The Eurasian Space: Far More Than Two Continents 9789812305886

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The Eurasian Space

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IIAS/ISEAS Series on Asia

Series Editors: Wim Stokhof and Paul van der Velde The IIAS/ISEAS Series on Asia takes a multidisciplinary approach to issues of inter-regional and multilateral importance for Asia in a global context. The series aims to stimulate dialogue amongst scholars and civil society groups at the local, regional and international levels.

Titles in This Series Srilata Ravi, Mario Rutten and Beng-Lan Goh, eds., Asia in Europe, Europe in Asia (2004). Volume 1. Wim Stokhof, Paul van der Velde and Yeo Lay Hwee, eds., The Eurasian Space: Far More Than Two Continents (2004). Volume 2. The International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) is a postdoctoral research centre based in Leiden and Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Its main objective is to encourage the study of Asia and to promote national and international co-operation in this field. The geographical scope of the Institute covers South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, and Central Asia. The Institute focuses on the humanities and the social sciences and, where relevant, on their interaction with other sciences. The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) was established as an autonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional centre dedicated to the study of socio-political, security and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its wider geostrategic and economic environment. The Institute’s research programmes are the Regional Economic Studies (RES, including ASEAN and APEC), Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS), and Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS). ISEAS Publications, an established academic press, has issued more than 1,000 books and journals. It is the largest scholarly publisher of research about Southeast Asia from within the region. ISEAS Publications works with many other academic and trade publishers and distributors to disseminate important research and analyses from and about Southeast Asia to the rest of the world.

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IIAS/ISEAS Series on Asia

The Eurasian Space

Far More Than 1\vo Continents Edited by

W1m Stokhof • Paul van der Velde • Yeo Lay Hwee

I5ER5 International Institute for Asian Studies, The Netherlands

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

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First published in Singapore in 2004 by ISEAS Publications Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 E-mail: [email protected] Website: http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg First published in Europe in 2004 by International Institute for Asian Studies P.O. Box 9515 2300 RA Leiden The Netherlands E-mail: [email protected] Website: http://iias.leidenuniv.nl All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. © 2004 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore The responsibility for facts and opinions in this publication rests exclusively with the authors and their interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the publishers or their supporters. ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data The Eurasian Space : Far More Than Two Continents / edited by Wim Stokhof, Paul van der Velde and Yeo Lay Hwee. 1. Regionalism—Asia. 2. Regionalism—Europe. 3. Asia-Europe Meeting. 4. Asia—Foreign relations—Europe. 5. Europe—Foreign relations—Asia. 6. Asia—Foreign economic relations—Europe. 7. Europe—Foreign economic relations—Asia. I. Stokhof, W. A. L. II. Velde, Paul van der. III. Yeo, Lay Hwee. DS33.4 E8E91 2004 ISBN 981-230-255-7 (soft cover) ISBN 981-230-263-8 (hard cover) Typeset by Superskill Graphics Pte Ltd Printed in Singapore by Oxford Graphic Printers Pte Ltd

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Introduction — The Eurasian Space: Far More Than Two Continents Wim Stokhof, Paul van der Velde and Yeo Lay Hwee

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ASEM: Value-Added to International Relations and to the Asia-Europe Relationship Michael Reiterer

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Collective Identity-Building through Trans-regionalism: ASEM and East Asian Regional Identity Julie Gilson and Yeo Lay Hwee

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Inter-regionalism and Regional Actors: The EU-ASEAN Example Mathew Doidge

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ASEM’s Extra-regionalism: Converging Europe’s and East Asia’s External Projections toward Other Regions César de Prado Yepes

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ASEM — A Catalyst for Dialogue and Co-operation: The Case of FEALAC David M. Milliot

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ASEM’s Security Agenda Revisited Heiner Hänggi

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The Euro and East Asian Monetary Co-operation Xu Mingqi

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China and ASEM: Strengthening Multilateralism through Inter-regionalism Sebastian Bersick

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Japan and ASEM Kazuhiko Togo

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Korea and ASEM David Camroux and Park Sunghee

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Abbreviations

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References

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Contributors

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Introduction to the Eurasian Space

1 Introduction — The Eurasian Space: Far More Than Two Continents Wim Stokhof, Paul van der Velde and Yeo Lay Hwee

The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) officially established in 1996 is an interregional, some say trans-regional, forum that consists of the seven members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China, Japan and South Korea and the fifteen member states of the European Union (EU) and the European Commission (EC). The three pillars of the ASEM process, which has so far been loosely organized, include political, economic and socio-cultural dialogue. It is a soft-institutionalized process of consultation and co-operation between states from different regions of the world acting in their individual capacity. ASEM’s operating mode is based on informality, mutual respect and mutual benefit. Its scope of discussion and activity is multi-dimensional and encompasses politics, economics, societal, as well as cultural and intellectual exchange. In general the process is considered by all parties involved as a forum for enhancing the relations between Asia and Europe at all levels deemed necessary to achieve a more balanced multilateral world order. In the post-9/11 world and with the war and

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ongoing instability in Iraq there is ever more reason for Asia and Europe to deepen their co-operation to meet the common challenges of international terrorism, and maintaining a just and stable world order. This book, The Eurasian Space: Far More than Two Continents, is a sequel to the two books Stokhof and Van der Velde edited respectively five and three years ago: ASEM The Asia-Europe Meeting A Window of Opportunity (London 1999) and Asian-European Perspectives: Developing the ASEM Process (London 2001). In ASEM The Asia-Europe Meeting A Window of Opportunity we took a look at the politicians’ and bureaucrats’ view of ASEM, the possibilities to improve mutual contact between Asia and Europe while simultaneously trying to delineate the challenges and problem areas and hence map out the future of ASEM. In Asian-European Perspectives: Developing the ASEM Process answers to questions of a more practical nature or views on the process were given: How can the ASEM potential be realized? How can we create a usable ASEM vocabulary and how can we create a Eurasian research culture? This present volume have been edited together with Yeo Lay Hwee, Executive Director and Senior Research Fellow of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs, and co-published with the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore. This is a conscious move to increase academic co-operation between Asia and Europe. The contributors of this book consist of academics who can rightly be called specialists in the budding field of ASEM studies. They share a deep interest in how the relationship between Asia and Europe can be further enhanced. Their articles are written with the objective of examining the level of engagement between Asia and Europe, and highlighting how the ASEM process has been useful directly or indirectly not only in enhancing the ties between the various Asian and European countries, but also in contributing to the general development of new approaches to international co-operation. We have brought their contributions under four main headings: ASEMness and East Asianness; Inter-regionalism, transregionalism and extra-regionalism; Security and monetary co-operation; and East Asia and ASEM.

ASEMness and East Asianness Against the backdrop of the issue of the enlargement of ASEM, Michael Reiterer in his contribution, “ASEM: Value-Added to International

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Relations and to the Asia-Europe Relationship”, addresses a key question: what is ASEM all about and what function can it play in the area of international politics and the wider Asia-Europe relationship? He reiterates and highlights some of the discussion and debates on how ASEM has conceptually contributed to multi-level governance in international politics through encouraging inter-regional and intraregional co-operation and regional identity building and by enhancing multilateralism. In more concrete terms ASEM made a contribution to world governance in the fields of furthering cross-cultural understanding and mutual respect; overcoming narrow nationalism; regime building in specific issue areas; encouraging multi-dimensional dialogue and co-operation; the EU acting as a balancing and stabilizing power in East Asia and by enhancing the visibility and the role of the EU. More generally, ASEM can be regarded as a valuable experiment of quasiinstitutionalization, which brings together different cultural approaches to international co-operation, that is, the legalistic formal European approach and the pragmatic informal Asian approach. One of the issues in relation to the conceptual framework of the AsiaEurope relationship, is the effects of inter-regional interactions on regional identity building or more concisely, fostering regionalism through interregionalism. This is taken up by Julie Gilson and Yeo Lay Hwee in their chapter, “Collective Identity-Building through Trans-regionalsim: ASEM and the East Asian Regional Identity”. In it a constructivist perspective is taken, focusing on the role of ideas and interests in the creation of regional identity and on critical historical junctures from which new structural or institutional arrangements, norms and identities emerge and on interactions between existing cultures and institutions. The latter are defined as regularized channels of communication among state representatives acting in accordance with obligations set out in statements or declarations such as ASEM. While they do not overtly say that ASEM has been the impetus behind an East Asian regional identity, they conceive ASEM along the lines as lying within a process of increasing regional identification for the purpose of external affairs, which can ultimately lead to the development of a dominant discourse of East Asianness. Be that as it may, Gilson and Yeo do not hesitate to speak about an Asian identity in the context of ASEM that has become established by participation within a forum where a clear “other”, that is, the European Union, exists. At the basis of this emerging Asian identity is the intensification of co-operation among Asian

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countries in which ASEM has functioned as a stepping-stone for other regional initiatives such as the ASEAN+3 (South Korea, Japan and China) process (1997), which in turn reinforced ASEM.

Inter-regionalism, Trans-regionalism and Extra-regionalism The EU-ASEAN relationship is one of the oldest group-to-group dialogues and has been in existence since 1972. Mathew Doidge’s contribution “Interregionalism and Regional Actors: The EU-ASEAN Example” focuses on the function such a dialogue may perform. He applies the concept of actorness, the capacity to act in the international system, to explain performance and non-performance of this relationship. In addition to identity, actorness has three main components: action triggers (goals, interests, principles); policy structures and processes which involves the capacity to take decisions in relation to action triggers; and performance structures which includes all those structures and resources necessary for the actual performance of a given task once a decision has been taken. Doidge concludes that despite its long existence almost all advanced functions of inter-regionalism such as alliance-style balancing, rationalizing and agenda setting are hardly performed in the EU-ASEAN context. By applying the concept of actorness to ASEM, it would create the possibility of assessing the qualitative levels of actorness, which can be used in targetting efforts towards areas where success is most likely, instead of wasting them in those areas where their actorness is insufficient. In his article, “ASEM’s Extra-Regionalism: Converging Europe’s and East Asia’s External Projections towards Other Regions”, Cesar de Prado Yepes first focuses on the commonalities of the regional processes of the EU and East Asia which are reflected in the ASEM. At the heart of this process lays the conviction of all members that multilateralism fed by regional and inter-regional processes should be the facilitator of international relations. De Prado Yepes continues with an overview of the many regionalisms outside Asia and Europe such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC), the African Union (AU) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In a matrix, de Prado Yepes demonstrates that ASEM can potentially create extra-regional synergies with other world regions through the

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selective engagement of representatives of world regions in the ASEM process and through converging inter-regional processes that both Europe and East Asia have with other parts of the world. David Milliot in his contribution, “ASEM — a Catalyst for Dialogue and Cooperation: The Case of FEALAC”, studies the influence ASEM has had on the formation of the Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC) which was founded in 1999. It brings together the ten ASEAN countries, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and seventeen countries from Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. ASEM’s influence was considerable because its framework was used as a blueprint thus offering FEALAC similar working processes and functionalities as ASEM. Although FEALAC has so far kept a low profile, it is nevertheless a clear example that ASEM has made its mark in international relations as a catalyst for dialogue and co-operation and that both processes mark the emergence of a multi-level governance and creates a new trans-regional level between the regional and universal levels. It is up to the Asians and Europeans to turn trans-regionalism into a substantial and innovative component of international relations.

Security and Monetary Co-operation Heiner Hänggi in his contribution, “ASEM’s Security Agenda Revisited”, takes stock of the ASEM security agenda against the background of the process in general which started with a strong geo-economic agenda which gradually gave way to a more geo-political one culminating in the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the outbreak of the war in Iraq which once more gave security a central role in international relations. These external factors led to an increasing securitization of the ASEM agenda while internal factors relating to the political pillar of ASEM which has a political value (human rights and democratization) and security dimension (covering a broad range of traditional and new security issues) also strengthened the latter because it holds far more common ground than the political dimension. Therefore one can say that ASEM has in the past eight years acquired a certain “security acquis”. Hänggi is of the opinion that a further securitization of ASEM will decrease the relevance of the process because it was built on a geo-economic rationale. Nevertheless, the ASEM

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partners should use their inter-regional framework as instrument for keeping the United States engaged in a multilateral framework and to check and balance the United States’ unilateralist strivings. The Declaration on Multilateralism agreed upon during the Sixth Foreign Ministers Meeting (2004) can be construed as a strong signal. Whilst the influence of European and Asian influence on the world security agenda is limited, Xu Mingqi in his article, “The Euro and East Asia Monetary Co-operation”, is of the opinion that the European Monetary Union and the euro will have a strong influence not only on the monetary situation in Asia but also worldwide. First of all the introduction of the euro has lowered the transaction costs between Asia and Europe, which is beneficial for both parties. More and more transactions are in euro instead of in dollar. At the same time the introduction of the European currency has clearly inspired ideas of East Asian monetary co-operation. Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), a precondition for monetary integration, are in the pipeline. A lot will depend on the willingness of Japan and China to cooperate. Xu regards the Chiang Mai Initiative (2000), a bilateral swap agreement within the ASEAN+3 framework as its multilateral base, as the cornerstone of the future East Asian monetary co-operation. For the time being Xu envisions a bipolar euro-dollar international monetary system but with the strengthening of East Asian monetary co-operation a tripolar system will emerge which will further stabilize the international system.

East Asia and ASEM China, Japan, and South Korea have all, albeit at different points in time, from different angles and with different degrees of intensity, become involved in the ASEM process. One of the raisons d’etre for that process was to engage China further in world affairs and its interest in it dates from the turn of the century. Sebastian Bersick in his article, “China and ASEM: Strengthening Multilateralism through Inter-Regionalism”, examines why China has increasingly come to regard ASEM as a vehicle to further its foreign policy which is geared towards a tripolar world order. ASEM as such has at its heart multilateralism as an organizing principle of the international system while at the same time this approach stimulates inter-regional and intra-regional co-operation. The ASEM regime then can be regarded as a new way of balancing regions and nations in an

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evolving multipolar world order through increasing interdependencies which fits with present-day Chinese foreign policy. Kazuhiko Togo in his article, “Japan and ASEM” first describes Japan’s post Second World War Policy towards East Asia and Europe and the opportunity created by ASEM, with its comprehensive agenda including political, economical and security dialogue, to discuss its relationships with Asian countries in a multilateral context while at the same time offering the opportunity to reconsider its primarily bilateral relations with European countries. Togo then analyzes how Japan’s involvement in ASEM has changed its policies towards Asia and Europe from the angle of its desire to be actively involved in the East Asian Community and from the perspective of deepening its ties with member states of the EU. In his concluding remarks, Togo pleads for what he calls a true Eurasian perspective that is to develop ASEM as an entity with a bigger geopolitical perspective, which includes the Russian Federation. In their contribution, “Korea and ASEM”, David Camroux and Sunghee Park first analyze ASEM in the context of EU-Korean relations and then focus on South Korea’s ASEM diplomacy. The ties between Korea and the EU were, in comparison to other Asian countries till the mid-eighties, not very strong due to a lack of a Western colonial presence and because of the European conception seeing Korea as a developing country. In the nineties however, the economic and political ties between Korea and the EU matured. In 1996 at the outset of ASEM, Korea’s interest in it was based on the idea that it could counterbalance APEC. The active engagement of Korea in ASEM was triggered by its wish to obtain European support for its Sunshine Policy of engagement with North Korea which the United States refused to give. It used the hosting of the ASEM 3 summit in Seoul as a platform to internationalize its North Korea policy exemplified by the Seoul Declaration for Peace on the Korean peninsula. Camroux and Park conclude that the ASEM process has been truly beneficial for South Korea because it strengthened the promotion of its national interest and improved its bargaining power with the EU.

Concluding Remarks The Eurasian space is still far from being a continuum. While the present enlargement of ASEM is already a complicated affair, the inclusion of

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India and Russian Federation will be the big challenge for the decade lying ahead of us. Only then would one be able to speak of a real geographical continuum. Leaving geography aside ASEM has since its inception and because of its multilateralist organizing principle of the international system, paved the way for the eradication of inter-regional and intra-regional barriers at practically all levels of human interaction, which is showing us the way to a multipolar world order in which unilateralist behaviour will be regarded as uncouth globally and regionally. This last sentence may be construed as an abstract definition of an avantgarde concept in global relations. While the future of the official ASEM process may look uncertain as the recent cancellation of two ministerial meetings over Myanmar’s participation in the process exemplified, ASEM has provided that impetus toward new approaches to international relations. If ASEM had not been launched in 1996, it would have been re-invented sooner or later. That it has travelled this far, and spawn a network of interested people, academic and research institutions and civil society organizations, hold promise for the future. In the years ahead, those of us who have been following the ASEM process, and witnessing the increasing linkages develop between Asia and Europe, look forward to more research, more studies and more space in which we can all interact without unnecessary physical and mental barriers.

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2 ASEM: Value-Added to International Relations and to the Asia-Europe Relationship Michael Reiterer

In the run up to the fifth Summit of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in Hanoi in October 2004, the issue of ASEM enlargement is taking centre stage. While the Asian ASEM partners insist on a simultaneous enlargement, admitting the three missing ASEAN members, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, at the same time as ten new Member States join the European Union, the Union is prepared to accept unconditionally only Cambodia and Laos but not Myanmar because the EU’s Common Position1 on this country contains sanctions, in particular on the military members of the government. This problem, which has turned into a question of principle and pride, brings again the question of the nature of ASEM and its role in international relations to the fore. What is ASEM all about, and what functions can it fulfil? ASEM was set up originally to provide a much needed platform for heads of state or government from parts of Asia and Europe to meet and get acquainted during the period of the (East) Asian

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economic boom. However, ASEM has gradually changed its nature and function in reaction to changes in the international environment. This chapter attempts to take a fresh look at the role and function that ASEM can usefully play as an inter-regional process in the wider AsiaEurope relationship. Conceptually we can say that ASEM has contributed to multi-level governance in international politics through: Encouraging inter-regional co-operation; promoting intra-regional co-operation and regional identity-building; enhancing or promoting multilateralism. Concretely, ASEM process has contributed to world governance through: EU acting as a balancing and stabilizing power in East Asia; enhancing the visibility and role of the EU; encouraging multidimensional dialogue and co-operation; regime building in specific issue areas; overcoming narrow nationalism; and furthering cross-cultural understanding and mutual respect.

Inter- and Intra-regional Co-operation and Regional Identity Building It seems natural that the EU should be the champion of inter-regionalism as it has reached the deepest degree of regional integration worldwide. Inter-regional or group-to-group dialogue pursued by the EU dates back to the late 1970s and early 1980s. These inter-regional relations are handled in varying formats, differing in intensity and broadness of approach; they include, inter alia, the EU-ASEAN partnership,2 the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process),3 the Cotonou Process,4 EU-Mercosur,5 EU-Co-operation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC), 6 EU-South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC), 7 EU-South African Development Community (SADC), the Summit between the Heads of State and Government of Latin America, the Caribbean and the European Union,8 the EU-Andean Summit.9 Looking at EU’s approach towards external relations, one could see ASEM as one of the many group-to-group or inter-regional dialogues that have been very much part of the EU’s political and economic strategy since the 1980s. The EU has gained broad experience in using the interregional dialogue to manage increasing global interdependence, maximize local resources and move towards a more consistent European foreign policy, as well as foster the peaceful resolution of conflicts and greater co-operation.10

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While East Asian integration may pale in comparison to the integration process within the EU, it has picked up pace since the Asian financial crisis. In fact, one could also attribute the ASEM process for being one of the factors contributing to enhanced intra-regional co-operation within East Asia. Although the European Union has developed an overall Asia Strategy, it recognizes the diversity of Asia in political, economic, cultural, religious, historical and geographical terms. Consequently, a specific strategy for a special partnership with South East Asia was added in 2003.11 In terms of ASEM, this recognition was translated into the establishment of two Asian co-ordinators, one on behalf of the ASEAN countries, another one on behalf of the North East Asian partners. In the sub-regional context, ASEAN members have developed a certain culture of co-operation and co-ordination, although at a low level of integration: the “ASEAN way”12 assures consensus based actions only and non-interference in internal affairs. Since the Manila Summit (1999) there are some timid efforts to soften this principle that limits the problem solving capacity of ASEAN. Thailand, attempting to fill the power vacuum created by the disappearance of Indonesia as leader of ASEAN after the Asian financial crisis which brought the downfall of long time president Suharto, established the “Bangkok process” to facilitate or accelerate change in Myanmar. Although a Thai and not ASEAN initiative, it might be another step in the direction of establishing a regional problem solving capacity. The three North East Asian states China, Japan and South Korea, chartered new ground — learning to co-ordinate themselves in so diverse and sensitive areas as politics, economics and social and cultural, intellectual and people-to-people matters is work in slow progress. The need to merge South East and North East Asian views into one Asian view when meeting European partners is an important contribution to forging a regional identity and confidence building among Asian partners who still regard each other with a fair amount of suspicion.13 ASEM has contributed to bringing Southeast Asians and Northeast Asians together through the need for more co-ordination prior to official ASEM meetings. The meetings of Asian senior officials in preparing ASEM meetings contribute to the development of a nascent East Asian identity uniting the two sub-regions. Studies in inter-regionalism underline that the interactions between regions have a direct impact on the players involved. Through interactions

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the specificities of each region are highlighted which contributes to their further development and to the identity building of the regions, a sort of “fostering ‘regionalism through interregionalism’ ”.14 In addition, “[t]he growing numbers of regional actors created a need for intermediaries linking global and regional institutions and (at the lower end of the international system), regional and national policy making levels”. Applied to East Asia, Gilson argues that15 “ASEM has contributed towards the selfidentification of an ‘East Asia’ region, by providing a functional structure and a cognitive backdrop for new forms of collective behaviour”. Constructivists would argue that ASEM shapes the Asian region: “For the first time in modern era, Asia is emerging as distinct regional state system — a cluster of strong, prosperous, independent states dealing intensively and continuously with one another in diplomatic, strategic and economic matters.”16 In the inter-regional context the EU contributes by way of example the lesson that deep-seated hostility can be overcome and even be turned into a motor for integration (France, Germany). This process has not yet advanced sufficiently in Asia: Japan is lacking a partner in Asia allowing it to play a role comparable to the one played by Germany in Europe. ASEM could provide a regional setting in which Japan, especially when exercising the rotating co-ordinatorship for North East Asia, could conduct a more active foreign policy and become more assertive vis-à-vis European partners to prove her “Asianness”. Japan’s support for the Asian position on insisting on unconditional membership for Myanmar is one example of such a policy where Japan can put herself in the Asian camp, a role she cannot really play in other areas (Korean Peninsula, Iraq) where she is following U.S. policy17 because of the long shadow of the bilateral Security Pact.

Promoting Effective Multilateralism The habit of multilateralism, especially in the security arena, is still not entrenched in the East Asian region because of historical reasons and the role of the United States. The U.S. bilateral security arrangements with the various East Asian countries has stifled attempts by East Asian countries to work more multilaterally to manage common security problems. Hence, bilateralism remains the preferred route.

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ASEM from the outset has reaffirmed its commitment to multilateralism. Hence the very first few initiatives of ASEM talked about reform of the UN to ensure its relevance, and supporting the WTO process to ensure an open, multilateral trading order. The post-September 11 world with an increasingly unilateral Bush administration has further heightened the need felt by Asians and Europeans to promote multilateralism as the framework for confronting the common challenges facing us. From an institutionalist point of view, ASEM as an inter-regional forum may be regarded as rationalisers of multilateral fora.18 As Rueland explained, the presence of inter-regional dialogues add another layer into the process of policy-making in international relations. Due to an ever increasing number of international actors, their heterogeneity of interests and the growing complexity of policy fields, it is becoming more and more difficult to reach consensus at multilateral global level. Inter-regional dialogues such as ASEM thus negotiate topics that previously were immediately transferred to global multilateral fora and helped to strengthen the process of institutionalization of international politics. They helped to inculcate co-operative principles and norms and hence is an important ingredient of multilateralism.19 Most recently, at the Sixth ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in Ireland in April 2004, ASEM members reiterated the value they placed on multilateralism by incorporating a Special Declaration on Multilateralism into the Chair’s statement.

EU Acting as a Balancing and Stabilizing Power in East Asia Despite the end of the Cold War, there remains a high potential for conflicts based either on unresolved conflicts (Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Straits, Kurile Islands, South China Sea, Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) or the possible rekindling of power rivalry between Asian powers (China, Japan, India, Russia) or China and the extra-regional balancer, the United States. The lack of an efficient regional security forum — the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is still in a rather embryonic state when judged against effectiveness — was felt recently when a forum was needed to deal with the nuclear threat allegedly posed by North Korea. When the Four Party enlarged to Six Party Talks, Japan was granted a seat at the table, while

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Europe remains an interested observer with a stake in the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) only. Whether the Six Party Talks become the nucleus for a regional security forum or whether an OSCE type of process gains momentum, ASEM could seize this opportunity to play a more active albeit limited security role in the future in involving Europe more effectively in Asia. ASEM’s contribution could be in the field of soft security and related human security issues,20 while leaving the role of the U.S. as a military balancer uncontested. At the outset of ASEM the EU and ASEAN had an interest to engage China to stabilize East Asia and to contribute to the stabilization of one of the most volatile areas of the world after the Middle East. Over the years there was a remarkable development of the political and security dimension in ASEM — to be continued, although certainly at a slower pace compared to the economic pillar. This is another area where ASEM could develop a greater “multilateral utility function”21 in due course. ASEM could provide an additional stabilizing function when economic international competition strengthens because of the further rise of China; as the (geo) political conflict with Europe will remain comparatively low, the dialogue process may provide stability in an otherwise tenser environment. Therefore it is not surprising that the economic pillar of ASEM is the best developed comprising the Trade Facilitation Action Plan (TFAP), the Investment Promotion Action Plan (IPAP), Investment Experts’ Group, ASEM Invest Online,22 ASEM Connect23 the Asia-Europe Business Forum (AEBF) in addition to regular economic ministerial meetings prepared by officials at various levels. In this context, Kang’s view based on an analysis of the historic balancing function of China in the region merits mentioning. While he also underlines the importance of engaging China, he sees a “plausible argument that … a hierarchic system is re-emerging in Asia”.24 In his view Asian countries (including Japan) are inclined to accept the leading role of China as “Asian international relations emphasized formal hierarchy among nations, while allowing considerable informal equality… While realists and liberals have tended to view modern Asia as potentially unstable, if the system is reverting to a pattern of hierarchy, the result may be increased stability.”25 ASEM also acts as a corrective against the perceived dominance that “the West” equals the United States in international relations. The recent difference of opinion between most European nations and the United

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States on the war in Iraq has demonstrated to Islamic countries (the largest Islamic country of the world, Indonesia, is an Asian ASEM partner) that “the West” is not monolithic and that a conflict of “the rest against the West” can be avoided. Establishing firmly a Dialogue of Cultures and Civilization, as initiated by the Fourth ASEM Summit in Copenhagen involving a broad spectrum of stakeholders would be further proof of ASEM’s utility.

Enhancing the Visibility and Role of the European Union In Asia, there is still a stronger tendency to pursue separate bilateral relations with European countries rather than attempt to understand the inner workings of the European Union, and to deal with EU as a diplomatic entity. Because of the prominent role played by the Commission in coordinating the participation of EU members in the ASEM process, EU comes across more as a unified actor. ASEM therefore offers EU the possibility of a substantial diplomatic role with its civic power, relying on economic strength and related parallel interests, to engage East Asia, especially with the three North East Asian partners. Making use of the existing intra-European co-ordination mechanism and its competence in trade issues, the EU is a stronger actor in these matters than other partners confirming the realist approach to international relations. For example, during the Copenhagen summit the EU managed to put the euro clearly on the agenda when a Task Force was set up to study the impact of the euro on the financial markets and Asian bond markets.26 The report of the Task Force is due for ASEM 5 in Hanoi in October 2004. The impact of the euro on international relations has not been fully appreciated. From the political point of view, the introduction and the ensuing use of the euro were an important boost to raising the awareness of the European Union in Asia in general. In the same way as the euro has contributed to deepening integration among the participants in Europe and those depending de facto on the euro, Asian countries are now studying closely the European monetary co-operation in order to draw lessons and inspiration on the feasibility of a common Asian currency. Indeed monetary co-operation among the Asian countries have picked up pace after the failed attempt to set up an Asian Monetary Fund.27

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Encouraging Multi-dimensional Dialogue and Co-operation ASEM strives to overcome mutual historically embedded reservations in the Europe-Asia context by underlining the equal partnership of partners — a conscious effort to overcome any feature of colonialism or superiority. At the same time, this principle of equal partnership allows political dialogue (although in narrowly defined areas) and excludes development assistance dispersed through ASEM, as the latter would be the recognition of an unequal donor — recipient relationship. This approach is in line with the three-pillar structure of ASEM — an equal and comprehensive relationship between the two regions. Development assistance is left to the bilateral relations of EU member states and the Commission with Asian partners. While most of the Asian partners proudly follow this approach, there are some developing ASEM partners who occasionally try to introduce development aspects in proposing initiatives which de facto would result in the granting of aid. Unlike APEC, ASEM was conceived from the outset as a comprehensive and not only economic approach to international relations. This approach reflected not only much better the state of international relations in the mid-1990s characterized by globalization, but allowed ASEM to take up terrorism at ministerial and summit level in 2000 and 2002, without “distorting” the normal agenda, unlike the APEC summit in Shanghai where the United States called for and got support for the fight against terrorism right after 11 September 2001.

Regime-Building in Specific Issue Areas Yeo rightly draws attention to the regime building aspect28 in the economic pillar of ASEM. In discussing the Trade and Investment Promotion Action Plans, partners developed best practices, set up reporting schemes and discussed WTO matters in detail at high official and political (ministerial) level. Debating conflicts of interest on WTO matters openly and trying to build coalitions where possible to advance the international agenda is an important contribution to reaching global governance. Acting as a catalyst for results in the competent international organization is an important auxiliary function of ASEM.

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Asserting a regime in the context of the economic pillar of ASEM is in line with standard approach in international relations, as “[a]t least at a first approximation, trade is one area of IR governed by an international regime…Regimes are clearly seen as part of the governance of the international system but it should be noted that, pace the importance of the WTO in this case, they represent a clear break from the emphasis on institutions characteristic of the old Bretton Woods System… Regime theory is a genuine attempt to come to terms with post-Bretton Woods changes in the world economy”.29 Krasner provided the state-of-the-art definition of a regime as a set of “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”.30 The elements of this definition are useful tools for evaluating cooperation in ASEM as they allow a dynamic interpretation taking into account the pragmatic and functional development of ASEM. As mentioned above, the ASEM process has produced in its economic pillar best practices not only for state actors but also businesses which are additional to AECF 2000 which contains “principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures”. ASEM practice shows that partners in principle expect other partners to play by these rules (stabilizing effect), although they are ready to neglect them on a consensual basis. The latter applies in particular to the selection of ASEM initiatives where political considerations often override the rule book. However, the body of rules laid down in AECF 2000, various follow-up agreements on ASEM working methods and the actual practice of conducting ASEM matters, not least through the special feature of the four co-ordinators, provide enough elements to qualify ASEM as a partial regime or a regime in statu nascendi as the expectations of partners have not converged at the same intensity in the three pillars of ASEM. As long as ASEM is not formally institutionalized or assisted by its own administrative structure (secretariat), its further development will have to rely on pragmatic functionalism, which in turn could contribute to the intensification of the regime building process. Last but not least, as ASEM has originally been designed as a summit driven, elitist, top-down project based on some strong common interests and ensuing goals (filling a disturbing gap, raising mutual awareness, engaging China and the United States, assuring mutual profits through co-operation to assure economic development …) the pursuance of the process (and regime

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building for that end) need not rest firmly on rational choices, but in the mutual conviction that the process represents a value in itself. Being in the trend of interactions among regions and having accumulated eight years of socialization of stakeholders is an asset which merits not only preservation but further development. Making use of the pragmatic approach inherent in dialogue process, areas of common interest were defined and further developed. In a functionalist approach, progress in trade and investment clearly outpaced progress in other areas. A glance on the organizational chart of ASEM31 shows clearly that this is the most developed of all three pillars comprising working groups on standards, an Investment Experts Group and facilitators, an Asia-Europe Business Forum representing the partnership of state and business. Although business representatives identified ample room for improvement, “[t]he AEBF delegates noted with satisfaction that governments had made efforts to deal with previous AEBF recommendations and work towards their implementation”.32 Other areas where functionalism is reflected in ASEM were the setting up of the AsiaEurope Foundation (ASEF) to foster cultural and educational co-operation and of the Asia-Europe Environment Technical Centre (AEETC); the calling of an ad hoc Ministerial Conference on Co-operation for the Management of Migratory Flows between Asia and Europe33 to discuss migration policies in the aftermath of the tragic death of illegal Chinese immigrants in Dover. Thus, inter-regional contacts can contribute to global governance through increasing overall security and well-being.

Overcoming Narrow Nationalism and Furthering Cross-Cultural Understanding and Mutual Awareness No Asian ASEM partners would be ready to give up as much sovereignty as the ten candidate countries gave up when joining the European Union. This is one of the many reasons why the comparison with the degree of integration achieved through the EU and ASEAN, used by the Asian partners to argue for the need to be present as ASEAN 10 in the ASEM process, does not really bite. However, the mentioned intra-regional Asian co-ordinating mechanism, the need to develop with European partners even the smallest common denominator in the three pillars of ASEM, the working experience with European colleagues in various meetings are important contributions to a socialization process of Asian

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bureaucratic elites which allows them to overcome not only nationalism but also, if the European experience were to repeat itself, deep-seated mistrust or even hatred. Enlarging this socialization process beyond elites and bringing it to civil societies and grassroots remains one of the main challenges for ASEM to which ASEF has to contribute. ASEM also contributes to building more democratic societies in Asia while respecting their cultures according to the European guiding principle “unity in diversity”, which is another feature of ASEM’s utility. Through ASEM the European experience of engaging civil societies in the process of governance could be passed on in a subtle way, making good use especially, but not exclusively, of ASEF. As civil society intensifies participation in politics as a result of globalization, a regular consultative process making use of what is called Track II activities in ASEAN could be initiated, which in turn could build on existing events. “From its inception, ASEM has also tried to involve business and civil society in its dialogue programmes. In terms of the substance of the ASEM agenda, but also because of its broad-based, open, democratic and informal procedures and its strong emphasis on dialogue and mutual understanding, ASEM seemed well-placed to fit the model of global governance through public private policy networks as a complement to traditional ways of tackling the challenges of globalization.”34 While I agree in principle with this positive assessment, there are serious shortcomings in the process which need to be addressed to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the process. I have already earlier made proposals to add a “bottom-up” dimension to the original “top-down” approach in ASEM in involving not only civil society but also parliamentarians,35 building on existing contacts. Concerning civil society the lack of success of the Asia Europe Peoples’ Forum — not only because of the little attention paid to it by the “official” ASEM but also due to the lack of focus and the long-standing, although never convincingly substantiated, claim to set up a Social Forum — have to lead towards a rethinking and re-organization if this venue is to survive.36

Concluding Remarks While it might be too early to pass a definitive judgement about the success and failure of ASEM after eight years of its existence, this chapter

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puts in perspective some of the modest contributions that ASEM has brought about conceptually in the debate on multi-level governance, and more concretely to the level of interactions between Asia and Europe. Although falling short of being a “formal” institution, ASEM provides a forum for dialogue and consultations in a rather structured manner, and in the process: created some generalized principles of conduct, and best practices which might lead to “ASEM habits or ASEMness”; contribute to the recognition and formulation of common interests; and to the socialization of elites and initiated some Asian partners to comply with a more democratic working and decision-making method beyond their domestic experience; and enhance to the intra-regional co-operation within East Asia. In terms of value-added to international relations theory, ASEM is an interesting experiment of quasi-institutionalization combining different cultural approaches towards international co-operation — the more legalistic European approach with the more pragmatic, step by step, informal dialogue Asian approach. The mixture of these two culturally different approaches will hopefully lead to a middle way that would guide Asia-Europe relations to greater heights.

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6

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Yeo Lay Hwee, Asia and Europe: The Development and Different Dimensions of ASEM. New York and London: Routledge, 2003, p. 121.

Alistair Johnston, “Socialization in International Institutions: The ASEAN Way and International Relations Theory”. In International Relations Theory and the AsiaPacific, edited by Ikenberry/Mastanduno. Columbia University Press, 2003; pp. 107–62.

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Samuel Kim, ”Northeast Asia in the Local-Regional-Global Nexus: Multiple Challenges and Contending Explanations” in The International Relations of Northeast Asia, edited by S. Kim. Lanhayu: Rowman&Littlefield, 2004; pp. 45–51. Jürgen Rüland, Inter- and Transregionalism: Remarks on the State of the Art of a New Research Agenda. National Europe Centre Paper no. 35 prepared for the Workshop on Asia Pacific Studies in Australia and Europe: A Research Agenda for the Future. Australian National University, 5–6 July 2002 (hereinafter: Rüland. Inter-and Transregionalism). Julie Gilson, “Defining Inter-Regionalism: The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)”. SEAS Electronic Working Papers, vol. 1, no. 1, SEAS Website, 24 April 2002. Aaron Friedberg, “Will Europe’s past be Asia’s Future?”, Survival 42, no. 3 (Autumn 2000): 147. Hook/Gilson/Hughes/Dobson, Japan’s International Relations. London: Routledge, 2001, pp. 81–150. Yeo Lay Hwee, “Dimensions of Asia-Europe Cooperation”. Asia-Europe Journal 2, no. 1 (January 2004): 27–28. Juergen Rueland, “The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM): Towards a New EuroAsian Relationship”. Rostocker Informationen zu Politik and Verwaltung Heft 5. Universitat Rostock, Germany, pp. 72–73. For a detailed analysis, see Michael Reiterer, ”The ASEM Security Acquis” in Reiterer. “Do They Meet?” pp. 121–33. Christopher Dent, “From Inter-Regionalism to Trans-Regionalism? Future Challenges for ASEM”. Asia-Europe Journal 2 (May 2003): 229.

David Kang, “Hierarchy and Stability in Asian International Relations”. Ikeenberry/ Mastanduno, op cit.; p. 165. Ibid., p. 164. “Leaders agreed to work towards a closer ASEM economic partnership. To this end, they tasked ASEM Co-ordinators to set up an action-oriented taskforce. Taking into account work already carried out within the ASEM economic pillar, this taskforce should consider three areas: trade, investment and finance. These areas could include issues such as creation of a Eurobond market in Asia and use of the Euro as an international currency” ASEM 4 Chairs statement (emphasis added). Cf. Ooi Sang Kuang/Sukhdave Sing, “The ASEAN Currency and Exchange Rate Mechanism Task Force”. BIS paper 17; at

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Michael Reiterer Yeo Lay Hwee, Asia and Europe: The Development and Different Dimensions of ASEM. NY and London: Routledge, 2003, pp. 144–53. Chris Brown, Understanding International Relations, 2nd edn. N.Y. and London: Palgrave 2001, pp. 177, 179 respectively (emphasis in original). Stephen Krasner, ed. International Regimes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 2. Reiterer, Do They Meet? Singapore: Asia-Europe Foundation, 2002, p. 21. Chairman’s Statement. AEBF VII, Copenhagen, 18–20 September 2002.

Maull/Ofken. “Inter-Regionalism in International Relations: Comparing APEC and ASEM”. Asia Europe Journal 2 (May 2003): 245. Reiterer, Do They Meet?; pp. 43 and 58 respectively. Cf. Yeo, op cit.; pp. 59–62.

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3 Collective Identity-Building through Trans-regionalism: ASEM and East Asian Regional Identity Julie Gilson and Yeo Lay Hwee

Accounts of regional co-operation have been provided by a range of scholars from a host of theoretical perspectives. Rationalist approaches tend to focus primarily upon the distribution of material power capabilities and the impact of changing structural conditions and to assess the relative gains to be made through collaboration in order to maximize self interests.1 However, this chapter adopts a broadly constructivist perspective. In this way, it focuses primarily on the role of ideas and interests in the creation of regional identity and the development of a sense of “we-ness”. In fact, a range of cultural and sociological perspectives in International Relations has opened up an entirely new way of looking at inter-state relations and the formation of international norms and institutions. Indeed, this has permeated some of the rationalist literature, which itself has acknowledged the role of ideas in the formation of foreign policy. Several forms of constructivism take these approaches one step further, by focusing on critical historical junctures from which new structural or institutional

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arrangements, norms and identities emerge and on interactions between existing structures, institutions, norms and agents. In particular, many constructivist assessments also permit a focus on the mutual constitution of structure and agent, thereby breaking down what are often unhelpful distinctions between an actor and her environment.2 Although there are many forms of constructivism and it cannot lay claim to be a coherent body of theory, this chapter draws on the “mainstream” interpretations by scholars like Wendt and Katzenstein, which permit a continued focus on the state, while examining the multilevel identities it may adopt. The constructivist approaches with which this chapter is concerned respond to Katzenstein’s observation: “Power politics is now occurring on complex regional contexts that undercut the stark assumption of the international system as unmitigated anarchy and these regional contexts are making possible a variety of processes that put into question some conventional categories of analysis.”3 For the purpose of the subject of this book, this theoretical framework, therefore, allows the observer to consider the perceptual dimension of Asian regionalism. Wendt’s form of constructivism in practice may be understood as “the stories that social actors tell, and by which, in the process, they come to define themselves or to construct their identities and perceive conditions that promote and/or mitigate the possibility for future change”.4 Through their structures, regions become politicized and their identities become internalized among constituent members, and may come to be recognized as such even beyond their boundaries. Central to this process is the role of institutions. Institutions are understood here as regularized channels of communication among state representatives acting in accordance with obligations set out in statements or declarations (such as the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum) and do not necessarily represent formal organizations accommodated in concrete buildings and locations, such as the EU and the United Nations (UN). Viewed from this perspective, Ruggie’s three levels of institutionalization provide a useful framework. First, they may act at a cognitive level, where epistemic communities lie and which, for example in the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), may have an explicitly value-based agenda. Second, as in ASEAN, institutions may contain a level of mutual expectation, as embodied in rules and norms. Their formal or informal structures may build up expectations of behaviour among

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members, to which all are supposed to adhere. Third, they may act as formal international organizations, as embodied by the EU and UN, endowed with physical headquarters and founding treaties, whereby membership requires adherence to the rules and non-adherence can lead to sanctions by the rest of the participants.5 The framework adopted here focuses upon the second form of institution, which allows the observer to emphasise their subjectconstituting functions. They show how rules transform people into active social participants. Participants define their interests as they define the processes within which they interact. As a result, identities and collective cognitions are mutually constitutive. Thus, collective understandings of the meanings of rules, and not necessarily the rules themselves, have causal consequences for interaction patterns between allies, by locking them into an institutional discourse. By extension, moreover, collective understandings of the nature of one’s interlocutor and of one’s own nature can also be formed by the creation of this cognitive institution. In their cognitive roles, institutions provide the locus in which the practices that drive them also create norms for behaviour, which delineate “the social script through which institutional participants communicate and provides the basis upon which fixed and readily identifiable idea-sets for an institution’s practices are founded”.6 The norms they sustain may be seen to represent shared understandings of standards for behaviour, and collectively these norms establish expectations about who the actors should be in a particular environment and about how these particular actors would behave. The process of interaction itself, then, may lead actors to consider themselves as part of a “we-group” that is created by, and reflected in, the existence of certain norms.

