Crossroads of Two Continents: A Democratic Federation of East-Central Europe 9780231880527

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CROSSROADS OF TWO CONTINENTS

CROSSROADS OF TWO CONTINENTS A Democratic Federation of East-central Europe By FELIKS GROSS

Columbia University Press iVIORNINGSIDE HEIGHTS · NEW YORK · 1 9 4 5

A

WARTIME

IN

FULL

FOR

BOOK:

THIS

COMPLIANCE

CONSERVING

COMPLETE

WITH

PAPER

THfc

AND

I DITION

IS

GOVERNMENTS

OTHi.R

ESSENTIAL

PRODUCED

REGULATIONS MATERIALS

COPYRIGHT 1 9 4 5 , COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS, N E W M A N U F A C T U R E D

I N

T H E

i: Ν I Τ Ε D

S T A T E S

O F

YORK

A M E R I C A

To Zygmunt

viii

PREFACE

Federalism is the only road to economic reconstruction of these devastated areas and the only method whereby the standards of living of the most underdeveloped area in Europe can be raised. I shall attempt to present the concept of a federation, trace its growth, and outline a democratic and pragmatic plan for its realization. All the views expressed are my own and do not necessarily represent the viewpoint of any official group. I completed this work in the second half of November, 1943. In the meantime, the political situation had changed considerably, and the prospects of a federation were growing slimmer. Until it was no longer possible, I attempted to keep pace with current literature on this subject. I am especially grateful to Dr. Raymond Leslie Buell for reading the manuscript and for his invaluable comments. I should like to thank Professor James T . Shotwell, Mr. Malcolm Davis, and Dr. Sanford Schwarz for their concern with Central and Eastern European cooperation and with this small contribution. Their opinions contributed greatly to my understanding of the American point of view. T h e views expressed in this book are, however, my own and in no way commit any of the foregoing persons. I should also like to express my gratitude for the encouragement of my friends from the Polish Labor Group "Poland Fights" in my work, the assistance of Mr. Liston Oak and Mrs. Valetta Malinowska in editing the manuscript, and the aid of Mr. Tadeusz Korsak in compiling the bibliography under my direction. F E L I K S GROSS

New Yorl( City July 31, 1944

CONTENTS I · The Need for Global Organization

ι

II · The Central and Eastern European Region

5

III · East-central European Federation; the History of an Idea

1ι

IV · The Extent of the East-central European Federation

29

V · Integral and Democratic Federalism in East-central Europe

35

V I · A European Union and the East-central European Federation

68

VII · Relations with Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union

79

VIII · Conclusions and Summary

84

A P P E N D I X E S Selected Documents on Collaboration East-central Europe I. DECLARATION OF C O M M O N AIMS OF THE

in 87

INDEPENDENT

MID-EUROPEAN NATIONS II. PACT OF ORGANIZATION OF THE LITTLE ENTENTE

87 89

III. THE STATUTES OF T H E BALKAN CONFERENCE

91

IV. PROTOCOL-ANNEX OF THE PACT OF T H E BALKAN ENTENTE

96

V. THE STATUTE OF ORGANIZATION OF THE BALKAN ENTENTE

98

VI. THE STATUTE OF T H E ADVISORY ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF THE BALKAN ENTENTE VII. TEXT OF MR. TARDIEu's MEMORANDUM VIII. POLISH-CZECHOSLOVAK DECLARATION

99 IOO 102

IX. AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF GREECE AND T H E KINGDOM OF YUGOSLAVIA CONCERNING THE CONSTITUTION OF A B A L K A N UNION

IO4

X. JOINT DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENT AND EMPLOYERS' DELEGATIONS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GREECE, POLAND, AND YUGOSLAVIA TO THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE

IO7

XI. THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN PLANNING BOARD IO9 XII. PEASANT PROGRAM XIII. CENTRAL AND SOUTH-EAST EUROPEAN UNION

III II7

BIBLIOGRAPHY

139

INDEX

155

Maps I. II. III.

IV.

The Proposed Federation of Central and Eastern Europe in One All-Embracing Political and Economic Union

28

An Alternative Plan for Two Cooperating Federations: ( 1 ) a northern federation and (2) a southern federation

30

A Third Alternative Plan for Federalism in Central and Eastern Europe: three federations which would also cooperate with each other

32

A Concept of a Regional Organization of Europe

72

I · The Need for Global Organization THE past century has been one of rapid and ever-accelerated progress—particularly the last few decades. But, unfortunately, this progress has not been even and well balanced. T h e development of techniques has not been accompanied by equal progress in our humanistic culture, our social relations, and our international relations. T h e dichotomy in our civilization, this obvious cleavage between material development and spiritual development, prevails in every country to some degree. In Germany and Japan the gulf is greatest—technical progress and spiritual retrogression resulting in mechanized and streamlined brutality. It is chiefly in our international relations that this cleavage manifests itself in the worst form—war. T h e two world wars constitute clear and irrefutable proof that our whole international system is utterly inadequate to the needs of twentieth-century civilization. If a third world war is to be avoided, if, indeed, our civilization is to survive, a new system must be created. Technical progress has been speeded up tremendously by this war. T h e weapons of today are so efficient in destructiveness that even militarists fear the consequences of another such conflict. But alongside our twentieth-century weapons, we have nineteenth-century relations between nations. However, the war itself seems to be producing a revolution in international relationships—or at least the opportunity for drastic changes in order to make human relations correspond to the technical progress we have made. There is a growing consciousness among the peoples of all lands that if we miss this opportunity to build a new and better world with international cooperation instead of constant conflict between nations, new wars will bring complete chaos and catastrophe. Due to technical developments, war can no longer be localized. Any war anywhere can be the spark of an international conflagration. Space and time have new meanings. Oceans and mountains cannot serve as frontiers behind which peace and security can be maintained by one nation. Mechanized warfare—the "triphibian" way of concerted action in the air, on the land, and on the sea—has become so highly developed that peace is really one and indivisible.

2

T H E NEED FOR GLOBAL

ORGANIZATION

T h e unity about which Guglielmo Ferrero wrote in The Unity of the World may be realized for the first time in history. Technical progress which nearly annihilates distance and time and geographical barriers makes possible a spiritual unity. Before this period of world wars the earth was divided into more or less isolated spheres. China was a world in itself, and so were Europe and South America and Africa. Commercial relations developed rapidly, but cultural differences remained much deeper than they are today. Asiatic peoples are accepting more and more the technical improvements which made possible a higher standard of living for Europe and America. T h e old feudal methods are yielding to modern methods of production and administration. Parallel with the technical progress the ideas of social progress and democracy are gaining wider acceptance in Asia by the masses of people. Besides differentiation of cultures, a process of integration on a global dimension is gaining impetus. W e understand each other better than ever before, and differences in language, music, literature, and history are not the insurmountable barriers that they were in the 1800's. T h e ideas of progress and democracy have gained universal currency. In cultural, as in commercial respects, man is less strange to man. T h e basis is being laid for real international understanding and peaceful cooperation between peoples of even the most remote areas. T h e natural trend of history is toward a world economy. Economic frontiers are obstacles in the path of this development and must be removed. Modern industrial and commercial techniques demand international economic as well as political collaboration in making markets and raw materials accessible, in the distribution of industries and their products, in the exploitation of the world's resources for mutual benefit. A global system of cooperation, of international solidarity, is necessary to the success of collective security. There was too little solidarity among the democratic Western powers in the League of Nations, and they were too divided by conflicting interests, to make it possible to save Ethiopia and Loyalist Republican Spain from fascist aggressors. Both Mussolini and Franco had friends who aided them. Only a strong international and universal organization, embracing all nations, implemented by the requisite machinery, including an international police force, will be able

3

THE NEED FOR GLOBAL ORGANIZATION

to b u i l d and m a i n t a i n the n e w system of collective security. T h e times cry o u t for a union of free nations on a global scale. W i t h o u t a world-wide o r g a n i z a t i o n there can be n o lasting peace. E v e n regional federations, such as a E u r o p e a n federation, m a y somet i m e s result in continental struggles. M o r e o v e r , twice in this century history has proven that by itself E u r o p e is not sufficiently strong to be able to c h e c k G e r m a n

imperialism. T w i c e

extra-European

powers

were

n e e d e d to m a i n t a i n E u r o p e ' s peace for the sake of world peace. A syst e m o f universal collective security is also essential, then, for the future solution o f the G e r m a n problem. It is a basic prerequisite for any k i n d o f p o s t w a r political p l a n n i n g .

