Counter-terror by proxy: The Spanish State's illicit war with ETA 9781526158833

Citation preview

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Counter-terror by proxy

New Approaches to Conflict Analysis

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Series editors: Peter Lawler (School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester – United Kingdom) and Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet (Centre for Conflict, Liberty and Security, CCLS, Paris - France) Until recently, the study of conflict and conflict resolution remained comparatively immune to broad developments in social and political theory. When the changing nature and locus of large-scale conflict in the post-Cold War era are also taken into account, the case for a reconsideration of the fundamentals of conflict analysis and conflict resolution becomes all the more stark. New Approaches to Conflict Analysis promotes the development of new theoretical insights and their application to concrete cases of large-scale conflict, broadly defined. The series intends not to ignore established approaches to conflict analysis and conflict resolution but to contribute to the reconstruction of the field through a dialogue between orthodoxy and its contemporary critics. Equally, the series reflects the contemporary porosity of intellectual borderlines rather than simply perpetuating rigid boundaries around the study of conflict and peace. New Approaches to Conflict Analysis seeks to uphold the normative commitment of the field’s founders yet also recognises that the moral impulse to research is properly part of its subject matter. To these ends, the series is comprised of the highest quality work of scholars drawn from throughout the international academic community, and from a wide range of disciplines within the social sciences.

PUBLISHED Christine Agius Neutrality, sovereignty and identity: the social construction of Swedish neutrality Tim Aistrope Conspiracy theory and American foreign policy: American foreign policy and the politics of legitimacy Eşref Aksu The United Nations, intra-state peacekeeping and normative change Michelle Bentley Syria and the chemical weapons taboo: Exploiting the forbidden M. Anne Brown Human rights and the borders of suffering: the promotion of human rights in international politics

Anthony Burke and Matt McDonald (eds) Critical security in the Asia-Pacific Ilan Danjoux Political cartoons and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict Lorraine Elliott and Graeme Cheeseman (eds) Forces for good: cosmopolitan militaries in the twenty-first century Clara Eroukhmanoff The securitisation of Islam: Covert racism and affect in the United States post-9/11 Greg Fry and Tarcisius Kabutaulaka (eds) Intervention and state-building in the Pacific: the legitimacy of ‘cooperative intervention’

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Anna Geis, Maéva Clément and Hanna Pfeifer (eds) Armed non-state actors and the politics of recognition

David Bruce MacDonald Balkan holocausts? Serbian and Croatian victim-centred propaganda and the war in Yugoslavia

Naomi Head Justifying violence: communicative ethics and the use of force in Kosovo

Adrian Millar Socio-ideological fantasy and the Northern Ireland conflict: the other side

Charlotte Heath-Kelly Death and security: memory and mortality at the bombsite Richard Jackson Writing the war on terrorism: language, politics and counter-terrorism Tami Amanda Jacoby and Brent Sasley (eds) Redefining security in the Middle East Matt Killingsworth, Matthew Sussex and Jan Pakulski (eds) Violence and the state Jan Koehler and Christoph Zürcher (eds) Potentials of disorder Matthias Leese and Stef Wittendorp (eds) Security/Mobility: politics and movement

Jennifer Milliken The social construction of the Korean War Ami Pedahzur The Israeli response to Jewish extremism and violence: defending democracy Johanna Söderström Living politics after war: Ex-combatants and veterans coming home Maria Stern Naming insecurity – constructing identity: ‘Mayan-women’ in Guatemala on the eve of ‘peace’ Virginia Tilley The one state solution: a breakthrough for peace in the Israeli–Palestinian deadlock

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Counter-terror by proxy The Spanish State’s illicit war with ETA Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet

Manchester University Press

Copyright © Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet 2021 The right of Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Published by Manchester University Press Altrincham Street, Manchester M1 7JA www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN  978 1 5261 5882 6  hardback First published 2021 The publisher has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for any external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Front cover: Mural, Square du Trinquet (Patxa Square), Bayonne (Baiona), France. Author’s archive, 2010. Typeset by New Best-set Typesetters Ltd

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

To my beloved wife Amandine and to my wonderful daughters, Louise and Margaux

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Contents

Foreword by Elspeth Guild page x Preface and acknowledgements xii List of abbreviations xvi Maps xvii Introduction 1 1 Arch-enemy: Euskadi Ta Askatasuna 17 2 Continuity: Francoist legacy and transition to democracy 45 3 Controversy: extradition, political offence exception and the French sanctuary 73 4 Monstrous mimicry: actions and actors of the Anti-terrorist Liberation Groups 100 5 Sacrifice: code of silence, political scandal and strategies of denial 130 6 Symbolic violence: diplomatic embarrassment and European democratic identity 150 Conclusion: state terrorism, deceptive organisation and proxy 169 Bibliography 174 Index 198

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Foreword

It is both an honour and pleasure to introduce this book which is an extremely impressive contribution to the literature in the field of anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism policy and practice. Indeed, it should be obligatory reading for all academics, policy-makers and experts who engage with the field. This book has had a long gestation period which is revealed both by the depth of research and by the maturity of the analysis. It is a triumph; an accomplishment of which Emmanuel is well justified to feel proud. The position of this book in the literature is clear – this is an outstanding, and in-depth analysis of how terrorism, anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism are all too often driven by mimetism – as Emmanuel puts it: the contagious negative reciprocity of desire leading to rivalry and cycles of vengeance. The case study is one of exceptional importance in Europe today – the creation, operation and political support of a ‘death squad’ in an EU State, Spain, a liberal democracy with, at the time, a Socialist government which carried out extra-judicial killings not only within its own territory but also on the territory of another EU State, its neighbour, France, in some cases with the complicity of local police. The study asks the question: how is it possible in a Europe which professes to uphold the rule of law and fundamental rights that such a ‘death squad’ could be established and operate for more than ten years? But it is not simply a study of what went wrong and how, it is also a magnificent investigation of the long-term impact of the extra-judicial killing programme run by the Spanish Interior Ministry. First and most spectacularly, fourteen high-ranking Spanish civil servants and the former Interior Minister were tried and convicted for their part in the extra-judicial killing programme. Secondly, to this day, as Emmanuel explains, in Spanish politics a reference to a specific incident in the programme (the use of quicklime) is deployed by politicians as the most profound insult against the probity of an opponent. The political long tail of the programme

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Foreword xi is still highly potent. This book shows not only the political and bureaucratic descent into the most shocking of totalitarian practices through a spiral of increasing violence among the actors but also the long-term costs politically, socially and in terms of reputation which this mimetic cycle of vengeance sponsored by State officials has engendered. This book makes gripping reading. The argument and the narrative are beautifully crafted to capture the reader’s attention and challenge their preconceived notions of what is and is not possible in liberal democracies. I cannot recommend this book too highly to all readers, professional, academic and the public at large. This is the outcome of exceptional and impeccable research and a fascinating book. Elspeth Guild Jean Monnet Professor ad personam, Queen Mary University of London and Emeritus Professor of Law, Radboud University, Nijmegen, Netherlands 6 May 2020

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Preface and acknowledgements

One of the key foundations of the modern liberal democratic State is the requirement that government safeguards the security of its citizens by enacting and enforcing laws which are designed to protect their interests. In the name of security, however, and most notably in the context of the ‘War on Terror’, this political obligation has been largely undermined by a common yet ultimately dangerous set of claims: necessity knows no law and, hence, one must fight fire with fire. Operations beyond legal boundaries have been very often legitimised by sweeping claims about global dangers and the necessity to derogate from the rule of law and the liberal credo of governing contingency through freedom. With Counter-terror by proxy, I have tried to delve into this pernicious and complex phenomenon of illiberal practices of liberal regimes currently besetting our world. I thought that the best approach to such a complex issue did not lie in canvassing all the international facts; eventually offering a general argument about why illiberal practices of liberal regimes have won wide currency. Rather, I deemed it fit to make a thorough analysis of one significant episode in one European country, the Spanish illicit war against Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Country and Freedom), the armed Basque nationalist group long known to the world as ETA. Between 1983 and 1987, mercenaries adopting the pseudonym GAL (Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación, Anti-terrorist Liberation Groups) paid by the Spanish treasury and relying upon national intelligence support were at war with ETA. For four years, that particular campaign of extra-judicial assassinations spanned the French–Spanish border, although most of its activities occurred in the south-western part of the French territory. This establishment of unofficial counter-terrorist squads by a Spanish government is a blatant detour from legality. The GAL episode has been relatively neglected in literature concerning political violence, terrorism and counter-terrorism. Hopefully, this book

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document



Preface and acknowledgements

xiii

will contribute to reducing the deficiency. Why and how that happened are the book’s central themes. The GAL episode, which predates the current global fight against terrorism by decades, strikes me as emblematic for several reasons. From the outset, one could think that what happened in the 1980s is long gone. The past belongs to the past, as the saying goes. Yet, with this book, I beg to differ. More than thirty years later, this campaign of covered-up assassinations, coercion, death squads and targeted killings in a liberal democracy continues to grip Spain. Almost all the actions perpetrated by the GAL have been prosecuted. However, some remain unresolved. The GAL campaign and the prosecutions following from it are a strong reminder of a simple yet powerful hint for our present time: unlawful and illiberal activities of the past do not remain in the past. It is only a question of time before they resurface and become present matters. Furthermore, the GAL episode is also one which leads us to question one particular feature of our tormented world at war against terrorism: the belief that a mightier violence can end violence. It seems to be an attractive belief for many, and one must admit that a coercive response may sometimes yield immediate short-term gains. And yet, these immediate benefits, if any, are really an illusion, for beyond them lies a scenario of retaliation, of spiralling and mimetic violence. In many ways, the GAL postponed by decades the possibility of a political solution for the Basque conflict. Additionally, this particular use of unorthodox counter-terrorist strategies in a liberal democracy illustrates unmistakably that the borders between the licit and the illicit in the exercise of power and in the political regulation of societies are extremely permeable. Counterterror by proxy does not aim to justify or to forget the use and the outcome of noxious forms of violence. Despite the obvious emotional dimension of any work on violent means, actions and actors, I have tried to keep a self-consciously impersonal and analytic tone. What the reader is entitled to expect is that the analysis of what has already happened should aim to be objective and this is what I have striven to achieve in this book. It is customary to say that a book has taken much longer to complete than originally anticipated. This one is no exception. The road to publication has been long, frequently interrupted and certainly not always smooth. For many years, I contemplated the idea of translating into English my previous book published by Athena Editions in 2010 under the title Antiterrorisme clandestine, antiterrorisme officiel (Covert and official anti-terrorism). While lecturing at the University of Manchester, I found myself beleaguered by the difficult task of translating long French sentences into brief and, hopefully, graceful English ones. Learning the art of writing in English and to cope with its renowned law of stylistic economy pushed me to the considered view that writing a completely new book was the only bearable option.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

xiv

Preface and acknowledgements

Counter-terror by proxy is the result. In writing this book, I am indebted to many people, who helped me to gain insight into Basque politics and identities on both sides of the border, ETA’s convoluted history, Spanish contemporary history, security institutions and diplomacy. During my various trips to the Basque country – whether south or north or the Pyrenean mountains – and to Madrid, I benefited from the hospitality and kindness of many people who have opened their personal archives, and shared their personal thoughts with me. I would like to thank the members of the Guardia Civil and of the Spanish intelligence services. The sensitive subject matter required assurances of confidentiality that prevent identification in these pages. Yet they offered me some insights into their view of their fight against ETA but also, and very often against all odds, shared their profound reflections upon their own institutions’ controversial past. Equally, I would like to thank the members of the editorial teams of Enbata and Jakilea, and also the members of the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights in the Basque Country in Bayonne who have always welcomed me so warmly and allowed me to dig into their archives. Claire Frossard, who patiently sent me over the years press clippings about ETA and the GAL, deserves a special mention. I am grateful to Oroit eta Sala and Bake Bideak, who have invited me many times to present this book-in-progress. I am grateful to Emilien Guillon who managed to transform a flow of information into the production of elegant maps. When it comes to advice and encouragement, the list of benefactors is even longer. In the course of thinking about and writing what appears here, I have incurred more debts to friends and colleagues than I am now able to recall. I owe a great debt of gratitude to Didier Bigo, who pushed me, decades ago, to investigate the European anti-terrorism official storytelling in a PhD thesis. He spent countless hours tossing ideas back and forth, forcing me to clarify assumptions. His mentoring became a true friendship. I am equally grateful to Elspeth Guild for inviting me many times to contribute to the Queen Mary Reflection Group on Terrorism and Human Rights and for endorsing this volume. I am grateful to my former colleagues at the University of Manchester who read portions of the book in draft form and encouraged me to go further. Nick Turnbull and Peter Lawler deserve special mention. Conversations with Nick have always been inspiring and stimulating and Peter’s patient editing work of my French habitus made my writing skills better. They both embraced this project from the beginning and offered very friendly and thoughtful feedback and encouragement throughout. Equally, I would like to thank all the students I encountered in my nearly twenty years of teaching. They challenged my ideas and, perhaps unwittingly, helped me sharpen the argument and directed me to areas that needed further attention. I have learned a tremendous amount from them. I have been also very fortunate to be able to draw on

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Preface and acknowledgements

xv

the talents of a succession of PhD researchers including James Alexander, Benjamin Tallis, Emmy Eklundh and Luke Bathia. They have all happily landed in settings where they can concentrate on their own intellectual agendas. They have enormously enhanced my own. I am also grateful to the team at Manchester University Press for their ongoing encouragement of this project. I am similarly appreciative to the anonymous reviewer at MUP for their constructive feedback and informed recommendations. Sincere thanks are also due to Gareth Couch-Diewitz for his diligent proofreading. Any mistakes will be fewer because of his help. My family was my anchor in this long and sometimes arduous endeavour. My wife Amandine and my daughters Louise and Margaux are my greatest blessing. They deserve the utmost thanks for showing great forbearance and love. To all of them, my deepest thanks. While I acknowledge the contributions of others to this book, the responsibility for any errors or omissions is, of course, solely my own. Brussels, April 2020

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Abbreviations

BPS Brigada Político-Social, Francoist secret police BVE Batallón Vasco Español, Basque Spanish Batallion CESEDEN Centro Superior de la Defensa Nacional, Superior Centre of National Defence CESID Centro Superior de Información de la Defensa, Superior Centre of Defence Intelligence ETA Euskadi (e)Ta Askatasuna, Basque Country and Freedom GAL Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación, Anti-terrorist Liberation Groups OCN Organización Contrasubversiva Nacional, National Antisubversive Organisation PAF Police de l’Air et des Frontières, French border police PNV Partido Nacional Vasco, Basque National Party PP Partido Popular, Popular Party PS Parti Socialiste, French Socialist Party PSOE Partido Socialista Obrero Español, Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party SAC Service d’Action Civique, Civic Action Service SECED Servicio Central de Documentación, Central Intelligence Service TOP Tribunal de Orden Público, Public Order Court ZEN Zona Especial Norte, Special North Zone

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction

Terrorism has been naturalised into a constant risk that is omnipresent out there, a sort of chaotic principle always ready to strike and create havoc, and against which society must now marshal all its resources in an unending struggle. Joseba Zulaika and William A. Douglass, Terror and Taboo, 1996 Sometimes, we should try to keep the present at a distance, protecting ourselves from the incessant noise of the news surrounding us. In order to understand the present, we must learn to look at it obliquely. Carlo Ginzburg, Fear Reverence Terror. Reading Hobbes Today, 2008

The perennial contending issues of how best to deal with a violent insurgency while attempting to maintain adherence to the law are nothing new.1 Yet, they have gained a new direction since the inception of a global war against terrorism.2 The post-9/11 terrorist threat has been viewed as an extreme situation that makes dirty hands unavoidable. In times of emergency, authorities shed any pretence of being constrained by law and instead very often deploy it against designated enemies.3 Necessity knows no law and, hence, one must fight fire with fire. The claim that any attack should be met with swift, effective and merciless military retribution is now more than ever deeply rooted in international politics.4 Within the realm of international law it is acknowledged that, according to the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law, ‘States have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force’.5 But perceptibly since the late 1970s at a time when terrorism became a major hindrance in our world, this international norm has acquired a different meaning. Clearly, the normative dimension of the declaration has been shattered by the ‘war on terror’ and its various auxiliary forms of extra-judicial use of violence.6 It did not resist the pressure of actual practice by states who have resorted to self-help in the forms of military retaliatory strikes and infamous practices such as extra-judicial

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

2

Counter-terror by proxy

assassination, rendition and, more recently, the use of drones.7 The claim that responses to terrorism should go beyond passive defence and therefore should consider means of active prevention, pre-emption and retaliation is not controversial any more. The US policy and posture after 9/11, the changing values regarding the use of lethal force, the blurred boundaries and flexible legal background and their outcomes have been widely discussed since then. One should stop equivocating and adopt a policy of using military force against terrorist groups as ‘we cannot allow ourselves to become the Hamlet of nations, worrying endlessly over whether and how to respond’, once said Secretary of State Shultz in his 1984 address at the Park Avenue Synagogue in New York city.8 In many ways, one could even say that his much-quoted address was a foundational document not only of current American foreign policy but of the war mentality in international politics more broadly.9 The use of military force not only against terrorists but also against States that support, train or harbour terrorists is now part of the ordinary set of measures States employ, for they have acquired the confidence that in the ‘fight against terror’ the use of punitive measures is now part of the standard procedure in counter-terrorist actions. The idea that military strikes can be counterproductive does not prevail any more when the discourse of the fight against terrorism is invoked and the absolute necessity to derogate from the rule of law is pleaded.10 However, why and how a democratic government in a liberal society can turn to a ‘dirty war’ and go down the route of clandestine extra-judicial killing remains a serious question. Spain at war against ETA offers a fascinating case study that sheds important light on this fundamental and topical issue. Contemporary democratic Spain has been plagued with serious campaigns of political violence. From the end of the Francoist authoritarian regime in 1975 until the announcement of a ceasefire in 2011, the Basque separatist clandestine group ETA (Euskadi (e)Ta Askatasuna, Basque Country and Freedom) unquestionably played a central part in this deadly process.11 In response to the increasingly violent actions of ETA during the political transition and onwards, Spain adopted a determined and strong counterterrorist stance, establishing one of the most impressive anti-terrorist arsenals in Western democracies,12 pushing the agenda of a European-wide reformulation of police and judicial assistance between Member States and sparing no effort to secure French co-operation against terrorism in general and against ETA in particular.13 Less known were the extra-judicial strategies Spain used to suppress Basque radical nationalism and eradicate ETA. In the 1980s, initiatives to reopen channels to ETA by the Spanish Socialist government of Felipe González (1982–96) were twinned with a confusing if astute strategy of

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction 3 official enhancement of police and judicial co-operation with France on the one hand and a covert campaign of assassination of members of ETA on the other. Between 1983 and 1987, mercenaries adopting the pseudonym GAL (Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación, Anti-terrorist Liberation Groups) paid by the Spanish treasury and relying upon national intelligence support were at war with ETA. The ambition of the GAL, expressed in a single and unique communiqué released in 1984, was twofold: avenging victims of ETA by killing members of the Basque organisation who fled into France to avoid prosecution; and pushing French authorities to reconsider their generous political asylum and extradition policy towards greater co-operation with Spain in its fight against ETA. GAL disbanded shortly after France changed its policies and began to collaborate officially with the Spanish government in the struggle against ETA. Until the public declarations in the late 1990s of two Spanish police officers involved in the recruitment of the mercenaries, the cloak of ‘plausible deniability’ protected these extrajudicial killings. Yet these revelations triggered one of the biggest political scandals of the post-Transition years and became a source of political and diplomatic embarrassment for Spain. In vigorously promoting pan-European co-operation against terrorism, at a time when Member States were eager to discuss these matters, Spain managed to hide the GAL behind the veil of democratic solidarity in the fight against terrorism. The organisation, procedures, tactics and the identity of the GAL victims and perpetrators are now almost public knowledge.14 The creation of the GAL entailed Spanish police officers and members of the ‘sharp end’ of the state military and security infrastructures acting perfidiously, Special Forces acting with de facto legal impunity and, perhaps most controversially, the GAL involved third-party paramilitary pro-Francoist organisations, petty criminal, far-right Italians, Portuguese and French activists who were given money and information to plan and carry out political assassination. The GAL engaged in a campaign against ETA, unquestionably in a manifestly illegal fashion, but with all the legal structure and resources at their disposal. Nearly thirty people were killed in this campaign of torture, kidnapping, bombing and targeted and indiscriminate assassinations of suspected ETA activists, Basque refugees and sometimes ordinary citizens, mostly on French territory. Quite clearly, the GAL punitive actions dramatically impacted ETA’s strategy and course of action. At a time when the Basque separatist organisation was crippled by internal fights about the options of armed activity or political engagement, the GAL campaign empowered ETA’s hardliners’ views. The GAL contributed to the creation of a whole new pantheon of martyrs to the cause, nourishing ETA’s radical narrative of oppression and bolstering its recruitment among a new generation of faithful and enraged activists

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

4

Counter-terror by proxy

who had witnessed the paramilitary groups battling across the Basque country.15 The GAL fuelled a cycle of violence, and ETA, consumed by its self-depiction of grandiosity, as a champion of the Basque separatist cause, could not perceive how the former acquiescence of the Basque people of earlier times was steadily fading away.16 The GAL encouraged a marked increase in the violence of ETA, and the Basque separatist organisation gradually lost sight of its local supports. The GAL episode is one the darkest pages of the history of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE), alongside the 1993 scandal of corruption and embezzlement involving the chief of Spain’s Civil Guard, Luis Roldán Ibáñez, who was the first civilian to be appointed to the head of the service in 1986. The GAL and Roldán affairs were major contributors to a series of political and financial scandals that brought down the thirteen-year government of Prime Minister Felipe González in 1996.17 The GAL scandal is a rare case in Europe where no fewer than fourteen high-ranking Spanish police officers and senior government officials, including the Minister of the Interior himself, were arrested and condemned for counter-terrorism wrongdoings and illiberal practices. It is also safe to say that, even a full thirty years after its last known action, the GAL remain very much alive within Spain and across the Basque country. One could even say that they went beyond enduring in collective memory, as their initiators had surely hoped it would. The 1980s GAL episode periodically erupts ever anew in Spanish political debates. In 2004, while acknowledging his defeat in the Spanish general election, former Prime Minister Aznar declared that, at least, he and his political party ‘never used quicklime to cover up an assassination’.18 The allusion to the 1983 abduction and assassination of Joxean Lasa and Joxi Zabala with their bodies covered up with quicklime was crystal clear to every Spaniard. Cal viva, quicklime, is now one of the persuasive colloquial expressions used in Spanish politics when there is a political spat – sometimes short of an argument – with the PSOE or an attempt to ridicule its representatives. It is a powerful understatement that alludes graphically to an attempted cover-up and as a derogatory comment towards the PSOE’s liability. In a carefully constructed world of political language,19 the expression works as a potent political euphemism that provides an area of immunity from concern by identifying who is virtuous and who is not. In 2013, Diego Vivas, the councilman of the Popular Party (PP) in the city of Toledo railed against the Socialists in a tweet: The PSOE is a party that has stolen, kidnapped, killed and buried people in quicklime […] And yet it authorised itself to lecture others.20

In 2016, Pablo Iglesias, the secretary-general of the left-wing Spanish political party Podemos declared that one should ‘disregard any advice from those

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction 5 who have their past stained with quicklime’.21 Equally, in December 2018, Pablo Casado, leader of the PP, said during a tense parliamentary debate with the PSOE Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez over national security issues that he refused to be lectured on terrorism by a ‘party stained with quicklime’.22 José Amedo Foucé, National Police Superintendent of Bilbao and one of the very first state actors to be prosecuted for his contribution to the GAL episode, unequivocally used the expression for the title of his latest book released in 2013: Quicklime. A Shocking Tale: The Ultimate Truth about the GAL’s Innards,23 a book in which he restates his argument about the ‘PSOE’s cowardice’ in relation to the GAL.24 Of all the actions perpetrated by the GAL, the 1983 abduction and assassination of Lasa and Zabala became in Spain the most potent and gruesome illustration of that illicit war against ETA. The macabre images of their mangled and twisted bones published on the front page of the Spanish newspaper El Mundo following their long-awaited identification in 1995,25 certainly contributed to transform this explicit case of torture and enforced disappearance into an emblematic and yet troubling representation of the GAL campaign in Spanish collective memory. The GAL campaign disappearance and the assassination of Lasa and Zabala in particular triggered an important collection of journalistic investigations over the years.26 Equally, although more recently, it has been a daunting source of inspiration and interrogations for novelists,27 documentary and fiction filmmakers,28 and, to a certain extent, for graphic novel creators as well.29 While the subject has been widely treated in Spain, it is still a very discreet theme among French publications.30 While publications on ETA, the Basque country and Basque nationalism are legion, very few Englishspeaking scholars have actually delved into this fascinating and intriguing case of illiberal practices in a liberal regime where state agencies colluded with Spanish and foreign mercenaries in order to kill members of ETA and push the French government towards more co-operation in the fight against Basque terrorism.31 Unsurprisingly, the impacts of the GAL campaign are even more significant within the Basque country.32 Every year since the families of Lasa and Zabala buried the remains in the little cemetery of Tolosa in 1995, a tribute has been paid to them on the day they were abducted. A mural in Bayonne is dedicated to them, alongside Jean-Louis Larre ‘Popo’ – a militant of Iparretarak, literally ‘those of ETA from the North’, who disappeared in 1983.33 This mural, and its messages ‘herriak ez du barkatuko’, people cannot forgive, and ‘ez dugu ahaztu’, we do not forget, have been carefully protected and maintained since their creation in 1997.34 Every 20 November in Bilbao, there is a rally in memory of two members of the Herri Batassuna coalition, Santi Brouard and Josu Muguruza.35 Brouard was killed by the GAL in

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

6

Counter-terror by proxy

1984 and Muguruza by the Spanish Neo-Nazi group Bases Autónomas in 1989, although during these years, Muguruza’s assassination was perceived as yet another operation from the GAL. The 1980s extra-judicial campaign is a haunting memory in the Basque country. When the ETA militant Jon Anza disappeared in France in 2009 between Bayonne and Toulouse, the fear of a return of the GAL was largely shared across the political spectrum and ETA, at the time, was keen on exploiting this story.36 But perhaps and even more crucially against the current backdrop of the peace process, the GAL operations remain a vivid issue and a source of considerable ongoing trauma in the Basque country on both sides of the border.37 North of the Pyrénées and through the tumultuous years of criminal activities of the GAL in the 1980s, the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights in the Basque Country continuously campaigned against unfair arrest, detention without trial, enforced expulsion and any other form of intrusion or repression, and it still does.38 Enbata, the weekly bilingual French-Basque newspaper, eagerly covered every single aspect of the GAL campaign and its judicial whereabouts from day one, and still patiently reminds its readers about the knowns and unknowns. The collective Oroit eta Sala (To remember and to denounce) never failed to demand clarification about the French police involvement into the GAL campaign, and still does.39 In Euskadi, the Basque country, the sordid memory of the GAL period is equally rife. When María Pilar Zabala Artano was a Podemos candidate for the 2016 Basque Parliament elections, she was known to everyone as ‘Pili’, the grieving sister of Joxi Zabala who lost her brother when she was fifteen. Perhaps most crucially, GAL victims and their relatives still have the greatest difficulties in being recognised as victims under the Spanish compensation scheme.40 Nor are they recognised by the largest Spanish victims’ associations that were initially created in the 1980s and 1990s in order to defend the rights of victims of ETA.41 In this Spanish political landscape where victims of ETA’s violence receive the highest standard of protection, any attempt to recognise the victims of the GAL is still largely interpreted as an effort to justify ETA’s crimes.42 The existence of GAL was only part of a broader set of contentious politics. Political violence is, in essence, rarely a simple toe-to-toe confrontation. By nature, political violence is not a smooth and regular world but a churned up and uneven one. Any (tactical) choice is thus deployed in a pre-established order, within a universe bearing all the scars of its history of conflict, where social reality often triumphs over strategic will.43 Isolating violence from its historical, social and political background or overlooking personal and/ or institutional motives tend to reduce drastically our ability to understand it.44 The overriding theme of the book is to focus on the socio-political sequences of action and contexts in which violence is embedded and to

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction 7 reintroduce perspective about the all-pervading unpredictability which one encounters the moment one approaches the realm of violence.45 By stressing a relational, conjunctural and contingent reading of violence, I aim to avoid the over-deterministic explanations of violence and state terrorism characterising much of the literature. In eschewing such a pure understanding of violence as instrumental – where violence is intentional and therefore the product of decision-making with a view to maximising expected political return while minimising the costs – I intend to stress the mix of strategy, structure and conjuncture at play. The emergence of violence is not only about some quality intrinsic to particular actors and/or groups (whether we speak of a clandestine organisation such as ETA, GAL or of some influential security forces among the Spanish State) but the result of a complex web of relational patterns and practices that shape and are shaped by the interactions among a variety of actors and parties involved in contention, as well as by surrounding, at times contingent, events and circumstances.46 The idea that the violence and terror unleashed by the Spanish State was equivalent to ETA’s violence, in the sense that the former would not have happened without the latter, is not entirely wrong but misses a crucial point. Key to the theoretical underpinning of this book is to underline that conflict is both imagined and performed, and this duality is crucial when examining the nature of violence but also when analysing the logics of escalation that eventually led to a campaign of assassination.47 From the outset and all the way through, this book is thus inspired by the notion of ‘mimetic theory’ and its idea that we imitate the desire of others and that the contagious negative reciprocity of desire very often leads to rivalry and cycles of vengeance.48 Every opponent swears by their radical difference, pushing the other into the realm of inhumanity through the language of complete eradication.49 The escalation of violence is perpetuated by, and contingent upon, the effacement of differences between antagonists. Violence engenders counterviolence; counter-violence heightens the violence on the other side.50 The main sources used in this book are written sources. In exploring how ETA was perceived in Spain from its inception in the late 1950s until the creation of the GAL in the 1980s, I have relied predominantly on police archives and Spanish newspapers such as La Vanguardia and ABC for the Francoist period and El País and El Mundo for the subsequent period. In order to analyse the inception of the GAL, its structure and its activities, I have used French, Spanish and Portuguese official court records.51 For most of the court cases involving perpetrators or promoters of the GAL, I had access to the extensive summaries of the different trials and also to the relevant indictments, depositions and affidavits. In order to analyse the French perspective on Spain’s Transition and the so-called ‘Basque issue’, I consulted the Archives Nationales (Pierrefitte-Sur-Seine, France) and the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

8

Counter-terror by proxy

archives of the French Socialist Party (PS) available at the Centre d’Archive de la Fondation Jean-Jaurès (Paris). For Spain’s Transition, I relied predominantly on the archives of the technical counsellors of the Ministry of Interior between 1977 and 1984. For the Basque issue, while I consulted different series, I primarily relied on the documents of the ‘French Socialist Party’s International Relations Secretariat’ (Secretariat des relations internationales, 1970–85) and on the documents related to the different meetings of the PS with other European socialist parties (1972–96). In order to document how French authorities reacted to the Basque refugees, I also relied on the documentation available at the library-museum La Contemporaine (Nanterre), the Archives of the Comité européen de défense des réfugiés et immigrés (Forcalquier) and, last but not least, the archives of the Basque journal Enbata in Bayonne which possess a rich collection of leaflets and information pamphlets on Basque refugees. Finally, and in order to analyse the evolution of the Francoist doctrine on guerrilla and counter-insurgency warfare, I relied on the documentation available at La Contemporaine (Nanterre) and on the Biblioteca Virtual del Ministerio de defensa (online library of the Spanish Ministry of Defence). I focused on two particular sets of publications: the professional military magazine Ejército for the period 1940–75 and the internal bulletin of the Superior Centre for National Defence Studies (Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional, CESEDEN) from its creation in 1964 until the death of Franco in 1975. While my intent is to offer a thorough analysis of the historical and political conditions eliciting such conduct and their intended and unpremeditated consequences, I purposely discounted GAL perpetrators’ interviews. I did so for several reasons. Firstly, because of the very insignificant number of interviews I managed to secure. Tracking down and meeting people who had been involved in ‘wet operation’ is not a simple task. Some of them are supposedly still active in this line of business, soldiers of fortune moving from one conflict zone to another, and like Daniel Fernández Aceña embracing new causes including jihad.52 Others moved back to a criminal milieu, whether as a kingpin on Spain’s Costa del Sol, a ‘snitch’ for a Colombian drug cartel or even for the French police.53 Furthermore and unlike other activists, members of ETA and Basque militants for instance, the few GAL perpetrators I met were not only extremely reluctant to consider the possibility of an interview but also and fundamentally aware of the potential risks as some of them are still on the run and living under the threat of arrest. As will become evident on reading this book, there are still a number of unknown and unprosecuted events. Secondly, and although it might seem to my disadvantage, I also discounted these interviews because the results were not as significant as first hoped and too inconsistent to be of any use on their own. No matter how skilled one might be, conducting

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction 9 interviews comes with the idea that one can never be sure what will occur and therefore that disappointment and failure in getting access is always a possibility. The difficulties in getting access to GAL perpetrators amount to another factor that researchers dealing with oral sources know all too well. Personal recollection is a slippery world, especially if it implies memories of brutality and politically charged events. Salomé Lamas’s documentary film on a Portuguese contracted killer and member of the GAL, José Paulo de Figueiredo, is, as such, a valuable reminder.54 In her film, Lamas rightly captures the difficulties of interviewing someone who was once a soldier of fortune who fought in Mozambique, Angola and El Salvador before joining the ranks of the GAL, and who was, at the time of the film, finishing his life under a bridge in a mess of plastic bags and containers. Lamas’s film aptly leaves us with a simple yet powerful question; finally, who is really Paulo de Figueiredo? Whether one feels a certain degree of empathy or not for the character, he could be perceived either as a repugnant but retired assassin or as an ordinary homeless person, remembering his blessed childhood in Portuguese Angola. Finally, I choose not to use these interviews because the fact that GAL perpetrators endorsed or at least indulged in the use of extra-legal means in order to fight in particular against ETA and against ‘bolshies and terrorists’ more generally, was already well established in their different declarations and statements in courts. A singular and personal inclination towards violence and a certain professional ability to use it were equally demonstrated in both the legal procedures and the documentary films in which some of them were interviewed.55 Counter-terror by proxy aims at assessing the political and institutional context of the inception of this episode of the GAL, interrogating the logics and rationale at stake and offering a fuller examination of the implications of the use of unorthodox counter-terrorist strategies in a liberal democracy. The structure of the book is chronological yet based on a theoretical triptych combining theory of desire and mimetic rivalry, a social movement approach to contentious politics and a more criminological research agenda to state crime and extra-judicial killing. I undertake the argument as follows. The aim of Chapter 1 is to offer a succinct history of the Basque clandestine organisation from the late 1940s until the mid-1980s through its depictions in Spanish police and intelligence services archives, newspapers and political discourses, and to reflect upon how such representations of ETA as the ‘arch-enemy’, whose simple existence endangered the nature of Spain and its democratic future, unleashed for the agencies of a democratic state the desire to imitate ETA’s unlawful violence and thereby producing the motivation for setting up the campaign of assassination against ETA. Chapter 2 examines how the raison d’être, techniques and personnel of the intelligence and security institutions

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

10

Counter-terror by proxy

built under the Francoist regime and for the dictatorship survived the death of Franco. This chapter offers a closer look at how the institutionalised military culture of counter-subversion inherited from the Francoist period served to shape the mindset and policy of early democratic governments in Spain and thus paved the way for the implementation of the GAL. Chapter 3 closely examines the controversial and delicate issue of extradition of Basque refugees between France and Spain and how Spanish authorities were unrelenting in their attempts to persuade their French counterparts to act more vigorously against ETA. This chapter provides an overview of the uneven political and diplomatic relationships between Spain and France from the late 1930s until the mid-1980s and a thorough review of the evolution of French jurisprudence on refugees, which shifted uneasily between political sympathy, core judicial principle and pragmatism. Chapter 4 offers a detailed examination of the different actions and perpetrators involved in the GAL campaign, and the collusions and complicities it entailed. When, soon after the first actions of the GAL, serious allegations regarding the involvement of Spanish officials were raised by Basque nationalist activists, they were categorically denied. The aim of Chapter 5 is thus to examine the strategies of duplicity, maximum plausible deniability and evasion of responsibility that were employed and mobilised by the GAL activists and the Spanish authorities. The scandal surrounding GAL exposed deep-rooted problems in Spain’s security and counter-terrorism structures, which were eagerly exploited by the opposition in Madrid and by Basque nationalist groups and parties. It became not only a political embarrassment for the Spanish Socialist government but also a diplomatic issue with France. Chapter 6 examines how the Spanish State succeeded in using the GAL scandal to demonstrate the necessity for greater pan-European co-operation on the fight against terrorism, and in the case of ETA with France in particular. The Conclusion aims to scrutinise and discuss the validity of the concept of state terrorism in light of the GAL case. Many analysts have recently presented compelling arguments for rediscovering the notion in the analysis of supposedly western liberal states. Yet, in this final chapter, I argue that bringing in notions of camouflage, deception and proxy allows a better understanding of the strategies employed by contemporary liberal states to obfuscate their responsibility in the context of controversial actions taken in the name of national security and the fight against terrorism.

Notes 1 F. Reinares, ‘Democratic regimes, internal security policy and the threat of terrorism’, Australian Journal of Politics & History, 44:3, 1998, 351–71; R. D. Crelinsten, ‘The discourse and practice of counter-terrorism in liberal democracies’,

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction 11 Australian Journal of Politics and History, 44:1, 1998, 389–413; P. Chalk, ‘The liberal democratic response to terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 7:4, 1995, 10–44. 2 S. Cohen (ed.) Democracies at War Against Terrorism: A Comparative Perspective, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. P. Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response, London, Routledge, 2006. V. Jabri, ‘War, security and the liberal State’, Security Dialogue, 37:1, 2006, 47–64. 3 D. Bigo, A. Tsoukala (eds) Terror, Insecurity and Liberty: Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes after 9/11, Abingdon, Routledge, 2008; J. Reid, The Biopolitics of the War on Terror: Life Struggles, Liberal Modernity and the Defence of Logistical Societies, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2006. R. Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2005. 4 A. Neal, Exceptionalism and the Politics of Counter-Terrorism: Liberty, Security and the War on Terror, Abingdon, Routledge, 2009. R. Van Munster ‘The War on Terrorism: When the exception becomes the rule’, International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, 17:2, 2004, 141–53. 5 C. Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004. 6 C. Bassiouni, ‘The regression of the rule of law under the guise of combating terrorism’, International Review of Penal Law, 76:1/2, 2005, 17–26. A. Cassese, ‘Terrorism is also disrupting some crucial legal categories of international law’, European Journal of International Law, 12:5, 2001, 993–1001. 7 On the use of torture see E. Guild, D. Bigo, M. Gibney (eds) Extraordinary Rendition: Addressing the Challenges of Accountability, Abingdon, Routledge, 2018; A. Macklin, ‘From cooperation, to complicity, to compensation: The War on Terror, extraordinary rendition, and the cost of torture’, European Journal of Migration and Law, 10:1, 2008, 11–30; K. J. Greenberg, J. L. Dratel, The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005. On the use of drones see A. Cockburn, Kill Chain: Drones and the Rise of High-Tech Assassins, London, Verso, 2015. I. G. Shaw, ‘Predator empire: The geopolitics of US drone warfare’, Geopolitics, 18:3, 2013, 536–59. T. Wall, T. Monahan, ‘Surveillance and violence from afar: The politics of drones and liminal security-scapes’, Theoretical Criminology, 15:3, 2011, 239–54. 8 1984 address at the Park Avenue Synagogue reproduced in G. Shultz, ‘Terrorism and the modern world’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 7:4, 1985, 431–47. On the role and impact of this address, see D. Wills, The First War on Terrorism: Counter-Terrorism Policy During the Reagan Administration, New York, Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. 9 D. Starr-Deelen, Presidential Policies on Terrorism: From Ronald Reagan to Barack Obama, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014; A. S. Dal Lago, S. Palidda (eds) Conflict, Security and the Reshaping of Society. The Civilization of War, Abingdon, Routledge, 2010. 10 M. Crenshaw (ed.) The Consequences of Counterterrorism. New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 2010. L. K. Donohue, The Cost of Counterterrorism: Power,

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

12

Counter-terror by proxy

Politics and Liberty, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008. A. Brysk, G. Shafir (eds) National Insecurity and Human Rights: Democracies Debate Counterterrorism, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2007. 11 R. Leonisio, F. Molina, D. Muro (eds) ETA’s Terrorist Campaign: From Violence to Politics, 1968–2015, Abingdon, Routledge, 2016. I. Murua, Ending ETA’s Armed Campaign: How and Why the Basque Armed Group Abandoned Violence, Abingdon, Routledge, 2016. 12 F. Reinares (ed.) European Democracies Against Terrorism: Governmental Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation, Farnham, Ashgate / Oñati International Institute for the Sociology of Law, 2000. F. Jaime-Jimenez, ‘Spain: The terrorist challenge and the government’s response’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 4:4, 1992, 110–30. 13 E.-P. Guittet, Antiterrorisme clandestin, antiterrorisme officiel [Covert and official anti-terrorism], Montréal, Athéna Editions, 2010. E.-P. Guittet, ‘L’imposition de l’agenda politique espagnol à l’Europe de l’antiterrorisme’ [The Spanish political influence upon EU counter-terrorism], in D., Bigo, L., Bonelli, T.Deltombe (eds) Au nom du 11 septembre: les démocraties à l’épreuve de l’antiterrorisme [In the name of 9/11: Democracies against counter-terrorism], Paris, La Découverte, 2008, 227–33. 14 P. Woodworth, Dirty War, Clean Hands. ETA, the GAL and Spanish Democracy, London / New Haven, Yale University Press, 2002. 15 T. Whitefield, Endgame for ETA. Elusive Peace in the Basque Country, London, Hurst Publishers, 2014. For a thorough examination of the narratives employed in ETA’s communiqués and the impact of the GAL’s activities on ETA, see M. Saraxto, J. Zabalo, ‘Jarduera armatuaren armaiera. ETAren erabakirako arrozoiak’ [The end of armed activities. The reasons behind ETA’s decision], Jakin, 197, 2013, 11–32. On the impact of the GAL upon ETA’s recruitment, see F. Reinares, Patriotas de la muerte. Quienes militan en ETA y por qué [Patriots of Death. Who joined ETA and why], Madrid, Taurus, 2001. 16 M. J. Funes, ‘Social responses to political violence in the Basque country: Peace movements and their audience’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42:4, 1998, 493–510. 17 P. M. Heywood, ‘Corruption in contemporary Spain’, Political Science & Politics, 40:4, 2007, 695–9; F. Jiménez, ‘Political scandals and political responsibility in democratic Spain’, West European Politics, 21:4, 1998, 80–99. 18 ‘Quiero decir con la cara bien alta y las manos bien limpias que ni yo ni ninguno de nosotros hemos usado nunca cal viva para encubrir un asesinato.’ Extract from Aznar’s speech to the PP Convention reproduced in Aznar: ‘Nosotros nunca hemos usado cal viva para encubrir ningún asesinato’ [We have never used quicklime to cover up any murder], El Mundo, 4 October 2004. Unless otherwise noted, all translations from French, Spanish and Basque in the present book are by the author. 19 K. Allan and K. Burridge, Euphemism and Dysphemism. Language Used as Shield and Weapon, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1991. M. Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1988.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction 13 20 ‘Un concejal del PP afirma que el PSOE ha enterrado a gente en cal viva’ [A councilor of the PP says that PSOE has buried people in quicklime], El País, 3 February 2013. 21 J. Rico, ‘Pablo Iglesias: Felipe González tiene el pasado manchado de cal viva’ [Pablo Iglesias: Felipe González has the past stained with quicklime], El Periódico, 2 March 2016. 22 ‘Casado, a Sánchez: “Lecciones sobre terrorismo de un partido manchado de cal viva, ninguna”’ [From Casado to Sánchez: Lectures on terrorism from a party stained with quicklime, no way], El Diario.es, 12 December 2018. 23 J. Amedo Foucé, Cal viva: un relato estremecedor: la verdad definitiva desde las entrañas de los GAL [Quicklime. A shocking tale: the ultimate truth about the GAL’s innards], Madrid, La esfera de los libros, 2013. 24 J. Amedo Foucé, La conspiración, el último atentado de los GAL [The conspiracy, the final attack from the GAL], Madrid, Espejo de Tinta, 2006. 25 ‘Aparecen los cadáveres de Lasa y Zabala tras haber sido torturados y enterrados en cal viva’ [The corpses of Lasa and Zabala appear after being tortured and buried in quicklime], El Mundo, 21 March 1995. 26 J. L. Morales, T. Toda, M. Imaz, La trama del G.A.L. [The GAL plot], Madrid, Editorial Revolución, 1988. J. Garcia, Los GAL al descubierto: La trama de la ‘Guerra Sucia’ contra ETA [The GAL uncovered: the plot of the dirty war against ETA], Madrid, El País-Aguilar, 1988. M. Miralles, R. Arques, Amedo, el Estado contra ETA [Amedo, the State against ETA], Barcelona, Plaza y Janes, 1989. L. Alvaro Baeza, Gal, Crimen de Estado [GAL, State’s crime], Madrid, ABL Press, 1995. M. Cerdán, A. Rubio, El ‘caso interior’: GAL, Roldan y fondos reservados, el triángulo negro de un ministerio [The Home Office case: GAL, Roldan and the reserved funds, the black triangle of a ministry], Madrid, Temas de hoy, 1995. A. Rubio Campana, A. Cerdán, M. Alenda, El origen del GAL. Guerra sucia y crimen de Estado [The origins of the GAL. Dirty war and State’s crime], Madrid, Temas de hoy, 1997. E. Bayo, GAL: punto final [GAL: final point], Barcelona, Plaza y Janes, 1997. M. Miralles, A. Onetti, GAL: la historia que sacudió el país [GAL: the story that shook the country], Madrid, Esfera de los Libros, 2006. M. Cerdán, El informe Jano [The Jano report], Madrid, Plaza & Janes, 2010. A. Muñoz Molina, La puerta de la infamia: crónicas del caso Marey [The door of infamy: chronicles of the Marey case], Úbeda, Fundación Huerta de San Antonio, 2015. A. M. Pascual Cuenca, T. Rilo Cabezas, Cherid, un sicario en las cloacas del Estado [Cherid, a hitman in the State’s sewers], Madrid, El Garaje Ediciones, 2019. 27 H. Cano Jauregui, Twist, Zarautz, Susa, 2011. F. Letamendia, La mujer en la cueva [The woman in the cave], Bilbao, Txertoa, 2012. E. Portela, El eco de los disparos [The echo of the shots], Barcelona, Galaxia Gutenberg, 2016. L. Falcón, El honor de dios [The honour of god], Barcelona, el viejo topo, 2016. E. Portela, Mejor la ausencia [Better the absence], Barcelona, Galaxia Gutenberg, 2017. Harkaitz Cano Jauregi’s novel Twist published in Basque in 2011 and subsequently translated into Spanish and into English is among the very few novels that explore the issue of the abduction and assassination of Lasa and Zabala with great sensibility and literary talent. For the English translation, see

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

14

Counter-terror by proxy

H. Cano Jauregui, Twist [trans. A. Gabantxo], New York, Archipelago Books, 2018. 28 The first fiction film on the GAL was produced by the French filmmaker Miguel Courtois, GAL. En el punto de mira [GAL in the spotlight] in 2006. The films Lasa y Zabala [Lasa and Zabala] produced by the Basque filmmaker Pablo Malo and Sanctuaire [Sanctuary] produced by the Belgian filmmaker Olivier Masset-Depasse were released in 2014 and 2015 respectively. To date, they are the only fictional films related to the GAL. Bruno Fay and Xavier Muntz’s documentary-film GAL: des tueurs d’État [GAL: State’s killers] and Salome Lamas’s Terra de ninguem [No man’s land], both released in 2012, are the first to include interviews with GAL perpetrators. Prior to 2010, one should also mention here Arthur Mc Caig and Julio Medem who were among the first filmmakers to include testimonies of the GAL victims in their documentary films. A. Mc Caig, Terreur d’Etat au Pays basque [State terror in the Basque country]; J. Medem, La pelota vasca: la piel contra la piedra [The Basque ball: skin against stone]. 29 A. Zapico, Zubigileak [Those who build bridges], Bilbao, Astiberri ediciones, 2018; J. De Isusi, Baleak ikusi ditut [I have seen whales], Bilbao, Astiberri ediciones, 2014; B. Segui, F. Cava, Las oscuras manos del olvido [The dark hands of oblivion], Barcelona, Norma Editorial, 2014. 30 To date, only two academic volumes have been published in French on the subject: L. Thouverez, Violence d’État et Médias – Le traitement informatif du GAL dans la presse française et espagnole de référence (1983–1986) [State violence and media. The GAL in the French and Spanish mainstream media], Institut Universitaire Varenne / Paris, LGDJ, 2011, and E.-P. Guittet, Antiterrorisme clandestin, antiterrorisme officiel, Montréal, Athéna éditions, 2009. 31 B. Aretxaga, States of Terror: Begoña Aretxaga’s Essays, Reno, University of Nevada Press, 2005. O. G. Encarnación, ‘Democracy and dirty wars in Spain’, Human Rights Quarterly, 29:4, 2007, 950–72. P. Ciocchini, S. Khoury, ‘The “war on terror” and Spanish state violence against Basque political dissent’, in S. Poynting, D. Whyte (eds) Counter-Terrorism and State Political Violence: The ‘War on Terror’ as Terror, London, Routledge, 2012, 178–96. 32 R. Sola, ‘La cal viva no enterró la guerra sucia’ [Quicklime did not bury the dirty war], Naiz, 15 October 2013. 33 The last time the twenty-one-year-old militant was seen was during a shooting between IK and French Gendarmerie on 7 August 1983 in a camping site in the south-west of France. More than three decades after, the context of his disappearance is still a mystery and his body has never been found. On the genesis and history of Iparretarrak, see E. Bidegain, Iparretarrak (IK). Histoire d’une organisation politique armée [Iparretarrak. History of a political armed group], Larressore, Gatuzain, 2007. 34 A third message, ‘Herriak bizi behar du’ (the [Basque] people must live), is written on another wall close by under a giant painting of the ikurriña, the Basque flag. This sentence is the motto of Iparretarrak. 35 ‘Familiares de Brouard y Muguruza denuncian el “doble rasero” del Estado en el aniversario de sus asesinatos’ [Relatives of Brouard and Muguruza denounce

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction 15 the State’s ‘double standard’ on the anniversary of their murders], Publico, 20 November 2019. 36 Jon Anza Ortuñez went missing in April 2009 while transporting a large sum of money to an ETA meeting. In a statement released in May 2009, ETA claimed him as a member and blamed Spanish police for his disappearance. His body appeared in a morgue in Toulouse a year later in March 2010. The circumstances surrounding his disappearance and death are still unclear. See J. Zinkunegi, J. J. Petrikorena, Jon Anza: ¿el último crimen de Estado? [Jon Anza: the last State crime?], Tafalla, Txalaparta, 2010; G. Taberna, ‘La quête de vérité dix ans après la disparition de Jon Anza’ [The search for truth ten years after the disappearance of Jon Anza], Mediabask, 18 April 2019. 37 E. Goenaga (ed.) GAL hogeita hamar urte [GAL, thirty years later], Donostia/ Andoain, Elkar Argitaletxea/Berria, 2013. 38 The Committee for the Defence of Human Rights in the Basque Country (Comité de Défense des Droits de l’Homme en Pays Basque) was created in July 1984 by Basque Human Rights activists and members of the French Human Rights League (Ligue des Droits de l’Homme). They were concerned with the increasing violence of anti-Basque death squads such as the GAL and the poor level of reaction from French Human Rights organisations at the fore of the growing dissonance between the praised French tradition of political asylum and the implementation of special rules for the deportation of Basque refugee (see Chapter 3). 39 ‘gerla zikinean frantses estatuaren esku hartzearen argitzeko herri ekimena’ [in Basque: to remember and to denounce: a popular initiative to clarify the role of the French state in the dirty wars], Bayonne, Oroit eta Sala, 1998. 40 Ley 29/2011, de 22 de septiembre, de Reconocimiento y Protección Integral a las Víctimas del Terrorismo [2011 Law of Recognition and Comprehensive Protection for Victims of Terrorism]. See J. Argomaniz, ‘State responses to victims of terrorism needs in Spain’, in J. Argomanitz, O. Lynch (eds) International Perspectives on Terrorist Victimisation, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, 124–48. 41 B. Talegón, ‘Las víctimas de GAL, sin indemnización’ [The GAL’s victims without compensation], Diario 16, 18 July 2019. On the treatment of victims of terrorism in Spain, see R. Alonso, ‘Victims of ETA’s terrorism as an interest group: Evolution, influence, and impact on the political agenda of Spain’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 29:6, 2017, 985–1005. S. Baby, ‘Les victimes oubliées de la transition espagnole’ [The forgotten victims of the Spanish transition], Histoire@Politique, 29:2, 2016, 88–104. 42 M. Zernova, ‘Restorative justice in the aftermath of politically-motivated violence: the Basque experience’, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 12:4, 2019, 649–72; J. Fernández Vázquez, ‘After the quarantine: A closer look at monuments to victims of ETA in the Basque country and Navarre’, Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies, 19:2, 2018, 209–32; J.–M. Landa, ‘Human rights and politically-motivated violence in the Basque country’, Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 12:2, 2013, 7–29. 43 S. Malešević, The Sociology of War and Violence, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010; S. N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War,

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

16

Counter-terror by proxy

Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006; C. Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003. 44 X. Crettiez, L. Mucchielli (eds) Les violences politiques en Europe [Political violence in Europe], Paris, La Découverte, 2010. D. Della Porta, ‘Research on social movements and political violence’, Qualitative Sociology, 31:3, 2008, 221–30; D. Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995. 45 R. Collins, Violence: A Micro-Sociological Theory, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2009; Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence. 46 L. Bosi, C. Demetriou, S. Malthaner (eds) Dynamics of Political Violence: A Process-Oriented Perspective on Radicalization and the Escalation of Political Conflict, Farnham, Ashgate, 2014. 47 C. Nordstrom, Robben, A. (eds) Fieldwork Under Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Culture, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1995; A. Feldman, Formations of Violence. The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1991. 48 R. Girard, La violence et le sacré [Violence and the sacred], Paris, Grasset, 1972. 49 E. Brighi, A. Cerella, ‘An alternative vision of politics and violence: Introducing mimetic theory in international studies’, Journal of International Political Theory 11:1, 2015, 3–25. H. Wydra, ‘Towards a new anthropological paradigm: The challenge of mimetic theory’, International Political Anthropology, 1:1, 2008, 161–74. 50 H. Wydra, Politics and the Sacred, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015. 51 The various documents are listed in the first part of the bibliography at the end of this volume. 52 ‘La juez envía a prisión al yihadista que fue sicario de los GAL en los 80’ [The judge sent to jail the jihadist who was a GAL hitman in the 1980s], El País, 15 December 2016. In 2018, Daniel Fernández Aceña, ex-member of the GAL, was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment by the National Court (Audiencia Nacional) for the crime of ‘terrorism self-indoctrination’ (delito de autoformación terrorista). ‘Condenado a cuatro años el exmiembro de los GAL reconvertido al yihadismo’ [The exmember of the GAL converted to Jihad sentenced to four years’ imprisonment], El País, 12 June 2018. 53 J. Gil, ‘Del GAL a soplón del narco. El exinspector Domínguez trabajaba como chivato para una red colombiana de traficantes’ [From the GAL to narco snitch. Former Police inspector Domínguez worked as an informant for a Colombian trafficking network], El País, 4 October 2014; E. Fansten, ‘Stups: le “chacal”, source du scandale’ [French DEA: the ‘Jackal’ source of the scandale], Libération, 28 September 2017. ‘Pays basque: quand les “stups” français recyclaient un ancien tueur du GAL’ [Basque country: when French DEA was recycling a former GAL killer], Sud-Ouest, 29 September 2017. 54 S. Lamas. Terra de ninguém, O Som e a Fúria, 2012, 72 min. 55 Lamas, Terra de ninguém. Fay, Muntz, GAL: des tueurs d’État.

1

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Arch-enemy: Euskadi Ta Askatasuna

Since the terrorists want war, they will get it, and they will get it with all the consequences. Manuel Fraga Iribarne, Minister of Interior, 1976 ETA military is a sinister brood that Spain needs to exterminate. All the repressive means at the reach of the power must be employed in an all-out battle, without mercy against these scavenger beasts. Pedro J. Ramírez, Spanish journalist, 1981

Praised for the beauty of its thickly wooded mountains, the Basque country, a thorn-shaped slice of land that cuts into both Spain and France along their Atlantic seaboard, is also quite commonly and widely known as the centre of a conflict between a militant separatist organisation and Spain.1 From its inception during the 1950s until its declaration of self-dissolution in 2018, ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, Basque Country and Freedom) was a terrible thorn in the side of the Spanish State, for two diametrically opposed political regimes: the dictatorial regime of the Caudillo Francisco Franco (1936–75) followed by a parliamentary monarchy since then. After six decades of deadly activities, the Basque militant organisation is no more. ETA announced the definitive and unconditional cessation of its activities in October 2011. Six years later, in April 2017, the Basque organisation transmitted the list of its last weapons stashes to the French authorities. On 20 April 2018 the group made a full and unambiguous apology for its actions, accepting that it bore ‘direct responsibility’ for years of bloodshed and misery and, in May 2018, the Executive Director of the Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva confirmed the reception of ETA’s official final declaration on its dissolution. ETA is no more. But these successive and somehow historical announcements from the Basque armed organisation over the past few years have aroused only limited interest and mixed reactions, between distrust and general indifference.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

18

Counter-terror by proxy

For numerous security-led policy commentators across Spain and around the world, the end of ETA is not the defining challenge of our times. For many, our current political predicament is to fight back deterritorialised and messianic violence with its procession of suicide attacks. Consequently, localised and long-lasting revolutionary repertoires of violence are very often seen as old stories, part of a bygone era and promise to be wiped out by the intensity of religious forms of violence. Spouting quotes from Mao and adopting a Third Word and anti-capitalist radical outlook seem to be out-of-date and – in European countries at least – the pro-independence armed struggle seems to arouse much less enthusiasm than it once did. Last armed insurrection in western Europe and cumbersome remnant of a bested romanticised view of revolutionary violence for some, residue of a group more criminal than political for others, the end and dissolution of the Basque organisation ETA appears, for many, as a sort of anachronism. And yet, one might remember that for quite a long time ETA was regarded as one of western Europe’s most virulent movements, second only to the Provisional Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland. With ETA one is talking about a clandestine organisation which was not only at the centre of the Spanish political, police and judicial agenda – from a dictatorial regime to a European liberal democracy – but also at the very heart of police co-operation between France and Spain and subsequently at European level. The Basque conflict and the self-dissolution of ETA are far from being anecdotal. Gora Euskadi, long live the Basque country: the appearance of this slogan in the mid-1950s on the walls of several cities in the Basque country heralded the arrival of an organisation which no one, not even its founders,2 imagined would progressively come to occupy such a considerable political and symbolic space over nearly sixty years. The conflict between ETA and the Spanish State has enthralled generations of scholars. For decades, historians, social scientists and anthropologists have investigated the various forms of violence, delved into the convoluted story of ETA and investigated its fissiparous tendencies, explored the evolution and tactical choices of the militant organisation and discussed its impacts upon Basque and Spanish politics and populations. Until the late 1990s, most of the academic literature dedicated to ETA and the Basque conflict was written in Spanish, French or Basque. The language divide and the undeniably byzantine interplay between ETA, Basque political factions and Spanish politics may have prevented many English-speaking scholars from investigating anew the contentious situation.3 However, and since the mid-2000s – following ETA’s 2006 ceasefire and the violation of its own truce – the history, evolution, characteristics and demise of the Basque militant organisation have triggered a far more important number

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Arch-enemy 19 of academic publications in English.4 The more recent historiography on ETA also benefited from the renewed interest in the question of how militant groups end.5 Subsequently, the history of the Basque conflict, the growth of ETA, its connection to Basque politics, culture and society, the deadly activities of the militant organisation and eventually its demise are now widely known. However, and despite the increasing number of memoirs published by former members of ETA6 and the quite incredible amount of activist archives available to researchers,7 insights into the inner workings of the secretive organisation and the militants’ perspectives are still comparatively unexplored.8 There are an important number of robust studies analysing ETA’s legitimising discourses and grand narratives of violence. The representations of the ‘Spaniard’ hatred other within the Basque militants’ rhetoric and its impact upon the strategies deployed by the organisation are also widely discussed.9 Beyond the sole case of ETA, one knows all too well that the language and representations used to justify a particular cause and to define, and indeed to demonise, the enemy are intimately and intricately linked to the violence practised. Portrayal of violence has deleterious effects. Proliferation of aggressive speech feeds into and feeds upon violence, its representations and dynamics. While Basque militant narratives have been analysed and commented on over the years of activity of the militant organisation, very little has been said so far on the evolution of the representations of ETA among Spanish security forces and within political and intellectual circles.10 The purpose of this chapter is to address this shortcoming. ETA became increasingly and inexorably the Spanish enemy number one, an arch-enemy whose simple existence endangered the nature of Spain and its democratic future. In briefly retracing the inception and rise of ETA from the 1950s until the dawn of the 1980s, I intend to reflect upon how such representations of ETA as an evil force that inexorably undermined Spanish society’s most cherished values and institutions could have unleashed for the agencies of a democratic state the desire to imitate its unlawful violence and therefore produced the motivation for setting up the campaign of assassination against ETA.