Regionalism Applying the framework to the concept of regionalism allows the observer not just to consider it as an outcome of economic materialism or geopolitical calculations, but also to regard it as a reflection of “ideas, knowledge, and identity of the regions involved in some form of integrative process”.7 There are no natural regions, but they are, rather, “imagined communities”, which are “created and recreated in the process of global transformation”.8 As Hurrell points out, “it is how political actors perceive and interpret the idea of a region and notions of

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regionness that is critical”.9 Thus, regions may be defined as “socially constructed entities that take on meaning and importance because states perceive themselves as occupying a common area, facing similar problems and facing a common future”.10 Hettne provides a useful “staircase of ‘regionness’ ”, which encompasses five levels: regional space (geography and natural barriers); regional complex (in which constituent units are mutually dependent and trans-local relations are central); regional society (formal and informal rules for relations, such as in regional organization); regional community (the continuous social communication and convergence of values and actions and transnational civil society); and a regional institutionalized polity (with fixed structures and stronger actor capability).11 These categories offer a useful means of determining levels of East Asian regional development, which, in fact, has been a slow, painstaking process because of the following reasons. First, the diversity of the region itself hinders integration. The linguistic, ethnic, historical and strategic differences within the region make it important to see regional identity-building within these social and cultural frameworks. All these shape the nature of regional cooperation, and the mechanisms for achieving such co-operation. This also means that the “regional” trajectory that is ultimately followed may not lead to an EU-like set of structures. However, positing “East Asia” next to “Europe” within the ASEM framework often leads to the conclusion that “Asia” is the “lesser developed” region, as though the EU-model provides the end-goal. Second, the states of the region also have different historical backgrounds. It was only in the 1980s that the stage finally seemed set for greater contacts and co-operation among the East Asian states, and one could start to speak of an emerging East Asian regionalism. Although the experience varies from country to country, East Asian regionalism has been seen almost exclusively in terms of economic regionalization. Such economic regionalization is characterized more by market-driven integration rather than institutional integration promoted by the state. Some of the principal driving forces leading to more intra-regional trade and investments are the appreciation of the Yen after the Plaza Accord in 1985, the elimination of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) status for the newly developed countries (NICs) (then comprising Taiwan, Singapore, Korea and Hong Kong) by the United States in 1989, the liberalization of trade and investment regimes and adoption of exportoriented growth strategy by several East Asian countries and the opening

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up of the Chinese economy. Asian economies have therefore made pragmatic adjustments to changing international conditions. Third, despite the rapid economic regionalization process taking place in East Asia, the institutionalization of regional co-operation remains slow. East Asian regionalization depends primarily on informal and semi-formal linkages and consensus-building mechanisms. While economic regionalization was proceeding at a steady pace, regionalism as a conscious policy of states or governments to co-ordinate economic activities and arrangements was still relatively unrefined even in the mid-1990s. The emergence of an East Asian identity was still seen as far from reality. In fact, there are many factors that can explain the lack of progress towards regional integration and identity-formation, which include the strong statist approach towards nation-building and region-building, the historical animosities, the deep structural inequalities in power (imagine Brunei and China), the role of the United States in the region and the lack of leadership. Amidst all these structural and historical difficulties, some positive trends towards the building of an East Asian region and regional identity can be detected. The network of regional ties is growing. It is argued that the growing web of multilateral co-operative networks, such as the Pacific Economic Co-operation Council (PECC), APEC, the ARF, ASEM and the Forum for East Asia and Latin America Co-operation (FEALAC), provides a new underpinning to regional co-operation in East Asia. In these ways, externally-oriented region-building may be seen to have a capacity to strengthen intra-regional interests. On Hettne’s scale it is possible to perceive a growth of East Asian collaboration at a scale of moving from a regional complex to a nascent regional society.

Inter-Regionalism and Trans-Regionalism States in this collective context behave as if they were a region in the face of what they perceive to be a similar, definable, “other”. For this reason, it is important to consider the notion of inter-regionalism as a force for the creation of regional self-identity. Trans-regionalism — encapsulating APEC, and at a lower level ASEAN Plus Three (APT) — is a structural attempt to combine a range of states within a coherent unified framework. Interregionalism, by contrast, explicitly sets one region in a dialogue (or potentially a conflict) with an “other”. Thus, Asian participants meet qua “Asia” in order to frame a collective response prior to ASEM meetings and to provide an “identity-balance”.12 The rhetoric of “equal partnership”

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espoused at ASEM is quite different from the group of interests voiced within APEC. Moreover, this format has all sorts of implications, not least for questions of membership (to which region, for example, does Australia “belong”?), and for framing identity in cultural as well as political terms. This structure also generates potentially “comforting” notions of Confucian Asia and Christian Europe, which both legitimize and hinder change.13 The process of inter-regionalism within ASEM is important for the development of an East Asian identity, because it establishes at the outset a dominant regional European narrative alongside a weak regional collection of Asian states. As one bounded entity comes into contact with another, a pool of recognition and knowledge comes into being at the level where the interaction occurs, with the result that, for example, “Europe” and “Asia” come to recognize each other as such in particular forms (the EU and the “Asian Ten”). Though officially states still participate in an individual capacity in ASEM, in practice they frequently act along regional lines based on existing or incipient collective identities. Although informal and largely non-binding, the ASEM process offers its participants a regular, institutionalized channel for communication and the exchange of information. In assuming a definite framework, ASEM is able to create an atmosphere in which dialogue develops and is sustained not only by independent interests and external events, but also by the practical and cognitive effects of the process of constructing bilateral dialogue itself.14 A constructivist line of argument could assert that East Asia’s participation in fora such as APEC, ASEM and the FEALAC are attempts by East Asian governments to construct a regional identity vis-à-vis other regional communities. This may be a conscious, state-driven project, but it may also be a defensive or constructive drive towards collective responses to external actors. In this way, constructivism can also help us to understand how — through the process of interaction itself and the mutual constitution of participant and environment — exposure to ASEM may make “Asians” behave like Asians. Scholars like Cantori and Spiegel have argued that a sense of identity of a region is sometimes increased by the actions and attitudes of states external to the system. Similarly, we see closer regional co-operation between the East Asian states in response to what was happening elsewhere — the formation of NAFTA, and the further integration of the European Community. East Asians are surrounded by increasingly “coherent” and externally oriented “regions” like the EU and

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NAFTA which are responding to similar global forces. At the same time, this sense of identity is further refined when they participate in an explicitly inter-regional framework. In a similar vein to the process of engagement with the EU in the context of ASEM, East Asia is also partly defined by its perceived position in a triadic (economic) relationship with Europe and North America. For Segal, in fact, the main aims of the first ASEM summit was to “maximize European and Asian relations with the United States, and ... keep the Americans honestly committed to multilateralism”.15 This has been important for a number of reasons, which include opportunities to resist jointly US policy, such as opposition to the Strategic Impediments Initiative and to the Helms-Burton Act, and collaboration over WTO issues. Issues raised from this structure today include a changing U.S. response: “How will the United States react to an East Asian integration process from which it is excluded, but which it has inadvertently fostered?”.16 Currently, this relationship with East Asia is more complex and U.S. policy decisions towards East Asia — included among them the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI) of October 2002 — continue to embrace an East Asian collective, reasserting the notion that in fact the United States owns the idea of a “Pacific Rim”.17 It may therefore continue to be instrumental in facilitating the development of an East Asian identity. The contention of this chapter is that ASEM has contributed towards the self-identification of an “East Asia” region, by providing a functional structure and a cognitive backdrop for new forms of collective behaviour. Here, ASEM has helped to construct the notion of an East Asian region through a series of co-ordinating mechanisms and the fact that the East Asian countries are dealing with a much more defined regional entity like the EU. Although the ten East and Southeast Asian states of ASEM do not constitute a formalized region, EU acceptance and treatment of the ten East Asian member states as a collective entity has reinforced the conception of East Asia as a region. (In this regard, it is interesting to note that in the most recent Communication on “Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships”, the ASEM process is seen as “an excellent example of inter-regional co-operation”). In these ways, the “Asia–Europe framework sets up a discursive and normative set of boundaries within which a distinguishable and parallel ‘other’ exists, and which in turn will influence the (re)formation of self. In many ways the views of that ‘other’ help to define how Asians act within ASEM”.18

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The idea of ASEM as a regional integrator, contributing to the building of an East Asian identity, has been put forward or mentioned by several people. For instance, Maull and Tanaka in one of their Council for AsiaEurope Co-operation (CAEC) reports suggest that “ASEM could serve as a kind of regional integrator because it is a bilateral process between two regions which requires a modicum of co-ordination on both sides”.19 At this stage, however, it would be wrong to read too much into this. Transactions increase at the intra-regional level, but they do so in a multiplicity of fora and greater coordination does not immediately lead to cohesion. What constructivism helps us understand, however, is that over time, the well-trodden path of region-to-region interaction may create certain habits of co-operation within East Asia, initially for the purpose of conducting collective affairs with Europe, but in the long term possibly for intra-regional relations themselves. In a speech to the CAEC conference, former Korean foreign minister Han Sung-joo expressed his view that “a close relationship with Europe, which has developed a strong regional identity, will help define and encourage an Asian identity. The ASEM process is already helping Asia to define itself”.20 This high-level recognition itself, serves as part of that mutually constitutive process. Higgott adds to this view: “ASEM for its East Asian members is one more pillar in an emerging regional architecture that helps consolidate other useful emerging tendencies toward dialogue and co-operation between them. In this regard, even the symbolic and practical utility of co-ordinating positions prior to an ASEM meeting is not unimportant for East Asian states beginning to secure an understanding of their collective regional importance in world affairs.”21 Unlike those who simply see the formation of an East Asian regional identity as a by-product of such inter-regional or trans-regional dialogue as ASEM or APEC, there are some scholars such as Hänggi, who argue in some of their earlier writings that ASEM could be a deliberate strategy adopted by some Asian members to “promote regionalism through interregionalism”.22 Gilson notes that “the embryonic ASEM forum provides Japan with an opportunity to intensify relations with the other nine Asian members and develop greater intra-regional dialogue”.23

Notions of East Asia within ASEM Do East Asian representatives deliberately use ASEM as an instrument for regional integration? The following section examines the actual

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development of ASEM and the process of consultation and co-ordination that took place among the Asian ASEM members. The ASEM process had been conceptualized by its initiators (Singapore) in the context of a triangular relationship between the three engines of economic growth. North America, Western Europe and East Asia. Relations between East Asia and Western Europe were depicted as the missing link in this global triangle and in fact ASEM has been justified by the need to close this missing link in the triangular relationship where the framework for ties between North America and Europe and between North America and East Asia have already been established. The role of the EU as an “other” has also been extremely important. In its paper, Towards a New Asia Strategy, the EU creates a certain kind of Asia in “EU speak”, and is designed as a way of managing EU economic relations with East Asia.24 The EU reinforced this approach, when it issued a common position regarding the summit to its Asian counterparts in December 1995, and stated its intention to establish a new partnership. It is often remarked with regard to ASEM that it was the “Asian” side that pushed most for its establishment. In part, the actions of Asian participants were motivated by the need to deal with something called Europe, against the background of other things, called NAFTA, or APEC. In order to face up to these big conglomerates, the economies of Asia, too, have had to respond collectively in order to have any influence. By the time of the first ASEM, moreover, “Europe” had been strongly in the limelight since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and its successful Maastricht Treaty of 1993. As a result of this treaty, it looked clear that “Europe” of the single currency from 1999 would be an even more powerful international actor, and that political components to that power could not be ruled out. Indeed, years of incremental achievements for the EC/EU, especially the Commission in its representations in non-EU member states, had given the EU a de facto international political as well as economic role that Asia could not ignore. Only once the process had started, did aspects of an Asian identity for the non-European members of ASEM begin to be discussed, particularly in light of the fact that Australia and New Zealand were not members and that the de facto presence of the EAEC countries was frequently noted. In order to deal with its partner, the Asian contingent of ASEM was required to formulate an approach to Europe prior to bilateral meeting, thus bringing together Asian participants within their own forum. Asian co-ordinators are responsible for initiating intra-regional opinions, as well as for speaking on behalf of Asian members in meetings of the

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Group of Co-ordinators. However, this “Asian” formulation should not be seen as Asian “rather than anything else”, as noted in the CAEC report, so much as Asian in the face of SOMETHING else, that is, Europe. To date, then, this Asia exists only in order to take part in ASEM, in a relationship in which Europe can be seen as an “homogenous” unit. Before the inaugural ASEM leaders summit in Bangkok in March 1996, at least three Asian Senior Officials’ Meetings (SOM) were held to decide on the format and the agenda for the first ASEM Leaders Summit. In fact, what you start to see here, at the SOMs and later even in fora such as the Asia-Europe People’s Forum, are epistemic communities creating networks of interests which themselves shape the format and discourse of the inter-regional relationship.25 In many ways, ASEM offers its Asian participants a middle ground between the “Asia” of APEC and that of EAEC. While Asian critics of APEC in recent years have regarded that forum increasingly as a threat to Asian identity, at the same time reluctance on the part of nations such as Japan openly to support Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir’s plans for EAEC also make that a difficult option. ASEM, by contrast, provides both functional and cognitive benefits: borne of economic and political necessity, it also creates a forum for the confluence of the factors contributing to regional complex, society and community. These forms of regional identification emerge from an East Asia that is framing itself as a result of a number of influences. First, we can witness oppositional Asia, a region premised on what it is not (namely, Europe), within a defined structural (ASEM) context. Second, a partnership Asia derives from a growing regional body that posits itself increasingly as a body of equal status to that of its European interlocutor. Third, a mirror Asia may be socially constituted as a result of the “self” becoming a mirror image of its interacting partner, and thus identity becomes “a reflection of an actor’s socialization”.26 This intermediate level of ASEM has therefore act as a stepping stone for further regional initiatives within East Asia. Clearest of all these actions has been the development of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) process.

Institutionalization and the APT All these consultations that took place prior to the inaugural summit in Bangkok were consolidated and institutionalized after the meeting. Facing

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an advanced regional grouping like the EU, which would generally come up with a co-ordinated position in the formal meetings, the Asian members felt the need for continued co-ordination to prepare for the key official meetings. Also to ensure the continuation of the ASEM process between the key ministerial and senior official meetings, two co-ordinators (one from Northeast Asia and the other from Southeast Asia) were appointed to keep track of the dialogue process, signal new initiatives, table new proposals and in general help prepare for the various key meetings. Significantly, the ten East Asian countries are now meeting not only on a very regular basis, but are co-ordinating their positions, and during the co-ordinators’ meetings the two appointed co-ordinators speak on behalf of all the Asian members. Eight years after the inaugural meeting in Bangkok, ASEM now takes place in a stronger framework of East Asian co-operation which has been strengthened by the creation of the APT process. With very little fanfare, the very first APT informal summit took place in December 1997, and has gathered momentum even since. In 1998, at the suggestion of the South Korean President, the regional leaders agreed to set up an East Asian Vision Group to study ways their countries should co-operate more effectively. In 1999, a Joint Statement on East Asian Co-operation was issued, designed to bring together Northeast Asian and Southeast Asia in areas spanning trade, investment, monetary and financial co-operation, technology transfer, scientific exchange and training and human resource development. The APT process was given a further boost with the successful conclusion of a series of bilateral swap agreements in 2000 to help the APT countries deal with possible future financial crises. And in 2001 in Brunei a new regular APT summit was established. At that meeting, Japanese government representatives made it clear that such growing institutional linkages could serve to develop continuity for channels of communication among the states of East Asia. The APT represents a significant step forward in the delicate process of East Asian regional integration in the post-Cold War period, and highlights Japan’s important role within it. The APT summit has also been used to develop further ties between ASEAN and its major regional partners. For example, it was at the 2000 APT summit that China and ASEAN agreed to launch a study into a SinoASEAN free trade area (FTA). Following that, in the Brunei meeting, however, it was immediately made clear that Japan and South Korea were

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ultimately to form part of this expanded area. Japan’s own overtures to regional FTA partners have been made on the understanding, as stated by Koizumi, that Japan is following a “two-track approach”; namely, “building a framework in ASEAN as a whole and promoting bilateral efforts with ASEAN members that are ready to do so” . In the case of the proposed Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership, Koizumi in Phnom Penh on 5 November 2002 viewed as one of its purposes the “nurturing [of] a sense of community between Japan and ASEAN” and stressed in the same speech that bilateral arrangements would provide the building blocs “to explore and broaden such economic partnerships for the whole of East Asia” . One key reason for the emphasis on the APT has been the weakening of APEC as a regional vehicle, which is partly due to the severely weakened credibility of that forum in the wake of the financial crisis, and also to the fact that the “Asia Pacific” has been seen to fail as a political and cultural project. The concept of “Asia” in the form of the APT, by contrast, appears as a natural form of regional cohesion that is lacking in APEC. The potential for APT progress can be further gauged by examining the function of institutions such as ASEM as intra-Asian region builders. At the same time, participation in APT-type arrangements offers Japan the chance to “offset the challenges posed by the European Union and North American Free Trade Agreement zone”.27 More importantly, the APT serves to create potential safety nets in the eventuality of the “unravelling of the multilateral trading system and the emergence of a system based largely on regional economic blocs in which Western (and Central) Europe and North (and perhaps South) America would constitute blocs, but East Asia, if it did nothing, would not”.28 The apparent failure of the WTO process in Seattle and the inability of APEC to promote trade liberalization further promoted interest in regional responses. This regional emphasis is also conveyed by Japan when its representatives assume a pan-Asian mantle in fora such as the G-8 and Asian Development Bank (ADB). ASEM now takes place in a stronger framework of East Asianism, which has been strengthened by the creation of the APT. They are, in fact, mutually constitutive. While some observers may want to attribute the beginning of the APT process to the co-ordinating meetings of the Asian ASEM members, especially since it took place in the year after the first ASEM summit, others attributed the launch of the APT process to the

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Asian economic and financial crisis which first hit Thailand in July 1997. In fact, ASEM and the financial crisis might or might not be a catalyst for the APT process. What is certain now is that the APT process has taken on a life of its own. If the economic crisis that hit East Asia in 1997 was not the initial reason behind the APT process, it certainly had subsequent impacts on East Asian regional impulses. One of the lessons that East Asian nations learnt from the crisis was the extent of their vulnerability to forces outside to the region. Another lesson is that the existing “loose” regional cooperation arrangements were unable to make an effective contribution to solve the problems. The crisis might have also helped drive home the message that East Asia has to come together more often to iron out their differences and strengthen their co-operation among themselves. Additionally, some also speculated that the crisis might have generated a backlash against “outside, Western powers” resulting in more soulsearching to carve out a regional response to the economic challenges. ASEM and APT therefore combine, in the face of external shocks, to demonstrate the both the need and a potential way forward for greater regional identification.

Concluding Remarks Has ASEM been the impetus behind an East Asian regional identity? This is perhaps not one of those questions that we can answer in a clear “yes” or “no”. It is therefore more fruitful for us to see ASEM as lying within a process of increasing regional identification for the purpose of external affairs. As several constructivist commentators demonstrate, moreover, the various trans-regional fora such as ASEM, APEC and FEALAC can help lead to the development of a dominant discourse of East Asianness. How much real impact would ASEM really have on the process of East Asian identity-building would depend on the intensity and content of the ASEM dialogue. However, this is also a circular process, as the APT process has gathered its own momentum independent of ASEM. The success of the APT process would in turn have a positive impact on the dialogue between Europe and Asia, and strengthen ASEM into a more effective inter-regional dialogue for co-operation. Thus, rather than by cultural determinism, the current Asian identity in ASEM has become established by participation within a forum where

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a clear “other” exists, and for a specific purpose of fulfilling ASEM goals. As this identification becomes reinforced by further participation in active endeavours undertaken in the name of ASEM, a closer “Asian” identity may result, to the extent that members recognize their permanent participation in, and adherence to, such a group.29 Only time will tell whether ASEM is capable of creating a set of operating procedures and administrative agencies able to provide a strong transmission belt between ideas and the policy process. And if the ASEM process does survive, then the type of Asia that is created within Asia will influence the extent to which the gap in understanding can be closed between it and its European partners. Its success may indeed lead to the development of an Asian identity, but to find out that we will have to travel well beyond Hanoi in 2004.

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See for example, John Ravenhill, “A Three Bloc World? The New East Asian Regionalism”, in International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 2, 2002. Several scholars such as Peter Katzenstein and Alexander Wendt have employed the socio-cultural approach to enrich discussions on international co-operation, and increasingly such perspectives have been acknowledged even by scholars who take a more functionalist or rationalist approaches towards the study of international relations such as Robert Keohane and J. Goldstein. Peter Katzenstein. “Regionalism and Asia”, in New Political Economy 5, no. 3 (2000): 353. See Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State”. In American Political Science Review 88, no. 2 (1994): 384–96; and “Identity and Structural Change in International Politics”, in The Return of Culture and Identity in International Relations Theory, edited by Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp. 47–64. John Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity. London: Routledge, 1998, p. 55. Alexander Wendt and R. Duvall, “Institutions and International Order”, in Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s, edited by E.O.Czempiel and J.N. Rosenau. Lexington: Lexington Books, p. 7. Lee Jung-Hoon and Jin Park, “The Role of Regional Identity in Asia-Europe Relations with Special Reference to ASEM”, in Global Economic Review 30, no. 3 (2001): 20.

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Bjorn Hettne and Fredrik Soderbaum, “Theorising the Rise of Regionness”. Paper presented at the Third Annual Conference of the Centre for the Study of Globalization and Regionalization (CSGR), University of Warwick, 16–18 September 1999. Andrew Hurrell, “Regionalism in Theoretical Perspectives”, in Regionalism and World Politics: Regional Organization and World Order, edited by Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 41. David Lake and Patrick Morgan, “Introduction”. In Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World, edited by David Lake and Patrick Morgn. Pennsylvannia: The Pennsylvannia State University Press, 1997, p. 12. Bjorn Hettne, “Globalisation, Regionalisation and Security: The Asian Experience”, in European Journal of Development Research 14, no. 1 (2002): 35. Lee Jung-Hoon and Jin Park, “The Role of Regional Identity in Asia-Europe Relations with Special Reference to ASEM”, in Global Economic Review 30, no. 3 (2001): 30. See Hanns Maull, Gerald Segal and Jusuf Wanandi, eds. Europe and the AsiaPacific, London and New York: Routledge, 1998. Philip Cerny, “Plurilateralism: Structural Differentiation and Functional Conflict in the Post-Cold War World Order”, in Millennium 22, no. 1 (1993): 36–37. Gerald Segal, “Thinking Strategically about ASEM: The Subsidiarity Question”, in The Pacific Review 10, no. 1 (1997): 127. Douglas Webber, “Two Funerals and a Wedding? The Ups and Downs of Regionalism in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific after the Asian Crisis” in The Pacific Review 14, no. 3 (2001): 364. Bruce Cumings, “Rimspeak, or the Discourse of the Pacific Rim”. In What is in a Rim? Critical Perspectives on The Pacific Regional Idea, edited by Arif Dirlik. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998, p. 60. Julie Gilson, Asia Meets Europe: Inter-regionalism and the Asia-Europe Meeting. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2002. See Council for Asia-Europe Co-operation (CAEC) Taskforce Report (1997) The Rationale and Agenda for Asia-Europe Co-operation. Han Sung-joo, “The Future of the World and Asia-Europe Co-operation”. Speech delivered at the CAEC Tokyo Conference, 4 November 1997. Richard Higgott, “The Politics of Economic Crisis in East Asia: Some LongerTerm Implications” CSGR Working Paper No 02/98, University of Warwick. Heiner Hänggi, “Regionalism through Inter-regionalism: East Asia and ASEM”. In Regionalism in East Asia: Paradigm Shifting, edited by Fu-kuo Liu and Philippe Regnier. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. Julie Gilson, “Japan’s Role in the Asia-Europe Meeting: Establishing an InterRegional or Intra-Regional Agenda”, in Asian Survey 39, no. 5, p. 741.

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Julie Gilson and Yeo Lay Hwee Christopher Dent, “The ASEM: Managing the new framework of the EU’s economic relations with East Asia”, in Pacific Affairs 70, no. 4 (1997–98): 495. The rationale behind ASEM is richly discussed in the Council for Asia-Europe Co-operation (CAEC) Taskforce Report on The Rationale and Common Agenda for Asia-Europe Co-operation, 1997. Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, in International Organizations 46, no. 2 (1992). Japan Times, 4 April 2002. Douglas Webber, op cit., p. 359. David Camroux and Christian Lechervy, “Encounter of a Third Kind? The Inaugural Asia-Europe Meeting of March 1996”, in The Pacific Review 9, no. 3 (1996): 448.

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4 Inter-regionalism and Regional Actors: The EU-ASEAN Example Mathew Doidge

The EU-ASEAN relationship is one of the longest standing group-togroup dialogues in existence,1 linking the two most firmly established regional organizations — the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Indeed, the launching of the EC-ASEAN relationship, the genesis of which is to be found in the fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in 1971, is seen by many to be “the real date of birth of the group-to-group dialogue”.2 In 1972 the Special Co-ordinating Committee of ASEAN Nations (SCCAN) was set up in Brussels to focus on matters of trade between ASEAN and the EC, establishing the Community as the first dialogue partner of the Association. A relationship has thus existed between the European Community/Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations for more than three decades. It has survived the ending of the Cold War, and has spanned the periods of “old” (agency as the causal factor) and “new” (systemic structure/change as the causal factor) inter-regionalism.3 Simply, it is the single best example available for empirical analysis of inter-regional relationships, and more specifically for exploration of the deduced functions of inter-regionalism.

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In 1989 the world changed. The bipolar conflict of the Cold War era came to an end, and the international system underwent a series of profound transformations, including the relative diminution of the place of nation-states through the process of economic globalization and the increasing transnationalization of international politics. The practical effect has been that regional powers and organizations have proliferated as a means for states to gain greater weight in the international system, and indeed to avoid marginalization, and that in turn the proliferation and increasing importance of such regional arrangements has led to a corresponding growth of dialogues between regions. The growth in inter-regional dialogue throughout the 1990s and the first years of the twenty-first century has been reflected in an increase in academic interest. In addition to explanatory work on the emergence and functioning of inter-regionalism, this has involved such questions as: what is the value of inter-regionalism in international relations?; and to what extent are inter-regional dialogues useful institutions serving to streamline global governance? Most recently, this has resulted in the theorization of a series of functions that such dialogues may perform.4 These are: balancing, institution building, rationalizing, agenda setting and collective identity formation. The following discussion builds upon this framework of functions by highlighting the way in which their performance is affected by one significant moderating variable — actorness. It does not provide in-depth analysis of the EC/EU-ASEAN dialogue, but rather, utilizes examples drawn from this relationship to illustrate how the shape of their interaction may be broadly explicable through reference to the actorness of the two regional organizations. In this respect, it takes earlier studies, particularly that of Rüland,5 as its launching point, seeking to supplement rather than to reproduce these.

Actorness In much of the work that has been undertaken concerning inter-regionalism, it has become clear that not all of the deduced functions have been performed, or that they have been performed to only a limited extent. There is, however, nothing in the framework that has so far been established explaining why this is the case. Through injecting a concept of regional actorness as a moderating variable, this performance or non-performance

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may be broadly explicable.6 Actorness, it is argued, is a component the presence of which in varying amounts is a necessary attribute for the performance of the deduced functions of inter-regional dialogues. Drawing on the works of Sjöstedt,7 Allen and Smith,8 Hill9 and Jupille and Caporaso,10 among others, actorness — the capacity to act in the international system — is understood in highly structural terms. In addition to identity, three fundamental components are determinable: 1.

2. 3.

Action Triggers: include goals, interests and principles, or even simply emergent situations requiring a response, which spur a given entity into action; Policy Structures/Processes: involve the capacity to take a decision in relation to an action trigger; Performance Structures: include all those structures and resources necessary for the actual performance of a given task once the decision to act has been taken.

When these attributes are applied to regional organizations, a continuum of regional actorness11 is generated running from supranationalism to inter-governmentalism. A supranational regional actor at its most advanced is defined as one in which the binding authority which can take a given decision, have the capacity to do so, and the ability to perform any act decided upon, have been placed in the hands of collective institutions that exist above the level of the state,12 and which operate according to simple democratic procedures (majority voting). Correspondingly, an inter-governmental regional actor at its weakest is one in which all decisions are taken by representatives of the constituent units on the basis of unanimity. Such decisions are non-binding in a strictly legal sense. In order to be considered a regional actor, however, such an organisation must operate at a level above the baseline to be expected of a disaggregated grouping of states. Charted along this continuum, the EC/EU has increasingly tended towards supranationalism, at least in the economic sphere, while ASEAN has tended towards inter-governmentalism. Actorness relates to each of the functions of inter-regionalism in one of three ways. It is either: (i) largely irrelevant or of only tangential importance; (ii) important in absolute terms (it is the absolute strength of the actors that is significant); or (iii) important in comparative terms (it is the difference in strength between the actors that is significant).

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Balancing The notion of balancing has been deduced from the realist conception of actor competition, that is, of anarchy and a self-help approach to security, leading to the accumulation of power individually or as part of a temporary coalition. In a globalized world, power is increasingly seen to be founded upon economic strength, and is no-longer premised solely upon the egoistic nation-state, but incorporates regional groupings as well. Emphasis is thus often given to the concept of “triadic relations” and the balancing games of the three primary regions in the international arena: Europe, North America and Asia. Balancing may occur in a number of ways, though two are of particular importance. First, it may amount to an insurance against possible marginalization through, in the economic sphere for example, ensuring access to markets. Thus, Abe and Plummer13 point to the ASEM and APEC processes as having “the common feature of exhibiting the Asian desire to liberalize international markets and gain security from possible ‘fortresses’, and from the European and U.S. perspectives, the goal of attaching themselves to the fastest growing region in the world”. It is to be anticipated, therefore, that partners engaged in inter-regional dialogues will seek the expansion of inter-regional economic links. Through this desire not to be marginalized, it also constitutes a means for ensuring the open and honest participation of other triad regions within the global multilateral framework14 and therefore correspondingly strengthens and stabilizes these structures. Secondly, inter-regional relationships may constitute a means of constraining the ability of any of the triadic pillars or other powers to act in a unilateral manner by cementing in place automatic and preexisting “alliances” against them which may be activated when need arises.15 It is this latter that will be touched upon here. Evidence of alliance-style balancing behaviour is most often pointed to in relation to EC-ASEAN co-operation over the twinned issues of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan one year later in December 1979. Co-operation on these issues stemmed from the second AEMM, convened in Kuala Lumpur in March 1980, with the Community entering the meeting seeking support for its position on Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the neutralization of the country through international negotiations, and the Association correspondingly seeking European backing for their approach

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to the Cambodian issue. The result was the issuing of a statement deploring the armed interventions against small independent states in violation of international law, and marked the first occasion on which the two groupings had taken a joint position on an issue of political importance. Co-operation was to continue throughout the 1980s, though did not progress beyond routine declaratory statements and support for UN Resolutions on withdrawal from Cambodia and Afghanistan. While, despite the less than spectacular nature of co-operation, this has been highlighted as an example of balancing behaviour, it also provides a suggestion as to the importance of actorness where alliance-style balancing is concerned. In the 1970s and 1980s neither the EC nor ASEAN were possessed of significant actorness in the politico-security arena. The Association was, and still is, strongly characterized by inter-governmentalism. The Community was in the relatively early stages of its EPC experiment, though this too was exclusively inter-governmental in nature, premised upon unanimity decision-taking, the result of which was that “[t]he need for reaching a consensus, often at the lowest common denominator,… meant that there [was] more emphasis on procedures than on substance”.16 This system proved itself over time capable of dealing with matters of routine, but foundered in situations where the perceived interests of member states were threatened. In neither ASEAN nor the EC, therefore, were policy processes/structures sufficient to overcome entrenched member state interests, with intra-regional co-operation, and ipso facto inter-regional co-operation, being dependent to a great extent on a lack of major internal divisions. In the case of Afghanistan, co-operation was able to be maintained as a matter of course — neither EC nor ASEAN Member States had alternative interests in the situation which would lead them to abandon a common approach. On the issue of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, however, this was plainly not the case. The history of voting in the UNGA, as presented by Snitwongse,17 suggests that while such co-operation may have been the goal (as evidenced by the declarations of the AEMMs throughout the 1980s), in practice it broke down wherever the interests of member states diverged. EC member state positions, for example, diverged on recognition of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), with Ireland and the ex-colonial power France abstaining until the report of the UN Credential Committee was adopted without a vote in 1983.18 Further difficulties emerged in relation to aid, with the EC having

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agreed to withhold new aid from Vietnam until resolution of the Cambodian question had been achieved, but subsequently taking decisions to donate emergency medical supplies to the Vietnamese. This issue came to the fore at the fourth AEMM in Bangkok in March 1983. France, with a traditional interest in Indochina stemming from its colonial past, and with the backing of Greece and Ireland, had refused to ban all humanitarian aid to Vietnam. The co-operative EC-ASEAN effort was eventually saved through the release of a Declaration deemed to show sufficient European concessions to ASEAN’s viewpoint, with both sides agreeing that no aid should be given to Vietnam “of such a nature as to sustain and enhance the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea”.19 Further signs of discomfort on the part of the Europeans, again most notably France, were evident in relation to the inclusion of the Khmer Rouge within the so-called “third force” for Cambodia advocated by the ASEAN grouping. This too was smoothed over in the Declaration of 1983, with the joint assertion that the formation of the CGDK “constitutes a significant step in the search for a comprehensive settlement”.20 Where the Cambodian and Afghan situations provide an example of the limitations faced where the policy processes/structures element of actorness is weak, a more recent event provides a suggestion as to possible limitations when performance structures are inadequate. On 19 September 2002, as a result of the terrorist attacks of 11 September of the previous year, U.S. President George W. Bush proclaimed a new security doctrine for the United States in which the willingness to fight pre-emptive wars against “rogue states” held central place. When this new doctrine was used to target Iraq, it quickly became clear that, aside from the problem of lack of intra-regional agreement,21 any possible EU-ASEAN co-operation would largely be irrelevant, again as a result of insufficient actorness. The confrontational balancing of an “errant” power is constrained by context, which itself will largely dictate the tools necessary to achieve the desired outcome. In most academic approaches to balancing in inter-regional relationships, such activity is envisioned as being undertaken within global multilateral fora, with the World Trade Organization and the United Nations being the primary examples. Multilateral fora are posited as the arena for such balancing activity as they are governed by agreed rules and norms of decision-taking, with an expectation that all participants will adhere to the decisions taken. In the debate over military intervention in Iraq, however, it quickly became clear that the United States saw no need,

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largely as a function of its likely inability to achieve a desirable outcome, to seek the legitimacy of multilateral approval. Said Kolko, “Washington has decided that its allies must now accept its objectives and work solely on its terms.… This applied, above all, to the war against Iraq — a war of choice”.22 Even when the Bush administration, at the urging of Secretary of State Colin Powell, submitted the Iraq issue to the UNSC, it was clear that they would not be bound by an unfavourable outcome. By stepping outside of this framework, the United States had made any possible interregional co-operation between the EU and its Asian partners to balance its activities irrelevant. Simply, outside of the rules and constraints of global multilateral fora, EU-ASEAN co-operation possessed none of the performance structures necessary to “correct” the behaviour of the United States. What is being argued, therefore, is that at least as far as alliance-style balancing is concerned, the level of actorness of the regional organizations in absolute terms is critical. This function of inter-regional relations will be performed only where both groupings pass a threshold of actorness necessary for the task at hand, including the ability to come to collective regional positions and the possession of the tools necessary to achieve the goal in question. The EU and ASEAN are yet to reach this threshold.

Institution Building The institution building function of inter-regional dialogues has been informed primarily by institutionalist literature. Inter-regional dialogues, it is argued, encourage the proliferation of structures and norms, which is seen as an inherent good in that the resulting co-operation has a “legalizing effect on international relations… [and] is thus considered an important prerequisite for dispute settlement”.23 This institutionalization has two facets. The first is the institutionalization of dialogues between the cooperation partners, thus going beyond simple ad hocism into a more formal arrangement. Such dialogues facilitate co-operation in that they are a concrete part of the external relations of each grouping in a way that ad hoc meetings can never be, and as such provide the framework within which issues may be raised for discussion that may not otherwise feature on an agenda for dialogue between the states or regions in question. In this respect, such dialogue structures are an end in themselves, not simply a means to some other goal. The second facet occurs in the post-negotiation

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phase: it is often necessary to develop new institutions/organizations in the post-negotiation phase in order to implement agreements. This may be in the form of concrete institutions (for example, a secretariat) to oversee the implementation of an agreement, or it may be through the enactment of agreed rules and regulations which thus become a part of the institutional/legal structures of the regions in question. The result, therefore, is the emergence of subsidiary inter- or trans-regional institutions, adding a further institutional layer to the international system and in so doing enhancing its institutional density.24 Additionally, given the exigencies of inter-regional co-operation, it may be necessary for regional groupings to co-ordinate positions leading into negotiations, or for expression in the structures of co-operation already referred to. Inter-regional dialogues could, therefore, lead to the development or reinforcement of intra-regional co-ordination structures.25 Institutional proliferation has been the outstanding success of EC/ EU-ASEAN inter-regionalism, which is to say that the number of structures developed as a result of the EC/EU-ASEAN dialogue, and more recently that of the European Union with the broader East Asia has risen steadily, even if many of them do not do a great deal. Two months after the establishment of SCCAN in 1972, the Association created the ASEAN Brussels Committee (ABC) comprising EC-accredited Ambassadors. This was followed in November 1977 by the establishment of a dialogue between the Community’s Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and the ASEAN Brussels Committee (ABC), leading to an agreement at the second ABC-COREPER meeting in June 1978 for the convening of the first ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting (AEMM) in Brussels and the effective foundation of EC-ASEAN dialogue. Fourteen AEMMs have subsequently been held in the quarter century since 1978, though in the decade since the eleventh AEMM in 1994, largely as a result of disagreement over the place of Burma/Myanmar, only three Ministerial Meetings have been convened. The ministerials have produced co-operation that tends to be declaratory rather than substantive (evidenced by the rather formulaic nature of the Chairman’s statements) — a fact attributable largely to the inability of the partners to co-operate, in other words, to their limited actorness.26 In March 1980, the EC-ASEAN Co-operation Agreement was signed. Touted as an agreement of equal partners working co-operatively “to strengthen regional organizations committed to economic growth, social progress and cultural development and aiming to provide an element of

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balance in international relations”,27 in reality it offered little outside a loose framework of co-operation. Indeed, the agreement is memorable in dialogue terms only for the creation of the Joint Co-operation Committee (JCC). The JCC was created to “facilitate the implementation and further the general aims of th[e] [Co-operation] Agreement”.28 This effectively established a division between EC-ASEAN economic and political cooperation, with the economic sphere falling to the essentially technocratic JCC, typified by the direction that consultations be held at “an appropriate level”,29 while the political sphere was reserved for the ministerial level. These lower-level structures within which economic ties were posited were, by their very nature, limited in what they could do. They did not have the authority to make sweeping policy changes, or to chart the future path of economic relations between the two regions, meaning that co-operation in this sphere increasingly came to be characterized by relatively minor programme development (capacity-building measures) and adjustment. At its first meeting in Manila in November 1980, the JCC began what would be a rapid proliferation of EC-ASEAN working groups, programmes and networks, including: a Working Group on Trade Issues,30 conferences in various industrial sectors with the aim of instituting an ASEAN-EEC Business Council, a programme of co-operation in science, technology and energy, and a seminar for ASEAN experts on access to European capital markets.31 At subsequent JCC and AEMM meetings, the dialogue process has been further supplemented through the creation of additional institutions and programmes including: joint research and training programmes, embracing also fellowships, experts seminars and studies; conferences of agro-based industries; a tourism co-operation programme; an ASEAN-EU Management Centre; programmes for HR co-operation; networks of Joint Investment Committees (JICs), European Business Information Centres (EBICs) and Regional Technology Centres; an EUASEAN Co-generation from Biomass (COGEN) programme; an ASEANEU Energy Management Training Centre (AEEMTRC); an ASEAN Regional Centre for Biodiversity Conservation (ARCBC) — the list goes on. This has led one well-placed Commission official to comment: “It’s clear that we have tried… over the last ten years, in different areas to get to a deeper level of integration with ASEAN, and we have failed. What we have been doing is financing left and right certain projects, which are maybe, if you

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take it all together, not very coherent, but were more or less giving in to the shopping-list of wishes on the ASEAN side”.32 In 2004, the EU-ASEAN dialogue is one of the most densely institutionalized in existence, so dense in fact that many Commission officials concerned with this relationship have difficulty keeping track of the multitude of meetings and working groups involved.33 The reason for this proliferation is simple: institution building is a process largely independent of actorness. The institutions created are the arena for substantive co-operation, but do not necessarily produce such co-operation, this being dependent upon the ability of regional organizations to engage in substantive dialogue, or in other words, their actorness. In the absence of substantive co-operation, institutional proliferation is a simple means by which to appear to be doing something.

Rationalizing and Agenda Setting The deduced functions of rationalizing and agenda setting are concerned with the improved functioning of global multilateral fora. Put simply, given the nature of multilateral institutions as (theoretically) global, there is the (often realized) threat of becoming “bogged down” through overpopulation at the negotiation stage of regime/institution formation or modification. Inter-regional dialogues, it is argued, may serve as a remedy for this. Two assertions are made. First, with respect to rationalizing, it is argued that inter-regional dialogues allow global issues to be debated at a median level between global institutions/regimes and nation-states, thus alleviating some of the problems inherent within truly global negotiations. In this respect they effectively serve as clearing houses for these global multilateral fora. Rüland envisages the division of global negotiations into “a bottomup process which may start at the regional level before being elevated to the inter- or trans-regional level and finally to the global level”.34 Secondly, and closely related to this rationalizing role is the idea that smaller numbers and a greater sense of consensus and common interests lead to the possibility of concerted agenda setting for the global level. That is to say, a combined negotiating agenda is able to be established at a lower level in the structure of global governance for expression in global negotiations. This occurs both at the regional (that is, co-ordination within a region) and

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at the inter-regional level (that is, co-ordination between regions) for expression at the global multilateral level. Looked at in another way, agenda setting may be conceived as simply proactive rationalizing. Where rationalizing involves intra- or inter-regional co-ordination on an issue already the subject of negotiation at the global multilateral level, agenda setting involves the same process for an issue the groups wish to introduce to the global multilateral level. What is being suggested, therefore, is that regional actors and interregional dialogues, as pre-existing mechanisms for the aggregation and reconciliation of state interests, constitute natural coalitions for the expression of interests at the global multilateral level. The extent to which this is possible however, particularly at the inter-regional level, is dependent on the extent to which common positions can be agreed within regional actors. In the case of inter-governmental regional actors, with decisiontaking premised on unanimity, decisions reached leave very little room for flexibility. This makes agreeing to a subsequent inter-regional position a virtual impossibility, particularly where the partner also falls at the weak end of the regional actorness continuum. Midgaard and Underdal’s comment that “there seems to be a serious risk that conferences that turn into bipolar bargaining between coalitions will end in breakdown because neither side is able to engage in a sufficiently constructive search for integrative solutions”35 is as applicable to inter-regional dialogues as it is to global multilateral fora. It is necessary, therefore, that regional organizations possess sufficient actorness, particularly in terms of decisiontaking flexibility, in order that this function be performed. This need for sufficient actorness for the agreement of suitably flexible common positions at the regional level has meant that, while rationalizing and agenda setting are potentially the functions of most significance in terms of global governance, they are also, at least in the EU-ASEAN relationship, the two least performed. Thus Chairman’s Statements of the EU-ASEAN dialogue have, in the post-bipolar period, routinely listed global multilateral issues as among those discussed, yet despite the habitual profession of joint interests little co-operation has been evidenced in global fora. Indeed, for the EU, largely due to the disparity in actorness between the two groupings, the inter-regional EU-ASEAN dialogue is not seen to be a suitable arena for such undertakings. The Association is criticized for not being an “interesting partner”, a factor which if it is recognized could

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be overcome were ASEAN to “offer the support of a real bloc, (with) ten countries (having) the same opinion”.36 This is, ironically, often more than the Union itself is able to do. In terms of the rationalizing and agenda setting functions, the EU has moved its efforts to the newer trans-regional ASEM forum. While this is still subject to the same limitations of actorness, it is the home of “biggerhitters” than is the case of the EU-ASEAN inter-regional dialogue, including as it does China, Japan and South Korea, and is therefore seen as being worthy of more effort. While substantive co-operation is little more evident than in the EU-ASEAN dialogue, the debate is at least being undertaken. The first ASEM Summit, for example, explicitly asserted that “Asian and European participants will consult closely on new issues for the WTO agenda”,37 with a consultative process on WTO issues subsequently being launched in Hanoi in January 2003.