The Need for Regional Organization T h e persistent differences between peoples do not contravene the fact t h a t there is a trend toward cultural integration and a need f o r global e c o n o m y . T h e technical progress and the democratic ideas that are bec o m i n g universal property do not extinguish national variations. L a n g u a g e s , customs, traditions, ways of living determined by natural a n d social e n v i r o n m e n t continue to differ greatly; nevertheless, the world's n a t i o n s and peoples are c o m i n g closer together—sufficiently so, at least, to establish the basis for closer understanding. N o r do the e c o n o m i c differences necessarily conflict with the need for a global e c o n o m y . T h e historic development—social, political, e c o n o m i c — o f each nation also differs m o r e or less f r o m that of every other nation. A l t h o u g h these differences do not preclude t h e possibility of international cooperation, they are sufficiently great to indicate the need for regional organization. T h e r e are too m a n y nations and too m a n y variations a m o n g t h e m to have only one single, all-embracing u n i o n . T h e r e must be intermediary organizations—a system of regional federations — a l l tied up in a global association of peoples. T h e weaknesses of the L e a g u e o f N a t i o n s prove the need for regional organization within the global system. Certainly, to f o r m such confederations of small nations in E u r o p e , and, in some cases, small nations with big ones, is the way to insure the fulfillment of the responsibilities of each in the whole s c h e m e of collec-

THE NEED FOR GLOBAL ORGANIZATION

4

tivc security, and at the same time the federations would preserve national and cultural characteristics. Winston Churchill was quite right in his famous speech of March 21, *943 : H e r e let me ask w h a t w o u l d be thought of an A r m y that consisted only of battalions and brigades and w h i c h never f o r m e d any of the larger and high organizations like A r m y Corps. It w o u l d soon get mopped up. It would therefore seem to me at any rate, worthy of patient study that side by side w i t h the great powers there should be a number of groupings of states or confederations w h i c h w o u l d express themselves through their o w n chosen representatives, the whole m a k i n g a Council of great states and groups of states. . . . A l l this will I believe be found to harmonize with the high permanent interests of Britain, the United States and Russia. 1

T h e proper architecture of Europe necessitates uniting the small nations in regional unions, as Churchill says. These regional unions would meet the contemporary economic, political, and cultural needs of the peoples involved. If Europe is regarded as a region in a world organization, it must be made up of various units—subregional unions from the viewpoint of world organization, regional from the European point of view. These regions would constitute the logical and essential element of the politicoeconomic architecture of Europe; a supernational organization which will make possible the elimination of national passions in international relations. 1

The United Nations Review,

N e w York, April 15, 1943, III, 151.

II · The Central and Eastern European Region EAST

of Germany and west of Russia lies an area little k n o w n

to the average American. E v e n most American tourists who have visited Western Europe never traveled in Eastern Europe. But this is the area that typifies the need for regional organization and planning. T h i s is a region consisting of pulverized states, inhabited by Poles, Czechoslovaks, Rumanians, Hungarians, Serbs, Croats, Greeks, and other smaller national groups, such as Slovenes, Lithuanians, and others. W i t h the exception of the western part, this area is predominantly agricultural. Francis Delaisi, French economist, in his Two Europes,

divides

the continent into Europe A and Europe B. T h e Danzig-Cracow-Budapest line separates them. Europe B, the greater part of Central and Eastern Europe, is a region where the traction power of the horse is supreme. Its deeply rutted, muddy roads are characteristic features of the landscape. Its peasant economy is backward; here, also, social change is needed. T h e first and most obvious need in some areas is the distribution of large estates to the landless peasants, the consolidation of scattered strips belonging to small holders, and the introduction of modern agricultural techniques. A statistical comparison of Eastern and Western Europe will give a picture of this part of the continent: T A B L E I« Territory, Population, and Density in Western and Eastern Europe, 1937 Km.

Territory

Great Britain Switzerland Holland France Denmark Germany Belgium

243*4" 4 I > 2 95 35.023 550,986 42,929

Czechoslovakia Greece

140,508 129,976

47 0 .5i5 3°.5°7

Population

47,288,000

Density per Sq. Km.

4.173.550 8>639>539 41,905,538 3,749,000 67,831,000 8,361,220

194.3 IOI.I 246.7 76.1 87.3 144.1 274.1

15,263,399

108.6

7.012.993

54

6

THE

CENTRAL

AND

EASTERN

T A B L E 1°

EUROPEAN

REGION

(continued)

T e r r i t o r y , P o p u l a t i o n , a n d D e n s i t y in W e s t e r n and E a s t e r n E u r o p e , 1 9 3 7 Km.

Hungary

Territory

Population

Density

per Sq.

93,086

9,038,189

Poland

388,634

34,596,000

89

Yugoslavia

247,542

15,400,177

62.2

Bulgaria

103,146

6,319,200

61.3

Rumania

295,049

19,646,151

66.2

a

The

Europe book.

figures

in

T a b l e s I, and

and Federalism, of Agricultural

III are q u o t e d

from

Economic

Problems

of

Eastern

b y A . S u h a , p p . 1 0 f f . a n d w e r e c o m p i l e d f r o m International Statistics,

igj8-i9jt),

R o m e , International

Km.

97.1

Institute of

Year-

Agriculture,

1939·

T h e c o m p a r i s o n of population d e p e n d i n g on agriculture in relation to the total p o p u l a t i o n s h o w s the p r e d o m i n a n t agricultural character of E a s t e r n E u r o p e in c o m p a r i s o n w i t h W e s t e r n E u r o p e . T A B L E II

α

A c t u a l P o p u l a t i o n D e p e n d i n g on A g r i c u l t u r e in Relation to T o t a l in S o m e C o u n t r i e s of E u r o p e

%

Year

Austria

1934 1926

Bulgaria

France

1931

80.0

Germany

!

Czechoslovakia

1930

34.2

Italy

933 1931

Greece

1928

53-7

Netherlands

1930

Hungary

1930

Norway

!

Poland

1931

49-7 64.9

U.S.S.R.

1926

83.2

Switzerland

Denmark

1930

27.1

United K i n g d o m

"Concise

Statistical

Year-Book,

of Poland,

%

Year

26.0

Sweden

September,

1939-June,

34-5 24.5 39.2 ao.6 30.7

93° 1930

32.2 19.6

'93° 1931

5·2

1941, London,

The

Polish M i n i s t r y of I n f o r m a t i o n .

C e n t r a l a n d E a s t e r n E u r o p e need an i m p r o v e m e n t in a g r i c u l t u r a l s t a n d a r d s . T h a t this part of E u r o p e is agriculturally u n d e r d e v e l o p e d is s h o w n by a c o m p a r i s o n of the yields of the m a i n crops there a n d in Western Europe. T h e s e characteristic yields of C e n t r a l a n d E a s t e r n E u r o p e are l o w because these countries w e r e so o f t e n destroyed by w a r s a n d so m u c h exploited that capitalization did not take place to the same extent as i n the W e s t . It w a s a sphere of G e r m a n economic, especially i n d u s t r i a l , expansion.1 1

G e r m a n e c o n o m i c expansion in Central and Eastern E u r o p e is discussed b y

B ä s c h in The

Danube

Basin

and the German

Economic

Sphere.

Antonin

7

THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN REGION T A B L E III C o m p a r i s o n of Y i e l d s b e t w e e n W e s t e r n a n d E a s t e r n E u r o p e , 1938 Y i e l d s in quintals per hectare

Wheat

Rye

Barley

Oats

Potatoes

G r e a t Britain

25.6

17.0

23.0

20.9

175.2

Switzerland

20.2

22.3

162.9

Holland

34-4 18.6

235 22.7

21.0

29.9

276.0

~

12.9

32-5 17.0

16.8

121.5

«

19.5

34.2

180.8

France Denmark Sweden

26.7

20.1

24.2

3°-5 20.7

Germany

27.4

20.2

25.4

23.6

Belgium

3'·5

25.0

28.8

29.1

'75-9 220.9

Czechoslovakia

20.2

18.8

20.1

18.1

128.8 V ^ ;

Greece

11.4

8.6

I 1.2

9.8

Hungary

16.6

12.7

l6.0

13.8

Poland

12.4

12.3

11.6

II

Yugoslavia

136.8

67.1"

.7

73-5 114.1 63.9

14.2

8.9

IO.I

9.0

Bulgaria

τ5·4

10.0

.5.8

6.2

31.8

Rumania

12.6

10.7

6.5

7·1

86.4

—

^

H o w e v e r , the countries of C e n t r a l a n d E a s t e r n E u r o p e are relatively rich in r a w materials, a n d they had considerable, a l t h o u g h insufficient i n d u s t r y . F r o m 20 to 30 perccnt of the population w e r e , o n the a v e r a g e , e m p l o y e d in i n d u s t r y and trade. In the Silesian basin on the P o l i s h - G e r m a n - C z e c h o s l o v a k borders a n d in adjacent territories, the coal mines are a m o n g the richest in E u r o p e . Polish coal mines w e r e the most efficient in E u r o p e . T A B L E IV Efficiency in the C o a l M i n e s of E u r o p e a n C o u n t r i e s in 1937 COUNTRIES

D A I L Y COAI- O U T P L ' T FOR ONE W O R K E R IN TONS

Whole Crew England

Crew in the Pit

1.2

Belgium

0.8

1.1

Francc

0.8

1.2 2.5

Holland

1.6

Germany

1.5

1.9

Poland

1.8

2.7

° Concise Statistical Polish Year Book., Warsaw, 1939.

