whether or not the AEC should publish Harold Knapp’s radioiodine research. Despite doubts about Knapp’s methods, motives, and findings, he urged publication, as did the committee.! Knapp’s work led to the 1965 Public Health Service studies of Utah radioiodine, in which both Tamplin and Gofman became involved. In 1966, Gofman resigned as head of the biomedical research division to pursue his own research, and Tamplin published a report that largely confirmed Knapp’s findings. As both men grew doubtful about the safety of current radiation standards, they found themselves at growing odds with the laboratory and the AEC.!* Tamplin’s attack on Sternglass seemed to mark a turning point; AEC headquarters commended the critique but wished to see his estimate of infant and fetal deaths published separately in a professional journal. Tamplin’s figure of 4,000 fallout-caused deaths seemed small only in contrast to the 400,000 Sternglass calculated. By 1970, both Gofman and Tamplin had become outspoken critics of AEC safety standards.!*6 The AEC, in turn, sharply criticized them.'4’ Criticism from the AEC could perhaps be expected, but the scientific com-
munity at large, too, displayed little support for critics such as Knapp, Sternglass, Tamplin, and Gofman. Ambiguous data, suspect methods, and extreme statements each allowed skeptics to doubt the results. Ultimately, such
2504 Testing Underground results rested, as Melvin W. Carter observed of Gofman and Tamplin, “more on professional evaluation and judgment of scientific evidence than on specific scientific proof.”!48 Professional judgment in the early 1970s largely re-
jected the critics. Even those sharing their concerns might question their methods, style, and findings.'49 Mainstream scientific opinion, in fact, went further. In 1972, reports of both the American Advisory Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation and the U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation dismissed direct attempts to study lowdose effects. Investigating effects so small and so ambiguous seemed not only difficult but also unlikely to yield significant health benefits.15° The controversy over effects of low doses subsided in the early 1970s.15!
Coincidentally, the Atomic Energy Commission itself was about to depart the scene, a casualty of the energy crisis. President Gerald R. Ford signed the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 in October. Three months later, on 19 January 1975, the Energy Research and Development Administration opened its doors. Among its other research functions, ERDA took over the now-defunct AEC’s work on nuclear weapons.!*? Unlike the AEC, though, ERDA was not obliged both to promote nuclear energy and to protect the public from its hazards. A second new agency created from the AEC, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), would oversee the nuclear power industry. Dividing development and promotion from regulation and safety, however imperfectly, at least addressed one of the most serious long-standing complaints against the AEC.'3 By the mid-1970s, the last major issues surrounding radiation safety aspects of nuclear weapons testing appeared to have been settled, with one exception: how low must radiation levels fall on their home islands before the displaced Marshallese could return?
Caring for the Natives The Marshallese question involved four distinct groups: the Bikinians removed in 1946 by Operation Crossroads, the residents of Enewetak resettled in 1948 to create the Pacific Proving ‘Ground, and the peoples of Rongelap and Utirik evacuated after Castle Bravo in 1954. Despite much in common— widespread desire to go home, a growing sense of injustice, fear of the unseen danger that menaced their return—each group also had endured its own unique exile. For the United States, each came to pose distinct, though often related, problems. Whatever their special nature might be, though, they shared a common core: when could each people safely return to its native islands? Responsibility for answers to that question fell squarely on the AEC. Radioactivity from nuclear weapons tests, in prospect or in fact, caused each exile; only the AEC could decide what measures, if any, would be required to restore the islands to habitability.!54
The last to leave also became the first to return. By June 1954, the Bravo-
Testing Underground 205 displaced natives of Utirik were back home, seeming none the worse for their
ordeal. Estimated external exposures from Bravo fallout of 14 roentgens (later reduced to 11) left them without observed symptoms of radiation sickness, though laboratory tests after their evacuation detected transient blood changes.!55 Fallout much lighter on Utirik than Rongelap also meant much less risk from ingested radionuclides; nothing suggested the people evacuated from Utirik had acquired any significant body burdens, though they, like the Rongelapese, later suffered much greater rates of thyroid problems than other Marshallese. !°6
Radioactivity lingered in Utirik’s physical and biological environment when its inhabitants returned after a three-month absence, though detected traces fell far below any level thought to threaten health. Despite findings that such radionuclides as cesium-137 and zinc-65 entered the food chain to accumulate in Utirikese bodies, doctors still perceived no threat.!5’ Body burdens of some radionuclides did grow for a time, reaching peak levels far above Marshallese norms though still well below published standards. Radioactive decay continuously lowered intake, however, and in due course body burdens also trended downward.!*8 Rongelap remained off limits for more than three years; meanwhile the Rongelapese dwelt at Majuro atoll. By the time they went home in June 1957, their health again appeared normal, though later ills almost surely derived from their initial exposure.!>? The passage of three years altered the mix of radionuclides (each of which decayed at its own unique rate) that people met when they returned to Rongelap, as compared to what the Utirik people had found. But Rongelap also had received far more intense fallout than Utirik had. Like the people of Utirik, those of Rongelap added to their body burdens of some radionuclides through the food they ate after coming home. Again, the AEC verdict was no real health threat.!© Residual radioactivity emerged as the crucial factor in the much longer exiles of their inhabitants from Bikini and Enewetak. Having left before testing touched them, they had suffered no direct effects from radiation. They had endured, however, far more prolonged, and in the case of the Bikinians at least, much harsher exiles than the people of Rongelap and Utirik. For the Enewetakese it began in 1948, a year after the Marshall Islands became part of the U.N. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. The islands were entrusted to the United States with rights of military usage, and the new trustee decided
to create the Pacific Proving Ground for regular nuclear weapons testing. Enewetak provided the site. Resettled on Ujilang, the former residents of Enewetak faced reduced circumstances: Ujilang’s lagoon was much smaller than Enewetak’s, its plant life much less abundant. Despite such hardships, however, they managed to adjust reasonably well.!6! The Bikinians had not been so lucky. Their exile began in 1946, when they
loaned their atoll to the United States for Operation Crossroads.!6 Negotiations between the trust territory administration and the Bikinians for a
256 Testing Underground legal agreement on the use of Bikini waited until 1956. In addition to a lumpsum payment of $25,000, the Bikinians also would receive annual interest from a $300,000 trust fund.!©3 Meanwhile the Bikinians had nearly starved at Rongerik atoll, endured an uncomfortable sojourn at Kwajalein, then found themselves consigned to the isolated island of Kili, where their traditional atoll fishing and gathering skills were largely useless.!* Trying to describe the experience from a Marshallese viewpoint, one reporter likened it “to mov-
ing a community of American . . . farmers from the rich soil of Iowa. . . first to England, then to the Azores,” finally to the North African desert.!®©
The Bikinians still hoped to return, a dream that faded when the Pacific Proving Ground expanded to include Bikini in 1954. As the shock wore off, however, they began to make some progress toward their economic footing. Brightening prospects were dashed again by devastating typhoons in late 1957 and early 1958 which wiped out almost everything so far achieved. Kali came to seem more prison than refuge to the displaced Bikinians, especially after 1958 proved the Pacific Proving Ground’s final year. Relocation efforts during the early 1960s came to nothing, but later in the decade the longsought return seemed imminent.!6© Humanitarian concerns as well as two decades of critical world opinion, to say nothing of more formal challenges from the United Nations, at last prompted Washington to take action. In December 1966, Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall asked the AEC two questions: Was Bikini “now safe for continued habitation?” And could the Bikinians “have hazard-free use of the resources of the atoll and its adjacent water areas?’’!67
Continuing work done for the AEC throughout the years of Pacific testing, University of Washington scientists had led a radiological survey at Bikini in 1964. Although not intended for the purpose, their data furnished the spring-
board for planning further studies addressed specifically to Udall’s questions.168 Promising results followed the new survey, quickly mounted in spring 1967. Bikini appeared almost habitable. With radioactive test debris cleaned up, an inch or two of topsoil scraped off, and intake of certain foods limited, the Bikinians should face no undue hazards.! By summer 1968, President Johnson decided that the Bikinians could go home. On 12 August, he announced the decision and asked the AEC to help “in planning a comprehensive resettlement program and. . . in carrying it out with all possible dispatch.””!7
Sorting out responsibilities among the several agencies involved began at once.!7! Resettlement planning fell chiefly to the Department of the Interior, while the Department of Defense took charge of the cleanup. The AEC assumed a support role, which meant chiefly radiation safety services. These took the form of preliminary and follow-up radiological surveys, health physics for cleanup crews, and radiological health and safety direction of the resettlement program.!/2 Little more than a year later, Bikini cleanup was complete: radioactive debris was sunk at sea or; if only mildly contaminated, buried;
Testing Underground 2507 overgrown scrub vegetation was partly cleared; background radiation levels were surveyed; plants and animals were sampled. Even before the survey ended, teams of Bikinians and Americans had begun restoration. They cleared more of the dense scrub that now covered the islands, replanted coconut palms and other food trees, and began laying out sites for the concrete block buildings that would house the people when they returned.!”3 A follow-up survey in spring 1970 largely confirmed 1967 and 1969 find-
ings and recommendations. Provided those who returned resided only on Bikini and Eneu (though they might briefly visit elsewhere in the atoll) and observed modest food restrictions, the AEC believed they would suffer no harm from radiation.!74 Why they still could not return despite the AEC’s clean bill of health puzzled the Bikinians, but their questions had a simple anSwer: radioactivity was no longer the chief concern. Logistical problems in the trust territory building program on Bikini and Eneu delayed the atoll’s reoccupation. Territorial authorities also preferred to spread the natives’ return over as much as eight years, to allow food trees time to mature. These factors,
not danger from radiation, kept most Bikinians on Kili through the early
1970s.! Between 1974 and 1977, well over one hundred Bikinians returned to their only mildly radioactive atoll, mainly to work on its rehabilitation. Their body burdens of radionuclides began rising soon after they landed, though very gradually and staying well below mandated limits. In spring 1977, regular tests measured a sudden and alarming upswing of radiocesium.!”© Analysts traced the rise to diet: preferring fresh food to government-supplied canned goods and staples, Bikinians ignored recommended limits on eating plants and animals locally grown and gathered, especially coconuts that replanted palms had begun bearing. Unfortunately, like many plants and animals, palms concentrated radionuclides. Ameliorative efforts focused on altered eating patterns proved fruitless, and in summer 1978, the United States once again removed the Bikinians, perhaps for good but certainly for decades.!”” The Rongelapese also moved. Alarmed by the Bikini findings, they requested a new survey of their atoll. When promised American help failed to materialize, they left. In May 1985, the Greenpeace vessel Rainbow Warrior transported them to new homes on Mejato, 120 miles away. After completing its task, the ship resumed its mission: a campaign against French nuclear tests in the South Pacific. She never reached Moruroa. On 10 July 1985, French mines sank her in the harbor at Auckland, New Zealand, and killed one of her crew members.!78
Apparent success in cleaning up Bikini in the late 1960s had meanwhile encouraged hopes of doing the same for Enewetak. Under pressure from the displaced natives, the United States announced on 18 April 1972 its intent to return the atoll to the trust territory by the end of 1973.!79 Preliminary surveys
in 1971 and 1972 revealed that Enewetak posed much more difficult problems, quite apart from the complex results of nearly twice as many tests as
258 Testing Underground Bikini (43 versus 23). Serious plutonium contamination on Runit, chiefly from safety tests, provoked real doubts about ever rehabilitating the atoll’s northern sector. Radioactive wastes had been buried on the atoll, but about what kind, how much, and where the records were unclear or contradictory.!8°
Nontechnical factors also differed, adding to the burden. At Bikini atoll no test had occurred on either Bikini or Eneu Island, the only dwelling areas; at Enewetak one of the shot islands, Enjebi, was also a former residence island. In the few years since Bikini cleanup began, moreover, much had changed. Marshallese sensitivities in general, as well as the expressed desires of Enewetak’s former inhabitants, counted for much more in 1973 or 1974 than had the wishes of Bikinians in 1967 or 1968.18! Not least among the reasons for change was their finding forceful and sophisticated advocates in the newly created Micronesian Legal Services Corporation, an offshoot of President Johnson’s war on poverty.!82 With its aid, the people of Enewetak succeeded in blocking an air force attempt to conduct
a final series of test explosions before leaving. Though nonnuclear, PACE (for Pacific Cratering Experiments) seemed all too likely to further damage the fragile reef environment.'®3 Recent studies have found widespread fish poisoning in the Pacific, perhaps a product of bomb-disturbed coral reef ecology.!84 Environmental impact had only lately entered the language of planners in the early 1970s; the battle over PACE presaged more to come when the Defense Nuclear Agency drafted an environmental impact statement for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and resettlement of Enewetak. !8 The proposed work at Enewetak cast the AEC in much the same support role it had played at Bikini.!8° Enewetak, however, clearly required much the larger effort.!87 Radiation safety standards might not have changed between 1968 and 1974, commented the AEC when submitting its recommendations,
but “the degree of conservatism in their application has increased measurably.’”’!88 Despite such constraints, the AEC found at least part of Enewetak habitable by 1974; it concurred with the Department of the Interior in allowing some people to return after they agreed to sharply curtailed movement within the atoll. Approximately five hundred Enewetakese accepted the conditions and went home.!*? Subsequent radiation surveys did nothing to alter the judgment.!% If work remained to be done as 1974 drew to a close, the major issues surrounding radiation safety in the Marshall Islands appeared to be settled, or at
least seemed to be well in hand. Appearances, however, deceived, and the Marshallese, as well as others affected by AEC testing, would in time challenge the AEC settlement. Yet all that lay in the future. As 1975 dawned and the AEC expired, an impartial observer might well have deemed its efforts to resolve problems of radiation safety largely a success, however open to question other aspects of its twenty-eight-year tenure might remain.
Epilogue After the AEC 1975-1990
Congressional Initiatives Throughout its career, the Atomic Energy Commission enjoyed generally friendly relations with Congress. AEC oversight fell to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, a unique institution created like the AEC itself by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. Committee and commission largely shared common viewpoints and a mutual understanding of the commission’s purposes and methods. Particular policies or decisions might come under fire, but the joint committee rarely if ever questioned, much less challenged, the basic premises from which the AEC operated; it became, in fact, the commission’s most ardent supporter.! The joint committee survived the AEC but not for long. By late 1976, it had lost its powers of legislative oversight to other congressional committees, and an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 formally abolished it in 1977.2 Unlike its predecessors, therefore, the Department of Energy could no longer expect to answer to a single congressional committee and a restricted range of viewpoints. Nor could it expect the friendly atmosphere that had prevailed two decades earlier when the now-defunct joint committee had held hearings on fallout risks and radiation protection.2 How greatly things had changed emerged very clearly in early 1978, when DOE spokesmen first faced hostile congressmen. Leukemia in former soldiers who had once been ordered to Nevada for atomic maneuvers in the 1950s provoked the hearings
: 259
before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Subcommittee Chairman Paul G. Rogers, Democrat of Florida, called the hearing at the behest of rank-
260 Epilogue ing minority member Tim Lee Carter of Kentucky, who was angered by charges that the government had callously exposed young men to the dread disease. Officially, the subject was health effects of ionizing radiation, and the subcommittee heard more than the testimony of former soldiers.4 In particular, the Rogers subcommittee also learned about two widely aired scientific studies that seemed to link cancer to low levels of radiation exposure. In 1977, Thomas F, Mancuso, an expert in occupational health at the University of Pittsburgh, published the first results from a long-term research project begun in 1964 under AEC auspices. Examining death certificates from several thousand former Hanford workers, Mancuso and his colleagues found links between fatal cancer and low-level radiation exposure. The Hanford plant in Washington State had produced plutonium since 1944 and kept rad-safe records since 1943. Estimated exposures, the downfall of most other such studies, played no part in Mancuso’s work; he could draw on actual dosimeter readings. Statistically correlating cause of death with degree of exposure, he concluded that those who died of cancer had, in fact, been exposed more often and more intensely to ionizing radiation.5 Other scientists, including Allen Brodsky, one of Mancuso’s former colleagues, disputed both methods and results. A series of reports based on the same Hanford data Mancuso used reached sharply divergent conclusions.’ Scientific debate gave way to public acrimony in mid-1977 when Mancuso abruptly found himself with neither research contract nor further funding. He accused the Energy Research and Development Administration of trying to: suppress evidence of harmful effects from low-level radiation, a charge ERDA denied. Hearings before the Rogers subcommittee generated more press coverage for Mancuso and mounting public concern.’ Although a General Accounting Office probe at Rogers’s request failed to support Mancuso’s charges, the issue would not go away.® In recent years it has expanded to include radioiodine emitted by Hanford operations and its possible health effects on the facility’s downwind neighbors; that, in turn, has generated a new round of epidemiological studies.!° The Rogers subcommittee heard about disturbing results from another study at its 1978 hearings, this from Thomas Najarian, a physician and hematologist at the Veterans Administration hospital in Boston. He reported a disproportionately high incidence of cancer deaths among workers chronically exposed to low levels of radiation at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Maine, where nuclear-powered ships were serviced. Denied official data, Najarian resorted to informed guesswork. Debatable though his finding thus remained, they were nonetheless startling: the rate of cancer deaths among shipyard workers appeared almost double the expected figure." Partly funded by a newspaper, the Boston Globe, Najarian’s work was widely reported.!2 The Department of Energy announced its intent to study workers in seven shipyards that fueled or repaired nuclear-powered naval vessels, and Congress
Epilogue 261 ordered the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to conduct a thorough review.!3
Additional research has not sustained Mancuso or Najarian, but the issue is far from dead.'* Even at this late date, their allegations can still raise professional hackles.!5 Furthermore, though neither Mancuso’s study nor Najarian’s directly addressed the weapons testing program, they did broadcast the issue of effects from low-level radiation. Congress played a large role, not only providing a forum but also opening the archives. It pushed the Departments of Defense, of Energy, and of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Defense Nuclear Agency, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to declassify and release significant documents. Large numbers of once-secret letters, memos, and reports surfaced in the published hearings of several House and Senate committees during 1978 and 1979.16 Particularly active in printing newly released documents was the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, chaired by Bob Eckhardt, Democrat of Texas. Scheduled hearings in Salt Lake City, Las Vegas, and Washington during 1979 focused on another class of possible fallout victims, the so-called downwinders: people living downwind—actually an eastward to northeastward arc that included the wind directions favored by the test organization to avoid the most densely populated nearby areas—from the Nevada Test Site during aboveground testing. Government negligence, the subcommittee concluded, had betrayed public trust. It cited the government’s failure to give downwinders adequate warning of upcoming tests, to alert them to fallout dangers, or to tell them how to avoid radiation exposure. The subcommittee also judged fallout the likely cause both of adverse health effects to downwind residents and of the 1953 sheep losses. Finally, it saw little hope of victims finding relief in the courts. Because a direct cause-and-effect link could never be forged between low-level radiation exposure and cancer or other health effects that might not appear for years or decades, the Federal Tort Claims Act became almost impossible to apply. Legislation seemed the only answer. Subsequent attempts to enact laws compensating downwinders and other alleged radiation victims largely began from the problem as framed by Representative Eckhardt and his colleagues.!’
Executive Action Apparent evidence presented in congressional hearings on radiation injury from fallout and other sources of low-level radiation was widely reported. Such news further eroded the public’s already shaken confidence in its political institutions. To Americans who had learned to mistrust their leaders after Vietnam and Watergate, the AEC’s often-repeated safety claims began to look
262 Epilogue like yet another instance of past government deception and current coverup.!8 Public concern added to congressional prodding brought further action on several fronts. When Glyn Caldwell of the Center for Disease Control began his study of
Smoky veterans, he had the promise of backing from the Department of Defense; matching troop rosters to film badge records ought to allow linking dose and outcome, at least roughly. Unfortunately, some of the twenty-yearold records proved widely dispersed and hard to retrieve. Locating, organiz-
ing, and evaluating the data on those present and their doses, not only for Smoky participants but for all atomic veterans, assumed daunting proportions. Impelled by the Rogers subcommittee hearings, the Department of Defense in January 1978 formed the Nuclear Test Personnel Review (NTPR) with the Defense Nuclear Agency in charge.!9 DNA traced its lineage to World War II’s Manhattan Engineer District via the Armed Forces Special Weap-
ons Project (1947-1959) and the Defense Atomic Support Agency (19591971).2°
Although the personnel review may have originated in questions about Smoky, it involved much more than a single test. Subjects included any member of the armed forces (or civilian employee of the Department of Defense) who had attended an atmospheric nuclear test; added later were those who had served in American occupation forces around Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. A toll-free telephone number allowed concerned veterans to contact the Nuclear Test. Personnel Review directly, and NTPR news releases flooded the country. The Defense Nuclear Agency itself began to declassify thousands of documents, contracted for chronicles of each test series and many individual tests, and arranged to compile a census of all military test participants.?! At the same time and for much the same reasons, the fledgling Department of Energy mounted its own closely related effort. In February 1979, DOE headquarters in Washington approved the Central Dosimetry Records Project (ater the Dosimetry Records Centralization Project, then the Dosimetry Research Project) in Las Vegas. DOE’s Nevada Operations Office assigned Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Co. to reevaluate all exposure records for test participants and to revamp the entire records system.22 REECo had been supporting work at the test site under contract to the AEC and its successors for a quarter of a century. Since 1955, its role had included radiological safety services and the maintenance of weapons testing exposure records. The dosimetry research project was not limited to members of the armed forces or employees of the Department of Defense, as was the Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Instead, the Department of Energy sought data for everyone who might have been exposed to test-caused radiation. REECo nonetheless worked closely with the NTPR teams from each of the services to seek missing records, merge the individual service’s files to create a master computer file of exposures during nuclear weapons testing as well as working
Epilogue 2€3 files for each team, and provide military and civilian dose data to any person or group needing them for epidemiological studies, compensation claims, or lawsuits.?3
Project plans also included a history of test dosimetry, soon broadened to become a full-scale history of radiation safety in nuclear weapons testing.”4 Ultimately, that meant two books: The Dragon's Tail, a history of radiation safety in Manhattan Project nuclear weapons testing published in 1987; anda history of radiation safety in nuclear weapons testing under AEC auspices, this volume.* The Department of Energy also sponsored the recent work by J. Newell Stannard, a distinguished professor emeritus of radiobiology and biophysics at the University of Rochester. Radioactivity and Health chronicles the past and surveys the present in 1,963 pages of topically organized
and heavily documented text.Ӣ .
The White House also had moved into action by spring 1978. In May, President Jimmy Carter directed his secretary of health, education, and welfare, Joseph A. Califano, Jr., to devise a radiation exposure program that would include research on health effects, public information, care and benefits for those harmed, and preventive measures. Califano responded by forming the Interagency Task Force on the Health Effects of Ionizing Radiation. Besides his own department, it included senior members of the Departments of Defense, Energy, and Labor, as well as the Veterans Administration, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Environmental Protection Agency.?’ In June 1979, the task force issued its report, as did each of its six working groups. Recommendations covered a wide range of issues, from access to personal records by researchers to large-scale bureaucratic reorganization.” Several proposed changes brought surprisingly quick results. In July 1979, another interagency task group—substantially similar to the first, but less the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, chaired by a Department of Justice counsel, and adding members of the White House Domestic Policy Staff and the Office of Management and Budget—began tackling the problem of compensation for radiation-related illness. Congress meanwhile funded additional research on the biological effects of low-level radiation and directed Califano to review federal programs in the area.”? By 1980, the Interagency Radiation Research Committee and the Radiation Policy Council were both in place, as the working group on institutional arrangement had recommended. Committee and council proved ineffective, and four years later their functions were merged in the new Committee on Interagency Radiation Research and Policy Coordination, or CIRRPC (pronounced Chirpic).°° Possible long-term consequences of fallout for the health of residents in the three-state area east of the Nevada Test Site—the so-called downwinders from Nevada, Utah, and Arizona—became news again in 1978 and 1979. Strongly backed by both Utah and Nevada congressional delegations, Utah Governor Scott M. Matheson prodded President Carter to revive the federal
264 Epilogue leukemia and thyroid studies that had lain dormant since the early 1960s.3! New research findings in the late 1970s underlined the message. The key fig-
ure was Utah epidemiologist Joseph L. Lyon. His 1979 article in the New England Journal of Medicine became, as a federal task force noted, “‘the primary study suggesting a link between the atmospheric test program and illness in downwind residents.”’32
Lyon and his colleagues studied cancer, leukemia especially, in children from the seventeen Utah counties nearest the test site; they assumed the closest region had received the most fallout during the 1950s. Focusing on those under age fifteen at the time when they might have been exposed to fallout, the study compared them to both earlier and later cohorts matched in age and residence. Childhood leukemia and fallout seemed strongly correlated, although other cancers appeared with less frequency than expected.33 Epidemiological studies of relatively small populations often produce such anomalies and thus fuel controversy. Like other research in this field, Lyon’s attracted sharp questions about methods and findings.*+ Yet his work also won favorable comments. Lyon testified at congressional hearings centered on Utah's experience in 1979, and the Center for Disease Control judged his work worth further support.*>
More recently, the National Cancer Institute has addressed the question. With funding from the Departments of Energy and Defense, it contracted with the University of Utah for a new round of thyroid and leukemia studies during the late 1980s.°° Preliminary findings from this project, like other recently published research, tended to confirm some modestly significant health effects only among young children; statistically, other segments of the population show no disease linked to fallout.37
Public access to the documentary record became an issue during the late 1970s, despite (or perhaps because of) the volume of once-classified material published in congressional hearings. Publication in itself, however useful, might not mean much. Ordinary citizens seldom enjoy easy access to government documents; even scholars may have trouble tracking specific items through thousands of pages of lightly indexed hearings. Accordingly, Governor Matheson of Utah called for a public research center in the region to house copies of the documents.38 The popular governor’s interest was at least partly personal. As deputy attorney for Iron County, he had lived and worked in southern Utah from 1952 to 1954; his death from multiple myeloma in 1990 prompted renewed speculation about links between fallout and cancer.*?
Matheson’s 1979 plea fell on willing ears. Inundated by questions from Congress, the news media, and the public, the Department of Energy’s Nevada Operations Office worried about data still widely scattered and perhaps incomplete. Information must be in one place if answers were to rest on the most solid foundation. The rising tide of litigation against the government added further impetus. These concerns led the DOE to sponsor the Coordina-
Epilogue 265 tion and Information Center in Las Vegas. The Nevada Operations Office assigned REECo to collect the documents for and to operate the new research library. Initially, the CIC limited itself to holding copies of documents, tech-
nical data, and other records bearing on fallout from Nevada testing since its 1951 beginning. That proved only a start. The already massive effort expanded to include a wide range of work on radiation hazards from nuclear weapons tests, in the Pacific as well as the continental United States and from World War II until the present.*° The Coordination and Information Center also became the hub of efforts to locate and process surviving radiation survey data.*! Radiation exposures of people outside the test site had only sometimes been measured directly. Reconstructing likely doses, both internal and external, on the basis of survey data substituted for the missing measurements. Initially, the center undertook searching for documents, but indexing and storing the collected data always remained the center’s main function. Several task groups calculated doses for various groups and regions.*? Collectively termed the Off-Site Radiation Exposure Review Project, the efforts of the CIC and the working groups were closely monitored. A panel of outside experts known as the Dose Assessment Advisory Group (more commonly referred to by its acronym, DAAG) eyaluated the work and made recommendations. Although federally appointed, DAAG’s members represented local as well as national interests; almost half of them were chosen by the governors of the four western states—Nevada, Utah, Arizona, and California—most directly concerned. DAAG’s distinguished roster and its status independent of the DOE added substance and credibility to the review project’s findings.” Activities had proceeded on several fronts even before the advisory group
was in place. As early as summer 1979 a steering group appointed by the Nevada Operations Office had begun meeting with representatives of the governors to discuss plans and problems. Interpreting quarter-century-old survey data posed one obvious problem. The so-called Offsite Monitors Workshop convened in June 1980 to answer some of the outstanding questions. Not limited to monitors, it brought together twenty-six men who had in some manner
regulated, recorded, or interpreted fallout data from Nevada aboveground testing. For three days they discussed among themselves and sought to explain to an audience of scientists and bureaucrats what they had done, how they had done it, and what assumptions guided their actions. Like so many other efforts to address scientific and technical issues of fallout, the monitors
workshop not only produced useful results but also proved contentious. Controversy boiled over when one former monitor unable to attend the June meeting came to Las Vegas in August to discuss why he disagreed with certain reported findings.“ Historians in DOE headquarters also took a hand. Established in 1957 by the Atomic Energy Commission, the History Division in the AEC’s Execu-
266 Epilogue tive Secretariat helped ensure that what had been accomplished would outlive the particular crisis. Like DAAG, it urged making the Coordination and Information Center a permanent archive. Although REECo continued to run the
CIC, the search for documents passed into more professional hands. With funding from Nevada Operations, the DOE history office contracted with a firm specializing in historical and archive services, History Associates Incorporated of Rockville, Maryland.*> In 1981, the information center opened to the public. Researchers might now consult in one place a wealth of wellindexed unclassified and declassified documents as well as relevant published work on all aspects of radiation safety. Accessible records eased the task of lawyers acting for soldiers, downwinders, and test workers. In due course, trial records added greatly to the mass of sources open for research.
Atomic veterans returned to prominence in 1980 with the publication of two provocative journalistic accounts, Howard Rosenberg’s Atomic Soldiers and Michael Uhl and Tod Ensign’s GJ Guinea Pigs. Drawing on the record made public in congressional hearings as well as interviews with veterans, they castigated the government for jeopardizing troops in nuclear tests, then denying help to those who became ill. Rosenberg, Uhl, and Ensign were only the first. Other books from other hands quickly followed, all of them echoing the same charges.*’
Such allegations gained some credence from the first published results of Glyn Caldwell’s Smoky research. Veterans of Smoky, he reported in 1980, appeared to contract leukemia at a rate significantly higher than they should have.*® Inadequate data left the findings open to question but scarcely softened the impact.4? The Medical Follow-up Agency of the National Research Council later reviewed the evidence. It confirmed the excess of leukemia among troops assigned to Camp Desert Rock during Smoky. Curiously, though, only
three of ten cases had actually participated in Smoky postshot maneuvers, and no other test yielded comparable findings.~° Caldwell himself came to conclude, as the Medical Follow-up Agency did, that leukemia incidence correlated with neither the men’s dose nor their unit assignments. All they had in common was time spent at Camp Desert Rock during the summer of 1957. Smoky remains problematic.5! Scientific uncertainty about radiation exposure as the cause of injury had little effect on the course of events. Ambiguous evidence, even suspicion, proved fuel enough to drive the quest for compensation, first in the courts, then more successfully in Congress, that dominated the 1980s.
The Quest for Compensation During the first half of the decade, seekers of compensation focused their efforts on the courts, though Senator Alan Cranston’s Committee on Veteran’s Affairs began to address veterans’ claims for disability attributed to
Epilogue 267 nuclear weapons testing as early as June 1979.52 From the viewpoint of vet-
erans who believed themselves to have been injured by radiation, options were limited. The Veterans Administration routinely denied most claims for service-connected radiation injury under the Veterans Benefits Act. Between 1967 and 1979, the VA decided 291 claims based on veterans’ participation in atmospheric nuclear weapons tests; 1t made awards in 8, less than 3 percent. Presumption that a disease was service connected applied only if it manifested itself within a year of discharge, too brief a period for some radiationcaused injuries. Although veterans legally enjoyed the benefit of the doubt, they still bore the burden of proof. Administrative appeal, the only recourse for a claim denied, rarely succeeded. The Board of Veterans Appeals reversed only 6 of the 283 test-related claims denied by VA regional offices from 1967 to 1979.3 Members of the armed forces who felt unjustly treated by the Veterans
Administration could sue for damages but with little prospect of success. Because special provisions for veterans’ health care existed, their presumed availability became a bar to atomic veterans seeking relief in the courts; a statutory limit of $10 for attorney fees in lawsuits against the Veterans Administration, legacy of the Civil War, further constrained the aggrieved veteran. Yet the VA was only part of the problem.*4
Congress in 1946 had passed the Federal Tort Claims Act; with certain specified exceptions, the act allowed suits against the government that were otherwise barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.>° In what became known as the Feres doctrine (or the doctrine of intramilitary immunity), however, the Supreme Court added a major exception of its own. The 1950 ruling left the government immune from liability for injuries suffered by members of the armed forces incident to military service. Controversial then as now, the doctrine has nonetheless persisted.5° In Jaffee v. the United States, the courts decided the Feres doctrine applied to radiation injury as well. While on active duty with the U.S. Army in 1953, alleged Stanley Jaffee, he had attended Exercise Desert Rock V, the military maneuvers conducted jointly with the nuclear weapons tests of Operation Upshot-Knothole.-’ A quarter century later he learned he had inoperable cancer. Believing the two events linked, he and his wife sued the United States and the unnamed individuals responsible for having put him at risk despite knowing the danger. The Jaffees claimed that by neither warning nor protecting him, they had violated his constitutional rights, as well as state tort laws. One of four counts was a Class action by Stanley Jaffee alone, on behalf of all soldiers who had been at the test with him; directed solely against the United States, it asked that the government be required to alert them to their health risks and pay their medical costs. Initial action centered on this count. New Jersey District Court Judge Herbert J. Stern dismissed the class action on grounds of sovereign immunity and certified the order for immediate appeal. On 9 February
268 Epilogue 1979, a three-judge panel of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of payment but accepted Jaffee’s plea for warning and remanded the case for further proceeding.*® The Department of Justice, which had acted for the defendants throughout, promptly moved to dismiss the rest of the Jaffee suit on the doctrine of intramilitary immunity. Labeling the use of the Feres doctrine to provide absolute immunity “unjust,” Judge Stern nonetheless regarded himself as having no choice and granted the government motion.°? On 15 November 1979, a three-judge panel of the Third Circuit unanimously reversed the lower court,
“holding that there is no such absolute immunity.” Government lawyers petitioned for a rehearing before the entire court. A year later the full court reversed the panel and upheld the lower court’s reluctant decision, two of the ten justices dissenting.®!
Despite such reservations and their echo in other cases, the absolute immunity view of Feres largely prevailed during the early 1980s. Innovative legal strategies designed to circumvent the Feres doctrine—claims of intentional tort or that additional damage had followed discharge from service, Suits directed at specific individuals rather than or in addition to the government, alleged violations of constitutional rights—proved ineffective.®? The last potential loophole closed with passage of the so-called Warner amendment in 1985. By barring suits against contractors or other agents of the government, the amendment to that year’s military appropriations bill virtually ensured that veterans could find no way around Feres in the courts.“ The Warner amendment also closed a possible loophole for nonmilitary plaintiffs. Civilians enjoyed only slightly greater prospects of redress from the courts than veterans, though they faced a different stumbling block: the so-called discretionary function exemption to the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946. In contrast to the court-created intramilitary exemption of Feres, the discretionary function exemption had been written into the original act. Yet it still was shaped by the courts, interpreted to cover a much wider range of action than Congress apparently had intended. In essence, the government stands immune from lawsuits that question policy decisions, and the courts have taken policy to refer to most government decisions about nuclear matters. From the 1955 case of Bulloch v. the United States (the Utah sheep case) through the 1980s, courts consistently dismissed government liability for damages that resulted from nuclear weapons testing.® The first nonmilitary case of alleged injury to people that reached trial involved former test workers, two men exposed to fallout after the Baneberry
venting in 1970. Both died of leukemia in 1974, and their widows filed a wrongful death suit two years later. In January 1979, a three-month nonury trial before Judge Roger Foley began in Las Vegas. Testimony centered on the difficult scientific question of whether or not the men’s relatively small measured doses could in fact have caused their fatal disease. In a preliminary
Epilogue 269 ruling Judge Foley found the AEC negligent in several areas, notably, in failing to use proper decontamination procedures on all eighty-six workers found to have radioactivity on their persons or clothing. His final ruling, however, though not issued until 1983, found for the government. Despite its negligence, he concluded, the evidence failed to show that radiation caused the leukemia to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.°’ But that was not the end of the matter. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case to Judge Foley’s court in 1988 for further action. If the government was operating within its discretionary function, the Las Vegas court lacked jurisdiction and the case should have been dismissed. In October 1989, Foley ruled that his court did have jurisdiction and repeated his finding of negligence. Policymaking was not at issue, Foley concluded, but rather the government’s failure to implement its own stated policy. In a related case, Foley on the same day denied a government motion for summary judgment based on the discretionary func-
tion. Prescott v. the United States consolidated radiation injury claims of some 240 workers at the Nevada Test Site. Again, Foley found that his court had jurisdiction because the government must implement its own mandated health and safety policies. The plaintiffs then selected six of their number for trial first, pending review by the appeals court.®8
The first case that involved people who had not participated in nuclear weapons testing but merely lived in nearby areas subject to fallout entered the legal system later but was sooner settled. Residents in the three-state area east of the Nevada Test Site—the downwinders from Nevada, Utah, and Arizona— had organized themselves in 1978 as the Committee of Survivors. Despite the all-too-obvious roadblocks but aided by former Interior Secretary Stewart Udall, they filed suit against the government for cancer and health problems attributed to fallout. Ultimately, over a thousand claims were grouped and in 1979 presented to the Federal District Court in Salt Lake City as a consolidated action, Irene Allen et al. v. the United States. Plaintiffs argued that the AEC was negligent in its conduct of atmospheric tests at the Nevada site and specifically had neglected to protect civilians. Attorneys selected twenty-six “typical” cases (later reduced to twenty-four); that is, cases representative of the commonly alleged injuries and deaths from fallout.® The trial took place in Salt Lake City from September to December 1982 before Judge Bruce Jenkins. Released in May 1984, the court’s decision denied AEC negligence in testing but not in protection. Ten plaintiffs won compensation for wrongful death or personal injury from diseases with known links to radiation exposure: leukemia, breast cancer, and thyroid cancer. The other fourteen failed in showing their ailments to have been caused by radiation. Though widely praised in the lay press for its erudition and humanity, the judgment failed on appeal.’° In 1987, the Tenth Circuit found health and safety decisions to fall within the government’s discretion, leaving such deci-
270 Epilogue sions immune to challenge. That, in turn, promptly furnished precedent for dismissing a large consolidated radiation injury suit in northern California. Citing the appellate decision in Allen, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court’s judgment of nonsuit.”! Another case of note was resolved in 1985, this a replay of the mid-1950s sheep trial. Unsatisfied with AEC explanations and still convinced that 1953 fallout had killed thousands of their animals, sheepmen went to court. They lost the 1956 judgment, but 1979 congressional hearings gave them means to challenge that decision. Testimony derived from the work of Califano’s interagency task force implied that the government had withheld crucial evidence in 1956. Later in the same hearings, Harold Knapp reported his reanalysis of
the 1953 data. His disputed conclusion blamed fallout as the most likely cause of sheep deaths.?2 Relying on this controversial new evidence, lawyers for the sheepmen suc-
ceeded in reopening the case. Bulloch v. the United States resumed in 1981 before the same Judge Sherman Christensen who had presided in 1956. Specifically, the issue was whether or not the government had committed a fraud upon the court by withholding information during the trial. Judge Christensen found such fraud, but a three-judge panel of the Tenth Circuit overturned this ruling in November 1983, and the full court concurred.’3 Midway through the 1980s, few any longer believed that the courts offered much hope of redress, despite cases still pending. Increasingly, those deeming themselves injured sought redress and help from Congress. Among those testifying at the Cranston committee hearings in 1979 had been members of the new National Association of Atomic Veterans. Founded by a former army sergeant, Orville Kelly, who has since died of cancer, its main purpose became finding atomic veterans and helping them win benefits. Lobbying Congress already seemed the likeliest avenue.” Citizen groups of several kinds became active. Organized in 1980, the Nevada Test Site Radiation Victims Association drew its members chiefly from civil-
ian workers at the test site. Another group, more proaalyLobbying based, formed in 1982 as the National Association of Radiation Survivors. and publicity pushed the main goal, compensation for injury they believed they had suffered from the test program.’ Congress, media, and public largely overlooked something resembling a precedent for legislative relief, though the exposures involved far exceeded most received by downwinders, veterans, or test workers. In 1964, Congress appropriated $950,000 to compensate Marshallese exposed to very high levels of fallout after the 1954 Bravo test in Operation Castle. Since 1977, anyone among them who needed thyroid surgery could receive up to $25,000, while relatives of someone who died from a radiation-related illness might recover as much as $100,000. Like payments to Japanese victims of Bravo, these payments are ex gratia; that is, the United States admitted moral responsibility but denied legal liability.”
Epilogue 271 The 1983 Compact of Free Association between the United States and the Republic of the Marshall Islands created a $150,000,000 perpetual trust fund to compensate displaced and injured Marshallese.”’ Despite suits then in court totaling nearly $6 billion, acceptance of compact and compensation meant renouncing all past and future claims on the United States.7® Section 177 of the compact established the trust fund in full settlement of all personal and property claims. On this basis, the U.S. Court of Claims in 1987 dismissed the suits filed in 1981 and 1982 by the people of Bikini Juda v. the United States), the people of Enewetak (Peter v. the United States), and the downwind peoples of the northern Marshall Islands (Nital et al. v. the United States). They have appealed.’? Unlike Japanese or Marshallese, American claimants could not clearly link their diseases to radiation exposure. With few exceptions, as this book has
shown, even the highest doses for test workers, Desert Rock veterans, or downwinders were an order of magnitude smaller than those estimated for Japanese fishermen or Rongelapese. Precisely for this reason a decade-long debate ensued, centered on the health consequences of low-level radiation exposure,
Congress began to address veterans’ demands as early as 1981. That year’s Veterans’ Health Care, Training, and Small Business Loan Act entitled atomic veterans to VA medical care, if they could prove their disease serviceconnected.®° Few could. The Veterans’ Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act of 1984 spelled out in greater detail just how such a connection was to be established; it also listed fifteen so-called radiogenic diseases with their latent periods and specified appropriate compensation. Veterans had to obtain dosimetry data from the Defense Nuclear Agency for the Veterans Administration to evaluate, and most claims still failed. Recorded and reconstructed doses almost always were too low to prove they caused disease, even with mandated benefit of the doubt favoring the veteran.®! Compensation that few or none could qualify for hardly satisfied the demand. Cancer afflicts over a million Americans every year, and many veterans of nuclear weapons testing who suffered from the disease concluded that radiation must have been the reason. Veterans and their supporters continued to press for relief, and success crowned their efforts in 1988. Congress passed the Radiation-exposed Veterans Compensation Act, signed by President Ronald
Reagan on 20 May 1988. It lifted the burden of proof from the veteran. Specified radiation-related diseases would instead simply be presumed service connected if the veteran had participated in a nuclear test or other related activity that involved the risk of radiation exposure. Eligibility for disability compensation followed automatically. Suffering one of the specified cancers, in other words, a claimant need only confirm his presence at a particular place at a particular time, not prove that he had been harmed or even that he had been exposed to radiation.’ Another 1988 law founded the new Court of Veterans’ Appeals as the final ruling authority.®3
2l2 Epilogue Downwinders benefited from congressional action two and a half years later. On 15 October 1990, President George Bush signed into law the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act. It authorized a $100,000,000 trust fund, from which those who lived in the downwind area during the years of aboveground testing could draw $50,000 if they contracted certain radiation-related diseases; uranium miners might receive $100,000.84 In short order, the act was amended to make test site workers eligible for compensation as well, fixed at $75,000, provided they had been present during atmospheric testing; it also removed the trust fund’s $100,000,000 ceiling. Opponents of the Warner amendment, which freed contractors from liability, in return dropped their Opposition; one amendment formally repealed Warner, while a second installed its Major provisions in the new act.® As 1990 closed, the controversy that began in the late 1970s appeared to be nearly resolved at last. That such a reso-
lution should be political rather than scientific underscored the fundamental nature of the controversy.
Radiation Exposure versus Radiation Damage The key issue was never radiation exposure as such. If nothing else, this book shows beyond any doubt that thousands of people were exposed to varying—but almost always very low—levels of external gamma and beta radiation during the course of aboveground testing. Many also must have acquired some amount of radionuclides in their bodies through normal eating, drinking, and breathing in contaminated areas. In a few well-documented and widely known instances—most notably, the Marshall islanders and Japanese fishermen caught by fallout from the Castle Bravo test in 1954—doses were high enough to cause radiation sickness and even threaten life.®° Radiation at such high doses produces well-known and obvious effects. But most doses were far lower, in fact so low as to defy detection except by laboratory analysis of blood chemistry and cell counts for radiation-caused changes; they certainly produced no evident damage to health. Exposure is presumed because people were in areas where fallout could be detected.®' On much shakier grounds, it also has been inferred from the controversial retrospective studies that suggest an unusually high incidence of radiation-related disease in the affected areas. Yet those responsible for testing, for test safety in particular, were diligent and competent. Certainly they indulged in no deliberate human experiments
on such unwitting outsiders as Marshall islanders, Japanese fishermen, or American downwinders, though in seeking to learn what they could from the aftermath of accidents they sometimes reported their findings in phrases that allow incautious critics to suggest otherwise.®? Unpredictability was nonetheless an inherent feature of testing new weapon designs, especially in the early
Epilogue 273 years, and uncertainty about the health effects of very low doses dictated extreme caution among radiation safety specialists. Increasingly elaborate safety procedures sought to keep risks down, and rules were ever more strictly enforced. Caution expressed in such guides as ALARA, as low as teasonably achievable, have long guided radiation protection.8? Such standards
have applied to other nuclear activities as well as weapons testing.” But if exposure alone was not the issue, what was? The real question from the viewpoint of science is whether or not very low levels of exposure have had disproportionately great health consequences. It remains unanswerable. Mainstream scientific opinion still judges the danger minute; that is, very low dose implies very low risk, though experts disagree about precisely how these terms relate quantitatively. Apparently contradictory conclusions about the risks of low-level radiation in BEIR III (1980) and BEIR V (1990) partly reflect new data but also arise from the persistent tension between divergent viewpoints on their evaluation.?! Ambiguity begins with the study of radiation-caused harm to living things and the concept of dose itself.9? For individuals, damage depends on both dose (how much radia-
tion absorbed) and dose rate (how fast). A dose lethal if received in a day might well be survived if spread over a month and prove harmless if stretched through years. Precisely what physical processes convert absorbed radiation dose into biological damage are still unclear. Inevitable death follows only very high acute doses. Exposure at lower levels and rates produce much less clear-cut results. No one can say a certain dose will cause a certain injury to a certain living thing. Prognosis becomes instead an exercise in probability, as witness the so-called median lethal dose, that is, the dose sufficient to kill half a large number of exposed subjects within a specified time. Statistically, one might know that half those exposed in twenty-four hours to 400 roentgens will die in thirty days, yet remain unable to predict which persons that half will comprise. Efforts to reconcile such statistical group effects with individual harm have been a source of constant tension in the medicolegal sphere as well as a fertile source of confusion in popular discussions. All such questions grow more difficult to answer as dose and dose rate decrease. Immediate or acute or short-term radiation effects, the result of relatively large, rapid exposures, have never seemed baffling or controversial.”
Acute effects were clear, how to deal with them obvious: straightforward measures like shielding sufficed to safeguard those at risk. Delayed or chronic or long-term effects were another matter entirely. That exposure to relatively low levels of radiation could cause harmful late effects had been known since the early years of the century. Such effects might be downplayed or ignored
in the midst of war, even cold war, but everyone knew that some forms of cancer and other disease sometimes occurred many years after certain exposures.
274 Epilogue Evidence of damage appears more slowly and rates of injury decline as dose and dose rate fall. Someone exposed to a massive burst of gamma rays quickly shows the effects, leaving no doubt about the cause. Some lesser dose might induce leukemia two or more years later, when the cause will seem less clear-cut. At still lower levels and longer times between exposure and injury, causal links grow fainter yet. Medical and legal questions alike multiply as ties between cause and effect loosen, and the evidence of injury becomes statistical rather than clinical. Just how very low doses trigger biological responses remains obscure. So, too, does the full range of late effects, which may include metabolic or immune system disorders as well as cancers; lately some researchers have wondered if our preoccupation with cancer as the major threat has caused us to underestimate the significance of other, perhaps more common if less deadly, forms of disease.?5 Natural background radiation, for such reasons as altitude or geology, varies enough to mask low-dose effects and so adds to the uncertainty. There may even be beneficial effects, termed hormesis, from low levels of radiation, presumably because humankind evolved in environments that included such background levels.” Scientific opinion thus divides about the shape of the dose-response curve at very low levels where cause and effect become hardest to measure or even to detect.%” Scientists taking one approach in effect graph the curve as straight line from known higher dose-response values through lower unknown values to zero dose. Any exposure thus implies some chance of harm, even if damage cannot always be detected. Linear extrapolation, in other words, means that only zero dose causes zero damage. Another approach frames the problem in more familiar terms. Biologically active agents, such as drugs or poisons, normally must exceed some threshold before causing harm. Biological systems exposed at levels below threshold can restore themselves and so suf-
fer no lasting effect. Radiation at low enough levels, in this model, causes no cumulative damage. The well-known fact that lethal acute doses became merely injurious when chronic seems to support the threshold theory. Analogously, long-term effects from low-level exposure likewise tend to vanish. The dose-response curve, in short, may turn sharply downward toward zero damage at some dose higher than zero. Since the mid-1970s the problem has been framed in somewhat different terms, stochastic versus nonstochastic effects of radiation, although the basic issues remain the same. Stochastic effects may be compared to the results of an on-off switch, which has no bearing on the brightness of the light it controls. Increasing dose increases the likelihood of cancer, for instance, not the severity of the disease that may occur. Nonstochastic effects are instead precisely those for which severity is the chief function of dose and which may therefore involve thresholds. Radiation damage to blood vessels, for instance, increases as dose rises, but such damage can be observed only at fairly high levels of exposure. Restating the problem in these terms also helps clarify the
Epilogue 275 issue of group versus individual effects. Stochastic effects are in essence population effects, the kind that can be predicted statistically but not individually; they also are low-dose effects and, as the word’s Greek root implies, matters of conjecture. Nonstochastic effects, in contrast, are the predictable and unambiguous consequences of higher radiation doses. The benefit-risk approach embodied in the concept of permissible exposure increasingly dominated radiation safety after World War II. As this book
attests, testing nuclear weapons meant taking risks. Obviously the safest course required no field testing at all, but that was out of the question. Concern instead centered on how to reduce or forestall risks while still getting the needed data. Naturally, that goal sometimes eluded testers. Discrepancies between normal standards and actual practice complicated matters. These might be inadvertent: accidents happened, instruments failed, unexpected sources of danger arose. Inexperienced or poorly trained monitors might overlook some
hazard; uninformed workers or laymen might make mistakes. Familiarity could also breed contempt for any danger, radiological included. Policy, too, affected safety. Officials set special limits for test operations. They also exempted those assigned to certain crucial data recovery missions from even these higher limits. Tests, in other words, had their own standards. Deliberation was not always one-sided. Scientists eager to retrieve data might willingly expose themselves to excess radiation, despite clear rules, even orders. The thirst for knowledge, perhaps even more the drama of testing, could evoke a kind of bravado that might transcend good sense. Economics could be a factor as well. Policy dictated that workers nearing their exposure limits
must be removed from areas where they might be further exposed. Some workers countered the threat of reassignment to less well-paying jobs by making certain their film badges did not record their full exposures.?® Exposure guides subverted unknowingly, in short, posed less a problem than more purposeful behavior by officials convinced that testing nuclear weapons justified
modest risks and by individuals willing to risk themselves for motives of their own. That lower dose limits now prevail should not be construed as solely, perhaps even chiefly, a product of greater knowledge. Certainly, better data and new findings have affected standards, but no new danger needed proving to invest exposures regarded calmly in one decade with deep concern in another.
Technology here has played a crucial role over the years in changing what “low” means with respect to radiation exposure. Improving instruments detect ever smaller amounts of radiation in the field as well as the laboratory.% As for many other toxic hazards, detection in practice, if not in theory, implies danger. Technical prowess, in other words, rather than assured hazard tends to define safe limits, for radiation as for other potential hazards, and changing political climate has often had far more effect on standards than new data or deeper understanding.!©
For radiation the crucial question has scarcely varied since turn-of-the-
276 Epilogue century X-ray users began to worry about the side effects of their wonderful new tool: What limits should be imposed on human exposure to ionizing radiation? The question persists because the answer depends at least as much on public policy and social values, even on philosophy, as on science. Social concerms in the widest sense have always molded safety standards, science at best setting guidelines for decision makers. Even in the unlikely event that all scientists agreed on the degree of risk from low-level radiation, public confidence might still remain shaky. Perceiving questions about such groups as Smoky veterans or downwinders as yet unresolved, nonexperts find themselves left with nagging doubts about long-term health effects of exposure to low levels of ionizing radiation.
History and Health Effects A striking feature of the third and current wave of public concern has been its historical orientation. The new discourse more often faces the past than, as before, the present or future. Technical treatises and scientific papers remain vital, but research on the health effects of radiation also began to acquire a more distinctly historical cast from the late 1970s onward. The case-control
method lately gaining emphasis in epidemiological studies of fallout and health effects was specifically devised to look systematically backward from the present.!° Scientific research, in any event, now competed with a growing body of more explicitly historical writing based on declassified federal
records, starting with those published in the 1978 and 1979 congressional hearings. The first such books appeared in 1980, and at least one book touching on alleged victims of nuclear weapons testing has followed every year since, !02
As the parallel] historiography of British nuclear weapons testing attests, this pattern is not unique. The official British history, like the official American history, has proceeded slowly and rigorously.!°3 Meanwhile, a substantial official history of early British nuclear weapons testing has appeared.!™ Paralleling the U.S. congressional hearings of the late 1970s was the Australian Royal Commission of 1984 and 1985, a rich source of testimony and documents on British weapons testing in the Australian desert.!© Critical journalistic accounts of the 1950s British tests in Australia promptly appeared.!© Mixed responses to the Australian commission’s 1985 report, an inconclusive official study of mortality and cancer incidence among test participants in 1988, and uncertainty in 1990 about cleaning up and restoring the test areas all echo the American experience.) By now American programs have been the subject of dozens of historical books and films, aside from congressional hearings and official publications, significantly (though not necessarily exclusively) concerned with health ef-
Epilogue 217 fects of fallout from nuclear weapons testing and based in whole or in part on these newly accessible records.!98 History like science may vary in quality, whether popular or academic. Journalistic and scholarly alike, however, these works tend to be highly critical of the government’s test-related activities. Criticism has centered on three main charges: (1) the government’s perceived use of false or misleading statements about the dangers of radiation, (2) its alleged neglect of adequate health and safety precautions, and (3) its apparently concerted attempt to thwart victims seeking compensation.!© Evaluating these charges requires asking how and why the current controversy evolved. What has happened since 1975 to make the radiation safety programs under AEC stewardship seem so problematic to many latter-day critics? That radiation protection standards are socially constructed and politically, rather than scientifically, decided may be the most pervasively misunderstood point in the entire public controversy. Whatever the dose, more often than not a showing of exposure is simply assumed by critics to be a proof of damage, a transition so easy as hardly to be noticed. It reflects a long history of public apprehensions about nuclear matters and the subjective judgment of their unseen risks. Quantitatively assessed risk, the “real” danger, need bear little relationship to danger perceived or risk deemed acceptable; this is perhaps even more true of the atom than of other technological hazards. !!0 Very low doses may cause long-delayed health effects, but the chain of cause and effect is tenuous at best; to many legal critics the virtual impossibility of confirming a causal link between radiation exposure and cancer or other disease years later had long seemed to lie at the heart of just compensation.!!! Ambiguous data about the health effects of exposure to very low
levels of radiation, in fact, have dictated extreme caution among health physicists. Given such care and real questions about the hazards of low-level radiation, we should not be surprised to find the government fighting alleged victims in the courtroom. Yet if it neither neglected health precautions then nor unjustly seeks to deny compensation now—two of the three main charges critics level—of what then is the government guilty? The first of the three charges cited above, government dissembling, carries more weight. Call it a matter of public accountability. The AEC itself was no monolith, and the test organization included any number of military and contractor personnel as well. Practically no one in the AEC or the test organization doubted that testing could be conducted safely—that is, without seriously endangering either test workers or the public—provided suitable precautions were observed. Opinion differed chiefly about how much to reveal. As we have seen, the people in the field, those involved in the test program directly,
tended to favor telling the public just what the risk was and stressing that whatever risk testing might pose was far outweighed by the national importance of the test program. Openness, they argued, would retain public trust and ensure continued testing.
278 Epilogue AEC officials in general, headquarters staff members in particular, mostly
preferred to reassure rather than inform. Convinced that trying to explain risks so small would simply confuse people and might cause panic, they feared jeopardizing the testing vital to American security. Their policy prevailed. A formal public relations plan became as much a part of every test series as the technical operations plan. Carefully crafted press releases never to my knowledge lied, though they sometimes erred. Yet by the same token, they rarely if ever revealed all. Choices about which truths to tell, which to omit, could routinely veil the larger implications of a situation. At times of crisis, such choices might be manipulated to mislead the public, as the aftermath of Castle Bravo all too clearly illustrates. !!2 Reluctance to acknowledge any risk, the policy that mainly prevailed in the 1950s, undercut the AEC’s credibility when the public learned from other sources that fallout might be hazardous. Somewhat greater openness in the 1960s and even more in the late 1970s proved inadequate. What looked like efforts to minimize risks came to seem no less suspect than denying them altogether. Each time the AEC (or one of its successors) faced questions about the possible hazards of radiation, it tended to issue reassuring statements and deny the existence of danger. Assuming that the public could not grasp the nuances of minor versus major risk, the AEC preferred to claim no risk at all. No one likely thought of that as lying, but powerful officials free of much di-
rect accountability in a secrecy-shrouded program found it all too easy to deny, dissemble, or mislead as a matter of course without a second thought.!!3 Although such attitudes may no longer prevail unchallenged, neither are they
entirely extinct, despite the Department of Energy’s vast efforts in the past decade to restore its credibility. Yet not all the issues were old ones. Secrecy cloaked the Manhattan Project during World War I], and all but one of the bombs exploded a long way
from home. Officials had little need to worry about what to tell the public. “Nothing” was the easy answer. That began changing after the war and even more sharply after 1951, when the Atomic Energy Commission began regular testing in Nevada, within the continental United States. Modern apprehensions reflect, perhaps as much as anything else, safety questions about later nuclear weapons tests troubling a more aware public. Educating the public seemed a fine idea to AEC officials, but the line between education and indoctrination proved hard to walk. Public relations bedame an increasingly central concern in test planning, public safety a heated question. It still is. Education and public relations, as officials of the Department of Energy have had to relearn, will not provide the answer, however much they may help to clarify the issues. Unfortunately, several factors have conspired to muddle the issue for nonexperts. They have generally misunderstood the basis for radiation protection standards, failing to distinguish between natural law and practical guideline
Epilogue 2719 and struggling with ambiguities of cause and effect in radiation injury. Even so basic a question as whether or not low-level radiation from nuclear weapons testing has harmed any identifiable person in the United States has no absolute answer. Radiation nonetheless is known to have harmful health effects, often long delayed. Furthermore, the widely aired research findings and public testimony of the late 1970s, however flawed they might appear in the eyes of science, aroused fear in many minds that even very low exposures might trigger very serious illness. How could aging sufferers from such diseases recall the ominous mushroom clouds that seemed to loom over their trenches, the omnipresent radiation monitors at their workplaces, the awesome flashes of nuclear explosions
they witnessed, and not wonder if something then unseen and unfelt had planted the slow-growing lethal seeds of the diseases that now ravaged them? Many did wonder, and so did their families. Believing themselves victims of a callous government more concerned for its weapons than its citizens, they sought redress—money, in part, but perhaps even more a settling of moral accounts. The Radiation Exposure Compensation Act of 1990 included more than monetary compensation. It also responded to the moral issue: “The Congress apologizes on behalf of the nation to the individuals described . . . and their families for the hardships they have endured.”!'4 In the words of Representative Wayne Owens, Democrat of Utah and member of the legal team in the Allen case before his election to Congress, “They are victims of the Cold War and they will now be compensated for their long suffering.» That the hardships they endured may have more often involved mental anguish or spiritual distress than physical disease made their suffering no less real. That they may also receive money does not detract from the solace of apology. Their compensation, however, should not be taken as a judgment against the men and women who sought to protect them against the hazards of radiation from nuclear weapons testing. Despite their human failings, they performed a difficult job honorably. If blame is to be assigned, it belongs to those higher in the government who too easily forget how much their special knowledge owes to their places rather than their virtues and too lightly dismiss the costs their high purposes may impose on their fellow citizens.
Appendix
The Fallout Controversy In Public A Chronology of Popular Books and Films 1980-1990
The following list excludes congressional hearings, other government publications, and purely scientific works, unless intended for a wider audience. It also excludes works of less than book length, such as pamphlets and journal articles.
1980 Rosenberg, Howard. Atomic Soldiers: American Victims of Nuclear Experiments. Boston: Beacon Press.
Uhl, Michael, and Tod Ensign. GI Guinea Pigs: How the Pentagon Exposed Our Troops to Dangers More Deadly than War, Agent Orange and Atomic Radiation. Chicago: Playboy Press.
1981 Browne, Corinne, and Robert Monroe. Time Bomb: Understanding the Threat of Nuclear Power. New York: William Morrow. .
Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombing. Translated by Eisei Ishikawa and David L. Swain. New York: Basic Books.
Freeman, Leslie J. Nuclear Witnesses: Insiders Speak Out. New York: W. W. Norton.
| 281
1982 Hilgartner, Stephen, Richard C. Bell, and Rory O’Connor. Nukespeak: Nuclear Language, Visions, and Mindset. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books.
Saffer, Thomas H., and Orville E. Kelly. Countdown Zero. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons.
Wasserman, Harvey, and Norman Solomon, with Robert Alvarez and
Eleanor Walters. Killing Our Own: The Disaster of America’s Experience with Atomic Radiation. New York: Delta.
282 Appendix 1983 Bradley, David. No Place to Hide, 1946-1984. 2d ed. Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, for Dartmouth College.
1984 Clarfield, Gerard H., and William M. Wiecek. Nuclear America: Military and Civilian Nuclear Power in the United States, 1940-1980. New York: Harper & Row.
Fuller, John G. The Day We Bombed Utah: America’s Most Lethal Secret. New York: New American Library. $zasz, Ferenc Morton. The Day the Sun Rose Twice: The Story of the Trinity
Site Nuclear Explosion, July 16, 1945. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
1985 Bertell, Rosalie. No Immediate Danger: Prognosis for a Radioactive Earth. London: Women’s Press.
1986 Half Life. A film produced by Dennis O’Rourke and Associates. Ball, Howard. Justice Downwind: America’s Atomic Testing Program in the 1950s. New York: Oxford University Press.
Miller, Richard J. Under the Cloud: The Decades of Nuclear Testing. New York: Free Press. Titus, A. Costandina. Bombs in the Backyard: Atomic Testing and American Politics. Reno: University of Nevada Press.
Toyosaki, Hiromitsu. Goodbye Rongelap! Translated by Masayuki and Heather Ikeda. Tokyo: Tsukiji Shokan.
1987 Radio Bikini. A film produced, directed, and edited by Robert Stone. Firth, Stewart. Nuclear Playground, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Hacker, Barton C. The Dragon’s Tail: Radiation Safety in the Manhattan Project, 1942-1946. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press.
1988 Dibblin, Jane. Day of Two Suns: U.S. Nuclear Testing and the Pacific Islanders. London: Virago Press.
Lerager, Jim. In the Shadow of the Cloud: Photographs and Histories of America’s Atomic Veterans. Golden, Colo.: Fulcrum.
Weart, Spencer R. Nuclear Fear: A History of Images. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
1989 Caufield, Catherine. Multiple Exposures: Chronicles of the Radiation Age. New York: Harper & Row.
Fradkin, Philip J. Fallout: An American Nuclear Tragedy. Tucson: University of Arizona Press. May, John. The Greenpeace Book of the Nuclear Age: The Hidden History, the Human Cost. New York: Pantheon Books.
1990 Gould, Jay M., and Benjamin A. Goldman. Deadly Deceit: Low-Level Radiation, High-Level Cover-up. San Francisco: Four Walls, Eight Windows.
Acronyms and Abbreviations
AAAS American Association for the Advancement of Science AAB Attitude Assessment Branch, Troop Information and Education Division
ABA American Bar Association ABC American Broadcasting Company ABCC Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission ABIIC Atomic Bomb Incident Investigating Committee ACBM Advisory Committee on Biology and Medicine
ACC Army Chemical Center ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ACE Army Corps of Engineers ACS Assistant Chief of Staff AEA Atomic Energy Authority, United Kingdom AEC Atomic Energy Commission, United States
AES American Ethnological Society
AFF Army Field Forces
AFOAT-1 Air Force Assistant for Atomic Energy AFOSR Air Force Office of Scientific Research
AFSC Air Force Systems Command AFSWC Air Force Special Weapons Command/Center AFSWP Armed Forces Special Weapons Project
AFWL Air Force Weapons Laboratory
AG Adjutant General
AGC Aerojet-General Corporation AGMIA Assistant General Manager for International Activities AGMMA Assistant General Manager for Military Application
AIF Atomic Industrial Forum
283
284 Acronyms and Abbreviations AIHA American Industrial Hygiene Association AIME American Institute of Mining Engineers ALO/O Albuquerque Operations/Office
ANL Argonne National Laboratory ANS American Nuclear Society
AP Associated Press
A-PICSC | Atlantic-Pacific Interocean Canal Study Commission
APS American Philosophical Society
ARB Attitude Research Branch, Armed Forces Information and Education Division
ARL-LV Air Resources Laboratory, Las Vegas ARMS Aerial Radiation Monitoring System ARPA Advanced Research Project Agency ASAO Association of Social Anthropology in Oceania ASDISA Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
ASROC Anti-Submarine Rocket
att. attached
AWS Air Weather Service BAI Bureau of Animal Industry BAS Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists BEAR Advisory Committee on the Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation BEIR Advisory Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation
BMI Batelle Memorial Institute BN2 Bosun’s Mate, 2d Class
BNL Brookhaven National Laboratory
BOB Bureau of the Budget BSS Bureau of State Services
CCEI Colorado Committee for Environmental Information
CDC Center[s] for Disease Control CEP Containment Evaluation Panel CETG Civil Effects Test Group
CG Commanding General
ch. chapter —
CINCPAC Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINCPACFLI Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CIRRPC Committee on Interagency Radiation Research and Policy Coordination
CISSM Center for International Security Studies at Maryland, University of Maryland
CITF Commander, Joint Task Force CMH Center of Military History, U.S. Army CNI Greater St. Louis Citizens’ Committee for Nuclear Information
CNO Chief of Naval Operations CNR Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc.
CO Commanding Officer comm. committee
Cong. Congress
Acronyms and Abbreviations 285
CP Control Point CS Chief of Staff CSUSA Chief of Staff, U.S. Army CSUSAF Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
CTF Commander, Task Force CTG Commander, Task Group CTU Commander, Task Unit
CY Calendar Year
DA Department of the Army DAAG. Dose Assessment Advisory Group
DAF Department of the Air Force DARPA Defense Advanced Research Project Agency
DASA Defense Atomic Support Agency DBER Division of Biological and Environmental Research
DBM Division of Biology and Medicine DEIS Draft Environmental Impact Statement
DIS Division of Information Services
diss. dissertation distrib. distribution
DMA Division of Military Application
DNA Defense Nuclear Agency DOD Department of Defense DOE Department of Energy DOI Department of the Interior DOP Division of Organization and Personnel
DOS Division of Operational Safety DPI Division of Public Information DPNE Division of Peaceful Nuclear Explosives
DRH Division of Radiological Health DVA Department of Veterans Affairs DWET Director(ate) of Weapon Effects Tests
EIC Eberline Instrument Corporation
encl. enclosure
EP Experimental Plan EPA Environmental Protection Agency
EPB Eniwetok Planning Board EPG Eniwetok Proving Ground ERDA Energy Research and Development Administration
FAS Federation of American Scientists
FC/AFSWP Field Command, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project
FCDA Federal Civil Defense Administration
FDA Food and Drug Administration FOA Foreign Operations Administration FOIA Freedom of Information Act
FRC Federal Radiation Council
FSI Federal Services, Inc.
FY Fiscal Year
286 Acronyms and Abbreviations GAC General Advisory Committee, AEC GAO General Accounting Office, U.S. Congress
GE General Electric Company
GI U.S. soldier
GM General Manager
GPO Government Printing Office H&N Holmes & Narver, Inc.
HA High Altitude
HASL Health and Safety Laboratory
HEG Hazards Evaluation Group HEW Department of Health, Education, and Welfare HMSO Her Majesty’s Stationery Office
HPS Health Physics Society
Hq Headquarters
HSPS Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences HumRRO Human Resources Research Office, George Washington University
IAC International Astronautical Congress IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICAF Industrial College of the Armed Forces ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile TEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
IRE Institute of Radio Engineers IRRC Interagency Radiation Research Committee JAMA JAMA: Journal of the American Medical Association
JCAE Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JNIH Japanese National Institute of Health JO(T)I Joint Office of (Test) Information
JTF Joint Task Force
JTO Joint Test Organization
KT kiloton
LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory LASL Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory LASV Low Altitude Supersonic Vehicle LL[N]L Lawrence Livermore [National] Laboratory
LRL Lawrence Radiation Laboratory LV(F)O Las Vegas (Field) Office, AEC MBEHC Missouri Basin Engineering Health Council MCPAEB Marine Corps Provisional Atomic Exercise Brigade
MLC Military Liaison Committee MLSC Micronesian Legal Services Corporation
MPC Maximum Permissible Concentration MPE Maximum Permissible Exposure MPL Maximum Permissible Limits MRC Medical Research Council, United Kingdom
msl mean sea level
MT megaton
Acronyms and Abbreviations 287
NAA North American Aviation, Inc. NAPM National Association of Photographic Manufacturers
NARS Nevada Aerial Radiation Survey
NAS National Academy of Sciences NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration NAS-NRC National Academy of Sciences—National Research Council
NATS Nevada Aerial Tracking System
NBS National Bureau of Standards
NCRH National Center for Radiological Health NCRP National Council/Committee on Radiation Protection (and Measurements)
NERC Northern Environmental Research Center NERVA Nuclear Engine for Rocket Vehicle Application
NIH National Institutes of Health
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology NMRI Naval Medical Research Institute
no. number
NOSC Naval Ocean Systems Center
NPB Nevada Planning Board NPG Nevada Proving Ground NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRDL Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory NRDS Nuclear Rocket Development Station
NRX Nuclear Reactor, Experimental NSAM National Security Action Memorandum
NSC National Security Council NSF National Science Foundation NSSC Naval Sea Systems Command
NTO Nevada Test Organization
NTPR Nuclear Test Personnel Review
NTS Nevada Test Site
NVO/O Nevada Operations/Office
NYC New York City
NYO/O New York Operations/Office
O&M Organization and Management OAH Organization of American Historians OCB Operations Coordinating Board OCDM Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
OFO Office of Field Operations, Las Vegas ORNL Oak Ridge National Laboratory ORO Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense OTA Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress
OTI Office of Test Information OTO Office of Test Operations
PAA Pan American World Airways
288 Acronyms and Abbreviations : PAC Plowshare Advisory Committee
PAO Public Affairs Office
PGO Project Gnome Organization
PHS Public Health Service
P.L. Public Law
PNE Peaceful Nuclear Explosives PNL Pacific Northwest Laboratory POD Pacific Ocean Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
PPG Pacific Proving Ground P(-)SAC President’s Science Advisory Committee
PST Pacific Standard Time
R&D Research and Development RADIAC Radiation Detection, Indication, and Computation
rad-safe radiation/radiological safety REECo Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Company, Inc.
rep roentgen equivalent, physical RHSA Radiological Health Research Activities
RIFT Reactor In-Flight Test R-MAD Reactor Maintenance, Assembly and Disassembly building
RMCE Rocky Mountain Center on Environment
RPC Radiation Policy Council
RPPAP Radiation Protection Policy Action Paper
RSC Radiation Surveillance Center
RSSU Radiological Safety Support Unit
SAC Strategic Air Command SAI Science Applications, Inc.
SAIC Science Applications International Corporation
SAN San Francisco Operations Office ° SANE Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy SERHL Southeastern Radiological Health Laboratory
SFO/O Santa Fe Operations/Office SLAM Supersonic Low Altitude Missile SNPO Space Nuclear Propulsion Office SNPO-N Space Nuclear Propulsion Office, Nevada Extension
SNS Space Nuclear Systems
SOP Standard Operating Procedure(s)
SSRS Society for Social Responsibility in Science SSSP Society for the Study of Social Problems
SWC Special Weapons Command SWRHL Southwest Radiological Health Laboratory
TAC Tactical Air Command
TG Task Group
TIO Test Information Office, Las Vegas
TNT Transient Nuclear Test
TR Technical Report
TTPI Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
TU Task Unit
Acronyms and Abbreviations 289 UAPC University of Alaska Project Chariot study UCLA University of California, Los Angeles UCRL University of California Radiation Laboratory UKAEA United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority
UN United Nations Univ. University
UNSCEAR United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation
UPI United Press International USA United States Army USAEC United States Atomic Energy Commission
USAF United States Air Force
USARPAC United States Army, Pacific
USBM United States Bureau of Mines USFDA United States Food and Drug Administration USFWS United States Fish and Wildlife Service
USGS United States Geological Survey USIA United States Information Agency USMC United States Marine Corps
USN United States Navy
USNRDL United States Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory
USPHS United States Public Health Service USUN United States Mission to the United Nations USWB United States Weather Bureau UWFL University of Washington Applied Fisheries Laboratory
VA Veterans Administration
vol. volume
VUF Vela Uniform
WAL Westinghouse Astronuclear Laboratory
w/att. with attached
WERL Western Environmental Research Laboratory
WHO World Health Organization
WOJG Warrant Officer Junior Grade
WSI Wackenhut Services, Inc.
WT Weapons Test
Notes
Preface 1. Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988). 2. Georg G. Iggers and Konrad von Moltke, Introduction, to Leopold von Ranke, The Theory and Practice of History, ed. Georg G. Iggers and Konrad von Moltke (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Mermill, 1973), xv—lxxi, at xix—xx; Novick, That Noble Dream (n. 1), ch. 1, “The European Legacy: Ranke, Bacon, Flaubert,” especially 28-30.
3. Barton C. Hacker, The Dragon’s Tail: Radiation Safety in the Manhattan Project, 1942-1946 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: Univ. of California Press, 1987).
4. See Wolfgang Schluchter, “Value Neutrality and the Ethic of Responsibility,” in Guenther Roth and Schluchter, Max Weber's Vision of History: Ethics and Methods (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: Univ. of California Press, 1979; paperback ed., 1984), 65-116. 5. Stephen Jay Gould, “Muller Bros. Moving & Storage: A Scientist Recalls Some Close Encounters of a Mental Kind,” Natural History (Aug. 1990): 12, 14, 16. On the restructuring of fact to suit narrative, see Bruce A. Rosenberg, Custer and the Epic of Defeat (University Park: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1974).
6. On the human experiments conducted during and after World War II, see J. Newell Stannard, Radioactivity and Health: A History, ed. Raymond W. Baalman, Jr., Report DOE/RL/01830-T59 (Richland, Wash.: PNL, 1988), especially 100-102 (uranium), 213~—214 (polonium), 350-356, 1458-1463 (plutonium), 454—455 (tritium), 1750-1753 (radioactive tracers).
introduction: Testing and Radiological Safety 1. See Barton C. Hacker, The Dragon's Tail: Radiation Safety in the Manhattan Project, 1942-1946 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: Univ. of California Press, 1987), for more details and full documentation. 291
292 Notes to Pages 2-6 2. See Herbert M. Parker, “Some Background Information on the Development of
Dose Units,” Report no. CRUSP-1, American College of Radiology, Nov. 1955; Parker and William C. Roesch, “Units, Radiation: Historical Development,” in George L. Clarke, ed., The Encyclopedia of X-Rays and Gamma Rays (New York: Reinhold, 1963), 1102-1107; Ronald L. Kathren, “Historical Development of Radiation Measurement and Protection,” in Allen B. Brodsky, ed., Physical Science and Engineering Data, Section A, vol. 1 of CRC Handbook of Radiation Measurement and Protection (West Palm Beach, Fla.: CRC Press, 1978), 13-52; Arthur C. Upton, “Evolving Perspectives on the Concept of Dose in Radiobiology and Radiation Protection,” Health Physics 55 (1988): 605-614. 3. See, e.g., Robert W. Young, “Acute Radiation Syndrome,” in James J. Conklin and Richard I. Walker, eds., Military Radiobiology (Orlando: Academic Press, 1987), 165-190, especially 172-177.
4. For an introduction to the major issues, see J. Samuel Walker, “The Controversy over Radiation Safety: A Historical Overview,” JAMA 262 (4 Aug. 1989): 664—668. See also Spencer R. Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1988), especially part 3, “New Hopes and Horrors, 1953-1963.” 5. The standard account of the public debate remains Robert A. Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1978); on internal politics, see Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission, vol. 3 of A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: Univ. of California Press, 1989); and for the scientific debate, Carolyn Kopp, “The Origins of the American Scientific Debate over Fallout Hazards,” Social Studies of Science 9 (1979): 403-422.
6. See Richard G. Hewlett, “Nuclear Weapon Testing and Studies Related to Health Effects: An Historical Survey,” in IRRC, Considerations of Three Proposals to Conduct Research on Possible Health Effects of Radiation from Nuclear Weapons
Testing in Arizona, Nevada, and Utah; and, Nuclear Weapon Testing and Studies Related to Health Effects, NIH Publication 81-507 (Washington, Oct. 1980), 24-101, at 82-85; Sarah C. Darby, “Review Article: Epidemiological Evaluation of Radiation Risk Using Populations Exposed at High Doses,” Health Physics 51 (1986): 269-281. 7. BEIR, “The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation,” 1972; UNSCEAR, “Ionizing Radiation Levels and Effects,” 1972. Cf. NCRP, Basic Radiation Protection Criteria, Report 39 (Washington, 15 Jan. 1971); L. D. Hamilton, “On Radiation Standards,” BAS 28 (March 1972): 30-33. 8. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-438, 11 Oct. 1974), sections 104 and 201; Executive Order 11834, “Activation of the Energy Research and Development Administration and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,” 15 Jan. 1975, effective 19 Jan. 1975; Department of Energy Organization Act (P.L. 95-91, 4 Aug. 1977), sections 301(a) and 703. 9. “Chapter 20. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Abolished; Functions and Responsibilities Reassigned,” amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (added by P.L. 95-110, 20 Sept. 1977), in U.S. Cong., House, Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment, Nuclear Regulatory Legislation through the 95th Congress, 2d Session, Comm. Print No. 1, 96th Cong., Ist Sess.,
Notes to Pages 7-8 293 May 1979, 141-143. See also Ralph Nader and John Abbotts, The Menace of Atomic Energy (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977), 287-292. 10. Roger Smith, “New Controversy over Low-Level Radiation Effects Brewing Up,” Nucleonics Week, 1 Jan. 1978, reprinted in Nucleonics Week Special Report, Series 5: Reactor and Radiation Safety, 1978 (New York: McGraw-Hill, n.d.), 1. For a glimpse of the apparent mid-1970s consensus, see Heinz G. Wilms and C. Eugene Moss, “A Bookshelf of Radiological Health,’ American Journal of Public Health 65 (1975): 1231-1237. 11. R. H. Romer, “Resource Letter ERPEE-1 on Energy: Resources, Production, and Environmental Effects,” American Journal of Physics 40 (1972): 805-829, especially Section VII.A, “The Low-Level Effects Controversy,” 820-822; Romer cites the most important critiques of the works referred to. Cf. Richard Lewis, “Last Word in the Radiation Debate,” New Scientist 57 (15 Mar. 1973): 610-611. 12. See especially John W. Gofman, “Jrrevy”: An Irreverent, Illustrated View of Nuclear Power. A Collection of Talks, from Blunderland to Seabrook IV (San Francisco: CNR, 1979); Gofman, Radiation and Human Health (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1981; paperback ed., updated and abridged, New York: Pantheon Books, 1983); Ernest J. Sternglass, Secret Fallout (New York: Ballantine Books, 1972; 2d
ed., New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981). . 13. Jaycor, Shot Smoky: A Test of the Plumbbob Series, 31 August 1957, by Payne
S. Harris et al., Report DNA 6004F (Alexandria, Va., 31 May 1981), 25-26; JRB Associates, Shot Galileo: A Test of the Plumbbob Series, 2 September 1957, by Jean Ponton et al., Report DNA 6001F (McLean, Va., 27 Feb. 1981), 21-32. 14. Testimony of CDC Director William H. Foege and Glyn G. Caldwell, U.S. Cong., House, Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Subcomm. on Health and the Environment, Effects of Radiation on Human Health, vol. 1, Health Effects of Ionizing Radiation, Hearings, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 24 Jan.—28 Feb. 1978, 195-217, at 197-198. See also A. Costandina Titus, Bombs in the Backyard: Atomic Testing and American Politics (Reno: Univ. of Nevada Press, 1986), 107-108; Thomas H. Saffer and Orville E. Kelly, Countdown Zero (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1982), 149156; Michael Uhl and Tod Ensign, GI Guinea Pigs: How the Pentagon Exposed Our Troops to Dangers More Deadly than War, Agent Orange and Atomic Radiation (Chi-
cago: Playboy Press, 1980), 89-92. .
15. Roger Ray to distrib., “Draft Minutes DOD/ERDA Meeting: Review of Military Historical Dosimetry Data for the Nuclear Weapons Test Program,” 18 July 1977, w/att. minutes; J. K. Bratton to Alfred D. Starbird, “Desert Rock Radiation Exposure Records Matters,” 14 June 1977. See testimony of DNA representatives in Health Effects of Ionizing Radiation, 1978 (n. 14), 218-330, which also publishes several relevant documents. 16. Health Effects of Ionizing Radiation, 1978 (n. 14), 2, 198. See also Paul H. Carew, “NTPR—A Case Study” (Washington: DNA, 3 May 1979), 12-13; Hewlett, “Nuclear Weapon Testing” (n. 6), 90; Howard Rosenberg, Atomic Soldiers: American Victims of Nuclear Experiments (Boston: Beacon Press, 1980), 156; Uhl and Ensign, GI Guinea Pigs (n. 14), 92-93. 17. As quoted in Saffer and Kelly, Countdown Zero (n. 14), 155. See also Titus, Bombs in the Backyard (n. 14), 108-109.
294 Notes to Pages 8-11 18. Health Effects of Ionizing Radiation, 1978 (n. 14). 19. Health Effects of Ionizing Radiation, 1978 (n. 14); U.S. Cong., House, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce; Senate, Subcomm. on Scientific Research of Comm. on Labor and Human Resources; and’ Senate, Comm. on the Judiciary, Health Effects of Low-Level Radiation, 2 vols., Joint Hearing, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 19 Apr. 1979; U.S. Cong., House,
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Low-Level Radiation Effects on Health, Hearings, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 23 Apr.—l Aug. 1979; idem, “The Forgotten Guinea Pigs”: A Report on Health Effects of Low-Level Radiation Sustained as a Result of the Nuclear Weapons Testing Program Conducted by the United States Government, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Aug. 1980.
20. Health Effects of Ionizing Radiation, 1978 (n. 14), passim. See also Titus, Bombs in the Backyard (n. 14), 109; Rosenberg, Atomic Soldiers (n. 16), ch. 8, “The Bitter Legacy”; Uhl and Ensign, GI Guinea Pigs (n. 14), 94-96.
1 Operation Sandstone: The AEC Test Program Begins, 1947-1948
1. Maxwell Dauer, “History of Atomic Energy Commission Proving Ground Group (Task Group 7.1 of Joint Task Force Seven),” in Test Director JTF 7, “Report to the Atomic Energy Commission on Operation Sandstone: Atomic Weapon Proof Tests, 1948,” part 1, vol. 1, report 1, 2-4; J. N. Shaffer and D. W. Wulzen, “Organization of the AEC Proving Ground Group (Task Group 7.1 of Joint Task Force Seven),” ibid., report 2, 1-2; CJTF 7, “Atomic Weapons Tests, Operation Sandstone, 1948,” vol. 1, “Report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” 16 June 1948, 5. On Trinity and Crossroads, see Barton C. Hacker, The Dragon's Tail: Radiation Safety in the Manhattan Project, 1942-1946 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: Univ. of California Press, 1987).
2. Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., The New World, 1939/1946, vol. 1 of A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (University Park: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1962), chs. 12-17; Vincent C. Jones, Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb, United States Army in World War II: Special Studies (Washington: CMH, 1985), ch. 28. 3. Joseph I. Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula: The Struggle to Control Atomic Weapons, 1945-1949 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970); Richard F. Haynes, The Awesome Power: Harry S. Truman as Commander in Chief (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1973); Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980); McGeorge Bundy,
Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988), ch. 4, “The Failure of International Control”; Martin J. Sherwin, “Scientists, Arms Control, and National Security,” in Norman A. Graebner, ed., The National Security: Its Theory and Practice, 1945-1960 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1986), 105-122; David Alan Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960,” ibid., 123-195. A revised and expanded version of Rosenberg’s article actually appeared in print earlier; see International Security 7 (Spring 1983): 3-71. 4, Edith C. Truslow and Ralph Carlisle Smith, “Manhattan District History,
Notes to Pages 11-13 295 Project Y, the Los Alamos Project,” vol. 2, “August 1945 through December 1946,” LASL Report no. LAMS-2532 (Vol. II), 1947 (issued 1961); Richard Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield, 1947/1952, vol. 2 of A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (University Park: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1969; reprinted Washington: AEC, 1972), ch. 2; James W. Kunetka, City of Fire: Los Alamos and the Birth of the Atomic Age, 1943-1945 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: PrenticeHall, 1978), ch. 16; Richard T. Sylves, The Nuclear Oracles: A Political History of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1977 (Ames: Iowa State Univ. Press, 1987). 5. Norris E. Bradbury, “Proposed Directive for Los Alamos Laboratory,” prepared for weapons subcommittee meeting, Los Alamos, 2-3 Apr. 1947, and J. Robert Oppenheimer to David E. Lilienthal, 3 Apr. 1947, as cited in Lucille Lemons, “J Division History,” annex 17, Part I, to “Scientific Director’s Report of Atomic Weapon Tests at Eniwetok, 1948,” Dec. 1948, 6-7. 6. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield (n. 4), 3, 58-60, 84; Dauer, “History of TG 7.1” (n. 1), 4-5; Shaffer and Wulzen, “Organization of TG 7.1” (n. 1), 2. 7. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (P.L. 585, 79th Cong., 60 Stat. 755-775, 42 U.S.C. 1801-1819), section 2(c). The act is reprinted with subsequent legislation and other useful material in U.S. Cong., House, Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment, Nuclear Regulatory Legislation through the 95th Congress, 2d Session, Comm. Print no. 1, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., May 1979. See also Hewlett and Anderson, The New World (n. 2), chs. 12—14; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield (n. 4), 131; Steven L. Rearden, The Formative Years, 1947-— 1950, vol. 1 of Alfred Goldberg, ed., History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Washington: OSD Historical Office, 1984), 111-114, 423-432. 8. “Draft of Memorandum from Mr. Lilienthal to Admiral [William D.] Leahy,” n.d. (President’s Secretary File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Truman Library, Independence, Mo.); David E. Lilienthal, “Notes on a Meeting at White House, June 27, Friday, 3:30-4:00 p.m.,” in The Atomic Energy Years, vol. 2 of The Journals of David E. Lilienthal (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 212-213; Hewlett and Anderson, The New World (n. 2), 648-649; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield (n. 4), 32~33, 64-65, 84-85; Dauer, “History of TG 7.1” (m. 1), 5. Declassification of stockpile figures, 1945-1948, was announced and the figures cited in Hq DOE, Classification Bulletin WNP-46A, 19 Feb. 1982; see also David Alan Rosenberg, “U.S. Nuclear Stockpile, 1945 to 1950,” BAS 38 (May 1982): 25-30. 9. James S. Russell, “Tentative Planning as Result of Conference with Los Alamos Laboratory, July 9-10, 1947,” 14 July 1947; Russell to Bradbury, 24 July 1947; Carroll L. Wilson to Carroll L. Tyler and Bradbury, “Proof Tests of Atomic Weapons,” 23 July 1947 (as cited in Lemons, “J Division History” [n. 5], 7-10). See also Dauer, “History of TG 7.1” (n. 1), 6-7; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield (n. 4), 85, 140. 10. Lemons, “J Division History” (n. 5), 10-13, 18; Dauer, “History of TG 7.1” (n. 1), 8-10, 20-21; Shaffer and Wulzen, “Organization of TG 7.1” (n. 1), 2—4, 6; CJTF 7, “Report to the JCS” (n. 1), 5-7, 11-13; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield (n. 4), 140; “Principles and Policies Governing Participation by the Armed Forces in the Proof-testing of Certain Types of Atomic Weapons,” n.d.
11. Dauer, “History of TG 7.1” (n. 1), 20-21, 23-26; Lemons, “J Division History” (n. 5), 11-17; Shaffer and Wulzen, “Organization of TG 7.1” (n. 1), 7-10;
296 Notes to Pages 14-18 CIJTF 7, “Report to the JCS” (n. 1), 6-7, 13, 17-18; “Proposed Agreement between Test Director and Scientific Director” signed by Darol K. Froman, 6 Oct. 1947, and Russell, 15 Oct. 1947. For a convenient overview of JTF 7 organization, see Kaman Tempo, Operation Sandstone: 1948, by L. H. Berkhouse et al., Report DNA 6033F (Santa Barbara, 19 Dec. 1983), 30—47.
12. Leslie R. Groves, Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962), 398-400; Kenneth D. Nichols, The Read to Trinity (New York: William Morrow, 1987), 253; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield (n. 4), 131-132; Jones, Manhattan (n. 2), 600; James E. Hewes, Jr., From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963 (Washington: CMH, 1975), 311. On the National Security Act of 1947, see Alice C. Cole et al., eds., The Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944-1978 (Washington: OSD Historical Office, 1978), ch. 1; Rearden, The Formative Years (n. 7), ch. 1. 13. Lemons, “J Division History” (n. 5), 17; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield (n. 4), 128-129, 131; Dauer, “History of TG 7.1” (n. 1), 23-24, 26; Frank A. Camm, “Armed Forces Special Weapons Project Activities, Operations and Training,” in Test Director JTF 7, “Report on Operation Sandstone” (n. 1), part 1, vol. 1, report 4. 14. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield (n. 4), 85; Lemons, “J Division History” (n. 5), 20. On the 1946 choice of Bikini, see Hacker, The Dragon’s Tail (n. 1), 118. 15. JCS to AEC, “Report of the Joint Proof Test Committee,” SM 9078, 18 Oct.
1947, paragraph 7, and enclosure D, “Analysis of Sites’; Froman to J. S. Russell, “Location of the Site for Proving Ground Operations,” 2 Oct. 1947, as cited in Lemons, “J Division History” (n. 5), 21; Froman to Russell, 6 Oct. 1947; Dauer, “History of TG 7.1” (n. 1), 12. 16. Dauer, “History of TG 7.1” (n. 1), 12; Lemons, “J Division History” (n. 5), 20-21; “Analysis of Sites” (n. 14); J. S. Russell to Lilienthal, “Notes for White House
Conference re Test Program,” 24 Nov. 1947. See also Kaman Tempo, Operation Sandstone (n. 11), 26-28. 17. Dauer, “History of TG 7.1” (n. 1), 14; Lemons, “J Division History” (n. 5), 22; Neal O. Hines, Proving Ground: An Account of the Radiobiological Studies in the Pacific, 1946-1961 (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1962), 86-87. 18. Russell to Lilienthal, 24 Nov. (n. 16); “Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands Approved at the One Hundred and Twenty-fourth Meeting of the Security Council,” 2 Apr. 1947; Arnold H. Leibowitz, Defining Status: A Comprehensive Analysis of United States Territorial Relations (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1989), ch. 10, ““The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands: Micronesia.” 19. Leonard Mason, “The Bikinians: A Transplanted Population,” Human Organization 9 (Spring 1950): 5—15; Mason, “Relocation of the Bikini Marshallese: A Study in Group Migration,” Ph.D. diss., Anthropology, Yale Univ., 1954 (abstract in Dissertation Abstracts International 31-B [July 1970}: 31-32); Robert C. Kiste, The Bikinians: A Study in Forced Migration (Menlo Park, Calif.: Cummings, 1974), 82-85; Hines, Proving Ground (n. 17), ch. 3; Dauer, “History of TG 7.1” (n. 1), 13. 20. Dauer, “History of TG 7.1” (n. ), 15; Kiste, The Bikinians (n. 19), 84; CITF 7, “Report to the JCS” (n. ), 73; James McCormack, Jr., memo for record, 5 Nov. 1947 [meeting with Secretary of State]; J. S. Russell, memo for record, “Conference with Secretary of State, 1000, November 20, 1947,” 24 Nov. 1947; Russell to Lilienthal,
Notes to Pages 18-20 297 24 Nov. (n. 16). For the controversy about a public statement, see Lilienthal, The Atomic Energy Years (n. 8), 214, 245, 247, 263, 311, 315, 316.
21. McCormack, draft memo for record, “Conference in the President’s Office at 12:30 pmM., November 25, 1947,” 25 Nov. 1947; Lilienthal to Truman, “Test of Atomic Weapons,” 20 Nov. 1947; Dauer, “History of TG 7.1” (n. 1), 15-18.
22. AEC release 69, “Statement . . . Relative to the Establishment of Pacific Experimental Installations,” 1 Dec. 1947 (reproduced in Dauer, “History of TG 7.1” [n. 1], Appendix A, 1); AEC release 70, “Information for the Press Prepared in Collaboration with the Department of State and the National Military Establishment to Supplement the Statement of the United States Atomic Energy Commission on the Establishment of Pacific Experimental Installations,” 1 Dec. 1947 (ibid., 2-3). 23. Dauer, “History of TG 7.1” (n. 1), 18-19; Kaman Tempo, Operation Sandstone (n. 11), 18, 21. See also Kiste, The Bikinians (n. 19), 85; Anne Chambers, “A Study of the Relocation of Two Marshallese Atoll Communities,” Kroeber Anthropology Society Papers no. 44 (1971): 30—47; Jack Adair Tobin, “The Resettlement of the Enewetak People: A Study of a Displaced Community in the Marshall Islands,” Ph.D. diss., Anthropology, Univ. of California, Berkeley, 1967 (abstract in Dissertation Abstracts 28-B [Apr. 1968]: 3982). 24. AEC release 74, “Announcement... Relative to the Organization and Staffing of Eniwetok Proving Ground,” 22 Dec. 1947 (reproduced in Dauer, “History of TG 7.1” [n. 1], Appendix A, 4—5).
25. AEC release 77, “Atomic Energy Commission Gives Notice of Hazards in Area Surrounding Eniwetok Proving Ground,” 30 Dec. 1947 (reproduced in Dauer, “History of TG 7.1” [n. 1], Appendix A, 6).
26. Bradbury to Tyler, “Atomic Weapons Tests,” 11 Aug. 1947, as cited in Lemons, “J Division History” (n. 5), 13; J. S. Russell to Bradbury, “Planning for Proofing,” 3 Sept. 1947; Dauer, “History of TG 7.1” (n. 1), 8-9; Joint Radiological Safety Group, “Operational Report, Phases A and B,” 20 Mar. 1948, in “Task Group 7.6 Operations: Operation Report, Phases A, B, C, D, E,” Sandstone Report 43, n.d., 1-2; James P. Cooney, “Medical Effects of Atomic Explosion,” in AFSWP, Radiological Defense, vol. 3, A Series of Indoctrination Lectures on Atomic Explosion, with Medical Aspects (Washington, n.d.), 31. On terminological evolution, see Hacker, The Dragon’s Tail (n. 1), 30-31, 119. 27. Field Order no. 1, Hq JTF 7, 14 Nov. 1947, paragraphs 3.d, 3.e (reproduced as Appendix A to CTG 7.1, “Operation Report of Atomic Energy Commission Proving Ground Group,” in Test Director JTF 7, “Report on Operation Sandstone” [n. 1], part i, vol. 1, report 3); Rad-safe, “Operational Report,” phases A—-B (n. 26), 2, 4; Dauer, “History of TG 7.1” (n. 1), 20. On the derivation of “health physics,” see Hacker, The Dragon's Tail (n. 1), 30-31; for rad-safe organization in Operation Crossroads, ibid., ch. 5. 28. JTF 7, “Radiological Safety Plan,” paragraph 1, Annex J to Field Order no. 1 (nm. 27).
29. Rad-safe, “Operational Report,” phases A-B (n. 26), 2—4; CJTF 7, “Report to the JCS” (n. 1), 49.
30. Cooney to CJTF 7, first endorsement of Frank L. Winant, Jr., to CJTF 7, “Requirements for Future Atomic Tests—Radiological Safety Group,” 25 May 1948 (reproduced as Annex III to CTG 7.6, “Operation Report” [n. 26]).
298 Notes to Pages 20-22 31. Froman and Alvin C. Graves, “General Report,” vol. 1 of Scientific Director JTF 7, “Report” (n. 5), 120. 32. Froman and Graves, “General Report” (n. 31), 120, 123, 125, 160-161; Dauer, “History of TG 7.1” (n. 1), 10-11. Cf. Graves to Paul T. Preuss, “Responsibility for Radiological Safety in Proving Ground Activities,” 28 Dec. 1948. 33. Dauer, “History of TG 7.1” (n. 1), 11; Rad-safe, “Operational Report,” Phases A-B (n. 26), 9. 34. JTF 7, “Radiological Safety Plan” (n. 28), paragraphs 4.b, 4.c, 4.d. 35. “Radiological Records,” paragraph I, Annex H to TG 7.6 Operation Plan no. 1-48, 6 Mar. 1948 (reproduced as Appendix B to CTG 7.6, “Operation Report” [n. 26]). See also TG 7.1, “Radiological Safety Plan,” paragraph 2.(a), Annex G to TG 7.1 Operation Order no. 1-48, 12 Feb. 1948 (reproduced in Appendix C to CTG 7.1, “Operation Report” [n. 27]). 36. Howard L. Andrews and Donald C. Campbell, “Evaluation of Radiological Survey Instruments Used for Health Protection during Operation Sandstone,” 1 Apr. 1949, 10, 19-21, annex 10 to Scientific Director JTF 7, “Report” (n. 5); Dauer to J. S. Russell, “Progress Report—Instruments and Equipment for Radiological Group (TG 7.6) Operation Sandstone,” 19 Jan. 1948; Ralph E. Lapp, “Survey of Nucleonics Instrumentation Industry,” Nucleonics 4 (May 1949): 102-103; Campbell, RADJAC: An Introduction to Radiological Instruments for Military Use, vol. 4 of Radiological Defense (Washington: AFSWP, 1950), 7-8, 59. Cf. Andrew G. Nelson and William J. Brady, “RADIAC Instruments and Film Badges Used at Atmospheric Nuclear Tests: Preliminary Report” (Alexandria, Va.: Jaycor, 23 Aug. 1984), 3-3, 3-4; Kaman Tempo,
Operation Sandstone (n. 11), 59, 99. On Met Lab instrument development, see Hacker, The Dragon’s Tail (n. 1), 39-41. 37. Dauer to Russell, 19 Jan. (n. 36); Rad-safe, “Operational Report,” Phases A-B (n. 26), 15, 24-25; “Issue of Radiological Safety Equipment,” Paragraphs VIII-X, Annex B to TG 7.6 Operation Plan (n. 35); Nelson and Brady, “RADIAC Instruments and Film Badges” (n. 36), 3-4. Cf. W. W. Perkins, History of Pacific Proving Ground Dosimetry, NOSC Technical Report 725 (San Diego, 1 Apr. 1981), 11-12, 15-16. On the reasons for using film badges for radiation dosimetry, see Hacker, The Dragon's Tail (n. 1), 36-37; on their use at Crossroads, ibid., 122. 38. Herbert Scoville, Jr., to J. S. Russell, “Nuclear Radiation Measurements for Atomic Bomb Tests,” 9 Sept. 1947; Rad-safe, “Operational Report,’ Phases A—B (n. 26), ch. 4, “Technical Measurements”; Lemons, “J Division History” (n. 5), 111-112; “Technical Measurements Unit—7.6.6,” Annex G to TG 7.6 Operation Plan (n. 35). For an overview of the experimental program, see Kaman Tempo, Operation Sandstone (n. 11), ch. 3. 39. Rad-safe, “Operational Report,” Phases A~B (n. 26), 24—25; ibid., Phase C, 10 May 1948, 40; Dauer to Russell, 19 Jan. (n. 36); “Technical Measurements Unit’ (n. 38), Paragraph II; Lemons, “J Division History” (n. 5), 111. 40. Rad-safe, “Operational Report,” Phases A—B (n. 26), ch. 3, “Instrument and Logistic Data”; Lapp, “Survey of Nucleonics Instrumentation Industry” (n. 36), 102103; Campbell, RADJAC (n. 36), 1. Cf. Richard D. Terry, “Historical Development of Commercial Health Physics Instrumentation,” in Ronald L. Kathren and Paul L. Ziemer, eds., Health Physics: A Backward Glance, Thirteen Original Papers on the History of Radiation Protection (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), 162—163. For
Notes to Pages 22-25 299 recent surveys of the development of both laboratory and field instruments, see H. L. Andrews, “Laboratory Measuring Instruments,” in J. Newell Stannard, Radioactivity and Health: A History, ed. Raymond W. Baalman, Jr., Report DOE/RL/01830-T59 (Richland, Wash.: PNL, Oct. 1988), 1509-1535; and Kathren, “Instrumentation for Monitoring and Field Use,” ibid., 1537-1573. 41. Andrews and Campbell, “Evaluation of Radiological Survey Instruments” (n. 36), 1-2; Lapp et al., “Final Report of the Subcommittee on Radsafe Survey Instruments,” 4 Oct. 1947 (reproduced as Appendix A to ibid.); Dauer to Russell, 19 Jan. (n. 36). 42. Andrews and Campbell, “Evaluation of Radiological Survey Instruments” (n. 36), passim; N. F. Murphy, “Report on Navy RADIAC Meters,” n.d., bound with ibid.; Campbell, RADJAC (n. 36), passim; Dauer to Russell, 19 Jan. (n. 36), Cf. Nelson and Brady, “RADIAC Instruments and Film Badges” (n. 36), 3-3.
43. JTF 7, “Radiological Safety Plan” (n. 28), paragraphs 4.e, 4.f, 4.g, and Appendix 1, “Hazards Resulting from Atomic Bomb Explosions,” paragraph 2.c; TG 7.6 Operation Plan (n. 36); CTG 7.6 to all task group commanders, “Radsafe One: Radiological Safety—General,” 14 Mar. 1948 (reproduced as Appendix C to CTG 7.6, “Operation Report” [n. 26]); TG 7.1, “Radiological Safety Plan” (n. 36), paragraphs 2.(b)—2.(k). 44. Rad-safe, “Operational Report,” Phases A-B (n. 26), 5-8; TG 7.6 Operation Plan (n. 35); ibid., Annex I, Hq TG 7.6, Special Orders no. 1, 28 Feb. 1948, and no. 2, 29 Feb. 1948 [personnel assignments]. See also Kaman Tempo, Operation Sandstone (n. 11), 54~—57.
45. Rad-safe, “Operational Report,” Phases A—B (n. 26), 3; Dauer, “History of TG 7.1” (n. 1), 21-22; Frank L. Winant, Jr., “Command Aspects of Radiological Defense,” in AFSWP, Radiological Defense, vol. 3 (n. 26), 103. 46. Rad-safe, “Operational Report,” Phase C (n. 39), 19, 35; Lemons, “J Division History” (n. 5), 19-20; Shaffer and Wulzen, “Organization of TG 7.1” (mn. 1), 13-15; CJTF 7, “Report to the JCS” (n. 1), 55-56; Dauer, “History of TG 7.1” (n. 1), 29-30; CTG 7.3 [Navy], “Operational Report—Task Group 7.3,” Section VII in annex 1, Part II, to ibid., 55-58; Froman and Graves, “General Report” (n. 31), 147. 47. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield (n. 4), 134, 159; Dauer, “History of TG 7.1” (n. 1), 27; CJTF 7, “Report to the JCS” (n. 1), 121-123; CTG 7.3, “Operational
Report” (n. 46), 58-65; Classification Bulletin WNP-46A (n. 8); Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), part 3, “The Great Divide”; Herken, The Winning Weapon (n. 3), ch. 12, “The Year of Opportunity: 1948.” 48. “Major Difficulties Encountered,” in CTG 7.3, “Operational Report” (n. 46),
5-8. 49. Rad-safe, “Operational Report,’ Phase C (n. 39), chs. 5 and 6; CJTF 7, “Report to the JCS” (n. 1), 50, 115. Cf. Froman and Graves, “General Report” (n. 31), 143-144; CTG 7.4, “Operational Report, Air Forces, Joint Task Force Seven,” 38-41, Section VIII in annex 1, Part II, to CJTF 7, “Report to the JCS” (n. 1).
50. Rad-safe, “Operational Report,” Phase C (n. 39), 36-49; TG 7.6 Operation Plan (n. 35). For a rad-safe overview, see Kaman Tempo, Operation Sandstone (n. 11), ch. 2.
51. CTG 7.4, “Operational Report” (n. 49), 24-25, 44-45; Rad-safe, “Operational
300 Notes to Pages 26-29 Report” (n. 26), Phase D, n.d., 50-51; TG 7.6 Operation Plan (n. 35); TG 7.6 Special Orders no. 1 (n. 44). 52. Rad-safe, “Operational Report,” Phase D (n. 51), 51, 53-54; TG 7.6 Operation Plan (n. 35); TG 7.6 Special Orders no. 2 (n. 44). 53. Rad-safe, “Operational Report,” Phase D (n. 51), 55-56; TG 7.6 Operation Plan (n. 35); “Laboratory,” Annex C to ibid.; “Radiological Records” (n. 35); “Personnel Decontamination,” Annex D to TG 7.6 Operation Plan (n. 35); James T. Brennan, “History of the Photo-Dosimetry Section of T. U. 7.6.4,” May 1948; Brennan, “History of Task Unit 7.6.5,” May 1948 (in “Continent and Pacific Historical Records,” Box 6, REECo microfilm records, roll 2). 54. Rad-safe, “Operational Report,” Phase D (n. 51), 54-55; TG 7.6 Operation Plan (n. 35); “Operations,” Annex E to ibid.; Froman and Graves, “General Report”
(n. 31), 156-157. !
55. CJTF 7, “Report to the JCS” (m. 1), 115; “Meteorology,” Section XH, 21-26,
66-67, in Annex 1, Part III, to ibid.; CTG 7.4, “Operational Report” (n. 49), 58; Froman and Graves, “General Report” (n. 31), 159. 56. “Meteorology” (n. 55), 65. 57. Ibid., 1-4, 65-67; Dauer, “History of TG 7.1” (n. 1), 9; CTG 7.4, “Operational Report” (n. 49), 29. 58. “Meteorology” (n. 55), 4-6; CTG 7.4, “Operational Report” (n. 49), 29-30, 58-59; CJTF 7, “Report to the JCS” (n. 1), 116. 59. “Meteorology” (n. 55), 7-8, 12-14, 67-68; “Meteorological Plan,” Annex K to Field Order no. 1 (n. 27); CJTF 7, “Report to the JCS” (n. 1), 115-116. 60. “Meteorology” (n. 55), 37-38; CTG 7.4, “Operational Report” (n. 49), 41-43; Froman and Graves, “General Report” (n. 31), 155, 157-158. 61. “Meteorology” (n. 55), 38-39; CTG 7.1, “Operation Report” (n. 27), 16-18; TG 7.1, “Scientific Operations Plan TU 7.1.1 ((3d] Revision),” 1 May 1948, with enclosure 1, “Bomb Assembly Operations Plan,” as reproduced in Froman and Graves, “General Report” (n. 31), Appendix 4. 62. “Meteorology” (n. 55), 39-40; Froman and Graves, “General Report” (n. 31), 158-159; CTG 7.1, “Operation Report” (n. 27), 18-19; CJTF 7, “Report to the JCS” (n. 1), 135; Bernard J. O’Keefe, Nuclear Hostages (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983), 137-139. 63. Dauer, “History of TG 7.1” (n. 1), 33. 64. Ibid., 14, 33; CTG 7.1, “Operation Report” (n. 27), 20-21; NVOO Office of Public Affairs, Announced United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 through December 1980, NVOQ-209 (Rev. 7), Jan. 1987, 2; Lemons, “J Division History” (n. 5), 26; CJTF 7, “Report to the JCS” (n. 1), 137. 65. CTG 7.1, “Operation Report” (n. 27), 3-4, 20; CJTF 7, “Report to the JCS” (n. 1), 137; Froman and Graves, “General Report” (n. 31), 67-73, 135-136; “Notes on Operations,” 3, Annex I to CTG 7.6, “Operation Report” (n. 26). 66. CJTF 7, “Report to the JCS” (n. 1), 137; CTG 7.6, “Operation Report” (n. 26), 59; CTG 7.1, “Operation Report” (n. 27), 7, 20; Froman and Graves, “General Report” (n. 31), 74-77, 136-137; CTU 7.6.4 to CTG 7.6, “Personnel Exposures on XDay,” 16 Apr. 1948 (REECo microfilm roll 2). See also Kaman Tempo, Operation Sandstone (n. 11), 108. 67. “Notes on Operations” (n. 65), 3.
Notes to Pages 29-32 301 68. Kaman Tempo, Operation Sandstone (n. 11), 108. 69. CTG 7.4, “Operational Report” (n. 49), 66-68; CJTF 7, “Report to the JCS” (n. 1), 137; CTG 7.1, “Operation Report” (n. 27), 3, 21; Froman and Graves, “General Report” (n. 31), 52-55, 131; CTU 7.6.4 to CTG 7.6, 16 Apr. (n. 55). See also Leland B. Taylor, History of Air Force Atomic Cloud Sampling, vol. 1, Narrative, AFSC Historical Publications Series 61-142-1 (Kirtland AFB, New Mex.: AFSWC, Jan. 1963), 13-20. 70. “Notes on Operations” (n. 65), 1.
71. Ibid., 2-3; CJTF 7, “Report to the JCS” (n. 1), 137; CTG 7.1, “Operation Report” (n. 27), 21-22; CTG 7.4, “Operational Report” (n. 49), 69; CTG 7.6, “Operation Report” (n. 26), 60; Froman and Graves, “General Report” (n. 31), 132. For tanks at Trinity, see Hacker, The Dragon's Tail (n. 1), 74-75, 89, 101-102. 72. CTG 7.6, “Operation Report” (n. 26), 59-62; “Notes on Operations” (n. 65), 1, 4-5; CTG 7.1, “Operation Report” (n. 27), 21-22; CJTF 7, “Report to the JCS” (n. 1), 137; CJTF 7 to all task group commanders, 19 Apr. 1948, and CTG 7.6 to CJTF 7, 20 Apr. 1948, both in CTG 7.6, “Operation Report,” Annex IV: “Task Group 7.6 Operational Report: Dispatches,” 2. 73. “Notes on Operations” (n. 65), 5; Thomas N. White, “Engebi Island Survey Data,” c. 22 Apr. 1948 (REECo microfilm roll 3); Winant to Cooney, “Radiological Activity in Engebi Crater,’ 22 Apr. 1948 (REECo microfilm roll 3); TG 7.6, “Technical Report on Radiological Safety at Operation Sandstone,’ 30 May 1948 (REECo microfilm roll 3); Dauer, “History of TG 7.1” (n, 1), 23, 28; Froman and Graves, “General Report” (n. 31), 132; Kaman Tempo, Operation Sandstone (n. 11), 109.
74. J. S. Russell to John E. Knights, 2 Feb. 1976; Russell to Knights, 17 Feb. 1976; Harvey Wasserman et al., Killing Our Own: The Disaster of America’s Experience with Atomic Radiation (New York: Dell, 1982), 49-50, citing Knights’s testimony before the Citizens’ Hearings for Radiation Victims, Washington, D.C., 11 Apr. 1980, 17-19; Michael Uhl and Tod Ensign, GI Guinea Pigs: How the Pentagon Exposed Our Troops to Dangers More Deadly than War: Agent Orange and Atomic Radi-
ation (Chicago: Playboy Press), 49-50. Cf. SAI, “Reconstruction of Dose Received by J. Knights at Sandstone (X-Ray),” 10 Sept. 1979, as discussed in Kaman Tempo, Operation Sandstone (n. 11), 109-110. 75. “Meteorology” (n. 55), 44-46; CTG 7.4, “Operational Report” (n. 49), 72; Froman and Graves, “General Report” (n. 31), 159. 76. Froman and Graves, “General Report” (n. 31), 159. 77. “Notes on Operations” (n. 65), 5. 78. Ibid., 6. 79. Ibid., 5-8; CTG 7.4, “Operational Report” (n. 49), 70-73; NVOO, Announced Nuclear Tests, (n. 64), 2; Dauer, “History of TG 7.1” (m. 1), 34; Lemons, “J Division History” (n. 5), 26; Howard A. Hawthorne, ed., Compilation of Local Fallout Data from Test Detonations 1945-1962 Extracted from DASA 1251, 2 vols., Report DNA 1251-1-EX, -2-EX (Santa Barbara: GE-TEMPO, 1 May 1979), vol. 2, Oceanic U.S. Tests, 14—15, 18-19.
80. “Notes on Operations” (n. 65), 6. 81. Ibid., 7. 82. Ibid., 6-8; CTG 7.6, “Operation Report” (n. 26), 92; CJTF 7 to CTG 7.7, CTU
302 Notes to Pages 33-34 7.6.1 to CTG 7.6, CTG 7.7 to CJTF 7, CTG 7.6 to CTG 7.7, all dated 3 May 1948, in “Task Group 7.6 Operation Report: Dispatches” (n. 72), 2—4, dealing with the fallout
problems and water sample testing. For best-estimate and upper-bound doses, see SAIC, Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Naval Personnel at Operation Sandstone, by C. Thomas et al., Technical Report DNA-TR-83-13 (McLean, Va., 15 Aug. 1983), table 6-1, “Summary of Calculated Doses.”
83. “Meteorology” (n. 55), 53-58; CTG 7.4, “Operational Report” (n. 49), 74; NVOO, Announced Nuclear Tests (n. 64), 2; “Notes on Operations” (n. 65), 8; Dauer, “History of TG 7.1” (n. 1), 34; Lemons, “J Division History” (n. 5), 26. 84. CTG 7.6, “Operation Report” (n. 26), 65; “Notes on Operations” (n. 65), 8-9. 85. Winant, “Interrogation of LtCdr Vandergrift,” 17 Aug. 1948. 86. Froman to Roderick W. Spence, 15/0405Z May 1948; Froman to Spence and Louis H. Hempelmann, Jr., 16/0611Z May 1948; Graves to Spence and Hempelmann, 17/0240Z May 1948; “Notes on Operations” (n. 65), 9; Melvin Bowman to Froman, “Radiation Burns of J-2 Personnel,” 10 June 1948; interviews by Joseph G. Hoffman in Los Alamos with Ernest J. Lang, 17 May 1948, John P. Balagna, 17 May 1948, James E. Sattizahn, 17 May 1948, and Charles Stanley, 21 May 1948; John C. Clark, “Operation Sandstone Radiation Injuries,” 27 July 1948, with Exhibits A—P; Winant, “Interrogation of LtCdr Vandergrift” (n. 85); Cooney to whom it may concern, n.d. 87. Spence and Hempelmann to Froman, 16/2230Z May 1948; Spence to Bradbury, 17/2257Z May 1948; J. G. Hoffman to Hempelmann, “Notes on the Sandstone Personnel Receiving Beta Radiation,” 24 May 1948; Bowman to Froman, 10 June (n. 86); “Statement—James Sattizahn,” Los Alamos, 1 July 1948; Clark, “Operation Sandstone Radiation Injuries” (n. 86); Winant, “Interrogation of LtCdr Vandererift” (n. 85). 88. Froman and Graves, “General Report” (n. 31), 160. 89. Hempelmann and E. R. Jette to distrib., “Recent Accident in Operation Sandstone,” 17 May 1948; Hempelmann to Cooney, 19/1833Z May 1948; Hempelmann to
Froman, 25/2242Z May 1948; Hempelmann to A. E. Dyhre, “Radiation Accident Report,” 7 June 1948; Hempelmann to Robert S. Stone, 28 June 1948; Harry O. Whipple to Dyhre, “Supplementary Radiation Accident Report,” 23 July 1948; Norman P. Knowlton, Jr., et al., “Beta Ray Burns of Human Skin,” JAMA 141 (24 Sept. 1949): 239-246. 90. Knowlton et al., “Beta Ray Burns of Human Skin” (n. 89), 239. See also J. G. Hoffman to Hempelmann, “Dosage Estimates on Sandstone Personnel Based on Interviews with Stanley, Balagna, Lang and Sattizahn,” 24 May 1948. 91. AEC, Atomic Energy and the Life Sciences (Washington, 1949), 34-35; Daniel F, Hayes, “A Summary of Accidents and Incidents Involving Radiation in Atomic Energy Activities, June 1945 through December 1955,” Report TID 5360 (Oak Ridge,
Aug. 1956), 64-65; James Barrett Brown and Minot P. Fryer, “Report of Surgical Repair in the First Group of Atomic Radiation Injuries,” Surgery, Gynecology & Obstetrics 103 (July 1956): 1-4; Frank W. McMullan for record, “Interview with John Balagna, LASL,” 30 Mar. 1982, w/att. “Radiation Burns—Sandstone.” 92. CJTF 7, “Report to the JCS” (n. 1), 141-146; Froman and Graves, “General Report” (n. 31), 161-167; CTG 7.6, “Operation Report” (n. 26), 94-97; Dauer, “History of TG 7.1” (n. 1), 34-35; S. J. Efnor, Jr., “Roll-up and Standby Preparations of
Notes to Pages 34-37 303 AEC Proving Ground Group (TG 7.1 of Joint Task Force Seven),” in Test Director JTF 7, “Report on Operation Sandstone” (n. 1), part 1, vol. 2, report 16. 93. Recommendations for future improvements formed part of virtually every report submitted on Operation Sandstone; see, e.g., J. S. Russell, “Notes for Guidance in Future Tests,” a separately paged section at the front of Test Director JTF 7, “Report on Operation Sandstone” (n. 1), part 1, vol. 1. 94. Hq USARPAC—Public Information Office releases: “Statement of Lieut. General John E. Hull, Commander, Joint Task Force Seven, at Press Conference, Hg. USARPAC, Fort Shafter, T.H., 18 May 1948”; “Statement of Dr. Darol K. Froman, Scientific Director, ...”; “Statement of Captain James S. Russell, USN, Test Director, . . .” (all reproduced in Dauer, “History of TG 7.1” [n. 1], Appendix A, 8-18); see also Froman and Graves, “General Report” (n. 31), 50-51. 95. Classification Bulletin WNP-46A (n. 8). 96. CTU 7.6.5 to Review Board, “Report on Exposure during Operation Sandstone,” 23 May 1948; CTU 7.6.5 to CTG 7.6, “Tabulation of Personnel Exposure Date, Operation Sandstone,” 24 May 1948 (both REECo microfilm roll 2). See also Kaman Tempo, Operation Sandstone (n. 11), ch. 10, “Summary of Personnel Exposures.” 97. Froman and Graves, “General Report” (n. 31), 160-161. For more critical journalistic assessments of Sandstone rad-safe based chiefly on the memories of some participants, see Wasserman et al., Killing Our Own (n. 74), 49-50; Uhl and Ensign, GI Guinea Pigs (n. 74), 46-53. 2 A Continental Test Site: Operations Greenhouse and Ranger, 1948—1951 1. Alvin C. Graves to Norris E. Bradbury, “Letter to Carroll L. Tyler on the Sub-
ject of the Technical Program for the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory for the Calendar Year of 1949,” 1 Sept. 1948; Bradbury to Tyler, 7 Sept. 1948.
2. James S. Russell, memo for record, “Visit by Dr. [Darol K.] Froman with Certain Members and Staff of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy,” 6 June 1949. 3. E. J. Hale to R. B. Landry, “Assignment of Lt. General Quesada to the Joint Technical Planning Committee,” 2 Sept. 1949; AEC release 225, “New Series of Tests
of Atomic Weapons Is Planned,” 29 Nov. 1949; Elwood R. Quesada, History of Operation Greenhouse, 1948-1951, 2 vols., Reports WT-47, -48 (Washington, 1951), vol. 1, ch. 1. The organization of JTF 3 is summarized in Kaman Tempo, Operation Greenhouse: 1951, by L. H. Berkhouse et al., Report DNA 6034F (Santa Barbara, 15 June 1983), 34-50. 4. Peter Galison and Barton Bernstein, “In Any Light: Scientists and the Decision to Build the Superbomb, 1952-1954,” HSPS 19 no. 2 (1989): 267-347; Herbert F. York, The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller, and the Superbomb (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1976), ch. 2, “The American Program to 1949.” 5. Ulrich Albrecht, “The Development of the First Atomic Bomb in the USSR,” in Everett Mendelsohn et al., eds., Science, Technology and the Military (2 vols.; Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), 2: 349-378; David Holloway, “En-
tering the Nuclear Arms Race: The Soviet Decision to Build the Atomic Bomb,
304 Notes to Pages 37-38 1939-45,” Social Studies of Science 11 (1981): 159-197; Charles Ziegler, “Waiting for Joe-1: Decisions Leading to the Detection of Russia’s First Atomic Bomb Test,” Social Studies of Science 18 (1988): 197-229; Lloyd R. Zumwait, “Analysis of Fission Products from Russia’s First Atomic Bomb Test,” presented at the conference, “30 Years of Nuclear Fission,” NIST, Gaithersburg, Md., Apr. 1989; York, The Advisors (n. 4), ch. 3, “The Soviet Program to 1949.” 6. York, The Advisors (n. 4), ch. 4, “The Debate over the Superbomb”; David Alan Rosenberg, “American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision,”
Journal of American History 66 (1979): 62-87; Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield, 1947/1952, vol. 2 of A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (University Park: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1969), ch. 12,
“Decision of Destiny”; James G. Hershberg, “‘Over My Dead Body’: James B. Conant and the Hydrogen Bomb,” in Mendelsohn et al., Science, Technology and the Military (n. 5), 2: 379-430; Warner R. Schilling, “The H-Bomb Decision: How to Decide without Actually Choosing,” Political Science Quarterly 76 (1961): 24-46; McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988), ch. 5, “To Have Thermonuclear Weapons— and Other Truman Choices.”
7. S. Everett Gleason to President Harry S. Truman, 31 Jan. 1951; York, The Advisors (n. 4), 76-77. 8. Hale to Landry, 2 Sept. (n. 3); George V. LeRoy to Shields L. Warren, 10 June 1949, w/att. “Minutes of Ad Hoc Committee,” 7 June 1949; Louis H. Hempelmann, Jr., to Warren, 15 Jan. 1950, w/att. “Review of the Bio-Medical Program in Operation
Greenhouse”; LeRoy, “Evaluation of Program 2 (Biomedical],” vol. 2, part 2, of Operation Greenhouse Scientific Director’s Report, Report WT-21, Dec. 1951 (extracted version, Washington: DNA, 1 Oct. 1979), 5. For an overview of the experimental program, see Kaman Tempo, Operation Greenhouse (n. 3), ch. 4, “Greenhouse Experimental Program.” 9. James McCormack, Jr., to Carroll L. Wilson, “Planning for 1951 Test Operations,” 25 Nov. 1949, w/att. AEC Info Memo from DMA, “Resume of Joint Proof Test Committee Planning Principles for Greenhouse,” 18 Nov. 1949, 2.
10. A. C. Graves to Paul T. Preuss, “Responsibility for Radiological Safety in Proving Ground Activities,” 28 Dec. 1948. For Sandstone rad-safe organization and its flaws, see ch. 1, above. On the 1946 accident, see Barton C. Hacker, The Dragon's Tail: Radiation Safety in the Manhattan Project, 1942-1946 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: Univ. of California Press, 1987), 73. 11. James P. Cooney, “Radiological Safety,” Annex 9.3 to Operation Greenhouse Scientific Director’s Report, Report WT-89, July 1951, 2.
12. A. C. Graves to Thomas L. Shipman, “20 December 1948 Conference between Shipman, [Harry O.] Whipple, and Graves,” 23 Dec. 1948. 13. Graves to Preuss, 28 Dec. (n. 10). 14. DMA, “Planning Principles for Greenhouse” (n. 9), 5.
15. Preuss to A. C. Graves, 23 Dec. 1948; Graves to Preuss, 28 Dec. (n. 10); Thomas N. White to Stanley Burris, “Joint Task Force Three, Field Order Number 2, Annex ‘D,’” 2 Sept. 1950; Cooney, “Radiological Safety” (n. 11), 1; Quesada, History of Operation Greenhouse (n. 3), 2: 39-40. See also ch. 1, above.
16. Cooney, “Radiological Safety” (n. 11), 1; Quesada, History of Operation
Notes to Pages 38-39 305 Greenhouse (n. 3), 2: 43. Kaman Tempo, Operation Greenhouse (n. 3), 51-63, summarizes task force rad-safe planning and organization. 17. Hq JTF 3, Annex D to Field Order no. 2 (Revised), 1 Dec. 1950. Cf. Hq TG 3.1, Annex D to Field Order no. 1, “Radiological Safety,” 18 Oct. 1950; Cooney, “Radiological Safety” (n. 11), 1. For an overview of Greenhouse rad-safe standards, safety criteria, and record keeping, see Kaman Tempo, Operation Greenhouse (n. 3), 63-73. 18. Shipman to A. C. Graves, “Decontamination Procedures at Eniwetok,” 28 Dec. 1948; Graves to Shipman, same title, 31 Dec. 1948; Cooney to Graves, “Resume of Trip to Eniwetok,” 4 Mar. 1949; McCormack to C. L. Wilson, “Resume of Radio-
logical Survey of Eniwetok Atoll,” 21 Mar. 1949; Whipple to Graves, “Current Radiation Levels at Eniwetok,” 11 Mar. 1949; Shipman to Graves, “Health Control at Eniwetok,” 22 Mar. 1949; Cooney to Graves, “Radiological Safety at Eniwetok,” 28 Mar. 1949; W. H. Ray, “Radiological Safety Report [Enewetak],” 20 May, 3 June, 8 July 1949; White to Graves, J-9 Monthly Progress Report, 27 Apr. 1950; White to Graves, “Termination of Rad-Safe Operations at Eniwetok,” 18 May 1950; White to Shipman, “Outline of Rad-Safe Operations at Eniwetok between the Sandstone and Greenhouse Tests, with Special Reference to Conditions on Engebi,” 25 June 1953. See also Neal O. Hines, Proving Ground: An Account of the Radiobiological Studies in the Pacific, 1946-1961 (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1962), chs. 4-5. 19. Kelly McBean to A. C. Graves, 4 Aug. 1949; “Contract Awarded for Work at Eniwetok Proving Ground,” SFOO release SFPR 35, 18 Aug. 1949; AFSWP, “The Test of Structures,” Annex 3.0 to Operation Greenhouse Scientific Director’s Report, Report WT-117, Aug. 1951 (extracted version, Washington: DNA, 1 Feb. 1980), ch. 1. 20. Quesada, History of Operation Greenhouse (n. 3), 1: 33-35; Gordon E. Dean, Forging the Atomic Shield: Excerpts from the Office Diary of Gordon E. Dean, ed. Roger M. Anders (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1987), ch. 2, “The Impact of Korea,” passim. See also Richard F. Haynes, The Awesome Power: Harty S. Truman as Commander in Chief (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1973), ch. 10, “The Intervener.” 21. McCormack to Tyler, “Greenhouse,” 20 July 1950. 22. Bradbury to McCormack, “Greenhouse,” 21 July 1950; AEC meeting no. 443, 27 July 1950, item 9. 23. Dean to Louis A. Johnson, 31 July 1950 (circulated as AEC 141/3, “Atomic Weapons Tests—Letter to the Secretary of Defense,” 1 Aug. 1950). 24, L. A. Johnson to Dean, 4 Aug. 1950. 25. AEC meetings no. 447, 2 Aug. 1950, item 4, and no. 456, 17 Aug. 1950, item 1; Robert LeBaron to Dean, 4 Aug. 1950; Quesada, History of Operation Greenhouse (n. 3), 1: 35-36. 26. Bradbury to McCormack, 22 Aug. 1950. 27. On the quadrupling of defense expenditures from 1948 to 1953 and its significance, see Warner R. Schilling et al., Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1962). For the Pentagon view, see Steven L. Rearden, The Formative Years, 1947—1950, vol. 1 of Alfred Goldberg, ed., History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Washington: SOD Historical Office, 1984), chs. 11-13; and Doris M. Condit, The Test of War, 1950-1953, vol. 2 of ibid. (1988), chs. 12-15. For a more critical assessment, see Gert Krell, “Capitalism and Armaments: Business
306 Notes to Pages 39-42 Cycles and Defense Spending in the United States, 1945-1979,” Journal of Peace Research 18 (1981): 221-240; Clarence Y. H. Lo, “Theories of the State and Business Opposition to Increased Military Spending,” Social Problems 29 (1982): 424—438.
28. GAC, minutes of the 22d meeting, 10-13 Sept. 1950, 6th sess.; Quesada, History of Operation Greenhouse (n. 3), 1: 36-37. On the changing fortunes of war that may have contributed to preserving Greenhouse as planned, see Haynes, Awesome Power (n. 18), ch. 11, “The Policeman I.” 29. McCormack to William S. Parsons, “Continental Proving Ground,” 25 Aug. 1948, w/att. “Draft Memorandum from the Chairman, AEC, to the Chairman, MLC”; AEC meeting no. 193, 16 Sept. 1948, item 5; Roy B. Snapp to McCormack, “Commission Action on AEC 141—Location of Proving Ground for Atomic Weapons,” 22 Sept. 1948; David E. Lilienthal to LeBaron, “Location of Proving Ground for Atomic Weapons,” 24 Sept. 1948; AEC 141/1, “Decision on AEC 141: Location of Proving Ground for Atomic Weapons,” 27 Sept. 1948. The relevant documents—memos by former test officials favoring a continental site, military reactions, the AEC response—are quoted at length in Tyler to distrib., “Documentation of Establishment of Continental Test Site,” 14 Sept. 1953, w/att. SFOO, “Review of Establishment of Continental Test Site,” Part V, “Abstract of Documents,” Sept. 1953, 1-5. See also ch. 1, above. 30. Howard B. Hutchinson, “Project ‘Nutmeg,’” 28 Jan. 1949, 1.
31. Hutchinson, “Project ‘Nutmeg’” (n. 30); Preuss to J. S. Russell, “Project ‘Nutmeg’—Feasibility of Continental Proof-Test Site,” 10 Feb. 1949; “Abstract of Documents” (n. 29), 6-9. 32. Preuss to Russell, 10 Feb. (n. 31).
33. Sumner T. Pike to LeBaron, “Location of Proving Ground for Atomic Weapons,” 8 Mar. 1949. 34. AEC meetings no. 433, 6 July 1950, item 1, and no. 436, 12 July 1950, item 7;
Snapp to McCormack, “Possible Continental Proving Ground,” 7 July 1950; AEC 141/2, “Location of Proving Ground for Atomic Weapons—Draft Letter to MLC,” 11 July 1950 (sent 13 July); Snapp to McCormack, “AEC 141/2—Letter to the Department of Defense Concerning Proving Grounds,” 13 July 1950; George F. Schlatter, memo for record, ‘““AFSWP Briefing on Continental Sites,” 17 July 1950; McCor-
mack to Tyler, “Greenhouse,” 20 July 1950; Bradbury to McCormack, 21 July (n. 22); Schlatter, memo for record, “Conference on Continental Site Selection with Mr. Shugg,” 25 July 1950; Kurt M. Landon to Cooney, “Population Figures,” 28 July 1950; Harold D. Anamosa to Woodford B. McCool, “Mr. [Lewis L.] Strauss’ Memorandum Regarding Presidential Directive to Hold No Further Tests,” 3 Sept. 1954. 35. H & N, “Report Covering the Selection of Proposed Emergency Proving Ground for the United States Atomic Energy Commission,” 14 Aug. 1950. 36. Frederick Reines, “Discussion of Radiological Hazards Associated with a Continental Test Site for Atomic Bombs: Based on Notes of Meetings Held at Los Alamos, 1 August 1950,” Report LAMS-1173, 1 Sept. 1950, 23-24. 37. Bradbury to McCormack, 22 Aug. 1950. 38.. Tyler to McCormack, 15 Sept. 1950, as reproduced in John C. Clark, “Report of the Deputy Test Director,” Operation Ranger, vol. 1, Report WT-206, Sept. 1953 (extracted version, Washington: DNA, 1 Oct. 1979), 15; McCormack to Tyler, “Preliminary Site Survey—Tonopah,” 15 Sept. 1950, as quoted in “Abstract of Docu-
Notes to Pages 42-44 307 ments” (n. 29), 13; DMA to Deputy Chief, Corps of Engineers, 26 Oct. 1950, as quoted ibid.; AEC 141/5, “Location of Proving Ground for Atomic Weapons,” 3 Nov. 1950; AEC meeting no. 492, 9 Nov. 1950, item 8; Dean, Forging the Atomic Shield (n. 20), 89 (entry for 10 Nov. 1951, “Ad Hoc Committee of NSC on Continental Site
and Procedure for Authorizing Use of an Atomic Weapon’); James S. Lay, Jr., to Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman AEC, “Additional Test Site,” 14 Nov. 1950; J Division, “Desirability of an Area in the Las Vegas Bombing Range to Be Used as a Continental Proving Ground for Atomic Weapons,” Report LAB-J1609, 22 Nov. 1950; Schlatter, memo for record, “Continental Site Selection,” 27 Nov. 1950; Tyler to McCormack, “Selection of Continental Proving Ground,” 1 Dec. 1950; Schlatter to McCormack, “Selection of a Continental Test Site,” 1 Dec. 1950.
39. AEC 141/7, DMA report, “Selection of a Continental Atomic Test Site,” 13 Dec. 1950, 3, 7.
40. Ibid., 4. Cf. J Division, “Desirability of an Area in the Las Vegas Bombing Range” (n. 38); Tyler to McCormack, 1 Dec. (n. 38). 41. AEC 141/7, “Selection of a Continental Atomic Test Site” (n. 39), 9. 42. AEC meeting no. 504, 12 Dec. 1950, item 1; AEC to NSC Special Committee for Atomic Energy Matters, “Additional Test Site,’ 14 Dec. 1950; Schlatter, memo for record, “Status of Continental Test Site—December 19,” 19 Dec. 1950; Dean to LeBaron, “Possibility of Pre-Greenhouse Low Yield Atomic Tests,” 20 Dec. 1950; Bradbury to McCormack, 22 Dec. 1950; Clark, “Report of the Deputy Test Director” (n. 38), 18. See also Dean, Forging the Atomic Shield (n. 20), 90-104, passim.
43. Schlatter memo for record, 19 Dec. (n. 42); J. S. Russell to AFOAT-1, “Capability for Monitoring Atomic Explosions in the United States,” 21 Dec. 1950; McCormack to AFOAT-1, “Meteorological Service Required for Las Vegas Site,” 26 Dec. 1950; Tyler to Schlatter, 29 Dec. 1950; AEC meeting no. 513, 2 Jan. 1951, item 3; McCormack to Bradbury, “Code Name for Pre-Greenhouse Atomic Tests,” 3 Jan. 1951; McCormack to Bradbury, “Code Name,” 3 Jan. 1951; Leland B. Taylor, History of Air Force Atomic Cloud Sampling, vol. 1, Narrative, AFSC Historical Publication Series 61-142-1 (Kirtland AFB, New Mex.: AFSWC, 1963), 30-31. For an overview of the military role in Ranger, see JRB Associates, Operation Ranger: Shots Able, Baker, Easy, Baker-2, Fox, 25 January-6 February 1951, by Carl Maag et al., Report DNA 6022F (McLean, Va., 26 Feb. 1982), ch. 3, “Department of Defense Participation in Test Operations during Operation Ranger.” 44. William R. Sturges, Jr., to Schlatter, “Public Relations Conference Concerning Mercury,” 20 Dec. 1950. “Aberdeen” refers to Aberdeen Proving Grounds, the army’s well-known ordnance test site in Maryland. 45. Schlatter memo for record, 19 Dec. (n. 42); McCormack to Schlatter, 28 Dec. 1950; AEC meeting no. 513, 2 Jan. 1951, item 3; Tyler to McCormack, 3 Jan. 1951. 46. AEC-MLC, draft minutes of 52d Conference, 3 Jan. 1951, 1-2; GAC, minutes of 24th meeting, 4-6 Jan. 1951; Dean to LeBaron, “Pre-Greenhouse Test Program (Ranger),” 4 Jan. 1951; Dean to NSC Special Committee for Atomic Energy Matters, “February 1951 Atomic Tests at the Las Vegas, Nevada, Test Site,” 4 Jan. 1951; AEC 388/3, “Pre-Greenhouse Test Program,” 5 Jan. 1951; Dean to Brien McMahon, 5 Jan. 1951.
47. AEC release 335, 11 Jan. 1951. Cf. Rodney L. Southwick to Joseph Short, 10 Jan. 1951; Ralph P. Johnson, “Warning,” 11 Jan. 1951; SFO, “Background In-
308 Notes to Pages 44-47 formation Regarding the Test Base at the Las Vegas Bombing and Gunnery Range,” 11 Jan. 1951. 48. McCormack to Tyler, 4 Jan. 1951; Preuss to Tyler, “Report on Organization
and Status of Plans for Operation Ranger,” 14 Jan. 1951; Tyler to A. C. Graves, “Delegation of Authorities and Responsibilities,” 17 Jan. 1951; “Military Support and Operations,” Appendix A in Sturges to Tyler, “Operational Report,” 26 Feb. 1951; Clark, “Report of the Deputy Test Director” (n. 38), 18, 22, 31; Tyler, “Administrative Summary Report,” Operation Ranger, vol. 6, Report WT-205, July 1952, part 1. See also JRB Associates, Operation Ranger (n. 43), ch. 2, “Functions of the Administrative Organization during Operation Ranger.” 49. Clark, “Report of the Deputy Test Director” (n. 38), 68, 69. 50. Ibid., 69. 51. Shipman, “Report of Rad-Safe Group,” 17 Apr. 1952, included as Report 4 in LASL, “Operation Ranger, Nevada Test Site, Jan.—_Feb. 1951,” vol. 5, “Program Reports—Operational,” Report WT-204, July 1952, 54; A. C. Graves to Shipman, “Delegation of Authorities and Responsibilities,” 24 Jan. 1951, as quoted ibid., 62, 64. 52. Shipman to J. C. Clark, “Preliminary Planning—Group JM-4,” 15 Dec. 1950; Shipman to William J. McElwreath, “Operations at Site Mercury,” 15 Dec. 1950; Carl W. Buckland to Simon Shlaer, “Project Mercury Monitoring Personnel,’ 28 Dec. 1950; Shlaer to distrib., “Organizational Meeting,” 8 Jan. 1951; Walter D. Claus to W. E. Kelley, Alfonso Tammaro, D. Shaw, R. W. Cook, and Shipman, 15 Jan. 1951; “Other Personnel for Ranger,” 18 Jan. 1951; “Operation Ranger: Test Group Personnel,” 21 Jan. 1951; Shipman, “Report of Rad-Safe Group” (n. 51), 55, 63-65; William S. Johnson to Hacker, 4 Nov. 1983. 53. Shipman, “Report of Rad-Safe Group” (n. 51), 57. 54. Shipman, “Operations Plan, Rad Safe Group, for Operation Ranger,” 20 Jan. 1951, paragraph 48.4.1, reproduced with minor changes as Appendix B to Shipman, “Report of Rad-Safe Group” (n. 51). See also discussion of Greenhouse safety planning, above. 55. Shipman, “Operations Plan” (n. 54), paragraph 4B.4.1. 56. Lauriston S. Taylor, Radiation Protection Standards (Cleveland: CRC Press, 1971), 23-28; and Taylor, Organization for Radiation Protection: The Operations of the ICRP and NCRP, 1928-1974, Report DOE/TIC-10124 (Washington, 1979), ch. 7.
57. Buckland to H-l monitors, “Definition of ‘Proposed Maximum Permissible Dose’ and Present Values,” 5 July 1949; Buckland to H-1 monitors and all concemed, ‘Proposed Maximum Permissible Dose’ and Present Values (Revision of July 5, 1949, Memo on Same Subject),” 6 Oct. 1949; Shipman to distrib., “Permissible Levels of Radiation,” 31 Mar. 1950. 58. White to Burris, 2 Sept. (n. 15). 59. AEC, “Ninth Semiannual Report,” Jan. 1951, 18-19. 60. Shipman to A. C. Graves, “Permissible Exposures in Connection with Test Operations,” 18 Dec. 1950. 61. Shipman, “Operations Plan” (n. 54), paragraph 4B.4.1. 62. Shields L. Warren to McCormack, “Hazards Involved in Operation Mercury,” 9 Jan. 1951; Charles L. Dunham and W. D. Claus to McCormack, “Hazards to State of California Involved in Operation Mercury,” 9 Jan. 1951. 63. AEC, “Ninth Semiannual Report,” Jan. 1951, 19.
Notes to Pages 47-51 309 64. Shipman, “Operations Plan” (n. 54), paragraph 4B.4.2. Cf. “Instructions for Mobile Monitoring Teams of JM-4,” n.d. On standards for off-site exposure in Trinity, see Hacker, The Dragon’s Tail (n. 10), 92-93. 65. “Evacuation Plan for Ranger Operation,” n.d. Quotations are taken from this
document, which was completed prior to the first detonation on 25 Jan. 1951. A slightly altered version appears as Appendix B in Sturges to Tyler, “Operational Report,” 26 Feb. 1951 (reproduced as “Operational Planning” in Tyler, “Administrative Summary Report” [n. 48], ch. 2). See also McCormack to Tyler, 2 Jan. 1951. 66. Shipman, “Preliminary Report of Rad Safe Group at Operation Ranger,” n.d., 12.
67. Shipman, “Report of Rad-Safe Group” (n. 51), 58; Richard D. Wolfe, “Radiological Safety: Informal Report,” Report NRDL-3-102, 18 Feb. 1951, and Report 11 in LASL, “Operation Ranger, Nevada Test Site, Jan—Feb. 1951,” vol. 4, “Program Reports—Gross Weapons Measurements,” Report WT-201, June 1951, 235-236. 68. Shipman, “Report of Rad-Safe Group” (n. 51), 58. 69. “JM-4 Personnel Roster—Nellis Air Base,” n.d.; John J. Flaherty to Shipman, 16 Jan. 1951; Kelley to Shipman, 17 Jan. 1951; Shipman to R. P. Johnson, 19 Jan. 1951; E. J. Kehoe to Merril Eisenbud, “Weapons Tests and Nevada Proving Grounds,”
6 Feb. 1951; Shipman, “Report of Rad-Safe Group” (n. 51), 55-56; Johnson to Hacker, 4 Nov. (n. 52). 70. Shipman, “Report of Rad-Safe Group” (n. 51), 103.