Collective Identity Formation Finally, the concept of collective identity formation is deduced from the constructivist body of theory. The constructivist assertion is that involvement in inter-regional dialogues spurs the formation of collective identities, a process that may occur as an intended or an unintended consequence of interaction. It is an intended consequence of interaction where it is the explicit goal of one partner to induce closer cohesion in the other. The clearest example is the European Union’s role as an external facilitator. Aside from major (economic) powers such as the United States, the EU seeks to conduct dialogues with larger groupings rather than bilaterally with individual states. This exerts a certain amount of pressure upon third party states to cohere at the regional level. This is not to say, in the case of identity formation, that the external federator effectively “creates” an identity, but rather to assert that they provide an impetus for that process by bringing the grouping together. Collective identity formation occurs as an unintended consequence of interaction where it is the result of a reactive or adoptive response to certain stimuli. In other words, involvement in an inter-regional dialogue may spur collective identification as a response to some aspect or act of the dialogue partner. This response may involve creation of an alternate position (reactive) or adoption of the same position (adoptive). Rüland points to the former occurring where “the relationship is perceived by one

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side as a device in the hands of the other to establish or consolidate superiority”.38 It is with this process of unintentional identity formation that the following discussion is concerned. The role of inter-regional dialogues in collective identity formation depends greatly on the nature of the regions engaged. More specifically, collective identity formation is most likely to be triggered in a grouping that is heterogenous in nature, a likelihood that is increased where its dialogue partner constitutes a significantly more coherent other. In the language of actorness, it is the comparative difference in actor capacity that is significant when considering collective identity formation as a function of inter-regionalism. Thus in the EU-ASEAN relationship, evidence of this is most often to be found within ASEAN as a response to the EU. In this respect the debate over human rights and “Asian values” is routinely highlighted. Since the end of the bipolar conflict, human rights have played a significant part in the external relations of Western powers, and particularly of the EU which included in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) an obligation to pursue their protection in its external relations. The issue of human rights had, prior to the 1990s, been largely excluded from the European dialogue with ASEAN, with the Dutch Foreign Minister, for example, having asserted during the lead up to the Sixth AEMM in 1986 that human rights and freedom of the press, which had been raised by the European Parliament as possible topics for consideration, were not issues that belonged in such multilateral discussions.39 In the aftermath of the events of 1989–90, however, human rights and fundamental freedoms emerged as a recurring element in the relationship, and have been discussed at all Ministerial Meetings from the Ninth AEMM in 1991 to the present. By 1992, with the signing of the TEU and the establishment of human rights clauses as basic elements of EC/EU agreements with third parties, the Association was fully aware of the place to be occupied by human rights in the newly formed Union’s external relations. Accordingly, 1992 was identified by Human Rights Watch40 as being characterized by the extent to which these countries decided to respond formally to pressure over the issue. This was to involve the creation or rediscovery of “Asian values” as a challenge to the Western position, and at times vitriolic debate.41 Subsequently the Tenth AEMM in 1992 was the place of an acrimonious exchange of views, with Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas asserting that developing nations must secure the economic rights

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of their people before looking to individual rights.42 In 1993 the true shape of opposition was made clear as Asian states met in Bangkok to agree on a common position for presentation at the second World Conference on Human Rights to be held in Vienna on June of that year. A major role was played by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore in defining a concept that recognized the importance of economic development over civil and political rights, and that human rights “must be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and regional particularities, and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds”.43 In other words, cultural relativism. In terms of actorness, the process of collective identity formation was determined by the particular configuration of actors involved in the human rights/Asian values debate. The EU, a comparatively strong regional actor in relation to ASEAN, was able to set the agenda of debate.44 The Association, on the other hand, with comparatively weaker actorness, finds it more difficult to be similarly proactive, and is therefore often cast in the role of reacting to an agenda set by the Union, or more specifically, conducting a debate in a context framed by the Union. Being a strong or proactive actor in a relationship with a weak or reactive actor is, in relation to collective identity formation, a powerful position to be in. By framing debates through which a collective identity will be established, the strong actor affects significantly the nature of the collective identity itself. In addressing the issue as it did, the EU ensured that “the attempt to articulate ‘Asian values’… relied heavily on liberalism as a point of departure and has been light on specifying the positive definitive characteristics of ‘Asian culture’ that are purported to permeate social and political organizations in the region”.45 Further, the EU’s level of actorness when compared to ASEAN meant that once introduced, the issue would be debated. Had the Union been a comparatively weaker actor than the Association, the rights issue would likely have been quickly pushed to one side. The Union’s level of actorness was, however, insufficient to bring about real change in the position of ASEAN in the form of the adoption of the EU position. Rather, a reactive and unintended process took place, whereby the ASEAN grouping undertook the elaboration of its own position on human rights, utilising in part a critique premised upon Asian values. The probable effect on collective identity formation of interaction between strong and weak regional actors is expressed as a matrix in Table 1.

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Inter-regionalism and Regional Actors TABLE 1 Matrix of Most Probable Collective Identity Formation Responses

Respondent

Initiator

Strong Actor

Weak Actor

Strong Actor

Weak Actor

Reactive identity formation or marginalization of issue. Adoptive identity formation.

Marginalization of issue.

Reactive identity formation or marginalization of issue.

Concluding Remarks While the above constitutes only a brief foray into the concept of interregionalism, it serves to make clear that more factors need to be considered when discussing region-to-region relationships than the simple existence of a dialogue. Indeed, the utility of such dialogues will be determined to an extent by the qualities of actorness of those regional organizations involved. In the case of the EU-ASEAN relationship, a process involving qualitatively different regional actors, many of the more advanced functions associated with inter-regionalism are simply not performed. Where actorness was necessary at an absolute level, in relation to alliance-style balancing and to the rationalizing and agenda setting functions, EUASEAN co-operation proved itself to be limited. The examples of the Cambodian and Afghan crises were framed by the ability of each regional grouping to achieve collective positions. While this was also the problem with regard to the United States-led invasion of Iraq, reference was here made to the third of the actorness requisites — performance structures. Irrespective of the ability of the EU or ASEAN to come to common positions

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on the matter, any possible co-operation was effectively trumped by the United States’ positing of the issue in an arena in which neither the Union nor the Association possess effective performance instruments — the politico-security sphere. The proliferation of institutional structures, itself not dependent on actorness, has, however, been evident. Since the dialogue’s inception in the early 1970s, it has become one of the most densely institutionalized inter-regional relationships. Unfortunately these institutions have not delivered a great deal in the way of substantive cooperation, a factor explicable with reference to actorness or the lack thereof. Finally, the process of collective identity formation has proceeded, enhanced by the fact that there is a qualitative difference in actorness. What we see, therefore, is an inter-regional dialogue that, despite its three-decade existence, remains immature in the sense that the more advanced functions of inter-regionalism posited by theorists, specifically alliance-style balancing, rationalizing and agenda setting, are not performed. If actorness is able to be used in this manner to explain performance and non-performance of the deduced functions of inter-regionalism, it may perhaps also be used to introduce some predictive capacity into the framework. Where two regional actors are embarking on a new interregional dialogue, an assessment of their qualitative levels of actorness may provide some indication as to the shape their relationship is initially likely to take, allowing the targetting of their efforts towards areas where success is most likely, rather than wasting them in those where their actorness is insufficient. Alternatively, it could allow the actors the opportunity to weigh the utility of entering the dialogue at all. Actorness is, therefore, a doubly useful addition to the study of inter-regionalism.

Notes 1

2

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Group-to-group dialogues being traceable back to the 1963 Yaoundé Convention between the European Community and the Associated African States and Madagascar (known under the French acronym of EAMA). Elfriede Regelsberger, “The Dialogue of the EC/Twelve with Other Regional Groups: A New European Identity in the International System?”. In Europe’s Global Links: The European Community and Inter-Regional Cooperation, edited by Geoffrey Edwards and Elfriede Regelsberger. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990, p. 5. Heiner Hänggi, “Interregionalism in Comparative Perspective: In Search of a

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4

5 6

7

8

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Typology”. Paper presented at the Conference on Inter-Regionalism in International Politics, Freiburg, 31 January to 1 February 2002, pp. 2–3. Early work on the functions of inter- and trans-regional relations is to be found in: Julie Gilson, “Europe-Asia: the Formal Politics of Mutual Definition”, in The European Union and East Asia: Interregional Linkages in a Changing Global System, edited by Peter W. Preston and Julie Gilson (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2001); Julie Gilson, Asia Meets Europe: Inter-Regionalism and the AsiaEurope Meeting (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2002); Heiner Hänggi, “ASEM and the Construction of the New Triad”, Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy 4, no. 1 (1999): 56–80; Heiner Hänggi, “Regionalism through interregionalism: East Asia and ASEM”, in Regionalism in East Asia: Paradigm Shifting?, edited by Fu-Kuo Liu and Philippe Régnier (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); Hanns W. Maull and Akihiko Tanaka, “The Geopolitical Dimension”, in The Rationale and Common Agenda for Asia-Europe Cooperation, CAEC Taskforce Reports (London: Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation, 1997); Jürgen Rüland, ASEAN and the European Union: A Bumpy Interregional Relationship, (Bonn: Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung, Rheinische Friedrich-WilhelmsUniversität, 2001). Rüland, op cit. It is unlikely that actorness constitutes the sole moderating variable determining the performance or non-performance of these functions. Other variables may include, for example, systemic structure, the place of hegemonial powers, the role of key individuals and so on. Gunnar Sjöstedt, The External Role of the European Community (Farnborough: Saxon House, 1977). David Allen and Michael Smith, “The European Union’s Security Presence: Barrier, Facilitator or Manager?”. In The European Union in the World Community, edited by Carolyn Rhodes. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. Christopher Hill, “The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role”, Journal of Common Market Studies 31, no. 3 (1993): 305–28. Joseph Jupille and James Caporaso, “States, Agency, and Rules: The European Union in Global Environmental Politics”. In The European Union in the World Community, edited by Carolyn Rhodes. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. A regional actor, drawing on Wyatt-Walter’s work on regionalism, is defined as a territorially-based organization, with a determinable identity, constructed by states for the purpose of designing and implementing a set of preferential policies in relation to a given issue within that regional grouping, and which are directed towards the improvement of the position of those states on that issue: Andrew Wyatt-Walter, “Regionalism, Globalization, and World Economic

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12

13

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15 16

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18 19 20 21

22

23 24 25 26

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Mathew Doidge Order”. In Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order, edited by Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 78. It is necessary that the authority of the supranational regional actor be founded upon the constituent state units in order that the body maintain its regional character for to cohere beyond the ordering principle of constituent state units is to effectively create a new super-state. Shigeyuki Abe and Michael G. Plummer, “Implications of the Asia-Europe Meeting for the World Trading System: An Issue-Oriented Review”, Kobe Economic and Business Review 41 (1996): 18. See: R. James Ferguson, “Shaping new relationships: Asia, Europe and the New Trilateralism”, International Politics 34, no. 4 (1997): 395–415; Gerald Segal, “Thinking strategically about ASEM: the Subsidiarity Question”, The Pacific Review 10, no. 1 (1997): 124–34; Yeo Lay Hwee, “ASEM: Looking Back, Looking Forward”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, no. 1 (2000): 113–44. Rüland, op cit., p. 6. Panos Tsakaloyannis, “The EC, EPC and the Decline of Bipolarity”. In The Future of European Political Cooperation: Essays on Theory and Practice, edited by Martin Holland (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), p. 37. Kusuma Snitwongse, “Interaction and Collaboration of the EC and ASEAN in the UN System and International Conferences”, in Western Europe and SouthEast Asia: Co-operation or Competition?, edited by Giuseppe Schiavone. Houndmills: Macmillan, 1989. Ibid., p. 233. See para. 8 Joint Declaration of the Fourth ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting. Snitwongse, op cit., p. 231. Both the EU and ASEAN were divided internally over the war on Iraq. It is, however, with the inadequacy of performance structures that we are here concerned. Gabriel Kolko, “Iraq, the United States, and the End of the European Coalition”, Journal of Contemporary Asia 33, no. 3 (2003): 294. Rüland, op cit., p. 7. Ibid. Ibid. Put simply, dialogues lack substance because the partners lack the ability to routinely co-operate on issues of substance. Much of this results from the difficulties in agreeing common positions at the regional level (the policy structures/processes component of actorness), let alone with an external partner. Preamble to the EC-ASEAN Co-operation Agreement of 1980. Art. 5(1) EC-ASEAN Co-operation Agreement.

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31

32 33 34 35

36 37 38 39 40

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Ibid. Hans H. Indorf, “Political Dimensions of Inter-regional Co-operation: ASEAN and the EEC”, Asia Pacific Community 19 (Winter 1983): 100. See Joint Press Statement of the First ASEAN-EC Joint Co-operation Committee Meeting. Interview with Commission official, 18 June 2002, Brussels. Interview with Commission official, 3 April 2003, Jakarta. Rüland, op cit., p. 8. Knut Midgaard and Arild Underdal, “Multiparty Conferences”, in Negotiations: Social-Psychological Perspectives, edited by Daniel Druckman. London: Sage, 1977, p. 343. Interview with Commission official, 18 June 2002, Brussels. Para. 11 Chairman’s Statement of the First Asia-Europe Meeting. Rüland, op cit., p. 9. Snitwongse, op cit., p. 256. Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1993: Events of 1992. New York, Human Rights Watch, 1993. Available online at: . Accessed on 29 October 2003. An example is the statement of Mahathir Mohamad that: “[I]n recent times, Western societies have witnessed an almost complete separation of religion from secular life and the gradual replacement of religion with hedonistic values. Materialism, sensual gratification and selfishness are rife. The community has given way to the individual and his desires… [leading to] the breakdown of established institutions and diminished respect for marriage, family values, elders and important customs, conventions and traditions… Hence, Western societies are riddled with single-parent families, which foster incest, with homosexuality, with cohabitation, and with unrestrained avarice, with disrespect for others and with rejection of religious teachings and values… Their moral foundations are crumbling, Westerners are suffering all kinds of psychological and physical decay, their lives filled with stress and the fear of terrible new diseases engendered and propagated by their hedonistic lifestyles”. Quoted in Thio Li-Ann, “Human Rights and Asian Values: At the Periphery of ASEAN-EU Relations”, Journal of European Studies Chulalongkorn University 5, no. 2 (1997): 32. Ibid. Art. 8, Bangkok Declaration [on Human Rights]. Simply stated, had the EU not pushed the issue, human rights would not have been an issue of contention in the EU-ASEAN relationship. Garry Rodan, “The Internationalization of Ideological Conflict: Asia’s New Significance”, The Pacific Review 9, no. 3 (1996): 333.

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5 ASEM’s Extra-regionalism: Converging Europe’s and East Asia’s External Projections toward Other Regions César de Prado Yepes

World governance is in disarray as big powers disagree in their worldviews and multilateral organizations (mainly those of the United Nations and Bretton Woods) seem to lack effectiveness in many crucial issues. This gives rise to different alliances and the “coalitions of the willing” that may arouse uneasiness as we are now seeing over the pursuit of “regime change” in Iraq led by the U.S. However, new world regionalism that emerged in the 1980s (defined in part by its openness), and associated inter-regional alliances could become key to decrease anarchy around our inter-dependent, multi-level world. Of course, dynamic states of various shapes and sizes still form the cornerstone of global politics. But regional co-operation agreements have recently increased in such great numbers, scope, and diversity that it would be reckless not to try to accommodate them between a system of states and multilateral organization to improve global governance issues.1

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Europe and East Asia in the New Regionalism Europe is often seen as the paradigm of new regionalism. The European Union (EU) regional project, originating in the 1950s among six countries, expanding to 25 over the years in the hope that peace can be further enhanced in the European region. There are inevitably uncertain aspects in such momentous evolution in international politics, but European states always seem to find a solution to move forward. The enlarged European Union is now finalizing a full-fledged Constitutional Treaty to rationalise its institutions and better manage its many internal and external prerogatives in broad political, economic, and social domains. Europe’s rapidly evolving regional process has been serving both as a model and a challenge to the rest of the world, and nowadays many other regions are trying to formalize co-operation in a growing number of issues. At the same time, the East Asian (ASEAN+3) regional process is advancing relatively fast to present an additional or alternative model to the new trend of multi-dimensional world regionalism. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the oldest regional organization in the East Asian region. During the Ninth ASEAN Summit held in Bali in October 2003, ASEAN leaders adopted the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II). Bali Concord II established the goal of creating an ASEAN Community supported by three pillars comprising the ASEAN Economic Community, the ASEAN Security Community and the ASEAN Socio-cultural Community, which should be put in place ideally by 2020. However, it is ASEAN’s external relations, especially with Japan, China and South Korea, that remain the key to maintaining momentum in all three pillars. The leaders of the thirteen countries, meeting in the Seventh ASEAN+3 Summit held on the margins of the Ninth ASEAN Summit, reaffirmed their co-operation and partnership, welcomed and firmly supported the adoption of the Bali Concord II, reiterated their determination to intensify joint efforts in combating terrorism, reaffirmed their commitment to a peaceful solution of the nuclear issue facing the Korean Peninsula through dialogue, endorsed the Implementation Strategy of the Short-Term Measures of the Final Report of the East Asia Study Group, held discussions on the progress of the Initiative for Development in East Asia, explored new ideas such as studying the feasibility of an East Asia Free Trade Area, and committed themselves to sustaining a joint process for broader and deeper co-operation. While one could be sceptical about the odds of full-fledge integration in East Asia, one has to humbly concede

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that the overall unprecedented peace and interdependent economic development of Southeast and Northeast Asian countries may also be of great interest to other parts of the world.

Increasing ASEM’s External Projection If Europe and East Asia start to share a common world vision in which regions have a useful role to play, then it would be natural for both Europe and East Asia to explore synergies to better advance that vision. The flexibility and scope of the multi-dimensional ASEM process might hold the key.2 Many activities advanced in ASEM’s political, economic and social pillars often touch the concern of the broader world. Moreover, the Chairman’s Statement of the Sixth ASEM meeting of foreign ministers held in Kildare in April 2004 explicitly addressed many issues of global interest to be jointly advanced or resolved: these are multilateralism, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, the Korean peninsula, Iraq, the Middle East Peace Process, the WTO Doha development round, sustainable development, dialogue of cultures and civilizations, international public health, and migration. Many of these issues have both strong regional components and global implications. In addition, ASEM foreign ministers agreed on a declaration on multilateralism that pays attention to regional and inter-regional processes. ASEM Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to multilateralism and to a fair and just rules-based international order, with a strong United Nations at its heart, to resolve international disputes, to promote positive aspects of globalization, and to advance democratization of international relations. … Ministers also stressed the role regional organizations and dialogue mechanisms such as ASEM can play in enhancing multilateralism. Let me first give an overview of the recent developments in world regionalism, and how Europe and East Asia engage with them in increasingly similar ways, before advancing policy proposals for adding an external dimension to the ASEM process in a fashion I call extraregionalism.

Current Regionalisms Outside Europe and East Asia The definition of regions and regional processes has not been settled. For the past half a century numerous academic disciplines including political

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science, economics, military strategy, international relations and geography have been adding insights into the concepts of regions and regionalism that have not yet been homogenized. This plurality of approaches jointly contribute to theorize a “new regionalism” paradigm — a multidimensional form of integration which includes economic, political, social, and cultural aspects and thus goes far beyond the goal of creating regionbased free trade regimes or security alliances of earlier regionalisms. In addition, the new regionalism aims to promote certain “world values” where a coherent mixture of policies to promote security, economic and social development, and ecological sustainability is in the long-term overall more beneficial than laissez-faire globalism. Let’s now review the status quo of regionalisms outside Europe and East Asia.3 The United States, itself the result of a unique process of regionalization, is the driving force of open economic regionalism in America focusing on trade and investment liberalization rather than multi-dimensional cooperation. It leads the active North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) since its inception in 1994, and hopes to advance the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations that year. The FTAA’s Eighth Ministerial Meeting in November 2003 tried to maintain political commitment to conclude negotiations by January 2005 against the background of the failed WTO Ministerial Meeting in Cancun the previous September. However, an earlier comprehensive FTAA agreement was then scaled down in terms of rights and obligations, timing and participation. Meanwhile, the United States is the key to the fate of the broader Organization of American States (OAS), far away from a regional process as its Charter, signed in 1948, hopes “to achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their territorial integrity, and their independence”. In short, largely contradictory goals, coupled with very limited resources render the OAS quite ineffective. South of Rio Grande, Latin-America countries are rethinking regionalism, looking into co-operation on more issues, hoping to avoid the failures of the previous waves of regionalism. Efforts during the 1960s– 1980s were driven by a high role of the state in the economy and a development model relying on import substitution. At the end of Cold War many countries were mired in debt crises forcing them to rely on a U.S.-backed, neo-liberal model of structural adjustments including economic deregulation and various types of trade liberalization substantially lowering tariffs. In the race to compete, there are nowadays

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over thirty new regional integration initiatives forming a mesh hard to disentangle. The most prominent is the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur) activated in 1991 among Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. It has actively pursued closer relations with other countries and regions, and recently signed a free trade agreement with the five countries of the Andean Community entering into force in July 2004, which may well be a step towards closer South American integration. The Central American Integration System started in 1991 faces many challenges but it has progressed on trade issues. More broadly, the Rio Group is a mechanism for permanent political consultation and coordination created in 1986 by eight countries that has grown to nineteen members. It lacks a permanent secretariat (or website) but it also has an active external dimension, especially with the EU and with East Asia. Regionalism in South Asia partly hopes to revive the range of relations possible under previous Indian Empires, including the time of the British Empire. India (including present-day Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka) was under Britain the core of an Asian trading empire, but its decolonization process focused on breaking the traditional political and social hierarchies, closed the country and left many economic problems unresolved. These are now addressed in a more liberal fashion moving away from close ties with the former Soviet Union and the non-aligned movement orbit to increase co-operation with the rest of the world. Yet, India’s relations with its neighbours have not been very good and the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) process remained stalled. SAARC, founded in 1985 to jointly advance in economic, social and cultural development was hampered by the rule of unanimity, by its slow and non-binding procedures, by a lack of trade promotion objectives (until the entry into force in 1995 of a preferential trading arrangement), and most importantly by the geopolitical tension between Pakistan and India. Dialogue on politically contentious matters was officially not allowed under the SAARC Charter. However, regular meetings of ministers did provide opportunities for informal talks, which have finally paid off. While at the beginning of 2003 India and Pakistan were on the edge of war over the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, a year later they agreed to a negotiated solution. This took place on the margins of the Twelfth SAARC Summit, where participants approved to have the free trade agreement enter into force by 2006, and to advance a social chapter hoping to improve the dismal indicators of human development.

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A renewed regional process in the former Soviet Union revolves around the promotion of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). For a long time the CIS was a very lukewarm effort to maintain former Soviet ties. Despite regular summits and a Secretariat in Belarus, CIS has been ineffective in maintaining peace or economic and social development, and Central Asia has once more become a cauldron of geopolitical hostilities. Under Putin, Russia has become increasingly concerned with European enlargement and Northeast Asian growth and instability in Central Asia. Russia is therefore seeking to revive its external projection to all parts of the world. This seems to particularly include the CIS with a recent mesh of bilateral agreements and a treaty creating a Common Economic space between Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan aiming to a shared tax code and a customs union. The key question is how the rest of the world can maintain amicable links with these developments. South of Europe is another rather fragmented area of precarious stability and limited development. Formal efforts of regional co-operation based on ethnic/linguistic affinities are not strong. The League of Arab States, created in 1948 nowadays has twenty-two members that usually prioritize nation building and self-sufficiency over any long-lasting regional cooperative efforts. For these and many other reasons it has become a large area of still very uneven development and generally limited social, political and economic opening. On the Eastern side of the League, six rich oil and gas producing countries formed in 1981 the multi-dimensional Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), which is lowering and standardizing tariffs and even exploring monetary co-operation. But on the Western side of the League, five quarrelling countries defer real convergence through the Arab Maghreb Union they created in 1987. The evolution of the League is particularly dependent on global geopolitics. Each military action led by the United States in the area divides it but prompts new efforts for smaller groups to explore other ways of co-operation. And as the mantra of freer trade slowly percolates, there are greater chances of success for a Greater Arab Free Trade Area to be gradually implemented this decade among the fourteen main traders of the League. That is if the Bush administration’s current chief vision for the region does not strain the process too much. The hawkish plan for a greater Middle East partnership, stretching all the way to Pakistan and giving priority to opening markets, again contrasts with the local visions and those of other external partners.

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In the large and diverse area South of the Sahara, several regional processes based on colonial legacies are also suffering problems of competition or co-ordination. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was created in 1975 to advance a free trade area, and later upgraded to broader economic and political co-operation. ECOWAS now wants to launch a monetary zone, which would partially compete with the existing French-speaking Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa (UEMOA) inside it, and perhaps even with the Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC) to the East. The rest of Sub-Saharan Africa is advancing a series of multidimensional regional groupings whose success is uncertain for a number of reasons, including overlapping. The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) was created in 1992 to advance economics, politics, and social issues and in its 2003 summit it approved a long-term Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan and a Charter of Fundamental Social Rights. SADC may now have some chances to achieve a free trade area with the recent joining of South Africa, the leader of a more successful and non-overlapping Southern African Customs Union. Yet, SADC overlaps the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), established in 1994 among countries all the way up to Egypt, which looks for a custom union and has even started to consider co-operation in peace, security and foreign policy. In 1999 the African Union was established as a consequence of the perceived ineffectiveness of Organization of African States (OAS). The African Union is a promising political process that works to accelerate social, economic and political integration, partly catalysing and coordinating existing smaller regional mechanisms. It also manages a New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), a uniquely consensual way for Africans to find their best development path and ways to cooperate with external partners. Now we have gained an idea of the advancement of multi-dimensional and open regionalism, we should now focus on how the EU and East Asian countries are linking up with these new regional processes.

Europe’s Inter-regionalism The EU has actively developed bi-regional dialogue and co-operation processes with most of the world that go beyond the core trade and aid

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competences of the European Commission, EC).4 These processes aim at comprehensiveness and often bring together heads of state and government to deal with a growing number of political, economic, and social issues. Since 1995 the comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is governing the EU’s policy towards the strategic southern and eastern Mediterranean; that is, the Maghreb, the Mashrek, and Turkey. The Partnership, also called the Barcelona Process, overarches bilateral and multilateral relations, seeks peace and stability based on fundamental principles, the creation of a free-trade area, and broader social, cultural and human relations. The EU gives some financial and much political support for the process, but it seems it is never enough. Part of the reason is the historic problems of the Middle East, which the EU hopes to resolve faster with a complementary multi-dimensional Middle East Peace Process. As the issue converges with others, the European Union is advancing a proposal for a “wider Middle East” to reach to Iraq and Iran. Furthermore, the EU is aiming at a free trade zone with the relatively peaceful and developed Gulf Co-operation Countries in order to deepen the Co-operation Agreement both parties signed. The enlarging EU has always emphasized its relations with neighbouring areas by advancing overlapping initiatives thereby strengthening them. In March 2003 the EC adopted a Communication setting out a new framework for relations over the coming decade with the 385 million people of what it calls “Wider Europe”, that is the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, Russia, and the Western Newly Independent States. The strategy aims to create a “ring of friends” by offering them greater aid, co-operation, and access to its internal market in exchange for concrete political, economic and institutional reforms. The EU’s relations with Russia have much improved in the past decade. A Partnership and Co-operation Agreement, in force since the end of 1997, addresses trade and economy, science and technology, energy, environment, transport, space and a range of other civil sectors, as well as more complex dialogues on broad political issues and justice and home affairs (to prevent illegal activities). It pays special attention to the long-term procurement of oil and gas through an Energy Charter Treaty on its way of political ratification. Meanwhile, the joint summit of 2003 went further and agreed to structure in the long-term all relations into four spaces: economic; freedom, security and justice; research, education and culture; and external security. This may eventually lead to some co-operation between the

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European Union and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Yet, interregional relations are negligible so far. Relations between the European Union and the African continent are developing in a multi-level way. The African-Caribbean-Pacific “Cotonou” Partnership Agreement signed between the EU and forty-eight sub-Saharan countries in 2000 with duration of twenty years supersedes former agreements. While differentiated to take account of the levels of development and the specific concerns of the countries concerned, the agreement embodies a comprehensive partnership based on three pillars: political dialogue, preferential trade relations and significant resources devoted to development and economic co-operation. Since October 2003 ACP negotiations advance at the sub-regional level, first with Western (ECOWAS) and Central (CEMAC), then with Eastern and Southern countries. Furthermore, the EU has been increasingly engaged in conflict-prevention activities in Africa and in the financing of postconflict demobilization and reconstruction programmes. In most cases, this has been in support of Africa’s own mediation efforts entrusted to regional or pan African bodies. At the continental level the First EU-Africa Summit was held in Cairo in April 2000, and the EU is prepared to use the NEPAD scheme for any activity that may be led by Africans themselves. Europe’s relations with developing South Asian countries on the other hand leave much room for improvement. Europe is the South Asian countries’ most important trading partner and a major export market, but the overall degree of trade is very low. The development co-operation between the EU and the countries of South Asia covers financial and technical aid as well as economic issues. Europe has in this way been trying to support the institutions and activities of the SAARC (including exchange of information, technical aid and training), but internal problems of SAARC have so far prevented any effective advancement. The EU’s relations with Latin America have since the 1990s progressed partly through inter-regional agreements with political, economic and social objectives that also foster regional integration. The San José Dialogue, which was launched in 1984 is the cornerstone of EU-Central American relations. The dialogue hopes to solve armed conflicts by means of dialogue and negotiation and includes a co-operation programme in order to address the socio-economic causes of the crisis. The meeting in 2004 took place alongside the Third EU-Latin America and Caribbean Summit, the highlight

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of a process which since 1999 tries to catalyse relations with Latin America as a whole, as well as with its various sub-regional processes, through a strategic association touching political, economic and co-operation aspects. For that a bi-regional group of public administrators manage over fifty priority actions. The EU concluded in 1983 a first co-operation agreement with the Andean Community, followed by a new one in 1993, which provided for economic and trade co-operation and development co-operation and included a most-favoured-nation clause. The last joint meeting was held in parallel with the Rio Summit in June 1999. Since 1999 the EU has a framework agreement with Mercosur to achieve a partnership for political and security issues, closer co-operation on economic and institutional matters and the establishment of a free trade area for goods and services under WTO rules. EU and Mercosur officials also meet on the margins of inter-regional summits in need to be more substantiated. Contrasting with the improving trend of the above inter-regional processes, Europe’s traditionally broad and good relations with the United States are now facing difficulties. The Trans-Atlantic Declaration adopted in 1990 set the new principles of co-operation and consultation, and the New Trans-Atlantic Agenda of 1995 laid a more detailed framework across many activities, with economic ones further addressed in 1998 in a special Trans-Atlantic Economic Partnership. The “full and equal partnership” also aims to stabilize and develop other regions of the world, although current disagreement on the takeover of Iraq and commercial matters makes that task very difficult. Meanwhile, there are almost non-existent inter-regional arrangements between the European Union and NAFTA, which Europe seems as too focused on trade liberalization without enough social and political issues.

East Asia’s Inter-regionalism Not only Europe, but now East Asia also seems to be developing a clear inter-regional strategy.5 Soon after the moderate success of the ASEM process in bridging the gap between Europe and Asia in a multi-level way and for an increasing number of issues, the East Asian side started to further promote itself through other inter-regional schemes. This goes

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much beyond the traditional ASEAN relations with the rest of the world. Here again, Singapore has been active in promoting some of them, but other East Asian countries took initiatives in this direction as well.6 In 1999 Singapore hosted the first senior officials meeting of the Forum for East Asia-Latin America Co-operation (FEALAC). It brings together the ASEAN+3 countries, Australia and New Zealand, and seventeen Latin America countries, which includes the twelve permanent members of the Rio Group, for informal dialogue and co-operation based on principles of consensus, equality and mutual benefit. And like the EU-Latin American process, FEALAC’s growing number of projects deal with a variety of issues and tries to involve private actors from all layers of society. In March 2001, the Rio Group had in Santiago, Chile three complementary ministerial summits: first they met among themselves, then with European Union representatives, and later with the East Asian representatives within FEALAC. The Second Ministerial Meeting in Manila in January 2004 enlarged to Guatemala and Nicaragua, and presented a comprehensive plan of action to advance chiefly through economic and cultural issues. FEALAC may seem as a way to go beyond the relatively stalled AsiaPacific Economic Conference (APEC) process. In the Fifteenth APEC Summit in October 2003, the twenty-one economic leaders agreed to pursue some security aspects of economic transactions, but they only showed mixed support for the resumption of trade liberalization in the WTO. The inter-regional model is also used in relation to other parts of the world where regionalism is much less developed, thus implicitly giving a leadership role to the East Asian side. A first effort to reach west was the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation (IORRC). Tracing its origins to a 1995 meeting in Mauritius that brought together Australia, India, Kenya, Mauritius, Oman, Singapore and South Africa (countries with noticeable Indian diasporas), it has now eighteen members while China, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, and Egypt are dialogue partners. Given the very limited results of the whole process (the Seychelles recently pulled out), a geographically more coherent effort started in June 2002 as the Thai Government hosted in Cha-Am the Asia Co-operation Dialogue (ACD) that brought together ministers from seventeen countries in East, Southeast, South Asia, and even some Arab states members of the GCC to discuss the diffusion of tensions and possibilities of economic and cultural co-operation. Moreover, ACD hopes “to become a viable partner for other regions”, and “ultimately transform the Asian continent into an

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Asian community, capable of interacting with the rest of the world on a more equal footing and contributing more positively towards mutual peace and prosperity”. The flexible but top-down ACD process has managed to bring Japan and China together, as well as Thailand, in most of the activities generally agreed. This is not the case for most other countries of ACD; for instance, Singapore has so far only shown an interest in being involved in one area of co-operation that focuses on small and medium enterprises. The Second ACD Ministerial in 2003 gathered eighteen ministers, agreed to enlarge the process to four new countries, and advanced economic issues such as the creation of a common bond market. Not surprisingly, India has recently warmed up to China (both premiers met for the first time in June 2003), and to ASEAN (they signed a free trade agreement in November 2002 at the time of the ASEAN+3 meeting). The intensity of inter-regional relations of East Asian countries only grows as an increasing number of countries try to encourage their neighbours to engage other parts of the world. For instance, there are prospects for broad-based East Asia–Africa inter-regional relations through the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) process. Started in 1993 by the Japanese Government, TICAD counts as partners several multilateral organizations but it tries to catalyse a broader East Asian interest as Japan promotes “Asian modes of development and governance”. TICAD-I already led to the First Asia-Africa Forum organized in 1994, which subsequently led to the Bandung Framework for Asia Africa Co-operation, and in TICAD-III held in September–October 2003, the Asian mode of development was more assertively advertised. Furthermore, in February 2004 Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong visited the Middle East in order to get a process of dialogue underway between that region and the East Asian countries.7 Finally, the world is watching the evolution of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a multi-issue process that brings together China, Russia and some Central Asia Republics. It started in 1996 to deal with security issues, but in 2001 broadened to economic and social issues and its secretariat opened in January 2004 in Beijing.8 The SCO may not yet be seen as an inter-regional process. But as Japan, South Korean and ASEAN countries keep improving their relations with Russia they may want also to be more involved in the SCO, and even jointly with China start thinking of promoting a link between East Asia and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

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Suggestions for an Effective ASEM Extra-regionalism The previous sections of this chapter presented the broad regional processes outside Europe and East Asia, and the European and East Asian projections towards them. Europe has a relative long history of inter-regional relations, and actively promotes broad regionalism through them. But the younger East Asian inter-regional projection is growing very fast and increasingly overlaps with Europe’s both geographically and thematically. Thus, Europe and East Asia could easily explore joint dialogue and even co-operation regarding crucial issues for the development of other world regions. Naturally, an ASEM process cannot formally enlarge to other world regions, but it can connect to them in innovative ways. Referring to the Myanmar problem critics of ASEM underscore the difficulties ASEM is encountering in its own enlargement process. Yet, the multi-pillar ASEM remains a very flexible process that could allow for innovative formulae such as allowing representatives from other world regions as temporary observers or participants in some of ASEM dialogues and activities. This approach to ASEM’s external projection would also reflect the fact that many ASEM activities do not have to be undertaken by consensual participation of the twenty-six partners but can also happen when a European and East Asia member decide to do so. Moreover, Europe’s and East Asia’s inter-regional processes could then converge to jointly reach other world regions. Both Europe’s and East Asia’s inter-regional projections could start speaking to other world regions on behalf of ASEM partners when there is mutual agreement to do so. Table 1 puts these external regional and inter-regional processes in perspective and summarizes the potential to find extra-regional synergies in the not too distant future. The potential for extra-regional synergies varies according to the degree of overlapping in geographic terms and in the themes addressed. Good ASEM relations with the U.S.-led processes of regional co-operation in America should be explored, although the potential of joint action is low for now. The Trans-Atlantic Dialogue and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation do not overlap geographically or thematically at all with NAFTA or the OAS. In contrast, the European Union–Latin America and Caribbean Summit and the Forum for East Asia Latin America Co-operation overlap very much with the Rio Group, not only in geographic terms, but also in the broad range of issues addressed. Similarly, both Europe and East Asia

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ASEM’s Extra-regionalism TABLE 1 Inter-regionalisms for a Better ASEM Extra-regionalism Other Broad Regional Processes

Inter-regionalisms Europe’s

East Asia

Potential for Extra-regional Synergies

Organization of American States; NAFTA

Transatlantic Dialogue

Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation

Low

Latin America’s Rio Group and various sub-regional processes

EU-Latin America and Caribbean Summit

Forum for East Asia Latin America Co-operation

High

African Union-NEPAD and various subregional processes

EU-Africa process; EU-ACP agreement

Tokyo International Conference on African Development

Medium-High

South Asia Association Regional Co-operation

EU-India and “ASEAN+3” + EU-SAARC dialogues India summits; Asian Co-operation Dialogue

Medium

Gulf Co-operation Council

EU-GCC Agreement

Asian Co-operation Dialogue

Medium

Middle East

Euro-Mediterranean Partnership; Wider Middle East

Singapore’s dialogue initiative

Low-Medium

Russia-led Commonwealth of Independent States

EU-Russia Summits; Wider Europe Initiative

Shanghai Co-operation Organization

Low

now also have mechanisms to reach the whole of the African continent through EU’s New Partnership for Africa’s Development, and through Japan’s TICAD processes. Europe and East Asia could try to connect to the SAARC in complementary ways. Europe’s multi-dimensional relations with SAARC are weaker than those with India, but both the external relations of ASEAN and the Asia Co-operation Dialogue allow East Asia to engage with India and SAARC countries in many issues in a wider geographical context. Moreover, as the ACD also reaches to some countries of the GCC, it could

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evolve and allow bi-regional dialogue and co-operation, which would then permit synergies with the EU-GCC agreement. Likewise, if the Singaporean prime minister manages to have East Asian countries reaching out to the Middle East there could be room for co-operation with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the new Wider Middle East initiative. Finally, developments in Russia and Central Asia merit much more common attention than so far is the case. So perhaps ASEM partners may want to suggest to the Shanghai Co-operation Organization to better link with East Asia, Europe and the rest of the world. The key long-term challenge for ASEM extra-regionalism would be to catalyse a growing number of public and private actors. The ASEM process itself often takes good advice from selected non-governmental actors. This is one of the functions of the Asia-Europe Foundation, which was designed to gradually reach to the public that can catalyse East Asia-Europe relations. Meanwhile, Europe’s inter-regionalism always includes clauses to promote civil society contacts, and many European think-tanks and networks have regular regional links with counterparts around the world. Similarly, East Asia increasingly relies on this type of semi-public diplomacy in its regional and inter-regional processes. The ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (a network of think tanks in nine ASEAN countries which is very much a part of the Track II diplomacy within ASEAN) collaborated with the Chilean Pacific Foundation to host the first academic seminar on the FEALAC process in October 2000. And a first Symposium for Intellectuals from East Asia and Latin America was held in Tokyo in February 2002. Meanwhile, an India–ASEAN Eminent Persons lecture series launched in 1996 by India has grown since 2003 to an India–ASEAN+3 format in a New Asia Network of think tanks. The ACD is so far a top-down intergovernmental process with very little input from more independent intellectuals, but Thailand is helping the ACD to create a think-tank network. Moreover, the business oriented Boao Forum for Asia that meets since 2001 in the Chinese island of Hainan hopes to become a broad-based Track II for ACD, and its 2004 annual conference included an informal meeting for heads of Asia’s regional and sub-regional organizations. Even the TICAD process was planning to launch an Africa-Japan-Asia Centre for Economic, Trade and Cultural Exchanges in Tokyo before the end of 2003 to “contribute to furthering

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African awareness within Japan and the Asian community, particularly within the business community”.9 While they used to be few and secluded, nowadays the number of think-tanks around the world keeps growing and most have very visible and comprehensive websites with policy recommendations that often take into consideration the input of many concerned people in political, economic and social organizations at home and beyond. Thus, policy think-tanks based in Europe and East Asian countries could well serve as an additional window of opportunity to promote ASEM extra-regionalism that also strives to advance a more effective multilateral system. Between the current system of states and international disorder, an additional, flexible layer of dynamic world regions and inter-regional processes led by Europe and East Asia might just make the necessary difference for a much better world.

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For an overview of regional developments, see the UNU-CRIS Regional Integration Information System, . For developments in 2003, see UNU-CRIS Annual Report 2003, and the websites of the regional (and inter-regional) processes mentioned in this paper. The UN’s University programme on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS) was created in 2001 in Bruges, Belgium by the Flemish University System in collaboration with the College of Europe and the United Nations University. For information on ASEM, see the public websites: , and , or the private one . This section benefited greatly from the knowledge of my colleagues at UNUCRIS, especially Luk van Langenhoven, Mary Farrell, Philippe De Lombaerde, Nikki Slocum, and Brigid Gavin. For official updated overviews, see the specialized portal of the European Commission , and the fact sheets on the European Union prepared by the European Parliament . For deeper academic analyses, see H. Smith, 2002 and K. Smith, 2002. Although there are efforts to theorize the rising role of inter-regional relations (Rüland 2002), there is still a need to monitor the rapid current developments for both academic and policy purposes.

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César de Prado Yepes I have argued elsewhere that the East Asian process also has an external dimension towards other world regions catalysed by the ASEM (de Prado, forthcoming). See Channel News Asia online (Singapore), 20 February 2004, . There is not yet a website or information about the exact location of the secretariat. Yet, the Chinese Foreign Ministry posts online a number of news on the topic through . See United Nations University update (Tokyo), Issue 28, November–December 2003, .

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6 ASEM — A Catalyst for Dialogue and Co-operation: The Case of FEALAC David M. Milliot1

ASEM’s rationale is today well-known. It was intended to fill a “missing link” between Europe and Asia. While trans-Pacific relations were being strengthened in the nineties with the development of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), and transatlantic relations remained traditionally strong, institutional relations between Asia and Europe were still relatively under-developed. Asia-Europe relations were seen as the “weak link” in the context of the new emerging triad of North America, Western Europe and East Asia.2 Launched in Bangkok in 1996 between the fifteen member countries of the EU, the European Commission, ASEAN members,3 China, Japan and South Korea, ASEM has created a new dynamic around a global agenda between the two regions. It has developed a new set of methods of fostering political and economic dialogue as well as intellectual and cultural exchanges.4 It is structured by a number of principles such as equality, mutual benefits and consensus. Its informality and multi-dimensionality are two of the key features. Moreover, states participate on an individual

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basis, which makes ASEM different from bloc-to-bloc dialogue such as EU-ASEAN. Since its creation, ASEM has underlined a number of functions which help states manage their bilateral, inter-regional and multilateral affairs. It has raised the issue of the emergence of new forms of diplomacy between state actors and non-state actors (civil society, firms) as well as between national and regional actors. This new diplomacy adopts a more informal and multi-dimensional approach by involving both public and private sectors. In many ways, ASEM has created a new level of interaction in international relations, just below the universal level (UN for instance), and above the inter-regional level (EU-ASEAN) and regional level (EU).5 ASEM is not a typical inter-governmental forum. The process that has emerged from ASEM has been characterized by the notion of transregionalism. In the absence of any authoritative definition6, trans-regionalism is hereby defined as a soft-institutionalized process of consultation and co-operation between states from different regions of the world acting in their individual capacity. The criteria for adhesion remain flexible and do not correspond automatically to the geographical criteria of regional organizations to which participating states might be members. A transregional forum’s operating mode is based on informality, mutual respect and mutual benefit. Its scope of discussion and activity is multi-dimensional and encompasses politics, economics and trade, as well as cultural and intellectual exchanges. Hence, ASEM has not only emerged as being a new layer of cooperation, but it has also created windows of opportunity for fostering new types of co-operation between other world regions. In fact, ASEM has served as a blueprint for Asia to foster new relations with other regions. The success of ASEM has given Asia confidence to launch a similar process with Latin America. The valuable experience gained out of ASEM has proved useful in forging other linkages. In that sense too, ASEM has already put its mark on the international stage. The idea of establishing a link between East Asia and Latin America on the model of ASEM was put forward by Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong in October 1998 during his official visit to Chile. At that time, the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) was the only framework for dialogue and co-operation between the two countries. Following the visit, Singapore and Chile worked to get countries in their respective

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regions to come onboard the idea of launching a dialogue process between Asia and Latin America. Like in ASEM, by moving beyond national bureaucracies, an informal process would allow more direct contacts at all levels between East Asian and Latin American societies. As a matter of fact, ASEM and the newly created Forum for East Asia and Latin America Co-operation (FEALAC) share many common characteristics. FEALAC — like ASEM — creates a new soft-rules framework and informal process to promote dialogue and foster cooperation. Despite great distance and lack of resources, Asia and Latin America show commitment on both sides of the Pacific to increase their level of interaction. FEALAC is predominantly a South-South dialogue process as it comprises mainly developing countries, who share many similar concerns and issues. The issue of the integration of developing countries into the political and economic mainstream has become an issue over the years. The multilateral system which is seen by many as neglecting the needs of developing countries has been under mounting criticisms.7 Powerful regional poles (Europe, North America, East Asia) have developed strong institutional links. Many countries and regions located outside this triangle or triadic zone feel left out. But new trends have revealed emerging alternative strategies and partnerships: the creation of the G-3,8 G-20,9 and the multiplication of linkages between Asia, Latin America, and Africa indicate new developments in South-South co-operation. In this context, FEALAC key objectives are: to increase and improve mutual understanding, trust, political dialogue and friendly co-operation among member states with a view to enriching and sharing experiences and developing new partnership; to tap the potential of multi-disciplinary co-operation in areas of economics, trade, investment, finance, culture, tourism, sciences and technology, environmental protection, sport and people-to-people exchanges; to expand the common ground on important international political and economic issues with a view to working together in different international fora in order to safeguard our common interest.10 Several factors contributed to the creation of FEALAC and specific dynamics between Asia and Latin America must be taken into account. But initial developments of FEALAC are related to some extent to the ASEM process. By using ASEM as a blueprint, FEALAC adopts a similar philosophy of fostering a multi-dimensional and informal dialogue

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between two regions. In doing so, Asia and Latin America aim at increasing their international profile, and use FEALAC as leverage on the international stage.