‘Outlaw’ – from Basque culture to armed struggle (1950–68) Basque nationalism and its party (Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea, Partido Nacional Vasco, PNV) emerged at the end of the nineteenth century and expanded therein.11 Following the Civil War (1936–39), however, it was defeated, militarily and politically. As a result of the successful coup orchestrated by Franco, the Basque Nationalist Party had been once again outlawed and

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

20

Counter-terror by proxy

condemned to reorganise itself in exile, between New York and Paris.12 Within the Basque region, nationalism was culturally overpowered by the Francoist policy of linguistic and cultural homogenisation, involving sporadic but severe repression.13 Basque nationalism was still alive though in terms of hidden familiar culture and somehow survived here and there, mainly among members of the rural Catholic clergy.14 In the years following the end of the Second World War, when Francoist repression was driving many Basque nationalist leaders into exile, the PNV appeared unable or unwilling to fight against the regime and to channel nationalism into effective opposition to the dictatorship. At the beginning of the 1950s ETA was no more than a small group of students, mainly from the private and Jesuit University of Deusto in Bilbao, and young PNV members who were disaffected with what they perceived as their elders’ immobilism. They were feverishly reading illegal nationalist magazines from the Spanish Civil War (such as Gudari, the magazine of the Basque soldiers) and books printed in Buenos Aires by the Basque publisher Ekin editorial (Ekin argitaletxea) and disseminated all over the world through the networks of the Basque diaspora.15 ETA was born out of a tiny, obscure study group (‘Ekin’, ‘action’ in Basque) composed of young idealistic individuals in search of their culture, their language and their identity at a time when the Francoist dictatorship allowed only Spanish nationalism and violently forbade any other form of expression. One could say that what initially drew those young people together was the need to do something, anything really. ETA is the gradual gathering, between 1952 and 1959, of these young Basques from ‘Ekin’ and from the PNV youth wing, Euzko Gatzedi Indarra (Basque Youth Force) around a common project: to set free the Basque country and the desire to give dignity and prestige to Basque nationalism, in Basque territory. The project was certainly ambitious but for several years these young people would have no idea of the strategy to be adopted, in the medium and long term, to achieve their ends. In 1956, the government-in-exile of José Antonio Aguirre organised a gathering of the Basque intellectual and political elites in Paris.16 When two members of the ‘Ekin group’ presented their views to this first ‘World Basque Congress’, their argument for the necessity of armed struggle was essentially a contentious pro forma statement not backed up by any real capacity for action. By 1959, the Ekin group had abandoned any hope of moving the PNV towards a more aggressive policy against the Francoist regime, and ETA was created. In its early years, ETA’s activity seems to have consisted mostly of theorising and of protesting by hanging forbidden Basque flags (ikurriña), painting nationalist graffiti and distributing leaflets.17 The use of violence and direct action was still controversial and provoked heated debates among the members.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Arch-enemy 21 When and how the Francoist regime started keeping track of the organisation and its members is a moot point. ETA was part of the Basque nationalist scene from the mid-1950s but was far from being an obsession at the time for the Francoist regime. The intelligence units of the Spanish military police force (Guardia Civil) knew nearly nothing about ETA.18 They were much more preoccupied with the elimination of those pockets of tenacious antiFrancoist guerrilla fighters in Andalucía, Galicia and Cataluña19 perceived by the regime as thugs (bandoleros)20 under the orders of the real bête noire of the regime, the worldwide Communist movement and its national counterpart, the Spanish Communist Party (Partido Comunista de España). The Francoist regime was indeed deeply anti-Communist, anti-liberal and hyper-nationalist, and dreaded any form of rebellion. This conflation of political opposition with unbearable and criminal disorder and a strong determination to chase down and punish those ‘forces from abroad who aim[ed] to overthrow the Spanish regime’ 21 were equally shared by the Francoist political police.22 The Brigadas Político-Social y de Investigación Criminal (the Social-Political and Criminal investigation brigades, also known as Brigada Político-Social, BPS) were created in 1941 in order to investigate and suppress all forms of anti-state tendencies.23 In order to maintain the law and order of the Francoist ‘New State’, the BPS originally benefited from the knowhow of the Nazi Secret State police during the Second World War24 but also from a complete reorganisation of the control over the territory through the implementation of regional agencies25 and ultimately from vast networks of informers across Spain.26 In the 1950s, the BPS was more concerned with quelling students’ activism and labour struggles, both perceived by the regime as intolerable forms of seditions and violations of the new Spanish way of life. If the fight against Communism, socialism and anarcho-syndicalism were the highest priorities of the regime, the Francoist secret state police were none the less keeping an eye on the whereabouts of the exiled PNV. Stamping out any kind of ‘regional disturbance’ that might arise anywhere on the Spanish territory and therefore compromise the peace and tranquillity of the regime was entirely part of the core missions of the Francoist police. In a 1950 internal news-sheet of the BPS, recollecting the list of the clandestine political activities in Spain squashed during the previous year, mention is made of the ‘dismantling of an extremely dangerous separatist web’ of Basque student activists in Bilbao.27 In a similar document produced in 1951 and establishing a summary of the ‘clandestine disturbance’ for the year 1950, the BPS reached the conclusion of the ‘existence of a secessionist ferment’ within the Basque country.28 Since the access to the BPS archives is still unfortunately denied, it would be a delicate matter to establish firmly when ETA appears as a subject of concern of its own for the political police.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

22

Counter-terror by proxy

One can only assume that this moment might have been correlated to the ideological evolution of ETA towards a more leftist agenda and to the very first violent actions perpetrated by the organisation. In the early 1960s, as the mental frameworks of ETA’s members were progressively shaped by national liberation movements taking place elsewhere in the world, not only by the rise of student dissents across Spanish universities but also, and ultimately, by the local resurgence of workers’ movements in the Basque country,29 the organisation became increasingly politically focused. Fascinated with leftist insurgencies and anti-colonial struggles in Indochina, Cuba and Algeria, some members of the Basque clandestine organisation were starting to envision an independent, socialist Basque country. The justification of violence inexorably gathered pace in the early 1960s. The attempt to derail a train carrying supporters to Francoist commemorative celebrations in San Sebastián on 18 July 1961 is the first known violent action planned by ETA, and yet a terrible failure for the organisation, with numerous arrests. Interestingly though, in the recollection of the disrupted clandestine activities for the year 1961, a BPS internal report dated January 1962 laid less emphasis on the failed attempt to derail a train than on the fact that, on the same day, members of ETA burned Spanish flags.30 None the less, ETA in the early 1960s was identified by the regime as an expression of Basque separatism involved in social and labour unrest. ETA, as a group of young Basque people engaged in ‘activities contrary to the principle of the regime’, began to be a target for further police investigation.31 In an internal report from the Francoist secret police dating from March 1962 and related to the arrest of members of ETA caught for painting subversive content and distributing brochures on Basque separatism, the document underlined the fact that they were also possessing ‘Astra 600/43 9 mm parabellum’, semi-automatic pistols made in Spain for the German military police during the Second World War.32 This was yet more evidence of the dangerousness of the Basque organisation for the police, even if one could argue, that in the early 1960s, carrying a gun for the members of ETA was still a pose, a numinous object lost in endless theoretical debates rather than a device to be used. None the less, the BPS was indeed tracking down ETA. In subsequent internal reports produced during the period 1962–64, one can realise how incredibly informed the BPS was about ETA. The increasing arrests, the use of routine torture and undercover informers within ETA, gave the police a serious advantage over the militant organisation.33 Even the whereabouts of the militants who fled to France in order to avoid arrest and to hold the first assembly of the organisation were known to the Francoist police. In a 43-page internal report from the political police written in September 1962,34 two-thirds of the document is a catalogue of the names and precise addresses of alleged members of ETA living in France – between

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Arch-enemy 23 Bayonne, Biarritz and Paris – and of the names of their contacts within the Popular Liberation Front (Frente de Liberación Popular)35 or the French Unified Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste Unifié).36 Between 1962 and 1967, from its first General Assembly to its fifth, ETA underwent a fratricide ideological evolution, striving to unite Basque nationalism with Third Worldism and revolutionary warfare, connecting the dots between national and social revolution.37 These internal debates over the primacy of the nationalist or the class struggle would remain constant throughout the organisation’s convoluted history. ‘Armed struggle’ was still a discourse, though – one imbued with the ordinary radical outlook of the time when Mao’s Little Red Book or Che’s Guerrilla Warfare were waved to initiate, interrupt or close a debate.38 If Basque militants were more and more signing their contributions in the organisation’s main publication ‘Zutik’ (stand up) with a ‘gora munduko langileak’ (long life to the workers of the world) or with a disturbing ‘askatasuna ala hill’ (freedom or death), most of them continued to read, write and experience the revolution on paper. Other unfortunates though, arrested and sentenced, were living the harsh realities of the Francoist repression. In 1965, the strategy of armed struggle was adopted by ETA. The core assumption of the group at the time was that multiplying actions against the regime would necessarily activate a broader repression that would fall not just on the perpetrators but on the broader population, pushing them into sympathy with ETA. This support would then enable the group to carry out bigger actions which in turn would produce even more repression and therefore even more sympathy. This spiral of ‘action-reaction-action’ would continue until it produced either a popular insurrection or a capitulation by the Francoist regime to the group’s demands.39 If that strategy was perceived by the members of ETA as an intuitively satisfying and promising one, it was not put into motion at that time. The different factions within ETA were still arguing and fighting vehemently over the leadership of the organisation. Two years later though, in 1967, the ‘action-reaction-action’ strategy was ratified by ETA’s fifth assembly. ETA got rid of its old nationalist reactionary rags and mimicking the Vietminh, started to structure itself in different fronts: political, economic, military and cultural. What the available police archives during that period suggest is that, while they were fully aware of ETA’s tortuous internal debates through the reading of the organisation’s publications and the information gathered from apprehended activists, the police seem to have been puzzled none the less about ETA’s agenda and motives. Was ETA the expression of a ‘stubborn separatism’, a dangerous form of ‘deep-seated nationalism-terrrorism’ 40 but limited to the Basque regions or was it part of a broader Communist Partydriven plan aiming at connecting every single anti-Francoist actor into a

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

24

Counter-terror by proxy

unified front to overthrow the regime?41 That issue notwithstanding, the Francoist regime was clear not only about south-west France being used as an intolerable rear base and haven for the Basque militants but also on the necessity to crush any kind of subversive activities. At a time when the regime was hoping to enhance Spanish prestige by opening its borders to mass tourism,42 it was equally obvious that dealing with ‘acts of subversion’ had to be done efficiently yet discreetly. Actions perpetrated by or against the Basque organisation were hardly ever acknowledged in the Spanish daily newspapers.

‘Anti-Spain’ – from regional dissidence to national enmity (1968–75) The year 1968 was pivotal. In January 1968, José María Quesada Lasarte (aka ‘Jaime’), one of the very first members of ETA, died from the consequences of ill-treatment and torture he received during his time in jail. In April, the Francoist regime violently quelled the prohibited celebration of the Day of the Basque Homeland (Aberri Eguna) in San Sebastián during the Easter holidays. Two months later, on 7 June 1968, the first killing by ETA came unplanned, almost by accident. Stopped at a roadblock, a leading member of ETA, Xabier Etxebarrieta Ortiz (aka ‘Txabi’) shot dead a Civil Guardsman, José Antonio Pardines, and was then killed in turn. The death of Txabi – the first member of the Basque organisation to kill and to be killed – was a triggering event for ETA. The death of the Guardia Civil member Pardines was equally decisive for the military police force and for the Francoist regime.43 Consumed by a desire to avenge the death of the first ‘martyr of the revolution’, the members of ETA found themselves dragged into the very cycle of action-reaction-action they approved. Almost twenty years after its inception in the 1950s, ETA planned its first assassination and shot dead on 2 August 1968 the police inspector Melitón Manzanas González, zealous member of the BPS of San Sebastián.44 ETA’s strategy of action-reaction-action was indeed largely based on an interrelated set of assumptions and a rather mechanical understanding of the repression. None the less, it was not altogether without meaning. The Francoist regime did react brutally to the assassination of Melitón Manzanas by declaring yet another state of emergency over the Basque territory in August 1968 and extending it over the entire nation six months later, in January 1969.45 Melitón Manzanas’s supervisor, Luis Fernández Tomas – who had been in charge of policing the region of Vizcaya since 1963 – was discharged and replaced by a colleague from Barcelona, Antonio Juan Creix, a man known for his success against the anti-Francoist guerrillas in Cataluña and his merciless repression of student protests in 1962 in Barcelona.46

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Arch-enemy 25 While ETA was committed to prove its strategy right by multiplying successful robberies, blowing up statues, printing and distributing great quantities of leaflets, the number of brutal and excessive arrests among the Basque population escalated by the thousands.47 The scale of repression did produce a wave of protests, including a notable opposition to the state of emergency by the Bishop of San Sebastián. It did very little to halt ETA’s campaign of violence though, even if the police eventually had some success in capturing core members of ETA’s military leadership. For the very first time since its inception, ETA reached national coverage. In the pages of the Spanish daily newspapers such as La Vanguardia and ABC, ETA was presented as a ‘Basque anarchist and separatist group’, a disruptive ‘terrorist organisation’ and its members simply perceived as ‘extremists’ and ‘terrorists’.48 Following the condemnation in July 1969 of three members of ETA, the newspaper La Vanguardia republished the press release from the military headquarters (Capitanía General): The War Council [Consejo de Guerra] considers that the following facts are proven: the separatist organisation ETA, which is clandestine and illegal, exists and its purposes are to disturb the internal order, to dishonour the Spanish nation and its fundamental institutions, to destroy the organisation of the State and to dismember a part of the national territory through propaganda, subversive action, terrorism and social sedition. […] ‘Zutik’, ETA’s clandestine organ, is profoundly anti-Spanish and is the mouthpiece of the organisation.49

In a subsequent press release from the military headquarters of Burgos dated August 1969 and republished in the national press, the emphasis was on not only how despicable the existence of a ‘Marxist subversive organisation’ such as ETA was but also on the abomination of separatism perceived as an unbearable dismembering of the national body.50 The fact that Francoist media relied only on law enforcement sources and reproduced them faithfully should be hardly a surprise. Neither, incidentally, should the fact that a regime that looked upon itself as the only true possible protector of ‘Spanish national unity and concord’ feared separatism and subversion. At the dawn of the 1970s, ETA personified both Francoist main fears and, gradually, outshone other clandestine organisations in the regime’s pantheon of national foes. The Basque militant organisation was indeed a force for Franco to reckon with and, moreover, one that possessed a broad base of support in the Basque country.51 But it was also, and at the same time, an organisation riddled with internal disputes and always on the verge of splitting up. Following its sixth assembly in August 1970, ETA did break up into two irreconcilable factions, ETA Fifth Assembly (ETA-V) with the original members of ETA and ETA Sixth Assembly (ETA-VI) composed of activists much more oriented towards a class-based struggle.52

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

26

Counter-terror by proxy

In many ways, the December 1970 Burgos trial came as a blessing for the Basque militant organisation characterised by political factionalism and terribly weakened by the repression. During that trial, where foreign correspondents were invited into the courtroom, sixteen ETA militants were accused of various acts of terrorism and six of them accused of having murdered the police officer Melitón Manzanas. While the Francoist regime thought it would dishearten Basque separatism in particular and any other form of subversion more generally, it eventually worked the other way around by taking the case out of the confines of the Basque provinces and giving it a national and international dimension.53 By exposing the ferocity of the regime, the trial enhanced the international reputation of ETA members as ‘freedom fighters’, giving the Basque quest for independence a heroic halo.54 Massive demonstrations in Spain, the rest of Europe and the United States aided the lawyers’ strategy of procedural stalling as a means of staving off a death sentence for the defendants. Assailed by international protest, attacked even by his own Catholic church, Franco backed down. The activists’ death sentences were commuted. The Burgos trial was ETA’s first significant international exposure, and the unforeseen positive effect of the trial upon ETA’s reputation was a serious disaster for the Francoist regime. The Basque organisation garnered a lot of sympathy as the standard-bearer for the struggle against Franco. Obviously, the militant organisation and its associated odium occupied centre stage in the conduct of the authoritarian regime. This new central role of ETA took a step further on 20 December 1973 with the assassination in Madrid of Franco’s closest adviser and newly chosen Prime Minister, Luis Carrero Blanco. The blast of the explosion was so powerful that it sent Carrero’s car hurtling into the air. Not only the first action perpetrated outside Basque country, it was also the first action that received extensive visual coverage in the Spanish and international press.55 At that point, ETA’s prestige was extraordinary within Basque society and outside; ‘Operación ogro’, the code name of assassination, was highly praised all around the world as a wonderful coup against the fascist regime.56 The admiral Carrero Blanco, bred in the Civil War, was indeed a powerful advocate of a non-reformist line of the regime. Devoted anti-Communist and ultra-Catholic nationalist, Carrero was seen as the one who would guarantee the continuation of pure Francoism – by force if necessary – after the death of an ageing Franco.57 In confronting the regime right into the streets of Madrid, the Basque militant organisation shattered the beliefs of Francoism that, since the Civil War, looked upon itself as the only way to steadily protect the unity of the nation and fighting back against the ‘AntiSpain’, those enemies from inside and outside who were tearing the true Spain apart.58

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Arch-enemy 27 In acting so violently and spectacularly, ETA exposed the vulnerability of the regime. It drove many among the variegated Francoist forces, but also among foreign observers, to wonder about the future of Spain. The death of Carrero Blanco marked a key moment for both the Francoist regime and ETA. Following the assassination of the Prime Minister, the tensions among the different forces of the regime, between the extremists and the reformists, were exacerbated.59 The intransigent Francoists, to be found mainly in the military, war veterans’ organisations and the security apparatus, were bred in the cult of the Civil War as a crusade against the evil forces.60 They demanded a return to the initial combative nature of the regime, adhering more stringently to the Francoist dogma than perhaps the Caudillo himself. Twisting the famous line of Franco announcing the end of the Civil War in 1939, Blas Piñar López, founder of the ultra-right party Fuerza Nueva (New Force) declared after the death of Carrero Blanco that actually ‘war is not over yet and, unfortunately, peace never begins’.61 The technocratic reformists, under the umbrella of the Catholic organisation Opus Dei, were certainly committed to the authoritarian values of the regime, yet much more in favour of a modernisation of the institutions and open to some of the demands of what they perceived as a growing and ever stronger opposition.62 Even if the assassination of Carrero Blanco brought the regime’s most conservative segment to power culminating in cruel executions63 and yet another state of emergency,64 it did not alter a process of disintegration of the regime that started earlier in the long 1960s when Spain opened its borders, experienced the shock of cultural and economic modernity and faced a spectacular rise of students’ and workers’ conflicts across the country.65 Following the campaign of violence initiated in the mid-1960s which culminated in the death of the Francoist Prime Minister, ETA was certainly even more at the centre of political attention than previously. The sheer audacity of the attack and the fierce anti-Spanish narratives of ETA were largely perceived by the regime as confirmations – if any were needed – of the real threat posed by the Basque militant group. The idea that ETA’s campaign of violence was undermining national cohesion and unity was already well established. The thought that the Basque militant group could seriously jeopardise Francoist institutions was a growing concern among the hardliners of the regime and those nostalgic for the early days of Francoism.66 In a period of heavy social unrest and sheer uncertainty about the continuity of the regime, ETA was indeed largely perceived as a formidable force. For the hardliners of the regime, ETA was an existential threat to the national unity established by the victory of 1939. For the moderates – and to a certain extent for some in the Francoist opposition as well – ETA’s actions were rather more perceived within the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

28

Counter-terror by proxy

terrifying memories of the Civil War and its trail of fratricide pain and violence. ETA did challenge the Francoist regime but was not as necessarily forceful and potent as it was portrayed by the authorities. It was certainly not a monolithic entity either. Following its enduring internal history of splittism, ETA was indeed fractured and riven by rivalries. The death of Carrero Blanco clearly reinforced the position of those who were advocating the continuity of the ‘armed struggle’ within the Basque organisation but eventually precipitated the division between the military and the political wings. With the death of Francisco Franco in 1975, ETA was formerly divided into two separated organisations with two different types of agenda: a smaller group with ETA-M (ETA-Military) favouring the continuity and intensification of armed struggle, and the majority of the members in ETA-PM (ETA-Political-Military), much more inclined to the ballot box.67

‘Vermin’ – ETA as the greatest enemy of democracy (1975–83) In 1975, with the death of the Caudillo and the ascent of King Juan Carlos to the throne, Spain moved from being one of the most politically backward and stagnant countries in Western Europe to being an effervescent and promising liberal democracy, on its way to join NATO and the European Economic Community.68 The death of Franco and the end of his authoritarian regime combined with the discovery of market society, and begot a new era of prosperity and elation.69 ‘La Movida Madrileña’, the Madrid countercultural movement as an explosion of modern cultural expression in the capital city,70 somehow epitomised this period of hope, idealism and renegotiation of the Spanish identity.71 Whether ‘la Movida’ was a nationwide cultural renaissance or a much more localised and urban youth movement is still subject to debate.72 In 1975 none the less, Spain entered a period a profound political and societal changes and every segment of the society was deemed to move along a new way of life: a profound but long and uncertain process though, where competing actors and groups were negotiating for a way of transforming the country into a democracy by means of the laws and institutions of a dictatorship. The convoluted history of the Spanish political Transition, its spirit of ‘national reconciliation’ over divisive issues and, above all, the difficulties in breaking with the institutions and ingrained values inherited from Francoism will be discussed further in Chapter 2. The critical assessment of the Spanish Transition notwithstanding, the end of the authoritarian regime clearly induced a period of risk, uncertainty and volatility. Carlos Arias Navarro, the hardliner Premier appointed by Franco after the death of Carrero Blanco

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Arch-enemy 29 in 1973 and reappointed to the post by King Juan Carlos in 1975, was reluctant to produce more than a limited effort towards democratisation. In 1976, his successor, Adolfo Suárez, was certainly more committed to speeding up the process but strong military hostility to his reforms – and notably the legalisation in 1977 of the outlawed Spanish Communist Party – bedevilled his time in office. The pace of reform did quicken, but the negotiation process aiming at accommodating both international and domestic pressures was surrounded by violence perpetrated by various groups, factions and informal political clusters, from one extreme of the political spectrum to the other. The Marxist-Leninist First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Groups, the left-wing Maoist Revolutionary Antifascist Patriotic Front emerged strongly in the months following the death of Franco. The Transition also gave momentum to independent movements in Cataluña with Free Land (Terra Lliure) and in the Canary Islands with the Guanche Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Guanches), the armed wing of the Movement for the Self-Determination and Independence of the Canarian Archipelago (Movimiento por la Autodeterminación e Independencia del Archipiélago Canario). Foreign right-wingers living in Spain and Francoist die-hards equally indulged in assassination, bombing and arson against ‘Reds’, Basque militants and ‘progressists’ but also against any places related to them, such as bookshops, art galleries and theatres. Operating under various and misleading names, such as the Warriors of Christ the King (Guerrilleros de Cristo Rey), the Spanish Basque Battalion (Batallón Vasco Español, BVE), the Apostolic Anticommunist Alliance (Alianza Apostólica Anticomunista, also known as Triple A), the Spanish National Action (Acción Nacional Española) or the antigram ATE for Anti-Terrorism ETA (Anti-Terrorismo ETA),73 they acted every so often with the acquiescence and connivance of the Francoist nostalgics among Spanish law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The first elections in June 1977, the approval of an Amnesty Law in October the same year, the Moncloa Agreements between all the major political parties aiming at co-ordinating a common approach to economic issues and the promulgation of the Spanish Constitution in 1978 did not impede the dramatic increase of violence. ETA itself contributed to this period of extreme convulsion, exceeding by far in just a couple of years the number of deadly actions perpetrated during its entire existence under the Francoist regime. In 1977 it was responsible for eleven deaths, but in 1978 ETA killed sixty-six people. In 1979, the militant organisation was responsible for seventy-two deaths and in 1980, the figure rose to eighty-eight.74 The Spanish Transition was anything but a peaceful one.75 The multiplication of actions perpetrated by Franco-nostalgic paramilitary groups against Basque militants had a serious impact upon the evolution

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

30

Counter-terror by proxy

of the organisation. Even more so did the unexplained disappearance in 1976 of one of ETA-PM’s leaders, Eduardo Moreno Bergaretxe (aka ‘Pertur’)76 and the assassination in 1978 by the Spanish-Basque Battalion (BVE) of one of the members of the commando squad who killed Carrero Blanco five years before, José Miguel Beñarán (aka ‘Argala’).77 All these, together with the harsh repression of public protests by Spanish authorities and their inflexibility towards peripheral nationalisms, fuelled the radical view among the ranks of the military wing of ETA that nothing had changed since the death of Franco.78 To consider that ETA-M deliberately thus stepped up its armed activity in the late 1970s to press Madrid for major concessions on regional autonomy is not entirely inaccurate but fails to take full account of how the politically charged atmosphere of the Transition impacted upon the militant organisation and its members.79 The Spanish Transition – like any political transition really – was fraught with uncertainty. Public demonstrations, strikes, attacks, police repression, involutionist and anti-democratic groups and right-wing attempts to topple the government were indeed crucial in preparing the ground for a dynamic of political outbidding, for the Basque militant group. ETA’s campaign of mounting violence would eventually unfold into a war of attrition, with a greater use of explosives and a serious increase in the range of targets, including not only members of the security forces but also civilians. Beyond any doubt, ETA’s campaigns of violence during the first years of the Transition and onwards were not only significant but also impacted durably on Spanish contemporary politics and identity. The role and editorial activities of the press were decisive in this process.80 It would be certainly questionable to speak of the Spanish press as a unique actor. In the months and years after the death of Franco, the hegemonic position of the far-right newspaper El Alcázar and the Francoist dailies La Vanguardia Española and ABC was steadily challenged by new centre-left pro-democratic arrivals such as El País and Diario 16 but also by new autonomist media such as the Basque left-leaning daily Egin, and Deia, created by the Basque National party (PNV). The new Spanish printed media landscape was indeed plural and diverse. However, and besides the staunch, nostalgic and anti-reform stand of El Alcázar and Egin the voice of the Basque left, all the different newspapers embraced the Transition to democracy as a rather indisputable course of action and were committed to support and eventually defend it. This particular collaborative and protective role of the Spanish press is clearly patent in the choices made in the editorial columns of the different dailies. In contrast to the newspaper censorship of the Francoist era, during the Transition nearly all of ETA’s actions were fully reported and commented on at length. The leading articles published in the daily press between 1975

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Arch-enemy 31 and 1980 clearly amount to a unanimous condemnation of the terrorist violence perpetrated by ETA on one hand, and to the depiction of the Basque militant organisation as one of the worst enemies of democracy, if not the only one, on the other. ‘Anyone who embarked upon armed struggle is, objectively, an enemy of the people.’ 81 The rhetorical modes and tropes, metaphors and narratives one can read in these editorials were quite identical to the ones used during the successive parliamentary debates on the implementation of urgent legislation ‘for the defence of democracy against terrorism’.82 The unremitting violence of ETA was largely perceived then as a national concern against which people of all parties and horizons should join forces in defence of the construction of democracy.83 The memory of the Civil War and its trails of division and violence is undoubtedly one of the key dimensions of the Spanish Transition. The politics of consensus was indeed a value rooted in the lessons the Spanish nation had learned from the bloodshed of the Civil War; ‘Blood cries for blood and the terror thus unleashed only leads to chaos.’ 84 The here and now violence was therefore largely perceived as not only deliberately provocative but also used with the view to undermining the nation: ‘It is not just democracy that is in danger, it is even more important: the prestige of Spain, the unity of Spain, the peace of Spain.’ 85 The classic Francoist view of the indivisibility of the nation steadily morphed into a new faith in a consensus democracy as the only bulwark against the resurgence of past divisions. In the midst of an intensified campaign of ETA violence, an economic crisis and a pressurised government, Colonel Tejero, a moustachioed blackguard with a three-cornered hat, burst into Parliament with a group of paramilitary Guardia Civil and held the assembly to hostage at gunpoint on 23 February 1981. This military-led operation against Spain’s fledgling democracy, which eventually failed, was critical. It marked another step in the fight against ETA as the violence of the Basque organisation against the armed forces was largely perceived as a cause of the coup, if not the only one. While the attempted coup has reinforced democratic legitimacy,86 it has also contributed to delegitimise the use of violence even further. A few days after the attempted coup, ETA-PM declared a ceasefire. Less than a day after the political-military wing announcement, ETA’s military wing pursued its unflinching belief in armed struggle and carried on its violent course. Following the shooting of Lieutenant Colonel Ramón Romeo Rotaeche in March 1981, El País published an editorial column under the title A shooting against all (‘Un disparo contra todo’). The narrative deployed in this editorial column is emblematic of the time: There is no other assumption than that these terrorists are trying by all means to galvanise all the ‘Tejeros’ of Spain […] In their attitudes, the bandits [bandoleros] of ETA bring together the criminal cruelty, the terrible and childish

32

Counter-terror by proxy

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

arrogance of the gunmen and the chronic stupidity of their political reasoning […]. In any case, the pistol shot in the neck of Lieutenant Colonel Romeo Rotaeche, and after the last political upheavals, must serve, at least, to unite this society against a common enemy […] one should not fall into the trap of considering yesterday’s attack as a mere blow against the Armed Forces; yesterday we all have been hit again.87

In this context of democratic legitimacy, the steady nostalgia for Franco’s time among a rather important segment of the Spanish population was, in actual fact, downplayed. The tangible existence of a wide spectrum of far-right forces in the country was belittled. The inclination and capacity of all the ‘Tejeros’ in Spain to derail the democratic game were apprehended only as a regrettable yet foreseeable result of the disruptive provocations of the Basque militant group. One could not accept that reckless terrorists undermine and reverse the palpable gains achieved by the transition towards democracy. Who the true enemy was then was unequivocal. The almost classic punitive rhetoric against ETA was not used in this editorial column. It was only lurking in the background of the national solidarity’s narrative. One knows too well how the call to national unity and solidarity is a potent means for legitimising retaliatory counter-violence. As we underlined previously, the punitive rhetoric was crucial under the Francoist regime. It did not disappear with Franco’s death, though. The ultra-Catholic and Francoist Manuel Fraga, founder of the main conservative right-wing party People’s Alliance (Alianza Popular), Home Secretary and Deputy Prime Minister in Carlos Arias Navarro’s government championed this view. When the Basque industrialist Angel Berazadi was kidnapped and eventually executed by ETA, Fraga said that The assassination of Angel Berazadi highlights in all its crude rawness the authentic character of ETA, a minority of soulless fanatics […]. Since the terrorists want war, they will get it, and they will get it with all the consequences. The State will act in a civilised manner but firmly and relentlessly.88

His unambiguous declaration of war against ETA and his view of the Basque conflict as a ‘civil war’ were not always approved by his peers – publicly at least – but the punitive rhetoric according to which ETA had to be eliminated by all means necessary – even by the least conventional means – steadily found its way across the political spectrum as a valid and logical perspective.89 Though fifty ETA members should fall in combat, Spain’s hands will remain unstained by human blood. We must honour as heroes any policemen who fire upon them.90

At the dawn of the 1980s, the punitive war against the arch-enemy ETA was not only part of the ordinary set of political narratives but also and

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Arch-enemy 33 more crucially a shared view among security and intelligence services. The many lives of ETA since the 1950s, its ideological divisions and deviations, its compartmentalisation into multiple sub-groups more or less in contact, make it difficult to speak of one actor, born in the 1950s and terminated in the 2000s. Furthermore, the genesis and the subsequent evolution of ETA were not as clear-cut and linear as one might think. Odd as it may now seem, ETA was born in the 1950s not as an armed resistance group, but as a cultural enterprise to save the Basque language and its people’s customs. ETA embraced armed struggles only in the late 1960s, a decade particularly notable for its intellectual ferment and ideological struggles all around the world. ETA’s political orientations and selfrepresentations were subject to considerable disputes, change and redefinition over the years. Initially, the concept of race was held to be of the utmost importance. Then it was language and, later still, class. Within the many lives of ETA what occurred was an often-acrimonious struggle between Catholic traditionalists and left-wingers. Even those who shared a leftist political perspective indulged in factional disputes: there were MarxistLeninists, Third Worldists, Trotskyists and every shade in between. These groups argued about the name, character, function and future direction of the organisation. For years, the use of violence was a subject of endless theoretical discussions, a pose rather than a reality. ETA entered the Spanish national consciousness and gained an international audience in the 1970s with the trial of sixteen ETA militants before a military court in Burgos following the murder in August 1968 of the police commissioner Melitón Manzanas, and with the spectacular assassination of Admiral Carrero Blanco, the designated political heir of Francisco Franco on 20 December 1973. With the death of Franco in 1975 and the subsequent political transition to liberal democracy, many commentators were bewildered over ETA’s continued existence and its violent separatist agenda. ETA’s violence increased during the democratic transition and onwards. Not only did the organisation’s violence grow sharply, it became more indiscriminate, with the use of car bombs and their trails of civilian victims. Although death tolls are always subject to dispute, it is rather safe to say that casualties inflicted by ETA during its entire course amounted to around eight hundred. The vast majority of these casualties were inflicted in the nascent and then consolidated Spanish democracy. For decades and until the last known action in March 2010,91 members of ETA perpetrated thousands of violent actions against Spanish institutions and representatives, but also against Basque political representatives and civilians. It would be fair to say that no one, including its founders, would have thought that ETA would last so long. Perhaps and even more crucially as we suggest in this chapter, the language used to report incidents of violence has changed over time and so has its

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

34

Counter-terror by proxy

impact on representation and perceptions of ETA and of the Basque issue. The level of violence and the organisation’s seemingly endless ability to regenerate itself in the face of ongoing law enforcement repression has contributed even more to the production of a performative representation of ETA as one of Western Europe’s most virulent clandestine movements, second only at the time to the Provisional Irish Republican Army in NorthernIreland. At the dawn of the 1980s, in a political context where Spain was not only eager to regain its international status after decades of isolation with the Francoist regime, but also promoting its political transition as a successful one, ETA – with its seemingly perpetual violence and intractable separatist agenda – was a terrible thorn in the side of the Spanish State. Whether ETA has ever been able to reverse the course of democratisation in Spain is quite doubtful. ETA’s increase in the use of violence in the late 1970s and its multiplication of defiant actions were certainly and definitively challenging but, at the same time, the organisation was far from being a potent and coherent one. In the aftermath of the death of Francisco Franco, the separatist organisation was yet again crippled by internal fights about the options of armed activity or political engagement. By the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, the fight against terrorism had become one of the highest priorities of the Spanish authorities, multiplying the number of emergency laws and decrees. At a time when the possibility of a political negotiation with ETA was not yet completely excluded by either Madrid or the Basque Nationalist Party, the perception of the Basque militant organisation as the quintessence of terrorism, and terrorism viewed as the worst enemy of democracy, was firmly established. The ‘Basque issue’ was largely perceived back then and across Spain as a pervasive phenomenon and ETA as a tangible and insidious enemy, if not the only one.92 The Basque problem is easy to solve: it is 200 thousands guys pissing off 39 million Spaniards.93

ETA was an enemy commonly perceived as an evil force that was inexorably undermining Spanish society’s most cherished values and institutions and whose simple existence jeopardised Spain’s democratic future. One knows the ambiguities and range of meaning of such fears attached to terror and terrorism. More importantly perhaps, once the enemy as pest is confirmed as the dominant theme, the language of eradication follows quite unsurprisingly.94 One knows too well how framing influences reasoning. Contrary to the assumption that political and security elites are immune to such mechanisms, what we suggest in this chapter is that this unmistakably deep-seated hostile attitude towards ETA has grown relentlessly over the years. As our argument goes, this hostility was a basic yet necessary precondition for the implementation of the GAL campaign of assassination. The

Arch-enemy 35

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

firm belief that ETA was able to reverse the course of democratisation and endangering the nature of Spain unleashed the desire to imitate the Basque militant violence. Yet, in order to be implemented, this blatant desire to imitate forbidden repertoires of violence was to be met with a practical knowledge and an aptitude to do so. Such knowhow was to be found at the time within Spanish military, security and intelligence services created by and for the Francoist regime and hardly altered by the political transition to democracy. We will turn to this point in the next chapter.

Notes 1 The Greater Basque Country (Euskal Herria, literally the ‘Basque-speaking nation’) straddles the Spanish–French border along the western Pyrénées. The provinces of Labourd (Lapurdi), Basse-Navarre (Nafarroa Beheroa) and Soule (Zuberoa) north of the Spanish border are included in the French department Pyrénées-Atlantiques in the region of Nouvelle-Aquitaine. They form the Northern Basque country (Iparralde). South of the border (Hegoalde), the provinces of Guipúzcoa (Gipuzkoa), Vizcaya (Bizkaia), Alava (Araba) and Navarra (Nafarroa) are further divided with the first three provinces making up the Basque Autonomous Community (Euskadi) since 1979 and the latter being itself an autonomous community since 1982 (Comunidad Foral de Navarra). 2 See the memoirs of one of ETA’s founders: J. Madariaga, Zor Egiari [Deserving the truth], Tafalla, Txalaparta, 2014. See also the interview of Madariaga with the journalist Antonio Batista: A. Batista, Madariaga. De las armas a la palabra [Madariaga, from weapons to words], Barcelona, RBA ediciones, 2007. 3 The English academic literature on ETA and the Basque country was much sparser before the 2000s. There are a few notable exceptions though. See S. Payne, Basque Nationalism, Reno, University of Nevada, 1975; R. Clark, The Basques, the Franco Years and Beyond, Reno, University of Nevada Press, 1979; P. Clark, The Basque Insurgents. ETA, 1952–1980, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1984; W. Douglass, Basque Politics: A Case Study in Ethnic Nationalism, Reno, University of Nevada Press, 1985; J. Sullivan, ETA and Basque Nationalism. The Fight for Euskadi, 1890–1986, London, Routledge, 1988; J. Zulaika, Basque violence. Metaphor and Sacrament, Reno, University of Nevada Press, 1988; M. Heiberg, The Making of the Basque Nation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989; P. Clark, Negotiating with ETA. Obstacles to Peace in the Basque Country, 1975–1988, Reno, University of Nevada Press, 1990; D. Conversi, The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation, London, Hurst, 1997; W. Douglass (ed.) Basque Politics and Nationalism on the Eve of the Millennium, Reno, University of Nevada Press, 1999; C. Irvin, Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1999.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

36

Counter-terror by proxy

4 While it would be fascinating to review at length these different publications, it would venture too far beyond the scope of the present chapter. For an overview of the literature dedicated to ETA, see for instance R, Leonisio, F. Molina, D. Muro (eds) ETA’s Terrorist Campaign. From Violence to Politics, 1968–2015, London, Routledge, 2017. 5 See for instance I. Murua, Ending ETA’s Armed Campaign: How and Why the Basque Armed Group Abandoned Violence, Abingdon, Routledge, 2016; T. Whitfield, Endgame for ETA. Elusive Peace in the Basque Country, London, Hurst Publishers, 2014; R. Alonso ‘Why do terrorists stop? Analyzing why ETA members abandon or continue with terrorism’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 34:9, 2011, 696–716. 6 J.-L. Alvarez Enparantza, Euskal Herria en el horizonte [The great Basque country in the horizon], Tafalla, Txalaparta, 1997; M. Onaindia, El precio de la libertad: Memorias 1948–1977 [The price of freedom: Memoirs 1948–77], Madrid, Espasa-Calpe, 2001; T. Uriarte, Mirando atrás. De las filas de ETA a las listas del PSE [Looking back. From ETA to the PSE], Barcelona, Ediciones B, 2005; X. Zumalde, Mi lucha clandestina en ETA. Memorias del primer Jefe del Frente Militar (1965–1968) [My underground fight with ETA. Memoirs of the first leader of the Military Front], Arrigorriaga, Status Ediciones, 2004; J. Madariaga, Zor Egiari [Deserving the truth], Tafalla, Txalaparta, 2014. 7 G. Fernández Soldevilla, R. López Romo, Sangre, votos y manifestaciones: ETA y el nacionalismo vasco radical. 1958–2011 [Blood, ballots and protests: ETA and radical Basque nationalism 1958–2011], Madrid, Tecnos, 2012; G. Fernández Soldevilla, R. López Romo, M. Barandiaran Contreras, P. Casanellas, ‘La documentación de (y sobre) ETA’ [Archives of and on ETA], Tabula, 14, 2011, 45–57. 8 There are a few notable exceptions though. See C. Hamilton, Women and ETA. The Gender Politics of Radical Basque Nationalism, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2007; F. Reinares, Patriotas de la Muerte: Quiénes han militado en ETA y por qué [Patriots of death: who joined ETA and why], Madrid, Taurus, 2001; M. Alcedo Moneo, Militar en ETA. Historias de vida y muerte [ETA’s active members. Stories of life and death], San Sebastián, Haranburu, 1996. 9 There is assuredly a vast literature. The works listed here are a sample. D. Muro, Ethnicity and Violence: The Case of Radical Basque Nationalism, London, Routledge, 2013; J. Mansvelt Beck, ‘Geopolitical imaginations of the Basque homeland’, Geopolitics, 11:3, 2006, 507–28; H. Van den Broek, ‘Borroka – The legitimation of street violence in the political discourse of radical Basque nationalists’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 16:4, 2004, 714–36; L. Mees, Nationalism, Violence and Democracy – the Basque Clash of Identities, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003; P. Raento, ‘Political mobilisation and placespecificity: Radical nationalist street campaigning in the Spanish Basque country’, Space and Polity, 1(2), 1997, 191–204; J. Mac Clancy, ‘The culture of radical Basque nationalism’, Anthropology Today, 4:5, 1988, 17–19. 10 There is a notable exception with Gabriel Carrión’s study of how ETA was portrayed within the Francoist police archives. See G. Carrión, ETA en los archivos secretos de la policía de Franco. 1952–1969 [ETA in the secret archives

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Arch-enemy 37 of the Francoist police, 1952–69], Alicante, Agua Clara, 2002. To our knowledge, Carrión’s monograph is the only one but unfortunately his approach and his choice of material are not as clear as one could expect. On the use of police archives in the historiography of ETA, see M. Aizpuru, ‘El primer informe policial sobre ETA? Los archivos franquistas como fuente para la investigación histórica’ [The first police report on ETA? Francoist archives as a source for historical research], Sancho el Sabio, 39, 2016, 223–51. 11 On the inception of Basque nationalism see J. Corcuera Atienza, La patria de los Vascos. Orígenes, ideología y organización del nacionalismo vasco (1876–1903) [Basque homeland. Origins, ideology and organisation of Basque nationalism (1876–1903)], Madrid, Taurus, 2001; Mees, Nationalism, Violence and Democracy, 9–20. 12 Previously, during the Spanish dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923–30), the Basque nationalist movement had been outlawed and therefore forced underground. See Heiberg, The Making of the Basque Nation, 75–7; Mees, Nationalism, Violence and Democracy, 21–30. 13 M. Richards, A Time of Silence: Civil War and the Culture of Repression in Franco’s Spain, 1936–45, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998; J. Mansvelt Beck, Territory and Terror. Conflicting Nationalisms in the Basque Country, Abingdon, Routledge, 2005, 59–61; A. Pérez-Agote, The Social Roots of Basque Nationalism, Reno, University of Nevada Press, 2006, 73–4. 14 On the ideological tenets of Basque nationalism, its strong Christian identity and the impact of the rural clergy during the Francoist period, see X. Itçaina, Les virtuoses de l’identité. Religion et politique en Pays Basque [Virtuosi of identity. Religion and politics in the Basque country], Rennes, Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2007; B. Tejerina Montaña, Nacionalismo y Lengua. Los procesos del cambio linguístico en el País Vasco [Nationalism and language. The processes of linguistic change in the Basque country], Madrid, Siglo XXI, 1992, 112–19; P. Iztueta Armendáriz, Sociología del fenómeno contestario del clero vasco: 1940–1975 [Sociology of the Basque clergy rebellion phenomenon: 1940–75], Bayonne, Elkar, 1981. 15 G. P. Totoricagüena, Identity, Culture, and Politics in the Basque Diaspora, Reno, University of Nevada Press, 2004; Douglass, Basque Politics and Nationalism on the Eve of the Millennium. 16 For a thorough account of the complex history of the PNV and its period of exile, see S. De Pablo, L. Mees, J. A. Rodriguez Ranz (eds) El péndulo patriotico: historia del Partido Nacionalista Vasco, Vol. 2, 1936–1979 [The patriotic pendulum: History of the Basque Nationalist Party, 1936–79], Barcelona, Crítica, 2001. 17 A. Elorza (ed.) La historia de ETA [The story of ETA], Madrid, Temas de hoy, 2000. 18 L. Silva. M. Sanchez, G. Araluce, Sangre, sudor y paz. La Guardia Civil contra ETA [Blood, sweat and peace. The Guardia Civil against ETA], Barcelona, ediciones Peninsula, 2017, 22. 19 J. Aróstegui, M. Jorge, El último frente: la resistencia armada antifranquista en España, 1939–1952 [The last front: the anti-Francoist armed resistance in Spain, 1939–52], Madrid, Los Libros de la Catarata, 2008; S. Serrano, Maquis:

38

20

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Counter-terror by proxy Historia de la guerrilla antifranquista [Maquis: History of the anti-francoist guerrilla]. Madrid: Temas de hoy, 2001. On the demonisation of the ‘bandolero’ as a common criminal by the Francoist regime see C. Moreno-Nuño, ‘Criminalizing Maquis: Configurations of antiFrancoist guerrilla fighters as bandoleros and bandits in cultural discourse’, HIOL, Hispanic Issues On Line, 10, 2012, 79–99, https://cla.umn.edu/hispanic-issues/ online/armed-resistance, accessed on 19 June 2018. Boletín informativo, ‘Situación y proyectos del extremismo español’, Madrid, Dirección General de Seguridad / División de investigación Social, 31 January 1954, p. 2: ‘fuerzas del exterior que ambicionado el derrocamiento del régimen español’. This document from the BPS and the following ones used in this chapter were collected by Juan José del Águila, and made available on his blog https://justiciaydictadura.com/, accessed 19 June 2018. D. López Garrido, El aparato policial en España: historia, sociología e ideología [The police aparatus in Spain: History, sociology and ideology]. Barcelona, Ariel, 1987. During the Spanish Civil War, the General Directorate of Security (Dirección General de Seguridad) was reorganised and the former Special Information Brigade (Brigada Especial de Información) which was carrying out information and espionage in the Republican zone became, in 1941, the Social Research Brigade (Brigada de Investigación Social) better known as BPS. The 1941 Law reorganising the police forces brought all the police forces and auxiliary security services under the sole command and control of the General Directorate of Security. While the BPS was linked to the Ministry of the Interior (Ministerio de la Gobernación), it operated under military jurisdiction and enjoyed discretionary powers in the exercise of its broad remit. By the end of the Spanish Civil War, Heinrich Himmler’s SS officers were involved in the training of the Francoist police. See A. Szanajda, D. A. Messenger, ‘The German secret state police in Spain: Extending the reach of National Socialism’, The International History Review, 40:2, 2018, 397–415. The BPS had an office in each police regional headquarters (jefaturas superior de policia): Madrid, Barcelona, Sevilla, Bilbao and Zaragoza. ‘Ley de 2 de Septiembre de 1941 por la que se regulan las atribuciones y funcionamiento de las Jefaturas Superiores de Policía’, BOE, núm. 250, 7 September 1941, 6814–16. Á. Cenarro, ‘Matar, vigilar y delatar: la quiebra de la sociedad civil durante la guerra y la posguerra en España (1936–1948)’ [To kill, monitor and inform on: the collapsing of civil society during the war and the postwar periods in Spain (1936–48)], Historia Social, 44, 2002, 65–86. Dirección General de Seguridad / Comisaria General Político-Social. La actividad político-social clandestina en España, durante 1.949, Madrid, 1950, 13: ‘Un peligrosísimo tinglado separatista’. Dirección General de Seguridad / Comisaria General Político-Social. La actividad político-social clandestina en España, durante 1.950, Madrid, 1951, 13: ‘no puede achacarse a otra cosa que a la existencia de un ferment secesionista’.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Arch-enemy 39 29 E. Hernández Sandioca, M. Baldó, M. A. Ruiz Carnicer, Estudiantes contra Franco (1939–1975) [Students against Franco (1939–75)]. Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 2007; C. Molinero, P. Ysàs Solanes, ‘Workers and dictatorship: Industrial growth, social control and labour protest under the Franco regime, 1939–76’, in A. Smith (ed.) Red Barcelona: Social Protest and Labour Mobilization in the Twentieth Century, London, Routledge, 2002, 185–205; J. M. Maravall, Dictatorship and Political Dissent. Workers & Students in Franco’s Spain. London: Tavistock, 1978. 30 Boletín informativo núm. I, 7: ‘Nacionalismo Vasco – El 18 de Julio fueron quemadas dos banderas nacionales izadas en edificios de San Sebastián’ [Basque Nationalism – on 18 July, two national flags raised on buildings in San Sebastián were burned]. 31 Boletín informativo núm. I, ‘Los servicios policiales en el orden político-social durante 1961’, Madrid: Dirección General de Seguridad / Comisaria General de investigación Social / Secretaria General y Técnica, 12 January 1962, 7: ‘Se logro la detención de uno de los autores materiales del hecho y aquí comenzó una larga y paciente labor policial, con el descubrimiento de una importante organización vasquista que bajo el nombre de “Euzkadi ta Azkastasuna” (E.T.A.) había difundido gran cantidad de propaganda.’ 32 Boletín informativo núm. VIII, ‘Actividades Extremistas’, Madrid: Dirección General de Seguridad / Comisaria General de investigación Social / Secretaria General y Técnica, 27 March 1962, 10. 33 Boletín informativo núm. XIX, Madrid: Dirección General de Seguridad / Comisaria General de investigación Social / Secretaria General y Técnica, 17 July 1962, 2. 34 Boletín informativo núm. XXV, ‘La campaña terrorista en España y las actividades de la Euzkadita Azkatasuna (E.T.A.) en relación con la E.S.B.A. (F.L.P.)’ [The terrorist campaign in Spain and the activities of ETA in relation to Euskadiko Sozialisten Batasuna (Basque Socialist Union, ESBA) (Frente de Liberación Popular, Popular Liberation Front, FLP)], Madrid: Dirección General de Seguridad / Comisaria General de investigación Social / Secretaria General y Técnica, 20 September 1962, 9–37. 35 On the story of the Popular Liberation Front (FLP) commonly known as Felipe, see J. A. García Alcalá, Historia del Felipe (FLP, FOC y ESBA). De Julio Cerón a la Liga Comunista Revolucionaria [History of the Felipe (FLP, FOC and ESBA). From Julio Cerón to the Communist Revolutionary League], Madrid, Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales (CEPC), 2002; E. García Rico, Queríamos la revolución. Crónicas del FELIPE, Frente de Liberación Popular [We wanted the revolution. Chronicles of the FELIPE, the Popular Liberation Front], Barcelona: Flor del Viento Ediciones, 1998. 36 On the support of the French PSU for the Basque cause, see J.-C. Gillet, Le PSU et la question basque: sa participation à la lutte pour l’émancipation nationale et sociale du peuple basque (1960–1990) [The PSU and the Basque issue: Its contribution to the struggle for the national and social emancipation of the Basque people (1960–90)], Paris, Editions du Croquant, 2019.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

40

Counter-terror by proxy

37 On the succession of the different assemblies of ETA and their impact upon the ideological evolution of the organisation, see G. Jáuregui, Ideología y estrategia política de ETA: Análisis de su evolución entre 1959 y 1968 [ETA’s ideology and political strategy: An analysis of its evolution between 1959 and 1968], Madrid, Siglo XXI, 1981. 38 T. Brown, L. Anton (eds) Between the Avant-Garde and the Everyday: Subversive Politics in Europe from 1957 to the Present, Oxford, Berghahn Books, 2011. On the Spanish context, see S. Mangini, Rojos y rebeldes: La cultura de la disidencia durante el Franquismo [Reds and rebels: The dissident culture during the Francoist regime], Barcelona, Anthropos, 1987. 39 Jáuregui, Ideología y estrategia política de ETA. 40 Boletín informativo núm. I, ‘Los servicios policiales en el orden político social durante 1962’, Madrid: Dirección General de Seguridad / Comisaria General de investigación Social / Secretaria General y Técnica, 2 January 1963, 11. 41 Boletín informativo núm. XXV, 3. 42 N. Rosendorf, Franco Sells Spain to America: Hollywood, Tourism and Public Relations as Postwar Spanish Soft Power, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2014; S. Pack, Tourism and Dictatorship: Europe’s Peaceful Invasion of Franco’s Spain, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2006. 43 Silva, Sanchez, Araluce, Sangre, sudor y paz, 19: ‘La fecha del 7 de junio de 1968 está grabada a fuego en la memoria colectiva de la Guardia Civil’ [The date of 7 June 1968 is burnt into the collective memory of the Guardia Civil]. On the impact of 1968 on the Francoist regime, see P. Casanellas, Morir matando: El franquismo ante la práctica armada, 1968–1977 [Dying killing: Francoism facing armed struggle, 1968–77], Madrid, Libros de la Catarata, 2014. 44 ‘Irún: el jefe de la brigada social de San Sebastián fue muerto ayer a tiros en su domicilio’, La Vanguardia, 3 August 1968, 5; ‘Sepelio del jefe de la Brigada Social de Guipúzcoa’, ABC, 4 August 1968, 13. 45 The August 1968 state of emergency was the fifth out of eleven to be declared by the Francoist regime between 1956 and the death of Franco in 1975. On the extended use of state of emergency by the Francoist regime, see E.-P. Guittet, ‘Les recours à l’Etat d’exception sous le régime franquiste (1956–1975)’ [State of emergency during the Francoist regime (1956–75)], Cultures & Conflits, 113, 2019, 89–98. 46 A. Batista, La carta: Historia de un comisario Franquista [The letter: Story of a Francoist superintendent], Barcelona, Editorial Debate, 2010. On the repression of the student movement in Barcelona by Antonio Creix, see the documentary produce by Enric Canals. E. Canals, Barcelona 1962. L’ombra dels Creix, OptimTV, Televisió de Catalunya, 2014, 60 min. 47 A. Martinez Foronda, E. Baena Luque, I. García Escribano (eds) La dictadura en la dictadura: detenidos, deportados y torturados en Andalucía durante el estado de excepción de 1969 [The dictatorship within the dictatorship: detainees, deportees and victims of torture in Andalucía during the 1969 state of emergency], Córdoba, Fundación de Estudios Sindicales y Archivo Histórico de Comisiones Obreras de Andalucía, 2011; M. Castells Arteche, Radiografía de un modelo represivo

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Arch-enemy 41 [Patterns of State oppression], San Sebastián, Ediciones Vascas, Argitaletxea, 1982. 48 ‘Captura en Regil (Guipuzcoa) del segundo de los asesinos del Guardia Civil’, ABC, 9 June 1968, 47; ‘Nuevas detenciones de activistas guipuzcoanos de la ETA’, ABC, 7 December 1968, 71; ‘parece ser que la policia ha identificado al asesino del comisario de San Sebastián, don Meliton Manzanas’, ABC, 30 May 1969, 37. 49 ‘Son condenados tres activistas de la E.T.A. en Consejo de Guerra. Nota de Prensa de la Capitanía General de la VI Región Militar’, La Vanguardia, 17 July 1969, 13. 50 La Vanguardia Española, 24 August 1969, 7. 51 J. M. Mata López, El nacionalismo vasco radical: Discurso, organización y expresiones [Radical Basque nationalism: Discourse, organisation and manifestations], Bilbao, Servicio Editorial, Universidad del País Vasco, 1993; F. Reinares, ‘Sociología política de la militancia en organizaciones terroristas’ [Political sociology of militancy in terrorist organisations], Revista de estudios políticos, 98, 1997, 85–114. 52 J. M. Garmendia, ‘ETA: nacimiento, desarrollo y crisis (1959–1978)’ [ETA: Birth, development and crisis (1959–78)], in Elorza (ed.) La historia de ETA, 77–168. 53 Elorza (ed.) La historia de ETA. 54 See the preface by the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre to Gisèle Halimi’s chronicle of the trial. G. Halimi, Le procès de Burgos [The Burgos trial], Paris, Gallimard, 1971. 55 R. Borras Betriu, El día en que mataron a Carrero Blanco [The day they killed Carrero Blanco], Barcelona, Planeta, 1974. 56 J. Aguirre [pseudo. for Eva Forrest], Operación ogro: Cómo y por qué ejecutamos a Carrero Blanco [Operation Ogre: how and why we executed Carrero Blanco], Donostia, Hordago, 1978; P. Woodworth, ‘In 1973, I applauded an ETA killing. Not now’, Irish Times, 8 April 2017: ‘It’s conveniently forgotten by many now, but ETA’s bold defiance of the fascist military dictatorship of General Franco was, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, often compared to the impeccable anti-Nazi struggle of the French Résistance’. 57 J. Tussell, Carrero: la eminencia gris del régimen de Franco [Carrero: The éminence grise of Franco’s regime], Madrid, Temas de hoy, 1994. 58 D. Muro, A. Quiroga, ‘Spanish nationalism’, Ethnicities, 5, 1, 2005, 9–29. 59 For an overview of the different ‘political families’ and forces of the Francoist regime, see E. Moradiellos, Franco: Anatomy of a Dictator, London, I. B. Tauris, 2018; P. Preston, Franco: A Biography, London, Harper & Collins, 1993; S. G. Payne, The Franco Regime, Madison, University of Wisconcin Press, 1987. 60 See the article published by the newspaper El Alcázar on the death of Carrero Blanco: ‘Muerto por Dios y por España’ [Died for God and Spain], El Alcázar, 21 December 1973: ‘Nadie con sentido común puede creer que en la España de 1973, con Franco en la Jefatura del Estado […] la muerte de Carrero Blanco

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

42

Counter-terror by proxy

puede cambiar el curso de la historia o hacer reversible el sentido de la victoria de 1939’. 61 ‘La guerra no ha terminado, y que la paz, por desgracia, empieza nunca’. Quoted in J. L. Rodríguez Jiménez, ‘Origen, desarrollo y disolución de Fuerza Nueva (Una aproximación al estudio de la extrema derecha española)’ [Origin, development and dissolution of Fuerza Nueva (An approach to the study of the Spanish extreme right)], Revista de Estudios Políticos, 73, 1991, 276. The expression ‘la paz empienza nunca’ (peace never begins) is the title of a famous Spanish novel on the dismantling of the guerrilla in the Asturies written by Emilio Romero in 1957. The novel would be turned into an award-winning propaganda film by León Klimovsky in 1960. 62 C. Palomares, Sobrevivir después de Franco. Evolución y triunfo del reformismo, 1964–1977 [Surviving after Franco. Evolution and triumph of reformism, 1964–77], Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 2006. 63 The young Catalonian anarchist Salvador Puig Antich, member of the Iberian Liberation Movement and charged with the killing of a police officer, was executed by garrotting in March 1974. In September 1975, two members of ETA and three members of the Revolutionary Antifascist Patriotic Front (FRAP) were executed by firing squads. 64 Guittet, ‘Les recours à l’Etat d’exception sous le régime franquiste (1956–1975)’. 65 Palomares, Sobrevivir después de Franco. 66 On the rise of the Spanish extreme Right during the late Francoism, see F. Gallego, Una patria imaginada. La extrema derecha española (1973–2005) [An imagined homeland. The Spanish far-right (1973–2005)], Madrid, Síntesis, 2005; J. L. Rodríguez Jiménez, Reaccionarios y golpistas: la extrema derecha en España: del tardofranquismo a la consolidación de la democracia (1967–1982) [Reactionaries and coup perpetrators: The far-right in Spain from late-francoism to the consolidation of democracy (1967–82)], Madrid, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC), 1994. 67 F. J. Llera, J. M. Mata, C. L. Irvin, ‘ETA: From secret army to social movement – the post-Franco schism of the Basque nationalist movement’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 5:3, 1993, 106–34; G. Fernández Soldevilla, Héroes, heterodoxos y traidores. Historia de Euskadiko Ezkerra (1974–1994) [Heroes, mavericks and traitors. Story of Euskadiko Ezkerra (1974–94)], Madrid, Tecnos, 2013. 68 V. Núñez Peñas, ‘Spanish accession to the EEC: A political objective in an economic reality’, Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 90, 2015, 59–70; M. Trouvé, L’Espagne et l’Europe. De la dictature de Franco à l’Union européenne [Spain and Europe. From the Francoist dictatorship to the European Union], Bruxelles, Peter Lang, 2008; J. Crespo MacLennan, España en Europa, 1945–2000: del ostracismo a la modernidad [Spain in Europe, 1945–2000: From ostracism to modernity], Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2004. 69 V. P. Díaz, The Return of Civil Society: The Emergence of Democratic Spain, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1998. 70 S. Juliá, ‘History, politics, and culture, 1975–1996’, in D. Gies (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Modern Spanish Culture, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, 104–20.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Arch-enemy 43 71 H. M. Stapell, Remaking Madrid: Culture, Politics, and Identity after Franco, New York, Palgrave, 2010. 72 Stapell, Remaking Madrid; Juliá, ‘History, politics and culture’. 73 One could add to this list the Organización de voluntarios antiseparatistas y antiterroristas, but also the Grupo independiente Patriotico Antiterrorista, the Grupo Anticomunista Internacional and the Grupos Armados Espanoles. Most of these groups had a very short lifespan, disappearing as fast as they had been created. On the prolific number of pseudo-organisations within the Spanish far-right nebulous, see S. Baby, Le mythe de la transition pacifique. Violence et politique en Espagne (1975–1982) [The myth of the peaceful transition. Violence and politics in Spain (1975–82)], Madrid, Casa de Velázquez, 2012, 75–83. 74 L. De la Calle, I. Sánchez-Cuenca, ‘La selección de víctimas de ETA’ [ETA’s victims selection], Revista Española de Ciencia Política, 10, 2004, 53–79; J. L. Piñuel, El terrorismo en la transición española: 1972–1982 [Terrorism during the Spanish Transition, 1972–82], Madrid, Fundamentos, 1986. 75 Baby, Le mythe de la transition pacifique; M. Sánchez Soler, La transición sangrienta: Una historia violenta del proceso democrático en España (1975–1983) [The bloody Transition: A violent history of the democratic process in Spain (1975–83)], Barcelona, Península, 2010. 76 The disappearance of Pertur is still shrouded in mystery. Whether he was killed by ETA hardliners or by Italian neo-Fascists working for the Spanish police is still subject to debates. See the documentary produced by A. Amigo, El año de todos los demonios / Deabru guztien urtea [All demons’ year], Zurriola Group Entertainment, 2007, 72 min. 77 On the impact of the death of Argala upon ETA see R, Leonisio, F. Molina, D. Muro (eds) ETA’s Terrorist Campaign. From Violence to Politics, 1968–2015, London, Routledge, 2017. 78 R. Durán Muñoz, Contención y transgresión: las movilizaciones sociales y el estado en las transiciones española y portuguesa [Containment and transgression: The social movements and the State in the Spanish and Portuguese transitions], Madrid, Centro de estudios políticos y constitucionales, 2000; Mata López, El nacionalismo vasco radical. 79 On the crucial importance of analysing context, time and space in contentious politics, see L. Bosi, C. Demetriou, S. Malthaner (eds) Dynamics of Political Violence: A Process-Oriented Perspective on Radicalization and the Escalation of Political Conflict, Farnham, Ashgate, 2014; C. Tilly, R. E. Goodin (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006. 80 M. Montero, J. Rodriguez-Virgili, C. García-Ortega, ‘The political role of the press in Spanish transition to democracy, 1975–1978’, Javnost – The Public, 15:4, 2008, 5–20. 81 ‘Los hijos del terror’ [The children of terror] (editorial), Cambio 16, 6 June 1977, 3. 82 O. Jaime-Jiménez, Policía, terrorismo y cambio político en España, 1976–1996 [Police, terrorism and political change in Spain, 1976–96], Valencia: Tirant Lo Blanch, 2002, 25–34.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

44

Counter-terror by proxy

83 Baby, Le mythe de la transition pacifique, 302–5. 84 ‘La sangre llama a la sangre y el terror desatado sólo conduce al caos’ in ‘Contra violencia, libertad’ [Against violence, freedom], Cambio 16, 6 February 1976, 3. 85 ‘¿Hasta cuando?’ [Until when?], ABC, 26 May 1979. See also ‘Terrorismo contra democracia’ [Terrorism against democracy], ABC, 23 March 1978. 86 ‘Libertad, democracia y constitucion’ [Freedom, democracy and constitution], El Pais, 27 February 1981. 87 ‘Un disparo contra todo’ [A shooting against all], El Pais, 20 March 1981. 88 Fraga quoted in ABC, 11 April 1976. 89 Baby, Le mythe de la transition pacifique, 312–15. 90 Diario 16, 23 March 1981. 91 The French police officer Jean-Serge Nérin, shot dead near Paris by militants fleeing after a car robbery in March 2010, is ETA’s last fatal victim. 92 On the ‘Basque issue’ and the ‘Basque conflict’ as seductive and performative narratives, see M. Alonso, F. Molina, ‘Historical narratives, violence and nation. Reconsidering the ‘Basque conflict’, in Leonisio, Molina, Muro (eds) ETA’s Terrorist Campaign, 165–83. 93 Remark made in 1986 by Juan Antonio González-Pacheco (‘Billy el Niño’), former member of the Francoist police and notorious for his brutality. See A. Mc Caig, S. Gillet, P. Voigt, J. Douai, Les mains sales [Dirty hands], Antenne 2 / Le magazine, 10 April 1986. 94 S. Keen, Faces of the Enemy: Reflections of the Hostile Imagination, New York, Harper Collins, 1991.