8

THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN REGION

T h e oil industry is of first importance in Eastern Europe. T h e oil wells begin in the Carpathian Mountains of southeastern Poland a n d end with the wells of R u m a n i a , which are the richest in Europe, with an a n n u a l output of 8 million tons. Other rich resources are coal, lignite, potassium salt, bauxite, manganese, iron, nickel, lead, copper, c h r o m i u m , a n d silver. T h e steel industry of Czechoslovakia and of southeastern Poland is a m o n g the most important on the continent. Czechoslovakia has also developed a machine industry k n o w n for its high-quality products. T e x tile factories are f o u n d throughout Eastern Europe, centering in Czechoslovakia and Poland. A n d there are other industries that are important to the economic life of this region. Yet industrial production is relatively low in Central and Eastern E u r o p e as compared with Western Europe or with Great Britain and the United States—low in total output and in n u m b e r of workers. T h o u g h protected f r o m competition with the highly industrialized nations of Western Europe a n d America, industry developed very slowly. T h e m a i n reason for this was the lack of capital and of a dynamic domestic m a r k e t . T h e population consists mostly of poor peasants. T h e lack of purchasing power among the peasant masses has been a great handicap to industrial development. T h e comparison of the consumption per capita in Eastern Europe with that of the higher industrial countries shows great discrepancies in the standards of living. TABLE V

0

Per Capita Consumption Wheat and Rye

United States Great Britain France Czechoslovakia Poland Yugoslavia

Electric Current

Cotton Yarn

'939

'937-3$

Kilowatts 1,160

Pounds 22.1

Pounds

620

26.4

313.I

1.6

420

Meat

Sugar

Coal 1936 Metric Tons

'931-34

'93°~34

'93^-34

Pounds

Pounds

Pounds

233-7

135

99-4

348.4

140

108.7

3-5 3-9

590.9

2

52.9

Pig Iron Production

352.8

13-4

309.0

39-9

1.4

286

12.2

176.4

456.4

7 73 41

19.6

0.7

4.6

291.1

29

12.2

0.2

113 39

59-5 7-5

553-4

" Strassburgcr,The Core of a Continent,

p. 22.

2.6

THE CENTRAL AN» EASTERN EUROPEAN REGION

0

A great plan of economic reconstruction and development is needed for the whole region of Central and Eastern Europe, Culturally, the peoples of the Eastern European crossroads area seem much alike. Standards of living, customs, manners, social attitudes, and laws are similar throughout this part of the continent. T h e r e are differences, of course, but the differences between Poland and Czechoslovakia are not much greater than between two parts of Germany, Bavaria and Prussia, and less than between France and Italy. T h e language barrier is not insurmountable. Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs, and others can all make themselves understood to one another. Except for language, there is not as great a difference between an inhabitant of Warsaw and an inhabitant of Prague as can be found in the United States—between N e w York and N e w Orleans, for example. After W o r l d W a r I the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe realized an age-old aspiration; these nations were liberated f r o m the German, A u s t r o H u n g a r i a n , and Tsarist yokes. President W o o d r o w Wilson's fourteen points and the Treaty of Versailles were historical steps toward national liberty. But national independence is not enough. U n fortunately, nothing was done adequately to ensure a healthy, balanced economy in these small nations. They were guaranteed no security, economic or political. Peace in Central and Eastern Europe is essential to collective security for other nations. W a r in this part of Europe means European war, and European war means world war. These small nations may seem remote to the American in Kansas—but the United States has an immediate and direct interest in maintaining peace in Eastern Europe. T h e strategic importance of Gibraltar, the Dardanelles, and other such geographic points has been clearly recognized—because they c o m m a n d water routes. Sea-minded leaders of the Western democracies have, however, neglected the crucial importance of Eastern Europe as the crossroads of continents and as an area whose peace is necessary to universal peace. W e do not believe in the geopolitics of Haushofer, but it is true that there are strategic spots of decisive military importance—and Eastern Europe is one such strategic area. But this is true, not so much for natural or geopolitical reasons, as for historical reasons. T h e strategic im-

10

T H E CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN REGION

portance of any area depends upon the historical development of adjacent nations. D e n m a r k or the K a i s e r W i l h e l m C a n a l have strategic importance because the canal is controlled by G e r m a n y , a

warlike

nation, and D e n m a r k is menaced by her directly. T h e B a l k a n s are important because of the imperialistic interests of the neighboring powers. If G e r m a n y were as peaceful as the United States of A m e r i c a , D e n m a r k , or S w i t z e r l a n d , then these areas w o u l d lose their strategic significance; or if nations other than G e r m a n y and Italy had become fascist aggressors, the geographic distribution of strategic areas w o u l d be different. T h e location of aggressive nations is the deciding factor in strategic— or geopolitical, if some prefer—importance of certain territories. I n this sense only is the English geopolitician Sir H a i f o r d M a c k i n d e r right w h e n he stresses the importance of certain strategic territories, Eastern a n d Central E u r o p e a m o n g them. In 1904 Sir H a l f o r d declared before a meeting of the R o y a l G e o g r a p h i c Society in L o n d o n : " H e w h o g o v e r n s E a s t e r n E u r o p e , governs the Heartland; he w h o governs the H e a r t l a n d governs the world island." " H e a r t l a n d " means the heart of E u r a s i a ; " w o r l d island" means the entire Eastern hemisphere—Europe and A s i a . T h i s area is a nerve center of E u r o p e . W o r l d W a r I broke out first in Sarajevo, in 1914. W o r l d W a r II started with the invasion of Poland, in 1939. T h u s both w a r s have begun in Central and Eastern

Europe—

between the Baltic and the A e g e a n Seas. Both wars were started, of course, by G e r m a n imperialism, not by conflicts between the small nations of this area. In 1 9 1 4 the first victims were the Serbs; in 1939, the Poles.

III · East-central European Federation; the History of an Idea 1848-1914 THE idea of close collaboration of the Central and Eastern European states is not a new one. Its beginnings reach back to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In modern times the concept has become an integral part of progressive and liberal thinking in Central and Eastern Europe. T h e great Hungarian revolutionary, Louis Kossuth, who led the struggle against the Hapsburgs in 1848-49, realized after the defeat of the revolt the evils of jealousies and rivalries among the nations of the Danubian Basin. Unfortunately, Kossuth himself, when his influence in H u n g a r y was decisive, did not support the demands of the Serbs, Croats, and Transylvanian-Rumanians for national freedom. A f t e r the insurrection was crushed, Kossuth recognized fully that this was one of his major mistakes. H e then realized that only close collaboration of the Danubian nations could solve the problem. H i s friend Laszlo Teleki outlined the idea of a Danubian federation to Kossuth. " I implore my Magyar, Slav, and Rumanian brethren," wrote Kossuth, "to pull a veil over the past and reach out to each other the hand of brotherhood." Others, too, in the "springtime of nations," dreamt of a federation. T h e great Czechoslovak patriot and historian Frantisek Palacky, a contemporary of Kossuth, as a representative of Czech democrats expressed the aspiration for some kind of federal system in that part of the world. Defeat in 1848 did not extinguish the spirit of the fight for freedom against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. T h e non-Austrian nations have continued their struggle for independence. In this struggle efforts were made to transform Austria into a federal state. Many of the leaders of the small oppressed nationalities also realized the necessity of federation if and when their peoples were liberated from the Hapsburg yoke. Between 1905 and 1908 the conviction that Austria should be transformed into a democratic federal state became more and more clear to Austrian liberals and socialists. Karl Renner (pseudonym Springer) and Otto Bauer, leaders of the Austrian socialist and labor movement, put