Developing Asia-Latin American Relations: Towards FEALAC The United States has always loomed large in Latin America. However, since the end of the Cold-War era, Latin America countries have been pursuing a policy of engagement with Europe and Asia in order to counterbalance the American influence. The implementation of the North-American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), created in 1992, has increased synergies around the North American economy. Mexico external trade has been diverted to a large extent to U.S. and Canadian markets. In addition, the idea to launch a pan-American free trade area (the Free Trade Area of Americas — FTAA) has provoked both hope and fear. Latin America stepped up its engagement with Europe to avoid a too exclusive partnership with North American countries. Latin America and Europe upgraded their level of dialogue with the launch of the Europe-Latin America Summit whose first meeting took place in Brazil in Rio de Janeiro11 in 1999. At the same time, Latin America also gladly accepted the offer of partnership from Asia. For Asia, the development of the Pole of Americas12 represents in the long term a challenge, in particular for ASEAN.13 But more importantly, the financial crisis of 1997 was a wake-up call for many governments in the region. The crisis revealed a need for greater intra-regional as well as international co-operation and exchanges of experience in order to create early warning systems and prevent such a disaster to occur again. In that respect, Asia could gain from the South American experience in managing financial crisis, in particular in Brazil, Chile14 and Mexico. Moreover, Latin America offers a rich regional integration experience among developing countries, with the co-existence of three major structures of regional cooperation, namely Mercosur, the Andean Pact and the Group of Rio.15 In the meantime, the first inter-regional institutional linkage was taken place between the Andean Pact and ASEAN.16 Hence, the ground for launching a wide-ranging initiative between the two regions was gaining momentum. Trade remains high on the agenda. The potential for greater Asian and Latin American trade and investment relations has not been fully realized yet.17 Economies of the two regions have much to gain from closer

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relations,18 but the existing low level of trade relations between the two regions has so far prevented a greater mutual awareness. However, trade patterns may change in the future as most export economies of East Asia have entered a process of export markets diversification. Europe and United States are Asia’s main trade partners, but now intra-regional in Asia is fast expanding, and new opportunities are being sought in Latin America, and in Africa. Therefore, expanding inter-regional trade and investment has become a priority. In sum, FEALAC will create a privileged forum for dialogue and cooperation as the two regions share common experiences and interests on economic regional co-operation, and on managing of financial crises. But the launch of a comprehensive partnership between the two regions is also deemed to facilitate the management of trans-national issues, and reinforce the two regions’ respective role in international politics, in particular by promoting a more equitable multilateral system. The idea of bringing together Latin America and East Asia had been around for quite some time. Informal contacts had been developed within APEC, where Mexico and Chile have been active members. The FEALAC project really took off during the official tour of Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong in Latin America. The idea of launching a dialogue forum was raised with Chilean President Eduardo Frei, by gradually creating a process of dialogue within a timeframe from three to five years, and which could function in a similar way to ASEM. Interestingly, the Singaporean Prime Minister used the same expression of “missing link” during his visit to Latin America as he did during his official visits to Europe prior to the launch of ASEM. In a speech held in Argentina, Goh Chok Tong referred to the “missing link” between Asia and the Latin America: APEC has linked both shores of the Pacific for a decade. Trans-Atlantic links between Europe and North America are even better established. North and South America have the Organization of American States (OAS) and deeper inter-dependencies will be built by the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Four years ago, I drew attention to the need to bridge the gap between Asia and Europe. The first Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) was held in Bangkok the following year. Since then, ASEM members have met at different levels every year. The missing link is now between Asia and Latin America.19

The use of a similar vocabulary to explain the creation of FEALAC and ASEM is striking. In fact, ASEM and FEALAC are two major Singaporean

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initiatives designed to reinforce Singapore and Southeast Asia relations with their external partners. By creating a web of global links, Singapore is pursuing its Global City policy.20 In that respect, both initiatives serve the long-term initiatives of Singapore’s foreign policy. Pursuant to the Goh-Frei meeting, Singapore prepared a working document which described the main rationale and ideas behind the project, and sent it for consideration to its Asian partners, that is, the ten members of ASEAN, China, South Korea and Japan. Singapore also insisted on inviting Australia and New Zealand. Despite initial reluctance of some Asian partners, they were included from the onset. Though interested, South Asia was not included in order to avoid any difficulties associated with South Asia’s political situation. Overall, this new initiative was well-received. In Latin America, President Eduardo Frei used the same method by addressing a letter to the twelve members of the Group of Rio inviting them to take part individually in this project. Chile however did not include the English-speaking countries of the Caribbean. During this preliminary phase, it was stressed that the participation in the Forum should be considered on an individual basis, and not on a regional or blocto-bloc basis. Hence, FEALAC membership would be limited to states acting in their individual national capacities. Therefore, regional organizations (Mercosur, ASEAN or the Group of Rio) were not included as such. With positive answers from all invited countries, Singapore and Chile began a process of joint evaluation. The informal phase of consultation continued on the “margin” of the United Nations General Assembly in New York between the representatives of ASEAN and the Group of Rio. The broad support received showed that the potential for increasing relations between the two regions was shared. The idea of FEALAC was ready to be implemented.

Using the ASEM Blueprint FEALAC uses to a large extent the “ASEM way” of promoting dialogue and co-operation. As far as FEALAC working principles, purpose and process are concerned, the work carried out within ASEM has largely served as blueprint.21 Preliminary work was carried out on the basis of the

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working paper prepared by Singapore and Chile. It was designed to identify all sectors where co-operation would be possible and fruitful. FEALAC was launched at ministerial meeting level and not at summit level, but it has created a process of regular consultation between the two regions very similar to the ASEM process, though developing at a slower pace. So far, FEALAC process has been structured by the Foreign Minister Meetings (FMM), which take place when deemed appropriate, but in principle every two years. The first FMM was organized in Chile in 2001 and the second FMM in the Philippines in January 2004. “The Santiago meeting marks the beginning of an unprecedented dialogue and co-operation between their regions to meet political, cultural, social, economic and international issues of common interest.”22 The first ministerial meeting took place in Santiago (Chile) on 29 and 30 March 2001. In total, the participation of the first ministerial meeting of FEALAC included thirty countries, from “Asia”: Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, South Korea, Japan, Indonesia, The Philippines, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, and for “Latin America”: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela. FEALAC’s geographic scope was in fact very broad, some would say too broad. The participation of Cuba reaffirmed the SouthSouth dimension of the FEALAC dialogue, and the Forum’s ambition to differentiate itself from the United States. Ministers endorsed the project and its rule of operation as defined during the preparatory phase.23 The document named “Forum for East Asia and Latin America Co-operation Framework” gives the general background (rationale, purpose, principles) of FEALAC. During the sessions, discussions focused inter alia as to how FEALAC could be used as a platform to address trans-national security issues such as terrorism, illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and organized crime. In the economic field, ministers addressed the consequences of globalization, as well as regional integration, political and economic transition issues. They call for a new cycle of WTO negotiations, hence making FEALAC a platform to voice their concerns on multilateral issues. During the second FEALAC ministerial meeting, it was decided to both enlarge and reinforce the FEALAC dialogue. Two new members, Nicaragua and Guatemala, were accepted. In the meantime, the Manila

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Action Plan was endorsed. It sets the Forum priorities for its next stage of development, and defines the role of FEALAC in inter-regional relations and the international system.24 In a tense international environment, FEALAC ministers pledged to discuss in the future political and security issues in a more comprehensive way. Similarly to ASEM, FEALAC approach to security is holistic, and includes issues such as environment degradation, natural disaster, extreme poverty hunger, infectious diseases, drugs and narcotics trafficking. On international economic matters, the Action Plan calls for a fairer and more equitable international trading system, as well as for implementing reforms in the international financial architecture. Main characteristics of FEALAC are very close to ASEM’s own. Although less exhaustive, the FEALAC framework document is similar to the Asia-Europe Co-operation Framework 2000 adopted during the ASEM 3 Summit in Seoul in 2000. It describes the main characteristics, purpose and principles of FEALAC. FEALAC is an informal mechanism for dialogue and co-operation among the countries of the two regions. It is based on the principles of respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality, mutual benefits, the common goal of development, and respect for each other’s cultures and social values.25 The process is driven by consensus. According to its general principles, FEALAC remains open to all sovereign states committed to promoting better relations and linkages between East Asia and Latin America. New members are allowed on the basis of general consensus. Like in ASEM, the informal dimension of the process is a key feature so that a free and frank exchange of ideas can be encouraged. Participants are interested in a more flexible mechanism of consultation than traditional international negotiation. The primary purpose of such process is to facilitate, reinforce interactions, and increase mutual knowledge between the two regions. Hence, any type of bureaucracy that could jeopardize the process and its informal dimension should be avoided. In addition, the informal dimension of the meeting shall promote the dialogue between private sectors of the two regions, and at people-to-people level. The scope of FEALAC dialogue and co-operation is not limited to one specific set of issues. Its approach is comprehensive and deals equally with political, cultural, and economic and trade issues. However, in order to streamline the process, three working groups were set up to foster cooperation in the fields of political and cultural relations, economic and

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social issues, and in sciences and education. Here again, the ASEM structure in three pillars (political, economic, and cultural/intellectual pillars) is not very far away. However, it is worth noting that in FEALAC political cooperation includes its cultural dimension, and economic co-operation includes social aspects as well. In addition, these three working groups include the participation of representatives of private sector, international organizations, NGOs and academics. The senior officials have been tasked to co-ordinate the process, thus making Senior Officials Meetings (SOM), like in ASEM, the principal body of co-ordination. Hosted for the first time in Singapore in September 1999, senior officials meetings have since met regularly every year. Furthermore, two co-ordinators (one from each region) provide a focal point for a period of two years each. Singapore and Chile were the first two co-ordinators. In 2002, they were replaced by Colombia and the Philippines, and in 2004 by Brazil and South Korea. Co-ordinators, who are acting de facto as secretariat, are assisted by deputy co-ordinators.26 Like ASEM, venue of meetings alternates in the two regions. Given the wide geographic scope of FEALAC, its partners are committed to make full use of modern technologies and the internet. A dedicated website was created.27 Hosted by Colombia, part of its content is available to the general public, while most of working documents are only available to officials. Hence, by accessing the website with a password, they can exchange official documents through the web, thus making this website an e-secretariat. Within ASEM, idea about setting up a secretariat has been floating around for quite some time but was never endorsed because of lack of consensus. However, proposal to create a virtual secretariat was put forward by the Philippines. In that respect, FEALAC may be showing the way forward. In order to lay the ground for a more enduring partnership, only a few selected number of FEALAC projects will be implemented. Given its geographic scope and its limited resources, FEALAC partners have been careful in the initiatives so as not to spread the resources too thin. Two FEALAC countries can launch a FEALAC initiative.28 About twenty projects were endorsed at the first ministerial meeting. They are designed to enhance substantive co-operation between East Asia and Latin America by raising awareness and fostering better understanding. However, proposed initiatives in various fields like SME, university and cultural exchanges, development of human resources, promotion of investment

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and trade, maritime and air linkages, need to avoid duplication with existing programmes. FEALAC is also about promoting participation of non-governmental sector and developing people-to-people exchanges. During the preparatory phase, Chile proposed the creation of a cultural foundation “Latin America — East Asia” on the model of ASEF. But this initiative was not taken up because of the early stage of development of FEALAC and the fragile financial sustainability of ASEF. However, several initiatives have been endorsed to foster trans-Pacific co-operation through FEALAC. For instance, Singapore organized the FEALAC Journalists Visit Programme (JVP) since 2000, conducted a study on “Obstacles and Impediments to Trans-Pacific Trade and Investment”, and proposed the Young Parliamentarian Forum (YPF) as a forum for regular dialogue between the young politicians and opinion leaders from both East Asia and Latin America. Other high-profile projects include the establishment of a FEALAC Business Council and of a FEALAC Academic Exchange Programme.

FEALAC on the International Stage With the exception of Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, a vast majority of FEALAC partners are developing economies. Hence, FEALAC offers a unique platform to develop the positions on international, particularly, development issues. FEALAC purpose is however different from previous traditional South-South dialogue forum like G-77.29 FEALAC does not contest global markets and the globalization process. On the contrary, it aims at taking advantage of it, and to accelerate the development process of its economies. In a world of global interdependence, FEALAC wants to stress the South-South dimension: “Global interdependence is a reality that cannot be ignored. But the global market is highly uneven in its effects and does not in itself create international cohesion. The dichotomy between the economic and political dimensions of global interdependence should be addressed.”30 A specific focus is set on disadvantaged and marginalized people with a view of empowering socially and economically most vulnerable components of population.31 However, despite their “common vision”, interest and objectives of each FEALAC member remain driven by their national interest and long

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term objectives. In Asia, besides Singapore, Thailand and Japan have been active in the initial development of FEALAC, whereas the Philippines are “reinventing” their Spanish cultural background to raise its international profile, and increase political and trade relations with Latin America. The South-South dimension of FEALAC is for China a major element of its participation. Beijing wishes to pursue its policy of bringing closer regional poles from the developing world, and accordingly is interested to develop its relations with South America.32 Through FEALAC, Australia and New Zealand can reinforce their regional dialogue both with East Asia and Latin America. Auckland thus can intensify its lobbying for bilateral free trade agreements. On its part, Canberra may try to use FEALAC as a channel to reactivate the Group of Cairns, of which Brazil, Argentina and Chile are members. Chile, along with Singapore, has been one of the two main drivers behind FEALAC. Since the early nineties, Chile has been a strong advocate for enhancing Latin American ties across the Pacific Rim Basin. The experience acquired within the ASEM framework has proved to be valuable, not only for Asia-Europe relations, but also for enhancing Asia’s external relations vis-à-vis other world regions. This new form of dialogue and co-operation seems to meet a number of expectations from participating states. Study of trans-regional processes like ASEM has indeed revealed several functionalities associated with trans-regionalism. Some functions are quite basic and are already working. Some others have the potential to develop further, and shape future international relations. In the short term, primary purpose of FEALAC is to build a certain level of mutual awareness and engagement between the participants. In fact, initial goal of FEALAC remains modest. As Yeo Lay Hwee puts it: “FEALAC is mainly for networking, information-sharing and confidencebuilding”.33 FEALAC partners can thus promote an open and inclusive dialogue. Building network, sharing data and raising confidence are three key-functions of FEALAC. At this initial stage of development, FEALAC is primarily about knowledge building. The launch of such processes creates an additional conduit for communication and meetings. Therefore, its bilateral function is important: each FEALAC partners is free to develop its bilateral relations, and FEALAC can provide a useful dialogue platform, in particular for its smaller states with limited diplomatic capacities. Bilateral meetings take place “on the margin” of ministerial meetings.34 In

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a similar way to ASEM, the Forum allows bilateral exchanges between participants, thus contributing to reinforce the overall dialogue between Asia and the Latin America, but also within each geographic “group”. FEALAC’s long-term objectives are to develop strong inter-regional relations at all levels, and play a bigger role on the international stage, in particular in the context of multilateral negotiations. The practice of ASEM has revealed a function of agenda setting, agenda rationalization, and of pre-negotiation consultation. Similarly, FEALAC wants to develop its work in synergy with the multilateral agenda. At the international level, FEALAC has the potential to act as catalyst for the multilateral system. By creating a permanent process of consultation, FEALAC might help to streamline the work on the international agenda. It can provide additional consultation opportunities before official negotiations take place in multilateral conferences. However, the “multilateral-utility”35 of FEALAC will still need to be assessed in the future as FEALAC is further developing. In particular, how can FEALAC link with the international system? How can this new level of dialogue strengthen the overall South-South co-operation as well as promote North-South co-operation? Other potential functions include an institutional and multilateral function as well as a balancing function vis-à-vis North America and Europe. In the case of Latin America-Asia relations, FEALAC can be used to leverage both regions’ position on strategic issues, including agricultural reforms and agricultural subsidies in the context of WTO, and United Nations reforms.36 Consequently, the multiplication of ASEM like-minded processes poses a number of issues. FEALAC and ASEM mark the emergence of a multilevel governance, and creating a new trans-regional level between the regional and universal levels. In the future, the issue of subsidiarity will need to be addressed. As the Commission on Governance underlined “with its universality, it (the UN) is the only forum where the governments of the world come together on an equal footing and on a regular basis to try to resolve the world’s most pressing problems”.37 In this context, in order to put the principle of subsidiarity on a strong basis, it will be necessary to study the type of co-operation that can be promoted between the UN and other multilateral regimes (that is, WTO) and those new transregional dialogue and co-operation forums. How can ASEM’s and FEALAC’s trans-regionalism contribute to the creation of a multi-layered

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global governance? How is it possible to use the principle of subsidiarity by which issues must be addressed at the most relevant policy-level? Interestingly, ASEM partners have lately endorsed a Declaration on Multilateralism38 which defines a more systematic approach when addressing multilateral issues within ASEM, and sets the ASEM priorities for reinforcing the multilateral system.

Concluding Remarks FEALAC is still a very new process and its achievements remain limited. FEALAC initial developments have been relatively low profile when compared with the launch of ASEM in Bangkok in 1996. However, a regular and extensive channel of communication now exists between Asia and Latin America. The perspective of organizing a Summit level meeting is being discussed, and if realized, will certainly mark an important political development between the two regions. Interestingly, ASEM has set the path for developing trans-regionalism. Based on their initial successes, Europe and Asia have become the best promoters of trans-regionalism. In fostering new partnerships with other world regions, Asia and Europe can learn from each other. The developments of EU external relations — besides its bilateral inter-regional relations — is completed by a web of new dialogue and co-operation processes like ASEM, the Europe-Latin America summit and the EuropeAfrica summit.39 Asia has taken a similar path with ASEM, now with FEALAC, and possibly with Africa with the launch of the new strategic partnership Africa-Asia40 in 2005. An Asia-Middle East dialogue is also being explored. Emerging linkages between world regions reveal a new landscape that is progressively taking shape in international relations. How ASEM and FEALAC develop are not only important for their respective partners, but also for the overall system of international relations. The rise of a new form of dialogue and co-operation, using ASEM as a blueprint, indicates that management of international relations needs innovation and imagination. In an ever increasing complex and interdependent world, Europeans and Asians are setting new benchmarks. It is up to them to make trans-regionalism a substantial component of new international relations.

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This text reflects only the personal views of the author. Heiner Hänggi, “ASEM and the Construction of the New Triad”. Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy 4, no. 1 (1999): 56–80. At that time, namely: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam. ASEM co-operation and dialogue is based on three pillars: Politics, Economics and Intellectual/Cultural Exchanges. Those principles and soft rules are defined in the document Asia-Europe Co-operation Framework 2000. States participate on an individual basis, which makes ASEM different from block-to-block dialogue. On this idea: Jürgen Rüland, “The EU as Inter-Regional Actor: The AsiaEurope Meeting”. Asia-Europe on the Eve of the 21st Century, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, 19–20 August 1999. No definition of trans-regionalism is given in dictionary of international relations as the concept is still relatively new. Some authors like Fred Bergsten defined APEC as “super-regional”: Fred Bergsten, “America’s Two-Front Economic Conflict”, Foreign Affairs 80, no. 2 (2001): 16–27. Other authors stressed that the notion of trans-regionalism itself refers to trans-nationalism, which is below state-level (firms, civil society), whereas trans-regional relations imply interstate relations. Hence, they refer to the idea of mega-regionalism developed by Yoshinobu Yamamoto, which involves the creation of new regional areas of dialogue and co-operation by including existing regionalism and inter-regional relations: Yoshinobu Yamamoto, “Regionalization in Contemporary International Relations”, in Regionalization in the World Economy: NAFTA, the Americas and Asia-Pacific, edited by Van R. Whiting. London/New York: Macmillan, 1996, pp. 19–42. Lately, the election of the new managing director of the IMF revealed the divergence between developing countries, who feel under-represented, and Europe and North America. The WTO ministerial meeting in Cancun has seen the emergence of an IndiaBrazil-South African triangle. These three countries have decided to establish a trilateral commission named IBSA. The last G-3 meeting took place in India in March 2004. Informal grouping of twenty-two states from the developing world and designed to use some leverage in international trade negotiations. See para. 4 of the Framework for a Forum for Dialogue and Co-operation between East Asia and Latin America. Placed under the joint presidency of Brazil and Germany, and with the participation of the fifteen members of the European Union and thirty-three

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countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, the first Europe-Latin America and the Caribbean summit took place in Rio de Janeiro in 1999. The endorsed declaration of Rio refers to the creation of a strategic partnership between the two areas similar with the one launched by ASEM: “Us, heads of state and government of the European Convention country, from Latin America and the Caribbean, decided to promote and look further into our relations in order to establish a strategic partnership between our two areas, based on the deeply anchored cultural inheritance which links us and on the richness and the diversity of our respective cultural expressions, sources of strong and multiple identities, as on the will to create an international environment which will enable us to increase the level of well-being of our companies and to respect the principle of the durable development, by benefiting from the prospects offered by increasing universalization, in a spirit of equality, of respect, of alliance and co-operation between our two areas”. The subsequent process includes also three pillars, namely politics, economics as well as cultural, educational, scientist exchanges, social issues and human security issues. It thus creates a multi-level dialogue between Europe and Latin America. Negotiations towards establishing a Free Trade Area of the Americas have started during the Miami summit in 1997. Now the Summit of Americas takes place every two years. “ASEAN has China on the one side, coming into the WTO and armed for war in terms of marketing prowess, and then the Americas, which could pretty well do many and most if not all of what Southeast Asia does for the U.S. market now”, “Trade Onus Now Falls on ASEAN”, Straits Times (ST), 4 May 2001. On this issue, it is interesting to note that during the Asian financial crisis, Thailand showed interest in the Chilean experience on banks debt management and banking restructuring. In fact, Latin American banking crisis during the eighties help to draw some conclusions from crisis management, especially in the case of Chile and Mexico. With a better access to information on the Latin America experience in managing financial and banking crisis, Asian economies could have saved some precious time in implementing relevant policies. See: Manfred Mols, “Der verletzte Subkontinent. Die Auswirkung der Asien-Krise auf Latinamerika”, Internationale Politik 54, no. 5 (Mai 1999): 41–48. Dynamics of integration have been reinforced by the creation of a Free Trade Area between Mercosur and the Andean Pact on 1 January 2000. On relations between ASEAN and the Andean Pact: “ASEAN, Andean Community take first step in trans-regional tie-up”, The Nation (TN), 9 May 2000. Trade relations between Asia and Latin America, though low in volume, have seen a regular progression since the early nineties. According to the United

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David M. Milliot Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, inter-regional trade grew from US$16 billion in 1990 to US$26 billion in 1994. See Mikio Kuwayama, “Search for a New Partnership in Trade and Investment between Latin America and Asia-Pacific” . Speech by H.E. Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong at the Argentina Institute of International Relations (CARI), Buenos Aires, Argentina, 2 June 1999. “We are more than a regional city. We draw sustenance not only from the region but also from international economic system to which as a Global City we belong and which will be the final arbiter of whether we prosper or decline. If we view Singapore’s future not as a regional city but as a Global City then the smallness of Singapore, the absence of hinterland, or raw materials and a large domestic market are not fatal or insurmountable handicaps”. In S. Rajaratnam: The Prophetic and The Political, edited by Chan Heng Chee and Obaid Ul Haq. New York: St Martin’s Press, 1987, pp. 223–31. Interestingly, during a seminar on Asia-Latin America co-operation organized at ESCAP in Bangkok, on 15 and 16 February 2000, it was specifically referred to the adoption of similar techniques of co-operation with those developed within ASEM: “The Trade Facilitation Action Plan (TFAP) of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) could provide an example for addressing trade issues of Asia, and the Pacific and Latin America”: UN-ESCAP, Inter-regional Co-operation in Trade and Investment Asia-Latin America, ESCAP, Studies in Trade and Investment, no. 43, United Nations, 2000, p. 117. See Co-Chair’s Statement, First Ministerial Meeting of the Forum for East AsiaLatin America Co-operation. It was however decided to amend the official name of the Forum in order to emphasize the co-operation dimension rather than the geographical element. Hence, the previous denomination of “East Asia Latin America Forum” was changed to “Forum for East Asia-Latin America Co-operation” or “FEALAC”. The Action Plan is divided into three parts: a) Enhancing Economic Ties to Further Economic Development and Creating Opportunities to Overcome Poverty, b) Securing the Future, and c) Strengthening FEALAC to Further Inter-Regional Dialogue. See para. 5 of the Framework document. Deputy co-ordinators are set to become the next co-ordinators. See FEALAC website at . Initiatives are country-based. Projects can be self-financed or financed by external donors such as the Asian Bank of Development or the Inter-American Bank of Development. At the occasion of the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1964 in Geneva, developing countries established a working

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group composed of 77 countries. The so-called Group of 77 has now 133 members. During the Cold-War era, it was an important component of the North-South Dialogue, in particular on issues relating to economic development, and stability and equality in trade relations. See para. 1 of the Framework document. “We reiterated that one of FEALAC’s priorities is overcoming poverty and providing equal opportunities including by promoting among our people, particularly among the disadvantaged and marginalized, including women and youth, a worldview that embraces entrepreneurship and the right to a better life, thus contributing to socio-economic development”: § 12 of the Manila Action Plan to Further Enhance Co-operation Between East Asia and Latin America. “China is the largest developing nation in the world and Latin America is a region with a considerable concentration of developing nations. In recent years, China has carried out very good co-operation with many Latin American countries. Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s upcoming visit to Chile and five other Latin American countries is of major importance. It will certainly push the friendly and co-operative relations between China and Latin American countries to a higher level of development in the new century”: Press conference by H.E. Tang Jiaxuan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, Xinhua News Agency, 31 March 2001. Yeo, Lay Hwee. “The Long Term Vision of FEALAC: An East Asian Perspective”. Paper presented at the 2003 Korea-Latin America Business Forum, Regionalism in the Americas and Vision for Korea-Latin America Co-operation. Seoul, 22 September 2003. For instance, during the FMM I, consultations took place between Thailand and Myanmar/Burma and Rangoon gave its approval to co-operate with Bangkok and Beijing on fighting drug trafficking: “Burma Backs Three-way Battle Plan”, Bangkok Post (BP), 31 March 2001. This notion has been developed and explained by Christopher Dent in the case of ASEM: Christopher M. Dent. “From Inter-Regionalism to Trans-Regionalism? Future Challenges for ASEM”. Asia-Europe Journal 1, no. 2 (2003): 223–35. “In reinforcing our contribution to shaping international politics, the allocation of the UNSC membership need[s] to reflect a more balanced geographical representation of our respective regions”: Statement by H.E. Surakiart Sathirathai, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, First East Asia-Latin America Ministerial Meeting, Santiago, Chile, 29–30 March 2001. See Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 6. See Chair Statement of the ASEM Foreign Ministers Meeting 6, Kildare, Ireland, 17–18 April 2004.

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David M. Milliot The first Europe-Africa summit took place in Cairo in 2000 under the auspices of the EU and the OUA. The launch of an inter-regional co-operation framework between Asia and Africa and the inauguration of the New Strategic Partnership between Asia and Africa will take place in Bandung in April 2005. It will also mark the Golden Anniversary of the Asian-African Conference (Bandung Conference): “This Strategic Partnership will unite more than 100 countries representing four billion of the world’s population of six billion, with the world’s largest wealth of natural resources”: Speech by the President of the Republic of Indonesia, Megawati Sukarnoputri, at the first Asian-African Sub-Regional Organization Conference in Bandung on 29 July 2003.

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7 ASEM’s Security Agenda Revisited1 Heiner Hänggi

The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process has been conceptualized by its initiators and proponents in the context of the triangular relationship between the three major regions of the world economy: North America, Europe and East Asia, herein referred to as the new Triad.2 Relations between Europe and East Asia were depicted as the “missing link” in the new Triad, which ASEM was intended to bridge.3 The problematic nature of the triangle imagery notwithstanding, right from the outset it was clear that ASEM followed a geo-economic rationale rather than a geopolitical one. As a matter of fact, ASEM got on track with a major economic agenda concentrating on trade and investment issues and a minor socio-cultural agenda covering a broad range of topics. However, this did not preclude ASEM from taking up security issues. As modest as it may have been at the inauguration of ASEM,4 the security agenda was slowly but surely expanded as ASEM progressed. The expansion of ASEM’s security agenda was mainly a result of major developments and changes in the international system, starting with the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in July 1997 which undermined the very geo-economic rationale of ASEM and culminating in the terrorist

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attacks of 9/11, and their aftermath, including the war in Iraq in spring 2003, which brought back the pre-eminence of security in international relations after a decade that had been characterized by the primacy of geoeconomics. Indeed, the first two ASEM summit meetings reflected the geo-economic rationale of ASEM — ASEM 1 (1996) was held at the height of the so-called East Asian (economic) Miracle, and ASEM 2 (1998) took place in the wake of the (East) Asian Crisis. Security issues were to take greater prominence at ASEM 3 (2000) (with the adoption of a common position on the Korean Peninsula conflict) and particularly so at ASEM 4 (2002) which took place one year after 9/11 and as the war in Iraq was approaching. The “securitization” of the ASEM agenda continued in the period leading up to ASEM 5 in October 2004, particularly in the fields of anti-terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As a result of this process, in the meantime, ASEM has acquired a considerable security dimension — or even a kind of a “security acquis”,5 as Michael Reiterer puts it in European Union parlance. The security dimension of the ASEM process has to be positioned in the context of the three-pillar structure, which, because of its comprehensiveness, is often viewed as a comparative advantage of ASEM — the three pillars standing for (1) political dialogue, (2) economic and financial co-operation, and (3) co-operation in other fields such as social, cultural and intellectual issues. The political pillar rests on two component parts (other than its co-ordinating function for the overall ASEM process), each reflecting a major issue-area in international politics: (a) values on the one hand, and (b) security on the other. The values dimension of the political dialogue essentially concentrates on human rights and democratization issues, which are considerably contested within ASEM, whereas the security dimension covers a broad range of traditional as well as “new” security issues, which seem to constitute more common ground among East Asians and Europeans than political values. The objective of this chapter is to take stock of the ASEM security agenda — as it stands more than eight years after the launch of the ASEM process — and to explore some of the opportunities and constraints of its further development.6 Having started with a brief discussion about the general context of Asia-Europe security co-operation and the constraining parameters of the ASEM security dialogue in particular, the main part of the chapter consists in a review of the ASEM security agenda. This review is based on an inventory of security issues that are addressed in the ASEM

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framework.7 The chapter concludes that, though there is indeed a growing ASEM security acquis, the dialogue on security issues is bound to remain constrained by structural impediments — impediments, which appear to have increased in extent in the wake of the events of 9/11, and its aftermath. In order to substantiate its security agenda, ASEM may be well advised to concentrate the security dialogue on those specific issues where it enjoys a comparative advantage.

The Context of the Asia-Europe Security Co-operation In their 1997 article entitled “Getting serious about Asia-Europe Security co-operation”, Dong-Ik Shin and Gerald Segal rightly said that “any thinking about security issues in ASEM has to recognize the limits of security co-operation, and the continuing central role of the United States”. As a matter of fact, in addressing the relevance of security issues in the ASEM framework, three important asymmetries with a constraining effect on Asia-Europe security co-operation have to be taken into account — asymmetries in terms of: the global security equation; regional security situations; and, the motivation to engage in inter-regional security co-operation.8 Firstly, as mentioned above, the original conception of ASEM as put forward by its initiators followed a strategic rationale of global scope. The establishment of “Pacific-style”, that is, APEC-like relations between “Asia” and “Europe”, was justified by the need to bridge the “missing link”, or at least to strengthen the “weak link”, in the Triad regions, that is, North America, Europe and East Asia. ASEM was seen as a device (a) to check and balance the predominant role of the United States by increasing the bargaining leverage of Europe and East Asia vis-à-vis the U.S., and (b) to contribute to the management of increasingly complex interdependence in face of globalization.9 At that time, it was already the case that this rationale was more a reflection of its proponent’s conception of the preferable world order than the real one. While the triangle imagery came quite close to the material reality of the pre-Asian crisis world economy and may regain its relevance in the future, it was completely at odds with the international security situation as well as with the international fault lines regarding political values.10 In terms of the latter, despite their differences regarding human rights and democracy promotion, the United States and Europe are perceived by other world regions as being part of a

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more or less solid Western bloc. In terms of security, the United States is the only superpower, whereas Europe and also East Asia are still largely dependent on the United States, which, through its military presence and political leadership, ultimately ensures regional peace and stability — though on its own terms — and particularly so in East Asia (see below). Since the inception of the ASEM process in the mid-1990s, the shift in international relations from geo-economics back to the primacy of security has further strengthened the position of the United States as the sole truly global security actor. In addition to that, the U.S.-led fight against terrorism and, even more so, the war in Iraq has increased intra-regional cleavages in both East Asia and Europe. Thus, there is a structural asymmetry between the initially economic rationale of ASEM based on three roughly equal world regions and the diverging logic of the international security system in which the United States is predominant. Secondly, the Asian and European participants of ASEM have somewhat different security concerns and interests. Regional stability is much better grounded in Europe than it is in East Asia. Large parts of Europe constitute an archetype of a “security community”, in which war between states has become inconceivable, whereas East Asia is still a rather volatile “security complex”, although modest progress in sub-regional security-community building has been made in the framework of ASEAN. While European states are constituent parts of a densely knit security architecture with a variety of “interlocking” institutions including the OSCE, NATO and the EU, the East Asian region is still in the experimental phase of regional security co-operation as illustrated by the rather slow “comfortable to all” pace of the ARF. European members of ASEM are engaged in the process of developing a common security and defence policy in the EU framework, whereas Asian members of ASEM are still far from any form of security co-operation among themselves. Consequently, East Asian countries are still facing classical security dilemmas, whereas European states have successfully transformed the balance of power into effective checks and balances against the hegemonial abuse of power in their own region. As Hanns W. Maull asserts, the basic ingredients for a robust regional order are in place and should keep Europe secure, whereas East Asian stability and security still rests on the operation of rough balances of power on the sub-regional, regional and trans-regional levels.11 The fight against terrorism has further increased the asymmetry

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regarding the security environments in Europe and East Asia, because old domestic and new geopolitical realities have made Southeast Asia once more a potential, or in case of Indonesia, the Philippines and possibly Thailand, a real battlefield of global conflict. Apart from the different regional security environments, there is also a marked asymmetry in the involvement of Asian and European states in each other’s security affairs. The European role in Asian security affairs is modest indeed but not insignificant, as symbolized by the EU’s membership in the ARF, whereas the East Asian involvement in European security affairs is marginal at best, with the noted exception of Japan. Thus, there is a structural imbalance, reflecting different security environments and different degrees of interaction, which renders security co-operation between Europe and East Asia rather difficult. Thirdly, the Asian and European participants of ASEM had different motivations for engaging in closer ties with each other. As previously mentioned, the ASEM initiative as conceived by Singapore and initiated by ASEAN, followed a predominantly economic rationale, though there were strong strategic ambitions of a political nature, too.12 ASEAN wanted the meeting to be seen “as an informal gathering of economic leaders from Asia and Europe” and the Asian participants “to include dynamic economies which have contributed to the region’s prosperity and growth”. Furthermore, ASEAN initially proposed an exclusively economic agenda for the meeting, under the title “Towards a New Europe-Asia Partnership for Greater Growth”.13 The economic rationale of the ASEM initiative was, in principle, in line with the leading European discourse on Asia at the time. As a consequence of the Maastricht Treaty,14 however, the European Union, which quickly embraced the ASEM idea, could but insist on a comprehensive approach including “the promotion of political dialogue” in addition to “the deepening of economic relations and the reinforcement of co-operation in various fields”. Consequently, it called for a “[d]ialogue on values and codes that govern societies on both continents”, with “[h]uman rights, the rule of law and good governance” playing a key role.15 The Asian side emphasized that the priority should be given to economics, but finally accepted the inclusion of political and security issues although initially rejecting European attempts to discuss human rights issues.16 Thus, there is a third asymmetry relating to motivations to engage in ASEM, with the Asian side putting an emphasis on economic

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and financial issues and the European side trying hard to engage the Asian side in a comprehensive political dialogue on issues related to security as well as values. In summary, the asymmetries in global and regional security environments coupled with the different (initial) priorities of Asian and European participants tend to constrain the development of the political pillar of ASEM as compared to the economic and the socio-cultural pillars, which are less constrained structurally and are fully supported by all ASEM partners. These constraints on the growth of ASEM’s political pillar, of which the security dimension is one of the two key features, are reflected by the institutional parameters of the political dialogue.

The Parameters of the ASEM Political Dialogue ASEM is an inter-governmental forum designed to “enhance mutual understanding and awareness through a process of dialogue” between Asia and Europe “on an equal partnership”, which should “lead to cooperation on the identification of priorities for concerted and supportive action” as well as “go beyond governments in order to promote dialogue and co-operation” between the private sectors and the civil societies (“peoples”) of the two regions. The forum is conceived as “an open and evolutionary process” of an “informal” nature, which “need not be institutionalized” and should “carry forward the three key dimensions with the same impetus: fostering political dialogue, reinforcing co-operation in the economic and financial fields, and promoting co-operation in other areas”, including social and cultural issues.17 This is, in a nutshell, the “long-term vision” of ASEM according to the Asia-Europe Co-operation Framework (AECF) 2000.18 It is both an ambitious and a modest vision at the same time: ambitious in terms of objective, modest in terms of means to achieve this objective. The objective of the ASEM process is to enhance mutual understanding and awareness between Asia and Europe. The means to achieve this goal is to provide “a forum for informal dialogue at the highest level and [to build] a framework for enhancing co-operation in political, economic and social/cultural fields”.19 In spite of an increasing number of functional co-operation projects, including projects in security-related areas, the emphasis of the ASEM process still remains on building a sustainable dialogue between

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Asians and Europeans. This holds particularly true as far as the political field is concerned. In contrast to the two other pillars of ASEM and despite the commitment to develop the three pillars “with the same impetus”, the political pillar essentially relies on the means of dialogue in the framework of consultative meetings resulting in Chairman’s statements or declarations, with concrete co-operative projects being by and large limited to the organization of workshops and communication mechanisms. Furthermore, the political dialogue has a number of strings attached, which are absent in the economic and socio-cultural fields and which reflect the hesitation of some Asian participants to engage in a political dialogue with Europe. Accordingly, the political dialogue “should focus on issues of common interest”, proceed “step-by-step in a process of consensus-building” and, though “not excluding any issue beforehand”, exercise “wisdom and judiciousness in selecting the topics for discussion”. In addition to this, the political dialogue has to be conducted “on the basis of mutual respect, equality, promotion of fundamental rights and, in accordance with the rules of international law and obligations, non-intervention, whether direct or indirect, in each other’s internal affairs”, with the principle of non-intervention being a standard safeguard for the Asian side, namely ASEAN member states backed by China, to prevent sensitive issues from being put on the ASEM agenda.20 The narrow confines of the political dialogue, however, refer to the values dimension rather than to security issues. From the very outset, the security component of the political dialogue has been much more substantive than the values-related part. Given the relatively marginal role of security issues in Asia-Europe relations, it was much easier to find non-controversial security-related topics in great number, particularly “global issues of common concern” such as arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, small arms and light weapons, migratory flows, transnational crime and international terrorism.21 In face of the diverging views among the participants, however, the dialogue on “values and codes that govern societies” rapidly became stuck on contentious issues such as human rights, democratization and the rule of law, which the European partners were trying to introduce into the political dialogue against the resistance of Asian partners, and among them the leading proponents of “Asian values”.22

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After several failed attempts, at ASEM 3, the European side finally succeeded in persuading China and others to accept a commitment “to promote and protect all human rights”23 and to uphold “respect for democracy, the rule of law, equality, justice and human rights”.24 According to media reports, China, Malaysia and Singapore agreed to this formula in order to avoid embarrassing the Chairman of ASEM 3, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize just a few days before the summit meeting and, as a former dissident, is known for his long-standing commitment to human rights.25 Additionally, China may have been guided by the wish to avoid deadlock during its presidency of forthcoming ASEM meetings in 2001.26 At the Third ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, which was held in Beijing in May 2001, the Asian side even agreed to a call “for greater international co-operation in promoting … democracy, the rule of law, human rights”.27 Whether this compromise on the values dimension of the political dialogue signifies a “breakthrough”, which will make it easier to discuss human rights in the future, has yet to be seen. Reasonable doubts about this issue exist given the firm nonintervention clause codified in the AECF 2000 and the developments since ASEM 3. As a matter of fact, references to the promotion and protection of human rights, rule of law and democracy are conspicuously absent from the Chairman’s statements and other declarations issued at ASEM 4 and the foreign ministers’ meetings that followed (July 2003 and April 2004) — apart from a call “for all counter-terrorist measures to be conducted based on the principles of the UN Charter and international law, including respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”.28 Against this background, one might expect security issues to continue to dominate the agenda of the political dialogue — as it was clearly the case at ASEM 4 and in the period of time leading up to ASEM 5. In sum, though it appears to be the principal feature of the first pillar of ASEM, the security dimension is equally subject to the narrow confines of the political dialogue, which have been shaped by Asian concerns about European attempts to make human rights a central issue of the ASEM agenda. This means that, in principle, security issues are only dealt with in the context of informal consultations focusing on issues of common interests and aimed at gradually building consensus, hence excluding, in principle at least, any substantive discussions of contentious issues. The following section reviews the security agenda that was able

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to evolve within the structural and institutional constraints discussed in this and the previous sections.