71. Clark, “Report of the Deputy Test Director” (n. 38), 58-59; “Log of JM-4 Operations, Rad-Safe Group, Operation Ranger, 23 January to 11 February 1951: Site Monitoring,” n.d., 1-3. 72. Clark, “Report of the Deputy Test Director” (n. 38), 31, 56, 59; NVOO Office of Public Affairs, Announced United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 through December 1986, Report NV0-209 (Rev. 7), Jan. 1987, 2. 73. Wolfe, “Radiological Safety” (n. 67), 221. 74. Edwin Bemis, “Activities vs. Distance as a Function of Time,” 15 Feb. 1951, reproduced in Shipman, “Report of Rad-Safe Group” (n. 51), 72-79, at 73; “Log of JM-4 Operations” (n. 71), 4-7; Wolfe, “Radiological Safety” (n. 67), 235.
75. Shipman, “Report of Rad-Safe Group” (n. 51), 103. See also Howard A. Hawthorne, ed., Compilation of Local Fallout Data from Test Detonations 1945-1962 Extracted from DASA 1251, 2 vols., Report DNA 1251-1-EX, -2-EX (Santa Barbara: GE-TEMPO, 1 May 1979), vol. 1, Continental U.S. Tests, 10-13. 76. Wolfe, “Radiological Safety” (n. 67), 221. 71. “Log of JM-4 Operations” (n. 71), 7-9; Shipman, “Report of Rad-Safe Group” (n. 51), 103; Clark, “Report of the Deputy Test Director” (n. 38), 59; Demetrius H.
Russell, “Weather Support for Operation Ranger,” 1 Mar. 1951, and Report 2 in LASL, “Operation Ranger” (n. 51), 5: 26; Bemis, “Activities vs. Distance” (n. 74), 74; Hawthorne, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 75), 14-17. 78. Cooney to Tyler, 1 Feb. 1951; W. Wayne Meinke, “Observations on Radioactive Snows at Ann Arbor, Michigan,” Science 113 (11 May 1951): 545-548; Robert E. Heft to C. H. Perry, “Determination of Areas of Possible and Probable Rain-out— Operation Ranger,” 17 May 1951, w/att. plots of trajectory analyses for Ranger tests;
interview with Merril Eisenbud, Tuxedo, N.Y., 24 Oct. 1979, transcript, 5-6. On the Trinity episode, see Julian H. Webb, “The Fogging of Photographic Film by
310 Notes to Pages 51-53 Radioactive Contaminants in Cardboard Packaging Materials,” Physical Review 76 (1 Aug. 1949): 375-380. 79. Kelley to McCormack, “Survey of Fall-Out of Radioactive Material Following the Las Vegas, Nevada, Test Explosions,” 28 Feb. 1951, w/att. survey report; John H. Harley, “A Brief History of Long-Range Fallout,” HASL, New York, 1976, 3-4; Eisenbud to Hacker, 17 Oct. 1983; Eisenbud interview transcript (n. 78), 6-7. See also Merril Eisenbud, An Environmental Odyssey: People, Pollution, and Politics in the Life of a Practical Scientist (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1990), 65-67. 80. Webb, “Conference with the A.E.C. on Monitoring for Activity from Atom Bomb Tests,” 14 Mar. 1951; Minutes of meeting, NAPM Committee on Radioactivity, 21 Mar. 1951, reproduced as Appendix A in Hanson D. Blatz, “Dust and Precipitation Sampling Program, April thru June 1951,” NYOO Health and Safety Division, 25 June 1951; Eisenbud and Harley, “Radioactive Dust from Nuclear Detonations,” Science 117 (13 Feb. 1953): 141-147; Harley, “Brief History of Long-Range Fallout” (n. 79), 4; Eisenbud to Hacker, 17 Oct. (n. 79); Eisenbud to William J. Brady, 10 June 1989. Although quite unreliable in detail, Richard L. Miller, Under the Cloud: The Decades of Nuclear Testing (New York: Free Press, 1986), 90-94, manages to convey some sense of the public distress distant Ranger fallout engendered; see also the “Maps of Fallout Trajectories” for Ranger Able and Baker, ibid., 445.
81. Clark, “Report of the Deputy Test Director” (n. 38), 58-59; NVOO, Announced Nuclear Tests (n. 72), 2. 82. Shipman, “Report of Rad-Safe Group” (n. 51), 103.
83. “Log of JM-4 Operations” (n. 71), 10-12; Clark, “Report of the Deputy Test Director’ (n. 38), 59-60; Russell, “Weather Support for Operation Ranger’ (n. 77), 27-28; Bemis, “Activities vs. Distance” (n. 74), 75-76; Shipman, “Report of RadSafe Group” (n. 51), 103-104; NVOO, Announced Nuclear Tests (n. 72), 2. Cf. Hawthorne, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 75), 19-25. 84. Clark, “Report of the Deputy Test Director” (n. 38), 62; Shipman, “Report of Rad-Safe Group” (n. 51), 104; Russell, “Weather Support for Operation Ranger” (n. 77), 30. 85. Wolfe, “Radiological Safety” (n. 67), 225.
86. “Log of JM-4 Operations” (n. 71), 13-14; Shipman, “Report of Rad-Safe Group” (n. 51), 104; Clark, “Report of the Deputy Test Director” (n. 38), 62, 65; Bemis, “Activities vs. Distance” (n. 73), 78-79; NVOO, Announced Nuclear Tests (n. 72), 2. Cf. Hawthorne, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 75), 27-29. 87. Buckland, “Summary of Rad-Safe Operations at the Nevada Test Site,” 16 Feb. 1951, in Shipman, ‘Report of Rad-Safe Group” (n. 51), Appendix C.I., 71-72. 88. Martha L. Starner to Shipman, “Exposures of Personnel Film Badges from the Nevada Tests,” 1, 6 Mar. 1951; Buckland to Shipman, “Overexposures during the January—February 1951 Nevada Tests,” 12 Mar. 1951; Wolfe, “Radiological Safety” (n. 67), 236; Tyler, “Administrative Summary Report” (n. 48), 14. JRB Associates, Operation Ranger (n. 43), 77-80, reports three exposures above 3 roentgens, one of which exceeded 5 roentgens. 89. Shipman to W. D. Claus, 19 Feb. 1951; Shipman, “Report of Rad-Safe Group” (n. 51), 61; Clark, “Report of the Deputy Test Director” (n. 38), 68. 90. Shipman, “Report of Rad-Safe Group” (n. 51), 61. 91. Cooney, “Radiological Safety” (n. 11), 4-5; Quesada, History of Operation
Notes to Pages 54-56 311 Greenhouse (n. 3), 2: 43, 45. For more details on rad-safe training, see Kaman Tempo, Operation Greenhouse (n. 3), 59-63. 92. Elbert W. Pate and George F. Taylor, “Operation Greenhouse—Meteorological Technical Report,’ Report WT-46, Sept. 1951 (extracted version, Washington:
DNA, 1 August 1981), 3-42 (quote at 37). Taylor was JIF 3 staff weather officer, Pate his deputy (see Quesada, History of Operation Greenhouse 2 [n. 3], ch. 19, “Meteorology”). 93. Cooney, “Radiological Safety” (n. 11), 10; Pate and Taylor, “Meteorological Technical Report” (n. 92), 42-43, 59; Kelley to McCormack, “Dust and Precipitation Sampling Program,” 11 July 1951, w/att. Blatz, “Dust and Precipitation Sampling Program” (n. 80); Eisenbud and Harley, “Radioactive Dust from Nuclear Detonations” (n. 80), 141; Harley, “Brief History of Long-Range Fallout” (n. 79), 4. 94. Pate and Taylor, “Meteorological Technical Report” (n. 92), 38.
95. “List of Declassified Yields of Tests Conducted in the Pacific Prior to 1958-1961 Moratorium,” Washington, 7 Dec. 1993; cf. NVOO, Announced Nuclear Tests (n. 72), 2; Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, “Nuclear Notebook: Filling in the Blanks,” BAS 48 (Nov. 1992): 48. 96. Quesada, History of Operation Greenhouse (n. 3), 2: 118. 97. Jerald L. Goetz to Hacker, 10 July 1989, w/att. Goetz, “Comments on Elements of Controversy,” 1-2; Cooney, “Radiological Safety” (n. 11), 5; Quesada, History of Operation Greenhouse (n. 3), 2: 118.
98. Whipple to files, “Fall-Out from Dog Shot,” 25 Apr. 1951. Cf. Cooney, “Radiological Safety” (n. 11), table 2.1, “Atoll Surveys, Dog,” 6; Hawthorne, Compilation of Local Fallout Data (n. 75), vol. 2, Oceanic U.S. Tests, 27-31. 99. Gaelen L. Felt to Raymond P. Campbell, Jr., 7 May 1951. See also Andrew
McB. Jackson to Richard W. Dodson, “Preliminary Results of First and Second Greenhouse Shots,” 8 May 1951; Quesada, History of Operation Greenhouse (n. 3), 2: 118. Cf. Kaman Tempo, Operation Greenhouse (n. 3), 109-110. 100. Pate and Taylor, “Meteorological Technical Report” (n. 92), 59; Whipple to files, 25 Apr. (n. 98); Cooney, “Radiological Safety” (n. 11), 5, 11. 101. Pate and Taylor, “Meteorological Technical Report” (n. 92), 38; Cooney, “Radiological Safety” (n. 11), 6; Quesada, History of Operation Greenhouse 2 (n. 3),
ch. 29, “Shot Easy”; LeRoy, “Evaluation of Program 2” (n. 8); AFSWP, “Test of Structures” (n. 19). 102. Cooney, “Radiological Safety” (n. 11), 6. Cf. ibid., table 2.2, “Atoll Surveys, Easy,” 8; Hawthorne, Oceanic U.S. Tests (n. 98), 33-35; Payne Harris to Navy NTPR, “Information on Greenhouse,” 11 June 1981; Goetz, “Comments on Elements of Controversy” (n. 97), 2.
103. Cooney, “Radiological Safety” (n. 11), 6-7, 29; Felt to Campbell, 7 May 1951.
104. Pate and Taylor, “Meteorological Technical Report” (n. 92), 38. 105. Pate and Taylor, “Meteorological Technical Report” (n. 92), 45-50; Cooney, “Radiological Safety” (n. 11), 7. 106. Pate and Taylor, “Meteorological Technical Report” (n. 92), 38. 107. York, The Advisors (n. 4), 75-81; Hans A. Bethe, “Comments on the History
of the H-Bomb,” Los Alamos Science 3 (Fali 1982): 42-53; Daniel Hirsch and William G. Mathews, “The H-Bomb: Who Really Gave away the Secret?” BAS 46
312 Notes to Pages 56-59 (Jan./Feb. 1990): 22~30. Cf. Edward Teller, ““The Work of Many People,” Science 121
(25 Feb. 1955): 267-275; Stanley A. Blumberg and Gwinn Owens, Energy and Conflict: The Life and Times of Edward Teller (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1976), ch. 12, “Fusion and Confusion.” 108. York, Making Weapons, Talking Peace: A Physicist’s Odyssey from Hiroshima to Geneva (New York: Basic Books, 1987), 56. See also “List of Declassified Yields” (n. 95). 109. Quesada, History of Operation Greenhouse (n. 3), 2: 138. 110. Robert L. Shannon, memo for record, “History of Greenhouse Observer Program,” 18 May 1951. 111. Dean, Forging the Atomic Shield (n. 20), 144 (entry for 17 May 1951, “Re: Eniwetok’”’). Cf. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield (n. 6), 542. 112. Shipman to White, 17 May 1951.
113. Cooney, “Radiological Safety” (n. 11), 7, and table 2.3, “Atoll Surveys, George,” 9; Quesada, History of Operation Greenhouse (n. 3), 2: 138, 140; Hawthorne, Oceanic U.S. Tests (n. 98), 39-43; Kaman Tempo, Operation Greenhouse (n. 3), 121. 114. York, The Advisors (n. 4), 22-23, 26, 76-77.
115. Pate and Taylor, “Meteorological Technical Report’ (n. 92), 38, 50-51; Quesada, History of Operation Greenhouse (n. 3), 2: 143. 116. Cooney, “Radiological Safety” (n. 11), 7, 9.
117. Gerald M. McDonnel to White, 25 June 1951, w/att. “External Radiation from Fall-Out Following Shot Item.” See also Cooney, “Radiological Safety” (n. 11), 9-10, and table 2.4, “Atoll Surveys, Item,” 10. Cf. Kaman Tempo, Operation Greenhouse (n. 3), 128. 118. White to A. C. Graves, “Exposure at Eniwetok Atoll,” 26 June 1951. See also Cooney, “Radiological Safety” (n. 11), 10. Cf. Goetz, “Comments on Elements of
Controversy” (n. 97), 2; SAIC, Analysis of Radiation Exposure on the Residence Islands of Enewetak Atoll after Operation Greenhouse, 1951-1952, Report DNA-TR85-390 (McLean, Va., 20 Apr. 1987). 119. Cooney, “Radiological Safety” (n. 11), 25. 120. Ibid., 7, 25, 29, 33. 121. Ibid., 41. 122. Ibid., 41; Harris to Navy NTPR, 11 June (n. 102). 123. Film badge readings are summarized and the possible contribution of fallout discussed in Kaman.Tempo, Operation Greenhouse (n. 3), ch. 10, “Personnel Exposures.” Cf. SAI, Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Shipboard Naval Personnel, Operation Greenhouse, by C. Thomas et al., Report DNA-TR-82-15 (McLean, Va., 30 July 1982); and SAIC, Analysis of Radiation Exposure on the Residence Islands (n. 118); Goetz, “Comments on Elements of Controversy” (n. 97), 2. 124. Cooney, “Radiological Safety” (n. 11), 41. 125. Shipman to Robert S. Grier, 2 May 1951. 126. White to Shipman, 3 May 1951; Robert L. Bryant to distrib., “Inactivation of Elements of Joint Task Force Three and Assumption of Residual Responsibilities,” 30
July 1951; A. C. Graves to Schlatter, “Radiation Exposures on Operation Greenhouse,” 1 Aug. 1951; McCormack to Herbert B. Loper, 10 Aug. 1951. 127. Shipman to White, 17 May 1951. See also White to Shipman, 18 May 1951.
Notes to Pages 59-62 313 128. White, “Comments on: Report by the Commander, JTF-3 on Completion of Operation Greenhouse,” n.d., 3.
3 Developing Weapons and Tactics In Nevada: Testing and Troop Maneuvers, 1951-1952 1. AEC 141/10, DMA report, “The Las Vegas Test Site Construction Program,” 25 Apr. 1951; AEC meetings no. 549, 17 Apr. 1951, item 6, and no. 551, 25 Apr. 1951, item 2; AEC 141/11, “Decision on AEC 141/10,” 3 May 1951; AEC Info Memo 317, “Code Names for Proposed Tests,” 3 May 1951; Richard G. Elliott to distnb., “Names for Two New Facilities,” 17 May 1951; SFOO release SF-52-8, 8 July 1951; LVFO, “Background Data on Nevada Test Site Construction,” 19 Sept. 1951; Seth R. Woodruff to Milton A. Rex, “Nevada Test Site Report for Operations Buster-Jangle,” 2 Jan. 1952.
2. Louis A. Johnson to Sumner T. Pike, 30 June 1950; AEC meeting no. 480, 5 Oct. 1950, item 2; F. S. Withington to Norris E. Bradbury, 9 Nov. 1950; James McCormack, Jr., to Carroll L. Tyler, “Underground and Surface Test,” 22 Nov. 1950; McCormack to Tyler, “Code Name,” 22 Nov. 1950; George F. Schlatter, memo for record, “Continental Site Selection,” 27 Nov. 1950; Pike to Brien McMahon, 22 Jan. 1951. For a brief account of Windstorm’s background, see Deputy DWET, “Operation Jangle—Summary Report: Weapon Effects Tests,” AFSWP report no. WT-414, Nov. 1952 (extracted version, Washington: DNA, 1 Oct. 1979), 1. 3. AEC 322/11, “Proposed Special Test at Las Vegas Site—Draft Reply to the MLC,” 27 Feb. 1951. See AEC meeting no. 527, 27 Feb. 1951, item 8. 4, Raymond P. Campbell, Jr., to Schlatter, “Summary of Jangle Status to 15 June 1951,” 15 June 1951; James S. Lay, Jr., to President Harry S. Truman, 4 June 1951, w/att. George C. Marshall to Lay, “Operation Windstorm,” 21 May 1951. See also JRB Associates, Operation Buster-Jangle, 1951, by Jean Ponton et al., Report DNA 6023F (McLean, Va., 21 June 1982), 20-21. 5. S. T. Pike to Robert LeBaron, 2 May 1951. Identical letters went to J. Robert Oppenheimer and McMahon: Andrew McB. Jackson to Oppenheimer, 8 May 1951; Henry D. Smyth to McMahon, 11 May 1951; see AEC meeting 543, 29 Mar. 1951, item 1. On the status of fallout studies in 1951, see William R. Kennedy, Jr., Fallout Forecasting—1945 through 1962, Report LA-10605-MS (Los Alamos, Mar. 1986), 9. 6. GAC, Minutes of 26th meeting, 8-10 May 1951, 4. 7. AEC meetings: no. 552, 26 Apr. 1951, item 2; no. 553, 30 Apr. 1951, item 1; no. 564, 29 May 1951, item 3; no. 566, 7 June 1951, items 3, 5; Alvin C. Graves to Bradbury, 27 Apr. 1951; McCormack to Tyler, 17 May 1951; John C. Clark to Bradbury, “Windstorm Program,” 18 May 1951; AEC Info Memo 317/1, “(Code Names for Proposed Tests,” 28 May 1951; Lay to Truman, 4 June (n. 4); Campbell to Schlatter, 15 June (n. 4). 8. “Meeting of a Committee to Consider the Feasibility and Conditions for a Preliminary Radiologic Safety Shot for Jangle, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, May 21 and 22, 1951,” n.d. 9. Jangle Feasibility Committee meeting, 21-22 May (n. 8), 2 and passim; four Appendixes anticipate specific particle problems and how to solve them. 10. Ibid., 3, 5.
314 Notes to Pages 62-66 11. Shields L. Warren to Thomas L. Shipman, 8 June 1951; Warren to Walter D. Claus, 27 June 1951; Bradbury to Warren, 22 June 1951. 12. Bradbury to Warren, 22 June (n. 11); cf. Shields L. Warren to Tyler, 27 June 1953.
13. Gaelen L. Felt to A. C. Graves, “Jangle Fallout Problems,” 28 June 1951. See also Kennedy, Fallout Forecasting (n. 5), 9-10. 14. Bradbury to Shields L. Warren, 7 July 1951. 15. Felt to Graves, 28 June (n. 13), 1. 16. Shipman to J. C. Clark, “Special Rad Safe Problems—Operation Bungle,” 11 July 1951. 17. Shields L. Warren to Bradbury, 19 July 1951, w/att. “Meeting of Jangle Feasibility Committee, Washington, D.C., July 13, 1951,” n.d., 2. 18. Felt to Graves, 28 June (n. 13). 19. Shipman to Clark, 11 July (n. 16). 20. Jangle Feasibility Committee meeting, 13 July (n. 17), 6. 21. Ibid., 3; Bradbury to Warren, 7 July (n. 14); Shipman to Clark, 11 July (n. 16). See also William S. Johnson to Barton C. Hacker, 23 June 1983. 22. Felt to Graves, 28 June (n. 13), 3. 23. Jangle Feasibility Committee Meeting, 13 July (n. 17), 6. 24. Shipman to Clark, 11 July (n. 16). 25. Ibid.; Shipman to Bradbury, “Civil Defense Participation in Future Nevada Tests,” 26 Feb. 1951; Bradbury to McCormack, 3 Mar. 1951; Shipman to Bradbury, “Civil Defense—Monitoring at Nevada Site,” 16 Mar. 1951; AEC meetings no. 554, 2 May 1951, item 11, and no. 557, 9 May 1951, item 5; AEC 432/1, “Federal Civil Defense Administration Participation in Test Activities,” 9 May 1951; AEC 432/2, “Decision on AEC 432/1,” 14 May 1951; AEC 446/2, DMA report, “Operations Plan for Buster-Jangle,” 25 July 1951, 2-3. 26. John C. Bugher to Roy B. Snapp, “Jangle Feasibility Committee,” 20 July 1951.
27. Precis of memo, Shipman to Bradbury, “Organization of Rad-Safe Program for Future Tests,” 5 June 1951; Shipman to Clark, 11 July (n. 16). 28. A. C. Graves to Tyler, “Buster-Jangle Program,” 16 July 1951, w/att. “Operations Plan for Atomic Tests—Fall 1951,” 14 July 1951; Tyler to McCormack, “Buster-Jangle Program,” 18 July 1951; Bugher to Snapp, 20 July (n. 26); AEC 446/2, 25 July (n. 25); AEC meeting 584, 27 July 1951, item 1; AEC 446/3, “Decision on AEC 446/2,” 31 July 1951; S. T. Pike to McMahon, 15 Aug. 1951. 29. “Operations Plan,” 14 July (n. 28). Most of this plan comprised the six enclosures, divided evenly between lists of experiment priorities and rad-safe personnel: Thomas N. White to CG, SWC, “Procurement of Military Personnel for the BusterJangle Rad-Safe Unit,” 30 June 1951; Leonard A. Eddy to CG, SWC, “Procurement of Military Personnel for the Buster-Jangle Rad-Safe Unit,” 6 July 1951; Duncan Curry,
Jr., “Personnel Requirements—Operational Decontamination Unit, Projects Buster and Jangle,” 14 July 1951. Cf. A. C. Graves to Tyler, “Personnel Requirements—for Buster-Jangle,” 17 July 1951. 30. Operation Order 1-51 (Buster-Jangle), 25 Aug. 1951, Annex A: “Special Instructions, Shot A,” A-2 (repeated in the instructions for each subsequent shot); and Annex R: “Radiological Safety and Health,” 31 Aug. 1951, 2.
Notes to Pages 66-67 315 31. Interview with Col. Paul H. Fackler, AFOAT-1, 24 July 1957, as quoted in Leland B. Taylor, History of Air Force Atomic Cloud Sampling, vol. 1, Narrative, AFSC Historical Publication Series 61-142-1 (Kirtland AFB, New Mex.: AFSWC, Jan. 1963), 23. 32. Taylor, History of Air Force Atomic Cloud Sampling (n. 31), 29-37. 33. Taylor, History of Air Force Atomic Cloud Sampling (n. 31), 38-41; JRB Associates, Operation Buster-Jangle (n. 4), 110-112. 34. Shipman to Clark, 11 July (n. 16). 35. Shipman to Shields L. Warren, 15 Sept. 1951; W. D. Claus to Shipman, 28 Sept. 1951; Warren to Tyler, “Permissible Levels of Radiation Exposure for Test Personnel,” 11 Oct. 1951; ACBM, minutes of 33d meeting, Washington, 12-13 Sept. 1952, 6-7. 36. Shipman, “Radiological Safety: Operation Buster-Jangle,” LASL Report WT425, July 1953, 11.
37. Ibid., 9-12; Harry F. Schulte to J. C. Clark, “Particle Studies at Jangle,” 8 Aug. 1951; Schulte to Shipman, “Personnel for Jangle,” 8 Sept. 1951; Tyler to Sew-
ard Miller, “Loan of Public Health Service Personnel for Operations Buster and Jangle,” 8 Sept. 1951; Schulte to Shipman, “Preliminary Report on Buster-Jangle Fall-
Out Program,” 15 Dec. 1951; Deputy DWET, “Operation Jangle” (n. 2), 57-79; George L. Voelz to Hacker, 15 July 1983, w/att. Schulte, “Comments on Chapter 8, History of Early Nevada Tests,” n.d.; W. R. Kennedy to Voelz, “Comments on Draft of ‘Chapter VIII, Developing Weapons and Tactics in Nevada: Buster-Jangle, TumblerSnapper, and Desert Rock I-IV,’” 1 July 1983. For details on Kennedy’s and Schulte’s units and their findings, see Shipman, “Radiological Safety” (n. 36), Appendix D, “Mobile Monitoring for Fall-Out,” and Appendix E, “Fail-Out Project,” respectively. See also JRB Associates, Operation Buster-Jangle (n. 4), 119-122. 38. Julian H. Webb, “Conference with the A.E.C. on Monitoring for Activity from Atom Bomb Tests,” 14 Mar. 1951; R. P. Campbell to Schlatter, “Radioactive Fallout Monitoring for Buster-Jangle,” 11 July 1951. See also ch. 2, above. 39. R. P. Campbell to A. M. Jackson, “Proposed Meeting with the National Association of Photographic Manufacturers,” 13 July 1951. 40. Shields L. Warren to McCormack, “Long Range Monitoring of Fall-Out from Jangle and Buster,” 17 July 1951; Robert G. Butler to R. C. Maude, 24 July 1951; W. E. Kelley to Tyler, 6 Aug. 1951; Merril Eisenbud to W. D. Claus, “Mobile Fallout Studies for ‘Buster’ and ‘Jangle,’” 23 Aug. 1951; Kenneth E. Fields to AFOAT-1, “Proposed Program for Continental Cloud Tracking,” 24 Aug. 1951; Claus to J. C. Robinson, “Fall-Out Monitoring during Nevada Tests,” 2 Oct. 1951; Kelley to Bugher, “Country-Wide Monitoring by the New York Laboratory during Buster-Jangle,” 18 Oct. 1951; NYOO, “Radioactive Debris from Operations Buster and Jangle: Observations beyond 200 Miles from the Test Site,” Report NYO-1576, 28 Jan. 1952. See also Eisenbud and John H. Harley, “Radioactive Dust from Nuclear Detonations,” Science 117 (13 Feb. 1953): 141-147. 41. Frank I. Winant, Jr., to T. N. White, 14 June 1951; Winant to White, 25 June 1951; Winant to J. C. Clark, 25 June 1951; Ralph L. Stevenson to CG, AFSWP, “Personnel Requirements for Jangle (Effects Tests—Radiological Safety Group),” 12 July 1951; Shields L. Warren to Alfonso Tammaro, “Monitors for the ‘Fall’ Tests,” 27 Aug. 1951 (identical letters went to the New York, Chicago, Hanford, and Oak
316 Notes to Pages 67-69 Ridge Operations Offices; see Schlatter to Shipman, 31 Aug. 1951); Elmo “Morgan to Shipman, “Protective Force Personnel for Detail to Rad Safe Unit during Operation Buster-Jangle,” 8 Sept. 1951; White to distrib., “Information for Buster-Jangle RadSafe Monitors,” 17 Sept. 1951; Shipman to A. C. Graves, “Jangle Personnel for H-5
Group,” 18 Sept. 1951; Herbert B. Loper to DMA, “Additional Military RadSafe Monitors for Operation Jangle,” 18 Oct. 1951; Schlatter to Tyler, 22 Oct. 1951; Tyler to Schlatter, 25 Oct. 1951; Butler to Loper, “Additional Radiological Safety Monitors for Buster-Jangle,” 26 Oct. 1951; Shipman, “Radiological Safety” (n. 36), 9-10. 42. Schlatter to McCormack, “Jangle Planning,” 21 June 1951; Harry McK. Roper to Chairman AEC, “Attendance of Military Personnel at Atomic Weapons Tests,” 16 July 1951; Gordon E. Dean to LeBaron, “Participation by Military Combat Troops in
Buster,” 3 Aug. 1951; AEC 446/5, “Participation by Military Combat Troops in Atomic Weapons Tests,” 14 Aug. 1951; Schlatter to Fields, 29 Aug. 1951; Schlatter to Commissioners, “Combat Maneuver Plans for Buster-Jangle,” 29 Aug. 1951; AEC 446/10, “Attendance of Military Personnel at Atomic Weapons Tests,” 4 Sept. 1951; William B. Kean to CG, Army Field Forces, “Outline Plan—Operation Desert Rock,” 18 Sept. 1951, as reproduced in “Exercise Desert Rock I,’’ Headquarters, III Corps, Fort MacArthur, Cal., n.d., 2-3. See also JRB Associates, Operation Buster-Jangle (n. 4), 38-45. 43. Schlatter to Fields, 29 Aug. (n. 42); George P. Kraker to Fields, 12 Sept. 1951; J Division to Schlatter, 21 Sept. 1951; Kean, “Outline Plan” (n. 42); Kean, “Operation
Order 1 (Operation Thundercloud),” 10 Oct. 1951, in “Exercise Desert Rock I” (n. 42), 52ff; “Medical and Psychological Report,” ibid., 122-125. 44. ARB and AAB, “A Study of Soldier Attitudes and Knowledge about Atomic Effects,” ARB Report 123, AAB Report 1 KF Feb. 1952; ORO, “Troop Performance on a Training Maneuver Involving the Use of Atomic Weapons,” by Alfred Hausrath et al., Technical Memo ORO-T-170 (Baltimore, 15 Mar. 1952); HumRRO, “Desert Rock I: A Psychological Study of Troop Reaction to an Atomic Explosion,” by Peter
A. Bordes et al., Report HumRRO-TR-1 (Washington, Feb. 1953). See also JRB Associates, Operation Buster-Jangle (n. 4), 54-55. On the background of army mterest in psychological studies, see John J. Midgley, Jr., Deadly Illusions: Army Policy for the Nuclear Battlefield (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), ch. 1, “Origins of the Nuclear Battlefield,’ especially 22-23; and more generally, G. Andrew Mickley, “Psychological Effects of Nuclear Warfare,” in James J. Conklin and Richard I. Walker, eds., Military Radiobiology (Orlando: Academic Press, 1987), 304-319.
45. “Annex 7 (Radiological Safety) to Opn 0 1,” 10 Oct. 1951, in “Exercise Desert Rock I” (n. 42), 80-86; “Radiological Safety Operations,” ibid., 107—109. See also JRB Associates, Operation Buster-Jangle (n. 4), 116-118. 46. “Radiological Safety Operations” (n. 45), 108.
47. Schlatter to McCormack, 21 June (n. 42); Bugher to McCormack, “Biomedical Test Program for Operation Buster,” 24 July 1951; Schlatter to Tyler, 25 July 1951; Tyler to Schlatter, 16 Aug. 1951; L. W. Tuttle to files, “Buster Jangle Tests—
Los Alamos Discussions,” 16 Aug. 1951; A. C. Graves to Schlatter, “D.O.D. Objectives,” 14 Sept. 1951; AEC 446/17, “Summary of Buster-Jangle Military Effects Program Objectives,” 25 Sept. 1951. See also JRB Associates, Operation BusterJangle (n. 4), ch. 4. 48. Tyler to McCormack, “Attendance of Military Personnel at Atomic Weapons
Notes to Pages 69-70 317 Tests,” 15 Aug. 1951; Shields L. Warren to Fields, “Biomedical Test Program for Buster-Jangle Operations,” 21 Aug. 1951; AEC meeting no. 594, 22 Aug. 1951, item 4; AEC 446/11, DMA report, “Operations Planned for Buster-Jangle,” 6 Sept. 1951; Dean to LeBaron, 7 Sept. 1951; C. Sharp Cook to Hacker, 11 July 1983. 49. AEC 446/11, “Operations Planned for Buster-Jangle” (n. 48), 4. 50. Dean to LeBaron, 7 Sept. (n. 48); AEC meetings: no. 594, 22 Aug. 1951, item 4; no. 602, 7 Sept. 1951, item 4; and no. 612, 5 Oct. 1951, item 2; Marion W. Boyer to Tyler, “Designation of Authority as AEC Test Director for Buster-Jangle,” 20 Sept. 1951; Boyer to Tyler, 12 Oct. 1951.
51. AEC release 395 and SFOO release SF-52-42, 28 Aug. 1951; AEC 446/13, DMA report, “Proposed Experimental Devices—Buster,” 7 Sept. 1951; AEC 446/16, DMA report, “Presidential Approval of Buster-Jangle,” 25 Sept. 1951; Lay to Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Chairman AEC, “Request of Presidential Approval for Buster-Jangle,” 9 Oct. 1951.
52. AEC release 395, “AEC to Resume Test Operations at Nevada Test Site,” 28 Aug. 1951, as reproduced in AEC 446/9, DIS report, “Public Information Plan, Operation Buster-Jangle,” 5 Sept. 1951, 6-7. 53. LVFO releases, 2 Oct. 1951, 3 Oct. 1951.
34. AEC 446/9, “Public Information Plan” (n. 52), 1. Cf. Tyler to DMA, “Revision and Summary of Buster Jangle Public Plan,” 17 Aug. 1951; AEC meetings no. 600, 29 Aug. 1951, item 3, and no. 603, 11 Sept. 1951, item 15. 55. “Information Plan for Desert Rock (Buster-Jangle),” 25 Sept. 1951, 3. 56. “Draft of Fact Sheet for Pre-Test Release to Satisfy Public Questions Concerning Safety of Troops,” in “Information Plan for Desert Rock” (n. 55), 8-9; Camp Desert Rock release, 1 Oct. 1951. 57. Shipman, “Radiological Safety” (n. 36), 18-23, 48; Dean, Forging the Atomic
Shield: Excerpts from the Office Diary of Gordon E. Dean, ed. Roger M. Anders (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1987), 178-179; TIO releases: 22 Oct., 28 Oct., 30 Oct., 1 Nov., 5 Nov. 1951; interview with W. S. Johnson, Phoenix, 9 Nov. 1978, transcript, 12; Johnson to Hacker, 23 June (n. 21). See also NVOO Office of Public Affairs, Announced United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 through December 1986, Report NVO-209 (Rev. 7), Las Vegas, Jan. 1987, 2; Howard A. Hawthorne, ed., Compilation of Local Fallout Data from Test Detonations 1945-1962 Extracted from DASA 125], 2 vols., Report DNA 1251-1-EX, -2-EX (Santa Barbara: GE-TEMPO, 1 May 1979), vol. 1, Continental U.S. Tests, 32-54. 58. Shipman, “Radiological Safety” (n. 36), 43.
59. LeBaron to Dean, “Attendance of Military Personnel at Atomic Weapons Tests,” 15 Oct. 1951; AEC meetings no. 615, 16 Oct. 1951, item 4, and no. 623, 6 Nov. 1951, item 1; Sumner T. Pike to LeBaron, 24 Oct. 1951; AEC 446/24, DMA report, “Additional Military Observers for Jangle,” 6 Nov. 1951; AEC 446/25, “Decision on AEC 446/24,” 16 Nov. 1951; “Organization and Functions of Camp Desert
Rock,” in “Exercise Desert Rock I” (n. 42), 17-18; B. M. Fitch to CG, 6th Army, “Report of Exercises Desert Rock II and III,” 15 Dec. 1951, w/att. “Report.” See also JRB Associates, Operation Buster-Jangle (n. 4), 43-45, 50-54. 60. NVO, Announced Nuclear Tests (n. 57), 3; Dean to McMahon, 3 Jan. 1952; Shipman, “Radiological Safety” (n. 36), 15-16, 24-25; Shipman to Bugher, 29 Feb. 1952; Gerald W. Johnson, “Monitor Survey of Ground Contamination (Radsafe),”
318 Notes to Pages 71-72 Operation Jangle, Project 2.1d, AFSWP Report WT-381, 22 May 1952; Shipman to S. R. Woodruff, “Radiation Exposures—Haddock & Newberry Personnel,” 6 Nov. 1951; Hawthorne, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 57), 55, 61. 61. W. R. Kennedy to Shipman, “Buster-Jangle Personnel Exposures in Excess of
3.9 R,” 28 Feb. 1952; Kennedy to Marshall Page, Jr., 14 Apr. 1983, w/att. M. R. Nadler, “Excerpts from Report of Radiological Safety, Indian Springs A.F.B. Nevada,” 5 Dec. 1951; and Frederick C. Worman, “Resume of Personnel Radiation Exposure Records of Operation Buster/Jangle, 1951,” n.d. Cf. JRB Associates, Operation Buster-Jangle (n. 4), 129-152, especially 135: table 6.1, “Distribution of Gamma Radiation Exposures for Operation Buster-Jangle Participants by Affiliation,” which divides participants by Service (i.e., army, navy, Marine Corps, air force, nonmilitary), rather than by function (1.e., test organization [which included military personnelj, Desert Rock maneuver troops, Desert Rock observers): 2,642 individuals with film badges, 38 of whom exceeded 3 roentgens. Of the 38, 12 came from individuals assigned to 4925th Test Group (Atomic), which provided the cloud samplers (ibid., 148: table 6-5, “Distribution of Gamma Radiation Exposures for Air Force Participants, Operation Buster-Jangle’’). 62. “Annex ‘A’ to Radiological Safety Report for Exercise Desert Rock: Person-
nel Dosimetry,” in “Exercise Desert Rock I’ (n. 42), 110-112, quote at 111. Cf. “Medical and Psychological Report” (n. 43), 124. JRB Associates, Operation BusterJangle, table 6.1 (n. 60), gives 658 military participants in Buster-Jangle recorded exposures between 0.1 and 1 roentgen, 258 exposures 1 roentgen or higher, but does not specify how many belonged to Desert Rock. 63. “Report on Radiological Safety and Decontamination Operations, Exercise
Desert Rock II and HI,” in “Report of Exercises Desert Rock II and HP’ (n. 59), 131-132. See Jerald L. Goetz to Hacker, 10 July 1989, w/att. “Comments on Elements
of Controversy,” 2-3, citing SAIC, Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Military Participants, Exercises Desert Rock I, II, and Il, Operation Buster-Jangle, Report DNA-TR-87-116 (McLean, Va., 22 Dec. 1987). 64. Eisenbud to W. D. Claus, “Summary of Data Collected by Mobile Monitoring Stations during Jangle-Sugar,” 27 Nov. 1951; Fred A. Bryan to Stafford L. Warren, “Fall-Out in Los Angeles Area,” 23 Nov. 1951; AEC meeting no. 654, 23 Jan. 1952, item 3. 65. NYOO, “Radioactive Debris” (n. 40), 47. 66. Shipman, “Radiological Safety” (n. 36), 48. 67. W. D. Claus to Shields L. Warren, “Evacuation Plans for Buster-Jangle,” 20 Sept. 1951; T. N. White to L. Joe Deal, 11 Dec. 1951; Shipman, “Radiological Safety” (n. 36), 11, 34, 39-40, 41-50. For an authoritative discussion of fallout phenomena, see Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, eds., The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 3d ed. (Washington: Department of Defense and Department of Energy, 1977), especially 36-38.
68. Shipman to Potter Campbell, 8 July 1953. Cf. Shipman to S. R. Woodruff, 15 Feb. 1954. On the so-called infinity dose (infinite time dose), see Glasstone and Dolan, Effects of Nuclear Weapons (n. 67), 396-397. 69. Shipman, “Radiological Safety” (n. 36), 9-14; Johnson interview transcript (n. 57), 7-8; Johnson to Hacker, 23 June (n. 21). On off-site communication and transportation problems at Trinity, see Hacker, The Dragon’s Tail: Radiation Safety in the
Notes to Pages 72-73 319 Manhattan Project, 1942-1946 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: Univ. of California Press, 1987), 102-103. 70. Shipman, “Radiological Safety” (n. 36), 11. 71. “Report of Exercises Desert Rock II and IIT” (n. 59), 157. 72. AEC meeting no. 624, 7 Nov. 1951, final item. 73. William R. Sturges, Jr., to Fields, “Possible Limitation on Length of Time Nevada Test Site May Be Used, Due to Radiological Contamination,” 3 Dec. 1951. 74. Tyler to McCormack, 15 Aug. (n. 48); AEC Info Memo 317/2, “Assignment of Code Names,” 31 Aug. 1951; AEC 487, DMA report, “Special Atomic Detonation for Weapons Effects and Training,” 24 Oct. 1951; AEC 487/2, “Special Atomic Detonations for Weapons Effects and Training (Revision),” 6 Nov. 1951; AEC meetings no. 620, 25 Oct. 1951, item 4, and no. 624, 7 Nov. 1951, item 5; AEC 487/3, ‘Decision on AEC 487/2,” 13 Nov. 1951. 75. “Draft Memorandum to the Chairman, Military Liaison Committee, Regarding Special Atomic Detonation for Weapons Effects and Training,” in AEC 487/2, “Special Atomic Detonations” (n. 74), Appendix. See also JRB Associates, Operation Tumbler-Snapper, 1952, by Ponton et al., Report DNA 6019F (McLean, Va., 14 June 1982), 26-28; Midgley, Deadly Illusions (n. 44), ch. 1, “Origins of the Nuclear Battlefield.” 76. AEC meetings: no. 636, 12 Dec. 1951, item 4; no. 639, 19 Dec. 1951, item 3; no. 642, 2 Jan. 1952, item 4; no. 649, 16 Jan. 1952, item 2; no. 654, 23 Jan. 1952, item
1; “Items for Discussion at Conference to [be] held at LASL on 9 January 1952”; “Conference at SFOO, 9 January 1952”; Chief AFSWP, “Memorandum of Agreements Reached at Conference Held at Los Alamos, New Mexico, 9 January 1952”; LeBaron to Dean, 15 Jan. 1952; Robert A. Lovett to Lay, “Test to Determine Air Blast Effects of Atomic Weapons,” 16 Jan. 1952; AEC Info Memo 317/5, “Code Name for Proposed Test,” 18 Jan. 1952; Lay to Secretary of State and Chairman AEC, “Test to Determine Air Blast Effects of Atomic Weapons,” 18 Jan. 1952; Dean to LeBaron, 29 Jan. 1952; Dean to Lay, 30 Jan. 1952; Dean to Lovett, 30 Jan. 1952; AEC 505/7, “Tentative Tumbler-Snapper Program, as of February 1, 1952,” 6 Feb. 1952. For a brief account of Snapper origins, see Gordon B. Page, “Operation Snapper Final Report: Nevada Proving Grounds, April-June 1952,” AFSWP report WT-564, March 1953 (extracted version, 1 Oct. 1979), ch. 1. 77. AEC 505/7, “Tentative Tumbler-Snapper Program” (n. 76); Office of the Test Director, J-Division, “Operation Order 1-52 (Tumbler-Snapper),” 2 Feb. 1952; AEC meeting no. 658, 5 Feb. 1952, item 1; AEC 505/14, “Technical Operation Plan for Tumbler-Snapper,” 10 Mar. 1952; Deal to W. D. Claus, “Monitors for Tests,” 8 Jan. 1952; Chief AFSWP, “Memorandum of Agreements” (n. 76). 78. Gailon M. McHaney to CG, III Corps, “Cooperation of the III Corps and the
Effects Test Group of the Technical Operations Squadron, Provisional in Exercise Desert Rock,” 25 Sept. 1951; W. D. Claus to Harry H. Haight, “Areas of Responsibility for Monitoring during Tumbler-Snapper,” 29 Jan. 1952; Fields to Tyler, “Areas of Responsibility for Monitoring during Tumbler-Snapper,” 11 Feb. 1952; Shields L. Warren to Kelley, “Monitoring Fall-Out from Weapons Tests,” 7 Feb. 1952; Eisenbud to F. W. Reichelderfer, 13 Feb. 1952; J. C. Clark to Kenner F. Hertford, “Air Sampling
Operations (Division of Biology & Medicine),” 20 Mar. 1952; Clark to Hertford, “Monitoring of Fall-Out for Tumbler-Snapper,” 27 Mar. 1952; Eisenbud to distrib.,
320 Notes to Pages 73-76 “Radioactive Dust Monitoring, Operation of Mobile Teams,” 17 Apr. 1952; NYOO Health and Safety Division Staff, “Radioactive Debris from Operations Tumbler and Snapper: Observations beyond 200 Miles from the Test Site,” Report NYO-4505, 12 Jan. 1953. 79. Harry S. Allen to Winant, 15 Feb. 1952; Allen to H. J. Prince, “Rad Safe at NTS,” 18 Feb. 1952; J. C. Clark to Director, SFOO OTO, “Rad Safe Responsibility, Nevada Proving Ground,” 6 Mar. 1952; idem, “Medical Services at Nevada Proving Ground,” 6 Mar. 1952; Shipman to Hertford, 7 Mar. 1952; Clark to Shields L. Warren, 12 Mar. 1952; Clark to Warren, 13 Mar. 1952; Philip S. Gwynn, “Radiological Safety, Operation Tumbler-Snapper: Report to the Test Director,” AFSWP Report WT-558, Dec. 1952, 13-14, 17. 80. Shipman to A. C. Graves, “Advisory Committee,” 5 Mar. 1952. For an overview of rad-safe organization, see JRB Associates, Operation Tumbler-Snapper (n. 75), 132-144. 81. Gwynn, “Radiological Safety” (n. 79), 14-36; Taylor, History of Air Force Atomic Cloud Sampling (n. 31), 47-56. 82. “Radiological Safety Plan,” 27 Mar. 1952, Annex R to “Operation Order 1-52 (Tumbler-Snapper)” (n. 77). See also JRB Associates, Operation Tumbler-Snapper (n. 75), 128, 132, 144. 83. See I-39 and I-40, above; Hacker, The Dragon's Tail (n. 69), 143; Gordon M. Dunning to file, “Relationship between Gamma Dose and Beta Counts from Fallout Material,” 10 Feb. 1953. 84. “Emergency Evacuation Plans for Operation Tumbler-Snapper,” c. 1 Apr. 1952, as reproduced in Gwynn, “Radiological Safety” (n. 79), Appendix I; William W. Drake, Jr., and Lawrence J. Keyes, “Plans and Operations,” Aug. 1952, in Operation Tumbler-Snapper, Aug. 1952, “Staff Reports: Report to the Test Director,” LASL Report WT-553 (Los Alamos, n.d.), 26. 85. Loper to DMA, “Army Participation in Future Atomic Tests,” 26 Nov. 1951; Fields to Loper, 28 Dec. 1951. On the background of army interest in the nuclear battlefield, see A. J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army between Korea and Vietnam (Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1986). 86. Schlatter to Hertford, “Military Troop and Observers Participation in Operation Snapper,” 18 Feb. 1952. 87. Alvin R. Luedecke to DMA, 7 Mar. 1952. 88. Ibid. 89. J. C. Clark to SFOO OTO, “Military Troop and Observer Participation in Operation Snapper,” 10 Mar. 1952. 90. Tyler to Schlatter, “Military Troop and Observers Participation in Operation Snapper,” 12 Mar. 1952. See also Kraker to Fields, 17 Mar. 1952.
91. Shields L. Warren to Fields, “Draft Staff Paper on Troop Participation in Operation Tumbler-Snapper,” 25 Mar. 1952.
92. AEC 494/3, DMA report, “Troop Participation in Operation TumblerSnapper,” 31 Mar. 1952, 3, 4. 93. AEC meetings no. 677, 1 Apr. 1952, item 2, and no. 678, 2 Apr. 1952, item 9. 94. Dean to Loper, 2 Apr. 1952. Cf. Sturges to Tyler, 3 Apr. 1952. On Desert Rock
IV rad-safe organization, see JRB Associates, Operation Tumbler-Snapper (n. 75), 128-132.
Notes to Pages 77-78 321 95. Sturges to Tyler, 3 Apr. (n. 94); AEC meeting no. 679, 3 Apr. 1952, item 4; R. P. Campbell to Schlatter, “Second AFSWP Letter,” 4 Apr. 1952; Dean to Loper, 10 Apr. 1952; Loper to DMA, 23 Apr. 1952; Campbell to Schlatter, “Report on Exercise Desert Rock IV, 22 April 1952,” 24 Apr. 1952; Fields to Marion W. Boyer, “Approval of Additional Troop Participation in Tumbler-Snapper,” 1 May 1952; Boyer to Loper, 2 May 1952; “Exercise Desert Rock IV, April-June 1952,” n.d. (c. August 1952), 21— 24, 29-31, et passim. See also Goetz, “Comments on Elements of Controversy” (n.
63), 3, citing SAIC, Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Observers and Maneuver Troops, Exercises Desert Rock IV, Operation Tumbler-Snapper, by J. Goetz et al., Report DNA-TR-85-277 (McLean, Va., 1 Aug. 1985). 96. AEC 519/1, “Attendance of State and Territorial Civil Defense Directors at Atomic Weapon Test,” 18 Feb. 1952; Dean to Millard F. Caldwell, 27 Feb. 1952; Bradbury to Hertford, 3 Mar. 1952; Elliott to Fields, “Preliminary Field Plan for Press Observation of Tests,” 5 Mar. 1952; AEC 505/15, DIS report, “Admission of Limited,
Selected Group of Uncleared Observers to One Shot Spring 1952 Test Series in Nevada,” 11 Mar. 1952; AEC meetings: no. 669, 12 Mar. 1952, item 10; no. 674, 25 Mar. 1952, item 3; no. 681, 9 Apr. 1952, item 9; no. 684, 16 Apr. 1952, item 4; and no. 687, 30 Apr. 1952, item 6; William C. Foster to Dean, 29 Mar. 1952; AEC 505/25, DIS report, “Information Plan and Materials for Shot 3 Tumbler-Snapper Test Series,” 15 Apr. 1952; AEC 505/27, “Security Plan for Handling Uncleared Observers for Third Tumbler-Snapper Shot,” 22 Apr. 1952. 97. SFOO, “Tumbler-Snapper Information Plan,” n.d., 1. Cf. Shelby Thompson to distrib., “Information Plan for Tumbler-Snapper,” 25 Mar. 1952. 98. AEC 505/21, DIS report, “Information Plan for Tumbler-Snapper Test Series,” 2 Apr. 1952, 2. See also AEC meeting no. 679, 3 Apr. 1952, item 4; AEC 505/24, “Decision on AEC 505/21,” 10 Apr. 1952. This was the information plan for shots other than 3; only 3 would be seen by uncleared observers. 99. NVOO, Announced Nuclear Tests (n. 57), 3; “Results of Tumbler-Snapper Shots as Extracted from Teletypes Received from Nevada Proving Ground,” 11 June
1952; Hawthorne, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 57), 66-78; Gwynn, “Radiological Safety” (n. 79), 69-70, 94-96, 124-125, 151-152, 185; C. Starr to Shields L. Warten, 15 May 1952, w/att. A. A. Jarrett, “Radioactivity in Southern California from Atomic Weapons Tests in Nevada—April 1952,” NAA-SR-Memo-322, 12 May 1952; “Exercise Desert Rock IV” (n. 95), 7, 23-24. 100. Gwynn, “Radiological Safety” (n. 79), 151, 152; Hawthorne, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 57), 79-82. See also JRB Associates, Shots Able, Baker, Charlie, and Dog: The First Tests of the Tumbler-Snapper Series, 1 April-1 May 1952, by Jean Ponton and Carl Maag, Report DNA 6020F (McLean, Va., 15 June 1982). 101. NVOO, Announced Nuclear Tests (n. 57), 3; Gwynn, “Radiological Safety” (n. 79), 187; Hawthorne, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 57), 85. See also JRB Associates, Shots Easy, Fox, George, and How: The Final Tests of the Tumbler-Snapper Series, / May-5 June 1952, by Ponton and Maag, Report DNA 6021F (McLean, Va., 16 June 1982).
102. V. B. Lamoureux to Norair M. Lulejian, “Lincoln Mine and Groom Mine Post-Shot Survey, May 8, 1952,” 8 May 1952; Paul Szilli, monitor’s report from air sampling and fallout station at Lincoln Mine, 7 May 1952; Charles Hammond and Norbert Wolfe, mobile monitoring team report from vicinity of Lincoln Mine and
322 Notes to Pages 78-81 Groom Mine, 7 May 1952; Irving O. Elge, “Readings at Ely, Nevada,” 7 May 1952; Lyle B. Borst to A. Ray Olpin, “Radiation Effects from Nevada Bomb Test of May 7 [at Salt Lake City],” 6 June 1952. 103. TIO release, 7 May 1952. 104. AEC meeting no. 694, 14 May 1952, item 3.
105. Gwynn, “Radiological Safety” (n. 79), 39-40, 42, 187-188; Lulejian to Gwynn, “Radioactive Contamination at Lincoln Mine as a Result of Snapper-Easy Shot,” 15 May 1952; Lulejian to Gwynn, “Integrated Dosage at Ely, Nevada curing Snapper/Easy Shot,” 27 May 1952; James B. Hartgering to Shields L. Warren, 18 May 1952; Hartgering to George A. Spendlove, 29 May 1952. 106. Lamoureux to Lulejian, 8 May (n. 102). 107. Gwynn, “Radiological Safety” (n. 79), 187. 108. Ibid., 188-189. See also Hawthorne, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 57), 83-84. 109. AEC 505/28, “Change in Snapper Shot Schedule,” 13 May 1952; AEC meeting no. 700, 20 May 1952, item 2; TIO release, 20 May 19572.
110. Jon H. Olafsen, “Historical Account of Program 22,” n.d., entry for May 21-26. 111. TIO reply to Alan Jarrlsson, 26 May 1952. Cf. Kelley to Elliott, “Background Information for Your Possible Use re Radiation Levels,” 13 May 1952; TIO release, 25 May 1952. 112. Gwynn, “Radiological Safety” (n. 79), 40-42, 228-237. This includes Raymond Stattel and Charles Huffman, “Readings at Groom Mine, Nevada, Shot 6 (25 May 1952),” 41; and “Ground Mobile Monitors’ Report—Shot 6—25 May 1952,” Table F.1. See also Hawthorne, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 57), 88-90. 113. Elliott to Hertford, “Local Procedure to Recommend Public Announcements of Radiation,” 28 May 1952. 114. Gwynn, “Radiological Safety” (n. 79), 272, 304. For fallout and other data from the final two Tumbier-Snapper shots, see Hawthorne, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 57), 93-102. 115. Gwynn, “Radiological Safety” (n. 79), 47, 188-189, 272-273, 304; “Dosages Accumulated by Personnel—1 April through 9 June 1952,” ibid., table 6.5; “Accumulative Dosages for Personnel during Tumbler/Snapper Series,” n.d. Cf. JRB Associates, Operation Tumbler-Snapper (n. 75), 161: table 6-1: “Distribution of Gamma Radiation Exposures for Operation Tumbler-Snapper Participants by Affiliation,” and 178: table 6-7, “Film Badge Readings Exceeding Established Limits for DOD Participants at Tumbler-Snapper’; GAO, Nuclear Health and Safety: Radiation Exposures for Some Cloud-sampling Personnel Need to Be Reexamined, Report GAO/RCED-87-134 (Washington, Sept. 1987), 11-14, 25-26, et passim. See also comment in n. 56, above. 116. TIO release, 27 May 1952. 117. W. D. Claus to Tyler, 6 Aug. 1952; Shipman to A. C. Graves, “Nevada Cattle,” 6 Aug. 1952; James E. Reeves to S. R. Woodruff, “Cattle of Floyd [R.] Lamb,” 8 Aug. 1952; Reeves to Woodruff, “Nevada Cattle,” 12 Aug. 1952; Bugher to Graves, 14 Aug. 1952. 118. Shipman to A. C. Graves, “Nevada Cattle,” 8 Aug. 1952. 119. Bugher to Marion W. Boyer, “Monthly Status and Progress Report, August
Notes to Pages 81-83 323 1952—Division of Biology and Medicine,” 10 Sept. 1952; Robert E. Thompsett to Frank C. DiLuzio, 18 Nov. 1952, w/att. “List of Cattle by Category.” 120. William U. Schofield to whom it may concern, 9 Oct. 1952; Lamb to AEC, 10 Oct. 1952; Joe B. Sanders to Tyler, “Lamb Cattle Case—Alamo, Nevada,” 13 Oct. 1952; Chester G. Brinck to Miles Pike, 17 Oct. 1952; S. R. Woodruff to Lamb, 20 Oct. 1952; Sanders to files, “Lamb Cattle,” 9 Dec. 1952; Donald J. Leehey to Fields, “Alleged Damage to Cattle in the Vicinity of the Nevada Proving Ground,” 23 Dec. 1954; Paul B. Pearson to V. R. Bohman, 30 Dec. 1954; Vincent G. Huston to Leehey, “Alleged Damage to Cattle in Vicinity of the Nevada Test Site,” 12 Jan. 1955; Alan Bible to Lewis L. Strauss, 11 Oct. 1955. On the Trinity cattle, see Hacker, The Dragon’s Tail (n. 69), 105-106. 121. Gwynn, “Radiological Safety” (n. 79), 4.
4 Testing Jeopardized: Fallout from Ivy and Upshot-Knothole, 1952-1953
1. Alvin C. Graves to James McCormack, Jr., “Tests Subsequent to Operation Greenhouse,” 12 May 1950. On the H-bomb decision, see ch. 2, above.
2. AEC/334, DMA report, “Test Planning Subsequent to Greenhouse,” 7 July 1950, and Appendix A, “Draft Memorandum to the Military Liaison Committee” (sent 17 July 1950); AEC meetings: no. 436, 12 July 1950, item 6; no. 576, 11 July 1951, item 7; no. 578, 12 July 1951, item 1; Gordon E. Dean to Robert LeBaron, “Military Assistance for Atomic Weapon Tests,” 20 Dec. 1950; AEC 334/7, “Organi-
zation for Participation in Future Tests,” 8 May 1951; AEC 334/10, DMA report, “Responsibilities Associated with the Maintenance of Eniwetok Proving Ground and Conduct of Future Test Operations,” 17 Aug. 1951. See also Frank J. Sackton, “Joint Operations—Operation Ivy,” Military Review 35 (Sept. 1955): 22-30.
3. GAC, minutes of 25th meeting, 15-17 Mar. 1951, 3; Herbert F. York, The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller, and the Superbomb (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1976), 75-81; Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield, 1947/1952, vol. 2 of A History of the Atomic Energy Commission (University Park: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1969), 527-545, passim; Stanley A. Blumberg and Gwinn Owens, Energy and Conflict: The Life and Times of Edward Teller (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1976), chs. 12-13, passim. 4. AEC, In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer, Transcript of hearing before Personnel Security Board, Washington, 12 Apr.—6 May 1954 (Washington: GPO, 1954), 251. See also York, The Advisors (n. 3), 81. 5. Sumner T. Pike to LeBaron, 15 Aug. 1951; Norris E. Bradbury to Fields, 29 Sept. 1951; York, The Advisors (n. 3), 81. 6. AEC 425/20, DMA report, “Thermonuclear Research at the University of California Radiation Laboratory,” 13 June 1952, as quoted in York, The Advisors (n. 3), 82. See also Frank H. Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer (Colorado Springs: Shelton Enterprise, 1988), 5-30 to 5-45. 7. SFOO releases SF-52-68, 26 Nov. 1951; and SF 52-85, 17 Jan. 1952. 8. SFOO release SF-52-NN, 15 Feb. 1952. See also Richard G. Elliott to distrib., “Public Reporting Policy for Ivy,” 23 Sept. 1952; Marion W. Boyer to Fields and
324 Notes to Pages 83-85 Morse Salisbury, “Compliance with NSC Request on Public Reporting of Ivy,” 25 Sept. 1952; Elliott to Salisbury, “Public Reporting Policy for Ivy,” 29 Sept. 1952. 9. York, The Advisors (n. 3), 82-83; Bernard J. O’Keefe, Nuclear Hostages (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983), 150; Neal O. Hines, Proving Ground: An Account of the
Radiobiological Studies in the Pacific, 1946-1961 (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1962), 139-140. 10. Robert G. Butler to James S. Lay, Jr., “Operation Ivy—Task Force Organization,” 29 Feb. 1952; Stanley W. Burriss to Percy W. Clarkson, “Submission of Report of the Commander, Task Group 132.1 on Operation Ivy,” 18 Dec. 1952, w/att. “Report .. . (in 3 parts),” part 3, “General Activities of TG 132.1,” 62-63; Russell H. Maynard and John D. Servis, “Radiological Safety,” Report to the Scientific Director JTF 132, LASL Report WT-614, Jan. 1953, 17-19; Kaman Tempo, Operation Ivy: 1952, by KF. R. Gladeck et al., Report DNA 6036F (Santa Barbara, 1 Dec. 1982), 46. 11. Thomas L. Shipman to A. C. Graves, “1. Rad Safe Participation in Operation Ivy; 2. Fall-Out Studies, Snapper and Ivy,” 29 Jan. 1952. See also H-Division Progress Report, 20 Jan.—20 Feb. 1952, 17-19.
12. Thomas N. White to Shipman, “Health Division Participation in Rad Safe Work at Future Nuclear Field Tests,” 31 Jan. 1952.
13. Shipman to A. C. Graves, “H-Division Participation in Operation Ivy,” 29 May 1952. Cf. Shipman to Graves, 29 Jan. (n. 11); CJTF 132, “Radiological Safety,” Annex P to CJTF 132 Operation Plan No. 2-52, 15 Aug. 1952, paragraph 3, “Responsibilities” (reproduced in Kaman Tempo, Operation Ivy [n. 10], Appendix B). 14. Harold F. Plank to A. C. Graves, “Shielded Flying Clothes for Sampling Aircraft Personnel, Operation Ivy,” 8 Apr. 1952; DBM, “Monthly Status and Progress Report,” Nov. 1952, 2; Kaman Tempo, Operation Ivy (n. 10), 81, 95-102. For background on manned cloud sampling, see Leland B. Taylor, History of Air Force Atomic Cloud Sampling, vol. 1, Narrative, AFSC Historical Publication Series 61-142-1 (Kirtland AFB, New Mex.: AFSWC, Jan. 1963), chs. 1-2; ch. 3 discusses Ivy.
15. Duncan Curry, Jr., to P. W. Clarkson, “Report of Evacuation Plans Conference,” 24 June 1952; Curry to distrib., “Phase-Out of Personnel from Eniwetok Atoll Prior to Evacuation for Mike Shot,” 26 June 1952; H. K. Stephenson to A. C. Graves, “Consideration of Tsunami Problem Connected with Mike Shot,” 16 Sept. 1952; Clarkson, “Shot Phase Evacuation Plan,” Annex T to CJTF 132 Operation Plan 2-52, 8 Oct. 1952 (reproduced in Kaman Tempo, Operation Ivy [n. 10], Appendix B); Maynard and Servis, “Radiological Safety” (n. 10), 27. 16. Curry to Clarkson, 24 June (n. 15), 3.
17. CYG 132.1, “Radiological Safety Regulations,” Appendix I to Annex H, Radiological Safety, CTG 132.1 Operations Plan No. 1-52, 15 Aug. 1952, paragraph l.a. Cf. CJTF 132, “Radiological Safety” (n. 13), Appendix II, “Special Radiological Safety Regulations,” 10 May 1952, paragraph 1. 18. Maynard and Servis, “Radiological Safety” (n. 10), Appendix J, “Radiological Safety Regulations,” 94; Kaman Tempo, Operation Ivy (n. 10), 85. 19. CTG 132.1, “Radiological Safety Regulations” (n. 17), paragraph 2. 20. Ibid., paragraph 1.a. 21. Curry to Clarkson, 24 June (n. 15), 3; Kaman Tempo, Operation Ivy (n. 10), 88-90; Taylor, History of Air Force Atomic Cloud Sampling (n. 14), ch. 3.
22. Curry’ to Clarkson, 24 June (n. 15), 3; TU 132.1.7, “Consolidated List of
Notes to Pages 86-88 325 Exposures to Radiation of Personnel Participating in Operation Ivy,” 20 Nov. 1952; Kaman Tempo, Operation Ivy (n. 10), 191. 23. CIJTF 132, “Radiological Safety” (n. 13), paragraph 3.h. See also Samuel Glasstone, ed., The Effects of Atomic Weapons (Los Alamos: Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Sept. 1950), 342: table 11.28, “Probable Early Effects of Acute Radiation Doses over Whole Body,” from which the Defense figures may well have been obtained. Cf. Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, eds., The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 3d ed. (Washington: Department of Defense and Department of Energy, 1977), 580-581, table 12.108, “Summary of Clinical Effects of Acute Ionizing Radiation Doses”; Robert W. Young, “Acute Radiation Syndrome,” in James J. Conklin and Richard I. Walker, eds., Military Radiobiology (Orlando, Fla.: Academic Press, 1987), 165-190. 24. CJTF 132, “Radiological Safety” (n. 13), paragraph 4. 25. CTG 132.1, “Report” (n. 10), 64. 26. Maynard and Servis, “Radiological Safety” (n. 10), 20-22; Kaman Tempo, Operation Ivy (n. 10), 77-80. 27. F. E. Moore and H. G. Bechanan, “History of Operation Ivy,” 218, as quoted in Kaman Tempo, Operation Ivy (n. 10), 107.
28. Major A. S. Knauf, as quoted in Kaman Tempo, Operation Ivy (n. 10), 187-188. Cf. Howard A. Hawthorne, ed., Compilation of Local Fallout Data from Test Detonations 1945-1962 Extracted from DASA 1251, 2 vols., Report DNA 1251]-EX, -2-EX (Santa Barbara: GE-TEMPO, 1 May 1979), vol. 2, Oceanic U.S. Tests, 53, which gives the upper limit of cloud height as 102,000 feet, cloud diameter after four minutes as 106,000 feet (20 miles). 29. Unidentified members of JTF 132, as quoted in “Eyewitness Stories of the Bomb Test,” BAS 8 (Dec. 1952): 300. 30. Dean, Memorandum for the President, 1 Nov. 1952. Cf. Hawthorne, Oceanic U.S. Tests (n. 28), 51, giving crater diameter as 6,240 feet (2,080 yards), depth as 164 feet. 31. Maynard and Servis, “Radiological Safety” (n. 10), 37. 32. Ibid.; CTG 132.1, “Report” (n. 10), 66-67; Kaman Tempo, Operation Ivy (n. 10), 188-189. See Hawthorne, Oceanic U.S. Tests (n. 28), 52, for atoll dose-rate contours an hour after firing.
33. Maynard and Servis, “Radiological Safety” (n. 10), 30. On Mike fallout at Enewetak, see Hawthorne, Oceanic U.S. Tests (n. 30), 52. 34. See the detailed tables of air and ground readings for Mike day and the three weeks following in Maynard and Servis, “Radiological Safety” (n. 10), ch. 10, “Ra-
diological-Survey Results” (reproduced in Kaman Tempo, Operation Ivy [n. 10], Appendix C). See also Vincent G. Huston to Fields, “Notes on Mike Effects,” 17 Feb. 1953.
35. Maynard and Servis, “Radiological Safety” (n. 10), 30. 36. Ibid.; TU 132.1.7, “Consolidated List of Exposures” (n. 22); Kaman Tempo, Operation Ivy (n. 10), 189-191. 37. CITF 132, “Special Radiological Safety Regulations” (n. 17), paragraph 1. 38. TU 132.1.7, “Consolidated List of Exposures” (n. 22); Maynard and Servis, “Radiological Safety” (n. 10), 30. 39. Merril Eisenbud to John C. Bugher, “Monitoring Network for Operation Ivy,” 4 Aug. 1952; Raymond P. Campbell, Jr., memo for record, “Long Range Detection for
326 Notes to Pages 88-90 Ivy,” 5 Sept. 1952; Eisenbud to files, “Conference at Pearl Harbor,” 17 Sept. 1952; Gordon M. Dunning to Huston, “Monitoring Activities,” 3 Oct. 1952. 40. DBM, “Monthly Status” (n. 14), 1, 2. See also John H. Harley to CINCPAC, “Results of AEC Worldwide Monitoring Program through 21 November,” 26 Nov. 1952; Eisenbud to Dunning, “Transmittal of Memorandum,” 5 Dec. 1952; Kaman Tempo, Operation Ivy (n. 10), 196. 41. P. W. Clarkson to Dean, 15 Nov. 1952; Maynard and Servis, “Radiological Safety” (n. 10), 65; Kaman Tempo, Operation Ivy (n. 10), 199-204. 42. Moore and Bechanan, “History” (n. 27), 294, as quoted in Kaman Tempo, Operation Ivy (n. 10), 204. 43. Maynard and Servis, “Radiological Safety” (n. 10), 65. See also TU 132.1.7, “Consolidated List of Exposures” (n. 22); Kaman Tempo, Operation Ivy (n. 10), 206— 208. On King fallout at Enewetak, see Hawthorne, Oceanic U.S. Tests (n. 28), 56-57. . 44, DBM, “Monthly Status” (n. 14), 1. 45. Maynard and Servis, “Radiological Safety” (n. 10), 66. 46. Dean to Regents, Univ. of California, 9 June 1952; Dean, Forging the Atomic
Shield: Excerpts from the Office Diary of Gordon E. Dean, ed. Roger M. Anders (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1987), 184-185, 204-213, 215. On the conflict-filed background of the Livermore laboratory, see especially York, Making Weapons, Talking Peace: A Physicist’s Odyssey from Hiroshima to Geneva (New ‘York: Basic Books, 1987), ch. 4, “‘Do We Need a Second Laboratory?’” See also Edward Teller with Allen Brown, The Legacy of Hiroshima (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962), ch. 4, “A Laboratory in the Cold War’; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield (n. 3), 581-584; York, “The Origins of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory,’ BAS 31 (Sept. 1975): 8-14; Richard T. Sylves, The Nuclear Oracies: A Political History of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1977 (Ames: Iowa State Univ. Press, 1987), 164-168; Duane C. Sewell, “The Branch Laboratory at Livermore during the 1950’s,” in Hans Mark and Lowell Wood, eds., Energy in Physics, War and Peace: A Festschrift Celebrating Edward Teller’s 80th Birthday (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1988), 319-326. 47. “Assignment of Code Name,” AEC Info Memos 317/3, 16 Nov. 1951, and 317/9, 3 June 1952; Herbert B. Loper to Director R & D, DAF, “Implementation of Weapons Effects Program; Operation Knothole,” 28 Aug. 1952; William C. Bullock
to Chief AFF, “Final Report, Exercise Desert Rock V,” 16 July 1953; James G. Beckerley to Charter Heslep, “FCDA Report on Operation Doorstep,” 22 Apr. 1953, w/att. FCDA, “Operation Doorstep: A Summary Report,” n.d.; FCDA, Operation Doorstep: A Preliminary Report (Washington: GPO, 1953); JRB Associates, Operation Upshot-Knothole, 1953, by Jean Ponton et al., Report DNA 6014F (McLean, Va., 11 Jan. 1982), ch. 1. 48. AEC 487/2, DMA report, “Special Atomic Detonation for Weapons Effects and Training,” 6 Nov. 1951; AEC meetings no. 624, 7 Nov. 1951, item 5, and 643, 3 Jan. 1952, item 12; Carroll L. Tyler to Dean, “Future Tests at Nevada Test Site,” 19 Dec. 1951; Fields to Dean, “Future Tests at Nevada Test Site,” 3 Jan. 1952; Fields to Loper, 26 Feb. 1952; Tyler to Bradbury, 13 May 1952; Tyler to Bradbury, 11 June 1952; Bradbury to Fields, 14 July 1952. 49. Tyler to Dean, 19 Dec. (n. 48). 50. Kenner F. Hertford to David A. Tate, 5 June 1952; Tate to Hertford, 6 June
Notes to Pages 90-91 327 1952; George P. Kraker to Tate, 17 June 1952; Frank I. Winant, Jr., to Kraker, 25 June 1952; Hertford to Fields, “Rad-Safe Responsibilities,” 9 July 1952; Fields to Loper,
17 July 1952; Donald E. Antes to ACS/G3, DA, “Radiological Safety Support of Technical Operations at Nevada Proving Grounds,” 8 Aug. 1952; L. B. Seely to Reuben E. Cole, “Contamination and Rehabilitation Studies, NPG,” 20 Dec. 1952; Seth R. Woodruff, Jr., to Given H. Dugger, “Rad-Safe Controls,” 6 Jan. 1953; John C. Clark to Woodruff, “Health Physics Assistance at Nevada Proving Grounds,” 8 Jan. 1953; “Nevada Proving Ground Operation,” Memorandum of Agreement signed by Tyler and Leland S. Stranathan, 13 Feb. 1953.
51. AEC meeting no. 755, 23 Sept. 1952, item 5; Jack L. Armstrong to Tyler, “Reference Nevada Proving Ground Workmen Exposed to Radiation,” 24 Sept. 1952; Harold D. Anamosa to Fields, “Request for Report on Procedures Governing Health and Safety Practices at Nevada Test Site,” 26 Sept. 1952; Armstrong to DOP, “Radiological Matters—-Nevada Proving Grounds,” 14 Oct. 1952. 52. Bugher to S. R. Woodruff, 18 July 1952; Woodruff to OTO, 12 Sept. 1952; Thomas M. Wethington and Walter T. Parcell to William C. Bush, “Excessive Dosage Reports,” 26 Sept. 1952; SFOO to Bugher, 29 Sept. 1952; Parcell and Martin L. Grimes to Bush, “Radiation Over-Dosage,” 2 Oct. 1952; AEC meeting no. 763, 7 Oct. 1952; Kraker to Fields, “Radiological Matters—Nevada Proving Grounds,” 8 Oct. 1952; Bush to Woodruff, 10 Oct. 1952; Shipman to Kraker, “Radiological Matters— Nevada Proving Grounds,” 16 Oct. 1952; Walter D. Claus to Armstrong, “Radiological Matters—Nevada Proving Grounds,” 23 Oct. 1952; AEC 604, DMA report, “Procedures Governing Health and Safety Practices at Nevada Test Site,” 8 Dec. 1952; Woodruff to Dugger, 6 Jan. (n. 50). 53. Armstrong to Tyler, 24 Sept. (n. 51). 54. Kraker to Fields, 8 Oct. (n. 52); AEC Information Memorandum by DMA, “Study of Operational Future—Nevada Proving Grounds,” n.d.; Tyler to Bradbury, “Committee to Study Operational Future—Nevada Proving Grounds,” 30 Dec. 1952. 55. AEC 604, “Procedures Governing Health and Safety” (n. 52), 3. 56. Tyler to Fields, 9 Jan. 1953; Tyler to Bradbury, “Committee to Study Operational Future—Nevada Proving Grounds,” 12 Jan. 1953; Committee to Study Operational Future—Nevada Proving Grounds, “Agenda for Meeting January 14, 1953 at SFOO, Albuquerque, New Mexico,” n.d.; Committee on Operational Future of NPG, “Summary of Minutes,” meeting of 14 Jan. 1953. 57. Darol K. Froman to R. E. Cole, “Comments on Draft Report of Minutes of the Committee to Study the Operational Future of the Nevada Proving Ground,” 3 Feb. 1953.
58. Bradbury to Tyler, “Committee to Study Operational Future—Nevada Proving Grounds,” 5 Jan. 1953; Committee on Operational Future, “Summary of Minutes” (n. 56), 5—9; idem, “Report,” 11 May 1953, 1-2; Froman to Cole, 3 Feb. (n. 57). 59. Bugher to Tyler, “Committee to Study Operational Future, Nevada Proving Grounds,” 30 Jan. 1953. Cf. Committee on Operational Future, “Summary of Min-
utes” (n. 56), 6, 7.
60. Committee on Operational Future, “Summary of Minutes” (n. 56), 13-20; idem, “Report” (n. 58), 1-3. 61. Committee on Operational Future, “Report” (n. 58), 4.
62. Ibid., 5-6.
328 Notes to Pages 91-95 63. Tyler to Fields, 11 May 1953. 64. R. E. Cole to Tyler, 11 May 1953; Tyler to Fields, “Preliminary Report on Continental Tests and Future Utilization of Nevada Proving Grounds,” 29 Sept. 1953, 3. 65. Hg Camp Desert Rock, “Report of Exercises Desert Rock II and III,” 15 Dec. 1951, 253-254. 66. See ch. 3, pp. 77-80, above. 67. “Exercise Desert Rock IV, April-June 1952,” n.d. (Aug. 1952), 14-15. 68. Ibid., 14. 69. Harry H. Haight to Fields, “Exercise Desert Rock IV,” 21 Aug. 1952. 70. Paul T. Preuss to Tyler, 22 Sept. 1952.
71. John T. Hayward to Bugher, “Exposure Standards for Personnel at AEC Weapon Tests,” 19 Sept. 1952.
72. Bugher to Hayward, “Exposure Standards for Personnel at AEC Weapon Tests,” 20 Oct. 1952. Cf. Shields L. Warren to Tyler, “Permissible Levels of Radiation Exposure for Test Personnel,” 11 Oct. 1951. 73. Kraker to Fields, “Troop Participation in Upshot-Knothole,” 7 Oct. 1952. 74. Loper to Fields, 15 Oct. 1952, w/att. “Department of Defense Plan for Troop Participation in Operation Upshot-Knothole,” paragraph 2.e. 75. Loper to Fields, 15 Oct. (n. 74).
76. AEC 487/21, DMA report, “Troop Participation in Continental Tests,” 22 Dec. 1952, 4. 77. Preuss to Tyler, 22 Sept. 1952; AEC 487/21, “Troop Participation” (n. 76), 2. 78. AEC 487/21, “Troop Participation” (n. 76), 4—5. 79. Ibid., 5—7, quote at 7.
80. AEC meeting no. 794, 23 Dec. 1952, item 6. See Roy B. Snapp to Fields, “Commission Action on AEC 487/21—Troop Participation in Continental Tests,” 29 Dec. 1952; AEC 487/29, “Decision on AEC 487/21,” 18 Feb. 1953. 81. Rodney L. Southwick to R. P. Campbell, “Draft Statement on DOD Responsibility for Troop Safety at Nevada Tests,” 15 Dec. 1952, w/att. original and revised drafts.
82. AEC 487/21, “Troop Participation” (n. 76), Appendix B, Encl. II, “Draft Statement on Safety Responsibility for Troops.” Cf. Southwick to Campbell, 15 Dec. (n. 81). 83. M. W. Boyer to Loper, 8 Jan. 1953. 84. M. W. Boyer to Tyler, “Directive for Operation Upshot-Knothole,” 25 Feb. 1953.
85. Wilburt S. Brown to CG, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, et al., “Participation in Desert Rock V; instructions for,” 9 Mar. 1953, encl. 1, “Preliminary Instructions for Organizations,” paragraph 1 (encl. 2 in Brown to Commandant USMC, “Exercise Desert Rock V—Marine Corps; report on,” 19 May 1953); 2d MCPAEB, Operation Plan no. 1-53, “(Desert Rock V, Marine Corps,” Annex Easy, “Radiological Safety,” 14 Apr. 1953 (encl. 6 in Brown to Commandant, “Exercise Desert Rock V”); annex 7 (Radiological Safety Plan) to Operations Order 4, Exercise Desert Rock V, 21 Apr. 1953 (annex 1 [Model Copy of Operations Order] in “Final Report, Exercise Desert
Rock V” [n. 47], 55-60); “Final Report, Exercise Desert Rock V,” 12; JRB Associates, Operation Upshot-Knothole (n. 47), 56-57, 148-155. 86. JRB Associates, Operation Upshot-Knothole (n. 47), 65: table 3-1, “Exercise
Notes to Pages 96-98 329 Desert Rock V, Estimated Number of Participants at Operation Upshot-Knothole, by Program.” 87. “Final Report, Exercise Desert Rock V” (n. 47), 12. 88. Chief AFF, Directive for Desert Rock V, 5 Feb. 1953, as quoted in “Final Report, Exercise Desert Rock V” (n. 47), 13. 89. JRB Associates, Shots Annie to Ray: The First Five Tests of the UpshotKnothole Series, 17 March—ll April 1953, by Jeannie Massie et al., Report DNA 6017F (McLean, Va., 14 Jan. 1982); JRB Associates, Operation Upshot-Knothole (n. 47), 74, 145-146, 150. 90. Hq Camp Desert Rock, “Annex 3 (Shot Victor 2),” 1 June 1953, to “Final Report, Exercise Desert Rock V” (n. 47), 108. 91. Brown to Commandant, “Exercise Desert Rock V” (n. 85), 5; JRB Associates, Operation Upshot-Knothole (n. 47), 150. 92. Joint AEC-DOD TIO, release 37, 18 Apr. 1953. 93. Brown to Commandant, “Exercise Desert Rock V” (n. 85), 6. Cf. Hq Camp Desert Rock, “Annex 5 (Shot Victor 5),” 1 June 1953, to “Final Report, Exercise Desert Rock V” (n. 47), 148-151. 94. SAI, “Analysis of Radiation Exposure, 2nd Marine Corps Provisional Atomic Exercise Brigade, Exercise Desert Rock V, Operation Upshot-Knothole,” by G. Frank et al., Report DNA-TR-82-03 (McLean, Va., 5 Feb. 1982). Cf. JRB Associates, Shot Badger: A Test of the Upshot-Knothole Series, 18 April 1953, by Jeannie Massie et al., Report DNA 6015F (McLean, Va., 12 Jan. 1982), 61-63. 95. Elliott to Southwick, 25 Mar. 1953. Cf. TIO release 12, 24 Mar. 1953; Elliott to Shelby Thompson, 27 Mar. 1953; Elliott to Thompson, 28 Mar. 1953. 96. Hq Camp Desert Rock, “Annex 3” (n. 90), 110; JRB Associates, Shots Annie to Ray (n. 89), 65-66, 94.
97. W. EF Lantz, “Special Report . . . on Participation as an Observer at a Volunteer Position in Desert Rock V, Marine Exercise,” n.d. 98. A. C. Graves to Fields, 20 Apr. 1953; Hq Camp Desert Rock, “Annex 3” (n.
93), 153; H. F. Schwethelm, “Selected Officer Volunteer Program,” n.d. (encl. 9 in
Brown to Commandant, “Exercise Desert Rock V” [n. 85]); SAI, Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Troop Observers, Exercise Desert Rock V, Operation UpshotKnothole, by J. Goetz et al., Report DNA 5742F (McLean, Va., 28 Apr. 1981); JRB Associates, Shot Badger (n. 94), 64-65.
99. Hq Camp Desert Rock, “Annex 7 (Shot Victor 7),” 1 June 1953, to “Final Report, Exercise Desert Rock V” (n. 47), 210. See also JRB Associates, Shot Simon: A Test of the Upshot-Knothole Series, 25 April 1953, by Jeannie Massie et al., Report DNA 6016F (McLean, Va., 13 Jan. 1982), 57. 100. SAI, Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Troop Observers (n. 98), especially
89: table 5-1, “Observer Dose Summary”; Goetz to Hacker, 10 July 1989, w/att. “Comments on Elements of Controversy,” 4, citing Charles Cook to Deputy Commander for Operations, “Report of Radiation Received by Volunteer Observers, Exercise Desert Rock V-7,” 29 Apr. 1953. Cf. JRB Associates, Operation UpshotKnothole (n. 47), 216: table 6-8, “Reconstructed Doses for Desert Rock Observers.”
101. Hq Camp Desert Rock, “Annex 7” (n. 99), 204. Cf. JRB Associates, Siot Simon (n. 99), ch. 2. 102. Hq Camp Desert Rock, ‘Annex 7” (n. 99), 207.
330 Notes to Pages 98-101 103. SAIC, Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Maneuver Units: Exercise Desert Rock V, Operation Upshot-Knothole, by R. Edwards et al., Report DNA-TR-84-303 (McLean, Va., 15 Oct. 1985); Goetz, “Comments on Elements of Controversy” (n. 100), 4. Cf. JRB Associates, Shot Simon (n. 99), 55-56. 104. Hq Camp Desert Rock, “Annex 9 (Shot Victor 9),” 1 June 1953, to “Final
Report, Exercise Desert Rock V” (n. 47), 293; JRB Associates, Shots Encore to Climax: The Final Four Tests of the Upshot-Knothole Series, 8 May-4 June 1953, by Jeannie Massie et al., Report DNA 6018F (McLean, Va., 15 Jan. 1982), 76. 105. TIO release 76, 25 May 1953, w/att. fact sheet, “280mm Atomic Rifle”; Hq
Camp Desert Rock, “Annex 10 (Shot Victor 10),” 1 June 1953, to “Final Report, Exercise Desert Rock V” (n. 47), 332, 334-335; IRB Associates, Shots Encore to Climax (n. 104), 166.
106. “Final Report, Exercise Desert Rock V” (n. 47), 14-15. Cf. Shepard G. Schwartz and Berton Winograd, “Preparation of Soldiers for Atomic Maneuvers,” Journal of Social Issues 10, no. 3 (1954): 42-52. For a much harsher journalistic assessment of Desert Rock V, see Howard L. Rosenberg, Atomic Soldiers: American Victims of Nuclear Experiments (Boston: Beacon Press, 1980), 53-61. 107. Preuss to Tyler, 28 Aug. 1952; A. C. Graves to OTO, “Rad-Safe Operation Plan and Personnel Requirements for Operation Upshot/Knothole,” 25 Sept. 1952; Graves to distrib., “Movement of Test Director and Staff from Los Alamos to Nevada Proving Grounds,” 21 Jan. 1953; Dunning to files, “Meeting at AFSWP Concerning Radsafe at the NPG,” 29 Jan. 1953; SFOO, “Administrative Order, Continental Tests,” Feb. 1953, 9-10; TIO, “Background Information on Continental Nuclear Tests, Nevada Proving Grounds and Military Installations: The Spring 1953 Series,” n.d. (ca. 8 Apr.
1953), 14-15; U.S. Army Chemical Corps, General Orders no. 14, 1 July 1953, as cited in Chemical Corps Table of Distribution no. 03-9778-07, 1 Jan. 1954.
108. Tom D. Collison, “Radiological Safety Operation: Report to the Test Director,” AFSWP/FC, Report WT-702 (REF.) (Albuquerque, June 1953), 13-14, 446; JRB Associates, Operation Upshot-Knothole (n. 47), 156-157. 109. Collison, “Radiological Safety” (n. 108), 14. 110. “Roster of Personnel,” encl. 2 to ch. 1 of Collison, “Radiological Safety” (n. 108), 50—56.
111. Collison, “Radiological Safety” (n. 108), 446. 112. “Radiological Safety Operation Order No. 1-53 (Upshot-Knothole),” Annex B: “Radiological Safety Regulations,” paragraph 1, in Collison, “Radiological Safety” (n. 108), encl. 1 to ch. 1, 19.
113. Collison, “Radiological Safety” (n. 108), 442. . 114. JRB Associates, Operation Upshot-Knothole (n. 47), 215: table 6-7, “Film Badge Readings Exceeding Established Limits for JTO Participants at Operation Upshot-Knothole.”
115. JRB Associates, Operation Upshot-Knothole (n. 47), 176-178. For cloud sampling at Upshot-Knothole, see Taylor, History of Air Force Atomic Cloud Sampling (n. 14), ch. 4. 116. Collison, “Radiological Safety” (n. 108), 444. 117. JRB Associates, Operation Upshot-Knothole (n. 47), 189, 215. 118. “Conference on the Collection and Evaluation of Fallout Material Following Nuclear Detonations,” Los Alamos, 5—6 Aug. 1952; Graves to OTO, 25 Sept. (n. 107);
Notes to Pages 101-103 331 Dunning to Fields, “Request for Military Support for Monitoring Program during 1953 Spring Tests,” 23 Oct. 1952; Dunning to James E. Reeves, “Military Support of Monitoring Program,” 9 Dec. 1952; “Notes on Meeting, December 9, 1952, to Establish Network of Stations for World-wide Monitoring”; AEC, “Thirteenth Semiannual Report,” Jan. 1953, 100-112. 119. Shipman to A. C. Graves, “Suggested Change Rad Safe Unit at NPG,” 14 June 1952; interview with William S. Johnson, Phoenix, Arizona, 9 Nov. 1978, transcript, 1-3.
120. Shipman to Bradbury, “Rad Safe Operations at NPG,” 2 Oct. 1952. 121. Graves to OTO, 24 Sept. (n. 106); Kraker to Bradbury, “Request for Personnel, Operation Upshot/Knothole,” 9 Oct. 1952; Bradbury to Kraker, “Request for Personnel, Operation Upshot/Knothole,” 14 Oct. 1952. 122. W. S. Johnson to James G. Terrill, Jr., 21 Oct. 1952; Kraker to Fields, “Request for USPHS Personnel for Off-Site Rad-Safe Unit for Operation Upshot/ Knothole,” 18 Dec. 1952; M. W. Boyer to Terrill, 29 Dec. 1952; Memorandum of Understanding, signed by Tyler for AEC, 16 Mar. 1953, and Otis L. Anderson for PHS, 10 Mar. 1953. Cf. PHS, “Report of Public Health Service Activities in the OffSite Monitoring Program,” Report EMSL-LV-0539-15 (Washington: HEW, n.d.). 123. “Roster of Personnel” (n. 110), 55. 124. Dunning to files, 29 Jan. (n. 107). 125. Collison, “Radiological Safety” (n. 108), 443. 126. A. C. Graves to Fields, 18 Mar. 1953; TIO release 5, 18 Mar. 1953; Collison,
“Radiological Safety” (n. 107), 59-60; map of “Ground Monitoring Results, Shot Annie,” ibid., encl. 8 to ch. 2, 88. See also Hawthorne, Compilation of Local Fallout Data (n. 28), vol. 1, Continental U.S. Tests, 104-106.
127. A. C. Graves to Fields, 26 Mar. 1953; Collison, “Radiological Safety” (n. 108), 102, 104; “Off-Site Shot Activities Journal, Shot Nancy,” ibid., encl. 5 to ch. 3, 119-120; H. J. L. Rechen, “Log of Events, Lincoln Mine, March 24, 1953,” ibid., encl. 11 to ch. 3, 134; Hawthorne, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 126), 110~-112. 128. TIO release 11, 24 Mar. 1953. 129. Collison, “Radiological Safety” (n. 108), 106. 130. Ibid., 151. See also TIO release 18, 31 Mar. 1953; Hawthorne, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 126), 116-118.
131. Collison, “Radiological Safety” (n. 108), 175. See also TIO release 23, 6 Apr. 1953; Hawthorne, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 126), 122. 132. Collison, “Radiological Safety” (n. 108), 189-190; TIO release 29, 11 Apr. 1953; Hawthorne, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 126), 126-128. See also JRB Associates, Shots Annie to Ray (n. 89), 102, 153.
133. Collison, “Radiological Safety” (n. 108), 215-217; Richard H. Fetz and Albert L. Platz to W. S. Johnson, “Special Study, Post Shot VI,” 24 Apr. 1953, ibid.,
encl. 3 to ch. 7, 233-235. See also Hawthorne, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 126), 132-134. 134. Collison, “Radiological Safety” (n. 108), 252. 135. Ibid., 254. See also Hawthorne, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 126), 138-140. 136. A. C. Graves to Fields, 27 Apr. 1953; AEC 487/52, “Preliminary Report on
Seventh Shot in Upshot-Knothole Series,” 30 Apr. 1953; Collison, “Radiolog:cal Safety” (n. 108), 253; “Off-Site Activities Journal, Shot Simon,” ibid., encl. 2 to ch. 8,
332 Notes to Pages 103-105 257-260; W. S. Johnson to Graves, “Special Report on the System of Roadblocks Established on D-Day, Shot Simon,” 29 Apr. 1953, ibid., encl. 3 to ch. 8, 261-282; Reeves to Graves, “Fall-Out Maps Pertaining to Litigation Arising out of Nevada Tests,” 17 June 1955. 137. TIO release 46, 25 Apr. 1953. Cf. Elliott to distrib., “Radiation Fallout,” n.d. 138. TIO release 47, 25 Apr. 1953; “Off-Site Activities Journal, Shot Simon” (n. 136), 259-260; Frank A. Butrico to W. S. Johnson, “Report Covering Vehicle Decontamination Proceedings at Las Vegas, Nevada, 25 Apr. 1953,” in Johnson to Graves, 19 Apr. (n. 136), 269-275; Fetz to Johnson, “Summary of Events at St. George Roadblock,” ibid., 275-280; Otto Paganini, “Roadblock Experience Report, Hwy. 93, Alamo, Nevada, 4/25/53,” 28 Apr. 1953, ibid., 281-282. 139. Fetz to Johnson, 29 Apr. (n. 138), 278. 140. AEC meeting no. 862, 13 May 1953, item 4; B. C. Lyon to Curry, “Report of Activities—J-3, Continental—20 April 1953 to 19 May 1953,” item 2.b; “Highway Rad Safe Plan,” 14 May 1953. 141. Collison, “Radiological Safety” (n. 108), 316. See also A. C. Graves to Fields, 9 May 1953; Hawthorne, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 126), 144-145. 142. A. C. Graves to AEC, 20 May 1953. 143. “Radiation Doses for Infinite Exposure,” in Collison, “Radiological Safety” (n. 108), encl. 4 to ch. 10, 354. See also Hawthorne, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 126), 149-151. 144. “Highway Rad Safe Plan,” 14 May (n. 140); Lyon to Curry, 19 May (n. 140); Collison, “Radiological Safety” (n. 108) 330-331; “Off-Site Activities Journal, Shot Harry,” ibid., encl. 2 to ch. 10, 335-340; Butrico to W. S. Johnson, “Report on the Sequence of Events Occurring in St. George, Utah, as a Result of the Detonation of Shot IX,” 30 May 1953, ibid., encl. 18 to ch. 10, 374—378. 145. TIO release 70, 19 May 1953. 146. TIO release 71, 19 May 1953, 11:30 A.M.; “Off-Site Activities Journal” (n. 144); Butrico to Johnson, 30 May (n. 144).
147. “Highway Rad Safe Plan” (n. 140), part 1, “Responsibilities,” 2; part 3, “Public Relations,” paragraph 2; TIO 71 {m. 146); TIO release 72, 19 May 1953, 3:30 p.M.; Graves to AEC, 20 (n. 142); “Off-Site Activities Journal” (n. 144); Butrico to Johnson, 30 May (n. 144). 148. A. C. Graves to AEC, 20 May 1953. See also Dunning, “Protective and Remedial Measures Taken Following Three Incidents of Fallout,” paper prepared for the symposium “Radiation Protection of the Public in Large Scale Nuclear Disasters,” annual meeting of the Fachverband fiir Strahlenschutz, Interlaken, Switzerland, May 1968, 10-16. For a much more critical journalistic account, see Harvey Wasserman et al., Killing Our Own: The Disaster of America’s Experience with Atomic Radiation (New York: Delta Books, 1982), 70—75. 149. Douglas R. Stringfellow to Dean, 20 May 1953. Utah Sen. Arthur V. Watkins also urged greater care in testing: Watkins to Dean, 23 May 1953. 150. AEC meeting no. 864, 20 May 1953, item 4. 151. AEC meeting no. 865, 21 May 1953, item 1.
152. Ibid., item 2. See also AEC 652, DMA report, “Meteorological Criteria for Test Detonations at Nevada Proving Grounds,” 4 June 1953. 153. Tyler to Fields, 7 May 1953; AEC 487/55, DMA report, “Proposed Addi-
Notes to Pages 105-106 333 tional Shot for Upshot-Knothole Series,” 13 May 1953; AEC meeting no. 863, 18 May 1953, item 1; “Decision on AEC 487/55,” AEC 487/61, 17 June 1953. 154. Eugene M. Zuckert to Dean, “Eleventh (11th) Shot at Nevada,” 20 May 1953; AEC meetings no. 866, 22 May 1953, item 3, and no. 868, 25 May 1953, item 1; Dean, Forging the Atomic Shield (n. 46), 256-258 (entries for 25-27 May 1953);
Gaelen L. Felt to A. C. Graves, “Radiological Hazards near Nevada Proving Grounds,” Aug. 1953, 13-14. 155. A. C. Graves to Fields, 26 May 1953; D. L. Worf to M. W. Boyer, “Trajec-
tory and Fallout of Tenth Atomic Detonation on May 26 [sic] at Nevada Proving Grounds,” 28 May 1953; Collison, “Radiological Safety” (n. 108), 379, 381. See also Hawthorne, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 126), 155-157.
156. Dean to Lewis L. Strauss, 26 May 1953; AEC meeting no. 871, 27 May 1953, item 2; TIO releases 81, 30 May 1953, and 82, 2 June 1953. 157. A. C. Graves to Fields, 5 June 1953. See also TIO release 84, 4 June 1953; Collison, “Radiological Safety” (n. 108), 409-410; Hawthorne, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 126), 161-162. 158. R. G. Elliott to files, “Statement on Sheep, NPG,” 9 June 1953; AEC meeting
no. 875, 10 June 1953, item 10; Fields to Tyler, 11 June 1953; Paul B. Pearson to Bugher, “Sheep Losses in Nevada and Utah,” 12 June 1953; Dunning to Bugher, “Discussions on Alleged Radiation Injury to Animals and on Public Relations at the Nevada Proving Ground,” 12 June 1953; Dunning to files, “Alleged Injury to Animals as Result of Tests at NPG,” 12 June 1953. 159. Fields to M. W. Boyer, 15 June 1953. 5 The Cost of Sheep: Fallout and the Future of Nevada Testing, 1953 1. See ch. 3, pp. 80-81, above.
2. Joe B. Sanders to files, “Irradiated Cattle Owned by Mr. Stuart [Stewart Brothers],” 1 June 1953; Gordon M. Dunning to Vincent G. Huston, “Information on Cattle and Horses Claimed to Have Been Damaged by Radiation from Fallout,” 11 June 1953; Dunning to files, “Alleged Injury to Animals as Result of Tests at NPG,” 12 June 1953. Many of the documents cited in this chapter were reproduced in 1979 congressional hearings: U.S. Cong., House, Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, Low-Level Radiation Effects on Health, hearings, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 1979; idem, and Senate, Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, Subcomm. on Scientific Research, and Senate, Comm. on the Judiciary, Health Effects of Low-Level Radiation, 2 vols., joint hearing, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 1979. 3. Dunning to Committee on the Judiciary et al., 10 Sept. 1984, w/att. comments, 7. The 31 pages of comments address his disagreements with testimony presented during the 1979 hearings (n. 2) and material in the related staff report: Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations, “The Forgotten Guinea Pigs”: A Report on Health Effects of Low-Level Radiation Sustained as a Result of the Nuclear Weapons Testing Program Conducted by the United States Government, staff report, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Aug. 1980. Apparently, Dunning was moved to reply when he read allegations about his role and motives in two questionable journalistic accounts that made extensive use of these hearings, the documents they reproduced, and the staff report: John
334 Notes to Pages 106-107 G. Fuller, The Day We Bombed Utah: America’s Most Lethal Secret (New York: New American Library, 1984); and the draft by Philip L. Fradkin, “Downwind: An American Nuclear: Tragedy” (later published as Fallout: An American Nuclear Tragedy (Tucson: Univ. of Arizona Press, 1989]). See Attachment 1 (correspondence between Fradkin and Dunning, 18 Feb. 1983 to 6 Aug. 1984) to Dunning, untitled critique of Fradkin, Fallout, Apr. 1989; and Dunning to Marshall Page, Jr., 22 Oct. 1984, w/att. untitled rebuttal to Fuller, The Day We Bombed Utah. See also interview with Dunning, Las Vegas, 19 July 1989, transcript, 6-7. 4. Dunning entry in American Men & Women of Science: Physical and Biological Sciences, Jaques Cattell Press, ed., 14th ed., vol. 2 (New York: R. R. Bowker, 1979); Dunning interview transcript (n. 3), 48-49. 5. Dunning to Huston, 11 June (n. 2); Dunning interview transcript (n. 3), 10-11.
6. Protocols from pathological examinations of equine and bovine samples by John H. Rust and Bernard F, Trum, dated 23 and 24 June 1953. The quotation 1s from the pathological diagnosis entry in protocol no. 597, 24 June, signed by Rust. See also August T. Rossano, Jr., “Report of Circumstances Surrounding the Collection of Water and Soil Samples at Lake Papoose Reservoir—June 5, 1953,” 6 June 1953; Rust, Trum, and Cyril L. Comar, “Report of Farm Animal Survey at Nevada Test Site,” 16 June 1953; Paul B. Pearson to John C. Bugher, “Livestock Losses around Test Site,” 21 June 1953; J. B. Sanders to files, “Afflicted Animals from Range Areas Close to Nevada Proving Grounds,” 22 June 1953; William W. Allaire to files, “Report on Trip of June 10-16, 1953, re Livestock in the Nevada Proving Grounds Area,” 24 June 1953. 7. EC meetings no. 888, 15 July 1953, item 2, and no. 933, 28 Oct. 1953, item 1.a; Bugher to Carroll L. Tyler, “Damage to Horses from Beta Burns,” 7 Aug. 1953; James E. Reeves to Seth R. Woodruff, Jr., “Replying to Inquiries on Horse Actions,” 17 Aug. 1953; Bugher to Marion W. Boyer, “Death of Cattle Adjacent to Test Site,” 26 Aug. 1953, w/att. Pearson report, same title, n.d.; J. B. Sanders to files, “Afflicted Animals—Vicinity of Nevada Proving Grounds,” 27 Aug. 1953; Sanders to Trum, 23
Sept. 1953; AEC 604/2, “Death of Cattle Adjacent to Test Site,” 2 Sept. 1953; Sanders to Richard G. Elliott, “Settlements on Horses and Blast Damage,” 9 Oct. 1953. See also “Horses Suffer Burns from Radiation Near Nevada A-Test Site,” Albuquerque Tribune, 25 Aug. 1953; “A-Blasts Affect Horses, Studies Show,” Salt Lake Tribune, 25 Aug. 1953; “Nevada Cattle Suffer A-Radiation Injuries,” Santa Fe New Mexican, 25 Aug. 1953.
8. Sanders to Trum, 23 Sept. (n. 7); Trum to J. B. Sanders, 30 Nov. 1953, w/att. Trum to Stewart Brothers, 30 Nov. 1953; S. R. Woodruff to Tyler, “Report on Livestock Allegedly Damaged by Radiation—NPG,” 10 Dec. 1953; Tyler to Bugher, “Letter Report on Stewart’s Cows—Nevada Proving Grounds,” 15 Dec. 1953; Tyler to Woodruff, “Report of Livestock Allegedly Damaged by Radiation—NPG,” 23 Dec. 1953; Sanders to files, “Stewarts’ Cattlhe—Stock Damage, NPG,” 6 Jan. 1954; Trum to Pearson, 14 Jan. 1954; Woodruff to Pearson, “Livestock Damage—Nevada Proving Grounds,” 25 Jan. 1954; Woodruff to Tyler, “Stewart’s Cattlheh—Livestock Damage— NPG,” 11 Feb. 1954; Donald J. Leehey to Bugher, 23 Feb. 1954; Allaire to files, “Stewart’s Cattle,” 24 Feb. 1954; Pearson to Leehey, 24 Feb. 1954; Woodruff to Leehey, “Stewarts’ Cattle—Livestock Damage—NPG,” 26 Feb. 1954; Chester G.
Notes to Pages 107-110 335 Brinck to Woodruff, “Possible Damage to Stewart Cattle,” 26 Feb. 1954; Trum to Sanders, 30 Dec. 1954; Trum to Woodruff, “Report Regarding the Cattle Belonging to the Stewart Brothers,” 30 Dec. 1954. 9. F. H. Melvin to Chief BAI, 8 June 1953. See also Warren B. Earl to John I. Curtis, 11 June 1953; Monroe A. Holmes to James H. Steele, “Compiled Report on Co-operative Field Survey of Sheep Deaths in S.W. Utah (Cedar City); by the US. Public Health Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, B.A.I., the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, the University of Utah Medical School, Utah Agricultural College, and Utah State Department of Health,” n.d. (ca. 15 Aug. 1953), 1-2; James G. Termill, Jr., “Interim Report on the Investigation of the Deaths of Sheep in Areas Affected by Atomic Fall-Out,” 21 Aug. 1953. 10. Dunning to files, 12 June (n. 2). 11. J. H. Steele to PHS Executive Office, “Epidemic Aid Request from Dr. G. A. Spendlove, Health Officer, Utah,” 4 June 1953; J. B. Sanders to files, “Alleged Damage to Stock on Range Lands Close to NPG,” n.d. (ca. 9 June 1953); Dunning to files, 12 June (n. 2); “Data on Sheep Loss—Cedar City, Utah Area: Preliminary Investigation Begun Friday, June 5, 1953,” 17 June 1953; Pearson to Bugher, 21 June (n. 6), 5; Holmes to Steele, n.d. (n. 9), 2-3; entry for George Arthur Spendlove in American Men & Women of Science (n. 4), vol. 6. 12. “Data on Sheep Loss” (n. 11); Holmes to Steele, n.d. (n. 9), 3-4. 13. Sanders to files, n.d. (n. 11). 14. Elliott to files, “Statement on Sheep, NPG,” 9 June 1953; “Experts Puzzled by
Mysterious Deaths of Sheep,” Salt Lake Tribune, 7 June 1953; “AEC Investigates Effect of Fail Out on Animals,” Las Vegas Review-Journal, 7 June 1953; “A-Sickness Suspected in Sheep,” Albuquerque Tribune, 8 June 1953; ““AEC Investigates Danger of Fallouts to Sheep, Crops,” Oxnard Press Courier, 8 June 1953. 15. Dunning to Bugher, “Discussions on Alleged Radiation Injury to Animals and on Public Relations at the Nevada Proving Ground,” 12 June 1953. 16. AEC meeting no. 875, 10 June 1953, item 10. See also Dunning to Bugher, 12 June (n. 15). 17. Notes on radiation readings and samples collected at Cedar City, 6/13/53; J. B. Sanders to files, “Trip to Cedar City, Utah, to Check with Stockmen, Perform Post Mortems on Afflicted Sheep and Obtain Location of Grazing Rights,” n.d. (ca. 15 June 1953); “Data on Sheep Loss—Cedar City, Utah, Area: Second Preliminary Investigation,” 17 June 1953; Allaire to files, 24 June (n. 6); S. R. Woodruff to Robert E, Thompsett, “Samples,” 15 June 1953; Woodruff to Robert H. Veenstra, “Samples,” 15 June 1953. 18. Allaire to files, 24 June (n. 6). 19. Kenneth E. Fields to Marion W. Boyer, 15 June 1953. 20. Fields to Tyler, 16 June 1953; Tyler to distrib., “Livestock and Mining Matters, Nevada Proving Grounds Area,” 26 June 1953; Bugher to Boyer, 26 Aug. (n. 7); Paul B. Pearson entry in American Men & Women of Science (n. 4), vol. 5.
21. Pearson to Bugher, “Sheep Losses in Utah and Nevada,” 12 June 1953. On photosensitization as understood in the United States during the early 1950s, see I. E. Newsom, Sheep Diseases (Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins, 1952), ch. 19, “Diseases Due to Poisonous Plants—Photosensitization”; for the current view, see Cleon V.
336 Notes to Pages 110-111 Kimberling, Jensen and Swift's Diseases of Sheep, 3d ed. (Philadelphia: Lea & Febiger, 1988), 293-298. 22. Pearson to Bugher, 21 June (n. 6); Sanders to files, 22 June (n. 6); Allaire to files (n. 6). 23. Pearson to Bugher, 21 June (n. 6). 24. Ibid. See also Elliott to Fields, “Clipping—Las Vegas Review Journal, July 16, 1953,” 16 July 1953, w/att. “Southeast Nevada Cattle Crisis Worsens; 1400 Animals Dead,” Las Vegas Review-Journal, 16 July 1953; John L. O’ Harra to J. B. Sanders, 25 July 1953, w/att. “Report of Committee Investigating Drought Conditions, State of Nevada,” 21 July 1953. 25. Pearson to Bugher, 11 June (n. 6). 26. Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, eds., The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 3d ed. (Washington: Department of Defense and Department of Energy, 1977), 624; Charles W. Hagen, Jr., to Barton C. Hacker, 30 May 1984. Cf. I. S. Eve, “A Review of
the Physiology of the Gastrointestinal Tract in Relation to Radiation Doses from Radioactive Materials,” Health Physics 12 (1966): 131-161; this review deals with the human model, which had not been revised since 1953. 27. See, e.g., L. A. Stoddart, “Report on Livestock Conditions Adjacent to the Las Vegas Bombing Range,” 22 June 1953; Rust and Trum pathology protocols, 23 and 24 June (n. 6); Arthur H. Wolff to Holmes, 24 June 1953, w/att. “Preliminary Report of Radioassays of Selected Tissue Specimens of Sheep from the Cedar City, Utah, Area,” n.d. 28. Wolff to Edward M. Kennedy, Bob Eckhardt, and Scott M. Matheson, 10 Aug.
1979, w/att. “Comments on Report by Dr. Harold Knapp Entitled ‘Sheep Deaths in Utah and Nevada Following the 1953 Nuclear Tests,’” 9 Aug. 1979, 1, published as annex 26 to Appendix E of Knapp, “Sheep Deaths in Utah and Nevada Following the 1953 Nuclear Tests,” 1 Aug. 1979 (revised 9 May 1980), in Low-Level Radiation Effects on Health (n. 2), 791. 29. AEC meeting no. 877, 17 June 1953, item 8. See also Tyler to Fields, 16 June 1953; Fields to Tyler, 18 June 1953; Tyler to Fields, 19 June 1953.
30. Rust et al., “Report of Farm Animal Survey” (n. 6), 5. See also Rust, “Pathology Report on Special AEC Problem,” n.d. (ca. 24 June 1953).
31. “Atom Poison Out in Sheep Deaths; Hunger Blamed,” Deseret News (Salt Lake City), 24 June 1953; “Nevada Livestock Losses Due to Poor Range, Not Atom Tests,” Las Vegas Morning Sun, 2 July 1953; “Test of Utah Sheep Sera Collected by Dr. [William H.] Hadlow from Trip of 6/5/53,” 11 June 1953; Hadlow, Necropsy records of ovine females, no. P53-353 and -354, 30 June 1953; Hadlow to Holmes, 10 July 1953; Hadlow to Rust, 14 July 1953; Trum to O’Harra, 28 Aug. 1953; O’Harra to Trum, 5 Sept. 1953. 32. Rust to Pearson, 21 July 1953. 33. Hadlow to Rust, 27 July 1953. 34. Veenstra to Allaire, 17 June 1953. 35. Stoddart, “Report on Livestock Conditions” (n. 27); W. T. Huffman to H. W.
Schoening, 23 June 1953; Holmes to Huffman, 24 June 1953; “Dead Utah Sheep Show Radiation,” Deseret News, 10 July 1953; Dee A. Broadbent to Holmes, 20 July 1953; Broadbent to Holmes, 27 July 1953.
Notes to Pages 112-114 337 36. Wolff to Holmes, 24 June 1953 (Wolff’s emphasis). See also Wolff to Hadlow, 10 June 1953; Wolff, “Results of Radioassay of Tissues from Sheep in Southwest Utah,” 5 Aug. 1953. 37. Betsy J. Stover to Holmes, 21 July 1953, w/att. Stover to Holmes, “Report on Southern Utah Sheep,” 21 July 1953. 38. Pearson to Allaire, 22 July 1953; Pearson to Bugher, “Salt Lake City Conference on Livestock Losses,” 13 Aug. 1953. 39. Thompsett to Reuben E. Cole, “Possible Radiation of Animals,” n.d. (ca. 3 Aug. 1953). 40. Bugher to Lewis L. Strauss, “Comments on Fallout Memoranda,” 8 July 1953. 41. AEC meeting no. 888, 15 July 1953, item 2. 42. Elliott to distrib., “Test Fallout Information Activity,” 15 July 1953; Morse Salisbury to distrib., “Statement That Might Be Issued If Authoritative Sources Cniticize NPG Operations,” 29 July 1953. 43. AEC, “Major Activities in the Atomic Energy Programs, January—June 1953,” Washington, July 1953, 52. See also SFOO SF-54-4, 24 July 1953, for release 30 July 1953; “AEC Discounts Excessive Atom ‘Fall-out’ as Hazard,” Salt Lake Tribune, 30 July 1953. 44, Pearson to Allaire, 22 July 1953. 45. Strauss to Douglas R. Stringfellow, 5 Aug. 1953. 46. Pearson to Bugher, 13 Aug. (n. 38). 47. Ibid.; Terrill, “Interim Report on the Investigation of the Deaths of Sheep” (n. 9), 3-5; Sanders to files, 27 Aug. (n. 7); Allaire to files, “Report of Trip to Salt Lake City Meeting re Nevada-Utah Livestock,” 7 Aug. 1953; W. T. Huffman to Schoening, 26 Aug. 1953. 48. Sanders to files, 27 Aug. (n. 7). See also Thompsett to Cole, n.d. (n. 39); John A. Seller to Veenstra, “Thyroid Samples from Major Veenstra,” 25 June 1953; J. S. Reed to Veenstra, “Answers to Questions Raised by Dispatch Discussed Verbally,” 29 June 1953; Veenstra to Reeves, 30 June 1953; Reed to Veenstra, “Sheep Samples of Tissue, Data from,” 3 July 1953; Reeves to Holmes, 3 July 1953; Veenstra to R. E. Cole, 20 July 1953. 49. Holmes to Steele, n.d. (n. 9), 13. 50. Terrill, “Interim Report on the Investigation of the Deaths of Sheep” (n. 9), 7. See also William L. Guthrie to Fields, “Status of Investigation on Horses, Cattle, and Sheep,” 11 Aug. 1953.
51. Allaire to files, 7 Aug. (n. 47), 4-5; Pearson to Bugher, 13 Aug. (n. 38), 5; Terrill, “Interim Report on the Investigation of the Deaths of Sheep” (n. 9), 5. 52. Pearson to Bugher, 13 Aug. (n. 38), 5. 53. Sanders to files, 27 Aug. (n. 7). 54. Shirley Foster (secretary to Stephen L. Brower, County Agricultural Agent,
Iron County, Utah), “Notes from Meeting of Atomic Energy Commission, State Health Department, Livestockmen and Others, Held at the City and County Building, in Cedar City,” 9 Aug. 1953. Quotations are at 3 and 4. A slightly different version identifies speakers somewhat more fully: “Notes Taken at Meeting of Atomic Energy Commission, State Health Department, Public Health Department, Livestockmen and Others. .. .”
338 Notes to Pages 114-118 55. Terrill, “Interim Report on the Investigation of the Deaths of Sheep” (n. 9), 6.
56. Ibid., 7. See also J. B. Sanders to Pearson, “Investigation of Livestock Conditions, Ely-Eureka Areas,” 24 Aug. 1953. 57. Pearson to Hadlow, 13 Aug. 1953; Pearson to Comar, 13 Aug. 1953; Pearson to Broadbent, 13 Aug. 1953. 58. Tyler to Fields, “Actions Proposed on NPG Livestock Losses,” 18 Aug. 1953, 1-2. 59. Ibid., 3. 60. Ibid., 4—S.
61. Fields to Tyler, 24 Aug. 1953.
62. Committee on Operational Future of NPG, “Report,” 11 May 1953; AEC meeting no. 877, 17 June 1953, item 8; Fields to Tyler, 18 June 1953. See also ch. 4, pp. 91-95, above. 63. Minutes of 81st AEC-MLC meeting, 28 May 1953, item 2.
64. Raymond P. Campbell, Jr., to Fields, “Radioactive Fallout from UpshotKnothole,” 8 May 1953. 65. R. P. Campbell to Guthrie, “Radioactive Fallout from Upshot-Knothole,” 27 July 1953.
66. Thomas L. Shipman to Darol K. Froman, “Fallout in Nevada and Utah,” 2 June 1953.
67. Tyler to Fields, “Radioactive Fallout from Upshot/Knothole,” 21 July 1953, w/att. Alvin C. Graves to Reeves, 13 July 1953. 68. A. C. Graves, “Radiation Exposures,” n.d. 69. Bugher to Harry H. Haight, “Letter of Inquiry from Colonel Karl H. Houghton,” 12 Mar. 1953. 70. Dunning to R. P. Campbell, “Suggested Changes in Memorandum for Commissioner [Thomas E.] Murray re Purchase of Groom Mine,” 10 July 1953. 71. AEC meeting no. 862, 13 May 1953, item 2. 72. Tyler to Fields, 11 May 1953. 73. Bugher to Haight, 12 Mar. (n. 69). 74. AEC meetings no. 869, 26 May 1953, item 1, and no. 875, 10 June 1953, item 11; Robert G. Lecompte to files, “[James E.] Van Zandt Statement of Tests Causing Weather Disturbances,” 10 June 1953; Colonel Jack L. Armstrong to Editor, New York Times, 12 June 1953; AEC 652/1, “Effects of Atomic Explosions on Weather Conditions in the U.S.,” 16 June 1953; J. L. Morrisson, “Outline of Proposed Testimony at Possible Congressional Hearing on Effect of Atomic Tests on the Weather,” 19 June 1953; AEC 652/2, “Effects of Atomic Explosions on Weather Conditions in the U.S.,” 14 July 1953; Elliott, “The Public Relations of Continental Tests,” 23 Sept. 1953. 75. AEC meeting no. 875, 10 June 1953, item 10; Fields to Tyler, 11 June 1953; Dunning to Bugher, “Recommendations for Organization of Off-Site Radiological Safety at the Nevada Proving Ground,” 11 June 1953; Dunning to Bugher, 12 June (n. 15); Eugene M. Zuckert to Fields, 18 June 1953; Fields to Tyler, 18 June 1953; Fields to Zuckert, 23 June 1953; Marcus F. Cooper to Tyler, “Reconvening of Committee to Study the Operational Future of the Nevada Proving Grounds,” 7 July 1953. 76. Elliott (Secretary) to chairman, members and advisers of Committee to Study NPG, “Summary of Actions Taken, August 6, 1953,” 10 Aug. 1953. 77. Cooper to Tyler, 7 July (n. 75).
Notes to Pages 119-122 339 78. Tyler to Guthrie, 22 July 1953, w/att. Scope for consideration. 79. Elliott to chairman et al., 10 Aug. (n. 76). 80. Tyler to Fields, “Transmittal of NPG Study Document,” 25 Sept. 1953, w/att. Froman, “The Necessity for and Value of Continental Tests,” 28 Aug. 1953; Paul T. Preuss, “Importance of the Nevada Proving Grounds to the Department of Defense,” 28 Aug. 1953; Tyler to distrib., “Documentation of Establishment of Continental Test
Site,” 14 Sept. 1953, w/att. SFOO, “Review of Establishment of Continental Test Site,” Sept. 1953; Gaelen L. Felt and A. C. Graves to members of Committee to Study NPG, “Transmittal of Paper on ‘Criteria for Future Continental Tests,’” 11 Sept. 1953, w/att. Felt and Graves, “Criteria for Future Continental Tests,” n.d. 81. Elliott, “Public Relations of Continental Tests” (n. 74); Bugher to members of Committee to Study NPG, “Interpretations of the Standards of Radiological Exposure,” 8 Sept. 1953, w/att. Bugher, same title, n.d.; Howard L. Andrews, “Residual Radioactivity Associated with the Testing of Nuclear Devices within the Continental Limits of the United States,” 13 Sept. 1953. 82. Elliott to chairman et al., 10 Aug. (n. 76); Tyler to Bugher, “Study—Continental Atomic Test Sites,” 20 Aug. 1953; Reeves to A. C. Graves, “Nevada Proving Grounds History of Establishment,” 21 Aug. 1953; Reeves to Huston, “Selection of Continental Test Site,” 28 Aug. 1953; Tyler to distrib., 14 Sept. (n. 80); Armstrong to Reeves, “Documentation of Establishment of Continental Test Site,” 29 Sept. 1953. 83. Bugher, “Interpretations of the Standards of Radiological Exposure” (n. 81), 1-2. 84. Ibid., 3. See also table 1, “Personnel Exposures.” 85. Ibid., 3—4.
86. Ibid., 1-2. 87. Ibid., 4. 88. Ibid., 5-6. 89. Ibid., 6. 90. Elliott to chairman et al., 10 Aug. (n. 76). Cf. H. L. Andrews, “Essentials of Instrumentation,” in AFSWP, Radiological Defense, vol. 3, A Series of Indoctrination Lectures on Atomic Explosion, with Medical Aspects (Washington, n.d.), 25; entry for Andrews in American Men & Women of Science (n. 4), vol. 1.
91. Andrews, “Residual Radioactivity Associated with the Testing of Nuclear Devices” (n. 81), 7. 92. Ibid., 3—4. 93. Bugher to Strauss, 8 July (n. 40). 94. Elliott, “Public Relations of Continental Tests” (n. 74), 2-3.
95. Ibid., 4-5. 96. Ibid., 10. 97. Ibid., 11. 98. Ibid., 11-12. 99. Ibid., 12-17. 100. “Notes on Presentation and Discussion at Sept. 24 & 25 Sessions of Committee to Study Nevada Proving Grounds Relating to Continental Tests Public Relations and to Public Education and Information,” 7 Oct. 1953. 101. Tyler to Fields, “Preliminary Report on Continental Tests and Future Utilization of Nevada Proving Grounds,” 29 Sept. 1953.
340 Notes to Pages 122-125 102. Tyler to members and advisers, Committee to Study NPG, “Assignments for Further Studies on NPG,” 19 Oct. 1953. 103. Tyler to Fields, 29 Sept. (n. 101). 104. Committee to Study NPG, “Report,” 1 Feb. 1954, 4. 105. Elliott, “Public Relations of Continental Tests” (n. 74), 14. 106. Stringfellow to Strauss, 16 Sept. 1953.
107. Strauss to Stringfellow, 25 Sept. 1953. Cf. Allaire to files, “Telephone Conversation with Commander [Guy J.] Anderson, DMA, Relative to Sheep and Groom Mine,” 24 Sept. 1953; Anderson for record, “Telephone Conversation with Bill Allaire on September 24, 1953,” 24 Sept. 1953; Elliott to Shelby Thompson, “Replying to Inquiries on Sheep Losses,” 30 Sept. 1953. 108. Leo K. Bustad et al., “A Comparative Study of Hanford and Utah Sheep,” Report HW-30119 (Richland, Wash.: Hanford Atomic Products Operation, 30 Nov. 1953), 1-2. See also R. C. Thompson et al., “Validity of Maximum Permissible Standards for Internal Exposure,” in Proceedings of the First International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Geneva, Aug. 1955, vol. 11, Biological Effects of Radiation (New York: United Nations, 1956), 202-203, citing Bustad et al., ““Toxicity of I'3} in Sheep. X, Low-Level Chronic Effects,” in Hanford Works, Biology
Research—Annual Report for 1953, Report HW-30437 (Richland, Wash., 1954), 131-140. 109. Trum to Pearson, 15 Sept. 1953; Health Division Progress Report, 20 Sept.— 20 Oct. 1953; Trum to Clarence C. Lushbaugh, 4 Nov. 1953; Lushbaugh et al., “Comparative Study of Experimentally Produced Beta Lesions and Skin Lesions in Utah Range Sheep,” Los Alamos, 30 Nov. 1953. 110. Melvin to Chief BAI, 29 Oct. 1953; Holmes to J. H. Steele, “Report of Conference Held at Los Alamos, New Mexico, on Utah Sheep Deaths and Experimentally Induced Beta-Radiation Burns on Sheep,” 9 Nov. 1953; [Wolff,] “Report of Trp to Los Alamos, October 26-29, 1953,” n.d. 111. Holmes to Steele, 9 Nov. (n. 110). 112. Wolff, “Report of Trip to Los Alamos” (n. 110). 113. Trum to Lushbaugh, 4 Nov. (n. 109). 114. [Dunning,] “October 27, 1953, Los Alamos Conference on Livestock Losses,” with signatures. On Dunning’s self-perceived role, see Dunning comments, 10 Sept. (n. 3), 9; cf. Dunning to Salisbury, “Alleged Radiation Damage to Sheep,” 3 Nov. 1953.
115. Lushbaugh to Dunning, 12 Feb. 1981, as quoted in Dunning comments, 10 Sept. (n. 3), 10. 116. Melvin to Chief BAT, 29 Oct. (n. 110). 117. Holmes to Steele, 9 Nov. (n. 110). 118. Wolff, “Report of Trip to Los Alamos” (n. 110; Wolff’s emphasis). 119. Holmes to Steele, 9 Nov. (n. 110); Melvin to Chief BAI, 29 Oct. (n. 110); Trum to Henry A. Gill, Jr., 13 Mar. 1982, as quoted in Dunning comments, 10 Sept. (n. 3), 10. Cf. Trum to Lushbaugh, 4 Nov. (n. 109). 120. Dunning comments, 10 Sept. (n. 3), 9. Cf. Dunning to Salisbury, 3 Nov. (n. 114).
121. Holmes to Steele, 9 Nov. (n. 110); Melvin to Chief BAI, 29 Oct. (n. 110); Wolff, “Report of Trip to Los Alamos” (n. 110).
Notes to Pages 125-128 341 122. J. B. Sanders to Trum, 19 Oct. 1953. Cf. Holmes to Steele, 9 Nov. (n. 110). Thompsett never did change his mind about a link between fallout and sheep deaths, as he told a reporter shortly before his death (Fradkin, Fallout [n. 3], 274, n. 42, citing Deseret News, 8 Mar. 1979). 123. Lushbaugh to J. B. Sanders, 24 Nov. 1953. 124. J. B. Sanders to Reeves, “Livestock Losses Vicinity of NPG,” 30 Oct. 1953. Cf. Terrill, “Interim Report on the Investigation of the Deaths of Sheep” (n. 9), 7; J. B. Sanders to Pearson, 24 Aug. (n. 56). 125. Tommy F. McCraw to L. Joe Deal, “Possible Issues Related to Past Offsite Exposures around NTS,” 14 Feb. 1979; S. C. Black and G. D. Potter, “Historical Perspectives on Selected Health and Safety Aspects of Nuclear Weapons Testing,” Health Physics 51 (1986): 17-33; Dunning to whom it may concern, n.d. [ca. 1986— 1989], w/att. “Comments on Justice Downwind by Howard Ball,” 6. 126. Trum, “Report on Examination of Sheep in Vicinity of Ely, Nevada, August 1953,” 7 Sept. 1953. Cf. Trum and Rust, necropsy no. 651, ovine female, 7 Sept. 1953.
127. Wolff to Terrill, “Utah Sheep,” 13 Oct. 1953. 128. Pearson to Veenstra, 19 Oct. 1953; [Dunning,] “Compilation of Radiation Dose to the Thyroid of Sheep Resulting from the Ingestion of Iodine from Fallout during the Spring 1953 Nuclear Tests,”’ n.d.; Dunning to Trum, 23 Nov. 1953; Dunning comments, 10 Sept. (n. 3), 7. 129. Dunning, “Compilation of Radiation Dose to the Thyroid of Sheep” (n. 128), 1-4, 130. Ibid., 5—9 (quote at 5). 131. Pearson to Veenstra, 19 Oct. (n. 128). 132. Veenstra to Pearson, 23 Dec. 1953. See also Veenstra to Trum, 7 Apr. 1955. This most complete statement of Veenstra’s skepticism about AEC findings carries an unexplained notice that it “was not sent, has not been published and is confidential to the Department” (reproduced in Low-Level Radiation Effects on Health [n. 2], 692—693). 133. Dunning to Salisbury, 3 Nov. (n. 114). 134. Pearson to Bugher, “Conference at Los Alamos on Beta Burns on Sheep,” 4 Nov. 1953. 135. AEC 604/3, DBM report, “Sheep Losses Adjacent to the Nevada Proving Grounds,” 4 Nov. 1953, 1-2. 136. Ibid., 8. 137. Ibid. 138. Pearson to Veenstra, 17 Nov. 1953; Veenstra to Pearson, 23 Dec. (n. 132); Pearson to Veenstra, 11 Jan. 1954. Cf. Trum, “[Tnp] Report of Lt. Col. Trum, March 31 to April 20, 1955,” n.d., 3-4; Veenstra to Trum, 7 Apr. (n. 132). 139, Pearson to Tyler, “Report on Sheep Losses,” 5 Nov. 1953; Pearson to Bugher, “Conference with Dr. George A. Spendlove,” 5 Nov. 1953; George P. Kraker to Pearson, “Report on Sheep Losses,” 16 Nov. 1953; Bustad et al., “Comparative Study of Hanford and Utah Sheep” (n. 108); Lushbaugh et al., “Comparative Study of Experimentally Produced Beta Lesions” (n. 109).
140. [Pearson] draft, “Final Report on Sheep Losses Adjacent to the Nevada Proving Grounds,” n.d.; Pearson to Terrill, 11 Dec. 1953; AEC Memo for Information,
342 Notes to Pages 128-129 “Report on Sheep Losses Adjacent to the Nevada Proving Grounds,” 22 Dec. 1953; Samuel C. Ingraham to Wolff and Holmes, ““AEC Report on Sheep Losses Adjacent to the Nevada Proving Ground,” 24 Dec. 1953; Terrill to Spendlove, 24 Dec. 1953. 141. Pearson draft, “Final Report on Sheep Losses” (n. 140), 1. 142. Notes on telephone conversation between Allaire and Howard C. Browa, Jr., 23 Dec. 1953; Allaire to files, “Report on Sheep Losses,” 24 Dec. 1953; Holmes to Spendlove, “Observations and Comments on Draft of Paul Pearson’s Final Report on Sheep Losses, Dated December 16th, 1953,” 30 Dec. 1953. 143. Holmes to Spendlove, 30 Dec. (n. 142). 144. AEC, “Report on Sheep Losses Adjacent to the Nevada Proving Grounds,” 6 Jan. 1954, 1. 145. Notes on Allaire-Brown conversation, 23 Dec. (n. 142); Pearson to Roy B. Snapp, “Information Staff Paper on Sheep Losses,” 4 Jan. 1954; Pearson to Spendlove, 5 Jan. 1954; SFOO SF-54-19, 8 Jan. 1954, for release 13 Jan. 1954 w/att. AEC, “Report on Sheep Losses” (n. 144); Strauss to W. Sterling Cole, 11 Jan. 1954; Strauss to Stringfellow, 11 Jan. 1954; Pearson to Veenstra, 11 Jan. 1954; AEC 604/4, DBM report, “Report on Sheep Losses Adjacent to the Nevada Proving Grounds,” 13 Jan. 1954.
146. Pearson to Bugher, “Report on Meetings in Utah on Sheep Losses,” 19 Jan. 1954. See also list, “People attending Salt Lake City meeting January 12, 1954,” n.d. 147. Transcription of remarks at “Meeting of Livestockmen and AEC Officials, January 13, 9:30 A.M., Fire House, Conference Room, Cedar City, Utah,” n.d., w/att.
list, “Those in attendance at the meeting at Fire House in Cedar City, January 13, 1954, 9:30 A.M.”
148. Pearson to Bugher, 19 Jan. (n. 146). 149. “Meeting of Livestockmen and AEC,” 13 Jan. (n. 147); Spendlove to Stnngfellow, 14 Jan. 1954; “A.E.C. Denies Rays Killed Utah Sheep,” New York Times, 17 Jan. 1954; Pearson to Spendlove, 20 Jan. 1954; Stringfellow to Strauss, 10 Feb. 1954; AEC 604/5, “Study of Sheep Losses Adjacent to the Nevada Proving Grounds,” 17 Feb. 1954; Strauss to Stringfellow, 9 Mar. 1954; J. B. Sanders to Trum, 22 Mar. 1954;
Stringfellow to Strauss, 20 Apr. 1954; Strauss to Stringfellow, 4 May 1954; AEC 604/6, “Study of Sheep Losses Adjacent to the Nevada Proving Grounds,” 6 May 1954; Utah Agricultural Experiment Station, “The Effect of Level of Nutrition on the Pathology and Productivity of Range Sheep: First Progress Report, April 15, 1954 to January 15, 1955,” n.d. 150. Sanders to Trum, 22 Mar. (n. 149). 151. Charles F. Eason to Chalmers C. King, “(1) Douglas Cory v. U.S.—Civil C-22-55; (2) A. C. Seegmiller & Myron Higbee, etc. v. U.S.—Civil C-23-55; (3) Lillian W. Clark, Admx., etc. v. U.S.—Civil C-27-55; (4) Nelson Webster v. United States U.S.D.C. for the D. of Utah, Civil Action No. C 26-55; (5) David C. Bulloch, et al. v. United States, U.S.D.C for the District of Utah—Civil Action No. C-19-55,” 16 Mar. 1955, w/att. copies of complaints. The several suits were consolidated as Bulloch et al. v. United States, Civil C-19-55; the trial record is reprinted in Health Effects of Low-Level Radiation (n. 2), 1: 628-1404.
152. For a summary of the case as decided in 1956, then revived in 1982, see Howard Ball, Justice Downwind: America’s Atomic Testing Program in the 1950's
Notes to Pages 129-132 343 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1986), Appendix A, “The Long Journey of Bulloch v. United States, 1953— : Polaris Sighted?” See also Epilogue, below. 153. Tyler to Fields, “Nevada Proving Grounds,” 21 Dec. 1953.
154. Committee to Study NPG, “Report” (n. 104); Tyler to distrib., “Report of NPG Study Committee,” 2 Feb. 1954. 155. AEC meeting no. 962, 17 Feb. 1954, item 6; AEC 141/23, “Use of the Nevada Proving Grounds,” 16 Mar. 1954. 156. E. C. Stakman to Thomas E. Murray, 26 Mar. 1954 (circulated as AEC 141/ 24, “Use of the Nevada Proving Grounds,” 13 Apr. 1954); I. I. Rabi to Strauss, 9 Apr. 1954; AEC 141/25, DMA report, “Use of the Nevada Proving Grounds,” 24 June 1954; Leehey to Norris E. Bradbury, 28 July 1954; Strauss to W. Sterling Cole, 6 Aug. 1954.
6 Operation Castle, 1954
1. AEC Information Memorandum 317/7, “Announcement of Code Name,” 23 May 1952; Percy W. Clarkson to Carroll L. Tyler, 7 Aug. 1952; Tyler to Kenneth E. Fields, “Development of Bikini for Operation Castle,” 18 Nov. 1953; Clarkson, “History of Operation Castle,” 1954 (extracted version, Washington: DNA, 1 June 1983), 2—4; Holmes & Narver, “Final Report on Operation Castle,” 4 May 1954, 1. See also Frank H. Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer (Colorado Springs: Shelton Enterprise, 1988), 6-28 to 6-44. 2. AEC meeting no. 746, 11 Sept. 1952, item 1; Tyler to Fields, 18 Nov. (n. 1);
James E. Reeves to F. E. Roper, “Report of Commander, TG 7.5, for Operation Castle,” 26 Aug. 1954, w/att. CTG 7.5, “Operation Castle, Pacific Proving Grounds, Spring of 1954: Report,” 4-5. See also Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Aioms for Peace and War, 1953-1961; Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission, vol.
3 of A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford: Univ. of California Press, 1989), 164-165. 3. P. W. Clarkson and Fields, memo for record, “Conference on Castle Planning at 1030 hours, 7 Oct. 1952, War Room, JTF 132, Parry Island,” 7 Oct. 1952; Fields to Norris E. Bradbury, 3 Nov. 1952; Clarkson, ‘History of Operation Castle” (n. 1), 11; “Status of Castle Construction” as of 15 June 1953. 4. AEC 334/16, “Change in Designation of JTF-132,” 5 Feb. 1953; William E. Ogle to distrib., “General Concept of Operation Castle,” 7 Apr. 1953; Charles M. Tyson to CS JTF 7, “Staff Visit Report,” 10 Apr. 1953; Tyler to Fields, 18 Nov. (n. 1); Clarkson, “History of Operation Castle” (n. 1), 10-12. See also Hewlett and Holl, Atoms for Peace and War (n. 2), 169-170. 5. Thomas L. Shipman to Paul W. Spain, “Special Monitoring at Eniwetok,” 19
Jan. 1953; Ogle to CJTF 7, “Radiological Safety Support Unit,” 12 Feb. 1953; Shipman to Spain, “Rad Safe Service at Proving Grounds,” 10 Mar. 1954; Leo G. Chelius to Spain, “Rad-Safe Requirements for Pacific Proving Grounds,” 10 Mar. 1954; “Organization Chart—Task Group 7.1,” revised 3 Oct. 1953; John D. Servis, “Radiological Safety,” Report WT-942, Aug. 1954 (extracted version WT-942 [EX], Washington: DNA, 1 Apr. 1981), 16-17; Ogle, “Report of the Commander Task Group 7.1,” June 1954, 109.
344 Notes to Pages 132-135 6. Servis to Shipman, “Health Hazards of Operation Castle,” 13 Feb. 1953. 7. Shipman to Servis, “Health Hazards of Operation Castle,” 6 Mar. 1953. 8. Servis to Duncan Curry, Jr., “Lagoon Contamination during Operation Castle,” 11 Mar. 1953, 4, 6. Cf. Barton C. Hacker, The Dragon's Tail: Radiation Safety in the Manhattan Project, 1942-1946 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: Univ. of Cali-
fornia Press, 1987), ch. 6, “Crossroads.” .
9. See Tab F, “Correspondence Relative to Studies of Expected Lagoon Contamination on Operation Castle,” in Richard A. House, “Final Report, Radiological Safety, Operation Castle, Spring 1954,” 2 vols., 1954, including Alvin C. Graves to P. W. Clarkson, “Lagoon Contamination and Health Hazards during Operation Castle,” 22 Apr. 1953; House, memo for record, “Ship and Boat Operations in Radiologi-
cally Contaminated Lagoons,” 29 Apr. 1953; Robert H. Cushing to H. C. Bruton, “Lagoon Contamination and Health Hazards during Operation Castle,” 4 May 1953. See also House to Shipman, 4 May 1953; Shipman to House, 18 May 1953. 10. House memo for record, 29 Apr. (n. 9). 11. Hq JTF 7, Operation Order No. 1-53, 20 June 1953, Annex I, “Radiological Safety,” Appendix, “Radiological Safety Regulations,” paragraph 12.c, “Ship and Boat MPLs,” subparagraph (7) (extracted version, Washington: DNA, 1 Jan. 1981). Cf. Hq JTF 7, Operation Plan No. 3-53, 10 Nov. 1953, Annex N, “Radiological Safety,”
Appendix I, “Radiological Safety Regulations,’ paragraph 17.c, “Ship and Boat MPLs,” subparagraph (1) (extracted version, Washington: DNA, 1 Nov. 1981). 12. Hq JTF 7, Operations Order 1-53, Annex I, Appendix, paragraph 1; Hq JTF 7, Operations Plan 3-53, Annex N, Appendix I (n. 11), paragraph 5.a.
13. Hq JTF 7, Operations Plan 3-53, Annex N, Appendix I (n. 11), paragraph 17.c.(3).
14. Ibid., paragraph 17.c.(5). Cf. Hq JTF 7, Operation Order 1-53, Annex I, Appendix (n. 11), paragraph 12.c.(1), (3). 15. Hq JTF 7, Operations Order 1-53, Annex I, Appendix (n. 11), paragraph 12.d, “Aircraft MPLs,” subparagraph (1); Hq JTF 7, Operations Plan 3-53, Annex N, Appendix I (n. 11), paragraph 17.d, “Aircraft MPLs,” subparagraph (1). Cf. Hq TG 7.4 (Air Force), Operations Order 1-53, 15 Aug. 1953, Annex H, “Radiological Safety,” and Appendix I, “TG 7.4 Radiological Safety Regulations.” 16. A. R. Walk to John C. Bugher, “Proposal for Exigent Permissible Exposure, Operation Castle,” n.d.; Hq JTF 7, Operations Order 1-53, Annex I, Appendix, paragraph 1; Hq JTF 7, Operations Plan 3-53, Annex N, Appendix I (n. 11), paragraph 5.b. See also Leland B. Taylor, History of Air Force Atomic Cloud Sampling, vol. 1, Narrative, AFSC Historical Publications Series 61-142-1 (Kirtland AFB, New Mex.: AFSWC, Jan. 1963), 103. 17. Hq JTF 7, Operations Plan 3-53, Annex N, Appendix I (n. 11), paragraph 3. Cf. Hq JIF 7, Operations Order 1-53, Annex I, Appendix (n. 11), paragraph 12.c.(7). 18. Hq JTF 7, Operations Order 1-53, Annex I (n. 11), paragraph 1; Hq JTF 7, Operations Plan 3-53, Annex N (n. 11), paragraph 1. 19. Hq JTF 7, Operations Order 1-53, Annex I, “Radiological Safety,” paragraph 9; Hq TG 7.2 (Army), Annex D to Training Memo #1, “Radiological Safety,” 1 June 1953, as reproduced in Tab F, CTG 7.2, “Final Report: Operation Castle,” 19 May 1954; CTG 7.1 to project officers and task unit commanders of TG 7.1, “Radiological Safety Monitors,” 22 June 1953, w/att. “Program of Instruction,” 22 June 1953. 20. Servis, “Radiological Safety” (n. 5), 21.
Notes to Pages 135-137 345 21. CTG 7.1 to project officers and task unit commanders, “Radiological Safety Monitors,” 4 Aug. 1953; “H-Division Progress Report,” 20 Oct-20 Nov. 1953, 1; Hq TG 7.2 (Army), Training Memorandum no. 9, “Radiological Safety Indoctrination Course,” 7 Dec. 1953, w/att. lesson plans, in CTG 7.2 Final Report (n. 19), Tab CC; Ogle, Report of CTG 7.1 (n. 5), 111; Servis, “Radiological Safety” (n. 5), 19-20. See also Kaman Tempo, Castle Series, 1954, by Edwin J. Martin and Richard H. Rowland, Report DNA 6035F (Santa Barbara, 1 Apr. 1982), 87-94. 22. Marion W. Boyer to CNO, 31 Mar. 1953; Cushing to CINCPAC, “Radiological Hazards in the Marshall Islands Area during Operation Castle,” 30 July 1953. Cf. Hewlett and Holl, Atoms for Peace and War (n. 2), 170-171. 23. Vincent G. Huston to Kenneth D. Nichols, “Chronology of Establishment of Danger Area around Pacific Proving Grounds,” 30 Mar. 1954, 2-3. 24. Henry Cabot Lodge to the Secretary-General of UN, “Letter Dated 2 April 1953 from the Representative of the United States Addressed to the Secretary-General Relating to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,” U.N. Security Council S$/2978, 3 Apr. 1953. Cf. Fields to CNO, 28 Apr. 1953; Jack L. Armstrong to CNO, 22 May 1953.
25. Gordon Dean log, entry for 27 May 1953. 26. Tyler for office and division directors, field managers, “Public Information: Pacific Proving Grounds and Overseas Tests,” Office of the Manager Announcement no. 28, 23 Sept. 1953.
