Early Philosophical Sufism 9781463239176, 1463239173

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Early Philosophical Ṣūfism

Islamic History and Thought

8 Series Editor Series Editorial Board Peter Adamson AGDPVRQ Beatrice Gründler %HDWULFH *UXHQGOHU Ahmad $KPDG Khan .KDQ

Jack Tannous TDQQRXV Isabel Toral-Niehoff ,VDEHO7oral-Niehoff Manolis Manolis Ulbricht Ulbricht

Jack Tannous

Advisory Editorial Board Islamic History and Thought provides a platform for scholarly research on any geographic areaUlbricht within the expansive Islamic Manolis Binyamin Abrahamov Konrad world, stretching from the Mediterranean to Hirschler China, and dated to Asadthe Q.eve Ahmed Howard-Johnston any period from of Islam untilJames the early modern era. This Jan Just Witkam Mehmetcan Akpinar Maher Jarrar(Arabic, Persian, series contains original monographs, translations Syriac, Greek, and Latin) and edited volumes. Abdulhadi Alajmi Marcus Milwright Mohammad-Ali Amir-Moezzi Harry Munt Arezou Azad Gabriel Said Reynolds Massimo Campanini Massimo Campanini Walid A. Saleh Agostino Series Editorial Board: Godefroid de Callataÿ Jens Scheiner Maria Conterno Delfina Serrano Peter AdamsonFarhad Daftary Farhad Daftary Georges Tamer Beatrice Gruendler Wael Hallaq Ahmad Khan

Jack Tannous Islamic History and Thought provides a platform for scholarly research Isabel Toral-Niehoff on any geographic area within the expansive Islamic world, stretching from the Mediterranean to China, and dated to any Manolis Ulbricht period from the eve of Islam until the early modern era. This series contains original monographs, translations (Arabic, Persian, Syriac, Jan Justand Witkam Greek, Latin) and edited volumes.

Early Philosophical Ṣūfism

The Neoplatonic Thought RIʙXVD\QIbn 0DQʜşU al-Ḥallāğ

Saer El-Jaichi

gp 2018

Gorgias Press LLC, 954 River Road, Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA www.gorgiaspress.com Copyright © 2018 by Gorgias Press LLC All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise without the prior written permission of Gorgias Press LLC. ‫ܝ‬

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2018

ISBN 978-1-4632-3917-6

$&DWDORJLQJLQ3XEOLFDWLRQ5HFRUGLVDYDLODEOHIURPWKH /LEUDU\RI&RQJUHVV Printed in the United States of America

TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents ..................................................................................... v Preface ...................................................................................................... vii Abbreviations and Transliteration ........................................................ ix Introduction .............................................................................................. 1 Methodological considerations...................................................... 8 The Arabic Neoplatonic Texts .............................................. 10 Structure of the book .................................................................... 12 Chapter I. God’s Unknowability: 7DQ]ĪK as Neoplatonic Via Negativa ............................................................................................ 15 I.1 The theological debate in medieval Islam regarding the via negativa: a brief overview ................................................ 18 ,7KHDWWULEXWHVRI*RGDVVHHQIURPʗDOOćüps perspective ............................................................................. 23 I.3 The inadequacy of human language to express God ......... 27 ,ʗDOOćüps via negativa and the Neoplatonic account of God’s non-being ................................................................... 35 I.5 Final remarks ............................................................................ 46 Chapter II. The Theophanic Creator-God: The Muʰill as One and Multiple.................................................................................... 49 II.1 Causation as non-reciprocal dependence ........................... 51 II.2 Contemplation as the principal mode of creation ............ 59 II.3 Participation as the principle of existence.......................... 62 II.4 Participation in Plotinus and the AP .................................. 65 ,,ʗDOOćüps concept the 0XʰLOO and Neoplatonic Selfcontemplation ....................................................................... 76 II.5.1 God’s contemplative role in ʗallćüps creation account .............................................................. 79 ,,,VʗDOOćü a pantheist? ............................................................. 84 II.7 Final remarks .......................................................................... 91

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Chapter III. The Experience of Divine Love, Creation and Cosmology ...................................................................................... 93 III.1 Context: The One as source and ultimate goal of all beings ...................................................................................... 96 III.2 The idea of “the Good” ....................................................102 III.3 The final cause in the Aristotelian context .....................104 ,,,*RGDVDILQDOFDXVHLQWKH$3DQGʗDOOćü .....................108 III.5 Neoplatonic reversion and its repercussions in ʗDOOćü ....................................................................................114 III.6 Divine ʲ,šq: the source, vehicle and goal of divine self-communication ............................................................128 III.6.1 Text in context: the faʜl fĪʯO-ʰLšq ................................133 III.6.2 God’s self-identical solitude ....................................134 III.6.3 God’s eternal act of self-intellection as selfdesire ...............................................................................138 III.6.4 God’s self-desire as a means of His selfcommunication .............................................................142 III.6.5 The procession of Intellect due to God’s radiation .........................................................................144 III.7 Final remarks .......................................................................148 Chapter IV. The Neoplatonic Role of the Primordial Muʘammad in ʗallćüps Cosmology..........................................155 IV.1 Emanation through the light of the lamp .......................157 IV.2 0XʘDPPDG’s primordial participation in God’s nŠr ....162 ,90XʘDPPDGpVGHPLXUJLFUROH ............................................167 IV.4 The archetypal ideal and final purpose of the cosmos..................................................................................174 IV.5 Final remarks .......................................................................179 Conclusion .............................................................................................183 Chapter I .......................................................................................183 Chapter II .....................................................................................183 Chapter III ....................................................................................184 Chapter IV ....................................................................................185 Bibliography ..........................................................................................189 Index .......................................................................................................219

PREFACE This work is a revised version of my doctoral dissertation, submitted to the University of Copenhagen in March 2016 and defended in June 2016. On the publication of this book, I wish to thank my advisor Joshua A. Sabih who has been a great teacher, friend and my role model since I began my Master’s degree in 2007 at the University of Copenhagen. I am especially grateful to him for many lively discussions about a variety of Islamic topics and for learning so much through the example of his commitment to high standards of research. I also owe much to Jørgen Bæk Simonsen for drawing my attention to Louis Massignon’s contribution to the study of Islamic P\VWLFLVPDQGLQSDUWLFXODUʗDOOćü There are many people who offered me comments and criticism that helped to shape the revisions of my original dissertation. Here, I would like to single out two people for special thanks: Peter Adamson and Christian Høgel, who read and extensively commented on the earlier version of my dissertation. I am also deeply grateful for the financial support I have received from the Danish Research Council, which enabled me to conduct my research in Copenhagen. I am also indebted to the library staff of The ToRS Centre of Knowledge at the Department of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies, especially Søren Mølgaard Rantzau, who have been exceptionally helpful and friendly. I would like to thank Dr Amanda Hannoosh Steinberg, Visual Resources Librarian for Islamic Art & Architecture at Harvard Faculty of Arts and Sciences, for her kind assistance in choosing the cover image for this book.

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Most of all I would like to thank my ex-wife Hajan Nawzad, who supported me throughout the PhD process and cared for our children while I was busy researching and writing my dissertation. Finally, I am deeply grateful to my publisher, Gorgias Press, for its kind, professional and efficient support of this publication.

ABBREVIATIONS AND TRANSLITERATION i)

ʗDOOćü .Dʝ .LWDEDʞ-ʝDZćVĪQ, ed. Q. M. ʲ$EEćs, (Beirut, 2002) NaW 1XʜŠʜDO-:LOć\DHG40ʲ$EEćs, (Beirut, 2002) NaK 1XʜŠʜDO-.LWćEHG40ʲ$EEćs, (Beirut, 2002) Riw 5LZć\ćWHG40ʲ$EEćs, (Beirut, 2002)

ii)

L. Massignon PhM1 Vol. 1: The Life of al-+DOOćM.Transl. from the French by H. Mason (Princeton, New Jersey, 1982) PhM2 Vol. 2: The Survival ofal-+DOOćM.Transl. from the French by H. Mason (Princeton, New Jersey, 1982) PhM3 Vol. 3: The Teaching of al-+DOOćM.Transl. from the French by H. Mason (Princeton, New Jersey, 1982) Ph The Passion of Al-+DOODM 0\VWLF DQG 0DUW\U RI ,VODP. Abridged ed. / translated and edited by H. Mason (Princeton, New Jersey, 1994) EO (VVD\RQWKH2ULJLQVRIWKH7HFKQLFDO/DQJXDJHRI,VODPLF0\sticism. Trans. from the French with an introduction by B. Clark (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1997)

iii) The texts contained in the Arabic Plotinus are abbreviated as in P. Adamson (2002) ThA 7KHRORJ\RI$ULVWRWOH (.LWćE8ʤŠOXüL\\D$ULVʞXʞćOLV HGʲ$EG ar-R. BadawĪ (Cairo, 1966) DS Letter on the Divine Science (5LVćOD IL-ʯO-ʰLOP DO-ʯLOćhĪ), ed. ʲ$EGDU-R. BadawĪ (Cairo, 1966)

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6D\LQJV DVFULEHG WR WKH *UHHN 6DJH (1XʜŠʜ PXWDIDUULTD OL-ʯO ŠD\ʢDO-f@EDUĪʯDPLQD\LWWLʜćOELʰćlam al-ʢDOT.” 15 16

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tude; a fourth group denied the attributes thus committing WDʰʞĪO and annulling (God’s oneness). Another group affirmed the attributes as belonging to God but anthropomorphised Him and doubted. No one has hit the mark of truth except those who believe in the essence and the attributes, reject the idolisation and the instrumentalisation (of the attributes) and stuck to the (true meaning of) oneness […], asserts the necessity of the attributes, and denies WDʰʞĪO and the WDxEĪK altogether. >f@TDVXUDWDO-PDʰćULIʰDQʨćWLKLZDʜLIćWLKLZDDVPćʯLKLZDʚćUDWDOʰXTŠOIĪQX]ŠOLKLZDLUWifćʰLKLZDLVWLZćʯLKLIDTDZPXQüDʚDGŠZDDOʚDGŠZDTDZPXQ>f@ʰDGGDGŠZDTDZPXQDQNDUŠ Dʜ-ʜLIćWIDʰDʞʞDOŠ ZDEDʞʞDOŠZDTDZPXQDʤEDWŠKćZDOćNLQxDEEDKŠZDxDNNŠZDODP \XʜLExćNLODWDO-ʚDTTLOOć man ćPDQELʯO-ʨćWZDʯO-ʜLIćWZDNDIDUDEʯOlćt wDʯO-ćlćt, wa lćzama at-WDZʚĪG >f@ZDDʤEDWDDʜ-ʜLIDZDQDIćDWWDʰʞĪOZDʯO-tašbĪh. 20

This passage is important, not only because it points to the signifiFDQFHRIWKHWKHRORJLFDOGHEDWHVRIʗDOOćüpVRZQWLPHEXWDOVREecause it reveals the way in which ʗDOOćüpVDFFRXQWRI*RGpVHVVHQFH and attributes, responds to and criticises those debates. It is notable WKDW ʗDOOćü PDNHV QR PHQWLRQ RI WKH QDPHV RI WKRVH WKHRORJLDQV whose views he is criticising. Yet, his association of WDʰʞĪO with the denial of the attributes leaves no doubt that the doctrine he criticises is that which found ardent defenders among the MuʲWD]LOD namely, the doctrine according to which the affirmation (LʤEćW) of God’s attributes (ʜLIćW) amounts to a violation of God’s oneness. 21 As stated explicitly in the quoted passage, the denial of the attributes is just an indirect way of obliterating the true meaning of divine oneness (ʰDʞʞDOŠ ZD EDʞʞDOŠ). Although it is not explicitly mentioned in the passage, the other group of theologians ʗDOOćü is criticising are the ʚDGĪʤ VFKRODUVSUREDEO\WKHʗDQEDOLWHVDQGVRPHRI WKH $xʲDULWHV who, as mentioned above, affirmed the attributes. 22 These scholars were more or less literalist theologians, who defined Translation is mine, and so are the words in parentheses. NaW: §29, p. 226. 21 J. Van Ess, (,2: vol. X, “TashbĪKZD-WDQ]ĪKr 22 For more on this group of theologians, see N. El-Bizri 2008. 20

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their own position in reaction to the MuʲWD]ila’s claim that the attributes (ʜLIćW) are the essence (ʨćW) of God, not additional to it. Like PRVW 6XQQĪ WKHRORJLDQV WKH\ LQVLVWHG WKDW WKH 4XUʱćn “was to be taken at face value when it speaks of God’s having bodily parts, or sitting on the throne.” 23 TKDW ʗDOOćü KDV LQ PLQG WKHVH OLWHUDOLVW theologians seems to be implied in his linking of the anthropomorphist account with WDxEĪK in the sense described above – namely, as “the assimilation of God to creatures.” 24 In the light of these considerations, the present passage may very roughly be construed as follows: regardless of its method, every theory of God’s being, rational or otherwise, remains locked within the limits of language and thought. This is why there is no significant difference between the MuʲWD]LODDQGWKHLURSSRQHQWV,QVSLWHRI their methodological differences, they are engaged in the same gesture, which stops short of “the true meaning of oneness.” As J. F. Anderson explains elsewhere with reference to the Jewish philosopher Maimonides (d. 1204), “if those alleged attributes are distinct from Him (i.e., God) they are ‘accidents’ superadded to His essence; which, needless to say, is impossible, for God is unqualifiedly One. On the other hand, if the proposed attributes are not distinct from God, they are vain, being mere tautologies, empty names.” 25 Neither WDxEĪK nor WDʰʞĪO, then, brings us closer to understanding *RGpV QDWXUH DFFRUGLQJ WR ʗDOOćü %XW ZKDW SUHFLVHO\ GRHV ʗDOOćü mean when he says, in the passage cited above, 26 that a proper understanding of God’s oneness goes hand in hand with the affirmation of His attributes? Is this not at odds with his dismissal of WDxEĪK, which he criticises in the above passage as a kind of “idolisation” – namely, the assumption that a proper understanding of God’s oneness presupposes unconditional appreciation of the atWULEXWHV"7RXQGHUVWDQGPRUHSUHFLVHO\ʗDOOćüpVFULWLTXHRIWKHWKeologians, and, especially, his attack on their way of approaching the P. Adamson 2006: p. 102. See also W. Watt 1947–49: pp. 1–10. The picture of God sitting on the heavenly throne, the so-called LVWDZćʰDOD ʯO-ʰDUšLVUHSHDWHGLQWKH4XUʱćn several times: e.g., 7: 54; 20:4; 25:59. 24 Adamson 2012: p. 61. 25 J. F. Anderson 2013: p. 40. 26 NaW: §29, p. 226. 23

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problem of God’s oneness and the plurality of the attributes, we must come to terms with the meaning of the “ʜLIćWrLQʗDOOćü

, T+($775,%87(62)G2'$66((1)520ʙ$//Ćû’6 3(563(&7,9(

,W LV GRXEWOHVVO\ QRW HDV\ WR DVFHUWDLQ ZKDW H[DFWO\ ʗDOOćü PHDQV by the term “ʜLIćW.” It seems safe to say, however, that he has in mind something entirely different than what was ordinarily meant by the term in the theological circles of the time. One of the most LPSRUWDQWFOXHVIRUDSURSHUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIZKDW ʗDOOćüKDVLQ mind when he speaks of the ʜLIćW can be found in Chapter IV of .Dʝ, especially in the introductory part, where he elaborates on this fundamental issue, using the following diagram:

)LJqʝć-Sin of the Circle,” from .Dʝ; Ch. IV: p. 175 al-EDUUćQĪPćZDʜDODʯLOD\Kć ZDʯOʤćQĪZDʜDODZDʯLQTDʞDʰ:DʯO-ʤćOLʤ ʘDOOD IĪ PDIć]DW ʚDTĪTDWX ʯO-ʚDTĪTD :D KXZD ʨćOLN DO-EćE ʚD\ʤ DOZXʜŠOZDIĪKLDW-WD\KZDʯO-ʤćOLʤPDIćZL]DO-ʚDTĪTDZDKL\DʚDTĪTDWX ʨćOLNʯO-bćb, al-ODʨĪNDʯO- bćʯZD\XTćELOXKXEćEćQWDʚWDG-GćʯLUDDʤʤćQL\D. 27

In her translation of .Dʝ, Aisha Abd Ar-Rahman offers a plausible DQG FRQYLQFLQJ SDUDSKUDVH RI ZKDW ʗDOOćü VD\V LQ WKH DERYH SDssage: [Ώ = door]

27

.Dʝ; Ch.IV: p. 175.

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EARLY PHILOSOPHICAL ʙş),60 The first door represents the one who reaches the circle of Truth. The second door represents the person who reaches it, who after entering it comes to a closed door. The third door represents the one who goes astray in the desert of the TruthNature of the truth. He who enters the circle is far from the Truth because the way is blocked and the seeker is sent back. The point on high represents his yearning. The lower point represents his return to his point of departure, and the middle point is his bewilderment. 28

In his &RPPHQWDU\, 29 5X]ELKćQ %DTOĪ G   ZKR ZDV qWKH most important interpreter RIʗDOOćü”30 explains the same enigmatic passage in a way that makes a stronger case for the paraphrase cited above, further clarifying the meaning of the term “door”, while at the same time pointing out its intended mystical function LQʗDOOćüpVFRVPRORJy: 7KHGRRUEć DERYHWKHHQFORVXUHUHSUHVHQWVWKHGLYLQHDFWLRQ that causes God’s signs to appear in creation. Below that, inside the larger enclosure, a second door stands for the glory of God’s attributes. The door just beneath the inner enclosure symbolises the light of the ultimate Truth from which the attributes emerge. A point at the upper left-hand corner of the larger enclosure is the wise person’s zeal for the divine attributes. The smaller, inner enclosure symbolises knowledge of the divine essence […]. Within that enclosure, the point on the right is the mystic’s eagerness to approach the divine essence. To the left of the central circle, a dot stands for the perplexity of the seeker wandering in the desert of divine power. In the middle stands the circle of knowledge of the innermost es-

Aisha Abd Ar-Rahman, 1974: pp. 30–31; slightly modified. 5%DTOĪSS0–81. 30 C. W. Ernst 1985: p. 15; EO 1997: p. 83 n. 69. 28 29

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sence of God, and within that is the dot of pre-eternity and absolute essence. 31

On this reading, the passage cited above from Chapter IV of .Dʝ may be taken as designating a meaning for ʜLIćW, which is entirely diIIHUHQWLQQDWXUHIURPWKDWLQʲilm al-NDOćP:KHUHDVWKH0XʲWD]LOD and other theologians conceive the ʜLIćW as descriptions related to certain qualities and hence to certain accidentsIRUʗDOOćüWKHDttributes are better understood as primordial actions. Indeed, as we VKDOOVHHʗDOOćüFODLPVRXWRID1HRSODWRQLFSRVLWLRQWKDWWKH ʜLIćW are inextricably connected to God’s agency. Thus, in saying that the DWWULEXWHV DUH H[SODLQDEOH LQ WHUPV RI SULPRUGLDO DFWLRQV ʗDOOćü seems to be saying that the divine disclosure takes place in and through the attributes, which are nothing else, but certain expressions of certain primordial actions, not properties of the divine essence. Indeed, as we will see in Chapters II and III, this selfdisclosure entails that the attributes are some sort of ‘ideas’ that reside in God. The ʜLIćW are not qualities that belong to God in the manner of properties, but are indispensable means for God’s selfdisclosure, precisely insofar as they serve as archetypes for divine actions. Put simply, the divine attributes should be seen here as originating “in the multitude of His (i.e., God’s) actions, not in a plurality existing in His essence.” 32 ,Q WKLV ZD\ ʗDOOćüpV QRWLRQ RI *RGpV VHOI-disclosure can be viewed as representing his own attempt to answer the question as to whether or not the ʜLIćW are accidental or essential to God’s ʨćW. In fact, this latter notion of a “disclosure,” entails an understanding of the ʜLIćW that was VXEVHTXHQWO\ WR EHFRPH FRPPRQ LQ WKH ʙŠIĪ WUDGLWLRQRI,EQʲ$UabĪ. In this understanding, the attributes, which issue from the primordial light (QŠU DO-azal), 33 serve as a vital link between “the two opposite poles of the essentially unique Divine Absolute, that is, transcendence and immanence, incomparability and similarity, oneness and plurality.” 34 ,WVHHPVWKHQWKDWʗDOOćü Trans. J. Renard 1996: p. 250. J. F. Anderson 2013: p. 40, parenthesis mine. 33 %DTOĪS 34 Quoted in Alexander D. Knysh 1999: p. 181. 31 32

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avoids the fall into the theological dichotomy of the essence and the attributes through the positing ofthe divine self-disclosure. InGHHGMXGJLQJIURPQXPHURXVSDVVDJHVLQWKHʗDOOćüLDFXP&RUSXV ʗDOOćüKDGQRKHVLWDWLRQLQGHFODULQJWKHʨćWʜLIćW dichotomy as invalid. The two apparently contradictory theses of the theologians, which assert that one must choose either a theology of WDxEĪK or a theology of WDʰʞĪO, end up in the wrong track because in the final analysis they both tend to portray God as a composite being. The perfect identity of God’s ʨćW with his ʜLIćW and with his acWLRQVKDVDQRWKHULPSRUWDQWIXQFWLRQLQʗDOOćüpVZRUOGYLHZDVZH shall see in the next chapter: namely, the function of (i) explaining the multiplicity in the world without ascribing to God the role of an ordinary cause; and (ii) explaining the simultaneous transcendence and immanence of God. 35 Thus, what is important here is to see WDQ]ĪKnot as a question of whether or not the attributes are “real and eternal while distinct from the divine essence” 36 or, in other words, a matter either of denying or approving the ʜLIćW as real “eternal” or “created.” 37 Nor is it a matter of interpreting the attributes in a “nonliteral” sense to uphold the incomparability of God, as the MuʲWD]LODVXJJHVWHG. 38 ʗDOOćüUHMHFWVWKHVHYLewpoints, which were the source of the countless debates about the nature of *RGWKDWSODJXHGʲilm al-NDOćP, for the simple reason that they approach God through the concepts that are appropriate to anything else, except God. In doing so, the theologians fail to see the true core of the subject matter; namely, that God is ineffable, and therefore inexpressible in human language. If so, this interpretation conILUPVWKDWʗDOOćüLVFRQFHUQHG WRGLVWDQFHKLPVHOIIURPʲilm alNDOćP and its methods of defining God’s oneness; even the 0XʲWD]LODZKRUHSXGLDWHGWKHWDxEĪK and insisted that the attributes should be seen as inseparable from God’s essence; (2) to show that

Indeed, to appreciate exactly what this sense of the ʜLIćWentails, it is important to keep in mind the idea of a divine self-disclosure, which, as we shall see, is based upon a very special concept of causation. 36 G. R. Hawting 2005: “Idolatry,” p. 378. 37 Wolfson 1976: p. 231. 38 Wolfson 1976: p. 136 n. 23. 35

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it is impossible to say anything about God, or know Him, in any way whatsoever.

, T+(,1$'(48$&f@ ZD KDʨćQ DO-ILNUćQ \DQTDʞLʰćn, wa hćtćn an-natĪüatćQ WDʘPDʚLOOćQ ZD KDʨćQ DO-NDZQćQ \DIQL\ćQZDʯO-ʚXüDüWDUŠʚZD\DWDOćxćDO-ʰLUIćn. 54

The immediate context of the passage explains why all methods and proofs, whether learned or popular, fail to acknowledge the impenetrable character of the divine. God’s nature cannot be inferred through a chain of reasoning. Human knowledge, by contrast, is inferred on the basis of ʰilm, which, no matter how sophisticated and exemplary, remains bound to some sort of “intellectual knowing” and therefore unfitting to delineate the truth of God’s oneness. 55 This insight, which, as pointed out by Affifi, underlies ʗDOOćüpV GLVWLQFWLRQ qEHWZHHQ Nnowledge of the ‘real’ and knowledge of the ‘phenomenal,’” is crucial. 56 ,WFODULILHVKRZʗDOOćü endeavours successfully to reformulate the question of WDZʚĪG in a manner that refrains from defining and delimiting God’s oneness .Dʝ: Ch. V, p. 179. Trans. Aisha Abd Ar-Rahman 1974: p. 61; slightly modified. .Dʝ: Ch. X, p. 209. 55 See J. Renard 2004: p. 11, and pp. 25–26. 56 Affifi 1939: p. 105 n. 1. 53 54

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in terms of any determinate concept. ,QIDFWʗDOOćüpVXQGHUVWDQding of WDZʚĪG as inexpressible – i.e., his understanding of divine oneness as something that cannot be put into words (at-WDZʚĪGʢćULü ʰDQDO-NDOLPDʚDWWć\XʰDEEDUʰDQKX 57) – explains his need to escape all sorts of statements about God; first and foremost, statements that are construed in accordance with the ordinary rules of predication. Subsequently, there is no sense in saying that WDZʚĪG shall be demonstrated on the basis of this or that proposition. That is, regardless of whether the proposition in question affirms or denies something of/about God. In line with his profound reasoning, which sometimes takes a polemical form, the following quote illustrates clearly his uncompromising position vis-à-vis WDZʚĪG. In a parodic manner, he presents all sorts of postulates/propositions concerning God, with which he diametrically opposes; he simply considers them inadequate – including traditional authority’s postulates (ʯO-ʢDEDU) – because of their rootedness in predetermined descriptions, not immediate awareness of the divine: He who says: ‘I know Allah by my lack of Him,’ how can he who lacks know Him who always is. He who says: ‘I know Him because I exist’ – two external absolutes cannot co-exist. He who says: ‘I know Him because I am ignorant of Him’ – ignorance is only a veil, and gnosis is beyond the veil. If not, there is no reality to it. He who says ‘I know Him by His Name’ – the Name is not separable from the Named because He is not created. He who says: ‘I know Him by Himself’ – this alludes to two objects of recognition. He who says: ‘I know Him by His works’ – that is to suffice oneself with the works without looking for the One who made them.

57

$NKEćU 1936: no. 49.

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He who says: ‘I know Him by my inability to know Him’ – this one is unable to cut off, so how can the connected perceive the known object? He who says: ‘As He knew me, I know Him’ – that is to allude to acquired knowledge and to return to the known which is different from the Divine Essence. Being distinct from the Essence how can it perceive the Essence? He who says: ‘I know Him as He has described Himself.’ It is to be satisfied with traditional authority without immediate confirmation. He who says: ‘I know Him by the anti-thetical Attributes’- the known is one thing which does not admit of being confined or cut into parts He who says: ‘The object alone knows Himself’ – He confirms that the gnostic is tied by his difference, because the object never ceases to know Himself in Himself. PDQTćOʰDUDIWXKXELIDTGĪ IDʯO-PDITŠGND\ID\DʰULIDO-mawüŠd? Wa PDQ TćO ʰDUDIWXKX EL ZXüŠdĪ ID TDGĪPćQ Oć \DNŠQćQ ZD PDQ TćO ʰDUDIWXKXʚĪQDüDKDOWXKXZDʯO-üDKOXʚLüćEZDO-PDʰULIDZDUćʯDO-ʚLüćE OćʚDTĪTDWDODKć:DPDQTćOʰDUDIWXKXEʯO-ism IDʯO-ism lć \XIćriq alPXVDPPćOLDQQDKXOD\VDELPDʢOŠT:DPDQTćODʰDUDIWXKXELKLID qad axćra ilć PDʰUŠID\QZDPDQTćOʰDUDIWXKXELVXQʰLKLIDTDGLNWDIć ELʯO-VXQʰGŠQDʜ-ʜćQLʰ:DPDQTćOʰDUDIWXKXELʯOʰDü]LʯDQPDʰULIDWLKL IDʯO-ʰćüL]PXQTDʞLʰZDʯO-PXQTDʞLʰND\ID\XGULNDO-PDʰUŠf? Wa man qćONDPćʰDUDIDQĪ ʰDUDIWXKXIDTDGDxćra ilć al-ʰLOPIDUDüLʰDLOć alPDʰOŠP ZD ʯO-PDʰOŠP \XIćULT Dʨ-ʨćW ZD PDQ IćUDTD Dʨ-ʨćW ND\ID \XGULN DO-ʨćW" :D PDQ TćO ʰDUDIWXKX NDPć ZDʜDID QDIVDKX ID TDG TDQDʰDELʯO-ʢDEDUGŠQDDO-DʤDUZDPDQTćOʰDUDIWXKXʰDOć ʚDGGD\QID ʯO-PDʰUŠf šD\ʯXQZćʚLGOć\DWDʚD\\D]ZDOć\DWDEDʰDʘ:DPDQTćO al-PDʰUŠIʰDUUDIDQDIVDKXIDTDGDTDUUDELDQQDDO-ʰćrif fĪʯO-ED\QPuWDNDOOLIELKLOL-anna al-PDʰUŠIODP\D]DONćQDʰćrifan bi nafsihi. 58

Trans. Aisha Abd Ar-Rahman 1974: 63–64; slightly modified; .Dʝ Ch. XI: pp. 213–14. 58

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EARLY PHILOSOPHICAL ʙş),60

Although very different from one another, all these propositions are similar, as far as they share the same urge to know God by means of either linguistic or logical inquiry. Therefore, all such attempts to define WDZʚĪG inevitably run the risk of reducing God to something definable and construable, by means either of logical or linguistic procedures. What these propositions have in common, in other words, is their adherence to the supposition that God can be cognised in accordance with the rules of grammar; that is to say, in accordance with ordinary ways of talking and thinking. Formulating the same point in Plotinian terms, one could put it like this: adherents to this supposition ignore or deny the fact that the divine is a “transcendent” and, thus, non-propositional reality; that “we, the describers,” by contrast, are “necessarily” “propositional;”and therefore that all our “explanations are always provisional.” 59 Thus, we might suppose that in the quote above, 60 ʗDOOćüwas merely displaying the other scholars’ ignorance of the absolute otherness of God; that is to say, displaying their ignorance of God’s “nonSURSRVLWLRQDO UHDOLW\r ʗDOOćüpV REMHFWLRQ WR SURSRVLWLRQV VXFK DV those expressed in the above passage, then, is that they confuse their own provisional perceptions with the transcendent and nonpropositional reality of God. They ignore the fatal flaws inherent in their very attempt to apply propositional language to ‘knowing’ God. 0DQLQʗDOOćüpVZRUGVhardly knows how “a hair of his body […] grew black or white. So how will he know He (i.e., God) who PDGH WKLQJV H[LVW"r ʲDüDEDQ PLP-PDQ Oć \DʰULI šDʰUDWXQ PLQ EDGDQLKL ND\IDWDQEXWVDZGćʯDPED\ʘćʯND\IDPXNDZZLQDO-aš\ćʱ  61 This, briefly, H[SODLQV ZK\ ʗDOOćü FRnsiders all kinds of conceptualisations of God according to the so-called five predicables as inadequate, as we will see below. My discussion so far has been driven by two main goals: (1) to shed light on and describe the theological debatethat had shaped ʗDOOćüpV SRVLWLRQ YLV-à-vis God’s ineffability in brief terms; (2) to FODULI\WKHODUJHUFRQWH[WRIʗDOOćüpVUHDVRQVIRUUHMHFWLQJWKHWHQHWV K. Corrigan 2005: pp. 171–72. .Dʝ: Ch. XI: pp. 213–14. 61 .Dʝ: Ch. XI, p. 214; trans. Aisha Abd Ar-Rahman 1974: p. 64; slightly modified, parenthesis mine. 59 60

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of the theologians’ epistemology, which postulates a distinction between God’s essence and attributes. Having done this, in the remaining part of this chapter, I will turn my attention to an exploration of how the Neoplatonic concept of God’s non-EHLQJSOD\VDGLUHFWUROHLQʗDOOćüpVXVHRIWKHvia negativa.

, ʙ$//Ćû’6VIA NEGATIVA $1'7+(N(23/$721,& $&&28172)GOD’6121-%(,1* $V SRLQWHG RXW HDUOLHU LQ WKLV FKDSWHU ʗDOOćüpV FRQFHSW RI WDQ]ĪK (purification) is fundamentally different from the way theologians and traditionalists understand the concept. Now, I shall (a) demonstrate wK\ʗDOOćüpVFRQFHSWRIWDQ]ĪK is mystical and philosophical, not theological, and (b) explain why it should be understood within the framework of Neoplatonic via negativa. On the latter point, it should become clear that the Neoplatonic via negativa constitutes the only framework within which ʗDOOćüpV FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQ RI WDQ]ĪKmakes sense. ʗDOOćüpV conceptualisation of WDQ]ĪK entails, primarily, understanding God as a non-EHLQJ LQ WKH 1HRSODWRQLF VHQVH, rather than just a supreme supra-sensible being. As we have previously seen, ʗDOOćüpV VKLIWLQJDZD\IURPʲilm al-NDOćPgoes hand in hand with his departure from focusing on the distinction between negation (QDI\) and affirmation (ʱLʤEćW). He departs from the positions taken by the 0XʲWD]LODDQGWKHLURSSRQHQWVLQUHJDUGWRWKHFRQFHSWLRQRIWDQ]ĪK, yet he remains preoccupied with the epistemological question of knowing God as ‘One.’ The kind of WDQ]ĪKʗDOOćüproposes is very different from that advocated E\WKH0XʲWD]LODwhich amounts to nothing more than a doctrinal attempt to elevate “God above similarity to His creatures.” 62 Indeed, the only way to uphold WDQ]ĪK LQ ʗDOOćüpV DFFRXQW RI tawʚĪG is the via negative in the sense Neoplatonism gives to it. In fact, the way in which ʗDOOćüDSSOLHVWKHvia negativa is closely tied with Plotinus’ method of “abstraction” (ÒθţɼÊÀË), 63 which is 62 63

Quoted in Abou Ridah 1982: p. 47. J. R. Bussanich 1988: 114; H. A. Wolfson 1952: p. 118.

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EARLY PHILOSOPHICAL ʙş),60

premised on the notion of God as a non-being. Taken literally, Plotinus’ abstraction here means to “predicate of God what He is not.” 64 As Wolfson points out, early Arabic philosophic texts apply QDI\ in the technical sense of Plotinus’ ÒθţɼÊÀË, mainly due to the influence of “the Arabic translation of Aristotle’s 0HWDSK\VLFV” 65 Understood as a concept and method, ʗDOOćüpVWerm WDQ]ĪK implicitly has the same meaning as the concept of QDI\in the Arabic philosophic texts to which Wolfson refers. In contradistinction to the theologians’ way of doing WDQ]ĪK, ʗDOOćü does it by applying QDI\ in the technical sense of Plotinus’ ÒθţɼÊÀË. This comes out most clearly in the two lengthy excerpts, which, according to Massignon, encapsulate ʗDOOćüpVvia negativa. 66 7KH ILUVW H[FHUSW SUHVHUYHG RULJLQDOO\ LQ $EŠ %DNU DO.DODEćGKĪpVGVV q%RRNRIWKH'RFWULQHVRIWKHʙŠIĪVr (KiWćE DW-WDʰDUUXI OL PDʨKDE DKO DW-WDʜDZZXI), represents seemingly ʗDOOćüpV FRPPHQWDU\RQ 4q+H*RG LV WKH)LUVWal-awwal) and the Last (al-ćʢĪU), the Outwardly Manifest (al-ʲćKLU) and the Inwardly Hidden (al-%ćʞLQ):” There is no before which precedes Him; there could be no after to go beyond Him, nor any SODFH where He could come from, nor any where to meet Him, nor any toward which unites with Him, nor any into to make Him come down, nor any when which reckons Him, nor any if which commands Him, nor any above which overhangs Him, nor any below which diminishes Him, nor any RSSRVLWH to confront Him, nor any near to to trouble Him, nor any EDFNZDUG to find fault with Him, nor any forward which expands Him, nor any beforehand which can make Him appear, nor any after which can make Him disappear, nor any whole which focuses Him, nor any he is which can help to discover Him, nor any he is not which can deprive Him, nor any concealment which veils Him. His pre-existence preceded time, His being preceded notbeing, His eternity preceded limit. If you say “when,” His beWolfson 1952: p. 120. Wolfson 1952: p. 130 n. 98. 66 PhM3: p. 126. 64 65

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ing has outstripped time. If you say “before,” this before which you speak of is after Him. If you say “He,” the ‘h’ and ‘e’ are His creation. If you say “how,” His essence eludes description. If you say “where,” His being precedes place; and if you ask who is He, His ipseity is not measured by anything among things […] He acts without making contact, He makes himself cognised without being encountered, and guides without winking. Aspirations do not go very far to tell us about Him, thoughts do not mingle with Him. His essence is without qualification, His action without commission. ODP\DVELTKXTDEOXQZDOć\DTWDʰKXEDʰGXZDOć \XʜćGLUXKXPLQZD Oć \XZćILTXKX ʰDQ ZD Oć \XOćʜLTXKX LOć, wa lć \XʚLOOXKX IĪ ZD Oć \XTLWXKXʯLʨZDOć\XʯćPLUXKXʯLQZDOć \DʲLOOXKXIDZTZDOć\XTLOOuKX WDʚW ZD Oć \XTćELOXKX ʚXʨćʯ ZD Oć \X]ćʚLPXKX ʰLQG ZD Oć \DʯʢXʨXKXʢDOIXQZDOć\DʚXGGXKXDPćPZDOć\XʲKLUXKXTDEOZDOć \DIQĪKL EDʰG ZD lć \DüPDʰXKX NXOOXQ ZD Oć \XüLGXKX Nćn, wa lć \XITLGXKXOD\VZDOć \XVD\\LUXKXʢDIćʯWDTDGGDPDDO-ʚDGDʤTLGDPXKX ZD ʯO-ʰDGDP ZXüŠGXKX ZD ʯO-Ġć\D D]DOXKX LQ TXOWX PDWć" )D TDG sabaqa al-ZDTWXNDZQXKXZDLQTXOWXTDEOIDʯO-TDEOXEDʰGXKXZDLQ qultu KXZD ID ʯO-hćʯ ZD ʯO-wćZ ʢDOTXKX ZD LQ TXOWD ND\I" Fa qad LʚWDüDEDʰDQDO-ZDʜIʨćWXKXZDLQTXOWXPćKXZD")DTDGEć\DQDDODx\ćʯKDZL\\DWXKX>f@IʯLʰOXKXPLQĠD\ULPXEćxDUDZDWDIKĪPXKXPLQ ĠD\UL PXOćTćW ZD KLGć\DWXKX PLQ ĠD\UL ʯĪmćʯ ZD Oć tunć]LʰXKX alhimam, wa lć WXʢćOLʞXKX DO-DINćU ZD OD\VD OL ʨćWLKL WDN\ĪI ZD Oć OL ILʰOLKLWDNOĪI>f@. 67

The second excerpt, preserved LQ $EX ʱO-QćʛLP DO-4XxD\UĪpV (376/986–  q(SLVWOH RQ ʙŠILVPr 5LVćOD), provides the strongest possible evidence in favour of a Neoplatonic reading of the way ʗDOOćüDSSOLHVWDQ]ĪK: He has bound the whole to contingency, for transcendence belongs to Him. As for that which exists in a body, accidents determine it; and that which is assembled by decree has no power except by His confirmation. That which is predetermined by Trans. A. J. Arberry (.DOćEćGKĪ 1935/1977): Ch. V, pp. 15–16; 126–27, NaW: §22, p. 224, and al-.DODEćGKĪSS8–49.