The Security Agenda of the Political Dialogue in ASEM Any attempt to identify the current agenda of the ASEM security dialogue has to take into account the fact that security is a contested concept.29 For much of the Cold War period, security has been understood in terms of national security, which was largely defined in militarized terms. This did not preclude the acceptance of broader concepts such as common and cooperative security, but these were clearly linked to national (and interstate) security concerns in the politico-military field. A substantive broadening and deepening of this traditional concept in both the academic and the policy discourses on security, however, have marked the postbipolar period. On the one hand, it was increasingly noted that security might be endangered by more than military threats alone, which led to the inclusion of political, economic, societal and environmental aspects. In the meantime, non-military issues have put down roots in the international security agenda though some scholars have criticized the “securitization” of non-military issues, and disagreements still exist concerning the importance of the non-military aspects of security as compared to the military ones (as illustrated by the events of 9/11 and its aftermath). On the other hand, there is a growing recognition that in the age of globalization and with the proliferation of internal wars and “failed states”, individuals and collectivities other than the state could and, indeed, should be the “referent” of security. Following this view, security issues should not be addressed on the traditional national and international levels alone, but take into account the security concerns of individuals and social groups. This led to the emergence of alternative security concepts such as “human security” and “societal security”.30 The concept of human security in particular has gained much recognition in the international policy arena. Though still an ill-defined concept, it covers a wide range of problems such as anti-personnel landmines, small arms and light weapons, violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, child soldiers, international terrorism and transnational organized crime as well as, in its wider notion, all aspects of human development such as economic, food, health and environmental insecurity.31 What makes these problems

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“new” or “non-traditional” security issues is not that they are truly novel phenomena but rather that they are explicitly characterized and treated as security concerns — in other words: that they are “securitized”. This paradigmatic change in addressing security issues — from traditional (political-military) to non-traditional or new security issues — is also reflected in the ASEM security agenda.32 A closer reading of official ASEM documents shows that traditional concerns of international security may have characterized the ASEM security dialogue in its initial phase. However, non-traditional or new security issues have increasingly gained importance and, indeed, become predominant in the aftermath of 9/11 (Tables 1 and 2). The shift is not only reflected in the fact that new security issues discussed in the framework of the ASEM political dialogue have rapidly increased in number. Most of the co-operative activities, which fall under the political pillar, have been launched in the field of new security issues as opposed to the traditional security issues area. Even more importantly, in the course of the ASEM process, some issues such as epidemiological threats, environmental degradation, migratory flows, money laundering, trafficking in persons and in particular international terrorism have been transferred from the third (sociocultural) to the first (political) pillar — in other words: these issues have been “securitized” even before the “re-securitization” of international relations in the aftermath of 9/11. At ASEM 4, the first summit meeting which was held after the events of 9/11, the fight against international terrorism and transnational organized crime were given the top priority on the ASEM security agenda. Related issues such as drug trafficking, trafficking in persons and money laundering have been clustered around this first priority area. It is in these areas where the ASEM security dialogue has gone beyond a mere dialogue to concrete cooperative activities, though one is forced to admit that, in most cases these are still at a very embryonic state (Table 1). Apart from international terrorism and transnational crime, the non-traditional or new issues on the ASEM security agenda reflect, for the most part, a broad human security agenda (Table 2),33 though the human security concept itself is not acceptable to some of the Asian ASEM partners because of its emphasis on the rights of individuals and this includes human rights.34 These reservations against the human security concept are reflected by the fact that concrete activities have been initiated in less sensitive areas such as health, environment and migration. In the case of the latter two, special

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Chairman’s Statements at ASEM 1 (third pillar), ASEM 3 (first pillar), ASEM 4 (political dialogue); separate Declaration and Co-operation Programme adopted at ASEM 4; Chairman’s Statements at the 2nd, 4th, 5th and 6th FMM Chairman’s Statements at ASEM 3 (first pillar, follow-up); Chairman’s Statements at 2nd, 3rd and 4th FMM; AECF 2000

International Terrorism (at ASEM 4, leaders underlined their resolve to fight international terrorism; in previous documents, the fight against terrorism had been mentioned in the context of “international crimes including international terrorism”). Activities: (1) Declaration on Co-operation against International Terrorism, adopted at ASEM 4; (2) Co-operation Programme on Fighting International Terrorism, adopted at ASEM 4, including shortterm activities (e.g. ASEM Seminar on Anti-Terrorism; establishment of an ad hoc informal consultative mechanism for ASEM Coordinators and Senior Officials), medium-term activities (e.g. enhancing customs communication networks; initiating an ASEM dialogue on Cultures and Civilizations), longterm activities (e.g. people-to-people exchanges) as well as existing ASEM initiatives (e.g. ASEM AntiMoney Laundering Initiative); (3) ASEM Seminar on Anti-Terrorism (September 2003, follow-up planned for October 2004).

Transnational Organized Crime (at ASEM 4, leaders agreed that the fight against terrorism and transnational organised crime are among the foremost priorities on the upcoming ASEM calendar of activities). Activities: (1) Symposium on “Law Enforcement Organs: Co-operation in Combating Transnational Crime”; (2) Anti-Corruption Initiative; (3) Establishment of links between EUROPOL, ASEANPOL and the law enforcement agencies of China, Japan and Korea to facilitate intelligence sharing and co-operation; (4) see also “International Terrorism”, “Drug Trafficking”, “Trafficking in Persons” and “Money Laundering”.

continued on next page

Sources (see footnote 6)

Security Issues

TABLE 1 “New” Security Issues: International Terrorism and Transnational Crime

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Chairman’s Statements at ASEM 1 (third pillar), ASEM 2 (follow-up), ASEM 3 (first pillar), ASEM 4; Chairman’s Statement at 2nd and 4th FMM; AECF 2000 Chairman’s Statements at ASEM 3 (first pillar, follow-up); Chairman’s Statements at 2nd and 3rd FMM; AECF 2000 Chairman’s Statements at ASEM 1 (third pillar), ASEM 2 (global issues), ASEM 3 (first pillar, follow-up); Chairman’s Statement at 2nd, 3rd and 4th FMM; AECF 2000

*Drug Trafficking (“…to strengthen co-operation to deal with transnational crime, such as drug trafficking…”; “…cooperate in combating illicit drugs, in particular to prevent the diversion of precursor chemicals and synthetic drugs”). Activities: (1) Initiative on Asia-Europe Co-operation in Promoting an Awareness of the Drug Problem in the Young Generations.

*Trafficking in Persons, in particular the trafficking of women and children (“… to strengthen co-operation to deal with transnational crime, such as … trafficking in persons…”; “…in particular addressing such issues as the trafficking of women and children for the purpose of sexual exploitation”). Activities: (1) Initiative to Combat Trafficking of Women and Children

*Money Laundering (“…to strengthen cooperation for dealing with transnational crime, such as … money laundering and arms smuggling”; ASEM partners are encouraged to follow recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering [FATF]). Activities: (1) Anti-money Laundering Initiative (including an ASEM Symposium on combating underground banking); (2) ASEM Seminar on the Fight Against Money-Laundering (October 2003)

* These issues are considered to be “other forms of transnational crime” (see Chairman’s Statement, 4th FMM)

Sources (see footnote 6)

Security Issues

TABLE 1 — continued

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Chairman’s Statement at ASEM 3 (first pillar); Chairman’s Statement at the 2nd FMM, AECF 2000 Component part of the first (political) pillar of ASEM

Chairman’s Statements at ASEM 2 (global issues) and ASEM 3 (first pillar); Chairman’s Statement at 2nd FMM; AECF 2000

Small Arms and Light Weapons (“…stressed the need to combat illicit trafficking in and accumulation of small arms and light weapons”). Activities: none

Human Rights (widely considered as a component part of the “new” security agenda, particularly in the context of the human security concept) Activities: (1) Series of informal ASEM symposia on Human Rights and the Rule of Law (though not considered to be an official ASEM activity).

Welfare of Women and Children (“…stressed the need to promote the welfare of women and children, particularly by combating violence against women and children in all its forms”). Activities: (1) Children Welfare Initiative; (2) see also “Trafficking in persons”.

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Chairman’s Statements ASEM 3 (first pillar, follow-up); Chairman’s Statements at 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 6th FMM; AECF 2000; Lanzarote Declaration

Chairman’s Statements at ASEM 3 (first pillar) and at 2nd FMM

Anti-personnel Landmines (“… appreciated the international community’s efforts to deal with this problem”). Activities: none

Legal and Illegal Migration (“… expressed their commitment to addressing global issues of common concern such as managing migratory flows in a globalised world”; “…to ensure orderly migratory movements and counter criminal actions by traffickers and smugglers”). Activities: (1) Ministerial Conference on Co-operation for the Management of Migratory Flows ` between Europe and Asia (which adopted the Lanzarote Declaration); (2) ASEM meetings at the Director-General level of Immigration services on illegal migration; (3) Creation of a network of contact points of officials and experts in charge of migration; (4) see also “Trafficking in Persons”.

Sources (see footnote 6)

Security Issues

TABLE 2 “New” Security Issues: Components of Human Security ASEM’s Security Agenda Revisited

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Sources (see footnote 6) Chairman’s Statements at ASEM 1 (third pillar), ASEM 2 (global issues) and ASEM 3 (first pillar, follow up, annex); Chairman’s Statements at 2nd, 3rd and 6th FMM; AECF 2000 Chairman’s Statements at ASEM 1 (third pillar, follow-up), ASEM 2 (follow-up) and ASEM 3 (first pillar); Chairman’s Statement at 2nd, 3rd and 4th FMM; AECF 2000 Component part of the second (economic) pillar of ASEM

Security Issues

Health-Related Issues (“… reaffirmed their resolve to continue their efforts to combat infectious diseases like HIV/Aids, SARS and avian influenza”). Activities: (1) Seminar on the Combination of Traditional and Modern Medicine for Public Health Care; (2) Initiative on HIV/AIDS; (3) Project for a Euro-Asian Network for the Monitoring and Control of Communicable Diseases; (4) Seminar on Management of Public Health Emergency (October 2003).

Environmental Issues (“… acknowledged the importance of addressing environmental issues such as global warming, protection of water resources, deforestation and desertification, biodiversity of species, marine environment protection; … the problem of energy and environment; … co-operation on environmental disaster preparedness”). Activities: (1) Asia-Europe Environmental Technology Centre (AEETC) in Thailand; (2) Two Environmental Ministers’ Meetings; (3) Science and Technology Co-operation on Forestry Conservation and Sustainable Development.

Economic and Financial Insecurity (widely considered as a component part of the “new” security agenda, particularly in the context of globalization and in the wake of the Asian crisis).

TABLE 2 — continued

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ministerial meetings were held to substantiate the ASEM dialogue on environmental issues (January 2002 and October 2003) and on migration (April 2002). On other, more sensitive, human security issues such as antipersonnel landmines, small arms and light weapons, violence against women and children and human rights in particular, ASEM has so far been less, or indeed, not active at all. When it comes to the ASEM acquis in the field of traditional (politicomilitary) security, the focus is on the general international security situation and on specific regional conflicts, which are linked to global security agenda, with an example of this being the conflict on the Korean Peninsula (Tables 3 and 4). Activities in this field do not go beyond regular consultations and the adoption of political declarations. In terms of regional security, the ASEM dialogue initially focused on issues of common concerns in each other’s region — though with an emphasis on Asia (Table 3). The conflict on the Korean peninsula has become the most intensely discussed regional issue, and this is reflected by the Seoul Declaration for Peace on the Korean peninsula adopted at ASEM 3 — the first ASEM document announcing a common position on security issues35 — and the Copenhagen Political Declaration for Peace on the Korean Peninsula which was endorsed at ASEM 4. With the adoption of the latter declaration, ASEM partners reconfirmed their support for an engagement policy towards North Korea despite the fact that, in the meantime, the new U.S. administration which had taken office in January 2001 positioned the reclusive country on an “axis of evil”. The other regional security issues under discussion cover specific cases of postconflict state building where Asian and European countries are/were involved, namely in East Timor, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Furthermore, regular attention is given to the development of regional security architectures, again with an emphasis on the situation in Asia. This clearly reflects the aforementioned imbalance between Asia and Europe regarding the regional security environments and also concerning the involvement in the other region’s security mechanisms. It is only recently that ASEM members have started to talk about regional issues of common concern in other world regions, namely in South Asia and the Middle East, with a special emphasis being placed on post-war Afghanistan and Iraq.36 Though being of a regional scope, these conflicts tend to reflect new global security challenges such as international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

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Sources (see footnote 6) Chairman’s Statements at ASEM 2 (within and outside first pillar), ASEM 3 (outside first pillar), 2nd and 3rd FMM Chairman’s Statements at ASEM 3 (outside first pillar) and 3rd FMM Chairman’s Statements at ASEM 2 (first pillar), ASEM 3 (first pillar); Chairman’s Statements of 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th FMM; Declarations mentioned Chairman’s Statements at ASEM 2 (first pillar), ASEM 3 (first pillar); Chairman’s Statement at the 3rd FMM Chairman’s Statements at ASEM 3 (first pillar); Chairman’s Statement at the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th FMM; Declarations mentioned

Security Issues

Role of ASEAN, ASEAN+3, ARF and PMCs in the discussion of regional security issues in East Asia. Activities: none

Role of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, particularly the European Security and Defence Policy. Activities: none

Regional Issues of Common Concern in East Asia (Korean peninsula including KEDO project, Cambodia, East Timor, Myanmar). Activities: (1) Seoul Declaration for Peace on the Korean peninsula, adopted at ASEM 3; (2) Copenhagen Political Declaration for Peace on the Korean peninsula, adopted at ASEM 4.

Regional Issues of Common Concern in Europe (Western Balkans, particularly Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe). Activities: none

Regional Issues of Common Concern in Other World Regions (Afghanistan; Iraq; Middle East [peace process]; South Asia [India-Pakistan]). Activities: (1) Declaration on the India-Pakistan Situation, adopted at the 4th FMM; (2) Declaration on the Middle East Peace Process, adopted at the 4th FMM.

TABLE 3 Traditional Security Issues: The Regional Level

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Sources (see footnote 6) Chairman’s Statements at ASEM 1, ASEM 2, ASEM 3 (first pillar), 1st, 2nd and 3rd FMM, AECF 2000; Declaration on Multilateralism adopted at the 6th FMM Chairman’s Statements at ASEM 1, ASEM 2 (first pillar), 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th FMM, AECF 2000, separate Declaration Chairman’s Statements at ASEM 3 (first pillar); Chairman’s Statements at 2nd and 3rd FMM Chairman’s Statement at ASEM 4; Chairman’s Statement at 4th FMM

Security Issues

Institutional Reform of the UN System, including the Security Council (“…stressed their support for the multilateral system of collective security, based on the United Nations … underlined that ASEM countries are committed to the process of reform of the United Nations system”) Activities: (1) consultative meeting of ASEM partners in the margins of the United Nations General Assembly; (2) ASEM Declaration on Multilateralism (emphasis on the key role of the United Nations).

Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Activities: (1) Political Declaration on Prevention of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Means of Delivery issued at the 5th FMM.

New International Order / Global Strategic Balance (“… expressed their commitment to ASEM playing a constructive role in building a new international political and economic order”; “… underlined the importance of maintaining global strategic balance and stability”). Activities: none

General International Security Situation (“… took the international security situation as their point of departure and discussed new security challenges” in the aftermath of 9/11). Activities: (1) establishment of an ad hoc informal consultative mechanism enabling ASEM Co-ordinators and Senior Officials to confer expeditiously on significant international events; (2) ASEM Declaration on Multilateralism,; (3) see also Table 1 (“International Terrorism”).

TABLE 4 Traditional Security Issues: The Global Level

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As regards global security (Table 4), two sets of issues have been put on the agenda since the very beginning of the ASEM process: (a) the institutional reform of the UN system and (b) the strengthening of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation regimes, with the first set of issues now being regularly discussed before the sessions of the UN General Assembly. Two additional items have appeared on the ASEM agenda fairly recently, which may both reflect ASEM’s “hidden agenda” of checking and balancing U.S. predominance: (c) the commitment to build a new international order and to maintain a global strategic balance, and (d) the resolve to discuss the general international security situation in the aftermath of 9/11, both of which have been initiated by China. While the relevance of these two items should not be over-estimated, their addition to the ASEM security agenda stands for the increasing unease of some European and Asian powers concerning the U.S. propensity for unilateralism in international security affairs as most recently demonstrated in the war in Iraq. Indeed, the discussion on the new international security situation in the aftermath of 9/11 was among the top priority items on the agenda of ASEM 4. This resulted in the establishment of an “ad hoc informal consultative mechanism enabling ASEM Co-ordinators and Senior Officials to confer expeditiously on significant international events”.37 At the boundary between traditional and new security issues, ASEM 4 introduced a number of nuances to the U.S. position on the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. While supporting in principle the need to fight international terrorism along with the U.S., ASEM leaders emphasized that this: must be based on the leading role of the United Nations as well as the principles of the UN Charter and basic norms of international law; requires a comprehensive approach comprising political, economic, diplomatic and legal means in addition to military means; and, must take into account root causes of terrorism without acknowledging these as justifications for terrorist activities.38

Furthermore, ASEM leaders stressed the importance of conducting a dialogue on cultures and civilizations, which was the topic of the informal retreat session that was held for the first time during the fourth summit. This could be read as an attempt to promote an opposite view to Samuel Huntington’s influential thesis about the “clash of civilizations”. Finally, as mentioned above, ASEM partners reaffirmed their support for an

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engagement policy towards North Korea (see above). This again could be interpreted as promoting an alternative view to current U.S. policy. The ASEM 4 debate on Iraq, however, showed the limits of the very idea that ASEM could constitute a “ganging up” of East Asian and European countries to establish a more balanced relationship with the United States. Though the issue was top of the informal agenda, no consensus was achieved among the participants — as reflected in the Chairman’s Statement, which merely mentioned that “[L]eaders also discussed the Iraq issue and the situation in the Middle East”.39 The fault lines of more or less understanding for the U.S. policy on Iraq ran right through both regional groups, the EU as well as Asian ASEM, with both groups being composed of states which either supported the war or opposed it. The review of the ASEM security agenda would not be complete without a brief look at those issues that have been proposed for discussion but not been taken up, or for which a proposal has not even been emitted. The latter category — security issues which are conspicuously absent even from an informal agenda — comprises highly contentious traditional security issues such as the conflict over Taiwan, the United States plans to establish a regional theatre missile defence system (TMD) in East Asia as well as internal conflicts with the potential to spill over into neighbouring countries such as Aceh and Mindanao. Traditional security issues, and mainly politico-military ones, dominate the category of those items that have been proposed for discussion but have not (yet) been included in the formal agenda, such as: the situation in the South China Sea, whose addition to the ASEM agenda was strongly opposed by China at the Third Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in March 1999, but which seemed to have been informally discussed at ASEM 3 though this was not reflected in the Chairman’s Statement; the endorsement of the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) — proposed by ASEAN at ASEM 1;40 the exchange of regional experiences on fields relating to conflict prevention and peacekeeping as well as the strengthening of efforts to control arms trade — proposed by the European Commission in view of ASEM 3;41 the designation of joint training centres and facilities for peacekeeping operations — a suggestion made by the ASEM Vision Group; the promotion of greater transparency in the security and defence areas (including the publication of defence white papers and the commitment to a broad spectrum of confidence and security building measures) — a further

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suggestion that was made by the ASEM Vision Group; and, the promotion of co-operation between the ARF and OSCE — another suggestion made by the ASEM Vision Group.42 So far, only two non-traditional security issues have been proposed for discussion but have not been added to the ASEM security agenda. These are: the afore-mentioned concept of human security as such — introduced by Thailand at ASEM 3 and, indirectly at least, proposed by the European Commission in view of ASEM 3;43 and, a political statement affirming the principles of good governance — as suggested by the European Commission based on a proposal made by the ASEM Vision Group.44 In sum, the ASEM security agenda covers traditional as well as nontraditional security issues on the global and also on the regional level. In the field of traditional security, it concentrates on politico-military issues on both, the regional and the global level; in the rapidly expanding field of non-traditional or new security issues, its focus is on transnational security challenges such as international terrorism and organized crime as well as on politically less sensitive aspects of human security such as migratory flows, environmental degradation, economic insecurity and, last but not least (given the emergence of SARS and the avian influenza), epidemiological threats. It excludes contentious issues in all categories, particularly if they reflect vital interests of leading ASEM member states such as China or of the invisible force, the United States. The ASEM security agenda reflects the continuous attempts of the European side to expand the political dialogue between Asia and Europe — indeed, most of the security-related items have been pushed onto the ASEM agenda by the EU and its member states — as well as the rather slowly decreasing reluctance of the Asian side to engage in a political dialogue pushed by the European side. It also reflects the fact that the European side has a rich body of regional security-related experiences to offer, whereas the mindsets on the Asian side are still absorbed in traditional security concerns.45 It furthermore reflects the fact that traditional (politico-military) security issues of common concern to Asian and European ASEM partners are already taken care of by other multilateral frameworks such as the ARF in Asia and the OSCE and NATO in Europe, organizations in which the United States has a strong say. Finally, the ASEM security agenda reflects the fact that military security issues are practically out of reach of ASEM (but not necessarily of bilateral relationships between its member states), due to the predominant role of the United States in the field of global security in general and of East Asian and European security in particular.

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Concluding Remarks Although after the first two summit meetings it was correct to say that “little has been achieved in terms of enhancing ASEM’s role as a forum for inter-regional consultation on political and security issues”,46 a different conclusion would have to be drawn from the more recent developments in the ASEM process. No doubt, “a considerable security dimension or ‘acquis’ has already developed” within the so-called political pillar of ASEM.47 After a rather hesitant beginning, the security agenda continually expanded from one leaders’ or foreign ministers’ meeting to another. The growing importance of security issues on the ASEM agenda is very much reflective of the respective international situation. The current “resecuritization” of international affairs will have contradictory effects on ASEM’s security agenda because it tends to decrease the relevance of the ASEM process which has been built on a geo-economic rationale, while at the same time has a tendency to increase the relative importance of security issues on the ASEM agenda. In response to that, ASEM could, and most probably will, further expand its security agenda. In this process, following the initial triadic rationale of the ASEM process, Asian and European ASEM partners may use this inter-regional framework as an instrument for keeping the United States engaged in a multilateral security framework or, in case of defection, to check and balance the latter’s unilateralist temptations. The recent adoption of an ASEM Declaration on Multilateralism at the Sixth Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (April 2004) may be viewed as a first concrete albeit modest step in this direction.48 However, as the case of Iraq has demonstrated, East Asia and Europe are hardly likely to find enough common ground within and among themselves to oppose unilateralist U.S. policies beyond the declaratory level, particularly in the security field. Moreover, one is forced to admit that large parts of the ASEM security agenda, including non-traditional as well as new security issues such as terrorism and transnational crime, are very much in line with the U.S. security agenda and are, to a great extent, even supportive of the latter’s respective policies.49 This leads to the conclusion that there is certainly room for progress in the development of the ASEM security dialogue, even within the narrow limits set by the aforementioned external and internal constraints of the ASEM process — constraints which seem to have grown considerably as a result of 9/11 and its aftermath. Progress will necessarily be slow and incremental. In terms of substance, the ASEM security dialogue will

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continue to focus on new security issues, particularly non-controversial ones. In terms of method, it will focus on the exchange of views and experiences as well as on the adoption of common positions on specific issues, which may well introduce a number of further nuances to the U.S. position. If the gap between the capabilities of ASEM to take up a security agenda that matters and the expectations raised by the policy and epistemic communities should not be widened, however, then the best that ASEM can achieve in dealing with its security agenda is to deepen rather than broaden it even further. This means that ASEM partners, making a virtue out of a necessity, would aim for developing niches in which ASEM enjoys a degree of comparative advantage and in which it is able to deliver tangible results. Niche-making may well be the name of the game at ASEM 5 and beyond.

Notes 1

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The research for this chapter was carried out during a Visiting Scholarship granted by the Swiss Foundation for World Affairs at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC. The author is indebted to Wendy Robinson for editorial assistance as well as to Anna-Carin Krokstade, David Milliot, Wolfgang Pape, Michael Reiterer and Wei-Wei Zhang for providing comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. The concept of the Triad has its roots in the trilateral relationship between the United States, the EC/EU and Japan, the three powers of the capitalist world economy during the Cold War period. The concept underwent an expansion to embrace the Triad regions (North America, Western Europe and East Asia) as a consequence of several factors such as the end of the Cold War, the appearance of “new regionalism” and the emergence of East Asia as the third centre of the world economy; and it was further strengthened by the establishment of interregional relations among the Triad regions in the 1990s. By the mid-1990s, the new Triad concept had become a major feature in the discourse about the emerging international order in general and about Asia-Europe relations in particular. See Hänggi (1999, pp. 57–62). At the second senior official’s level ASEM preparatory meeting in Madrid in December 1995, the East Asian countries came up with a jointly agreed “Asian Discussion Paper” which stressed the need to bridge the “missing link” between Asia and Europe. In the first paragraph of this paper, it is stated that: “When

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4

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the world is moving towards the 21st Century, it is of great significance that close ties be built up between three centres of economic growth and power — North America, Europe and Asia. Europe is well linked to North America through history and rich network of trans-Atlantic institutions. East Asia and North America are linked by APEC and a growing dense web of Pacific Basin networks. The missing link is the one between Asia and Europe. The first and foremost purpose of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) is to bridge this missing link.” The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM): An Asian Discussion Paper, 19 December 1995, para. 1, mimeographed. At their first summit meeting in 1996, ASEM leaders “agreed on the importance of strengthening global initiatives on arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction” in the context of “their common desire to strengthen political dialogue between Asia and Europe”. Chairman’s Statement of the Asia-Europe Meeting, 2 March 1996, Bangkok, paras. 5 and 8. Michael Reiterer, Asia and Europe: Do They Meet? Reflections on the Asia-Europe Meeting. Singapore: Asia-Europe Foundation, 2002, p. 121. For earlier stock-takings of the ASEM security agenda see Soeya/Roper (1997, pp. 41–48) [situation as after ASEM 1]; Sukontasap/Santipitakis (2000, pp. 98– 107) [situation as after ASEM 2]; Lim (2000) [situation as after ASEM 3]; Bersick (2002, pp. 116–20, 246–54) [situation as after the FMM 3]; Reiterer (2002, pp. 121–33) [situation before ASEM 4] and Pareira (2003, pp. 135–44, 284–86) [situation as after ASEM 4]. The inventory (cf. Tables 1–4) is based on a review of a select body of ASEM documents, including the Chairman’s Statements at ASEM 1, 2, 3 and 4; the Asia-Europe Co-operation Framework (AECF) 2000; the Seoul Declaration for Peace on the Korean Peninsula (ASEM 3); the Political Declaration for Peace on the Korean Peninsula (ASEM 4); the Declaration on Co-operation against International Terrorism (ASEM 4); the Co-operation Programme on Fighting International Terrorism (ASEM 4); the Chairman’s Statements from the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meetings (FMM); the Declaration on the India-Pakistan Situation (FMM 4); the Declaration on the Middle East Peace Process (FMM 4); the Political Declaration on the Prevention of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Means of Delivery (FMM 5); the ASEM Declaration on Multilateralism (FMM 6); the Chairman’s Statements from the ASEM Environment Ministers’ Meetings; the Lanzarote Declaration (ASEM Ministerial Conference on Co-operation for the Management of Migratory Flows between Europe and Asia). The respective documents can be found on the website of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for External Relations (RELEX): .

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9 10 11

12

13 14

15

16 17 18

19 20 21 22

23

24 25 26

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For overviews see Bridges (1999, pp. 151–64); Maull et al. (1998, pp. 107–70) [contributions by Gerald Segal, Jusuf Wanandi, Yukio Satoh, Jin-Hyun Paik, Harry Harding, Wang Jisi and Joachim Krause]; Stares/Regaud (1997–98); Shin/Segal (1997). See Hänggi (2003a, pp. 200, 206–7). See Hänggi (1999, pp. 62–69). Hanns Maull, “Regional Security Cooperation: Comparison of Europe and East Asia” in Internationale Politik and Gesellschaft, no. 1 (1997): 49–67. Making a virtue out of necessity, some East Asian governments used ASEM to promote (East Asian) regionalism through (Asia-Europe) inter-regionalism. See Hänggi (2003, pp. 212–14). Asia-Europe Meeting (18 March 1995), paras. 5, 6 and 8, mimeographed. The EU’s relations to third states and other regional groupings have been transformed as a result of the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, with the creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy in 1993 (and the strengthening of this policy from 1999 onwards in building a European Security and Defence Policy), and the increasing importance of Justice and Home Affairs issues in external relations. Europe-Asia Meeting (ASEM). European Union Position (19 December 1995), pp. 2, 4 and 5 (mimeographed). See Lim (2000), pp. 8–10. The Asia-Europe Co-operation Framework (AECF) 2000, para. 8. The AECF that was adopted at ASEM 3 in October 2000 is an updated and enlarged version of the initial AECF which was endorsed at ASEM 2 in April 1998. See The Asia-Europe Co-operation Framework (AECF) 2000, paras. 2 and 4. Michael Reiterer, op cit., p. 15. The Asia-Europe Co-operation Framework (AECF) 2000, para. 13. Ibid., para. 14. For an assessment of the “Asian values” debate in the context of the Asian Crisis and its aftermath, see Hänggi (2002, pp. 215–21). Chairman’s Statement of the Third Asia-Europe Meeting, Seoul, 20–21 October 2000, para. 8. The Asia-Europe Cooperation Framework (AECF) 2000, para. 5. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 23 October 2000, p. 5. Paul Lim, “Has Anything Changed in Security Co-operation between the EU and Asia with ASEM III in Seoul?” Mimeographed. Seventeenth Sino-European Conference, Taipei, 12–15 December 2000. Chair’s Statement, Third ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Beijing, China, 24–25 May 2001, para. 2. Chairman’s Statement, Sixth ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Kildare, Ireland, 17–18 April 2004, para. 12.

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35 36

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This and the following paragraph draw heavily on Hänggi (2003b, pp. 5–6). The move away from the traditional concept of security has been aptly discussed in Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jan De Wilde’s book on A New Framework for Analysis. London: Lynne Reinner, 1998. For an overview of the human security concept, see Human Security Now. New York: Commission on Human Security, 2003. See . The inventory of the ASEM security dialogue is based on a review of the relevant documents mentioned in footnote 6. In this context, it is important to know that not all the security issues that are mentioned in the Chairman’s Statements of the summit and other meetings have really been discussed by the ASEM leaders and ministers. This was particularly true for the period of time preceding the Fourth Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (June 2002), in which issues were added to the Chairman’s Statements without necessarily having been discussed at all. It is only from the June 2002 meeting onwards that security (and other) issues mentioned in these statements have actually been discussed at the meetings in question. — The author is grateful to Anna-Carin Krokstade for this information. See also Reiterer (2002), pp. 130–32. Despite the fact that human security is a contested concept among the ASEM partners, five ASEM participants — one Asian, four European (Austria, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands and Thailand) — are also members of the Human Security Network, a government-led initiative which co-ordinates the conceptualization of human security (see ). Another ASEM participant, Japan, promotes a broader notion of human security (to include human development) within the United Nations framework (see ). For an overview, see Bersick (2002, pp. 251–53). In this context, the Fourth FMM issued two political declarations: one on the India-Pakistan situation and another one on the Middle East peace process. See the Fourth ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting Declaration on the India-Pakistan Situation, Madrid, 6–7 June 2002, and the Fourth ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting Declaration on the Middle East Peace Process, Madrid, 6–7 June 2002. Chairman’s Statement. ASEM 4 — Fourth Asia Europe Meeting Summit, Copenhagen, 22–24 September 2002, para. 6. Ibid., para. 5; Declaration on Co-operation against International Terrorism. ASEM 4 — Fourth Asia Europe Meeting Summit, Copenhagen, 22–24 September 2002, para. 2. Chairman’s Statement. ASEM 4 — Fourth Asia Europe Meeting Summit, Copenhagen, 22–24 September 2002, para. 13. The European nuclear powers Britain and France and, consequently, the EU

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member states, were not ready to endorse the proposal put forward by ASEAN but merely to take note of this Treaty, which calls upon nuclear powers to sign it. See Lim (2000, p. 4). Perspectives and priorities for the ASEM process (Asia-Europe Meeting) into the new decade, Working Document of the Commission, COM 2000 (241), 18 April 2000, section 3.1 (General priorities). For A Better Tomorrow: Asia-Europe Partnership in the 21st Century, Asia-Europe Vision Group Report 1999, pp. 38–39. In its working paper on priorities for ASEM 3, the European Commission refers to the “increasing importance of the security dimension, its relevance for ordinary citizens…”. Perspectives and priorities for the ASEM process (Asia-Europe Meeting) into the new decade, Working Document of the Commission, COM 2000 (241), 18 April 2000, section 3.2 (Specific priorities for ASEM 3). For A Better Tomorrow: Asia-Europe Partnership in the 21st Century, Asia-Europe Vision Group Report 1999, pp. 37–38. In fact, traditional and particularly military security, both external as well as internal, remains a more urgent consideration and is given a high priority in the allocation of resources in a number of Asian ASEM partners. See Zakaria/ Kuik (2000, pp. 174–75). Darmp Sunkontasap and Busadee Santipitaks. “ASEM: A Political and Security Agenda”, in Strengthening International Order: The Role of Asia-Europe Cooperation. A CAEC Task Force Report. Tokyo and London: Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation, 2000, p. 110. Michael Reiterer, op cit. p. 89. ASEM Declaration on Multilateralism, Kildare, Ireland, 17–18 April 2004. See Pareira (2003, pp. 248–49); Brobow (1999).

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The Euro and East Asian Monetary Co-operation

8 The Euro and East Asian Monetary Co-operation Xu Mingqi

The launch of the euro in 1999 generated great interest within Asia. To Asians, the euro is not just a single currency of the European Union (EU) and a milestone of EU’s integration. More importantly, many Asians see the euro as a potential stabilizer in the international economic system and are concerned about the impact of the euro on EU-Asia economic and trade relations. Many also believed that the euro as a symbol of EU’s success story of integration would have a stimulating effect on their own regional co-operation. This paper specifically examines this latter point — if and how the launch of the euro would impact East Asian regionalism and more specifically, the prospect of East Asian monetary integration in the foreseeable future.

The Euro Effect in East Asian Regionalism Generally speaking, East Asians were not as skeptical as Americans when the EU embarked on the final stage of its European Monetary Union with the launch of a single currency, the euro. East Asians welcomed the euro

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basically because of two reasons: the first is that it would be more convenient and efficient for them to do business and travel around the EU countries with a single unified currency; the second is the hope that the euro backed by EU’s economic size and strength would eventually become an alternative choice of international currency vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar. This would also allow the East Asians to diversify their reserve currencies presently held primarily in U.S. dollars. Such desire was clearly reflected in the Chinese Government’s announcement, just before the euro became a tangible commodity, that it would increase the share of the euro in its foreign exchange reserve. In China, there was a strong belief in the success of the euro even before its physical launch. There was also a strong feeling that East Asia would benefit from the success of the euro. Since 1998, EU-China trade has increased rapidly. For example, China’s export to the EU has gone up from US$20.5 billion in 1998 to US$38.2 billion in 2000, and to US$40.9 billion in 2001 respectively, almost doubled in absolute value in three years. China’s import from EU has also increased by 33 per cent from US$25.5 billion in 1998 to US$340 billion in 2000.1 Many believed that the euro created a favourable condition for both sides in business and promoted the bilateral trade. During the period from 1998 to 2000, EU’s investment in China also increased rapidly and surpassed the United States and Japan to become the second largest source of FDI to China next to Hong Kong. Many Chinese attributed this to the successful launch of the euro too. Almost all of the Asian countries use the U.S. dollar in all international transactions and some of them even have their currencies pegged to the U.S. dollar. Dollarization is seen as a necessary evil. After the Asian financial crisis in 1997, some East Asian countries have increasingly hoped that another international currency would surface with a stable value which would enable them to adjust their peg as they suffered a great deal from the drastic exchange rate fluctuations between the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen in 1996. Many believed that this was one of the causes that lead to the Asian financial crisis.2 Of course there is also the possibility of dramatic fluctuations of exchange rates between the euro and the dollar. This would mean that instead of being a stabilizing force, the euro would become a destabilizing factor.3 Therefore, most Asian countries, including Japan, hoped that the launch of the euro will promote and enhance international monetary co-ordination and co-operation, especially between the United States and the EU.

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Despite the initial drop in value of the euro against the dollar after the launch of the euro, Asian countries shared the view that the euro is successful in its role as a unified currency in the EU. Inflation rates has been kept well below the target point and the fiscal discipline has been well implemented in the member countries. Financial market integration has been sped up and competition has been enhanced in many industries. Many other policies converged owing to the introduction of the single currency. Above all, the economic performance in the euro area improved compared to the pre-euro period. Asian countries believed that the euro would further deepen European political integration. The euro as a concrete, tangible symbol of a unified Europe may help the further development of a European identity. There was of course initial disappointment among some Asian observers with the depreciation of the euro against the U.S. dollar in the first two years of its existence but now that the euro has surpassed the dollar in value, they are more optimistic. While Asians are realistic that the euro cannot replace the U.S. dollar as the international currency of choice within such a short period of time, they nevertheless believe that the euro will become more important in the international currency market. It will be used more in international transactions and it will also increasingly be held as reserve currency. When that happens, the euro would play a stabilizing role in the international financial system, especially in the monetary markets. The euro’s impact on Asia does not only show in the EU-Asia bilateral trade and economic relations. There is also a psychological element that as a concrete showcase of successful integration, this would spur the East Asians to start thinking more about their own regional monetary cooperation. In this regard, the euro has an impact in three ways. By the mere fact that a monetary union can help prevent financial turmoil caused by currency fluctuations, individual member states can hence be better protected from such exogenous shock. It was noted that during the late 1980s to mid-1990s, there were several exchange rate crises — in the British pound, Spanish peseta, Portuguese escudos and Italian lira. This led to the re-arrangement of the Fixed Exchange Rate mechanism in the European Monetary System. Some Asian scholars believed that this was the immediate reason for the EU to speed up the process of monetary union. With the successful launch of the third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), monetary stability has been maintained ever

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since. The EU countries were therefore also shielded from contagion of the Asian financial crisis in 1997–98. The harsh lessons learnt from the Asian financial crisis coupled with the positive example of the EMU led to some soul-searching. A lot of suggestions and discussions on Asian financial and monetary co-operation emerged during and after the Asian financial crisis in the attempt to maintain East Asian financial stability.4 ASEAN countries even established a common surveillance and early warning mechanism on monetary and financial markets. The second impact was caused by the fact that the euro proved the theory of optimum currency area formulated by Robert Mundell (1961), which stimulated other regions to start thinking of the possibility of their own optimum currency zones. With the growing interdependence of trade and capital flows in the region, it would be good to form a certain kind of optimum currency area in East Asia in spite of enormous differences in political and social systems as compared with that of Europe. With the launch of the ASEAN+3 process, finance ministers and central bankers from the ASEAN+3 countries wasted no time in meeting to shape some sort of monetary and financial co-operation within the ASEAN+3 framework.5 The third impact was the way in which the success of the euro is beginning to change the international monetary system in a geo-economic sense. In the West there is talk of “bipolar international monetary system” after the launch of the euro.6 Some East Asians are also sensitive about this bipolar prospect but prefer a tripolar or multipolar system. The East Asian region has been a dollar-circulating zone in practice and Japanese yen has not been playing such an important role in international transactions and reserve as to form a de facto yen bloc. If people in this region do not really want to see a bipolar system and want to have another choice, they have to enhance their own co-operation. Without closer co-operation in the region, there would not be a third parallel monetary bloc on the horizon even though intra-regional trade and capital flow in East Asia are becoming increasingly important. Therefore, scholars and government officials in the region, especially in Korea and Japan, appealed for enhanced cooperation to form an East Asian monetary zone.7 What is worth mentioning here is that the successful launch of the euro has influenced the Chinese view on regional monetary co-operation. Although China was active in international co-operation to prevent further volatility in the currency markets by maintaining a stable yuan during the

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Asian financial crisis, China was reluctant to commit to any multilateral arrangement of monetary and financial co-operation in the region. China did not respond positively to the initial suggestion of an Asian Monetary Fund put forward by Japan in 1997 and remained doubtful about the desirability of such co-operation until recently. China became more positive to the idea of East Asian monetary co-operation in part due to the success of the European monetary integration and the launch of the euro. In the 1999 ASEAN+3 submit, China expressed support for closer financial and monetary co-operation within East Asia and actively took part in the currency swaps agreement later on. Of course, the prospects of further opening of China’s financial sector after joining the WTO also played a role in the policy shift towards favouring closer regional monetary cooperation. This came with the realization that China would be increasingly exposed to financial risk as it slowly opens up its financial sector. Regional monetary and financial co-operation could help to reduce the exogenous financial shock and the risk of financial crisis.

Prospects of East Asian Monetary Co-operation and Integration The demand for greater monetary co-operation in East Asia encouraged by European monetary integration is only one part of the story. Successful launch of the euro while setting a positive example of the virtues of monetary co-operation, cannot in itself induce such a big move towards greater East Asian monetary co-operation. Without a solid economic foundation and the convergence of national and regional interests, there would not be such willingness to move towards monetary co-operation. What then are the basic elements of this economic foundation? The increasing economic interdependence in this region provides the basis for further monetary co-operation in Asia. Take the trade flows in the region for example. The intra-regional trade dependence index in East Asia increased from 22.35 per cent in 1985 to 45.37 per cent in 1999, which is higher than the intra-regional trade level in EU.8 If one looked at the individual economy’s trade flows in Asia, one would find more impressive trade interdependency within the East Asian region (See Tables 1 and 2). Although trade flows in Table 1 did not include all East and Southeast Asia economies, those in the table were the principal traders in the region. According to Shin and Wang’s estimate, the average ten Asian ASEM

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Economies China, P.R. Hong Kong, China Indonesia Korea, Republic of Malaysia Philippines Singapore Taiwan, China Thailand

Exports to Asia

Imports from Asia

1990

2000

1990

2000

68.8 44.1 66.6 37.3 59.0 35.9 48.4 41.4 38.6

46.0 53.5 58.0 43.0 53.8 42.1 57.2 56.4 48.9

50.9 73.2 46.3 38.9 53.6 42.6 50.1 49.0 56.6

60.7 78.3 65.8 46.0 64.9 53.8 57.0 65.1 60.8

Source: Asia Development Bank, Key Indicators 2001.

TABLE 2 Trade Dependency Index, East Asia 14 as Partner Reporters

1980

1985

Brunei Darussalam Myanmar Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam Taiwan, China Hong Kong, China Korea China, P.R. Average of the above

17.03 4.43

27.20 2.19

7.64

5.96 1.89 30.36 8.55 107.65 11.31 0.98 10.77 71.24 7.23 5.23 22.35

26.78 6.92 140.24 11.62 12.81 47.40 6.11 3.36 25.85

1990

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

33.63 59.88 62.05 62.41 33.93 36.47 2.20 2.24 1.76 1.40 0.89 0.84 5.47 53.53 48.67 38.96 41.91 52.67 9.91 11.41 12.02 13.70 27.12 23.41 18.28 31.26 34.82 24.42 43.31 45.13 49.72 62.36 61.05 62.42 70.72 78.53 11.03 16.73 15.93 22.59 29.11 29.99 112.06 130.61 125.91 124.86 112.95 122.74 15.76 21.80 20.36 24.01 26.06 29.71 23.03 37.98 45.79 43.46 38.00 38.76 14.71 24.14 23.50 24.96 23.75 25.55 106.56 138.20 130.86 123.69 117.09 121.72 6.84 12.66 13.57 15.77 18.80 17.63 14.73 14.26 12.36 13.33 11.73 12.06 30.28 44.08 43.47 42.57 42.49 45.37

Sources: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, World Bank Database; also see in Junichi Goto, “Economic Interdependence and Co-operation with Reference to Asia”.