27. Robert Chesney to Bugher, “Radiological Safety Regulations, Operation Castle,” 27 July 1953, w/att. Hq JTF 7 Operation Order 1-53, Annex I and Appendix, 20 June 1953; Gordon M. Dunning to Bugher, “Suggestions on CJTF Seven Operation Order No. 1-53,” 31 July 1953; Walter D. Claus to Bugher, “Comments on JTF-7
Operation Order 1-53,” 7 Aug. 1953; Dunning to Bugher, “Comments on Radiological Safety Order for Castle,” 21 Sept. 1953; E. McGinley to Bugher, 30 Oct. 1953, w/att. draft Annex N, “Radiological Safety,” to Operation Plan 3-53. 28. CINCPACEFLT to CJTF 7, “Radiological Hazards in the Marshall Islands Area during Operation Castle,” 31 Oct. 1953. 29. House to A. C. Graves, 19 Nov. 1953; P. W. Clarkson to CINCPACELT, “Radiological Hazards in the Marshall Islands Area during Castle,” 11 Dec. 1953; House to Graves, 14 Dec. 1953; House to Bugher, 15 Dec. 1953; Bugher to Willard F. Libby, 28 Dec. 1953; AEC meeting no. 950, 6 Jan. 1954; CINCPAC to CJTF 7 et al., “Support of Atomic Energy Commission Worldwide Fallout Monitoring Program during Operation Castle,” 11 Feb. 1954; CINCPACFLT to CJTF 7, “AFOAT-1 Castle Participation,” 12/0238Z Feb. 1954; Clarkson, “History of Operation Castle” (n. 1), 118. 30. P. W. Clarkson to CINCPAC, “Safety Measures during Operational Phase of Castle,” 11 Dec. 1953. 31. Clarkson, “History of Operation Castle” (n. 1), 55-57; Taylor, History of Air
Force Atomic Cloud Sampling (n. 16), ch. 5. | 32. Merril Eisenbud to Bugher, “Conference with CINCPAC Staff—Pearl Harbor, July 24—25, 1953,” 29 July 1953; Hg AWS, Directorate of Climatology, “Climate Data for Kwajalein, Eniwetok, and Bikini, Part I,” July 1953; CTG 7.1 to distrib., “General Concept of Operation Castle (Revision #1),” 17 Aug. 1953, Appendix J, “Climatology of the Eniwetok-Bikini Area for the Months of January, February, March and April,” and “Weather Service Available during Operation Castle”; George J. Newgarden III, “Weather Conditions in the Marshall Islands with Special Emphasis on the
346 Notes to Pages 137-139 Eniwetok Area,” 15 Sept. 1953; Chesney to CTG 7.1, “Off-Site Fall-Out Program for Castle,” 25 Aug. 1953. 33. Bugher to files, “Conversation at Santa Monica with Dr. Harold [F.] Plank,” 27 July 1953. 34. “Radiological Safety Regulations,” 20 June (n. 20), paragraph 1. 35. CTG 7.1 to CJTF 7, “Test Maximum Permissible Exposure,” 11 Aug. 1953; A. C. Graves to Servis, “Test Maximum Permissible Exposure,” 2 Sept. 1953. 36. CTG 7.1 to CJTF 7, “Test Maximum Permissible Exposure,” 8 Sept. 1953.
37. Walter D. Claus to Bugher, 25 Sept. 1953. Cf. Shipman to Ogle, “Castle Safety,” 24 Sept. 1953. 38. House to A. C. Graves, 19 Nov. 1953, w/att. draft memo, William S. Cowart to CJTF 7, “Policy of Waiver of Maximum Permissible Exposure,” n.d. 39. “Radiological Safety Regulations,” 10 Nov. (n. 20), paragraph 2. 40. House to A. C. Graves, 19 Nov. (n. 38). 41. Cowart to CJTF 7, n.d. (n. 38). 42. Servis to A. C. Graves, “Rad-Safe Waiver Policy,” 16 Dec. 1953. Cf. Carl W. Buckland to whom it may concern, “Policy Interpretation of Overlapping Test Exposure Limitations at ‘Castle’ and LASL for the Spring of 1954,” 29 Dec. 1953. 43. Hq JTF 7, SOP 30-2, “Waiver of Maximum Permissible (Radiation) Exposure (MPE),” 15 Feb. 1954, w/att. request-for-waiver form. 44. Plank to A. C. Graves, “Comment on the Pate-Palmer Report to CJTF-7 Dated 30 June 1953,” 17 July 1953.
45. Servis to Shipman, “Technical Support of Task Group 7.1 Radiation Safety Programs,” 7 Aug. 1953; Shipman to Servis, “Technical Support of Task Group 7.1 Radiation Safety Programs,” 23 Aug. 1953; Servis to Shipman, “Air Sampling Training Program,” 20 Nov. 1953; Servis to Shipman, “Pacific Proving Ground Laboratory Health Physics Program,” 23 Dec. 1953. 46. CTG 7.1, “General Concept of Operation Castle” (n. 32), 2. Cf. Henry R. Hoyt to Robert M. Underhill, 13 Jan. 1954.
47. CTG 7.1 to distrib., “Change #3 to General Concept of Operation Castle (Revision #1),” 20 Oct. 1953; Tyler to Fields, 18 Nov. (n. 1); Clarkson, “History of
Operation Castle” (n. 1), 54, 61. 48. Clarkson, “History of Operation Castle” (n. 1), 95. 49. Ralph Carlisle Smith to James G. Beckerley, 6 Nov. 1953. 50. George P. Kraker to distrib., “PPG Information Activity,” 12 Nov. 1953; “Operation Castle Information Plan,” draft, 4 Dec. 1953; AEC/DOD release 514, “State-
ment by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense,” 8 Jan. 1954.
51. J-3 Daily Diary, Monday, 11 Jan. 1954; Chesney to distrib., “Daily Weather Forecast,” 4 Feb. 1954; Clarkson, “History of Operation Castle” (n. 1), 60, 65, 84. Cf. ch. 2, above. 52. Darol K. Froman to A. C. Graves, 4 Feb. 1954.
53. Claude L. Coray to distrib., “Bravo Evacuation Plans,” 9 Feb. 1954; H. H. Fleming, “Phasing of Evacuation Planning Conferences,” n.d., w/att. agenda, Evacuation Conference, 12 Feb. 1954; CINCPACFLT to High Commissioner, TTPI, 19/ 0225Z Feb. 1954; Reeves to W. D. Richardson, “Emergency Evacuation of Parry and Rojoa Group,” 27 Feb. 1954; Clarkson, “History of Operation Castle” (n. 1), 116, 118.
Notes to Pages 139-140 347 54. Servis to R. Rutherford, “Contamination of Bikini Island Recreational Facilities,” 29 Dec. 1953; Chesney to distrib., “Protection of Food and Water from Contamination Resulting from Fall-Out,” 19 Feb. 1954; Robert E. Bohne to CTUs, “Safety Instructions,” 19 Feb. 1954, w/att. JTF 7 Special Bulletin, same title, same date; Reeves to Clinton S. Maupin, “Radiological Safety at Elmer and Ursula,” 26 Feb. 1954; Reeves to all task force personnel at Enewetak atoll (except Eniwetok Island), “Safety Instructions,” 27 Feb. 1954. 55. Clarkson, “History of Operation Castle” (n. 1), 119-120. 56. C. D. Bonnot to CJTF 7 (Administration), 26/2016Z Feb. 1954. 57. Bonnot to CJTF 7, 27/0544Z Feb. 1954. 58. Bonnot, “Summary of Weather Situation for Bravo Shot,” 5.a.(1){(2), Tab A in A. C. Graves and P. W. Clarkson, memo for record, “Bravo Shot, Operation Castle,” 12 Apr. 1954.
59. House, “Radsafe Narrative Sequence of Events,” 1, Tab B in Graves and Clarkson, “Bravo Shot” (n. 58). 60. Bonnot, memo for record, “B-1, 1100M Command Briefing,” 28 Feb. 1954, w/att. wind and area forecasts; House, memo for record, “CCommand Briefing, 1100, 28 February 1954,” 28 Feb. 1954; Bonnot, memo for record, “B minus 1, 1800 Hour
Weather Briefing,” 28 Feb. 1954; House, memo for record, “Command Briefing, 1800,” 28 Feb. 1954; Bonnot, “Summary of Weather Situation for Bravo Shot” (n. 58), 5.a.(3)-(4); House, “Radsafe Narrative” (n. 59), 1.
61. Bonnot, memo for record, “2400M Weather Briefing Prior to Bravo Shot (B-0645 hours),” 1 Mar. 1954, w/att. wind and area forecasts; House, memo for record, “Command Briefing, 0000, 1 March 1954,” 1 Mar. 1954; Bonnot, memo for record, “Weather Briefing at 0400M, Bravo Day,” 1 Mar. 1954; House, memo for record, “Final Weather and Radsafe Check, 0430, 1 March 1954,” 1 Mar. 1954; Bonnot, “Summary of Weather Situation for Bravo Shot” (n. 58), 5.a.(6); House, “Radsafe Narrative” (n. 59), 1. 62. “Extract from WOJG Kapral’s Diary,” entry for 1 Mar., encl. 3 to Fellie F. Robinson to M. B. Hammond, “Rongerik Incident,” 27 Mar. 1954. 63. Don Whitaker, letter to his mother dated 3 Mar. 1954, as quoted from an unnamed Cincinnati newspaper of 11 Mar. 1954 in Fields to P. W. Clarkson, 15 Mar. 1954. Cf. Clarkson, “History of Operation Castle” (n. 1), 110. 64. Clarkson, “History of Operation Castle” (n. 1), 121. 65. Huston to Donald J. Leehey, 15 Mar. 1954. 66. Log of J-3 Activities on USS Bairoko, 28 Feb.—4 Mar. 1954, entry for 1 Mar.; J-3 Daily Diary, Bikini Atoll, 28 Feb.-2 Mar. 1954, entry for 1 Mar. 67. Shipman to Bugher, 9 Mar. 1954; Huston to Leehey, 15 Mar. 1954; House, “Radsafe Narrative” (n. 59), 1-2; William H. Ray to Thomas N. White, 13 Aug. 1954; Clarkson, “History of Operation Castle” (n. 1), 123. See also John C. Clark, as told to Robert Cahn, “We Were Trapped by Radioactive Fallout,” Saturday Evening Post 230
(20 July 1957): 65; Bernard J. O’Keefe, Nuclear Hostages (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983), 178-186. 68. Log of J-3 Activities, USS Bairoko, 28 Feb.—4 Mar. 1954, entry for 1 Mar.; Emmet O’Beirne to CNO, “U.S.S. Bairoko (CVE-115); radiological contamination of,” 7 Mar. 1954; O’ Beirne to CTG 7.3, “Radioactive Contamination; summary of for period 1-8 Mar. 1954,” 11 Mar. 1954; CTG 7.3 to CNO, “Radioactive Contamination
348 Notes to Pages 140-143 of Ships and Radiological Exposure of Persons of Task Group 7.3 due to Bravo, the First Nuclear Explosion of Castle,” 22 Mar. 1954; House, “Discussion of Off-Site Fallout,” enclosure 3 to House, “Radsafe Narrative” (n. 59); Clarkson, “History of Operation Castle” (n. 1), 123. 69. Log of J-3 Activities, 1 Mar. (n. 68).
70. Servis, “Radiological Safety” (n. 5), 24. Cf. William R. Kennedy, Jr, to Shipman, 01/2329Z March 1954; Ogle, Report of CTG 7.1 (n. 5), 114-115. 71. Servis, “Radiological Safety” (n. 5), 24. 72. Clarkson, “History of Operation Castle” (n. 1), 123-124. See also Hewlet: and Holl, Atoms for Peace and War (n. 2), 173-174.
73. Clark, “We Were Trapped by Radioactive Fallout” (n. 67), 66. See also O’ Keefe, Nuclear Hostages (n. 67), 186-196. 74. O’Keefe, Nuclear Hostages (n. 67), 196-197. Cf. Clark, “We Were Trapped by Radioactive Fallout” (n. 67), 66. For local fallout pattern, see Howard A. Haw-
thorne, ed., Compilation of Local Fallout Data from Test Detonations 1945-1962 Extracted from DASA 1251, 2 vols., Report DNA 1251-1-EX, -2-EX (Santa Barbara: GE-TEMPO, 1 May 1979), vol. 2, Oceanic U.S. Tests, 63-64.
75. Paul R. Wignall, “Cloud Tracking Operations for Bravo,” 8 Mar. 1954, 2; House, “Radsafe Narrative” (n. 59), 2—3.
76. Kapral diary, 1 Mar. (n. 62); House, “Discussion of Off-Site Fallout” (n. 68); House, “Radsafe Narrative” (n. 59), 2. 77. Weather Detachment, Rongerik, to JTF 7, 01/1500M March 1954, as quoted in Karl H. Houghton, memo for record, “Evacuation of Rongerik after Shot Bravo, Operation Castle,” 14 Apr. 1954. 78. CTG 7.3 to CNO, 22 Mar. (n. 68); Russell H. Maynard, “Pattern of Fall-Out Following Bravo Event (Combined Analyses—Immediate and One Week after Bravo),” 12 Apr. 1954. 79. House, “Radsafe Narrative” (n. 59), 2. 80. Weather Detachment, Rongerik, to JTF 7, 01/0815Z March 1954, as quoted in Houghton, “Evacuation of Rongerik after Shot Bravo” (n. 77). 81. Houghton, “Evacuation of Rongerik after Shot Bravo” (n. 77); Robinson to Hammond, 27 Mar. (n. 62); Louis B. Chrestensen to whom it may concern, “Island Evacuation,” n.d. (ca. 2 Mar. 1954), 2; House, “Radsafe Narrative” (n. 59), 2. 82. Fellie F. Robinson to Rongerik, 01/1215Z March 1954, as quoted in Houghton, “Evacuation of Rongerik after Shot Bravo” (n. 77). 83. Kapral diary (n. 62). 84. Joseph W. McDaniel to F. F. Robinson, “Evacuation of Rongerik Personnel,” n.d., attached to Robinson to Hammond, 27 Mar. (n. 62). 85. Chrestensen, “Island Evacuation” (n. 81); Houghton, “Evacuation of Rongerik after Shot Bravo” (n. 77); James E. Crosby to whom it may concern, “Island Evacuation,” n.d. (ca. 2 Mar. 1954); House, “Discussion of Off-Site Fallout,” 12 Apr. (n. 68); House, “Radsafe Narrative” (n. 59), 3; Dunning to Servis, 3 Aug. 1954; Servis to Dunning, “Radiological Exposures,” 6 Aug. 1954. Cf. SAIC, Analysis of Radiation Exposure, Service Personnel on Rongerik Atoll: Operation Castle, Shot Bravo, by Jerald L. Goetz et al., Report DNA-TR-86-120 (McLean, Va., 9 July 1987); Goetz to Hacker, 10 July 1989, w/att. “Comments on Elements of Controversy,” 4—5. 86. Chrestensen to CTG 7.4, 2 Mar. 1954, as quoted in Houghton, “Evacuation of Rongerik after Shot Bravo” (n. 77).
Notes to Pages 143-146 349 87. House, “Discussion of Off-Site Fallout” (n. 68); House, “Radsafe Narrative” (n. 59), 3-4. 88. A.C. Graves to Bugher, 03/0530 March 1954. 89. House, “Discussion of Off-Site Fallout” (n. 68); House, “Radsafe Narrative” (n. 59), 3. 90. House, “Discussion of Off-Site Fallout’ (n. 68). 91. G. W. Albin to CTG 7.3, “Evacuation of Rongelap and Ailinginae Atolls on 3 March 1954; report of,” 5 Mar. 1954; House, “Radsafe Narrative” (n. 59), 3—4; House, “Discussion of Off-Site Fallout” (n. 68); Servis, “Radiological Safety” (n. 5), 24.
92. CTG 7.1 to Bugher, 04/0333Z Mar. 1954. Cf. Robert Sharp et al., “Radiation Characteristics of Fallout Material and the Determination of the Dose of Radiation,” in Eugene P. Cronkite et al., eds., Some Effects of Ionizing Radiation on Human Beings: A Report on the Marshallese and Americans Accidentally Exposed to Radiation from Fallout and a Discussion of Radiation Injury in the Human Being, Report TID 5358 (Washington: AEC, July 1956), 1-12, with estimates of gamma dose on Rongelap at 175 rem, on Ailinginae at 69. 93. Graves to Bugher, 03/0530 Mar. (n. 88). 94. House, “Radsafe Narrative” (n. 59), 4; House, “Discussion of Off-Site Fallout” (n. 68). 95. L. H. Alford to CTG 7.3, “Report of Evacuation of Natives, Utirik Atoll, 4 March 1954,” 18 Mar. 1954, w/att. “Informal Narrative of Evacuation of Natives from Utirik Atoll, Marshall Islands,” n.d.; Clarkson, “History of Operation Castle” (n. 1), 128; Servis, “Radiological Safety” (n. 5), 24. 96. Dunning to Bugher, 05/0010Z Mar. 1954. Cf. Sharp et al., “Radiation Characteristics of Fallout Material” (n. 92), estimating gamma dose at 14 rem.
97. House, “Radsafe Narrative” (n. 59), 4. Cf. Kaman Tempo, Castle Series (n. 21), 242: “Table 25. Summary of Estimated Fallout Exposure for Castle, Bravo,” gives estimated mean exposure for Ailuk as 4 roentgens. 98. Ogle to A. C. Graves, 05/1140Z Mar. 1954; R. D. Crea to CJTF 7, “Report on Soil and Water Sampling Mission,” 8 Mar. 1954; White to CJTF 7, “Report on Soil and Water Sampling Mission,” 10 Mar. 1954; table of samples collected, 5-10 Mar. 1954. 99. Herbert Scoville, Jr., “Radiological Survey of Downwind Atolls Contaminated by Bravo,” 12 Mar. 1954; J. C. Eliot to CTG 7.3, “Radsafe Survey 8-11 March 1954,” 20 Mar. 1954; House, “Radsafe Narrative” (n. 59), 4—S.
100. CJTF 7 to CS and Chairman AEC, 03/0017Z March 1954; Chrestensen, “Island Evacuation” (n. 81); House, “Radsafe Narrative” (n. 59), 3; Maupin, ‘“Medical Aspects of Fall-Out from Bravo,” 12 Apr. 1954. 101. Robinson to Hammond, 27 Mar. (n. 62). Cf. McDaniel to Robinson, n.d. (n. 84). 102. AEC release 524, 1 Mar. 1954; P. W. Clarkson to Fields, 04/0600Z Mar. 1954.
103. CJTF 7 to Frank Midkiff, 04/1905Z Mar. 1954. 104. A. C. Graves to Fields, 04/2202Z Mar. 1954. 105. Fields to P. W. Clarkson, 4 Mar. 1954.
106. Bugher to A. C. Graves, 05/2223Z Mar. 1954. Cf. Graves to Haight, 06/ 0630Z Mar. 1954.
350 Notes to Pages 146-148 107. Fields to P. W. Clarkson and A. C. Graves (Eyes Only), 06/1746Z Mar. 1954. 108. Ibid. 109. CJTF 7 to Chairman AEC, 13/1218Z Mar. 1954. Cf. Clarkson, “History of Operation Castle” (n. 1), 132. 110. Dunning to Bugher, 05/0010Z Mar. 1954; Eisenbud to Bugher, 05/1545Z Mar. 1954; P. W. Clarkson to Fields, 6 Mar. 1954; Clarkson to Fields and Bugher, 10/0603Z Mar. 1954; Maupin, “Medical Aspects of Fall-Out from Bravo” (n. 100), 2; Clarkson, “History of Operation Castle” (n. 1), 128, 130. 111. Clarkson, “History of Operation Castle” (n. 1), 130. Cf. CJTF 7 to Chairman AEC, 14/0842Z Mar. 1954. See Cronkite et al., Some Effects of Ionizing Radiation on Human Beings (n. 92). 112. Preuss to Chief AFSWP, 04/0001Z Mar. 1954; Bugher to P. W. Clarkson, 5 Mar. 1954; CJTF 7 to CINCPAC, 05/1045Z Mar. 1954; CJTF 7 to Chief AFSWP, 05/1050Z Mar. 1954; JTF 7 Travis AFB, Calif., to JTF 7 Hickam AFB and Enewetak, 07/1935Z Mar. 1954, 08/0240Z Mar. 1954; Chief AFSWP to Preuss, 8 Mar. 1954; Officer Temporary Additional Duty Request [Cronkite], 9 Mar. 1954; Chief of Naval Personnel to Robert A. Conard, Cronkite, William H. Chapman, Nahum R. Shulman, R. Sharp, “Temporary Additional Duty,” 12 Mar. 1954. 113. CJTF 7 to Chief AFSWP, 06/0545Z Mar. 1954; H. K. Gilbert to Cronkite, “Letter of Instruction to Cdr Eugene P. Cronkite, USN,” 8 Mar. 1954; Reeves to Frank
D. Peel, “Establishment of Program 4 and Project 4.1 in Castle,” 11 Mar. 1954; Maupin, “Medical Aspects of Fall-Out from Bravo” (n. 100), 3; Armand W. Kelly to distrib., “Outline of Scientific Programs—Operation Castle (Change #1 to J-21366, dated 10 November 1953),” 16 Apr. 1954; Clarkson, “History of Operation Castle” (n. 1), 130. See also Cronkite et al., Some Effects of Ionizing Radiation on Human Beings (n. 92). 114. Gilbert to Cronkite, 8 Mar. (n. 113). 115. George V. LeRoy to Bugher, 10/0649Z Mar. 1954; Maupin, “Medical Aspects of Fall-Out from Bravo” (n. 100), 3; Clarkson, “History of Operation Castle” (n. 1), 130. 116. As quoted in Fields to P. W. Clarkson, 15 Mar. 1954. 117. Clarkson, “History of Operation Castle” (n. 1), 110. 118. AEC release, 11 Mar. 1954, as quoted in Fields to P. W. Clarkson, 11/2347Z Mar. 1954. Cf. AEC meeting no. 966, 11 Mar. 1954, item 7. 119. Fields to Clarkson, 11/2347Z Mar. (n. 118). 120. CJTF 7 to CINCPACFLT, 16/0204Z Mar. 1954; CJTF 7 to Chairman AEC, and CSUSA, 16/0352Z Mar. 1954; DMA to Bradbury, 16/1620Z Mar. 1954; DMA to Bradbury, 16/1625Z Mar. 1954; Eisenbud to Bugher, “Contamination of the Fukuryu Maru and Associated Problems in Japan: Preliminary Report,” 9 Apr. 1954, 1. See also Ralph E. Lapp, The Voyage of the Lucky Dragon (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), ch. 6, “The Story Breaks.” 121. John J. Morton et al., “Medical Report on the Fukuryu Maru No. 5 Incident,” ABCC Preliminary Report, 26 Mar. 1954, w/att. case histories; Aide-Memoire from
Japanese to U.S. government, on the itinerary and experience of Fukuryu Maru, handed to U.S. Ambassador to Japan John Allison by Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Okamura, 27 Mar. 1954; Eisenbud to Bugher, 9 Apr. (n. 120), 2; Yukio Tsuge and Toshio Ohi, “Early Symptoms of the Cases Affected by the Hydrogen Explosion at
Notes to Pages 148-150 351 Bikini,” in Committee for Compilation of Report on Research in the Effects of Radioactivity, ed., Research in the Effects and Influences of the Nuclear Bomb Test Explo-
sions, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, 1956), 13091311; Lapp, Voyage of the Lucky Dragon (n. 120), chs. 1-5. 122. AEC meetings no. 967, 16 Mar. 1954, item 1, and no. 978, 17 Mar. 1954, item 5; Bugher to Morton, 16 Mar. 1954; John Foster Dulles to American Embassy Tokyo, telegrams 2071, 18 Mar. 1954, and 2090, 19 Mar. 1954; Unidentified author, draft memo to Morse Salisbury, “Chronology of American Offers of Medical Assistance in re Japanese Fishermen,” 23 Apr. 1954, items 1, 2, 4; John H. Stumpf to files, “Commission Actions Concerning Radiation Incident,” 23 Apr. 1954. 123. Hiroshi Maki, “Program of ABCC and U.S.-Japan Relationship,” in Research in the Effects and Influences of the Nuclear Bomb Test Explosions (n. 121), 14491458; Hiroshi Maki et al., The Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission, 1947-1975: A
General Report on the ABCC-JNIH Joint Research Program, Report TID-28719 (Washington: NAS-NRC; Tokyo: JNIH of the Ministry of Health and Welfare, 1978). See also Hacker, The Dragon’s Tail (n. 8), 113-116.
124. Bugher to H. Burke Fry, 19 Mar. 1954; Bugher to Allison, 19 Mar. 1954; Bugher to Masao Tsuzuki, 19 Mar. 1954; Morton et al., “Medical Report” (n. 121), 3; Morton and Jack J. Lewis, “The Relationship between the American and Japanese Scientists during the Fukuryu Maru No. 5 Incident,” ABCC Final Report, 27 May
1954, 6-7. See also Tsuzuki, “Medical Consideration on Radiation Injury due to Bikini Fall-Out (A General Review),” in Research in the Effects and Influences oj the Nuclear Bomb Test Explosions (n. 121), 1287-1304. 125. “Fish Prices Plunge: Atomic Radiation Scare Grips Nation,” Japan News, 18 Mar. 1954; “Nine More Ships Found Radioactive,” ibid., 19 Mar. 1954; Eisenbud, “Contamination of the Fukuryu Mar” (n. 120), 6; Keishi Amano et al., “Studies on the Radioactivity in Certain Pelagic Fishes—I. Distribution of Radioactivity in Various Tissues of Fishes,” in Research in the Effects and Influences of the Nuclear Bomb Test Explosions (n. 121), 2: 839-848; Toshihara Kawabata, “Radiological Survey of Fishes at the Landing Ports in Japan,” ibid., 2: 1085-1093. 126. Rodney L. Southwick to distrib., “Draft Statement on Fish,” 18 Mar. 1954; Bugher to Oscar Sette, 19 Mar. 1954; State Department to American Embassy Tokyo, telegram 2075, 18 Mar. 1954; “Tuna Exports to be Tested,” Asahi Evening News, 20 Mar. 1954; “U.S. to Check Fish for Radioactivity,” Nippon Times, 21 Mar. 1954. See also Lapp, Voyage of the Lucky Dragon (n. 120), ch. 7, “The Crying Fish”; Neal O. Hines, Proving Ground: An Account of Radiobiological Studies in the Pacific, 1946— 1961 (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1962), 172—176. 127. “Politics, Jealousy Slow Bikini Victims’ Treatment,” Nippon Times, 23 Mar. 1954; Bugher to Charles L. Dunham, 26 Mar. 1954; Morton et al., “Medical Report” (n. 121), 3-4; “Hematology Report,” ibid., 23; Morton and Lewis, “American and Japanese Scientists” (n. 124), 7, 9, 10; “Chronology of American Offers” (n. 122), items 8, 9, 12 (parenthetical comment), 16; Eisenbud to Bugher, 9 Apr. (n. 120), 2. On the 1945-46 experience of Japanese scientists, see Hacker, The Dragon’s Tail (n. 8), 114-116. 128. “Chronology of American Offers” (n. 122), items 13, 14, 19; “Japan, U.S. to Negotiate on Fukuryu Compensation,” Nippon Times, 22 Mar. 1954; State Department telegrams 2106, 23 Mar. 1954, and 2107, 24 Mar. 1954, as cited in Log of Outgoing
352 Notes to Page 150 Telegrams, Department of State to American Embassy Tokyo, n.d.; “Japan, U.S. Scientists Moot Atomic Injuries,” The Mainichi, 25 Mar. 1954; “Officials Meet to Iron
out U.S.-Japan Radiation Conflict,” Japan News, 25 Mar. 1954; John A. Hall to Gerard C. Smith, 28 Apr. 1954; Yoshio Hiyama, “General Backgrounds to These Re-
ports,” annex to Research in the Effects and Influences of the Nuclear Bomb Test Explosions (n. 121), separately paginated insert in vol. 1, 1-3; Rokuzo Kobayashi and Isamu Nagai, “Atomic Bomb Injuries Investigation and Research Committee,” ibid., 2: 1281-1286. 129. State Department to American Embassy Tokyo, no. 2109, 24 Mar. 1954; Eisenbud to Bugher, no. 2295, 24 Mar. 1954; Bugher to Eisenbud, 25 Mar. 1954; Eisenbud to Bugher, no. 2307, 25 Mar. 1954; “AEC Says Fish Can be Eaten without Fear,” Nippon Times, 25 Mar. 1954; State Department no. 2137 to American Embassy Tokyo, 26 Mar. 1954; “Chronology of American Offers” (n. 122), items 24, 25, 26; Morton and Lewis, “American and Japanese Scientists” (n. 122), 11-12; Lapp, Voyage of the Lucky Dragon (n. 120), ch. 9, “Troubled Days.”
130. “Chronology of American Offers” (n. 122), items 29, 30, 32; Bugher to Allison, 31 Mar. 1954; Willis R. Boss to Bugher, “Meeting of Operation Coordination Board,” 31 Mar. 1954; Bugher to Allison, 1 Apr. 1954; Bugher to John H. Harley, 1 Apr. 1954; Howard C. Brown, Jr., to Bugher, “Urine Samples—NYOO Analysis of First Batch of Japanese,” 2 Apr. 1954. See also Kobayashi and Nagai, “Cooperation by the United States in the Radiochemical Analyses,” in Research in the Effects and Influences of the Nuclear Bomb Test Explosions (n. 121), 2: 1435-1445, which reproduces Eisenbud’s four urinalysis reports to Kobayashi of 6 Apr., 14 May, 24 May, and 15 Sept. 1954, as well as the U.S. analysis of ash from Fukuryu Maru (Eisenbud to Kobayashi, 8 Apr. 1954).
131. Dunning to Bugher, “Interpretation of Urine Counts from Japanese Fishermen and Natives,” 12 Apr. 1954. 132. Yingling to Hawley, 29 Mar. 1954; Paul B. Pearson to Lauren R. Donaldson,
29 Mar. 1954; Huston, “Chronology of Establishment of Danger Area” (n. 23); Bugher to Joseph Campbell, Nichols, I. I. Rabi, and Roy B. Snapp, 31 Mar. 1954, w/att. report: Bugher, “Effects of Pacific Tests on Commercial Tuna Fishing,” 31 Mar. 1954; Eisenbud to Bugher, Tokyo TWX no. 2372, 31 Mar. 1954; Boss to Bugher, “DMA Meeting, Called by Colonel [N. D.] Greenberg,” 1 Apr. 1954; Eisenbud to Bugher, Tokyo TWX no. 2387, 1 Apr. 1954; Eisenbud to Bugher, 9 Apr. (n. 120), 8; Lapp, Voyage of the Lucky Dragon (n. 120), ch. 10, “Controversy and Confusion.”
133. Huston to Nichols, ‘Notice to Mariners re Residual Radiation,” 30 June 1954; Huston to CJTF 7, “Proposed Notice to Mariners,” 12 July 1954; Greenberg to John P. Trevithick, “Reply to State Department Message #489,” 2 Sept. 1954; Note verbale, Ambassador of Japan to Secretary of State, Washington, 4 Oct. 1954; Allison to Secretary of State, no. 849, 8 Oct. 1954; J. A. Hall to G. C. Smith, “Japanese Note Verbale—Publication of HYDROPAC,” 14 Oct. 1954; State Department cable, 25 Oct. 1954; Huston to Hall, “Japanese Note re Testing,” 9 Nov. 1954; AEC 730/9, “Exchange of Notes with Japan Concerning Possible Future Thermonuclear Experiments,” 12 Nov. 1954; Hall to Smith, “Japanese Note Regarding Future United States Nuclear Experimentation,” 27 Dec. 1954. 134. “Statement by Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission,” 31 Mar. 1954 (published in BAS 10 [May 1954]: 163-164).
Notes to Pages 151-152 353 135. Hagerty diary, 2, 6 Apr. 1954, James C. Hagerty Papers, Eisenhower Library, as quoted in Hewlett and Holl, Atoms for Peace and War (n. 2), 177; Lewis L. Strauss, Men and Decisions (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962; paperback ed., New York: Popular Library, 1963), 424. See also Richard Pfau, No Sacrifice Too Great: The Life of Lewis L. Strauss (Charlottesville: Univ. Press of Virginia, 1984), 190.
136. Aide-memoire, 27 Mar. (n. 121); Aide-memoire from Embassy of Japan, Washington, 12 Apr. 1954. 137. Kaman Tempo, Castle Series (n. 21), 204, 212-213.
138. Ibid., 230-232, 240, citing estimates by SAIC (J. McGahan to D. Auten, “Exposure Estimates of the Crew of the USS Patapsco,” 19 Jan. 1979); and NOSC (R. R. Hammond to W. W. Perkins, “Gamma Dose Estimates for Patapsco Crew,” 25 Jan. 1979). See also Goetz, “Comments on Elements of Controversy” (n. 87), 5. 139. “Chronology of American Offers” (n. 119), items 33, 34, 35; “Dr. Nakaizumi Tells Condition of Radiation Victims,” Nippon Times, 7 Apr. 1954; Morton and Lewis,
“American and Japanese Scientists” (n. 124), 13-14; Lapp, Voyage of the Lucky Dragon (n. 120), ch. 11, “An Anxious Spring.” 140. Allison to Bugher, 30 Mar. 1954, in “Chronology of American Offers” (n. 122), item 29.
141. Hirotake Kakehi, “Ash of Bikini and Its Effects on Human Body,” trans. Toichiro Kinoshita, Japan Physicians Society 31, no. 9 (1 May 1954). Kakehi later estimated 270—440 roentgens, depending on decay rate and each individual’s specific behavior during the two-week trip home (see Fumio Yamasaki and Kakehi, “Radiation
Levels Observed on the Fukuryu Maru No. 5,” in Research in the Effects and Influences of the Nuclear Bomb Test Explosions [(n. 121], 1: 421-423). Cf. Hiyama, “General Backgrounds” (n. 128), 7, summarizing findings reported in Research in the Effects and Influences of the Nuclear Bomb Test Explosions, part 2, “Physics,” and part 8, “Medical Science.” 142. Shipman to Froman, “Eisenbud Report Concerning Japanese Fishermen,” 20 May 1954.
143. Eisenbud to JIF 7, 01/1056Z Apr. 1954, in CJTF 7 TWX Log 1, 2-21; Allison to Bugher, 9 Apr. 1954, in “Chronology of American Offers” (n. 122), item 37.
144. Allison to Bugher, 15 Apr. 1954, in “Chronology of American Offers” (n. 122), item 39.
145. “Chronology of American Offers” (n. 122), items 40, 41; H. C. Brown to Bugher, 22 Apr. 1954; Lapp, Voyage of the Lucky Dragon (n. 120), 138-140. 146. Brown to Bugher, 22 Apr. (n. 145). 147. CJTF 7 to Chairman AEC, 13/1218Z Mar. 1954. 148. J-3 Daily Diary, Bikini Atoll, 3, 6,7 Mar. 1954; Log of J-3 Activities, USS Bairoko CVE-115, 3, 4, 6 Mar. 1954; Clarkson, “History of Operation Castle” (n. 1), 135-137; Kaman Tempo, Castle Series (n. 21), 83, 102.
149. CTG 7.3 to CNO, “Radioactive Contamination of Ships and Radiological Exposure of Persons of Task Group 7.3 due to Bravo, the First Nuclear Explosion of Castle,” 22 Mar. 1954; C. P. Carlson, “Investigation of Burns on Personnel of the USS Bairoko; Information Concerning,” 22 Mar. 1954; CTG 7.1 to CTG 7.5, “Approximate Exposures Aboard Ship at Bikini Atoll Following Bravo,” 2 Apr. 1954; CTU-7
to CTG 7.5, “Approximate Exposure of Personnel Aboard Ship at Bikini Atoll
354 Notes to Pages 152-154 Following Bravo,” 2 Apr. 1954; Maupin, “Medical Aspects of Fall-Out from Bravo” (n. 100), 4. Cf. SAIC, Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Naval Personnel at Oper-
ation Castle, by C. Thomas et al., Report DNA-TR-84-6 (McLean, Va., 28 Feb. 1984).
150. Maupin, “Medical Aspects of Fall-Out from Bravo” (n. 100), 4. See also CJTF 7 to Chairman AEC, 21/0840Z Mar. 1954; Kaman Tempo, Castle Series (n. 21), 243-244. 151. CJTF 7 to Chairman AEC, 13/1218Z Mar. 1954. Cf. Clarkson, “History of Operation Castle” (n. 1), 124; Kaman Tempo, Castle Series (n. 21), 98. 152. Bruton to CJTF 7, “Maximum Permissible Exposures; Request for change of,” 18 Mar. 1954. 153. CJTF7 to DMA, 21 Mar. 1954; P. W. Clarkson to CTG 7.3, 1st Indorsement, “Request for Change of Maximum Permissible Exposures,” 23 Mar. 1954; Clarkson, “History of Operation Castle” (n. 1), 124. 154. Bugher to CJTF 7, 29 Mar. 1954.
155. Ogle to distrib., “Change No. 3 to Operation Plan No. 1-53, Task Group 7.1,” 6 Mar. 1954, section 2. 156. J-3 Daily Diary, Bikini Atoll, 8 Mar. 1954. 157. CJTF 7 to Chairman AEC, 13/1218Z Mar. 1954. 158. Clarkson, “History of Operation Castle” (n. 1), 137.
159. J-3 Daily Diary, Bikini Atoll, 12-27 Mar. 1954; Vern Denton to Vivian Whitley, 25/1545Z Mar. 1954; A. C. Graves to Bradbury, 25/2255Z Mar. 1954. See also Kaman Tempo, Castle Series (n. 21), 246-255. 160. JTF 7 to AEC, CSUSA, 27/1113Z Mar. 1954. 161. Ibid.; CJTF 7 to Chairman AEC, CSUSA, 28/1155Z Mar. 1954; CJTF 7 to Chairman AEC, 29/0818Z Mar. 1954; Duane C. Sewell to Ogle, 28/1329Z Mar. 1954; Sewell to Ogle, 28/1425Z Mar. 1954; J-3 Daily Diary, Bikini Atoll, 28, 29 Mar. 1954; Breslin to Eisenbud, 29/0637Z Mar. 1954; Servis, “Radiological Safety” (n. 5), 26; Ogle, Report of CTG 7.1 (n. 5), 114, 116, 117. See also Hawthorne, Oceanic U.S. Tests (n. 74), 71-73; Kaman Tempo, Castle Series (n. 21), 255-267. 162. CJTF 7 to Chairman AEC, 03/0804Z Apr. 1954; JTF 7 to Washington, 05/ 0022Z Apr. 1954; JTF 7 to Chairman AEC, 06/1030Z Apr. 1954; CJTF 7 to Chairman AEC, 07/1055Z Apr. 1954; Log of J-3 Activities, Bikini Atoll, 7, 9-10 Apr. 1954; AEC release 530, 7 Apr. 1954; Ogle, Report of CTG 7.1 (n. 5), 116, 118; Servis, “Radiological Safety” (n. 5), 26. 163. SFOO, “Operation Castle: Report of the Manager, Santa Fe Operations,” 1954 (extracted version; Washington: DNA, 1 Nov. 1981), 19. See also Hawthorne, Oceanic U.S. Tests (n. 74), 76-77; Kaman Tempo, Castle Series (n. 21), 267-283. 164. CJTF 7 to Chairman AEC, 15/0232Z, 15/1154Z, 19/0750Z, 22/1920Z, 23/ 2116Z Apr. 1954; AEC meeting no. 977, 16 Apr. 1954, item 1; Snapp to Fields, “Schedule for Test Operation,” 16 Apr. 1954; JTF 7 to JTF 7 LNO Hickam AFB, 24/0753Z Apr. 1954; CTG 7.1 to CJTF 7, “Historical Report,” 11 June 1954, w/att. “Task Group 7.1 Historical Report, Fourth Installment, 11 April-30 May 1954.” See also Kaman Tempo, Castle Series (n. 21), 283-290. 165. Reeves to Spain, 08/2110Z Apr. 1954. 166. Richard C. Durant to Tom [Shipman?], 13 Apr. 1954. 167. Hq TG 7.1 to George, 24 Apr. 1954.
Notes to Pages 154-155 355 168. Log of J-3 Activities, Bikini Atoll, 26, 27 Apr. 1954; CJTF 7 to Chairman AEC, CSUSA, 26/0813Z, 27/0832Z Apr. 1954; Ogle to Bradbury, 29/0354Z Apr. 1954; R. Lee Aamodt and H. K. Gilbert, “Operation Castle: Preliminary Report of the Results of [Union] Shot,” 15 May 1954, 11; Ogle, Report of CTG 7.1 (n. 5), 116, 119, 120; Servis, “Radiological Safety” (n. 5), 26, 37. See also Hawthome, Oceanic U-.S. Tests (n. 74), 80-81; Kaman Tempo, Castle Series (n. 21), 290-296. 169. CJTF 7 to Chairman AEC, 27/0202Z, 27/1756Z, 28/0257Z, 28/1635Z, 30/ 0743Z Apr. 1954, 01/0628Z, 02/0806Z, 03/0607Z, 05/0615Z May 1954; TG 7.1 to AEC, 29/0651Z Apr. 1954.
170. CJTF 7 to Chairman AEC, 03/1407Z, 04/0635Z, 04/1831Z, 04/2037Z, 05/0750, 06/0835Z, 07/0918Z May 1954; Log of J-3 Activities, Bikini Atoll, 5, 11 May 1954; Hq JTF 7, Operation Order No. 2-54 (Interim Phase Operation Order), 7 May 1954; Ogle, Aamodt, and H. K. Gilbert, “Very Preliminary Report of the Results of [Yankee],” 20 May 1954; Ogle, Report of CTG 7.1 (n. 5), 120, 121; Servis, “Radiological Safety” (n. 5), 37; Clarkson, “History of Operation Castle” (n. 1), 151-152. See also Hawthorne, Oceanic U.S. Tests (n. 74), 85-87; Kaman Tempo, Castle Series (n. 21), 296-310. i171. James B. Graham to Ogle, “Report of Exposures Exceeding 3.5 R as of 2400, 27 April 1954, TG 7.1 Personnel,” n.d.; Robert H. Dempsey to CJTF 7, “Request for Waiver of Maximum Permissible (Radiation) Exposure (MPE),” 30 Apr. 1954; Gaelen L. Felt to CJTF 7, “Request for Waiver of Maximum Permissible (Radiation) Exposure (MPE),” 30 Apr. 1954; Spain to Fields, “Request for Continuation of the Operational Exposure Rate (3.9R per 13 Weeks) at the Pacific Proving Ground for
Remainder of 1954,” 3 May 1954; Servis to Ogle, “Report of TG 7.1 Personnel Exposures Exceeding 3.5 R, as of 2400 Hours, 8 May 1954 (Personnel Remaining PPG),” 9 May 1954, w/att. 1st Indorsement, P. W. Clarkson to CTG 7.1, “Request for Waiver of Maximum Permissible (Radiation) Exposure (MPE),” n.d., approved; Project 6.4, TU 13, “Exposure Breakdown,” 10 May 1954; Project Officer Project 6.4 to CTU 13, “Overexposure of George G. Molumphey, Captain, USN, James J. Kearns and Stanley R. Williamson; Explanation of,” 11 May 1954; Molumphey to CTU 13, “Overexposure of Raymond, D. G., BM2, USN (Proj. 2.5a),” 12 May 1954; CTU 13
to CJTF 7, “Request for Waiver of Maximum Permissible (Radiation) Exposure (MPE),” 12 May 1954; Spain to CJTF 7, “Request for Waiver of Maximum Permmissible (Radiation) Exposure (MPE),” 13 May 1954. 172. P. W. Clarkson to Fields, 06/0200Z May 1954.
173. P. W. Clarkson to Fields, 06/0300Z May 1954; Servis to CTG 7.1, 7.5, “Phasing Out Schedule—Task Unit-7,” 6 May 1954; CJTF 7 to Chairman AEC, 06/0358Z, 06/0835, 09/0735Z, 10/0840Z, 11/0033Z, 11/0805Z, 11/1700Z, 12/0738Z, 13/0703Z, 14/1025Z, 15/0310Z, 15/0614Z May 1954; CTG 7.1 to LASL, 11/1725Z May 1954; A. C. Graves to Bradbury, 13/0349Z May 1954; Log of J-3 Activities, Enewetak Atoll, 14 May 1954; “Task Group 7.1 Historical Report” (n. 164); Ogle, Report of CTG 7.1 (n. 5), 120, 122; Servis, “Radiological Safety” (n. 5), 37; Clarkson, “History of Operation Castle” (n. 1), 151. See also Hawthorne, Oceanic U.S. Tests (n. 74), 91-93; Kaman Tempo, Castle Series (n. 21), 310-324. 174. Servis, “Radiological Safety” (n. 5), 6. 175. Servis to R. A. Miller, Nov. 1980, as cited in Kaman Tempo, Castle Series (n. 21), 75.
356 Notes to Pages 155-156 176. Hq JTF 7, Special Orders Number 87, 4 June 1954. 177. Ogle, Report of CTG 7.1 (n. 5), 125. 178. DNA, “Operation Castle,” Public Affairs Office Fact Sheet, 1 Dec. 1981, 4. 179. CJTF 7 to Chairman AEC, CSUSA, CINCPACFLT, CJTF 7 Rear, 19/1307Z Mar. 1954. Cf. Ogle to Bradbury, “Condition of the Natives,” 18/0756Z Mar. 1954;
Maupin, “Medical Aspects of Fall-Out from Shot Bravo” (n. 100), 3-4. See also Robert A. Conard, “The Effects of Fallout Radiation on the Skin,” in Gordon M. Dunning and John A. Hilcken, eds., The Shorter-Term Biological Hazards of a Fallout
Field, proceedings of an AEC-DOD symposium, Washington, 12-14 Dec. 1956 (Washington: GPO, 1958), 135-142. 180. LeRoy to CJTF 7, 11/2301Z Mar. 1954; LeRoy to CJTF 7, 12/2330Z Mar.
1954; Dunham to Bugher, 15/2219Z Mar. 1954; CJTF 7 to Chairman AEC et al. [Cronkite daily report], 13/0220Z, 14/0842Z, 16/1044Z, 17/1000Z, 19/0904Z, 20/414Z, 21/0840Z, 22/0832Z, 23/1305Z, 24/2012Z, 26/1224Z, 27/1114Z, 28/0707Z,
29/0710Z, 30/1145Z, 31/0555Z Mar. 1954, 01/0021Z, 02/0736Z, 03/2149Z Apr. 1954; CJTF 7 to Cronkite, 19/1311Z Mar. 1954; Maupin, “Medical Aspects of FallOut from Shot Bravo” (n. 100), 3. 181. Cronkite daily report, 19/0904Z (n. 173); Shipman to Wright H. Langham,
31/2343Z Mar. 1954; Bugher to Cronkite, 1 Apr. 1954; Langham to Shipman, 02/130Z Apr. 1954; Cronkite to CO NRDL, “Study on Internal Deposition of Fission Products in Man and Animals; Suggestions Concerning,” 6 Apr. 1954; Dunning to Bugher, 12 Apr. (n. 127); Shipman to A. C. Graves, 13/2106Z Apr. 1954; Graves to Cronkite, 14/0418Z Apr. 1954; H-Division Progress Reports, Apr. 20-May 20, June 20—July 20, 1954.
182. CJTF 7 to Chairman AEC et al. [Cronkite daily report], 04/0746Z Apr. 1954. 183. Shipman to A. C. Graves, 12 Apr. 1954; Shipman to Graves, 13 Apr. 1954, w/att. outline, “Project Hardy (The Return of the Native),” 14 Apr. 1954; CJTF 7 to Chairman AEC, 14/0339Z, 14/0534 Apr. 1954.
184. CINCPAC to Washington, 16/0501Z Apr. 1954; Cronkite to CJTF 7, “Preliminary Report Project 4.1; Submission of,” 21 Apr. 1954; Cronkite to CJTF 7, “Care and Disposition of Rongelap Natives, Recommendations for,” 21 Apr. 1954; David O. Byars, “Survey Party to Visit Rongelap and Utirik Atolls,” n.d. [ca. 21 Apr. 1954]; CJTF 7 to Chairman AEC, 22/1303Z Apr. 1954; Byars to CINCPAC, “Survey of Rongelap and Utirik Atolls,” 30 Apr. 1954, w/att.; CINCPACFLT to CJTF 7,
“Survey of Rongelap and Utirik Atolls,” 17 June 1954; Clarkson, “History of Operation Castle” (n. 1), 130-131. 185. Cronkite to CJTF7, 21 Apr. (n. 184). 186. H. C. Brown to Nichols, “Future Medical Care of Natives of Rongelap and Utink,” 23 Apr. 1954; Brown to Alfonso Tammaro, same title, 23 Apr. 1954; White to Shipman, 29/0353Z Apr. 1954; CJTF 7 to Bugher, 29/0440Z Apr. 1954; McGinley to Manager SFOO, “Responsibilities for Care and Disposition of Native Inhabitants of Rongelap and Utirik Atolls,” 6 July 1954; DBM transcript, “In the Matter of: Conference on Long Term Surveys and Studies of Marshall Islands,” Washington, 12-13 July 1954. 187. Fields to P. W. Clarkson, 14 Apr. 1954; CJTF 7 to CSUSA for G3, 15/0240Z Apr. 1954; State Department message no. 2355 to American Embassy Tokyo, 24 Apr. 1954; JTF 7 to AG, 24 Apr. 1954; CJTF 7 to U.S. Naval Station Kwajalein, 24/1713
Notes to Pages 156-157 357 Apr. 1954; CJTF 7 to Chairman AEC et al., 28/2145Z Apr. 1954; CJTF 7 to Tripler Army Hospital, 07/0240Z May 1954. 188. Southwick to Herschel Schooley, “Draft Announcement by JTF on Weather Service Returnees,” 23 Apr. 1954. 189. Kaman Tempo, Castle Series (n. 21), 244-245. 190. “Petition from the Marshallese People Concerning the Pacific Islands,” 20 Apr. 1954, circulated as UN Trusteeship Council T/PET.10/28, 6 May 1954; State Department message no. 539 to American Embassy Tokyo, 4 May 1954; “Statement of the United States Representative to the United Nations Concerning the Petition of the Marshallese People Regarding Thermonuclear Tests in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,” USUN press release, 5 May 1954. 191. CINCPACFLT to CNO, 17 May 1954; Fields to P. W. Clarkson, 20 May 1954; Salisbury to Strauss and Nichols, “AP Reporter’s Visit to Marshall Islands,” 27 May 1954; CJTF 7 to addressees, 29/0201Z May 1954. 192. State Department message 558 to USUN, New York, 14 May 1954; Dunning to Bugher, “Suggested Answers to Questions Raised by State Department,” 20 May 1954; Salisbury to Fields et al., 27 May 1954, w/att. “Draft Text for Announcement by the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. Trustee Council of the U.N.,” 26 May 1954; Nichols to David McK. Key, 9 June 1954, with enclosed “Answers to State Department ‘List of Possible Questions’”’; AEC 125/9, “Effects of Fall-Out in Pacific Test Area,” 21 June 1954; USUN releases 1931 and 1932, both 7 July 1954; Dulles to USUN, “Additional Adviser for the U.S. Delegation to the 14th Session of the Trusteeship
Council,” Message A-10, 8 July 1954. See also Merze Tate and Doris M. Hull, “Effects of Nuclear Explosions on Pacific Islanders,” Pacific Historical Review 33 (1964): 384-386.
193. DBM, “Conference on Long Term Surveys” (n. 186), 5. Cf. Bugher to Nichols, “Consideration by the United Nations Trusteeship Council in Connection with the Marshall Islanders’ Petition,” 12 July 1954; AEC 125/10, same title, 20 July 1954.
194. J. A. Hall to Nichols, “The Funding Arrangements for Possible Compensation to the Japanese Government on the Fukuryu Maru Case,” 22 Apr. 1954; Hall to G. C. Smith, 28 Apr. 1954; State Department TWX 2394 to American Embassy Tokyo, 30 Apr. 1954; AEC 730/1, “Funding Arrangements for Possible Compensation to the Japanese Government on the Fukuryu Maru Case,” 4 May 1954. 195. Allison to Secretary of State, “Fukuryu Maru,” 20 May 1954. 196. Dunham to J. A. Hall, “Estimate of Present Medical Status of the 23 Japanese Fishermen from the Fukuryu Maru,” 30 Apr. 1954. Cf. H. C. Brown, “Condition of Exposed Japanese Fishermen,” 3 May 1954, draft for “Major Activities in the Atomic Energy Programs, January-July 1954,” 16th Semiannual Report of the AEC, July 1954, 52-53. 197. Katsuji Sugimoto to James Victor Martin, Jr., “Hydrogen Test Blast, Rhee Line and Japanese Fishing Boats and Their Crew Seized by Koreans,” 23 June 1954; Allison to Sugimoto, 22 July 1954; “Indirect Loss May be Paid,” Asahi Evening News, 7 Aug. 1954; “Kyushu Plea Is Answered by Allison,” Nippon Times, 7 Aug. 1954. See also Y. Kondo et al., “Economic Aspects of Effects of Bikini H-Bomb Experiments on Japanese Fisheries,” in Research in the Effects and Influences of the Nuclear Bomb Test Explosions (n. 121), 2: 1251-1280.
358 Notes to Pages 157-158 198. Boss to files, “Meeting with Representative from Japanese Foreign Office, June 2, 1954,” 14 June 1954; Boss ito files, “Tokyo, June 7, 1954,” 14 June 1954; Boss to Pearson, “Letter Written June 11, 1954,” 15 June 1954. See also Hines, Proving Ground (n. 123), 183-189. 199. AEC meetings no. 982, 7 May 1954, item 12, and no. 984, 12 May 1954, item 4; William R. Adair to J. A. Waters, 28 May 1954; Waters to Fields, “Japanese Ship, Shunkatsu Maru,” 3 June 1954; Boss to files, “Trip to Misake, One of the Leading Tuna Ports, May 30, 1954,” 14 June 1954; Bugher to Snapp, “Japanese Expedition to the Pacific Proving Grounds Area,” 17 July 1954; AEC 730/7, “Japanese Expedition to the Pacific Proving Grounds Area,” 19 July 1954; S. Watari, “Summary of Investigation by the Shunkotsu Maru into the Effects of Radioactivity in the Bikini Waters,” in Research in the Effects and Influences of the Nuclear Bomb Test Explosions (n. 121), 939-942. See also Hines, Proving Ground (n. 123), 190-195. 200. AP, Washington, 1 Sept. 1954; AP, Tokyo, 3 Sept. 1954; UPI, Tokyo, 3 Sept. 1954; Southwick to distrib., “Jap Fisherman’s Condition,” 3 Sept. 1954; ABIIC release, 5:00 P.M., 7 Sept. 1954; Dunham to Southwick, “Your Memo Dated Septem-
ber 3, 1954, re Jap Fisherman’s Condition,” 10 Sept. 1954; George A. Morgan to Department of State, “Transmittal of Emergency Announcements Issued by the Clinic Subcommittee, ABIIC, Regarding Recent Health Relapse of Mr. Aikichi Kuboyama,” 21 Sept. 1954; Elizabeth Weideman, “Ashes of Death: First H-Bomb Victims,” The Nation 179 (9 Oct. 1954): 308-309; Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “H-Bomb Victim’s Case History Given to Dispel False Rumors,” Public Information and Cultural Affairs Information Bulletin, 15 Oct. 1954. See also Richard Hudson and Ben Shahn, Kuboyama and the Saga of the Lucky Dragon (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1965).
201. Richard Storry, A History of Modern Japan (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1960), 261-262. See also Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan: The Story of a Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), 280. 202. American Embassy Tokyo to Secretary of State, telegram 704, 23 Sept. 1954; James L. Hansen, “Autopsy Report,” 25 Oct. 1954; Hansen to Allison, “Autopsy Report,” 25 Oct. 1954; Eisenbud, memo of conversation, 20 Nov. 1954; Eisenbud to Rodney L. Sedgwick, “Radioactivity of the Tissues of Kuboyama,” 24 Nov. 1954; G. A. Morgan to Department of State, “Kuboyama Autopsy,” 13 Dec. 1954; Bugher to Tsuzuki, 5 Apr. 1954; Bugher to J. A. Hall, “Causes of Death Aikichi Kuboyama,” 6 Apr. 1955; Elbert DeCoursey to Bugher, 8 June 1955. 203. Seiichi Ohashi, “Pathological Findings on Late Mr. Kuboyama,” report at Japan ABCC, 16 Nov. 1954; Ohashi et al., “Pathological Findings in the Fatal Case (the Late Mr. Kuboyama) of the Radiation Sickness Caused by Bikini Ashes (an
Intermediate Report),” Iryo 9, no. 1 (Jan. 1955): 46-55; Masashi Miyake et al., “Pathology of the Bikini Patients,” in Research in the Effects and Influences of the Nuclear Bomb Test Explosions (n. 121), 2: 1371-1402; Tsuzuki, “Radiation Injury due to Radioactive Fallout,” Paper A/CONE.8/P/1045, International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, New York, 1955, 11 July 1955, 3. 204. American Embassy Tokyo to Secretary of State, telegram 705, 23 Sept. 1954; Allison to Mrs. Aikichi Kuboyama, 24 Sept. 1954; Allison to Katsuo Okazaki, 24 Sept. 1954; American Embassy Tokyo to Secretary of State, telegram 713, 24 Sept.
1954; Suzu Kuboyama to U.S. Ambassador, 18 Oct. 1954; G. A. Morgan to De-
Notes to Pages 158-160 359 partment of State, “Transmitting Copies of Exchange of Correspondence with Mrs. Kuboyama, Widow of Fukuryu Maru Victim,” 2 Nov. 1954; Dunning to Dunham, 15 Dec. 1954. 205. Bugher to Thomas E. Murray, “Inquiry from Japan Relative to Effects of Weapons Tests in the Pacific on the Tuna Industry,” 23 Aug. 1954; Bugher to Nichols, “Status of Conference with Japanese Scientists,” 26 Aug. 1954; Bugher to J. A. Hall, “Proposed Japanese-American Conference,” 27 Aug. 1954; American Embassy Tokyo to Secretary of State, no. 711, 29 Sept. 1954; Allison to Secretary of State, no. 776, 30 Sept. 1954; Nichols to W. Sterling Cole, 9 Nov. 1954; Pearson, “Report of United States-Japan Conference on Radiobiology, Tokyo, November 15-19, 1954,” nd.; ACBM, minutes of meeting, 15 Jan. 1955, 12—13; Hiyama, “General Backgrounds” (n. 128), 13-16. 206. G. A. Morgan to Department of State, “Transmitting of Welfare Instructions on Detection of Radioactivity and Additional Documents Relative to Bikini Claims,” 8 Oct. 1954; Department of State Policy Information Statement FE-173 for USIA, “Compensation to Japan for Bikini Atomic Damages,” 30 Dec. 1954; American Embassy Tokyo to Secretary of State, no. 1565, 3 Jan. 1955; Dwight D. Eisenhower to Director FOA [Harold E. Stassen], “Special Assistance to Japan for Compensatory Relief and Rehabilitation of Japanese Nationals for Personal and Property Damage Sustained as a Result of United States Nuclear Tests in the Pacific: Determination under Section 401 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954,” 6 Jan. 1955; AEC 730/12, “Compensation to the Japanese Government,” 14 Jan. 1955; Stassen to Strauss, 17 Jan. 1955; AEC 730/13, “Compensation to Japan,” 21 Jan. 1955. See also Lapp, Voyage of the Lucky Dragon (n. 120), 184. 207. Toshiyuki Kumatori, “A Summary of the Findings over the 20 Year Period on the Japanese Fishermen Exposed to Fallout in 1954,” Appendix 3 in Conard et al., A Twenty-Year Review of Medical Findings in a Marshallese Population Accidentally Exposed to Radioactive Fallout, Report BNL 50424 (Upton, N.Y.: BNL, Sept. 1975); Stephen Salaff, “The Lucky Dragon,” BAS 34 (May 1978): 22-23.
7 Routinization and Controversy: Accelerated Testing and Rising Public Concern, 1955-1956 1. Eugene M. Zuckert to Gordon Dean et al., 9 June 1953. 2. See, e.g., GM-DBM draft, “Limitation of Environmental Exposure to Radioactive Materials Released by U.S.A.E.C. Installations,” 1 Oct. 1953; Thomas N. White to Thomas L. Shipman, “Comments on GM-B&M-Draft, 10/1/1953,” 4 Nov. 1953.
3. Carroll L. Tyler to Alvin C. Graves, “Radiological Safety Organization— Nevada Proving Grounds,” 14 July 1953. 4. A. C. Graves to Tyler, “Radiological Safety Organization—-Nevada Proving Grounds,” 17 July 1953.
5. Tyler to office and division directors, field managers, “Field Manager, Las Vegas Field Office: Assignment of Functions,” Bulletin SF-O&M-41, Serial no. 186 (Revision 2), 30 Sept. 1953, paragraph 2.b. Cf. Seth R. Woodruff, Jr., “Radiological Safety (Non-Test Operational Periods),” Circular no. 8, 21 July 1953. 6. S. R. Woodruff to James E. Reeves, “Radiological Safety Organization—NPG,”
360 Notes to Pages 160-161 5S Oct. 1953; John C. Clark, “Report of the Test Director, Operation Teapot,” Report LA-1966, Oct. 1955, 12-13.
7. Reeves to John C. Bugher, “NYOO—Participation in Future Continental Tests,” 2 Sept. 1953; Paul T. Preuss to Reeves, “Off-Site Monitoring Requirements During Tests at NPG,” 24 Sept. 1953; Reeves to S. R. Woodruff, “Participation of NYOO in Future Continental Tests,” 29 Sept. 1953; Reeves to Woodmniff, “Off-Site Radiological Safety—Nevada Proving Grounds,” 30 Sept. 1953. 8. Bugher to Reeves, “Participation of NYOO in Future Continental Tests,” 18 Sept. 1953. 9. Reeves to Howard L. Andrews, 1 Oct. 1953, w/att. draft, Tyler to PHS Surgeon General, 30 Sept. 1953; Tyler to PHS Surgeon General, n.d.; James G. Terrill, Jr., “Report of Off-Site Meeting, November 6, 1953,” n.d.; Terrill, “Outline of the Scope of P.H.S. Off-Site Operations,” 9 Nov. 1953; William W. Allaire to Reeves, “Notes on Visit to NPG and Vicinity,” 10 Nov. 1953; Reeves to Shipman, “Off-Site Radiological Safety—Nevada Proving Grounds,” 17 Nov. 1953; Allaire draft, “Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and Public Health Service of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,” 18 Nov. 1953; A. C. Graves to Allaire, 30 Nov. 1953. 10. Tyler to Kenneth E. Fields, “DOD Proposals for Teapot,” 16 Nov. 1953 (emphasis in original). See also R. A. Bice to Donald J. Leehey, “Teapot Airdrop Reliabilities,” 6 Dec. 1954. 11. Vincent G. Huston to Tyler, “DOD Proposals for Teapot,” 24 Nov. 1953. 12. Bugher to Benjamin G. Holzman et al., “Meeting, AEC, Washington, January 20, 1954,” 14 Dec. 1953. On the earlier work of the Jangle Feasibility Committee, see ch. 3, above. 13. Shipman in “Review of Health Division Research Program,” 4 Feb. 1954, 2.
14. Joseph ‘M. Gardner to J. C. Clark, “Report of Decontamination Studies (Rough Draft),” 12 Oct. 1953, w/att. draft report by John Trapp; S. R. Woodruff to Clark, “Preliminary Analysis of Proposals for Reducing Contamination,” 18 Nov. 1953; Clark to Reeves, “Test Planning, Teapot; Area Stabilization Tests,” 18 Jan. 1954; Duane C. Sewell, notes on a meeting held 14 Feb. 1954, “Use of Areas, and Test Directors’ Responsibilities at NPG,” 15 Feb. 1954; “Memorandum of Understanding between U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and Weather Bureau of the U.S. Department of Commerce to Study Close-In Fallout from Continental Atomic Tests,” SF-54-351, 15 Feb. 1954; Lester Machta to Leehey, 17 Feb. 1954; Joe B. Sanders to H. L. Johnson, “Contamination Report,” 23 July 1954; Johnson to Clark, “Contamination Reduction Studies—NPG,” 9 Aug. 1954; R. W. Newman to Reeves, “Fall-Out Stabilization Test, Nevada Proving Ground,” 29 Sept. 1954; Reeves to A. C. Graves, “Asphalt Paving,” 26 Oct. 1954. 15. A. C. Graves to Tyler, “Meteorological Meeting of 27 October 1953,” 29 Oct. 1953; George J. Newgarden III to Commander, 4th Weather Group, “New Weapons and Meteorology,” 13 Nov. 1953; William H. Wyatt, “Outline for Weather Support at Nevada Proving Ground,” 9 Dec. 1953; Holzman and Machta, “Weather Forecasting Service at the Nevada Proving Ground,” 7 Jan. 1954; Dewitt Allen, “Seasonal Weather Considerations in Planning NPG Operations,” n.d.; White to Thomas S. Moorman, 18 June 1954; Moorman to White, 16 Aug. 1954; E. F. Cox to distrib., 18 Aug. 1954, w/att. report by Jack W. Reed, “Some Additional Notes on Winds Aloft Forecasting for the Nevada Proving Ground,” n.d.; White to Moorman, 10 Sept. 1954;
Notes to Pages 161-162 361 Ha 4th Weather Group, “Report on the 1954 Nevada Proving Grounds Wind Project,” Sept. 1954. 16. Harold F. Plank to A. C. Graves, “Available Documentary Material on Cloud Sampling Equipment,” 24 Sept. 1953; Tyler to Leland S. Stranathan, “Off-Site Radiological Safety at Nevada Proving Grounds,” 3 Feb. 1954; White to Shipman, “The
Fate of Inhaled Bomb Products and the NPG Airlanes Closure Problem,” 12 Feb. 1954; Machta to Graves, 28 May 1954; Graves to Machta, 23 June 1954; Newgarden to Shipman, “USAF-U.S. Weather Bureau Conference Held in Washington July 7,”
16 July 1954; J. C. Clark to Reeves, “U.S. Weather Bureau Conference Held in Washington July 7-8, 1954,” 20 July 1954; Newgarden to Shipman, “SFOO Conference,” 3 Aug. 1954. On air force support missions generally, see JRB Associates, Operation Teapot: 1955 Continental Nuclear Weapons Test Series, by Jean Ponton et al., Report DNA 6009F (McLean, Va., 23 Nov. 1981), 130-139. 17. Shipman to A. C. Graves, “Offsite Monitoring—NPG,” 26 Jan. 1954; Tyler to Norris E. Bradbury, “Off-Site Radiological Safety Functions—Nevada Proving Grounds,” 3 Feb. 1954; Shipman to Tyler, “Off-Site Activities—-NPG,” 4 Feb. 1954; S. R. Woodruff to Shipman, “Off-Site Radiological Safety Activities—NPG,” 12 Feb. 1954; Shipman to Woodruff, 15 Feb. 1954; “A Summary of the Discussions on the Off-Site/Rad-Safe Organization at the Nevada Proving Grounds” held 1—3 Mar. 1954, n.d.; Reuben E. Cole to Graves, “Air Sampling Requirements for NPG,” 8 Mar. 1954;
Allaire to Graves, “Air Sampling Requirements for NPG,” 18 Mar. 1954; Machta to Graves, 26 Mar. 1954; William S. Johnson to J. B. Sanders, “Transmittal of Comments,” 31 Mar. 1954. 18. Gordon M. Dunning to Bugher, “Off-Site Monitoring Organization for Future Tests at NPG,” 14 May 1954.
19. Harald M. Graming to Terrill, “Request for Additional Information on Proposed Functions for Personnel Participating in Off-Site Activities Program,” 11 May 1954.
20. Terrill to Graming, “Request for Additional Information on Proposed Functions for Personnel Participating in Off-Site Activities Program,” 17 May 1954; Terrill
to Oliver R. Placak, “Suggestion on Operational Details for Fallout Monitoring Personnel,” 27 May 1954.
21. AEC 141/25, DMA report, “Use of the Nevada Proving Ground,” 24 June 1954; AEC 141/26, “Decision [of 30 June 1954] on AEC 141/25,” 14 Sept. 1954; Clark, “Report of the Test Director” (n. 6), 11-12. On the Committee to Study NPG and its findings, see chs. 4 and 5, above. 22. Lewis L. Strauss to Donald A. Quarles, 1 July 1954 (circulated as AEC 707/2, “Operation Teapot,” 16 July 1954). Cf. Strauss to W. Sterling Cole, 6 Aug. 1954. 23. Hershell E. Parsons to SFO Manager, “Underground Shot, Operation Teapot,” I Oct. 1954, 2-3.
24. A. C. Graves to Reeves, “Fall-Out Prediction for NPG,” 5 Aug. 1954; Shipman to Bradbury, “Fallout Advisor—Continental Tests,” 28 Sept. 1954; Shipman to Graves, “Fallout Advisor—Continental Tests,” 28 Sept. 1954; Reeves to White, “Underground Shot, Operation Teapot,” 2 Nov. 1954; White to Reeves, “Underground Shot, Operation Teapot,” 16 Nov. 1954. Cf. NRDL, “Distribution and Intensity of Fallout from the Underground Shot,” by R. L. Stetson et al., Operation Teapot Project 2.5.2, Report WT-1154 (San Francisco, 14 Mar. 1958). 25. JRB Associates, Shots Ess through Met and Shot Zucchini: The Final Teapot
362 Notes to Pages 163-164 Tests, 23 March-15 May 1955, by Jean Ponton et al., Report DNA 6013F (McLean, Va., 27 Nov. 1981), 23-61.
26. Leehey to Fields, “Comments on Staff Paper AEC 707/1,” 17 May 1954; Leehey to Fields, “Inclusion of Teapot Announcement in 16th Semiannual Report to Congress,” 1 June 1954; Fields to Leehey, same title, 10 June 1954; Daniel F. Worth, Jr., to Fields, “Suggested Text of Teapot Announcement,” 22 June 1954; Terrill to Placak, “Off-Site Activities,” 26 July 1954; FCDA, “Desert Rat Handbook: For Civil Defense Field Exercise Participants, Operation Cue, Spring Series, 1955, AEC Nevada Test Site” (Washington, 1954).
27. R. W. Hart to Mark D. Hollis, “Off-Site Radiological Health and Safety Activities,” 5 Aug. 1954; Terrill to Hart, “PHS Off-Site Activities,’ 11 Aug. 1954; Terrill to Placak, “Scheduling of Off-Site Activities,” 11 Aug. 1954; Terrill to Placak, “Personnel for PHS Off-Site Activities,” 11 Aug. 1954; Placak to Terrill, “Off-Site Activities,” n.d.; Placak to Terrill, 16 Aug. 1954. 28. Reeves to Shipman, “Off-Site Radiological Plan—Nevada Proving Ground,” 18 Aug. 1954, w/att. draft “Off-Site Radiological Safety Plan,” n.d. See also Dunning
to Bugher, “Off-Site Monitoring Organization for Future Tests at NPG,” 12 Aug. 1954; Fields to Leehey, 24 Sept. 1954.
29. Reeves to Given H. Dugger, “Radiological Safety Criteria for Continental Test,” 2 Sept. 1954; J. C. Clark to Reeves, “Comments on Off-Site Rad-Safe Plan, Nevada Proving Ground,” 8 Sept. 1954; Lynn Anderson to distrib., “Meeting,” 9 Sept. 1954; Dugger to Reeves, “Radiological Safety Criteria for Continental Test,” 17 Sept. 1954.
30. Dugger to Reeves, 17 Sept. (n. 29). 31. Dunning draft, “Policies of the Atomic Energy Commission Regarding Radiological Safety of the Public during Weapons Testing at the Nevada Proving Grounds,” 30 Sept. 1954, the 16-page version marked OFFICIAL USE ONLY, the 63-page version marked SECRET (both now declassified); Dunning to A. C. Graves, 5 Nov. 1954; Dunning to Graves, 9 Nov. 1954; Shipman to Dunning, 19 Nov. 1954; PHS Radiological Health Program, “Operational Plan and Orientation Text for Mid-February 1955 Test Series,” draft 28 Sept. 1954, revised Nov. 1954, especially Appendix I,
“Off-Site Radiological Safety Plan: Emergency Evacuation Plan for Protection of Personnel and Materials outside of Nevada Proving Grounds,” 23-25, and Appendix III, “Public Relations,” 26. 32. AEC 141/27, DBM report, “Radiological Safety Criteria and Procedures for Protecting the Public during Weapons Testing at the Nevada Test Site,” 31 Jan. 1955; AEC meeting no. 1060, 2 Feb. 1955, item 3; AEC, “Radiological Safety Criteria and Procedures for Protecting the Public during Weapons Testing at the Nevada Test Site,” Feb. 1955; Willard F. Libby to I. I. Rabi, 18 Feb. 1955; Duncan Clark to William L. Guthrie and Walter D. Claus, “Radiological Safety Criteria for Teapot,” w/att. draft
statement, “Radiological Safety Criteria for Protecting the Public during Nevada Weapons Tests,” 21 Feb. 1955; Guthrie to J. C. Clark, “Radiological Safety Cnteria for Teapot,” 24 Feb. 1954; Reeves, “Operation Teapot—Report of the Test Manager,” 3 Aug. 1955 (extracted version as “Operation Teapot: Report of the Test Manager, Joint Test Organization, Nevada Test Site, Spring 1955” [Washington: DNA, 1 Nov. 1981}), 36-39; AEC 141/30, “Decision on AEC 141/27 [at AEC meeting no. L060, 11 Feb. 1955],” 11 Aug. 1955. 33. AEC meetings no. 1020, 18 Aug. 1954, item 6; no. 1025, 15 Sept. 1954, item
Notes to Pages 164-165 363 8.b; and no. 1029, 24 Sept. 1954, item 1; Fields to Kenneth D. Nichols, “Proposal for Operation Teapot,” 27 Aug. 1954; Strauss to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, 30 Aug. 1954; AEC 707/5, “Nevada Proving Ground Test Activities for Calendar Year 1955,” 9 Sept. 1954; Paul M. Foster to Guy J. Anderson, 24 Sept. 1954; Strauss to W. S. Cole, 24 Sept. 1954. 34. AEC Washington release 568, “AEC to Conduct Tests in Nevada in 1955,” 24 Sept. 1954; the same as LVFO release LAV-55-4. 35. LVFO release, 24 Sept. 1954. 36. W. H. Rowen to Guthrie, “Teapot Tests,” 20 Aug. 1954. 37. Ibid. Cf. Jack L. Armstrong to Leehey, “Teapot Tests,” 25 Aug. 1954. 38. Leehey to Fields, “Announcing Purpose of Spring 1955 Tests,” 4 Oct. 1954.
See also Richard G. Elliott to Bradbury, “Announcing Purpose of Certain Teapot Tests,” 31 Aug. 1954; Bradbury to Elliott, same title, 30 Sept. 1954.
39. See, e.g., Huston to Charles L. Dunham, “Letter Reply to Representative [Douglas R.] Stringfellow re Spring 1955 Test Series,” 4 Nov. 1954; Nichols to Stringfellow, 26 Nov. 1954. 40. Reeves to Ralph P. Johnson, “Commission Briefing—Operation Teapot,” 14 Oct. 1954. See also William E. Ogle, “Very Tentative Outline of Proposed Discussion, with Commission, of Problem of Safely Firing at N.P.G.,” i Oct. 1954; AEC meeting no. 1032, 5 Oct. 1954, item 1; Ogle to A. C. Graves, “Statements Made to the Atomic
Energy Commission on the Safe Conduct of the Teapot Operation on October 5, 1954,” 29 Nov. 1954. Cf. Roy Reider, “Safety Planning of an Atomic Test Operation,” prepared for presentation at National Safety Congress, 20 Oct. 1954.
41. Morse Salisbury, “Public Information and Education Preceding and During Teapot,” draft staff paper, 5 Oct. 1954; Salisbury to Fields et al., “Draft Staff Paper on Public Education and Information Plans for Teapot,” 2 Nov. 1954, w/att. draft by Rodney L. Southwick, “Public Information and Education Preceding and During Teapot,” 2 Nov. 1954; Huston to Salisbury, “Draft Staff Paper on Public Education and Information Plans for Teapot,” 15 Nov. 1954; G. J. Anderson to all concerned, “Trip Report for Visit to SFO 18-19 November 1954,” 29 Nov. 1954, 2-3; AEC 707/12, DIS report, “Public Information and Public Education Programs for Operation Teapot,” 6 Dec. 1954. See also “Course of Action to Achieve Better Public Understanding of the Varying Effects of Sizes and Types of Nuclear Weapons,” working draft, 17 Mar. 1955. 42. Leehey to Fields, “Public Discussions in NPG Region,” 28 Oct. 1954; Bugher to Leehey, “Public Discussions in NPG Region,” 5 Nov. 1954; Elliott to Fields, “Visits to Nevada Site Region Communities,” 15 Nov. 1954; Guthrie to Nichols, “Pre Test Educational Program,” 21 Jan. 1955; Elliott to John Bowers, 27 Jan. 1955; Elliott to S. R. Woodruff, “Pre-Test Community Visits,” 27 Jan. 1955; Leehey to Fields, “Report on Utah Community Visits,” 28 Jan. 1955; JOTI releases JOTI-55-6, 5 Feb. 1955, and JOTI-55-7, 7 Feb. 1955. 43. JOTI draft, ““A Fact Sheet on Continental Nuclear Tests,” 5 Jan. 1955; Elliott to distrib., “First Draft of Proposed Test ‘Fact Sheet,’” 14 Jan. 1955; Elliott to distrib., “Public Safety Section of Fact Sheet,” 19 Jan. 1955; Leehey to Fields, “Final Section
of Fact Sheet,” 20 Jan. 1955; Dunning to Bugher, “Review of ‘A Fact Sheet on Continental Nuclear Tests,’” 31 Jan. 1955; Bugher to Huston, “Review of a ‘Fact Sheet on Continental Nuclear Tests,’” 3 Feb. 1955; Southwick, “Rewrite of Fact Sheet on Continental Tests,” 8 Feb. 1955; AEC meeting no. 1065, 14 Mar. 1955, item 9;
364 Notes to Pages 165-166 Woodford B. McCool to Fields, “Use of ‘Health and Safety Facts Sheet,’” 14 Mar. 1955.
44. Leehey to Fields, 1 Dec. 1954; Elliott to Fields, “Transmittal of Test ‘Popular Booklet,’” 10 Dec. 1954; Elliott to Fields, “Nevada Test ‘Popular Booklet,’” 13
Dec. 1954; Salisbury to Guthrie, “Popular Brochure on Effects of Nevada Detonations,” 30 Dec. 1954; AEC, Atomic Test Effects in the Nevada Test Site Region, Jan. 1955. 45. Terrill to Dunning, 8 Nov. 1954; Dunning to Bugher, “Request for Data during Teapot,” 16 Nov. 1954; Dunning to Terrill, 17 Nov. 1954; AEC 707/12, “Public In-
formation and Public Education,’ Appendix B, “Public Education Program in Advance of Spring 1955 Test Series in Nevada,” 7-10; Dunning to Bugher, “Plans for Spring 1955 Tests at Nevada Test Site,” 24 Jan. 1955; Dunham to James W. McRae, 28 Jan. 1955; Reeves to Director DMA, 13 Mar. 1955. 46. AEC 707/12, “Public Information and Public Education,” Appendix C, “Public Information Program for Teapot,” 11-16; AEC 707/20, “Joint AEC-DOD Information Program for Teapot,” 17 Jan. 1955; Elliott to Director DMA, “Information Service during Nevada Tests,” 27 Jan. 1955; JOTI release JOTI-55-2, 1 Feb. 1955; Reeves, “Test Manager’s Operation Order, Operation Teapot, Part II: Operational,” Feb. 1955, 16-19; A. C. Graves press briefing, “Planning and Conducting Nevada Tests,” 13 Feb. 1955; “Transcript of Remarks by Dr. John C. Bugher, Director of AEC’s Division of Biology and Medicine, at Pre-Series Press Conference, Las Vegas, February 13, 1955,” n.d.; Leo K. Bustad press briefing, “Biological Implications of Atomic Test Fallout,” 26 Feb. 1955. 47. Gaelen L. Felt to distrib., “Teapot Schedule,” 4 Nov. 1954. 48. Teapot Test Director’s Information Letter no. 11, “Firing Schedule,” 22 Nov. 1954; J. C. Clark to Reeves, “Continental Atomic Tests, Spring 1955,” 22 Nov. 1954;
Reeves and A. C. Graves to Fields, “Operation Teapot,” 7 Dec. 1954; Leehey to Fields, “Operation Teapot,” 8 Dec. 1954; Duncan Curry, Jr., and B. C. Lyon, “Operation Teapot: Report to the Test Director,” 3 Aug. 1955, 2—3; Clark, “Report of the Test Director” (n. 6), 13-17. 49. Rabi to Strauss, 22 Dec. 1954; Fields, memo for record, “Telephone Call from Dr. N. E. Bradbury, Director, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, 11:45 A.M., Tuesday, December 14, 1954,” 14 Dec. 1954; Test Director’s Information Letter no. 15, “Teapot Schedule,” 28 Dec. 1954; AEC 707/17, DMA report, “Proposed Program for Operation Teapot,” 30 Dec. 1954; AEC meeting no. 1051, 4 Jan. 1955; McCool to Fields, “Commission Action on AEC 707/17—-Proposed Program for Operation Teapot,” 5 Jan. 1955; Herbert B. Loper to Nichols, 6 Jan. 1955; Huston to Leehey, “GAC
Report,” 12 Jan. 1955; AEC 707/24, “DOD Concurrence for Operation Teapot,” 19 Jan. 1955; Leehey to Reeves, “Directive for Operation Teapot,” 25 Jan. 1955; AEC707/30, “Proposed Program for Operation Teapot,” 16 Feb. 1955. 50. J. C. Clark to Preuss, “Draft of Rad-Safe Procedures,” 23 Aug. 1954; E. W. Niles to distrib., “Radiological Safety Procedures for Tests at Nevada Proving Grounds,” 3 Sept. 1954; Ogle to Clark, “WET54-503D [Proposed project on biological doses],” 27 Sept. 1954; Test Director’s Information Letter no. 3, “Radiological Safety Procedures for Teapot,” 28 Sept. 1954; Test Director to Director DBM, “Alpha Tolerances for Nevada Test Site,” 25 Jan. 1955; W. D. Claus to Clark, 10 Feb. 1955.
Notes to Page 166 365 51. Test Director’s Information Letter no. 10, “Teapot Participation,” 16 Nov. 1954; G. A. Work, “Brief Statement of Requirements for Early Entry into Shot Area,” 29 Dec. 1954; Robert L. Corsbie to Test Director, “Recovery Problem—Projects 33.1 and 33.2,” 29 Dec. 1954; B. C. Lyon to J. C. Clark, “H Plus 30 Min. Entries to 5 R/Hr Line by Project 6.1.2,” 26 Jan. 1955; Clark to H. E. Parsons, “Post Shot Entry, Project 6.1.2,” 27 Jan. 1955; Reeves to Parsons, “Radiation Dosage—Project 2.8, Operation Teapot,” 11 Apr. 1955; Clark to Tom D. Collison, “Radiation Dosage—Project 2.8,
Operation Teapot,” 16 Apr. 1954; Reeves, “Report of the Test Manager” (n. 32), 40-41; AFSWC, Operation Teapot, Project 2.8b: Manned Penetration of Atomic Clouds, by J. E. Banks et al., Report WT-1156 (Kirtland AFB, New Mex., 30 Apr. 1958; extracted version, Washington: DNA, 1 Sept. 1980). See also Leland B. Taylor, History of Air Force Atomic Cloud Sampling, vol. 1, Narrative, AFSC Historical Publication Series 61-142-1 (Kirtland AFB, New Mex.: AFSWC, Jan. 1963), 128-130; JRB Associates, Operation Teapot (n. 16), 175.
52. A. J. Amerson to DWET, “Over Exposure of Drop Aircrew on HA Shet,” 8 Nov. 1954.
53. Ibid., 1st Indorsement, H. E. Parsons to Commander, 4925th Test Group (Atomic), “Over Exposure of Drop Aircrew on HA Shot,” n.d. 54. Paul H. Fackler to Test Director, “Effects Envelopes for High Altitude Shot of Operation Teapot,” 14 Dec. 1954. On the HA shot, see also Taylor, History of Air Force Atomic Cloud Sampling (n. 51), 130-136. 55. Collison, “Expected Exposure of Test Personnel in Aircraft in Critical Position
for Teapot,” 20 Dec. 1954. See also B. C. Lyon to distrib., “Support Aircraft Requirements for Teapot,” 9 Nov. 1954; Plank to J. C. Clark, “Meeting with Lt. Col. Collison at K[irtland] AFB, 2 December 1954,” 8 Dec. 1954. 56. H. E. Parsons to distrib., “RadSafe for Operational Training and Troop Participation Projects,” 25 Oct. 1954; Reeves to J. C. Clark, “Teapot Operational Training Projects,’ 3 Jan. 1954; Parsons to Test Director, “Operational Training Project Manned Stations for Teapot,” 4 Jan. 1955; Parsons to Reeves, “Operation Analysis Memorandum no. 88 (TAC),” 10 Jan. 1955, w/att. memo by George W. Stickle and Norman E. Brake, “On TAC Participation in Teapot,” TAC Hq, 17 Dec. 1954; Parsons to Reeves, “Summary of Operational Training Projects, Operation Teapot,” 11 Jan. 1955; Allaire to Reeves, “(DOD Operational Training Projects—Teapot,” 11 Jan. 1955;
B. C. Lyon to Reeves, “Teapot Operational Training Projects,” 20 Jan. 1955; JOTI release JOTI-55-4, 1 Feb. 1955. For a concise description of air training projects in Teapot, see JRB Associates, Operation Teapot (n. 16), 124-129. 57. Garlen R. Bryant to Comptroller et al., “Personnel Requirements for Desert Rock,” 3 Sept. 1954; Leehey to Fields, “Proposed DOD Operational Training and Troop Participation in Teapot,” 30 Oct. 1954; H. E. Parsons, press briefing, “Military Participation,” 12 Feb. 1955; Fred W. Sladen, Jr., press briefing, “Exercise Desert Rock VI,” 13 Feb. 1955; “Army Remarks of February 14: Pre-Shot Press Briefing,” 14 Feb. 1955; JOTI, “Summary of Department of Defense Participation in the Spring 1955 Test Series,’ 20 Mar. 1955. On Desert Rock VI organization and training, see JRB Associates, Operation Teapot (n. 16), ch. 3, 129-130. The basic reference is Hq Exercise Desert Rock VI, “Exercise Desert Rock VI, Final Report of Operations,” 23 May 1955. For the place of Desert Rock VI in army planning for nuclear war, see
366 Notes to Pages 166-167 A. J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army between Korea and Vietnam (Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1986), 110-119. 58. Chief AFF, to CGs, Continental Armies, “Directive for Exercise Desert Rock
VI,” 8 Dec. 1954, encl. 9, “Criteria for Positioning of DA Troops and Troop Observers at Continental Atomic Tests,” 1; Reeves, “Report of the Test Manager” (n. 32), 45-46. See also JRB Associates, Operation Teapot (n. 16), 142—158.
59. Leehey to Fields, “Desert Rock Participation in Teapot,” 5 Nov. 1954. Cf. G. J. Anderson for the record, “Telephone Conversation with Mr. Allaire, SFOO,” 4 Nov. 1954. On the DOD statement of responsibility for safety in Upshot-Knothole, see ch. 5, above. 60. Fields to Leehey, “Directive for Operation Teapot,” 13 Dec. 1954.
61. H. E. Parsons to Reeves, “Directive for Exercise Desert Rock VI,” 3 Jan. 1955; Huston to Bugher, same title, 20 Jan. 1955.
62. Dunham to Huston, “Directive for Exercise Desert Rock VI,” 28 Jan. 1955, w/att. Bugher to John T. Hayward, “Exposure Standards for Personnel at AEC Weapon Tests,” 20 Oct. 1952. See also Guthrie to Reeves, “Directive for Exercise Desert Rock VI,” 3 Feb. 1955. 63. “Continental Test Organization,” draft organization chart, 30 Aug. 1954; Lee-
hey to Fields, “Proposed Organization for Continental Test,” 26 Oct. 1954, w/att. SFOO Test Division draft, “Functional Statements for Continental Test Organization,” 20 Oct. 1954; Dunning to Bugher, “Proposed Organization for Continental Tests in Spring 1955,” 16 Nov. 1954; SFO Test Division, “Functional Statements for Joint Test Organization, Operation Teapot,” 15 Dec. 1954; JOTI release JOTI-55-5, 3 Feb. 1955; Reeves, “Test Manager’s Operation Order” (n. 46), 1; Reeves, “Report of the Test Manager” (n. 32), 41—42; J. B. Sanders to A. C. Graves, “Off-Site Report, Operation Teapot, Spring—1955,” 9 Mar. 1956, w/att. Sanders et al., “Report of Off-Site Radiological Safety Activities, Operation Teapot, Nevada Test Site, Spring 1955,” n.d., 2-11, 148-150. 64. J. C. Clark to Collison, “Functions of the On-Site Rad-Safe Unit, Operation Teapot,” 9 Sept. 1954; B. C. Lyon to Clark, “Trip Report—Visit to DWET and SFOO, 17 September 1954,” 20 Sept. 1954; Clark to Reeves, “Requirements for Military Personnel for Teapot,” 24 Sept. 1954; Test Director’s Information Letter no. 4, “Test
Director’s Staff and Support Groups—Teapot,” 12 Oct. 1954; G. H. Dugger to Reeves, “Radiological Safety Procedure for NPG,” 22 Oct. 1954; Lyon to Clark and D. Curry, “Trip Report—Trip to NPG and UCRL,” 13 Dec. 1954; Reeves to White, ‘Designation of Rad-Safe Coordinator—Joint Test Organization—Operation Teapot,” 31 Dec. 1954; H. E. Parsons to Clark, 10 Jan. 1955, w/att. ““Radsafe History, Period: 1 July thru 31 December 1954,” sections 3—4; JOTI release JOTI-55-64, 19 Mar. 1955; Collison, “Radiological Safety: Report to the Test Director,” FC/AFSWP Report WT1166 (Albuquerque, May 1955), 9-11. 65. W. S. Johnson to Placak, 22 Nov. 1954; B. C. Lyon to distrib., “Rad-Safe Monitor Training Courses,” 3 Jan. 1955; Collison to DWET, “Program of Instruction for Project Monitors,” 5 Jan. 1955, w/att. program and lesson plans; Corsbie to those listed, “One-Day Monitor’s Training Course, Nevada Test Site,” 10 Jan. 1955; Test Director’s Information Letter no. 17, “Rad-Safe Monitor Training Courses,” 13 Jan.
1955; Collison to distrib., “One-Day Monitor’s Training Course,” 5 Feb. 1955;
Notes to Page 168 367 Collison to distrib., “One-Day Monitor’s Training Course,” 8 Mar. 1955; Collison to distrib., same title, 23 Mar. 1955; Collison, “Radiological Safety” (n. 64), 11-12. For an overview of the Teapot on-site rad-safe organization, including training programs, see JRB Associates, Operation Teapot (n. 16), 158-174.
66. Felt to J-Division group leaders, “On-Site Rad-Safe at Nevada Proving Ground,” 12 Nov. 1954. See also H. E. Parsons to Reeves, “Vehicle Decontamination Station,” 6 Oct. 1954; Reeves to J. C. Clark, “Vehicle Decontamination Station,” 11 Oct. 1954; Ogle, “Notes on Pogo Staff Meeting, November 17, 1954,” 22 Nov. 1954, item 1; Parsons to Kenneth H. Houghton, J. E. Tefft, and Plank, “Issue, Receipt, and Processing of Film Badges,” 9 Dec. 1954; Test Director’s Information Letter no. L9, “Instruction for Entry into Contaminated Areas,” 1 Feb. 1955; Dosimetry and Records Section, On-Site Rad-Safe Group, “Standard Operating Procedure for Issue, Receipt and Processing of Personal Dosage Devices at Nevada Test Site,” 1 Feb. 1955; Curry and Lyon, “Report to the Test Director” (n. 48), 8.
67. Test Director’s Operation Order no. 1-55 (Teapot), 26 Jan. 1955, Annex D, “Radiological Safety Plan,” 3 Feb. 1955; S. R. Woodruff to distrib., “Emergency Evacuation Plan for Protection of Personnel and Material in Mercury Area,” 3 Feb. 1955; Test Manager to distrib., “Emergency Evacuation Plan for Personnel of the Control Point and the Manned Stations within the Immediate Test Area,” n.d.; B. C. Lyon to distrib., “Disaster Plan—Part I—Emergencies Involving Tower or Underground Device,” 14 Feb. 1955; Lyon to distrib., “Disaster Plan—Part I]—Emergencies Involving Delivery Aircraft and Airborne Devices,” 14 Feb. 1955. 68. Operation Order no. 1-55 (n. 67), Annex B, “Teapot Schedule”; Test Director’s Information Letters, “Teapot Schedule”: no. 20, 4 Feb. 1955; no. 23, 15 Feb. 1955; and no. 24, 26 Feb. 1955; AEC meetings no. 1063, 1 Mar. 1955, item 16, and no. 1065, 14 Mar. 1955, item 6; AEC 707/38, DMA report, “Revised Schedule for Teapot,” 5 Apr. 1955. 69. Reeves to A. C. Graves, “Weather Advisor—Teapot,” 15 Nov. 1954; John J. Jones to Shipman, 3 Dec. 1954; Reeves to Graves, “U.S. Weather Bureau Assistance in Teapot,” 20 Dec. 1954; H. E. Parsons to Graves, “Transmittal of Operations Order 702-54,” 27 Dec. 1954, w/att. Hq 4th Weather Group, Operations Order 702-54, “Weather Support for AEC-DOD Operation Teapot,” 1 Dec. 1954; Reeves to Parsons, 26 Jan. 1955; Reeves to all concerned, “Attendance at Weather Briefings,” 25 Feb. 1955; Reeves, “Report of the Test Manager” (n. 32), 11-25, 31. Cf. “Teapot: Summary of Reports of Advisory Panel,” n.d. 70. Clinton P. Anderson to Strauss, 21 Feb. 1955 (circulated as AEC 141/28, “Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the Nevada Test Site for Test Operations under Present Criteria,” 24 Feb. 1955). 71. AEC meetings no. 1062, 23 Feb. 1955, item 23, and no. 1063, 1 Mar. 1955; AEC-MLC meeting, 24 Feb. 1955, item 4; AEC 141/29, “Operations at Nevada Test Site under Present Criteria—Draft Letter to JCAE,” 28 Feb. 1955; Forrest Westem to Bugher, “Conversation with Gordon Dunning,” 28 Feb. 1955; Guthrie, revised draft of letter to C. P. Anderson, 2-3 Mar. 1955; AEC 141/31, “Decision on AEC 141/29 [at AEC meeting no. 1063, 1 March 1955],” 23 Aug. 1955. See also Kenneth D. Nichols, The Road to Trinity (New York: William Morrow, 1987), 335. 72. Strauss to C. P. Anderson, 3 Mar., 24 Mar., 11 Apr., 6 June 1955.
368 Notes to Pages 168-169 73. “Memorandum of Understanding between FCDA and AEC for FCDA Participation in Full-Scale Nuclear Tests,” 3 Nov. 1954; AEC 707/11, DMA report, “FCDA Proposal for an Open Shot during Operation Teapot,” 10 Dec. 1954; AEC 707/15, “Attendance of Foreign Observers at ‘Open Shot,’” 28 Dec. 1954; McCool to Fields, “Commission Action on AEC 707/11—FCDA Proposal for an Open Shot during Operation Teapot,” 27 Dec. 1954; JOTI release JOTI-55-8, “Reporters and Civilian Observers to Witness Civil Defense Exercise at Nevada Atomic Test,” 9 Feb. 1955, and JOTI-55-73, 25 Mar. 1955; Fields to Nichols, “Program for Open Shot,” 12 Apr. 1955; AEC meeting no. 1078, 28 Apr. 1955, item 1; Reeves, “Report of the Test Manager” (n. 32), 93-104; Roscoe H. Goeke, “Indoctrination and Training of Radiological Defense Personnel,” CETG Report WT-1165, Nov. 1955; FCDA, “Operation Cue: The Atomic Test Program of the Federal Civil Defense Administration in Cooperation with the Atomic Energy Commission, Nevada Test Site, Spring 1955,” n.d. 74. “Transcript of Meeting of the ACBM held on Saturday, May 7, 1955,” 12. Cf. Reeves, “Report of the Test Manager” (n. 32), 43, 45; Dunham to Fields, “Summary Report by the Division of Biology and Medicine re Fallout from Operation Teapot,”
19 Mar. 1956 (circulated as AEC 604/14, “Fallout from Operation Teapot,” 5 Apr. 1956); ACC, “Fallout Studies,” by M. J. Schumchyk and E. H. Bouton, Operation Teapot Project 2.5.1, Report WT-1119, 23 July 1958; UCLA Atomic Energy Project, “Distribution and Characterization of Fall-Out and Airborne Activity from 10 to 160 Miles from Ground Zero, Spring 1955,” by L. Baurmash et al., Operation Teapot Project 37.2, Report WT-1178 (Los Angeles, 17 Nov. 1958). For local fallout patterns from Teapot tests, see also Howard A. Hawthorne, ed., Compilation of Local Fallout Data from Test Detonations 1945-1962 Extracted from DASA 1251, 2 vols., Report DNA 1251-1-EX, -2-EX (Santa Barbara: GE-TEMPO, 1 May 1979), vol. 2, Continental U.S. Tests, 165-245. 75. SAIC, Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Troop Observers, Operation Desert Rock VI, Operation Teapot, by Jerald L. Goetz et al., Report DNA 5354F (McLean, Va., 15 July 1980), 77-78 passim; SAIC, Analysis of Radiation Exposure, Task Force Razor: Exercise Desert Rock VI, Operation Teapot, by R. Edwards et al., Report DNA-TR-83-07 (McLean, Va., 15 July 1983); SAIC, Analysis of Radiation Exposure, Third Marine Corps Provisional Atomic Exercise Brigade: Exercise Desert Rock VI, Operation Teapot, by Goetz et al., Report DNA-TR-84-13 (McLean, Va., 15 Feb. 1984); JRB Associates, Operation Teapot (n. 16), 8 passim. For more details on military participation in Teapot, see “Exercise Desert Rock VI, Final Report of Operations” (n. 57); see also the several individual volumes from JRB Associates: Shots Wasp through Hornet: The First Five Teapot Tests, 18 February—12 March 1955, by Carl Maag et al., Report DNA 6010F (McLean, Va., 26 Nov. 1981); Shot Bee: A Test of the Teapot Series, 22 March 1955, by Carl Maag et al., Report DNA 6011F (24 Nov. 1981); Shot Apple 2: A Test of the Teapot Series, 5 May 1955, by Jean Ponton et al., Report DNA 6012F (25 Nov. 1981); Shots Ess through Met and Shot Zucchini (n. 25). 76. Shipman to Bradbury, “Rad-Safe Operations in the Pacific,” 8 Apr. 1955. 77. Test Director to Staff Surgeon, Sandia Base, “Report on Radiation Exposure of DOD Personnel Participating in Teapot,” 23 May 1955, w/att. Teapot final dosage re-
ports by Benjamin H. Purcell, 17 May 1955; Collison to John F. Newell, “OverExposures during Operation Teapot,” 24 May 1955, w/att. “Listing of All Personnel
Notes to Pages 169-170 369 Exposed over the Permissible Level for Operation “Teapot’”; “Appendix B: Persons Receiving More than Authorized Radiation Exposure,” n.d. (this unidentified typescript appears to be unpublished Appendix to Collison, “Radiological Safety” [n. 64]); Reeves, “Report of the Test Manager” (n. 32), 41; JRB Associates, Operation Teapot (n. 16), ch. 6, “Dosimetry for Department of Defense Personnel at Operation Teapot.” Typical of the standard memorandum sent as notice that a worker had exceeded the limit and would not be allowed to reenter contaminated areas is Collison to Director CETG, “Over-Exposure of Project Personnel,” 13 Mar. 1955. 78. JOTI release 55-44, 4 Mar. 1955. See also JOTI Note to Correspondents, 5 Mar. 1955; Henry G. Vermillion, memo for record, “Photo Interview on Radiation Exposure,” 5 Mar. 1955; George Mason, memo for record, “Press Coverage on Security Guard [Eugene D.] Haynes,” 9 Mar. 1955; JOTI release 55-64, 19 Mar. 1955. 79. Ross Sutherland to FSI, “Eugene D. Haynes,” 8 Mar. 1955; Clinton S. Maupin to Test Manager, “Exposure of Personnel to Radiation in Excess of 3.9 R,” 3 Apr. 1955; Reeves to Fields, “Overexposure of Security Guard Eugene D. Haynes,” 11 Apr. 1955; Sutherland to Nevada Industrial Commission, 14 Apr. 1955; Nevada Certificate of Death for Eugene D. Haynes, 4 Apr. 1985. 80. Collison to Test Director, “Over-Exposure of Radsafe Personnel,” 2 Mar. 1955; Earle D. Hightower to S. R. Woodruff, “Over-Exposure of Eugene D. Haynes,” 7 Mar. 1955; R. N. Ferley, Jr., to D. Curry, “Incidents at Gate Four during Tesla,” 9 Mar. 1955; Reeves to J. C. Clark, “Rad-Safe Procedures to Prevent Overexposure of Personnel,” 10 Mar. 1955; Walter T. Kerwin, Jr., to Clark, “Entry into Yucca Flat
between H and R Hour,” 11 Mar. 1955; Curry to W. A. Cude, “Instructions for Controlling Entry into Yucca Flat from H Hour to R Hour, D-Day,” 11 Mar. 1955; Reeves to G. H. Dugger, “Overexposure of Security Guard, Eugene D. Haynes,” 29 Mar. 1955; Curry and Lyon, “Report to the Test Director” (n. 48), 5-6. 81. Interviews with William J. Brady, Mercury, Nevada, 25 May and 15 June 1978; and Floyd Wesley Wilcox and Brady, Las Vegas, Nevada, 15, 17, and 23 Jan. 1979.
82. See Barton C. Hacker, The Dragon's Tail: Radiation Safety in the Manhattan Project, 1942-1946 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: Univ. of California Press, 1987), 147.
83. Hayward to Tyler, “AEC Participation in an Underwater Atomic Explosion at Deep Submergence,” 23 Oct. 1952; George F. Kraker to Bradbury, Quarles, and D. F. Worth, Jr., “AEC Participation in Tests of an Underwater Atomic Explosion at Deep Submergence,” 3 Nov. 1952; J. C. Clark to Bradbury, “J-Division Comments on WD14, 3 Nov 52, Concerning Deep Underwater Test,” 18 Nov. 1952; Bradbury to Kraker, “AEC Participation in Tests of an Underwater Atomic Explosion at Deep Submergence,” 9 Dec. 1952; Robert LeBaron to Chairman AEC, “Deep Underwater Test of an Atomic Weapon,” 24 Dec. 1952 (circulated as AEC 606, “Underwater Test of an Atomic Weapon,” 30 Dec. 1952); AEC 606/5, GM report, “Background Information
Concerning Operation Wigwam,” 26 July 1954. For a more detailed account, see A. B. Focke, “Scientific Director’s Summary Report, Operation Wigwam, May 1955,” Report WT-1003 (extracted version, Washington: DNA, 1 Feb. 1980), Appendix B, “Early History of the Deep Underwater Atomic Detonation.” 84. Dean to LeBaron, 18 Feb. 1953 (circulated as AEC 606/1, “Underwater Test of an Atomic Weapon,” 20 Feb. 1953); Tyler to Bradbury, Worth, and Quarles, “Deep
370 Notes to Pages 170-171 Underwater Test of an Atomic Weapon,” 27 Feb. 1953; Henry D. Smyth to LeBaron, 30 Apr. 1953 (circulated as AEC 606/2, “AEC Participation in Underwater Test of Atomic Weapon,” 8 May 1953); Fields to Tyler, “Operation Wigwam,” 7 May 1953; Tyler to Bradbury, “Operation Wigwam,” 22 May 1953; Quarles to Tyler, “Operation Wigwam,” 9 June 1953; Tyler to Fields, “Operation Wigwam,” 17 June 1953. 85. Huston to Tyler and Flaherty, “Operation Wigwam,” 17 Aug. 1953; Husion to A. C. Graves, 18 Aug. 1953, w/att. Wigwam program proposals and tentative schedule; Tyler to Fields, “Planning for Operation Wigwam,” 17 Aug. 1953; Fields to Alvin R. Luedecke, 14 Sept. 1953; Tyler to Fields, “Planning for Operation Wigwam,” 14 Sept. 1953; Guthrie to Darol K. Froman, 13 Nov. 1953; Tyler to Fields, “AEC Participation in Wigwam,” 13 Nov. 1953; Froman to Guthrie, 18 Nov. 1953; Tyler to
James W. McCrea, “Designation of Mr. H. E. Lenander as AEC Project Officer, Operation Wigwam,” 19 Jan. 1954; Tyler to Harlan E. Lenander, 19 Jan. 1954; N. D. Greenberg, memo for record, “Wigwam Planning Meeting,” 26 Feb. 1954; Reeves to Bradbury, “Report on Operation Wigwam,” 18 Oct. 1955, w/att. Lenander, “Summary Report: Atomic Energy Commission Responsibilities on Operation Wigwam, 1955.” 86. Luedecke to distrib., “Operation Wigwam,” 21 Apr. 1954, w/att. “Operation Wigwam Concept” (extracted version, Washington: DNA, 1 Feb. 1980); John Syl-
vester to CJTF 7, “Report of Operation Wigwam,” 22 July 1955, w/att. CTG 7.3, “Operation Wigwam: Report,” 22 July 1955 (extracted version, Washington: DNA, 1 Feb. 1980), 14. For more details, see Jaycor, Operation Wigwam, by S. E. Weary et al., Report DNA 6000F (Alexandria, Va., 1 Sept. 1981). 87. “Operation Wigwam Concept” (n. 86), 38. See also J. M. Coogan and J. H. Lofland, Jr., “Experimental Plan for Operation Wigwam,” Project 2.4, 27 Apr. 1955; Focke, “Scientific Director’s Summary” (n. 83), 93-96. 88. “Operation Wigwam Concept” (n. 86), 50-51; Dunning to Dunham, “Radiological Safety for Wigwam,” 17 Nov. 1954; Nichols to Luedecke, 23 Nov. 1954; 8. R. Sapirie to Bugher, “ORNL Participation in Nevada Tests and NRDL in Operation Wigwam,” 6 Dec. 1954; W. B. Reynolds to Dunning, 6 Jan. 1955; Sapirie to Allen B. Myers, “Oak Ridge National Laboratory Assistance to the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory in Operation Wigwam,” 13 Jan. 1955; Nichols to Luedecke, 26 Jan. 1955; NRDL, “Radiological Safety for Operation Wigwam,” by Albert L. Baietti and A. L. Smith, Wigwam Report WT-1001 (San Francisco, Jan. 1957), 52-54, 63-64.
89. “Operation Wigwam Concept” (n. 86), 38. See also Coogan and Lofland, “Experimental Plan” (n. 87); Focke, “Scientific Director’s Summary” (n. 83), 96-101.
90. Bugher to Fields, “Operation Wigwam,” 19 Aug. 1954. See also Dunning draft memo, Howard C. Brown, Jr., to Fields, “Deep Underwater Test,” 28 July 1954; Brown to Fields, “Deep Underwater Tests,” 29 July 1954; Brown to Dunham, “Operation Wigwam,” 5 Aug. 1954; Greenberg to files, “Wigwam Meeting—August 13, 1954,” 16 Aug. 1954. 91. Strauss to Charles E. Wilson, 10 Aug. 1954 (circulated as AEC 606/6, “Operation Wigwam,” 12 Aug. 1954). See also Thomas E. Murray to Strauss, 23 Aug. 1954; Strauss to Murray, 30 Aug. 1954. 92. AEC meetings no. 1021, 24 Aug. 1954, item 1; no. 1023, 8 Sept. 1954, item 8;
and no. 1025, 15 Sept. 1954, item 5; Fields to Nichols, “Wigwam,” 7 Sept. 1954, w/att. draft letter Strauss to C. E. Wilson (circulated as AEC 606/7, “Operation
Notes to Page 171 371 Wigwam,” 9 Sept. 1954); McCool to Fields, “Commission Action on AEC 606/7— Operation Wigwam,” 17 Sept. 1954. 93. Strauss to C. E. Wilson, 23 Sept. 1954. 94. Strauss to W. S. Cole, 11 Oct. 1954; Strauss to Loper, 4 Nov. 1954 (circulated as AEC 606/10, “Operation Wigwam,” 5 Nov. 1954); Fields to Corbin Allardice, 17 Nov. 1954, w/att. “Purposes and Programs—Operation Wigwam” (circulated as AEC 606/11, “Operation Wigwam,” 24 Nov. 1954); Greenberg to files, “State Department Concurrence Requesting Presidential Approval for Conduct of Wigwam,” 3 Dec. 1954; Strauss to Wilson, 23 Dec. 1954; Robert B. Carney to CJTF 7, “Directive for the Conduct of Operation Wigwam,” 18 Feb. 1955; Loper to Chairman AEC, “Directive to Commander, Joint Task Force Seven, for the Conduct of Operation Wigwam,” 1 Mar. 1955; Guthrie to McCool, “Wigwam Briefing,” 11 Mar. 1955; AEC meeting no. 1067, “Briefing on Operation Wigwam,” 15 Mar. 1955; Strauss to C. B. Momsen, 18 Mar. 1955 (circulated as AEC 606/16, “Designation of AEC Representative for Conduct of Operation Wigwam,” 23 Mar. 1955); Momsen to Strauss, 4 Apr. 1955 (circulated as AEC 606/18, “AEC Representative for Operation Wigwam,” 11 Apr. 1955). 95. Strauss to Wilson, 23 Sept. (n. 93). 96. C. L. Marshall to Salisbury, “Draft Announcement and Staff Paper on Public Information Plan for Operation Wigwam,” 7 Mar. 1955; Salisbury and Fields to Nichols, “Information Plan and Draft Announcement of Wigwam,” 14 Mar. 1955 (circulated as AEC 606/15, “Information Plan for Wigwam,” 17 Mar. 1955); McCool to Fields and Salisbury, “Commission Action on AEC 606/15—Information Plan for Operation Wigwam,” 23 Mar. 1955; Southwick to distrib., “Navy Modifications of Wigwam Information Plan and Announcement,” 29 Mar. 1955. 97. Sylvester to CNO, “Monitoring of West Coast Commercial Fish; responsibility for,’ 8 Feb. 1955; CNO to Chairman MLC, “Monitoring of West Coast Commercial Fish; responsibility for,” 16 Feb. 1955; Loper to Chairman AEC, “Responsibility for Monitoring West Coast Commercial Fish,” 21 Feb. 1955 (circulated as AEC 793, same title, 25 Feb. 1955); Frank O’Beirne to Fields, 18 Mar. 1955 (circulated as AEC 606/17, “Operation Wigwam Briefing,” 7 Apr. 1955). 98. Bugher to Nichols, “Tuna Fish Monitoring along California Coast,” 30 Mar. 1955 (circulated as AEC 793/1, same title, 7 Apr. 1955). See also Bugher to George P. Larrick, 28 Apr. 1955; Bugher to Fields, “Wigwam Post Shot West Coast Tuna Fish Monitoring Program,” 10 May 1955 (circulated as AEC 793/3, “West Coast Tuna Fish Monitoring Program,” 19 May 1955); Willis R. Boss to files, “Post Wigwam Monitoring Program, Conferences with Tuna Canner at Terminal Island, Los Angeles,” 10 May 1955. 99. Strauss to Loper, 7 Apr. 1955 (circulated as AEC 793/2, “Monitoring of Commercial Fish on the West Coast,” 12 Apr. 1955); Boss to files, “Wigwam Monitoring Program, Telephone Conversations with Major Frank G. Richie, A.F.,” 18 Apr. 1955; Bugher to Reeves, “Radiation Monitoring Personnel for Operation Wigwam,” 28 Apr. 1955; Sylvester and Lofland to Bugher, 2 May 1955; E. V. McGarry to files, “Wigwam Tuna Monitoring Program,” 5 May 1955; Boss to files, “Post Wigwam Monitoring Program,” 13 May 1955; Paul B. Pearson to Alfonso Tammaro, “Status of Fish Monitoring Program—wWest Coast,” 16 May 1955; Boss to files, “Post Wigwam
372 Notes to Pages 171-172 Monitoring Program, Personnel and Equipment Assignment,” 18 May 1955; Boss to Bugher, “Calibration of West Coast Fish Monitoring Instruments,” 24 May 1955; Boss to Bugher, “Termination of USF&DA-AEC Post Wigwam Monitoring Program,” 9 June 1955. 100. Boss to files, “Wigwam Monitoring Program, Telephone Conversations with Terrill and Richie,” 19 Apr. 1955; Seth Gordon to AEC, 12 May 1955; Boss to files, “Post Wigwam Monitoring Program: McKinnon’s Report of San Francisco Bay Area, Carry’s Conversation,” 12 May 1955; Charles R. Carry to Southwick, 13 May 1955; Pearson to Tammaro, 16 May (n. 99); Huston to CTG 7.3, 16 May 1955; G. C. Wright
to Libby, 17 May 1955; Lee Hargus to Salisbury, “Proposed Release on Recent Atomic Tests,” 24 May 1955; Salisbury to Hargus, “Proposed Release on Recent Atomic Test,” 24 May 1955; Salisbury to distrib., “Draft Announcement Proposed by Navy on Operation Wigwam,” 24 May 1955. 101. Huston to Bugher, “Statement re Radiological Monitoring of Fish,” 21 Apr. 1955; McCool to Salisbury, “Press Release on Monitoring at West Coast Canneries,”
2 May 1955; Salisbury to McCool, “Press Release on Monitoring at West Coast Canneries,” 3 May 1955; Libby to CNO, 6 May 1955, w/att. draft contingency statement; D. B. Duncan to Deputy Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of State, and Chairman AEC, “Single Explosion in Submarine Defense Test of Nuclear Device; draft announcements for,’ 9 May 1955; Salisbury to McCool, “Public Release on Underwater Test,” 10 May 1955, w/att. draft releases; Southwick to Albert H. Holland, Jr., 10 May 1955, w/att. draft announcement; Salisbury to Libby, 13 May 1955; Libby to CNO, 13 May 1955, w/att. draft statement; Salisbury to those listed, “Announcement of Conclusion of Underwater Test,” 17 May 1955; DOD-AEC release no. 640, “Underwater Test Completed,” 17 May 1955. 102. Huston to Salisbury, “Wigwam Information Plan,” 12 Jan. 1955, w/att. “Basis for Desiring Press Release on Wigwam.” 103. AEC Memorandum of Conversation, “Discussion of Public Information Plan for Wigwam,” 14 Mar. 1955; Bugher to Strauss, “Recommendation of ACBM Regarding Announcement of Project Wigwam,” 18 Mar. 1955; AEC meetings no. 1068, 22 Mar. 1955, item 8; no. 1070, 25 Mar. 1955, item 8; no. 1073, 6 Apr. 1955, item 16; no. 1075, 13 Apr. 1955, item 8; no. 1077, 27 Apr. 1955, item 14; no. 1081, 5 May 1955, item 1; McCool to Salisbury and Fields, “Press Release on Operation Wigwai,” 24 Mar. 1955; AEC-MLC meeting no. 97, 31 Mar. 1955, item 4; D. B. Duncan to Deputy Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of State, and Chairman AEC, ‘Single Explosion in Submarine Defense Test of Nuclear Device; press announcement for,” 13 Apr. 1955 (circulated as AEC 606/20, “Press Announcement for Operation Wigwam,” 15 Apr. 1955); McCool to Fields, “Letter to the Joint Committee: Wigwam Press Release,” 14 Apr. 1955; Gioacchino Failla to Strauss, 23 Apr. 1955; Libby to Secretary of Defense, 28 Apr. 1955; Libby to CNO, 28 Apr. 1955; Transcript of ACBM meeting, Saturday, May 7, 1955, 5, 8-9, 17-18; Fields to C. P. Anderson, 9 May 1955; McCool to J. L. Calahan, “Public Release on Operation Wigwam,” 13 May 1955; Loper to Libby, 13 May 1955 (circulated as AEC 606/23, “Public Release on Operation Wigwam,” 19 May 1955). 104. “Single Explosion in Submarine Defense Test of Nuclear Device Scheduled for Mid-May in Pacific Area,” draft release, 28 Feb. 1955, in AEC 606/15, “Infor-
Notes to Pages 172-173 373 mation Plan for Wigwam” (n. 96); “Single Explosion in Submarine Defense Test of
Nuclear Device Scheduled for Mid-May in Pacific Area,” revised navy draft in Southwick to distrib., 29 Mar. (n. 96); “Joint DOD AEC Press Announcement Tentatively Scheduled to be Released 9 May 1955,” revised draft in AEC 606/20, “Press
Announcement for Operation Wigwam” (n. 103); JCAE release 30, 9 May 1955; DOD-AEC release 635, “Single Explosion in Submarine Defense Test of Nuclear Device Scheduled for Mid-May in Pacific Area,’ 9 May 1955; JOTI release, 9 May 1955. 105. Paul W. Spain to Leehey, “Operation Wigwam Test,” 8 June 1955, 1.
106. Ibid.; AEC 606/25, “Wigwam Detonation,” 17 June 1955; Focke, “Scientific Director’s Summary” (n. 83), 29-32; CTG 7.3, “Operation Wigwam: Report” (n. 86),
23-25; NRDL, “Radiological Safety” (n. 88), 37-39. See also Jaycor, Operation Wigwam (n. 86), ch. 4, “Personnel Exposures at Wigwam”; Hawthorne, Compilation of Local Fallout Data Report (n. 74), vol. 2, Oceanic U.S. Tests, 97-99. Several veterans of Wigwam dispute these conclusions; though lacking documentary evidence, they hold vivid memories of surging seas and battered ships after Wigwam but cannot recall wearing film badges and remain convinced their present ailments stem from exposure to Wigwam radiation. See Dan Noyes et al., “Operation Wigwam,” New West (1 Dec. 1980): 25-38; Harvey Wasserman et al., Killing Our Own: The Disaster of America’s Experience with Atomic Radiation (New York: Dell, 1982), 104—105. Cf. Robert R. Monroe to Edmund G. Brown, Jr., 4 Feb. 1980; Quality of Life Board, City of San Diego, “Operation Wigwam: Special Report to Honorable Mayor and City Council,” 10 Apr. 1980. 107. AEC meeting no. 1093, 28 June 1955; McCool to Bugher, “General Manager’s Request for Letter to the Joint Committee,” 1 July 1955; Fields to C. P. Anderson, 18 July 1955 (circulated as AEC 793/4, “Fish Monitoring—Operation Wigwam,” 28 July 1955); James R. Cribbett to Boss, 3 Aug. 1955, w/att. Irwin B. Berch, “Summary Report—1955 Tuna Monitoring Program”; Dunning to Dunham, “Radiological Data on Operation Wigwam,” 3 Dec. 1957.
108. Loper to Strauss, 13 June 1955, as reproduced in Chuck Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History (Arlington, Tex.: Aerofax, 1988), 219, n. 290. See also J. C. Clark, “One-Point Tests at Nevada Test Site,” 13 July 1955; A. C. Graves to Leehey, 25 July 1955; Greenberg, “Proposal for One-Point Detonation Safety Tests,” 28 July 1955; draft of AEC 840/4, “One Point Detonation Tests,” 22 Aug. 1955; Huston to Bradbury, 3 Aug. 1955. For a general discussion of the safety problem as seen from the outside, see Joel Larus, Nuclear Weapons Safety and the Common Defense (Columbus: Ohio State Univ. Press, 1967); for a historical overview and the current outlook, see Shaun Gregory, The Hidden Cost of Deterrence: Nuclear Weapons Accidents (London: Brassey’s [UK], 1990). 109. SFO Manager Announcement no. 44, “Change in Name of Nevada Proving Ground,” 31 Dec. 1954; Cox to A. C. Graves, “Contamination Measurements at NTS during One-Point Detonation Tests, Fall 1955,” 10 Aug. 1955; J. C. Clark to distrib., “Component Scheduling for Fall Nevada Test Site LASL Tests,” 12 Aug. 1955; AEC
meeting no. 1119, 24 Aug. 1955; McCool to Alfred D. Starbird, “Commission Decision on AEC 840/4—One-Point Detonation Tests,” 25 Aug. 1955; L. A. Minnich
to Strauss, 6 Sept. 1955 (circulated as AEC 840/5, “One-Point Detonation Tests
374 Notes to Pages 173-174 Presidential Approval,” 13 Sept. 1955); Clark, “Report of the Test Director, 56-Project
NTS,” Feb. 1956, 11-15; SFO Test Division, “Report of the Test Manager on ‘56 Project-NTS,’” 12 June 1956, 9-12. 110. Leehey to Reeves, 19 Oct. 1955, as quoted in “Report of the Test Manager’ (n. 109), 13. 111. J. B. Sanders et al., “Report of Off-Site Radiological Safety Activities,” 14 Mar. 1956, 1-2; “Report of the Test Manager” (n. 109), 14—15, 27, 31. 112. W. S. Johnson, “Rad-Safe Annex to Test Director’s Report, 56 Project NTS,” 17 Feb. 1956, 1, issued as “Appendix B: On-Site Rad-Safe,” in Clark, “Report of the Test Director” (n. 109), 109-120. See also 56-Project NTS Test Director’s Information Letters: no. 1, “7 September 1955 Conference,” 15 Sept. 1955; no. 2, “Health Hazards Associated with Project 56-NTS,” 16 Sept. 1955, w/att. “General Comments on Hazards from Certain Alpha Emitting Elements.” 113. W.S. Johnson to J. C. Clark, “Urine Sampling for Fall Tests,” 12 Sept. 1955; Johnson to D. Curry, “Contaminated Personal Effects—Fall Test,” 13 Sept. 1955; Cude to William R. Adair, “Security Procedures for 56 Project-NTS,” 19 Sept. 1955; Dean D. Meyer to Wray B. Garn, “Permissible Weather Conditions for Operations in Nevada,” 20 Sept. 1955; 56-Project NTS Test Director’s Information Letter no. 5, ‘“Contaminated Area Procedures,” 6 Oct. 1955; A. C. Graves to Reeves, 7 Oct. 1955; John-
son to distrib., “Emergency Procedures for Project 56 Operation,” 12 Oct. 1955; Johnson to Clark, “Emergency Procedures for 56 Project NTS,” 13 Oct. 1955; Reeves to Clark, 18 Oct. 1955; Health and Safety Procedures for Work Order no. 4511-01, n.d.; “Report of the Test Manager” (n. 109), 19-20.
114. AEC release 710, 10 Oct. 1955. See also AEC meeting no. 1136, 10 Oct. 1955, item 3.
115. LVFO release, 5 Nov. 1955; AEC meeting no. 1146, 8 Nov. 1955, item 3; Kenner F. Hertford, “Continental Atomic Tests,” Office of the Manager Announce-
ment no. 35, 8 Nov. 1955; W. S. Johnson to J. B. Sanders, “Urine Sampling for REECO Personnel,” 9 Nov. 1955. See also JRB Associates, Safety Experiments, November 1955—March 1958, by Jeannie Massie and Inara Gravitis, Report DNA 6030F (McLean, Va., 2 Aug. 1982), 13-18.
116. W. S. Johnson to J. B. Sanders, “Rad/Safe Roll-Up for 56 Project-NTS,” 9 Nov. 1955; “H-Division Progress Report, November 20-December 20, 1955.” 117. “H-Division Progress Report” (n. 116), section I.A. 118. J. B. Sanders to LVBO et al., “Danger Notice—Areas Nos. 3 and 7,” 3 Nov. 1955; Sanders to LVBO et al., “Danger Notice,” 4 Nov. 1955; J. C. Clark to Reeves, “Transmittal of Paper on 56-Project NTS Off-Site Rad-Safe Procedures,” 17 Nov. 1955, w/att. “Suggestions and Recommendations for 56-Project NTS Off-Site RadSafe Operations Relating to Plutonium Only,” 17 Nov. 1955; W. S. Johnson to Frank H. Rogers, “Rad-Safe Control in Area 11 for Period 21 November—8 December, 1955,” 21 Nov. 1955; Harry S. Jordan to Sanders, “Area 11, NTS,” 11 Dec. 1955. 119. Hertford to Dunning, 10/2135Z Nov. 1955; Hertford to Starbird, 11/0009Z Nov. 1955; J. B. Sanders to Starbird, 14/2130Z Nov. 1955; AEC meeting no. 1148, 15 Nov. 1955, item 7.a. 120. DBM to DMA, 2 Dec. 1955, as summarized in “Report of the Test Manager” (n. 109), 27; Sanders et al., “Report of Off-Site Radiological Safety Activities” (n. 111), 8.
Notes to Pages 174-175 375 121. Bradbury to Starbird, 14/2247Z Nov. 1955. See also J. B. Sanders to Starbird, 17/1702Z Nov. 1955. 122. Reeves to J. B. Sanders, 17/2316 Nov. 1955; Spain to Starbird, 18/2027Z Nov. 1955; McCool to Dunham, “Commissioner’s Request Concerning Contamination Incident,” 18 Nov. 1955; McCool to Starbird, ‘““Nevada Test Incident,” 18 Nov. 1955; R. W. Cook to C. P. Anderson, 28 Nov. 1955; NTS rad-safe unit, “Tray Collection Data,” through 1 Dec. 1955; Sanders to Starbird, 09/1810Z Dec. 1955; Fields to Anderson, 5 Jan. 1955. 123. Wright H. Langham and Payne S. Harris to Shipman, “Plutonium Hazards
Associated with the Accidental and Experimental One-Point Detonation of Small Atomic Weapons in Which Appreciable Criticality Does Not Occur,” n.d. (ca. 5 Dec. 1955); Elliott to Starbird, “Announcement of Safety Tests Resumption,” 8 Dec. 1955;
Hertford to R. G. Bulter, “Special Safety Problems in Production of Optimized Weapons,” 13/1900Z Dec. 1955; J. C. Clark to D. P. MacDougall, “Summary of Mea-
surements of Fallout, 56-Project NTS,” 19 Dec. 1955; W. S. Johnson to Reeves, “Counting Efficiency for Alpha Emitters,” 22 Dec. 1955; Shipman to Reeves, “NTS Policies Concerning Plutonium Contamination,” 23 Dec. 1955; A. C. Graves to Reeves, “NTS Policies Concerning Plutonium Contamination,” 29 Dec. 1955; Corsbie, “Plutonium Hazards Created by Accidental or Experimental Detonation of Atomic Weapons,” May 1956. 124. W. S. Johnson to J. C. Clark, “Changes in Rad-Safe Plans for 56 ProjectNTS,” 22 Dec. 1955; Johnson to distrib., “Operational Procedures for Fallout Program,” 27 Dec. 1955; Johnson to Cude, “Rad-Safe Requirements and Operational Plans for 56 Project-NTS,” 27 Dec. 1955; Reeves to distrib., “Addendum—Test Manager’s Operation Order—56 Project-NTS,” 29 Dec. 1955, w/att. “Radiological Safety Responsibilities”; SFO Test Division, ‘Test Manager’s Operation Order, 56 Project NTS, Part I1—Operational,” 30 Dec. 1955. 125. Kraker to Starbird, “Report of Offsite Air Sampling,” 30/2305Z Jan. 1956; “Fallout Briefings for the January 1956 Phase of 56-Project NTS,” n.d.; R. P. Johnson to Starbird, 09/2140Z Feb. 1956; J. B. Sanders to Starbird, “Air Sampling Results— Off-Site Rad-Safe Plan,” 11 Feb. 1956; Reeves to Starbird, “Air Sampling Results— 56 Project-NTS,” 13 Feb. 1956; Reeves to Starbird, same title, 17 Feb. 1956; W. S. Johnson, “Report of Fallout Study of January 1956, 56 Project N.T.S.,” 19 Mar. 1956; Sanders et al., “Report of Off-Site Radiological Safety Activities” (n. 111), 90, table XIV: “Accumulated Air Concentrations ... for Inhabited Locations,” and elsewhere. 126. W. S. Johnson to J. B. Sanders, “Urine Sampling Results,” 12 Dec. 1955; Sanders to Johnson, “Urine Sample Shipment,” 16 Dec. 1955; Johnson to Sanders, “Urine Sampling for Nevada Test Site Personnel,” 23 Jan. 1956; Everett R. Mathews, “Report on Radiological Health Survey at NTS, January 24-26, 1956,” n.d.; Johnson to John Enders, “Urine Samples from 56 Project NTS Personnel,” 31 Jan. 1956; Johnson to CO, Ist RSSU, 31 Jan. 1956; Johnson to Sanders, 1 Feb. 1956 and 23 Feb. 1956, w/att. “Urine Analysis.” 127. Placak to Terrill, “Radiation Exposures,” 2 Feb. 1956; Brady in conversation, 2 July 1985. 128. J. B. Sanders, “Radiological Exposure of Personnel,” 19 Jan. 1956; R. P. Johnson to John W. Gannon, 20/2358Z Jan. 1956; J. C. Clark to distrib., “Transmittal of Memo,” 2 Feb. 1956, w/att. “Test Director’s Memo Concerning Technical Over-
376 Notes to Pages 175-176 exposures, 56-Project N.T.S.,” 2 Feb. 1956; C. Y. Jordan to F H. Rogers, 13 Feb. 1956; Placak to files, “Radiation Exposures of Oral Epley and Lawrence Odegaard Received in Area 11 on January 18, 1955,” n.d. See also JRB Associates, Safety Experiments (n. 115), 19-21. 129. LVBO release LAV-56-13, 20 Jan. 1956. See also Shipman to Bradbury, “Press Releases Concerning Overexposures to Radiation,” 24 Jan. 1956; Elliott to Bradbury, 27 Jan. 1956. 130. Starbird to Strauss et al., 31 Jan. 1956; AEC meeting no. 1171, 3 Feb. 1956, item 3; Elliott to Director DMA, “Las Vegas Press Statement of Epley Death,” 3 Feb.
1956; Starbird to Strauss et al., 3 Feb. 1956; Starbird to Strauss et al., “Final Information with Respect to the Death of Mr. Epley,” 3 Feb. 1956; Jordan to Rogers, 13 Feb. (n. 128). 131. H. S. Jordan and W. S. Johnson to J. C. Clark, “S56 Project NTS Incident,”
2 Feb. 1956; Jordan and Johnson to Clark, “Comments Regarding Test Directors Memo on 56 Project NTS Incident on January 18, 1956,” 2 Feb. 1956; Clark to distrib., “Remarks Concerning Technical Overexposure, 56-Project NTS,” n.d.; Ogle to Clark, “Remarks Concerning Technical Overexposure, 56-Project NTS,” 8 Feb. 1956. 132. Hq JTF 7, “A History of Operation Redwing: The Atomic Weapons Tests in the Pacific, 1956,” by Martin Blumenson and Hugh D. Hexamer, 1 Dec. 1956, ch. 10, “Weather and RadSafe”’; NVOO Office of Public Affairs, Announced United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through December 1986, Report NVO-209 (Rev. 7) (Las Vegas, Jan. 1981), 2-6; Kaman Tempo, Operation Redwing: 1956, by S. BruceHenderson et al., Report DNA 6037F (Santa Barbara, Calif., 1 Aug. 1982), ch. 1. 133. Shipman to Bradbury, “Rad-Safe Operations in the Pacific,” 8 April 1955; Kerwin to distrib., “Minutes of Meeting Held at Los Alamos on 18 May 1955 to Discuss Proposed DOD Participation in Operation Redwing,” 25 May 1955, 11; Gordon L. Jacks, “Operation Redwing: Radiological Safety,” Report WT-1366, May
1957 (Extracted version, Washington: DNA, 1 July 1980), 9. . 134. CTG 7.1, “General Concept no. 1-55: Operation Redwing,” 12 Apr. 1955, 8. 135. Ibid., 8-9; Kerwin to CJTF 7, “Shipboard Requirements of the Radiological Safety Task Unit, TG 7.1,” 2 May 1955; CTG 7.1 to distrib., “Minutes of the Project Officers’ Meeting Held in Los Alamos July 27-28, 1955,” 12 Aug. 1955, 13-14; Hq JTF 7, “Concept of Radiological Safety Operations for Redwing,” Annex C to CJTF 7 Planning Directive no. 1-55, 10 Aug. 1955; Ogle to Comptroller CJTF 7, “Funds for TU-7 (Radiological Safety unit for TG 7.1),” 12 Aug. 1955; Harry S. Allen to Reeves, ‘“Rad-Safe Requirements,” 6 Sept. 1955; TG 7.3 (Navy), “Radiological Safety Plan,” Annex G to CTG 7.3 Operation Plan no. 1-56, 24 Jan. 1956; Hq TG 7.1, “Radiological Safety,” Annex G to CTG 7.1 Operation Plan no. 1-56, 25 Jan. 1956; Hq TG 7.5, ‘Radiological Safety,” Annex C to Operation Order no. 1-56, 1 Mar. 1956; Hq JTF 7, “History of Operation Redwing” (n. 132), 35; Jacks, “Radiological Safety” (n. 133), 7-10. 136. Hq JTF 7, “Radiological Safety Regulations,” Appendix 1 to Annex K to CJTF 7 Operation Order 1-56, 20 Jan. 1956; Jacks, “Radiological Safety” (n. 133), 38-40.
137. Plank to Herschel D. Mahon, 14 Apr. 1955; Kerwin to CJTF 7, “Cloud Sampling Requirements for Redwing,” 3 May 1955; CTG 7.1, “Minutes of Project Officers’ Meeting” (n. 135), 62; Hq TG 7.1, “J-3 Summary of Operation Redwing
Notes to Page 177 377 Experiments,” 2 Dec. 1955, 6; Plank to John H. Samuel, 17 Jan. 1956; Hq JTF 7, “Radiological Safety Regulations” (n. 136), paragraph 5.b; Hq TG 7.1, “Weather Conditions for Sampling,” 27 Apr. 1956. See also Taylor, History of Air Force Atomic Cloud Sampling (n. 51), ch. 7. 138. Jacks to Ogle, “Dosage Limitations for Aircrews Flying for Hal Plank,” 28 Oct. 1955.
139. Ernest A. Pinson, in CTG 7.1, “Minutes of Project Officers’ Meeting” (n. 135), 32. See also Kerwin, “Minutes of Meeting” (n. 133), 6; Hq TG 7.1, “J-3 Summary of Operation Redwing Experiments: Programs 1-9, DOD,” 27 Feb. 1956, 24; Kaman Tempo, Operation Redwing (n. 132), 92-93. 140. Ogle to CTF 7, “Maximum Permissible Radiation Exposure for Personnel Participating in Projects 2.6.6 and 11.2, Operation Redwing,” 8 Nov. 1955; A. H. Thompson to B. Hall Hanlon, “Exposure to Individuals in Excess of the Established Maximum Permissible Exposure (MPE),” 27 Apr. 1956; Hanlon to CTG 7.1, “Maximum Permissible Radiation Exposure for Personnel Participating in Projects 2.6.6 and 11.2, Operation Redwing,” 1 May 1956. Cf. GAO, Nuclear Health and Safety: Radiation Exposures for Some Cloud-sampling Personnel Need to Be Reexamined, Report GAO/RCED-87-134 (Washington, Sept. 1987), 14-15, 26, 28-33, 42—43.
141. J. M. Lloyd and Leo A. Woodruff to all PPG personnel, “Radiological Hazards at PPG,” Joint Bulletin PPG #20—Amendment #4, 12 Nov. 1955; Lloyd and Woodruff to all PPG personnel, “Radiological Safety Responsibilities of Personnel at PPG,” Joint Bulletin PPG #22—-Amendment #2, 14 Nov. 1955; C. W. Kelley to distrib., “Protection of Food and Water from Radioactive Contamination Resulting from
Fall-Out in Camps Operated by Holmes & Narver, Inc., for the Atomic Energy Commission at the Pacific Proving Ground during Operation Redwing,” 24 Apr. 1956.
142. C. S. Thomas to Strauss, 6 Apr. 1955, w/att. draft “Land Agreement Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands” (circulated as AEC 125/18, “Use and Occupancy Agreement for Lands in Trust Territory of the Pacific,” 15 Apr. 1955); Orme Lewis to Strauss, 19 July 1955 (circulated as AEC 125/25, “Statement on Nuclear Experiments in Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands,” 28 July 1955); Fields to Delmas H. Nucker, 5 Oct. 1955 (circulated as AEC 125/26, “Repatriation of the Rongelapese,” 17 Oct. 1955); Strauss to John Foster Dulles, 25 Oct. 1955; Dunham to Libby, “Evaluation of Environmental Contamination of Rongelap Atoll,” 19 Apr. 1956; Jack A. Tobin, “Anthropologist’s Report on Special Ujelang Assignment,” n.d., enclosure 2 in Robert B. Cruise to distrib., “Orientation on Customs of the Marshall Island Natives,” 23 Apr. 1956. 143. R. Goldthwaite to DMA, “Weather and Fallout Forecasting,” 20 Aug. 1954 (circulated as 652/4, same title, 28 Sept. 1954); Hq TG 7.1, “Weather Services,” Annex J to CTG 7.1 General Concept no. 1-55, 12 Apr. 1955; Vallard C. Smith to W. D. Gibbins, “Report of Trip to the Pacific Proving Ground,” 18 Apr. 1955; Kerwin to Ogle, “Brief of JTF Seven Study on Selection of Weather Stations for Redwing,” 22 July 1955; Hg JTF 7, “Concept of the Weather Plan for Operation Redwing,” Annex
D to CJTF 7 Planning Directive no. 1-55, 10 Aug. 1955; Hanlon to CINCPAC, “Hazards and Safety Measures during Operation Redwing,” 7 Mar. 1956; Leonard B. Southerland to CTG 7.1, 7.4, 7.5, “Consolidated Meteorological Requirements, Operation Redwing,” 27 Apr. 1956; Hq JTF 7, “History of Operation Redwing” (n. 132), 26-32; Kaman Tempo, Operation Redwing (n. 132), 104-105.
378 Notes to Page 178 144. Reeves, “Test Manager’s Operation Order” (n. 46), 10-11; Reeves, “Report of the Test Manager” (n. 32), ch. 4, “Fallout Predictions,” 54-67; Hq JTF 7, “History of Operation Redwing” (n. 132), 32. 145. A. Vay Shelton to White, 21 June 1955; A. C. Graves to Momsen, 21 June 1955; White to C. F. Kanda, 29 June 1955; White to R. R. Rapp, 29 June 1955; Orin W. Stopinski to White, “Fallout Prediction Unit Weather Requirements for Operation Redwing,” 11 July 1955; Rapp to White, 12 July 1955. 146. HASL, “Preliminary Operations Manual, HASL Monitoring Program,” 19 Oct. 1955; Hertford to McCrea, “Participation by Sandia Corporation in Test Related Fallout Activities,” 22 Dec. 1955; R. T. Graveson to Dunning, “Monitoring Program,” 17 Jan. 1956; Ogle to distrib., “Meeting of Fallout Prediction Unit,” 18 Jan. 1956; Lauren R. Donaldson, “Preliminary Outline of a Program for Oceanic Survey,” 21 Feb. 1956; Shelton to distrib., “CConference,” 5 Mar. 1956, w/att. Shelton, “Conclusions of the Fallout Prediction Unit Meeting at Los Alamos 8 and 9 February 1956,” 5 Mar. 1956; Hanlon to CINCPAC, 7 Mar. (n. 143); Hq JTF 7, “History of Operation Redwing” (n. 132), 32-35; Kaman Tempo, Operation Redwing (n. 132), 101-103, 105-106. 147. Hanlon to CINCPAC, 7 Mar. (n. 143); John C. MacDonald, “Safety Measures—Operation Redwing: Remarks Presented at Department of State, 10 February 1956,” as reproduced in Kaman Tempo, Operation Redwing (n. 132), 355-358, at 357; Southerland to J. Lazarr, “Instructions for Off-Atoll Representative of CJTF Seven,” 23 Apr. 1956, w/att. “Radsafe Emergency Instructions for Populated Islands” and “Unofficial but Helpful Information for Visitors to the Marshall Islands,” 17 Feb. 1956 (same to Bennett L. Harless, 2 July 1956); D. Curry to Lazarr, 23/0135Z Apr. 1956.
148. Strauss to Loper, 14 Oct. 1954 (circulated as AEC 334/31, “JCS Recommendation for Public Announcements of Weapons Tests at the Pacific Proving Ground,” 15 Oct. 1954); Elliott to distrib., “Overseas Information and Education Programs,” 20 Oct. 1955, w/att. draft, “Public Education and Public Information Program for Operation ‘Redwing,’” 20 July 1955, 1-3. 149. Hertford to Starbird, 21/2254Z Dec. 1955; Salisbury to Dunham, “Setting Up Machinery for Reporting Fallout for Operation Redwing,” 22 Dec. 1955; Salisbury to distrib., “Information Plan for Operation Redwing,” 22 Dec. 1955, w/att. Draft B, “Joint AEC-DOD Information Plan for Operation Redwing”; Charter Heslep to Elliott, 27/2010Z Dec. 1955; DIS Draft C, “Joint AEC-DOD Information Plan for Operation Redwing,” 14 Mar. 1956; AEC 787/24, DIS report, same title, 23 Mar. 1955; McCool, “Decision on AEC 787/24,” 5 Sept. 1956. 150. Salisbury to those listed, “Answers to Inquiries re Operation Redwing,” 11 Jan. 1956; Gannon to Salisbury, “Answers to Inquiries re Pacific Tests,” 12 Jan. 1956; Vermillion to distrib., “Announcement of Forthcoming Tests in Pacific,” 12 Jan. 1956; DOD-AEC release 757, “Statement by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense,” 12 Jan. 1956; AEC release 758, “Statement by Lewis L. Strauss,” 12 Jan. 1956. 151. Gerard C. Smith to John A. Hall, 23 Jan. 1956, w/att. “Proposed Position Paper re Testing in Trust Territory,” 23 Jan. 1956; Fields to CNO, “Danger Area for Operation Redwing,” 2 Feb. 1956; Hall to Smith, “Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,” 2 Feb. 1956, w/att. “Answers to Questions Raised in
Notes to Pages 178-179 379 Mr. Gerard C. Smith’s Memorandum of 1/23/56”; Hall to Fields, “Request by State Department for Information on Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands,” 6 Feb. 1956 (circulated as AEC 125/27, “Pacific Islands Trust Territory,” 21 Feb. 1956).