67

PhM3:

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EARLY PHILOSOPHICAL ʙş),60 time, subsists, for a predetermined duration. Any being whatever which is caused to exist by something else is prey to necessities. That which is overpowered by the imagination, is at the mercy of its faculty of representation. What is delimited in space is defined by the where; and that which belongs to any given genus cannot be determined without the how. But Him, Praise to Him! May He be exalted, there is no above which hangs over Him, no below which diminishes Him, no limitation which confronts Him, no near to to trouble Him, no EDFNZDUG to find fault with Him, no forward to limit Him, no beforehand which makes Him appear, no after to make Him vanish, no whole to embrace Him, no He is which helps to discover Him, no He is not which can deprive Him. No attribute exists to describe Him, His action has no cause, His being has no boundary. He holds Himself apart from the states of His Creation […] He has separated Himself from them in His transcendence, as they are separated from Him in their contingency. If you say, “When?” never mind, His being has preceded time […] And if you say “Where?” never mind, His absoluteness and His existence surpass place […] Whatever you imagine in your mind is unlike Him […] No eyes perceive Him, no speculations comprehend Him. alzama al-NXOOD DO-ʚDGDʤ OL-anna al-qidam lahû ID ʯO-ODʨĪ EL ʯO-üismi ʲXKŠUXKX ID ʯO-ʰDUʘ \XO]LPXKX ZD ʯO-ODʨĪ EL ʯO-irćGDWL ʯLütimćʰXKX IDqiwćhć WDPDVVXNXKXZʯO-ODʨĪ\XʯDOOLIXKXZDTW\XIDUULTXKXZDTWZʯOODʨĪ\XTĪPXKXĠD\UXKXIDʯO-ʘDUŠUDWDPXVVXKXZʯO-ODʨĪDO-ZDKP\DʲIuUX ELKL ID ʯO-WDʜZĪU \DUWDTĪ LOD\KL ZD PDQ ćwćKX PDʚDOOXQ DGUDNDKX D\QXQ ZD PDQ NćQD ODKX üLQV ʞćODEDKX ND\IDXQ LQQDKX WDʰćlć lć \DʲLOOXKXIDZTXQZDOć\DTLOOXKXWDʚWXQZDOć\XTćELOXKXʚDGGXQZD Oć \X]ćPLʚXKX ʰLQGXQ ZD Oć \DʯʢXʨXKX ʢDOIXQ ZD Oć \DʚXGGXKX DPćPZDOć\XʲKLUXKXTDEOXQZDOć\DIQĪKLEDʰGXQZDOć \DüPDʰXKX NXOOXQ ZD Oć \XüLGXKX Nćn, wa lć \XITLGXKX OD\V ZDʜIXKX Oć ZDʜID ODKØZDILʰOXKXOć ʰLOODWDODKXZDNDZQXKXOć amada lahu, tanazzaha ʰDQ DʚZćOL ʢDOTLKL >f@ Eć\DQDKXP EL TLGDPLKL NDPć Eć\DQŠKX EL ʚXGŠʤLKLPLQTXOWXPDWć? Fa qad sabaqa al-ZDTWXNDZQXKX>f@ZD LQ TXOWX D\QD" )D TDG WDTDGGDPD DO-PDNćn wuüŠGXKX >f@ PD

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WXʜXZZLUILʯO-awhćPIDKXZDELʢLOćILKL>f@OćWXPćTLOXKXDO-ʰX\Šn, wa lć tuqćELOXKXDʲ-ʲXQŠQ. 68

Both excerpts establish ʗDOOćü’s debt to the Neoplatonic notion of God as a SXUHEHLQJ, or non-being. Besides, they bear traces of the arguments that Plotinus follows in order to establish the postulate of God’s ineffability; e.g., in Enn. V.3.13.1–2: “It [the One] is, therefore, truly ineffable: for whatever you say about it, you will always be speaking of a “something.”” Indeed, taking a closer look into WKHFRQWHQWRIWKHWZRH[FHUSWVZHFDQFRQFOXGHWKDWʗDOOćüFRnstrues God’s unknowability from a Neoplatonic standpoint in two interrelated ways: (a) His conspicuous insistence on abstracting God from all the elements of discourse (adverbs, pronouns, prepositions, and conjunctions, as well as verbs and nouns) that indicate a relation of place, time, causality, etc. In this connection it is noteworthy how intimately ʗDOOćüOLQNV*RGpVXQNQRZDELOLW\WRWKHHWHUQDOFKDUDFWHU of God (op.cit: “WDTDGGDPDʯO-ʚadaʤ TLGDPXKXZDʯO- ʰDGDPZXüŠduhu;” “sabaqa al-ZDTWXNDZQXKX”), which is reminiscent of Enn. III.7.3.34– 35, where Plotinus explains how “the eternal being exists in a state of timeless present […] outside any succession of the tenses of time.” 69 (b) His unwavering quest to abstract God from the so-called “five predicables,” i.e., genus (üLQV), species (nawʲ), difference (faʜl), property (ʢaʜʜa  DQG DFFLGHQW ʲaraʘ). 70 It is worth noticing, here, that Trans. PhM3: pp. 127–28; slightly modified, italics in original. NaW §216: p. 257 and $NKEćU 1936: no. 13. See also $NKEćU 1936: no. 47, ZKHUH ʗDOOćü LQWHUSUHWV WKH 4XUʱćnic verse (42:11) – Nothing resembles Him – in terms of God’s transcendence beyond “the limits of the imagination” and “the representations and projections of thought” (ʚXGŠG DODZKćPZDWDʜćZĪUDʲ-ʲXQŠQZDWDʢ\ĪODO-ILNU). 69 G. Stamatellos 2007: p. 112. 70 It is worth mentioning that these five predicables had already been integrated into the Kindian philosophical tradition. It is most likely that ʗDOOćü FDPH WR NQRZ WKHVH qILYH 3RUSK\ULDQ SUHGLFDEOHVr WKURXJK Porphyry’s Neoplatonising ,QWURGXFWLRQ to Aristotle’s Categories (al-0DTŠOćW), i.e., the ,VDJRJH (al-ĩVćĠŠüĪ ZKLFKKDGEHHQWUDQVODWHGLQWR$UDELFqLQWKH 68

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ʗDOOćüDQGWKHAP agree that God’s ineffability does not mean the denial of the attributes, but rather the affirmation of “the identity of being and oneness in God.” 71 )RU .LQGĪ ZKRVH DIILOLDWLRQ with the AP tradition is firmly established, 72 this “identity of being and oneness in God” entails delineating exactly “the sense in which God is one by a process of elimination.” 73 More precisely, the Plotinian notion of “abstraction” (ÒθţɼÊÀË) seems to be the most suited interpretive framework within which both ʗDOOćü DQG WKH AP apply QDI\. In other words, understood in this Neoplatonic sense, QDI\ safeguards the oneness of God as WDQ]ĪK from the polemics among theologians and traditionalists about the divine attributes. ʗDOOćüDJUHHVZLWK.LQGĪWKDW*RGpVHWHUQDOQDWXUHHQWDLOV God’s having “no existential before;” “no cause;” “neither subject nor predicate;” “no genus.” 74 As shown by Stamatellos, in the Enneads the argument for divine ineffability consists of – and appears in – a variety of negations that lend support to the notion of the One as “beyond being”; 75 e.g., the One is “formless” (Enn. VI.7.17.40; VI.9.3; II.4.4.17–20: ÓÄÇÉÎÇÅ/Òżţ»¼ÇÅ); “without dimensions” (VI.8.17.22–27: Ò»ÀÚÊ̸ÌÇÅ); “without limits” (V.5.10.19–21; VI.7.32.15; VI.9.6.10: ÓȼÀÉÇÅ); is “not in place”

first half of the 9th FHQWXU\r $ /MXERYLā  S  S  0DVVLJQRQ DOVR UHPDUNV WKDW ʗDOOćü qGHQLHV WKDW *RG FRPHV XQGHU DQ\ RI WKH ILYH predicables, or “universals,” as he calls them. However, he refrains from OLQNLQJ WKLV FHQWUDO WHQGHQF\ RI ʗDOOćüpV via negativa with Neoplatonism. Instead, he remarks, in a vague and undeveloped way, that the sort of classification of being implied in the tZRSDVVDJHVFLWHGE\.DODEćGKĪDQG 4XxD\UĪ IROORZV qWKH FODVVLILFDWLRQ RI WKH +HOOHQLVW SKLORVRSKHUVr PhM3, p. 128 n. 29. 71 Adamson 2006: pp. 56–57; italics mine. 72 For more details about the “Kindian tradition,” see. P. Adamson 2007; also, Adamson 2006, pp. 12–17; and G. Endress 2003: esp. pp. 127– :LWK UHJDUG WR WKH qILYH 3RUSK\ULDQ SUHGLFDEOHVr LQ .LQGĪ VHH , 5 Netton 2013: pp. 57–60; and Wolfson 1976: pp. 323. 73 Adamson 2006: p. 55. 74 Quoted in A. L. Ivry 1974: p. 67. 75 E.g., Enn. V.5.6.11.

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(VI.9.3.41–45: ÇĤÁëÅÌĠÈĿ), and “not in time” (ÇĤÁëÅÏÉĠÅĿ). 76 In fact, the Enneads’ notion of the One as “beyond being” underlies the AP’s idea of God as “pure being” (DQQL\\D IDTDW). 77 In this regard, the AP presents three presuppositions that are of particular interest for our purpose. Taken together, they capture the line of thinking that underlies the via negativa in ʗDOOćüpV WZR OHQJWK\ Hxcerpts quoted above: (1) God is “eternal or atemporal.” 78 (2) “The acts of God are not one after another, nor do they have a “beginning and end,” but rather they are all at once.” 79 (3) God “must be one, not many: the many are deficient.” 80

Upon closer examination, each of these presuppositions seems to FRQFXUZLWKʗDOOćüpV (a) refusal to subdue God to spatial and temporal boundaries (“His pre-existence precedes time, His being preceded not-being, His eternity preceded limit”); 81 (b) understanding of God’s acts as having no cause (“His action has no cause”); 82 (c) definition of God’s oneness as beyond being (“His essence is without qualification”). 83 7KXV ERWK ʗDOOćüpV DQG WKH AP’s arguments are premised upon the Plotinian idea that God’s being is not expressible in accordance with the rules of language, nor with the rules of thought. Similarly, on the latter point, proposition 5 in al-ʡD\UDO-PDʚʘ 84 states that God cannot be described because of His transcendence above predication and logic ([…] Oć \ŠʜDI OL DQQDKX ʯDʰOć PLQ Dʜ-ʜLIćW ZD OD\VD \DEOXĠXKX DO-PDQʞLT ZD ʨćOLN DQQD Dʜ-ʜLID WDNŠQ EL ʯO-PDQʞLT). Logic, proposition 5 continues, abides by, whereas God departs Stamatellos 2007: pp. 34–35, p. 203; parentheses in original. Adamson 2002: p. 125. 78 ThA: V.17; 33; X.40; quoted in Adamson 2002: p. 120. 79 ThA: V.47; X.39; quoted in Adamson 2002: p. 120. 80 7K$ X.96; 126; quoted in Adamson 2002: p. 120. 81 NaW: §22, p. 224; trans. Arberry 1935: p. 15. 82 NaW: §216, p. 257; trans. PhM3: p. 128. 83 NaW: §22, p. 224; trans. Arberry 1935: p. 16. 84 BadawĪ 76 77

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from, reason (al-ʰDTO). In turn, the latter serves as a foundation of thinking, which is itself inextricably bound to the faculty of imagination and the senses (ZDʯO-PDQʞLTELʯO-ʰDTOZDʯO-ʰDTOELʯO-ILNUZDʯOILNU[…] ELʯO-ZDKPZDʯO-ʚDZćV). Therefore, assuming that God can be known would be to assert that God can be known in the way in which created beings can be known. 85 This argument, which, in the AP explains why the pure One “has no need of anything,” “is above completeness (fawqa at-WDPćP) and perfection (al-NDPćO),” 86 implies that God has no being, at least not in the sense of “something external attributed to him.” 87 ʗDOOćü employs a similar idea as a means of explaining why no knowledge can reach God; as for example, in the earlier quoted passage: Oh marvel! Man does not know before a hair of his body how it grew black or white. So how will he know He who made things exist? Indeed, he who does not know the difference between general and particular species of a thing, nor the First and the Last, nor the way of classifying all the morphological forms, the rules of grammar, the facts, or (the correct use of) the legal stratagems (in matters pertaining to the law), it is not possible for him to have knowledge of He (i.e., God) who does not cease to exist. 88

Thus, in spite of the fact that the AP remains entangled within the framework of Islamic theology (NDOćP), confining the via negativa to the GHQLDO RI SRVLWLYH TXDOLWLHV DORQJ HVVHQWLDOO\ 0XʲWD]LOLWH OLQHV HJ DS: 117–20, [B 175, 11–18]), it may nevertheless be said of the AP that it corroborates the Neoplatonic interpretation of God as a non-being. Adamson ( 2002: 120–23) has made this same point on the basis of several passages from the AP: e.g., ThA: V.39, [B 71]; X.6, [B 135]; X.4–5, [B 134–35]; X.7, [B 135]; V.17, [B 68]; GS: I.14, [B 185]. For a somewhat IXOOHU WUHDWPHQW RI WKH 0XʲWD]LOLWH LQIOXHQFes in the AP, especially the theme of “the inexpressibility of the One,” see C. D’Ancona 1997: esp. pp. 422–427. 86 ThA: X.4–5, [B 134–35]; as quoted in Adamson 2002: p. 122. 87 Adamson 2002: p. 129. 88 .Dʝ: Ch. XI, 214; trans. Aisha Abd Ar-Rahman 1974: p. 64; slightly modified. Italics and parentheses mine. 85

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In fact, the main idea that transpires from this quote applies the principle of “divine simplicity,” 89 which, in the AP, serves as an explanation of why God’s ipseity implies no multiplicity and, as such, unattributable in any sense whatsoever (DQQDKX DQL\\D IDTDW OD\VDODKćʜLIDWDOĪTXELKć). 90 In the Enneads, 91 the principle of divine simplicity is introduced to confirm “the status of nonbeing of the One” 92 that is reiterated in .Dʝ: Ch IX, 206. As we saw above, ʗDOOćü GHQRXQFHV KHUH DQ\ FRQFHSWXDOLVP WKDW REMHFWLILHV *RG DV ‘something’, i.e., a “substance” (üDZKDU), or a “body” (üLVP), etc. 93 Likewise, for Plotinus, divine simplicity means that “God cannot be of the same genus with other beings.” Because if so, then God would differ from other beings “only in property (Ċ»ĕĿ) or specific difference (»À¸ŞÇÉê) or accident (ÈÉÇÊ¿ûÁþ) (V.5.13).” 94 Thus, the backbone of the Neoplatonic via negativa in its variety of adaptations and applications can be summed up in the following proposition: “being and thought are not merely coextensive but identical.” 95 Indeed, Plotinus’ argument, which also recurs powerfully in .LQGĪ DLPV WR VKRZ WKDW EHLQJ ěÅ), as “the content of thought,” can be nothing but the apprehension of being.” 96 This “ěÅ” is, therefore, in the context of Neoplatonic philosophy, totally availaThis principle is known already in Plato; e.g., Parmenides (137c142a); see M. J. Nyvlt, 2012: p. 54 n. 34. 90 GS: 1.10–11, [B 185, 5–6]. The doctrine about God’s simplicity recurs also in al-ʡD\UDO-mDʚʘ; e.g., in proposition 20, trans. Taylor 1981: p. 317): “It is simple to the utmost degree of simplicity;” see also ThA: X.175, [B 160]. 91 E.g., V.1–3. 92 Nyvlt 2012: p. 54 n. 34. 93 Or, as .LQGĪSXWVLWWUDQV Ivry 1974: p. 112: “ […] the True One is not one of the intelligible things, and is neither matter, genus, species, individual, specific difference, property, common accident, motion, soul, intellect, whole, part, all or some.” Also, Netton: p. 54, pp. 57–58. 94 As quoted in H. A. Wolfson, “Albinus and Plotinus on Divine Attributes,” in: The Harvard Theological Review, vol. 45, no. 2 (1952), pp. 116– 117. 95 Perl 2007: p. 9. 96 Perl 2007: p. 9. 89

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ble to and accessible by thought. It is that “which can be truly known and truly said.” 97 God, by contrast, is not available to human apprehension because if He were He would “have various attributes, such as being, intelligibility, unity, and so on, in common with other beings.” 98 Indeed, one of the many debts of ʗDOOćü to this position is his insistence on the total otherness of God, which, in this context, has to be understood in the strict metaphysical sense that God “is not at all included within the whole of reality, of things that are, as any member of it.” 99 In contrast to “other things” (VćʯLU DO-aš\ćʱ  *RGpV RQHQHVV FDQQRW EH DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK D numerical value either quantitative or substantial; because, as maintained in the AP, substantial and quantitative values are predicated either of a “thing’s being” (ćQL\\DWDx-xD\ʱ RUDqWKLQJpVPHDVXUHr 100 7KLV RQHQHVV RI *RGpV WUDQVFHQGHQFH ʗDOOćü FRQFOXGHV PXVW EH conceived in a way that has no direct correlation with any arithmetical value (al-ZćʚLGDO-ODʨĪOć\DWLPPXEL-KLʰDGDGXQQćqis). 101 Elsewhere, ʗDOOćüSXWVWKLVSKLORVRSKLFDOWHQHWLQWKHIROORZLQJZD\ “On the side of the pure divinity, Allah the Almighty remains, transcending all dependent things, […] not touched by any cause. His proof is strong, and His power glorious. He, the Lord of Splendour and Glory and Majesty. The Uncountable One, not ‘one’ like arithmetical unity. Neither definition, nor deduction, beginning, nor end touches Him. His existence is a marvel, for He has no mode of existence, He alone knows Himself, the Lord of Majesty and Magnanimity […].” $OOćK DU-UDʚPćQ KXZD DO-PXQD]]DK ʰDQ ʯO-ʚDGDʤ KXZD VXEʚDQDKX PXQD]]DKʰDQNXOOLʯO-ʰLODOZDʯO-naqćʯLVTDZL\\XʯO-burhćQʰD]Ī]XʯOVXOʞćQ ʨX ʯO-üalćO ZD ʯO-maüG ZD ʯO-NLEUL\ćʯ ZćʚLG Oć PLQ KD\ʤ DOʰDGDGZćʚLGOćNDZćʚLGOD\VDODKXʚDGGZDOćʰDGGZDOćLEWLGćʯZD

F. A. Shehadi 1975: p. 152. Perl 2007: p. 11. 99 Perl 2007: p. 13. 100 DS, [B 180, 5–8] 101 NaW: §167, p. 247. 97 98

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lć intihćʯPXEGLʰDO-NDZQPXQD]]DKʰDQDO-NDZQ– lć \DʰULIXKXʯLOOć KXZDʨXʯO-üalćOZDʯO-LNUćP>f@. 102

,QWKHILQDOVHQWHQFHRIWKHSDVVDJHʗDOOćüSHUFHLYHVGod as having “no mode of existence,” in a manner that reiterates the fundamental premise of Plotinus’ interpretation of the One as containing “no multiplicity and therefore also no positively conceivable content.” 103 This latter conclusion recurs indirectly in proposition 21 of al-ʡD\U DO-PDʚʘ. 104 It provides, in a Neoplatonic context, a philosophical underpinning that justifies the refutation of all attempts to arrive “at the first principle by analogy with the mathematical analysis of numbers.” 105 That is to say, that the One is “not a numerical one, not the first in the numerical order, not the unity of all units.” 106 For Plotinus, this must be so for otherwise, “there will be something in common between it (the One) and those which are included in the count with it.” 107 In keeping with this view, therefore, “the expression of God’s oneness in terms of the arithmetic of numbers introduces a limiting condition.” 108 Hence, the Neoplatonic idea of God as a non-being, understood in terms of the foundational predicate of the divine simplicity, reflects not only a theological doctrine but also a philosophical standpoint. It entails the quest for defining God’s oneness “in a purely negative sense, as meaning, only, that the one is not any being.” 109

Trans. Aisha Abd Ar-Rahman 1974: p. 61; PhM3: 320–21; slightly modified. .Dʝ: Ch. X, p. 209. 103 J. Halfwassen 2014: p. 189. 104 Trans. Adamson 2002: p. 122: that the One is “above every name” for neither deficiencies nor mere completeness are befitting for it” (IDZTDNXOOLLVP\XVDPPćELKLZDʨćOLNDQQDKXOć\DOĪTELKćDQ-QLTʜćQZDOćDWWDPćP). 105 Z. Pleše 2006: p. 111 n. 36. 106 T. W. Organ, 3KLORVRSK\DQGWKH6HOI: East and West (1987), p. 151. 107 V.5.4.14–16; also, VI.9.6, quoted in Perl 2007: p. 11; parenthesis mine. 108 .Dʝ: Ch. X, p. 208. 109 Perl 2007: p. 11. 102

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ÞÞÞÞ , ),1$/5(0$5.6 In contrast to Massignon’s contention and interpretation – accordLQJWRZKLFKʗDOOćüpVvia negativa is simply a theological doctrine – the via negativa RI ʗDOOćü VKRXOG EH XQGHUVWRRG ZLWKLQ WKH SKLOosophical framework of Neoplatonism in both its Greek and Arabic YHUVLRQV ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV WKH W\SH RI DQVZHUV ʗDOOćü JLYHV WR WKH question of how and to what extent human beings are able to know God calls upon a line of argumentation that is typically Neoplatonic. Massignon, however, fails to see the similarities between the via negativa RIʗDOOćüDQGWKDW of Plotinus and the AP. In the context of WKH ʗDOOćüLDQ via negativa, negation amounts to saying that God FDQQRWEHNQRZQQRUEHWKRXJKW7KHUHIRUHʗDOOćü’s concept of WDQ]ĪK is radically distinct from the theological concept of WDQ]ĪK as SUDFWLFHGE\WKH0XʲWD]LOD:KLOHWDQ]ĪK, in the latter case, is equivalent to the denial of positive attributes (i.e., WDʰʞĪO Dʜ-ʜLIćW), the way ʗDOOćüSUDFWLFHV WDQ]ĪK entails absolutely no WDʰʞĪO of the attributes as the criterion for true recognition of God’s oneness. The kind of WDQ]ĪK ZH HQFRXQWHU LQ ʗDOOćüpV WH[WV HQWDLOV WKH same sense of ‘abstraction’ as Plotinus’ ÒθţɼÊÀË. That is, it rests on a commitment to the notion of God’s non-being or pure-being, which recurs repeatedly in the AP as a corollary of God’s simplicity, eternity, and completeness. It is also, though indirectly, built LQWR ʗDOOćüpV DEDQGRQPHQW RI DOO IRUPV RI SUHVXSSRVLWLRQV LQ Iavour of a philosophical concept of WDQ]ĪK that refutes all kinds of statements about God,QGHHGZHPD\FRQFOXGHWKDWʗDOOćüpVFRncept of WDQ]ĪK is the very embodiment of the Neoplatonic axiom that, “God is the unknowable that, ORJLFDOO\ speaking, is the opposite of the knowable” and “ontoORJLFDOO\ speaking, even beyond the One.” 110 As will become clear in Chapter III, to think in this way does not mean that God is not approachable. It simply means that it is impossible to know God in a discursive fashion. There, in Chapter III, I will highlight how this latter position is better understood in the light of yet another Neoplatonic trend that is noticea110

Quoted in I. N. Bulhof et al., 2000: p. 17; italics in original.

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EOHLQDQXPEHURIʗDOOćüpVSRHPVQDPHO\WKHqVXSUHPHP\VWLFDO experience of ‘reunion’ with God.” 111 Before going into the details of how this ‘mystical’ trend in ʗDOOćü PD\ EH XQGHUVWRRG LQ WKH QH[W FKDSWHU , ZLOO IXUWKHU Hxplore another significant theme which seems, at first sight at least, to be completely incompatible with everything we have said so far about the total transcendence of God. That is, the theme of God’s disclosure.

111

Arberry 2013: p. 59.

CHAPTER II. THE THEOPHANIC CREATOR-GOD: THE M U ʰILL AS ONE AND MULTIPLE The main purpose of the previous chapter was to demonstrate how ʗDOOćüpVLQVLVWHQFHRQWKHLQH[SUHVVLEOHFKDUDFWHURI*RGDVDZD\ of safeguarding divine transcendence can be translated philosophically into the idea of God’s non-being. In this chapter, we turn our attention to another issue, which is perhaps the most intriguing IHDWXUHRIʗDOOćüpVWKRXJKWLH*RGpVGLVFORVXUH7KLVLVVXHZKLFK ZHHQFRXQWHUHGLQWKHFRQWH[WRIRXUGLVFXVVLRQRIʗDOOćüpVSRVition about the divine attributes and their relation to God’s disclosure in Chapter I induces a particular way of relating to the divine, as we will see in Chapter III. At first glance at least, this idea of LPPDQHQFH VHHPV WR EH LQFRQVLVWHQW ZLWK ʗDOOćüpV RZQ LQVLVWHQFH on the absolute transcendence of God. Yet, as I shall argue in this chapter, this seeming inconsistency hides a quite sophisticated Neoplatonic mode of thinking that offers a means of overcoming the traditional designation of God as a direct cause of creation. Indeed, by using this Neoplatonic mode of thinking as an explanatory framework, we will be able to explain that God’s transcendence above all creation, DFFRUGLQJ WR ʗDOOćü LV SHUIHFWO\ LQ KDUPRQ\ with God’s immanence in the world. 1 Thus, only by using Neoplatonism as a framework, we will be able to unlock the paradox, which at ILUVW JODQFH VHHPV WR FRPSURPLVH ʗDOOćüpV RZQ FRPPLWPHQW WR WDQ]ĪK in the sense we gave to it in the last chapter: WDQ]ĪK as abstracting God above all categories of being. The paradox stems IURPZKDWʗDOOćüVD\VLQVHYHUDOSODFHVLQWKHʗDOOćüLDFXP&RUSXV 1

NaK: §59, §108, §114; NaW: §127, §128.

49

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about God’s causal role; for example, in NaW (§200, 253), where he speaks of God as the “Source of intelligible beings” (PDʜGDUDOPDZüŠGćW), and in .Dʝ (Ch. X: 209), where he refers to God as the “Originator of the Cosmos” (mXEGLʰDO-NDZQ). The apparent tension between these statements and many others, which we meet in the ʗDOOćüLDFXP&RUSXVDERXWGLYLQHWUDQVFHQGHQFHLVIXUWKHUH[DFHrbated by a number of other statements that can be cited in support of the portrayal of God as immanent or present within the world. 2 In his exegesis of Q 10:35 and Q 53:42, we encounter a depicWLRQ RI GLYLQH FUHDWLYLW\ LQ ZKLFK ʗDOOćü GHVLJQDWHV WKH &UHDWRUGod by the Arabic term 0XʰLOO 7KURXJK WKLV GHVLJQDWLRQ ʗDOOćü makes two claims: (i) God “is not subject to the laws of causation” (Oć\DʰWDO); (ii) God “makes beings act as causes without being affected by them” (ʰLQGDKXEDʞXODWDO-PDʰOŠlćt). 3

Here, I shall argue that this way of upholding God’s creativity can be understood properly only in light of the Neoplatonic tradition. In this tradition, the designation of God as a ‘First Cause’ does not mean a direct or ‘first cause’ “in a horizontal series of causes,” but rather “the one who bestows being upon all creatures.” 4 One should bring to mind WKDWʗDOOćüUHIUDLQVIURPXVLQJWKHWHUPʲilla ŠOć, ‘First Cause;’ a term that was widely used amongst the IDOVćVLID RI ʗDOOćü 0DVVLJQRQ DOOXGHV LQ D IRRWQRWH WR WKLV IHDWXUH WKDW LV ʗDOOćüpV UHIUDLQ IURP XVLQJ WKLV ZLGHO\ XVHG SKLORVRSKLFDO WHUP without giving any further explanation, although one might infer WKDW0DVVLJQRQLQWHUSUHWVʗDOOćüpVSRVLWLRQDVDVLJQRI originality. 5 7KLVERRNKRZHYHUVKDOODUJXHWKDWʗDOOćüpVUHIUDLQIURPXVLQJWKH term ‘First Cause’ and his use of the term 0XʰLOO is not arbitrary, but FHQWUDO LQ ʗDOOćüpV GHSLFWLRQ RI *RGpV FUHDWLYLW\ LQ WHUPV RI WUDnscendence above and immanence within the world. By using the Ne2

NaK: §187, §142, §202; NaW: §58, §166, §169, §170; Riw: §10, §19,

§20. NaK: §60, p. 122. Quoted in R. van Nieuwenhove 2012: p. 180. 5 PhM3: p. 129, n. 38. 3 4

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oplatonic notion of causation as interpretative framework, we will be able to resolve the paradox surrounding ʗDOOćüpVVHHPLQJO\FRQWUadictory goals of: (a) doing justice to God’s transcendence, (b) safeguarding God’s immanence, while at the same time (c) abandoning causal descriptions of God’s creative act in ordinary terms of a direct first cause. Indeed, the Neoplatonic notion of causation offers an interpretative tool that guarantees God’s transcendence and immanence and exSODLQV WKH UHDVRQ ZK\ ʗDOOćü GRHV QRW XQGHUVWDQG *RGpV FDXVDWLRQ LQ WKH VWDQGDUG SKLORVRSKLFDO VHQVH RI WKH WHUP ʲLOOD ŠOć, but instead, the term 0XʰLOO. Approaching God in this Neoplatonic manner offers a deeper appreciation of divine causation as a kind of creative contemplation. This, in turn, should help us make sense RIʗDOOćüpVFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRIGod as a Creator who is not “subject to the laws of causation” (Oć \DʰWDO). It also contains a key to H[SODLQLQJ ZK\ ʗDOOćüpV LQVLVWHQFH RQ *RGpV LPPDQHQFH is not compatible with a pantheist conception of creation. Contrary to the interpretations of modern scholarship, the last section of this chapWHUZLOOVKRZWKDWʗDOOćüpVFRQFHSWLRQRI*RGDVLPPDQHQWZLWKLQ the world can be seen to go hand in hand with the Neoplatonic notion of divine disclosure (WDüDOOĪ) that was later to be adopted by ,EQʲ$UDEĪ.

,, &$86$7,21$6121-5(&,352&$/'(3(1'(1&E This section will begin with a brief overview of the Neoplatonic conception of being; then I will introduce the most basic implications of this conception in order to clarify its crucial connection with the Neoplatonic view of causation, under discussion. In Neoplatonism, the concept of causation relates to questions in regard to the nature and content of the world, including the question of how entities, that is, beings inhabiting the higher, transcendent world operate in the production of the lower ones, and how these lower levels of reality are connected to the higher ones. Neoplatonists therefore tend to frame every sort of relation between beings in terms of “dependence,” that is, the reliance of what is created, and thus, hierarchically lower, upon the prior and

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hierarchically higher. 6 As P. Remes points out (2008), from a Neoplatonic point of view, this implies that “the caused and thus the metaphysically posterior in the hierarchy” is, by necessity, “dependent on its cause and origin.” 7 This means that anything’s being in the world is an expression or manifestation of a higher and more superior cause, “to which it stands as an image to its archetype.” 8 In effect, the image is not the same as the archetype, but a lower (and less perfect) manifestation of the latter, which is higher and therefore more perfect. Causation in this sense is a one-way process and therefore by definition “non-reciprocal.” More precisely, this means, “the generated thing is always dependent, both for its features and existence, on its cause.” 9 In this respect, the notion of dependence explained in Proclus’ (OHPHQWV RI 7KHRORJ\ – in both its Greek and Arabic versions – is an underlying principle of this conception, which ascribes every higher cause in the hierarchy of being “greater causal power than the power of the lower causes; ” 10 al-ʰLOOD al-Šlć al-EDʰĪGD DNʤDU LʚćʞD ZD-DxDGGX ʰLOODWLQ OL ʯO-šD\ʯ PLQ ʰLOODWLKL DOqarĪba. 11 Following this principle, therefore, hierarchical dependence entails an ongoing top-down communication, beginning with the highest, most simple, and most perfect of all, namely the One, the only self-sufficient whose presence is manifested to varying degrees down through the various causal layers in the hierarchy. 12 More importantly, it means that each level in the hierarchy receives its very existence and foundation through its superior level. Each level, which is higher and superior, gives all its content and qualities to the inferior level. The latter, in turn, becomes wholly intelligible,

S. L. Rappe 2002: p. 78. P. Remes 2008: p. 43. Remes 2008: p. 44. 8 M. F. Wagner 2002: p. 279; Remes 2008: p. 45; Rappe 2002: p. 78. Enn. V.4.1.4–5. 9 Quoted in Remes 2008: p. 43. 10 El. Theol., Dodds 1963: Prop. 7, p. 9. 11 al-ʡD\UDO-PDʚʘ 1955: 4, p. 4. 12 M. Nyvlt 2012: p. 166 6 7

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and therefore a ‘being’ in the Neoplatonic sense of the word, that is, “an object and content of thought.” 13 Nevertheless, what, precisely, is the nature of this “content” which makes the existence of something intelligible? What is transmitted from the higher/superior level to the lower/inferior level with the aim of constituting another intelligible being? The content that, according to Neoplatonists, defines a being as intelligible is the basic building blocks, or, in the words C. D’Ancona, “rational seeds.” 14 These seeds constitute a being’s very existence and real nature. Moreover, they are “eternal,” as we shall see, because they emerge from and grow out of the divine mind, which pours forth or “overflows” into the next lower level of the hierarchy. 15 This second level, Intellect, is made of the very same “intelligible” seeds as the Platonic Forms, as we will see especially in Chapter III. Likewise, Intellect overflows “into other things in such a way as to establish a new order of being, or one might say a new universe of being.” 16 Thus, the multiple beings found in the created world are produced through the agency of Intellect, which is wholly dependent upon the One for its being. The Neoplatonists refer to the process whereby the world is brought into existence as a “pouring forth,” 17 commonly translated in Arabic Neoplatonic texts as “ID\ʘ” 18 This process of an eternal divine act sets off an outpouring, or “emanation,” from God to the sublunary worldE. D. Perl, “Signifying Nothing: Being as Sign in Neoplatonism and Derrida”: R. Baine Harris (ed.) 1HRSODWRQLVPDQG&RQWHPSRUDU\7KRXJKW: Part Two 2002: p. 131. 14 C. D’Ancona, “Divine and Human Knowledge in the Plotiniana Arabica”: (ed.) John J. Cleary The Perennial 7UDGLWLRQ RI 1HRSODWRQLVP 1997: 437. In fact, the “seed” metaphor is one that Plotinus uses himself, e.g., in Enn. V.4.1.4–5; Remes 2008: p. 45. 15 Enn. V.2.1.7–9. 16 D. V. Freiberg, 7UHDWLVHRQWKH,QWHOOHFWDQGWKH,QWHOOLJLEOH: Tractatus de ,QWHOOHFWX(W,QWHOOLJLELOL, translated from the Latin with an introduction and notes by M.L. Führer: Mediaeval philosophical texts in translation; no. 31, (1992), p. 26. 17 K. Corrigan 2005: p. 14, 28; Adamson 2002: p. 185. 18 E.g., §19 al-ʡD\UDO-PDʚʘ, [B 1955, 21]; Adamson 2002: p. 185. 13

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through Intellect. 19 Together with the Neoplatonic notion of causation, this understanding of the divine mind as the originating source of all things provides the backgrouQG IRU ʗDOOćüpV LGHD RI the Creator-God as the 0XʰLOO. Both will help us in resolving the apparent contradiction between the assertion that God’s act of creation “is not subject to the laws of causation” (Oć\DʰWDO) 20 and the claim that God is present in all beings. In the course of this chapter, we will gain a better understanding of how these Neoplatonic QRWLRQV VXSSRUW ʗDOOćüpV GHSLFWLRQ RI WKH &UHDWRU-God as the 0XʰLOO. To return to our main topic of discussion: Understood in a properly Neoplatonic manner, the intelligibility of a thing’s being, then, would be unthinkable in isolation from the sum of the features – or “seeds” – whereby this thing becomes a being of its own. 21 As one single whole, these features constitute both the cause of a thing’s being – i.e., the cause of its identity – and what render it distinct from other beings. Intelligibility and being are thus two expressions of the same thing – namely, the being of something in terms of its constitutive parts, that is, the intelligible “seeds” that make this being distinct as an object of knowledge. 22 Indeed, for Neoplatonists, intelligibility engages a reciprocal relation with being. They are each other’s designators. In other words, it is not possible to understand the true – and intelligible – nature of a being, without knowing the forming principles, that is, the intellectual causes or seeds, of this being’s true existence. The following brief quotation from the Enneads will illustrate this pattern of causation, as well as giving an insight into its rationale:

Enn. V.2.1.25–28; V.1.6. NaK: §60, p. 122. 21 A being that is consisting of several parts or elements is already known in the Platonic tradition. In Theaetetus 157b-c it is said, for example, that a sensible particular is a “bundle (Ó¿ÉÇÀÊĸ) of properties”; L. Turcescu 2005: p. 38. 22 D’Ancona 1997. 19 20