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member economies’ intra-East Asian trade share to total trade increased from 41.9 per cent in 1980 to 47.5 in 1990 and to 51.3 per cent in 2000 respectively.9 Hence, most of intra-Asian trade is among East Asian economies. Table 2 shows the trade dependence index change of fourteen East Asian economies during last two decades. Trade interdependence is the key indicator for economic interdependence. Some analysts believe that with increasing intra-regional flow of goods and services, it would be good to have a stable exchange rate arrangement among the economies in East Asia. And it would be better to create a key currency in this region and have close co-ordination among monetary authorities in the region.10 Besides intra-regional trade, capital flows within the region are increasing too. For example, China attracted 54 per cent of its total FDI from Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore in 1990. The ratio rose to 58 per cent in 1996 and to 61 per cent in 1999. Japan’s foreign direct investment (FDI) in Asia was 712 billion yen, which was 27.8 per cent of total Japanese FDI outflow in 1994. In 1996, Japan’s FDI in Asia increased to 1,305 billion yen and the ratio also rose to 52.7 per cent.11 During 1990s, Korean FDI outflow to Asia was maintained at more than 43 per cent of its total FDI, while its FDI in North America dropped by 10 per cent from 34.6 per cent in early 1990s to 24.6 per cent in late 1990s.12 According to a recent issue of the Far Eastern Economic Review, China also increased its investment in Southeast Asia in the past few years. In 1999, officially approved investment in Southeast Asia was US$72 million, reflecting an annual increase in recent years.13 In 2000, officially approved new investment to the same region rose to US$108 million. Increasing intra-regional capital flow is the reflection of regional industrial integration and serves for the increasing industrial and technological transfer in the region. It becomes another important aspect of regional interdependence. It directly enhances the possibility for regional financial and monetary integration. Another factor of production, human resources, also increased its mobility in the region, further enhancing the economic interdependence of East Asian economies. According to Goto’s study, Japan’s registered foreigners from Asia in 1980 were 734,500. In 1997 the figure rose to 1,086,400, which was 73.4 per cent of all registered foreigners. In Thailand, the figure was 94,100 in 1993 and rose to 148,800, which represented 80.3 per cent of all registered foreigners. In the Philippines, foreigners from

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Asia increased from 90,800 in 1990 to 221,300 in 1998. Asian foreigner percentage increased from 27.1 per cent in 1990 to 39.3 per cent in 1998.14 Similar patterns probably exist in many other East Asian countries. This means that more and more people are moving across East Asian countries, which creates more favourable condition for economic co-operation and integration of the region. However, many analysts in East Asia are still pessimistic about the real prospect of monetary integration in the region. The reasons are: First, the lack of a regional free trade arrangement in East Asia. These analysts argued that any sort of Asian Monetary Union (AMU) is not feasible now because logically, it should follow sequentially after the establishment of a Free Trade Area (FTA). They think that in East Asia, currency and exchange rate stabilization arrangement can be reached only in the wake of malignant speculative attacks.15 The second reason is the lack of trust within the region. Economically and politically, East Asians still do not identify closely with each other. China, Japan and ASEAN do not trust each other and fear the threat from one another. While the EU “pool” sovereignty, East Asia is still at the stage of reasserting their sovereignty. East Asia is also too culturally and socially diverse. Asian values as expounded in the early 1990s are suspect as the traditional network among families extending to the paternal states has over-extended the sanguine limits of benign state intervention and there is moral hazard associated with cozy political-business alliances.16 Therefore it is a commonly held belief that East Asian regionalism has a long way to go. The third reason is that East Asia has benefited from both globalization and open regionalism. Indeed East Asia has gained tremendously from the open multilateral trading system. Most East Asian economies are still highly dependent on the markets in the developed North. An exclusive, closed East Asia bloc, especially one that is based on a sort of South-South regionalism would not be in the interest of East Asia. Open regionalism, such as APEC, stands the best chance for the economic well-being of most East Asian countries. In other words, not only would Japan and the United States gain less from a closed East Asian bloc, but a Regional Trade Agreement and monetary co-operation among mainly developing countries in East Asia would be a bad choice for the region. Therefore without the support of Japan and the United States, any institutional arrangement of monetary co-operation is not feasible.

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Indeed following the above arguments, there is still a long way to go towards the high level integration. Yet, the trend of regionalism encouraged by the success of the EU should not be overlooked. As mentioned earlier, East Asia regionalism is gathering momentum in spite of the existing diversities and differences in political and socio-economic development. The EU sailed through a long journey of more than fifty years to today’s remarkable integration. There had been many ups and downs during the journey. East Asia would certainly need more years to reach a similar stage. But it does not necessarily mean that East Asia should follow the same path that the EU has gone through. There are many ways to start and the pattern of integration can be quite different. Some Korean scholars even argued that the sequence of regional integration could be reversed (Shin and Wang 2002). I think, at least, monetary integration and trade integration can be pushed ahead on both tracks at the same time. In practice, these two complement each other. From the EU’s experience, the European Monetary System increased internal trade and the moves towards a single market. Even if it is true that monetary co-operation should be built upon an FTA, this base is not unreachable as the moves towards regional FTAs are gathering pace. For example, there is already the existence of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). Negotiations are under way for a China-ASEAN FTA. An early harvest agreement has been reached in November 2002. Japan-ASEAN, Korea-ASEAN Japan-Korea free FTAs are all underway, and all these reflect the awareness of interdependence in the region, although each proposal has its own specific incentives behind it. But if all these proposals are realized, an East Asian FTA would not be too far away. As for the East Asian identity, I think it needs time to discover and define. There are indeed many differences, but East Asian countries do have similarities. Family value and ties, collectiveness and the strong role of the state are accepted in most of the countries in the region. East Asians’ participation in an open regional framework like APEC does not preclude the formation of a tighter East Asian community. Indeed one may argue that the flexibility of APEC-like institution and open regionalism provided the room for manoeuvre towards a tighter sub-regional East Asian arrangement. Just like the EU, East Asian regional co-operation and integration would have to contend with the forces of globalization and be consistent with the multilateral global framework. Both will develop and

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go hand in hand. The characteristics of open regionalism in East Asia will help this region to overcome some difficulties in further co-operation as most of the countries in the region can still maintain their increasing ties with the United States, the EU and the rest of the world. Also when examined with the theory of optimum currency area, we cannot draw the conclusion that East Asian monetary integration is impossible. Mundell himself believed that countries with symmetric incidence of shocks would form an optimum currency area. He also analyzed that countries with real wage rate flexibility and mobility of labour could substitute the exchange rate flexibility for an optimum currency area so as to gain the efficiency of transaction and welfare benefit. He believed that wage flexibility and labour mobility could solve the problem of asymmetric shock such as demand shift among countries in an optimum currency area. So he believed that the ideal condition would be the world divided into several currency areas and each one within has a fixed exchange rate and between them, floating exchange rate regime.17 Since then, a general belief was established that the precondition for countries to form an optimum currency area is the free flow of production factors, especially labour mobility. Mckinnon expanded on Mundell’s theory to take into account the ratio of tradable to non-tradable goods. He noted that the greater the ratio of tradable to non-tradable goods of a country, the less appropriate would it be for the country to have flexible exchange rate.18 This led to the further proposition that if trade flow between countries increase to a very high level, it would be proper for them to form a kind of currency area. Kenen went one step further to prove that the more diverse the export product mix of a country is, the less it is likely to need exchange rate adjustment as an important policy tool.19 These findings enhanced the common belief that free trade among countries is a precondition for an optimum currency area. In the 1970s, the theory evolved to the argument of Phillips-Curve in the implication of whether countries need respective monetary policy to maintain full employment, if they form a monetary union. As many argued that, there was not a stable Phillips-Curve in the long run, monetary policy and especially exchange policy is neutral to maintaining full employment. So the cost to give up an exchange policy is not as high as some people believed. Whether a country needs to collect seigniorage revenue or not was also discussed by economists.20 With the launch of

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European Monetary System (EMS) and later the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), more cost-benefit analysis of monetary union has been made. For the proponents, the benefits to form a currency area or monetary union range from reducing transaction cost, enhancing the efficiency of resources allocation and reducing the possibility of high inflation, to less need to hold huge foreign exchange reserve and gaining more political power in international society with close unity. So the benefit of monetary integration outweighs the cost. Many economists also tried to establish an index to examine those countries that can potentially form an optimum currency area. For example, Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1996) developed an index, which takes into account the export structures, bilateral trade intensity and countries’ size to examine Asian countries. They found that Asian countries satisfied the criteria for a standard optimum currency area. Intra-Asian trade and investments have reached a high level. There is the ability to adjust to shocks. Supply and demand disturbances are small and symmetric by European standards. What is lacking is financial depth in some countries, and most importantly, the lack of political will. However, all the above analysis did not take into account the shocks caused by the 1997–98 financial crisis. The damage to the countries hit by the financial crisis during late 1990s was tremendous and lingering effects of the crisis continued to haunt these countries. More people are led to believe that with the existing international monetary system, only stronger regional monetary co-operation could help prevent another similar financial crisis.21 Hence, the demand for closer regional cooperation in this area is increasing. As an example, in late May 2002, when U.S. dollar depreciated sharply against the Japanese yen and the Korean won, both countries sent their Deputy Ministers of Finance to Beijing to discuss the situation and seek some sort of policy co-ordination among them.22 It is with this perspective that there is hope that despite the lack of some conditions stipulated in the optimum currency theory, there is enough interest and impetus for East Asians to start seriously explore regional monetary co-operation. Another point to note is that monetary integration is a progressive process that has many stages. The highest stage is monetary union achieved by the EU while the lowest stating stage can be the exchange rate coordination and co-operation. Lack of certain elements indicated by the theory of optimum currency area, does not deny the possibility of lower level monetary integration in the form of closer co-operation and

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co-ordination in exchange rate management. This would provide some form of insurance against further external shocks and crisis caused by capital and currency movements in the international monetary system. East Asia has enough reasons to start the exchange rate co-operation together with free trade arrangements.23 Many economists still follow the classic type of regional economic integration and believe in the sequential steps from preferential trade agreements to free trade area to custom union, to a common market and finally an Economic Union, as reflected in the path taken by the EU. But I doubt the certainty of this order. EU launched its monetary union after it realized the single market goal. But in reality the plan for monetary union was drawn in the 1960s and close monetary co-operation started far earlier than was led to believe. East Asia should learn from the experiences and lessons of European integration, but it should not follow exactly the path pursued by the EU.

The Way Forward for East Asian Monetary Integration Of course, the increasing awareness of the need for monetary and financial co-operation is only a necessary condition and not a sufficient condition to start the co-operation. Given the oft-noted political and economic differences, real monetary integration in East Asia require strong political will, commitment and concrete efforts from the big players in the region. Firstly, there is a need for Japan and China to come to terms with the historical baggage behind their relationship. Japan and China has to work to enhance their mutual understanding and trust. Due to historical and political reasons, countries in this region remain somewhat distrustful of each other. This is not conducive towards closer regional co-operation. What we really need is for both big players to consult each other more, and not seek to play each other off with different alliances in the region. In this regard, the experience of the co-operation and reconciliation between France and Germany in Europe may offer some useful lessons for Japan and China. The roles of Japan and China in the region are crucial. Japan, the first Asian state to make it to the OECD in 1964, has provided a development model for several other East Asian economies. Despite its decade of economic slump in the 1990s, Japan continued to be an important source of capital and technology in the region. ASEAN countries and even China also regard Japan as a very important market for their exports. Seeing the

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United States with its two-track approach toward both regionalism and multilateralism, Japan has relented on sticking only to the multilateral or bilateral route, and started to embrace regionalism as well. However, Japan remained highly protectionist in some sectors such as agriculture and has been criticized by its East Asian neighbours. Its special relation with the United States has also caused some unease among the Chinese. China is increasingly playing an active role in regional activities. Its promise not to devalue its currency has gained respect from the rest of Asia. Yet, because of its economic size and increasing export potentials and competitiveness, other East Asian countries, especially the developing ASEAN countries, are feeling China’s weight. In combination with historical factors, feelings towards China tend to be mixed. It was in trying to allay the fears about China and in seeking a win-win partnership that China took the initiative in 2000 to propose an ASEAN-China FTA.24 If Japan, Korea and China can come together with ASEAN under the ASEAN+3 framework to work out an East Asian Free Trade Area that remains free and open to the outside world, East Asia would really become a promising economic development region and an East Asian Monetary Union would not be impossible in the future. Secondly, start with concrete policy co-ordination and take small steps towards regional monetary co-operation. Any impractical suggestion and aim would delay the regional co-operation process. While monetary unification might be the ultimate goal, this should be rightly seen as a distant goal to be reached in the longer-term. In the meantime, the East Asians have begun to take small steps towards closer co-operation. The Chiang Mai initiative signed in 2000 has resulted in the conclusion of various bilateral currency swap agreements, which would serve as a basis for further regional monetary co-operation. Although the Chiang Mai Initiative is only a swap agreement and its main content is to extend the original ASEAN Swap Arrangement and establish a network of bilateral swap and repurchase agreement facilities, China, Korea and Japan have all been involved in this concrete monetary co-operation. It is based on a bilateral arrangement, but overall it has multilateral characteristics. Up till now, the absolute dollar value of all the various currency swap arrangements has exceeded US$20 billion. The problem for East Asia at present is that “the Chiang Mai initiative carefully eschews institution building, thus failing to plant the seeds for an eventual next step. From the point of view of regional integration, the

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risk is that the initiative will be both a beginning and an end”.25 Without some institutional mechanisms to manage closer co-operation in exchange rate management, this would not lead to real monetary integration. Therefore, my suggestion is to take one step further and make the Chiang Mai Initiative more comprehensive and multilateral. First, make the standby credit a common credit pool. The credit quota in each bilateral agreement be pooled together as the one member’s overall credit quota and can be increased in an urgent condition agreed upon by member states. Next, convert the entire credit quota into an Asian Monetary Cooperation Fund (AMCF). And finally, create an Asian Monetary Unit (AMU) to link with AMCF. From the beginning, this virtual money can be valued in a basket of currencies including the U.S. dollar, the euro and the currencies of member states. Later on, the member countries can loosely link their currency to the AMU according to their will and situation. After successful application of these stages, the AMU currency basket can be limited only to member state currencies and the exchange rate fixing requirement can be applied. This is somewhat like the European Monetary System, but the starting point is lower. Once this process begins, the impact is not only in its basic function of lending facility. It will begin to demand that all participating countries co-ordinate and seek convergence in their economic policy in order to achieve the monetary stability. It will also create a favourable atmosphere in this region and will greatly discourage international currency speculators to attack individual currencies in this region. Thirdly, avoid any competition for leadership among big countries. The Japanese yen should play an important role in the AMU as Japan is the biggest economy in the region and the only industrialized economy that has the potential ability to provide credit. However, the Japanese yen is also not suitable to be the sole anchor of the future AMU. This is because the exchange rate between Japanese yen and the U.S. dollar is still not stable, and the Japanese Government is not ready and willing to stabilize the exchange rate of yen to the U.S. dollar because of the potential cost to its economy. In economic practice, East Asian countries are inclined to use U.S. dollar as their main reserve currency and intermediate for international transactions. East Asia does not have a tradition of yen circulation. Especially at this moment, the Japanese economy is still in recession. If the yen is going to play a key currency role in East Asian monetary cooperation, it will become a burden to Japanese economy and adds to the

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cost for Japan’s economic recovery. Japan is not willing nor ready to take the responsibility of playing a regional key currency role as Japan still prefers to keep its huge current account surplus. Usually, the key currency country should provide its own currency to the rest of the world either through current account deficit or continuous capital out flow. We would therefore be better off to create a virtual currency based on a basket of currencies. In this way, not only can we avoid the negative effect of exchange rate fluctuations of the Japanese yen, but also enhance the willingness of co-operation from all participating parties. We should learn from the experience of the European Monetary Fund (EMF) and European Monetary System (EMS). Why did the European countries not make the Deutschmark or French franc the anchor for EMS but instead created the European Currency Unit? I think the reason is similar to what we are facing today in East Asia. In order to balance the power and share the same responsibility, to create virtual money is the best way to enhance co-operation among participating parties. Japan would be better off in this kind of co-operation. A Yen Bloc or Yen Zone is either impractical or to the disadvantage of the Japanese economy.

The EU-East Asia Relation and Glimmers of a Tripolar Currency System What is suggested here — East Asian monetary integration — would take a long time to realize. Therefore in the immediate future, the international monetary system will more likely be a bipolar system as the euro grows in international stature. A bipolar system is better than unipolarity in the international monetary system. The current international monetary system has many defects that caused instability and financial crises. The central problem with the present system is the over-dominance of the U.S. dollar and the Triffin Dilemma. The essence of the Triffin Dilemma is the contradiction that a national currency like the U.S. dollar is being used as an international currency. Without any institutional stabilizing mechanism of exchange rate between key currencies, there will be no real stability of the international financial system at large. International economists have become increasingly aware of the problems of the current international system. Many suggestions for reform have been put forward. But the real progress of reform is tremendously difficult as the most powerful country in the world is not interested in it. With the euro now, there is hope that

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some checks and balances can be maintained to help create a more stable international financial climate. However, to have a tripolar system would even be better. To further stabilize the international financial system, it is the hope that through increasing co-operation among East Asian countries, there will emerge a third pole in the international monetary system. If this new horizon really emerges in the near future, it will overhaul the current international monetary system and a stabilized international monetary order will more likely be maintained. The Japanese yen or the Chinese yuan on their own is unlikely to provide the pillar for the third pole to emerge. Without close monetary cooperation to start the regional integration in East Asia, it would be impossible for East Asia to emerge as the third pole in the system. The reason is clear. Though Japan is the second largest economy in the world, its real size is only half that of the United States and half of the EU total. China is growing fast, but even assuming the same pace of growth for the next decade or so, China could only reach half of the GDP of the United States by 2020. Therefore, any country alone in East Asia or ASEAN as a sub-regional grouping cannot match the other two poles. Japan and China are accumulating more and more foreign exchange reserves now, and now they are held essentially in U.S. dollars. Imagine if East Asian monetary integration is now a reality, and that at least half of today’s reserves of the ASEAN + 3 countries (which is in the range of US$1,000 billion) could be used by the region itself — the potential in investment terms for the region, and so on, is tremendous. East Asian monetary co-operation would also be a good thing for Europe-Asia relation, because it would create more opportunities for Europeans to invest and trade in Asia. It is also hoped that East Asian monetary co-operation will not just provide security and a stable financial climate in the region, but also will stimulate EU-Asia bilateral trade and investment. Just as Asian people welcome European economic and political integration, East Asian monetary co-operation and integration would likely be welcomed by Europe. European integration is expanding and deepening at a historical pace. East Asian integration is still in its infancy. So in many aspects, the EU acts as an example for East Asia. The EU could provide support and technical help for East Asia. And the ASEM co-operation framework can be used to look into the currency issue more profoundly and at the same time should promote East Asian regional integration.

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Notes 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

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Here I use Chinese official statistics. Owing to the statistical difference, The EU’s figure showed the export from China to EU was US$75.92 billion in 2001 and import from EU was US$30.03 billion in 2001. Despite the differences, all showed the rapid growth in bilateral trade relations in recent years and China now is the third largest trade partner for the EU and the EU is the second largest source of imports and third largest market for China excluding Hong Kong. See discussions in Kwan, C.H., Yen Bloc: Towards Economic Integration in Asia. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001, and Kang, Sammo et al., “Hanging Together: Exchange Rate Dynamics between Japan and Korea”. Korean Institute for International Economic Policy’s Working Paper 02-06, 2002. Xu, Mingqi, “The Euro as a Stabilizer in the International Economic System: A Chinese Perspective”, in The Euro as a Stabilizer in the International Economic System, edited by Robert Mundell and Armand Cleese. Cambridge MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000. Suggestions were in a wide rage and different from many aspects, such as Asian Monetary Fund, Asian Monetary Unit, Swap Agreement, Exchange Board and Yen Bloc. The intentions of different countries’ scholars are also different. However, in all suggestions there was a common element, that is, to enhance the regional monetary co-operation and to learn something from the European monetary integration. Although the first ASEAN+3 heads of state summit meeting was held in December 1997 in response to the Asian financial crisis, the monetary and financial co-operation were adopted in 1999 summit. Obviously, the successful launch of the euro had influenced the countries in the region to expand their co-operation to the monetary and financial area. Charles Kindelberger, “A New Bipolarity?”, in The Euro as a Stabilizer in the International Economic System, edited by Robert Mundell and Armand Cleese. Cambridge MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000. For examples, in the Asia Development Forum 2 Singapore 2000, there was a special workshop on Regional Financial Architecture, in which Japanese and Korean scholars all discussed favourably on Asian Monetary Fund and advocated closer monetary co-operation among East Asian countries. In the Asia Development Forum 3 in Bangkok, Thailand 2001, this was still a hot topic and a Korean scholar made an eloquent argument for starting the concrete monetary co-operation among the countries in this region. Junichi Goto, “FTAS and Their Economic Implications with Reference to Asia”. Paper presented to Capacity Building Workshop on Trade Policy Issues,

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organized by ADB Institute and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, 16–24 April 2000. Shin Kwan Ho and Yunjong Wang, “Reverse Sequencing: Monetary Integration ahead of Trade integration in East Asia?” Korean Institute for International Economic Policy’s Discussion Paper 02-08. Professor Dutta proposed to start Asian monetary integration as early as 1998. His main argument is the increasing interdependence in the region (Dutta 1998). Korean and Japanese scholars’ arguments during Asian Development Forums, mentioned in the last note, were also based on the increasing level of interdependence. In October 2001, Nobel Laureate Professor Robert Mundell made a public lecture in Shanghai. In his lecture, he suggested to the East Asian countries that they start the monetary co-operation by creating a monetary unit and strengthen the monetary co-ordination by having an exchange board so as to gain the benefit of optimum currency zone while the condition to establish monetary union was lacking. He also mentioned the basic condition of increasing trade flows within the region. Figures from JETRO Report 1998. Lee Chang Soo, “Korea’s FDI: Choice of Location and Effect on Trade”. Korean Institute for Economic Policy’s Working Paper 02-07, 2002. See Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 March 2001. See Goto, op cit., and another of Goto’s paper, on “Economic Interdependence and Cooperation with reference to Asia”. Paper presented at Capacity Building Workshop, 2002. Linda Low, “Whither Multilateralism: Whither Asian Regionalism?” Paper presented at the Third Asia Development Forum on Regional Economic Cooperation in Asia and Pacific, 11–14 June 2001, Thailand. Linda Low, ibid. For a detailed discussion on the theory of Optimum Currency Area, please see Robert Mundell’s article on “The Theory of Optimum Currency Area” in American Economic Review, no. 51 (1961): 657–65. See Ronald McKinnon’s “Optimum Currency Area” in American Economic Review, no. 53 (1963): 717–25. See Peter Kenen’s “The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas: An Eclectic View”, in the Monetary Problems of the International Economy, edited by Robert Mundell and Alexander Swobuda. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969. For literature surveys of theory of monetary integration, please see De Brauwe (1997), Eichengreen (1993) and Hefeker (1997). Also see Mongelli (2002). This kind of argument can be typically found from the discussions during Asian Development Forum (ADF). From ADF2 in Singapore 2000 to ADF3 in Bangkok 2001 and to ADF in Seoul 2002, there were appeals for rapid and

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closer co-operation in this regard. First there were Japanese scholars and Korean scholars in favour of the idea of Asian Monetary Fund and later scholars from ASEAN countries believed that close monetary co-operation in exchange rate management is crucial for the countries in the region. See International Financial News in Chinese, 22 May 2002. Recurrence of financial crisis is a common phenomenon. Asian countries are very vigilant against the risk of recurrence of financial crisis in the region (Keiseok Hong et al., 2002). On 24 March 2002, Chinese Vice Premier Wen Jiabao stated in a seminar on China’s Economic Development in Beijing that, in the next five years, China will import as much as US$1.5 trillion of goods from the rest of the world. The potential market for East Asian countries is huge. See International Finance News, 25 March 2002, China. Charles Wyplosz, “A Monetary Union in Asia: Some European Lessons”, in Report on Future Direction of Monetary Policy in Asia, published by the Reserve Bank of Australia, 2001.

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9 China and ASEM: Strengthening Multilateralism Through Inter-regionalism* Sebastian Bersick

In contrast to other inter-regional co-operation processes in which the European Union is involved (for example, EU-ASEAN, EU-Mercosur) the ASEM process developed an extensive approach to the challenges and perils of our times.1 This approach is based on two fundamental principles: 1. multilateralism, 2. regionalism. During the eight years of its existence, the co-operation among ASEM participants has become more intense than anybody could have expected in the middle of the 1990s. The thematic diversity of the co-operation is twofold: On the one side ASEM activities are part of the economic dimension of globalization. On the other side the process deals with the socio-political dimension of globalization. Since the dynamics of rising interdependencies are the most challenging aspect of globalization, the ASEM process can be understood as an answer to the challenges of a world which relies more and more on the co-operative interaction of all its inhabitants. In February the Far Eastern Economic Review depicted the relationship between the People’s Republic of China and the European Union as a

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“love affair” that drives business and trade. After the recent EUnification of Europe on 1 May, it was the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao who visited the European Union as the first major world leader. Was Wen on a sentimental journey? On the occasion of his visit the President of the EU Commission Romano Prodi stated: “Both of us want a multipolar world in which we have many active protagonists. This is a Chinese priority and it is a European interest”.2 While the expanded EU will become China’s biggest trade partner and a counterweight to United States’ influence3 the United States (U.S.) will remain the “security linchpin for Asia”.4 Nevertheless, the roles of the European Union and of China as actors in regional and global affairs have changed dramatically in recent years. Moreover, “the general trend in Asia” as Wang Jisi argues, “is conducive to China’s aspiration to integrate itself more extensively into the region and the world, and it would be difficult for the United States to reverse this direction”.5 As I am going to argue this holds true for the level of inter-regional affairs as well. A central variable with regard to the long-term strategic aspects of the inter-regional co-operation within the ASEM process concerns the so-called multipolar world. In this context, actors in Europe and Asia make use of the ASEM process and its inherent “politics of inter-regional relations”.6 The latter refers to the empirical phenomenon that regions and regional actors progressively institutionalize their inter-regional co-operation. This chapter examines how China utilized the ASEM process to strengthen multilateralism as an organizing principle of the international system in order to use it as a counterweight to United States’ increasing unilateralism.

Theoretical Implications of Inter-regional Co-operation Though co-operation within the ASEM process is based on a multilateral approach it differs from other forms of multilateralism: All ASEM actors are organized in relation to their regional assignment. While this is obvious for the European side — which has a long experience in inter-regional cooperation with organizations in Asia and Latin America — the Asian ASEM actors have not been organized in a regional institution before. What is more: The ten Asian ASEM actors agreed to build a new institution to co-ordinate their respective interests in order to arrive at a common Asian position.7 We therefore have from an international relations’ perspective, a new type of multilateral co-operation, that is, multilateralism on the inter-regional level.

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This development can be explained with the help of the neo-liberal paradigm of international relations theory. The co-operation between the regions increases the interdependence between the actors. But the policies of ASEM make sense in terms of the neo-realist point of view as well. As the establishment of ASEM has been justified with the need of a link between the regions of Europe and Asia, ASEM can be explained as an empirical example of the logics of power politics and its balancing aspects.8 If one uses a constructivists’ approach, ASEM serves as an example of identity or collective identity building within the Asian region9 or between Asia and Europe.10 Due to the nature of the politics of inter-regional relations a theory-based explanation of the empirical data needs to encompass and make use of different paradigms in international relations theory.11

Chinese Interests in ASEM In October 2003, the Chinese Government issued its first actor-specific policy paper. In this paper the Chinese Government formulates that “China and the EU should work together to make ASEM a role model for intercontinental co-operation on the basis of equality, a channel for oriental and occidental civilizations and a driving force behind the establishment of a new international political and economic order”.12 China is one of the most important actors of the ASEM regime and its de facto hegemon. This is for two reasons. Firstly, a reason for the formation of the ASEM process has been to engage China, or, to put it in the words of a Southeast Asian diplomat, “to coax China into the mainstream of world affairs”. But although Beijing agreed to participate in the first ASEM summit in Bangkok in 1996 the Chinese input was very low at the beginning. Secondly, the interests of China towards ASEM changed within the last years and can be differentiated into those before the Asian crisis and those that developed within the new context of the Asian crisis after 1998. Shen Guoliang, Senior Research Fellow at the China Institute for International Strategic Studies, describes Beijing’s interest in the ASEM in four clusters: 1. Because of the imperialistic history between Asia and Europe the establishing of co-operation on an equal footing in the fields of economy, politics and culture ASEM is a historic event. 2. ASEM will further a process of multipolarization and by this help to establish a new political and economic world order. 3. ASEM shall counterbalance the

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influence of the United States. 4. ASEM lays the basis for an Asian-European partnership that shall lead to common interests and common positions. According to Shen there are conflicts of interests as well: Asia and Europe do not agree on issues like values, the role of the political dialogue and of security issues in the ASEM process, the liberalization of trade and investments. Zhang Yunling, Director at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, furthermore underlines the importance of European technology, which the Chinese Government hopes to acquire with the help of the ASEM process. Beijing, for instance, took the lead on the Study Group on Enhancing Technological Exchanges and Co-operation, and hosted the Asia-Europe Experts’ Meetings on Technological Co-operation. According to Wu Xingtang, former Secretary General of the Chinese Association for International Understanding, the most important aspect of the ASEM process is that the United States does not participate in it. The Chinese interest in ASEM is also expressed by senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Chinese Communist Party. Diplomats and cadres alike stress the importance of the ASEM process as a mechanism that allows for inter-regional co-operation with the Europeans without the participation of the United States. The absence of the United States explains why the Chinese Government is convinced of the politicostrategic relevance of the ASEM process. As the Second Secretary of the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China put it: The absence of the United States in ASEM is good. There are three poles: North America, Asia and Europe. The United States does not want to recognize this. ASEM marks the end of a fifty-year long phase in which the United States monopolized the Asian economies. The non-existence of the ASEM process would have a negative influence on the evolving new world order — especially in the political realm. Europe and Asia want to balance the influence of the USA.

The director of the Department of Policy Research in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasizes the politico-strategic importance of the ASEM process as well. In that context he defines multipolarity as the “growing importance of Asia and Europe”. According to him, the rising willingness of the Asian ASEM actors to co-operate on an intra-regional level has a substantial impact on the co-operation between Europe and China. In addition to that, he explains that when Chinese and European

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actors meet within the ASEM context not only bilateral issues are part of the agenda. “The common interest of Asia comes first. China’s interests are second”. In that context the director of the ASEM-Division of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs argues that ASEM’s strategic relevance results from its aim to foster multipolarity through the strengthening of interdependencies between Asia and Europe. The increasing interest of Beijing in ASEM results in a rising role of China in the overall process. Not only did China become an ASEM coordinator but she was also host of several meetings on the ministerial and senior official level. The latest examples are the Fifth ASEM Economic Ministers’ Meeting in July, the ASEM Seminar on Anti-Terrorism in September, the ASEM Conference on Culture and Civilization as well as the High Level Conference on Agricultural Co-operation in December 2003. As the ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in 2002 made apparent, China has increased its practical ASEM input by acting as a co-sponsor in all “key ASEM initiatives” for the last ASEM summit in Copenhagen.13 Apart from that the Chinese Government makes a gradually rising use of the ASEM regime to actively criticize U.S. policy, for example, towards Iraq, during the summit in Copenhagen.14

The Impact of Transnational Terrorism There can be no questioning that though much has changed in the world of international relations since 11 September 2001, we still live in a world which is driven by the forces of globalization. Nevertheless one fundamental change is becoming more and more apparent: During the twelve years between 9 November 1989 when the Berlin Wall came down and the attacks on New York City and Washington D.C., globalization and regionalization were conceptualized in terms of a dialectical relationship. The frequently asked question in the 1990s was whether regionalism was a stepping-stone or a stumbling block to the WTO and its multilateral approach to international economy. Because of the integration process and the pooling of sovereignty, a region like the EU was described and perceived by some as a fortress. Especially Southeast Asian governments were afraid of this development because their bargaining power was becoming smaller compared to the so-called one voice of the EU. This is why strengthening co-operation with China on the regional level was thought of as a strategy

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for ASEAN to increase its bargaining power when dealing with the EU on the inter-regional level. But with the emergence of a new international terrorism the co-operation between Asia and Europe has been confronted with a challenge that has a grave impact on the issue of how the ASEM process can contribute to strengthen multilateralism as an organizing principle of the international system in order to better handle the terrorism issues. In that sense the attacks of 9/11 triggered a new process of awareness-building. Regionalization and integration are no more considered as problematical but as natural. Because the Bush Jr. administration behaves more and more unilaterally (for example, with regard to issues like free trade, environmental protection, the founding of the International Criminal Court and human rights issues like the prisoners in Guantanamo Bay), the principle of multilateralism as an organizing principle of the international system is eroding under this stress and tension and risked becoming delegitimized. Therefore the potential and importance of Asia-Europe relations as a balancer of unilateral policy behaviour in favour of a multilateral one is rising. It is therefore an important development that the ASEM foreign ministers’ discussions during their recent meeting in Ireland took place under the overarching theme “how can we sustain an international order based on effective multilateralism”. The ministers agreed on an “ASEM Declaration on Multilateralism” in which they state: ASEM Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to multilateralism and to a fair and just rules-based international order, with a strong United Nations at its heart, to resolve international disputes, to promote positive aspects of globalization, and to advance democratization of international relations.15

In that context civil society actors16 play an important role.

The Role of Civil Society Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) provide expertise in regard to regional and global issues, they undertake monitoring functions where governments or parliaments do not act and they raise global and regional issues to the awareness of the public. This is why NGOs “reinforce the democratic element in the international system without being, in the formal sense, democratically legitimized”.17

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As it has been spelled out by the European Commission, Asia and Europe could make use of the comprehensive nature of Asia-Europe cooperation covered by the three ASEM pillars to “[d]eal with the social root causes of transnational criminal behaviour and terrorism, such as poverty, lack of basis education, persistent unemployment or underemployment, lack of sustainable economic growth.”18 Therefore, in order to serve the fight against the so-called “underlying root causes for the spread of international terrorism”,19 official action must be complemented by the role of civil society. If civil society actors are to make a substantive input in order to serve the goal of effectively stopping the trend of increasing virulence of force in the international system, it is a prerequisite that all civil society actors who are interested be allowed to participate in the ASEM regime. NGOs, like Amnesty International for instance, demand an institutionalized link between the NGOs that are engaged in the ASEM process and the governments. During the third ASEM summit in Seoul NGOs demanded the founding of an “Asia-Europe Social Forum”. But though the “Asia-Europe Peoples’ Forum” lobbied hard, ASEM leaders during their last summit in Copenhagen did not agree on its founding. Therefore a decisive question for civil society actors dealing with ASEM runs as follows: “What is the extent to which civil society groups can influence the agenda and become part of the ASEM process?”20 In the eyes of those civil society actors their work has reached a crossroad. To quote an outspoken assessment by one leading NGO activist: “I do not think the official ASEM process has opened up to the civil society nor any of our arguments have been taken seriously. ASEM 4 in Copenhagen was a shame in that sense. The ‘AsiaEurope Business Forum’ was well received by the officials and we were hardly given any space for dialogue.” As has been described, it is a function of NGOs to raise global and regional issues to the awareness of the public. This is why it should be an important role of civil society actors within the inter-regional context of co-operation to complement government organizations in their efforts in “dealing with the social root causes of transnational behaviour and terrorism”. In that context, the enhancement of the use of multilateralism as the dominating organizing principle of the international system correlates with the reinforcement of “the democratic element in the international

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system” through the engagement of civil society actors. But the participation of civil society actors within the ASEM process is an issue of concern. Even before ASEM’s inauguration in Bangkok a conflict of interest existed among its Asian and European participants concerning the role of civil society in the ASEM process. Because of the forceful resistance of some Asian countries, human rights issues were not included in the first ASEM summit. The Asian side also successfully blocked the use of the term “civil society” in paragraph 19 of the Chairman’s Statement of the Second ASEM Summit in London in 1998. Though the Europeans had used the term in a draft version of the Chairman’s Statement it was finally changed into the formulation “all sectors of society”.21 China was one of the vocal parties in this context. While elaborating on the “Asia-Europe Co-operation Framework” (AECF) in 1998, Beijing again tried to hinder the usage of the term “civil society” in the document, replacing it by the formulation “relevant sectors of society”. But the Chinese Government failed this time. Civil society is mentioned in paragraph 25 of the AECF as one of the three “prime actors” of the ASEM process — together with “government” and “business”.22 Since then, there has been a change in China’s attitude towards the role of civil society. One early indicator for that important development is the “Informal ASEM Seminar on Human Rights”, which took place in Beijing in 1999 with participation of civil society actors from all ASEM countries, that is, NGOs and — mostly — the academe.23 Another indicator is the active co-operation of the Chinese Government with civil society actors, like the German political foundation, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), in the establishing of a so-called social dimension within the ASEM process. During the ASEM summit in Copenhagen in 2002 the leaders agreed on a “Workshop on Employment”. Following this conclusion a preparatory meeting took place in November 2003 in Beijing. This “Informal ASEM brainstorming on The Future of Employment and the Quality of Work” was co-sponsored by the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour, the FES and the Chinese Ministry of Labour and Social Security. Apart from statist actors and the EU Commission, nonstate actors, including the Asian Employers Confederation, the European Trade Union Federation, the Denmark Trade Union Federation, the AllChina Confederation of Trade Unions and the China Employment Confederation, took part in the meeting. During the ASEM Employment

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Conference in Berlin in June 2004, the Chinese Vice-Minister of Labour and Social Security stated: The gap between labour demand and labour supply and the structural unemployment, and the increasing urban unemployment pressure due to labour migration from rural areas to urban cities, and new labour market entrance and the need of re-employment of the unemployed are the major issues to be addressed in China. With China’s entry into the WTO, the mismatch of labour quality and job demands also becomes more and more outstanding (…) We are pleased to work with other countries and actively promote Asia-Europe exchange and co-operation in the field of employment and social security, which is of great significance, into major activities of ASEM.24

This conference brought together a mix of NGOs, the academe and business representatives. This new development shows that the Chinese Government is willing to co-operate with civil society actors in order to fight problems that threaten the stability of the political system of the People’s Republic of China. The gradual inclusion of civil society actors is only possible because the government in Beijing changed its ASEM policy with regard to civil societies’ role in the ASEM process. This change in turn is the result of the European actors’ ASEM policy of engaging civil society. Since a second preparatory meeting took place in April 2004 in Hanoi, the example of the establishing process of a social dimension within the ASEM process has made apparent results of inter-regional co-operation. Though Vietnam has not been a so-called co-sponsor25 of the ASEM initiative to hold a Workshop on Employment, the government of Vietnam agreed to host the preparatory meeting and thereby started to co-operate with civil society actors within the ASEM process.26 The strengthening of multilateralism through inter-regionalism is facilitated by the growing participation of civil societies actors in the ASEM process, thereby reinforcing “the democratic element in the international system”. In that context, the example of China shows that the ASEM process has a grave impact on the behaviour of statists’ actors. While China uses the ASEM process as a counterweight to the United States’ increasing unilateralism, Beijing becomes engaged in the democratization of the international system through the participation of civil society actors. Though the fighting of terrorism of the current U.S. administration has not led to “a region wide response to American action”27 the integration of civil society actors in the ASEM process can foster a further integration of

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non-state actors and thereby, ASEM’s role in fighting the root causes of terrorism. It is important that Asian and European actors allocate further resources to the engagement of civil society actors, namely on “activities with business, think tanks, academia and other sectors of society”.28 Especially for China, whose government is still suspicious of NGO participation. China needs to be further engaged in a dialogue that makes apparent that it is in its own national interest to engage civil societies and have their inputs for better policy formulation.

The Question of Enlargement In 1997, with the expansion of ASEAN from ASEAN 7 to ASEAN 9, the German Foreign Minister then made it clear that there is no direct linkage between the enlargement of ASEAN and that of ASEM. However, as ASEAN expanded and with the enlargement of the EU from fifteen to twenty-five on 1 May 2004, the issue over enlargement of ASEM had to be settled. The ASEM Foreign Ministers in 2002 recommended that the decision on the membership question and of enlargement be decided at the ASEM summit in 2004 in Hanoi. The Southeast Asian ASEM participants and especially Malaysia, whose government repeatedly advocated the joining of the three new ASEAN members (that is, Cambodia, Laos and Burma/ Myanmar), have lobbied hard for the inclusion of all ASEAN countries in the ASEM process. As a result the three countries have been mentioned as potential ASEM candidates in an official ASEM document.29 At the same time diplomats of the member states of the EU and of the EU Commission hold the view that, as a natural outcome of the EU enlargement, all new EU member states will automatically be ASEM participants. This is why the aspect of the enlargement of ASEAN and EU plays an important role for the enlargement of the ASEM process. But due to the fact that no obvious improvements had been made in the human rights situation in Burma/Myanmar and the continued detention of Aung San Suu Kyi and key leaders of the opposition party, National League for Democracy (NLD), the enlargement question of the ASEM regime may be left unsolved again when the ASEM leaders meet for the fifth time in October 2004 in Hanoi. This issue at its worst prognosis may even derail the whole process as several European leaders may decide to stay away from the Fifth ASEM Summit.

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During their meeting in Ireland in April the foreign ministers did not reach a consensus. This is because the European side will not agree on the participation of Myanmar in the ASEM process as long as the government in Yangon does not change its policy towards the opposition forces in the country. The enlargement issue has put the ASEM process under enormous pressure since European diplomats are not willing to think of an ASEM process in which new EU member states do not participate. A chance to solve the problem has been wasted on 17 May. The European side had indicated that it would show flexibility on the issue of Myanmar’s participation in the ASEM process, if Myanmar’s military government allowed Aung San Suu Kyi to take part in the talks of a new constitution, which started in a tightly guarded compound outside the capital on that day. But Suu Kyi was not released from house arrest. The FEER reasoned: Asean’s engagement has only led to an emboldening of the ruling authoritarians (…) It is truly a measure of Burma’s deplorable political condition that the best hope for the people may lie with following China’s example. Then again, everything else seems to have failed.30

In the case of the ASEM process this failure might lead — according to a senior official of the EU-Commission — to the postponement of the ASEM summit in Vietnam. As a first result of the approaching stalemate both ASEM Finance and Economic Ministers’ Meetings were cancelled. The ASEM Senior Officials meeting held in Tokyo 8–9 July 2004 to solve the enlargement dilemma did not yield a conclusive result. The analysis of China’s policy towards ASEM’s enlargement shows that Beijing’s interests are mainly determined by politico-strategic criteria. For instance, the Chinese Government argues, behind closed doors, that it is against the participation of Australia and New Zealand because of those countries’ “ideology and tendency”. The governments should not “too intensively link themselves to the USA”.31 With regard to the Myanmar question Beijing until now actively supports the inclusion of Myanmar within the ASEM process. But as a matter of fact, ASEAN as a regional organization is not a member of the ASEM process. ASEM is still touted as an inter-governmental forum and not a bloc-to-bloc relationship. This is why the ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Berlin in 1999 took place while the Thirteen ASEAN-EU Meeting, which was planned to take place back-to-back, had to be postponed. Because of the development of the enlargement issue within the ASEM process over the last years an analogical structural impediment now threatens the future of the ASEM process.

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Against this background a window of opportunity has opened up for the Chinese Government. Since the ASEM policy of Beijing is driven by the overall aim to further the so-called multipolarization of international relations, the Chinese Government should take this opportunity to demonstrate to its European partners the extent of China’s support of the multilateral principle. The Chinese Government needs to take the lead in solving the issue by convincing the European side — most importantly London — that China will use its special relationship with Myanmar and do its best to convince the government in Yangon to “mimic China’s economic opening”.32 This policy might lead the way to some resolution or ASEM official process looks likely to be stalled. Opening up ASEM for the inclusion of Myanmar could in turn demonstrate to the Asian side that the recent EU enlargement poses no structural impediment for Asia-Europe relations. Instead the Europeans demonstrate that they are willing to change their Myanmar policy in order to support the multilateral principle within the ASEM process. As the development of the ASEAN-EU dialogue shows, the ASEM process should not be held hostage by Myanmar. Such an engagement policy on the interregional level would differ fundamentally from the United States’ approach of extending the sanctions on Myanmar for another year. But it opens up new policy fields of dialogue and co-operation. Apart from that, the government of Myanmar would be exposed to an Asian-European dialogue process that facilitates the engagement of civil society. Whether the principle of reciprocity — which is on the basis of the enlargement dilemma — will dominate the ongoing negotiations or a more flexible approach can be agreed upon is still an open question. But the inter-linkages over ASEAN enlargement, EU enlargement and ASEM enlargement and the resulting problems must be solved soon because the strengthening of multilateralism through inter-regionalism is under serious constraints as long as both organizations and their participating actors cannot successfully deal with the challenge of co-operation in a more and more interdependent world and its resulting asymmetries. In contrast to the relations between the United States and Europe and between the United States and Asia, European and Asian actors cohabit the same geostrategic space, that is, Eurasia. Utilizing the ASEM process to strengthen multilateralism as an organizing principle of the international system in order to use it as a counterweight to the United States’ increasing unilateralism should take this factor into account. It is in the interest of

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European and Chinese actors to make use of the politics of inter-regional relations through a policy of engaging all countries that are interested in multilateral co-operation on the inter-regional level. At the same time engaging all non-state actors that are interested in multilateral co-operation on the inter-regional level is important in order to fight the root causes of terrorism. Thereby, China’s interest in the ASEM process can lead to increasing use of multilateralism as the dominating organizing principle in the international system. In this context the further engagement of civil society actors and the enlargement of the ASEM regime may be important steps on the road to gradually integrating Asia and Europe as the AsiaEurope Vision Group has envisioned it.33 Engaging Russia and India within the ASEM regime may set the frame for the “Eurasian Space” and a complementary development to other processes of regionalization, like the project of the Free Trade Area of the Americas.