12

EAST-CENTRAL EUROPEAN FEDERATION

f o r w a r d the idea of a u t o n o m y of the nations in this area in their v a r i o u s w r i t i n g s o n the nationality q u e s t i o n . A u r e l - P o p o v i c i , an able T r a n s y l v a n i a n w r i t e r , a t t e m p t e d in his b o o k The United

States of Great

(1906) to lay the f o u n d a t i o n of the federal theory in the

Austria

Danubian

B a s i n , w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k of old A u s t r i a , p r o p o s i n g the o r g a n i z a t i o n of a D a n u b i a n e m p i r e c o m p o s e d of

fifteen

semi-sovereign states con-

nected b y f e d e r a l ties. N o D a n u b i a n f e d e r a t i o n w a s possible as long as the H a p s b u r g s w e r e in p o w e r . T h e A u s t r o - H u n g a r y

monarchy

w a s hated by too

many

peoples, and it p r e s e r v e d t h e leadership of the A u s t r i a n m i n o r i t y . A s T h o m a s G . M a s a r y k has said, a H a p s b u r g A u s t r i a w a s "a dynasty w i t h the aristocracy, t h e A r m y a n d its h i g h e r officers, the h i g h e r b u r e a u c r a c y a n d the C h u r c h ( h i e r a r c h y ) f u r n i s h i n g the necessary spiritual p o l i c e . " It b e c a m e clear that the first step t o w a r d a D a n u b i a n f e d e r a t i o n m u s t be t h e f a l l of the A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n M o n a r c h y and the liberation of t h e p e o p l e s w i t h i n its borders. A l l theoretical plans m a d e w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k o f the M o n a r c h y w e r e unrealistic. It w a s T h o m a s G . M a s a r y k w h o o u t l i n e d the idea of close collaboration of peoples b e t w e e n the Baltic a n d t h e A d r i a t i c o n a d e m o c r a t i c basis.

1914-1918 D u r i n g the first W o r l d W a r , M a s a r y k d r e a m e d of a C e n t r a l a n d Easte r n E u r o p e a n r e g i o n a l f e d e r a t i o n of free p e o p l e s — s t a r t i n g w i t h F i n l a n d o n t h e N o r t h e r n Baltic a n d e n d i n g w i t h the countries o n t h e

warm

w a t e r s of the A d r i a t i c . M a s a r y k lived in the U n i t e d States f o r several y e a r s a n d believed enthusiastically in Jeffersonian d e m o c r a c y . H e felt t h a t this type of d e m o c r a c y c o u l d be applied to C e n t r a l a n d

Eastern

E u r o p e , as the solution of its difficulties. H e w o r k e d on p l a n s a n d exc h a n g e d ideas w i t h t h e A m e r i c a n scholar James S h o t w e l l , at C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y , w h o is a n a r d e n t advocate of this idea. T h e idea of close c o o p e r a t i o n a m o n g the m i d - E u r o p e a n nations f o u n d expression in the d e c l a r a t i o n of c o m m o n a i m s of these nations, a d o p t e d in P h i l a d e l p h i a in 1918 ( t h e so-called P h i l a d e l p h i a M a n i f e s t o ) . " A small nation, an enlightened and culturally progressive nation, is just as m u c h a full fledged unit and cultural individual as a great nation. T h e problem of small nations and states is the same as the problem of the so-called

EAST-CENTRAL EUROPEAN FEDERATION

13

small man; what matters is that the value of the man, the individuality of the man, is recognized without regard for his material means. T h i s is the proper sense and kernel of the great humanitarian movement which characterizes modern times. . . . Everywhere the weak, oppressed and exploited unite themselves—association is the watchword of our era: federation, the free federation of small nations and states will be the continuation of this principle, securing the final organization of the whole mankind. . . .

A real

federation of nations will be accomplished only when nations are free to unite of their o w n accord. T h e development of Europe points to that end. T h e program cf the Allies answers fully the demand for this development: free and liberated nations will organize themselves, as they find necessary into greater units, and thus, the whole continent will be organized. Should there be federation of the smaller states, they will be federations freely entered upon out of the real needs of these nations, not out of dynastic and imperialistic motives. Federation without freedom is impossible; that must be emphatically stated to those Austrian and other politicians w h o are promising autonomy and federation." T h a t is w h a t T h o m a s G . M a s a r y k w r o t e in New

Europe

(the W a s h -

ington, D . C . , e d i t i o n ) .

1918-1939 It is tragic that all the efforts of T h o m a s G . M a s a r y k resulted only in the Little E n t e n t e after W o r l d W a r I. T h i s alliance e m b r a c e d C z e c h o slovakia, R u m a n i a , a n d Y u g o s l a v i a , w i t h some slight ties w i t h P o l a n d t h r o u g h its alliance w i t h R u m a n i a . In his b o o k The Maying

of a State M a s a r y k wrote that he c o n c e i v e d

the idea of the Little Entente in 1918 and discussed it with T a k e Jonescu, the R u m a n i a n statesman, and w i t h V e n i z e l o s of Greece. T h e situation at the time [he wrote] led us to contemplate a close entente with the Yugloslavs, Poles, and Rumanians, as well as with the Greeks who, since the Balkan War, had had a treaty of friendship with the Serbs. W e clearly recognized the difficulties which lay ahead of us . . . the idea of the Little Entente was in the air. T a k e Jonescu w r o t e in his articles in La Revue

de France,

in 1921, of

a plan f o r a bloc of five states w h i c h had e m e r g e d f r o m the c o m m o n victory and w o u l d comprise 90 million inhabitants of P o l a n d , C z e c h o -

EAST-CENTRAL EUROPEAN FEDERATION

14

Slovakia, R u m a n i a , Y u g o s l a v i a , and Greece. B u t n o federation, exccpt for the Little Entente, w a s o r g a n i z e d in the D a n u b i a n Basin. A b o u t 1922 the Little E n t e n t e started to play its role at the conference at G e n o a as a political o r g a n i z a t i o n of the D a n u b i a n peoples, especially in d e f e n d i n g themselves against the H u n g a r i a n revisionist ideas. T h e Little Entente was closely tied u p w i t h the L e a g u e of N a t i o n s . Its leaders were able statesmen, but the political a n d e c o n o m i c realities w e r e not favorable to M a s a r y k ' s d r e a m . T h e economic problems in C e n t r a l E u r o p e g r e w m o r e acute in 1927 a n d collaboration w a s required a m o n g the small states for their solution. A commission w a s set up to f o r m u l a t e an e c o n o m i c p r o g r a m for the Little Entente, and it played an increasingly important role thereafter. T h e Little Entente w a s g i v e n its final shape on D e c e m b e r 19, 1932. O n that day, at Belgrade, Benes, of C z e c h o s l o v a k i a , T i t u l e s c u , of R u m a n i a , and Jevtic, of Y u g o s l a v i a , acted as godfathers of the pact w h i c h determ i n e d the organizational f o r m of the Little Entente and w a s signed at G e n e v a on February 16, 1933. T h i s pact established the economic a n d political unity of the states of the Little Entente. A permanent council, an economic council, a n d secretaries were proposed. O n the p e r m a n e n t council w e r e the f o r e i g n ministers of the signatory states; the presidency rotated a m o n g t h e m . It devoted its attention to the international relations of the Little E n tente, particularly the p r o b l e m of m u t u a l defense. Its job w a s to coordinate the interests of the three countries. H u n g a r i a n revisionism w a s a m a j o r issue of the Little Entente f r o m the very b e g i n n i n g . Simultaneously, steps w e r e taken to achieve some balance of the agrarian e c o n o m y of the D a n u b i a n states. E x p e r i e n c e has s h o w n that it is impossible to establish in that region an e c o n o m i c policy o n a nationalistic pattern—the only feasible plan w a s a regional treatment of the various problems. In 1932 A n d r e T a r d i e u , the F r e n c h statesman, approached the g o v e r n m e n t s of G r e a t Britain, Italy, a n d G e r m a n y , prop o s i n g a n e w D a n u b i a n system, a sort of m o d i f i e d customs u n i o n for the Little Entente and A u s t r i a a n d H u n g a r y w i t h a v i e w to i n t r o d u c i n g preferential measures to relieve the economic distress. T h e t i m e w a s not ripe, he considered, f o r a f u l l customs u n i o n for all the D a n u b i a n states,