152. Philip F. Bankhardt for record, “Meeting with Dr. Dunham re Japanese Fisheries Interests,” 6 Dec. 1955; Heslep to Salisbury, “Japanese Embassy Discusses Eniwetok Tests in Press Background Conference,” 20 Jan. 1956; AEC meeting no. 1180, 28 Feb. 1956, item 8; Memorandum of Conversation, 29 Feb. 1956, at State Department, between AEC, State Department, Japanese Embassy, and Head of Fisheries Commission of Japan; McCool to Dunham, “Fish Monitoring for Operation Redwing,” 6 Mar. 1956; Dunham to McCool, “Fish Monitoring at the Time of Next Pacific Proving Ground Tests,” 12 Mar. 1956; AEC 787/22, DBM report, “Marine Biological Survey,” 15 Mar. 1956; J. A. Hall to G. C. Smith, “Pacific Tests—Japanese,” 9 Apr. 1956, w/att. draft, “Public Health and Safety Precautions for Eniwetok Tests Announced”; Yoshio Hiyama to Boss, 23 Apr. 1956; Carey L. O’Bryan to J. K. Rouleau, “Japanese Request for Information on Special Precautionary Measures, Operation Redwing,” 27 Apr. 1956; Allen E. Rayfield to Philip J. Farley, 27 Apr. 1956 (circulated as AEC 793/6, “Monitoring of Tuna Imports,” 22 May 1956); AEC 793/5, DBM report, “West Coast Fish Monitoring,” 3 May 1956; Boss to files, “Tuna Fish Monitoring on the West Coast by U.S. Food and Drug Administration,” 23 May 1956. 153. MacDonald, “Safety Measures” (n. 147), 355-358; Gannon for record, “JTF7 Briefing for State Department on 10 February 1956,” 16 Feb. 1956; AEC release 790, “AEC Announces Danger Area in Pacific for Nuclear Tests,” 1 Mar. 1956; Hanlon to CINCPAC, 7 Mar. (n. 143); James R. Landress to CTGs, “Official AEC Announcement Regarding Operation at the Pacific Proving Ground,” 9 Mar. 1956; JOTI release 29, “Public Health and Safety Precautions for Eniwetok Tests Announced,” 27 Apr. 1956. 154. Southwick to distrib., “Proposed Announcement of Uncleared Observer Project,” 21 Mar. 1956; JOTI, “Pooled Group of U.S. Newsmen Invited to Cover Pacific Test,” 2 Apr. 1956; JTF 7, “The AEC Proving Ground and Operation Redwing,” press briefing at PPG, 19 Apr. 1956; Hq JTF 7, “History of Operation Redwing” (n. 132), 69-72, 80-83. 155. Alexander R. Gordon, Jr., to Charles C. Bates, 21 May 1956, as quoted in Bates and John F, Fuller, America’s Weather Warriors, 1814-1985 (College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press, 1986), 166. 156. Ogle, “Unclassified Talk to Reporters for Redwing ‘Open Shot,’” n.d. (ca. May 1956); Frank H. Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer (Colorado Springs: Shelton Enterprise, 1988), 7-30 to 7-46; Hq JTF 7, “History of Operation Redwing” (n. 132); NVOO, Announced Nuclear Tests (n. 132), 5-6; Kaman Tempo, Operation Redwing (n. 132); Hawthorne, Oceanic U.S. Tests (n. 107), 100-184. 157. Starbird to Strauss et al., “Latest Information on Redwing,” 23 July 1956; Starbird to Strauss et al., “Fall-Out from Tewa,” 2 Aug. 1956; Robert W. Taft to Reeves, “Problems, Conclusions, and Action Taken as a Result of Tewa Fallout,” 7 Sept. 1956; Reeves to Starbird, “Supplementary Information on Tewa Fallout,” 14 Sept. 1956; Ernest C. Anderson to Dunning, 14 Sept. 1956, w/att. Anderson, “Radiation Exposures Received on Populated Atolls as a Result of Operation Redwing”; Corsbie, “Fallout: Operational Decontamination,” n.d.; “Tewa Event, Operation Red-
380 Notes to Pages 180-181 wing,” summary, in Hq JTF 7, “Operation Redwing: Radiological Safety,” 1956 (extracted version, Washington: DNA, I July 1983), Tewa section, Tab A; Jacks, “Radiological Safety” (n. 133), 26-27; Kaman Tempo, Operation Redwing (n. 132), 203210; Hawthorne, Oceanic U.S. Tests (n. 107), 175-177. 158. Jacks to Shipman, 25 July 1956. See also Kaman Tempo, Operation Redwing (n. 132), 212-213.
159. Starbird to Felt, 26/1956Z July 1956; Starbird to ALOO, 02/1359Z Aug. 1956; R. P. Johnson to Reeves, 02/2311Z Aug. 1956; J. B. Sanders to Holmes & Narver, “Study for Fallout Protection at Parry and Eniwetok Islands,” 13 Aug. 1956; Taft to Reeves, 7 Sept. (n. 157); William R. Kennedy, Jr., to A. C. Graves, “Area Decontamination—P.P.G.,” 4 Dec. 1956, w/att. Stan Curry, “Area Decontamination on
Parry Island Following Fallout,” n.d.; Corsbie, “Fallout” (n. 157). See also SAIC, “Calculated Radiation Doses for Personnel on the Residence Islands of Enewetak Atoll during Operation Redwing—Revised Memo of 6 July 1984,” C. Thomas memo to file, 22 July 1985, 6-10. 160. Ogle to Starbird, 24/0301Z July 1956. 161. Starbird to MacDonald, 23 July 1956; Starbird to MacDonald and Ogle, 24/1745Z July 1956; AEC meeting no. 1218, 24 July 1956, item 6; Starbird to Felt, 26/2143Z July 1956; Felt to Starbird, 26/2320Z July 1956; Starbird to A. C. Graves and Herbert F. York, 27/0318Z July 1956. 162. A. C. Graves to Starbird, 27/2056Z July 1956. 163. DOD-AEC release 864, “JTF-7 Commander Makes Preliminary Reports to DOD and AEC,” 2 Aug. 1956. See also Starbird to James T. Ramey, 2 Aug. 1956.
164. York to Huston, “Clean Weapon Development,” 26 Apr. 1955 (circulated with Bradbury to Fields, 15 Apr. 1955, as AEC 778/5, “Clean Weapons,” 18 May 1955).
165. AEC release, 19 July 1956, as quoted in Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission, vol. 3 of A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford: Univ. of California Press, 1989), 347. See also Robert A. Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1978), 82-83. 166. Ralph E. Lapp, “The ‘Humanitarian’ H-Bomb,” BAS 12 (Sept. 1956): 261264. See also Divine, Blowing on the Wind (n. 165), 82-83; Hewlett and Holl, Atoms for Peace and War (n. 165), 347-348. 167. Libby to Strauss, “Sensitivity of Clean Weapons Information,” 6 July 1956; AEC meeting no. 1215, 12 July 1956, item 1; Hewlett and Holl, Atoms for Peace and War (n. 165), 346-348. 168. AEC meetings no. 1228, 25 Sept. 1956, item 6; and no. 1233, 11 Oct. 1956, item 2; Libby to C. E. Wilson, 10 Oct. 1956 (circulated as AEC 778/7, “High Yield Clean Weapons,” 17 Oct. 1956); Strauss to Reuben B. Robertson, Jr., 2 Nov. 1956; Starbird to Strauss, “Clean Weapons,” 22 Jan. 1957.
169. Hertford to Bradbury and York, “Review of NTS Operating Criteria,” 13 June 1955; AEC meeting no. 1101, 14 Aug. 1955, item 2; J. C. Clark to A. C. Graves, “Comments on 9—8—55 Draft of ‘Outline for Review of Continental Tests Criteria,’”’ 26 Sept. 1955; Reeves to A. V. Shelton, “Study Relative to Radiological Fallout,”
Notes to Pages 181-183 38 1 20 Oct. 1955; Hertford to McRae, “Study of Balloon Suspensions for Test Devices,” 14 Nov. 1955; Reeves to Graves, “Study of Balloon Suspensions for Test Devices,” 16 Dec. 1955. 170. Harry McK. Roper to Bradbury, “Radioactive Saturation of the Earth’s Atmosphere,” 24 Jan. 1947; Nicholas M. Smith, Jr., to Shields L. Warren, 22 May 1949; Wendell M. Latimer and Joseph G. Hamilton to Warren, “Review of the Gabriel Project Report,” 4 Oct. 1949; Warren to Carroll L. Wilson, 23 Nov. 1949 (circulated as AEC 278, “Report on Project Gabriel,” 12 Dec. 1949). 171. AEC meetings: no. 565, 4 June 1951, item 3; no. 566, 7 June 1951, item 4; no. 633, 4 Dec. 1951; Shields L. Warren to Nathan H. Woodrmff, “Requesting Assistance of Dr. Nicholas Sinith,” 19 June 1951 (circulated as AEC 278/1, “Reevaluation of Project Gabriel,’ 24 Aug. 1951); Marion W. Boyer to T. E. Murray, “Reference to Project Gabriel in Semiannual Report to the President,” 5 Aug. 1953, item 3; L. Joe Deal to N. M. Smith, 3 July 1951; H. C. Brown to W. D. Claus, “Gabriel,” 8 Aug. 1951; Warren to Richard T. Coiner, “Re-Evaluation of Project Gabriel,” 21 Aug. 1951; Deal to Roy B. Snapp, “Reevaluation of Project Gabriel,” 21 Aug. 1951; Deal to Claus, “Visit to Oak Ridge,” 29 Aug. 1951; Deal to Smith, 30 Aug. 1951; Deal to Bugher, “Discussions between Nick Smith and Dr. [Henry D.] Smyth,” 11 Oct. 1951; Deal to Warren, “Gabriel,” 15 Oct. 1951; Deal to Smith, 19 Oct. 1951; Warren to Joseph S. Kaplan, 16 Nov. 1951; Deal to Claus, “Information for Gabriel,’ 10 Dec. 1951.
172. W. D. Claus to Smyth, “Consideration of the Gabriel Report,” 3 Dec. 1951.
173. GAC, minutes of 28th meeting, 12-14 Dec. 1951, 8-9, 22-23; J. Robert Oppenheimer to Dean, 14 Dec. 1951.
174. DBM Biophysics staff, “Radiological Affects of Multiple Atomic Bomb Detonations,” 11 Feb. 1952. See also AEC 278/2, “Project Gabriel,” 14 Feb. 1952; GAC, minutes of 29th meeting, 15-17 Feb. 1952, 10; AEC 278/3, DBM report, “Status of Gabriel Studies,” 3 Mar. 1953; Committee on Atomic Energy, Research and Development Board, Memo for committee members, “Project Gabriel,” 22 Apr. 1953. 175. AEC 278/3, “Status of Gabriel Studies” (n. 174), 3-5. 176. AEC meetings no. 830, 4 Mar. 1953, item 12, and no. 831, 4 Mar. 1953, item 2. 177. Bugher to Fields, “Task Group Gabriel,” 9 Mar. 1953. Similar letters (seek-
ing recruits for the task group) dated 9 Mar. went to Thomas H. Johnson, H. Burke Fry, Bradbury, and P. H. Clarkson; dated 9 Apr. to Earle E. Partridge; dated 22 Apr. to William O. Senter.
178. Fields to Bugher, “Task Force Gabriel,’ 16 Mar. 1953; T. H. Johnson to Bugher, “Task Force Gabriel,” 20 Mar. 1953; Bugher to Fry, 10 Apr. 1953; Bugher to Felt, 10 Apr. 1953; John W. Carpenter to Bugher, 16 Apr. 1953; Bugher to Senter, 22 Apr. 1953.
179. Ernst H. Plesset to Bugher, 29 June 1953, w/att. “Rand Gabriel Project: General and Worldwide Problem,” n.d.; W. D. Claus to Paul McDaniel, ‘“‘GabrielHorn’ as Topic for GAC Agenda,” 15 July 1953; Bugher to M. W. Boyer, “Rand ‘Gabriel’ Conference,” 27 July 1953 (circulated as AEC 278/4, same title, 10 Aug. 1953); Carole Gilpatrick to Bugher, 12 Aug. 1953, transmitting transcript of conference held 21—23 July 1953; Rand Corporation, “Worldwide Effects of Atomic Weap-
382 Notes to Pages 183-184 ons: Project Sunshine,” Report R-251-AEC, 6 Aug. 1953 (unclassified version, same title, issued as Report R-251-AEC [Amended], 1956). Cf. Rand Corporation, “Closein Fallout,” Report R-309, 30 Sept. 1957, also intended for public consumption. 180. EF Western draft, “Summary Outline of Proposed Gabriel Program,” 13 Aug. 1953; Western draft, “Gabriel,” 13 Aug. 1953; Robert A. Dudley to files, “Report on Chicago Trip, September 14-15, 1953,” 18 Sept. 1953; Dudley to files, “Collection of Milk Samples—Chicago Milkshed—9/28-10/2/53,” 9 Oct. 1953; AEC 278/6, DBM report, “Status of Project Gabriel,” 27 Oct. 1953; Strauss to W. S. Cole, 12 Nov. 1953, w/att. DBM, “Status of Project Gabriel,” 12 Nov. 1953. 181. Plesset to F. Western, 31 July 1953. 182. Libby to distrib., “Explanation of the Code to be Used in the Project Sunshine Bulletins,” 3 Sept. 1953; Plesset to W. D. Claus, 18 Sept. 1953, w/att. “Proposed Original Outside RAND Distribution for R-251-AEC, Project Sunshine”; Claus to Plesset, 25 Sept. 1953; Claus to Libby, 16 Oct. 1953; Libby to Claus, “Mailing List for Project Sunshine Bulletins,” Oct. 1953. 183. Robert A. Dudley to Gertrude Steel, 16 Oct. 1953. 184. Robert A. Dudley to Shields L. Warren, 26 Oct. 1953; Robert A. Dudley to Raymond A. Dudley, 26 Oct. 1953; Robert A. Dudley to Steel, 27 Oct. 1953; Raymond A. Dudley to Robert A. Dudley, 4 Nov. 1953; Robert A. Dudley to Raymond A. Dudley, 10 Nov. 1953; Robert A. Dudley to Edward W. Wilder, 10 Nov. 1953; Robert A. Dudley to James K. Scott, 9 Dec. 1953; Bugher to Andrew J. Warren, 30 Dec. 1953; W. D. Claus, “Projects Gabriel and Sunshine,” abstract of remarks presented at the Conference on Biological Effects of Atomic Weapons: Tripartite Exchange of Information under TCP (Area 2), Washington, 17-18 Feb. 1954. 185. AEC 278/7, DBM report, “Supplementary Information on Gabriel,” 19 Jan. 1954, 3.
186. H. C. Brown to branch chiefs, “Project Gabriel Status Report,” 31 Mar. 1954; H. A. Stanwood, Jr., to R. W. Locke, “Status of Project ‘Gabriel,’” 22 June 1954;
Brown to Harry S. Traynor, “Progress Report on Project Sunshine,” 22 July 1954, w/att. DBM, “Report on Project Gabriel,” July 1954; transcript of minutes of 47th ACBM meeting, Los Angeles, 4 Dec. 1954, 28-42, and of 52d meeting, Washington, 10 Sept. 1955, 80-96; AEC 278/8, “Proposed Sunshine Conference,” 12 Jan. 1955; AEC 275/2, GM report, “Reorganization of the Division of Biology and Medicine,” 20 Feb. 1957; Hal Hollister, report to DBM, “Project Sunshine: Its Aims and Operation,” 7 Apr. 1958.
187. Salisbury to Paul F. Foster, 22 Mar. 1955, w/att. D. Clark to Salisbury, “Published Story on Fallout in U.S. News and World Report (March 25 Edition),’ 22 Mar. 1955; Elliott to Salisbury, “Letter to Commissioner Libby,” 5 Apr. 1955; H. C. Brown to Bugher, “Study of Radiation Effects by an International Group,” 19 Apr. 1955; Fields to Loper, 12 Apr. 1956; McCool, “Declassification of Certain Infor-
mation on the Amount of Radioactivity in the Stratosphere,” Decision on AEC 278/10, 20 Sept. 1956; Everett Holles to Strauss, “Article on Radiation in January Issue of McCall’s Magazine,” 18 Dec. 1956, w/att. Salisbury to AEC Commissioners, “Attached Copy of McCall's Magazine,” 15 Dec. 1956; Salisbury to Libby, “Letter to McCall’s Magazine,” 20 Dec. 1956; Salisbury to Christine Sadler, 21 Dec. 1956; Salisbury to Traynor, “Public Education Campaign on the Nature of Fallout Hazard,” 12 Feb. 1957, w/att. Salisbury to Traynor, “Information Policies on Fallout,” 12 Feb.
Notes to Page 184 383 1957; Libby to Traynor, “Public Education Campaign on True Nature of Fallout Hazard,” 19 Feb. 1957; Shelby Thompson to Libby, “Public Information Program on Fallout,” 11 Mar. 1957, w/att. DIS report, “Expedited Public Information Program on Fallout.” Cf. Lapp, “Sunshine and Darkness,” BAS 15 (Jan. 1959): 27-29; Divine, Blowing on the Wind (n. 165), 131-132. 188. Among the public statements on fallout issues by Libby during his first two years as AEC commissioner: “Radioactive Fallout,” presented at the Univ. of Chicago, 3 June 1955; “The Radioactive Fallout,” presented to U.S. Civil Defense Council, Boston, 29 Sept. 1955; “The Radioactive Fallout and Radioactive Strontium,” presented at Northwestern University, 19 Jan. 1956 (published in Science 123 [20 April 1956}: 657-660); “The Effects of Atomic Weapons and Civilian Defense,” statement to the Military Operations Subcomm., House Comm. on Government Operations, 31 Jan. 1956; “Radioactive Strontium Fallout,” presented to the APS, Philadelphia, 20 Apr. 1956 (published in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 42 [1956]: 365-390); “Current Research Findings on Radioactive Fallout,” presented at AAAS meeting, Washington, 12 Oct. 1956. 189. See, e.g., Bugher, “Effects of Fission Material on Air, Soil and Living Species,” in William L. Thomas, Jr., ed., Man’s Role in Changing the Face of the Earth, proceedings of a symposium (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, for Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research and NSF, 1956), 831-848; Dunning, “Effects of Nuclear Weapons Testing,” Scientific Monthly 81 (Dec. 1955): 265-270; Merril Eisenbud and John H. Harley, “Radioactive Fallout through September 1955,” Science 124 (10 Aug. 1956): 252-255; Machta et al., “World-Wide Travel of Atomic Debris,” Science 124 (14 Sept. 1956): 474-477; Bugher, “Some Considerations of the Presence of Strontium-90 in the Environment of Man,” presented at Cancer Retiteat, Univ. of Michigan, 14-16 Sept. 1956; Eisenbud, “Global Distribution of Radioactivity from Nuclear Detonations, with Special Reference to Strontium-90,” presented to Washington Academy of Sciences, 15 Nov. 1956. 190. See especially E. B. Lewis, “Leukemia and Ionizing Radiation,” Science 125
(17 May 1957): 965-972; SANE, “Some Examples of AEC Bias in Favor More Optimistic Interpretations of the Fallout Hazard,” 7 Mar. 1958. See also Carolyn Kopp, “The Origins of the American Scientific Debate over Fallout Hazards,” Social Studies of Science 9 (1979): 415-418. 191. Herbert J. Muller, “Artificial Transmutation of the Gene,” Science 66 (1927): 84-87. See also Gioacchino Failla, “Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation,” Journal of Applied Physics 12 (1941): 279-295; Daniel S. Grosch and Larry E. Hopwood, Biological Effects of Radiations, 2d ed. (New York: Academic Press, 1979), 115-139. On the impact of Muller’s work, see Elof Axel Carlson, Genes, Radiation, and Society: The Life and Work of H. J. Muller (ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981). 192. Linus C. Pauling to Libby, 30 Mar. 1955; M. Stanley Livingston to Libby, 31 Mar. 1955; Bugher to Libby, “Draft Reply to Prof. Livingston’s Letter,” 11 Apr. 1955, w/att. draft, Libby to Livingston, 4 Apr. 1955; Libby to Pauling, 6 May 1955; Corsbie to Libby, “Testimony: Ralph E. Lapp, Committee on Government Operations,” 20 Mar. 1956 (circulated as AEC 604/15, “Testimony of Ralph E. Lapp before Congressional Committee,” 9 Apr. 1956); Libby to Harold S. Vance, “[Francis] Cardinal Speliman’s Query about Dr. Lapp’s Testimony and Father [Theodore M.] Hesbergh’s
384 Notes to Page 184 Letter,’ 5 Apr. 1956; AEC 859/3, “Study Proposal by Commissioner Libby Concerning Limitation on Weapons Testing,” 6 Aug. 1956; William F. Neuman to Libby,
26 Nov. 1956, w/att. “The Evaluation of the Hazards of Sr-90 Fallout”; Libby to Detlev V. Bronk, 28 Nov. 1956; Libby to Kenneth W. Cooper, 11 Dec. 1956; Walter R. Guild to Libby, 6 Dec. 1956; Libby to Guild, 11 Dec. 1956. 193. Dudley to files, 18 Sept. (n. 180). 194, Hardin Jones to Bugher, 18 July 1955; Bugher to Jones, 29 July 1955; W. D.
Claus to files, “Reconsideration of Objectives of Project Sunshine,” 1 May 1956; Eisenbud to Libby, 18 May 1956, w/att. Eisenbud, “Some General Observations on the Sunshine Program,” 10 Mar. 1956; Lyle T. Alexander to Claus, “Objectives of Project Sunshine,” 23 May 1956; Machta to D. L. Worf, “Recommendations for Sunshine Program,” 31 May 1956. 195. Stopinski to Ogle, “World Wide Fallout,” 2 Oct. 1956; Libby to Doyle L. Northrup, 3 Oct. 1956; Edward A. Martell to Libby, 23 Oct. 1956; Libby to Martell, 25 Oct. 1956; Karl Z. Morgan to Libby, 3 Nov. 1956; Libby to Morgan, 5 Nov. 1956; Machta to J. Calvin Potts, 13 Nov. 1956, w/att. Machta, “Meteorological Factors Affecting Spread of Radioactivity from Nuclear Bombs,” prepared for delivery at the Washington Academy of Sciences, 15 Nov. 1956; transcript of special ACBM meeting on the Sunshine problem, Washington, 26 Nov. 1956; Shipman to Dunham, 5 Dec. 1956; Gioacchino Failla to members of ACBM, 28 Dec. 1956, w/att. Simeon T. Cantril to Failla, 22 Nov. 1956; Langham to Dunham, 28 Feb. 1957; Libby to Machta, 8 Apr. 1957; Martell to Libby, 15 May 1957; Machta to Libby, 21 May 1957, 6 June 1957, 12 June 1957; Machta to Libby, 19 June 1957, w/att. draft, Machta to Chet Holifield, 17 June 1957; Hollister to Langham, 16 July 1957, w/att. “Reasons Why I Don’t Think the Libby-Campbell Model Is Valid”; Langham to Dunham, 23 July 1957; Langham to Hollister, 25 July 1957, w/att. “Comments by Ernest C. Anderson.” 196. AEC 278/9, DBM report, “Tolerance of Large-Yield Weapons,” 15 Sept. 1955; Nathan S. Hall to Theodore Babbitt, “Request for Estimate of Damage to Crops and Cattle from Fallout,” 20 Sept. 1955; Libby to W. D. Claus, 1 May 1956; Harley to J. B. Sanders, “Damaging Radioactivity Levels,” 6 July 1956; Dunham to John H. Burchard, “Reports to the National Security Council,” 23 July 1956; David F. Shaw to Fields, “Fallout Studies,” 20 Aug. 1956; C. L. Marshall to Libby, “Review of Project Sunshine Reports,” 24 Sept. 1956; Libby to Dunham, 26 Sept. 1956; Dunning to Dunham, “Estimations of Possible Accumulation of Strontium-90 from Continued Nuclear Weapons Tests,” 3 Dec. 1956; “Draft Remarks Made by W. F. Libby to Sunshine Group on Monday, February 4, 1957,” 11 Feb. 1957; Dunham to T. E. Murray, “Sunshine,” 19 Feb. 1957; Libby to Dunham, 22 Apr. 1957; S. Allan Lough to Charles W. Shilling, “Informative Material for Commissioner Libby on Health and Safety Laboratory Activity in the Broad Field of Sunshine,” 15 May 1957; Dunham to Libby, “Sunshine Program Information,” 21 June 1957; U.S. State Department to Buenos Aires, Guatemala, Lima, Montevideo, Quito, Rio de Janeiro, San Jose, and Santiago, “Food Collection Activities of Dr. Paul B. Pearson, Biology and Medicine, AEC,” Instruction 418, 3 July 1957; Potts to J. Laurence Kulp, 25 July 1957; AEC 604/32, ““Commission’s Research Program Related to Fallout,” 2 Aug. 1957; Lough to F. Western, “Conference on Strontium Program,” 9 Aug. 1957; Eisenbud to Dunham, “Strontium Analytical Contracts,” 23 Aug. 1957,
Notes to Pages 185-186 385 8 Atmospheric Testing Challenged: Safety Issues and the Test Ban Movement, 1956—1961
1. NAS, “The Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation,” 12 June 1956; MRC, “The Hazards to Man of Nuclear and Allied Radiations,” June 1956. See also AEC 604/16, “Plans for Issuing National Academy of Sciences’ Radiation Study,” 29 May 1956; NAS transcript, “Press Conference on “The Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation,’” 12 June 1956; Bentley Glass, “The Hazards of Atomic Radiations to Man— British and American Reports,” BAS 12 (Oct. 1956): 312-317; Robert A. Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1978), 78-79. 2. Charles L. Dunham to Willard F. Libby, “Comments on NAS Study Panel Reports,” 7 June 1956; AEC release 838, “Statement by Lewis L. Strauss,” 13 June 1956; Harold E. Stassen to Paul F. Foster, “AEC Analysis of Recent Radiation Reports,” 19 June 1956; Libby to Secretary of State, 5 July 1956, w/att. “Summary of Major Findings of the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council and the United Kingdom Medical Research Council” (circulated as AEC 604/20, “Summary of Findings of National Academy of Sciences Radiation Study and U.K. Medical Research Council Report,” 18 July 1956); Strauss to Stassen, 17 July 1956, w/att. critiques of NAS and MRC reports and other materials (circulated as AEC 604/21, “Analysis of Reports on Radiation,” 7 Aug. 1956). 3. NAS Committee on Genetic Effects of Atomic Radiation, “Genetic Effects of Atomic Radiation,” Science 123 (29 June 1956): 1157—1164 (quote at 1164). This article includes most of the text of the committee’s summary report, issued with the other
five committee summary reports as “The Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation” (n. 1). On the role of genetic concerns in the origins of the fallout controversy, see Carolyn Kopp, “The Origins of the American Scientific Debate over Fallout Hazards,” Social Studies of Science 9 (1979): 403-415. 4. Given H. Dugger to James E. Reeves, “Radiological Safety Criteria for Continental Test,” 17 Sept. 1954. Cf. ch. 7, p. 163, above. 5. Alvin C. Graves to Gordon M. Dunning, 7 Sept. 1956. 6. “Genetic Effects of Atomic Radiation” (n. 3), 1164. 7. G. H. Dugger to Reeves, “Radiological Safety Criteria for Continental Test,” 17 Sept. 1954. 8. James G. Terrill, Jr., to Oliver R. Placak, “Planning for Future Test Activities,” 18 June 1956; Placak to Terrill, “Planning for Future Test Activities,” 16 July 1956; Terrill to Dunning, 17 July 1956; Thomas L. Shipman to distrib., “Predicted Limita-
tions of Radiation Exposure,” 17 July 1956; Dunning to Dunham, “Dr. Shipman’s Letter on Radiation Exposures,” 26 July 1956; Dunning to Shipman, 30 July 1956, w/att. draft “Criteria for Exposure to Populations around the Nevada Test Site Resulting from Radioactive Fallout,” 31 July 1956 (identical letters to A. C. Graves, Terrill, Reeves, Richard G. Elliott, and Herbert F. York); Shipman to Graves, “Permissible Exposures,” 6 Aug. 1956; Roscoe H. Goeke to Joe B. Sanders, “Draft, “Criteria for Exposure to Population around the Nevada Test Site Resulting from Radioactive Fallout,’ by Dr. Dunning,” 6 Aug. 1956; Shipman to Dunning, 14 Aug. 1956; Sanders to Goeke, “Draft, ‘Criteria for Exposure to Population around the Nevada Test Site Resulting from Radioactive Fallout,’ by Dr. Dunning,” 16 Aug. 1956; Dunham to
386 Notes to Pages 186-187 Alfred D. Starbird, “Radiological Safety Criteria for Populations around the NTS,” 22 Aug. 1956; Dunning to Dunham, “Comments on Radiological Safety Criteria at Nevada Test Site,” 4 Sept. 1956; Graves to Dunning, 7 Sept. 1956. 9. ACBM, minutes of 57th meeting, Washington, 21-22 Sept. 1956, 22-23; and minutes of 58th meeting, Brookhaven, 16—17 Nov. 1956, 11-12; DBM, “In the Matter of: Fifty-Seventh Meeting of the Advisory Committee for Biology and Medicine,” transcript of discussion of “Criteria for Safety of Off Site Populations, Nevada Test Site,” 166-191; Shipman to Tech Board members, “Proposed Revision of Permissible Doses of Radiation,” 2 Oct. 1956; AEC Secretariat, “(Commission Discussion of Radiological Safety Criteria for the Nevada Test Site,” 4 Jan. 1957. 10. Lauriston S. Taylor to members of NCRP executive and main committees, “Partial Report on Meeting of Executive Committee: Maximum Permissible Dose Levels,’ 10 Oct. 1956, w/att. “Tentative Recommendations of the NCRP for the Maxi-
mum Permissible Levels of Radiation to Man,” 10 Oct. 1956; NCRP, “Maximum Permissible Levels of Radiation Exposure to Man: A Preliminary Statement,” 6 Dec. 1956. These and other relevant documents have been published in Taylor, Organization for Radiation Protection: The Operations of the ICRP and NCRP, 1928-1974, Report DOE/TIC-10124 (Washington: DOE, 1979), 8-061 to 8-101. See also Walter D. Claus with Taylor, “The Concept and Philosophy of Permissible Dose of Radiation,” in Claus, ed., Radiation Biology and Medicine: Selected Reviews in the Life Sciences (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1958), 389-404. 11. AEC 141/33, DBM report, “Radiological Safety Criteria for the Nevada Test
Site,” 13 Nov. 1956; transcript of AEC meeting no. 1246, 14 Nov. 1956, item 6; Kenner F, Hertford to Starbird, “Clarification of NTS Off-Site Criteria,” 21 Feb. 1957;
ACBM, minutes of 61st meeting, Washington, 14-16 Mar. 1957, 10; idem, 62d meeting, 10-11 May 1957, 4—7; AEC, “Radiological Safety Criteria during Nuclear Weapons Testing at the Nevada Test Site,” Apr. 1957; OTO, “Report of the Test Manager: Operation Plumbbob,” Dec. 1957 (extracted version as “Operation Plumbbob: Report of the Test Manager, Nevada Test Site, May—October 1957,” Dec. 1957 [Washington: DNA, 1 Feb. 1980]), 76; Nathan H. Woodruff to Reeves, “Radiological Protection Criteria at Nevada Test Site,” 1 Aug. 1962. 12. Dunham to Reeves, “Onsite Criteria for Gamma Exposure,” 20 Feb. 1957; OTO, “Report of the Test Manager” (n. 11), 71. 13. Plumbbob Test Manager’s Report (n. 11), 71.
14. Harold F. Plank to CO, 4950th Test Group, 10 Oct. 1956; W. D. Claus to Dunning, “Special Exposure Allowance for Pilots in Pilgrim,” 18 Jan. 1957. 15. William B. Kieffer to Hertford, 21 Mar. 1957, as quoted in Leland B. Taylor,
History of Air Force Atomic Cloud Sampling, vol. 1, Narrative, AFSC Histcrical Publication Series 61-142-1 (Kirtland AFB, New Mex.: AFSWC, Jan. 1963), 232, 236-237. 16. Plank to A. C. Graves, “Col. Kieffer’s Proposal for the Decontamination of Sampling Aircraft,” 24 Apr. 1957, as quoted in Taylor, History of Air Force Atomic Cloud Sampling (n. 15), 237-238.
17. Shipman to A. C. Graves, “Decontamination of Aircraft at Tests,’ 29 Mar. 1957, as quoted in Taylor, History of Air Force Atomic Cloud Sampling (n. 15), 238.
18. Edward J. Walker to Goeke, “Sampler Crew Dosage,” 22 Mar. 1957; Goeke to files, “Film Dosimetry Procedures for 4926th Test Squadron Personnel,” 25 July
Notes to Pages 187-188 587 1957; DASA, “Nuclear Radiation Received by Aircrews Firing the MB-1 Rocket,” Operation Plumbbob Project 2.9, Report WT-1418, 27 May 1959 (extracted version as WT-1418 [EX], Washington: DNA, 1 Oct. 1979); Plumbbob Test Manager’s Report (n. 11), 74; Taylor, History of Air Force Atomic Cloud Sampling (n. 15), ch. 8, “Operation Plumbbob, a New Organization.”
19. Hertford to Starbird, “Standard Operating Procedures for Exercise Desert Rock VIII,” 23 Nov. 1956; Herbert B. Loper to Strauss, “Department of Defense Military Weapons Effects Program for CY 1957 Nuclear Tests at the Nevada Test Site,” 20 Feb. 1957, w/att. “Operational Training and Troop Participation Program, Operation Plumbbob,” 12 Feb. 1957 (circulated as AEC 944/12, “DOD Weapons Effects Program for Operation Plumbbob,” 28 Feb. 1957); Hq Camp Desert Rock, Memo no. 10, “Radiological Safety Operations,” 7 May 1957; Hq Exercise Desert Rock VII and VIII, “Final Report of Operations,” 25 Nov. 1957, 101-104; Jaycor, Plumbbob Series, 1957, by Payne S. Harris et al., Report DNA 6005F (Alexandria, Va., 15 Sept. 1981), 74. 20. Hertford to Starbird, “Operating Criteria and Radiological Safety Criteria for NTS,” 24 July 1956. See also Dunham to Starbird, “Nevada Test Site,” 25 July 1956.
21. Hertford to Norris E. Bradbury, “Operating Criteria, NTS,” 14 Sept. 1956, w/att. “Criteria for Exposure to Populations around the Nevada Test Site Resulting from Radioactive Fallout” (identical letter to York, same date); William E. Ogle to Reeves, “Operating Criteria, NTS,” 16 Oct. 1956; Reeves to Lester Machta, 18 Oct. 1956; Hertford to Bradbury, “Review of NTS Operating Criteria,” 31 Oct. 1956;
Hertford to York, 31 Oct. 1956; Bradbury to Hertford, 6 Nov. 1956; Goeke to Dunning, “NTS Planning Board Subcommittee Report,” 19 Nov. 1956, w/att. “Report of the NTS Planning Board Sub-Committee on Fallout: Operating Criteria,” 13 Nov. 1956.
22. York to Bradbury, “NTS Test Organization,” draft, 18 Sept. 1956; Bradbury to York, 24 Sept. 1956; Vi Malik, memo for record, “3rd Meeting of Planning Board for Nevada Weapons Tests,” 2 Jan. 1957; Reeves to Starbird, “Recommended Operational Safety Criteria for Operation Plumbbob,” 18 Jan. 1957; AEC 944/8, DMA report, “Proposed Test Plans for CY 1957,” 8 Feb. 1957, Appendix C, “Operational Safety Criteria for Operation Plumbbob,” 18-22; Plumbbob Test Manager’s Report (n. 11), 60-61.
23. AEC 944, DMA report, “Test Activities for Calendar Year 1957,” 9 Nov. 1956; AEC meeting no. 1246, 14 Nov. 1956, item 5.
24. Reeves to Dunham, “Support for Fallout Phenomenology Project,” 15 Jan. 1957; Starbird to Leland Hayworth, 16 Jan. 1957; draft minutes of meeting in Las Vegas to discuss fallout data collection for Libby, 24 Jan. 1957; Paul B. Pearson to Dunham, “Letter from James E. Reeves to Dr. Dunham Dated January 21, 1957,” 5 Feb. 1957; Kermit H. Larson to Stafford L. Warren, “Proposal for Project 37.2A ‘Physical Aspects of the Fall-Out Phenomena,’” 5 Feb. 1957; Warren to Reeves, 8 Feb. 1957; Dunham to Robert L. Corsbie, “Letter from James E. Reeves to Dr. Dunham Dtd January 21, 1957,” 8 Feb. 1957; Dunham to A. C. Graves, 8 Feb. 1957; Corsbie to Dunham, “Dr. Libby’s Memorandum of January 25, 1957—Radiological Countermeasures Program,” 11 Feb. 1957; Bernard F. Trum to Pearson, “Letter from James E. Reeves to Dr. Dunham Dated January 21, 1957,” 14 Feb. 1957; Hertford to H. A. Fidler, 18 Feb. 1957; Graves to Dunham, 18 Feb. 1957; Dunham to Graves,
388 Notes to Page 188 20 Feb. 1957; Warren to R. B. Allen, 25 Feb. 1957; Dunham to Reeves, “Fallout Assimilation in Cattlkh—Operation Plum[b]bob,” 24 Apr. 1957; Dunham to Starbird, “Cattle Program’ at Nevada Test Site,” 24 May 1957; Corsbie, comp., “Operation Plumbbob: Civil Effects Test Group Project Summaries,” revised June 1957; William W. Allaire to Reeves, “Notes on Visit of Drs. Libby and Potts,” 2 Sept. 1957; Reeves to Starbird, “SOP for Field Investigations in Off-Site Animals,” 21 Sept. 1957; Larson
et al., “Radio-Ecological Aspects of Nuclear Fallout: Introduction, Methods and Procedures,” Plumbbob Program 37, CETG, Sept. 1957. 25. George A. Cowan to A. C. Graves, “Garbage Disposal,” 18 Jan. 1957; Starbird to Graves, 16 Apr. 1957, w/att. Libby, “Fireball Chemistry Project”; Kenneth Street
to Graves, 19 Apr. 1957, w/att. Street to York, “Proposed UCRL Participation in ‘Fireball Chemistry Project’ at Plumb Bob,” 19 Apr. 1957; John Turkevich to Graves, 24 Apr. 1957; Cowan to Graves, “Investigation of Relative Availability of Sr® in Bomb Debris,” 25 Apr. 1957; Donald L. Benedict to Libby, 13 June 1957; Benedict to Libby, “Discussion on 21 June; Minimization of Fallout Hazard,” 26 June 1957;
C. E. Lapple to Benedict, “Fallout Control Problem,” 26 June 1957; Graves to Starbird, 6 Sept. 1957. 26. Starbird to Hertford, “Fallout Monitoring Project for Pilgrim,” 28 Dec. 1956; Dunham to A. C. Graves, 7 Mar. 1957; Placak to files, “Weathering, Shielding and Other Data Requested by DBM,” 20 June 1957; Reeves to distrib., “Collection of OffSite Radiation Data,” 21 June 1957; Reeves to Corsbie, “Fallout Monitoring Project for (Pilgrim) Plumbbob,” 12 July 1957; Goeke to files, “Comments on Corsbie Memorandum to Test Manager Dated July 12, 1957, Entitled ‘Fallout Monitoring Project for Plumbbob,’” 17 July 1957; Reeves to distrib., “Computing Effective Biological Doses,” 19 July 1957; Dunning to Dunham, “Fall-Out Programs for Operation Plumbbob,” 19 July 1957; Dunning to Reeves, “Off-Site Data on Weathering and Shielding,” 23 July 1957; Allaire to Placak, “Obtaining Shielding Data,” n.d. (July 1957); Terrill to Placak, “Planning for Weathering and Shielding,” 25 July 1957; Dunning to Graves, 30 July 1957; Reeves to Starbird, “Off-Site Weathering and Shielding Data Collection,” 4 Aug. 1957; Graves to Dunning, 5 Sept. 1957. 27. George T. Anton, “Shielding Studies in the Offsite Area at NTS for Operation Plumbbob,” 29 July 1957; Placak to Allaire, “Status of Weathering and Shielding
Data Collected by Off-Site Rad-Safe to Date,” 28 Aug. 1957; Corsbie to Reeves, 31 Aug. 1957; Allaire to Reeves, “Notes on Visit of Drs. Libby and Potts,” 2 Sept. 1957; Reeves to Starbird, “Directive to Expand Off-Site Radiation Data Collection,” 2 Sept. 1957; Anton to Dunning, “Fallout Briefing for Commissioner Libby,” 3 Sept. 1957; Anton to Reeves, “Content of Incomplete or Unevaluated Data in an Interim Weathering and Shielding Report,” 5 Sept. 1957; Reeves to Dunham, “Progress Report on Collection of Weathering and Shielding Data of Test Manager’s Sponsored Project,” 14 Sept. 1957; Reeves to Starbird, “Off-Site Radiation Data Collection,” 19 Nov. 1957; R. A. Gilmore draft, “[Plumbbob] Weathering Studies,” 19 Nov. 1958. 28. Woodford B. McCool to Starbird, “Tests in the Pacific Proving Grounds,” 16 Nov. 1956; Potts to Libby, 20 Nov. 1956; Reeves to Starbird, 21 Nov. 1956; Reeves to Starbird, 22 Nov. 1956; Ogle, memo for record, 23 Nov. 1956; Reeves to Bradbury, “Future Test Operations—Nevada Test Site and Eniwetok Proving Ground,” 26 Nov. 1956.
Notes to Pages 188-189 389 29. AEC 944/2, DMA report, “Means of Reducing Off-Site Fallout Which May Result from Operation Pilgrim,” 3 Dec. 1956. 30. R. E. Hepplewhite to distrib., “Firing Schedule,” 1 Nov. 1956. 31. AEC meetings: no. 1252, 5 Dec. 1956, item 1; no. 1253, 10 Dec. 1956, item 3; no. 1254, 12 Dec. 1956, item 10; no. 1255, 18 Dec. 1956, item 7; Kenneth E. Fields to AEC Commissioners, “Proposed Test Plans for Calendar Year 1956,” 14 Dec. 1956 (circulated as AEC 944/4, same title, 17 Dec. 1956); AEC Secretariat, “Commission Discussion of Operation Pilgrim,” 18 Dec. 1956; Starbird to York, 21 Dec. 1956. 32. Strauss to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, 21 Dec. 1956, endorsed by Eisenhower, 28 Dec. 1956 (reproduced in Jaycor, Plumbbob Series [n. 18], 33); ALOO release AL-57-49, 24 Jan. 1957. 33. Harry D. Pickett to CO, 4950th Test Group (Nuclear), “Operational Planning
Guide for Operation Pilgrim,” 21 Dec. 1956, w/att. AFSWP, “Operation Pilgrim Operational Planning Guide,” Jan. 1957; Starbird to Alvin R. Luedecke, 22 Jan. 1957; Fields to Loper, “Weapons Effects Programs for Operation Plumbbob,” 28 Jan. 1957 (circulated as AEC 944/7, same title, 4 Feb. 1957); Strauss to Eisenhower, 21 Feb. 1957; AEC 944/8, DMA report, “Proposed Test Plans for CY 1957,” 8 Feb. 1957; AEC meeting no. 1265, 11 Feb. 1957, item 2; Fields to Hertford, “Directive for Operation Plumbbob,” 1 Mar. 1957; Fields to Loper, “Nuclear Test Activities for Calendar Year 1957,” 4 Mar. 1957; Starbird to McCool, “Directive for Operation Plumbbob,” 22 Mar. 1957.
34. Donald J. Leehey, “Reorganization of SFO Full-Scale Test Office,” Announcement no. 10,-27 June 1955; Leehey, “Movement and Relocation of Rad-Safe Headquarters,” Announcement no. 18, 1 July 1955; Hertford to Bradbury, “Committee on Use of Nevada Test Site,” 20 Dec. 1955. 35. Reeves to Hershell E. Parsons, “Interim Period Radiological Safety,” 22 Apr. 1955; Starbird to Leehey, “Nevada Test Site,” 28 Sept. 1955; Shipman to Bradbury, “Health Services for N-Division Off-Site Activities,” 25 Jan. 1956; Reeves to REECo, “Proposed Assignment of Radiological Safety Activities,’ 3 Apr. 1956; L. J. Reynolds, Jr., to Reeves, “Proposed Assignment of Radiological Safety Activities,” 5 Apr. 1956; Duncan Curry, Jr., to Reeves, 16/2330Z, 16 July 1956; Reeves to Curry, 17/ 2029Z, 18 July 1956; Placak to Goeke, 14 Aug. 1956, w/att. Marshall Page, Jr., draft, “Radiological Safety Division for the Nevada Test Site: Standard Operating Procedure,” n.d. See also T. E. Murray to Strauss, “Increasing U.S. Weapons Testing Capability by Continuous Testing,” 28 Mar. 1957; Starbird to Fields, “Continuous Testing,” 4 Oct. 1957 (circulated as AEC 908/2, same title, 11 Oct. 1957). 36. Reeves to Dunham, “On-Site Radiological Safety—-NTS,” 23 Mar. 1956, w/att. Reeves draft, “Review of Transfer of On-Site Rad-Safe Support Responsibilities to Support Director,” 7 Mar. 1956; and J. B. Sanders and Allaire draft, “OnSite Radiological Safety Operations Plan,” 15 Mar. 1956 (identical letter to G. H. Dugger, 28 Mar. 1956); Dugger to Reeves, “On-Site Radiological Safety—-NTS,” 10 Apr. 1956. 37. York to Bradbury, “NTS Test Organization,” 18 Sept. 1956; Bradbury to York, 24 Sept. 1956; Gerald W. Johnson, “Test Director’s Organization,” Test Bulletin no. 1, 25 Oct. 1956; Goeke to Placak, “Test Manager’s Operation Plan,” 29 Oct. 1956; Melvin W. Carter, “Minutes of Meeting Held in the Las Vegas Branch on October 30,
390 Notes to Pages 189-190 1956,” draft, n.d.; anonymous notes of meeting in AEC office, Las Vegas, to discuss Pilgrim rad-safe plans, 15 Nov. 1956; Goeke to distrib., “Minutes of Conference on Radiological Safety, October 30, 1956,” 23 Nov. 1956; William E. Nolan to Placak, 28 Nov. 1956; Nolan, Test Bulletin no. 8, 29 Nov. 1956; V. Malik to A. C. Graves and Ogle, “Test Director’s Organization,” 5 Dec. 1956; Goeke to Placak, ‘“Rad-Safe Activities Nevada Test Site,” 21 Dec. 1956. 38. Placak to Goeke, “On-Site Rad-Safe Plan for Test Manager’s Operations Order,” 10 Jan. 1957, w/att. draft plan; Nolan to distrib., “Rad-Safe Annex to the Test Director’s and Test Manager’s Operation Plan,” 14 Feb. 1957; John C. Clark to Nolan, “Comments on Proposed Rad-Safe Annex,” 25 Feb. 1957; Shipman to Carl Lyon, “Comments on Rad-Safe Annex,” 25 Feb. 1957; P. F. Dickens, Jr., to Clinton S. Maupin, “Rad-Safe Annex to Test Directors’s Operation Plan; Comments on,” 7 Mar. 1957; Maupin to Dunham, 11 Mar. 1957; draft “Rad-Safe Annex,” 15 Mar. 1957; Reeves to distrib., “[Test Manager’s] Operation Order 1-57—-Operation Plumbbob,” 29 Mar. 1957; “Operation Plumbbob: Test Director’s Operation Plan,” Report CTDN22, 1 Apr. 1957 (extracted version, Report CTDN-22 [EX], Washington: DNA, 1 Feb. 1980); Allaire to distrib., “Support Director’s Rad-Safe Instructions,” 20 May 1957; Reeves to G. W. Johnson, “Clarification Section V—Test Manager’s Standard Operating Procedure,” 20 June 1957. 39. Reeves to Corsbie, “Fallout Monitoring—Continental Test Series,” 11 Sept. 1956; Reeves to Corsbie, “Fallout Monitoring—Continental Test Series,” 17 Sept. 1956; REECo draft, “Plan of Action, Full Scale Weapons Test Period, for Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Co., Inc., Radiological Safety Division,” 12 Oct. 1956; Shipman to A. C. Graves, “Test Directors Organization, NTS,” 8 Nov. 1956; Allaire to REECo, “On-Site Rad-Safe Plans—Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., Inc.,” 23 Nov. 1956; Max E. Smith to REECo, “Test Director’s Requirements for REECoProvided Radiological Safety Support during Next NTS Operation,” 3 Jan. 1957; REECo, “Nevada Test Site Radiological Safety Division Operation Procedures during Full Scale Weapons Test Periods,” 16 Jan. 1957; William S. Johnson to distrib., “Transmittal of Plumbbob Report,” 15 July 1958, w/att. REECo, “Operation Plumbbob On-Site Radiological Safety Support Report,” Report OTO-57-2, n.d. 40. Reeves to Commander, FC/AFSWP, 30 Oct. 1956; Gordon L. Jacks to William F. Climo, 2 Nov. 1956; Robert B. Cruise to Chief Chemical Officer, “Utilization of Personnel of 1st Radiological Support Unit,” 14 Nov. 1956; Reeves to Gaelen L. Felt, 3 Dec. 1956; Allaire to W. S. Johnson, “Utilization of 1st RSSU,” 6 Dec. 1956; REECo, On-Site Rad-Safe Report (n. 39), 7. 41. Reeves to Corsbie, ‘Fallout Monitoring—Continental Test Series,” 11 Sept. 1956; Shipman to distrib., “Monitoring Requirements—Operation Pilgrim,” 5 Nov. 1956; Nolan, Test Bulletin no. 8, 29 Nov. 1956; R. Lee Aamodt to Nolan, “Test Bulletin No. 8 CTDC-28 of November 29, 1956,” 10 Dec. 1956; W. S. Johnson to M. Page, 20 Dec. 1956, w/att. “Basic Rad-Safe Training Program at Nevada Test Site”; Placak to Johnson, “Proposed Radiological-Safety Training Course,” 8 Jan. 1957; Allaire to M. E. Smith, “Training for Medical Officers—NTS, February 25—28, 1957,” 31 Jan. 1957; Roy Reider to H-3 Safety Office, “Nevada Test Site,” 5 Feb. 1957; Jack W. Aeby to J-Division group leaders, “Lectures for the Preparation of Test Site Monitors,” 6 Feb. 1957; REECo, “Basic Radiological Safety Training Manual,’ Feb. 1957.
Notes to Page 190 391 42. Ernest C. Anderson to Placak, 16 June 1955, w/att. memo for files, “Meeting to Discuss Nevada Test Site Operations, June 14, 1955,” 15 June 1955; Terrill to Leehey, 25 July 1955; Anderson to Mark D. Hollis, “Meeting to Consider Additional PHS Participation at the Nevada Test Site—August 2, 1955, Washington, D.C.,” 26 July 1955; Reeves to A. C. Graves, “AEC-PHS Liaison Officer Program—Continental Tests,” 28 Dec. 1955, w/att. draft ““General Plan for AEC-PHS Liaison Officer Program,” 9 Dec. 1955; Ogle to Reeves, ““AEC-PHS Liaison Officer Program—Continental Tests,” 13 Jan. 1956. 43. Form letter, Regional Engineer to Commissioned Reserve (Inactive Status) in Engineering and Allied Professional Categories, “Participation in Public Health Service Off-Site Radiological Safety Activities,” with attachments, n.d.; E. C. An-
derson to Placak et al., “Draft of Outline for Training Course to be Held at Mercury, Nevada, February 11-22, 1957,” 30 Oct. 1956, w/att. draft “Training Program”; Placak to Anderson, “Comments Regarding Proposed Public Health Service Training Course to be Held at Mercury,” 20 Nov. 1956; Anderson to Goeke, 18 Dec. 1956;
Allaire to M. E. Smith, “Requirements for PHS Training at NTS,” 23 Dec. 1956; Anderson to Simon Kinsman, “Curriculum for Mercury Nevada—Feb. 11-22, 1957,” 19 Dec. 1956; PHS, “Operational Plan and Orientation Text for Off-Site Radiological Safety Activities, Nevada Proving Grounds,” Jan. 1957; Charles F. Henke to Ander-
son, “Training Aids for Mercury, Nevada—February 11-22, 1957,” 4 Feb. 1957; “Orientation and Planning Sessions, Public Health Service, Feb. 11-22, 1957,” roster of participants; “Off-Site Planning Conference (Revised Schedule), Mercury, Nevada, February 18-21, 1957”; Walter L. Shilte, “Report on Orientation and Planning Conference, PHS, Off-Site Monitoring, Mercury, Nevada,” 23 Feb. 1957 (other reports, same title, same date by Louis W. Pickles, Lan J. Wong, Frank De Marinis, and Royal F. Makens); V. L. Rucker to Glen J. Hopkins, “Field Trip Report,” 25 Feb. 1957.
44. E. C. Anderson to Dunning, 14 Sept. 1956; Goeke to Reeves, “AEC-PHS Liaison Officer Network,” 26 Dec. 1956; Reeves to Terrill, 9 Jan. 1957; PHS, “Operation Plan for the Medical Liaison Officers Network, Nevada Proving Grounds,” Jan. 1957; Goeke to Placak, “Remarks by Mr. Don Fowler, Office of Assistant Gen-
eral Counsel,” 14 Mar. 1957, w/att. “Remarks... ,” by Donald R. Fowler; R. G. Elliott to Reeves, “Pre-Series Contacts in NTS Region,” 25 Mar. 1957; AEC, “Atomic Tests in Nevada,” Mar. 1957; Henry G. Vermillion to Reeves, “Distrib. of Popular Booklet by Off-Site Monitors,” 15 Apr. 1957; Placak to files, “Meeting at Alamo— April 17, 1957,” 18 Apr. 1957; “Off-Site Radiological Safety Plan for Operation Plumbbob,” 1 May 1957, Appendix 4, “Education and Public Relations”; Placak et al., eds., “Operation Plumbbob Off-Site Radiological Safety Report: Nevada Test Site, 1957,” Report OTO-57-3, n.d. (ca. July 1958), 19-24, 185-191. 45. Dunning to Starbird, “Radiological Safety Monitoring,” 30 Oct. 1956; Starbird to Corsbie, same title, 7 Nov. 1956; Dunning to Starbird, same title, 9 Nov. 1956; Dunham to Starbird, same title, 20 Nov. 1956; Dunning to Dunham, “Reply to Memorandum from Dr. Dunham to Dr. Dunning, December 5, 1956,” 6 Dec. 1956; Libby to A. C. Graves, 12 Dec. 1956; Starbird to Hertford, “Fallout Monitoring Project for Pilgrim,” 28 Dec. 1956; Allaire to Placak, same title, 9 Jan. 1957; Placak to Allaire, “Request for Information on Off-Site Program,” 31 Jan. 1957, w/att. “Program for Obtaining Data for the Evaluation of Dose to Off-Site Area Populations”; Dunham to Graves, 7 Mar. 1957; Starbird to Dunham, “Plumbbob Off-Site Fallout
392 Notes to Pages 190-191 Monitoring,” 15 Apr. 1957; Dunham to Joseph C. Clarke, “Monitoring Program,” 16 Apr. 1957; Dunning to Reeves, “Offsite Radiological Monitoring Programs,” 16 Apr. 1957; Reeves to Bradbury, “Monitoring Program,” 24 Apr. 1957; Dunning to Forrest Western, same title, 3 May 1957; Dunning to Reeves, “Offsite Monitoring,” 10 June 1957; Reeves to distrib., “Computing Effective Biological Dose,” 19 July 1957; Reeves to distrib., “Programs for Computing Biological Doses,” 2 Aug. 1957; A. Vay Shelton et al., “Fallout Patterns: Operation Plumbbob,” 1 Apr. 1958. 46. Plumbbob Test Manager’s Report (n. 11), 292. 47. Hertford to Starbird, “Nevada Test Interim Information Program,” 4 Aug. 1956, w/att. “Appendix ‘A’: Public Information Program in Advance of 1957 Nuclear Tests in Nevada’; Carey L. O’Bryan to Hertford, “Planning Pilgrim Public Information,” 20 Aug. 1956; L. P. Gise to Rodney L. Southwick, “Draft Initial Announcement on Nevada Test Series,” 24 Oct. 1956; Elliott to Starbird, ‘The Situation in Nevada,” 1 Nov. 1956; Salisbury to distrib., “Proposed Language on Radiation Criteria for Addition to Nevada Test Announcement,” 7 Nov. 1956; Gise to Southwick, “Proposed Releases Concerning Forthcoming Test Series,” 16 Nov. 1956; Hertford to All AEC— ALOO key officials, “Litigation Arising out of Nevada Tests,” 20 Nov. 1956; Salisbury to Starbird, “Revised Draft Announcement of Nevada Tests,” 13 Dec. 1956; Salisbury to distrib., “Revised Draft Announcement on 1957 Nevada Tests,” 20 Dec. 1956; Plumbbob Test Manager’s Report (n. 11), 295-296. 48. AEC 944/11, DIS report, “Public Education and Information Plan for Operation Plumbbob,” 12 Feb. 1957; AEC meeting no. 1269, 27 Feb. 1957, item 2;
Southwick to Elliott, 2 Mar. 1957, w/att. “Approved Replies to Proposed Questions [on radiation criteria for Plumbbob]’; Vermillion to A. C. Graves, 21 Mar. 1957, w/att. Elliott draft, “Off-Site Radiological-Safety Programs for Summer 1957 Test
Series in Nevada,” 21 Mar. 1957; Elliott to Starbird, “Statement of Criteria and Monitoring,” 29 Mar. 1957; Duncan Clark to Elliott, “Draft Radiation Annex to Public Information and Education Plan for Plumbbob,” 18 Apr. 1957, w/att. draft annex; NTO release OTI-57-11, 13 May 1957 [on safeguarding public health and safety]. 49. Plumbbob Test Manager’s Report (n. 11), 292. 50. JCAE Special Subcomm. on Radiation, The Nature of Radioactive Fallout and Its Effect on Man, Hearings, 85th Cong., Ist Sess., 1957; JCAE, Summary Analysis of Hearings, May 27-29, and June 3—7, 1957, on The Nature of Radioactive Fallout and
Its Effects on Man, Joint Comm. Print, 85th Cong., Ist Sess., Aug. 1957. See also Chet Holifield to Strauss, 3 May 1957, w/att. outline of hearings and press release (circulated as AEC 604/28, “Hearings on “The Nature of Radioactive Fallout and Its Effects on Man,’” 13 May 1957); AEC 604/29, “Draft Testimony for JCAE Hearings on Radioactive Fallout,” 21 May 1957; AEC meeting no. 1283, 21 May 1957, item 4;
Holifield to Strauss, 21 May 1957 (circulated as AEC 604/30, “Radiation Fallout Hearings,” 24 May 1957); William Mitchell to McCool, “Commission Discussicn of AEC 604/29,” 28 May 1957; Dwight A. Ink to Robert E. Hollingsworth, “Review of Fallout Problems,” 17 June 1957; Plumbbob Test Manager’s Report (n. 11), 293; Divine, Blowing on the Wind (n. 1), 129-138. 51. Paul Jacobs, “Clouds from Nevada,” The Reporter 16 (16 May 1957): 10-29. See also Shelby Thompson to Starbird, “Meeting with Paul Jacobs, Correspondent for Reporter Magazine,” 1 Mar. 1957; M. E. Smith to Jacobs, w/att. medical reports by
Notes to Page 191 393 Clinton C. Powell of alleged injuries during Teapot; H. A. Dixon to Strauss, 8 May 1957; Wallace F. Bennett to Strauss, 9 May 1957; Elliott to distrib., “Senator [Clinton P.j] Anderson’s Comments,” 25 May 1957; Plumbbob Test Manager’s Report (n. 11), 293-294. For a harsh, journalistic critique of these events, see Harvey Wasserman et al., Killing Our Own: The Disaster of America’s Experience with Atomic Radiation (New York: Delacorte Press, 1982), 112. 52. Libby to Bennett, 27 May 1957; DBM, “Report . .. Concerning Some Questions Raised in Connection with an Article by Paul Jacobs, ‘Clouds from Nevada,’ The Reporter, May 16, 1957,” n.d.; Reeves to distrib., “Test Manager’s Committee to Evaluate Radiation Dose to Off-Site Communities,” Test Manager’s memorandum no. 13, 17 June 1957; Hollingsworth to Fields, “Discussion of Fallout Problems,” 25 June 1957; Strauss to Fields, “The Recent Fallout Hearings and Resulting Commission Action,” 10 July 1957; Corsbie to Reeves, “Fallout Monitoring Project for (Pilgrim) Plumbbob,” 12 July 1957; Goeke to files, “Comments on Corsbie Memorandum to Test Manager Dated July 12, 1957, Entitled ‘Fallout Monitoring Project for Plumbbob,” 17 July 1957; Dunning to Dunham, “Fall-Out Programs for Operation
Plumbbob,” 19 July 1957; Dunning to Dunham, “Fallout Monitoring Programs for Plumbbob,” 15 Aug. 1957; AEC 604/33, DBM report, “Review of Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, “The Nature of Radioactive Fallout and Its Effects on Man,’ May 27—June 7, 1957,” 28 Aug. 1957; Reeves to distrib., “Visit of Ranchers at Nevada Test Site,” 9 Sept. 1957; DBM, “Review of Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, “The Nature of Radioactive Fallout and Its Effects on Man,’ May 27-June 7, 1957,” 21 Nov. 1957; Plumbbob Test Manager’s Report (n. 11), 294~295. 53. J. D. Shreve to Hertford, “Basic Requirements for the 57 Project,” 28 Jan. 1957; E. H. Draper to R. A. Bice, “Forthcoming MB-1 Full Scale Test at the Nevada Proving Ground,” 7 Feb. 1957; Luedecke to Starbird, “Use of Land for Project 57,” 25 Feb. 1957; AEC 944/13, DMA report, “Summary of Project 57, the First Safety Test of Operation Plumbbob,” 14 Mar. 1957; Elliott to DIS, 18 Apr. 1957; LVBO release LAV-57-37, 24 Apr. 1957; Starbird, “Project 57 Safety Test,” Plumbbob Test Bulletin no. 2, 26 Apr. 1957; Shreve, “Summary Report, Test Group 57,” Sandia Corporation, Apr. 1958; J. L. Dick and T. P. Baker, “Monitoring and Decontamination Techniques for Plutonium Fallout on Large-Area Surfaces,” Report WT-1512 (Kirtland AFB, New Mex.: AFSWC, Jan. 1961); JRB Associates, Safety Experiments, November 1955—March 1958, by Jeannie Massie and Inara Gravitis, Report DNA 6030F (McLean,
Va., 2 Aug. 1982), 23-39; NVOO Office of Public Affairs, Announced United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through December 1986, Report NVO-209 (Rev. 7) (Las Vegas, Jan. 1987), 5-6. 54. Starbird to Fields, “Summary of Operation Plumbbob Weapon Development Tests,” 14 Oct. 1957 (circulated as AEC 944/35, “Summary of Operation Plumbbob Tests,” 17 Oct. 1957); Plumbbob Test Manager’s Report (n. 11); Plumbbob On-Site Rad-Safe Report (n. 39); Allaire to Starbird, “Nevada Test Site Radiation Exposure Data for 1957,” 14 Mar. 1958, w/att. W. S. Johnson to OTO, “Radiation Exposure Data for Calendar Year 1957,” 27 Feb. 1958 (circulated as AEC 141/34, “Nevada Test Site Radiation Exposure Data for 1957,” 8 Apr. 1958); Plumbbob Off-Site Rad-Safe Report (n. 44); Howard A. Hawthorne, ed., Compilation of Local Fallout Data from Test Detonations 1945-1962 Extracted from DASA 1251, 2 vols., Report DNA 1251-
394 Notes to Page 192 1-EX, -2-EX (Santa Barbara: GE-TEMPO, 1 May 1979), vol. 2, Continental U.S. Tests, 251-371; Jaycor, Plumbbob Series (n. 19); NVOO, Announced Nuclear Tests (n. 53), 5-6; DNA, “Plumbbob Series,” Public Affairs Office fact sheet (Washington, n.d.).
55. Jaycor, Plumbbob Series (n. 19), ch. 4, “Exercise Desert Rock VII and VII Programs.” See also Jaycor, Shot Smoky: A Test of the Plumbbob Series, 31 August 1957, by Harris et al., Report DNA 6004F (Alexandria, Va., 31 May 1981); and the volumes from JRB Associates, McLean, Va.: Shots Boltzmann to Wilson: The First
Four Tests of the Plumbbob Series, 28 May-18 June 1957, by Jaton West et al., Report DNA 6008F, 28 Sept. 1981; Shot Priscilla: A Test of the Plumbbob Series, 24 June 1957, by Mary Jo Viscuso et al., Report DNA 6003F, 27 Feb. 1981; Shot Hood: A Test of the Plumbbob Series, 5 July 1957, by Carl Maag et al., Report DNA 6002F, 27 Feb. 1981; Shots Diablo to Franklin Prime: The Mid-Series Tests of the Plumbbob Series, 15 July-30 August 1957, by Maag and Jean Ponton, Report DNA 6006F, 29
Sept. 1981; Shot Galileo: A Test of the Plumbbob Series, 2 September 1957, by Ponton et al., Report DNA 6001F, 27 Feb. 1981; Shots Wheeler to Morgan: The Final Eight Tests of the Plumbbob Series, 6 September—7 October 1957, by Massie and Ponton, Report DNA 6007F, 30 Sept. 1981.
56. Deputy Exercise Director, “Plan for US Army Infantry Battle Group Test, Exercise Desert Rock VII and VIII,” n.d. (Aug. 1957); Hq Exercise Desert Rock VII and VIII, Operation Order 7 [Hood], 28 June 1957; idem, Operation Order 17 [Smoky], 23 Aug. 1957; Walter A. Jensen to CG Continental Army Command, “Infantry Troop Test, Exercise Desert Rock VII & VIII,” 11 Dec. 1957, w/att. “Report of Test,” n.d. See also JRB Associates, Shot Hood (n. 55); Jaycor, Shot Smoky (n. 55); JRB Associates, Shot Galileo (n. 55).
57. David I. Saunders, “Final Report, Radiological Safety Section, Exercise Desert Rock VII & VIII,” n.d., Tab F in Technical Service Chiefs, “Operation Plumbbob, Camp Desert Rock VII & VUHI,” n.d.; “Final Report, 50th Cml Plat (Svc), Exercise Desert Rock VII & VIII,” 16 Sept. 1957, Tab G, ibid.; Desert Rock VII and VIII Final Report (n. 19).
58. Jerald L. Goetz to Barton C. Hacker, 10 July 1989, w/att. “Comments on Elements of Controversy,” 7, citing SAIC, “Film Badge Dosimetry Analysis, Exercise Desert Rock VII-VHI, Camp Desert Rock, Nevada, 1957,” revised 18 Feb. 1981. Cf. Jaycor, Plumbbob Series (n. 19); DNA, “Plumbbob Series” fact sheet (n. 54).
59. Frank B. Berry to Thomas Ludlow Ashley, 16 Sept. 1957; Sheldon S. Brownton to Dunham, 16 Sept. 1957. See also Epilogue, below.
60. M. E. Smith to REECo, “Proposed Safety Events—NTS,” 28 Oct. 1957; Fields to Hertford, 07/1927Z Nov. 1957; Hertford to Reeves, “‘Directive for 58 Project NTS,” 12 Nov. 1957; Reeves, “58 Project NTS,” Operation Order 2-57, 12 Nov. 1957;
Plank to Paul R. Wignall, 19 Nov. 1957, w/att. “Summary of Cloud Sampling Requirements for NTS-58,” 19 Nov. 1957; Pickett to Commander AFSWC, “Air Support for ‘58 Project NTS,’” 20 Nov. 1957; Strauss to Andrew J. Goodpaster, 23 Nov. 1957; Strauss to Eisenhower, 23 Nov. 1957, endorsed by Eisenhower, 3 Dec. 1957.
61. Starbird, “[deleted] Safety Test Completed,” 58 Project NTS Test Bulletin no. 2, 9 Dec. 1957; Reeves to Starbird et al., 10/1641Z Dec. 1957; Floyd Wesley Wilcox to W. S. Johnson, “Initial Surveys—Pascal-C and Coulomb-C,” 16 Dec. 1957; Johnson to distrib., “On-Site Rad-Safe Shot Reports,” 9 Jan. 1958, w/att. “Rad-Safe
Notes to Pages 192-193 395 Support Activities for Pascal ‘C’ (December 5 through December 9, 1957)’ and “Rad-Safe Support Activities for Coulomb ‘C’ (December 9 through December 12, 1957)”; Ogle, “58 Project-NTS: Test Director’s Report to the Test Manager,” 17 Jan. 1958; Hawthome, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 54), 374-379; JRB Associates, Safety Experiments (n. 53), 43-46; Hacker telephone interview with William J. Brady and Clifford R. Penwell, 27 Oct. 1987. 62. Vermillion to files, “Radioactivity Increase in Los Angeles Area,” 16 Dec. 1957; Terrill to Dunning, “Recent Preliminary Findings of the Public Health Service Radiation Surveillance Network, December 9-16, 1957,” 19 Dec. 1957; Dunham to Starbird, “Fallout from Safety Tests,” 9 Jan. 1957; Terrill to Dunning, “Increases in Beta Radioactivity of Air Samples, December 8-18, 1957,” 14 Jan. 1958; Placak to Allaire, “Trip Report [Los Angeles],” 14 Jan. 1958; Placak et al., “Report of Off-Site Radiological Safety Activities for Project 58, Nevada Test Site, December 1957,” n.d. See also Elliott to Jacobs, 10 Mar. and 13 Mar. 1958; Placak to Allaire, “Interview with Paul Jacobs of Reporter Magazine,” 14 Mar. 1958, w/att. “Notes of Conversation between Paul Jacobs and O. R. Placak on March 13, 1958”; Elliott to distrib., “Las Vegas Interview with Paul Jacobs, Reporter Magazine,” 26 Mar. 1958; Jacobs, “The Little Cloud That Got Away,” The Reporter 18 (3 Apr. 1958): 18-19. 63. Charles E. Violet to distrib., “Test Director’s Operational Plan, Project 58ANTS,” 27 Jan. 1958; Hertford to Reeves, “Directive for Project 58A-NTS,” 28 Jan. 1958; Reeves to distrib., “Project 58A-NTS,” Operation Order 1-58, 29 Jan. 1958. 64. John S. Coogan, “Recovery and Decontamination in Tunnel U 12-C,” 7 Feb. 1958; Wilcox to file, “Discussion with Scott Bybee,” 24 Feb. 1958; Violet to W. S. Johnson, 3 Mar. 1958; Clifton R. Lund to Wilcox, “Report on REECO Rad-Safe Participation in Venus Event,” 19 Mar. 1958; Brady to Wilcox, “Initial Survey of the February 22, 1958, Venus Event,” 21 Apr. 1958; Hawthorne, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 54), 381-382; JRB Associates, Safety Experiments (n. 53), 50. 65. Wilcox to Rad-safe division personnel, ““SOP—Second Detonation Project 58A,” 10 Mar. 1958; W. S. Johnson to L. J. Reynolds, “Telephone Report to AEC-ALO
of This Date,” 14 Mar. 1958; J. S. Coogan to Wilcox, “Initial Survey of Uranus Tunnel,” 19 Mar. 1958; Earl C. Forry to Wilcox, “Sample Recovery at the U12-C Vent Sample Station,” 19 Mar. 1958; Johnson to Reynolds, “Meeting with R. Scott Bybee, UCRL-N,” 1 Apr. 1958. 66. Bradbury to Starbird, 20 Feb. 1957; Starbird to CSUSAF, “Cloud Sampling at Hardtack,” 27 Mar. 1957; Dunham to Starbird, “Comments on Draft Staff Paper “Test
Activities for Calendar Year 1958,’” 5 Apr. 1957; AEC meetings no. 1276, 9 Apr. 1957, minutes of executive session, item 1, and 1295, 24 July 1957, item 1; McCool to Starbird, “Fallout Data from Operation Hardtack,” 12 Apr. 1957; O’Bryan to distrib., 24 July 1957, w/att. “Minutes of Hardtack Fallout Conference,” 10 June 1957; AEC 926/7, “Notes for the 112th AEC-MLC Conference,” 26 June 1957, item 7; McCool and Richard H. Free, “Minutes of the One Hundred and Twelfth AEC-MLC Conference, June 27, 1957,” 2 Oct. 1957, item 5; Paul C. Tompkins to Raymond I. Schnittke, 28 June 1957; Starbird to A. C. Graves, 10 July 1957; Starbird to Hertford, “Hardtack Radiobiological Survey,” 17 July 1957; AEC 952/8, DMA report, “Fallout Program—Hardtack,” 24 July 1957; Graves to Starbird, 26 July 1957 (circulated as AEC 952/9, “Fallout Program—Hardtack,” 31 July 1957). 67. 112th AEC-MLC Conference (n. 66), item 6; Strauss to Eisenhower, 2 Aug.
396 Notes to Page 193 1957 (circulated as AEC 952/12, “Plans for Initiation of Hardtack,” 12 Aug. 1957); Strauss to Secretary of Defense, 13 Aug. 1957 (circulated as AEC 952/13, “Preparations for Hardtack,” 19 Aug. 1957); AEC meeting no. 1300, 13 Aug. 1957, item 14.
68. NTO release OTI-57-NN, “Text of an Announcement Made on Sunday, September 15, 1957, by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission,” 16 Sept. 1957. See also Strauss to Fields, 12 Sept. 1957, w/att. draft “Joint A.E.C.—D.O.D. Statement”; Fields to Jarnes T. Ramey, 17 Sept. 1957. 69. AEC 952/11, DMA report, “Hardtack Fallout Program,” 14 Aug. 1957; AEC meeting no. 1301, 22 Aug. 1957, item 5; Harold D. Anamosa to Starbird and Dunham, “Commission Decision on AEC 952/11—Fallout Program—Hardtack,” 27 Aug. 1957
(revised 4 Sept. 1957); Schnittke to Starbird, “Conference with Dr. Libby on Hardtack,” 9 Sept. 1957; Fields to Loper, 10 Sept. 1957; Dunning to Dunham, “Meetings on Discussion—Fallout from Hardtack,” 18 Sept. 1957; Loper to Fields, 19 Sept. 1957, w/att. “Recommended Joint AEC-DOD Fallout Investigation” (circulated with Fields to Loper, 26 Sept. 1957, as AEC 952/14, “Fallout Program—-Hardtack,” 2 Oct. 1957); Starbird to Hertford, 25/1356Z Sept. 1957; Starbird to Libby, ‘“Hardtack Fallout Program,” 26 Aug. 1958. 70. Salisbury to distrib., “Updating of Announcement on Public Health and Safety Precautions for Pacific Tests,” 16 Apr. 1958, w/att. JOTI, “Public Health and Safety Precautions for Eniwetok Tests Announced,” 27 Apr. 1956; Luedecke to Starbird, 22/0130Z Apr. 1958; Salisbury to Fields, “Draft JOTI Announcement on Health and Safety Precautions for Operation Hardtack,” 24 Apr. 1958; JOTI release A-96 (J-3), “Health and Safety Precautions for Eniwetok Proving Ground Tests,” 1 May 1958; “Joint AEC-DOD Operation Hardtack Information Plan,” 2d draft, 11 Feb. 1958; S. Thompson to distrib., “Draft Public Information Plan for Operation Hardtack,” 7 Apr. 1958, w/att. “Joint AEC-DOD Operation Hardtack Public Information Plan,” 4th draft, 24 Mar. 1958; AEC meeting no. 1364, 26 Apr. 1958, item 1. 71. Milton S. Katz, Ban the Bomb: A History of SANE, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), ch. 1, “Nuclear Pacifism in Cold War America, 1945-1957”; Frances B. McCrea and Gerald E. Markle, Minuies to Midnight: Nuclear Weapons Protest in America (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1989), 71—78; John MacDougall, “Ban Nuclear Tests: The History and Values of the Popular Movement in America, 1957-63,” presented at annual meeting of SSSP, San Antonio, Aug. 1984. See also Spencer R. Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1988), 241-248. 72. Divine, Blowing on the Wind (n. 1), 147-152; Katherine Magraw, “Teller and the ‘Clean Bomb’ Episode,” BAS 44 (May 1988): 32, 34-37; Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission, vol. 3 of A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford: Univ. of California Press, 1989), 398-402.
73. Darol K. Froman to Starbird, 10/2321Z Sept. 1957; Duane C. Sewell to Starbird, 10/2325Z Sept. 1957; UCRL to Starbird, 18/1835Z Sept. 1957; Northrup to J. Carson Mark, 11/2020Z Oct. 1957; AEC 952/17, DMA report, “Demonstration Shot for Operation Hardtack,” 17 Oct. 1957; AEC 952/25, DMA report, “U.N. Observation Program for Hardtack,” 9 Dec. 1957; AEC meeting no. 1337, 26 Feb. 1958, item 1; H. J. Watters to the record, “U.N. Observers Clean Weapons Demonstration
Notes to Page 193 397 Shot, Operation Hardtack,” 10 Mar. 1958; Strauss to Chairman OCB, “‘Clean Weapon’ Demonstration at Eniwetok for U.N. and Press Observers,” 17 Mar. 1958; “Clean Bomb Demonstration for United Nations Observers,” 1 Apr. 1958; JOTI release A-129 (J-8), “U.S. News Group Named to Cover Reduced Fallout Demonstration,” 11 June 1958; JOTI release A-147 (J-11), “U.S. Demonstration of Reduced Nuclear Fallout Expected to Begin in August,” 19 June 1958; “Schedule: U.N. Observers Program,” n.d.; G. W. Johnson to Bradbury, 11 July 1958; Bradbury to Johnson, 17 July 1958.
74. Starbird and P. F Foster to Secretary of State, “The Planned UN Demonstration Shot,” 14 July 1958; McCool to Starbird, “Commission Decision on AEC 952/63—-UN Demonstration Program—Operation Hardtack,” 16 July 1958; C. B. Stewart to Luedecke et al., 26/2155Z July 1958; Starbird to Luedecke et al., 28/2138Z July 1958; Starbird to McCool, “Action Taken as a Result of Commission Action on AEC 952/63,” 31 July 1958; AEC 952/70, “Laboratory Demonstration of Data Concerning Hardtack Shot,” 19 Nov. 1958; Kaman Tempo, Operation Hardtack I, 1958, by F. R. Gladeck et al., Report 6038F (Santa Barbara, 1 Dec. 1982), 55-56. 75. Goodpaster, “Memorandum of Conference with the President, March 24, 1958—4:00 P.M.,” 28 Mar. 1958; Goodpaster, “Memorandum of Conference with the President, April 17, 1958,” 17 Apr. 1958; James R. Killian, Jr., Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977), 150-158. See also Divine, Blowing on the Wind (n. 1), ch. 7, “Reversal”; Hewlett and Holl, Atoms for Peace and War (n. 72), ch. 17, “Toward a Nuclear Test Moratorium.”
76. AEC release A-30, “AEC Announces Danger Area for Eniwetok Nuclear Tests,” 14 Feb. 1958; AEC meetings: no. 1350, 2 Apr. 1958, item 14; no. 1352, 7 Apr. 1958, item 2; no. 1355, 14 Apr. 1958, item 2; no. 1380, 6 June 1958, item 1; AEC release A-77, “AEC Issues Regulations Prohibiting Entry into Weapons Testing Danger Area by Persons Subject to the Jurisdiction of the U.S.,” 11 Apr. 1958; Fields, affidavit, Montgomery County, Md., Apr. 1958; AEC General Counsel to AEC Com-
missioners, “Current Status of Procedures to Prevent Entry of ‘Golden Rule’ into Hardtack Danger Area,” 2 May 1958; Christian A. Herter to Strauss, 12 May 1958 (circulated as AEC 125/35, “Prevention of Ketch ‘Golden Rule’ from Interfering with
Hardtack Series,” 22 May 1958); L. K. Olson to AEC Commissioners and GM, “Current Status, ‘Golden Rule,’” 6 June 1958; Olson to Commissioners and GM, “Possible Entry of Yacht ‘Phoenix’ into Hardtack Danger Area,” 13 June 1958; AEC 952/60, “Amendment of AEC Regulation to Prohibit Interference with the Hardtack Test Series,” 23 June 1958; JOTI release A-157 (J-12), “Danger Area for Johnston Island Nuclear Tests Announced; Unauthorized Entry Prohibited,” 26 June 1958. Cf. Albert Bigelow, The Voyage of the “Golden Rule”: An Experiment with Truth (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959); Earle Reynolds, The Forbidden Voyage [Phoenix] (New York: David McKay, 1961). See also Divine, Blowing on the Wind (n. 1), 197, 214— 215, 220.
77. Daniel F Rex to distrib., “Establishment of the Joint Task Force Seven Meteorological Center, Pearl Harbor, T.H. [Territory of Hawaii],” 15 Jan. 1957; AEC meeting no. 1275, 3 Apr. 1957, item 11; Felt to distrib., “Task Group 7.1 Organization for Hardtack,” 23 Apr. 1957; Felt to Harry B. Keller, 2 May 1957; CTG 7.1, “General Concept 1-57, Operation Hardtack,” 1 June 1957.
398 Notes to Pages 193-194 78. Froman to group and division leaders, “Task Group 7.1 Commander,” 12 Sept. 1957; D. Curry to distrib., “Announcement of Activation of Task Group 7.4,” 10 Oct.
1957; Curry to distrib., “Appointment of Colonel E[rnest] A. Pinson, USAK as a Deputy Commander, Task Group 7.1, effective 1 December 1957,” 18 Oct. 1957; Robert Chesney to distrib., “Key Personnel,” 18 Nov. 1957; “Comments on Task Unit Commanders Meeting,” 19 Nov. 1957; Hertford to Starbird, “Operation Hardtack,” 21 Nov. 1957; E. A. Lucke to TG 7.1 staff members, “Review of Draft CTG 7.1 Operation Plan 1-58 for Operation Hardtack,” 6 Dec. 1957; Luedecke to distrib., “Exercise of Command,” 10 Dec. 1957; Lucke to CJTF 7, “Hardtack Sample Return Aircraft Requirement,” 13 Dec. 1957. 79. AEC meetings: no. 1280, 1 May 1957, item 7; no. 1308, 22 Oct. 1957, item 1; no. 1313, 6 Nov. 1957, item 12; McCool to Starbird, “Commission Decision on AEC 952/5—Test Activities for CY 1958,” 2 May 1957; 113th AEC-MLC Conference, 26 Sept. 1957, item 6; Strauss to Loper, “Concurrence in Operation Hardtack,” 13 Nov. 1957; McCool and Free, “Minutes of the One Hundred and Fourteenth AEC~MLC Conference [25 Oct. 1957],” 21 Nov. 1957, item 3; AEC 952/28, “Operation Hardtack Test Program,” 17 Jan. 1958. 80. Kaman Tempo, Operation Hardtack I (n. 74), 23-24; DNA Public Affairs Office, “Hardtack Fact Sheet” (Washington, n.d); NVOO, Announced Nuclear Tests (n. 53), 7-8. 81. Kaman Tempo, Operation Hardtack I (n. 74), 224-273. 82. Roger Ray et al., “Report on a Study of the Safety Aspects of UHA and VHA for Operation Hardtack,” 21 Oct. 1957; AEC 952/21, “Interim Report on the Safety Aspects of Certain Shots of Operation Hardtack,” 15 Nov. 1957; Warren C. Johnson to Strauss, 10 Dec. 1957; Fields to Luedecke, 9 Jan. 1958; AEC meetings no. 1345, 22 Mar. 1958, item 1, and no. 1347, 28 Mar. 1958, item 3; Dunning to Starbird, “High Altitude Shots,” 24 Mar. 1958; Starbird to AEC Commissioners, “The High Altitude Shots,” 31 Mar. 1958; Joshua Z. Holland, “Present Status of Information on Fallout from Teak and Orange,” 24 Oct. 1961. See also Frank H. Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer (Colorado Springs: Shelton Enterprise, 1988), 9-12 to 9-16, 9-35 to 9-41. 83. AEC meetings: no. 1349, 1 Apr. 1958, item 1; no. 1351, 4 Apr. 1958, item 1; no. 1352, 7 Apr. 1958, item 9; no. 1361, 24 Apr. 1958, item 8; no. 1360, 30 Apr. 1958, item 3; Libby to Carl T. Durham, 8 Apr. 1958; Luedecke to Starbird, 20/0033Z Apr. 1958; Salisbury to Starbird, “Public Information Problems Associated with Creation of Additional Pacific Testing Area,” 22 Apr. 1958; Dunning to Dunham, “Firing Cri-
teria for Teak and Orange, 26 May 1958; Dunham to Starbird, “Firing Criteria for Teak and Orange,” 29 May 1958; AEC, Twenty-Fourth Semiannual Report, July 1958, 13; JOTI release B-94, 15 June 1959, w/att. JCAE and OCDN, “Results of the Teak and Orange Shots in the 1958 Hardtack Series.”
84. H. E. Parsons to CTG 7.1, “Weapons Effects Tests Standard Operating Procedures,” 10 Aug. 1957, w/att. “Radiological Safety,’ SOP 90-1, 24 July 1957; Reeves to Felt, “Radiological Safety at EPG for Task Group 7.5,” 15 Aug. 1957, w/att. J. B. Sanders, “Radiological Safety Procedures for Eniwetok Proving Grounds,” n.d.
85. Hq JTF 7, “Radiological Safety Operations,” Operation Plan 11-58, Annex K,
Notes to Pages 195-196 399 1 Oct. 1957; Jacks to distrib., “Monitor School for Project Monitors,” 4 Dec. 1957; Jacks to individual concerned, “Film Badge Issue,” 2 Apr. 1958; Jacks and George C. Zimmerman, “Radiological Safety: Report to the Scientific Director,” 15 Nov. 1958, 6-9; Kaman Tempo, Operation Hardtack I (n. 74), 70-77, 81-84, 86-94, 407-411. 86. Wignall to CJTF 7, “Radiation Dosages for Task Group 7.4 Personnel during Hardtack,” 21 Nov. 1957; Shipman to Ogle, “Radiation Doses for Cloud Samplers, Operation Hardtack,” 26 Nov. 1957; Ogle to Perry B. Gniffith, 4 Dec. 1957; Dunning to Dunham, “Meeting on Rad Safe for Operation Hardtack on January 16, 1958,” 17 Jan. 1958, w/att. “Proposed Radiation Criteria for Operation Hardtack”’; Jack Rosen, memo for record, “Meeting at Joint Task Force Seven, Arlington Hall, 16 January 1958, on Rad Safe Criteria for Operation Hardtack,” 17 Jan. 1958; Hq JTF 7, “Radiological Safety Regulations,” Operations Plan 1-58, Annex K, Appendix 1, 8 Feb. 1958; Jacks to distrib., “Task Group 7.1 Radiological Safety Regulations for Operation Hardtack,” 11 Mar. 1958, w/att. “Rad-Safe Regulations.” See also Taylor, History of Air Force Atomic Cloud Sampling (n. 15), 174-186; Kaman Tempo, Operation Hardtack I (n. 74), 77-81. 87. Kenneth A. Noseck to Henry L. Swartz, “Instruction for Off-Atoll Represen-
tative of JTF Seven,” 14 Feb. 1958 (and similar memos to others assigned to like jobs); E. C. Anderson, “Manual for Public Health Service Participants, Operation Hardtack, at Pacific Proving Grounds during 1958,” Mar. 1958; “Report of Public Health Service Off-Site Radiological Monitoring Data, Operation Hardtack, Phase I, 1958,” n.d.; Kaman Tempo, Operation Hardtack I (n. 74), 84-86. 88. “Final History, Task Group 7.4,” 136, as cited in Kaman Tempo, Operation Hardtack I (n. 74), 98; “Final Report TG 7.4 Eniwetok,” 36, as cited ibid., 102. 89. TU 7.1.6, Eniwetok Atoll, “Log Book, 13 April 1958—Aug. 19, 1958,” entry for 14 May; Jacks and Zimmerman, “Radiological Safety” (n. 85), 34-45; Holmes & Narver, “Task Group 7.5 Radiological Safety Support, Operation Hardtack, Phase I,” ed. Carl Minkkinen et al., Report OTO 58-3, Apr. 1959, 22-24; Kaman Tempo, Operation Hardtack I (n. 74), 154. 90. Dunning to Anton, 13 June 1958; Anton to Dunning, 13/0032Z June 1958; J. B. Sanders to Luedecke, “Dosage Increases,” 23 June 1958; J. B. Sanders to Luedecke, “Dosage Increases,” 27 June 1958. 91. Jacks and Zimmerman, “Radiological Safety” (n. 85), 12. 92. Kaman Tempo, Operation Hardtack I (n. 74), 381-382; DNA, “Hardtack Fact Sheet” (n. 80), 4—5.
93. Starbird to Luedecke, 15 July 1958; Starbird to Luedecke, 21 July 1958; Starbird to Luedecke, 23 July 1958; C. B. Stewart to Luedecke, 25 July 1958; Starbird to Philip J. Farley, 1 Aug. 1958; Starbird to General Manager, “Follow-up Report to JCAE on Japanese Ship Takuyo Maru,” 4 Aug. 1958; U.S. Team Investigating Reported Radioactivity Aboard the Jakuyo Maru and Satsuma Maru, “Report of Findings Made Available to Japanese Foreign Office,” 4 Aug. 1958; Douglas McArthur to Secretary of State, message no. 293, 11 Aug. 1958; P. F Foster to Ramey, 12 Aug. 1958; Starbird to GM, “Third Letter to JCAE Concerning Hardtack Fallout on Two Japanese Ships,” 19 Aug. 1958; Dunham and Starbird to AEC Commissioners, “Fallout on Japanese Ships,” 20 Aug. 1958; Dunham and Starbird to AEC Commissioners, “U.S. Team Findings and Conclusions Regarding Fallout on Japanese Ships Made
400 Notes to Pages 196-197 Public in Japan,” 9 Sept. 1958, w/att. “U.S. Team Findings Made Public in Japan Regarding Crews of Satsuma Maru and Takuyo Maru.” Cf. Kaman Tempo, Operation Hardtack I (n. 74), 178-179. 94. Nicholas C. Christofilos, “The Argus Experiment,” Journal of Geophysical Research 64 (1959): 869-875; Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower (n. 75), 186-188; Herbert F. York, Making Weapons, Talking Peace: A Physicist’s Odyssey from Hiroshima to Geneva (New York: Basic Books, 1987), 128-132. 95. Eighteenth AEC-MLC meeting, 26 June 1958, item 5; CTF 88, “Operation Argus,” Report WT-1665 (Washington: DASA, 29 Dec. 1959; extracted version as “Operation Argus: Report of the Commander, Task Force 88,” Report WT-1665 [EX] [Washington: DNA, 1 Oct. 1979]); Hawthorne, Compilation of Local Fallout Daia (n. 54), vol. 2, Oceanic U.S. Tests, 316-318; Kaman Tempo, Operation Argus, 1958, by C. B. Jones et al., Report DNA 6039F (Santa Barbara, 30 Apr. 1982). 96. Hanson W. Baldwin, “3 Atomic Devices Detonated 300 Miles Up,” New York Times, 19 Mar. 1959, 1; Walter Sullivan, “Radiation and Geomagnetic Phenomena Probed and Revealed by Test Outlined,” ibid., 1; S. Fred Singer, “Nuclear Explosions in Space,” Missiles and Rockets 5 (30 Mar. 1959): 33-36, (6 Apr. 1959): 36-40, (13 Apr. 1959): 21-24f, (20 Apr. 1959): 26ff; Charles D. LaFond, “Top Scientists Find Argus Opening New Avenue of Experimentation,” ibid. (18 May 1959): 37ff; Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower (n. 75), 189-191; York, Making Weapons, Talking Peace (n. 94), 148~150. 97. Harold Karan Jacobson and Eric Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians: The United States and the Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1966), 34-85; Keesing’s Research Report, Disarmament: Negotiations and Treaties, 1946-1971 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1972), 174-175, 301-308; ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations, 1980 ed. (Washington, Aug. 1980), 34—37; Divine, Blowing on the Wind (n. 1), ch. 8, “Moratorium”; Robert Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1962), 186-200; Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower (n. 75), 158-162. 98. Bradbury to Starbird, 8 Jan. 1958; Dunning to Dunham, “Proposed Weapons Effects Tests,” 22 Jan. 1958; AEC meetings no. 1378, 28 May 1958, item 5, and 1383,
18 June 1958, item 4; Loper to Strauss, 4 June 1958 (circulated as AEC 952/57, “DOD Recommendation Regarding Operation Hardtack,” 12 June 1958); Fields to AEC Commissioners, “Letter to the President Requesting Modification of the Hardtack Program,” 9 June 1958, w/att. draft letter; Strauss to Eisenhower, 12 June 1958, endorsed by Eisenhower, 12 June 1958; Starbird to Hertford, 23/2140Z July 1958 (circulated as AEC 987/7, “Operation Millrace,” 29 July 1958); Salisbury to those listed, “Draft Announcement of Millrace,” 25 July 1958. 99. Hertford to Reeves, “Operation Directive—Hardtack, Second Phase,” 29 Aug.
1958; Reeves to distrib., “Operation Hardtack, Second Phase, Nevada Test Site,” Operations Order 2-58, 29 Aug. 1958; Test Manager’s Bulletins: no. 1, “Appointments to the Nevada Test Site Organization for Operation Hardtack, Second Phase,” 29 Aug. 1958; and no. 2, “Additional Appointments to the Nevada Test Site Organization for Operation Hardtack, Second Phase,” 9 Sept. 1958. 100. P. F Foster to Ramey, 10 Oct. 1958; John A. McCone to Eisenhower, 16 Oct.
Notes to Pages 197-198 401 1958, endorsed by Eisenhower, 16 Oct. 1958 (circulated as AEC 987/9, “Presidential Approval of Certain Recommended Changes in Test Program,” 17 Oct. 1958); Starbird to Hertford and Reeves, 17/1513Z Oct. 1958; McCone to Eisenhower, 27 Oct. 1958, endorsed by Eisenhower, 29 Oct. 1958 (circulated as AEC 987/12, “Presidential Approval of AEC Letter Regarding Adjusted Test Program,” 31 Oct. 1958). 101. Sewell to Reeves, “2315 PST 30 October 1958 Briefing—Adams,” 22 Apr. 1959, w/att. “Wind Soundings—30 October 1958—Yucca Flat” and Jack W. Reed, “Blast Predictions Presented 30 October 1958”; ALOO release OTI-58-56, 30 Oct. 1958; AEC meeting no. 1421, 31 Oct. 1958, item 4. 102. Starbird to General Manager, “Summary of Operation Hardtack, Phase II, Weapon Development Tests,” 14 Nov. 1958 (circulated as AEC 987/15, “Summary of Operation Hardtack, Phase II,” 24 Nov. 1958); Hawthorne, Continental U.S. Tests (n.
54), 383-496; Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer (n. 82), 9-43 to 9-47; NVOO, Announced Nuclear Tests (n. 54), 8-10; JRB Associates, Operation Hardtack IT, 1958, by Ponton et al., Report DNA 6026F (McLean, Va., 3 Dec. 1982), 29; DNA, “Operation Hardtack II,” Public Affairs Office fact sheet (Washington, n.d.). 103. Shipman to Dunham, 2 Jan. 1958; Dunham to Shipman, 23 Jan. 1958; Dunning to Dunham, “Liaison for NTS Activities,” 10 Feb. 1958; Dunham to Starbird, “Meeting on Activities at NTS,” 24 June 1958; Dunham to Starbird, “Radiological Safety—NTS,” 14 Aug. 1958, commenting on “Radiological Safety,” NTO SOP, ch. 0502; D. Curry, “Phase II Operation Hardtack, LASL Test Director’s Operation Plan,” 3 Sept. 1958; Aeby to distrib., ““Rad-Safe Requirements & Procedures, Second Phase Hardtack,” 8 Sept. 1958; Test Manager’s Bulletin no. 3, “Muster System and Safety Procedures—Area 12,” 12 Sept. 1958; G. W. Johnson to distrib., Deputy Test Manager’s Technical Bulletin no. 2, 17 Sept. 1958; G. P. Stobie to distrib., “Deputy Test Manager’s Operation Plan,” 17 Sept. 1958; Stobie to distrib., “Deputy Test Manager’s Operation Plan (Revision #1),” 26 Sept. 1958, w/att. “Rad-Safe Plan,” 17 Sept. 1958; REECo, “Operation Hardtack, Phase II, On-Site Rad-Safe Support Report,” Report OTO 58-5, n.d. 104. Reeves to Dunham, “Operation Guide for Radiation Exposure—Test Sites,” 26 Dec. 1957; Shipman to all LASL groups covered by film badge monitoring et al., “Changes in Radiation Exposure Policy and Reporting of Exposures,” 20 May 1958; Dunham to Starbird, “Radiological Safety Criteria for Operation Millrace,” 13 June
1958; NTO SOP, ch. 0502, paragraph 044, on safety standards, as reproduced in REECo, “On-Site Rad-Safe Support” (n, 103), Appendix A; “Rad-Safe Plan” (n. 103), Section II.B; Reeves to William S. Hutchinson, Jr., “Authority for Additional Exposure of Certain Individuals to Radiation,” 9 Oct. 1958; Taylor, History of Air Force Atomic Cloud Sampling (n. 15), 186-195. . 105. JRB Associates, Operation Hardtack II (n. 102), 81-86; “Operation Hardtack II” fact sheet (n. 102), 5, 11. 106. Arthur V. Watkins to Strauss, 11 Sept. 1957; Dunning to files, “Cesium!9’ Measurements around NTS,” 16 Nov. 1957; Norman Bauer, “An Evaluation of Some Available Data on Radioactive Fallout in Southern Utah,” paper presented at Utah Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters, Logan, 9 Nov. 1957; Bauer to A. C. Graves, 19 Nov. 1957; Bauer, “Appendix to Paper of Nov. 9, 1957,” 8 Dec. 1957; Graves to
K. H. Larson, 7 Jan. 1958; Larson to Graves, 3 Feb. 1958, w/att. “Levels of Fall-
402 Notes to Page 198 out, Radiostrontium, and Availability of Fall-out in Southern Utah” and “Radiostrontium Accumulation in Jack Rabbits Sampled from Areas in Utah Contaminated by Radioactive Fall-out Resulting from Activities at the Nevada Test Site”; M. W. Carter to Bauer, 11 Feb. 1958; Bauer to Graves, 18 Feb. 1958; Charles C. Price, “The Atomic Energy Commission and Nuclear Testing Information,” 23 Mar. 1958; Graham DuShane to Dunham, 8 Apr. 1958; Dunham to DuShane, 15 Apr. 1958; Bauer, “An
Evaluation of Some Available Data on Radioactive Fallout in Southern Utah, in Relation to Radiostrontium and Radioactive Burdens,” 18 June 1958; Larson to Dunning, 12 July 1958, w/att. “Levels of Total Fallout and Radiostrontium in Southern Utah”; Dunning to Dunham, “Fallout Data for Southern Utah,” 16 July 1958; Dunham to Bauer, 12 Sept. 1958.
107. Robert H. Neill to J. Z. Holland, “Environmental Sampling Networks for Radioactivity in Milk,” 20 Jan. 1960, w/att. DRH, “Environmental Sampling Networks for Radioactivity in Milk: A Selected List,” n.d.
108. K. F Musick to Dunning, “Monitoring of Underground Water Supplies around the NTS,” 4 Oct. 1957; Starbird to Dunham, “Ground Water Contamination around NTS,” 14 Apr. 1958; Starbird to Dunham, “Groundwater Contamination around the Nevada Test Site,” 15 July 1958; Dunning to John W. Wolfe and G. V. Beard, “Review of Geological Survey Plan for NTS,” 17 July 1958. 109. Dunning to distrib., “Radiological Monitoring in Southern Utah,” 23 July 1958; Dunning to Corsbie, “Aerial Survey in Southern Utah,” 24 July 1958; Dunning to distrib., “Meeting August 1, 1958, Radiological Monitoring—NTS,” 4 Aug. 1958; Dunning to distrib., “Radiological Monitoring—NTS,” 4 Aug. 1958, w/att. draft “Radiological Monitoring Programs around the Nevada Test Site,” 4 Aug. 1958; Dunham to Joseph F. Rose, 7 Aug. 1958; Hollister to J. W. Wolfe, “Radiological Monitoring Program—NTS and Vicinity,” 13 Aug. 1958; Dunning to Dunham, “Immediate Documentation for NTS Environs,” 18 Aug. 1958; Starbird to Hertford, “Radiological Monitoring Program around Nevada Test Site,” 20 Aug. 1958; Lyle T. Alexander to Dunham, 4 Sept. 1958; Reeves to Starbird, “Radiological Monitoring Program around NTS,” 16 Sept. 1958; Starbird to Dunham, “Radiological Monitoring Program around Nevada Test Site,” 26 Sept. 1958; Dunning to Starbird, “Radiological Monitoring Program around Nevada Test Site,” 22 Oct. 1958. 110. Goeke to files, “Notes on Meeting with James G. Terrill, USPHS,” 17 Feb. 1958; E. C. Anderson to distrib., “Public Health Service Off-Site Monitoring Activities,” 17 Mar. 1958; Anonymous notes, “A ‘Program Review’ of PHS Off-Site Moni-
toring Activities,’ 21 Mar. 1958; Dunning to distrib., “Monitoring Programs for N.T.S.,” 14 July 1958; Charles L. Weaver to Allaire, “Off-Site Radiological Safety Program,” 16 July 1958; Allaire to Placak, “Off-Site Radiological Safety Plan for Operation Millrace,” 14 Aug. 1958; Allaire to Placak, “Off-Site Rad-Safety Plan,” 5 Sept. 1958; Placak et al., “Operation Hardtack—Phase II: Off-Site Radiological Safety Report, Nevada Test Site, 1958,” Report OTO-58-6, n.d. 111. Placak et al., “Hardtack II Off-Site Rad-Safe Report” (n. 110), 1. 112. Placak to Allaire, “Off-Site Rad-Safe’s Section of the Test Manager’s Report,” 28 Nov. 1958, w/att. “Off-Site Radiological Safety Report, Operation Hardtack—Phase II,” 12; Placak to Weaver, “Off-Site Data for Hardtack II,” 1 Dec. 1958; Kosta Telegadas and Kenneth M. Nagler, “Fallout Patterns from Operation Hardtack, Phase II,”” USWB report, May 1960.
Notes to Page 198 493 113. McCool to Starbird, “Reports to JCAE on Hardtack Fallout,” 3 Nov. 1958; Dunning to files, “Fallout in California,” 3 Nov. 1958; Louis B. Silverman to Dunning and Southwick, 04/2100Z Nov. 1958; Silverman to Dunning, 07/2330Z Nov. 1958; Dunham to C. T. Durham, 7 Nov. 1958; Goeke to Shipman, “Reports on Fallout,” 14 Nov. 1958; Alexander S. Langsdorf to McCone, 21 Nov. 1958; Dean D. Meyer to Goeke, “Reports on Fallout,” 24 Nov. 1958, w/att. “Fallout Measurement—Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, January 1-November 15, 1958,” and “Measurements of Fall-out Activity in Rain at Los Alamos, January through November 17, 1958,” 24 Nov. 1958; Richard X. Donovan to Dunham, “Report on Los Angeles Fallout Problem,” 25 Nov. 1958; Silverman to Dunham, 26 Nov. 1958, w/att. “Summary of Background and Fallout Monitoring at U.C.L.A. Atomic Energy Project, Los Angeles, California’; Reeves to Dunham, “Reports of Fallout,” 1 Dec. 1958; Dunham to Joe Holt, 8 Dec. 1958; J. A. Swartout to H. M. Roth, “Monitoring during Weapons’ Tests—ORNL,” 15 Dec. 1958; McCone to Langsdorf, 17 Dec. 1958; Dunham to C, T. Durham, 22 Dec. 1958, w/att. “California Fallout Data, Fall 1958,” n.d.; Dunning to Philip F. Bankhardt, “Radioactive Fallout Incident in Los Angeles,” 23 Dec. 1958; Dunning to files, “Meeting in Los Angeles on Fallout,” 23 Dec. 1958. 114. Minnesota Atomic Developments Problems Committee, “Preliminary Report of Task Group on Uncontrollable or Background Radiation in Minnesota,” 19 Nov. 1957; R. W. Parr to Lee Loevinger, 10 Jan. 1958, w/att. “Evaluation of Minnesota Department of Health Data in Report of Task Group on Uncontrollable or Background Radiation in Minnesota’; Maurice B. Visscher to Dunning, 20 Feb. 1958, w/att. “Interim Report of Task Group 4 on Biological Effects of Radiation,’ 24 Jan. 1958; Dunham to Fields, “Discussion of Radioactive Contamination in Minnesota,” 3 Mar. 1958; Dunning to files, “Meeting with Senator Edward J. Thye of Minnesota,” 10 Mar. 1958; Dunning to William O. Caster, 12 Mar. 1958; Dunham to files, “Call from Governor Freeman of the State of Minnesota,” 12 Mar. 1958; Eisenbud to Philippe G. Jacques, 20 Mar. 1958; DBM report, “Allegation by Maurice B. Visscher in Letter to Editor, New York Times, That U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Is Withholding Data on Strontium 90 in U.S. Milk,” 1 Apr. 1958; Fields to Orville L. Freeman, 11 Apr. 1958; E. C. Anderson to Caster, 16 Apr. 1958. 115. J. Z. Holland to files, “Telephone Call from Dr. Maurice Visscher,” 5 Feb. 1959; Visscher, “Statement,” 6 Feb. 1959; Visscher to Harland A. Wood, 9 Feb. 1959; Dunning to Dunham, “Data for Minnesota,” 12 Feb. 1959; AEC release B-31, Libby’s “Statement on Strontium 90 in Minnesota Wheat Made before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy during the Authorization Hearings,” 27 Feb. 1959; Visscher to Hubert H. Humphrey, 28 Feb. 1959; S. Thompson to Dunham, “Proposed USIA Guidance on Strontium in Wheat,” 3 Mar. 1959; Dunham to Thompson, “Proposed USIA Guidance on Strontium in Wheat,” 4 Mar. 1959; Robert Gray, “Additional Item for Friday’s Cabinet Agenda,” 4 Mar. 1959; Gray to Eisenhower, “Cabinet Agenda for Friday, March 6,” 5 Mar. 1959; Dunning to Donald M. Gardiner, “Fallout Information,” 5 Mar. 1959; Minutes of Cabinet meeting, 6 Mar. 1959; AEC meeting no. 1402, 6 Mar. 1959, item 6; F Western to Noel Krutch, 12 Mar. 1959; Chief RHSA to files, “Radioactivity Levels in Food,” 13 Mar. 1959; McCone to AEC Commissioners and GM, 18 Mar. 1959; Dunham to J. Floyd Breeding, 20 Mar. 1959; Dunning to files, “Minnesota Wheat,” 24 Mar. 1959; Dunham to Libby, “Sr® Measurements on Grains and Flours and Vegetables,” 25 Mar. 1959; Ramey to Leroy Burney, 31 Mar. 1959.
404 Notes to Pages 198-199 116. Divine, Blowing on the Wind (n. 1), 267 and ch. 10, “The Fallout Scare.” Cf. Hazel Gaudet Erskine, “The Polls: Atomic Weapons and Nuclear Energy,” Public
Opinion Quarterly 27 (1963): 155-190; Sidney Kraus et al., “Mass Media and the Fallout Controversy,” ibid., 191-205; Eugene J. Rosi, “Mass and Attentive Opinion on Nuclear Weapons Tests and Fallout, 1954-1963,” ibid. 29 (1965): 280-297. See also Weart, Nuclear Fear (n. 74), especially ch. 11, “Death Dust.” 117. JCAE Special Subcomm. on Radiation, Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Tests, Hearings, 86th Cong., Ist Sess., 4 vols., 1959; JCAE, Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Tests: Summary-Analysis of Hearings, May 5-8, 1959, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., Joint Committee Print, Aug. 1959. See also Dunham to Luedecke, “Summary of 1957 Fallout Hearings,” 1 Apr. 1959; AEC 604/39, “JCAE Hearings on Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Tests,” 17 Apr. 1959. Cf. Lapp, “Fallout Hearings: Second Round,” BAS 15 (Sept. 1959): 302-307; Divine, Blowing on the Wind (n. 1), 271-277. 118. As quoted in Divine, Blowing on the Wind (n. 1), 269. See also George B. Kistiakowsky, A Scientist at the White House: The Private Diary of President Eisenhower’s Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1976), 27. 119. McCone to Luedecke, 4 Apr. 1959. See also Divine, Blowing on the Wind (n. 1), 269-270. 120. Elmer B. Staats to McCone, “Radiological Health Organization,” 25 June 1959, w/att. BOB draft memo for Eisenhower, “Organization of Federal Radiological Health Functions,” 19 June 1959, 4. See also Maurice H. Stans to C. P. Anderson, 6 May 1959; McCool to files, “Notes on Briefing on the Transfer of Certain Radiological Functions from the Atomic Energy Commission,” 1 June 1959; Luedecke to McCone, “BOB Study of Federal Organization of Radiological Health Activities,” 3 June 1959; Troy B. Conner, Jr., to Robert Lowenstein, “Responsibility of Public
Health Service, Food and Drug Administration and Department of Labor to Set Radiation Standards,” 15 June 1959; Cantril to McCone, 1 July 1959, w/att. “Comments by the Advisory Committee for Biology and Medicine on the Report by the National Advisory Committee on Radiation to the Surgeon General of the U.S. Public Health Service on the Control of Radiation Hazards in the United States,” 1 July 1959 (circulated as AEC 985/8, “ACBM Comments on Report ‘The Control of Radiation Hazards in the United States,’” 13 July 1959); Luedecke to McCone, “Radiological Health Organization,” 8 July 1959. 121. Eisenhower, Executive Order 10831, “Establishing the Federal Radiation Council,” 14 Aug. 1959; Wayne Hawks, press release, the White House, Gettysburg, Pa., 14 Aug. 1959; James C. Hagerty, press release, the White House, Gettysburg, Pa., 22 Aug. 1959; Salisbury to distrib., ‘““White House Statement on Federal Radiation Council,” 25 Aug. 1959; Arthur S. Flemming, “Statement” released at news conference, Washington, 26 Aug. 1959. See also Cantril to McCone, 14 May 1959 (circulated as AEC 156/78, “Report on Meeting of ACBM,” 25 May 1959); Starbird to Luedecke, “ACBM Letter of May 14, 1959,” 18 Aug. 1959 (circulated as AEC 1030, “Recommendation Concerning Fallout Problem—Federal Radiation Council,” 27 Aug. 1959). 122. Merril Eisenbud, Environmental Radioactivity, 2d ed. (New York: Academic Press, 1973), 49. To illustrate his point, Eisenbud reproduces the first two sets of rec-
Notes to Page 199 405 ommendations FRC submitted: Flemming memo for the president, ‘“‘Radiation Protection Guidance for Federal Agencies,” 13 May 1960 (Eisenbud, 73-79); and Abraham
Ribicoff memo for the president, same title, 20 Sept. 1961 (Eisenbud, 80-86). The first dealt with external exposure and was accompanied by FRC Staff Report no. 1, “Background Material for the Development of Radiation Protection Standards,” 13 May 1960; FRC Staff Report no. 2, same title, 20 Sept. 1961, accompanied the second memo, which recommended internal exposure guides. See also Donald R. Chadwick, “The Federal Radiation Council,” Health Physics 4 (1961): 223-227. 123. Eisenbud, Environmental Radioactivity (n. 122), 48-50; George T. Mazuzan and J. Samuel Walker, Controlling the Atom: The Beginnings of Nuclear Regulation, 1946-1962 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: Univ. of California Press, 1984), especially ch. 9, “The Politics of Radiation Protection.” 124. Dunning, “Minutes of the Meeting of the Interagency Working Group on Radiation Studies,” 19 Mar. 1959; Dunning, “Minutes of the Second Meeting—Interagency Working Group on Fallout Radiation Studies,” 6 Apr. 1959; Dunning to Dunham, “Collation of Information Relative to Fallout Studies,” 6 Apr. 1959; Dunning to distrib., “Minutes of the Interagency Working Group on Fallout Radiation Studies,” 7 Apr. 1959; Luedecke to heads of divisions and offices, “Inventory of Reports on Radioactive Content of the Atmosphere and Fallout,” 7 Apr. 1959; McCone to Luedecke, 13 Apr. 1959; Starbird to distrib., “Declassification of Information Concerning Fission Product Release into the Atmosphere,” 20 Apr. 1959; Luedecke to McCone, 27 Apr. 1959; McCone to Luedecke, 5 May 1959; Dunham and Salisbury to Luedecke, “Chairman’s Request for Public Information Program on Radiation Effects,” 1 Dec. 1959 (circulated as AEC 604/44, “Public Information Program on Radiation Effects,” 29 Dec. 1959); Luedecke to distrib., “Dissemination to the Public of Data on Environmental Levels of Radioactivity,” 8 Jan. 1960; Luedecke to McCone et al., “Reports Containing Information on Radioactive Content of the Atmosphere and Fallout,” 3 Mar. 1960. 125. Among Libby’s public statements were “Radioactive Fallout from Nuclear Tests,” presented at the Univ. of New Hampshire, 11 Apr. 1957; “Radioactive Fallout,” presented to the American Physical Society, Washington, 26 Apr. 1957; “Distribution and Effects of Fall-Out,” BAS 14 (Jan. 1958): 27-30; “Radioactive Fallout,” presented at the Symposium on Radioactive Fallout, Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences, Lausanne, 27 Mar. 1958; “Radioactive Fallout and Nuclear Test Suspension,” presented at Amherst College, 30 Apr. 1958; “Radioactive Fallout,” presented at the Univ. of Washington, 13 Mar. 1959; “Ways of Reducing World-Wide or Offsite Fall-
out from Testing at a Given Level,” statement to JCAE, 5-8 May 1959; “The Biological and Environmental Effects of Nuclear War,” statement to the JCAE Special Subcommittee on Radiation, 18 June 1959. 126. K. W. Cooper to Libby, 4 Jan. 1957; Libby to Cooper, 8 Jan. 1957; Libby to Bruce V. Snow, 11 Jan. 1957; Libby to Kulp, 24 Jan. 1957; Libby to Corsbie, 25 Jan. 1957; Corsbie to Dunham, “Dr. Libby’s Memorandum of January 25, 1957—Radiological Countermeasures Program,” 11 Feb. 1957; Libby to H. Jones, 1 Apr. 1957; Ernest C. Pollard et al. to Prescott Bush, 21 Jan. 1957; Libby to Bush, 5 Apr. 1957, w/att. DBM, “Report on Questions Raised by Yale Department of Biophysics in Letter to Senator Prescott Bush,” 27 Mar. 1957 (circulated as AEC 604/24, “Radiation
406 Notes to Page 199 Hazards—Report on Questions Raised by Yale Department of Biophysics,” 10 Apr. 1957); Holles to Libby, 26 Apr. 1957; Libby to Albert Schweitzer, 26 Apr. 1957; Henry Hetzel to Libby, 27 Apr. 1957; Libby to Hetzel, 2 May 1957; Herbert M. Hirsch to Libby, 3 May 1957; Libby to Hirsch, 6 May 1957; Hirsch to Libby, 12 May 1957; Gabriel G. Nahas to Libby, 15 May 1957; Libby to E. B. Lewis, 17 May 1957; Harrison Brown to Libby, 21 May 1957; Libby to Brown, 24 May 1957; Neuman to Libby, 11 June 1957; Neuman to Libby, 2 July 1957; Willard E. Baier to Libby, 5 July 1957; Libby to Baier, 13 Aug. 1957; Libby to Pauling, 12 Mar. 1958; Libby to Killian, 9 July 1958, w/att. draft form letter on potential hazard of radioactivity, same date; Libby to C. T. Durham, 26 Aug. 1958. 127. Walter Selove and Mortimer M. Elkins, eds., “Radiation and Man,” special
issue of BAS 14 (Jan. 1958): 7-61; Machta and Robert J. List, “Criticism of Dr. Libby’s Paper ‘Radioactive Fallout’ Delivered in Lausanne, Switzerland, on March 27, 1958,” n.d.; Libby to Machta, 15 Apr. 1958; Irving H. Blifford to Harry Wexler, 6 May 1958, w/att. “Comments for the National Academy Committee on the Meteorological Aspects of Atomic Radiation,” n.d.; Wexler to members and advisers of NAS Committee on Meteorological Aspects of the Effects of Atomic Radiation, 13 May 1958; Libby to Dunham, “DBM’s Briefing for ACBM on ‘The Biological Hazard to Man of Carbon-14 from Nuclear Weapons,’” 19 June 1958; Libby to GM, “Fallout
Ecology at Eniwetok,” 20 June 1958; List to Libby, 14 July 1958; Hollister to Dunham, “Comments on Draft of Remarks Prepared by Dr. Libby on Radioactive Fallout for Delivery in Seattle on March 13, 1959,” 4 Mar. 1959. 128. Shilling to Hollister, “Discussion of ‘Project Sunshine,’” 5 Feb. 1958; Hollister to distrib., “Project Sunshine Scientific Objectives,” 27 Feb. 1958; Hollister report to DBM, “Project Sunshine: Its Aims and Operation,” 7 Apr. 1958; Dunham to F. W. Reichelderfer, 4 June 1958; Hollister to Wright H. Langham, 26 June 1958; L. T. Alexander to Dunham, 9 July 1958; J. Z. Holland to Shilling, “Suggested Revision of Programmatic Categories,” 18 Aug. 1958; Hollister to Shilling, “Fallout Problems at AEC or ‘It’s Time. . . ,’” 26 Aug. 1958; Hollister to Dunham, “Fallout Radiochemistry,” 11 Sept. 1958; Holland to files, “Gummed Film Program,” 22 Oct. 1958; Lough to Dunham, “Fall-Out Analytical Program,” 10 Nov. 1958; Dunham to Libby, “Fallout
Analytical Program,” 12 Nov. 1958; Libby to Dunham, same title, 21 Nov. 1958; Francis J. Weber to Chief BSS, “Radioactivity in Food Samples Collected by Food and Dmg Administration in Southern California,” 20 Nov. 1958; Dunning to Henry J. L. Rechen, 26 Nov. 1958; Alfred W. Klement, Jr., “Notes on Conference “WorldWide Fallout’ 12/5/58,” 5 Dec. 1958; Hollister to Dunham, “Hardtack and WorldWide Fallout Meetings of December 4th and 5th,” 8 Dec. 1958; Dunham to Langham, 11 Feb. 1959 (identical letters to Martell, Machta, Alexander, and Austin M. Brues); Hollister, “AEC Program on World-Wide Fallout,” abstract prepared for Program Directors’ Meeting, 16—17 Feb. 1959. 129. Dunham to distrib., ““The Work on World-Wide Radioactive Fallout in the Division of Biology and Medicine,” 23 June 1958; J. W. Wolfe to Hollister, “Questions on Atomic Fallout Resulting from Nuclear Detonations and Their Biological
Implications,” 21 Apr. 1959; Dunham to McCone, “Transmittal of Statement on Radioactive Fallout,” 26 June 1959, w/att. DBM, “Statement on Radioactive Fallout,” n.d.; Dunham to Luedecke, “Proposal to Strengthen AEC’s Radioactive Fallout Studies Program,” 7 July 1959, w/att. proposal; DBM Fallout Studies Branch, “Summary of
Notes to Pages 199-200 407 Proceedings: Conference on Radioactive Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Test, November 15-17, 1961, Germantown, Maryland,” n.d. 130. Bradbury to McCone, 2 Oct. 1958; Dunham to P. F. Foster, “Report of Status of Review of Feasibility of Radioepidemiology Project,” 5 Nov. 1958 (circulated as AEC 604/36, “Status of Review of Feasibility of Radioepidemiology Project,” 2 Dec. 1958); Sewell to Reeves, 10 Nov. 1958; Harold A. Knapp, Jr., to Paul C. Fine, “Fallout from Clean Weapons,” 10 Nov. 1958; Nagler to Reeves, 14 Nov. 1958; Reeves to Machta, 1 Dec. 1958; Bradbury to Starbird, 6 Jan. 1959; McCool, “Minutes of the One Hundred and Twenty-First AEC-MLC Conference [18 Dec. 1958],” 20 Jan. 1959, w/att. “Weapons Test Program for the Future, and General Impact on Major Weapons Programs Caused by Test Moratorium,” by H. C. Brown, and “Impact of a Weapons Test Moratorium as Related to Weapons Effects,” by David Lambert; Bradbury to Clark Kerr, 16 May 1962, w/att. “LASL Weapons Effort during the Moratorium (Fall 1958—Fall 1961).” 131. AEC meetings: no. 1366, 29 Apr. 1958, item 3; no. 1376, 21 May 1958, item 7; no. 1377, 28 May 1958, item 1; no. 1396, 8 Aug. 1958, item 3; no. 1397, 14 Aug. 1958, item 11; no. 1432, 24 Nov. 1958, item 1; no. 1459, 26 Jan. 1959, item 1; EPB and NPB, draft notes of meeting on 1 Dec. 1958, Las Vegas, 17 Dec. 1958; Sewell to Reeves, 15/1854 June 1959. 132. Strauss to Starbird, 7 Feb. 1958; AEC meeting no. 1380, 6 June 1958, item 3; Starbird to Edward Teller, 17/2132 July 1958; G. W. Johnson to Starbird, 6 Nov. 1958, w/att. preliminary reports on Tamalpais, Neptune, Logan, and Blanca, all dated 4 Nov.
1958; Starbird to McCone, “Latest Information on the Hardtack II Underground Shots,” 20 Nov. 1958; Street to Starbird, 8 Dec. 1958; Bradbury and A. C. Graves to Starbird, 12 Dec. 1958; Bradbury to Starbird, 31 Dec. 1958 (circulated as AEC 987/19, “Letter from Dr. Bradbury Regarding Underground Testing,” 2 Feb. 1959); Bradbury to Teller, 16 Apr. 1959; “High Altitude Test Problem,” draft report, 7 May 1959; Bradbury, “Weapon Research and Development at LASL under Various Conditions of Test Moratorium,” n.d. (ca. Sept. 1959); Teller to McCone, 6 Jan. 1960 (circulated as AEC 605/7, “Nuclear Experiments—Comments by Dr. Teller,” 13 Jan. 1960); Gary H. Higgins, “Underground Radioactivity,” 8 Sept. 1960; AEC meeting no. 1787, 17 Oct. 1961, item 4.
133. See Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower (n. 75); Walter A. McDougall, . . . the Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New York: Basic Books, 1985). 134. T. S. Donaldson, “Atomic Engines for Aircraft, Missiles and Spacecraft,”
Flying 63 (August 1958): 34-39; Robert W. Bussard and R. D. DeLauer, Nuclear Rocket Propulsion (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1958); Ralph Zirkind, “Atomic Energy
in Jet Propulsion,” in O. E. Lancaster, ed., Jet Propulsion Engines (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1959), 700-756; “Air Force Nuclear Propulsion,” special issue of Air University Quarterly Review 11 (Fall/Winter 1959): 1-208 (reprinted as Kenneth F. Gantz, ed., Nuclear Flight: The United States Air Force Programs for Atomic Jets, Missiles, and Rockets [New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1960]); P. I. Nitikin, comp., Nuclear Propulsion, Bibliographical Series no. 3 (Vienna: IAEA, 1961); Bussard, “Nuclear Rocketry—tThe First Bright Hopes,” Astronautics 7 (Dec. 1962): 32-35. 135. Raemer E. Schreiber, “Los Alamos’ Project Rover,” Nucleonics 16 (July
408 Notes to Pages 200-201 1958): 70-72; T. P. Cotter, “Potentialities and Problems of Nuclear Rocket Propulsion,” Aero/Space Engineering 18 (Feb. 1959): 50-53; J. S. Butz, Jr., “Kiwi-A to Test Nuclear Rocket Feasibility,” Aviation Week 70 (16 Feb. 1959): 48—49ff; Myron M. Levoy and John J. Newgard, “Rocket-Reactor Design,” Nucleonics (July 1958): 66— 68; Newgard and Levoy, “Nuclear Rockets,” Scientific American 200 (May 1959): 46-51; Franklin P. Durham, “Solid-Core Nuclear-Rocket Design,” Astronautics 4 (Oct. 1959): 26—27ff; Schreiber, ““Nuclear-Rocket Propulsion,” Air University Quar-
terly Review 11 (Fall/Winter 1959): 128-137; Joseph A. Angelo and David Buden, Space Nuclear Power (Malabar, Fla.: Orbit, 1985), ch. 10, “Solid-Core Nuclear Rocket Program.” 136. “AEC Begins Nuclear Ramjet Study,” Aviation Week 67 (19 Aug. 1957): 27; Theodore C. Merkle, “Nuclear Reactors for Ramjet Propulsion,” Air University
Quarterly Review 11 (Fall/Winter 1959): 112-118; Alan R. Gruber, “Design of a Nuclear Ramjet,” ibid., 119-127; Frank G. McGuire, “Will Pluto Provide Power for SLAM?” Missiles and Rockets 7 (19 Dec. 1960): 16ff; “Increased Potential Spurs Pluto Research,” Aviation Week 74 (16 Jan. 1961): 74—75ff; Harry L. Reynolds, “The Pluto Program,” Astronautics 6 (Aug. 1961): 37—39ff. 137. ALOO, “Background Information on Los Alamos and Livermore Nuclear Propulsion Projects, and the Static Test Areas Being Developed at the Commission’s Nevada Test Site,” 6 Mar. 1958; Russell Hawkes, “Nuclear Rocket Facility Nears Completion,” Aviation Week 69 (13 Oct. 1958): 33-34; Bussard and DeLauer, Nuclear Rocket Propulsion (n. 134), ch. 8, “Testing.” 138. Shipman to Bradbury, “Health Services for N-Division Off-Site Activities,” 25 Jan. 1956.
139. Ogle and Schreiber to Bradbury, “Agreement Concerning NTS Reactor Testing,” 1 Feb. 1956; Bradbury to Hertford, “Nevada Test Site,” 3 Feb. 1956. 140. A. C. Graves to distrib., “Appointment of Director for Project 400,” 10 Sept.
1957; Robert H. Campbell to Hertford, “Organization for NTS Project 400,” 10 Oct. 1957; Graves and Schreiber to Bradbury, “Organization for NTS Project 400,” 10 Oct. 1957. 141. Schreiber to Paul W. Ager, “Requested Comments on Minutes of Third Meeting of Committee on Use of Nevada Test Site,” 2 July 1957. 142. Schreiber to Shipman, “H Division Participation in NTS Rover Testing,” 5 July 1957. 143. Jerome E. Dummer to R. H. Campbell, “U?*5 Urine Analysis for Project 400 Personnel,” 24 Jan. 1958; Schedule, “Project 400 Health Physics Indoctrina-
tion Series,” 24-25 Feb. 1958; Shipman to distrib., “H Division Participation in N Division Tests,” 12 Mar. 1958; Dummer to Meyer, 17 Mar. 1958; Harris to B. C. Lyon, “Program 460 Personnel,” 27 Mar. 1958; Dummer to Meyer, “Project 400
Progress Report March 28 to April 11,” 14 Apr. 1958; Lyon to files, “Rad-Safe Training Course for Project 400,” 22 Apr. 1958; Harris to Shipman, “Costs on Program 460,” 28 Apr. 1958; Harris to Roderick W. Spence, “Summary of Projects within Program 460 and Progress to Date,” 10 June 1958; Summary of meeting to discuss Program 460 status, budget, and operating procedures, 9 Dec. 1958; “H-5 Air Sampling Program at Project 400,” n.d.
144, Brady and Wilcox, “Nevada Test Site, Project 400 Radiological Safety Section, Standard Operating Procedure,” 10 Mar. 1958; Dummer to W. S. Johnson,
Notes to Pages 201-202 409 “Comments on REECo Rad-Safe SOP for Project 400,” 24 Mar. 1958; REECo Project 400 Radiological Safety Section, Operation Plan, 1 Apr. 1958 (draft), 27 May 1958; B. C. Lyon to R. H. Campbell, “REECo’s Nevada Test Site Project 400 Radiological Safety Section Operation Plan,” 14 Apr. 1958. 145. Schreiber to distrib., “Rover Target Schedules,” 10 Apr. 1958; ibid., 7 May 1958; ALOO release AL-58-93, 26 June 1958; R. H. Campbell to distrib., “Rover Quarterly Report,” 7 July 1958; G. K. Hess, Jr., to distrib., “Kiwi-A Test Operations
Procedures,” 17 Oct. 1958; Frank K. Pittman to Hertford, “Reporting Rover NTS Activities,” 21 Oct. 1958; Reeves to Stobie, “Reporting Rover NTS Activities,” 5 Nov. 1958; Project 400 Test Director’s Operation Plan for Kiwi-A, 10 Dec. 1958. 146. Hertford to Bradbury, “Criteria for Reactor Operations—Nevada Test Site,” 25 June 1958; Hertford to distrib., “Orientation Meeting on Reactor Projects at NTS,” 2 July 1958; Bradbury to Hertford, “Orientation Meeting on Reactor Projects at NTS,”
10 July 1958; Dunham to Hertford, “Radiological Safety Criteria at Nevada Test Site,” 29 Dec. 1958: 147. Shipman to A. C. Graves, “Rover Feasibility Calculations,” 27 Feb. 1959, w/att. “Fallout Hazard from Kiwi-A,” n.d.; Graves to Reeves, ‘“Rover-Type Tests,’ 30 Mar. 1959; R. H. Campbell to Reeves, “Kiwi-A Test Plans,” 4 May 1959; Reeves to files, “Kiwi-A Test Plans,” 20 May 1959. 148. Schreiber, “Rover Target Schedules (January 1959 Version),” 20 Jan. 1959; Hertford to Reeves, “Directive for Kiwi-A Test Operation,” 25 May 1959; Reeves, Test Manager’s Bulletins: no. 10, “Appointments to the Nevada Test Site Organization for NTS Project 400 Test Operations—Kiwi-A,” 29 May 1959, and no. 11, “Operational Period—Project 400 Test Operations—Kiwi-A,” 1 June 1959; Reeves to distrib., “Operation Order 2-59—Kiwi-A Field Test (NTS Project 400),” 1 June 1959; Project 400 Test Director’s Operation Plan for Kiwi-A, “Rad-Safe Plan,” 10 June 1959.
149. Reeves to distrib., 1 June (n. 148), paragraph 10. 150. Paul R. Guthals to Wignall, “Basic and Detailed Requirements for Air Sam-
pling Kiwi-A Project,’ 9 Apr. 1959; R. H. Campbell to Allaire, “Meteorological Predictions for Reactor Operations,” 4 May 1959; Ogle, “Resume of Safety Meeting,” 5 June 1959; Nagler, “Fallout Briefing,” 5 June 1959; Philip W. Allen, “Information
Briefing for Kiwi-A,” 5 June 1959; Isaac Van der Hoven, “Diffusion-Deposition Briefing,” 5 June 1959; Ogle to Reeves, “1930 Weather Briefing—June 29, 1959— Camp Mercury,” 6 July 1959; Ogle to Reeves, “1930 PDT Weather Briefing—June 30, 1959—Camp Mercury,” 6 July 1959.
151. Guthals, cloud sampling notebooks, “Kiwi A (Nuclear Rocket Motor),’ 30 June—1 July 1959; ALOO release AL-60-NN, 1 July 1959; C. D. Montgomery to distrib., “Operational Plan—Disassembly,” 14 July 1959; Placak to Reeves, “Special Re-
port on Operation of Kiwi-A Reactor,” 28 July 1959, w/att. “Off-Site Rad-Safety Report on Kiwi-A Operations”; Orin W. Stopinski to distrib., “Preliminary Report on
Fallout from Kiwi-A,” 6 Aug. 1959; Harry S. Jordan to Schreiber, “Conclusions Regarding Health Hazards Due to Kiwi A Effluent,” 26 Aug. 1959; Wilcox to R. H. Campbell, “Transmittal of Kiwi-A Plan 16 Report,” 2 Sept. 1959, w/att. “On-Site Rad-Safe Report, Kiwi-A—Plan 16”; Dummer, “Health Physics Advisor’s Report, Kiwi-A,” Sept. 1959; Charles I. Browne to Campbell, “Fraction of Gamma Activity Escaping Kiwi A,” 6 Oct. 1959; Schreiber, “Kiwi Tests Pave Way to Rover,” Nu-
410 Notes to Pages 202-203 cleonics 19 (Apr. 1961): 77-79; Harold M. Mork and Firmin J. Berta, “Environmental Contamination from a Nuclear Reactor at the Nevada Test Site,” Report UCLA 12-615 (Los Angeles, Dec. 1966). 152. R. H. Campbell to Hertford, “Organization for NTS Project 400 (Revised),” 13 July 1959; Froman to distrib., “Rover Target Schedules as of September 1959,” 18 Sept. 1959; Ogle to distrib., “Appointment of Director for Project 400,” 5 Oct. 1959; E. A. Bacon, Jr., to distrib., “FY 1960 Rover Operations Budget,” 12 Jan. 1960.
153. P. S. Harris to distrib., “Kiwi-A’ Meeting on 21 October,” 23 Oct. 1959; Wilcox to distrib., “Radiological Safety Division Capabilities,” 1 Dec. 1959; Stopinski, “Radiation Hazards from Kiwi-A’,” 7 Mar. 1960; Keith Boyer, “Project 400 Director’s Rad-Safe Plan for Kiwi-A’ and Kiwi-A3,” 7 Mar. 1960; Reactor Projects, “Off-Site Radiological Safety Plan,” 15 June 1960; Jack L. Armstrong to Boyer, 14/1343Z 1960. 154. K. Boyer to Armstrong, 17 June 1960. 155. Dummer to Meyer, “Project 400 Activities Report—4 June to 9 July, 1960,” 21 July 1960; B. C. Lyon to distrib., “Radiological Situation in Test Cell Area,” 21
July 1960; Dummer to K. Boyer, “Project 400 Health Physics Advisor’s Report of February 25, 1960 through November 18, 1960,” 21 Nov. 1960; PHS, “Kiwi-A Reactors Prime and Three: Off-Site Radiological Safety Report, Nevada Test Site,” Report OTO-60-1, 1960. 156. Pittman to Hertford, “Health and Safety Review of Reactor Tests at NTS,” 19 Sept. 1960; Shipman to Ogle, “Kiwi-A-3 and the Weather,” 19 Sept. 1960; REECo, “Rad-Safe Support Kiwi-A3,” 5 Oct. 1960; ALOO release AL-61-40, 10 Oct. 1960; Philip K. Lee and Donald McKown to Meyer, “Project 400 Activities Report 9 August through 19 October 1960,” 25 Oct. 1960; Dummer to Boyer, 21 Nov. (n. 154); Lee to Meyer, “Radiation Associated with Kiwi-A Three Power Runs,” 1 Dec. 1960; REECo, “Kiwi-A3 Plan 216-B, On-Site Rad-Safe Report,” Apr. 1961; PHS, “Off-Site Radiological Safety Report” (n. 155). 157. Schreiber, “Kiwi Tests Pave Way to Rover” (n. 151); Langham, “Radiation Safety in the Development and Use of Nuclear Energy for Rocket Propulsion,” Health Physics 8 (1962): 305-311; William C. House, “The Development of Nuclear Rocket Propulsion in the United States,” Journal of the British Interplanetary Society 19 (1964): 307-308; Spence, “The Rover Nuclear Rocket Program,” Science 160 (31 May 1968): 956. 158. Robert L. Rosholt, An Administrative History of NASA, 1958-1963 (Washington: NASA, 1966), 124. 159. Schreiber to distrib., “Procedure for AEC, NASA and USAF Contractor Briefings,” 22 Aug. 1960; Shipman to Schreiber, “NASA and USAF Contractor Briefings,” 23 Aug. 1960; LVO release, 1 Nov. 1960; Froman to R. D. Baker et al., “Weekly Technical Progress Report on Rover,” 24 Apr. 1961; Bussard to Bradbury, “Rover Program,” 27 Apr. 1961; McGuire, “Crucial Rover Rocket Program Picks up Momentum,” Missiles and Rockets 9 (14 Aug. 1961): 22—23ff; “NERVA Contract
Awarded; RIFT Bidders Are Selected,” ibid., 10 (S Feb. 1962): 10; Howard R. Schmidt, “The Nuclear Rocket Engine and Flight Program,” JRE Transactions on Nuclear Science NS-9 (Jan. 1962): 9-15; W. Scott Fellows, “RIFT,” Astronautics 7 (Dec. 1962): 38—47; House, “Development of Nuclear Rocket Propulsion” (n. 157), 310-312.
Notes to Page 203 411 160. ALOO release AL-61-131, 1 June 1961; Harold B. Finger, “Managing the Nuclear-Rocket Program,” Astronautics 7 (Dec. 1962): 18-21; Rosholt, Administrative History of NASA (n. 158), 254-255. See also John M. Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo and the National Interest (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970); McDougall, Heavens and the Earth (n. 133). 161. Reider to Shipman, “Kiwi-B Design,” 8 May 1959; Shipman to Bradbury, “Kiwi-B Design,” 11 May 1959; Stopinski to distrib., “Fallout Resulting from Serial Testing of 10,000 Megawatt Reactors,” 11 Jan. 1961; Robert L. Elder to Placak, “(1) Comparative Review of Proposed Instrumentation and Monitoring Program for Fallout Study of Kiwi-B Device . . . , (2) Proposal of PHS Rad-Safe Organization. . . ,” 27 Feb. 1961; F. P. Durham to K. Boyer, “Possible Action in the Event Kiwi-B-1A Cannot Be Shut Down,” 30 Aug. 1961; Jim Henshall to Boyer, “Operation of Kiwi B1A,” 31 Aug. 1961; Stopinski to distrib., “Fallout from a 4000 Megawatt Reactor,” 5 Sept. 1961; Glen A. Graves to Boyer, “Response to Inquiry [about disassembly],” 5 Sept. 1961; Robert E. Baker to those listed, “Details of Thyroid Dose Calculations from Iodine Inhalation,” 7 May 1962; Ralph S. Decker to L. D. P. King, 6 Sept. 1962; King to Cowan, “Rover Flight Safety Work,” 20 Nov. 1962; G. L. Alexander et al., “Off-Site [Radioiodine] Contamination [Criteria] at the Nevada Test Site,” Jan. 1963; H. S. Jordan to King, “Documentation of Simulated and Actual Kiwi Releases out to 25 Miles Radius,” 2 Aug. 1963; P. S. Harris, “The Iodine Portion of the Effluent from Kiwi B Series Reactors,” n.d. 162. REECo, “On-Site Rad-Safe Report, Kiwi B1A Reactor Operation (December 7, 1961),” n.d.; Allen E. Smith to Vernon E. Andrews, “Flight Report for Kiwi B-1B—September 1, 1962,” 4 Sept. 1962; Placak to distrib., “PHS Off-Site Rad-Safety Final Report of Kiwi Reactors B-1B and B-4A,” 2 May 1963; Charles F. Costa to files, “Flight Report for the Kiwi (Low Power) Run of May 8, 1964,” 27 May 1964; Costa to files, “Flight Report for the Kiwi Full Power Run of May 13, 1964,” 5 June 1964; SWRHL, “Final Report of Off-Site Surveillance for the Kiwi B4D Experiment,” Report SWRHL-7r, 23 July 1964); ibid., “. . . for the Kiwi B4E Experiment,” Report SWRHL-15r, 25 Jan. 1965; ibid., “. . . for the Kiwi. TNT Experiment,” Report SWRHL-17r, 6 Aug. 1965; Charles K. Fitzsimmons to files, “Flight Report for the Kiwi B4E Full Power Run of August 28, 1964,” 31 Aug. 1964; Fitzsimmons to files, “Flight Report for the Kiwi B4E Full Power Run of September 10, 1964,” 17 Sept. 1964; SNPO-N, “Radioactive Effluent Releases at the Nuclear Rocket Development Station, 1964,” Sept. 1965; Andrews and Richard D. Coleman, “Aerial Sampling and Cloud Measurement for the Kiwi Transient Nuclear Test,” 16 Nov. 1965.
163. K. Boyer, “Project 400 Director’s Operation Plan,” 7 July 1961; Charles Fenstermacher to distrib., “Experimental Plan Schedule—Kiwi B1A Test,” 12 Oct. 1961; A. C. Graves to Reeves, ““Kiwi-B1A Plan 6 Weather Briefing—November 6, 1961—2000 PST,” 7 Dec. 1961; Graves to Reeves, “Kiwi B-1A Weather Briefings,” 30 Jan. 1962; Schreiber to Finger, 1 Feb. 1962. 164. K. Boyer, “Project 400 Director’s Operation Plan (Kiwi B4A and B4B),” 24 Sept. 1962; “Kiwi Test Key to Nuclear Progress,” Missiles and Rockets 11 (26 Nov. 1962): 142—144f; McGuire, “Rover Slips Extra 14-16 Months,” ibid. 12 (11 Mar. 1963): 14-15; Robert Lindsey, “Upcoming Tests May Determine Nuclear Rocket
Reactor Design,” ibid. 13 (14 Oct. 1963): 384; Gene Bylinsky and William E. Howard, “Hot Rocket to Nowhere: Project Rover,” Saturday Evening Post 236
412 Notes to Page 203 (9 Nov. 1963): 78-81; House, “Development of Nuclear Rocket Propulsion” (n. 157), 309; Angelo and Buden, Space Nuclear Power (n. 135), 181.
165. Spence and F. P. Durham, “The Los Alamos Nuclear-Rocket Program,” Astronautics and Aeronautics 3 (June 1965): 42—46; Finger, “United States Progress on Nuclear Propulsion for Rockets,” in Michal Lunc, ed., Problems of Propulsion and Re-Entry, XVIUIth IAC, Madrid 1966, “Proceedings,” vol. 3 (New York: Gordon & Breach, 1967), 193-207; Spence, “Rover Nuclear Rocket Program” (n. 158), 953959; Robert W. Schroeder, “NERVA—Entering a New Phase,” Astronautics and Aeronautics 6 (May 1968): 42-53; L. C. Corrington, “The Nuclear Rocket Program—lIts Status and Plans,” Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets 6 (1969): 465-470; C. M. Rice and W. H. Arnold, “Recent NERVA Technology Development,” ibid., 565-569; Angelo and Buden, Space Nuclear Power (n. 135), 179-182.
166. Shipman to A. C. Graves, “NTS-NRDS Off-Site Air Sampling,” 28 Oct. 1963; Bob P. Helgeson to distrib., “Rover Effluent Appraisal Committee,” 27 Nov. 1963; Schreiber to Helgeson, same title, 3 Dec. 1963; Helgeson to Schreiber, same title, 17 Dec. 1963; AEC 855/75, “Effluent from Rover Test Operations at NRDS,” 28 Apr. 1966; Oliver W. Larson to files, “Particle Impaction/Retention,” 21 Sept. 1967; Fred W. Sanders to Herbert T. Knight, “Protection Afforded by Buildings,” 10 Oct. 1967; “Report of the DBM Committee on SNS Radiological Safety,” 15-16 Feb. 1968; Francis N. Buck to M. W. Carter, “Radiation Safety Meeting Held at the NRDS on June 24, 1968,” 2 July 1968; John P. Jewett to Knight, “Radiation Dose Guides at the NRDS,” 14 Oct. 1968; AEC-NASA, “Environmental Statement, Reactor Testing—FY 1972: Nuclear Rocket Development Station, Nevada,” Report WASH- 1508, Dec. 1971. 167. W. B. Henderson to Knight, “Radiation and Dosimetry Measurements Required for NRX Reactor Program,” 7 Oct. 1963; Schreiber to H. S. Jordan, “Radiation Measurements for NRX Testing,” 8 Oct. 1963; “Phoebus LA Safety Evaluation Report—Part II,” 13 May 1965; Jordan to Knight, “Bead Hazard Evaluation—Phoebus 1B,” 22 Sept. 1966; F. W. Sanders to Knight, “Informal Comparison of Effluent Predictions with Experimental Values, Phoebus 1B,” 23 Aug. 1967; Jewett to R. L. Yordy, “Off-Site Release Guides for Phoebus 2A,” 5 Apr. 1968; Milton Klein to Jewett, “Additional Radiation Criteria,’ 20 May 1968; David N. McNelis, “Phoebus 1B EP-IV Reactor Effluent Study,” Report BER-16 (Las Vegas: PHS, 11 Apr. 1968); AGC and WAL, “XE-1 Safety Evaluation Report, Phase II,’ Report NJD-11, Sept. 1968.