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[…] just as in our universe, which subsists from a multiplicity of elements, all things are linked with each other, and the explanation from the individual consists in its being a member of the totality (that is, just as the part in the case of every individual is perceived in terms of its relation to the whole), it is not the case that first one thing arises and then after that, this, but rather things subsist in relation to each other, both the cause and the effect. 23

According to this passage, in explaining something’s existence, two points are crucial. First, every existent thing is SHU VH multiple and composite; it is made up of several features. The latter precede and condition the creature of which they are the constituents. As building blocks, they are the source of every creature’s nature and existence; that is, the “seeds” that define its very being. 24 Explaining this relation of dependence between a thing’s being and its features, S. Rappe posits three assumptions: (1) “all things co-originate with one another;” (2) “the reason for the existence of each thing consists in its membership within a totality;” and (3) “in the case of each individual, the part is seen to exist in relation to the whole.” 25 Put into a nutshell, while each new level of reality is a manifestation of its higher level, each represents a more multiple and less complete level of the highest, perfect level of being. Second, the process of the being’s becoming is not sequential. More precisely, this process of becoming is causal, but not in the successive sense of a relationship between an antecedent (cause) and a consequent (effect). Rather, as defined in the above quoted passage, cause and effect arise simultaneously; “the relationship between cause and effect is one of co-arising.” 26 The conception of causation presented here conceives of the effect as part of the cause itself. This means that the effects contain the cause and vice versa, they are each other’s container. The effects are inherent to, and thus dependent on, the arising of the cause. Because the cause VI.7.2.35; quoted in Rappe 2002: p. 77. D. J. O’Meara 1993: p. 61; Remes 2008: p. 45. 25 2002: pp. 77–78. 26 Rappe 2002: p. 78. 23 24

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comprises all of its effects eternally – that is to say, “in a timeless present,” 27 the cause is neither more nor less exhausted when producing its effects. As will become clearer in Chapters III and IV, this explains why the arising of Intellect, for example, is not a temporal occurrence. Indeed, the main thrust of the Neoplatonic metaphor of “overflow” is to capture the non-temporal, and therefore eternal, nature of the act of creation. Here, “overflow” does not entail any form of succession. For instance, this implies that the Intellect and the One take part in the act of creation simultaneously. In fact, in Neoplatonic terminology, all beings in the universe are “causes” and “effects,” eternally interconnected and interdependent. The Neoplatonic conception of causation is part and parcel of a cosmology that takes as its starting point a non-WHPSRUDO QRWLRQ RI creation. Indeed, for Neoplatonists “causation” is not reducible to a temporal relationship between a being and its causal antecedent. An explanation for a thing’s true being is not causal in the conventional sense. Rather, it involves here the exploration of the intelligible content of this thing. Thus, when Neoplatonists say that a being can be apprehended through its intelligible content, they mean, in Platonic fashion, that we should identify its building blocks, that is, the rational “seeds” which makes it DQREMHFWRIWKought. At the receiving side, the lower level receives these seeds from a cause above itself. The very origin of this cause, in turn, is contained in an ascending hierarchy of causes leading up to God whose causality penetrates everything. 28 For our purposes, this framework provides a crucial context for understanding two points of great importance in regard to the Neoplatonic conception of causation: (1) causes are nothing but ideas, and therefore eternal, originally contained in the divine mind E.g., Enn. VI. 9. 9. 3–6; quoted in Stamatellos 2007: p. 112. An example of this position may also be found in Enn. VI.7.1., where the “logic of temporal succession [ÌĠ»¼ ļÌÛ ÌĠ»¼], is denied”; quoted in S. Rappe 2002: p. 78. 28 E.g., Enn9,7KLVFRUUHVSRQGVWRWKHZD\LQZKLFK.LQGĪHxplains why “in every case other than God, unity and multiplicity always co-exist”; quoted in Adamson 2006: p. 51. 27

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as “seeds” that “subsist separately from the material world;” 29 (2) the material world is only a secondary offshoot of these ideas. Neoplatonism thus conceives the study of the sublunary world as a study of the intelligible ideas from the perspective of their manifold manifestations. 30 Unceasingly, creation is a continuous act channelled from the upper levels down to the lower ones through a downward causation. Significantly, therefore, beings here share a common source in the higher realm, the very ‘place’ of their existence and true nature. It should be clear to us that the Neoplatonic conception of causation is a “vertical” 31 conception of reality that moves downward and functions as framework according to which all creation is explainable by reference to a divine process of overflow. Unlike the horizontal view of causation by which, for instance, “a tsunami is caused by an underwater earthquake or volcanic eruption,” 32 the Neoplatonic causation posits a cosmos that consists of various levels of reality interacting vertically. Sharing the “seeds” of intelligibility, these levels are inextricably linked in virtue of the process of emanation that begins in and through the Godhead. This implies that the “seeds” are present throughout every level of reality according to the capacity of each level, which, in turn depends on – and determines – the level’s place in the hierarchy. 33 The upper levels in the hierarchy, therefore, are causes or metaphysical principles “acting from above upon the physical world:” 34 Quoted in L. Elders 1990: p. 242. See also A. Linguiti 2009: p. 173; also M. F. Wagner’s seminal paper from 1982 (see bibliography), which contains relevant discussions on Neoplatonic causation. 30 D. J. O’Meara 1993: p. 60; A. Linguiti 2009. 31 Wagner 1982: 57; P. Remes 2008: p. 42, pp. 44–5. 32 A. Isaacs 2005: p. 38. As Wagner points out (1982: p. 58), according to Plotinus, horizontal causes are features of the physical world that “we discern by means of the materials of sense.” 33 Enn. V.8.4–8. 34 Linguiti 2009: 173; Enn. V.5.9; Perl 2007: p. 18. As A. Linguiti points out (2009: p. 177), “the distinction between self-moving incorporeal entities and bodies moved by incorporeal forces” can be traced back to Plato’s Laws (e.g., bk. X 896a); O’Meara 1993: pp. 29–32. 29

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EARLY PHILOSOPHICAL ʙş),60 One might certainly call the powers of fire and the other bodies great; but it is by mere inexperience of true power that they are imagined burning and destroying and crushing […] But these destroy, because they are destroyed, and help to generate because they are generated themselves; but the power in the intelligible world has nothing but its being and its being beautiful […] For in deficiency of beauty it would be defective also in reality. 35

As one can read from this passage, what makes things what they really are – as beautiful, for example – is not some physical feature (as, for instance, a particular shape or particular colour). Rather, it is by virtue of the immaterial idea of “beauty” itself that a being derives its beauty and hence its intelligibility. 36 In other words, beauty as content is inseparable from Beauty as Form. The latter is seen as the pre-existing archetype in the sense described above; namely as the intelligible cause of all appearances of beauty as content in the sublunary world, which in turn express “the beauty of that higher world in accordance to its own capacity and position in the hierarchy.” 37 These archetypes, by contrast, inhabit the “Intellectual Realm” 38 and therefore are discernible only by intellect, since the causation in each Form is induced intellectually, namely by means of contemplation. In sum, the vertical relationship between higher and lower levels can only be understood in the light of this hierarchical conception in which each level reflects in varying degrees the intelligible nature of the divine by virtue of its own capacity for contemplation. 39 Enn. V.8.9.32–39. E.g., Enn. I.6.2; Corrigan 2005: pp. 210–11; O’Meara 1993: p. 89, p. 91; F. M. Schroeder 1992: pp. 3–24. 37 Enn. V.8.4–8; quoted in M. A. R. Habib 2008: p. 135; pp. Corrigan 2005: p. 217. 38 Enn. V.8.7. 39 This contemplative capacity essentially enables a being to comprehend its own nature. In Chapter III, we will take a much more detailed look at how this Neoplatonic notion of contemplation functions in the EDFNJURXQGRIʗDOOćüpVGHVLUHIRUHWHUQDOVDOYDWLRQZKLFKLPSOLHVWKHDELl35 36

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,, &217(03/$7,21$67+(35,1&,3$/02'(2) &5($7,21

To think of something’s existence as real, actual and genuine in virtue of its intelligible content plays several important roles in Neoplatonism. One of these roles is intimately connected with the notion of ¿¼ÑÉţ¸ – i.e., contemplation – as the fundamental mode of creation. 40 Basically speaking, contemplation is an activity at works at all levels of the Neoplatonic hierarchy. There is a fundamental assumption underlying this idea in the Enneads, namely, “that all things come from contemplation and are contemplation.” 41 Indeed, each creature is brought into existence by means of contemplation regardless of what category it belongs to. Specifically, this means, “everything is either contemplation (in the sense that it contains its intelligibility within itself, as does Intellect), or a product or consequence of contemplation.” 42 Correspondingly, ¿¼ÑÉţ¸ in its Neoplatonic sense would be a synonym for “being,” the very essence in all actual creatures. All things have within them a certain degree of intelligibility that can be grasped only by the mind, precisely because their essence can be traced back ultimately to “intelligible archetypes.” 43 Contemplation (¿¼ÑÉţ¸), then, is synonymous with creation and being. That is, contemplation is a synthesis of both creation and being that applies to all levels in the Neoplatonic hierarchy, especially to the ‘Intellectual Realm’ and the way in which it is structured. The Intellect, for instance, which comprises within itself the intelligible seeds (or building blocks) of all things, functions as the repository of all “forming principles” through contemplation. 44 ity both to attain insight into the unity of being and to establish a sense of self-awareness through communion with God. 40 See also Enn. III.8.7, and III.8.8. 41 Enn. III.8.7.1–2; Stamatellos 2007: p. 79. 42 K. Corrigan 2007: p. 105; parenthesis original. See also J. Yhap 2003: p. 81. 43 Nyvlt 2012: p. 74; Corrigan 2007: p. 102. 44 M. F. Wagner 1996: p. 166. As we shall see in Chapter III, this V\QWKHVLVRIFRQWHPSODWLRQDQGEHLQJGRPLQDWHVʗDOOćüpVDFFRXQWRIFUHa-

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The synthesis of contemplative thinking and being comprises the creation of the entire cosmos. Creation in this sense amounts to causing “a form to exist,” which in turn “is equivalent to an active filling of everything with contemplation.” 45 Seen in this light, “Intellect exists as a contemplation” – and hence as “an image” – of the One; 46 Soul as a contemplation of Intellect, and Nature as a contemplation of Soul whose by-product is the world.” 47 Hence we have to distinguish between the different levels in the hierarchy that are patterned according to the capacity that is proper to each level’s function; that is, the “power of self-contemplation.” 48 Therefore, in speaking about the physical world, Plotinus is not speaking about “a realm of reality in its own right;” but rather about a product of a “higher” – and thus superior – level of contemplation. 49 Later it will become clear that Intellect (ÅÇıË) has its special status as the primordial ideal and destination of all beings by virtue of its timeless contemplation of the One. 50 Our discussion so far has touched on two closely related points that are central to Neoplatonic causation: a) each level in the hierarchy of being is dependent on the immediate level above it; 51 b) when a level contemplates the level immediately superior to it, it receives its true nature – and hence perfection. Each level in the Neoplatonic hierarchy comes to being as an “expression” of a higher, more perfect level. The latter, in turn, gives the lower level its rational content and power to contemplate. 52 This kind of topdown causation by means of emanation is just what the Neoplatontion in terms of an eternal and dynamic interaction between divine selfcontemplation and downward-causation. 45 Corrigan 2007: 103; Corrigan 2005: pp. 106–7, 134–35, and p. 146. 46 Enn. V.4.2; V.1.7. 47 Quoted in O’Meara 1993: p. 76; Wagner 1982: p. 58; also L. P. Gerson 2012: p. 221; Yhap 2003: p. 82; Stamatellos 2007: p. 87. 48 Schroeder 1992: p. 6. 49 C. Wildberg 2009: p. 124, p. 132; also, Enn. III.8.3; 4. 50 Enn. V.4.2; V.1.7.1; G. Stamatellos 2007: pp. 59–61, p. 79; Yhap 2003: p. 75; Gerson 2012: pp. 222–23. 51 Corrigan 2007: p. 105. 52 Rappe 2002: p. 78.

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ic term “procession” (ÈÉĠÇ»ÇË) implies: namely, the overflow from the One to Intellect whose intelligibility permeates, in varying degrees, the lower levels of being. 53 Ultimately, from this perspective, the creation process from the highest level down to the lowest one entails a relation characterised by a “non-reciprocal” top-down causation, which Plotinus explains in the following way: Those are not right who destroy the image-universe while the intelligible abides, and bring it into being as if its maker ever planned to make it. For they do not want to understand how this kind of making works, that as long as that higher reality gives its light (ëŠÄȼÀ), the rest of things can never fail: they are there as long as it is there; but it always was and will be. 54

Essentially, creation is a continuous process produced and sustained in virtue of the higher level’s giving its eternal light to the lower. Each level of reality receives its intelligible nature and the ability to exist from above, that is to say, due to its subordination to a superior level: Of necessity […] all things must exist forever in ordered dependence upon each other: those other than the First have come into being in the sense that they are derived from other, higher principles. Things that are said to have come into being did not just come into being […] but always were and always will be in process of becoming. 55

As we can see from this passage, in the Neoplatonic hierarchy of beings, everything proceeds from and is subordinate to “higher principles,” which are themselves participants in and products of higher principles/levels in the hierarchy. Consequently, all levels in this hierarchy share a common origin in the very act of divine selfNyvlt 2012: p. 131; M. L. Gatti 1996: p. 32; Wagner 1982: p. 51. As we shall see in more detail in Chapter III, for ʗDOOćüWKLVNLQGRIRXtflow is an activity reserved to God and His first offspring, i.e., the Intellect. 54 Enn. V.8.12.21–26. 55 Enn. II.9.3.11–14. 53

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contemplation, understood, here, as the inaugural moment of the process of top-down causation. This is but a mere echo of the Platonic doctrine: all creatures exist by “participation” in the Forms. 56 This Platonic doctrine of participation in the Forms, which underlies the Neoplatonic notion of top-down causation, is highly signifLFDQWEHFDXVHWKURXJKLW1HRSODWRQLVWVLQFOXGLQJʗDOOćü ZHUHDEOH to safeguard and confirm God’s transcendence and immanence at the same time. For reasons that will become apparent, the doctrine of participation will help us understand better not only the relation between cause and effect in Plotinus, but also the very conception of causation, which we encounter in the AP. Once again, insisting upon the function aspect of this notion of participation, any understanding of ʗDOOćüpVVHHPLQJO\ SDUDGR[LFDOFRQFHSWLRQRI*RGDV transcendent and totally immanent – including his use of the epithet 0XʰLOOto designate God’s creative agency – would be impossiEOH,QRUGHUWKHUHIRUHWRJUDVSʗDOOćüpVSRVLWLRQRQWKLVSRLQWLW will be necessary to become acquainted with this doctrine.

,, P$57,&,3$7,21$67+(35,1&,3/(2)(;,67(1&( Plato’s participation designates the process, by which what is lower comes to exist by receiving its intelligible nature from the level immediately above it, i.e., to which it is subordinate. 57 Indeed, as we have just seen in the case of Plotinus, Plato’s doctrine explains the coming-to-be of things as a relation of dependence on – and subordination to – higher levels of reality. Unlike beings that exist at the higher intelligible level of the hierarchy, creatures existing at the lower level belong to the “imperfect […] changing world in which things pass in and out of existence.” 58 Thus, in order to be able to exist at all, creatures existing at lower levels participate in the intelligibility of their immediate higher level, i.e., “the perfect […] unYhap 2003: p. 153; Gerson 2012: p. 31. “ļÌñϼÀÅ, Phaedo 100c5–6 or ļ̸ÂÚĹ¸Å¼ÀÅ, 5HS. 102b2”; quoted in W. A. Welton 2002: p. 25 n. 34. For references to the theory of Forms in Plato’s own texts, see e.g., Phaedo: 65d-66, 74a-c, 78c-80b, and 100–02; RHSXEOLF: pp. 476–80, pp. 507–18, 595–6a; Phaedrus: 247. For a full account of Plato’s theory of Forms, see F. J. Gonzalez 2002; and D. Sedley 1998. 58 R. Hall 2004: pp. 25–26. 56 57

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changing” “archetype or form which is also a standard or model to be imitated or approximated in its copies in the physical world.” 59 In the Platonic perspective, this amounts to the acknowledgment that the intelligible content of something is nothing but the byproduct of something more perfect, more eternal, and more divine, namely, of the Form. The nature or essence of something is, therefore, identical with “what can be truly known” of this kind of thing, namely the Form “that makes that thing what it is.” 60 Intelligibility, then, which binds all beings to each other, is communicated from one level to another in a contemplative manner, that is, by means of thought. This, briefly, means understanding FRQWHPSODWLRQ to be the very essence of the causal power that all intelligibles possess. Indeed, this is the basic sense of participation, which in Neoplatonism explains, “how higher realities, whether hypostases or forms, can be both transcendent and yet immanent at lower levels.” 61 Like Neoplatonic causation, participation signifies the intelligible links between the Forms and sensible things in terms of causal subordination and dependence of what is lower on what is higher in the hierarchy. For example, as already mentioned, things are beautiful insofar as they participate or partake in Beauty itself. As Plato says: “If anything is beautiful, other than the Beautiful itself it is beautiful through no other cause than that participates in that Beautiful.” 62 Or, as he puts it elsewhere: “Nothing else makes it beautiful than the presence or communion of that beautiful […] all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful.” 63 This is precisely what is at work in the Neoplatonic hierarchy. Here, like the Intellect itself, the Form of Beauty functions as a cause (¸ĊÌĕ¸) that defines the nature, content, and essence of something else. Recognising or identifying something as beautiful in the context of this philosophy amounts to recognising that this thing is beautiful

Hall 2004: p. 26. Quoted in R. A. Watson 2012: p. 9. 61 J. Gregory 2014: p. 156; Nyvlt 2012: p. 202; Corrigan 2005: p. 13; Yhap 2003: p. 72. 62 Phaedo 100c. 63 Phaedo 100d4–8. 59 60

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because it has a share in the archetypal Form of Beauty. 64 This implies, most importantly, that this archetypal Beauty is present, indeed, manifested in, this manifold of beautiful things without losing its own transcendent, divine character. Neither does its beauty decrease, nor does it cease to be perfect. 65 Thus understood, the Form serves as a fixing point for many other forms of being at the same time, just as the Neoplatonic One is the fixing point for all living things. As Plato puts it: “Each [form] is itself one, but, as they appear everywhere by communion (ÁÇÀÅÑžʊÅÌÑÅ) with actions and bodies and each other, each appears many.” 66 In sum, then, the sense of participation intended here is the intelligible kind of causation that involves top-down procession. 67 For the Neoplatonists, this causation is non-reciprocal. The presence of the Form in manifold things can be likened to the presence of the cause in its effects; these effects, in turn, are nothing but merely the manifold appearances of this same cause in the sublunary world. In Neoplatonism, therefore, the familiar contradiction between immanence and transcendence is perceived as pretentious: the Form is above its multiple effects; and yet, at the same time, it is not but “immanently” manifest within them. 68 As the cause or archetype, the Form transcends its effects in the sense of being “non-identical with” and “ontologically prior” to its effects. 69 In other words, the Platonic Form has for the Neoplatonists the function of clarifying the nature according to which one can apply the same definition to different things at one and the same time – i.e.,

Sedley 1998: p. 116; see also A. Nehamas 1999: p. 176, p. 198, p. 203, p. 211, and p. 222. 65 See D. J. Yount 2014: pp. 49–69. Plotinus puts forward this view in several passages, e.g., V.5.3, VI.7.36–37, and VI.9.5. 35–38. 66 5HSXEOLF 476a5–7; quoted in F. J. Gonzalez 2002: p. 45. 67 Wagner 1982: pp. 51–73. 68 J. H. Fielder 1976: pp. 101–12; esp. pp. 113–115. 69 Quoted in Sedley 1998: 131–2 n. 23; on the Forms as causes in the Enneads, see esp. VI.7 [37].2; also, Yhap 2003, p. 55, p. 62. 64

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as “beautiful.” 70 This idea, alone, is sufficient to establish that the Form is present within a particular thing, as far as the latter is seen as “nothing but a by-product and a reflection of the Form itself.” 71 Importantly, this does not imply that the sensible world is an illusion, i.e., that it is not real at all. Rather, worldly things are “sensible manifestations.” For instance, variations in the degree and appearance of beauty in “earthly” things are variations in their reflection of the Form, which depends on each earthly thing’s place in the cosmic hierarchy. 72 Intelligible and sensible/physical realms cannot exist apart from each other. To claim otherwise entails a false distinction between two distinct levels of existence. As Eric Perl has remarked, “the difference between intelligible forms and sensible instances is the difference, not between two kinds of reality, but between reality and appearance.” 73 This insight, which clarifies the notion of participation as developed by Platonists, is indispensible for understanding the relationship between God and the world, between transcendence and immanence, as well as for grasping the top-down movement of Neoplatonic causation which scholars define as “vertical.”

,, P$57,&,3$7,21,1P/27,186$1'7+($3 The ontological link between the higher exemplary realm and the lower realm amounts to nothing more than a kind of ‘participation,’ understood as the top-down procession by means of the overflow of the cause in its effects. We find a similar understanding of this kind of participation in Plotinus, especially in treatises 4 and 5 of Enn. VI,74 which can be construed as follows: Sedley 1998: 128. One also finds passages in the Enneads (e.g., I.6.1–2 and V.9.2) talking about bodies as beautiful “through their participation in the Form of beauty ÄŖ՝¿ŖÆÀË, ÄŖÌÇϾ՝”; quoted in O’Meara 1993: 89. 71 Enn. III.5.1–26–36; quoted in P. Kalligas 2014: p. 509; Tim., 50c-d; also A. F. Ashbaugh 1988: p. 4, p. 19, p. 88; Wagner 1982: p. 65. 72 Wagner 2002: p. 298. 73 Perl 2007: p. 20. 74 O’Meara 1993: p. 24. For more on the way that Plotinus interprets the notion of participation, see S. Strange 1992: esp. pp. 492–6. 70

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EARLY PHILOSOPHICAL ʙş),60 (i) Each thing is the image of its archetypal Form that remains transcendent in spite of the fact that its manifestation in reality is always manifold. 75 Thus, Forms are “archetypes” of worldly appearances, the function of which is to render the intelligible present in a manifold manner: 76 ÒÂÂЏ ëȼĖ ¼ċ»Ñ¸ ÌÛ ëÅ Ìĉ ĩÂþբÒÉϼÌŧÈÑÅ»ò֙…]; “since things in matter are images and the Forms hold the rank of archetypes […].” 77 (ii) The aim should therefore be to identify the common source of existence of these earthly appearances. In the first place, this means contemplating their content and intelligible nature, which surpasses the capacity of our physical senses. The Form appears to us as manifold because of our limited senses: “It [i.e., Form] is not […] divided up into parts, but seems to be so divided to the recipient.” 78 Therefore, “it is not correct to divide that same up into the many, but rather to bring back the divided many to the one.” 79 (iii) Our senses perceive the Form in terms of its appearances “here and there,” but “reason says” that these appearances are nothing but manifestations of one and the same Form (÷ĚŠºÛÉ ¸ċÊ¿¾ÊÀËբ Ć ÈÉÇÊšÏÇÅ̼Ë ÒÈÀÊÌÇijļÅ ÌÇęË ¼ºÇÄš-ÅÇÀËբ šº¼ÀĞÌÀ Ļ»¼ Á¸Ė Ļ»¼բ ĝ »ò ÂĠºÇË Ìġ Ļ»¼ Á¸Ė Ļ»ò ޾ÊÀÅ ÇĤÁ

Gregory 2014: p. 36. Plotinus’ Form (¼ċ»ÇË) is DUFKHW\SDO in a way that resembles “the principle and cause of the motion in Aristotle’s account”; quoted in A. Marmodoro 2014: p. 50. As Nyvlt makes clear (2012: p. 77), the ¼ċ»ÇËat issue here (e.g., 3K\Vics II 3, 194b27) is “the logos, which is particularized, or instantiated, in matter.” In other words, for Aristotle, as for Plato, ¼ċ»ÇË is the formal cause that renders something intelligible as a being “in its own right;” Stamatellos 2007: 62 77 Enn. VI.5.8.13–21; quoted in Perl 2012: p. 21; see also Yhap 2003: p. 76; Corrigan 2005: p. 200; Stamatellos 2007: p. 6. 78 Enn. VI.4.14.13–14; quoted in Perl 2012: p. 21. 79 Enn. VI.4.7.4–8; quoted in Perl 2012: p. 21; Gerson 2012: 22; O’Meara 1993: p. 79. 75 76

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ëÁ̸¿¼ęʸÅ Ļ»¼ Á¸Ė Ļ»¼ º¼ºÇÅñŸÀբ ÒÂÂÛ Ìġ ëÁ̸¿òÅ ÈÞÅ ¸ĤÌÇijļ̼À¾ޚŸÀěÅÌÇËÒ»À¸ÊÌŠÌÇ͸ĤÌÇij). 80 (iv) Due to its intelligible nature, the Form participates in manifold things without losing its most essential character, i.e., as “a single rational principle encompassing itself […] nowhere parted from itself, but everywhere in itself.” 81 The Form remains, indeed, “the same in number everywhere” (ÈÚɼÊÌÀ»ò ÒÉÀ¿Äń̸ĤÌġÅÈÚÅ̾); 82 that is, really ‘one’ though in fact present in many places at once; 83 therefore, the Form is immanent in many things, while still remaining separated from them as wholly intelligible: “There is nothing, therefore, surprising in its being in all things in this way, because it is also in none of them in such a way as to belong to them.” 84

Accordingly, Forms are true causes of sensible things; sensibles, in turn, are effects or by-products of the (immaterial) Forms. 85 As such, the Form is not just separate from and in opposition to its sensible manifestations, but operates in this context as the lifegiving source of a thing’s mode of being, that is, “of its being just that thing which it is and of its being knowable and definable as such.” 86 We can say, then, that the higher level is a cause of the lower considering that Plotinus (like Plato before him) thinks of the former as the very condition of the latter. The higher level contemplates, and thus, creates the lower as the cause of its appearances. However, as we have stated before, the Form remains above all appearances, that is, “an integral totality, not divided up by the dependence of various bodies on it.” 87

Enn. VI.4.13.2–6; Perl 2012: p. 21. Enn. VI.5.9.36–44. 82 Enn. VI.5.11.32. 83 Enn. V.5.11.38. 84 Enn. VI.4.3.17–19; Perl 2012: p. 21. 85 O’Meara 1993: p. 16. 86 Quoted in H. Staten 1986: p. 9; Wagner 2002: p. 285, p. 294; O’Meara 1993: p. 27. 87 O’Meara 1993: p. 27. 80 81

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Interestingly, the same conception of participation, as well as the hierarchical sort of causation it implies, comes to expression in the AP, including the Arabic versions of Proclus’ Elements; i.e., alʡD\U DO-PDʚʘ and 0DEćGLʯ DO-ilćKL\\ćW. 88 Thus, with regard to the question, “how multiplicity can come from a source that is purely one” (ND\ID LEWDGDʰD DO-wćʚLG DO-EDʜĪʞ Dx\ćʯ NDʤĪUD), 89 the Adaptor seems to reinforce Plotinus’ notion of participation, stating that the causation of God lies in His capacity to produce all things “by the mere fact of His being” (DEGDʰDDO-aš\ćʯEL-DQQDKXIDTDʞ). 90 Notwithstanding the obvious differences in their respective theological positions, 91 Plotinus and the AP certainly share some common ground with respect to God’s privileged status as both transcendent beyond everything and immanent, sustaining the existence of everything. Indeed, the AP formulates this view in a manner, which endorses the basic Plotinian tenet that the transcendence and immanence of God correlate with His “contemplative” nature (huwa al-UDZL\\D). 92 Thus, on the one hand, “the One is the cause of the multiplicity of things” and “the existence (ZXüŠG) of the One is in each one of them,” on the other. 93 As P. Adamson argues, this view “has the salutary effect of introducing an immediate relationship between God and each created thing”; 94 it also highlights that God is present in all things precisely as the prior, all-encompassing This shows that this peculiarly Neoplatonic conception was in ZLGH FLUFXODWLRQ LQ WKH SKLORVRSKLFDO FLUFOHV RI %DĠGćG LQ the ninth and tenth centuries – FLUFOHVZKLFKDV0DVVLJQRQVXJJHVWVʗDOOćüKDGFRPH WR NQRZ DIWHU KLV EUHDN ZLWK WKH ʙŠIĪV 0DVVLJQRQ Ph 1994: p. 101, pp. 105–8. 89 DS: 142, [B 177, 1]; trans. Adamson 2002: p. 137. 90 ThA: X.191, [B 163, 8]; see also GS: 1.10–11, [B 185]; DS: [B 179, 2]; ThA: X.175, [B 160, 12]. C. D’Ancona in her excellent study, Recherches sur le Liber de Causis (1995), provides an exhaustive treatment of this subject; see esp. p. 63, p. 107, and pp. 139–52. 91 For a discussion of these differences see, for example, C. D’Ancona 2001; see also Zimmermann, 1986. 92 ThA: X. 188, [B 162, 13]. 93 DS: 144, [B 177, 4]. 94 Adamson 2002: p. 139. 88

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cause of these things (huwa al-Dx\ćʯEL-DQQDKXʰLOODODKć). 95 The Adaptor expresses this idea in various ways, among which prevails the theme of God’s supreme “power” to originate all things (qudra DEGDʰDWal-Dx\ćʯNXOOXKć). 96 Furthermore, the Adaptor states that God is the cause of all intelligibles and sensibles (al-Dx\ćʯDl-ʰDTOL\\DZ’lʚLVVL\\D); that He “embraces” within Himself all “things” while remaining “different from everything” (al-Dx\ćʯNXOOXKć fĪhć ZDKL\DĠD\U al-Dx\ćʯNXOOXKć). 97 As already noted, explaining God’s immanence and transcendence in this manner finds a strong parallel in al-ʢD\UDO-PDʚʘ. 98 In proposition 19, God is described as the First Cause (al-ʰLOOD DOŠlć) who “governs the created things while remaining transcendent” (tudabbiru al- Dx\ćʱal-PXEWDGDʰD […] PLQĠD\UʯDQWXʚĪʞXELKć). 99 In this regard it might appear, at first sight, that the Adaptor adopts a purely monotheistic framework that leaves no room whatsoever for God’s immanence in the Neoplatonic sense. This, however, is not the case. The Adaptor explains further that this First Cause governs all created things in the capacity of being the emanating source of their existence (tudabbirual-Dx\ćʱal-PXEWDGDʰDZDWXIĪʘXʰDOD\Kć al-quwwa ZDʯO-ʚD\ćW). 100 In other words, what is really intriguing in the argument put forward here is how God can be DSXUHWUDQVFHQGHQWXQLW\, “totally different from everything” (PXEć\LQDOLʯO-aš\ćʯ), on the one hand, and be the emanating source that governs things, on the other? From the Adaptor’s point of view, the fact that God governs everything does not affect His unity in any way. Several reasons are given for this, again in a typical Neoplatonic manner: God’s transcendent unity remains “unweakened” (Oć \XʘʰLI ZDKGćQL\\DWDKć) 101 due to the fact that God’s creation emanates “all at once” (ID\ʘDQ ZćʚLGDQ) as an overflow of “the pure goodness of His being” (liThA: X. 186 [B 162, 9–10]. E.g., Enn. V.1.7.10; V.3.15.26–33; V.4.1.36; V.4.2.39; VI.7.32.31. 97 ThA: X. 153, [B 156, 17–18]. 98 %DGDZĪ 99 Proposition 19, line 1. 100 Proposition 19, line 4. 101 %DGDZĪ„6–9. 95 96

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DQQDKX LQQDPć KXZD ʢD\UXQ EL-DQL\\DWLKL). While the transcendent divine cause “is equally present in all things” (PDZüŠGDIĪpODx\ćʯNXOOLKć ʰDOć tartĪbin wćʚLG), 102 the extent of created beings’ participation in the divine presence varies according to each being’s capacity of reception (PLQ WLOTćʯ DO-qćbil; 103NXOOX ZćʚLG PLQ DO-Dx\ćʯ \DTEDODKć ʰDOć QDʚZLTXZZDWLKL). 104 That is to say, according to each being’s “proximity” to the First Cause (ʰDOćQDʚZLTXUELKLPLQDO-ʰLOODDO-Šlć). 105 Like the causality of Plato’s Form, all things receive their unity and intelligibility by means of their participation in the “True Pure One” who is the only cause of all oneness (ʜćUDWZDʚGćQL\\DPLQDüODO-ZćʚLG al-ʚDTT DO-ODʨĪ KXZD ʰLOODWX ZDʚGćQL\\DWLKć). 106 In this sense, the very notion that the First cause governs while remaining transcendent means that God originates beings in the Neoplatonic sense of emanating them, while remaining transcendent, completely unaffected by this creative act. Despite in fact being immanent in all of them, God is not reducible to the sum total of His effects. The same idea lies at the heart of Proclus arabus (0DEćGLʯ DOilćKL\\ćt, G. Endress, ed., 1973). The argument, as presented here, explains in two steps why the One inherently exists in every multiplicity (LQQD IĪ NXOOL NDʤUD DO-ZćʚLG PDZüŠd). 107 As a first step, the Adaptor argues that “if the One does not exist in all parts of multiplicity then all multiple parts must likewise be infinite, which is impossible” (LQODP\DNXQDO-ZćʚLGIĪNXOOLxD\ʯLQPLQKć […] ZDOćxD\ʯPLQ ʯO-aš\ćʯDO-NDʤĪUDDO-ODWĪPLQKćUXNNLEDWDO-NDʤUD […] IDKćʨć\DNŠQLOć mć lć nihć\DODKØ […] ZDKćʨćPXPWDQLʰOć \DNŠn al-batta). 108 As a second step, the Adaptor argues that there must be a “first cause that is purely one, containing no multiplicity whatsoever” (ʰLOODŠOćOćPDʚćO ZćʚLGDIDTDWZDTDEODDO-Dx\ćʯDO-NDʤĪUDZD-OD\VDIĪKćxD\ʯPLQDO-NDʤUD). 109 This is why the One participates in multiplicity and vice-versa (anna 102

%DGDZĪ„ %DGDZĪ„ 104 %DGDZĪ„ 105 %DGDZĪ„ 106 %DGDZĪ„ 107 Endress 1973: §1.1. 108 Endress 1973: §1.2–13, my translation. 109 Endress 1973: §1.19–21, my translation. 103

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al-ZćʚLG TDG xćUDND DO-NDʤĪU ZD ʯO-NDʤĪU xćUDND DO-ZćʚLG). 110 The truly transcendent One (al-ZćʚLG DO-ODʨĪ KXZD ZćʚLG ʚDTTDQ) 111 should be conceived as one in essence – devoid of all multiplicity – and many/multiple in emanation (fi-pOʨćWZćʚLGIDTDWOD\VDIĪKLxD\ʯmin alNDʤUD […] DPPć IĪ DO-LQELʤćW ID ʯO-wćʚLG NDʤĪU). 112 In that sense, each multiplicity is the effect of the One, i.e., the transcendent cause (alNDʤUDKL\DDO-PDʰOŠODPLQʯO-wćʚLG). 113 The transcendent cause is prior to all multiple things (al-NDʤUDEDʰG al-wćʚLG). 114 “He is truly one due to nothing but Himself” (al-ODʨĪ KXZD EL-ʨćWLKL ZćʚLG KDTT), 115 being the same “One in all things” (al-ZćʚLG IĪ ʯO-Dx\ćʯ). “Created things have unity in a way that is non-essential (al-ODWĪ OD\VDW EL ʨćWLKć ZćʚLGD), 116 becoming what they really are by receiving life from the primordial One” (VćʯLUDO-aš\ćʯLQQDPDKL\DZćʚLGDPLQDüOLQD\OLKćDOZćʚLG). 117 Indeed, this is precisely what the designation of God as a First Cause means, according to this account. God, we are told, “contains all things because He is prior to and source of all things” (KXZD üćPLʰ OL ʯO-aš\ćʯ DO-NDʤĪUD OL-DQQDKX DZZDOXKć); “is above all things” (OD\VDIDZTDKXxD\ʱ  118 “things exist in Him not as multiplicity” (OD\VDIĪKLxD\ʯPLQDO-NDʤUD). 119 This must be true, because otherwise created things would be traced back to infinity, without ever

Endress 1973: §5.27–28, my translation. Endress 1973: §5.19, my translation. 112 Endress 1973: §5.20–22, my translation. 113 Endress 1973: §5.23, my translation. 114 Endress 1973: §5.1, my translation. 115 Endress 1973: §5.19, my translation. 116 Endress 1973: §3.2, my translation. 117 Endress 1973: §3.9. This argument, too, is parallel to one of .LQGĪpVDUJXPHQWVIRUWKH“True Oneness” of God, in contrast to things whose unity is “accidental rather than essential”: “[The True One] […] is pure and simple unity, i.e., (having) nothing other than unity, while every other than one is multiple;” quoted in Netton 2013: p. 48; parenthesis and brackets in original). 118 Endress 1973: §5.41. 119 Endress 1973: §5.44. 110 111

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arriving at their ultimate cause. “And that is simply impossible” (ĠD\UPXPNLQDQ\DNŠQ). 120 This mere fact, i.e., the conjunction of being and oneness helps to explain the nature of the relationship between all things, since each thing derives its quality from its cause, and this cause from its immediate cause, which in turn derives from a prior cause and so on back to the ‘First Cause’. This is how Neoplatonism explores philosophically the ever-central question of why there must be a “single source of the unity of everything.” 121 In addition, this shows that the binary ‘transcendence’ and ‘immanence’ is not oppositional. Actually, in proposition 21.11–16, Proclus arabus conveys this very point within a Plotinian hierarchical framework in which all inferior levels are dependent upon and subordinated to higher levels. The oneness of these higher levels is stronger as they are closer to the divine first cause, possessing the unique capacity to communicate intelligibility downwards: […] in jeder Ordnung und Stufung vor der Vielfalt ein Eines sein, das allem, was unter ihm ist, eine Bestimmung gibt: so erhält die Vielfalt unter ihm eine Ordnung ihrer Teile zueinander und in Bezug auf das Ganze, welches das Eine ist […] Jedes einzelne Glied eines Systems ist die Ursache dessen, was unter ihm ist, bis hinauf zu dem Einen (LOćDQ\DʯWĪ ilć al-wćʚLG), welches die Ursache aller Glieder dieses gesamten Systems ist und somit notwendig vor den (einzelnen) Dingen, die in diesem System sind: Sie alle gehen aus ihm hervor (…). 122