EAST-CENTRAL EUROPEAN

FEDERATION

15

but, nevertheless, a c o m m o n currency was considered. E v e n such a modest and modified proposal w a s not successful as a step toward the integration of the economy of this area. F i n a l l y , two unsatisfactory preferential systems were introduced, 1 embracing the Little Entente g r o u p (Czechoslovakia, R u m a n i a , and Y u g o s l a v i a ) and the other g r o u p of states (Italy, Austria, and H u n g a r y ) . T h e main issue in both cases w a s the facilitation of the exports of agricultural products f r o m H u n g a r y , R u m a n i a , and Y u g o s l a v i a , as well as products f r o m Austria. T h e idea of regional collaboration had a long prewar tradition in the Balkan countries. A system of close collaboration was instituted in 1934 by a treaty which linked the Greeks, R u m a n i a n s , and Y u g o s l a v s together, as well as the T u r k s . T h e pact was signed on February 9, in Athens, and w a s called " T h e B a l k a n Pact." A t the next conference in A n k a r a (October-November, 1934), the B a l k a n statute, outlined by the R u m a n i a n F o r e i g n Minister, Titulescu, was discussed. T h u s , an attempt—though w e a k and inadequate—was made to coordinate the economic life of these countries by political collaboration through a council which met in regular annual sessions. 2 T h i s short survey of the history of the idea of Central and Eastern E u r o p e a n federations and cooperation up to W o r l d W a r I I shows that the plan f o r federation does not spring, like M i n e r v a f r o m the b r o w of Jove, fully g r o w n and fully armed, but is inherent in the history, traditions, and needs of the region. It is not just another postwar plan, but it is the fulfillment of a long historical development, having its roots in economic and political realities. H o w e v e r , another aspect of the survey is its history of failure. L e t us glance through the various documents on D a n u b i a n and Eastern European collaboration in the Appendices at the back of this book. T h e y offer evidence that there has been a tendency toward greater unity and that the necessity for collaboration has been recognized, but never sufficiently achieved. T h e w a r has shown the weaknesses of the Little Entente and of all attempts at B a l k a n collaboration. N o t one of the countries was involved deeply enough to help the others in the moment of danger. 1

Sec also Bascli, The Danube Basin and the German Economic Sphere, pp. 59 ff. Balkan cooperation was discussed by Kerncr and Howard in The Balkan Conference and the Balkan Entente, igjo-igj;. 2

16

EAST-CENTRAL EUROPEAN

FEDERATION

W h y ? Bccause, in the first place, nationalistic tendencies were still strong in this area. I n the struggle between "nationalism or unity," as L e o Pasvolsky puts it, nationalism has proven to be stronger than tendencies toward integration. 3 Secondly, the conflicting interests of the great powers in the D a n u b i a n Basin have also hampered closer regional cooperation. T h i r d l y , because Central and Eastern E u r o p e is only a part of the w h o l e E u r o p e a n and w o r l d problem, it was difficult to establish peace in one region, while the rest of the world is in chaos. T h i s region must be organized, if peace is to prevail in E u r o p e ; but even this w i l l not help if a state of anarchy exists throughout the rest of E u r o p e and the w o r l d . T h e organization of this region is a necessity, and our failures h a v e s h o w n that a lasting settlement cannot be achieved by diplomatic measures alone. It can only be accomplished through the will of the people and by a definitely democratic process. F u r t h e r m o r e , it must be part of a E u r o p e a n and a w o r l d organization. It cannot be a sectional project, but must be regional in scope, a part of one entity. B e f o r e 1918 there were always multinational organisms in this region contributing to its political stability. In the fifteenth century close collaboration

4

existed there, which had its roots in a dynastic g o v e r n m e n t .

L a t e r on, the H a p s b u r g monarchy controlled a large bloc of nations that w a s not a federation, but a system of government imposed against the w i l l of the peoples. T h e r e f o r e it could not possibly have lasted and inevitably g a v e way to another system—a system of small states. T h e liberated nations should have been organized on the principle of a union— " f r e e w i t h the frees; equal with the equals"—but this was not done. N a t i o n a l liberation is today, as it was then, only a partial solution. Most of the national—ethnical frontiers, hence general political borders — w e r e different f r o m the economic frontiers. 5 Political

nationalism

barred economic collaboration. T h e only w a y to solve economic and national problems in this area is to apply the principle of federalism, w h i c h 3

Pasvolsky, Economic Nationalism of the Danubian States, pp. xxx, 572. For the history of dynastic integration of states in Central and Eastern Europe see Oskar Halccki, " T h e Historical Role of Central and Eastern Europe," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Saence, March, 1944. 5 Pasvolsky, Economic Nationalism of the Danubian States, p. 548. " T h e frontiers established by peace cut across economically independent areas. With principal emphasis placed on ethnic delimitation and the reestablishment of historic frontiers, the question of economic interrelations was left almost entirely out of account in the defining of the territorial limits 4

EAST-CENTRAL EUROPEAN

FEDERATION

17

would permit the people to retain their national culture and would provide the opportunity for supranational economic planning in order to meet economic demands. Unity was a necessity then and is today. T h u s , a system of small states proved to be no solution. Having had this experience, we can now look forward to realizing a successful solution to the problems of this area by liberating the nations and forming a federation of the peoples.

1939-1943 Since the outbreak of World W a r II the idea of Central and Eastern European regionalism has revived, and its advocates are found not only in these small nations but also among advanced political thinkers and statesmen of all countries. A f t e r 1939 many of the representatives of these nations felt that the system of small and loose national states in Central and Eastern Europe contributed to the ease with which the Germans subjugated this part of Europe. In the underground movements and in exile, in Paris, London, and N e w Y o r k , statesmen, journalists, soldiers, and scientists widely discussed the causes of their defeat and the way toward a betterment of this situation. In the gloomy days when German war machinery was triumphant, many of the representatives of these nations understood how small were their differences and how petty the quarrels in comparison with what was happening in the occupied territories and in comparison with the German menace. T h e necessity for close cooperation was being realized more and more. Political thinking and planning became clearer. Earlier, there were plans and programs for some kinds of international cooperation, more or less vaguely expressed in 1848. T h e concept was limited to the transformation of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy before 1914; later Masaryk made clear the necessity for close regional collaboration. Since 1942 the plans have become definite in their federal or confederal form of international cooperation in this area; the concept of a looser regional cooperation was accepted as an outcome of political reality. of the newly created and reconstituted states . . . factories were often cut off from their supplies of raw materials and fuel, and vice versa. Mutually dependent industries in some instances, branches of the same industry, became separated by frontiers."

18

EAST-CENTRAL EUROPEAN

FEDERATION

O n November u , 1940, the exiled leaders of the Czechoslovak and the Polish governments took the first step toward a confederation of the two countries. In a spirit of cordiality and enthusiasm they laid what they hoped would be the cornerstone of future unity in this area. Simultaneously there took place discussions on the problems of Central and Eastern Europe among all the leaders and statesmen of this region. Liberals and radicals of varying political affiliations—Czechoslovaks, Hungarians, Yugoslavs, Rumanians, and Bulgars—argued the urgent need for a union of their peoples. President Eduard Benes, of Czechoslovakia, in his article " T h e Organization of Post-War Europe,"

0

wrote that the core of a Central Euro-

pean federation "will be a Czechoslovak-Polish confederation. T h e creation of this new political unit can already be considered as an accomplished fact. It might be joined by Austria and Hungary and possibly by R u m a n i a . " H e proposed also a Balkan bloc. In Central Europe, those territories which have associated together most naturally, must be fused into firm blocs. These will be the foundations for more expansive structures. . . . I should expect that with the passage of time, a natural bridge will be established between the northern and southern confederations in Central Europe—that is, between the Polish-Czechoslovak group and the Balkan group—and that in this way, we shall take a further logical step toward the consolidation of Europe as an element in some sort of world commonwealth; for without the first, the second seems to me inconceivable. I go further and affirm that without this broad European framework, no regional confederation can be envisaged. Jaromir Necas, Czechoslovak Socialist Labor Minister of Economic Reconstruction, in "Czechoslovak Post-War Reconstruction,"

7

wrote

that, "Within the framework of this collective security we consider that the best regional economic and political solution for us is a bloc of States f r o m the Baltic to the Adriatic, as enunciated by Masaryk at Philadelphia, but without hostility, and indeed with friendship, toward the Soviet Union." In the meantime the political situation has greatly changed. Between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union a rapproche?nent

has developed

6

Published in Foreign Affairs, January, 1942. Vol. X X , pp. 226-242. A mimeographed memorandum of the Czechoslovak Ministry of published in London, 1942. 7