2

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Continuity: Francoist legacy and transition to democracy

In order to avoid democratic rupture and replace it with the self-reform of Francoism, Spaniards were subjected to the ablation of historical memory. José Vidal-Beneyto, Spanish philosopher, 1980 Franco isn’t dead. Anyone who dies in Christ is not dead. Pilar Gutiérrez, President of Movement for Spain, 2018

The Francoist regime lasted for almost forty years (1939–75). The subsequent Spanish Transition was largely perceived and analysed afterwards and across the world as a successful model of a peaceful democratisation by agreement between former members of the authoritarian regime and members of the democratic opposition.1 Within Europe, it is also one of the greatest stories of a rapid modernisation of a stagnant and isolated country into a fully fledged European one. In Spanish politics, the Transition with a capital T is more than just an episode in the recent history of the country. It is a symbolic and normative resource. The Transition is a nodal point around which Spanish democracy was envisioned and constructed.2 However, considering the Spanish Transition as a success story and a casebook for building an inclusive and democratic political future following an authoritarian period falls short of recognising how the negotiation process was tremendously precarious and how the trade-off has engendered severe problems that have strained Spanish politics since and still do. Spain is indeed, and once for all, a modern country – but a country that has not entirely come to terms with one of its darkest periods. More than forty years after the end of the authoritarian regime and a transition to a parliamentary one, the manifold legacies of Franco’s epoch still haunt contemporary Spain. For decades after the death of Franco in 1975, what had happened before was unspoken, or rather timidly spoken and mostly within private circles. In the name of national reconciliation and proudly looking ahead to the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

46

Counter-terror by proxy

future, Spaniards collectively accepted the so-called unwritten ‘agreement to forget’ the past (pacto de olvido, the pact of oblivion).3 The trauma of democracy’s collapse in the 1930s, the violent environment of the Transition and the fear that reprisals would reopen the old wounds and upset the democratic movement were largely shared among the Francoist reformists and high-ranking members of the opposition. The immediate past was rapidly set aside and every political actor was deemed to move along. This national political consensus, based on the fear of a return to a fratricidal civil war led to a negotiated transition rather than a rupture between once worst enemies.4 This fear of the civil war and its consequences upon national unity, largely cultivated as such during the Francoist regime, was also accompanied by a shared view among political actors that anything that could distance Spain from its European and international destiny should be avoided. Moving forward and retrieving Spain’s international pride was crucial and delving into the past was largely perceived therefore as detrimental to both Spain’s modernisation and national pride. Consequently, political elites agreed upon a deliberate renouncement of any action to redress legacies of human rights abuses. The promulgation of the 1977 Amnesty Law,5 which freed political prisoners and guaranteed permanent impunity for all acts of political intentionality committed before the death of Franco, sealed this policy of voluntary forgetting.6 The Spanish authoritarian past was silenced and the successive governments since have all committed themselves to keep this policy intact.7 The possibility of confronting the past was swept under the carpet in the name of an inclusive future. For decades after the death of Franco, all Spaniards were encouraged to fully appreciate every single economic and social improvement, to accept the common national destiny and to distance themselves from the past. When the former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet was arrested in London in 1998 for crimes against humanity on the basis of an international warrant issued by Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón, many Spaniards thought that this international event would be an exception to the post-Franco pledge not to delve into the past.8 Pinochet’s arrest had indeed meaningful impacts on the international scene and in Chile. In revitalising the principle of international jurisdiction with its possibility to prosecute individuals regardless of the place where the crimes were committed and the nationality of the perpetrators, the arrest of Pinochet has set a legal precedent. Undoubtedly, the charges against the ageing former Chilean dictator made even more visible Chile’s tortured survivors and forced the country to deal more openly with the atrocities of its authoritarian past, its recent political transition and its constitution inherited from Pinochet. The pace of judicial reforms in Chile subsequently increased and so did the number of cases against human rights abuses.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Continuity 47 In Spain however, the repercussions of Pinochet’s arrest upon Spanish domestic politics took a different and convoluted path. It did spur a national debate as some Spaniards started to question why no one was ever brought to justice for crimes committed during Franco’s rule. Yet, when in 2000 the Association for the Recovery of Historical Memory took up the challenge to help the efforts of private citizens in searching and identifying the corpses of many Republicans shot during the Civil War or during the subsequent Francoist repression, its activities raised a lot of concern about its potential deleterious effect upon national cohesion.9 Thirty-two years after the death of the ‘Caudillo’, the 2007 Historical Memory Law, formerly condemning Franco’s dictatorship and honouring its victims, caused more controversy and sparked more passionate feelings than any other piece of legislation in recent years.10 When the ruling Socialists presented their bill to the Parliament, they faced fierce opposition from the conservative PP. Even though after months of haggling the law was approved, the difficulty in producing an acceptable draft across the political spectrum revealed how deeply Franco’s legacy divided Spain. It was only by 2006 that the University of Santiago de Compostela’s ruling council voted unanimously to cross off Franco’s name from the official list of honorary doctorates. The University of Salamanca followed in 2008 in saying that the Caudillo, once revered as the saviour of the nation, ‘lacked any scientific, artistic or cultural merit’.11 The massive equestrian statue of Franco erected in the military academy in Zaragoza in 1948 was pulled down only in 2006. The one in Santander was removed in 2008 and the one presiding over a patio in the regional military headquarters in Valencia was removed in 2010. Franco’s resting place, the Valley of the Fallen (El Valle de los Caídos), has caused even more disputes. Conceived as a monument to remember the heroes who fell during the ‘Glorious Crusade’ against Spain’s enemies and inaugurated in 1959 for the twentieth anniversary of the end of the Civil War, the sprawling mausoleum crowned with a towering stone cross and carved out of the side of a granite mountain just outside Madrid is one of the last surviving relics of the dictatorship.12 Following Franco’s own wishes, the design of the monument was to purposely ‘defy time and oblivion’.13 In many ways it did so. For decades after the death of Franco, the Valley of the Fallen remained a sensitive issue in Spanish politics. The questions over what should be done with this unique example across Europe of a monument of truly totalitarian proportions have always proved to be difficult for the successive Spanish governments.14 The decision to remove Franco’s remains in 2017 and the idea of turning the Valley of the Fallen into a non-partisan site of national mourning and remembrance provoked outrage. ‘Don’t touch the Valley of the Fallen’ (¡El Valle no se toca!) became a rallying motto for numerous nostalgic Spaniards across the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

48

Counter-terror by proxy

country. It is unlikely that the exhumation of Franco’s remains in October 2019 will put a definitive end to the nostalgia for Franco and Francoism among large segments of the population. Spain’s mainstream conservative PP had always remained extremely traditional in terms of its political and cultural values. The Spanish far-right party Vox, founded in 2013, has swept its way into the political landscape with a clear ultra-nationalist and culture-war rhetoric. Its policies towards national unity and its staunch view against Catalan nationalism are clearly based on an idealistic view of Francoist hues. The recruitment and inclusion of two openly pro-Franco retired generals on Vox’s lists for the 2019 Parliamentary election cannot be seen as a political miscalculation. More broadly and across Spain, the narratives of lost identity and past harmony have grown even thicker over the past years. In some quarters, the idea that Francoism had some merits is ever more present.15 Eighty years after the end of the Spanish Civil War in 1939, one could reasonably say that the recollection of what happened in the subsequent decades continues to be at the centre of heated and polarised political debates. The long-running debates over Franco’s resting place and the surge in nostalgia for the aesthetics and politics of the Franco regime do epitomise how deep the Spanish divide about the past lies and how emotionally and politically charged the history of the Transition remains.16 Spain is experiencing a critical reassessment of the drivers in its democracy, and the perception of the Transition as an idealised and foundational norm in Spanish politics is indeed crumbling. Against the backdrop of a straightforward and successful negotiation, a more recent historiographic endeavour has opened up the Spanish Transition to new historical assessment and has enriched our understanding of this uneasy and convoluted period in Spanish contemporary politics.17 The Transition was a far lengthier and more convoluted process that started earlier in the late 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, during a period of growing social pressures and dissenting voices within the regime.18 Numerous scholarly informed publications, underpinned by an empirically derived appreciation of the complexity and non-linearity of the process, have successfully addressed the enmeshment of competing interest groups, strategies and understandings of the local, national and international dimensions of the political Transition. The role of the Transition’s leading figures and the disputed territorial nature of the Spanish State have been progressively reassessed and the struggle for a collective memory and its impact upon national identity has received a lot of attention more recently. It would be beyond the scope of the present chapter to discuss this historiographic endeavour in great detail. Others have already done this work and pointed to some areas of further needed research. None the less, these different and enlightening historical and socio-political accounts provide a much more

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Continuity 49 comprehensive picture of the Transition, its rationale, mechanisms and actors. Undoubtedly, and like most political transitions, the Spanish process was beset with numerous uncertainties and, as we underlined in the previous chapter, largely undermined by a high level of violence. The memory of the Civil War perceived as an irrefutable expression of collective responsibility worked as a potent narrative to channel the democratic opposition’s desire for greater political change into the spirit of national unity that the Francoist reformists deemed desirable and appropriate. The Transition was indeed a process largely – if not entirely – guided by reformist Francoist elites, closely supervised by the powerful pro-Franco armed and security forces. It was a process without any State-sanctioned mechanisms of retribution, apology or purge of those who had shown their utter disregard and contempt for the values of democracy. This very particular process of democratisation left the former Francoist intelligence, military and security forces almost unchanged and still very influential over policy-making. In effect, the merging of amnesia and amnesty ensured a quasi-total continuity of State and political personnel from the one regime to the other. This strong institutional continuity that has determined Spain’s post-1975 transition to parliamentary democracy is crucial. What we argue in the present chapter is that the institutions, culture and military assumptions inherited from the Francoist period with their warlike attitude against ETA served to shape the mindset and policy of early democratic governments in Spain and thus paved the way for the implementation of the GAL in 1983.

‘Indivisible Spain’ – defending national and social order It is well established that the Spanish Civil War experience played a foundational role in the formation and the consolidation of the Francoist regime. The ‘Glorious National Uprising’ (glorioso Alzamiento Nacional) of July 1936 brought to a successful conclusion by Franco in 1939, perceived as an inevitable ‘War of Liberation’ to forestall the imminent threat of a communist dictatorship, shaped the judicial, political and social tenets of the entire Francoist regime. During the entire forty years of the regime, memories of the Civil War as a ‘crusade’ against Communism and for the glory of Spain were carefully nurtured.19 Spanish cinema was massively utilised as a myth-making machine to spin stories about the timeless Hispanic superiority (Hispanidad, Spanishness), about the glorious heroism of the victors, but also about the cruel and vicious vanquished, responsible for all the evils that afflicted Spain and that were still threatening the unity and values of the Francoist ‘New Spain’.20 The regime’s motto – ‘One, Great and Free’ (Una, Grande y Libre) – intensely expressed the centrality of national unity

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

50

Counter-terror by proxy

and the subsequent necessity of extirpating any form of separatist threat. At the top of the Francoist regime’s agenda was the perceived moral and political imperative of ridding the population of all elements incompatible with its quasi-mystical vision of Spain. Traditional Catholicism, fierce nationalism and intense aversion to all politically motivated acts merged into the ideal of an organic and unified society free of political dissent and liberal ideas that could destroy Spain’s high moral criteria and way of life. Francoists laid an almost mystical emphasis on national unity. Any manifestation of ‘separatism’ was deemed suspicious. It was the worst possible sin against the sacrosanct unity of the nation and could not be countenanced.21 This dogma was closely tied to the regime’s visceral anti-Communism. The phobic obsession with Marxism, the fear of foreigners who would strike at the very heart and health of the Spanish nation and the demonisation of this seditious and subversive enemy were essential components of the Francoist mindset, and indeed the structures of the regime.22 Between 1939 and 1975, the Francoist regime thus steadily adopted a wide and punitive criminal law system, dominated by military justice and an impressive number of possibilities to repress those who would jeopardise the sacrosanct unity of the nation and ‘pervert the social harmony’ promoted by the regime. The 1939 Law of Political Responsibilities (Ley de Responsabilidades Políticas) allowed the prosecution of anyone who had supported, even vaguely and passively, the Republican ‘rebels’ during the Civil War23 and the 1940 Law on the Repression of Freemasonry and Communism (Ley sobre represión de la masoneria y del comunismo) was vague enough to allow the prosecution of anyone really.24 The 1933 Vagrants and Criminals Public Order Law,25 aiming at prosecuting social outcasts and other ‘dangerous individuals’, was bolstered by a new law in 1943 defining any form of infringement of public order as military rebellion.26 In the particular context following the Second World War when Francoist Spain was isolated and under strong scrutiny, Franco adopted a democratic façade, enacting various laws without, however, making any substantial change in the totalitarian style he had imposed since coming to power. Among these laws, the 1945 Spanish Charter (Fuero de los Españoles) was a mere declaration of individual rights that had absolutely no power or effect. Indeed, article 12 of the 1945 Spanish Charter states that ‘all Spaniards have the right to freely express their ideas as long as it does not infringe on the fundamental rights of the Spanish State’ and article 33 of the Charter made it clear that ‘the exercise of these rights recognised in the Charter cannot prejudice the spiritual, national and social unity of Spain’.27 It is within the framework of this Charter that the use of ‘state of emergency’ was made possible.28 Article 35 of the Charter allowed the regime to temporarily or completely suspend articles relating to freedom of opinion (Article 12), the right to liberty and

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Continuity 51 the secrecy of correspondence (Article 13), the rights to freedom of residence (Article 14) and the inviolability of the home (Article 15), the rights of association and assembly (Article 16) and the guarantee against arbitrary arrests (Article 18).29 The July 1959 Public Order Act (Ley de Orden Público) stipulates that ‘in case of a threat to the Law and Order that cannot be resolved by ordinary means’, a state of emergency can be declared.30 Article 2 lists all the acts contrary to public order, before adding that all acts that are not mentioned but which would eventually ‘alter public peace or social coexistence’ are de facto included. Unsurprisingly for an authoritarian regime, any act infringing on order falls simultaneously and concomitantly within the realms of the illicit and the subversive. The use of emergency law perfectly illustrates the logic of a regime driven by a martial conception of social order and unity of the nation.31 To declare a state of emergency and using excessive force were only two of the possibilities the Francoist regime had in order to maintain or to re-establish the natural order of things – the ‘pax franquista’.32 It was attuned to the Spanish authoritarian regime’s raison d’être. It eventually amounts to the symbolic nature of the promulgation of emergency as a reaffirmation of sovereign authority, an attempt to secure legitimacy for a brutal coup-born regime. The affinity with the Schmittian theological underpinnings of modern politics and his understanding of exceptional powers was more than semantic.33 The Francoist lawyers knew Schmitt’s work quite well and drew inspiration from it in order to provide the intellectual justification of the regime, thereby consolidating it. The legal theory on the state of exception, the distinction between friends and foes and the providential man produced by the German jurist Carl Schmitt was indeed pivotal. The defence of the greater good and the emphasis on the necessity to decide promptly were reclaimed by the regime in its attempt to convert the 1939 military victory into political legitimacy.34 The 1959 Public Order Act and the 1968 Decree on the Repression of banditry and terrorism were indeed central features of the emergency institutions under Franco. With the Law of December 1963, establishing a Court of Public Order (Tribunal de Orden Público, TOP), they provided all together a solid framework allowing the regime to deal with any type of act that aimed to Subvert the basic principles of the state, disturb public order or to sow serious concern in the national conscience.35

Military justice had, of course, largely characterised Franco’s regime since the uprising of the Spanish troops stationed in Morocco in 1936, and would continue to do so until his death. There were ordinary courts as well but the scope of their jurisdictions was restricted. Any politically sensitive cases were channelled into special courts where loyal, co-opted and tightly controlled judges, swearing unconditional adhesion to the regime and fidelity to its

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

52

Counter-terror by proxy

core principles, were administering justice in the name of the New State. The TOP was indeed the spearhead of the regime’s obsessive conception in defending of the order. Its jurisdiction encompassed ‘political crimes’, illegal propaganda, and threats or attacks on the regime and its representatives. Headquartered in the same Madrid building as the Supreme Court, the Tribunal was the primary agent of Francoist political repression throughout the country.36 The TOP operated using case files prepared by the political police (BPS) and its raison d’être was to react promptly to any threat to ‘public order’ through pre-emptive imprisonment.37 Though not a military court per se, the Tribunal was ideally suited to quelling criticism of the regime, as Franco demanded. Political and social dissent was indeed criminalised and the excessive use of force was on a par with the ideological tenets of the regime. Furthermore, every single police force – including local police auxiliaries – was militarised.38 Security and defence were both directed towards maintaining social and national order on one hand and aiming at neutralising the enemies of the regime on the other. The Guardia Civil, a military organisation charged with policing duties, was instrumental in ensuring this strict order. As the oldest Spanish public force, the Guardia Civil, also known and promoted by the Francoist regime as the ‘Benemérita’ (the meritorious or the finest), was the daily defender of the State and social order. Their three-cornered black patent leather hats were present throughout Spain’s vast rural territory. Following the 1941 Police Law, the Armed Police (Policía Armada) was the Guardia Civil’s counterpart in urban and industrial Spain.39 Franco could count also on a vast number of intelligence units among the different sectors of its military and security apparatus to collect the information needed to pursue his policy of freeing Spain from its enemies. Until the mid 1950s, these Francoist intelligence services were fragmented and rather disconnected from each other, despite earlier attempts to centralise them within the Third Section of the High General Staff of the Army (Alto Estado Mayor).40 As the Cold War unfolded, Spain became more and more perceived as a critical strategic point for Western countries in the event of a Soviet invasion of Europe. Spain was clearly viewed by the US as a geopolitical asset, a country in which the allies could set up bases impervious to Soviet air attack and could launch a counter-attack to a ‘red advance’ on the continent. In 1953, Franco signed a pact with the US administration and received significant military and economic aid.41 For a Francoist regime which was in serious need of supply and foreign investment but also eager to regain international status, this Spanish–US 1953 pact of Madrid marked the beginning of a new era after years of political isolation.42 It marked a turning point in the professionalisation of modern Spanish intelligence services, with high officials of the Francoist regime benefiting from British MI6 and CIA training, and

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Continuity 53 from direct links with French intelligence services. Building upon their new relationships with the US and European countries, Francoist intelligence and counter-intelligence services grew exponentially. Equally, the appointment of the former commander of the Blue Division General Agustin Muñoz Grandes as first vice-president of Spain in 1962 led to some profound change within the intelligence services. During the tumultuous 1960s, at a time of student protests and labour movements across the Western world and of the ascent of ETA in Spain, the Francoist regime opted for the creation in 1968 of a new intelligence service. The missions of the National Antisubversive Organisation (Organización Contrasubversiva Nacional, OCN), placed under the direction of Colonel José Ignacio San Martín,43 were first to identify and then to neutralise the subversion and its various components among Spanish universities. In the subsequent years, the OCN expanded its targets to labour movements, religious groups, intellectuals and, last but not least, Basque and Catalan ‘subversive activities’. In 1972, the OCN was reorganised, put under the direct patronage of the vice-president of the government Admiral Carrero Blanco and became the Central Service of Documentation (Servicio Central de Documentación, SECED). Carrero Blanco was the linchpin in the government’s ongoing battle with ETA and the one who spearheaded this reorganisation and modernisation of the Spanish intelligence services with the creation of covert action units. A few months after the spectacular assassination of Carrero Blanco by an ETA commando squad in December 1973, SECED was restructured.44 While the agency did not undergo extensive changes, apart from the promotion of Colonel José Ignacio San Martín to the post of Director of State Security in the Ministry of the Interior, Carrero Blanco’s dirty war took on greater dimensions after his death. The term ‘French safe haven’ made its appearance.45

War culture – counter subversion and clandestine actions by proxy The role of the armed forces in shaping Spain’s modern and contemporary history has been explored at length.46 The Francoist armed forces benefited from the victory in the Civil War and could therefore perceive themselves as the Praetorian Guard of the regime, in charge of upholding order and territorial integrity. The fact that military officers kept high-ranking posts in the Francoist state apparatus and that the army remained a key element for domestic repression throughout the entire dictatorship is equally well known. The army was indeed a major component of the regime in terms of social control and a key institution in terms of civic education through the dissemination of a cohesive and martial understanding of ‘New Spain’. But it was equally a poorly equipped force with limited tactical and operational

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

54

Counter-terror by proxy

effectiveness, dominated by a haughty ‘old guard’ with little appetite for military innovation and rather unresponsive to new tactics and doctrines.47 Despite antiquated materiel and this rather backward military culture driven by officers who fought during the Civil War, new ideas about ‘revolutionary warfare’, ‘low intensity conflict’ and ‘counter-insurgency’ rapidly emerging around the Western world in the 1950s and 1960s did enter Francoist military doctrine and were progressively reshaped to fit domestic issues, not least of the Basque insurgency.48 Amid the 1950s Western world’s widespread paranoia of betrayal and Communist infiltration by ‘fifth columnists’, the Francoist regime and its army found their mark.49 Spanish propaganda presented Spain as a safe place and Franco as the only one who actually defeated Communism. In the highly charged context of the Cold War, and building upon the 1953 Spanish–US agreement, European countries followed suit, reopening diplomatic relations with Madrid, signing commercial agreements and welcoming Spanish officers in their military training on modern warfare. In the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, struggle against subversion was among the most important concerns and scenarios scrutinised and taught among the highest military institutions across the Western world. Revolutionary warfare, counter-insurgency and irregular warfare were not entirely new for Spanish officers, though. After the 1808 French invasion, Spanish guerrilla fighters harassing Napoleon’s troops were elevated to folk hero status. The use of irregular warfare was common as well during the Carlist wars (1833–40, 1846–49 and 1872–76).50 During the short 1859–60 Moroccan campaign and in the subsequent small-scale engagements with local tribesmen (1893, 1909–10 and 1921), irregular tactics were crucial.51 On the background of the 1898 Spanish–American War, guerrilla tactics and strategies of attrition were a key component for the rebels during the 1895–98 Cuban revolution, and Spanish General Valeriano Weyler did reply brutally with his own counter-insurgency techniques.52 During the Civil War and in the early years of Francoism, when the last pockets of insurrection and resistance were still being rubbed out, it was common for groups of civil guardsmen known as contrapartidas to disguise themselves as guerrillas and to sow terror and confusion in the regions that the latter controlled.53 Memories of the Civil War and the use of irregular techniques against anti-Franco fighters in Spain were still relatively fresh, and prime actors of the repression were keen on writing down their direct experience or more generally on the fight against subversion and Marxism.54 Spanish officers were well aware of the French and Yugoslav resistance in the Second World War and the postwar insurgent activities in Algeria, Greece, Malaya, Palestine and the Philippines.55 Although one can trace an interest in the contemporary guerrilla in the Spanish monthly military magazine Ejército back to 1945,56 it is none the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Continuity 55 less between the end of the 1950s and the mid-1960s that the number of articles dedicated to this topic in the magazine increases exponentially (five articles for the period 1945–55 and twenty-one between 1956 and 1965).57 Prior to the 1960s, articles or personal thoughts on guerrilla and revolutionary warfare published in the Spanish military magazine were the sole province of high-ranking officers who fought during the Civil War.58 In the subsequent period, a substantial part of these publications were more and more authored by younger officers who benefited from the counter-insurgency training offered by the Argentine War Academy, the French Military School (Ecole de Guerre) and the US Fort Bragg’s special warfare school training on psychological and unconventional tactics.59 This increase of publications on guerrilla warfare and counter-insurgency cannot be separated from the creation in 1964 of the Centre for National Defence Studies (Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional, CESEDEN) and its determination to reflect the global standards in counterinsurgency of the time.60 It cannot be disconnected either from the increased pressure ETA was putting on the regime and the fact that military and police personnel were the main targets of the Basque organisation. While ETA in the late 1960s was expressly seeking to provoke a violent reaction, reasoning that State repression would in turn elicit popular support for armed struggle, Spanish military circles began an internal debate over how to cope with the problem, reading the same subversive books as the members of ETA.61 Given the crippling limitations that faced Spanish armed forces, a counter-insurgency strategy that did not put a premium on the familiar elements of military power – equipment, budget and personnel – gained ground among Francoist officers. Counter-insurgency as a set of punitive tactics stressing the utmost importance of small units (made of individuals showing the highest degree of commitment) was also appealing to the Spanish army which idealised martial virtues of discipline, courage and honour. Furthermore, counter-insurgency was a strategy that could be easily recast within the Francoist moral crusade of national regeneration against the ‘Anti-Spain’. Among the many articles and books dedicated to guerrilla and counterinsurgency published in Spain in the mid-1960s, two volumes in particular deserve special attention: Colonel Štir’s Elements and Methods of the Communist Guerrilla (Elementos y métodos de la guerrilla comunista)62 and infantry captain Cassinello Pérez’s Operations of Guerrillas and Counterguerrillas (Operaciones de guerrillas y contraguerrillas).63 The fact that they were both published in 1966 is purely coincidental. It illustrates however an interesting climax in the expansion and growth of a Francoist doctrine on counter-subversion. It epitomises a steady move from the recollection

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

56

Counter-terror by proxy

and discussion of Spanish or foreign hands-on experience into their theorisation and adjustment to the Spanish context. Elementos y métodos de la guerrilla comunista holds a special place because of its author and its publisher. The author is Ivan Štir (1913–98), an Ustaše colonel who found refuge in Argentina. The book is published by Drina ediciones, a publishing house owned by Luburić in Madrid where he found refuge after the defeat of the Independent State of Croatia and from where he feverishly organised the Croatian National Resistance against Ante Pavelić, the founder of the Ustaše movement.64 Originally printed in Croatian in 1965,65 the book was not only translated into Spanish a year after but also complemented by an extolling foreword by Spanish General José Diaz de Villegas: With Colonel Ivan Štir, the secrets of the Communist guerrilla are revealed. He equally points out the most appropriate means to combat it; one must fight evil actions back with the same means.66

The fact that a highly ranked officer as the Spanish Army Chief of Staff approved such a book does not mean that the Francoist regime endorsed it. It is, however, a testimony of the tight connections between Spanish military officers and the far-right and anti-Communist refugee community living in Spain.67 General Díaz de Villegas, one of the former officers of the Spanish volunteer unit sent by the Franco regime to join the Axis war against the Soviet Union during the Second World War,68 concurred with the Croatian colonel’s view on the Red Menace and the absolute necessity to defeat it. The fight against the moral depravity and satanic danger of Communism is central to both of them.69 Reflecting upon his own military experience against the Yugoslav partisans, Štir exposes his staunch anti-Communist view and urges his fellow comrades of the ‘Free World’ to join the fight against the immorality of the enemy.70 Štir’s argument is quite straightforward; whether one talks about ‘revolutionary warfare’, ‘guerrilla’, ‘subversion’, ‘infiltration’ or ‘corruption’, it is the same and fundamentally consubstantial to the so-called Communist plan to take over the world. If not treated rapidly, guerrilla warfare will degenerate into a civil war. Štir suggests that one can defeat a guerrilla only if, firstly, one knows how a guerrilla works and, secondly, if one adopts the same logics of action. It is then only a matter of doing exactly the same but in an orderly fashion.71 The Croatian colonel’s understanding of counter-guerrilla action as a war against Communism is clear from the outset. One needs to ‘contain’ and ‘sanitise’ a territory infected by guerrillas, using their same tools and techniques, before the Communist virus spreads and replicates itself.72 Štir’s military credentials and experience in the fight against Tito’s partisans and his portrayal of the Communist militants as the dupes of

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Continuity 57 Moscow could only appeal to the hardliners of the Francoist regime with their much-vaunted anti-Communism and their depiction of Spain as the Cold War’s ‘sentinel of the West’.73 Štir’s volume is emblematic of a generation who had first-hand experience in combat and whose lives were moulded during wartime. In this respect, infantry captain Cassinello Pérez’s volume Operations of Guerrillas and Counter-guerrillas is quite the opposite, with abundant theoretical knowledge but scarce practical experience.74 Cassinello Pérez was quite representative of that new ‘professionalised’ generation of young Spanish officers who had not experienced war directly but who were well-versed in classic war theorists.75 Operaciones de guerrillas y contraguerrillas is based on the author’s reading of modern counter-insurgency doctrines he was exposed to during his training at the US Army Special Warfare School in Fort Bragg. The book describes at length the kinds of environments and the conditions in which insurrection may take root and flourish, the character of the military conflict between guerrilla and government forces and the critical struggle between the two for popular support. The tone and the structure of his manual are clearly inspired by the different US field manuals on counter-insurgency and by the French military strategists of the time.76 If Cassinello Pérez’s monograph is considerably and directly less antiCommunist than Štir’s, both volumes share a similar and explicit suggestion about the rationale of counter-insurgency. For both of them, it is clear that there are powerful and volatile social forces in the community and beyond which, upon hearing a revolutionary message of agitators, are likely to sweep all before them with unstoppable force. People can be turned into resources that can help prolong guerrilla tactics and threaten the security of surrounding regions that were originally guerrilla-free. They equally concur on the main approach to be adopted, although Cassinello adopts a more ‘neutral’ tone, preferring the clinical detachment of strategic terminology to the language of pure anti-Communism: It is necessary to become irregular, to deviate from the routine, to lighten the equipment, thus, to imitate the enemy’s tactics77

Cassinello Pérez replicates what the different US counter-insurgency field manuals and French strategists already prescribed.78 The design is to take and hold the initiative and the mood is relentlessly on the offensive. In order to maintain the initiative, Cassinello lays considerable stress on the application of intelligence principles to counter-insurgency actions, to the orchestration of political and military operations designed to win back or win over and secure the allegiance of the population and, finally, to the use of ‘special paramilitary units clearly detached from the hierarchy and employing clandestine and terrorist tactics’.79 According to the standard of the time,

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

58

Counter-terror by proxy

his understanding of counter-insurgency techniques was far from original.80 However, in the Spanish context where the army was more used to gaining a higher moral ground than to using punctual coercive and clandestine actions, his interpretation of counter-insurgency and revolutionary warfare was actually quite innovative. The Basque nationalist movement fixed on Cassinello Pérez, elevating him to one of its central hate figures. That many other officers were trying to apply experiences gained elsewhere to the environment of the Basque country was something largely ignored because their writings took the form of classified internal army papers. Furthermore, the idea that the problem could be solved by shooting ETA ringleaders was a shared belief among Francoist security and military services. However, exposing clearly how the use of clandestine actions by proxy groups would be an efficient way to terminate insurrection was indeed a novelty. Cassinello Pérez’s 1966 manual was as such a fantastic blueprint for a regime eager to deal with ETA in a swift manner but without upsetting its international repute too directly; one should mimic the methods of the enemy, yet assigning the responsibility for waging an irregular war to persons other than official agents of the state. His interpretation came at a time when every segment of the intelligence and military apparatus was largely and deeply concerned by the fear that Basque terrorism would develop along the lines of Latin American guerrilla warfare.81 As we underlined in Chapter 1, for the Spanish authorities it was clear that the Basque problem was the more serious in that ETA evidently had the sympathy of (at any rate) a significant part of the Basque population. All the Francoist intelligence and military forces agreed upon the fact that, in order to fight ETA, it was necessary to adopt a similar mode of organisation and action.82 The necessity of defending the country against the unconventional methods of warfare employed by ETA meant to mimic them. Yet, in order to win over foreign and domestic opinion, the Spanish authorities had to project an image of leniency while at the same time meting out harsh punishment. At a time when the Francoist regime was courted by almost every Western country for strategic reasons and by international investors for economic ones, using clandestine groups as fronts for anti-terrorism operations was not unrelated to this necessity to improve the country’s international relations so as to ensure the regime’s survival after Franco’s death.83 Until the end of the 1960s and early 1970s, repression of all dissidents was direct and without subterfuge, sending a strong and exemplary message to anyone who defied the regime. But from then on, repression of Basque dissidents in particular began to appear in other guises. It remained equally intense but was increasingly the bailiwick of far-right clandestine organisations composed of individuals who showed the highest degree of patriotism and a clear commitment to defeat Communism and all its supporters, sympathisers

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Continuity 59 and ‘fellow travellers’. Spain was then a country of asylum for far-right exiles from Europe and South America.84 In addition to the many Spanish organisations originating in the 1930s nationalist movements (Fuerza Nueva, Vanguardia Nacional, Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista (JONS), Falange Española Tradicionalista (XFET)),85 Spain took in Italian neo-fascist sects such as Ordine Nuovo and Avanguardia Nazionale,86 former members of the French paramilitary group Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS),87 and Triple A.88 Also present were anti-Semitic, anti-Communist and negationist political groupings such as Jeune Europe and Frente Nacional de Trabajadores. These clandestine organisations readily yielded up recruits who were well disposed to attack ETA if they were given the necessary information and money. Increasingly, they took over the job of fighting terrorism, using information gathered and relayed by SECED to carry out assassinations in France and Spain.

‘Quijotismo’ – Reforming autocratic institutions and mentalities Following the 1939 victory, Franco did purge brutally every segment of Spanish society.89 During the forty years of his regime, the maintenance of a strict public order and the assurance of political power prevailed. Every single actor of the regime was trained and socialised to that particular authoritarian understanding of law and order.90 Military personnel were a crucial element of the Francoist regime, and very few positions within the policy-making arenas and internal security were occupied by civilians. The army was indeed the backbone of the regime and the guarantor of the Francoist order. While it would be improper to assert that during the Francoist regime the army was a monolithic institution free of power struggles, corporate interests and ideological divergences, it is none the less safe to say that military personnel were largely convinced that they were the ultimate and loyal saviour of the unity of the nation.91 The military and repressive assumptions were even more significant among the security agencies and the armed forces since, during the last decade of the regime, the Francoist hardliners transformed them into their last redoubt. With the death of Franco in 1975, Spain went through the challenging task of reforming these autocratic institutions created by the Francoist regime for the protection and the continuation of the Francoist regime itself and which were largely composed of people hostile to the democratisation process. The concern that any rush in the reform of these institutions could provoke a rebellion was far from being irrelevant. The stripping away of these military prerogatives and the development of the security and armed forces from institutions to an occupation was a constant preoccupation and a delicate

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

60

Counter-terror by proxy

task during the transition to democracy. Removing the security personnel from policy-making arenas and getting them to jettison their haughty perception of themselves as the ultimate saviours of the nation were indeed delicate tasks. The transformation in Spain of highly autonomous and politically powerful militarised institutions inherited from the Franco regime into non-deliberative agents of the State that executed the policies of an elected government was not a smooth or easy process.92 During the first years of the Transition, reforms were limited. In order to deal with serious organised crime and terrorist offences the TOP was replaced by the National Court (Audiencia Nacional) in 1977. That same year, the Moncloa Pact included a tentative reform of the police and security services but it would be only in 1986 that a Police Law would lead to the creation of a full civil police body and only in 1991 that the infamous Francoist Public Order Law would eventually be amended. Like most of the police and military institutions, SECED retained its powers and members after the Caudillo’s death. In 1977, its name was changed to Centro Superior de Información para la Defensa, but its personnel remained the same. Institutional arrangements and professional cultures are typically hard to change, and one knows only too well how constitutions and decrees in themselves tend not to change greatly the traditions and customs of generations. The focus on eliminating enemies of the regime through military action outlasted Franco93 and was passed along to the transitional government of 1975–78 by the many members of the Francoist bureaucracy who kept their positions and responsibilities (even police and army officers known for repressing the opposition or suspected of having aided attempts to destabilise the new government). The members of the BPS were transferred to the Guardia Civil and police intelligence brigades. In May 1982, former BPS officers still held eight of twelve chief positions in the national police. Manuel Fraga, the last minister of information and censorship under Franco, became Minister of the Interior in 1975. Indeed, the top brass of the police and military institutions as a whole remained largely untouched.94 The professional life of Cassinello Pérez is an interesting testimony of this agreed transition. In 1968, two years after the publication of his book on counter-insurgency, he joined the OCN and was awarded the rank of Major (Comandante) in 1970. When the OCN became the SECED in 1972, Cassinello moved within the new organisation and, under the first years of Adolfo Suárez’s government (1976–77), he was in charge of the intelligence services. For a short period of time, Cassinello served as a close collaborator of the Ministry of Defence Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado, a Franco-era general who created the Defence Information Service, which together with the Military Information Service was the precursor of Spain’s secret service.95 Cassinello then served between 1978 and 1984 as head of the Guardia Civil intelligence

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Continuity 61 services (jefatura del Servicio de Información de la Guardia Civil). In this position, he worked in close co-operation with the counter-terrorist unified command (Mando Unificado para la Lucha Contraterrorista) led by Manuel Ballesteros (1935–2008), a former member of the BPS in Valencia who became police superintendent in the Basque country in 1974 before joining the national police intelligence services (Comisaría General de Información) in 1979, and also, with General José Antonio Sáenz de Santamaría (1919–2003), the former Francoist co-ordinator for the fight against the Spanish Maquis, the architect responsible for remodelling the Guardia Civil’s fight against ETA in the 1970s and for the modernisation of the Spanish police, who as special delegate for the government in the Basque country was in charge of counter-terrorism, before being nominated as director-general of the Guardia Civil in 1983.96 Cassinello became Colonel in 1982, Brigadier General in 1984 and awarded Major-General in 1986 with the responsibility of the prestigious Ceuta General Command in the Spanish enclave on the northern shores of Morocco’s Mediterranean coast.97 From the outset of the 1980s, the steady conversion of Francoist countersubversion actors, discourse and knowhow into counter-terrorism was completed. The war by proxy, initiated under Franco with a great deal of foreign training support, appears to have been hard-wired into the Spanish military and police institutions, which were hardly altered by the change of regime. Until the mid-1980s, Spanish officers were still benefiting from counter-insurgency training in Argentina at the infamous Navy School of Mechanics (Escuela de Mecánica de la Armada), arguably one of the most important centres of detention of the Argentinian dictatorship.98 The State security institutions had retained not only their attributes and powers but also their vision of the conflict with ETA, perceived as the direst threat to the social and political order. ETA was a criminal, ‘anti-Spanish’, ‘antipatriotic’, organisation that had to be fought by all the country’s security forces. When the socialists won a landslide in the general elections of October 1982, the moderation of their reforms had assuaged the fears of the right without alienating the support of the mass of their voters.99 Yet, when Serra became the first PSOE minister of defence, every member of the Higher Council of the Army had fought in the Civil War.100 The room for manoeuvre for the newly elected first socialist government of Felipe Gonzalez in 1982 was therefore quite limited; how to avert military reaction and yet also respond to ETA’s violence. The military’s capacity to derail the new democracy was a lingering concern for the PSOE and the spectre of another military rebellion was never far from becoming a reality. In choosing not to confront the Spanish armed forces and not to purge the military institutions after 1982, the PSOE was hoping to introduce a smooth modernisation of institutions created by and for the Francoist regime. Yet,

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

62

Counter-terror by proxy

at the same time, the Socialist government was urged to react firmly against the violence of ETA. Many among the Spanish law enforcement and intelligences agencies thought at the time that the Socialist government of Prime Minister Felipe González would be soft on terrorism. Yet, and against the odds, the PSOE had shown an almost ruthless resolve to eradicate ETA. The increasing number of anti-ETA successes, stemming from intensified police work, signalled the government’s commitment to a tough anti-terrorist line. The PSOE’s inroad against terrorism certainly contributed to allay the initial suspicions of the police and military forces. The energy deployed by the socialist government in order to secure French co-operation against ETA and the end of the ‘French sanctuary’ did not go unnoticed either among the security services or more largely among the conservative segments of Spain: I have never encountered such a level of decision or motivation to go all the way down such as our current socialist government, and to do so in a coordinated way, with diplomatic actions, with police actions, with support to the security forces. […] This government has entered this theme like a fighting bull.101

Spanish socialist officials were indeed unrelenting in their attempts to persuade their French counterparts to act more vigorously against terrorism. This Spanish determination towards the end of exception to extradition and the government’s lobbying efforts towards greater co-operation in the fight against ETA are the central tenets of the next chapter.

Notes 1 J. M. Colomer, Game Theory and the Transition to Democracy: The Spanish Model, Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1995; D. Share, ‘Transitions to democracy and transition through transaction’, Comparative Political Studies, 19:4, 1987, 525–48. 2 O. G. Encarnación, Spanish Politics: Democracy After Dictatorship, Cambridge, Polity, 2008; V. Druliolle, ‘Democracy captured by its imaginary: The transition as memory and discourse of constitutionalism in Spain’, Social & Legal Studies, 17:1, 2008, 75–92. 3 O. G. Encarnación, Democracy Without Justice in Spain: The Politics of Forgetting, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014. 4 P. Aguilar, Memory and Amnesia. The Role of the Spanish Civil War in the Transition to Democracy, New York, Berghahn Books, 2002. 5 Law 46/1977, BOE, Madrid, 15 October 1977. 6 Encarnación, Democracy Without Justice. 7 J. Marco, ‘Francoist crimes: Denial and invisibility, 1936–2016’, Journal of Contemporary History, 52:1, 2017, 157–63.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Continuity 63 8 O. Encarnación, ‘Pinochet’s revenge: Spain revisits its Civil War’, World Policy Journal, 24:4, 2007, 39–50. 9 O. Ferrán, L. Hilbink (eds) Legacies of Violence in Contemporary Spain: Exhuming the Past, Understanding the Present, Abingdon, Routledge, 2016. 10 Ley 57/2007 por la que se reconocen y amplían derechos y se establecen medidas en favor de quienes padecieron persecución o violencia durante la Guerra Civil y la Dictadura, known in Spain as Ley de Memoria Histórica. 11 ‘La Universidad de Santiago retira a Franco de su lista de doctores “honoris causa”’, El Mundo, 11 November 2006; ‘La Universidad de Salamanca rechaza el Honoris Causa a Franco’, El Mundo, 30 April 2008. Francisco Franco was appointed also by the distinguished Portuguese University of Coimbra as doctor honoris causa. To date, he still is on the list of the recipients of the honorary degree. ‘Coimbra mantém Franco doutor honoris causa’, Jornal de Notícias, 24 November 2018. 12 DECRETO de 1 de abril de 1940 disponiendo se alcen Basílica, Monasterio y Cuartel de Juventudes, en la finca situada en las vertientes de la Sierra del Guadarrama (El Escorial), conocida por Cuelga-muros, para perpetuar la memoria de los caídos en nuestra Gloriosa Cruzada, Boletín Oficial del Estado [BOE], 2 April 1940, 93, 2240. See R. Delso, A. Amann, F. Soriano, ‘Time, architecture and domination: The Valley of the Fallen’, Heritage & Society, 11:2, 2018, 126–50. 13 DECRETO de 1 de abril de 1940: ‘Es necesario que las piedras que se levanten tengan la grandeza de los monumentos antiguos, que desafien al tiempo y al olvido’. 14 In 2011, a national commission of experts argued that Franco’s remains should be removed. This position was eventually endorsed in 2014 by the UN human rights expert Pablo de Greiff in a series of recommendations to Spain on how to deal with Franco’s legacy. See Andrea Hepworth, ‘Site of memory and dismemory: The Valley of the Fallen in Spain’, Journal of Genocide Research, 16:4, 2014, 463–85. 15 J. L. Rodríguez Jiménez, ‘The Spanish extreme right: From neo-Francoism to xenophobic discourse’, in A. Mammone, E. Godin and B. Jenkins (eds), Mapping the Extreme Right in Contemporary Europe: From Local to Transnational, Abingdon, Routledge, 2012, 109–23; Á. Cenarro, ‘Francoist nostalgia and memories of the Spanish Civil War’, International Journal of Iberian Studies, 21:3, 2008, 203–17. 16 H. Graham (ed.) Interrogating Francoism: History and Dictatorship in TwentiethCentury Spain, London, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016. 17 E. Richard, C. Vorms, ‘Transition historiographique: Retour sur quatre-vingts ans d’histoire de l’Espagne, de la Seconde République à la transition’ [Historiographical transition: A review of eighty years of Spanish history, from the Second Republic to the Transition], Vingtième siècle. Revue d’histoire, 127:3, 2015, 13–41. 18 N. Townson, Spain Transformed: The Late Franco Dictatorship: 1959–1975, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. On the impact of the encyclicals of Pope John XXIII and the declarations of the Second Vatican council upon

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

64

Counter-terror by proxy

the slow-pace mutation of the Spanish Church and its dissociation from the Francoist regime, see A. Brassloff, Religion and Politics in Spain: The Spanish Church in Transition, 1962–96, New York, Palgrave, 1998. 19 A. Alcalde, Los excombatientes franquistas. La cultura de guerra del fascismo español y la Delegación Nacional de Excombatientes (1936–1965) [Franco’s former soldiers. The culture of war in Spanish fascism and in the National Delegation of Veterans (1936–65)], Zaragoza, Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza, 2014. C. Hernández Burgos, Granada Azul: La construcción de la ‘Cultura de la Victoria’ en el primer franquismo [Blue Granada: The construction of the Culture of Victory in the first Francoism], Granada, Comares, 2011. 20 J. Großmann, ‘“Baroque Spain” as metaphor. Hispanidad, Europeanism and Cold War anti-communism in Francoist Spain’, Bulletin of Spanish Studies, 91:5, 2014, 755–71. 21 D. Muro, A. Quiroga, ‘Spanish nationalism’, Ethnicities, 5:1, 2005, 19. 22 J. Domínguez Arribas, El enemigo judeo-masónico en la propaganda franquista (1936–1945) [The Judaeo-Masonic enemy in Franco’s propaganda (1936–45)] Madrid, Marcial Pons Ediciones de Historia, 2009; F. Sevillano Calero, Rojos. La representación del enemigo en la guerra civil [Reds. The representation of the enemy in the Civil War], Madrid, Alianza, 2007. 23 Ley de 9 de Febrero de 1939 de Responsabilidades Politicas, BOE, 13 February 1939, 824. 24 Ley de 1 de Marzo de 1940 sobre represión de la masoneria y del comunismo, BOE, 1 March 1940, 62, 1537. 25 Ley de vagos y maleantes, Gaceta de Madrid, núm. 217, 1933, 874–7. 26 Ley de 2 de Marzo de 1943 por la que se equiparan al delito de rebelión militar las transgresiones de orden jurídico que tengan una manifiesta repercusión en la vida publica, BOE, núm. 75, 16 March 1943, 2384–5. 27 Fuero de los Españoles, 18 juillet 1945 (BOE, núm. 199, pp. 358–60). 28 E.-P. Guittet, ‘Les recours à l’état d’exception sous le régime franquiste (1956–1975)’ [Recourses to the state of exception under the Francoist regime, 1956–75], Cultures & Conflits, 113, 2019, 89–98. 29 Artículo 35: La vigencia de los Artículos doce, trece, catorce, quince, dieciséis y dieciocho podrá ser temporalmente suspendida por el Gobierno total o parcialmente mediante Decreto-Ley, que taxativamente determine el alcance y duración de la medida. 30 Ley 45/1959, de 30 de julio de Orden Público (BOE, núm. 182, pp. 10365–70). Ley 36/1971, de 21 de julio, sobre modificación de determinados artículos de la Ley de Orden Público de 30 de julio de 1959 (BOE, núm. 175, pp. 12092–4). 31 The preamble to the 1968 Decree on the Repression of banditry and terrorism, which referred cases of terrorism to military courts, explicitly expressed this authoritarian and extensive conception of order as a means to an end: ‘The defence of national unity and integrity and the maintenance of public order and social peace recommend the use at all times of the necessary means to safeguard these values’ (Decreto-ley 9/1968, de 16 de agosto, sobre represión del bandidaje y terrorismo, BOE, núm. 198, p. 12192).

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Continuity 65 32 J. Arostegui Sanchez (ed.), Franco: la represión como sistema [Franco: Systemic oppression], Barcelona, Flor del Viento, 2012. N. Sartorius, J. Alfaya, La memoria insumisa: sobre la dictadura de Franco [Insubordinate memory: About Franco’s dictatorship], Barcelona, Crítica, 2002. 33 L. Tahmassian, ‘Carl Schmitt and the Basque conflict: From the design of Francoism to Spanish democracy’, Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies, 13:1, 2012, 59–81; J. A. López García, ‘La presencia de Carl Schmitt en España’ [The presence of Carl Schmitt in Spain], Revista de Estudios Políticos (Nueva Época), 91, 1996, 139–68. 34 I. De la Rasilla del Moral, ‘The fascist mimesis of Spanish international law and its Vitorian Aftermath, 1939–1953’, The Journal of the History of International Law, 14, 2012, 207–36. A. J. Menendez, ‘From republicanism to fascist ideology under the early Franquismo, in C. Joerges, N. Singh Ghaleigh (eds) Darker Legacies of Law in Europe: The Shadow of National Socialism and Fascism over Europe and Its Legal Traditions, Oxford, Hart, 2003, pp. 337–60; J. A. López García, Estado y derecho en el franquismo. El nacionalsindicalismo: F. J. Conde y Luis Legaz Lacambra [Rule of Law under Francoism. National syndicalism: F. J. Conde and Luis Legaz Lacambra], Madrid, Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 1996. Between Schmitt and the Francoist jurists, there was a common understanding on the programmed decadence of democracy but also a belief in the virtues of authority and inflexible decision-making. Furthermore, Schmitt’s view on liberalism was guided by his reading of Spanish conservative and counter-revolutionary literature. These credentials would make Schmitt a guest of honour of Francoist Spain and indeed, Schmitt delivered a series of lectures in 1960s Spain that would eventually become the basis of his Theory of the Partisan. 35 Ley 154/1963, de 2 de diciembre, sobre creación del Juzgado y Tribunales de Orden Público (BOE, núm. 291, pp. 16985–7). S. Nuñez de Prado Clavel, R. Ramirez Ruiz, ‘La oposición al franquismo en las sentencias del TOP: organizaciones políticas y movimientos sociales’, Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea, 35, 2013, 263–85. 36 J. J. Del Aguila, El TOP: la represión de la libertad (1963–1977) [The TOP. Repression of Freedom (1963–77)], Barcelona, Planeta, 2001, 230. 37 Del Aguila, El TOP, 241. 38 M. Ballbé, Orden público y militarismo en la España constitucional (1812–1983) [Public order and militarism in constitutional Spain (1812–1983)], Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1983. 39 M. Turrado Vidal, La policia en la historia contemporánea de España (1766–1986) [The police force in the contemporary history of Spain (1766–1986)], Madrid, Dykinson Editorial, 2000, 243–66; D. López Garrido, El aparato policial en España [The police system in Spain], Barcelona, Ariel, 1987. 40 A. Días, Los servicios de inteligencia en España [The intelligence services in Spain], Madrid, Alianza, 2005; M. Ros Agudo, La guerra secreta de Franco (1939–1945) [Franco’s secret war, 1939–45], Barcelona, Critica, 2002, 207–11.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

66

Counter-terror by proxy

41 On the context of the 1953 Spanish–US Agreement and its subsequent reformulations, see A. Viñas, En las garras del águila. Los pactos con Estados Unidos, de Franco a Felipe González (1945–1995) [In the eagle’s claws. The US agreements from Franco to Felipe González, 1945–95], Barcelona, Crítica, 2003. 42 Prior to the Pact of Madrid, Spain’s contacts with the international community were limited to Argentina, Portugal and the Vatican. 43 J. I. San Martin, Servicio Especial. A las órdenes de Carrero Blanco [Special duty. At the service of Carrero Blanco], Barcelona, Planeta, 1983. 44 A. Giménez-Salinas, ‘The Spanish intelligence services’, in J.-P. Brodeur, P. Gill, D. Tollborg (eds) Democracy, Law and Security. Internal Security Services in Contemporary Europe, London, Ashgate, 2003, 63–80. 45 We will discuss this point further in Chapter 3. 46 There is a rich scholarly literature on the Spanish armed forces. For an overview of Spanish military through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see W. H. Bowen, J. Alvarez (eds) A Military History of Modern Spain: From the Napoleonic Era to the International War on Terror, Westport, Praeger Security International, 2007. For a detailed examination of the Spanish armed forces’ ideological components, see P. Preston, The Politics of Revenge. Fascism and the Military in 20th Century Spain, London, Routledge, 1991; C. Boyd, Praetorian Politics in Liberal Spain, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1979; S. G. Payne, Politics and the Military in Modern Spain, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1967. 47 J. J. Olivas Osuna, Iberian Military Politics: Controlling the Armed Forces During Dictatorship and Democratisation, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015; G. Cardona, El poder militar en el franquismo. Las bayonetas de papel [The military power during Francoism. Paper bayonets], Barcelona, Les Punxes, 2008; M. Aguilar Olivencia, El ejército español durante el franquismo [The army during Francoism], Madrid, Ediciones Akal, 1999; J. A. Olmeda Gómez, Las fuerzas armadas en el estado franquista [The armed forces in the Francoist State], Madrid, Ediciones el Arquero, 1988. 48 Monographs and edited volumes on the genesis and rise of counter-insurgency doctrines and their national variations have flourished in the past two decades or so. Within that literature, counter-insurgency and guerrilla warfare in Spain are very often limited to the nineteenth- century Napoleonic experience and the Francoist counter-insurgency period largely ignored. For some elements on the development and learning processes of the Francoist police and military forces in the implementation of counter-insurgency techniques, see P. Casanellas, Morir matando. El franquismo ante la práctica armada, 1968–1977 [To die killing. Francoism against armed struggle, 1968–77], Madrid, Libros de la Catarata, 2014; J. Marco, ‘Una Corea en pequeño. Contrainsurgencia y represión de la guerrilla en España, 1939–1952’ [A small Korea. Counter-insurgency and repression of the guerrillas in Spain, 1939–1952], Contenciosa, 1:1, 2013, 1–20; J. C. Diz Monje, ‘La guerra irregular en el marco de la defensa operativa del territorio (1965–1975)’ [Irregular warfare in the context of the operational

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Continuity 67 defence of the territory (1965–75)], in F. Puell de la Villa, S. Alda Mejías (eds) Fuerzas Armadas y políticas de defensa durante el franquismo: IV Congreso de Historia de la Defensa [Armed forces and defence policies during the Franco regime: Fourth Congress on the History of Defence], Madrid, Instituto Universitario General Gutiérrez Mellado de Investigación sobre la Paz, la Seguridad y la Defensa – UNED, 2010, 217–35. 49 The term ‘fifth column’ originated in the Spanish Civil War, when the nationalist General Mola announced that, although four columns of troops surrounded Madrid, the city would fall to a fifth column ready to strike from within. For an insightful analysis of the complex network of anti-Communist motives and movements during the Cold War, see L. Van Dongen, S. Roulin, G. Scott-Smith (eds) Transnational Anti-Communism and the Cold War: Agents, Activities and Networks, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 50 G. Jensen, ‘The Spanish army at war in the nineteenth century: Counterinsurgency at home and abroad’, in Bowen, Alvarez (eds) A Military History of Modern Spain, 15–36. 51 On the crucial importance of the experience of war in Morocco upon the creation of an interventionist military elite that would eventually lead to the 1936 coup, see S. Balfour, Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the Road to Spanish Civil War, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002. 52 On Weyler’s use of ‘reconcentration’ camps to separate the guerrilla from their local supports, see J. L. Tone, War and Genocide in Cuba, 1895–1898, Chapel Hill, North Carolina University Press, 2006. 53 Marco, Una Corea en pequeño. 54 T. Cossias, La lucha contra el maquis en España [The fight against the Maquis in Spain], Madrid, Editorial nacional, 1956; C. Alonso, La pacificación (guerrilleros, maquis y pistoleros) [Pacification (fighters, maquis and armed bandits)], Barcelona, AHR, 1957; J. Díaz de Villegas, La guerra revolucionaria: la técnica de la revolución y la acción psicológica, el arma secreta del marxismo [Revolutionnary warfare: The technique of revolution and the psychological campaign, the secret weapon of Marxism], Madrid, Ediciones Europa, 1959. Díaz de Villegas’s La guerra revolucionaria was awarded the National Literature Prize (Premio Nacional de Literatura) and declared of ‘public interest’ by National Decree in July 1963. It was also translated in Italian in 1967 under the title ‘Guerra + Rivoluzione’. On the importance of Díaz de Villegas’s book for the Italian ‘strategy of tension’ – the name given to the collusion between parts of the Italian state, fascist terrorists and provocateurs in the 1970s – see E. González Calleja, Guerras no ortodoxas: La ‘estrategia de la tensión’ y las redes del terrorismo neofascista [Unorthodox warfare: The strategy of tensión and the networks of neo-fascist terrorism], Madrid, Catarata, 2018. 55 Ferdinand Otto Miksche’s Secret Forces, Technique of Underground Movements, originally published by Faber & Faber (London) in 1950, was translated in Spanish the same year under the title Fuerzas secretas: La técnica de los movimientos clandestinos (Madrid, Editorial Gran Capitán). Miksche, a Czechoslovak major on the General Staff of the Spanish Republican army

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

68

Counter-terror by proxy

during the Civil War who later on joined the Operations Planning Department of General De Gaulle’s secret service during the Second World War, played an important part in the underground movement against the German forces in France. His volume is among the very first to methodically analyse ‘guerrilla warfare’. 56 G. Salcedo Ortega, ‘La guerra de guerrillas’ [Guerrilla warfare], Ejército – Revista ilustrada de las armas y servicios, 65, June 1945, 11–18. 57 E.-P. Guittet, ‘Rediscovering the “small war”? Francoist military doctrine on guerrilla and counterinsurgency (1950–1975)’, Brussels, 2019 [unpublished working paper]. 58 See for instance J. Esparza Arteche, ‘Posibilidades de la guerra de guerrillas’ [Chances of guerrilla warfare], Ejército – Revista ilustrada de las armas y servicios, 182, March 1955, 15–22; J. Díaz de Villegas, ‘De cómo España frustró los designios comunistas sobre la Península Ibérica. (Informe para enseñanza de despreocupados)’ [On how Spain thwarted the Communist plots on the Iberian peninsula], Ejército – Revista ilustrada de las armas y servicios, 234, July 1959, 7–17; J. Fernández Lamuño, ‘Guerra subversiva (con algunas referencias históricas)’ [Subversive warfare (with some historical notes)], Ejército – Revista ilustrada de las armas y servicios, 243, April 1960, 11–16. 59 For a compelling critical history of counter-insurgency, see D. Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2013. On the influence of the French school of revolutionary warfare in South and North America, see M.-M. Robin, Les esacdrons de la mort, l’école française [Death squad, the French school], Paris, La Découverte, 2004. On the infamous US Army School of the Americas (SOA), see G. Lesley, The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 2004. 60 Between 1966 and 1973, the information bulletin of the CESEDEN (Boletín de Información del CESEDEN) offered a translation in Spanish of the 1963 Portuguese field manual on guerrilla warfare (Bulletins 2, 4, 7 and 9, published between January and October 1966), of the 1965 US Field Manual on guerrilla warfare (Bulletins 16 to 18, published between May and August 1967) but also of Carlos Marighella’s 1969 Mini Manual of the Urban Guerrilla (Bulletin 60, January 1972) and of Von der Heydte’s Modern Irregular Warfare (Bulletins 70 and 71, released respectively in January and February 1973). 61 P. Casanellas, Morir matando. El franquismo ante la práctica armada, 1968–1977 [Dying killing. Francoism facing armed struggle, 1968–77], Madrid, Libros de la Catarata, 2014. 62 I. Štir, Elementos y métodos de la guerrilla comunista, Madrid, Drina ediciones, 1966. 63 A. Cassinello Pérez, Operaciones de guerrillas y contraguerrillas, Madrid, COMPI, 1966. 64 On the complex history of the Ustaše movement and the independent state of Croatia, see R.B. McCormick, Croatia under Ante Pavelic. America, the Ustaše and Croatian Genocide in World War II, New York, I. B. Tauris, 2017. On

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Continuity 69 the post-Second World War Croatian separatism see M. N. Tokić, ‘Landscapes of conflict: Unity and disunity in post-Second World War Croatian émigré separatism’, European Review of History, 16:5, 2009, 739–53. 65 I. Štir, Elementi i metode komunističke gerile, Madrid, Drinina Knjiznica, 1965. 66 J. Díaz de Villegas, ‘Prologo’, in I. Štir, Elementos y métodos de la guerrilla comunista, Madrid, Drina ediciones, 1966, 6. Diaz de Villegas had already published his view on the importance of Štir’s volume in the Spanish context. See J. Díaz de Villegas, ‘Lecciones de la experiencia ajena. La guerrilla como arma de subversión comunista’ [Lessons from foreign experience. Guerrilla as a subversive Communist weapon], Ejército – Revista ilustrada de las armas y servicios, 299, December 1964, 3–8. 67 M. Eiroa, ‘From the Iron Curtain to Franco’s Spain: Right-wing central Europeans in exile’, Central Europe, 16:1, 2018, 1–16. C. Collado Seidel, España, refugio Nazi [Spain, Nazi’s refuge], Madrid, Temas de hoy, 2005. 68 On the history of the ‘División Azul’, the Blue infantry division, see X. Moreno Juliá, La División Azul: sangre española en Rusia, 1941–1945 [Blue infantry division: Spanish blood in Russia, 1941–45], Barcelona, Critica, 2005. X. M. Núñez Seixas, Camarada invierno. Experiencia y memoria de la División Azul (1941–1945) [Comrade winter. Experience and memory of the Blue Infantry Division], Barcelona, Crítica, 2016. On General Díaz de Villegas, see S. E. Norling, ‘José Díaz de Villegas, un militar al frente de la política colonial del franquismo’ [José Díaz de Villegas, a soldier at the forefront of Franco’s colonial politics], Aportes, 97, 2018, 205–31. 69 J. Díaz de Villegas, La guerra revolucionaria: la técnica de la revolución y la acción psicológica. El arma secreta del marxismo, Madrid, Ediciones Europa, 1959. Among the numerous articles he published in the journal Ejército, see J. Díaz de Villegas, ‘De cómo España frustró los designios comunistas sobre la Península Ibérica. (Informe para enseñanza de despreocupados)’, Ejército – Revista ilustrada de las armas y servicios, 234, July 1959, 7–17. Interestingly, Díaz de Villegas’s book on revolutionary warfare was translated into Croatian by Luburić in two volumes: Gradjanski ratovi i revolucije [Civil wars and revolutions] in 1965 and Politicki rat [Political war] in 1968. 70 Štir, Elementos y métodos de la guerrilla comunista, 34 and 196. In his volume, Štir clearly expresses his concerns about South America but does not mention Spain. In his postface, Luburić stresses the fact that his former assistant’s concerns about the ‘red menace’ and how to fight it back are equally important for Spain, and even more as he follows Halford Mackinder’s heartland theory: ‘who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the World’. See ‘Notas marginales ante la segunda edición’, 274–8. 71 Štir, Elementos y métodos de la guerrilla comunista, 140 and 247. 72 On the medical metaphor used in military circles, see G. Périès, ‘Du corps au cancer: la construction métaphorique de l’ennemi intérieur dans le discours militaire pendant la Guerre Froide’ [From body to cancer: The metaphorical

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

70

Counter-terror by proxy

construction of the internal enemy in the military discourse during the Cold War], Cultures & Conflits, 43, 2001, 91–125. 73 J. Fernández Lamuño, No al marxismo [No to Marxism], Madrid, Escuela Superior del Ejercito, 1966. 74 A. Cassinello Pérez, Operaciones de guerrillas y contraguerrillas, Madrid, COMPI, 1966. His manual received a formal recognition though from the Francoist regime and was declared by decree ‘of Armed Forces utility’ (‘Obra declarada de utilidad para el ejército con fecha 21 de marzo de 1966’, Diario Oficial del ministerio del ejército, 24 March 1966, Volume 1, 1353). 75 Born in 1927, Andrés Cassinello Pérez entered the Military Academy in 1945 and became an Infantry Captain in 1958. Cassinello Pérez was nine years old when the Civil War started. However, his father José Cassinello Barroeta and his uncle Andrés Cassinello Barroeta were killed during the Civil War and later on included on the list of the martyrs of the Civil War (‘the Blessed Martyrs of Almeria’). A biography of Andres Cassinello Pérez would certainly be of interest. To my knowledge, such a work does not exist yet. 76 Among the French strategists Cassinello Pérez mentions in his manual Gabriel Bonnet and Roger Trinquier. See G. Bonnet, Les guerres insurrectionnelles et révolutionnaires [Insurgency and revolutionary wars], Paris, Payot, 1958. Bonnet’s book was translated in Spanish in 1967: G. Bonnet, Las guerras insurrecciónales y revolucionarías, Madrid, Cid Ediciones, 1967. R. Trinquier, La guerre moderne, Paris, la Table Ronde, 1961. Trinquier’s book has been translated in Spanish: R. Trinquier, La guerra moderna y la lucha contra las guerrillas, Barcelona, Editorial Herder, 1965. In Cassinello Pérez’s manual there is also a clear influence of French Colonel Buchond, who was commander of the French Paratroopers (9th Parachute Chasseur Regiment) in Algeria between 1956 and 1959, and an active lecturer at the US Special Warfare School. One can only assume that Cassinello Perez followed his teaching when he was at Fort Bragg. 77 Cassinello Pérez, Operaciones de guerrillas y contraguerrillas, 159. 78 M. Rigouste, L’ennemi Intérieur. La généalogie coloniale et militaire de l’ordre sécuritaire dans la France contemporaine [The internal enemy. Colonial and military genealogy of security order in contemporary France], Paris, La Découverte, 2011. 79 Cassinello Pérez, Operaciones de guerrillas y contraguerrillas, 161–9, 185–6 and 243 80 On the prioritisation of taking the offensive and the importance of intelligence, including the need for interrogation specialists, see Trinquier, La guerre moderne. On how ‘counter-gangs’ lived, dressed, ate and operated like their enemies see R. Miers, Shoot to Kill, London, Faber & Faber, 1959. Cassinello relies heavely on these classic readers in counter-insurgency and revolutionary warfare. 81 Casanellas, Morir matando. 82 M. Pato Movilla, La subversión y las fuerzas armadas [Subversion and armed forces], Madrid, COMPI, 1969.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Continuity 71 83 J. Cabezas, Yo mate a un etarra: Secretos de un comisario de la lucha antiterrorista [I killed a member of ETA: Secrets of a counter-terrorist superintendent], Barcelona, Planeta, 2003, 95. 84 Eiroa, From the Iron Curtain to Franco’s Spain; Collado Seidel, España, refugio Nazi. 85 J. L. Rodríguez Jiménez, Historia de Falange Española de las JONS [History of the Spanish JONS Falange], Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 2000; J. L. Rodríguez Jiménez, Reaccionarios y golpistas: la extrema derecha en España: del tardofranquismo a la consolidación de la democracia (1967–1982) [Reactionaries and coup perpetrators: the far-right in Spain from late francoism to the consolidation of democracy (1967–82)], Madrid, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC), 1994. 86 M. Sánchez Soler, Los hijos del 20-N: Historia violenta del fascismo español [The children of 20 November: Violent history of Spanish fascism], Madrid, Temas de hoy, 1993, 167ff. On the history and evolution of the Spanish–Italian extreme-right nexus during the Francoist period and the Transition, see M. Albanese, P. Del Hierro, Transnational Fascism in the Twentieth Century: Spain, Italy and the Global Neo-Fascist Network, London, Bloomsbury Academic, 2016. 87 The Organisation Armée Secrète (Secret Army Organisation, OAS) was created in Madrid in 1961. OAS battled the Algerian liberation movement FLN and De Gaulle’s Algerian politics. See R. Kauffer, L’OAS: histoire d’une organisation secrète [OAS: History of a secret organisation], Paris, Fayard, 1986. For a carefully documented analysis of the Algerian conflict, see for instance M. Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006. 88 I. Gonzalez Jansen, La Triple-A, Buenos Aires, Editorial Contrapunto, 1986, 93–106. 89 P. Preston, Spanish Holocaust. Inquisition and Extermination in TwentiethCentury Spain, London, Harper Press, 2012; J. Ruiz, Franco’s Justice: Repression in Madrid After the Spanish Civil War, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005; M. Richards, A Time of Silence: Civil War and the Culture of Repression in Franco’s Spain, 1936–1945, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998. 90 In the later part of the Franco era, there was none the less some resistance, notably among the judicial settings. On the genesis and role of justicia democrática (democratic justice) in Spain’s transition, see L. Hilbink, ‘Politicising law to liberalise politics: Anti-Francoist judges and prosecutors in Spain’s democratic transition’, in T. Halliday, L. Karpik, M. Feeley (eds) Fighting for Political Freedom, Portland, Hart Publishing, Oñati International Series in Law and Society, 2007, 403–37. 91 On the genesis and role of the clandestine organisation of democratic army officers (Unión Militar Democrática, UMD) see F. Reinlein, Capitanes rebeldes: los militares españoles durante la transición, de la UMD al 23-F [Rebel captains: The Spanish military during the transition from the UMD to the attempted coup], Madrid, La Esfera de los Libros, 2002.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

72

Counter-terror by proxy

92 N. Serra, The Military Transition. Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010. Narcís Serra was Spain’s minister of defence from 1982 until 1991. 93 F. Agüero, Militares, civiles y democracia. La Espana postfranquista en perspectiva comparada [Soldiers, civilians and democracy. Comparative approach on the post-Francoist Spain], Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1995. 94 Agüero, Militares, civiles y democracia. O. Jaime Jimenez, Policia, terrorismo y cambio politico en Espana. 1976–1996 [Police, terrorism and political change in Spain. 1976–96], Valencia, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2002, 143–67. 95 Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado (1912–95) joined the uprising of Franco’s forces in July 1936 that opened the Spanish Civil War and served the Caudillo loyally until Franco’s death in 1975, but he then turned his energies to persuading Franco’s armed forces to serve Spain’s emerging democracy. He became a key figure in the transition process and is best remembered for standing up to the rebel Civil Guardsmen who burst into the Spanish Parliament building on 23 February 1981. For a decent biography, see F. Puell de la Villa, Gutiérrez Mellado, un militar del siglo XX (1912–1995) [Gutiérrez Mellado, a soldier of the twentieth century (1912–95)], Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 1997, and, for a thorough overview of Gutiérrez Mellado’s impact upon the transition and the professionalisation of the Spanish armed forces, see F. Puell de la Villa, S. Ángel Santano (eds) El legado del general Gutiérrez Mellado [The legacy of General Gutiérrez Mellado], Madrid, Instituto Universitario General Gutiérrez Mellado / UNED, 2013. 96 Carcedo, Sáenz de Santa María, el General que cambió de bando [Sáenz de Santa María, the General who switched sides], Madrid, Temas de hoy, 2004. 97 In 1988, Cassinello moved to north-eastern Spain in Zaragoza (Aragon) and was in charge, until his retirement in 1991, of the Fifth Military Region (Quinta Región Militar Pirenaica Occidental). Since then, he has authored a book on Juan Martín Díez, a Spanish military leader and guerrilla fighter during the nineteenth-century Peninsular War, and numerous articles on the history of the Spanish armed forces. He has also been, since its creation in 2007, the President of the Association for the Defence of the Transition (Asociación para la Defensa de la Transición). 98 ‘Militares españoles se entrenaron en Argentina para la guerra sucia’ [Spanish officers trained for the dirty war in Argentina], El Mundo, 3 May 1998. 99 P. Kennedy, The Spanish Socialist Party and the Modernisation of Spain, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2013. 100 Serra, The Military Transition, 91. 101 C. Yárnoz, interview with Andres Cassinello: ‘El Gobierno ha entrado en el tema del terrorismo como un Miura’, El País, 22 July 1984.