In Greek and Arabic Neoplatonic texts, the account of the world’s creation, then, follows a law of “vertical” causation. 123 One should bear in mind that causation from this vintage point means that the dependence relation between levels of being is non-temporal. All beings are, simply put, effects of the primordial divine act of “overEndress 1973: §5.35. For a discussion of the arguments that Plotinus employs to demonstrate why there must be a “single source of the unity of everything,” see O’Meara 1993: esp. pp. 44–49. 122 Trans. Endress 1973: p. 268. 123 Wagner 1982. 120 121

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flow.” Neoplatonic causation, however, should not be mistaken as an act of creating things that do not exist a priori in the One. I hope that by now, it should be clear that causation in the Neoplatonic sense rests on the fundamental principle that effects depend on superior causes that, in non-temporal manner, precede their effects due to their degree of unity and intelligibility. As Perl puts it, “all effects are nothing but lesser appearances of the cause above them in the hierarchy.” 124 The idea of ‘creation’ understood in its proper Neoplatonic sense is the result of a timeless self-FRQWHPSODWLRQ that triggers the ongoing emanation, which is nothing but the realisation of God’s multiple manifestations downwards in the hierarchy. Causation in this sense should be construed in terms of a quite different mode of “production” or “making,” namely, in the sense of the “overflow” of God’s causal power. As we shall see in Chapter III, it is precisely this Neoplatonic notion of creation that ʗDOOćü will turn to as a starting point for his alternative account of the world’s creation. ʗDOOćüpVXVHRIWKHʙŠIĪWHUPqWDüDOOĪ” can only be understood in the light of this emanative model of causality, which safeguards God’s transcendence and makes room for his immanence. The image that Plotinus and other Neoplatonists often employ to illustrate this point of divine presence is that of “sunlight”; e.g.: 125 If someone said that the sun was all light, one might take this as contributing to the explanation of what we are trying to say; for the sun will then be light which is in no form belonging to other visible things, and will be, perhaps, purely visible: for the other visible objects are not pure light […]. 126

God is like the sunlight. He is not and cannot be anything as such and yet He is indivisibly present in all living beings. Just as sunlight illuminates all beings without mingling with them, so is God, He does not mingle with any of the visible things. God is present in all beings, allowing them to appear just as things can be seen only Perl 2012: p. 98. Enn. VI.2.6.19. 126 Enn. V.5.7.14–21. 124 125

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when illuminated by the sunlight. To be sure, the kind of light Plotinus has in mind here is not the kind that just “stimulates sight and makes things visible”; nor is it a kind of physical object that “produces a flame or spark.” Rather, this light should be seen as “the light, which produces all other existence, either immediately (on each level: i.e., Intellect, Soul, Nature) or mediately on several levels (e.g., the hypostases or forms of the level of Nature that lightens the intelligible substances, from which all things have been made).” 127 In order to understand the Plotinian conception of creation, then, it is essential to understand how “the pure One […] comes […] to be the cause of the origination of the many things without disturbing His unity or becoming plural:” PLQĠD\UDQ\DʢUXü PLQ ZDʚGćQL\\DWLKL. 128 This background explains, too, the sense in which, for ʗDOOćü*RG is manifest in the world through His “causal effects” (al-PDʰOŠlćt). 129 Indeed, when ʗDOOćü speaks of God as the 0XʰLOO and, at the same time maintains that God “is not subject to the laws of causation”(Oć\DʰWDO), 130 he agrees with the AP that God’s causal act is the LQELʰćʤ – the “unfolding” – of the PDʰOŠlćt (the effects),” inasmuch as these are not accidental to God’s being. This is what ʗDOOćü expresses by saying that God “makes beings act as causes without being affected by them.” Because, in this context, God’s act of creation is nothing but the primordial act of divine contemplation. In other words, what we have here is an act of thinking that produces what it thinks. It is a process starting from the top of the hierarchy with God, who gives rise to His first byproduct, the Intellect, by contemplating His own being. The Intellect’s causality, too, is characterised by a contemplative activity that gives birth to multiplicity on a lower level in the hierarchy. 131 As will become clearer below – and especially in the latter part of the next Chapter – ʗDOOćü also addresses this Neoplatonic notion of L. Sweeney 1983: p. 196; parenthesis mine. ThA VIII.137, [B 113, 19–20]; trans. Lewis, p. 273 – slightly modified. 129 NaK: §179. 130 NaK: §60. 131 E.g., ThA VIII.22, [B 95, 1–2]: “ILʰOX-l awwal al-ODʨĪ PLQ-l awwal NDʤĪU.” 127 128

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creation as an ongoing process of top-down contemplation. In the case of God, as we shall see, self-contemplation is just inward, involving no duality of subject and object, which means that causation proceeds solely from His own self-contemplation. Lurking in the background here, once again, is the view that God remains absolutely ‘One,’ totally unaffected by the multiplicity of His “overflow.” This idea, explicitly expressed in the Enneads, provides the key to the AP’s explanation of the primordial origin of God’s causal activity: Who will not wonder at the power of that noble and sublime substance, that it originated things without reflection or investigation of their causes but originated them by the mere fact of its being? Its being is the cause of causes and therefore its being has no need, in originating things, of investigating their causes, or of bringing them well into existence and perfection, because it is the cause of causes […] being self-sufficient withRXWQHHGRIDQ\FDXVH (PXVWDĠQĪEL-QDIVLKLʰDQNXOOLʰLOOD). 132

It is important to keep in mind this notion of primordial causality to understand why ʗDOOćü calls God the 0XʰLOO. The issue at stake here is the nature of this primordial causality. That is, the question of how God carries out His act of creation by means of thinking or contemplating. From a philosophical point of view, the meaning of this mode of causality cannot be interpreted correctly without taking into account the principle of divine self-contemplation inherent to the emanative model of creation. More precisely, the principle of divine self-contemplation means that thought, understood as a primordial cause, functions downwards in the hierarchy. At the same time, this principle of divine self-contemplation lies at the heart of what God’s presence in the world is all about. Indeed, the notion of God’s self-contemplation is important because of its relevance in explaining not only the derivation of multiple beings from one source (PDʜGDU), but also the primordial nature of God’s act of creation, as well as the nature of God’s relation to the world. 133 In the remainder of this chapter, I shall try to clarify why 132 133

ThA, X. 180–1, [B 161, 6–9]. Naw: §200.

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the Neoplatonic notion of divine self-contemplation should be the starting point of any philosophical examination of the term 0XʰLOO, which ʗDOOćü uses to designate God’s creative function. This clarification will also help us in the latter part of Chapter III where we turn to a more detailed analysis of ʗDOOćü’s creation account.

,, ʙ$//Ćû’6 &21&(372)THE M U ʰILL $1' N(23/$721,&6(/)-&217(03/$7,21 Linguistically speaking, the 0XʰLOO is an active participle (LVP IćʰLO). As a rule, in Arabic active participles indicate “the doing of an action,” and signify the agent of “an on-going, simultaneous or imminent action, corresponding to the English present participle.” 134 Grammatically speaking, the active noun designated by the term 0XʰLOO LVGHULYHGIURPWKH,9WKIRUPRIʲll, namely aʲalla, and since the common meaning associated with form IV verbs is causative, 0XʰLOOconveys a meaning, which, as Makarem suggests, is different from that of ʰLOOD. Indeed, rather than “causing something or someone to exist,” the subject of the verb (aʲalla) makes “something acts as a cause for something else.” 135 From this perspective, therefore, God is always present in the world as the primordial source of creation. A similar view is found in the AP, despite the fact that it does not use the term 0XʰLOO. 136 As we shall see, by using the term 0XʰLOO, ʗDOOćüFDOOVDWWHQWLRQ to the fact that God’s causal role is contemplative. The emanations of God’s self-contemplation constitute the divine immanence in the world. This way of conceiving God’s creative act can be likened to the role that an architect plays in a house-building process. Just as the Neoplatonic ‘One’ is the source of the emanative unfolding F. Abu-Chacra 2007: p. 160. S. Makarem 1984: p. 81. 136 Endress 1973: §5.41–44. I disagree with S. Makarem’s argument (1984: p. 84) that this way of perceiving God as the 0XʰLOO is “at variance with Plotinus” who calls God “the cause of causes.” Despite their frequent use of the term “cause” to describe God’s function in the creative act, the notion of causation embedded in the Enneads and the Arabic tradition of both Plotinus and Proclus runs counter to the very concept of creation in any conventional sense of the term, as we have seen. 134 135

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of creation (i.e., of Intellect and all other beings) – not directly involved in this unfolding – so is the architect “not a direct cause as such of the existence of the house.” Unlike the builder, the architect’s design for the house cannot, in this case, be the cause of the building of the house.” This is so, as S. Makarem explains, because the architect is “not involved in person in the act of building.” 137 The craftsman or the builder, however, is an intermediary – that is, someone that knows of the architect’s idea of the house before embarking on the building process. For the same reason, without this idea the builder would have absolutely no clue as what to build. The building process would never be accomplished without the architect’s idea of the house. Though physically present during the building process itself, the builder can totally withdraw at any time. However, the pre-existing mental idea of the house will still exist. The situation would be different in the case of the architect’s withdrawal, or temporary forgetting, of the idea. Indeed, even though the architect “remains outside the whole process of the actual coming into existence of the house,” 138 the “blueprint” of the house is not the result of the building process itself but the result of the architect’s idea of the house, whose real existence is merely dependent on “the actual building.” In that sense, “the architect is a sine qua non for the house,” in as much as the architect’s (intelligible) idea of the house functions as the “ideal archetype” or the image for the builder. 139 The architect exists in some manner in all parts of the house, as in the same way all parts of the house exist in the architect’s mind. Thus, in this case, the coming-to-existence of the house can be taken to entail an unfolding brought about through the constant interaction between the architect’s idea and the builder’s actualisation of it. Applied to our case, this means that God’s creative act should be seen as an act of sheer ‘intellection’; as the architect, God’s design for the cosmos escapes, therefore, causal catego-

Makarem 1984: p. 83. Makarem 1984: p. 83. 139 Makarem 1984: p. 84. 137 138

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ries. 140 In this light, it would seem reasonable to suppose that ʗDOOćü avoids conventional philosophical expressions, like First &DXVHʲilla ŠOć RUoWKHFDXVHRIFDXVHVpʲillat al-ʰLODO), because they imply that God is a ‘Creator’ in the way that other beings create. In contrast to the term ʰLOOD that philosophers used to characterise the creative function of God, ʗDOOćüpV term 0XʰLOO seems to carry with it a “cognitive” function inevitably bound up with the Neoplatonic sense of ¿¼ÑÉţ¸. Somehow, therefore, it misses the point to translate 0XʰLOO simply as “Causer”, as S. Makarem does. 141 As we shall see in more detail later, what is at stake here is nothing but an ongoing act of intellection that makes “something acts as a cause for something else.” 142 Creation, or the contents, so to say, of the cosmos is nothing but emanations of this primordial act of intellection. In other words, although in his analysis Makarem emphasises again and again the importance of suspending “the laws of causality” in understanding God’s role as the 0XʰLOO, he seems to lose sight of this dimension, namely the contemplative dimension of God’s primordial essence. 143 This dimension, I believe, is precisely what ʗDOOćüpVVXEVWLWXWLRQRIWKHWHUPʲilla seeks to address. That is, the 0XʰLOOof all things brings things into existence in an entirely different way than any other being. When viewed in this light, it becomes clear why God’s sovereignty as Originator (Mubdiʲ  DFFRUGLQJ WR ʗDOOćü, requires the suspension or denial of causation (“f L]ćODWDOʰLOOD ʰDQ DO-UXEŠEL\\D.”) 144 That is, just like an architect who gives birth to a house by the workings of his mind. In contrast to this, the builder’s way of bringing the house into existence is contingent, and amounts therefore to the “becoming” of the house itself, as Thomas Aquinas would put it, not the cause of its (intelligible) be-

In the Enneads (e.g., VI.7.16.24–31), the fact that the One is the source of intelligible life implies that the One “is the cause both for existence and contemplation”; quoted in Stamatellos 2007: p. 39. 141 Makarem 1984: p. 81. 142 Makarem 1984: p. 81. 143 1984: p. 88. 144 NaK §9: p. 111. 140

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ing, in the sense of an idea thought-out-in-advance. 145 By the same token, prior to its creation, the cosmos is a product of God’s selfcontemplation, and as such, a mental picture waiting to be realised as an actual existing thing by the builder, who has no role whatsoever in the designing of the house’s intelligible make-up. As already indicated above, in Neoplatonism, this builder is the One’s first byproduct, that is, the intermediary cosmic figure that fulfils the same role as the builder, or Platonic “Craftsman” in ʗDOOćü,146 as we shall see in Chapter III. ,,*RGpVFRQWHPSODWLYHUROHLQ ʙDOOćüps creation account The following excerpt is a YHUEDWLPH[WUDFWIURP'D\ODPĪpVʲAtf alalif. 147 It HQFDSVXODWHV WKH FRQWHPSODWLYH UROH LPSOLHG LQ ʗDOOćüpV conception of God as the 0XʰLOO: […] The Most high, having thus radiated, made a Person (kDʢV) arise […] He spoke to it, then He complimented it for its good appearance […] Then He praised it, then He glorified it, then He made it the Elect; by means of these same attributes of His act, and of the attributes that He had made arise through the thought of manifesting this Person risen with His Form: the Person, Creative and Providential, who created, nurtured, said

See Gregory T. Doolan 2008: p. 174. The Arabic equivalent of Plato’s “Craftsman,” Dʜ-ʜćQLʲ DSSHDUV VHYHUDO WLPHV LQ WKH ʗDOOćüLDFXP &RUSXV HJ NaK, § 108, 132), most QRWDEO\LQʗDOOćüpVFRPPHQWDU\RQ4NaK: §12, p. 111. “Here”, says ʗDOOćüq*RGGLUHFWO\WHVWLILHVDERXW+LPVHOIDVWKHRQO\craftsman (xDKćGatun li-QDIVLKLDQQDOćʜćQLʰĠD\UDKX).” It is very difficult, no doubt, to identify ZLWK FHUWDLQW\ D SDUWLFXODU VRXUFH RI ʗDOOćüpV DFTXDLQWDQFH ZLWK WKH WHUP “Dʜ-ʜćQLʲ” Nevertheless, it seems likely that his acquaintance with this philosophical term is indebted to the Arabic translation of Plato’s Timaeus. According to Ibn an-1DGĪPpV Fihrist (1970: vol. 2. p. 593), the earliest Arabic translation of this Platonic text wDVPDGHE\f@ ID KXZD PXWDʚDUULN ʰDQ DQ-QXTʞD EL-ʰD\QLKć. :D NXOOX Pć \DTDʰ ʰDOD\KL EDʜDU DʚDGXQ fa-KXZD QXTʜD ED\QD QXTʜDWD\Q. :DKćʨćGDOĪOXQʰDOćWDüDOOĪDO-ʚDTTPLQNXOOLPć\XxćKDG >f@ZDPLQKćʨćTXOWXPćUDʯD\WXšD\ʯDQLO-lć wa-UDʯD\WX$OOćh. 176

As we can see from this passage, ʗDOOćü conceptualises WDüDOOĪ in a way that is synonymous with ID\ʘ. Unlike the pantheistic God, the primordial nature of the Neoplatonic Creator-God is the key to all existence even though His causality transcends anything that we might identify as being ‘here’ or ‘there.’ More specifically, what we should retain here from the geometry example of ʗDOOćü – outlined in the quote above – is that it reiterates two key features of the Neoplatonic concept of causation: 177 take it away from the fact that it is one entity in existence”; quoted in Chittick 1989: p. 84; parentheses mine. 176 $NKEćU 1936: no. 4, p. 16; also, NaW: §196, 252; trans., PhM3: p. 68 – slightly modified; parenthesis mine. 177 For a more thorough account of this so-called point-line geomeWU\LQʙŠIĪPHWDSK\VLFVDQGWKHZD\VLWZDVXVHGE\ʗDOOćüDQGRWKHUʙŠIĪpV during the classiFDO SHULRG RI ,VOćP WR LOOXVWUDWH WKH qSDUDGR[r RI WUDn-

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EARLY PHILOSOPHICAL ʙş),60 (a) *RGDVRQHDQGPXOWLSOH: the oneness of God - or His unity has no material existence, no dimensions, is primordially one, perfect and transcends the multiplicity it has in itself. God, therefore, considered in terms of geometry, equals a point (QXTʞD), which, as “the origin of every line,” makes possible the unfolding of the line itself. As ʗDOOćüVD\VHOVHZKHUH.Dʝ ch. V), the primordial point in this sense “is the source” (al-DʜO); the point “does not grow or decrease, nor consume itself (Oć \D]ĪG\DQTXVZD-Oć\DEĪG),” 178 but exists in the manner of something present, because without it, the line would otherwise be non-existent. A similar thing has been already said in the parable of the architect and the builder, in which the architect exists in all parts of the house in virtue of his role as the one who determines the intelligible design of the house. It is precisely this meaning that ʗDOOćü conveys by the expression: God’s “pure divinity”; namely that “He remains transcending all dependent things, untouched “by any secondary cause.” 179 (b) WKH KLHUDUFKLFDO SURJUHVVLRQ RI *RGpV VHOI-disclosure: creation takes place in a top-down fashion, from the highest to the lowest as well as from more intelligible to the less intelligible. The SRLQWOLQH FRQVWLWXHQWV RI ʗDOOćüpV JHRPHWU\ DUH LQWHUGHSHQdent in virtue of their participation in the primordial point. In the same vein, the world of manifold appearances is not other than God, constituting as it were a reality that is external to – but not dependent from – God. This explains how ʗDOOćü can simultaneously assert (a) that God is the “Source of intelligible beings” (PDʜGDUDO-mawüŠGćW); (b) that He “is not subject to the laws of causation” (Oć \DʰWDO), and (c) that “He acts without making contact” (ILʰOXKX PLQ ĠD\U PXEćxara). 180 For just as the points that make up the line are appearances of the indivisible, transcendent unity in the “realm of geometry,” so are created

scendence and immanence inherent to the divine act of self-manifestation, see S. Akkach 2005: pp. 64–68. 178 Trans. Aisha Abd Ar-Rahman 1974: p. 8. 179 Trans. Aisha Abd Ar-Rahman 1974: p. 22. 180 NaW: §22, p. 224, my translation.

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beings “contained in an unmanifest mode” within God’s mind prior to their appearances. 181 This “unmanifest mode” designates “LEGćʱ” in the sense that lies behind the primordial act of contemplation.

Like ʗDOOćü ,EQ ʲ$UabĪ uses a geometrical figure consisting of point, line and circle in order to (a) explain the concept of WDüDOOĪ and (b) to solve the paradox of God’s transcendence and immanence: Every line projecting from the centre to the circumference is equal to its companion and terminates at a point on the circumference. In itself, the centre neither multiplies nor increases despite the multitude of lines that project from it to the circumference. The point of the centre relates to every point on the circumference by its same essence. For if it were to relate to one point on the circumference by other than that by which it relates to another, it would be divisible, and it would not be true that it is one, yet it is. So it relates to all the points, in spite of their multitude […] It is certain then that multiplicity manifests from the one Essence without this Essence being multiplied. NXOOXʢDʞʞLQ\DʢUXüXPLQʯOQXTʞDWLʯLOć al-PXʚĪʞPXVćZLQOL-ʜćʚLELKLZD \DQWDKĪ ʯLOD QXTʞDWLQ PLQ DO-PXʚĪʞ ZD ʯO-QXTʞDWX IĪ ʨćWLKć Pć WDʰDGGDGDW ZD Oć WD]D\\DGDW PDʰ NDʤUDWL ʯO-ʢXʞŠʞ DO-ʢćULüD PLQKć LOć ʯOPXʚĪʞ ZD KL\D WXTćELO NXOOD QXTʞDWLQ PLQ ʯO-PXʚĪʞ EL-ʨćWLKć ʯLʨ ODZ NćQDPćWDTćEDODELKLQXTʞDWXQPLQʯO- PXʚĪʞĠD\UDPćWDTćEDODELKL QXTʞDWXQXʢUćOD-LQTDVDPDWZDOć\DʜLʚʚXDQWDNŠQDZćʚLGDWXQZDKi\DZćʚLGDWXQPćTćEDODWDO-QXTDʞNXOOXKćʰDOć NDʤUDWLKć>f@ID-qad ʲDKDUDW DO-NDʤUDWX ʰDQ DO-wćʚLG DO-ʰD\Q ZD ODP \DWDNDʤʤDU KXZD IĪ ʨćWLKL. 182

181 182

260.

Akkach 2005: p. 63, p. 65. Trans. Akkach 2005: p. 69; quoted in Ibn Arabi 1911: vol., I, p.

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Fig. 2. 7KHFLUFOHDVDV\PERORI*RGpVWDüDOOĪIURP ,EQʲ$UDEĪpVSHUVSHFWLYH 183

Clearly, then, nothing hinders us from interpreting ʗDOOćüpV concept of WDüDOOĪ along the lines of ID\ʘ, which Plotinus defines as ‘overflow.’ Moreover, the Neoplatonic term ‘ID\ʘ,’ 184 which is used in the AP to render the Greek ¸ÈŦÉÉÇÀ¸LVV\QRQ\PRXVZLWK,EQʲ$UDEĪps notion of WDüDOOĪ 185 In addition, the term ID\ʘ provides a framework for understanding God’s relation to the world, which, as formulated by ʗDOOćüHQWDLOV*RGpVFreative unfolding throughout the multi-layered levels of reality. In the case of both thinkers, God’s selfdisclosure is perceived within the emanative framework of Neoplatonic causation as a means of (i) explaining how the world came to be, as well as (ii) bridging the gap between the transcendent, divine world and the sublunary world.

Akkach 2005: p. 68. Adamson 2002: p. 185. 185 In his discussion of the doctrine of the unity of being (ZDʚGDWDOZXüŠG), S. H. Nasr (1993: p. 202) draws a very similar conclusion with reJDUGWR,EQʲ$UDEĪ. He notes that, “the doctrine of emanation or effusion […] can be understood and integrated only in the esoteric aspect” of the Islamic tradition, which repudiates the doctrine born out of the pantheist worldview, “that the Universe is God or that God is the Universe.” 183 184

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ÞÞÞÞ ,, ),1$/5(0$5.6 Neoplatonic causation and contemplation provides the rationale to explain ʗDOOćüpV D  GHVLJQDWLRQ RI *RG DV WKH 0XʰLOO and (b) suspension of the causal foundation for God’s act of creation. Selfcontemplation, understood as the principle of divine causation, provides another way of looking at the divine creative act in the 1HRSODWRQLFFRVPRORJ\RIʗDOOćü,QWKLVFRVPRORJ\*RGSOD\VQR direct causal role in His creation; at least not in the sense commonly understood. The kind of causation ascribed to God, here, is primordial, operating as self-contemplation. Leaning on this cosmoloJ\ʗDOOćüZDVDEOHWRVDIHJXDUG*RGpVWUDQVFHQGHQFHZLWKRXWJLving up God’s immanence. Indeed, unlike traditional NDOćPtheology, there is no need to suppose any contradiction here between these two modes of existence in God. ʗDOOćüDFFRXQWVIRU*RGpVUROHLQ creation as multiplicity, without loosing God’s primordial oneness. God’s WDüDOOĪ is emanative, not pantheistic: God creates in an intelligible way in accordance with His contemplative nature, just like an architect who mentally unfolds the design of the house prior to its building. The designation of God as the 0XʰLOO can only be understood in such a Neoplatonic framework where God acts (i) as a divine architect who (ii) creates by contemplating Himself. Interpreted in that manner, creation is nothing but God’s WDüDOOĪ from the primordial source. The metaphysical problem of oneness as unity and multiplicity, which characterises the entire paradox of transcendence and immanence in Neoplatonism, is not a matter of contrariety, but rather complementarity. )D\ʘ, which, in the Neoplatonic sense of the word stands for emanation remains, therefore, DQLPSRUWDQWGLPHQVLRQRIʗDOOćüpVFRVPRORJ\DVDZKROHFailure to recognise this is the major reason as to why some scholars have PLVWDNHQO\VHHQʗDOOćüDVDSDQWKHLVW/LNH Plotinus, ʗDOOćüZRXOG “not accept a view that would force us to choose between a God that is part of the world and a God that is separate from it.” 186 For both 3ORWLQXVDQGʗDOOćüthe question of creation is intimately re186

O’Meara 1993: p. 46.

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lated to the primordial self-disclosure of God and the sense of immanHQW FDXVDOLW\ WKDW ZH DOVR ILQG LQ ,EQ ʲ$UDEĪps description of WDüDOOĪ as the outflowing of God from the “centre” to the “circumference” (al-PXʚĪʞ). Despite its seeming similarity to the pantheist account, WDüDOOĪ in this sense of causality does not support the claim that God is all creatures; yet, at the same time, it does not relinquish the idea that all creatures are appearances of God. Capitalising on the 3rd/9th century theological debate over God’s oneness (tDZʚĪG  ʗDOOćü treats the question of divine transcendence in a very different way. Concerning the issue of God’s act of creation, NDOćP theologians shared various degrees of what W. Chittick calls the “rational perception of God’s distance.” 187 ʗDOOćüVpFRQcept of WDüDOOĪ, however, dethrones the unquestioned dogma that stipulates God’s total separation, which in traditional NDOćPtheology is logical and necessary WR XSKROG *RGpV VRYHUHLJQW\ ʗDOOćü GRHV QRW XQGHUPLQH WKH HGifice of WDZʚĪG, but he offers a different interpretation that seeks to overcome the polarising dichotomy between transcendence and LPPDQHQFH $V , VHH LW ʗDOOćüpV insistence on the all-embracing, dynamic character of God’s mode of being is compatible with the twofold determination of *RGpVPRGHRIEHLQJLQWKH4XUʱćn; for example in sŠra 57:3, where immanence and transcendence are two faces of the same coin: “He is the First and the Last, the Evident and the Immanent.” 188 As we shall see in the following chapter, this twofold determination of God as source and final destination lies at WKHYHU\KHDUWRIʗDOOćüpVFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRIVDOYDWLRQDVWKHHxperience of loving union.

187 188

W. Chittick 2008: p. 29. Riw: §19, p. 273.

CHAPTER III. THE EXPERIENCE OF DIVINE LOVE, CREATION AND COSMOLOGY One of the signs of His omnipotence is that He sends the “breezes of His mercy” to the hearts of lovers, bringing them the good news that the veils of reserve are going to move aside so that they may experience the full extent of love without fear, and so that He may feel them as amply with the beverage of joy. And the breaths of His generosity pass over them, they banish them from their qualities and revive them in His qualities and even His attributes, for one cannot walk on the spread carpet of Truth as long as He remains at the threshold of separation, as long as he fails to see in all essences one single Essence, and as long as he fails to see what is fleeting as dying and the One Entity Who remains as Living. 1

The reG WKUHDG WKDW UXQV WKURXJK PRVW RI ʗDOOćüpV ZULWLQJV DQG much of his poetry 2 is the topic of the human soul’s passionate Trans. PhM3: p. 41. This is a translation of the Arabic text quoted according to as-6XODPĪ FRQFHUQLQJ4ZKLFKLVDOVRIRXQGLQ NaK: §133, p. 138: “PLQʰDOćmćt rubŠEL\\DWLKLʯDQ\XUVLOUL\ćʚxDIDTDWLKLLOć qulŠb awiddćʯLKLPXEDššLUDQELKDWNʚXüDEʯO-LʚWLxćPOL-\DʞʯŠ ELVćʞDO-PDZDGGDPLQĠD\U ʚLxPDID\DVTĪKLP ʯDOć ʨćOLN ʯO-bisćʞ xDUćE DO-ʯXQV ZDWXKLEEX ʰDOD\KLP UL\ćʚX-ʯO NDUDP ID-\DQIĪKLP ʰDQ ʜLIćWLKLP ZD \DüĪʯDKXP EL ʜLIćWLKL ZD EL QXʰŠtihi, fa inna bisćʞDO-ʚDTTWDʰćlć lć \DʞDʯKXPDQKXZDPXTĪPʰalć ʚDGGʯO-ʯLʚʞLUćTʚDWWć\DUćʯOʰX\ŠQ NXOODKć ʰD\QDQ ZćʚLGDQ ZD \DUć Pć ODP \DNXQ NDPć ODP \DNXQ ZD Pć ODP\D]DONDPDODP\D]DO.” 2 Several people compiled his poems into a collection known as the 'ĪZćQDO-ʙDOOćü &ROOHFWLRQRIʗDOOćüpVSRHPV $FFRUGLQJWRVRPHKLVWRr1

93

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love for God. Indeed, if one sentence could summarise ʗDOOćüpV enterprise, it would be the path to, and the experience of, loving union with God. As the above quote clearly shows, according to ʗDOOćüDWWDLQLQJthe state of loving oneness with God is equivalent to a kind of immediate experience that gives first-hand insight into the unitive root of all things, that is, the archetypal reality hidden beyond the visible surface of multiplicity. I shall argue in this chapter that the experience of divine unity is best conceived along Neoplatonic lines, that is, as a particular experience that is “purely intellectual,” involving “a state of absorbed contemplation.” 3 &ORVHH[DPLQDWLRQ RIʗDOOćüpVORYLQJXnion with God from a Neoplatonic perspective helps us appreciate this ‘mystical’ aspect of his thought on philosophical grounds. Conceiving this aspect of ʗDOOćüpVWKRXJKWIURPDNeoplatonic perspective means, more precisely, conceiving the loving union with, and ascension to God, through cognition of “One Entity.” Thus ‘mystical union,’ in this context, means a certain mode of experience, namely a contemplative state, which closely resembles the Neoplatonic ¿¼ÑÉţ¸. :KHQʗDOOćüVSHDNVRIXQLRQZLWK*RGWKHQ he has in mind something radically different from the pantheist type of union that he was accused of preaching, which involves the intermingling of the divine with the human. 4 More specifically, I shall argue that ʗDOOćüpVP\VWLFLVPLHKLVDFFRXQWRIPDQpVVDOYation and union with God, depends on a Neoplatonic ideal of union. Indeed, when seen against the background of this ideal, we will be able to better understand the conWHPSODWLYH character of his philosophical mysticism, which I believe has not been sufficiently explored in earlier research on ʗDOOćü

LFDO VRXUFHV WKH ILUVW FRPSOLHU ZDV $EŠ ʲ$EG DU-5DʘPćQ DV-6XODPĪ G 412/1021), the author of ʝDEDTćWDʜ-ʛŠIL\\D. For an excellent analysis ofthe VXEMHFWPDWWHUDQGVWUXFWXUHRIʗDOOćüpVSRHWU\LWV literary forms, as well as vocabulary and prosody, see K. M. aš-kD\EĪ kDUʚ 'ĪZćQ DO-ʙDOOćü (2007). 3 S. K. Wear and J. Dillon 2007: p. 129. 4 Massignon 1994: p. 42; L. Ridgeon 2013: pp. 113–114; Ernst 1985: p. 103.

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This chapter unfolds in six sections. As a way of clarifying ZKDWʗDOOćüPHDQVZKHQKHGHSLFWV*RGDVWKHVRXUFHDQGGHVtiny of all human beings, the first three sections (III.1, III.2 and III.3) explain the notion of the divine as the origin and ultimate goal of human life in Neoplatonic philosophy. I shall show, in the course of these three sections: (1) that in speaking of the unity with the divine in terms of ʚXOŠO, ʗDOOćüGRHVQRWPHDQWKHIXVLRQRUPLngling) of the divine and human substances; (2) that the unity of KXPDQDQGGLYLQHORYHDERXWZKLFKʗDOOćüFKDQWVLQKLVSRHWU\LV better understood through the lens of the Neoplatonic notion of God as a final cause. Combining the Platonic Idea of the ‘Good’ with Aristotle’s notion of final causality, this Neoplatonic notion yields, as a consequence, the notion of contemplative intellection in the sense of an ascent towards the ‘end goal’ that corresponds to the ultimate station: soul’s perfection. Proceeding mainly through KLVP\VWLFDOSRHPVWKHVHFRQGDQGWKLUGVHFWLRQDUJXHWKDWʗDOOćüpV deep-rooted yearning for a loving union with God is best explained in terms of this (Aristotelianised) version of the (Neoplatonic) conception of the (Platonic) Good. As will be shown in section III.4, this conflation of the (Aristotelianised) version of the (Neoplatonic) conception of the (Platonic) Good plays an important, often overlooked, role in the AP WKDWZLOOKHOSXVFODULI\ʗDOOćüpVQRWLRQ of ‘reversion’ and its connection to what Muslim Neoplatonists call LWWLʜćO. As we shall see in section III.5, this conflation constitutes the background of my discussion of the idea of divine love in the mystical philosophy of ʗDOOćü1HRSODWRQLFUHYHUVLRQLVFHQWUDODQGDV VXFKLWSURYLGHVWKHNH\WRXQORFNʗDOOćüpVSKLORVRSK\RIP\VWLFDO union with the divine. The analysis in section III.6 allows us to appreciate more thoroughly Anne Marie Schimmel’s definition of ʗDOOćüpV QRWLRQ RI GLYLQH ORYH LQ WHUPV RI D qPDJQHWLF IRUFH WKDW has caused emanation and draws everything back to its source.” The analysis, which ends the sixth section, explores how the Plotinian concept of divine love may serve to explain this definition, which, in my view, provides the best context for elucidating ʗDOOćü’s conceptualisation of God’s essence in terms of love.