Concluding Remarks It has been stated that any China policy will have to be a mixtum compositum of three elements: considerations on economy, world order, and the East-Asian regional and security order.34 Within the ASEM framework all three elements are dealt with. This is why China has begun to see the importance of the ASEM framework in the conduct of its foreign policy. In that context the ASEM regime and the co-operation between its actors can be explained as a new approach to the challenge of building a balance between regions in an evolving multipolar international system. Within this process of regime building China has changed its attitude towards the role of civil society. Increasingly, Beijing accepts the participation of non-state actors. This policy change enhances the strengthening of multilateralism. In order to capitalize on this development, a dialogue on the root causes of terrorism is needed that encompasses as well all NGOs that are interested in the ASEM process. European and Chinese actors are aware of the de facto new unilateralism of the United States and they endeavour to overcome resulting asymmetries by transforming them within a new multipolar world order. Nevertheless, at least not until now, the actors have not made use of the politics of interregional relations as an instrument to proactively multipolarize international relations. This is because a non-cooperative usage of the politics of inter-regional relations would be contrary to the normative and

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institutional dimension of open regionalism, as it is operationalized within the ASEM regime.35 ASEM has been inaugurated as a process that enables the actors of the regions of Asia and Europe to overcome old as well as possible new resentments and to co-operate on a so-called equal basis and in consensus in order to develop common ground and common interests.36 It has been conceptualized on the basis of the concept of open regionalism in order to engage China but at the same time, without the intention to antagonize the United States. This is why it is detrimental to the regimes’ norms and principles if ASEM actors use the regime unilaterally against the national interests of the United States or any other actors’ national interests. The politics of inter-regional relations have been — so far — a promising model of co-operation. As the analysis shows, co-operation within the ASEM process enhances the strengthening of multilateralism as an organizing principle of the international system because it allows, inter alia, for the inclusion of non-state actors. Furthermore, it fosters interregional co-operation as well as intra-regional co-operation. In order to follow up on ASEM’s approach to international relations it is necessary that China takes the lead in overcoming the current enlargement dilemma. This could allow for the engagement of Myanmar on the inter- as well as on the intra-regional level of international co-operation. As the engagement of China within the ASEM process demonstrates, the linkage of multilateralism and regionalism facilitates the strengthening of multilateralism. Against the backdrop of the unilateral behaviour of the current U.S. administration, this development may well be called a “Eurasian” response to American action.

Notes *

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The article draws on a paper which I prepared for the international conference “Sino-US-European Relations in the New Century: Opportunities and Challenges”, organized by the China Institute for International Strategic Studies in Beijing, 18–20 November 2003. The interview information used in the article has been gathered in Asia and Europe during the last five years. A region can be defined by territorial and functional criteria. Depending on the emphasis, geographical, or, for example, political elements are pinpointed. In contrast to other inter-regional mechanisms like the above mentioned EUASEAN dialogue, it is a further characteristic of ASEM, that the meaning of “region” is not preformed by the participation in any regional organization.

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Therefore inter-regionalism within the ASEM context has the meaning of cooperation between actors of two mainly territorially circumscribed regions. The role of the geographical element becomes obvious when looking at the name of the process: Asia-Europe Meeting. Because of the importance of the geographical aspect of regionalism, ASEM has been conceptualized as a process of co-operation between potential actors that are foremost defined by their geography and not by functional criteria, like belonging to an organization. Due to this territorial conceptualization of regionalism, Russia, Switzerland and India apply like many other countries for participation in ASEM. Since no definition has been made by the participants about the geographical extension of the two continents Europe and Asia, the de facto moratorium which exists in respect to the expansion of the ASEM-membership can be explained by the fundamental role that the territorial criterion plays within the ASEM process. Far Eastern Economic Review (hereafter cited as FEER), 6 May 2004, p. 30. FEER, 12 February 2004, p. 27. Heinrich Kreft, “Die USA - Stabilitätsanker für Asien?” [The United States — The Security Linchpin for Asia?]. Petermanns Geographische Mitteilungen, no. 148 (2004/2), p. 36. Jisi Wang, “China’s Changing Role in Asia”. Internationale Politik (Trans-Atlantic edition), 4 (3/2003): 73. See: Sebastian Bersick, Auf dem Weg in eine neue Weltordnung? Zur Politik der interregionalen Beziehungen am Beispiel des ASEM-Prozesses [Towards a New World Order? On the Politics of Inter-regional Relations: The Example of the ASEM Process]. Baden-Baden, 2004. The two so-called ASEM co-ordinators enable the Asian ASEM actors to coordinate their interests and formulate common positions when meeting their European counterparts. See: Werner Link, Die Neuordnung der Weltpolitik [A New Order of World Politics]. München, 1998. See: Heiner Hänggi, “Regionalism through Inter-Regionalism: The Case of ASEM”. Paper presented at The 15th Sino-European Conference. 1998 AsiaEurope Co-operation Forum. Asian Turbulence: Challenges and Opportunities in Shaping New Regional and Inter-regional Order. 13–16 December 1998, Taiwan, R.O.C, mimeographed; Hanns W. Maull and Nuria Okfen, “InterRegionalism in International Relations. Comparing APEC and ASEM”. Paper prepared for the international conference on “Inter-regional Relations” at the University of Freiburg, Germany, 31 January/1 February 2002, mimeographed. See: Julie Gilson, “Defining Inter-Regionalism: The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)”. SEAS Electronic Working Papers 1, no. 1 (April 2002), , 15 November 2003; Julie Gilson, “Considering Inter-Regional Relations: The Political Economy of the AsiaEurope Meeting (ASEM)”, in ASEM 2000: New Co-operation between Asia and

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Europe in the 21st Century, edited by Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security. Seoul 2000. For this conceptual approach that explains the ASEM process as a new kind of regime see: Bersick, op cit.; Yeo Lay Hwee, “The Three Images of ASEM — A Conceptual Analysis”, NIASnytt, no. 2 (June 2002): 6–8. China’s EU Policy Paper, 13 October 2003, , 30 October 2003. See: Fourth ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Chair Statement, Madrid, 6–7 June 2002, paras. 6 and 7, mimeographed. See: Sebastian Bersick, “Die ASEM-Politik der VR China. Zwischen Hegemonie und Multilateralität” [The ASEM Policy of the PR China. Between Hegemony and Multilateralism], Südostasien 20, no. 1 (March 2004): 21–24. ASEM Declaration on Multilateralism, The Sixth ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Kildare, Ireland, 17–18 April 2004, mimeographed. Definitions of the term civil society vary. With the political and legal community concepts, civil society is a part of the state. For sociologists and philosophers focusing on the state as government, civil society is seperate from the state. In this paper the civil society is composed of non-state actors (that is of transnational actors, in contrast to international organizations). A transnational actor is “any non-governmental actor from one country that has relations with any actor from another country or with an international organization”. See: Peter Willetts, “Transnational Actors and International Organizations in Global Politics”, in The Globalization of World Politics, edited by John Baylis and Steve Smith, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 290. Wolfgang Thierse, ed., Grundwerte für eine gerechte Weltordnung [Basic Values for a Just World Order], Frankfurt, 2003, p. 43. Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working Paper, Fourth Asia Europe Meeting in Copenhagen, 22–24 September 2002 (ASEM 4): Unity and Strength in Diversity, Brussels, 23 July 2002, SEC(2002) 874, p. 9, mimeographed. Ibid. Internal background paper of the Asia Europe Peoples’ Forum on the AEPF’s Strategies and Structure and Emerging Questions, October 2003. Draft Version of the Chairman’s Statement of the Second Asia-Europe Meeting, London, 3–4 April 1998, mimeographed. See: “Asia-Europe Co-operation Framework 2000”, , 8 December 2002, para. 25. See: Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Report No. 30, Second Informal ASEM Seminar on Human Rights, Beijing, 27–29 June 1999, p. 127. Speech at the opening ceremony of the ASEM Employment Conference by

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Wang Dongjin, Vice-Minister of Labour and Social Security, China, 1 June 2004, Berlin, Germany, mimeographed. The co-sponsors of the German initiative are China, Spain and Ireland. The informal ASEM brainstorming on “The Future and the Quality of Work: The Decent Work Agenda in a Globalized Economy” was co-sponsored by the FES. Apart from government representatives, representatives of trade unions and the private sector participated as well. Mark Beeson, “ASEAN Plus Three and the Rise of Reactionary Regionalism”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 25, no. 2 (August 2003): 265. Chair’s Statement, The Fifth ASEM Foreign Ministers‘ Meeting, Bali, Indonesia 22–24 July 2003, para. 5, mimeographed. Fourth ASEM Foreign Ministers‘ Meeting, Chair Statement, Madrid, 6–7 June 2002, para. 11, mimeographed. FEER, 27 May 2004, p. 6. See for an analysis of the enlargement issue: Bersick, Auf dem Weg in eine neue Weltordnung? Zur Politik der interregionalen Beziehungen am Beispiel des ASEMProzesses, pp. 122–36. FEER, 27 May 2004, p. 6. See: “For A Better Tomorrow. Asia-Europe Partnership in the 21st Century”. Asia-Europe Vision Group Report 1999. Seoul 1999, p. 14. See: Kay Möller, “Diplomatic Relations and Mutual Strategic Perceptions: China and the European Union”, The China Quarterly, no. 169 (March 2002): 30. Bersick, Auf dem Weg in eine neue Weltordnung? Zur Politik der interregionalen Beziehungen am Beispiel des ASEM-Prozesses, pp. 73–93. See: “Asia-Europe Cooperation Framework 2000”, , 8 December 2002, paras. 8 and 9.

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10 Japan and ASEM Kazuhiko Togo

For Japan, relations with East Asia have been strategically vital, but a difficult agenda in the post-WWII foreign policy. Relations with Europe have also been looked upon as one of the weakest links of Japan-USEurope triangle that needed further strengthening. In the post-Cold War paradigm change in international relations, ASEM has given Japan a unique opportunity to address these two issues more proactively than ever. Taking into account this unique advantage, Japan has tried to be a positive contributor to ASEM in the last eight years since ASEM was launched. In this chapter I will attempt to analyze, first, the essence of Japan’s East Asian policy, then its European policy, and finally, to examine Japan’s participation in the ASEM process and how this has in turn contributed to the re-orientation of Japan’s policies towards both Asia and the EU. This includes a look into Japan’s efforts in strengthening ASEM’s organizational activities, and reaffirming a certain Asian approach on discussions concerning fundamental values such as “human rights”. The paper will conclude with a personal contemplation of the future tasks of Asia-Europe relations from a “Eurasian” perspective.1

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Japan’s Post-WWII Policy towards East Asia Japan’s geopolitical strategic external policy in the post-Meiji Restoration era not only looked towards the East Asian continent but also across the Pacific Ocean. It was through the Korean peninsula, Manchuria and eventually China and Southeast Asia that Japan’s sphere of influence spread. It was with the United States (U.S.) across the Pacific Ocean with which Japan fought its fatal war and lost. The continental landmass and the vast Pacific Ocean continued to form the backdrop of post-WWII geopolitical scenery for Japanese foreign policy orientation. The Cold War overwhelmed the basic paradigm of international relations. Under intense U.S.-Soviet rivalry, the United States became Japan’s sole and strongest ally across the ocean. Toward the East Asian continent, Japan gradually became the foremost economic power in the region. But politically Japan’s policy toward East Asia has remained cautious, partly because of the complexity of intra-regional relations and partly because of Japan’s unsettled WWII legacy in the region. During the Cold War, Japan’s cautious approach toward East Asia was well reflected in its multilateral diplomacy. But cautious attitude to multilateralism in East Asia was not only attributed to Japan. The basic security structure which evolved in the region was a network of bilateral security arrangements between the countries concerned such as Thailand, Philippines, South Korea, and the United States. The historical, racial and religious diversities, and the vast differences in political and economic developments of the countries in the region prevented the creation of a solid regional multilateral institution. Even the Southeast Asian countries that were to set the tone and pace of the multilateral co-operation took a very cautious approach, because of the history of Chinese imperialism, European colonialism and Japanese occupation. It was not till the end of the 1970s that the first multilateral institution involving both Northeast and Southeast Asian countries, the Pacific Economic Co-operation Council (PECC) was established. PECC has several conspicuous characteristics: it was a Track II organization, the major purpose being confidence-building with a typically Asian consensus-based and gradual approach; it was an Asia-Pacific organization; Japan under Prime Minister Ohira was one of the active initiators of the PECC. However, much of this was done behind the scene with great sensitivity to

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possible lingering fears of Japan’s dominance. Hence, Japan had intentionally played second fiddle and allowed the Australians to take the credit for the launch of the PECC. But the end of the Cold War brought about a paradigm change. Growing economic power of Asian NIEs, growing confidence of ASEAN as a regional organization, the opening up of China led to greater intra-regional cooperation, and also led the region to think with a greater sense of autonomy. Within the framework of the Asia-Pacific region and with an Asian way of consensus building, the first meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum was held in 1989, in the same month when the Berlin wall fell. Japan, which was in the midst of an economic boom, became more assertive and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry actively supported the launch of APEC, but again Australia took the leading role in convening the first meeting in Canberra. In the foreign policy-security arena, as a result of the end of the Cold War the rigid structure of “Hub and Spoke” relations with the United States had become more relaxed allowing for a broader type of multilateral security co-operation to emerge. With the more positive climate, ASEAN took the initiative to launch the very first regionwide security forum in 1994 to be known as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). It was again an Asia-Pacific organization with a consensus building approach, driven very much by the “ASEAN way”2 — a mode of operation based on informality with a very gradual approach towards confidence-building and consensus-based decision-making. It was against this background of increased regional confidence and co-operation that Japan viewed with special interest the idea proposed by Singapore in 1994 to hold a summit meeting between Asia and Europe. For the first time in the search of regional co-operative scheme in Asia, a structure of exclusively East Asian countries (minus the United States, Australia and New Zealand) appeared in the agenda. Despite the increased economic ties between Japan and its neighbouring East Asian countries, a lingering sense of unease continued to plague its political and security relations. ASEM with its comprehensive agenda including political and security dialogue offered an opportunity for Japan to step up overall relations with its East Asian neighbours in a less sensitive framework. Similarly, ASEM also offered an opportunity for Japan to rethink its relations with Europe.

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Japan’s Post-WWII Policy towards Europe Post-war relations between Japan and Europe began from chilly environment of adjustment to war time indemnity and reparations to accepting Japan into the fold of international society (the 1950s and the 1960s). It quickly moved to decades of trade conflicts (the 1970s and the 1980s), but at the beginning of the 1990s a new era toward political cooperation began. The growing economic power of the European Union, in contrast to Japan’s failure to overcome non-performing loans and revive its deflationary economy in the l990s, took the heat off the trade disputes. The end of the Cold War contributed to the stepped-up relations between Japan and the EU. Japan saw in Europe a region with which it can share common values of democracy, market economy and peace. In July 1991 Japan and the EC adopted a Joint Declaration that emphasized JapanEurope co-operation not only in economic but also in a wide range of political, security, and socio-cultural issues. But concrete steps toward cooperation in wider arena other than economics progressed very slowly. Perhaps the first Japanese involvement in European politics and security was its acceptance in 1992 as a non-member state in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) (this evolved into the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe [OSCE] in 1994) during the Helsinki Summit Meeting. Japan was officially accepted as a Partner for Co-operation, and since then has been invited to major conferences with the right to speak but without voting rights. Japan also began sending lecturers and making financial contributions for seminars within the OSCE. The idea of holding Asia-Europe summit meeting must also be seen against this backdrop with regards to Japan’s increasing engagement with Europe. Engaging in ASEM thus allows Japan not only to step up intraAsian co-operation, but it also offers an additional framework for Japan to strengthen and widen political, economic and cultural co-operation with Europe. Also starting from the mid-1990s, Japan began considerable efforts to enhance bilateral relationships with major European countries through a series of action agendas. But things did not proceed as expeditiously as Japan wanted. Therefore co-operation with Europe through a multilateral forum like ASEM was heavily emphasized. Both in the Japan-UK Action Agenda in December 1995 and its revised form of the New Action Agenda for a Special Partnership in September 1996, promotion of Asia-Europe

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regional co-operation, including ASEM co-operation, was highlighted. The revised Action Agenda for the Japan-Germany Partnership in October 1997 singled out as one of the five major areas for co-operation, “Cooperation in Asia-Europe relations such as ASEM”. As for France, JapanFrance 20 Actions for the Year 2000 adopted in November 1996 included as its nineteenth action for co-operation, “contribution toward successful implementation of ASEM”.

Japan’s Embrace of ASEM Japan’s embrace of ASEM and the benefits accrued to it can therefore be examined from two perspectives — from its desire to partake more actively in an emerging East Asian Community, and its development of a multipronged approach toward Europe to deepen ties with the various EU member states. From the latter part of the 1990s East Asian co-operation gained further momentum probably not foreseen when leaders of ASEAN + 3 (APT) and the EU met in the inaugural ASEM summit in Bangkok in 1996. The trigger element was probably the Asian financial crisis, which engulfed East Asia in 1997 and 1998. Japan’s Ministry of Finance made a most proactive proposal to create a new Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) to supplement the existing International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, because of U.S.’ objection, the idea was aborted. Still by the end of 1998, Japan committed around US$80 billion of economic assistance in helping fellow East Asian countries. Amidst this financial crisis, ASEAN leaders during their summit meeting in December 1997 invited leaders from China, South Korea and Japan to an informal ASEAN + 3 (APT) meeting. Since then, the ASEAN + 3 process has gathered pace and co-operation developed fast. Tangible result already emerged at the second meeting of the ASEAN + 3 Finance Ministers’ Meeting in Chiang Mai, Thailand in 2000 to create a network of bilateral emergency currency swap accords. Known as the Chiang Mai initiative, several bilateral swap agreements have now been concluded. By early 2003 Japan had concluded such accords with Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, China and Indonesia, and negotiations with Singapore are ongoing.3 What was even more remarkable was that the ASEAN + 3 meeting offered Japan the opportunity to reach out to its two Northeast Asian

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neighbours, China and South Korea, in a low-key but politically symbolic gesture. During the 1999 ASEAN + 3 Leaders’ Meeting in Manila, Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi invited leaders from China and Korea for a breakfast meeting. Prime Minister Obuchi’s tenacious endeavour to create a gathering of the three Northeast Asian leaders came true.4 Given the complexity of relations with these two countries, for many Japanese, the harmonious images of the informal gathering of China, Japan and Korea televised from Manila in the morning of 28 November 1999 evoked a great sigh of relief. It also brought hopes that better co-operation can be forged among these three Northeast Asian countries. Japan’s improving relations with its East Asian neighbours in the mid 1990s to late 1990s and its efforts to strengthen the East Asian community faced several new challenges in the beginning of the twenty-first century. First, it was Japan’s relations with the United States. In principle, Japan’s stronger relations with East Asian countries are compatible and complementary to having solid security and economic ties with the United States. But because Japan’s efforts in strengthening its relations with East Asian countries are based on Japan’s mid-to-long term interests, when a security issue of immediate importance explodes, attentions to such matters of mid-to-long term interests cannot but be put slightly in the backdrop. Thus the events after 9/11, the war in Iraq, and North Korean nuclear posturing, exposed Japan upfront to security matters of real priority. In particular, continued belligerence from the North Koreans and the heightened tensions in the Korean peninsula created a sense of crisis that forced the Japanese to focus on a more self-assertive defence policy which resulted in strengthened security ties with the United States. The Koizumi government in principle reacted adequately to respond to these new security concerns. But inevitably, his attentions were somewhat diverted away from East Asian economic and political scenery.5 Second, it was Japan’s competition with China. China’s economic development from the end of the 1970s based on its policy of “reform and opening” began to take on an amazing tempo from the 1980s onwards. Political tension rose after the Tiananmen Square incident but toward the end of the 1990s China’s external policy became more co-operative, flexible and pro-active. Japan should be given credits in avoiding China’s isolation and persuading it toward a greater engagement through the 1990s, but at the same time stronger anti-Chinese mood has emerged inside Japan in the latter part of the 1990s.

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In the early 2000s following the failure of the WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle, a new wave toward conclusion of bilateral and sub-regional Free Trade Agreements (FTA) emerged in the Asia-Pacific. China responded strategically by offering to start free trade negotiations with ASEAN. This policy was in line with China’s enhanced policy toward greater harmonization both economically and politically with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. In autumn 2001 China and ASEAN reached a basic agreement to conclude a FTA in ten years time, that is before 2010. To show China’s goodwill, an early harvest in some agricultural products was offered to the ASEAN countries. Japan was also engaged in the game of bilateral and plurilateral FTAs. However, the sensitivity of its agricultural sector has slowed the pace and the commitments it can make. Not surprisingly, Japan concluded its first FTA in the Asia-Pacific region with Singapore, which does not have an agricultural sector. The Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement (JSEPA) was concluded in 2001 and came into effect in 2002.6 Japan was, however, more hesitant in its offer towards ASEAN, and was severely criticized by some ASEAN leaders for its delay in expanding its regional economic ties and its commitment to ASEAN. Third, it was Japan’s controversial initiative to include Australia and New Zealand as part of the East Asian community. In 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi made his trip to Singapore in January and to Australia and New Zealand in May and made respectively major policy speeches, in which he outlined two notions: first, that Australia and New Zealand must become core countries of the East Asian community, and second, that East Asian community should develop its relations with other regions through APEC toward the Pacific and ASEM toward Europe. The two points were deeply interwoven. Koizumi’s ideas embodied in the two speeches seem to be the following: (a) East Asian regional co-operation is becoming important; (b) but it must not stay as an exclusively Asian co-operation and Australia and New Zealand should become an integral part; and (c) East Asian community is becoming so substantial that the historic notion of “Asia-Pacific cooperation” has now lost its meaning, and East Asia should develop its regional co-operation with Asia-Pacific countries through APEC, and with European countries through ASEM. There is some wisdom in underlining the openness and nonexclusivity of East-Asian regional co-operation, and geopolitically Japan

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might have an advantage in having Australia and New Zealand within the East Asian community in order to counterbalance China’s growing influence. But there are equally critical views inside Japan as well as from other East Asian partners against Koizumi’s proposal to include Australia and New Zealand. However, at the end of 2003, Japan managed to overcome some of these new problems and challenges, and revive its more proactive policy towards East Asia. At the ASEAN + 3 meeting in Bali in October 2003 a historic Joint Declaration by Japan, China and South Korea was signed. Against the background of thorny relations with China and South Korea on issues related to WWII, the statement included in this Declaration “future-oriented co-operation in variety of areas”7 is noteworthy. Greater sense of trust is slowly developing through this multilateral co-operation at the fringe of the ASEAN + 3 process. Another important development took place in the context of JapanASEAN relations. Japan and ASEAN leaders met in December in Tokyo to celebrate thirty years of ASEAN-Japan partnership. It was the first historic meeting where all ASEAN leaders travelled to a country outside the organization and held a summit meeting. In the Declaration adopted then, East Asian co-operation under the framework of APT was amply underlined as follows: Heads of States of Japan and ASEAN recognize that the ASEAN Plus Three process as an important channel to promote co-operation and regional economic integration networks in East Asia to attain the goals of sustainable development and common prosperity; and seek to build an East Asian community which is outward looking, endowed with the exuberance of creativity and validity and with the shared spirit of mutual understanding and upholding Asian traditions and values, while respecting universal rules and principles.8

In the latter half of the 1990s, Japan tried to step up a number of bilateral ties. Bilateral action agendas with the UK, Germany and France were concluded, but things did not proceed as expeditiously as Japan wanted. Therefore the pursuit of co-operation with Europe through the broader perspective of Japan-Europe and Asia-Europe became a conscientious approach of Japan’s policy towards the EU and its member states. First, so as to conceptualize the wider framework of Japan-Europe cooperation, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (JMOFA) developed a

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new notion of “cross support”. This in essence means that Japan would become more involved in issues with a security dimension to the Europeans, in return for Europe’s greater involvement in issues of security implications to Japan. This is best reflected concretely in Japan’s humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to former Yugoslavia in return for the European Union’s contribution to the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) aimed at defusing the nuclear crisis in the Korean peninsula. This is an issue which certainly touched the heart of Japan’s security but at the same time with a wider bearing on the whole of East Asia. After the framework agreement was reached between the United States and North Korea in October 1994, America, South Korea and Japan signed an agreement in 1995 to launch KEDO, which the EU joined in 1997. Japan’s assistance to former Yugoslavia was tied closely with European efforts, and amounted to almost US$1 billion. Second, co-operation between Japan and the OSCE developed, though small in magnitude, toward an imaginative direction involving Asian perspectives. In December 2000 in Tokyo, Japan and the OSCE held the first Joint Conference on “Comprehensive Security in Central Asia — Sharing OSCE and Asian Experiences”. Five Central Asian states, very much Asian in their culture and tradition but as full members of the OSCE, basically a European organization, sent their representatives to Japan to partake in this important conference. The most interesting part of the discussions during the conference developed around the issue of “human rights”. Central Asian countries did not hide the fact that they were perplexed at being overwhelmed by such “Western” values as “human rights” in the short period after their independence in 1992. Delegations from Europe, America, and international organizations pleaded for the necessity of protecting “human rights”, by each expressing its position with delicate and different nuances. Japan took a position somewhere in the middle, and worked hard to bridge the differences in positions on the human rights issue and develop a consensus view, taking into consideration the delicate and different nuances.9 In March 2004 the second Japan-OSCE conference was held with an even greater tinge of Asia-Europe co-operation. That Japan-OSCE conference concerning conflict prevention was held on the eve of an ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Workshop held on the same subject. Participants from the ARF workshop joined in the Japan-OSCE conference,

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and a unique informal dialogue meeting was held just in between the two conferences by all participants of the Japan-OSCE and ARF workshop meetings. ARF participants were expected to profit from comparisons of differing security circumstances in the wake of the Cold War and also from joint efforts in combating international terrorism and other new threats.10 As a part of multifaceted efforts in enhancing Japan-Europe relations, the EU-Japan Summit in December 2001 in Brussels adopted a new Action Plan for EU-Japan Co-operation. It noted Japan’s and EU’s support of “cross-regional links of co-operation, for example, through ASEM and the OSCE”.11 All these developments show Japan’s desire in enhancing substantial ties with Europe, but also the fact that a single all-embracing solution in achieving that purpose does not exist. Thus, through the prism of Asia-Europe co-operation, ASEM has constantly been seen as a mechanism where Japan can consolidate its relations with Europe.

Japan’s Contribution to ASEM Activities ASEM is the only organization where a sort of East-Asian community has coalesced as East Asian members of ASEM meet and co-ordinate more with one another before the ASEM meetings take place with the European partners. The ASEAN + 3 process has further strengthened this emerging East Asian community. The role of ASEM in strengthening the need to be more outward-looking even when building an East Asian community cannot be under-estimated. At the same time ASEM is a unique organization where Japan can strengthen its European ties through the prism of Asia. Thus Japan tried to become an active partner in ASEM activities since it was founded in 1996. Several examples are outlined below: Japan participates actively in various ASEM activities.12 Examples of Japan-led concrete projects in ongoing ASEM activities may not be spectacular but they reflect the belief that day-to-day continuous cooperation and small steps taken each time are the best way to consolidate long-term ties and co-operation: Within the Trade Facilitation Action Plan (TFAP), Japan became the facilitator for the Working Group on “Harmonization of custom procedures” and is making positive contributions toward the improvement of custom data and the deepening of mutual knowledge on this subject; within the Investment Promotion

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Action Plan (IPAP), Japan has continuously fulfilled the role of a “shepherd” on the Asian side, and a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) seminar was organized in Tokyo co-sponsored with France in May 2004; Upon Prime Minister Koizumi’s initiative a symposium on educational exchange was held in November 2003, and as a follow-up, a database concerning higher educational exchanges between Europe and Asia is being studied at the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF). Japan also played an active role at the various ASEM summits and Foreign Ministers’ Meetings to adopt such statements to answer key questions which Asia and Europe were then facing: In February 1997 at the first Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, a Chairman’s Statement was adopted concerning terrorists activities at the Japanese embassy in Peru; In April 1998 at the second London summit, a statement concerning Asian financial and economic situation was adopted; In September 2002 at the fourth Copenhagen summit, a political declaration concerning Peace in the Korean peninsula was adopted; In July 2003 at the Fifth Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, another political declaration was adopted concerning prevention of proliferation of WMD and its transportation. It was regrettable that Foreign Minister Kawaguchi was unable to attend the Sixth Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Dublin in April 2004 because of the hostage crisis in Iraq. However, Japan had been actively co-ordinating those papers adopted in that meeting, such as “Recommendations for ASEM Working Methods — Proposals for FMM6”, “Concept Paper on ASEM Infoboard”, and “Use of the ASEM Logo Guidelines”; Toward the fifth summit meeting in Hanoi in autumn 2004, Japan is preparing a declaration to further enhance economic relations between Asia and Europe, based on the report to be made by the ASEM Taskforce on Closer Economic Partnership, established at the fourth ASEM summit in 2002, and in which Mr. Gyoten from Japan is playing the role of a co-chairman. The single important event which took place between the fourth and fifth ASEM summits is the war in Iraq and the issue of American unilateralism. ASEM Declaration on Multilateralism adopted in April 2004 at the sixth Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Dublin clearly reflects the acute interests by ASEM partners on this matter. Japan supported President Bush and sent its troop for reconstruction in Iraq. It was an action which went a clear step forward toward greater participation in issues related to global security, but at the same time, Japan has continuously maintained the importance of the United Nations as a body

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to resolve global security crises. On a personal note, Japan is in an ideal position in ASEM to lead the discourse on these matters, particularly with European member countries. But the enlargement issue related to Myanmar is probably the most important agenda which Japan has encountered as an Asian co-ordinator, and in which Japan has been tested whether it can play the role of an effective interlocutor, representing and defending the East Asian community while conducting a useful and convincing dialogue with European partners. Myanmar has a dictatorial regime in which human rights are derogated, or not protected to the level of advanced democracies in Europe, the United States or even Japan. The Asian side maintains that in considering the question of enlargement at the fifth summit meeting in Hanoi, all non-ASEM members of ASEAN, that is, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar have to be admitted. European countries maintain that Myanmar cannot be accepted because of the human rights issue, while considering that all new ten members of EU have to be accepted as new members. The Asian side does not object to the ten new EU members entering ASEM, but considers that new ASEAN members, including Myanmar, have to be accepted unconditionally. At the time of writing this chapter, no consensus was yet reached. The human rights issue is an important but not an easy subject. It goes to the heart of democracy. Without a basic respect of human rights, democracy will not be sustained. To that extent, all democracies share basically the same understanding and value judgement. But in the process of its actual realization, there are differences in approach, tempo and degree of urgency. Japan’s position on democracy in Myanmar needs careful scrutiny, but perhaps the best way for its understanding is to quote Ms. Taeko Takahashi, Director of the First East-Asia Division in JMOFA in charge of Myanmar, from her interview which appeared at the JMOFA homepage, dated September 2002: If you analyse each country’s position vis-à-vis Myanmar, there are roughly three categories. First, Europe and the U.S. spearheaded the criticism against Myanmar. These countries considered that the establishment of democracy and respect for basic human rights are of primary importance and support economic sanctions and policy of pressure. Second, ASEAN and China strongly maintain non-interference to internal matters. Myanmar joined in ASEAN in 1997 and since then EU has long rejected dialogue with ASEAN, but ASEAN persisted in its position of non-interference on internal matters

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by refraining from open criticisms on Myanmar. Japan belongs to Asia but is not sharing that position. Japan has its third position. Japan is an Asian country but as a member of G-8, shares its view that respect of human right[s] and establishment of democracy are a prerequisite for a nation’s stable development, based on its own experience. Japan therefore asked Myanmar, our Asian friend, to respect these values. But as Japan had its own process commensurate with its development process, Myanmar has its own process, and it is important that Myanmar acts autonomously. In addition, there are many people in Japan who share a sense of intimacy with Myanmar. I understand that this is due to the experience during WWII and the fact that Myanmar touches upon the hearts of many Japanese as a common Buddhist-based country. Thus Japan, based on its own experience and its relations with Myanmar takes a position to encourage democratization, quietly and consistently, granting assistance which people of Myanmar needs, without resorting to economic sanctions.13

In the whole process of post-WWII diplomacy, Japan believed that it had something to say regarding the importance of human rights, based on its own experience in post-war democracy and even on pre-war Taisho democracy. But Japan’s position has always been relatively mute, because Japan was aware of her lingering war-responsibility issues and was reluctant to preach to others about democracy and what form other countries should pursue. But should Japan pronounce its own vision of democracy, it could not but be accompanied with certain humility, because Japan realized through her own experience that protecting human rights was a difficult task and that each country had to find its own way. As Ms. Takahashi’s statement above shows, Japan’s policy toward Myanmar’s democratization is to seek a third way. This policy urges Myanmar’s unconditional acceptance in ASEM in this autumn, or in other words, an active policy of engagement rather than isolation in order to achieve the ultimate purpose of democratization in Myanmar. Myanmar’s acceptance in ASEM has become a test case whether Japan’s proactive engagement policy would bear a positive result along the direction which Japan wants to shape the world.

Eurasian Perspective The last perspective, which Japan might consider and take some leadership in ASEM, is to develop ASEM as an organization with greater geopolitical perspective. This agenda clearly belongs to the future, but as the shape of

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a post-Cold War era is still fluid, and the age of globalization under the post-9/11 world is filled with uncertainties, it may not be counterproductive to be, on a personal basis, a little imaginative. From the time of its establishment, ASEM was born with a fundamental question as to how to define “Europe” and “Asia”. ASEM has given an answer out of political expediency then. But in considering ASEM’s future, there is another outstanding issue, to which hardly any attention is given now. That is the question of a true Eurasian perspective, or in other words, the perspective of looking into the huge geographical mass, which lies between Europe and Asia that is the Russian Federation. In the latter part of the 1990s there was a brief period when the relationship between ASEM and Russia was lightly discussed among the countries concerned. From the Russian point of view, from the time of its establishment of ASEM there was a natural desire to become a part of it. Given its self-labelled identity that Russia is a country which spreads from West to East or from Europe to Asia, as its state symbol of a double-headed eagle shows, a prestigious international gathering between Europe and Asia without Russian presence could not be justified. But precisely because of this Russian dual identity, there occurred a dilemma for Russia from which side should they better file their application. During the HashimotoYeltsin honeymoon period14 before the London ASEM summit in April 1998, there emerged an idea, probably more due to expediency than principle, that Russia filed its wishes to join ASEM from the Asian side. Although Japan floated this proposal to its Asian counterparts, the idea then did not get general support. Russia is probably more European than Asian. But among the experts concerned there emerged some preliminary discussion that, should Russia join ASEM, the only viable option was to give Russia a special status with a recognition of their dual identity between Europe and Asia. The discussion waned after President Putin came to power in early 2000.15 But in the geopolitical landscape after 9/11, we have seen in Europe and East Asia some interesting development in expanding further communication through the Eurasian continent. This means Russia cannot be ignored. One example is the question of the railroad linkage between East Asia and Europe. The ASEM Symposium on an Iron-Silk Road to be held in Seoul in June 2004 must be a timely and stimulating occasion to discuss this issue.16

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The rapprochement between North and South Korea in 2000 opened a new possibility to link their railroad between Seoul and Sinuiju, a border town facing China at the North Korean frontier.17 Kazakhstan agreed in March 2004 to build a US$3.5 billion, 1,900-mile (864-kilometre) rail project linking China to Western Europe.18 Russia has been alerted and acted energetically to create another link between the North-South linkage with the Trans-Siberian railroad from Pusan19 or from Seoul through Wonsan, a port located at the east coast of North Korea.20 Vladimir Volkov underlines the seriousness of this issue for the Russians by quoting President Putin’s statement in August 2002 that “Russia must help in constructing a TransKorean rail network, if only because China would do it otherwise.”21 Can Japan take any proactive initiative so that ASEM considers these crucial geopolitical issues from a Eurasian perspective? Former Prime Minister Hashimoto, in July 1997, in the wake of the Madrid NATO Summit which decided its first eastward expansion and resolved the most difficult post-Cold War security issue in the trans-Atlantic context, stated that, “at such an historical period of transition, have we not reached a time when we must introduce a new dynamism into our nation’s foreign policy by forging a perspective of a Eurasian diplomacy viewed from the Pacific?”22

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My thanks to former colleagues in JMOFA who shared with me some of the working papers in their preparation toward ASEM Summit in Hanoi in autumn 2004. Akiko Fukushima, Japanese Foreign Policy, the Emerging Logic of Multilateralism. Houndmills: Macmillan, 1999, p. 147. , 18 July 2003. Kon Gno Myon, “Shidoshano Shutugen Matsu Higashiajia” [East Asia which Awaits the Appearance of a Leader], Asahi Shinmbun, 21 April 2004. Yoichi Funabashi writes in his columns in Asahi Shinbun that Japan must direct much more serious attention toward Asia: “Koizumi Gaikou, Datsuakara Nyuuahe” [Koizumi’s Foreign Policy, from Exit-Asia to Entry-Asia], 13 November 2003; “TAC Ajaheno Kakugo” [TAC, a Resolve Toward Asia], 11 December 2003. Chris Hughes argues that Japan “is actually losing some very important opportunities to play a greater role in the East Asia region”

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because of “a real energy of Japan’s security policy going to the U.S.-led multilateral coalition of the willing” (Takashi Kitazume, Japan Times, 19 March 2004). , 20 October 2002. Precisely ten years had passed since February 1992 when the Treaty of Maastricht was signed in Europe, and December of the same year when the NAFTA was signed by America, Canada and Mexico. Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite Co-operation among Japan, the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Korea, II,2 , 27 October 2003. 2.(6) of the “Tokyo Declaration for the Dynamic and Enduring Japan-ASEAN Partnership in the New Millennium” . This description is based on author’s experience in organizing and attending that conference. From the Keynote speech by Senior Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Masatoshi Abe “Search for Effective Conflict Prevention under New Security Circumstances” . An Action Plan for EU-Japan Co-operation, Brussels 2001, “Shaping Our Common Future”, para. 6 , 24 April 2004. Analysis in this section is based on JMOFA working documents toward ASEM Summit in Hanoi in autumn 2004. Interview with Ms. Taeko Takahashi, Director of the First East-Asian Division: “Ajiano Kyoudai Myanma to Watashitachi, Minshukahe Muketeno Marason” [Asian Brother Myanmar and Us, a Marathon toward Democratization], pp. 1–2 , 19 April 2004. Relations between Japan and Russia warmed up from 1997 to 1998 under Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Yeltsin and series of summit meetings were held in Denver, Krasnoyarsk and Kawana. Serious negotiations were conducted on peace treaty, economic co-operation developed and co-operation in international relations expanded. This observation is based on the author’s experience in JMOFA. Chairman’s Statement at the Sixth Foreign Minister’s Meeting in Dublin, April 2004. , 24 April 2004. JDA, Bouei Hakusho 2002 [Defence White Paper 2002], p. 49.

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“China Moves Toward Another West: Central Asia”. New York Times, 28 March 2004. Gilbert Rozman, “Russian Foreign Policy in Northeast Asia”, in The International Relations of Northeast Asia, edited by Samuel S. Kim. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2003, p. 213. Naomi Koizumi, “Roshiano Tai-Iran, Iraku, Kitachousen Seisaku” [Russian Policy toward Iran, Iraq and North Korea], in “9.11 Jiken-igono Roshiagaikouno Tenkai” [Russian Foreign Policy after 9/11], edited by Hiroaki Matsui, JIIA, 2003, pp. 111–12. Vladimir Volkov, “Russia: A Railroad Deal Lies behind Putin’s Meeting with North Korean Leader”. World Socialist Web Site, 19 September 2002, p. 2 , 29 February 2004. , 24 April 2004.

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11 Korea and ASEM David Camroux and Park Sunghee

On 21 October 2000, Kim Dae Jung, the then president of the Republic of Korea (hereafter South Korea) declared boastfully that third Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) had ended with unprecedented success. In his Chairman’s Statement he claimed that all of the twenty-five leaders recognized it as a historic milestone in the evolution of the ASEM process.1 French President Jacques Chirac, who held then the six-month rotating presidency of the European Union (EU), congratulated South Korea enthusiastically and pointed out that the Seoul meeting had laid a foundation for a balanced development of relations between the world’s three major pillars: Asia, Europe and North America. He emphasized that ASEM provided an important momentum towards bringing balance to what he hoped would be a multipolar international system. Kim Dae Jung, reiterated similar remarks in the closing news conference claiming that “through this meeting, Asia and Europe were able to solidify the partnership for prosperity and stability in the new millennium”.2 Elsewhere in the South Korean capital, Seoul police congratulated themselves on the handling of the two-day summit, which some had feared could turn into a focal point for anti-globalization protests.3 There

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were indeed unprecedented scuffles during several anti-ASEM protests and marches by thousands of students, participants from civil society and trade unionists, watched by thousands of baton-wielding riot police. With the benefit of hindsight it could be said that the parallel summit held along with ASEM 3 marked another historic milestone for the antiglobalization movement. Musing on the ASEM, it could easily be asked: “Is it this country that won the Nobel Peace Prize?” These striking images outside the ASEM venue, contrasted with those within, where leaders were feeling more relaxed to talk about prosperity and stability in Europe and Asia in a festive atmosphere occasioned by President Kim’s winning of the Nobel Peace Prize, remind us of the contemporary history of South Korea. Authoritarian governments have dominated South Korea since independence in 1945 and human rights concerns were ignored under the name of prosperity and stability for more than twenty-five years. It was only in 1997 that the head of opposition party beat the ruling party and achieved the first peaceful transfer of power through a presidential election. Nevertheless such reflections may not make Koreans happy, for many wanted to show through the holding of the ASEM summit that South Korea had a mature democracy commensurate with its status as an economic powerhouse. The holding of the summit was also seen as way of paying a symbolic farewell to the 1997–98 economic crisis and as providing an opportunity to garner European support for Kim Dae Jung”s policy towards North Korea. Taking these factors into consideration, we would suggest that since its inception, South Korea found more political and diplomatic interest — rather than an economic one — in the ASEM process, which was seen by South Koreans as one of opportunities where it could raise its own international profile. Hence the ASEM 3 Summit meeting was thought of as an international “public relations” event in the same token as the 1988 Olympic Games and the 2002 World Football Cup. The ASEM Summit meeting in general was viewed as being of similar international standing to a prestigious gathering like the G-8 where Korea is not a member. This was not always the case. At the beginning, the South Korean interest in ASEM was based on the appreciation that ASEM should counterbalance APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation) in the economic domain. However quite rapidly the focus shifted to obtaining European support for its North Korean policy, support that it had failed to receive from the United States.

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The first section of this chapter presents ASEM in the context of EUKorea relations. The second section examines South Korea’s ASEM diplomacy, giving particular emphasis on how Korea internationalized its North Korea agenda successfully from ASEM 1 to ASEM 4. It was highlighted as the entry of the EU into the scene where the United States has been playing the main role as traditional security power in Asia.4 Seen from Seoul, for both practitioners and observers, while South Korea perhaps lacks the weight to alter the balance of power in East Asia, it could play a key advocacy role for EU interests in the region.5 As the European Commission claimed in one of its communications, today’s relationship between South Korea and the EU is founded on increasingly shared political values, strong economic links reflecting strong bilateral trade and investment flows and the EU’s repeated support for South Korea’s “Sunshine” policy of engagement with the North.6 South Korea may be the pivotal actor in future developments in the ASEM process if it succeeds in generating a common interest from ASEM members focused on North Korea related issues. Despite political changes in South Korea, an overriding concern in Seoul, it would appear, is to keep alive the EU’s willingness to be involved in the Korean peninsula. In order to achieve this objective a South Korean political leadership needs to play a proactive role in agenda setting and the establishment of implementation strategies.