3

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Controversy: extradition, political offence exception and the French sanctuary

If the protection Basque terrorism found in the south of France, the French ‘sanctuary’, was to disappear, or if there was greater co-operation on the part of the French authorities, ETA would not last six months in front of the Spanish Police. Manuel Ballesteros, Director of the Spanish Counter-terrorist Unified Command, 1981 Had these indomitable Basques not sounded the death knell for Francoism when they blew into the air of 1973 Madrid the armoured car of Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, Franco’s designated heir? Louis Joinet, French attorney, 2013

In May 2019 and after nearly two decades on the run, Jose Antonio Urrutikoetxea Bengoetxea, one of the former key leaders of ETA and better known as Josu Ternera, was arrested in France in a joint French and Spanish police operation. ‘Operación Infancia robada’ (Operation stolen childhood) was named in memory of the young victims of the 1987 barracks bombing in the northern city of Zaragoza perpetrated by ETA. The arrest of Josu Ternera in front of the hospital of the little town of Sallanches in the French Alps is certainly far from being insignificant. His name is not an ordinary one on the long list of Basque veteran militants arrested since the mid-1990s in joint operations by Spanish and French police. Ternera is one of those who spent a lifetime within ETA.1 Since the early 1970s, his militant journey followed the trials and tribulations of the Basque organisation from his contribution to the assassination of Carrero Blanco in 1973 to the direction of the organisation in 1987 after the death of one of its principal leaders, Domingo Iturbe Abasolo,2 and then to his announcement confirming the dissolution of the militant group in 2018. In his fifty years of involvement with ETA, Ternera moved from armed struggle in the 1970s to politics in the 1990s when he won a seat in the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

74

Counter-terror by proxy

Basque Parliament in 1998 on behalf of the Basque leftist party Euskal Herritarrok and joined the Parliament’s Human Rights Committee to the great displeasure of the Spanish associations of victims of terrorism. While on the run, after he was summoned in 2002 by a Spanish court to testify about his role in the 1987 attack in Zaragoza, he still took part in the secret talks between ETA and the government of the Socialist Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero in 2006. Ternera was the one who confirmed the end of ETA in May 2018. His arrest in 2019 led to a bitter exchange through the French media. The former Sinn Féin president Gerry Adams and Ronnie Kasrils, the former South African government minister and leading member of the African National Congress during Apartheid, published an article in the French liberal newspaper Le Monde highlighting the importance of the former leader of ETA in the Basque peace process and his crucial role in the final dissolution of the Basque group.3 Their invitation to defend Ternera in the name of the preservation of peace has been vehemently decried in an editorial published in the French conservative newspaper Le Figaro, co-written by fourteen Spanish and French intellectuals and political actors, including the Nobel Prize-winning author Mario Vargas Llosa and Spanish philosopher Fernando Savater.4 For political authorities on both sides of the Pyrénées, though, the operation that led to the arrest of Josu Ternera was presented not only as a definitive success but also and more importantly as a testimony to the close and resolute co-operation between the two European countries in the fight against terrorism. The Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez and the French Minister of the Interior Christophe Castaner applauded to the efficiency of the co-operation between the two countries. The exchange of congratulations on both sides of the Pyrénées following the arrest of members of ETA is now a well-established component of the political and diplomatic relationships between Spain and France. However, it was not always the case. The return in October 2019 of the former ETA activist Alfonso Etxegarai and his wife Kristiane Etxaluz from São Tomé and Príncipe, the two-island African nation 140 miles off the coast of Gabon where they were expelled to in 1985, perfectly brings back this period when extradition to Spain of Basque militants was not exactly favoured by the French authorities.5 The desire to secure French co-operation against ETA had been an early preoccupation of every Spanish government since the end of the Franco regime. During the late 1970s and 1980s, however, France and Spain were embroiled in diplomatic spats over requests for the extradition of ETA militants who found a comfortable refuge beyond the reach of Spanish law in south-west France.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Controversy 75 In strict legal terms, refuge or asylum and extradition are different matters but intimately woven into the same fabric. The questions of territorial asylum and the extradition of fugitive offenders are closely connected and constitute certainly two substantial subjects of continuing interest for scholars of international law and international politics. The question of granting territorial asylum arises when a person has fled from one country, enters the territory of another State and seeks permission to remain there. Whilst it is a fundamental right of a refugee to seek asylum in a State other than his or her own, the decision as to whether or not he or she should be granted asylum is a matter for determination of the State concerned. In rather simple terms as well, extradition is a formal process supported by bilateral or multilateral treaties whereby States grant each other mutual judicial assistance in criminal matters.6 A request for extradition hardly ever makes the news except in certain circumstances such as when exemption to an extradition is invoked by one party or the other. One of the most substantial elements under customary international law is that States are not under a legal duty to grant the request for extradition of an alleged offender. For the judges, lawyers, academic commentators and other legal and diplomatic practitioners, the historical, legal and practical developments of extradition and asylum usually present a rich array of thorny questions and moot points very often beyond the reach of the common mortal.7 Most extradition treaties incorporate a clause exempting from surrender persons accused of political offences, so that generally they are given asylum in the State where they have taken refuge. The political offence exemption has had varying provisions and different wordings but its key idea was that political offenders are to be excluded from the scope of mandatory extradition. The commended claim to draw a clear line between extraditable and nonextraditable offences has informed decades and decades of legal and jurisprudential debates.8 The underpinning rationale is that the entire international legal framework is based upon a distinction between common criminals and political offenders. That distinction, whilst universally accepted, is still one of the most controversial topics in extradition law, especially in relation to the fight against international terrorism.9 The essence of a decision to protect, to grant asylum or to extradite a person pertains to political matters and that argument constitutes the background of this chapter. The difficulties involved in determining what constitutes an offence committed by a political actor has led to some particularly sharp political exchanges but also to some tremendously complex legal battles between French and Spanish authorities. In the Spanish fight against ETA, France’s delicate position relative to its Iberian neighbour and its staunch purely political offence approach to the doctrine of extradition are key elements needed to understand why the GAL made their

76

Counter-terror by proxy

appearance in the mid-1980s and disappeared as rapidly once France started to co-operate.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

France and Spain: troubled relations At the dawn of the nineteenth century, the Bourbon kingdom of Spain was a fertile ground for French Napoleonic expansion before the principle of nationalism, so long a vital force in the success of the French revolution, had been turned against France. Spanish national feeling owes much to the French invasion of 1808 and perhaps even more to its neighbour’s sneering contempt for the once great Spanish power.10 The French condescending view of the Iberian country was matched only by Spanish anti-French sentiment. Yet, and at the same time, France was equally perceived by Spanish liberals as a political model to be followed, and Paris was the main cultural reference for the nineteenth-century Spanish urban middle class.11 North of the Pyrénées, Velázquez, El Greco, Zurbarán and Goya were influential on the imagination of nineteenth-century French artists and the exotic Spanish gypsies as an endless source of inspiration for European people.12 The fad for all Hispanic things would persist in France until the earlier twentieth century – although in a non-linear way. The French influence on Spanish intellectuals and politics saw a similar fate. In the long history between the two countries, relations swung back and forth between competition and co-operation, rivalry and concord, but always with a certain degree of French distrust, not to say disdain, for its Iberian neighbour.13 The way France reacted to the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s was attuned to this ambiguous perception made of misunderstanding and stereotypes. Yet the Spanish Civil War and its aftermath begot a new era of ‘good neighbour’ relationship between France and Spain. But it was none the less a relationship that oscillated over time, with a series of rifts and reconciliations. Thanks to its reputation as Europe’s foremost nation of asylum,14 but also on account of its geographical proximity, France of the Third Republic was the prime destination for refugees from the Spanish Civil War. The French Popular Front coalition elected in 1936 and led by Léon Blum was keen on offering political asylum to all comers. But, in a period of cultural anxiety after the nightmare of the First World War and industrial conflicts, and confronted with the reality of fascism’s expansion in Europe, the French Popular Front coalition found itself between a rock and a hard place.15 The coalition’s desire to oppose fascist aggression and its determination to remain true to a tradition of hospitality were matched with an equally strong desire to avoid another war at all costs and the affiliated fear of bringing war home.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Controversy 77 The Spanish Civil War did put the coalition under strain and brought these tensions to the surface. When the Spanish Republican Prime Minister José Giral y Pereira, surprised by the Francoist coup in 1936, requested French military assistance in the form of arms shipments, Blum’s first reaction was to respond favourably. The Spanish Republic was also governed by a Popular Front coalition and France was eager to help its political counterpart in the democratic fight against fascism. But concerns about a revival of violence in France from vocal far-right organisations and the risk of a European conflagration pushed the French coalition to a non-intervention agreement in August 1936.16 France did not intervene but none the less recommended that refugees should be given hospitality. However, the French government was not only unprepared for the size of the refugee population but also quite ambivalent and suspicious towards foreigners with war experience. The first major refugee movement into France came after the battle of Irùn in September 1936 and the fall of the Basque territories to Spanish nationalists in June 1937. The fall of Cataluña during the last year of the war in 1939 – known as la Retirada, ‘the Retreat’ – led also to the displacement of half a million refugees into southern France.17 The fear that the Spanish Civil War might spread on the other side of the Pyrénées was a serious concern among the traditional and conservative segments of the French-Basque region,18 but also at the national level where retaining neutrality with Franco was deemed as crucial in a time of potential war with Germany. In June 1937, the Socialist Léon Blum surrendered command of the government to the Radical Edouard Daladier, who soon turned to the right for support. France’s policy towards Spanish refugees became increasingly restrictive and determined to limit the number of refugees. France did not extend the legal status set out in the 1933 Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees to Spanish refugees fleeing the Civil War.19 Against the backdrop of a proclaimed republican tradition of asylum, French authorities reluctantly granted a form of jurisdictional safety for those not so welcomed Spanish, Basque and Catalan refugees before herding them into hastily improvised ‘welcome camps’ and shelters on the beaches of the Pyrénées-Orientales, close to Cataluña, and others in the south-western part of France for the anti-Franco Basques.20 These refugees fled a war-torn land only to find that the French, who purported to stand for values opposite to those of Francoist nationalists whom they had escaped from, had in fact set up hurdles of their own. The brutal internment of refugees and the absence of legal pathways to their safety exposed how France’s principles about asylum were progressively shattered during the interwar period by the rise of countervailing tendencies towards restricting the influx of refugees and the fear of Communism. With the victory of General Francisco Franco’s Nationalist forces in April 1939, the Spanish refugees’ fate worsened. France was concerned at the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

78

Counter-terror by proxy

time to ensure a neutral Spain. In the event of a war, having one hostile country on its south-west flank was not an option for the French. That strategic issue alone made it imperative for France to normalise its diplomatic relations with the new leader of Spain. France officially recognised Franco’s regime and appointed Marshal Philippe Pétain, who led the French army to victory in the First World War, as its ambassador to Madrid in 1939. Within this ‘good neighbour policy’ between the two countries, vexed questions still, though, remained concerning the repatriation of Spaniards who fled the war and the extradition of the Republicans who found refuge in France. Spanish authorities were eager to deal with the issues swiftly and all at once in order to liquidate definitively what was left from the defeated Spanish Republic on one hand, and to reintegrate ordinary Spanish citizens into the postwar reconstruction scheme on the other. North of the Pyrénées, French authorities were straitened and divided about the ‘Spanish problem’. Regional security and European strategic considerations were balanced against a more legal approach to the problem and notably through the 1877 French–Spanish extradition treaty which provided for the refusal of extradition if it was requested for a political purpose21 and a 1927 French law which required that each request for extradition had not only to pass through the courts but also to be judged individually.22 This legal point of view notwithstanding, most of Spanish refugees who did not choose to return to Spain were still locked up in internment camps, though. The Third Republic’s restrictions on immigration, its heightened surveillance of foreigners and its internment legislation did mark the end of a period where France was widely perceived as a leading liberal democracy.23 The onset of the Second World War provided yet another dramatic shift to the issue concerning Spanish, Basque and Catalan refugees. The rapid defeat of the French armed forces in June 1940 and the fall of France to the Germans led to the formation of the authoritarian Vichy regime of Marshal Philippe Pétain (1940–44) and to a clear increase of the late Third Republic’s repressive policy towards refugees and foreigners. The ideological proximity between Franco and Pétain, and the commitment of the Vichy regime to a policy of collaboration with the German occupier, sealed the fate of the refugees.24 With its undiluted form of ultra-conservative ideology, Vichy France unequivocally treated them as undesirables, dangerous elements of the ‘anti-France’. Francoist intelligence services worked with the cooperation of French police to chase down and forcibly repatriate refugees deemed to be criminals in the eyes of Franco.25 The camps set up by the Third Republic were still used and even expanded to the other categories of Vichy’s foes – Jews, foreigners, Communists and gypsies.26 The Vichy regime did try though to rid the country of those ‘undesirable’ political refugees through repatriation to Spain and re-emigration

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Controversy 79 to Latin American countries, but moved rapidly to another solution, transforming them into cheap foreign workers.27 The work companies made of refugees and the internment camps played a central part in Vichy’s attempt to control and expel political suspects. They were equally crucial though in the development of the French resistance, with numerous Spanish, Basque and Catalan refugees escaping and joining the ranks of the Free French Forces of General De Gaulle or the various segments of the French internal resistance, notably across the Pyrénées-Orientales region.28 During and after the liberation of France in 1944, Spanish Republicans, Catalans and Basque refugees shared a tangible sense of expectation about the downfall of Franco’s dictatorship. For a short period of time in the immediate postwar period, they could have reasonably thought so. The Allies had defeated Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, and it seemed logical that Franco’s Spain would suffer a similar collapse. Of course, Spain did not officially participate in the Second World War but, as it leaned towards the Axis side and considering that Nazi Germany helped Franco during the Civil War, there was a common suspicion among the French and British in particular towards Spain. Invested with all the moral authority of the resistance and also to ease the memories of the days of non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War, post-Second World War France did indeed contribute to the international policy of Spanish isolation. It did so especially after the execution in Spain in February 1946 of Spanish Republican members of the French resistance.29 France did close its Pyrenean border and address a note to its allies asking them to join with it in requesting the newly created United Nations Security Council to consider the severance of diplomatic and economic relations with Spain as long as Franco remained in power. Many of the considerations that were to be decisive in the relationship between France and Francoist Spain were laid bare in the resolution of this crisis. In a postwar context where France was trying to regain its lost reputation but also facing dire economic problems and serious political instability,30 the Spanish–French foreign policy was conflict-ridden. Combining French national security and economic interests with ambitions over the country’s status in the international arena and a principled anti-fascist resistance discourse was indeed a quixotic task.31 By the end of the 1940s, the French ‘realpolitik’ approach overrode ethical concerns.32 The onset of the Cold War pushed many countries around the world to reconsider their position towards Spain, which was astutely promoting itself as a true European bulwark against Communism, if not the only one. As the United States became increasingly concerned with the Soviet threat following the fall of Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade in 1948 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, Spain was more and more perceived as a geopolitical asset in Europe for the US administration.33

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

80

Counter-terror by proxy

After this explicit American military definition of security and its undeniable effect upon European countries, the ‘Spanish question’ was still perceived in Europe within at least two other sets of consideration: for many, there was no sign of a credible alternative to Franco and, more importantly, the fear that any political change might mean yet another Spanish civil war was a shared concern.34 The French debates over the Spanish question were informed by these political dimensions but further complicated by French self-righteous resistance vision and its ambition of national grandeur. The tension between the pursuit of the Western Alliance and the associated drive to rebuild Europe to resist potential Soviet aggression and the perceived need to ground foreign policy in moral principles, derived from the reinvention of France as a nation of democratic resistance fighters, was indeed at the core of the French attitude towards Francoist Spain.35 As we will see later on in this chapter, the victorious French resistance as a core democratic component of the national identity will remain an important political trope in the strained relationship between France and Spain. However, in a period marked by international and domestic tensions, room for manoeuvre was really narrow for the French Fourth Republic. In 1948, two years after the incident that precipitated discussions about Spain within the UN arena, the French–Spanish border was reopened and Paris stabilised relations with Madrid with the signature of commercial agreements in May 1948 and June 1949 and the appointment in 1951 of a French ambassador in Madrid. At the international level, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution in 1950, repealing the recommendation that prevented Spain from being a member of the United Nations. Five years later, in 1955, Francoist Spain would indeed join the international organisation. The rehabilitation of Spain under the aegis of the US foreign policy fostered a new relationship between France and Spain, based on a French renewed interest for the economic potentials of the Iberian market. During General De Gaulle’s presidency (1958–69) of the newly created Fifth Republic, French–Spanish economic and diplomatic links expanded even more. Francoist Spain was indeed part of De Gaulle’s global plan to achieve France’s greatness and grandeur through the improvement of its economic power and cultural influence across the world and within Europe.36 The authoritarian nature of Franco’s Spain did hamper political relations between the two countries but did not constitute an obstacle to the intensification of their economic ties. Indeed, the economic reform and the liberalisation of the Spanish domestic market initiated by the Francoist regime in the 1960s opened up great prospects for French products, techniques and capital. The new booming consumerist Spain was an opportunity for every European country. In the subsequent years, France showed no qualms about trading with Franco’s Spain and created numerous working groups and national

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Controversy 81 bodies dedicated to help the French arms industry, car manufacturers and energy companies but also the retail and the banking sectors to invest and to conclude agreements in Spain.37 The succeeding French Presidents Georges Pompidou (1969–74) and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (1974–81) were equally committed to De Gaulle’s original strategy of grandeur and pursued the policy of stabilisation with Spain. President Pompidou’s European policy was indeed directed towards the south of Europe and the Mediterranean Sea.38 Like De Gaulle, Pompidou believed that Spain with its rapid economic growth would eventually join the European Economic Community and therefore he was keen on backing Spain’s application for European membership.39 President Giscard d’Estaing was keen on strengthening the role of France in the European Economic Community. He was equally concerned about maintaining relationship with countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean and committed to Spain’s joining the European Community. However, during Pompidou’s and Giscard d’Estaing’s presidencies, the relations between France and Spain were marred by interlocking issues. The assassination by ETA of Franco’s heir, Admiral Carrero Blanco, and the multiplication of trials and brutal executions of opponents in Spain during the decade largely impacted the relations. Spain’s application to the European Community was indeed largely redefined by the regime’s return to an aggressive course of action, quite reminiscent of its earlier period.40 France, previously keen on supporting its Iberian neighbour for obvious economic reasons, then adopted a more cautious attitude. The view that Spain would join the European Community in due course was connected to the feeling that the Francoist regime would eventually collapse with the death of its ageing Caudillo. Like most Western countries, France was thus attempting to hedge its bets for the future by establishing contacts with the Francoist moderates and, to a certain extent, with the members of the opposition to the regime. But the blatant punitive reactions of the Francoist regime to the dramatic increase of violence by ETA in the 1970s had also a direct effect on French– Spanish bilateral relations, especially since ETA was indeed using southwestern France as a rear base. Subversion and terrorism from abroad had always been viewed by the Francoist regime as one of the most serious threats, and from 1936 Franco spared no effort in blaming France for its liberal attitude towards Spanish Republicans and Basque refugees. But in the 1970s, Spain was even more overtly critical. When, following the December 1973 assassination of Carrero Blanco, ETA held a press conference in Bordeaux to endorse and justify its action, the Spanish authorities made no attempt to conceal their frustrations. The Francoist newspaper La Vanguardia Española remarked that the French Ministry of the Interior was strangely quiet about this event before sarcastically interjecting that ‘Christmas holidays may have contributed to this silence

82

Counter-terror by proxy

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

or maybe this official silence was actually a way to assist the police investigations’.41 The newspaper El Alcázar was even more direct. In an article published in January 1974, it condemned ETA without reserve as an expression of ‘pathological terrorism from a minority of political heartless people’ who essentially benefited from ‘the legal protection and the unspeakable complicity’ of France.42 The presence of ETA in the south-west of France was indeed a rift in the 1970s Hispano-French relations.

The French fluctuating policy towards Spanish refugees and Basque militants Since the end of the Civil War and even more since the end of the Second World War, Francoist Spain always had three interlocking recriminations against France which all clustered on its contention that France was encouraging opposition to the regime or, at the very least, tolerating anti-Spanish activities on its soil. For Madrid, the first pressing issue was related to border control. The Pyrénées border might be one of the oldest and most stable state boundaries in Western Europe,43 but it was never impassable, and the mountain passes had been known to the ‘mugalari’ (smugglers in Basque) since time immemorial. The Francoist secret defensive fortifications built in the Pyrénées after the Civil War for fear of a foreign invasion and to defend against domestic resistance never hindered movements across the border.44 Indeed, during the Second World War, the Basque Pyrénées were a key point for the ‘Comet Escape Line’, the route from Belgium through France to Spain used by hundreds of Allied airmen to escape Nazi-occupied Europe.45 As we underlined previously, many of the defeated remnants of the Spanish Republic, who found refuge in France, re-enlisted in the anti-fascist struggle, and crossed the border again with weapons and ammunition. Paris was regularly pressed by Madrid to resolve the problem of those individuals and materiel crossing the border illegally. Equally and at a time when France recognised the need for immigrants to assist its reconstruction, numerous Spaniards and Portuguese crossed the Pyrenean border. For the Francoist regime, these movements of populations across the Pyrénées were a blatant breach in the long-standing agreements on border control between the two countries. The second main issue with France was related to what the Francoist regime perceived as a despicable liberal-minded sympathy for refugees. The centrality of refugees along with the practical and political challenges they posed in shaping human-rights legislations and international humanitarianism in the postwar international order is now well established.46 The 1945 Charter of the United Nations, followed by the Universal Declaration of Human

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Controversy 83 Rights and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948, followed by the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War in 1949 and the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, shaped the basic architecture of postwar human rights, lending the latter unprecedented visibility on the international political stage. France was keen on following this international movement.47 In order to come to terms with the legacy of the German occupation and redeem the country’s reputation tarnished by the previous Vichy regime, France was not only vigorously promoting the self-glorifying role of the resistance but also reclaiming the old republican spirit of hospitality and its right of asylum for those ‘persecuted for the cause of liberty’. Accordingly, France granted the Spanish Republicans refugee status and created a Central Office for Spanish Refugees (Office Central des Réfugiés Espagnols) in 1945.48 Any person holding or having held Spanish citizenship and who enjoyed neither de jure nor de facto the protection of the Spanish government was then considered a Spanish refugee. As a result, Spanish refugees were granted a special status which included the right of residence in France. Like every foreigner in France, their status was also governed by the Immigration Act of November 1945 on the conditions for entry and residence of foreigners in France and the creation of the National Office for Immigration (Office National d’Immigration).49 Unless their presence on French territory was constitutive of a ‘threat to public order’, or where it was absolutely necessary for State safety or public security,50 they were granted the right not to be expelled from the French territory and the right of non-refoulement to Spain. Furthermore, and in order to implement the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to the status of refugees, France created an Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (Office Français de Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides, OFPRA) and reinforced the principle of nonrefoulement of refugees in a law on asylum rights in July 1952.51 For the Francoist regime the porosity of the border and the French liberal attitude towards Spanish refugees amounted to another more serious issue: the geographical proximity and the political significance of numerous and active opponents to the regime living in the south-western regions of France, close to the border, but also in Paris. Since the end of the Spanish Civil War, Toulouse, 150 miles away from Barcelona, had been the stronghold of the Spanish anarcho-syndicalists of the National Confederation of Labour (Confederación Nacional del Trabajo) and of the Italian anarchist volunteers among others.52 Also known as ‘the pink city’, Toulouse was critical to the development and expansion of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ party (PSOE) and equally important for the Spanish Communist Party. Very often viewed as the ‘Fifth Catalan Province’, the region between Toulouse, Perpignan

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

84

Counter-terror by proxy

and Montpellier not only welcomed large numbers of Spanish refugees but was also crucial in the dissemination of anti-Francoist books, pamphlets and novels.53 The French department of Pyrénées-Atlantiques was naturally home to many Basques who fled the Civil War. In the aftermath of the Second World War, there was a notable revival of Basque cultural associations in many places across the French-Basque country with Bayonne at its centre from where the Basque Nationalist Party’s newspaper Alderdi was produced and disseminated among other publications promoting Basque nationalism and the reunification of the south and north parts of the Basque country. Paris was also a strong concern for the Francoist regime since the Spanish Republican government in exile of Giral, the Basque government in exile of Aguirre and the Catalan government in exile of Irla were all established there. Prior to the creation of ETA in the mid-1950s, the Spanish Communist Party and the regional governments in exile in France were the main targets of the Francoist regime outside the territory. In the aftermath of the Second World War, France turned a deaf ear to Franco’s demands. However, in the 1950s, when anti-Communism was high across Europe and the possibility for restoring economic relations with Spain was opened, France started to respond more favourably. The September 1950 ‘Operation Bolero-Paprika’ – crudely named after the Spanish refugees (‘Bolero’) and the Central and Eastern Europe refugees (‘Paprika’) – with its numerous arrests across the national territory and the expulsion of hundreds of suspected foreigners in Corsica, Algeria and East Germany is indeed a rather flagrant example of a French positive response to Franco’s insistence on crushing the dangerous ‘Reds’.54 The expulsion in 1951 of the Basque government in exile from its headquarters situated in the prestigious and grand 16th Arrondissement in Paris (Avenue Marceau) and the shutdown of ‘Radio Euzkadi’ in 1954 were real blows to the Basque opposition in the name of the normalisation of French–Spanish relations.55 The Basque government in exile of José Antonio de Aguirre was still allowed to stay in Paris though and, despite the regular complaints from Madrid, it eventually managed to organise the 1956 World Basque Congress in Paris where members of what would become ETA presented their project.56 But the real litmus test of ‘good neighbour policy’ between the two countries was indeed the increasing importance of ETA in Spain in the 1960s and the presence of Basque militants in France fleeing the harsh repression of the Francoist regime. For the Francoist regime, France was aiding and abetting them to carry on anti-Francoist propaganda and conspiracy actions. While France was hoping to take advantage of the liberalisation of the Spanish market, the presence of Basque militants in south-western France was indeed an embarrassing issue.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Controversy 85 Spain astutely used this issue when dealing in contracts with its partner, pushing France to consider how swift actions against these militants would be appreciated as a token concession. Not only were these Basque militants a diplomatic issue with Madrid but they were also a political thorn in the firmly established French Jacobin ideal of a nation without regionalism and indigenous demands.57 At a time when the French Fifth Republic was hoping to dissolve local-regional sentiments by implementing a huge policy of centralised regional development (aménagement du territoire), the presence of Basque militants that could empower a local Basque identity and distort the process of centralisation was not viewed very positively.58 Yet, these Basque militants were equally perceived within the much prevailing national trope of the self-proclaimed solid history of France’s fight against authoritarian regimes. The French ambivalence towards Spanish refugees in general and Basque militants in particular is the result of these political, diplomatic and symbolical tensions. The first action of France against ETA was to introduce an entry ban on south-west France and, in November 1964, to expel the founding members of the Basque organisation from the Pyrenean border. As a result, most of them went underground. Others went further north and found refuge in Belgium.59 Protected by their refugee status delivered by the OFPRA, these Basque activists could not be handed over to Spain. France’s policy was to do the bare minimum in order to avoid any major issues with its Iberian partner and to protect its economic and financial interests with Spain. The only acceptable option was therefore to move these Basque refugees away from the contentious Pyrenean border, and to assign them residence elsewhere in France. The assassination in 1968 of the police officer Manzanas marked a notable increase of Spanish requests relating to Basque refugees in France. It equally marked the beginning of insistent Spanish requests for police co-operation and exchange of information between the two countries.60 Following the 1970 Burgos trial, Spain introduced even longer lists of Basque refugees supposedly in cahoots with ETA, hoping that France would acquiesce to its request and eventually contribute to hampering the Basque nationalist platform flourishing north of the Pyrénées. But as the trial enhanced the reputation of ETA members as ‘freedom fighters’, the issue of Basque refugees between France and Spain came under the international spotlight. In order to keep its relations with Spain, France was somehow willing to co-operate, but at the same time it was an extremely delicate matter to respond positively to Spanish requests in this particular international context of sympathy for the Basque cause. It was equally difficult to satisfy Madrid without compromising France’s international human rights obligations. As a result, the number of Basque militants expelled from the southern

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

86

Counter-terror by proxy

departments close to the Pyrénées increased over the years and ETA was eventually made illegal in France in 1972. Embata, the Basque movement founded in 1963, was equally made illegal in 1974.61 But, to the greater dissatisfaction of Madrid, France did not grant a single positive answer to the numerous requests for the extradition of Basque militants. France preferred administrative control measures such as establishing an entry ban on south-west France, deporting Basque refugees and militants elsewhere in France such as the Auvergne region in south-central France, in Angers and Tours in the Loire Valley, on the island of Île d’Yeu just off the Vendée coast of western France, or expelling Basque militants to third countries. The Basque issue was indeed complex for the French authorities. At a time when terrorism was becoming the leading concern of the world, France was still trying to find the right balance between the defence of the right to seek asylum and the promotion of international co-operation in the punishment of criminal activities. According to French laws, the executive is under a legal obligation to consult with the judiciary. Whether the charges contained in the arrest warrants constituted extraditable crimes under French law was a question for the judges of the indictments division of the Court of Appeal (chambre des mises en accusation de la Cour d’appel). They were required to give a legal opinion prior to the final decision of the executive taken by the Prime Minister. The opinion delivered by the judges was subject to review by another Court (Cour de Cassation), while the final extradition decision could have been appealed to the Conseil d’Etat. The principal task of the judges of the Cour d’appel was to determine whether the extradition request was in conformity with procedural requirements. The court did not have power in the process in the sense that it could deny an extradition request on substantive grounds and that this denial would have been binding upon the executive. But, otherwise, the executive was free to grant or to deny the request on the basis of its own determination. The subordinate role of the courts took on greater significance when an offender sought to invoke the political offence exception because it was for the judiciary to define the delicate concept of political crime and to determine how it was to be applied in extradition litigation. The French 1927 extradition law contained a political offence exception that encompassed the subjective motivation of the offender as well as the circumstances in which they committed the offence.62 As a result, courts had the possibility of denying extradition requests on the grounds that the crime of the accused constituted a political offence. Equally, they could deny an extradition request when they considered that it was made for a political end. After the Second World War, jurisprudence shows clearly a trend among French courts to favour the right of asylum over international interest in the punishment of criminal activities. The 1953 Rodriguez case is a good example of this trend. The

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Controversy 87 Spanish government requested the extradition of two Spanish citizens who found refuge in France. The Cour d’appel of Paris concluded that, since both men were members of movements seeking to overthrow the Francoist regime, the crimes for which extradition was sought fell under the political offence exemption and therefore denied the extradition request. From the outset, one could say that French courts were not averse to denying the extradition of a terrorist on the basis of the reasoning that their acts were a political crime.63 While the Cour de Cassation carried out judicial control of the procedure, the Conseil d’Etat examined the legality of the extradition decision in all other respects. Until the 1970s, the Conseil d’Etat refused to comment on the decisions made by the courts but held that general principles of law applicable with respect to refugees constituted an impediment to the surrender of a Spanish refugee to Spain. Is a crime deemed to be political if its political aspect outweighs its common elements? In that respect, the case of Pedro José Astudillo Calleja is interesting. In 1973, the Spanish government requested the extradition of the accused on bank robbery and other theft charges. The accused had a long history of opposition to the Francoist regime.64 While the Spanish authorities maintained that the acts of the accused did not have a political character and that it could not be contended that they were inspired by a political motive, the French Conseil d’Etat decided otherwise and, in light of the accused’s past opposition to the Francoist regime in Spain, refused the extradition in June 1977.65

The Spanish decision to move towards the end of exception to extradition Two years after the death of Francisco Franco and beyond the sole case of Spanish litigation, there was still no consensus among French courts as to precisely what constituted a political offence under extradition law. Indeed, in November 1977, Klaus Croissant, the vocal and indefatigable lawyer for the members of the German Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Fraktion) was extradited to West Germany. The same year, Mohammed Daoud Oudeh (known as Abou Daoud), a prominent Palestinian militant arrested in France on suspicion of having been responsible for the killing of members of the Israeli team at the 1972 Olympics in Munich, was freed.66 None the less, the 1977 Klaus Croissant case marked a shift in French jurisprudence on the application of the political offence exception in litigation involving the extradition of terrorists. Yet its application in regard to Spanish extradition requests was still inconsistent. French courts were still mostly viewing Basque refugees as political militants. Despite French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s wish to promote international judicial co-operation

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

88

Counter-terror by proxy

at the December 1977 European Council through the creation of a European Judicial Area (espace judiciaire unique),67 the promulgation of the 1978 Spanish Constitution and the cancellation by the OFPRA in 1979 concerning refugee status for Spanish people, French courts were still reluctant to render a favourable opinion in the extradition of Spanish-Basque militants. As such, the April 1979 decision of the Court of Aix-en-Provence in regards to the Spanish request for the extradition of Mikel Goikoetxea (‘Txapala’) and of Martin Apaolaza Azcargorta – both members of ETA – is significant. The accused were wanted for a number of serious charges, including the murder of policemen. The court ruled that since the offences were perpetrated in the context of the struggle led by a part of the population of the Basque provinces of Spain, they were politically charged and consequently extradition not could be granted. The accused were freed, although banned from the south-western part of France. Between 1966 and 1980, no fewer than seventeen Spanish requests for extradition were denied by French courts on the grounds of political offence exemption. France’s attitude towards Basque refugees was to deport them away from the Pyrénées in an attempt to respond somehow to Madrid’s queries without compromising a liberal position in regards to asylum. Much to the chagrin of the Spanish authorities, solidarity with the nascent democracy was then far less important for France than the adoption of a more ‘neutral’ two-pronged position: the Basque problem was exclusively perceived as a Spanish issue on the one hand, and it was deemed necessary to avoid this conflict spilling over into France on the other. French protection from prosecution for Basque militants was seemingly air-tight. The idea that Spanish-Basque militants could be granted asylum clearly and strongly irritated the two successive centre-right governments of Suárez (1976–81) and Calvo-Sotelo (1981–82), notwithstanding the opposition party, the PSOE. With the French opposition to European enlargement and the frictions over Spain’s application to join the European Common Market, the extradition issue largely contributed to the deterioration of Spanish–French relations under President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. With the electoral victory of the PS in the presidential election in 1981 and of the social democratic PSOE in Spain in 1982, many among the Spanish political and judicial elites hoped that the French attitude towards the ‘Basque problem’ would change for good.68 However, the live televising of the aborted military coup of 23 February 1981 in Spain certainly strengthened the view in France that, despite the end of the dictatorship, the sound of Francoist jackboots was pretty much still lingering around.69 The May 1981 favourable opinion of the Paris Court of Appeal on the extradition of the ETA member Tomas Linaza Echevarria marked a significant shift in French jurisprudence, even if the French Socialist government decided not

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Controversy 89 to proceed with the extradition eventually and chose to assign Linaza Echevarria to residence. Arrested in March 1981, Linaza Echevarria was accused of assassination of a Spanish local government official and of the ambush of a Spanish convoy in which Civil Guards were killed. The Court stated that ‘irrespective of the object sought or possible context, murders are too serious to be regarded as having a political character or as being related to a political offence’. The 1981 Linaza Echevarria case was the first time that a French court ruled clearly in favour of extraditing a Spanish-Basque accused of assassination for ETA. Spanish officials and newspapers greeted the French court decision with enthusiasm, hailing it as a positive contribution to the struggle against ETA. For Spanish authorities, the decision boded well since no fewer than a dozen other requests for extradition of alleged members of ETA and of the Autonomous Anti-Capitalist Commandos (Comandos Autónomos Anticapitalistas) were pending. However, in the eyes of the French authorities, there were reasons to believe that there was no guarantee that Basque activists would receive a fair trial if sent back to an only recently democratised Spain.70 The French Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy affirmed France’s position as a country of asylum.71 The situation was even further aggravated with the publication of the opinion of Gaston Defferre, the Minister of the Interior, comparing the Basque armed struggle to his former engagement in the French resistance during the Second World War.72 During question time at the National Assembly in November 1981, Defferre reiterated the position of the government: France is a land of freedom, a land of asylum. She is opposed to extradition for political reason. But the French government intends to help the young Spanish democracy and to prevent any setbacks that would affect it […] we do not accept political extradition, but we do not want the Spanish democracy to suffer from that.73

To the great irritation of the newly elected Spanish Socialist government of Felipe González, the attitude of the French Socialist government changed little to reflect Spain’s Transition. The French condescending view about Spain as a young and therefore fragile democracy in a country that had so little knowledge and practice of it was on a par with the French Socialist desire to retrieve the core republican principles of asylum and the self-righteous image of France as the embodiment of freedom. The quarrel over extradition continued, even though both French and Spanish Socialist governments pledged to work for better relations out of a sense of fraternal solidarity. In his memoirs as deputy-director of President Mitterrand’s cabinet in the 1980s, Gilles Ménage wrote that clearly for every member of the government the view was that France did not have a

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

90

Counter-terror by proxy

Basque issue per se, but a problem related to the border with the SpanishBasque country.74 This view of the Basque problem as a Spanish one was coupled with not only a position made of republican principles about the impossibility to extradite for political crime but also with a view that political solutions should be privileged over the use of force.75 The position was that, if no violence was committed on French territory, then no one would be arrested or extradited. The French attorney Louis Joinet, who was legal adviser to France’s first Socialist Prime Minister Mauroy, explained the French ‘hands off’ policy in the following terms: To live in France these militants were not invited to surrender but rather to make themselves visible.76

The reasoning behind this was less about turning a blind eye and more about avoiding the importing of ‘terrorism within’ through the implementation of a procedure of conditional regularisation. Consequently, Spanish-Basque militants who respected the contract and refrained from using French territory as a staging area for attacks would be protected by French law. The logical outcome was therefore to examine the different situations and requests on a case-by-case basis, looking for a political way out of violence.77 If, for French authorities, extradition of Basque militants would not solve the problem of terrorism, for Spanish authorities on the contrary, time was of the essence. Spanish police and intelligence efforts aimed at reducing ETA’s operational capabilities were perceived as hindered by the presence of a rear-base for the Basque militant organisation in the south-west of France. Interviewed by a French journalist, the founder of the Spanish magazine Cambio 16, Juan Tomás de Salas, stated unambiguously that If we [Spain] were Israel and you [France] Lebanon, we would have then occupied Biarritz, Hendaye and all that and we would have put things in order there. We would probably be safe by now in Spain.78

The French failure to act in concert was therefore perceived by Spain as tantamount to State support of terrorism because it fostered a possibility and subsequently a space in which ETA could recover and develop its operational capacities. Furthermore, Basque militants were far from keeping a ‘low political profile’ while in France and this undoubtedly was generating further exasperation. The Spanish Socialist government of Felipe González launched an all-out assault on ETA at both domestic and international levels. At the domestic level, the fight against the Basque organisation meant not only the toughening of anti-terrorist laws and the stiffening of penalties for terrorist crimes79 but also the formation of special counter-terrorist units, alongside with the necessity for defusing Basque separatist sentiments in order to isolate ETA politically.80 At the international level, Spanish Socialist

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Controversy 91 officials multiplied the number of contacts with other European governments in order to elicit greater police co-operation and to further advance the eradication of the political offence exception. They equally embarked upon a series of meetings with their French counterparts, bent on persuading them to end their long-standing reservations about acting against fugitive ETA members. The French reluctance to extradite was perceived not only as tacit support for the clandestine organisation’s activities but also and perhaps more importantly as an affront to Spanish national identity and prestige, a frustrating hindrance to its endeavour to be seen as a modern and forward-looking European nation (see Chapter 6). The Spanish recrimination against the ‘French sanctuary’ largely predates the 1980s. As we underlined in the previous chapters, the Francoist regime also did blame France for its liberal approach and one could even say that this accusation is as old as the French doctrine of political offence exception itself, and its convoluted history through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.81 None the less, it is really with the transition to democracy that the delicate ‘French sanctuary’ issues intensified. The tension between France and Spain reflected an unresolved tension in extradition law itself as it is supposed to play a dual function of protection of the accused on one hand, and to achieve international co-operation on the other. France was more inclined to interpret the concept of political offence in a more flexible and liberal way so as to protect the individual, while Spain was much more disposed to consider a stricter interpretation more in line with the requirements of international co-operation. French jurisprudence on that matter shifted uneasily between political sympathy, core judicial principle and pragmatism. Legal ambiguities very often proved to be interesting political tools to deflect responsibilities on to others. In 1983, and despite the unrelenting attempts to persuade their French counterparts to act more vigorously against Basque terrorism, Spanish officials were still without positive answers to their extradition requests. The GAL emerged in that tense and frustrating context. Spanish authorities had yet to realise that the need to conduct assassinations outside Spanish borders would require allaying the sensibilities of the French government. We will turn to this point in the next chapters.

Notes 1 F. Domínguez, Josu Ternera: Una vida en ETA [Josu Ternera: A lifetime within ETA], Madrid, La Esfera de los libros, 2006. 2 Domingo Iturbe Abasolo, known by his nom-de-guerre ‘Txomin’, oversaw ETA military front from the mid-1970s. He was one of the leaders most favourable

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

92

Counter-terror by proxy

to negotiations. Arrested in France in June 1982, he served eight months in jail for possession of arms and ETA documents. He was then moved out of the Basque region to Tours (Loire Valley) in January 1984 as an alternative to being extradited. He disappeared from house arrest in February 1985 and was consequently arrested in April 1986 near the Spanish border. Deported to Gabon and later sent to Algeria, he died in a car accident in March 1987. 3 G. Adams, R. Kasrils,’Il faut soutenir Josu Urrutikoetxea, artisan de la paix’ [One needs to back up peacemaker Josu Urrutikoetxea], Le Monde, 21 June 2019. 4 ‘Ceux qui défendent l’ETA et Josu Ternera doivent aussi assumer leurs massacres’ [Whoever defends ETA and Josu Ternera has to assume their bloodbath as well], Le Figaro, 2 July 2019. 5 G. Taberna, M. Ubiria, ‘Alfonso Etxegarai: “Je me demande comment j’ai fait pour survivre là-bas” [Interview with Alfonso Etxegarai: ‘I wonder how I managed to survive there’], Naiz, 17 October 2019. On Etxegarai’s deportation, see the documentary produced by J. Martinez, T. Larreategi, Sagarren denbora – Alfonso Etxegarai eta Kristiane Etxaluz: 25 urte deserritik itzultzen [Apple-picking season – Alfonso Etxegarai and Kristiane Etxaluz: 25 years of exile], Bilbao, Gizarte Ikasketerako Talde Eragilea – Instituto de Promocion de Estudios Sociales (GITE-IPES), 2010, 67min. 6 A. Aust, Handbook of International Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005. 7 For a thorough and clear overview on the history, the debates and controversies about extradition, see C. Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, 3–33; C. Bassiouni, E. Wise, Aut Dedere aut Judicare: The Duty to Extradite or Prosecute in International Law, Dordrecht, Boston, London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995. 8 Bassiouni, International Extradition; C. Van den Wijngaert, The Political Offence Exception to Extradition: The Delicate Problem of Balancing the Rights of the Individual and the International Public Order, Deventer, Kluwer, 1980. 9 For a thorough historical review of the debates on political offence exception, see J. Jansson, Terrorism, Criminal Law and Politics: The Decline of the Political Offence Exception to Extradition, London, Routledge, 2019, chapter 3 ‘The rise and decline of romantic liberalism from the 1800s to the 1960s’, 71–109. 10 R. Carr, Spain, 1808–1975, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982. 11 On the modernisation of Spanish cuisine through the incorporation of French recipes and customs, see L. Anderson, Cooking Up the Nation: Spanish Culinary Texts and Culinary Nationalization in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century, Woodbridge, Boydell & Brewer, 2013. 12 For a fascinating account on the nostalgic search for an idealised Gypsy way of life on the part of French and British Romantics, see L. Charnon-Deutsch, The Spanish Gypsy: The History of a European Obsession, University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004. 13 For a comprehensive overview of Spain–France relations at the dawn of the twentieth century, see J. M. Delaunay, Méfiance cordiale: les relations franco-espagnoles

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Controversy 93 au début du XXe siècle (1899–1914) [Cordial distrust: France–Spain relations at the dawn of the twentieth century], Paris, L’Harmattan, 2011 (3 volumes: Vol. 1 – Les relations métropolitaines [Metropolitan relations]; Vol. 2 – Les relations coloniales [Colonial relations]; Vol. 3 – Les relations économiques [Economic relations]). For an informed analysis of the Spanish–French policy in the interwar period, see Y. Denéchère, La politique espagnole de la France de 1931 à 1936, une pratique française de rapports inégaux [France’s Spanish policy from 1931 to 1936, a French practice of unequal relations], Paris, L’Harmattan, 1999. 14 Burgess, Refuge in the Land of Liberty. 15 J. Jackson, The Popular Front in France. Defending Democracy, 1934–38, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990. 16 The reluctance of Great Britain to get involved in the Spanish conflict significantly influenced France’s decision. On the British position and attitude towards the Spanish Civil War, see E. Mason, Democracy, Deeds and Dilemmas: Support for the Spanish Republic Within British Civil Society, 1936–1939, Eastbourne, Sussex Academic Press, 2017; T. Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997. 17 S. Soo, The Routes to Exile: France and the Spanish Civil War Refugees, 1939–2009, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2013; A. Alted, La voz de los vencidos: El exilio republicano de 1939 [The voice of the vanquished: The 1939 Republican exile], Madrid, Aguilar, 2012; G. Dreyfus-Armand, L’exil des républicains espagnols en France: De la Guerre civile à la mort de Franco [The exile of Spanish Republicans in France: From the Civil War to the death of Franco], Paris, Albin Michel, 1999; L. Stein, Beyond Death and Exile: The Spanish Republicans in France, 1939–1955, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1979. 18 On how Spanish and Basque refugees have been perceived by the local traditional communities north of the Pyrénées and on their fear of communism contagion, see S. Ott, War, Judgment, and Memory in the Basque Borderlands, 1914–1945, Reno, University of Nevada Press, 2008, 63–74. On the extremely conservative Basque politics in south-west France and notably one of its champions, Jean Ybarnegaray, member of the nationalist French Social Party (Parti Social Français), see I. Bilbao, Jean Ybarnegaray: entre petite et grande patrie [Jean Ybarnegaray: between the small and great motherland], Bayonne, Elkar, 2013. 19 League of Nations, Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees, 28 October 1933, League of Nations, Treaty Series Vol. CLIX No. 3663. The 1933 Refugee Convention was the first attempt to create a comprehensive legal framework for refugees. It was the first international multilateral treaty to offer refugees legal protection and guarantee their basic civil and economic right. On the interwar refugee regime and the failure of international co-operation on that matter, see P. Orchard, A Right to Flee: Refugees, States, and the Construction of International Cooperation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014, 104–39. 20 Argelès-sur-Mer, Rivesaltes, Saint-Cyprien and Agde in the south-eastern part of the Pyrénées (Pyrénées-Orientales) and Gurs in the south-western part

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

94

Counter-terror by proxy

(Pyrénées-Atlantiques) are among the most well-known internment camps for Spanish Republican refugees. On the creation and management of these camps, see D. Peschanski, La France des camps. L’internement, 1938–1946 [French camps. Internement 1938–46], Paris, Gallimard, 2002. 21 The 1877 convention on extradition between France and Spain, signed on 14 December 1877, replaced the previous agreement signed on 26 August 1850. Convention, Journal Officiel de la République Française [Official Journal of the French Republic], 183, 7 July 1878, 7625–7. 22 Loi du 10 mars 1927 relative à l’extradition des étrangers. 23 Burgess, Refuge in the Land of Liberty. 24 On the relationship between Franco and Pétain, see M. Séguéla, Pétain-Franco: les secrets d’une alliance [Pétain – Franco: The secrets of an alliance], Paris, Albin Michel, 1992. For a documented perspective on the uneven relations between Vichy France and Francoist Spain, see M. Catala, Les relations francoespagnoles pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale: Rapprochement nécessaire, réconciliation impossible, 1939–1944 [French–Spanish relationships during the Second World War: Necessary alignment, impossible reconciliation, 1939–44], Paris, L’Harmattan, 1997. For a clear overview of the Vichy regime and its racial policies, see J. Jackson, France: The Dark Years, 1940–1944, Oxford, Oxford, University Press, 2001. 25 J. Guixé i Coromines, ‘Persécutions d’exil. La répression politique des républicains espagnols en France (1937–1951)’ [Exiles’ persecutions. Political repression of Spanish Republicans in France (1937–51)], Relations Internationales, 142, 2010, 71–86. 26 Peschanski, La France des camps. 27 S. Soo, ‘Returning to the land: Vichy’s Groupement de Travailleurs Etrangers and Spanish Civil War refugees’, in S. Ott (ed.) War, Exile, Justice, and Everyday Life, 1936–1946, Reno, University of Nevada Press, 2011, 149–70. 28 Spanish Republicans formed one of the most important contingents of foreigners in the French Free Forces. See D. G. Celaya, La guerra continúa. Voluntarios españoles al servicio de la Francia libre, 1940–1945 [The war continues. Spanish volunteers serving Free France, 1940–45], Madrid, Marcial Pons Ediciones, 2015; E. Mesquida, La nueve: los españoles que liberaron París [The Ninth: The Spaniards who liberated Paris], Barcelona, Ediciones B, 2008. On the contribution of Basque refugees to the French resistance, notably through the Gernika Batallion led by Kepa Ordoki, see M., Esteban, Regards sur la seconde guerre mondiale en Pays basque [The Second World War in the Basque country at a glance], Donostia, Elkar, 2007; M. Rodríguez Alvarez, Memoria de los Vascos en la II Guerra Mundial. De la Brigada Vasca al Batallon Gernika [Memory of the Basques during the Second World War. From the Basque Brigade to the Gernika battalion], Pamplona, Pamiela, 2002. 29 A. Dulphy ‘Un miroir des relations franco-espagnoles: les maquisards FFI-FTP détenus par le régime franquiste 1944–1955’ [A mirror of French–Spanish relations: French resistance fighters detained by the Francoist regime, 1944–55], Exils et migrations ibériques au XXe siècle, 7, 1999, 179–203.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Controversy 95 30 In French contemporary history, the Fourth Republic (1944–58) holds the record for political crisis and ministerial instability with twenty-six short-lived governments between 1944 and 1958. There are many causes behind this instability, but an important one would be the difficulty arising from the absence of any potential majority in the electorate which necessitated an artificial coalition majority in Parliament. For a solid overview of the history of the Fourth Republic, see J.-P. Rioux, The Fourth Republic, 1944–1958, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987. On the coalition system and political immobilism, see F. Petry, ‘Coalition bargaining in the French Fourth Republic 1946–58’, in M. J. Laver, I. Budge (eds) Party Policy and Government Coalitions, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 1992, 380– 408. 31 For a thorough examination of these positions and the tensions between the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior, see D. Messenger, L’Espagne Républicaine: French Policy and Spanish Republicanism in Liberated France, Brighton, Sussex Academic Press, 2008; A. Dulphy ‘La politique de la France à l’égard de l’Espagne franquiste, 1945–1949’ [French policy towards Francoist Spain, 1945–49], Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, 35:1, 1988, 123–40; A. Dulphy, ‘La politique espagnole de la France (1945–1955)’ [The French Spanish policy (1945–55)], Vingtième siècle, revue d’histoire, 68, 2000, 29–42. On French public opinion about Spain in postwar France, see A. Angoustures, ‘L’opinion publique française et l’Espagne, 1945–1975’ [French public opinion and Spain, 1945–75], Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, 37, 1990, 672–86. 32 Dulphy, ‘La politique espagnole de la France (1945–1955)’; J. W. Young, France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance, 1944–49: French Foreign Policy and Post-war Europe, New York, St Martin’s Press, 1990. 33 O. Calvo-Gonzalez, ‘American military interests and economic confidence in Spain under the Franco dictatorship’, The Journal of Economic History, 67:3, 2007, 740–67; B. Liedtke, ‘Spain and the United States, 1945–1975’, in S. Balfour, P. Preston (eds) Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century, London, Routledge, 2002, 237–52. 34 For a well-documented perspective on Britain’s Spanish foreign policy and its concern about the lack of credible alternatives to Franco, see D. Dunthorn, Britain and the Spanish Anti-Franco Opposition, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2000. 35 Messenger, L’Espagne Républicaine. 36 On De Gaulle’s French overweening pride and his foreign policy of national grandeur, see J. Jackson, A Certain Idea of France. The Life of Charles de Gaulle, London, Allen Lane, 2018; M. Vaisse, La Grandeur, Politique étrangère du Général De Gaulle (1958–1969) [Grandeur, General De Gaulle’s foreign policy (1958–69)], Paris, Fayard, 1998. 37 For a thorough analysis of France’s economic strategy, see E. Sánchez Sánchez, Rumbo al sur: Francia y la España del desarrollo, 1958–1969 [Heading south: France and the Spanish development, 1958–69], Madrid, CSIC Editorial, 2006. 38 S. Berstein, J.-P. Rioux The Pompidou Years, 1969–1974, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000; E. Bussière, E. Willaert, Un projet pour l’Europe, Georges

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

96

Counter-terror by proxy

Pompidou et la construction européenne [A project for Europe, Georges Pompidou and the European construction], Bruxelles, PIE, Peter Lang, 2010. 39 M. Trouvé, L’Espagne et l’Europe: De la dictature de Franco à l’Union européenne [Spain and Europe. From Franco’s dictatorship to the European Union], Bruxelles, Peter Lang, 2008; F. Guirao, Spain and the Integration of Europe, 1950–77. A Comparative Perspective, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004. On Spain’s accession to the EU, see Chapter 6. 40 Trouvé, L’Espagne et l’Europe. 41 La Vanguardia Española, 28 December 1973, 44: ‘Cierto que las fechas festivas pueden haber contribuido a ello, y que quizá el silencio oficial trata de ajudar a las investigaciones policiales’. 42 El Alcázar, 2 January 1974. 43 P. Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989. 44 S. Gorostiza, ‘There are the Pyrenees! Fortifying the nation in Francoist Spain’, Environmental History, 23:4, 2018, 797–823. 45 J. C. Jiménez de Aberasturi, En passant la Bidassoa: Le réseau Comète au Pays Basque: 1941–1944 [Through the Bidassoa: The Comet network in the Basque country, 1941–44], Biarritz, J & D Editions, 1996. 46 G. D. Cohen, In War’s Wake: Europe’s Displaced Persons in the Postwar Order, New York, Oxford University Press, 2012; M. Frank, J. Reinisch (eds) Refugees in Europe, 1919–1959: A Forty Years’ Crisis?, London, Bloomsbury, 2017. 47 For a thorough overview of postwar France’s asylum and migration policies, see G. Burgess, Refugees and the Promise of Asylum in Postwar France, 1945–1995, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. From the same author, see G. Burgess, ‘Remaking asylum in post-war France, 1944–52’, Journal of Contemporary History, 49:3, 2014, 556–76. 48 Décret n°45–766 du 15 mars 1945 accordant aux réfugiés espagnols le bénéfice du statut international des réfugiés de la Convention de 1933. 49 Ordonnance n° 45–2658 du 2 novembre 1945 relative aux conditions d’entrée et de séjour des étrangers en France et portant création de l’Office National d’Immigration [Ordinance of 2 November 1945 concerning the conditions under which aliens may enter and remain in France and creating the National Office on Immigration]. 50 According to Article 23 of the Ordinance of 2 November 1945, ‘a deportation order may be made by the Minister of the Interior if the presence of the alien on French territory constitutes a threat to public order or public confidence’. 51 Loi n°52–893 du 25 juillet 1952 portant création d’un Office Français de Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides. 52 On Toulouse as a stronghold for Spanish anarchism, see C. Ealham, ‘Spanish anarcho-syndicalists in Toulouse: the red-and-black counter-city in exile’, Bulletin of Spanish Studies, 91:1–2, 2014, 95–114. On the diffusion of armed struggle among Toulouse’s anarchist community and the actions perpetrated in Francoist Spain, see E. Romanos, ‘Radicalization from outside: The role of the anarchist diaspora in coordinating armed actions in Franco’s Spain’, in L. Bosi, C. Demetrious, S. Malthaner (eds) Dynamics of Political Violence: A

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Controversy 97 Process-Oriented Perspective on Radicalization and the Escalation of Political Conflict, London, Ashgate, 2014, 237–54. 53 A. Alted Vigil, L. Domergue (eds) El exilio republicano español en Toulouse, 1939–1999 [The Spanish Republican exile in Toulouse, 1939–99], Toulouse, Presses Universitaires du Mirail / Madrid, UNED, 2003. 54 P. Pigenet, ‘L’opération Boléro-Paprika ou la protection des étrangers à l’épreuve de la guerre froide’ [Operation Bolero-Paprika or the protection of foreigners tested during the Cold War], Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, 46:2, 1999, 296–310. On the expulsion of Spanish Communists to East Germany, see A. Denoyer, L’exil comme patrie – Les réfugiés communistes espagnols en RDA (1950–1989) [Exile as homeland – Spanish Communist refugees in the GDR, 1950–89], Rennes, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2017. 55 Radio Euzkadi, the voice of the Basque resistance (Radio Euzkadi, La voix de la Résistance basque), was created in 1946 by the Basque governemnt in exile and broadcast on short wave from Mougerre, in the vicinity of Bayonne. After its closure, Radio Euzkadi broadcast from Venezuela between 1965 and 1977. See J. A. José Antonio Rodríguez Ranz, L. Arrieta Alberdi (eds) Radio Euskadi, La Voz de La Libertad, Iparralde 1946–1954, Venezuela 1965–1977 [Radio Euskadi, the voice of freedom, Iparralde 1946–54, Venezuela 1965–77], Bilbao, Euskal Irrati Telebista, 1998. 56 On the activities of the Basque government in exile and its close relations with French politics and intellectuals, see L. Mees, El profeta pragmático: Aguirre, el primer Lehendakari (1939–1960) [The pragmatic prophet: Aguirre, the first Lehendakari (1939–60)], Irún, Alberdania, 2006, 299ff. 57 On Basque nationalism in France, see J. Jacob, Hills of Conflict; Basque Nationalism in France, Reno, University of Nevada Press, 1994. 58 Basque regionalism’s revival was not unique. Brittany’s and Corsica’s regionalisms were equally intense. On the renaissance of ethno-regionalism in 1960s France and the concept of pays, see R. Pasquier, Regional Governance and Power in France: The Dynamics of Political Space, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. 59 Jose Luis Álvarez Emparantza, known as ‘Txillardegi’, who was one of the cocreators of Ekin and later of ETA, found refuge in Belgium in 1965. Profoundly opposed to the new political line of the Basque militant group, he was evicted from ETA in 1967. He eventually returned to the south-west of France in 1968 and to the Basque country in 1977. 60 X. Hualde, ‘“La question basque”, un factor de tensión entre Francia y la España franquista (1945–1975)’ [The Basque issue. A source of tension between France and Francoist Spain (1945–75)], Sancho el Sabio, 32, 2010, 95–116. 61 On the creation of the Embata movement in 1963, see J. Etcheverry-Ainchart, P. Etcheverry-Ainchart, Le mouvement Enbata, à la source de l’abertzalisme du nord [The Enbata movement, towards the genesis of Basque patriotism in the North], Donostia, Elkar, 2013. 62 Law of 10 March 1927 on the extradition of foreigners, Article 5(2): ‘when the crime or offense has a political character or when it is clear from the circumstances that the extradition is requested for a political end’.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

98

Counter-terror by proxy

63 J.-C. Bonichot, ‘L’évolution récente de l’extradition passive en France’ [Recent trends on passive extradition in France], Annuaire français de droit international, 30, 1984, 19–42. 64 P. Astudillo, ‘Un espagnol à sauver’ [A Spaniard to rescue], Le Nouvel Observateur, 17 November 1975, 4; P. Astudillo, ‘L’affaire Astudillo’ [The Astudillo case], Les Temps Modernes, 353, 1 December 1975, 926–34. 65 Recueil des Décisions du Conseil d’Etat, Assemblée du 24 juin 1977, 01591, Astudillo Calleja. This case is emblematic of a change of attitude of the French Conseil d’Etat which, for the very first time in post-Second World War France, decided to cancel a decision from a court on the basis that the extradition was requested for a political end. See Bonichot, ‘L’évolution récente de l’extradition passive en France’. 66 Israel and West Germany requested the extradition of Aboud Daoud. The court ruled that France’s special terrorist-extradition pact concluded with Israel in July 1975 did not apply because the acts had been committed before the agreement. The West German request for extradition was rejected on two grounds: the technically improper identification of the prisoner, and the fact that West German officials had not yet formally confirmed the extradition request through diplomatic channels. See R. Riggle, ‘L’affaire Abou Daoud: Some problems of extraditing an international terrorist’, The International Lawyer, 12:2, 1978, 333–50. 67 Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s proposal is available at: www.cvce.eu/obj/proposition_de_ valery_giscard_d_estaing_sur_la_mise_en_place_d_un_espace_judiciaire_europeen_ bruxelles_5_decembre_1977-fr-c7f7171f-f73a-4ab4–829e-faa221acaeca.html (accessed 23 June 2019); J. Charpentier, ‘Vers un espace judiciaire européen’ [Towards a European judicial area], Annuaire français de droit international, 1978, 927–41. 68 P. Ortuño Anaya, European Socialists and Spain: The Transition to Democracy, 1959–77, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. 69 Archives du Secrétariat des Relations Internationales du Parti Socialiste, 424RI12, Compte-rendu du Congrès du PSOE à Madrid les 21 et 22 octobre 1981; see also the memoirs of the Socialist Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy in which he relates his concerns at the time about Francoist habits within the Spanish police. P. Mauroy, Mémoires. ‘Vous mettrez du bleu au ciel’ [Memoirs. ‘You will paint the sky in blue’], Paris, Plon, 2003, 235–7. 70 Archives du Secrétariat des Relations Internationales du Parti Socialiste, 424RI19 [procès, extraditions (1975–81)] and 424RI21 [Question des réfugiés espagnols en France (1977–80)]. See also Archives Nationales (AN), Ministry of Interior, Services attached to the cabinet, series 19860185 (1977–84). 71 P. Cassan, Le pouvoir français et la question basque (1981–1993) [French politics and the Basque issue (1981–93)], Paris, l’Harmattan, 1997. Declaration of French Prime Minister Mauroy on the French Radio Europe 1 on 8 June 1981: ‘La France est une terre d’asile pour tous ceux qui sont des condamnés politiques et doit rester fidèle à son histoire et à son image’. 72 Nouvel Observateur, 18 July 1981: ‘peut-être parce que j’ai vécu la clandestinité, je ressens très fortement qu’extrader est contraire à toutes les traditions de la

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Controversy 99 France, surtout lorsqu’il s’agit comme là d’un combat politique’. In the 1979 Metz Congress of the French Socialist Party (PS), Gaston Defferre – mayor of Marseille and head of the regional council of Provence-Cote-d’Azur – supported a motion against the end of the Spanish refugee status. 73 Journal Officiel de la République Française, Débats parlementaires Assemblée Nationale, Premiere session ordinaire, 17 November 1981, 3847. 74 G. Ménage, L’œil du pouvoir, Volume 2, Face aux terrorismes (1981–1986) [The eye of power. Dealing with terrorism (1981–86)], Paris, Fayard, 2000, 359. 75 Archives du Secrétariat des Relations Internationales du Parti Socialiste, 424RI20, question du terrorisme au Pays Basque (1977–84): ‘La France, dans ce contexte, doit rester très attentive et veiller à ne pas se laisser entraîner à privilégier les solutions de force sur celles qui peuvent conduire au dialogue’. 76 L. Joinet, Mes Raisons d’Etat. Mémoires d’un épris de justice [My Raison d’Etat. Memoirs of a firm believer in justice], Paris, La Découverte, 2013, 115. 77 Joinet, Mes Raisons d’Etat, 194. This position would be further developed in the mid-1980s in relation to members of the Italian Red Brigades and would be known as ‘Mitterrand’s doctrine’: if one renounces one’s past, does not go into hiding, and keeps oneself out of politics, no one should be extradited. See V. Ruggiero, ‘Sentenced to normality: the Italian Political Refugees in Paris’, Crime, Law and Social Change, 19, 1993, 33–50. 78 Interview with Juan Tomás de Salas in the documentary film produced by Arthur Mc Caig et al. and released on French national TV on 10 April 1986. See A. Mc Caig, S. Gillet, P. Voigt, J. Douai, Les mains sales [Dirty hands], Antenne 2 / Le magazine, 1986, 39 min. 79 G. Ubasarte-Gonzalez, ‘ETA and State action: The development of Spanish antiterrorism’, Crime, Law and Social Change, 72, 2019, 569–89; F. Reinares, O. Jaime-Jiménez, ‘Countering terrorism in a new democracy: The case of Spain’, in F. Reinares (ed.) European Democracies Against Terrorism: Governmental Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2000, 119–45; F. Jiménez, ‘Spain: The terrorist challenge and the government’s response’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 4:4, 1992, 110–30. 80 E.-P. Guittet, ‘Is consensus a genuine democratic value? The case of Spain’s political pacts against terrorism’, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 33: 3, 2008, 267–91. 81 D. Diaz, Un asile pour tous les peuples? Exilés et réfugiés étrangers en France au cours du premier XIXe siècle [A sanctuary for all the Peoples? Exiles and foreign refugees in France during the first part of the nineteenth century], Paris, Armand Colin, 2014; S. Aprile, Le siècle des exilés. Bannis et proscrits de 1789 à la Commune [The century of exiles. Outcasts and Outlaws from 1789 to the Commune], Paris, CNRS éditions, 2010; G. Burgess, Refuge in the Land of Liberty. France and its Refugees, from the Revolution to the End of Asylum, 1787–1939, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2008; G. Noiriel, La tyrannie du national. Le droit d’asile en Europe, 1793–1993 [The tyranny of the national: Asylum rights in Europe 1793–1993], Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1991.