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In Neoplatonic philosophy, the One signifies not only the source but also the ultimate goal of all beings. 5 It is both the ÒÉÏŢ and ÌšÂÇË: on the one hand, as the final cause of completion or perfection; 6 on the other hand as the “productive” ÒÉÏŢ from which all goodness flows. 7 We are dealing here, in other words, with two types of causation that are closely intertwined with the modality of the One: on the one hand, the ÒÉÏŢ understood as the causal source of things; and, on the other hand, as the ultimate object that drives things toward their pre-determined destination, i.e., their ÌšÂÇË. 8 Therefore, to talk about self-fulfilment, on this account, equals the fulfilment of one’s intellectual/intelligible nature in and through the divine ÒÉÏŢ. 9 In Neoplatonism, true perfection of one’s being equals the “assimilation” of one’s soul to God, i.e., becoming ‘God-like’ due to the soul’s return to its “original nature.” 10 As D. J. O’Meara points out, according to Plotinus, perfection or self-fulfilment should be seen as the culmination of a three-stage process comprising: (1) “the return to one’s true self as soul, (2) attaining the life of divine intellect; (3) union with the One.” 11 Accordingly, salvation is the culmination of a journey towards selfperfection with the ultimate aim of achieving union with the divine. It is a journey “wherein the soul finally comes into direct communion with that part of the One that is already within it;” therefore, to Remes 2008: 177. On the connection between the One as first and final cause, see Plotinus’ discussion in Enn.V.1.6. 7 Bussanich 1988: p. 151; Bussanich 1996: p. 57; see also A. H. Armstrong 1940: p. 6, p. 12. 8 Enn. V.5.12.8–9; Gerson 2012: p. 187. 9 E.g., Enn. VI.9.9.59. 10 D. A. Dombrowski 2012: p. 99; also, Schroeder 1992: p. 93, p. 95; Bussanich 1988: pp. 208–9. Theaetetus 176a5–d1 and Timaeus 90a2–d8 are two of the most celebrated texts in the Platonic corpus, in connection with this teaching; see also Enn. I.6.1.3; V.6.5.1; VI.7.22.6; VI.7.31.17–18; VI.9.9.33–4, 44–7. 11 O’Meara 1993: p. 103 5 6

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become divine through union with the One represents “the end of the journey.” 12 This principle entails two important implications: (1) that “the true nature of the One can be revealed only in the mystical union,” 13 and (2) that “a perfect union in which the two united retain their distinct natures.” 14 Unity between God and man is not of the pantheistic type; 15 God does not conflate with man in one unity. This also holds true for ʗDOOćü Indeed, as Arberry points out, 16 IRU ʗDOOćü WKLV LV XQWKLQNDEOH WKH XOWLPDWH VWDJH of the mystical journey is not – and cannot be – a union of two natures, nor does it involve a personal claim for “divinity.” What ʗDOOćü KDV LQ PLQG ZKHQ KH VSHDNV RI ORYLQJ XQLRQ ZLWK *RG however, is a heightened sense of awareness that culminates in the fulfillment of a spiritual – super-sensory – vision of God’s presence. ,QZKDWZD\VKDOOZHXQGHUVWDQGʗDOOćüpVQRWLRQRIPDQpV union with God (ʚXOŠO)? Is it in terms of “the return to one’s true self?” The significance of this question becomes clear when we know that this notion is in harmony with the Neoplatonic ideal of the fulfilment of one’s essential origin. ʗDOOćü designates the direct communion with the divine in terms of ZDüG (ecstasy), 17which in ʙŠIĪ contexts connotes “the direct contact with God.” 18 The experience conveyed by means of this term – ZDüG – represents, by definition, a heightened form of mušćhada, that is, “perception based on contemplation,” which, DFFRUGLQJWRʗDOOćüHQDEOHVRQHqto reach God and see God everywhere” (DQ \DNŠQD PXxćKLGDQ OL ʯO-ʚDTT IĪ NXOOL ZDTW). 19 Similarly, Plotinus defines the moment of divine experience as one in which “the contemplator (ĝĊ»ŪÅ) becomes one with the “object of con-

Enn. VI.9.11.45; quoted in R. B. Harris 1976: p. 6. Enn. VI.7.36; quoted in Stamatellos 2007: p. 37. 14 Quoted in Armstrong 1988: vol. 7, pp. 192–93 n. 1. 15 See Corrigan 2005: pp. 185–86. 16 Arberry 2013: pp. 59–60. 17 NaW: §201, p. 253. 18 S. Yazaki 2013: p. 73. 19 NaW: §201, p. 253. 12 13

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templation (Ìġ îÑɸĚÅÇÅ).” 20 Like ZDüG PXxćhada is one of the technical terms in the classical ʙŠIĪ repertoire that describes this contemplative experience, in virtue of which, says ʗDOOćü q*RG makes Himself cognised without being encountered ([…] PLQ ĠD\U PXOćTćW). 21 In addition to ZDüGDQGPXxćhada, NDxI is the most encompassing of all ʙŠIĪ terms because it covers multiple aspects of this contemplative encounter. The meaning of the root Nšf designates a visionary insight that is brought to the fore by what A. Knysh calls “the lifting of the veil.” 22 For ʗDOOćü the person – model – who acquired this visionary insight is none other than Moses who “had gone into solitude (away from every created thing) for God”; as a result, “God was alone in Moses, for whom He became the one Object of all thought” (LQIDUDGD OL ʯO-ʚDTT ZD-infarada al-ʚDTTX ELKL IĪ üDPĪʰ PDʰćnĪh). Therefore, “God became what prevented him (i.e., Moses) from seeing all perceived objects (ZDʜćUDDO-ʚDTTPXZćüLKXKX IĪNXOOLPDQʲŠULQLOD\K), what came face to face with him and erased all other perceptible presences, by an unveiling” (ZDPXTćELOXKXGŠQD PDʚʘŠUXQODGD\KʰDOć al-NDšf al-ʲćKLUʰDOD\K). 23 Kašf is the highest spiritual state and the state of heightened awareness in which Moses became one with God without mingling with Him. As will become clearer from what follows, this sense of unveiling or NDxI resonates with Plotinus’ union with the One: it directs the soul to the “highest levels of reality” in the sense – more particularly – of “overcoming the subject/object gap in an intuitional or mystical experience.” 24 Let me illustrate what this means for ʗDOOćü by quoting the following passage in which he spells out this experience of contemplative union with God: […] my present status is that a veil separates me from my own “self.” This veil precedes vision for me; for, when the moment of vision approaches, the qualifying attributes are erased. “I” Enn. VI.9.11.1–9; quoted in Stamatellos 2007: p. 87. NaW: §22, p. 224. 22 Knysh 2010: p. 310; see also W. C. Chittick 2000: p. 138. 23 Trans. EO 1997: p. 211; NaW: §81, p. 234, parentheses mine. 24 Quoted in A. Smith 1974: 114; Remes 2008: p. 185. 20 21

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am separated then from my self […] my present “I” is no longer me […] I am an appearance [of God …], not a material manifestation [of God …]. ʚXNPĪʯDQDNŠQʰLQGDQDIVĪ ʰLQGDDO-NDWPZD\DNŠQXʚLüćEĪʰLQGDʯONDšIIDʯLʨćGDQćZDTWXʯO-NDšf ʯLPWDʚćQXʰŠt al-ZDʜIDQćPXQD]]DK ʰDQQDIVĪʯLʨODVWXQDIVĪDQć>f@ʲXKŠUOćʚXOŠO. 25

Divine unity is a matter of participation in the divine vision, not a matter of the infusion of the divine into the human. Man, on this view, realises his true nature by contemplating the divine within himself. Due to this contemplation, man’s soul attains the culminating point of the via negativa; that is, when one reaches the state of NDxI, the need for comprehending God through attributes vanishes (ZDTWXʯO-NDšfʱimtaʚćQXʰŠt al-ZDʜI). In other words, when referring to NDxI ʗDOOćü KDV LQ PLQG D FRQWHPSODWLYH NLQG RI FRQWDFW ZLWK WKH divine reality, not incarnation in the sense of a material fusion of the divine and the human nature (Oć ʚXOŠO). The above passage quoted from WKHq'LVFRXUVHRQWKH,QHIIDELOLW\RI*RGrq7DQ]ĪK ʲDQ DO-QDʲW ZDʱO ZDʛIr  ZKLFK LV RIWHQ PLVVHG LQ PRGHUQ VFKRODrVKLSRQWKHP\VWLFLVPRIʗDOOćü, is an explicit indication of tanzĪK as negation of material ʚXOŠO. To paraphrase Schimmel, in this context, “the divine unity does not result in destroying the personality of the mystic”; it “makes him more perfect, more sacred, and more divine.” 26 $Q\GHVFULSWLRQRIWKHQDWXUHRIP\VWLFDOXQLRQLQʗDOOćüpV texts should take careful note of this kind of self-fulfilment. In the words of the thirteenth-FHQWXU\ ʙŠIĪ -DOćO ad-'ĪQ 5ŠPĪ selfNaW: §128, 241; trans. PhM3: p. 45; slightly modified. As noted in Chapter II, this argument can be directed against anti-ʙŠIĪSROHPLVWVWKDW VHH LQ ʗDOOćü D ZKROH-hearted adherent of the doctrine of ʚXOŠO in the Christian sense of the word; i.e., the “indwelling of the divine in humanity”; quoted in Y. Michot 2007: 126; see also pp. 123–37. This misleading assumption underlies, for example, Ibn Taymiyyah’s treatise, 5LVćOD IĪ DOüDZćEʰDQVXʯćl al-ʙDOOćüKDONćQDʜLGGĪNDQDZ]LQGĪTDQ. For a more detailed DFFRXQWRI,EQ7D\PL\\DKpVYLHZRIWKHSKLORVRSKHUVDQGWKHʙŠIĪpVLQIOuenced by WKHP VXFK DVʗDOOćü DQG ,EQDO-ʲ$UDEĪ on the contents of the doctrine RIGLYLQHXQLW\VHH0$EGXOʗDT$QʛćUĪ 26 Schimmel 1963: p. 347. 25

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fulfilment here leads to the insight “that nothing has existence but God.” 27 As O’Meara puts it, this union is none other than the very process wherein “each creature expresses its specific form” in order to attain “its appropriate form of union with divine goodness.” 28 It is the degree of goodness – that is, how far or close to the divine goodness – that determines the extent of a being’s unity as well as its proximity (or distance) from the divine source. 29 “Goodness,” in this sense, should be taken as an expression of God’s grace, or “undiminished self-giving.” 30 It is a gift to human beings, a magnetic compass implanted, as it were, in every human soul as a means of drawing it back to God. The idea that soul’s attraction to God is the result of the goodness originally implanted in it can also be found in the AP, 31 and the Enneads. 32 Indeed, love, LQʗDOOćüDFTXLUHVDVLPLODUPHDQLQJDQGIXQFWLon as goodness in Neoplatonic cosmology. In particular, as will become clear and conceptually precise toward the end of this chapter, ʗDOOćüXQGHrstands love in such a way as to account for the seed of creation, which once it encroaches upon the heart, attracts all souls back to *RG ,Q RQH RI KLV SUD\HUV ʗDOOćü FDSWXUHV WKLV GLPHQVLRQ RI Givine love and grace with a hint of warning: […] the calling of love calls us to desire, the calling of desire to rapture; and the calling of rapture calls us to God! As for those who feel no inner incentive to answer this calling, their expecA. Schimmel 1993: p. 205. O’Meara 1993: p. 52; e.g., Enn.VI.9.9; V.5.13, 10–15, 20; see also J. Porter 1999: p. 163. 29 Gerson 2012: p. 161. In this context, therefore, divine goodness is that “which gives a degree of unity to each thing in order for it to be a single, coherent whole-in-diversity, whether it be a blade of grass, a cow, or a person”; quoted in D. Allen and E. O. Springsted 2007: p. 57. For a concise explanation of this argument in the context of Plotinus’ Enneads, see O’Meara 1993: pp. 48–49. 30 Bussanich 1996: p. 48; Corrigan 2005: p. 121. This idea derives in part from Plato’s account of divine creation in Timaeus 29e–30a. 31 E.g., ThA Ch. II, [B 36]; VIII, [B 108]. 32 Bussanich 1988: p. 199; e.g., VI.7.35.22.18–19; V.9.1.18. 27 28

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tation will be frustrated; they waste their time in the deserts of deviation. >f@GćʰĪ al-PDʚDEED\DGʰŠ ʯLODʯO-šawq, wa dćʰĪ aš-šDZT\DGʰŠ ʯLODʯOwalah, wa dćʰĪ al-ZDODK\DGʰŠ ʯLODʯO-AllćKZDʢćEDPDQODP\DNXQ ODKŠ GćʰĪ\D PLQ KćʨLKL DG-GDZćʰĪ ʯXOćʯLN PLQ ʯO-ODʨĪQ ʯXKPDOŠ fĪ mafćwiz at-WDʚD\\XU. 33

7KH VHQVH RI IUXVWUDWLRQ WKDW ʗDOOćü ZDUQV XV DJDLQVW KHUH LV WULggered by the feeling of being distant from God. In turn, the yearning for God marks the initiating point that culminates in a “contemplative witnessing.” 34 In practical terms, this means the lifting of the veil, which empowers the soul to realise its inmost intellectual nature. Realising one’s inmost intellectual nature is the ultimate JRDOKXPDQVVKRXOGVWULYHWRDWWDLQ$VZHVKDOOVHHIRUʗDOOćüWKLV realisation of one’s inmost intellectual nature is germane to a particular understanding of completeness and perfection. In Neoplatonism, a being’s perfection means this being fulfilling its very nature, that is, its intrinsic goodness. Once again, the question of how close or far a being is from fulfilling or realising its nature depends solely on the degree of its unity. The latter determines the place of this very being in the hierarchy of beings. 35 Distinguishing between oneness and goodness in this hierarchy is merely a matter of conceptualisation, not of ontology: The soul’s perfection – and unity – ultimately depends upon how much goodness the soul possesses. One should bear in mind, therefore, that the goodness of a thing is always premised upon the oneness of its nature and vice versa. In fact, the same can be said of all levels of being. For Neoplatonists, the whole world-order is one in which oneness and goodness coexists, intertwined on all levels of existence. Beings partake of existence with different degrees of goodness, unity, and perfection, depending on their ability to actualise their potential, that is to say, the extent to which they participate in God’s goodness. 36 NaW: §225, p. 260; trans. PhM3: 26. J. Baldick 2012: p. 38. 35 Gerson 2012: p. 34; Remes 2008: p. 94. 36 E.g., Enn. I.7.2; IV.8.6.16–18. 33 34

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At the divine level, oneness and goodness are two aspects of the same reality, not two distinct natures in the divine: the One is different from the supreme Good (Ìġ Òº¸¿ĠÅ) only in respect of definition. 37 Hence, the divine does not have two distinct functions: the One functioning as source, and the Good functioning as end-goal. Rather, the point is that the One is the principle of unity and goodness, and, because of this, the ÒÉÏŢ of all beings, precisely by being their end. 38 As Plotinus himself puts it, “the One is on both sides of them; for it is that from which they come and to which they go; for all things originate from the One and strive toward as the One. For in this way they also strive towards the Good; for nothing whatever among beings could have come to exist or endure in existence if its striving was not directed towards the One.” 39 As we shall see in the following two subsections, the source of this understanding of God as both source (ÒÉÏŢ) and goal (ÌšÂÇË) lies in (1) Plato’s “Idea of the Good” and (2) Aristotle’s final cause.

,,, T+(,'($2)“THE GOOD” Plato conflates two notions in his concept of the Good: (1) the primary principle of all life (2) the end or purpose of life as an object of desire and aspiration. 40 In the sense used here, these two notions are complementary. They differ only conceptually, in the way that, according to Plotinus, goodness is conceptually separable from unity. According to this view, therefore, the conception of the Good as the object of desire is fully comprehensible only in light of the conception of the Good as the principle of life. 41 As life-giving source, the Good permeates the created world and sustains everything. On this basis, as Guthrie, 42 M. L. Mcpherran, 43 H. Boese 1990: liii. Gerson 2012: p. 187; Remes 2008: p. 53, p. 81. 39 Enn. VI.2.11.25–29. 40 W.K.C. Guthrie 1986: p. 506; also R. L. Nettleship 1964: p. 218; E.g., 5HSXEOLF (bk. 6) 509b6–10. 41 On Plato’s notion of the Good as the One, see J. J. Cleary 2013: p. 519 n. 14; and K. Sayre 1983: pp. 171–4. 42 Guthrie 1986: pp. 349–352. 37 38

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and others have argued, the Good in Plato’s philosophy conflates three forms of causation: (a) efficient causation, (b) formal causation and (c) final causation. 44As formal cause, the Good makes things “well-proportioned and harmonious.” 45 As efficient cause, the Good produces and endows “the universe” with life. 46As final cause the Good is the ultimate end goal, understood as that “for the sake of being such-and-so that things […] come to be.” 47 As a result, the threefold agency of Plato’s Good should not be understood in terms of three separate functions. Indeed, the Good is itself a “single identical thing in all its instances.” 48 Not only does the Good “gives being […] to the things;” 49 it constitutes “what a thing is in its essence.” 50 This makes the Good the sustainer of all life not only in the sense of being formally present in all things but also in the sense of being the “standard or model of perfection” towards which every being is naturally oriented. 51 The Platonic Good, properly defined, then, is not just a fixed life-giving source, but also a dynamic, all-encompassing root “of organized movement and that, which gives it its movement.” 52 The full weight of the Neoplatonic conception of the Good as both ÒÉÏŢ and ÌšÂÇË of being will become clearer once we deal with it within the Aristotelian context. Against this Aristotelian background, we will be able to understand the conception of God as an object of desire in the AP, as well as in other Arabic recenVLRQVRIWKH1HRSODWRQLFWH[WVWRZKLFKʗDOOćüKDYHKDGDFFHVV

M. L. Mcpherran 2008: 253–254. See also E. E. Benitez 1995: esp. pp. 117–18, pp. 123–24, pp. 127–128, pp. 133–35 and 136; Nettleship 1964: p. 230; also G. Santas 1983: esp. pp. 233–234, p. 238, p. 240, and pp. 246–7. 45 Quoted in E. Benitez 1995: p. 134. 46 E. Benitez 1995: pp. 136–37. 47 Benitez 1995: p. 135. 48 Quoted in Benitez 1995: p. 124. 49 Benitez 1995: p. 135. 50 Quoted in Y. Masih 1999: p. 94. 51 Benitez 1995: p. 132. 52 Benitez 1995: p. 128. 43 44

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,,, T+(),1$/&$86(,17+E $5,6727(/,$1&217(;7 As R. D. Parry points out, as “final cause of imitation the Good has two aspects, which correspond roughly to the two senses of final cause” in Aristotle: the sense of a final cause as object of desire and the sense of a “final cause as the good for something, as what is to be achieved.” 53 In order to understand the reason why Plotinus and his fellow Neoplatonists identify God as the Good in this Aristotelian sense, it is essential, therefore, to understand what is meant by this very concept in the Aristotelian context. This, in turn, will provide the background against which the Neoplatonic conception of the Good as an object of desire is to be understood. From Aristotle’s point of view, the final cause and the efficient-formal cause are two sides of the same coin. 54 The efficientformal cause is the essence of the thing and the final cause, i.e., the telos, is simply the realisation of the essence of the thing in actuality. 55 The formal cause is the form that the thing or object takes: that which gives it its very being and makes it this thing and not some other. In the same way, a final cause is always teleological and explains what takes place in terms of fulfilling its inborn purpose. 56 What the thing aims at is always already expressive of its form. This means that the thing’s telos is the same as its efficient-formal cause. The latter, in turn, is the “archetype” i.e., the definition of the thing itself 57 and consequently also the “goal and good” of this thing. 58 The final cause constitutes ‘the good,’ which in turn serves as the ground for that, which is worthy, of desire: 59 “We desire a thing because it seems good to us;” 60 “for everything that has a good, its

R. D. Parry 1996: p. 204. 3K\V: II.7 198a24–26. 55 G. Lawrence 2011: p. 356. 56 E.g., Enn. VI.7.2.16; see S. Rappe 2002: p. 85. 57 3K\V. II.3 194b27. 58 3K\V. II.3 195a23–25. 59 For a good example of this argument in the Aristotelian corpus, see EN I.7: “a thing’s function (ergon) is identical with or closely linked to its telos”. Quoted in J. Moss 2010: p. 69. 60 MetaƍDTXRWHGLQ3'Hstrée 2007, p. 150. 53 54

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good resides in its function,” says Aristotle. 61 In this sense, therefore, “a thing’s or a being’s function (ìɺÇÅ) is identical with or closely linked to its end or final cause.” 62 In order to fulfil its telos, a thing needs to fulfil its function in a way that reflects the thing’s very own nature. Strictly speaking, then, a thing is good, complete and perfect, precisely because it fulfils its function in the sense of being capable of fulfilling its inborn nature. This interpretation, wherein a thing’s goodness and its telos can be conceptually distinguished but cannot be ontologically separate, is a natural extension of Aristotle’s view that a thing’s telos is at the VDPHWLPHWKHIRUPRUqZKDWQHVVrƵƠ RIWKHWKLQJ 63 Telos, therefore, is to be understood as “intrinsic to thing whose end it is.” 64 For this reason Aristotle says that, “what a thing is, and what it is for, are one and the same.” 65 In this way, to know the essence of something from the point of view of its telos is to know its form. What makes perfection possible, in this conception, is having a form. It is in virtue of the form that something is a being because a form tells what something is from the point of view of its essence. The ultimate realisation of the form is determined by the “final cause,” which is nothing but the purpose of its very being. From this point of view, things strive for the good insofar as they strive to fulfil their telos. Therefore, the form of a being is seen here as nothing but the ultimate goal; i.e., that “for the sake of which” the being exists. 66 Accordingly, what is good, in Aristotle’s view, is a fulfilment, a state of completeness (ëÅ̼ÂñϼÀ¸), toward which beings are oriented by nature. 67 “Every art and every inquiry, and sim-

EN I.7 1097b26–27; quoted in J. Moss 2012: p. 33 J. Moss 2012: 33; Corrigan 2005: 109, 143. For Aristotle this means that “the virtue of each thing is relative to its proper egon” (NE 6.1 1139a16–17); quoted in D. Achtenberg 2002: p. 198 n. 40. 63 E.g., 3K\V: II.2 194a27–b15. 64 Quoted in S. MacDonald 1992: p. 54. 65 3K\V: II.7 198a25–26; quoted in G. R. Lear 2009: p. 14. 66 Lear 2009: p. 11. 67 See also MetaƍE3–25: “We call complete (teleion) […] the things which have attained a good end are called complete (teleion); for 61 62

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ilarly every action and choice is thought to aim at some good: and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim.” 68 A typical Neoplatonic example of this conception of the (Aristotelian) final cause is the way in which the human being’s potentiality for becoming one with God depends on its ability to actualise its inborn divine nature. This actualization is achieved due to the human being’s return to his or her place of origin. Thus, as with all beings, the end goal of a human being’s self-completion is determined by the human being’s capability of (i) realising its own form and (ii) performing the kind of function to which it is naturally suited. 69 This ultimate end to which everything is naturally drawn is the highest good “on which all ends converge.” 70 Aristotle applies to this highest good the name “god” (¿¼ŦË), or somewhat more often, the adjective “divine” (¿¼ėÇË): 71 A kind of living deity, without which there could be neither motion nor cause. In this interpretation, the movement of all things can be explained by their desire for this deity that, in Aristotle’s philosophy, is called the unmoved “Prime Mover.” 72 As we will see in the case of both Plotinus and ʗDOOćüRQHGLVWLQFWLYHIHDWXUHRIWKH1HRSODWRQLFLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI this idea suggests that the desire for God is something we experience in terms of a desire to encounter one’s own original, divine reality. Self-completion in this sense is found only in the One.

things are complete in virtue of having attained their end;” trans. Barnes ed., 1984: vol. 2, p. 1613. 68 NE 1094a1; trans. Barnes ed., 1984: vol. 2, p. 1729; see also Meta. 5.2 1013b25, 1.2 982b4–7, b10, 1.3 983a31–32, 11.1 1059a35– Ɗ 1050b22–30. As J. Moss points out (2010: p. 69), “Aristotle links the notion of the good […] with that of the end (telos), so much that he often equates the two”; see e.g., 3K\V. 194a32–33, 195a23–25; Meta. 1.3 9833102. 69 NE 1.7 1097b25–27. 70 Meta. 1073a3–5; 1075a12–15; Lear 2009: 39; S. Menn 1992: p. 545. 71 Menn 1992: p. 546. 3K\V. VIII and Meta ƍ DUH WZR NH\ SODFHV where Aristotle develops his conception of divinity. 72 Meta. 1072a24–26.

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The perspective here, then, is distinctively teleological: everything tends in a normal, rational manner toward the final divine cause, which draws all beings back to their place of origin, inspires their love, awakens their passion, keeping them moving until they attain their ends.73 That is to say, all things are directed to the highest good as their end. 74 The highest good is the cause of eternal motion, because, as explained above, everything in the world has an immanent driving force, urging it towards perfection. 75 The point Aristotle makes is precisely that this force (i.e., the Prime Mover) is also “the source and cause” of goodness to everything else, and thus the goal “in imitation of which all good things, including the world-order, are produced.” 76 Unlike everything else in creation, this Prime Mover is not subject to potentiality “and cannot otherwise be than as it is; it therefore exists necessarily, and as necessarily, is good.” 77 Aristotle thus conceives of the Prime Mover in a way analogous to Plato’s “Good”: namely as “a mover whose act is eternally simultaneous with his being.” 78 Thus conceived, the Prime Mover represents the ultimate good and as such, therefore, is the ultimate final cause and the ultimate object of desire and knowledge. 79 This is because, in the first place, the Prime Mover moves, or draws, the cosmos toward its natural end, namely, toWhether the causal power of Aristotle’s Prime Mover is exclusively final, or both final and efficient, has been a topic of intense debate among scholars. On the former view, see J. Owens 1979: 207–26; and L. P. Gerson 1990: pp. 120–41. On the latter view, see W.J. Verdenius 1960: pp. 65–70. 74 MetaƍE1–4, b13–14. 75 Meta. 1075a19; 3K\V. II.7 198b1–4. 76 NE I.12 1102a3–4. Here I am quoting Menn 1992: p. 573. 77 Quoted in C. Hanley 2000: p. 92. 78 Quoted in S. M. Kaye 2008: p. 103. In adopting this interpretation, I am following A. Laks (2000: p. 225) who argues that the identification of the prime unmoved mover both with an object of desire and with an object of knowledge should be seen against “the Platonic horizon of Aristotle’s approach”; see also L. P, Gerson 2006: p. 126, p. 201; Lear 2009: p. 79. 79 E.g., Meta. 1072a25. 73

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ward itself. It is precisely this feature that characterises our life and destiny: We are all caught up in a unifying movement back to the source from which we came. In fact, the premise that Neoplatonists take as being self-evident, is this desire for union with the divine, based on the idea that in every living being there is an innate “capacity” for perfection. 80 The Neoplatonic account of the union of the soul and the divine good are comprehensible in light of the Aristotelian account MXVW RXWOLQHG ,Q RUGHU WR XQGHUVWDQG WKH UHODWLRQVKLS RI ʗDOOćüpV mystical union to the Neoplatonic tradition, it is essential to observe briefly the Aristotelian influences in the Arabic Plotinus. As ZLOOEHFRPHFOHDUʗDOOćüDQGWKHAP texts share some of the same Aristotelian underpinnings. Understanding these underpinnings is WKHUHIRUH FUXFLDO ,QGHHG WKH GHHSHU PHDQLQJ WKDW ʗDOOćü DVFULEHV to the conception of God as the end of existence gives sense in the context of this Aristotelianised conception of God. “No matter how much you strive”, he says, “the only destination you will reach is God. [This is so], because there is no other God except Him.” 81 The insight that arises from this union is the highest degree of PDʰULID that triggers the awareness and reflection of God’s ineffability. 82

,,, G2'$6$),1$/&$86(,17+($3 $1' ʙ$//Ćû The AP texts contain numerous indications of Aristotle’s notion of God as the unmoved mover and final cause of motion. In the Pro-

Remes 2008: p. 102; Schroeder 1992: p. 95; Gerson 2012: pp. 186–87; Corrigan 2005: pp. 30–34. 81 +HUH,DPTXRWLQJWZRRSHQLQJOLQHVRIDSRHPRIʗDOOćüDFFRUdLQJWR.ćPHO0DO-kD\EĪpVHGLWLRQS >f@qinna al-ĠKć\D$OODK fa-OćLOćK- LʨćEćODĠWD – LOOćKŠ”; also quoted in $NKEćU 1936: no. 46, p. 71. 7KH$UDELFZRUGXVHGE\ʗDOOćüZKLFK,KDYHWUDQVODWHGqILQDOHQGrLV ĠKć\D. Added words in brackets are mine. 82 For aconcise summary of the history of the term PDʰULID in “classiFDO DQG PHGLHYDOr ʙŠIĪ WH[WV ERWK LQ $UDELF DQG 3HUVLDQ VHH - 5HQDUG 2004: esp. pp. 19–63. For a general discussion of the term, see R. ShahKazemi 2002; and R. Arnaldez: (,2, vol. 5. 80

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logue to the ThA, 83 for instance, the Adaptor argues in a strongly Aristotelian vein that “the first desired is the last attained, and the first attained is the last desired.” 84 In light of this assumption, the Adaptor draws the implication, that “all agents that are generated act because of natural, everlasting desire and that the desire and search are due to a fixed [i.e., XQPRYHG@ FDXVH ʲLOOD ʤćELWD).” 85 On this basis, the Adaptor proceeds in the following sections of the Prologue to a more detailed explanation of the core meaning of alĠć\D, i.e., “the end that is sought.” 86 The end or final cause determines, by its very nature, a thing’s being. When we shift to a thing’s final cause, he argues, we explain this very thing by its goal or end: “the meaning of ‘end’ is that others exist because of it” (DQ\DNŠQ ĠD\UXKćEL-VDEDELKć). 87 The Adaptor then generalises this into the claim that the final cause is “the object of desire” (al-EXĠ\D). This, he says elsewhere, is true of any final cause, and particularly of a “pure good.” Moreover, as this pure good is nothing else but the ultimate object of desire, the object of desire can be nothing else but the unmoved source of all movement (ʚDUDNDWüDPĪʰDO-aš\ćʱ  88 For the Adaptor, there are two interrelated reasons why the ultimate object of desire is found in the unmoved source of all movement. In the first place because “every good in the upper world and in the lower world comes […] from that high nature,” which in itself guarantees that “things are moved towards [it] through a sort of desire and yearning” (WDWDʚDUUDN LOD\KL EL QDZʰ DššDZT ZD ʯO-nuzŠʰ). 89 In another, but related, context, 90 the Adaptor supports this claim by arguing that this desire is found both in “inFor an outline of the Aristotelian features of the Prologue, see Adamson 2002: pp. 27–35; also Zimmermann 1986: p. 121. 84 Trans. Adamson 2002: p. 28; [B 4, 3]. 85 [B 4, 6]. 86 Adamson 2002: 28; [B 5, 3]. 87 Adamson 2002: 32, 41; [B 5, 5]. 88 Adamson 2002: 38; [B 178, 11–12]; also, e.g., ThA I. §48; DS §221; §227; GS I.24, 36; II.89; IX.2. 89 Adamson 2002: 41; Prol. 15, ThA I §48, [B 6, 12]. 90 DS [B 179, 1–2]. 83

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telligible and sensible things” (al-Dx\ćʯ DO-ʰDTOL\\D ZD-l-ʚLVVL\\D), thus implying the Neoplatonic longing for the soul’s reunion with a divine source. According to the Adaptor, this means that “everything yearns to perceive it” (WDxʞćTLOć DQ-WDʰTLODKX), i.e., the Prime Mover (al-IćʰLODO-awwal), 91 who, says the Adaptor, moves without itself being moved or being subject to change (\DETćʰDOć ʚćOLKLVćNLQDQ). 92 The Aristotelian resonance of the Platonic and the Neoplatonic One-Good is even more evident in al-ʢD\U DO-PDʚʘ 93 As the title indicates, Aristotle’s Prime Mover is replaced here by the OneGood (al-ZćʚLGDO-laʨĪKXZDʢD\U). Nevertheless, the basic perspective remains the same. Thus, in proposition 20, 94 the One is also the Good (DOODʨĪKXZDʢD\U) on the assumption that “His unity is good SHU VH” (ZDʚGćQL\DWXKX ʢD\U). Everything else (VćʯLU DO-aš\ćʱ  E\ FRntrast, has being and goodness from God who unfolds and bestows goodness on all beings (al-PXIĪʘʰDOD\Kćbi üamĪʰDO-ʢD\UćW). 95 Working from this proposition, the Adaptor comes to the conclusion in proposition 22, that all things desire the Good and endeavour to appropriate it more than anything else (al-Dx\ćʯNXOOXKć taštćq ilć alʢD\U ZD WDʚULʜ ʰDOć QD\OLKL). In proposition 16 the Adaptor prepares the way for this argument by laying the basis of its main premise, in a way that clearly echoes the teleological dimension of selffulfilment; namely, by saying that proximity to the One-Good means greater unity (al-Dx\ćʯ NXOODPć qarrabat min al-wćʚLG DO-PDʚʘ LxWDGGDWZDʚGćQL\\DWXKć). In Plotinus, this unity “does not constitute an end in itself, but rather a means for the achievement of ‘assimi-

DS [B 179, 1–2]. [B 179, 23]; see also GS [B 184, 1]: al- IćʰLODO-awwal sćNLQĠD\UPuWDʚDUULN (“the First Mover is stationary and completely motionless” = GS §1, trans. 3ORWLQLRSHUD II); Adamson 2002: 87. 93 For more about Aristotle’s theory of God as the unmoved mover and final cause in Arabic philosophical texts, see for example the short treatise On the first mover by al-6LüLVWćQĪSijistani 1974: pp. 372–76). 94 %DGDZĪ 95 As P. Adamson has shown with respect to the AP, this is so because God’s “goodness is in some unspecified way distinct from the goodness of, say, Soul or Intellect” (2002: p. 217, n. 8). 91 92

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lation’ to God. 96 In one of his poems – of which only the first six lines are given here – ʗDOOćüGHVFULEHVWKLVDVVLPLODWLRQLQWHUPVRI soul’s communion with or participation in the ultimate object of desire: I am not I and I am not He; then who am I and who is He? Not “and I” for He is not I and not “not I” for He is not He If it is He at whom and by whom we gaze There is nothing in existence but us, me and Him and Him and Him […] I am the One I desire and the One I desire is me There is nothing in the mirror except us two. 97

In this pRHPʗDOOćüGHVFULEHVWKHH[SHULHQFHRI*RGpVSUHVHQFHLQ a way analogous to the presence of an object in a mirror. First, let us to note that the association of the mirror image with soul’s absorption in God lies in the direct line of the Plotinian tradition. 98 As Stamatellos points out, in Plotinus the clearness of soul’s awareness in this state of unity is illustrated by means of the “mirror-reflection.” 99 Here, metaphorically speaking, the receptivity of the soul is like that of a mirror; e.g., like Moses, who, according to ʗDOOćüUHFHLYHGDFOHDUYLVLRQRI*RG7REHVXUHWKHUHDUHXQPLstakable echoes of this in the AP, which also describes the soul’s return to God in terms of “seeing” as the only way of accessing or attaining the noble, divine realm (al-ʰćlam aš-xDUĪI). 100 As argued previously, Neoplatonists conceive this idea of union in terms of deifiEnn. I.2.6.6–7: “¿¼ġË »ò ֙զ֚ ÌŊ ÈÉŪÌĿ”; quoted in P. Kalligas 2014: p. 145. This aspect of Plotinus’ philosophy is examined in several studies; e.g., J. Trouillard 1974. 97 Translation slightly modified. The original Arabic text reads as follows (L. Massignon 1931: p. 92): “ODVWXDQćZDODVWXKXZDIDPDQDQćZDPDQ KXZDKXZDOćZDDQćPćKXZDDQćZDOćDQćPDKXZDKXZDODZNćQDKXZDPć QDʲDUDW DEʜćUXQD EL-KL ODKX Pć IL-ʯl wuüŠd ĠD\UDQć, anć wa huwa wa huwa wa KXZD>f@DQć man ahwć wa man ahwć anć OD\VDIL-ʯOPLUʯćt šD\ʯXQĠD\UDQć.” See S. Selim 1990: p. 40. 98 E.g., Enn. I.4.10.6–18; P. Hadot 1998: p. 30. 99 Stamatellos 2007: p. 86. 100 E.g., ThA II, [B 29, 1–6]. 96

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cation, that is, the return of a being to its divine source of origin. 101 In the poem just quoted, the “mirror” is the image of the speaker’s deified soul, which in turn also reflects, or mirrors, its object of desire. Again, deification here should not be understood as a claim to divinity, but merely as referring to the spiritual and contemplaWLYHXQLRQRIVRXOZLWK*RG$VʗDOOćüLQGLFDWHVWKHPLUURULPDJH is used in an openly symbolic way, namely, to illustrate the soul’s capacity to picture, portray, and receive in mental images what it has already acquired in the mind. Massignon describes this supreme moment of insight as “intellectual inebriation.” That is, an intense state of intellectual interiority in which the “desired Object transmutes the subject.” 102 This indeed is an immediately striking peculiDULW\RIWKHQDWXUHRIP\VWLFDOXQLRQLQʗDOOćüpVWH[WVIf, in fact, this is correct, from the point of view of the implicit message, the poem quoted above reiterates what Verena Lobsien has described as a Neoplatonic “mode of non-discursive cognition.” 103 This mode of cognition, says Lobsien, is a kind of “seeing” which leads the soul “toward the desired union with the One” in a way that opens “its intellectual faculty to embrace even its ground of being.” 104 Elsewhere ʗDOOćüUHIHUVWRWKLVVWDWHRInon-discursive knowing as LWWLʜćO – (from the root [ZʜO], “to commune,”or “to establish a contact with”). 105 According to M. Fakhry, among “Muslim NeoPlatonists,” the term LWWLʜćO was used to designate perfection, i.e., “full actualisation of man’s intellectual potentialities” when one finally attains “the condition of complete identity with the medium of all perception.” 106 $VʗDOOćüKLPVHOILQGLFDWHVLWLVa state of beIt is worthy of note, however, that the AP does not explicitly address the issue of deification, and the fact that it does not is, of course, significant. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that this idea of the soul’s likeness to God was in circulation DWWKHWLPHRIʗDOOćüLH ninthFHQWXU\ .LQGĪ IRU LQVWDQFH XVHV LW LQ some of his works; see Adamson 2006: p. 157. 102 EO 1997: p. 192. 103 V. O. Lobsien 2010: p. 192. 104 Lobsien 2010: p. 192. 105 EO 1997: p. 26. 106 M. Fakhry 1971: pp. 198–200. 101

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ing in which the created being “sees nothing but His creator” (alLWWLʜćO DQ Oć \DxKDG DO-ʰDEG ĠD\U ʢćOLTDKX). 107 Strictly speaking, then, ʗDOOćüFRQVWUXHVLWWLʜćOin a Neoplatonic sense; that is, in the sense of a final, contemplative state in which the soul is “restored to unity with the One.” 108 ,QWKLVUHJDUG ʗDOOćü LVYHU\FORVH WR DQGLQ IDFWDQWLFLSDWHV,EQʲ$UDEĪ. For the latter, the state of “transcendence of the unity” (WDQ]ĪKDO-WDZʚĪG) involves a moment of contemplative insight wherein the soul sees “[…] that the property of unity is so characteristic of the divine essence that it is peculiar to it SHUVH and a se with exclusion of all beings.” 109 The second last line of the poem quoted above is the expression of this precise moment in the soul’s spiritual itinerary, which represents what, from a Neoplatonic point of view, is nothing less than a “momentary liberation from the delimitations of predication.” 110 ʗDOOćüpV SOD\ RQ WKH SHUVRQDO SURQRXQV qKXZDr DQG qDQćr VKRZV WKLV +HUH WKH VRXO LV GUDZQ out of itself and led into the vision of its divine object of desire; so closely, in fact, as to be barely distinguishable from it. When the divine object is seen as it really is, the boundaries between seer and seen – qQćʴLUDQGPDQʴŠUr– fall away or dissolve (“There is nothing in existence but us, I and He and He and He”). 111From a Plo-

107NaW:

§217, p. 258. ,QWKLVUHJDUGRQHVKRXOGQRWHWKDW,EQ6ĪQć and other Muslim Neoplatonists used LWWLʜćO in precisely the same sense, to designate “the attainment of a spiritual or intellectual condition”; quoted in I. Lancaster 2003: p. 92; see also Fakhry 1971: p. 198. On the use of this term in Arabic Neoplatonic literature, see S. Pessin 2013: 29. On the technical use of the term LWWLʜćO LQʙŠIĪWH[WVVHH-%DOGLFN5DOʲ$üam 1999: p. 7. 108 Bussanich 1988: 188. It is noteworthy that already in 1934 (esp. pp. 196–209), I. Madkour recognized LWWLʜćO as a key concept for establishing the link between the Arabic tradition of Neoplatonism and the tradiWLRQRI,VODPLFP\VWLFLVPWRZKLFKʗDOOćüEHORQJV. 109 Quoted in M. A. Palacious 1978: p. 73. 110 Quoted in M. A. Sells 1994: 20. 111 Ph: 65.

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tinian point of view, this is nothing but the moment of vision whereby “the seer himself was one with the seen.” 112 Within a Neoplatonic perspective, the process that leads to this non-discursive mode of insight is a ‘reversion’ (ëÈÀÊÌÉÇŞû). The following section elaborates further the meaning of mystical XQLRQLQʗDOOćüpVWH[WVRQWKHEDVLVRIWKLVSXUHO\SKLORVRSKLFDOQotion.