168. Lee to John Potter, 16 Sept. 1963; Shipman to Potter, 18 Sept. 1963; Helgeson to N. H. Woodruff, “NRDS Safety Responsibilities,” 24 Apr. 1963; “Safety of LASL’s Rover Reactor Operations,” Memorandum of Agreement between ALOO and SNPO, signed 29 Oct. 1963; “Safety Analysis Reports, Safety Evaluation Reports
and Operating Limits for Reactor and Engine Test Operations at NRDS,” SNPO Regulation X-1-01, 25 Nov. 1964; F. W. Sanders to Joseph A. Mohrbacher, “Pan Am Radiation Services Support to the LASL during the Phoebus 1B Reactor Test,” 18 Oct. 1966; Mohrbacher to Sanders, same title, 16 Nov. 1966; J. D. Spencer to H. S. Jordan, “Phoebus II Safety Analysis Report,” 1 Nov. 1966; Carl L. Cuntz, Jr., to files, “H-8 Effluent Monitoring Program,” 15 Mar. 1967; Cuntz to distrib., “H-8 Effluent Monitoring Program with 28 Trailers,” 27 Mar. 1967; Klein to Schreiber, 10 May
Notes to Page 203 413 1967, w/att. “Review of LASL Safety Activities at the NRDS (1966)”; Jordan to Schreiber, “Outline of Current H-8 Planning,” 11 July 1967; Jordan to files, “Group Meeting of August 25, 1967,” 25 Aug. 1967; R. M. Nelson to Jordan, “Effluent Program, NRX-A6,” 8 Nov. 1967, w/att. “Pan Am Participation in the Effluent Measurement and Prediction Program for NRX A-6,” 30 Oct. 1967; Sanders to Mohrbacher, “Pan Am Health and Safety Support to LASL during the Pewee 1 Reactor Tests,” 5 Nov. 1968. 169. Lee to Harold Claus, “Expected Radiation Levels at Test Cell C Following Phoebus 321 Full Power Tests,” 24 June 1965; Lee to files, “Radiation Situation of Test Cell ‘C’ Following Removal of Phoebus 321 Reactor,” 1 July 1965; Lee to distrib., “Phoebus 321 Health Physics Report,” 1 July 1965; Schreiber to K. Boyer and Spence, “Report on Phoebus-1A Problems,” 26 July 1965; Mohrbacher to health physics adviser, “Phoebus 1A-321 Radioactive Waste,” 1 Apr. 1966; Jewett to all NRDS personnel, “Personnel Precautions on the NRDS,” SNPO-N Announcement no. 11-67, 24 Feb. 1967; D. L. Carter to distrib., “Procedures for Entering R-MAD Radioactive and/or Contaminated Areas,” 29 Aug. 1968. 170. Fitzsimmons to files, “Flight Report for the NRX ER4 Full Power Run of September 24, 1964,” 28 Sept. 1964; Leo J. Clark to files, “Flight Report for the NRX (A2EP5) Full Power Run of October 15, 1964,” 20 Oct. 1964; LASL Group H-8, “Phoebus 1A-321 EP-IV Preliminary Evaluation of Environmental Effects,” Report H8-MR-65-2, 2 June 1965; Helgeson to Finger, “Confirming Phoebus Effluent Effects,” 30/2215Z June 1965; Helgeson to distrib., “Preliminary Results of Ecological Sampling Program Associated with Phoebus 1A,” 1 July 1965; P. Griffiths to distrib., “Minutes of Meeting to Critique Radioactive Effluent Results of Phoebus 1A-EP-IV,” 19 July 1965; James E. Sattizahn to distrib., “Fission-Product Losses during FullPower Run of Phoebus-1A,” 23 July 1965; “NATS Cloud Track and Ground Deposition Support of NRX/A5 Reactor Tests,” n.d.; J. K. Thompson, “Aerial Radiological Monitoring, Nevada Test Site: NRX/A5 EP-IV, 23 June 1966,” Report NATS 11-P-66 (Las Vegas, 30 June 1966); O. W. Larson to files, “Review of the Phoebus 1B Effluent Monitoring Program,” 8 Mar. 1967. 171. PAA, “On-Site Radiological Report for the Nerva Test Operations NRXA4/EST Test Series, Experimental Plan IV,” Report PAA:33-5 I, 21 Mar. 1966; PAA, “On Site Radiological Report for the Phoebus 1B Reactor Test Series,” Report PAA 33-13, 18 Aug. 1967; PAA, “On-Site Radiological Report for the Nerva Test Operations NRX-A6 Test Series, Experimental Plans I], II, and HIJA,” Report PAA 33-18, 20 Dec. 1967; PAA, “. . . for the LASL Test Operations Phoebus 2A Test Series, Experimental Plan IV,” Report PAA 33-26, 1 July 1968; PAA, “. . . Experimental Plan V,” Report PAA 33-27, 24 July 1968; PAA, “On-Site Radiological Support for the LASL Test Operations Pewee-1 Test Series, Experimental Plan 1,” Report PAA 33-29, 20 Nov. 1968; PAA, “On-Site Radiological Report for the Nerva Test Operations XE Prime Test Series, Experimental Plan VC,” Report Pan Am 41-3, 17 June 1969; PAA, “. . . Experimental Plan VIA,” Report Pan Am 41-5, 15 July 1969. 172. PHS, “NRX A-2,” n.d.; PHS, “NRX-A3,” n.d.; Dennis Tate to Robert H. Thalgott, “Final Report of Off-Site Surveillance for the NRX-A5,” 25 Nov. 1966; SWRHL, “Final Report of Off-Site Surveillance for the NRX-A5 Test Series,”’ Report SWRHL-32r, 15 Oct. 1968; “Summary of Off-Site Environmental Surveillance for
414 Notes to Pages 203-204 Phoebus 2A EP III, EP IV, and EP V,” 7 Aug. 1968; SWRHL, “XE Prime Experimental Plan V Aerial Monitoring and Sampling, Preliminary Report,” 11 June 1969; SWRHL, “Final Report of Off-Site Surveillance for the Phoebus 1B, EP-1, EP-II, EP-III, EP-IV, Reactor Test Series,” Report SWRHL-45r, July 1969; SWRHL, “Final Report of Off-Site Surveillance for the NRX-A6 Reactor Test Series,” Report SWRHL-78r, Aug. 1971; SWRHL, “Pewee Experimental Plans II and III, Aerial Monitoring and Sampling Preliminary Report,” n.d.; SWRHL, “Final Report of Environmental Surveillance for Pewee 1, Experimental Plans II and III, November 21 and December 4, 1968,” Report SWRHL-874, Sept. 1971; SWRHL, “Nuclear Furnace 1 Experimental Plan 1A-1, Aerial Monitoring and Sampling Preliminary Report,” 24 May 1972; SWRHL, “. . . Experimental Plan II,’ 29 June 1972; SWRHL, “. . . Experimental Plan IV,” 21 July 1972; SWRHL, “. . . Experimental Plan V,” 27 July 1972.
173. Schmidt, “Can We Afford to Wait for Nuclear Rockets?” Astronautics and Aeronautics 3 (Mar. 1965): 16—25; Heather M. David, “Saturn Nuclear Stage Seen Possible in ‘75,” Missiles and Rockets 19 (28 Nov. 1966): 18ff; Frank A. Burnham, “Emphasis Grows on Military Use of Nuclear Upper State,” ibid. 22 (17 June 1968):
21-22; David S. Gabriel and John Morrissey, “Status and Prospects for Nuclear Rockets,” in Proceedings of the Fifth AFOSR Symposium on Advanced Propulsion Concepts, Chicago, 8-10 April 1968 (Arlington, Va.: AFOSR, 1969), 290-317; Schroeder, “Nerva Program Status,” ibid., 318-341; Buden, “Operational Characteristics of Nuclear Rockets,” Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets 7 (1970): 832-836; W. E. Durkee and F. B. Damerval, “Nuclear Rocket Experimental Test Results,” ibid., 1397-1402; J. H. Altseimer et al., “Operating Characteristics and Requirements for the NERVA Flight Program,” ibid. 8 (1971): 766-773; Gabriel and I. Helms, “The New Status of Space Nuclear Propulsion in the United States of America,” Atomic Energy Review 12 (1974): 801-836; Angelo and Buden, Space Nuclear Power (n. 135), 181-182. 174. See, e.g., Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Nuclear Navy, 1946-1962 (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1974). 175. Donald J. Keirn, “The USAF Nuclear Propulsion Programs,” Air University Quarterly Review 11 (Fall/Winter 1959): 13-19; Armstrong, “Nuclear Missile, Rocket, and Auxiliary Power Programs,” ibid., 26—36. 176. Butz, “Lack of Engineering Data Delays Nuclear Ramjet,” Aviation Week 70 (2 Mar. 1959): 38-—40f; McGuire, “Will Pluto Provide Power for SLAM?” (n. 136); “Increased Potential Spurs Pluto Research” (n. 136); Reynolds, “The Pluto Program” (n. 136). 177. ALOO, “Background Information on Los Alamos and Livermore Nuclear Propulsion Projects” (n. 137); Hawkes, “Nuclear Rocket Facility Nears Completion
(n. 137); LVO release, 1 Dec. 1960; Hawkes, “Tory II-A Nuclear Ramjet Nears Testing,” Aviation Week 73 (19 Dec. 1960): 34. 178. Minutes, 3d meeting of Committee on Use of NTS, 28 May 1957; “Tory ITA Testing Will Emphasize Safety,” Missiles and Rockets 6 (20 June 1960): 30—31f; PHS, “Radiological Safety Plan, Tory IA,” n.d.; REECo, “Tory II-A, On-Site Radiological
Safety Plan,” n.d.; REECo, “Rad-Safe Support Plan, Project Pluto,” 1 May 1961; Bybee to distrib., “Tory ITA Radiation Survey and Re-Entry Plan,” 22 Sept. 1961.
Notes to Pages 204~—205 415 179. LVO release LAV-61-64, “Atomic Energy Commission Ramjet Missile Reactor Successfully Passes Initial Power Test Run,” 14 May 1961; REECo, “Tory IIA Operation, On-Site Rad-Safe Report,” May 1961; OFO, “Pluto Tory II A-1 Reactor Tested at Nevada Test Site,” 28 Sept. 1961; PHS draft, “Interim Off-Site Report of the Tory ILA Power Run, October 5, 1961,” 5 Oct. 1961. 180. McGuire, “[Tory] I[A-1 Run Aids Pluto Outlook,” Missiles and Rockets 8 (22 May 1961): 15; Merkle, “Nuclear Ramjet Propulsion,” State of the Art—1961: Nuclear Propulsion, Astronautics 6 (Dec. 1961): 129; “Air Force Seen Okaying Pluto Tests,” Missiles and Rockets 11 (2 July 1962): 14f.
181. Willard E. Wilks, “AEC Confident of Tory II-C Design,” Missiles and Rockets 14 (20 Apr. 1964): 26-27; AEC release G-115, “Tory II-C Reactor Successfully Runs at ‘Intermediate Power,’” 14 May 1964; PHS, “Tory II-C Reactor Intermediate and Full Power Runs, May 12 and May 20, 1964,” n.d.; Donald T. Oakley to John S. Coogan, “Summary of Tory II-C Full Power Run (May 20, 1964) On and Off-Site Survey Instrument Readings,” 21 May 1964; J. F. Reeve to files, “Flight Report—Tory II-C Full Power Run, May 20, 1964,” 3 June 1964; SWRHL, “Final Report of Off-Site Surveillance for the Tory II-C Tests,” 1 Sept. 1964.
182. “AF Says SLAM Would Cost $500 Million to Flight-Test,” Missiles and Rockets 9 (4 Sept. 1961): 44; Katherine Johnsen, “Pluto Cancellation or Cutback Threatened,” Aviation Week 80 (13 Jan. 1964): 26-27; “Low Altitude Supersonic Missile,” Aerospace in Perspective, Space/Aeronautics 41 (Jan. 1964): 144, 146; “AEC Asks $5 Million to End Pluto Effort,” Aviation Week 81 (20 July 1964): 21; Butz, “Pluto: A New Strategic System or Just Another Test Program?” Air Force Magazine 47 (July 1964): 31-32. 183. Hawkes, “Airborne Slam Range Stations Proposed,” Aviation Week 75 (20 Nov. 1961): 103; NRDL, “Evaluation of Radiation Hazards Associated with Operation of Nuclear-Powered Space Units at Pacific Missile Range,” by C. L. Newcombe et al., Report USNRDL-TR-545 (San Francisco, 1 Feb. 1962); “Propulsion,” Research and Development Technical Handbook Issue, Space/Aeronautics 40 (July 1963): 69; “Low Altitude Supersonic Missile,” Aerospace in Perspective, ibid. 41 (Jan. 1964):
146; Johnsen, “Pluto Cancellation or Cutback Threatened” (n. 182), 26; James Trainor, “DOD Decides to Cancel LASV,” Missiles and Rockets 15 (13 July 1964): 16; Butz, “Pluto” (n. 182), 35; ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements (n. 97), 34-43. On the question of treaty compliance, see also ch. 9, below. 184. Nels A. Parson, Missiles and the Revolution in Warfare (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1962); Harvey M. Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in Government (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1972); Edmund Beard, Developing the ICBM: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1976); Norman Polmar, ed., Strategic Air Command: People, Aircraft, and Missiles (Annapolis, Md.: Nautical & Aviation, 1979); Desmond Ball, Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: Univ. of California Press, 1980). 185. William H. Avery, “Twenty-five Years of Ramjet Development,” Jet Propulsion 25 (1955): 604-614; Gordon L. Dugger, ‘“‘Ramjets,” State of the Art, 1962,
Astronautics 7 (Nov. 1962): 138-142; Russ Murray, “The Navaho Inheritance,” American Aviation Historical Society Journal 19 (Spring 1974): 17-21; Richard K.
416 Notes to Page 205 Betts, ed., Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy, Politics (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1981), especially Ron Huisken, “The History of Modern Cruise Missile Programs,” 83-100, and Robert J. Art and Stephen E. Ockenden, “The Domestic Politics of Cruise Missile Development, 1970-1980,” 359-413; Kenneth P. Werrell, The Evolution of the Cruise Missile (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Univ. Press, 1985); J. W. Powell, “Navaho, the ‘Know-How’ Missile,” Journal of the British Interplanetary Society 40 (Feb. 1987): 93-95. 186. “AF Says SLAM Would Cost $500 Million to Flight-Test” (n. 182); George C. Wilson, “Pluto, Snap De-Emphasized by Defense,” Aviation Week 77 (24 Sept. 1962): 38-39; Johnsen, “Pluto Cancellation or Cutback Threatened” (n. 182); “Pluto Nuclear Ramjet Project to be Dropped,” Missiles and Rockets 14 (14 May 1964): 16; William J. Coughlin, “The Penls of Pluto,” ibid. (22 June 1964): 46; Trainor, “DOD Decides to Cancel LASV” (n. 183); “AEC Asks $5 Million to End Pluto Effort” (n. 182); Butz, “Pluto” (n. 182), 30-35; Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (New York: Herper & Row, 1971). 187. French Embassy [Ambassade de France], France's First Atomic Explosion, Release 886 (New York: Service de Presse et d’Information, 13 Feb. 1960); Wilfrid
Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1971), 82-84, 103-106; Bertrand Goldschmidt, The Atomic Complex: A Worldwide Political History
of Nuclear Energy, trans. Bruce M. Adkins (La Grange Park, Ill.: ANS, 1982), 138-139. For a recent, brief, and annotated discussion of French nuclear weapons development, see McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988), 472—487. For a critical assessment of the consequences of French nuclear weapons testing both in Africa and the Pacific, see International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Radioactive Heaven and Earth: The Health and Environmental Effects of Nuclear Weapons Testing in, on, and above the Earth (New York: Apex Books; London: Zed Press, 1991), ch. 9, “French Testing.”
188. Chris L. Henderson to John H. Harley and J. Z. Holland, “Collection of Fallout in Connection with French Tests,” 8 Mar. 1960; DBM, “Detailed Data on Fallout with Reference to French Tests,” 21 Apr. 1960; Klement, “Radioactive Fallout from Nuclear Detonations of February and April 1960,” Report TID-6235, 24 June 1960. 189. Keesing’s Research Report, Disarmament (n. 97), 14—16.
190. U.S. Disarmament Administration, Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests: History and Analysis of Negotiations, Department of State publication 7258 (Washington: GPO, Oct. 1961); Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower (n. 75), 158-174; Kistiakowsky, A Scientist at the White House (n. 118), xliv—li passim. See also Hewlett and Holl, Atoms for Peace and War (n. 72), ch. 20, “The Test Ban: A Fading Hope.” 191. ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements (n. 97), 35-39; Richard Scott, “A Ban on Nuclear Tests: The Course of the Negotiations, 1958-1962,” Jnternational Affairs 38 (1962): 501-510; Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy (n. 97); Keesing’s Research Report, Disarmament (n. 97), ch. 4, “Geneva Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, 1958-62”; Jacobson and Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians (n. 97), part 2, “The Conference
Notes to Pages 205-207 417 on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests”; Divine, Blowing on the Wind (n. 1), ch. 9, “Detection.” 192. Glenn T. Seaborg with Benjamin S. Loeb, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: Univ. of California Press, 1981), chs. 2-5. 193. Kenneth S. Pitzer to Seaborg, 2 May 1961. 194. AEC 29/140, “Comments on GAC Letter—74th Meeting,” 20 June 1961, 1. See also McCool, “Summary Notes of Special Briefing on Weapons Testing,” 20 June 1961.
195. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban (n. 192), 68-73.
196. As quoted ibid., 88. Cf. Seaborg to files, 23 Aug. 1961. See also Divine, Blowing on the Wind (n. 1), 315-316.
197. USWB, “Stratospheric Fallout from the 1961 Soviet Test Series,” 2 Oct. 1961; Arve H. Dahl to Dunning, 4 Oct. 1961, w/att. draft press release on iodine-131 in fallout from Soviet tests; Olaf A. Hougan to Department of State, “Radioactivity in Sweden,” American Embassy, Stockholm, despatch 291, 5 Oct. 1961; Sidney Sober to Department of State, “Indian Atomic Energy Commission Release on Radioactive Fallout,’ American Consul, Bombay, despatch 148, 6 Oct. 1961; Robert J. List et al., “Fallout from the 1961 Soviet Test Series,” Weatherwise 14 (Dec. 1961): 219-223; Dunning, “Fallout from USSR 1961 Nuclear Tests,” Report TID-14277, Jan. 1962. 198. Austin W. Betts for the record, “Meeting of 5 September 1961 re Testing,” 5 Sept. 1961; AEC meeting no. 1770, 13 Sept. 1961, item 3; Seaborg to President John F. Kennedy, 15 Sept. 1961; NVOO, Announced Nuclear Tests (n. 53), 10-13. 199. Reeves to A. W. Betts, 16/2108Z Jan. 1962; Seaborg to J. F. Kennedy, 19 Feb. 1962 (circulated as AEC 1077/51, “DOD Interest in Nuclear Cratering Effects Program,” 27 Feb. 1962); D. Clark to Reeves, 28/1900Z Feb. 1962, w/att. draft Danny Boy press release; Technical Director’s Operation Plan for Project Danny Boy, n.d. See also REECo, Operations Nougat and Whetstone: Events Hard Hat, Danny Boy, Marshmallow, Mudpack, Wishbone, Gumdrop, Diluted Waters, and Tiny Tot, 15 February 1962-17 June 1965, by Brady et al., Report DNA 6320F (Las Vegas, 31 Jan. 1984), 41, 103. 200. Seaborg to J. F Kennedy, 19 Feb. (n. 199). See also Elliott to J. S. Cannon and A. W. Betts, “Public Information for Special NTS Test,” 17 Jan. 1962. 201. PHS, “Off-Site Report, Project Danny Boy,” Report WT-1830, 22 Mar. 1963, 7. See also REECo, “On-Site Rad-Safe Report, Danny Boy Event,” Report WT-1832, 22 Mar. 1963; USWB Las Vegas Research Station, “Final Report of Weather and Surface Radiation Prediction Activities for Project Danny Boy,” Report WT-1831, 22 Mar. 1963; Milo D. Nordyke and W. Wray, “Cratering and Radioactivity Results from a Nuclear Cratering Detonation in Basalt,’ Report UCRL-6999 Rev. II (Livermore, 10 Oct. 1963); Martell, “Radioactive Fallout from Cratering Shots: Remarks on Paper
by M. D. Nordyke and W. Wray,” n.d.; John A. Miskel and Norman A. Bonner, “Distribution of the Radioactivity from a Nuclear Cratering Experiment,” Danny Boy Project 21.1, Report WT-1817, 31 Dec. 1964; Hawthome, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 54), 519-523. 202. Reeves to Starbird, “Detonation of Underground Devices—Studies,” 20 July 1956; S. D. Cornell to R. W. Cook, 31 Oct. 1956; G. W. Johnson to distrib., ““General Concept of a Deep Underground Shot—Rainier Event—Operation Plumbbob,” 25 Mar. 1957, w/att. “General Concept. . . ,” 25 Mar. 1957 (circulated as AEC 944/19,
418 Notes to Page 207 “Special Shot for Operation Plumbbob,” 15 Apr. 1957); AEC meetings no. 1274, 27
Mar. 1957, item 8, and no. 1277, 17 Apr. 1957, item 1; Starbird to Fields, “Underground Nuclear Shot at NTS,” 12 Apr. 1957 (circulated as AEC 944/21, “Special Shot for Operation Plumbbob,” 16 Apr. 1957); Starbird to Reeves, 18 Apr. 1957; Starbird to Reeves, “Plumbbob Underground Shot,” 29 Apr. 1957; Starbird to Fields, “Status of Underground Shot—Rainier Event, in Operation Plumbbob,” 10 Sept. 1957 (circulated as AEC 944/33, “USGS Study of Underground Shot in Operation Plumbbob,” 13 Sept. 1957); G. W. Johnson et al., “The Underground Nuclear Detonation of September 19, 1957: Rainier, Operation Plumbbob,” Report UCRL-5124, 4 Feb. 1958, 6-9. 203. Starbird, Plumbbob Test Bulletins: no. 46, “Rainier Fired,” 20 Sept. 1957; and no. 49, “Status of Rainier Tunnel,” 27 Sept. 1957; REECo, “Rad-Safe Support Activities for Rainier,” 19 Sept. 1957; Placak to distrib., “Off-Site Rad-Safe Report for Rainier, Operation Plumbbob,” 27 Sept. 1957; Reeves to Starbird and Dunham, “Off-Site Rad-Safe Report for Rainier, Operation Plumbbob,” 4 Oct. 1957; G. W. Johnson to Starbird, “Planned Procedure for Post Shot Study of Rainier,” n.d. (circulated as AEC 944/36, same title, 1 Nov. 1957); AEC 944/39, DIS report, “Public Reaction to Tunnel Shot in Operation Plumbbob,” 15 Nov. 1957; AEC, “Background Information on the Deep Underground Shot (Rainier) at the Nevada Test Site,” 6 Mar. 1958; Johnson et al., “The Underground Nuclear Detonation” (n. 202), 26. See also JRB Associates, Shots Wheeler to Morgan: The Final Eight Tests of the Plumbbob Series, 6 September-7 October 1975, by Massie and Ponton, Report DNA 6007F (McLean, Va., 30 Sept. 1981), ch. 6. 204. York to Starbird, 4 Oct. 1957 (circulated as AEC 987, “Proposal for Additional Underground Tests,” 18 Oct. 1957); Fields to Warren C. Johnson, “Request for GAC Opinion on Test Shot,” 12 Feb. 1958; Hawthorne, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 54), 303-304, 310, 321, 375-376, 381, 382; JRB Associates, Safety Experiments (n. 53), 32-36, 42-43, 46, 50-51; NVOO, Announced Nuclear Tests (n. 53), 6-7; REECo, Operations Nougat and Whetstone (n. 199), 48. 205. Starbird, Hardtack Phase II Test Bulletins: no. 19, 9 Oct. 1958; no. 25, 16 Oct. 1958; no. 36, 29 Oct. 1958; G. W. Johnson, “Preliminary Report: Tamalpais,”
“. . . Logan,” and “. . . Blanca,” all dated 4 Nov. 1958, revised 18 Dec. 1958; Hawthorne, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 54), 384-389, 395-403, 411-412, 426-427, 448; JRB Associates, Operation Hardtack II (n. 102), 96, 98, 124, 160, 179; NVOO, Announced Nuclear Tests (n. 53), 8-10. 206. Hawthorne, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 54), 414-415, 435, 480, 491-493; JRB Associates, Operation Hardtack IT (n. 102), 185, 187, 189, 190, 191, 197, 198, 201; NVOO, Announced Nuclear Tests (n. 53), 8-9. 207. Higgins, “Underground Radioactivity,” 8 Sept. 1960; AEC 1077/105, DMA
report, “Report on Holes, Tunnels, Shafts and Drifts as Used in the Underground Nuclear Test Program,” 21 Nov. 1961; NVOO, “Operational Safety Programs,” Feb. 1962; George B. Maxey et al. to Reeves, 1 Mar. 1962; REECo, Operations Nougat and Whetstone (n. 199), 54—S5.
208. A. C. Graves, “Motor Vehicles,” 23 Sept. 1960. See also DOS, “Operational Accidents and Radiation Exposure Experience within the United States Atomic Energy Commission, 1943-1975,” Report WASH 1192 (Rev.), 1975.
Notes to Pages 207-209 419.
54-55. :
209. Hacker, The Dragon’s Tail: Radiation Safety in the Manhattan Project,
1942-1946 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: Univ. of California Press, 1987), 4,
210. A. W. Betts to Seaborg et al., “Discussion of Controlled Venting,” 19 Jan. 1962; E. G. Rapp, “Containment of Buried Nuclear Explosions,” Report UCRL-50604 (Livermore, Oct. 1968); Edward B. Giller to AEC Commissioners, “Summary Report on Activities for Assuring the Safety of Underground Nuclear Testing,” 25 Feb. 1969 (circulated as AEC 141/122, same title, 26 Feb. 1969); AEC, “Safety of Underground Nuclear Testing,” Report TID-24996, Apr. 1969; AEC, “Underground Nuclear Testing,” Report TID 25180, Sept. 1969; Samuel Glasstone, Public Safety and Underground Nuclear Detonations, Report TID-25708 (Washington: AEC, June 1971); REECo, Operations Nougat and Whetstone (n. 199), 48-51. 211. A. W. Betts to Reeves, “Directive for Weapon Test Operation, Fiscal Year 1962,” 09/1540Z Sept. 1961, paragraph 5.b, and Reeves, “Delegation of Authority for Operation Nougat,” 11 Sept. 1961, paragraph 5.b, as quoted in “Test Manager’s Authority,” n.d. 212. REECo, “Operation Nougat: On-Site Radiological Safety Report,” ed. Bernard F. Eubank, Report NVO-162-7/RRS-64-5, May 1964; NVOO, Announced Nuclear Tests (n. 53), 10-13.
213. Maupin to Reeves, “Raising the Radiological Safety Criteria for Tests,” 15 Nov. 1961 (circulated as AEC 604/59, same title, 4 Dec. 1961); Shipman to A, C. Graves, “Limits to Radiation Exposures, Nevada Test Site,” 24 Nov. 1961; Carroll L. Tyler to Reeves, “Impact on Tunnel Activities Due to Radiation Ceilings,” 28/2125Z Nov. 1961; A. W. Betts to Luedecke, “Radiation Exposure Guidance for the NTS Test Manager,” 18 Dec. 1961 (circulated as AEC 604/60, same title, 2 Jan. 1962); Betts to Hertford, “Radiation Exposure Guidance for NTS,” 20 Dec. 1961; Betts to Hertford, “Additional Guidance with Respect to Radiation Exposure Limits at NTS,” 29 Dec. 1961; Reeves to distrib., “Radiation Exposure Guidance for Nevada Test Site,” 5 Jan. 1962; Otto H. Roehlk to M. A. Rex, “Procedure to Limit Radiation Exposure of Miners at NTS,” 10 Apr. 1962; E. H. Forgotson to Seaborg, “Trip Report,” 10 Apr. 1962.
214. R. L. Gotchy, “Radioactive Effluent Monitoring at the Nevada Test Site Following Nuclear Detonations,” Report UCRL-12272 (Livermore, 21 Dec. 1964); Victor M. Milligan, “Onsite Radiological Safety,” in NVOO, “Safety Involving Detonation of Nuclear Devices,” Report NVO-28 (Las Vegas, May 1966), 99-106. 215. Donald E. Wimber, “Effects of Intracellular Irradiation with Tritium,” Advances in Radiation Biology 1 (1964): 85-115; Burton G. Bennett, “Environmental Tritium and the Dose to Man,” Proceedings of the Third International Congress of the International Radiation Protection Association (Washington, Sept. 1973), 23-31; NCRP, Tritium in the Environment: Recommendations, NCRP Report 62 (Washington: NCRP, 1979), especially ch. 6, “Biology of Tritium Exposures”; J. Newell Stannard, Radioactivity and Health: A History, ed. Raymond W. Baalman, Report DOE/ RL/01830-TS9 (Richland: PNL, Oct. 1988), ch. 10, section 4, “Tritium and Tritiated Water.”
216. A. A. Moghissi et al., “Improved Radiobioassay of Urine for Tritium,” Report SERHL 68-14, 10 Dec. 1968; Moghissi to M. W. Carter, “Transmittal of ‘Tritium in the Environment,’” 5 Dec. 1969; Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, eds., The
420 Notes to Pages 209-210 Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 3d ed. (Washington: DOD and DOE, 1977), section 12.197, 12.200; Glasstone, Public Safety and Underground Nuclear Detonations (n. 210), 163-164. 217. J. E. Campbell et al., “The Occurrence of Strontium-90, Iodine-131, and Other Radionuclides in Milk—May, 1957, through April, 1958,” American Journal of
Public Health 49 (Feb. 1959): 225-235; Klement, “A Review of Potential Radionuclides Produced in Weapons Detonations,” Report WASH-1024, 30 July 1959; Wright H. Langham, “Considerations of Biospheric Contamination by Radioactive Fallout,” in Eric B. Fowler, ed., Radioactive Fallout, Soils, Plants, Foods, Man (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1965), 3-18; R. Scott Russell, ed., Radioactivity and Human Diet (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1966), part 3, “Food Chains on Dry Land: Strontium”; Russell and R. S. Bruce, “Environmental Contamination with Fall-out from Nuclear Weapons: A Review,” IAEA, Environmental Contamination by Radioactive Mate-
rials, proceedings of a seminar on agricultural and public health aspects, Vienna, 24-28 March 1969 (Vienna: IAEA, 1969), 3-13; Glasstone and Dolan, Effects of Nuclear Weapons (n. 215), section 9.123. 218. Dunning, “Two Ways to Estimate Thyroid Dose from Radioiodine in Fallout,” Nucleonics 14 (Feb. 1956): 38—41; Lester Van Middlesworth, “Radioactivity in Thyroid Glands Following Nuclear Weapons Tests,” Science 123 (1 June 1956): 982-983; Margaret R. White and Hardin B. Jones, “Uptake of Iodine-131 in Human and Bovine Thyroids Following Detonation of Nuclear Weapons,” in Dunning and John A. Hilcken, eds., The Shorter-Term Biological Hazards of a Fallout Field, proceedings of an AEC-DOD symposium, Washington, 12—14 Dec. 1956 (Washington:
GPO, 1958), 161-164; R. H. Wasserman et al., “The Transfer of Fall-out Radionuclides from Diet to Man,” in Fowler, Radioactive Fallout, Soils, Plants, Foods, Man (n. 217), 205-244, at 221-230; R. J. Garner and Russell, “Isotopes of Iodine,” in Russell, Radioactivity and Human Diet (n. 217), 297-315. 219. H. J. Dunster, H. Howells, and W. L. Templeton, “District Surveys Following
the Windscale Incident, October 1957,” in W. G. Marley and K. Z. Morgan, eds., Progress in Nuclear Energy, series 12, Health Physics, vol. 1 (New York: Pergamon, 1959), 458-485; Merril Eisenbud, Environmental Radioactivity (n. 122), 351-357; Stannard, Radioactivity and Health (n. 215), 787-789.
220. AEC release B-155, 8 Sept. 1959, w/att. “[First] Quarterly Statement on Fallout by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission,” Sept. 1959; R. H. Neill to J. Z. Holland, “Environmental Sampling Networks for Radioactivity in Milk,” 20 Jan. 1960; Anton, “Program of the United States Government in Atmospheric Radioactivity,” Report TID-6947, 7 Nov. 1960; J. E. Campbell, “Radionuclides in Milk,” in
Fowler, Radioactive Fallout, Soils, Plants, Foods, Man (n. 217), 156-179; Terrill, “Radiological Health Activities Related to Weapons and Missile Testing,” statement for Senate Committee on Public Works, Subcommittee on Air and Water, 30 June 1964, w/att. (1) PHS, “Highlights of Public Health Service Activities in Radiological Health, 1959-1964” and (2) G. W. Werdig, “Public Health Off-Site Activities Conducted by the Public Health Service,” June 1964; Thomas J. Sharpe and John L. Stein, “Standby Milk Surveillance Network,” Radiological Health Data and Reports 11 (1970): 379-382; David E. Bernhardt et al., “Protective Actions for Radioiodine in Milk,” Health Physics 21 (1971): 401-416.
Notes to Pages 210-212 421 221. Bugher, “The External Dose from Short-Lived Isotopes in Fallout from Nuclear Explosions,” 9 Nov. 1959; Dunning, “Shorter-Lived Fission Products in Fallout,” Health Physics 4 (1960): 35-41; Luedecke to McCone, “Letters from Senator Anderson Dated 5/18/59 and 9/14/59 re GAC Statement on Fallout,” 7 Jan. 1960, w/att. letters; Luedecke to McCone et al., “Report on Fallout,” 29 Mar. 1960; AEC meeting no. 1603, 1 Apr. 1960, item 3; McCool to Dunham, “Commission Action on the Report on Fallout,” 4 Apr. 1960; Langham to J. Z. Holland, 13 Apr. 1964; Bugher et al. to McCone, 25 May 1960; DBM Fallout Studies Branch, “The Contribution of Short Lived Isotopes and Hot Spots to Radiation Exposure in the United States from Nuclear Test Fallout,” 6 June 1960; Dunham to Bradbury et al., “Report on Contributions of Short Lived Isotopes and Hot Spots to Radiation Exposure in the United States from Nuclear Test Fallout,” 17 June 1960; Knapp to W. C. Johnson, 21 June 1960.
222. R. J. Garner, “An Assessment of the Quantities of Fission Products Likely to be Found in Milk in the Event of Aerial Contamination of Agricultural Land,” Nature 186 (25 June 1960): 1063-1064; Van Middlesworth to Klement, 10 Aug. 1960; William H. Beierwaltes et al., “Radioactive Iodine Concentration in the Fetal Human Thyroid Gland from Fall-Out,” JAMA 173 (27 Aug. 1960): 1895-1902; H. D. Bruner to distrib., 4 Aug. 1961, w/att. “Tentative Outline” of informal conference on radioiodine in the environment; Dunning to Klement, “Proposed Meeting on Radioiodine,” 11 Aug. 1961; P. C. Tompkins to distrib., “Minutes of Informal Conference on Fallout, September 12, 1961,” 28 Sept. 1961; Dunham to Seaborg et al., “Conference on Radioactive Fallout from Nuclear Weapons,” 5 Oct. 1961.
9 From Moratorium to Test Ban: Radiation Safety in Transition, 1961-1964 1. Myrl KF Smith to distrib., “Test Manager Special Instructions and Schedule of Events—Antler,” 13 Sept. 1961; Alvin C. Graves to James E. Reeves, “1600 PDT Weather Briefing, September 14, 1961—Control Point,” 18 Sept. 1961; REECo, “Detailed Safety Support Plan, Nougat Series, Antler Event,” n.d. 2. Graves to Reeves, 18 Sept. (n. 1). 3. Ibid.; Reeves to DMA, 15/0053Z Sept. 1961. 4. Reeves to Austin W. Betts, “H Plus 30 Minute Shot Report, Operation Nougat,” 15/1802Z Sept. 1961; Arnold R. Fritsch to Glenn T. Seaborg, “Fallout,” 19 Sept. 1961; Allen H. Anderson to Reeves, “Antler Radioactivity,” 22 Sept. 1961; REECo, “Operation Nougat: On-Site Radiological Safety Report,” ed. Bernard F. Eubank, Report NVO-162-7/RRS-64-5 (Las Vegas, May 1964), 13-17; Howard A. Hawthorne, ed., Compilation of Local Fallout Data from Test Detonations 1945-1962 Extracted from DASA 1251, 2 vols., Report DNA 1251-1-EX, -2-EX (Santa Barbara: GETEMPO, 1 May 1979), vol. 1, Continental U.S. Tests, 498; NVOO Office of Public Affairs, Announced United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 through December 1986, Report NVO-209 (Rev. 7) (Las Vegas, Jan. 1987), 10. 5. J. R. Crockett to Reeves, “Radiation Exposure Due to Tunnel Activities,” 17 Nov. 1961; Vincent C. Vespe to Reeves, “Radiation Safety Controls, NTS Tunnel ReEntry Operations,” n.d.; A. W. Betts to AEC Commissioners, “Radiation Exposure at
422 Notes to Pages 212-213 NTS Tunnels ‘B’ and ‘E,’” 28 Nov. 1961; Alvin R. Luedecke to Chet Holifield, 29 Nov. 1961; Richard G. Elliott to files, “Radiation Exposures at NTS,” 1 Dec. 1961. 6. Oliver R. Placak to distrib., “Interim Off-Site Rad-Safe Reports for the Antler and Shrew Events,” 1 Nov. 1961, w/att. PHS, “Interim Off-Site Report of the Antler Event, September 15, 1961,” 1 Nov. 1961, 5-6. See also “Verbatim Copy of CloudTracking Log,” 15 Sept. 1961; A. W. Betts to Seaborg, “Radioactivity Found off the Test Site,” 18 Sept. 1961; SWRHL, “Final Report of Off-Site Surveillance for Operation Nougat, September 15, 1961—June 30, 1962,” Report SWRHL-1, 24 Apr. 1964, 73-77; Gordon M. Dunning to distrib., “Testimony for the Up-Coming Congressional
Hearings on Fallout,” 27 May 1965, w/att. Dunning testimony, “Nuclear Explosive Tests: Health and Safety,” 21-24. See also REECo, Radiological Effluents Released from Announced U.S. Continental Tests, 1961 through 1988, by Carole R. Schoengold et al., Report DOE/NV-317 (Las Vegas, May 1990), 7.
7. Milton A. Rex to A. W. Betts, “H Plus 30 Minute Shot Report, Operation Nougat,” 10/1927Z Oct. 1961; REECo, Nougat On-Site Rad-Safe Report (n. 4), 19-20; Hawthorne, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 4), 500; NVOO, Announced Nuclear Tests (n. 4), 10; REECo, Radiological Effluents Released (n. 6), 8. 8. Placak to Dunning, “Preliminary Information on Chena,” 12/1931Z Oct. 1961. 9. Placak to distrib., “Interim Off-Site Rad-Safe Reports for the Chena and Mink Events,” 1 Nov. 1961, w/att. SWRHL, “Interim Off-Site Report of the Chena Event,
October 10, 1961,” 15 Nov. 1961, 3-4. See also SWRSL, Nougat Final Off-Site Report (n. 6), 61. 10. Reeves to A. W. Betts, 14/1944Z Apr. 1962. 11. Ibid.; AEC meeting 1839, 16 Apr. 1962, item 10; A. W. Betts, Nougat Test Bulletin no. 38, “Platte Event,” 17 Apr. 1962; Morgan S. Seal and Allen E. Smith,
“Flight of April 14, 1962,” n.d.; Hawthorne, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 4), 534; NVOO, Announced Nuclear Tests (n. 4), 11. 12. Dunning to Luedecke, “Offsite Radiation Exposures from Operation Nougat,” 31 May 1962; Vernon E. Andrews to John R. McBride, “Personnel Removed from Cloud Path—Platte Event,” 6 June 1962; “Nevada Test Site Detonation Surveillance: April 14 Event,” Radiological Health Data 3 (1962): 420-421; SWRHL, Nougat Final Off-Site Report (n. 6), 9-10. 13. Placak to distrib., “Interim Off-Site Rad-Safe Report for the Platte Event,”
10 July 1962, w/att. SWRHL, “Interim Off-Site Report of the Platte Event, April 14, 1962,” n.d., 3-4; Dunning, “Nuclear Explosive Tests” (n. 6), 28-29. See also REECo, Radiological Effluents Released (n. 6), 21-22. 14. A. W. Betts, Nougat Test Bulletin no. 48, “Des Moines Event,” 15 June 1962.
15. Ibid.; V. E. Andrews, “Flight Report, Des Moines Event,” 13 June 1962; SWRHL, “Interim Off-Site Report of the Des Moines Event, June 13, 1962,” 10 Aug. 1962, 11; REECo, Nougat On-Site Rad-Safe Report (n. 4), 68-70; Dunning, “Nuclear Explosive Tests” (n. 6), 30-31; Hawthorne, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 4), 544-545. 16. SWRHL draft, “Operation Nougat Off-Site Radiological Safety Report, September 15, 1961—June 30, 1962,” n.d., ch. 1, 1. See also SWRHL, Des Moines Interim Off-Site Report (n. 15), 4; SWRHL, Nougat Final Off-Site Report (n. 6), 65-66, 107-119. 17. SWRHL, Des Moines Interim Off-Site Report (n. 15), 11. See also REECo, Radiological Effluents Released (n. 6), 25-26.
Notes to Pages 213-214 423 18. Ibid., 9. 19. Placak to Otto H. Roehlk, “Test Manager’s Report—Operation Nougat,” 22 July 1963, w/att. SWRHL, “Operation Nougat: Off-Site Radiological Safety,” n.d. See also SWRHL, Nougat Final Off-Site Report (n. 6), 59, 61; NVOO, Announced Nuclear Tests (n. 4), 10-13. 20. SWRHL, Nougat Off-Site Rad-Safe Report (n. 19), ch. 1, 1.
21. ALOO, “Background Information on Plowshare Program,” release 59-8, 6 Aug. 1958; Gerald W. Johnson and Harold Brown, “Non-Military Uses of Nuclear Explosives,” Scientific American 199 (Dec. 1958): 29-35; Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission, vol. 3 of A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford: Univ. of California Press, 1989), 528—530; Ralph Sanders, Project Plowshare: The Development of the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosives (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1962). 22. AEC 811/37, DMA report, “Proposed Revisions to the Program for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosions,” 3 Mar. 1959; AEC meeting no. 1484, 10 Mar. 1959, item 1; SAN, “General Plan, Project Gnome, Plowshare Program,” Oct. 1959; AEC 811/51, DMA report, “The Plowshare Program,” 17 Dec. 1959; G. W. Johnson, “Industrial and Scientific Applications of Nuclear Explosions,” Report UCRL-5840 (Livermore, 19 Jan. 1960); PGO, “Project Manager’s Report,” Oct. 1962, xii, 11. See also JRB Associates, Projects Gnome and Sedan, the Plowshare Program, by Inara Gravitis et al., Report DNA 6029F (McLean, Va., 18 Mar. 1983), 17-39; DNA, “Projects Gnome and Sedan, the Plowshare Program,” Public Affairs Office fact sheet, n.d. (ca. 1983). 23. AEC 811/48, DMA report, “Plowshare Advisory Committee,” 18 Sept. 1959; OTO, “Public Safety and Security Plan, Project Gnome, Operation Plowshare,” Sept. 1959; Reeves to distrib., “Revisions to Public Safety and Security Plan—Project Gnome,” 26 Jan. 1960; Reeves to distrib., “Presentations at Plowshare Advisory Committee Meeting,” 2 Aug. 1960, w/att. PAC agenda, “Public Safety Programs”; Alfred D. Starbird to John A. McCone, “Plowshare Safety Measures,” 15 Aug. 1960, w/att. “Summary of Plowshare Safety Measures”; Dunning to Richard Hamburger, “Health and Safety Matters—Project Gnome,” 15 Nov. 1961; PGO, “Project Gnome Safety Program,” 15 Nov. 1961. 24. Charles E. Violet to Dana E. Kilgore, “Present Status of Project Gnome,” 2 Dec. 1958; James D. Vine and James E. Weir, Jr., to Reeves, “Evaluation of Gnome
Sites Recommended by the Potash Industry,” 10 Dec. 1958; Roland F. Beers to Reeves, “Summary of Technical Considerations,” 11 Dec. 1958; Beers et al., “Statement of the Panel of Consultants,” 2 Feb. 1959; G. W. Johnson to Kilgore, 18 May 1959; G. W. Housner to Reeves, “Estimate of Ground Motions from Project Gnome,” 14 Oct. 1959; PGO, “Project Manager’s Report” (n. 22), 1, 4. 25. SAN release 137, “Public Announcement on the Meeting of Project Gnome Panel of Consultants at Mercury,” 11 Sept. 1958; Violet to Jack Sitton, 22 Sept. 1958; Reeves to R. Dean Wait, 28 Sept. 1959, w/att. seismic reports; Reeves, “Report on the Current Status of Project Gnome,” presented at an AIME meeting, Carlsbad, New Mex. (ALOO telease, 22 Feb. 1961); Reeves, “Uses of Nuclear Explosives: Summary of Remarks to Phoenix Kiwanis Club,” OFO release LV-PR-62-NN, 5 Dec. 1961; PGO, “Project Manager’s Report” (n. 22), 32-38; “Public Information Programs for Project Gnome Field Operations, 1958-1962,” n.d.
424 Notes to Pages 214-215 26. Dunning to Roscoe H. Goeke, “Draft of Rad-Safety Off-Site Plan for Project Gnome,” 26 Feb. 1959; Placak to Reeves, “Draft of Off-Site Plan for Project Gnome,” 13 Jan. 1960; “Off-Site Radiological Safety Plan for Project Gnome,” 25 Apr. 1960; REECo, “General Support Plan, Project Gnome,” 4th revision, May 1961; Reeves to Violet, “Proposed PGO-SOP 0524, ‘Radiological Safety,’” 7 June 1961, w/att. draft PGO SOP, ch. 0524, “Radiological Safety,” 6 June 1961; Reeves to Carroll L. Tyler, “Issuance of Project Gnome Organization SOP’s,” 30 June 1961, w/att. PGO SOP, ch. 0524, “Radiological Safety,” 29 June 1961; PGO, “Technical Director’s Operation Plan,” 24 July 1961, 9-12; Reeves to distrib., “Operation Order OFO-OpO-13-61— Project Gnome,” 1 Nov. 1961, 7-8; Placak to Dunning, “Off-Site Coverage—Project Gnome,” 27 Nov. 1961; “Off-Site Radiological Safety Plan for Project Gnome,” 27 Nov. 1961. Cf. JRB Associates, Projects Gnome and Sedan (n. 22), 56-68. 27. PGO, “Background Information on Project Gnome,” 1 June 1961; PGO release, “Summary Report on. . . Project Gnome Detonation,” 11 Dec. 1961; Seaborg to President John F. Kennedy, 12 Sept. 1961 (circulated as AEC 811/94, “Preliminary Report on Status of Project Gnome,” 14 Dec. 1961); W. L. Oakley to AEC Commissioners, “Project Gnome—Preliminary Post-Shot Report,” 14 Dec. 1961; John S. Kelly to Seaborg et al., “Second Post-Shot Status Report on Project Gnome,” 27 Dec. 1961. See also NVOO, Announced Nuclear Tests (n. 4), 10; Hawthorne, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 4), 503-504; JRB Associates, Projects Gnome and Sedan (n. 22), 31; REECo, Radiological Effluents Released (n. 6), 10. 28. PGO, “Project Manager’s Report” (n. 22), 25-26. See also REECo, “Project Gnome, On-Site Radiological Safety Report,” Report PNE-33F, 22 May 1962; JRB Associates, Projects Gnome and Sedan (n. 22), 60-62. 29. PGO, “Project Manager’s Report” (n. 22), 26. 30. SWRHL, “Project Gnome, Off-Site Radiological Safety Report,” 22 May 1962; PGO, “Project Manager’s Report” (n. 22), 26-28; Dunning, “Nuclear Explosive Tests” (n. 6), 25-27. 31. SWRHL, Gnome Off-Site Rad-Safe Report (n. 30), 96. 32. AEC meeting no. 1777, 19 Sept. 1961, item 3; Seaborg to J. F. Kennedy, 7 Oct. 1961, 19 Oct. 1961, 27 Oct. 1961; Kenneth S. Pitzer to Seaborg, 19 Oct. 1961;
“Notes for Dr. Seaborg re: Testing,” n.d. (ca. 31 Oct. 1961); John S. Graham to Seaborg, “Atmospheric Testing,” 21 Nov. 1961; A. W. Betts to AEC commissioners, “Methods of Testing Large Yield Nuclear Devices,” 11 Dec. 1961; Seaborg to Pitzer,
23 Jan. 1962 (circulated as AEC 29/144, “Comments on Report of 76th General Advisory Committee Meeting,” 25 Jan. 1962); McCool, “Proposed Atmospheric Test Program,” 1 May 1962; Seaborg with Benjamin S. Loeb, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: Univ. of California Press, 1981), part 3. See also Kaman Tempo, Operation Dominic I, 1962, by L. Berkhouse et al., Report DNA 6040F (Santa Barbara, 1 Feb. 1983), 25.
33. McCone to Thomas S. Gates, 22 Apr. 1960 (circulated in AEC 141/38, “Transfer of Eniwetok Proving Ground,” 23 May 1960). 34. James H. Douglas to McCone, 16 May 1960 (circulated in AEC 141/38 [n. 33]); “AEC-DOD Agreement for Transfer of Eniwetok Proving Ground,” signed by Luedecke (AEC) and Fred A. Buntz (DOD), 30 June 1960 (circulated as AEC 141/41,
same title, 11 July 1960). |
35. William E. Ogle to Roger E. Batzel, 25 Oct. 1961; John T. Conway to
Notes to Page 216 425 Seaborg, 26 Oct. 1961 (circulated as AEC 141/47, “JCAE Inquiry Regarding Eniwetok Proving Ground,” 30 Oct. 1961); A. W. Betts to Seaborg, “Assessment of Possible Overseas Sites for Conduct of a Long Range Test Program,” 1 Nov. 1961, w/att. table of ““The Advantages, Disadvantages and Unique Problems”; Betts for record, “Nuclear Tests in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,” 2 Nov. 1961; James K. Carr to Seaborg, 3 Nov. 1961 (circulated as AEC 141/50, “Recommendation against Further Testing in Eniwetok and Bikini Atolls,” 9 Nov. 1961); Betts to Seaborg, “Eniwetok—Bikini Considerations Relative to Atmospheric Test Resumption,” 20 Nov. 1961; Seaborg to Stewart L. Udall, 27 Nov. 1961 (circulated as AEC 141/51,
“Problems of Nuclear Testing Near Eniwetok and Bikini Atolls,” 13 Dec. 1961); Kaman Tempo, Operation Dominic I (n. 32), 26. 36. Eric Bailey, The Christmas Island Story (London: Stacey International, 1977), 58-60; Denys Blakeway and Sue Lloyd-Roberts, Fields of Thunder: Testing Britain’s Bomb (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1985), chs. 10-11; Kenneth Hubbard end Michael Simmons, Operation “Grapple”—Testing Britain’s First H-Bomb (London: Tan Allen, 1985); Wilfred E. Oulton, Christmas Island Cracker: An Account of the Planning and Execution of the British Thermo-Nuclear Bomb Tests, 1957 (London: Thomas Harmsworth, 1987). For a recent, brief, and annotated discussion of the history of British-American nuclear relations, see McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988), 463-472. 37. “Notes for Dr. Seaborg,” n.d. (n. 32); Betts to Seaborg, 1 Nov. (n. 35); Philip W. Allen to Reeves, “Weather at Christmas Island, 2°N, 157° 20’ West,” 14 Nov. 1961; John C. Bugher to Seaborg, 4 Jan. 1962; Seaborg to Bugher, 9 Jan. 1962; Sea-
borg to Pitzer, 23 Jan. 1962 (circulated as AEC 29/144, “Comments on Report of 76th General Advisory Committee Meeting,” 25 Jan. 1962); Joshua Z. Holland to Charles L. Dunham, “Proposed Study of Alternate Testing Sites,” 26 Jan. 1962; Betts to Seaborg, “Letter to Dr. Bugher Concerning Latitudinal Distribution of Fallout,” 14 Feb. 1962; Seaborg to Manson Benedict, 23 Mar. 1962; AEC-DOD release E-179, “AEC and DOD Announce High Altitude Tests,” 28 May 1962, w/att. “Effects of High-Altitude Nuclear Explosions.” See also Kaman Tempo, Operation Dominic I (n. 32), 31-40, 140, 172. 38. Captain Craig to A. H. Anderson, “Danger Area and Swordfish Situations,” 28 Mar. 1962; AEC meeting 1832, 30 Mar. 1962, on Swordfish; A. W. Betts, Dominic Test Bulletins: no. 19, “Frigate Bird Event,” 7 May 1962, no. 23, “Swordfish Event,” 14 May 1962, no. 27, “. . . Frigate Bird Data,” 28 May 1962; Anderson to Seaborg, “Frigate Bird Test Results,” 23 May 1962; Seaborg to McGeorge Bundy, 15 Apr. 1963, w/att. “Summary of Results of the 1962 Atmospheric Nuclear Test Series.” See also DNA, “Dominic I,” Public Affairs Office fact sheet, n.d.; Kaman Tempo, Operation Dominic I (n. 32), 43, 184, 196; NVOO, Announced Nuclear Tests (n. 4), 12-15. 39. ALOO release AL-62-NN, “Joint Task Force 8 Set Up by Defense Department,” 29 Dec. 1961; G. W. Johnson to Seaborg, 16 Feb. 1962, w/att. proposed “Agreement between Atomic Energy Commission and Department of Defense on Costs and Responsibilities for Nuclear Test Operations at Off-Continent Test Sites”; AEC release E-135, “AEC and DOD Are Authorized to Proceed with Nuclear Tests,” 24 Apr. 1962; Kaman Tempo, Operation Dominic I (n. 32), 43.
426 Notes to Pages 216-218 40. McCool, “Summary Notes of Briefing on Joint Task Force Eight Operations, Wednesday, March 28, 1962,” 11 Aug. 1962. 41. Hq JTF 8, Operations Plan 2-62, 23 Jan. 1962, Annex J, “Radiological Safety Operations,” 23 Feb. 1962; Thomas L. Shipman to Ogle, “Radiation Exposures for Cloud Sampling Personnel,” 19 Feb. 1962; Hershell E. Parsons to distrib., “Operation Dominic Radiological Safety Report,” 3 Apr. 1963, w/att. Arthur L. Knipp, Jr., “Radiological Safety Operations (Operation Dominic),” n.d.; Charles F. Mudgett, Jr., to distrib., “CJTF 8 Report Radiological Safety Operations, 1962 Pacific Nuclear Tests,” 4 June 1964, w/att. CJTF 8, “Report . . . on the 1962 Pacific Nuclear Tests (Operation Dominic),” Encl. N, “Report of Radiological Safety Operations,” Appendix A, “On-Site Radsafe”; Kaman Tempo, Operation Dominic I (n. 32), ch. 2. 42. Knipp, “Dominic Radiological Safety Report” (n. 41), 28; “Report of Radiological Safety Operations” (n. 41), N-A-1-1; Kaman Tempo, Operation Dominic I (n. 32), ch. 13. 43. Memorandum of Understanding between JTF 8 of DOD and PHS of HEW, signed by Starbird for JTF 8, 31 Jan. 1962, and Robert J. Anderson for PHS, 5 Feb. 1962; James E. Martin, “Off-Site Radiological Safety during Operation Dominic— 1962,” 30 Aug. 1962; PHS, “1962 Pacific Nuclear Tests (Operation Dominic), OffSite Surveillance Program,” n.d., parts 1-3; Knipp, “Dominic Radiological Safety Report” (n. 41), ch. 3; “Report of Radiological Safety Operations” (n. 41), Appendix B, “Off-Site Radsafe”; Kaman Tempo, Operation Dominic I (n. 32), 70-71. 44. “Report of Radiological Safety Operations” (n. 41), N-B-22. Cf. GAO, Nuclear Health and Safety: Radiation Exposures for Some Cloud-sampling Personnel Need to Be Reexamined, Report GAO/RCED-87-134 (Washington, Sept. 1987), 1516, 26-27, 33-34, 43-44. 45. A. W. Betts, Dominic Test Bulletins: no. 16, “Tiger Fish Event,” 4 May 1962, no. 29, “Blue Gill Event,” 6 June 1962, no. 36, “Starfish Event,” 21 June 1962, no. 42, “1. Starfish Prime Event; 2. “Little Feller II Event,” 9 July 1962; Seaborg to Bundy, 9 June 1962. See also Kaman Tempo, Operation Dominic I (n. 32), 227—232. On the troubled development history of the Thor missile, see Michael Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1969). 46. A. W. Betts, Dominic Test Bulletin no. 47, “Blue Gill Prime Event,” 31 July 1962; Holmes & Narver, Inc., “Decontamination and Monitoring of Launch Pad No. 1, Johnston Island,” May 1962; R. C. Harbert to William B. Hills, “Plutonium Contamination of LE #1, July 25, 1962, Johnston Atoll,’ 9 Jan. 1973; Knipp, “Dominic Radiological Safety Report” (n. 41), 18-23; “Report of Radiological Safety Operations” (n. 41), N-A-13 to -18. See also Kaman Tempo, Operation Dominic I (n. 32), 232-241. 47. A. W. Betts, Dominic Test Bulletins: no. 51, “Bluegill Double Prime,” 16 Oct.
1962, no. 53, “Checkmate Event,” 23 Oct. 1962, no. 54, “Bluegill Triple Prime Event,” 26 Oct. 1962, no. 55, “1. Calamity Event; 2. Bluegill Triple Prime Event,” 29 Oct. 1962, no. 58, “Kingfish Event,” 1 Nov. 1962; Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban (n. 32), 152—158. See also Kaman Tempo, Operation Dominic I (n. 32), 21-25; NVOO, Announced Nuclear Tests (n. 4), 15. 48. Anthony H. Ewing to file, “Organizational Chart for Operation of Nevada Test Site,” 12 Feb. 1962; AEC 132/51, GM report, “Organization for Administering Field
Notes to Pages 218-219 427 Test Activities at NTS and Other Locations,” 14 Feb. 1962; Luedecke to David E. Bell, 27 Feb. 1962; Fritsch to Seaborg, “Trip Report of Visit to NTS—March 1, 1962,” 2 Mar. 1962; Luedecke to Holifield, 5 Mar. 1962; AEC Manual, section 010353, “Functions and Delegations, Nevada Operations Office,” approved 6 Mar. 1962; Norris E. Bradbury to A. W. Betts, “Concerning Steady State Testing at NTS,” 8 Mar. 1962; Seaborg to J. F. Kennedy, 26 Mar. 1962; Placak to distrib., “Off-Site Radiological Safety Program Reorganization,” 1 May 1962, as quoted in PHS, “OffSite Radiological Safety Plan,” July 1962, 4-5. See also JRB Associates, Operation Dominic IT: Shots Little Feller I, Johnie Boy, Small Boy, Little Feller I, 7 July—17 July 1962, by Ponton et al., Report DNA 6027F (McLean, Va., 31 Jan. 1983), 20, 34-35; NVOO, Announced Nuclear Tests (n. 4), 14. For AFSWP’s succession by DASA, see Harry B. Yoshpe et al., Defense Organization and Management (Washington: ICAF, 1967), 126-128. 49. Placak to Dunning, 28/2242Z May 1962; Dunning to A. W. Betts, “Fallout from Small Boy,” I June 1962; Betts to AEC Commissioners, “Results of Safety Studies for NTS Johnie Boy and Little Feller II Events,” 25 June 1962. See also Hawthorne, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 4), 557-560, 563-565, 569-574; DNA, “Operation Dominic II,” Public Affairs Office fact sheet, n.d.; JRB Associates, Operation Dominic IT (n. 48), ch. 3. 50. Reeves to distrib., “Operational Safety Plan—tLittle Feller I Event,” 12 July 1962; Seaborg to G. W. Johnson, 13 July 1962; Reeves to A. W. Betts, “H Plus 6 Hour Advisory on Little Feller I,” 17/2320Z July 1962; Betts, Dominic Test Bulletin no. 46, “Little Feller I Event... ,” 18 July 1962; Donald H. Mills to Commandant USMC, “Marine Participation in Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Tests 1962,” 5 Jan. 1964. See also Hawthorne, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 4), 577-581; JRB Associates, Operation Dominic I (n. 48), ch. 8. For the place of the Davy Crockett in army missile development, see A. J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army between Korea and Vietnam (Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1986), 95-96, 101. 51. Roehlk to Nathan H. Woodruff, 20 June 1962; Luedecke to Reeves, 29 June 1962; Placak to distrib., “Preliminary Off-Site Report of the Small Boy Event,” 23 July 1962; Placak to distrib., “Interim Off-Site Report of the Little Feller II Event,” 20 Aug. 1962; Placak to distrib., “Interim Off-Site Report of the Small Boy Event,” n.d.; Placak to distrib., “Interim Off-Site Report of the Little Feller I Event,” 25 Sept. 1962; SWRHL, “Interim Off-Site Report of the ‘Johnnie [sic] Boy’ Event,” 25 Oct. 1962; SWRHL, draft report on Dominic II, n.d.; REECo, “Dominic Series, Nevada Phase,
On-Site Radiological Safety Report,’ Report RRS-62-7, 23 Oct. 1962; SWRHL, “Final Report of Off-Site Surveillance for Operation Dominic II, July 1962,” Report SWRHL-3r, 15 July 1965; Edwin H. Bouton et al., “Radiological Surveys: Sunbeam Shots Little Feller I, II, Johnie Boy, and Small Boy,” Project 2.8, Report WT-2266, 30 Oct. 1964. See also JRB Associates, Operation Dominic II (n. 48), ch. 4; REECo, Radiological Effluents Released (n. 6), 31. 52. Herbert F. York, “The Great Test-Ban Debate,” Scientific American (Nov. 1972), as reprinted in York, ed., Arms Control: Readings from Scientific American (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1973), 294-302; Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban (n. 32); Gregg Herken, Counsels of War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), ch. 16, “False Dawn.” 53. ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of
428 Notes to Page 219 Negotiations, 1980 ed. (Washington, Aug. 1980), 39-47; Keesing’s Research Report, Disarmament: Negotiations and Treaties, 1946-1971 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1972), ch. 9, “Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 1963.” 54. Russell H. Ball to George J. Keto, “Plowshare Activity Report,” 10 Aug. 1959; G. W. Johnson, “Nuclear Explosions in Science and Technology,” BAS 16 (May 1960): 155-161; Johnson, “Peaceful Nuclear Explosions: Status and Promise,” Nucleonics 18 (July 1960): 49-53. See also Johnson and Brown, “Non-Military Uses of Nuclear Explosives” (n. 21); AEC 811/37, “Proposed Revisions to the Program for Peaceful Uses” (n. 22); AEC 811/51, “The Plowshare Program” (n. 22); Johnson, “Industrial and Scientific Applications” (n. 22). For a brief and still hopeful overview of the entire Plowshare program, see Wilson K. Talley and Carl R. Gerber, “Nuclear Explosives as an Engineering Tool,” in Hans Mark and Lowell Wood, eds., Energy in Physics, War and Peace: A Festschrift Celebrating Edward Teller’s 80th Birthday (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1988), 221-236. Taking a comparative view and far more critical is Trevor Findlay, Nuclear Dynamite: The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Fiasco (Sydney: Brassey’s Australia, 1990). 55. Dunham to Joseph F. Ross, 6 Mar. 1959; Kermit H. Larson, “Radiological and Biological Availability Assessment of Fallout from Project Chariot, Plowshare Program—Phase I,” 9 June 1959; Douglas K. Milliard to John N. Wolfe, “Limnobiological Reconnaissance of the Cape Thompson Area,” 22 Sept. 1959; Francis S. L. Williamson to Wolfe, “Ornithological Investigation in the Cape Thompson Region,” 23 Sept. 1959; Murray L. Johnson to Wolfe, “Marine Mammal Investigations in the Cape Thompson Region,” 23 Sept. 1959; Richard H. Fleming et al., “Oceanographic Survey of the Eastern Chukchi Sea, 1 August to 2 September 1959: Preliminary Report of Brown Bear Cruise No. 236,” Sept. 1959; Dayton L. Alverson to Ellison C. Shute, “Interim Progress Report, Bureau of Commercial Fisheries Participation Project Chariot,” 24 Sept. 1959, w/att. USFWS, “Cruise Report: Exploratory Cruise No. 43, Vessel USFWS John N. Cobb,” 16 Sept. 1959; G. Donald Eberlein to R. H. Ball, 1 Oct. 1959; Allyn H. Seymour, “Progress Report of the Laboratory of Radiation Biology, University of Washington,” 1 Oct. 1959; Gilbert J. Ferber to Reeves, 11 Dec. 1959, w/att. Kenneth M. Nagler and Ferber, “Some Fallout Possibilities from Operation Chariot for a Selected Wind Situation,” n.d. See also Neal O. Hines, Proving Ground: An Account of Radiobiological Studies in the Pacific, 1956—1961 (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1962), 302-305. 56. P. W. Allen, “Summary of Presentation on Weather,” Project Chariot Coordination Conference, 29 Oct. 1959, w/att. “Resume of Off-Site Radiological Safety Plan for Operation Chariot”; “Project Chariot Off-Site Radiological Safety Operation Plan,” 1 Nov. 1959; A. Vay Shelton, “Fallout—Project Chariot,” 4 Nov. 1959; G. R. Farmer to Reeves, “Radiobiological Safety Criteria for Project Chariot,” 27 Nov. 1959; Placak to Charles L. Weaver, “Chariot Directory,” 29 Dec. 1959; Starbird to McCone, “Plowshare Safety Measures,” 15 Aug. 1960, w/att. “Summary of Plowshare Safety Measures,” n.d.; ALOO, “Public Safety Plan, Project Chariot, Plowshare
Program,” Nov. 1960. ;
57. C. L. Anderson to Chairman AEC and Director LRL, 30 Jan. 1959; Native Village of Point Hope, Alaska, minutes of special council meetings, 28 and 30 Nov. 1959; Point Hope Village Council to Ernest D. Campbell, 30 Nov. 1959; Wilderness Society, “Resolution,” Sept. 1960; Leslie A. Viereck to William R. Wood, 29 Dec.
Notes to Page 219 429 1960; Alaska Conservation Society release, 13 Feb. 1961; James A. Haddock et al., “The Threat of Project Chariot to the People of Point Hope, Alaska, and Their Way of Life,” Feb. 1961; CNI, “Project Plowshare,” Nuclear Information 2 (June 1960): 1-4, and “Project Chariot,” ibid., 3 (June 1961): 1-20; Howard Margolis, “Project Chariot: Two Groups of Scientists Issue ‘Objective’ But Conflicting Reports,” Science 123 (23 June 1961): 2000-2001. See also Virginia Brodine, Radioactive Contamination (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), 7-23; Dan O’Neill, “Project Chariot: How Alaska Escaped Nuclear Excavation,” BAS 45 (Dec. 1989): 28-37. 58. Luedecke to E. L. Bartlett, 3 Dec. 1959; Luedecke to Henry M. Jackson, 15 Dec. 1959; Luedecke to Warren G. Magnuson, 17 Dec. 1959; AEC, “Fact Sheet on Project Chariot,” 8 Apr. 1961; Special Subcommittee on Project Chariot, “Report to the Plowshare Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission,” 8 June 1961;
AEC release D-152, “AEC Publishes First Report on Alaskan Studies for Project Chariot,” 8 June 1961; Luedecke to Emest Gruening, 30 June 1961, w/att. staff comments on Project Chariot; Luedecke to Chester E. Marrow, 17 July 1961; A. W. Betts
to Luedecke, “St. Louis Committee for Nuclear Information Bulletin on Project Chariot,” 2 Aug. 1961, w/att. 1. CNI, “Project Chariot” (n. 57); 2. “Plowshare Staff Comments on the CNI Fallout Predictions”; 3. J. N. Wolfe, “Comments on Biological
Aspects of Report by St. Louis Citizens’ Committee for Nuclear Information”, 4. Margolis, “Project Chariot” (n. 57) (circulated as AEC 811/82, same title, 15 Aug. 1961); J. S. Kelly for the record, “Report on Trip of July 24—August 2 to Livermore, California, and Alaska,” 7 Aug. 1961; Spofford G. English to Seaborg et al., “Report of Sixth Plowshare Advisory Committee Meeting,” 7 Aug. 1961; “Staff Report on Letter from Vincent Foster, Doris R. Haddock, and James A. Haddock,” 12 Oct. 1961.
59. Gary H. Higgins to distrib., “Runoff Water Contamination from Project Chariot,” 21 Feb. 1961; John F. Philip to Reeves, “Fallout Patterns from NTS and Chariot,” 31 Mar. 1961; Placak to Reeves, “NTS and Project Chariot Site Area Comparison,” 17 Apr. 1961; Reeves to Philip, “Fallout Patterns—-NTS and Chariot,” 28 Apr. 1961; Roehlk to Reeves, “Public Information and Public Safety Studies— Project Chariot,” 23 May 1961; P. W. Allen to Reeves, “Verification for Expanding the Weather Study for Chariot,” 24 May 1961; Reeves to Shute, “Project Chariot Safety
Studies,” 2 June 1961; Roehlk to Reeves, “Project Manager’s Analysis of Project Chariot Shot Dates,” 8 June 1961; Reeves to Shute, “Fallout Predictions—Project Chariot,” 25 July 1961; Placak to Goeke, “Monitoring Results from Project Chariot,” 20 Oct. 1961; Philip to J. N. Wolfe, “Project Chariot Throwout Estimates,” 9 Jan. 1962; Philip to Wolfe, “Project Chariot Fallout Predictions,” 19 Feb. 1962, w/att. Higgins to Philip, 9 Feb. 1962; Placak to Reeves, “Proposed Environmental Sampling Program for Project Chariot,” 9 Mar. 1962; Philip to Reeves, “Fallout Monitoring Program in Project Chariot Area,” 26 Mar. 1962; John S. Coogan and Donald T. Wruble to files, “Report of Trip for the Purpose of Establishing Additional Environmental Sampling Stations and Initiating a Public Relations Program in the Project Chariot Area, Cape Thompson, Alaska,” 21 May 1962. 60. C. L. Weaver to J. N. Wolfe, “Prediction of Fission Product Ingestion at Chariot Site,” 16 Aug. 1960; Batzel, “Distribution of Radioactivity from a Nuclear Excavation,” Report UCRL 6249-T (Livermore, 26 Oct. 1960); G. W. Johnson to Keto, 6 Dec. 1960; Frank D. Cluff et al., “Surface Radiation Estimate for Project Chariot,” revised Mar. 1961; Peter C. Lent, “Caribou Investigations, Northwest
430 Notes to Pages 219-220 Alaska,” UAPC Phase III Progress Report, June 1961; Arthur M. Piper, “Potential Effects of Project Chariot on Local Water Supplies,” Nov. 1961; Doris J. Saario, “Human Ecological Investigations at Kivalina, Alaska,” UAPC Final Report, Dec. 1962; J. J. Davis et al., “Hanford Progress Report of Project Chariot Studies—1961,” n.d.
61. Joe B. Sanders to files, “Austere and Small Program—Project Chariot,” 24 Jan. 1962; AEC meeting no. 1821, 14 Feb. 1962, considering AEC 811/97, as cited in AEC 811/104, DPNE report, “Plowshare Program (Project Chariot),” 10 July 1962; Philip to Higgins, 28 Feb. 1962; J. S. Kelly to Luedecke, “Implementation of NSAM
No. 152,” 9 May 1962, w/att. Kelly to John S. Foster, Jr, 9 May 1962 (circulated as AEC 811/102, same title, 17 May 1962); Shute to Kelly, “Plans for Cancellation of Project Chariot,” 15 June 1962; Philip to Robert E. Miller, “USPHS Fallout Monitoring at Chariot Site,” 5 July 1962; AEC 111/105, DPNE report, “Plowshare Excavation Program,” 10 July 1962; AEC, Monthly report to GAC, July 1962, I-41; Wruble to Placak, “Telephone Conversation with Ernest Campbell Concerning Project
Chariot,” 2 Aug. 1962; McBride to E. D. Campbell, “Status of Project Chariot,” 9 Aug. 1962. 62. AEC 811/104, “Plowshare Program” (n. 61), 2—3.
63. Ibid., 4. 64. Ibid., 5, and Appendix B, “Draft Public Announcement: Success of Project Sedan Leads to Cancellation of Project Chariot.” Cf. AEC releases: E-294, “Project Chariot Decision Held in Abeyance,” 24 Aug. 1962; and F-15, “AEC Publishes Second Summary Report on Alaskan Studies for Project Chariot,” 25 Jan. 1963; Rodney L. Southwick to Henry G. Vermillion, “Project Chariot—PHS Reports,” 16 May 1963. 65. Seaborg to Bundy, 18 Dec. 1961; FRC, draft memo for J. F. Kennedy, “A Consideration of Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Testing,” 19 Jan. 1962; PHS, “OffSite Radiological Safety Program,” 23 Mar. 1962; Duncan Clark to distrib., “Media and Public Inquiries on Fallout,” 17 Apr. 1962; HASL, “AEC Fallout Research Program for 700-1000 Mile and 2000 Mile Arcs for an NTS Event,” 20 Apr. 1962; Seal to James G. Terrill, Jr., “Fallout Estimate for the Sedan Event,” 25 May 1962; AEC, “Plowshare Excavation Program: Project Sedan,” 19 June 1962. 66. LRL, “Technical Director’s Concept for Project Sedan,” 18 May 1962; Placak to Dunning and J. S. Kelly, “Information Concerning Sedan Event,” 22/1920Z May 1962; SWRHL, “Off-Site Radiological Safety Plan for Project Sedan,” 29 May 1962; “Project Sedan: Technical Director’s Operation Plan,” 6 June 1962; Reeves to distrib., “Planning Directive (PL-3-6-62)—Sedan,” 8 June 1962; Edmund L. Fountain to field team captains, “Rad-Safe Plan,” 1 July 1962; REECo, “Detailed Support Plan: Sedan Event,” n.d.; NVOO draft, “Project Sedan: Project Manager’s Report,” Jan. 1963, part 1; JRB Associates, Gnome and Sedan (n. 22), ch. 3. 67. Dunning to files, “Radiation Exposures to Off-Site Population from Sedan,” 22 May 1962; Luedecke to Seaborg, “Approvals for Project Sedan,” 31 May 1962; Fritsch to Seaborg, “Approvals for Project Sedan,” 1 June 1962; Chris L. Henderson to Seaborg, 4 June 1962; AEC 604/65, DMA—DOS report, “Off-site Radiation Exposure Criteria for Nevada Test Site,” 12 June 1962; AEC meeting no. 1854, 15 June 1962, item 9; Reeves to distrib., “NTS Off-Site Radiation Exposure Criteria,” 25 June 1962, w/att. messages.
Notes to Pages 220-221 431 68. Reeves to distrib., “Planning Directive (PL-3-6-62), Sedan, Revision II,” 2 July 1962, paragraph 2.a.(2). 69. NVOO releases: NV-62-32, 6 July 1962; NV-62-38, 7 July 1962; NV-62-74, 3 Oct. 1962; Southwick to editors and correspondents, 19 July 1962, w/att. SAN releases, 4—7 July 1962; AEC, Monthly report to GAC, July 1962, I-41, I-42; “Project Sedan Scientific Account,” 15 Nov. 1962; Sedan Project Manager’s Report (n. 66),
part 2, ch. 1. See also JRB Associates, Projects Gnome and Sedan (n. 22), 70-75; REECo, Radiological Effluents Released (n. 6), 28-29. 70. William W. Allaire to David F. Felan, “NTS Temporary Relocation Agreements,” 20 July 1962; Dunning to distrib., “Preliminary Health and Safety Report— Project Sedan,” 25 July 1962 (circulated as AEC 811/106, same title, 2 Aug. 1962); draft “Project Manager’s Preliminary Statement of the Public Safety Accomplishments for Project Sedan,” 2 Aug. 1962; Reeves to Walter S. Baring, 2 Aug. 1962; REECo, “Summary of Participation. . . in Project Sedan,” Aug. 1962; REECo, “The Sedan Event: On-Site Radiological Safety Report,’ Report RSS-62-8, 23 Oct. 1962; SWRHL draft, “Interim Off-Site Report of the Sedan Event, July 6, 1962,” 12 Dec. 1962; SWRHL, “Final Off-Site Report of the Project Sedan Event, July 6, 1962,” 12 Dec. 1962; Roehlk to R. E. Miller, “Project Manager’s Report of Project Sedan,” 28 Dec. 1962, w/att. “Part Three: Safety Program”; Higgins to distrib., “Proceedings of Sedan Fallout and Radiochemistry Meeting, 24 Jan. 1963,” 8 Feb. 1963; Joseph B. Knox to distrib., “Amendum” to ibid., 28 Feb. 1963; Sedan Project Manager’s Report (n. 66), part 4; Hawthorne, Continental U.S. Tests (n. 4), 552-554; IRB Associates, Projects Gnome and Sedan (n. 22), 94-97. 71. Sedan Project Manager’s Report (n. 66), part 4, 13.
72. G. D. Carlyle Thompson to Donald R. Chadwick, 26 July 1962; Robert C. Pendleton to Thompson, 31 July 1962; Pendleton et al., “Differential Accumulation of I'3! from Local Fallout in People and Milk,” in “Proceedings of the Hanford Symposium on the Biology of Radioiodine,” Richland, June 1963, Health Physics 9 (1963): 1253-1262; Pendleton et al., “Iodine-131 in Utah during July and August 1962,” Science 141 (16 Aug. 1963): 640-642. 73. Maxine Martz, “Experts Visit S.L. [Salt Lake], Make Fallout Study,” Deseret News, 7 Aug. 1962; William C. Patric, “Scientist Dissipates Milk Scare in Utah,” Salt Lake Tribune, 8 Aug. 1962; Dunning to distrib., “Meetings in Utah re High Iodine Levels in Milk,” 13 Aug. 1962, w/att.; Seal to E. C. Anderson, “Jodine-131 in Salt Lake City Milk due to Sedan Event,” 14 Aug. 1962; Dunning to Dwight A. Ink, “PHS Press Release August 17, 1962,” 17 Aug. 1962; Utah State Department of Health with Salt Lake City Health Department and PHS, “Utah’s Experience with Radioactive Milk,” 1 Oct. 1962; Bruce V. Snow to Pendleton, 6 Dec. 1962.
74. John H. Harley to H. E. Menker, “Present Fallout Program,” 5 Sept. 1961; F. Raymond Zintz to files, “Telecon with Arve Dahl, USPHS,” 22 Sept. 1961; Zintz to Dahl, “Radioactivity in Milk,” 9 Oct. 1961; John D. Faulkner to E. M. Norton, 17 Dec. 1961; Alex F. Perge to N. H. Woodruff, ‘““Miik—Fallout Countermeasures,” 18 Dec. 1961; Chadwick to David King, 22 Jan. 1962; Luther L. Terry to Philip A. Hart, 29 Jan. 1962; Dunning to Luedecke, “Radioactive Fallout from Current U.S. Nuclear Tests,” 22 May 1962; Lester Machta for the record, “Remarks on I-131 Fallout in Midwestern U.S. in Mid-May 1962,” 24 May 1962; Dunning to distrib., “Iodine-131 in Rain Water,” 25 June 1962; Dunning to distrib., “Iodine-131 Levels in Milk,” 27
432 Notes to Pages 221-222 June 1962 (circulated as AEC 604/66, same title, 29 June 1962); SSRS release, “Scientists Call Underground Testing Hazardous,” 12 Sept. 1962; DOS, “Off-Site Environmental Contamination from Nuclear Explosives at the Nevada Test Site, September 15, 1961—September 15, 1962,” Report TID-18892, n.d.; FRC, “Estimates and Evaluation of Fallout in the United States from Nuclear Weapons Testing Conducted through 1962,” Report 4, May 1963, 14, 22~23; Terry and Chadwick, “Current Concepts in Radiation Protection, Part II: Radioiodine Intake, 1961-1962,” JAMA 188 (27 Apr. 1964): 343-350. 75. Raymond T. Moore to E. C. Anderson, “Internal Exposure Hazard NTS Off-
Site Area,” 12 June 1962; Anderson to Placak, “Iodine Measurements in Vivo in Connection with Small Boy and Sedan Events,” n.d.; Anderson to Terrill, “Internal Exposure Hazard NTS Off-Site Area,” 19 June 1962; Abraham Ribicoff to FRC, “Radiation Protection Guides—Application to Radioiodine Concentrations,” 20 June 1962, w/att. (1) Terrill to FRC, “Estimated Population Exposure to Iodine-131 from Weapons Testing and Suggested Course of Action,” 18 June 1962, and (2) Ribicoff to Detlev W. Bronk, 20 June 1962; Victor P. Bond, “Comments on Guides for !3! Ingestion,” 21 June 1962; Terrill, “Radiation Surveillance—1962,” prepared for annual meeting of MBEHC, Cheyenne, Wyo., 27 June 1962; Reeves to Robert H. Thalgott, “Todine Measurements,” 3 July 1962; Wolff to Anderson, “Internal Exposure Hazard NTS Off-Site Area,” 10 July 1962; Placak to Roehlk, “Iodine 131 Monitornng,” 9 Aug. 1962, w/att. “Off-Site Radiological Safety Program (Revised August 1, 1962).”
76. Terrill to Reeves, 16 Oct. 1962. See also J. Z. Holland to S. Allan Lough, “Outline of ]-131 Research Program,” 4 Sept. 1962; Ralph E. Lapp, “Nevada Test Fallout and Radioiodine in Milk,” Science 137 (7 Sept. 1962): 756-758; Placak to Batzel, 7 Sept. 1962; AEC, Monthly report to GAC, Sept. 1962, I-45, I-46; J. S. Kelly to Luedecke, “Preliminary Report on Iodine-131 from the Sedan Event,” 1 Oct. 1962, w/att. Ralph A. Jones, “T!3! from the Sedan Event,” 24 Sept. 1962 (circulated as AEC 811/110, “Iodine-131 from Sedan Event,” 15 Oct. 1962); Thalgott to N. H. Woodruff, 8 Nov. 1962; Reeves to Terrill, 23 Nov. 1962; FRC, “Estimates and Evaluation of Fallout” (n. 74), 26. 77. Paul C. Tompkins to distrib., “Proposed Federal Radiation Council Statement, ‘Council Policy Concerning Radioactive Iodine in Fallout,’” 15 Nov. 1962, w/att. draft statement, 8 Nov. 1962.
78. N. H. Woodruff to P. C. Tompkins, “Proposed Federal Radiation Council Statement, ‘Council Policy Concerning Radioactive Iodine in Fallout,’” 21 Nov. 1962; Shipman to Seaborg, 19 Dec. 1962; Seaborg to Anthony J. Celebrezze, 26 Dec. 1962; AEC 604/75, “Proposed Letter to Chairman, Federal Radiation Council, in Response to Draft Statement, ‘Council Policy Regarding Iodine Fallout,’” 14 Mar. 1963; AEC meeting no. 1918, 25 Mar. 1963, item 1; Forrest Western, “Policy Position of the AEC with Respect to Criteria for the Initiation of Measures to Control Exposures to Radioactivity in the Environment as a Result of an Accident or of Fallout,” 25 Mar. 1963; Seaborg to Celebrezze, 10 Apr. 1963, w/att. (A) “Discussion,” and (B) “AEC Staff Study Regarding Federal Radiation Council Policy on Fallout.” 79. FRC, “Guidance for Protective Actions Applicable to Fallout,” RPPAP FRC/ 2/2, 27 Apr. 1964, w/att. draft guidance, Appendix A, “Recommendations for Protective Action Applied to Iodine-131,” 17-25. See also AEC meeting no. 2017, 13 May
Notes to Pages 222-223 433 1964, item 6; Celebrezze to President Lyndon B. Johnson, “Report from the Federal Radiation Council,” 26 May 1964, w/att. “Summary: Federal Radiation Council Organization and Activities,” 17 Apr. 1964 (circulated as AEC 1030/9, “Memorandum for the President—Report from the FRC Dated May 26, 1964,” 23 June 1964), 15; FRC, Minutes and record of actions, 4 June 1964, 2-3 (circulated as AEC 1030/10, “Minutes of Twenty-Fifth Meeting of Federal Radiation Council,” 21 July 1964). 80. Hewlett, “Nuclear Weapon Testing and Studies Related to Health Effects: An Historical Survey,” in IRRC, Consideration of Three Proposals to Conduct Research on Possible Health Effects of Radiation from Nuclear Weapon Testing in Arizona, Nevada, and Utah; and, Nuclear Weapon Testing and Studies Related to Health Effects, NIH Publication 81-507 (Washington, Oct. 1980), 76-78; Merril Eisenbud, Environmental Radioactivity, 2d ed. (New York: Academic Press, 1973), 386. 81. Harold A. Knapp, Jr., “Average and Above Average Doses to the Thyroids of Children in the United States from Radioiodine from Nuclear Weapons Tests,” 6 Aug.
1962.
82. Knapp to Dunham, “Transmittal of Report on Radioiodine,” 13 Sept. 1962, 1. 83. Ibid., 6. 84. Dunham to Knapp, “Draft Document: ‘Average and Above Average Doses
to the Thyroids of Children in the United States from Radioiodine from Nuclear Weapons Tests,’” 24 Oct. 1962. 85. Knapp to Luedecke, “Transmittal of Report on Radioiodine,” 28 Sept. 1962; Dunham to Luedecke, “Transmittal of Report on Radioiodine,” 1 Oct. 1962; Knapp to
DBM staff, “Report on Thyroid Doses from Radioiodine,” 10 Oct. 1962; Louis H. Hempelmann to Knapp, 6 Feb. 1963. 86. Knapp, “Observed Relations between the Deposition Level of Fresh Fission Products from Nevada Tests and the Resulting Levels of I-131 in Fresh Milk,” 1 Mar. 1963.
87. Knapp to Dunham, “Recommendations for Additional Measures Related to the Evaluation and Control of Radioiodine from Nevada Nuclear Tests,” 12 Mar. 1963, w/att. conclusions and recommendations, 2. 88. Dunham to Wright H. Langham, 20 Mar. 1963, w/att. Knapp report.
89. V. E. Andrews to Placak, “Review of Knapp I!3! in Milk Report,” 28 Mar. 1963; Fountain, “Comments—Relation between Deposition Levels of I 131 and Resultant Levels in Milk, as Proposed by H. A. Knapp,” 29 Mar. 1963; P. W. Allen to Placak, “Review of Iodine Paper by Knapp,” 29 Mar. 1963. 90. Langham to Knapp, 19 Apr. 1963. 91. Dunham to Knapp, 10 Apr. 1963; Knapp to Dunham, 16 Apr. 1963; Knapp to Langham, 16 Apr. 1963; Langham to Knapp, 19 Apr. 1963. 92. Knapp, “Jodine-131 in Fresh Milk and Human Thyroids Following a Single Deposition of Nuclear Test Fallout,’ 1 June 1963 (later published substantially unchanged as Report TID-19266 [Washington, 1 June 1963)). 93. Murray L. Nash to J. Z. Holland, “Paper Entitled ‘Iodine-131 in Fresh Milk and Human Thyroids Following a Single Deposition of Nuclear Test Fallout’ by H. A. Knapp Dated June 1, 1963,” 17 June 1963. 94. Knapp to English, 5 July 1963. 95. Dunning to N. H. Woodruff, “Comments on ‘Iodine-131 in Fresh Milk and
434 Notes to Pages 223-225 Human Thyroids Following a Single Deposition of Nuclear Test Fallout,’ by Dr. Harold Knapp,” 14 June 1963. Cf. ch. 5, p. 126, above, and the sources cited in chap. 5, n. 128. 96. Placak to Langham, “Comments on ‘Todine-131 in Fresh Milk and Human
Thyroids Following a Single Deposition of Nuclear Test Fallout,’ by Dr. Harold Knapp,” 27 June 1963. 97. Julian M. Nielsen to Dunham, 13 June 1963; Cyril L. Comar to Langham, 24 June 1963; Gofman to Langham, 24 June 1963; P. C. Tompkins to Dunham, 25 June 1963; Hamburger to J. S. Kelly, “Comments on ‘Iodine-131 in Fresh Milk and Human Thyroids Following a Single Deposition of Nuclear Test Fallout,’ by Harold Knapp,” 25 June 1963; Dunham to Langham, 26 June 1963; Placak to Langham, 27 June (n. 96). 98. Gofman to Langham, 24 June (n. 97). 99. Langham to Comar, 5 July 1963. Identical letters dated 8 July 1963 went to the rest of the ad hoc committee—Gofman, Nielsen, Placak—to Higgins in DPNE, and to P. C. Tompkins at FRC. See also Dunham to Langham, 10 July 1963. 100. Knapp to Dunham, 27 June 1963, w/att. Dunning to Woodruff, 14 June (n. 95). Knapp’s responses appear as extended interpolations between the lines of Dunning’s text. 101. Knapp to Langham, 15 July 1963; Langham to Knapp, 17 July 1963; Comar to Langham, 12 July 1963; P. C. Tompkins to Langham, 12 July 1963; Higgins to Langham, 22 July 1962; Langham to Comar and other committee members, 31 July 1963; Langham to John R. Totter, 31 July 1963; Langham to Dunham, 6 Aug. 1963, w/att. “Committee Review of Report on ‘Todine-131 in Fresh Milk and Human Thyroids Following a Single Deposition of Nuclear Test Fallout’”; Dunham to Seaborg et al., “Review Committee’s Critique of Dr. Knapp’s ‘Iodine Paper,’” 20 Aug. 1963. 102. “Committee Review” (n. 101), 5. 103. Ibid., 1-7. 104. Ibid., 7. 105. Cf. Alfred W. Klement, Jr., ed., Radioactive Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Tests, proceedings of a conference, 15-17 Nov. 1961, held at AEC hq, Germantown, Maryland, Report TID-7632 (Oak Ridge: AEC DTI, Feb. 1962); and Klement, ed., Radioactive Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Tests, proceedings of the 2d conference, Germantown, 3-6 Nov. 1964, Report CONF-765 (Oak Ridge: AEC DTI, Nov. 1965). See also Eugene W. Bierly and Klement, “Radioactive Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Tests,” Science 147 (26 Feb. 1965): 1057—1060; C. E. Miller, Jr., and W. F. Hilsmeier,
“Second AEC Conference on Radioactive Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Tests,” Nuclear Safety 6 (1965): 283-291.
106. See, e.g., Lindsay Mattison and Richard Daly, “Nevada Fallout: Past and Present Hazards,” BAS 20 (Apr. 1964): 41-45; Dunning, “AEC Official Protests,” ibid. (Sept. 1964): 29-30; and the reply from Mattison and Daly, ibid., 30. 107. Dunham to Kenner F. Hertford, “Radiological Safety Criteria at Nevada Test Site,” 29 Dec. 1958.
108. Harry S. Jordan to Raemer E. Schreiber, “Conclusions Regarding Health Hazards Due to Kiwi A Effluent,” 26 Aug. 1959. See also Joseph A. Connor, Jr., “Safety Aspects of the Nuclear Space Program,” presented at annual AIF meeting,
Notes to Pages 225-226 435 San Francisco, 15 Dec. 1960; Langham, “Radiation Safety in the Development and Use of Nuclear Energy for Rocket Propulsion,” Health Physics 8 (1962): 305-311; Harold M. Mork and Firmin J. Berta, “Environmental Contamination from a Nuclear Reactor at the Nevada Test Site,” Report UCLA 12-615 (Los Angeles, Dec. 1966). 109. Robert L. Elder to Placak, “Comparative Review of Proposed Instrumentation and Monitoring Program for Fallout Study of Kiwi-B Device as Proposed by USPHS, REECo, LASL,” 27 Feb. 1961; “Estimates of External Whole Body Dose and Internal Dose to the Thyroid: Estimations Based on Data Collected during NTS Operations,” n.d. (ca. Apr. 1962); William J. Brady to Floyd W. Wilcox, “Iodine MPC Values for Different Fission Product Mixtures and Ages,” 17 Aug. 1962; Brady to Wilcox, “Iodine Thyroid Dose Relative to External Gamma Dose,” 20 Sept. 1962; interviews in Las Vegas with Brady, 25 May and 15 June 1978, and with Wilcox and Brady, 15, 17, and 23 Jan. 1979. Cf. H. S. Jordan, “Radiation Levels Associated with Testing of Nuclear Propulsion Reactors,” presented at annual AIHA meeting, Cincinnati, May 1963. 110. “Off-Site Contamination at the Nevada Test Site,” n.d. (notes on discussions of 22—24 Jan. 1963), 1. 111. Dunning to E. J. Blech, “Recommendations of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radioiodine in the Environment,” 25 Apr. 1963. 112. Dunning to Bloch, “Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radioiodine in the Environment,” 26 Mar. 1963.
113. Dunning to distrib., “Work Sessions on Radioiodine at Nevada Operations Office,” 26 Mar. 1963, w/att. reports on “Monitoring,” “Sources and Radiochemistry,” “Transport,” and “Biological”; Dunning to Bloch, 25 Apr. (n. 109), w/att. “Recommendations of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radioiodine in the Environment.” 114. Frank K. Pittman to Dunham, “Health & Safety Studies Related to Radioiodine,” 4 Apr. 1963; Roehlk to Dunning, “Comments on the Recommendations of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radioiodine in the Environment,” 26 Apr. 1963; Placak to Thalgott, “Proposal for Iodine Study—Ferris Wheel,” 1 May 1963; Seal to distrib., “Operational Plans for Ferris Wheel,” 10 May 1963; I. E. Jackson, Jr., to William B. Cottrell, 21 May 1963; PHS, “Radioiodine Investigation Proposal,” 13 June 1963; Deibert S. Barth, “Protocol for Environmental Radioiodine Study,” n.d.; PHS, “Todine Investigation Program,” 8 Nov. 1963. 115. A. W. Betts, Storax Test Bulletin no. 40, “Yuba Event,” 10 June 1963; Placak to distrib., “Interim Off-Site Rad-Safe Report,” 9 July 1963, w/att. SWRHL, “Interim Off-Site Report of the Yuba Event, Operation Storax, June 5, 1963.” 116. L. E. Jordan to Clifford R. Penwell, “‘B’ Tunnel Thyroid Exposure,” n.d.; R. E. Gillett to files, “Re-Entry Personnel ‘B’ Tunnel,” 7 June 1963; SWRHL, “Preliminary Report of Radiation Exposure Incident of June 6, 1963,” n.d.; NVOO release NV-63-77, 7 June 1963; “Note to Editors and Correspondents,” 13 June 1963; Roehlk to Placak, “‘U12B Tunnel Incident,” 14 June 1963. 117. “Nevada Test Site—Off-Site Surveillance of Accidental Releases, October 1962—March 1964,” Radiological Health Data (Aug. 1964): 406—409; REECo, “Operation Storax On-Site Radiological Safety Report, July 1962 through June 1963,” ed. Leslie McClendon and Eubank, Report NVO-162-14/RRS-64-17, Sept. 1964, 8588; SWRHL, “Final Report of Off-Site Surveillance for Operation Storax,” Report
436 Notes to Page 226 SWRHL-4r, 20 July 1965, 20. See also REECo, Radiological Effluents Released (n. 6), 46-47. 118. Reeves to Batzel, 7 June 1963; Roehlk to Reeves, “Investigative Report of U12B Incident (Part B—Conclusions and Recommendations),” 11 July 1963; F. D. Rowsell, “Note: U-12-B Tunnel Re-Entry Procedure Established June 7, 1963,” 22 July 1963. 119. JCAE Subcomm. on Research, Development, and Radiation, Fallout, Radiation Standards, and Countermeasures, Hearings, 88th Cong., Ist Sess., 1963. See especially Charles Mays’s statement, 536-562; Eric Reiss’s statement, 601-672; Appendix 2, “Report by Dr. Harold A. Knapp, Jr., “Iodine in Fresh Milk and Human Thyroids Following a Single Deposition of Nuclear Test Fallout’ and Related Correspondence,” 914-1081; and Appendix 6, “Correspondence on Comments of Testimony Given before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Fallout and Report of Iodine 131 in Fallout to be Submitted for Inclusion into the Record,” 1101—1125. CNI summarized its testimony in “Local Fallout: Hazard from Nevada Tests,” Nuclear Information 5 (Aug. 1963): 1-12. 120. PHS release, 23 Aug. 1963; Frank E. Moss to Seaborg, 29 July 1964; Gerald
F. Tape to Moss, 11 Aug. 1964.
121. Reeves to Frank D. Peel, “Establishment of Program 4 and Project 4.1 in Castle,” 11 Mar. 1954; Eugene P. Cronkite et al., “Study of Response of Human Beings Accidentally Exposed to Significant Fallout Radiation,” Operation Castle Project 4.1, Report WT-923, Oct. 1954; Stanton H. Cohn et al., “Nature and Extent of Internal Radioactive Contamination of Human Beings, Plants, and Animals Exposed to Fallout,” Operation Castle Project 4.1, Addendum Report WT-936, Dec. 1955; Bond et al., “Medical Examination of Rongelap People Six Months after Exposure to Fallout Radiation during Operation Castle,” Operation Castle Project 4.1, Addendum Report WT-937, Apr. 1955; Robert Sharp and William H. Chapman, “Exposure of Marshall Islanders and American Military Personnel to Fallout,” Operation Castle Project 4.1, Addendum Report WT-938, Mar. 1957; C. A. Sondhaus and Bond, “Physical Factors and Dosimetry in the Marshall Island Radiation Exposures,” Operation Castle Project 4.1, Addendum Report WT-939, Dec. 1955. See also Kaman Tempo, Castle Series,
1954, by Edwin J. Martin and Richard H. Rowland, Report DNA 6035F (Santa Barbara, 1 Apr. 1982), 186-189; and ch. 6, pp. 148-149, above. 122. Enzi DeRenzis to Henry M. Jackson, 29 Mar. 1972, w/att. “AEC Staff Com-
ments on Allegations of Congressman Balos of the Congress of Micronesia.” Cf. Robert A. Conard et al., A Twenty-Year Review of Medical Findings in a Marshallese Population Accidentally Exposed to Radioactive Fallout, Report BNL 50424 (Upton, N.Y.: BNL, Sept. 1975), 4, 84; Jane Dibblin, Day of Two Suns: U.S. Nuclear Tesiing and the Pacific Islanders (New York: New Amsterdam Books, 1990), 60-62. 123. Cronkite et al., “Response of Human Beings Accidentally Exposed to Significant Fall-out Radiation,” JAMA 159 (1 Oct. 1955): 430-434; Conard et al., “Response of Human Beings Accidentally Exposed to Significant Fallout Radiation (Summary),” in Joseph S. Mitchell et al., eds., Progress in Radiobiology, proceedings of 4th International Conference on Radiobiology, Cambridge, Aug. 1955 (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1956), 491-493; Cronkite et al., Some Effects of Ionizing Radiation on Human Beings: A Report on the Marshallese and Americans Accidentally Exposed to
Notes to Page 227 437 Radiation from Fallout and a Discussion of Radiation Injury in the Human Being, Report TID 5358 (Washington: AEC, July 1956). 124. DBM transcript, “In the Matter of: Conference on Long Term Surveys and Studies of Marshall Islands,” Washington, 12-13 July 1954; Conard et al., TwentyYear Review of Medical Findings (n. 122), 1-5. Conard’s recently drafted memoir, “Fallout: The Experiences of a Medical Team in the Care of a Marshallese Population Accidentally Exposed to Fallout Radiation,” n.d. [1991], focuses on personal relationships. For a list of Brookhaven internal and published reports on the Marshallese (and other pertinent references), see William H. Adams et al., Medical Status of Marshallese Accidentally Exposed to 1954 Bravo Fallout Radiation: January 1983 through December 1984, Report BNL 51958 (Upton, N.Y.: BNL, n.d.), 14-17. 125. Dunning, ed., Radioactive Contamination of Certain Areas in the Pacific Ocean from Nuclear Tests: A Summary of the Data from the Radiological Surveys and
Medical Examinations (Washington: AEC, Aug. 1957); Seymour to J. N. Walfe, ‘Availability of Rongelap Data,” 19 Jan. 1959; Hines, Proving Ground (n. 55), chs. 7-9. Hines’s full bibliography, 341-351, lists all UWFL reports, and cites numerous other studies. 126. H & N, Report of Repatriation of the Rongelap People for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Albuquerque Operations Office (Los Angeles, n.d.); Dunning, Radioactive Contamination of Certain Areas (n. 125), ch. 6, “Return of the Rongelapese”; Conard et al., Twenty-Year Review of Medical Findings (n. 122), v, 1, 4; Hines, Proving Ground (n. 55), 197, 234-238.
127. Hugh S. Pratt and Conard, “Ethnoepidemiology: The Marshall Islanders Twenty-five Years after Exposure to Radiation,” presented at annual meeting of AAAS, San Francisco, Jan. 1980. See also Rosemary Elmo to McCool, “‘Medical Status of Rongelap People’—Report for Transmittal to Commission,” 12 June 1959, w/att. Conard, “Medical Status of Rongelap People Five Years after Exposure to Fallout Radiation,” 1 June 1959; Conard, “Medical Survey of Marshallese People Five Years after Exposure to Fall-out Radiation,” in A. A. Buzzati-Traverso, ed., Immediate and Low Level Effects of Ionizing Radiations, proceedings of a symposium, Venice, June 1959 (London: Taylor & Francis, 1960), 269-281; Conard et al., Medical Survey of Rongelap People Five and Six Years after Exposure to Fallout (with Addendum on Vegetation), Report BNL 609 (Upton, N.Y.: BNL, Sept. 1960). See also Conard et al., Twenty-Year Review of Medical Findings (n. 122), 10-14.
128. Conard and Arobati Hicking, “Medical Findings in Marshallese People Exposed to Fallout Radiation: Results from a Ten-Year Study,” JAMA 192 (10 May 1965): 457-459; Wataru W. Sutow et al., “Growth Status of Children Exposed to Fallout Radiation on Marshall Islands,” Pediatrics 36 (Nov. 1965): 721-731; Hermann Lisco and Conard, “Chromosome Studies on Marshall Islanders Exposed to Fallout Radiation,” Science 157 (28 July 1967): 445-447; Charles F. Demoise and Conard, “Effects of Age and Radiation Exposure on Chromosomes in a Marshall Island Population,” Journal of Gerontology 27 (April 1972): 197-201; Conard et al., Twenty-Year Review of Medical Findings (n. 122), 17-39. 129. Conard, “Acute Myelogenous Leukemia Following Fallout Radiation Exposure,” JAMA 232 (30 June 1975): 1356-1357; Conard et al., Twenty-Year Review of Medical Findings (n. 122), 63-66; Adams et al., “Pituitary Tumors Following Fallout
438 Notes to Pages 227-228 Radiation Exposure,” JAMA 252 (3 Aug. 1984): 664-666; Thomas E. Hamilton, “Preliminary Report on the Rongelapese People: Health Effects of Radiation from Nuclear Fallout,” Sept. 1984. 130. Conard and Hicking, “Medical Findings in Marshallese” (n. 126); Conard et al., “Thyroid Nodules as a Late Sequela of Radioactive Fallout in a Marshall Island Population Exposed in 1954,” New England Journal of Medicine 274 (23 June 1966):
1391-1399; Jacob Robbins et al., “Late Effects of Radioactive Iodine in Fallout: Combined Clinical Staff Conference at the National Institutes of Health,” Annals of Internal Medicine 66 (June 1967): 1214-1242; Conard et al., “Thyroid Nodules as a Late Effect of Exposure to Fallout,” in Radiation-induced Cancer, proceedings of a symposium, Athens, April 1969 (Vienna: IAEA, 1969), 325-336; BNL, “Fallout and Marshallese,” BAS 26 (Mar. 1970): 45; Conard et al., “Thyroid Neoplasia as Late Effect of Exposure to Radioactive Iodine in Fallout,” JAMA 214 (12 Oct. 1970): 316-324. 131. Edward T. Lessard et al., Thyroid Absorbed Dose for People at Rongelap, Utirik, and Sifo on March 1, 1954, Report BNL 51882 (Upton, N.Y.: BNL, Mar. 1985), 61 and elsewhere. Cf. R. A. James, Estimate of Radiation Dose to Thyroids of Rongelap Children Following the Bravo Event, Report UCRL-12273 (Livermore, Dec. 1964); Sutow and Conard, “Effects of Ionizing Radiation in Children,” Journal of Pediatrics 67 (Oct. 1965): 658-673. 132. Conard et al., Twenty-Year Review of Medical Findings (n. 122), 39-62; Lessard et al., “Thyroid Cancer in the Marshallese: Relative Risk of Short-Lived Internal Emitters and External Radiation Exposure,” presented at 4th International Radiopharmaceutical Dosimetry Symposium, Oak Ridge, Nov. 1985; T. E. Hamilton et al., “Thyroid Neoplasia in Marshall Islanders Exposed to Nuclear Fallout,” JAMA 258 (7 Aug. 1987): 629-636. 133. Conard et al., Twenty-Year Review of Medical Findings (n. 122), 39. 134. Conard, “Medical Status of Rongelap People Five Years after” (n. 127), 2—5. See also Cohn et al., “Radioisotopes and Environmental Circumstances: The Internal Radioactive Contamination of a Pacific Island Community Exposed to Local Fallout,” in Richard S. Caldecott and Leon A. Snyder, eds., Radioisotopes in the Biosphere, proceedings of a symposium, Univ. of Minnesota, 19-23 Oct. 1959 (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Center for Continuation Study, 1960), 306—330, at 319. 135. Conard, “Medical Survey of Marshallese People Five Years after” (n. 127), 277. Cf. Conard et al., Medical Survey of Rongelap People Five and Six Years after (n. 127), 3; Conard et al., Twenty-Year Review of Medical Findings (n. 122), 9-10, 74-75. 136. See John A. D. Cooper, “Radioisotope Toxicity: As Related to the Thyroid,” in Caldecott and Snyder, Radioisotopes in the Biosphere (n. 134); Kathren, Radioactivity in the Environment: Sources, Distribution, and Surveillance (Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic, 1984), 106—108. 137. Edward S. Weiss to Dunning, 1 June 1965, w/att. draft proposal, “Environmental and Genetic Factors in the Oral Dental and Medical Characteristics of Utah School Children,” 28 Apr. 1965; PHS draft release on initiation of dental, eye, and thyroid study, 24 Aug. 1965; Conard et al., Twenty-Year Review of Medical Findings (n. 122), 42; Hewlett, ‘Nuclear Weapon Testing” (n. 80), 79-81; J. Samuel Walker, “Evaluating Fallout Hazards: The Public Health Service, the Atomic Energy Com-
Notes to Pages 228-230 439 mission, and the Weiss Reports,” presented at the annual OAH meeting, Reno, 26 Mar. 1988. 138. Dunning to Ink, “PHS Studies in Utah,” 27 Aug. 1965. 139. Dunning to Weiss, draft letter, 2 June 1965, used as basis for telephone call on 14 June 1965, 3. 140. Ibid., 4. 141. Dunning to Ink, 27 Aug. (n. 138). 142. Terrill to Dunham, 30 July 1965, w/att. Weiss draft, “Leukemia Mortality in Southwestern Utah,” 23 July 1965, 4—5. 143. Weiss, “Leukemia Mortality in Southwestern Utah, 1950-1964,” revised 14 Sept. 1965; Walker, “Evaluating Fallout Hazards” (n. 137), 7-8, citing Walker’s telephone interview with Weiss, 20 Jan. 1988.
144. Dunning to Ink, 27 Aug. (n. 138), w/att. (4), comments by Tommy F. McCraw, and (5), comments by Dunning. 145. Dunning to O. S. Hiestand, Jr., “PHS Studies in Utah,” 3 Sept. 1965. 146. PHS draft release, 24 Aug. (n. 137); Judson Hardy for the record, “Meeting of PHS-AEC Representatives re Utah Study,” 2 Sept. 1965; Ink to AEC Commissioners, “USPHS Epidemiology Studies in Southwestern Utah,” 7 Sept. 1965; Ink to AEC Commissioners, same title, 9 Sept. 1965; McCool to file, same title, 15 Sept. 1965; Robert E. Hollingsworth to L. L. Terry, n.d., w/att. “Comments on ‘Environmental and Genetic Factors in the Oral Dental and Medical Characteristics of Utah School Children,’” and “Comments on ‘Leukemia Mortality in Southwestern Utah’”; Walker, “Evaluating Fallout Hazards” (n. 137), 9.
147. D. Clark to Hardy, “Review of Proposed Public Announcement of Utah Studies,” n.d. Cf. PHS draft release on Utah study, for release 16 Sept. 1965; ibid., revised draft. 148. Chadwick to Surgeon General, “Thyroid Abnormalities Revealed by Field Study of Utah and Arizona Students,” 4 Oct. 1965; Chadwick to Surgeon General, “Utah-Nevada Population Study,” 11 Oct. 1965; Dunham, “Report on USPHS Survey of School Children in St. George, Utah, and Safford, Arizona, for Thyroid Tumor and Dental Anomalies,” 4 Oct. 1965; Dunham to John V. Vinciguerra, “USPHS Survey of School Children in St. George, Utah, and Safford, Arizona, for Thyroid Tumor and Dental Anomalies,” 12 Oct. 1965 (both circulated as AEC 604/91, “USPHS Survey of School Children for Thyroid Tumor and Dental Anomalies,” 14 Oct. 1965). 149. Dunning to Ink, 16 Dec. 1965. See also Placak to Thalgott, “PHS Study on Human Thyroids in Utah,” 1 Dec. 1965; “Transcript of Meeting on Statistical Con-
siderations on Field Studies on Thyroid Diseases in School Children in UtahArizona,” Rockville, Md., 3 Dec. 1965; Dunning to Ink, “PHS Study on Human Thyroids in Utah,” 6 Dec. 1965; AEC meeting no. 2165, 14 Dec. 1965, item 3; Reeves to Delmar L. Crowson, 28 Jan. 1966.
150. Dunning to Ink, “Discussion with Drs. Gofman and Tamplin re Fallout Studies,” 15 Dec. 1965. See also Michael M. May to Seaborg, 29 Nov. 1965; Gofman and Arthur R. Tamplin to Dunham, “The Problem of Potential Thyroid Pathology in Washington County, Utah,” 6 Dec. 1965; Tamplin and H. Leonard Fisher, “Estimation
of Dosage to Thyroids of Children in the U.S. from Nuclear Tests Conducted in Nevada during 1952 through 1955,” Report UCRL-14707 (Livermore, 10 May 1966). 151. Chadwick to Surgeon General, 11 Oct. (n. 148); PHS draft release, 22 Oct.
440 Notes to Pages 230-231 1965; Franklin Tobey to Vermillion et al., 27/1715Z Oct. 1965; D. Clark to AEC Commissioners, “PHS Announcement on Thyroid Studies in NTS Area,” 27 Oct. 1965, w/att. PHS release, 25 Oct. 1965; Albert W. Hilberg to G. D. C. Thompson, 29 Oct. 1965; Walter Bauer and Brodine, “Children and Fallout: Report on a Study in Progress,” Scientist and Citizen 8 (Nov. 1965): 15-17; Walker, “Evaluating Fallout Hazards” (n. 137), 12-13. 152. Surgeon General Assistant for Information to Surgeon General, 1 Nov. 1965, as quoted in Walker, “Evaluating Fallout Hazards” (n. 137), 14.
153. Howard C. Brown, Jr., to AEC Commissioners, “Public Health Service Announcement on Utah-Arizona Thyroid Studies,” 4 Mar. 1966; PHS release, 16 Mar. 1966; “Fallout in Utah,” Time (25 Mar. 1966): 60; Leonard A. Sagan to Dunham, “Public Health Service Studies of Thyroid Disease in the Utah Fallout Area,” 27 July 1966; “No Thyroid Malignancy Found in Children Exposed to Fallout,” Los Angeles Times, 5 Feb. 1967; Weiss et al., “Thyroid Nodularity in Southwestern Utah School
Children Exposed to Fallout Radiation,” American Journal of Public Health 61 (1971): 241-249; Walker, “Evaluating Fallout Hazards” (n. 137), 14-15. 154. Weiss et al., “Surgically Treated Thyroid Disease among Young People in Utah, 1948-1962,” American Journal of Public Health 57 (1967): 1807-1814; Hewlett, “Nuclear Weapon Testing” (n. 80), 81-82; Walker, “Evaluating Fallout Hazards” (n. 137), 16-20. For current views, see Charlotte Silverman, “Thyroid Tumors Associated with Radiation Exposure,” Public Health Reports 99 (1984): 369-373; NCRP, Induction of Thyroid Cancer by Ionizing Radiation: Recommendations, Report 80 (Washington: NCRP, 30 Mar. 1985). 155. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater, signed 5 Aug. 1963, Article I, paragraph 1. See also George W. Ball
to J. F Kennedy, 8 Aug. 1963; U.S. Cong., Senate, Comm. on Foreign Relations, Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Hearings on Executive M, . . . Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests. . . , 88th Cong., Ist Sess., 1963. 156. Seaborg to John O. Pastore, 6 Feb. 1964, w/att. “AEC Actions to Insure Weapons Tests Will be Conducted within the Terms of the Partial Test Ban Treaty,” 2. 157. Robert Gillette, “Nuclear Testing Violations: Keeping It All in the Family,”
Science 185 (9 Aug. 1974): 506-510; H. N. Friesen, A Perspective on Atmospheric Nuclear Tests in Nevada (Las Vegas, Aug. 1985), 10; NVOO, Announced Nuclear Tests (n. 4), 10-18. Containment percentages including formerly unannounced tests does not alter containment percentages; see DOE, “Summary List of Previously Unannounced Tests,” Washington, 7 Dec. 1993, 1-2. 158. Crowson to Luedecke, “Underground Testing,” 27 Feb. 1964; “Readiness Briefing Report [Pike],” 12 Mar. 1964; Crowson to AEC Commissioners, “Pike Event,” 16 Mar. 1964, w/att. sketch of Pike cloud path; Crowson, Niblick Test Bulletin no. 37, 17 Mar. 1964; Seaborg to Bundy, 24 Mar. 1964; Seaborg to Pastore, 28 Mar. 1964; AEC, “Transcript of Briefing on Pike Event,” 20 Mar. 1964, 2—4, 6-7; Map 1, “Ground Zero Area,” with overlays 1-1, “Pike Event Area,” and 1-2, “Geological Structure,” in “Maps, Overlays and Photographs Prepared for Briefing of Commission on Pike Event,” 20 Mar. 1964, 9, 10, 11; Dunning draft, “Report of the Atomic Energy Commission on the Venting of the Nuclear Test Detonated on Merch 13, 1964, at the Nevada Test Site,” n.d. (ca. 22 Mar. 1964), 1-6. 159. “Transcript of Briefing” (n. 158), 22. 160. Crowson to AEC Commissioners, 16 Mar. (n. 158).
Notes to Pages 231-233 441 161. Robert G. Patzer for the record, “Possible Release from NTS,” 13 Mar. 1964.
162. Dahl for the record, “RSC Record of NTS Venting—Friday, March 13, 1964,” 17 Mar. 1964; Dahl for the record, “Report on March 13th, NTS Underground
Test Venting, Gordon Dunning, Division of Operational Safety—AEC,” 17 Mar. 1964; SWRHL draft, “Preliminary Report of Off-Site Surveillance for the Pike Event, March 13, 1964,” 7 Apr. 1964, 2-3; V. E. Andrews to files, “Aerial Coverage—Pike
Event, March 13, 1964,” 23 Apr. 1964; SWRHL draft, “Final Report of Off-Site Surveillance for the Pike Event of March 13, 1964,” 28 July 1964, 10-13; Victor M. Milligan to Arthur J. Whitman, 8 Oct. 1964, w/att. “Pike Event—Operation Niblick— Health Data Report”; Crowson to AEC Commissioners, 16 Mar. (n. 158); Seaborg to Bundy, 24 Mar. (n. 158); “Transcript of Briefing” (n. 158), 8-13, 17-19; map 4, “Southwest United States,” with overlays: 4-B, “Forecast Trajectories for 12 Hour Travel Time”; 4-2, “ARMS Aircraft Third Flight—Approximate Position of Cloud Area at H+21 to H+26”; and 4-3, “ARMS Flights with Negative Results,” in “Maps, Overlays and Photographs” (n. 158), 7, 23, 25; Dunning draft report on Pike venting (n. 158), 6-9. See also SWRHL, “Pike Event,” n.d.; Melvin W. Carter to Donald W. Hendricks, 10 Nov. 1969, w/att. David E. Bernhardt, “Integrated External Exposure at Cactus Springs, Pike Event—3/13/64,” 7 Nov. 1969; V. Urban to Hendricks, “Assessment of External-Gamma Exposure at Cactus Springs as a Result of Pike,” 27 Jan. 1970. See also REECo, Radiological Effiuents Released (n. 6), 56—57. 163. Crowson to AEC Commissioners, 16 Mar. (n. 158). 164. J. G. Holloway to Paul Fannin, 16 Mar. 1964; Fannin to Seaborg, 19 Mar. 1964; Malcolm Peterson to Dunning, 19 Mar. 1964; Dunning to Peterson, 27 Mar. 1964; Peterson to Dunning, 31 Mar. 1964; Dunning to Peterson, 8 Apr. 1964, w/att. summary of data; Seaborg to Fannin, 8 Apr. 1964; Luedecke to AEC Commissioners,
“Investigation of Complaint Registered by Governor of Arizona Following Pike Venting,” 14 May 1964. See also Reeves to Dunning, “Preliminary Report of Off-Site Surveillance for the Pike Event,” 30/0210Z Apr. 1964; Dunning to Luedecke, “Preliminary Report of Off-Site Surveillance for the Pike Event,” 4 May 1964; Luedecke to AEC Commissioners, “Preliminary Report on the Pike Event, March 13, 1964,” 14 May 1964, w/att. SWRHL, “Preliminary Report of Off-Site Surveillance for the Pike Event, March 13, 1964”; SWRHL, Final Pike Off-Site Report (n. 162), 14-18; Delbert S. Barth and Joel G. Veater, Dairy Farm Radioiodine Study Following the Pike Event, Report SWRHL-14r (Las Vegas, 23 Nov. 1964). 165. Dunning draft report on Pike venting (n. 158), 10. 166. D. Clark to AEC Commissioners, “Replies to Inquiries Relating Pike Venting to Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,” 3 June 1964, 2. See also G. W. Johnson to J. S. Kelly,
07/0115Z Mar. 1964; Luedecke to AEC Commissioners, “Test Ban Treaty and Nuclear Excavation,” 10 Mar. 1964; Seaborg to Dean Rusk, n.d., w/att. “Nuclear Excavation and the Test Ban Treaty”; Clark to George Reedy, 9 June 1964, w/att. replies; Seaborg with Benjamin S. Loeb, Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), 207-211. 167. Dunning draft report on Pike venting (n. 158); Clark to AEC Commissioners, 3 June (n. 166); H. C. Brown to files, 9 June 1964; memo of telephone call, Spurgeon M. Kenney, Jr., to Seaborg, 12 June 1964. 168. D. Clark to AEC Commissioners, “PHS Paper, ‘Fallout from Underground Nuclear Test of March 13, 1964, at Nevada Test Site,’” 11 Dec. 1964, 1. See also Dunning to Crowson, “Fresh Fission Products in Air Filters at Los Angeles,” 23 Apr.
442 Notes to Pages 233-234 1964, w/att. trajectory maps; James Hardin et al., Fallout from Underground Nuclear Test of March 13, 1964, at Nevada Test Site, Report MS 64-116 (Las Vegas: PHS, n.d. [ca. 9 Oct. 1964]), especially table 2, “Radionuclide Concentrations on Air Filters, in pc/m3,” 8. 169. D. Clark to Hilberg, draft, n.d., enclosed with Clark to AEC Commissioners, 11 Dec. (n. 168).
170. Vermillion to Reeves, “NTS Radiation Releases and Public Reporting,” 18 Mar. 1964, 4. 171. Reeves to Luedecke, “Off-Site Monitoring—Pike Event,” 19 Mar. 1964. See also E. C. Anderson to Placak, “Reporting of Ventings or Other Incidents in Connec-
tion with Activities under the Auspices of the Nevada Operations Office,” 1 Apr. 1964; Anderson to distrib., “Reporting of Ventings or Other Incidents in Connection with Activities under the Auspices of the Atomic Energy Commission’s Nevada Operations Office,” 28 May 1964.
172. Reeves to D. Clark, “Proposed Public Report on Pike Venting,” 13 Apr. 1964. See also Reeves to Ink, “Impact on Regional Public of NTS Activities,” 6 Apr. 1964, as quoted and discussed in Dixon Stewart to Reeves, “Nuclear Test Information Policy,” 4 May 1965, 4. 173. P. W. Allen to Thalgott, “Models of Maximum Venting from Underground Explosions,” 15 Jan. 1968; McBride to Allaire, “Models of Maximum Venting from Underground Explosions,” 22 Apr. 1968; Allen to Thalgott, “The Pike Model,” 9 May 1968; Thalgott to distrib., “Data Related to the ‘Pike Model,’” 10 May 1968; Thalgott to Allaire et al., “Venting Model for Plowshare Projects,” 3 Sept. 1968, w/att.; Barth
to M. W. Carter, “Venting Model for Plowshare Projects,” 10 Sept. 1968; Robert Jacobs to Carter, “Venting Model for Plowshare Projects,” 18 Sept. 1968; Thalgott to Harry L. Reynolds et al., 20 Sept. 1968; Reynolds to Thalgott, 25 Oct. 1968. 174. Reeves to Crowson, 16/2314Z Dec. 1964, 3-4. 175. Reeves to Crowson, “Concerning Effect of Post-Pike Restrictions,” 07/0032Z Jan. 1965, 4, 6-7. 176. McCraw, “Categories of Release of Radioactivity from Tests at the Nevada Test Site,” 19 Feb. 1964; Hendricks to Whitman, “Categorization of Events,” 19 Nov. 1964; D. Stewart to Reeves, “Nuclear Test Information Policy,” 4 May 1965; Fritsch to Seaborg, 19 May 1965; Crowson to AEC Commissioners, “Procedures for Notification of Agencies in the Event Unexpected Results of a Nuclear Test Require Prompt Governmental Action,” 4 Feb. 1966, w/att. procedures; DMA, “Standard Operating Procedures, Test Operations Center—Information and Data Processing Procedures,” revised 4 Feb. 1966 (circulated in AEC 1187/38, “Memorandum for Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests,” 29 June 1966); Fritsch to Seaborg, 2 May 1966. 177. John G. Palfrey to Bundy, w/att. Palfrey to L. B. Johnson, 2 Apr. 1964 (circu-
lated as AEC 1138/3, “Underground Test Program,” 29 Apr. 1964); Pastore and Holifield to Seaborg, 12 May 1964. 178. O. C. Doerflinger to Crowson, ‘“Post-Pike Restrictions,” 1 Mar. 1967, w/att.
‘“Post-Pike Restrictions,” n.d. See also Reeves to Crowson, 07/0032Z (n. 175), 3; Crowson to Reeves, 12/1440Z July 1965; Reeves to Crowson, 16/2341Z July 1964, 1—3; Crowson to J. S. Foster and Bradbury, 25/2102Z Aug. 1965; Foster to Crowson, 27/2050 Aug. 1965.
Notes to Pages 234-236 443 179. A. W. Betts to Reeves, 20 August 1962; Betts to Luedecke, “Nuclear Weapons Tests (Alluvium) without Surface Subsidence,” 20 Aug. 1962 (distrib. as AEC 1077/99, “Nuclear Weapons Tests without Surface Subsidence,” 27 Aug. 1962; Dunning, “Releases of Radioactivity from Nuclear Detonations,” prepared for Special Subcommittee on Air and Water, Senate Committee on Public Works, 30 June 1964, 16-17; E. G. Rapp, Containment of Buried Nuclear Explosions, Report UCRL-50604 (Livermore, Oct. 1968); Lawrence S. Germain and J. S. Kahn, Phenomenology and Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions, Report UCRL-50482 (Livermore, Nov. 1968); P. W. Allen, “Venting and Fallout Prediction,” in Lynn E. Weaver, ed., Education for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosives (Tucson: Univ. of Arizona Press, 1970), 193-204; Samuel Glasstone, Public Safety and Underground Nuclear Explosions (Washington: AEC, June 1971). 180. R. L. Gotchy, Radioactive Effluent Monitoring at the Nevada Test Site Folllowing Nuclear Detonations, Report UCRL-12272 (Livermore, 21 Dec. 1964).
10 Testing Underground: The New Character of Radiation Safety, 1964-1974 1. Edward Teller et al., The Constructive Uses of Nuclear Explosives (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), ch. 5, “Industrial Uses of Nuclear Explosives: Earth Moving”; Marvin M. Williamson, “Nuclear Cratering Applications,” in PHS, Public Health Aspects of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosives, proceedings of a symposium, Las Vegas, 7-11 Apr. 1969, Report SWRHL-82 (Las Vegas, 1969), 21-46; John Toman, “Summary of Results of Cratering Experiments,” ibid., 48-80; Richard Hamburger, “United States of America,” in IAEA, Peaceful Nuclear Explosions: Phenomenology and Status Report, 1970 (Vienna, 1970), 30-31; Milo D. Nordyke, “Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosions,” ibid., 77-99; Toman, “Results of Cratering Experiments,” ibid., 346-355; Gerald W. Johnson, “Technological Development of Nuclear Explosives Engineering,” in Lynn E. Weaver, ed., Education for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosives (Tucson: Univ. of Arizona Press, 1970), 11-21; Luke J. Vortman, “Nuclear Excavation,” ibid., 65-79; Joseph B. Knox, “Technologies Being Used in Nuclear Explosives Engineering,” ibid., 115-132. 2. Claude Gailledreau, “Radiological Protection in Underground Nuclear Explosions,” in A. M. Francis Duhamel, ed., Health Physics, vol. 2, part 1, Progress in Nuclear Energy, Series XII (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1969), 481-509; Samuel Glasstone, Public Safety and Underground Nuclear Explosions (Washington: AEC, 1971), Appendix, “Nuclear Excavation Safety.” 3. Glenn T. Seaborg to President John F. Kennedy, 19 Feb. 1962 (circulated as AEC 1077/51, “DOD Interest in Nuclear Cratering Effects Program,” 27 Feb. 1962). See also ch. 9, above. 4. John S. Foster, Jr., to John S. Kelly, 2 Apr. 1963; Kelly to Seaborg, “Nuclear Devices for the Plowshare Excavation Program,” 12 Apr. 1963; Kelly to Leland J. Haworth, “Discussion Paper on Plowshare Device Development,” 2 May 1963; Seaborg to F. A. Long, 12 July 1963; Alvin R. Luedecke to George M. Kavanagh and Kelly, “Limitations on Underground Testing under the Test Ban,” 2 Aug. 1963;
444 Notes to Page 237 Woodford B. McCool to files, “Limitations on Underground Testing under the Test Ban Treaty,” 6 Aug. 1963; Seaborg to Thomas H. Kuchel, 23 Nov. 1963; Luedecke to AEC Commissioners, “Test Ban Treaty and Nuclear Excavation,” 10 Mar. 1964; Seaborg to Dean Rusk, n.d., w/att. “Nuclear Excavation and the Test Ban Treaty”; Herbert F. York, Making Weapons, Talking Peace: A Physicist’s Odyssey from Hiroshima to Geneva (New York: Basic Books, 1987), 218-221; Seaborg with Benjamin S. Loeb, Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), 313-314. See also Stephen Gorove, “Distinguishing ‘Peaceful’ from ‘Military’ Uses of Atomic Energy: Some Facts and Considerations,” Ohio State Law Journal 30 (1969): 495-501; Thomas Ehrlich, “The Limited Test Ban Treaty and Civil Nuclear Engineering,” in Weaver, Education for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosives (n. 1), 223-230. 5. J. S. Kelly to Luedecke, “Revised Plowshare Program for FY 1964 and FY 1965,” 30 Oct. 1963 (circulated as AEC 811/115, same title, 8 Nov. 1963). See also Gary H. Higgins to Kelly, 4 Mar. 1964; Seaborg to McGeorge Bundy, 5 June 1964; U.S. Cong., JCAE, Peaceful Applications of Nuclear Explosives—Plowshare, Hearing, 89th Cong., Ist Sess., 5 Jan. 1965. 6. NVOO, “Test Manager’s Operational Concept, Project Sulky,” revised 14 Nov. 1963; Oliver R. Placak to Otto H. Roehlk, “Project Sulky Activities,” 31 Jan. 1964; George W. Miles to John S. Coogan, “Training Program for Sulky,” 3 Feb. 1964; J. S. Foster to Seaborg, 21 Feb. 1964; “Weather Bureau Estimate of Sulky Airborne Debris and Routine Detection Capabilities,” 30 Sept. 1964; Seaborg to President Lyndon B. Johnson, 13 Oct. 1964; “Technical Director’s Plan for Project Sulky,” 8 Nov. 1963, revised 30 Oct. 1964; John R. McBride to Roehlke, “Project Sulky Activities—OffSite Surveillance Program,” 18 Nov. 1964; LRL, “Sulky Health and Safety Re-Entry Plan,” Dec. 1964; Seaborg, Stemming the Tide (n. 4), 318-319; NVOO Office of Public Affairs, Announced United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through December 1986, Report NVO-209 (revision 7) (Las Vegas, Jan. 1987), 14-19. See also Toman, “Results of Cratering Experiments” (n. 1), 359. 7. AEC, “Radiation Protection Criteria for Plowshare Programs,” 3 July 1963; Readiness briefings for Sulky, 7-18 Dec. 1964; PHS, “Preliminary Report of Aerial Sampling and Cloud Measurements, Sulky Event,” 18 Dec. 1964; NTS to DMA, “H Plus Six Hour Advisory on Operation Whetstone, Event Sulky,” 19/0310Z Dec. 1964; Charles K. Fitzsimmons to files, “Flight Report for the Sulky Event of December 18, 1964,” 19 Dec. 1964; J. S. Kelly to AEC Commissioners, “Preliminary Report to the White House on Project Sulky,” 24 Dec. 1964; PHS, “Final Report of Off-Site Surveillance for Project Sulky,” Report PNE-715F, 9 Mar. 1965; Leslie McClendon, ed., “Project Sulky On-Site Radiological Safety Program,” Report PNE-717F, July 1965; Hamburger to Lewis M. Groover, “Effluent Releases [Sulky and Palanquin],” 12 Aug. 1965. See also REECo, Radiological Effluents Released from Announced U.S. Continental Tests, 1961 through 1988, by Carole R. Schoengold et al., Report DOE/NV-317 (Las Vegas, May 1990), 68-69; Seaborg, Stemming the Tide (n. 4), 319. 8. AEC 811/116, DPNE report, “Plowshare Program—Project Sulky,” 16 Dec. 1963; Seaborg to Bundy, 15 Jan. 1965, w/att. “Analysis of Project Sulky”; J. S. Foster to Seaborg, 21 Feb. 1964. 9. AEC 811/116, “Plowshare Program” (n. 8), 21-22.
Notes to Pages 238-239 445 10. Duncan Clark to J. S. Kelly, “DPI Comments on Project Sulky Draft Staff Paper,” 29 Nov. 1963 (circulated as Appendix C to AEC 811/116, “Plowshare Program” (n. 8], 24-26). 11. Bundy to D. Clark, 9 Nov. 1964; J. S. Kelly to AEC Commissioners, “Execution Data for Project Sulky,” 16 Nov. 1964, w/att. draft release; Kelly to Robert E. Hollingsworth, “Procedures for Handling Information on Project Sulky Venting,” 25 Nov. 1964 (circulated in AEC 811/126, “Procedures for Handling Information on Project Palanquin Venting,” 10 Mar. 1965); AEC release G-327, 21 Dec. 1964. 12. Seaborg to Bundy, 3 Feb. 1965, w/att. “Analysis of Project Palanquin,” 2-3.
See also Delmar L. Crowson, Niblick Test Bulletin no. 52 [Dub test], 2 July 1964; PHS, “Interim Report of Off-Site Surveillance for the Dub Event of June 30, 1964,” 14 Aug. 1964; G. W. Johnson to J. S. Kelly, 22 Jan. 1965 (circulated in AEC 811/125, “Palanquin Event,” 5 Feb. 1965). See also Toman, “Summary of Results of Cratering Experiments” (n. 1), 53-54. 13. “Analysis of Project Palanquin” (n. 12), 5-6. See also John Allen to J. S. Coogan, 28 Jan. 1965; L. B. Ballou to K. N. Joy, “REECo Rad-Safe Proposal, Project Palanquin,” 11 Feb. 1965; Roehlk to Nathan H. Woodruff, 23 Feb. 1965; “Radiological Studies Program, Project Palanquin,” n.d.; McBride to Robert H. Thalgott, “Proposed Use of C-54 for Additional Cloud Tracker—Palanquin,” 4 Mar. 1965; “Operational Safety Plan, Project Palanquin—Plowshare Program,” Mar. 1965; Seaborg, Stemming the Tide (n. 4), 322-323. 14. J. S. Kelly to Hollingsworth, “Procedures for Handling Information on Project Palanquin Venting,” 8 Mar. 1965 (circulated in AEC 811/126, “Procedures for Handling Information” [n. 11]). 15. Reeves to J. S. Kelly et al., “Estimated Planning Schedule for Project Palan-
quin,” 11 Feb. 1965; Reeves to distrib., “Planning Directive (P.L.-14-2-65) Project Palanquin,” 1 Mar. 1965; Kelly to Reeves et al., 2 Mar. 1965; Seaborg to Bundy, 14 Mar. 1965; J. S. Foster to Gerald F. Tape, 23 Mar. 1965; Kelly to Reeves, 31/2300Z Mar. 1965. 16. Readiness briefing—Palanquin, 1400 hours, 4/7/65; 1915 briefing, 4/7/65; 1900 briefing, 4/9/65; 1900 briefing, 4/13/65; 0130 briefing, 4/14/65; Julius H. Rubin to Seaborg, 14 Apr. 1965. 17. Seaborg to L. B. Johnson, “Preliminary Report on Project Palanquin,” 16 Apr. 1965. See also Seaborg, Stemming the Tide (n. 4), 323; J. S. Kelly, Whetstone Test Bulletin no. 30, “Palanquin Event,” 16 Apr. 1965; J. K. Thompson, “Aerial Radiological Monitoring, Nevada Test Site, Palanquin,” NATS Mission Report 13-F-65, 15 July 1965; PHS, “Final Report of Off-Site Surveillance for Project Palanquin,” Report PNE 910F, 19 Oct. 1965; Omer W. Mullen and Bernard F. Eubank, comps., “Project Palanquin On-Site Radiological Safety Report, Plowshare Program,” Report PNE911F (Las Vegas: REECo, Nov. 1965); Toman, “Summary of Results of Cratering Experiments” (n. 1), 54. See also REECo, Radiological Effluents Released (n. 7), 72-73. 18. Reeves to DMA, “H Plus Twelve-Hour Report, Operation Whetstone, Palanquin,” 15/0210Z Apr. 1965; Reeves to DMA, “H Plus Twenty-Four Hour Report, Project Palanquin,” 15/2010Z Apr. 1965; Reeves to DMA, “H Plus Forty-Eight Hour Report, Project Palanquin,” 17/0220 Apr. 1965; Seaborg to L. B. Johnson, 16 Apr. (n.
446 Notes to Pages 239-240 17); Kelly, “Palanquin Event” (n. 17), 16 Apr. 1965; Seaborg to Johnson, 19 Apr. 1965; Seaborg, Stemming the Tide (n. 4), 323-324. 19. Milton F, Moore to Reeves et al., 16/2210Z Apr. 1965.
20. AEC release H-86, 19 Apr. 1965; D. Clark to AEC Commissioners, “Questions and Answers on Palanquin,” 26 Apr. 1965; Robert W. Kastenmeier to Seaborg, 30 Apr. 1965; McCool to Allen M. Labowitz, “U.S.S.R. April 29, 1965, Aide Memoire re NTS Event,” 4 May 1965; Labowitz to AEC Commissioners, 5 May 1965, w/att. draft aide memoire; Seaborg to Kastenmeier, 8 May 1965; Kavanagh to Hollingsworth, “Memorandum of Conversation with Representative Robert Kastenmeier, May 10, 1965,” 24 May 1965; John F. Philip to distrib., “Revision #1 to Project Palanquin Technical and Safety Reporting Plan,” 28 July 1965; Higgins to distrib., “Description of the Palanquin Event,” 13 Oct. 1965. 21. J. S. Kelly to AEC Commissioners, “P-SAC Nuclear Excavation Meeting of May 19, 1965,” 21 May 1965. 22. J. S. Kelly to Hollingsworth, “Plowshare’s Revised Excavation Program for FY 1966,” 28 Sept. 1965 (circulated as AEC 811/133, same title, 6 Oct. 1965). 23. Seaborg to Bundy, 22 Nov. 1965, w/att. “Concept for Project Cabriolet,” n.d., 3.
24. AEC, ACE, and Panama Canal Company, “Construction of an Isthmian Sea Level Canal by Nuclear Methods—1964,” Annex III to Isthmian Canal Studies— 1964, Report PNE-1999, Sept. 1964; Spofford G. English to AEC Commissioners, “Report on Fourteenth Meeting of the Plowshare Advisory Committee,” n.d., w/att. PAC, “Report on Fourteenth Meeting,” 9-10 Nov. 1965; AEC, “The Plowshare Program,” 13 Feb. 1968, 2-4; Edward A. Martell, “The Plowshare Nuclear Sea-Level Canal Project—Problems and Hazards,” Mar. 1969, 2-3; Alfred W. Klement, Jr., “Radiological Safety Research for Nuclear Excavation Projects—Interoceanic Canal Studies,” in PHS, Public Health Aspects of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosives (n. 1), 652-661; Bernard C. Hughes, “The Corps of Engineers’ Nuclear Construction Research Program,” in Weaver, Education for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosives
(n. 1), 81-103, at 91-100; Richard T. Sylves, The Nuclear Oracles: A Political History of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1977 (Ames: Iowa State Univ. Press, 1987), 204—205. 25. G. W. Johnson to J. S. Kelly, 20 Oct. 1965; Placak to Nordyke, “Proposal for PHS Participation in Cabriolet,” 2 Dec. 1965; “Technical Plan for Project Cabriclet,”
10 Jan. 1966; Delbert S. Barth to Nordyke, “Project Cabriolet Field Support Requirements,” 11 Jan. 1966; Thalgott to William E. Ogle, “Meteorological Statistics Related to Cabriolet,” 14 Jan. 1966; Thalgott to distrib., “Operational Safety Plan— Project Cabriolet, Plowshare Program, February 1966,” 28 Feb. 1966, w/att. “Operational Safety Plan, Project Cabriolet,” Feb. 1966; J. S. Kelly to AEC Commissioners, “Proposed Letter to McGeorge Bundy Regarding Cabiolet,” 14 Feb. 1966, w/att. “Analysis of Project Cabiolet”; PHS, “Off-Site Radiological Safety Program Operational Plan for Project Cabriolet,” 16 Feb. 1966; Lester Machta for the record, “Airborne Radioactivity Concentrations from a Hypothetical Nuclear Cratering Event,” 18 Feb. 1966; “Probability of Cabriolet Debris Being Detected outside the U.S.,” Feb. 1966; Kelly to distrib., “Additional Information on Project Cabriolet,” 21 Feb. 1966; Reeves to Kelly, 24 Feb. 1966. 26. J. S. Kelly to AEC Commissioners, “Letter from Secretary [Cyrus] Vance to
Notes to Page 240 447 Dr. [Donald C.] Hornig about Cabriolet,” 10 Mar. 1966; Seaborg to Rusk, 4 Apr. 1966, w/att. “Project Plowshare—Cabriolet’; S. George for the record, “Plowshare: Cabriolet Cratering Experiment,” 15 Apr. 1966; F. T. Hobbs to files, “Conversation with Secretary of State re Cabriolet, April 14, 1966,” 20 Apr. 1966; Kelly to AEC Commissioners, “Department of State Proposed Action on Cabriolet,” 26 May 1966; Kelly to AEC Commissioners, “Memorandum on Cabriolet,” 10 May 1966; Memo for President Johnson, 12 Sept. 1966, w/att. “Background Facts on Cabriolet’; Seaborg, Stemming the Tide (n. 4), 327-333. See also Glenn C. Werth and Warren Heckrette, Technical Relation between Plowshare and Weapons Programs under Various Nuclear Weapon Test Ban Treaty Proposals, LRL report (Livermore, 1 Aug. 1966). 27. AEC release K-16, ““AEC to Conduct Plowshare Cratering Experiment in Nevada,” 23 Jan. 1967, w/att. “Background Information on Project Cabriolet.” See also J. S. Kelly to AEC Commissioners, “Background Information Paper on Nuclear
Excavation,” 6 Feb. 1967, w/att. AEC background paper, 3 Feb. 1967. See also R. H. Shaw to distrib., ““Test Manager’s Special Instructions and Schedule of Events— Cabriolet,” 24 Jan. 1967; Ogle to Raemer E. Schreiber, 25/2100Z Jan. 1967; John A. Harris to Hollingsworth, “Project Cabriolet Field Public Information Plan,” 31 Jan.
1967, w/att. plan (circulated as AEC 811/149, same title, 31 Jan. 1967); Shaw to Crowson et al., 10 Feb. 1967; Philip J. Farley to McCool, “Planning for Cabriolet,” 5 Jan. 1968; Harris to AEC Commissioners, “Project Cabriolet Public Information,” 24 Jan. 1968. 28. Seaborg to Walt W. Rostow, 10 Oct. 1967, w/att. “Background Facts on Cabriolet”; AGMIA to Seaborg, “Proceeding with Nuclear Excavation Experiments While the NPT Negotiations Are Still in Progress,” 17 Nov. 1967; Higgins to McBride, 20 Nov. 1967; R. H. Shaw to distrib., “Test Manager’s Special Instructions and Schedule of Events—Cabriolet,” 9 Jan. 1968; Seaborg, Stemming the Tide (n. 4), 333-338. 29. Seaborg to Rostow, 30 Jan. 1968, w/att. “Preliminary Report on Cabriolet,” 30 Jan. 1968. See also Reeves to J. S. Kelly and Crowson, “H Plus Six Hour Advisory on Operation Crosstie Event Cabriolet,” 26/2340Z Jan. 1968; Kelly to Crowson, “H
Plus 24 Hour Advisory. . . ,” 27/1920Z Jan. 1968; Kelly to Crowson, “H Plus 96 Hour Advisory. . . ,” 30/2241Z Jan. 1968; “NARS/ARMS Cloud Track and Ground Deposition Summary: Cabriolet Event Support,” n.d.; SWHRL, “Preliminary Report, Cabriolet Environmental Surveillance,” Feb. 1968; Thalgott to Hamburger, “Summary of Preliminary Cabriolet Sample Collection Data,” 7 Feb. 1968; Rubin to Seaborg, 5 Feb. 1968; Reeves to Kelly, “Cabriolet—Integrated Dose at Highway 6,” 7 Feb. 1968; Seaborg to Holifield, 9 Feb. 1968; Richard D. Coleman to Whitman, “Hupmobile and Cabriolet Reports to AEC Effiuent Sub-Committee,” 15 Apr. 1968, w/att. “Off-Site Environmental Surveillance Results for Cabriolet,” 28 Feb. 1968; Kelly to Spurgeon M. Kenney, Jr., 6 May 1968; Martin B. Biles to J. A. Harris, “NTS Events Summaries: Cabriolet, Buggy I and Hupmobile,” 24 July 1968; PHS, “Report of OffSite Surveillance for Project Cabriolet,” Report PNE-959, Jan. 1970; Toman, “Results of Cratering Experiments” (n. 1), 364. See also REECo, Radiological Effluents Released (n. 7), 102—103. 30. Seaborg to Rostow, undated draft, w/att. “Analysis of Project Buggy”; Reeves to Biles, “USPHS Environmental Surveillance Operations Plan for Project Buggy I,” 1 Mar. 1968, w/att. plan, Feb. 1968; Charles N. Anderson to Thalgott, “Operational Plan for NATS/ARMS Participation in Project Buggy,” 4 Mar. 1968; Buggy press kit,
448 Notes to Page 240 . 4 Mar. 1968; Reeves, “Operational Safety Plan, Buggy I Event,” 6 Mar. 1968; J. S. Kelly, Crosstie Test Bulletin no. 24, “Buggy I Event,” 13 Mar. 1968; Seaborg, Stemming the Tide (n. 4), 344.