4

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Monstrous mimicry: actions and actors of the Anti-terrorist Liberation Groups

Whatever the circumstances, one can consider that the most recommendable form of action is the disappearance by sequestration. CESID, internal memo on Actions in France, 1983 The GAL are the logical result of ETA’s actions. He who lives by the sword shall die by the sword. Manuel Fraga Iribarne, President of People’s Alliance, 1984

In the early 1980s, Spain’s economy was plummeting and unemployment soaring. Tensions between Madrid and the peripheral nations of Cataluña and the Basque country were growing relentlessly.1 Violence between the Spanish State and Basque militants was escalating and discontent with the centre-right Suárez government was especially rife among the ranks of the security and armed forces. On 23 February 1981, a cohort of armed Civil Guards who believed that democracy had brought Spain little but economic decline, regional separatism and terrorism took over the cabinet and the lower house of the Parliament, holding the deputies hostage in an attempt to overthrow the government.2 Led by Colonel Antonio Tejero Molina and Major Ricardo Sáenz de Ynestrillas Martínez, the insurgents erupted with a blast of gunfire and ordered everyone on to the floor as the Prime Minister, Adolfo Suárez, was preparing to hand over power to his successor, Calvo Sotelo. Meanwhile, in Valencia, right-wing Lieutenant-General Jaime Milans del Bosch was declaring a state of emergency and took over the military district, rolling out tanks into the streets. The coup failed not only because the conspirators assumed wrongly that the king Juan Carlos would support them but also because of serious disagreements about the possible outcomes of the coup among the perpetrators. Following Colonel Tejero’s coup, ETA-PM proclaimed a unilateral ceasefire and violence began to recede in Spain. The secret discussions between Mario

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document



Monstrous mimicry

101

Onaindia and Juan Maria Bandrés – members of Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE, the Basque Country Left) – and the then centre-right Ministry of Interior Juan José Rosón led to the implementation of a disengagement and reinsertion scheme in 1982. The ‘social reinsertion’ policy offered to ETA-PM members the possibility of re-establishing themselves in society upon their renouncement of the armed struggle.3 This Spanish version of the Italian example of disassociation was a success since hundreds of former members of ETA-PM regressed from violence as an option. However, the expectation that intransigent militants from ETA-PM would join the scheme was simply a step too far. By 1982, violence had resumed, with several notable actions (including bank robberies) and multiple assassinations. The September 1982 attack on a police patrol car near Rentería (Errenteria in Basque) – a town situated in the Basque nationalist heartland of Gipuzkoa province and near the border with south-western France4 – was the deadliest, with four Spanish policemen dead and one wounded.5 In a pre-election period, the attack provoked strong reactions. At a time when the PSOE was well positioned and its chances to win the general elections were high, it expressed without delay its strong determination to eradicate terrorism in general and to deal firmly with ETA in particular.6 Indeed, the PSOE led by Felipe González swept home in the October 1982 elections and became the first single party to win a governing majority since the first post-Franco elections in 1977. The triumph was short-lived since, within just a couple of days before the PSOE was to assume power, the general Víctor Lago Román heading the elite Brunete First Armoured Division was gunned down by ETA in Madrid.7 Prime Minister-elect Felipe González vowed anew that his government would ‘use all means at the disposal of the democratic state to do away with the scourge of terrorism’.8 In February 1983, the Minister of the Interior José Barrionuevo held a series of meetings revolving around a new plan to ‘restore public order’ to the Basque country. The plan, finally called Zona Especial Norte (Special North Zone, ZEN), was devised by the planning unit under the Secretary of State for Security Rafael Vera in the Ministry of the Interior. A few excerpts were made public in March, the plan itself was unveiled in May, and, at the request of the opposition Partido Popular (PP), it was submitted to the Spanish Parliament in June.9 Simultaneously, Vera travelled through the Basque country and Navarra on a publicity campaign. At a press conference in Pamplona after presenting the plan to the Navarra parliament, he contended that it was not an anti-ETA war device: ‘what we are planning is to defend citizens against the terrorist phenomenon and to include anyone who wants to co-operate with peace’.10 ZEN became official in September and received extensive media coverage.11 Its stated purpose was to co-ordinate the Basque political and law

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

102

Counter-terror by proxy

enforcement institutions in an ideological fight against the Basque National Liberation Movement (Movimiento de Liberación Nacional Vasco)12 in general and ETA in particular; to ‘eradicate the influence of ETA over the Basque population and to destroy its military apparatus’.13 Dubbed the ‘Damborenea doctrine’ after the PSOE secretary-general in the Basque country, Ricardo García Damborenea, it called for a resumption of the talks that had been initiated by the Ministry of the Interior under the preceding transitional government. In political terms, the ZEN plan affirmed the need to make links with political figures and organisations locally (in the Basque country), nationally and internationally so as to increasingly isolate and discredit ETA: Democratic governments do not make decisions that run counter to public opinion. Therefore, actions must be taken to influence public opinion in foreign countries, providing objective information on the reality of terrorism.14

It proposed to set up groups specialising in the tracing of financial transactions with a view to analysing, tracking and prosecuting ETA’s ‘revolutionary taxation’ practices. Rewards would be offered to anyone who co-operated. Another goal was to discredit ETA’s activities and members by rehabilitating the law enforcement apparatus in the Basque country. The incompatibility of ETA’s activities with traditional Basque values would be asserted through media campaigns that painted ETA as anti-Basque and by stepping up government support for the creation of pro-Basque, anti-ETA associations.15 In terms of the legal system, the plan combined the strengthening of anti-terrorist legislation with the maintenance of a policy of reintegration, inspired by the Italian model, for ETA members who renounced violence.16 With regard to institutional structure, its major innovation, particularly relevant to the genesis and operationalisation of the GAL, was to decentralise the regional-level intelligence-gathering functions of the anti-terrorism agencies. A regional intelligence committee comprising the federal envoy to the Basque country, the command of the Guardia Civil’s Fifth Zone and the Navarra police force, co-ordinated operations in the Basque country on the instructions of the Secretary of State for Security. At the provincial level, the anti-terrorist campaign was structured around the provincial governor, a provincial intelligence committee, the Civil Guard and the police prefecture. The national structure remained the same, with national security, Civil Guard and police consolidated in a central co-ordinating cabinet with a mandate to gather, analyse and distribute intelligence. The plan embodied a counter-insurgency approach harking back to the infamous psy-ops of the 1960s: ‘what is needed are psychological operations designed to lead citizens to oppose the ideas and activities of terrorism’.17



Monstrous mimicry

103

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación campaign (1983–87) The Anti-terrorist Liberation Groups (Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberacion, GAL) made their appearance in the autumn of 1983. On 5 October of that year, an ETA commando squad kidnapped Captain Alberto Martín Barrios in Bilbao and spirited him across the French border. The Spanish intelligence service (CESID) was then embroiled in lively and sustained debate over the merits of conducting cross-border operations as a means of quickening French–Spanish co-operation. A 28 September 1983 CESID document titled Asunto: Sur de Francia (Re: South of France) had deemed the kidnapping of ETA members in France to be an appropriate course of action, and Barrios’s kidnapping brought matters to a head. José Amedo Foucé, Deputy Chief of the national police (Cuerpo Nacional de Policía) in Bilbao, who worked with its regional anti-terrorism brigade; the Governor of Vizcaya, Julian Sancristóbal, and the Bilbao police chiefs Francisco Álvarez and Miguel Planchuelo wanted to kidnap the ETA leader José María Larretxea Goñi and question him on Martín Barrios’s whereabouts. The governor conferred with José Barrionuevo and Rafael Vera, both of whom accepted the plan. Álvarez, who also headed the Spanish government’s anti-terrorism unit in the Basque country, took charge of organising the kidnapping, entrusting it to three members of the elite police squads known as Grupos Especiales Operativos (GEO) acting under the command of officer Gutiérrez Argüelles.18 The four were ordered to avoid confrontation with the French authorities. But the kidnapping went badly wrong. On 18 October 1983, when the GEO men were about to capture Larretxea after hitting him with their car, a French gendarme intervened. The four Spanish officers were arrested and Barrios’s corpse was found the next day.19 Undaunted by this initial failure, Sancristóbal, Álvarez, Planchuelo and Amedo planned a second cross-border kidnapping to be carried out by foreign – in the event, mainly French – mercenaries. Another event had determined the politicians and policemen on this course of action as well: an ETA bomb had blown up a Civil Guard patrol on 15 October in Oñate, leaving two injured and one dead.20 On the scene, the Guipúzcoa governor Julen Elgorriaga met Colonel Enrique Rodríguez Galindo, the long-time commander of the Intxaurrondo (San Sebastián) Guardia Civil detachment, who told him of his plan to kidnap two ETA members in retaliation. As Elgorriaga and Rodríguez were returning to San Sebastián together, the latter was informed that two young ETA members, José Antonio Lasa Arostegui (‘Lasa’) and José Ignacio Zabala Artano (‘Zabala’), had been unlawfully detained by the Guardia Civil. Under torture, the men supplied information about Mikel Goikoetxea Elorriaga (‘Txapela’).21 They were then executed.22 Meanwhile in Bilbao, plans to kidnap Larretxea’s relative Mikel Lujua were

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

104

Counter-terror by proxy

being finalised. Police Inspector Francisco Saiz Oceja, reporting to Miguel Planchuelo, was entrusted with finding an isolated place conducive to the operation. A CESID internal memo of 3 November titled Actividades en el Sur de Francia (Operations in Southern France) provides a list of ETA targets, Lujua prominent among them. Sancristóbal and Álvarez approved the plan and Planchuelo and Amedo promised three French mercenaries one million francs to carry it out. Sancristóbal informed Barrionuevo, obtaining his approval and the money (18 million pesetas) from a secret ministerial fund.23 On 4 December, Pedro Sánchez, one-time legionnaire Mohand Talbi and Jean-Pierre Échalier went to the home in Hendaye of an ordinary French furniture dealer named Segundo Marey and kidnapped him. At the Dancharinea border crossing into Spain, Talbi asked the two local policemen on duty to call the Bilbao prefecture of police. They informed their superior, the Pamplona chief of police, who in turn contacted the federal government representative to Navarra, Luis Roldán Ibañez. He proceeded to call Vera, who informed him that this was a secret operation under Bilbao’s command, and to let the men through. Back in Spain, the three mercenaries met with Amedo who saw Marey, contacted Sancristóbal and informed him of the mistake. The same day, Álvarez, Sancristóbal and Planchuelo met and called Vera to inform him of the situation: instead of Lujua they had got Marey, an entrepreneur living in France since 1936. Thus, the GAL made their entrance with a case of mistaken identity. Nevertheless, the kidnappers persisted. On 6 December they telephoned the San Sebastián Red Cross and demanded the speedy release of the four GEO officers arrested in the Larretxea case or they would execute Marey.24 Sancristóbal kept Barrionuevo informed of the situation throughout the incident. When the GEO men were released without charges on 8 December, it was decided to release Marey. Amedo received a document from Sancristóbal signed ‘los GAL’ that he was instructed to have translated into French. The translation was done by Michel Domínguez, a French-born police inspector in Bilbao, and it would be the GAL’s only written communication. On 14 December, a barefoot Marey was freed on a snowy road near the border. The note found in his jacket pocket admitted the mistake but warned that the threat was real for all ETA members living in French safe havens and for all Basque exiles who supported the militant organisation in any way: Due to the rise in assassinations, kidnappings and extortions committed by the terrorist organisation ETA on Spanish soil, and planned and directed from France, we have decided to eliminate this situation. The Anti-terrorist Liberation Groups, formed for that purpose, hereby state the following: 1. Each terrorist assassination will be met with the necessary response; not one victim will remain without a response. 2. We state our idea of attacking French interests



Monstrous mimicry

105

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

in Europe, since its government is responsible for harbouring terrorists and allowing them to act with impunity. From now on, no French person or economic target will be safe. 3. As proof of our good will, and convinced of the appropriate weight given to the action by the French government, we hereby release Segundo Marey, detained by our organisation because of his co-operation with ETA terrorists. You will receive news from the GAL.25

The overt message was clear: ETA should expect to give an eye for an eye; any attack or action against Spain, its representatives or its institutions would be met with immediate retaliation. Moreover, France was on notice that it too would be targeted if the French government refused to co-operate more actively in the fight against ETA. Ten days later, the Civil Guard detained and imprisoned Pedro Sánchez, a former Spanish legionnaire known for his participation in the French paramilitary group Civic Action Service (Service d’Action Civique, SAC),26 as he tried to cross the border carrying weapons and some forty photocopied identity cards corresponding to Basque exiles. Two weeks later, the alleged ETA member Ramon Oñaederra (‘Kattu’), a waiter at the Kaietenia bar on Pannecau Street in Bayonne, was killed in an armed attack. The establishment was known for being frequented by abertzales (Basque patriots). The GAL immediately claimed responsibility, warning in a radio communiqué that anyone who ‘protects or co-operates with ETA terrorists’ would be vulnerable, and that ‘French interests’ would be attacked again. We have seen how Sancristóbal’s invention of the GAL acronym answered the need to make the best of a failed kidnapping. As for the Lasa and Zabala killings, the GAL would claim authorship for them only later, on 20 January 1984, by which time they had committed three attacks and/or assassinations. These two very different, unrelated incidents had the same design: to push the French government to co-operate on anti-ETA measures. The Marey kidnapping received major media coverage; both the Spanish and the French press treated it as a return to the dirty war waged by the BVE, whose last operation had taken place over three years earlier.27 The ‘dirty war’ concept – this time, hiring foreign mercenaries to operate under a made-up moniker – had once again become a pragmatic accelerator of diplomacy on French– Spanish co-operation. Thus the GAL, which began as the result of the free hand given by the Ministry of the Interior to law enforcement officials in their fight against ETA, gathered steam from the favourable reception given after the Marey affair. On 28 December 1983, Mikel Goikoetxea, an alleged member of ETA’s military command, was shot in the head and left for dead as he returned home with his wife and daughter. He died from his injuries at the Bayonne Hospital on New Year’s Day. Goikoetxea was indeed well known in Basque nationalist circles, and his death sounded alarms among ETA members and

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

106

Counter-terror by proxy

sympathizers. The GAL were, to all appearances, aiming at the top of the hierarchy – and hitting their targets. That was reconfirmed on 8 February 1984 when Angel Gurmindo Izarraga (‘Stein/Escopetas’) and Bixente Perurena Telletxea (‘Peru’) were shot down on a Hendaye street. On 25 February, two days after the assassination of the senator and the leading candidate on the Socialist list for the Basque regional elections Enrique Casas,28 Eugenio Gutiérrez Salazar (‘Tigre’) was assassinated by a sniper at a Basque-language school run out of a converted presbytery in the French village of IdeauxMendy. A few days later in Irún, Jean-Pierre Leiba, a stranger to the Basque nationalist cause, was gunned down while working on the railway – the second GAL ‘targeting error’. His two co-workers pursued the two gunmen and alerted the Spanish police, who arrested Maríano Moraleda Muñoz (Daniel Fernandez Aceña gave himself up to the police a few hours afterwards). The following day the GAL claimed and then later, retracting their statement, denied responsibility. On 23 March, Xavier Pérez de Arenaza, brother-in-law to Domingo Iturbe Abásalo (‘Txomin’), was shot down at a Biarritz gas station. Responsibility was claimed by the GAL within hours. Between the Leiba and Pérez killings, on 20 March, a car bomb exploded with its driver in downtown Biarritz. The victim, identified the following month, was Jean-Pierre Chérid, an ex-paratrooper and BVE member involved in attacks on Basque exiles in the late 1970s.29 The bomb had been intended for others. On 3 May, Jesús Zugarramurdi Huici (‘Kiskur’) and Rafael Goikoetxea, alleged members of ETA’s military wing, were driving away from the cooperative where they worked in Saint Martin d’Arossa when a motorcycle overtook them and opened fire. Goikoetxea died before reaching hospital. The GAL claimed responsibility by telephone. On 15 June, the day after a meeting between the French and Spanish ministers of the interior, a motorcycle bomb exploded in Biarritz in front of the Café du Haou, setting fire to alleged ETA members Tomás Pérez Revilla (‘Hueso’) and Ramón Orbe Etxeberria as they left. Both suffered grave burns and Pérez died of his injuries in July. On 10 July, another GAL bomb blew up in a bar in Saint-Jean-de-Luz, shattering a window and injuring José Luis Oliva Gallastegui, Bonifacio García Nuño and Juan Vicente Jáuregui, all alleged ETA members. Then a number of co-operatives and businesses known as employers of Basque exiles were burned down in apparent cases of arson (4 August in Hendaye, 9 August in Saint Martin d’Arossa, 13 August in Bayonne) and the GAL also claimed responsibility for the machine-gunning of a Bayonne bar. On 18 November, the Olaskoaga brothers were shot as they left a party in the village of Biriatou, only five minutes’ drive from the Irún border post. Christian Olaskoaga died instantly while his brother Claude was wounded. Neither had any nationalist connections, and the GAL admitted in their telephone message of 20 November

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document



Monstrous mimicry

107

that they had hit the wrong target again. On the latter date, the GAL assassinated Santiago (Santi) Brouard, a high-profile parliamentarian with the Basque nationalist party Herri Batasuna, a close associate of certain ETA members, president of the People’s Revolutionary Socialist Party (Herri Alderdi Sozialista Iraultzailea) and a well-loved Bilbao paediatrician. His funeral brought thousands of people on to the streets. A further series of actions followed across the border. On 11 December, Juan José Iradier was targeted by a car bomb in Hendaye but escaped; on 1 February 1985, Xabier Manterola escaped a similar attack in Bayonne. In March, a woman wearing sunglasses shot five bullets at a group of Basque exiles gathered at the Lagunekin bar in Bayonne, wounding alleged ETA members Jesús Amantes Arnaiz (‘Txirlas’) and Angel Zabaleta Mendia (‘Gotxon’). On 13 March, a hotel in the same neighbourhood of Bayonne was also fired upon. On 25 March, the Basque exile Ramón Basañez was wounded in an attack on the Bittor bar in the village of Ciboure near Saint-Jean-de-Luz. On 29 March, Benoît Pécasteing died in an attack on the Café des Pyrénées in the nationalist district of Bayonne, and five people, including the Basque exiles Pedro José (Kepa) Pikabea and Jean-Marc Mutio, were seriously injured. A crowd of Basque exiles gave chase and the killer, Pierre Baldés, was detained, disarmed and beaten before being handed over to the police. The next day, a protest against the GAL was then held in the Petit Bayonne neighbourhood. Xabier Galdeano, a photographer for the Basque newspaper Egin, took pictures of the demonstration before going home to Saint-Jean-de-Luz, where he was shot down in front of his home by two men. Ciboure was targeted again on 14 June. The French gypsies Emil Weiss and Claude Doerr died at a bar called Txiki under a hail of machine-pistol bullets fired by a woman disguised as a man, who tossed a grenade to cover her flight. The GAL stated in a radio communiqué that it regretted the men’s death and urged French citizens to stay out of the abertzal bars. On the evening of 26 June, Santos Blanco González was killed in the streets of Bayonne. On 16 July, Fernando Egileor Ituarte noticed tracks in the sand near his car; a bit of digging exposed wires leading to several kilograms of dynamite. On 2 August, the ETA veteran Juan María Otegi (‘Txato’) was assassinated while driving home to Saint-Jean-Pied-de-Port. In his native town of Itxasondo, Guipúzcoa, the town council honoured his memory as a gudari, or Basque combatant.30 The Monbar Hotel, situated within the maze of small streets making up Petit Bayonne, was the scene of a bloody GAL attack on the evening of 25 September when Lucien Mattei and Pierre Frugoli methodically machine-gunned the hotel bar. The alleged ETA members Sabin Etxaide (‘Eskumotz’), Agustín Irazustabarrena (‘Legra’), Iñaki Asteasuinzarra (‘Beltza’) and José María Etxaniz Maiztegi (‘Potros’) died. When the news was

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

108

Counter-terror by proxy

announced, strikes broke out in their native province of Guipúzcoa. The funeral held the next day coincided with the ten-year anniversary of Franco’s execution of Juan Paredes Manot (‘Txiki’) and Angel Otaegui. The Herri Batasuna member Tasio Erkizia made an explicit link between these two dates, stating that the new dead were martyrs in the continuing fight against the Francoist regime, which had never gone away.31 On 24 December in Biarritz, Robert Caplanne was shot while getting into his car and died two weeks later. The discovery of the killer’s vehicle, licensed in Andorra, led inspectors to Javier Rovira, whose ties to a Barcelona neo-fascist group were known to the police. At Rovira’s trial in 1987, he admitted that he had mistaken Caplanne for a known ETA member, Enrique Villar Errasti. The GAL’s actions continued none the less. On 8 February 1986, the Batxoki bar was sprayed with gunfire and Frédéric Haramboure, Juan Luis Zabaleta and Carmen Otegui and her daughter were critically injured. Witnesses gave chase but the gunmen escaped. Within a week, the GAL had made two more appearances. On 13 February, the La Consolation bar in Saint-Jean-de-Luz was attacked a second time. Again the gunmen were pursued, but only one of three, Paulo Fontes Figueiredo, was caught. On 17 February, the GAL ambushed a car leaving the village of Bidarray; Christophe Matxikote and Catherine Brion were shot multiple times and died instantly. Neither the shepherd nor his niece, who had come to attend to their animals, had any connection with ETA. The Spanish border being only 15 km away, the killers easily escaped. Matxikote’s property was adjacent to a farm where a Basque exile was often visited by his compatriots, and investigators determined that the killers had made a mistake, a fact admitted two days later in a communiqué.32 After this incident, the GAL were quiet until 24 July 1987 when a final victim, Juan Carlos García Goena, a twenty-eight-year-old Spanish-Basque with no nationalist connections, died in a car bomb in Hendaye.

Perpetrators, promotors and bystanders From the time the GAL began operating, three questions inevitably arose: who was sponsoring them, who was paying them, and from whom were they obtaining information about potential victims? Might the French police or other officials be directly involved? Or might the French government be providing the information? To their credit, French authorities wasted no time arresting GAL members in the wake of the first attacks. Pedro Sánchez was arrested in December 1983 as he attempted to cross the French–Spanish border the night of the Marey kidnapping. In April 1984, when the wouldbe bomber Jean-Pierre Chérid blew himself up in his car, the Bordeaux

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document



Monstrous mimicry

109

investigative section of the National Police (Police Judiciaire, SRPJ) arrested Yamina Mekouafi, Mohamed Mekouafi, Mohamed Khiar, Yves Peignier, Roger Bernard, Robert Valdonado Quevedo, Daniel Schroeder and Khader Bouljellal and charged them with membership of a criminal association (association de malfaiteurs). On 15 June, the night of the motorcycle bomb attack on Pérez Revilla and Orbe Etcheverria, the police arrested Patrick de Carvalho and Roland Sampietro; the following day in Pau, they detained Jean-Philippe Labade and Jean-Pierre Bounin, who alleged that they had all been recruited by a man named Christian Hittier. In August, the police arrested Mohand Talbi in the Savoie. On 13 September, one month after the arson incidents, Yan Brouchos was arrested. On 21 September, the French police arrested Jean-Pierre Daury and André Vicente García; on 22 November, they arrested Raymond Sanchis. On 29 March 1985, Pierre Baldès was arrested and charged with the Pyrénées café attack. On 13 April 1985, Jacky Pinard, Alain Parmentier and Bernard Foucher were arrested; on 25 September 1985, Lucien Mattei and Pierre Frugoli were arrested for the Monbar hotel massacre which occurred the same day. They admitted the crime, stating that they were recruited in a Marseille bar to eliminate ETA terrorists. In November 1985, the French police arrested Roger Roussey, Alain Lambert, Alain Domenge and Michel Morganti, all known in Marseille crime circles, for the July 1985 car bomb attack on Fernando Egileor. The suspects stated that Georges Mendaille recruited them to work for the Spanish secret services. On 24 December 1985, shortly after Robert Caplanne’s assassination, Javier Rovira was arrested and he revealed the name of another recruiter, Ismaël Miquel Gutiérrez. On 13 February 1986, Paulo Fontes Figueiredo was apprehended for that day’s attack on the La Consolation bar. In June 1984, Pedro Sánchez, the first mercenary arrested for GAL-related operations, was released by Michel Svahn, Judge of the Appeals Court of Pau (Chambre d’Accusation), who threw out the charges against him. Arrested and imprisoned a second time, he was released for health reasons in August 1985 and died of cancer one month later. On 28 November 1984, Jean-Philippe Labade, charged for the motorcycle bomb attack of 15 June, was released by the appeals court on a technicality and disappeared without a trace. On 28 December 1984, Jean-Pierre Bounin, charged for the same attack, was released for the same reasons, as was Yan Brouchos. On 15 May 1984, the seven individuals arrested in Bordeaux were released on a technicality. As the arrests continued, the French investigators found themselves in a delicate position: ‘we have not yet been able to put the GAL out of action, and for good reason: we cannot go to Spain to find their sponsors’.33 The arrest and indictment of Paulo Fontes Figueiredo, among others, was particularly helpful in tracing the GAL hierarchy. The information gathered

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

110

Counter-terror by proxy

by the Bayonne judge Christophe Seys led to the arrest of the GAL members Mario Correia da Cunha, Rogerio da Silva and Antonio George Ferreira in Portugal in February 1987. Jean-Philippe Labade’s name resurfaced, initially lending credence to the idea that he was one of the GAL leaders and motivating an extradition request to Portugal. Judge Seys’s inquiry made it possible for a Lisbon judge, Antonio Castelo, to charge the three mercenaries with participating in an armed group as well as to confirm the hypothesis that the GAL masterminds had close ties to Spanish law enforcement. The mercenaries stated that they had been taken to lunch on 31 January 1986, two weeks before the attack, by two Spanish police officers. The bill had been picked up on a credit card belonging to José Amedo Foucé, Deputy Police Commissioner of Bilbao. Though Spanish involvement was now more than plausible, French investigators continued their search for the intermediaries Labade, Hittier and Mendaille. Labade had, after all, told judge Gilbert Cousteau when arrested on 16 June 1984 that he was an intelligence agent in the employ of Spain. Roussey, Lambert, Domenge and Morganti had made the same admission, working through Mendaille. From this point on it was clear that the GAL command was to be found across the Pyrénées and it was there that the French investigators were now searching for Hittier, Mendaille and Amedo. The first GAL members arrested, Baldés, Sampietro and de Carvalho, had named Christian Hittier as their recruiter, and that name arose again in March 1988 when Andorra police arrested Dominique and Marie-Chantal Thomas. Hittier was apprehended on 1 March 1988 in Belgium under an international arrest warrant and was extradited on 12 November to face charges of participation in a crime syndicate and of conspiracy to commit murder. An OAS militant, he fled to Spain at the end of the Algerian war, returning to France only in the mid-1970s. Later, while the GAL were active, he lived in Andorra. At his hearing he admitted being accountable to Spanish sponsors for the success of his missions and mentioned the name of José Amedo, who had also been named in the Spanish proceedings. The same month judges Christophe Seys and Armand Riberolles went to Madrid to question Amedo in the presence of Spanish judge Carlos Bueren, who referred the case to the Audiencia Nacional on 6 January 1988. Proceedings began the following week, with Judge Francisco Castro Meije questioning Amedo about his ties to the GAL. On 3 February, the Bayonne judge Philippe Cavalerie (replacing Seys) issued an international arrest warrant for Amedo’s extradition to France; on 15 February, Judge Castro called for his indictment in connection with the GAL crimes. On 18 February 1988, Judge Baltazar Garzón was designated to preside over the ‘Amedo affair’. On 24 March 1988: a demonstration by some one hundred intellectuals and lawyers calling on the Audiencia Nacional to

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document



Monstrous mimicry

111

convict and imprison Amedo became an acción popular.34 Amedo had become publicly identified as the mastermind behind the GAL, the recruiter of recruiters, the hierarchical superior responsible for the events.35 In June 1988, Judge Garzón opened case ‘1/88’, resulting in the 14 July 1988 incarceration of Amedo and Domínguez on charges of ‘six attempted murders, participation in an armed group, and usage of counterfeit currency’. In 1991, Amedo and Domínguez admitted to sole responsibility for recruiting the mercenaries, drawing on the networks available to the Spanish police since the time of Franco.36 Former OAS members and legionnaires, Italian neo-fascists and leftovers from the Franco era, hired killers from Marseille, Paris and Bordeaux: these were some of the individuals who had accepted sums of 100,000 to 200,000 francs to murder or assist with the murder of ETA members. On 17 July 1991, the two Spanish officers were convicted and sentenced to 108 years in prison for attempted murder, murder and membership of an armed group, but not for terrorism. The GAL affair was considered closed. Amedo’s public notoriety eclipsed the important role played by other intermediaries such as the ex-legionnaire Mendaille. Mendaille had been arrested by the Spanish authorities after considerable legal wrangling on 9 February 1989, but they made his extradition to France conditional on the reciprocal extradition of imprisoned ETA leaders. It was not until 24 May 1994, after years of pressure by French judges with the support of Audiencia Nacional judges, that Mendaille was finally extradited and incarcerated in Bayonne. In the early 1990s, the Spanish judges hearing the GAL cases and probing the involvement of the security services were up against a fortress of state secrets that were legally protected by a constitutional provision.37 A breakthrough came with revelations of a convoluted affair involving a Spanish government secret fund dedicated to anti-terrorism operations. The affair implicated Luis Roldán who, as the first civilian director of the Civil Guard since its founding in 1844, was next in line for the position of Minister of the Interior. But a 1993 Diario 16 article casting doubt on the sources of his immense personal wealth forced him to resign. In March of the following year, a parliamentary commission was set up under Judge Anna Ferrer to inquire into the matter. The commission’s initial conclusions came as a surprise even to the journalists covering the story: Roldán had Swiss bank accounts that held money embezzled from construction programmes of barracks for Civil Guard members. Before the commission could confiscate his passport and summon him to testify, Roldán had left Spain. Interviewed in Paris, he claimed that people close to the Minister of the Interior had topped up their salaries by dipping into the slush fund.38 What had begun as an instance of corruption and personal enrichment was now an affair of the State.39

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

112

Counter-terror by proxy

It was in this political climate that the issues surrounding the command and financing of the GAL took an astounding new turn. Amedo and Domínguez, still in prison, appeared before Judge Garzón on 16 December 1994 and broke their silence on the GAL affair, implicating numerous senior law enforcement officials and politicians including Barrionuevo, Sancristóbal, Álvarez, Planchuelo and Julio Hierro, former chief of police of San Sebastián. On the strength of these allegations, four of these five individuals (the direct hierarchical superiors) were arrested on 19 December. The new testimony reopened the GAL case and kicked off an unprecedented political scandal. Barrionuevo vehemently denied having had any knowledge of the GAL, as did the González government: ‘The government acted lawfully at all times.’ 40 In an appearance before Parliament, the Minister of Justice and the Interior Juan Alberto Belloch categorically denied the allegations that Amedo and Domínguez had requested and been given payment in exchange for their silence: ‘The government cannot be blackmailed in this way.’ 41 He went on to fulminate against those who were demanding what he considered to be non-existent proof of the government’s innocence. Amedo’s statements also implicated Ramón Jáuregui, PSOE secretary-general in the Basque country 1990–93, now the Minister of Labour and Employment. He too vehemently denied the allegations, stating repeatedly that he would ‘not let a common criminal sully [his] political career’.42 There was now ample information with which to justify reopening the GAL inquiry, but the González government kept up a wall of denial. On 18 January 1995, Rafael Vera tried to have Judge Garzón recused, claiming that the two had become implacable enemies during the four weeks in which their time in government had overlapped.43 The same day Sancristóbal, in a television interview from his cell, charged that he was the victim of a conspiracy concocted by Garzón. On 2 February 1995, the high-ranking PSOE member Ricardo García Damborenea, accused by Amedo of having planned and arranged the Marey kidnapping, appeared in court. On 16 February 1995, Judge Garzón sentenced Vera to a term in Alcalá de Henares prison for misappropriation of public funds and for covering up the Marey affair. On 17 February, García Damborenea joined Sancristóbal and Vera in prison after a few weeks of provisional release; he was accused of being the author of the GAL communiqué and of illegal detention and attempted murder. The GAL affair returned to the forefront of Spanish politics in the summer of 1995. On 16 July, Miguel Planchuelo admitted his involvement, while Barrionuevo kept up his denial. Then, a spectacular development arose: accusations emerged against Prime Minister Felipe González. On 18 July, Sancristóbal maintained that González had to have been apprised of the GAL; he could not have been ‘out of the loop’. Two days later, García

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document



Monstrous mimicry

113

Damborenea went further, telling the judge and the media that the GAL had been conceived and implemented at two levels, political and operational, that González had taken part in regular discussions on the matter, and that he had been privy to the CESID document recommending operations in southern France.44 On the basis of these statements, on 28 July Judge Garzón referred the indictment of José Barrionuevo, Narcis Serra, José María Benegas and Felipe González to the Supreme Court. On 7 September, the high court prosecutors deemed the charges sufficiently specific for parliamentary immunity to be lifted for Barrionuevo but not for the other three.45 The time for flippancy and protestations of honour had passed: no fewer than thirteen Socialist politicians, senior bureaucrats and high-ranking officers had been charged, indicted and/or examined,46 in addition to some twenty-five militants wanted, arrested, on trial or convicted. No longer could the GAL be perceived as a run-of-the-mill anti-terrorist cell formed out of the ranks of the Spanish police. The chain of command issues were further complicated with the appearance of new players in other cases before the Audiencia Nacional, particularly case 15/95 concerning the disappearance and death of Lasa and Zabala. The autopsy report made public on 21 March 1995 directly implicated the Civil Guard. The two men had been subjected to lengthy torture before being shot in the back of the neck with a 9 mm Geco, a standard Civil Guard firearm at the time. These facts corroborated the statements of the first mercenaries arrested ten years earlier, who claimed to have worked in conjunction with Civil Guard members, although the judges had found the evidence on this point insufficient to reach a conclusion; after all, no guardsmen were ever caught in flagrante delicto. The 4 August 1995 issue of El Mundo carried an astounding lead story about Civil Guard Colonel Enrique Rodríguez Galindo and his criminal involvement in the two men’s deaths. It described how they had been taken in a Seat 600 to a deserted country road, shot in the legs, and then finished off execution-style by a Civil Guard officer. Rodríguez and a senior Ministry of the Interior official had allegedly visited the two men in the dungeons of the abandoned Palacio de la Cumbre in San Sebastián on 17 October 1983, wearing hoods to disguise their identity. The story appeared the day that the González administration was set to raise Rodríguez to the rank of general. The suspicion of Civil Guard involvement in the GAL gained additional credence when a police officer named Angel López Carrillo testified before Judge Bueren of the Audiencia Nacional that, while working for Guipúzcoa governor Julen Elgorriaga from 1982 to 1986, he learned that Rodríguez Galindo and Elgorriaga were the two hooded men in question. He named seven other officers – Felipe Bayo Leal, José Guisado Fernández, Fidel del Hoyo Cepeda, José Domínguez Tuda, Fabián Dorado Villalobos, Francisco Hermida Bouza and Luis Sandoval Santos – as having participated in the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

114

Counter-terror by proxy

kidnapping and killing. All seven worked for the AT1 (anti-terrorism one) section of the Intxaurrondo detachment under the command of Rodríguez’s right-hand man Enrique Dorado Villalobos. One year later, they were all indicted on the basis of the testimony of Luis Roldán. On 7 May 1996, after Roldán’s testimony in connection with the Oñaederra assassination, Judge Garzón indicted Andrés Cassinello and José Saenz de Santamaría, former Civil Guard chief of staff and general respectively, along with Rodríguez, who had by now been forced to resign. On 20 May, Judge Xavier Gómez ordered the arrest of Dorado and Bayo as suspects in the Lasa and Zabala murders. Three days later, Rodríguez was put in solitary confinement.47 The statements of Amedo, Domínguez and others also renewed suspicions as to the involvement of Spanish intelligence, suspicions that were confirmed on 12 June 1995 when the El Mundo journalists Antonio Rubio and Manuel Cerdán revealed that CESID had illegally wiretapped journalists, politicians and even the King. The CESID director General Emilio Alonso Manglano, Deputy Prime Minister Narcis Serra and Defence Minister Julián García Vargas immediately resigned. In September 1995, further to García Damborenea’s statements, Colonel Juan Alberto Perote, former head of covert operations for CESID, testified before Judge Garzón that he had co-written, along with his superiors including General Manglano, a memo identified by García Damborenea as the ‘founding document of the GAL’.48 Subpoenaed the next day, Manglano denied CESID’s involvement, contending that the ‘hypothetical’ memo had been produced by García. But the same day, Francisco Álvarez, silent since his indictment, alleged that he had received from an anonymous CESID correspondent and promptly destroyed a rubber stamp bearing the initials ‘GAL’. On 27 May 1996, El Mundo published new transcripts of recorded CESID conversations indicating the agency’s involvement with the GAL, and on 16 December it published further documents, bringing tensions to a head as Judge Garzón sought to have them declassified. (The Supreme Court did so in March 1997.) Against this backdrop, the first major Spanish trial of GAL figures began with Barrionuevo and Vera in the dock and Felipe González, re-registered as a practising lawyer, on the defence team. For them, it was just a ‘political problem dressed up as a criminal matter’.49 While González was theoretically no longer at risk of being found criminally liable, he stood to incur tremendous political liability if his former cabinet ministers were convicted. Throughout the trial, he categorically denied his own involvement as well as the charges against Barrionuevo, who, in his defence, maintained that it was an ‘underhanded settling of scores’.50 In July 1988, the Supreme Court convicted Barrionuevo and Vera and, on 8 September, sentenced them to ten years in prison.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document



Monstrous mimicry

115

What of French police involvement in the GAL? This possibility had been raised at the time when the police judiciaire and the gendarmes were rounding up the killers.51 Under examination in 1987, Mohand Talbi had repeatedly named the Spanish police as the intellectual authors and claimed that the ‘[French] police had knowledge of all the planned attacks by the French and Spanish terrorist police of the GAL’.52 The same year, three years after their conviction for the premeditated murder of Xabier Galdeano, Alain Parmentier and Jacky Pinard wrote to the French Minister of Justice stating that ‘the French authorities were not hostile to this fight’. On 11 June 1989, Jean-Philippe Labade stated at trial in Lisbon that he worked for the French police. On 24 June, Fernando Carvalho and Antonio Jorge Ferreira alleged the French police logistical support for their actions. On 20 June 1990, the alleged GAL member Roger Roussey accused the French government of being behind the GAL. José Amedo denied none of this at his trial in 1991, although he mentioned no names. Inspector Jean-Marc Dufourg of Renseignements Généraux (RG, the French domestic intelligence agency) wrote in his memoirs that his agency had relayed files on Basque exiles to the Spanish police, which gave them to the GAL.53 Thus, suspicions of French involvement already carried considerable weight when, in 1994, the statements of Amedo and Domínguez brought them to the fore. Amedo recounted in considerable detail how he had been ordered to maintain contact with and make payments to French bureaucrats since 1982.54 Just a few days earlier, Joël Cathala, deputy prefect for anti-terrorism co-ordination in the Basque country and formerly chief of the Police de l’Air et des Frontières (PAF, the border patrol agency), had been transferred out of the Basque country to a job as a liaison officer in Poland. The following week, Christian Montoux, the regional judicial police director, was transferred along with the Bayonne judicial police chief Régis Abribat and the Bayonne RG commissioner Alain Etcheto. On 14 September 1995, the Basque weekly Enbata published a photograph of Cathala along with the headline ‘Les dividendes de la traque d’ETA’ (The wages of hunting ETA members). The article was largely based on López Carrillo’s testimony at the trial of José Barrionuevo. On 26 October 1995, Enbata published another photo of Cathala with the headline ‘Cathala-Hélie: Ordures galeuses’ (Cathala-Hélie: GAL scum). Cathala sued. The Bayonne court, ignoring López Carrillo’s letter (certified by a Spanish court) in which he reiterated his role in carrying suitcases full of cash to France, ordered Enbata to pay damages, holding that it should have observed caution.55 The Tribunal de Paris reiterated these caveats in regard to López Carrillo’s testimony in a second case pitting Cathala against journalists. Cathala sued El Mundo on 17 November for an article from 11 September 1995 suggesting that he had received large sums of money from the Spanish Ministry of the Interior through López Carrillo in exchange for information about ETA

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

116

Counter-terror by proxy

members. Judge Monfort found for the plaintiff, holding that ‘the credibility given by the Spanish courts to Angel López Carrillo in the matter of the kidnapping and murder of two ETA militants is not tantamount to blanket corroboration of his entire testimony’.56 The effect of this judgement was to stop López Carrillo’s testimony at the border, leaving the question of French official involvement in the GAL attacks in suspense. In an interview with Le Monde, Judge Seys maintained that he had not been able to do a thorough job – that, in fact, his work had been impeded.57 On 14 June 1996, Juan Ramón Basañez, critically wounded in two separate GAL attacks, filed a complaint against Francisco Álvarez, Pierre Hassen and Miguel Planchuelo with an application for intervenor status (constitution de partie civile) before the Tribunal de Bayonne, arguing that López Carrillo’s statements called for the opening of a new trial. On 30 January 1997, Judge Christian Lauqué dismissed the complaint in the Tribunal de Grande Instance (general trial court) of Bayonne, holding that, since the legal proceedings relating to the two attacks had concluded, only the Ministère Public (public prosecutor’s office) had the power to lay new charges.58 Basañez appealed against the decision to the Appeals Court of Pau59 which held, on 10 March 1998, that an investigation of French police involvement in the GAL was in order,60 and the Bayonne Judge Jocelyne Rubantel was put in charge of it. She could not help but observe the explosive revelations emerging from the Spanish courts and compare them with the sluggish French proceedings. In March 2000, the Spanish judges gave their French counterparts some six hundred pages of transcribed hearings into López Carrillo’s statements. Rubantel went to Madrid with two members of the Bordeaux SRPJ on 3 April 2001 to question Julen Elgorriaga, now serving a lengthy prison term. Over a year later, on 3 October 2002, the retired PAF officer Pierre Hassen was arrested by the Police Judiciaire and placed under judicial supervision. Upon learning of the arrest, Judge Garzón, in charge of the case concerning the 24 July 1987 attack that killed Carlos García Goena, ordered the creation of a rogatory commission. However, nothing ever came of this one and only legal proceeding that could have assessed French involvement in the GAL. It seems that different French law enforcement authorities may have been acting at cross-purposes: while some were investigating and arresting GAL members, others were helping the paramilitary group in collusion with the Spanish authorities. Though the official documents do not shed sufficient light on modes and motives, several relevant observations can be made. José Amedo revives his allegations of French involvement in his recent book.61 The French authorities, he writes, were letting ETA members live in the south of France undisturbed, and in that context informal French and Spanish law enforcement networks took on special importance. He reiterates his ten-year-old statements about the methods used to build a

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document



Monstrous mimicry

117

network of informers among the French police. Every off-duty meeting was an opportunity to gather previously unavailable intelligence. The specific date of 16 June 1982, when the World Cup football tournament was held in Bilbao, marked the beginning of this process. There had followed long discussions over drinks and increasingly close but informal relations between local police departments, leading to the emergence of a social network. In attempting to distinguish the various roles of the French law enforcement authorities, an initial distinction may be drawn between intelligence officials, who cross borders in the course of their duties, and judicial police officers, who are attached to their territorial prerogatives. Thus, the former had more contact with Spanish law enforcement than the latter. It is known that the Civil Guard was dissatisfied to have the PAF and Renseignements Généraux rather than the Gendarmerie as its main French interlocutors.62 It is easy to understand why this was the case by examining the micro-sociological aspects of policing in the Basque country.63 The Gendarmerie, being more decentralised and more poorly equipped and staffed than the PAF, was shut out of cross-border policing. The PAF, on the other hand, had a history of operations in the Basque country stretching back more than a decade. In addition, its organisational culture allowed it to keep efficient databases on ETA in parallel with its general border policing responsibilities. These informal co-operation networks have not yet been the subject of a legal proceeding in France and information on them remains scant. There must have been some degree of French government involvement, that much is clear, but there is no certainty about which individuals and agencies participated. Still, one can rule out certain hypotheses and received ideas in an effort to refine what much of the activist literature considers the generalised complicity of the French law enforcement authorities with the GAL. What with the statements of various Spanish figures and the refusal of the French courts to implicate French officials, it is unfair to carry on as if every French police officer serving in the Basque country assisted Spanish law enforcement in the surveillance of the exiles. While one must not understate the responsibility of those French officials who helped set up the GAL, funnelled information or passively allowed the hitmen to carry out their sinister work, neither should one inflate the number of persons involved. Be that as it may, the Spanish trials revealed an intent on the part of the Spanish police hierarchy to attract, retain and pay French police informers under a policy initiated by Franco.64 In the absence of legal decisions or inquiries, these facts show how difficult it is for the French authorities to investigate such instances of collusion and other direct or informal cooperation (the GAL as ‘a little unofficial Interpol’),65 without having to admit the dubious origins of that co-operation, consisting of discreet and illegal exchanges of information.

118

Counter-terror by proxy

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Retaliation – GAL, ETA and the reciprocal fascination The only written note produced by the GAL vowed that assassination by ETA would meet reprisal, one for one. The pre-eminent justification for the GAL, issuing from their members, backers and earliest observers alike, was that of vengeance, punitive action against ETA: ‘Each terrorist assassination will be met with the necessary response; not one victim will remain without a response.’ The GAL existed because ETA existed. The operative concept here was that of mimesis, mimetic rivalry, the symbolic pitting of violence against violence: What the two sides have in common is their sordid cult of violence, vengeance, and crime. Both sides represent variants of the same terrorist phenomenon.66

The GAL imitated ETA in order to break free of a particular normative context, the rule of law.67 Now, if ETA was a terrorist organisation in the eyes of the Spanish authorities, the reverse was equally true: the authorities were perceived as terrorists by ETA.68 And here, in essence, is how difference was wielded in the terroristic interaction: each side had to portray the other in negative terms and in contradistinction to itself, so as to convey the image of ignominy, of something worth defeating. But the terroristic interaction, in addition to being a locus of difference, of intense rivalry, was also one of wide-ranging mimesis – imitation of methods, rhetoric and even organisational structures. The State, though combated and loathed, also inspired fascination and envy in the non-State actor, which attempted to mimic every one of its features.69 Taking this into account, the terroristic interaction was a conflictive manifestation of mimetic envy in which the State was both the model and the obstacle. Conversely, the states – and especially their counterterrorist agencies – were fascinated with what they perceived as the non-State actor’s tactically effective use of violence. As René Girard perspicaciously notes, rival envies are all the more formidable in that they tend to be mutually reinforcing. The prime movers in this type of conflict are escalation and retaliation.70 The GAL, in this interpretation, were an instrument allowing the Spanish authorities to use ETA’s methods without attracting the opprobrium associated with the organisation’s violent image. No wonder, as we will discuss in the next chapter, that Spanish authorities railed with indignation when anyone suggested that the Spanish police and intelligence services might be involved. An example serves to illustrate this point. After a January 1978 clash between the police and ETA in which two militants and one police officer were killed, the Minister of the Interior, Rodolfo Martin Villa, used a sports metaphor to describe the toll: the government was winning two to one. In the well-worn register of mundane violence that characterises sports discourse, the right side is simply the side that fights harder and wins.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document



Monstrous mimicry

119

The police officer’s death was no more than a mark on a scoreboard, a necessary sacrifice in a winning game. As we underlined in the previous chapters, with a constant stream of such performative utterances, the image of ETA as a model enemy was given substance and detail, modulating not only the representation of facts but also the convictions, judgements and public reactions flowing from them. The ‘reality’ of violence becomes inseparable from the images and rhetoric used to describe it, and bellicose confrontation appears as the natural and appropriate response. The GAL acronym and logo can themselves be seen as interesting instances of such semantic warfare. ‘Gal’ is a Basque root word denoting the idea of loss or perdition,71 and these three letters also form the first syllable of a

Logo of the GAL

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

120

Counter-terror by proxy

Spanish epithet used to denigrate the French, los gallos, the ‘roosters’. As for the logo, found several times on the walls of GAL victims’ homes, it is a perversion of the ETA logo: the snake is wrapped around the axe, but the axe is cutting off the snake’s head.72 This combination of verbal and visual images made for an implicit yet unambiguous signifier of the people targeted by the GAL, the people who must lose their heads: ETA members and sympathisers, Basque exiles and all gallos who aid or abet ETA in any way. The GAL’s promoters successfully conveyed their message without having to state the unacceptable and unthinkable overtly in public. As we have underlined in this chapter, multiple legal proceedings since have brought a great deal of information to light but for long the GAL’s backers could safely claim to be unconnected to the group’s offences. The backers were able all at once, without obvious contradiction, to pursue their accusations against ETA through legal channels, advocate the importance of eliminating ETA through French–Spanish co-operation, and assert their willingness to help the French police find the GAL murderers. From the kidnapping, torture and execution of Lasa and Zabala on 16 October 1983 to the explosion of a car bomb on 24 July 1987 (killing Juan Carlos García), the GAL committed some two dozen attacks in a small area of the department of Pyrénées Atlantiques bounded by Bayonne, Hendaye and Saint Martin d’Arrossa, killing twenty-seven and injuring dozens of others in the Basque exile community. It was one of the most murderous episodes in France’s recent history. In terms of numbers of assassinations committed in 1983–85 on French territory, the GAL topped the list with twenty, followed by the Corsican National Liberation Front (Front de Libérational National Corse), with nine, the Armenian Secret Liberation Army with nine, and Action Directe with one. Whereas the GAL, in their first communiqué, had promised to kill one ETA member in France for every ETA assassination in Spain, the actual tally for 1984 was rather unequal: thirty-two ETA assassinations versus only nine by the GAL (seven alleged ETA members and two French nationals with no known Basque connections).73 If one looks no further than this comparison, the disproportion appears to render the GAL insignificant. But this would be to ignore the group’s role as a front for those further up the hierarchy. It had no strategic autonomy other than to choose the weapons with which to execute its targets. The GAL were the instruments of Spanish political figures who, to settle the score of perceived French non-cooperation in the fight against ETA, used a series of highly symbolic attacks to put urgency into what had become a diplomatic stalemate. This would explain the GAL’s failure to respond to ETA attacks committed from April 1986 to July 1987, when the French government’s willingness to act was becoming more evident. The GAL’s subordination to political ends was never clearer than when the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document



Monstrous mimicry

121

political landscape dictated that they disappear and they promptly complied. Moreover, just as ETA’s acts cannot be fully understood without taking account of the social position of its victims – considered by the group to be representatives of the government’s security apparatus – it is a matter not of counting the GAL’s victims but of determining what they represent. The operative logic was not so much an eye for an eye as escalation, whose effectiveness is to be looked for in the symbolic nature of the victims. The purpose of the Lasa and Zabala killings was to acquire information with which to hunt down and kill Mikel Goikoetxea (‘Txapela’). The latter murder was particularly important for its symbolism, coming as it did within a few days of the tenth anniversary of the Carrero Blanco assassination. The symbolism went further: Goikoetxea (who was defended by Robert Badinter before the Court of Appeal of Aix-en-Provence in January 1979) had adopted his brother Jon’s alias ‘Txapela’ after the latter’s 1972 execution by the Guardia Civil. This action, like others of the GAL and of ETA as well, was largely dictated by a quest for public notoriety through the execution of symbolic ETA members, with reference to the political calendar and in response to ETA’s own actions. Again, Ramón Oñaederra, murdered on 19 December 1983, was the bartender at a café frequented by Basque exiles and militants that was owned by the son of the separatist pioneer Mixel Labeguerie. The date was also the fifth anniversary of the BVE’s assassination of the presumed ETA leader José Miguel Beñarán Ordeñana (‘Argala’) at Anglet. When an ETA commando assassinated Lieutenant-General Quintana on 29 January 1984 in Madrid, followed by Mikel Solaun, an ex-member of ETA’s military wing who had accepted an amnesty, on 4 February, the GAL’s response was not long in coming: Angel Gurmindo Izarraga and Bixente Perurena Telletxea were shot down on a San Sebastián street within days. Following the 23 February assassination of the PSOE member Enrique Casas, the GAL committed two new attacks. Though the first was a French national without known Basque ties (Jean-Pierre Leiba), the other targeted an important ETA figure (Eugenio Gutiérrez Salazar) and, perhaps more importantly, it evidenced the GAL’s intention to do battle on ‘enemy territory’, even in a remote ETA stronghold like the village of Ideaux-Mendy. And just as shootings were met with shootings, the GAL responded to car bomb attacks in kind. Jean-Pierre Cherid, as a BVE militant, had taken part in the car-bomb assassination of Argala, and was considered the technical expert behind the Carrero Blanco assassination. There was symbolism, too, in the assassination of Xavier Pérez de Arenza on 23 April in Biarritz (following ETA’s killing of a civil guardsman in Bilbao). Pérez de Arenza was the brother-in-law of Domingo Iturbe Abasolo (‘Txomin’), a high-ranking ETA member in hiding. Similarly, the March 1984 GAL attack on Goikoetxea and Zugarramurdi was, by extension, an attack on the Saint Martin d’Arrossa

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

122

Counter-terror by proxy

co-operative, founded five years earlier by Zugarramurdi and others. The attack was also a GAL response to ETA’s killing of Angel Rodríguez Sánchez the same day. Between Goikoetxea’s death and the GAL’s Biarritz attack of 15 June, ETA assassinated three police officers and an officer of the marines. The Biarritz attack, which severely wounded two ETA veterans, came only hours after the San Sebastián funeral of civil guardsman Angel Zapatero Antolín. The attack on Tomás Pérez was significant in that he had escaped a previous BVE attack in 1976. ETA and the GAL occupied pole positions that were subject to frequent inversion. While the GAL were committing assassinations, ETA was denouncing them; while ETA was doing the killing, the Spanish authorities did the denouncing and the GAL handled the retaliation. In situations like these, a vicious circle is set up, with each accusation leading to retaliation, counterretaliation and more accusations. Once blood has been shed, satisfactory vengeance demands that the killers’ blood be shed as well. The reciprocity between the two organisations is real even though it is composed of a succession of non-reciprocal moments.74 As the pace of the actions increases, the initial objectives are lost, and the logic of retaliation takes over, it becomes increasingly clear that there is not the slightest difference between the people on either side. This is especially true in view of the mimetic nature of the terroristic interaction. Each player pays back the other’s violence with interest. The more intense the rivalry, the more the two parties become blind to its origins and come to resemble one another. The fascination of each for the other becomes a reality denied, or rather ignored. Using the same methods and slinging the same accusatory rhetoric at each other, the parties’ reciprocal stance forces both to accentuate their Manichean visions of each other’s roles. On either side, the combat produces its own justifications, its own body of truths; on either side the rhetoric of grievances is structured so as to persuade others and oneself that the violence is justified. Thus it is no mere truism to say that, in a terroristic interaction, the terrorist is always the Other. Both think of themselves as special, both are blind to the mimetic dynamic. The terroristic interaction, like the logic of clandestine methods at work, imposes itself on the parties, governing not only their strategic and tactical possibilities but also their visions of reality. Despite their strong resemblances, they must try to differentiate themselves, to justify their actions by categorically opposing one another. As their visions of reality confront each other, as they face off in a spiral of verbal and physical escalation, the reciprocity is perpetuated willy-nilly. The terroristic interaction is a configuration of interdependencies in which the imperative of appearing to be different produces resemblance, rivalry and collision. There was truly something akin to reciprocal demonisation going on between ETA and the GAL, where each party ascribed to the other



Monstrous mimicry

123

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

a cohesion it did not possess outside of the terroristic interaction. As the GAL assassinated ETA members, they became for the latter a monstrosity that epitomised Spanish tyranny over the Basque country. Likewise, the GAL were perceived by their supporters as a powerful way of unmasking ETA’s criminal nature; hence, by the same token, demonstrating the necessity of combating the separatist organisation. At the core of the GAL was a visceral hatred, one that its actions both fed and justified. José Antonio Lasa Arostegui and José Ignacio Zabala Artano died begging to be attended by a priest. We did not allow it, because they did not deserve it.75

The counter-insurgency mindset initiated under Franco appears to have been hard-wired into the Spanish military and police institutions, which were hardly altered by the change of regime. The State security institutions had retained not only their attributes and powers but also their vision of the conflict with ETA, perceived as the direst threat to the social and political order. The forbidden envy of ETA’s clandestine structure took form in a conflictive relationship structured by games of rivalry and dramatisation, in which the demonisation of the adversary in some sense legitimised the use of the weapons that it was alleged to have, but in the name of a greater good – reason, necessity and State security. A symbiosis existed between counter-subversion and its designated enemy. The GAL were only the extreme formalisation of the mimetic rivalry between ETA and the State, in which the necessity of using any means to combat the clandestine organisation made the creation of the GAL both possible and desirable. To the extent that the configuration of the GAL was a choice, it was constrained by these institutions’ standard repertoire of techniques. They used what was ready to hand, not necessarily the approaches best suited to the problems in question.

Notes 1 R. Gilespie, C. Gray (eds) Contesting Spain? The Dynamics of Nationalist Movements in Catalonia and the Basque Country, London, Routledge, 2015. 2 J. Cercas, The Anatomy of a Moment, London, Bloomsbury, 2011. 3 M. Von Tangen Page, Prisons, Peace and Terrorism: Penal Policy in the Reduction of Political Violence in Northern Ireland, Italy and the Spanish Basque Country, 1968–97, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1998, 137–40. 4 In the 1980s, Rentería was among the region’s most notorious focal points of ETA’s violence. The city was known as the ‘Basque Belfast’ (Belfast Vasca) or the ‘outlaw city’ (ciudad sin ley). 5 ‘Cuatro policías nacionales, asesinados en una emboscada terrorista cerca de Rentería’ [Four policemen murdered in a terrorist ambush near Renteria], El País, 15 September 1982. A fifth policeman, member of the same unit and a

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

124

Counter-terror by proxy

close friend of some of the deceased, committed suicide a day after the attack. In 2018, José Miguel Cedillo, son of one of the policemen assassinated in 1982, came back to Rentería within the reconciliation and coexistence scheme implemented by Julen Mendoza, the Mayor of Errenteria. ‘Todos los partidos vascos arropan al hijo de un policía nacional que reivindica la paz tras el final de ETA’ [All the Basque parties rally around the son of a policeman who claims peace after the end of ETA], El Mundo, 15 September 2018. On the peace process and the various local reconciliation schemes across the Basque country, see M. Zernova, ‘Restorative justice in the aftermath of politically-motivated violence: The Basque experience’, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 12: 4, 2019, 649–72. 6 ‘El PSOE no negociará con ETA’ [PSOE will not negotiate with ETA], ABC Nacional, 16 September 1982. Javier Solana, at the time member of the PSOE Federal Executive Committee and one of its leading members, declared that ‘the terrorism issue is still the most important one and the PSOE considers that there are two ways to eradicate it: firstly, the police option, with the reinforcement and the improvement of the security forces, and secondly, the political one, through a campaign to raise public awareness’. 7 ‘Dos motoristas asesinan al general jefe de la División Acorazada Brunete e hieren gravemente a su conductor’ [Two men on a motocycle killed the general heading the Brunete Armored Division and severly wounded his driver], El Pais, 5 November 1982. Victor Lago Roman was the fifth general to be assassinated by ETA since 1978. 8 ‘Utilizaremos contra el terrorismo todos los medios del Estado’, afirma Felipe González, El País, 5 November 1982: ‘Nosotros, que hemos sido siempre unas personas dialogantes, vamos a utilizar todos los medios de que dispone el Estado democrático’ para acabar con la plaga del terrorismo’. 9 ‘El Grupo Popular pide que Barrionuevo explique el plan ZEN al Parlamento’ [The PP ask that Barrionuevo explains the Plan ZEN in front of the Parliament], El País, 25 May 1983. On the presentation of the Plan ZEN by Barrionuevo in front of the Parliament, see Congreso de los Diputados, II legistura, Sesiones informativas de Comisiones, Comision de Justicia e Interior, 16 June 1983, núm. 26, 3–29. 10 Rafael Vera, El País, 2 June 1983: ‘No es un plan de represión por la represión. Se trata, precisamente, de defender al ciudadano del fenómeno terrorista e incluso da la mano a todo aquel que quiera colaborar por la paz. Es enconmiable el esfuerzo que se ha hecho para compatibilizar la seguridad con la libertad’. 11 ‘El plan de seguridad del Gobierno para el País Vasco supondrá 15.000 millones de pesetas cada dos años’ [The government security plan for the Basque country will involve 15,000 million pesetas every two years], El País, 19 May 1983. 12 A general term for the group of political and military organisations which, together, make up the Basque militant nationalist movement. 13 ZEN Plan, chapter V, ‘Psychological Action’, ‘General Considerations’, 4th paragraph. 14 ZEN Plan, chapter IV, ‘Intelligence and Investigation’, 1, ‘Knowledge of the terrorist group’, par 1.5, ‘International Co-operation’.



Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

15 16 17 18

Monstrous mimicry

125

ZEN Plan, ‘Preamble’, last paragraph. Von Tangen Page, Prisons, Peace and Terrorism. ZEN Plan, chapter 1, ‘Introduction’, ‘Policing’ section. The GEO were formerly created in 1977 and were operational by 1979 thanks to the extensive support of the German Grenzschutzgruppe 9, the elite tactical unit of the German Federal police. 19 ‘El capitán Alberto Martín fue asesinado de un tiro en la nuca a última, hora del martes, en un bosque cerca de Bilbao’ [Captain Alberto Martín was shot in the back of the head late Tuesday in a forest near Bilbao], El País, 20 October 1983. 20 ‘Un guardia civil muerto y otros dos heridos leves al estallar una bomba en Oñate’ [A civil guard killed and two other suffered minor injuries when a bomb explodes in Oñate], El País, 16 October 1983. 21 Audiencia Nacional, Summary no. 15/95, Lasa/Zabala affair, Testimony no. 2345, 26 April 2000. 22 The two mutilated bodies were found on 18 January 1985 under a pile of quicklime in the countryside near Busot (Alicante). It took over ten years to identify them as those of Lasa and Zabala. 23 Tribunal Supremo, Marey Case, Decision 2/1998, Hechos Probados, §4, 29 July 1998: Pta 18 million in 1983 would be the equivalent of €0.5 million nowadays. 24 Tribunal Supremo, Marey Case, Decision 2/1998, Hechos Probados, §11, 29 July 1998. Sancristóbal gave Amedo a document written by the governor and García Damborenea, the PSOE secretary in the Basque country: ‘Escuche, le hablo del secuestro de Segundo Marey. Esta secuestrado por sus relaciones con ETA militar, occultando terroristas y por participar en cobro del impuesto revolucionario. Como este iran desapareciendo todos. Repetir y “clic”’. 25 The newspaper El País published a translation into Spanish of the communiqué in its edition of 15 December 1983. 26 The SAC was created in the late 1950s as a praetorian guard to protect Gaullist personalities from attacks by far-right French Algerians who opposed Algerian independence. The SAC worked as a type of private militia, a form of parallel police that was bypassing official chains of command to carry out dubious acts. The leaders of the SAC were mostly Gaullists of some note. The organisation drew much of its membership from the French national police but the rank and file included also professional thugs from the Parisian and Marseille milieu whose activities were being overlooked because of their anti-Communist dedication. The SAC was dissolved in 1982 by thenewly elected president François Mitterrand, after the ‘Auriol massacre’, a village 40 km north-east of Marseille, in which the head of the local section of the SAC, Jacques Massié, was killed with all his family after his friends from the SAC had suspected him of treason. See F. Audigier, Histoire du S.A.C. La part d’ombre du Gaullisme [The history of the SAC. The dark side of Gaullism], Paris, Stock, 2003. 27 The last known action of the BVE was on 23 November 1980, when two armed men irrupted in a local bar in Hendaye and opened fire. Two people were killed and ten others severely wounded. With French police in pursuit, the gunmen managed to cross the border but crashed their car. Surrounded by the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

126

Counter-terror by proxy

Guardia Civil, they claimed that they were on a mission for the Spanish police and Ballesteros, Director of the Spanish counter-terrorist unified command, protected them. The identities of the gunmen are still unknown. 28 Enrique Casas was killed on 23 February 1984, on the third anniversary of the Tejero attempted coup, by the Autonomous Anti-capitalist Commandos (Comandos Autónomos Anticapitalistas, CAA). The killing of Enrique Casas was the first murder of an election candidate in Spain since 1975. Rallies were called off and all the political parties, including Herri Batasuna, cancelled the rest of their campaigns. On the CAA, see J. Arrizabalaga, A. Murias, Autonomoekin solasean [Speaking with the autonomists], Tafalla, Txalaparta, 1997. 29 ‘El agente de los GAL que falleció en Biarritz había sido miembro de la OAS’ [The member of the GAL who died in Biarritz has been a member of the OAS], El País, 23 April 1984. See A. M. Pascual Cuenca, T. Rilo Cabezas, Cherid, un sicario en las cloacas del Estado, Madrid, El Garaje Ediciones, 2019. 30 From the Basque gudua, ‘war’. This term came back into common currency with its use in the Basque anthem (Eusko Gudariak) composed several years before the Spanish Civil War. It became the anthem of the Republican-aligned Basque army. 31 ‘Los GAL reivindican el asesinato de cuatro presuntos “etarras” en el País Vasco francés’ [The GAL claimed the murder of four alleged members of ETA in the French Basque country], El País, 27 September 1985: ‘los mismos que asesinaron a Otaegui y Paredes, siguen actuando hoy’ [the same people who murdered Otaegui and Paredes are still active today]. 32 ‘Le GAL reconaît son erreur’ [The GAL acknowledges its mistake], Le Monde, 21 February 1986: ‘Le Groupe antiterroriste de libération (GAL) a reconnu, mercredi 19 février, qu’il avait commis une erreur en assassinant, lundi à Bidarray, un berger âgé de soixante ans, M. Cristobal Machicote, et une jeune Parisienne, Catherine Brion’ [The Anti-Terrorist Liberation Group (GAL) admitted on Wednesday 19 February that it had made a mistake by murdering a sixty-year-old shepherd, Mr Cristobal Machicote, and a young Parisian woman, Catherine Brion, in Bidarray on Monday]. 33 Declaration of Alain Tourré, in charge of the criminal investigation police (Police Judiciaire, PJ) and co-ordinator of the counter-terrorist police efforts in the Basque country since September 1983, quoted in Libération, 11 January 1985. Tourré had been put into place of the counter-terrorist police effort in the Basque country by the Minister of the Interior Gaston Deferre in September 1983. He was to keep this position until 1986 when Superintendent Roger Bosle, head of the Bordeaux criminal investigation police unit, took over. 34 An application for intervenor status prescribed by Article 125 of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 in order for citizens to take action in defence of the public interest. 35 M. Miralles, R. Arques, Amedo. El Estado contra ETA [Amedo. The State against ETA], Barcelona, Plaza & Janes / Cambio 16, 1989. 36 J. Amedo Foucé, La Conspiración. El último atentado de los GAL [The conspiracy. The final GAL attack], Madrid, Ediciones Espejo de Tinta, 2006, 17ff.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document



Monstrous mimicry

127

37 I., Segrelles de Arenaza, Protección penal del secreto de estado: artículo 135 bis a) al 135 bis d) del Código penal [Criminal protection of state secrecy: article 135a(a) to 135 a.m. d) of the Criminal Code], Madrid, Universdad Complutense de Madrid, Editoriales de Derecho Reunidas, 1994. 38 ‘Sólo la mitad de los fondos reservados de Interior se usan en luchar contra el terrorismo y el narcotráfico’ [Only half of the reserved funds in Interior are used to fight terrorism and drug trafficking], El País, 13 March 1994. ‘No me van a engañar como a Amedo; si voy a la cárcel, no iré yo sólo’ [They are not going to fool me like Amedo; if I go to jail, I will not be going alone], El Mundo, 2 May 1994. 39 Roldán found himself at the centre of one of the most damaging corruption scandals in post-Franco Spain and one that would bring down the government of Prime Minister Felipe González in 1996. Roldán was sentenced to twentyeight years in prison in 1998 and released on parole in 2002. See M. Cerdán, A. Rubio, El ‘caso interior’: GAL, Roldan y fondos reservados, el triángulo negro de un ministerio [The Internal Case: GAL, Roldan and reserved funds, the black triangle of a ministry], Madrid, Temas de hoy, 1995. On the impact of the scandal in Spain, see F. Jiménez, M. Caínzos, ‘Political corruption in Spain’, in M. J. Bull, J. L. Newell (eds) Corruption in Contemporary Politics, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, 9–23; F. Jiménez, ‘Political scandals and political responsibility in democratic Spain’, West European Politics, 21:4, 1998, 80–99. 40 El País, 29 January 1994. 41 ‘Belloch garantiza que el Estado no acepta ningún chantaje de los antiguos miembros de los GAL’, El País, 31 December 1994. 42 El País, 31 December 1994: ‘No voy a permitir que un delincuente ensucie mi trayectoria política y deshonore mi nombre’. 43 El País, 3 February 1995. 44 El País, 21 July 1995. 45 Decision of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court, 7 September 1995. 46 Principal file 1/88 concerning the kidnapping of Segundo Marey in Hendaye (4 December 1983), the attacks on the Batxoki bar in Bayonne (8 February 1986) and the Consolation bar in Saint-Jean-de-Luz (10 July 1984). 47 On 24 May 1996, José María Aznar’s new government announced Rodríguez’s dismissal as adviser to the Ministry of the Interior. On 2 August, the Audiencia Nacional ordered his release without bail from the Alcalá de Henares military prison. 48 Statement of Colonel Juan Alberto Perote before the Audiencia Nacional, 5 September 1995. 49 Le Monde, 26 May 1998. 50 El País, 24 May 1998. 51 Canard enchaîné, 26 March 1984; Canard enchaîné, 27 June 1984. 52 Mohamed Talbi showed up at the Pau courthouse on 3 December 1987 with a cardboard sign on which it was written in bold letters: ‘La police connaissait tous les projets d’attentats des terroristes policiers français et espagnols du GAL’.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

128

Counter-terror by proxy

53 J.-M. Dufourg, Section Manipulation. De l’antiterrorisme à l’affaire Doucé [Manipulation section. From anti-terrorism to the Doucé case], Paris, Michel Lafon, 1991. 54 José Amedo, El Mundo, 27 December 1994. 55 Tribunal de Grande Instance de Bayonne, Cathala, Hélie v. Jakes Abeberry, Jakes Bortayrou (Enbata), Judgment no. 548/96, 27 March 1996, 12. 56 Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, 17th Chamber, Cathala v. De Salas Castellano, Ramirez Codina, Lobo Pérez et al., 8 November 1996, 10. 57 Le Monde, 21 February 1996. 58 Tribunal de Grande Instance de Bayonne, dismissal, no. CPC 0/96/47, correctional proceeding, 30 January 1997. 59 Cour d’Appel de Pau, 1st Chambre d’Accusation, Basañez Jáuregui v. Ministère Public, case no. A97/00273, hearing of 26 September 1997. 60 Cour d’Appel de Pau, Judgement no. 106/98, 10 March 1998, 7. 61 J. Amedo Foucé, La Conspiración. 62 J. Cabezas, Yo maté a un etarra. Secretos de un comisario de la lucha antiterrorista [I killed a member of ETA. Secrets of a counter-terrorist superintendent], Barcelona, Planeta, 2003, 377: ‘El mapa de la situación era más o menos el siguiente: los de información, RG, no querían trabajar con la policía española: llevaban muchos años trabajando con la GC; Los de PJ, Policía Judicial francesa, solo eran accesibles si se les presentaba un asunto muy concreto, no perdían el tiempo en investigaciones. Los únicos que estaban dispuestos a colaborar en las fronteras eran los miembros de la PAF.’ 63 J. Ferret, ‘La construction par le bas de la lutte antiterroriste. Une analyse microsociologique de la coopération policière franco-espagnole au Pays basque’ [The bottom-up construction of the fight against terrorism. A microsociological analysis of the Franco-Spanish police co-operation in the Basque Country], in X. Crettiez, J. Ferret (eds) Le silence des armes? L’Europe à l’épreuve des nationalismes violents [Weapons down? Violent nationalism in Europe], Paris, IHESI / La documentation Française, 1999, 115–40. 64 Amedo Foucé, La Conspiración. 65 L. Aimé-Blanc, J.-M. Caradech’h, L’indic et le commissaire [The snitch and the police superintendent], Paris, Plon, 2006. 66 ‘La guerra sucia’ [The dirty war], El País, 21 December 1983. 67 B. Aretxaga, ‘Fictional reality: Paramilitary death squads and the construction of State terror in Spain’, in J. A. Sluka (ed.) Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror, Philadephia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000, 46–69. 68 ‘Entrevista con ETA-Militar’ [Interview with ETA-M], Cambio 16, 12 May 1986. 69 During its existence, ETA allegedly produced various military awards and decorations for its members. ETA’s memorabilia are now favoured by private collectors. See ‘Las medallas secretas de ETA’ [The secret medals of ETA], El Mundo, 28 December 2017. 70 R. Girard, Je vois satan tomber comme l’éclair [I see Satan fall like lightning], Paris, Grasset, 2001, 25. See also R. Girard, La violence et le sacré [Violence

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document



Monstrous mimicry

129

and the sacred], Paris, Grasset [1972], 1999, 233ff. Girard’s mimetic theory is based on a central idea that we imitate the desire of others. It is fundamentally an instinctive and unconscious process that contains the possibility of tension and conflict which can entail rivalry, violence and vengeance. Whether mimetic desire always paves the way towards a violent destiny is a moot point and subject to debates. See H. Wydra, Politics and the Sacred, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015; A. J. McKenna, Violence and Difference. Girard, Derrida, and Deconstruction, Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 1992. 71 The verb ‘galdu’ in Basque means to lose (something or someone) or to be defeated. 72 The image of a snake wrapped around an axe has been used by the organisation in its various communications since the late 1970s when Basque anarchist and anti-Francoist Félix Likiniano (aka ‘Liki’) created it on a piece of wood. The meaning is still subject to controversy, including among ETA members and sympathisers. For some, it is a symbol of ‘bietan jarrai’, or the two paths of ETA, with the axe representing military force – or armed struggle – and the snake suggesting political cunning. For others, the axe means bravery and the snake sagacity. For Mikel Albisu Iriarte (‘Antza’), former head of ETA political wing, the symbols have to be understood jointly; no force without political wisdom. See ‘Antza explica al tribunal que le juzga en París que el anagrama de ETA propugna usar la fuerza con inteligencia’, El Correo, 25 November 2010. 73 E.-P. Guittet, Antiterrorisme clandestin, antiterrorisme officiel [Covert and official anti-terrorism], Montréal, Athéna Editions, 2010. 74 Girard, La violence et le sacré. 75 Excerpt from telephone message claiming responsibility for the crime on 20 January 1984. See Lasa/Zabala case, Summary no. 15/95, Hechos Probados, §5.

5

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Sacrifice: code of silence, political scandal and strategies of denial

Assassination is a ‘dirty war’ whoever practises it, and the highest marks there go to ETA from any point of view. Felipe Gonzalez, Spanish Prime Minister, 1983 There is no other way than using the irregular war against some guys who shoot in the back. The Rule of Law is a good thing, but we cannot definitively respect it because it would be playing by the rules of the terrorists. General José Antonio Sáenz de Santamaría, former director of the Guardia Civil, 2001

Deceit plays a striking role in the typical Italian novel from Boccaccio to Bandello. It is well established that the development of the Spanish novela has been strongly influenced by its Italian counterpart.1 Equally, Spanish classic poetry has been long obsessed with the idea that nothing in the world can be trusted, for all is by nature engaño, deceptive. The concept of deception infuses Spanish classic literature – Don Quixote being the most well-known example. With the GAL, Spanish authorities were deeply concerned by the possibility of being caught red-handed. If Madrid’s putative involvement in the GAL was confirmed, the democratic credentials of the Spanish government and the Socialist Party would be seriously tarnished. The overall rule, therefore, was to operate under a strict policy of silence and official denial. From its inception and first actions in 1983 lasting up to 1995, the GAL squads were shrouded in secrecy. Denial of culpability was on a par with attacking the accusers, changing the subject and channelling public attention in a different direction. Spanish governments railed with indignation when anyone suggested that the Spanish police might be involved. How dare anyone assert that the young Spanish democracy was behaving like the contemptible Francoist regime? Those who sought to link the GAL’s actions to the Spanish police were accused outright of lying and supporting ETA:

Sacrifice 131

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Terrorism in our country claims to win battles without weapons. Herri Batasuna accomplishes this on behalf of ETA. Herri Batasuna and ETA have benefited from the GAL trauma like no one else. The strategy of lies is clear. And it should be obvious who benefits, exclusively, from this strategy: ETA, Herri Batasuna and their collaborators of all kinds, whose machinations, and whose depraved, venal or frightened witnesses are worthless before the truth. And with the truth, the proclaimed innocence of Mr Domínguez and myself.2

Denial is frequently the first and often the most enduring reaction to accusations of wrongdoing.3 And the Spanish authorities were no exception. Alongside the complementary pair of simulación and disimulación or the art of outright lying and covering up reality, the Spanish government was able to condemn its detractors as either pro-ETA or anti-Spain people masquerading under a mask of outrageous moral reasoning. As we underlined in the previous chapter, until the thunderous declarations of José Amedo and Michel Dominguez, the Spanish government managed to simultaneously involve itself in and distance itself from terror. However, when denial was not possible any more, justifications took over. This chapter reflects on the Spanish controversial albeit somehow successful efforts deployed over time up to and including the present day, glossing over and rewriting the brutal history of the GAL.

Dodging politics – plausible deniability and evasion of responsibility ‘The GAL are the logical result of ETA’s actions. He who lives by the sword shall die by the sword.’ 4 The dictum of Manuel Fraga, once a minister in Franco’s government, appears to have been espoused by every GAL member arrested; each GAL action, they claimed, was just a logical response to the violence of ETA. In an interview with alleged GAL mercenaries published in the weekly Cambio 16 on 21 May 1984, this punitive rhetoric was spelled out: ‘the GAL, after all, are not killing innocent people’.5 Bernard Foucher put it far more bluntly at his sentencing hearing before the French Cour d’Assises Spéciale de Pau (a special criminal court for terrorism and related offences) when he yelled at the intervenor, ‘Vive la France! Kill all the Basques!’ Likewise, Jacky Pinard and Alain Parmentier, in a letter to the French Minister of Justice, demanded pardon for their actions on the grounds that they had believed themselves to be defending the public interest: ‘I felt I had done my civic duty by agreeing to give information on ETA people, whom I regard as terrorists.’ ‘Fighting terrorists’ is a justification that frequently arises in the discourse of the GAL members. Patrick de Cavalho told the court that he had committed his crime ‘in the name of the men who died in the Drakkar attack in Beirut.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

132

Counter-terror by proxy

That day I promised myself I would fight the terrorists.’ 6 The GAL militants all defined themselves in relation to the generic enemy, ETA, and justified targeting errors by invoking the principle of collective responsibility, whereby every Basque citizen was potentially guilty of being an ETA supporter. This semantic shift from suspect to criminal recurs frequently in the speech of the GAL members and is reminiscent of the classic counter-insurgency mindset in which every local is suspected of being in the know, therefore guilty of hiding what they know: in every Basque there hides a terrorist. Anti-Communism, the fear and hatred of the Red terrorist menace and the separatists, was undoubtedly used by the recruiters as a selling point. The target, after all, was easy for many to rally around, as witness these words of a French judge: There are people who do not like Communists, and we mustn’t forget that these Spanish Basques living in France are Communists. People may belong to the GAL for ideological reasons. And there are perhaps 250 people in this department [Pyrénées Atlantiques] who are just waiting for the chance to catch Spanish Basques. We can’t put them all in prison: the Bayonne prison is overflowing already! Let’s be honest: if you want to eliminate the GAL, you have to start by eliminating ETA.7

Also attractive to the recruits was the chance to be paid by intelligence operatives for the pastime of picking off Communists: We were all playing at being James Bond. We were having a ball on the Basque coast with all the money we received.8

While the first GAL members arrested were voluble about their personal investment in hunting ETA members, they also took issue with their employer’s claims of innocence. Most of them were still completely unaware of the financing and recruitment mechanisms operating further up the hierarchy; still, not wanting to be the scapegoats, they were at pains to incriminate the French and Spanish political authorities. The Spanish authorities responded by vehemently denying any involvement and by invoking the deadly reality of ETA: The five hundred murders committed by ETA since the 1977 amnesty worry me a lot more than any Spanish police operations in France.9

For the time being there was nothing Spanish at all about the GAL; to all appearances they were a group of French mercenaries operating in France.10 Their presence allowed the Spanish political hierarchy to sow confusion about the origins of the GAL by laying the problem at the French government’s door. Each had his own version of the Basque country, his own definition of violence and safe haven:

Sacrifice 133

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The events occurred in France and concerned the people we were supposed to pursue anyway [ETA members]. We weren’t especially worried. Nobody shed a tear [for ETA] back then.11

Since the initial arrests and judgements in France concerned GAL ‘small fry’ and there was no evidence incriminating Spanish law enforcement, the authorities could plausibly denounce attempts to link the GAL to the Spanish government. It was worse than libellous, they said;12 it was playing into the hands of the ETA terrorists. Once Amedo and Domínguez were on trial, though, denial became more difficult. The González government met this delicate situation with silence before invoking Amedo’s right to the presumption of innocence and reminding everyone that the GAL were, after all, doing the noble work of fighting terrorism. During the three years between Amedo’s arrest and his conviction in 1991, the political rhetoric remained worlds apart from the vituperative discourse of the GAL members, who presented themselves as having faithfully done the Spanish government’s dirty work. And though the trial of Amedo and Domínguez went some small distance towards raising the veil on what appeared to have been a particularly successful ‘anti-guerrilla guerrilla group’, the politicians’ stance remained firm: denial in the face of mounting evidence of wrongdoing. As long as Amedo was taking the blame, the others could hide behind the argument of individual initiative – that is, until the two policemen began to incriminate them. From January 1995 on, the Spanish political hierarchy was on the defensive as new trials opened and their defendants made new revelations. The scandal peaked the following year, a legislative election year, with the reopening of the Marey case. El Mundo began the year with an editorial virulently attacking Felipe González: González is the candidate of the GAL and the secret funds, the dirty war and the CESID, Ibercorp, Filesa, wiretapping, the AVE commissions, and many other scandals for which he has always refused to bear responsibility.13

The opposition parties incessantly brandished the charges against Barrionuevo and the possible implication of González. The campaign against the PSOE became increasingly aggressive: A vote for the González list or for the PSOE is a vote for the GAL, for the kidnapping of Segundo Marey, for the assassination of García Goena, for torture, impunity, and the ‘dirty war.’ It is a vote against the Constitution.14

The indictments of Barrionuevo and Vera by Supreme Court Judge Eduardo Moner five weeks before the elections did not stop González from keeping Barrionuevo fifth on his list of candidates for Madrid and from publicly criticising the judge’s decision in light of the electoral calendar. He asserted

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

134

Counter-terror by proxy

that neither his government nor any prior government had ever waged a dirty war against ETA. Why, he asked rhetorically, would the government want to fund clandestine operations in parallel with official anti-terrorism initiatives? This would be pointless and counter-productive, and the GAL’s violence had in fact impeded French–Spanish co-operation. On 3 March 1996, the opposition Partido Popular won the legislative elections and José María Aznar became the country’s fourth constitutional prime minister, putting an end to fourteen years of Socialist rule. Despite Aznar’s invitation to turn the page, the legal proceedings continued, new testimony was heard, the evidence mounted and convictions were handed down. The incriminated politicians remained indignant; upon being convicted in the Marey case, Barrionuevo stated that the GAL were no more than a ‘political machination and a plot to get rid of the PSOE’.15 He and the other politicians caught up in the scandal tried to exonerate themselves with almost ritual denunciations of the use of the affair for electioneering purposes. They invoked realpolitik, the imperatives and exigencies of wielding power for the benefit of society. The operations had been illegal, everyone more or less agreed, but they had been justified by the compelling need to eliminate ETA’s anti-democratic violence.

Distortion – the GAL as legitimate defence against ETA The ‘compelling need’ argument – in its most candid form, that murder is a justifiable response to more heinous and anti-democratic murder – almost never lacks for proponents when better arguments falter, and it was omnipresent in the discourse of the authorities. They pointed to the exemplary nature of the incidents and the value of the intelligence gathered, claiming that it had in fact saved lives. On 29 July 1998, after a long trial, the Audiencia Nacional convicted Ricardo García Damborenea to seven years’ imprisonment and barred him from public office for the crimes of kidnapping, illegal detention and fraudulent use of public property.16 García was well-known for his anti-Basque statements. In the early 1980s, he had publicly and mercilessly rebuked the French government for its ‘failure to co-operate’ in the fight against ETA. In December 1983, in the pages of Diario 16, he called on France to expel the terrorists and to authorise the Spanish police to act on French soil against the Basque separatist militants. Accusing the French public as a whole of supporting the assassins, he demanded that the French authorities should clearly state their position; Spain had to know whether it was fighting ETA with France or against France.17 He and counsel Felipe González filed an appeal for constitutional protection before the Tribunal Constitucional,18 invoking the existence of a compelling need (estado

Sacrifice 135 de necesidad) to act as he had. The Supreme Court had refused to acknowledge the existence of attenuating circumstances in his case, whereas it should have considered ‘the total absence of French government co-operation, which allowed southern France to become a base of operations for the terrorist group’. Therefore, he continued,

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

It was necessary to urge or provoke the necessity for the French government to engage in co-operation with Spain so as to avert the ongoing massacre by ETA.

Given these attenuating circumstances, he concluded, the court should place a limitation of action on the offence for which he had been convicted. Nothing at the time could have led him to believe that the impediments to French–Spanish anti-terrorism co-operation would disappear. CESID’s idea of operating in southern France in order to ‘push that country’s authorities towards co-operation with the Spanish police’ was both an obvious solution and an urgent matter in view of ETA’s criminal activities. In the Marey case, García Damborenea had to find a prompt solution to a botched kidnapping whose motivations – to pressure the ‘unfriendly’ French authorities into co-operating on ETA – were nonetheless valid.19 In the Lasa and Zabala case, Miguel Planchuelo had reported a conversation between Barrionuevo and Vera in which the former allegedly said, ‘we have to teach the French a good lesson’.20 The high court was not swayed by García Damborenea’s arguments and dismissed his appeal.21 A senior civilian official could not invoke the pretext of anti-terrorism as a justification for arbitrary detention. The kidnapping, as indeed the entire organisation of the GAL, remained a criminal offence. The question of whether the GAL were genuine ‘armed groups’ is important in the judicial context as a potentially aggravating circumstance. Moreover, most of the convicted politicians, policemen and army officers appealed against their convictions or applied for pardons on these grounds. The strategy did not work for García Damborenea, but it did work for Enrique Rodríguez Galindo, who was paroled in 2004 after his 26 April 2000 conviction by the Audiencia Nacional in the Lasa and Zabala case to seventy-three years and eight months’ imprisonment (upheld by the Supreme Court and increased to seventy-five years on 25 July 2001). In Rodríguez’s case, the sentencing Judge Javier Gómez upheld the modification of his correctional regime since he had not been convicted for ‘crimes of terrorism committed in the context of a criminal organisation’. He was placed under a preferential mandatory supervision regime allowing him to be absent on weekends; on 1 October 2004, he was permanently released for ‘health reasons’. In November the Supreme Court upheld Rafael Vera’s conviction to seven years in prison for embezzlement of secret anti-terrorism funds. The former

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

136

Counter-terror by proxy

police chief José María Rodríguez Colorado went to prison for six years on the same charges. In anticipation of this decision, Vera published an open letter in El País to his PSOE colleagues, stating that he had always been careful to inform his superiors of his intended actions (e.g., the GAL) and to obtain their authorisation in principle. Taking the defence of Rodríguez Galindo, Vera berated those who had ‘lynched the most devoted servants of the State, people who have given the best of themselves’.22 On 26 October, Felipe González, José Barrionuevo and José Luis Corcuera, all former ministers of the interior, wrote a letter to the Minister of Justice through Attorney Jorge Argote asking Prime Minister Zapatero to grant a full pardon to Vera and Rodríguez Colorado in view of their ‘meritorious service to the State and to democracy’. Vera already enjoyed a partial pardon in regard to the ban on holding public office, and his ten-year prison term had been reduced by one-third at the time of his appeal to the Tribunal Constitucional. As for Barrionuevo and Corcuera, they were acquitted on charges of misappropriation of government funds. The minutes and decisions of the GAL trials offer a way of reconstructing the group’s command structure and financing, and recruitment networks. As we have seen in Chapter 4, their members were foreign mercenaries recruited by the Spanish police and Guardia Civil and paid out of secret government funds, and the intellectual authors of their crimes were found at the highest levels of government. In court, the GAL were held to be an illegal armed group (banda armada) in violation – like ETA – of the same sections of the Spanish Criminal Code. Although the Spanish judicial system raised relevant questions in due course that required the gathering of evidence on specific crimes, the hearings did not systematically shed light on the subjective attributes of the intellectual authors and their agents, for these were not seen as germane to the proceedings. Thus, the court documents are useful in elucidating the facts of the matter but of almost no use in divining the underlying reasons why any particular individual came to find himself in the dock. The defendant, in stating his defence, has every reason to distort, lie about or find pressing justifications for his actions. We can learn little from his statements about the mindset of the criminal at the moment of the crime. What these documents – judicial and police investigation reports, confessions etc. – can offer is a means of deconstructing the images manufactured by the media and the authorities, in which the logic of accusation and denunciation casts these shadowy figures in an especially inhuman light. One gets insight into the weaknesses of the organisation, its workings as a clandestine entity, its fundamentally human character. By limiting oneself to the proven facts (hechos probados), one can avoid the typical pitfalls of the analyst who relies on government and intelligence sources alone, as well as those of the journalist who speculates at random so as not to be outdone

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Sacrifice 137 by other journalists doing precisely the same thing. The GAL affair is a complex one that is not amenable to a colour-coded analysis in which (grossly oversimplifying yet hinting at the disturbing multifariousness of the phenomenon) there is a ‘green GAL’ representing the Civil Guard’s involvement, a ‘brown GAL’ for that of CESID, a ‘red GAL’ for the role of its Francoist predecessors and a ‘blue GAL’ for the police. Such an explanation not only downplays the importance of institutional interaction but also ignores the inevitable conflicts of interest and legitimacy among these agencies in the fight against terrorism. In Spain, the investigating magistrate (juez de instrucción) remains an important figure in the justice system. They have the power to investigate formal charges and can also hear an amparo action or an acción popular. They are also the authority who decides whether to remand the defendants into custody, although they can order provisional detention only at the initiative of one of the parties. The highest prosecutorial authority is the Procurador General, who is appointed by and serves at the pleasure of the government. All other prosecutors operate within a pyramidal hierarchy under the Procurador General. Spanish criminal procedure is essentially inquisitorial, although the participation of the parties has introduced adversarial elements. Beyond these general characteristics, the Spanish justice system possesses institutional idiosyncrasies and a history of its own. In particular, the six central investigating magistrates of the Audiencia Nacional in Madrid have jurisdiction over organised crime, hence terrorism. They do not operate as a collegial body; each is an independent entity. The treatment of terrorism-related cases by the Audiencia Nacional since its inception in 1979 has raised the status and prestige of investigating magistrates after several decades of political control over the judiciary under Franco. They have come to be regarded as repositories of legal expertise on terrorism and, more generally, unbiased guarantors of the rule of law. The GAL trials, in particular, with their patient, meticulous and impartial sifting of facts that implicated members of the executive branch of government, solidified this shift towards judicial independence and integrity.23 The process was aided by the coming into its own of a second profession that had been silenced by Franco’s regime: investigative journalism as both a purveyor of political information and a mouthpiece for public opinion: Throughout this time, the investigations were conducted on the basis of the fundamental principle that every citizen has a constitutional right to receive true information, a right for which we journalists are the depositaries or intermediaries.24

The court’s revelations of illicit governmental practices were speeded, and in some cases preceded, by journalistic investigations whose effect was to

138

Counter-terror by proxy

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

set up the journalist, alongside the magistrate, as a guarantor of political integrity.25 This dual enhancement of judicial and journalistic prestige rendered the defence of the politicians implicated in the GAL scandal more complex. They were left with few grounds for defence other than realpolitik and pragmatism. They had acted, they said, because they had to: In a democracy, terrorism cannot and must not be met with passive, inhibited, or ambiguous positions or attitudes. That would be tantamount to complicity in terrorist crimes, thus contributing to the destruction of the political system itself.26

Conversely, the newfound prestige of the judiciary and journalists helped to make the GAL affair into the scandal it became. Yet another outcome of these developments was a reconfiguration of interactions between politicians and security professionals. It was in 1987, with the commencement of the first major trial, but more prominently in June 1993 with the legislative elections, that the GAL made their entrance into the Spanish media. Their appearance gave a boost to the strategies of the political groupings opposed to the PSOE, which used the media’s reports of raison d’Etat, human rights violations and ‘State terrorism’ to their advantage.27 The GAL trials became a morality play writ large, and these parties (along with various Basque nationalist groupings) were its beneficiaries. Yet the GAL’s attacks and suspected links to the authorities had attracted little attention while they were taking place;28 at best El País had emphasised the ‘odious nature of the crimes’ and certain Basque nationalist publications had done likewise. Now, a fully functioning journalistic apparatus turned them into an unprecedented political scandal. It is worth stressing that while the heightened prestige of investigative journalism and the extraordinary attention paid by the press to the GAL scandal made legal progress possible, they also at times jeopardised the legal process by providing grounds for the overturning of judgements when evidence appeared in the press before it was filed in court. It is also important to emphasise that the GAL scandal, like any scandal, was more than just the product of a partisan political squabble. Proponents of that view of the events would have to explain, for example, the insistence of several highranking PSOE officials on a full inquiry into the affair. This fact shows the extent to which the configuration of confrontations cut across normal political divisions. It indicates how the scandal involved different actors in an interplay of offensive and defensive strategies, themselves conditioned by the constraints of the political system. The idea that the GAL were a necessary evil, ‘an act of collective selfdefence’, has gained credence; in fact, it appears to have become the motto of those who would consign these acts of torture and murder to history:

Sacrifice 139

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The GAL and their predecessors emerged in parallel with ETA. They killed to prevent ETA from killing; to save lives and prevent ETA from destroying the hard-won freedoms of a law-abiding society, even though that society does not recognise the legitimacy of this defence.29

The absence of prosecutions beyond the Pyrénées, formerly so permeable to commandos of all sorts, appears to legitimise this discourse, or at any rate to lend weight to it. Moreover, the spectacular results of the Spanish trials should not obscure use of the courts as a forum for the continuation of the mechanisms that gave rise to the GAL/ETA dyad in the first place. Indeed, the defendants seized upon that forum as another opportunity to revive the terroristic interaction by repeatedly asserting the radical Otherness of ETA. Central to the legal arguments in the GAL trials is an attempt to rewrite the history of Spanish anti-terrorism as a pressing need for flawless international co-operation against ETA, the ultimate peril, the Hydra whose heads regrow when they are cut off. ‘In the fight against terrorism, there are things that must not be done. If they are done, they must not be talked about. And if they are talked about, they must be denied’, wrote General José Saenz de Santamaría (1919–2003) forthrightly and rather cynically in the pages of El País on 24 February 1995.30 As we underlined previously, Saenz de Santamaría’s biography is coterminous with the history of Spanish anti-terrorism. Examined numerous times as a witness for the defence in the GAL trials, indicted but never convicted, Saenz perfectly embodies the continuity of Spanish anti-terrorism discourse and practice from the 1970s to the 1990s. It was, moreover, on the basis of his long experience that he was called to testify. To condemn the PSOE for the activities of the GAL was to condemn the transitional governments and the dictatorship, and Saenz straightforwardly confirmed that clandestine anti-terrorism had been a routine component of Franco’s reign as far back as he could remember. ‘The fight against terrorism is atypical by nature’, he stated rather sententiously on the radio show Cadena Ser on 27 January 1996, Its rules verge on the illegal. It is a matter of state and we must all apply pressure so that it develops along with all possible guarantees of legality.

Under Supreme Court examination in the Marey case in 1998, Saenz stated that where anti-terrorism is concerned, ‘the end justifies a few illegalities’. He elaborated on this idea in an interview with El Mundo. Saenz argued that, in the early 1980s, his position did not enable him to Prevent isolated elements from waging war on their own account. There were always a few self-styled defenders of the fatherland or isolated members of the security forces who had no understanding of the Transition, nor any awareness that terrorism was not to be fought with the same weapons.31

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

140

Counter-terror by proxy

Before the Supreme Court, Saenz maintained that ‘an alphabet soup’ of mercenary groups had ‘participated in attacks under the UCD, with the UCD and the PSOE’. He named ATE, BVE, Triple A, GAL and others. In November 2001, testifying for the defence on the issue of the secret funds, he expressed his chagrin at seeing Rafael Vera, ‘the soul of the anti-terrorist struggle’, in the dock. ‘When I was called as security envoy to the Basque country’, he stated, ‘it is because there was a problem, and we solved it. No one asked me whether I had solved it using legal or illegal means.’ It was not a dirty war but an ‘irregular war. I do not know of any clean war. That is why I prefer to use the words regular or irregular war. And an anti-terrorist campaign cannot be waged in a regular manner.’ An interview in the daily La Razón gives further insight into Saenz’s reading of counterterrorism practices: ‘if you’re fighting guys who will shoot you in the back, there is no choice but to wage an irregular war. The rule of law is fine, but it cannot be strictly obeyed or else you’re letting the terrorists control you.’ 32 One is reminded of the famous words of Charles Pasqua, then Minister of the Interior of France – ‘We have to terrorise the terrorists’ 33 – or Felipe González’s statement during the 1982 electoral campaign that ‘we must crush the terrorists with their own weapon: terrorism’. The publicity given to this vengeful rhetoric against ETA and, by extension, radical Basque nationalism as a whole, or any violent protest movement, helped to make the GAL appear like an obvious solution. In the resulting mimetic interaction, exceptional measures appeared as the appropriate solution to an exceptional threat; bombs had to be fought with bombs, shootings with shootings and kidnapping with kidnapping. This was the counter-terrorist modus operandi: do the things that must not be done, keep them quiet and deny them if they should come to light; or, to put it differently, give operational concerns precedence over law. The defendants, with their shared belief in the menace of ETA and the absence of French co-operation, felt authorised to revive the long-standing and (so they argued) generally accepted tactic of setting up illicit front groups. These two arguments – the need for pragmatic selfdefence in the face of a terrorist threat, and the belief that Spanish law enforcement history offered solid precedents for operating outside the law – formed the basis for much of the defence in the GAL trials, and still undergirds historical revisionist accounts of the affair that seek to disassociate the violence from its effects.

Misdirection – the GAL as evidence of inevitability of police and judicial co-operation Ten years of trials resulted in a judicial refutation not only of the right of public officials to act unlawfully, or to be above the law, but also of

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Sacrifice 141 the idea that raison d’Etat must always prevail over the ‘fragile’ principles of democracy. In this respect, the Spanish justice system did its job and, in the process, regained the autonomy it had lost over decades of dictatorship. It bears noting, however, that it did not manage to keep the perpetrators behind bars for anything like their full terms. Julen Elgorriaga was released on 17 October 2001. Felipe Bayo and Enrique Dorado, each serving seventy-one years for torture since 1996, were released in February 2002 after serving a period of supervised parole, and Enrique Rodríguez Galindo was paroled in January 2005. The apparent laxity with which the Spanish correctional system treated these individuals suggests a new reaffirmation of politicians’ rights, where anti-terrorism was concerned, to invoke ‘good faith’ as grounds for engaging in unlawful practices and to seek post hoc immunity from being held accountable for those practices. If a benevolent spin had been put on the genesis of the GAL in this way, and if they were now being forgiven for promptly getting on a war footing in response to ETA’s safe haven, it was not merely because of the constraints of the Spanish legal system. The revision of the GAL story was given further impetus from the 1990s with the advent of a discourse on anti-terrorism co-operation among European States (we will discuss this point further in Chapter 6). As people became convinced of the necessity of co-operating on cross-border terrorism in a democratic Europe, the ‘good faith’ argument gathered force: the GAL forces were necessary because France refused to co-operate with Spain and, furthermore, their disappearance when France finally did begin to co-operate proved that they served their purpose. The embarrassment that this argument represented for French political figures close to the affair led them to join their Spanish counterparts in rewriting the GAL’s history. Pierre Guidoni, French ambassador to Spain from 1982 to 1985, reacted sharply to the ongoing trials with an op-ed piece in El País on 23 January 1995.34 He claimed that, as a participant in talks between the two countries, he was one of the few people who can recall the key facts of early 1980s French–Spanish anti-terrorism co-operation in chronological sequence. His argument is that it would have been implausible for the González government to have organised and financed the GAL, since that would have impaired Spanish–French cooperation efforts and have most certainly harmed Spain’s prospects for entering the European Community: All Spain’s hopes rested on the quality of its relations with France, its daily bilateral negotiations in public or in secret, and on the mutual trust between the two governments. It would have been insane, absurd and highly risky to take responsibility for a major crisis between the two countries whose inevitable first effect would have been, without any doubt, to see Spain’s entrance into Europe put off for years.35

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

142

Counter-terror by proxy

The argument is predicated on the assertion of a fundamental incompatibility between ongoing French–Spanish co-operation and support for clandestine operations. The proof, according to Guidoni, is that France and Spain had already signed an anti-terrorism agreement when the GAL appeared on the scene. ‘In such a context, the appearance of the GAL was a disaster, a catastrophe’, since ‘from the standpoint of the fight against ETA, the GAL – let us be clear – were utterly useless. They were profoundly and tragically damaging’ to French–Spanish anti-terrorist co-operation by alerting ETA’s members, manufacturing martyrs and thus setting back the fight against ETA. Having made this case for the González administration’s non-involvement, Guidoni maintains that the enduring suspicions about the PSOE are ‘psychologically implausible, politically absurd and technically impossible’. They are psychologically implausible, since ‘the same men could not have simultaneously organised the GAL and negotiated a legal and official co-operation agreement with France. One precludes the other.’ They are politically absurd in that, if French reconciliation with Spain was the prerequisite for the latter’s entrance into the European Community, ‘the GAL were a direct and unacceptable provocation’. And they are technically impossible because covert operations could not have remained a secret in view of the dense networking among the agencies concerned with anti-terrorism co-operation on both sides of the border. ‘[If] there had been ties to the GAL, we would have known it. There is no way we could not have known it, and co-operation would have been immediately interrupted”. Guidoni’s theory leaves him with the necessity of seeking a different explanation for the origins of the GAL. If the politicians of the day were not responsible, he argues, then one must look to the individual efforts of a police force trained under Franco and conditioned by ‘the hysterical Francophobia put about by the Spanish press, which was ignorant of the secret processes and negotiations under way between the two governments’. This rewriting of the GAL ‘creation story’, however, runs aground on the issue of why the groups disappeared. In his valuable and stimulating memoir of a career as a senior civil servant,36 Gilles Ménage revisits the GAL episode in a tone devoid of polemics and sensationalism.37 Though it is important not to underestimate the likelihood that the author of such a work might capitalise on the opportunity for retrospective justification of his own actions and reactions,38 Ménage’s memoir represents a particularly valuable documentary compilation for anyone interested in the relations between police, intelligence and political actors. And while a plethora of books have been published by former police chiefs and intelligence officials, none of them offers such a comprehensive reading of the complexity of these professional relations in the early 1980s when terrorism emerged as a polemical subject.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Sacrifice 143 In his memoirs, Ménage, who was technical adviser on security, intelligence and antiterrorism operations and later chief of staff to François Mitterrand from 1981 to 1992, considers the consequences of the GAL’s activities on French policy vis-à-vis Spain as well as the problems associated with French bureaucratic involvement in the GAL. The hypothesis of the GAL as a pressure tactic against France is nonsense, he argues, and was proved false in the courts and the political arena.39 Ménage’s legal and political arguments are trenchant and merit further examination. In clear and forthright terms, he situates the origins of the GAL with the Spanish secret services and ‘the baneful tradition of the “right of pursuit” that they had practised in successive waves from 1975 to 1981’.40 The return to the dirty war was a major annoyance in that the French government did not want a new dispute with the Spanish authorities during the arduous negotiations for Spain’s entrance into the European Community. But he forcefully asserts that there was, at that time, no complicity, at least of a tacit nature, between the French and Spanish authorities on counterterrorism activities; quite the contrary.41 Still, ‘the certainty that Spanish agencies were involved did not determine the degree of political responsibility or the sphere which, within the government, served as the motive or constraining force’.42 The first relevant constraint, he writes, was that any progress on the question of extradition vis-à-vis the Basque exiles would inevitably be interpreted by French-Basque nationalists as giving free rein to counter-terrorism, and Felipe González’s definition of the GAL as retaliatory terrorism dictated prudence on the part of the French authorities. Therefore, for Ménage, the GAL’s activities were, more than anything else, hindrances to the reform of the right to asylum and the practice of extradition. They did not have the effect on the French authorities that was ascribed to them. On this point his argument coincides with Guidoni’s: it is absurd to imagine a government simultaneously attempting to elicit anti-terrorism co-operation through open diplomacy while seeking to compel it through secret pressure tactics. But Ménage goes further, attempting to discern the subtler structural reasons for the GAL’s existence. He notes how the PSOE, upon taking power, was anxious to spare the susceptibilities of Spain’s different armed entities. The army’s threat carried considerable weight because of the Basque question. This question necessitated delicate and ongoing arbitration between the initiatives that were required to address it and the guarantees that had to be offered in order to facilitate the ongoing process of democratisation.43

This argument, though much more subtle, gives short shrift to the political origins of the GAL, reducing the group’s genesis to its Francoist genealogy. It essentially asserts that the GAL were solely the product of an intent to

144

Counter-terror by proxy

carry on the heritage of the Francoist dirty war, to apply the knowledge acquired under the dictatorship. As I have already argued, this argument inadequately explains the group’s genesis. ‘Counter-terrorism’, writes Ménage,

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

was obviously not an element of the government-to-government co-operation policy between Paris and Madrid for the simple reason that it was unacceptable and intolerable for one side and systematically denied by the other!44

A political pragmatist, Ménage deems that the French government was bound to ignore such an anti-diplomatic dispute at a time when the critical task was to solidify the European Union by opening it up to the Iberian peninsula. In short, for Ménage, there cannot have been any generalised French government complicity. Instead, France must have taken into consideration its higher interests (‘contributing to the stability of the young Spanish democracy’)45 as well as the inevitable political difficulties of holding Spain to account for the GAL, even as it kept its eyes open to the likelihood of Spanish police and Civil Guard involvement. There remains the question of independent complicity by lower-level French police or intelligence officials with those of their Spanish counterparts who oversaw the GAL’s operations. Ménage writes, ‘It is my conviction that the answer to this question is [that there was none]; besides, no decisive evidence was ever produced at a legal level to support the pleadings (mises en cause) filed several times on both sides of the Pyrénées during the prosecution brought against the Spanish authors of the acts in 1995 and 1996; furthermore, these pleadings were not innocent in a climate of intense politicking.’ 46 In this denial of French–Spanish law enforcement complicity, it does not seem to matter to Ménage what the individual defendants actually stated to the Spanish judges. Moreover, he finds it necessary to repeat the argument proffered by most of the PSOE defendants and commentators to the effect that the trials were being scandalously manipulated for political purposes. Perhaps, but it deserves to be said that the absence of ‘decisive evidence’ is no more a proof of innocence than of guilt. Prime Minister José Luis Zapatero has avoided the proud defensiveness of his predecessors in the GAL affair, refraining, as his predecessors did not, from indignant diatribes against the ‘judicial cabal’ of which they felt themselves to be the sacrificial victims. Though Zapatero has never publicly condemned his colleagues, he was not, for example, among those who accompanied Barrionuevo and Vera to the prison doors with roses in their hands in 1998. Another example showing the distance Zapatero took from his predecessors is his implicit denial of Vera’s request for a pardon.47 Vera granted an interview before he finally went to prison on 16 February 2005, in which he claimed to be a victim of ‘a great deal of hypocrisy’ on the subject of the ‘dirty war and the use of the secret funds’.48

Sacrifice 145

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

We inherited a situation, and I’m talking about all those issues that we were blamed for on the dirty war and the use of the secret funds. I think there is a great deal of hypocrisy when it comes to analysing these issues. A dividing line is drawn between 1982 and the earlier years and they neglect to investigate that earlier period. I thought that the pre-existing practices were generally accepted. None of the information provided by the government’s legal advisers and counsel alerted us to the fact that it could be illegal.49

Vera demands the privilege of being judged not for what he did but with reference to the practices predating his assumption of the duties of Secretary of State for Security. By keeping the fraudulent use of a slush fund behind the chaste veil of pre-existing practices that were never condemned because they never came to trial, he perfectly illustrates the disconnect between judicially revealed impunity and the personal conviction of blamelessness, ‘good faith’, resulting in a feeling of retrospective legitimacy that bears no relationship to law. For his book about the GAL, the Irish journalist Paddy Woodworth asked Vera in November 1997 why he had covered for Amedo and Domínguez after their indictment.50 His response: Because they were not terrorists, but persons fighting terrorism, ‘using methods that may or may not have been the right ones, granted, but they did it in all good faith’.51 Here again encapsulated is the ‘good faith’ argument, which transforms the covert and illiberal practices of a clandestine front group into fair play, actions forgivable in the service of patriotism.52 In this argument, evidently, the fact that the intellectual authors were thereby shielded from blame is merely a convenient coincidence rather than a predictable and desirable consequence of such practices.53 In the rewriting of the GAL, the sweeping claims of the US about the necessary ‘war on terror’ served the Spanish authorities well. In substance, the overarching justification of the GAL goes like this: even if the Spanish government was reluctant to go down the dirty war route, it had to be done anyway and we did it. There was no denial per se of the wrongdoings, rather more an emphasis on the idea that one had to do what had to be done and detractors should therefore appreciate the burden of such a decision. This post-factum justification is less about the rule of law and rather more about context of action. Since ETA was violent and France offered little assistance, there was no other solution but to engage in illiberal practices. In this scenario, responsibility becomes secondary to understanding the exceptional context. Though not unanimous, the Spanish politicians have generally favoured immunity or, at any rate, a silencing of the facts. They have invoked the need to defend an imperilled democracy at all costs and by all means necessary, including illegal ones. As discussed earlier, the chronology of the latest GAL trials, including the arguments put forward and the responses of the Spanish courts, offers valuable insights into the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

146

Counter-terror by proxy

political and judicial handling of covert operations and violations of the rule of law in the field of anti-terrorism. ETA, as terrorists, had to be defeated, and that meant taking cross-border action at a time when the authorities of a neighbouring government could not be induced to co-operate through diplomatic channels. So far, José Amedo is the only actor of the GAL who has expressed public sorrowful remorse for his involvement and his actions.54 The others have continued to remain silent or to justify the covert actions as a necessary, albeit last-resort, strategy. In a perhaps rather unforeseen way, the rewriting of the history of the GAL largely benefited from this exculpatory narrative. In his preface to José Amedo’s latest book, the Spanish journalist Antonio Rubio predicts that the liable political actors will ‘run to hide like cockroaches’ avoiding the light.55 One could say that it is actually unlikely since the claim that exceptional times require exceptional measures is so widely shared now. It is also unlikely since mutual recognition and solidarity against terrorism are nowadays the mainstay of European police and judicial cooperation. We shall turn to this point in the next chapter.

Notes 1 D. T. Gies (ed.) The Cambridge History of Spanish Literature, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004; D. Andrist, Deceit Plus Desire Equals Violence: A Girardian Study of the Spanish ‘Comedia’, New York, Peter Lang, 1989. 2 Declaration of José Amedo reproduced in Diario 16, 21 September 1988. 3 S. Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing About Atrocities and Suffering, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000. 4 Manuel Fraga, quoted in El País, 21 February 1984. 5 See Cambio 16, 21 May 1984. According to the newspaper, the interviews with those two GAL members had been conducted in Biarritz, earlier in May 1984. 6 See the court reporting pubished by Pascale Nivelle in Libération, 22 March 1988. 7 Declaration of Juge Swahn reproduced in Libération, 11 January 1985. 8 Declaration of Michel Morganti in front of the Tribunal de Pau, hearing of 28 January 1987. 9 Felipe González quoted in El País, 21 December 1983. 10 José Barrionuevo quoted in El País, 21 February 1986. 11 J. Barrionuevo, 2001 días en Interior [2001 days in Home Office], Barcelona, Ediciones B., 1997, 135: ‘No obstante, conviene tener bien presente que los hechos, al tener lugar fuera del territorio nacional, estaban fuera de nuestra competencia. Además, por qué no decirlo, nos preocupaban más, como es lógico los crímenes que sí nos afectaban y que ocasionaban las bandas terroristas, ETA fundamentalmente, en nuestro territorio […]. Los hechos sucedían en Francia y afectaban a quienes nosotros debíamos perseguir. No sentíamos un

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Sacrifice 147 gran dolor – ¿quién lo sentía entonces? – ni una gran pasión por investigarlos, sin perjuicio de la cooperación con nuestros vecinos.’ 12 Barrionuevo in El País, 29 January 1986. 13 ‘La doble encrucijada del 96’ (Editorial), El Mundo, 2 January 1996. 14 See El Mundo, 24 January 1996. 15 Barrionuevo quoted in Le Monde, 25 June 1998. 16 Tribunal Supremo, Sala de lo Penal, special case no. 2530/95, conviction of 29 July 1998. 17 See Diario 16, 4 December 1983; R. Damborenea, Manual del buen terrorista [The good terrorist handbook], Madrid, Cambio16, 1987. 18 In Spain, all physical or legal persons invoking a legitimate interest may lodge an individual constitutional complaint (recurso de amparo) with the Constitutional Court regarding the violation of the principle of equal treatment. 19 See Tribunal Supremo, Sala de lo Penal, special case no. 2530/95, folio 4779. 20 In his book, José Barrionuevo is more cautious and speaks about the French ‘lack of solidarity’ (insolidaridad). When talking about the French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Barrionuevo remembers the President’s lack of solidarity for the ‘young nascent Spanish democracy’. See Barrionuevo, 2001 días en Interior, 47, 114ff. 21 See Tribunal Constitucional, Recurso de Amparo no. 3721/98, BOE, no. 83, 6 April 2001, 17. 22 Rafael Vera, ‘A mi familia, a los amigos, a la opinion publica’ [For my family, my friends and the public opinion], El País, 21 October 2004. 23 J. Navarro Estevan, Manos sucias. El poder contra la justicia en España [Dirty hands. Power against Justice in Spain], Madrid, Temas de hoy, 1995. In his book Juge Joaquim Navarro Estevan compares the trials of the GAL to ‘Mani Pulite’ (clean hands), the Italian judicial investigation into political corruption in Italy. Mani Pulite started in 1992 with the arrest of Mario Chiesa, socialist manager of a public hospice, and the subsequent expansion of the investigations to the whole country and a huge increase in the number of politicians, bureaucrats and entrepreneurs involved. In a couple of years, six former prime ministers, more than five hundred members of Parliament and several thousand local and public administrators had become caught up in the investigations. 24 M. Millares, ‘15 años tras una X. Asi investigamos y descubrimos la trama de los GAL’ [15 years after an X. This is how we investigated and discovered the plot of the GAL], El Mundo, www.el-mundo.es/nacional/gal/investigacion/ investigacion.html (accessed December 2019). 25 M. Cerdan, A.Rubio, ‘Toda la Verdad sobre el WaterGAL español’ [The whole truth about the Spanish WaterGAL], Cambio 16, 27 November 1989, 115–22. 26 R. Martin Villa, Al servicio del Estado. Un examen riguroso y objetivo del paso de un regimen autoritario a la democracia por uno de los protagonistas más significados de la transición [State service. A rigorous and objective examination of the transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy by one of the most significant actors of the Transition], Barcelona, Planeta, 1984, 171. 27 R. Cotarelo, El alarido ronco del ganador. Las elecciones de 1996, los medios de comunicación y el porvenir de España [The roaring voice of the winner. The

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

148

Counter-terror by proxy

1996 elections, the media and the future of Spain], Barcelona, Grijalbo, 1996, 63ff. 28 F. Jimenez, ‘Political scandals and political responsibility in democratic Spain’, in P. Heywood, (ed.) Politics and Policy in Democratic Spain: No Longer Different?, London, Frank Cass Publishers, 1999, 80–99. 29 E. Bayo, GAL: punto final [The GAL: Endpoint], Barcelona, Plaza & Janes, 1997, 25: ‘los GAL y sus predecesores surgieron paralelamente a ETA. Mataeron para evitar que ETA matase, es decir para salvar vidas, y evitar que ETA destruyera las libertades conquistadas en un Estado de derecho, aunque éste no reconozca la legitimidad de esa defensa.’ 30 M. González, ‘Entrevista: Contra ETA se han usado iguales métodos con el PSOE y con UCD’ [Interview: PSOE and UCD used the same methods against ETA], El País, 24 February 1995. See also ‘Historias “sucias”’ (editorial), El País, 25 February 1995. 31 ‘El teniente General sostiene ante el Tribunal Supremo que “el fin justificaba alguna ilegalidad”’ [The Lt-General argued before the Supreme Court that ‘the end justified some illegality’], El Mundo, 18 June 1998. 32 La Razón, 19 November 2001. 33 In March 1986, while France was experiencing violent waves of attacks, the Minister of the Interior Charles Pasqua said that ‘we must terrorise the terrorists’. In September 1986, following an attack by the Solidarity Committee for Middle East Political Prisoners asking for the release of George Ibrahim Abdallah, the leader of the Armed Forces of the Lebanese Revolution, Charles Pasqua declared ‘war against terrorism’. Interviewed on television in 1987, he declared, ‘Democracy ends where the interests of the state begin’. 34 P. Guidoni, ‘Tribuna: Una página de historia’ [Open letter: A page of history], El País, 23 January 1995. 35 Guidoni, ‘Tribuna’. 36 G. Ménage, L’oeil du pouvoir. Volume 1: Les affaires de l’Etat, 198–1986 [The eye of power. Volume 1: State affairs, 1981–86], Paris, Fayard, 1999; G. Ménage, L’oeil du pouvoir. Volume 2: Face aux terrorismes. 1981–1986. Action directe, Corse, Pays basque [The eye of power. Volume 2: Facing terrorism. 1981–86. Direct Action, Corsica, Basque country], Paris, Fayard, 2000. 37 Ménage, L’oeil du pouvoir. Volume 2. 38 As a former high-ranking aide to President François Mitterrand, Ménage has been charged with carrying out extensive illegal wire-tapping while he was head of the president’s personal anti-terrorism team. The team functioned independently of France’s security agencies to advise the president on a surge in terror attacks, but became obsessed with ferreting out perceived enemies. The existence of the cell and details of its clandestine operations in the early 1980s were disclosed in journalists’ investigative reports and court documents beginning in 1993. It took more than two decades to bring those responsible to justice, and in a judgement of December 2005 seven former members of this unit were found guilty and given light sentences on the grounds that they acted on the President’s orders. Dubbed ‘l’affaire des écoutes’, this scandal about illegal bugging, lists

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Sacrifice 149 of enemies and executive privilege under cover of counter-terrorism activities was one the biggest scandals of François Mitterrand’s first presidency. See J.-M. Pontaut, J. Dupuis, Les oreilles du président, Paris, Fayard, 1996. 39 Ménage, L’oeil du pouvoir. Volume 2, 506. 40 Ménage, L’oeil du pouvoir. Volume 2, 408. 41 Ménage, L’oeil du pouvoir. Volume 2, 410. 42 Ménage, L’oeil du pouvoir. Volume 2, 414. 43 Ménage, L’oeil du pouvoir. Volume 2, 372. 44 Ménage, L’oeil du pouvoir. Volume 2, 402. 45 Ménage, L’oeil du pouvoir. Volume 2, 444. 46 Ménage, L’oeil du pouvoir. Volume 2, 443, n. 1. 47 El País, 7 November 2004. 48 El País, 17 February 2005. 49 El País, 21 October 2004. 50 P. Woodworth, Dirty War, Clean Hands. ETA, the GAL and Spanish Democracy, New Haven / London, Yale University Press, 2002. 51 Woodworth, Dirty War, Clean Hands, 417. 52 D., Bigo, E.-P. Guittet, ‘The quest for absolution and immunity: justifying past and future torture in the name of democracy’, in E. Guild, D. Bigo, M. Gibney (eds) Extraordinary Rendition: Adressing the Challenges of Accountability, London, Routledge, 2018, 202–29. 53 CEHD, Partial decision on admissibility of application no. 74181/01 filed by Rafael Vera Fernandez-Huidoboro v. Spain, 4 May 2004. 54 ‘La contrición de José Amedo’ [The repentance of José Amedo], El Mundo, 30 December 2016. In 2018, he met with Pilar Zabala, the sister of José Ignacio Zabala. Their conversation was recorded and published. See P. Simon, A, Rubio, ‘El día en que la hermana de un enterrado en cal viva se vio con el subcomisario de los GAL’ [The day the sister of a man buried in quicklime met with the deputy commissioner of the GAL], El Mundo, 16 May 2018. 55 A. Rubio, ‘Las cucarachas corren a esconderse’ [Cockroaches run for cover], preface to J. Amedo, Cal viva: un relato estremecedor: la verdad definitiva desde las entrañas de los GAL [Quicklime: A shocking tale: the ultimate truth about the the GAL’s innards], Madrid, La esfera de los libros, 2013.

6

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Symbolic violence: diplomatic embarrassment and European democratic identity

It seems to me unacceptable that asylum requests or other difficulties in extradition can be problematic among the associate members who form the European Union. José Maria Aznar, Spanish Prime Minister, 1996 No international material has been put before me to demonstrate that Spain fails to live up to its fair-trial obligations in terrorism cases or otherwise. Judge Howard Riddle, Senior District Judge, Westminster Magistrates’ Court, 2015

Spain’s desire for European membership and the long road to its successful completion have been discussed and commented on at length. Well before the inception of the European Community in the 1950s, Spain looked upon Europe as the realisation of the country’s historic destiny. The impact of the end of Spain’s vestigial empire in the late nineteenth century upon the renegotiation of the country’s political and historical identity and its European aspirations have been well documented.1 The 1898 Spanish–US war that ended Spain’s colonial empire, compelling the Spanish to relinquish claims on Cuba, to cede sovereignty over Guam, Puerto Rico and the Philippines to the United States of America, had a devastating impact upon Spain.2 The once great Spanish Armada had been sunk with almost contemptuous ease by the American navy and the subsequent humiliation opened an intense debate over Spain’s identity. Spanish intellectuals found themselves living in a world where their claims to national greatness had all but vanished. It was the same world in which Catalan and Basque nationalisms were rising and threatening the Spanish nationalism narrative.3 The loss of national honour and pride was indeed a political issue and an intellectual preoccupation.4 Among the Spanish intellectuals, there were those who were attached to the national greatness and loyal to Spain’s imperial heritage and those who doubted its existence as a nation and were

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document



Symbolic violence

151

eager to modernise the country.5 The former were expressing the need to reinforce the traditional and distinctive elements of the Hispanic culture, looking towards Africa and pointing to the dangers of modernity when deprived of a great spiritual inspiration. The latter, ashamed by Spain’s decadence and backwardness, considered that Spain’s misfortune and poor political condition were to be attributed to its perennial isolation from the rest of Europe and, therefore, that ‘Europeanisation’ was the cure to make Spain more productive, more modern and able to march ahead.6 Between these contrasting views over the ‘Spanish problem’ during Spain’s fin-de-siècle crisis, there were much more common perspectives than one might think at first.7 In a climate of national despondency following the defeat of 1898 and at a time of generalised critical social, political and cultural destabilising transformations across the Western world in the ‘long nineteenth century’,8 they were all driven by an intense sense of patriotism. Although they disagreed upon the means to be used and the direction to be taken, they all approved the necessity to redeem Spain’s international standing. Whether one talked about Spain’s grandeur to be retrieved through an introspective move and the recovery of its distinctive values or to be achieved by seeking guidance from those more advanced neighbouring European countries, the common view was still that Spain had its proper national character and destination. Redeeming Spain’s repute and bolstering selfconfidence in the national spirit have since been distinguishing features of the country’s seething intellectual and political life. This view of the homeland as a unifying enterprise was indeed continually summoned, invoked and recalled throughout most of the twentieth century. The struggle between the past and modernisation, the competition between a ‘liberal’ and a ‘conservative-traditionalist’ perception of the country and the tension between Spanish and peripheral nationalisms have been at the core of the convoluted history of contemporary Spain.9 These tensions also permeated Spanish attitudes towards Europe. The tortuous relationship between Spain under Franco and the European Communities (EC) has been widely discussed as well.10 Undoubtedly under the Francoist regime, the Spanish nation was understood in terms of providential destiny. Eschewing what was perceived as the inevitable decadence of democracy and secularism, Spain was for Franco to remain the spiritual reserve of the West, its fortress against the dangers of modernity. The Francoist understanding of Europe was thus grounded in a distinction between Europe as a profoundly Christian civilisation to be defended and Europe as a concrete project to be rejected as a dreadful alienation. The Francoist ideological stance did not override economic imperatives though. Cutting off the country from international markets and foreign investment, Franco’s policies of autarky were largely detrimental. For the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

152

Counter-terror by proxy

technocrats of the regime, Spain could not remain aloof, and in the 1960s integrating into the EEC was instrumental in terms of both improving the economy and sustaining the Francoist regime. If political accession criteria were not mentioned in the 1957 Treaty of Rome,11 the European countries rejected Spain’s application anyway on the grounds of its lack of a democratic system.12 Spain’s rapprochement with the EC did spark a critical reconceptualisation of the community’s membership norms resulting in the adoption of the core principle that only parliamentary democracies were eligible for membership.13 Spain’s application was indeed a crucial test for the EC. If political cooperation was unequivocally ruled out, the EC discussed at length the pros and cons of some possible economic association.14 Between those who thought that some economic relationship with Spain could contribute to some political change within the Iberian peninsula, and those who regarded any concession towards Franco as a dangerous way to boost his dictatorial regime, it took a decade before a Preferential Agreement on commercial trade with the EC could be signed in 1970.15 During the last five years of the Francoist regime, when Franco was reverting to a hard-core position, the relationships between Spain and the EEC were anything but stable. In 1973, the political character of the Community and its members was reaffirmed in a ‘Declaration on European Identity’.16 After the death of Franco in 1975, becoming a fully fledged member of the EC was largely perceived as a way for Spain to cast its traumatic past aside and to overcome its political and economic isolation. Because of its previous rejection of the Francoist regime, Europe became a symbol and a way to anchor Spain’s democratic aspirations. Following the first elections of June 1977, and with the full support of all political parties, Spain submitted its application to the EC. However, negotiations were moving at a slow pace. The Common Agricultural Policy proved to be difficult for the EC and, as we underlined in Chapter 2, Spain was entangled with its own domestic political crisis.17 It was only, in effect, when the PSOE assumed the government of Spain in 1982 that the pending negotiation was unblocked. The adhesion to the EC was indeed central to the new Socialist government’s foreign policy, alongside with its adhesion to NATO in 1982.18 The Socialist Prime Minister Felipe González committed himself to achieve the adhesion swiftly and after just a couple of years of diplomatic intercessions Spain signed an agreement in 1985 and joined the EC on January 1986 with Portugal. As we underlined previously, Spain’s enthusiastic entry into the European Union (EU) cannot be ignored. Joining Europe meant a considerable enhancement of national prestige,19 ending decades of isolation for Spain, and last but not least the possibility of retrieving a strong position in the world.20 Three years after its adhesion in 1989, Spain held the Presidency of the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document



Symbolic violence

153

Council of the European Communities and the Socialist MEP Enrique Barόn Crespo took over the Presidency of the European Parliament. For a country eager for recognition, this double presidency was definitively significant. Six years later, in 1995, Spain held again the EU Presidency, precisely at a time when revelations about the GAL and the indictment of former government officials were eagerly exploited by the opposition in Madrid and by Basque nationalist groups and parties. The democratic credentials of the government and the PSOE were seriously tarnished. In office since 1982, the PSOE lost the 1996 general elections to the Conservative PP and its leader José María Aznar. Less than a decade after Spain joined the EC, the GAL affair was not only a serious example of a major departure from accepted liberal democratic constitutional principles of law and order but also a source of diplomatic embarrassment, first and foremost with France.