Reconstruction,

EAST-CENTRAL EUROPEAN FEDERATION

19

that finally resulted in the Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement of December 1 2 , 1 9 4 3 , signed in Moscow. Simultaneously, Polish-Soviet relations were getting worse. T h e situation in the Balkans, especially in Yugoslavia, has also changed considerably and has become a disturbing problem. Obviously these facts did not remain without influence on Czechoslovak policy. T h e cooperation of Poland and Czechoslovakia and other Central and Eastern European nations has been weakened. President Bene?, while stressing the fundamental importance of the Polish-Czechoslovak collaboration for Czechoslovak foreign policy, did not advocate later (1944) the Central and Eastern European federalist idea, which is for the moment, not acceptable to the Soviet Union. H e is trying to bring about a closer cooperation between Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the U.S.S.R. 8 But the idea of a federation has not been abandoned in Czechoslovak plans. It was again brought to public attention in 1944 by Hubert Ripka, Czechoslovak Minister of State and one of the foremost Czechoslovak political planners, in a collection of his speeches and articles issued in the official series of "Czechoslovak Documents and Sources." T h e core of this publication forms H . Ripka's outline for a Central and Eastern European federation. 9 T h e Polish National Council and the Polish Government accepted the idea of federation in Central and Eastern Europe as the basic political line of foreign policy. This idea is strongly supported by the representatives of the Polish labor and peasant group. T h e late Polish Prime Minister, W . Sikorski, was an ardent advocate of federation. H e regarded it as one of the goals of this war. Said Sikorski, T h e end of this w a r must see the g r o u p i n g together of the smaller nations of Europe—both for their o w n protection and for economic development. Ideally, we should tend toward a United States of E u r o p e . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , I doubt if such a union is attainable for the time being. T h e interests a n d cultures of the European nations are too diverse to permit inclusion of all in a single state. B u t the European system can be arranged along somewhat similar lines. T h e day when each nation of E u r o p e can hope to stand alone—providing 8 See Benes Czechoslovak Policy for Victory and Peace, the fourth message of the President of the Republic to the State Council on February 3 , 1944, pp. 25, 3 3 . 9 Sec Ripka, Small and Great Nations, pp. 20 ff., 5 0 - 6 1 (Plans of Federation); see also below, p. 79.

20

EAST-CENTRAL EUROPEAN FEDERATION

temptation for potential aggressors—has passed. In union there is strength, and in strength there is peace. Already the governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia have concluded an agreement looking toward a postwar federation. Yugoslavia and Greece have signed a similar treaty. T h e Polish Government under my leadership favors the adoption of federal principles in Central and Eastern Europe. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Greece should be member nations of this great Central European Confederation and later, so should the rehabilitated peoples of Central Europe who have temporarily thrown their lot with Hitler. T h e Confederation, stretching from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, would form a foundation of security against German aggression and would be a safeguard of Russia's security on her western borders against any future German Drang

nach dem

Osten.

Both of the last wars started in Central Europe—one in Belgrade and one in W a r s a w — a n d both were started by Germany. Since this is a war for democracy, the peace must see the extension of this form of government in the Confederation. . . . Each nation would retain its own identity and government. But there must be a central governing council of ministers, selected in democratic fashion. The Confederation should have a single foreign policy, to be directed by the central council, and a single army, drawn from all the nations. There should be no trade barriers or customs duties between the member states, and all should have a common currency. T h e entire area could be developed as an economic unit. T h e 130,000,000 citizens of the Confederation would constitute a vast

new

market for American goods. 1 0 T h e democratic leader of Y u g o s l a v i a , f o r m e r Minister of State and f o r m e r c h a i r m a n of the C e n t r a l a n d Eastern E u r o p e a n P l a n n i n g Board, Sava N . K o s a n o v i c h , w r o t e in favor of close collaboration: T h e nations of Eastern Europe and the Balkans can find a common solution for many of their problems. T h e peasant masses from the Balkans to the Baltic may be looked upon as a unit. Their relationship to industry is the same; their pre-war standard of living was practically the same; and their mentality is almost identical. . . . For the sake of a greater commonwealth of nations, in which he will feel secure as an individual and as a member of nations, the common man of Eastern Europe is ready today to support a realization of the principles I have here outlined. T h e territory between the 10

W l a d i s l a w Sikorski, " P o l a n d

11, 61-62.

W a n t s a Total Pcacc," Collier's,

III ( A p r i l 3,

1943),

EAST-CENTRAL E U R O P E A N

FEDERATION

21

Baltic, the Adriatic and the Aegean Seas should be a bridge between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies. Living on the crossroads between the East and the West, the inhabitants of this territory understand Russia and they understand the West. That area must be the link which will connect Soviet Russia with the great nations of the West. It must not be made into a buffer state between Rusia and the West. If an attempt were made to impose such a solution upon the nations of that territory, they would reject it, for it would mean that in the near future, their countries would again become new theaters of war and victims of new conflicts. The Yugoslavs, Czechoslovaks, Poles and Greeks have suffered enough, and they have shown more than enough moral strength in making sacrifices not only for their existence, but also for the ideals of humanity, not to deserve such a fate. These are the peoples of the common man, and they deserve a common man's peace.11 T h e liberal Greeks are not opposed to a Central and Eastern European Federation, but they would not accept an organization along ethnic lines, that is, Slavic federation. They justly prefer a federation based on universal and democratic principles, repudiating any ethnic or racial alignment. "Greeks, Albanians, Rumanians, Hungarians and Turks are the forces that will counterbalance the Slavic elements in the Federation and will create the confidence which is indispensable for the materialization of such idea," wrote Basil J. Vlavianos, editor of the Greek language daily in New York, The National

Herald,12

an outstanding leader of

Greek liberals. Here Vlavianos presents a democratic viewpoint. In any kind of federation or cooperation there should not be any racial prejudices, not even in a linguistic "Slavonic" sense. In any concept of this type there will always be dangers. The time may come when such a "Slavonic" concept will become a social myth, in Sorel's sense, and will be a dangerous basis for some kind of nationalistic movement. In this area there are all kind of people—beside the Slavonic-speaking there are Greeks, Hungarians, and so forth. A true democratic federation is neither Slavonic nor Panslavic, but democratic, with equal rights for everybody, whether he speaks Hungarian, Greek, Yiddish, or Rumanian. 11

Kosanovich, "Eastern Europe Awaits a Common Man's Peace," in The People's

pp· 135-136·

Peace,

12 Vlavianos, "Anti-Balkan Ideals," The National Herald, April 1 3 , 1944, and Polids, "Nationality in the Balkans," New Europe, IV (July, 1944), 1 3 - 2 1 .

11

EAST-CENTRAL EUROPEAN

FEDERATION

A federal system was also regarded by some American and British experts as the proper way to solve the difficult problems of Central and Eastern Europe. "Unless the nations of Eastern Europe learn the lesson Masaryk tried to teach out of American experience, they must inevitably make way for a greater unitary movement from Central Europe than has yet appeared, backed by the full weight of an industrialized empire. Federalism would save them, but it presupposes peace based on justice," wrote James T . Shotwell as early as 1940, long before the federation idea took on a more definite shape. 13 This idea of a federated Central and Eastern Europe in a united world has inspired emigre circles in London and Washington and New York and wheresoever refugees from nazism gather. It was widely discussed by all such groups. Not only the leaders of the Central and Eastern European states but also the fighters against fascism in the underground movements in these countries are followers of this concept, from radicals and labor leaders to the moderate liberals. In an article in an underground Polish newspaper, Nowe Drogi, January 21, 1942, commenting on the declaration adopted at an International Labor Conference held in New York on November 5, 1942, where delegates of Czechoslovakia, Greece, Poland, and Yugoslavia agreed upon the necessity of close cooperation, we read: "The federated Europe must be composed of federated regions. The Central and Eastern European confederation is regarded as a necessary step." Underground papers of various political tendencies support this idea, though in different ways—for example, Notva Polsf^a (New Poland), July, 1942; Plomien (Flame), January, 1942; Wolnosc, Roivnosc, Niepodlegosc (Liberty, Equality, Independence), a radical labor underground paper issued in Poland—the latter carried an article on February 28, 1941, favoring federation: "Only the concept of international solidarity which respects everybody's national differences but which nevertheless achieves common aims and causes, can be the new hope of Europe." Another underground paper declared: The moral atmosphere of the federation must be created by a deep conviction of its citizens that the union has not been formed to foster imperialism . . . 13

Shotwell and others, Governments

of Continental Europe, p. 34.