31. “NATS-ARMS Effiuent Tracking and Ground Deposition Surveys, Buggy Event,” 17 Mar. 1968; Frank L. Ingram to files, “Response to Inquiries Related to Off-Site Ground Readings from Project Buggy,” 21 Mar. 1968; AEC 811/197, “Preliminary Report on Buggy,” 22 Mar. 1968; PHS, “Preliminary Report, Aerial Monitoring and Sampling, Buggy I,” n.d.; PHS, “Buggy Off-Site Environmental Surveillance,” Report PNE-327, 29 Jan. 1971; Toman, “Summary of Results of Cratering Experiments” (n. 1), 358-359. See also REECo, Radiological Effluents Released (n. 7), 103-104. 32. “Effects and Safety Evaluation for Schooner,” 25 June 1963; AEC 811/113, DPNE report, “Plowshare Program (Project Schooner),” 31 Aug. 1963; AEC meeting no. 1963, 10 Sept. 1963, item 9; McCool to J. S. Kelly, “AEC 811/113—Plowshare Program (Project Schooner),” 12 Sept. 1963; Seaborg to Bundy, 16 Sept. 1963; Seaborg to Jerome B. Wiesner, 16 Sept. 1963; Dwight A. Ink to Kenney, 25 Sept. 1963, w/att. “Supplemental Information on Project Schooner” (circulated as AEC 811/114, “Plowshare Program [Project Schooner],” 30 Sept. 1963); Seaborg to Bundy, 7 Oct. 1963; Bundy to Seaborg, 11 Oct. 1963; Reeves to distrib., “Public Discussion Regarding Schooner Site,” 21 Oct. 1963; Kelly to Luedecke, 30 Oct. (n. 5); Reeves to distrib., “Planning Directive (P.L.-8-10-63) Project Schooner,” 1 Nov. 1963; Seaborg to Al Uliman, 17 Aug. 1966, w/att. “Project Schooner Fact Sheet,” 11 Aug. 1966. 33. Werth to J. S. Kelly, 23 Apr. 1968 (circulated in AEC 811/200, “Review of the Plowshare Excavation Program,” 17 May 1968, 13-16); Howard A. Tewes, “Experimental Plan for Project Schooner,’ LRL Report SDK 68-26, Aug. 1968; Henry G. Vermillion to J. A. Harris, “News Media Observation of Project Schooner,” 17 Oct. 1968; ARL-LV, “Meteorological Support Plan for Project Schooner,” 18 Oct. 1968; J. S. Kelly to Michael M. May et al., 20/2140Z Nov. 1968; R. H. Shaw to distnb., “Test Manager’s Operation Plan—Schooner,” 21 Nov. 1968; Reeves to distrib., “Operational Safety Plan—Project Schooner,” 27 Nov. 1968, w/att. plan, 25 Nov. 1968; Harris to Vermillion, “Public Affairs Package for Schooner,” 26 Nov. 1968; PHS, “Environmental Surveillance Operations Plan for Project Schooner,” n.d. 34. Thalgott to Hamburger and DMA, “H Plus Six Hour Advisory on Operation Bowline Event Schooner,” 08/0055Z Dec. 1968; Thalgott advisories followed at H + 12 hours (08/0202Z), H + 24 hours (09/0203Z), H + 48 hours (10/0391), and H + 96 hours (12/2232Z Dec. 1968). See also Toman, “Results of Cratering Experiments” (n. 1), 364—365.
35. Biles to John A. Erlewine, “Environmental Releases from Schooner,” 17 Dec. 1968; Hamburger to distrib., n.d., w/att. “Summary of January 29, 1969, Briefing on Project Schooner’; David E. Bernhardt to Melvin W. Carter, “Relative Hazard of Selected Radionuclides from Schooner Type Effluent via the Milk-Food-Chain,” 6 Feb. 1969; PHS, “Preliminary Report of Off-Site Surveillance for Project Schooner,” Feb. 1969; PHS, “Off-Site Surveillance, Schooner Event,” Jan. 1970; Toman, “Results of Cratering Experiments” (n. 1), 355. See also REECo, Radiological Effluents Released (n. 7), 109-110; Seaborg, Stemming the Tide (n. 4), 344-345.
36. Robert B. Anderson to Seaborg, 23 Aug. 1968 (as reproduced in Martell, “Plowshare Nuclear Sea-Level Canal Project” [n. 24], 11-12). See also R. H. Groves,
Notes to Page 241 449 “Status of the Interoceanic Canal Study,” in AEC, Symposium on Engineering with Nuclear Explosives, sponsored by ANS, Las Vegas, 14-16 Jan. 1970, Proceedings, CONF-700100 (vol. 1), May 1970, 280-293. 37. Anderson to Seaborg, 23 Aug. (n. 36). See also J. S. Kelly to AEC Commissioners, “Canal Commission Attitude toward Plowshare,” 30 Sept. 1965; Kelly to AEC Commissioners, “Review of the Plowshare Excavation Program,” 17 May 1968, w/att. Werth to Kelly, 2 May 1968 (circulated in AEC 811/200, same title, 17 May 1968); Seaborg to Robert G. Storey, n.d. (ca. May 1968); Seaborg to Anderson, 30 Aug. 1968; Seaborg, Stemming the Tide (n. 4), 345-346. 38. G. Hoyt Whipple, Some Long-Term Environmental Health Aspects of the Engineering Applications of Nuclear Explosives, LRL Report UCID (Livermore, 7 June 1967); AEC 811/200, “Review of the Plowshare Excavation Program” (n. 33); Reeves
to distrib., “Planning Directive for Gondola Site Selection, P.L.-2-11-68,” 14 Nov. 1968; John A. Korver to distrib., “Experimental Objectives and Program—Project Yawl,” 4 Apr. 1969; Knox, “Technical Problems and Future Cratering Experiments,” in PHS, Public Health Aspects of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosives (n. 1), 83-110; Klement, “Radiological Safety Research for Nuclear Excavation Projects” (n. 24); Donald T. Wruble, “Environmental Radiological Surveillance for Plowshare Projects,” 15 Oct. 1969; Hamburger, “United States of America” (n. 1), 42; Tewes and L. L. Schwartz, “Potential Pathways to Man for Radionuclides from Contained Applications of Peaceful Nuclear Explosives,” in IAEA, Peaceful Nuclear Explosions IV (Vienna, 1975), 297-320; Schwartz et al., “Potential Pathways to Man for Radionuclides from Excavation Applications of Peaceful Nuclear Explosives,”’ ibid., 321-342. 39. Machta to Elwood M. Douthett, 27 Oct. 1969. 40. A-PICSC, Interocean Canal Studies (Washington, 1970), as cited in Sylves, The Nuclear Oracles (n. 24), 207-208; Long, “Peaceful Nuclear Explosions,” BAS 32 (Oct. 1976): 26; Martell, “The Plowshare Nuclear Sea-Level Canal Project” (n. 24). See also J. S. Kelly to AEC Commissioners, “Resources for the Future Study of Plowshare,” 31 May 1966; Kelly to AEC Commissioners, “Economic Studies of Plowshare,” 28 July 1966; Resources for the Future, Inc., “Peaceful Use of Nuclear Explosives: Some Economic Aspects,” draft by David B. Brooks, 1 Aug. 1966; AEC, “General Commentary on Resources for the Future Study of Plowshare,” n.d.; Seaborg, Stemming the Tide (n. 4), 346-349; Brooks and John V. Krutilla, Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosives: Some Economic Aspects (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, for Resources for the Future, Inc., 1969). Cf. H. Peter Metzger, The Atomic Establishment (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1972), 233-234. 41. AEC 811/115, “Revised Plowshare Program” (n. 5); JCAE, Peaceful Applications of Nuclear Explosives (n. 5); Teller et al., Constructive Uses of Nuclear Explosives (n. 1), ch. 6, “Other Industrial Uses of Nuclear Explosives”; Werth, “Planned Applications of Peaceful Nuclear Explosions,” in AEC, Biological Implications of the Nuclear Age, ed. Anne M. Goulden (Oak Ridge, Dec. 1969), 31-61; Nordyke, “Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosions” (n. 1), 51-77; Nordyke, ‘“Underground Engineering Applications,” in PHS, Public Health Aspects of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosives (n. 1), 112-132; Higgins, “Technical Problems and Future Underground Engineering Experiments,” ibid., 160-175; G. W. Johnson, “Plowshare at the Crossroads,” BAS 26 (Aug. 1970): 83-91; Henry F. Coffer and Higgins, “Future
450 Notes to Pages 241-242 Contained Nuclear Explosives Experiments,” in Weaver, Education for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosives (n. 1), 45-63; Hamburger, “United States of America” (n. 1),
27-29. For a brief but well-documented discussion of the distinct safety problems posed by nuclear excavation and industrial applications, as well as their similarities, see Tewes, “Radioactivity from Plowshare Applications—Safety Considerations,” in AEC, Symposium on Engineering with Nuclear Explosives (n. 36), 375-380.
42. “Technical Plan for Project Handcar,” 20 Aug. 1964; D. Clark to AEC Commissioners, “Project Handcar Background Information,” 3 Nov. 1964; NVOO release NV-64-113, 6 Nov. 1964; AEC release G-254, “AEC Schedules Underground
Plowshare Experiment,” 3 Nov. 1964; Crowson, Whetstone Test Bulletin no. 16, ‘““Handcar Event,” 6 Nov. 1964; Fitzsimmons to files, “Flight Report for the Handcar or Painted Pony Event of November 5, 1964,” 9 Nov. 1964; PHS, “Handcar Event, November 5, 1964,” n.d.; Bryce L. Rich to Wayne R. Woodruff, “Interim Report— U10b, “Handcar’ Event,” 21 Dec. 1964; Werth, ed., “The Handcar Nuclear Explosion in Dolomite,” Report UCRL-50951, 13 Oct. 1970. See also REECo, Radiological Effluents Released (n. 7), 64-65; NVOO, Announced Nuclear Tests (n. 6), 19. 43. El Paso Natural Gas Company et al., “Project Gasbuggy: A Feasibility Study Concerned with Nuclear Explosive Stimulation of a Natural Gas Reservoir,” 14 May 1965; SAN et al., “Summary of the Sloop Feasibility Study: A Study of the Feasibility of Fracturing Copper Orebodies with Nuclear Explosions and the Extraction of the Copper by In-situ Leaching Methods,” 1 June 1967; Columbia Gas System Service Corporation et al., “Project Ketch: The Possible Use of a Nuclear Explosive to Create Underground Natural Gas Storage. A Summary of a Joint Study,” 28 Aug. 1967; SAN et al., “Project Bronco: A Joint Government-Industry Study of Nuclear Fracturing & In situ Retorting of Oil Shale,” 13 Oct. 1967; J. A. Harris to AEC Commissioners, “Summary of Bronco Study Report,” 24 Oct. 1967, w/att. SAN et al., “Summary of a Study on Methods to Utilize Oil Shales for Increasing National Oil Resources.” 44. El Paso Natural Gas et al., “Project Gasbuggy” (n. 43); NVOO releases NV65-52, 14 June 1965, and NV-67-9, 31 Jan. 1967; Howard Boyd to Seaborg, 3 Feb. 1966; David D. Rabb, comp., “Plowshare Program, November 1, 1966—January 31, 1967,” Report UCRL-50008-67-1, 31 Jan. 1967, 1-3; LRL, “Project Gasbuggy Technical Concept,” 25 Jan. 1967; Reeves to distrib., “Project Gasbuggy Planning Directive—PL.-1-2-67,” 28 Feb. 1967; “Project Gasbuggy Preliminary Fact Sheet,” 7 Apr. 1967; Project Gasbuggy JOI, “Project Gasbuggy: A Government-Industry Natural Gas Production Stimulation Experiment Using Nuclear Explosives,” 15 Sept. 1967; J. S. Kelly to AEC Commissioners, “Redirection of Plowshare Industrial Effort,” 21 Nov. 1967. 45. Reeves to Philip, “Project Gasbuggy Feasibility Study,” 28 July 1964, 1—4; El
Paso Natural Gas et al., “Project Gasbuggy” (n. 43), ch. 5; J. S. Coogan to distrib., “Off-Site Radiological Safety Plan—Project Gasbuggy,” 6 Oct. 1965; McBride to Donald H. Edwards, “Off-Site Radiological Safety Plan—Project Gasbuggy,” 21 Oct. 1966; Higgins to Robert E. Miller, 22 Nov. 1966; W. R. Woodroff, “Statement of Safety Presented to New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission,” 15 Feb. 1967; “Project Gasbuggy Preliminary Fact Sheet,” 7 Apr. 1967, 9-11; Edwards to Placak, 7 Sept. 1967, w/att. SAN, “Project Gasbuggy Technical and Safety Reporting Plan,” 18 Aug. 1967; J. S. Kelly to Reeves, “Regarding the Radiological Safety Criteria for
Notes to Page 242 451 Project Gasbuggy,” 01/2110 Sept. 1967; JOI, “Project Gasbuggy” (n. 44), 10-16; Thalgott to distrib., “Operational Safety Plan—Project Gasbuggy,” 30 Oct. 1967, w/att. plan, Oct. 1967; Thalgott to Biles, “Off-Site Radiological Safety Operational Plan for Project Gasbuggy,” 21 Nov. 1967, w/att. plan, 3 Nov. 1967.
46. J. S. Kelly to AEC Commissioners, “Project Gasbuggy,” 7 Sept. 1967; McBride to Allaire, “Affects of Project Gasbuggy Delay on the Off-Site Rad Safety Program,” 27 Oct. 1967; AEC release K-257, “Technical Difficulties Delay Project Gasbuggy,” 30 Oct. 1967; Releases JOI-67-13, “Gasbuggy Detonation Rescheduled,” 22 Nov. 1967, and JOI-67-19, 10 Dec. 1967; R. H. Shaw to distrib., “Project Manager’s Special Instructions and Schedule of Events—Project Gasbuggy,” 28 Nov. 1967; W. R. Woodruff, “Gasbuggy: D+10 Day Report,” n.d.; Leo J. Dymerski to McBride, “Gasbuggy,” 15 Jan. 1968; Fred Holzer, “Gasbuggy: Preliminary Postshot Summary Report,” LRL Report PNE-1003, Jan. 1968; Holzer to distrib., “Yield of Gasbuggy Explosive,” 5 Jan. 1970; Holzer, “Summary of Results of Underground Engineering Experience,” in PHS, Public Health Aspects of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosives (n. 1), 133-157; Holzer, “Gasbuggy Experiment,” in Weaver, Educaiion for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosives (n. 1), 23-44. 47. “Project Manager’s Report—Project Gasbuggy Off-Site Radiological Safety Program,” n.d. (ca. Feb. 1968); William J. Silver to Thalgott, 22 Mar. 1968, wiatt. “Gasbuggy Post-Shot Program, Radiological Safety Support”; McBride to Simon Kinsman, 22 Mar. 1968, w/att. “Project Gasbuggy Gas Sampling Data’; Don C. Ward to D. H. Edwards, 5 Apr. 1968; Thalgott to distrib., “Supplemental Operational Safety Plan—Project Gasbuggy GB-2R Reentry,” 19 June 1968; Philip L. Randolph to McBride, 3 July 1968; Coleman, “Proposal for Post Gasbuggy Surveillance of Natural Gas,” 26 July 1968. 48. Robert H. Neill, “Planning Required in the Development of Radiation Protection Guidance for Underground Engineering Application,” in PHS, Public Health Aspects of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosives (n. 1), 665-669; M. J. Kelly et al., “The Relative Risks from Radionuclides Found in Nuclearly Stimulated Natural Gas,” in IAEA, Peaceful Nuclear Explosions III: Applications, Characteristics and Effects (Vienna, 1974), 321-339; Frank Kreith and Catherine B. Wrenn, The Nuclear Impact: A Case Study of the Plowshare Program to Produce Gas by Underground Nuclear Stimulation in the Rocky Mountains (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1976), 13-14, ch. 3. 49. J. S. Kelly to Reeves, 27 Sept. 1968; Holzer to El Paso Natural Gas Co. and USBM, 27 Sept. 1968; PHS, “Report of Off-Site Surveillance for Project Gasbugzy,” May 1969; M. W. Carter to Thalgott, 26 June 1969, w/att. “Off-Site Surveillance for Gasbuggy Flaring Operations, March 1969 through May 1969”; PHS, “Interim Report, Environmental Surveillance for Gasbuggy Production Test Phase,” 19 Aug. 1969; “Operational Safety Plan” (n. 45), Appendix B (supplement 2), “GB-3 Drilling Operation,” Aug. 1969; EIC, “Project Gasbuggy: On-Site Radiological Safety during Production Testing, January 25, 1968, to August 12, 1969,” Report NVO-234-2, 31 Oct. 1969; McBride and Dixon Hill, “Offsite Radiological Surveillance for Project Gasbuggy,” Radiological Health Data and Reports 10 (Dec. 1969): 535-546; McBride, “Public Health Service Safety Program,” in PHS, Public Health Aspecis of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosives (n. 1), 478-484. 50. PHS, “Environmental Surveillance for Project Gasbuggy Production Test
452 Notes to Pages 242-243 Phase,” Report SWRHL-100r, June 1970, i. See also R. L. Gotchy, “Radiological Safety Considerations Following Natural Gas Stimulation with Nuclear Explosives,” paper prepared for the Symposium on Engineering with Nuclear Explosives, Las Vegas, 14-16 Jan. 1970. 51. “Tentative Operational Plan, Project Rulison,” 27 Nov. 1967; “Technical Plan, Project Rulison,” 20 Mar. 1968; Thalgott to W. R. Cooper, “Rulison Project Definition Plan (Draft),” 26 Nov. 1968; NVOO draft, “Project Rulison Analysis,” 17 Dec. 1968; “Project Rulison Definition Plan,” 26 Mar. 1969; Project Rulison JOI, “Project Rulison: A Government-Industry Natural Gas Production Stimulation Experiment Using a Nuclear Explosive,” 1 May 1969; “Project Rulison Manager’s Report,” Report NVO71, Apr. 1973, ch. 1. 52. Charles L. Weaver to James G. Terrill, Jr., “Public Health Considerations— Plowshare Program,” 29 Feb. 1968, w/att. draft memo, Terrill to distrib., “Public Health Considerations in the Use of Nuclear Explosives for Peaceful Purposes,” 2/29/68; NCRH, “Public Health Considerations in the Use of Nuclear Explosives for Peaceful Purposes,” Mar. 1968; D. H. Edwards to distrib., “Safety Criteria for Plowshare Program Industrial Projects,” 15 Mar. 1968; PHS, “Planning Criteria for OffSite Safety Programs for Industrial Plowshare Projects,” n.d.; M. W. Carter to Weaver, “Project Proposal for Public Health Evaluation of Plowshare Projects,” 24 July 1968; Neill, “Planning Required in the Development of Radiation Protection Guidance for Underground Engineering Applications” (n. 48).
53. McBride to C. L. Weaver, “Comments on the Draft Document, ‘Guidelines to the NCRH Staff on Public Health Considerations in the Use of Nuclear Explosives for Peaceful Purposes,’” 10 Sept. 1968, w/att. Weaver to NCRH Staff, “Guidance to the NCRH Staff on Public Health Considerations in the Use of Nuclear Explosives for Peaceful Purposes,” 9 Sept. 1968, and “Background Material”; Hamburger to Weaver, “Draft Document ‘Status of the Health Aspects of the Use of Nuclear Exposives for Peaceful Purposes’ Dated September 1968,” 2 Oct. 1968; Lester R. Rogers and Forrest Western, “Development of Regulatory Criteria Applicable to Control of Radiation Exposures to the Population from Products Containing Radioactive Material,” in PHS, Public Health Aspects of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosives (n. 1), 529-540; Robert J. Catlin to R. E. Miller, “Comments on Safety Planning Guide for Plowshare Projects,” 26 May 1969, w/att. “Outline: Guidance for Industry Regarding Safety Programs Relating to the Utilization of Nuclear Explosives.” 54. D. H. Edwards to McBride, “Project Rulison,” 27 Dec. 1967; J. S. Coogan to files, “Project Rulison Radiological Health and Safety Plan,” 25 Sept. 1968; “Project Rulison . . . Safety Plan,” draft, 16 Sept. 1968; PHS, “Off-Site Safety and Environmental Surveillance Operation Plan for Project Rulison,” Apr. 1969; NVOO, “Effects Evaluation—Project Rulison,” Apr. 1969; R. E. Miller to Herbert E. Grier, “Safety Program for Project Rulison under Contract No. AT(26-1)-429,” 11 June 1969; “Effects Evaluation for Project Rulison,” Report NVO-43 (Final), June 1969; “Project Rulison Operations Order,” Appendix B, “Safety Plan,” June 1969; R. Glen Fuller, “Pre-Event Bioenvironmental Safety Survey and Evaluation, Project Rulison,” Report PNE-R-3, 28 July 1969; “Project Rulison Manager’s Report” (n. 51), chs. 3, 6—10. 55. J. A. Harris to AEC Commissioners, “Local Announcements of Project Rulison Meetings and Project Bronco Response to Inquiry,” 6 June 1968; “Information for Project Rulison Area Residents,” n.d.; “Detailed Rulison Community Affairs, Public
Notes to Page 243 453 Information and Observer Plan,” draft, 8 Jan: 1969; Vermillion to distrib., “Final Arrangements for Rulison Meetings and Briefings in Colorado,” 7 Apr. 1969; R. E. Miller to John A. Love, 28 Aug. 1969; “Project Rulison Manager’s Report” (n. 51), ch. 13 and Appendix D. 56. Paul B. Smith to M. W. Carter, “Project Plowshare,” 21 Aug. 1968; Colorado Department of Health news release, 13 Feb. 1969; E. van der Smissen to M. W. Carter, “Trip Report of Dr. Bandt and Dr. van der Smissen to the Rulison Area in Colorado, April 23-24, 1969,” n.d.; Wruble to files, “Telephone Conversation with Bob [Robert D.] Siek; August 7, 1969,” 8 Aug. 1969; “Project Rulison Manager’s Report” (n. 51), 98. 57. RMCE, “Questions on Environmental and Ecological Effects That Have Been Directed to Our Attention from Various Sources,” Project Rulison meeting with AEC, Denver, 24 Apr. 1969; CCEI to members of the Colorado House of Representatives, n.d.; Vermillion to distrib., “Opposition to Project Rulison,” 25 July 1969; Metzger et al., CCEI press release, 28 July 1969; Metzger to Love, 29 Aug. 1969; “Project Rulison Manager’s Report” (n. 51), 120; Metzger, The Atomic Establishment (n. 40), 234-237; Kreith and Wrenn, The Nuclear Impact (n. 48), 84-90. 58. Vermillion to distrib., “Letter to the Colorado House of Representatives re Rulison,” 27 May 1969; R. E. Miller to J. S. Kelly et al., 26 Aug. 1969; “Comments on Dr. H. Peter Metzger’s Letter to Governor Love Dated August 29, 1969,” n.d. 59. Alfred A. Arraj, “Hearing on Preliminary Injunction Request—Project Rulison,” 27 Aug. 1969, 3. 60. Ibid.; Lester E. Blaschke for the record, “Telephone Call re Rulison Project,” 28 Aug. 1969; NVOO to distrib., “Project Rulison Litigation,” 18 Sept. 1969; M. W. Carter to Roy L. Cleere, 16 Oct. 1969; Thomas O. Fleming to Joseph F. Hennessey et al., “Project Rulison Litigation,’ 28 Oct. 1969, w/att. “Memorandum in Support of Motion. . . for Summary Judgment,” and “Memorandum in Support of Motion... . to Dismiss the Complaint’; M. W. Carter to Fleming, 17 Nov. 1969, w/att. “Answers to Fleming’s Questions on Rulison”; “Project Rulison Manager’s Report” (n. 51), ch. 14; Kreith and Wrenn, The Nuclear Impact (n. 48), 91-92. 61. PHS, “Final Report: Off-Site Radiological Safety and Resident Evacuation Program for Project Rulison,” Dec. 1969; John K. Emerson, “Project Rulison Progress
Report V,” 5 Feb. 1970, 1-5, w/att. air, water, and milk sampling data; “Project Rulison Manager’s Report” (n. 51), passim. 62. Decision by Chief Judge Alfred A. Arraj, U.S. District Court, Denver, Colo., 16 Mar. 1970; Robert B. Miller to Metzger, “Project Rulison Memorandum,” 1 Apr. 1970; “Project Rulison Manager’s Report” (n. 51), 126-127; Kreith and Wrenn, The Nuclear Impact (n. 48), 96-101. 63. R. E. Miller to NVOO principal staff et al., “Rulison Trial Information Plan,”
18 Dec. 1969; Vermillion to Miller, “Public Affairs Plans for Rulison after Trial Decision,” 24 Feb. 1970; Marcus A. Rowden to G. Walter Bowman, 27 Feb. 1970, w/att. “Procedures for Public Dissemination of Project Rulison Raw Monitoring and Related Data’; Miller to J. S. Kelly, 27/0253Z Feb. 1970; Project Rulison: Text of Decision Rendered March 16, 1970 by Chief Judge Alfred A. Arraj (Houston: Austral Oil Company, 8 Apr. 1970); Neil B. Steuer to files, “Project Rulison Public Information Meetings, Grand Valley, Colorado, May 6-7, 1970,” 19 May 1970; PHS, “Description of Public Health Service Open File Information for Project Rulison,
454 Notes to Pages 243-244 Production Testing Phase,” May 1970; “Project Rulison Manager’s Report” (n, 51), 121—122. See also REECo, Radiological Effluents Released (n. 7), 113-114. 64. Draft memo for Project Rulison Technical Committee, “Post-Shot Gas Analysis and Radioactivity Monitoring,” 21 Oct. 1969, w/att. “Production Testing—Project Rulison”; R. Lee Aamodt, “Rulison Reentry Document,” 29 Oct. 1969; Miles Reynolds, Jr., to W. S. Twenhofel et al., “Re-Entry Document, Project Rulison,” 10 Nov. 1969; John E. Regnier to E. M. Douthett, 12 Nov. 1969, w/att. PHS draft section of Rulison reentry and production testing document; “Project Rulison Post-Shot Activities,” Report NVO-61 (Preliminary), Nov. 1969; Cleere to David L. Morrison, 10 Dec. 1969. See also documents cited in note 54, above. 65. Siek to M. W. Carter, 30 Dec. 1969; “Safety Plan, Project Rulison: R-E PreProduction Test Sampling,” Operation Order NV-OpO-1-69, Appendix B (supplement 1), Dec. 1969; W. E. Robison and Lynn R. Anspaugh, “Assessment of Potential Biological Hazards from Project Rulison,” Report UCRL-50791, 18 Dec. 1969; Bernhardt to files, “Discussion with Mr. Coleman on Rulison Surveillance,” 5 Jan. 1970; “Project Rulison Operating Instructions: Reentry Drilling and Production Testing,” 9 Jan. 1970; Emerson, “Project Rulison Progress Report V” (n. 61), 5-9; R. E. Skjei
to Marshall Page, Jr, “Rulison Area Public Attitudes,” 4 Feb. 1970; Thalgott to Carter, “Off-Site Safety Program for Project Rulison,” 5 Feb. 1970.
66. Knox and K. R. Peterson, “Technical Aspects of Monitoring the Rulison Flaring Plume,” LRL Report SDK 70-2, 14 Apr. 1970; Thalgott to distrib., “Project Rulison Operation Order NV-OpO-1-69—Addendum,” 27 Apr. 1970, w/att. addendum 1, “Project Rulison Phase 11—Post Shot Investigations”; M. W. Carter to Ernest D. Campbell, 28 Apr. 1970, w/att. “Ecological Study Associated with Project Rulison Drill-Back and Flaring Operations”; Roy B. Evans and Bernhardt, “Public Health Evaluation, Project Rulison (Production Testing), Report SWRHL-96, May 1970; Carter to Hendricks, 8 June 1970, w/att. “USPHS/SWRHL Field Operations Plan: Project Rulison Cavity Re-Entry and Flaring Periods’; J. S. Kelly to AEC Commissioners, “Report UCRL-50791,” 30 July 1970, w/att. report (circulated as SECY159, “UCRL-50791: Assessment of Potential Biological Hazards from Project Rulison,” 31 July 1970). 67. “Project Rulison Manager’s Report” (n. 51), 134-135. See also Cleere to distrib., 7 May 1971, w/att. Colorado Department of Health, “Project Rulison: 1970 Environmental Surveillance Summary Report,” n.d.; George A. Boysen, “Off-Site Radiological Safety Program for Project Rulison: Flaring, Phase III,” Sept. 1971; Donald W. Payne and R. Frank Grossman, “Off-Site Radiological Safety Program for Project Rulison: Drill-Back and Re-Entry, Phase III,” Report SWRHL-115r, Apr. 1972; Payne and Grossman, “Off-Site Radiological Safety Program for Project Rulison: Re-Entry Portion of Phase III,” Report NERC-LV-539-14, Nov. 1972; “Rulison Site Cleanup Report,” Report NVO-136, Sept. 1973; Kreith and Wrenn, The Nuclear Impact (n. 48), 108-114. 68. “Project Rulison Manager’s Report” (n. 51), 139-140. 69. Kreith and Wrenn, The Nuclear Impact (n. 48), 103-108; Long, “Peaceful Nuclear Explosions” (n. 40), 22.
_70. AEC release R-51, “AEC, Interior Announce Decision to Proceed with Rio Blanco Test,” 9 Feb. 1973; Project Rio Blanco JOI, “Project Rio Blanco: A Government-Industry Natural Gas Production Stimulation Experiment Using Nuclear
Notes to Pages 244-245 455 Explosives,” 1 Mar. 1973; R. T. Stearns et al., comps., “Project Directors’ Completion
Report D+30 Days (Detonation Related Activities), Project Rio Blanco,” Report NVO-165, July 1973; W. R. Woodruff and R. S. Guido, “Project Rio Blanco—Panrt I: Nuclear Operations and Chimney Re-Entry,” in IAEA, Peaceful Nuclear Explosions IV (n. 39), 29-115; Toman, “Project Rio Blanco—Part II: Production Test Data and Preliminary Analysis of Top Chimney/Cavity. Project Scientist’s Summary Report,” ibid., 117—137; Kreith and Wrenn, The Nuclear Impact (n. 48), 169-176. 71. CER Geonuclear, “Project Rio Blanco Environmental Impact Evaluation,” 12 Oct. 1971; EPA, “Comments on Draft Environmental Statement for Rio Blanco Gas Stimulation Project, Colorado,” n.d.; Aamodt et al. to James R. Schlesinger, 14 Apr. 1972, w/att. “Statement by the Presiding Board of Major Issues Raised during the Hearings on the Rio Blanco Gas Stimulation Project” and transcript of hearings at Meeker, Colo., 24 Mar. 1972, and at Denver, 27—28 Mar. 1972; AEC, “Environmental
Statement: Rio Blanco Gas Stimulation Project, Rio Blanco County, Colorado,” Report WASH-1519, Apr. 1972; 1bid., addendum, Mar. 1973. See also Sally Jacobsen, “Turning up the Gas: AEC Prepares Another Nuclear Gas Stimulation Shot,”
BAS 28 (May 1972): 35-38; JOI, “Project Rio Blanco” (n. 70), 6-8; Kreith end Wrenn, The Nuclear Impact (n. 48), chs. 5-6. 72. G. W. Johnson, “United States of America,” in IAEA, Peaceful Nuclear Explosions III (n. 48), 15-19; E. H. Fleming, “The United States of America,” in IAEA, Peaceful Nuclear Explosions IV (n. 39), 23-25; Long, “Peaceful Nuclear Explosions” (n. 40), 18-28; T. Roncalio, “Plowshare—A Technology in Search of a Use,” Atomic Energy Law Journal 16 (Summer 1974): 93-140; Sylves, The Nuclear Oracles (n. 24), 208-212; Seaborg, Stemming the Tide (n. 4), 349-351; Ralph H. Lutts, “Chemical Fallout: Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, Radioactive Fallout, and the Environmental Movement,” Environmental Review 9 (1985): 210-225. 73. DASA to ALOO, “Sensitive Seismic Area, Technical Criteria, Vela Uniform Explosion Series,” 29 Aug. 1960, and DASA to ALOO, “Additional Technical Cnteria, Vela Uniform Explosion Series,” 13 Oct. 1960, as cited and discussed in draft “Public Safety Plan, Shoal Event, Project Shade,” 25 Apr. 1962, 2—4; Joy to R. E. Miller, “Shoal Site Announcement—November 15-16, 1961,’ n.d.; OFO, “Background Information on Project Shoal,” 26 Feb. 1962; “Facts about Project Shoal,” 18 Oct. 1963. For a near contemporary overview of the problem, see Edward Bullard, “The Detection of Underground Explosions,” Scientific American (July 1966), as reprinted in York, ed., Arms Control: Readings from Scientific American (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1973), 140-150. 74. Andrew J. Max to Roehlk, “Shoal Venting,” 06/2244Z Mar. 1963; Austin W. Betts to Luedecke, “Shoal Event,” 5 Sept. 1963; Tape to Robert S. McNamara, 18 Sept. 1963, w/att. “Shoal Event Safety Considerations.” 75. Draft “Tentative Off-Site Radiological Safety Plan for Project Shoal,” 5 Jan. 1962; Roehlke to R. E. Miller, “Preliminary Outline for Public Safety Program— Project Shoal,” 16 Jan. 1962; draft “Public Safety Plan, Shoal Event” (n. 73); Reeves to distrib., “Project Shoal Preliminary Operational Safety Plan—Project Shoal Authorization No. 2,” 23 Jan. 1963, w/att. “Revised Preliminary Operational Safety Plan, Project Shoal,” Jan. 1963; J. S. Coogan to Robert Allen, “Project Shoal Population Density,” 3 Apr. 1963; Roehlk to Placak, “Operational Safety Plan—Project Shoal,” 2 May -1963; Placak to Roehlk, “Operational Safety Plan—Project Shoal,” 20
456 Notes to Page 245 June 1963; T. J. Sharpe to Vernon E. Andrews, “Report of Activities in the Fallon Area, July 29-August 3, 1963,” 19 Aug. 1963. 76. Ray C. Emens to Vermillion, “Public Relations, Shoal Project, Fallon Nevada,” 18 Dec. 1961; Vermillion to D. Clark, “Project Shoal Public Information Plan,” 29 May 1963, w/att. draft “Public Information Plan for Project Shoal,” 29 May 1963; Reeves to Grant Sawyer, 1 Sept. 1963; “Facts about Project Shoal” (n. 73), 8-11; Seaborg to Henry M. Jackson, 21 Oct. 1963; Seaborg to John O. Pastore, 21 Oct. 1963.
77, E. G. Halligan to distrib., “Project Manager’s Special Instructions and Schedule of Events—Project Shoal,” 18 Oct. 1963; H. L. Rarrick to Max, “Radiation Safety for Post Shot Drilling,” 4 Nov. 1963; A. W. Betts to AEC Commissioners, “Project Shoal Post-Shot Dmnilling,” 19 Dec. 1963; Roehlk to R. E. Miller, “Outline of LongRange Operational Safety Programs—Project Shoal,” 3 Jan. 1964; Max to distrib., “Disposition of the Shoal Site,” 12 June 1964, w/att. study of “Shoal Site Disposition,” n.d.; Clinton S. Maupin to Roehlk, “Revised Pages for Project Shoal [On-Site Health and Safety] Report,” 2 July 1964, w/att. revisions; PHS, “Vela Uniform Proj-
ect Shoal: Final Report of Off-Site Surveillance,” 1 Sept. 1964. See also REECo, Radiological Effluents Released (n. 7), 51-52; NVOO, Announced Nuclear Tests (n. 6), 17. 78. “Project Dribble: AEC Program Concept,” 4 Nov. 1960; USWB Research Station, Las Vegas, “Climate Summary, Tatum Dome, Mississippi,” 12 Jan. 1961; Placak to J. W. Moore, “Map Requirements for PHS Rad-Safety Program for Project Dribble Series,” 19 Jan. 1961; Emens, untitled address'on Dribble to Hattiesburg Chemical Club, 7 Feb. 1961. 79. AEC, monthly report to GAC, July 1963, III-61; NVOO release NV-63-115, 18 Oct. 1963; AEC release F-260, “AEC Orders Study of Engineering Problems at Dribble Site,” 20 Dec. 1963; AEC 1029/30, DMA report, “Salmon Event—Project Dribble,” 17 July 1964; “Project Manager’s Report, Project Dribble (Salmon Event),” July 1966, chs. 1, 5. 80. Frank D. Cluff and Terrance R. Palmer, “Estimate of Radiation Exposure Levels Resulting from Project Dribble Controlled Release Operation,” 1 Feb. 1963; M. W. Carter to Placak, “Population and Cattle Distribution in the Vicinity of Hattiesburg, Mississippi,” 12 Feb. 1963; Carter to Placak, “Support Requirements—Project Dribble,” 12 Feb. 1963; Edmund L. Fountain to Carter, 1 Mar. 1963, w/att. “Operation Plan, Veterinary Support—Project Dribble”; Allaire draft, “[Rad-safe] Criteria and Policy,” 27 Mar. 1963; Roehlk to distrib., “Operational Safety Plan—Project Dribble—April, 1963,” 13 May 1963, w/att. plan; “Off-Site Radiological Safety Program, Project Dribble—Status Report,” 3 May 1963; H. F. Perls to files, “Structural Survey and Re-Entry Activities, Project Dribble,” 16 May 1963; PHS, “Off-Site Radiological Safety Program Progress Report—Project Dribble, April 15 through August 9, 1963,” n.d.; Carter to Placak, “Reports Originating from PHS Off-Site Radiological Safety Program—Project Dribble,” 23 Sept. 1963; Allaire to Emens, “Pre-Shot and Standby Facilities for Support of Area Residents, Salmon Event—Project Dribble,” 17 Oct. 1963; PHS, “Plan to Gather Information and Data Pertaining to the Dairy Industry and Related Farming Practices in the Off-Site Area, Project Dribble, Mississippi,” 21 Nov. 1963.
81. M. W. Carter to Roehlk, “Revised USPHS Off-Site Radiological Safety Pro-
Notes to Page 246 457 gram Logistical Requirements—First Event of the Dribble Series,” 8 Jan. 1964; Allaire to L. J. Yelinek, “Structural Support—Off-Site Structures within 2.6 Miles of Salmon G.Z.—Project Dribble,” 17 June 1964; Reeves to distrib., “Operation Order NV-OpO-5-64, Project Dribble,” 10 July 1964; “Technical Director’s Operation Plan, Project Dribble, Salmon Event,” July 1964; M. W. Carter to distrib., “Off-Site Radiological Safety Program Report, Project Dribble,” 11 Sept. 1964, w/att. status report; “Transcript of Dribble Public Safety Meeting,” Baxterville, Miss., 6 Aug. 1964; AEC 1029/30, “Salmon Event” (n. 79); “Project Manager’s Report, Salmon” (n. 79), ch. 4. See also Kathy Movius, “Radiological Safety Criteria for the U.S. Continental Test Program,” working draft, 20 Feb. 1991. 82. Dunning to Luedecke, “Salmon Shot,” 16 July 1964, 1.
83. Ibid., 5-6. 84. Ibid.; AEC 1029/30, “Salmon Event” (n. 79); AEC meeting no. 2028, 22 July 1964, item 4. See also R. H. Goeckermann to Reeves, “Further Detail on the Salmon Maximum Credible Accident,” 19 Oct. 1964. 85. Crowson, Whetstone Test Bulletin no. 14, “[Deleted],” 28 Oct. 1964; Roehlk
to distrib., “ARMS Report: Salmon Event, Report no. 32,” 28 Jan. 1965; USWB Research Station, Las Vegas, “Final Report of Weather and Surface Radiation Predic-
tion Activities for the Salmon Event—Project Dribble,” Report VUF-1020, Aug. 1965; J. Tell Tappan and William E. Moore, comps., “Project Dribble—Salmon Event
On Site Health and Safety Report,” Nov. 1965; M. W. Carter and Placak, “Final Report of Off-Site Surveillance for the Salmon Event of Project Dribble, October 22, 1964,” Report VUF-1021, 26 Feb. 1966; “Project Manager’s Report, Salmon” (n.
79), 49-54, 71-100; Leo A. Rogers, “Nuclear Explosions in Mississippi: Projects Salmon and Sterling,” Report UCRL-70470, 1 June 1967.
86. Crowson, Latchkey Test Bulletin no. [deleted], “[Deleted],” 8 Dec. 1966; “USPHS Off-Site Radiological Safety Program Status Report—Project Sterling,” 16 Dec. 1966; Reeves to distrib., “Project Manager’s Report—Project Sterling,” 27 Mar. 1968, w/att. report, NVO 34, n.d.; M. W. Carter and Placak, “Off-Site Surveillance for Project Sterling, December 3, 1966,” Report VUF-1036, 24 May 1968; Rogers, “Nuclear Explosions in Mississippi” (n. 85). 87. D. H. Edwards to M. W. Carter, “ARPA/TC/DASA—Gas Explosion Program (Miracle Play Series) at Tatum Salt Dome,” 7 Aug. 1968; Walter J. Davis, “Technical and Operation Plan, Miracle Play,” Oct. 1968; Hubert D. Harvey, Jr., to files, “Safety Review Meeting, November 14, 1968—Miracle Play Series,” 20 Nov. 1968; ‘“Proposed Off-Site Safety Program for the Miracle Play Series,” 12 Nov. 1968; Thalgott to distrib., “Project Miracle Play Appendices to Operation Order NV-OpO-5-68,” 31 Dec. 1968, w/att. Appendix B, “Operational Safety Plan, Operation Miracle Play”; R. E. Miller to Edward B. Giller, “Safety Evaluation—Project Miracle Play,” 7 Jan. 1969; Harvey to files, “Status Report—Miracle Play Series, Hattiesburg, Mississippi,” 24 Apr. 1969. 88. Hendricks to E. M. Douthett, “Long Term Surveillance Program—Hattiesburg,” 8 Dec. 1970; NVOO, “Radiation Monitoring and Disposal Plan for the Roll-up of the Tatum Salt Dome Test Site,” 14 May 1971; R. E. Miller to Giller, “Tatum Dome Test Site Disposal,” n.d., w/att. draft “Long Term Radiological Surveillance Program, Tatum Salt Dome Test Site, Hattiesburg, Lamar County, Mississippi,” July 1971. 89. Crowson to Seaborg and Tape, “Vela Uniform Underground Nuclear Test in
458 Notes to Pages 246-247 Alaska,” 8 Mar. 1965; R. W. Duborg to Reeves, “Radiological Safety Support— Operation Long Shot,” 2 Apr. 1965; Crowson to AEC Commissioners, “Approval of Proposed Agreement between AEC and DOD on Project Long Shot,” 7 Apr. 1965, w/att. “AEC-DOD Memorandum of Agreement, Project Long Shot” (circulated in AEC 1029/35, same title, 7 Apr. 1965); M. W. Knapp to Reeves, “Transmittal of NV/HEG Evaluation of Project Long Shot,” 18 May 1965; Reeves to D. I. Prickett, “Radiological Safety Support—Operation Long Shot,” 20 May 1965; Thalgott to distrib., “Public Safety Plan—Project Long Shot,” 16 Sept. 1965, w/att. plan, Aug. 1965;
Crowson to AEC Commissioners, “Status of Project Long Shot,” 30 Sept. 1965; “Report of the AEC Deputy Test Manager, Project Long Shot,” Report NVO-26, July 1966, chs. 1-3. 90. D. Clark to Crowson, “Public Information Plan—Project Longshot,” 8 Mar. 1965; Allaire to distrib., “Information Concerning Long Shot,” 14 June 1965; Deputy Test Manager’s Report, (n. 89), ch. 7. 91. Richard F. Smale to files, “Longshot,” 28 Oct. 1965; Marion R. Scalf to files, “Flight Report for the Longshot Event of October 29, 1965,” 26 Nov. 1965; R. L. Hitechew to Roehlk, “Post Shot Advisories,” 7 Dec. 1965; Smale, “Operation Long
Shot, Radiation Safety Final Report,” Dec. 1965; PHS, “Final Report of Off-Site Surveillance for Project Longshot,” Report SWRHL-6r, Dec. 1968; Deputy Test Manager’s Report (n. 89), chs. 3, 9. 92. J. A. Harris to AEC Commissioners, “Proposed Interior Department Announce-
ment on Cooperation in Alaska STS Survey,” 29 Dec. 1966; Crowson to Robert B. Weeden, 6 May 1967; Walter J. Hickel to Seaborg, 11 Sept. 1967; E. L. Bartlett to Seaborg, 25 Sept. 1967; Hickel to Seaborg, 28 Sept. 1967; Seaborg to Hickel, 13 Oct. 1967; Seaborg to Bartlett, 19 Oct. 1967; Bartlett to Seaborg, 24 Oct. 1967; Hickel to Seaborg, 8 Nov. 1967; Clarence Pautzke to Seaborg, 26 Jan. 1968; Charles Winter to Hollingsworth, “Sea Otters at Amchitka,” 30 Jan. 1968, w/att. text of public announcement (circulated as AEC 141/83, same title, 1 Feb. 1968); Winter to Hollingsworth, “Sea Otters at Amchitka,” 8 Feb. 1968 (circulated as AEC 141/84, same title, 14 Feb. 1968); Giller to Hollingsworth, “Transplant of Sea Otters from Amchitka,” 9 May 1968, w/att. draft “Cooperative Agreement between the State of Alaska, the United States Atomic Energy Commission, and the United States Department of the Interior,” 2 May 1968; NVOO release NV-68-81, 27 May 1968. 93. Seaborg to L. B. Johnson, 2 May 1968; Reeves to Giller, 21/2359Z May 1968; Geneva S. Douglas to J. W. Betit, 5 Sept. 1968; R. E. Miller to Giller, 26 Aug. 1968; “Summary of Bioecological Aspects of AEC Activities on Amchitka Island, Alaska,” n.d. (ca. Feb. 1969); NVOO, “Background Information Regarding AEC Activities on Amchitka Island, Alaska,” 30 July 1969; NVOO, “Effects Evaluation for Milrow Event,” Aug. 1969; Luther J. Carter, “Earthquakes and Nuclear Tests: Playing the Odds on Amchitka,” Science 165 (22 Aug. 1969): 773-776; AEC, Underground Nuclear Testing: A Report, Report TID 25180 (Washington, Sept. 1969). 94. James B. Kirkwood, “Bioenvironmental Safety Studies, Amchitka Island, Alaska: Milrow D+7 Days Report,” Report BMI-171-122, 12 Oct. 1969, revised 17 Oct. 1969; EIC, “Project Milrow On-Site Radiological Safety and Medical Services,” Report NVO-294-3, 20 Feb. 1970; PHS, “Final Report of Off-Site Surveillance for the Milrow Event, October 2, 1969,” Report SWRHL-95r, June 1970; Glasstone, Public Safety and Underground Nuclear Explosions (n. 2), 205-211.
Notes to Page 247 459 95. R. E. Miller to distrib., “Amchitka Planning Directive,” 3 Mar. 1970, w/att. ‘“Amchitka Island Planning Directive, January 1970 through End of Program,” Report NVO-62, 15 Jan. 1970; Seaborg to John N. Irwin II, 14 Apr. 1971, w/att. “Cannikin Programmatic Justification”; “Project Cannikin Health and Safety Plan,” 1 June 1971,
revised 28 Oct. 1971; H. F Mueller to distrib., “Revised Fallout Exposure Estimates—Project Cannikin,” 17 Aug. 1971; Giller to AEC Commissioners, “Project
Cannikin D+30 Day Report,” 25 Feb. 1972, w/att. “Project Cannikin D+30 Day Report: Preliminary Operational and Test Results Summary,” Report NVO-108, Feb. 1972, 1-4. 96. E. M. Douthett to R. E. Miller, “Bioenvironmental Implications of an April Shot Date on Amchitka,” 30 Jan. 1970, w/att. “Discussion of Major Bioenvironmental Factors Relating to an April/May Shot Time on Amchitka,” 29 Jan. 1970; Russell E. Train to Irwin, “Potential Environmental Hazards Associated with Cannikin,” 2 Dec. 1970; BMI, “Preliminary Cannikin Testtime Plan for the Amchitka Bioenvironmental Program,” Feb. 1971; PHS, “WERL Marine Sampling Program for Cannikin Event,” n.d. 97. R. H. Johnston, Jr., to distrib., “Release of Information Concerning Cannikin,” 9 Apr. 1970; Seaborg to J. Glenn Beall, Jr., 9 Mar. 1971; Seaborg to John D. Dingell, 6 May 1971; John Paul Hammerschmidt to Seaborg, 12 May 1971; Melvin P. Laird to William A. Egan, 5 Aug. 1971; “Highlights for Egan Briefing,” n.d.; Charles W. Fort to files, “Meeting with Commissioners Brewer, McGinnis and Noerenberg on 8/2/71,” 10 Aug. 1971. 98. J. A. Harris to AEC Commissioners, “Cannikin Booklet,” 7 May 1971, wéatt. AEC, “Project Cannikin,” May 1971; NVOO, “Public Hearings on Effects of Project Cannikin to Be Conducted in Juneau, Alaska, on May 26, 1971, and in Anchorage, Alaska, on May 28, 1971,” n.d.; M. W. Carter, “Radiological Off-Site Safety Program—Cannikin,” 26 May 1971; AEC transcript, “Informal Public Hearings on the Proposed Cannikin Test, Juneau, Alaska,” 26 May 1971; AEC transcript, “Informal Public Hearings on Project Cannikin,” Anchorage, 28-29 May 1971. 99. R. E. Miller to Giller, 04/1837Z June 1971; Giller to AEC Commissioners, “Report on Cannikin Informal Public Hearings—Juneau on May 26; Anchorage on May 28 and 29, 1971,” 10 June 1971, w/att. “Summation of Informal Public Hearings” (circulated as SECY-1707, “Cannikin: Report on Informal Public Hearings,” 11 June 1971); John M. Berlinger, “Report on Project Cannikin Public Hearings,” 14 June 1971. 100. Erlewine to AEC Commissioners, “Implementing Section 102(2)(c) of the
‘National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,’ for Cannikin Event in Amchitka,” 9 June 1970, w/att. draft “Environmental Statement, Cannikin,” June 1970 (circulated as AEC 1334, “Cannikin Event in Amchitka: Implementing National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,” 10 June 1970); AEC, “Environmental Statement, Cannikin,” June 1971; M. W. Carter to Ermest D. Harward, “Review of Final Environmental Statement—Cannikin,” 1 Sept. 1971, w/att. PHS, “Staff Report on June 1971 Environmental Statement, Cannikin,” 1 Sept. 1971. 101. James H. Heller to Allen J. Ellender, 29 June 1970; “Radiation Hazards of Underground Nuclear Explosions on Amchitka Island,” n.d.; “Underground Nuclear Blasts Trigger Off Earthquakes,” n.d.; “Alaska Mothers’ Campaign against Cannikin,” n.d., w/att. background information by Stephen Haycox; Robert J. Bazell, “Nuclear
460 Notes to Pages 247-248 Tests: Big Amchitka Shot Target of Mounting Opposition,” Science 172 (18 June 1971): 1219-1221; M. W. Carter to files, “Telephone Conversations with Mr. R. H. Thalgott and Mr. Bill Fort,” 4 Oct. 1971; A. De Volpi to President Richard M. Nixon, 27 Oct. 1971. 102. CNR press release, 8 July 1971; CNR et al., Plaintiffs, against Seaborg et al., Defendants, “Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunction,” filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, 8 July 1971; “Project Cannikin D+30 Day Report” (n. 95), 4-5. ‘ 103. Bernhardt to files, “Telephone Conversations with Mr. E. Campbell, AEC/ NVOO, and Dr. M. L. Merritt, Sandia, Concerning the Cannikin Event,” 18 Nov. 1971; AEC release 0-221, “Summary Report on Cannikin Effects,” 19 Nov. 1971; PHS, “Summary of Cannikin Public Health and Environmental Effects,” n.d.; Bernhardt to files, “Telephone Conversation with Dr. James Hadley of LLL on November 19, 1971,” 6 Dec. 1971; “Project Cannikin D+30 Day Report” (n. 95), 16-26; Melvin L. Merritt, “Physical and Biological Effects, Cannikin,” Report NVO-123, Oct. 1973.
104. PHS, “Preliminary Report: Off-Site Radiological Surveillance and Public Safety for the Cannikin Event,” 3 Dec. 1971; E. J. Lang draft, “Environmental Sampling Program, Cannikin, Amchitka, Alaska,” 22 Dec. 1971; “Project Cannikin D+30 Day Report” (n. 95), 12-15; Fort and Wruble, “Off-Site Radiological Safety for the Cannikin Event, November 6, 1971,” Report NERC-LV-539-2, Sept. 1972; EIC, “Project Cannikin On-Site Radiological Safety and Medical Services Final Report,” Report NVO-294-6, Aug. 1973; Layton J. O’Neill, “Summary of On-Site Radiological Monitoring Operations for the Cannikin Event (November 6, 1971), Amchitka, Alaska,” Report NVO-191, Oct. 1978. 105. “Amchitka Island Planning Directive” (n. 95), part 3; R. E. Miller to NV principal staff, “Site Roll-up and Restoration,” 23 Nov. 1970; M. W. Carter to William A. Mills, “Cannikin Test Effects,” 29 Dec. 1971. 106. James E. Martin, “A Proposed Public Health Service Program of Off-Site Radiological Safety for the Pacific Test Area,” 5 Aug. 1965; Thomas L. Shipman to distrib., “Health and Safety in the Pacific,” 19 Aug. 1965; Shipman to Ogle, “Health and Safety in the Pacific,” 13 Sept. 1965; Thalgott to Robert R. Brownlee, Orin W. Stopinski, and Jack W. Reed, “Pacific Off-Site Safety Organization,” 14 Sept. 1965; Arthur N. Cox to Shipman, “H Division Representative for the LASL Test Group,” 30 Sept. 1965; Shipman to Neel Glass, “Draft Safety Annex, JTF-8 Operation Plan 10066,” 25 Jan. 1968; Roy Redier to Glass, “Draft Safety Annex, JTF-8 Operations Plan
100-66,” 30 Jan. 1968. ,
107. REECo, Safety Involving Detonation of Nuclear Devices, Report NVO-28 (Las Vegas, May 1966); Giller to AEC Commissioners, “Summary Report on Activities for Assuring the Safety of Underground Nuclear Testing,” 25 Feb. 1969, w/att. draft report (circulated as AEC 141/122, same title, 26 Feb. 1969); NVOO, Safety of Underground Nuclear Testing: Summary Report on Activities for Assuring the Safety of Underground Nuclear Testing, Report TID-24996 (Las Vegas, Apr. 1969); REECo, Technical Discussions of Offsite Safety Programs for Underground Nuclear Detonations, Report NVO-40 (Revision 2) (Las Vegas, May 1969); AEC, Underground Nuclear Testing (n. 93); W. C. King, “Methods Used by LRL to Document Releases of Activity Following a Nuclear Weapons Test,” 10 July 1970.
Notes to Page 248 461 108. Allaire to distrib., “Interpretation of the Terms ‘Venting’ and ‘Seepage,’”’ 15 June 1966; Reeves to distrib., “Safety Evaluation Off-Site Project Document,” 27 Mar. 1967; Hendricks to files, “Off-Site Radiological Safety Criteria,” 16 Oct. 1967; Thalgott to Placak, “Off-Site Radiological Safety Criteria,” 31 Oct. 1967; Dunning draft, “Radiation Exposure Criteria for Evaluating Potential Hazards from Underground Nuclear Explosives,” 5 Nov. 1968; Francis N. Buck to M. W. Carter, “Radiation Exposure Criteria,” 21 Nov. 1968; Rarrick to J. T. Jones, “General Summary of Radioactive Effluent Releases,” 18 Sept. 1969; Seaborg to Mike Gravel, 22 Nov. 1969, w/att. “Releases of Radioactivity to the Atmosphere from Underground Nuclear Detonations Designed for Containment, 1963-1969”; R. E. Miller to Biles, “Radioactive Effiuents and Releases,” 15 Apr. 1970; Giller to AEC Commissioners, “Radioactive Releases at the Nevada Test Site,” 20 Aug. 1970, with attachments (circulated as SECY-250, “NTS: Radioactive Releases,’ 24 Aug. 1970); Biles to managers of field offices, “Radioactive Effluents from AEC Facilities,” 27 Nov. 1970. See also H. N. Friesen, A Perspective on Atmospheric Nuclear Tests in Nevada (Las Vegas, Aug. 1985), 10; NVOO, Announced Nuclear Tests (n. 6), 19-26. 109. Seaborg to Lee Metcalf, 8 Feb. 1968; Vermillion to distrib., “Revised Draft of Proposed Underground Test Booklet,” 19 June 1968, w/att. NVOO, “Underground Nuclear Testing: Why There Must be Tests—How Safety Is Assured,” 2d draft, 19 June 1968; PHS, “Off-Site Radiological Safety Program,” 2d draft, 9 July 1968; PHS, “Proposed Modifications of Environmental Surveillance Network Operations,” 3 Apr. 1970; Whitman to H. E. Kendrick, “Orientation Outline of Rad-Safe Operations at the NTS,” 27 Oct. 1970. 110. L. J. O’Neill draft, “Environmental Radiological Safety Considerations for Nuclear Detonations,” 15 Apr. 1970; Vincent Schultz, “References on Nevada Test Site Ecological Research,” Great Basin Naturalist 26 (31 Dec. 1966): 79-86, with addendum of references to 1970, n.d. (ca. June 1970); Erlewine to Hollingsworth, “FY 1971 Environmental Statement—Underground Nuclear Test Programs, Nevada Test Site,” 12 Nov. 1970, w/att. comments and draft statement (circulated as SECY-632, “FY 1971 Environmental Statement: NTS Underground Nuclear Test Programs,” 13 Nov. 1970); McBride to files, “Telephone Call from Mr. Donald Hendricks,” 24 Nov. 1970; AEC, “Environmental Statement: Underground Nuclear Test Programs, Nevada Test Site (Tests of 1 Megaton or Less),” Nov. 1970. 111. Thalgott, “Test Manager’s Operations Plan—Baneberry,” 10 Dec. 1970; NVOO release NV-70-127, 18 Dec. 1970; Seaborg to NSC Under Secretaries Committee, “Baneberry Interim Status Report,” 11 Jan. 1971, w/att. “Underground Nuclear Test Baneberry, Dec. 18, 1970: Interim Report (As of December 24, 1970),” 11, 5-7; Harry S. Jordan to T. T. Scolman, “Estimate of the Radioactivity Released by the Baneberry Event,” 11 Jan. 1971; NVOO, “Baneberry Summary Report,” Jan. 1971, 16-19, 48-50; W. C. King to J. E. Sattizahn, “Baneberry Vent,” 8 Feb. 1971, wiatt. King and K. W. Price, “Baneberry Vent Source Term Estimate,” 8 Feb. 1971; SECY1092, DMA report, “Release of Radioactivity Resulting from the Baneberry Test,” 2 Mar. 1971, Appendix E, “Nevada Operations Office Test Evaluation Panel,” 21-29. See also REECo, Radiological Effluents Released (n. 7), 124.
112. REECo, “Area 12 Radiological Safety Procedures,” 31 Dec. 1970; W. E. Robertson to Cluff, “Baneberry Event and Evacuation of Area 12,” 12 Jan. 1971; Robertson to R. W. Kiehn, “Baneberry Event and Evacuation of Area 12,” 26 Jan.
462 Notes to Page 249 1971; Baneberry Interim Report (n. 111), 9-10; NVOO, “Baneberry Summary Report” (n. 111), 51. 113. “Statistical Summary of Vehicle Monitoring and Decontamination Efforts; Prognosis of Vehicle Decontamination Situation,” 2400 hours, 20 Dec. 1970; L. J. O’Neill, “Test Manager’s Rad Safe Advisor—Status Report,” 22 Dec. 1970, Annex
A, “Film Badge Recorded Exposures of Personnel Evacuated from Area 12 on 12/18/70”; John A. Eckert to Arden E. Bicker, “Report of Counting NTS Personnel from Area 12,” 24 Dec. 1970; McCraw to Catlin, “Baneberry Summary, December 22, 1970,” 31 Dec. 1970; E. R. Sorom to A. W. Western, “Status of Private Vehicles and Belongings—January 5, 1971,” 6 Jan. 1971; Eckert to McBride, “Exposure of
PHS Personnel during the Baneberry Event,” 14 Jan. 1971; William J. Brady to Bicker, “Dose Estimate Revision—Roberts, H. R., WSI,” 10 Feb. 1971; R. E. Miller to Biles, 16 Feb. 1971; Bicker to Hendricks, “Report of Counting NTS Personnel from Area 12,” 16 Apr. 1972; T. C. Roy and Eubank, comps., “Onsite Environmental Sciences Activities during the Baneberry Event,” REECo Report NVO-410-29, June 1973; Baneberry Interim Report (n. 111), 10; NVOO, “Baneberry Summary Report” (n. 111), 51-53. 114. Wayne A. Bliss to files, “Aerial Tracking—Baneberry Event of December 18, 1970,” 23 Dec. 1970; PHS, “Baneberry Event, Aerial Monitoring and Sampling: Preliminary Report,” n.d. (ca. 20 Dec. 1970); PHS, “Off-Site Radiological Safety Program for the Baneberry Event,” n.d. (ca. 23 Dec. 1970); Grossman to files, “Daily
Report to AEC/NVOO,” 31 Dec. 1970; “Radioiodine Studies for the Baneberry Event: Memo Report,” n.d. (ca. 5 Jan. 1971); PHS release SWRHL-171, 7 Jan. 1971;
Baneberry Interim Report (n. 111), 10-12, 13-14. See also REECo, Radiological Effluents Released (n. 7), 123-124. For a description of the organization and function of SWRHL, see M. W. Carter, “Offsite Radiological Safety Program,” in REECo, “Technical Discussions of Offsite Safety Programs for Underground Nuclear Detonations,” NVO-40 (Revision No. 2) (Las Vegas: NVOO, May 1969), 271-299. 115. Seaborg to NSC, 11 Jan. (n. 111). 116. EPA, “Surveillance Report: Baneberry Event of December 18, 1970,” 25 Jan. 1971; Safety Panel of Consultants to R. E. Miller, 3 Feb. 1971; M. W. Carter to distrib., “Interim Report of Off-Site Surveillance,” 19 Feb. 1971, w/att. SWRHL, “Interim Report of Off-Site Surveillance for the Baneberry Event, December 18, 1970,” Jan. 1971; John J. Koranda et al., “Radioecological Studies Related to the Baneberry Event,” 1 Mar. 1971; Bernhardt to files, “Review of AEC Baneberry Report,” 22 Mar. 1971; PHS, “Preliminary Report of Off-Site Surveillance for the Baneberry Event, December 18, 1970,” 13 Jan. 1971, revised 5 Apr. 1971; Robert E. Allen, “Summary Information on Accidental Releases of Radioactivity to the Atmosphere from Under-
ground Nuclear Detonations Designed for Containment, August 5, 1963-June 30, 1971,” DOS Report WASH-1183, June 1971, 27-28; Wruble to Carter, ““Dosimetry’ Words in Final Baneberry Report,” 24 Oct. 1971, w/att. “Baneberry Dosimetry Statements”; PHS, “Final Report of Off-Site Surveillance for the Baneberry Event, De-
cember 18, 1970,” Report SWRHL-107r, Feb. 1972; Wruble to files, “Baneberry Aerial Data Meeting,” 5 July 1972; NVOO, “Baneberry Summary Report” (n. 111), 56-63. 117. NVOO release NV-70-130, 21 Dec. 1970; F. I. Strabala to R. E. Miller, “Resumption of Work—NTS,” 24 Dec. 1970; J. J. Brown to files, “Decontamination
Notes to Pages 250-251 463 and Control of Area 12 Camp and Portal Areas, Period Beginning 4 January 1971,” 4 Feb. 1971; Baneberry Interim Report (n. 111), 12-13; NVOO, “Baneberry Summary Report” (n. 111), 53-56. 118. R. D. McArthur to Phil Coyle and Fred Beane, “Potential Site for the Baneberry Event,” 15 July 1970; Giller to R. E. Miller, “Baneberry After-Action Report,” 22 Dec. 1970; Hollingsworth to John V. Vinciguerra et al., “Headquarters Evaluation Panel,” 3 Feb. 1971; Miller to distrib., “Panel of Consultants Statement—Baneberry,” 16 Feb. 1971, w/att. statement; Vinciguerra et al. to Hollingsworth, “Headquarters Evaluation Panel Conclusions,” 25 Feb. 1971; R. W. Terhune et al., “Calculational Examination of the Baneberry Event,” Report UCRL-52365, 5 Dec. 1977; Baneberry Interim Report (n. 111), 1-5; NVOO, “Baneberry Summary Report” (n. 111), 16-47; SECY-1092, “Release of Radioactivity” (n. 111), 2—4. 119. Theodore R. Butkovich, “Effects of Water Saturation on Underground Nuclear Detonations,” Report UCRL-51110, Livermore, 9 Sept. 1971, 14. 120. Robert E. Clemensen to distrib., “CEP Charter,” 12 Mar. 1971, w/att. draft charter; Hollingsworth to Edward J. Bauser, 13 Mar. 1971; Higgins to Thalgott, 22 Mar. 1971; Twenhofel to Thalgott, 29 Mar. 1971; James E. Carothers to R. E. Miller et al., 09/1814Z Apr. 1971; Carothers to Ogle, 8 May 1972; C. E. Williams to distrib., “Containment Evaluation Panel,” 9 Aug. 1972; Mahlon E. Gates to Carothers, 7 June 1973, w/att. “Containment Evaluation Panel Charter,” 7 June 1973; Gates to Frank A. Camm, “Containment Review Procedures,” 11 June 1973, w/att. procedures, June 1973; SECY-1092, “Release of Radioactivity” (n. 111), Appendix C, “Summary of Actions to be Inititated for Test Resumption,” 17-20. 121. Giller to AEC Commissioners, “Impact of Banebury on NTS Operations,” 2 Apr. 1971 (circulated as SECY-1279, “Baneberry: Impact on NTS Operations,” 5 Apr. 1971); SEC Y-1092, “Release of Radioactivity” (n. 111), 6-10. 122. SECY-1092, “Release of Radioactivity” (n. 111), 8. 123. H & N, “Reviews to Insure Safety of Nuclear Operations,” Report NVO-48 (Rev. -2) (Las Vegas, July 1972); Tommy F. McCraw to Biles, “Radiation Exposure Standards for Weapons Test Operations,” 18 July 1972; Friesen, Perspective on Aimospheric Nuclear Tests (n. 108), 10; NVOO, Announced Nuclear Tests (n. 6), 27-32; R. G. Patzer and M. E. Kaye, “Results of a Surveillance Program for Persons Living around the Nevada Test Site—1971 to 1980,” Health Physics 43 (1982): 791-801; Allen, “Summary Information on Accidental Releases” (n. 116), 3-5. For an overview of containment practices and results, since Baneberry, see OTA, The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions, Report OTA-ISC-414 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, Oct. 1989). 124. Gravel to Seaborg, 19 Dec. 1970, w/att. “Questions Regarding the BombTests in Nevada”; Holifield to Seaborg, 22 Dec. 1970; M. W. Carter to files, “Telephone Conversation with Mr. Lynn Thatcher,” 22 Dec. 1970; Carter to files, “Telephone Conversation with Dr. Arthur Wolff,” 22 Dec. 1970; Carter to files, “Telephone Conversation with Mr. Don Dubois,” 22 Dec. 1962; Carter to files, “Telephone Conversation with Mr. David Finne,” 22 Dec. 1970; Myron B. Kratzer to AEC Commissioners, “Baneberry Test,” 28 Dec. 1970 (circulated as SECY-814, same title, 29 Dec. 1970); Edward U. Condon and Seymour Melman to Seaborg, 28 Dec. 1970; McBride to files, “Telephone Conversation with Dr. Clifford Nelson,” 29 Dec. 1970; Jeremy J. Stone to Seaborg, 31 Dec. 1970; McBride to files, “Telephone Conver-
464 Notes to Pages 251-252 sation with Mr. Robert Siek,” 4 Jan. 1971; McBride to files, “Telephone Conversation with Dr. Clifford Nelson,” 8 Jan. 1971; Carter to files, “Telephone Conversation with Mr. Beals,” 11 Jan. 1971; Carter to files, “Telephone Conversation with Dr. H. Peter Metzger,” 12 Jan. 1971; Mrs. Robert Succetti to AEC, Las Vegas, 12 Jan. 1971. 125. McCool to files, “Public Announcement on Baneberry,” 22 Dec. 1970, w/att.
resume of public information actions by NVOO Office of Public Affairs after Baneberry venting, 21 Dec. 1970; David G. Jackson to files, “ABC-TV News Team Trip to the Nevada Test Site,” 23 Dec. 1970; G. S. Douglas to files, “Request from ABC Radio News in Los Angeles,” 11 Jan. 1971; SECY-861, “Script of Paul Jacobs’ Net Show, January 20, 1971,” 11 Jan. 1971, w/att. script. 126. V. E. Andrews to files, “Telephone Conversation with Dr. Amasa Cornish,” 10 Feb. 1971; Seaborg to Stone, 30 Jan. 1971, w/att. “Summary Comments to Questions Raised by Dr. Jeremy J. Stone”; Seaborg to E. U. Condon and Melman, 18 Feb. 1971, w/att. “Baneberry Summary”; Seaborg to Gravel, 11 Mar. 1971, w/att. “AEC Response to Questions Contained in Letter from Senator Gravel Dated December 19, 1970”; Edythalena Tompkins to W. A. Mills, “Telephone Call from Dr. Lymen J. Olsen,” 8 Mar. 1971. 127. NVOO Office of Public Affairs, “Baneberry Fact Sheet,” n.d. (distributed to reporters at meeting on 7 Jan. 1971); R. E. Miller to J. A. Harris, “Information Plan for Announcement of Baneberry Investigation Preliminary Report,” 15 Jan. 1971; Vermillion to Harris, “Open Meeting at Beatty, Nevada, Jan. 28, 1971, on Baneberry Venting,” 29/2056Z Jan. 1971; McBride to files, “Telephone Conversation with Mr. Donald Hendricks,” 12 Mar. 1971; Miller to Biles, 13 Mar. 1971; Biles to Miller, 16/1735Z Mar. 1971; M. W. Carter to files, “Telephone Conversation with Mr. Don Hendricks,” 31 Mar. 1971; Carter to files, ““Telephone Conversation with Mr. R. E. Miller,” 31 Mar. 1971. 128. J. A. Harris to AEC Commissioners, “Baneberry,” 19 Mar. 1971, w/att. (1) “Public Information Action Plan for Baneberry Press Briefing”; (2) “Public Announcement”; (3) “Q’s and A’s for Baneberry Press Briefing”; and (4) AEC, Baneberry Summary Report, Mar. 1971. 129. R. E. Miller, “Opening Remarks—Baneberry Report Press Conference,” 14
May 1971, 3. |
130. NVOO release NV-71-29, 14 May 1971; “Q’s and A’s for Baneberry Press Briefing,” n.d. (ca. 14 May 1971); Miller, “Opening Remarks” (n. 129); AEC, Baneberry Summary Report (n. 128); SWRHL, “Interim Report of Off-Site Surveillance” (n. 116). 131. Chris L. West to files, “Baneberry Press Conference,” 19 May 1971. 132. McBride to files, “Telephone Conversation with Mr. Frank Ingram,” 6 July 1971. See also Regnier to files, “Telephone Call from Mrs. Gail Bradshaw on July 8, 1971,” 21 July 1971; Ernest J. Sternglass, Secret Fallout: Low-Level Radiation from Hiroshima to Three-Mile Island, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981), 178-181. 133. E. Tompkins and J. Godbold, “Infant Mortality and the Baneberry Event,”
3 Aug. 1971, 2 (emphasis in original).
134. Alice M. Stewart et al., “A Survey of Childhood Malignancies,” British Medical Journal 1 (1958): 1495-1508; Brian MacMahon, “Prenatal X-Ray Exposure and Childhood Cancers,” Journal of the National Cancer Institute 28 (1962): 1173-
Notes to Pages 252-253 465 1191; Ralph E. Lapp, “Nevada Test Fallout and Radioiodine in Milk,” Science 137 (7 Sept. 1962): 756-758. 135. Sternglass, “Cancer: Relation of Prenatal Radiation to Development of the
Disease in Childhood,” Science 140 (7 June 1963): 1102-1104; James T. Ramey to Charles L. Dunham, “Statement on Low Level Radiation and Childhood Cancer,” 14 June 1963, w/att. FAS release prepared by Pittsburgh Chapter, “Revised Draft Statement on Low Level Radiation and Childhood Cancer,” 7 June 1963. See also Philip M. Boffey, “Ernest J. Sternglass: Controversial Prophet of Doom,” Science 166
(10 Oct. 1969): 195-200; “AEC Staff Evaluation and Critique of the Arguments Presented by E. J. Sternglass,” n.d. (ca. Nov. 1969), 3; Sternglass, Secret Fallout (n. 132), chs. 2-3. 136. Thomas L. Shipman to Les Redman, “Attached Correspondence,” 4 Feb. 1969. Cf. Sternglass, Secret Fallout (n. 132), 50-53; “AEC Staff Evaluation and Critique” (n. 135), 3. 137. Shipman to Redman, 4 Feb. (n. 136). Cf. Louis H. Hempelmann to Shipman, 20 Jan. 1969. 138. Shipman to Sternglass, 4 Feb. 1969. See also Sternglass to Shipman, 30 Jan. 1969; Sternglass, Secret Fallout (n. 132), ch. 10, “The Clouds of Trinity.” 139. See Barton C. Hacker, The Dragon’s Tail: Radiation Safety in the Manhattan Project, 1942-1946 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: Univ. of California Press, 1987), chs. 3, 4, 6. 140. Sternglass, “Infant Mortality and Nuclear Tests,” BAS 25 (Apr. 1969): 18-20; Sternglass, “Has Nuclear Testing Caused Infant Deaths?” New Scientist 43 (24 July 1969): 178-181; Sternglass, “The Death of All Children,” Esquire 72 (Sept. 1969): la—1d. See also Boffey, “Ernest J. Sternglass” (n. 135); Sternglass, Secret Fallout (n.
132), chs. 7-14; Leslie J. Freeman, Nuclear Witnesses: Insiders Speak Out (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981), ch. 3, “Ernest J. Sternglass, Physicist”; Harvey Wasserman et al., Killing Our Own: The Disaster of America’s Experience with Atomic Radiation (New York: Delta Books, 1982), 212-215. 141. Van der Smissen to M. W. Carter, “‘Evidence for Low-Level Radiation Effects on the Human Embryo and Fetus,’ a paper by Dr. E. J. Sternglass (Dept. of Radiology, U. of Pittsburgh),” 22 July 1969; A. M. Stewart, “The Pitfalls of Extrap-
olation,” New Scientist 43 (24 July 1969): 181; Leonard A. Sagan, “A Reply to Sternglass,” New Scientist 44 (2 Oct. 1969): 14-17; Sagan et al., “Infant Mortality Controversy: Sternglass and His Critics,” BAS 25 (Oct. 1969): 26-32; Peter Greenwald and Sandra Kinch, “Relation of Radioactive Fallout to Leukemia and Fetal Mortality: A Reconsideration,’ New York State Department of Health Report EXEP690501 (Oak Ridge: AEC, Dec. 1969); Michael W. Friedlander and Joseph Klarmann, “How Many Children?” Environment 11 (Dec. 1969): 3-8; Allan R. Hoffman and David Rittenhouse Inglis, “Radiation and Infants,” BAS 28 (Dec. 1972): 45-52; “AEC Staff Evaluation and Critique” (n. 135), 4-8; Victor R. Fuchs, “Low-Level Radiation and Infant Mortality,” Health Physics 40 (1981): 847-854. 142. Arthur R. Tamplin, “Fetal and Infant Mortality and the Environment,” BAS 25 (Dec. 1969): 23-29; Sternglass, “A Reply,” ibid., 29-34. 143. Bernard W. Shore, “The Fate and Importance of Radionuclides Produced in Nuclear Events,” in PHS, Public Health Aspects of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear
466 Notes to Page 253 Explosives (n. 1), 595-649; Boffey, “Gofman and Tamplin: Harassment Charges against AEC, Livermore,” Science 169 (28 Aug. 1970): 838-843; Carl P. Musacchio, “Atomic Safety—What’s Behind the Controversy?” Occupational Safety (Dec. 1970): 32-36; Tamplin and John W. Gofman, “Population Control” through Nuclear Pollution (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1970), 56-63; Gerald Wick, “They Won’t Shut Up,” New Scientist 50 (27 May 1971): 532-533; Corinne Browne and Robert Munroe, Time Bomb: Understanding the Threat of Nuclear Power (New York: William Morrow,
1981), 128-149; Freeman, Nuclear Witnesses (n. 140), ch. 4, “John W. Gofman, Medical Physicist”; Wasserman et al., Killing Our Own (n. 140), 209-212.
144. Gofman to Wright H. Langham, 24 June 1963. See also Langham to Gofman, 8 July 1963; Dunham to Langham, 10 July 1963; Langham to Gofman, 31 July 1963; Langham to Dunham, 6 Aug. 1963, w/att. “Committee Review of Report on ‘Iodine!! in Fresh Milk and Human Thyroids Following a Single Deposition of Nuclear Test Fallout’; Dunham to Seaborg et al., “Review Committee’s Critique of Dr. [Harold A.] Knapp’s ‘Iodine Paper,’” 20 Aug. 1963. See also Tamplin and Gofman, “Population Control” through Nuclear Pollution (n. 143), 64-65, and ch. 9, above. 145. AEC meeting 2165, 14 Dec. 1965, item 3; Tamplin and H. Leonard Fisher,
Estimation of Dosage to Thyroids of Children in the U.S. from Nuclear Tests Conducted in Nevada during 1952 through 1955, Report UCRL-14707 (Livermore, 1966); Tamplin and Gofman, “Population Control” through Nuclear Pollution (n. 143), 65, 240. See Philippe G. Jacques to Hollingsworth, “Proposed Replies to Inquiries on Livermore Laboratory Estimates of Thyroid Gland Exposures to Radioiodine in the U.S. (1952 through 1955),” 9 Aug. 1966, w/att. advance copy of UCRL14707, and “Tamplin Report, UCRL-14707: Proposed Responses to Anticipated News Media Inquiries,” n.d. 146. U.S. Cong., Senate, Comm. on Public Works, Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution, Underground Uses of Nuclear Energy: Hearings on S. 3042, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., 18-20 Nov. 1969, especially testimony by Gofman and Tamplin, 58-100; Appendix I, “Supplementary Material Submitted by Dr. Gofman and Dr. Tamplin,” 259-277; Appendix III, “Materials Presented as Testimony by Drs. Gofman and Tamplin at Hearings of Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, January 28, 1970.” See also Edward S. Muskie to Robert H. Finch, 1 Dec. 1969; Gofman and Tamplin, “A Proposal for at Least a Ten-Fold Reduction in the FRC Guidelines for Radiation Exposure to the Population-at-Large,” 28 Jan. 1970; Gofman and Tamplin, “Low Dose Radiation and Cancer,” JEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science n.s. 17/1 (Feb. 1970): 1~9; Gofman and Tamplin, “Radiation: The Invisible Casualties,” Environment 12 (Apr. 1970): 12-19, 49; Gofman and Tamplin, “Questions for Dr. Paul Tompkins,” 29 June 1970; Gofman to Seaborg, 29 July 1970; Tamplin, “Issues in the Radiation Controversy,” BAS 27 (Sept. 1971): 25-27; Tamplin and Gofman, “Population Control” through Nuclear Pollution (n. 143), ch. 5, “Lip Service to the Public Health.”
147. John R. Totter to AEC Commissioners, “Analysis of Gofman-Tamplin Statements,” 16 Jan. 1970, w/att. Alexander Grendon, untitled critique, 9 Jan. 1970; Totter to Seaborg et al., “Remarks by Dr. John W. Gofman at the Gramercy Park Hotel, New York, March 5, 1970,” w/att. “Unedited Transcript of Remarks” (circulated as AEC 604/127, “Gofman Remarks before National Committee to Stop
Notes to Pages 254-255 467 Pollution et al., March 5, 1970, NYC,” 10 Apr. 1970); Remarks by Holifield, Congressional Record—House, 7 July 1970, H6415-19; Totter to Seaborg, “GofmanTamplin Paper GT-122-70, ‘Questions for Dr. Paul Tompkins,’” 5 Aug. 1970; Underground Uses of Nuclear Energy (n. 146), Appendix II, “Agency Comments on Testimony of Gofman and Tamplin,” 278-318; Roger E. Batzel to Totter, 10 May 1971, and Totter to Hollingsworth, “Budget for Biomedical Programs at LLL,” 30 July 1971 (both circulated as SECY-1966, same title, 30 July 1971). 148. As quoted in Musacchio, “Atomic Safety” (n. 143), 36. 149. Robert W. Holcomb, “Radiation Risk: A Scientific Problem?” Science 167 (6 Feb. 1970): 853-855; Boffey, “Ernest J. Sternglass” (n. 135); Sagan et al., “Infant
Mortality Controversy” (n. 141); Hoffman and Inglis, “Radiation and Infants’ (n. 141); Boffey, “Gofman and Tamplin” (n. 143). 150. BEIR, “The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation,” 1972; UNSCEAR, “Tonizing Radiation Levels and Effects,’ 1972. Cf. NCRP, Basic Radiation Protection Criteria, Report 39 (Washington, 15 Jan. 1971);
L. D. Hamilton, “On Radiation Standards,” BAS 28 (Mar. 1972): 30-33. See also Richard G. Hewlett, “Nuclear Weapon Testing and Studies Related to Health Effects: An Historical Survey,” in IRRC, Considerations of Three Proposals to Conduct Re-
search on Possible Health Effects of Radiation from Nuclear Weapon Testing in Arizona, Nevada, and Utah; and, Nuclear Weapon Testing and Studies Related to Health Effects, NYH Publication 81-507 (Washington, Oct. 1980), 82-85; Sarah C. Darby, “Review Article: Epidemiological Evaluation of Radiation Risk Using Populations Exposed at High Doses,” Health Physics 51 (1986): 269-281. 151. For an evenhanded contemporary assessment of the issues and comments on the literature, see R. H. Romer, “Resource Letter ERPEE-1 on Energy: Resources, Production, and Environmental Effects,” American Journal of Physics 40 (1972): 805-829, especially section VII.A, “The Low-Level Effects Controversy,” 820-822. Cf. Richard Lewis, “Last Word in the Radiation Debate,” New Scientist 57 (15 Mar. 1973): 610-611. 152. Llewllyn King, “The AEC Is Dead; Long Live the AEC,” New Scientist 64
(31 Oct. 1974): 328-329; Roger M. Anders, The United States Nuclear Weapon Program: A Summary History, “The Institutional Origins of the Department of Energy,” Report DOE/ES-0005 (Washington, Mar. 1983), 27, 51. 153. Elizabeth S. Rolph, Nuclear Power and the Public Safety: A Study in Regulation (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1979); George T. Mazuzan and J. Samuel
Walker, Controlling the Atom: The Beginnings of Nuclear Regulation, 1946-1962 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: Univ. of California Press, 1984); Walker, Containing the Atom: Nuclear Regulation in a Changing Environment, 1963—1971 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford: Univ. of California Press, 1992). 154. Stewart Firth, “The Nuclear Issue in the Pacific Islands,” Journal of Pacific
History 21 (Oct. 1986): 209-212; Jon Van Dyke et al., “Nuclear Activities and the Pacific Islanders,” Journal of Pacific Studies 10 (1984): 2-8, 26-29; Roger Ray, “A Perspective on Health Physics in the Marshall Islands,” presented at the HPS Honolulu Chapter annual dinner, 28 May 1982; Merze Tate and Doris M. Hull, “Effects of Nuclear Explosions on Pacific Islanders,” Pacific Historical Review 33 (Nov. 1964): 379-384. 155. Nahum Raphael Shulman et al., “Clinical Observations and Treatment,” in
468 Notes to Pages 255-256 Eugene P. Cronkite et al., eds., Some Effects of Ionizing Radiation on Human Beings:
A Report on the Marshallese and Americans Accidentally Exposed to Radiation Fallout and a Discussion of Radiation Injury in the Human Being (Washington: AEC, July 1956), 15-16; Victor P. Bond et al., “Hematologic Observations,” ibid., 50-51.
156. Stanton H. Cohn et al., “Internal Deposition of Radionuclides in Human Beings and Animals,” in Cronkite et al., Some Effects of Ionizing Radiation (n. 155), 65-76; William H. Adams et al., Medical Status of Marshallese Accidentally Exposed
to 1954 Bravo Fallout Radiation: January 1983 through December 1984, Report BNL 51958 (Upton, N.Y.: BNL, n.d. [ca. 1986]), 10-12, especially table 6, “Thyroid Lesions Diagnosed at Surgery through 1984.” 157. Dunning, ed., Radioactive Contamination of Certain Areas in the Pacific Ocean from Nuclear Tests: A Summary of the Data from the Radiological Surveys and Medical Examinations (Washington: AEC, Aug. 1957); H. V. Weiss, “Residual Contamination of Plants, Animals, Soil, and Water of the Marshall Islands Two Years Following Operation Castle Fallout,” in Dunning and John A. Hilcken, eds., The ShorterTerm Biological Hazards of a Fallout Field, proceedings of an AEC-DOD symposium,
Washington, 12-14 Dec. 1956 (Washington: GPO, 1958), 205-210; S. H. Cohn, “Persistence of Radioactive Contamination in Animals of Marshall Islands Two Years after Operation Castle,” ibid., 211-218; Kent T. Woodward et al., “The Determination of Internally Deposited Radioactive Isotopes in the Marshallese People by Excretion Analysis” (Washington: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, n.d. [ca. 1959]). 158. Edward T. Lessard et al., A Reconstruction of Chronic Dose Equivalents for Rongelap and Utirik Residents—1954 to 1980, Report BNL 51257 (Upton, N.Y.: BNL, Oct. 1980); Lessard et al., “Protracted Exposure to Fallout: The Rongelap and Utirik Experience,” Health Physics 46 (Mar. 1984): 511-527. 159. See above, ch. 9, pp. 228-230. 160. Dunning, Radioactive Contamination of Certain Areas in the Pacific Ocean (n. 157); Robert A. Conard, “Medical Survey of Marshallese People Five Years after Exposure to Fall-Out Radiation,” in A. A. Buzzati-Traverso, ed., Immediate and Low Level Effects of Ionizing Radiations (London: Taylor & Francis, as a supplement to
International Journal of Radiation Biology, 1960), 278-279; Lessard et al., “Protracted Exposure to Fallout” (n. 158); Thomas E. Hamilton, “Preliminary Report on the Rongelapese People: Health Effects of Radiation from Nuclear Fallout,” Sept. 1984. 161. Jack Adair Tobin, “The Resettlement of the Eniwetok People: A Study of a
Displaced Community in the Marshall Islands,” unpublished Ph.D. diss., Anthropology, Univ. of California, Berkeley, 1967; Anne Chambers, “A Study of the Relocation of Two Marshallese Atoll Communities,” Kroeber Anthropological Society Papers no. 44 (1971): 30—47. See also above, ch. 1, pp. 14-19. 162. Carl Markwith, “Farewell to Bikini,” National Geographic 90 (July 1946): 97-116; Robert C. Kiste, The Bikinians: A Study in Forced Migration (Menlo Park, Calif.: Cummings, 1974), 26-34; Kiste, ““The Relocation of the Bikini Marshallese,” in Michael D. Lieber, ed., Exiles and Migrants in Oceania, ASAO 5 (Honolulu: Univ.
Press of Hawaii, 1977), 81-86; Jonathan M. Weisgall, “The Nuclear Nomads of Bikini,” Foreign Policy, no. 39 (Summer 1980): 75-80. 163. “Agreement in Principle Regarding the Use of Bikini Atoll,” 22 Nov. 1956 (reproduced in Kiste, The Bikinians [n. 162], Appendix). 164. Leonard Mason, “The Bikinians: A Transplanted Population,” Human Or-
Notes to Pages 256-257 469 ganization 9 (1950): 5-15; Mason, “Ecological Change and Culture Pattern in the Resettlement of Bikini Marshallese,” in Verne F. Ray, ed., Cultural Stability and Cultural Change, proceedings of AES 1957 annual spring meeting (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1957), 1-6; Kiste, “Relocation and Technological Change in Micronesia,” in H. Russell Bernard and Pertti J. Pelto, eds., Technology and Social Change (New York: Macmillan, 1972), 82-94; Kiste, The Bikinians (n. 162), chs. 4—5; Weisgall, “Nuclear Nomads of Bikini” (n. 162), 80-83. 165. Robert Trumbull, Paradise in Trust: A Report on Americans in Micronesia, 1946-1958 (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1959), 43-44.
166. Tobin to Maynard Neas, 19 Sept. 1954, w/att. “Kili Journal, August 28 to September 18, 1954”; Tobin, “Preliminary Anthropologist’s Report—Bikini Atoll Survey 1957,” n.d.; Kiste, “Relocation and Technological Change in Micronesia”
(n. 164), 94-104; Kiste, The Bikinians (n. 162), ch. 6, “The Kili Development Project.” See also ch. 6, pp. 131-132, above. 167. Stewart L. Udall to Seaborg, 7 Dec. 1966. See also Tate and Hull, “Effects of Nuclear Explosions on Pacific Islanders” (n. 154), 84-93; Trumbull, Paradise in Trust (n. 165), 44—48; E. J. Kahn, Jr., A Reporter in Micronesia (New York: W. W. Norton, 1966), ch. 7, “Wards vs. Guardians.” 168. Seaborg to Udall, 20 Dec. 1966; Dunham to files, “Meeting on Bikini Data— January 24, 1967,” 26 Jan. 1967. On the 1964 survey, see Hill Williams, “Bikini Nine Years Later,” Science Journal 3 (Apr. 1967): 48-53.
169. Totter to AEC Commissioners, “Activities Concerning the Return of the Natives to the Bikini Atoll,” 2 Apr. 1968, w/att. “Meeting to Discuss Return of the Natives to the Bikini Atoll,” n.d. (ca. 28 Feb. 1968). For the 1967 resurvey, see Burton G. Bennett and Harold L. Beck, “External Radiation on Bikini Atoll,” Nature 223 (30 Aug. 1969): 925-928.
170. L. B. Johnson to Seaborg, 12 Aug. 1968. See also AEC release, 12 Aug. 1968.
171. Giller to AEC Commissioners, “Resettlement of the Bikintans,” 4 Sept. 1968 (circulated as AEC 604/114, same title, 5 Sept. 1968); Giller to AEC Commissioners, “Bikini Atoll Survey,” 12 Sept. 1969, with 9 att. (circulated as AEC 604/115, same
title, 13 Sept. 1968); McCraw to G. Kley, “Comments on ‘Major Action Items,’” 31 Dec. 1968.
172. Giller to AEC Commissioners, “Bikini,” 22 Jan. 1969, w/att. DOI draft, “Bikini Resettlement Progr.,” n.d. (circulated as AEC 604/117, “Bikini Resettlement Program,” 24 Jan. 1969); Seaborg to Hickel, 1 Feb. 1969; Giller to Bauser, 3 Feb. 1969; Giller to AEC Commissioners, “Memorandum of Understanding on Bikini Cleanup,” 14 Feb. 1969 (circulated as AEC 604/118, “AEC-DOD Memorandum of Understanding on Bikini Cleanup,” 17 Feb. 1969). See also SECY-2549, “Discussion of Rehabilitation on Eniwetok Atoll,” 21 June 1973, w/att. discussion paper. 173. L. M. Mustin to Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Interior, and Chairman
AEC, “Fifth Status Report, Cleanup of Bikini Atoll,” 1 Oct. 1969; Giller to AEC Commissioners, “Bikini,” 27 Oct. 1969 (circulated as AEC 604-121, “Bikini: Completion of Cleanup,” 28 Oct. 1969); Biles to Hollingsworth, “Proposed Survey of Plu-
tonium in Soils and in Air at Bikini Atoll,” 13 Apr. 1970, w/att. “Staff Report on Bikini Atoll Environmental Levels of Plutonium,” 11 Apr. 1970 (this report includes a substantial review of the organization and findings of the 1964, 1967, and 1969 radio-
470 Notes to Page 257 logical surveys, as well as its titular subject; circulated as AEC 604/130, “Bikini: Proposed Survey of Plutonium in Soils and Air,” 13 Apr. 1970); McCraw, “Preliminary Report on Bikini Atoll,” May 1970; Erlewine to Hollingsworth, “Summary Report on Bikini Status,” 1 June 1970 (circulated as AEC 604/138, “Bikini Atoll: Summary Report of Environmental Status,” 2 June 1970). 174. Biles to AEC Commissioners, “Interim Staff Report on 1970 Bikini Atoll Environmental Survey,” 17 Nov. 1970, w/att. report (circulated as SECY-651, same
title, 18 Nov. 1970); Biles to AEC Commissioners, “Cleanup of Bikini Atoll and Current Status, 22 Feb. 1971, w/att.; NVOO, “Summary Report of the 1969 and 1970 Bikini Surveys,” Feb. 1971; Biles to AEC Commissioners, “Cleanup of Bikini Atoll,”
3 June 1971, with att. (circulated as SECY-1642, same title, same date); Allan E. Smith and William E. Moore, “Report of the Radiological Clean-up of Bikini Atoll,” Report SWRHL-111r (WERL, Jan. 1972). 175. MLSC to Nixon, 4 May 1973; Ralph Waltz to Stanley S. Carpenter, 30 Mar. 1974; Hamlet J. Barry, III, to Dixy Lee Ray, 17 Apr. 1974; Biles to Carpenter, 8 Nov. 1974; Kiste, The Bikinians (n. 162), 177-181; Kiste, “Relocation of the Bikini Marshallese” (n. 162), 113-114; Weisgall, “Nuclear Nomads of Bikini” (n. 162), 85-86. 176. Bruce W. Wachholz to William J. Bair, 22 Jan. 1980, with enclosed Nathaniel A. Greenhouse, “Dosimetry Methods and Results for the Former Residents of Bikini Atoll,” Report 26797 (Upton, N.Y.: BNL, n.d.); Greenhouse et al., “Dosimetric Results for the Bikini Population,” Health Physics 38 (1980): 846-851. 177. McCraw to Hal Hollister, “Suggested DOE Responses to Questions on Bikini Atoll Resettlement,” 17 May 1978; W. W. Burr, Jr., to Alan Cranston, 14 July 1978; “Statement of Understanding on the Part of the Government of the United States and the Government of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands Concerning the Move of the People of Bikini Island, August, 1978,” signed by James A. Joseph (Undersecretary of Department of Interior), Ruth G. Van Cleve (Director of Office of Territorial Affairs), and Adrian P. Winkel (High Commissioner of Trust Territory), 16 Aug. 1978; DOI news release, “Relocation of Bikini Island People Will Begin August 28,” 25 Aug. 1978; Kay Lynch, “Radiation Danger Forces Bikinians from Island Home,” Washington Post, 1 Sept. 1978. See also Firth, Nuclear Playground (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaii Press, 1987), 30-32; W. S. Ellis, “A Way of Life Lost: Bikini,” National
Geographic 169 (June 1986): 813-834. For more recent developments, see ACE, Environmental Resources Section, “Environmental Assessment for Initial Resettlement of Eneu Island, Bikini Atoll,” Bikini Atoll Rehabilitation Committee, Supplementary Document No. 1 (Berkeley, Calif., 1 Jan. 1987). 178. Hiromitsu Toyosaki, Good-bye Rongelap! (Tokyo: Tsukiji Shokan, 1986);
Michael King, Death of the Rainbow Warrior (Auckland: Penguin Books [N.Z.], 1986), 22-35; Chris Masters, “Foreword,” in Bengt Danielsson and Marie-Thérése Danielsson, Poisoned Reign: French Nuclear Colonialism in the Pacific (Ringwood: Penguin Books Australia, 1986), ix—xv; Jane Dibblin, Day of Two Suns: U.S. Nuclear Testing and the Pacific Islanders (New York: New Amsterdam, 1990), ch. 4, “Leaving Rongelap.” For background on French testing, see French Embassy (Ambassade de
France), The French Nuclear Tests in the Pacific (New York: Service de Presse et d’ Information, June 1966); Georges-Henri Soutou, The French Military Program for Nuclear Energy, 1945-1981, trans. Preston Niblack, CISSM Occasional Paper 3, for the Nuclear History Program (College Park, Md.: CISSM, 1989).
Notes to Pages 257-258 471 179. William J. Crowe, Jr., to Franklin Haydn Williams, “Plan for Eniwetok,” 1 Mar. 1972; High Commissioner TTPI to distrib., 18/0705 Apr. 1972; SECY-2549, “Discussion of Rehabilitation” (n. 172). 180. Biles to AEC Commissioners, “Eniwetok,” 1 June 1972; “Summary Statement: Radiological Contamination at Eniwetok Atoll,” 15 June 1972; SECY-2549, “Discussion of Rehabilitation” (n. 171); “AEC Recommendations for Cleanup and Rehabilitation of Enewetak Atoll,” 30 Aug. 1974. 181. Tobin to Walter E. Nervik, “Info Requested by You Regarding Specific Needs of Returning Marshallese, to Eniwetok Atoll,” 16 Oct. 1972; R. Ray to M. E.
Gates, 13/0230Z Nov. 1972; Tobin to Nervik, 12 Nov. 1972, w/att. “Enewetak Census,” 9 Nov. 1972; Tobin to Nervik, “Information in Regard Needs of Returning Marshallese to Enewetak,” 10 Jan. 1973, w/att. Tobin, “The Enewetak Atoll People: A Special Report for the Radiological Survey of 1972-73,” 10 Jan. 1973; Nervik to Tobin, 24 Jan. 1973; Tobin to Michael E. Q. Pilson, 15 Feb. 1973; Tobin to Nervik, 15 Feb. 1973, w/att. “Additional Information in re Enewetak Atoll: Dietary” (with further additions 20 Feb. and 2 Apr.); Tobin to N. F. Barr, 6 Apr. 1973; Tobin to Robert B. Leachman, 30 Apr. 1973; Kiste to Jack Woolfenden, “Eniwetok Resettlement Project: Opinions Concerning the Eniwetok People’s Reactions to ACE’s Conclusion that Northern Islands of Eniwetok Atoll May Not Be Resettled,” 16 Sept. 1974. 182. Camm to Jack L. Stempler, n.d.; Smith Gideon to Edward E. Johnston, 14 May 1973, w/att. “Resolution of the People of Eniwetak,” 16 Apr. 1973; DNA to Barry, 11/2038Z May 1973; T. J. Bigley to Gideon, 31 May 1973. 183. Neal E. Lamping to AEC/EPA (NVOO), “Pacific Cratering Experiments (PACE),” 23 Sept. 1971, w/att. AFWL, “Environmental Statement: Pacific Cratering Experiments (PACE),” Albuquerque, Aug. 1971 (Revision 1); People of Enewetak v. Melvin R. Laird et al., Civil Action File 72-3649, U.S. District Court for the District
of Hawaii, 19 Sept. 1972; Theodore R. Mitchell to AEC, 26 Sept. 1972; Philip Helfrich to R. Ray, 6 Oct. 1972; Erlewine to principal hq staff and field office managers, “Injunction against Pacific Cratering Experiments (PACE),” 27 Oct. 1972; Joseph L. Dickman to Mitchell, 2 Nov. 1972; Ray to Peter T. Coleman and Oscar DeBrum, 10/2350Z Nov. 1972, transmitting Mitchell to M. E. Gates, 30 Oct. 1972; Mitchell to Robert R. Monroe, “Enewetak v. Laird,” 26 Oct. 1979. See also Kiste, “The People of Enewetak vs. the U.S. Department of Defense,” in Michael A. Rynkiewich and James P. Spradley, eds., Ethics and Anthropology: Dilemmas in Fieldwork (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976), 61-80. 184. Tilman A. Ruff, “Ciguatera in the Pacific: A Link with Military Activities,” The Lancet no. 8631 (28 Jan. 1989): 201-205; Ruff, “Bomb Tests Attack the Food Chain,” BAS 46 (Mar. 1990): 32-34. 185. Holmes & Narver, “Draft—Transcript of Meetings [on DEIS]—May 1 & 2, 1973, Majuro, Marshall Islands,” n.d.; “AEC Recommendations for Cleanup” (n. 180), 2; Hal Busey to Gordon C. Facer, “Enewetak Problems,” 28 Sept. 1974; James L.
Liverman to W. E. Shedd, 29 Jan. 1975; Liverman to Warren D. Johnson; T. R. Mitchell, “Comments of the People of Enewetak Concerning the Draft Environmental Impact Statement, ‘Clean Up, Rehabilitation, Resettlement of Enewetak Atoll— Marshall Islands,’” 1 Feb. 1975; Biles to W. D. Johnson, 6 Feb. 1975, w/att. ERDA,
“Staff Review of EPA Comments on the DEIS for Cleanup, Rehabilitation, Resettlement of Enewetak Atoll,’ 4 Feb. 1975; POD, “Feasibility Study for Crater
472 Notes to Pages 258-259 Containment of Contaminated Material at Enewetak,” 21 Mar. 1975; Liverman to Shedd, 4 Apr. 1975, w/att. ERDA, “Comments on the Submission of the People of Enewetak Concening the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Cleanup, Rehabilitation and Resettlement of Enewetak—Marshall Islands.” 186. R. Ray, “Eniwetok Survey, Radiological Safety Requirements,” 19 Oct. 1972; Ray, “A Review of Phase I of the Eniwetok Radiological Survey,” 28 Oct. 1972; Camm to AEC Commissioners, “Eniwetok Radiological Survey,” 26 Jan. 1973; DOS, “Recommendations for Cleanup, Eniwetok Atoll,” 9 Apr. 1973, with att.; Biles to Hollingsworth, “Cleanup and Rehabilitation of Eniwetok Atoll,” n.d. (ca. 1 Apr. 1973); Carroll H. Dunn to ASDISA, “Proposed Cleanup Program for Eniwetok Atoll,” 8 Aug. 1973; Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., to Roy L. Ash, 17 Aug. 1973; “AEC Recommendations for Cleanup” (n. 180). 187. “Engineering Criteria for Estimating Magnitude of Cleanup on Eniwetok Atoll,” 15 Feb. 1973; “Eniwetok Precleanup Survey, Yvonne [Runit] Island Program, Radiological Safety Plan,” 2 Feb. 1973; Leachman, “Possible Degrees of Eniwetok Cleanup,” 27 Apr. 1973; O. D. T. Lynch, Jr., “Eniwetok Precleanup Survey: Engineering Survey, Radiological Aspects,” 15 May 1973; Lynch, “Eniwetok Precleanup Survey: Radiological Controls,” May 1973. 188. “AEC Recommendations for Cleanup” (n. 180), 1. 189. T. R. Mitchell to Dunn, “Enewetak Rehabilitation and Resettlement Program; Japtan Return,” 19 Oct. 1973, w/att. “Preliminary Plan for Return of Enewetakese to Japtan Island”; W. D. Johnson to S. S. Carpenter, 2 Nov. 1973; R. Ray to Mitchell, 16 Jan. 1974; P. T. Coleman, Harry U. Brown, and Biles to Enewetak Council, 9 Sept. 1974; “Ordinance of the Council of Enewetak,” 9 Sept. 1974, approved by District Administrator Oscar DeBrum, 11 Sept. 1974; “Agreement between the Defense Nuclear Agency and the Department of the Interior to Provide for Dri-Enewetak Settlement at Japtan Island, Enewetak Atoll, M.I.,” signed by W. D. Johnson for DNA, S. S. Carpenter for DOI, 3 Jan. 1975; McCraw to L. Joe Deal, “Summary of BikiniEnewetak Conference, January 13-15, 1975,” 22 Jan. 1975, w/att. DNA, “Enewetak Atoll: Early Return Program Operational Plan, Japtan Island, Marshall Islands District, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,” Dec. 1974. See also Firth, Nuclear Playground (n. 177), 33-38. 190. K. W. Crase et al., “B- and y-Comparative Dose Estimates on Enewetak Atoll,” Health Physics 42 (1982): 559-564. For a full discussion from the U.S. government’s viewpoint, see Robert L. Peters and David L. Wilson, The Radiological Cleanup of Enewetak Atoll (Washington: DNA, 1981).
Epilogue: After the AEC, 1975-1990
1. Corbin Allardice and Edward R. Trapnell, The Atomic Energy Commission, Praeger Library of U.S. Government Departments and Agencies (New York: Praeger, 1974), ch. 7, “Congress and AEC’; Harold P. Green and and Alan Rosenthal, Government of the Atom: The Integration of Powers (New York: Atherton Press, 1963); Steven L. Del Sesto, “Government Control of Atomic Energy in the United States: The Formation of the Political Subsystem of Atomic Energy Regulation,” International Review of History and Political Science 16 (Aug. 1979): 44—74; Richard Wayne Dyke, Mr. Atomic Energy: Congressman Chet Holifield and Atomic Energy Affairs,
Notes to Pages 259-260 473 1945-1974, Contributions in Political Science 241 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1989).
2. “Chapter 20. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Abolished; Functions and Responsibilities Reassigned,” amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, P.L. 95110 (1977), in U.S. Cong., House, Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment, Nuclear Regulatory Legislation through the 95th Congress, 2d Session, Comm. Print No. 1, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., May 1979, 141-143. See also Ralph Nader and John Abbotts, The Menace of Atomic Energy (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977), 287-292. 3. JCAE, Special Subcomm. on Radiation, The Nature of Radioactive Fallout and
Its Effect on Man, Hearings, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.. 27 May-8 June 1957; idem, Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Tests, Hearings, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 5-8 May 1959; idem, Radiation Protection Criteria and Standards: Their Basis and Use, Hearings, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 24 May-—3 June 1960; JCAE, Subcomm. on Research, Development, and Radiation, Radiation Standards, Including Fallout, Hearings, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 1962; idem, Fallout, Radiation Standards, and Countermeasures, Hearings, 88th Cong., Ist Sess., 3-6 June 1963. 4. U.S. Cong., House, Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Subcomm. on Health and the Environment, Effects of Radiation on Human Health, Hearings, 2 vols., 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 24 Jan.—28 Feb. 1978. 5. Thomas F. Mancuso et al., “Radiation Exposures of Hanford Workers Dying
from Cancer and Other Causes,” Health Physics 33 (1977): 369-385; George W. Kneale et al., “Re-Analysis of Data Relating to the Hanford Study of the Cancer Risks of Radiation Workers,” in IAEA, Late Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation, Proceedings of a symposium, Vienna, 13-17 Mar. 1978 (Vienna: IAEA, 1978), 387412; Alice M. Stewart et al., “A Reply to Recent Criticisms,” Ambio 9, no. 2 (1980): 66-73; Mancuso et al., “Analyses of Hanford Data: Delayed Effects of Small Doses of Radiation Delivered at Slow-Dose Rate,” in Richard Peto and Marvin Schneiderman, eds., Banbury Report 9: Quantification of Occupational Cancer (New York: Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, 1981), 129-150. 6. John A. Reissland, An Assessment of the Mancuso Study, Report NRPB-R79 (Harwell: National Radiological Protection Board, Sept. 1978); Terence W. Anderson, “Radiation Exposures of Hanford Workers: A Critique of the Mancuso, Stewart and Kneale Report,” Health Physics 35 (1978): 743-750; Allen Brodsky, “A Statistical Method for Testing Epidemiological Results, as Applied to the Hanford Worker Population,” ibid. 36 (1979): 611-628; George B. Hutchison et al., “Review of Report by Mancuso, Stewart and Kneale of Radiation Exposure of Hanford Workers,” ibid. 37 (1979): 207-220; John W. Gofman, “The Question of Radiation Causation of Cancer in Hanford Workers,” ibid. 37 (1979): 617-639; S. Marks et al., “Cancer Mortality in Hanford Workers,” in IAEA, Late Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation, proceedings of a symposium, Vienna, 13-17 Mar. 1978 (2 vols.; Vienna: IAEA, 1978), 1: 369-386; John Fremlin, “Health Risks from Low-Level Radiation,’ Ambio 9, no. 2 (1980): 60-66; NAS-NRC, The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation: 1980 (Washington: National Academy Press, 1980),
455-458 (BEIR III); Darby and Reissland, “Exposure to Ionizing Radiation and Cancer Mortality among Workers at the Hanford Plant,” in Banbury Report 9 (n. 5), 115-127; Nancy A. Dreyer et al., “Choosing Populations to Study the Health Effects
474 Notes to Page 260 of Low-Dose Ionizing Radiation,’ American Journal of Public Health 71 (1981): 1247-1252. 7. The most important of these, some of which specifically address shortcomings in Mancuso’s work, are listed in the section, ‘“‘Hanford Environmental Health Foundation and Pacific Northwest Laboratory,” in DOE Epidemiologic Research Task Force, DOE Epidemiologic Research Program: Selected Bibliography (Washington, Jan. 1990), 31-38. 8. U.S. Cong., House, Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Subcomm. on Health and the Environment, Effects of Radiation on Human Health, vol. 1, Health Effects of Ionizing Radiation, Hearings, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 24 Jan.—28 Feb. 1978, 523-633; Howard Kohn, “The Government’s Quiet War on Scientists Who Know Too Much,” Rolling Stone, 23 Mar. 1978, 42-44. See also Richard G. Hewlett, “Nuclear
Weapon Testing and Studies Related to Health Effects: An Historical Survey,” in IRRC, Considerations of Three Proposals to Conduct Research on Possible Health Effects of Radiation from Nuclear Weapons Testing in Arizona, Nevada, and Utah; and, Nuclear Weapon Testing and Studies Related to Health Effects, NIH Publication 81-507 (Washington, Oct. 1980), 86-87. 9. U.S. Comptroller General, Review of the Department of Energy's Controversial Termination of a Research Contract (Washington: GPO, 2 Jan. 1979). See also Joseph
Rotblat’s review of the Comptroller General report, BAS 35 (Oct. 1979): 39-41; Robert Alvarez and Rotblat, “Mancuso Affair,” ibid. 36 (Feb. 1980): 61-63; Stephen Hilgartner et al., Nukespeak: Nuclear Language, Visions, and Mindset (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1982), 104-108; Harvey Wasserman et al., Killing Our Own: The Disaster of America’s Experience with Atomic Radiation (New York: Delta Books, 1982), 141-147.
10. Karen Dorn Steele, “Hanford’s Bitter Legacy,” BAS 44 (Jan/Feb. 1988): 17-23; Steele, “Tracking Down Hanford’s Victims,” BAS 46 (Oct. 1990): 7-8, 46-47; Michele Stenehjem, “Indecent Exposure,” Natural History (Sept. 1990): 6ff; Allen B. Benson, Hanford Radioactive Fallout: Hanford’s Radioactive lodine-131 Releases (1944-1956). Are There Observable Health Effects? (Cheney, Wash.: High Impact Press, 1989). Cf. Lowell E. Sever et al., “The Prevalence at Birth of Congenital Malformations in Communities Near the Hanford Site,” American Journal of Epidemiology 127 (1988): 243-254; Sara Cate et al., “Feasibility of an Epidemiologic Study of Thyroid Neoplasia in Persons Exposed to Radionuclides from the Hanford Nuclear Facility between 1944 and 1956,” Health Physics 59 (1990): 169-178. 11. Thomas Najarian and Theodore Colton, “Mortality from Leukemia and Cancer
in Shipyard Nuclear Workers,” The Lancet no. 8072 (13 May 1978): 1018-1020; Najarian, “The Controversy over the Health Effects of Radiation,” Technology Review 81 (Nov. 1978): 74-82. 12. “The Danger of Radiation at the Portsmouth Shipyard,” Boston Globe, 19 Feb. 1978, 1ff; Lee Torrey, “Radiation Haunts Shipyard Workers,” New Scientist 77 (16
Mar. 1978): 726-727; Andrew Schneider, “Nuclear Sub Worker Toll Grows,” Los Angeles Times, 25 Feb. 1979, part 1, p. 2; Ralph E. Lapp, “Cancer and the Fear of Radiation,” New Scientist 91 (2 July 1981): 14-15; Lapp, The Radiation Controversy (Greenwich, Conn.: Reddy Communications, 1979), 9-14, 95-105; Anne Gyorgi and Friends, No Nukes: Everyone’s Guide to Nuclear Power (Boston: South End Press, 1979), 194; Wasserman et al., Killing Our Own (n. 9), 155-157.
Notes to Page 261 475 13. M. E. Miles, “Occupational Radiation Exposure from U.S. Naval Nuclear Propulsion Plants and Their Support Facilities, 1977,” Report NT-78-2 (Washington: NSSC, Mar. 1978); Miles, “Occupational Radiation Exposure from the U.S. Naval Reactor Program, 1977,” Nuclear Safety 20 (1979): 345-351; Health Effects of Ionizing Radiation, 1978 (n. 8), 1: 1207-1453; Genevieve Matanoski, “U.S. Naval Shipyard Studies,” in NCRP, Quantitative Risk in Standards Setting, proceedings of the 16th annual meeting, Washington, 2-3 Apr. 1980 (Washington: NCRP, 3 Apr. 1981),
170-178; BEIR III (n. 6), 461-463; Hewlett, “Nuclear Weapon Testing” (n. 8), 87-88. 14. Robert A. Rinsky et al., “Cancer Mortality at a Naval Nuclear Shipyard,” The Lancet no. 8214 (31 Jan. 1981): 231-235; Dreyer and Emmy Friedlander, “Identifying the Health Risks from Very Low-Dose Sparsely Ionizing Radiation,” American Journal of Public Health 72 (1982): 585-588; Gilbert W. Beebe, “A Methodological Assessment of Radiation Epidemiology Studies,” Health Physics 46 (1984): 745-762; David A. Savitz, “Review of Epidemiologic Studies of Hanford Workers: Cancer Risk and Low-Level Radiation,” in William R. Hendee, ed., Health Effects of Low-Level Radiation (Norwalk, Conn.: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1984), 57-76; Michael Alderson, Occupational Cancer (London:: Butterworths, 1986), 91-92; Ethel S. Gilbert et al., “Mortality of Workers at the Hanford Site: 1945-1981,” Health Physics 56 (1989): 11-25; Roy E. Shore, “Occupational Radiation Studies: Status, Problems, and Prospects,” ibid. 59 (1990): 63-68. For further references, see DOE Epidemiologic Research Program (n. 7).
15. For one recent heated exchange, see Irwin D. Bross, “Confirm or Deny: Nuclear Submarine Workers at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Had Excess Leukemia,” Health Physics 49 (1985): 535-536; and Richard J. Hickey, “Low-Level Radiation, Malignant Disease, Extrapolation and ‘Official Science,’” ibid. 49 (1985): 536-538. Cf. Robert A. Rinsky et al., “Case-Control Study of Lung Cancer in Civilian Employees at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Kittery, Maine,” American Journa! of Epidemiology 127 (1988): 55-64; Bross, “Re: Case-Control Study of Lung Cancer in Civilian Employees of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Kittery, Maine,” ibid., 202-204, with Rinsky’s reply, 204. See also Stewart and Kneale, “Mortality of Hanford Workers,” Health Physics 57 (1989): 839-841, a response to Gilbert et al., “Mor-
tality of Workers at the Hanford Site” (n. 14). 16. Health Effects of Ionizing Radiation, 1978 (n. 8); U.S. Cong., House, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce; Senate, Subcomm. on Scientific Research of Comm. on Labor and Human Resources; and Senate, Comm. on the Judiciary, Health Effects of Low-Level Radiation, 2 vols., Joint Hearing, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 19 Apr. 1979; U.S. Cong., House, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Low-Level Radiation Effects on Health, Hearings, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 23 Apr.—l Aug. 1979; idem, “The Forgotten Guinea Pigs”: A Report on Health Effects of Low-Level Radiation Sustained as a Result of the Nuclear Weapons Testing Program Conducted by the United States Government, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Aug. 1980. See also Hewlett, “Nuclear Weapon Testing” (n. 8), 49-95; Howard Ball, Justice Downwind: America’s Atomic Testing Program in the 1950s (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1986), 130-131. 17. Low-Level Radiation Effects on Health, 1979 (n. 16); “The Forgotten Guinea
476 Noies to Page 262 Pigs” (n. 16). See also A. Costandina Titus, Bombs in the Backyard: Atomic Testing and American Politics (Reno: Univ. of Nevada Press, 1986), 131—133; Ball, Justice Downwind (n. 16), 129-130; Michael Uhl and Tod Ensign, GI Guinea Pigs: How the Pentagon Exposed Our Troops to Dangers More Deadly than War, Agent Orange and Atomic Radiation (Chicago: Playboy Press, 1980), 103-105; Hewlett, ‘Nuclear Weapon Testing” (n. 8), 94-95. 18. Pam Solo and Mike Jendrzejczyk, “Nuclear Watergate: Radiation Roulette in Nevada,” The Nation 228 (2 June 1979): 631-633; Raymond E. Brim and Patricia Condon, “Another A-Bomb Cover-Up,” Washington Monthly 12 (Jan. 1981): 45-
49; Titus, Bombs in the Backyard (n. 17), 109-110. On the meaning of Vietnam and Watergate for trust in government, see David Wise, The Politics of Lying: Government Deception, Secrecy, and Power (New York: Vintage Books, 1973); Robert W. Rasberry, The “Technique” of Political Lying (Washington: Univ. Press of America, 1981).
19. Robert N. Smith to Director DNA, “Operational Program Responsibility for Studies on Feasible Long Medical Consequences of Atmospheric Nuclear Testing,” 20 Dec. 1977; Benjamin R. Baker to distrib., “Summary Report: 1 December Meeting on Possible Long Term Medical Consequences of Atmospheric Nuclear Testing,” 14 Dec. 1977; John P. White to distrib., “DoD Personnel Participation in Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing,” 28 Jan. 1978, w/att. White to to Director DNA, same title. 20. Paul H. Carew, “NTPR—A Case Study” (Washington: DNA, 3 May 1979); SAIC, For the Record: A History of the Nuclear Test Personnel Review Program, 1978-1986, by Abby A. Johnson et al., Report DNA 6041F (McLean, Va., 1 Aug. 1986), ch. 1, “Introduction to the Defense Nuclear Agency and the NTPR Program.” On DNA and its background, see also the section, “Defense Nuclear Agency,’ in Theodore W. Bauer and Eaton T. White, Defense Organization and Management (Washington: ICAF, 1975), 98-101; Edgar Ulsamer, “DNA’s Business: Thinking the Unthinkable,” Air Force Magazine 59 (Sept. 1976): 50-54. 21. Robert R. Monroe to Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, “DoD Personnel Participation in Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing,” 13 Feb. 1978 and
9 June 1978; Monroe to distrib., “Nuclear Test Personnel Review (NTPR) Pilot Medical Examination Program,” 1 Mar. 1979, and “Medical Examination of Selected Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Test Participants,” 26 July 1979; Monroe to Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Records and Reports of Pacific Atmospheric Nuclear Testing, 1946-1962,” 29 May 1979; Monroe to Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics), “Notification Program for Atmospheric Nuclear Test
Participants,” 16 June 1979, and “Expansion of Nuclear Test Personnel Review Program,” 3 Oct. 1979; Robert B. Pirie to Director DNA, “Expansion of Nuclear Test Personnel Review Program,” 19 Oct. 1979; William J. McGee, “Atmospheric Nuclear Test Participation Public Information Plan,” DNA, 26 June 1979. See also Carew, “NTPR” (n. 20); DNA, “Nuclear Test Personnel Review,” PAO fact sheet, Apr. 1984. For DNA-contracted chronicles of individual tests and test series, see the bibliography, below, under “Nuclear Test Personnel Reports.” 22. Roger Ray to distrib., “Draft Minutes DOD/ERDA Meeting: Review of Military Historical Dosimetry Data for the Nuclear Weapons Test Program,” 18 July 1977, w/att. minutes; H. N. Friesen, Off-Site Radiation Exposure Review Project (Las Vegas:
NVOO, Aug. 1985); William J. Brady, “An Overview of the Dosimetry Research
Notes to Page 263 477 Project: Including Background Information, Origin, History, Political Implications, and Relationship to the Defense Nuclear Agency ... ,” 2 Apr. 1987; Bruce W. Church et al., “Overview of the Department of Energy’s Off-Site Radiation Exposure Review Project (ORERP),” Health Physics 59 (1990): 503-510. 23. Hal Hollister to REECo, 14 July 1977; Ray to distrib., 18 July 1977 (n. 22); Ray D. Duncan to Harold D. Cunningham, “Personnel Exposure at Nevada Test Site,” 1 Dec. 1977; REECo, Radiation Dosimetry Records Centralization Project, Scope of Work, n.d.; Bruce W. Church to distrib., “Draft Minutes of Joint DOE/DOD Meeting on Dosimetry Records for Atmospheric Testing,” 3 Apr. 1978, w/att. minutes; Arden E. Bicker to distrib., “Department Organization—Central Dosimetry Records Project,” 12 Sept. 1978; Mahlon E. Gates to Duane C. Sewell, “Centralization of OffSite Exposure Matters,” 17 Jan. 1979, w/att. “Off-Site Radiation Exposure Review: Project Plan”; NVOO to principal staff and contractor FOIA representatives, “Guidelines for Answering Public Requests for Documents and Information,” 26 Oct. 1979, w/att. DOE Order 1700, “Freedom of Information Program,” n.d. 24. Harold D. Cunningham to R. D. Duncan, “Request for Reimbursement Authorization—Radiation Dosimetry Historian,” 13 Feb. 1978, w/att. job description, 7 Feb. 1978; Trudie L. Rainey to Barton C. Hacker, “Employment Confirmation,” 2 Mar. 1978; Hacker and William J. Brady, “Radiation Dosimetry Historian: Statement of Mission, Procedures, and Goal,” 27 Sept. 1978. 25. Barton C. Hacker, “Statement of Contractual Understanding Concerning Responsibility in Historical Research, with Special Reference to ‘Elements of Controversy: A History of Radiation Safety in the Nuclear Weapons Testing Program,’”’ revised draft, 5 Jan. 1984; Hacker, The Dragon’s Tail: Radiation Safety in the Manhattan Project, 1942-1946 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: Univ. of Califomia Press, 1987). 26. J. Newell Stannard, Radioactivity and Health: A History, ed. Raymond W. Baalman, Jr., Report DOE/RL/01830-T59 (Richland, Wash.: PNL, Oct. 1988). 27. Stuart Eizenstat and Zbigniew Brzezinski to Secretary of Defense, Secretary of HEW, Secretary of Energy, and Administrator of VA, “Radiation Exposure In-
quiry,” 9 May 1978. This and related documents have been published in IRRC, Research on Health Effects of Radiation, vol. 1, Selected Documents Relating to the Activities of Federal Agencies Concerning Research on Health Effects of Ionizing Radiation, May 1978-May 1980, Part A, Correspondence, Notices, Reports, NIH Publication 81-2195 (Washington, Sept. 1980). 28. Interagency Task Force on the Health Effects of Ionizing Radiation, Report (7 vols.; Washington: HEW, June 1979). 29. Interagency Task Force on Compensation for Radiation-related Illness, “Report: Phase I,” draft (Washington, 1 Feb. 1980); Hewlett, “Nuclear Weapon Testing” (n. 8), 92-93; Titus, Bombs in the Backyard (n. 17), 110-111; Ball, Justice Downwind (n. 16), 131-132. 30. Interagency Task Force on Health Effects, Report (n. 28), vol. 7, Report on
Institutional Arrangements, 12-16 (IRRC), 37-39 (RPC); Alvin L. Young, “The Committee on Interagency Radiation Research and Policy Coordination (CIRRPC),” in proceedings of the HPS-ANS topical symposium, “Environmental Radiation and Public Policy,” Las Vegas 1990, separately paged; author’s notes on meeting with Bruce W. Church, Las Vegas, 27 Mar. 1992.
478 Notes to Page 264 31. Jimmy Carter to Secretary of HEW, “Utah Radiation Exposure,” 27 Nov. 1978; Joseph A. Califano, Jr., to Assistant Secretary of Health, 5 Jan. 1979; Califano to Donald S. Frederickson, “Federal Research on Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation,” 18 Jan. 1979; Califano to William Foege, “Study of Possible Health E/fects from Worker Exposure to Low-Level Radiation,” 18 Jan. 1979; James R. Schlesinger to Califano, 17 Feb. 1979; Robert R. Monroe to Scott M. Matheson, 11 Apr. 1979; Health Effects of Low-Level Radiation, 1979 (n. 16), 1: 69-97. On the earlier leukemia and thyroid studies, see ch. 9, pp. 226—230, above. 32. Interagency Task Force on Compensation, “Report” (n. 24), 27.
33. Joseph L. Lyon et al., “Childhood Leukemias Associated with Fallout from Nuclear Testing,” New England Journal of Medicine 300 (22 Feb. 1979): 397-402; Lyon et al., “Further Information on the Association of Childhood Leukemias with Atomic Fallout,” in John Cairns et al., eds., Cancer Incidence in Defined Populations, Banbury Report no. 4 (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, N.Y., 1980), 145-162; Lyon and John W. Gardner, “Radiation Exposure and Cancer,” JAMA 246 (13 Nov. 1981): 2153-2154. See also Ball, Justice Downwind (n. 12), 112-115, 118, 124. 34. Herman Chernoff to J. L. Lyon, 8 May 1979, w/att. “Report for the United States General Accounting Office [on Lyon et al., “Childhood Leukemias’],” n.d.; Charles E. Land, “The Hazards of Fallout or of Epidemiological Research?” New England Journal of Medicine 300 (22 Feb. 1979): 431; James E. Enstrum, “The Nonassociaton of Fallout Radiation with Childhood Leukemia in Utah,” in Cairns et al., Cancer Incidence in Defined Populations (n. 48), 163-164; Bernard Shleien, “External Radiation Exposure to the Offsite Population from Nuclear Tests at the Nevada Test Site between 1951 and 1970,” Health Physics 41 (1981): 243-254; Harold L. Beck and Philip W. Krey, “Radiation Exposures in Utah from the Nevada Nuclear Tests,” Science 220 (1 Apr. 1983): 18-24; Land et al., “Childhood Leukemias and Fallout from Nevada Nuclear Tests,” Science 223 (1 Jan. 1984): 139-144. See also Ball, Justice Downwind (n. 12), 115-116, 120. 35. David Dickson, “Doctors Claim A-Bomb Tests Linked to Rise in Child Leukaemia Deaths,” Nature 277 (8 Feb. 1979): 420; Torrey, “Disease Legacy from Nevada Atomic Tests,” New Scientist 84 (1 Nov. 1979): 336-337; Carl J. Johnson, “Cancer Incidence in an Area of Radioactive Fallout Downwind from the Nevada Test Site,” JAMA 251 (13 Jan. 1984): 230-236; Health Effects of Low-Level Radiation, 1979 (n. 16), 1: 355-371. See also Ball, Justice Downwind (n. 16), 120-127; Hewlett, “Nuclear Weapon Testing” (n. 8), 88-89. 36. See Thomas F, Gesell and Paul G. Voillequé, eds., “Evaluation of Environmental Radiation Exposures from Nuclear Testing in Nevada,” Health Physics 59 (Nov. 1990): 501-746 (special issue), especially Bruce W. Wachholz, “Overview of the National Cancer Institute’s Activities Related to Exposure of the Public to Fallout from the Nevada Test Site,” 511-514; Ray D. Lloyd et al., “Individual External Exposures from Nevada Test Site Fallout for Utah Leukemia Cases and Controls,” 723-737; Marvin L. Rallison et al., “Cohort Study of Thyroid Disease near the Nevada Test Site: A Preliminary Report,” 739-746. 37. Elaine A. Zeighami and Max D. Morris, “Thyroid Cancer Risk in the Population around the Nevada Test Site,” Health Physics 50 (1986): 19-32; Victor E. Archer, “Association of Nuclear Fallout with Leukemia in the United States,” Archives of Environmental Health 42 (1987): 263-271; S. G. Machado et al., “Cancer
Notes to Pages 264-266 479 Mortality and Radioactive Fallout in Southwestern Utah,” American Journal of Epidemiology 125 (1987): 44-61; C. J. Johnson, “A Cohort Study of Cancer Incidence in Mormon Families Exposed to Nuclear Fallout versus an Area-based Study of Cancer
Deaths in Whites in Southwestern Utah,” ibid., 166-168; Walter Stevens et al., ‘“Teukemia in Utah and Radioactive Fallout from the Nevada Test Site,” JAMA 264 (1 Aug. 1990): 585-591; Stevens et al., “A Historical Dose Reconstruction and Epidemiologic Study of Leukemia in Utah Residents Exposed to Fallout,” in proceedings of the HPS-ANS topical symposium, “Environmental Radiation and Public Policy,” Las Vegas 1990, separately paged. 38. Scott M. Matheson to James R. Schlesinger, “Radiation Fallout and Public Health in Utah,” 2 Jan. 1979; J. K. Bratton to Schlesinger, “Health Effects from Past U.S. Nuclear Testing,” 26 Jan. 1979; Health Effects of Low-Level Radiation, 1979 (n. 16), 1: 16—41, 2: 2442-2468; H. N. Friesen, “Fireballs at Dawn (Assessment of Radiation Exposures from Atmospheric Nuclear Tests at the Nevada Test Complex),” review draft, 1 Aug. 1990, ch. 3, “Trunks in the Attic.” 39. “Ex-Utah Gov. Matheson Dies of Bone Marrow Cancer,” Mesa [Ariz.] Tribune, 8 Oct. 1990; “Son Says A-Bomb Test Led to Matheson’s Death,” Las Vegas Review-Journal, 10 Oct. 1990. 40. Friesen, Off-Site Radiation Exposure Review Project (n. 22); Friesen, “Fireballs at Dawn” (n. 38), ch. 3; SAIC, For the Record (n. 20), 51-55 and Appendix D. 41. Lynn R. Anspaugh and Bruce W. Church, “Review and Retention of Documents, Technical Reports, Journal Articles and Conference Preparations,’ ORERP Project Directive #3, 24 Dec. 1985, as printed in DAAG, Final Report (Las Vegas, 20 May 1987), 121. 42. Bruce W. Church to ORERP task group leaders, “Work Priorities,” 5 Oct. 1979, in DAAG, Final Report (n. 36), 119. 43. Reports of the 14 DAAG meetings from Dec. 1980 to May 1987 are available in DAAG, Final Report (n. 36), 16-71. On ORERP in general, see ibid., ch. 6, “A History of ORERP,” 72-93; Friesen, Off-Site Radiation Exposure Review Project (n. 22); Church et al., “Overview of the Department of Energy’s Off-Site Radiation Exposure Review Project” (n. 22); notes on meeting with Church (n. 30). 44. “Proceedings of the Offsite Monitors Workshop,” held at NVOO, 25-27 June 1980, transcribed by Beth A. Douthett et al. (3 vols.; Las Vegas, 1980); “Discussions with Frank Butrico, Monitor at St. George, Utah, May 1953,” held at NVOO, 14 Aug. 1980, transcribed by Linda Colucci (Las Vegas, 1980); notes on meeting with Church (n. 30). 45. Robert D. Moseley, Jr., to John S. Herrington and Thomas R. Clark, 16 Jan. 1986, and Herrington to Edward L. Alpen, 16 June 1987 (both documents are published in DAAG, Final Report [n. 36], 116-117); author’s discussion with former DOE Chief Historian Jack M. Holl, Las Vegas, 2 May 1991; notes on meeting with Church (n. 30). 46. “Coordination and Information Center, Operating Procedures,” NVOO brochure, 21 Aug. 1984. Exemplifying recent works based heavily on trial records are Ball, Justice Downwind (n. 16), and Philip L. Fradkin, Fallout: An American Nuclear Tragedy (Tucson: Univ. of Arizona Press, 1989). 47. Uhl and Ensign, G/ Guinea Pigs (n. 17); Howard Rosenberg, Atomic Soldiers: American Victims of Nuclear Experiments (Boston: Beacon Press, 1980). Following in
480 Notes to Pages 266-267 quick succession Corinne Browne and Robert Munroe, Time Bomb: Understanding the Threat of Nuclear Power (New York: William Morrow, 1981), ch. 3, “Dragon’s Tail”; Leslie J. Freeman, Nuclear Witnesses: Insiders Speak Out (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981), ch. 7, “William H. Hodsden, Atomic Bomb Test Veteran”; Thomas H. Saffer and Orville E. Kelly, Countdown Zero (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1982); and Wasserman et al., Killing Our Own (n. 9), part 1, in 1982. For a more recent compilation, see Jim Lerager, In the Shadow of the Cloud: Photographs and Histories of America’s Atomic Veterans (Golden, Colo.: Fulcrum, 1988). 48. Glyn G. Caldwell et al., “Leukemia among Participants in Military Maneuvers at a Nuclear Bomb Test: A Preliminary Report,” JAMA 244 (3 Oct. 1980): 15751578.
49. Victor P. Bond and L. D. Hamilton, “Leukemia in the Nevada Smoky Bomb Test,” JAMA 244 (3 Oct. 1980): 1610; Lyon and Gardner, “Radiation Exposure and Cancer” (n. 33). See also Hewlett, “Nuclear Weapon Testing” (n. 8), 89-91; Ball, Justice Downwind (n. 16), 116-119. 50. NRC, Mortality of Nuclear Weapons Test Participants: Studies of Participants in Nuclear Tests, Final Report, 1 September 1978-31 October 1984, by C. Dennis Robinette et al. (Washington: National Academy Press, May 1985).
51. Caldwell et al., “Mortality and Cancer Frequency among Nuclear Test (Smoky) Participants, 1957-79,” JAMA 250 (5 Aug. 1983): 620-624; Caldwell et al., “Polycythemia Vera among Participants of a Nuclear Weapons Test,” JAMA 252 (3 Aug. 1984): 662-664. See the exchange between Murray M. Finkelstein and Caldwell et al., “Mortality and Cancer Frequency among Military Nuclear Test (Smoky) Participants,” JAMA 252 (3 Aug. 1984): 627-628. See also Michael Wines, “Study Finds No Data Linking A-Tests, Deaths,” Los Angeles Times, 4 June 1985, 1f; SAIC, For the Record (n. 20), 185-188. Cf. Irwin D. Bross and Neal S. Bross, “Do Atomic Veterans Have Excess Cancer? New Results Correcting for the Healthy Soldier Bias,” American Journal of Epidemiology 126 (1987): 1042-1050. 52. U.S. Cong., Senate, Comm. on Veterans Affairs, Veterans’ Claims for Dis-
abilities from Nuclear Weapons Testing, Hearings, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 20 June 1979.
53. Interagency Task Force on Health Effects, Report (n. 28), vol. 4, Report of the Work Group on Care and Benefits, 16-23.
54. Christopher C. Williams, “Atomic Veterans’ Tort Claims: The Search for a Tort Remedy Dead Ends with the Veterans’ Administration,” Notre Dame Law Review 61 (1986): 819-837; Allan Favish, “Radiation Injury and the Atomic Veteran: Shift-
ing the Burden of Proof on Factual Causation,” Hastings Law Journal 32 (1981): 933-974. 55. “The Federal Tort Claims Act,” (Comment) Yale Law Review 56 (1947): 534-561; Hervey A. Hotchkiss, “An Overview of the Federal Tort Claims Act,’ Air Force Law Review 33 (1990): 51-57. 56. “Military Personnel and the Federal Tort Claims Act,” (Note) Yale Law Review 58 (1949): 615-627; Robert L. Rhodes, “The Feres Doctrine after Twenty-five Years,” Air Force Law Review 18 (1976): 24—44; Howard L. Donaldson, “Constitutional Torts and Military Effectiveness: A Proposed Alternative to the Feres Doc-
trine,” ibid. 23 (1982-83): 171-207; “Intramilitary Immunity and Constitutional
Notes to Pages 267-268 481 Torts,” (Note) Michigan Law Review 80 (1981): 312-333; Donald N. Zillman, “Intramilitary Tort Law: Incidence to Service Meets Constitutional Tort,” North Carolina Law Review 60 (1982): 489-537. The issue remains lively and law review articles continue to appear; see Ralph H. Johnson to Howard W. Dickson, “Epilogue for Elements of Controversy,” 24 April 1992, w/att. Leon B. Taranto to Johnson, same title, 23 Apr. 1992, 2.
57. On Desert Rock V, see ch. 4, above. According to NTPR, a search of the Desert Rock V morning reports (the army’s primary record of troop presence or absence for duty) has not located Jaffee’s name (personal communication, Carlton fCliff] T. Chapman, 15 Mar. 1991). 58. Jaffee v. United States (Jaffee I], Docket no. 78-2041, U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, argued 14 Nov. 1978, decided 9 Feb. 1979, Federal Reporter, 2d series,
592 (1979): 712-720.
59. Jaffee v. United States (Jaffee II], Docket Civ. A. no. 78-1014, U.S. District Court, District of New Jersey, 29 Mar. 1979, Federal Supplement 468 (1979): 632635, at 635. See also Stephen M. Packard, “Sovereign Immunity—Armed Forces— Nuclear Liability—Jaffee v. United States,” (Comment) New York Law School Law Review 25 (1979): 377-395. 60. Jaffee v. United States [Jaffee III], Docket no. 79-1543, U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, argued 15 Nov. 1979, reargued en banc, 17 Nov. 1980, decided 2 Nov. 1981, Federal Reporter, 2d series, 663 (1981): 1226-1268, at 1249. The panel opinion was the subject of a note, cited ibid.: “Government Immunity and Liability— Armed Forces—Government Officials Charged with Violating Servicemen’s Fifth Amendment Rights Not Entitled to Absolute Immunity,” Seton Hall Law Review 11 (1980): 275.
61. Jaffee III (n. 60). See also J. Thomas Morina, “Denial of Atomic Veterans’ Tort Claims: The Enduring Fallout from Feres v. United States,” William and Mary Law Review 24 (1983): 259-293. 62. “Everett v. United States,” Federal Supplement 492 (1980): 318-326; “Kelly v. United States,” ibid. 512 (1981): 356-362; “Hinkie v. United States” [Hinkie I], ibid. 524 (1981): 277-285; “Laswell v. Brown” [Laswell I], ibid. 524 (1981): 847-850; “Lombard v. United States” [Lombard I], ibid. 530 (1981): 918-924; “Fountain v. United States,” ibid. 533 (1981): 698-703; “Seveney v. U.S. Government, Dept. of Navy,” ibid. 550 (1982): 653-661; “Punnett v. Carter,” Federal Reporter, 2d series, 621 (1980): 578-588; “Broudy v. United States” [Broudy I], ibid. 661 (1981): 125129; “Monaco v. United States,” ibid. 661 (1981): 129-134; “Laswell v. Brown’ [Laswell II], ibid. 683 (1982): 261-270; “Lombard v. United States” [Lombard II], ibid. 690 (1982): 215-234; “Mondelli v. United States,” ibid. 711 (1983): 567-570; “Gaspard v. United States,” ibid. 713 (1983): 1097-1106; “Hinkie v. United States” [Hinkie II), ibid. 715 (1983): 96-99; “Broudy v. United States” [Broudy II], ibid. 722 (1983): 566-570; “Heilman v. United States,” ibid. 731 (1984): 1104~1113.
63. Tom Conrad and Michael L. Marchino, “A Lawsuit That Unwraps the A-Bomb’s Evil Gift,” Christianity and Crisis 39 (26 Nov. 1979): 295-297; Lora Tredway, “When a Veteran ‘Wants’ Uncle Sam: Theories of Recovery for Servicemembers Exposed to Hazardous Substances,” American University Law Review 31 (1982): 1095-1139; Lorna Hislop-Brumfield, “Judicial Recovery for the Post-Service
482 Notes to Pages 268-269 Tort: A Veteran’s Last Battle,” Pacific Law Journal 14 (1983): 333-355; Edwin.F. Hornbrook and Eugene J. Kirschbaum, “The Feres Doctrine: Here Today—Gone Tomorrow?” Air Force Law Review 33 (1990): 1-18. 64. “Department of Energy National Security and Military Applications of Nu-
clear Energy Authorization Act of 1985,” PL. 98-525, section 1631 (“Warner Amendment’). See also Jane E. Malloy, “Department of Defense Authorization Act: Leaving Atomic Veterans at Ground Zero,” Valparaiso University Law Review 20 (1986): 413-444; Elizabeth Louise Loeb, “Constitutional Fallout from the Warner Amendment: Annihilating the Rights of Atomic Weapons Testing Victims,” New York University Law Review 62 (1987): 1331-1378; Titus and Michael W. Bowers, “‘Konizeski and the Warner Amendment: Back to Ground Zero for Atomic Litigants,” Brig-
ham Young University Law Review (1988): 387—408. . 65. Bruce Clark, “Discretionary Function and Official Immunity: Judicial Forays into Sanctuaries from Tort Liability,” Air Force Law Review 16 (1974): 33-53; Zillman, “The Changing Meanings of Discretion: Evolution in the Federal Tort Claims Act,” Military Law Review 76 (1977): 1—42; Zillman, “Regulatory Discretion: The Supreme Court Reexamines the Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act,” ibid. 110 (1985): 115-143. 66. Debra Sholl, “The Nevada Proving Grounds: An Asylum for Sovereign Immunity,” Southwestern University Law Review 12 (1981): 627-665; Christine M. Doyle, “Government Liability for Nuclear Testing under the Federal Tort Claims Act,” U.C. Davis Law Review 15 (1982): 1003-1028; David B. Durrett, “Issues in Nuclear Testing,” ibid., 1028-1045; Marilyn M. Pesto-Edwards, “Legal Recourse for Damages Suffered from Low-Level Radiation Exposure,” in Hendee, Health Effects of Low-Level Radiation (n. 14); Joseph DiStefano, “A Comment on Radiation Litigation in the United States Courts,” paper presented at the annual meeting of ABA, Tort and Insurance Practice Sections, Energy Resources Law Committee, London, 15-19 July 1985. 67. Jane Ann Morrison, “Widow Testifies in Baneberry Trial,” Las Vegas ReviewJournal, 3 Feb. 1979, 5A; Morrison, “Trial Tough on Baneberry Widows,” ibid., 18 Feb. 1979, 18; Morrison, “Baneberry Case a Potential Legal Bombshell,” ibid., 25 Feb. 1979, 1B; UPI, “Trial to Decide Fault after Botched A-Test: Court Will Rule Whether Two Deaths were from Radiation,” Los Angeles Times, 11 Mar. 1979, 3f; Claudia Luther, “Millions at Stake in Court Test on Radiation Exposure,” ibid., 29 Apr. 1979, 1f; Mary Manning, “Baneberry Decision Could Blast Legal Precedent,” Las Vegas Sun, 31 Jan. 1982, 13f. See also Titus, Bombs in the Backyard (n. 17), 122-124. 68. “Order on Remand,” Dorothy Roberts et al. v. U.S., U.S. District Court, Roger D. Foley, District Judge, 27 Oct. 1989; “Order Denying United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment Based upon the Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act,” Keith Prescott et al. v. U.S., U.S. District Court, District of Nevada, Roger D. Foley, District Judge, 27 Oct. 1989; A. L. Williams, Jr., to distrib., “Prescott, et al., v. USA,” 4 June 1990. See also Keith Schneider, “Nuclear Tests’ Legacy of Anger: Workers See a Betrayal on Peril,” New York Times National, 14 Dec. 1989, 1, 19; Tim Dahlberg, “Attorneys Wage Marathon Battle for Nuclear Test Compensation,” Las Vegas Review-Journal, 16 Dec. 1989, 5B. The Ninth Circuit affirmed
Notes to Pages 269-270 483 Foley’s determination on 24 Mar. 1992 and remanded the case for trial (Taranto to Johnson, 23 Apr. 1992 [n. 56], 3, citing Prescott v. United States no. 90-16758— F.2d—(9th Cir. Mar. 24, 1992).