‘Common interest’ – promoting mutual assistance and recognition At the beginning of the 1980s, judicial co-operation with Spain was the least of France’s priorities, whereas ETA was perceived in Spain as the worst national enemy. Yet, and to the great disappointment of Spanish authorities as we underlined in Chapter 3, France was still rather inclined to see the Basque group as a Spanish issue only and to stay as neutral as possible. In order to avoid any kind of spillover of the conflict on to its national soil, France was prepared to leave Basque activists in safety whilst under surveillance in return for not stirring up trouble in the French-Basque country. For the French Socialists, political activists were to be treated more leniently, and those who had committed crimes for ‘legitimate regional aspirations’ were invited to resume their place within a spirit of national harmony.21 In the 1981 French Presidential amnesty order, terrorism was not excluded from the scope of clemency.22 The implementation of a dialogue-oriented strategy was largely perceived at the time as the only promising and viable solution to political violence.23 However, the particular violent context of the 1980s, with the multiplication of actions originating in Lebanon or from Palestinian groups, unquestionably contributed to undermine the French approach to political violence as a strict foreign-policy issue.24 This series of attacks perpetrated on French territory crudely exposed the failure of French intelligence, highlighted the perennial problem of rivalry among police forces and, last but not least, showed the lack of dialogue between the Ministries of the Interior, Foreign Affairs and Justice.25 Following the deadly attack on a Jewish restaurant in Paris in August 1982, President Mitterrand solemnly announced in a TV interview that France had been singled out for terrorism because it was ‘the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

154

Counter-terror by proxy

major force for peace in the Middle East’.26 He also underlined a series of decisions intended to provide for better co-ordination both internally and internationally.27 France was indeed reconsidering its counter-terrorist policy and was in the process of cautiously moving away from some of its previous reservations. By November 1982, France had established a new policy for extradition making clear that requests would be assessed in the light of four criteria: the nature of the political and judicial system of the requesting state, the political nature of the offence prosecuted; the political motive for the extradition request and the risk of aggravation, in the event of extradition, of the situation of the person concerned, resulting in particular from their political actions or opinions, race or religion. Following upon this, the communiqué stipulates that The political nature of the offence will not be accepted, and extradition will be granted when the crime has been committed in a State where fundamental rights and freedoms are respected.28

In that particular climate when France was taking a firmer hand on terrorism, the enduring Spanish claim for more effective and concerted police and judicial co-operation between the two countries started to resonate differently. The idea that a denial of co-operation with a neighbouring country amounted to a failure to provide assistance to a democracy in danger started to gain credence among French authorities, though only timidly.29 When Felipe González became the new Spanish Prime Minister in December 1982, France was still sitting on the fence, between a rather idealistic view of ETA and a still condescending approach to Spain.30 Basque nationalistic claims on the French side of the Pyrénées were far less vocal than south of the mountains. As far as France was concerned, there was little reason to intervene in what was perceived as a Spanish issue. Yet, under the soft glow of ideological affinity, the relationship between Spain and France evolved significantly over the years 1983–84. Following a meeting between the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs Fernando Moràn and his French counterpart Claude Cheysson in December 1982, the year 1983 saw the first French–Spanish ministerial meeting aimed at resolving the various frictions and the numerous disputes between the two neighbouring countries. For Spain, it was really a matter of mimicking the settings of the established Franco-German bilateral relation and, hopefully, gaining the same level of connection.31 The first meeting was held in France in January 1983 at the country house of La Celle Saint-Cloud, near Versailles. The two delegations spoke about NATO, the French and Spanish policy in the Maghreb and the schedule for the Spanish accession to the EEC, but the main subject that left its seal on the discussion was police and judicial

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document



Symbolic violence

155

co-operation. This first official encounter between the two ministers of Foreign Affairs was followed by a meeting in June 1983 between French Prime Minister Mauroy and his Spanish counterpart Felipe González and another meeting in July 1983 near Segovia (La Granja) with the French and Spanish Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Economy, Agriculture and Culture. The relationship between the two neighbouring countries was more cooperative than previously. If the police and judicial co-operation over the Basque issue was still subject to disagreement between Spain and France, the idea that the Basque issue should not be perceived as only a Spanish problem but rather as a concern for every democracy was gaining ground in other European policy and diplomatic settings. Indeed, Spain had been invited in December 1982 to participate in TREVI, the informal inter-governmental arrangement set up by the Italian, German, French, Dutch and Belgian Interior Ministers.32 Although invited as an observer, Spain could eventually share its concerns among the TREVI participants about the international dimensions of ETA and the need to expand European co-operation further.33 In the meantime, Madrid hosted the follow-up meeting of the conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in September 1983. When Prime Minister González met President Mitterrand in December 1983 in Paris, the rationale of the Spanish policy towards a Europeanisation of its counter-terrorism policy and thus asking for a united front of European democracies against terrorism was not only clear but also consistent. The presentation by Felipe González of the list of the names of the victims of attacks perpetrated by ETA since 1968 took the French President by surprise but profoundly modified the French reluctance to co-operate.34 This meeting of December 1983 marked a turning point. The special counsellor to President Mitterrand wrote in his diary that ‘this day an agreement was reached on the expulsion of the Basques’.35 In January 1984, while the GAL mercenaries were battling in the Basque country, seventeen Basque refugees were arrested. Some of them were assigned to residence and the others expelled to third countries. While Prime Minister González was expressing his wishes to see greater co-operation in the fight against terrorism in front of the Council of Europe, he could declare that I think I can assure this Assembly – and I do so with legitimate satisfaction – that co-operation between Spain and France is now moving in a direction that will eradicate the phenomenon of violence.36

A month later, the French and Spanish Ministers of Foreign Affairs met in Rambouillet (Paris) and in June of the same year the Ministers of the Interior José Barrionuevo and Gaston Defferre signed the Agreements of Castellana, containing pledges to strengthen the Spanish–French law enforcement

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

156

Counter-terror by proxy

co-operation against ETA. The French Minister of the Interior declared that ‘a terrorist cannot be a political refugee’.37 This agreement was a success for the Spanish diplomacy over the French reluctance to co-operate. The abrupt change of government in France in mid-July 1984 did not upset this agreement. Pierre Joxe, the new Minister of the Interior, reaffirmed his intention to abide by the agreement between Paris and Madrid. The Agreements of Castellana opened a period of increasing co-operation between Spain and France, starting with the extradition to Spain of three Basque separatists in September 1984.38 The decision to sign this extradition decree was a major step forward and a point of no return in the implementation of a French policy on extradition. González welcomed the decision and highlighted its signification as ‘a legal and political consecration of the Spanish argument according to which ETA’s terrorist actions should not be considered as political crimes’.39 Following a French police operation in the Basque country in January 1985, the Spanish Minister of the Interior, José Barrionuevo, sent a message to his French counterpart Pierre Joxe, I would like to sincerely thank you for preventing people residing in France to engage in criminal acts in Spain, especially in regards to yesterday’s operation […]; it is really an act of democratic activism that we do appreciate and one that, we are certain, bodes well for the future.40

The signature of ‘declaration of friendship and co-operation’ between the two countries in July 1985 and the organisation of regular inter-governmental meetings and of a yearly summit between the French President and the Spanish Prime Minister confirmed the good relationship between the two neighbouring countries.41 The French co-operation against ETA would further evolve when in 1986, short of a parliamentary majority, President Mitterrand was pushed to cohabit with the opposition.42 With Jacques Chirac as Prime Minister and Charles Pasqua as Minister of the Interior in France, Spain found itself with people keen on pushing the counter-terrorist co-operation even further, especially at a time when France was experiencing another wave of attacks on its soil.43 French policy on the extradition of Basque refugees changed dramatically. In July 1986, Prime Minister Chirac issued administrative orders for the expulsion of Basque refugees, using a disposition offered in the Ordinance of November 1945 regarding the entry and residence conditions for foreigners in France; where the presence of an alien represents a particularly grave threat and disturbance to the public order, deportations are allowed. In September 1987, Chirac’s government ratified the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism that facilitated the extradition of suspected terrorists as the accord disallows ‘political motives’ as grounds for refusing extradition.44 In October 1987, three months after the last known attack

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document



Symbolic violence

157

perpetrated by the GAL, the French government carried out a vast police operation among autonomist and nationalist circles in the Basque country. This operation resulted in 120 arrests, forty-five expulsions to Spain, twelve to Algeria and three to Venezuela. For the French government, the procedure in ‘absolute emergency’ made it possible to dissociate the problem of the refugee protection from the wish to see a particular person expelled.45 Clearly, the Basque problem ceased to be a Spanish problem. The return of the French Socialists to power in 1988 did not call into question this anti-terrorist policy. All of the measures taken since then have fallen under what one could call a Spanish–French anti-terrorist ‘acquis’. ETA activities were now fully repressed and the police and judicial co-operation between France and Spain had intensified.46 The need for co-operation has since been reiterated in each press release and all French–Spanish summits inevitably ended with declarations of satisfaction. If at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, France felt entitled to be the experienced tutor of the ‘young Spanish democracy’, one could say that by the mid-1990s Spain entirely reversed the situation by decorating French judges and former French Ministers for their good and loyal services in the fight against ETA.47 Spain’s grievances against France were no longer as severe as before.48 When the south-west region of France was still described as a ‘sanctuary’, it was only as a double political reminder; a logical and historical explanation of the success of the now established anti-terrorist co-operation between the two countries and a normative declaration on the never-ending task of improving this prosperous collaboration further.49 As the Spanish–French co-operation was enriching its own record of successful joint police operations and thus setting an example for the other EU Member States, the Spanish rhetoric of the ‘sanctuary’ was steadily replaced by a different one. By using the lexical field of ‘impunity’ rather than ‘sanctuary’, the focus of Spanish criticism moved from the French authorities – those who once were mistaken and thus were protecting terrorists – to a less prejudicial and distinctive target, legal matters and their shortcomings. Since the long-standing diplomatic row between Madrid and Paris was eventually settled, the core of the Spanish argument was then that European judicial, extradition and asylum matters were not fulfilling their functions.

‘Solidarity’ – securing EU Member States’ co-operation The evisceration of the political offence exception to extradition and the expansion of policing and criminal judicial co-operation have always been the key mantras of the Spanish authorities. As we underlined in the previous

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

158

Counter-terror by proxy

chapters, they have been certainly the most consistent Spanish claims since the late 1970s with the necessity of simplifying and speeding up the overall process of rendition between the requesting and requested States. When Spain joined the EU in 1986 and seized the issue of co-operation among Member States, several European conventions already amended the situation by exempting a number of violent crimes from the protection of the political offence exception and thus making extradition unavoidable.50 Other European conventions and Agreements were in progress and under discussion.51 Furthermore, the 1985 first Schengen Convention designed to lead to the abolition of border controls among Member States was coming with flanking policing and security measures.52 The trend towards a common EU approach in criminal matters was confirmed by Article K.1.7 of the 1992 Treaty on European Union, which stated explicitly that Member States should regard judicial co-operation in criminal matters as a matter of common interest.53 The desire to relax the conditions and political grounds for refusing extradition was indeed inscribed on the agenda, but strong divergences between Member States meant that the debates were stalled.54 In March 1994, during the meeting of the Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) of the twelve Member States,55 the Council approved a report from the Article K.4 Committee56 on developing the system of liaison officers, increasing the frequency of meetings and contacts between police forces, but the thorny issues of political offence and of the extradition of national citizens continued to fuel sharp divergence of opinions.57 However, the meeting led to a crucial point of convergence among the twelve: when a defendant consents to his or her surrender, and, since one can assume that all Member States are democracies, an agreement on streamlining extradition among European states can be eventually reached. In March 1995, the JHA Council drew up such a Convention on simplified extradition procedure between Member States.58 If this 1995 Convention was supplementing the 1957 European Convention on Extradition, it did not allow, however, countries to extradite their own nationals. Improving the effectiveness of the extradition process was a serious and urgent matter for the Spanish authorities. Anything that presented itself as an additional measure towards the implementation of a ‘European judicial area’ was a victory for Spain, whereas anything that was actually delaying the extradition procedure and weakening the relation between Member States had to be corrected.59 The Spanish wish to see more effective co-operation in regard to criminal matters was understood by its European peers, but not yet crowned with success – partly because most other Member States saw the Spanish demand as excessive and in contravention of Human Rights conventions.60 The 1993–96 diplomatic spat between Spain and Belgium over the extradition of two

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document



Symbolic violence

159

suspected members of ETA reactivated the European debates and pushed the Spanish agenda further. Following the assassination by ETA of a police officer in Bilbao in January 1992, an International Provisional Arrest Warrant was issued in May 1993 against Luis Moreno Ramajo and Raquel García Arrantz, suspected of housing the ETA commando who perpetrated the attack. The arrest warrant was addressed to Belgium, where the couple had escaped. Moreno was thus arrested in June 1993 and the District Court of Brussels declared the warrant executable. However, a month later the Brussels Court of Appeal issued a negative advice to the Minister of Justice, recommending that the extradition be denied since the Spanish request concerned political crimes. While the Belgian Minister of Justice decided to ignore the advice and to grant the extradition, the couple lodged an asylum application which delayed the extradition. In February 1994, the asylum was denied but Moreno and García appealed to the Belgian Commission for Refugee Appeal. The Moreno–García affair made the headlines in Spain, and the opposition PP challenged the Socialist Minister of Justice, Juan Alberto Belloch Julbe: It is incredible that Spain can be perceived as a country that is in deficit when it comes to democratic and constitutional guarantees. […] No one can allow or tolerate that the status of political refugee could be applied to two terrorists.61

The Moreno–García affair equally led to tense debates in the Belgian Parliament and in the press where Flemish nationalists were quite receptive to the issues at stake. Two years later, in January 1996, the Belgian omission confirmed the previous decision and denied asylum, and Stefaan de Clerck, the Belgian Minister of Justice, decided to extradite them. However, in February 1996, the supreme administrative court in Belgium (Conseil d’Etat) cancelled the decision by the Minister of Justice and terminated all proceedings against the Spanish couple. The entire Moreno–Garcia case caused intense outrage among both Spanish Conservative and Socialist political actors, and Belgium’s conduct was considered unfriendly. At a time when the GAL had become a huge political scandal in Spain, the Belgian refusal to extradite Luis Moreno Ramajo and his wife Raquel García Arranz because of doubts about the request was totally unacceptable for the new government of José Maria Aznar. For Spanish authorities, the elimination of any delay or paralysing effect on extradition request due to parallel asylum application was crucial. The promotion of trust among EU Member States about their respective democratic systems was equally important. It was perhaps even more significant when revelations about the GAL episode were making the headlines across Europe and thus disturbing the Spanish democratic reputation. The argument between Madrid and Brussels became a rapidly European

160

Counter-terror by proxy

concern since the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the affair, demanding

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

That a definitive solution to this problem be found, as a matter of urgency, in the context of co-operation between the Member States in accordance with Title VI of the Treaty on European Union.62

In September 1996, an agreement was reached on the Convention relating to extradition between the Member States of the EU.63 The 1996 Convention supplemented the 1957 European Convention on Extradition, the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism and the 1995 Convention on Simplified Extradition Procedure, resulting in a further limitation of the political offence exemption.64 For Spain, this 1996 Convention on Extradition between Member States was indeed received as a first concrete success by Spain following the quarrel with Belgium.65 But among Spain’s priorities, the one related to exclusion of EU citizens from seeking refugee status within the EU was not yet fulfilled. During the 1996 inter-governmental conference however, Prime Minister Aznar submitted a straightforward clause prohibiting political asylum to a citizen of any other Member State: No Member State accept to examine applications for asylum or for the grant of refugee status submitted by nationals of other Member State.66

Clearly intended to avoid the repetition of disputes such as the Moreno–García case, his proposition was well received by the Dublin European Council of December 1996.67 Modified slightly in order to match some requirements expressed by other delegations, the Spanish proposal was adopted in no time and became a Protocol attached to the Amsterdam Treaty: Given the level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms by the Member States of the European Union, Member States shall be regarded as constituting safe countries of origin in respect of each other for all legal and practical purposes in relation to asylum matters.68

The agreement was premised upon the assumption that the level to which fundamental freedoms are protected within the EU rendered all EU Member States ‘safe countries of origin’ for asylum purposes.69 Although exceptions have been incorporated, the ‘Aznar Protocol’ drastically reduced asylum possibilities for EU citizens.70 The Protocol valued a simple yet powerful idea: mutual trust among European countries should be embraced since every Member State is, by nature, a democracy. As such, the Protocol invited assumption of a principle of mutual recognition of judicial rulings and sentences in criminal matters. The principle of mutual recognition presupposing mutual trust was confirmed as the cornerstone of judicial co-operation at the Tampere European Council of October 1999.71

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document



Symbolic violence

161

With the 1996 Convention on Extradition and the 1997 Protocol on asylum – and despite their options for reservations – one could say that Spain’s strategy of seeking EU Member States’ and institutions’ support in its fight against ETA was rather successful. Even more if one considers the extremely swift adoption in 2001 of the Council Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant (EAW)72 and of the EU list of ‘terrorist organisations and persons linked to terrorist activities’.73 Indeed, the Framework Decision contributed to shortening extradition procedures by making decisions judicial, by opening direct lines between judicial authorities and by introducing time limits. Spain was certainly one of the most receptive to the EAW and the first EU Member State to implement it.74 As for the EU list of terrorist organisations, in 2001, the listed individuals were almost exclusively ETA members (twenty-six out of thirty-five), making the Basque organisation European public enemy number one. When the Council decided in December 2003 to update the list, Spain posted more people on the list of wanted individuals than any other Member State.75 The EAW does encapsulate all the Spanish wishes. Indeed, it effectively depoliticises the procedure of extradition, and those in receipt of a request are invited to take it in ‘good faith’. Once issued, there are very limited grounds, mostly purely procedural, on which the country receiving the EAW may refuse to execute it. However, this ‘fast-track surrender’ mechanism is not faultless.76 Furthermore, and over the course of the past years, it appears that the focus has moved from swift prosecution to a European co-operation in criminal cases in which more attention is given to fundamental and procedural rights.77 The European landscape of co-operation in criminal matters and its various agencies are now fairly well regulated, even if controlling and overseeing intelligence agencies is still a delicate mission. Whether one is witnessing a revival of fundamental rights in the fight against terrorism is still a moot point.78 None the less, one could say that, since the 1980s, Spanish authorities have successfully promoted the need for mutual assistance and did secure EU Member States’ co-operation in their fight against ETA as a democratic credential par excellence.79 Curiously enough, and even if one could say that the GAL affair was a sordid deviation from the carefully crafted domestic and international Spanish democratic storytelling, it did not cross the Pyrénées. The GAL affair barely affected Spain’s long-standing ambition aimed at winning the respect of other EU Member States and to be considered a significant European player. At the peak of the different trials against political actors accused of involvement with GAL, Spain was actively participating in the long negotiations following the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht and leading to the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam which, among other things, dealt with encouraging greater co-operation between the Member States of the EU on matters of co-operation

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

162

Counter-terror by proxy

in justice and home affairs. Spain indeed devoted considerable attention to the field of police and judicial co-operation, most notably by rejecting the very notion of political asylum for EU nationals in other Member States. Spain strongly advocated the development of the EU as a space for freedom, security and justice at the 1999 Tampere Council, promptly adopting the 2002 European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures between Member States and endorsing all the subsequent EU framework decisions concerning the fight against terrorism after 2001. Spain has always been strongly determined to develop EU procedures capable of proving effective in the ongoing struggle against ETA in particular and against terrorism in general. What we have suggested in this chapter is that, in choosing to go even further in their demands of stronger and swifter mechanisms of police and judicial co-operation among European democratic peers, Spain found itself a convenient veil behind which GAL’s operations could be hidden and their political and diplomatic consequences rewritten. In promoting greater pan-European co-operation on the fight against terrorism as a collective democratic expression, Spain actually succeeded in lifting the disastrous effect of the GAL affair as a source of embarrassment.

Notes 1 S. Balfour, The End of the Spanish Empire, 1898–1923, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997. 2 J. Smith, The Spanish-American War 1895–1902: Conflict in the Caribbean and the Pacific, London, Routledge, 1994. 3 On the origins and rise of Catalan nationalism, see A. Smith, The Origins of Catalan Nationalism, 1770–1898, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. On the genesis of Basque nationalism, see J. Corcuera Atienza, La patria de los Vascos. Orígenes, ideología y organización del nacionalismo vasco (1876–1903) [Basque homeland. Origins, ideology and organisation of Basque nationalism (1876–1903)], Madrid, Taurus, 2001. 4 J. Álvarez-Junco, Mater dolorosa: La idea de España en el siglo XIX [Mother of Sorrows: The idea of Spain in the nineteenth century], Madrid, Taurus, 2001. For an abridged version in English see J. Álvarez-Junco, Spanish Identity in the Age of Nations, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2011. 5 S. Balfour, A. Quiroga, The Reinvention of Spain: Nation and Identity since Democracy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007. 6 R. García Cárcel, La herencia del pasado. Las memorias históricas de España [The legacy of the past. The historical memories of Spain], Barcelona, Galaxia Gutenberg, 2011. 7 J. Krauel, Imperial Emotions: Cultural Responses to Myths of Empire in Finde-siècle Spain, Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2013.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document



Symbolic violence

163

8 E. Hobsbawn, The Age of Empire: 1897–1914, New York, Vintage Books, [1987], 1989. 9 D. Muro, A. Quiroga, ‘Spanish nationalism. Ethnic or civic?’, Ethnicities, 5:1, 2005, 9–29. 10 M. Trouvé, L’Espagne et l’Europe. De la dictature de Franco à l’Union européenne [Spain and Europe. From Franco’s dictatroship to the European Union], Bruxelles, Peter Lang, 2008; J. C. MacLennan, Spain and the Process of European Integration, 1957–85, London, Palgrave, 2000; F. Guirao, Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–57, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 1998; C. Closa, P. M. Heywood, Spain and the European Union, Basingstoke, Plagrave Macmillan, 1995. 11 Membership of the EEC was not open to the Communist states of Central and Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans, and in that sense political conditions did apply, but other than that all European countries were eligible to join. See R. Janse, ‘The evolution of the political criteria for accession to the European Community, 1957–1973’, European Law Journal, 24:1, 2018, 57–76. 12 P. Ortuño Anaya, ‘The EEC, the Franco regime, and the socialist group in the European Parliament, 1962–77’, International Journal of Iberian Studies, 14:1, 2001, 26–39. Interestingly, the Portugese application provoked much less controversy. See N. A. Leitão, ‘A flight of fantasy? Portugal and the first attempt to enlarge the European Economic Community, 1961–1963’, Contemporary European History, 16:1, 2007, 71–87. 13 D. C. Thomas, ‘Constitutionalization through enlargement: The contested origins of the EU’s democratic identity’, Journal of European Public Policy, 13:8, 2006, 1190–210. It might be worth reminding here that in the late 1950s and early 1960s many countries in Europe were expressing an interest in association (Greece and Turkey in 1959, Austria, Sweden and Switzerland in 1961, and Spain and Portugal in 1962) or even applied for membership (United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland in 1961). 14 On the German support of Spain’s application, see A. Muñoz Sánchez, ‘A European answer to the Spanish question: The SPD and the end of the Franco dictatorship’, Journal of European Integration History, 15:1, 2009, 77–94; B. Aschmann, ‘The reliable ally: Germany supports Spain’s European integration efforts, 1957–67’, Journal of European Integration History, 7:1, 2001, 37–51. 15 MacLennan, Spain and the Process of European Integration. 16 See the ‘Declaration on European Identity’, Bulletin of the European Communities, 1973, 12, 118–22. For a solid account of the international context and the French influence upon the declaration, see A. E. Gfeller, Building a European Identity: France, the United States, and the Oil Shock, 1973–74, Oxford, Berghahn Books, 2012. For a critical account of the long history and ambivalence of ‘European identity’ see B. Stråth, ‘A European identity: To the historical limits of a concept’, European Journal of Social Theory, 5:4, 2002, 387–401. 17 For an account of the Spanish adhesion to the European Community by one of its key actors, see R. Bassols, España en Europa. Historia de la adhesión a la

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

164

Counter-terror by proxy

CE, 1957–1985 [Spain in Europe. History of the adhesión to the EC, 1957–85], Madrid, Estudios Políticas Exterior, 1995. 18 P. Kennedy, The Spanish Socialist Party and the Modernisation of Spain, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2013; P. Ortuño Anaya, Los socialistas europeos y la transición española, 1959–1977 [The European socialists and the Spanish Transition, 1959–77], Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2005. 19 P. Jáuregui, ‘National pride and the meaning of “Europe”: A comparative study of Britain and Spain’, The Sociological Review, 48, 2000, 257–87; J. Díez Medrano, Framing Europe. Attitudes to European Integration in Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2003. 20 R. Gillespie, F. Rodrigo, J. Story (eds) Democratic Spain: Reshaping External Relations in a Changing World, London, Routledge, 1995. 21 During the presentation of the Presidential clemency and amnesty orders in front of the French National Assembly, the Rapporteur highlighted that ‘Ceux que des aspirations régionales légitimes ont poussés à commettre des actes de délinquance sont invités à reprendre leur place dans l’unité nationale’. Journal Officiel, Assemblée Nationale, Compte-rendu de la séance du 29 juillet 1981, 477. 22 S. Wahnich (ed.) Une histoire politique de l’amnistie: Études d’histoire, d’anthropologie et de droit [A political history of amnesty: History, anthropology and law studies], Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2007. 23 See the recent declarations of Yves Bonnet, the former head of French intelligence services, about the deal made with the Palestinian splinter group Abu Nidal organisation following the 1982 attack against Goldenberg’s restaurant in the Paris Jewish quarter. ‘Ex-French spy chief admits 1980s pact with Palestinian terrorists’, The Guardian, 9 August 2019 24 The series of attacks started with the explosion of a bomb in front of a synagogue in Paris’s Jewish quarter, in October 1980, followed by actions perpetrated by the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions and the Committee of Solidarity with Arab and Middle East prisoners. 25 For a thorough historical review of the rivalry between police forces, see M. Anderson, In Thrall to Political Change: Police and Gendarmerie in France, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011. 26 Interview available at www.elysee.fr/francois-mitterrand/1982/08/17/interviewde-m-francois-mitterrand-president-de-la-republique-au-journal-televise-detf1-notamment-sur-la-politique-de-la-france-au-proche-orient-et-les-mesuresgouvernementales-anti-terroristes-paris-mardi-17-aout-1982. 27 N. Cettina, L’antiterrorisme en question. De l’attentat de la rue Marbeuf aux affaires corses [Antiterrorism under question. From the Marbeuf street attack to the Corsican affairs], Paris, Michalon, 2001. 28 See the Communiqué by the Conseil des Ministres, 10 November 1982. Reproduced in the newspaper Le Monde on 12 November 1982: ‘La tradition républicaine et son application’. 29 In his lengthy, detailed record of François Mitterrand’s first five years in office, the President’s special counsellor and personnal assistant Jacques Attali notes

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document



Symbolic violence

165

that in the cases of Basque refugees who were not respecting their ‘duty to be discreet’ (devoir de réserve), Prime Minister Mauroy wanted to extradite them but faced the opposition of some of his Ministers and notably Robert Badinter, Minister of Justice. See J. Attali, Verbatim – Vol. 1: 1981–1986, Paris, Fayard, 1993, 164. See also G. Ménage, L’oeil du pouvoir. Volume 2: Face aux terrorismes. 1981–1986. Action directe, Corse, Pays basque, Paris, Fayard, 2000, 363f. 30 In his analysis of the perception of Spain in France in the early 1980s, JeanJacques Kourliandsky talks of an ‘unconsciously condescending friendship’. J.-J. Kourliandsky, ‘Une politique espagnole pour la France’ [A Spanish policy for France], La revue internationale et stratégique, 9, 1993, 160–72. For a clear overview of the difficult relations between Paris and Madrid in the 1980s, see the analysis offered by Thierry Maliniak, Le Monde’s Madrid correspondent, in Les Espagnols, de la Movida à l’Europe – La décennie socialiste [Spaniards, from the Movida to Europe – The socialist decade], Paris, Centurion, 1990. 31 F. Morán, España en su sitio [Spain in its place], Barcelona, Plaza y Janès, 1990. 32 On the genesis and evolution of the TREVI group, see D. Bigo, Polices en réseaux: l’expérience européenne [Police networks. The European experience], Paris, Presses de Sciences-Po, 1996. 33 J. Barrionuevo, 2001 dias en Interior [2001 days in the Ministry of the Interior], Barcelona, Ediciones B., 1997, 140. 34 F. González, Memorias del futuro: Reflexiones sobre el tiempo presente [Memoirs of the Future: Reflections on the present time], Madrid, Aguilar ediciones, 2003. 35 Attali, Verbatim – Vol. 1: 1981–1986, 556. 36 Response of Felipe González to a question asked during his speech in front of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (31 January 1984). Speech available at www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/Speeches/Speech-XML2HTMLEN.asp?SpeechID=76. 37 ‘ETA pierde su refugio político en Francia’ [ETA loses its political refuge in France], El País, 16 June 1984. 38 The newly appointed Prime Minister Laurent Fabius signed the extradition decree for Francisco Lujambio, José Carlos García Ramírez and José Manuel Martínez Beiztegi on 23, September 1984. Four others Basque activists were expelled to Togo. 39 ‘Felipe González ve en la decisión de Paris un reconocimiento a la democracia espanola’ [Felipe González sees the Paris decision as an acknowledgement of the Spanish democracy], El País, 25 September 1984. 40 Telegram from José Barrionuevo to Pierre Joxe, 31 January 1985. Archives Nationales, Cabinet du ministre de l’Intérieur et de la décentralisation (series AN 19860277). 41 On the different meetings and summits, see E.-P. Guittet, Antiterorrisme clandestin, antiterrorisme officiel. Chroniques espanoles de la coopération en Europe, Montréal, Athéna éditions, 2010, 108–15. 42 After the legislative election of March 1986 and the victory of the right-wing coalition of the Rassemblement pour la République and the Union pour la Démocratie Française, France found itself with a Prime Minister and a President of radically different political persuasion. This unprecedented experience in the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

166

Counter-terror by proxy

French Fifth Republic is known as ‘la première cohabitation’, the first cohabitation. On this French political peculiarity, see S. G. Lazardeux, Cohabitation and Conflicting Politics in French Policymaking, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. 43 For a clear overview of the attacks perpetrated in 1986, see D. Bigo, ‘Les attentats de 1986 en France: un cas de violence transnationale et ses implications’ [The 1986 attacks in France: a case of transnational violence and its implications], Cultures & Conflits, 4, 1991, 123–73. 44 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, ETS No. 090, Strasbourg, 27 January 1977. 45 The procedure in ‘absolute emergency’, combined with the anti-terrorist law of 9 September 1986, allowed the Executive to bypass the Court of Appeal. See Loi n° 86–1020 du 9 septembre 1986 relative à la lutte contre le terrorisme (Act No. 86–1020 of 9 September 1986 on the fight against terrorism). 46 S. Vuelta Simon, P. Ollivier-Maurel, La justice française contre ETA [The French justice against ETA], Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2012. 47 French investigating anti-terrorist magistrates Laurence Le Vert, Roger Leloire and Irène Stoller were decorated in 1993 for their contributions against ETA. In 1996, it was the former French Minister of Interior Charles Pasqua who received the Grand Cross of the Order of St Raymond of Peñafort, the highest Spanish distinction awarded to civil servants involved in justice administration. 48 Barrionuevo, 2001 dias en Interior, 115f. 49 On this hyperbolic discourse of ‘always more, never enough’, see E.-P. Guittet, ‘“Ne pas leur faire confiance serait leur faire offense”. Antiterrorisme, solidarité démocratique et identité politique’, Cultures & Conflits, 61, 2006, 61, 51–76. 50 The relation between Member States in the field of extradition was governed by the 1957 European Convention on Extradition supplemented by two additional Protocols (1975 and 1978) and by bilateral treaties. For the Benelux countries, extradition was governed by the 1962 Benelux Extradition Treaty. The 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism and the 1979 Dublin Agreement provide special extradition regulations. 51 The 1987 Convention between the Member States of the European Union on Double Jeopardy, the 1987 Agreement on the application of the Convention on the transfer of sentenced persons and the 1989 Agreement between the Member States concerning the simplification and modernisation of transmission modes of extradition requests. 52 The Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders. The Schengen Agreement was given its practical form with the 1990 Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement. 53 Article K.1.7 of the Treaty on European Union, signed at Maastricht on 7 February 1992, Official Journal of the European Communities, C 191, volume 35, 29 July 1992, 61. 54 Council of the European Union, 10655/93 JAI 11, 2 December, 1993. 55 Council of the European Union (Justice and Home Affairs), 5790/94 (Presse 45), 23 March 1994.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document



Symbolic violence

167

56 With the creation of the Third Pillar on Justice and Home Affairs Co-operation (JHA) in the 1992 Treaty on European Union, working groups and fora such as the Ad Hoc Group and TREVI were brought under the umbrella of the Co-ordinating Committee, also known as the K.4 Committee. The Co-ordinating Committee was accountable to the Committee of Permanent Representatives and to the Council of Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA Council). See M. Anderson, M. Den Boer, P. Cullen, W. Gilmore (eds) Policing the European Union. Theory, Law and Practice, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995. 57 Council of the European Union, 5366/94, 7 March 1994, JUSTPEN 13. 58 Convention of 10 March 1995 on simplified extradition procedure between the Member States of the European Union, Official Journal of the European Communities, 78, 30 March 1995, 2–10. 59 See ‘La Gomera Declaration on Terrorism’ (Annex III), adopted by the European Council at Madrid on December 1995: ‘in order to prevent and combat terrorist action effectively, there is a need for thorough co-ordination between Member States by way of improved machinery for police and judicial co-operation’. 60 C. Closa, ‘International limits to national claims in EU constitutional negotiations: The Spanish government and the asylum right for EU citizens’, International Negotiations, 3:3, 1998, 389–411. 61 Cortes Generales, Diario de sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados (Comision Justicia e Interior), Sesion 12, 23 February 1994, 3798–801. 62 European Parliament, ‘Resolution on the extradition of two presumed ETA militants’, Official Journal, 65, 4 March 1996, 160. 63 Convention of 27 September 1996 relating to extradition between the Member States of the European Union, Official Journal of the European Communities, 313, 1996, 11–23. 64 See J. Jansson, Terrorism, Criminal Law and Politics. The Decline of the Political Offence Exception to Extradition, London, Routledge, 2019. 65 E. Bribosia, A. Weyembergh, ‘Extradition et asile: vers un espace judiciaire européen?’ [Extradition and asylum: Towards a European judicial area?], Revue Belge de droit international, 1, 1997, 69–98. 66 Spanish government, ‘Proposition concernant la justice et ses affaires intérieures’, CONF3925/96, 25 September 1996, 6 [document originally written in French]. 67 Dublin European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 13–14 December 1996, DOC/96/8, Part IV, ‘The Intergouvernemental Conference’: ‘The European Council asks the Conference to develop the important proposal to amend the Treaties to establish it as a clear principle that no citizen of a Member State of the Union may apply for asylum in another Member State, taking into account international treaties’. 68 The Protocol on Asylum for Nationals of Member States of the European Union [also known as the ‘Spanish Protocol’ or ‘Aznar Protocol’] is an annexe to the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam (Protocol 24). 69 On the history of the concept of a safe country of origin as an irrefutable presumption in the EU, see E. Guild, The Developing Immigration and Asylum Policies of the European Union: Adopted Conventions, Resolutions, Recommendations, Decisions and Conclusions, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1996.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

168

Counter-terror by proxy

70 K. Zwaan, ‘The Aznar Protocol: Diminishing the geography of refugee protection in Europe’, in P. Minderhoud, S. Mantu, S. Zwaan (eds) Caught in Between Borders. Citizens, Migrants and Humans. Liber Amicorum in Honour of Prof. Dr. Elspeth Guild, Tilburg, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2019, 303–11. 71 Tampere European Summit, Presidency Conclusions, 15–16 October 1999, SN 200/9. The principle of Mutual Recognition was subsequently developed in a programme of measures adopted in 2000. The Hague Programme of November 2004 and the Programme of Stockholm of December 2009 confirmed its importance in the EU area of criminal Justice. See G. De Kerchove, A. Weyembergh (eds) La reconnaissance mutuelle des décisions judiciaires pénales dans l’Union Européenne [Mutual recognition of judicial decisions in criminal matters in the European Union], Bruxelles, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2001. 72 The proposed EAW Council Framework Decision came within eight days of the attacks that took place in the US on 11 September 2001. See S. Peers, ‘EU responses to terrorism’, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 52:1, 2003, 227–43; J. Wouters, F. Naerts, ‘Of arrest warrants, terrorist offences and extradition deals. An appraisal of the EU’s main criminal law measures against terrorism after 11th September’, Common Market Law Review, 41:4, 2004, 904–35. 73 Adoption of Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, December 2001. The establishment of the EU list followed the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (28 September 2001). The EU list is reviewed every six months. 74 M. Jimeno-Bulnes, ‘Spain and the European arrest warrant – The view of a ‘key user’, in E. Guild (ed.) Constitutional Challenges to the European Arrest Warrant, Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2006, 163–85. 75 Council Common Position 2003/651/CFSP of 12 September 2003 updating Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism and repealing Common Position 2003/482/CFSP. In 2017, ETA activists were all removed from the list of individuals. See E. Guild, ‘The uses and abuses of counter-terrorism policies in Europe: The case of the “terrorist lists”’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studie, 46:1, 2008, 173–93. 76 EAW-Rights: Analysis of the implementation and operation of the European Arrest Warrant from the point of view of defence practitioners, Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE), European Lawyers Foundation (ELF), Brussels / The Hague, 2016; Rights International Spain (RIS), Beyond Surrender – National Report, 2018. Report available at www.rightsinternationalspain.org/ en/campanias/20/beyond-surrender/82/national-report (accessed 25 January 2020). 77 E. Guild, D. Bigo, Anti- & Counter-terrorism and Human Rights in Europe. Five Snapshots of Current Controversies, Paris, London, L’Harmattan, Queen Mary University of London, School of Law, 2018. 78 M. Meysman, ‘Belgium and the European arrest warrant: Is European criminal cooperation under pressure?’, European Criminal Law Review, 6:2, 2016, 186–210. 79 E.-P. Guittet, ‘European political identity and democratic solidarity after 9/11: The Spanish case’, Alternatives, 29, 2004, 441–64.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Conclusion: state terrorism, deceptive organisation and proxy

These practices are extremely dangerous, because you know how they start, but you never know how they end up. They can be a quick fix for today and a severe handicap for tomorrow. Andrés Cassinello Pérez, 1984 ETA existed and the GAL as well. If one did not exist, there would not have been the other. What have the dead been good for? Nothing! José Amedo Foucé, former Police superintendent, 2018

Terrorism has, in the past three decades or so, become the focus for much innovative work across social sciences. Having long been considered a topic of little academic moment, terrorism has become an issue of major scholarly concern. The outcome has been a sudden and massive increase in the quality and quantity of work conducted in the field, very much characterised by sharp differences of emphasis and interpretations, reflecting the varying disciplinary backgrounds and intellectual and ideological presuppositions of those contributing to it.1 Few areas in terrorism studies remain untouched. Many analysts have recently presented compelling arguments for rediscovering the notion of state terrorism in the analysis of supposedly Western liberal States.2 In regard to the long history of covert operations and dirty wars all around the world during the twentieth century, many might be tempted to consider the 1983–87 GAL campaign against ETA in the south-western part of France as a perhaps surprisingly forgotten episode, but definitively one smaller than any other known State-sponsored campaigns of extra-judicial abductions and assassinations. Indeed, the 1970s–80s ‘Operation Condor’ involving no fewer than six South American dictatorships in a shadowy network devised to eliminate left-wing activists who had dared confront them would certainly be one example of a larger campaign of extra-judicial abductions, torture, assassinations and disappearances.3 Bigger and certainly far more sophisticated than the GAL as its purpose was to allow co-operating

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

170

Counter-terror by proxy

countries to send death squads into each other’s territory – and sometimes further afield – to monitor, kidnap or kill political opponents. Although the exact number of people who were hunted down, arrested and executed in these combined cross-border operations between the mid-1970s and mid1980s may never be known, it is none the less reasonable to say that it would amount to thousands. Cases of systematic extra-judicial killings, torture and forced disappearance and aggressive counter-insurgency campaigns to dismantle leftist groups and organisations are legion. Waging ‘dirty war’, as a pattern of repression of internal dissent, belongs to common usage and the notion is by no mean peculiar to South America, or to authoritarian regimes only.4 Indeed, the Cold War ushered in a flurry of State-sponsored extra-judicial political assassinations outside the bounds of war.5 The counter-insurgency doctrine of the United States as implemented during the Vietnam War, in Central America and then in Iraq has also revealed a rich underbelly of amoral strategies that have left in their wake a recurring pattern of serious human rights violations including murder and torture.6 More recent and rigorous archival research has undermined the idea that Britain used only the minimum necessary force and with the utmost discrimination during the wars of decolonisation in the two decades after 1945.7 The 1954–62 Algerian war of independence remains an example of a fierce conflict where French armed forces brutally cracked down on independence fighters and routinely used torture.8 What verdict then can be passed on the Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación? What can be said of those Spanish, French, and Portuguese officers, soldiers and mercenaries who, acting under the banner of virtuous patriotism and with disdain for the executive responsibilities of the Spanish government, hunted down ETA members and Basque exiles in France in order to quicken the resolution of a diplomatic conflict? After years of sensational trials and political scandals that cast doubt on the certainties of the young Spanish democracy9 while offering the opposition, the press and the magistrates a whole new image, no one can claim that the last word has been said about the GAL. It is true that the latest news emerging from courts on either side of the Pyrénées is less sensational – in fact, it has been rather subdued. Not all the acts laid at the door of the GAL have been elucidated; some never will be due to lack of sufficient evidence. As to the possible involvement of French law enforcement officials, it remains out of reach of substantiation, what with the general unwillingness of French courts to admit testimony heard across the border and the paucity of French prosecutions. On the specific point of whether French officers received payment in exchange for information about Basque exiles, Angel López Carrillo remains the key witness in Spain, yet his account is

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Conclusion 171 derided in France. The status of certain ‘blindingly obvious’ evidence heard twenty years ago has been demoted by the courts over time, namely the evidence heard in the Lasa and Zabala and Marey cases. This conclusion also follows from the 3 July 2003 decision of the Biscaye Provincial Court in which the defendants (José Amedo, ex-Civil Guard Colonel Rafael Masa and businessman José Luis Morcillo) were acquitted of the assassination of Herri Batasuna and the politician Santiago Brouard for lack of evidence. ‘The crime was apparently authored by unknown individuals for political reasons’, wrote the court, even though the Audiencia Nacional had previously given credence to the thesis of Amedo’s central involvement in GAL recruitment. One thing is not in doubt: if the authorities’ stated aim is to erode popular support for a violent insurgency, then it is self-evidently counter-productive to devote public resources to illegal methods copied from the adversary alongside legal law enforcement efforts. Perhaps it is true that the courts have had their say on the GAL affair and moved on, but it none the less constitutes, whether explicitly or implicitly, a moment of ignominy in opposition to which the lawful Spanish State must now define itself. No politician or judge can reopen the Pandora’s box of the GAL death squads without finding responsibility to lie across the political spectrum as well as to be rooted in Spanish police and military tradition. The affair tested popular belief in the success of the democratic Transition so sorely that it is no longer possible for anyone, whether in Spain or in the community of democracies that is Europe, to condone extra-judicial execution as a clandestine anti-terrorism tactic. Perhaps the consignment of the affair to history also answers to the dictates of political expediency; still, it would be a mistake to draw the conclusion that the GAL were no more and no less than a lasting stain on democracy. After all, if it is possible to write this book about them, it is because the Spanish legal system worked as it is supposed to. Notwithstanding much Basque nationalist rhetoric, it is an undeniable historical fact that judicial action was taken and, as a result, high-ranking Spanish political and military figures were indicted, convicted and imprisoned. The GAL episode certainly constituted a major departure from accepted liberal democratic constitutional principles of law and order. As I suggest in the present book, it was a campaign of violence used in pursuit of a double-edged agenda. Once reassured by the clear intention that the Spanish Socialist government would be harsh on violence and perhaps tougher than the previous conservative governments on the Transition, Spanish police officers and soldiers piped down and got back in line. Secondly, the violence used and the victims were instrumental and directed at French authorities with the expectation that it would dramatically alter their attitude towards

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

172

Counter-terror by proxy

more police and intelligence co-operation with France’s closest neighbour and new member of the European community. Equally important, the perpetrators, recruiters and leaders were either in cahoots with or simply part of Spanish State agencies. For all these reasons it would be quite reasonable to argue that GAL’s activity was a form of state terrorism. While the GAL were unquestionably linked to senior government officials, a front group as a sort of proxy fits their actions better than that of State terrorism. The purpose of a front group is to obscure the chain of command and/or financing leading from the intellectual author of a terrorist attack to the victim, hence to shield that intellectual author from reprisals.10 This is what the GAL did: while they claimed to act independently, and in fact at times had their own special interests and grievances, they also acted on behalf of government officials and enjoyed generous logistical support from them. The expression State-sponsored terrorism’ is a misnomer in a case like this, for sponsorship suggests a desire for publicity, when what the responsible public officials wanted, at all costs, was the opposite: anonymity.11 Notions of camouflage, deception and proxy allow a better understanding of the strategies employed by contemporary liberal States to obfuscate their responsibility in the context of controversial actions taken in the name of national security and the fight against terrorism. The early admitted crude and overtly violent Spanish attempt at illiberal practices intended to shore up a still shaky new liberal State would arguably be eschewed by most liberal States today even if it is not unreasonable to suppose that most if not all intelligence services deploy similar borderline or entirely illegal practices. Covert operations have become a fundamental, arguably banal feature of foreign policy. The use of military force not only against so-called terrorists but also against States that support, train or harbour them is now part of the ordinary set of measures States employ for they have acquired the confidence that in the ‘fight against terror’ the use of punitive measures is now part of the ordinary set of counter-terrorism tools. The idea that military strikes can be counter-productive does not prevail any more when the discourse of the fight against terrorism and self-defence is invoked. In light of the relatively recent revelations about such things as illegal rendition flights, mass surveillance of dubious legal status and so on, it could be argued that liberal States have simply learned to conduct their ‘dirty wars’ against terrorism in more subtle form or, worse perhaps, that they have acquired the confidence to believe that executive policies and punitive strategies are no longer controversial. If the preceding analysis is accurate, one might expect this punitive licence to remain at the centre of international politics for the foreseeable future and to be likely to become more self-evident than ever. The use of an alleged existential danger to justify extreme policies is where the real threat lies.

Conclusion 173

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Notes 1 M. Ranstorp (ed.) Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction, Abindgon, Routledge, 2007; A. Silke (ed.) Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures, Abingdon, Routledge, 2004. 2 S. Poynting, D. Whyte (eds) Counter-Terrorism and State Political Violence: The ‘War on Terror’ as Terror, Abingdon, Routledge, 2012; R. Jackson, E. Murphy, S. Poynting (eds) Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and Practice, Abingdon, Routledge, 2009; R. Blakeley, State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South, London, Routledge, 2009; R. Blakeley, ‘Bringing the state back into terrorism studies’, European Political Science, 6:3, 2007, 228–35. 3 For an overview of ‘Operation Condor’, see J. P. McSherry, Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2005. 4 D. Kohut, O. Vilella, Historical Dictionary of the Dirty Wars, New York, Rowman & Littlefield, 2016. 5 Recalling the range of covert action and unconventional warfare events as well as counter-insurgency support to various countries is beyond the range of the present monograph. 6 W. Blum, Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II, London, Zed Books, 2003. On how anti-Communism and extra-legality have been a matter of course in US policy towards Central America, see for instance N. Cullather, Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala, 1952–1954, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2006. The 2002–9 US government’s global kidnap, secret detention programme and the use of so-called ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ during the period of secret detention have been widely discussed and detailed since they were revealed. See E. Guild, D. Bigo, M. Gibney (eds) Extraordinary Rendition. Addressing the Challenges of Accountability, Abingdon, Routledge, 2018. 7 See for instance David French’s thorough reassessment of British counter-insurgency doctrine and practice. D. French, The British Way in Counter Insurgency, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011. 8 See Raphaëlle Branche’s seminal study on the use of torture by the French armed forces. R. Branche, La torture et l’armée pendant la guerre d’Algérie, 1954–1962 [Torture and armed forces during the Algerian War, 1954–62], Paris, Gallimard, 2001. 9 A. Landaburu, ‘La venganza de Garzón’ [The revenge of Garzón], Cambio 16, 7 August 1995. 10 R. Jamieson, K. McEvoy, ‘State crime by proxy and juridical othering’, British Journal of Criminology, 2005, 45:4, 504–27. 11 M. L. R. Smith, S. Roberts ‘War in the gray: Exploring the concept of dirty war’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 31:5, 2008, 377–98.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Bibliography

Archival sources Archives Nationales (AN), French National Archives, Pierrefitte-Sur-Seine (France): Ministry of the Interior, Services attached to the cabinet, series 19860185 (1977–84) Ministry of the Interior, Services attached to the cabinet, series 19870320 (1981–86) Centre d’Archive de la Fondation Jean-Jaurès, Archives of the French Socialist Party, Paris (France): French Socialist Party and the European issue, series 40/RI (1972–90) French Socialist Party’s meetings with other European socialist parties (South of Europe), series 41/RI (1975–80) French Socialist Party’s international Relations secretariat (Spanish Section), series 424/RI (1970–85) La Contemporaine (formerly known as Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine), Nanterre (France): Several series on Spanish refugees in France (1944–75) Series on Guerrillas in Spain (1940–52) Archives of the Comité européen de défense des réfugiés et immigrés (CEDRI, European committee for the defence of refugees and immigrants), Longo Maï, Forcalquier (France): Bulletins and publications of the CEDRI (1983–95) Leaflets and information pamphlets on Basque refugees Archives of Enbata, Bayonne (France): Enbata (journal) Euskadi Information (journal) Jakilea (journal) Other leaflets and information pamphlets on Basque refugees Biblioteca Virtual del Ministerio de defensa (online library of the Spanish ministry of defence): Boletín de Información del CESEDEN Ejército – Revista ilustrada de las Armas y Servicios Judgements and sentences Audiencia Nacional de Madrid, Sala de lo Penal, Sección 3a, Juzgado de Instrución n°5, Sumario 1/88, Declaraciones del Señor Planchuelo, 20 September 1988

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Bibliography 175 Audiencia Nacional de Madrid, Sala de lo Penal, Sección 3a, Rollo 3/88, Juzgado de Instrución n°5, Sumario 1/88, Sobre la responsabilidad civil del Estado, 31 May 1989 Audiencia Nacional de Madrid, Sala Penal, Juzgado Central de Instrucción n°1, Caso Lasa y Zabala, Sumario n°15/95, 26 April 2000 Baltazar Garzón, Audiencia Nacional de Madrid, Sala de lo Penal, Sección 3a, Propuesta razonada que eleva a la sal el Instructor para la investigación de los fondos reservados y su relación con las fuentes de financiación de la organización terrorista G.A.L., en aplicación del auto de la Sección Tercera de la Audiencia Nacional de fecha 3 de noviembre de 1.988, Madrid, 17 January 1989 Cour d’Appel de Pau, 1ere Chambre d’Accusation, Arrêt dans l’affaire Basañez Jauregui contre Hassen et autres, 10 March 1998 Cour d’Appel de Pau, 1ere Chambre d’Accusation, Mémoire dans l’affaire n°A97/00273, Basañez Jauregui contre le Ministère Public, 26 September 1997 Cour d’Appel de Pau, Chambre de l’instruction, Arrêt dans l’affaire Juan Maria Olano contre Ministère Public, 22 March 2002 Cour d’Appel de Pau, Chambre de l’instruction, Arrêt dans l’affaire Francisco Javier Irastorza Dorronsoro et autres contre Ministère Public, 16 May 2003 Cour d’Assises de Pau, Affaire Baldès, 30 May 1986 Cour d’Assises de Pau, Affaire Figueiredo Fontes, 13 June 1991 Cour d’Assises de Pau, Affaire Mendaille, 29 January 1997 Cour d’Assises de Pau, Affaire Roussey, Morganti, Lambert, Domenge, 21 June 1990 Cour d’Assises de Pau, Affaire Talbi, Echalier, 4 December 1987 Tribunal Constitucional, Sentencia 100/2002, Recursos de amparo 520/97 y 2344/97 (acumulados), promovidos por don José Antonio Sáenz de Santamaría Tinture y don José Luis Corcuera Cuesta frente al Auto de la Sala de lo Penal de la Audiencia Nacional que confirmó la prórroga del secreto sumarial decretada en un sumario seguido por delitos de asesinato y otros, 06 mai 2002, BOE, 5 June 2002 Tribunal Constitucional, Sentencia 155/2002, Recursos de amparo avocados 4858–2001, 4907–2001 y 4922–2001 (aumulados) promovidos por don Ángel Vaquero Hernández, don Felipe Bayo Leal y don Enrique Rodríguez Galindo y don José Julián Elgorriaga Goyeneche, frente a las Sentencias de la Sala de lo Penal de la Audiencia Nacional y del Tribunal Supremo que les condenaron por dos delitos de asesinato y de detención ilelgal en el caso Lasa y Zabala, 22 July 2002 Tribunal Constitucional, Sentencia 63/2001, Recurso de amparo 3721/98 promovido por don Ricardo García Damborenea frente a la sentencia de la Sala Segunda del Tribunal Supremo que le condenó por un delito de detención ilegal en la causa seguida por el secuestro de don Segundo Marey Samper, 17 March 2001 Tribunal Constitucional, Sentencia 64/2001, Recurso de amparo 3805/98 promovido por don Julián Sancristóbal Iguaran frente a la sentencia de la Sala Segunda del Tribunal Supremo que le condenó por un delito de detención ilegal en la causa seguida por el secuestro de don Segundo Marey Samper, 17 March 2001 Tribunal Constitucional, Sentencia 65/2001, Recurso de amparo 3835/98 promovido por don Luis Hense Serena y don Juan Ramón Corujo Rodríguez frente a la sentencia de la Sala Segunda del Tribunal Supremo que le condenó por un delito de detención ilegal en la causa seguida por el secuestro de don Segundo Marey Samper, 17 March 2001 Tribunal Constitucional, Sentencia 66/2001, Recurso de amparo 3836/98 promovido por don Julio Hierro Moset, don Míguel Planchuelo Herresánchez y on Francisco Saiz Oceja frente a la sentencia de la Sala Segunda del Tribunal Supremo que le

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

176 Bibliography condenó por un delito de detención ilegal en la causa seguida por el secuestro de don Segundo Marey Samper, 17 March 2001 Tribunal Constitucional, Sentencia 67/2001, Recurso de amparo 3837/98 promovido por don Michel Domínguez Martínez frente a la sentencia de la Sala Segunda del Tribunal Supremo que le condenó por un delito de detención ilegal en la causa seguida por el secuestro de don Segundo Marey Samper, 17 March 2001 Tribunal Constitucional, Sentencia 68/2001, Recurso de amparo 3860/98 promovido por don José Barrionuevo Peña frente a la sentencia de la Sala Segunda del Tribunal Supremo que le condenó por un delito de detención ilegal en la causa seguida por el secuestro de don Segundo Marey Samper, 17 March 2001 Tribunal Constitucional, Sentencia 69/2001, Recurso de amparo 3862/98 promovido por don Rafael Vera Fernández-Huidobro frente a la sentencia de la Sala Segunda del Tribunal Supremo que le condenó por delitos de malversación de caudales públicos y de secuestro en la causa seguida por el secuestro de don Segundo Marey Samper, 17 March 2001 Tribunal Constitucional, Sentencia 70/2001, Recurso de amparo 3865/98 promovido por don Francisco Álvarez Sánchez frente a la sentencia de la Sala Segunda del Tribunal Supremo que le condenó delitos de malversación de caudales públicos y de secuestro en la causa seguida por el secuestro de don Segundo Marey Samper, 17 mars 2001, BOE, 6 April 2001 Tribunal de Grande Instance de Bayonne, Affaire Cathala contre Enbata, judgement n°548/96, 27 March 1996 Tribunal de Grande Instance de Bayonne, Ordonnance d’irrecevabilité n°0/96/47 dans l’affaire Basañez Jauregui contre Alvarez, Hassen et Planchuelo, 30 January 1997 Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, Afaire Bescoechea, Ugalde, Duran et autres, 12eme Chambre, 24 October 1996 Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, Affaire Aguirre, Anduaga, Garcia de Albanis, Solazabal, Ibarra, Derteano, 12eme Chambre, 11 March 1994 Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, Affaire Bergara, Sorondo, Olazabal, Garmendia, 12eme Chambre, 8 July 1991 Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, Affaire Lasquibar, Sasin, Prieto, 14eme Chambre, 16 December 1998 Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, Affaire Lavaud, Khalerras, Allard, 14eme Chambre, 11 June 1986 Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, Affaire n°9532702489, Cathala contre De Salas Castellano, Ramirez Codina, Lobo Perez et autres, 17e Chambre, November 08, 1996 Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, Affaire Sistiaga, Mugica et autres, 14eme Chambre, 1 July 1999 Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, Affaire Valencia, Aguruza, Lacunza, 12eme Chambre, 2 September 1998 Tribunal Supremo de Madrid, Caso Segundo Marey Samper, sentencia n°2/1998, Causa Especial n°2530/1995, 29 July 1998 Films Amigo, A. El año de todos los demonios, Zurriola Group Entertainment, 2007, 72 min.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Bibliography 177 Canals, E. Barcelona 1962. L’ombra dels Creix, OptimTV, Televisió de Catalunya, 2014, 60 min. Courtois, M. GAL. En el punto de mira, Aurum Producciones, 2006, 111 min. Fay, B., Muntz, X. GAL: des tueurs d’État, Canal + / Spécial investigation, 2012, 52 min. Lamas, S. Terra de Ninguem, O Som e a Fúria, 2012, 72 min. Mc Caig, A. Terreur d’Etat au Pays basque, Agat Film & Cie / Arte France, 2000, 59 min. Mc Caig, A., Gillet, S., Voigt, P., Douai, J. Les mains sales, Antenne 2 / Le magazine, 1986, 39 min. Malo, P. Lasa eta Zabala, Abra Producciones / Abra Produkzioak, 2014, 107 min. Martinez, J., Larreategi, T. Sagarren denbora – Alfonso Etxegarai eta Kristiane Etxaluz: 25 urte deserritik itzultzen, Bilbao, Gizarte Ikasketerako Talde Eragilea – Instituto de Promocion de Estudios Sociales (GITE-IPES), 2010, 67min. Masse-Depasse, O. Sanctuaire, Haut et Court / Versus Production, 2015, 90 min. Medem, J. La pelota vasca: la piel contra la piedra, Alicia Produce, 2003, 115 min. Published primary sources CEDRI, Le GAL ou le terrorisme d’Etat dans l’Europe des Démocraties, Bale, CEDRI, 1989 CESEDEN, ‘El Ejército en la Guerra Subversiva (Manual del Ministerio del Ejercito portugués)’, Boletín de Información del CESEDEN, 2, 1966 (January), Part II, ‘Doctrina’, 1–70 CESEDEN, ‘El Ejército en la Guerra Subversiva (Manual del Ministerio del Ejército portugués, II volumen, 2. parte)’, Boletín de Información del CESEDEN, 4, 1966 (March) CESEDEN, ‘El Ejército en la Guerra subversiva (Manual del Ministerio del Ejército portugués, III Volumen)’, Boletín de Información del CESEDEN, 7, 1966 (June/July) CESEDEN, ‘El Ejército en la Guerra Subversiva (Manual del Ministerio del Ejército portugués, IV volumen), Boletín de Información del CESEDEN, 9, 1966 (October) CESEDEN, ‘La moderna guerra pequeña como fenómeno militar y político militar (3.a y 4.a partes)’, Boletín de Información del CESEDEN, 70, 1973 (January) CESEDEN, ‘La moderna guerra pequeña como fenómeno militar y político militar (5.a y 6.a partes)’, Boletín de Información del CESEDEN, 71, 1973 (February) CESEDEN, ‘Manual del Asesor contra la subversión’, Boletín de Información del CESEDEN, 16, 1967 (May) CESEDEN, ‘Manual del Asesor para la contra-subversión (II)’, Boletín de Información del CESEDEN, 17, 1967 (June/July) CESEDEN, ‘Manual del Asesor para la contra-subversión (III)’, Boletín de Información del CESEDEN, 18, 1967 (August/September) ‘Errefuxiatuak euskadin libre: euskaldun errefuxiatuak mintzo’, Errefuxiatuen Komitea, Amnistiaren aldeko Batzordea, 1986 ETA, ETAk Euskal Herriari, azken adierazpena, 3 May 2018 ‘Guerra sucia, estatuaren terrorismoa’, Euskadiko Amnistiaren Aldeko Batzordeak, [circa 1988] Plan Z.E.N. (Zona Especial Norte), Dirección de la Seguridad del Estado, Ministerio del Interior, 1983

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

178 Bibliography Talde inkontrolatuek, eskuin muturreko Taldeek eta GAL ek eragindako terrorismoaren biktimei buruzko txostena [Report on victims of terrorism linked to right-wing uncontrolled groups and the GAL], Vitoria Gasteiz, Eusko Jaurlaritza / Herrizaingo Saila, Terrorismoaren Biktimei Laguntzeko Zuzendaritza [Home Office of the Basque Government, Department directorate of care to victims of terrorism], 2008 Todas las víctimas del terrorismo. Documentos para la historia, documentos para la paz, Tomo I: ETA – Comandos Autónomos Anticapitalistas (1968–1979), Bilbao, ADDH Asociación para la Defensa de la Dignidad Humana (Giza Duntasunaren Aldeko Elkartea), Vitoria-Gasteiz, Gobierno Vasco / Dirección de Atención a las Víctimas del Terrorismo (Eusko Jaurlaritza / Terrorismoaren Biktimei Laguntzeko Zuzendaritza), 2007 Todas las víctimas del terrorismo. Documentos para la historia, documentos para la paz, Tomo II: ETA – Comandos Autónomos Anticapitalistas (1980–1983), Bilbao, ADDH Asociación para la Defensa de la Dignidad Humana (Giza Duntasunaren Aldeko Elkartea), Vitoria-Gasteiz, Gobierno Vasco / Dirección de Atención a las Víctimas del Terrorismo (Eusko Jaurlaritza / Terrorismoaren Biktimei Laguntzeko Zuzendaritza), 2007 Todas las víctimas del terrorismo. Documentos para la historia, documentos para la paz, Tomo III: ETA – Comandos Autónomos Anticapitalistas (1984–1991), Bilbao, ADDH Asociación para la Defensa de la Dignidad Humana (Giza Duntasunaren Aldeko Elkartea), Vitoria-Gasteiz, Gobierno Vasco / Dirección de Atención a las Víctimas del Terrorismo (Eusko Jaurlaritza / Terrorismoaren Biktimei Laguntzeko Zuzendaritza), 2007 Todas las víctimas del terrorismo. Documentos para la historia, documentos para la paz, Tomo IV: ETA – Comandos Autónomos Anticapitalistas (1992–2007), Bilbao, ADDH Asociación para la Defensa de la Dignidad Humana (Giza Duntasunaren Aldeko Elkartea), Vitoria-Gasteiz, Gobierno Vasco / Dirección de Atención a las Víctimas del Terrorismo (Eusko Jaurlaritza / Terrorismoaren Biktimei Laguntzeko Zuzendaritza), 2007 Todas las víctimas del terrorismo. Documentos para la historia, documentos para la paz, Tomo V: Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación, GAL (1983–1987), Bilbao, ADDH Asociación para la Defensa de la Dignidad Humana (Giza Duntasunaren Aldeko Elkartea), Vitoria-Gasteiz, Gobierno Vasco / Dirección de Atención a las Víctimas del Terrorismo (Eusko Jaurlaritza / Terrorismoaren Biktimei Laguntzeko Zuzendaritza), 2007 Todas las víctimas del terrorismo. Documentos para la historia, documentos para la paz, Tomo VI: Batallón Vasco Español, B.V.E. (1978–1980), Bilbao, ADDH Asociación para la Defensa de la Dignidad Humana (Giza Duntasunaren Aldeko Elkartea), Vitoria-Gasteiz, Gobierno Vasco / Dirección de Atención a las Víctimas del Terrorismo (Eusko Jaurlaritza / Terrorismoaren Biktimei Laguntzeko Zuzendaritza), 2007 Todas las víctimas del terrorismo. Documentos para la historia, documentos para la paz, Tomo VII: Grupo de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre, GRAPO (1975–2006), Bilbao, ADDH Asociación para la Defensa de la Dignidad Humana (Giza Duntasunaren Aldeko Elkartea), Vitoria-Gasteiz, Gobierno Vasco / Dirección de Atención a las Víctimas del Terrorismo (Eusko Jaurlaritza / Terrorismoaren Biktimei Laguntzeko Zuzendaritza), 2007 Todas las víctimas del terrorismo. Documentos para la historia, documentos para la paz, Tomo VIII: Otras bandas terrorsitas. Triple A, extrema derecha, GAE (Grupo Anti ETA), terrorismo islamista, Iraultza, incontrolados (1975–2004), Bilbao,

Bibliography 179 ADDH Asociación para la Defensa de la Dignidad Humana (Giza Duntasunaren Aldeko Elkartea), Vitoria-Gasteiz, Gobierno Vasco / Dirección de Atención a las Víctimas del Terrorismo (Eusko Jaurlaritza / Terrorismoaren Biktimei Laguntzeko Zuzendaritza), 2007