ASEM within the Larger Context of EU-Korea Relations As Brian Bridges has argued, the legacies of historical experiences during the centuries of European colonial involvement in Asia and, not least, the way in which these experiences have been interpreted and reinterpreted in recent decades, are an important element underpinning the contemporary relationship between Europe and Asia.7 Compared to Japan and China, Korea largely escaped European interest from the beginning of sixteenth century through to the middle of the nineteenth century.8 Further on in the twentieth century, we would suggest, Korea largely escaped from European interest until the early nineties. Korea remained outside the zone of European colonial competition in Asia once it came under Japanese colonization in 1910, which only ended with Japan’s unconditional surrender on 15 August 1945. And a United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) was formed in

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January 1946 and ruled Korea for three years.9 The Republic of Korea (ROK) was established on 17 July 1948 with a U.S.-backed general, Syngman Rhee, as its president. Since then Korea has been within the sphere of interests of the United States. All U.S. administrations have defined the security of the Korean peninsular as being important to the security of the post-war order in the Pacific region, one which was vital to American security.10 To return to our previous argument, if we acknowledge the lingering impact of a colonial factor in current EU-Asia relations, it is not surprising to find that South Korea has a close relationship with Japan and the United States while the EU-Korea relation remained modest. It could be argued that the logic of colonial links of member states has dominated the EU’s relations with third countries, for example, putting the Asian and Latin American countries together into the same category, the so-called ALA (Asia and Latin America). In that context, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) has developed a closer relationship with the EU, undoubtedly facilitated by the colonial legacy of all of its members (except for Thailand) with four major European countries, namely Britain, France, the Netherlands and Spain. The then European Economic Community (EEC) and ASEAN established a first institutional contact in the early 1970s. The initiative for an institutional link came from the ASEAN side in 1972 driven by an understandable concern by its two Commonwealth members, Malaysia and Singapore, about market access following a loss of preferences occasioned by Britain’s membership of the EC.11 In this light, without the vestiges of colonial responsibility or a special interest from any member state, South Korea kept a low profile in the EU’s external relations until very late in the twentieth century. Till the 1990s, the EU-Korea relationship had long been characterized by a concern with aid and trade than with politics and security. In the 1960–70s, South Korea, governed by an authoritarian regime perpetuating serious human rights abuses, was generally treated like a poor Third World country not much different from North Korea, a communist country. The EU’s economic relations with South Korea, were the last in East Asia to be formalized through formal agreements, whereas those with Japan, China and the ASEAN have formal arrangements dating from the 1960s and 1970s. Relations with South Korea began with the setting up of an EC Chamber of Commerce in Seoul in 1986, which was soon followed by an EC delegation office, established in 1989.12 In our view the EC Chamber of

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Commerce is certainly one of the most influential in East Asia, dominating those of individual European countries and competing with the EC delegation to be “the” European voice in Seoul. The surge in South Korean exports to the European Community (EC) did not really begin until the mid-1980s, after which a considerable increase in exports occurred: total exports to the EC of US$8.8 billion in 1988 were more than triple those of 1985. But in the early 1990s exports levelled off and hovered around the US$9–US$10 billion mark, before beginning to rise again in 1994, reaching US$14.1 billion in 1996. In 1993, faced with this remarkable development of EC/EU-South Korea economic relations, European Commission Vice-President and Trade Commissioner, Sir Leon Brittan, noted that the developing bilateral trade and economic relations with South Korea were favourable for the EU.13 On the political level, South Korea’s awareness of the EU was increased by the negotiation of the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in 1994 when South Korean diplomats actively sought a stronger relationship with the EU.14 When the South Korean Government negotiated to conclude a framework agreement with the EU in 1995, it soon agreed to attach a political declaration, which entered into force much earlier than the other aspects of the agreement itself. This agreement initialled shortly before the ASEM 1 was announced in Bangkok during the first summit.15 This agreement negotiated over a year between South Korea and the European Union initially concerned questions of trade and co-operation was extended over a year of negotiation in Luxembourg to cover environmental, energy, agro-fisheries, shipping, science and technology issues.16 Some analysts have argued that South Korean Government saw ASEM as an opportunity to diversify its foreign economic relations and as a way of aiding the global strategies of its chaebol multinationals, many of which had begun to invest heavily in Europe.17 For these chaebols, ASEM’s highly developed economic pillar has provided another window of economic opportunity in EU-South Korea relations. However if ASEM is seen merely as providing further economic opportunity for South Korea, this analysis would be rather short-sighted and limited in order to understand the reality of ASEM where various actors are interacting in terms of multilevel governance in EU-South Korea relations. The economic achievements of South Korea, in terms of trade and foreign direct investments with the European Union (EU), are difficult to explain empirically and statistically in direct relation to the ASEM process. Hence it is problematical to tease

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out the main inputs and results of the ASEM process in EU-Korea economic relations since 1996. To simplify for South Korea, as indeed for all Asian countries, it is extremely difficult to evaluate the “added value” of ASEM to the underlying economic, political and social developments in EUSouth Korean relations. In our view, ASEM should be interpreted within the broader context of EU-Korea relations and, in particular, on the one hand, by referring to the Korean peninsula’s unique position in the broader geopolitical context and, on the other, by the EU’s role as an “incomplete” international actor, institutionally speaking, in Asia. For the South Korean Government, political and security considerations and interests were the cornerstone of the early rationale for ASEM. For its part, the European Commission also wished to give a genuine political dimension to EU-Korea relations. For example, in its Communication to the Council on relations between the EC and Korea of May 1993, the Commission stated that: “The Community should be prepared now to explore areas of co-operation with Korea and to start developing co-operative activities for the mutual benefit…Cooperation, however, go hand-in-hand with the overall development of EC/Korea trade and economic relations.” In this context, ASEM can be seen as providing another framework in which more co-operative EU-Korea economic relations can be nurtured.18 The creation of ASEM and South Korea’s support from its beginning should be resituated and reassessed within EU-South Korea’s maturing bilateral relations on the political and security sphere as well as in economic terms. Through ASEM, South Korea was able to strengthen its political and diplomatic presence in the EU — as a counterpoise to that in ASEAN — and to diversify its choice of foreign policy actors, beyond Japan and the United States, in relation to the Korean peninsula.

Korea’s ASEM Diplomacy: From KEDO to ASEM At ASEM 1 in Bangkok in 1996, Sir Leon Brittan declared that the EU would participate via the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) in the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO). As a board member of KEDO, EURATOM would contribute a sum of 75 million euros.19 The EU’s KEDO participation can be seen as the first visible engagement of the EU with Asia in the security field endorsed as a joint action within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy

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(CFSP) through the inter-governmental process of the second pillar.20 The EU’s declaratory statements, expressing general political interest contrasted with previous declarations, which had rarely endorsed real military or security actions in Asia. The security dimension of EU-Asia relations was previously broadly satisfied by EU participation as one of seven formal dialogue partners of ASEAN and a participant in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) since 1994.21 In this regard, the EU’s KEDO participation provided a new, if albeit limited, impetus to EU-Asia security relations for South Korea’s sake. KEDO was formally inaugurated as an international consortium of Japan, South Korea and the United States on 9 March 1995 after the United States and North Korea had signed a framework agreement on 21 October 1994.22 During this period, relying on information from the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), EU members were divided over whether sanctions should be imposed on North Korea. At this stage, these three initial board members had started to find more financial support within the international community. In particular, Seoul kept up a constant campaign to gain a European contribution to KEDO.23 As we have previously argued, given the absence of a colonial heritage factor, strong economic interest and increased political awareness between the EU member states and South Korea must be seen as paramount in the KEDO case. Britain, the first European state to offer financial support of US$1 million in June 1995, played a key role in persuading some other reluctant EU member states and in their adopting of the first joint action of the CFSP in Asia in the European Council of 1996. In contrast to Britain, the Danes and the Swedes, for example, were worried about the nuclear safety angle, Germans about the potential liability problems, Austrians about compromising their neutrality and the French about the exact budget details.24 In fact strong political and economic interests rather than historical legacy pushed this security engagement of the EU in the Korean peninsular. The EU cast its decision to contribute financially in terms of the “high priority” that it attached to the full implementation of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) regime and its willingness to be politically engaged in Northeast Asia.25 In terms of economic interest, it was an important opportunity to sell the expertise of several European nations in nuclear power technology because companies from KEDO member countries would have preference in bidding for the remaining contracts not already allocated to the South Koreans.26 Thanks to KEDO for the first

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time, under article J.3 of the EU Treaty, the EU had become more visible and credible as a nuclear power, alongside the United States, in Asia. The role of the EU as a credible multilateral partner in terms of political and security co-operation was highlighted by the declaration of its KEDO participation at ASEM 1 in 1996. For South Korea’s sake, ASEM’s political dialogue including nuclear issues provided the EU with the rationale for being a regional power in Asia corresponding to the EU’s ambition of being an important international player.27 From the perspective of Seoul, South Korea’s experience working with the EU in KEDO opened a new dimension in the foreign policy of South Korea. It perceived the EU as a worthwhile partner with whom to engage in multilateral initiatives and ASEM as a useful forum in order to promote its national interests.

From Business Diplomacy to an Ever Closer Asia Richard Higgott, in arguing that the Asia financial crisis represented a watershed for ASEM, noted that the Asian crisis of 1997–98 in the long run may turn out to be more important for its symbolic legacy than its economic impact.28 However, while across the board for Asia this interpretation is justified, for South Korea the crisis had more implications than a symbolic legacy for it had a real material impact and, above all, led to fundamental changes in domestic and foreign policies. Most Koreans interpreted the crisis as revealing real political and social failures as well as being an economic disaster.29 After the collapse of currencies and stock exchanges in Thailand and Indonesia in late 1997, South Korea found itself in turn under the threat of national bankruptcy at a time when the capability of the lame duck administration of President Kim Young-Sam was questionable. Many South Koreans initially perceived the crisis as the “national disgrace” of 1997 comparing it to the forced repayment of national debts to Japan in 1907, a national humiliation that opened the door three years later to Japanese occupation.30 Rather than trying to find the fundamental causes for the crisis within South Korea itself this feeling was soon mixed with recriminations against the United States (another “occupier”) for not doing enough. In the meantime the Korean won had lost 40 per cent to 60 per cent of its value against the U.S. dollar since the beginning in July 1997. On the whole, Europeans have been subject to less direct criticism than others. For example, even though cumulatively the European states contributed a larger share financially to the IMF than the Americans, it has

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been the United States which has been cast in the villainous role as the “controller” of the IMF. The South Korean crisis was the one — more than that in Thailand and Indonesia — that seemed to wake up the EU, who ahead of the Japanese and the Americans, offered help in East Asia.31 Soon after crisis talks with the South Korean Central Bank governor in early 1998, some EU member states agreed to work out a roll-over solution which avoided a formal debt rescheduling.32 This is understandable given that, for example, German banks were heavily exposed in South Korea to the tune of some US$10.6 billion, French banks to US$10.1 billion and British banks to US$6.1 billion. By appearing to be constructive rather than gloating or uninterested, the Europeans could prove again to South Korea that they could be a useful friend for an Asian country in need.33 On assuming office, President Kim Dae-Jung who officially took power on 25 February 1998 introduced national reconstruction projects by restructuring the chaebol dominated economic system, rebuilding international confidence in the Korean economy, opening up the South Korean market to foreign competition, actively seeking foreign direct investment, etc. In this regard, ASEM 2 in London in April 1998 provided a first significant opportunity for President Kim Dae Jung to speak to an international audience. The South Korean Government highlighted ASEM 2 as its first successful exercise in “business diplomacy”, reemphasizing international support for its economic reforms. At this stage we would like to suggest that the Asian financial crisis had at least four positive impacts on South Korea. Firstly South Koreans came to perceive the ASEM process in a more pragmatic way when the ASEM 2 endorsed a British proposal for a network of experts to provide technical advice in the financial sector and the creation of an ASEM Trust Fund. This ASEM Trust Fund was created at the World Bank to help finance technical assistance and advice both on restructuring the financial sector and on finding effective ways to redress poverty.34 As of April 2002, South Korea had received $4,984,800 which is approximately 11.7 per cent of the US$43,453,450 total grant amount. Funds were 67 per cent allocated to the social sector and 33 per cent to the financial sector.35 In contrast to this positive view of ASEM, South Koreans felt that APEC was losing its momentum when the Vancouver APEC summit in November 1997 failed to generate any substantial assistance to Korea. Divisions over East Timor at the Auckland APEC summit in 1999

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demonstrated that the Asia-Pacific forum had serious problems of identity while it failed to provoke any positive interest from participants on its own economic liberalization objectives. The then Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad, and the then President of Indonesia B.J. Habibie were not present at this Seventh APEC summit meeting.36 Finally Korea reviewed its former position on ASEM — that it should keep its speed and scope up in parallel with APEC — and reconsidered its former view that the APEC method could be applied to ASEM.37 Secondly the Asian financial crisis changed Korea’s political and economic “landscape” both inside and outside, which in the long-term is favourable to the further development of an open market and, more importantly, in our normative view, democratization in South Korea. Kim Dae Jung’s embryonic national reunification policy required a greater regional and international dimension because South Korea no longer possessed ultimate economic leverage in relation to the North and began to realize the vulnerability of its own economy. This is of particular salience, for South Korea’s economic strength had previously been a source of soft power in implementing its own foreign policy agenda. Given these new parameters, the EU emerged as a constructive partner, who, in the context of South Korea’s own democratization process and economic liberalization programme, clearly seemed to share the same universal values on open markets and liberal democracy. On the “plus” side, from the South Korean perspective, the EU as a partner appeared much less worrying than the United States, in terms of changing rigid notions of sovereignty in the Korean peninsula. Thirdly the Asian financial crisis aroused in South Korea the urgent need to reinforce and institutionalize co-operation in East Asia. For example Sakong Il, the Korean member of ASEM Vision Group, claimed in May 2000 that “we need to have some kind of defence mechanism. Since not much is expected to be done at the global level, something should be done at the regional level”.38 But the term “East Asia Community” was avoided because it still reminded Koreans of the Greater East Asia Prosperity Zone of wartime Japan. Amongst contemporary developments unfolding before us, we would suggest that attention should be paid to South Korea’s attempt to play a key role in a putative “ASEAN + 3” community when President Kim Dae Jung suggested the formation of an East Asian Vision Group to look into the idea of an East Asian community.

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Fourthly, both as a result of the financial crisis and in terms of an exercise in learning, South Korea came to appreciate the ASEM process and its co-ordinating mechanisms as useful models for developing an “ever closer Asia” complementing its informal bilateral relations with Japan, China and the ASEAN countries with a regionally developed institutional framework. From the Seoul perspective, such a development would allow North Korea to engage internationally or at least, in Asia.

From Nobel Peace Prize to North Korea Leaving aside the ASEM political rhetoric of a multi-polar world and new Asia-Europe partnership, the ASEM 3 summit in Seoul provided the then South Korean administration with the international legitimacy that it was eager to acquire for President Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy, a positive engagement policy towards North Korea. The announcement of Mr Kim’s Nobel Peace Prize shortly before ASEM 3 contributed to making the meeting in fact a “Korean Summit” which involved adopting an unexpected official ASEM document, “the Seoul Declaration for Peace on the Korean Peninsular”. The Seoul declaration presented ambitious measures for improving relations with North Korea through dialogue, people-to-people exchange, and economic links as well as through the North Korean government’s participation in multilateral dialogue.39 However, in our view, as far as the EU, and in particular the European Commission, is concerned, ASEM 3 in Seoul was not much better than a political “nightmare” marred by the expressions in the practice of intergovernmentalism amongst EU member states. Contrary to the ASEM 1 summit in Bangkok in 1996, where the EU succeeded in securing a highlevel and broad consensus among all fifteen member states, with the European Commission playing an important brokering role,40 ASEM 3 testified to the limited powers of the Commission in international affairs. At the Seoul summit, the Commissioner of External Relations, Chris Patten, rapidly announced a series of measures including a 20 million euro aid package to develop farming in the North, the loosening of restrictions on North Korean textile exports, and the sending of EU experts to improve forestry, coal mining and management. However, he could not declare immediately the establishment of diplomatic ties with the North because the power of the EC in foreign policy making is still limited and it cannot exercise any initiative without the consensus support of all member states

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in certain areas. Underlying these limitations is traditional diplomatic protocol for the recognition of a country that only sovereign states can enjoy. In this particular case, for example, Spain, Britain and Germany announced that they would rapidly establish diplomatic relations with North Korea. The Netherlands was expected to follow suit while Italy, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Portugal and Sweden already had diplomatic relations with the North. In giving reasons for the unilateral German decision, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder insisted that opening an embassy in Pyongyang would make it easier to persuade North Korea to account for its human rights record and for its arms of mass destruction. On the Asian ASEM side, Japan remained alone firmly against North Korea, saying that it would not re-open its diplomatic ties without resolving the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by the North. ASEAN, for its part, had already declared its intention to include North Korea in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) reiterating its constructive engagement and confidence-building diplomacy practice. China welcomed the European initiatives and promised further co-operation with the Kim Dae Jung government on North Korea issues. Only French President Jacques Chirac refused to normalize France’s diplomatic relations with the North, reiterating his government’s position that France would establish ties with North Korea eventually, but only if North Korea remained committed to halting its nuclear programmes and improving its human rights behaviour.41 Acting within the mandate of its six-month rotating presidency of the EU, France blamed EU member states for their lack of unity and consensus. Nevertheless, the EU established diplomatic relations with North Korea on 4 May 2001 and all EU member states normalized their diplomatic ties with North Korea. Ireland officially announced its diplomatic establishment with the North in December 2003.42 France alone remained inflexible and firm against North Korea.43 Such a complex intra-European reality simply reinforced the notion of pragmatism in South Korea’s policy towards the EU and its member states. As previously mentioned, Korea came to perceive through ASEM that the EU is an ideal partner with whom it can engage in multilateral action. As noted in such cases as KEDO and the ASEM Trust Fund, the contribution of individual EU member states is based on national interest perceptions and depends on calculations of costs and benefits. In other words, the North Korean case cannot be exempted from the overriding logic of European integration over the last half century, where the national

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interest of individual member states always prevails over the larger general interest of the EU.

From North Korea to Iraq Former ASEM Counsellor in the European Commission, Michael Reiterer, has argued that North Korea and the Korean peninsula have always been on the agenda of political discussions between the EU and East Asia and were not a one-off event of ASEM 3.44 Nevertheless, an examination of the available literature would suggest, in our view, that dealing with instability in the Korean peninsula has never been one of the top priorities within the ASEM process. Certainly there was a lack of common concern and interest from Europe and Asia before 9/11. U.S. President George Bush’s State of the Union addresses of 29 January 2002 highlighted the difference between Europe and the United States concerning North Korean policies. In this infamous “axis of evil” speech he singled out North Korea, Iran and Iraq as rogue states and proliferators and therefore threats to world peace. In reply, France’s then foreign minister, Hubert Vedrine, said the caricature was “simplistic” and Joschka Fischer, Germany’s foreign minister responded that “we won’t be treated as satellites” in the war against terrorism. Chris Patten, the EU’s External Relations commissioner, summed up a common European perception of the Bush Administration by stating that America was going into “unilateral overdrive”.45 Well before 9/11 the European Union, first set out a coherent roadmap for its future relations with North Korea in the Council Conclusions on the Korean peninsula of July 1999. Welcoming the inter-Korean Summit in Pyongyang in June 2000 it adopted the Council Conclusions of 9 October and 20 November 2000 envisaging expanded assistance, engagement on non-proliferation issues and action to encourage respect for human rights and structural economic reform in North Korea. The Stockholm European Council meeting of 23–24 March 2001 agreed to enhance the role of the EU in support of peace, security, and freedom in the Korean peninsula. The EU made its historic troika mission to Pyongyang from 2 to 4 May 2001.46 During the visit the EU received a firm commitment from the North Korean leader, Kim Jung Il, to the inter-Korean Joint Declaration signed in 2000 maintaining a moratorium on missiles testing until at least until 2003. Since 1998, the EU has held five rounds of political dialogue with North

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Korea at the level of senior officials. After its first humanitarian intervention to cope with serious floods in North Korea in 1995, the EU has provided total aid worth around 393 million euros. 47 Finally the European Commission’s Country Strategy Paper for 2001-2004 sets out the strategic framework and objectives for technical assistance in North Korea concentrating on institutional support and capacity building, sustainable management and use of natural resources, and the development of a reliable and sustainable transport sector.48 In this European context, the South Korean Government initialled the draft and the ASEM foreign ministers meeting in Madrid in June 2002 reaffirmed its support for Korea’s Sunshine Policy.49 Finally ASEM 4 in Copenhagen in September 2002 adopted the Political Declaration for Peace on the Korean Peninsula. In the declaration, ASEM reconfirmed the importance of engaging North Korea in the international community through constructive dialogue delivering concrete progress and suggested the resumption of dialogue between the United States and North Korea.50 It is worth noting in this regard how South Korea actively pursued its national interest and effectively lobbied during the preparations for ASEM 4 in order to insert the suggestion on U.S.-North Korea dialogue into the declaration.

Concluding Remarks This chapter has attempted to analyze South Korea’s ASEM diplomacy giving emphasis to the increasing pragmatism and an over-arching concern to promote national interest as the hallmark of EU-South Korea relations. Brian Bridges has claimed that ASEM has added more complexity to EU-Asia relations that are already complex enough because the EU-level relationship with either individual countries or sub-regional organizations, such as ASEAN, is closely entangled with relationship between individual EU member states and those same Asia-Pacific partners. While we share his opinion, we do not think that complexity necessarily means greater difficulty. To offer some normative views, we would argue that, in particular, the EU-Korea relationship is a somewhat limited — and not fully exploited within conventional international relations dialectics — compared to the EU’s relationships in East Asia with Japan, China, and ASEAN. As

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previously mentioned, South Korea established its formal diplomatic relations with the EU in 1963 and only held the first EU-Korea bilateral summit meeting — some forty years later — at the margins of ASEM 4 in 2002. Till the mid-nineties, in general EU-Korea relations can be characterized more by economically determined anti-dumping and antisubsidy cases than by historical legacy and post-colonialism. Thus for Korea the “ASEM process — that is, concretely, defending unilateral interests within a multilateral context — has become a unique and irreplaceable political and diplomatic modus operandi with the EU. Since the beginning of the ASEM process in 1996, South Korean governments have built upon a traditional form of diplomacy centred on bilateral relations and have progressively discovered as a spin-off the notion of “an ever closer Asian” region. This development confers our experience as overall observers of the Asia-Europe dialectic: a much unappreciated aspect of the Asia-Europe “dialogue”, to use the appropriate jargon, has been to contribute to the ongoing process of the creation of an Asian community. Furthermore ASEM has been a valuable learning exercise for South Korean governments — and, we would add, civil society — involving various foreign policy actors such as individual nation states, ASEAN, the EU and, most important of all, ASEAN + 3. In this regard we feel that the attempts of the Kim Dae Jung administration and that of his successor Roh Moo-hyun, to be the mediating element in the “plus three” aspect of the equation, that is to position South Korea in relation to both China and Japan, only makes sense when seen in the wider international context involving major external actors, the United States and the European Union, the latter of which both is a supranational interlocutor and, at the same time, faute de mieux, a model for a putative East Asian Community. Because ASEM is a co-operative arrangement, primarily but not exclusively driven by governmental actors, striving to facilitate contacts in the political, economic/financial and cultural/people-to-people area, it has provided a broader locus for South Koreans to promote their broader national interests.51 In particular we would like to argue that Korea successfully took advantage of both the EU’s supranationalist and intergovernmentalist ways of functioning though the ASEM process. For example, South Korea succeeded in putting its North Korean concerns on the Asia-Europe inter-regional agendas by using ASEM effectively:

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ASEM 3 generated the Seoul Declaration for Peace on the Korean Peninsular and ASEM 4 produced the Political Declaration for Peace on the Korean Peninsular. Hence, thanks to the ASEM process, we feel that, in relative terms, South Korea strengthened the promotion of its national interest and improved its negotiating strength with the EU. As Simon Nuttall, a former EU diplomat and shrewd observer of EU-Asian relations has argued, South Korea fits into one of the third parties categories in relation to the EU: “Some third parties, while having a very clear idea of the state of affairs at any given time, nevertheless professed ‘faux naif’ bewilderment in an endeavour to draw diplomatic advantage from the Community’s uncertainties and ambiguities.”52 The South Korean Government posited dealing with North Korea as an interesting test where Europe and Asia could interact producing positive results for a common good. Both share interests in strengthening the EU’s engagement in Asia in the political and security fields.53 North Korea is indeed one of the areas where issues like civilian nuclear energy development, ballistic missile technology control, the human rights problems of political refugees and economic migrants, poverty reduction and sustainable development, etc. could, at least partially, be dealt within the fora engendered by the political, economic and cultural/social pillars of ASEM. However promising the positive engagement over the North Korean question may be for ASEM’s future, we cannot under-estimate its danger. Firstly, South Korea’s intention of reducing its financial burdens in relation to the North by engaging other international players through ASEM initiatives might have negative impacts in the long-term. South Korea’s engagement policy with North Korea is the result of compromise between its often proclaimed reunification objectives, and foreign policies as well as an attempt to square its economic and security interests. South Korean governments are ready and willing to share political leadership with the EU and even ASEAN as far as North Korea is concerned, going beyond the provision of financial support. Yet the exclusion of the EU from sixparty talks demonstrated the reluctance and shortcomings of a South Korean commitment to multilateralism and, to be frank, a somewhat disdainful view of the European Union’s real political clout. Secondly, the EU’s North Korea policies determined by the individual member states and the Commission could jeopardize the ASEM process

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because a supranational body, namely the European Commission, is both denied a leadership role and, could it do so, lacks the depth of expertise to assume such a role. As a result the member states different raison d’être and national interests remain paramount. France, for example, still stands firm against establishing official diplomatic ties with the North Korea on the grounds that it is premature to throw away this bargaining chip. In early 2004, British Prime Minister Tony Blair said that the United Nations would confront North Korea’s nuclear ambitions after dealing with the question of Iraq.54 In this sense, the “subsidiarity” role claimed for ASEM by Gerald Segal should be reformulated by asking the right question: how could EU members strategically transfer their power to the EU level in order that ASEM could do best and usefully intervene in North Korea related issues?55 Thirdly, as Davis Bobrow has argued, it is difficult for ASEM members to take meaningful collective action proactively, when North Korea represents a real threat, because all members have different national priorities, policy convictions, and domestic pressures particularly in relation to the United States.56 It was said that the EU felt both shocked and betrayed when North Korea admitted in December 2002 that it was developing a nuclear programme.57 Since then the EU has suspended all technical and financial assistance to North Korea and changed its North Korea policy from “constructive engagement” to a “wait and see” strategy, checking up on U.S. decisions before taking action. As Axel Berkofsky lamented, gone are the days when EU policymakers hoped that the advantage of being a “distant power” with no strategic interests and colonial legacy on the Korean Peninsula would enable the EU to act as a mediator between the United States and North Korea.58 From our perspective, both the limits of European influence and the salience of the ASEM process, in the affairs of the Korean peninsula, have become clear: when these are not coupled with the hard power of the United States, they come to nought.59 This rather salutary point being made, we would feel it is unfair to round on ASEM for what it failed to achieve for South Korea rather than for the added value it has brought to forms of South Korean international relations. In our view, South Korea might be a pivotal power in the future ASEM process on the condition that it succeeds in generating a common interest from ASEM members continually on North Korea related issues, in maintaining the EU’s willingness to be involved in the Korean peninsula, and in playing a leadership role in agenda setting and implementation.

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Korea and ASEM Chronology of EU-Korea Relations July 2004 June 2004 April 2004

Third EU-Korea Joint Committee held in Seoul ASEM Iron Silk Road Symposium held in Seoul DPRK Human Rights Resolution adopted at UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva 8th ASEM Business Forum in Seoul ASEM Customs Directors General and Commissioners Meeting in Seoul Council Conclusion on the Korean Peninsula EU Declaration on the DPRK’s Nuclear programme ASEM 4 in Copenhagen, Denmark European Commission adopts the National Indicative Programme 2002–04 Visit of the DPRK delegation led by Foreign Trade Minister Ri Gwang Gun to the EU EU grants over 5 million euros for humanitarian aid in the DPRK European Commission adopts a Country Strategy Paper for the DPRK Renewed EU support for KEDO ASEM DUO-Korea launched TFAP first e-commerce seminar in Seoul First round of exploratory talks on human rights between EU and DPRK EU high level troika visit to Pyongyang and Seoul EU establishes diplomatic relation with North Korea Inaugural Joint Committee under EU-Korea Framework Agreement Round Table on Globalization in Seoul Entry into force of the Framework Agreement on Trade and Co-operation between the EU and ROK Trans-Eurasia Information Network Meeting of Experts in Seoul Nobel Peace Prize formally awarded to Kim Dae Jung, President of the ROK European Union Council Conclusion on the Korean Peninsula Third Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in Seoul First inter-Korean Summit in Pyongyang EU Council of Ministers adopts Conclusions on the Korean Peninsula European Commission issues Communication on EU relations with the Republic of Korea Second Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) summit in London

October 2003 May 2003 November 2002 October 2002 September 2002 July 2002 March 2002

February 2002 December 2001 November 2001 October 2001 June 2001 May 2001

April 2001 March 2001 December 2000 November 2000 October 2000 June 2000 July 1999 December 1998 April 1998

continued on next page

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Chronology of EU-Korea Relations — continued March 1998 December 1997

A preliminary meeting of Asia Europe Vision Group in Seoul South Korea receives a bailout of US$50 billion from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) EU accession to KEDO South Korea’s adhesion to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Signature of Framework Agreement on Trade and Co-operation First Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) summit in Bangkok EU first provides humanitarian assistance to North Korea (DPRK) Establishment of the Delegation of the European Commission in Seoul First regular annual meeting between senior officials of European Commission and Republic of Korea (first known as the “EC-Korea Monitoring Discussions” and then from 1993 as the “EC-Korea High-Level Consultations”) First regular annual ministerial meeting between the European Commission and the Republic of Korea Establishment of diplomatic relations between the European Community and the Republic of Korea; accreditation of Korean Ambassador to the Community in Brussels

September 1997 December 1996 October 1996 March 1996 October 1995 November 1989 July 1986

March 1983 July 1963

Source: By the authors based on the information from the European Commission.

Notes 1

2 3

4 5

6

7

8

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Chairman’s Statement of the Third Asia-Europe Meeting, Seoul, 20–21 October 2000. Le Monde, 21 October 2000. “North, South Korea reconciliation boosted by Asia, EU summit participants”, Reuters, 21 October 2000. “Europe seeks a Greater Role in Korea”, The Japan Times, 24 April 2001. Christopher M. Dent, “Economic exchange and diplomacy in Korea and EU relations”, Korea Observer 29, no. 2: 401–24. European Commission, “The EU’s Relations with the Republic of Korea”, . Brian Bridges, Europe and the Challenge of the Asia Pacific: Change, Continuity and Crisis, Cheltenham, UK & Northampton, U.S.: Edward Elgar, 1999, p. 6. Ibid, p. 10. Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain and France made contact with Korea’s last dynasty, Choson, from late sixteenth century for both commercial and religious purposes. Korea maintained relatively friendly relations with Europeans until the French military retaliated for the deaths of nine French

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9

10

11

12

13 14 15

16 17

18 19

20 21

22

23

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Catholic priests in 1866. The return of medieval Korean documents, Oekyujanggak, plundered by the French in this confrontation still remains an important diplomatic issue between South Korea and France. Yong-Woo Song, HanKookei yeigyo (Diplomacy of Korea), Seoul: Pyongmin Sa, 2000, p. 22. Sunghee Park, “First North-South Korean Summit: Post 1945 Balance of Power”, EIAS Bulletin 4, nos. 6 and 7 (June–July 2000): 1–2 and 40–42. Michael Leifer, “Europe and Southeast Asia”, in Europe and Asia Pacific, edited by Hanns Maull, Gerald Segal and Jusuf Wanandi. London and New York: Routledge, 1998, pp. 198–205. Christopher M. Dent, The European Union and East Asia: An Economic Relationship. London and New York: Routledge, 1999, p. 200. Agence Europe, 26 May 1993. Soeya Yoshihide and Simon Nuttall, “Europe and Northeast Asia”, pp. 171–83. EU-Korea Framework Agreement, a “mixed” agreement whereby the EU member states and the Community share competence, entered into force in 2001 after ratified by all member states. Korea Herald, 11 June 1996. Christopher M. Dent, “ASEM and the ‘Cinderella Complex’ of EU-East Asia Economic Relations”, Pacific Affairs 74, no. 1 (2001): 25–52. H.S. Chun, “ASEM: A New Opportunity for Korean Foreign Economic Policy”, Korea and World Affairs 20, no. 2, pp. 236–47. Christopher M. Dent and Christopher Randerson, “Korean Foreign Direct Investment in Europe: The Determining Forces”, Pacific Review 9, no. 4, pp. 531–52. Dent, op cit., pp. 187–218. Agence Europe, 4 March 1996. However, through intense negotiation, the EU agreed to contribute annually about $18 million for five years in May 1997. Article V of the Treaty of European Union. The first ARF meeting was inaugurated in Bangkok in July 1994. It included the then six ASEAN member countries (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Thailand), seven formal dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, the EU and the United States) and four observers (China, Papua New Guinea, Russia and Vietnam). In the 1994 Framework, the United States pledged to provide North Korea with two modern nuclear power plants by 2003 if the North would freeze its nuclear programme. Dong-Ik Shin and Gerald Segal, “Getting Serious about Asia-Europe Security Co-operation”, in ASEM: A Window of Opportunity, edited by Wim Stokhof and Paul van der Velde. London and New York: Kegan Paul International and Leiden and Amsterdam: International Institute for Asian Studies, 1999, pp. 73–83.

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192 24 25 26 27

28

29

30

31 32 33 34

35

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Agence Europe, 22 November 1995, Korea Herald, 2 October 1996. Agence Europe, 22 November 1995, Korea Herald, 1 August 1997. Korea Herald, 1 August 1997. Article 8 in ASEM 1 Chairman’s Statement, Towards a Common Vision for Asia and Europe, 2 March 1996: “The Leaders reiterated their determination to pursue systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons and of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international controls.” Richard Higgott, “ASEM and the Evolving Global Order”, Global Economic Review 29, no. 1 (2000): 21–52. In November 1997 the number of unemployed was 615, 000 and by February 1998 it had risen to 1,235,000. GDP fell to an annual rate of 3.9 per cent in the first quarter of 1998 and 5.3 per cent in the first semester. This was the sharpest half-year fall registered since 1953, when the central bank began publishing these statistics. There was also a sharp upswing in the divorce, suicide, thefts and robberies. See Corrado G.M. Letta, “Postscript (October 1998)”, Korea from Microcosm to Globalisation, Roma: ISIAO, 2000. In 1907, Korea had run up about 13,000,000 won as foreign debt from Japan which had penetrated the Korean economy prior to Korea’s total colonization. The Korean Government, saddled by a budget deficit of 770,000 won, was incapable of refunding this debt. In order to protect Korean sovereignty against Japan, a nationwide movement was organized to collect the funds required to refund the debt. Ibid. Sunday Morning Post, 11 January 1998 Brian Bridges, op cit., pp. 181–98. See Article 7 Technical Co-operation, “Statement on the Financial and Economic Situation in Asia”, ASEM 2 London, 3–4 April 1998. The EU contributed 20 per cent of total support funds to Asia during the crisis through the IMF, and the European Commission also organized the provision of technical assistance on financial sector reform. European Commission, “ASEM Trust Fund (Round 1–8) Programs by Country”, ASEM Trust Fund distributed 14.3 per cent for China, 17 per cent for Indonesia, 5.1 per cent for Malaysia, 13.2 per cent for the Philippines, 14.1 per cent for Thailand, 13.8 per cent for Vietnam. Ju-Myong Song, “Jei Iljang, Asia Teapyongyang Jiyeck: APECeul Joungsimeiro” (Chapter 1. Asia Pacific Region: APEC), in Asia Pacific 2000, edited by the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul: Seoul National University, 2000, p. 4. Geung-Chan Bae, “Jei Ilcha ASEM Gyulgwa Bounsuck: Jei Samcha ASEM

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38 39 40

41 42 43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

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yuichiwa Hangwho Gwajeiryul Jounsymeiro” [Analysis of First ASEM Results: Giving Importance to Third ASEM], IFANS Review, May 1996. Financial Times, 6–7 May 2000. The Seoul Declaration for Peace on the Korean Peninsula, 21 October 2000. Christopher M. Dent, “ASEM and the ‘Cinderella Complex’ of EU-East Asia Economic Relations”, Pacific Affairs 74, no. 1 (2001): 25–52. Korea Herald, 21 October 2000. Hangeirye Sinmoon, 21 December 2003. However since the 1980s the North Korean delegation to the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in Paris acted as de facto embassy in France. Michael Reiterer, “Globalization and the ASEM Process”. Paper presented for the first ASEM Roundtable on Globalization, “Globalization and Regional Responses”, on 28–29 May 2001, Seoul, Korea. “Who Needs Whom?” Special Report America and Europe, The Economist, 9 March 2002. Prime Minister Göran Persson of Sweden in his capacity as president of the EU, External Relations Commissioner, Chris Patten, and High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, visited the North. European Commission, “The EU’s Relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”. . European Commission, The EC-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Country Strategy Paper 2001–2004, 2002, p. 3. “ASEM Summit likely to adopt a Declaration on Korean Peace”, Korea Times, 10 June 2002. Article 5, Political Declaration for Peace on the Korean Peninsula, ASEM 4, Copenhagen, 23 September 2002. Michael Reiterer, “Globalization and the ASEM Process”. Paper presented for the first ASEM Roundtable on Globalization, Globalization and Regional Responses, Seoul, Korea, 28–29 May 2001. Simon Nuttall, “The Commission: The Struggle for Legitimacy”, in The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy, edited by Christopher Hill. London: Routledge, 1996, pp. 130–50. European Commission, “Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships”, COM(2001) 469 final, Brussels, 2001, p. 28. “Blair Says North is Next after Iraq is Dealt With”, JoongAng Daily, 31 January 2003. Gerald Segal, “Thinking Strategically about ASEM: The Subsidiarity Question”, Pacific Review 10, no. 1 (1997): 124–34.

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57

58

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Davis B. Bobrow, “The U.S. and ASEM: Why the Hegemon Didn’t Bark”, Pacific Review 12, no. 1 (1999): 103–28. EU Suspends Co-operation with North Korea, Digital Chosun, 5 December 2002. Axel Berkofsky, “EU’s North Korea Policy a Non-Starter”, Asia Times, 10 July 2003. Zbigniew Brezinski, “Summit of Impotence in Bangkok”, Washington Times, 25 February 1996.

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Abbreviations

Abbreviations ABC ACD ACP ADB AEBF AECF AEETC AEH AEMM AEVG AFTA AIA AIDS AMF AMM AMU APEC APT ARF ASEAN ASEAN-PMC ASEF ASEM CAEC CEE CFSP CIS COREPER

12 ES Abbreviations

ASEAN Brussels Committee Asia Co-operation Dialogue African, Caribbean and the Pacific Asian Development Bank Asia-Europe Business Forum Asia-Europe Co-operation Framework Asia-Europe Environmental Technology Centre ASEM Education Hub ASEAN-EC/EU Ministerial Meeting Asia-Europe Vision Group ASEAN Free Trade Area ASEAN Investment Area Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome Asian Monetary Fund ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Asian Monetary Union Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation ASEAN Plus Three/ASEAN+3 ASEAN Regional Forum Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference Asia-Europe Foundation Asia-Europe Meeting Council for Asia-Europe Co-operation Central and Eastern Europe Common Foreign and Security Policy Commonwealth of Independent States Community’s Committee of Permanent Representatives

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196 DG DTI EAEC EAEG EBIC EC ECB ECOWAS ECU EEC EIB EMM EMS EMU EPC EPG ESDI ESDP EU EURATOM EUROSEAS FDI FEALAC FinMM FMM FPDA FTA FTAA GATT GCC GDP GNP GSP IAEA IBRD IEG IGC IGO

12 ES Abbreviations

Abbreviations

Directorate-General Department of Trade and Industry East Asia Economic Caucus East Asia Economic Grouping European Business Information Centre European Community European Central Bank Economic Community of West African States European Currency Unit European Economic Community European Investment Bank Economic Ministers’ Meeting European Monetary System Economic and Monetary Union European Political Co-operation Eminent Persons’ Group European Security and Defence Identity European Security and Defence Policy European Union European Atomic Energy Community European Organization for Southeast Asian Studies Foreign Direct Investment Forum for East Asia and Latin America Co-operation Finance Ministers’ Meeting Foreign Ministers’ Meeting Five Power Defence Arrangement Free Trade Agreement/Area Free Trade Agreement of Americas General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Gulf Co-operation Council Gross Domestic Product Gross National Product Generalized Systems of Preferences International Atomic Energy Association International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Investment Experts Group Inter-Governmental Conference Inter-Governmental Organization

196

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197

Abbreviations

IMF IORRC IPAP IPE IR JCC JIC JSEPA JSG JVP KEDO KL MAI MEM MFN NAFTA NEPAD NGO NICs NIEs NZ OAS ODA OECD OSCE PAFTAD PBEC PD PECC PMC PPGG PPP QMV ROK SADC SCCAN SCO SEA

12 ES Abbreviations

International Monetary Fund Indian Ocean Rim Association of Regional Co-operation Investment Promotion Action Plan International Political Economy International Relations Joint Co-operation Committee Joint Investment Committee Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement Joint Study Group Journalists’ Visit Programme Korean Energy Development Organization Kuala Lumpur Multilateral Agreement on Investment Most Effective Measures Most Favoured Nation North American Free Trade Area New Partnership for Africa’s Development Non-Governmental Organization Newly Industrializing Countries Newly Industrializing Economies New Zealand Organization of American States Official Development Assistance Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Pacific Trade and Development Conference Pacific-Basin Economic Council Prisoners’ Dilemma Pacific Economic Co-operation Council Post-Ministerial Conference Pilot Phase Guidance Group Public-Private Partnership Qualified Majority Voting Republic of Korea Southern Africa Development Co-operation Special Co-ordinating Committee of ASEAN Nations Shanghai Co-operation Organization Single European Act

197

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198 SME SOM SOMTI TAFTA TICAD TEU TFAP UK UN UNGA UNCTAD UNDP UNICEF US USAMGIK VIE WB WMD WTO WWII YPF

12 ES Abbreviations

Abbreviations

Small and Medium Enterprises Senior Officials’ Meeting Senior Officials’ Meeting (Trade & Investment) Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Agreement Tokyo International Conference on African Development Treaty of the European Union Trade Facilitation Action Plan United Kingdom United Nations United Nations General Assembly United Nations Council on Trade and Development United Nations Development Programme United Nations Children’s Fund United States United States Army Military Government in Korea Virtual Information Exchange World Bank Weapons of Mass Destruction World Trade Organization World War II Young Parliamentarians Forum

198

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199

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Contributors

Contributors Sebastian Bersick Lecturer, Department of Political and Social Sciences, Freie Universitat Berlin. David Camroux Director, Asia-Europe Centre, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques (Sciences-Po). César de Prado Yepes Research Fellow, Comparative Regional Integration Studies Programme, United Nations University, Bruges. Mathew Doidge Doctoral Candidate, National Centre for Research on Europe, University of Canterbury. Julie Gilson Senior Lecturer, University of Birmingham. Heiner Hänggi Assistant Director and Head of Think Tank, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. David M. Milliot Graduate of the Vienna Diplomatic Academy and Ph.D. in International Relations/Political Sciences from the University of Paris X, Nanterre.

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Park Sunghee Consultant/Project Manager, EU-Korea Industrial Co-operation Study, Asia-Europe Centre, Institute of Political Studies. Michael Reiterer Lecturer, University of Innsbruck and Deputy Head of the Delegation of the European Commission to Japan. Wim Stokhof Director, International Institute for Asian Studies. Kazuhiko Togo Canon Professor, International Institute for Asian Studies. Paul van der Velde Senior Consultant, International Institute for Asian Studies. Xu Mingqi Professor and Director, Department of International Finance, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. Yeo Lay Hwee Executive Director and Senior Research Fellow, Singapore Institute of International Affairs.

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