69. Gordon C. Facer to James L. Liverman, “Handling of Legal Claims Concerning Offsite Injuries from Test Fallout,” 30 Apr. 1979; Titus, Bombs in the Backyard (n. 17), ch. 9, “More Likely Than Not”; Ball, Justice Downwind (n. 16), ch. 6, “The Downwinders Discover the AEC Records and Seek a Remedy for Radiationcaused Injuries in Federal Court, 1978-1979.”
70. Memorandum Opinion, Irene Allen et al. v. United States, Civil No. C 790515-J, 10 May 1984, U.S. District Court, Utah, Bruce Jenkins, Judge. See Howard Ball, “The Problems and Prospects of Fashioning a Remedy for Radiation Injury Plaintiffs in Federal District Court: Examining Allen v. United States, 1984,” Utah Law Review, no. 2 (1985): 267-324; Tom Christoffel and Daniel Swartzman, ‘“‘Nuclear Weapons Testing Fallout: Proving Causation for Exposure Injury,” American Journal of Public Health 76 (1986): 290-292; Swartzman and Christoffel, “Allen v. the United States: The ‘Substantial Connection between Nuclear Fallout and Cancer,’”’ Touro Law Review 1 (1985): 29-55; H. N. Friesen, Perspective on Atmospheric Nuclear Tests in Nevada (Las Vegas: NVOO, Aug. 1985), 27; Titus, Bombs in the Backyard (n. 17), 119-122; Ball, Justice Downwind (n. 16), ch. 7, ““We Are Going to Give Them a Fight’: The Allen Case in Federal District Court.” 71. Allen v. United States, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988); In re Consol. United States Atmospheric Testing Litig., 820 F.2d 982 Oth Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1988), as cited in Taranto to Johnson, 23 Apr. 1992 (n. 56), 4. See also Gisele C. DuFort, “All the King’s Forces; or, The Discretionary Function Doctrine in the Nuclear Age: Allen v. United States,” Ecology Law Quarterly 15 (1988): 477-501; Titus and Bowers, “Konizeski and the Warner Amendment” (n. 64); Loeb, “Constitutional Fallout from the Warner Amendment” (n. 64). 72. Testimony of F. Peter Libassi, HEW General Counsel and Chairman of Interagency Task Force on Health Effects, in Health Effects of Low-Level Radiation, 1979 (n. 20), 1: 69-226, at 98-99; Knapp, “Sheep Deaths in Utah and Nevada Following the 1953 Nuclear Tests,” 18 June 1979, ibid., 1: 285-341. For a DAAG view contrary
to Knapp’s, see Anspaugh et al., “A Preliminary Dose Assessment for Sheep in Penoyer Valley Exposed to Fallout from Shot Nancy” (Livermore: LLNL, n.d. [ca. 1981]). The transcript of the 1956 sheep trial appears as Appendix E in Health Effects of Low-Level Radiation, 1979 (n. 20), 1: 628-1403. 73. R. Jeffrey Smith, “Atom Bomb Tests Leave Infamous Legacy,” Science 218 (15 Oct. 1982): 266-269; Smith, “Scientists Implicated in Atom Test Deception,” ibid. 218 (5 Nov. 1982): 545-547; Bulloch et al. v. United States, 82-2245, 82-2352 (Civil No. C-91-0123C), U.S. Court of Appeals, 10th Circuit, 23 Nov. 1983 (Slip Opinion); Friesen, Perspective on Atmospheric Nuclear Tests (n. 70), 26-27; Titus, Bombs in the Backyard (n. 17), 117-118, 121-123; Ball, Justice Downwind (n. 16), Appendix A. 74. Saffer and Kelly, Countdown Zero (n. 47), 191-194; Rosenberg, Atomic Soldiers (n. 47), ch. 8, “The Bitter Legacy”; Lerager, In the Shadow of the Cloud (n. 47); J. A. Lobbia, “Atomic Vets Fighting a Long Battle,” Mother Jones 11 (Nov. 1986): 10-12.
484 Notes to Pages 270-271 75. Titus, Bombs in the Backyard (n. 17), 112; Ball, Justice Downwind (n. 16), 99-100; Wasserman et al., Killing Our Own (n. 9), 118-120; Schneider, “Nuclear
Tests’ Legacy of Anger” (n. 68). 76. Doyle and Durrett, “Issues in Nuclear Testing: An Introduction,” U.C. Davis
Law Review 15 (1982): 997-1003, at 999; Seth Forman, “Bravo’s Fallout: International Law and Nuclear Pollution in the Pacific,” North Carolina Centrai Law Journal (1983): 172-214, at 187-188. On ex gratia payments to the Japanese, see ch. 6, p. 158, above. 77. Compact of Free Association between the United States and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, signed 25 June 1983, section 177; U.S. Cong., Senate, Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, Hearing on Senate Joint Resolution 286 [to approve Compact of Free Association between the U.S. and Federated States of Micronesia, and between U.S. and Republic of the Marshall Islands], 98th Cong., 2d Sess.,
24 May 1984. See also Robert C. Kiste, “Termination of the U.S. Trusteeship in Micronesia,” Journal of Pacific History 21 (July 1986): 127-138; Stewart Firth, Nuclear Playground (Honolulu: Pacific Islands Studies Program and Univ. of Hawaii Press, 1987), chs. 4 and 5; Leonard Mason, “A Marshallese Nation Emerges from the Political Fragmentation of American Micronesia,” Pacific Studies 18 (Nov. 1989): 1-46; Amold H. Leibowitz, Defining Status: A Comprehensive Analysis of United States Territorial Relations (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1989), 611-612. 78. Jon Van Dyke et al., “Nuclear Activities and the Pacific Islanders,” Journal of Pacific Studies 10 (1984): 1-35, at 8; Jonathan M. Weisgall, “Micronesia and the Nuclear Pacific since Hiroshima,” SAIS Review 5 (Summer—Fall 1985): 41-55, at 50-51; Firth, “The Nuclear Issue in the Pacific Islands,” Journal of Pacific History 21 (1986): 202-216, at 210; Jane Dibblin, Day of Two Suns: U.S. Nuclear Testing and the Pacific Islanders (London: Virago Press, 1988; reprinted New York: New Amsterdam Books, 1990), 179-188; Ball, Justice Downwind (n. 16), 174-175. 719. People of Bikini, Enewetak, Utirik and Other Marshall Islands Atolls v. United States, Consolidated Brief of Apellants, United States Court of Appeals, Nos. 881206, -1207, -1208, 15 Apr. 1988; James L. Whittle, “Juda v. United States: An Atoll’s Legal Odyssey,” American University Journal of International Law and Policy
4 (Summer 1989): 655-698. | 80. “Veterans’ Health Care, Training, and Small Business Loan Act of 1981,” P.L. 97-72, Title I. See also William J. Flor and Jerald L. Goetz, “DoD Experience with Dose Reconstructions for Atmospheric Test Veterans,” in proceedings of the HPSANS topical symposium, “Environmental Radiation and Public Policy,” Las Vegas 1990, separately paged.
81. “Veterans’ Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act,” P.L. 98-542 (1984); DNA final rule, “Guidance for the Determination and Reporting of Nuclear Radiation Dose for DOD Participants in the Atmospheric Nuclear Test Program,” Federal Register 50 (21 Oct. 1985): 42521-42525. See also Flor and Goetz, “DoD Experience with Dose Reconstructions for Atmospheric Test Veterans” (n. 80). 82. “Radiation-Exposed Veterans Compensation Act of 1988,” P.L. 100-321; DVA final regulation, “Claims Based on Exposure to Ionizing Radiation,” Federal Register
54 (18 Oct. 1989): 42802-42803. See also Flor and Goetz, “DoD Experience with
Notes to Pages 271-273 485 Dose Reconstructions for Atmospheric Test Veterans” (n. 80); Titus and Bowers, “Konizeski and the Warner Amendment” (n. 64), 406-407. 83. “Veterans’ Judicial Review Act,” P.L. 100-687 (1988). See also Flor and Goetz, “DoD Experience with Dose Reconstructions for Atmospheric Test Veterans” (n. 80). 84. “Radiation Exposure Compensation Act,” P.L. 101-426 (1990). 85. H.R. 4739-351, section 3139, “Payments for Injuries Believed to Arise out of Atomic Weapons Testing Program,” P.L. 101-510 (1990); ibid., section 3140, “Repeal”; ibid., section 3141, “Contractor Liability for Injury or Loss of Property Arising out of Atomic Weapons Testing Programs,” also cited as “Atomic Testing Liability Act.” See also Robert L. Brittigan, memo for DFRA, “Implementation of the Radiation Expo-
sure Compensation Act,” 9 Nov. 1990, w/att. Stuart M. Gerson to Dick Cheney, 2 Nov. 1990. The Ninth Circuit’s 1992 ruling in the Prescott case (n. 68) suggests that the resolution may not be so near as it seemed in 1990. 86. See chap. 6, Castle, 1954, above. 87. Lynn R. Anspaugh and Bruce W. Church, “Historical Estimates of External y Exposure and Collective External y Exposure from Testing at the Nevada Test Site. I. Test Series through Hardtack II, 1958,” Health Physics 51 (1986): 35-51; Anspaugh et al., “Historical Estimates of External ‘y Exposure and Collective External y Exposure from Testing at the Nevada Test Site. II. Test Series after Hardtack II, 1958, and Summary,” ibid. 59 (1990): 525-533. 88. See, e.g., on the Marshallese as experimental subjects, Dibblin, Day of Two Suns (n. 79), 58-64; Giff Johnson, “Paradise Lost,” BAS 36 (Dec. 1980): 24-29, at 28;
Michael King, Death of the Rainbow Warrior (Auckland: Penguin Books [N.Z.], 1986), 1-9. 89. ICRP, Implications of Commission Recommendations That Doses Be Kept as Low as Readily Achievable: A Report of ICRP Committee 4, ICRP Publication 22 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, Apr. 1973); cf. Harald H. Rossi, “What Are the Limits of ALARA?” Health Physics 39 (1980): 370-371; John A. Auxier and H. W. Dickson, “Concern over Recent Use of the ALARA Philosophy,” ibid. 44 (1983): 595-600. See also Alan Martin and Samuel A. Harbison, An Introduction to Radiation Protection,
3d ed. (London: Chapman & Hall, 1986); NCRP, Quantitative Risk in Standards Setting (n. 13); J. W. Healy, “Radiation Protection Standards: A Historical Perspective,” Health Physics 55 (1988): 125-130. 90. Radiation protection standards in nuclear weapons testing provide, of course, a major theme of this book, but see also Hacker, The Dragon’s Tail (n. 26), and the
works there cited; Stuart C. Black and G. D. Potter, “Historical Perspectives on Selected Health and Safety Aspects of Nuclear Weapons Testing,” Health Physics 51 (1986): 17-33. 91. BEIR III (n. 6); BEIR V, Health Effects of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation (Washington: National Academy Press, 1990). For some of the questions they raise, see, on BEIR III, Jacob I. Fabrikant, “The BEIR III Controversy,” Radiation Research 84 (1980): 361-368; Edward P. Radford, “Human Health Effects of Low Doses of Ionizing Radiation: The BEIR IH Controversy,” ibid., 369-394; Rossi, “Comments on the Somatic Effects Section of the BEIR III Report,” ibid., 395-406; Joseph Rotblat, “Hazards of Low-Level Radiation—Less Agreement, More Confu-
486 Notes to Pages 273-274 , sion,” BAS 37 (June/July 1981): 31-36. On BEIR V, see Eliot Marshall, “Academy Panel Raises Radiation Risk Estimate,” Science 247 (5 Jan. 1990): 22-23; Ralph E. Lapp, “BEIR V: Implications for the Nuclear Workforce,” ibid. 247 (9 Feb. 1990): 620-621; Joyce P. Davis, “BEIR V and Its Implications,” Nuclear News (Aug. 1990). Cf. UNSCEAR, Sources, Effects and Risks of Ionizing Radiation (New York: United Nations, 1988); Fred A. Mettler et al., “The 1986 and 1988 UNSCEAR Reports: Findings and Implications,” Health Physics 58 (1990): 241-250.
92. Arthur C. Upton, “Evolving Perspectives on the Concept of Dose in Radiobiology and Radiation Protection,” Health Physics 55 (1988): 605-614. 93. On acute effects, see especially, Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings, trans. Eisei Ishikawa and David L. Swain (New York: Basic Books, 1981), part 2, “Injury to the Human Body.”
94. For a brief review of what was known before World War II and what was learned during the war, see Hacker, The Dragon's Tail (n. 26). 95. For instance, P. Reed Larsen et al., “Thyroid Hypofunction Appearing as a
Delayed Manifestation of Accidental Exposure to Radioactive Fall-out in a Marshallese Population,” in IAEA, Late Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (n. 6), 101-113; Larsen et al., “Thyroid Hypofunction after Exposure to Fallout from a Hydrogen Bomb Explosion,” JAMA 247 (19 Mar. 1982): 1571-1575; A. M. Stewart and Kneale, “A-Bomb Radiation and Evidence of Late Effects Other than Cancer,” Health Physics 58 (1990): 729-735. 96. See Merril Eisenbud, Environmental Radioactivity: From Natural, Industrial, and Military Sources, 3d ed. (Orlando: Academic Press, 1987), ch. 7, “Natural Radioactivity”; Gerald P. Hanson, “Health Effects in Residents of High Background Radiation Regions,” in Hendee, Health Effects of Low-Level Radiation (n. 14), 193212; Leonard A. Sagan, ed., “Radiation Hormesis,” Health Physics 52 (1987): 517678 (special issue). 97. In addition to the works cited in notes 91-95, above, the following discussion
of changing perceptions of low-dose effects rests chiefly on the following: Arne Forssberg, “Effects of Small Doses of Ionizing Radiation,” Advances in Radiation Biology 1 (1964): 117-156; John B. Storer, “Late Effects: Extrapolation to Low Dose
Rate Exposures,” Health Physics 17 (1969): 3-9; R. H. Mole, “Radiation Effects in Man: Current Views and Prospects,” ibid. 20 (1971): 485-490; Sagan, “Human Radiation Effect: An Overview,” ibid. 21 (1971): 827-833; Storer and Bond, “Evaluation of Long-Term Effects of Low-Level Whole-Body External Radiation Exposures,” in Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference, Geneva, 1971 (15 vols.; New York: United Nations; Vienna: IAEA, 1972), 11: 3-12; E. E. Pochin, “Radiology Now: Malignancies Following Low Radiation Exposures in Man,” British Journal of Radiology 49 (1976): 577-579; Rossi, “The Effects of Small Doses of Ionizing Radiation: Fundamental Biophysical Characteristics,” Radiation Research 71 (1977): 1-8; M. M. Elkind, “The Initial Part of the Survival Curve: Implications for Low-Dose, Low-Dose-Rate Radiation Response,” ibid., 9-23; J. Martin Brown, “The Shape of the Dose-Response Curve for Radiation Carcinogenesis: Extrapolation to Low Doses,” ibid., 34-50; Upton, “Radiobiological Effects of Low Doses: Implications for Radiological Protection,” ibid., 51-74; Frank
Notes to Pages 275-276 487 Barnaby, “The Controversy over Low-Level Radiation,’ Ambio 9, no. 2 (1980): 74-80; Upton, “The Biological Effects of Low-Level Ionizing Radiation,” Scientific American 246 (Feb. 1982): 41-49; Bond, “Causality of a Given Cancer after Known Radiation Exposure,” in National Academy of Engineering, Hazards: Technology and Fairness (Washington: National Academy Press, 1988), 24—43; Electric Power Research Institute, “Biological Effects of Low-Dose Radiation: A Workshop,” Health Physics 59 (1990): 11-102 (special issue). 98. For obvious reasons, this behavior cannot be readily documented. The homemade lead-lined box in the back of a test site pickup truck is an article of local folklore, as I learned from any number of stories the old-timers told, often with a good deal of circumstantial detail. None of them, needless to say, wanted such stories on the record. 99. For recent surveys, see the two articles in Stannard, Radioactivity and Health (n. 26): Howard L. Andrews, “Laboratory Measuring Instruments,” 1509-1535; and Ronald L. Kathren, “Instrumentation for Monitoring and Field Use,” 1537-1573. 100. Roger Williams, “Government Response to Man-Made Hazards,” Government and Opposition 12 (1977): 3-19; Perry Gehring, “The Threshold Controversy,” New Scientist 75 (18 Aug. 1977): 426—428; Jerry Ravetz, “The Political Economy of Risk,” New Scientist 75 (8 Sept. 1977): 598-599; Richard Wilson, “Risks Caused by Low Levels of Pollution,” Yale Journal of Biology and Medicine 51 (1978): 37-51; Thomas H. Maugh II, “Chemical Carcinogens: The Scientific Basis for Regulation,” Science 201 (29 Sept. 1978): 1200-1205; Maugh, “Chemical Carcinogens: How
Dangerous Are Low Doses?” ibid. 202 (6 Oct. 1978): 37-41; Stewart L. Udall, “Toxic Chemicals and Radiation,” Mercer Law Review 38 (1987): 511-524.
101. See David H. Wegman and Ruthann Giusti, “Epidemiology,” in Barry S. Levy and Wegman, eds., Occupational Health: Recognizing and Preventing Workrelated Disease (Boston: Little, Brown, 1983), 51-68, at 61-63; or, more technically, David G. Kleinbaum et al., Epidemiological Research: Principles and Quantitative Methods (Belmont, Calif.: Lifetime Learning Publications, 1982), 67-70. An example cited above is Rinsky et al., “Case-Control Study of Lung Cancer in Civilian Employees at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard” (n. 15). 102. I have commented on several of these works individually: see “Radioactivity on Film: Operation Crossroads at Bikini, 1946,” Film and History 19 (Feb. 1989):
14-18; and my reviews of Fradkin, Fallout (n. 46), Technology and Culture 31 (1990): 344-346; Richard L. Miller, Under the Cloud: The Decades of Nuclear Testing (New York: Free Press, 1986), and Titus, Bombs in the Backyard (n. 17), Technology and Culture 29 (1988): 331-334; Ferenc Morton Szasz, The Day the Sun Rose Twice: The Story of the Trinity Site Nuclear Explosion, July 16, 1945 (Albuquerque: Univ. of New Mexico Press, 1984), Technology and Culture 27 (1986): 614-615; and Ball, Justice Downwind (n. 16), Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 496 (Mar. 1988): 157-158. For the complete list, see the Appendix.
103. Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-1945 (London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1964); Gowing and Lorna Amold, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952 (2 vols.; London: Macmillan, 1974). The next volume, tentatively entitled Interdependence Regained, is currently in progress. Cf. Hewlett et al., A History of the United States Atomic Energy
488 Notes to Pages 276-277 Commission (3 vols. to date; various publishers, 1962— ); the fourth volume is currently in progress. See also Ian Clark and Philip Sabin, “Sources for the Study of British Nuclear Weapons History,” CISSM Occasional Paper, for the Nuclear History Program (College Park, Md.: CISSM, 1989). 104. L. Amold, A Very Special Relationship: British Atomic Weapon Trials in Australia (London: HMSO, 1987). As customary for British official history, the book does not cite official documents, but a list of references is available in pamphlet form: L. Arnold, “A Very Special Relationship: References to Official Papers” (London: UKAEA, 1987). There is also an official Australian report, which reproduces a number of documents: J. L. Symonds, A History of British Atomic Tests in Australia (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1985). For an account of the full British nuclear weapons research, development, and testing program, see John Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State: The United States, Britain and the Military Atom (London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983); chs. 4 and 5 cover the independent test program from 1952 to 1958. 105. See the series of reports by Jeffrey Sellar and Susan Watts in Nature: Sellar, “Claim and Counter-Claim,” 309 (10 May 1984): 199; Sellar, “Another Australian Inquiry,” 310 (12 July 1984): 90; Sellar, “Inquiry Stirs Fallen Dust,” 311 (25 Oct. 1984): 696; Watts, “Australian Inquiry in London,” 313 (10 Jan. 1985): 86; Watts, “Penney’s Evidence on British Nuclear Bombs,” 313 (17 Jan. 1985): 174; Watts, “British Tell Too Little Too Late,” 313 (24 Jan. 1985): 258. Cf. Denys Blakeway and Sue Lloyd-Roberts, Fields of Thunder: Testing Britain's Bomb (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1985), ch. 14, “Return to Maralinga.”
106. Blakeway and Lloyd-Roberts, Fields of Thunder (n. 105); Joan Smith, Clouds of Deceit: The Deadly Legacy of Britain’s Bomb Tests (London: Faber & Faber, 1985); Derek Robinson, Just Testing (London: Collins Harvill, 1985); Robert Milliken, No Conceivable Injury (Ringwood: Penguin Books Australia, 1986). See also Simpson’s essay review of the three 1985 titles, plus Symonds’s report (n. 104): “Fall out over Atomic Tests,” Nature 318 (28 Nov. 1985): 319-320. 107. “Australia’s Grudge: The McLelland Report Seems a Fair Complaint. What Can Be Done?” Nature 318 (12 Dec. 1985): 496; Simon Hardington, “Cancer Risk ‘Slightly Higher’ for UK Nuclear Test Participants,” Nature 331 (4 Feb. 1988): 383, discussing S. C. Darby et al., Mortality and Cancer Incidence in UK Participanis in UK Atmospheric Weapon Tests and Experimental Programmes, NRPB Report R214 (London: HMSO, 1988); Tania Ewing, “Still Dirty after All These Years,” Nature 346 (30 Aug. 1990): 785; Eric Nelson, “Britain’s Aboriginal Sin,” BAS 48 (July/Aug. 1992): 8-9. For a recent critical assessment of the consequences of British nuclear weapons testing, see International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Radioactive Heaven and Earth: The Health and Environmental Effects of Nuclear Weapons Testing in, on, and above the Earth (New York: Apex Books; London: Zed Press, 1991), ch. 7, “British Testing in Australia.” 108. Not included in this total are innumerable government documents. See the bibliography, below, for various HEW and other executive branch reports, as well as relevant congressional hearings and Defense Nuclear Agency publications. 109. My analysis rests chiefly on the works chronologically listed in the Appendix.
Notes to Pages 277-279 489 110. Spencer R. Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1988); William W. Lowrance, Of Acceptable Risk: Science and the Determination of Safety (Los Altos, Calif.: William Kaufmann, 1976); NCRP, Perceptions
of Risk, proceedings of the 15th annual meeting, Washington, 14-15 Mar. 1979 (Washington: NCRP, 15 Mar. 1980), especially Ida Hoos, “Risk Assessment in Social
Perspective,” 57-84; Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technological and Environmental Dangers (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: Univ. of California Press, 1982).
111. E. Blythe Stason, “Tort Liability for Radiation Injuries,” Vanderbilt Law Review 12 (1958): 93-114; Earl F. Cheit, “Radiation Disability: Will It Be Adequately Compensated?” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 13 (Oct. 1959): 72-89; Sam-
uel D. Estep, “Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Need for a New Approach to Injury Litigation,” Michigan Law Review 59 (1960): 259-304; Thomas J. O’ Toole, “Radiation, Causation, and Compensation,” Georgetown Law Journal 54 (1966): 751-776; W. Noel Keyes and John L. Howarth, “Approaches to Liability for Remote Causes: The Low-Level Radiation Example,” Jowa Law Review 56 (1971): 531-575; Charles F. Eason and Natalie Y. St. Denis, ““The Law and Low-Level Radiation,”
Nuclear Safety 15 (1974): 585-592. 112. See chap. 6, “Castle, 1954,” above.
113. James W. Hulse, Fifty Years in the Wilderness: Impressions of Nevada, 1940-1980 (Reno: Univ. of Nevada Press, 1986), 60-64. See also Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), especially chs. 12 and 14; Bok, Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), especially chs. 8, 9, and 12; Norman Dorsen and Stephen Gillers, eds., None of Your Business: Government Secrecy in America (New York: Viking Press, 1974). 114. “Radiation Exposure Compensation Act,” P.L. 101-426 (1990), section 2 (c). 115. As quoted in Steve Tetreault, “Nuclear Test Radiation Victims to Receive
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Conference Proceedings and Other Edited Works
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Bennett, Burton G. “Environmental Tritium and the Dose to Man.” In Proceedings of the Third International Congress of the International Radiation Protection Association, 23-31. Washington, D.C., 1973. Bernard, H. Russell, and Pertti J. Pelto, eds. Technology and Social Change. New York: Macmillan, 1972. Betts, Richard K., ed. Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy, Politics. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1981. Biological Implications of the Nuclear Age. Proceedings of a symposium at Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Livermore, 5—7 March 1969, edited by Anne M. Goulden. AEC Symposium Series no. 16. Report CONF-60380. Oak Ridge: Division of Technical Information, December 1969. Bond, Victor P. “Causality of a Given Cancer after Known Radiation Exposure.” In National Academy of Engineering, Hazards: Technology and Fairness, 24—43.
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Wilms, Heinz G., and C. Eugene Moss. “A Bookshelf of Radiological Health.” American Journal of Public Health 65 (1975): 1231-1237. Wilson, George C. “Pluto, Snap De-Emphasized by Defense.” Aviation Week 77 (24 September 1962): 38-39. Wilson, Richard. “Risks Caused by Low Levels of Pollution.” Yale Journal of Biology and Medicine 51 (1978): 37-51. Wimber, Donald E. “Effects of Intracellular Irradiation with Tritium.” Advances in Radiation Biology 1 (1964): 85-115. York, Herbert F. “The Origins of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 31 (September 1975): 8-14. Zeighami, Elaine A., and Max D. Morris. “Thyroid Cancer Risk in the Population around the Nevada Test Site.” Health Physics 50 (1986): 19-32. Ziegler, Charles. “Waiting for Joe-1: Decisions Leading to the Detection of Russia’s First Atomic Bomb Test.” Social Studies of Science 18 (1988): 197-229. Zillman, Donald N. “The Changing Meanings of Discretion: Evolution in the Federal Tort Claims Act.” Military Law Review 76 (1977): 1-42.
——. “Intramilitary Tort Law: Incidence to Service Meets Constitutional Tort.” North Carolina Law Review 60 (1982): 489-537. ———. “Regulatory Discretion: The Supreme Court Reexamines the Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act.” Military Law Review 110 (1985): 115-143.
Newspaper and News Magazine Articles “A-Blasts Affect Horses, Studies Show.” Salt Lake Tribune, 25 August 1953. “A.E.C. Denies Rays Killed Utah Sheep.” New York Times, 17 January 1954. “AEC Discounts Excessive Atom ‘Fall-out’ as Hazard.” Salt Lake Tribune, 30 July 1953.
| Bibliography 531
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“AEC Investigates Danger of Fallouts to Sheep, Crops.” Oxnard Press Courier, “AEC Investigates Effect of Fall Out on Animals.” Las Vegas Review-Journal, 7 June 1953.
“AEC Says Fish Can Be Eaten without Fear.” Nippon Times, 25 March 1954. ,
24 June 1953.
“A-Sickness Suspected in Sheep.” Albuquerque Tribune, 8 June 1953. “Atom Poison Out in Sheep Deaths; Hunger Blamed.” Deseret News (Salt Lake City),
Dahlberg, Tim. “Attorneys Wage Marathon Battle for Nuclear Test Compensation.” Las Vegas Review-Journal, 16 December 1989, 5B. “The Danger of Radiation at the Portsmouth Shipyard.” Boston Globe, 19 February 1978, 1 ff.
“Dead Utah Sheep Show Radiation.” Deseret News, 10 July 1953. “Dr. Nakaizumi Tells Condition of Radiation Victims.” Nippon Times, 7 April 1954. “Experts Puzzled by Mysterious Deaths of Sheep.” Salt Lake Tribune, 7 June 1953. ‘“Ex-Utah Gov. Matheson Dies of Bone Marrow Cancer.” Mesa [Arizona] Tribune 8 October 1990. “Fallout in Utah.” Time (25 March 1966): 60. “Fish Prices Plunge: Atomic Radiation Scare Grips Nation.” Japan News, 18 March
1954. .
“Horses Suffer Burns from Radiation Near Nevada A-Test Site.” Albuquerque Tribune, 25 August 1953. “Indirect Loss May be Paid.” Asahi Evening News, 7 August 1954. “Japan, U.S. Scientists Moot Atomic Injuries.” The Mainichi, 25 March 1954. “Japan, U.S. to Negotiate on Fukuryu Compensation.” Nippon Times, 22 March 1954. “Kyushu Plea Is Answered by Allison.” Nippon Times, 7 August 1954. Luther, Claudia. “Millions at Stake in Court Test on Radiation Exposure.” Los Angeles Times, 29 April 1979. Lynch, Kay. “Radiation Danger Forces Bikinians from Island Home.” Washington Post, 1 September 1978. Manning, Mary. “Baneberry Decision Could Blast Legal Precedent.” Las Vegas Sun, 31 January 1982. Martz, Maxine. “Experts Visit S.L. [Salt Lake], Make Fallout Study.” Deseret News, 7 August 1962. Morrison, Jane Ann. “Baneberry Case a Potential Legal Bombshell.” Las Vegas Review-Journal, 25 February 1979, 1B. ———.. “Trial Tough on Baneberry Widow.” Las Vegas Review-Journal, 18 February 1979, 18. ——_—. “Widow Testifies in Baneberry Trial.” Las Vegas Review-Journal, 3 February 1979, 5A.
“Nevada Cattle Suffer A-Radiation Injuries.” Santa Fe New Mexican, 25 August 1953.
“Nevada Livestock Losses Due to Poor Range, Not Atom Tests,” Las Vegas Moming Sun, 2 July 1953. “Nine More Ships Found Radioactive.” Japan News, 19 March 1954. “Officials Meet to Iron out US-Japan Radiation Conflict.” Japan News, 25 March 1954.
532 Bibliography Patric, William C. “Scientist Dissipates Milk Scare in Utah.” Salt Lake Tribune, 8 August 1962. “Politics, Jealousy Slow Bikini Victims’ Treatment.” Nippon Times, 23 March 1954. Schneider, Andrew. “Nuclear Sub Worker Toll Grows.” Los Angeles Times, 25 February 1979, part 1, p. 2. Schneider, Keith. “Nuclear Tests’ Legacy of Anger: Workers See a Betrayal on Peril.” New York Times, 14 December 1989, 1, 19. “Son Says A-Bomb Test Led to Matheson’s Death.” Las Vegas Review-Journal, 10 October 1990. “Southeast Nevada Cattle Crisis Worsens; 1400 Animals Dead.” Las Vegas ReviewJournal, 16 July 1953. Tetreault, Steve. “Nuclear Test Radiation Victims to Receive Payments.” Las Vegas Review-Journal, 16 October 1990, 2A, 4A. “Tuna Exports to be Tested.” Asahi Evening News, 20 March 1954. United Press International. “Trial to Decide Fault after Botched A-Test: Court Will Rule Whether Two Deaths Were from Radiation.” Los Angeles Times, 11 March 1979, 3+. “U.S. to Check Fish for Radioactivity.” Nippon Times, 21 March 1954. Wines, Michael. “Study Finds No Data Linking A-Tests, Deaths.” Los Angeles Times, 4 June 1985, 1+.
Congressional Hearings and Reports (Listed Chronologically) U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Special Subcommittee on Radia-
tion. The Nature of Radioactive Fallout and Its Effect on Man. Hearings, 85th Congress, lst Session, 27 May—7 June 1957. U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Summary Analysis of Hearings, May 27-29, and June 3—7, 1957, on The Nature of Radioactive Fallout and Its Effect on Man. Joint Committee Print, 85th Congress, Ist Session, August 1957. U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Special Subcommittee on Radiation. Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Tests. Hearings, 86th Congress, 1st Session, 5-8 May 1959. U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Summary Analysis of Hearings, May 5-8, 1959. Joint Committee Print, 86th Congress, 1st Session, August 1959. U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Special Subcommittee on Radiation. Radiation Protection Criteria and Standards: Their Basis and Use. Hearings, 86th Congress, 2d Session, 24 May-—3 June 1960.
U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Special Subcommittee on Radiation. Radiation Protection Criteria and Standards: Their Basis and Use: SummaryAnalysis of Hearings, May 24, 25, 26, 31, June 1, 2, and 3, 1960. Joint Committee Print, 86th Congress, 2d Session, October 1960. U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Subcommittee on Research, Development, and Radiation. Radiation Standards, Including Fallout. Hearings, &7th Congress, 2d Session, 1962. U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Subcommittee on Research, Development, and Radiation. Fallout, Radiation Standards, and Countermeasures. Hearings, 88th Congress, Ist Session, 3-6 June 1963.
Bibliography 533 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Hearings, 88th Congress, Ist Session, 1963. U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Peaceful Applications of Nuclear Explosives—Plowshare. Hearing, 89th Congress, 1st Session, 5 January 1965. U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Federal Radiation Council Protective Action Guides. Hearings, 89th Congress, 1st Session, 29-30 June 1965. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Public Works, Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution. Underground Uses of Nuclear Energy. Hearings, 91st Congress, Ist Session, 18—20 November 1969. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Public Works.
Atomic Energy Commission: Cannikin Test and Nuclear Power Program, Hearings, 92d Congress, Ist Session, 1971. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Territorial and Insular Affairs. Rehabilitation of Enewetak Atoll. Hearing on H.R. 15963 and S. 3812, 93d Congress, 2d Session, 1 October 1974. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Territorial and Insular Affairs. Jo Provide Authorizations for the Trust Territory Government and for the People of Bikini Atoll. Hearings, 94th Congress, Ist Session, 1975. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Territorial and Insular Affairs. Current Problems in the Marshall Islands. Hearings held on Ebeye, 13 July 1976, and on Majuro, 14 July 1976, 94th Congress, 2d Session, 1976. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Subcommittee on Health and the Environment. Effect of Radiation on Human Health. Vol. 1, Health Effects of Ionizing Radiation. Hearings, 95th Congress, 2d Session, 24 January—28 February 1978. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Subcommit-
tee on Oversight and Investigations; Senate, Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Subcommittee on Scientific Research; and Senate, Committee on the Judiciary. Health Effects of Low-Level Radiation. 2 vols. Joint hearing, 96th Congress, lst Session, 19 April 1979. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. Low-Level Radiation Effects on Health. Hearings, 96th Congress, 1st Session, 23 April—1 August 1979. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment. Nuclear Regulatory Legislation through the 95th Congress, 2d Session. Committee Print no. 1, 96th Congress, Ist Session, May 1979.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Veterans Affairs. Veterans’ Claims for Disabilities from Nuclear Weapons Testing. Hearing, 96th Congress, 1st Session, 20 June 1979. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research; and Committee on the Judiciary. Radiation Exposure Compensation Act of 1979. Joint hearing on S. 1865, “to amend Title 28 of the United States Code to make the United States liable for damages to certain individuals, to certain uranium miners, and to certain sheep herds, due to certain
534 Bibliography nuclear tests at the Nevada Test Site or employment in a uranium mine, and for other purposes,” 96th Congress, 2d Session, 10 June 1980. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary. Government Liability for Atomic Weapons Testing Program. Hearing on S. 2454 and H.R. 1338, 96th Congress, 2d Session, 27 June 1980. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “The Forgotten Guinea Pigs”: A Report on Health Effects of Low-Level Radiation Sustained as a Result of the Nuclear Weapons Testing Program Conducted by the United States Government. 96th Congress, 2d Session, August 1980. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Human Resources. Radiation Exposure Compensation Act of 1981. Hearing on S. 1483, 97th Congress, 1st Session, 27 October 1981. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Human: Resources; and Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Agency Administration. Nuclear Weapons’ Fallout. Compensation. Joint hearing on “examination of the potential dangers of an liability for radioactive emissions resulting from the government’s weapons testing program,” 97th Congress, 2d Session, 12 March 1982. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Veterans Affairs. Veterans’ Exposure to Ionizing Radiation as a Result of Detonation of Nuclear Devices. Hearing, 98th Congress, 1st Session, 6 April 1983. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. Hearing on Senate Joint Resolution 286 [to approve Compact of Free Association between the U.S. and Federated States of Micronesia, and between U.S. and Republic of the Marshall Islands]. Hearing, 98th Congress, 2d Session, 24 May 1984. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. Review of Federal Studies on Health Effects of Low-Level Radiation Exposure and Implementation of Public Law 97-72. Hearing, 98th Congress, 2d Session, 24 May 1984. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations. Litigation Relating to Atomic Testing. Hearing on H.R. 2797 [DOE Authorization], 98th Congress, 2d Session, 7 June 1984. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations. Department of Energy National Security and Military Applications of Nuclear Energy Authorization Act of 1984. House Report 98-124, part 4, 98th Congress, 2d Session, 15 June 1984. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, Subcommittee on Compensation, Pension, and Insurance. H.R. 1613—The Atomic Veterans Relief Aci of 1985. Hearing, 99th Congress, Ist Session, 16 July 1985. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations. Litigation Related to Atomic Testing. Hearings on H.R. 1338, “bill to repeal Warner amendment and Feres doctrine, allowing veterans to sue government and contractors,” 99th Congress, 1st Session, 2-3 October 1985.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Veterans Affairs. Oversight on Issues Pertaining to Veterans’ Exposure to Ionizing Radiation. Hearings, 99th Congress, 1st Session, 14 November and 1 December 1985.
Bibliography 535 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary. Amending Title 28, U.S. Code, to Allow Suits against the U.S. for Acts or Omissions of Contractors in Carrying out the Atomic Weapons Testing Program. House Report 99-567, 99th Congress, 2d Session, 29 April 1986. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary. Government Liability for Atomic Weapons Testing Program. Hearing on S. 2454 and H.R. 1338, 99th Congress, 2d Session, 27 June 1986. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations. Military Medical Malpractice and Liability for Injuries Resulting from the Atomic Weapons Testing Program. Hearing on H.R. 1054 and H.R. 1341, 100th Congress, 1st Session, 19 March 1987. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, Subcommittee on Compensation, Pension, and Insurance. Legislative Hearing on Radiation Measures—H.R. 1811, S. 1002, S. 453. Hearing on “bills to establish a presumption of service connection for certain diseases possibly caused by exposure to low-level ionizing radiation,” 100th Congress, 1st Session, 20 May 1987. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Veterans’ Affairs. VA Compensation and Other Service-Connected Benefits. Hearing on S. 9 et al., 100th Congress, Ist Session, 30 June 1987. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems. Impact of Repeal of Section 1631 of Public Law 98525, Hearing, 100th Congress, 1st Session, 30 July 1987. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment. Health Effects of Underground Nuclear Tests. Hearing in Salt Lake City, 100th Congress, 1st Session, 25 September 1987. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations. Radiation Exposure Compensation Act. Hearing on H.R. 5022, 100th Congress, 2d Session, 16 September 1988.
Nuclear Test Personnel Review Reports Defense Nuclear Agency. Dominic I. Public Affairs Office Fact Sheet. Washington, D.C., n.d. (ca. 1983).
—. Dominic IT. Public Affairs Office Fact Sheet. Washington, D.C., n.d. (ca. 1983).
———. Hardtack. Public Affairs Office Fact Sheet. Washington, D.C., n.d. (ca. 1982).
——. Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Public Affairs Office Fact Sheet. Washington, D.C., April 1984. ——_—. Operation Hardtack II. Public Affairs Office Fact Sheet. Washington, D.C., n.d. (ca. 1982). ———. Plumbbob Series. Public Affairs Office Fact Sheet. Washington, D.C., n.d. (ca. 1981). ———. Projects Gnome and Sedan, the Plowshare Program. Public Affairs Office Fact Sheet. Washington, D.C., n.d. (ca. 1983). ———. The Radiological Cleanup of Enewetak Atoll. By Robert L. Peters and David L. Wilson. Washington, D.C., 1981.
536 Bibliography Jaycor. Operation Wigwam. By S. E. Weary, W. J. Ozeroff, J. L. Sperling, B. Collins, C. W. Lowery, and S. K. Obermiller. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6000F. Alexandria, Virginia, 1 September 1981. ———-. Plumbbob Series, 1957. By Payne S. Harris, C. Lowery, Andrew G. Nelson, S. Obermiller, W. J. Ozeroff, and S. E. Weary. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6005F. Alexandria, Virginia, 15 September 1981. ———. Shot Smoky: A Test of the Plumbbob Series, 31 August 1957. By Payne S.
Harris, C. Lowery, Andrew G. Nelson, S. Obermiller, W. J. Ozeroff, and S. E. Weary. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6004F. Alexandria, Virginia, 31 May 1981.
JRB Associates. Operation Buster-Jangle, 1951. By Jean Ponton, Stephen Rohrer, Carl Maag, Robert Shepanek, and Jean Massie. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personne] Review. Report DNA 6023F. McLean, Virginta, 21 June 1982. ————-, Operation Dominic IT: Shots Little Feller I, Johnie Boy, Small Boy, Little Feller I, 7 July-17 July 1962. By Jean Ponton, Carl Maag, Stephen Rohrer, and Robert Shepanek. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6027F. McLean, Virginia, 31 January 1983. ———.. Operation Hardtack IT, 1958. By Jean Ponton, Stephen Rohrer, Carl Maag, Robert Shepanek, and Inara Gravitis. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6026F. McLean, Virginia, 3 December 1982.
———. Operation Ranger: Shots Able, Baker, Easy, Baker-2, Fox, 25 January6 February 1951. By Carl Maag, Stephen Rohrer, and Robert Shepanek. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA
6022F. McLean, Virginia, 26 February 1982. , ———-. Operation Teapot: 1955 Continental Nuclear Weapons Test Series. By Jean Ponton, Carl Maag, Martha Wilkinson, and Robert KF. Shepanek. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6009F. McLean, Virginia, 23 November 1981. ——_——. Operation Tumbler-Snapper, 1952. By Jean Ponton, Carl Maag, Mary Francis Barrett, and Robert Shepanek. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear
Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6019F. McLean, Virginia, 14 June 1982. . ———. Operation Upshot-Knothole, 1953. By Jean Ponton, Jeannie Massie, Carl Maag, Robert Shepanek, and Stephen Rohrer. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6014F. McLean, Virginia, 11 January 1982. ———-. Projects Gnome and Sedan, the Plowshare Program. By Inara Gravitis, Stephen Rohrer, Carl Maag, and Robert Shepanek. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6029F. McLean, Virginia, 18 March 1983.
——. Project Trinity, 1945-1946. By Carl Maag and Steve Rohrer. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6028F. McLean, Virginia, 15 December 1982. ———. Reference Manual: Background Materials to CONUS Volumes. By Steve
Bibliography 537 Rohrer and Martha Wilkinson. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6031F. McLean, Virginia, 25 April 1983. ———. Safety Experiments, November 1955—March 1958. By Jeannie Massie and Inara Gravitis. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6030F. McLean, Virginia, 2 August 1982. ———. Shot Apple 2: A Test of the Teapot Series, 5 May 1955. By Jean Ponton,
Martha Wilkinson, and Stephen Rohrer. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6012F. McLean, Virginia, 15 November 1981. ————. Shot Badger: A Test of the Upshot-Knothole Series, 18 April 1953. By Jeannie Massie, Carl Maag, Stephen Rohrer, and Robert Shepanek. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6015F. McLean, Virginia, 12 January 1982. ———. Shot Bee: A Test of the Teapot Series, 22 March 1955. By Carl Maag, Martha Wilkinson, and Stephen Rohrer. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear
Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6011F. McLean, Virginia, 24 November 1981.
———. Shot Galileo: A Test of the Plumbbob Series, 2 Sept. 1957. By Jean Ponton, Martha Wilkinson, James Striegel, and Burt Collins. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6001F. McLean, Virginia, 27 February 1981. ———. Shot Hood: A Test of the Plumbbob Series, 5 July 1957. By Carl Maag, Martha Wilkinson, James Striegel, and Burt Collins. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6002F. McLean, Virginia, 27 February 1981. ———. Shot Priscilla: A Test of the Plumbbob Series, 24 June 1957. By Mary Jo Viscuso, Steven Geller, Martha Wilkinson, James Striegel, and Burt Collins. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6003F. McLean, Virginia, 27 February 1981. ————. Shot Simon: A Test of the Upshot-Knothole Series, 25 April 1953. By Jeannie
Massie, Carl Maag, Stephen Rohrer, and Robert Shepanek. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6016F. McLean, Virginia, 13 January 1982. ———.. Shots Able, Baker, Charlie, and Dog: The First Tests of the Tumbler-Snapper Series, 1 April-1 May 1952. By Jean Ponton and Carl Maag. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6020F. McLean, Virginia, 15 June 1982. ———. Shots Able to Easy: The First Five Tests of the Buster-Jangle Series, 22 October—5 November 1951. By Jean Ponton, Stephen Rohrer, Carl Maag, and Jean Massie. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6024F. McLean, Virginia, 22 June 1982. ———.. Shots Annie to Ray: The First Five Tests of the Upshot-Knothole Series, 17 March-Il April 1953. By Jeannie Massie, Carl Maag, Stephen Rohrer, and Robert Shepanek. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6017F. McLean, Virginia, 14 January 1982. ———. Shots Boltzmann to Wilson: The First Four Tests of the Plumbbob Series, 28 May-18 June 1957. By Jaton West, Martha Wilkinson, Carol Simpson, and
538 Bibliography Jeannie Massie. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6008F. McLean, Virginia, 28 September 1981.
—. Shots Diablo to Franklin Prime: The Mid-Series Tests of the Plumbbob Series, 15 July-30 August 1957. By Carl Maag and Jean Ponton. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6006F. McLean, Virginia, 29 September 1981. ————. Shots Easy, Fox, George, and How: The Final Tests of the Tumbler-Snapper
Series, 7 May—5 June 1952. By Jean Ponton and Carl Maag. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6021F McLean, Virginia, 16 June 1982. ——_——. Shots Encore to Climax: The Final Four Tests of the Upshot-Knothole Series, 8 May-4 June 1953. By Jeannie Massie, Carl Maag, Stephen Rohrer, and Robert Shepanek. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6018F. McLean, Virginia, 15 January 1982.
————. Shots Ess through Met and Shot Zucchini: The Final Teapot Tests, 23 March—-15 May 1955. By Jean Ponton, Carl Maag, Martha Wilkinson, and Stephen
Rohrer. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6013F, McLean, Virginia, 27 November 1981.
——. Shots Sugar and Uncle: The Final Tests of the Buster-Jangle Series, 19 November-29 November 1951. By Jean Ponton, Stephen Rohrer, Carl Maag, and Jean Massie. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6025F. McLean, Virginia, 23 June 1982. ——.. Shots Wasp through Hornet: The First Five Teapot Tests, 18 February—12 March 1955. By Carl Maag, Jean Ponton, Martha Wilkinson, and Stephen Rohrer. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6010F. McLean, Virginia, 26 November 1981. ———. Shots Wheeler to Morgan: The Final Eight Tests of the Plumbbob Series, 6 September—7 October 1957. By Jeannie Massie and Jean Ponton. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6007F. McLean, Virginia, 30 September 1981. Kaman Tempo. Castle Series, 1954. By Edwin J. Martin and Richard H. Rowland. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6035F. Santa Barbara, California, 1 April 1982. ———. Operation Argus, 1958. By C. B. Jones, M. K. Doyle, L. H. Berkhouse, F. S. Calhoun, and E. J. Martin. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6039F. Santa Barbara, California, 30 April 1982.
———. Operation Crossroads, 1946. By L. H. Berkhouse, S. E. Davis, FR. Gladeck, J. H. Hallowell, C. B. Jones, E. J. Martin, F W, McMullan, and M. J. Osborne. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personne] Review. Report DNA 6032F. Santa Barbara, California, 1 May 1984.
———. Operation Dominic I, 1962. By L. H. Berkhouse, S. E. Davis, F. R. Gladeck, J. H. Hallowell, C. B. Jones, E. J. Martin, R. A. Miller, RF W. McMullen, and M. J. Osborne. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6040F. Santa Barbara, California, 1 February 1983.
———. Operation Greenhouse: 1951, By L. H. Berkhouse, S. E. Davis, FR.
Bibliography 539 Gladeck, J. H. Hallowell, C. B. Jones, E. J. Martin, KF W. McMullan, and M. J. Osborn. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6034F. Santa Barbara, California, 15 June 1983. ———-. Operation Hardtack I: 1958. By F. R. Gladeck, K. G. Gould, J. H. Hallowell, E. J. Martin, F W. McMullan, R. H. Miller, M. J. Osborn, C. F. Shelton, L. H. Berkhouse, and F. S. Calhoun. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6038F. Santa Barbara, California, 1 December 1982.
——-. Operation Ivy: 1952. By FE. R. Gladeck, J. H. Hallowell, E. J. Martin, F. W. McMullan, R. H. Miller, R. Pozega, W. E. Rogers, R. H. Rowland, C. F Shelton, L. H. Berkhouse, S. E. Davis, M. K. Doyle, and C. B. Jones. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6036E. Santa Barbara, California, 1 December 1982.
———. Operation Redwing: 1956. By S. Bruce-Henderson, F. R. Gladeck, J. H. Hallowell, E. J. Martin, F W. McMullan, R. H. Miller, W. E. Rogers, R. H. Rowland, C. F Shelton, P. Sturman, L. Berkhouse, S. Davis, H. DeSantis, P. Dean, M. K. Doyle, and D. S. Patterson. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6037F. Santa Barbara, California, 1 August 1982.
———. Operation Sandstone: 1948. By L. H. Berkhouse, S. E. Davis, FR. Gladeck, J. H. Hallowell, C. B. Jones, E. J. Martin, F. W. McMullan, M. J. Osborn, and W. E. Rogers. United States Atmospheric Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6033F. Santa Barbara, California, 19 December 1983.
Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Co., Inc. Operations Nougat and Whetstone: Events Hard Hat, Danny Boy, Marshamliow, Mudpack, Wishbone, Gumdrop, Diluted Waters, and Tiny Tot, 15 February 1962-17 June 1965. By William J. Brady, Karen K. Horton, and Bernard F. Eubank. United States Underground Weapons Tests, Underground Nuclear Test Personnel Review. Report DNA 6320F. Las Vegas, Nevada, 31 January 1984. Science Applications International Corporation (formerly Science Applications, Inc.). “Analysis of Radiation Exposure, 2nd Marine Corps Provisional Atomic Exercise
Brigade, Exercise Desert Rock V, Operation Upshot-Knothole.” By G. Frank, J. Goetz, J. Klemm, T. Schweizer, and R. Weitz. Draft report SAI 82-685-WA. McLean, Virginia, 5 February 1982. ———. Analysis of Radiation Exposure—Service Personnel on Rongerik Atoll: Op-
eration Castle—Shot Bravo. By J. Goetz, J. Klemm, J. Phillips and C. Thomas. Technical Report DNA-TR-86-120. McLean, Virginia, 9 July 1987. ———. Analysis of Radiation Exposure, Task Force Razor: Exercise Desert Rock VI,
Operation Teapot. By R. Edwards, J. Goetz, and J. Klemm. Technical Report DNA-TR-83-07. McLean, Virginia, 15 July 1983. ————. Analysis of Radiation Exposure, Third Marine Corps Provisional Atomic
Exercise Brigade: Exercise Desert Rock VI, Operation Teapot. By J. Goetz, J. Klemm, and E. Ortlieb. Technical Report DNA-TR-84-13. McLean, Virginia, 15 February 1984. ———.. Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Maneuver Units: Exercise Desert Rock V, Operation Upshot-Knothole. By R. Edwards, J. Goetz, and J. Klemm. Report DNA-TR-84-303. McLean, Virginia, 15 October 1985.
540 Bibliography ———. Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Military Participants, Exercises Desert Rock [, If, and III, Operation Buster-Jangle. Technical Report DNA-TR-87-116. McLean, Virginia, 22 December 1987. ———. Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Naval Personnel at Operation Castle. By C. Thomas, J. Goetz, J. Klemm, and R. Weitz. Technical Report DNA-TR-84-6. McLean, Virginia, 28 February 1984. ——_——. Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Naval Personnel at Operation Ivy. By C. Thomas, J. Stuart, J. Goetz, and J. Klemm. Technical Report DNA-TR-82-98. McLean, Virginia, 15 March 1983. ———. Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Naval Personnel at Operation Sandstone. By C. Thomas, J. Goetz, J. Stuart, and J. Klemm. Technical Report DNA-TR-8313. McLean, Virginia, 15 August 1983. _ —_—. Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Observers and Maneuver Troops: Exercise Desert Rock IV, Operation Tumbler-Snapper. By J. Goetz, J. Klemm, and E. Ortlieb. Technical Report DNA-TR-85-277. McLean, Virginia, 1 August 1985. ———. Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Personnel on the Residence Islands of Enewetak Atoll after Operation Greenhouse, 1951-1952. By C. Thomas, J. Goetz, and J. Klemm. Technical Report DNA-TR-85-390. McLean, Virginia, 20 April 1987.
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Banks, J. E., et al. Operation Teapot, Project 2.8b: Manned Penetration of Atomic Clouds. Air Force Special Weapons Center Report WT-1156. Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, 30 April 1958. Extracted version, Washington, D.C.: Defense Nuclear Agency, 1 September 1980. Batzel, Roger E. Distribution of Radiation from a Nuclear Excavation. Report UCRL6249-T. Livermore: University of California Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, 26 October 1960.
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Blumenson, Martin, and Hugh D. Hexamer. “A History of Operation Redwing: The Atomic Weapons Tests in the Pacific, 1956.” Joint Task Force 7, 1 December 1956. Bond, Victor P., Robert A. Conard, James S. Robertson, and E. A. Waden, Jr. “Medical Examination of Rongelap People Six Months after Exposure to Fallout Raciation during Operation Castle.” Operation Castle Project 4.1. Addendum Report WT-937. Naval Medical Research Institute and Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, April 1955. Bond, Victor P., Eugene P. Cronkite, R. S. Farr, and Hyman H. Hechter. “Hematologic Observations.” In Some Effects of Ionizing Radiation on Human Beings: A Report on the Marshallese and Americans Accidentally Exposed to Radiation from Fallout and a Discussion of Radiation Injury in the Human Being, edited by Eugene P. Cronkite, Victor P. Bond, and Charles L. Dunham, 43-63. Report TID 5358. Washington, D.C.: Atomic Energy Commission, July 1956.
Bordes, Peter A., John L. Finan, Joseph R. Hochstim, Howard H. McFann, and Shepard G. Schwartz. “Desert Rock I: A Psychological Study of Troop Reaction to an Atomic Explosion.” Report HumRRO-TR-1. Washington, D.C.: Human Resources Research Office, George Washington University, February 1953. Bouton, Edwin H., et al. “Radiological Surveys: Sunbeam Shots Little Feller I, II, Johnie Boy, and Small Boy.” Operation Sunbeam Project 2.8. Report WT-2266. Edgewood Arsenal, Md.: Army Nuclear Defense Laboratory, 30 October 1964. Brennan, James T. “History of the Photo-Dosimetry Section of T. U. 7.6.4.” Operation Sandstone. Joint Task Force 7, May 1948. In “Continent and Pacific Historical Records,” Box 6, Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Company, Inc., Las Vegas, Nev., Microfilm records, Roll 2. ———. “History of Task Unit 7.6.5.” Operation Sandstone. Joint Task Force 7, May 1948. In “Continent and Pacific Historical Records,” Box 6, Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Company, Inc., Las Vegas, Nev., Microfilm records, Roll 2. Brown, Wilburt S. “Exercise Desert Rock V—Marine Corps; report on.” Camp Desert Rock, Nev., 19 May 1953. Bullock, William C. “Final Report, Exercise Desert Rock V.” Camp Desert Rock, Nev., 16 July 1953. Burris, Stanley W. “Report of the Commander, Task Group 132.1 on Operation Ivy.” Joint Task Force 132, 18 December 1952.
Bustad, Leo K., L. A. George, C. M. Barnes, S. Marks, D. E. Warner, and H. A. Kornberg. “Toxicity of I'3! in Sheep. X. Low-Level Chronic Effects.” In Biology Research—Annual Report for 1953, Report HW-30437, 131-140. Richland, Wash.: Hanford Works, 1954.
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ground Nuclear Detonations. Report NVO-40, Revision 2, 271-299. Las Vegas: Nevada Operations Office, May 1969. Carter, Melvin W., and Oliver R. Placak. “Final Report of Off-Site Surveillance for the Salmon Event of Project Dribble, October 22, 1964.” Report VUF-1021. Las Vegas: Public Health Service, 26 February 1966. ———.. “Off-Site Surveillance for Project Sterling, December 3, 1966.” Report VUF1036. Las Vegas: Public Health Service, 24 May 1968. Clark, John C. “Operation Sandstone Radiation Injuries.” Los Alamos, 27 July 1948. With Exhibits A-P.
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Collison, Tom D. “Radiological Safety: Report to the Test Director.” Operation Teapot, Report WT-1166. Armed Force Special Weapons Project, Field Command, May 1955.
———. “Radiological Safety Operation: Report to the Test Director.” Operation Upshot-Knothole, Report WT-703 (REF). Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, June 1953. Colorado Department of Health. Project Rulison: 1970 Environmental Surveillance Summary Report. Denver: The Department, n.d. Columbia Gas System Service Corporation, San Francisco Operations Office, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, and United States Bureau of Mines. “Project Ketch: The Possible Use of a Nuclear Explosive to Create Underground Natural Gas Storage. A Summary of a Joint Study.” 28 August 1967. Committee to Study Operational Future of Nevada Proving Grounds. “Report of the Committee. . . .” Las Vegas, 11 May 1953. Conard, Robert A. “Medical Status of Rongelap People Five Years after Exposure to Fallout Radiation.” Upton: Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1 June 1959. Conard, Robert A., et al. Medical Survey of Rongelap People Five and Six Years after Exposure to Fallout (with Addendum on Vegetation). Report BNL 609. Upton: Brookhaven National Laboratory, September 1960.
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Darby, Sarah C., et al. Mortality and Cancer Incidence in UK Participants in UK Atmospheric Weapon Tests and Experimental Programmes. National Radiological Protection Board, Report R214. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1988. Dauer, Maxwell. “History of Atomic Energy Commission Proving Ground Group
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Dick, J. L., and T. P. Baker. “Monitoring and Decontamination Techniques for Plutonium Fallout on Large-Area Surfaces.” Report WT-1512. Kirtland Air Force Base, N. Mex.: Air Force Special Weapons Command, January 1961. Dose Assessment Advisory Group. Final Report. Las Vegas: Nevada Operations Office, 20 May 1987. Drake, William W., Jr., and Lawrence J. Keyes. “Plans and Operations.” In “Staff Reports: Report to the Test Director,” Operation Tumbler-Snapper, August 1952, Report WT-553. Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, n.d. Dunning, Gordon M. Fallout from USSR 1961 Nuclear Tests. Report TID-14277. Washington, D.C.: Atomic Energy Commission, January 1962. ———.. Health Aspects of Nuclear Weapons Testing. Washington, D.C.: Atomic Energy Commission, 1964. ——_—., ed. Radioactive Contamination of Certain Areas in the Pacific Ocean from Nuclear Tests: A Summary of the Data from the Radiological Surveys and Medical Examinations. Washington, D.C.: Atomic Energy Commission, August 1957. Eberline Instrument Corporation. “Project Cannikin On-Site Radiological Safety and Medical Services Final Report.” Report NVO-294-6. Albuquerque, August 1973. ————.. “Project Gasbuggy: On-Site Radiological Safety during Production Testing, January 25, 1968, to August 12, 1969.” Report NVO-234-2. Albuquerque, 31 October 1969. ———. “Project Milrow On-Site Radiological Safety and Medical Services.” Report NVO-294-3. Albuquerque, 20 February 1970. Efnor, S. J., Jr. “Roll Up and Standby Preparations of AEC Proving Ground Group
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Shreve, J. D. “Summary Report, Test Group 57.” Albuquerque: Sandia Corporation, April 1958. Shulman, Nahum Raphael, Eugene P. Cronkite, Victor P. Bond, Charles L. Dunham, and Robert A. Conard. “Clinical Observations and Treatment.” In Some Effects of Ionizing Radiation on Human Beings: A Report on the Marshallese and Americans Accidentally Exposed to Radiation Fallout and a Discussion of Radiation Injury in the Human Being, edited by Eugene P. Cronkite, Victor P. Bond, and Charles L. Dunham, 13-24. Report TID 5358. Washington, D.C.: Atomic Energy Commission, July 1956. Smale, Richard F. “Operation Long Shot, Radiation Safety Final Report.” December 1965. Sondhaus, C. A., and Victor P. Bond. “Physical Factors and Dosimetry in the Marshall
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Stetson, R. L., S. Baum, T. H. Shirasawa, H. K. Chan, M. M. Sandomire, and L. B. Werner. “Distribution and Intensity of Fallout from the Underground Shot.” Operation Teapot Project 2.5.2. Report WT-1154. San Francisco: Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, 14 March 1958. Sylvester, John. Operation Wigwam: Report of Commander Task Group 7.3. Joint Task Group 7.3, 22 July 1955. Extracted version, Washington, D.C.: Defense Nuclear Agency, 1 February 1980.
Tamplin, Arthur R., and H. Leonard Fisher. Estimation of Dosage to Thyroids of Children in the U.S. from Nuclear Tests Conducted in Nevada during 1952 through 1955. Report UCRL-14707. Livermore: University of California Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, 1966. Tappan, J. Tell, and William E. Moore, comps. “Project Dribble—Salmon Event On Site Health and Safety Report.” November 1965. Task Force 88. Operation Argus: Report of the Commander, Task Force 88. Report WT-1665. Defense Atomic Support Agency, n.d. (ca. 1958). Extracted version, Washington, D.C.: Defense Nuclear Agency, 1 October 1979. Taylor, Lauriston S. Organization for Radiation Protection: The Operations oj the ICRP and NCRP, 1928-1974. Report DOE/TIC-10124. Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, 1979. Taylor, Leland B. History of Air Force Atomic Cloud Sampling. Air Force Systems
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560 Bibliography Telegadas, Kosta, and Kenneth M. Nagler. “Fallout Patterns from Operation Hardtack, Phase II.” U.S. Weather Bureau, May 1960.
Terhune, R. W., H. D. Glenn, D. E. Burton, H. L. McKague, and J. T. Rambo. Calculational Examination of the Baneberry Event. Report UCRL-52365. Livermore: University of California Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, 5 December 1977. Tewes, Howard A. “Radioactivity from Plowshare Applications—Safety Considerations.” In Atomic Energy Commission. Symposium on Engineering with Nuclear Explosives, January 14-16, 1970, Las Vegas, Nevada, Proceedings, 375-380. Report CONF-700100 (Vol. 1). May 1970. Truslow, Edith C., and Ralph Carlisle Smith. “Manhattan District History, Project Y, the Los Alamos Project.” Vol. 2, “August 1945 through December 1946.” Report LAMS-2532 (Vol. IL). Los Alamos, 1947 (issued 1961). Tyler, Carroll L. “Administrative Summary Report.” Operation Ranger, vol. 6. Report WT-205. Santa Fe Operations, July 1952. United States Comptroller General. Review of the Department of Energy’s Controversial Termination of a Research Contract. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2 January 1979. U.S. Disarmament Administration. Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests: History and Analysis of Negotiations. Department of State publication 7258. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, October 1961. University of Alaska. “Caribou Investigations, Northwest Alaska.” Project Chariot, Phase III, Progress Report, June 1961. Weiss, Edward S. “Leukemia Mortality in Southwestern Utah, 1950-1964.” Salt Lake City: Public Health Service, 23 July 1965; revised, 14 September 1965. Werth, Glenn C., ed. The Handcar Nuclear Explosion in Dolomite. Report UCRL50951. Livermore: University of California Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, 13 October 1970. Winant, Frank L., Jr. “Command Aspects of Radiological Defense.” In A Series of Indoctrination Lectures on Atomic Explosion, with Medical Aspects. Vol. 3 of Radiological Defense, 102-109. Washington, D.C.: Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, n.d. (ca. 1947). Wolfe, Richard D. “Radiological Safety: Informal Report.” Report NRDL-3-102. San Francisco: Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, 18 February 1951. Reissued as Report 11 in Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, “Program Reports—Gross Weapons Measurements,” Operation Ranger, vol. 4. Report WT-201, June 1951.
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Text Index
Ist Radiological Safety Support Unit: estab- Advanced Research Projects Agency: and lished, 99, 132; in Castle rad-safe, 132; in Argus, 196; and Vela Uniform, 244 Teapot rad-safe, 167; overexposed mem- Advisory Committee on Biology and Medibers of, 169; and Wigwam fish monitoring, cine: NPG testing endorsed by, 130; Bugher 171; in Redwing, 176; limited use of, 189; heard by, 168 in Plumbbob and Hardtack, 189-190; in Advisory Committee on the Biological Effects
Hardtack I, 194; in Dominic, 216-217 of Ionizing Radiation. See BEIR 50th Chemical Service Platoon: in Desert Ailinginae atoll (Marshall Islands), evacuation
Rock V, 95; in Desert Rock VI, 166 of, 143
56-Project NTS: organization of, 173, 176; Ailuk atoll (Marshall Islands), fallout on, 145 rad-safe for, 173-174; plutonium contami- Aircraft, in testing. See B-17; B-29; B-36; nation from, 174-175; gamma exposures B-50D; C-54; F-84G; T-33
from, 175 Air Force, Department of, represented on
57 Project, NTS safety testing, 191 MLC, 12
58-Project NTS: fallout from, 192; under- Air Force, U.S.: Sandstone weather stations,
ground tests in, 207 27; Rover transferred from, 202; and Pluto
400 project, NTS Kiwi testing, 201, 204 project, 204—205; and PACE, 258 |
401 project, NTS Tory II testing, 204 Air Force Office of Atomic Energy, in Ranger, 505th Signal Service Group, in Desert Rock V, 43
96 Air Force Special Weapons Command/Ceater:
514th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, in in Ranger, 43, 52; and Buster-Jangle, 69; in
Sandstone, 27 Tumbler-Snapper, 90; in Upshot-Knothole, Knothole, 100 Air Weather Service: in Ranger, 43; in Castle,
9778th Technical Support Unit, in Upshot 100-101; in Castle, 136. See also Kieffer 136; in Teapot, 161
Aberdeen Proving Ground: in Sandstone, 13; Alamo, Nevada: fallout near, 103; roadblock
as model for NTS, 43 at, 104
Able test (Buster), 70 ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable), Able test (Crossroads), 4 radiation protection guide, 273 Able test (Ranger), 50 Alaska, and Chariot, 219. See also Amchitka Able test (Tumbler-Snapper), 78 Albemarle, scientific measurements ship: in
torium, 197 test on, 29
Adams test (Hardtack II), cancelled by mora- Sandstone, 24; sample counting for X-Ray
565
966 Text Index Albuquerque Operations Office, replaced Army, U.S.: Buster-Jangle troop exercise pro-
SFO, 187. See also Hertford posed by, 67; in Tumbler-Snapper, 77; dis-
Aleutian Islands National Wildlife Refuge, satisfaction with AEC rad-safe limits, 92;
threatened by testing, 246 at Desert Rock V, 98-99; divergence from
Allaire, William W. (SFO test operations): AEC rad-safe limits, 166—167. See also sheepmen interviewed by, 108; on sheep- Aberdeen Proving Ground; Corps of Enmen’s attitude, 109; at Las Vegas meeting gineers; Edgestone Arsenal; Evans Signal
of experts, 110; at LASL sheep meeting, Laboratory
124 Army Chemical Corps, Collison in, 99. See
Allen et al. v. the United States, downwinder also 50th Chemical Service Platoon; Chem-
suit, 269-270 ical Corps School
Allison, John (U.S. ambassador to Japan): Army Field Forces, Office of the Chief of, and compensation for Japanese fishermen urged Desert Rock V, 95—96 by, 150, 157; on value of studying Japanese § Army Medical Corps: Cooney in, 19; Hartger-
fishermen, 151 ing in, 73; Maupin in, 99
Alpha radiation: contamination from 56-Project Arnold O. Beckman, instrument maker, 21 NTS, 174-175; new limits on adopted, 187 Arraj, Alfred (U.S. district court judge),
Amchitka (Aleutian Islands): selected for Rulison ruling by, 243 Windstorm, 60-61, 67, 68; site of Long “Ashes of death,” 148 Shot, 246; of Milrow, 246-247; of Can- ASROC nuclear depth charge, tested, 216
nikin, 247 Associated Press: Japanese radiation sickness
American Journal of Physics, article by reported by, 148; allowed to interview Mar-
Romer in, 7 shallese, 157
Anderson, Clinton P. (JCAE chair), on viabil- Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study
ity of NPG, 168 Commission: and Plowshare goals, 239—
Andrews, Howard L. (NIH biophysicist), 240; on Plowshare deadline, 240-241
report on fallout by, 121 Atomic artillery, tested, 99
Annie test (Upshot-Knothole), 96, 101-102 Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission, bacx-
Antler test (Nougat), 211-212 ground of, 148-149. See also Morton
Aomon-Bijire island (Enewetak), and Sand- Atomic Bomb Injury Investigation Committee
stone Yoke, 17, 30, 31-32, 56 (Japan): formed, 150; first report issued by, Applied Fisheries Laboratory, University of 152 Washington, Pacific radiological surveys Atomic Energy Act of 1946: AEC established
by, 227, 256 by, 10; DMA and MLC mandated by, 12;
Area 11, NTS, site of 1956 safety tests, 173 JCAE established by, 259
Area 12, NTS: Baneberry-forced evacuation Atomic Energy Act of 1954, amended to abol-
of, 248; background of base camp in, 250 ish JCAE, 259 Argonne National Laboratory (AEC), in Sand- |§ Atomic Energy Commission: creation of, LO—
stone, 13 11; and rad-safe command responsibility,
Argus operation, 196 20; and post-Sandstone plans, 34; justificaArizona: NIH thyroid study in, 228-231; and tion for Greenhouse requested by, 39; and
Pike fallout, 232 continental test site, 41; Nevada site ac-
Armed Forces Special Weapons Project: cre- cepted by, 43; NCRP standards adopted by, ation of, 13—14; and Sandstone rad-safe, 46; weapon effects tests supported by, 60;
14; Sandstone experiment by, 22; and ground-level Nevada tests rejected by, 61; Greenhouse rad-safe, 38; and Nutmeg, 41; Buster-Jangle plans approved by, 65; Desert and Windstorm, 60-61; and Buster-Jangle, Rock endorsed by, 67; on military rad-safe 67; and Desert Rock, 68; and Tumbler- responsibility, 72; LLL authorized by, 89; Snapper, 73; on need for large surface policy on military rad-safe limits, 94—95; burst, 161, 162; and off-site exposure lim- on sheep malnutrition, 112-113; NPG conits, 163; in Teapot, 167; in Wigwam, 170; tinuation approved by, 129-130; PPG exin Plumbbob, 189. See also Cooney; Loper; pansion approved by, 130-131; and joint
Scoville; Winant study of Marshallese, 146-147; and Castle
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, evaluation committee, 148; NPG study re-
opposed to Plowshare, 236, 240 port approved by, 162; Teapot approved by, Army, Department of, represented on MLC, 165; reply to JCAE by, 168; and Wigwam,
12 170-171; public distrust of, 181, 199, 277-
Text Index 567 278; new NTS exposure limits adopted by, infant mortality attributed to, 251-252.
186-187; NTS fallout discussed by, 188; See also Roberts Plumbbob siting discussed by, 189; re- Ban the bomb movement, 198. See also SANE sponse to public concerns by, 190; in joint Bay, Robert C. (Radiobiological Laboratory): study of radiation standards, 198-199; op- sheep examined by, 108-109; malnutrition posed to moratorium, 205; Plowshare ap- blamed by, 111; on radioactivity in sheep,
proved by, 214; PPG transferred by, 215; 112 and Chariot cancellation, 219-220; FRC Beatty, Nevada, monitors stationed at, 48 radioiodine countermeasures opposed by, Beckman. See Amold O. Beckman 221-222; and PHS thyroid study, 229; and BEIR report (1972), low dose effects judged definition of cratering, 236; Plowshare plans insignificant by, 6, 7, 254 revised by, 236-237; Sulky announcement BEIR III (1980) and BEIR V (1990), contrarejected by, 238; and Plowshare industrial dictions of, 273 partners, 241-244; population exposure Bemis, Edwin (H-Division), and Ranger radlimits lowered by, 245; Salmon favored by, safe, 45 246; in Bikini cleanup, 256-257; in Enewe- _ Beta radiation: workers bumed by, 33-34; tak cleanup, 258; relations with congress, problems of detecting, 74; cattle injured by, 259; demise of, 6, 258. See also Biology 80-81; horses injured by, 106-107; sheep and Medicine; General Advisory; Informa- burned by, 108, 109, 124—125; Japanese tion Services; Military Application; Military fishermen burned by, 151; sailors burned
Liaison; Operational Safety; Peaceful Nu- by, 152 clear Explosives; Public Information; Reac- _ Betts, Austin W. (DMA director), on Des
tor Development; and see further Dean; Moines venting, 213 Libby; Lilienthal; Seaborg; Strauss; Zuckert —_ Bijire island (Enewetak). See Aomon-Bijire
Atomic Soldiers, by Rosenberg, 266 Bikinians: removal of, 17-18, 254; move to Atomic Tests in Nevada, AEC film, 165 Ujilang thwarted, 18; U.S. financial settleAtomic Tests in Nevada, AEC pamphlet, 190 ment with, 255-256; sufferings on Kili, Australian Royal Commission, British nuclear 256; return to Bikini, 256-257; permanent
testing investigation by, 276 removal of, 257
Austral Oil Company, in Rulison, 242-244 Bikini atoll (Marshall Islands): rejected as PPG site, 14; Mike air samplers at, 88; added to PPG, 131-132; addition announced, 136; B-17, drone in X-Ray cloud sampling, 29-30 emergency evacuation plans for, 139; cleanB-29: in Crossroads, 4; in Sandstone weather up of, 256-257. See also Castle; Crossroads;
network, 27; in Buster-Jangle cloud sam- Hardtack I; Redwing pling, 66; for Tumbler-Snapper cloud sam- “Bikini Incident,” usage of by Japanese, 150,
pling, 74; for Ivy cloud sampling, 84; in 158 Castle cloud sampling, 136, 141 Bikini island (Bikini): building on, 257; free
B-36, in Ivy, 88 of tests, 258 B-50D, in Ranger, 48 Biological effects of radiation: acute, 2, 3; low Badger test (Upshot-Knothole), 96-97, 98, level, 6—7; stochastic versus nonstochastic,
102 274-275. See also Cancer; Dose; Exposure;
Baietti, Albert L. (NRDL rad-safe head), Genetic effects; Hormesis Wigwam rad-safe organized by, 170 Biology and Medicine, AEC Division of:
Bairoko, aircraft carrier: Sandstone rad-safe Ranger rad-safe plan endorsed by, 46; base ship, 24; rad-safe training aboard, 25; Buster-Jangle operation plan considered by, rad-safe operations from, 26; off Enjebi 65; and flight crew exposure limits, 66; and after X-Ray, 30; Yoke fallout on, 32; Bravo exposure limits for NPG workers, 90; and fallout on, 140; beta burns to crew mem- military rad-safe limits, 93, 167; assigned
bers of, 152 to investigate sheep deaths, 105; as source
Baker test (Buster), 70 of exposure standards, 117; status report on Baker test (Crossroads), 4, 60 sheep from, 127; final sheep report from,
Baker test (Ranger), 50-51 127-128; Castle rad-safe plan accepted by, Baker test (Tumbler-Snapper), 78 136; draft protection guidelines by, 159-
Baker-Two test (Ranger), 52 160; off-site exposure limit recommended Baneberry test, 248-249; investigation of, by, 163; and Wigwam fish monitoring, 171; 249-250; reforms caused by, 250-251; plutonium exposure limit by, 174; Gabriel
568 Text Index sponsored by, 181-182; reorganized, 184; 119-121; informed of LASL sheep meetand reactor rad-safe, 201. See also Fallout ing, 127; on Castle cloud tracking, 137; Studies Branch; and see further Bugher; higher Castle operational limits rejected Dudley; Dunham; Dunning; Pearson; by, 137; informed of Rongelap fallout, 143;
Warren, Shields L. informed of Rongelapese symptoms, 143;
Biology Branch (DBM). See Pearson informed of Utirikese exposure, 145; assis-
Blanca test (Hardtack II), 197 tance to Japanese requested by, 148; as obBluegill Double Prime test (Dominic), 218 server at the U.N., 157; on PHS off-site Bluegill Prime test (Dominic), plutonium scat- value, 160; on Teapot fallout, 168; qualms
tered by, 217 about Wigwam, 170; Gabriel upgraded by,
Bluegill test (Dominic), 217 182; on long-range radiological hazards,
Bluegill Triple Prime test (Dominic), 218 183-184
Board of Veterans Appeals, radiation injury Bulloch v. the United States, Utah sheep case,
claims rejected by, 267 129, 268; retried, 270 Boosting, meaning of, 57 Desert Rock V), 95
Boltzmann test (Plumbbob), 191 Bullock, William C. (exercise director for Boston Globe, Najarian study funded by, 260 Bureau of Animal Industry: in sheep study, Boyer, Keith (Project 400 director), on com- 113; AEC sheep conclusions supported by,
pliance with FRC guidelines, 202 127, 128. See also Huffman; Melvin Boyer, Marion W. (AEC General Manager), Bureau of the Budget: and compensation for
DBM sheep study endorsed by, 109 Japanese fishermen, 157; in joint study of Bradbury, Norris E.: named LASL director, radiation standards, 198-199 11; Holzman chosen by, 27; on Greenhouse —_ Bush, George (U.S. president), exposure com-
cancellation, 39; on NTS rad-safe standards, pensation act signed by, 272 62-63; and nuclear reactor testing, 201 Buster-Jangle operation: approved, 61; plans Brady, William J. (REECo rad-safe), and Kiwi for, 65-66, 74, 89; conduct of, 70, 73; ra-
training, 201 dioactivity from, 70-72; rad-safe for, 90
Bravo test (Castle): evacuation plans for, 139;
uncertain weather for, 139, 177; detonation C-54, crew exposed in Mike, 87 of, 140; close-in fallout from, 140; cloud Cabriolet test (Plowshare), 239, 240 tracking for, 141; distant fallout from, 141— Cactus Springs, Nevada, fallout at, 231 145; misleading press release about, 147~ Calcium, analogous to strontium, 183 148; radiostrontium threat revealed by, 184; | Caldwell, Glyn G. (CDC), and Smoky study,
effects of studied, 226 7-8, 262, 266
chair, 12 at, 48
Brereton, Lewis H. (USAB), appointed MLC Caliente, Nevada, Ranger monitors stationed
British tests, thermonuclear, 215; at NTS, Califano, Joseph A., Jr. CHEW secretary), in-
215-216; in Australia, 276 teragency task force on radiation created
Brodsky, Allen (University of Pittsburgh), by, 263 Mancuso study criticized by, 260 California, University of. See Donner LaboraBrookhaven National Laboratory (AEC), in tory; Lawrence Livermore Laboratory; Los
Marshallese study, 227 Alamos Scientific Laboratory
Brower, Stephen L. (Iron County agricultural Cambridge Instrument, instrument maker, 21
agent), and sheep study, 108 Camp 12. See Area 12
Bruton, Henry C. (CTG 7.3), radiation waiver Campbell, Raymond P., Jr. (DMA staff offi-
requested by, 153 cer), on prospects for Nevada testing, 116
B Tunnel (NTS), in Chena, 212 Camp Desert Rock: in Plumbbob, 7, 8, 192;
Buckland, Carl W. (H-Division): named chief established, 68; converted to standby, 74; in onsite monitor for Ranger, 45; on exposure Tumbler-Snapper, 77; as one-time experi-
records, 52 ence, 187
Buggy test (Plowshare), 240 Canada: exposure standards followed by, 117; Bugher, John C. (DBM director): on fallout threatened by Palanquin fallout, 239 exposure at St. George, 104—105; sheep Cancer, thyroid: in Marshallese, 227-228; study initiated by, 109; sheep study re- linked to fallout, 264; caused by radiation, viewed by, 111, 112; on operational expo- 273-274. See also Leukemia sure standards, 117; on primacy of safety, Cannikin test (Vela Uniform), 247 117-118; on philosophy of standard setting, | Carbon-14. See Radiocarbon .
Text Index 569 Carlsbad, New Mexico, Gnome site, 214 CIC. See Coordination and Information Center Carter, Jimmy (U.S. president), radiation pro- | Cincinnati Environmental Health Center. See
gram ordered by, 263 Wolff
Carter, Melvin W. (PHS officer), on scientific Clark, John C. (J-Division): Ranger test di-
judgment versus scientific proof, 254 rector, 44; on St. George fallout, 104; 56Carter, Tim Lee (U.S. congressman), radiation Project NTS test director, 173
hearings demanded by, 8, 259-260 Clark, Robert H. (Nevada deputy state veteriCastle operation: contrasted with Ivy, 83, 131; narian), livestock injuries investigated by,
potential problems for, 105; planning for, 106, 109, 110 131-132, 138; potential lagoon contamina- Clarkson, Percy W. (USA): appointed CJTF-
tion by, 132-134; rad-safe preparations, 132, 82; retained for Castle, 131; on Castle 134-136; cloud-tracking plans, 136-137; planning flaws, 132; Bravo firing ordered dispute over operational exposure limits by, 139; Bravo pronounced successful by, for, 137-138, 170; weather for, 139; con- 140; Marshallese and Japanese symptoms duct of, 140-141, 152-155; fallout contro- compared by, 146; and Bravo press release, versy caused by, 159, 170, 171, 180-181; 147; on JTF-7 disruption after Bravo, 152; as cause of Redwing organizational change on application of waiver policy, 152-153; in rad-safe, 176; role in shaping Redwing tighter weather rules imposed by, 153 public relations, 178. See also Bravo Claus, Walter D. (DBM biophysics chief), Cattle injured by fallout: from Trinity, 4, 110; higher Castle operational limit opposed by,
from Tumbler Snapper, 80-81, 106; not 137 from Upshot-Knothole, 106-107, 114, 115 Clean bomb: tested in Redwing, 180; tested in Cedar City, Utah, center of sheep deaths, 107 Hardtack, 193; for Plowshare, 237 Center for Disease Control, and Smoky study, Climax test (Upshot-Knothole), 105
6-7. See also Caldwell Cloud penetration experiment, Redwing, 177
Central Dosimetry Records Project: created by | Cloud sampling: drone, in Sandstone, 29-30;
DOE, 262; activities of, 262-263 manned, in Buster-Jangle, 66; in Ivy, 85CER Geonuclear: Rulison managed by, 242; 86, 87-88; in Upshot-Knothole, 100-101;
and Rio Blanco, 244 in Redwing, 176-177, 179. See also Flight
Cesium-137. See Radiocesium crews
Chariot project (Plowshare), 219 “Clouds from Nevada,” by Jacobs, 191
Charlie test (Buster), 70 Coast Guard, U.S., in Hardtack, 193
Charlie test (Crossroads), cancellation of, 170 Coe, Donald (Plumbbob veteran), and the
Charlie test (Tumbler-Snapper), 77, 78 Smoky test, 8 Chemical Corps School (later Training Collison, Tom D. (USA/AFSWP): rad-safe Center), Fort McClellan, monitors provided head for Upshot-Knothole, 99; on off-site by: for Desert Rock I, 68; for Upshot- rad-safe, 101; on Lincoln Mine fallout, 102;
Knothole, 100 on fallout at St. George, 104; in Teapot rad-
Chena test (Nougat), 212 safe, 167
Cherokee test (Redwing), opened to press, 178 = Colorado: Rulison in, 242~243; Rio Blanco in,
Chicago, University of, Sunshine research at, 244 182, 183. See also Metallurgical Laboratory = Columbia University, Sunshine research et,
Children and infants: radioiodine doses to, 183
228-231 . , .
222; thyroid abnormalities in Marshallese, Command responsibility for rad-safe: in Sand226, 227-228; developmental problems in stone, 20; in Greenhouse, 38; at NTS, dis-
Marshallese, 227; thyroid study of Utah, puted, 69; in Castle, 135
Chrestensen, Louis B. (air task group rad-safe Committee tor Nuclear Information, Greater
: St. Rongerik Louis Citizens’, 226; and Pikeon fallout officer): and fallout, 142; oo ’ Rongelap fallout, 143 232
270 Commoner, Barry, 252
Christensen, Sherman, judge in Bulloch case, Committee of Survivors, 269
Christmas Island: British thermonuclear tests Compact of Free Association between the at, 215; Dominic testing at, 215-216; per- United States and the Republic of the Mar-
sonnel film badged at, 217 shall Islands, effect on legal cases, 171
Christofilos, Nicholas C. (LLL), and Argus, Compensation for radiation injury: suits for,
196 267-270; legislated, 270, 271-272
570 Text Index : Conard, Robert A. (BNL physician), long- dioactive ships from, 22; Winant at, 24; term Marshallese study headed by, 227 weather problems at, 26; Holzman at, 27; Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear beta radiation problems at, 74; in Castle
Weapons Tests, 205 planning, 133-134; cancellation of Charlie
Congress, U.S.: members invited to Tumbler- test in, 170
Snapper, 77; hearings by House Subcom- Crowson, Delmar (DMA director), on Pike
mittee on Health and the Environment, 8, fallout, 232 259-260; role in low-level radiation contro- Curie. See Radiation units versy, 261; hearings by House Subcommit- Currant, Nevada, radioiodine detected at, 212—
tee on Oversight and Investigation, 261; 213 hearings by Senate Committee on Veteran’s —_ Curtis, John I. (Utah state veterinarian), sheep
Affairs, 266-267; compensation to radia- studied by, 107 tion victims voted by, 270-272. See also Curtiss, weapon assembly ship: in Sandstone,
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 24, 28; in Castle, 139 Containment: value of, 206; problems of, 207-208; early NTS record of, 231; record
before Baneberry, 248; after Baneberry, DAAG. See Dose Assessment Advisory Group 250-251. See also Underground; Venting Damage claims, 80; from Upshot-Knothcle,
Continental Oil. See CER Geonuclear 106-107. See also Compensation Cooney, James P. (USA Medical Corps): Danny Boy test (Nougat), defined as undernamed JTF-7 rad-safe officer and rad-safe ground, 206 unit commander, 19; and command respon- David Taylor Model Basin, in Sandstone, 13. sibility for rad-safe, 20; replaced as Sand- Davy Crockett tactical nuclear missile, tested,
stone rad-safe unit commander, 24; named 218 Greenhouse rad-safe head, 37—38; and Dean, Gordon E. (AEC chair): Greenhouse movement of Greenhouse rad-safe unit to support by, 39; on Greenhouse George, 56; PPG, 53; and fallout after Greenhouse Dog, on safety issues in Desert Rock IV, 76; on 54-55; and fallout from Greenhouse Item, Mike shot, 87; concerned about fallout, 57-58; on fallout and operational exposure 104; succeeded by Strauss, 112; and use of limits, 58; Greenhouse rad-safe assessed by, Bikini, 131
58-59; at Upshot-Knothole, 99 Death Valley, fallout in, 102 Cooper, Paul (Plumbbob veteran), and the Debris entrapment, meaning of, 238
Smoky test, 7-8 Decoupling, meaning of, 245, 246
Coordination and Information Center (AEC): Defense, Department of, 8, 12; creation of, 14; established, 264—265; activities of, 265; and weapon effects tests, 37, 60; and contimade permanent and opened to the public, nental test site, 41; and troop safety policy,
266 75-76; and troop exposure limits, 86, 93-
Corps of Engineers, NTS survey by, 42 94; joint study of Marshallese by, 146-147;
Cosgriff, Thomas (VA physician), and Smoky and Castle evaluation committee, 148; large
study, 7 surface burst proposed by, 160-161, 1€2;
Coulomb-C test (58-Project NTS), unantici- and Teapot plans, 165; weapon deployment
pated nuclear yield from, 192 plans of, 172; Pluto rejected by, 204, 205; Court of Veterans Appeals, founded, 271 moratorium opposed by, 205; PPG transCranston, Alan (U.S. senator), hearings on ferred to, 215; and Long Shot, 246; and
veterans, 266—267 Bikini cleanup, 256-257; and Enewetak
Crater, subsidence, 234—235, 236 cleanup, 258. See also Advanced Research Cratering: meaning of, 206; in Sedan, 220; nu- Projects Agency; Air Force; Armed Forces clear excavation role of, 236; abandoned, Special Weapons Project; Army; Joint
241 Chiefs; Joint Task Force; Navy; Secretary
Cronkite, Eugene P. (NMRI physician), proj- of Defense
ect officer for Marshallese study: enjoined Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
to secrecy, 146-147; on exposed Ron- See Advanced Research Projects Agency
gelapese, 155, 156 Defense Atomic Support Agency, AFSWP
Crossroads operation: conduct of, 4-5, 10; im- succeeded by, 218, 262 pact on LASL, 11; joint task force for, 13; Defense Nuclear Agency: and Enewetak Bikini advantages for, 14, 131; Enewetak cleanup, 258; DASA succeeded by, 262; airstrip support by, 17; Cooney at, 19; ra- and claims for radiation injury, 271
Text Index 571 Department of Defense. See Defense Berkeley, Baneberry workers checked at,
Department of Energy. See Energy 226
Department of Health, Education, and Wel- Doorstop operation, 89 fare. See Health, Education, and Welfare Dose and dose rate: meaning of, 273; acute
Department of Interior. See Interior versus chronic, 273-274; response curve,
Department of Navy. See Navy meaning of, 274
Department of State. See State Dose Assessment Advisory Group, formed,
Department of War. See War 265
Depth of burial: meaning of scaled, 231; Dose reconstruction: to sheep thyroids problems of, 234-235; variations in, 238; (Dunning), 126; to human infant thyroids
in underground engineering, 241 (Knapp), 222-223; for sheep (Knapp), 270. Desert Rock I exercise: proposed for Buster- See also Exposures calculated Jangle, 67; rad-safe for, 67-68; with Buster | Dosimeters, pocket: for Sandstone, 21; for
Dog, 68; public relations for, 69-70; value Ranger, 48
of, 74-75 Dosimetry Records Centralization Project. See
Desert Rock II and III exercise: added to Central Dosimetry Records Project
Jangle, 70; army dissatisfaction with rad- Dosimetry Research Project. See Central
safe limits in, 92 Dosimetry Records Project
Desert Rock IV exercise: plans for, 75; con- Down-hole scheme, meaning of, 238 duct of, 77; army dissatisfaction with rad- Downwinders: in the news, 263; Allen suit by,
safe limits in, 92 269-270; compensation legislated for, 272
Desert Rock V exercise: plans for, 89; new The Dragon's Tail, by Hacker, 6, 263 rad-safe policy for, 93-95, 166; conduct of, | Dmnbble project (Vela Uniform), 245-246
95-99; Jaffee suit from, 267—268 Dub test (Plowshare), 238 Desert Rock VI exercise: plans for, 166; rad- Dudley, Robert A. (DBM): and Sunshine
safe plans for, 166-167 cover story, 183; on working with Libby,
Desert Rock VII and VIII exercise, 7; rad-safe 184
for, 187; conduct of, 191-192 Dunham, Charles L. (DBM deputy chief): Des Moines test (Nougat), 212; conduct of, meeting to discuss Bravo patients, 155; and
213; radioiodine from, 225 Knapp’s dose reconstruction, 222-223; and
Device, meaning of, 28 PHS thyroid study, 228
Diablo, Nevada: radioiodine detected at,212— | Dunning, Gordon M. (DBM, later DOS dep-
213; Sedan fallout at, 221 uty director): at Upshot-Knothole, 100; in
Diamond Dust test (Vela Uniform), 246 livestock investigation, 106; on beta-burned Discretionary function exemption, to Federal livestock, 107; sheep investigation instigated
Tort Claims Act, 268 by, 107; AEC and DMA briefed by, 108,
Division of Biology and Medicine. See Biol- 111; at LASL sheep meeting, 124-126;
ogy and Medicine sheep thyroid dose reconstruction by, 126,
Division of Information Services. See Infor- 223; evaluation of LASL meeting by, 127;
mation Services on Utirikese exposure, 145; on non-AEC
Division of Military Application. See Military rad-safe, 161-162; off-site exposure rules
Application drafted by, 163-164; Knapp’s analysis crit-
Division of Peaceful Nuclear Explosives. See icized by, 223-224; on environmental ra-
Peaceful Nuclear Explosives dioiodine, 225; testimony on radioiodine Division of Public Information. See Public by, 226; objections to Weiss study by, 228—
Information 229; criticism of Gofman-Tamplin study tor Development sition to Salmon by, 245-246
Division of Reactor Development. See Reac- by, 230; on cross-border fallout, 232; oppoDixie test (Upshot-Knothole), 102
Dog test (Buster), 70 “Early Cloud Penetration,” Redwing Project
Dog test (Greenhouse), 53-55 2.66, 177
Dog test (Tumbler-Snapper), 77, 78 Eastman Kodak: Sandstone film badges supDominic operation: scope of, 215; conduct of, plied by, 21-22; Ranger fallout detected by,
216; rad-safe for, 216-217; rocket launches 51
in, 217-218 Easy test (Buster), 70
Domino operation, 105 Easy test (Greenhouse), 55 Donner Laboratory, University of California, Easy test (Ranger), 51
972 Text Index Easy test (Tumbler-Snapper), fallout from, Castle emergency evacuation plans for, 139;
78-79 prepared as alternative site after Bravo, 153;
Eberline Instrument Company, and Gasbuggy proposed as NTS alternative for Plumbbob,
rad-safe, 242 188—189; fallout from Hardtack I on, 195;
Ebiruru. See Eleleron cleanup of, 257-258. See also Castle;
Echo test (Castle), canceled, 154 Greenhouse; Hardtack; Ivy; Redwing; Eckhardt, Bob (U.S. congressman), and low- Sandstone
level radiation hearings, 261 Enewetakese: removal of to Ujilang, 18, 254; Edgerton, Germeshausen and Grier, Inc.: in difficulties at Ujilang, 255 Sandstone, 13; monitor training by, 135 Enewetak island (Enewetak): selected as PPG Edgestone Arsenal (USA), monitors trained main base, 17; airstrip on, 25; weather sta-
at, 23 tion at, 27; Item fallout on, 57—58; Tewa
Effects testing. See Nuclear weapons testing fallout on, 179-180 Eisenbud, Merril (NYOO): fallout sampling Eniwetok Field Office, created, 83 network initiated by, 51; in Castle, 136- Eniwetok Proving Ground, 215 137; as advisor to Morton in Japan, 149; Enjebi island (Enewetak), 25; X-Ray site, 17, and Japanese physicians, 150; Marshall 27-31; Greenhouse Easy site, 50; Item site, Islands visit by, 151; on FRC contribution, 37
199 Environmental impact statement: for Rio
Eisenhower, Dwight D. (U.S. president): and Blanco, 244; for Cannikin, 247; for Enemoratorium, 6, 205; Climax test approved wetak cleanup, 258 by, 105; on fission and fusion, 136; Teapot Environmental Protection Agency: created, plans submitted to, 164; Teapot approved 199; Sternglass refuted by, 252. See also by, 165; Wigwam approved by, 171; Plumb- Southwestern Radiological Health
bob approved by, 189; Hardtack approved Laboratory in principle by, 192; clean bomb promised Environmental-Radiation Studies, NTS
to, 193; Hardtack II approved by, 197; on Committee for, 224-225
AEC honesty, 198 Environmental studies, for Chariot, 219 jit island (Majuro), Rongelapese resident on, Epidemiology of radiation-caused disease:
227 PHS study of, 226; Mancuso study of, 260;
El Cortez Hotel, Ranger monitors housed in, Najarian study of, 260-261; Lyon study of,
48 264; expanded study of, 276
Eleleron isiand (Enewetak), site of Greenhouse — E Tunnel (NTS), in Antler, 211
George, 56 Eugalab. See Eluklab
Elliott, Richard G. (SFO information director): | Eureka, Nevada, officials and ranchers inter-
better public information urged by, 80; on viewed in, 114 AEC responsibility for public information, Evacuation: Ranger plans for, 47—48; Jangle
121-122; on sheep deaths, 123 criteria for, 64-65; Ivy plans for, 85-86; El Paso Natural Gas Company, and Gasbuggy, Castle plans for, 135-136; Teapot plans for,
241-242 163-164; after Baneberry, 248
Eluklab island (Enewetak): site of Ivy Mike, Evans Signal Laboratory (USA), Castle train-
83; destroyed by Mike, 87 ing at, 135
Ely, Nevada: Ranger monitors stationed at, 48; | Exercise Desert Rock. See Desert Rock
Upshot-Knothole fallout on, 78-79; offi- Exercise Ivy Flats. See Ivy Flats cials and ranchers interviewed in, 114 Ex gratia payment: to Japanese, 158; to Mar-
Encore test (Upshot-Knothole), 99, 103 shallese, 270 Energy, Department of: creation of, 6; relations © Experiments: Sandstone weapon effects, 22;
with congress, 8, 259-260 Greenhouse weapon effects, 70; Redwing
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 254 cloud penetration, 177. See also PACE Energy Research and Development Adminis- Exposure limits, operational: for Sandstone,
tration: creation of, 6, 254; and Mancuso 20-21; for Greenhouse, 38, 45-46; for
controversy, 260 Ranger, 45-46; for Ranger emergency,
Eneu island (Bikini): Bravo firing party on, 46-47; and fallout, 58, 65; for Buster140; party rescued from, 141; Bikinians Jangle, 65-66; for Tumbler-Snapper, 74;
returned to, 257, 258 for Ivy, 85-86; for Upshot-Knothole, 100;
Enewetak atoll (Marshall Islands): selected as and conflict with safety, 117-118; justifiPPG site, 16, 17; shortcomings of, 131; cation for, 119-120; for Castle, 134—135;
Text Index 573 waiver policy concerning, 137-138; for Failla, Gioacchino, and Jangle Feasibility Teapot, 163, 165-166; for Wigwam, 170; Committee, 62, 64 for 56-Project NTS, 174; for Redwing, Fallon, Nevada, Shoal test near, 244-245 176-177; for Plumbbob, 186-187; for Fallout: after Yoke, 32; after Ranger Baker, Hardtack I, 194-195; for Hardtack II, 197; 51; after Greenhouse Dog, 54-55; after for reactor testing, 201-202; for Gnome, Item, 57-58; from Buster-Jangle, 71-72;
214; for Dominic, 217 from Tumbler-Snapper, 78-81; from Ivy,
Exposure limits, population: problems in set- 88; from Upshot-Knothole, 102-105; after ting, 120-121; for Teapot, 163-164; for Bravo, 140~-145, 148; after Romeo, 153; plutonium, 174; NAS recommendations for, from Teapot, 168-169; after Tewa, 179185; revised for Plumbbob, 185-186; for 180; after Fir, 195; from Hardtack II, 198; reactor testing, 201-202; for Nougat, 206; from Sedan, 220-221; from Pike, 231-232; for Sedan, 220; for Dribble, 245. See also after Palanquin, 239 Maximum permissible concentration; Tri- Fallout concerns: from photographic industry,
partite Conference 51, 71; from Lincoln Mine workers, 79;
Exposures calculated and reconstructed: from from roadblock detainees, 103; from sheepSandstone Yoke, 32; from Greenhouse Item, men, 109, 114, 129; from the public, 116, 57-58; for Greenhouse, 58; for Desert Rock 190-191, 198, 231; from NPG neighbors, I, II, and WI, 71; from Tumbler-Snapper 118, 164, 165; from H&N personnel, 154; Easy, 79; from Tumbler-Snapper Fox, 80; reduced by underground testing, 247—248, from Bravo, 142-143, 151; for Redwing, 250-251; aroused by Baneberry, 251; re-
179-180 jected by AEC, 278. See also Radiation,
Exposures estimated: from Zebra, 34; from attitudes toward
Greenhouse Dog, 54-55; for Desert Rock Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Tests, JCAE
V, 98; from Bravo, for weather unit at 1959 hearings, 198 Rongerik, 142; for Rongelapese, 143; for Fallout hazards, local: Campbell on, 116; Utirikese, 143; for Ailukese, 145; for Jap- Graves on, 117; Bugher on, 120; Andrews anese, 151; for sailors at Bikini, 152; from on, 121; and yield limits for NTS tests, 181 Fir, 195; from Poplar, 195-196; from Platte, | Fallout hazards, worldwide: early concerns 212, 213; from Des Moines, 213; for Nou- about, 181-182; joint AEC-DOD study of,
gat, 213; for Dominic, 217 193. See also Worldwide Fallout Monitor-
Exposures recorded: from Zebra, 33; for Sand- ing Network stone, 34-35; for Ranger, 52-53; from Fallout Prediction Unit: in Teapot, 162, 177— Greenhouse Dog, 55; from Greenhouse . 178; in Redwing, 178 Easy, 55; for Greenhouse, 58; for Buster- Fallout Studies Branch (DBM), established, Jangle, 70-71; for Desert Rock IJ, I, and 199. See also Knapp IH, 71; from Tumbler-Snapper Dog, 78; Federal Civil Defense Administration: in from Tumbler-Snapper Easy, 79; for Jangle, 65; monitors for Buster-Jangle proTumbler-Snapper, 80; for Desert Rock V, vided by, 67; invited to observe Tumbler97-98, 99; for Upshot-Knothole, 100, 119- Snapper Charlie, 77; in Upshot-Knothole, 120; from Bravo, to firing party, 141; to 89; in Teapot, 162, 168 H&N personnel, 154; for Castle, 155; for Federal Radiation Council, 199; guidelines Desert Rock VI, 168-169; for Teapot, 169; applied at NTS, 202, 206; radioiodine for Wigwam, 172; for 56-Project NTS, 174, countermeasures proposed by, 221-222; 175; for Plumbbob, 191; for Desert Rock and PHS thyroid study, 230 VII and Vill, 192; for 58-Project NTS, 192; Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946: and Feres
for Hardtack I, 195; for Hardtack II, 197; doctrine, 267-268; discretionary function for Gnome, 214, 215; for Dominic, 217; for amendment to, 268 Sunbeam, 218; for Sedan, 220-221; from Federation of American Scientists. See Yuba, 226; from underground testing, 248; Sternglass
from Baneberry, 248-249 Felt, Gaelen L. (J-Division): on Teapot
External dose, ratio to thyroid dose, 225. See scheduling, 165; concerns about military
also Gamma radiation rad-safe unit, 167-168
Feres doctrine, intramilitary immunity, 267—
F-84G: for Ivy cloud sampling, 84; downed in 268
pling, 136 rad-safe, 135
Enewetak lagoon, 87; in Castle cloud sam- ‘Field Monitor’s Manual,” prepared for Castle
574 Text Index Fields, Kenneth E. (DMA director): on mili- miners exposure to, 208, 211-212; from tary demands for Desert Rock IV, 76; on Platte test, 213. See also External dose compromising between AEC and DOD Gamma spectrometry, 209-210 exposure limits, 93-94; briefed on sheep Gasbuggy test (Plowshare), 241-242 problem, 108; concerned about direction Gas stimulation, 241-244 of sheep investigation, 109; sheep study re- | Gastrointestinal damage, as cause of sheep
viewed by, 111; Tyler statement modified deaths, 110-111 by, 115; study of NTS future requested by, Geiger counter. See Instruments 116, 118; Bravo secrecy policy supported General Accounting Office, Mancuso charges by, 146, 147; asked to intervene with DOD, investigated by, 260
161 General Advisory Committee (AEC), 10,
Film badges: types of, 21; for Sandstone, 21- 11; continued NPG use endorsed, 130; 22; for Ranger, 48; at Greenhouse, 58; in Teapot approved by, 165; radiostrontium Teapot, 169; in Wigwam, 172; for Redwing, study recommended by, 182; on prompt 176; for Hardtack I, 194; for Dominic, 217 resumption of testing, 205. See also Libby;
Fir test (Hardtack I), 195 Oppenheimer
Fishbowl] events (Dominic), 216, 217—218 “General Monitoring Handbook,” LASL, 135 Fish poisoning, from disturbed reef ecology, Genetic effects: background of concern about,
258 184; and exposure limits, 185; in Marshall-
Flight crews, exposure limits for: in Ivy, 85- ese, 227
86, 87-88; in Castle, 134-135; in Teapot, Geneva Conference of Experts: on test ban 166; in Plumbbob, 187; in Hardtack I, 195; monitoring, 196; adjourned, 197
in Dominic, 217 George test (Greenhouse), 56-57, 82
Flights Able, Baker, and Charlie, aerial radia- George test (Tumbler-Snapper), 77, 80
tion surveys, 143, 145 GI Guinea Pigs, by Ensign and Uhl, 266
Foley, Roger: judge in Roberts case, 268-269; | Glendale Junction, Nevada: Ranger monitors
judge in Prescott case, 269 stationed at, 48; roadblocks at, 103, 104
Food and Drug Administration: and radio- Gnome project (Plowshare), 214—215; Vela
active fish, 149; in Wigwam, 171, 172 Uniform objectives in, 244 Ford, Gerald R. (U.S. president), energy re- Gofman, John: teamed with Tamplin in thyroid
organization act signed by, 254 study, 230, 253; development with Tamplin
Fox test (Ranger), 52, 70 as AEC critic, 253
79-80 Hardtack by, 193
Fox test (Tumbler-Snapper), 77; fallout from, Golden Rule, yacht, attempted disruption of France, nuclear testing by: in the Sahara, 205; Gough Island, south Atlantic, Argus conducted
in the Pacific, 257 near, 196
Frenchman Flat (NTS), 42, 234 Grable test (Upshot-Knothole), 99, 105 Frigate Bird test (Dominic), 216 Grand Canyon, NTS fallout in the direction of, Froman, Darol K. (J-Division leader): named 102 Sandstone scientific director, 13; Enewetak Graves, Alvin C. (J-Division): deputy leader,
surveyed by, 17; and rad-safe command re- 13; Enewetak surveyed by, 17; on Sandsponsibility, 20; final report on Sandstone, stone, 35; head and Greenhouse scientific 35; on need for regular testing, 36; suc- director, 37; rad-safe concerns of, 37; on ceeded as J-Division head, 37; amazed by command rad-safe responsibility, 38;
Greenhouse George, 56 Ranger test group chief, 44; informed of
Fukuryu Maru, Daigo, Japanese fishing ves- Ranger rad-safe plans, 46; amazed by
sel: fallout on, 148; enshrined, 158 Greenhouse George, 56; Buster-Jangle plan Fukuryu Maru crew: symptoms of, 148, 227; by, 65, 67; and Tumbler-Snapper rad-safe, hospitalized, 148-150; estimated exposure 73-74; open shot proposed by, 77; Ivy sciof, 151; persistent illness of, 157; U.S. in- entific task group headed by, 83; roadblocks
demnity to, 158 ordered by, 103; questioned by AEC, 104;
Fusion. See Thermonuclear on Climax results, 105; on test risks and
benefits, 116-117; on adding Bikini in PPG, 131; and Castle rad-safe, 132; higher
Gabriel project, 181-182 Castle operational limit endorsed by, 137;
Galileo test (Plumbbob), 7, 192 on Rongelap fallout, 143; on Utink fallout, Gamma radiation: from 56-Project NTS, 175; 143; on Bravo secrecy, 145; on test opera-
Text Index 575 tions and rad-safe, 160; in Teapot, 168; on Hawaii: fleet weather central at, 27; Bravo Redwing overexposures, 180; on NAS pop- seen at, 140; Dominic aircraft flights from,
ulation exposure limits, 185; on Plumbbob 216 advisory panel, 188; amazed by Pike, 231 Haynes, Eugene D. (NTS guard), over-
Greenhouse operation: plans for, 36, 37-39; exposed, 169 Korean war threat to, 39; decision to pro- H-bomb. See Hydrogen bomb ceed with, 42; weather problems at, 53-54, H-Division. See Health Division 55-56; conduct of, 54—57; fallout from, 57— Health, Education, and Welfare, Department
59; data from, used in Gabriel, 182. See of: in joint study of radiation standards,
also Joint Task Force 3 198-199; ordered to review Najarian
Greenpeace. See Rainbow Warrior charges, 261. See also Public Health Groom Lake, Nevada, airborne plutonium Service
detected at, 175 Health and Safety Laboratory (AEC): notified
Groom Mine, Nevada, fallout on, 80 of Ranger fallout, 51; Buster-Jangle distant Groves, Leslie R. (USA): Manhattan Project fallout survey directed by, 67; distant fa!lcommanded by, 3; named AFSWP chief, out assessed by, 71; Tumbler-Snapper na-
13-14 tionwide fallout survey by, 73; in Upshct-
Guam, fleet weather central at, 27 Knothole, 101, 160; in Castle, 136-137;
Gwynn, Philip S. (USAF/AFSWP): Tumbler- Japanese fishermen’s urine samples anaSnapper rad-safe headed by, 73; on Dog lyzed by, 150; and Redwing fallout predic-
fallout, 78 tion, 178; Sunshine research at, 183; Marshallese environmental studies by, 227. See
Hadlow, William J. (PHS pathologist): sheep also Eisenbud; Worldwide Fallout examined by, 107-108, 109; vacillating Health Division (LASL): Shipman named stand on radiation as cause of sheep deaths head of, 44—45; central role in test safety
by, 111 surrendered, 73; ambiguous Ivy role of, 83-
Hagerty, James C. (Eisenhower’s press secre- 84; in Upshot-Knothole, 100, 101; monttortary), on Strauss and the Fukuryu Maru, ing handbook by, 135; off-site exposure
151 limit agreed to, 163; and 56-Project NTS
Haight, Harry H. (USN/DMA): Desert Rock rad-safe, 173; and Rover, 201. See also IV rad-safe recommendations challenged Langham; Lushbaugh; Shipman; White by, 93; Marshallese observed by, 146; Health physics, meaning of, 19 meeting to discuss Bravo patients, 155 Health Physics Society, Sternglass at annual
Handcar test (Plowshare), 241 meeting of, 252
Hanford Works: sheep thyroid study at, 123- Helicopter crew: exposed in Platte, 212;
124, 127-128; epidemiological study of exposed in Des Moines, 213
workers at, 260 Hempelmann, Louis H. (H-Division), sucHanion, B. Hall (USN), CJTF-7 for Redwing, ceeded by Shipman, 44
177 Hepatitis, in Kobayahsi death, 158
Hardtack I operation: Ist RSSU in, 189-190; Hertford, Kenner F. (ALOO manager), on impact of disarmament talks on, 192-193; yield and safety standards, 187-188 planning and conduct of, 193-194; rad-safe | “Highway Rad Safe Plan,” 104
in, 194-195 Highways, contaminated by fallout, 103, 104,
Hardtack II operation: and fallout concerns, 192, 212, 221
196; planning and conduct of, 197-198; Hiroshima: survivors studied, 19, 149, 226;
underground tests in, 207 compared to Castle Bravo, 146, 147
Harry test (Upshot-Knothole), 100, 103-104; Historiography: of British test safety, 276; of
and livestock injuries, 107; radioiodine USS. test safety, 276-277, 281-282 dose reconstruction for, by Dunning, 126; History Associates Incorporated, contracted to
radioiodine dose reconstruction for, by support CIC, 266
Knapp, 223 History Division (AEC), 265-266
Hartgering, James B. (USA Medical Corps/ Holmes, Monroe A. (PHS officer): sheep exAFSWP): Tumbler-Snapper rad-safe plan- amined by, 107—108; on malnutrition ver-
ning by, 73; at Upshot-Knothole, 99 sus radiation in sheep deaths, 113; at LASL Harvard University. See MacMahon sheep meeting, 124-125; AEC final sheep Hattiesburg, Mississippi, and Dribble, 245— report rejected by, 128
246 Holmes & Narver: building contractor at Ene-
576 Text Index wetak, 39; site for testing in Nevada sur- 219; agreement on Milrow, 247; resettleveyed by, 42; AEC contract renewed, 83; ment of Bikini planned by, 256; EneweBikini reconnoitered by, 131-132; build- takese return okayed by, 258 ing on Majuro by, 156; workers granted Iodine-131. See Radioiodine
waivers, 195 Ionization chamber. See Instrument
Holzman, Benjamin G. (USAF): named Sand- _ Iron County, Utah, Matheson from, 264
stone meteorologist, 27; X-Ray weather Item test (Greenhouse), 57-58
briefings by, 27-28 Ivy Flats exercise, 218
Hood test (Plumbbob), 192 Ivy operation: contrasted with Castle, 83; radHormesis, radiation, meaning of, 274 safe organization for, 83—84; rad-safe plan-
Horn project, 182 ning for, 84-86; conduct of, 86-88; results
Horses, fallout injuries to, from Upshot- from, 88-89, 132; in Castle planning, 133-
Knothole, 106-107, 114, 115 134. See also Joint Task Force 3
House, Richard A. (USAF), JTF-7 rad-safe
officer: on operating in radioactive water, Jackass Flats (NTS): fallout on, 192; facilities
134; on Ailuk fallout, 145 for nuclear rocket and ramjet at, 200
How test (Tumbler-Snapper), 80 Jacks, Gordon L. (USA): Redwing rad-safe Huffman, W. T. (BAI plant toxicologist): head, 176; on cloud samplers’ limits, 176— sheep examined by, 108-109; plant poison- 177; on Redwing overexposures, 179-180; ing or malnutrition as cause of sheep death and Hardtack I, 194 rejected by, 111; AEC final sheep report Jacobs, Paul, on test site safety, 191
endorsed by, 128 Jaffee, Stanley (army veteran), at Desert Rock
Hull, John E. (USA): named CJTF-7, 13; Ene- V, 267 wetak surveyed by, 17; rad-safe staff for, Jaffee v. the United States, applied Feres doc19; on command responsibility for radia- trine to radiation injury, 267—268 tion safety, 20; daily weather briefings for, Jangle Feasibility Committee: formation of,
26, 27 61; deliberations of, 62, 63-64; evacuation
Hurricane, Nevada, fallout on, 104 criteria considered by, 63-64; on public
Hutchinson, Howard B. (USN), Nutmeg study trust and radiation safety, 64; fallout study
L by, 41 requested by, 66; effects of, 74; revived for Hydrogen bomb: decision to develop, 36-37; Teapot, 161
conceptual breakthrough, 82-83. See also Japan: tuna panic in, 149; friction with United
Thermonuclear States, 150, 151, 152; easing of friction
with United States, 157; summer research
Indian Springs Air Station, Nevada, 42; cruise to Marshalls, 157; ex gratia payment Ranger monitors stationed at, 48; in to, 158. See also Hiroshima; Nagasaki; Tumbler-Snapper, 74; in Upshot-Knothole, Yaizu 100; plutonium detected at, 175 Japanese National Institute of Health: anc Industrial applications. See Underground ABCC, 149; physicians at, 150
engineering Japtan island (Enewetak): fallout after Green-
Industrial safety, at NTS, 207 house Dog on, 54; fallout after Item on, Infant, bones in radiostrontium study, 183. See 57-58
also Children J-Division, 20; creation of, 13; Ranger respon-
Information Services, AEC Division of: in sibility for, 44; Buster-Jangle and TumblerTeapot, 165; on Pike fallout, 232. See also Snapper directed by, 73; unwilling to pro-
Salisbury vide Desert Rock IV monitors, 75; off-site
Instrument Development Laboratories, instru- rad-safe responsibility surrendered by, 160.
ment maker, 22 See also Clark; Felt; Froman; Graves
Instruments, radiation, 21—23; effects on stan- Jenkins, Bruce, judge in Allen case, 269-270
dards, 275 , Johnie Boy test (Sunbeam), 218
263 39
Interagency Radiation Research and Policy Johnson, A. C. (Cedar City veterinarian),
Coordination, Committee on, 263 sheep treated by, 108
Interagency Radiation Research Committee, Johnson, Louis A. (U.S. secretary of defense), Interagency Task Force on the Health Effects Johnson, Lyndon B. (U.S. president): informed
of Ionizing Radiation, report of, 263 of Palanquin, 238-239; announced return Interior, Department of: opposition to Chariot, of Bikinians, 256
Text Index 577 Johnson, William S. (H-Division industrial landing program, 203; and pressure for nuhygienist): head of Upshot-Knothole off- clear testing, 205; testing authorized by, site rad-safe, 101; and sheep death investi- 206; Dominic authorized by, 215 gation, 110; on 56-Project NTS plutonium Kennedy, William R., Jr. (H-Division), offsite hazards, 173; head of 56-Project NTS on- rad-safe headed by: for Ranger, 45; for
site rad-safe, 173-175 Buster-Jangle, 66-67
Johnston Island (central Pacific): in Hardtack Kieffer, William B. (AFSWC deputy com-
I, 194, 216; in Dominic, 216; personnel mander), on excessive rad-safe costs, 187
film badged at, 217 Kili island (Marshall Islands), Bikinians re-
John test (Plumbbob), air-to-air missile, 191 moved to, 256 Joint Chiefs of Staff: and Sandstone decision, King test (Ivy), 88 12; CJTF-7 appointed by, 13; support for Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico: in Pacific tests by, 14; and rad-safe command Ranger, 52; in Upshot-Knothole, 100 responsibility, 20; informed of AEC test Kiwi reactor: LASL nuclear rocket project, plans, 34; CJTF-3 appointed by, 36; Korea 200; testing of, 202-203 and Pacific tests considered by, 39; conti- Knapp, Harold A. (DBM mathematician): thynental test site considered by, 41; on urgent roid doses estimated by, 222~223; ad hoc need for air blast effects test, 73; JTF-132 committee to evaluate work of, 223-224.
extended by, 131; and Wigwam, 170 253; NTS response to, 225; reanalysis of Joint Committee on Atomic Energy: Froman sheep data by, 270 testimony to, 36; and Ranger, 43; fallout Knights, John E., and stalled drone tank, 31 hearings by, 191; and radioiodine questions, | Kobayashi, Rokuzo (Japanese NIH head),
226; as AEC supporter, 259; demise of, 6, advisory group formed by, 150
259. See also Anderson Koon test (Castle), 153-154
Joint Task Force 1: Crossroads conducted by, Korean War: impact on Greenhouse, 39; re-
4-5, 13; Cooney in, 19 consideration of continental test site caused
Joint Task Force 3: created, 36; rad-safe for, by, 41 38; excluded from Ranger, 43; NCRP radi- Kuboyama, Aikichi (Fukuryu Maru radioation protection standards rejected by, 46; man): death from hepatitis, 157-158; comthreatened by typhoon, 53; absorbed by pensation for family of, 158
JTF-132. See also Greenhouse Kwajalein atoll (Marshall Islands): JTF-1 Joint Task Force 7 (1947-1948): created, 13; retreat to, 4; rejected as PPG site, 16—17; existence announced, 18; headquarters Winant at, 24; Sandstone air base at, 25; transferred, 24; departed PPG, 34. See also weather station at, 27; weather reconnais-
Sandstone sance from, 27; fallout after Yoke on, 32;
Joint Task Force 7 (1953-1958): established Bravo witnessed from, 140; Rongerik unit as permanent testing unit, 132; trial run off evacuated to, 142—143; Rongelapese evacuSan Diego, 138; Bravo recovery delayed, ated to, 143; Marshallese examined at, 146, 140; evacuees received by, 145; on why no 147; meeting to discuss Bravo patients at, prior evacuation, 146; disrupted after Bravo, 155 152; role of 1st RSSU in, 189-190; dissolved, 216. See also Castle; Hardtack IJ; Laboratory of Radiation Biology. See Applied Redwing; and see further Navy Task Group Fisheries Laboratory Joint Task Force 8, created, 216. See also Landsverk, Ole G. (Metallurgical Laboratory),
Dominic dosimeter designed by, 21
Joint Task Force 132: created, 82; existence Landsverk Electrometer Company, instrument
announced, 83; Operation Plan by, 85-86; maker, 21, 22 existence extended, 131; superseded by Langham, Wright H. (H-Division), ad hoc
JTF-7, 132. See also Ivy committee on Knapp headed by, 224
Juda v. United States, Bikinians suit, 271 Lapp, Ralph E. (physicist), New York fallcut reported by, 252
Kean, William B. (USA), Desert Rock di- Las Vegas Bombing and Gunnery Range, Ne-
rected by, 67, 70 vada: as nuclear test site, 42; renamed Nellis
Kelly, John S. (DPNE director), 240 Air Force Range, 200
Kelly, Orville, National Association of Atomic | Las Vegas Field/Branch Offfice: livestock in-
Veterans founded by, 270 juries reported to, 106; meeting of sheep
Kennedy, John F. (U.S. president): and lunar experts at, 110; off-site rad-safe shifted 1o,
578 Text Index 160; and PHS, 162; off-site rad-safe plan sion, 76; on military rad-safe responsibility, drafted by, 163. See also Sanders; Woodruff 93; on DOD weapon plans, 172-173 Lawrence Livermore (National) Laboratory: Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (AEC): in founded, 89; test fizzles by, 102, 154; moni- World War II, 3; postwar design work at, tor training by, 135; fallout prediction re- 10; postwar problems of, 11; and early search at, 177; and clean bombs, 180; and Sandstone planning, 11, 12-13; GreenNTS yield limits, 188; test directors pro- house justified by, 39; hazards of Nevada vided by, 189; in Hardtack, 193; assigned testing discussed at, 42; pre-Greenhouse Tory II reactor project, 200; and Tory II Nevada testing proposed by, 43; NCRP ratesting, 204; biomedical division estab- diation protection standards adopted by, 46; lished, 253. See also Plowshare; Tory II; conflict with LLL, 89; objection to concept and see further Gofman; Shelton; Tamplin; of proving ground by, 90; meeting on sheep
Teller; York at, 124-126, 127; objection to Teapot pub-
LeBaron, Robert F. (MLC chairman), on pub- lic relations plan by, 164; fallout prediction
lic fear of fallout, 116 ) research at, 177-178; and NTS yield limits,
Legal suit, to block testing: in Rulison, 243; in 188; test directors provided by, 189; in Hard-
Rio Blanco, 244; in Cannikin, 247 tack, 193; assigned Kiwi reactor project, Legal suit, for damages, 271; to livestock, 200. See also Health Division; J-Division; 129, 268, 270; to Marshallese, 271; to vet- N-Division; and see further Bradbury erans, 267—268; to NTS workers, 268-269; Los Angeles, fallout detected in, 192, 232-233
to downwinders, 269-270 Low dose effects: majority opinion on, 6-7, Legislation: on federal tort claims, 267; on 253-254; minority opinion on , 7, 252-253; contractors’ immunity, 268; on Marshallese congressional hearings and, 261—262; scicompensation, 270; on veterans compen- entific evidence on, 273-275; ambiguity of
sation, 271; on compensation for down- evidence for, 277
winders, 272 Lucky Dragon. See Fukuryu Maru.
Leukemia: in veterans, 7, 8, 259-260; Luedecke, Alvin R. (AFSWP deputy chief): Rongelapese death from, 227; in southern on military needs versus AEC rules, 75; as
Utah, 229; in children, 264 CYJTF-7, 193; waiver authority by, 194;
“Leukemia Mortality in Southern Utah,” waivers granted by, 195; as AEC general
Weiss report, 229 manager, 245; Salmon favored by, 246
Libby, Willard F. (University of Chicago/ Lushbaugh, Clarence C. (H-Division patholoAEC): and Sunshine, 182—184; member of gist), sheep study by, 124, 125, 127-128 AEC, 184; and Plumbbob, 188; on hazards Lyon, Joseph L. (Utah epidemiologist), study
of fallout, 199 of childhood leukemia, 264
Lilienthal, David E. (AEC chair): Pacific tests advocated by, 11, 12; prompt statement on
Enewetakese removal urged by, 18 McCormack, James, Jr. (DMA director), 12; Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: and under- Nevada testing endorsed by, 42; tenure at
ground testing, 6, 230-231; as obstacle to DMA ended, 76 Pluto, 204-205; signed, 218-219; ambigu- McDaniel, Joseph W. (USAF weather unit ous provisions of, 232; impact on Plow- deputy commander), on need for Rongerik
share, 236, 237—238 evacuation, 142
Limit on yields: Nevada testing, 42—43, 81, McKee Company, R. E., building contractor at
82; proposed by Committee on Operation Nevada site, 44
Future of NPG, 91 MacMahon, Brian (Harvard University), fetal Lincoln Mine, Nevada, fallout on: from X-ray and childhood cancer link studied by, Tumbler-Snapper Easy, 78—79; from Nancy, 252
102; from Grable, 105 McNamara, Robert S. (U.S. secretary of deLittle Feller I test (Sunbeam), 218 fense), 205
Little Feller II test (Sunbeam), 218 Majuro atoll (Marshall Islands): air force Livermore. See Lawrence Livermore weather station at, 27; Rongelapese moved
Laboratory to, 156. See also Ejit
Logan test (Hardtack IT), 207 Malnutrition, and sheep deaths, 110, 111 Long Shot test (Vela Uniform), 246 Mancuso, Thomas F. (University of PittsLoper, Herbert B. (AFSWP commander/MLC burgh), long-term study of Hanford workchair): informed of AEC Desert Rock deci- ers by, 260
Text Index 579 Manhattan Project: and first atomic bomb, 1, jected, 72; reviewed past PPG announce5-6; Metallurgical Laboratory in, 2-3, 21; ments, 148; and reactor rad-safe, 201. See and Trinity, 3-4; and Crossroads, 4—5; re- also Crowson; Fields, Haight; McCormack placed by AEC, 10; Stafford Warren in, 19; Military Liaison Committee: creation and comCooney in, 19; and Soviet atomic bomb, position of, 11-12; Sandstone postpone-
37; Libby in, 182 ment considered by, 24; Nutmeg report
Mariana Islands, Mike radioactivity detected considered by, 41; Ranger support sought
at, 88 from, 44; Nevada weapon effects tests pro-
Marines, U.S.: withdrawal from Desert Rock posed by, 61; Buster-Jangle troop exercise IV threatened by, 76; in Tumbler-Snapper requested by, 67; informed of AEC attitude
96-97 LeBaron; Loper
Dog, 77; in Upshot-Knothole Badger, toward effects tests, 73. See also Brereton; Marshallese: injuries of, 146, 147; petition to Military rad-safe limits: for troop exercises in
UN, 156; allegation of experiments on, Desert Rock I, 68; in Desert Rock IV, 226. See also Bikinians; Enewetakese; 75-76, 77, 92, 93; in Desert Rock II and
Rongelapese; Utirikese III, 92; in Desert Rock V, 92-95; exceeded,
Marshall Islands: in Crossroads, 4; PPG site 96, 97-98, 99; in Desert Rock VI, 166-167; in, 14-17; Japanese League of Nations in Desert Rock VII and VIII, 187. See also Mandate for, 17. See also Alinginae; Bikini; Radiation protection standards Enewetak; Kili; Kwajalein; Majuro; Mejato; = Milk: Upshot-Knothole sampling of, 198;
Rongelap; Rongerik; Ujilang; Utirik sparseness of data on radioiodine in, 210; Matheson, Scott M. (Utah governor): epidemi- contamination after Sedan, 221; as source ological studies urged by, 263-264; death of radioiodine, 222; sampling after Bane-
from cancer, 264 berry, 249
Maupin, Clinton S. (USA Medical Corps): Miller, Robert E. (NVO manager): on Rulison Upshot-Knothole rad-safe staff officer, 99; rad-safe, 243—244; on Baneberry reforms,
in Castle, on Rongelapese symptoms, 155 251 Maximum permissible concentration, 213,215 §Millrace operation, 197
Maynard, Russell H. (USN): chief Ivy rad- Milrow test (Vela Uniform), 246-247 safe officer and CTU-132.1.7, 83; role of Miners at NTS: overexposures of, 208; exter-
H-Division discussed by, 84 nal overexposure of, 211; tritium overexpoMays, Charles (University of Utah), testimony sure of, 212; radioiodine overexposure of,
on radioiodine, 226 225-226. See also Uranium miners
Median lethal dose, defined, 273 Ministry of Health and Welfare (Japan), adMedical Research Council (U.K.), report on vice on Bikini incident for, 150
biological effects, 185 Minnesota, charges of crop contamination
Mejato atoll (Marshall Islands), Rongelapese from, 198
removed to, 257 . Miracle Play project (Vela Uniform), 246
Melvin, F. H. (BAI Salt Lake City office): Miscarriages, among Rongelapese, 227 sheepmen interviewed by, 107; at LASL Mississippi test site, 245-246 sheep meeting, 124-125; AEC final sheep Monitors, rad-safe: schoo] training, 23; ship-
report endorsed by, 128 board training, 25; exposed to radioiodine,
Mercury, Nevada: sometime designation of 225-226 Nevada test site, 43; NTS base camp at, 68 Moratorium: public protest stilled by, 6; proMetallurgical Laboratory, University of Chi- posed by British and American governcago: rad-safe practice at, 2-3; Graves at, ments, 196; began, 199; ended, 205; Chariot 13; health physics at, 19; Landsverk and delayed by, 219
Wollan at, 21 Morgan test (Plumbbob), 191
Mexico, fallout from Nevada in, 232 Morton, John (ABCC director): contacted by Micronesian Legal Services Corporation, 258 Bugher, 148; radiation victims examined Mike shot (Ivy): preparations for, 83, 86; rad- by, 149; on comparative value of Marshallsafe planning for, 83-86; weather problems ese and Japanese data, 151 at, 86; spectacle of, 86-87; fallout from, Moruroa, French Polynesia, nuclear weapons
87-88 test site, 257
Military Application, AEC Division of: cre- Mount Charleston, Nevada, radioactivity de-
ation of, 12; Buster-Jangle operation plan tected at, 52, 70 considered by, 65; special effects test re- Mt. McKinley, Sandstone flagship, 24; rad-
580 Text Index safe center on, 26; task force weather cen- itor training by, 135; Marshallese environ-
tral on, 27 mental studies by, 227. See also Baietti;
Muller, Herbert J. (geneticist), on genetic Veenstra threat from radiation, 184 Naval Research Laboratory, Sandstone participation by, 13
Nagasaki: bomb used at, 4, 11; survivors stud- | Navy, Department of, represented on MLC,
ied, 19, 149, 226; compared to Castle 11, 12
Bravo, 146, 147 Navy Atomic Defense School: Castle training Najarian, Thomas (Boston VA hematologist), at, 135; Wigwam training at, 170 study of Portsmouth shipyard workers by, Navy Task Group (JTF-7), in Wigwam, 170-
260-261 172. See also Bruton
Nam island (Bikini), site of Castle Bravo, 140 N-Division (LASL), responsible for nuclear
Nancy test (Upshot-Knothole), 96, 102; and rocket testing, 201 sheep deaths, 109; computed thyroid dose Nectar test (Castle), conducted, 154-155
from, 126 Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada: Ranger evacuNational Academy of Sciences: and report on ation unit at, 47; Ranger rad-safe headquarbiological effects, 6, 185-186; and ABCC, tered at, 48; roadblock at, 104 149; guidelines adopted by AEC, 186-187, Nellis Air Force Range, Nevada, renamed Las
190 Vegas Bombing and Gunnery Range, 200
National Aeronautics and Space Administra- Neptune test (Hardtack II), 197 tion: created, 200; collaboration with AEC, | NERVA program, initiated, 203
202-203 Nevada, University of: at Las Vegas sheep
National Association of Atomic Veterans, meeting, 110; AEC contract for sheep stud-
formed, 270 ies with, 113
National Association of Photographic Manu- Nevada Operations Office: Sulky announcefacturers, radioactivity monitoring urged ment advocated by, 238; Central Dosimetry
by, 51 Records Project created by, 262; CIC cre-
National Association of Radiation Survivors, ated by, 264-265
formed, 270 Nevada Proving Ground (1953-1954). See
National Bureau of Standards: Sandstone par- Nevada Test Site
ticipation by, 13; Sandstone film-badge pro- Nevada Test Site: origins of, 41-43, 119; exis-
cessing by, 22 tence publicly acknowledged, 44; officially National Cancer Institute, and leukemia study, named, 60; renamed Nevada Proving
264 Ground, 73; public fear as threat to, 77—78;
National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Pol- sheep pastures northeast of, 107; reverted
icy. See SANE to original name, 173; REECo rad-safe
National Committee/Council on Radiation contract at, 189; nuclear reactor testing at, Protection: recommendations of, 159; plu- 200; industrial safety at, 207; revamped tonium limits recommended by, 174; re- radioiodine monitoring at, 225; Baneberry vised population exposure limits from, 186; interruption of testing at, 249. See also 56and population exposure limits, 220. See Project NTS; 57 Project; 58-Project NTS;
also Subcommittee No. 1 Baneberry; Buster-Jangle; Diamond Dust;
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Hardtack IT; Miracle Play; Niblick; Nougat;
244 Plowshare; Plumbbob; Pluto; Ranger;
National Institute(s) of Health, thyroid study. Rover; Storax; Sunbeam; Teapot; Tumbler-
See Andrews Snapper; Upshot-Knothole
National Research Council: and report on bio- = Nevada Test Site Radiation Victims
logical effects, 6; and Smoky study, 266 Association, formed, 270
National Security Act of 1947, 14 New Mexico, and Gasbuggy, 241-242 National Security Council, and Nevada test- New York Operations Office. See Health and
ing, 42, 43 Safety Laboratory
National Technical Laboratories, instrument New York Times, Argus story in, 196
maker, 22 Niblick operation, FY65 test series, 231:
Navaho missile, failed chemical ramjet, 205 Nichols, Kenneth D. (AFSWP chief), 14 Naval Medical Research Institute. See Nital v. United States, Marshallese down-
Cronkite winders case, 271
Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory: mon- _Nonstochastic effects. See Biological effects
Text Index 58 1 North American Aviation (Los Angeles), fall- | Operation Argus. See Argus
out detected by, 78 Operation Buster-Jangle. See Buster-Jangle
North Las Vegas, Nevada, roadblock at, 103 Operation Castle. See Castle Norton Sound, Argus missile launch ship, 196 | Operation Crossroads. See Crossroads Nougat operation: FY62 test series, 206; con- Operation Dominic. See Dominic tainment of tests in, 208; rad-safe results Operation Dominic II. See Sunbeam from, 213. See also Antler; Chena; Des Operation Domino. See Domino
Moines; Platte Operation Doorstop. See Doorstop
NRX< research reactors, tested, 203 Operation Greenhouse. See Greenhouse Nuclear excavation: rationale for, 219; crater- Operation Hardtack I. See Hardtack I
ing in, 236; end of, 240-241. See also Operation Hardtack II. See Hardtack II Buggy; Cabriolet; Chariot; Dub; Palanquin; Operation Ivy. See Ivy
Schooner; Sedan; Sulky Operation Jangle. See Buster-Jangle
Nuclear Furnace research reactor, tested, 203 Operation Millrace. See Millrace
Nuclear ramjet. See Pluto; Tory II Operation Niblick. See Niblick Nuclear reactor. See Kiwi; Tory H Operation Nougat. See Nougat Nuclear Regulatory Commission, creation of, Operation Pilgrim. See Pilgrim
6, 254 Operation Plumbbob. See Plumbbob
Nuclear rocket. See Kiwi; Rover Operation Ranger. See Ranger
Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NTS), Operation Redwing. See Redwing
creation of, 203 Operation Sandstone. See Sandstone
Nuclear Test Personnel Review, created by Operation Storax. See Storax
DOD, 262 Operation Sunbeam. See Sunbeam
Nuclear weapons testing: for design, 10; for Operation Teapot. See Teapot effects, 68-69, 89; for safety, 172-173 Operation Tumbler-Snapper. See TumblerNucleonics Week, on low-level radiation con- Snapper
troversy, 7 Operation Upshot-Knothole. See Upshot-
Nutmeg project, 41 Knothole
“Nuts and Bolts Committee.” See Operation Wigwam. See Wigwam Environmental-Radiation Studies Operation Windstorm. See Windstorm
Nyala, Nevada, radioactivity at, 213 Oppenheimer, J. Robert: LASL directed by, 3; GAC chaired by, 11; on radiation hazards,
Oak Ridge National Laboratory. See Smith 61; on thermonuclear design, 82
Off-Site Monitors Workshop, 265 Opposition to testing: Golden Rule at HardOff-Site Radiation Exposure Review Project, tack, 193; Cannikin public hearings, 247
265 Orange test (Hardtack I), 194
Off-Site Radiological Safety Organization, Overexposure: meaning of, 8; in Sandstone,
213 31, 33, 34-35; in Ranger, 52—53; in Green-
Ogle, William E. (J-Division): Castle scien- house, 55, 58; in Ivy, 87-88; in Desert tific group headed by, 132; higher operation Rock V, 96-98; in Upshot-Knothole, 101— limit proposed by, 137; on Rongelapese 102; for Castle personnel, 155; in Desert symptoms, 143; on Redwing overexpo- Rock VI, 169; for Teapot workers, 169; in
sures, 180 56-Project NTS, 175; in Redwing, 179-
O’Harra, John L. (Nevada veterinarian), sheep 180; in Plumbbob, 191; in Desert Rock VII deaths attributed to malnutrition by, 111 and VIII, 192; in Hardtack II, 197; for Ant-
One-point detonation tests, 172. See also ler miners, 211-212; in Dominic, 217; in |
Safety tests Sunbeam, 218; from Palanquin venting,
Openness, advocated from the field, 276 239
Open test: in Tumbler-Snapper, 77; in Teapot, Owens, Wayne (U.S. congressmen), on radia-
168; attempted in Hardtack, 193 tion victims, 279
Operational Future of the Nevada Proving Oxford, University of. See Stewart Ground, Committee on: formed, 90; interim report submitted, 91, 115-116; renamed
and reconvened, 118. See also Study PACE (Pacific Cratering Experiments),
Nevada Proving Ground blocked by Enewetakese, 258
Operational Safety, AEC Division of. See Pacific Fleet Command (Hawaii), Castle rad-
Dunning safe plan questioned by, 136
582 Text Index Pacific Missile Range: PPG transferred to, NTS): in Teapot, 167; in 56-Project NTS,
215; and Pluto flight testing, 204 173
Pacific Proving Ground: announcement of, Plank, Harold F, (J-Division), on uncertainties 12-13, 18-19; choice of Enewetak for, 14— in Castle cloud predictions, 138 17; Enewetakese removal from, 17, 18; Plant toxins. See Photosensitization Bikini added to, 131, 136; adjustment of Platte test (Nougat), 212—213; radioiodine
boundaries to, 135-136; transferred to Pa- from, 225 cific Missile Range, 215. See also Castle; Plowshare project: origins of, 214; and inter-
Greenhouse; Hardtack I; Ivy; Redwing; oceanic canal, 239-241; biomedical studies
Sandstone stimulated by, 253. See also Gnome; Nuclear
Palanquin test (Plowshare), 238-239 excavation; Underground engineering
Pan American World Airways, NRDS rad-safe | Plumbbob operation: revised exposure limits
contractor, 203 for, 186-187, 194; yield limits for, 187-
Parry island (Enewetak): PPG control station 188; plans for, 188-189; rad-safe for, at, 17, 28; fallout from Yoke on, 32; fallout 189-190, 197; public relations for, 190— from Greenhouse Dog on, 54; fallout from 191; conduct of, 191; and Hardtack reItem on, 57-58; laboratory at, 138; fallout sources, 193; and fallout controversy, 198;
from Tewa on, 179-180 underground tests in, 207. See also Desert
Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. See Limited Rock VII and VIII exercise
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Plutonium: traces found in Marshallese, 156; Patapsco, U.S. tanker, caught by Bravo fall- exposure limits for, 166, 174; clean-up
out, 151 problem, 173; contamination at NTS, 174;
Peaceful Nuclear Explosives, AEC Division detected off-site, 174, 175; contamination of, on public announcement of Sulky, 237. of Runit, 258
See also Kelly Pluto project, nuclear ramjet: begun, 200; fall-
Pearson, Paul B. (DBM biology branch out threat from, 204—205
chief): sheep situation reviewed by, 109; Polaris missile: deployed, 205; tested in
Las Vegas meeting of experts called by, Frigate Bird, 216 109-110; sheep radiation readings reported Poplar test (Hardtack I), 195-196 by, 110; and Salt Lake City meeting, 113; Port Chicago, California, 139 and Cedar City sheep meeting, 113-114; Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, cancer deaths Veenstra queried by, 126-127; and Utah au- among workers at, 260-261 thorities, 128-129; and second Cedar City Post-Pike restrictions on test firing, 234
sheep meeting, 129 Prescott v. the United States, 269
221 Project 401. See 401
Pennoyer’s ranch, Nevada, Sedan fallout on, Project 400. See 400
Permissible exposure: meaning of, 2; as Project Gabriel. See Gabriel
benefit-risk approach, 275 Project Horn. See Horn
Peter v. United States, Enewetakese suit, 271 Project Nutmeg. See Nutmeg Peter X-Ray (Sandstone), practice test con- Project Plowshare. See Plowshare
ducted, 26, 31 Project Pluto. See Pluto
Pewee research reactor, 203 Project Rover. See Rover Philip, destroyer, radiation injury to crew Project Sunshine. See Sunshine
members of, 152 Public Health Service: Buster-Jangle monitors
Phoenix, yacht, attempted disruption of Hard- from, 66; in Upshot-Knothole, 100, 101,
tack by, 193 160; AEC sheep conclusions supported by,
Phoenix research reactor, 203 127; and NTS off-site rad-safe, 160, 163;
Photosensitization in sheep deaths: explana- status of, 162; at Teapot, 167; and Redwing tion favored by Pearson, 109; explanation fallout prediction, 178; in Plumbbob, 190;
favored by Bugher, 112 in Hardtack I, 195; in Hardtack II, 198; and Pike test (Niblick), 231-232 Danny Boy, 206; and milk sampling, 210;
Pilgrim operation, 186 in Gnome, 214; thyroid disease studied by, Pinson, Ernest A. (USAF), on risks of cloud 226, 228-230; and Pike fallout, 232-233;
penetration, 177 in Gasbuggy rad-safe, 242; public relations cuso; Sternglass Radiation Studies; Southwestern Radio-
Pittsburgh, University of. See Brodsky; Man- role of, 243. See also Environmental-
Placak, Oliver R. (PHS officer in charge at logical Health Laboratory; and see further
Text index 583
Wolff 148
Hadlow; Holmes; Placak; Terrill; Weiss; 143, 146, 147, 155; symptoms in Japanese, Public Information, AEC Division of, on pub- Radiation units, 1-2 lic announcement for Sulky, 237-238 Radioactive Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Public Information, DOD Office of: in Desert Tests, AEC conferences on, 224
Rock V, 94; in Teapot, 165 Radioactive hazards. See Plutonium; RadioPublic relations: for Ranger, 43; for Buster- carbon; Radiocesium; Radioiodine; Radic-
Jangle, 69; for Desert Rock, 69-70; as strontium; Radium; Tritium factor in solving sheep deaths, 108, 112; Radioactivity and Health, by Stannard, 263 distinguished from public information, Radiobiology Laboratory, University of Utah 121-122; required for continued Nevada Medical School. See Bay testing, 122; plan for Teapot, 164-165; for Radiocarbon, dating by, 182 Wigwam, 171-172; Redwing information Radiocesium: as health concem, 210, 224; plan for, 178; for Plumbbob, 190-191; for on Utirik, 255; Bikinian uptake of, 257 Hardtack, 193; for Gnome, 214; for Char- Radioiodine: in sheep, 123; at LASL sheep iot, 219; for Rulison, 243; for Shoal, 245; meeting, 124-125; traces found in Marfor Milrow, 246—247; for Cannikin, 247; shallese, 156; from reactor testing, 203;
disputed after Baneberry, 251 hazards of, 209-210; from Antler, 212; from Platte, 212-213; from Des Moines, 213; recognized as major threat, 221; dose
Quesada, Elwood R.: named CJTF-3, 36; im- reconstruction for, 222-224; as neglected pact of Korea on Greenhouse reviewed by, topic, 224; studied at NTS, 224—225; leak-
39; on Greenhouse George, 56 age after Yuba test, 225-226
Radioiodine in the Environment, NTS Ad Hoc Working Group on, 225
RADIAC, 22 Weiss
Rad. See Radiation units Radiological Health, PHS Division of. See
Radiation, attitudes toward: by members of “Radiological Safety Plan,” Tumbler-Snapper,
the public, 6, 164, 278-279; by military 74 personnel, 20, 59; by scientists, 20; by Radiostrontium: as fallout hazard, 181; lethal Sandstone workers, 33; by laboratory work- body burden estimated, 182; in Minnesota ers, 45; by air crew members, 66, 187; by wheat, 198; in Pacific testing, 209; pernaval officers, 134; by troops, studied in ceived as major hazard, 210, 224. See also Plumbbob, 192; intensified after Hardtack, Sunshine
198. See also Fallout responses Radium: in Sunshine cover story, 183; dial Radiation-exposed Veterans Compensation painters, 226
Act of 1988, 271 , Rad-safe group, organization and training of:
Radiation Exposure Compensation Act of for Sandstone, 19-23, 25-26; for Green-
1990, 272; apology in, 279 house, 37—38, 83; for Ranger, 44—45; for Radiation Policy Council, 263 Buster-Jangle, 66-67; for Tumbler-Snapper, Radiation protection standards: philosophy 73-74; for Ivy, 83-84, 86; for Desert Rock of, 2; meaning of overexposure for, 8; in V, 95; for Upshot-Knothole, 99-100; for Nevada, 42; proposed by NCRP, 46; offsite, Castle, 132, 135, 139; for Teapot, 162, 163;
formulated for NTS, 62-64; DOD-AEC for Teapot, 167-168; for Redwing, 176; for tension over, 68-69, 72-73, 75-76, 92-95, Plumbbob, 189-~-190; for Hardtack I, 194, 166—167; for NPG workers, 90; for under- 195; for Hardtack II, 197; for nuclear reac-
ground testing, 208-210; influenced by tor testing, 200-201; for Dominic, 216— instrument development, 275; socially con- 217; for Sunbeam and Ivy Flats, 218; for structed, 277. See also Exposure limits; Gasbuggy, 242. See also Collison; Cooney;
Military rad-safe limits Gwynn; Jacks; Maynard; Servis; Shipman; Radiation safety: command versus scientific White; Winant responsibility in, 20, 38, 135; as factor in Rad-safe operations: at Trinity, 4; for Cross-
choice of Nevada site, 42—43; at NTS, roads, 4—5; for Sandstone, 29-33; for 61-64; and public relations, 77—78; as Ranger, 50-53; for Greenhouse, 54—59; for factor in Plowshare, 237-244; extraneous Buster-Jangle, 70-71, 72; for Desert Rock
factors affecting, 275 I, II, and III, 71, 72; for Desert Rock IV, 77;
Radiation sickness: symptoms in Rongelapese, for Tumbler-Snapper, 78-81; for Ivy, 87—
084 Text Index 89; for Desert Rock V, 96-99; for Upshot- portance of public education about fallout, Knothole, 101-105; for Castle, 140-145, 165; 56-Project NTS test manager, 173; on 152-155; for Desert Rock VI, 168-169; for Platte venting, 212; on Pike venting and Teapot, 169; for Plumbbob, 191; for Desert costs of secrecy, 233 Rock VII and VIII, 192; for Hardtack II, Reiss, Eric (Washington University physician), 197-198; for Kiwi testing, 202, 203; for on fallout radioiodine, 226 Tory testing, 204; for Danny Boy, 206; for Rem. See Radiation units Dominic, 217-218; for Ivy Flats, 218; after Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., Inc.: Baneberry, 248-249. See also Collison; building contractor at Nevada site, 44; in Cooney; Gwynn; Jacks; Maynard; Servis; Teapot, 167; and 56-Project NTS rad-safe,
Shipman; White; Winant 173-175; expanded rad-safe role for, 189—
Rad-safe planning: for Sandstone, 19-23; for 190; and rad-safe for nuclear reactor testGreenhouse, 37-38; for Ranger, 45-48; for ing, 201; in Gnome, 214; in Ivy Flats, 218. Buster-Jangle, 64—67; for Desert Rock I, See also Central Dosimetry Records Proj68; for Tumbler-Snapper, 73-74; for Desert ect; CER Geonuclear; Coordination and
Rock IV, 74-76, 77; for Ivy, 83-86; for Information Center; EnvironmentalDesert Rock V, 92—96; for Upshot-Knothole, Radiation Studies; and see further Brady 99-101; for Castle, 132-138, 139; for Tea- RIFT program, initiated, 203 pot, 163-164, 166, 167-168; for Desert Rio Bravo test (Plowshare), 244 Rock VI, 166-167; for 56-Project NTS, R-MAD building, 202 173-174; for Redwing, 176-178; for Desert Roberts et al. v. the United States, Baneberry
Rock VII and VIII, 187; for Hardtack I, case, 268-269 194—195; for Gnome, 214; for Dominic, Robinson, Fellie F, (USAF/weather unit com216; for Chariot, 219; for Sedan, 220; for mander): Rongerik warned by, 142; secrecy Gasbuggy, 242; for Rulison, 243-244; for ordered by, 145 Shoal, 245; for Dnbble, 245. See also Rochester, University of, and Ranger fallout,
Jangle Feasibility Committee 51. See also Warren, Stafford L.