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Secondary sources Agüero, F. Militares, Civiles y Democracia: La España postfranquista en perspectiva comparada, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1995 Aguilar Olivencia, M. El ejército español durante el franquismo, Madrid, Ediciones Akal, 1999 Aguilar, P. Memory and Amnesia: The Role of the Spanish Civil War in the Transition to Democracy, New York, Berghahn Books, 2002 Aguirre, J. [pseudo. for Eva Forrest] Operación ogro: Cómo y por qué ejecutamos a Carrero Blanco, Donostia, Hordago, 1978 Aimé-Blanc, L. Caradech’h, J.-M., L’indic et le commissaire, Paris, Plon, 2006 Aizpuru, M. ‘El primer informe policial sobre ETA? Los archivos franquistas como fuente para la investigación histórica’, Sancho el Sabio, 39, 2016, 223–51 Albanese, M., Del Hierro, P. Transnational Fascism in the Twentieth Century: Spain, Italy and the Global Neo-Fascist Network, London, Bloomsbury Academic, 2016 Alcalde, A. Los excombatientes franquistas: La cultura de guerra del fascismo español y la Delegación Nacional de Excombatientes (1936–1965), Zaragoza, Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza, 2014 Alcedo Moneo, M. Militar en ETA: Historias de vida y muerte, San Sebastian, Haranburu, 1996 Allan, K. and Burridge, K. Euphemism and Dysphemism: Language Used as Shield and Weapon, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1991 Alonso, R. ‘Victims of ETA’s terrorism as an interest group: Evolution, influence, and impact on the political agenda of Spain’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 29:6, 2017, 985–1005 Alonso, R. ‘Why do terrorists stop? Analyzing why ETA members abandon or continue with terrorism’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 34:9, 2011, 696–716 Alted, A. La voz de los vencidos: El exilio republicano de 1939, Madrid, Aguilar, 2012 Alted Vigil, A., Domergue, L. (eds) El exilio republicano español en Toulouse, 1939–1999, Toulouse, Presses Universitaires du Mirail / Madrid, UNED, 2003 Alvarez Enparantza, J.-L. Euskal Herria en el horizonte, Tafalla, Txalaparta, 1997 Álvarez-Junco, J., Mater dolorosa: La idea de España en el siglo XIX, Madrid, Taurus, 2001 Álvarez-Junco, J. Spanish Identity in the Age of Nations, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2011 Alvaro Baeza, L. Gal, Crimen de Estado, Madrid, ABL Press, 1995 Amedo Foucé, J. Cal viva: un relato estremecedor: la verdad definitiva desde las entrañas de los GAL, Madrid, La esfera de los libros, 2013 Amedo Foucé, J. La conspiración, el último atentado de los GAL, Madrid, Espejo de Tinta, 2006 Anderson, L. Cooking Up the Nation: Spanish Culinary Texts and Culinary Nationalization in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century, Woodbridge, Boydell & Brewer, 2013

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

180 Bibliography Anderson, M. In Thrall to Political Change: Police and Gendarmerie in France, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011 Anderson, M., Den Boer, M., Cullen, P., Gilmore, W. (eds) Policing the European Union: Theory, Law and Practice, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995 Andrea Hepworth, A. ‘Site of memory and dismemory: The Valley of the Fallen in Spain’, Journal of Genocide Research, 16:4, 2014, 463–85 Angoustures, A. ‘L’opinion publique française et l’Espagne, 1945–1975’, Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, 37, 1990, 672–86 Aprile, S. Le siècle des exilés: Bannis et proscrits de 1789 à la Commune, Paris, CNRS éditions, 2010 Aretxaga, B. ‘Fictional reality: Paramilitary death squads and the construction of State terror in Spain’, in J. A. Sluka (ed.) Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror, Philadephia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000, 46–69 Aretxaga, B. States of Terror: Begoña Aretxaga’s Essays, Reno, University of Nevada Press, 2005 Argomaniz, J. ‘State responses to victims of terrorism needs in Spain’, in J. Argomanitz, O. Lynch (eds) International Perspectives on Terrorist Victimisation, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, 124–48 Aróstegui, J., Jorge, M. El último frente: la resistencia armada antifranquista en España, 1939–1952, Madrid, Los Libros de la Catarata, 2008 Arostegui Sanchez, J. (ed.) Franco: la represión como sistema, Barcelona, Flor del Viento, 2012 Arrizabalaga, J., Murias, A. Autonomoekin solasean, Tafalla, Txalaparta, 1997 Aschmann, B. ‘The reliable ally: Germany supports Spain’s European integration efforts, 1957–67’, Journal of European Integration History, 7:1, 2001, 37–51 Attali, J. Verbatim – Vol.1: 1981–1986, Paris, Fayard, 1993 Audigier, F. Histoire du S.A.C. La part d’ombre du Gaullisme, Paris, Stock, 2003 Aust, A. Handbook of International Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005 Baby, S. Le mythe de la transition pacifique: Violence et politique en Espagne (1975–1982), Madrid, Casa de Velázquez, 2012 Baby, S. ‘Les victimes oubliées de la transition espagnole’, Histoire@Politique, 29:2, 2016, 88–104 Balfour, S. Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the Road to Spanish Civil War, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002 Balfour, S. The End of the Spanish Empire, 1898–1923, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997 Balfour, S., Quiroga, A. The Reinvention of Spain: Nation and Identity since Democracy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007 Ballbé, M., Orden público y militarismo en la España constitucional (1812–1983), Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1983 Barrionuevo, J. 2001 dias en Interior, Barcelona, Ediciones B., 1997 Bassiouni, C. International Extradition: United States Law and Practice, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014 Bassiouni, C. ‘The regression of the rule of law under the guise of combating terrorism’, International Review of Penal Law, 76:1/2, 2005, 17–26 Bassiouni, C., Wise, E. Aut Dedere aut Judicare: The Duty to Extradite or Prosecute in International Law, Dordrecht, Boston, London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995 Bassols, R. España en Europa. Historia de la adhesión a la CE, 195–1985, Madrid, Estudios Políticas Exterior, 1995

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Bibliography 181 Batista, A. La carta: Historia de un comisario Franquista, Barcelona, Editorial Debate, 2010 Batista, A. Madariaga. De las armas a la palabra, Barcelona, RBA ediciones, 2007 Bayo, E. GAL: punto final, Barcelona, Plaza y Janes, 1997 Berstein, S., Rioux, J.-P. The Pompidou Years, 1969–1974, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000 Bidegain, E. Iparretarrak (IK). Histoire d’une organisation politique armée, Larressore, Gatuzain, 2007 Bigo, D. ‘Les attentats de 1986 en France: un cas de violence transnationale et ses implications’, Cultures & Conflits, 4, 1991, 123–73 Bigo, D. Polices en réseaux: l’expérience européenne, Paris, Presses de Sciences-Po, 1996 Bigo, D., Guittet, E.-P. ‘The quest for absolution and immunity: justifying past and future torture in the name of democracy’, in E. Guild, D. Bigo, M. Gibney (eds) Extraordinary Rendition: Addressing the Challenges of Accountability, London, Routledge, 2018, 202–29 Bigo, D., Tsoukala, A. (eds) Terror, Insecurity and Liberty: Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes after 9/11, Abingdon, Routledge, 2008 Bilbao, I. Jean Ybarnegaray: entre petite et grande patrie, Bayonne, Elkar, 2013 Blakeley, R. ‘Bringing the State back into terrorism studies’, European Political Science, 6:3, 2007, 228–35 Blakeley, R. State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South, London, Routledge, 2009 Blum, W. Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions since World War II, London, Zed Books, 2003 Bonichot, J.-C. ‘L’évolution récente de l’extradition passive en France’, Annuaire français de droit international, 30, 1984, 19–42 Bonnet, G. Les guerres insurrectionnelles et révolutionnaires, Paris, Payot, 1958 Borras Betriu, R. El día en que mataron a Carrero Blanco, Barcelona, Planeta, 1974 Bosi, L., Demetriou, C., Malthaner, S. (eds) Dynamics of Political Violence: A Process-Oriented Perspective on Radicalization and the Escalation of Political Conflict, Farnham, Ashgate, 2014 Bowen, W. H., Alvarez, J. (eds) A Military History of Modern Spain: From the Napoleonic Era to the International War on Terror, Westport, Praeger Security International, 2007 Boyd, C. Praetorian Politics in Liberal Spain, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1979 Branche, R. La torture et l’armée pendant la guerre d’Algérie, 1954–1962, Paris, Gallimard, 2001 Brassloff, A. Religion and Politics in Spain: The Spanish Church in Transition, 1962–96, New York, Palgrave, 1998 Bribosia, E., Weyembergh, A. ‘Extradition et asile: vers un espace judiciaire européen?’, Revue Belge de droit international, 1, 1997, 69–98 Brighi, E., Cerella, A. ‘An alternative vision of politics and violence: Introducing mimetic theory in international studies’, Journal of International Political Theory, 11:1, 2015, 3–25 Brown, T, Anton, L. (eds) Between the Avant-Garde and the Everyday: Subversive Politics in Europe from 1957 to the Present, Oxford, Berghahn Books, 2011 Brysk, A., Shafir, G. (eds) National Insecurity and Human Rights: Democracies Debate Counterterrorism, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2007

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

182 Bibliography Buchanan, T. Britain and the Spanish Civil War, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997 Burgess, G. Refuge in the Land of Liberty: France and Its Refugees, from the Revolution to the End of Asylum, 1787–1939, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2008 Burgess, G. Refugees and the Promise of Asylum in Postwar France, 1945–1995, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019 Burgess, G. ‘Remaking asylum in post-war France, 1944–52’, Journal of Contemporary History, 49:3, 2014, 556–76 Bussière, E., Willaert, E. Un projet pour l’Europe, Georges Pompidou et la construction européenne, Bruxelles, PIE, Peter Lang, 2010 Cabezas, J. Yo maté a un etarra. Secretos de un comisario de la lucha antiterrorista, Barcelona, Planeta, 2003 Calvo-Gonzalez, O. ‘American military interests and economic confidence in Spain under the Franco dictatorship’, The Journal of Economic History, 67:3, 2007, 740–67 Cano Jauregui, H. Twist, Zarautz, Susa, 2011 Carcedo, D. Sáenz de Santa María, el General que cambió de bando, Madrid, Temas de Hoy, 2004 Cardona, G. El poder militar en el franquismo. Las bayonetas de papel, Barcelona, Les Punxes, 2008 Carr, R. Spain, 180–1975, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982 Carrión, G. ETA en los archivos secretos de la policía de Franco. 1952–1969, Alicante, Agua Clara, 2002 Casanellas, P., Morir matando. El franquismo ante la práctica armada, 1968–1977, Madrid, Libros de la Catarata, 2014 Cassan, P. Le pouvoir français et la question basque (1981–1993), Paris, l’Harmattan, 1997 Cassese, A. ‘Terrorism is also disrupting some crucial legal categories of international law’, European Journal of International Law, 12:5, 2001, 993–1001 Cassinello Pérez, A. Operaciones de guerrillas y contraguerrillas, Madrid, COMPI, 1966 Castells Arteche, M. Radiografía de un modelo represivo, San Sebastián, Ediciones Vascas, Argitaletxea, 1982 Catala, M. Les relations franco-espagnoles pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale: Rapprochement nécessaire, réconciliation impossible, 1939–1944, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1997 Celaya, D. G. La guerra continúa. Voluntarios españoles al servicio de la Francia libre, 1940–1945, Marcial Pons Ediciones, Madrid, 2015 Cenarro, Á. ‘Francoist nostalgia and memories of the Spanish Civil War’, International Journal of Iberian Studies, 21:3, 2008, 203–17 Cenarro, Á. ‘Matar, vigilar y delatar: la quiebra de la sociedad civil durante la guerra y la posguerra en España (1936–1948)’, Historia Social, 2002, 44, 65–86 Cercas, J. The Anartomy of a Moment, London, Bloomsbury, 2011 Cerdán, M. El informe Jano, Madrid, Plaza & Janes, 2010 Cerdán, M., Rubio, A. El ‘caso interior’: GAL, Roldan y fondos reservados, el triángulo negro de un ministerio, Madrid, Temas de hoy, 1995 Cettina, N. L’antiterrorisme en question. De l’attentat de la rue Marbeuf aux affaires corses, Paris, Michalon, 2001 Chalk, P. ‘The liberal democratic response to terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 7:4, 1995, 10–44

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Bibliography 183 Charnon-Deutsch, L. The Spanish Gypsy: The History of a European Obsession, University Park, Pensylvania State University Press, 2004 Charpentier, J. ‘Vers un espace judiciaire européen’, Annuaire français de droit international, 1978, 927–41 Ciocchini, P., Khoury, S. ‘The “war on terror” and Spanish state violence against Basque political dissent’, in S. Poynting, D. Whyte (eds) Counter-Terrorism and State Political Violence: the ‘War on Terror’ as Terror, London, Routledge, 2012, 178–96 Clark, P. The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952–1980, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1984 Clark, P. Negotiating with ETA: Obstacles to Peace in the Basque Country, 1975–1988, Reno, University of Nevada Press, 1990 Clark, R. The Basques, the Franco Years and Beyond, Reno, University of Nevada Press, 1979 Closa, C. ‘International limits to national claims in EU constitutional negotiations: The Spanish government and the asylum right for EU citizens’, International Negotiations, 3:3, 1998, 389–411 Closa, C., Heywood, P. M. Spain and the European Union, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 1995 Cockburn, A. Kill Chain: Drones and the Rise of High-Tech Assassins, London, Verso, 2015 Cohen, G.D. In War’s Wake: Europe’s Displaced Persons in the Postwar Order, New York, Oxford University Press, 2012 Cohen, S. (ed.) Democracies at War Against Terrorism: A Comparative Perspective, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008 Cohen, S. States of Denial: Knowing About Atrocities and Suffering, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000 Collado Seidel, C. España, refugio Nazi, Madrid, Temas de Hoy, 2005 Collins, R. Violence: A Micro-Sociological Theory, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2009 Colomer, J. M. Game Theory and the Transition to Democracy: the Spanish Model, Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1995 Conversi, D. The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation, London, Hurst, 1997 Corcuera Atienza J. La patria de los Vascos. Orígenes, ideología y organización del nacionalismo vasco (1876–1903), Madrid, Taurus, 2001 Cossias, T. La lucha contra el maquis en España, Madrid, Editorial nacional, 1956 Cotarelo, R. El alarido ronco del ganador. Las elecciones de 1996, los medios de comunicación y el porvenir de España, Barcelona, Grijalbo, 1996 Crelinsten R. D., ‘The discourse and practice of counter-terrorism in liberal democracies’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 44:1, 1998, 389–413 Crenshaw, M. (ed.) The Consequences of Counterterrorism. New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 2010 Crespo MacLennan, J. España en Europa, 1945–2000: del ostracismo a la modernidad, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2004 Crettiez, X., Mucchielli, L. (eds) Les violences politiques en Europe, Paris, La Découverte, 2010 Cullather, N. Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952–1954, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2006

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

184 Bibliography Dal Lago, A., Palidda, S. (eds) Conflict, Security and the Reshaping of Society. The Civilization of War, Abingdon, Routledge, 2010 Damborenea, R. Manual del buen terrorista, Madrid, Cambio16, 1987 De Isusi, J. Baleak ikusi ditut, Bilbao, Astiberri ediciones, 2014 De Kerchove, G., Weyembergh, A. (eds) La reconnaissance mutuelle des decisions judiciaries pénales dans l’Union Européenne, Bruxelles, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2001 De la Calle, L., Sánchez-Cuenca, I. ‘La selección de víctimas de ETA’, Revista Española de Ciencia Política, 10, 2004, 53–79 De la Rasilla del Moral, I. ‘The fascist mimesis of Spanish international law and its Vitorian aftermath, 1939–1953’, The Journal of the History of International Law, 14, 2012, 207–36 De Pablo, S., Mees, L., Rodriguez Ranz, J. A. (eds) El péndulo patriotico: historia del Partido Nacionalista Vasco, Vol. 2, 1936–1979, Barcelona, Crítica, 2001 Del Aguila, J., El TOP: la represión de la libertad, 1963–1977, Barcelone, Planeta, 2001 Delaunay, J. M., Méfiance cordiale: les relations franco-espagnoles au début du XXe siècle (1899–1914), Paris, L’Harmattan, 2011 Della Porta, D. ‘Research on social movements and political violence’, Qualitative Sociology, 31:3, 2008, 221–30 Della Porta, D. Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995 Delso, R. Amann, A., Soriano, F. ‘Time, architecture and domination: The Valley of the Fallen’, Heritage & Society, 11:2, 2018, 126–50 Denéchère, Y. La politique espagnole de la France de 1931 à 1936, une pratique française de rapports inégaux, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1999 Denoyer, A. L’exil comme patrie – Les réfugiés communistes espagnols en RDA (1950–1989), Rennes, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2017 Días, A. Los servicios de inteligencia en España, Madrid, Alianza, 2005 Diaz, D. Un asile pour tous les peuples? Exilés et réfugiés étrangers en France au cours du premier XIXe siècle, Paris, Armand Colin, 2014 Díaz, V. P. The Return of Civil Society: The Emergence of Democratic Spain, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1998 Díaz de Villegas, J. La guerra revolucionaria: la técnica de la revolución y la acción psicológica. El arma secreta del marxismo, Madrid, Ediciones Europa, 1959 Díez Medrano, J. Framing Europe: Attitudes to European Integration in Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2003 Diz Monje, J. C. ‘La guerra irregular en el marco de la defensa operativa del territorio (1965–1975)’, in F. Puell dela Villa, S.Alda Mejías (eds) Fuerzas Armadas y políticas de defensa durante el franquismo: IV Congreso de Historia de la Defensa, Madrid, Instituto Universitario General Gutiérrez Mellado de Investigación sobre la Paz, la Seguridad y la Defensa – UNED, 2010, 217–35 Domínguez, F. Josu Ternera: Una vida en ETA, Madrid, La Esfera de los libros, 2006 Domínguez Arribas, J. El enemigo judeo-masónico en la propaganda franquista (1936–1945), Madrid, Marcial Pons Ediciones de Historia, 2009 Donohue, L. K. The Cost of Counterterrorism: Power, Politics and Liberty, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008 Douglass, W. Basque Politics: A Case Study in Ethnic Nationalism, Reno, University of Nevada Press, 1985

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Bibliography 185 Douglass, W. (ed.) Basque Politics and Nationalism on the Eve of the Millennium, Reno, University of Nevada Press, 1999 Dreyfus-Armand, G. L’exil des républicains espagnols en France: De la Guerre civile à la mort de Franco, Paris, Albin Michel, 1999 Druliolle, V. ‘Democracy captured by its imaginary: The transition as memory and discourse of constitutionalism in Spain’, Social & Legal Studies, 17:1, 2008, 75–92 Dufourg, J.-M., Section Manipulation. De l’antiterrorisme à l’affaire Doucé, Paris, Michel Lafon, 1991 Dulphy A. ‘La politique de la France à l’égard de l’Espagne franquiste, 1945–1949’, Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, 35:1, 1988, 123–40 Dulphy, A. ‘La politique espagnole de la France (1945–1955)’, Vingtième siècle – Revue d’histoire, 68, 2000, 29–42 Dulphy A. ‘Un miroir des relations franco-espagnoles: les maquisards FFI-FTP détenus par le régime franquiste 1944–1955’, Exils et migrations ibériques au XXe siècle, 7, 1999, 179–203 Dunthorn, D. Britain and the Spanish Anti-Franco Opposition, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2000 Durán Muñoz, R. Contención y transgresión: las movilizaciones sociales y el estado en las transiciones española y portuguesa, Madrid, Centro de estudios políticos y constitucionales, 2000 Ealham, C. ‘Spanish anarcho-syndicalists in Toulouse: The red-and-black counter-city in exile’, Bulletin of Spanish Studies, 91:1–2, 2014, 95–114 Edelman, M. Constructing the Political Spectacle, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1988 Eiroa, M. ‘From the Iron Curtain to Franco’s Spain: Right-wing central Europeans in exile’, Central Europe, 16:1, 2018, 1–16 Elorza, A. (ed.) La historia de ETA, Madrid, Temas de Hoy, 2000 Encarnación, O. ‘Pinochet’s revenge: Spain revisits its Civil War’, World Policy Journal, 24:4, 2007, 39–50 Encarnación, O. G. ‘Democracy and dirty wars in Spain’, Human Rights Quarterly, 29:4, 2007, 950–72 Encarnación, O. G. Democracy Without Justice in Spain: The Politics of Forgetting, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014 Encarnación, O. G. Spanish Politics: Democracy After Dictatorship, Cambridge, Polity, 2008 Esteban, M., Regards sur la seconde guerre mondiale en Pays basque, Donostia, Elkar, 2007 Etcheverry-Ainchart, J., Etcheverry-Ainchart, P. Le mouvement Enbata, à la source de l’abertzalisme du nord, Donostia, Elkar, 2013 Evans, M. Algeria: France’s Undeclared War, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006 Falcón, L. El honor de dios, Barcelona, el viejo topo, 2016 Feldman, A. Formations of Violence. The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1991 Fernández Soldevilla, G. Héroes, heterodoxos y traidores. Historia de Euskadiko Ezkerra (1974–1994), Madrid, Tecnos, 2013 Fernández Soldevilla, G., López Romo, R. Sangre, votos y manifestaciones: ETA y el nacionalismo vasco radical. 1958–2011, Madrid, Tecnos, 2012 Fernández Soldevilla, G., López Romo, R., Barandiaran Contreras, M., Casanellas, P. ‘La documentación de (y sobre) ETA’, Tabula, 14, 2011, 45–57

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

186 Bibliography Fernández Vázquez, J. ‘After the quarantine: A closer look at monuments to victims of ETA in the Basque country and Navarre’, Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies, 19:2, 2018, 209–32 Ferrán, O., Hilbink, L. (eds) Legacies of Violence in Contemporary Spain: Exhuming the Past, Understanding the Present, Abingdon, Routledge, 2016 Ferret, J. ‘La construction par le bas de la lutte antiterroriste. Une analyse microsociologique de la coopération policière franco-espagnole au Pays basque’, in X. Crettiez, J. Ferret (eds) Le silence des armes? L’Europe à l’épreuve des nationalismes violents, Paris, IHESI / La documentation Française, 1999, 115–40 Frank, M., Reinisch, J. (eds) Refugees in Europe, 1919–1959: A Forty Years’ Crisis?, London, Bloomsbury, 2017 French, D. The British Way in Counter Insurgency, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011 Funes, M. J. ‘Social responses to political violence in the Basque country: Peace movements and their audience’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42:4, 1998, 493–510 Gallego, F. Una Patria imaginada. La extrema derecha española (1973–2005), Madrid, Síntesis, 2005 Garcia, J. Los GAL al descubierto: La trama de la ‘Guerra Sucia’ contra ETA, Madrid, El País-Aguilar, 1988 García Alcalá, J. A. Historia del Felipe (FLP, FOC y ESBA). De Julio Cerón a la Liga Comunista Revolucionaria, Madrid, Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales (CEPC), 2002 García Cárcel, R. La Herencia del pasado. Las memorias históricas de España, Barcelona, Galaxia Gutenberg, 2011 García Rico, E. Queríamos la revolución. Crónicas del FELIPE, Frente de Liberación Popular, Barcelona: Flor del Viento Ediciones, 1998 Gfeller, A. E. Building a European Identity: France, the United States, and the Oil Shock, 1973–74, Oxford, Berghahn Books, 2012 Gillespie, R., Gray, C. (eds) Contesting Spain? The Dynamics of Nationalist Movements in Catalonia and the Basque Country, London, Routledge, 2015 Gillespie, R., Rodrigo, F., Story, J. (eds) Democratic Spain: Reshaping External Relations in a Changing World, London, Routledge, 1995 Gillet, J.-C. Le PSU et la question basque: sa participation à la lutte pour l’émancipation nationale et sociale du peuple basque (1960–1990), Paris, Editions du Croquant, 2019 Giménez-Salinas, A. ‘The Spanish Intelligence Services’, in J.-P. Brodeur, P. Gill, D. Tollborg (eds) Democracy, Law and Security. Internal Security Services in Contemporary Europe, London, Ashgate, 2003, 63–80 Girard, R. Je vois satan tomber comme l’éclair, Paris, Grasset, 2001 Girard, R. La violence et le sacré, Paris, Grasset [1972], 1999 Goenaga, E. (ed.) GAL hogeita hamar urte, Donostia / Andoain, Elkar Argitaletxea / Berria, 2013 González, F. Memorias del Futuro. Reflexiones sobre el tiempo presente, Madrid, Aguilar ediciones, 2003 González Calleja, E. Guerras no ortodoxas. La ‘estrategia de la tensión’ y las redes del terrorismo neofascista, Madrid, Catarata, 2018 Gonzalez Jansen, I., La Triple-A, Buenos Aires, Editorial Contrapunto, 1986 Gorostiza, S. ‘There are the Pyrenees! Fortifying the nation in Francoist Spain’, Environmental History, 23:4, 2018, 797–823

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Bibliography 187 Graham, H. (ed.) Interrogating Francoism: History and Dictatorship in TwentiethCentury Spain, London, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016 Gray, C. International Law and the Use of Force, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004 Greenberg, K. J., Dratel, J. L. The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005 Großmann, J. ‘Baroque Spain’ as metaphor. Hispanidad, Europeanism and Cold War anti-Communism in Francoist Spain’, Bulletin of Spanish Studies, 91:5, 2014, 755–71 Guild, E. The Developing Immigration and Asylum Policies of the European Union: Adopted Conventions, Resolutions, Recommendations, Decisions and Conclusions, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1996 Guild, E. ‘The uses and abuses of counter-terrorism policies in Europe: The case of the “terrorist lists”’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 46:1, 2008, 173–93 Guild, E., Bigo, D. Anti- & Counter-terrorism and Human Rights in Europe. 5 Snapshots of Current Controversies, Paris, L’Harmattan, London, Queen Mary University of London, School of Law, 2018 Guild, E., Bigo, D., Gibney, M. (eds) Extraordinary Rendition: Addressing the Challenges of Accountability, Abingdon, Routledge, 2018 Guirao, F. Spain and the Integration of Europe, 1950–77. A Comparative Perspective, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004 Guirao, F. Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–57, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 1998 Guittet, E.-P. Antiterorrisme clandestin, antiterrorisme officiel. Chroniques espanoles de la coopération en Europe, Montréal, Athéna éditions, 2010 Guittet, E.-P. ‘Is consensus a genuine democratic value? The case of Spain’s political pacts against terrorism’, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 33: 3, 2008, 267–91 Guittet, E.-P. ‘L’imposition de l’agenda politique espagnol à l’Europe de l’antiterrorisme’, in Bigo, D., Bonelli, L., Deltombe, T. (eds) Au nom du 11 septembre: les démocraties à l’épreuve de l’antiterrorisme, Paris, La Découverte, 2008, 227–33 Guittet, E.-P. ‘Les recours à l’Etat d’exception sous le regime franquiste (1956–1975)’, Cultures &Conflits, 113, 2019, 89–98 Guittet, E.-P. ‘Ne pas leur faire confiance serait leur faire offense. Antiterrorisme, solidarité démocratique et identité politique’, Cultures & Conflits, 61, 2006, 61, 51–76 Guixé i Coromines, J. ‘Persécutions d’exil. La répression politique des républicains espagnols en France (1937–1951)’, Relations Internationales, 142, 2010, 71–86 Halimi, G. Le procès de Burgos, Paris, Gallimard, 1971 Hamilton, C. Women and ETA: The Gender Politics of Radical Basque Nationalism, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2007 Heiberg, M. The Making of the Basque Nation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989 Hernández Burgos, C. Granada Azul: La construcción de la ‘Cultura de la Victoria’ en el primer franquismo, Granada, Comares, 2011 Hernández Sandioca, E., Baldó, M., Ruiz Carnicer, M. A. Estudiantes contra Franco (1939–1975), Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 2007 Heywood, P. M. ‘Corruption in contemporary Spain’, Political Science & Politics, 40:4, 2007, 695–9 Hilbink, L. ‘Politicising law to liberalise politics: Anti-Francoist judges and prosecutors in Spain’s democratic transition’, in T. Halliday, L. Karpik, M. Feeley (eds)

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

188 Bibliography Fighting for Political Freedom, Portland, Hart Publishing, Oñati International Series in Law and Society, 2007, 403–37 Hobsbawn, E. The Age of Empire: 1897–1914, New York, Vintage Book, [1987], 1989 Hualde, X. ‘“La question basque”, un factor de tensión entre Francia y la España franquista (1945–1975)’, Sancho el Sabio, 32, 2010, 95–116 Irvin, C. Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1999 Itçaina, X. Les virtuoses de l’identité. Religion et politique en Pays Basque, Rennes, Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2007 Iztueta Armendáriz, P. Sociología del fenómeno contestario del clero vasco: 1940–1975, Bayonne, Elkar, 1981 Jabri, V. ‘War, security and the liberal State’, Security Dialogue, 37:1, 2006, 47–64 Jackson, J. A Certain Idea of France. The Life of Charles de Gaulle, London, Allen Lane, 2018 Jackson, J. France: The Dark Years, 1940–1944, Oxford, Oxford, University Press, 2001 Jackson, J. The Popular Front in France. Defending Democracy, 1934–38, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990 Jackson, R. Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2005 Jackson, R., Murphy, E., Poynting, S. (eds) Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and Practice, Abingdon, Routledge, 2009 Jacob, J. Hills of Conflict; Basque Nationalism in France, Reno, University of Nevada Press, 1994 Jaime-Jiménez, F. ‘Spain: The Terrorist Challenge and the Government’s Response’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 4:4, 1992, 110–30 Jaime-Jiménez, O. Policía, terrorismo y cambio político en España, 1976–1996, Valencia: Tirant Lo Blanch, 2002 Jamieson, R., McEvoy, K. ‘State crime by proxy and juridical othering’, British Journal of Criminology, 2005, 45:4, 504–27 Janse, R. ‘The evolution of the political criteria for accession to the European Community, 1957–1973’, European Law Journal, 24:1, 2018, 57–76 Jansson, J. Terrorism, Criminal Law and Politics: The Decline of the Political Offence Exception to Extradition, London, Routledge, 2019 Jáuregui, G. Ideología y estrategia política de ETA: Análisis de su evolución entre 1959 y 1968, Madrid, Siglo XXI, 1981 Jáuregui, P. ‘National pride and the meaning of “Europe”: A comparative study of Britain and Spain’, The Sociological Review, 48, 2000, 257–87 Jensen, G. ‘The Spanish army at war in the nineteenth century: Counterinsurgency at home and abroad’, in W. H. Bowen, J. Alvarez (eds) A Military History of Modern Spain: From the Napoleonic Era to the International War on Terror, Westport, Praeger Security International, 2007, 15–36 Jiménez, F. ‘Political scandals and political responsibility in democratic Spain’, West European Politics, 21:4, 1998, 80–99 Jiménez, F. ‘Spain: The terrorist challenge and the government’s response’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 4:4, 1992, 110–30 Jiménez, F., Caínzos M. ‘Political corruption in Spain’, in M. J. Bull, J. L. Newell (eds), Corruption in Contemporary Politics, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, 9–23 Jiménez de Aberasturi, J. C. En passant la Bidassoa: Le réseau Comète au Pays Basque: 1941–1944, Biarritz, J & D Editions, 1996

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Bibliography 189 Jimeno-Bulnes, M. ‘Spain and the European arrest warrant – The view of a ‘key user’, in E. Guild (ed.) Constitutional Challenges to the European Arrest Warrant, Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2006, 163–85 Joinet, L. Mes Raisons d’Etat. Mémoires d’un épris de justice, Paris, La Découverte, 2013 Kalyvas, S. N. The Logic of Violence in Civil War, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006 Kauffer, R. L’OAS: histoire d’une organisation secrète, Paris, Fayard, 1986 Keen, S. Faces of the Enemy: Reflections of the Hostile Imagination, New York, Harper Collins, 1991 Kennedy, P. The Spanish Socialist Party and the Modernisation of Spain, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2013 Kohut, D., Vilella, O. Historical Dictionary of the Dirty Wars, New York, Rowman & Littlefield, 2016 Kourliandsky, J.-J. ‘Une politique espagnole pour la France’, La Revue internationale et stratégique, 9, 1993, 160–72 Krauel, J. Imperial Emotions: Cultural Responses to Myths of Empire in Fin-de-siècle Spain, Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2013 Landa, J.–M. ‘Human rights and politically-motivated violence in the Basque country’, Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 12:2, 2013, 7–29 Lazardeux, S. G. Cohabitation and Conflicting Politics in French Policymaking, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015 Leitão, N. A. ‘A flight of fantasy? Portugal and the first attempt to enlarge the European Economic Community, 1961–1963’, Contemporary European History, 16:1, 2007, 71–87 Leonisio, R, Molina, F., Muro, D. (eds) ETA’s Terrorist Campaign. From Violence to Politics, 1968–2015, London, Routledge, 2017 Lesley, G. The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 2004 Letamendia, F. La Mujer en la Cueva, Bilbao, Txertoa, 2012 Liedtke, B. ‘Spain and the United States, 1945–1975’, in S. Balfour, P. Preston (eds) Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century, London, Routledge, 2002, 237–52 Llera, F. J., Mata J. M., Irvin, C. L. ‘ETA: From secret army to social movement – the post-Franco schism of the Basque nationalist movement’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 5:3, 1993, 106–34 López García, J. A., Estado y derecho en el franquismo. El nacionalsindicalismo: F. J. Conde y Luis Legaz Lacambra, Madrid, Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 1996 López García, J. A., ‘La presencia de Carl Schmitt en España’, Revista de Estudios Políticos (Nueva Época), 91, 1996, 139–68 López Garrido, D. El aparato policial en España: historia, sociología e ideología, Barcelona, Ariel, 1987 Mac Clancy, J. ‘The culture of radical Basque nationalism’, Anthropology Today, 4:5, 1988, 17–19 Macklin, A. ‘From cooperation, to complicity, to compensation: The War on Terror, extraordinary rendition, and the cost of torture’, European Journal of Migration and Law, 10:1, 2008, 11–30 MacLennan, J. C. Spain and the Process of European Integration, 1957–85, London, Palgrave, 2000

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

190 Bibliography Madariaga, J. Zor Egiari, Tafalla, Txalaparta, 2014 Malešević, S. The Sociology of War and Violence, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010 Maliniak, T. Les Espagnols, de la Movida à l’Europe – La décennie socialiste, Paris, Centurion, 1990 Mangini, S. Rojos y Rebeldes: La cultura de la disidencia durante el Franquismo, Barcelona, Anthropos, 1987 Mansvelt Beck, J. ‘Geopolitical imaginations of the Basque homeland’, Geopolitics, 11:3, 2006, 507–28 Mansvelt Beck, J. Territory and Terror: Conflicting Nationalisms in the Basque Country, Abingdon, Routledge, 2005 Maravall, J. M. Dictatorship and Political Dissent: Workers & Students in Franco’s Spain, London: Tavistock, 1978 Marco, J. ‘Francoist crimes: Denial and invisibility, 1936–2016’, Journal of Contemporary History, 52:1, 2017, 157–63 Marco, J. ‘Una Corea en pequeño. Contrainsurgencia y represión de la guerrilla en España, 1939–1952’, Contenciosa, 1:1, 2013, 1–20 Martin Villa, R. Al servicio del Estado. Un examen riguroso y objetivo del paso de un regimen autoritario a la democracia por uno de los protagonistas más significados de la transición, Barcelona, Planeta, 1984 Martínez Foronda, A., Baena Luque, E., I. García Escribano (eds) La dictadura en la dictadura: detenidos, deportados y torturados en Andalucía durante el estado de excepción de 1969, Córdoba, Fundación de Estudios Sindicales y Archivo Histórico de Comisiones Obreras de Andalucía, 2011 Mason, E. Democracy, Deeds and Dilemmas: Support for the Spanish Republic Within British Civil Society, 1936–1939, Eastbourne, Sussex Academic Press, 2017 Mata López, J. M. El nacionalismo vasco radical: Discurso, organización y expresiones, Bilbao, Servicio Editorial, Universidad del País Vasco, 1993 Mauroy, P. Mémoires. ‘Vous mettrez du bleu au ciel’, Paris, Plon, 2003 McCormick, R. B. Croatia under Ante Pavelic. America, the Ustaše and Croatian Genocide in World War II, New York, I. B. Tauris, 2017 McKenna, A. J. Violence and Difference. Girard, Derrida, and Deconstruction, Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 1992 McSherry, J. P. Predatory states: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2005 Mees, L. Nationalism, Violence and Democracy – the Basque Clash of Identities, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003 Mees, L. El profeta pragmático: Aguirre, el primer Lehendakari (1939–1960), Irún, Alberdania, 2006 Ménage, G. L’œil du pouvoir. Volume 1: Les affaires de l’Etat, 1981–1986, Paris, Fayard, 1999 Ménage, G. L’œil du pouvoir. Volume 2: face aux terrorismes. 1981–1986. Action directe, Corse, Pays basque, Paris, Fayard, 2000 Menendez, A. J., ‘From republicanism to fascist ideology under the early Franquismo’ in C. Joerges, N. Singh Ghaleigh, (eds) Darker Legacies of Law in Europe: The Shadow of National Socialism and Fascism over Europe and Its Legal Traditions, Oxford, Hart, 2003, 337–60 Mesquida, E. La nueve: los españoles que liberaron París, Barcelona, Ediciones B, 2008 Messenger, D. L’Espagne Républicaine: French Policy and Spanish Republicanism in Liberated France, Brighton, Sussex Academic Press, 2008

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Bibliography 191 Meysman, M. ‘Belgium and the European arrest warrant: Is European criminal cooperation under pressure?’, European Criminal Law Review, 6:2, 2016, 186–210 Miralles, M., Arques, R. Amedo, el Estado contra ETA, Barcelona, Plaza y Janes, 1989 Miralles, M., Onetti, A. GAL: la historia que sacudió el país, Madrid, Esfera de los Libros, 2006 Molinero, C., Ysàs Solanes, P. ‘Workers and dictatorship: industrial growth, social control and labour protest under the Franco regime, 1939–76’, in A. Smith (ed.) Red Barcelona: Social Protest and Labour Mobilization in the Twentieth Century, London, Routledge, 2002, 185–205 Montero, M., Rodriguez-Virgili, J., García-Ortega, C. ‘The political role of the press in Spanish transition to democracy, 1975–1978’, Javnost – The Public, 15:4, 2008, 5–20 Moradiellos, E. Franco: Anatomy of a Dictator, London, I. B. Tauris, 2018 Morales, J. L., Toda, T., Imaz, M., La trama del G.A.L., Madrid, Editorial Revolución, 1988 Morán, F. España en su sitio, Barcelona, Plaza y Janès, 1990 Moreno Juliá, X. La División Azul: sangre española en Rusia, 1941–1945, Barcelona, Critica, 2005 Moreno-Nuño, C. ‘Criminalizing Maquis: Configurations of anti-francoist guerrilla fighters as bandoleros and bandits in cultural discourse’, HIOL, Hispanic Issues On Line, 10, 2012, 79–99 Muñoz Molina, A. La puerta de la infamia: crónicas del caso Marey, Úbeda, Fundación Huerta de San Antonio, 2015 Muñoz Sánchez, A. ‘A European answer to the Spanish question: The SPD and the end of the Franco dictatorship’, Journal of European Integration History, 15:1, 2009, 77–94 Muro, D. Ethnicity and Violence: The Case of Radical Basque Nationalism, London, Routledge, 2013 Muro, D., Quiroga, A. ‘Spanish nationalism: Ethnic or Civic?, Ethnicities, 5:1, 2005, 9–29 Murua, I. Ending ETA’s Armed Campaign: How and Why the Basque Armed Group Abandoned Violence, Abingdon, Routledge, 2016 Navarro Estevan, J. Manos sucias. El poder contra la justicia en España, Madrid, Temas de Hoy, 1995 Neal, A. Exceptionalism and the Politics of Counter-Terrorism: Liberty, Security and the War on Terror, Abingdon, Routledge, 2009 Noiriel, G. La tyrannie du national. Le droit d’asile en Europe, 1793–1993, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1991 Nordstrom, C., Robben, A. (eds) Fieldwork under Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Culture, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1995 Norling, S. E. ‘José Díaz de Villegas, un militar al frente de la política colonial del franquismo’, Aportes, 97, 2018, 205–31 Nuñez de Prado Clavel, S., Ramirez Ruiz, R., ‘La oposición al franquismo en las sentencias del TOP: organizaciones políticas y movimientos sociales’, Cuadernos de historia contemporánea, 35, 2013, 263–85 Núñez Peñas, V. ‘Spanish accession to the EEC: A political objective in an economic reality’, Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 90, 2015, 59–70 Núñez Seixas, X. M. Camarada invierno. Experiencia y memoria de la División Azul (1941–1945), Barcelona, Crítica, 2016

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

192 Bibliography Olivas Osuna, J. J. Iberian Military Politics: Controlling the Armed Forces During Dictatorship and Democratisation, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015 Olmeda Gómez, J. A. Las fuerzas armadas en el estado franquista, Madrid, Ediciones el Arquero, 1988 Onaindia, M. El precio de la libertad: Memorias 1948–1977, Madrid, Espasa-Calpe, 2001 Orchard, P. A Right to Flee: Refugees, States, and the Construction of International Cooperation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014 Ortuño Anaya, P. ‘The EEC, the Franco regime, and the socialist group in the European Parliament, 1962–77’, International Journal of Iberian Studies, 14:1, 2001, 26–39 Ortuño Anaya, P. European Socialists and Spain: The Transition to Democracy, 1959–77, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002 Ortuño Anaya, P. Los socialistas europeos y la transición española, 1959–1977, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2005 Ott, S. War, Judgment, and Memory in the Basque Borderlands, 1914–1945, Reno, University of Nevada Press, 2008 Pack, S. Tourism and Dictatorship: Europe’s Peaceful Invasion of Franco’s Spain, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2006 Palomares, C. Sobrevivir después de Franco. Evolución y triunfo del reformismo, 1964–1977, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 2006 Pascual Cuenca, A. M., Rilo Cabezas, T. Cherid, un sicario en las cloacas del Estado, Madrid, El Garaje Ediciones, 2019 Pasquier, R. Regional Governance and Power in France: The Dynamics of Political Space, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015 Payne, S. Basque Nationalism, Reno, University of Nevada, 1975 Payne, S. G. The Franco Regime, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1987 Payne, S. G. Politics and the Military in Modern Spain, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1967 Peers, S. ‘EU responses to terrorism’, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 52:1, 2003, 227–43 Pérez-Agote, A. The Social Roots of Basque Nationalism, Reno, University of Nevada Press, 2006 Périès, G. ‘Du corps au cancer: la construction métaphorique de l’ennemi intérieur dans le discours militaire pendant la Guerre Froide’, Cultures & Conflits, 43, 2001, 91–125 Peschanski, D. La France des camps. L’internement, 1938–1946, Paris, Gallimard, 2002 Petry, F. ‘Coalition bargaining in the French Fourth Republic 1946–58’, in M. J. Laver, I. Budge (eds) Party Policy and Government Coalitions, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 1992, 380–408 Pigenet, P. ‘L’opération Boléro-Paprika ou la protection des étrangers à l’épreuve de la guerre froide’, Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, 46:2, 1999, 296–310 Piñuel, J. L. El terrorismo en la transición española: 1972–1982, Madrid, Fundamentos, 1986 Pontaut, J.-M., Dupuis, J. Les oreilles du président, Paris, Fayard, 1996 Porch, D. Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2013 Portela, E. El eco de los disparos, Barcelona, Galaxia Gutenberg, 2016 Portela, E. Mejor la ausencia, Barcelona, Galaxia Gutenberg, 2017

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Bibliography 193 Poynting, S., Whyte, D. (eds) Counter-Terrorism and State Political Violence. The ‘War on Terror’ as Terror, Abingdon, Routledge, 2012 Preston, P. Franco: A Biography, London, Harper & Collins, 1993 Preston, P. The Politics of Revenge. Fascism and the Military in 20th Century Spain, London, Routledge, 1991 Preston, P. Spanish Holocaust. Inquisition and Extermination in Twentieth-Century Spain, London, Harper Press, 2012 Puell de la Villa, F. Gutiérrez Mellado, un militar del siglo XX (1912–1995), Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 1997 Puell de la Villa, F., Ángel Santano, S. (eds) El legado del general Gutiérrez Mellado, Madrid, Instituto Universitario General Gutiérrez Mellado / UNED, 2013 Ranstorp, M. (ed.) Mapping Terrorism Research. State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction, Abingdon, Routledge, 2007 Raento, P. ‘Political mobilisation and place-specificity: Radical nationalist street campaigning in the Spanish Basque country’, Space and Polity, 1(2), 1997, 191–204 Reid, J., The Biopolitics of the War on Terror: Life Struggles, Liberal Modernity and the Defence of Logistical Societies, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2006 Reinares, F. ‘Democratic regimes, internal security policy and the threat of terrorism’, Australian Journal of Politics & History, 44:3, 1998, 351–71 Reinares, F. (ed.) European Democracies Against Terrorism: Governmental Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation, Farnham, Ashgate / Oñati International Institute for the Sociology of Law, 2000 Reinares, F. Patriotas de la Muerte: Quiénes han militado en ETA y por qué, Madrid, Taurus, 2001 Reinares, F. ‘Sociología política de la militancia en organizaciones terroristas’, Revista de estudios políticos, 98, 1997, 85–114 Reinares, F., Jaime-Jiménez, O. ‘Countering terrorism in a new democracy: The case of Spain’, in Reinares, F. (ed.) European Democracies Against Terrorism: Governmental Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation, Farnham, Ashgate / Oñati International Institute for the Sociology of Law, 2000, 119–45 Reinlein, F. Capitanes rebeldes: los militares españoles durante la transición, de la UMD al 23-F, Madrid, La Esfera de los Libros, 2002 Richard, E., Vorms, C. ‘Transition historiographique: Retour sur quatre-vingts ans d’histoire de l’Espagne, de la Seconde République à la transition’, Vingtième Siècle. Revue d’histoire, 127:3, 2015, 13–41 Richards, M. A Time of Silence: Civil War and the Culture of Repression in Franco’s Spain, 1936–1945, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998 Riggle, R. ‘L’affaire Abou Daoud: Some problems of extraditing an international terrorist’, The International Lawyer, 12:2, 1978, 333–50 Rigouste, M. L’ennemi Intérieur. La généalogie coloniale et militaire de l’ordre sécuritaire dans la France contemporaine, Paris, La Découverte, 2011 Rioux, J.-P., The Fourth Republic, 1944–1958, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987 Robin, M.-M., Les escadrons de la mort, l’école française, Paris, La Découverte, 2004 Rodríguez Álvarez, M. Memoria de los Vascos en la II Guerra Mundial. De la Brigada Vasca al Batallon Gernika, Pamplona, Pamiela, 2002 Rodríguez Jiménez, J. L., Historia de Falange Española de las JONS, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 2000

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

194 Bibliography Rodríguez Jiménez, J. L. Reaccionarios y golpistas: la extrema derecha en España: del tardofranquismo a la consolidación de la democracia (1967–1982), Madrid, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC), 1994 Rodríguez Jiménez, J. L. ‘The Spanish extreme right: From neo-Francoism to xenophobic discourse’, in A. Mammone, E. Godin, B. Jenkins (eds), Mapping the Extreme Right in Contemporary Europe: From Local to Transnational, Abingdon, Routledge, 2012, 109–23 Rodríguez Ranz, J. A., Arrieta Alberdi, L. (eds) Radio Euskadi, La Voz de La Libertad, Iparralde 1946–1954, Venezuela 1965–1977, Bilbao, Euskal Irrati Telebista, 1998 Romanos, E. ‘Radicalization from outside: The role of the anarchist diaspora in coordinating armed actions in Franco’s Spain’, in L. Bosi, C. Demetrious, S. Malthaner, (eds) Dynamics of Political Violence. A Process-Oriented Perspective on Radicalization and the Escalation of Political Conflict, London, Ashgate, 2014, 237–54 Ros Agudo, M. La guerra secreta de Franco (1939–1945), Barcelona, Critica, 2002 Rosendorf, N. Franco Sells Spain to America: Hollywood, Tourism and Public Relations as Postwar Spanish Soft Power, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2014 Rubio Campana, A. Cerdán, A., Alenda, M. El origen del GAL. Guerra sucia y crimen de Estado, Madrid, Temas de hoy, 1997 Ruggiero, V. ‘Sentenced to normality: The Italian political refugees in Paris’, Crime, Law and Social Change, 19, 1993, 33–50 Ruiz, J. Franco’s Justice: Repression in Madrid After the Spanish Civil War, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005 Sahlins, P. Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989 San Martin, J. I. Servicio Especial. A las órdenes de Carrero Blanco, Barcelona, Planeta, 1983 Sánchez Sánchez, E. Rumbo al sur: Francia y la España del desarrollo, 1958–1969, Madrid, CSIC Editorial, 2006 Sánchez Soler, M. La transición sangrienta. Una historia violenta del proceso democrático en España (1975–1983), Barcelona, Península, 2010 Sánchez Soler, M. Los hijos del 20-N. Historia violenta del fascismo español, Madrid, Temas de hoy, 1993 Saraxto, M., Zabalo, J. ‘Jarduera armatuaren armaiera. ETAren erabakirako arrozoiak’, Jakin, 197, 2013, 11–32 Sartorius, N., Alfaya, J., La memoria insumisa: sobre la dictadura de Franco, Barcelona, Crítica, 2002 Segrelles de Arenaza, I., Protección penal del secreto de estado: artículo 135 bis a) al 135 bis d) del Código penal, Madrid, Universdad Complutense de Madrid, Editoriales de Derecho Reunidas, 1994 Séguéla, M. Pétain-Franco: Les secrets d’une alliance, Paris, Albin Michel, 1992 Segui, B., Cava, F. Las oscuras manos del olvido, Barcelona, Norma Editorial, 2014 Serra, N. The Military Transition. Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010 Serrano, S. Maquis: Historia de la guerrilla antifranquista, Madrid, Temas de hoy, 2001 Sevillano Calero, F. Rojos. La representación del enemigo en la guerra civil, Madrid, Alianza, 2007

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Bibliography 195 Share, D. ‘Transitions to democracy and transition through transaction’, Comparative Political Studies, 19:4, 1987, 525–48 Shaw, I. G. ‘Predator empire: The geopolitics of US drone warfare’, Geopolitics, 18:3, 2013, 536–59 Shultz, G. ‘Terrorism and the modern world’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 7:4, 1985, 431–47 Silke, A. (ed.) Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures, Abingdon, Routledge, 2004 Silva. L, Sanchez, M., Araluce, G. Sangre, sudor y paz. La Guardia Civil contra ETA, Barcelona, ediciones Peninsula, 2017 Smith, A. The Origins of Catalan Nationalism, 1770–1898, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014 Smith, J. The Spanish-American War 1895–1902: Conflict in the Caribbean and the Pacific, London, Routledge, 1994 Smith, M. L. R.,Roberts, S. ‘War in the gray: Exploring the concept of dirty war’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 31:5, 2008, 377–98 Soo, S. ‘Returning to the land: Vichy’s Groupement de Travailleurs Etrangers and Spanish Civil War refugees’, in S. Ott (ed.) War, Exile, Justice, and Everyday Life, 1936–1946, Reno, University of Nevada Press, 2011, 149–70 Soo, S. The Routes to Exile: France and the Spanish Civil War Refugees, 1939–2009, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2013 Stapell, H. M. Remaking Madrid: Culture, Politics, and Identity After Franco, New York, Palgrave, 2010 Starr-Deelen, D. Presidential Policies on Terrorism. From Ronald Reagan to Barack Obama, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014 Stein, L. Beyond Death and Exile: The Spanish Republicans in France, 1939–1955, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1979 Štir, I. Elementos y métodos de la guerrilla comunista, Madrid, Drina ediciones, 1966 Stråth, B. ‘A European identity: To the historical limits of a concept’, European Journal of Social Theory, 5:4, 2002, 387–401 Sullivan, J. ETA and Basque Nationalism. The Fight for Euskadi, 1890–1986, London, Routledge, 1988 Szanajda, A., Messenger, D. A. ‘The German secret state police in Spain: Extending the reach of National Socialism’, The International History Review, 40:2, 2018, 397–415 Tahmassian, L., ‘Carl Schmitt and the Basque conflict: From the design of Francoism to Spanish democracy’, Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies, 13:1, 2012, 59–81 Tejerina Montaña, B. Nacionalismo y lengua. Los procesos del cambio lingüístico en el País Vasco, Madrid, Siglo XXI, 1992 Thomas, D. C. ‘Constitutionalization through enlargement: The contested origins of the EU’s democratic identity’, Journal of European Public Policy, 13:8, 2006, 1190–210 Thouverez, L. Violence d’État et médias – Le traitement informatif du GAL dans la presse française et espagnole de référence (1983–1986), Paris, Institut Universitaire Varenne / Paris, LGDJ, 2011 Tilly, C. The Politics of Collective Violence, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003 Tilly, C. Goodin, R. E. (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

196 Bibliography Tokić, M. N. ‘Landscapes of conflict: Unity and disunity in post-Second World War Croatian émigré separatism’, European Review of History, 16:5, 2009, 739–53 Tone, J. L., War and Genocide in Cuba, 1895–1898, Chapel Hill, North Carolina University Press, 2006 Totoricagüena, G. P. Identity, Culture, and Politics in the Basque Diaspora, Reno, University of Nevada Press, 2004 Townson, N. Spain Transformed: The Late Franco Dictatorship: 1959–1975, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007 Trinquier, R. La guerra moderna y la lucha contra las guerrillas, Barcelona, Editorial Herder, 1965 Trinquier, R. La guerre moderne, Paris, la Table Ronde, 1961 Trouvé, M. L’Espagne et l’Europe. De la dictature de Franco à l’Union européenne, Bruxelles, Peter Lang, 2008 Turrado Vidal, M. La Policía en la historia contemporánea de España (1766–1986), Madrid, Dykinson Editorial, 2000 Tussell, J. Carrero: la eminencia gris del régimen de Franco, Madrid, Temas de hoy, 1994 Ubasarte-Gonzalez, G. ‘ETA and State action: The development of Spanish antiterrorism’, Crime, Law and Social Change, 72, 2019, 569–89 Uriarte, T. Mirando atrás. De las filas de ETA a las listas del PSE, Barcelona, Ediciones B, 2005 Vaisse, M. La Grandeur, Politique étrangère du Général De Gaulle (1958–1969), Paris, Fayard, 1998 Van den Broek, H. ‘Borroka – The legitimation of street violence in the political discourse of radical Basque nationalists’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 16(4), 2004, 714–36 Van den Wijngaert, C. The Political Offence Exception to Extradition: The Delicate Problem of Balancing the Rights of the Individual and the International Public Order, Deventer, Kluwer, 1980 Van Dongen, L., Roulin, S., Scott-Smith, G. (eds) Transnational Anti-Communism and the Cold War: Agents, Activities and Networks, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014 Van Munster, R. ‘The War on Terrorism: When the exception becomes the rule’, International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, 17:2, 2004, 141–53 Viñas, A. En las garras del águila. Los pactos con Estados Unidos, de Franco a Felipe González (1945–1995), Barcelona, Crítica, 2003 Von Tangen Page, M. Prisons, Peace and Terrorism: Penal Policy in the Reduction of Political Violence in Northern Ireland, Italy and the Spanish Basque Country, 1968–97, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1998, 137–40 Vuelta Simon, S., Ollivier-Maurel, P. La justice française contre ETA, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2012 Wahnich, S. (ed.) Une histoire politique de l’amnistie: Études d’histoire, d’anthropologie et de droit, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2007 Wall, T., Monahan, T. ‘Surveillance and violence from afar: The politics of drones and liminal security-scapes’, Theoretical Criminology, 15:3, 2011, 239–54 Whitefield, T. Endgame for ETA. Elusive Peace in the Basque Country, London, Hurst Publishers, 2014 Wilkinson, P. Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response, London, Routledge, 2006

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Bibliography 197 Wills, D. The First Wwar on Terrorism: Counter-Terrorism Policy During the Reagan Administration, New York, Rowman & Littlefield, 2003 Woodworth, P. Dirty War, Clean Hands. ETA, the GAL and Spanish Democracy, London / New Haven, Yale University Press, 2002 Wouters, J., Naerts, F. ‘Of arrest warrants, terrorist offences and extradition deals. An appraisal of the EU’s main criminal law measures against terrorism after 11th September, Common Market Law Review, 41:4, 2004, 904–35 Wydra, H. Politics and the Sacred, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015 Wydra, H. ‘Towards a new anthropological paradigm: The challenge of mimetic theory’, International Political Anthropology, 1:1, 2008, 161–74 Young, J. W. France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance, 1944–49: French Foreign Policy and Post-War Europe, New York, St Martin’s Press, 1990 Zapico, A. Zubigileak, Bilbao, Astiberri ediciones, 2018 Zernova, M. ‘Restorative justice in the aftermath of politically-motivated violence: The Basque experience’, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 12:4, 2019, 649–72 Zinkunegi, J., Petrikorena, J. J. Jon Anza: ¿el último crimen de Estado?, Tafalla, Txalaparta, 2010 Zulaika, J. Basque Violence. Metaphor and Sacrament, Reno, University of Nevada Press, 1988 Zumalde, X. Mi lucha clandestina en ETA. Memorias del primer Jefe del Frente Militar (1965–1968), Arrigorriaga, Status Ediciones, 2004 Zwaan, K. ‘The Aznar Protocol: Diminishing the geography of refugee protection in Europe’, in P. Minderhoud, S. Mantu, S. Zwaan (eds) Caught in Between Borders. Citizens, Migrants and Humans. Liber Amicorum in Honour of Prof. Dr. Elspeth Guild, Tilburg, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2019, 303–11

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Index

Note: ‘n.’ after a page reference indicates the number of a note on that page abduction 4, 5, 13n.27 see also assassination; rendition Algerian war 110, 170 Alianza Apostólica Anticomunista see Triple A Amedo Foucé, José 5, 103–4, 110–33 passim, 145–6, 169, 171 anti-Communism 50, 57, 84, 132 see also dirty war; Francoism; separatism Anti-Spain 24, 26, 55, 131 see also anti-Spanish anti-Spanish 25, 27, 61, 82 Anti-terrorist Liberation Groups see GAL Apostolic Anticommunist Alliance see Triple A armed forces 29, 31–2, 53–61 passim, 78, 100, 170 armed struggle 18–31 passim, 55, 73, 89 assassination 2–6, 19, 24–34 passim, 53, 73, 81–91 passim, 101–22 passim, 130, 159, 169–71 asylum 3, 75–7, 83–9 passim, 143, 150–62 passim Aznar, José Maria 4, 134, 150, 153, 159–60 Aznar Protocol 160 see also extradition

Barrionuevo, José 101–15 passim, 133–6, 144, 155–6 Basque nationalism 5, 19–20, 84, 140 Basque Nationalist Party 19–21, 30, 34, 84, 107 see also Basque Youth Force Basque Youth Force 20 Batallón Vasco Español see Spanish Basque Battalion borders 24, 27, 91, 117 see also Pyrénées; cross-border action BPS see Francoist Secret Police Brigada Político-Social see Francoist Secret Police BVE see Spanish Basque Battalion Carrero Blanco, Luis 26–8, 30, 33, 53, 73, 81, 121 Centro Superior de Información de la Defensa see Superior Centre of Defence Intelligence CESID see Superior Centre of Defence Intelligence Civil Action Service 105, 125n.26 Civil War 19–32 passim, 53–6, 76–84 passim see also Francoism Cold War 52, 54, 57, 79, 170 Communism 21, 49–58 passim, 77, 79, 84, 132

Index 199

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

counter-insurgency 8, 54, 55, 57–8, 60–1, 102, 123, 132, 170 coup 19, 26, 31, 51, 77, 88, 90, 100–1 see also Francoism Court of Public Order 51, 52, 60 cross-border action 146 democracy 9–18 passim, 28–49 passim, 60–2, 65–6, 71–2, 88–100 passim, 130, 136, 138, 141–65 passim, 171 dictatorship 10, 20, 28, 37–53 passim, 62–79 passim, 88, 95–6, 139–44 passim see also Francoism dirty war 2, 53, 105, 130–49 passim, 170 EAW see European Arrest Warrant ETA-M see ETA-Military ETA-Military 28, 30, 128n.68 ETA-PM see ETA-Political-Military ETA-Political-Military 28, 30–1, 100–1 European Arrest Warrant 161–2 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 156, 160 Europeanisation 151, 155 Euzko Gatzedi Indarra see Basque Youth Force Exile 59, 104–7, 115, 117, 120–1, 143, 170 extradition 3, 10, 62, 73–5, 78, 86–91, 110–11, 143, 150–68 passim Convention 1957 European Convention on Extradition 158, 160, 166 1995 Convention on Simplified Extradition Procedure 158 1996 Convention on Extradition 160–1 law 75, 86–7, 91 treaty 78 Franco, Caudillo Francisco 17, 25–6, 50–1, 60–1, 74, 77–81 anti-communism of 49, 54, 56, 95n.34, 151 death of 8, 26, 28–30, 33–4, 45–8, 59, 87, 152

United States policy and 40n.42, 52, 80 see also Civil War; coup; Francoism Francoism 26, 28, 40–54 passim see also Francoists Francoists 27, 50 Francoist Secret Police 21–2, 24, 52, 60–1 French domestic intelligence agency 115, 128 see also intelligence services French Socialist Party 8, 88 Fueza Nueva see New Force GAL 3–16, 34, 49, 75, 91, 100–27 passim, 130–49, 153–72 passim see also dirty war GEO see Grupos Especiales Operativos González Márquez, Felipe 2, 4, 61–2, 89–90, 101–55 passim Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación see GAL Grupos Especiales Operativos 103–4, 125n.18 Guardia Civil 21–61 passim, 102–3, 121–36 passim see also law enforcement; police guerrilla 21, 54–8, 133 warfare 8, 23, 55–6, 58 human rights 6, 46, 74, 83, 85, 138, 158, 170 immunity 4, 113, 141, 145 impunity 3, 46, 105, 133, 145, 157 intelligence services 9, 33, 35, 52–3, 60–1, 78, 118, 172 see also French domestic intelligence agency; secret service; Superior Centre of Defence Intelligence kidnapping 3, 103, 105, 108, 112, 116, 120, 133–5, 140 Lasa, José Antonio 4–5, 103, 105, 113–14, 120–1, 123, 135, 171

200 Index

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

law enforcement 25, 29, 34, 62, 102, 105, 112, 116–17, 133, 140, 144, 155, 170–1 lethal force 2 mercenaries 3, 5, 103–5, 110–13, 131–2, 136, 155, 170 see also counter-insurgency; dirty war Mitterand, François 89, 143, 153, 155–6 Moncloa Agreements 29 National Anti-subversive Organisation 53, 60 national consciousness 33 national unity 25, 27, 32, 46, 48–50 NATO see North Atlantic Treaty Organisation New Force 27, 59 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 28, 152, 154 OCN see National Anti-subversive Organisation Organización Contrasubversiva Nacional see National Anti-subversive Organisation Partido Comunista de España see Spanish Communist Party Partido Popular see Popular Party Partido Socialista Obrero Español see Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party Parti Socialiste see French Socialist Party plausible deniability 3, 10, 131 PNV see Basque Nationalist Party police 2–7, 9, 18, 22–6, 33, 52, 60–142 passim 153–9, 162 border 115 Francoist 21–2 French 73, 78, 109, 115–18, 120, 156 military 21–2, 24 secret 21 Spanish 61, 73, 90, 106, 110–17 passim, 123, 130, 132–6, 144, 171

political asylum 3, 76, 160, 162 see also extradition; refugee political offence exemption 75, 87–8 Popular Party 4–5, 47–8, 101, 134, 153, 159 PP see Popular Party prison 111–16 passim, 132, 135–6, 144 PS see French Socialist Party PSOE see Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party Pyrénées 94, 132 refugee 56, 75–99 passim, 156–7, 159–60 rendition 2, 158, 172 extraordinary 11n.7, 149n.52, 173n.6 Renseignements Généraux see French domestic intelligence agency repression 6, 20, 23–6, 30–47 passim, 50–5, 58, 64–6, 71, 84, 94, 170 see also Francoism; torture RG see French domestic intelligence agency SAC see Civil Action Service sanctuary 14n.21, 99n.81, 157 French 62, 73, 91 see also asylum Second World War 20, 50, 54, 78–9, 82, 84, 86 secret services 109, 143 separatism 22–3, 25–6, 50, 100 Service d’Action Civique see Civil Action Service Spanish Basque Battalion 29–30, 105–6, 121–2, 140 see also dirty war; terrorism, counterSpanish Civil War (1936–39) see Civil War Spanish Communist Party 21, 29, 83–4 Spanish intelligence service see Superior Centre of Defence Intelligence Spanish nationalism 20, 64n.21, 150 see also national consciousness; unity

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Index 201 Spanish security forces 19 see also Guardia Civil; police Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party 4–5, 61–121 passim, 124–5, 133–4, 136, 138–44, 148, 152–3 Spanish Transition 15n.41, 28–31, 45, 48 see also Francoism; Moncloa Agreements Special North Zone 101, 102, 177 state of emergency 24–5, 40n.45, 50–1, 100 subversion 10, 24–6, 53–6, 61, 81, 123 Superior Centre of Defence Intelligence 100, 103–4, 113–14, 133, 135, 137 symbolism 121 terrorism 1–16 passim, 25–6, 131, 145, 150, 161–2, 169, 172 anti- 29, 58–9, 62, 102–3, 111, 114–15, 133–46 passim, 171 counter- 4, 61, 140, 143–4, 155, 172 democracy and 31, 34, 51, 74, 100–3

diplomacy and 73, 81–2, 86, 90–2, 153–4 state 7, 10, 138, 169, 172 see also extradition; intelligence services TOP see Court of Public Order torture 3, 5, 22, 24, 103, 113, 120, 133, 138, 141, 169–70 Tribunal de Orden Público see Court of Public Order Triple A 29, 140 UN see United Nations United Nations 79–80, 82 unity 25–7, 31–2, 46, 48–51, 59 Vichy 78, 83 victims 3, 6, 33, 47, 73–4, 108, 120–1, 144, 155, 171 war on terror 1, 145 Zabala, José Ignacio 4–6, 103–5 passim, 171 ZEN see Special North Zone Zona Especial Norte see Special North Zone