,,, N(23/$721,&5(9(56,21 $1',765(3(5&866,216 ,1ʙ$//Ćû What, then, is meant by “reversion”? In Neoplatonic thought, this notion of reversion goes hand in hand with the idea of procession and is best understood in relation to the final cause dimension of the One-Good. 113 As was already indicated in the previous chapter (Chap. II), the doctrine of procession encourages us to consider God’s creation of and relation to beings in a vertical perspective. That is to say, the perspective of what we could call God’s “downward unfolding.” 114 By comparison, in the perspective of reversion, we are encouraged to perceive “God in His capacity to return all things to Himself,” while standing at the top of a vertical chain of being. 115 As R. Wisnovsky points out, in this perspective, procession may be seen as “the downward direction of the efficient causation”; reversion, on the other hand, may be seen as “the upward direction of the final causation of well-being.” 116 In simple terms, this means that reversion and procession are not opposites but complementary to each other, just as for Aristotle efficient causality and final causality are complementary to each other as two aspects of the same cosmic unity. ʗDOOćü JLYHV LQGLUHFW H[SUHVVLRQ WR WKLV pair of concepts (i.e., procession and return), implying that they are VI.9.11.5–6: “ðÅ öÅ ¸ĤÌġË ĝ Ċ»ĽÅ ÈÉġË Ìġ îÑɸĚÅÇÅբ ĸË ÔÅ Äü îÑɸĚÅÇÅբÒÂÂн÷ÅÑÄšÅÇÅ”; quoted in Bussanich 1988: p. 215. 113 Dodds, 1963: p. 219. 114 God’s “downward unfolding” is a term that I borrow from S. Pessin 2013: p. 72, p. 81, p. 126, p. 147; see also Remes 2008: p. 67. 115 S. Pessin 2013: p. 125. 116 R. Wisnovsky 2003: p. 79. 112

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complementary aspects with the same starting and ending point. 7KLV FRPHV RXW PRVW FOHDUO\ LQ KLV FRPPHQWDU\ RQ ʛŠUD 53:42 of WKH4XUʱćn, which states that our final destination should be with the Lord (“LOćUDEELNDDO-PXQWDKć”). According to ʗDOOćü, this verse exhibits two aspects that are implied in one another: namely, that “all things proceed from Him and return to Him” (minhu al-ibtidćʯ ZDLOD\KLDO-LQWLKćʱ). 117 The notion of reversion is closely related with a recurring theme in Neoplatonic accounts of mystical experience, namely the theme of soul’s ascent to the beatific vision. In their metaphysical reflections, both Plotinus and the AP describe reversion from this perspective; namely, from the perspective of the soul’s ascent to its most desirable destination: Often I have woken up out of the body to myself and have entered into myself, going out from all things; I have seen a beauty wonderfully great and felt assurance that then most of all I belonged to the better part; I have actually lived the best life and come to identity with the divine; and set firm in it I have come to that supreme actuality, setting myself above all else in the realm of Intellect. Then, after that rest in the divine, when I have come down from intellect to discursive reasoning, I am puzzled how I ever came down, and how my soul has come to be in the body when it is what it has shown itself to be by itself, even when it is in the body. 118 Sometimes, I was as it were alone with my soul: I divested myself of my body, put it aside, and was as it were a simple substance without a body. Then I entered into my essence by returning into it free from all things. I was knowledge, knowing and known at the same time. I saw in my essence so much of beauty, loveliness, and splendour that I remained astonished and confused, and I knew that I was part of the exalted, splenNaK: §179, p. 148. The use of the verbal noun LEWLGćʯin this connection is familiar from the AP. The Arabic root from which LEWLGćʯ is derived, (b-d-ʱ LVXVHGKHUHWRH[SODLQLQZKDWVHQVH*RGLVqSULRUWRDOO things” (awwal al-DZćʯLO: DS [B 182 4]). 118 Enn. IV.8.1. 117

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EARLY PHILOSOPHICAL ʙş),60 did, divine upper world, and that I was endowed with an active life. When this became clear to me, I rose in my essence from this world to the divine world, and I was as it were placed there and attached to it. I was above the whole intelligible world and saw myself as if I stood in that exalted divine position, and beheld there such light and splendour as tongues are unable to describe and ears are impotent to hear. 119

Here both passages share the same notion that reversion is the vehicle of soul’s access to the divine world. In fact, reversion in this sense comes from Proclus, who employs the Greek term ëÈÀÊÌÉÇŞû to explain why all things are motivated by a desire to ‘return.’ 120 In Proclus’ account, procession goes hand in hand with reversion, in much the same way as Plotinus. The source, says Proclus, is not only “that from which it derived the procession of its own substance,” 121 “but also its final cause.” 122 That is so, simply because every being has a “structural affinity” with its causal source. 123 Reversion, in this perspective, corresponds conceptually to Plotinus’ concept of assimilation. Reversion and assimilation are simultaneous, concomitant, and inextricable aspects of soul’s quest for self-fulfilment; a sort of ʗDOOćüian “experience of embracing the One.” 124 The soul attains its true nature by contemplating the divine cause of its existence. In a Neoplatonic context, this is explained in terms of the fundamental notion that man’s soul knows its own essence by knowing its prior cause (LQ ʰDOLPD Pć fawqahŠ ʰDOLPDʨDWDKŠD\ʘDQ). 125 Though not explicitly stated or precisely defined, reversion in this sense as a process of ascent and longing toward the divine can HDVLO\ EH GLVFHUQHG LQ ʗDOOćüpV SRHWU\ 'LYLQH ORYH DQG VSLULWXDO ThA, B 22, 1–8; trans. A. Altmann and S. M. Stern 2010: p. 191. A. D. R. Sheppard 1980: p. 63. 121 El. Theol. prop. 34; trans. Dodds 1963: p. 37. 122 Remes 2008: p. 52, p. 212. 123 R. Chlup 2012: p. 65; also G. Reale 1990: p. 432. 124 Mason 2013: p. 66. 125 Endress 1973: prop. 167, p. 35; El. Theol., Dodds 1963: prop. 167, pp. 145–146. 119 120

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union with God, which are the most strongly stated themes in some of these poems – like those we have already quoted – may also be seen as variations on this Neoplatonic notion. Within the framework presented here, the soul experiences an intellectual ascent (or a return) that culminates in the soul’s fulfilment of its divine telos. As formulated by Plotinus, and reformulated by Proclus, this realisation is the result of a process called theosis, or deification. 126 The deification of the soul also means that it becomes one with the divine: “to be unified is the same as to be deified.” 127 In the Islamic context, there is a strong strain of self-divinisation in ʙŠIĪ WKLQNLQJ EHVW H[SUHVVHG LQ ʗDOOćüpV NQRZQ – but also highly controversial statement – “$Qć-OʙDTT” (meaning “‘I am the Truth’ and by implication ‘I am God’” 128  ʗDOOćü ZDV SUREDEO\ WKH ILUVW non-Hellenistic thinker to borrow the language of deification in the sense just described, that is, in the Neoplatonic sense of awakening GLYLQHWKRXJKWVZLWKLQRQHVHOIʗDOOćüXVHVWKHODQJXDJHRIGHLILFation as the equivalent of becoming a partaker in a contemplative vision. This vision, which, as we noted, he calls “PXxćKDGD”, allows man to penetrate deeply into the divine reality. ,QGHHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKHQDWXUHRIP\VWLFDOXQLRQLQʗDOOćüpV texts is better understood once we understand it in terms of experiencing a beatific vision, that is, a moment of contemplative purity, which, as Plotinus says, is not attained “by way of reasoned knowledge” […] “but by way of a presence superior to knowledge.” 129 This understanding of mystical union as a state in which the soul attains contemplative purity can also be discerned in ʗDOOćüpVGHILQLWLRQRIWKHʙŠIĪFRQFHSWPDʰULID. Here, PDʰULID stands for a contemplative awareness that carries the seeker beyond the boundaries of “transmitted tradition” (al-aʢEćU), “intellectual per-

M. Fakhry (1971: p. 196) notes that deification, in this sense, corresponds to “the condition of divination of which Aristotle had spoken in Nicomachean Ethics X, 8.” 127 Quoted in R. M.van den Berg 2001: p. 43. 128 T. S. Halman 2006: p. 89. 129 Enn. VI.9.4.1–3. 126

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ceptions” (al-LGUćN), as well as “modes of knowing” that remain confined to “causes and effects” (al-ʰLOOćWZDʯO-ćlćt). 130 In the following poem, this moment of awareness triggers the poet’s ecstatic affirmation of the divine object of desire as part of the soul’s journey towards deification. This deification leads the soul to a state of felicity that involves a certain glimpse of the divine and greater insight into the true WDQ]ĪK: I wonder at You and at myself – O Vow of my desire! You had drawn me so close to Yourself – that I began to believe that You were my “self.” Then you escaped into ecstasy – to the point of depriving me of my “self” in You. O my happiness in my life – O my rest after my burial! There can no longer be any rejoicing for me except in You […] Ah! In the gardens of Your designs, I have embraced all knowledge, And if I still desire one thing more – it is You, all my desire! 131

In another poem, because of this experience, the soul grows into the likeness of God in a moment of conjunction: I have become the One I love, and the One I love Has become me! We are two spirits infused in a (single) body And to see me is to see Him And to see Him is to see us. 132

.Dʝ, Ch XI: 213; trans. Aisha Abd ar-Rahman 1974: p. 62 – slightly modified. 131 Trans. PhM3: p. 172. $UDELFWH[WLQ.ćPHO0kD\EĪS ʰDüLEWXPLQNDZDPLQQĪ\ć PXQ\DWDDO-mutamannĪDGQD\WDQĪ PLQNDʚDWWćʲDQDQWX DQQDNDDQQĪZDĠLEWXIĪ-ʯOZDüGLʚDWWćDIQD\WDQĪELNDʰDQQĪ\ć QLʰPDWĪ fĪ ʚD\ćWĪZD UćʚDWĪEDʰGDGDIQĪPćOĪELĠD\ULNDXQVXQ>f@\ćPDQUL\ćʘXPDʰćnĪKTDGʚDZDW NXOODIDQQLZDʯLQWDPDQQD\WXšD\ʯDQIDDQWDNXOOXDW-tamannĪ. 132 Trans. PhM3: p. 42. The bracketed explanations are Massignon’s. $UDELF WH[W LQ .ćPHO 0 kD\EĪ  S  qDQć PDQ DKZć ZD PDQ DKZć DQćQDʚQXUŠʚćQʚDODOQćEDGDQć>f@IDʯLʨćDEʜDUWDQĪDEʜDUWDKXZDʯLʨćDEʜDUtDKXDEʜDUWDQć.” 130

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Here, as depicted in the poem, ʚXOŠO – understood as conjunction – depends on the Proclean sense of reversion described above. By means of reversion, the soul experiences (a) the loss of self-identity and (b) affinity with its divine origin. This poem shows, then, that GHLILFDWLRQLQʗDOOćüpVWKRXJKWVWDQGVLQFORVHFRQQHFWLRQZLWKUeversion. Understanding this point will help us avoid common misFRQFHSWLRQVRIʗDOOćüpVP\VWLFLVP)RUʗDOOćüʚXOŠO in the sense of deification means restoration of the soul’s purity through the loving presence of God. If this interpretation is correct, reversion can be viewed as the YHKLFOH WKDW HQVXUHV DFFHVV WR ZKDW FODVVLFDO ʙŠILV FDOO oD\Q DO-üDPʲ (i.e., “essential union”); that is, the visionary experience “in which all thoughts and aspirations of the mystic are wholly permeated by God.” 133 In Proclus, soul’s yearning for this experience follows from two principles: one (noted earlier) stating that existence “has the Good as its principium and first cause;” 134 the other stating, “each being has a natural appetition of its well-being and of the Good.” 135 In ʗDOOćü, these two principles are closely interlinked, – so closely, in fact, that it seems impossible to separate them. A case LQSRLQWLVWKHIROORZLQJSRHPZKHUHʗDOOćüpVVHQVHRIXUJHQF\LQ addressing the desire for reversion is explicit: O God, first You created us, and this was out of goodness and generosity Then You showed us the right path, and this was out of grace itself. Now You summon us to Paradise, Yourself. Ah! That does not suffice. If indeed You have acted in this way from the beginning Out of Your grace, complete your goodness!

Quoted in M. Fakhry 2004: p. 252. For more details on ʗDOOćüpV concept of “essential union,” see Massignon, PhM3: p. 118; also C. W. Ernst 1985: p. 20, and K. Bunyadzade 2012: p. 254. 134 El. Theol., Dodds 1963: prop. 12, p. 15. 135 El. Theol., Dodds 1963: prop. 35, p. 39; Remes 2008: p. 68. 133

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EARLY PHILOSOPHICAL ʙş),60 Otherwise, the work that You had undertaken will be only half-way done. 136

The premise of this poem depends entirely on the fact that reversion is an essential, complementary aspect of the relationship between God and His creation. Anyone who believes in divine creation will know, as something obvious, that beings return to and find fulfilment in God. Simply put, reversion is inevitable. It does not mean the opposite of procession. Divine goodness entails both procession and reversion. In other words, the poem’s reference to “goodness” is a reiteration of this Neoplatonic principle, which defines God’s goodness as both ÒÉÏŢ and ÌšÂÇË of creation. In turn, this principle seems to explain why things or beings are caused to exist; namely, because of their inevitable return to their cosmic point of departure. Reversion, then, is necessary as a principle of cosmic existence in perfecting the process of divine creation. Otherwise, if God does not fulfil His promise of returning everything back to Himself, the purposes for which the entire world have been created, will remain incomplete, unfinished, and God’s work will remain half done. ʗDOOćüpVLQVLVWHQFHRQWKHQHFHssity of reversion in the imperative mode of his yearning – “Out of Your grace, complete your goodness” – reiterates, in a slightly indirect manner, the fundamental teaching of the Proclus Arabus, “that all things desire the Good and endeavour to appropriate it more than anything else” (al-Dx\ćʯ NXOOXKć taštćq ilć ʯO-ʢD\U ZD WDʚULʜ ʰDOć QD\OLKL). 137 On this interpretation, therefore, reversion to the divine is the goal of the entire teleological movement of the world, a cosmic law – not something merely to be hoped and wished for. In other ZRUGVIRUʗDOOćüWKHFUHDtion of the universe is only preliminary to, or a phase in the process of, everything’s return to its divine origin, in the sense that Plotinus and the Neoplatonists understood it.

136 137

Quoted and trans. PhM3: p. 111. Endress 1973: prop. 22.

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In the poem, “'Xʰćʯ OL ʰXxxćq al-ʙDTT,” 138 which is a “prayer for the desirous-lovers of God,” 139 ʗDOOćü FRQYH\V WKLV LQVLJKW LQ DQ explicit manner: Here am I, here am I, O my secret, O my trust! Here am I, here am I, O my hope, O my meaning! I call to You … no, it is You Who calls me to Yourself. How could I say “it is You!” – if You had not said to me “it is I” O essence of the essence of my existence. – O aim of my intent […] O All of my all, – O my hearing and my sight O my assembling, my composition and my parts! O All of my all, – the all of all things, equivocal enigma, It is the all of You that I obscure in wanting to express You! O You, by Whom my spirit was hanged, already dying of ecstasy Ah! Keep its token in my anguish! […] O Highest thing I ask and hope for, O my Host, O food of my spirit, O my life in this world and the next! Let my heart be Your ransom! O my hearing, O my sight! Why do You keep me so long at such a distance? Ah, though You hide in what is invisible to my eyes, My heart already beholds You in my distance, yes, in my exile! 140

In addition to the many topics this poem addresses, it shows that the experience of deification amounts to a kind of seeing which 138

$UDELFWH[WLQ.ćPHO0kD\EĪSqODEED\NDODEED\ND\ć VLUUĪZDQDüZćʯĪODEED\NDODEED\ND\ć qasdĪ ZDPDʰQćʯĪDGʰŠNDEDODQWDWDGʰŠnĪ LOD\ND ID KDO QćGD\WX L\\ćND DP QćGD\WD L\\ćʯĪ \ć D\QD D\QL ZXüŠdĪ \ć madć himamĪ >f@ \ć NXOOD NXOOĪ Z \ć VDPʰĪ ZD \ć EDʜDUĪ \ć üXPODWĪ ZD WDEćʰĪʘĪ ZD Dü]ćʯĪ\ćNXOODNXOOĪZDNXOOXDO-NXOOĪPXOWDELVXQZDNXOOXNXOOLNDPDOEŠVXQEL PDʰQćʯĪ\DPDQELKLʰDOLTDWUŠʚĪIDTDGWDOLIDWZDüGDQIDʜLUWXUDʚĪQDQWDʚWDDKZćʯĪ >f@\ć ʰD\ša rŠʚĪ\ćGĪQĪZDGXQ\ćʯĪ, qul lĪIDGD\WXND\ć VDPʰĪ ZD\ć EDʜDUĪOLP ʨćDO-OXüćüDWXIĪEXʰGĪ ZDLTʜćʯĪLQNXQWDELʯO-ĠD\ELʰDQQĪ PXʚWDüLEDQIDʯO-qalbu \DUʰćNDILʯO-LEʰćGLZDʯO-nćʯĪ.” 139 I translate ʰXxxćTwith “desirous lovers” rather than merely “lovers” due to the conceptualisation of the term ʰLxT (divine love), which I shall examine in more detail later in this chapter. 140 Trans. PhM3: pp. 42–43; my italics.

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goes beyond, or transcends, sensible reality just as we saw earlier in Enn. IV.8.1 and ThA, B 22, 1–8. The moment of man’s union with God is purely intellectual caused by a certain kind of attraction (or desire), which begins and ends in God. This underlying philosophiFDOSRLQWLVQLFHO\EURXJKWRXWE\ʗDOOćüZKHQKHDIILUPVUKHWRUically: “no, it is You Who calls me to Yourself” (DQWDWDGʰŠnĪ LOD\ND). ,W VHHPV FHUWDLQ LQ SDUWLFXODU WKDW ʗDOOćü LV LQWURGXFLQJ KHUH D sense of “divine attraction” that draws the soul to its beloved creator. Clearly, the awareness of the real source of this attraction provides the starting point for the poem and pervades it as a whole down to its conclusion. From an Aristotelian point of view, the ground of this (Neoplatonic) attraction is not difficult to discern. God imbues creatures with the desire for self-realisation; and, therefore, God is the One who attracts or draws creatures to move towards Him, and thereby fulfilling both the role of “the supreme object of thought” and “the ultimate final ground.” 141 The poet’s inability to convey the mystical experience through language is another important point from the view of the desirous lover. This inability is caused and concomitant with the experience of ʚXOŠO – or LWWLʜćO, which is equivalent, as explained earlier, with a higher, “noetic” mode of cognition that culminates in a so-called “non-discursive” vision of God. 142 7KXV ZKHQ ʗDOOćü FRQWHQGV “though You hide in what is invisible to my eyes, My heart already beholds You in my distance,” he is implying not only the inadequacy of language as a tool for conveying the experience of mystical union with God. More importantly, he is reiterating the principle of the via negativa understood in terms of tanzĪK in the sense described in Chapter I; namely, that God is perceivable and knowable only by means of contemplation, not by demonstrative insight or discursive reasoning. This, it seems, is the “anguish” which the speaking subject experiences as he encounters the ineffable. In a sense, then, this is just another example of how remarkably accurate L. MasVLJQRQZDVZKHQKHVDLGWKDWP\VWLFDOXQLW\LQʗDOOćüpVWH[WVUHSUeC. Hanley, 2000: 95. Lobsien, 2010. Therefore, S. Pessin (2013: p. 29) seems right to conclude that the Arabic equivalent for the Neoplatonic term ‘reversion’ is LWWLʜćO. 141 142

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sents a particular mode of “intellectual inebriation.” 143 :KDWʗDOOćü in the present context describes as EDʜDU, therefore, is not to be understood in the literal sense, “which in Arabic may refer both to the faculty of sight and to the perception of seeing with this faculty.” 144 Rather, it is best understood according to the vocabulary of Arabic Neoplatonism, namely as a vision of the divine realm. In this perspective, the term EDʜDU designates a perception of the divine that triggers the soul’s desire. In the context of the AP, the attainment of this vision is synonymous with a direct super-sensory insight into al-ʰćlam al-DʰOć, i.e., the “upper” divine realm. That which belongs to the other realm, i.e., the sensory realm (al-ʰćlam al-ʚLVVĪ), is EDʜDU in the literal sense of the word: i.e., perception of physical objects (ND LGUćN DO-baʜDU DO-Dx\ćʯ DO-ʚLVVL\\D). 145 Here, as depicted in the poem, the vision itself is formed and shaped in the soul of the individual, though it remains unreachable by his intellect. This is the reason why the visionary moment remains inexpressible. The vision, which Massignon calls “intellectual inebriation,” leads, momentarily at least, to the deification of the human soul, resulting in the inability of the soul to convey through language what it receives in its experience of the “Highest” object of desire. This moment of contemplative insight, or NDxI, referred to above, cannot be capWXUHGLQZRUGVDQGLVWKHUHIRUHXQVSHDNDEOH$VʗDOOćüSXWVLW the divine realm is an “enigma” (sirr), even when experienced through full presence. H. Mason’s translation of “NXOOX NXOOLND PDOEŠVXQ ELPDʰQćʯĪ” as “It is the all of You that I obscure in wanting to express You,” accurately captures this sense of ineffable meaningfulness which the poem seeks to communicate. One thing, moreover, is quite clear. When ʗDOOćü addresses God, asking Him, “Why do You keep me so long at such a distance (EXʰGĪ ZDLTʜćʯĪ)?” properly speaking, he not only implies the inevitable return of the soul; he is also implying what we have pointed out above, i.e., that no being is capable of attaining God by his own efforts. EO 1997: p. 192. Massignon, however, does not conceive of this mode of “intellectual inebriation” in Neoplatonic terms, i.e., as the nondiscursive reversion to and vision of the soul’s source of origin. 144 Quoted in J. Hoover 2007: p. 32 145 ThA VIII, [B 99 12–13]. 143

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The assumption resounding in the background here can thus be reformulated as follows: “whenever it feels lonely and far away from You, my soul desires to return to its source because the desire to be reunited with You was implanted into my soul by You.” In this interpretation, the soul finds true rest when it returns to God, because in this Neoplatonic context, “separation from God is the source of the soul’s agony and suffering.” 146 Elsewhere in the 'ĪZćQ, in a poem, which perhaps provides the best example of this Neoplatonic dimension in KLVP\VWLFDOORQJLQJʗDOOćüGHVFULEHVWKH state of separation and distance from the divine source, as a state of imprisonment, asking God to “release” his soul from its bondage: “I am imprisoned, so [please] tell me when is my release going to come” (DQćʚDEĪVXQID-TXOOOĪPDWć\DNŠQXDO-IDNćN). 147 In fact, this is a characteristically Platonic – and therefore philosophical – definition of salvation, which is concomitant with the emancipation of soul from its “bodily prison.” 148 By implication, therefore, we have here an insistence upon the idea of return as an unfolding of the “natural appetition” which, in Proclus’ view, draws the soul back to its first cause. A soul hindered from returning to its point of departure and final destination is a soul in exile. This, roughly, is also how the AP seems to conceive of the soul’s exile in the world; for instance in ThA VII.49 [B 91 13–17] in which the Adaptor speaks of “the pleasures of this sensible world” that block our way to the “intellectual world” (al-ʰćlam al-ʰDTOĪ). 149 Because of this hindrance, which holds the soul from reaching its desired end, the soul is detained from salvation, and hence from its ultimate perfection. Such is the case, in fact, with “the exile from god” which, in the Enneads, is synonymous with barring the soul from attaining contact with God. 150 Because of this barring, a feeling of KRPHVLFNQHVV is caused in the soul. This sense of homesickness is understandable, says Plotinus, because the soul

B. Abrahamov 2003: p. 30. kD\EĪOLQH 148 Abrahamov 2003: p. 2. 149 Adamson 2002: p. 70. 150 IV.8.1.19: ŞÍºÛË¿¼Ġ¿¼Å; Stamatellos 2007: p. 167. 146 147

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“carries a dim and indistinct memory of home within it.” 151 In a verse omitted from the above-cited English translation, ʗDOOćü speaks of this homesickness in terms of being-in-the-world, understood – again – as being in exile from God: “DENĪ ʰDOć šaganĪ min furqatĪ ZDʞDQĪ.” 152 The term waʞan, as used here, is a metaphor for a place of spiritual birth, not a literal place of birth. The metaphorised place of spiritual birth – waʞan – is no doubt identical with the final resting-place wherein, according to Neoplatonists, the presence of God is actually formed. 153 As revealed in the last line of the poem, the vision of the ineffable/invisible Deity brings the soul into the ultimate place. In another poem, ʗDOOćü calls this place “the realm of self-annihilation,” (al-ʰćODPDO-PćʚLT); in this ultimate realm, a genuine experience of love culminates in union of the “desirous lover” and his divine “beloved” (al-ʰćxiq bi-O PDʰxŠq) due to their participation in the same state (of ʰ,xT)” (LxWDUDND Dx-xDNOćQ IĪ ʚćOD). As depicted here, the human soul enjoys the reciprocal effect of God’s beatitude in a place of eternal love. Because the soul’s love is identical with God’s love the soul dwells, as it were, in a state of mind wherein the smile of God is ever seen. It is that moment where one experiences “the beloved’s smile” (ibtasama alPDZPŠT). 154 In short, it is the state of mind wherein Neoplatonic perfection, and thus, self-realisation is fulfilled; namely, the realisation of the reality of oneness with the One-Good. In sum, then, ʗDOOćü is saying that ʚXOŠO constitutes a sort of reversion to and culmination of the experience of divine presence. As described by ʗDOOćü, this experience exists in and through love that, in culmination, dissolves the soul, and causes it to ascend into union with God. Indeed, this is the only way we can perceive NeoD. Carabine 1997: p. 192. kD\EĪSOLQH 153 E.g., Enn. IV.4.28.56; IV.7.10.19. In favour of the latter interpretation, one may argue that the term waʞan was commonly used by Arabic Neoplatonists in this figurative sense; for example, E\ .LQGĪ ZKR XVHG the term waʞan to refer to “the lasting abode and the resting-place of the pious” (GćUDO-TDUćUZDPDKDOODO-DEUćU); quoted in C. E. Butterworth 1992: p. 49. 154 kD\EĪSP\WUDQVODWLRQ 151 152

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platonic reversion: in terms of the reciprocal love relation, which starts and ends in God. As mentioned before, salvation in this context means receiving and experiencing divine love, understood as the ÒÉÏŢ and ÌšÂÇË of reversion. Clearly, this indicates that the soul is drawn back to the source of its origin in and through the divine love. This argument means, then, that God is not only an object of worship – and, more importantly, an object of desire and love. By the means of “God’s majesty and beauty,” VD\V ʗDOOćü this love gives rise to an “overwhelming, passionate desire” within the “hearts of the faithful,” “encouraging them all the more to embrace the love of God” (aš-šawq al-PXWD]ć\LG IĪ ʯO-TXOŠE \DĠOXEX […] biüDOćOLKL ZD üDPćOLKL). 155 In other words, the natural desire towards self-realisation is God-given in all things as their ultimate destination. Simply speaking, the desire for, as well as the attraction to God, is divinely inspired. Humans can achieve the ultimate goal of self-fulfilment through God’s goodness, or God’s grace. By now, we should be in a position to say that, when speaking of his love relationship with God, ʗDOOćü does not describe an interpersonal love in the common sense of love between two individuals. As we have seen from the aforementioned quotes and poems, ʗDOOćü supports a Neoplatonic conception of divine love, understood as a cosmic principle. A. M. Schimmel was entirely accurate, I believe, when she defined the “essential desire of ʗDOOćMpV*RGrDVDqIRUFH that causes emanation and draws everything back to its source.” 156 This, in a nutshell, is the “passionate RYHUIORZLQJ ORYHr ʗDOOćü calls ʰ,xT. In fact, this way of construing God’s essence has been criticised by normative Islam for its inherent and threatening ideas of intense and “passionate love” between man and God. 157 The 'D\ODPĪ1962: 179b, 87, my translation. Schimmel 1975: p. 138. 157 Schimmel 1975: p. 72, p. 137. ʰ,xT, as applied by ʗDOOćü, attracted both interest and controversy. A primary preoccupation of classicDO ʙŠIĪ writers was ‘passionate desire,’ and whether this sense of ʲ,xT – which literally means passionate love – may appropriately be applied to God in YLHZ RI WKH IDFW WKDW LW KDV QR 4XUʱćnic basis; J. Norment Bell 1979: p. 158; also L. A. Giffen 1971: p. 86. For a discussion of the controversy 155 156

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moving force behind this divine emanation, which Plotinus call eros (ìÉÑË), designates the means and final cause of creation and the soul’s attraction toward the One-Good. 158 According to this account, which recurs, in various guises throughout the history of Neoplatonism, love is the final cause of life, as well as the formal and originating cause. 159 6WULSSHG IURP WKLV IUDPHZRUN ʗDOOćüpV thinking vis-à-vis Divine ʰ,šq would be devoid of any sense both from the philosophical and the theological point of view. As will become clear below, ʗDOOćüpV DGRSWLRQ RI WKH WHUP ʰ,xT, indicating the final stage in the path of self-annihilation, reflects this teaching: God is the highest object of desire, i.e., alPDʰxŠq, which draws creatures toward self-perfection. Love, in this sense becomes something that, like goodness, imbues everything emanating from God. The soul intensely longs for this love. As Proclus makes clear in this passage, this kind of love radiates, reflects, and spreads itself, like “light”: the whole order of love is for all beings the cause of reversion to divine beauty, on the one hand elevating to, uniting with and establishing in it all that is secondary, and on the other fill-

among the mystics concerning the application of ʰ,šq to God, see $EŠpOʗDVVDQDO-'D\ODPĪ.LWćEʰDʞIDO-alif (1962: p. 5). As C. A. Zargar observes (2008: pp. 154–55), “one should not mistakenly assume here that all those opposed to applying the term ʰ,šq to God were simply punctilious literalists who doubted the centrality of love (PDʚDEED  WR WKH 4XUʱćn or Sunnah.” “The fact that “God is the loving and man the capability to love +LPDQGEHORYHGE\+LPLVFOHDUO\HVWDEOLVKHGLQWKHWH[WRIWKH4XUʱćn.” As Schimmel has pointed out (1975: p. 72), the application of the word ʰ,xT to the relation between man and God involves desire and love on God’s behalf, not only on man’s behalf. Those who rejected the application of the non-4XUʱćnic term ʰ,xTdid so because of this “erotic connotation” which “was considered dangerous.” For a brief overview of Islamic attitudes toward ʰ,xT, including orthodox Islamic condemnations of ʰ,šq as a designation for God; see Bell 1979: pp. 162–171. 158 Remes, 2008: p. 159; D. Carabine 1997: p. 192. For a thorough account of Plotinus’ concept of divine love, see A. R. Arnou 1967. 159 Bussanich 1996: p. 61.

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EARLY PHILOSOPHICAL ʙş),60 ing therefrom what lies subsequent to itself and radiating the communications of divine light that proceed from it. 160

As R. M. van den Berg explains, this passage describes the “double movement” of love: from God to the “inferior beings,” then through the love of beings, back to the divine source. 161 Reversion is the natural urge of all beings, and, as such, innate in all creation. It is part of and complementary to God’s self-giving act: the act of self-communication, as can be inferred from the above-quoted passage. In what follows I will give a much more carefully nuanced exposition of ʗDOOćüpVWKHRU\ on Divine ʰ,šq from this Neoplatonic perspective.

,,, D,9,1(ʰ,Š4: 7+(6285&(, 9(+,&/($1'*2$/2) ',9,1(6(/)-&20081,&$7,21 The most comprehensive source now extant on ʗDOOćüpV SKLORVophy on ʰ,xT is the chapter entitled IDʜOIĪʯO-ʰLšq in 'D\ODPĪpVʰ$ʞIDO-alif (1962). In this chapter, 'D\ODPĪ SUHVHQWV ʗDOOćüpV SKLORVRSK\ RQ ʰ,xT, which synthesises Neoplatonic and Aristotelian ideas on the VXEMHFW%DVHGRQWKLVV\QWKHVLVʗDOOćüUHFDVWVKLVWKHRU\RIFUHation in the IDʜOIĪʯO-ʰLšq, on the premise that there is no contradiction between the Qurpćnic doctrine of creation ex nihilo (i.e., creation out of nothing) and the Neoplatonic notion of emanation. He provides an alternative philosophical lens through which we can view ZKDW 1HWWRQ FDOOV WKH qFUHDWLRQ H[ QLKLOR RI WKH 4XUʱćnic Creator Paradigm.” 162 Significantly, in the IDʜO IĪʯO-ʰLšq these two notions – the doctrine of creation ex nihilo and emanation ௅ are shown to be not mutually exclusive. Indeed, as we shall see, the IDʜOIĪʯO-ʰLšq provides an alternative philosophical lens through which we can view Trans. R. M. van den Berg 2001: p. 197. R. M. van den Berg 2001: p. 197. 162 This dispute is closely linked with another recurrent theme in the debate between falsafa and NDOćP: namely, the controversy regarding the eternity of the world. As I. A. Bello points out (1989: 84), debates over the question of the eternity of the world or its ex nihilo creation in time “was an issue from the time Greek philosophy made its main thrust into the domains of Islam in the 9th century.” 160 161

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what Netton calls the “creation ex nihilo RI WKH 4XUʱćnic Creator Paradigm.” 163 Creation, as depicted in the IDʜOIĪʯO-ʰLšq, is an event of divine emanation premised upon a Neoplatonic version of Aristotle’s theory of the self-thinking God. In particular, this version implies a) the absolute creation of the world ex nihilo outside of and prior to time; b) the idea that God created the world as a result of His self-thinking activity. The significance of divine love or ʲ,xT is due to the pivotal cosmic role it plays in the creation-process. ʰ,šq, as it were, is the divine emanation understood as a three partite operation: source, vehicle and content of God’s self-disclosure, i.e., WDüDOOĪ (cf. Ch. II). This WDüDOOĪ is none other than God’s selfdisclosure or God’s self-communication: While God expressing Himself, or disclosing Himself as ʰ,šq, He is creating the world. Indeed, as depicted in our primary source, the IDʜOIĪʯO-ʰLšq, the world’s creation in ʗDOOćüpV FRVPRORJ\ is the absolute and final activity of God’s self-love. This doctrine, in the words of Zargar, “signifies a love that is excessive and – in its original – desirous.” 164 As Schimmel points out, it is also the doctrine, which became ʗDOOćüpV qWUDGHPDUNr DPRQJ KLV ʙŠIĪ SHHUV. 165 More importantly, this doctrine reveals an affiliation that goes back to ancient philosRSK\ DFFRUGLQJ WR 'D\ODPĪ 166 As a matter of fact, in the framework of this doctrine: Netton 2013: p. 122. Zargar 2008: p. 155. 165 Schimmel 1975: p. 72. 166 ,QWHUHVWLQJO\0DVVLJQRQGRHVQRWFRQWHVWWKHYLHZWKDWʗDOOćüpV theory of divine love is modelled on a number of ancient accounts, going back to early Greek thinkers. In his article from 1950 (p. 228), Massignon makHV WKH IROORZLQJ SRLQWV UHJDUGLQJ WKH VLJQLILFDQFH RI ʗDOOćüpV QRWLRQ of Divine ʰ,xT: (1) ʗDOOćüpV XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI 'LYLQH ʰ,xT is philosophical and can easily be derived from the metaphysical content of his ideas on divine love ʗDOOćüpVFRQFHSWLRQRI divine love can be considered as an important precursor of a tradition, which dominated the thought of cerWDLQʙŠIĪVRIWKHWHQWKDQGHOHYHQWKFHQWXU\'D\ODPĪpVʰ$ʞIDO-alif stands in this same tradition, according to Massignon. It is important to note, however, that Massignon does not engage in a discussion of the philosophical content of the IDʜOIĪʯO-ʰLšq. 163 164

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EARLY PHILOSOPHICAL ʙş),60 divine love is a pre-eternal principle from which everything that exists proceeds throughout all levels of reality, including the lower as well as higher levels of intelligibility and being, divine as well as natural. al-PDʚDEEDDO-ODWĪKL\DIĪKDʨćDO-ʰćODPNXOOXKć PLQWDʯʤĪUćWWLONDDOmaʚabba al-aʜOL\\D >f@ LQʜDGDUD PLQKć üDPĪʰ Pć fĪ ʯO-ʰDZćlim, asVXIOL\\DPLQKć ZDʯO-ʰLOZL\\DDO-ilćKL\\DPLQKć ZDʯO-ʞDEĪʰL\\D. 167

In the AP, we find another variant of this typical Neoplatonic doctrine describing “love in the upper world” as the “emanating source of all kinds of life”: “fa in-QDPć DO-ʰćlam al-DʰOć fa in-namć huwa PDʚDEED IDTDʞ ZD ʚD\ćW WDQEDʤ PLQKć NXOOX ʚD\ćW” 168 As shown by S. .ʰ$ʞIDO-alif 1962: 49b-50a, p. 25, my translation. With this definition of divine love in mind, 'D\ODPĪ DUJXHV that ʗDOOćü KDG EHHQ WKH great SLRQHHUDPRQJWKHHDUOLHVWʙŠIĪxD\ʤVDGRSWLQJD notion of ʰ,xT so strikingly reminiscent of the “ancient sages” (51a, p. 25: TćUDEDTDZOXKXDODZćʯLOPLQ-ʯOʚXNDPćʯ). Among these ancients, 'D\ODPĪ mentions the PreSocratic philosophers Empedocles and Heraclitus. As various scholars have pointed out, this way of introducing Neoplatonic ideas under the disguise of the wisdom of ancient philosophers was a very common feature in medieval Arabic “gnomologia and doxographies”; see D. Gutas 1994: pp. 4957–58; also G. Stamatellos2012: p. 122; and C. Baffioni 2010: vol. 1, p. 1073. Given this praxis, which was typical of and pertaining to $UDE DXWKRUV LQ WKH 0LGGOH $JHV LW LV QR VXUSULVH WKDW 'D\ODPĪ IDOVHO\ ascribes the Neoplatonic definition of Divine ʰ,šq to Heraclitus and Empedocles. This pseudo Empedoclean tradition – falsely ascribed “to the Greek philosopher Empedocles” (S. Pessin 2004: p. 42) – maintained “the universe originated from a constant struggle between the contrary cosmic principles of Love and Strife” (L. Morgan 1999: p. 95). However, as our analysis of the IDʜOIĪʯO-ʰLšq will show, there is no trace of this Ps. EmpedoFOHDQ GRFWULQH LQ ʗDOOćü 1HLWKHU LV WKHUH DQ\ WUDFH ZKDWVRHYHU RI WKH “Neoplatonism represented by the Ps.-Empedocles” in early Arabic doxographies. As I will show in more detail below based on the IDʜO IĪʯO-ʰLšq, ʗDOOćüpVdepiction of the origin of the world combines cosmological and philosophical notions that originate in Neoplatonic and Aristotelian philosophy. For interesting discussions of the Ps. Empedoclean tradition, see U. Rudolph (1989: p. 37). 168 ThA VIII, [B 99 line 7], my translation. 167