Rad-safe survey, aerial, in Sandstone, 30 Rocket engine. See Kiwi Rainbow Warrior, Greenpeace vessel, Ron- Rocky Mountain Laboratory (PHS). See
gelapese removed by, 257 Hadlow
Rainier test (Plumbbob): first underground Roentgen. See Radiation units containment, 191, 207; questions suggested Rogers, Paul G. (Florida congressman), and
by, 214 radiation hearings, 8, 259-260
Ramjet engine. See Tory II Romeo test (Castle), conducted, 153 | Rand Corporation, AEC contractor for radio- Rongelap atoll (Marshall Islands): excluded
strontium studies, 182 from PPG danger area, 135-136; no pre-
Ranger operation: public relations for, 43—44; dicted Castle fallout threat to, 139; fallout rad-safe organization for, 44—45, 47-48; on, 143, 145; residual radioactivity on, 156,
operational exposure limits for, 45—47; 255 public exposure limits for, 47; conduct of, Rongelapese: emergency evacuation of, 143,
48-52; trouble-free character of, 60; as 254; estimated exposures of, 143; radiation model operation, 91; data for Gabriel from, sickness in, 146, 155; moved to Majuro,
182 156, 255; long-term study of, 227-228;
Rauland Manufacturing, 22 returned to Rongelap, 255; departed Ray test (Upshot-Knothole), 102 Rongelap, 257
Reactor Development, AEC Division of, and Rongerik atoll (Marshall Islands): removal of
reactor rad-safe, 201 Bikinians to, 17; Bikinians remain on, 18,
Reagan, Ronald (U.S. president), signed vet- 256; air force weather station established
erans compensation act, 271 at, 27; no predicted Castle fallout threat to,
Redstone rocket, in Hardtack I, 194 139
Redwing operation: plans for, 170, 176, 181; Rongerik weather unit personnel: Bravo witrad-safe for, 176, 194; exposure limits for, nessed by, 140; emergency evacuation of,
176-177; fallout concerns in, 177-178; 141-142; estimated exposures of, 142-143; public relations for, 178; conduct of, 179, ordered to secrecy, 145; absence of symp-
193; fallout from, 179-180 toms among, 155; returned to duty, 156
REECo. See Reynolds Electrical Rover project, nuclear rocket: initiated, 200; Reeves, James E. (SFO test director): on im- radioiodine from, 225. See also Kiwi
Text Index 585 Rulison test (Plowshare), 242~244 Teapot public relations plan by, 164; on Runit island (Enewetak): selected for Zebra, military rad-safe responsibility, 166; moved 17; selected for Greenhouse Dog, 54; and to Albuquerque, 187. See also Albuquerque King, 88; plutonium contamination of, 258 Operations; and see further Reeves; Tyler Russell, James S. (USN): named deputy Saturn V launch vehicle, cancellation of, 203 DMA, 12; named Sandstone test director Schooner test (Plowshare): conducted, 240; as and CTG 7.1, 13; Enewetak surveyed by, last cratering test, 241
17 Schreiber, Raemer E. (N-Division director),
Russia. See Soviet Union on Kiwi fallout, 201
Rust, John H. (USA/Trinity cattle study team), Scientific task group, Greenhouse, organizec,
on radiation in sheep deaths, 111, 126 37-38 Ruth test (Upshot-Knothole), 102 Scoville, Herbert, Jr. (AFSWP physicist): technical measurements unit headed by, 22,
Safety tests: rationale for, 172-173; at Runit, 25; survey of evacuated atolls by, 145 258. See also 56-Project NTS; 57 Project; Scripps Institution of Oceanography, in Wig-
58-Project NTS wam, 170
Safford, Arizona, NIH thyroid study in, 228- Scroll test (Vela Uniform), 246
231 Seaborg, Glenn T. (AEC chairman): test ban
St. George, Utah: Ranger monitors stationed favored by, 205; on ambiguity of cratering, at, 48; fallout on, 103, 104; AEC film pre- 206; on scaled depth, 231; on Palanquin miered in, 165; thyroid dose reconstruction venting, 238-239; on need to reduce vent-
for, 223 ing, 239; on Baneberry safety, 249
Salisbury, Morse (DIS director): at meeting Sea otters, 246; transplanted, 247
with sheepmen, 114; on importance of pub- _—_— Secrecy: in Trinity, 3; relaxed for Crossroads,
lic information, 122; informed of LASL 4; in Sandstone, 13, 14, 18-19, 34; in Nut-
sheep meeting, 127 meg, 41; in Ranger, 43; in Buster-Jangle,
Salmon test (Dribble), 245-246 69; in Ivy, 83; public debate inhibited by, Salt Lake City, Utah, fallout on, 78-79; from 118; in Castle, 136, 138; in Teapot, 162-
Sedan, 221 163; for Sunshine, 183, 184; costly to AEC,
Sanders, Joe B. (LVFO deputy manager): live- 232; as AEC policy, 232-233; for Sulky de-
stock injuries investigated by, 106; and bated, 237-238; about Palanquin, 239; sheep investigation, 107, 108, 110; on radi- field-headquarters tension over, 277-278 ation as contributing factor, 113; at meeting Secretary of Defense, Office of: represented with sheepmen, 114; on sheep range survey, on MLC, 12; established, 14. See also 114, 126; at LASL sheep meeting, 124; on Johnson; McNamara; Wilson sheepman’s attitude, 129; as Teapot off-site | Sedan test (Plowshare): background of, 219rad-safe officer, 167; in 56-Project NTS, 220; planning and conduct of, 220; fallout
173 from, 220-221; and radioiodine threat, 221;
Sandstone operation: requirement for, 10; and cratering by, 237, 240 GAC, 11; and MLC, 12; planning of, 12- Seepage. See Venting 13; AFSWP in, 14; responsibility for rad- Seismic effects, feared for Milrow, 247. See safe in, 19-20; exposure limits for, 20-21; also Vela Uniform rad-safe instruments for, 21-22; rad-safe Servis, John D. (USA): Ivy deputy CTU organization for, 23-24, 25-26; weather 132.1.7 and operations officer, 83; Castle problems in, 26—27, 31, 41; rad-safe results rad-safe headed by, 132; on lagoon contamfrom, 34-35, 37, 39. See also X-Ray; Yoke; ination, 132, 133-134; objections to waiver
Zebra policy by, 138; on Castle rad-safe experi-
SANE, cancellation of Hardtack urged by, 193 ence, 155 Santa Fe Operations Office: Ranger adminis- Shaft tests. See Containment
tered by, 44; and Ranger evacuation plans, Sheep: unusual symptoms displayed by, 107—
47; Buster-Jangle operation plan transmit- 108; postmortems on, 108-109; radiation ted by, 65, 67; and Eniwetok Field Office, implicated in death of, 108, 109, 110, 11183; and exposure limits for NPG workers, 112; as public relations problem, 108, 112, 90; on Desert Rock rad-safe limits, 93; first 122, 123; other possible causes for deaths press release on sheep, 108; memorandum of, 109, 110-111, 113; Salt Lake City meetof understanding with PHS, 160; off-site ing on, 113; Cedar City meeting on, 113exposure limit agreed to, 163; objection to 114; Tyler proposed report on, 114—115;
586 Text Index AEC internal conflicts on, 115; Strauss sta- with sheepmen, 114; AEC final sheep retus report on, 123; Hanford study of, 123- port rejected by, 128-129 124; LASL meeting on, 124-127; AEC Spring Mountains, Nevada, fallout detected
final report on, 127-129. See also Bulloch on, 52 Shelton, A. Vay (LLL), and Redwing fallout Sputnik, Soviet satellite, 196, 200
prediction unit, 178 Starbird, Alfred D. (CJTF-8), safety review
Shipman, Thomas L. (H-Division): named committees formed by, 216 to head Ranger rad-safe section, 44; on Starfish Prime test (Dominic), 217 rad-safe fieldwork, 45; plans for Ranger Starfish test (Dominic), 217 rad-safe standards by, 46; on Ranger Able State, Department of: problem of Pacific testmonitoring results, 50; on strains of field ing for, 11, 12, 14; and Castle evaluation operations, 51; on Ranger rad-safe results, committee, 148; payment of Japanese med53; on Greenhouse George, 56; Greenhouse ical expenses approved by, 150; PPG exclurad-safe assessed by, 59; on NTS radiation sion area questioned by, 150; Japanese comprotection standards, 63-64; on monitor in- pensation organized by, 157; emergency
experience, 73-74; on injured cattle, 81; compensation to widow Kuboyama by, on H-Division Ivy role, 83-84; at Upshot- 158; and Wigwam, 171; reassured about Knothole, 99; Campbell’s assessment en- Redwing, 178 dorsed by, 116; at LASL sheep meeting, Sterling project (Vela Uniform), 246 124; on hazards of surface shots, 132-133; Stern, Herbert J. (New Jersey district court
on Japanese exposures, 151; on Rongel- judge), in Jaffee case, 267-268 apese exposures, 156; on Teapot overexpo- Sternglass, Ermest J. (University of Pitts-
sures, 169; on air force bravado, 187; on burgh), infant mortality from Baneberry
hazards of NTS reactor testing, 200; on charged by, 251-252
Trinity rad-safe, 252-253 Stewart, Alice M. (Oxford University), on
Shlaer, Simon (H-Division): named chief off- fetal x-rays and cancer, 252
site Ranger monitor, 45; at Nellis, 48 Stewart family, 106 Shoal test (Vela Uniform), 244—245 Stillbirths, among Rongelapese, 227 Silas Mason Company, AEC contractor, 167 Stochastic effects. See Biological effects Simon test (Upshot-Knothole), 97-98, 102- Stockpile: in 1947, 12; in 1948, 34
103 Stoddart, L. A. (range ecologist), plant poison-
Sioux, Swordfish weapon debris sampling ship, ing or malnutrition as cause of sheep death
exposures to crew of, 217 rejected by, 111
Slotin, Louis, killed by radiation, 37 Storax operation, FY63 test series, 218 Small Boy-test (Sunbeam), 218 Storry, Richard (historian), on Japanese reSmith, Nicholas M., Jr. (ORNL), and Gabriel, sentment, 158
181-182 Strategic Air Command, Redwing experiment
Smoky test (Plumbbob), 7, 192; Caldwell for, 177 study of, 262 Strauss, Lewis L. (AEC chairman): succeeded Smyth, Henry (AEC commissioner), on safety Dean, 112; status report on sheep by, 123;
as way to allay public fear, 116 secrecy on Bravo fallout ordered by, 145;
pper oper é Pp
Snapper operation, See Tumbler-Snapper on the Fukuryu Maru incident, 150-151;
; . large DOD surface burst Laboratory, opposed by, 162; Southwestern Radiological ; c | approval for TeapotHealth sought by, 164; contransterred from PHS to EPA, 249 cerns about Wigwam, 170-171; on need
Sovereign immunity , 267-268 for public relations plan, 171; informed Soviet Union: atomic bomb test, detected by of DOD plans, 172; on clean bombs, 180 United States, 37; unilateral test halt, 193; Stringfellow, Douglas R. (U.S. congressman): Sputnik launched by, 196; ended test mora- disturbed by Utah fallout, 104; promised torium, 205, 206, 215 ; radioiodine from, report on sheep deaths, 113; on AEC lack
detected in United States, 221 of action, 123
Space Nuclear Propulsion Office, 203 Strontium-90. See Radiostrontium Spartan missile, test of warhead for, 247 Study Nevada Proving Ground, Committee to: Spendlove, George A. (Utah commissioner of reconvened, 118-119; Bugher report on health): AEC informed of sheep deaths by, rad-safe standards to, 119-121; Andrews 107; on malnutrition and radiation as possi- report on fallout to, 121; Elliott reporton ble causes of sheep deaths, 111; at meeting public information to, 121-122, 123; posi-
Text Index 587 tive conclusions of, 122, 181; final report Tesla test (Teapot), 169 of, 129; surface burst limit recommended Test Division. See J-Division by, 162; testing guided by standards of, Test manager and director, positions defined,
164, 181. See Operational Future of the 189
NPG Test Manager’s Advisory Panel: and rad-safe
“Study of Response of Human Beings Exposed at Upshot-Knothole, 99-100; in Teapot, to Significant Beta and Gamma Radiation 168; in Plumbbob, 188; on Antler prosDue to Fall-out from High-Yield Weapons,” pects, 211 Castle Project 4.1, 146, 226. See also Tewa test (Redwing), fallout from, 179-1806
Cronkite Thermonuclear: reaction achieved in Green-
Subcommittee No. 1, NCRP, on Permissible house George, 56, 82; feasibility tested in External Dose, 1949 draft report of, 46. See Ivy Mike, 83
also Failla Thompsett, Robert E. (Los Alamos veterinar-
Sugar test (Jangle), 70 ian): cattle injured by fallout from TumblerSulky test (Plowshare), 237; debate over an- Snapper studied by, 81; sheep examined
nouncement of, 237-238 by, 107-108, 109; on radiation as cause of
Sunbeam operation: conduct of, 218; preceded sheep death, 112, 113, 127, 129; as problem
by Sedan, 220; radioiodine threat, 221 for AEC, 115; at LASL sheep meeting, Sunshine project: significance of, 180, 184; 124; on beta burns, 125; and AEC final origin of, 182-183; sample collection for, sheep report, 128 183-184; made public, 184, 199; in Plumb- — Thor rocket, in Dominic, 217
bob, 188 Threshold, biological, and radiation tolerance, “Super.” See Hydrogen bomb 2,274 Swordfish test (Dominic), 216 Thyroid: radioiodine and damage to, 123; abSylvester, John (Navy task group comman- normalities in Marshallese, 226, 227-228;
der), on Wigwam safety, 171 and radioiodine dose to Rongelapese, 227; Syracuse University. See Dunning in PHS epidemiological study, 228-231. See also Radioiodine
T-33, in Buster-Jangle cloud sampling, 66 Tiger Fish test (Dominic), 217 Tamplin, Arthur (LLL), radiation and fetal Tightrope test (Dominic), 218 deaths studied by, 215. See also Gofman Tokyo University Hospital: radiation victims Task Force 88, Argus conducted by, 196 in, 149; patients’ urine samples provided
Task Force Big Bang, 7 by, 150
Task Group Gabriel, 182 Tolerance. See Threshold Tatum Salt Dome, Mississippi, site of Dribble, | Tonopah, Nevada: near potential test site, 42;
245 Ranger monitors stationed at, 48
Teapot operation: proposed surface burst in, Tory II reactor, LLL nuclear ramjet project.
161, 162; fallout reduction measures for, 200; testing of, 204 161; rad-safe organization for, 161-162, Trinity test: conduct of, 3-4, 10, 11, 52; sig167-168, 171, 189; PHS in, 162-163; and nificance of, 5; use of multifilm badges at, population exposure limits, 163-164, 181, 21; Holzman at, 27; drone tank sampling 185; public relations for, 164-165, 172; in, 30; as data source for fallout prediction, operational limits for, 165-166; delays in, 63; fallout from, 72; compared to Tumbler168; rad-safe results from, 168, 169; yield Snapper Easy, 78; cattle injuries from, 80— limits for, 188. See also Desert Rock VI 81; data on sought by Sternglass, 252—253
Teak test (Hardtack I), 194 Tripartite Conference on Radiation Hazards, Teller, Edward: role in Ivy Mike, 89; and 117, 120
clean bomb, 193 Tripler Army Hospital, Honolulu, exposed
Tempiute, Nevada, Sedan fallout on, 221 servicemen treated at, 156
Tennessee, University of, Trinity cattle study Tritium: hazards of, 208; in underground test-
at, 110. See also Rust; Trum ing, 209; miners exposed to, 211; from
Terminal Island Naval Shipyard, Long Beach, Gnome, 214
24, 25 Trum, Bernard F. (USA veterinarian): sheep
Ternll, James G., Jr. (PHS Radiological Health study by, 124; at LASL sheep meeting,
branch chief): on evidence for cause of 124-125; on sheep thyroid, 126 sheep deaths, 113; on attitude of sheepmen, = Truman, Harry S. (U.S. president): AEC
114; on sheep range survey, 114, 126 chairman appointed by, 11; Sandstone ap-
588 Text Index proved by, 12; Pacific testing approved by, United Nations Scientific Committee on 14; hydrogen bomb development approved the Effects of Atomic Radiation. See
by, 36-37; and Korean intervention, 39; UNSCEAR NTS approved by, 43; Windstorm approved _—_ United Nations Security Council: TTPI ap-
by, 61; Buster-Jangle approved by, 61, 69 proved by, 17; notified of Enewetak closTrust Territory of the Pacific Islands: creation ing, 18; notified of PPG closing, 136 of, 17; removed from testing, 215; settle- United Nations Trusteeship Council: TTPI ment with Bikinians, 255-256; plans for jurisdiction of, 17; Marshallese petition
Bikini restoration, 257 considered by, 157
Tsuzuki, Masao (Tokyo University radiolo- University of California Radiation Laboratory.
gist), and radiation injury patients, 149 See Lawrence Livermore Laboratory Tumbler-Snapper operation: planning for,72- = UNSCEAR report, 1972, low dose effects
73, 89; rad-safe organization and standards judged insignificant by, 6, 7, 254 for, 73-74; public relations for, 77-78; con- | Upshot-Knothole operation: complicaticns of,
duct of, 78; fallout from, 78-79; rad-safe 89, 91; Tyler test director for, 95; rad-safe results from, 79, 80; livestock injuries from, organization for, 99-100, 101; exposure 80-81, 106; roll-up, 89-90. See also Desert limits for, 1OO-101; conduct of, 101-102,
Rock IV 103-104, 105; fallout from, 102-103, 104—
Tunnel tests. See Containment 105, 106; and fallout controversy, 159, 170, Tyler, Carroll L. (SFO manager): separation of 180-181. See also Desert Rock V; Opera-
development and effects testing urged by, tional Future of the NPG 68; Buster-Jangle test commander, 69; on Uranium miners, compensation legislated for,
military rad-safe responsibility, 75-76; on 272 AEC rad-safe responsibility, 89; Committee Utah, fallout in, 226. See also Cedar City; Iron
on Operational Future of NPG created by, County; St. George; Salt Lake City; Wash-
90; on inherent risks of testing, 91; as test ington County manager for Upshot-Knothole, 95; state- Utah, University of, cancer study by, 264. See
ment on sheep proposed by, 114-115; re- also Bay; Mays sponse of Fields to, 115; on need for special | Utah Agricultural Experiment Station. See
Nevada exposure standards, 117; Commit- Stoddart tee to Study NPG chaired by, 118; and final | Utah State Agricultural College: in sheep NPG report, 129; on Castle secrecy, 136; on meeting, 110; AEC contract for sheep stud-
off-site rad-safe at NPG, 160; on danger of ies with, 113
large surface burst, 161 Utah State Department of Agriculture, AEC Typhoons, Greenhouse delayed by, 53, 55-56 final sheep report endorsed by, 129 Utah State Department of Health, and AEC
Udall, Stewart L. (U.S. secretary of interior): final sheep report, 128. See also Holmes; on Bikinians return home, 256; attorney for Spendlove
downwinders, 269 Utirik atoll (Marshal! Islands): excluded from
Ujilang atoll (Marshall Islands): Enewetakese PPG danger area, 135-136; surveyed, 156; removed to, 18; evacuation during Ivy of, persistent radioactivity on, 255 85; automatic air samplers at, 88; emer- Utinikese: estimated exposures of, 143, 255;
gency Castle plans for, 139 emergency evacuation of, 143, 145, 254; Umbrella test (Hardtack I), 194 returned home, 156, 227, 254-255; long-
Uncle test (Jangle), 70 term study of, 227-228
Underground engineering: rationale for, 241; gas stimulation as, 241-244; failure of, 244 = Veenstra, Robert H. (NRDL): sheep examined
Underground testing: pros and cons of, 206— by, 107-108, 109; on radiation as contribut207, 215; problem of burial depth in, 231, ing factor, 111, 113, 127, 129; as problem 234—235; success of, 247-248. See also for AEC, 115; on ingested fission products,
Containment; Venting 126-127; and AEC final sheep report, 128
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. See Vela Uniform seismic research program, 244.
Soviet Union See also Dribble; Miracle Play; Shoal;
Union test (Castle), 154 Sterling
United Kingdom, exposure standards of, 117 Venting: from Antler, 211-212; from Chena,
United Nations, censure of United States 212; from Platte, 212-213; from Des
threatened by, 18, 256 Moines, 213; from Gnome, 214; from Pike,
Text Index 589 231-232; from Baneberry, 248. See also Buster-Jangle, 66; on military rad-safe
Containment shortcomings, 83; livestock injuries investi-
Vermillion, Henry (SFO Information Service), gated by, 106; Marshalls fallout survey by,
on Pike venting and AEC secrecy, 233 145; and Teapot fallout prediction unit, Veterans Administration, and claims for radia- 162, 177-178; as Teapot rad-safe coordina-
tion injury, 7, 267, 271 tor, 167
Veterans’ Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Whole-body counting, Baneberry overexpoCompensation Standards Act of 1984, 271 sures cross-checked by, 249 Veterans’ Health Care, Training, and Small Wigwam operation: plans for, 170-171; public
Business Loan Act of 1981, 271 relations for, 171-172; conduct of, 172, Victoreen Instrument Company (Cleveland), 176, 216
instrument maker, 22 Wilson, Charles E. (U.S. secretary of defense),
Volunteer officers: at Desert Rock V, qualifica- and Wigwam, 170 tions for, 96; experience in Desert Rock V, Wilson 2, Castle high-altitude cloud tracking
97-98; at Desert Rock VI, 166, 169 flight, 141
Winant, Frank L., Jr. (USN/AFSWP): Sand-
Wahoo test (Hardtack I), 194 stone rad-safe group commanded by, 23—Waiver of exposure limits: Castle policy for, 24; rad-safe operation plan written by, 25 137-138; applied after Bravo, 152-153; Windscale reactor accident (U.K.), 209 results of, 155; in Redwing, 179-180 Windstorm operation: plans for, 60-61, 68;
Wake Island, weather station at, 27 renamed Jangle, 61
Walter Reed Army Hospital, and Bravo over- Wolff, Arthur H. (PHS): sheep examined by,
exposures, 156 107-108; on overlooked gastrointestinal
War, Department of, in decision to conduct effects, 110-111; on high radioactivity ir
Sandstone, 11, 12 sheep, 111-112; at LASL sheep meeting,
Warner Amendment: suits against contractors 124—125; on ingested fission products, 126
barred by, 268; repealed, 272 Wollan, Ermest O., Metallurgical Laboratory Warren, Shields L. (DBM director): Jangle health physics head, 21 Feasibility Committee chaired by, 61-64; Woodruff, Seth R., Jr. (LVFO manager), at
off-site monitoring for Tumbler-Snapper meeting with sheepmen, 114 discussed by, 73; on safety as AEC respon- § Worldwide Fallout Monitoring Network: sibility, 76; on fallout from Tumbler-Snapper initiated for Greenhouse, 51; expanded
Easy, 78-79; on worldwide fallout threat, for Buster-Jangle, 67; in Ivy, 88; expanded
181; fallout panel convened by, 182 for Castle, 136-137 Warren, Stafford L., role in Crossroads, 19
Washington, University of. See Applied Fish- XE prototype nuclear rocket engine, tested,
eries Laboratory 203
Washington County, Utah, NIH thyroid study X-rays, fetal, and childhood cancer, 252
in, 228-231 X-Ray test (Sandstone), 25; weather briefings
Washington University. See Reiss for, 27-28; device installed for, 28; fired,
Weather organization: for Sandstone, 27-28; 28-29; neutron measurements for, 29; air for Castle, 139; rules tightened after Bravo, sampling for, 29-30; crater sampling for, 153; upgraded for Redwing, 177; for Hard- 30; aerial survey for, 30; crater readings
tack I, 195 after, 30-31
Weather problems: in Sandstone, 26-27, 31; in
Greenhouse, 53-54, 55-56; in Castle, 139, Yaizu (Japan): radiation victims in hospital at, 154, 155; in Teapot, 168; in Redwing, 179 148, 149; patients transferred to Tokyo, 150 Weather Service, U.S.: in Teapot study, 161; Yankee test (Castle), 154 fallout prediction research by, 177. See also _‘ Yield limits: for NTS tests, 181; for Teapot
Environmental-Radiation Studies and Plumbbob, 187-188
Weiss, Edward S. (PHS biostatistician), and- Yoke test (Sandstone): weather for, 31; deto-
NIH thyroid study, 228-229 ; nation of, 31-32, 56; sampling after, 32: Whipple, Harry O. (H-Division), on Enewetak fallout from, 32
exposure levels, 54 Yomiuri Shimbun, Japanese fallout victims
White, Thomas N. (H-Division deputy chief): reported in, 148 onsite Ranger rad-safe overseen by, 45; York, Herbert F: on Greenhouse George, 56; Greenhouse rad-safe assessed by, 59; in LLL director, 89; ARPA head, 196
590 Text Index Yuba test (Storax), radioiodine from, Zebra test (Sandstone), 54; weather for, 32;
226-226 detonation of, 32-33; sampling problems
Yucca Flat [Lake] (NTS): surveyed for test in, 33; beta burns from, 33-34
site, 42; and Area 11, 173; characteristics Zuckert, Eugene M. (AEC commissioner): and
of, 234; evacuated after Baneberry, 248 sheep controversy, 125; on educating the
Yucca test (Hardtack I), 194 public, 159
Notes Index
The author or authors of a document are given only at the first mention of the document in the notes to each chapter.
Aamodt, R. Lee, 355n168, 355n170, 390n41, Allen, Philip W., 409n150, 425n37, 428n56,
454n64, 455n71 429n59, 433n89, 442n173, 443n179
Abbotts, John, 293n9, 473n2 Allen, R. B., 388n24
Adair, William R., 358n199, 374n113 Allen, Robert, 455n75 Adams, William H., 437n124, 437n129, Allen, Robert E., 462n116
468n156 Allison, John, 350n121, 351n124, 352n130,
Adkins, Bruce M., 416n187 352n133, 353n140, 353n143, 353n144,
Aeby, Jack W., 390n41, 401n103 357n195, 357n197, 358n202, 358n204,
Ager, Paul W., 408n141 359n205
Albin, G. W., 349n91 Alpen, Edward L., 479n45 Albrecht, Ulrich, 303n5 Altseimer, J. H., 414n173
Alderson, Michael, 475n14 Alvarez, Robert, 474n9 Alexander, G. L., 411n161 Alverson, Dayton L., 428n55 Alexander, Lyle T., 384n194, 402n109, Amano, Keishi, 351n125
406n128 Amerson, A. J., 365n52
Alford, L. H., 349n95 Anamosa, Harold D., 306n34, 327n51, Allaire, William W., 334n6, 334n8, 336n34, 396n69 337n38, 337n44, 337n47, 340n107, Anders, Roger M., 305n20, 317n57, 326n46, 342n142, 360n9, 361n17, 365n56, 366n59, 467n152 388n24, 388n26, 388n27, 389n36, 390n38, Anderson, Allen H., 421n4, 425n38 390n39, 390n40, 390n41, 391n43, 391n45, Anderson, C. L., 428n57
393n54, 395n62, 402n110, 402n112, Anderson, Charles N., 447n30 409n150, 431n70, 442n173, 451n46, Anderson, Clinton P., 367n70, 367n72, 456n80, 457n81, 458n90, 461n108 372n103, 373n107, 375n122, 393n51,
Allardice, Corbin, 371n94, 472n1 404n120 Allen, Dewitt, 360n15 Anderson, Ernest C., 379n157, 384n195, Allen, Harry S., 320n79, 376n135 391n42, 391n43, 391n44, 399n87,
Allen, Irene, 483n70 402n110, 403n114, 431n73, 432n75,
Allen, John, 445n13 442n171
591
592 Notes Index Anderson, Guy J., 340n107, 363n33, 363n41, Baring, Walter S., 431n70
366n59 Barnaby, Frank, 486n97
Anderson, Lynn, 362n29 Barr, N. F., 471n181
Anderson, Oscar E., Jr., 294n2 Barry, Hamlet J., IIT, 470n175 Anderson, Otis L., 331n122 Barth, Delbert S., 435n114, 441n164,
Anderson, Robert B., 448n36 442n173, 446n25
Anderson, Robert J., 426n43 Bartlett, E. L., 429n58, 458n92 Anderson, Terence W., 473n6 Bates, Charles C., 379n155 Andrews, Howard L., 298n36, 299n40, Batzel, Roger E., 424n35, 429n60, 432n76,
339n81, 339n90, 360n9, 487n99 436n118, 467n147
Andrews, Vernon E., 411n162, 422n12, Bauer, Norman, 401n106 422n15, 433n89, 441n162, 456n75, Bauer, Theodore W., 476n20
464n125 Bauer, Walter, 440n151
Angelo, Joseph A., 408n135 Baurmash, L., 368n74
Anspaugh, Lynn R., 454n65, 479n41, 483n72, Bauser, Edward J., 463n120, 469n172
485n87 Bazell, Robert J., 459n101
Antes, Donald E., 327n50 Beall, J. Glenn, Jr., 459n97 Anton, George T., 388n27, 399n90, 420n220 Beals, 464n124
Archer, Victor E., 478n37 Beane, Fred, 463n118
Arkin, William M., 311n95 Beard, Edmund, 415n184 Armacost, Michael, 426n45 Beard, G. V., 402n108 Armstrong, Jack L., 327n51, 327n52, 338n74, = Bechanan, H. G., 325n27
339n82, 345n24, 363n37, 410n153, Beck, Harold L., 469n169, 478n34
410n154, 414n175 Beckerley, James G., 326n47, 346n49 Arnold, Lorna, 487n103, 488n104 Beebe, Gilbert W., 475n14 Arnold, W. H., 412n165 Beers, Roland F., 423n24 Arraj, Alfred A., 453n59, 453n62 Beierwaltes, William H., 421n222
Art, Robert J., 416n185 Bell, David E., 427n48 Ash, Roy L., 472n186 Bemis, Edwin, 309n74 Ashley, Thomas Ludlow, 394n59 Benedict, Donald L., 388n25 Auten, D., 353n138 Benedict, Manson, 425n37
Auxier, John A., 485n89 Bennett, Burton G., 419n215, 469n169 Avery, William H., 415n185 Bennett, Wallace F., 393n51, 393n52
Benson, Allen B., 474n10 Baalman, Raymond W., Jr., 299n40, 419n215 Berch, Irwin B., 373n107
Babbitt, Theodore, 384n196 Berkhouse, L. H., 296n11, 303n3, 424n32
Bacevich, A. J., 320n85, 366n57, 427n50 Berlinger, John M., 459n99
Bacon, E. A., Jr., 410n152 Bernard, H. Russell, 469n164
Baier, Willard E., 406n126 Bernhardt, David E., 420n220, 441n162,
Baietti, Albert L., 370n88 448n35, 454n65, 454n66, 460n103,
Bailey, Eric, 425n36 462n116
Bair, William J., 470n176 Bernstein, Barton J., 303n4 Baker, Benjamin R., 476n19 Berry, Frank B., 394n59 Baker, R. D., 410n159 Berta, Firmin J., 410n151, 435n108 Baker, Robert E., 411n161 Bethe, Hans A., 311n107
Baker, T. P., 393n53 Betit, J. W., 458n93
Balagna, John P., 302n86, 302n90, 302n91 Betts, Austin W., 417n198, 417n199,
Baldwin, Hanson W., 400n96 417n200, 419n210, 419n211, 419n213,
Ball, Desmond, 415n184 421n4, 421nS5, 422n6, 422n7, 422n10, Ball, George W., 440n155 422n11, 422n14, 424n32, 425n35, 425n37, Ball, Howard, 341n125, 342n152, 475n16, 425n38, 426n45, 426n46, 426n47, 427n48,
483n70 427n49, 427n50, 429n58, 435n115,
Ball, Russell H., 428n54 443n179, 455n74, 456n77 Ballou, L. B., 445n13 Betts, Richard K., 415n185
Bandt, 453n56 Bible, Alan, 323n120
Bankhardt, Philip F., 379n152, 403n113 Bice, R. A., 360n10, 393n53
Banks, J. E., 365n51 Bicker, Arden E., 462n113, 477n23
Notes Index 593 Bierly, Eugene W., 434n105 409n146, 410n159, 411n161, 421n221,
Bigelow, Albert, 397n76 427n48, 442n178 Bigley, T. J., 471n182 Bradshaw, Gail, 464n132
Biles, Martin B., 447n29, 447n30, 448n35, Brady, William J., 298n36, 310n80, 369n8],
451n45, 461n108, 462n113, 463n123, 375n127, 395n61, 395n64, 408n144, 464n127, 469n173, 470n174, 470n175, 417n199, 435n109, 462n113, 476n22,
471n180, 471n185, 472n186, 472n189 477n24 Black, Stuart C., 341n125, 485n90 Brake, Norman E., 365n56 Blakeway, Denys, 425n36, 488n105 Bratton, J. K., 293n15, 479n38
Blaschke, Lester E., 453n60 Breeding, J. Floyd, 403n115 Biatz, Hanson D., 310n80 Brennan, James T., 300n53 Blifford, Irving H., 406n127 Breslin, 354n161
Bliss, Wayne A., 462n114 Brewer, 459n97
Bloch, Edward J., 435n111, 435n112 Brim, Raymond E., 476n18 Blumberg, Stanley A., 312n107, 323n3 Brinck, Chester G., 323n120, 334n8
Blumenson, Martin, 376n132 Brittigan, Robert L., 485n85
Boffey, Philip M., 465n135, 466n143 Broadbent, Dee A., 336n35, 338n57
Bohman, V. R., 323n120 Brodine, Virginia, 429n57, 440n151 Bohne, Robert E., 347n54 Brodsky, Allen B., 292n2, 473n6
Bok, Sissela, 489n113 Bronk, Detlev W., 384n192, 432n75 Bond, Victor P., 432n75, 436n121, 468n155, Brooks, David B., 449n40
480n49, 486n97 Bross, Irwin D., 475n15, 480n51
Bonner, Norman A., 417n201 Bross, Neal S., 480n51
Bonnot, C. D., 347n56, 347n57, 347n58, Brower, Stephen L., 337n54
347n60, 347n61 Brown, Allen, 326n46
Bordes, Peter A., 316n44 Brown, Edmund G., Jr., 373n106
Borst, Lyle B., 322n102 Brown, Harold, 423n21
Boss, Willis R., 352n130, 352n132, 358n198, Brown, Harrison, 406n126
358n199, 371n98, 371n99, 372n100, Brown, Harry U., 472n189
373n107, 379n152 Brown, Howard C., Jr., 342n142, 352n130,
Bouton, Edwin H., 368n74, 427n51 353n145, 356n186, 357n196, 370n90,
Bowers, John, 363n42 382n186, 382n187, 407n130, 440n153,
Bowers, Michael W., 482n64 441n167
Bowman, G. Walter, 453n63 Brown, J. J., 462n117 Bowman, Melvin, 302n86 Brown, J. Martin, 486n97
Boyd, Howard, 450n44 Brown, James Barrett, 302n91 Boyer, Keith, 410n153, 410n154, 410n155, Brown, Wilburt S., 328n85 411n161, 411n163, 411n164, 413n169 Browne, Charles I., 409n151 Boyer, Marion W., 317n50, 321n95, 322n119, Browne, Corinne, 466n143, 480n47 323n8, 328n83, 328n84, 331n122, 333n155, Brownlee, Robert R., 460n106 333n159, 334n7, 335n19, 345n22, 381n171, | Brownton, Sheldon S., 394n59
381n179 Bruce, R. S., 420n217
Boysen, George A., 454n67 Bruce-Henderson, S., 376n132 Bradbury, Norris E., 295n5, 295n9, 297n26, Brues, Austin M., 406n128 302n87, 303n1, 305n22, 305n26, 306n34, Bruner, H. D., 421n222 306n37, 307n42, 307n43, 313n2, 313n7, Bruton, H. C., 344n9, 354n152 314n11, 314n14, 314n17, 314n25, 314n27, Bryan, Fred A., 318n64 321n96, 326n48, 327n54, 327n58, 331n120, Bryant, Garlen R., 365n57
331n121, 343n156, 343n3, 350n120, Bryant, Robert L., 312n126 354n159, 355n168, 355n173, 356n179, Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 477n27 361n17, 361n24, 363n38, 364n49, 368n76, Buck, Francis N., 412n166, 461n108
369n83, 369n84, 370n85, 373n108, Buckland, Carl] W., 308n52, 308n57, 310287,
375n121, 376n129, 376n133, 380n164, 346n42 380n169, 381n170, 381n177, 387n21, Buden, David, 408n135, 414n173 387n22, 388n28, 389n34, 389n35, 389n37, Bugher, John C., 314n25, 314n28, 315n40, 392n45, 395n66, 397n73, 400n98, 407n130, 316n47, 317n60, 322n117, 322n119,
407n132, 408n138, 408n139, 408n140, 325n39, 327n52, 327n59, 328n71, 328n72,
594 Notes Index 333n158, 334n6, 334n7, 334n8, 335n15, Campbell, Ernest D., 428n57, 430n61, 335n21, 337n38, 337n40, 338n69, 338n75, 454n66, 460n103 339n81, 339n82, 341n134, 341n139, Campbell, J. E., 420n217, 420n220
342n146, 344n16, 345n27, 345n29, Campbell, Joseph, 352n132 345n32, 346n33, 346n37, 347n67, 349n88, Campbell, Potter, 318n68 349n96, 349n106, 350n110, 350n112, Campbell, Raymond P., Jr., 311n99, 313n4, 350n115, 350n120, 351n122, 351n124, 315n38, 321n95, 325n39, 328n81, 338n64,
351n126, 351n127, 352n129, 352n130, 338n65, 338n70 352n131, 352n132, 353n140, 353n143, Campbell,- Robert H., 408n140, 408n143, 353n144, 353n145, 354n154, 356n180, 409n144, 409n145, 409n147, 409n150,
356n181, 356n186, 357n192, 357n193, 409n151, 410n152 358n199, 358n202, 359n205, 360n7, Cannon, J. S., 417n200 360n8, 360n12, 361n18, 362n28, 363n42, Cantril, Simeon T., 384n195, 404n120,
363n43, 364n45, 364n46, 366n61, 366n62, 404n121 366n63, 367n71, 370n88, 370n90, 371n98, Carew, Paul H., 293n16, 476n20
371n99, 372n101, 372n103, 373n107, Carlson, C. P., 353n149 381n171, 381n177, 381n178, 381n179, Carlson, Elof Axel, 383n191 382n184, 382n187, 383n189, 383n192, Carney, Robert B., 371n94 384n194, 385n5, 421n221, 425n37 Carothers, James E., 463n120
Bullard, Edward, 455n73 Carpenter, John W., 381n178
Bulloch, David C., 342n151 Carpenter, Stanley S., 470n175, 472n189
Bullock, William C., 326n47 Carr, James K., 425n35
Bulter, R. G., 375n123 Carry, Charles R., 372n100 Bundy, McGeorge, 294n3, 304n6, 416n187, Carson, Rachel, 455n72
425n36, 425n38, 426n45, 430n65, Carter, D. L., 413n169 440n158, 442n177, 444n5, 444n8, 445n11, Carter, Jimmy, 478n31
445n12, 445n15, 446n23, 448n32 Carter, Luther J., 458n93
Buntz, Fred A., 424n34 Carter, Melvin W., 389n37, 402n106, Burchard, John H., 384n196 412n166, 419n216, 441n162, 442n173, Burney, Leroy, 403n115 448n35, 451n49, 452n52, 453n56, 453n60, Burnham, Frank A., 414n173 454n65, 454n66, 456n80, 456n81, 457n85,
Burr, W. W., Jr., 470n177 457n86, 457n87, 459n98, 459n100,
Burris, Stanley W., 304n15, 324n10 460n101, 460n105, 461n108, 462n114.
Busey, Hal, 471n185 462n116, 463n124, 464n127, 465n141 Bush, Prescott, 405n126 Caster, William O., 403n114 Bush, William C., 327n52 Cate, Sara, 474n10 Bussard, Robert W., 407n134, 410n159 Catlin, Robert J., 452n53, 462n113
Bustad, Leo K., 340n108, 364n46 Celebrezze, Anthony J., 432n78, 433n79 Butkovich, Theodore R., 463n119 Chadwick, Donald R., 405n122, 431n72,
Butler, Robert G., 315n40, 324n10 431n74, 439n148
Butrico, Frank A., 332n138, 332n144, 479n44 Chambers, Anne, 297n23, 468n161
Butz, J. S., Jr., 408n135, 414n176, 415n182 Chapman, Carlton (Cliff) T., 481n57 Buzzati-Traverso, A. A., 437n127, 468n160 Chapman, William H., 350n112, 436n121
Byars, David O., 356n184 Cheit, Earl F., 489n111
Bybee, R. Scott, 395n64, 395n65, 414n178 Chelius, Leo G., 343n5
Bylinsky, Gene, 411n164 Cheney, Dick, 485n85
Chernoff, Herman, 478n34
Cahn, Robert, 347n67 Chesney, Robert, 345n27, 346n32, 346n5],
Cairns, John, 478n33 347n54, 398n78
Calahan, J. L., 372n103 Chrestensen, Louis B., 348n81, 348n86 Caldecott, Richard S., 438n134 Christoffel, Tom, 483n70
Caldwell, Glyn G., 293n14, 480n48, 480n51 Christofilos, Nicholas C., 400n94
Caldwell, Millard F,, 321n96 Church, Bruce W., 477n22, 477n23, 477n30,
Califano, Joseph A., Jr., 478n31 479n41, 479n42, 485n87 Camm, Frank A., 296n13, 463n120, 471n182, Clark, Bruce, 482n65
472n186 Clark, Duncan, 362n32, 382n187, 392n48,
Campbell, Donald C., 298n36 417n199, 430n65, 439n147, 440n151,
Notes Index 595 441n166, 441n168, 442n169, 442n172, Conard, Robert A., 350n112, 356n179, 445n10, 445n11, 446n20, 450n42, 456n76, 359n207, 436n122, 436n123, 437n124,
458n90 437n127, 437n128, 437n129, 438n130,
Clark, George L., 292n2 438n131, 468n160 Clark, Ian, 488n103 Condit, Doris M., 305n27
Clark, John C., 302n86, 306n38, 308n52, Condon, Edward U., 463n124, 464n126 313n7, 314n16, 315n37, 315n41, 319n78, Condon, Patricia, 476n18 320n79, 320n89, 327nS0, 347n67, 359n6, Conklin, James J., 292n3, 316n44, 325n23 360n14, 361n16, 362n29, 362n32, 364n48, Conner, Troy B., Jr., 404n120 364n50, 365n51, 365n55, 365n56, 366n64, Connor, Joseph A., Jr., 434n108
367n66, 369n80, 369n83, 373n108, Conrad, Tom, 481n63 373n109, 374n113, 374n118, 375n123, Conway, John T., 424n35 375n124, 375n126, 375n128, 376n131, Coogan, J. M., 370n87
380n169, 390n38 Coogan, John S., 395n64, 395n65, 415n18], Clark, Leo J., 413n170 429n59, 444n6, 445n13, 450n45, 452n54,
Clark, Lillian W., 342n151 455n75
Clark, Thomas R., 479n45 Cook, C. Sharp, 317n48 Clarke, Joseph C., 392n45 Cook, Charles, 329n100
Clarkson, P. H., 381n177 Cook, R. W., 308n52, 375n122, 417n202 Clarkson, Percy W., 324n10, 324n15, 326n41, Cooney, James P., 297n26, 297n30, 301n72,
343n1, 343n3, 344n9, 345n29, 345n30, 302n86, 302n89, 304n11, 305n18, 306n34,
347n58, 347n63, 349n102, 349n105, 309n78 350n107, 350n110, 350n112, 350n116, Cooper, John A. D., 438n136 350n118, 354n153, 355n171, 355n172, Cooper, Kenneth W., 384n192, 405n126
355n173, 356n187, 357n191 Cooper, Marcus F., 338n75
Claus, Harold, 413n169 Cooper, W. R., 452n51
Claus, Walter D., 308n52, 308n62, 310n89, Coray, Claude L., 346n53 314nil1, 315n35, 315n40, 318n64, 318n67, Cornell, S. D., 417n202
319n77, 319n78, 322n117, 327n52, Cornish, Amasa, 464n125 345n27, 346n37, 362n32, 364n50, Corrington, L. C., 412n165 381n171, 381n172, 381n179, 382n182, Corsbie, Robert L., 365n51, 366n65, 375n123,
382n184, 384n194, 384n196, 386n10, 379n157, 383n192, 387n24, 388n26,
386n14 388n27, 390n39, 390n41, 391n45, 393n52,
Cleere, Roy L., 453n60, 454n64, 454n67 402n109, 405n126
Clemensen, Robert E., 463n120 Cory, Douglas, 342n151
Climo, William F., 390n40 Costa, Charles F., 411n162 Cluff, Frank D., 429n60, 456n80, 461n112 Cotter, T. P., 408n135
Coffer, Henry F., 449n41 Cottrell, William B., 435n114
Cohn, Stanton H., 436n121, 438n134, Coughlin, William J., 416n186
468n156, 468n157 Cowan, George A., 388n25, 411n161
Coiner, Richard T., 381n171 Cowart, William S., 346n38 Cole, Alice C., 296n12 Cox, E. F.,, 360n15, 373n109, 460n106 Cole, Reuben E., 327n50, 327n57, 328n64, Coyle, Phil, 463n118
337n39, 337n48, 361n17 Craig, Captain, 425n38
Cole, W. Sterling, 342n145, 343n156, Cranston, Alan, 470n177 359n205, 361n22, 363n33, 371n94, Crase, K. W., 472n190
382n180 Crea, R. D., 349n98
Coleman, Peter T., 471n183, 472n189 Cribbett, James R., 373n107 Coleman, Richard D., 411n162, 447n29, Crockett, J. R., 421n5
454n65 Cronkite, Eugene P., 349n92, 350n112,
Collison, Tom D., 330n108, 365n5i, 365n5S5, 350n113, 356n180, 356n181, 356n182,
366n64, 366n65, 368n77, 369n79 356n184, 436n121, 436n123, 468n155
Colton, Theodore, 474n11 Crosby, James E., 348n85 Colucci, Linda, 479n44 Crowe, William J., 471n179
Comar, Cyril L., 334n6, 338n57, 434n97, Crowson, Delmar L., 439n149, 440n158,
434n99, 434n101 441n168, 442n174, 442n175, 442n176,
Conant, James B., 304n6 442n178, 445n12, 447n27, 447n29,
596 Notes Index 450n42, 457n85, 457n86, 457n89, 458n90, Dodson, Richard W., 311n99
458n92 Doerfflinger, O. C., 442n178
Cruise, Robert B., 377n142, 390n40 Dolan, Philip J., 318n67, 325n23, 336n26, Cude, W. A., 369n80, 374n113, 375n124 419n216 Cunningham, Harold D., 477n23, 477n24 Donaldson, Howard L., 480n56
Cuntz, Carl L., Jr., 412n168 Donaldson, Lauren R., 352n132, 378n146 Curry, Duncan, Jr., 314n29, 324n15, 332n140, Donaldson, T. S., 407n134
344n8, 364n48, 366n64, 367n66, 369n80, Donovan, Richard X., 403n113
374n113, 378n147, 389n35, 398n78, Dorsen, Norman, 489n113
401n103 Douglas, Geneva S., 458n93, 464n125
Curry, Stan, 380n159 Douglas, James H., 424n34 Curtis, John I., 335n9 Douglas, Mary, 489n110 Cushing, Robert H., 344n9 Douthett, Beth A., 479n44
Douthett, Elwood M., 449n39, 454n64,
Dahl, Arve, 417n197, 431n74, 441n162 457n88, 459n96
Dahlberg, Tim, 482n68 Doyle, Christine M., 482n66, 484n76 Daly, Richard, 434n106 Drake, William W., Jr., 320n84 Damerval, F. B., 414n173 Draper, E. H., 393n53 Danielsson, Bengt, 470n178 Dreyer, Nancy A., 473n6, 475n14
Danielsson, Marie-Thérése, 470n178 Dubois, Don, 463n124
Darby, Sarah C., 292n6, 467n150, 473n6, Duborg, R. W., 458n89
488n107 Dudley, Raymond A., 382n184
Dauer, Maxwell, 294n1, 298n36 Dudley, Robert A., 382n180, 382n183,
David, Heather M., 414n173 382n184 Davis, J. J., 430n60 DuFort, Gisele C., 483n71
Davis, Joyce P., 486n91 Dugger, Given H., 327n50, 327n52, 362n29,
Davis, Walter J., 457n87 366n64, 369n80, 385n4, 385n7, 389n36 Deal, L. Joe, 318n67, 319n77, 341n1235, Dugger, Gordon L., 415n185
381n171, 472n189 Duhamel, A. M. Francis, 443n2
Dean, Gordon, 305n20, 305n23, 305n24, Dulles, John Foster, 351n122, 357n192, 305n25, 307n42, 307n46, 316n42, 317n48, 377n142 317n57, 317n5S9, 317n60, 319n76, 320n94, Dummer, Jerome E., 408n143, 408n144,
321n95, 321n96, 323n2, 325n30, 326n41, 409n151, 410n155, 410n156 326n46, 326n48, 332n149, 333n154, Duncan, D. B., 372n101, 372n103 333n156, 345n25, 359n1, 369n84, 381n173 Duncan, Francis, 295n4, 304n6, 323n3,
DeBrum, Oscar, 471n183, 472n189 414n174 Decker, Ralph S., 411n161 Duncan, Ray D., 477n23, 477n24
DeCoursey, Elbert, 358n202 Dunham, Charles L., 308n62, 351n127,
DeLauer, R. D., 407n134 356n180, 357n196, 358n200, 363n39,
Del Sesto, Steven L., 472n1 364n45, 366n62, 368n74, 370n88, 370n90, De Marinis, Frank, 391n43 373n107, 375n122, 377n142, 378n149, Demoise, Charles F., 437n128 379n152, 384n195, 384n196, 385n2, Dempsey, Robert H., 355n171 385n8, 386n12, 387n20, 387n24, 388n26,
Denton, Vern, 354n159 388n27, 389n36, 390n38, 391n45, 393n52, DeRenzis, Enzl, 436n122 394n59, 395n62, 395n66, 396n69, 398n83,
De Volpi, A., 460n101 399n86, 399n93, 400n98, 401n103, Dibblin, Jane, 436n122, 470n178, 484n78 401n104, 402n106, 402n108, 402n109, Dick, J. L., 393n53 403n113, 403n114, 403n115, 404n117,
Dickens, P. F,, Jr., 390n38 405n124, 405n126, 406n127, 406n128, Dickman, Joseph L., 471n183 406n129, 407n130, 409n146, 418n203,
Dickson, David, 478n35 421n221, 421n222, 425n37, 428n55,
Dickson, Howard W., 481n56, 485n89 433n82, 433n84, 433n85, 433n87, 433n88,
DiLuzio, Frank C., 323n119 433n90, 433n91, 434n97, 434n99, 434n100,
Dingell, John D., 459n97 434n101, 434n107, 435n114, 439n142, DiStefano, Joseph, 482n66 439n148, 440n153, 465n135, 466n144, Divine, Robert A., 292n5, 380n165, 385n1 469n168
Dixon, H. A., 393n51 Dunn, Carroll H., 472n186, 472n189
Notes Index 597 Dunning, Gordon M., 320n83, 326n39, 389n31, 389n33, 394n60, 395n67, 400n98, 326n40, 330n107, 331n118, 332n148, 400n100, 403n115, 404n118, 404n120, 333n158, 333n2, 333n3, 334n4, 335n15, 404n121 338n70, 338n75, 340n114, 340n115, Eizenstat, Stuart, 477n27 341n125, 341n128, 345n27, 348n85, Elder, Robert L., 411n161, 435n109 349n96, 350n110, 352n131, 356n179, Elge, Irving O., 322n102 356n181, 357n192, 361n18, 362n28, Eliot, J. C., 349n99 362n31, 363n43, 364n45, 366n63, 367n71, Elkind, M. M., 486n97
370n88, 370n90, 373n107, 374n119, Elkins, Mortimer M., 406n127 378n146, 379n157, 383n189, 384n196, Ellender, Allen J., 459n101 385n8, 386n14, 387n21, 388n26, 388n27, Elliott, Richard G., 313n1, 321n96, 322n111, 391n44, 391n45, 393n52, 395n62, 396n69, 322n113, 323n8, 329n95, 332n137, 398n82, 398n83, 399n86, 399n90, 400n98, 333n158, 334n7, 335n14, 336n24, 337n42, 401n103, 401n106, 402n108, 402n109, 338n74, 338n76, 340n107, 363n38, 363n42,
402n110, 403n113, 403n114, 403n115, 363n43, 364n44, 364n46, 375n123, 405n1i24, 417n197, 420n218, 420n218, 376n129, 376n130, 378n148, 378n149, 421n221, 421n222, 422n6, 422n7, 422n12, 382n187, 385n8, 391n44, 392n47, 392n48, 423n23, 424n26, 427n49, 430n66, 430n67, 393n51, 393n53, 395n62, 417n200, 422n5 431n70, 431n73, 431n74, 433n95, 434n100, = Ellis, W. S., 470n177
434n106, 435n111, 435n112, 435n113, Elmo, Rosemary, 437n127 435n114, 437n125, 438n137, 439n138, Emens, Ray C., 456n76, 456n78, 456n80 439n139, 439n144, 439n145, 439n149, Emerson, John K., 453n61 439n150, 440n158, 441n162, 441n164, Enders, John, 375n126 441n168, 443n179, 457n82, 461n108, English, Spofford G., 429n58, 433n94,
468n157 446n24
Dunster, H. J., 420n219 Ensign, Tod, 293n14, 301n74, 476n17 Durant, Richard C., 354n166 Enstrum, James E., 478n34 Durham, Carl T., 398n83, 403n113, 406n126 Enthoven, Alain C., 416n186
Durham, Franklin P., 408n135, 411n161, Epley, Oral, 376n128, 376n130
412n165 Erlewine, John A., 448n35, 459n100,
Durkee, W. E., 414n173 461n110, 470n173, 471n183
Durrett, David B., 482n66, 484n76 Erskine, Hazel Gaudet, 404n116
DuShane, Graham, 402n106 Estep, Samuel D., 489n111
Dyhre, A. E., 302n89 Eubank, Bernard F., 419n212, 421n4, Dyke, Richard Wayne, 472n1 435n117, 445n17, 462n113
Dymerski, Leo J., 451n46 Evans, Roy B., 454n66 Eve, I. S., 336n26
Earl, Warren B., 335n9 Ewing, Anthony H., 426n48 Eason, Charles F., 342n151, 489n111 Ewing, Tania, 488n107 Eberlein, G. Donald, 428n55
Eckert, John A., 462n113 Fabrikant, Jacob I., 485n91 Eckhardt, Bob, 336n28 Facer, Gordon C., 471n185, 483n69 Eddy, Leonard A., 314n29 Fackler, Paul H., 315n31, 365n54
Edwards, Donald H., 450n45, 452n52, Failla, Gioacchino, 372n103, 383n191,
452n54, 457n87 384n195
Edwards, R., 330n103, 368n75 Fannin, Paul, 441n164 Efnor, S. J., Jr., 302n92 Farley, Philip J., 379n152, 399n93, 447n27
Egan, William A., 459n97 Farmer, G. R., 428n56 Ehrlich, Thomas, 444n4 Faulkner, John D., 431n74
Eisenbud, Merril, 309n69, 309n78, 310n79, Favish, Allan, 480n54 310n80, 315n40, 318n64, 319n78, 325n39, Felan, David F., 431n70 326n40, 345n32, 350n110, 350n120, Fellows, W. Scott, 410n159 352n129, 352n132, 353n143, 354n161, Felt, Gaelen L., 311n99, 314n13, 333n154, 358n202, 383n189, 384n194, 384n196, 339n80, 355n171, 364n47, 367n66, 403n114, 404n122, 420n219, 433n80, 380n159, 380n161, 381n178, 390n40,
486n96 397n77, 398n84
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 359n206, 363n33, Fenstermacher, Charles, 411n163
598 Notes Index Ferber, Gilbert J., 428n55 Forssberg, Arne, 486n97 Ferley, R. N., Jr., 369n80 Fort, Bill, 460n101, 460n104
Fetz, Richard H., 331n133, 332n138 Fort, Charles W., 459n97
Fidler, H. A., 387n24 Foster, John S., Jr., 430n61, 442n178, 443n4, Fields, Kenneth E., 315n40, 316n42, 316n43, 444n6, 444n8, 445n15 317n48, 319n73, 319n78, 320n85, 320n90, Foster, Paul F,, 382n187, 385n2, 397n74, 320n91, 321n95, 321n96, 323n120, 323n8, 399n93, 400n100, 407n130 325n34, 326n48, 327nS0, 327n51, 327n52, Foster, Paul M., 363n33 327n56, 328n63, 328n64, 328n69, 328n73, Foster, Shirley, 337n54
328n74, 328n80, 329n98, 331n118, Foster, Vincent, 429n58 331n122, 331n126, 331n127, 331n136, Foster, William C., 321n96 332n141, 332n153, 333n155, 333n157, Fountain, Edmund L., 430n66, 433n89,
333n158, 333n159, 335n19, 335n20, 456n80 336n24, 336n29, 337n50, 338n58, 338n61, Fowler, Donald R., 391n44 338n62, 338n64, 338n67, 338n72, 338n75, Fowler, Eric B., 420n217 339n80, 339n101, 343n153, 343n1, 343n3, Fradkin, Philip J., 334n3, 479n46
345n24, 347n63, 349n102, 349n104, Frank, G., 329n94 349n105, 350n107, 350n110, 350n116, Frederickson, Donald S., 478n31 350n118, 354n164, 355n171, 355n172, Free, Richard H., 395n66, 398n79 355n173, 356n187, 357n191, 358n199, Freeman, Leslie J., 465n140, 480n47 360n10, 362n26, 362n28, 362n33, 363n38, Freeman, Orville L., 403n114 363n41, 363n42, 363n43, 364n44, 364n48, Fremlin, John, 473n6 364n49, 365n57, 366n59, 366n60, 366n63, =‘ Friedlander, Emmy, 475n14 368n73, 368n74, 369n79, 370n84, 370n85, Friedlander, Michael W., 465n141 370n90, 370n92, 371n94, 371n96, 371n97, Friesen, H. N., 440n157, 461n108, 476n22,
371n98, 372n103, 373n107, 375n122, 479n38, 483n70 377n142, 378n151, 380n164, 381n177, Fritsch, Armold R., 421n4, 427n48, 430n6/7,
381n178, 382n187, 384n196, 389n31, 442n176 389n33, 389n35, 393n52, 393n54, 394n60, Froman, Darol K., 296n11, 296n15, 298n31, 396n68, 396n69, 396n70, 397n76, 398n82, 302n86, 302n87, 302n89, 303n94, 303n2,
400n98, 403n114, 418n202, 418n204 327n57, 338n66, 339n80, 346n52,
Finch, Robert H., 466n146 353n142, 370n85, 396n73, 398n78,
Findlay, Trevor, 428n54 410n152, 410n159
Fine, Paul C., 407n130 Fry, H. Burke, 351n124, 381n177, 381n178
Finger, Harold B., 411n160, 411n163, Fryer, Minot P., 302n91
412n165, 413n170 Fuchs, Victor R., 465n141 Finne, David, 463n124 Fuller, John G., 333n3 Finkelstein, Murray M., 480n51 Fuller, John F., 379n155
Firth, Stewart, 467n154, 470n177, 484n77, Fuller, R. Glen, 452n54 484n78
Fisher, H. Leonard, 439n150, 466n145 Gabriel, David S., 414n173
Fitch, B. M., 317059 Gailledreau, Claude, 443n2 Fitzsimmons, Charles K., 411n162, 413n170, Galison, Peter, 303n4 444n7, 450n42 Gannon, John W., 375n128, 378n150, Flaherty, John J., 309n69, 370n85 379n153 Fleming, E. H., 455n72 Gantz, Kenneth F., 407n134 Fleming, H. H., 346n53 Gardiner, Donald M., 403n115 Fleming, Richard H., 428n55 Gardner, John W., 478n33 Fleming, Thomas O., 453n60 Gardner, Joseph M., 360n14 Flemming, Arthur S., 404n121, 405n122 Garn, Wray B., 374n113
Flor, William J., 484n80 Garner, R. J., 420n218, 421n222 Focke, Alfred B., 369n83 Gates, Mahlon E., 463n120, 471n181, Foege, William, 293n14, 478n31 471n183, 477n23 Foley, Roger D., 482n68 Gates, Thomas S., 424n33 Forgotson, E. H., 419n213 Gehring, Perry, 487n100
Forman, Seth, 484n76 George, S., 354n167, 447n26 Forry, Earl C., 395n65 Gerber, Carl R., 428n54
Notes Index 599 Germain, Lawrence S., 443n179 312n126, 313n7, 314n13, 314n28, 314n29,
Gerson, Stuart M., 485n85 316n41, 316n47, 320n80, 322n117, Gesell, Thomas F., 478n36 322n118, 323n1, 324n11, 324n13, 324n14, Gibbins, W. D., 377n143 324n15, 329n98, 330n107, 331n119, Gideon, Smith, 471n182 331n126, 331n127, 331n136, 332n141, Gilbert, Ethel S., 475n14 332n142, 333n154, 333n155, 333n157, Gilbert, H. K., 350n113, 355n168, 355n170 338n67, 338n68, 339n80, 339n82, 344n9,
Gill, Henry A., Jr., 340n119 345n29, 346n35, 346n38, 346n42, 346n44, Giller, Edward B., 419n210, 457n87, 457n88, 346n52, 347n58, 349n88, 349n98, 349n104,
458n92, 458n93, 459n95, 459n99, 349n106, 350n107, 354n159, 355n173, 460n107, 461n108, 463n118, 463n121, 356n181, 356n183, 359n3, 359n4, 360n9,
469n171, 469n172, 469n173 360n14, 360n15, 361n16, 361n17, 361n24,:
Gillers, Stephen, 489n113 362n31, 363n40, 364n46, 364n48, 366n63,
Gillett, R. E., 435n116 367n69, 370n85, 373n108, 373n109,
Gillette, Robert, 440n157 374n113, 375n123, 378n145, 380n159, Gilmore, R. A., 388n27 380n161, 380n162, 380n169, 385nS5,
Gilpatrick, Carole, 381n179 385n8, 386n16, 386n17, 387n24, 388n25,
Gilpin, Robert, 400n97 388n26, 390n37, 390n39, 391n42, 391n45,
Gise, L. P., 392n47 392n48, 395n66, 401n106, 407n132,
Giusti, Ruthann, 487n101 408n140, 409n147, 411n163, 412n166, Gladeck, F. R., 324n10, 397n74 418n208, 419n213, 421n1
Glass, Bentley, 385n1 Graves, Glen A., 411n161 Glass, Neel, 460n106 Graveson, R. T., 378n146
Glasstone, Samuel, 318n67, 325n23, 336n26, Gravitis, Inara, 374n115, 393n53, 423n22
419n210, 419n216, 443n179, 443n2 Gray, Robert, 403n115
Gleason, S. Everett, 304n7 Green, Harold P., 472n1 Godbold, J., 464n133 Greenberg, N. D., 352n132, 352n133, 370n85, Goeckermann, R. H., 457n84 370n90, 371n94, 373n108 Goeke, Roscoe H., 368n73, 385n8, 386n18, Greenhouse, Nathaniel A., 470n176 387n21, 388n26, 389n35, 389n37, 390n38, Greenwald, Peter, 465n141
391n43, 391n44, 393n52, 402n110, Gregory, Shaun, 373n108
403n113, 424n26, 429n59 Grendon, Alexander, 466n147 Goetz, Jerald L., 311n97, 318n63, 321n95, Grier, Herbert E., 452n54
329n98, 329n100, 348n85, 368n75, Grier, Robert S., 312n125
394n58, 484n80 Griffith, Perry B., 399n86
Gofman, John W., 293n12, 434n97, 434n99, Griffiths, P., 413n170 439n150, 466n143, 466n144, 466n146, Grimes, Martin L., 327n52
466n147, 473n6 Groover, Lewis M., 444n7
Goldberg, Alfred, 295n7, 305n27 Grosch, Daniel S., 383n191 Goldschmidt, Bertrand, 416n187 Grossman, R. Frank, 454n67, 462n114
Goldthwaite, R., 377n143 Groves, Leslie R., 296n12
Goodpaster, Andrew J., 394n60, 397n75 Groves, R. H., 448n36
Gordon, Alexander R., Jr., 379n155 Gruber, Alan R., 408n136
Gordon, Seth, 372n100 Gruening, Emest, 429n58 Gorove, Stephen, 444n4 Guido, R. S., 455n70
Gotchy, R. L., 419n214, 443n180, 452n50 Guild, Walter R., 384n192
Gould, Stephen Jay, 291n5 Guthals, Paul R., 409n150, 409n151
Goulden, Anne M., 449n41 Guthrie, William L., 337n50, 338n65, 339n78, Gowing, Margaret, 487n103 362n32, 363n36, 363n42, 364n44, 366n62,
Graebner, Norman A., 294n3 367n71, 370n85, 371n94
Graham, James B., 355n171 Gwynn, Philip S., 320n79, 322n105
Graham, John S., 424n32 Gyorgi, Anne, 474n12 Graming, Harald M., 361n19, 361n20
Gravel, Mike, 461n108, 463n124, 464n126 Hacker, Barton C., 291n3, 29in1, 294nl, Graves, Alvin C., 298n31, 302n86, 303nl1, 304n10, 308n52, 310n79, 311n97, 314n21, 304n10, 304n12, 304n15, 305n18, 305n19, 315n37, 317n48, 318n63, 318n69,
308n48, 308n51, 308n60, 312n118, 329n100, 336n26, 344n8, 348n85, 369n82,
600 Notes Index 394n58, 395n61, 419n209, 465n139, Hawthorne, Howard A., 301n79, 309n75, 477n24, 477n25, 477n30, 479n45, 487n102 317n57, 325n28, 348n74, 368n74, 393n54,
Haddock, Doris R., 429n58 421n4
Haddock, James A., 429n57, 429n58 Haycox, Stephen, 459n101
Hadley, James, 460n103 Hayes, Daniel F., 302n91
Hadlow, William H., 336n31, 336n33, Haynes, Eugene D., 369n78, 369n79, 369n80
337n36, 338n57 Haynes, Richard F., 294n3, 305n20
Hagen, Charles W., Jr., 336n26 Hayward, John T., 328n71, 328n72, 366n62,
Hagerty, James C., 353n135, 404n121 369n83
Haight, Harry H., 319n78, 328n69, 338n69, Hayworth, Leland, 387n24
349n106 Healy, J. W., 485n89
Hale, E. J., 303n3 Heckrotte, Warren, 447n26 Hall, John A., 352n128, 352n133, 357n194, Heft, Robert E., 309n78 357n196, 358n202, 359n205, 378n151, Helfrich, Philip, 471n183
379n152 Helgeson, Bob P., 412n166, 412n168, Hall, Nathan S., 384n196 413n170 Halligan, E. G., 456n77 Heller, James H., 459n101
Hamburger, Richard, 423n23, 434n97, 443n1, Helms, I., 414n173 444n7, 447n29, 448n34, 448n35, 452n53 Hempelmann, Louis H., Jr., 302n86, 302n87,
Hamilton, Joseph G., 381n170 302n89, 302n90, 304n8, 305n18, 433n85, Hamilton, L. D., 292n7, 467n150, 480n49 465n137
Hamilton, Thomas E., 438n129, 438n132, Hendee, William R., 475n14
468n160 Henderson, Chris L., 416n188, 430n67
Hammerschmidt, John Paul, 459n97 Henderson, W. B., 412n167 Hammond, Charles, 321n102 Hendricks, Donald W., 441n162, 442n1756,
Hammond, M. B., 347n62 454n66, 457n88, 461n108, 461n110,
Hammond, R. R., 353n138 462n113, 464n127
Hanlon, B. Hall, 377n140, 378n146 Henke, Charles F.,, 391n43
Hansen, Chuck, 373n108 Hennessey, Joseph F., 453n60 Hansen, James L., 358n202 Henshall, Jim, 411n161 Hanson, Gerald P., 486n96 Hepplewhite, R. E., 389n30 Harbert, R. C., 426n46 Herken, Gregg, 294n3, 427n52 Harbison, Samuel A., 485n89 Herrington, John S., 479n45
Hardin, James, 442n168 Hershberg, James G., 304n6
Hardington, Simon, 488n107 Herter, Christian A., 397n76 Hardy, Justin, 439n146, 439n147 Hertford, Kenner F., 319n78, 320n79, 320n86,
Hargus, Lee, 372n100 321n96, 322n113, 326n50, 374n115,
Harless, Bennett L., 378n147 374n119, 375n123, 378n146, 378n149,
Harley, John H., 310n79, 310n80, 315n40, 380n169, 381n169, 386n11, 386n15, 326n40, 352n130, 383n189, 384n196, 387n19, 387n20, 387n21, 387n24, 388n26,
416n188, 431n74 389n33, 389n34, 391n45, 392n47, 393n53,
Harris, John A., 447n27, 447n29, 448n33, 394n60, 395n63, 395n66, 396n69, 398n78,
450n42, 452n55, 458n92, 459n98, 400n98, 400n99, 400n100, 402n109,
464n127, 464n128 408n139, 409n145, 409n146, 409n148, Harris, Payne S., 293n13, 311n102, 375n123, 410n152, 410n156, 419n213, 434n107
387n19, 394n55, 408n143, 410n153, Hesbergh, Theodore M., 383n192
411n161 Heslep, Charter, 326n47, 378n149, 379n152 Hart, Philip A., 431n74 Hess, G. K., Jr., 409n145 Hart, R. W., 362n27 Hetzel, Henry, 406n126 Hartgering, James B., 322n105 Hewes, James E., 296n12
Harvey, Hubert D., Jr., 457n87 Hewlett, Richard G., 292n5, 292n6, 294n2,
Harward, Ernest D., 459n100 295n4, 304n6, 323n3, 343n2, 380n165,
Hausrath, Alfred, 316n44 396n72, 414n174, 423n21, 433n80, Hawkes, Russell, 408n137, 414n177, 415n183 467n150, 474n8, 487n103
Hawks, Wayne, 404n121 Hexamer, Hugh D., 376n132
Hawley, 352n132 Hickel, Walter J., 458n92, 469n172 Haworth, Leland J., 443n4 Hickey, Richard J., 475n15
Notes Index 601 Hicking, Arobati, 437n128 Hornig, Donald C., 447n26 Hiestand, O. S., Jr., 439n145 Hotchkiss, Hervey A., 480n55 Higbee, Myron, 342n151 Hougan, Olaf A., 417n197 Higgins, Gary H., 407n132, 418n207, 429n59, Houghton, Karl H., 338n69, 348n77 430n61, 431n70, 434n99, 434n101, 444nS, Houghton, Kenneth H., 367n66 446n20, 447n28, 449n41, 450n45, 463n120 House, Richard A., 344n9, 345n29, 346n38,
Hightower, Earl D., 369n80 347n59, 347n60, 347n61, 348n68 Hilberg, Albert W., 440n151, 442n169 House, William C., 410n157 Hilcken, John A., 356n179, 420n218, Housner, G. W., 423n24
468n157 Howard, William E., 411n164
Hilgartner, Stephen, 474n9 Howarth, John L., 489n111
Hill, Dixon, 451n49 Howells, H., 420n219
Hills, William B., 426n46 Hoyt, Henry R., 346n46
Hilsmeier, W. EF, 434n105 Hubbard, Kenneth, 425n36 Hines, Neal O., 296n17, 305n18, 324n9, Hudson, Richard, 358n200
351n126, 428n55 Huffman, Charles, 322n112
Hirsch, Daniel, 311n107 Huffman, W. T., 336n35, 337n47 Hirsch, Herbert M., 406n126 Hughes, Bernard C., 446n24
Hislop-Brumfield, Lorna, 481n63 Huisken, Ron, 416n185
Hitechew, R. L., 458n91 Hull, Doris M., 357n192, 467n154 Hiyama, Yoshio, 352n128, 379n152 Hull, John E., 303n94
Hobbs, F. T., 447n26 Hulse, James W., 489n113
Hodsden, William H., 480n47 Humphrey, Hubert H., 403n115 Hoffman, Allan R., 465n141 Huston, Vincent G., 323n120, 325n34, Hoffman, Joseph G., 302n86, 302n87, 302n90 326n39, 333n2, 339n82, 345n23, 347n65,
Holcomb, Robert W., 467n149 352n133, 360n11, 363n39, 363n41, 363n43, Holifield, Chet, 384n195, 392n50, 422nS5, 364n49, 366n61, 366n62, 370n85, 372n100,
427n48, 442n177, 447n29, 463n124, 372n101, 372n102, 373n108, 380n164
467n147 Hutchinson, Howard B., 306n30 .
Holl, Jack M., 292n5, 343n2, 380n165, Hutchinson, William S., Jr, 401n104
396n72, 423n21, 479n45 Hutchison, George B., 473n6
Holland, Albert H., Jr., 372n101
Holland, Joshua Z., 398n82, 402n107, Iggers, Georg G., 291n2 403n115, 406n128, 416n188, 420n220, Inglis, David Rittenhouse, 465n141
421n221, 425n37, 432n76, 433n93 Ingraham, Samuel C., 342n140 Holles, Everett, 382n187, 406n126 Ingram, Frank L., 448n31, 464n132 Hollingsworth, Robert E., 392n50, 393n52, Ink, Dwight A., 392n50, 431n73, 439n138,
439n146, 445n11, 445n14, 446n20, 439n146, 439n149, 439n150, 442n172,
446n22, 458n92, 461n110, 463n118, 448n32
463n120, 466n145, 467n147, 469n173, Irwin, John N., Il, 459n95, 459n96
472n186 Ishikawa, Eisei, 486n93
Hollis, Mark D., 362n27, 391n42
Hollister, Hal, 382n186, 384n195, 402n109, Jacks, Gordon L., 376n133, 377n138, 406n127, 406n128, 406n129, 470n177, : 380n158, 390n40, 399n85, 399n86
477n23 Jackson, Andrew M., 311n99, 313n5, 315n39
Holloway, David, 303n5 Jackson, David G., 464n125
Holloway, J. G., 441n164 Jackson, Henry M., 429n58, 436n122, 456n76 Holmes, Monroe A., 335n9, 336n27, 336n31, Jackson, I. E., Jr., 435n114
336n35, 337n36, 337n37, 337n48, Jacobs, Paul, 392n51, 393n52, 395n62,
340n110, 342n140, 342n142 464n125 Holt, Joe, 403n113 Jacobs, Robert, 442n173 Holzer, Fred, 451n46 Jacobsen, Sally, 455n71 Holzman, Benjamin G., 360n12, 360n15 Jacobson, Harold Karan, 400n97 Hoos, Ida, 489n110 Jacques, Philippe G., 403n114, 466n145 Hopkins, Glen J., 391n43 James, R. A., 438n131 Hopwood, Larry E., 383n191 Jarrett, A. A., 321n99 Hormbrook, Edwin F,, 482n63 Jarrisson, Alan, 322n111
602 Notes Index Jendrzejczyk, Mike, 476n18 Kastenmeier, Robert W., 446n20 Jenkins, Bruce, 483n70 Kathren, Ronald L., 292n2, 298n40, 438n136,
Jensen, Walter A., 394n56 487n99
Jette, E. R., 302n89 Katz, Milton S., 396n71 Jewett, John P., 412n166, 412n167, 413n169 Kavanagh, George M., 443n4, 446n20
Johnsen, Katherine, 415n182 Kawabata, Toshihara, 351n125
Johnson, Abby A., 476n20 Kaye, M. E., 463n123
Johnson, Carl J., 478n35, 479n37 Kean, William B., 316n42, 316n43
Johnson, Gerald W., 317n60, 389n37, 390n38, Kearns, James J., 355n171
397n73, 401n103, 407n132, 417n202, Kehoe, E. J., 309n69 418n203, 418n205, 423n21, 423n22, Keirn, Donald J., 414n175 423n24, 425n39, 427n50, 428n54, 429n60, Keller, Harry B., 397n77 441n166, 443n1, 445n12, 446n25, 449n41, Kelley, C. W., 377n141
455n72 Kelley, W. E., 308n52, 309n69, 310n79,
Johnson, Giff, 485n88 311n93, 315n40, 319n78, 322n111 Johnson, H. L., 360n14 Kelly, Armand W., 350n113
Johnson, Louis A., 305n23, 305n24, 313n2 Kelly, John S., 424n27, 429n58, 430n61,
Johnson, Lyndon B., 433n79, 442n177, 430n66, 432n76, 434n97, 441n166, 443n4, 444n6, 445n17, 447n26, 458n93, 469n170 444n5, 444n7, 445n10, 445n11, 445n12,
Johnson, Murray L., 428n55 445n14, 445n15, 445n17, 446n21, 446n22, Johnson, Ralph H., 481nS6 446n25, 446n26, 447n27, 447n29, 448n30, Johnson, Ralph P., 307n47, 309n69, 363n40, 448n32, 448n33, 449n37, 449n40, 4560n44,
375n125, 375n128, 380n159 450n45, 451n46, 451n49, 453n58, 4532n63, Johnson, Thomas H., 381n177, 381n178 454n66 Johnson, Warren C., 398n82, 418n204, Kelly, M. J., 451n48
421n221 Kelly, Orville E., 293n1i4, 480n47
Johnson, Warren D., 471n185, 472n189 Kendrick, H. E., 461n109 Johnson, William S., 308n52, 314n21, Kennedy, Edward M., 336n28 317n57, 331n119, 331n122, 331n133, Kennedy, John F.,, 417n198, 417n199, 332n136, 332n138, 332n144, 361n17, 417n200, 424n27, 424n32, 427n48, 366n65, 374n112, 374n113, 374n115, 430n65, 440n155, 443n3 374n116, 374n118, 375n123, 375n124, Kennedy, William R., Jr., 313n5, 315n37,
375n125, 375n126, 376n131, 390n39, 318n61, 348n70, 380n159 390n40, 390n41, 393n54, 394n61, 395n64, Kenney, Spurgeon M., Jr., 441n167, 447n29,
395n65, 408n144 448n32
Johnston, Edward E., 471n182 Kerr, Clark, 407n130 Johnston, R. H., Jr., 459n97 Kerwin, Walter T., Jr., 369n80, 376n133,
Jones, C. B., 400n95 376n135, 376n137, 377n143 Jones, Hardin, 384n194, 405n126, 420n218 Keto, George J., 428n54, 429n60 Jones, J. T., 461n108 Key, David M., 357n192
Jones, John J., 367n69 Keyes, Lawrence J., 320n84 Jones, Ralph A., 432n76 Keyes, W. Noel, 489n111 Jones, Vincent C., 294n2 Kieffer, William B., 386n15, 386n16 Jordan, C. Y., 376n128 Kiehn, R. W., 461n112 Jordan, Harry S., 374n118, 376n131, Kilgore, Dana E., 423n24 409n151, 411n161, 412n167, 412n168, Killian, James R., Jr., 397n75, 406n126
434n108, 435n109, 461n111 Kimberling, Cleon V., 335n21
Jordan, L. E., 435n116 Kinch, Sandra, 465n141
Joseph, James A., 470n177 King, Chalmers C., 342n151 Joy, K. N., 445n13, 455n73 King, David, 431n74 King, L. D. P., 411n161
Kahn, E. J., Jr., 469n167 King, Llewellyn, 467n152 Kahn, J. S., 443n179 King, Michael, 470n178, 485n88 Kakehi, Hirotake, 353n141 King, W. C., 460n107, 461n111 Kanda, C. F., 378n145 Kinoshita, Toichiro, 353n141
Kaplan, Joseph S., 381n171 Kinsman, Simon, 391n43, 451n47
Kapral, 347n62 Kirkwood, James B., 458n94
Notes Index 603 Kirschbaum, Eugene J., 482n63 Lamoureux, V. B., 321n102 Kiste, Robert C., 296n19, 468n162, 469n164, Lamping, Neal E., 471n183
471n181, 471n183, 484n77 Lancaster, O. E., 407n134
Kistiakowsky, George B., 404n118 Land, Charles E., 478n34
Klarmann, Joseph, 465n141 Landon, Kurt M., 306n34
Klein, Milton, 412n167, 412n168 Landress, James R., 379n153
Kleinbaum, David G., 487n101 Landry, R. B., 303n3
Klement, Alfred W., Jr., 406n128, 416n188, Lang, Ernest J., 302n86, 302n90, 460n104
420n21, 421n222, 434n105, 446n24 Langham, Wright H., 356n181, 375n123,
Kley, G., 469n171 384n195, 406n128, 410n157, 420n217, Knapp, Harold A., 336n28, 407n130, 421n221, 421n221, 433n88, 433n90, 433n91, 433n81, 433n82, 433n84, 433n85, 433n86, 434n96, 434n97, 434n99, 434n101, 433n87, 433n89, 433n90, 433n91, 433n92, 435n108, 466n144 433n93, 433n94, 434n95, 434n96, 434n97, Langsdorf, Alexander S., 403n113
434n100, 434n101, 436n119, 466n144, Lantz, W. F., 329n97
483n72 Lapp, Ralph E., 298n36, 299n41, 350n120,
Knapp, M. W., 458n89 380n166, 383n187, 383n192, 404n117,
Knauf, A. S., 325n28 432n76, 465n134, 474n12, 485n91 Kneale, George W., 473n5, 473n6, 475n15, Lapple, C. E., 388n25
486n95 Larrick, George P., 371n98
Knight, Herbert T., 412n166, 412n167 Larsen, P. Reed, 486n95
Knights, John E., 301n74 Larson, Kermit H., 387n24, 401n106, 428155 Knipp, Arthur L., Jr., 426n41 Larson, Oliver W., 412n166, 413n170 Knowlton, Norman P., 302n89 Larus, Joel, 373n108 Knox, Joseph B., 431n70, 443n1, 449n38, Latimer, Wendell M., 381n170
454n66 Lay, James S., Jr., 307n38, 313n4, 317n51,
Kobayashi, Rokuzo, 352n128, 352n130 319n76, 324n10
Kohl, Wilfrid, 416n187 Lazarr, J., 378n147 Kondo, Y., 357n197 Leahy, William D., 295n8
Kohn, Howard, 474n8 Leachman, Robert B., 471n181, 472n187 Kopp, Carolyn, 292n5, 383n190, 385n3 LeBaron, Robert, 305n25, 306n29, 306n33,
Koranda, John J., 462n116 307n42, 307n46, 313n5, 316n42, 317n48, Korver, John A., 449n38 317n59, 319n76, 323n2, 323n5, 369n83, Kraker, George P., 316n43, 320n90, 327nSO, 369n84 327n52, 328n73, 331n121, 331n122, Lecompte, Robert G., 338n74 341n139, 346n5S0, 369n83, 375n125 Lee, Philip K., 410n156, 413n169
Kratzer, Myron B., 463n124 Leehey, Donald J., 323n120, 334n8, 343n156,
Kraus, Sidney, 404n116 347n65, 360n10, 360n14, 362n26, 362n28, Kreith, Frank, 451n48 363n37, 363n38, 363n42, 363n43, 364n48, Krell, Gert, 305n27 364n49, 365n57, 366n59, 366n60, 366n63, Krey, Philip W., 478n34 373n105, 373n108, 374n110, 389n34,
Krutch, Noel, 403n115 389n35, 391n42
Krutilla, John V., 449n40 Leibowitz, Arnold H., 296n18, 484n77 Kuboyama, Aikichi, 358n200, 358n202, Lemons, Lucille, 295n5
358n203 Lenander, Harlan E., 370n85
Kuboyama, Suzu (Mrs. Aikichi Kuboyama), Lent, Peter C., 429n60
358n204 Lerager, Jim, 480n47
Kuchel, Thomas H., 444n4 LeRoy, George V., 304n8, 350n115, 356n180 Kulp, J. Laurence, 384n196, 405n126 Lessard, Edward T., 438n131, 438n132,
Kumatori, Toshiyuki, 359n207 468n158
Kunetka, James W., 295n4 Levoy, Myron M., 408n135 Levy, Barry S., 487n101
Labowitz, Allen M., 446n20 Lewis, E. B., 383n190, 406n126 LaFond, Charles D., 400n96 Lewis, Jack J., 351n124
Laird, Melvin P., 459n97, 471n183 Lewis, Orme, 377n142 Lamb, Floyd R., 322n117, 323n120 Lewis, Richard, 293n11, 467n151
Lambert, David, 407n130 Libassi, F. Peter, 483n72
604 Notes Index Libby, Willard F.,, 345n29, 362n32, 372n100, Luther, Claudia, 482n67
372n101, 372n103, 377n142, 380n167, Lutts, Ralph H., 455n72 380n168, 382n182, 382n187, 383n188, Lynch, Kay, 470n177 383n192, 384n194, 384n195, 384n196, Lynch, O. D. T., Jr., 472n187 385n2, 387n24, 388n25, 388n27, 388n28, Lynn, Laurence E., Jr., 472n186 391n45, 393n52, 396n69, 398n83, 403n115, Lyon, B. C., 332n140, 364n48, 365nS51,
405n125, 405n126, 406n127, 406n128 365n55, 365n56, 366n64, 366n65, 367n66,
Lieber, Michael D., 468n162 367n67, 408n143, 409n144, 410n155
Lieberman, Joseph I., 294n3 Lyon, Carl, 390n38
Lilienthal, David E., 295n5, 295n8, 296n16, Lyon, Joseph L., 478n33, 478n34 297n21, 306n29
Lindsey, Robert, 411n164 Maag, Carl, 307n43, 321n100, 321n101,
Lisco, Hermann, 437n128 368n75, 394n55
List, Robert J., 406n127, 417n197 McArthur, Douglas, 399n93 Liverman, James L., 471n185, 483n69 McArthur, R. D., 463n118
Livingston, M. Stanley, 383n192 McBean, Kelly, 305n19
Lloyd, J. M., 377n141 McBride, John R., 422n12, 430n61, 442n173, Lloyd, Ray D., 478n36 444n6, 445n13, 447n28, 450n45, 451n46, Lloyd-Roberts, Sue, 425n36, 488n105 451n47, 451n49, 452n53, 452n54,
Lo, Clarence Y. H., 306n27 461n110, 463n124, 464n127, 464n132
Lobbia, J. A., 483n74 McClendon, Leslie, 435n117, 444n7 Locke, R. W., 382n186 McCone, John A., 400n100, 403n113,
Lodge, Henry Cabot, 345n24 403n115, 404n119, 404n120, 404n121, Loeb, Benjamin S., 417n192, 424n32, 405n124, 406n129, 407n130, 407n132,
441n166, 444n4 421n221, 423n23, 424n33, 424n34, 428n56
Loeb, Elizabeth Louise, 482n64 McCool, Woodford B., 306n34, 364n43,
Loevinger, Lee, 403n114 364n49, 368n73, 371n92, 371n94, 371n96, Lofland, J. H., 370n87, 371n99 372n101, 372n103, 373n107, 373n109, Logsdon, John M., 411n160 375n122, 378n149, 379n152, 382n187, Long, F. A., 443n4, 449n40 388n28, 389n33, 392n50, 395n66, 397n74,
Loper, Herbert B., 312n126, 316n41, 320n85, 398n79, 403n113, 407n130, 417n194, 320n94, 321n95, 326n47, 326n48, 327nS0, 421n221, 424n32, 426n40, 437n127, 328n74, 328n83, 364n49, 371n94, 371n97, 444n4, 446n20, 447n27, 448n32, 464n125 371n99, 372n103, 373n108, 378n148, McCormack, James, Jr., 296n20, 297n21,
382n187, 387n19, 389n33, 396n69, 304n9, 305n18, 305n21, 305n22, 305n26,
398n79, 400n98 306n29, 306n34, 306n37, 306n38, 307042, Lough, S. Allan, 384n196, 406n128, 432n76 307n45, 308n48, 308n62, 309n65, 310279,
Love, John A., 453n55 311n93, 312n126, 313n2, 313n7, 314n25,
Lovett, Robert A., 319n76 314n28, 315n40, 316n42, 316n47, 316048,
Lowenstein, Robert, 404n120 323n1
Lowrance, William W., 489n110 ‘ McCraw, Tommy F., 341n125, 439n144,
Lucke, E. A., 398n78 442n176, 462n113, 463n123, 469n171, Luedecke, Alvin R., 320n87, 370n85, 370n86, 470n173, 470n177, 472n189 370n88, 389n33, 393n53, 396n70, 397n74, McCrea, Frances B., 396n71 398n78, 398n82, 398n83, 399n90, 399n93, McCrea, James W., 370n85, 378n146,
404n117, 404n119, 404n120, 404n121, 381n169 405n124, 406n129, 419n213, 421n221, McDaniel, Joseph W., 348n84 422n5, 422n12, 424n34, 427n48, 427n51, McDaniel, Paul, 381n179 429n58, 430n61, 430n67, 431n74, 432n76, MacDonald, John C., 378n147, 380n161 440n158, 442n171, 443n179, 443n4, 444n5, © McDonnel, Gerald M., 312ni17
448n32, 455n74, 457n82 MacDougall, D. P., 375n123 Lulejian, Norair M., 321n102, 322n105, MacDougall, John, 396n71
433n85, 441n164, 441n166 MacDougall, Walter A., 407n132
Lunc, Michal, 412n165 McElwreath, William J., 308n52 Lund, Clifton R., 395n64 McGahan, J., 353n138 Lushbaugh, Clarence C., 340n109, 340n115, McGarry, E. V., 371n99
341n123 McGee, William J., 476n21
Notes Index E05 McGinley, E., 345n27, 356n186 Mathews, Everett R., 375n126
McGinnis, 459n97 Mathews, William G., 312n107 411n164, 415n180 Maude, R. C., 315n40
McGuire, Frank G., 408n136, 410n159, Mattison, Lindsay, 434n106
Machado, S. G., 478n37 Maugh, Thomas H., II, 487n100
McHaney, Gailon M., 319n78 Maupin, Clinton S., 347n54, 349n100,
Machta, Lester, 360n14, 360n15, 361n16, 369n79, 390n38, 419n213, 456n77 361n17, 383n189, 384n194, 384n195, Max, Andrew J., 455n74, 456n77 387n21, 406n127, 407n130, 431n74, Maxey, George B., 418n207
446n25, 449n39 May, Michael M., 439n150, 448n33
McKinnon, 372n100 Maynard, Russell H., 324n10, 348n78
McKown, Donald, 410n156 Mays, Charles, 436n119 McLelland, 488n107 Mazuzan, George T., 405n123, 467n153 MacMahon, Brian, 464n134 Meinke, W. Wayne, 309n78 McMahon, Brien, 307n46, 313n2, 313n5, Melman, Seymour, 463n124, 464n126
* 314n28, 317n60 Melvin, F. H., 335n9, 340n110
McMullan, Frank W., 302n91 Mendelsohn, Everett, 303n5 McNamara, Robert S., 455n74 Menker, H. E., 431n74 McNelis, David N., 412n167 Merkle, Theodore C., 408n136, 415n180
McRae, James W., 364n45 Merritt, Melvin L., 460n103 Magnuson, Warren G., 429n58 Metcalf, Lee, 461n109
Magraw, Katherine, 396n72 Mettler, Fred A., 486n91
Mahon, Herschel D., 376n137 Metzger, H. Peter, 449n40, 453n57, 453n538,
Makens, Royal F,, 391n43 453n62, 464n124 Makt, Hiroshi, 351n123 Meyer, Dean D., 374n113, 403n113, 408n143, Malik, Vi, 387n22, 390n37 410n155, 410n156 Malloy, Jane E., 482n64 Mickley, G. Andrew, 316n44 Mancuso, Thomas F,, 473n5, 473n6, 474n7, Midgley, John J., Jr., 316n44
474n9 Midkiff, Frank, 349n103
Manning, Mary, 482n67 Miles, George W., 444n6
Marchino, Michael L., 481n63 Miles, M. E., 475n13 Margolis, Howard, 429n57 Miller, C. E., Jr., 434n105 Mark, Hans, 326n46, 428n54 Miller, R. A., 355n175 Mark, J. Carson, 396n73 Miller, Richard L., 310n80, 487n102
Markle, Gerald E., 396n71 Miller, Robert B., 453n62
Marks, S., 473n6 Miller, Robert E., 430n61, 431n70, 450n45,
Markwith, Carl, 468n162 452n53, 452n54, 453n55, 453n58, 453n63, Marley, W. G., 420n219 455n73, 455n75, 456n77, 457n87, 457n88, Marrow, Chester E., 429n58 458n93, 459n95, 459n96, 459n99, 460n105, Marshall, C. L., 371n96, 384n196 461n108, 462n113, 462n116, 462n117,
Marshall, Eliot, 485n91 463n118, 463n120, 464n127, 464n129 Marshall, George C., 313n4 Miller, Seward, 315n37
Martell, Edward A., 384n195, 406n128, Milliard, Douglas K., 428n55
417n201, 446n24, 448n36 Milligan, Victor M., 419n214, 441n162
Martin, Alan, 485n89 Milliken, Robert, 488n106
Martin, Edwin J., 345n21, 436n121 Mills, Donald H., 427n50 Martin, James E., 426n43, 460n106 Mills, William A., 460n105, 464n126 Martin, James Victor, Jr., 357n197 Minkkinen, Carl, 399n89
Martz, Maxine, 431n73 Minnich, L. A., 373n109 Mason, George, 369n78 Miskel, John A., 417n201
Mason, Leonard, 296n19, 468n164, 484n77 Mitchell, Joseph S., 436n123 Massie, Jeannie, 329n89, 329n94, 329n99, Mitchell, T. B., 471n185, 472n189 330n103, 374n115, 393n53, 418n203 Mitchell, Theodore R., 471n183
Masters, Chris, 470n178 Mitchell, William, 392n50 Matanoski, Genevieve, 475n13 Miyaki, Masashi, 358n203 Matheson, Scott M., 336n28, 478n31, 479n38, §Moghissi, A. A., 419n216
479n39 Mohrbacher, Joseph A., 412n168, 413n169
606 Notes Index
Mole, R. H., 486n97 Nelson, Clifford, 463n124 Moltke, Konrad von, 291n2 Nelson, Eric, 488n107
Molumphey, George C., 355n171 Nelson, R. M., 413n168 Momsen, C. B., 371n94, 378n145 Nervik, Walter E., 471n181 Monroe, Robert R., 373n106, 471n183, Neuman, William F., 384n192, 406n126
476n21, 478n31 Newcombe, C. L., 415n183
Montgomery, C. D., 409n151 Newell, John F., 368n77
Moore, F. E., 325n27 Newgard, John J., 408n135
Moore, J. W., 456n78 Newgarden, George J., III, 345n32, 360n15,
Moore, Milton F., 446n19 361n16
Moore, Raymond T., 432n75 Newman, R. W., 360n14
Moore, William E., 457n85, 470n174 Newsom, I. E., 335n21
Moorman, Thomas S., 360n15 Niblack, Preston, 470n178
Morgan, Elmo, 316n41 Nichols, Kenneth D., 296n12, 345n23, Morgan, George A., 358n200, 358n202, 352n133, 356n186, 357n191, 357n192,
358n204, 359n206 357n194, 359n205, 362n33, 363n39,
Morgan, Karl Z., 384n195, 420n219 363n42, 364n49, 367n71, 368n73, 370n88,
Morina, J. Thomas, 481n61 370n92, 371n96, 371n98
Mork, Harold M., 410n151, 435n108 Nielsen, Julian M., 434n97, 434n99
Morris, Max D., 478n37 Niles, E. W., 364n50
Morrison, David L., 454n64 Nitikin, P. I., 407n134
Morrison, Jane Ann, 482n67 Nixon, Richard M., 460n101, 470n175
Morrissey, John, 414n173 Noerenberg, 459n97
Morrisson, J. L., 338n74 Nolan, William E., 390n37, 390n38, 390n41 Morton, John J., 350n121, 351n122, 351n124 Nordyke, Milo D., 417n201, 443n1, 446n25,
Moseley, Robert D., Jr., 479n45 449n41 Moss, C. Eugene, 293n10 Norris, Robert S., 311n95 Moss, Frank E., 436n120 Northrup, Doyle L., 384n195, 396n73 Movius, Kathy, 457n81 Norton, E. M., 431n74 Mudgett, Charles F,, Jr., 426n41 Noseck, Kenneth A., 399n87 Mueller, M. F.,, 459n95 Novick, Peter, 291n1 Mullen, Omer W., 445n17 Noyes, Dan, 373n106 Muller, Herbert J., 383n191 Nucker, Delmas H., 377n142 Munroe, Robert, 466n143, 480n47
Murphy, N. F, 299n42 Oakley, Donald T., 415n181 Murray, Russ, 415n185 Oakley, W. L., 424n27 Murray, Thomas E., 338n70, 343n156, O’Beirne, Emmet, 347n68 359n205, 370n91, 381n171, 384n196, O’Beirne, Frank, 371n97
389n35 O’ Bryan, Carey L., 379n152, 392n47, 395n66
Musacchio, Carl P., 466n143 Ockenden, Stephen E., 416n185
Musick, K. F.,, 402n108 Odegaard, Lawrence, 376n128
Muskie, Edward S., 466n146 Ogle, William E.,'343n4, 343n5, 346n37,
Mustin, L. M., 469n173 349n98, 354n155, 354n161, 355n168, Myers, Allen B., 370n88 355n170, 355n171, 356n179, 363n40, 364nS0, 367n66, 376n131, 376n135,
Nader, Ralph, 293n9, 473n2 377n138, 377n140, 377n143, 378n146,
Nadler, M. R., 318n61 379n156, 380n160, 380n161, 384n195,
Nagai, Isamu, 352n128, 352n130 387n21, 388n28, 390n37, 391n42, 395n61, Nagler, Kenneth M., 402n112, 407n130, 399n86, 408n139, 409n150, 410n152,
409n150, 428n55 410n156, 424n35, 426n41, 446n25,
Nahas, Gabriel G., 406n126 447n27, 460n106, 463n120 Najarian, Thomas, 474n11 O’Harra, John L., 336n24, 336n31
Nakaizumi, 353n139 Ohashi, Seiichi, 358n203
Nash, Murray L., 433n93 Ohi, Toshio, 350n121 Neas, Maynard, 469n166 Okamura, 350n121
Neill, Robert H., 402n107, 420n220, 451n48 Okazaki, Katsuo, 358n204
Nelson, Andrew G., 298n36 O’ Keefe, Bernard J., 300n62, 324n9, 347n67
Notes Index 607 Olafsen, Jon H., 322n110 Pfau, Richard, 353n135
Olpin, A. Ray, 322n102 Philip, John F,, 429n59, 430n61, 446n20,
Olsen, Lyman J., 464n126 450n45
Olson, L. K., 397n76 Pickett, Harry D., 389n33, 394n60 O’Neill, Dan, 429n57 Pickles, Louis W., 391n43 O’Neill, Layton J., 460n104, 461n110, Pike, Miles, 323n120
462n113 Pike, Sumner T., 313n2, 313n5, 314n28,
Oppenheimer, J. Robert, 294n5, 313n5, 317n59, 323n5
323n4, 381n173 Pilson, Michael E. Q., 471n181
O’ Toole, Thomas J., 489nil1 Pinson, Ernest A., 377n139, 398n78
Oulton, Wilfred E., 425n36 Piper, Arthur M., 430n60 Owens, Gwinn, 312n107, 323n3 Pirie, Robert B., 476n21
Pittman, Frank K., 409n145, 410n156,
Packard, Stephen M., 481n59 435n114
Paganini, Otto, 332n138 Pitzer, Kenneth S., 417n193, 424n32, 425n37 Page, Gordon B., 319n76 Placak, Oliver R., 361n20, 362n26, 362n27, Page, Marshall, Jr., 318n61, 334n3, 389n35, 366n65, 375n127, 376n128, 385n8,
390n41, 454n65 388n26, 388n27, 389n35, 389n37, 390n38,
Palfrey, John G., 442n177 390n41, 391n42, 391n43, 391n44, 391n45, Palmer, Terrance R., 456n80 395n62, 402n110, 402n112, 409n151, Parcell, Walter T., 327n52 411n161, 411n162, 418n203, 422n6, 422n7, Parker, Herbert M., 292n2 422n8, 422n13, 423n19, 424n26, 427n48,
Parr, R. W., 403n114 427n49, 427n51, 428n56, 429n59, 430n61,
Parson, Nels A., 415n184 430n66, 432n75, 432n76, 433n89, 434n96, Parsons, Hershell E., 361n23, 365n51, 434n99, 435n109, 435n114, 435n115, 365n53, 365n56, 365n57, 366n61, 366n64, 435n116, 439n149, 442n171, 444n6, 367n66, 367n69, 389n35, 398n84, 426n41 446n25, 450n45, 455n75, 456n78, 456n80,
Parsons, William S., 306n29 457n85, 457n86
Partridge, Earle E., 381n177 Plank, Harold F., 324n14, 346n33, 346n44, Pastore, John O., 440n156, 440n158, 361n16, 365n55, 367n66, 376n137,
442n177, 456n76 377n138, 386n14, 386n16, 394n60,
Pate, Elbert W., 311n92 461n108
Patric, William C., 431n73 Platz, Albert L., 331n133 Patzer, Robert G., 441n161, 463n123 Plesset, Ernst H., 381n179, 382n181, 382n182 Pauling, Linus C., 383n192, 406n126 Pochin, E. E., 486n97
Pautzke, Clarence, 458n92 Pollard, Emest C., 405n126 Payne, Donald W., 454n67 Polmar, Norman, 415n184
Pearson, Paul B., 323n120, 333n158, 334n6, Ponton, Jean, 293n13, 313n4, 319n75,
334n7, 334n8, 335n20, 335n21, 336n32, 321n100, 321n101, 326n47, 361n16, 337n38, 337n44, 338n56, 338n57, 340n109, 361n25, 368n75, 394n55, 401n102, 341n128, 341n132, 341n134, 341n138, 418n203, 427n48 341n139, 341n140, 342n145, 342n146, Potter, G. D., 341n125, 485n90 342n149, 352n132, 358n198, 359n205, Potter, John, 412n168
371n99, 384n196, 387n24 Potts, J. Calvin, 384n195, 384n196, 388n27,
Peel, Frank D., 350n113, 436n121 388n28 Pelto, Pertti J., 469n164 Powell, Clinton C., 393n51 Pendleton, Robert C., 431n72, 431n73 Powell, J. W., 416n185 Penwell, Clifford R., 395n61, 435n116 Pratt, Hugh S., 437n127
Perge, Alex F., 431n74 Prescott, Keith, 482n68 Perkins, W. W., 298n37, 353n138 Preuss, Paul T., 298n32, 304n10, 304ni5, Perls, H. F., 456n80 306n31, 308n48, 328n70, 328n77, 330n107, Perry, C. H., 309n78 339n80, 350n112, 360n7, 364n50 Pesto-Edwards, Marilyn M., 482n66 Price, Charles C., 402n106
Peters, Robert L., 472n190 Price, K. W., 461n111
Peterson, K. R., 454n66 Prickett, D. I., 458n89 Peterson, Malcolm, 441n164 Prince, H. J., 320n79 Peto, Richard, 473n5 Purcell, Benjamin H., 368n77
608 Notes Index Quarles, Donald A., 361n22, 369n83, 369n84 429n59, 430n66, 430n67, 431n68, 431n70,
Quesada, Elwood R., 303n3 432n75, 432n76, 436n118, 436n121,
439n149, 441n164, 442n170, 442n171,
Rabb, David D., 450n44 442n172, 442n174, 442n175, 442n176,
Rabi, 1. I., 343n156, 352n132, 362n32, 442n178, 443n179, 445n15, 445n18,
364n49 446n19, 446n25, 447n29, 447n30, 448n32,
Radford, Edward P.,, 485n91 448n33, 449n38, 450n44, 450n45, 451n49, Rainey, Trudie L., 477n24 455n75, 456n76, 457n81, 457n84, 457n86,
Rallison, Marvin L., 478n36 458n89, 458n93, 461n108
Ramey, James T., 380n163, 396n68, 399n93, Regnier, John E., 454n64, 464n132
400n100, 403n115, 465n135 Reichelderfer, F. W., 319n78, 406n128 Randolph, Philip L., 451n47 Reider, Roy, 363n40, 390n41, 411n161
Ranke, Leopold von, 291n2 Reines, Frederick, 306n36
Rapp, E. G., 419n210, 443n179 Reischauer, Edwin O., 358n201
Rapp, R. R., 378n145 Reiss, Eric, 436n119
Rarrick, H. L., 456n77, 461n108 Reissland, John A., 473n6
Rasberry, Robert W., 476n18 Rex, Daniel F., 397n77 Ravetz, Jerry, 487n100 Rex, Milton A., 313n1, 419n213, 422n7
Ray, Dixie Lee, 470n175 Reynolds, Earle, 397n76
Ray, Roger, 293n15, 398n82, 471n181, Reynolds, Harry L., 408n136, 442n173 471n183, 472n186, 472n189, 476n22 Reynolds, L. J., Jr., 389n35, 395n65
Ray, Verne F., 469n164 Reynolds, Miles, Jr., 454n64 Ray, William H., 305n18, 347n67, 467n154 Reynolds, W. B., 370n88
Rayfield, Allen E., 379n152 Rhodes, Robert L., 480n56 Raymond, D. G., 355n171 Ribicoff, Abraham, 405n122, 432n75
Reardon, Steven L., 295n7, 305n27 Rice, C. M., 412n165
Rechen, Henry J. L., 331n127, 406n128 Rich, Bryce L., 450n42
Redier, Roy, 460n106 Richardson, W. D., 346n53 Redman, Les, 465n136 Richie, Frank G., 371n99, 372n100 Reed, J. S., 337n48 Rinsky, Robert A., 475n14, 475n15 Reed, Jack W., 360n15, 401n101, 460n106 Robbins, Jacob, 438n130 Reedy, George, 441n166 Roberts, Dorothy, 482n68
Reeve, James F., 415n181 Roberts, H. R., 462n113
Reeves, James E., 322n117, 331n118, Robertson, Reuben B., Jr., 380n168 332n136, 334n7, 337n48, 338n67, 339n82, Robertson, W. E., 461n112
341n124, 343n2, 346n53, 347n54, Robinette, C. Dennis, 480n50 350n113, 354n165, 359n6, 360n7, 360n8, Robinson, Derek, 488n106 360n9, 360n14, 361n16, 361n24, 362n28, Robinson, Fellie F., 347n62, 348n82, 348n84 362n29, 362n32, 363n40, 364n45, 364n48, Robinson, J. C., 315n40 364n49, 365n5S1, 365n56, 366n61, 366n62, Robison, W. E., 454n65 366n64, 367n66, 367n69, 369n79, 369n80, Roehlk, Otto H., 419n213, 423n19, 427n51,
370n85, 371n99, 374n110, 374n113, 429n59, 431n70, 432n75, 435n114, 374n118, 375n122, 375n123, 375n124, 435n116, 436n118, 444n6, 445n13, 375n125, 376n135, 379n157, 380n159, 455n74, 455n75, 456n77, 456n80, 456n81, 380n169, 385n4, 385n7, 385n8, 386n11, 457n85, 458n91 386n12, 387n21, 387n22, 387n24, 388n26, Roesch, William C., 292n2 388n27, 388n28, 389n35, 389n36, 390n38, Rogers, Frank H., 374n118, 376n128 390n39, 390n40, 390n41, 391n42, 391n44, Rogers, Leo A., 457n85 392n45, 393n52, 394n60, 394n61, 395n63, Rogers, Lester R., 452n53
398n84, 400n99, 401n100, 401n101, Rolph, Elizabeth S., 467n153 401n104, 402n109, 403n113, 407n130, Romer, R. H., 293n11, 467n151 407n131, 409n145, 409n147, 409n148, Roncalio, T., 455n72 409n150, 409n151, 411n163, 417n199, Roper, F. E., 343n2 417n202, 418n203, 418n207, 419n211, Roper, Harry M., 316n42, 381n170 419n213, 421n1, 421n3, 421n4, 421n5, Rose, Joseph F., 402n109 422n10, 423n23, 423n24, 423n25, 424n26, Rosen, Jack, 399n&6 425n37, 427n50, 427n51, 428n55, 428n56, Rosenberg, Bruce A., 291n5
Notes Index 609 Rosenberg, David Allen, 294n3, 295n8, 304n6 374n119, 375n121, 375n122, 375n125, Rosenberg, Howard L., 293n16, 330n106, 375n128, 380n159, 384n196, 385n8,
479n47 389n36, 398n84, 399n90, 430n61
Rosenthal, Alan, 472n1 Sanders, Ralph, 423n21
Rosholt, Robert L., 410n158 Sapirie, S. R., 370n88 Rosi, Eugene J., 404n116 Sapolsky, Harvey M., 415n184 Ross, Joseph F., 428n55 Sattizahn, James E., 302n86, 302n87, 302n90, Rossano, August T., Jr., 334n6 413n170, 461n111 Rossi, Harald H., 485n89, 485n91, 486n97 Saunders, David I., 394n57 Rostow, Walt W., 447n28, 447n29, 447n30 Savitz, David A., 475n14
Rotblat, Joseph, 474n9, 485n91 Sawyer, Grant, 456n76
Roth, Guenther, 291n4 Scalf, Marion R., 458n91
Roth, H. M., 403n113 Schilling, Warner R., 304n6, 305n27
Rouleau, J. K., 379n152 Schlatter, George F., 306n34, 307n38, 307n42, Rowden, Marcus A., 453n63 307n43, 307n44, 307n45, 312n126, 313n2,
Rowen, W. H., 363n36 313n4, 315n38, 316n41, 316n42, 316n43, Rowland, Richard H., 345n21, 436n121 316n47, 320n86, 320n90, 321n95
Rowsell, F. D., 436n118 Schlesinger, James R., 455n71, 478n31,
Roy, T. C., 462n113 479n38
Rubin, Julius H., 445n16, 447n29 Schluchter, Wolfgang, 291n4
Rucker, V. L., 391n43 Schmidt, Howard R., 410n159, 414n173 Ruff, Tilman A., 471n184 Schneider, Andrew, 474n12 Rusk, Dean, 441n166, 444n4, 447n26 Schneider, Keith, 482n68
Russell, Demetrius H., 309n77 Schneiderman, Marvin, 473n5 Russell, James S., 295n9, 296n11, 296n15, Schnittke, Raymond I., 395n66, 396n69 296n16, 296n20, 297n26, 298n36, 298n38, Schoengold, Carole R., 422n6 301n74, 303n93, 303n94, 303n2, 306n31, Schoening, H. W., 336n35, 337n47
307n43 Schofield, William U., 323n120
Russell, R. Scott, 420n217, 420n218 Schooley, Herschel, 357n188
Rust, John H., 334n6, 336n29, 336n31, Schreiber, Raemer E., 407n135, 408n139,
336n32, 336n33, 341n126 408n140, 408n141, 408n142, 409n145,
Rutherford, R., 347n54 409n148, 409n151, 410n159, 411n163, Rynkiewich, Michael A., 471n183 412n166, 412n167, 412n168, 413n169, 434n108, 447n27
Saario, Doris J., 430n60 Schroeder, Robert W., 412n165, 414n173
Sabin, Philip, 488n103 Schulte, Harry F., 315n37 Sackton, Frank J., 323n2 Schultz, Vincent, 461n110
Sadler, Christine, 382n187 Schumchyk, M. J., 368n74 Saffer, Thomas H., 293n14, 480n47 Schwartz, L. L., 449n38
Sagan, Leonard A., 440n153, 465n141, Schwartz, Shepard G., 330n106
486n96, 486n97 Schweitzer, Albert, 406n126
St. Denis, Natalie Y., 489n111 Schwethelm, H. F, 329n98
Salaff, Stephen, 359n207 Scolman, T. T., 461n111
Salisbury, Morse, 324n8, 337n42, 340n114, Scott, James K., 382n184
351n122, 357n191, 363n41, 364n44, Scott, Richard, 416n191 371n96, 372n100, 372n101, 372n102, Scoville, Herbert, Jr., 298n38, 349n99 372n103, 378n149, 378n150, 379n152, Seaborg, Glenn T., 417n192, 417n193, 382n187, 392n47, 396n70, 398n83, 417n196, 417n198, 417n199, 419n210,
400n98, 404n121, 405n124 419n213, 421n222, 421n4, 422n6, 424n27, Samuel, John H., 377n137 424n32, 425n35, 425n37, 425n38, 425n39, Sanders, Fred W., 412n166, 412n167, 426n45, 427n48, 427n50, 429n58, 430n55,
412n168 430n67, 432n78, 434n101, 436n120,
Sanders, Joe B., 323n120, 333n2, 334n6, 439n150, 440n156, 440n158, 441n164, 334n7, 334n8, 335n10, 335n17, 336n24, 441n166, 441n167, 442n176, 442n177, 338n56, 341n122, 341n123, 341n124, 443n3, 443n4, 444n5, 444n6, 444n8, 342n149, 360n14, 361n17, 366n63, 445n12, 445n15, 445n16, 445n17, 446n18, 374n111, 374n115, 374n116, 374n118, 446n20, 446n23, 447n26, 447n28, 447n29,
610 Notes Index 447n30, 448n32, 449n37, 450n44, 456n76, 390n39, 390n41, 399n86, 401n103, 457n89, 458n92, 458n93, 459n95, 459n97, 401n104, 403n113, 408n138, 408n142, 460n102, 461n108, 461n109, 461n111, 408n143, 409n147, 410n156, 410n159, 463n124, 464n126, 466n144, 466n146, 411n161, 412n166, 412n168, 419n213, 466n147, 469n167, 469n168, 469n170, 426n41, 432n78, 460n106, 465n136,
469n172 465n137, 465n138
Seal, Morgan S., 422n11, 430n65, 431n73, Shlaer, Simon, 308n52, 346n37
435n114, 448n36 Shleien, Bernard, 478n34
Sedgwick, Rodney L., 358n202 Sholl, Debra, 482n66 Seegmiller, A. C., 342n151 Shore, Bernard W., 465n143
Seely, L. B., 327n50 Shore, Roy E., 475n14 Sellar, Jeffrey, 488n105 Short, Joseph, 307n47 Seller, John A., 337n48 Shreve, J. D., 393n53
Selove, Walter, 406n127 Shulman, Nahum R., 350n112, 467n155 Senter, William O., 381n177, 381n178 Shute, Ellison C., 428n55, 429n59, 430n61 Servis, John D., 324n10, 343n5, 344n6, Siek, Robert D., 453n56, 454n65, 464n124 344n7, 344n8, 346n35, 346n42, 346n45, Silver, William J., 451n47 347n54, 348n85, 355n171, 355n173, Silverman, Charlotte, 440n154
355n175 Silverman, Louis B., 403n113
Sette, Oscar, 351n126 Simmons, Michael, 425n36
Sever, Lowell E., 474n10 Simpson, John, 488n104, 488n106 Sewell, Duane C., 326n46, 354n161, 360n14, Singer, S. Fred, 400n96
396n73, 401n101, 407n130, 407n131, Sitton, Jack, 423n25 477n23 Skjei, R. E., 454n65 Seymour, Allyn H., 428n55, 437n125 Sladen, Fred W., Jr., 365n57
Shaffer, J. N., 294n1 Smale, Richard F, 458n91 Shahn, Ben, 358n200 Smith, A. L., 370n88
Shannon, Robert L., 312n110 Smith, Allen E., 411n162, 422n11, 470n174 Sharp, Robert, 349n92, 350n112, 436n121 Smith, Gerard C., 352n128, 352n133,
Sharpe, Thomas J., 420n220, 456n75 357n194, 378n151, 379n152
Shaw, D., 308n52 Smith, Joan, 488n106
Shaw, David F., 384n196 Smith, K. Wayne, 416n186
451n46 392n51, 394n60
Shaw, R. H., 447n27, 447n28, 448n33, Smith, Max E., 390n39, 390n41, 391n43,
Shedd, W. E., 471n185 Smith, Myrl F, 421n1 Shelton, A. Vay, 378n145, 378n146, 380n169, § Smith, Nicholas M., Jr., 381n170, 381n171
392n45, 428n56 Smith, Paul B., 453n56
Shelton, Frank H., 323n6, 343n1, 379n156, Smith, R. Jeffrey, 483n73
398n82 Smith, Ralph Carlisle, 294n4, 346n49
Sherwin, Martin J., 294n3 Smith, Robert N., 476n19 Shilling, Charles W., 384n196, 406n128 Smith, Roger, 293n10
Shilte, Walter L., 391n43 Smith, Vallard C., 377n143 Shipman, Thomas L., 304n12, 308n51, Smyth, Henry D., 313n5, 370n84, 381n171, 308n52, 308n54, 308n57, 308n60, 309n66, 381n172 309n69, 310n87, 310n89, 312n112, Snapp, Roy B., 306n29, 306n34, 314n25, 312n125, 312n126, 314n11, 314n16, 314n28, 328n80, 342n145, 352n132, 314n25, 314n27, 315n35, 315n36, 315n37, 354n164, 358n199, 381n171 316n41, 317n60, 318n61, 318n68, 320n79, Snow, Bruce V., 405n126, 431n73
320n80, 322n117, 322n118, 324n11, Snyder, Leon A., 438n134 324n12, 324n13, 327n52, 331n119, Sober, Sidney, 417n197 331n120, 338n66, 343nS, 344n6, 344n7, Solo, Pam, 476n18 344n9, 346n45, 347n67, 348n70, 353n142, Sondhaus, C. A., 436n121
354n166, 356n181, 356n183, 356n186, Sorom, E. R., 462n113 359n2, 360n9, 360n13, 361n16, 361n17, Southerland, Leonard B., 377n143, 378n147 361n24, 362n28, 362n31, 368n76, 375n123, Southwick, Rodney L., 307n47, 328n81,
376n129, 376n133, 380n158, 384n195, 329n95, 351n126, 357n188, 358n200, 385n8, 386n9, 386n17, 389n35, 390n38, 363n41, 363n43, 371n96, 372n100,
Notes Index 611 372n101, 373n104, 379n153, 392n47, Stewart, Alice M., 464n134, 465n141, 473nS,
392n48, 403n113, 430n64, 431n68 473n6, 475n15, 486n95 Soutou, Georges-Henri, 470n178 Stewart, C. B., 397n74, 399n93 Spain, Paul W., 343n5, 354n165, 355n171, Stewart, Dixon, 442n172, 442n176
373n105, 375n122 Stewart brothers, 333n2, 334n8
Spellman, Francis Cardinal, 383n192 Stickle, George W., 365n56 Spence, Roderick W., 302n86, 302n87, Stobie, G. P., 401n103, 409n145 408n143, 410n157, 412n165, 413n169 Stoddart, L. A., 336n27
Spencer, J. D., 412n168 Stone, Jeremy J., 463n124, 464n126 Spendlove, George Arthur, 322n105, 335n10, Stone, Robert S., 302n89 341n139, 342n140, 342n142, 342n145, Stopinski, Orin W., 378n145, 384n195,
342n149 409n151, 410n153, 411n161, 460n106
Spradley, James P., 471n183 Storer, John B., 486n97 Staats, Elmer B., 404n120 Storey, Robert G., 449n37
Stakman, E. C., 343n156 Storry, Richard, 358n201 Stanley, Charles, 302n86, 302n90 Stover, Betsy J., 337n37 Stannard, J. Newell, 299n40, 419n215, Strabala, F, I., 462n117
477n26 Stranathan, Leland S., 327nS0, 361n16
Stans, Maurice H., 404n120 Strauss, Lewis L., 306n34, 323n120, 333n156, Stanwood, H. A., Jr., 382n186 337n40, 337n45, 340n106, 340n107, Starbird, Alfred D., 293n15, 373n109, 342n145, 342n149, 343n156, 352n133, 374n119, 375n121, 375n122, 375n123, 353n135, 357n191, 359n206, 361n22, 375n125, 376n130, 378n149, 379n157, 363n33, 364n49, 367n70, 367n72, 370n91, 380n159, 380n160, 380n161, 380n162, 370n92, 371n93, 371n94, 371n99, 372n103, 380n163, 380n168, 386n8, 386n11, 387n19, 373n108, 373n109, 376n130, 377n142, 387n20, 387n22, 387n24, 388n25, 388n26, 378n148, 378n150, 379n157, 380n167, 388n27, 388n28, 389n31, 389n33, 389n35, 380n168, 382n180, 382n187, 385n2, 391n45, 392n47, 392n48, 392n51, 393n53, 387n19, 389n31, 389n33, 389n35, 392n50, 393n54, 394n61, 395n62, 395n66, 396n69, 393n51, 393n52, 394n60, 395n67, 396n58, 396n73, 397n74, 398n78, 398n79, 398n82, 397n73, 397n76, 398n79, 398n82, 400098,
398n83, 399n93, 400n98, 401n100, 401n106, 407n132 401n102, 401n103, 401n104, 402n108, Street, Kenneth, 388n25, 407n132 402n109, 403n113, 404n121, 405n124, Stringfellow, Douglas R., 332n149, 337n45, 407n130, 407n132, 417n202, 418n203, 340n106, 340n107, 342n145, 342n149,
418n204, 418n205, 423n23, 426n43, 363n39
428n56 Stumpf, John H., 351n122
Starner, Martha L., 310n87, 396n70 Sturges, William R., Jr., 307n44, 308n48,
Starr, C., 321n99 309n65, 319n73, 320n94
Stason, E. Blythe, 489n111 Succetti, Mrs. Robert, 464n124 Stassen, Harold E., 359n206, 385n2 Sugimoto, Katsuji, 357n197
Stattel, Raymond, 322n112 Sullivan, Walter, 400n96
Stearns, R. T., 455n70 Sutherland, Ross, 369n79 Steel, Gertrude, 382n183, 382n184 Sutow, Wataru W., 437n128, 438n131 Steele, James H., 335n9, 335n11, 340n110 Swain, David L., 486n93
Steele, Karen Dorm, 474n10 Swartout, J. A., 403n113
Stein, Eric, 400n97 Swartz, Henry L., 399n87
Stein, John L., 420n220 Swartzman, Daniel, 483n70
Stempler, Jack L., 471n182 Syives, Richard T., 294n4, 326n46, 446n24 Stenehjem, Michele, 474n10 Sylvester, John, 370n86, 371n97, 371n99
Stephenson, H. K., 324n15 Symonds, J. L., 488n104
Sternglass, Ernest J., 293n12, 464n132, Szasz, Ferenc Morton, 487n102 465n135, 465n138, 465n140, 465n141, Szilli, Paul, 321n102 465n142
Stetson, R. L., 361n24 Taft, Robert W., 379n157 Steuer, Neil B., 453n63 Talley, Wilson K., 428n54 Stevens, Walter, 479n37 Tammaro, Alfonso, 308n52, 315n41, Stevenson, Ralph L., 315n41 356n186, 371n99
612 Notes Index Tamplin, Arthur R., 439n150, 465n142, 432n78, 434n97, 434n99, 434n101, 466n143, 466n145, 466n146, 466n147 466n146, 467n147 Tape, Gerald F.,, 436n120, 445n15, 457n89 Torrey, Lee, 474n12, 478n35
Tappan, J. Tell, 457n85 Totter, John R., 434n101, 466n147, 4692169 Taranto, Leon B., 481n56 Toyosaki, Hiromitsu, 470n178
Tate, David A., 326n50 Train, Russell E., 459n96 Tate, Dennis, 413n172 Trainor, James, 415n183 Tate, Merze, 357n192, 467n154 Trapnell, Edward R., 472n]1 Taylor, George F,, 311n92 Trapp, John, 360n14
Taylor, Lauriston S., 308n56, 386n10 Traynor, Harry S., 382n186, 382n187 Taylor, Leland B., 301n69, 307n43, 315n31, Tredway, Lora, 481n63
324n14, 344n16, 365n51, 386n15 Trevithick, John P., 352n133
Tefft, J. E., 367n66 Trum, Bernard F., 334n6, 334n7, 334n8,
Telegadas, Kosta, 402n112 336n31, 340n109, 340n119, 341n122,
Teller, Edward, 312n107, 326n46, 407n132, 341n126, 341n128, 341n132, 341n138,
428n54, 443n1 342n149, 387n24
Templeton, W. L., 420n219 Truman, Harry S., 295n8, 297n21, 304n7,
Terhune, R. W., 463n118 313n4
Terrill, James G., Jr., 331n122, 335n9, Trumble, Robert, 469n165 341n127, 341n140, 360n9, 361n19, Truslow, Edith C., 294n4 361n20, 362n26, 362n27, 364n45, Tsuge, Yukio, 350n121 372n100, 375n127, 385n8, 388n26, Tsuzuki, Masao, 351n124, 358n202, 358n203 391n42, 391n44, 395n62, 402n110, Turkevich, John, 388n25 420n220, 430n65, 432n75, 432n76, Tuttle, L. W., 316n47
439n142, 452n52 Twenhofel, W. S., 454n64, 463n120
Terry, Luther L., 431n74, 439n146 Tyler, Carroll L., 295n9, 297n26, 303n1,
Terry, Richard D., 298n40 305n21, 306n29, 306n34, 306n38, 307n43, Tetreault, Steve, 489n115 307n45, 308n48, 309n65, 309n78, 313n2, Tewes, Howard A., 448n33, 449n38, 450n41 313n7, 314n12, 314n28, 314n29, 315n35,
Thalgott, Robert H., 413n172, 432n75, 315n40, 316n41, 316n47, 316n48, 317nS0, 432n76, 435n114, 439n149, 442n173, 317n54, 319n78, 320n90, 320n94, 322n117, 445n13, 446n25, 447n29, 447n30, 448n34, 323n120, 326n48, 327n50, 327n51, 327n54, 451n45, 451n47, 451n49, 452n51, 454n65, 327n56, 327n58, 327n59, 328n63, 328n64,
454n66, 457n87, 458n89, 460n101, 328n70, 328n72, 328n77, 328n84, 330n107, 460n106, 461n108, 461n111, 463n120 331n122, 332n153, 333n158, 334n7, 334n8,
Thatcher, Lynn, 463n124 335n20, 336n29, 338n58, 338n61, 338n62, Thomas, C., 302n82, 312n123, 354n149, 338n67, 338n72, 338n75, 339n78, 339n80,
380n159 339n82, 339n101, 340n102, 341n139,
Thomas, C. S., 377n142 343n153, 343n1, 345n26, 359n3, 359n4, Thomas, William L., Jr, 383n189 359n5, 360n9, 360n10, 360n11, 360n15, Thompsett, Robert E., 323n119, 335n17, 361n16, 361n17, 369n83, 369n84, 370n85,
337n39, 341122 419n213, 424n26 :
Thompson, A. H., 377n140 Tyson, Charles M., 343n4 Thompson, G. D. Carlyle, 431n72, 440n151
Thompson, J. K., 413170, 445n17 Udall, Stewart L., 425n35, 469n167, 4690168,
Thompson, R. C., 340n108 Uhl, Michael 293n14, 301n74, 476n17 Thompson, Shelby, 321n97, 329n95, 340n107, Ullman, Al, 448n32 , : 383n187, 392n51, 396n70, 403n115 Ulsamer, Edgar, 476n20
Thye, Edward J., 403n114 Underhill, Robert M., 346n46
Titus, A. Costandina, 293n14, 476n17, 482n64 Upton, Arthur C., 292n2, 486n92, 486n97
Tobey, Franklin, 440n151 Urban, V., 441n162 Tobin, Jack A., 297n23, 377n142, 468n161,
469n166, 471n181 Vance, Cyrus, 446n26
Toman, John, 443n1, 455n70 Vance, Harold S., 383n192 Tompkins, Edythalena, 464n126, 464n133 Van Cleve, Ruth G., 470n177 Tompkins, Paul C., 395n66, 421n222, 432n77, = Vandergrift, 302n85
Notes Index 613 Van der Hoven, Isaac, 409n150 Weeden, Robert B., 458n92 Van der Smissen, E., 453n56, 465n141 Wegman, David H., 487n101
Van Dyke, Jon, 467n154, 484n78 Weideman, Elizabeth, 358n200 Van Middlesworth, Lester, 420n218, 421n222 Weir, James E., Jr., 423n24
Van Zandt, James E., 338n74 Weisgall, Jonathan M., 468n162, 484n78
Veater, Joel G., 441n164 Weiss, Edward S., 438n137, 439n139,
Veenstra, Robert H., 335n17, 336n34, 337n48, 439n142, 439n143, 440n153, 440n154 341n128, 341n132, 341n138, 342n145 Weiss, H. V., 468n157 Vermillion, Henry G., 369n78, 378n150, Werdig, G. W., 420n220
391n44, 392n48, 395n62, 430n64, Werrell, Kenneth P., 416n185 440n151, 442n170, 448n33, 453n55, Werth, Glenn C., 447n26, 448n33, 449n37,
453n57, 453n58, 453n63, 456n76, 449n41, 450n42
461n109, 464n127 West, Chris L., 464n131
Vespe, Vincent C., 421n5 West, Jaton, 394n55
Viereck, Leslie A., 428n57 Western, A. W., 462n113 Vinciguerra, John V., 439n148, 463n118 Western, Forrest, 367n71, 382n180, 382n181,
Vine, James D., 423n24 384n196, 392n45, 403n115, 432n78, Violet, Charles E., 395n63, 395n64, 423n24, 452n53
423n25, 424n26 Wethington, Thomas M., 327n52
Viscuso, Mary Jo, 394n55 Wexler, Harry, 406n127
Visscher, Maurice B., 403n114, 403n115 Whipple, G. Hoyt, 449n38
Voelz, George L., 315n37 Whipple, Harry O., 302n89, 304n12, 305n18,
Voillequé, Paul G., 478n36 311n98
Vortman, Luke J., 443n1 Whitaker, Don, 347n63 White, Eaton T., 476n20
Wachholz, Bruce W., 470n176, 478n36 White, John P., 476n19
Wait, R. Dean, 423n25 White, Margaret R., 420n218
Walk, A. R., 344n16 White, Thomas N., 301n73, 304n15, 305n18, Walker, Edward J., 386n18 312n112, 312n117, 312n118, 312n126, Walker, J. Samuel, 292n4, 405n123, 438n137, 312n127, 313n128, 314n29, 315n41,
439n143, 467n153 318n67, 324n12, 347n67, 349n98, 356n186,
Walker, Richard I., 292n3, 316n44, 325n23 359n2, 360n15, 361n16, 361n24, 366n64,
Waltz, Ralph, 470n175 378n145
Ward, Don C., 451n47 Whitley, Vivian, 354n159
Warren, Andrew J., 382n184 Whitman, Arthur J., 441n162, 442n176, Warren, Shields L., 304n8, 308n62, 314n11, 447n29, 461n109 314n12, 314n14, 314n17, 315n35, 315n40, Whittle, James L., 484n79 315n41, 317n48, 318n67, 319n78, 320n79, Wick, Gerald, 466n143
320n91, 321n99, 322n105, 328n72, Wiesner, Jerome B., 448n32 381n170, 381n171, 382n184 Wignall, Paul R., 348n75, 394n60, 399n&6,
Warren, Stafford L., 318n64, 387n24 409n150
Wasserman, Harvey, 301n74, 332n148, Wilcox, Floyd Wesley, 369n81, 394n61,
373n106, 393n51, 465n140, 474n9 395n64, 395n65, 408n144, 409n151,
Wasserman, R. H., 420n218 410n153, 435n109 Watari, S., 358n199 Wildavsky, Aaron, 489n110 Waters, J. A., 358n199 Wilder, Edward W., 382n184 Watkins, Arthur V., 332n149, 401n106 Wilks, Willard E., 415n181
Watters, H. J., 396n73 Williams, A. L., 482n68 Watts, Susan, 488n105 Williams, C. E., 463n]20
Weart, Spencer R., 292n4, 396n71 Williams, Christopher C., 480n54
Weary, S. E., 370n86 Williams, Franklin Haydn, 471n179 Weaver, Charles L., 402n110, 402n112, Williams, Hill, 469n168 428n56, 429n60, 452n52, 452n53 Williams, Roger, 487n100
Weaver, Lynn E., 443n179, 443n1 Williamson, Francis S. L., 428n55 Webb, Julian H., 309n78, 310n80, 315n38 Williamson, Marvin M., 443n]1
Weber, Francis J., 406n128 Williamson, Stanley R., 355n171
Webster, Nelson, 342n151 Wilms, Heinz G., 293n10 |
614 Notes Index Wilson, Carroll L., 295n9, 304n9, 305n18, Woodward, Kent T., 468n157
381n170 Woolfenden, Jack, 471n181
Wilson, Charles E., 370n91, 370n92, 371n93, Worf, D. L., 333n155, 384n194
371n94, 380n168 Work, G. A., 365n51
Wilson, David L., 472n190 Worman, Frederick C., 318n61
Wilson, George C., 416n186 Worth, Daniel F., Jr., 362n26, 369n83,
Wilson, Richard, 487n100 369n84
Wimber, Donald E., 419n215 Wray, W., 417n201 Winant, Frank I., Jr., 297n30, 299n45, 301n73, © Wrenn, Catherine B., 451n48
302n85, 315n41, 320n79, 327n50 Wright, G. C., 372n100
Wines, Michael, 480n51 Wruble, Donald T., 429n59, 430n61, 449n38,
Winkel, Adrian P., 470n177 453n56, 460n104, 462n116 Winograd, Berton, 330n106 Wulzen, D. W., 294n1 Winter, Charles, 458n92 Wyatt, William H., 360n15 Wise, David, 476n18
Withington, F. S., 313n2 Yamasaki, Fumio, 353n141 Wolfe, John N., 428n55, 429n58, 429n59, Yelinek, L. J., 457n81
429n60, 437n125 Yergin, Daniel, 299n47
Wolfe, John W., 402n108, 402n109, 406n129 Yingling, 352n132
Wolfe, Norbert, 321n102 Yordy, R. L., 412n167
Wolfe, Richard D., 309n67 York, Herbert F.,, 303n4, 312n108, 323n3, Wolff, Arthur H., 336n27, 336n28, 337n36, 326n46, 380n161, 380n164, 380n169, 340n110, 341n127, 342n140, 432n75, 385n8, 387n21, 387n22, 388n25, 389031,
463n124 389n37, 400n94, 418n204, 427n52, 444n4,
Wong, Lan J., 391n43 455n73
Wood, Harland A., 403n115 Yoshpe, Harry B., 427n48
Wood, Lowell, 326n46, 428n54 Young, Alvin L., 477n30 Wood, William R., 428n57 Young, Robert W., 292n3, 325n23 Woodruff, Leo A., 377n141
Woodruff, Nathan H., 381n171, 386n11, Zeighami, Elaine A., 478n37 412n168, 427n51, 431n74, 432n76, Ziegler, Charles, 304n5
432n78, 433n95, 445n13 Ziemer, Paul L., 298n40
Woodruff, Seth R., Jr., 313n1, 318n60, Zillman, Donald N., 481n56, 482n65 318n68, 322n117, 323n120, 327nS0, Zimmerman, George C., 399n85 327n52, 334n7, 334n8, 335n17, 359n5, Zintz, F. Raymond, 431n74 359n6, 360n7, 360n14, 361n17, 363n42, Zirkind, Ralph, 407n134
367n67, 369n80 Zuckert, Eugene M., 333n154, 338n75,
Woodruff, Wayne R., 450n42, 450n45, 359n1
451n46, 455n70 Zumwalt, Lloyd R., 304n5
Designer: U.C. Press Staff Compositor: Prestige Typography Text: 10/12 Times Roman Display: Helvetica Printer: Thomson-Shore, Inc. Binder: Thomson-Shore, Inc.