EAST-CENTRAL EUROPEAN

FEDERATION

23

of any nation, but to harmonize and coordinate the interests of all the federated nations, to eliminate war, and to facilitate the cultural, political and material development of all the peoples. T h e s e are typical of n u m e r o u s q u o t a t i o n s w h i c h c o u l d be cited f r o m d i f f e r e n t u n d e r g r o u n d p a p e r s , all stressing the fact that o n l y t h r o u g h f e d e r a t i o n can the m u t u a l p r o b l e m s of these states b e solved. O n N o v e m b e r 19, 1942, at a m e e t i n g of the P o l i s h N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l , a k i n d of Polish Parliament-in-exile, representatives of the Polish L a b o r P a r t y ( P . P . S . - P o l i s h Socialist P a r t y ) a n d of the P o l i s h P e a s a n t s P a r t y presented jointly a project o n p o s t w a r P o l a n d . T h e project w a s p r e p a r e d in the Polish u n d e r g r o u n d and transmitted t h r o u g h u n d e r g r o u n d channels to L o n d o n . O n e of the basic p r e m i s e s is that a " p e o p l e ' s " P o l a n d w o u l d f a v o r the o r g a n i z a t i o n of a f e d e r a t i o n of C e n t r a l a n d E a s t e r n Europe. I n connection w i t h their p r o g r a m f o r a people's P o l a n d , the P o l i s h u n d e r g r o u n d m o v e m e n t stressed in a special p a m p h l e t the f o l l o w i n g principles as the f o u n d a t i o n of the p r o p o s e d f e d e r a t i o n : ( 1 ) C i v i l liberties; ( 2 ) equality f o r all citizens, w i t h o u t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n o n account of race or c r e e d ; ( 3 ) social j u s t i c e ; ( 4 ) a g r a r i a n r e f o r m , based o n cooperative f a r m i n g . T h e Polish labor u n d e r g r o u n d criticized the L i t t l e E n t e n t e as inadeq u a t e f o r the present situation; loose f e d e r a t i o n w a s rejected. It recognizes the i m p o r t a n c e of m a k i n g the masses in these countries conscious of the necessity of a superstate o r g a n i z a t i o n as a m e a n s of a c h i e v i n g solid a r i t y . T h e f e d e r a t i o n w i l l need joint councils in w h i c h all the parliam e n t s are represented, a c o m m o n

f o r e i g n policy, a n d

a

reciprocal

e c o n o m i c policy a b o l i s h i n g tariff barriers. T h e r e m u s t be a p l a n n e d e c o n o m y f o r the entire r e g i o n , w i t h e q u a l i z e d labor s t a n d a r d s a n d legislation, p r o v i d i n g f u l l social s e c u r i t y . 1 4 A C z e c h o s l o v a k u n d e r g r o u n d p a p e r stated: " T h e

Polish-Czechoslo-

v a k U n i o n m u s t not be a l l o w e d to b e c o m e the basis f o r a n y imperialist designs. It must r e m a i n one of the stable f o u n d a t i o n s of the f u t u r e f e d eration of f r e e E u r o p e a n nations, based o n peace, security, a n d d e m o c racy.

1»

A l t h o u g h there w a s support a m o n g the leaders of all these states f o r 14

A resume of this material was printed in Robotni\

Polsk.', London, June i , 1 9 4 3 .

24

EAST-CENTRAL EUROPEAN FEDERATION

this ideal of federation, a n d also w i t h i n the u n d e r g r o u n d m o v e m e n t s of these countries, the idea has not been adequately i m p l e m e n t e d .

On

N o v e m b e r n , 1940, there w a s an agreement to f o r m a C z c h o s l o v a k P o l i s h confederation. T h i s w a s f o l l o w e d by an agreement reached in L o n d o n o n January 15,1942, by Y u g o s l a v i a and Greece to f o r m a B a l k a n U n i o n . It w a s greeted by the Poles a n d C z e c h o s l o v a k s on January 24, 1942, in L o n d o n , w h o declared by c o m m o n agreement that the t w o g o v e r n m e n t s desire that the P o l i s h - C z e c h o s l o v a k confederation should embrace other states of the E u r o p e a n area w i t h w h i c h the vital interests of P o l a n d and C z e c h o s l o v a k i a are l i n k e d . T h e purpose of the C z e c h o slovak-Polish confederation is, a c c o r d i n g to this agreement, to assure a c o m m o n policy w i t h regard to: ( a ) f o r e i g n affairs; ( b ) defense; ( c ) econ o m i c matters; ( d ) social questions; ( e ) transport, posts and telegraphs. D e m o c r a t i c principles are regarded in this agreement as an essential condition. In Article 12 w e read that the constitution of the individual states included in the confederation will guarantee to citizens of these states the following rights: ( a ) freedom of conscience; (b) personal freedom; ( c ) freedom of learning; (d) freedom of spoken and written word; ( e ) freedom of organization and association; (/) equality of all citizens before the law; (g) free admission of all citizens to performance of all state functions; ( Λ ) independence of courts of law, control of government by representative national bodies elected by means of free elections. T h e agreement between G r e e c e and Y u g o s l a v i a provides some permanent institutions as " o r g a n s of the u n i o n " ; for instance, a political o r g a n constituted of the ministers for f o r e i g n affairs; an economic and financial o r g a n constituted of t w o m e m b e r s of each g o v e r n m e n t competent in e c o n o m i c and financial matters; a n d a permanent military o r g a n . P r o visions w e r e m a d e for collaboration of the parliaments of the various m e m b e r states. Both of these agreements, in spite of some far-reaching ideas, must be r e g a r d e d as preliminary. Both envisage the establishment of a customs u n i o n a n d presume a coordinated economic policy for this region. B u t in the a g r e e m e n t a customs u n i o n w a s not concluded. E x c e p t for temporary committees, no regular o r g a n s or institutions were f o r m e d . T h e only m o v e e m b r a c i n g the w h o l e area f r o m the Baltic to the

EAST-CENTRAL EUROPEAN FEDERATION

25

A e g e a n was made by representatives of labor, employers, and governments. T h e delegations of workers, employers, and governments w h o met at the International L a b o r Conference on November, 1941, in N e w Y o r k , adopted a declaration concerning the whole region. T h i s declaration was an enthusiastic expression of the aspiration of the people f o r a Central and Eastern E u r o p e a n settlement. 1 6 T h e delegations f r o m Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Poland signed this act and simultaneously asked for a c o m m o n representation on the International L a b o r Office Reconstruction Committee. T h e American Press greeted this act sympathetically. " W e spoke at the I.L.O. Conference on behalf of one hundred milion people," wrote the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, J a n M a s a r y k , 1 6 one of the founders of the Central and Eastern European Planning B o a r d — " W e are ready, we are eager to cooperate to the best of our ability. W e should be given a chance to do so—it is in the interest of all concerned." F r o m the Yugoslav fighting youth came w o r d through underground channels to the Yugoslav Government Mission in N e w Y o r k about this "most hopeful step"; and in the Polish underground press, articles were printed about it. Consequently, in connection with this declaration the Central and Eastern European Planning Board of Czechoslovakia, Y u g o s l a v i a , Greece, and Poland w a s formed as a planning and research agency in January, 1942, in N e w Y o r k . T h e first Steering Committee w a s composed of four members of the respective governments and a secretary general. 1 7 10

Concerning the Declaration, Nicholas Mirkovich stated: "It is undoubtedly an act of first historical significance, and, should a confederation of Central and East European states be made real, November 5 will mark the beginning of the first chapter of a new book. "It was in a spirit of democratic good-will, understanding, sincere insight, and a deep concern for the future that the Declaration was conceived. Its beginnings were a spontaneous affair. "For the time being, one can work but on a blueprint, but blueprints become real things if there is enthusiasm, imagination, and power behind them. As it is now, the Declaration shows a way toward a better future of the masses of the peasant population of Eastern Europe." "East Europe's New York Charter," The Dalhousie Review, XXII (1942), 163-166. Mirkovich was afterwards director of the Yugoslav Office of Reconstruction and chairman of the Central and Eastern European Planning Board's Agricultural Subcommittee. In 1943 he joined the American Army, landed in Dalmatia, Yugoslavia, in 1944, fought with the Partisans against the Germans, and was killed in action there during the spring of 1944. ie Thc Polish Review, December 1, 1 9 4 1 . 17 The members of the first Steering Committee were: for Czechoslovakia, Jan Masaryk,

26

EAST-CENTRAL

EUROPEAN

FEDERATION

It was in reality the only institution embracing all fighting nations of Central and Eastern Europe, members of the United Nations. The formation of the Planning Board was based on the mentioned declaration and on the Atlantic Charter. T h e latest expression of this federal tendency toward federation is an important document, skillfully prepared in London: Central and SouthEast European

Union, published September 21, 1943. It is a courageous

program for a federation of East Central Europe, a fruit of the discussions and work of the Danubian Club. This club originally sprang from the South-East Europe Committee of the Fabian Socicty. Besides British members, the club contains nationals of Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. T h e members are radical democrats, peasant and labor leaders, and socialists. T h e program they issued is an expression of progressive, true democratic, and federal tendencies among the liberal intellectuals of Eastern Europe, as well as the masses. It is signed by responsible leaders of peasants and workers of Central and Eastern Europe. W e will not conceal the fact that the Central and Eastern European Planning Board was not and is not lacking special difficulties in its work. During the past year, particularly, the political realities of power politics have not favored the idea of federation; the outlook for cooperation has been weakened. But private committees and clubs started to operate, and the idea has spread through the underground among the masses. Planning for a confederation required more vision and courage than is usually manifested by cautious diplomats. Such vision and courage was not lacking in the liberal, democratic planning groups which met in London and in N e w York, and especially in the underground movements within the Central and Eastern European countries. T h e governments-in-exile of Yugoslavia and Grcece encountered grave internal difficulties, so that the question of federation and international collaboM i n i s t e r of F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , ant! J a r o m i r N'ecas, Minister of Reconstruction, a l t e r n a t e l y ; f o r Yugoslavia,

Sava

N.