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Pessin, this Neoplatonic notion of ʰ,xT has the meaning of a “downward-directed” creation-process, rooted in “God’s own prebeing Essence.” 169 Following Pessin’s interpretation of Neoplatonic creation in terms of “God’s own Desire-To-Be,” 170 I perceive ʗDOOćüpV QRWLRQ RI GLYLQH ORYH DV qDQ HWHUQDOO\ SXOVLQJ IORZ >…] that finds its flowing source in the Divine Himself or, at the very least, in God’s first creation – a cosmic intellectual conduit through which God breathes forth reality.” 171 Strictly speaking, the key assumption underlying this perception deals with the origin of the world in terms of a divine desire, functioning primarily to transmit goodness, light and truth from the higher realms to the lower ones. ʗDOOćüpVGRFWULQHRI'LYLQHʰ,xT consists of several cosmological and philosophical elements. Taken together, these elements constitute an account of divine love as a cosmic force that accompanies the downward movement of causation, the outpouring of perfect goodness, unbounded light and truth, triggered by God’s loving self-contemplation. As we shall see in more detail below, this self-contemplation is a special kind of Neoplatonic ¿¼ÑÉţ¸ marked by the outpouring of desire, expressed through divine selfcommunication or self-disclosure. I shall argue that the IDʜOIĪʯO-ʰLšq depicts this outpouring Divine ʰ,xT in a manner that combines features of the Neoplatonic and Aristotelian Godhead without running counteUWRWKH4XUʱćnic doctrine of creation ex nihilo. My reading of the IDʜO IĪʯO-ʰLšq examines ʗDOOćüpV QRWLRQ RI ʰ,xT against the background of the Neoplatonising version of the Aristotelian universe; that is to say, in a cosmological framework within which Neoplatonic emanation takes place due to God’s self-thinking. The cosmological and philosophical elements RIʗDOOćüpVWKeory of creation combine God’s efficient causality with His final causality, which means that Divine ʰ,xT encompasses God’s “loving self-contemplation,” “God’s Desire-to-Be,” as well as “God’s selfdisclosure.” From this perspective, the concept ʰ,xT becomes the “site of the nerve system” RI ʗDOOćüpV HQWLUH FRVPRORJ\ 2QH FDQ therefore conceive each element within the framework of this cosPessin 2013: p. 71, p. 67. Pessin 2013: p. 93. 171 S. Pessin 2013: p. 166. 169 170

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mology as performing the function of what Ian R. Netton in another context calls “a theologeme.” 172 According to Netton’s semiotic definition, a theologeme is a “basic unit of theological discourse which can also function as a sign” because it stands for something else, a “thing or event” for example. 173 Divine ʰ,xT is a theologeme in the sense that it refers to the many different forms in which God’s-Desire-to-Be can be expressed and perceived. Thus, we could say, for example, that the theologeme of Divine ʰ,xT implies emanation and divine self-communication as two moments of God’s Desire-to-Be. 7KH ZD\ LQ ZKLFK ʗDOOćü XVHV WKH FRQFHSW RI ʰ,xT as a theologeme combining the various cosmological and philosophical elements of his theory of creation pose a challenge of translation. This is the reason why I choose to leave the term ʰ,xTuntranslated. The existent translations of this philosophical ʙŠIĪFRQFHSWinto, for example, French or English, have proven to be inadequate in capturLQJ ʗDOOćüpV FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQ RI WKH WHRORJHPH ʰ,xT. The very translations previously employed tend to infer that the term means either “passionate” or “dynamic,” as a way of indicating the reciprocity of ‘desire’ between the human soul and God. 174 Massignon’s (cf. 1950) translation of ʰ,xT as a divine “l’essentiel désir” (i.e., essential desire) certainly picks up on the idea of ʰ,xT as “God’s Desire to-Be.” Yet, it fails in capturing the emanative impulse in ʗDOOćüpVWKHRU\RI'LYLQHʰ,xT. Perhaps Annemarie Schimmel is one of the few scholars that have proposed an interpretation of ʲ,xT which so far has come closer to the Neoplatonic reading I am proposing here. Through the expression “passionate overflowing,” Schimmel seems to capture the emanative impulse of the concept of ʰ,xT, interpreting the latter as a cosmic force that “causes emanation and draws everything back to its source.” 175 Moreover, leaving the concept of ʰ,xT untranslated means inWHUSUHWLQJʗDOOćüpVFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRIWKLVFRQFHSWDVDWKHRlogeNetton 2013: p. 79. Netton 2013: pp. 78–79 174 E.g., E. Geoffroy 2010: p. 70; Schimmel 1975: p. 137; Massignon, PhM1: pp. 340–43, p. 523 fn. 64; PhM2: p. 412; PhM3: pp. pp. 102–104. 175 Schimmel 1975: p. 72, p. 138. 172 173

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me in terms of the Plotinian ìÉÑË: i.e., as an originating and creative force that generates and attracts all life. By adopting this translaWLRQ,DPLPSO\LQJWKDW3ORWLQXVDQGʗDOOćüVKDUHGDQidentical view regarding divine love and its function in the process of cosmic creation. They simply are in agreement vis-á-vis a number of fundamental points that, taken together, make up a distinct and clearly recognisable theory of creation. Sadly, the significance of this Neoplatonised theory of creation in ʗDOOćüpV WKRXJKW KDV EHHQ RYHrlooked or at least not fully appreciated in modern scholarship. To remedy this lack of appreciation, I shall explain in more detail how this Neoplatonised theory of creation works in the context of the IDʜOIĪʯO-ʰLšq. ,,, 7H[WLQFRQWH[WWKHIDʛOIĪʯO-ʰLšq J. C. Vadet’s (1962) Arabic critical edition of the IDʜOIĪʯO-ʰLšq, which I follow here, consists of seven numbered paragraphs: 92 (51b–c); 94 (52a–b); 95 (53a); 96 (53b–54a); 97 (54a–b); 98 (54b–55a); 99 (55b). In terms of translation, I have undertaken a modified version of H. Mason’s English translation. 176 The main reason for not adopting fully Mason’s English translation is that it is a second-hand translation of Massignon’s French translation, not of the original Arabic text. 177 Furthermore, both R. A. Nicholson’s 178 and E. Schroeder’s 179 abridged translations have been helpful. Although I consider Mason’s English translation useful, I find it a bit awkward when compared to the Arabic original. Therefore, I have found it inadvisable to use it without modifications. My translation is carried out with the aim of sticking to the content and the style of the Arabic original, in an attempt to avoid the awkwardness that Mason’s translation sometimes suffers from. Therefore, I have taken the liberty of both rephrasing and paraphrasing Mason’s translation, sometimes with bracketed commentaries, instead of referring to additional notes that might interrupt the reading of the text. PhM3: pp. 102–4. Massignon 1950: pp. 232–34. 178 Nicholson 1963: p. 80. 179 Schroeder 1955: p. 532. 176 177

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,,,*RGpVVHOI-LGHQWLFDOVROLWXGH Parag. 92 (51b–c) […] in His eternal and immutable identity, God is One, wholly undifferentiated and without distinction, abiding in the solitude of His own unity (ZćʚLG QDIVXKX EL-QDIVLKĪ), thoroughly, completely, and without anything being mentioned […] He was gazing at Himself; contemplating the splendour of His Essence by Himself; holding an ineffable discourse with Himself, without manifestation […] Knowledge, Power, Love, ʰ,šq, Wisdom, Immensity, Beauty, Glory, was in contemplation, [because] the perfect goodness of the Most High, as well as mercy, holiness […] and all of the attributes; all of that was merely a Form in His Essence, and this Form was His Essence. >f@ al-ʙDTT IĪ Pć ODP \D]DO ZćʚLG QDIVXK ELQDIVLK ZD Oć xD\ʯ PDʨNŠU >f@ )D-NćQD QćʲLU LOć QDIVLKL IĪ azalihi bi-QDIVLKL IL ʯO-üamĪʰ ZD Oć ʲXKŠU :DüDPĪʰPć \XʰUDIPLQʯO-ʰLOPZDʯO-TXGUDZDʯOPDʚDEEDZDʯO-ʰLšTZDʯO-ʚLNPDZDʯO-ʰDʲDPDZDʯOüamćOZDʯO-üalćl wa sćʯLUPć \ŠʜDIELKLWDʰćlć min ar-UXʯIDZDDU-UDʚPDZDʯO-ʰDʲDPDZDʯO-TXGVZDʯOarwćʚZDVćʯLUDʜ-ʜLIćWʜŠUDIĪʨćWLKKL\DʨćWXK This cited passage describes the mystery of God’s solitude: In the solitude of His own unity, God’s main activity is not directed towards anything but Himself, like Aristotle’s unmoved mover. As depicted here, this inward activity represents a significant moment in the process we have been examining in the preceding chapter: i.e., the internal process of divine ¿¼ÑÉţ¸. 180 In fact, the English term FRQWHPSODWLRQ, commonly used in the Neoplatonic context to translate the Greek ¿¼ÑÉţ¸, is entirely appropriate to capture the kind of self-directed thinking at play here. From a standard Neoplatonic standpoint, God’s self-thinking activity is not a contemplative act For a discussion of this topic in Plotinus, see Remes 2008: p. 50 and p. 70; see also J. Bussanich 1987. 180

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directed towards an external object. In this framework, therefore, “God cannot be perceived as not ‘doing’ anything,” because “the divine creativity bears upon the very essence of the divine being itself.” 181 This means that God is the ÒÉÏŢ of motion towards a goal that ‘acts’ for an internal end, i.e., His own Essence. In other words, God’s self-intellection is not posterior to His essence, but rather identical with a teleological activity inherent in the very nature of God. 182 ʗDOOćüpV SX]]OLQJ VWDWHPHQW DW WKH HQG RI SDVVDJH 51b, i.e., God “was gazing at Himself; contemplating the splendour of His Essence by Himself” (QćʲLU LOć QDIVLKL […] bi-nafsihi), resonates with the Aristotelian notion of the Prime Mover as “a selfthinking God (ÅĠ¾ÊÀË ÅÇüʼÑË).” 183 The very same notion also recurs in the AP; e.g., ThA X.185–8, 191, [B 162]; also III.47–9 [B 51–2]: “When He acts, he only gazes at Himself, and thus performs His act all at once.” 184 In this notion, we find grounds for explaining why God’s self-contemplation is above time; above the concept of existence and all positive predication in ʗDOOćüpVVSHFLILFVHQVHRI the divine nature as eternal, immutable, thinking Itself “in an ineffable discourse.” 185 Against this background of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic ideas, the argument put forward by ʗDOOćüLQEPD\ be interpreted along the lines of Plotinus’ doctrine concerning God as pure, eternally enjoying perfect self-vision: 186 “[the One] … all things belong to it and are in it and with it; it is completely self-discerning; life is in it and all things are in it, and its thinking of itself is itself, and exists by a kind of immediate self-consciousness in everlasting rest.”

Quoted in P. Tzamalikos 2006: p. 148. In Aristotle’s ontology, says S. J. Grenz (2005: p. 32), “this connection lends an emphasis on what might be termed “internal finality.” 183 Quoted in Stamatellos 2007: p. 60; Meta XII, 7: 1072b 19–21; 1074b34. 184 Quoted in Adamson 2002: 133. Also, DS 105–7, [B 174]. 185 Also e.g., Meta. XII 7, where Aristotle denotes the divine being as “[…] always outside the flow of time;” quoted in L. Elders 1990: p. 177. 186 Enn. V.4.2.15–18; see also VI.8.16.19–21; Bussanich 1988: p. 42. 181 182

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In this framework, God engenders His thoughts in the process of thinking. This means that His thoughts are DSULRUL contained in the divine intellect: they are immutable and, by implication, eternal in the mind of God, in the sense in which Forms are in the mind of Plato’s Demiurge. 187 In Greek philosophy, particularly that of Plato and Aristotle, the significance of this emphasis on the thoughts as eternal archetypes in the divine intellect cannot be overstated enough. There is, however, one important issue that we must address concerning the nature of God’s self-thinking as conceived respectively by Aristotle and Plotinus. In an Aristotelian context, “God thinks himself, but certainly not by thinking Platonic Forms.” 188 As L. P. Gerson explains, for Aristotle, “God’s essence or ư੝ƴƠƢLVLGHQWLFDOZLWKKLVWKLQNLQJrQRWDSURSHUW\DGGHGWRLWDccidentally; and so “when he thinks, he thinks himself.” 189 Plotinus accepts this Aristotelian view but with one very important addition. For him, “thinking is essentially self-thinking or, equivalently, thinking the Forms.” 190 The Forms cannot possibly exist independently of God’s mind. Because God is intrinsically active, and His activity is self-directed, He has, strictly speaking, “all Forms in it ‘indistinctly’.” 191 7KLVLVZKDWʗDOOćüPHDQs when he says that, in the state of eternal self-contemplation, God embraces, and therefore is identical with, each of His attributes: “üDPĪʰPć \XʰUDIPLQʯOʰLOP ZDʯ O-TXGUD ZD ʯO- PDʚDEED ZD ʯO-ʰLšq […] ZD VćʯLU Pć \ŠʜDI ELKL WDʰćlć.” 192 See G. Reale 1990: pp. 113–14. Gerson 2012: p. 46. 189 Gerson 2006: p. 198. 190 Gerson 2012: p. 46. 191 V.3.15.31 “Äü »À¸Á¼ÁÉÀÄñŸ;” Gerson 2012: p. 28. With respect to this doctrine, Gerson also refers to Enn. V.2.1.1; V.4.2.17; VI.7.32.14; and VI.8.21.24–5; see also Schroeder 1992: p. 107. E.g., ThA III.49, [B 52, 1]. 192 By insisting that the attributes are identical with God’ essence, ʗDOOćüUHLWHUDWHVWKH0XʲWD]LOLWHSRVLWLRQWKDW“the ʜLIćW or attributes are not real, distinct entities in God” (Adamson 2002: p. 166). Given this context, DQGVXSSRVLQJWKDWʗDOOćüLVVLJQDOLQJKLVHQWU\LQWRWKHGHEDWHRYHUWKH 187 188

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:KDWGRHVʗDOOćü mean when he states that the attributes of *RGDUHD)RUPLQ+LV(VVHQFHqʛŠUDIĪʪćWLKKL\DʪćWXKr "$ULVWotle’s self-thinking God and the Neoplatonic “divine Intellect thinking the Forms in itself” 193 seem to provide the most plausible explanatory framework in comparison to any other theological docWULQH,IVRWKHQZHKDYHKHUHDQLQGLFDWLRQWKDWʗDOOćüFRQVWUXHV the divine attributes in the same manner T. Aquinas construes them: that is, as “perfections” that “pre-exist in God unitedly and simply.” 194 In Plotinian terms, this would mean that due to the attributes’ primordial nature, they are not additional to God’s essence; rather they can be seen as “the contents of the selfintellection of the first divinity, the very nature of the first god himself.” 195 Thus, according WR ʗDOOćü “knowledge,” “power,” “love,” qʲLšq,” “wisdom,” “immensity,” “beauty,” “glory,” “goodness,” etc., are inseparable from and identical with God. They are also H[HPSODU\FDXVHVFRPSDUDEOHWRWKRVHZKLFK,EQʲ$UDEĪ later identifies as the archetypes or “the forms of the entire cosmos.” 196 This could mean that God’s self-contemplation is identical with Him being all-powerful, all knowing, self-loving-love, etc. If correct, this interpretation provides further evidence for the argument put forZDUGLQ&KDSWHU,QDPHO\WKDWIRUʗDOOćüWKHDWWULEXWHVqDSSOLHGWR

divine attributes, this passage in the IDʜOIĪʯO-ʰLšq seems to be addressing this iQKHUHQW FRPSRQHQW ZLWKLQ WKH WUDGLWLRQ RI 0XʲWD]LOLVP DV ZHOO DV WKRVH (Neoplatonising) theologies of the period that emphasized divine simplicity. In fact, KindĪ could be regarded as the most influential starting point for this Neoplatonising tendency towards the end of the 9th century in NDOćP circles in Arabic philosophy; see: A. L. Ivry’s introduction, 1974: pp. 22–RQWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRI.LQGĪpVUROHLQHDUOLHU NDOćP discussions, see R. Walzer 1962: esp. pp. 176–186. 193 Stamatellos 2012: p. 60. 194 Quoted in M. B. Adam 2014: p. 118. 195 J. P. Kenney 2010: p. 70. 196 Chittick 1989: p. 40. For a thorough account of this Neoplatonic way of conceiving the divine attributes, see R. M. Jones 1926 and A.N.M. Rich 1954.

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God, originate in the multitude of His actions, not in a plurality existing in His essence.” 197 In sum, then, this (Plotinian) way of construing the (Platonic) Forms within the mind of Aristotle’s self-thinking God becomes a PHGLXPIRUDVVHUWLQJWKHUDUHO\QRWLFHGSRLQWWKDWLQʗDOOćü*RG WKLQNVq+LVRZQWKRXJKWVrLQFOXGLQJXOWLPDWHO\WKH)RUPRIʲ,šq, that exists primordially in His mind. In this context, where God’s creative actions are seens as emanations, the issue is not so much, whether or not the ʜLIćW are accidental or essential to God’s ʨćW. Rather, when speaking of the ʜLIćW, ʗDOOćüKDVLQPLQGQRWKLQJEXWWKH actions emanating from God’s ʨćW. This point, which lends further support to the Neoplatonic view of God as a “pure being” (DQQL\\D faqat  LV FRUROODU\ WR DQRWKHU 3ORWLQLDQ FRQFHSWLRQ ZKLFK ʗDOOćü construes in the next paragraph; that is, the conception of the ʜLIćW as “contents” of – and thereby as identical with – the divine mind. 198 ,,,*RGpVHWHUQDODFWRIVHOI-LQWHOOHFWLRQDVVHOI-GHVLUH Parag. 94 (52a–b) And God turned, with this Perfection of His, toward that which was in Him of the attribute of ʰ,šq; and this attribute was a Form, in His Essence, which was His Essence. Just like you, if you saw something beautiful in your essence, and if you rejoiced over one thing in your essence. God remained with this attribute (of ʰ,šq) for a long time, the duration of which we are not able to comprehend. This is due to the fact that one year of His years, even if the people of the heavens and the two earths were assembled to figure out of its duration according to their calculation (in the physical world), they would not succeed in doing so; for we are dealing here with the preeternal existence. This pre-eternal existence is 197 198

Quoted in J. F. Anderson 2013: p. 40. S. Byers 2015: p. 180.

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ruled, measured, and ordered in accordance with a pre-eternal Ideal, and which the calculation of a contingent being cannot grasp. If someone spent an indefinite period of time, searching for the meaning of this attribute (of ʰ,šq), he would reach neither the point where he could understand it nor the point where he could not understand it, […]. fa-DTEDODWDʰćlć PLQʯO-NDPćOʰDOć mć fĪKLPLQʜLIDW al-ʯLšq, wa hćʨLKL Dʜ-ʜLID ʜŠUD IĪ ʨćWLKL KL\D ʨćWXK :D KXZD ND-LVWLʚVćQLN Dx-xD\ʯ PLQ ʨćWLN ZD IDUDʚLN EL-xD\ʯ PLQ ʨćWLN )D-NćQD ʰDOć hćʨLK DʜʜLID DO-PXGGD Dʞ-ʞDZĪOD DO-ODWĪ Oć \ŠTDI ʰDOć ʞŠO PXGGDWLKć ZD-ʨćOLN DQ-na as-sana al-ZćʚLGD PLQ VLQĪK ODZ LüWDPDʰD DKO DO-samćwćW ZD ʯO-DUʘD\Q DQ \DʰULIŠ miqdćrahć ʰDOć mć \XʰUDIDO-ʚLVćEOD-ʰDüizŠ li-annahć awqćʞ D]DOL\\D Oć \Xʚćʞ EL-Kć LO-Oć EL ʯOD]DOL\\DZD-lć \DGELWXKć ʚLVćEDO-ʚDGDʤ. Fa law mutalammiʚ talammaʚ NDP PDNDʤ PXTELODQ ʰDOć hćʨihi aʜ-ʜifa li-PDʰQć bi-PDʰQć la-mć ʚaʜal mimPć\XʰUDIZDPLP-mć lć \XʰUDI>f@. In this paragraph, we learn more of God’s internal life, namely, how by a single movement He knows Himself in all His infinite perfection and how this divine self-apprehension leads to a timeless act of self-desire. The implication of this position suggests that ʰ,xT is the attribute or Form (ʜŠUD) that most fully expresses God’s eternal self-intellection. As already indicated above, similar approximations of this idea are found both in the metaphysical paradigm of Aristotle’s Self-Thinking-Thought and in the Neoplatonic “paradigm of Self-Desiring-Desire,” where “the One is simultaneously the loved one and love.” 199 It is noteworthy that, according to ʗDOOćüGHVLUHEHORQJVWRWKHHVVHQFHRI*RGLHWR WKHUHDOPRI God’s eternal self-contemplation. As the primary act of selfcontemplation, this desire is God-born and God-directed: ʜŠUD IĪ Quoted in R. Kearney 2001: p. 15; e.g., Enn. VI.8.15.1–8; Bussanich 1996: p. 61. 199

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ʨćWLK KL\D ʨćWXK. This way of construing the primordial state in which there is no distinctions in God seems to have been widespread among both Arab philosophers and theologians in the ninth-century. The doxography of Ps.-Ammonius, which, according to H. Daiber (1994) belongs to the genre ‘Scheindoxographien,’ “in which Neoplatonising doctrines are placed in the mouth, mainly, of Pre-Socratic philosophers,” 200 provides evidence of this fact. Indeed, one passage, worthy of citation from this doxography neatly summarises what ʗDOOćü VD\V LQ D, both in terms of technical terminology and theological tone: For before He originated, He was Himself alone (KXZD IDTDʞ), and all the attributes were in His being Himself (IĪ KXZD Kuwa). 201 Quoted in J. Mansfeld and D. T. Runia 1997: vol. 1, p. 153 n.101. For a discussion of this doxographical genre and its significant role in the emergence of syncretistic tendencies in Arabic philosophy, see H. Daiber 1994. Arabic doxographies such as the Ps.-Ammonius are related generically to the so-called ‘wisdom literature’ called ‘gnomologia.’ D. Gutas 1975. 201 The English translation of this quote is taken from Adamson 2002, p. 156. As C. D’Ancona notes (2006: p. 385), according to U. Rudolph (1989), who produced the critical edition the Arabic doxography of ps.-Ammonius, the latter collection of extracts “exhibits in its linguistic and doctrinal adaptations the hall mark of the philosophic and religious ideas held in the ‘circle of al-.LQGĪpr,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHSV-Ammonius is inter-textually linked to the known complex of reworked Proclus translations in Arabic, the Plotinian ps. Th. of Arist, as well as other Neoplatonic works, which emerged in Arabic translation in the same philosophical milieu with which ʗDOOćüKDGFRQWDFWqDIWHUKLVEUHDNZLWKWKH6XILVr(Ph, p. 101; Mason 2013: p. 45)7KLVFRPELQHGZLWKWKHIDFWWKDWʗDOOćü lived in a social milieu remarkably exposed to “the cultural renaissance of his time” (Ph), suggests that ʗDOOćü had some kind of contact, or at least was familiar with, the philosophical ideas of the so-called KindĪ-circle. The idea exposed here in the IDʜOIĪʯO-ʰLšq of a God, existing prior to all creation as a self-contemplating being, inhering within Himself all of the ideas in the Neoplatonic way, is the product of this developing intellectual milieu in which similar cosmological ideas emerged. So, at least in this regard, the 200

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,QʗDOOćüpVPLQG*RGpVVHOI-identity in this sense means that God’s act of self-desire is “timeless” and, by implication, therefore, immeasurable; that is, something which, in his words, “we are not able to comprehend.” 202 7KHDUJXPHQWʗDOOćüEHJLQVWRVNHWFKRXW in 52b in support of this view, which, at least implicitly, takes as its starting point the Platonic disjunction of timeless eternity and temporal duration seems to reflect the fundamental Plotinian thesis in Enn. III.7, namely, “that eternity (¸ĊŪÅ) and time (ÏÉĠÅÇË) are two different natures.” 203 In the AP, perhaps the best textual evidence in support of this thesis is found in ThA; e.g., in §56–58 [B 27–28, 16–20], where the distinction between two basic types of action is outlined: one relating to the sensible realm and implying temporal duration; and another relating to God’s absolute and primordial act implying “non-durational eternity.” 204 These primordial aspects of ERWK GLYLQH ƩƦƺƲƠƢ DQG WKH activity of self-desire 205 are implied in ʗDOOćüpVRZQFKDUDFWHULVDWLRQRI*RGpVVHOI-contemplation. WKHRORJ\RIWKH.LQGĪ-circle seems likely to have had an important, though mainly indirect, influence on ʗDOOćüpV thought. If this hypothesis is correct, this resemblance in ideas uncovers another important link between ʗDOOćü DQG WKH falsafa tradition, which sought, among other things, to harmonise the Islamic conception of divine creation with the cosmological principles and ideas of the Greeks2QWKH.LQGĪFLUFOHPRUHJHQHUDOO\ see Endress 1997: pp. 3–42. For more on the relationship between on the one hand, ps.-Ammonius, and, on the other hand, the AP and the Proclus Arabus, see: G. Endress, Proclus Arabus 1973, pp. 185–93. 202 Similarly, “Aristotle thought that something was timeless if (i) it was not measured by time, and (ii) it was not affected by time or ‫ދ‬contained‫ ތ‬by time;” quoted in A. Padgett 2000: p. 126; also, Gerson 2012: p. 232. 203 Stamatellos 2012: pp. 93. 204 Quoted in Stamatellos 2012: p 220. As Adamson observes (2006: 101), “both the Arabic Plotinus and the Arabic Proclus associate eternity with immaterial entities that transcend […] our physical world.” On the other hand, however, “both of these texts at least sometimes say that God Himself is EH\RQG eternity.” 205 For Plotinus, these primordial aspects of divine ¿¼ÑÉţ¸ and the activity of self-desire are “self-directed”: “÷ ëŚɺ¼À¸ ÷ ÈÉġË ¸ĤÌĠÅ:

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,,,*RGpVVHOI-GHVLUHDVDPHDQVRI+LVVHOIFRPPXQLFDWLRQ Parag. 95(53a) God turned (then) to the thought of ʰ,šq, out of a totality of Discourse; He talked to Himself about it (i.e., the thought of ʰ,šq); then He greeted it with a perfect greeting […] If the people of this world wrote with the trees of the ground and the water of the ocean, they would not reach the ultimate end of what He confided to it and told it; [because] this had all happened through, from, in, and to God Himself. Fa-DTEDODʰDOć PDʰQć al-ʰLšT>f@ZD-ʢćʞDEQDIVDK ʰDQKXEL-üamĪʰDO-ʢLʞćEʤXP-PDʚćGDʤDKEL-üDPĪʰDOPXʚDGDʤDʤXP-PDʚD\\ćKEL-NDPćODW-WDʚL\\D>f@ :DODZNDWDEDDKOXʯO-DUʘEL-xDüDUDO-DUʘEL-PćʯDOEDʚU ODP \DEOXĠŠ ć-ʢLUL\\DW Pć QćüćK ZD-ʢćʞDEDK NXOOXʨćOLNPLQʨćWLKIĪʨćWLKOL-ʨćWLK In this passage, we should note the postulation of two principles: first, that God’s self-desire is expressed in and through selfcommunication; and secondly, that this desire is everlasting, immutable, and inherent to God’s self-communication. To put it another way, self-desire is the essential activity of self-thinking or selfcontemplation. As an act belonging to the realm of God’s internal self-contemplation, this self-desire is absolutely indiscernible. It is on this account that ʰ,xT is the archetypal form of divine thinking, the very compass of the internal ¿¼ÑÉţ¸ of God, and thereby God’s most essential aspect. As Plotinus says in a parallel passage, 206 it is the primordial moment where the One is “borne to his own interior, as it were well pleased with himself.” In this primordial moment, there is no real otherness. In addition, as the closing statement indicates, it is a moment of divine solitude in which God’s desire operates as a threefold process: that is, as an effective, forVI.8.16.28”; quoted in Bussanich 1988: p. 64; D. Bradshaw 2004: p. 92; Gerson 2012: p. 259. 206 Enn. VI.8.16.12–13.

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mal, and final cause (“through, from, in, and to God Himself”/ NXOOXʨćOLNPLQʨćWLKIĪʨćWLKOL-ʨćWLK). 207 What follows down to 54b in paragraph 96 and 97, serves to establish this principle in two different but related steps: first, by emphasising that God’s self-desire and self-thinking are simultaneous moments within an everlasting activity (53b-54a): i.e., the ineffable and inherently self-directed activity of God’s self-communication; secondly (54a-b), by highlighting that the true essential content of all things exist as archetypes contained, as it were, within God’s mind. Parag. 96 (53b–54a) Then, desiring to behold that Love in aloneness [i.e., without otherness and duality], He revealed Himself to Himself alone, in the way that was explained in the first paragraph, (that is to say), by means of conversation and discourse […] In order for that to happen, He turned, out of ʰ,šq, total self-giving, and unselfish generosity toward Himself, for in the Essence of God ʰ,šq is the Essence of His Essence. As infinite Essence, ʰ,šq has attributes that draw together numerous thoughts. And God turned by one of the attributes of ʰ,šq to another of its attributes, discoursed with it, just as we said previously, by the attributes of ʰ,šq, with the attributes of ʰ,šq. And He repeated this number of times. ʣXP-PD DTEDO ʰDOć PDʰQć PLQ PDʰćnĪh, fa-aqbal ʰDOD\KPLQʯO-PDʚDEEDʰDOć al-infirćG:DNćna min iqbćOLKʰDOD\KPLʤODO-ODʨĪxXULʚILʯOEćb al-awwal min As D. Bradshaw points out (2004: p. 170), “this identification had been upheld in a modified form by Plotinus, who managed to reconcile it with the unknowability of the One by insisting on the non-discursive character of the One’s internal act.” As A. C. Lloyd points out (1969: p. 263), according to Plotinus, therefore, this type of thinking “involves no distinction between the thinker or the thinking on one side and the object of his thinking or the thought on the other.” 207

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ʯO-PXʚćGDʤD ZD ʯO-PXʢćʞDED >f@ ʣXP-ma aqbal ʰDOD\KPLQʜLIDWDO-ʰLšTʰDOć NXOOL\DWʜLIDWDO-ʰLšq. FaʨćN DQ-na al-ʰLšq fĪ ʨćWLK ODKX ʜLIćW WDüPDʰ PDʰćnĪ NDʤĪUD )D-DTEDO PLQ ʜLID PLQ ʜLIćW DO-ʰLšT ʰDOć ʜLID PLQʜLIćtih, fa-NćQPLQDO-PXʢćʞDEDZDʯO-PXʚćGDʤD ND-PćʨDNDUQćKD-ʨćPLQTDEOPLQʜLIćWDO-ʰLšTʰDOć ʜLIćWDO-ʰLšq. Ha-NDʨćNDUUDUDWDNUĪUNDʤĪU. Parag. 97 (54a–b) Then He gazed at another one of His attributes, which was treated in the same way, until He had turned to every attribute, and by every attribute to every attribute, and turned with this perfection of His to the totality of these attributes, in a way that would take too long to explain, because it is indescribable, even unknowable vis-à-vis His pre-eternity, His Perfection, His Solitude, and His Will […]. ʣXP-PD QDʲDUD LOć ʜLID XʢUć PLQ ʜLIćWLK ID-NćQ VDEĪOXKć ʨćOLN ʚDW-Wć DTEDO ʰDOć PLQ NXOO ʜLID ʰDOć NXOO ʜLID ZD-min al-NDPćO ʰDOć üamĪʰ Dʜ-ʜLIćW PLPPć\DʞŠOʨLNUXK:DKD-NDʨćPć-Oć\ŠʜDIʰDOć azDOL\\DWLK ZD-NDPćlih wa-infirćdih wa-maxĪʯDWLK >f@. ,,,7KHSURFHVVLRQRI,QWHOOHFWGXHWR*RGpVUDGLDWLRQ Parag. 98 (54b–55a) Then, desiring to project out of Himself, to behold that love-in-aloneness, He caused a Form to arise from non-existence which is His Form and His Essence. For when God the Most High turns to something and causes a Form to appear in it and of it, He makes a Form arise and endows that Form with all His attributes such as knowledge, power, movement, will, and all of His attributes. The Most High, having thus radiated, made a Person (ŠDʢV) arise “Huwa huwa”[…] He gazed at it […] Then He greeted it […] Then He spoke to it […] Then He complimented it for its good appearance […]. Then He rejoiced in it in a view of its certain accomplishment, of its

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fullness, and of the glory of God displayed in it […]. Fa-DUćGD $OOćK DQ \DUć KćʨLKL Dʜ-ʜLID PLQ ʯO-ʰLšq ʰDOć- ʯO-infirćd nćʲLULOD\KćPXʢćWLEODKć)DDTEDO ʰDOć ʯO-azal fa-abdć ʜŠUDKL\DʜŠUDWXKZDʨćWXKZD ʯO-AllćK WDʰćlć LʨD DTEDOD ʰDOć šD\ʯ ID-DʲKDU IĪK PLQKʜŠUDDEGćʜŠUDZDDEGćILʯOʜŠUDDO-ʰLOPZDʯOqudra wa ’l-ʚDUDNDZDʯO-irćda wa-sćʯLUʜLIćWLK)Dlam-PćWDüDOOćWDʰćlć abdć šDʢV>f@ID-QDʲDULOD\KL >f@ ʤXP-ma sallama ʰDOD\K >f@ ʤXP-PD KD\\ćK >f@ʤXP-PDʢDWDEDKXʤXP-PDKDQQDʯDKXʤXP-ma baš-xDUDKX>f@. :LWK WKLV SDUDJUDSK ʗDOOćü EHJLQV D QHZ VWUHWFK RI DUJXPHQW providing a vital portrait of the first procession, whereby God “leaves” His solitude, as it were. In Plotinian terms, this act of procession is an expression of divine self-love. It is a non-temporal moment by which God comes forth from His concealed premanifest hiddenness by eternally radiating, i.e., emanating, from Himself a yet undefined cosmic being, that is, the so-called kDʢV, who is no one else but the Neoplatonic Intellect. 208 Understood in terms of a vertical subordination, the moment of procession is the ultimate product of God’s self-desire, terminating at the level of a new cosmic SHUVRQ “in and through” God (Parag. 99, 55b: “WDüDOOćIĪK wa-WD WDüDOOć PLQKX”). 209 This way of illustrating the procession of The IDʜOIĪʯO-ʰLšq leaves us completely in the dark as to the identity of this kDʢV. The task of the next chapter will be to clarify, on the basis of textual evidence in the ʗDOOćüLDQ FRUSXV the identity of the Intellect to ZKRPʗDOOćüUHIHUVKHUH in the name of the kDʢV. 209 Bussanich 1996: 51. It is this entity, which, after being generated by God, orders the whole nature in this world. In this connection, it is noteworthy that the first recipient of God’s love LVFRQFHLYHGE\ʗDOOćüDV a “separate” Intellect in a way that is strikingly similar to the Proclus Arabus. As D. Janos observes (2012: p. 168), this is unlike the “historical Proclus, for whom the One first emanates Being, then Life, then Intellect.” Janos also points out (2012: p. 168) that “the elimination of these intermediary entities between the One and Intellect is […] the most notable and radical transformation undergone by the Greek Proclus in the Arabic 208

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Intellect – namely, as occurring through God’s radiating gaze – reflects Plotinus’ description of Intellect’s procession “as an instrument of the efficient causal activity of the One.” 210 It is found, with only a few differences, in the ThA (X.8–10 [B 135, 11–12]), where God emanates in a downward outpouring of generosity in and through the Intellect. Noteworthy, as it transpires from the verbal phrase beginning with paragraph 98 “Fa-DUćGD $OOćK >…],” the procession of this so-called kDʢV is an intentional act on God’s behalf. Both Plotinus and the ThA refer to this divine unfolding in terms of a Divine Will, which – ʗDOOćü DVVXUHV XV – results from God’s “desire to project out of Himself.” This paragraph at least VKRZVWKDWʗDOOćüFRQVWUXHVWKHHQWLUHDFWRI creation as one act of divine love. In this context, the identification of the Forms as God’s thoughts becomes more certain. His depiction of the creation event in terms of a radiation supports this point. Intellect has a unique status here, as well as in Plotinus, because it participates in a particular way in God: namely by way of likeness (Parag. 99, 55b: “al-EćGĪʰDQʜŠUDWLKL”). 211 The important point to note here LVʗDOOćüpV emphasis on God’s intensity and passion expressed in His gaze upon the kDʢV. Being part and parcel of God’s loving gaze, the Intellect perceives the vision of God not because of its desire to emucontext.” For a detailed account of Plotinus’account of the “derivation of divine Intellect from the One,” see O’Meara 1993: pp. 62–65; Corrigan 2005: pp. 149–151. 210 E.g., Enn. III.8.9.29–32; III.8.11.16–23; V.1.5.18–19; V.1.7.5–35; V.2.1.7–11; V.3.10.40–4; VI.7.21.5–6; quoted in Gerson 2012: 50; see also Stamatellos 2012: 61. According to Adamson (2006: p. 73), “the view that God is an efficient cause of being, and that Aristotle knew it, becomes commonplace in Arabic philosophy, and al-.LQGĪVKRXOGEHFUHGLWHGZLWK anticipating this important feaWXUHr ,I WKLV LV FRUUHFW WKHQ ʗDOOćü ZDV following an already well-established tendency among Neoplatonising contemporaries. 211 See e.g., Enn. V.1.7: “The Intellectual-Principle stands as the image of the One […] carrying on much of its quality”; as well as V.2.1: “This second outflow is an image or representation of the Divine Intellect as the Divine Intellect represented its own prior, the One.” Gerson 2012: p. 38; Schroeder 1992: p. 15; Bussanich 1996: p. 63, p. 122.

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late God’s contemplative activity. The latter point of view is typical of Plotinus and other Neoplatonists who explain the multiplicity of Intellect from the latter’s attempt to reflect the glory of the One. 212 $FFRUGLQJWRʗDOOćüKRZHYHULWLV*RGZKRJD]HVDWWKHJORU\ of the kDʢV, not the opposite. 213 In spite of this difference, as pointed RXWLQ&KDSWHU,,ʗDOOćüpVGHVFULSWLRQRIWKHkDʢV remains Neoplatonic, fulfilling a crucial metaphysical role; namely that of the first image (ʜŠUD) that receives the forms inherent in God’s selfcontemplative mind. It is this fact, for example, that in Neoplatonism explains “the derivation of goodness, beauty, life, and so on from the One to Intellect.” 214 In this perspective, the act of creation (understood in the sense of God’s Desire-to-be) is the inaugural moment of God’s procession in and through Intellect. God’s creative presence in and through Intellect means that there is no real distinction between procession and reversion, i.e., between God’s efficient and final causality. As far as I can see, this Neoplatonic feature is necessary in order to capture the unitive overtone of the formula “He is he” (huwa huwa ZKHQʗDOOćüVSHDNVLQWKHSUHVHQWSDUDJUDSKD RI the theophanic appearing of God in and through Intellect. In this allegorised account, theophany (WDüDOOĪ) unfolds, due to God’s contemplation of His attributes, in a downward movement of selfdesire that becomes instantiated in the structures of the cosmos through the mediation of Intellect. 215 Though not explicitly stated A clear statement of this thought may be found in Enn. V.1.6.48– V.1.7.1; Schroeder 1992: p. 15, p. 42. 213 This account closely parallels that of the Arabic text of the 0DEćGLʱ q2Q WKH 3ULQFLSOHV RI WKH 8QLYHUVHr  DVFULEHG WR $OH[DQGHU RI Aphrodisias, which describes this relationship between the One and Intellect in terms of a lover who loves his beloved. See C. Genequand’s 2001: 97. For the Arabic text of the 0DEćGLʱVHH%DGDZĪSS3–77. 214 Bussanich 1996: pp. 51–55. 215 This position which, as we have seen in the last chapter (ch. II), ascribes creative/demiurgic functions to Intellect is very close to Plotinus’ position which identifies the Divine Craftsman in Plato’s Timaeus with the Aristotelian divine Intellect; e.g., Enn. II.3.18; V.9.3; IV.4.10. In that sense, ʗDOOćüpVGRFWULQHRI,QWHOOHFWLVDV\QWKHVLVRI1HR-) Platonic and Aristo212

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in that way, this interpretation receives strong support, not only from the passages under consideration here, but also from the way ʗDOOćü GHSLFWV WKH FUHDWLYH DFWLYLW\ RI ,QWHOOHFW LQ WKH VXEVHTXHQW SDUDJUDSKE +HUHʗDOOćü construes the creation process as a special type of unfolding, in the sense I have described in Chapter II. Parag. 99 (55b)

Then He praised it, then He glorified it, then He made it the Elect; by means of these same attributes of His act, and of the attributes that He had made arise through the thought of manifesting this Person risen with His Form: the Person, Creative and Providential, who created, nurtured, said the WDVEĪʚ and the WDKOĪO, made arise (by turn) attributes, acts and forms, makes substances (\XüDZKLU) and causes miracles to appear. And when He had gazed at it and possessed it, He radiated in it and by it. ʣXP-ma PDGDʚDKX ZD DʤQć DOD\KL ʤXP-PD LʜʞDIćK bi-PLʤOLKćʨLKLDʜ-ʜLIćWPLQILʰOLKLZDʯO-Dʜ-ʜLIćWDO-ODWĪ DEGćKć PLQ PDʰQć Dʲ-]XKŠU EL ʨćOLND Dx-xDʢV DOEćGĪʰDQʜŠUDWLKL:DKXZDʢćOLTZDUć]LTID-\DU]XT wa-\XVDEELʚZD-\XKDOOLOZD-\XEGĪDʜ-ʜLIćWZDʯO-DIʰćl wa ʯO-ʜXZDU ZD-\XüDZKLU DO-üDZćKLU ZD-\XEGĪ DOʰDüćʯLE)DODP-mć QDʲDULOD\KZD-PDODNDK WDüDOOć IĪKZD-WDüDOOćPLQKX.

ÞÞÞÞ ,,, ),1$/5(0$5.6 ʗDOOćüFRQVWUXHVPDQpVVRXOpVFRPSOHWLRQLQD1HRSODWRQLFIDVKLRQ depicting it as originally divine yearning for reversion. Indeed, NeRSODWRQLVP SURYLGHV WKH SKLORVRSKLFDO XQGHUSLQQLQJV RI ʗDOOćüpV poetry, namely his assertion of an inborn attraction to and love for telian elements. Placing the Platonic Ideas in the pure Aristotelian divine Intellect seems to meet the requirements of both philosophies.

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God as the highest object of love. In this perspective, God’s essence is a distinct kind of love called ʰ,xT. It functions as the efficient and final cause of soul’s yearning for perfection. Thus, like ERWK3ORWLQXVDQG3URFOXVIRUʗDOOćüWKHWKHPHVRIWKHVRXOpVSHrfection and salvation are intertwined with the nature and function of divine love. In this context, divine love serves as a primary medium for the acquisition of perfection. For ,EQʲ$UDEĪ, ʰ,xT lifts the souls to the spiritual state of IDQćʱ 216 For ʗDOOćü, ʰ,xT “lifts the veil” from the eyes of the seeker (\DUIDʰKXʰDQDO-ʚDüE), by giving the seeker entrance into God’s uniqueness (ID \DUć DO-IDUGćQL\\D EL ʯOmuxćhada), glory and beauty (ʤXPPD ʯO-NDšI ʰDQ DO-NLEUL\ćʯ ZD ʯOüamćl). 217 Thus, far from being a matter of pantheistic absorption into God, deification here is a contemplative experience achieved through the vision of the divine attributes. 218 ʗDOOćüpV WKHRU\ RI GLYLQH ORYH FUHDWLRQ DQG FRVPRORJ\ LV D blend of several Greek Arabic philosophical sources: mainly, the Arabic Plotinus, the Proclus Arabus and the Arabic doxography of Ps.-Ammonius. ʗDOOćüKRZHYHUGLGQRWPHUHO\UHSURGXFHRUVODvishly copy the ideas of these sources. On the contrary, our analysis of the IDʜOIĪʯO-ʰLšq demonstrates how ʗDOOćü was trying to develop a creation theory of his own against the background of the various ideas that were built into the Graeco-Arabic texts. The most fundamental ingredient in the IDʜO IĪʯO-ʰLšq is the portrayal of creation process in terms of an emanative act of self-desire. Creation, here, refers at once to God’s self-loving contemplation and the primordial moment of WDüDOOĪ. Taken together, these acts should be seen as essentially inseparable from God’s Essence; that is to say, “from God’s contemplation of his attributes in pre-eternity.” 219 In fact, this understanding of ʰ,šq as an expression of an eternal essence of God, can be seen to anticipate two important love 216

ʲ8,f@PćʰDUDIDKXʰćrif il-la üDKLOD ZDVIDKX 4XUʱćnic verse (2:146) DQZćr an-nubuwwa min nŠrihi barazat, wa-anwćrahum min nŠULKLʲDKDUDWZD-OD\VDILʯO-anwćr nŠrun anwar wa-DʲKDU ZD-DTGDP PLQ ʯO-qidam siwć nŠU ʜćʚLE DONDUDP.

7KLVLOOXPLQDWLQJSDVVDJHLVDKDUPRQLRXVEOHQGRI4XUʱćnic beliefs and Neoplatonic ideas. It encapsulates one of the fundamental aspects of 0XʘDPPDGpV prophecy: namely, that the Prophet’s conduct or “Sunna” is a form of divine revelation, the product of the primordial vision that illuminated 0XʘDPPDG in the Empyrean, that is, SULRr to his historical manifestation. The word “EDʛĪUDrXVHG by ʗDOOćü KHUH WR GHOLQHDWH WKH SUH-eternal, divine nature of Muʘammad’s prophetic knowledge, immediately calls to mind the beatific vision in the Neoplatonic sense we have dealt with in Chapter III; namely, the vision of direct, immediate insight into the divine. In fact, this conceptualisation of Muʘammad’s visionary H[SHULHQFHFDQEHGHULYHGIURP7XVWDUĪpVH[HJHVLVRI43–18), which explains how Muʘammad “was absorbed in the contemplative witnessing of the divine theophany” because of seeing the “greatest signs of his Lord.” 32 In fact, the train of thought here is not uncommon in Neoplatonism. As we have seen, it is precisely this dimension, this “wit32

Quoted in Böwering 1979: p. 151.

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nessing” or so-called “hyper-intellectual” vision, which constitutes the ultimate perfection of the first created being, the Intellect. 33 ,QGHHG LW VHHPV WKDW ʗDOOćü SRVLWV WKLV YLVLRQ DV D FRQGLWLRQ RI 0XʘDPPDGpV unique status as the primordial source of all light and all prophets. Because of his assumed unmediated vision of the divine light, the prophet is an archetype whose light precedes the lights of other prophets. Moreover, all subsequent prophets participate in this metaphysical light. In this context, the preposition “from” (min) in the phrase DQZćU DQ-QXEXZZD PLQ QŠULKL EDUD]DWZDDQZćUDKXPPLQQŠULKLʲDKDUDW (“the lights of prophecy emerged from his light and their lights appeared from his radiant light”) is relevant as it carries the implication that the lights of other prophets emanate, or radiate, in a strictly vertical fashion. As we saw in Chapter II, emanation in Neoplatonism implies no separation between the different layers of the hierarchy of being. That is to say, the level of Intellect is not just one additional level of being, separated from its prior level. Rather, Intellect is the immediate manifestation of its prior divine level. Moreover, the levels of the hierarchy are all of the same content, varying only in their degrees of density, depending on their distance/proximity from the One-Good. 34 From this perspective, Muʘammad has a primordial intimacy with God that no other prophet has. The significance of his status consists in being the light from which God derived all other prophets. This, in turn, means that the primordial Muʘammad contains everything within himself in a manner that is much denser than any other being, including the other prophets who are ‘just’ lower manifestations or expressions of Muʘammad’s light. This kind of intimate relation between God and the primordial Muʘammad runs as a leitmotif throughout the above-PHQWLRQHG 1HRSODWRQLVLQJ ʘDGĪʦ WUDGLWLRQV ZKLFK ZHUH ZLGHO\ FLUFXODWLQJ DPRQJ WKH ʙŠIĪV LQ WKH th and 10th E.g., V.3.11; also, III.8.29–32; V.5.5; VI.7.35.19–23; Bussanich 1988: p. 10, p. 48, p. 69, p. 74, and p. 136. 34 E.g., al-ʡD\UDO-PDʚʘ 1955: §9, p. 13: “this is so because intellects close to the Pure One are less dense and have more limited power” (wa ʨćOLNDQQDDO-ʰXTŠl al-qarĪba min -ʯOZćʚLGDO-PDʚʘDTDOOXNDPPL\\DWDQZDDʰʨDP quwwa). 33

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centuries. In one of these traditions, 35 a supreme God addresses the subordinate “Intellect” (al-ʰDTO) in the second-person, praising it as his most beloved in a double sense; namely, as the cause and goal of all life: ʤXPPDTćOD$OODK[…] wa-ʰL]]DWĪ wa-üalćlĪ mć ʢDODTWXʢDOTDQ DNUDP ʰDOD\\D PLQND EL-ND ćʢXʨ ZD-bi-ND DʰʞĪ (“Then God said [to him], I have created nothing which is more beloved to Me and more favoured by Me than You, Through You I will give and take back”). 36 $QRWKHUʘDGĪʦFLWHGLQ.DOćEćʪĪpV.LWćEDW-7DʰDUUXI depicts the same kind of intimacy between God and Intellect according to a Neoplatonic metaphor of the “One’s filling of Intellect with vision.” 37 “When God created the Intellect, He said to it, ‘Who am I?’ I was silent, so He anointed it with the light of Oneness; and it opened its eyes, and said: ‘Thou art God; there is no God except Thee’.” 38 This face-to-face encounter with God is just the same as God’s encounter with the cosmic kDʢV in the IDʜO IĪʯO ʰLšq. It is the VROH SULYLOHJH RI 0XʘDPPDG 1R RQH HOVH KDV DFFHVV WR WKLV SUimordial state. Therefore, it is impossible for any other being to UHDFK WKLV NLQG RI FRQWHPSODWLYH H[SHULHQFH $V ʗDOOćü VD\V Muʘammad’s uniqueness is impenetrable even to the “gnostics.” 39 Goldziher 1908: p. 317. Goldziher 1908, p. 319; trans. M. Ayoub 1984: p. 51. 37 Enn. VI.7.16, pp. 31–35; Corrigan 2005: p. 3p. 6, p. 149, p. 127. 38 Quoted in .DOćEćʪĪFK;;,S 39 In this regard, ʗDOOćü seems to be polemicising against, not his felORZʙŠIĪ*QRVWLFVWKHʲXUDIćʱ EXWDJDLQVWH[WUHPHkĪʲĪ sects, most likely the ğXOćW who flourished in al-.ŠIDGXULQJWKHrd/9th century. They were given the name ğXOćW by the heresiographers, in part because they mainWDLQHG WKDW WKH ,PćPV qH[LVWHG EHIRUH DOO RI creation.” In consequence, the ğXOćW LPSDUW D GHPLXUJLF VWDWXV WR WKH ,PćPV DVFULELQJ WR WKHP   the ability of directing the affairs of the universe, and (2) access to the esoteric, hidden knowledge (PDʰULID) that had emanated from God through 0XʘDPPDG. In addition, the ğXOćW claimed to have higher and fuller access to (a) “the nature and attributes of God and, (b) the ways He communicates with the world”; quoted in S. A. Mourad 2006: 299; also, Matti Moosa 1987: pp. xx, pp. 152–57, and p. 353; M. M. Dakake 2007: esp. ch. 8, pp. 157–75. The ,PćPV usually share the same roles among different 35 36

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His closeness to God should be understood in light of his cosmic genesis,QGHHGʗDOOćüVHHms to be pointing out that this is the true meaning of Muʘammad’s privileged status, according to Q 2: 146: q7KRVH WR ZKRP :H JDYH WKH %RRN NQRZ 0XʘDPPDG DV WKH\ NQRZ WKHLU RZQ VRQVr ,Q WKLV UHJDUG ʗDOOćü VHHPV WR XQGHUSOD\ the polemical message addressed in this verse against the People of the Book (ahl al-NLWćE) who refused to accept Muʘammad’s SURSKHWKRRG7REHPRUHSUHFLVHʗDOOćüseems here to be replacing Muʘammad’s corporeal descent with a notion of his cosmic genesis. As noted by Massignon 40, this genesis is consonant with 0XʘDPPDGpVrole in emanating the lower levels of prophetic lights. In other words, 0XʘDPPDG SHUIRUPV WKH UROH RI DQ HIILFLHQW cause, “which is superior to that which it produces.” 41 The implicaWLRQ RI ʗDOOćüpV YLHZ VHHPV WR EH WKDt Muʘammad possesses the primordial divine light in a manner superior to all other prophets because of his unmediated participation in God’s light, just like the kDʢVpXQPHGLDWHGSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKH'LYLQHʲ,šq. Indeed, this is the reason why all other prophets stand in an inferior relationship to Muʘammad. If, as we have seen, creation is born out of God’s Desire-to-Be, then, in light of the Neoplatonic causal scheme, we may speak of these prophets as a chain of participations starting with 0XʘDPPDGWKHshining VLUćü DQGILUVWPDQLIHVWDWLRQRI'LYLQHʲ,šq. The divine light comes second-hand to the prophets through QŠU 0XʚDPPDG, so to speak, just as Intellect emanates what is below in kĪʲĪsects, but may have different functions ascribed to them; for a more general overview, see M. G. S. Hodgson: (,2, vol. 2; H. Halm, 1982; also, Rubin 1975: pp. 65–67, p. 81, p. 89, p. 99, p. 102, p. 104, p. 107, pp. 110– 14; Goldziher 1908: pp. 329–330. 40 PhM1: 131–32. Indeed, Massignon clearly recognises this implication of the Prophet’s primordial existence and its crucial importance for XQGHUVWDQGLQJ ʗDOOćüpV LQWHQWLRQ LQ WKH qʝć-6ĪQ RI WKH /DPS:” “what +DOOćM H[DPines in this chapter,” Massignon says, “is his (i.e., Muʘammad’s) outer causality” (PhM3: 285). However, Massignon does not treat this causality of Muʘammad against a Neoplatonic backdrop. 41 Quoted in El. Theol., Dodds 1963: propos. 7, p. 9; al-ʡD\UDO-PDʚʘ, §1, [B 4, 13]: al-ʰLOOD DO-Šlć ašDGGX ʰLO-ODWDQ PLQ ʰLOODWLKL DO-qarĪba al-ODWĪ WDOĪK; also, Enn. V.9.29–33.

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the Neoplatonic hierarchy. This feature of the argument, in turn, seems to imply that Muʘammad is very unique, not just one prophet among many prophets of the same rank, because he is the first recipient of the divine light. Each prophet is endowed with light, which radiates through 0XʘDPPDG LQ YLUWXH RI KLV SULPRUGLDO XQLW\ with God. If Muʘammad did not pre-exist, the other prophets would not have FRPHLQWRH[LVWHQFH1XPHURXVʘDGĪʦWUDGLWLRQV- circulating in several slightly different versions 42 - anticipate this meta-historical notion of Muʘammad, affirming his cosmic primacy over all other prophets. “I was a prophet”, MuʘDPPDG GHFODUHV LQ RQH ʘDGĪʦ q:KHQ$GDPZDVVWLOOEHWZHHQZDWHUDQGFOD\rLQ DQRWKHUʘDGĪʦ “I was the first of the prophets to be created” (NXQWX DZZDOD ʯODQEL\ćʯ IĪ ʯO-ʢDOTĪ). 43 7XVWDUĪ LQ IDFW HFKRHV the words that are put KHUHLQWKHPRXWKRI0XʘDPPDGLQDVLPLODU\HWPXFKPRUHHxplicit vein: “The light of the prophets (QŠU DO-DQEL\ćʯ) is from his (Muʘammad’s) light and the light of the heavenly kingdom is from his light.” 44 In other words, by ascribing to Muʘammad an explicit mediatLQJUROHLQWKHHPDQDWLRQRIDOORWKHUSURSKHWVʗDOOćüLVFRQWLQuLQJDWHDFKLQJWKDWRQFHDJDLQFDQEHWUDFHGEDFNWR7XVWDUĪpVLmagery of Muʘammad’s light, which resonates, in terms of both style and content, with early Neoplatonising traditions about QŠU 0XʚDPPDG.

,9 0Uʙ$00$'’6'(0,85*,&52/( §3 His aspiration preceded all other aspirations, his existence preceded nothingness, and his name preceded the Pen, because he existed before all people. There is not in the horizons, beyond the horizons, or below the horizons, anyone more elegant, nobler, more knowing, and more just, more fearsome, or 42

M. J. Kister 1988; Rubin (1975), pp. 68–71, p. 97, pp. 104–5, and

p. 115. Quoted and translated in Rubin 1975: p. 69, fn. 15; also, Schimmel 1975: p. 215. 44 Quoted in Böwering 1979: p. 153; parenthesis original. 43

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EARLY PHILOSOPHICAL ʙş),60 more compassionate, than the holder of this role. He is the Master of created beings, the one “whose name is the Glorious >$ʘPDG@r [Q 61:6]. His nature is unique, his command is absolutely certain, his essence is most excellent, his attribute is more glorious, and his aspiration is most distinctive. Oh, marvel! What is more manifest, more visible, greater, more famous and more radiant, powerful, and knowledgeable than him? He is and was known before all created things, beings and modes of existence. He is and was known prior to all calculation of time, and before the realities of ‘before’ and ‘after’, when no substance or qualities existed. His substance is pure, his word is prophetic, his knowledge is celestial, his mode of expression is Arabic, and his tribe is “neither of the East nor the West” [Q 24:35] (…) KLPPDWXKX ʜDEDTDW DO-himam wa-ZXüXGXKX VDEDTD DO-ʰDGDP ZDLVPXKX ʜDEDTD DO-qalam, li-DQQDKX NćQD TDEO ʯO-umam, mć Nćna fĪ-l ćfćq wa-warćʯ DO-ćfćq wa-dŠQD ʯO-ćfćq, aʲraf wa-ašraf wa aʰUDI ZDDQʜDIZD-DUʯDIZD-aʢwaf wa-Dʰʞaf min ʜćʚLEKćʨLKLDO-TDGL\\DZD-huwa VD\\LG DO-EDUL\\D DO-laʨĪ LVPXKX $ʚPDG ZD-QDʰWXKX DZʚDG ZDamruhu DZNDG ZD-ʨćWXKX DZüDG ZD-ʜLIDWXKX DPüDG ZD-himmatuhu DIUDG\ćʰDüaban mć aʲharahu wa-DQʲDUDKXZD-DNEDUDKXZD-ašharahu wa anwarahu wa-aqdarahu wa-DEʜDUDKX ODP \D]DO NćQ NćQD PDxKŠUDQ TDEOD ʯO-ʚDZćGĪʤ ZD ʯO-NDZć\LQ ZD ʯO-DNZćQ ZD-ODP \D]DO NćQD PDʨNŠUDQ TDEOD ʯO-qabl, wa-EDʰGD ʯO-EDʰG ZD ʯO-üawćKLU ZD ʯOalwćn, üawharuhu ʜDIDZĪ NDOćPXKX QDEDZĪ ʰLOPXKX ʰDODZĪ ʰLEćUDWXKXʰDUDEĪ, qabĪlatuhu lć mašriqi wa lć maĠribĪ (f)

This paragraph continues the argument of the preceding one, describing 0XʘDPPDGpVHVVHQFHZLWK HSLWKHWVLQGLFDWLQJKLVUDQNRI nobility, perfection, beauty, as well as his unparalleled knowledge. In a sense, these epithets designate typical features of Plato’s Demiurge, who embodies, inter alia: “perfect beauty” and “perfect goodness.” 45 From this vantage point, 0XʘDPPDG LV D 1HRSOatonised model of the Demiurge, containing all perfections that other beings seek to emulate. The epithets ascribed here to 0XʘDPPDG – e.g., his elegance, nobility, and supreme mode of 45

J. Pietarinen 2009: p. 19.

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cognition – can be seen to refer to archetypes of the “virtues” (alIDʘćʯLO) which flow out eternally (bi-ĠD\ULQLKć\D). 46 All those excellent epithets which originate in the very nature of 0XʘDPPDG PD\ therefore be seen as the “attributes” (ʜLIćW), which the Prophet, in 7XVWDUĪpV ZRUGV qWRWDOO\ DEVRUEHG  LQ FRQWHPSODWLRQ RI KLV Lord.” 47 ,Q 7XVWDUĪpV GHVFULSWLRQ WKLV LQYROYHV D WKHPDWLVDWLRQ RI WKH Prophet’s “visionary experience,” which comes very close to ʗDOOćüpVGHVFULSWLRQRI*RGpVLQLWLDOHQFRXQWHUZLWKWKHkDʢV in the IDʜO IĪʯO ʰLšq: namely, as an act of contemplation through which 0XʘDPPDG UHFHLYHV ORYH PDʚDEED), desire (ʰLxT), and strength (quwwa) due to his role as a demiurge. In particular, as a demiurge that shapes “the archetypes of the created beings.” 48 The epithets, which ʗDOOćü ascribes here to 0XʘDPPDG DUH WKH inborn excellences that the latter receives due to the divine self-disclosure. This, in turn, affirms that, XQOLNHRWKHUEHLQJV0XʘDPPDGpV virtues are HVVHQWLDO QRW DFFLGHQWDO $V 5 %DTOĪ SRLQWV RXW LQ KLV &RPPHQWDU\, WKLVVHHPVWKHUHDVRQZK\LQʗDOOćüpVYLHZ0XʘDPPDGGHVHUYHV WKHVXSHUODWLYHHSLWKHWq$ʘPDGrLHqthe Glorious”): namely, because he possesses all virtues “from eternity” (NćQDPDʚPŠGDQIĪʯOazal). 49 3XW LQ RWKHU ZRUGV WKH JORU\ EHORQJV WR 0XʘDPPDG QRW because he fulfils a certain function, as, for instance, the Demiurge, whose beauty and goodness consists in bringing “all things” […] “from disorder into order.” 50 0XʘDPPDG is glorious by his very nature, and possesses the glory in and through himself, prior to “nothingness” (ʰDGDP); and even before the cosmic “Pen” (alqalam), with which God recorded “all destinies.” 51 In fact, this interpretation indicates that ʗDOOćüpV PHWaphorical use of the

This idea recurs in the AP, e.g., ThA: IX.69–71, [B 130, 10–11]. Quoted in Böwering 1979: p. 151. 48 Quoted in Böwering 1979: p. 150. 49 Sharh-LVKDWKL\\DW1966: §282–3, p. 460. 50 Tim. 30a, as quoted in Pietarinen 2009: p. 21. On this aspect of the Demiurge’s creative role in pagan Neoplatonism, see J. Phillips 2007: esp. pp. 98–99, pp. 111–113, and pp. 145–48. 51 )RUPRUHDERXWWKLVʙŠIĪGRFWULQHVHH T. Burckhardt 2008: p. 59. 46 47

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Qurʱćnic term “qalam” 52 LV QRW LGHQWLFDO ZLWK WKDW RI ,EQ ʲ$UDEĪ, who uses it to designate several cosmic entities; e.g.: 1. “The Real who is the instrument of creation” (al-ʙDTTX ʯOPDʢOŠTXEL-hi). 2. “The Origin of the Universe” (DʜOXʯO-ʰćlam) 3. “The servant of the All-embracing One” (DEGXʯO-üćmiʲ 4. “The First Intellect” (al-ʰDTOXʯO-awwal). 53

$V VXFK WKH q3HQr IRU ,EQ ʲ$UDEĪ, epitomises key aspects of 0XʘDPPDGpV FUHDWLYH UROH DV XQGHUVWRRG LQ the qʝć-6ĪQ RI WKH Lamp.” 54 A full and detailed account of how ,EQʲ$UDEĪ interprets HDFKQDPHLQWKHFRQWH[WRIKLVFRQFHSWRIWKHo0XʘDPPDGDQ5eality’ (al-ʚDTĪTDPXʚDPPDGL\\D) 55, would take us away from our main concern here. It is relevant to note though that al-ʚDTĪTD PXʚDPPDGL\\D, in WKHZULWLQJVRI,EQʲ$UDEĪ, is the most original and complete manifestation of God’s attributes and perfections, in a VRPHZKDWVLPLODUZD\WRWKDWRI7XVWDUĪ,QRWKHUZRUGVthe theme that would, centuries later, gain explicit articulation as the q0XʘDPPDdan Reality”, is already to be found, in a less elaborated form, in the motif of QŠU0XʚDPPDG, which was to be adopted by Q 68:1; 96:4. Affifi 1939: ch. II §A, p. 66. For more on ,EQʲ$UDEĪ’s use of the Qurʱćnic metaphor “Pen,” see Zargar 2008: p. 80; G. T. Elmore 1999: p. 300, p. 324, p. 342, p. 396, and p. 552; also, Chittick 1998: p. 60, p. 116, p. 144, p. 182, p. 283, and p. 442. In his magnum opus al-IXWXʚćWDO-PDNNL\\D (“Meccan Illuminations”), ,EQ ʲ$UDEĪ uses the term “Pen” in more than one sense: for example, as a metaphor for the ultimate source of the existing things, which is the repository of all revelations; R. al-ʲ$üam 1999: pp. 769–70. As shown in R. Todd (2014: p. 33, pp. 64–69, p. 71, p. 110, and S   LQ ODWHU ʙŠIĪ ZULWLQJV WKH 4XUʱćnic term “Pen” became widely used to connote several esoteric aspects of “0XʘDPPDG’s light.” 54 Affifi 1939: p. 86 n. 3. 55 ,EQʲ$UDEĪ’s concept of WKHo0XʘDPPDGDQ Reality’ has been studied extensively; see G. T. Elmore 1999: pp. 420–21; Affifi 1939: pp. 68– 92; Chittick 1989: p. 139; T. Izutsu 1984: pp. 237–38; R. J. Dobie 2010: pp. 240–41, and p. 286. 52 53

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ʗDOOćü,ILQGHHGZHWDNHWKLVLPSRUWDQWLQVLJKWVHULRXVO\DV$IIifi 56 and other scholars have done, 57 ʗDOOćüEHFRPHVDIRUHUXQQHU– or at least one of the forerunners – in laying the main foundations RIWKHGRFWULQHZKLFKqLQWKHZRUNVRI,EQʲ$UDEĪ and his school […] reaches its apogee in the concept of al-LQVćQDO-NćPLO or the perfect human being.” 58 $V1ʗ$EŠ=D\GKDVGHPRQVWUDWHG  LQ,EQʲ$UDEĪps theory, the ideal of al-LQVćQDO-NćPLO is equivalent to al-ʚDTĪTDPXʚDPPDGL\\D. The latter, in turn, designates: (a) the very first theophany of the divine light (DZZDOʲćKLUIĪʯOwuüŠd […] min an-QŠUDO-LOćKĪ); 59 (b) “the creative principle and originating source to which the world will return” (DʜODO-ʰćlam wa-ELGʯLKLZD-muntahćhu); 60 F WKHGHPLXUJLFVSLULWWKDWDV$EŠ=D\GSXWVLWqUXOHVrRYHU the world in a downward way, “extending to all beings on the basis of their degrees of receptivity” (UŠʚPXGDEELUDOL-Oʰćlam min DʰOćKʯLOć adnćh […] wa mumadda […] LOćNXOODO-PDZüŠGćWʚDVDELsWLʰGćdihć); 61 (d) the prophets who are nothing but “different emanations” of one and the same “reality,” that LVWKHq0XʘDPPDGDQ5HDlity” (al-DQEL\ćʯüamĪʰDQPDüćlĪ li-ʚćʨLKLDO-ʚDTĪDO-ZćʚLGD). 62

Properly understood, then, the ideal of al-LQVćQ DO-NćPLO and alʚDTĪTDPXʚDPPDGL\\D are two names of the same primordial locus of manifestation of the divine names and attributes which, for

Affifi 1939: p. 71. E.g., Moosa 1987: p. 59; Ebstein 2013: p. 145. 58 Todd 2014: p. 2. 59 $EŠ=D\GS. 60 $EŠ=D\GSS8–89. 61 $EŠ=D\GS 62 $EŠ=D\GSFor a brief historical survey of the notion of ‘The Perfect Human Being’ and its underlying idea of 0XʘDPPDG as a pre-existent light, see G. Böwering 1998: pp. 457–461; R. A. Nicholson 2013: ch. II. Pp. 77–142; see also W. C. Chittick 1979: esp. pp. 135–57; ibid pp. 2012: 143–47; Schimmel 1975: pp. 223–24. 56 57

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7XVWDUĪ 63 DQG IRU ,EQ ʲ$UDEĪ, 64 constitute the “causal powers” (IćʰLOL\\D) that become realised in and through the WDüDOOĪ of QŠU 0XʘDPPDG 65 Thus, wheQʗDOOćüDVFULEHVGLYLQHQDPHVDQGSRwHUVWR0XʘDPPDGLWGRHVQRWIROORZWKDW0XʘDPPDGEHFRPHVDQ incarnation of God, as, for example, in the case of the Christian GRFWULQHRI&KULVW5DWKHUʗDOOćüPD\EHXQGHUVWRRGDVVXJJHVWLQJ WKH VDPH DV 7XVWDUĪ DQG ,EQ ʲ$UDEĪ, namely, that these attributes DQG QDPHV DUH DSSOLFDEOH WR 0XʘDPPDG EHFDXVH LW LV WKURXJK 0XʘDPPDGpV SULPRUGLDO IRUP WKDW *RG FRPPXQLFDWHV +LV JORU\ celestial knowledge, nobility and perfection to other creatures. 7KHUHIRUH ZKHQ ʗDOOćü VD\V WKDW 0XʘDPPDG LV qWKH 0DVWHU RI created beings,” I do not believe that he is going as far as saying WKDW0XʘDPPDGLVLGHQWLFDOZLWKWKHHVVHQFHRI*RG5DWKHUZKDW ʗDOOćüVD\VKHUHFDQEHEHWWHUXQGHUVWRRGLQOLJKWRIWKHVHWZR1eoplatonic doctrines: (i) WKH 1HRSODWRQLF GRFWULQH WKDW ,QWHOOHFW YL] 0XʘDPPDG  has “a divine capacity” because of its unmediated reception of the virtues emanating from the divine. 66 (ii) the Neoplatonic doctrine that Intellect is (a) the “archetypal repository of all things” (miTGćU DO-KDZL\\ćW DO-ŠOć), 67 which (b) “resembles God, and because of that has been given the power (from God) to impose life and order upon all things below it” Böwering 1979: pp. 147–48. $EŠ=D\GS 65 Chittick 1989: pp. 39–47. In H. Corbin’s view (1998: p. 114), the kind of WDüDOOĪ ,EQʲ$UDEĪ has in mind is not an “emanation in the NeoplaWRQLFVHQVHr)RU,EQʲ$UDEĪ, Corbin argues, WDüDOOĪ is “rather a succession of manifestations of being, brought about by an increasing light, within the undifferentiated God.” Corbin seems strangely unaware that Ibn ʲ$UDEĪps description of WDüDOOĪ is identical with Neoplatonic emanation. 66 E.g., al-ʡD\UDl-PDʚʘ §6, [B 10, 9]; §7, [11, 4–5]: “the virtues that descend to the Intellect from the First Cause” (al-IDʘćʯLO DO-latĪ ta-tanazzal ʰDOć al-ʰDTOPLQDO-ʰLOODDO-Šlć); §8, [B 11, 14–15]: “the Intellect that organises everything due purely to the divine power” (al-ʰDTOPXGDEELUOL-üamĪʰDO-aš\ćʯ […] ELʯO-quwwa al-ilćKL\\D). 67 al-ʡD\UDO-PDʚʘ §15, [B 17, 9–10]. 63 64

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(KXZD DNʤDU WDxDEEXKDQ EL ʯO-lćKL WDʰćlć, fa min aüOL ʨćOLN ʜćUD \XGDEELUDO-Dx\ćʯDO-latĪ WDʚWXhu). 68

,QIDFWLIWKLVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQLVFRUUHFWWKHSULPRUGLDO0XʘDPPDG is comparable to the “Supreme EDU]Dʢ” or EDU]DʢDO-EDUć]Lʢ, which, IRU,EQʲ$UDEĪ is “the realm of divine self-disclosure.” 69 That is, the “intermediary realm” 70 where the divine names and attributes “receive their full manifestation.” 71 This is the true meaning – ʗDOOćü seems to be saying – RI40XʘDPPDGLVHVVHQWLDOO\DOLJKW whose genesis is “neither of the East nor the West.” It is in fact WKHUHIRUHWKDW0XʘDPPDGDFFRUGLQJWRʙŠIĪVLVFDSDEOHRIPLUURring the “hidden” divine “treasure,” to which God refers in the ʘDGĪʦTXGVĪGLYLQHVD\LQJ q,ZDVDKLGGHQ7UHDVXUH>…] and I created the creatures so that I might be known.” 72 According to ʗDOOćü WKH KLGGHQ PHDQLQJV al-PDʰćnĪ) of the divine reality are JUDQWHG RQO\ WR 0XʘDPPDG Pć ʜDʚʚDW KćʨLKL DO-PDʰćnĪ li-DʚDG VLZć 0XʚDPPDG. 73 In fact, the same view is found in NaW „  ZKHUH ʗDOOćü states that “the absolute truth, or true meaning, of WDZʚĪG is attainable only by God’s messenger” (ʚDTĪTDWDW-WDZʚĪGIDOD\VDOL-DʚDGLOD\KL VDEĪOLOOćOL-UDVŠO$OOćK). 74 In this conception, which is more fully deYHORSHG LQ WKH VXEVHTXHQW WUDGLWLRQ RI ʙŠIĪ SRHWU\ DQG SKLORVophy, 75 0XʘDPPDGLVWKHqPLUURULQZKLFK*RGpVDWWULEXWHVPD\EH al-ʡD\U DO-PDʚʘ §22, [B 23, 8–9] (my translation); Enn. VI.7.3; VI.7.17, pp. 41–42. 69 Chittick 1989: p. 181. 70 $EŠ=D\GSSS4–95. 71 Chittick 1989: p. 125; Todd 2014: p. 95; Baldick 2012: p. 84; Affifi 1939: p. 74, p. 81. S. H. Bashier 2004: esp. pp. 86–92, pp. 113–22. For an excellent defence of this view in ,EQ ʲ$UDEĪ, see M. De Cillis 2013: pp. 217–19. 72 Trans., G. T. Elmore 1999: 324 n. 49; slightly modified. 73 Abbas 2002: 168; PhM3: p. 290. 74 Also NaW: §52, p. 229; $NKEćU, no. 63 and no. 57: “Pć ʰDUDID ʚDTĪTDWDW-WDZʚĪGĠD\UUDVŠO$OOćK” (“no one has attained knowledge of the truth of WDZʚĪGexcept God’s messenger.” 75 This feature of the primordial 0XʘDPPDG is even more pronounced among the so-called “philosophically oriented” ʙŠIĪs in the 68

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seen.” 76 7R EH VXUH ʗDOOćü PDNHV QR PHQWLRQ RI WKLV SDUWLFXODU ʘDGĪʦ EXW KLV DWWULEXWLRQ RI D GLYLQH VWDWXV WR 0XʘDPPDG FDQ EH VHHQDVSDUWRIDWUDGLWLRQWKDWLVLQWHUHVWHGLQ0XʘDPPDGQRWDVD historical figure, but in his primordial status and cosmic nature. In this respect, the Prophet of Islam is a Neoplatonised version of Plato’s Demiurge who “governs the things below it in virtue of its likeness with God” (ZDKXZDDNʤDUWDxDEEXKDQE-illćKLWDʰćlć fa min aüli ʨćOLNʜćUD\XGDEELUDO-Dx\ćʯDO-latĪ WDʚWDKX). 77

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