Kosanovich,

Minister

of

State;

f o r Greece,

Aristides

M i n i s t e r of L a b o r and A g r i c u l t u r e , shortly thereafter replaced by E m m a n u e l

Dimitratos, Tsouderos,

P r i m e Minister and Minister of L a b o r ; for Poland, Jan S t a n c z y k , Minister of L a b o r a n d Social W e l f a r e ; Secretary

G e n e r a l , Fcliks Gross. Sava

N. Kosanovich

w a s elected

first

c h a i r m a n , the others acted as deputy chairmen. D u r i n g the absence of Minister J. M a s a r y k , M i n i s t e r Jan P a p a n e k acted as his locum

tenens,

as did Minister S y h v i n S t r a k a c z ( P o l a n d )

f o r Minister J. S t a n c z y k and Minister Stavros T h e o p h a n i d e s ( G r e e c e ) f o r P r i m e Minister E . Tsouderos.

EAST-CENTRAL EUROPEAN FEDERATION

27

r a t i o n b e c a m e s e c o n d a r y . D i f f i c u l t i e s w e r e p r e s e n t e d also to t h e C e n t r a l a n d E a s t e r n E u r o p e a n P l a n n i n g B o a r d b y the p o l i t i c a l realities w h i c h w e r e r e p e r c u s s i o n s of this s i t u a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e , a l t h o u g h at t h e e n d of 1943 t h e f e d e r a l p r i n c i p l e r e m a i n e d a l i v i n g ideal a m o n g t h e p e o p l e o f this a r e a a n d t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a b r o a d , n e v e r t h e l e s s , i n o f f i c i a l a n d diplomatic pronouncements

a n d a c t i v i t i e s the i d e a of f e d e r a t i o n

has

g r o w n w e a k e r than formerly. Primarily

responsible

for the m o m e n t a r y

weakening

of

the

drive

t o w a r d f e d e r a t i o n is t h e u n f r i e n d l y a t t i t u d e of the S o v i e t U n i o n t o w a r d a n y f e d e r a t i o n w h a t e v e r in E u r o p e , at least f o r t h e m o m e n t . It is n o w a p p a r e n t that w i t h o u t a p r e v i o u s s e t t l e m e n t of the s t a t u s of t h e n a t i o n s of C e n t r a l a n d E a s t e r n E u r o p e n o f e d e r a t i o n w i l l b e p o s s i b l e .

MAP I. The Proposed Federation of Central and Eastern Europe in One All-Embracing Political and Economic Union

IV · The Extent of the East-central European Federation T H E East-central European federation should embrace A l bania, Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Poland, and Rumania. It should bring together about n o millions of people of various nationalities. However, there are different conceptions as to the application of the federal principles. T h e projects fall generally into three groups, as follows: ( i ) One inclusive federation of states from the Aegean Sea to the Baltic (see Map I ) . (2) T w o federations: in the north a Polish-Czechoslovak union; and in the south a Danubian federation of Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece and Albania (see Map II). (3) Three federations: (a) in the north a federation of Poland and Czechoslovakia; (b) in the middle a Danubian federation of Austria, Hungary, and R u m a n i a ; (c) in the south a union of the Balkan States (see Map III). Eventually Austria could be attached to the northern union. T h e maps do not reflect any disputes over boundaries, but follow preMunich maps. It is proposed that this union of small states will form a part of the general European federation, which, in turn, will be part of a world federation. Thus, and thus only, can collective security be assured and the age-old feuds and conflicts in the "powder-keg of Europe" be extinguished so that they will never again be the spark lighting a world conflagration. Such a federation can be established only on a democratic basis. According to the second proposal ( M a p I I ) , there would be close collaboration between the two on both economic and political questions. T h e plan for a Balkan federation has a somewhat longer tradition than does the plan for an all-embracing union of these states from the Baltic to the Aegean seas. Turkey looks with favor on the idea of a Balkan federation and would collaborate or even possibly join such a union. T h e third plan (Map I I I ) has its disadvantages as compared with the first and second plans, but it has more legal and historical basis. After the outbreak of the second World W a r steps were taken toward the Polish-Czechoslovak federation; likewise there was formed a YugoslavGreek confederation as the Balkan Union. Liberals in Yugoslavia and

M A P II. An A l t e r n a t i v e P l a n for Two Cooperating F e d e r a t i o n s : ( 1 ) a northern f e d e r a t i o n and ( 2 ) a southern f e d e r a t i o n

THE EXTENT OF THE FEDERATION

31

Bulgaria are looking forward toward a democratic South Slav Union embracing all the Slavic peoples of the Balkan Peninsula. T h e greatest defect of this plan is that ( 1 ) it would separate the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe and (2) the central federation of Austria, Hungary, and Rumania would unite three nations now collaborating with the fascist Axis and would not eliminate the danger of a future aggressive plot of this bloc with Germany. This plan must be discarded in favor of one of the first two plans, of which the all-embracing union is preferable. Some Polish plans envisaged a Central and Eastern European federation without Austria, since, they argued, it would mean German influence on the new young union. Contrary to these plans, most of the Czechoslovak experts regarded inclusion of Austria in this federation as a conditio

sine qua non. Austria outside the Central and Eastern

European federation implies, sooner or later, an "Anschluss." " A n schluss," in turn, means the immediate influence and pressure of Germany in the Danubian basin, and we have had sufficient experience of this kind. 1 A project for formation of a large Balkan Union embracing Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Albania in which Yugoslavia is to be a federation of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and Bulgarians has been proposed lately by the Yugoslav Minister Sava N . Kosanovich, member of the Subasich Government. There may exist some other proposals, but it is beyond the scope of this book to discuss all of them. Of course, it must be recognized that the fate of the Baltic States is very uncertain; but those who wish to see the universal application of the principles of the Atlantic Charter, regardless of demands and conflicting national interests, advocate that the three small states must not be deprived of their basic international rights. These are some attitudes and plans in respect to the Baltic States: (a) According to persistent rumors, the Baltic States may be absorbed 1 As a result of the annexation of Austria in 1938, " G e r m a n y obtained definite economic supremacy in the Danube basin and, moreover, a springboard for further military and economic expansion. This one experience too clearly demonstrated that the economic and political balance in this part of Europe will always be disturbed when Austria belongs to any kind of union or federation with Germany. Austria belongs to the Danubian group, economically, politically, and geographically; she holds a key position for maintaining a workable balance in this part of Europe. Thus "annexation has exposed problems of European magnitude," states the Czechoslovak economist, Antonin Bäsch, in The Danube Basin and the German Economic Sphere, p. 203.

M A P III. A Third Alternative Plan for Federalism in Central and Eastern E u r o p e : three federations which would also cooperate with each other

33

THE EXTENT OF THE FEDERATION

by the Soviet Union. (b) Henrikas Rabinavicius, former Lithuanian Charge d'Affaires in Washington, advocates a return to the mutual assistance pacts signed by the Soviet Union and the Baltic States in 1939, which provided military bases for the U.S.S.R. in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. This would mean a limited independence for the Baltic States and military bases for the U.S.S.R. "Lithuanians . . . hope," Rabinavicius wrote, "that . . . Soviet Russia will restore the treaty (1939 cd.) and will treat Lithuania and the other Baltic States in the same manner as Great Britain treats Egypt, or as the United States will treat the Philippines, in accordance with the recent statement made by President Roosevelt."

2

(